Woodrow Wilson and world settlement

i

•^^M

m

f'/V

WOODROW WILSON

AND
WORLD SETTLEMENT

WOODROW WILSON

AND

WORLD SETTLEMENT

WRITTEN FROM HIS UNPUBLISHED
AND PERSONAL MATERIAL

BY
RAY STANNARD BAKER

IS. 3. a

ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

OF THE .

PEACE CONFERENCE

VOLUME
III

GARDEN CITY NEW YORK

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
1922

COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY

ALL EIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF TRANSLATION
INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES, INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES

AT
THK COUNTRY LIFE PBES8, GARDEN CITT, N. Y.

First Edition

PREFACE

THIS volume, it is hoped, will contribute vitally to the
documentary record of America at Paris, illuminating not
only the inside history of the Peace Conference, but ex-
hibiting in the form of original letters, memoranda, and
minutes, the underlying processes through which the
final decisions were reached. Nothing could more clearly
present the workings of the President's mind, or his in-
timate relationships with his advisers, than many of these
documents; here are exposed the veritable procedures
by which the Americans worked out their policies and
came to their decisions. Relatively few of the sixty-
nine documents here included have been published before ;
and all are referred to or quoted from in Volumes I and II
of this book. They are all from Woodrow Wilson's
private files, his own records preserved at Paris, except
the following:

From Norman H. Davis:

Documents 49, 54, 55.
From Bernard M. Baruch:

Documents 29, 47, 60.
From Professor Douglas Johnson:

Documents 31, 32, 40.
From Dr. Isaiah Bowman:

Document 36.
From Major General Mason M. Patrick:

Document 61.
From Ray Stannard Baker:

Documents 4, 5, 6, 16, 21, 35, 38, 39, 43, 68, 69.

It is a matter of great regret that the minutes of the
Councils of Four, Ten, and Five, upon which so much of
the narrative in Volumes I and II is based, have not yet
been published. Their great bulk makes it wholly im-

vi PREFACE

possible, of course, to include them here, except for a few
annexed reports and memoranda. The minutes of one
important meeting of the Heads of States, however, that
of March 20, before the Council of Four began functioning
formally, is here presented in full in Document I. It
will serve as an excellent specimen of the voluminous min-
utes of the Four as kept by the Secretary, Sir M. P. A.
Hankey.

Since the League of Nations was so peculiarly an enter-
prise of the Americans at Paris with President Wilson
as its chief sponsor the record of the origin and devel-
opment of the Covenant is of special interest. The
President methodically preserved every scrap of memo-
randa connected with the League, including not only his
his own original notes, made upon his typewriter or in
shorthand, but letters and memoranda from Colonel
House, General Bliss, and other American advisers; and
these are here presented as completely as possible.

A number of important unpublished documents of
foreign origin — British, French, and Italian — are here
included not only for the light they throw upon the
methods of the Peace Conference, but more especially
for the influence they had upon American policies at
Paris.

PAGE

PREFACE v

PART I. FOUNDATIONS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

DOCUMENT I. Minutes of the Secret Conference of the
Four Heads of States, on March 20, 1919, relative
to the partition of Turkey under the secret agree-
ments of 1916 and 1917 1

PART II. THE OLD AND THE NEW DIPLOMACY. ORGANIZA-
TION AND PROCEDURE.

DOCUMENT 2. Report made early in January, 1918, by
the American Inquiry to President Wilson regard-
ing "War Aims and Peace Terms." It was pre-
pared by Dr. S. E. Mezes, David Hunter Miller
and Walter Lippmann. The President used this
report in formulating six of his Fourteen Points.
Stenographic notes which he made on the margin
of this document (see facsimile, Volume I, p.
Ill) were translated by him for the author and ap-
pear in this volume in italic type in brackets at the
head of paragraphs that were annotated in the
text 23

. ^/DOCUMENT 3. The "Fourteen Points" and the Four
Points. President Wilson's Fourteen Points, from
his Address to the Joint Session of Congress, Jan-
uary 8, 1918. President Wilson's Four Points,
from his Address at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918. 42

DOCUMENT 4. Statement adopted by the Council of
Ten, January 17, for presentation to the Press rep-
resentatives at Paris, explaining policies of pub-
licity 47

vii

viii CONTENTS

PAGE

DOCUMENT 5. Text of Resolutions adopted by dele-
gates of the Allied and American Press, at the
Hotel Ritz, January 16, 1919 50

DOCUMENT 6. Record of protests and resolutions
adopted by American press correspondents, April
23, 1919, regarding admission to meeting of Allied
with German delegates at Versailles May 7, at
which the treaty was formally presented to the
Germans. 53

DOCUMENT 7. Preliminary French plan of procedure
for the Peace Conference with letters of trans-
mission from Ambassador Jusserand, November 29,
1918, to the State Department, and from Frank
L. Polk, Counsellor of the State Department, De-
cember 2, 1918, to President Wilson 55

PART III. THE LEAGUE AND THE PEACE.

tj DOCUMENT 8. The "Phillimore Report" of March
20, 1918, to the British Cabinet regarding the or-
ganization of a League of Nations. The basic
document used by President Wilson in the prepara-
tion of his Covenant 67

DOCUMENT 9. Colonel House's proposed draft of a
covenant for the League of Nations, July 16, 1918,
with his letter of transmittal and explanation to
President Wilson. The articles starred are those
checked by President Wilson 79

DOCUMENT 10. President Wilson's first draft of the

Covenant of the League of Nations 88

DOCUMENT 11. General J. C. Smuts's recommenda-
tions for a League of Nations, as copied from his
pamphlet for President Wilson's use 94

DOCUMENT 12. President Wilson's second draft (first
printed draft) of the Covenant, distributed Jan-
uary 10, 1919 100

DOCUMENT 13. Memorandum made by Major-General
Tasker H. Bliss for President Wilson, January
14, 1919, criticizing the draft of the Covenant . . Ill

CONTENTS ix

PAGE

DOCUMENT 14. President Wilson's third draft of the

Covenant. Printed but not distributed. . . . 117

^ DOCUMENT 15. British draft of the Covenant. . . 130

DOCUMENT 16. Hurst-Miller compromise draft of the
League of Nations Covenant used as the basis of
discussion in the League of Nations Commission.
Introduced at First Meeting, February 3, 1919. . 144

, DOCUMENT 17. Official French plan for a League of

Nations 152

DOCUMENT 18. Text of the Covenant as adopted at
the Plenary Session of February 14 and taken by
President Wilson to America 163

DOCUMENT 19. Letter of United States Senator Gil-
bert M. Hitchcock to President Wilson, March 4,
1919, containing suggestions for amendments in
Covenant to satisfy American criticism. . . . 174

' DOCUMENT 20. Final text of the Covenant of the
League of Nations as it appears in the Treaty of
Versailles 175

DOCUMENT 21. Text of the so-called "Loucheur Re-
port," from Appendix B to Secret Minutes, Coun-
cil of Ten, February 7 189

PAET IV. STRUGGLE FOR LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS.

DOCUMENT 22. Letter to President Wilson, March 14,
1919, from Rear-Admiral W. S. Benson, sub-
mitting memorandum dated March 13, of United
States Naval Advisory Staff on "Disposition of
German and Austrian Vessels of War." . . . 197

DOCUMENT 23. Letter to President Wilson, April 9,
1919, from Rear-Admiral W. S. Benson, submit-
ting memorandum dated April 7, of United States
Naval Advisory Staff on "United States Naval
Policy" 206

DOCUMENT 24. Confidential Report of Major General
F. J. Kernan, Chief American representative on
the Inter-Allied Commission to Poland, to Presi-
dent Wilson, April 11, giving his view of con-
ditions in Central Europe 218

x CONTENTS

PAGE

PART V. THE DARK PERIOD: THE FRENCH CRISIS.

DOCUMENT 25. Memorandum of Marshal Foch, dated
January 10, 1919, presenting the French demand
for the military frontier of the Rhine. Letter of
Marshal Foch, March 14, 1919, transmitting this
memorandum to President Wilson 227

DOCUMENT 26. Letter from Major General Tasker H.
Bliss, March 28, for President Wilson with two
memoranda on the military intrigues in Hungary . 238

DOCUMENT 27. Letter of King of Spain to President
Wilson, March 25th (written by hand in English
and autographed) with copy of letter of Ex-
Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary (written in
German and translated by Dr. J. V. Fuller.) . . 246

/ DOCUMENT 28. Letter of M. Clemenceau to Presi-
dent Wilson, March 31, together with his note of
reply to Lloyd George's memorandum of March
26 249

DOCUMENT 29. Bernard M. Baruch's letter to Presi-
dent Wilson of April 9 arguing against French
ownership of the coal mines of the Saar. . . . 253

DOCUMENT 30. Letter of P. B. Noyes, American
delegate, Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, to
President Wilson, May 27, sharply criticizing the
proposed arrangements for the "Left Bank." . . 255

PART VI. THE ITALIAN CRISIS.

DOCUMENT 31. Basic Recommendation of American
Experts, January 21, 1919, regarding Italian
boundary settlements 259

DOCUMENT 32. Memorandum, March 18, of four
American experts, reaffirming their recommenda-
tion that "Fiume and all Dalmatia shall go to the
Jugo-Slavs." 263

DOCUMENT 33. Memorandum, April 4, of five Ameri-
can experts to President Wilson, regarding dis-
position of Fiume, advising that "it is unwise to
make Fiume a free city," with memorandum on
the legal aspects of the situation by David Hunter
Miller. 266

CONTENTS xi

PAGE

DOCUMENT 34. Letter of Orlando to President Wilson,
April 3, 19 19, refusing to discuss boundary problems
while .representatives of the Croats and Slovenes
were present 272

DOCUMENT 35. Memorandum concerning the question
of the Italian claims on the Adriatic presented
by President Wilson to the Italian delegation
on April 14, with permission to make it public in
Italy. Rejected by Orlando 274

DOCUMENT 36. Letter of six American experts to Presi-
dent Wilson urging him not to yield on the Italian
claims 278

DOCUMENT 37. Memorandum of A. J. Balfour, April
24, explaining attitude of Great Britain and France
regarding the Italian settlement. A great con-
troversy raged over making this document public,
but it was finally kept secret and has never before
been published 281

DOCUMENT 38. Famous public statement of President
Wilson, April 23, on the Italian settlement, which
nearly disrupted the Peace Conference. . . . 287

DOCUMENT 39. Orlando's reply to President Wilson,

April 24 291

DOCUMENT 40. Memorandum of May 8 for Adriatic
settlement through plebiscites and the develop-
ment of a new port for the Jugo-Slavs (Buccari) to
take the place of Fiume. Presented by the Chief
of Boundary Geography, Douglas W. Johnson, to
President Wilson and by him laid before the
Council of Four 296

DOCUMENT 41. Balfour's memorandum of May 17, on

the "Problem of Italy and Turkey in Anatolia." . 303

PART VII. THE JAPANESE CRISIS.

DOCUMENT 42. Memorandum by A. J. Balfour of his
conversation with the Japanese Delegates, pre-
sented to the Council of Four, April 28, with im-
portant letter of Mr. Balfour to Baron Makino of
the same date in which the relationship of the

xii CONTENTS

PAGE

Shantung settlement to Japanese acceptance of

the League of Nations is set forth 311

DOCUMENT 43. Statement, April 30, of President
Wilson regarding the Shantung settlement, the
substance of which, but not the text, was given to
the press on the same day: also cabled to Mr.
Tumulty 315

PART VIII. THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENTS.

DOCUMENT 44. Cablegram, November 21, 1918,
William G. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury,
to Oscar T. Crosby, United States financial repre-
sentative in London, regarding policies of continued
financial and economic cooperation : with letter of
transmittal to President Wilson from Secretary
McAdoo, November 22, 1918 319

DOCUMENT 45. The Pork Crisis. Letter of Herbert
Hoover to President Wilson, January 8, 1919, re-
garding the refusal of Great Britain to continue
buying American food, especially pork, at war
prices: with his memorandum regarding plans for
meeting the situation 323

DOCUMENT 46. Letter of Herbert Hoover to Presi-
dent Wilson February 4, 1919, regarding French
obstruction to plans for feeding Germany, with
copy of proposed resolutions, to be presented to
the Council of Ten, providing for extending food
supply both to Germany and to neutral nations. 328

l/ DOCUMENT 47. Series of letters regarding economic
situation and plan of financial reconstruction of
Europe exchanged between Lord Robert Cecil for
Great Britain, and Edward M. House and Bernard
M. Baruch for America. These are: (1) Colonel
House to Lord Robert Cecil, April 10, 1919. . . 331

2. Response of Lord Robert Cecil to Colonel
House, April 11, 1919 332

3. Letter of Bernard M. Baruch to Lord
Robert Cecil, April 12, 1919 332

4. Response of Lord Robert Cecil to Bernard M.
Baruch, April 14, 1919 334

CONTENTS xiii

PAGE

DOCUMENT 48. The Keynes Financial Scheme, to-
gether with letter of explanation, dated April 23,
1919, from Mr. Lloyd George to President Wilson . 336

DOCUMENT 49. Letter of President Wilson to Mr.
Lloyd George, May 5, 1919, criticizing and oppos-
ing the Keynes financial scheme 344

DOCUMENT 50. Letter of Bernard M. Baruch to
President Wilson, May 7, suggesting American
ideas for the reconstruction of Europe. . . . 347 ^

DOCUMENT 51. Printed memorandum of Norman H.
Davis, and Thomas W. Lament, May 15, "Obser-
vations upon the European [Economic] Situation:
Possible Measures to Be Taken," with letter of
transmittal from Lament. The idea of the Ameri-
can economic advisors as to America's relation to
the European situation 352

DOCUMENT 52. Confidential report, June 4, 1919,
from a Committee of Economists appointed by the
Four Heads of States to report on Europe's re-
quirements of food and raw materials and the
means of financing such supplies. This important
and significant report was never seriously con-
sidered by The Four 363

DOCUMENT 53. Cablegram from R. C. LeflSngwell,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to Norman H.
Davis, May 7, 1919, giving views of Treasury re-
garding further financial assistance to Europe.
Transmitted to President Wilson May 9 ... 373

DOCUMENT 54. Report, March 20, 1919, made by
Norman H. Davis, Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu and
Louis Loucheur regarding the reparation settle-
ment, with special reference to Germany's capacity
to pay 376

DOCUMENT 55. Memorandum on reparations made

by Norman H. Davis for Mr. Lloyd George. . . 380

DOCUMENT 56. Letter of Norman H. Davis, March
25, 1919, to President Wilson, with memorandum
of American experts on the reparation settlement,
their estimates, and those of the French and
British. 383

riv CONTENTS

PAGE

DOCUMENT 57. Memorandum of progress with the
reparation settlement, April, with Anglo-American
draft of Reparations Clauses. ...... 397

DOCUMENT 58. Letter of Norman H. Davis and Vance
McCormick to President Wilson, April 4, with
draft clauses, comments, and reservations. . . 403

DOCUMENT 59. French memorandum, April 5, criti-
cizing the 'Anglo-American draft of reparations
clauses ... 409

DOCUMENT 60. French memorandum (printed; no
date) submitted to the Economic Commission,
on permanent economic relations, together with
draft clauses for the treaty of peace. In French:
translated by Dr. J. V. Fuller 413

DOCUMENT 61. Draft convention submitted to the
Aeronautical Commission by the American mem-
bers, Rear-Admiral H. S. Knapp and Major
General Mason M. Patrick 419

DOCUMENT 62. Cablegram of Postmaster General
A. S. Burleson to President Wilson (forwarded
through Secretary Tumulty, March 14) regarding
American policy and control of international
cable lines 425

DOCUMENT 63. Memorandum on cables and radio,
submitted to President Wilson by Walter S.
Rogers, communications expert of the American
Commission to Negotiate Peace on February 12,
1918 427

DOCUMENT 64. Letter of Walter S. Rogers, communi-
cations expert of the American Commission to
Negotiate Peace, to President Wilson, dated May
2, 1919, discussing the problem of the disposition
of the captured German oceanic cables. . . .443

PART IX. GERMANY AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

/ DOCUMENT 65. Memorandum of Major-General
Tasker H. Bliss for President Wilson, "Some con-
siderations for the Peace Conference before they
finally draft their terms," dated March 25, 1919 . 449

CONTENTS xv

PAGE

DOCUMENT 66. Letter of General J. C. Smuts to the
Prime Minister, Lloyd George, May 22, criticizing
the terms of the Treaty as drawn and suggesting
changes 458

DOCUMENT 67. Letter of General J. C. Smuts to Presi-
dent Wilson, dated May 30, 1919, criticizing the
Treaty and asserting that it "is against the letter
and spirit of your points." 466

DOCUMENT 68. Stenographic Report of meeting be-
tween President Wilson, the Peace Commissioners,
and technical advisers of the American Com-
mission to Negotiate Peace, Hotel Crillon, June 3,
1919, at 11 o'clock A. M. This was the meeting
in which President Wilson sought advice upon sug-
gested changes in the Treaty 469

DOCUMENT 69. Letter of Major-General Tasker H.
Bliss to President Wilson, June 6, 1919, making
"A Brief Analysis of the German Proposals on the
Military Terms of the Draft Treaty." .... 505

PART I
FOUNDATIONS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

WOODROW WILSON AND
WORLD SETTLEMENT

DOCUMENT 1.

Minutes of the Secret Conference of the Four
Heads of States on March 20, 1919, relative to
the partition of Turkey under the secret agree-
ments of 1916 and 1917.

Secret,

I. C — 163— A.

NOTES OF A CONFERENCE held in the Prime Min-
ister's Flat at 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on THURS-
DAY, MARCH 20, 1919, at 3 p. M.

Present:

United States of America British Empire

President Wilson The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd

George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour,

O. M., M. P.
General Allenby.
General Bols [Botha?]
Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Han-
key, K. C. B.

France Italy

M. Clemenceau M. Orlando

M. Pichon Baron Sonnino
M. Berthelot

Interpreter Prof. P. J. Mantoux
i

2 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

SYRIA AND TURKEY.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Pichon should
open the discussion.

M. PICHON began by explaining that the origin of this
question was the agreement of May 1916 (Sykes-Picot)
concluded between Great Britain and France in regard
to Mesopotamia, Syria, and the adjoining regions. This
agreement had two objects. First, to detach the Arabs
from the Turks; second, to decide the claims of Great
Britain and France. He then proceeded to explain the
principles of the dispositions made on a map. The agree-
ment fixed a zone colored blue within which France
would exercise direct administration, and a zone colored
red in which England would exercise direct administration.
In addition, there was a zone colored white enclosed by
a blue line within which France should exercise indirect
administration, known as zone A, and a corresponding zone
enclosed in a red line within which Great Britain would
exercise indirect administration (zone B). At this stage
it was unnecessary to say anything of the subsequent
agreement with Italy. Within the A and B zones it
was intended to favor the creation of an independent
Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. In area A
France, and area B Great Britain, should alone supply
advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the
Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. In addition
Great Britain was to be accorded the ports of Haifa and
Acre. Haifa was to be a free port as regards the trade of
France, and there was to be freedom of transit for French
goods through Haifa by the British railway, for which fa-
cilities were to be given. Alexandretta, which fell in the
blue area, was to be a free port as regards the trade of the
British Empire, and there was to be freedom of traffic for
British goods through Alexandretta by railway through
the blue area. In addition, there were certain customs
and political stipulations. Such were the general disposi-
tions of 1916 which, he emphasized, were designated:

(1) to favor the establishment of an Arab State or

SECRET CONFERENCE OF MARCH 20, 1919 3

Confederation of States and to detach the Arabs

from Turkey;

and
(2) To decide between the claims of Great Britain

and France.

The above agreement, confirmed by an exchange of Notes
between M. Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey (Lord
Grey), declarations which had been made by Great
Britain as early as 1912, in which Great Britain had dis-
interested herself and recognized the rights of France in
Syria, subject only to Great Britain's insistence on keep-
ing untouched her economic rights. In short, Grea,t
Britain had declared she had no politicarclaims, but that
her economic rights must remain intact in Syria.

^Sfnce the conclusion of the Agreement of 1916 there
had been a long further correspondence and an exchange
of many Notes between France and Great Britain con-
cerning particularly various local interests. This brought
us to the most recent period in which the French made,
he would not say a protest against, but a series of observa-
tions in regard to, the British attitude in Syria. The
whole series of these had recently been handed by the
President of the Council to Lord Milner.

The incidents referred to in this correspondence were
chiefly due to the disproportion in the relative contingents
furnished by Great Britain and France to the campaign
in Syria. It had only been possible for France to send
a very small number of troops to Syria in consequence
of the large demands made on her for the protection of
French soil and to the prominent part played by her
armies in Salonica. Great Britain, however, had inter-
ested herself far more in the Turkish campaigns, and
had sent many troops which had been led by General
Allenby. From that disproportion there resulted a great
many incidents. Eventually, the President of the Council
had thought it right to bring them before the British
Government with a view to putting an end to the faction
and the friction which now existed.

From all the declarations made by the British and French
governments he only wanted to quote one, namely, that

4 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

of November 9, 1918. This was particularly important
as showing the disinterested attitude of both governments
towards the Arabs. This declaration had been communi-
cated shortly after its issue by the French Ambassador in
Washington to President Wilson.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE interpolated at this point that
this announcement, which was the latest expression of
policy by the two governments, was more important
than all the old agreements.

M. PICHON then read the declaration of November 9,
1918, as follows:—

The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in
prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the
complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the
Turks, and the establishment of national governments and adminis-
trations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of
the native populations.

In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great
Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of
native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia
already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are
proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognize such gov-

rernments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from de-
siring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these
regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective
assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by
these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal
way. The function which the two allied governments claim for them-
selves hi the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal jus-
tice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by
encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and
to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy.

As the difficulties between the two governments con-
tinued, and as the French Government particularly did
not wish them to reach a point where ultimate agreement
would be compromised, the President of the Council, on
his visit to London in December, 1918, had asked Mr.
Lloyd George to confirm the agreement between the two
countries. Mr. Lloyd George had replied that he saw
no difficulty about the rights of France in Syria and
Cilicia, but he made demands for certain places which
he thought should be included in the British zone, and

SECRET CONFERENCE OF MARCH 20, 1919 5

which, under the 1916 agreement, were in the French
zone of influence, namely, Mosul. He also asked for
Palestine. M. Clemenceau had, on his return to Paris,
been desirous that this suggestion should be examined
in the most favorable spirit. In consequence, he had
ordered a scheme of agreement to be prepared, with the
inclusion of Mosul in the British zone of influence, and
this had been handed to the British Government on the
15th of February, 1919. The letter which accompanied
this proposal had asked for a recognition of the historic
and traditional case for including the regions claimed
in the French zone. It had pointed out that there
was no government in the world which had such a posi-
tion as France in the regions claimed. It had given an
exposition of the historic rights of France dating from
the time of Louis XIV. M. PICHON continued by point-
ing out that French intervention in Syria had been fre-
quent, the last instance being the case of the expedition
organized in Syria and Lebanon in 1860, which had
resulted in the establishment of the status of the Lebanon.
France, he pointed out, had a great number of hospitals
in Syria. There were a great number of schools in many
villages, and some 50,000 children were educated in
French primary schools. There were also a number of
secondary schools and one great university in Bey rout.
Moreover, the railway system of Syria was French, and
included the Beyrout to Damascus line and the Tripoli-
Horns line, which later it was proposed to prolong to the
Euphrates and to unite with the Bagdad system. Alto-
gether it was contemplated to have a system of 1,233
kilometers, of which 683 kilometers had already been
constructed. Beyrout was entirely a French port. The
gas and electricity works were French, and the same
applied to the lighting along the coast. This was not
the limit of French enterprise, for France had perfected
the agriculture and the viticulture of Syria and had
established many factories. No other country had any-
thing like so complete a development in these regions.
Hence, France could not abandon her rights. More-
over, France strongly protested against any idea of divid-

6 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ing Syria. Syria had geographical and historic unity.
The French Government frankly avowed that they did
not want the responsibility of administering Palestine,
though they would prefer to see it under an international
administration. What they asked was:

(1) That the whole Syrian regions should be treated
as a unit;

and

(2) That France should become the mandatory of the
League of Nations of this region.

On January 30 of this year Mr. Lloyd George had
urged the Conference to reconsider the distribution of
troops in Turkey and the Caucasus with the object of
lightening the heavy burden which fell on Great Britain.
As a result, the Military Representatives had been asked
to prepare a plan. The scheme of the Military Repre-
sentatives provided for:

The occupation by France of Syria and Cilicia, with
2 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade;

The occupation by Great Britain of Mesopotamia, in-
cluding Mosul, by 2 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade;

The occupation by Italy of the Caucasus and Konia.

The economy which Great Britain would achieve by this
plan would have amounted to 10 divisions of infantry and
4 divisions of cavalry. The plan of the Military Rep-
resentatives had been placed on the Agenda Paper of the
Conference, but at Lord Milner's request the subject had
been adjourned and had never been discussed.

About this time a conversation had taken place between
M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon and Mr. Lloyd George and
Mr. Balfour, as a result of which Sir Maurice Hankey had
handed M. Pichon a map containing a British counter
proposal to the French proposal of February 15. This
scheme provided for a great limitation of the territory to
come under French influence, both on the east and on the
south as regards the Jebel Druse. The French Govern-
ment was quite unable to take this project into consid-
eration. Recently Lord Milner had left a map with.

SECRET CONFERENCE OF MARCH 20, 1919 7

M. Clemenceau containing yet another project, which M.
PICHON proceeded to explain, and which, he added,
greatly circumscribed the French area. It was evident
that the French Government could not look at this scheme
either, even though they had the greatest desire to reach
an agreement. No one felt more deeply than he what
Great Britain and France owed to each other, and no
one had a greater desire to reach an agreement. It was,
however, quite impossible to accept a proposal such as that
put forward by Lord Milner. It would be absolutely
indefensible in the Chamber. It was enough for the
Chamber to know that the Government were in negotia-
tion with Great Britain for the handing over of Mosul to
create a movement that had resulted in a proposal in the
Budget Committee for a diminution of credits for Syria.
This had not been a mere budget trick, but represented a
real movement of public opinion. French opinion would
not admit that France could be even partly excluded
after the sacrifices she had made in the war, even if she
had not been able to play a great part in the Syrian cam-
paign. In consequence, the minimum that France could
accept was what had been put forward in the French
Government's note to Mr. Lloyd George, the object of
which had been to give satisfaction to his desire for the
inclusion of Mosul in the British zone.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Pichon had opened as
though the question of the mandate for Syria was one
between Great Britain and France. There was, in fact,
no such question as far as Great Britain was concerned.
He wished to say at once that just as we had disinter-
ested ourselves in 1912, so we now disinterested ourselves
in 1919. If the Conference asked us to take Syria, we
should reply in the negative. The British Government
had definitely decided this because otherwise it would be
said afterward in France that they had created dis-
turbances in order to keep the French out. Hence, the
British Government definitely intended to have nothing
to do with Syria. The question of the extent to which
Great Britain and France were concerned was cleared up
in the interview he had had with M. Clemenceau in

8 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

London, and at which he had said that he wanted Mosul
with the adjacent regions and Palestine.

As there was no question between France and Great
Britain in regard to Syria, we could examine the question
in as disinterested a spirit as we could a Carpathian
boundary to be decided in accordance with the general
principles accepted by the Conference. He wished to
make this clear before General Allenby said what he had
to say. In regard to Mosul, he wished to acknowledge
the cordial spirit in which M. Pichon had met our desires.

But if there was a French public opinion there was also
a British public opinion, and it must be remembered that
the whole burden of the Syrian campaign had fallen upon
Great Britain. The number of French troops taking
part in the campaign had been so small as to make no
difference. Sometimes they had been helpful, but not on
all occasions. The British Empire and India had main-
tained from 900,000 to 1,000,000 troops in Turkey and
the Caucasus. Their casualties had amounted to 125,000,
the campaign had cost hundreds of millions of pounds.
He himself had done his best to induce M. Clemenceau's
predecessors to take part in the campaign. He had also
pressed Marshal Foch on the subject, and to this day he
had in his possession a rough plan drawn up by Marshal
Foch during an air raid at Boulogne. He had begged the
French Government to cooperate, and had pointed out to
them that it would enable them to occupy Syria, although,
at the time, the British troops had not yet occupied Gaza.
This had occurred in 1917 and 1918, at a time when the
heaviest casualties in France also were being incurred by
British troops. From that time onward most of the
heavy and continuous fighting in France had been done by
British troops, although Marshal Petain had made a
number of valuable smaller attacks. This was one of the
reasons why he had felt justified in asking Marshal Foch
for troops. He had referred to this in order to show that
the reason we had fought so hard in Palestine was not
because we had not been fighting in France. M. Pichon
seemed to think that we were departing from the 1916
agreement in other respects, as well as in respect to Mosul

SECRET CONFERENCE OF MARCH 20, 1919 9

and Palestine. In fact, we were not. M. Pichon had
omitted in his lucid statement to explain that the blue
area in which France was "allowed to establish such direct
or indirect administration or control as they may desire
and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State
or Confederation of Arab States" did not include Damas-
cus, Horns, Hama, or Aleppo. In area A France was
"prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab
State or Confederation of Arab States . . . under the
suzerainty of an Arab Chief." Also in area A France
would "have priority of right of enterprise and local loans
. . . and . . . shall alone supply advisers or
foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or
Confederation of Arab States." Was France prepared
to accept that? This, however, was not a question be-
tween Great Britain and France; it was a question between
France and an agreement which we had signed with
King Hussein.

(At this point M. ORLANDO and GENERAL DIAZ entered.)

M. PICHON said he wished to say one word. In the
new arrangements which were contemplated no direct
administration whatsoever was claimed by France. Since
the Agreement of 1916, the whole mandatory system had
been adopted. If a mandate were granted by the League
of Nations over these territories, all that he asked was
that France should have that part put aside for her.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that we could not do that.
The League of Nations could not be used for putting aside
our bargain with King Hussein. He asked if M. Pichon
intended to occupy Damascus with French troops. If
he did, it would clearly be a violation of the Treaty with
the Arabs.

M. PICHON said that France had no convention with
King Hussein.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that the whole of the agree-
ment of 1916 (Sykes-Picot) was based on a letter from
Sir Henry McMahon to King Hussein from which he
quoted the following extracts :—

10 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of
Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Kama, and
Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded
from the proposed limits of boundaries. With the above modi-
fications, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab
chiefs, we accept these limits of boundaries; and in regard to those
portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to
act without detriment to the interests of her ally France, I am em-
powered, in the name of the Government of Great Britain, to give
the following assurances and make the following reply to your
letter:

"Subject to the above modifications Great Britain is prepared to
recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within terri-
tories included in the limits of boundaries proposed by the Sherif
of Mecca." — (Extract from a letter from SIR H. McMAHON to
KING HUSSEIN, Oct. 24, '14.)

M. PICHON said that this undertaking had been made by
Great Britain (Angleterre) alone. France had never
seen it until a few weeks before, when Sir Maurice Hankey
had handed him a copy.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said the agreement might have
been made by England (Angleterre) alone, but it was
England (Angleterre) who had organized the whole of the
Syrian campaign. There would have been no question
of Syria but for England (Angleterre). Great Britain
had put from 900,000 to 1,000,000 men in the field against
Turkey, but Arab help had been essential; that was a
point on which General Allenby could speak.

General ALLENBY said it had been invaluable.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that it was on
the basis of the above quoted letter that King Hussein had
put all his resources into the field which had helped us
most materially to win the victory. France had for
practical purposes accepted our undertaking to King
Hussein in signing the 1916 agreement. This had not
been M. Pichon, but his predecessors. He was bound to
say that if the British Government now agreed that
Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo should be included
in the sphere of direct French influence, they would be
breaking faith with the Arabs, and they could not face
this. He was particularly anxious for M. Clemenceau to
follow this. The agreement of 1916 had been signed sub-

SECRET CONFERENCE OF MARCH 20, 1919 11

sequent to the letter to King Hussein. In the following
extract from the agreement of 1916 France recognized
Arab independence:

It is accordingly understood between the French and British Gov-
ernments :

(1) That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and
uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States
in the areas A and B marked on the annexed map under the su-
zerainty of an Arab Chief.

Hence, France, by this act, practically recognized our
agreement with King Hussein by excluding Damascus,
Horns, Hama, and Aleppo from the blue zone of direct
administration, for the map attached to the agreement
showed that Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo were
included, not in the zone of direct administration, but in
the independent Arab State.

M. PICHON said that this had never been contested,
but how could France be bound by an agreement the
very existence of which was unknown to her at the time
when the 1916 agreement was signed? In the 1916 agree-
ment France had not in any way recognized the Hedjaz.
She had undertaken to uphold "an independent Arab
State or Confederation of Arab States," but not the
King of the Hedjaz. If France was promised a man-
date for Syria, she would undertake to do nothing except
in agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of
States. This is the role which France demanded in Syria.
If Great Britain would only promise her good offices, he
believed that France could reach an understanding with
Feisal.

President WILSON said that he would now seek to
establish his place in the Conference. Up to the present
he had had none. He could only be here, like his colleague
M. Orlando, as one of the representatives assembled to
establish the peace of the world. This was his only
interest, although, of course, he was a friend of both
parties to the controversy. He was not indifferent to the
understanding which had been reached between the
British and French Governments, and was interested to

12 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

know about the undertakings to King Hussein and the
1916 agreement, but it was not permissible for him to
express an opinion thereon. He would, however, like to
point out that one of the parties to the 1916 agreement had
been Russia, and Russia had now disappeared. Hence,
the partnership of interest had been dissolved, since one
of the parties had gone out. This seemed to him to alter
^the basis of the agreement. The point of view of the
; United States of America was, however, indifferent to the
claims both of Great Britain and France over peoples un-
less those peoples wanted them. One of the fundamental
. principles to which the United States of America adhered
f was the consent of the governed. This was ingrained in
I the United States of America thought. Hence, the only
' idea from the United States of America point of view was
; .as to whether France would be agreeable to the Syrians.
The same applied as to whether Great Britain would be
agreeable to the inhabitants of Mesopotamia. It might
not be his business, but if the question was made his
business, owing to the fact that it was brought before the
Conference, the only way to deal with it was to discover
the desires of the population of these regions.

He recalled that, in the Council of Ten, resolutions
had been adopted in regard to mandatories, and they
contained a very carefully thought out graduation of
different stages of mandate according to the civilization of
the peoples concerned. One of the elements in those
mandates was the desire of the people over whom the
mandate was to be exercised. The present controversy
broadened out into very important questions. Cilicia,
for example, from its geographical position, cut Armenia
off from the Mediterranean. If there was one mandatory
in the south, and another in the north of Armenia, there
would be a great danger of friction, since the troublesome
population lived in the south. Hence, the controversy
broadened into a case affecting the peace of the whole
world in this region. He hoped, therefore, that the
question would be discussed from this point of view. If
this were agreed to, he hoped that he might ask General
Allenby certain questions. If the participation of M.

SECRET CONFERENCE OF MARCH 20, 1919 13

Orlando and himself were recognized as a matter of right
and not of courtesy, the question he wanted to know was
whether the undertaking to King Hussein, and the 1916
agreement, provided an agreement which would work.
If not, and you asked his opinion, he would reply that we
ought to ask what is the opinion of the people in the part of
the world concerned. He was told that, if France insisted
on occupying Damascus and Aleppo, there would be
instant war. Feisal had said that he could not say how
many men he had had in the field at one time, as it had
been a fluctuating figure, but from the first to last he had
probably had 100,000 men.

General ALLENBY said that he had never had so many
at one time.

President WILSON said that, nevertheless, from first
to last, France would have to count on having 100,000
troops against her. This would mean that France must
send a large number of troops. He was greatly concerned
in a fight between friends, since he was a friend of France
and the friend of Feisal. He was very concerned to know
if a "scrap" was developing. Hence, he asked that it
might be taken for granted that this question was on the
Council table, since it was one of interest to the peace of
the world, and that it was not merely a question of agree-
ment between France and Great Britain. The Turkish
Empire at the present time was as much in solution as
though it were made of quicksilver. Austria, at any rate,
had been broken into pieces, and the pieces remained, but
the Turkish Empire was in complete solution. The
Councils of the world would have to take care of it. For ,
his part he was quite disinterested, since the United States
of America did not want anything in Turkey. They would '
be only too delighted if France and Great Britain would
undertake the responsibility. Lately, however, it had been
put to him that he must approach his own people on this
matter, and he intended to try, although it would mean
some very good talking on his part. He admitted that the
United States of America must take the responsibilities as
well as the benefits, of the League of Nations. Neverthe-
less, there was great antipathy in the United States of

14 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

America to the assumption of these responsibilities. Even
tEe Philippines were regarded as something hot in the hand
that they would like to drop. If we said to the French
Government "Occupy this region," what would happen?
He had a method to propose of finding out, which he would
develop later.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that General Allenby
should be questioned at this point.

President WILSON asked the following question: "If
before we arrive at a permanent settlement under the
League of Nations we invite France to occupy the region
of Syria, even as narrowly defined, what would the re-

• suit be?"

General ALLENBY said there would be the strongest
possible opposition by the whole of the Moslems, and

• especially by the Arabs. Shortly after the capture of
Damascus, Feisal had been allowed to occupy and ad-
minister the city. He had said that he would like to be
helped in the administration. A little later, after the
setting up of the military administration in these regions,
General Allenby had put French administrators in the
blue area. When they arrived Emir Feisal had said that
he could not retain the command of the Arab Army if
France occupied the ports. He had said that it meant
that he was occupying a house without a door, and it
would be said that he had broken faith with the Arab
nation. Feisal had originally asked if he could occupy
Beyrout and the ports. General ALLENBY had replied
in the affirmative, but had told him that he must with-
draw when the allied armies came along, and he had
done so. To Feisal's protests against the occupation by
the French of places in the blue zone, General ALLENBY
had replied that he himself was in charge of the ad-
ministration, as Commander-in-Chief; and that the
French officers, appointed as administrators must be
regarded, not as French officers, but as allied military
officers. Feisal had then said that he would admit it
for the present, but would it last for ever? General
ALLENBY had replied that the League of Nations intended
to give the small nations the right of self-determination.

SECRET CONFERENCE OF MARCH 20, 1919 15

Feisal had insisted that "if put under French control"
he would oppose to the uttermost. General ALLENBY
had replied that at present there was no French control,
but only the control of the Allies, and that eventually
Feisal's rights would be considered. Soon afterwards he
had visited Beyrout, and there and in other places depu-
tations had come to protest against the French Adminis-
tration. These had included various Christians, Orthodox
and Protestants, as well as Mussulmans. General
ALLENBY had again replied that it was not a French admin-
istration, but merely officers put in by himself as Allied
Commander-in-Chief. Every time he had been in that i
country he had found the greatest opposition to French
administration. He had done his utmost to make a
rapprochement among the Arabs and the French, but
without success. The French liaison officers did not get
on well with the Arabs. M. Picot had been with him to
Damascus and Aleppo and was perfectly conversant with
the situation. M. Picot would say that General Allenby
had done his best to create good feeling. Lately, Sir
Mark Sykes had been to Beyrout, Aleppo, and Damascus
with M. Picot, and had done his best. Nevertheless, the
misunderstanding continued. If the French were given
a mandate in Syria, there would be serious trouble and
probably war. If Feisal undertook the direction of
operations there might be a huge war covering the whole
area, and the Arabs of the Hedjaz would join. This would
necessitate the employment of a very large force. This
would probably involve Great Britain also if they were in
Palestine. It might even involve them in Egypt, and
the consequences would be incalculable.

He had gone with M. Picot to Damascus and had seen
there Ali Riza el Rikaby Pasha, the Governor of the
territory to the east of Damascus. The administration
had not been doing well. There was practically no
Budget, and it had been necessary to give him advisers.
General ALLENBY had given him two British advisers,
Majors Cornwallis and Stirling. M. Picot had subse-
quently sent a very good man named Captain Cousse, to
replace a liaison officer (Captain Mercier) who had been

16 WOQDROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

there before [but] who had not got on with the Arabs be-
cause he had stood too much on his dignity. Even Captain
Cousse, however, had not been able to get on well. After-
ward, General Allenby had sent a British Financial
Expert, and had invited M. Picot to send a French Finan-
cial expert. The British adviser, Colonel Graves, had
cooperated with M. Moulin, the French adviser. They
reported very badly on finance. There had practically
been no budget. Then General ALLENBY had with-
drawn Colonel Graves. M. Moulin was still there, but
was meeting great difficulties owing to Ali Riza el Rikaby's
dislike of the French administration. General ALLENBY
had visited Damascus with M. Picot and had there inter-
viewed Riza el Rikaby Pasha. General ALLENBY pro-
duced at the Conference a document containing the gist
of the communication made by him to Riza el Rikaby
Pasha. A copy of this document in Arabic and English
had been left with Riza el Rikaby Pasha.

In reply to Mr. Lloyd George he said that at Damascus
there was a brigade of infantry and two regiments of
cavalry. The Sherifian troops were only used for police
purposes, since the Sherifian army was still in process of
formation.

(At this point there was an adjournment.)

President WILSON suggested that the fittest men that
could be obtained should be selected to form an Inter-
Allied Commission to go to Syria, extending their in-
quiries, if they led them beyond the confines of Syria.
Their object should be to elucidate the state of opinion
and the soil to be worked on by any mandatory. They
should be asked to come back and tell the Conference
what they found with regard to these matters. He made
this suggestion, not because he lacked confidence in the
experts whose views he had heard, such as Dr. Howard
Bliss and General Allenby. These, however, had been
involved in some way with the population, with special
objects, either educational or military. If we were to
send a commission of men with no previous contact with

SECRET CONFERENCE OF MARCH 20, 1919 17

Syria, it would, at any rate, convince the world that the
Conference had tried to do all it could to find the most
scientific basis possible for a settlement. The Commission
should be composed of an equal number of French, British,
Italian, and American representatives. He would send
it with carte blanche to tell facts as they found them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he adhered in principle to an
inquiry, but it was necessary to have certain guarantees.
The inquiry must not confine itself to Syria. Mandates
were required for Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia,
and other parts of the Turkish Empire, as well as Syria.
The peoples of these districts were not isolated. They
were all connected by historical and religious and other
links, including mutual feuds, and old quarrels existed
between all of them. Without contesting what General
Allenby had said, he wished it to be recorded, if there were
a proces-verbal, that many Syrians were not Arab, and
that if the Syrians were put under the Arabs they would
revolt. He knew quite well the great share taken by
Feisal in the Syrian campaign, and he thought that
the British were also a little afraid of it. The whole
inquiry would be an extremely delicate one. Orientals
were very timid and afraid to say what was at the back
of their minds. It was very difficult to get the real feelings
of the people. It was very important, therefore, that the
inquiry should not be merely superficial. Hence, he
would ask for twenty-four hours of reflection before setting
up the Commission. He might like to send some French
Arabs there, as Feisal only represented one side of the
Arab race. Moreover, Feisal was practically a soldier
of England. That was a fact that all the world knew.
He said he would revolt if the French were at Damascus,
but, as a matter of fact, French artillery had recently
been sent there and had been received quite well. He had
made every effort to bring himself to agree with the prin-
ciples propounded by President Wilson, but something
must be said for the historical claims and for the efforts
that nations had made in different regions. For example,
insistence on an Arab outlet to the sea would destroy
the claim of one nation in that part of the world. The

18 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

members of the Commission must be very carefully
selected, and they must inquire into every Turkish man-
date. Subject to these provisions he was prepared to
accept President Wilson's proposal in principle.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said he had no objection to an
inquiry into Palestine and Mesopotamia, which were the
regions in which the British Empire were principally
concerned. Neither would he object to an inquiry into
Armenia, in which they were not so closely concerned.

President WILSON said he saw advantages in an unified
inquiry into Turkish mandates.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said if this extension was to be
given to the Commission it was essential it should get to
work at once, as the burden of military forces in Turkey
fell mainly on the British.

Mr. BALFOUR said that he felt these proposals might
postpone the making of peace.

President WILSON said this was not so. For the pur-
poses of peace all that was necessary to tell Turkey was
that she would have nothing.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that Turkey was entitled to
know who would be the mandatory for Turkish territory.

President WILSON said it was rather that they ought to
know how much was to remain Turkish.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of who was
to be mandatory of Anatolia would make all the difference
for the arrangements for Turkey.

President WILSON said that Turkey was entitled to
know if she was to have territory of her own, and that
other parts of Turkey were to be placed under the League
of Nations. Subsequently she would be informed who
would be her next-door neighbor.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said that he supposed that if the
evidence were so overwhelming that, for example, the
British Empire was ruled out of Mesopotamia, they would
be free to consider whether they could take a mandate
elsewhere in Turkey?

President WILSON said this was an administrative
matter and not one of sovereignty. Turkey was entitled
to knowledge on all questions affecting the sovereignty.

SECRET CONFERENCE OF MARCH 20, 1919 19

M. PICHON suggested that, in order to avoid delay, the
Commission might divide into sub-commissions working
in different sections.

Mr. BALFOUR asked whether it would be wise to in-
clude Western Anatolia in the purview of the Commission.
Constantinople was mainly a military question (Presi-
dent Wilson said a strategic question), but south of the
region which went with Constantinople came regions to
which the Greeks laid claim.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE said there was no suggestion that
the Commission was to travel beyond Armenia.

At Mr. Lloyd George's request, President Wilson under-
took to draft a Terms of Reference to the Commission.

PART II

THE OLD AND THE NEW DIPLOMACY: ORGAN-
IZATION AND PROCEDURE

DOCUMENT 2.

Report made early in January, 1918, by the
American Inquiry to President Wilson regarding
' ' War Aims and Peace Terms. ' ' It was prepared
by Dr. S. E. Mezes, David Hunter Miller, and
Walter Lippmann. The President used this
report in formulating six of his Fourteen Points.
Stenographic notes which he made on the margin
of this document (see facsimile, Volume I, p. Ill)
were translated by him for the author and appear
in this volume in italic type in brackets at the
head of paragraphs that were annotated in the
text. (Typewritten original.)

THE PRESENT SITUATION

THE WAR AIMS AND PEACE TERMS IT SUGGESTS
OUR OBJECTIVES

The allied military situation and Berlin-Bagdad.

The Allies have had various opportunities to destroy
Middle Europe by arms, to wit: the Russian invasion of
Galicia, the protection of Serbia, the intervention of
Rumania, the offensive of Italy, the expedition of Galli-
poli, the expedition to Saloniki, the Mesopotamian cam-
paign, and the Palestinian campaign. The use made of
these opportunities has produced roughly the following
results : The Russian Army has ceased to be an offensive
force, and Germany occupies a large part of that territory
of the Russian Empire which is inhabited by more or
less non-Russian peoples; Rumania is occupied to the
mouth of the Danube; Serbia and Montenegro are occu-
pied; the Austrian and German are deep into Italian
territory. As the Russian, Rumanian, Serbian, and

23

24 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Italian armies cannot be expected to resume a dangerous
offensive, the invasion of Austria-Hungary has ceased
to be a possibility. The Allies hold Saloniki, which they
are unable to use as a base for offensive operations. There
is a danger that they may be driven from it. If they are
able to hold it, and to keep it from Austrian hands, they
have made a blind alley of one subordinate part of the
Berlin-Bagdad project, which has always included a
branch line to Saloniki, and then to the sea. By the cap-
ture of Bagdad they cannot only control the rich resources
of Mesopotamia, but have made a blind alley of the main
Berlin-Bagdad line, so far as that line was aimed to be a
line of communication to the Persian Gulf as a threat
against India. By the capture of Palestine the British
have nullified a subordinate part of the Berlin-Bagdad
scheme, that is, the threat to the Suez Canal. By the
almost complete separation of Arabia from Turkey, the
Turks have not only lost the Holy Cities, but another
threat to the Red Sea has been removed. Germany has
therefore lost the terminals of her project, and if Saloniki,
Jerusalem, Bagdad, and Arabia remain in non-German
hands the possibilities of defense against the politico-
military portions of the Bagdad scheme exist.

The problem of Berlin-Bagdad.

The problem is therefore reduced to this : how effectively
is it possible for Germany to organize the territory now
under her political and military influence so as to be in
a position at a later date to complete the scheme and to
use the resources and the man-power of Middle Europe
in the interests of her own foreign policy? She faces here
four critical political problems: (1) The Poles; (2) the
Czechs; (3) the South Slavs; and (4) Bulgaria. The
problem may be stated as follows : if these peoples become
either the willing accomplices or the helpless servants
of Germany and her political purposes, Berlin will have
established a power in Central Europe which will be the
master of the continent. The interest of the United
States in preventing this must be carefully distinguished
before our objectives can become clear. It can be no

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN INQUIRY 25

part of our policy to prevent a free interplay of economic
and cultural forces in Central Europe. We should have
no interest in thwarting a tendency towards unification.
Our interest is in the disestablishment of a system by
which adventurous and imperialistic groups in Berlin
and Vienna and Budapest could use the resources of this
area in the interest of a fiercely selfish foreign policy
directed against their neighbours and the rest of the world.
In our opposition to Middle Europe, therefore, we should
distinguish between the drawing together of an area
which has a certain economic unity, and the uses of that
unity and the methods by which it is controlled. We are
interested primarily in the nature of the control.

The chief binding interests in Middle Europe.

The present control rests upon an alliance of interest
between the ruling powers at Vienna, Budapest, Sofia,
Constantinople and Berlin. There are certain common
interests which bind these ruling groups together. The
chief ones are: (1) the common interests of Berlin,
Vienna, and Budapest in the subjection of the Poles, the
Czechs, and the Croats; (2) from the point of view of
Berlin the present arrangement assures a control of the
external affairs and of the military and economic resources
of Austria-Hungary; (3) from the point of view of Vienna
and Budapest it assures the German-Magyar ascendancy;
(4) the interest that binds Sofia to the alliance lay chiefly
in the ability of Germany to exploit the wrong done Bul-
garia in the treaty of Bucharest; (5) the interest of Con-
stantinople is no doubt in part bought, in part coerced,
but it is also in a measure due to the fact that in the Ger-
man alliance alone lies the possibility of even a nominal
integrity for the Turkish Empire; (6) at the conclusion of
the war, the greatest tie which will bind Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Turkey to Germany will be the debts of
these countries to Germany.

The disestablishment of a Prussian Middle Europe.

It follows that the objectives to be aimed at in order
to render Middle Europe safe are the following:

26 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

1 . Increased democratization of Germany, which means,
no doubt, legal changes like the reform of the Prussian
franchise, increased ministerial responsibility, control
of the army and navy, of the war power and foreign policy,
by representatives responsible to the German people.
But it means something more. It means the appointment
to office of men who represent the interests of south and
west Germany and the large cities of Prussia — men who
today vote Progressive, Centrist, or Social Democrat
tickets — in brief, the men who stood behind the Bloc
which forced through the Reichstag resolution of July.

2. In addition to increased democratization of Ger-
many, we have to aim at an independent foreign policy
in Austria-Hungary.

3. We must aim at preventing the military union of
Austria-Hungary and Germany.

4. We must aim at the contentment and friendship of
Bulgaria through a satisfactory solution of the Balkan
frontiers.

5. We must aim at the neutralization and the inter-
nationalization of Constantinople and the Straits.

6. We must see that the control of the two military
terminals of Berlin-Bagdad remain in the hands of an
administration friendly to the western nations.

7. As a result of the accomplishment of the foregoing,
we must secure a guaranteed autonomy for the Armenians,
not only as a matter of justice and humanity but in order
to reestablish the one people of Asia Minor capable of
preventing economic monopolization of Turkey by the
Germans.

These being our objectives, what are our present assets
and liabilities?

ASSETS.

Our economic weapon.

The commercial control of the outer world, and the
possibility of German exclusion both from the sources of
raw materials and the richer markets, and from the routes
of communication, lie in our hands. The possibility of
a continued commercial exclusion weighs heavily, in

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN INQUIRY 27

fact, most heavily of all, upon the German mind at
present, because upon the conclusion of peace a successful
demobilization is possible only as there are raw materials
and markets for the resumption of German industry.
Without these the army would become a discontented
and dangerous body. If the possibility of exclusion from
economic opportunity is associated with a vision of a
world cooperation realized, the double motives of fear
and hope can be used upon the German people. This is
our strongest weapon, and the Germans realize its menace.
Held over them it can win priceless concessions. It should
be noted that this weapon will be of special advantage
after the peace conference has assembled. Our ability
to protract the discussion at the industrial expense of
Germany and to our own benefit, and will give us
a bargaining power of great advantage. Skilfully
handled, this asset can be used both to threaten and
to lure them; and its appeal is well nigh universal, as the
utterances and comment from Germany clearly show.
To the dynasty and the ruling classes, it presents the most
tangible threat of revolution, because it is obvious that
the danger of revolution will be enormously increased
upon the conclusion of peace, when the patriotic motive
subsides. To the commercial classes it presents the
obvious picture of financial ruin and of disorder. To
the army it presents a picture of a long period following the
conclusion of the war in which government will not dare
to demobilize rapidly. To the poorer classes generally
it presents the picture of a long period after the war in
which the present hardships will continue.

II. Our assets in Austria-Hungary.

In Austria-Hungary we have a number of assets which
may seem contradictory at first, but which can all be
employed at the same time. There is the nationalistic
discontent of the Czechs and probably of the South Slavs ;
The increase of nationalistic discontent among the
Czechs and the possibility of some kind of Poland will
tend to break the political coalition which has existed
between the Austrian Poles and the German Austrians.

28 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

On the part of the Emperor and of the present ruling powers
in Austria-Hungary there is a great desire to emerge from
the war with the patrimony of Francis Joseph unimpaired.
This desire has taken two interesting forms: (1) it has re-
sulted in the adoption of a policy of no annexations, which
is obvious enough; and (2) in the adoption, evidently with
much sincerity, of a desire for disarmament and a league
of nations. The motive here is evidently a realization
that financially Austria cannot maintain armaments at the
present scale after the war, and a realization that in a
league of nations she would find a guarantee of the status
quo. It follows that the more turbulent the subject
nationalities become and the less the present Magyar-
Austrian ascendancy sees itself threatened with absolute
extinction, the more fervent will become the desire in
Austria-Hungary to make itself a fit partner in a league
of nations. Our policy must therefore consist first in a
stirring up of nationalist discontent, and then in refusing
to accept the extreme logic of this discontent which would be
the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. . By threatening
the present German-Magyar combination with national-
ist uprisings on the one side, and by showing it a mode of
safety on the other, its resistance would be reduced to
a minimum, and the motive to an independence from
Berlin in foreign affairs would be enormously accelerated.
Austria-Hungary is in the position where she must be
good in order to survive.

It should be noted that the danger of economic exclusion
after the war affects Austria-Hungary as well as Germany
very seriously, and no amount of ultimate trade in transit
to Turkey will be able to solve for her the immediate
problem of finding work for her demobilized army, of re-
plenishing her exhausted supplies, and of finding enough
wealth to meet her financial burdens.

III. Our assets in Bulgaria.

In regard to Bulgaria our greatest asset is the possibil-
ity of satisfying her just claims, now that the threat of
an imperialistic Russian occupation of Constantinople
is removed. A satisfied Bulgaria would no doubt share

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN INQUIRY 29

in the economic advantages of Middle Europe, but with-
out a strong national grievance of her own, her exploita-
tion for political and military purposes is improbable.
To this should be added the consideration that the re-
verberations of the Russian revolution are sure to be felt
in Bulgaria.

IV. Our assets in Turkey.

In regard to Turkey our primary assets are our military
successes, already commented upon above. These military
successes should have a religio-political effect upon the
Ottoman Turk. The great financial and economic weak-
ness of Turkey immediately after the war and her need
of assistance are also assets to be considered.

V. Our assets outside of Europe.

The German colonies are obvious material to bargain
with, as is Germany 's exclusion from the Pacific and from
Central and South America.

VI. The radicalism of Russia.

It is often overlooked that the Russian revolution, in-
spired as it is by deep hatred of autocracy, contains within
it at least three other great motives of serious danger
to German domination: (1) anti-capitalist feeling, which
would be fully as intense, or more intense, against German
capitalism; (2) a religious love of Russia which is spiritu-
ally antagonistic to protestant Germany; and (3) a power-
ful nationalist feeling among the Moderates, who will
either return to power or at least exercise a strong influence
in Russia. The revolution, therefore, must be regarded
not only as inherently difficult for the Germans to manage
and to master, but as being in itself a great dissolving
force through its sheer example. Note in this regard the
reported interpellation of a deputy in the Austrian parlia-
ment, who wanted to know when the Austrian and Hun-
garian landed estates were to be broken up upon Bolshe-
viki principles, seeing that the government had recognized
the Bolsheviki.

30 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

VII. The Vatican.

The Vatican has been rightly regarded as pro-German
in its neutrality. But we should not be misled in regard
to it as we have been misled in regard to the Russian rev-
olution. The Germans have been skilful enough to use
it. The Vatican is one of those forces in the world which
require exceedingly skilful handling and contains within
it the possibility of great assistance to our cause, as is
shown, for example, by the opportunity it offered the
President to carry on the first successful diplomatic of-
fensive made by the Allies since the beginning of the
war.

VIII. American resources.

The fact that with time the man-power and resources
of this country, added to the present forces of the Entente,
render a complete and crushing military victory over the
Central Powers a certainty.

IX. The intangibles.

To be counted on our side if skilfully used are certain
intangibles which the President undoubtedly had in mind
when he warned the statesmen of the world in his last
message that they were living "in this midday hour of the
world's life." These are: (1) the universal longing for
peace, which under the circumstances should not be
handed over to Germany as something for them to cap-
italize; (2) the almost universal feeling on the part of the
common people of the world that the old diplomacy is
bankrupt, and that the system of the armed peace must
not be restored. This is a sentiment fundamentally anti-
Prussian in its nature, and should be capitalized for our
side; (3) there is then, too, a great hope of a league of
nations which has the approbation of disinterested people
everywhere; (4) there is the menace of the social revolu-
tion all over the world, and as a factor in it a realization
by the governing political and financial groups that the
meeting of the war debts is virtually insoluble without
revolutionary measures about property. In a war fought

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN INQUIRY 31

for democratic aims, these fears should be made to fight
on our side.

X. The changed direction of German policy.

In estimating the objects of German policy, as well as
the concessions which Germany offers, it should be borne
in mind that her first economic and political penetration
pointed due south through Italy, that later it swerved
southeast towards Constantinople, Bagdad, and the
Persian Gulf, and that at present, in view of the Russian
debacle, its direction of easiest advance is due east. The
present is the best time for Germany to seize the oppor-
tunities offering themselves there, and this may very
well cause her to decide that she will accept sacrifices
towards the southeast, the west, on other continents, and in
distant seas, in order to assure her contol of the Russian
opportunities.

LIABILITIES.

Balanced off against these assets are our liabilities.
They are, briefly:

I. The military impotence of Russia.

II. The strategic impossibility of any military operation
which will cut to the heart of Middle Europe.

III. The costs and dangers of a war of attrition on the
western front, and the improbability of anything more
than a slow withdrawal by the Germans, leaving behind
them an absolute devastation of western Belgium and
of northern France.

IV. The possession by the Germans at this time of the
occupied areas.

V. The concentration of France upon Alsace-Lorraine,
which opens at least as a possibility an attempt by the
Germans to cause an almost complete rupture of the
western alliance by offering France an attractive com-
promise solution. In case the Germans should decide
within the next few months that they could compensate
themselves in the east, they may offer France enough
in the west to force either a peace or so keep a schism of

French opinion as to render France impotent.

• •

82 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

VI. In regard to Italy, our liabilities are also heavy.
There is the obvious danger of social revolution and dis-
organization.

VII. Another liability lies in the present unwillingness
of the dominant opinion of Great Britain to discuss modi-
fications of sea power.

A PROGRAMME FOR A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE.
Bulgaria, Servia, and Italy.

Attention may first be directed to Bulgaria as a weak
section of the German line. The Allies should publicly
recognize Bulgaria's just national claims and Serbia's
right to independence and to access to the sea. This
should be accompanied by a strong public move in the
direction of Italy, emphasizing Italy's just claims to a
rectification of her frontier, both for defensive and for
nationalistic reasons. The abandonment by Italy of her
imperialist claims can be covered by strong assurances
that her territory shall be evacuated and her pressing
economic needs now and after the war assured.

Austria-Hungary.

Towards Austria-Hungary the approach should consist
of references to the subjection of the various nationalities,
in order to keep that agitation alive, but coupled with it
should go repeated assurances that no dismemberment
of the Empire is intended, together with allusions to the
humiliating vassalage of the proudest court in Europe.
It will probably be well to inject into the discussion a
mention of the fact that Austria-Hungary is bound to
Germany by huge debts expended in the interest of Ger-
man ambition. In regard to Austria-Hungary it will
probably not be wise to suggest frankly the cancellation of
these debts, as in the case of Turkey. Reference to their
existence and to the bondage which they imply will, how-
ever, produce a useful ferment. The desire of Austria-
Hungary to discuss the question of disarmament should
not be ignored. The discussion should specifically be
accepted and the danger of disarmament in the face of
an autocratic Germany explained again.

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN INQUIRY 33

Germany.

As against Germany the lines of the offensive have
already been laid down by the President. There should
be more explicit assertion that the penalty of a failure
to democratize Germany more adequately must mean
exclusion from freedom of intercourse after the war, that
the reward for democratization is a partnership of all
nations in meeting the problems that will follow the peace.
This offensive should of course contain the explicit assur-
ance that we do not intend to dictate the form of respon-
sible government in Germany, and that we are quite
within the justified limits of intercourse with nations if
we take the position that our attitude towards a respon-
sible Germany would be different from our attitude
towards the present Germany.

Russia.

Towards Russia our best success will lie: (1) in showing
that we are not unwilling to state war aims ; (2) in a hearty
propaganda of the idea of a league of nations; and (3) in
a demonstration to them that the diplomatic offensive is
in progress, and that the Allies are not relying totally
upon force.

France.

For the sake of the morale of France it will perhaps
be wise to indicate an interest in the solution of the prob-
lem of Alsace-Lorraine.

The western Allies in general.

All of the western Allies should be braced: (1) by an
energetic movement for economic unity of control; (2) by
utterances from the United States which will show the way
to the Liberals in Great Britain and in France, and there-
fore restore their national unity of purpose. These
Liberals will readily accept the leadership of the Presi-
dent if he undertakes a liberal diplomatic offensive, be-
cause they will find in that offensive an invaluable support
for their internal domestic troubles; finally (3) such a
powerful liberal offensive on the part of the United States

34 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

will immensely stimulate American pride and interest in
the war, and will assure the administration the support of
the great mass of the American people who desire an
idealistic solution. Such a liberal offensive will do more
than any other thing to create in this country the sort
of public opinion that the President needs in order to
carry through the programme he has outlined.

A SUGGESTED STATEMENT OF PEACE TERMS.

What follows is suggested as a statement of peace terms
in case a general statement of terms at this time is desired.
The different items are phrased, both with a view to what
they include and exclude, in their relationship to the
present military and diplomatic situation. The purpose
is to make them serve both as the bases of an ultimate
just peace and as a programme of war aims which would
cause the maximum disunity in the enemy and the maxi-
mum unity among our associates.

BELGIUM:

BELGIUM MUST BE EVACUATED AND RESTORED BY
GERMANY, WITHOUT ANY ATTEMPT TO LIMIT THE SOV-
EREIGNTY WHICH SHE ENJOYS IN COMMON WITH ALL
OTHER FREE NATIONS.

NORTHERN FRANCE:

["All the French territory must be freed and invaded por-
tions restored."]*

THE INVADED PORTIONS OF NORTHERN FRANCE MUST
BE EVACUATED AND RESTORED.

LUXEMBOURG:

This question should be ignored at this time and left
to negotiation.

ALSACE-LORRAINE :

["Alsace-Lorraine must be restored to France without ex-
cluding Germany from the use of tfie economic resources of
those provinces.]*

"""Translation of President Wilson's stenographic annotation.

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN INQUIRY 35

EVERY ACT OF GERMANY TOWARDS ALSACE-LORRAINE
FOR HALF A CENTURY HAS PROCLAIMED THAT THESE
PROVINCES ARE FOREIGN TERRITORY, AND NO GENUINE
PART OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE. GERMANY CANNOT BE
PERMITTED TO ESCAPE THE STERN LOGIC OF HER OWN
CONDUCT. THE WRONG DONE IN 1871 MUST BE UN-
DONE.

This paragraph is phrased so as to avoid making the
return of Alsace-Lorraine to France an essential aim of the
United States in the war, while giving all possible moral
support to France in her effort to regain the provinces.
It is our belief that the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine is
highly desirable and practically essential to the successful
recovery of France. It is also our belief that the relin-
quishment of Alsace-Lorraine would be the final seal
upon the destruction of German militarism. At the
same tune, we recognize that America cannot insist upon
fighting for Alsace-Lorraine longer than France herself is
willing to fight, and therefore if Germany should offer
France a compromise which France herself was willing to
accept, it would be unwise for us to have a commit-
ment on record which we could not fulfill.

ITALY:

[" That is the readjustment of the frontiers of Italy along
clearly recognized lines of nationality.9']*

WE RECOGNIZE THAT ITALY Is ENTITLED TO RECTIFI-
CATIONS OF HER BOUNDARIES ON THE BASIS OF A JUST
BALANCE OF DEFENSIVE AND NATIONALIST CONSIDERA-
TIONS. THIS RIGHT WAS RECOGNIZED IN PRINCIPLE
BY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY BEFORE ITALY ENTERED THE
WAR AND JUSTICE TOWARDS ITALY Is IN NO WISE
ALTERED BY ANY SUBSEQUENT MILITARY EVENTS.
WE RECOGNIZE ALSO THAT THE PORT OF TRIESTE SHOULD
BE COMMERCIALLY FREE AND THAT THE INHABITANTS OF
THE CITY DESERVE THEIR CULTURAL AUTONOMY.

It is our belief that the application of this plank will
meet the just demands of Italy, without yielding to those

""Translation of President Wilson's stenographic annotation..

36 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

larger ambitions along the eastern shore of the Adriatic
for which we can find no substantial justification.

THE BALKANS:

[" Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro must be evacuated;
occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure
access to the sea; and the relationships of the several Balkan
States to one another determined by friendly counsel along
historically established lines of allegiance and nationality.
International guarantees should be entered into of the politi-
cal independence and territorial integrity of all the Balkan
States."]*

No JUST OR LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE TANGLED
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE DEEPLY WRONGED PEOPLES
OF THE BALKANS CAN BE BASED UPON THE ARBITRARY
TREATY OF BUCHAREST. THAT TREATY WAS A PRODUCT
OF THE EVIL DIPLOMACY WHICH THE PEOPLES OF THE
WORLD ARE Now DETERMINED TO END. THAT TREATY
WRONGED EVERY NATION IN THE BALKANS, EVEN THOSE
WHICH IT APPEARED TO FAVOUR, BY IMPOSING UPON
THEM ALL THE PERMANENT MENACE OF WAR. IT UN-
QUESTIONABLY TORE MEN AND WOMEN OF BULGARIAN
LOYALTY FROM THEIR NATURAL ALLEGIANCE. IT DE-
NIED TO SERBIA THAT ACCESS TO THE SEA WHICH SHE
MUST HAVE IN ORDER TO COMPLETE HER INDEPENDENCE.
ANY JUST SETTLEMENT MUST OF COURSE BEGIN WITH
THE EVACUATION OF RUMANIA, SERBIA, AND MONTE-
NEGRO BY THE ARMIES OF THE CENTRAL POWERS, AND
THE RESTORATION OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO. THE
ULTIMATE RELATIONSHIP OF THE DIFFERENT BALKAN
NATIONS MUST BE BASED UPON A FAIR BALANCE OF
NATIONALISTIC AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS, APPLIED
IN A GENEROUS AND INVENTIVE SPIRIT AFTER IMPARTIAL
AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY. THE MEDDLING AND IN-
TRIGUING OF GREAT POWERS MUST BE STOPPED, AND
THE EFFORTS TO ATTAIN NATIONAL UNITY BY MASSACRE
MUST BE ABANDONED.

It would obviously be unwise to attempt at this time to
draw frontiers for the Balkan states. Certain broad con-

Translation of President Wilson's stenographic annotation.

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN INQUIRY 37

siderations, however, may tentatively be kept in mind.
They are in brief these: (1) that the area annexed by
Rumania in the Dobrudja is almost surely Bulgarian in
character and should be returned; (2) that the boundary
between Bulgaria and Turkey should be restored to the
Enos-Midia line, as agreed upon at the conference of
London ; (3) that the south boundary of Bulgaria should be
the ^Egean Sea coast from Enos to the gulf of Orfano, and
should leave the mouth of the Struma river in Bulgarian
territory; (4) that the best access to the sea for Serbia is
through Saloniki; (5) that the final disposition of Mace-
donia cannot be determined without further inquiry;
(6) that an independent Albania is almost and certainly
an undesirable political entity.

We are strongly of the opinion that in the last analysis
economic considerations will outweigh nationalistic af-
filiations in the Balkans, and that a settlement which
insures economic prosperity is most likely to be a lasting
one.

POLAND:

["An independent Polish State must be established,
whose political and economic independence and territorial
integrity shall be guaranteed by international covenant.
It shall include the territories inhabited by an indisputably
Polish population, and shall be granted a free and secure
access to the sea."]*

AN INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC POLAND SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED. ITS BOUNDARIES SHALL BE BASED ON A
FAIR BALANCE OF NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC CON-
SIDERATIONS, GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE NECESSITY
FOR ADEQUATE ACCESS TO THE SEA. THE FORM OF
POLAND'S GOVERNMENT AND ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
RELATIONS SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE DETERMINATION OF
THE PEOPLE OF POLAND ACTING THROUGH THEIR CHOSEN
REPRESENTATIVES.

The subject of Poland is by far the most complex of all
the problems to be considered. The present distribution
of Poles is such as to make their complete unification

*Translation of President Wilson's stenographic annotation.

38 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

impossible without separating East Prussia from Ger-
many. This is probably not within the bounds of practical
politics. A Poland which consists essentially of Russian
and perhaps Austrian Poland would probably secure its
access to the sea through the Vistula River and the canals
of Germany which run to Hamburg and Bremen. This
relationship would very probably involve both the eco-
nomic subjection of Poland and the establishment of an
area of great friction. If Russia is to remain weak the new
Poland will lie in an exceedingly exposed position. The
experiment must no doubt be made, however, but in order
to assure it a fair start, it is necessary to insist at the outset
upon a democratic basis for the Polish state. Unless
this is loyally observed, the internal friction of Poles,
Ruthenians, and Jews is likely to render Poland impotent
in the presence of Germany.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

["The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the
nations of the world we wish to see safeguarded and assured
must be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous
development."]*

WE SEE PROMISE IN THE DISCUSSIONS NOW GOING
ON BETWEEN THE AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN GOVERNMENTS AND
THE PEOPLES OF THE MONARCHY, BUT THE VASSALAGE
OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO THE MASTERS OF GERMANY,
RIVETED UPON THEM BY DEBTS FOR MONEY EXPENDED IN
THE INTERESTS OF GERMAN AMBITION MUST BE DONE
AWAY WITH IN ORDER THAT AUSTRIA-HUNGARY MAY BE
FREE TO TAKE HER RIGHTFUL PLACE AMONG THE NATIONS.

The object of this is to encourage the present move-
ment towards federalism in Austria, a movement which,
if it is successful will break the German-Magyar ascend-
ency. By injecting the idea of a possible cancellation
of the war debts to Germany, it is hoped to encourage all
the separatist tendencies as between Austria-Hungary and
Germany, as well as the social revolutionary sentiment
which poverty has stimulated.

Translation of President Wilson's stenographic annotation.

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN INQUIRY 39

TURKEY:

[" The Turkish portions of the present Turkish Empire must
be assured a secure sovereignty and the other nationalities
which are now under Turkish rule must be assured full
opportunity of autonomous development."]*

IT Is NECESSARY TO FREE THE SUBJECT RACES OF THE
TURKISH EMPIRE FROM OPPRESSION AND MISRULE. THIS
IMPLIES AT THE VERY LEAST AUTONOMY FOR ARMENIA
AND THE PROTECTION OF PALESTINE, SYRIA, MESOPO-
TAMIA, AND ARABIA BY THE CIVILIZED NATIONS. IT Is
NECESSARY ALSO TO ESTABLISH FREE INTERCOURSE
THROUGH AND ACROSS THE STRAITS. TURKEY PROPER
MUST BE JUSTLY TREATED AND FREED FROM ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL BONDAGE. HER WAR DEBTS TO GERMANY
MUST BE CANCELLED. NONE OF THE MONEY INVOLVED
WAS SPENT IN THE INTEREST OF TURKEY, AND NONE OF IT
SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A TURKISH OBLIGATION. AN
ADJUSTMENT OF HER PRE-WAR DEBT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
HER TERRITORIAL LIMITATIONS Is ALSO REQUIRED BY THE
CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE. MOREOVER IT WILL UN-
DOUBTEDLY BE FEASIBLE TO ARRANGE ADVANCES OF
MONEY TO TURKEY IN ORDER TO ENABLE HER UNDER
SUITABLE SUPERVISION TO INSTITUTE AND MAINTAIN
SATISFACTORY EDUCATIONAL AND SANITARY CONDITIONS,
AND TO UNDERTAKE HER ECONOMIC REHABILITATION.
THUS TURKEY CAN BE FREED FROM INTERMEDDLING
AND ENABLED TO DEVELOP INSTITUTIONS ADAPTED TO
THE GENIUS OF HER OWN PEOPLE.

This will appear on the surface to be a drastic solution
of the Turkish problem, but it is one which the military
situation enables us to accomplish, and it can hardly be
doubted that no principle of justice requires the return
of occupied portions of Turkey to the German-Turkish
alliance. The cancellation of Turkey's debt to Germany
is the one final way to abolish German political and com-
mercial penetration. It is also the one method by which
Turkey can be given a new start, considerably reduced
in size, without power to misgovern alien races, and there-

Translation of President Wilson's stenographic annotation.

40 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

fore free to concentrate upon the needs of her own popu-
lation. It should be noted in this regard that only a few
days ago it was announced that Germany had agreed
to forego interest on the Turkish debt for a period of
twelve years after the war. This implies a realization
on Germany's part that if she insists upon the interest
payments a repudiation is possible, carrying with it a
destruction of German influence in Turkey.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

FROM THE NATIONS AT PRESENT ENGAGED IN RESIST-
ANCE TO GERMANY'S EFFORT TO DOMINATE THE WORLD
THERE Is GROWING A LEAGUE OF NATIONS FOR COMMON
PROTECTION, FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-
NATIONAL DISPUTES, FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF A JOINT
ECONOMIC PROSPERITY INCLUDING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
UPON THE HIGHWAYS OF THE WORLD AND EQUITABLE AC-
CESS TO THE RAW MATERIALS WHICH ALL NATIONS NEED.
WHETHER THIS LEAGUE Is TO REMAIN ARMED AND Ex-

CLUSIVE, OR WHETHER THERE Is TO BE A REDUCTION OF

ARMAMENTS AND A CORDIAL INCLUSION OF GERMANY,
WILL DEPEND UPON WHETHER THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT
Is IN FACT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRACY.
This is, of course, simply another statement of the
alternative before Germany.

CONCLUSION

We regard all of the terms mentioned as essential to
any final agreement. It may well be, however, that
some of the provisions other than those relating to Belgium
and northern France, the evacuation of Italy and Ru-
mania, and the evacuation and restoration of Serbia and
Montenegro, do not require assent as a preliminary to
discussion at the conference. And this is due to the fact
that we have the power to compel Germany's assent at
the peace conference by our ability to bar her indefinitely
from access to supplies and to protract the negotiations
at her cost and at our own benefit.

We emphasize our belief that no surrender of this power,
even by inference, should be considered until all the terms

REPORT OF THE AMERICAN INQUIRY 41

stated above are definitely agreed to, in detail as well as
in principle, by Germany at the peace conference. This
involves adopting as our policy the reserving of the dis:
cussion of economic peace until our political, social, and
international objects are attained.

We might well adopt as our slogan "No economic
peace until the peoples are freed."

DOCUMENT 3.

The "Fourteen Points" and the "Four Points."
President Wilson's Fourteen Points, from his
address to the Joint Session of Congress, January
8, 1918.

President Wilson's Four Points, from his ad-
dress at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918.

THE "FOURTEEN POINTS" AND THE "FOUR

POINTS."

PRESIDENT WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS.

From His Address to the Joint Session of Congress, January 8, 1918.

We entered this war because violations of right had
occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life
of our own people impossible unless they were corrected
and the world secured once for all against their re-
currence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is
nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be
made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be
made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our
own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own insti-
tutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other
peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggres-
sion. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners
in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly
that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to
us. The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is
our programme; and that programme, the only possible
programme, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after
which there shall be no private international under-

42,

THE "FOURTEEN POINTS" AND "FOUR POINTS" 43

standings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always
frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas,
outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except
as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by inter-
national action for the enforcement of international
covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic
barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade
conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace
and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national
armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent
with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial ad-
justment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observ-
ance of the principle that in determining all such questions
of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned
must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the
government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such
a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure
the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the
world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unem-
barrassed opportunity for the independent determination
of her own political development and national policy and
assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free
nations under institutions of her own choosing; and,
more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that
she may need and may herself desire. The treatment
accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to
come will be the acid test of their good will, of their com-
prehension of her needs as distinguished from their own
interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be
evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the
sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free
nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve
to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which
they have themselves set and determined for the govern-

44 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ment of their relations with one another. Without this
healing act the whole structure and validity of inter-
national law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the
invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France
by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which
has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years,
should be righted, in order that peace may once more be
made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be
effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place
among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured,
should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous
development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be
evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded
free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the
several Balkan states to one another determined by
friendly counsel along historically established lines of
allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees
of the political and economic independence and territorial
integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered
into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman
Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the
other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule
should be assured an undoubted security of life and an ab-
solutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous develop-
ment, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened
as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations
under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected
which should include the territories inhabited by in-
disputably Polish populations, which should be assured
a free and secure access to the sea, and whose politi-
cal and economic independence and territorial integrity
should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed
under specific covenants for the purpose of affording

THE "FOURTEEN POINTS" AND "FOUR POINTS" 45

mutual guarantees of political independence and terri-
torial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and
assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners
of all the governments and peoples associated together
against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in
interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until
the end.

We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to
admit of any further doubt or question. An evident
principle runs through the whole programme I have out-
lined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and
nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of
liberty and safety with one another, whether they be
strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its
foundation no part of the structure of international
justice can stand. The people of the United States could
act upon no other principle ; and to the vindication of this
principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor,
and everything that they possess. The moral climax of
this the culminating and final war for human liberty has
come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their
own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to
the test.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S FOUR POINTS.

From His Address at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918.

I. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere
that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice
disturb the peace of the world ; or, if it cannot be presently
destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

II. The settlement of every question, whether of
territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of
political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance
of that settlement by the people immediately concerned,
and not upon the basis of the material interest or ad-
vantage of any other nation or people which may desire a

46 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

different settlement for the sake of its own exterior in-
fluence or mastery.

III. The consent of all nations to be governed in their
conduct toward each other by the same principles of
honor and of respect for the common law of civilized
society that govern the individual citizens of all modern
States in their relations with one another; to the end that
all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no
private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries
wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established
upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for
right.

IV. The establishment of an organization of peace
which shall make it certain that the combined power of
free nations will check every invasion of right and serve
to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a
definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and
by which every international readjustment that cannot be
amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned
shall be sanctioned. These great objects can be put into
a single sentence. What we seek is the reign of law, based
upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the
organized opinion of mankind.

DOCUMENT 4.

Statement adopted by the Council of Ten,
January 17, for presentation to the Press repre-
sentatives at Paris, explaining policies of publi-
city (mimeograph).

STATEMENT OF PEACE CONFERENCE ON PUB-
LICITY, JANUARY 17, 1919.

The representatives of the Allied and Associated
Powers have given earnest consideration to the question
of publicity for the proceedings of the Peace Conference.
They are anxious that the public, through the Press,
should have the fullest information compatible with
safeguarding the supreme interest of all, which is that a
just and honorable settlement should be arrived at with
the minimum of delay. It is, however, obvious that
publicity with regard to the preliminary conversations
now proceeding must be subject to the limitations neces-
sarily imposed by the difficult and delicate nature of their
object.

/The proceedings of a Peace Conference are far more /
analogous to those of a Cabinet than to those of a legis- (/
lature./ Nobody has ever suggested that Cabinet meet-
ings should be held in public, and if they were so held, the
work of government would become impossible. One
reason why Cabinets are held in private is in order that
differences may be reconciled and agreement reached
before the stage of publicity is begun. /The essence of
democratic method is not that deliberations of a Govern-
ment should be conducted in public, but that its conclu-
sions should be subject to the consideration of a popular
Chamber and to free and open discussion on the platform
and in the Press^/

47

48 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

The representatives of the Allied and Associated
Powers are holding conversations in order to solve ques-
tions which affect the vital interests of many nations and
upon which they may, at present, hold many diverse
views. These deliberations cannot proceed by the method
of a majority vote. No nation can be committed except
by the free vote of its own delegates. The conclusions
arrived at at these consultations, therefore, can only be
formed by the difficult process of reaching agreement
among all. This vital process would only be hindered if
the discussion of every disputed question were to open by
a public declaration by each Delegation of its own national
point of view. Such a declaration would in many cases
followed by premature public controversy/ This
would be serious enough if it were confined to controversy
between parties within each State. It might be extremely
dangerous if, as would often be inevitable, it resulted in
controversy between nations. Moreover such public
declarations would render that give and take on the part
of the delegates themselves, which is essential to a success-
ful negotiation, a matter of infinitely greater difficulty.

It is also extremely important that the settlement
should be not only just but speedy. Every belligerent
Power is anxious for the early conclusion of peace, in
order that its armies may be demobilised and that it may
return once more to the ways of peace. If premature
publicity is given to the negotiations, the proceedings of
the Peace Conference would be interminably protracted,
and the delegates would be forced to speak not only to
the business before the Conference, but to concern them-
selves with the controversies which had been raised by the
account of their proceedings outside.

Finally, there will often be very strong reasons against
announcing the conclusions of the conversations as they
are arrived at. Representatives of a nation may be
willing to give their assent on one point only provided they
receive a concession on another point which has not yet
been discussed. It will not be possible to judge of the
wisdom and justice of the Peace settlement until it can
be viewed as a whole, and premature announcements

COUNCIL OF TEN, POLICIES OF PUBLICITY 49

might lead to misapprehensions and anxiety as to the
ultimate results for which there was no real foundation.

In calling attention, however, to these necessary
limitations on publicity, the representatives of the
Powers do not underrate the importance of carrying
public opinion with them in the vast task by which they
are confronted. They recognize that unless public
opinion approves of the results of their labours, they will
be nugatory.

This reasoning applies with conclusive force to the
present conversations between the representatives of the
Great Powers.

With regard to the full conferences, the following rule
was adopted :

Representatives of the Press shall be admitted to the
meetings of the full conference but upon necessary occa-
sions the deliberations of the Conference may be held in
camera.

DOCUMENT 5.

Text of Resolutions adopted by delegates of
the Allied and American Press, at the Hotel Ritz,
January 16, 1919 (mimeograph).

At a meeting of the special committee appointed by the
delegates of the Allied and American press, held at the
Hotel Ritz, Paris, the sixteenth of January, 1919, it was
unanimously resolved:

One — That it is essential to ensure full publicity to the
peace negotiations.

Two — That the official communiques issued by the Peace
Conference shall be as complete as possible.

Three — That, in addition to the official communiques,
full summaries of each day's proceedings should be
issued, not necessarily for textual publication, but for the
guidance of the members of the press who will maintain
full freedom of comment.

Four — That this committee is opposed to any rule of the
Conference which would interfere with free intercourse
between delegates and responsible journalists.

Five — That the committee recommends equality of
treatment of the Allied press by the abolition of the
censorship in all Allied countries.

Six — That, apart from the general question of the admis-
sion of representatives of the press to the Peace Confer-
ence and conversations, the committee is of opinion that
journalists representing all Allied countries and America
should be permitted to attend the formal opening session
of the Conference.

There being substantial agreement among the British,
Italian and American delegations, and that of the smaller
nations, to recommend equal representation of the press
at the Conferences, from which, however, the French

50

PRESS RESOLUTIONS, JANUARY 16, 1919 51

delegation dissents, no joint proposal on this point is made,
it having been left to the representatives of each nation-
ality to make separate recommendations to their own
delegates on this subject.

[Signed] L. MARCELLIN]

ST. BRICE > For France
LEON BASSEE J

GEORGE A. RIDDELL]

GEORGE ADAM > For Great Britain

P. GILMORE J

H. B. SWOPE ]

ARTHUR B. CROCK! For the United States

JOHN E. NEVIN J

MARIO BORSA ]

GUGLIELMO EMANUEL > For Italy
ROBERTO CANTELUPOJ

CVIETSAJ For ihe Smaller Nations

These further resolutions were unanimously adopted
by the British, Italian, and American press committee,
and by that representing the smaller nations :

One — That there should be direct representation of
the press at the sittings of the Peace Conference.

Two — That the press of each of the great powers should
be represented by not fewer than five delegates, and that
each of the smaller nations which have taken an active
part in the war should have proportionate representation.

GEORGE RIDDELL]
GEORGE ADAM ( ^ ^ . T> •. •
P. GILMORE f For Great Bntam

G. H. PERRIS J

H. B. SWOPE \

ARTHUR B. KROCK> For the United States

JOHN E. NEVIN )

58 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT
MARIO BORSA )

GUGLJELMOEMANUEL) For Italy

ROBERTO CANTELUPO)

CvIETSA ( For the Smaller Nations

DOCUMENT 6.

Record of protests and resolutions adopted by
American press correspondents April 23, 1919,
regarding admission to meeting of Allied with
German delegates at Versailles, May 7, at which
the Treaty was formally presented to the
Germans (carbon copy).

MEETING OF PRESS REPRESENTATIVES.

April 23, 1919.

Mr. William Allen White in the Chair.
Moved by Mr. Frank Simonds : —

That a Committee of Nine — four in addition to the
present Press Executive Committee — be appointed by
the Chair to draw up a resolution expressing the sentiment
of the meeting that the representatives of the press be per-
mitted to be present when the Peace Treaty is handed
to the German plenipotentiaries. Motion carried unani-
mously.

After discussion of several motions, presented and
amended, all motions were withdrawn and a vote was
taken on the simple question of whether it was or was
not the sense of the meeting that the representatives
of the press must be permitted to see the spokesman of
the Germans. Motion carried by vote 16 in favor and 7
opposed.

Meeting adjourned subject to call of Chair. Commit-
tee appointed by Chair to confer with existing Press
Committee :

John E. Nevin,

Fred S. Ferguson,

Burge McFall,

Alice Riggs Hunt.

53

54 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Existing Press Committee:

Lawrence Hills,
Herbert Bayard Swope,
Henry G. Wales.

April 25, 1919.

The following letter was submitted to and unanimously
adopted at a subsequent meeting of the correspondents on
April 25th—

To the Honorables,

Members of the American Peace Commission: —

We, the properly accredited representatives of the
newspapers and magazines of the United States, request
in the interest of the people of the United States that we
shall be afforded in the coming negotiations with the
enemy delegates:

First: — Full and complete opportunity to witness and
record the initial meeting between the representatives of
the Allied and Associated Powers and enemy delegates at
Versailles.

Second: — That we shall be afforded opportunity to
confer from time to time with the spokesmen of the
German delegation in order that we may be able to secure
their viewpoint on the peace negotiations to present it to
the American public properly unbiased and analyzed
from the standpoint of patriotic American citizens.

We respectfully point out to the Honorables of the
American Commission that from the standpoint of the
Allied interests, and from the standpoint of equity and
fairness, it is far more to be desired that this news shall be
handled from Paris where the sympathy is entirely with
the Allied and Associated cause, rather than through
Berlin and neutral countries where there is always danger
that the versions made public will be garbled to suit the
German viewpoint.

[Signed] WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE, Chairman,
ALICE BIGGS HUNT, Secretary.

DOCUMENT 7.

Preliminary French plan of procedure (type-
written translation) for the Peace Conference
with letters of transmission from Ambassador
Jusserand, November 29, 1918, to the State
Department (typewritten translation), and
from Frank L. Polk, Counsellor of the State
Department, December 2, 1918, to President
Wilson (autographed original).

December 2, 1918.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

The French Ambassador brought in on Saturday the
enclosed letter and the attached study of the procedure of
the Peace Conference. He was very anxious that this
should reach you as soon as possible, in order to get your
views.

I told him you would probably not have an opportunity
to take this up until you were at sea, as you were so
rushed, and if you desired to make any observations,
they could be then sent to the French Government by
wireless.

Yours faithfully,

[Signed] FRANK L. POLK.

Enclosure.
THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

65

56 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

( Translation)

EMBASSY OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED

STATES.

Washington, November 89, 1918.
MR. SECRETARY OF STATE:

My Government has just informed me that, with a
view to expediting the peace preliminaries, which any
way can not be actually determined until after the arrival
in Paris of the President of the United States, it had
taken up a preliminary study of the various problems
bearing upon that very important question.

In compliance with the instructions I have received,
I have the honor to communicate herewith to Your
Excellency a statement of the results of that examina-
tion. My Government would be glad to know whether
the plan of studies suggested by it, and the principles
upon which they rest, meet with the general approval of
the American Government. It would be also very
desirous of being informed of all the remarks which you
might see fit to offer.

Be pleased to accept, etc.,

JUSSERAND.

His Excellency

THE HONORABLE ROBERT LANSING,
Secretary of State of the United States.
DI-S JSM/MVD

( Translation)
Enclosure

The French Government upon examination of the pre-
cedents of the Congresses of Vienna 1814-1815, Paris,
1856, and Berlin, 1878, has taken up the various problems
raised by the determination of the peace preliminaries
and the establishment of the general peace treaty by the
Congress which is to meet at Versailles.

The arrival of President Wilson in Paris in the middle
of December will enable the four Great Powers to agree
among themselves upon the conditions of the peace pre-

FRENCH PLAN OF PROCEDURE 57

liminaries to be imposed severally on the enemy without
any discussion with him.

The examination will first apply to Germany and
Bulgaria, with which it is to our interest to negotiate at
once in order to promote on the one hand the disassocia-
tion of the countries which compose the first named: and
on the other hand, as to the second country, avoid the
dangerous Bulgarian intrigues at home and abroad.

The peace preliminaries with Germany will further-
more shape the way for the settlement of the main terri-
torial restorations: Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, the Slav
countries, Belgium, Luxembourg, the cession of the Ger-
man colonies, the full recognition of the protectorates of
France over Morocco and of England over Egypt, the
provisional acceptance of the Constitution of new in-
dependent states out of the territories of the former
Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, as well as the
conclusion of the treaties signed among the Allies with
Bulgaria ; and about Turkey, the abrogation of the Brest-
Litovsk and Bucharest treaties, and of all the previous
conventions with Russia and Roumania.

The speedy establishment of peace preliminaries with
Germany raises the question of a future regime. Even
now one may notice the antagonism of the Centralist
tendency, which was that of the Hohenzollern Prussian
Administration, the National Liberals and the Socialists,
to the Federalist tendency (represented by the dynasty
and administration of the secondary states and by the
deputies to the Reichstag). We are interested in favor-
ing Federalism and furnishing It with a basis by-elections
Keld under universal suffrage^ by promoting the mani-
festation of variances through the clauses of the treaty.
Indeed, we can not negotiate except with a Constituent
Assembly freely elected by universal, secret, and direct
suffrage.

The peace preliminaries with Bulgaria will likewise
define the main lines of the respective territorial status
of the Bulgarian countries.

The question of peace preliminaries with the other two
enemy powers presents itself in a different aspect. With

58 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

respect to Austria-Hungary it is not even existent, since
that Power has disappeared; it will then be within the
province of Congress to admit de piano the two new
states that have already been recognized : the Czfichp-
Slovaks and Poland, and to listen to the claims of the
Jugo-Slav state now forming. As for the country of the
Magyars (formerly Hungary stripped of the Slovaks,
Roumanians of Transylvania, and Croatians) and Austria
(German), the objections of [blank in the text] growing
out of their interpretations surest exclusion.

The same, of course, applies a fortiori to Turkey whose
complete reorganization, accompanied by intervention
in her internal regime (which on principle is barred with
respect to other states), is worthy of consideration. It
seems preferable to leave to the Congress the discussion
of the fate of those nationalities, for if peace preliminaries
were signed with them, it would be tantamount to pledg-
ing ourselves at once to maintain the Ottoman Empire,
that is to say, a rule which for a century has perpetrated
its abuses, crimes, and causes of discussion among the
great civilized states. Furthermore, where could the
power authorized to ratify in the name of Turkey be
found? Is it not better that the Allies should determine
the fate of the territories lying within the former Ottoman
Empire without the encumbrance of negotiations with
that Empire?

After reaching an agreement as to the peace prelimi-
naries, the representatives of the Great Powers will have
to come to an agreement on the principles of the represen-
tation of the several belligerent, neutral, and enemy
states at the Peace Congress. They will take up seriatim
the cases of the actual and theoretical belligerents, the
newly recognized states, and the states in formation,
the former Allies who have concluded treaties with the
enemy but whose treaties have not been recognized by
us (Russia and Roumania), the neutrals and the enemies.
Among the belligerents it will be proper to distinguish
in respect of the number of plenipotentiaries and of ad-
mission to the sessions as between the small and the great
powers. The great victorious powers alone will attend

FRENCH PLAN OF PROCEDURE 59

ail its sessions, the small powers being called only to
sessions designated for their special affairs. As for the
neutrals and states in formation, they may be called when
their own interests are at stake.

The number of plenipotentiaries will be limited to avoid
congestion and confusion in the debates ; the Great Powers
may designate from three to five plenipotentiaries, the
small powers from one to two, the neutral and forming
states only one. As the decisions are to be taken by a
majority vote, and as the representation of a state is but
one unit, it is not necessary that any state should have as
many representatives as a power of the same category,
as provided by the precedents of the Congresses of the
nineteenth century: each state may freely choose the
number of its delegates within the limits above cited.

It seems that the labors of the Congress should be
divided into two main series: the settlement of the war
properly so-called, and the organization of the Society
of Nations. The examination of the second question no
doubt calls for the settlement of the first. Furthermore,
the settlement of the concrete questions should not be
confounded with the enforcement of the stipulation of
general public law. Besides, that distinction is made
necessary by the fact that the enemy has no right to
discuss the terms that will be imposed upon him by the
victors, and that the neutrals will only be called in ex-
ceptional cases to attend the sessions where the belliger-
ents will fix the peace terms, while ^JLthe peoples, whether
belligerents, neutrals or enemies, will be called to discuss
and take part in the principle of the Society of Nations.

On the contrary those principles of President Woodrow
Wilson's which are not sufficiently defined in their char-
acter to be taken as a basis for a concrete settlement of
the war, even if appealed to as they have been admitted
by the Allies, will resume their full strength in the matter
of the future settlement of public law, and this will remove
one of the difficulties that might obstruct the Allies.

The procedure of the Congress will also be determined
at the preliminary meetings in the second half of De-
cember: Election of the President, appointment of the

60 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

secretarial forces (charged with the duties of drawing the
protocols, filing the archives, preparing daily communi-
ques, provide for the administrative organization of the
Congress and the regular operation of the services)
motions in writing read at the previous session discussed
jointly (so as to bring about an agreement on the principle
and afterwards work out the details) printing of the proto-
cols, organization of a drafting committee, etc.

The programme of the labors will then be determined,
for in all the previous Congresses the stipulations of a
treaty (the Paris Treaty of May 30, 1814 at the Vienna
Congress; the protocol signed at Vienna on February 1,
1854 at the Paris Congress; the treaty of San Stefano
signed March 3, 1878 at the Berlin Congress), has served
as a basis while the Congress of 1919 has no fixed basis
before it; indeed neither the four armistices signed with
Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Germany, nor
the answer of the Allies of January 10, 1917, jointly
making known their war aims to President Wilson,
nor the President's fourteen propositions which are
principles of public law can furnish a concrete basis for
the labors of the Congress.

That basis can only be a methodical statement of the
questions to be taken up which may be classified as
follows :

First — Settlement of the War

A. Political stipulations.

1. New States: a. already recognized (Bohemia).

b. Being formed (Jugo-Slavia, Russian States,
etc.).

2. Territorial questions: restitution of territories.
Neutralization for protection purposes.

a. Alsace-Lorraine (8th Wilson proposition).

b. Belgium (7th Wilson proposition).

c. Italy (9th Wilson proposition).

d. Boundary lines (France, Belgium, Serbia,

Roumania, etc.).

e. International regime of means of transporta-

tion, rivers, railways, canals, harbors.

FRENCH PLAN OF PROCEDURE 61

3. Eastern Questions (12th Wilson proposition).

4. Colonies (5th Wilson proposition).

5. Far East.

B. Military and Naval stipulations. Military guar-
antees on land and at sea. Number of effectives, dis-
mantling of fortifications, reduction of war manufactures,
territorial occupation.

C. Indemnities stipulations: reparation for war damage
on land and at sea, restitution, reconstruction, compensa-
tion in kind, reimbursement of expenses unlawfully im-
posed. "(C.R.B.)"

D. Economic and financial stipulations : raw materials,
economic systems, settlement of accounts.

E. Stipulations of private law: settlement of private
debts, liquidation of sequestrated property.

F. Punishments to be inflicted on account of acts of
violence and crimes committed during the war in violation
of public law.

G. Stipulations of a moral character: Recognition by
Germany of the responsibility and premeditation of her
rulers justifying the measures of penalization and pre-
caution taken against her. Solemn disavowal of the
breaches of international law and of the crimes against
humanity.

H. Restoration of the conventional regime broken by
the war.

Second — Organization of the Society of Nations.

A. Stipulations of general public law.

B. Guarantees and Penalties.

C. Freedom of the seas (2nd Wilson proposition).

D. International economic regime (3rd Wilson propo-
sition).

E. Publication of the treaties (1st Wilson proposition).

F. Limitation of armaments (4th Wilson proposition).

G. International arbitral organization of the Hague.
H. Society of Nations.

The programme of labors being thus defined, there
would be left only to make a logical distribution deter-
mining their order and the conditions under which com-

62 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

missions should study them as to territorial and political
affairs and Committees as to general international questions.

A. Commissions.

1. Polish affairs.

2. Russian affairs.

3. Baltic nationalities.

4. States sprung from former Austria-Hungary.

5. Balkan affairs.

6. Eastern affairs.

7. Affairs of the Far East and the Pacific.

B. Committees.

1. Committee on Jewish affairs.

2. Committee on the international river navigation
(Rhine, Danube, Scheldt, Elbe) practice of the
society of nations.

3. Committee on international railways (railways
of the 45th parallel from the Adriatic to the Baltic,
Bagdad trans-African railways from Capetown to
Cairo and from Capetown to Algiers).

4. Committee on public law (free determination of
the peoples combined with the rights of the
ethnical and religious minorities).

5. Committee on international labor legislation
(a very important question, the initiative, man-
agement and settlement of which must be left
to the Socialists).

6. Committee on law relative to patents and trade-
marks.

7. Committee on punishment for crimes committed
during the war.

It may be remarked that a certain number of the
questions that are raised have to be settled directly
amongst the great powers without calling upon any
committee to discuss them; this also applies to colo-
nial affairs which essentially concern England and France.
It also applies to indemnities, for outside of the tor-
pedoing from which the British fleet mainly suffered,
Belgium and France alone are entitled to indemnities on
account of the systematic devastation suffered by them.

FRENCH PLAN OF PROCEDURE 63

(The states which have become independent and those
which have secured considerable territorial enlargement
would have but a slight claim to indemnities.) It also
applies to economic and financial stipulations, the amount
of which will be determined by the great powers but the
mode of payment of which alone will be discussed by the
peace treaty.

The Congress finally could place itself as has sometimes
been done in the past under the invocation of some of the
great principles leading to justice, morals and liberty,
which would be proclaimed at its very opening and even
before fixing the procedure (concerning which an un-
official agreement only would have been reached) : right of
self-determination of the peoples, right of the minorities,
suspension of all previous special agreements arrived at by
some of the Allies only, with a view to the fullest freedom
of the examination by the Congress, declaration that the
metropolitan and colonial territory held by the Allies on
August 1, 1914, shall not be touched, solemn repudiation of
all the violations of international law and of humane
principles and disqualification of enemy delegates who
have signed violated instruments or are personally
guilty of violations of the law of nations or of the crimes
against humanity.

The foregoing sums up the plan of study and the
principles suggested by the French Government.

PART III
THE LEAGUE AND THE PEACE

DOCUMENT 8.

The "Phillimore Report" of March 20, 1918,
to the British Cabinet regarding the organization
of a League of Nations. The basic document
used by President Wilson in the preparation of
his Covenant (printed).

Confidential.
[53848/W. 39]

This Interim Report of Sir Walter Phillimore's Committee
is circulated to the War Cabinet for their considera-
tion. It is suggested that a copy should be sent to
President Wilson confidentially, so that if he thinks
right he may have it considered by an American expert
committee. Copies should perhaps also be sent to
the Dominions in view of the approaching conference.

ROBERT CECIL.

THE COMMITTEE ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Right Hon. Sir Walter G. F. Phillimore, Bart., P. C.

(Chairman).

Professor A. F. Pollard, M. A.
Sir Julian S. Corbett.
Dr. J. Holland Rose, Litt. D.
Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. M. G.
Sir William Tyrrell, K. C. M. G.
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst, K. C., C. B.

Mr. A. R. Kennedy (Secretary).

INTERIM REPORT

To THE RIGHT HON. A. J. BALFOUR, P. C., O. M. &c., &c.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

March 20, 1918.

1. We had the honour to be appointed by you as a
Committee to enquire particularly from a juridical and

67

68 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

historical point of view into the various schemes for
establishing by means of a League of Nations, or other
device, some alternative to war as a means of settling
international disputes, to report on their practicability,
to suggest amendments, or to elaborate a further scheme
if on consideration it should be deemed possible and expe-
dient, and to report to you the result of our deliberations.

2. We have held nine meetings in which our attention
has been directed mainly to the various proposals for a
League of Nations which were formulated in the 16th and
17th centuries and to those which have been put forward
since the recent revival of the movement.

3. With regard to other methods of international
combinations for avoiding war which were actually
attempted during the 19th century, we have not completed
our investigation, and without further inquiry into past
political experience we would offer no opinion as to
whether a modification of those methods or a formal
League of Nations is the more promising means of secur-
ing the end in view.

4. The earlier projects which aimed at setting up a kind
of European Confederation with a supernational authority
we have after consideration rejected, feeling that inter-
national opinion is not ripe for so drastic a pooling of
sovereignty, and that the only feasible method of securing
the object is by way of co-operation or possibly a treaty of
alliance on the lines of the more recent schemes.

5. We have accordingly carefully considered those
schemes, all of which substitute, in place of the earlier
idea of confederation, a system working by means of a
permanent conference and an arbitral tribunal. None
of them, however, in their entirety appear to your Com-
mittee to be practicable or likely to meet with acceptance.
We have therefore drafted a Convention in which, while
embodying their leading ideas, we have endeavored to
avoid their more obvious stumbling blocks.

6. On the assumption that a League of Nations may be
regarded as a possible solution of the problem, we now
submit this draft as the best we have been able to devise,
to serve as a basis for an interchange of views. In mak-

"PHILLIMORE PLAN" FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 69

ing it the subject of an Interim Report we have been
influenced by the consideration that His Majesty's
Government may regard it as desirable to initiate such
an interchange of views before the termination of the
war.

7. The primary object of the proposed alliance will be
that whatever happens peace shall be preserved between
members of the alliance. The secondary object will be
the provision of means for disposing of disputes which
may arise between the members of the alliance. Our
draft treaty, therefore, divides itself into four parts:
Articles 1 and 2, which stand very much by themselves,
are to provide for the avoidance of war; Articles 3 to 12,
for the pacific settlement of international disputes;
Articles 13 to 17, for the relations between the allied
States and States not party to the Convention; while
Article 18 provides that this treaty shall override all
others.

8. The mutual covenant not to go to war is contained
in Article 1. We have not covered all cases. We have
provided that no State shall go to war without previously
submitting the matter to arbitration or to the Conference
of the League, nor while the discussion is pending in
debate, nor shall seek any further satisfaction than that
which the award or the recommendation of the Conference
requires. This leaves untouched the case in which the
Conference can make no recommendation, but we are in
great hope that this event will be rare. There will be
every inducement to the Conference to find a mode of
escaping from war, and, at any rate, the time will be so
long drawn out that passions will have cooled. The other
case omitted is when a State that has given cause of
offense refuses to abide by the award or the recommenda-
tion of the Conference. It might be suggested that in
this case the whole power of the League should be used
to enforce submission, but we have felt a doubt whether
States would contract to do this, and a still greater doubt
whether, when the time came, they would fulfil their
contract. Most of the writers on this subject have hesi-
tated to recommend such a provision.

70 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

9. It will be noted that the proposed moratorium only
extends to actual warfare. Some writers have suggested
that there should be no warlike preparations during the
period. We have rejected this

(a) because it would be difficult to ascertain what were
special warlike preparations;

(6) because we would designedly give an opportunity to
the most peaceful State which had not kept its
armaments up to a high pitch to improve them
during the period of the moratorium, in this way
discounting to some extent the advantages which
a State which kept up excessive armaments
would otherwise have had.

10. Article 2 contains the sanction proposed. We have
desired to make it as weighty as possible. We have,
therefore, made it unanimous and automatic, and one to
which each State must contribute its force without wait-
ing for the others, but we have recognized that some States
may not be able to make, at any rate in certain cases, an
effective contribution of military or naval force. We
have accordingly provided that such States shall at the
least take the financial, economic, and other measures in-
dicated in the Article.

11. Article 3 is adapted from Article 38 of The Hague
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, 1907.

12. Article 4 expands an idea, the germ of which appears
in Article 48 of the same Covention ; it gives the power to a
State to apply ex parte to the Conference of the Allied
States. Reference to arbitration requires the consent of
both parties, but this provision will enable any one
State, party to the dispute, to bring its case before the
Conference even if the other State is not willing. We
have been careful to remember that there will be much
jealousy, particularly among the continental Powers of
Europe, of any provision which will appear to infringe
their independence or sovereignty, and therefore we do
not give the Conference, thus appealed to, any power of
adjudication, but only one of recommendation.

13. Article 5. — It is in our view desirable that if the

"PHILLIMORE PLAN" FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 71

Conference be appealed to it shall not fail to act, and, as
in cases which will come under Article 12 speedy action
would be required, we have made the assembly of the
Conference as it were automatic. It must be a matter for
diplomatic determination to settle its seat. If the League
should be in the first place confined to the present Allies,
a convenient seat might be Versailles. If the League
should embrace a number of States, and some of those at
present neutral, it might be better to place the seat in
Holland or Switzerland, or possibly in Belgium; but it .
should be a fixed place, and in this connection we have
been much impressed by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Maurice
Hankey's memorandum and address to us, in which he
pointed out the great advantage arising from constant mu-
tual intercourse between the representatives of nations, and
we therefore propose that, subject to the power of substitu-
tion or addition, the ordinary diplomatic representatives
at the capital which is the seat of the Conference should
represent their respective States.

14. The next questions which enter into consideration in
Articles 7, 10, 11, and 12 are whether the decisions of
the Conference must be unanimous, and whether, if any
resolutions may be passed by a majority, the voting
strength of the States should differ. We have concluded
to eliminate the States parties to the dispute, but the
precedents in favour of unanimity are so invariable that
we have not seen our way to give power to a majority, or
even a preponderant majority, to issue a definite recom-
mendation, though we are aware that many English
writers express themselves in a contrary sense. On the
other hand, we have felt that for all preliminary work the
vote of a majority should be sufficient. We may add
that we have been rather loath to frame a scheme under
which our own country should be rendered liable to have a
recommendation passed against it by a majority vote
in a matter vitally affecting the national interests, and
that we have also felt that if some of the enemy Powers are
even to come into this League they would equally be
unwilling to submit themselves to such a liability. As to
the question of the voting strength in cases where a

72 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

majority is to determine, most English and American
writers have contemplated giving a larger vote to the
more important Powers, and there are precedents, such as
the General Postal Union Treaty of 1878 and the Tele-
graphic Convention of 1897, for giving to those Powers
which have important colonial possessions additional
votes in respect of their colonies; but the experience
obtained during The Hague Conference of 1907 shows
that any such superiority would be greatly resented by
some States, and we have shrunk from providing it.

15. Article 11, as it will be seen, is expressed in an
alternative form. The first alternative is that which
commended itself to the majority of the Committee.

16. Article 12 is a substitutional provision for that
power of injunction which has been recommended by
many English and American writers. It has been felt
that if there is to be a moratorium, there may be cases
of continuing or irreparable injury to which the injured
State cannot be expected to submit. In order to meet
this difficulty these writers have taken an idea from the
legal procedure common to Great Britain and the United
States. But in applying this procedure to international
matters the following objections seem to arise:—

(a) If final awards or recommendations are not to be
the subject of enforcement by the League, it
would seem illogical that interlocutory awards or
recommendations should be so enforced.

(6) The aggressive State would certainly resent such an
infringement of its sovereignty and struggle to
prevent the use of an injunction, and the proceed-
ing would almost necessarily be so prolonged,
particularly if the injunction is to be the work of
the whole Conference, that the interlocutory
decision would hardly be reached sooner than
the final one, and the mischief would have been
done;

(c) It may be added that such knowledge as any of the
members of the Committee have of such foreign
jurisprudence as is founded on the Code de
Napoleon, leads them to doubt whether the

"PHILLIMORE PLAN" FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 73

procedure which most nearly approaches to the
Anglo-American injunction has received the
same development or occupies the same position
of importance which it has with us.

17. The Committee have, therefore, rejected the idea of
injunction, and submit this Article as a corrective for
hardship which might otherwise be worked by the mora-
torium.

18. Article 15 requires some observation. The scheme
of the British League of Nations Society makes the
League a defensive alliance as against external Powers,
and requires all the other Allied States to come to the
assistance of any one of them "which may be attacked by
an outside Power which refuses to submit the case to an
appropriate tribunal or council"; but the American
League to Enforce Peace has omitted this provision, and
only one known American speaker or writer has taken the
line of the British League. We have felt, therefore, that
our draft treaty might provoke opposition if we inserted
a clause obliging the Allies to mutual defense against ex-
ternal Powers, and we have substituted one which is
facultative only.

19. Under Article 17 we might draw attention to the
suggestion that when the League is once formed any
future applicant for admission may have terms imposed
upon him. This would enable the League to require
reparation for past outrages, or to insist upon partial
disarmament if the military or naval forces of the appli-
cant were disproportionate to those of the States already
in the League.

[Signed] WALTER G. F. PHILLIMORE (Chairman).
A. F. POLLARD.
JULIAN CORBETT.
J. HOLLAND ROSE.
EYRE A. CROWE.
W. TYRRELL.
C. J. B. HURST.
A. R. KENNEDY (Secretary).

March 20, 1918.

74

ANNEX.
DRAFT CONVENTION.

[There will be a Preamble reciting that the object of this
Convention is to create a League of Nations which
will, if possible, prevent all wars in the future.]

Avoidance of War.

ARTICLE 1. — Each of the Allied States (being the
parties to this Convention) agrees with the other Allied
States collectively and separately that it will not go to
war with another of the Allied States—
/ (a) without previously submitting the matter in dis-
pute to arbitration or to a Conference of the
Allied States ; and

(b) until there has been an award or a report by the

Conference, provided that in the case mentioned
in Article 12 the observance of this sub-clause
is suspended;
and also that it will not go to war —

(c) with another of the Allied States which complies

with the award or with the recommendation
(if any) made by the Conference in its report.
ARTICLE 2. — If, which may God avert, one of the Allied
States should break the covenant contained in the pre-
ceding Article, this State will become ipso facto at war
with all the other Allied States, and the latter agree to
take and to support each other in taking jointly and
severally all such measures — military, naval, financial,
and economic — as will best avail for restraining the breach
of covenant. Such financial and economic measures
shall include severance of all relations of trade and finance
with the subjects of the covenant-breaking State, pro-
hibition against the subjects of the Allied States entering
into any relations with the subjects of the covenant-
breaking State, and the prevention, so far as possible,
of the subjects of the covenant-breaking State from having
any commercial or financial intercourse with the subjects
of any other State whether party to this Convention or not.

"PHTTJJMORE PLAN" FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 75

For the purpose of this Article, the Allied States shall
detain any ship or goods belonging to any of the subjects
of the covenant-breaking State or coming from or destined
for any person residing in the territory of such state, and
shall take any other similar steps which shall be necessary
for the same purpose.

Such of the Allied States (if any) as cannot make an
effective contribution of military or naval force shall at
the least take the other measures indicated in this Article.

Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

ARTICLE 3. — If a dispute should hereafter arise between
any of the Allied States as to the interpretation of a
treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the
existence of any fact which if established would constitute
a breach of any international obligation, or as to the
nature and extent of the reparation to be made for any
such breach, if such dispute cannot be settled by negotia-
tion, arbitration is recognized by the Allied States as the
most effective and at the same time the most equitable
means of settling the dispute.

ARTICLE 4. — But if the Allied States concerned do not
agree that the dispute is suitable for reference to arbitra-
tion or do not agree as to the question to be referred or
as to the composition of the tribunal of arbitration, or
if for any other reason a reference to arbitration should
prove impracticable, any one of the Allied States con-
cerned may make application to the Conference of the
Allied States to take the matter of the dispute into con-
sideration.

ARTICLE 5. — The seat of the Conference shall be at X,
the convener shall be the Sovereign or President of the
State of X, and his representative shall be president of
the Conferences. The Allied States shall be represented
at the Conference by their diplomatic representatives
accredited to the State of X. In the event of X being
one of the States parties to the dispute, either State may
communicate with the Sovereign or President of Y, who
thereupon shall become the Convener and shall fix the
seat of the Conference and name its president.

76 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

The provisions of this Article shall not prejudice the
right of the Allied States to send other representatives to
the Conference, but the Conference shall be under no
obligation to await their arrival.

ARTICLE 6. — It shall be the duty of the convener of the
Conference to give notice of the application to the Con-
ference to every State party to the dispute and to summon
the Conference as speedily as possible.

ARTICLE 7. — The Conference shall regulate its own
procedure, and may appoint Committees to enquire and
report. In all matters covered by this Article the Con-
ference may decide by the votes of a majority of the
Allied States represented.

ARTICLE 8. — The function of the Conference shall be
to ascertain the facts with regard to the dispute, and to
make a recommendation based on the merits of the case,
and calculated to ensure a just and lasting settlement.
The recommendation shall not have the force of a decision.

ARTICLE 9. — The Allied States agree to place at the
disposal of the Conference, or of any Committee appointed
by the Conference, to the fullest possible extent com-
patible with their interests, the information in their pos-
session which bears upon the dispute.

ARTICLE 10. — The recommendation of the Conference
shall be addressed to the parties to the dispute, and will
not require their assent.

ARTICLE 11. — In the event of the Conference being
unable to agree upon a recommendation to be addressed
to the parties to the dispute, it shall be the duty of the
representatives of such of the Allied States attending
the Conference as shall be satisfied as to the nature of
the recommendation which should be made — provided
that they represent not less than a majority of the Allied
States attending the Conference — to publish on behalf
of the States which they represent a statement setting
out what they believe to be the facts with regard to the dis-
pute. They may also add thereto the text of the recom-
mendation which they consider the Conference should
have addressed to the parties to the dispute.

ALTERNATIVE ARTICLE 11. — If, in the event of the Con-

"PHILLIMORE PLAN" FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 77

ference being unable to agree upon a recommendation
to be addressed to the parties to the dispute, any State
or group of States having taken part in the Conference
issues a public statement of the view which, as a result
of the deliberations of the Conference, it takes of the
dispute, such action shall not be regarded as an unfriendly
act by either of the parties to the dispute.

ARTICLE 12. — Any one of the Allied States having a dis-
pute pending may apply to the Conference to be relieved
from the moratorium imposed by Article 1 (6) on the
ground that there is a continuing injury, or on the ground
that unless some prompt provision for the reparation or
restitution is made the injury will be irreparable. The
Conference shall, without deciding in any way upon the
merits of the dispute, forthwith consider this applica-
tion, and may relieve the applicant state from the pro-
visions of the moratorium, or may suggest terms of tem-
porary arrangement as a condition of not relieving the
applicant State from the moratorium, and may from
time to time reconsider the application and the terms
which should be imposed. In the event of relief from the
provisions of the moratorium being granted under this
Article, any of the Allied States may, notwithstanding
the provisions of Article 1, come to the assistance of the
State so relieved.

Relations between the Allied States and States not Party
to this Convention.

ARTICLE 13. — As regards disputes between one of the
Allied States and a State not party to this Convention,
the Allied State shall endeavor to obtain submission of
the dispute to arbitration, if it be of a suitable nature for
arbitration, and if the dispute be not of a nature suitable
for arbitration, or if the other State will not agree
to submit it to arbitration, the Allied State shall bring
it before the Conference. In the latter event, the con-
vener of the Conference shall, in the name of the League
of Nations, invite the State not party to this convention
to become for this purpose a party to the Conference and
to submit its case to the Conference, and in such case the

78 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

provisions hereinbefore contained shall be applicable to
the dispute both against and in favor of such State in
all respects as if it were a party to this Convention.

ARTICLE 14. — If the State not party to this Convention
will not accept the invitation to become ad hoc a party
to the Conference, the Conference may enquire into the
dispute ex parte, and may make a recommendation in the
same way as if both parties were present.

ARTICLE 15. — If the Allied State shall be attacked by
the other State before an award or a report of the Con-
ference is made, or notwithstanding the compliance of the
Allied State with the award or the recommendation (if
any) made by the Conference in its report, any of the
Allied States may come to its assistance.

ARTICLE 16. — In the case of a dispute between States
none of whom are parties to this Convention, any of the
Allied States may bring the matter before the Conference
with a view to the Conference using its good offices to
prevent war.

ARTICLE 17. — Any State not party to this Convention
may apply to the Conference for leave to become a party.
The Conference will forthwith examine the application
favorably, and will determine whether it should be
granted and whether it is necessary to impose any terms.

Conflict of Treaties.

ARTICLE 18. — A. The Allied States severally agree that
the present Convention abrogates all treaty obligations
inter se inconsistent with the terms hereof, and that they
will not enter into any engagements inconsistent with
the terms hereof, and that they will not enter into any
engagements inconsistent with the terms hereof.

B. Where any of the Allied States, before becoming
party to this Convention, shall have entered into any
treaty imposing upon it obligations inconsistent with the
terms of this Convention, it shall be the duty of such
State to take immediate steps to procure its release from
such obligations.

DOCUMENT 9.

Colonel House's proposed draft of a covenant
for the League of Nations (typewritten original),
July 16, 1918, with his letter of transmittal and
explanation to President Wilson (autographed).
The articles starred are those checked by Presi-
dent Wilson.

EDWARD M. HOUSE.
THE PRESIDENT,

The White House, Washington.

Dear Governor:

I am enclosing you the draft for a League of Nations.
The Preamble and Articles 1, 2, and 3 are the keystone of
the arch.

It is absolutely essential for the peoples of the world
to realize that they can never have international peace
and order if they permit their representatives to sanction
the unmoral practices of the past. Every large nation, as
you know, has been guilty. Bismarck's forgery of a
telegram in order to force a war on France is a notable
modern instance. Roosevelt's rape at Panama brings it
closely home. If these things had been done by private
individuals they would have been classed as criminals.

Articles 1, 2, and 3 might well come under the Preamble.
The reason they are segregated is that it gives them
emphasis and makes the pledge binding.

No. 4 was written with the intention of satisfying those
who would be distrustful of Germany in the event she
became a signatory power.

It is necessary I think to do away with the abominable
custom of espionage, but to abolish it and leave some
dishonorable nation free to surreptitiously prepare for
war would be a mistake. It is to be remembered that
nations are even more suspicious of one another than

79

80 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

individuals, and such suspicions, as in the case of indi-
viduals, is nine times out of ten unfounded. Instead of
letting this condition grow there should be some way in
which the truth could be openly arrived at.

No. 6 is taken largely from Article 5 of the British
Draft. Two alternatives are named for the seat of meet-
ings because it is conceivable that there might be trouble
between Holland and Belgium, and if either of them
represented X or Y it might be necessary to move the
conference to Z.

No. 9. The first and last sentences in this are taken
verbatim from Article 7 of the British Draft. I inter-
larded a sentence providing for a Secretariat and for the
funds to maintain it.

To all intents and purposes the representatives of the
contracting powers become automatically an International
Parliament, and I am sure it will be necessary for them
to be in almost continuous session. I believe that it
will be a place of such power and consequence that the
contracting parties will send their leading statesmen to
represent them. It will be a greater honor to become
a member of this body than to hold any other appointive
position in the world, and it is probable that ex-Presidents,
ex-Prime Ministers and ex-Chancellors will be chosen.

No. 10 provides for an International Court to have juris-
diction to determine certain questions which are now
determined in many countries in courts of last resort.
This court should be smaller than fifteen members.

In the past I have been opposed to a court, but in work-
ing the matter out it has seemed to me a necessary part
of the machinery. In time the court might well prove
the strongest part of it.

No. 11 was written largely to conform with the laws
and practices of certain nations, particularly the Latin
American Republics.

No. 12 has in mind the possibility of using, if de-
sired, courts of last resort now in being, as a medium
for the settlement of disputes in the event other methods
prescribed do not appeal to certain nations. I also had
in mind that if such a provision were a part of the Cove-

COLONEL HOUSE'S DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 81

nant, it would have a tendency to make all courts of last
appeal broader and less biased in passing upon inter-
national questions.

Nos. 16, 17, 18 and 19 are obvious and in the event that
it is desirable to have a League limited to the Great
Powers, these articles would force every nation not a
member of the League to submit their disputes to the
League, or use the forms of settlement prescribed by it.

Articles 13, 14 and 16 of the British Draft seek in a
measure to accomplish the same purpose, but in an en-
tirely different way.

No. 20 was written with the thought that it would not
do to have territorial guarantees inflexible. It is quite
conceivable that conditions might so change in the course
of time as to make it a serious hardship for certain por-
tions of one nation to continue under the government of
that nation. For instance, it is conceivable that Canada
might sometime wish to become a part of the United
States. It is also a possibility that Chihuahua, Coahuila
or Lower California might desire to become a part of
this country and with the consent in each instance of the
mother country.

No. 22. The first sentence of this article is taken ver-
batim from the British Article 17. I did not use their
second sentence for the reason that it seemed to point
to Germany, and I have worded the second sentence of
No. 22 differently to avoid this.

No. 23 is almost a verbatim copy of Article 1 of the

British. Affectionately yours,

Magnolia, Massachusetts, ^^ K M' H°USE'
July 16, 1918.

SUGGESTION FOR A
COVENANT OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

PREAMBLE.

International civilization having proved a failure be-
cause there has not been constructed a fabric of law to

82 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

which nations have yielded with the same obedience and
deference as individuals submit to intra-national laws,
and because public opinion has sanctioned unmoral acts
relating to international affairs, it is the purpose of the
States signatory to this Convention to form a League
of Nations having for its purpose the maintenance through-
out the world of peace, security, progress and orderly
government. Therefore it is agreed as follows :

ARTICLE 1. — The same standards of honor and ethics
shall prevail internationally and in affairs of nations as
in other matters. The agreement or promise of a Power
shall be inviolate.*

ARTICLE 2. — No official of a Power shall either directly
or by indirection on behalf of his Government, be ex-
pected or permitted to act or communicate other than
consistently with the truth, the honor and the obliga-
tion of the power which he represents.*

ARTICLE 3. — Any attempt by a Power, either openly
or in secret, whether by propaganda or otherwise, to in-
fluence one Power or nation against another shall be
deemed dishonorable.*

ARTICLE 4. — Any open or direct inquiry regarding the
acts or purposes of a Power may be made by another
Power as of course, and shall be regarded as an act of
friendship tending to promote frankness in international
relations, but any secret inquiry to such end shall be
deemed dishonorable.

ARTICLE 5. — Any war or threat of war is a matter of
concern to the League of Nations, and to the Powers,
members thereof.*

ARTICLE 6. — The Ambassadors and Ministers of the
Contracting Powers to X and the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of X shall act as the respective delegates of the
Powers in the League of Nations. The meetings of the
delegates shall be held at the seat of government of X, and
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of X shall be the presid-
ing officer.

If the delegates deem it necessary or advisable, they
may meet temporarily at the seat of government of Y or

*The articles starred are those checked by President Wilson.

COLONEL HOUSE'S DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 83

Z, in which case the Ambassador or Minister to X of
the country in which the meeting is held, shall be the pre-
siding officer pro tempore.*

ARTICLE 7. — The Delegates shall meet in the interests of
peace whenever war is rumored or threatened, and also
whenever a Delegate of any power shall inform the Dele-
gates that a meeting in the interests of peace is advisable.*

ARTICLE 8. — The Delegates shall also meet at such
other times as they shall from time to time determine.*

ARTICLE 9. — The Delegates shall regulate their own
procedure and may appoint committees to inquire and
report. The Delegates shall constitute a Secretariat and
fix the duties thereof and all expenses of the Secretariat
shall be paid by the Contracting Powers as the Delegates
may determine. In all matters covered by this article
the Delegates may decide by the votes of a majority of
the Contracted Powers represented.*

ARTICLE 10. — An International Court composed of not
more than fifteen members shall be constituted, which
shall have jurisdiction to determine any difference between
nations which has not been settled by diplomacy, arbitra-
tion, or otherwise, and which relates to the existence,
interpretation, or effect of a treaty, or which may be sub-
mitted by consent, or which relates to matters of com-
merce, including in such matter, the validity or effect
internationally of a statute regulation or practice. The
Delegates may at their discretion submit to the Court
such other questions as may seem to them advisable.

The judges of the International Court shall, both origi-
nally and from time to time as vacancies may occur, be
chosen by the Delegates. A judge of the International
Court shall retire from office when he shall have reached
the age of seventy-two years, and may be so retired at
any time by a vote of two thirds of the Delegates, but
in case of retirement of a judge from office, the salary
paid to him shall be continued to be so paid during his
natural life.

A judge may be removed by a vote of two thirds of the
Delegates. The International Court shall formulate its
own rules of procedure.

84 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ARTICLE 11. — Any difference between nations relating to
matters of commerce and which involves the validity or ef-
fect internationally of a statute regulation or practice, shall,
if the Power having adopted such statute regulation or
practice so request, be submitted to its highest national
court for decision, before submission to the International
Court.

ARTICLE 12. — The highest national court of each Con-
tracting Power shall have jurisdiction to hear and finally
determine any international dispute which may be sub-
mitted by consent for its decision.

ARTICLE 13. — The Contracting Powers agree that all
disputes between or among them or any of them of any
nature whatsoever which shall not be settled by diplomacy
and which are not within the provisions of Article 10 shall
be referred for arbitration before three arbitrators, one to
be selected by each party to the dispute and one to be
chosen by two arbitrators so selected, or in the event of
their failure to agree to such choice, the third arbitrator
shall be selected by the Delegates.

The decision of the arbitrators may be set aside on the
appeal of a party to the dispute, by a vote of three fourths
of the Delegates, if the decision of the arbitrators was
unanimous, and by a vote of two thirds of the Delegates
if the decision of the arbitrators was not unanimous, but
shall otherwise be finally binding and conclusive.

When any decision of the arbitrators shall have been
set aside by the Delegates, the dispute shall again be sub-
mitted to arbitration before three arbitrators, chosen as
heretofore provided, but none of whom shall have pre-
viously acted as such and the decision of the arbitrators
upon the second arbitration shall be finally binding and
conclusive without right of appeal.*

ARTICLE 14. — Any Power which the Delegates deter-
mine shall have failed to submit to the International
Court any dispute of which that Court has jurisdiction
as of course, or failed or neglected to carry out any de-
cision of that Court, or of a national court to which a
dispute has been submitted by consent for decision, or
failed to submit to arbitration any dispute pursuant to

COLONEL HOUSE'S DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 85

i

Article 13, hereof, or failed to carry out any decision of
the arbitrators, shall thereupon lose and be deprived of
all rights of commerce and intercourse with the Contract-
ing Powers.*

ARTICLE 15. — If any Power shall declare war or begin
hostilities before submitting a dispute with another
Power as the case may be, either to the International
Court or to Arbitrators, as herein provided, or shall de-
clare war or begin hostilities in regard to any dispute
which has been decided adversely to it by said Court or
by Arbitrators or pursuant to Article 12 hereof, as the
case may be, the Contracting Powers shall not only cease
all commerce and intercourse with that Power as in
Article 14 provided, but shall also arrange to blockade
and close the frontiers of that power to commerce and
intercourse with the world.*

ARTICLE 16. — As regards disputes between one of the
Contracting Powers and a Power not a party to this Con-
vention, the Contracting Power shall endeavor to ob-
tain submission of the dispute to judicial decision or to
arbitration. If the other state will not agree to submit the
dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration the Con-
tracting Power shall bring it before the Delegates. In
the latter event the Delegates shall in the name of the
League of Nations invite the state not a party to this
Convention to become ad hoc a party and to submit its
case to judicial decision or to arbitration and in such case
the provisions hereinbefore contained shall be applicable
to the dispute both against and in favor of such state
in all respects as if it were a party to this Convention.*

ARTICLE 17. — If the state not a party to this Convention
will not accept the invitation to become ad hoc a party,
the Delegates shall inquire into the dispute and shall make
a recommendation in respect thereof.*

ARTICLE 18. — If hostilities shall be commenced against
the Contracting Power by the other state before a de-
cision of the dispute, or before the recommendation made
by the Delegates in respect thereof, or contrary to such
recommendation, the Contracting Powers will thereupon
cease all commerce and intercourse with the other state

86 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

and will also arrange to blockade and close the frontiers of
that state to commerce and intercourse with the world
. and any of the Contracting Powers may come to the
assistance of the Contracting Power against which hos-
tilities have been commenced.*

ARTICLE 19. — In the case of a dispute between states
not parties to this Convention, any Power may bring the
matter before the Delegates, who shall tender the good
offices of the League of Nations with a view to the peace-
able settlement of the dispute.

If one of the Powers, party to the dispute, shall offer
and agree to submit its interests and cause of action in
regard thereto wholly to the control and decision of the
League of Nations, that Power shall ad hoc be deemed a
Contracting Power. If no one of the Powers, parties to
such dispute, shall so offer and agree, the Delegates shall
take such action and make such recommendations to
their Governments as will preserve peace and prevent
hostilities and result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE 20. — The Contracting Powers unite in several
guarantees to each other of their territorial integrity and
*/ political independence, subject, however, to such terri-
torial modifications, if any, as may become necessary
in the future by reason of changes in present racial con-
ditions and aspirations, pursuant to the principle of
self-determination and as shall also be regarded by three
fourths of the Delegates as necessary and proper for the
welfare of the peoples concerned; recognizing also that
all territorial changes involve equitable compensation and
that the peace of the world is superior in importance and
interest to questions of boundary.*

ARTICLE 21. — The Contracting Powers recognize the
principle that permanent peace will require that national
armaments shall be reduced to the lowest point consistent
with safety, and the Delegates are directed to formulate
at once a plan by which such a reduction may be brought
about. The plan so formulated shall not be binding until
and unless unanimously approved by the Governments
signatory to this Covenant.

The Contracting Powers agree that munitions and

COLONEL HOUSE'S DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 87

implements of war shall not be manufactured by private
enterprise and that publicity as to all national armaments
and programmes is essential.*

ARTICLE 22. — Any Power not a party to this Conven-
tion may apply to the Delegates for leave to become a
party. The Delegates may act favorably on the applica-
tion if they shall regard the granting thereof as tending to
promote the peace and security of the world.*

ARTICLE 23. — A. The Contracting Powers severally
agree that the present Convention abrogates all treaty
obligations inter se inconsistent with the terms thereof,
and that they will not enter into any engagements in-
consistent with the terms hereof.

B. Where any of the Contracting Powers, before be-
coming party to this Convention, shall have entered into
any treaty imposing upon it obligations inconsistent with
the terms of this Convention, it shall be the duty of such
Power to take immediate steps to procure its release from
such obligations.*

DOCUMENT 10.

President Wilson's first draft of the Covenant
of the League of Nations (original draft on his
own typewriter).

COVENANT.

PREAMBLE.

In order to secure peace, security, and orderly govern-
ment by the prescription of open and honorable relations
between nations, by the firm establishment of the un-
derstandings of international law as the actual rule of
conduct among governments, and by the rrainterance of
justice and a scrupulous respect of all treaty obligations
in the dealings of all organized peoples with one another,
the Powers signatory to this covenant and agreement
jointly and severally adopt this constitution of the
League of Nations.

ARTICLE I. — The action of the Signatory Powers under
the terms of this agreement shall be effected through the
instrumentality of a Body of Delegates which shall
consist of the ambassadors and ministers of the contract-
ing Powers accredited to H. and the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of H. The meetings of the Body of Delegates
shall be held at the seat of government of H. and the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. shall be the presiding
officer of the Body.

Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable,
they may meet temporarily at the seat of government of
B. or of S., in which case the Ambassador or Minister to
H. of the country in which the meeting is held shall be
the presiding officer pro tempore.

ARTICLE II. — The Body of Delegates shall regulate
their own procedure and shall have power to appoint such

88

WILSON'S FIRST DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 89

committees as they may deem necessary to inquire into
and report upon any matters which lie within the field of
their action.

They shall organize a Secretariat to act as their min-
isterial agency, and the expense of the maintenance of the
Secretariat shall be borne as they may prescribe.

In all matters covered by this Article the Body of
Delegates may decide by a majority vote of the whole
Body.

ARTICLE III. — The Contracting Powers unite in guar-
anteeing to each other political independence and terri-
torial integrity; but it is understood between them that
such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future
become necessary by reason of changes in present racial
conditions and aspirations or present social and political
relationships, pursuant to the principle of self -de termina-
tion, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the
judgment of three-fourths of the Delegates be demanded
by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples con-
cerned, may be effected, if agreeable to those peoples;
and that territorial changes may in equity involve
material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept
without reservation the principle that the peace of the
world is superior in importance to every question of
political jurisdiction or boundary.

Article IV. — (H. 21.) The Contracting Powers rec-
ognize the principle that the establishment and main-
tenance of peace will require the reduction of national
armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic
safety and the enforcement by common action of inter-
national obligations; and the Delegates are directed to
formulate at once plans by which such a reduction may
be brought about. The plan so formulated shall be
binding when, and only when, unanimously approved by
the Governments signatory to this Covenant.

The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions
and implements of war shall not be manufactured by
private enterprise or for private profit, and that there shall
be full and frank publicity as to all national armaments
and military or naval programmes.

90 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ARTICLE V. — The Contracting Powers agree that all
disputes arising between or among them of whatever
nature, which shall not be satisfactorily settled by diplo-
macy, shall be referred for arbitration to three arbitra-
tors, one of the three to be selected by each of the parties to
the dispute, when there are but two such parties, and
the third by the two thus selected. When there are more
than two parties to the dispute, one arbitrator shall be
named by each of the several parties and the arbitrators
thus named shall add to their number others of their own
choice, the number thus added to be limited to the
number which will suffice to give a deciding voice to
the arbitrators thus added in case of a tie vote among the
arbitrators chosen by the contending parties. In case
the arbitrators chosen by the contending parties cannot
agree upon an additional arbitrator or arbitrators, the
additional arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by the
Body of Delegates.

On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of
the arbitrators may be set aside by a vote of three-fourths
of the Delegates, in case the decision of the arbitrators was
unanimous, or by a vote of two-thirds of the Delegates in
case the decision of the arbitrators was not unanimous,
but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and con-
clusive.

When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus
set aside the dispute shall again be submitted to arbitra-
tors chosen as heretofore provided, none of whom shall,
however, have previously acted as arbitrators in the dis-
pute in question, and the decision of the arbitrators
rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally binding
and conclusive without right of appeal.

ARTICLE VI. — (H. 14.) Any power which the Body of
Delegates shall declare to have failed to submit any
dispute to arbitration under the terms of Article V of this
Covenant or to have refused or failed to carry out any
decision of such arbitration shall thereupon lose and be
deprived of all rights of commerce and intercourse with
any of the Contracting Powers.

ARTICLE VII. — If any Power shall declare war or begin

WILSON'S FIRST DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 91

hostilities, or take any hostile step short of war, against
another Power before submitting the dispute involved to
arbitrators as herein provided, or shall declare war or
begin hostilities, or take any hostile step short of war, in
regard to any dispute which has been decided adversely to
it by arbitrators chosen and empowered as herein provided,
the Contracting Powers hereby bind themselves not only
to cease all commerce and intercourse with that Power but
also to unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that
power to commerce or intercourse with any part of the
world and to use any force that may be necessary to
accomplish that object.

ARTICLE VIII. — (H. 5, 7, 8.) Any war or threat of
war, whether immediately affecting any of the Contract-
ing Powers or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern
to the League of Nations and to all the Powers signatory
hereto, and those Powers hereby reserve the right to take
any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safe-
guard the peace of nations.

The Delegates shall meet in the interest of peace
whenever war is rumoured or threatened, and also when-
ever the Delegate of any Power shall inform the Delegates
that a meeting and conference in the interest of peace is
advisable.

The Delegates may also meet at such other times and
upon such other occasions as they shall from time to time
deem best and determine.

ARTICLE IX. — (H. 16, 17.) In the event of a dispute
arising between one of the Contracting Powers and a
Power not a party to this Covenant, the Contracting
Power involved hereby binds itsell to endeavour to obtain
the submission of the dispute to judicial decision or to
arbitration. If the other Power will not agree to submit
the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration, the
Contracting Power shall bring the matter to the attention
of the Body of Delegates. The Delegates shall in such
case, in the name of the League of Nations, invite the
Power not a party to this Covenant to become ad hoc a
party and to submit its case to judicial decision or to
arbitration, and if that Power consents it is hereby agreed

92 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

that the provisions hereinbefore contained and applicable
to the submission of disputes to arbitration shall be in
all respects applicable to the dispute both in favour of
and against such Power as if it were a party to this Cove-
nant.

In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall
accept the invitation of the Delegates to become ad hoc
a party, it shall be the duty of the Delegates immediately
to institute an inquiry into the circumstances and merits
of the dispute involved and to recommend such joint
action by the Contracting Powers as may seem best and
most effectual in the circumstances disclosed.

ARTICLE X. — (H. 18.) If hostilities should be begun
or any hostile action taken against the Contracting Power
by the Power not a party to this Covenant before a
decision of the dispute by arbitrators or before investiga-
tion, report, and recommendation by the Delegates in
regard to the dispute, or contrary to such recommenda-
tion, the Contracting Powers shall thereupon cease all
commerce and communication with that Power and shall
also unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that
Power to all commerce or intercourse with any part of the
world, employing jointly any force that may be necessary
to accomplish that object. The Contracting Powers shall
also unite in coming to the assistance of the Contracting
Power against which hostile action has been taken, com-
bining their armed forces in its behalf.

ARTICLE XI. — (H. 19.) In case of a dispute between
states not parties to this Covenant, any Contracting
Power may bring the matter to the attention of the Dele-
gates, who shall thereupon tender the good offices of the
League of Nations with a view to the peaceable settlement
of the dispute.

If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer
and agree to submit its interests and cause of action wholly
to the control and decision of the League of Nations, that
state shall ad hoc be deemed a Contracting Power. If no
one of the states, parties to the dispute, shall so offer and
agree, the Delegates shall of their own motion take such
action and make such recommendation to their govern-

WILSON'S FIRST DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 93

ments as will prevent hostilities and result in the settle-
ment of the dispute.

ARTICLE XII. — (H. 22.) Any Power not a party to
this Covenant may apply to the Body of Delegates for
leave to become a party. If the Delegates shall regard
the granting thereof as likely to promote the peace, order,
and security of the World, they may act favourably on
the application, and their favourable action shall operate
to constitute -the Power so applying in all respects a full
signatory party to this Covenant.

ARTICLE XIII. — (H. 23.) The Contracting Powers
severally agree that the present Covenant and Conven-
tion is accepted as abrogating all treaty obligations
inter se which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and
solemnly engage that they will not enter into any engage-
ments inconsistent with the terms hereof.

In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subse-
quently admitted to the 'League of Nations shall, before
becoming a party to this covenant, have undertaken any
treaty obligations which are inconsistent with the terms
of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to
take immediate steps to procure its release from such
obligations.

DOCUMENT 11.

Proposals made by General Jan Smuts for a
League of Nations. General Smuts 's original
proposals were made in the form of a pamphlet
of twenty pages, dated December 16, 1918.
From this the President had copied out the
twenty-one specific proposals as in the following
document. He worked from this in re-drafting
the Covenant.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

A.

1. That in the vast multiplicity of territorial, economic,
and other problems with which the Conference will find
itself confronted, it should look upon the setting-up of a
League of Nations as its primary and basic task, and as
supplying the necessary organ by means of which most
of those problems can find their only stable solution. In-
deed, the Conference should look upon itself as the first
or preliminary meeting of the League, intended to work
out its organization, functions, and programme.

2. That, so far at any rate as the peoples and terri-
tories formerly belonging to Russia, Austria-Hungary,
and Turkey are concerned, the League of Nations should
be considered as the reversionary in the most general
sense, and as clothed with the right of ultimate disposal
in accordance with certain fundamental principles. The
reversion to the League of Nations should be substituted
for any policy of national annexation.

3. These principles are: firstly, that there shall be no
annexation of any of these territories to any of the vic-
torious States, and secondly, that in the future govern-
ment of these territories and peoples the rule of self-

94

SMUTS 'S PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 95

determination, or the consent of the governed to their
form of government, shall be fairly and reasonably ap-
plied.

4. That any authority, control, or administration
which may be necessary in respect of these territories
and peoples, other than their own self-determined auton-
omy, shall be the exclusive function of and shall be vested
in the League of Nations and exercised by or on behalf
of it.

5. That it shall be lawful for the League of Nations to
delegate its authority, control or administration in respect
of any people or territory to some other State whom it may
appoint as its agent or mandatary, but that, wherever
possible, the agent or mandatary so appointed shall be
nominated or approved by the autonomous people or
territory.

6. That the degree of authority, control, or administra-
tion exercised by the mandatary State shall in each case
be laid down by the League in a special Act or Charter
which shall reserve to it complete power of ultimate
control and supervision as well as the right to appeal to
it from the territory or people affected against any gross
breach of the mandate by the mandatary State.

7. That the mandatary State shall in each case be
bound to maintain the policy of the open door or equal
economic opportunity for all, and shall form no military
forces beyond the standard laid down by the League for
purposes of internal police.

8. That no new State arising from the old Empires be
recognized or admitted into the League unless on con-
dition that its military forces and armaments shall con-
form to a standard laid down by the League in respect
of it from time to time.

9. That, as the successor to the Empires, the League
of Nations will directly and without power of delegation
watch over the relations inter se of the new independent
States arising from the break-up of those Empires, and
will regard as a very special task the duty of conciliating
and composing differences between them with a view to
the maintenance of good order and general peace.

96 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

B.

10. The constitution of the League will be that of a
permanent Conference between the Governments of the
constituent States for the purpose of joint international
action in certain defined respects, and will not derogate
from the independence of those States. It will consist
of a General Conference, a Council, and Courts of arbi-
tration and conciliation.

11. The General Conference, in which all constituent
States will have equal voting power, will meet periodi-
cally to discuss matters submitted to it by the Council.
These matters will be general measures of international
law or arrangements or general proposals for the limita-
tions of armaments or securing world peace, or any other
general resolutions, the discussion of which by the Con-
ference is desired by the Council before they are forwarded
for the approval of the constituent Governments. Any
resolutions passed by the Conference will have the effect
of recommendations to the national Governments and
Parliaments.

12. The Council will be the executive committee of the
League, and will consist of the Prime Ministers or Foreign
Secretaries or other authoritative representatives of the
Great Powers, together with representatives drawn in
rotation from two panels of the middle powers and the
minor States respectively, in such a way that the Great
Powers have a bare majority. A minority of three or
more can veto any action or resolution of the Council.

13. The Council will meet periodically and will, in
addition, hold an annual meeting of Prime Ministers or
Foreign Secretaries for a general interchange of views
and for a review of the general policies of the League.
It will appoint a permanent secretariat and staff, and will
appoint joint committees for the study and coordination
of the international questions with which the Council
deals, or questions likely to lead to international dis-
putes. It will also take the necessary steps for keeping up
proper liaison, not only with the Foreign Offices of the
constituent Governments, but also with the mandataries

SMUTS 'S PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 97

acting on behalf of the League in various parts of the
world.

14. Its functions will be: —

(a) to take executive action or control in regard to the
matters set forth in Section A or under any international
arrangements or conventions;

(b) to formulate for the approval of the Governments
general measures of international law or arrangement or
for limitation of armaments or promotion of world peace.

(Its remaining functions in regard to world peace are
dealt with in the following section C.)

C.

15. That all the States represented at the Peace Con-
ference shall agree to the abolition of conscription or
compulsory military service; and that their future defence
forces shall consist of militia or volunteers, whose num-
bers and training shall after expert inquiry be fixed by the
Council of the League.

16. That while the limitation of armaments in the
general sense is impracticable, the Council of the League
shall determine what direct military equipment and arm-
ament is fair and reasonable in respect of the scale of
forces laid down under (15) ; and that the limits fixed by
the Council shall not be exceeded without its permission.

17. That all factories for the production of direct
weapons of war shall be nationalized and their production
shall be subject to the inspection of the officers of the
Council; and that the Council shall be furnished periodi-
cally with returns of imports and exports of munitions
of war into or from the territories of its members, and as
far as possible into or from other countries.

18. That the Peace Treaty shall provide that the mem-
bers of the League bind themselves jointly and severally
not to go to war with one another: —

(a) without previously submitting the matter in dispute
to arbitration or inquiry by the Council of the League;
and

(b) until there has been an award or a report by the
Council; and

98 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

(c) not even then, as against a member which complies
with the award or recommendation (if any) made by the
Council in its report.

19. That the Peace Treaty shall provide that if any
member of the League breaks its covenant under para-
graph (18), it shall ipso facto become at war with all the
other members of the League, which shall subject it to
complete economic and financial boycott, including the
severance of all trade and financial relations and the pro-
hibition of all intercourse between their subjects and the
subjects of the covenant-breaking State, and the pre-
vention, as far as possible, of the subjects of the covenant-
breaking State from having any commercial or financial
intercourse with the subjects of any other State, whether
a member of the League or not.

While all the members of the League are obliged to
take the above measures, it is left to the Council to decide
what effective naval or military force the members shall
contribute, and, if advisable, to absolve the smaller mem-
bers of the League from making such contribution.

The covenant-breaking State shall, after the restora-
tion of peace, be subject to perpetual disarmament and
to the peaceful regime established for new States under
paragraph (8).

20. That the Peace Treaty shall further provide that
if a dispute should arise between any members of the
League as to the interpretation of a treaty, or as to any
question of international law, or as to any fact which if
established would constitute a breach of any international
obligation, or as to any damage alleged and the nature and
measure of the reparation to be made thereto, and if such
dispute cannot be settled by negotiation, the members
bind themselves to submit the dispute to arbitration and
to carry out any award or decision which may be rendered.

21. That if on any ground it proves impracticable to
refer such dispute to arbitration, either party to the dis-
pute may apply to the Council to take the matter of
the dispute into consideration. The Council shall give
notice of the application to the other party and make the
necessary arrangements for the hearing of the dispute.

SMUTS 'S PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 99

The Council shall ascertain the facts with regard to the
dispute and make recommendations based on the merits
and calculated to secure a just and lasting settlement.
Other members of the League shall place at the disposal of
the League all information in their possession which bears
on the dispute. The Council shall do its utmost by
mediation and conciliation to induce the disputants to
agree to a peaceful settlement. The recommendations
shall be addressed to the disputants and shall not have
the force of decisions. If either party threatens to go to
war in spite of the recommendations, the Council shall
publish its recommendations. If the Council fails to
arrive at recommendations, both the majority and the
minority on the Council may publish statements of the
respective recommendations they favour, and such publi-
cations shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by
either of the disputants.

DOCUMENT 12.

President Wilson's second draft (first printed
draft) of the Covenant, distributed January 10,
1919.

COVENANT.

PREAMBLE.

In order to secure peace, security, and orderly govern-
ment by the prescription of open, just, and honorable
relations between nations, by the firm establishment of
the understandings of international law as the actual rule
of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance
of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obliga-
tions in the dealings of organized peoples with one another,
the Powers signatory to this covenant and agreement
jointly and severally adopt this constitution of the
League of Nations.

ARTICLE I. — The action of the Signatory Powers under
the terms of this agreement shall be effected through the
instrumentality of a Body of Delegates which shall consist
of the ambassadors and ministers of the contracting Powers
accredited to H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H.
The meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at
the seat of government of H. and the Minister for Foreign
affairs of H. shall be the presiding officer of the Body.

Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable,
they may meet temporarily at the seat of government of
B. or of S., in which case the Ambassador or Minister to
H. of the country in which the meeting is held shall be
the presiding officer pro tempore.

It shall be the privilege of any of the contracting Powers
to assist its representative in the Body of Delegates by any
method of conference, counsel, or advice that may seem

100

WILSON 'S SECOND DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 101

best to it, and also to substitute upon occasion a special
representative for its regular diplomatic representative
accredited to H.

ARTICLE II. — The Body of Delegates shall regulate
their own procedure and shall have power to appoint such
committees as they may deem necessary to inquire into
and report upon any matters that lie within the field of
their action.

It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates, upon the
initiative of any member, to discuss, either publicly or
privately as it may deem best, any matter lying within
the jurisdiction of the League of Nations as defined in this
Covenant, or any matter likely to affect the peace of the
world ; but all actions of the Body of Delegates taken in the
exercise of the functions and powers granted to them under
this Covenant shall be first formulated and agreed upon
by an Executive Council, which shall act either by refer-
ence or upon its own initiative and which shall consist
of the representatives of the Great Powers together with
representatives drawn in annual rotation from two panels,
one of which shall be made up of the representatives of
the States ranking next after the Great Powers and the
other of the representatives of the minor States (a classi-
fication which the Body of Delegates shall itself establish
and may from time to time alter), such a number being
drawn from these panels as will be but one less than the
representatives of the Great Powers; and three or more
negative votes in the Council shall operate as a veto upon
any action or resolution proposed.

All resolutions passed or actions taken by the Body of
Delegates upon the recommendation of the Executive
Council, except those adopted in execution of any direct
powers herein granted to the Body of Delegates them-
selves, shall have the effect of recommendations to the
several governments of the League.

The Executive Council shall appoint a permanent
Secretariat and staff and may appoint joint committees
chosen from the Body of Delegates or consisting of
specially qualified persons outside of that Body, for the
study and systematic consideration of the international

102 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

questions with which the Council may have to deal, or of
questions likely to lead to international complications or
disputes. It shall also take the necessary steps to
establish and maintain proper liaison both with the foreign
offices of the signatory powers and with any governments
or agencies which may be acting as mandatories of the
League of Nations in any part of the world.

ARTICLE III. — The Contracting Powers unite in guar-
anteeing to each other political independence and terri-
torial integrity; but it is understood between them that
such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future
become necessary by reason of changes in present racial
conditions and aspirations or present social and political
relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determina-
tion, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the
judgment of three-fourths of the Delegates be demanded
by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples con-
cerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples ; and
that territorial changes may in equity involve material
compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without
reservation the principle that the peace of the world is
superior in importance to every question of Political
jurisdiction or boundary.

ARTICLE IV. — The Contracting Powers recognize the
principle that the establishment and maintenance of
peace will require the reduction of national armaments
to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and
the enforcement by common action of international
obligations; and the Delegates are directed to formulate
at once plans by which such a reduction may be brought
about. The plan so formulated shall be binding when,
and only when, unanimously approved by the Govern-
ments signatory to this Covenant.

As the basis for such a reduction of armaments, all the
Powers subscribing to the Treaty of Peace of which this
Covenant constitutes a part hereby agree to abolish
conscription and all other forms of compulsory military
service, and also agree that their future forces of defence
and of international action shall consist of militia or
volunteers, whose numbers and methods of training shall

WILSON'S SECOND DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 103

be fixed, after expert inquiry, by the agreements with
regard to the reduction of armaments referred to in the
last preceding paragraph.

The Body of Delegates shall also determine for the
consideration and action of the several governments what
direct military equipment and armament is fair and
reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down
in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when
adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of
the Body of Delegates.

The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions
and implements of war shall not be manufactured by
private enterprise or for private profit, and that there shall
be full and frank publicity as to all national armaments
and military or naval programmes.

ARTICLE V. — The Contracting Powers jointly and
severally agree that, should disputes or difficulties arise
between or among them which cannot be satisfactorily
settled or adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy,
they will in no case resort to armed force without pre-
viously submitting the questions and matters involved
either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Executive
Council of the Body of Delegates or until there has been an
award by the arbitrators or a decision by the Executive
Council ; and that they will not even then resort to armed
force as against a member of the League of Nations who
complies with the award of the arbitrators or the decision
of the Executive Council.

The Powers signatory to this Covenant undertake and
agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise
between or among them with regard to any question of the
law of nations, with regard to the interpretation of a
treaty, as to any fact which would, if established,
constitute a breach of international obligation, or as to
any alleged damage and the nature and measure of the
reparation to be made therefor, if such dispute or diffi-
culty cannot be satisfactorily settled by the ordinary
processes of negotiation, to submit the whole subject
matter to arbitration and to carry out in full good faith
any award or decision that may be rendered.

104 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

In case of arbitration, the matter or matters at issue
shall be referred to three arbitrators, one of the three to
be selected by each of the parties to the dispute, when
there are but two such parties, and the third by the two
thus selected. When there are more than two parties to
the dispute, one arbitrator shall be named by each of the
several parties and the arbitrators thus named shall add
to their number others of their own choice, the number
thus added to be limited to the number which will suffice to
give a deciding voice to the arbitrators thus added in case
of tie vote among the arbitrators chosen by the contending
parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by the contending
parties cannot agree upon an additional arbitrator or
arbitrators, the additional arbitrator or arbitrators shall
be chosen by the Body of Delegates.

On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of
the arbitrators may be set aside by a vote of three-fourths
of the Delegates, in case the decision of the arbitrators was
unanimous, or by a vote of two- thirds of the Delegates in
case the decision of the arbitrators was not unanimous,
but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and con-
clusive.

When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus
set aside, the dispute shall again be submitted to arbitra-
tors chosen as heretofore provided, none of whom shall,
however, have previously acted as arbitrators in the
dispute in question, and the decision of the arbitrators
rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally binding
and conclusive without right of appeal.

If for any reason it should prove impracticable to refer
any matter in dispute to arbitration, the parties to the
dispute shall apply to the Executive Council to take the
matter under consideration for such mediatory action or
recommendation as it may deem wise in the circumstances.
The Council shall immediately accept the reference and
give notice to the other party or parties and shall make the
necessary arrangements for a full hearing, investigation,
and consideration. It shall ascertain all the facts involved
in the dispute and shall make such recommendations as it
may deem wise and practicable based on the merits of the

WILSON'S SECOND DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 105

controversy and calculated to secure a just and lasting
settlement. Other members of the League shall place
at the disposal of the Executive Council any and all
information that may be in their possession which in any
way bears upon the facts or merits of the controversy;
and the Executive Council shall do everything in its
power by way of mediation or conciliation to bring about
a peaceful settlement. The decisions of the Executive
Council shall be addressed to the disputants, and shall
not have the force of a binding verdict. Should the
Executive Council fail to arrive at any conclusion, it shall
be the privilege of the members of the Executive Council
to publish their several conclusions or recommendations;
and such publications shall not be regarded as an un-
friendly act by either or any of the disputants.

ARTICLE VI. — Should any contracting Power break or
disregard its covenants under ARTICLE V, it shall there-
by ipso facto become at war with all the members of the
League, which shall immediately subject it to a complete
economic and financial boycott, including the severance of
all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all inter-
course between their subjects and the subjects of the
covenant-breaking State, and the prevention, so far as
possible, of all financial, commercial, or personal inter-
course between the subjects of the covenant-breaking
State and the subjects of any other State, whether a
member of the League of Nations or not.

It shall be the privilege and duty of the Executive
Council of the Body of Delegates in such a case to recom-
mend what effective military or naval force the members
of the League of Nations shall severally contribute, and
to advise, if it should think best, that the smaller members
of the League be excused from making any contribution
to the armed forces to be used against the covenant-break-
ing State.

The covenant-breaking State shall, after the restora-
tion of peace, be subject to perpetual disarmament and
to the regulations with regard to a peace establishment
provided for new States under the terms SUPPLEMENTARY
ARTICLE 3.

106 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ARTICLE VII. — If any Power shall declare war or begin
hostilities, or take any hostile step short of war, against
another Power before submitting the dispute involved
to arbitrators or consideration by the Executive Council
as herein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities,
or take any hostile step short of war, in regard to any
dispute which has been decided adversely to it by arbitra-
tors chosen and empowered as herein provided, the Con-
tracting Powers hereby bind themselves not only to cease
all commerce and intercourse with that Power but also to
unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that
Power to commerce or intercourse with any part of the
world and to use any force that may be necessary to
accomplish that object.

ARTICLE VIII. — Any war or threat of war, whether
immediately affecting any of the Contracting Powers or
not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the League
of Nations and to all the Powers signatory hereto, and
those Powers hereby reserve the right to take any action
that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the
peace of nations.

It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly
right of each of the nations signatory or adherent to this
Covenant to draw the attention of the Body of Delegates
to any circumstances anywhere which threaten to disturb
international peace or the good understanding between
nations upon which peace depends.

The Delegates shall meet in the interest of peace when-
ever war is rumored or threatened, and also whenever
the Delegate of any Power shall inform the Delegates
that a meeting and conference in the interest of peace is
advisable.

The Delegates may also meet at such other times and
upon such other occasions as they shall from time to time
deem best and determine.

ARTICLE IX. — In the event of a dispute arising between
one of the Contracting Powers and a Power not a party
to this Covenant, the Contracting Power involved hereby
binds itself to endeavor to obtain the submission of the
dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration. If the other

WILSON'S SECOND DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 107

Power will not agree to submit the dispute to judicial
decision or to arbitration, the Contracting Power shall
bring the matter to the attention of the Body of Delegates.
The Delegates shall in such a case, in the name of the
League of Nations, invite the Power not a party to this
Covenant to become ad hoc a party and to submit its case
to judicial decision or to arbitration, and if that Power
consents it is hereby agreed that the provisions hereinbe-
fore contained and applicable to the submission of disputes
to arbitration or discussion shall be in all respects appli-
cable to the dispute both in favour of and against such
Power as if it were a party to this Covenant.

In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall
not accept the invitation of the Delegates to become
ad hoc a party, it shall be the duty of the Executive
Council immediately to institute an inquiry into the
circumstances and merits of the dispute involved and to
recommend such joint action by the Contracting Powers
as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances
disclosed.

ARTICLE X. — If hostilities should be begun or any
hostile action taken against the Contracting Power by
the Power not a party to this Covenant before a decision
of the dispute by arbitrators or before investigation, re-
port and recommendation by the Executive Council in
regard to the dispute, or contrary to such recommenda-
tion, the Contracting Powers shall thereupon cease all
commerce and communication with that Power and shall
also unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that
Power to all commerce or intercourse with any part of
the world, employing jointly any force that may be nec-
essary to accomplish that object. The Contracting
Powers shall also unite in coming to the assistance of the
Contracting Power against which hostile action has been
taken, combining their armed forces in its behalf.

ARTICLE XI. — In case of a dispute between states not
parties to this Covenant, any Contracting Power may bring
the matter to the attention of the Delegates, who shall
thereupon tender the good offices of the League of Nations
with a view to the peaceable settlement of the dispute.

108 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer
and agree to submit its interests and cause of action wholly
to the control and decision of the League of Nations, that
state shall ad hoc be deemed a Contracting Power. If no
one of the states, parties to the dispute, shall so offer and
agree, the Delegates shall, through the Executive Council,
of their own motion take such action and make such recom-
mendation to their governments as will prevent hostilities
and result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE XII. — Any power not a party to this Covenant,
whose government is based upon the principle of popular
self-government, may apply to the Body of Delegates for
leave to become a party. If the Delegates shall regard
the granting thereof as likely to promote the peace, order,
and security of the World, they may act favorably on
the application, and their favorable action shall operate
to constitute the Power so applying in all respects a full
signatory party to this Covenant. This action shall
require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Delegates.

ARTICLE XIII. — The Contracting Powers severally
agree that the present Covenant and Convention is ac-
cepted as abrogating all treaty obligations inter se which
are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and solemnly
engage that they will not enter into any engagements
inconsistent with the terms hereof.

In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subse-
quently admitted to the League of Nations shall, before
becoming a party to this Covenant, have undertaken any
treaty obligations which are inconsistent with the terms
of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to
take immediate steps to procure its release from such
obligations.

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS. I. — In respect of the
peoples and territories which formerly belonged to Austria-
Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies
formerly under the dominion of the German Empire, the
League of Nations shall be regarded as the residuary
trustee with sovereign right of ultimate disposal or of
continued administration in accordance with certain fun-
damental principles hereinafter set forth; and this re-

WILSON'S SECOND DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 109

version and control shall exclude all rights or privileges
of annexation on the part of any Power.

These principles are, that there shall in no case be any
annexation of any of these territories by any State either
within the League or outside of it, and that in the future
government of these peoples and territories the rule of
self-determination, or the consent of the governed to their
form of government, shall be fairly and reasonably applied
and all policies of administration or economic develop-
ment be based primarily upon the well-considered interests
of the people themselves.

II. — Any authority, control, or administration which
may be necessary in respect of these peoples or territories
other than their own self-determined and self-organized
autonomy shall be the exclusive function of and shall be
vested in the League of Nations and exercised or under-
taken by or on behalf of it.

It shall be lawful for the League of Nations to delegate
its authority, control, or administration of any such
people or territory to some single State or organized
agency which it may designate and appoint as its agent
or mandatory; but whenever or wherever possible or
feasible the agent or mandatory so appointed shall be
nominated or approved by the autonomous people or
territory.

III. — The degree of authority, control, or administra-
tion to be exercised by the mandatary State or agency
shall in each case be explicitly defined by the League in
a Special Act or Charter which shall reserve to the League
complete power of supervision and of intimate jcontrol,
and which shall also reserve to the people of any such
territory or governmental unit the right to appeal to the
League for the redress or correction of any breach of
the mandate by the mandatary State or agency or for the
substitution of some other State or agency, as mandatary.

The mandatary State or agency shall in all cases be
bound and required to maintain the policy of the open
door, or equal opportunity for all the signatories to this
Covenant, in respect of the use and development of the
economic resources of such people or territory.

The mandatary State or agency shall in no case form
or maintain any military or naval force in excess of defi-
nite standards laid down by the League itself for the
purposes of internal police.

IV. — No new State arising or created from the old
Empires of Austria-Hungary, or Turkey shall be recog-
nized by the League or admitted into its membership
except on condition that its military and naval forces and
armaments shall conform to standards prescribed by the
League in respect of it from time to time.

As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is
empowered, directly and without right of delegation, to
watch over the relations inter se of all new independent
States arising or created out of the Empires, and shall
assume and fulfil the duty of conciliating and composing
differences between them with a view to the maintenance
of settled order and the general peace.

V. — The Powers signatory or adherent to this Cove-
nant agree that they will themselves seek to establish and
maintain fair hours and humane conditions of labour for
all those within their several jurisdictions who are engaged
in manual labour and that they will exert their influence
in favour of the adoption and maintenance of a similar
policy and like safeguards wherever their industrial and
commercial relations extend.

VI. — The League of Nations shall require all new
States to bind themselves as a condition precedent to
their recognition as independent or autonomous States,
- to accord to all racial or national minorities within their
several .jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and
security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the
racial or national majority of their people.

DOCUMENT 13.

Memorandum of Major-General Tasker H.
Bliss for President Wilson, January 14, 1919,
criticizing the Draft of the Covenant (auto-
graphed original).

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Hotel de Crillon, Paris,
January 14, 1919.

Suggestions in Regard to the Draft of the
COVENANT.

1. Preamble — There are some people who may be
frightened at the use of the words "in order to secure
. . . an orderly government". They may regard
this as a suggestion of the possible use of the League of
Nations to put down internal disorders wherever they
occur. As the one essential object of the League of
Nations is to prevent international war, and as the pre-
vention of such war will be secured by the doing of the
things set forth in the preamble, and as the prevention of
such war results in security and will have the greatest
tendency to produce orderly government, it is suggested
for consideration that the first line of the preamble might
read as follows:

"In order to prevent future international wars by the
prescription of," etc., etc.

2. The idea in the word "COVENANT" is so good that
it is suggested that it be adhered to in the subsequent
phraseology, notwithstanding the repetition that will
necessarily result. Thus, it is suggested, that the words,
"Contracting Powers" be made to read "Covenanting

111

112 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Powers"; and that, wherever the word "agreement"
(referring to the constitution of the League of Nations)
is used, it be replaced by the word "covenant."

3. It is suggested that there should be a positive dec-
laration to provide against secret treaties. In no other
way can the League be assured that an alliance may not
be formed within itself, with a tendency adverse to the
peace of the world. It is suggested that the right of the
League to scrutinize individual treaties should be confined
to the object of determining whether the treaty is for the
purpose of effecting a private alliance.

4. Article III. — In the second line, after the word
"integrity," insert the words "as against external ag-
gression."

Do the words, which appear in Article III, "and also
such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment
of %ths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare
and manifest interest of the peoples concerned," con-
template the possibility of the League of Nations being
called upon to consider such questions as the independence
of Ireland, of India, etc., etc.?

5. Article IV. — It does not seem that so important a
matter as the reduction of national armaments should be
liable to a veto by the action of, possibly, one small power.
All hope of disarmament consists in the action of the Great
Powers. Until they agree to some disarmament there is
no use in talking about the matter. When they should
agree to disarm, they might well be permitted to exercise
such pressure as they, in agreement, should think prac-
ticable in order to compel general disarmament.

6. Article V. — It would seem that some time limit, —
say one year, — might well be fixed, within which an
award by the arbitrators or a decision by the Executive
Council must be rendered.

In clause 4 of Article V, should there not be some limits
imposed on the right of appeal?

In the first sentence of clause 6 of Article V appear the
words, "the parties to the dispute shall apply to the Ex-
ecutive Council," etc., etc. In the second sentence of
the same clause appear the words, "the Council shall

GENERAL BLISS CRITICIZES THE COVENANT 113

immediately accept the reference and give notice to the
other party or parties," etc., etc. It appears that a change
in these wordings is necessary.

7. Article VI. — Is it the intent of this article to provide
two steps, instead of one, in order to bring about the full
status of international war? Is it intended that, first
of all, there shall be a complete diplomatic, economic and
financial pressure exerted, and that only in case this fails
in attaining its object there shall be a resort to hostile
acts of war as contemplated in the second clause of Article
VI? If the latter be the intent, it is to be noted that the
breaching Power, being at war with the League, may
immediately use its land and naval forces against the
League, while the latter must wait for a recommendation
from the Executive Council before the several members
of the League know what military and naval forces they
are to contribute.

In the third clause of Article VI, omit the words "to
perpetual disarmament and"; and change the figure 3 to
the figure 4.

8. In regard to Articles VI and VII, it is again sug-
gested that a careful consideration be given to seeing
whether a form of words cannot be used that will largely
accomplish the object in view, without appearing, in the
mind of anyone, to yield (with respect to the United
States) to the League of Nations powers which are vested
in the American Congress.

9. Article X. — This article relates to a dispute between
a Contracting Power and a Power which is not a party to
this Covenant. The Article provides for action only in
the case when the Power not a party to this Covenant
"takes hostile action against one of the Contracting
Powers before a decision of the dispute by arbitrators
or before investigation, report and recommendation by
the Executive Council in regard to the dispute, or con-
trary to such recommendation." There is no assumption
that the Contracting Power itself may be in the wrong,
and it is provided that all of the other Contracting Powers
shall come to the assistance of the Contracting Powers
against which hostile action has been taken. How shall

114 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

we provide for the case where the enlightened sense of
the world holds the Contracting Power itself to be in the
wrong?

It would seem that careful note should be taken of the
possibility of a "Dred Scott" decision being made by the
tribunal of the League of Nations.

10. Article XL — Under the second clause of Article
XI, there is the same possibility of the difficulty which
may occur under Article X. Two nations not Covenant-
ing Powers may have a dispute. One of them, which is
in the wrong, offers to submit its interests to the decision
of the League of Nations. This State immediately be-
comes, for the purposes of the dispute, one of the Con-
tracting Powers; and as such, the League is bound to
support it, right or wrong, as would be the case under
Article X.

11. Article XII. — Change the word "may" at the end
of the fourth line of this Article to the word "shall."

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS.

1. Article I. — It would seem desirable to avoid phrase-
ology that would give color to the idea that the proposed
League of Nations has for one of its principal objects the
control of situations growing out of the present war. If
it is possible to avoid the use of the names "Austria-
Hungary" and "Turkey" and "the German Empire"
it is believed that it would be better.

2. Under the Supplementary Agreements, is it ob-
ligatory upon one of the Covenanting Powers to accept
the functions of "agent or mandatory" appointed by the
League of Nations, or may it decline to exercise this
function?

3. What financial obligations are imposed upon a
mandatory which accepts its functions as such? It is
evident that a mandatory must establish a quasi super-
vising government of its own. It must appoint someone
who will be its local director, and this latter must have
a large staff of assistants. If the people of the United
States accept this general proposition, they will have an
interest in knowing the expense to which they may be

GENERAL BLISS CRITICIZES THE COVENANT 115

subjected. It is easily possible that the representative
or agent of the mandatory cannot perform his functions
without the support of a powerful military force. Will
the United States, for example, be expected to maintain
in some foreign country an armed force of their own in
order to perform their functions as mandatory?

The sole object of the proposition of General Smuts
is to bring the United States into line with Great Britain
in exercising supervisory control over certain areas of
the earth. The people of the United States will under-
stand that a great burden is contemplated to be thrust
upon them by this plan. It is believed that to secure
good chance of acceptance by the United States these
things should be made clear, or else it should be made
clear that no state can be made a mandatory without its
own cordial consent.

In the third clause of Article III, it should be made
clear that the mandatory state is not to maintain a mili-
tary force, of native troops, in the state of which it is the
mandatory, in excess of the standard laid down by the
League. This provision in General Smuts's plan is evi-
dently to prevent a nation, acting as mandatory over a
densely populated area, from there raising a great military
force under the guise of internal police, which might be
used by the mandatory in case of a war outside of this
area.

4. In the first clause of Article IV, the provision with
respect to conformity to certain standards as to military
and naval forces might well be made to apply to all
states entering the League after the date of its creation,
instead of making them simply apply to territories of the
former empires of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey. This
will assist in avoiding the giving to the League of Nations
the appearance of being a new form of the old Holy
Alliance.

It is not improbable that before the League of Nations
can become an accomplished fact, it may be quite as
desirable "to watch over the relations inter se of all new
and independent states arising or created out of the
empires of Russia and Germany as it is to do so over the

116 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

states created out of Austria-Hungary or Turkey. It
would seem that this may be an additional reason for
omitting, if possible, reference to any existing or formerly
existing state by name.

[Signed] TASKER H. BLISS.

DOCUMENT 14.

Third draft of the Covenant of the League of
Nations made by President Wilson. This was
intended to form the basis of the discussion in
the League of Nations commission, but owing to
the pressure on President Wilson's time he was
unable to complete it to his satisfaction, and
therefore accepted the compromise Hurst-Miller
draft as the basis of discussion.

COVENANT.

PREAMBLE.

In order to secure international peace and security by
the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations
between nations, by the firm establishment of the under-
standings of international law as the actual rule of con-
duct among governments, and by the maintenance of
justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations
in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, and
in order to promote international cooperation, the Powers
signatory to this covenant and agreement jointly and
severally adopt this constitution of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE I. — The action of the Signatory Powers under
the terms of this covenant shall be effected through the
instrumentality of a Body of Delegates which shall
consist of the ambassadors and ministers of the contracting
Powers accredited to H. and the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of H. The meetings of the Body of Delegates
shall be held at the seat of government of H. and the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. shall be the presiding
officer of the Body.

Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable,
they may meet temporarily at the seat of government of

117

118 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

B. or of S., in which case the Ambassador or Minister
to H. of the country in which the meeting is held shall be
the presiding officer pro tempore.

It shall be the privilege of any of the contracting Powers
to assist its representative in the Body of Delegates by
any method of conference, counsel, or advice that may
seem best to it, and also to substitute upon occasion a
special representative for its regular diplomatic representa-
tive accredited to H.

ARTICLE II. — The Body of Delegates shall regulate
their own procedure and shall have power to appoint such
committees as they may deem necessary to inquire into
and report upon any matters that lie within the field of
their action.

It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates, upon the
initiative of any member, to discuss, either publicly or
privately as it may deem best, any matter lying within
the jurisdiction of the League of Nations as defined in
this covenant, or any matter likely to affect the peace of
the world; but all actions of the Body of Delegates taken
in the exercise of the functions and powers granted to
them under this Covenant shall be formulated and agreed
upon by an Executive Council, which shall act either by
reference or upon its own initiative and which shall con-
sist of the representatives of the Great Powers, together
with representatives drawn in annual rotation from two
panels, one of which shall be made up of the representa-
tives of the States ranking next after the Great Powers and
the other of the representatives of the minor States (a
classification which the Body of Delegates shall itself
establish and may from time to time alter), such a number
being drawn from these panels as will be but one less than
the representatives of the Great Powers; and three or
more negative votes in the Council shall operate as a
veto upon any action or resolution proposed.

All resolutions passed or actions taken by the Executive
Council, except those adopted in execution of any direct
powers herein granted to the Body of Delegates them-
selves, shall have the effect of recommendations to the
several governments of the League.

WILSON'S THIRD DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 119

The Executive Council shall appoint a permanent
Secretariat and staff and may appoint joint committees,
chosen from the Body of Delegates or consisting of
specially qualified persons outside of that Body, for the
study and systematic consideration of the international
questions with which the Council may have to deal, or of
questions likely to lead to international complications or
disputes. It shall also take the necessary steps to estab-
lish and maintain proper liaison both with the foreign
offices of the siguMory powers and with any governments
or agencies which may be acting as mandatories of the
League of Nations in any part of the world.

ARTICLE III. — The Contracting Powers unite in guar-
anteeing to each other political independence and terri-
torial integrity as against external aggression; but it is
understood between them that such territorial readjust-
ments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by
reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspira-
tions or present social and political relationships, pursuant
to the principle of self-determination, and also such
territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of
three-fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare
and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be
effected if agreeable to those peoples and to the States from
which the territory is separated or to which it is added; and
that territorial changes may in equity involve material
compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without
reservation the principle that the peace of the world is
superior in importance to every question of Political
jurisdiction or boundary.

ARTICLE IV. — The Contracting Powers recognize the
principle that the establishment and maintenance of
peace will require the reduction of national armaments to
the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and the
enforcement by common action of international obliga-
tions; and the Executive Council is directed to formulate
at once plans by which such a reduction may be brought
about. The plan so formulated shall be binding when,
and only when, unanimously approved by the Govern-
ments signatory to this Covenant.

120 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

As the basis for such a reduction of armaments, all the
Powers subscribing to the Treaty of Peace of which this
Covenant constitutes a part hereby agree to abolish con-
scription and all other forms of compulsory military
service, and also agree that their future forces of defense
and of international action shall consist of militia or
volunteers, whose numbers and methods of training shall
be fixed, after expert inquiry, by the agreements with
regard to the reduction of armaments referred to in the
last preceding paragraph.

The Executive Council shall also determine for tbe
consideration and action of the several governments what
direct military equipment and armament is fair and
reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down
in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when
adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of
the Body of Delegates.

The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions
and implements of war shall not be manufactured by
private enterprise or for private profit, and that there shall
be full and frank publicity as to all national armaments
and military or naval programmes.

ARTICLE V. — The Contracting Powers jointly and
severally agree that should disputes or difficulties arise
between or among them which cannot be satisfactorily
settled or adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy,
they will in no case resort to armed force without pre-
viously submitting the questions and matters involved
either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Executive
Council of the Body of Delegates or until there has been an
award by the arbitrators or a decision by the Executive
Council ; and that they will not even then resort to armed
force as against a member of the League of Nations who
complies with the award of the arbitrators or the decision
of the Executive Council.

The Powers signatory to this Covenant undertake and
agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise
between or among them with regard to any question of
the law of nations, with regard to the interpretation of a
treaty, as to any fact which would, if established, con-

WILSON'S THIRD DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 121

stitute a breach of international obligation, or as to any
alleged damage and the nature and measure of the rep-
aration to be made therefor, if such dispute or difficulty
cannot be satisfactorily settled by the ordinary processes
of negotiation, to submit the whole subject matter to
arbitration and to carry out in full good faith any award
or decision that may be rendered.

In case of arbitration, the matter or matters at issue
shall be referred to three arbitrators, one of the three to
be selected by each of the parties to the dispute, from out-
side their own nations, when there are but two such
parties, and the third by the two thus selected. When
there are more than two parties to the dispute, one arbitra-
tor shall be named by each of the several parties and the
arbitrators thus named shall add to their number others
of their own choice, the number thus added to be limited
in case of a tie vote among the arbitrators chosen by the
contending parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by
the contending parties cannot agree upon an additional
arbitrator or arbitrators, the additional arbitrator or
arbitrators shall be chosen by the Executive Council.

On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of
the arbitrators may be set aside by a vote of three-fourths
of the Delegates, in case the decision of the arbitrators was
unanimous, or by a vote of two-thirds of the Delegates in
case the decision of the arbitrators was not unanimous,
but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and con-
clusive.

When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus set
aside, the dispute shall again be submitted to arbitrators
chosen as heretofore provided, none of whom shall, how-
ever, have previously acted as arbitrators in the dispute in
question, and the decision of the arbitrators rendered in
this second arbitration shall be finally binding and con-
clusive without right of appeal.

If for any reason it should prove impracticable to refer
any matter in dispute to arbitration, the parties to the
dispute shall apply to the Executive Council to take the
matter under consideration for such mediatory action or
recommendation as it may deem wise in the circumstances.

122 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

The Council shall immediately accept the reference and
give notice to the parties, and shall make the necessary
arrangements for a full hearing, investigation, and con-
sideration. It shall ascertain and as soon as possible
make public all the facts involved in the dispute and shall
make such recommendations as it may deem wise and
practicable based on the merits of the controversy and
calculated to secure a just and lasting settlement. Other
members of the League shall place at the disposal of the
Executive Council any and all information that may be in
their possession which in any way bears upon the facts
or merits of the controversy; and the Executive Council
shall do everything in its power by way of mediation or
conciliation to bring about a peaceful settlement. The
decisions of the Executive Council shall be addressed to
the disputants, and shall not have the force of a binding
verdict. Should the Executive Council fail to arrive at
any conclusion, it shall be the privilege of the members of
the Executive Council to publish their several conclusions
or recommendations; and such publications shall not be
regarded as an unfriendly act by either or any of the
disputants.

Every award by arbitrators and every decision by the
Executive Council upon a matter in dispute between
States must be rendered within twelve months after
formal reference.

ARTICLE VI. — Should any contracting power break or
disregard its covenants under Article V, it shall thereby
ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war
against all the members of the League, which shall im-
mediately subject it to a complete economic and financial
boycott, including the severance of all trade or financial
relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their
subjects and the subjects of the covenant-breaking State,
and the prevention, so far as possible, of all financial,
commercial, or personal intercourse between the subjects
of the covenant-breaking State and the subjects of any
other State, whether a member of the League of Nations or
not.

It shall be the privilege and duty of the Executive

WILSON'S THIRD DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 123

Council of the Body of Delegates in such a case to recom-
mend what effective military or naval force the members
of the League of Nations shall severally contribute, and to
advise, if it should think best, that the smaller members of
the League be excused from making any contribution to
the armed forces to be used against the covenant-break-
ing State.

The covenant-breaking State shall, after the restora-
tion of peace, be subject to the regulations with regard to
a peace establishment provided for new States under the
terms Supplementary Article IV.

ARTICLE VII. — If any Power shall declare war or begin
hostilities, or take any hostile step short of war, against
another Power before submitting the dispute involved
to arbitrators or consideration by the Executive Council
as herein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities,
or take any hostile step short of war, in regard to any
dispute which has been decided adversely to it by arbitra-
tors chosen and empowered as herein provided, the
Contracting Powers hereby engage not only to cease all
commerce and intercourse with that Power but also to
unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that
Power to commerce or intercourse with any part of the
world and to use any force that may be necessary to
accomplish that object.

ARTICLE VIII. — Any war or threat of war, whether
immediately effecting any of the Contracting Powers or
not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the League
of Nations and to all the Powers signatory hereto, and
those Powers hereby reserve the right to take any action
that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the
peace of nations.

It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly
right of each of the nations signatory or adherent to this
Covenant to draw the attention of the Body of Delegates
or of the Executive Council to any circumstances anywhere
which threaten to disturb international peace or the good
understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

The Delegates and the Executive Council shall meet in
the interest of peace whether war is rumored or threatened,

124 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

and also whether the Delegates of any Power shall inform
the Delegates that a meeting and conference in the in-
terest of peace is advisable.

The Delegates may also meet at such other times and
upon such other occasions as they shall from time to time
deem best and determine.

ARTICLE IX. — In the event of a dispute arising between
one of the Contracting Powers and a Power not a party
to this Covenant, the Contracting Power involved hereby
binds itself to endeavor to obtain the submission of the
dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration. If the
other Power will not agree to submit the dispute to
judicial decision or to arbitration, the Contracting Power
shall bring the matter to the attention of the Executive
Council. The Delegates shall in such a case, in the name
of the League of Nations, invite the Power not a party to
this Covenant to become ad hoc a party and to submit its
case to judicial decision or to arbitration, and if that
Power consents it is hereby agreed that the provisions
hereinbefore contained and applicable to the submission of
disputes to arbitration or discussion shall be in all respects
applicable to the dispute both in favor of and against
such Power as if it were a party to this Covenant.

In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall not
accept the invitation of the Executive Council to become
ad hoc a party, it shall be the duty of the Executive
Council immediately to institute an inquiry into the cir-
cumstances and merits of the dispute involved and to
recommend such joint action by the Contracting Powers
as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances
disclosed.

ARTICLE X. — If hostilities should be begun or any
hostile action taken against the Contracting Power by the
Power not a party to this Covenant before a decision of the
dispute by arbitration or before investigation, report and
recommendation by the Executive Council in regard to the
dispute, or contrary to such recommendation, the Con-
tracting Powers engage thereupon to cease all commerce
and communication with that Power and also to unite in
blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to all

WILSON'S THIRD DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 125

commerce or intercourse with any part of the world, and
to employ jointly any force that may be necessary to
accomplish that object. The Contracting Powers also
undertake to unite in coming to the assistance of the
Contracting Power against which hostile action has been
taken, and to combine their armed forces in its behalf.

ARTICLE XI. — In case of a dispute between states not
parties to this Covenant, any Contracting Power may
bring the matter to the attention of the Delegates or the
Executive Council, who shall thereupon tender the good
offices of the League of Nations with a view to the peace-
able settlement of the dispute.

If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer and
agree to submit its interests and cause of action wholly to
the control and decision of the League of Nations, that
State shall ad hoc be deemed a Contracting Power. If no
one of the states, parties to the dispute, shall so offer and
agree, the Delegates shall, through the Executive Council,
of their own motion take such action and make such
recommendation to their governments as will prevent
hostilities and result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE XII. — Any Power not a party to this Cove-
nant, whose government is based upon the principle of
popular self-government, may apply to the Body of
Delegates for leave to become a party. If the Delegates
shall regard the granting thereof as likely to promote the
peace, order, and security of the World, they shall act
favorably on the application, and their favorable action
shall operate to constitute the Power so applying in all
respects a full signatory party to this Covenant. This
action shall require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of
the Delegates.

ARTICLE XIII. — The Contracting Powers severally
agree that the present Covenant and Convention is
accepted as abrogating all treaty obligations inter se
which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and sol-
emnly engage that they will not enter into any engagements
inconsistent with the terms hereof.

In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subse-
quently admitted to the League of Nations shall, before

126 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

becoming a party to this Covenant, have undertaken any
treaty obligations which are inconsistent with the terms of
this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take
immediate steps to procure its release from such obliga-
tions.

SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS.

I. — In respect of the peoples and territories which
formerly belonged to Austria-Hungary, and to Turkey, and
in respect of the colonies formerly under the dominion of
the German Empire, the League of Nations shall be re-
garded as the residuary trustee with the right of oversight
or administration in accordance with certain fundamental
principles hereinafter set forth; and this reversion and
control shall exclude all rights or privileges of annexation
on the part of any Power.

These principles are, that there shall in no case be any
annexation of any of these territories by any State either
within the League or outside of it, and that in the future
government of these peoples and territories the rule of
self-determination, or the consent of the governed to their
form of government, shall be fairly and reasonably applied,
and all policies of administration or economic develop-
ment be based primarily upon the well-considered in-
terests of the people themselves.

II. — Any authority, control, or administration which
may be necessary in respect of these peoples or territories
other than their own self-determined and self-organized
autonomy shall be the exclusive functions of and shall be
vested in the League of Nations, and exercised or under-
taken by or on behalf of it.

It shall be lawful for the League of Nations to delegate
its authority, control, or administration of any such
people or territory to some single State or organized
agency which it may designate and appoint as its agent
or mandatory; but whenever or wherever possible or
feasible the agent or mandatory so appointed shall be
nominated or approved by the autonomous people or
territory.

III. — The degree of authority, control, or administra-

WILSON'S THIRD DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 127

tion to be exercised by the mandatory State or agency shall
in each case be explicitly defined by the Executive Council
in a special Act or Charter which shall reserve to the
League complete power of supervision, and which shall
also reserve to the people of any such territory or govern-
mental unit the right to appeal to the League for the re-
dress or correction of any breach of the mandate by the
mandatory State or agency or for the substitution of some
other State or agency, as mandatory.

The mandatory State or agency shall in all cases be
bound and required to maintain the policy of the open
door, or equal opportunity for all the signatories to this
Covenant, in respect of the use and development of the
economic resources of such people or territory.

The mandatory State or agency shall in no case form or
maintain any military or naval force, native or other, in
excess of definite standards laid down by the League itself
for the purposes of internal police.

Any expense the mandatory State or agency may be put
to in the exercise of its functions under the mandate, so far
as they cannot be borne by the resources of the people or
territory under its charge upon a fair basis of assessment
and charge, shall be borne by the several signatory Powers,
their several contributions being assessed and determined
by the Executive Council in proportion to their several
national budgets, unless the mandatory State or agency is
willing itself to bear the excess costs; and in all cases the
expenditures of the mandatory Power or agency in the
exercise of the mandate shall be subject to the audit and
authorization of the League.

The object of all such tutelary oversight and administra-
tion on the part of the League of Nations shall be to
build up in as short a time as possible out of the people
or territory under its guardianship a political unit which
can take charge of its own affairs, determine its own con-
nections, and choose its own policies. The League may
at any time release such a people or territory from tutelage
and consent to its being set up as an independent unit.
It shah1 also be the right and privilege of any people or
territory to petition the League to take such action, and

128 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

upon such petition being made it shall be the duty of the
League to take the petition under full and friendly con-
sideration with a view to determining the best interests
of the people or territory in question in view of all the
circumstances of their situation and development.

IV. — No new State shall be recognized by the League
or admitted into its membership except on condition that
its military and naval forces and armaments shall conform
to standards prescribed by the League in respect of it from
time to time.

The League of Nations is empowered, directly and
without right of delegation, to watch over the relations
inter se of all new independent States arising or created
and shall assume and fulfil the duty of conciliating and
composing differences between them with a view to the
maintenance of settled order and the general peace.

V. — The Powers signatory or adherent to this Covenant
agree that they will themselves seek to establish and
maintain fair hours and humane conditions of labor for all
those within their several jurisdictions who are engaged in
manual labor and that they will exert their influence in
favor of the adoption and maintenance of a similar policy
and like safeguards wherever their industrial and com-
mercial relations extend.

VI. — The League of Nations shall require all new
States to bind themselves as a condition precedent to their
recognition as independent or autonomous States and the
Executive Council shall exact of all States seeking admis-
sion to the League of Nations the promise, to accord to all
racial or national minorities within their several jurisdic-
tions exactly the same treatment and security, both in
law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national
majority of their people.

VII. — Recognizing religious persecution and intolerance
as fertile sources of war, the Powers signatory hereto agree,
and the League of Nations shall exact from all new States
and all States seeking admission to it the promise that they
will make no law prohibiting or interfering with the free
exercise of religion, and that they will in no way discrimi-
nate, either in law or in fact, against those who practise

WILSON'S THIRD DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 129

any particular creed, religion, or belief whose practices are
not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

VIII. — The rights of belligerents on the high seas out-
side territorial waters having been defined by international
convention, it is hereby agreed and declared as a funda-
mental covenant that no Power or combinations of Powers
shall have a right to overstep in any particular the clear
meaning of the definitions thus established; but that it
shall be the right of the League of Nations from time to
time and on special occasion to close the seas in whole or in
part against a particular Power or particular Powers for the
purpose of enforcing the international covenants here
entered into.

IX. — It is hereby covenanted and agreed by the Powers
signatory hereto that no treaty entered into by them,
either singly or jointly, shall be regarded as valid, binding,
or operative until it shall have been published and made
known to all the other signatories.

X. — It is further covenanted and agreed by the signa-
tory Powers that in their fiscal and economic regulations
and policy no discrimination shall be made between one
nation and another among those with which they have
commercial and financial dealings.

DOCUMENT 15.

British draft of Covenant for the League of
Nations (printed), dated January 20, 1919, with
letter of transmittal of the same date from Lord
Robert Cecil (autograph) to President Wilson.

Confidential.

(Seal) BRITISH DELEGATION, PARIS.

20 Jan: 1919.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT

I send you in accordance with my promise a copy of
the Draft Convention prepared by the British League
of Nations Section. It has not yet been considered by
the Cabinet though in its general lines it has been ap-
proved by them. It would have reached you some days
ago but for difficulties in printing.

Yours very sincerely,
[Signed] ROBERT CECIL.

Secret.

January 20, 1919.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

DRAFT CONVENTION.

CHAPTER I.

FUNCTIONS AND ORGANISATION OF THE LEAGUE.

1. IMPRESSED by the horrors of the late War, and con-
vinced that another war of the same kind would be pro-
ductive of still greater disasters to humanity and civili-
sation, the High Contracting Parties1 unite in constituting
a League of Nations.

Hereinafter referred to as the H.C.P.

130

BRITISH DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 131

The primary object of the League is the promotion of
peace among the nations of the world. With this intent
the H.C.P. solemnly pledge themselves to co-operate in
the League for the prevention of war by eliminating, so far
as possible, the causes of international disputes, by pro-
viding for the pacific settlement of such disputes should
they arise, and by encouraging a general system of inter-
national co-operation for promoting the peaceful progress
of mankind.

(1) For achieving these ends the H.C.P. adopt the fol-
lowing measures: —

(i) They enter into the obligations intended to secure
the avoidance of war which are contained in Chap-
ter II of this Convention.

(ii) They undertake to respect the territorial integrity
of all States members of the League, and to
protect them from foreign aggression, and they
agree to prevent any attempts by other States
forcibly to alter the territorial settlement existing
at the date of, or established by, the present
treaties of peace.

(iii) They recognise the duty incumbent upon the more
advanced members of the family of nations to
render help and guidance, under the sanction of
the League, in the development of the administra-
tion of States and territories which have not yet
attained to stable government.

(iv) They entrust to the League the general super-
vision of the trade in arms and ammunition with
the countries in which the control of this traffic is
necessary in the common interest.
(v) They will endeavor to secure and maintain free-
dom of transit and just treatment for the commerce
of all States members of the League.
(vi) They appoint commissions to study and report
to the League on economic, sanitary, and other
similar problems of international concern, and
they authorize the League to recommend such
action as these reports may show to be necessary.
(vii) They appoint a commission to study conditions

132 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

of industry and labor in their international aspects,
and to make recommendations thereon, including
the extension and improvement of existing con-
ventions.

Stipulations for securing the above objects are embodied
in separate Conventions annexed hereto or in the general
treaties of peace.

(2) The H.C.P. place under the control of the League
all international bureaux established by general treaties
and now located elsewhere if the parties to such treaties
consent. Furthermore, they agree that all such interna-
tional bureaux to be constituted in future shall be placed
under the supervision of the League and shall be located
at the capital of the League.

2. If at any time it should appear that the boundaries
of any State guaranteed by Article I (i), (ii) do not
conform to the requirements of the situation, the League
shall take the matter under consideration and may rec-
ommend to the parties affected any modification which
it may think necessary. If such recommendation is re-
jected by the parties affected, the States members of the
League shall, so far as the territory in question is con-
cerned, cease to be under the obligation to protect the
territory in question from forcible aggression by other
States, imposed upon them by the above provision.

3. The H.C.P. agree to accept as the basis of the or-
ganization of the League the provisions contained in
the following articles.

4. A General Conference of the League shall be held
within six months of the date when the present Conven-
tion comes into force, and similar conferences shall be
held from time to time as occasion may require, and in
any case at intervals of not more than four years.

A General Conference of the League shall be composed
of responsible representatives of the States members of
the League.

The meetings of the General Conference of the League
are referred to in the present Convention as the Confer-
ence of the League.

5. The H.C.P. appoint the following States members

BRITISH DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 133

of the League to constitute the Council of the League:
France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United
States of America. The Council may at any time co-opt
additional members. Except as provided hereafter, no
State shall be represented at any meeting of the Council
by more than two members.

Meetings of the Council shall be held from time to
time as occasion may require, and in any case at intervals
of not more than one year.

6. The Council of the League will be responsible for
ensuring the successful working of the League of Nations,
and for seeing that it secures the harmonious co-operation
of all the States members of the League.

In particular, it is charged with the duty of watching
over the development of the new States which may be
recognized by the general treaties of peace, and of settling
all differences which may arise between them connected
with the arrangements effected by those treaties.

7. The Council shall invite any State member of the
League to send representatives to any meeting of the
Council at which matters affecting that State will be
under discussion.

No decision on any matter directly affecting the inter-
ests of a State member of the League which is not repre-
sented on the Council will be binding upon any such State
unless its representatives have been invited to the meeting
when the decisions in question were taken.

8. The Conference of the League shall regulate its own
procedure, and may appoint committees for any purpose
it may deem convenient. In. all matters covered by this
Article the Conference may decide by a majority of the
representatives present at any meeting. The provisions
of this Article apply also to the Council of the League.

9. There shall be established a permanent international
secretariat of the League. The secretariat shall be under
the general control and direction of the Chancellor of the
League, who shall hold office during the pleasure of the
Council. The first Chancellor of the League shall be
the person named in the Protocol hereto. Any successor
shall be appointed by the Council.

134 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

10. The Chancellor of the League shall be assisted by
such number of assistant secretaries as he may find it
necessary to appoint and such further staff as he may
think necessary within the limits of the expenditure which
may be authorized.

11. The Chancellor shall act as the Secretary of the
Conference of the League and of the Council of the League,
and will be responsible to them for such duties as may
be entrusted to him.

12. Representatives of the States members of the League
attending meetings of the League, the representatives
of the H.C.P. at the capital of the League, the Chancellor
and the members of the permanent secretariat of the
League, and the members of any judicial or administra-
tive organ or of any commission of enquiry working under
the sanction of the League, shall enjoy diplomatic privi-
leges and immunities while they are engaged in the
business of the League.

All buildings occupied by the League, or by any or-
ganization placed under the control of the League, or
by any of its officials, or by the representatives of the
H.C.P. at the capital of the League shall enjoy the benefits
of extra-territoriality.

13. The Secretariat of the League shall be established
at . This City shall constitute the capital
of the League. The meetings of the Conference of the
League and of the Council of the League shall be held
at the capital of the League, or in such other place as
may be determined.

14. Each of the H.C.P. may maintain a representative
at the capital of the League.

15. The expenses of the League, other than those
occasioned by meetings of the Council of the League,
shall be borne by the States members of the League, in
accordance with the distribution among the members of
the Postal Union of the expenses of the International
Postal Bureau. The expenses occasioned by the meetings
of the Council of the League shall be divided equally
among the States represented on the Council.

16. The H.C.P. recognize the right of the British

BRITISH DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 135

Empire to separate representation in respect of the Do-
minions of the British Empire, including India, at meet-
ings of the Conference of the League, and also at meetings
of the Council, at which matters affecting any particular
Dominion are under discussion.

CHAPTER II.

AVOIDANCE OF WAR.

1. Each of the States members of the League agrees
that it will not, except in accordance with Article 12, go
to war with another State member of the League: —

(a) without submitting the matter in dispute to a

Court of International Law or to the Conference
or the Council of the League; and

(b) until the Court or the Conference or the Council
of the League has had reasonable time to render
its decision or report on the matter, provided that
in the case of the Conference or of the Council
the time shall not exceed months; and

(c) within a period of three months after the render-

ing of the decision or the report, including for this
purpose a majority report, or after the expiration
of the reasonable period referred to in (b) ;
and also that it will not go to war with another State
member of the League which complies with the decision
of the Court or, subject to Article 9, with the recom-
mendations of the Conference or of the Council.

2. If there should arise between States members of the
League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which
both parties agree to refer to the decision of a court of
international law, or which under some convention be-
tween them either party is entitled to claim as of right
should be referred to the decision of a court of inter-
national law, the parties or party as the case may be
shall inform the Chancellor of the League, who shall
forthwith make all necessary arrangements for bringing
the dispute before the Court accordingly. All questions
of procedure shall, if not settled by agreement between
the parties, be decided by the Court, and, pending the

136

assembly of the Court, may be decided by the Chancel-
lor.

3. Pending the creation of a permanent court of inter-
national justice, the court of international law to which
the case is referred under the preceding article shall be
the court agreed on by the parties or stipulated in the
convention existing between them.

4. If there should arise between two States members
of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture
which is not submitted to a court of international law
under Article 2, it shall be open to either of them to de-
mand the reference of the matter to the League. The
object of the League in dealing with the matter shall be
to effect a just and lasting settlement of the difference.
The Chancellor of the League shall in that case convoke
a meeting of the Council of the League at such place as
may be deemed most convenient under the circumstances,
and the Council shall forthwith proceed with the inves-
tigation of the dispute.

5. In the event of any State represented on the Council
or of any party to the dispute notifying the Chancellor
within a period of 14 days after the demand for reference
to the League that in its opinion the dispute is one which
should be referred to the Conference, the Chancellor shall
convoke a meeting of the Conference. Pending the
assembly of the Conference, the investigation of the dis-
pute by the Council shall continue.

6. The party upon whose demand the matter has been
referred to the League shall file with the Chancellor of the
League a statement of its case with all the facts and papers
relevant to the dispute. The party against whom the com-
plaint is made shall be invited by the Chancellor to file a
statement of its case with all relevant facts and papers.

The Chancellor shall forthwith publish the statements
of the parties.

The H.C.P. agree that, in the case of the reference of
any dispute to the League under Article 4, they will each,
whether parties to the dispute or not, place at the dis-
posal of the Conference or the Council to the fullest
possible extent compatible with their interests all the in-

BRITISH DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 137

formation ID their possession which bears upon the
questions under discussion.

7. Where the Conference or the Council finds that the
dispute can with advantage be submitted to a court of
international law, or that any particular question in-
volved in the dispute can with advantage be referred to
a court of international law, it may submit the dispute
or the particular question accordingly, and may formulate
the questions for decision, and may give such directions
as to procedure as it may think desirable. In such case,
the decision of the Court shall have no force or effect
unless it is confirmed by the Report of the Conference
or Council.

Pending the creation of a permanent court of inter-
national justice, the court of international law referred to
in this article shall be a tribunal of arbitration nominated
by the Conference or the Council from among the members
of the Permanent Court created by the Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

8. Where the dispute is under investigation by the
Council, the Council shall, after considering the merits of
the dispute, and the decision of a court under Article 7,
make a report to the H.C.P.

9. Where the efforts of the Conference or of the Council
have led to the settlement of the dispute, a statement
shall be prepared for publication indicating the nature of
the dispute and the terms of settlement, together with
such explanations as may be appropriate.

If the dispute has not been settled, the report of the
Council to the H.C.P., or a similar report by the Confer-
ence, shall be published. This report shall set forth, with
all necessary facts and explanations, the recommendations
which the Council or Conference think just and proper
for the settlement of the dispute. If the Report is unani-
mously agreed to by the members of the Conference or
Council, other than the parties to the dispute, the H.C.P.
hereby agree that none of them will go to war with any
party which complies with its provisions and that they
will take all the measures described in Articles 12 and 13
to prevent any other Power going to war with such party.

138 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

If no unanimous report can be made it shall be the duty
of the majority to issue a report indicating what they
believe to be the facts and containing the recommenda-
tions which they consider just and proper.

10. The Council may at any time in the course of its
investigation of a dispute, or within a period of three
months after the making of its report, convoke a meeting
of the Conference and transfer to it the consideration of
the dispute.

11. Where any dispute arises between any States,
whether members of the League or not, which, in the
opinion of the Council, may lead to a rupture, the Council
may take the dispute into consideration, and may deal
with it as though it had been referred to the League under
Article 4, or in such other way as will in their opinion best
conduce to the peace of the world.

12. The H.C.P. agree that, in the event of any State
member of the League committing a breach of Article 1,
it will become, ipso facto, at war with all the other States
members of the League; they will all regard each other as
co-belligerents, and will take and support each other in
taking all such naval, military or economic measures as
will best avail for restraining the breach of covenant.

In particular, they shall each forthwith take all meas-
ures necessary to suspend financial, commercial, postal,
and telegraphic relations with such state, and, as far as
possible, shall prevent that State from having any such
relations with any other Power.

13. For the above purposes, each of the H.C.P. agrees
that it will detain aU ships and goods within its juris-
diction belonging to any person resident in that State;
it will prohibit all vessels flying the flag of its mercantile
marine from entering the ports of that State; it will pro-
hibit all exports to or imports from, and all financial trans-
actions direct or indirect, with any person in the territory
of such State; and it will also take such further economic
and commercial measures as the League may deem nec-
essary.

Furthermore, each of the H.C.P. agrees that, if it
cannot make an effective contribution of naval, military,

BRITISH DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 139

or aerial force, it will co-operate to the utmost of its power
in the naval and military measures which may be taken.
The naval, military, and economic operations under-
taken in pursuance of this article and of the immediately
preceding article shall be carried out without regard to
any limitations hitherto imposed on belligerent States by
any convention or rule of international law.

14. The H.C.P. agree, further, that they will mutually
support one another in the financial and economic meas-
ures which they are bound to take under the preceding
article in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience re-
sulting therefrom, and that they will mutually support
one another in resisting any special measures aimed at
one of their number by the State with which relations
have been broken off, and that they will afford passage
through their territory to the armed .forces of any of the
H.C.P. who are co-operating to resist the breach of Article 1 .

15. The H. C. P. agree that, as part of the terms of
peace imposed upon the State which has violated the
provisions of Article 1, it shall be called upon to restore all
contracts existing at the date of the outbreak of hostilities
between their nationals and the nationals of the enemy
State which their nationals wish to maintain, and also to
provide without reciprocity security for the payment of all
debts owing at that date to nationals of the co-operating
States members of the League.

16. In the event of disputes between one State member
of the League and another State which is not a member of
the League or between two States neither of which is a
member of the League, the H. C. P. agree that the State or
States not members of the League shall be invited to
become members of the League ad hoc, and the above
provisions shall be applied with such modifications as
may be necessary.

CHAPTER III.

GENERAL.

I. The H. C. P. agree that the provisions of this Con-
vention shall override any previously existing treaty

140 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

stipulations which may be inconsistent by which they may
be bound to any other members of the League. Further-
more, they agree that they will not enter into treaty
engagements in future which are inconsistent with it.

2. Powers not represented at the present Conference
may be invited to become parties to the present Conven-
tion. These invitations will be conveyed by the Chancel-
lor of the League.

3. Powers not invited to become parties to the present
Convention may apply for leave to become parties. The
League shall in such case decide whether the Power so
applying can be relied on to observe the terms of the
Conventions, and, if not, the League may refuse the
application, or, alternatively, may impose upon such
Power such further conditions as it may deem necessary.

4. The provisions of this Convention shall come into
effect so soon as it has been ratified by Great Britain, the
United States of America, France, Italy, and Japan.

NOTES ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS DRAFT CONVENTION.

Note to Chapter I.

The Conventions to be annexed to the Covenant will be,
roughly, the following:

(a) Conventions defining territorial settlements;

(b) Conventions defining the responsibilities of manda-
tory States;

(c) Conventions dealing with arms traffic, liquor

traffic, and other tutelage of backward races;

(d) Conventions defining general economic policy (e. g.,
transit, air, trade conditions) ;

(e) Conventions dealing with international labor con-

ditions ;

(f) Conventions establishing the legal machinery of the

League;

(g) Conventions dealing with standard international
activities of a more scientific or technical character
(e. g., Health);

and establishing in each case the international organs,
whether Commissions of Enquiry or Administrative or

BRITISH DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 141

semi-Administrative Commissions, required to carry out
the terms of each Convention.

These Conventions will probably include not only new
Conventions signed at Paris; but a number of existing,
agreements which the League will take over (e. g., existing
agreements under (g), such as the Postal Union).

Note to Chapter /, Article 10.

The duties of the Chancellor should be somewhat as
follows, and directions to that effect might be given to him
by the States composing the Council in the protocol.

(a) He should convene the meetings of the Conference
and the Council, prepare the work of these meet-
ings, and record the business transacted at them.

(b) He should facilitate and register the results of the
work of the various international organs indicated
in the Note to Chapter I, and, in this connection,
he should carry out the provisions of Chapter I,
article 1 (2) of the Convention.

(c) He should take the action required of him in con-

nection with international disputes, as provided in
Chapter II.

(d) He should register all international treaties brought
to the cognisance of the League.

(e) In general, he should collect, for the information of
the Council and the Conference, all facts affecting
the purposes and obligations of the League.

(f) The Conference and Council of the League should

correspond through him, as the sole responsible
channel, with the member States, with the inter-
national bodies indicated under (b) and with any
court of international law or conciliation operating
in pursuance of this Convention.

(g) He should maintain current relations at the capital
of the League with any official representatives
whom the member States may accredit to the
League.

(h) He should, at the request of two or more member
States, make arrangements for any official inter-
State meetings which it may be desired to hold.

142 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

(i) He should make similar arrangements for any
unofficial meetings of an international character
which he, as the representative of the Council,
may consider it advisable to invite to the capital
of the League.

Note to Chapter /, Article 11.

It might be well to agree in a protocol that the Council
shall, in the first instance, direct the Chancellor to select
the secretariat in a particular way. Such a protocol,
signed by the States composing the Council, might
stipulate that the Chancellor shall appoint ten permanent
secretaries at his discretion, subject to the following
provisions :—

He shall choose one national of each of the States
members of the Council, two nationals of two
European States not members of the Council, one
national of one of the States of America other than
the United States, and two nationals of any States
members of the League at his discretion. Before
appointing a national of any State, the Chancellor
ought, however, to secure the approval of the
Government of such State, and the Council should
have the right to veto any given appointment by
unanimous vote.

Note to Chapter III, Articles 1 and 2.

1. On the assumption, as a matter of procedure, that
the Convention will in the first instance be negotiated
and initialled by the States forming the Council of the
League, and that it will then be offered for signature,
during the Conference of Peace, to all the other States
represented at that Conference (except the enemy
Powers), it is suggested that a protocol should be annexed
to the Convention, as originally initialled, naming the
States to whom invitations should be issued as soon as
the Convention is finally signed by the States represented
at the Conference. It is suggested that invitations
should be issued as follows :

(a) to any States at war with Germany, or having

BRITISH DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 143

broken off diplomatic relations with her, which
may not be represented at the Conference.
(N. B. — It is possible that the United States may
advise against the inclusion of some Latin-Amer-
ican State coming within this category, e. g.,
Costa Rica.)

(b) To European neutrals, i. e., Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, and Spain;

(c) to Latin-American States not represented at the

present Peace Conference, except Mexico, Hayti,
San Domingo, and any other State which, in the
opinion of the United States, may be considered
unready for membership (without prejudice to the
right of such State to apply for membership under
Article" 17).

(d) to Persia.

2. The protocol should further set out that invitations
should be issued to new States recognized as sovereign
and independent by the Peace Conference. Jugo-Slavia
would be included in this class of States, unless it were
organically united to Serbia.

3. The policy with regard to the admission to the
League of enemy Powers, i. e., Germany, Austria, Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, remains to be decided. On
the whole, it might be well to state in a protocol that they
will be invited to apply, under Article 17, "when they
have given proof of their genuine acceptance of the
present Convention, of the treaties and agreements
annexed thereto, and of the present general treaties of
peace, and of their determination to abide by these obliga-
tions."

Russia cannot probably be invited to adhere, but it
may be advisable to state in a protocol the reasons for
this omission.

DOCUMENT 16.

Hurst-Miller compromise draft of the League
of Nations Covenant used as the basis of dis-
cussion in the League of Nations Commission.
Introduced at first meeting, February 3, 1919
(printed as annex to minutes of the Commission).

DRAFT COVENANT.

PREAMBLE.

In order to secure international peace and security by
the acceptance of obligations not to resort to the use of
armed force, by the prescription of open, just and hon-
orable relations between nations, by the firm establish-
ment of the understandings of international law as the
actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the
maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all
treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples
with one another, and in order to promote international
co-operation, the Powers signatory to this Covenant adopt
this constitution of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 1. — The action of the High Contracting
Parties under the terms of this Covenant shall be effected
through the instrumentality of meetings of Delegates
representing the High Contracting Parties, of meetings at
more frequent intervals of an Executive Council rep-
resenting the States more immediately concerned in the
matters under discussion, and of a permanent Inter-
national Secretariat to be established at the capital of the
League.

ARTICLE 2. — Meetings of the Body of Delegates shall
be held from time to time as occasion may require for the
purpose of dealing with matters within the sphere of
action of the League.

144

HURST-MILLER DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 145

Meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at the
capital of the League, or at such other place as may be
found convenient, and shall consist of not more than two
representatives of each of the High Contracting Parties.

An Ambassador or Minister of one of the High Contract-
ing Parties shall be competent to act as its representative.

All matters of procedure at meetings of the Body of
Delegates, including the appointment of committees to
investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the
Body of Delegates, and may be decided by a majority
of those present at the meeting.

ARTICLE 3. — The representatives of the States, mem-
bers of the League directly affected by matters within the
sphere of action of the League, will meet as an Executive
Council from time to time as occasion may require.

The United States of America, Great Britain, France,
Italy, and Japan shall be deemed to be directly affected
by all matters within the sphere of action of the League.
Invitations will be sent to any Power whose interests are
directly affected, and no decision taken at any meeting will
be binding on a State which was not invited to be rep-
resented at the meeting.

Such meetings will be held at whatever place may be
decided on, or, failing any such decision, at the capital of
the League, and any matter affecting the interests of the
League, or relating to matters within its sphere of action
or likely to affect the peace of the world, may be dealt
with.

ARTICLE 4. — The permanent Secretariat of the League
shall be established at which shall constitute

the capital of the League. The Secretariat shall com-
prise such secretaries and staff as may be required, under
the general direction and control of a Chancellor of the
League, by whom they shall be appointed.

The Chancellor shall act as Secretary at all meetings of
the Body of Delegates or of the Executive Council.

The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the
States members of the League in accordance with the dis-
tribution among members of the Postal Union of the ex-
penses of the International Postal Union.

146 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ARTICLE 5. — Representatives of the High Contracting
Parties and officials of the League when engaged on the
business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges
and immunities, and the buildings occupied by the League
or its officials or by representatives attending its meetings
shall enjoy the benefits of extra-territoriality.

ARTICLE 6. — Admission to the League of States who are
not signatories of this Covenant requires the assent of not
less than two-thirds of the Body of Delegates.

No State shall be admitted to the League except on
condition that its military and naval forces and armaments
shall conform to standards prescribed by the League in
respect of it from time to time.

ARTICLE 7. — The High Contracting Parties undertake
to respect and preserve as against external aggression the
territorial integrity and existing political independence of
all States members of the League.

ARTICLE 8. — The High Contracting Parties recognize
the principle that the maintenance of peace will require the
reduction of national armaments to the lowest point con-
sistent with domestic safety and the enforcement by
common action of international obligations; and the
Executive Council shall formulate plans for effecting such
reduction. It shall also enquire into the feasibility of
abolishing compulsory military service, and the substitu-
tion therefor of forces enrolled upon a voluntary basis,
and into the military and naval equipment which it is
reasonable to maintain.

The High Contracting Parties further agree that there
shall be full and frank publicity as to all national arma-
ments and military or naval programmes.

ARTICLE 9. — Any war or threat of war, whether im-
mediately affecting any of the High Contracting Parties
or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the
League, and the High Contracting Parties reserve the
right to take any action that may be deemed wise and
effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly
right of each of the High Contracting Parties to draw the
attention of the Body of Delegates, or of the Executive

HURST-MILLER DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 147

Council, to any circumstances anywhere which threaten
to disturb international peace, or the good understanding
between nations upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE 10. — The High Contracting Parties agree that
should disputes arise between them which cannot be
adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy, they
will in no case resort to armed force without previously
submitting the questions and matters involved either to
arbitration or to enquiry by the Executive Council, and
until three months after the award by the arbitrators, or
a recommendation by the Executive Council; and that
they will not even then resort to armed force as against
a member of the League which complies with the award
of the arbitrators, or the recommendation of the Executive
Council.

ARTICLE 11. — The High Contracting Parties agree that
whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise between
them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to
arbitration, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled
by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter
to arbitration, and will carry out in full good faith any
award or decision that may be rendered.

ARTICLE 12. — The Executive Council will formulate
plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of
International Justice, and this Court will be competent
to hear and determine any matter which the parties rec-
ognise as suitable for submission to it for arbitration under
the foregoing Article.

ARTICLE 13. — If there should arise between States
members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a
rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration as above,
the High Contracting Parties agree that they will refer the
matter to the Executive Council; either party to the dis-
pute may give notice to the Chancellor of the existence of
the dispute, and the Chancellor will make all necessary
arrangements for a full investigation and consideration
thereof. For the purpose the parties agree to communi-
cate to the Chancellor statements of their case with all the
relevant facts and papers.

Where the efforts of the Council lead to the settlement

148 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

of the dispute, a statement shall be prepared for publica-
tion indicating the nature of the dispute and the terms of
settlement, together with such explanations as may be
appropriate. If the dispute has not been settled, a report
by the Council shall be published, setting forth with all
necessary facts and explanations the recommendations
which the Council think just and proper for the settlement
of the dispute. If the report is unanimously agreed to by
the members of the Council, other than the parties to the
dispute, the High Contracting Parties agree that none of
them will go to war with any party which complies with
its recommendations. If no such unanimous report can
be made, it shall be the duty of the majority to issue a
statement indicating what they believe to be the facts and
containing the recommendations which they consider to
be just and proper.

The Executive Council may in any case under this
article refer the dispute to the Body of Delegates. The
dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party
to the dispute. In any case referred to the Body of
Delegates all the provisions of this Article relating to the
action and powers of the Executive Council shall apply to
the action and powers of the Body of Delegates.

ARTICLE 14. — Should any of the High Contracting
Parties be found by the League to have broken or dis-
regarded its covenants under Article 10, it shall thereby
ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war
against all the other members of the League, which shall
immediately subject it to the severance of all trade or
financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse be-
tween their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-
breaking State, and the prevention, so far as possible, of all
financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the
nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals
of any other State, whether a member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Executive Council in such
a case to recommend what effective military or naval
force the members of the League shall severally contrib-
ute to the armed forces to be used to protect the cove-
nants of the League.

HURST-MILLER DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 149

The High Contracting Parties agree, further, that they
will mutually support one another in the financial and
economic measures which are taken under this article in
order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting
from the above measures, and that they will mutually
support one another in resisting any special measures
aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking
State, and that they will afford passage through their
territory to the forces of any of the High Contracting
Parties who are co-operating to protect the covenants of
the League.

ARTICLE 15. — In the event of disputes between one
State member of the League and another State which is
not a member of the League, or between States not mem-
bers of the League, the High Contracting Parties agree
that the State or States not members of the League shall
be invited to become ad hoc members of the League, and
upon acceptance of any such invitation, the above provi-
sions shall be applied with such modifications as may be
deemed necessary by the League.

Upon such invitation being given the Executive Council
shall immediately institute an enquiry into the circum-
stances and merits of the dispute and recommend such
action as may seem best and most effectual in the circum-
stances.

In the event of a Power so invited refusing to become
ad hoc a member of the League, and taking any action
against a State member of the League, which in the case
of a State member of the League would constitute a
breach of Article 10, the provisions of Article 14 shall be
applicable as against the State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to
become ad hoc members of the League, the Executive
Council may take such action and make such recommenda-
tions as will prevent hostilities, and will result in the
settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE 16. — The High Contracting Parties entrust
to the League the general supervision of the trade in arms
and ammunition with the countries in which the control of
this traffic is necessary in the common interest.

I
150 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ARTICLE 17. — The High Contracting Parties agree
that in respect of territories which formerly belonged to
the German Empire or to Turkey, and which are inhabited
by peoples unable at present to secure for themselves the
benefits of a stable administration, the well-being of these
peoples constitutes a sacred trust for civilisation, and
imposes upon the States members of the League the
obligation to render help and guidance in the development
of the administration. They recognise that all policies of
administration or economic development should be based
primarily upon the well-considered interests of the peoples
themselves, upon the maintenance of the policy of the
open door, and of equal opportunity for all the High
Contracting Parties in respect of the use and development
of the economic resources of the territory. No military
or naval forces shall be formed among the inhabitants of
territories in excess of those required for purposes of
defence and of internal police.

ARTICLE 18. — The High Contracting Parties will work
to establish and maintain fair hours and humane conditions
of labour for all those within their several jurisdictions,
and they will exert their influence in favour of the adop-
tion and maintenance of a similar policy and like safe-
guards wherever their industrial and commercial relations
extend. Also they will appoint commissions to study
conditions of industry and labour in their international
aspects, and to make recommendations thereon, including
the extension and improvement of existing conventions.

ARTICLE 19. — The High Contracting Parties agree
that they will make no law prohibiting or interfering with
the free exercise of religion, and that they will in no way
discriminate, either in law or in fact, against those who
practice any particular creed, religion, or belief whose
practices are not inconsistent with public order or public
morals.

ARTICLE 20. — The High Contracting Parties will agree
upon provisions intended to secure and maintain freedom
of transit and just treatment for the commerce of all
States members of the League.

ARTICLE 21. — The High Contracting Parties agree

HURST-MILLER DRAFT OF THE COVENANT 151

that any treaty or international engagement entered into
between States members of the League shall be forthwith
registered with the Chancellor, and as soon as possible
published by him.

ARTICLE 22. — The High Contracting Parties severally
agree that the present Covenant is accepted as abrogating
all obligations inter se which are inconsistent with the
terms hereof, and solemnly engage that they will not
hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with
the terms hereof.

In case any of the Powers signatory hereto, or subse-
quently admitted to the League shall, before becoming a
party to this Covenant, have undertaken any obligations
which are inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it
shall be the duty of such Power to take immediate steps
to procure its release from such obligations.

DOCUMENT 17.

Official French plan for a League of Nations
(printed as annex to minutes of the Commission) .

Annex 2 to Minutes of First Meeting, League of Nations

Commission.

DRAFT ADOPTED BY THE FRENCH MINIS-
TERIAL COMMISSION FOR THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS.

(Translation.) I.

STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES TO BE TAKEN AS BASIS
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The problem of the League of Nations is one which
forces itself upon the consideration of every Government.
Historically, the idea is a very old one, which took shape
when the civilized States assembled at the two Hague
Conferences in 1899 and 1907. Practically, during the
present war, it has been taken up afresh under various
forms by the Allied Governments in their official declara-
tions, by President Wilson in his note of December, 1916,
and even by our enemies in their replies to the Papal Note
of the 16th August, 1917. It is, therefore, impossible to
avoid the study of the question; it can and must be con-
sidered quite apart from the questions which form the
subject proper of the Treaty of Peace.

1. In declaring that a sense of justice and honor
compelled them to carry on the war thrust upon them by
the aggressive action of the Central Powers until a joint
and decisive victory had been gained, the Allies intend
to convey that one of the results of that victory should
be (a) to protect the world in future against any recur-

152

153

rence of the employment of brute force and attempts on
the part of any nation to obtain universal supremacy,
and (b) to establish the reign of justice on sure founda-
tions throughout the world.

They declare that, in order to secure conditions which
will exclude the existence of a mere dangerous truce and
guarantee real peace, it is necessary to provide for the
contractual and permanent organization of international
relations, by the constitution between States of the as-
sociation to which universal public opinion has given the
name of "the League of Nations."

2. The object of the League of Nations shall not be to
establish an international political State. It shall merely
aim at the maintenance of peace by substituting Right
for Might as the arbiter of disputes. It will thus guar-
antee to all States alike, whether small or great, the ex-
ercise of their sovereignty.

3. The scope of the League of Nations is universal, but,
by its very nature, it can only extend to those nations
which will give each other all necessary guarantees of a
practical and legal nature, and which, in loyal fulfillment of
their given word, solemnly undertake to be bound by
certain rules in order to maintain peace by respecting
Right, and to guarantee the free development of their
national life.

Consequently, no nations can be admitted to the
League other than those which are constituted as States
and provided with representative institutions such as
will permit their being themselves considered responsible
for the acts of their own Governments.

4. The League of Nations shall be represented by an
international body, composed of the responsible heads of
Governments or of their delegates.

This international body shall have the following powers :

(1) It shall organize an international tribunal.

(2) It shall effect the amicable settlement of disputes
between the States members of the League by
means of mediation, preceded, if necessary, by an
enquiry in the terms of The Hague Convention of
1907.

154 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

(3) In the event of an amicable settlement proving
impossible, it will refer the matter to the Inter-
national Tribunal, if the question at issue is open
to a legal decision; otherwise it shall itself decide
the matter.

(4) It shall enforce the execution of its decisions and

those of the International Tribunal; at its de-
mand every nation shall be bound, in agreement
with the other nations, to exert its economic,
naval, and military power against any recalcitrant
nation.

(5) Every nation shall likewise be bound, at the demand
of the International Body, to exert, in common
accord with the other nations, its economic, naval,
and military power against any nation which, not
having become a member of the League of Nations,
shall attempt, by any means whatsoever, to impose
its will on another nation.

5. The International Tribunal shall pronounce on all
questions submitted to it, either by the International
Body or by a State having any dispute with another.

It shall decide and pronounce upon questions of law
at issue between States, on the basis of custom or of
international conventions, as well as of theory and juris-
prudence.

In cases of violation of such law, it shall order the
necessary reparation and sanctions.

II.

DIPLOMATIC, LEGAL, AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

(1) DIPLOMATIC SANCTIONS.

These sanctions, the result of which will be to place the
delinquent State for a shorter or longer period under the
ban of the member nations, fall under three headings :
(a) The suspension or breaking off of the diplomatic
relations existing up to that period between such
State and other member States of the League of
Nations;

FRENCH PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 155

(b) The withdrawal of the exequatur granted to the
consuls of such State;

(c) The exclusion of the State in question from the

benefit of any international conventions to which
it may be a party.

(2) LEGAL SANCTIONS.

On the other hand, certain sanctions of a legal nature
will enable the League of Nations, according to circum-
stances, to enforce respect of the principles which it is
called upon to protect.

(a) Thus offences committed, encouraged, or tolerated
by one of the member States may render it liable
to pecuniary sanctions which will be applied to it
by the International Court of Justice, in accordance
with the general principle laid down by Article 3
of The Hague Convention of the 18th October,
1907, as to the laws and customs of war.

(b) There are, moreover, other sanctions of a legal
nature which, without entailing the direct pecuniary
responsibility of the State concerned, will exert a
very marked and immediate influence on the atti-
tude and decisions of its representatives, by reason
of the sacrifices it will impose on the private in-
terests of the citizens themselves. There will be
no question of depriving the latter of the advan-
tages of common law, or of punishing them for acts
for which they are not directly answerable; but
that national unity which confers responsibilities
as well as benefits, will doubtless permit of the
temporary withdrawal from them of the exercise
of a faculty which, although not indispensable to
existence, nevertheless tends to facilitate it.

The following may be instanced as particularly effica-
cious measures from this point of view : the suspension, as
regards subjects of the recalcitrant State, of all Articles
of Association, conventions relating to the protection of
author's copyright and of industrial property, and con-
ventions under private international law concluded be-
tween that State and the other States, members of the

156 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

League of Nations; the exclusion of nationals of the
recalcitrant State from recourse to the Courts of Law in
the countries members of the League; the refusal to grant
the exequatur in the said countries as to the execution of
judgments pronounced by its Courts in favour of the
nationals; the seizure and sequestration of real estate or
movable property belonging to its nationals in the said
countries; the prohibition of commercial relations, and
even, if necessary, of any agreement of a private nature
with subjects of the States belonging to the League of
Nations.

The foregoing to be without prejudice to any legal
sanctions applicable under the ordinary rules of criminal
jurisdiction to the individual whose outrages upon law or
whose actions may have endangered the maintenance of
peace, or to the subsidiary measures which the League
of Nations may think well to take in order to secure con-
viction, in case it is not ensured by the Government to the
jurisdiction of which the criminal is subject.

(3) ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.

Other sanctions of an economic nature can be employed
by the League of Nations, by which it will be enabled to
exercise an efficient control over the recalcitrant State, by
various measures which may extend to placing it under an
absolute commercial, industrial, or financial ban.

The principal measures in question are:

(a) Blockade, consisting in the prevention by force of
any commercial intercourse with the territory of
the State in question.

(b) Embargo, i. e., the seizure and temporary se-
questration, in the ports and territorial waters of
the member States, of ships and cargoes belonging
to the delinquent State and its nationals, as also
the seizure of all goods destined for such State.

(c) Prohibition of the supply of raw materials and

foodstuffs indispensable to its economic existence.

(d) Prohibition of the issue by such State of public
loans in the territories of the member States; re-
fusal to allow stock issued elsewhere to be quoted

FRENCH PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 157

on the official Exchange, and even withdrawal of
any previous permission for the quotation of the
stock of such State.

The sanctions thus provided will be all the more effica-
cious and their application will be all the more prompt, in
that the member States will have previously arranged to
protect themselves against any reprisals to their prejudice,
by means of an economic organization adapted to facilitate
their cooperation and mutual assistance.

This rough outline will show that the League of Nations
will not be without weapons with which to enforce its
decisions, and to impose on any disturbing elements that
"Peace by Justice," the maintenance of which will be its
raison d'etre.

III.

MILITARY SANCTIONS.

(i) INTERNATIONAL FORCES.

The execution of the military sanctions on land or at sea
shall be entrusted either to an international force, or to one
or more Powers members of the League of Nations, to
whom a mandate in that behalf shall have been given.

The International Body shall have at its disposal a
military force supplied by the various member States of
sufficient strength:

(1) to secure the execution of its decision and those of
the International Tribunal;

(2) to overcome, in case of need, any forces which may
be opposed to the League of Nations in the event
of armed conflict.

(ii) STRENGTH OF INTERNATIONAL CONTINGENTS.

The International Body shall determine the strength of
the international force and fix the contingents which must
be held at its disposal.

Each of the member States shall be free to settle as it
deems best the conditions under which its contingent shall
be recruited.

158

The question of the limitation of armaments in each of
the member States will be dealt with elsewhere.

(iii) PERMANENT STAFF.

A permanent international Staff shall investigate all
military questions affecting the League of Nations.
Each State shall appoint the officer or officers who shall
represent it, in a proportion to be determined later.

The Chief and Deputy Chiefs of Staff shall be appointed
for a period of three years by the International Body, from
a list submitted by the member States.

(iv) FUNCTIONS OF THE PERMANENT STAFF.

It shall be the duty of the permanent International
Staff to deal, under the supervision of the International
Body, with everything relating to the organization of the
joint forces and the eventual conduct of military opera-
tions. It will in particular be charged with the task of
inspecting international forces and armaments in agree-
ment with the military authorities of each State, and of
proposing any improvements it may deem necessary,
either in the international military organization or in the
constitution, composition, and methods of recruiting of the
forces of each State.

The Staff shall report the result of its inspections, either
as a matter of routine or at the request of the Inter-
national Body. Military instructions shall be given in
each member State in accordance with rules designed
to procure, as far as possible, uniformity in the arma-
ments and training of the troops destined to act in con-
cert.

The International Body shall be entitled, at any tune, to
require that the member States introduce any alteration
into their national system of recruiting which the Staff
may report to be necessary.

(v) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF.

When circumstances shall so require, the International
Body shall appoint, for the duration of the operations to

FRENCH PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 159

be undertaken, a Commander-in-chief of the international
forces.

Upon his appointment, the Commander-in-chief shall
nominate his Chief of General Staff and the officers who are
to assist him.

The powers of the Commander-in-chief and his Chief of
General Staff shall cease when circumstances become such
that an armed conflict is no longer to be feared, or when the
object of the military operations has been attained.

In either case, the date at which the powers of the
Commander-in-chief and the General Staff shall cease
shall be fixed by a decision of the International Body.

IV.

SCOPE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY.

Public opinion among civilized nations, which regards
The Hague Conferences as a step towards the recognition
and application of the principles of justice and equity as
guarantees of the security of States and the well-being
of their peoples, is unanimously demanding a fresh effort
in the same direction. Although it has seen arbitration
applied in cases of ever-increasing importance, and like-
wise the creation of an international judicial organization
and the institution of a system of enquiry and mediation,
it still considers as indispensable the establishment of
more concrete guarantees, in order that peace may be
secured by the reign of organized justice.

The question thus arises of the institution of a per-
manent International Body to carry into effect the real
aims of the League of Nations.

There is no question of making the League of Nations
a super-State, or even a Confederation. Any such idea
is rendered impossible by respect for the sovereignty of
States, by the diversity of national traditions and of
political and judicial standards, by the differences in
systems of administration and opposition of economic
interests; but public opinion among the free nations would
be disappointed if the result of the present crisis were not
to be the institution of an International Body capable of

160 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

contributing, by constant vigilance and the exercise of
sufficient authority, to the maintenance of peace.

In conformity with the statement of principles adopted
by the Commission on the 18th January, this body, con-
stituted in the form of an International Council, will
derive its authority from the reciprocal undertaking given
by each of the member nations to use its economic, naval,
and military power in conjunction with the other members
of the League against any nation contravening the Cove-
nant of the League.

(l) MAINTENANCE OF PEACE BETWEEN THE MEMBER

NATIONS.

The Council shall devise and apply all means for the
prevention of international disputes.

To this intent —

1. The International Council shall maintain and develop
the international legal institutions created at The Hague
and call for international decisions to supplement them
as may be required.

£. The International Council shall, either at the demand
of the parties or at the instance of a third State, effect an
amicable settlement of differences menacing peace between
the member States; in default of any such demand, it
shall be bound to take the initiative as regards such settle-
ment.

3. It shall, in the first place, proceed either by means of
good offices and of mediation (preceded, if necessary, by
an enquiry in the terms of the First Hague Convention of
1907), or by reminding the disputant States that the
permanent Court is open to them.

4. Should no amicable settlement be thus obtained, the
International Council shall consider whether the question
is of a legal nature, in which case it shall order the dis-
putant States to submit their difference to the Court of
International Jurisdiction, which is competent to deal
with the matter in the terms of Section IV of the First
Hague Convention; in default of a compromise being
effected by agreement between the parties, the Court of
The Hague shall be competent to draw up such com-

FRENCH PLAN FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS 161

promise by extension of Article 53 of the said Conven-
tion;

5. The International Council shall ensure the execution
of the decisions of the International Court, if necessary, by
resorting to the application of diplomatic, legal, economic,
and military sanctions.

6. Should the International Council consider that the
matter is not of a nature to be finally settled by a legal
decision, it shall deal with the question direct.

It shall in the first instance attempt to promote an
amicable settlement, and, should it not itself be successful
in so doing, it shall define the terms according to which the
dispute shall be settled in a manner which shall respect
the rights of each State and the maintenance of peace.

This decision shall be notified to the States concerned, it
being intimated to them that as from such date no dispute
exists between the contestant States, but between the
entirety of the member States and the State which, by
refusing to accept such decision, violates the very prin-
ciples of the League. Should the State concerned refuse
to accept the decision after having been summoned to do
so, the International Council shall notify to it the coer-
cive measures of a diplomatic, legal, economic, or military
nature to be taken against it within a specified time.

(ii) DEFENCE AGAINST NON-MEMBER STATES.

Should a non-member State attempt to impose its will
on any member State upon any pretext whatsoever, the
International Council shall, after having employed all
possible means of conciliation, decide upon the steps to be
taken and shall cause all legal, diplomatic and military
action at the disposal of member States to be employed
against such State.

(iii) PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AGAINST THE SPREAD OF
ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN NON-MEMBER STATES.

Should conflict threaten to break out between two na-
tions who are not members of the League of Nations, the
International Council shall be bound to prevent any risk
of its extension in such a manner as to concern member

162 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

States, and to use all means in its power to arrive at a
peaceful settlement.

V.

COMPOSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL AND OF
THE PERMANENT DELEGATION.

The International Council representing all the nations
subscribing to the Covenant for securing peace by or-
ganized legislation shall be constituted as follows:

1. Each member State shall be represented by the head
of its Government, or by a representative of such Govern-
ment having sufficient power to bind the liability of his
State.

2. A plenary meeting of the International Council alone
shall be empowered to decide questions coming within
its jurisdiction. It shall make known the rulings given
in the case of disputes between States, and, should any
such State refuse to accept the ruling, it shall cause the
(corresponding) sanctions to be carried into effect by the
governments of the member States.

3. The International Council shall hold its ordinary
meeting once a year. The date and place of the following
meeting shall be settled at each such meeting.

4. The members of the International Council shall agree
inter se concerning the appointment of members of the Per-
manent Delegation which shall, between the meetings,
receive all communications destined for the said Council,
prepare its reports, etc., keep its archives in safe custody,
and, in cases of emergency, send out notices to members
of the Council and propose the calling of a special meeting.

5. The Permanent Delegation shall consist of 15 mem-
bers. Their term of office shall be years, and they
shall be eligible for reelection.

6. The International Council shall define the powers of
its Permanent Delegation.

7. The International Council shall call an extraordinary
meeting at the suggestion of the Permanent Delegation
(see paragraph 4 hereof), or at the request of one or more
of the member states.

June 8, 1918.

DOCUMENT 18.

Text of the Covenant as adopted at the
Plenary Session of February 14 and taken by
President Wilson to America (printed).

COVENANT.

PREAMBLE.

In order to promote international cooperation and to
secure international peace and security by the acceptance
of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of
open, just and honourable relations between nations, by the
firm establishment of the understandings of international
law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and
by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect
for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized
peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to this
Covenant adopt this constitution of the League of Na-
tions.

ARTICLE I. — The action of the High Contracting
Parties under the terms of this Covenant shall be effected
through the instrumentality of meetings of a Body of
Delegates representing the High Cnntrar^jpfl Parting of
meetings at more frequent intervals of an Executive
Council, and of a permanent international Secretariat to
be -established at the Seat of the League^

ARTICLE II. — Meetings of the Body of Delegates shall
be held at stated intervals and from time to time as occa-
sionjnay require for the purpose of dealing with matters
within the sphere of action of the League. Meetings of
the Body of Delegates shall be held at the Seat of the
League or at such other place as may be found convenient
and shall consist of representatives of the High Contract-
ing Parties. Each of the High Contracting Parties shall
res- — " "

164 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

have one vote hut may have no^more than three repre-
sentatives.

ARTICLE III. — The Executive Council shall consist of
representatives of the United States of Amejif^ the Brit-
ish Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, together with repre-
sentatives of four other States, members of the League.
The selection of these four States shall be made by the
Body of Delegates on such principles and in such manner
as they think fit. Pending the appointment of these rep-
resentatives of the other States, representatives of
shall be members of the Executive Council.

Meetings of the Council shall be held from time to time
as occasion may require and at least once a year at what-
ever place may be decided on, or failing any such decision
at the Seat of the League, and any matter within the
sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the
world may be dealt with at such meetings.

Invitations shall be sent to any Power to attend a meet-
ing of the Council at which matters directly affecting its
interests are to be discussed and Tin _Hp>^j,ginn tafopn at
lany meeting will be binding on sucFPower unless so
unvited.

ARTICLE IV. — All matters of procedure at meetings of
the Body of Delegates or the Executive Council including
the appointment of Committees to investigate particular
matters shall be regulated by the Body of Delegates or the
Executive Council and may be decided by a majority of
the States represented at the meeting.

The first meeting of the Body of Delegates and of the
Executive Council shall be summoned by the President of
the United States of America.

ARTICLE V. — The permanent Secretariat ^pf the League
shall be established at which shall constitute

the Beat ofHEEeTXeague. The Secretariat shall comprise
such secretaries and staff as may be required, under the
general direction and control of a Secretary-General of
the League, who shall be chosen by the Executive Coun-
cil; the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary-
General subject to confirmation by the Executive Council.

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all

TEXT OF THE COVENANT OF FEBRUARY 14

165

meetings of the Body of Delegates or of the Executive
Council.

The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the
States members of the League in accordance with the
apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau
of the Universal Postal Union.

ARTICLE VI. — Representatives of the High Contracting
Parties and officials of the League when engaged on the
business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges
and immunities, and the buildings occupied by the League
or its officials or by representatives attending its meetings
shall enjoy the benefits of extraterritoriality.

ARTICLE VII. — Admission to the League of States not
signatories to the Covenant and not named in the Proto-
col hereto as States to be invited to adhere to the Cove-
nant requires the assent of not less than two-thirds of the
States represented in the Body of Delegates, and shall be
1 united to fully self-governing countries including Domin-
ions and Colonies.

No State shall be admitted to the League unless it is
able to give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to
observe its international obligations, and unless it shall
conform to such principles as may be prescribed by the
League in regard to its naval and military forces and arma-
ments.

ARTICLE VIII. — The High Contracting Parties recog-
nize the principle that the maintenance of peace will re-
quire the reduction of national armaments to the lowest
point consistent with national safety and the enforcement
by common action of international obligations, having
special regard to the geographical situation and circum-
stances of each State; and the Executive Council shall
formulate plans for effecting such reduction. TheJExecu-
tive Council shall also determine for the consideration and
action of the several governments what military equip-
ment and armament is fair and reasonable in proportion
to~the scale of forces laid down in the programme of dis-
armament; and these limits, when adopted, shall not be
exceeded without the permission of the Executive Council.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the manufac-

166 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ture by private enterprise of munitions and implements
of war lends itself to grave objections, and direct the
Executive Council to advise how the evil effects attendant
upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard
being had to the necessities of those countries which are
not able to manufacture for themselves the munitions and
implements of war necessary for their safety.

The High Contracting Parties undertake in no way to
conceal from each other the condition of such of their
industries as are capable of being adapted to war-like pur-
poses or the scale of their armaments and agree that there
shall be full and frank interchange of information as to
their military and naval programmes.

ARTICLE IX. — A permanent Commission shall be con-
1 stituted to advise the League on the execution of the pro-
I visions of Article VIII and on military and naval questions
\ generally.

ARTICLE X. — The High Contracting Parties undertake
to respect and preserve as against external aggression the
territorial integrity and existing political independence of
all States members of the League. In case of any such
aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such ag-
gression the Executive Council shall advise upon the
means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE XI. — Any war or threat of war, whether im-
mediately affecting any of the High Contracting Parties
or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the
League, and the High Contracting Parties reserve the
right to take any action that may be deemed wise and
effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly
right of each of the High Contracting Parties to draw the
attention of the Body of Delegates or of the Executive
Council to any circumstances affecting international in-
tercourse which threaten to disturb international peace
or the good understanding between nations upon which
peace depends.

ARTICLE XII. — The High Contracting Parties agree
that should disputes arise between them which cannotBe"
adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy, they will

TEXT OF THE COVENANT OF FEBRUARY 14 167

in no case resort to war without previously submitting the
questions and matters involved either to arbitration or
toTinquiry by the Executive Council and until three
months after the award by the arbitrators or a recom-
mendation by the Executive Council; and that they will
not even then resort to war as against a member of the
League which complies with the award of the arbitrators
or the recommendation of the Executive Council.

In any case under this Article, the award of the arbi-
trators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the
recommendation of the Executive Council shall be made
within six months after the submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE XIII. — The High Contracting Parties agree
that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise between
them which they recognize to be suitable for submission
to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled
by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject mat-
ter to arbitration. For this purpose the Court of arbitra-
tion to which the case is referred shah1 be the court agreed
on by the parties or stipulated in any Convention existing
between them. The High Contracting Parties agree that
they will carry out in full good faith any award that may
be rendered. In the event of any failure to carry out
the award, the Executive Council shall propose what steps
can best be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE XIV. — The Executive Council shall formulate
plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice and this Court shall, when established,
be competent to hear and determine any matter which
the parties recognize as suitable for submission to it for
arbitration under the foregoing Article.

ARTICLE XV. — If there should arise between States
members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a
rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration as above,
the High Contracting Parties agree that they will refer
the matter to the Executive Council; either party to the
dispute may give notice of the existence of the dispute
to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary
arrangements for a full investigation and consideration
thereof. For this purpose the parties agree to communi-

168 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

cate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible,
statements of their case with all the relevant facts and
papers, and the Executive Council may forthwith direct
the publication thereof.

Where the efforts of the Council lead to the settlement
of the dispute, a statement shall be published indicating
the nature of the dispute and the terms of settlement,
together with such explanations as may be appropriate.
If the dispute has not been settled, a report by the Council
shall be published, setting forth with all necessary facts
and explanations the recommendation which the Council
think just and proper for the settlement of the dispute.
If the report is unanimously agreed to by the members
of the Council other than the parties to the dispute, the
High Contracting Parties agree that they will not go to
war with any party which complies with the recommen-
dation and that, if any party shall refuse so to comply,
the Council shall propose the measures necessary to give
effect to the recommendation. If no such unanimous
report can be made, it shall be the duty of the majority
and the privilege of the minority to issue statements in-
dicating what they believe to be the facts and containing
the recommendations which they consider to be just and
proper.

The Executive Council may in any case under this Arti-
cle refer the dispute to the Body of Delegates. The dis-
pute shall be so referred at the request of either party to
the dispute, provided that such request must be made
within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute.
In any case referred to the Body of Delegates all the pro-
visions of this Article and of Article XII relating to the
action and powers of the Executive Council shall apply
to the action and powers of the Body of Delegates.

ARTICLE XVI. — Should any of the High Contracting
Parties break or disregard its covenants under Article
XII, it shall thereby ipso facto be deemed to have com-
mitted an act of war against all the other members of the
League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject
it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the
prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and

TEXT OF THE COVENANT OF FEBRUARY 14 168

the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the
prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal inter-
course between the nationals of the covenant-breaking
State and the nationals of any other State, whether a
member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Executive Council in such
case to recommend what effective military or naval force
the members of the League shall severally contribute
to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of
the League.

The High Contracting Parties agree, further, that they
will mutually support one another in the financial and
economic measures which are taken under this Article,
in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting
from the above measures, and that they will mutually
support one another in resisting any special measures
aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking
State, and that they will afford passage through their
territory to the forces of any of the High Contracting
Parties who are cooperating to protect the covenants of
the League.

ARTICLE XVII. — In the event of disputes between
one State member of the League and another State which
is riot a member of the League, or between States not
members of the League, the High Contracting Parties
agree that the State or States not members of the League
shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership
in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such
conditions as the Executive Council may deem just, and
upon acceptance of any such invitation, the above provi-
sions shall be applied with such modifications as may be
deemed necessary by the League.

Upon such invitation being given the Executive Council
shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circum-
stances and merits of the dispute and recommend such
action as may seem best and most effectual in the circum-
stances.

In the event of a Power so invited refusing to accept
the obligations of membership in the League for the pur-
poses of such dispute, and taking any action against a

170 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

State member of the League which in the case of a State
member of the League would constitute a breach of Article
XII, the provisions of Article XVI shall be applicable as
against the State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to
accept the obligations of membership in the League for
the purposes of such dispute, the Executive Council may
take such action and make such recommendations as will
prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the
dispute.

ARTICLE XVIII. — The High Contracting Parties agree
that the League shall be entrusted with the general super-
vision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the coun-
tries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the
common interest.

ARTICLE XIX. — To those colonies and territories which
as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under
the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed
them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the
modern world, there should be applied the principle that
the well-being and development of such peoples form a
sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the per-
formance of this trust should be embodied in the constitu-
tion of the League.

The best method of giving practical effect to this prin-
ciple is that the tutelage of such peoples should be
entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their re-
sources, their experience or their geographical position,
can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tute-
lage should be exercised by them as mandataries on behalf
of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to
the stage of the development of the people, the geographi-
cal situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and
other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish
Empire have reached a stage of development where their
existence as independent nations can be provisionally
recognized subject to the rendering of administrative

TEXT OF THE COVENANT OF FEBRUARY 14 171

advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such
time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these
communities must be a principal consideration in the se-
lection of the mandatory power.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are
at such a stage that the mandatary must be responsible
for the administration of the territory subject to condi-
tions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or re-
ligion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and
morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade,
the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the prevention
of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval
bases and of military training of the natives for other
than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will
also secure equal opportunities for the trade and com-
merce of other members of the League.

There are territories, such as Southwest -Africa and
certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the
sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their
remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geo-
graphical contiguity to the mandatory state, and other
circumstances, can be best administered under the laws
of the mandatory state as integral portions thereof, sub-
ject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of
the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the mandatory state shall
render to the League an annual report in reference to the
territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to
be exercised by the mandatory State shall if not previously
agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties in each case
be explicitly defined by the Executive Council in a special
Act or Charter.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to establish
at the seat of the League a Mandatory Commission to
receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatory
Powers, and to assist the League in ensuring the observ-
ance of the terms of all Mandates.

ARTICLE XX. — The High Contracting Parties will en-
deavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions

178 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

of labor for men, women, and children both in their own
countries and in all countries to which their commercial
and industrial relations extend; and to that end agree to
establish as part of the organization of the League a per-
manent Bureau of Labor.

ARTICLE XXI. — The High Contracting Parties agree
that provision shall be made through the instrumentality
of the League to secure and maintain freedom of transit
and equitable treatment for the commerce of all States
members of the League, having in mind, among other
things, special arrangements with regard to the necessities
of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918.

ARTICLE XXII. — The High Contracting Parties agree
to place under the control of the League all international
bureaux already established by general treaties if the
parties to such treaties consent. Furthermore, they agree
that all such international bureaux to be constituted in
future shall be placed under the control of the League.

ARTICLE XXIII. — The High Contracting Parties agree
that every treaty or international engagement entered
into hereafter by any State member of the League, shall
be forthwith registered with the Secretary-General and
as soon as possible published by him, and that no such
treaty or international engagement shall be binding until
so registered.

ARTICLE XXIV. — It shall be the right of the Body of
Delegates from time to time to advise the reconsideration
by States members of the League, of treaties which have
become inapplicable, and of international conditions, of
which the continuance may endanger the peace of the
world.

ARTICLE XXV. — The High Contracting Parties sever-
ally agree that the present Covenant is accepted as abro-
gating all obligations inter se which are inconsistent with
the terms thereof, and solemnly engage that they will not
hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the
terms thereof.

In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subse-
quently admitted to the League shall, before becoming
a party to this Covenant, have undertaken any obligations

TEXT OF THE COVENANT OF FEBRUARY 14 173

which are inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant,
it shall be the duty of such Power to take immediate steps
to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE XXVI. — Amendments to this Covenant will
take effect when ratified by the States whose representa-
tives compose the Executive Council and by three-fourths
of the States whose representatives compose the Body of
Delegates.

DOCUMENT 19.

Text of letter from U. S. Senator G. M.
Hitchcock of Nebraska to President Wilson,
dated March 4, 1919, containing his suggestions
for amendment to the Covenant as originally
adopted (typewritten copy).

March 4, 1919.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

A number of republican Senators who signed Lodge's
manifesto on the league of nations constitution will, in my
opinion, vote for it nevertheless if it is a part of the peace
treaty. A still larger number will give it support if cer-
tain amendments are made. The following I would men-
tion as likely to influence votes in the order given :

First, a reservation to each high contracting party of
its exclusive control over domestic subjects.

Second, a reservation of the Monroe doctrine.

Third, some provision by which a member of the league
can, on proper notice, withdraw from membership.

Fourth, the settlement of the ambiguity in Article 15.

Fifth, the insertion on the next to the last line of first
paragraph of Article 8, after the word "adopted," of the
words "by the several governments."

Sixth, the definite assurance that it is optional with a
nation to accept or reject the burdens of a mandatory.

I wish you a safe journey.

Yours truly,

[sd] G. M. HITCHCOCK.
THE PRESIDENT,

The White House.

174

DOCUMENT 20.

Final text of the Covenant of the League of
Nations as it appears in the Treaty of Versailles.

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

In order to promote international cooperation and to
achieve international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription of open, just and honourable re-
lations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of
international law as the actual rule of conduct
among Governments, and

by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous re-
spect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of
organised peoples with one another,
Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 1. — The original Members of the League of
Nations shall be those of the Signatories which are named
in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other
States named in the Annex as shall accede without reserva-
tion to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected
by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within
two months of the coming into force of the Covenant.
Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the
League.

Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony
not named in the Annex may become a Member of the
League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the
Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees
of its sincere intention to observe its international obliga-
tions, and shall accept such regulations as may be pre-
175

176 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

scribed by the League in regard to its military, naval, and
air forces and armaments.

Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice
of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, pro-
vided that all its international obligations and all its obli-
gations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the
time of its withdrawal.

ARTICLE 2. — The action of the League under this
Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of
an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secre-
tariat.

ARTICLE 3. — The Assembly shall consist of Represent-
atives of the Members of the League.

The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from
time to time as occasion may require at the Seat of the
League or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter
within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the
peace of the world.

At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the
League shall have one vote, and may have not more than
three Representatives.

ARTICLE 4. — The Council shall consist of Representa-
tives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, to-
gether with Representatives of four other Members of the
League. These four Members of the League shall be
selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discre-
tion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of
the four Members of the League first selected by the
Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and
Greece shall be members of the Council.

With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the
Council may name additional Members of the League
whpse Representatives shall always be members of the
Council; the Council with like approval may increase
the number of Members of the League to be selected by the
Assembly for representation on the Council.

The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion
may require, and at least once a year, at the Seat of the
League, or at such other place as may be decided upon.

FINAL TEXT OF THE COVENANT 177

The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter
within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the
peace of the world.

Any Member of the League not represented on the
Council shall be invited to send a Representative to sit
as a member at any meeting of the Council during the
consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of
that Member of the League.

At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League
represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may
have not more than one Representative.

ARTICLE 5. — Except where otherwise expressly pro-
vided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present
Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of
the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members
of the League represented by the meeting.

All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly
or of the Council, including the appointment of Commit-
tees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated
by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided
by a majority of the Members of the League represented
at the meeting.

The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting
of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the
United States of America.

ARTICLE 6. — The permanent Secretariat shall be estab-
lished at the Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall
comprise a Secretary General and such secretaries and
staff as may be required.

The first Secretary General shall be the person named in
the Annex; thereafter the Secretary General shall be ap-
pointed by the Council with the approval of the majority
of the Assembly.

The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be
appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of
the Council.

The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all
meetings of the Assembly and of the Council.

The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the
Members of the League in accordance with the appor-

178 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

tionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of
the Universal Postal Union.

ARTICLE 7. — The Seat of the League is established at
Geneva.

The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of
the League shall be established elsewhere.

All positions under or in connection with the League,
including the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men
and women.

Representatives of the Members of the League and
officials of the League when engaged on the business of
the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and im-
munities.

The buildings and other property occupied by the
League or its officials or by Representatives attending
its meetings shall be inviolable.

ARTICLE 8. — The Members of the League recognise
that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of
national armaments to the lowest point consistent with
national safety and the enforcement by common action of
international obligations.

. The Council, taking account of the geographical situa-
tion and circumstances of each State, shall formulate
plans for such reduction for the consideration and action
of the several Governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revi-
sion at least every ten years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several
Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall
not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

The Members of the League agree that the manufacture
by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war
is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise
how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can
be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of
those Members of the League which are not able to manu-
facture the munitions and implements of war necessary
for their safety.

The Members of the League undertake to interchange

FINAL TEXT OF THE COVENANT 179

full and frank information as to the scale of their arma-
ments, their military, naval and air programmes and the
condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to
war-like purposes.

ARTICLE 9. — A permanent Commission shall be con-
stituted to advise the Council on the execution of the
provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval, and
air questions generally.

ARTICLE 10. — The Members of the League undertake
to respect and preserve as against external aggression the
territorial integrity and existing political independence of
all Members of the League. In case of any such aggres-
sion or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this
obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE 11. — Any war or threat of war, whether im-
mediately affecting any of the Members of the League
or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole
League, and the League shall take any action that may
be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of
nations. In case any such emergency should arise the
Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of
the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Mem-
ber of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly
or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting
international relations which threatens to disturb inter-
national peace or the good understanding between nations
upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE 12. — The Members of the League agree that
if there should arise between them any dispute likely to
lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to
arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree
in no case to resort to war until three months after the
award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.

In any case under this Article the award of the arbitra-
tors shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report
of the Council shall be made within six months after the
submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE 13. — The Members of the League agree that

180 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

whenever any dispute shall arise between them which
they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration
and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy,
they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any
question of international law, as to the existence of any
fact which if established would constitute a breach of any
international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of
the reparation to be made for any such breach, are de-
clared to be among those which are generally suitable for
submission to arbitration.

For the consideration of any such dispute the court of
arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court
agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in
any convention existing between them.

The Members of the League agree that they will carry
out in full good faith any award that may be rendered, and
that they will not resort to war against a Member of the
League which complies therewith. In the event of any
failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall pro-
pose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE 14. — The Council shall formulate and submit
to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the
establishment of a Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice. The Court shall be competent to hear and deter-
mine any dispute of an international character which the
parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give
an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred
to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

ARTICLE 15. — If there should arise between Members
of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture,
which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with
Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they
will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the
dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of
the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who
will make all necessary arrangements for a full investiga-
tion and consideration thereof.

For this purpose the parties to the dispute will commu-
nicate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible,

FINAL TEXT OF THE COVENANT 181

statements of their case with all the relevant facts and
papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publica-
tion thereof.

The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of
the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement
shall be made public giving such facts and explanations
regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof
as the Council may deem appropriate.

If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either
unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish
a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute
and the recommendations which are deemed just and
proper in regard thereto.

Any Member of the League represented on the Council
may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute
and of its conclusions regarding the same.

If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to
by the Members thereof other than the Representatives
of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members
of the League agree that they will not go to war with any
party to the dispute which complies with the recommenda-
tions of the report.

If the Council fails to reach a report which is unani-
mously agreed to by the Members thereof, other than the
representatives of one or more of the parties to the dis-
pute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the
right to take such action as they shall consider necessary
for the maintenance of right and justice.

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of
them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter
which by international law is solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and
shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

The Council may in any case under this Article refer the
dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred
at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that
such request be made within fourteen days after the sub-
mission of the dispute to the Council.

In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions
of this Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and

18* WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

powers of the Council shall apply to the action and powers
of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the
Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those
Members of the League represented on the Council and of
a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive
in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the
dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the
Council concurred in by all the members thereof other
than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to
the dispute.

ARTICLE 16. — Should any Member of the League resort
to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13
or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an
act of war against all other Members of the League, which
hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the sever-
ance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all
intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of
the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all
financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the
nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals
of any other State, whether a Member of the League or
not.

It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to rec-
ommend to the several Governments concerned what ef-
fective military, naval or air force the Members of the
League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be
used to protect the covenants of the League.

The Members of the League agree, further, that they
will mutually support one another in the financial and
economic measures which are taken under this article, in
order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting
from the above measures, and that they will mutually
support one another in resisting any special measures
aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking
State, and that they will take the necessary steps to
afford passage through their territory to the forces of any
of the Members of the League which are cooperating to
protect the covenants of the League.

Any member of the League which has violated any
covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer

FINAL TEXT OF THE COVENANT 183

a Member of the League by a vote of the Council con-
curred in by the Representatives of all the other Members
of the League represented thereon.

ARTICLE 17. — In the event of a dispute between a
Member of the League and a State which is not a Member
of the League, or between States not Members of the
League, the State or States not Members of the League
shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in
the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such
conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invita-
tion is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 in-
clusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be
deemed necessary by the Council.

Upon such invitation being given the Council shall
immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of
the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best
and most effectual in the circumstances.

If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations
of membership in the League for the purposes of such
dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the
League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as
against the State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to
accept the obligations of membership in the League for
the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such
measures and make such recommendations as will prevent
hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE 18. — Every treaty or international engage-
ment entered into hereafter by any Member of the League
shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall
as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or
international engagement shall be binding until so regis-
tered.

ARTICLE 19. — The Assembly may from time to time
advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of
treaties which have become inapplicable and the considera-
tion of international conditions whose continuance might
endanger the peace of the world.

ARTICLE 20. — The Members of the League severally
agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all

184 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

or understandings inter se which are inconsist-
ent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that
they will not hereafter enter into any engagements in-
consistent with the terms thereof.

In case any Member of the League shall, before becom-
ing a Member of the League, have undertaken any ob-
ligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant,
it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate
steps to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE 21. — Nothing in this Covenant shall be
deemed to affect the validity of international engage-
ments, such as treaties of arbitration or regional under-
standings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the
maintenance of peace.

ARTICLE 22. — To those colonies and territories which
as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under
the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed
them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the
modern world, there should be applied the principle that
the well-being and development of such peoples form
a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this
Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this
principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be
entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their
resources, their experience or their geographical position
can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing
to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by
them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to
the stage of the development of the people, the geograph-
ical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and
other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish
Empire have reached a stage of development where their
existence as independent nations can be provisionally
recognised subject to the rendering of administrative
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as

FINAL TEXT OF THE COVENANT 185

they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these com-
munities must be a principal consideration in the selection
of the Mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at
such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for
the administration of the territory under conditions which
will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject
only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the
prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms
traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the
establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases
and of military training of the natives for other than
police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also
secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of
other Members of the League.

There are territories, such as South- West Africa and
certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the
sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their
remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or their geo-
graphical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and
other circumstances, can be best administered under the
laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory
subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests
of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to
the Council an annual report in reference to the territory
committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to
be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously
agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly
defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to
receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories
and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the
observance of the mandates.

ARTICLE 23. — Subject to and in accordance with the
provisions of international conventions existing or here-
after to be agreed upon, the Members of the League: '
(a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and
humane conditions of labour for men, women,

186 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

and children, both in their own countries and in
all countries to which their commercial and
industrial relations extend, and for that purpose
will establish and maintain the necessary inter-
national organizations;

(b) undertake to secure just treatment of the native
inhabitants of territories under their control;

(c) will entrust the League with the general super-

vision over the execution of agreements with
regard to the traffic in women and children, and
the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;

(d) will entrust the League with the general super-
vision of the trade in arms and ammunition with
the countries in which the control of this traffic
is necessary in the common interest;

(e) will make provision to secure and maintain
freedom of communications and of transit and
equitable treatment for the commerce of all
Members of the League. In this connection,
the special necessities of the regions devastated
during the war of 1914-1918. shall be borne in
mind;

(f) will endeavour to take steps in matters of inter-
national concern for the prevention and control
of disease.

ARTICLE 24. — There shall be placed under the direction
of the League all international bureaux already established
by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent.
All such international bureaux and all commissions for the
regulation of matters of international interest hereafter
constituted shall be placed under the direction of the
League.

In all matters of international interest which are
regulated by general conventions but which are not
placed under the control of international bureaux or
commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject
to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties,
collect and distribute all relevant information and shall
render any other assistance which may be necessary or
desirable.

FINAL TEXT OF THE COVENANT 187

The Council may include as part of the expenses of the
Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission
which is placed under the direction of the League.

ARTICLE 25. — The Members of the League agree to
encourage and promote the establishment and cooperation
of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisa-
tions having as purposes the improvement of health, the
prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering
throughout the world.

ARTICLE 26. — Amendments to this Covenant will take
effect when ratified by the Members of the League whose
Representatives compose the Council and by a majority
of the Members of the League whose Representatives
compose the Assembly.

No such amendment shall bind any Member of the
League which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that
case it shall cease to be a Member of the League.

ANNEX.

I. ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY OF PEACE.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HEDJAZ

BELGIUM HONDURAS

BOLIVIA ITALY

BRAZIL JAPAN

BRITISH EMPIRE LIBERIA

CANADA NICARAGUA

AUSTRALIA PANAMA

SOUTH AFRICA PERU

NEW ZEALAND POLAND

INDIA PORTUGAL

CHINA ROUMANIA

CUBA SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE

ECUADOR STATE

FRANCE SIAM

GREECE CZECHOSLOVAKIA

GUATEMALA URUGUAY
HAITI

188 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

STATES INVITED TO ACCEDE TO THE COVENANT.

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC PERSIA

CHILI SALVADOR

COLOMBIA SPAIN

DENMARK SWEDEN

NETHERLANDS SWITZERLAND

NORWAY VENEZUELA
PARAGUAY

II. FIRST SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The Honourable Sir James Eric Drummond,
K. C. M. G., C. B.

DOCUMENT 21.

Text of the so-called "Loucheur Report " from
Appendix B to Secret Minutes, Council of Ten,
February 7 (mimeograph).

APPENDIX B TO MINUTES OF COUNCIL OF TEN.

February 7, 1919.
1557.
(Secret.)

Report by the Committee appointed by the SU-
PREME WAR COUNCIL at the Meeting of the 24th
January, 1919. (Morning.)

The Committee consisting of

Monsieur Loucheur, as President (France)

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief

of the Allied Forces.

General Bliss (America)

General Sir Henry Wilson (Great Britain)

(acting for Mr. Winston Churchill)

General Sir Frederick Sykes (Royal Air Force)

H. E. General Diaz, Chief of the

Staff, Italian Army.

Assembled on the 27th January, 2nd and 5th February.

From an examination of the Reports made by the Sub-
Committees and from the discussion which followed it
appeared that —

1. There is some uncertainty regarding the strength of
the existing German Army, and the resources in war
material of all kinds at its disposal, but both are still con-
siderable.

2. There is similar uncertainty regarding the war ma-
terial and stocks of munitions in the interior of Germany,

190 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

both in proof and in course of manufacture, also regarding
the means of production of such materials, but these stocks
and the means of production also are certainly still con-
siderable in quantity.

Any serious reduction in the effective strength of the
Allied Army of Occupation must depend on the carrying
out of certain necessary measures, the execution of which
must be controlled. To this end the Committee recom-
mends the following arrangements :

War material actually in possession of the German
Armies.

An approximate estimate of such war material is set
forth in Annex No. 1.

The Committee therefore considers that the Allied
Governments should fix definitely the number of troops
and the amount of war material of certain categories to
be left in the hands of the German Armies, which it pro-
poses should be reduced to a strength of 25 Infantry Divi-
sions and 5 Cavalry Divisions, and recommends that all
material in excess should be handed over.

All the war material to be surrendered by the Germans,
all stock of asphyxiating gas and gas masks, must be given
up at places selected by agreement, to Committees of
Allied officers who will carry out the removal, or the de-
struction, or the putting out of action of the surrendered
war material, according to circumstances.

As regards destruction and putting out of action, cer-
tain detailed measures have been considered; these will
be carried out by the above-mentioned Allied officers if
the general principles are accepted.

Manufacture of war material.

Similarly it is necessary that the German Government
should pledge itself not to continue the manufacture of
war material during the period of the armistice, in order
that she may not rearm in secrecy.

The most certain method of ensuring the correct execu-
tion of the above undertaking would consist in controlling
certain German munition factories but not necessarily all

THE "LOUCHEUR REPORT" 191

of them and in removing or destroying special machinery as
indicated in the Report of the Technical Sub-Committee
(Annex 2) . This control could be exercised by a compara-
tively small number of Allied experts.

It is, however, necessary to provide for the possibility
that, after the Allies have reduced the Army of occupa-
tion, Germany may put obstacles in the way of such con-
trol and resume the production of war material.

The Committee, therefore, calls attention to the fact
that a form of guarantee less comprehensive, but suffi-
ciently efficacious, provided that the delivery of existing
material has taken place, could be found in the establish-
ment of absolute control by military occupation of the
area extending to the east of the Rhine for an average
depth of about 50 kilometres from Cologne to 15 kilo-
metres to the north of Duisberg, in such a way as to
embrace Essen and the principal Krupp establishments,
the greater part of the Rheinish-Westphalian coal-fields
and the metallic industries which depend on these. A
map has been sent to Marshal Foch showing this zone.

The importance of this region from the point of view
of war in industries is so great that it would be practically
impossible for Germany once disarmed to take up arms if
she had not free disposal of it.

Further, the prevention of exportation to the unoc-
cupied German territories of the general products of this
area would have the most serious consequences from an
economic point of view. If the general munition control is
interfered with or if unauthorized production is found to
be going on, trade between the occupied territory and the
unoccupied territory would be prohibited.

These results can be looked for as a consequence of ne-
gotiating with the enemy, or they can be enforced upon
him as a condition of the renewal of the Armistice. In the
latter case the text of the agreement might be that of the
appended draft.

General Bliss has drawn up a Note (Annex 3) dealing
with certain reservations he wishes to make on the subject
matter of the above paragraphs.

General Diaz brought to notice the importance, in case

German Austria should be joined to Germany, of foresee-
ing the necessity of taking analogous measures as regards
factories in which war material is manufactured in that
region, where there are many of importance.

(Attached is an additional clause to the Armistice con-
ditions compiled in accordance with the above-mentioned
idea.)

To this Report are annexed the following documents :—

Annex 1. Report dated 1st February, 1919, of the
Military Sub-Committees.

Annex 2. Report dated 2nd February, 1919, of the
Technical Sub-Committee.

Annex 3. Memorandum by General Bliss, United
States Army.

Annex 4- Paper by General Groves devoted to aero-
nautics.

Annex 5. Normal allowance of arms for German units.

ADDITIONAL CLAUSE TO THE AEMISTICE CONDITIONS.

1. It is hereby agreed that provided Germany renounces
definitely any intention to resume hostilities and carries
out the following conditions as a guarantee of such renun-
ciation, the Allied and Associated Governments will re-
duce the financial burden imposed upon Germany by the
Allied occupation.

2. The reduction of the burden of occupation must be
preceded by the adoption of the measures mentioned
below, the execution of which will show clearly the wish
of Germany not to resume hostilities and to cease the man-
ufacture of war material.

3. Germany undertakes to reduce the effective person-
nel of her Armies to such numbers as are strictly necessary
for the garrison of their frontier and the maintenance of
order in the interior, that is to say

25 Divisions*
5 Cavalry Divisions*

4. Germany consequently undertakes to reduce the
quantity of war material to be maintained to the following
figures : —

*The establishment of a Division is shown in Annex 5.

THE "LOUCHEUR REPORT" 193

Note: General Weygand wishes to give further
consideration to these figures before accep-
ting them.

Heavy Guns 1,000

Field Guns 1,575

Machine Guns 3,825

Automatic Rifles 4,500

Rifles 412,500

Aeroplanes see para. 5 bis.

Trench Mortars 1,400

5. Consequently all war material of the above natures
in excess of these figures will be delivered at places to be
fixed by agreement, either in occupied or non-occupied
portions of Germany or outside Germany, to Commissions
of Allied officers who will be appointed for this purpose.
These surrenders will apply to the whole of the war ma-
terial existing either with the Armies or in the interior in
parks, depots, factories, etc., whether finished, under proof,
or in course of construction or repair. The Allied officers
will carry out according to circumstances the removal or
the destruction or the putting out of action of the war
material so surrendered.

5. bis. Aircraft. With regard to aircraft, Germany to
surrender the following : —

(a) 5,000 engines of types to be selected by the Allies.

(b) 450 German marine aircraft (i. e., aeroplanes, sea-
planes and flying boats) to be selected by the Allies.

(c) 15 airships to be selected by the Allies.

(d) All aircraft will be complete with all war equipment
and armament and to be flown by German personnel to
places to be specified by the Allies before a date to be
fixed by the Allies.

(e) 6 Rigid Airship Sheds over 800 feet long, with the
complete hydrogen-producing plant for each of the airship-
sheds, will also be surrendered in an efficient condition.

Note: It is considered important that the
question of the ultimate destination or des-
truction of all aircraft and aircraft material
surrendered by Germany shall be settled by

194 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

the Supreme War Council when a decision
as to the amount to be delivered has been
arrived at.

6. All tanks (all gas masks) and stocks of mustard and
arsenical gases with projectors and cylinders will be sur-
rendered.

7. Germany will, in addition, bind herself expressly to
stop all manufacture of war material of every kind, except
that strictly necessary for the upkeep of material of which
the existence is authorized.

8. To ensure the loyal and complete execution of the
pledges undertaken by Germany as laid down in paras.
1, 3, 4, 5, 5 bis., 6 and 7, the Allied Governments will
maintain in Germany a Mission of technical experts and
officers who will control the factories, workshops, and
building yards engaged in the manufacture of the classes
of war material mentioned in pars. 4, 5 bis., and 6 and
munition parks and magazines of all kinds.

This mission shall be authorized to inspect factories and
to remove or destroy such specialized machinery engaged
in the production of the above-mentioned claims of war
material as they may consider necessary to ensure the
cessation of output as aforesaid.

The civil and military German authorities will supply
these experts with the whole of the information which
they will need to carry out their mission and will furnish
them with all the necessary material means, and all the
necessary authorizations to complete it, without allowing
any obstacle to be placed in their way.

9. In the event of Germany not agreeing to the fore-
going proposals, or in the event of her not carrying them
out after having agreed to them the Allied Governments
wiH proceed to the military occupation of the Westphalian
basin on the right bank of the Rhine, the territory painted
red on the map which is annexed.

General
Military Section, C. I. G. S.

British Delegation.
5th February 1919.

[Five annexes omitted.]

DOCUMENT 22.

Letter to President Wilson, March 14, 1919,
from Rear-Admiral W. S. Benson (autographed
original), submitting memorandum, dated
March 13, of United States Naval Advisory Staff
on "Disposition of German and Austrian Vessels
of War" (typewritten original).

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

14 March, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

Realizing the tremendous importance of the final dis-
position of the enemy war vessels, we have given the sub-
ject most earnest and careful thought and study, and our
views are as concisely and clearly expressed in the attached
paper as we can put them.

Due to the importance of this subject, I hope you will
pardon me for strongly urging upon you the advisability
of reading this entire paper, as we have tried to make it
cover every single point involved in this question.

Should there be any doubt in your mind, or should
you wish to ascertain what I believe to be the professional
opinions of the officers of the foreign Navies with whom I
have been associated in the various conferences in Paris, I
would appreciate very much the opportunity of discussing
this matter personally with you.

I fully appreciate the value of your time and have there-
fore tried to make the paper as short as possible consistent
with clearness and completeness.

Sincerely yours,
[Signed] W. S. BENSON.

The President of the United States.

197

198 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

(Confidential.}

U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF, PARIS.

Memorandum No. XXIV

SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN
VESSELS OF WAR.

Copies to:
Mr. Lansing
Colonel House
General Bliss
Mr. White
Navy Department
Files 13 March, 1919.

MEMORANDUM.

The following naval vessels are, by the proposed naval
terms of peace, to be surrendered to the Allies and the
United States —

Battleships . . ... 21 ( 3 Austrian)

Battle Cruisers . v . . 6

Light Cruisers . . . ... 19 ( 3 Austrian)

Destroyers . . . . . 101 ( 9 Austrian)

Submarines (about) . . . 135 (15 Austrian)

There is now under consideration by the Peace Con-
ference two methods of disposing of these vessels: —

(1) Destruction.

(2) Distribution among the great Powers.

REASON FOR DESTRUCTION.

(a) The covenant for a League of Nations, Article VIII,
states "The High Contracting Parties recognise the prin-
ciple that the maintenance of peace will require the reduc-
tion of national armaments to the lowest point consistent
with national safety."

The destruction of the German- Austrian vessels would
be a practical demonstration to the world of the sincerity
of the High Contracting Parties in their determination
to reduce armaments. The distribution of the German-

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN SHIPS 199

Austrian vessels would increase the strength of the naval
armaments of the great Powers about 30 per cent. Great
Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy have
now 85 dreadnoughts and battle cruisers. The German-
Austrian dreadnoughts and battle cruisers awaiting dis-
position number 27.

(b) The fact that the menace of German- Austrian naval
power is removed renders unnecessary any increase in the
strength of the navies of the European Powers. On the
contrary, the logical result of the elimination of this
menace should be a reduction in European naval arma-
ments.

(c) The addition of German-Austrian ships to the navy
of any European power would be an increased economic
burden to that power. As the United States is called
upon to assist financially the great powers of Europe
which are already heavily in our debt and now nearly
bankrupt, it is to our financial interest to oppose any un-
necessary increase of their financial obligations.

(d) The distribution of German-Austrian vessels would
arouse dissatisfaction and jealousy between states that
were not satisfied with their respective shares and would
tend to stimulate armament construction to restore for-
mer relative naval strength. It is physically impossible
to make an equitable distribution of the German Navy
among the great Powers. The ships are of a variety of
types of greatly varying value, so that it is not a question
of numbers, but rather a vastly intricate naval question.
We consider it dangerous to permit this question to be
opened at all, since the problems presented by it cannot
be solved without compelling some of the Powers to accept
semi-obsolete vessels, thus giving them grounds for future
bitterness.

(e) The United States should not participate in the
distribution. America is proud to claim that she came
into this war with clean hands and will come out with
empty hands. We cannot stultify our position by accept-
ing any spoils of war.

(f) It is essential that the United States have a navy
as large as that of Great Britain. The League of Nations

200 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

must be strong enough to restrain, if necessary, its strong-
est member.

No international navy made up of ships of heteroge-
neous types, training, language, custom and command
could hope to cope with the British fleet. There must exist
in such an international force a single unit of the same
nationality of equal strength to the navy of Great Britain.
Such a unit with the assistance of the forces of the League
would be able to enforce the mandates of the League
against any power. The United States has its ambitions
satisfied and can be relied upon to support loyally the
League of Nations. The nations of the world know this
and have faith in us. Should we ever fail in our interna-
tional obligations there would exist the forces of the League
with the fleet of Great Britain to apply the remedy.

Any distribution of the German-Austrian ships on the
basis of losses or of naval effort in the war would give
the lion's share to Great Britain, which would mean that
the American taxpayer must pay hundreds of millions of
dollars to restore equality of strength.

(g) The German capital ships were built for a special
purpose — to oppose the British fleet. They are of short
steaming radius, built to fight near home and are un-
suitable for overseas operations. They have German
guns, German equipment and depend on German shops
and yards for replacements and upkeep. They would be
uneconomical and inefficient as a part of a foreign navy.
They are inferior in type to the later British and American
ships and will soon be obsolete. Any country that gets
them will find the cost of maintenance out of proportion
to their value. Great Britain alone might afford to keep
them as a reenforcement to her Channel fleet, thereby
releasing her own modern types for operations abroad.

(h) There are in the world but two great Powers whose
existence depends on naval strength. These are Great
Britain and Japan. In the past Great Britain built with
the exclusive idea of keeping a safe superiority over the
German fleet. In the future her sole naval rival will be
the United States, and every ship built or acquired by
Great Britain can have in mind only the American fleet.

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN SHIPS 201

Japan has no rival in the Pacific except America.
Every ship built or acquired by Japan can have in mind
only opposition to American naval strength in the Pacific.

The United States, in its desire to maintain the peace
of the w world and to help all nations, must not forget
the necessity of national safety. Any reduction in our
relative naval strength will weaken our influence in the
world and will limit our ability to serve the League of
Nations.

While distribution of the German-Austrian vessels to
other Powers than Great Britain or Japan would not be so
serious for us, it must be borne in mind that Great Britain
is in a position in Europe to compel, if necessary, a naval
alliance that would add these ships to her fleet.

(i) There is no means of guaranteeing that once the
distribution was made on an agreed basis, participating
Powers would not sell or exchange their vessels or others
which they replace to some other Power and thereby
affect the relative naval strength of states in a manner not
contemplated in their distribution.

(j) The German- Austrian submarines should not be
distributed — they should be destroyed. Not only should
these submarines be destroyed, but all submarines in the
world should be destroyed, and their future possession by
any Power forbidden. They serve no useful purpose in
time of peace. They are inferior to surface craft in time
of war except in ability to treacherously attack merchant
ships. In the present war, 99 per cent, of submarine
attacks were illegal attacks on merchant ships. Civiliza-
tion demands that naval war be placed on a higher plane
and confined to combatant vessels. So long as the
submarine exists it will be used in the stress of war to
attack neutral trade. High officers of the British Ad-
miralty have justified the unrestricted use of submarines
by Germany on the ground of military necessity.

REASONS FOR DISTRIBUTION.

(a) The chief reason advanced for not destroying the
German-Austrian vessels is that it is unsound to destroy
good vessels already built that cost millions of dollars,

202 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

while naval Powers are spending money to build new ships.
The soundness of this argument is more apparent than
real. The distribution of the German-Austrian ships
would so disturb the relative naval strength of the Powers
that it would necessitate a building programme greater
than any now necessary or contemplated, and in the end
would only add the burden of the upkeep of the new ships
to those acquired by the distribution. This result would
particularly affect the United States who would be com-
pelled to bear the brunt of matching the increased naval
strength of Great Britain.

(b) The particular desire on the part of France for
distribution of the German- Austrian ships is based on the
claim that while naval Powers like Great Britain and the
United States were enabled by their war effort to increase
the power of their fleets, France was compelled to devote
all her effort to the manufacture of materials for land
warfare, which leaves her at the end of the war in an un-
fair position relative to other naval powers whose chief
effort was on the seas.

The justice of this claim must be admitted at once,
but it is not admitted that the distribution of German-
Austrian ships would in any way serve as a compensation.
The financial condition of France does not warrant any
addition to her armament burdens. The elimination of
the fleet of her ancient enemy renders any addition to her
fleet unnecessary. Aside from these reasons, even though
a very real benefit would come to France from this dis-
tribution, such benefit to a single nation should not out-
weigh the interests of the rest of the world.

The following table illustrates the result of a distribution
of the German -Austrian capital ships as affecting the
relative naval strength of the five great naval Powers. It
is assumed that minor types would be distributed in the
same proportion.

Two assumptions are made — (1) that distribution
would take place on a basis of relative naval effort in the
war, in which case the least favorable treatment of Great
Britain would demand that her share should be twice as

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN SHIPS 203

great as that of any other Power (the United States not
participating); or (2) that the distribution should be on
the basis of absolute naval losses in the war, in which case
the share of Great Britain would be still greater.

i

II

in

Before distribution

After distribution on 2
to 1 basis, U. S. not
participating

After distribution on
basis of absolute losses

Great Britain .

43

53

63

United States .

17

17

17

France ....

7

13

12

Japan ....
Italy ....

13

5

18
11

13

7

To be noted in connection with Column I:

(a) With the German Navy wiped out and before any
distribution takes place, Great Britain has 43
capital ships; all other great Powers together have
42 capital ships. (Great Britain has also a
corresponding superiority in destroyers and sub-
marines.)

(b) The United States must build 26 more capital ships
than Great Britain does in an equal period of time
in order to have a navy equal to Great Britain's.

To be noted in connection with Column II:

(c) If the German Navy is distributed on a 2 to 1 basis,

the United States not participating, Great Britain
will have 53 capital ships. All other great Powers
together will have 59 capital ships.

(d) The United States will have to build 36 more
capital ships than Great Britain does in an equal
period of time in order to have a navy equal to
Great Britain's.

To be noted in connection with Column III:

(e) In case the German Navy is distributed on the

basis of absolute losses, Great Britain will have 63
capital ships; all other great Powers together will
have 49 capital ships.

(f) The United States will have to build 46 more
capital ships than Great Britain does in an equal

204 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

period of time in order to have a navy equal to
Great Britain's.

(g) If a distribution of the German Navy is made, the
naval armaments requiring to be supported by
the five great Powers will be increased immediately
from 85 capital ships to 112 capital ships, and this
at a time when we are talking disarmament and
when the world is burdened with a debt that it
cannot pay.
Should the United States and Great Britain participate

in the distribution but sink their respective shares, the

result would be as follows —

i

ii

in

Before distribution

After distribution on 2
to 1 basis

After distribution on
basis of absolute losses

Great Britain .

43

43

43

United States .

17

17

17

France ....

7

11

12

Japan ....
Italy ....

13
5

17

9

13

7

NOTE : A distribution on this 2 to 1 basis would leave Japan with the same number
of capital ships as the United States.

We believe it to be essential that the disposition of the
German-Austrian vessels be settled at once and by the
terms of the Peace Treaty. Unless the matter is decided
now as a part of the peace terms there will be an in-
evitable loss of interest in this vital matter and an in-
creasing difficulty in reaching a unanimity of agreement
that may in the end result in a disposition of these vessels
that will be favorable to the strongest naval Power and
vitally affect our relative naval strength.

Since, so far as known, there will be but one treaty
and that with Germany, and since the disposition of the
German -Austrian ships is one of the principal points to be
decided by that treaty, if the disposition of these vessels
is not definitely stated in that treaty there will be no
binding provision between the Allies and the United
States that will determine the final disposition of the
German -Austrian fleets.

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN SHIPS 205

The controlling reasons why the German -Austrian
vessels of war should not be distributed may be sum-
marised briefly as follows:

The covenant of the League of Nations requires reduc-
tion of armaments. Distribution increases the naval
armaments of the great Powers by over 30 per cent.

A stable League of Nations requires two equally great
navies. Distribution makes it impossible during many
years to come for the American Navy to overtake the
British Navy.

World conditions demand taxation be reduced. Dis-
tribution will increase taxation.

World conditions demand the removal of sources of
friction. Distribution will be an endless source of friction
and ill-feeling, not only on the part of Germany, but
among the Allies.

World interests demand that no single power may rule
the sea against all comers. Distribution will establish a
single power more firmly than ever in a position that
dominates the sea completely.

The morale of the world requires a dramatic herald of
better days. Distribution will herald preparations for a
continuance of warlike measures.

American interests in the League of Nations compel her
to accept the burden of a navy equal to Great Britain's.
Distribution makes that burden too great.

France wants Distribution. All other countries want
destruction.

CONCLUSION.

We conclude that —

(1) The disposition of the German- Austrian vessels of

war should be incorporated in the peace treaty.

(2) In order that the disposition may be carried out as

agreed upon, the disposition should be stated in
the terms submitted to Germany and Austria.

(3) That the terms of the peace treaty signed by Ger-

many and Austria should provide for the destruc-
tion of the German-Austrian vessels of war.

DOCUMENT 23.

Letter to President Wilson, April 9, 1919, from
Rear-Admiral W. S. Benson (autographed orig-
inal), submitting memorandum dated April 7,
of United States Naval Advisory Staff on
"United States Naval Policy" (typewritten
original) .

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Paris,

April 9, 1919.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I am sending you herewith a paper which we have pre-
pared after much thought and study.

If I may presume to say so, I urge you to read it, as it
will undoubtedly assist you in forming definite conclusions
on this most important subject without consuming the
time that would otherwise be necessary for independent
investigation.

My own opinion is that the necessity for at least two
approximately equal naval powers is absolute in order to
stabilize the League of Nations. This fact should be
recognized, and the United States should give it as a reason
for building up and maintaining its Navy.

Sincerely yours,
[Signed] W. S. BENSON.

The President of the United States.

206

BENSON ON "UNITED STATES NAVAL POLICY" 207

7 April, 1919.
(Confidential.)

U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF, PARIS.

Memorandum No. XXV.

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES NAVAL POLICY.

There is no subject in connection with the League of Na-
tions that has caused so much perplexity, both at home and
abroad, as the apparent inconsistency of the United States
in advocating a general reduction of armaments, while it-
self undertaking an intensified Naval Building programme.

It is natural that a hostile foreign press should seize
upon this apparent inconsistency as an evidence of hypoc-
risy on the part of the American Government, which is
accused of aiming to obtain an advantage over other
Powers by inducing them to trust in the ideal strength
of an unarmed League, while continuing itself to rely on
the practical strength of an armed nation. We hope that
the following examination of the subject will make clear
to all that American aims are legitimate aims, and that
the step America is taking is one demanded by world
interest, and one that menaces the just aspirations of no
Power whatever.

Every great change in world conditions makes it incum-
bent on each of the several States of the world to reexam-
ine its special situation, and to determine from this
examination the policies that will enable it best to fulfil
its duties to the world and to itself. Such a change in
world conditions has come and such a duty now falls upon
us as Americans. There are many interrelated external
policies which America must determine, but this paper
deals with naval policy only. Naval policy is a means
to an end, a means designed to assist the State in the at-
tainment of its international mission. This mission for
the United States is twofold — a duty to itself and a duty
to the world.

I. To promote and guard the interests of the United
States in every way consonant with justice.

208 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

II. To assist in promoting the welfare of the world.

We can make no progress in promoting our international
interests, or in promoting the welfare of the world, except
through international relations. Whenever we enter into
such relations we meet with other national aims, with
other national desires for the advancement of the interests
of other nations. The result is in part a system of ex-
change of advantages between States. If all international
relations were but systems of exchange of advantages and
concessions, and if no advantages were sought by any
State except on the basis of equal exchange, there might
be no occasion for the use of force in international rela-
tions, but such is not the case.

The growth of populations, the development of national
character, changes in national life, all introduce at times
insistent demands on other nations that are not consonant
with the interests of those nations. As our principle is
the promotion of national interests and world interests in
harmony with justice, we have to consider how extraor-
dinary international demands may be resisted where they
are not just.

Just and friendly relations are stimulated when national
aims may be attained through the reciprocal granting of
advantages on an equitable basis. The aim, of course,
on either side of a negotiation is profit in some form or
other. The natural aim is toward the maximum profit.
This is as true in international negotiation as in private
negotiation, so there is a constant tendency for nations to
devise means for obtaining by negotiation advantages as
great as possible. The negotiations of individuals and of
corporations are governed by written law, which has a
distinctly limiting influence on attempts to obtain unjust
profits. When States negotiate, they are free from the
restraining influence of law and may exact every advan-
tage which their position makes it possible for them to
exact. On minor questions we expect them to apply
equitable principles in their negotiations, but when ques-
tions of great national importance are at issue, expediency
rather than principle governs.

The question then becomes not so much a question of

BENSON ON "UNITED STATES NAVAL POLICY" 209

exchange of advantages as the acceptance by the weaker
state of demands made, rather than submission to the
penalties that otherwise would be inflicted by the more
powerful State. In other words, the attention of the
negotiators is shifted from the principle of exchange to the
principle of power, the decisions are arrived at by an esti-
mate of relative power, and this whether force be used or
not.

If Liberia cannot prevent occasional crimes
within her borders, she is compelled to yield
territory to neighbouring colonies as compensa-
tion, the alternative being still more drastic
action.

If Japan cannot get from China the concessions
she desires, she presents China with twenty-one
demands and intimates that the exchange China
has to make is the granting of those demands in
return for the non-infliction on her of the alter-
native penalties of war measures. Potential
military force slips in and closes the bargain that
China maintains is an unjust bargain.

If England cannot get by the mild terms of
diplomatic notes the decisions she desires regard-
ing equal rights in the use of the Panama Canal,
she presents a note that uncovers the idea of a
military superiority sufficient to enforce what
she considers a just decision.

When we examine our own world situation in the new
order of things, we realize that all of our important inter-
national relations and all of our important international
questions hinge upon matters relating to the sea and sea
communications. We cannot advance our external in-
terests, nor can we influence world policy, except by way
of the sea. Practically all of our great commerce is sea
commerce. If any foreign State desires to bring military
pressure to bear upon us, it must be a pressure based upon
possible operations by way of the sea. The attack of our
Colonies, of our commerce, of our frontiers, depends first
of all upon what happens at sea. Conversely if we desire

210 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

to retaliate or to exert opposing military pressure, we must
base our efforts upon our sea power.

In the past our naval position has derived great strength
from the potential hostility of the British and German
fleets. Neither the German nor the British fleet could
venture abroad without grave risk that the other would
seize the opportunity thus presented to crush a rival.
This condition gave to America a position of special
strength both in council and in decision, because her navy
was so strong that no other navy could neglect its influ-
ence. All that is now changed. The German fleet has
ceased to exist, with the result that we suddenly find the
British Navy in a position of unparalleled strength. No
navy is left in Europe capable of offering any real resist-
ance to the British Navy.

Under present conditions the British Navy, with its
world-wide supporting organization, is strong enough to
dominate the seas in whatever quarter of the globe that
domination may be required. We do not consider this a
condition calculated to advance either our own just in-
terests or the welfare of the world. A power so absolute
that it may disregard other powers with impunity, is less
apt to act with justice than if there be a balancing influence
of force as well as of world opinion to oppose it. This is
true within a league of nations as well as without a league
of nations.

Even when force is not applied, the knowledge of its
readiness is always an asset in negotiation. The smooth
and leisurely phrases of diplomacy derive their pungency
from a vision of the force in readiness that lies behind them.
Governments are influenced less by words than by ma-
terial facts. We are conscious of this in every phase of
the proceedings of the Peace Conference now in progress.
Everyone, except ourselves, looks to British Naval Repre-
sentatives for suggestions in naval matters and to French
Military Representatives for suggestions in military mat-
ters. This phenomenon is the unavoidable tendency of
the strong to dominate, and of the weak to accept domi-
nation.

Since we are considering naval policy as affecting Amer-

BENSON ON "UNITED STATES NAVAL POLICY" 211

ican interests, and since the British Navy is the only navy
in existence that can threaten the American Navy, British
policies have a peculiar interest for us.

Every great commercial rival of the British Empire has
eventually found itself at war with Great Britain — and has
been defeated. Every such defeat has strengthened the com-
mercial position of Great Britain.

The constant effort of Great Britain through centuries has
been to acquire control of the foci of the sea commerce of the
world.

A present governing policy of Great Britain is the control
and monopoly, so far as possible, of international communi-
cations. These include —

Submarine Telegraph Cables,
Radio Systems,
Commercial Aircraft,
Merchant Shipping,
Fuelling Facilities,
Fuel Deposits.

The British negotiations at the Peace Conference are
conducted with these objects frankly in view. Their at-
tainment is possible largely through British strength at
sea. No one can contend that such monopolies represent
the promotion of interests that are just to all the world.

The possibility of future war is never absent from the
minds of statesmen, so we see in the British negotiations
a very careful attention to the preservation of their
present military domination of the sea. Among the
measures they contend for are —

1. The distribution of the German and Austrian fleets.
COMMENT. Great Britain now has more than
half of all the dreadnoughts of the world; if the
German and Austrian ships are distributed on the
most probable basis of losses during the present war,
the United States would have to add to its navy
double the number of dreadnoughts it already
possesses, or else remain an inferior naval power.
In any case this perfectly logical policy of Great
Britain, if carried out, will place her in a position
of supremacy for many years to come.

212 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

2. The razing of fortifications commanding waterways

that Great Britain does not control.

COMMENT. This is a natural policy of a great
sea power. Its object is to give, in time of war,
the maximum possible freedom to that Power
whose navy controls the sea. It is put forward as
being a policy in the interest of freedom of the
seas, but the true object is that given above.

3. The most liberal possible interpretation of belligerent

rights on the High Seas.

COMMENT. Very few people realize how reluc-
tant the British are to codify maritime international
law. They naturally prefer the absence of law
in order that during war their Navy may have
complete freedom of action. The absence of Mari-
time Law during the present war has led to an
expansion of so-called belligerent rights that cer-
tainly would never be accepted by an International
Congress. As an example, if Canada should at-
tempt to gain her independence from Great Britain
by force, and if the United States remained neutral,
it is the British contention that Great Britain
could blockade every port of the United States and
could so regulate our imports that we could spare
none for exportation to Canada. This is not In-
ternational Law, but an application of the law of
force to neutrals. The only reply is the presence
of a potential force that will secure the abandon-
ment of the contention.

These proposals take on a special significance because of
a recent pronouncement. At a time when all the world
is seeking to form a league of nations that will secure
justice to great and small nations alike, the British Prime
Minister announces that the British alliance with France
will continue for ever. In the Far East, Japan remains
within the British alliance. We look in vain for any pro-
vision of the League Covenant that forbids such alliances.
Such combinations seem to us to contain elements of grave
danger and to demand of us extraordinary measures.
Our own present and prospective world position needs

BENSON ON "UNITED STATES NAVAL POLICY" 213

special consideration. We are setting out to be the
greatest commercial rival of Great Britain on the seas.
We know that increase of population, the development
of our great national resources, and our lack of real de-
pendence on the rest of the world, spread before us the
promise of a greater future than any other Power may
expect. The gradual realization of this promise is bound
to excite enmity and to cause unjust opposition to our
expanding world interests. Heretofore we have lived
apart, but now we are to live in constant and intimate
relation with the rest of the world. We must be able to
enter every world conference with the confidence of equal-
ity. We can have this confidence in but one way and
that is by actually being equal to the greatest. The
equality that counts in conferences as well as in conflicts
is the equality of power, and specially for us the equality
of sea power. Given that equality, our superiority of
motive will attract to us a following that will mean better
days in the world. But while we are weak we may expect
the powers of the world to group themselves about
strength rather than about the promise of a distant jus-
tice.

So far we have been considering the question of naval
policy more particularly from the standpoint of our just
interests, but there is a higher standpoint still — the pro-
motion of the welfare of the world, that demands with
special insistence that the American Navy equal the most
powerful navy in the world. At present the great inter-
national ideal is the League of Nations for the mainte-
nance of international justice. The League is to operate
through the association of the Powers. Its decisions are
to be arrived at by conferences of representatives of the
Powers. It is unavoidable that in those conferences mili-
tary and naval power will speak with a special author-
ity. America stands for high ideals and desires, above all
to promote those ideals. The possession of power, and
especially of the kind of power that is most effective in
our international relations, sea power, will give to her pro-
posals an importance and a probability of acceptance far
greater than we could expect otherwise.

214 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Whatever may be the eventual form of the Covenant
of the League of Nations as adopted, it will undoubtedly
contain as a fundamental idea the duty of the League to
restrain, if necessary, by the use of armed force, any re-
calcitrant member that endangers the peace of the world.
It is obvious that the Covenant cannot be accepted as
just, even in principle, unless it contemplates that the
will of the League shall be imposed upon the strong as
well as upon the weak. When we think of a recalcitrant
member, we are too apt to think of Albania instead of
one of the Great Powers, but the soundness of the League
as a practicable working scheme must stand the test of its
ability to restrain, if necessary, its strongest member. This
cannot be done by a heterogeneous combination of naval
craft assembled by the nations of the League, unless in
that assemblage there is one group of a single nationality
that is equal in strength to the strongest navy. It hap-
pens now that that navy is the British Navy, but the
principle does not depend upon nationality. Given that
single group of vessels, that navy of a single nationality
equal in strength to the strongest, and we may be sure
that the minor Powers of the League will furnish the ad-
ditional force to swing the League to the side of justice
against the efforts of a navy as powerful as any, whether
that Navy be our own or the British Navy.

We want the world League to be secure, to endure, and
to establish a new order — the reign of law among nations.
This cannot be brought about if some one Power is to
dominate the decisions of the League by a world-wide pre-
dominance of naval strength. We do not need to argue
that whoever dominates the sea exercises more control
over world policies than any other Power may do. As
the interdependence of nations increases this dominance
of sea power over world policies will become more and
more complete. It is contrary to human experience to
expect small weak nations, whose own immediate interests
are not vitally concerned, to place themselves in military
opposition to a strong power, even within a league of
nations, for the sake of principle, unless by so doing they
find themselves ranged with another strong Power. If

BENSON ON "UNITED STATES NAVAL POLICY" 215

they depend upon sea communications to a special extent
they will be governed by interest and side with the Power
that can crush them the easiest.

As long as Great Britain insists on retaining her over-
whelming naval force, the only answer for the purposes
of the League is the building of an equal force by some na-
tion capable of constructing and maintaining a fleet of
equal strength and efficiency. The United States is the
only power that is to-day financially and physically capa-
ble of building such a fleet, or of undertaking a future
building competition with Great Britain.

It is not believed, however, that any competition in
armaments is necessary. Once the principle of two equal
naval Powers within the League is made clear to our own
people and to the British public, a means will be found to
maintain a parity of the two fleets with the minimum of
burden to the taxpayer. Equality of the two fleets can
be brought about by the destruction of the German fleet,
the bulk of which would go to Great Britain on any prob-
able scheme of distribution, and by a further reduction
of the British fleet that, while leaving Great Britain ample
strength to protect her world commerce and colonies,
would still make it possible for the United States with a
reasonable increase of its fleet, to equal the size of the
British fleet.

It may be asked what would happen if the United
States and Great Britain combined against the League.
We need not be disturbed by this question. With satis-
fied ambitions the future interests of the United States
demand only the continuation of world peace. Should we
forget our ideals and attempt some day to support with
arms the cause of injustice, it is highly improbable that
our interests would march with those of Great Britain,
and there would remain an equal force within the League
to bring us to our senses.

The example of the United States in this war, and its
present attitude toward nations dependent upon us for
financial and economic support, can be relied upon to
absolve us in the eyes of the world from the charge of
Pharisaism when we assert our confident belief that the

216 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

League of Nations will never have anything to fear from
the United States.

With two navies of equal strength, the world would
breathe free from the fear of a naval domination that has
the power at any moment of threatening the economic life
of any nation. The resulting mutual respect of Great
Britain and the United States would go further than any-
thing else toward the establishment of just maritime law
upon the high seas both in peace and in war.

The success of the League of Nations will rest in large
part on the honesty, integrity and strength of the United
States. The political and economic weakness of Europe as
a result of the World War have thrust upon us the burden
of imparting vital force to a Covenant that attempts to
reconcile the conflicting interests of the world.

Our ability to sustain the League in its formative period
and establish it eventually on a secure foundation will
depend chiefly on the strength we give it to resist the dom-
ination of any single Power. We ourselves have no desire
to dominate the League, but we believe it to be our duty
to the world to make our counsels heard as attentively
as the counsels of any other Power.

CONCLUSION.

As one of an unorganized society of nations we need a
navy equal to the greatest —

1. To guard our great and greatly growing interests.

2. To give our voice in the councils of the world the

weight our world position warrants.

3. To give our ideals full expression and to obtain for

them a just recognition in the development of
the world organization that is about to be under-
taken.

As a member of the League of Nations we need a navy
equal to the greatest —

1. So that there may be within the League a power

strong enough to restrain any Power whatever
seeking unjust advantage by force.

2. So that the League may be relieved from the domi-

nance of any single Power, and thereby ensure to it

BENSON ON "UNITED STATES NAVAL POLICY" 217

a greater stability and a greater probability of just

administration.

We believe that a better way in which to obtain two
equal navies in the world is for the British Navy to be
reduced in strength, and for Great Britain and America to
determine jointly from time to time what the strength of
the two fleets shall be.

DOCUMENT 24.

Confidential report of Major General F. J.
Kernan, chief American representative on the
Inter-Allied Commission to Poland, to President
Wilson, dated April 11, giving his views of
conditions in central Europe (autographed orig-
inal).

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Paris, France
11 April, 1919.

Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission
to Negotiate Peace —

Subject : Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrain-
ians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observa-
tions on conditions in Poland.

On March 20th, last, the Great Powers sent identical
telegrams to the Ukrainian and Polish Commanders in
Eastern Galicia requesting, in substance, that a suspension
of arms should be forthwith effected, following the lines
of the former one, dated February 24th, 1919, this to be
followed by a formal armistice to be arranged preferably
in Paris under the direct supervision of the Peace Com-
mission. A copy of this identical telegram was furnished
the undersigned with instructions to see that it reached the
hands of each of the Commanding Generals in Eastern
Galicia, together with a second explanatory telegram.
As directed I delivered these telegrams personally to
General Jwaszkiewricz, Polish Commander at Przemysl
on March 24th, and on March 25th I met General Pav-
lenko, the Ukrainian Commander, at Sambor and de-
livered the same messages to him. These had already

218

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF GENERAL KERNAN 219

been received directly by wireless and both parties had,
so I was informed, accepted the proposition of the Great
Powers and the two Commanding Generals were in
communication with each other for the purpose of ar-
ranging a meeting between delegates. Both parties
requested me to be present at this meeting and left me
to designate the place. Pursuant to this arrangement
five delegates from each side met on the afternoon of
March 27th at Chyrow, just within the Polish lines.

I had suggested to each party the advisability of going
to the Conference with a prepared draft for the convention
and this course was followed. Before the actual meeting
of the delegates, each side read to me their propositions.
The Polish proposition contained an article providing
that the Poles should have the right to denounce the
suspension of arms at the end of three days unless, within
that period, the Ukrainian authorities had accepted in
toto the armistice terms drawn up February 28th, 1919,
by Dr. Lord, General Berthelemy and General DeWiatt
of the Inter-Allied Mission to Poland. This armistice
had been rejected by the Ukrainian authorities and it
was practically certain that their injection into the new
effort to bring about a cessation of hostilities meant the
failure of that effort. I told the Polish delegates this,
and also pointed out that the procedure they were
following did not conform to the request of the Great
Powers, as accepted by them; that is to say, instead of
attempting to make a simple suspension of arms, leaving
the formal armistice for subsequent arrangements, they
were tacking the one to the other and so defeating both.
They replied that their instructions had come from their
government and that they had no power to abate the
conditions respecting the armistice as written in their
draft. The Ukrainians had drawn up a simple plan for
a suspension of arms, each party remaining on the ground
occupied, and with the necessary stipulations for securing
its execution. When the delegates met and the Polish
terms were unfolded, the Ukrainians at once stated that
they had come to make a suspension of arms merely, in
agreement with their promise to Paris, and not an armis-

220 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

tice such as the Poles were proposing. They added that
they were willing to abide by whatever armistice terms
their delegates agreed to in Paris. Since the Polish
delegation was without authority to modify their demands
the meeting broke up.

Before leaving the Polish Headquarters at Przemysl
the following day I addressed to the Polish Commander a
letter outlining what I thought should be the substance
and nature of a brief convention establishing a suspension
of arms. On arrival in Warsaw I enclosed a copy of this
letter to Mr. Paderewski, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
indicating my views of what the Polish Government
should do in order to comply with the clear and earnest
desire of the Great Powers. Copies of these letters are
attached hereto, marked "A. "

While en route to Paris with the other members of the
Inter- Allied Commission, I received a message from the
Peace Commission directing me to proceed again to
the Ukrainian front and to make a further effort to bring
about a suspension of arms. I did so and found that the
Polish Commanding General was powerless to make a
truce except upon the terms already stated above. He
told me that the matter was not in his hands, but in the
hands of higher authority and that he could do nothing.
In this state of affairs, and knowing that the head of the
Polish Government was en route to Paris, I left Przemysl
and proceeded to this city where I arrived yesterday,
April 10th.

The distinct impression I brought away from Eastern
Galicia was that the Ukrainians were exceedingly anxious
for a truce and that their leaders were intelligent men by
no means Bolshevik and sincerely desirous of building up a
great Ukrainian Republic. General Pavlenko was quite
frank and stated that the Russian Soviet forces were
pressing the Ukrainians on the East and that his govern-
ment was anxious to secure a truce on the Polish side in
order to bring as strong a Ukrainian force as possible into
action against the Russian Soviets. Besides my own
observations I talked with quite a number of disinterested
observers who had been travelling through The Ukraine

quite recently and as a result I am convinced that the
present Ukrainian Government and the Ukrainians in the
mass are by no means Bolshevik. It must, however, be
realized that some of that spirit has penetrated at least
into the eastern fringe of The Ukraine and that the failure
of the present government might result in Soviet as-
cendency. The Ukrainians are wholly isolated from
Europe and they have, I believe, been misrepresented
in a large degree to the world, it being the policy of their
enemies to denounce them as bandits and Bolsheviks.
Reiterated statements of this kind have their effect,
however groundless they may be.

I travelled more than two thousand miles in Poland by
automobile, from Posen on the West to Slonin on the
East, southward through Brest-Litovsk to a point beyond
Lemberg and back by way of Cracow to Warsaw. I was
approximately two months in Poland and talked with a
great many people. From this experience I have drawn
the following conclusions:

(A) FOOD AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.

Want of the extremest character prevails in the large
cities, in the industrial centres, and in the territory lying
between Grodno and Brest-Litovsk. There is, I believe,
enough food in Poland to tide the population over until
the next harvest, assuming the American food supplies
to continue flowing into Poland at the present rate. The
supply is not evenly distributed but an effort is being
made by the Polish authorities in connection with our
Food Mission to overcome this difficulty. If raw ma-
terials go into Poland and public works are started by the
Government so that employment can be given to those
not engaged in agriculture, much of the dire distress will
be done away with. When the Russians made their
great retreat they drove the people out of a vast area
of agricultural land which remains practically without
population to-day and which for several years has been a
solitude outside of the larger towns. No acre of ground has
been ploughed, no seed planted, no domestic animals are
there, and practically no population. It is a vast area

222 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

and it is nearly a desert to-day. Manifestly no crops can
be sowed there this year, but the wretched inhabitants are
straggling back slowly, many on foot, shoeless, clothed
in rags, their whole worldly possessions carried on their
backs. The agricultural villages show here and there a
sign of life, and undoubtedly more of the former in-
habitants will return as the summer goes on. Since they
can raise no crops this year, manifestly they must be fed
from outside. It is in this region that the greatest
desolation and extremest want prevail. This was Russian
Poland. In their best days the lives of this agricultural
population must have approximated that of the animals
which they worked. These squalid villages explain the
spread of Bolshevism better than any other thing which
has fallen under my observation.

(B) BOLSHEVISM.

Although the common report and the common talk in
Poland constantly spoke of Bolshevik aggression against
Poland, I could get no evidence to that effect whatever.
On the contrary, I am satisfied that the desultory skir-
mishing along the Eastern frontiers of Poland represents
an aggressive effort of the Poles to extend their military
occupation as far as possible and as quickly as possible
into Russia. The ease with which they have done this
proves conclusively that no strong organized Soviet force
has been opposing the Poles. My belief is that as an
aggressive military crusade, undertaking to spread its
propaganda by violence from Russia as a centre, the
Bolshevik or Soviet movement has come to a halt. It
may be stirred into life again by aggressive action directed
against it from without, a danger to be feared from Poland
or from other States. This view may seem to be con-
tradicted by recent happenings about Archangel and in
the region of Odessa. But it must be remembered that
the Soviet government claims sovereignty over those
areas and its military operations there can be accounted
for on the ground of national defense and wholly apart
from any schemes of forcible propaganda. Communistic
views are not a new thing. The terrific outburst in

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF GENERAL KERNAN 223

Russia and the more recent happenings in other parts of
Central Europe signify an extraordinary condition of the
masses brought about by generations of misgovernment
and suddenly intensified beyond further endurance by
nearly five years of war. In this view, the great cause of
the apparent spread of Bolshevism in Europe is to be
found in the despairing and wretched condition of its
masses. It is not progressing in these days by force of
arms but through propaganda falling upon ground pre-
pared by long years of misery and culminating in the
hardships of the great war. Therefore, if the normal
life of the world can be restored, accompanied by such
bettered living conditions as will enable the masses to have
not merely enough bread to keep body and soul together
but some little share in the ordinary happiness of mankind,
Bolshevism will be stopped.

(c) MILITARISM.

In Central Europe the French uniform is everywhere in
evidence, officers and men. There is a concerted, dis-
tinct effort being made by these agents to foster the
military spirit in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and, I believe,
in Roumania. The imperialistic idea has seized upon the
French mind like a kind of madness and the obvious
effort is to create a chain of States, highly militarized,
organized as far as possible under French guidance, and
intended to be future allies of France. I have no doubt
whatever of this general plan and it is apparently meeting
with great success. Poland is endeavoring to raise an
army of approximately 600,000, the Czechs are striving
to raise an army of about 250,000, and Roumania is
struggling under a very extensive military burden. All
of this means that these people have no belief in the
efficacy of the League of Nations to protect them and that
under the guidance of the French a strong military com-
bination is being built up capable, perhaps, of dominating
Europe. This purpose of course is not avowed. The
claim is that this chain of strong military states is essential
to hold back the tide of Russian Bolshevism. I regard
this largely as camouflage. Each of the three States

224 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

named has aggressive designs upon the surrounding
territory and each is determined to get by force, if need
be, as large an area as possible. Nobody is attacking
Poland to-day. Quite the contrary; and it seems deplor-
able that in a country where so much distress prevails
and where the energies of the Government and its re-
sources should be devoted to bettering the conditions of its
people and to organizing an efficient state administration,
this rampant military spirit should have taken possession.
It presents to-day more danger to the future of Poland
than Bolshevism does. Bolshevism can be eradicated by
good Government and equal opportunity for all citizens,
but the .military disease, once fastened upon the State, is
going to be difficult to eradicate. With the arrival of
Haller's Army it is to be feared that aggressive military
action will be taken against the Russian, the Lithuanian,
and the Ukrainian fronts unless the Great Powers can find
effective means of checking the outburst of intoxicated
nationalism already existent and becoming stronger every
day.

I advise strongly against Inter-Allied Missions where
information or concrete results are sought. Send Amer-
icans alone upon such tasks.

[Signed] F. J. KERNAN
Major General, U. S. Army.
(2 Ends.)

PART V
THE DARK PERIOD: THE FRENCH CRISIS

DOCUMENT 25.

Memorandum of Marshal Foch, dated Jan-
uary 10, 1919, presenting the French demand for
the military frontier of the Rhine (carbon
copy, translation, autographed) . Letter of Mar-
shal Foch, March 14, 1919, transmitting this
memorandum to President Wilson (original
autographed letter).

LE MARECHAL FOCH

Le 14 Mars 1919.
MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT,

Avec 1'expression de mon regret pour le retard qu'elle
met a vous parvenir, j'ai 1'honneur de vous addresser
ci- joint la Note que j'ai fait etablir sur la frontiere mili-
taire de 1'ALLEMAGNE.

Recevez, Monsieur le President, 1'assurance de ma re-
spectueuse consideration.

[Signed] F. FOCH.

G. Q. G. A. 10th January, 1919.
C-in-C. Allied Armies.

The following memorandum, laid by the Marshal
Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied Armies before the
Plenipotentiaries, states, from the point of view of the
military security of the Allied and Associated Powers,
the problem of the German Western Frontiers.

The question of the frontiers, special to France and
Belgium, is not examined, but only the European collec-
tive and international guarantees necessary for the whole
mass of States, which, after having fought for right,
freedom, and justice, intend to prepare, on new bases,

227

228 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

inspired by these three ideas, the relations between Na-
tions.

MEMORANDUM.

Without any doubt, we may rely, in an uncertain future,
on a development of civilization and of the moral sense of
nations, such that it will be possible to find in a Society
or League of Nations, strongly organized, an efficient
barrier to wars of conquest. But, in order that this rising
society should acquire an authority so strong, that it may
be by itself a guarantee of the preservation of peace, it is
necessary that this society should receive, at once, a suffi-
ciently secure basis and an especial strength that will
ensure its development. Therefore we must know the
past situation of nations, so as to settle the future, in
starting from the situation of to-day, and also take into
account the peace securities, which a costly victory has
put in the hands of the Allied Nations, thanks to their
perfect cooperation, and which could not be given up,
without endangering in the future the preservation of
peace.

i.

Germany of 1914 is the result of a steady work 150 years
long, begun by Frederick II, methodically continued by
his successors, and which had led to the prussification of
Germany.

From the very outset the Hohenzollern have based the
Prussian power upon an exaggerated militarism, for in-
stance, the keeping up of an army, whose strength was
much larger than would be consistent with the total of
population. Thanks to this inflated military organization
Prussia played an important part in the wars of the
eighteenth century, realized important territorial expan-
sion, and took an important part in the wars of 1813, 1814
and 1815. In the same way, she soon secured, among
European Powers, a rank very superior to the one which
should have been allotted to her on account of her natural
means, population, trade, industry.

In fact, the investment of its resources in a strong army,

MEMORANDUM OF FOCH, JANUARY 10, 1919 229

produced by personal and compulsory service and the
practice of war as an industry of national conquests have
given to Prussia serious profits. She was going to apply
them to a triumph of her policy.

Thus, in 1866, by the victory of Sadowa, she expelled
Austria from the German territory, upset the German
Confederation, and took control of reorganised Germany,
so as to militarise it, according to the Prussian model and
under Prussian hands.

Thus, in 1871, in the days which followed a victorious
campaign, she created the Empire, in view of making of
Germany a stronger unity, more in Prussian hands, always
on the same basis of compulsory service, and of Hohen-
zollern command.

But, at the same time, Prussian activity exercised itself
far beyond purely military ground. All classes, all re-
sources of action or production, all associations as well as
all individuals were drilled, centralized and militarised.
An ingenious State monopoly system, applied by a covet-
ous and despotic monarchy, was always backed by a
strong aristocracy and making use of an undenied military
superiority and of profitable wars, that is, the supremacy
of might. Public education was soon imbued with the
same principles, and compulsory schools, a fairly old in-
stitution in this country, found, thanks to an acute man-
agement, the means of spreading these principles, and of
creating a German state of mind, "Kultur," with its own
morals. The rule is that might is above right. Might
creates right, for its benefit. Lastly Germany more and
more believed in a superior nature, in a special fate and
mission, which justified the most unjust doings, the most
cruel methods, provided that they led to German victory.
Morals are summed up in a word: "DEUTSCHLAND UBER
ALLES." The German ideal and the driving power,
which justifies its existence, are to dominate the world for
the Germans' benefit.

Besides, the centralised authority of the King of Prussia,
who has concentrated in his hands all the forces thus cre-
ated, so as to apply them, at the time he chooses, to the
development of Germany by war, has given by the

S30 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

"Rights of the Native," a privileged situation to each of
his subjects. The Bavarian, the Saxon, the Wiirttem-
berger, the inhabitant of Baden is above all a German
subject. He is protected and claimed by the Empire,
interested therefore in the preservation and greatness of
the Empire. Once more, on the physical and moral power
of Germany the King of Prussia laid his hand and used
it as a buttress for his system.

All this explains the irresistible, unanimous and blind
rising of 1914, called by William II.

After having, at the highest degree, exaggerated the
military organization so as to make of it a war machine
ready for conquests, after having strained the morale of
his people, and roused, in appealing to his interest, the
devotion of the individual to the Prussian Emperor's
cause, it is on the whole an army of scientific and convinced
hooligans, which prussified Germany has turned out,
against all treaties, on the peaceful population, and even
on the countries of Europe vowed to neutrality, and lastly,
on the seas of the world.

It is against this whole fabric of forces, result of a hun-
dred years' continuous drilling, that the Entente has taken
up the struggle, without being prepared, in the name of
the principles of Right, and Liberty of Peoples, and soon
followed in the fight by a mass of nations, urged by the
same principles, the United States in the first rank.

Thanks to the effort of all, and at the price of a victory,
which has been costly, especially for the first nations en-
gaged in the fight, the crisis is now at an end, but it may
start again.

ii.

So as to prevent it from being renewed, it shall not be
enough, without any doubt, to change the form of the
German Government. Now that the Hohenzollerns have
left, under conditions which are of specially disqualifying
character for this dynasty, and for all military monarchies,
the reinstalment of the Imperial system appears to be
improbable at least for some time. But a Republic, built
on the same principles of centralised authority and mili-

MEMORANDUM OF FOCH, JANUARY 10, 1919 231

tarism, taking in hand the whole of Germany, will be as
dangerous, and remain as threatening for European peace.
It might be perhaps easily realized1 in a country, imbued
with the Prussian spirit, Prussian methods, militarist
theories, and where, as much on account of the natural
characters as of historical traditions, reveals in a supreme
way the principle of authority and of centralisation.
Moreover, a German republic, freed from the hindrance
due without any doubt to the existing small principalities,
has a chance of finding a surplus of forces in her unity
thus completely achieved, and also in the vitality and
activity, specially on economic grounds, of a country now
more in touch with its government.

It is only in so straightening minds, brought back by
defeat and free discussion to a more correct conception of
right and justice, and by the sharing in a large proportion of
the control of executive power, that may be brought about
a democratic working of institutions, in appearance repub-
lican, which should have otherwise all the strength of a
despotic authority. We shall not see the coming out of
such an evolution without some time, a long time, with-
out any doubt, as we are decided not to quicken the work
of persuasion by using force, not to interfere in the internal
working of German affairs. But then, full of respect for
German tenure, can we be so over-confident as to endanger
our principles of Liberty and Justice, even our existence, by
a shifting opinion and by a reactionary force which may
take place on the other side of the Rhine, and can im-
mediately throw into a new war regimental staffs and
numerous classes of well -drilled soldiers, that is, a very
strong Army?

Thus Germany remains, for yet a long time, until the
achievement of its political and philosophical change, a
dangerous menace. Therefore, the Entente, embryo of a
Society of Nations, is absolutely compelled by mere pru-

lrTo create the Empire in 1871, it has only been necessary to include in the Northern
Confederation the Southern States and to replace, in the Constitution, the word " BUND"
by "REICH" and the word "PRAEsiDruM" by "KAISER." A move in the contrary
direction, which should replace in the Imperial Constitution, the word "REICH" by
"BUND" and the word "KAISER" by "PRAESIDIUM" would have for result to main-
tain, under a form only republican in appearance, all the power embodied in the Empire.

282 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

dence to take towards Germany systematic measures of a
purely defensive character, first emergency precautions.
At the same time, these will be plain enough, so as to show
that the Allies have well made up their mind to reach the
goal, peace, and make it impossible for Germany to start
again a war of conquest, to take up once more her plan of
armed domination.

In view of this lasting threat, what forces can we call
out?

in.

During a great part of the war, which is coming to an
end, Russia, with her large armies, has detained a fair
number of the German forces. Thus, in 1915, 1916 and
even during the greater part of 1917, the Allied powers
have been superior in numbers on the Western front.

To-day, the future of Russia is uncertain, probably for
many years. Therefore, Western Europe, cradle of and
necessary guarantees of the future organisation of nations,
can rely only on her own strength for studying, preparing
and ensuring her prospects towards Germany, and in case
of a possible attack.

To play this part, Western Europe cannot have a su-
periority of numbers. In fact, whichever type of political
organisation should be agreed to in the near future by the
people on the other side of the Rhine, there will always
remain, on the eastern bank of the river, a German popula-
tion of 64 to 75 millions of inhabitants1 naturally bound
together by common language, and therefore by common
ideas, as by common interest.

To these German forces, Belgium, Luxembourg, Alsace-
Lorraine and France can oppose only a total of 49 millions
of inhabitants. Only with the cooperation of the coun-
tries on the other side of the sea, can they reach the level

German Empire, 1914 68,000,000

German Provinces of Austria 7,000,000

German Poland 2,100,000

Alsace-Lorraine 1,900,000

Rhine-Lands of the Western Bank 5,400,000

Schleswig-Holstein 1,600,000

11,000,000 75.000,000
Balance, 64,000,000

MEMORANDUM OF FOCH, JANUARY 10, 1919 233

of the enemy's figures, as they did in 1914-1918, and yet
this help must be waited for, and for how long, especially
for the United States?

Now then, what has been the cause of the present ca-
lamity? Above all the fact that Germany was tempted
by the possibility of striking, with one blow, only in
stretching the fist, our vital parts. Without this convic-
tion, she certainly would have hesitated. Impressed with
that conviction, she did not even look for pretexts. " We
can't wait," said BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

Therefore, to put an end to the encroachments on the
West of Germany, which has always been warlike and
covetous of others' property, which lately had been pre-
pared and trained for conquering by force, against all
right, and with methods the most inconsistent with law,
which can start without delay a terrific war — if we want
at least to postpone the decisive battle — we must first of
all appeal to the help of nature. Nature has provided a
barrier on the road to invasion, but only one: the RHINE.
The Rhine must be used and defended, and therefore occu-
pied and organised since peace time. Without this fun-
damental precaution, Western Europe remains deprived
of her natural frontier and open, as in the past, to the dan-
ger of an invasion, which may be stronger. Without this
precaution, the industrial and peaceful countries of N. W.
Europe are immediately drowned under the flow of bar-
barous wars, which no dike checks.

The Rhine, in itself a serious obstacle, renders especially
difficult the crossing at a time when the machine guns of
the defence compel the assailant to resort to the use of
tanks. From Switzerland to Holland, on a front of more
than six hundred kilometres, this continuous obstacle
covers the allied countries, without possibility of being
outflanked.

Further, on account of fortified towns, by which it is
reinforced, the means of communication (roads and rail-
ways) which converge on it, or run laterally along it, it is
a magnificent basis of manoeuvre for a counter-offensive.

Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne are only at three days'
march from each other. Any attempt by the enemy to

234 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

effect a crossing between these towns would be threatened
in flank and in the rear, on both banks of the river, as each
bridge-head, which we are in possession of, on the Rhine,
flanks its neighbors and enables such an offensive to be
dealt with in the flank or from behind.

Marshal von Moltke considered the Rhine to be the
German military frontier, and concluded certain studies
of his by writing: " The extraordinary strength of our centre
of operations on the Rhine cannot be ignored. It could only
be compromised, should we undertake a premature offensive
on the left bank, with insufficient forces." And farther:
" The defensive front of Prussia against France is made up
by the Rhine and its fortresses. This line is so strong that
it should be far from requiring all the forces of the Monarchy."
The situation is to-day reversed for the benefit of the coali-
tion. She can't give up the advantage thus secured and
abandon the defensive shield in this area — the Rhine—
without seriously endangering its future. "Wacht am
Rhein" must be its rallying word.

Henceforward, the Rhine ought to be the western mili-
tary frontier of the German countries. Henceforward
Germany ought to be deprived of all entrance and assem-
bling ground, that is, of all territorial sovereignty on the
left bank of the river, that is, of all facilities for invading
quickly, as in 1914, Belgium, Luxembourg, for reaching
the coast of the North Sea and threatening the United
Kingdom, for outflanking the natural defences of France,
the Rhine, Meuse, conquering the Northern provinces and
entering upon the Parisian area.

This is for the time being, in the near future, an indis-
pensable guarantee of peace, on account of:

1. The material and moral situation of Germany.

2. Her numerical superiority over the democratic coun-

tries of Western Europe.

IV.

The Rhine, military frontier, without which cannot
be maintained the peace aimed at by the coalition, is not
a territorial benefit for any country. It is not a question,
in fact, of annexing the left bank of the Rhine, of increas-

MEMORANDUM OF FOCH, JANUARY 10, 1919 235

ing France or Belgium's territory, or of the protection
against German revindication, but to hold securely on the
Rhine, the common barrier of security necessary to the
League of Democratic Nations. It is not a question of
confiding to a single power the guarding of this common
barrier, but to ensure by the cooperation, either moral or
material, of all the democratic powers, the defence of their
existence and of their future, by forbidding Germany once
for all from carrying war and its influence of domination
across the river.

It must be understood that it will be for the treaty of
peace to lay down the status of the populations of the left
bank of the Rhine, not included within French or Belgian
frontiers.

But this organization, whatever form it may take, must
take into account the essential military factor stated
above, as follows:

1. The total prevention of German Military access to

and political propaganda in the territories on the
left bank of the Rhine; perhaps even the covering
of these territories by military neutral zones on the
right bank.

2. The ensuring of the military occupation of the terri-

tories of the left bank of the Rhine by Allied forces.

3. The guaranteeing to the territories on the left bank

of the Rhine the outlets necessary for their eco-
nomic activities, in- uniting them with the other
Western States by a common system of customs.
Under these conditions, and in conformity with the
principles, admitted by all, of the liberty of peoples, it is
possible to conceive the constitution on the left bank of
the Rhine of new autonomous States, administering them-
selves under the reservations stated above, a constitution
which, with the assistance of a strong natural frontier,
the Rhine, will be the only means capable of securing peace
to Western Europe.

v.

To sum up, the Powers of the Coalition, France, in spite
of her legitimate claims and her ever-present rights, Bel-

236 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

gium controlled by neutrality, Great Britain in her insular
position, never prepared an offensive against Germany,
but in 1914 were brutally assailed by this State. For a
certain time, the situation may again arise. If in 1914,
1915, 1916 and 1917, these Powers were able to resist
Germany, to give time to Great Britain to develop fully
her Armies, notably by her compulsory service and other
improvised measures, and to enable the United States to
arrive with her decisive support, it was because Russia
was fighting on their side, and on this account they were
able to maintain during a certain period numerical su-
periority on the Western front. Russia is no longer of as-
sistance, for a time which it is impossible to foresee. It
becomes necessary, therefore, that the Western barrier
against German invasion should be more strongly con-
stituted than in the past, and that the Powers of the
Entente, which are geographically in the front row of the
defenders of civilization, be organized henceforth on a
military basis to render possible the timely intervention
of the other States which are the defenders of civilization.

The organization defensively of the Coalition is there-
fore essential.

This defensive organization involves, before all, a nat-
ural frontier; the first barrier placed to withstand the
German invasion. Only one exists: the Rhine. It must
until further orders be held by the forces of the Coalition.

VI.

The object of this decision, which is purely defensive
and to be adopted at once, is to withstand an attack by
Germany and to answer the first needs created thereby.
It is an essential organization, for war, as soon as it breaks,
lives only on realities, on material forces brought into play
under definite conditions of time: natural lines of defence
or defensive organization, numbers, armament. These
are the conditions laid down above as necessary. They
could be carried out, as has here been seen, under the su-
pervision and patronage of the Nations founding the
League of Nations of Right: Belgium, England, United
States and France.

MEMORANDUM OF FOCH, JANUARY 10, 1919 237

Under the protection of these defensive measures, and
to provide them with a moral support, the League of
Nations, securely established, would be strengthened by
those Nations which have come to defend the same prin-
ciples of Right and Justice, and it would establish definite
statutes, henceforward practicable of execution.

The League once thus founded, with its statutes and
powers of coercion, could progressively develop into the
League of Nations, by the successive adhesion of other
Nations; neutral Nations first, enemy nations afterwards.
The results aimed at, once achieved, would be of such a
nature as to diminish by degrees the military burdens of
the nations of which the League will be composed.

That is an ideal to be realized in a future, which is neces-
sarily indefinite.

It will be possible of achievement under the protection of
the defensive measures explained above, without which civili-
zation will be placed in danger by a new German attack, which
this time it would not be possible to stop in time.

The fortune of war has placed the line of the Rhine in
our hands, thanks to a combination of circumstances and
a cooperation of Allied Forces, which cannot for a long
time be reproduced. The abandonment to-day of this
solid natural barrier, without other guarantee than insti-
tutions of a moral character and of distant and unknown
difficulty, would mean, from the military point of view,
the incurring of the greatest of risks.

The Armies, moreover, know how many lives it has cost
them.

[Signed] F. FOCH.

DOCUMENT 26.

Letter from Major General Tasker H. Bliss,
March 28, for President Wilson (autographed
original), with two memoranda (typewritten,
initialed) on the military intrigues in Hungary.

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Hotel de Crillon, Paris,

March 28, 1919.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

The plan which was presented yesterday afternoon in
Mr. Clemenceau's office to you and your colleagues, was
unknown to me thirty minutes before that. I was told
that it was made "in execution of the decision taken
by the Associated Governments." I therefore could not
express my real opinion about it without instructions from
you. I think that it brings you face to face with the
gravest decision yet called for at the Peace Conference.
If carried into execution it means the resumption of gen-
eral war and the probable dissolution of the Peace Con-
ference. I believe that this is the deliberate intention of
those who have proposed it. Various facts and, I think,
justifiable inferences from facts, have come to my knowl-
edge which I hesitate to commit to writing. I beg you
to take no action either in respect to the plan proposed
yesterday or the previous plan of providing supplies for
the Roumanian Army, until you can give me a very short
time in which to state the case to you.

I have this moment had a conference with Mr. House
on the subject and it is on his recommendation that I
write this letter.

Very sincerely,

[Signed] TASKER H. BLISS.

238

GENERAL BLISS ON INTRIGUES IN HUNGARY 239

P. S. I invite attention to the marked paragraphs of
my attached memorandum prepared last night. T. H. B.

[Note: this is in General Bliss's own handwriting, and
refers to paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of the first memorandum.]

The President

of the United States.

Hotel de Crillon, Paris,

March 27, 1919.

MEMORANDUM.

1. The armistice with Hungary, signed on November
13th by Gen. Franchet d'Esperey and Count Karolyi,
fixed the line of demarcation between the Hungarian
and Roumanian troops as the river SZAMOS-BISTRITZ,
river MAROS. General Charpy, Chief of Staff of Gen.
Franchet d'Esperey, reported on Feb. 25, 1919, that the
Hungarians had carried out all the conditions of the armis-
tice but that the Roumanians had not, as, without inform-
ing General Franchet d'Esperey, they had crossed the
demarcation line and had commenced an advance which
on that date had reached the line MARAMAROS SZIGET
CSURSA. General Charpy expressed the opinion that
the Roumanians should remain on their present line.

2. On February 26, 1919, the Supreme Council ap-
proved a recommendation of the Military Representatives
for the establishment of a neutral zone about 50 kilometres
in width, the Western or Hungarian limit of which is
the line VASAROS NAMENY-SZEGED, that is the treaty
line of 1916, and the Eastern or Roumanian limit, the line
SZATMAR NEMETI-ARAD. The creation of this zone
permitted a further advance of the Roumanian forces of
about 70 kilometers and imposed a corresponding retire-
ment on the Hungarian forces.

3. The Neutral Zone approved by the Supreme Council
is open to the objections:

(a) That the entire zone lies within the limits of terri-
tory that is ethnically Hungarian;

(b) That through sanctioning a further and extended

240 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

advance of the Roumanian beyond the demarcation line
of the armistice, it subjects the Associated Powers to a
charge of breach of faith;

(c) That it has been interpreted by the Hungarians as
a recognition by the Supreme Council, of the Treaty of
1916.

4. A more equitable neutral zone would have been one
whose median line corresponded with the line of ethnic
cleavage, that is the line SZATMAR NEMETI-ARAD, or
the Eastern limit of the zone established by the Supreme
Council. Such a zone would be made up of about equal
parts of Hungarian and Roumanian ethnic territory, and
would not raise the question of the Treaty of 1916.

5. On March 22, 1919, General Franchet d'Esperey
telegraphed that when on March 19th he notified the
Hungarian Government of the decision of the Supreme
Council, that Government resigned, declaring itself unable
either to receive the decision or to prescribe measures for
its execution. The Karolyi Government has been re-
placed by a government of Bolshevik tendencies which
is reported to be seeking an alliance with the Bolshevik
Government in Russia.

6. The question now confronting the United States is
one of fundamental far-reaching importance. If we join
the other Associated Powers in attempting the coercion
by armed force of Hungary aided by Russia, we shall be
committing ourselves to a war of enormous magnitude,
and of indefinite duration; one which will have to be
financed entirely by us; and one in which, because of the
war-weariness of the peoples of our allies, we may find
ourselves standing alone.

7. The present conditions in Hungary are the direct
result of the action of the Supreme Council on February
26, 1919. That act, therefore, was politically unwise. It
cannot be justified morally before the people of the United
States.

8. It is believed that the United States should decline
categorically to participate in armed intervention in this
theatre through the contribution of men or money or sup-
plies. It is believed also that if the United States is to

GENERAL BLISS ON INTRIGUES IN HUNGARY 241

continue to act with the Associated Powers in the deter-
mination of territorial and economic questions relating to
the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire, it insist upon the
immediate reversal of the action of the Supreme Council
of February 26, 1919; upon the issuance of orders to the
Commanding General of the Army of the Orient and all
other representatives of the Associated Powers in the
countries bordering on Hungary, that no action will be
taken by them with respect to the Hungarian people or
territory that is not clearly within the scope of the terms
of the armistice concluded with Hungary ; and that mean-
while every effort be made by the Supreme Council to
reopen communication with the Hungarian people and to
assure them that it is the purpose of the Associated Powers
to conclude a peace with Hungary on a basis of the declara-
tions of President Wilson contained in his address of
January 8, 1918, and subsequent addresses.

[Initialed] T. H. B.

MEMORANDUM.

SHOWING THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEUTRAL ZONE IN HUNGARY,
AND OF EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT

OF THAT ZONE.

NOTE: From February 13th until sometime after the
President's return from Washington, I was entirely oc-
cupied with work on the Committee drafting the final
military, naval and air peace terms with Germany, and
became acquainted with the following sequence of events
only in connection with the preparation of my memoran-
dum to Mr. Lansing dated March 8th, 1919.

1. On the signature of the Armistice between the Hun-
garians and the French Army of the East, General Fran-
chet d'Esperey fixed a fair armistice line beyond which
neither the Roumanians nor the Hungarians were to ad-
vance. Continued violation of this agreement on the
part of the Hungarians resulted in serious trouble.

2. February 19. On this date the Committee on Rou-

242 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

manian affairs had under consideration a proposed Neutral
Zone in Hungary to avoid further conflict between the
Hungarians and the Roumanians. General Alby, repre-
senting the French War Ministry, read a Note to the
Committee in which he said, inter -alia, that "General
Berthelot's Army must be kept ready for disposal and
eventual employment in South Russia." This matter
was brought before the Committee on Roumanian affairs
by the French Foreign Office, as a matter of urgency.

I understand that the French F. O. submitted the
boundaries of the proposed Neutral Zone.

NOTE: The underscored lines refer to some unknown
plan of operations against Russia.

3. February 25. Marshal Foch outlined to the Council
of Ten a plan which he had prepared for forming, imme-
diately after signature of peace with Germany, an army of
Greeks, Serbs, Roumanians, Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Es-
thonians, etc., under French direction, to fight Bolshevism.
Mr. Balfour's remarks on this subject, in the minutes of
that session, are interesting.

NOTE: The vaguely expressed plan of Marshal Foch
indicates the motive for the dispatch of three Greek divi-
sions to Odessa.

4. The final recommendation of the Committee on Rou-
manian affairs was submitted to the Council of Ten and
by it referred to the Military Representatives on the
Supreme War Council at Versailles.

5. February 25. The Military Representatives con-
curred in a recommendation as to the Neutral Zone. The
officer of the American Section who was present made
the reservation that this was not in any way to commit
the United States to military action, as we were not rep-
resented in Southeast Europe.

6. February_26. /The Council of Ten approved the
Neutral Zone.

7. March 8XMr. C. M. Storey, who had just previ-
ously returned from Hungary, sent me a memorandum,
through Mr. Lansing, who asked for any comments I
might desire to make, on the subject of the proposed
Neutral Zone. I returned it to Mr. Lansing on March 8th

GENERAL BLISS ON INTRIGUES IN HUNGARY 243

with my comments. It is the study which I then made
that acquainted me with the facts set forth above.

8. In the sessions of the Council of Ten, where was dis-
cussed the transportation of the Polish divisions to Dant-
zig, Marshal Foch brought up in various ways, his inten-
tion to unite these with the Roumanians in order to fight
the Ukrainians at Lemberg. On March 17th, he urged
that he be authorized to study the question of the trans-
portation of these divisions or a part of them by rail via
Vienna. The council, as I remember it, refused to give
him this authorization.

9. March 19th. On this day, two days after dis-
approval of the idea of transporting the Polish divisions
by rail, the official note establishing the Neutral Zone
was delivered to Karolyi's Government in Budapest and
that government fell and was succeeded by a so-called
Bolshevik Government. What is the connection between
these two dates?

10. March 25th. On this day the Council of Four had
before them the telegrams from General Berthelot relating
to the situation in Odessa. Sending for Marshal Foch,
they learned from him that he did not consider it worth
while to hold Odessa, but that the forces of Roumania and
Poland should be strengthened. This led to the question
of participation by the Four Governments in the equip-
ment and maintenance of the Roumanian Army.

11. March 27. Marshal Foch presented his plan to the
Council of Four for the organization of an army of French,
British, Americans, Greeks, Serbs and Roumanians, to
extend from Odessa on the Black Sea around Hungary,
and to occupy Vienna. This army is to extinguish Bol-
shevism in Hungary and unite to close the "Lemberg
Gap."

Thus, after many variations and deviations, we come
to the original plan of the great army to be formed to fight
Bolshevism.

12. There is reason to believe that General Franchet
d'Esperey and his officers on the spot do not favor the

244 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

plan of military intervention. His chief -of -staff, on Feb-
ruary 25th, opposed the proposed Neutral Zone. It is
said that General Franchet d'Esperey made a report op-
posing intervention.

On the other hand, General Berthelot has been in Rou-
mania as the immediate agent of the French Ministry of
War. He has favored the Roumanians, and the French
Government appears to be guided by his advice.

13. There appears to be no doubt from what Mr. Nor-
man Davis has told me, that some days prior to March
25th (when the evacuation of Odessa and provision for
the maintenance of the Roumanian Army were discussed
by the Council of Four), the British and French Govern-
ments agreed with the Roumanian Government to provide
for the entire maintenance of the latter's army.

From Colonel Browning's reports to me of the pro-
ceedings of Marsha] Foch's Committee, there seems no
doubt that the European Allies expect that the United
States will not merely provide certain food, clothing, etc.
for the Roumanian Army, but will also share in all of the
other expenses of its maintenance. There is no law under
which this can be done.

14. Another grave fact to notice is that the negotia-
tions by the French with the Germans for authority to
move the Polish divisions through the port of Dantzig
will in all probability, in view of the manner in which
the matter has been presented heretofore to the Ger-
man Government, result in the refusal of the Germans
to permit it.

It looks as though, either through the action taken in
Hungary or the proposed action in respect to the port of
Dantzig, or through both of those means, it was deter-
mined to break off the general armistice, both with Ger-
many and with the Austro-Hungarian States. The
United States is being dragged into a resumption of the
war through the fact that all negotiations or dealings with
the enemy are in the hands of the French. They can do
nothing except with the hope that the United States will

GENERAL BLISS ON INTRIGUES IN HUNGARY 245

see them through. Nothing but the most complete under-
standing with them as to the general attitude of the United
States will alter the present tendency of events. I believe
that the issue must be met within a very few days.

[Initialed] T. H. B.
Hotel Crillon,
March 28, 1919.

DOCUMENT 27.

Letter of King of Spain to President Wilson,
March 25 (written by hand in English and
autographed) , with copy of letter of Ex-Emperor
Karl of Austria-Hungary (typewritten in Ger-
man and translated by Dr. J. V. Fuller).

25. III. 1919.
MY DEAR PRESIDENT:

I have just received a letter of my Cousin Charles, the
late Emperor of Austria, giving the uttermost importance
to its text. I enclose you a full copy, hoping that you
will do all you can to stop the advance of Bolshevist ideas,
as it is for the sake of us all.

Excuse the step I am taking, & believe me
Your very sincere & loyal friend,

ALPHONSO R. H.

Ex-Emperor Karl to the King of Spain

(Transmitted to Wilson by the latter with covering
letter dated March 25th.)

DEAR COUSIN:

You once urged me that whenever I had anything on
my heart, I should communicate confidentially with you
through your courier.

I should now like to beg a great friendly favor of you.
I will describe the situation here, in the Monarchy, to you
loyally and without reserve. Would it not be possible
for you to instruct along these lines the Entente which
alone can save us from Bolshevism and utter collapse
through division into a number of dis-united independent
States?

246

LETTER OF KING OF SPAIN TO WILSON 247

After the armistice, I disbanded my brave army. The
solid, respectable portions of it returned to their occupa-
tions. That portion which we may properly term the
rabble, which had nothing to lose and had mostly crowded
to the rear, formed the new armies of the national states.

You cannot possibly consider these to-day any real
bulwarks against Bolshevism. Every government among
these national states is busily engaged in throwing sand
into the eyes of the Entente to convince it that complete
order reigns in their countries and Bolshevism has no
chance there. Believe me, I hold myself above the
nations and have, naturally, nothing to do with their
squabbles; and I can see that all these new states will
sooner or later come to first-class Bolshevism, and this
fire be spread into the Allied states, unless the Entente
intervenes with powerful military forces. The Govern-
ments are utterly powerless and allow themselves to be
swayed by the radicals.

The means of preventing Bolshevism and long continu-
ing wars are:

1. As I have already remarked, that the Entente send
troops;

2. That food be brought in the greatest possible
quantities.

3. That the present national states, with reservation of
their complete independence even in regard to form of
government (republic or monarchy), be brought together
under the dynasty into a confederation with only certain
common departments — foreign affairs, army, commerce
and customs.

If this is not done, Austria will become a second
Balkan peninsula. A president of the confederation
from any one of the nationalities would always be a thorn
in the side of the others. Only the Dynasty, standing
above the nations, can assume this position.

Do not believe that I have proposed the third point for
selfish reasons; but I regard any other solution as dis-
astrous for the peoples entrusted to me by God. Another
consideration is that Bolshevism has by this time spread
widely in Germany, where an operation is already hardly

248 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

possible, while in our part of the world it is just raising
its head and can be stifled by quick action.

I could give you many examples showing that my fears
are justified, but here are a few small ones. In Baden,
which you know, a Soldiers' Council collects its own taxes
while the Government looks calmly on. In Hungary,
many of the great estates which constitute the wealth of
the country have been socialized, which means confiscated
by the state and put under the administration of some
Socialist or other. The lord receives no income from his
estate, but must bear all the expenses of its operation.
In Bohemia there is a Bolshevik by the name of Muna who
predicts a universal overturn on the first of May.

Wages are extravagantly high. In Budapest, one
must pay a common private coachman 300 crowns a
week; the street-cleaner receives 150 crowns a day; while
university professors are obliged to carry sacks in their
free time in order to make a living. The Hungarian
government has just expended, in time of peace, 3 milliards
of crowns in a month and a half; whereas a threefold
greater Hungary spent only 400 millions a month in time
of war. The bank-note press is as overworked as in
Russia. What will all this lead to? And it is almost as
bad in all the other states as in Hungary ! We must have
financial help !

Excuse this long letter, but I could not help unburden-
ing my heart for once to a loyal relation.

Many sincere good wishes from

Your devoted cousin,

KARL.

Eckartsau, March 17, 1919.

DOCUMENT 28.

Letter of M. Clemenceau to President Wilson,
March 31 (autographed original), together with
his note of reply to Lloyd George's memorandum
of March 26 (carbon copy, translation).

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE

Le President du Conseil
Ministre de la Guerre

Paris, le 31 Mars, 1919.
MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT,

Vous trouverez sous ce pli une note en reponse a la note
de M. Lloyd George du 26 Mars 1919.

Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le President, 1'assurance de
ma haute consideration.

[Signed] G. CLEMENCEAU.

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT WILSON,
President des Etats-Unis d'Amerique.

28th of March, 1919.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S NOTE
OF MARCH 26TH.

1. The French Government is in complete accord with
the general purpose of Mr. Lloyd George's note: that is
to say, to make a durable and consequently a just peace.

It does not believe, on the other hand, that the principle
which it shares, really leads to the conclusions drawn by
the note in question.

2. The note suggests that moderate territorial condi-
tions should be imposed upon Germany in Europe in order
not to leave a profound feeling of resentment after peace.

This method might have value, if the late war had been

249

250 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

for Germany a European war. This, however, was not
the case. Before the war Germany was a great naval
power whose future lay upon the water. This world
power was Germany's pride; she will not console herself
for having lost it.

But, without being deterred by the fear of such resent-
ment, all of her colonies, her entire navy, a great part of
her commercial fleet (as a form of reparation), and her
foreign markets over which she held sway, have been
taken from her, or will be taken from her. Thus the blow
which she will feel the most is dealt her, and people think
that she can be appeased by a certain amelioration of terri-
torial conditions. This is a pure illusion and the remedy
is not proportionate to the evil.

If a means of satisfying Germany is sought, it should
not be sought in Germany. This kind of conciliation will
be idle, in case Germany is severed from her world policy.
If it is necessary to appease her she should be offered
colonial satisfaction, naval satisfaction or satisfaction with
regard to her commercial expansion. The note of the
26th of March, however, only takes into account European
territorial satisfaction.

3. The note of Mr. Lloyd George fears that too severe
territorial conditions will be playing the game of Bolshe-
vism in Germany. Is it not to be feared that the method
suggested will have precisely this result?

The conference has decided to call to life a certain num-
ber of new states. Can the Conference, without commit-
ting an injustice, sacrifice them, out of consideration for
Germany, by imposing upon them inaccep table frontiers?

If these peoples, especially Poland and Bohemia, ha/ve
been able to resist Bolshevism up to now, it is because of
a sense of nationality. If violence is done to this seViti-
ment, Bolshevism will find these two peoples an easy prey,
and the only barrier which at the present moment exists
between Russian Bolshevism and German Bolshevism
will be shattered.

The result will be either a confederation of Eastern and
Central Europe under the domination of a Bolshevist
Germany, or the enslavement of the same countries by a

LLOYD GEORGE'S MEMORANDUM OF MARCH 26 251

reactionary Germany, thanks to the general anarchy. In
both cases, the Allies will have lost the war. On the con-
trary, the policy of the French Government is resolutely
to aid these young peoples with the support of the liberal
elements in Europe, and not to seek at their expense, in-
effectual attenuations of the colonial, naval and commer-
cial disaster inflicted upon Germany by the Peace. If one
is obliged, in giving to these young peoples frontiers with-
out which they cannot live, to transfer to their sovereignty
the sons of the very Germans who have enslaved them,
it is to be regretted and it must be done with moderation,
but it cannot be avoided.

Moreover, while one deprives Germany totally and
definitely of her colonies, because she maltreated the
indigenous population, by what right can one refuse to
give Poland and Bohemia normal frontiers because the
Germans have installed themselves upon Polish and
Bohemian soil as guarantors of oppressive pan-Ger-
manism ?

4. Mr. Lloyd George's note insists — and the French
Government is in agreement — upon the necessity of
making a peace which shall seem to Germany to be a
just peace. But in view of German mentality, it is not
sure that justice is conceived by the Germans as it is
conceived by the Allies.

Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that this
impression of justice must be obvious not only to the
enemy, but also and principally to the Allies. The
Allies who have fought side by side must terminate
the war with an equitable peace. But what would be the
results of following the method suggested by the note of
March 26th? A certain number of total and definitive
guarantees will be acquired by maritime nations which
have not known an invasion. The surrender of the
German colonies would be total and definitive. The
surrender of the German navy would be total and de-
finitive. The surrender of a large portion of the German
merchant fleet would be total and definite. The ex-
clusion of Germany from foreign markets would be total
and would last for some time. On the other hand,

252 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

partial and temporary solutions would be reserved for
the continental countries, that is to say those which have
suffered most from the war. The reduced frontiers
suggested for Poland and Bohemia would be partial
solutions. The defensive agreement offered to France
for the protection of her territory would be a temporary
solution. The proposed regime for the coal fields of the
Sarre would be temporary. Here we have a condition of
inequality which might risk leaving a bad impression
upon the after- war relations between the Allies, more
important than the after-war relations between Germany
and the Allies.

In Paragraph 1 it has been demonstrated that it is
vain to hope by territorial concessions to find sufficient
compensation for Germany for the world disaster which
she has undergone. It may be permitted to add that it
would be an injustice to impose the burden of these
compensations upon those of the Allies who have felt
the weight of the war most heavily.

These countries, after the expenses of war, cannot
incur the expenses of peace. It is essential that they also
should have the sensation of a just and equitable peace.
In default of this, it is not alone in Central Europe that
Bolshevism is to be feared, for no field can be more
favourable to its propagation, it has been well noted, than
the field of national disappointment.

5. For the moment, the French Government desires
to limit itself to observations of a general nature.

It renders full credit to the intentions which have
inspired Mr. Lloyd George's memorandum. But it be-
lieves that the deductions made in the present note are in
harmony with justice and with general interest of all.

The French Government will be inspired by these
considerations in the forthcoming meetings when the
terms suggested by the British Prime Minister are
discussed.

DOCUMENT 29.

Bernard M. Baruch's letter to President Wilson
of April 9, arguing against French ownership of
the coal mines of the Saar (typewritten copy).

Hotel de Crillon, Paris,

April 9, 1919.
MY BEAR MR. PRESIBENT: —

The proposed arrangement by which the French would
own the coal mines in the Sarre Valley, while the territory
itself would remain German, would, in my opinion, be a
constant source of turmoil and unending friction. A
solution is possible through making a distribution of the
product of the Sarre Valley as one item in the general
allocation of coal from Germany to France, as a part of
the reparation adjustment.

So long as the Sarre mines exist, the French are en-
titled to the delivery of that quantity of coal from the
Sarre Basin that has been used in Alsace-Lorraine, and as
much more as they desire to use, which can be produced
from the Sarre mines without interference with the present
German industrial and civil life, which is now dependent
upon this. The French are now asking for twenty-seven
millions additional tons of coal in substitution for that
which was produced from the Lens and Pas de Calais
fields, and are quite willing to accept that solution.
There seems to be no reason why the same thing should
not be done in the case of the Sarre Valley. The following
is my recommendation.

1. Germany should be required to deliver to France
seven million tons a year, the amount which France im-
ported annually before the war.

2. Germany should be required to supply to France an
amount of coal sufficient to make up the deficit in the

253

254 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

normal production of the Lens and Pas de Calais fields
during the period of their restoration. The complete
restoration of the mines should require not to exceed five
years.

3. During the life of the Sarre mines Germany should
be required to sell the same amount of coal she has here-
tofore sold to territories that have now become French,
France having the option to receive a percentage of the
increased production of the Sarre, which its present de-
mands bear to the total production.

It is well to note that the German metallurgical in-
dustries in the Sarre Valley, as well as many of the gas
works of Southern Germany, are dependent upon the
coal of the Valley of the Sarre. Therefore, the ownership
of these mines by the French could be used to handicap
these industries and greatly disturb the economic life.
It should also be noted that the steel mills in the Sarre
Valley and adjacent German territory are dependent
upon the iron ores from Lorraine, which is now French
territory. This furnishes the French with a powerful
weapon for trading.

The Germans might, with equal justice, demand an
ownership in the iron mines of Lorraine for the protection
of their industries which have heretofore been supplied
from this source and from which a large amount must
come for reparational purposes.

A solution of the Sarre Valley -Lorraine problem would
be a reciprocal arrangement, whereby Germany would be
required to furnish the same percentage of the coal out-
put that has heretofore been used in Lorraine, and the
French, in turn, be required to furnish to Germany the
same percentage of the iron ore output that had previously
been distributed to the territory that still remains in Ger-
many.

Very sincerely yours,

BERNARD M. BARUCH.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

11 Place des Etats-Unis,

Paris.

DOCUMENT 30.

Letter of P. B. Noyes, American Delegate,
Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission to President
Wilson, sharply criticizing the proposed arrange-
ments for the "Left Bank."

Appendix IV to C. F. 41.

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Paris, May 27, 1919.
HONORABLE WOODROW WILSON,

President of the United States of America,
11, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris.

DEAR SIR:

After a month spent in the Rhineland as American
Commissioner I feel there is a danger that a disastrous
mistake will be made. The "Convention" for the gov-
ernment of those territories, as drafted by the military
representatives of the Supreme War Council on May
eleventh, is more brutal, I believe, than even its authors
desire upon second thought. It provides for unendurable
oppression of six million people during a period of years.

This "Convention" is not likely to be adopted without
great modification. What alarms me, however, is that
none of the revisions of this document which I have seen
recognize that its basic principle is bad — that the quarter-
ing of an enemy army in a country as its master in time of
peace and the billeting of troops on the civil population
will insure hatred and ultimate disaster.

I have discussed this matter at length with the Ameri-
can Commanders of the Army of Occupation; men who
have seen "military occupation" at close range for six
months. These Officers emphatically indorse the above
statements. They say that an occupying army, even one

£55

256 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

with the best of intentions, is guilty of outrages and that
mutual irritation, in spite of every effort to the contrary,
grows apace. Force and more force must inevitably be
the history of such occupation long continued.

Forgetting the apparent ambitions of the French and
possibly overlooking political limitations, I have sketched
below a plan which seems to me the maximum for military
domination in the Rhineland after the signing of peace.
Our Army Commanders and others who have studied the
subject on the ground agree with this programme:

SKELETON PLAN.

I. As few troops as possible concentrated in barracks
or reserve areas with no "billeting," excepting
possibly for officers.
II. Complete self-government for the territory with the

exceptions below.
III. A Civil Commission with powers: —

(a) To make regulations or change old ones when-

ever German law or actions —

(1) Threaten the carrying out of Treaty

terms, or —

(2) Threaten the comfort or security of

troops.

(b) To authorize the army to take control under

martial law, either in danger spots or
throughout the territory whenever condi-
tions seem to them to make this neces-
sary.

Very truly yours,

[Signed] P. B. NOTES.

American Delegate,
Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission.

PART VI
THE ITALIAN CRISIS

DOCUMENT 31.

Basic Recommendation of American Experts,
January 21, 1919, regarding Italian boundary
settlements.

OUTLINE OF TENTATIVE REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS.

Prepared by the Intelligence Section, in accordance with
instructions, for the President and the Plenipotentiaries
January 21, 1919.

ITALY.

It is recommended:

1. That Italy be given a northern frontier midway be-
tween the linguistic line and the line of the treaty of
London, 1915. The proposed line is delimited on maps
12 to 15 inclusive.

2. That Italy's eastern frontier be rectified as shown on
map 15.

3. That consideration be given the doubtful claim of
Italy to a sphere of influence at Avlona.

4- That Rhodes and the Dodecanese be assigned to
Greece.

5. That Libya be given a hinterland adequate for
access to the Sudan and its trade, but so limited as not
to hamper the French colonial domain or the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan.

DISCUSSION.

1. It is recommended that Italy be given a northern
frontier midway between the linguistic line and the line
of the treaty of London, 1915. The proposed line is de-
limited on maps 12 to 15 inclusive.

This recommendation would give Italy all that part
of the Tyrol to which she has any just claim on linguistic,
cultural, or historical grounds. It would leave no rational

259

260 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

basis for future irredentist agitation in this direction. It
transfers to Italy over 10,000 square kilometers of terri-
tory and a population consisting of 373,000 Italians and
Ladins, 161,000 Germans, and 3,000 others.

The recommended line does not meet those claims of
Italy which are based on strategic grounds alone, for the
line of 1915, following as it does the main watershed,
gives incomparably the best strategic frontier. On the
other hand, the proposed line does ameliorate the in-
tentionally bad frontier imposed upon Italy by Austria,
and some such amelioration seems essential if the Italians
are to enter a League of Nations with confidence in its
ability to render their peaceful existence reasonably sure.
The weight of this argument would be augmented if
Italy were confronted by a united and potentially power-
ful German state on the north. The task of the League
of Nations will be rendered easier and its success made
more certain by the adjustment of Italy's northern
frontier at least in part along lines which would discourage
armed aggression by a powerful German state.

As laid down upon the map the proposed boundary is
a good line from the geographical standpoint, since it
follows natural lines of demarcation and coincides with
the marked topographical barrier between regions cli-
matically dissimilar. Its position is easily recognizable
on the ground, it is capable of clear and accurate delimi-
tation, and is not subject to change from natural causes.
Since throughout its entire length it traverses regions of
little or no population it does not interfere with the
activities of the local population, and the small number of
practicable passes make the administration of customs and
other frontier regulations simple.

Finally, it is so drawn as to throw into Austria about
71,000 Germans, with a minority of 10,000 Italians and
Ladins, forming properly a part of the Austrian realm.
Were the line of 1915 to be followed (red line on map 13),
it would simply throw the irredentist problem into
Austrian territory and would not lead to a lasting peace.

2. It is recommended that Italy's eastern frontier be
rectified as shown on map 15.

AMERICAN EXPERTS ON ITALIAN SETTLEMENTS 261

The Jugo-Slav boundary in the Istria-Isonzo region is
the subject of hot dispute because both the Jugo-Slavs
and the Italians are eager for the possession of the eastern
Adriatic littoral and its ports. The commercial and
strategic advantages accruing to the possessor are ob-
vious.

The proposed boundary coincides in general with the
main watershed of the Carnic and Julian Alps, and
follows the crest of the high ridge forming the backbone of
the Istrian peninsula. It gives to Italy all of that portion
of the Isonzo basin and of the eastern Adriatic coast to
which she has any valid claim, together with as much of
the hinterland, peopled by Slavs, as is vitally needed on
economic grounds. It gives to the Jugo-Slavs part of
the Istrian coast and all of the Dalmatian coast and archi-
pelago claimed by Italy, with a fine series of harbors
from Fiume southward.

The proposed division would add 6,680 square kilo-
meters to Italy and a population of 715,000, consisting
of 345,000 Italians and 370,000 Jugo-Slavs. In Jugo-
Slav territory there would be left 75,000 Italians, a very
small number as compared with the number of Jugo-
Slavs in Italy. The Jugo-Slavs would be left in un-
disturbed possession of a stretch of coast upon which
their hopes have centered for years, and where the
Italian claim to majorities is unsubstantiated, except in
the case of several of the coast towns, such as Fiume and
Zara — there is a small Italian majority* in Fiume proper,
but a small Croat majority if the suburb of Susak, in
fact a part of Fiume, be added.

The retention of Fiume by Jugo-Slavia is vital to the
interests of the latter, and likewise assures to the more
remote hinterland, including Austria and Hungary, the
advantages of two competing ports under the control of
different nations.

Italy is accorded on the east as much natural protection
as can be permitted without giving undue weight to
strategic considerations. As defined the line affords
reasonable protection for Trieste and Pola and their

*ReIative majority.

262 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

connecting railway, and in fact would leave the Jugo-
Slavs in a position of military inferiority if they did not
have a protective mountainous terrain and one of the
best coasts in the world for defensive naval operations.
For almost its entire length the boundary follows water-
sheds on high and sparsely settled plateaus. It is not
without at least remote historical basis, since it follows
the frontier between Italy and the Provinces as it existed
for several centuries during the Roman period.

3. It is recommended that consideration be given to
the doubtful claim of Italy to a sphere of influence at
Avlona.

Probably Italy must be left in Avlona and its imme-
diately adjacent territory, not, however, as the final pos-
sessor of the region, but as a mandatory of the League of
Nations. In this manner any alleged propagandist move-
ments may be reviewed and restrictions imposed in har-
mony with the spirit of the time in which they arise.
Otherwise there will be left in both the northern and
southern ends of Jugo-Slavia regions of conflict between
two neighbouring peoples, the Jugo-Slavs and the Italians,
from which there could result only continued discord and
possible war.

4. It is recommended that Rhodes and the Dodecanese
be assigned to Greece.

Over 80 per cent, of the population of Rhodes and the
Dodecanese are Greek Orthodox. They are bitterly op-
posed to the present Italian occupation, and should be
assigned to the mother country.

5. It is recommended that Libya be given a hinterland
adequate for access to the Sudan and its trade, but so
limited as not to hamper the French colonial domain or
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

The need for such a hinterland is evident, and with the
limitations mentioned it is fair to satisfy this need. The
proposed action would no doubt be agreeable to France
and Great Britain.

DOCUMENT 32.

Memorandum, March 18, of four American
experts, regarding Italian claims to Dalmatia and
Fiume, reaffirming their recommendation that
"Fiume and all Dalmatia shall go to the Jugo-
Slavs" (carbon copy).

18 March 1919.
MEMORANDUM.

From: Chiefs of the Austro-Hungarian Division, the
Balkan Division, the Italian Division and the
Division of Boundary Geography, Section of
Territorial, Political and Economic Intelligence.
To: The Commissioners.
Re: Dalmatia and Fiume.

The Italians, in their memorandum presented to the
Council of Ten on 11 March 1919, demand:

1 — That part of Dalmatia granted to them by the
Treaty of London, and, in addition,

2 — Dalmatia as far south as Spalato,

3 — Fiume and the adjacent district.

Every memorandum hitherto submitted to the Com-
missioners, about which any of the heads of the above-
named divisions have been consulted, recommends that
Fiume and all of Dalmatia should go to the Jugo-Slavs.
We are still unanimously of that opinion for the reasons
here set forth.

I. DALMATIA.

1. The population of that portion of Dalmatia de-
manded by Italy was divided linguistically in 1910, as
follows: 406,100 Jugo-Slavs, 16,280 Italians. The town
of Zara had an Italian majority. Elsewhere there was
no commune in all Dalmatia with an Italian minority as
large as ten percent and only five with minorities of more

263

264 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

than five percent. The Austrian statistics may do some
injustice to the Italians, but there is no doubt that the
Italians are linguistically in a negligible minority. Though
in Alsace-Lorraine language may not be a good index of
nationality, it is in Dalmatia. There can be little doubt
that the national sympathies of an overwhelming majority
of the population are Jugo-Slav. The Jugo-Slavs, more-
over, have been settled in Dalmatia for over twelve
centuries, and for several centuries they have occupied
the largest part of the province. They are not a recent
importation of the Austrian government, as the Italian
memorandum implies.

' 2. Italy has no "historic right " to Dalmatia. Trent and

Trieste with their adjacent lands were integral parts of Italy

A in Roman days, but Dalmatia was not. Dalmatia was

• merely a Roman province, as were also France and England.

In the middle ages, Venice began to establish dominion

over the cities of the coast, but her control never extended

far inland, except during the last century of her rule.

3. Dalmatia is not now important as a commercial
outlet for the interior east of the mountainous coast. It
was the Austrian policy to prevent the construction of
railways across the mountains. But there are routes by
which it is practicable to build railroads connecting the
interior with excellent harbors on the coast. The Slavs
of the interior would have every incentive to build rail-
ways if they controlled the ports; the Italians whose in-
terests in Dalmatia are primarily strategic would be less
likely to make the sacrifices necessary for the economic
development of the Slav hinterland.

4. Italy claims Dalmatia in order to avoid remaining
in a state of permanent strategic inferiority. It should
be noted, however, that Italian naval experts (see special
memorandum submitted to Colonel House by Major
Douglas Johnson) generally agree with the opinion of the
U. S. Naval Advisory Staff as expressed in its memoran-
dum on "Problems of Naval Strategy," that secure pos-
session of Valona, Pola and a base in an island group near
the central Adriatic, would give to Italy effective control
of that sea.

MEMORANDUM OF FOUR AMERICAN EXPERTS 265
II FIUME.

1. In Fiume and the adjacent district the majority is
also Jugo-Slav. The Italian memorandum does not de-
limit the district exactly, but, assuming the smallest
proportions admitted by the description, it contained in
1910 a population of 87,248 of whom 24,870 were Italians
and 48,886 Jugo-Slavs. The whole surrounding hinter-
land was solidly Jugo-Slav.

2. For economic reasons it is essential, if Trieste goes
to Italy, that Fiume should go to Jugo-Slavia.

(a) No other port could be developed except at great
cost, and no other port could handle the commerce of the
Jugo-Slav State as advantageously as Fiume. Of the
Croatian coast Cholnoky, the Hungarian geographer
rightly says: "No bays suitable for modern shipping are
open." Dalmatian ports could not be utilized until con-
necting railways had been built, and they could never
supply to advantage the commercial needs of the northern
part of the Jugo-Slav State.

(b) Fiume is in no way an economic necessity to Italy.
The port's commercial hinterland is on the eastern side of
the Adriatic. Fiume in Italian hands would probably
have its development sacrificed to that of Trieste.

(c) The commercial interests of Central Europe should
be a primary consideration in determining the disposition
of Fiume. These interests would be safeguarded better
by the competition that would result from the assignment
of Trieste to Italy and Fiume to the Jugo-Slavs than in
any other way.

We are unanimously of the opinion that neither Fiume nor
any part of Dalmatia (with the possible exception of Lissa
and its neighboring islets) should be assigned to Italy.
CHARLES SEYMOUR

Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Division.
CLIVE DAY

Chief of the Balkan Division.
W. E. LUNT

Chief of the Italian Division.
DOUGLAS W. JOHNSON

Chief of the Division of Boundary-Geography.

DOCUMENT 33.

Memorandum, April 4, of five American ex-
perts to President Wilson, regarding disposition
of Fiume advising that "it is unwise to make
Fiume a free city," with memorandum on the
legal aspects of the situation by David Hunter
Miller (autographed originals).

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

April 4, 1919.

From: Chiefs of the Italian Division, the Balkan Divi-
sion, the Austro-Hungarian Division, the Division
of Boundary Geography, and the Division of
Economics.

To: President Wilson.

Subject: Disposition of Fiume.

The following statement of facts and opinions is
respectfully submitted for the President's considera-
tion:

1. The port of Fiume is vitally necessary to the eco-
nomic life of Jugo-Slavia.

It has no economic significance for Italy, except as
its development would prevent Italy from con-
trolling trade which might otherwise be artifi-
cially deflected to Trieste.

3. The large business interests of Fiume, the banking
houses, and the shipping are mainly in Hungarian
and Jugo-Slav hands. Italian capital did not
develop the port. The Italians constitute the
small traders and shop keepers and to some ex-
tent the professional classes.

266

AMERICAN EXPERTS ON DISPOSITION OF FIUME 267

4. According to the last official census the Italians

constituted only a plurality of the population of
Fiume, even when its artificial separation from
the Slavic Susak is maintained.

5. The Italian plurality in the restricted Fiume:

(a) If of recent development (Since 1880 or

1890).

(b) Includes an unknown but considerable num-

ber who have not given up Italian citizen-
ship.

(c) Has probably resulted from artificial encour-

agement by the Hungarian government,
which had a comprehensible interest in
developing an alien rather than a Slav
majority in the city.

6. The Italian agitation in favor of annexing Fiume is

only a few months old. Last summer it was
generally admitted in high Italian circles that /
Fiume would and should go to Jugo-Slavia.
In view of the foregoing consideration the American
specialists are unanimously of the opinion:

1. Thai Fiume should be given to the Jugo-Slav State
without restriction.

This solution is the only one which in our opin-
ion will prove attractive at the same time to Jugo-
Slav capital and to outside capital (Hungarian,
Czecho-Slovak, etc.); it will best serve the vital
economic interests of both city and state; and in
view of the facts regarding the nature and origin of
the Italian population, it seems to us the most just
morally.

2. That the interests of the Italian minority of greater
Fiume should be assured by the establishment of adequate
guarantees for protection.

Similar guarantees should be extended, in a spirit of
equality and justice, to the other Italian minorities
in Jugo-Slavia, and to the much larger Slavic mi-
norities in Trieste and other areas transferred to
Italy by the recommended new frontier.

3. That it is unwise to make of Fiume a free city.

268 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Our unanimity of opinion on this point is due to the
approximate equality of the two antagonistic ele-
ments of the population, the testimony of observers
as to the inability of the Italians of Fiume properly
to administer the port, the justified sensitiveness of
the Slavs toward any infringement of sovereignty over
their only good port and chief commercial city, and
the serious economic and political disadvantages
which such infringement would entail under the
peculiar physical conditions which obtain at Fiume.
(See attached letter by Mr. Miller.)
4. That if for reasons not connected with the best in-
terests of the city and its hinterland it is deemed necessary
that Fiume be made a free city, its right of local self-govern-
ment should be accompanied by the following safe-guards
of the interests of the Jugo-Slav State:

a. The moles, docks, basins and other instrumen-
talities of the port must be under Jugo-Slav sover-
eignty as well as Jugo-Slav ownership, and it must be
possible for the Jugo-Slavs to acquire the land and
other property needed for their extension.

b. The railways and other means of communication
with the interior, (e. g., telephones, telegraphs, and
postal service) must likewise be under Jugo-Slav
control.

c. There must be no discrimination with respect
to political and economic rights of any kind, nor
with respect to schools and churches.

d. The city (except for a possible free port) must
be included within the Slav customs frontier.

e. The organization of the city must be such as to
abolish the present artificial division of the port into
two parts.

These safe-guards are necessary :(1) To ensure conditions
of sufficient stability to justify expenditures by the govern-
ment and by Jugo-Slav and foreign private capitalists
for the improvement and development of the port; (2) To
prevent Italian interference with the development of the
port and with its full use; (3) To give the Slavs a fair
opportunity to achieve a position in the industrial and

AMERICAN EXPERTS ON DISPOSITION OF FIUME 269

political life of the community strong enough to safe-
guard their vital interests.

[Signed] W. E. LUNT

Chief of the Italian Division.
CLIVE DAY

Chief of the Balkan Division.
CHARLES SEYMOUR

Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Division.
DOUGLAS JOHNSON

Chief of the Division of Boundary Geography.
ALLYN A. YOUNG

Chief of the Division of Economics.

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE
OFFICE OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS.

6 April, 1919.
DEAR MAJOR JOHNSON:

In our conversation yesterday you asked my views as
to the creation of an independent territory comprising,
with certain exceptions, the districts of Fiume and Susak
under the hypothesis that the territory surrounding these
districts was entirely within the limits of Jugo-Slavia,
and under the further hypothesis that the entire port
facilities of Fiume as well as any land necessary for their
extension would likewise be under the sovereignty of
Jugo-Slavia, and that the railroads running into Fiume
and other means of communication with the interior,
such as telephones, telegraphs, and postal service, should
be under the control of Jugo-Slavia.

I do not doubt that such an arrangement is a legal
possibility, but there are certain legal questions to which
attention should be directed as they involve matters of
practical importance.

Under the hypothesis the territory in question would be
independent but the character of the locus is such as to
make it doubtful whether that independence could be
more than theoretical.

From the maps which you showed me it appears that

270 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

what I will call the proposed "free area" while of very
irregular shape, would run along the coast for ten or
twelve miles, extending into the interior for a very short
distance except in the center of the strip where it would
be perhaps five or six miles wide, and even from this area
would have to be deducted all of the docks, etc., which
extend over most although not all of the waterfront.
Furthermore, the control of the railroads by Jugo-Slavia
would result in dividing the territory to be administered
in the free area into three parts: the first what may be
called the interior on the land side of the railroad, and the
other two small strips of the coast between the railroad
and the sea, lying on either side of the docks.

It should be added that under your statement of the
hypothesis the area would for customs purposes be part
of Jugo-Slavia, and that the population of the area is
perhaps 60,000 persons, of whom no doubt a certain
number reside in the portion devoted to the docks.

Under any form of agreement it seems to me that the
difficulties of the administration of such a very small
area as an independent unit would be enormous, and to
be successful would require almost complete cooperation
and harmony between the government of the free area
and the government of Jugo-Slavia. Take for example
the question of police. The jurisdiction of police over
the docks, etc. would necessarily be Jugo-Slav, and also
similar jurisdiction over the railroads and their appurte-
nances, and even if the latter were not technically under
the sovereignty but only under the control of Jugo-
Slavia. Thus the police of the free area would be over
three distinct pieces of territory with the consequent
necessity of free passage and repassage over the railroad.

It may be assumed, although you did not so state, that
there is one water supply for the territory which would
be within the free area, and for the docks, etc. Such a
water supply would be under two distinct sovereignties
and yet would of necessity be under a single management ;
indeed, it would be quite important to determine in
making such an agreement where the source of the water
supply of Fiume was located, for if this source is in the

AMERICAN EXPERTS ON DISPOSITION OF FIUME 271

interior outside of the free area a still very difficult com-
plication would be presented.

Without attempting to go into further detail I may
mention that somewhat similar questions of administra-
tion would be presented in regard to the protection of
health, the sewage system, the prevention of fire, and the
means of communication between the two areas.

These matters are not mentioned for the purpose of
expressing any opinion upon the questions of policy in-
volved, but chiefly, as you suggest, in order, if such an
arrangement is to be made, that very detailed knowledge
of the local conditions may be obtained so that so far as
possible future difficulties may be foreseen and perhaps
avoided.

Very sincerely yours,
[Signed] DAVID HUNTER MILLER.

MAJOR DOUGLAS W. JOHNSON
Hotel Crillon
Paris.

DOCUMENT 34.

Letter of Orlando to President Wilson, April
3, 1919, refusing to discuss boundary problems
while representatives of the Croats and Slovenes
were present (autographed original).

IL PKESIDENTE

del
Consiglio dei Ministri.

Paris, April 3rd, 1919.
MR. PRESIDENT,

The quite unexpected way in which the Italian ques-
tions came up for discussion to-day, made it impossible
to examine more thoroughly the many difficult points,
including even questions of procedure, which present
themselves.

I had not been able to come to an understanding with
my colleagues on the Delegation, nor had my colleague,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Sonnino, come to
the meeting, as it had been agreed that he would do, and
as was done in the case of Mr. Tardieu when the problem
of the French frontiers was under consideration.

As for the very delicate matter of giving a further
hearing to the representatives of the Slovenes and Croats,
— against whom Italy has been at war for four years, —
I would not insist against it, just as I would not exclude
the advisability of giving a hearing to the representatives
of any other enemy people on whom it is a question of
imposing conditions. But, on the other hand, as no such
debate has yet been granted, I insist in thinking it ad-
visable to abstain from taking part in a meeting which,
as things stand, must necessarily give rise to debate.

I realize, with keen regret, that my absence may give
rise to an impression, which I should be the first to wish

272

ORLANDO TO PRESIDENT WILSON, APRIL 3, 1919 273

to avoid, that a misunderstanding has arisen between the
Italian Government and the Allied and Associated Gov-
ernments. I think however that such an impression will
not be given, as the meeting this afternoon is not the
meeting of the representatives of the four Powers, but a
conversation between the President of the United States
and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France
with those Gentlemen.

I earnestly hope, Mr. President, that in this way the
reason for my absence will be seen in its true light, i. e.
not as an evidence of disagreement, but as an act of con-
sideration towards colleagues, whose wish it is to obtain
all the data available in order to form their own opinion
on the grave matters under consideration.
Believe me,

Mr. President,
Sincerely yours,

[Signed] V. L. ORLANDO.

DOCUMENT 35.

Memorandum concerning the question of the
Italian claims on the Adriatic, presented by
President Wilson to the Italian delegation on
April 14, with permission to make it public in
Italy. Rejected by Orlando.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF ITALIAN
CLAIMS ON THE ADRIATIC.

There is no question to which I have given more careful
or anxious thought than I have given to this, because in
common with all my colleagues it is my earnest desire
to see the utmost justice done to Italy. Throughout
my consideration of it, however, I have felt that there
was one matter in which I had no choice and could wish
to have none.

I felt bound to square every conclusion that I should
reach as accurately as possible with the fourteen principles
of peace which I set forth in my address to the Congress
of the United States on the eighth of January, 1918, and
in subsequent addresses.

These fourteen points and the principles laid down in
the subsequent addresses were formally adopted, with
only a single reservation, by the Powers associated
against Germany, and will constitute the basis of peace
with Germany. I do not feel at liberty to suggest one
basis for peace with Germany and another for peace with
Austria.

It will be remembered that in reply to a communication,
from the Austrian Government offering to enter into
negotiations for an armistice and peace on the basis of
the fourteen points to which I have alluded, I said that
there was one matter to which those points no longer
applied.

274

WILSON TO THE ITALIAN DELEGATION, APRIL 14 275
INDEPENDENT STATES.

They had demanded autonomy for the several States
which had constituted parts of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, and I pointed out that it must now be left to the
choice of the people of those several countries what their
destiny and political relations should be.

They have chosen, with the sympathy of the whole
world, to be set up as independent States. Their complete
separation from Austria and the consequent complete
dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire has given a
new aspect and significance to the settlements which
must be effected with regard at any rate to the eastern
boundaries of Italy.

Personally I am quite willing that Italy should be
accorded along the whole length of her northern frontier
and wherever she comes into contact with Austrian
territory all that was accorded her in the so-called Pact of
London, but I am of the clear opinion that the Pact of
London can no longer apply to the settlement of her
eastern boundaries.

The line drawn in the Pact of London was conceived for
the purpose of establishing an absolutely adequate
frontier of safety for Italy against any possible hostility /
or aggression on the part of Austro-Hungary. But
Austro-Hungary no longer exists.

These eastern frontiers will touch countries stripped
of the military and naval power of Austria, set up in
entire independence of Austria, and organized for the
purpose of satisfying legitimate national aspirations, and
created States not hostile to the new European order, but
arising out of it, interested in its maintenance, dependent
upon the cultivation of friendships, and bound to a
common policy of peace and accommodation by the
covenants of the League of Nations.

ISTRIAN PENINSULA.

It is with these facts in mind that I have approached the
Adriatic question. It is commonly agreed, and I very
heartily adhere to the agreement, that the ports of

276 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Trieste and Pola, and with them the greater part of the
Istrian Peninsula, should be ceded to Italy, her eastern
frontier running along the natural strategic line estab-
lished by the physical conformation of the country, a line
which it has been attempted to draw with some degree of
accuracy on the attached map.

Within this line on the Italian side will lie considerable
bodies of non-Italian population, but their fortunes are so
naturally linked by the nature of the country itself with
the fortunes of the Italian people that I think their in-
clusion is fully justified.

There would be no such justification, in my judgment,
in including Fiume or any part of the coast lying to the
south of Fiume within the boundaries of the Italian
kingdom.

PORT OF NEW STATES.

Fiume is by situation and by all the circumstances of its
development not an Italian but an international port,
serving the countries to the east and north of the Gulf of
Fiume. Just because it is an international port and
cannot with justice be subordinated to any one sover-
eignty it is my clear judgment that it should enjoy a very
considerable degree of genuine autonomy and that, while
it should be included no doubt within the Customs
system of the new Jugo-Slav State it should nevertheless
be left free in its own interest and in the interest of the
States lying about it to devote itself to the service of the
commerce which naturally and inevitably seeks an out-
let or inlet at its port.

The States which it serves will be new States. They
will need to have complete confidence in their access to an
outlet on the sea. The friendships and the connections of
the future will largely depend upon such an arrangement as
I have suggested; and friendship, cooperation, freedom of
action must underlie every arrangement of peace, if
peace is to be lasting.

I believe that there will be common agreement that the
Island of Lissa should be ceded to Italy and that she
should retain the port of Volna. I believe that it will be

WILSON TO THE ITALIAN DELEGATION, APRIL 14 277

generally agreed that the fortifications which the Aus-
trian Government established upon the islands near the
eastern coast of the Adriatic should be permanently dis-
mantled under international guarantees, and that the
disarmament which is to be arranged under the League of
Nations should limit the States on the eastern coast of the
Adriatic to only such minor naval forces as are necessary
for policing the waters of the islands and the coast.

These are the conclusions to which I am forced by
the compulsion of the understandings which underlay
the whole initiation of the present peace. No other
conclusions seem to me susceptible of being rendered
consistent with these understandings. They were under-
standings accepted by the whole world, and bear with
peculiar compulsion upon the United States because the
privilege was accorded her of taking the initiative in
bringing about the negotiations for peace and her pledges
underlie the whole difficult business.

And certainly Italy obtains under such a settlement the
great historic objects which her people have so long had
in mind. The historical wrongs inflicted upon her by
Austro-Hungary and by a long series of unjust transac-
tions which I hope will before long sink out of the memory
of man are completely redressed. Nothing is denied her
which will complete her national unity.

Here and there upon the islands of the Adriatic and upon
the eastern coast of that sea there are settlements con-
taining large Italian elements of population, but the
pledges under which the new States enter the family of
nations will abundantly safeguard the liberty, the develop-
ment, and all the just rights of national or racial minorities
and back of these safeguards will always lie the watchful
and sufficient authority of the League of Nations.

And at the very outset we shall have avoided the fatal
error of making Italy's nearest neighbours on the east her
enemies and nursing just such a sense of injustice as has
disturbed the peace of Europe for generations together
and played no small part in bringing on the terrible
conflict through which we have just passed.

DOCUMENT 36.

Letter of six American experts to President
Wilson urging him not to yield on the Italian
claims (carbon copy).

April IT, 1919.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

En route to France, on the George Washington in De-
cember, the President gave the territorial specialists an
inspiriting moral direction :

"Tell me what's right and I'll fight for it. Give me a guaranteed
position."

We regard this as a noble charter for the new international
order. We have been proud to work for that charter. At
this critical moment we should like to take advantage of
the gracious invitation of the President to address him
directly on matters of the gravest importance, and in
accordance therewith beg to submit the following observa-
tions :

The Italian representatives demand Fiume and part
of Dalmatia in order to emerge from the Conference
with loot for their people. These districts belong to
Jugo-Slavia, not to Italy. In our opinion there is no
way — no political or economic device, of a free port or
otherwise — which can repair to Jugo-Slavia the injury
done if any outside Power prevents Fiume from being
made an integral part of the Jugo-Slav organization.
It would be charged that we had betrayed the rights of
small nations. It would be charged that the principle,
"There shall be no bartering of peoples" had been
publicly and cynically thrown aside.

Italy entered the war with a demand for loot. France
and England surrendered to her demand. Of all the
world's statesmen the President alone repudiated a war

278

SIX AMERICAN EXPERTS ON ITALIAN CLAIMS 279

for spoils and proclaimed the just principles of an
enduring peace. The belligerent nations, including
Italy, agreed to make peace on the President's prin-
ciples. Italy now insists that she must carry home an
ample bag of spoils or the government will fall.

If Italy gets even nominal sovereignty over Fiume as
the price of supporting the League of Nations, she has
brought the League down to her level. It becomes1-^
a coalition to maintain an unjust settlement. The
world will see that a big Power has profited by the old
methods: secret treaties, shameless demands, selfish
oppression. The League of Nations will be charged
with the acceptance of the doctrines of Talleyrand and
Metternich.

If Jugo-Slavia loses Fiume, war will follow. When
it comes, the League will be fighting on the wrong side.
Ought we to hope that it will be strong enough to win?
Will the people of the world send armies and navies
and expend billions of dollars to maintain a selfish and
aggressive settlement?

Better a League of Nations based on justice than a
League based on Italian participation bought at a [/'
price. The Italian government may fall, but the
Italian people cannot long withstand the opinion of the
world.

Never in his career did the President have presented
to him such an opportunity to strike a death blow to the
discredited methods of old-world diplomacy. Italian
claims are typical of the method of making excessive
demands in the hope of saving a portion of the spoils
in subsequent compromises. To the President is
given the rare privilege of going down in history as the
statesman who destroyed, by a clean-cut decision
against an infamous arrangement, the last vestige of
the old order.

Respectfully submitted,
ISAIAH BOWMAN

Chief Territorial Specialist.
W. E. LUNT

Chief of the Italian Division.

280 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

CLIVE DAY

Chief of the Balkan Division.
DOUGLAS W. JOHNSON

Chief of the Division of Boundary Geography.
CHARLES SEYMOUR

Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Division.
ALLYN A. YOUNG

Chief of the Division of Economics and Statistics.

DOCUMENT 37.

Memorandum of A. J. Balfour, April 24, ex-
plaining attitude of Great Britain and France
regarding the Italian settlement. A great con-
troversy raged over making this document
public, but it was finally kept secret and has
never before been published (typewritten copy).

FIUME AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT.

We learn with a regret which it is difficult to measure
that, at the very moment when Peace seems almost
attained, Italy threatens to sever herself from the company
of the Allied nations, through whose common efforts
victory has been achieved. We do not presume to offer
any opinion as to the effects which so momentous a step
would have upon the future of Italy herself. Of these
it is for the Italian people and its leaders to judge, and
for them alone. But we, who have been Italy's Allies
through four anxious years, and would gladly be her
Allies still, are bound to express our fears as to the dis-
astrous effects it will surely have upon us, and upon the
policy for which we have striven.

When in 1915 Italy threw in her lot with France,
Russia and the British Empire in their struggle against
the Central Powers, Turkey and Bulgaria, she did so on
conditions. She required her Allies to promise that in
case of victory they would help her to obtain in Europe
the frontier of the Alps, the great ports of Trieste and
Pola, and a large portion of the Dalmatian coast with
many of its adjacent islands. Such accessions of terri-
tory would enormously strengthen Italy's power of
defense, both on land and sea, against her hereditary

281

28$ WOODKOW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

enemy, and would incidentally result in the transfer of
over 200,000 German-speaking Tyrolese and over 750,000
Southern Slavs from Austrian to Italian rule. Under
this arrangement Fiume was retained by Croatia.

Such was the situation in April, 1915. In November,
1918, it had profoundly changed. Germany was beaten;
the Dual Monarchy had ceased to exist: and side by side
with this Military revolution, the ideals of the Western
Powers had grown and strengthened. In 1915 the im-
mediate needs of self-defense, the task of creating and
equipping vast armies, the contrivance of new methods for
meeting new perils, strained to the utmost the energies
of the Allies. But by 1918, we had reached the double
conviction that if the repetition of such calamities was to
be avoided, the Nations must organize themselves to
maintain Peace, as Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and
Turkey had organized themselves to make War; and that
little could be expected, even from the best contrived
organization, unless the boundaries of the States to be
created by the Conference were framed, on the whole, in
accordance with the wishes and lasting interests of the
populations concerned.

This task of re-drawing European frontiers has fallen
upon the Great Powers; and admittedly its difficulty is
immense. Not always, nor indeed often, do race, religion,
language, history, economic interests, geographical con-
tiguity and convenience, the influence of national preju-
dices and the needs of national defense, conspire to
indicate without doubt or ambiguity the best frontier for
any State: — be it new or old. And unless they do, some
element in a perfect settlement must be neglected,
compromise becomes inevitable, and there may often be
honest doubts as to the form the compromise should
take.

Now as regards most of the new frontier between
Italy and what was once the Austrian Empire, we have
nothing to say. We are bound by the Pact of London,
and any demand for a change in that Pact which is
adverse to Italy must come from Italy herself. But this
same Pact gives Fiume to Croatia, and we would very

BALFOUR ON THE ITALIAN SETTLEMENT 288

earnestly and respectfully ask whether any valid reason
exists for adding, in the teeth of the Treaty, this little city
on the Croatian coast to the Kingdom of Italy? It is said
indeed, and with truth, that its Italian population desire
the change. But the population which clusters around
the port is not predominantly Italian. It is true that the
urban area wherein they dwell is not called Fiume; for
it is divided by a narrow canal, as Paris is divided by the
Seine, or London by the tidal estuary of the Thames,
and locally the name, Fiume, is applied in strictness only
to the streets on one side of it. But surely we are con-
cerned with things, not names; and however you name it,
the town which serves the port, and lives by it, is physi-
cally one town, not two : and taken as a whole is Slav, not
Italian.

But if the argument drawn from the wishes of the
present population does not really point to an Italian
solution, what remains? Not the argument from history;
for up to quite recent times the inhabitants of Fiume, in
its narrowest meaning, were predominantly Slav. Not
the arguments from contiguity; for the country popula-
tion, up to the very gates of the city, are not merely
predominantly Slav, but Slav without perceptible ad-
mixture. Not the economic argument; for the territories
which obtain through Fiume their easiest access to the
sea, whatever else they be, at least are not Italian.
Most of them are Slav; and if it be said that Fiume is also
necessary to Hungarian and Transylvanian commerce,
this is a valid argument for making it a free port, but
surely not for putting it under Italian sovereignty.

There is one other line of argument on this subject about
which we would ask leave to say a word. It is urged by
some, and thought by many that the task of the Great
Powers is not merely to sit down and coldly rearrange
the pieces on the European board in strict, even pedantic,
conformity with certain admirable but very abstract
principles. They must consider these great matters in
more human fashion. After all (so runs the argument),
the problems to be dealt with arise out of a great war.
The conquerors in that War were not the aggressors:

284 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Their sacrifices have been enormous; the burdens they
have to bear seem well-nigh intolerable. Are they to get
nothing out of victory, except the consciousness that State
frontiers in Europe will be arranged in a better pattern
after 1918 than they were before; and that nations who
fought on the wrong side, or who did not fight at all, will
have gained their freedom through other peoples' losses?
Surely the victors, if they want it, are entitled to some
more solid reward than theoretical map-makers, working
in the void, may on abstract principles feel disposed to
give them.

There is something in this way of thinking which at
first sight appeals to us all; and where no interests are
concerned but those of the criminal aggressors, it deserves
respectful consideration. But in most cases of territorial
redistribution it is at least as important to enquire what
effects the transfer will have on the nations to whom the
territory is given, as upon those from whom it is taken:
and when, as in the case of Jugo-Slavia, the nation from
whom it is taken happens to be a friendly State, the
difficulty of the problem is doubled.

We do not presume to speak with authority on the
value of the strategical gains which Italy anticipates
from the acquisition of the islands and coastline of
Dalmatia. They seem to us to be small; though, small
as they are, they must greatly exceed the economic ad-
vantages, which will accrue to Italian trade from new
opportunities, or to the Italian Treasury from new sources
of revenue. We cannot believe that the owners of
Trieste have anything to fear from Fiume as a commercial
rival, or the owners of Pola from Fiume as a Naval base.

But if Italy has little to gain from the proposed ac-
quisition, has she not much to lose? The War found her
protected from an hereditary enemy of nearly twice her
size by a frontier which previous Treaties had deliberately
[rendered] insecure. Her Eastern seaboard was almost
bare of harbours, while Austria-Hungary possessed on
the opposite side of the Adriatic some of the finest harbours
in the world . This was her condition in!914. In 1919 her
Northern and Eastern frontiers are as secure as mountains

BALFOUR ON THE ITALIAN SETTLEMENT 285

and rivers can make them. She is adding two great ports
to her Adriatic possessions; and her hereditary oppressor
has ceased to exist. To us it seems that, as a State thus
situated has nothing to fear from its neighbours' enmity,
so its only interest must be to gain their friendship. And
though memories belonging to an evil past make friend-
ship difficult between Italians and Slavs, yet the bitterest
memories soften with time, unless fresh irritants are
frequently applied; and among such irritants none are
more powerful than the constant contemplation of a
disputed and ill-drawn frontier.

It is for Italy, and not for the other signatories of the
Pact of London, to say whether she will gain more in
power, wealth and honour by strictly adhering to that part
of the Pact of London which is in her favour, than by
accepting modifications in it which would bring it into
closer harmony with the principles which are governing
the territorial decisions of the Allies in other parts of
Europe. But so far as Fiume is concerned, the position
is different. Here, as we have already pointed out, the
Pact of 1915 is against the Italian contention; and so
also, it seems to us, are justice and policy. After the
most prolonged and anxious reflection, we cannot bring
ourselves to believe that it is either in the interests of
Jugo-Slavia, in the interests of Italy herself, or in the
interests of future peace — which is the concern of all the
world, — that this port should be severed from the terri-
tories to which, economically, geographically and eth-
nologically it naturally belongs.

Can it be that Italy on this account is prepared to
separate herself from her Allies? The hope that sustained
us through the perilous years of War was that victory,
when it came, would bring with it, not merely the defeat
of Germany, but the final discredit of the ideals in which
Germany had placed her trust. On the other hand,
Germany, even when she began to entertain misgivings
about the issues of the campaign, felt sure that the union
of her enemies would never survive their triumphs. She
based her schemes no longer on the conquest of Europe,
but on its political, and perhaps also on its social, dis-

280 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

integration. The Armistice might doubtless produce a
brief cessation of hostilities; but it would bring no repose
to a perturbed and overwrought world. Militant na-
tionalism would lead to a struggle between peoples;
militant internationalism to a struggle between classes.
In either event, or in both, the Conference summoned to
give us peace would leave us at war, and Germany alone
would be the gainer.

This or something like this is the present calculation
of a certain section of German politicians. Could any-
thing more effectually contribute to its success than
that Italy should quarrel with her Allies, and that the
cause of quarrel should be the manner in which our
common victory may best be used? We are calling into
being a League of Nations; we are daily adding to the
responsibilities which, under the approaching Treaty, it
will be called upon to assume; yet before the scheme has
had time to clothe itself in practical form, we hasten to
destroy its credit. To the world we supply dramatic
proof that the Association of the Great Powers, which
won the War, cannot survive peace; and all the world
will ask how, if this be so, the maintenance of Peace can
safely be left in their hands.

For these reasons, if for no other, we beg our Italian
colleagues to re-consider their policy. That it has been
inspired by a high sense of patriotism we do not doubt.
But we cannot believe either that it is in Italy's true
interests, or that it is worthy of the great part which
Italy is called upon to play in the Councils of the Nations.

, [Initialed] A. J. B.
Paris

24. 4. 19

DOCUMENT 38.

Famous public statement of President Wilson
April 23, on the Italian settlement, which nearly
disrupted the Peace Conference.

STATEMENT IN RE ADRIATIC.

April 23.

In view of the capital importance of the questions
affected, and in order to throw ,all possible light upon
what is involved in their settlement, I hope that the
following statement will contribute to the final formation
of opinion and to a satisfactory solution.

When Italy entered the war she entered upon the basis
of a definite, but private, understanding with Great
Britain and France, now known as the Pact of London.
Since that time the whole face of circumstance has been
altered. Many other powers, great and small, have
entered the struggle, with no knowledge of that private
understanding. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, then
the enemy, of Europe, and at whose expense the Pact of
London was to be kept in the event of victory, has gone
to pieces and no longer exists. Not only that. The
several parts of that Empire, it is now agreed by Italy and
all her associates, are to be erected into independent states
and associated in a League of Nations, not with those who
were recently our enemies, but with Italy herself and the
powers that stood with Italy in the great war for liberty.
We are to establish their liberty as well as our own. They
are to be among the smaller states whose interests are
henceforth to be as scrupulously safeguarded as the
interests of the most powerful states.

The war was ended, moreover, by proposing to Germany
an armistice and peace which should be founded on

287

288 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

certain clearly defined principles which should set up a
new order of right and justice. Upon those principles the
peace with Germany has been conceived, not only, but
formulated. Upon those principles it will be executed.
We cannot ask the great body of powers to propose and
effect peace with Austria and establish a new basis of
independence and right in the states which originally
constituted the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the
states of the Balkan group on principles of another kind.
We must apply the same principles to the settlement of
Europe in those quarters that we have applied in the
peace with Germany. It was upon the explicit avowal of
those principles that the initiative for peace was taken.
It is upon them that the whole structure of peace must
rest.

If those principles are to be adhered to, Fiume must
serve as the outlet and inlet of the commerce, not of
Italy, but of the lands to the north and northeast of that
port: Hungary, Bohemia, Roumania, and the states of the
new Jugo-Slavic group. To assign Fiume to Italy would
be to create the feeling that we had deliberately put the
port upon which all these countries chiefly depend for
their access to the Mediterranean in the hands of a power
of which it did not form an integral part and whose
sovereignty, if set up there, must inevitably seem foreign,
not domestic or identified with the commercial and in-
dustrial life of the regions which the port must serve. It
is for that reason, no doubt, that Fiume was not included
in the Pact of London but there definitively assigned to
the Croatians.

And the reason why the line of the Pact of London
swept about many of the islands of the eastern coast_pj:
the Adriatic and around the portion of the Dalmatian
coast which lies most open to that sea was not only that
here and there on those islands and here and there on that
coast there are bodies of people of Italian blood and con-
nection but also, and no doubt chiefly, because it was
felt that it was necessary for Italy to have a foothold
amidst the channels of the eastern Adriatic in order that
she might make her own coasts safe against the naval

WILSON'S PUBLIC STATEMENT OF APRIL 23 289

aggression of Austria-Hungary. But Austria-Hungary
no longer exists. It is proposed that the fortifications
which the Austrian government constructed there shall
be razed and permanently destroyed. It is part, also,
of the new plan of European order which centres in the
League of Nations that the new states erected there shall
accept a limitation of armaments which puts aggression
out of the question. There can be no fear of the unfair
treatment of groups of Italian people there because
adequate guarantees will be given, under international
sanction, of equal and equitable treatment of all racial or
national minorities.

In brief, every question associated with this settlement
wears a new aspect, — & new aspect given it by the very
victory for right for which Italy has made the supreme
sacrifice of blood and treasure. Italy, along with the
four other great powers, has become one of the chief
trustees of the new order which she has played so honour-
able a part in establishing.

And on the north and northeast her natural frontiers
are completely restored, along the whole sweep of the
Alps from northwest to southeast to the very end of the
Istrian peninsula, including all the great watershed
within which Trieste and Pola lie and all the fair regions
whose face nature has turned towards the great peninsula
upon which the historic life of the Latin people has been
worked out through centuries of famous story ever since
Rome was first set upon her seven hills. Her ancient
unity is restored. Her lines are extended to the great
walls which are her natural defence. It is within her
choice to be surrounded by friends; to exhibit to the
newly liberated peoples across the Adriatic that noblest
quality of greatness, magnanimity, friendly generosity,
the preference of justice over interest.

The nations associated with her, the nations that
know nothing of the Pact of London or of any other special
understanding that lies at the beginning of this great
struggle, and who have made their supreme sacrifice
also in the interest, not of national advantage or defence,
but of the settled peace of the world, now unite with her

290 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

older associates in urging her to assume a leadership which
cannot be mistaken in the new order of Europe. America
is Italy's friend. Her people are drawn, millions strong,
from Italy's own fair countrysides. She is linked in
blood as well as in affection with the Italian people.
Such ties can never be broken. And America was
privileged, by the generous commission of her associates
in the war, to initiate the peace we are about to con-
summate,— to initiate it upon terms she had herself
formulated, and in which I was her spokesman. The
compulsion is upon her to square every decision she takes
a part in with those principles. She can do nothing else.
She trusts Italy, and in her trust believes that Italy will
ask nothing of her that cannot be made unmistakably
consistent with these sacred obligations. Interest is not
now in question, but the rights of peoples, of states new
and old, of liberated peoples and peoples whose rulers have
never accounted them worthy of right; above all, the
right of the world to peace and to such settlements of
interest as shall make peace secure.

These, and these only, are the principles for which
America has fought. These, and these only, are the
principles upon which she can consent to make peace.
Only upon these principles, she hopes and believes, will
the people of Italy ask her to make peace.

[Signed] WOODROW WILSON.

DOCUMENT 39.
Orlando's reply to President Wilson, April 24.

ORLANDO'S STATEMENT.

April 24, 1919.

Yesterday, while the Italian Delegation was assembled
discussing an alternative proposal sent them from the
British Prime Minister for the purpose of conciliating the
opposing tendencies that had shown themselves in regard
to Italian territorial aspirations, the newspapers of Paris
published a message from the President of the United
States, Mr. Wilson, in which he expressed his own opin-
ion in reference to some of the most serious problems
that have been submitted to the judgment of the Con-
ference.

The step of making a direct appeal to the different
peoples certainly is an innovation in international inter-
course. It is not my intention to complain about it, but
I do take official notice of it so as to follow this precedent ;
inasmuch as this new system without doubt will aid in
granting the different peoples a broader participation in
international questions, and inasmuch as I have always
personally been of the opinion that such participation was
a sign of a newer era. However, if such appeals are to be
considered as being addressed to peoples outside of the
Governments that represent them, I should say almost in
opposition to their Governments, it is a great source of
regret for me to remember that this procedure, which,
up to now, has been used only against enemy Govern-
ments, is to-day for the first time being used against a
Government which has been, and has tried to be always a
loyal friend of the Great American Republic: — against
the Italian Government. I could also complain that

291

292 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

such a message, addressed to the people, has been pub-
lished at the very moment when the Allied and Associated
Powers were in the middle of negotiations with the
Italian Government, that is to say, with the very Govern-
ment whose participation had been solicited and highly
valued in numerous and serious questions which, up to
now, had been dealt with in full and intimate faith.

But above all I shall have the right to complain, if the
declarations of the presidential message signified opposi-
tion to the Italian Government and people, since in that
case it would amount to ignoring and denying the high
degree of civilization which the Italian nation has at-
tained in these forms of democratic and Liberal rule, in
which it is second to no nation on earth.

To oppose, so to speak, the Italian Government and
people, would be to admit that this great free nation could
submit to the yoke of a will other than its own, and I shall
be forced to protest vigorously against such suppositions,
unjustly offensive to my country.

I now come to the contents of the presidential message :
it is devoted entirely to showing that the Italian claims,
beyond certain limits defined in the message, violate the
principles upon which the new regime of liberty and
justice among nations must be founded. I have never
denied these principles, and President Wilson will do me
the justice to acknowledge that in the long conversations
that we have had together I have never relied on the
formal authority of a treaty by which I knew very well
that he was not bound. In these conversations I have
relied solely on the force of the reason and the justice upon
which I have always believed, and upon which I still
believe, the aspirations of Italy are solidly based. I did
not have the honor of convincing him : I regret it sincerely,
but President Wilson himself has had the kindness to
recognize, in the course of our conversations, that truth
and justice are the monopoly of no one person, and that
all men are subject to error, and I add that the error is all
the easier as the problems to which the principles apply
are more complex. Humanity is such an immense thing,
the problems raised by the life of the people are so in-

ORLANDO'S REPLY TO WILSON, APRIL 24 293

finitely complex, that nobody can believe that he has
found in a determined number of proposals as simple and
sure a way to solve them as if it were a question of deter-
mining the dimensions, the volume and the weight of
bodies with various units of measure. While remarking
that more than once the Conference nearly failed com-
pletely when it was a question of applying these principles
I do not believe that I am showing disrespect toward this
high assembly. On the contrary, these changes have
been and still are, the consequence of all human judgment.
I mean to say only, that experience has proved the
difficulties in the application of these principles of an
abstract nature to concrete cases, thus with all deference
but firmly, I consider as justified, the application made by
President Wilson in his message of his principles to
Italian claims. It is impossible for me, in a document of
this sort, to repeat the detailed proofs which were pro-
duced in great number. I shall only say, one cannot
accept without reservation the statement that the down-
fall of the Austria-Hungarian Empire implies a reduction
of the Italian aspirations. It is even permissible to
believe the contrary, that is, that at the very moment
when all the varied peoples who constituted that empire
sought to organize according to their ethnic and national
affinities, the essential problem caused by the Italian claims
can and must be completely solved. Now this problem is
that of the Adriatic in which is summed up all the rights
of both the ancient and the new Italy, all her sufferings
throughout the centuries and all the benefits she is
destined to bring to the great international community.

The Presidential message affirms that with the con-
cessions which she has received, Italy would attain the
walls of the Alps, which are her natural defences. This is
a grant of vast importance upon condition that the
eastern flank of that wall does not remain uncovered and
that there be included among the rights of Italy that
line from Mount Neveso separating the waters which
flow toward the Black Sea from those which empty into
the Mediterranean. It is this mountain which the Romans
themselves have called the "Limes Italianus" since the

294 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

very hour when the real figure of Italy appeared to the
sentiment and the conscience of the people.

Without that protection a dangerous breach would
remain open in that admirable natural barrier of the
Alps; and it would mean the rupture of that unques-
tionable political, historical and economic unity consti-
tuted by the peninsula of Istria.

I believe, moreover, that he who can proudly claim
that it was he who stated to the world the free right of
self-determination of nations, is the very person who
must recognize this right for Fiume, ancient Italian city,
which proclaimed its Italianness even before the Italian
ships were near; to Fiume, admirable example of a
national consciousness perpetuated throughout the cen-
turies. To deny it this right for the sole reason that it
has to do only with a small community, would be to
admit that the criterium of justice toward nations varies
according to their territorial expansion. And if, to deny
this right, we fall back on the international character
of this port, must we not take into account Antwerp,
Genoa, Rotterdam, — all of them international ports which
serve as outlet for a variety of nations and regions without
their being obliged to pay dearly for this privilege by the
suppression of their national consciousness?

And can one describe as excessive the Italian aspiration
for the Dalmatian Coast, this boulevard of Italy through-
out the centuries, which Roman genius and Venetian
activity have made noble and great, and whose Italian-
ness, defying all manner of implacable persecution through-
out an entire century, to-day shares with the Italian
nation the same emotions of patriotism? — The principle
is being adduced with regard to Poland that denationaliza-
tion obtained by violent and arbitrary methods should
not constitute grounds for de jure claims; why not apply
the same principle to Dalmatia?

And if we wish to support this rapid synthesis of our
good international rights by cold statistical facts, I
believe I am able to state that among the various na-
tional reorganizations which the Peace Conference has
already brought about or may bring about in the future,

ORLANDO'S REPLY TO WILSON, APRIL 24 295

none of these reorganized peoples will count within its new
frontiers a number of people of a foreign race propor-
tionately less than that which would be assigned to Italy.
Why, therefore, is it especially the Italian aspirations
that are to be suspected of Imperialistic cupidity?

In spite of all these reasons, the history of these nego-
tiations shall demonstrate that the firmness which was
necessary to the Italian Delegation was always associated
to a great spirit of conciliation in the research for a general
agreement that we all wished for fervently.

The Presidential message ends by a warm declaration of
friendship of America towards Italy. I answer in the
name of Italian people and I acclaim with pride this
right and this honor which is due me as the man who in
the most tragic hour of this war has uttered to the Italian
people the cry of resistance at all costs; this cry was
listened to and answered with a courage and abnegation of
which few examples can be found in the history of the
world. And Italy, thanks to the most heroic sacrifices
and the purest blood of her children, has been able to
climb from an abyss of misfortune to the radiant summit
of the most resounding victory. It is therefore, in the
name of Italy, that in my turn I express the sentiment of
admiration and deep sympathy that the Italian people
has for the American people.

[Signed] V. E. ORLANDO.
Paris, April 24, 1919.

DOCUMENT 40.

Memorandum of May 8 for Adriatic settle-
ment through plebiscites and the development of
a new port for the Jugo-Slavs (Buccari) to take
the place of Fiume. Presented by the Chief of
Boundary Geography, Douglas W. Johnson, to
President Wilson and by him laid before the
Council of Four (carbon copy).

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Paris, May 8, 1919.

From: Chief of Division of Boundary Geography.
To: The Commissioners.
Subject: Formula for Adriatic Settlement.
Referring to Ambassador Page's telegram of May 5
suggesting construction of a Jugoslav port at Buccari
in order that Fiume might eventually be ceded to Italy
without injury to the economic life of Jugoslavia, atten-
tion is directed to the accompanying formula which
might offer to the Italian plenipotentiaries a means of
emerging from a difficult situation without humiliating
the Italian people. Adoption of the formula would result
in the solution supported by the American territorial
specialists and proposed by the President in his public
memorandum of April 22nd, and hence is not a com-
promise solution; but the ends sought would be attained
without needlessly wounding Italian sensibilities.

The following comments will make clear the intent of
the formula:

Paragraph 1. If Italy is to receive all of German
Tyrol south of the Brenner watershed, as seems to be
implied in the President's published memorandum, the
addition of this small but strategically important
gateway into Italy would not appreciably increase the

296

MEMORANDUM OF MAY 8 FOR ADRIATIC SETTLEMENT 297

injury done to German sentiment in the Tyrol, and
would materially strengthen Italy's northern frontier.

Paragraph 2. In an earlier memorandum the Amer-
ican specialists have already recommended assigning
the Tarvis district to Italy on condition that Fiume
goes to Jugoslavia, and have set forth the considerations
which make this desirable from the point of view of
the central European countries. Possession of Tarvis
would favor Italy's scheme for a Predil Pass railway
and give her a better natural frontier on the Carnic
Alps-Karawanken Mountains crest.

Paragraphs 3 and 4. The area shaded blue, between
the line recommended by the American specialists
and the extreme Italian claims' line, is solidly Jugoslav,
is attached economically to Jugoslavia, and would un-
doubtedly vote for union with the Jugoslav State. The
Jugoslavs accept in principle decision by plebiscite, and
while the Slavs west of the recommended frontier, who
for economic and geographic reasons are not permitted
a vote, may object to this discrimination, the Jugoslavs
in general would not strongly contest a solution which
would give them the area in question. The Italian
Government should find satisfaction in a solution which
granted part of their claim immediately and which
merely postponed final decision for a few months as
regards the remainder; and the Italian people, their
passions cooled, would find it difficult to press their
case in face of a decision of the population in question
to become Jugoslav.

Paragraph 5. A plebiscite in Fiume would, in the
opinion of competent observers, show a majority in
favor of Jugoslav sovereignty for economic reasons
under present economic conditions. It may be re-
garded as certain that when asked to choose between
Jugoslav sovereignty on the one hand, and on the
other Italian sovereignty after a rival port has been
built at Buccari, even the Italians of Fiume (about
50 per cent, of the population) must in their own in-
terest vote in large numbers for Jugoslav sovereignty;
the total vote in this sense would presumably be an

298 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

overwhelming majority. Thus the provisions of para-
graph (b) would never be called into operation. Even
if they were, the practical impossibility of constructing
an adequate port at Buccari would be forced upon the
Italian Government as soon as it began to study the
problem and to count the cost. The government's
decision to abandon the project would come when
passions were less aroused, and the artificially stimu-
lated campaign for Fiume had subsided. Since Italy
claims that Fiume has already manifested its unanimous
desire to be Italian, and also claims that Buccari can
• serve Jugoslavia as well as Fiume, the formula is fair
v to the Italian claims.

Paragraph 6. Lussin and adjacent islands are
Italian in population, and while they dominate the
entrances to the Gulf of Fiume, under the League of
Nations such a condition may not be so serious as to
prevent giving the islands to Italy if such concession is
deemed necessary in order to secure a proper solution
of the much more important Fiume and Dalmatian
questions. Lissa has already been tentatively offered
; to Italy. The Pelagosa group could be given to Italy
without appreciable injury to Jugoslavia.

Paragraph 7. There are objections to making Zara
a free city, but these may be overbalanced by the ad-
vantages of making a concession to Italian sentiment at
V this point, provided the town alone is involved. If the
area were enlarged to include the commune of Zara, a
Jugoslav majority would be included.

Paragraph 8. A plebiscite in the Dalmatian coast
and islands will give that area to Jugoslavia by an over-
/ whelming majority. The area should vote as a whole,
to avoid difficulties due to possible small Italian en-
claves. The islands of Pago and Cherso, included in
the Treaty of London line, are omitted from the pro-
posed plebiscite area. The Italians have themselves
suggested relinquishing their claim to Pago. Cherso,
partly Italian in population, would together with its
territorial waters practically close Fiume's two best
outlets to the Adriatic; it may therefore be wise to

MEMORANDUM OF MAY 8 FOR ADRIATIC SETTLEMENT 299

avoid complications which might result in the improb-
able event that a majority on this island should vote
for Italian sovereignty. The chief value of the pleb-
iscite would lie in the fact that it is a popular decision
which the Italian people might be induced to accept
in view of their claim that the majority of the popula-
tion not only speaks Italian but is attached to Italy by
cultural and economic bonds ; and that it is a postponed
decision which would materialize only after the present
excitement in Italy had abated.

Paragraphs 9 and 10. Here may be inserted such
provisions for an Italian mandate in Albania, Abyssinia
or elsewhere as may be deemed wise.

NOTE.

The attached formula has been examined by the terri-
torial specialists concerned with the Fiume and Dalmatian
problems (the Chiefs of the Italian Division, Balkan
Division, Division of Economics, Division of Boundary
Geography, and Chief Territorial Specialist, — the Chief
of the Austro-Hungarian Division, being absent) and
has their unanimous approval.

SUGGESTED FORMULA
FOR ADRIATIC SETTLEMENT.

WITH PRESIDENT'S RECOMMENDATION.

1. Italy to receive the Sexten Valley (shaded green
on accompanying map), a strategic gateway into north-
ern Italy (not included in Treaty of London) .

2. Italy to receive the Tarvis district (shaded green
on map), a railway junction of much strategic and
commercial importance (not included in Treaty of
London).

3. Italy to receive the natural geographic frontier
in Julian Venetia shown by heavy black line on the
accompanying map.

4. Italian troops to be immediately withdrawn from
areas east of this line. A plebiscite to be held within
a period to be fixed by the League of Nations, and under
appropriate safeguards, to determine whether the area

300 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

shaded blue on the accompanying map shall belong to
Italy or to Jugo-Slavia.

5. Italian troops to be immediately withdrawn from
the vicinity and city of Fiume, which shall be ad-
ministered, within the Jugo-Slav customs regime, by
the League of Nations until its future status is de-
termined. The city and district of Fiume, together with
its moles, docks, basins and other port instrumentalities,
to be ceded to Italy when and if the following conditions
are fulfilled:

(a) By a plebiscite held within a period to be
fixed by the League of Nations, and under appropriate
safeguards, the city and district of Fiume by a
majority of all votes cast manifests its desire to be
annexed to Italy under condition that and as soon as
the provisions in (b) have been satisfied.

(b) Within six months after the plebiscite pro-
vided in (a) has been held, and in case this plebiscite
results favorably to the annexation of Fiume to
Italy under the conditions specified, Italy shall
proceed to the construction in and about the bay of
Buccari of all the port works, including moles, docks,
basins, warehouses, office-buildings, railway tracks
and all other port instrumentalities, necessary to
provide for Jugo-Slavia and neighboring states a
port whose facilities and possibilities of future
development shall not be inferior to those of the pres-
ent port of Fiume; and shall construct rail connections
between the new port and the Fiume-Agram and
Fiume-Laibach railways not inferior to the existing
rail connections between Fiume and the interior.
Construction shall proceed under the supervision of
an international commission of experts appointed
by majority vote of the Council of the League of
Nations, which shall certify that the port works,
when completed, are not inferior to the present port
of Fiume in facilities, possibilities of future develop-
ment, and rail connections with the interior. The
works to be completed within a period to be deter-
mined by majority vote of the Council of the League

MEMORANDUM OF MAY 8 FOR ADRIATIC SETTLEMENT 301

of Nations, and to be transferred without encum-
brance to Jugo-Slavia under such conditions as to
free port provisions as the Council of the League of
Nations may by majority vote determine.

(c) Italy shall assure in perpetuity, to all nations
concerned, the free and unhampered transit across
the city and district of Fiume of persons and goods en
route between points outside the territory of said
city and district. (None of the territory to be
ceded to Italy in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5 was promised to Italy by the Treaty of
London.)

In case any of the above conditions remain un-
fulfilled at the end of a period to be fixed by majority
vote of the Council of the League of Nations, Fiume
shall be transferrecf to Jugo-Slav sovereignty with
such restrictions as to free port provisions as the
Council of the League of Nations may by majority
vote determine.

6. Italy to receive the islands of Lussin, Unie,
Sansego, Asinella, Lissa and its adjacent islets including
Busi and San Andrea, and the Pelagosa group (Pelagosa
Grande, Pelagosa Piccola, Cajola, and immediately
adjacent islets), (enclosed in green circles on ac-
companying map).

7. The town of Zara to be made a free city.

8. Italy to relinquish claim to, and immediately
withdraw all troops from, those parts of the Istrian
and Dalmatian islands and the Dalmatian mainland
not mentioned in paragraphs 6 and 7.1

(// further concessions to Italian sentiment are

considered essential:

Change paragraph 8 to read:

8. Italian troops to be immediately withdrawn from
all parts of the Istrian and Dalmatian islands and
Dalmatian mainland not mentioned in paragraphs 6
and 7. A plebiscite to be held within a period of one
year from date of this Treaty, under appropriate safe-

indicated by rule m margin were ringed in the original document by
President Wilson.

302 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

guards, [prescribed by a majority of the Council of the
League of Nations]1 to determine whether the area
shaded red on the accompanying map shall, as a whole,
belong to Italy or to Jugo-Slavia).

9. Italy to receive Valona and a sufficient hinterland
for its defense.

10. Italy to receive mandatories in such regions as
may be agreed upon, and to be assured such equitable
economic safeguards as are justifiable in view of her
special situation.2

(See next page for 11, added after conference with
Trumbitch, and 12, added tentatively by me (Professor
Johnson) to sound the President on this point).

11. The entire east Adriatic coast, from the former
Austro-Italian frontier to the northern frontier of
Albania, to be neutralized under the League of Nations.
No fortresses to be allowed on any part of the coast,
and no war vessels of any kind to be permitted in the
waters bordering this coast. This provision to be
accompanied by guarantees for the free passage of
Jugo-Slav merchant vessels through the southern
Adriatic and Straits of Otranto, even in time of war.

(If further concessions to Italian sentiment are
necessary, change first sentence to read: "The
entire Jugo-Slav coast to be neutralized").

The effect of this provision would be to render a
Jugo-Slav navy impossible, and to give to Italy
absolute control of the Adriatic Sea. On the other
hand, the Jugo-Slavs would have the protection of
the League of Nations against any attack by sea.

12. The American government, as an evidence of its
friendship for Italy, engages to loan to Italy, on favor-
able terms, all funds received by the American govern-
ment by virtue of the terms of the Treaty of Peace with
Germany.

Handwritten notation by President Wilson.

Paragraphs indicated by rule in margin were ringed in the original document by
President Wilson.

DOCUMENT 41.

Balfour's memorandum of May 17, on the "Prob-
lem of Italy and Turkey in Anatolia" (mimeo-
graph).

Mr. Balfour's Statement Regarding the Problem of Italy
and Turkey in Anatolia, Dated May 16, 1919, and At-
tached as an Appendix to the Minutes of the Council of
Four, May 17, 1919.

The scheme provisionally accepted on Wednesday last
at a meeting of the "Three", contemplates the final
destruction of the Turkish State. This is already con-
demned, and I think rightly, to the loss of its European
possessions, its Arab-speaking population, and Armenia.
It is therefore in any case reduced, as far as the area of its
Empire is concerned, to a mere fraction of its former self;
this fraction, however, we originally proposed to preserve,
thus leaving to the Sultan that great block of Anatolia
lying west of the meridian of Constantinople, which is not
merely inhabited by a population the vast majority of
whom are Turks, but which contains within its boundaries
most of the Turkish race. For this scheme has now been
substituted one which cuts this region into two separate
states, with different capitals, different sovereigns and
different mandatories.

I look with much misgiving at this proposal. It will
not only deeply shock large sections of Mohammedan
opinion, but I think it will also be made the subject of a
great deal of very unfavourable Christian commentary.
We are all most anxious to avoid as far as possible placing
reluctant populations under alien rule; but ought we not
to be quite as careful to avoid the opposite fault? Is it
a greater crime to join together those who wish to be
separated than to divide those who wish to be united?

303

804 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

And if the Anatolian Turks say they desire to remain a
single people under a single sovereign, to what principle
are we going to make appeal when we refuse to grant their
request?

I think we must admit that no such scheme would ever
have been thought of, if it had not been necessary to find
some method of satisfying Italian ambitions. Unfor-
tunately, this necessity haunts and hampers every step in
our diplomacy. The Italians, armed with the Treaty of
London, and supported by a passionate public opinion,
will never be content with fragments of Tyrolese and
Jugo-Slav territory in Europe; with French and British
Colonial concessions in Africa, and with the Caucasus in
the Middle East. We have also to find something for
them out of the Turkish Empire in Asia Minor. Now I
believe there are only two kinds of scheme possible by
which the latter operation can be accomplished; — the
scheme of partition advocated by the "Three", and the
scheme which I ventured to lay before them. This last
has not, perhaps, in all respects, been very clearly under-
stood; which is not surprising, for it was very hastily
written, and not very fully explained. But the matter is
so important that I may be permitted to return to it.

Under my scheme Turkey remained an undivided
State without a Mandatory. Its status was substantially
that of the historic Turkish Empire. Its territories were,
indeed, much diminished; it could no longer count as a
Great Power; but in other respects the Sultan would
reign at Brussa or Konia as his predecessors had formerly
reigned at Constantinople.

Now it must be remembered that even at Constantinople
representatives of the Western Powers had special
positions in his administration, justified, and, indeed,
rendered necessary for various well-known reasons. The
public debt, the customs, and in some cases the police,
were under the control or supervision of foreign advisers.
This system I do not propose to alter, but rather to per-
fect. The Turks are familiar with it, up to a certain
point they welcome it, and they do not deem it incon-
sistent with their unity or their independence.

BALFOUR ON ITALY AND TURKEY IN ANATOLIA 305

The alternative scheme, which found favour on Wednes-
day, destroys both; for it cuts Turkey into two halves;
and puts each half under a separate Mandatory. What
are its compensating advantages? It is said, in the first
place, that it avoids the evils of a Condominium. A
Condominium, we are told, is never a success; it is slow
moving, ineffectual and the occasion of endless friction
between the controlling Powers; — a friction so acute as
even to endanger the peace of the world.

But the plan I propose is not a Condominium. A
Condominium, as I understand it, is the joint Government
of a single State by many Powers acting collectively.
Under such a system, the Powers first agree upon a
policy, and then impose it upon the subordinate State.
They control, actually or potentially, the whole ad-
ministration. If they differ, the administrative machin-
ery stands still. If their differences are due to their
being moved by inconsistent interests, they may be-
come acute and even dangerous. The subordinate Gov-
ernment is perpetually tempted to play one off against
the other, and the whole country becomes the theatre
of rival intrigues. Everybody quarrels, and nothing is
done.

Now nobody will pretend that the Constantinople
Government was a good one, but it was not as bad as all
this. There were, of course, endless intrigues, political
and financial. There was a perpetual struggle to obtain
influence with the Sultan and his Ministers. There was
much corruption; there was much mal-administration.
But it was never a Condominium. The Sultan appointed
his ministers; he appointed the Governors of his Prov-
inces; he raised and commanded the Army; he directed
the foreign policy of his country, and was in these and
all other important respects, an independent sovereign.
Certain branches of his administration were no doubt
controlled, not by a foreign Condominium, but by foreign-
ers. He remained, nevertheless, in quite a different po-
sition from that which he would have held either under
a Condominium or under a Mandatory.

Another objection raised against my scheme is that it

306 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

gives special privileges to Italy in the southern part of the
Turkish state. This is quite true, and of course I should
greatly prefer that it were otherwise. But inasmuch as
the whole plan is primarily devised in order to do some-
thing to satisfy Italian appetites, that is, I am afraid,
inevitable. From an administrative point of view, the
scheme would no doubt be much better if the Italians
played no part in it. I freely admit it — but I submit
that the argument is irrelevant. The Italians must
somehow be mollified, and the only question is how to
mollify them at the smallest cost to mankind.

Then it is said that to give the Italians a first claim to
concessions in any district is to violate the principle of
equal opportunities for all nations. Again, I am not
prepared to deny the charge. My whole object is to
give the Italians something which they will really like,
and it seems that they have a great liking for concessions.
I remember, when the Marquis Imperiali was comparing
the advantages which the French would get out of
Cilicia with the advantages which Italy was likely to get
out of her share of Asia Minor, he was wont to dwell
upon the wonders of a certain copper mine, which he
said, I am sure quite truly, was to be found somewhere
in the French zone. In the same way, I observe that
Baron Sonnino's eyes are lovingly fixed upon a very
indifferent coal mine on the Southern shores of the Black
Sea. Personally, I regard these hopes and expectations
with considerable scepticism. I doubt the existence of
these hidden riches in Southern Anatolia. Even if they
exist, I doubt whether their exploitation is going to make
Italy rich; and I have a strong suspicion that even if
these industrial enterprises are started under Italian
patronage, they will be found after no great lapse of time
to be under German management. But all this does not
seem to me to be to the point. The object is to find some
privileged position for the Italians in Southern Anatolia;
7 and I particularly beg the "Three" to remember that she
has already got the germs of such a position by a pre-war
arrangement which she made with the Turks, in respect
of the region neighbouring on Adalia. My suggestion

BALFOUR ON ITALY AND TURKEY IN ANATOLIA 307

only extends and emphasises her privileges. It does not
create them.

In any case, as Italy is not, under my plan, intended
to occupy the position of a Mandatory in these regions,
the general principle — that no Mandatory has a right to
exceptional trade advantages in the country which it
controls — is not violated. The only difference that I can
see between what would happen under my plan, and what
would happen if nothing were done for the Italians in
Asia Minor, is that in the first case Italy would without
question or controversy have the refusal of all concessions
within a certain area: in the second case these concessions
will be scrambled for at Brussa by the rival company-
mongers of every country under Heaven, supported, no
doubt, by their respective Ministers. The first plan may
be an infringement upon the liberty and equality, nomi-
nally at least, secured by the second; but I do not know
that these most excellent things are seen to the best ad-
vantage when they are enjoyed by corrupt administrators
and greedy speculators.

But once again, this is relatively unimportant compared
with the main objects of the scheme I am endeavouring
to support. This is designed to do two things : to maintain
something resembling an independent Turkish Govern-
ment, ruling over a homogeneous Turkish population; the
other is to find a position for the Italians within this
Turkish state which will make a sufficient appeal to the
ambitions of the Italian Government. From every other
point of view the plan is, I admit, a bad one; but from this
point of view — which is the one at the moment chiefly
occupying our thoughts — I still think it worthy of serious
consideration.

[Initialed] A. J. B.

PART VII
THE JAPANESE CRISIS

DOCUMENT 42.

Memorandum by Mr. Balfour of his conversa-
tion with the Japanese Delegates presented to
the Council of Four, April 28, with important
letter of Mr. Balfour to Baron Makino of the
same date in which the relationship of the Shan-
tung settlement to Japanese acceptance of the
League of Nations is set forth (mimeograph).

APPENDIX VI.

The result of my conversations with the Japanese may,
I think, be summarized somewhat as follows: —

In the first place, the Japanese strenuously deny
either that they intended to modify in their own favour
the conditions which the Germans had imposed upon the
Chinese in connection with the Shantung Peninsula, or
that, in fact, their treaties with China would have had
that effect.

They say, on the contrary, that they propose sur-
rendering all military control over the Peninsula, in-
cluding the 50-kilometre zone around Kiaochow within
which German troops were allowed but not Chinese, and
all interference with the civil administration of the terri-
tory. Their intention is fully to restore Chinese sover-
eignty within the leased territory.

The provisions that appear in the Treaty of 1918, with
regard to maintaining a garrison at Tsinan and guarding
the railway with Japanese troops, are purely provisional,
and refer only to the period of transition immediately
following peace, and this period it is their intention to
make as short as possible. No date was named, how-
ever, for the determination of this transitory arrangement.

In these circumstances, the German rights which the

311

312 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Japanese propose still to retain are economic in their
character. They consist in: —

1. A right to claim a concession at Tsingtau, which,
however, does not exclude, and was not intended to ex-
clude, the right also for other countries to organize an
international concession, if that is desired;

2. The German rights in the railways already built,
and the mines associated with them. The railways are
built on land which is in full Chinese sovereignty, and
subject to Chinese law.

3. Concessions granted to the Germans for building
two other railways. These railways are to be built with
Japanese capital, and the Japanese capitalists are at this
moment negotiating with the Chinese Government as to
the terms on which the necessary money will be provided.
The Chinese Government will be able to secure the same
position in regard to these railways as it has over other
railways constructed by foreign capital.

The Japanese Plenipotentiaries, for reasons of na-
tional dignity which are easy to understand, are unwilling
to modify the letter of the treaties which they have made
with China, but they are ready (if I understand them
rightly) to give explicit and binding assurances —

(a) That any concession which China gives them at
Tsingtau will not exclude other foreign enterprise from
the Port.

(b) That the economic control of the railway, which
the possession of the majority of the shares gives them
will not be used in any way to discriminate between the
trade facilities of different nations.

April 27th, 1919.

APPENDIX VII.

April 28th, 1919.
DEAR BARON MAKING,

Through no fault of mine, there has, I fear, been some
misunderstanding with regard to to-day's Meeting, and
the business of Shantung in which you are particularly
interested.

BALFOUR ON JAPANESE SETTLEMENTS 318

I was not myself present at the Meeting until I ac-
cidentally heard that the question of Shantung was de-
ferred until to-morrow, when they propose asking you
to give them the honor of your presence. As soon as I
heard of this decision I went over to President Wilson's
house, and again explained that you thought it due to
you to have the Shantung question settled one way or the
other before the discussion on the League of Nations came
on this afternoon at the Plenary Conference. It was
unfortunately then much too late to ask you to discuss
the matter with your colleagues from America, France,
and England. But after hearing what I had to say in
supplement of the paper which I read to you yesterday,
I was authorized to tell you that if — which they did not
doubt — the view which I represented to them as being
yours was held by you, they were quite satisfied as regards
the permanent arrangements come to between Japan and
China on the question of Shantung. The essence of these
arrangements, as I repeated to them, is that after German
rights have been ceded to Japan, Japan will hand back to
China the whole of the leased territory in complete sover-
eignty; that the only rights which Japan will retain are the
economic rights enumerated in my memorandum; and
that Japan proposes to take every precaution to prevent
undue discrimination in matters of railway rates, or
port and harbour dues, or other cognate matters between
nation and nation; in fact, that the policy of the open door
should be fully carried out in the spirit as in the letter.

The only points on which your colleagues expressed
anxiety were the temporary arrangements with regard to
guarding the line and garrisoning Tsinan. These, as they
pointed out, were not merely interferences with Chinese
sovereignty, but interferences in excess of anything which
the Germans could claim under their Shantung arrange-
ments. They hoped you would consent to discuss this
relatively unimportant aspect of the Shantung problem
to-morrow at 11 o'clock. They quite recognize, and
greatly regret, the inconvenience to which you may have
been put owing to the fact that the Plenary Conference
will, under this arrangement, precede the Shantung dis-

314 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

cussion; but they hoped that, inasmuch as the main doubts
and difficulties connected with the surrender of the
German lease appear to be already satisfactorily disposed
of, you will forgive the inevitable postponement of con-
versations upon the purely temporary arrangement which
still in their view seem to raise questions of difficulty.

Yours, &c.
(Initialed) A. J. B.

DOCUMENT 43.

Statement, April 30, of President Wilson re-
garding the Shantung settlement, the substance
of which, but not the text, was given to the press
on the same day: also cabled to Mr. Tumulty
(typewritten original.)

Paris, 30 April, 1919.

The Japanese-Chinese matter has been settled in a way
which seems to me as satisfactory as could be got out of the
tangle of treaties in which China herself was involved, and
it is important that the exact facts should be known. I
therefore send you the following for public use at such time
as the matter may come under public discussion. In the
treaty all the rights at Kiao-Chau and in Shantung Prov-
ince belonging to Germany are to be transferred without
reservation to Japan, but Japan voluntarily engages, in
answer to questions put in conference, that it will be her
immediate policy "to hand back the Shantung Peninsula
in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic
privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish
a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao.
Owners of the railway will use special police only to insure
security for traffic. They will be used for no other pur-
pose. The police force will be composed of Chinese, and
such Japanese instructors as the directors of the railway
may select will be appointed by the Chinese Government. "
It was understood in addition that inasmuch as the sov-
ereign rights receded to China were to be unqualified, all
Japanese troops remaining on the peninsula should be
withdrawn at the earliest possible time. Japan thus gets
only such rights as an economic concessionaire as are
possessed by one or two other great powers and are only
too common in China, and the whole future relationship
between the two countries falls at once under the guar-

315

310 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

antee of the League of Nations of territorial integrity and
political independence. I find a general disposition to
look with favor upon the proposal that at an early date
through the mediation of the League of Nations all
extraordinary foreign rights in China and all spheres of
influence should be abrogated by the common consent of
all the nations concerned. I regard the assurances given
by Japan as very satisfactory in view of the complicated
circumstances. Please do not give out any of the above as
a quotation from me, but use it in some other form for
public information at the right time.

WOODROW WILSON.

PART VIII
THE ECONOMIC SETTLEMENTS

DOCUMENT 44.

Cablegram, November 21, 1918, William G.
McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, to Oscar T.
Crosby, United States financial representative
in London (typewritten copy) regarding policies
of continued financial and economic cooperation :
with letter of transmittal to President Wilson
from Secretary McAdoo, November 22, 1918.
(autographed original) .

November 22, 1918.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I enclose a copy of a cable which I have sent Mr.
Crosby to guide him in his discussions with the Treasuries
of the Allied Governments. I shall be glad if you will look
over this cable and let me know if you wish further instruc-
tions sent to Mr. Crosby in regard to these questions.

Cordially yours,

THE PRESIDENT. [SiVne® W' G' ^DOO.

The White House.
Enclosure 1.

COPY
By F. J.

Compared SPECIAL GREEN

Charge to Treasury Department Novem^ 21, 1918.
AMEMBASSY,

London.

For Crosby from McAdoo. Treasury 576.
Embassy's 5620 from Paris October 29 midnight. Your

319

320 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

634. Embassy's 5662 from Paris November 1, 12 p.m.
Your 644. Embassy's 5830 from Paris November 13,
1 p.m. Your 666.

First. The outstanding contracts in United States of
Allied Governments are being compiled. Indications are
they will not reach very heavy total and that they will be
substantially reduced by cancellations.

Second. Regard it as unlikely that Allied Govern-
ments will desire to make further additional purchases
here for strictly military purposes to any important
amount but their applications for new purchases will be
strictly scrutinized. Our loans for war purposes should
rapidly diminish and soon cease. Loans to some countries
for food may have to continue as a war measure until
declaration of peace.

Third. Have no authority to make advances for re-
construction or other after-the-war purposes but expect
to ask authority to establish credits after peace for limited
period and to limited amounts so as to be able to furnish
credits for some of Allied Governments who for a time
after peace is declared would not be in a position to pur-
chase except on credit certain of our commodities of
which they are in need. Such sales may aid us in
finding markets for our commodities and there may
be considerable pressure here to induce Government
to extend such aid. I feel we must be careful not to
involve our Government too deeply and must encour-
age private financing of foreign business as much as pos-
sible.

Fourth. Under existing legislation we have authority
before peace within limits of existing appropriations to
establish credits from which advances may be made to
take care of commitments made in the United States by
Allied Governments in order that supplies they require for
prosecution of the war should go forward in an orderly
manner. I propose to establish such credits to the ex-
tent necessary to care for such commitments but have
given no assurances in this respect to Allied Governments
nor do I consider myself bound to make advances for
this purpose as some of Allied Governments may be in a

McADOO ON AMERICAN FINANCIAL POLICY 321

position to meet their commitments otherwise than
through borrowings from the United States.

Fifth. Our advances for purchases other than those
named in the United States should cease as soon as
possible and new commitments for neutral purchases
should not be made by any of Allied Governments in
expectation that our advances may be used to meet same.
See our 560. Assuming additional authority for credits
given by Congress then as soon after declaration of peace
as practicable, and before if possible, our loans to Allied
Governments should in general be limited to expenditures
for extraordinary replacements and not cover commodities
for general consumption.

Sixth. Approve of your indicating informally to
Allied Governments that they should notify their na-
tionals who are interested in the import of articles of
general consumption to undertake at once to make
private arrangements for their purchases and to state
that a policy of retrenchment in the Government's loans
from the United States must be contemplated as a con-
sequence of the armistice. The views above expressed
coincide with the conclusions which you indicate you have
reached as set forth in your 666. This is fortified by the
important considerations set forth in paragraph 5 of your
cable of that number.

Seventh. I would like to see all restrictions on ar-
bitrage exchange transactions removed and our ad-
vances to support exchanges discontinued. We must
however recognize that the ability of a foreign govern-
ment and its nationals to obtain commodities from us
depends on their ability to prevent their exchange go-
ing to prohibitory figures which in turn would prevent
them from utilizing our markets through private trans-
actions.

Eighth. Am interested to know that in your opinion
private assets available in allied countries if used to
maximum will suffice as basis of credit for transactions
involving private needs. While I approve of discussions
with Allied Governments on the lines that the Treasury
may not make advances to foreign governments for these

322 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

purposes, the time has not come to take final and positive
stand on the subject.

Ninth. It is obviously important that United States
should retain the utmost freedom of action in the disposal
of its resources. Am disposed to agree with your con-
clusion as to restricting the functions of inter-allied bodies
and gradually decreasing their activities and importance,
thus concentrating all important negotiations and de-
cisions in Washington. I do not think however these
considerations should cause us to ignore the advantages of
cooperation in certain situations, and I am quite willing
to consider cooperation wherever the advantages to be
derived therefrom are demonstrated.

Tenth. Determination of other branches of govern-
ment and decisions at peace conference must have im-
portant effect in determining the Treasury policies. Am
therefore unable at present to prescribe any hard-and-fast
rules, but for your guidance give you my present views in
the light of such information as I have at hand.

[Signed] W. G. McADOo.
Secretary of the Treasury.

DOCUMENT 45.

The Pork Crisis. Letter of Herbert Hoover
to President Wilson, January 8, 1919 (auto-
graphed original), regarding the refusal of Great
Britain to continue buying American food, es-
pecially pork, at war prices: with his memoran-
dum regarding plans for meeting the situation,
(typewritten original).

AMERICAN COMMISSION
TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

Paris, 8th January, 1919.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I have cablegrams this morning, copies of which are
enclosed, stating that the whole of the customary monthly
orders from the British buying organizations on behalf of
the Allied Governments have been withdrawn. I am
informed by the French and Italian officials that it is
untrue, that they have not withdrawn their share of the
orders, and I am endeavoring to restore them.

The Allied food necessities have been outlined from
time to time by a series of programmes made up by the
Inter- Allied Food Council; the latest of these programmes
is as recent as the 15th of December and calls for our
entire January surplus. Our manufacturers have pro-
vided the particular types of manufacture required by
each of these Governments and have enormous stocks
of these materials in hand ready for delivery in accordance
with the indicated programmes above mentioned.

While we can protect our assurances given producers
in many commodities, the most acute situation is in pork
products which are perishable and must be exported.
We have in January a surplus of about 400,000,000
pounds, and the French, Italian and Belgian Relief and

323

324 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

other customary orders when restored will cover 60
percent of such. The British orders, at the rate in-
dicated in their official programmes, would have been
140,000,000 pounds and covered our deficiency plus some
help I am giving from the Relief. The British position
is that they have sufficient supplies to last them for some
weeks and that they wish to reduce their stocks.

If there should be no remedy to this situation we shall
have a debacle in the American markets, and with the
advances of several hundred million dollars now out-
standing from the Banks to the pork products industry
we shall not only be precipitated into a financial crisis
but shall betray the American farmer who has engaged
himself to these ends. The surplus is so large that there
can be no absorption of it in the United States and it,
being a perishable, will go to waste.

You will recollect that measures are before the Con-
gress providing for appropriations for further economic
assistance to the Allied Governments and I am confident
that with the disclosure of this situation and the apparent
desire of certain parties in England to break the Ameri-
can market will cause a reaction in the United States
that will destroy the possibility of this economic support.
In the face of this, the demand of liberated, neutral and
enemy populations in Europe as to fats is beyond the
ability of the United States to supply, and the need from
the point of view of preserving order and laying the
foundation of peace is absolutely instant in its insistence.

Mr. Davis and I have endeavored for the last six weeks
to arrange some cooperative action with the British
agencies to forefend this situation and, as indicated above,
the final result has been the refusal on their part to co-
operate. We have suggested that the British Govern-
ment should join with ourselves in the purchase of the
necessary amounts of fats at our assured price to be resold
to the liberated and enemy territories in order to prevent
the above debacle, and in this they have finally refused.
I wish to assure you again that the prices which we are
maintaining are the very minimum on which our Ameri-
can producers can come out whole on the effort they

THE PORK CRISIS 325

have made in the Allied cause, and I cannot impress upon
you too strongly the reaction that will arise in the United
States if this situation falls to the ground.

With Mr. Davis I have prepared the attached memo-
randum which I would like to suggest should be presented
by you to the Allied Premiers at the earliest possible
moment, as I cannot conceive that men with their vision
as to the present situation will tolerate for one moment
the attitude taken.

Faithfully yours,

[Signed] HERBERT HOOVER.
His Excellency,

The President of the United States,
Paris.

MEMORANDUM FOR AGREEMENT WITH ALLIED PREMIERS,
TO COMPRISE A DIRECTION TO THEIR VARIOUS
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

It is impossible to discuss the peace of the world until
adequate measures have been taken to alleviate the fear
of hunger, its attendant anarchy and its danger of possible
further military operations. Therefore, before these
peace negotiations can be opened auspiciously, it is es-
sential to have the better feeding of the liberated, neutral
and enemy territories of Europe in actual progress as
the foundation of stability in government antecedent to
the settlement of the great problems that will come be-
fore the Conference. It is therefore agreed by the Allied
and the United States Governments that each shall, with-
out further delay, furnish every possible assistance and
facility required for carrying out the undertakings as to
European Relief, which shall be carried out in the name of
the Associated Governments.

The United States has, in order to support the Allied
Governments in war, provided large supplies of food-
stuffs, many of them perishable, which would have been
required by the Allies had hostilities continued. In
order to accumulate these supplies, the American Govern-
ment has given assurances and guarantees to their pro-

326 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ducers. The Allied Governments, as the result of the
cessation of hostilities and the opening of other markets,
no longer require the same amount of supplies from the
United States as they have from time to time indicated
by their programmes.

This surplus is now required to meet the necessities of
Europe, and it is most fortunate that the surplus is avail-
able for these purposes. It would be a disaster to the
objects of the Associated Governments if the congestion
in the United States should not be relieved so as to save
waste and to meet the assurances given by the United
States Government, and the Allied Governments agree
to at once direct their departments to cooperate with the
United States Food Administration to support these
assurances, and the application of these foodstuffs to the
needs of liberated, neutral and enemy peoples.

Pending the more mature plans and settlements of the
Relief Administration as to food, shipping and finance,
it is directed that immediate provision should be made
from any available source of food supplies for provisions
to points of acute need in the Balkan States, the liberated
peoples of Turkey, Austria, to Belgium and Poland, that
such provision shall be retroactively the obligation of the
four governments pending more definite arrangements.

It is desirable that the Associated Governments should
show their good will towards the neutral countries of
Europe by the immediate increase in the permitted im-
portation of the surplus food commodities to these
neutrals at once, being such amounts as the United
States shall declare to be in surplus.

That it is necessary to at once give evidence of progress
in the matter of food supplies to Germany and South
Europe, and to this end the British, French and United
States Governments will each at once give cabled orders
for the shipment during the month of January of 30,000
tons of such fats (in addition to their orders for home
consumption) as the United States shall declare available
for these relief purposes. These foodstuffs shall be sub-
sequently offered to Germany, subject to payment there-
for and other conditions that the Associated Governments

THE PORK CRISIS 327

may impose. That the Allied Governments and the
United States will cooperate in the securing of such pay-
ment in a manner acceptable to each of the Associated
Governments, and for providing the transportation of
such foodstuffs. Before these supplies can arrive, the
Relief Administration is expected to be working and to
decide the conditions of distribution of payment and of
further supplies and shipping.

These arrangements are declared binding upon all de-
partments of the Allied and the United States Govern-
ments and shall be given immediate execution.

DOCUMENT 46.

Letter of Herbert Hoover to President Wilson
February 4, 1919, regarding French obstruction
to plans for feeding Germany, with copy of pro-
posed resolutions, to be presented to the Council
of Ten, providing for extending food supply both
to Germany and to neutral nations (auto-
graphed original).

UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION.

Paris, 4 February, 1919.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

An error in the enclosure sent to you in my letter of
yesterday with respect to the relaxation of blockade has,
I am sorry to say, confused your mind on the matter. I
enclose herewith the resolution drafted by Mr. McCor-
mick and myself, which we are anxious to get through
the Supreme War Council. It has three main purposes:

First . There is no right in the law of God or man that
we should longer continue to starve neutrals now that
we have a surplus of food. That is the object of the
first part of the first resolution.

Second. The French, by obstruction of every financial
measure that we can propose to the feeding of Germany
in the attempt to compel us to loan money to Germany
for this purpose, have defeated every step so far for getting
them the food which we have been promising for three
months. The object of the second part of the first reso-
lution and of the second resolution is to at least find
some channel by which the Germans can help themselves
by trade with neutrals and South America.

Third. The object of the third resolution is to allow
the people bordering on the Mediterranean to get into
production and trade with all their might and by so doing

328

HOOVER ON PLANS FOR FEEDING GERMANY 329

not only revive their commercial life but also to a large
degree supply themselves with food and other com-
modities and thus take a large part of the burden of relief
from the back of our government.

There is no possibility that with all the restrictions
on trade taken off that the old Empire of Austria could
ever resurrect any military importance. At the present
time, we are actually furnishing food to points in Austria
at the expense of governments that could be taken care
of by private individuals if they could revive their foreign
credits without enemy trade restrictions, blockade and
censorship, etc., on commercial transactions. Of impor-
tance also in the longer view is that the Southwestern area
of Europe simply cannot be fed with any governmental
resources that either the allies or ourselves can produce
over the next six months, unless they be allowed to get
into the production of exportable commodities at the
earliest possible moment.

I have worked consistently since arriving in Europe
on the 25th day of November to secure these objects and
I have to confess that although they have been accepted
in principle in first one department and one government
after another, they are constantly defeated by one
bureaucratic and special self-interest after another of
various governments, and I can assure you that the
blockade against neutrals and the Southwest is being used
today for purely economic ends, when its sole justifi-
cation was for the protection and furtherance of military
operations, which justification is now gone.

I realize that there is still some political importance
in maintaining the blockade against Germany within
certain limits, but it does not apply to the rest of Europe.
I can see no hope of securing the removal of these restric-
tions except by a direct and strong intervention through
yourself and mandatory orders given by the Supreme
War Council.

Any reference to a given department in any govern-
ment will in many cases receive a negative opinion from
individuals, simply because of interest in the self-per-
petuation of bureaucracy or special interests of govern-

330 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ment or trade in a desire to continue the use of this
weapon for aims entirely apart from the war. I am
confident that no action is possible except of a mandatory
character from the top.

Faithfully yours,
[Signed] HERBERT HOOVER.
His Excellency,
The President,
Hotel Murat.
Paris.

PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO BE PRESENTED BY THE PRESI-
DENT TO SUPREME WAR COUNCIL.

The Supreme War Council at the present time sees no
military objection to certain relaxations of economic
control of the enemy and approves and recommends the
following relaxations in existing export and import
control :

1. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Switzer-
land to be allowed to import unlimited amounts of
foodstuffs and to be permitted to re-export foodstuffs to
Germany subject to the control of the Associated Govern-
ments, the aggregate amount of such re-exports with
other imports of foodstuffs by Germany, not to exceed
the amount of foodstuffs which the Supreme War Council
may, from time to time, have agreed to permit to be
imported into Germany.

2. Residents of Germany may be permitted, in such
manner and through such agency as may be approved by
the Supreme Council of Food and Supply to communicate
with persons in foreign countries relative to the purchase
of such amounts of foodstuffs as the Supreme War
Council may have agreed shall be imported into Germany.

3. All commodities to be allowed to be imported into
or exported from South Europe and countries bordering
on the Mediterranean without limit as to amount and
without guarantee against re-export of imports.

DOCUMENT 47.

Series of letters regarding economic situation
and plan of financial reconstruction of Europe
exchanged between Lord Robert Cecil for Great
Britain, and Edward M. House and Bernard M.
Baruch for America. These are:

1. Colonel House to Lord Robert Cecil (carbon
copy) April 10, 1919.

2. Response (autographed original) Lord Rob-
ert Cecil to Colonel House, April 11, 1919.

3. Letter of Bernard M. Baruch (carbon copy)
to Lord Robert Cecil, April 12, 1919.

4. Response (autographed original) of Lord
Robert Cecil to Edward M. House, April 14,
1919.

COLONEL HOUSE TO LORD ROBERT CECIL.

(Carbon copy)

April 10, 1919.
DEAR LORD ROBERT,

I have received this memorandum you sent me with
regard to the Economic Position of Europe. I agree
with you as to the vital importance of this matter dis-
cussed therein, and am quite in accord with your sug-
gestion that further investigation should be made of them.

I think the best way would be for France, England
and the United States each to appoint two representatives
of an expert character to an unofficial and informal
Committee which should report to us as soon as possible.
I will let you know our representatives. Will you let
me know the names of yours and also arrange matters
with the French Government?

[EDWARD M. HOUSE]

331

332 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT
(Autographed original)

BRITISH DELEGATION
PARIS

April 11, 1919.
DEAR COLONEL HOUSE,

With reference to your letter of April 10, the names
of our representatives on the Committee we discussed
will be Mr. J. M. Keynes and the Hon. R. H. Brand.
Mr. Keynes is at present in England for a few days, but
I have written to him asking him to serve.

M. Clementel has told me that he concurs warmly in
the idea of this Committee, and proposes to appoint
M. Monnet and M. Cellier, who is, I understand, one of
the chief men in the Ministry of Finance. I have told
M. Clementel that the Committee is quite informal and
private.

As soon as I hear the names of your representatives
I will ask Mr. Brand to get into touch with them, so as
to make further arrangements.

Yours sincerely,

[Signed] ROBERT CECIL.

(Carbon copy)

Hotel de Crillon, Paris

April 12, 1919.
MY DEAR LORD ROBERT:

Colonel House has turned over to me the communica-
tions which have passed between you and him. As you
will recall, you and I have discussed this matter, and I
endeavored to make it quite clear that I thought it would
be inadvisable, for reasons explained to you, to undertake
this now; and I was under the impression that you con-
curred in this opinion.

In the Supreme Economic Council we have discussed
the economic conditions of the world, and you and I have
talked it over at length. Furthermore, you have stated
in clear and unmistakable terms to the Council your
views upon this subject, in which we all concur.

LETTERS OF CECIL, HOUSE, AND BARUCH 333

Moreover, not alone all the governments suggested
in the memorandum, but likewise all other governments,
have been aware, since the signing of the Armistice, of
the increasingly difficult economic situation in Europe.
The Allied governments have it in their power to correct
this situation by removing restrictions that are hampering
trade; but all have refused to do it.

The raising of these restrictions includes the removal
of the black list and the censorship, and the freedom of
the use of the mails and the cables. This is something
that could have been done during the last five months,
can be done now, and would go far towards solving the
problem. Until this is done, the economic situation will
continually grow worse, and may reach a position where
financial assistance may be of no avail. Unless the
governments do this at once, it is useless to discuss any
other phase of the problem. What is the value of
setting up a commission to discuss this question, when
a solution has already been recommended to the various
governments, yet nothing has been done, while all Europe
suffers?

The salvation of the world must rest upon the initiative
of individuals. Individual credit can be established
where governmental credit is gone. It is of a volume
far beyond the capacity of governmental credit, where it
does exist. It is smothered in the Allied countries, and
in all other countries, by the restrictions.

You yourself have observed that, with Europe burning
up, certain governments have refused to give locomotives,
now lying idle, to countries whose structures are fast
disintegrating. You know of the difficulties of trade
in Roumania, and in other parts of Europe, which are
causing the very conditions which it would be your en-
deavor to remedy.

I suggest that we do not create another commission
to advise the governments to do the things they have
already been advised to do, which can be done now,
and which we all know will help the situation, but which
are not done. Let us rather bend our energies to con-
vincing our governments to do these things now. You

334 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

know what the position of the American government
has been.

Very sincerely yours,

[BERNARD M. BARUCH.]
THE RT. HON. LORD ROBERT CECIL,
Villa Majestic, Paris.

(Autographed original)

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET,
WHITEHALL GARDENS, S. W. 1.

April 14th, 1919.
MY DEAR MR. BARUCH,

I received your letter of the 12th this morning.

As you know, I am entirely in sympathy with your
view that all restrictions not proved to be necessary
should be removed, and I have very little doubt that
black lists will be suspended and that the modifications
which you suggested in the Censorship will be made. I
do not quite know what you mean by freedom of the use
of mails and cables, but I shall be very glad to take
that up when I see you. But with the rest of your letter
I do not feel myself in agreement.

In the first place, I am sorry you should have ever
misunderstood me to the extent of thinking that I thought
there was any advantage in shirking the large economic
issues which lie before us. I thought I had made it quite
clear that in my judgment they must be faced and dealt
with if possible before the President leaves Europe. You
think that without question the economic situation can
be solved by individual initiative. It may be so, though
my own opinion is to the contrary, and it is for that
reason that I pressed for the summoning of a small expert
Committee to which Colonel House agreed. It may be
that the result of the enquiry will show that without
American assistance on a large scale, nothing can be done,
and it may also be that America will decline to give that
assistance. If she intends to take that attitude, forgive
me for saying that she ought to take it quite openly and

LETTERS OF CECIL, HOUSE, AND BARUCH

335

before the face of the world. Then we in Europe shall
know the extent of the problem that faces us.

I ain afraid if I write more plainly, I shall offend even
your partiality.

Yours very sincerely,

[Signed] ROBERT CECIL.
B. BARUCH, Esq.

DOCUMENT 48.

The Keynes Financial Scheme, (printed) to-
gether with letter of explanation, date April 23,
1919, from Mr. Lloyd George to President Wilson
(autographed original).

BRITISH DELEGATION
PARIS

23rd April, 1919.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

The Chancellor of the Exchequer and Lord Robert
Cecil, on behalf of the British representatives on the
Supreme Economic Council, have forcibly urged on the
notice of His Majesty's Government the necessity of some
bolder solution for the rehabilitation of the credit and
economic life of Europe than is now available. For the
time being the United States is providing on a generous
scale for the urgent food requirements of the non-enemy
countries of Europe. We, on our part, are furnishing
assistance on a more modest scale. But these measures
which are primarily directed to the relief of immediate
distress, are inadequate, as Mr. Hoover himself is the
first to recognise, to the solution of the whole economic
problem. On the one hand, the United States may not
be able to continue indefinitely her present assistance;
on the other hand, this assistance does not touch the prob-
lem of supplying raw materials to any of the countries
concerned and does not apply to the enemy countries at all.

The position as it is reported by the British represen-
tatives on the Supreme Economic Council is as follows:
In the case of Germany the existing financial provision
is not expected to look after food supplies alone much
beyond June, and for raw materials there is no provision
at all, which, in view of existing unemployment, are not

336

THE KEYNES FINANCIAL SCHEME 337

less necessary if order is to be preserved in that country,
peace to be signed and the obligations of the peace to be
fulfilled. The other enemy countries are at a complete
economic standstill and there is at present no plan what-
ever for dealing with them or for preserving their social
and economic organisation from disruption and decay.
The condition of the new States, of Serbia and of Rumania
is hardly better. Mr. Hoover is meeting their immediate
food requirements, but their economic and commercial
fabric cannot be created or re-created unless they can be
put in the possession of purchasing power with which
to enter the markets of the world. France, Italy and
Belgium present a different problem. But here also
the external financial position has been represented to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer by the Finance Ministers
of these countries to be little short of desperate, and the
need of outside assistance to be essential if they are to
restore their countries and recommence the normal ac-
tivities of peace. The United Kingdom enters upon the
peace in a somewhat less unfavourable condition, with
the question as to how we are to pay what we owe to the
United States Treasury as the chief problem of our ex-
ternal finance; but we are in no position to give assistance
to others on anything approaching the scale which they
require. I may add this, however, that the difference
between the position in England and the complete eco-
nomic prostration of some of the other countries named
above is so enormous, that our own serious difficulties
in getting the wheels of industry going may be some index
to the appalling magnitude of the problem in these other
countries. In short, the economic mechanism of Europe
is jammed. Before the war, as Mr. Hoover has said,
400,000,000 Europeans by working their hardest just man-
aged to feed, clothe and house themselves, and perhaps six
months' capital on which to live. That capital has van-
ished; the complicated machinery of internal and external
production is more or less smashed; production has to
a great extent ceased. The largely increasing popula-
tion of Europe has only been maintained by the increasing
development and inter-connection of world industry and

338 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

finance. If this is not only checked, but for the time
being destroyed, it is difficult to see how the population
can be maintained, at any rate during the very painful
period of drastic re-adjustment. If free movement were
possible and other countries could absorb it, there would
inevitably be a vast emigration from Europe, until an
equilibrium were established between the numbers of
the population and the means of livelihood. As that
is not possible this equilibrium must be reached in some
other way. In Russia it is being reached, it appears,
by reduction of population by starvation, and by drastic
changes of occupation, e. g., by a town population being
forced out on the land as labourers.

To what extent the same conditions spread over the
rest of Europe must depend largely on whether or not
the obstacles to the resumption of production can be
rapidly overcome.

What, in such circumstances, are the alternatives be-
fore us? In some quarters the hope is entertained that
with the early removal of obstacles in the form of the
Blockade and similar measures to free international
intercourse, private enterprise may be safely entrusted
with the task of finding the solution. I am in accord
with the view that an early removal of such obstacles
is an essential measure, and that in the long run we must
mainly look for our salvation to the renewed life of private
enterprise and of private initiative. Indeed, so far as
trading and manufacture is concerned, as distinct from
finance, no other measures should be necessary from the
outset. Nevertheless, in the financial sphere, the problem
of restoring Europe is almost certainly too great for private
enterprise alone and every delay puts this solution further
out of court. There are two main obstacles: (a) the
risks are too great; (b) the amounts are too big and the
credit required too long. The more prostrate a country
is and the nearer to Bolshevism the more presumably it
requires assistance. But the less likely is private enter-
prise to do it. To a small extent and with a great margin
some trade will be done and some barter. But not enough
to meet the situation.

THE KEYNES FINANCIAL SCHEME 339

Apart from private enterprise His Majesty's Govern-
ment see only two possible courses — direct assistance and
various forms of guaranteed finance, on a very much
larger scale than is at present contemplated, by the
more prosperous of the Allied and Associated countries,
which probably means to an extent of not less than 90%,
the United States, or an attempt to re-create the credit
system of Europe and by some form of world wide co-
operation to enable the countries whose individual credit
is temporarily destroyed to trade on their prospects of
Reparation from the Enemy States or to capitalise their
future prospects of production. Every consideration of
policy and interest indicates the superiority of the second.
The people of Europe will have to live on the fruits of
their own daily labour and not on the bounty of another
country.

His Majesty's Government, therefore, desire to lay
before the Governments of the United States, of France
and of Italy the concrete proposal contained in the
paper annexed to this letter as their constructive con-
tribution to the solution of the greatest financial problem
ever set to the modern world. They are prepared to
commit themselves immediately to participation in such
a scheme, subject to the legislative sanction which it will
presumably require in all countries; and they invite your
observations and your criticisms.

I do not propose to enter upon any detailed explana-
tion or justification of this proposal until it has been
examined in outline by yourself and your advisers. There
are many points in it which will require very careful dis-
cussions between our experts, and it is doubtless capable
of much modification and improvement without detri-
ment to the main ideas which underlie it. But these
ideas I recommend to your judgment.

I may, however, at the present stage say this much.
The scheme is an attempt to deal simultaneously in as
simple a way as possible with several distinct problems.
The countries which have been the victims of devasta-
tion are enabled to convert the bonds of the enemy into
immediate purchasing power for the purpose of early

340 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

restoration. France is probably the greatest gainer from
this scheme and is offered a way out from her almost
overwhelming financial difficulties. The acute problem
of the liquidation of inter-ally indebtedness, while not
disposed of, is sensibly ameliorated. The Governments
of the new States are enabled to prepare definite economic
programmes which will consolidate their at present pre-
carious positions and inspire confidence in their peoples.
The Neutrals are shown that their claims against the
estate of the enemy will not be overlooked, in spite of
the circumstances of these claims' origin, provided they
are prepared to play their part in the world wide scheme
for the preservation of the credit of Europe. The enemy
peoples are shown a way of discharging a part of their
obligations and are given a reasonable measure of security
for their economic existence in the immediate future.
The good faith of the world as a whole is pledged for the
carrying out of a scheme, the sole object of which is to set
on its feet the new Europe. On the other hand it opens
prospects of a renewal of trade to those countries primar-
ily the United States and secondarily the British Em-
pire, who have surplus goods to export or a favourable
balance of trade to liquidate. It cannot be supposed
that the two great continents, America and Europe, the
one destitute and on the point of collapse and the other
overflowing with goods which it wishes to dispose of,
can continue to face one another for long without attempt-
ing to frame some plan of mutual advantage. And if it be
admitted, as it must be, that trade can only recommence
on the basis of credit of some kind, what better security
can the lenders hope to secure than is herein proposed?
But chief of all, perhaps, only a scheme of large and broad
dimensions, which can be announced to and understood
by the whole world, can inspire that sentiment of hope
which is the greatest need of Europe at this moment.
A proposal which unfolds future prospects and shows
the peoples of Europe a road by which food and em-
ployment and orderly existence can once again come
their way, will be a more powerful weapon than any
other for the preservation from the danger of Bolshevism

THE KEYNES FINANCIAL SCHEME 341

of that order of human society which we believe to be the
best starting point for future improvement and greater
well being.

I suggest that the relation of this scheme to the Rep-
aration Terms, which we are about to place before the
German Government might be as follows. In these
terms as at present drafted we demand an immediate
payment of £1,000,000,000 from which sum is first to be
deducted the cost of the Armies of Occupation and of
approved supplies of food and raw material to the enemy.
I suggest that if the present proposal is adopted the initial
payment might be £1,000,000,000 exclusive of the cost of
the Armies of Occupation and of approved supplies, and
that the enemy might be permitted to pay £724,000,000
out of this sum in special Bonds thus to be created,
providing the balance and also the cost of the Armies by
the transfer of ships, gold, securities and so forth.

Ever sincerely,
[Signed] D. LLOYD GEORGE.

(Secret.)

SCHEME FOR THE REHABILITATION OF EUROPEAN CREDIT
AND FOR FINANCING RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION.

April, 1919.

1. — (i) German Bonds to be issued to a present value
of £1,000,000,000 and to a face value of £1,200,000,000,
carrying interest at the rate of 4 per cent, per annum and
sinking fund at the rate of 1 per cent, per annum as from
January 1st, 1925, these payments to have priority over
all other German obligations whatever, including addi-
tional claims for reparation not covered out of the above,
the difference between the face value and the present
value representing the funding of interest from January
1st, 1920, up to January 1st, 1925.

(ii) Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Bonds to be

issued to the present value of £125,000,000, £170,000,000

and £50,000,000 respectively on similar conditions.

(N.B. — Turkey to be dealt with separately.)

342 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

(iii) Roumanian* Polish, Czecho-Slovakian, Jugo-
Slav* and Baltic States Bonds to be issued to the pres-
ent value of £15,000,000, £40,000,000, £20,000,000,
£15,000,000 and £10,000,000 respectively on similar
conditions.

2. Interest on each of the issues of Enemy Bonds under
1 (i) and (ii) above to be guaranteed jointly and sever-
ally by the other Enemy States, in the event of any one
of them failing to provide the payments due.

3. In the event of the failure of the above guarantees,
interest at 4 per cent, on all the above Bonds to the ag-
gregate present value of £1,500,000,000 (or £1,800,000,000
as from January 1st, 1925), to be guaranteed by the prin-
cipal Allied and Associated Governments, by the three
Scandinavian Governments and by the Governments of
Holland and Switzerland.

4. In the event of the guarantee under (3) becoming
operative, the guaranteeing Governments to be respon-
sible in proportions determined in advance, as set forth
in the accompanying Schedule A.

5. In the event of any of the guaranteeing Govern-
ments failing to meet their guarantee, the remaining
guaranteeing Governments to make good this failure
in the same proportions amongst themselves as under (4).

6. A failure of any Government to meet its guarantee
under the above clauses to be considered by the Financial
Section of the League of Nations, and if judged by them
to have been avoidable shall be punished by such penalty
or forfeiture of a financial, economic or commercial
character as the League of Nations may determine.

7. The Bonds to be free of all taxation in all the issuing
or guaranteeing States.

8. Of the £1,000,000,000 Bonds to be issued by the
German Government £724,000,000 shall be paid over
to the Allied and Associated Governments on account of
sums due for Reparation, £76,000,000 shall be utilized for
the discharge of existing debts to the three Scandi-
navian countries, Holland and Switzerland; and the
remaining one-fifth of the total, namely, £200,000,000

*Roumania and Serbia also to receive a share of Reparation.

THE KEYNES FINANCIAL SCHEME 343

shall be left in the hands of the German Government to
be made available for the purchase of food and raw
materials.

9. Of the bonds amounting to £345,000,000 in all to be
issued by the Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Gov-
ernments, four-fifths in each case shall be paid over to
the Allied and Associated Governments on account of
sums due for Reparation, the remaining one-fifth being
left in the hands of these Governments for the purchase
of food and raw materials.

10. The Bonds amounting in all to the present value
of £1,000,000,000 to be received by the Allied and Asso-
ciated Governments on account of Reparation to be di-
vided between them in the proportions determined upon
by them for the division of Reparation receipts generally.

11. The Bonds to be accepted at their par value plus
accrued interest in payment of all indebtedness between
any of the Allied and Associated Governments.

12. The Bonds to be acceptable as first-class collateral
for loans at the Central Banks of all the issuing or guar-
anteeing States, subject to such terms and limitations as
may be in force with these institutions from time to time.

SCHEDULE A.

PER CENT

United Kingdom 20

United States 20

France 20

Italy 10

Japan < . 10

Belgium 5

Norway

Sweden
Denmark
Holland
Switzerland

15

DOCUMENT 49.

Letter of President Wilson to Mr. Lloyd
George, May 5, 1919, criticizing and oppos-
ing the Keynes financial scheme (typewritten
copy).

5 May, 1919.
MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I have carefully considered your recent communication
enclosing a scheme suggested for the re-establishment of
more normal economic and financial conditions in Europe.
I am fully alive to the confused conditions that now exist
and to the very great importance of trying to clear and
improve them, especially in respect to the situation of
the new and weaker nations that are to be set up under
the Treaty of Peace.

I am sorry to say, however, that Mr. Keynes' plan
does not seem feasible from the American point of view.
Our Treasury and our financial delegates here in Paris
are convinced that the plan as presented lacks many
elements of economic and financial soundness. I have
asked our Treasury representatives here, Mr. Davis and
Mr. Lament, to explain in detail to your financial advisors
the serious objections to the plan which present them-
selves to us. Personally, I am convinced of the soundness
of these objections. I am convinced, moreover, that it
would not be possible for me to secure from the Congress
of the United States authority to place a Federal guar-
antee upon Bonds of European origin. Whatever aid
the Congress may see fit to authorize should, in my
judgment, be rendered along independent lines. By
that I do not mean in ways that would not involve close
and cordial cooperation with European governments,
for such harmony and cooperation I consider indispen-

344

WILSON ON THE KEYNES FINANCIAL SCHEME 345

sable. I mean merely that such cooperation should not,
so far as America is concerned, take the form of a guar-
antee upon bonds. Our Treasury also holds the view
(and in this again I concur) that to the very limit of what
is practicable such credits as it may be wise to grant
should be extended through the medium of the usual
private channels rather than through the several Gov-
ernments. Your Treasury, I understand, and certainly
ours, believes it wise to retire at the earliest possible
moment from "the banking business."

In order, however, that practical progress may be made,
I have asked our local advisors here to present to me their
views as soon as possible. Meantime, may I not call
to your attention the following facts and considerations
with regard to Germany's present and prospective finan-
cial situation?

(a) Germany requires working capital. Without that,
she will be unable to start her industrial life again, and
therefore unable to make any substantial progress in the
way of reparation, but

(b) The provision of the reparation clauses of the pro-
posed treaty demand that Germany shall deliver over
at once all her working capital, that is, practically the
whole of her liquid assets.

(c) Simultaneously the suggestion is in effect made
that America should in a large measure make good this
deficiency, providing in one form or another credit, and
thus working capital, to Germany.

Throughout the reparation discussions the American
delegation has steadily pointed out to the other delega-
tions that the plans proposed would surely deprive Ger-
many of the means of making any appreciable reparation
payments. I myself, as you know, have frequently made
the same observation. But whenever any of us was
urgent on this point, he was accused of being Pro-German.
Our delegation finally gave assent to the reparation
clauses as drawn, only because the reparation problem
was one that chiefly concerned France, Great Britain,
Belgium, and the other European countries, and not
America.

346 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

I venture to point this situation out to you in order
that I may make the following point clear. America has,
in my judgment, always been ready and will always stand
ready to do her full share financially to assist the general
situation. But America has grave difficulties of her
own. She has been obliged within two years to raise by
means of war loans and taxes the sum of forty billion
dollars. This has been a very heavy burden, even for
our well-to-do commonwealth, especially in view of the
fact of the short period during which such sums of money
had to be raised; and our Treasury informs me that our
investing public have reached, and perhaps passed, the
point of complete saturation in respect of investments.
Such is our situation.

You have suggested that we all address ourselves to
the problem of helping to put Germany on her feet, but
how can your experts or ours be expected to work out a
new plan to furnish working capital to Germany when we
deliberately start out by taking away all Germany's
present capital? How can anyone expect America to
turn over to Germany in any considerable measure new
working capital to take the place of that which the
European nations have determined to take from her?
Such questions would appear to answer themselves, but
I cannot refrain from stating them, because they so
essentially belong to a candid consideration of the whole
difficult problem to which we are addressing ourselves,
with as sincere a desire as that of their colleagues to
reach a serviceable conclusion.

Cordially and sincerely yours,
[Signed] WOODROW WILSON.

THE RIGHT HONORABLE DAVID LLOYD GEORGE,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
Paris, France.

DOCUMENT 50.

Letter of Bernard M. Baruch to President
Wilson, May 7, suggesting American ideas for
the reconstruction of Europe (autographed
original) .

AMERICAN COMMISSION
TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

Hotel de Crillon, Paris,

May 7, 1919.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

German militarism has been destroyed and the peoples
of the world set free from political domination not of
their own choosing. The rights of self-determination
and political freedom are coming to the whole world
which finds itself exhausted from the struggle to attain
these ends — exhausted mentally, physically and finan-
cially. It is staggering under huge debts. The conse-
quent grave industrial problems will require the strongest
and most sympathetic treatment. But unless great care is
taken, military domination will be succeeded by financial
domination.

All of the countries owe large debts, for the most part to
the United States, England and France. Exchange has
depreciated and commercial and economic life is prostrate.

In order that a government like Italy and new govern-
ments such as the Baltic Provinces, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, and the Balkan States such
as Roumania and Bulgaria may establish themselves
financial assistance must be given. Otherwise these
people will find themselves financially shackled for years
to come by a domination more severe and more difficult
to throw off than was the military domination.

Permit me to say that I think it is the duty of the

347

348 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

United States, which has done so much to free these
people and to establish high purposes and ideals in the
world, to complete its work of freeing these people by
giving them an equal opportunity in the world.

I recommend that aid be given to stricken Europe by
the United States, in cooperation with England, France
and any other country that desires to join; that the aid
be not given jointly but independently; that the United
States, England and France should each, by consulta-
tion, know what the others are doing in order that there
may be no duplication of effort.

A prime condition of our granting aid should be the
establishment of equality of trade conditions and removal
of economic barriers. Any credits we give should be
contingent upon the cancellation of preferential treaties
and trade agreements now existing, and upon an under-
standing that the monies advanced by any of the govern-
ments should not be held as a special charge against the
customs or duties or public utilities of any country. All
advances should be made with the understanding that
the nationals of all countries should receive equal oppor-
tunity to do business in the country to which the money
has been advanced, and that no preference or special
concession should be given to the country making the
advance, except that where commercial credits are
granted the material should be bought in the country
making the advance.

The restoration of economic life in Europe, particu-
larly in the new states which are being constituted by
the terms of the Peace Treaty, require the following:

One: The Secretary of the Treasury should be em-
powered, with the approval of the President, where
necessary, to adjust and change the terms of payment of
principal and interest of the loans made to other govern-
ments. Exchange in all countries has depreciated and it
will be difficult, until economic conditions improve, to pay
in dollars in some cases even the interest on these loans.
If the Secretary of the Treasury funded the loans over
long periods and deferred the interest payments (taking
notes for the interest for periods of from three to five

BARUCH ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 349

years) these countries would be freed from the immediate
necessity of finding money for this purpose. This would
relieve the exchange situation tremendously, have a
tonic effect upon financial conditions in Europe, and give
these countries an opportunity to rehabilitate and read-
just their systems of taxation and finance.

Two: The Secretary of the Treasury should be em-
powered, with the approval of the President, to establish
special commercial credit advances to the various nations
which it may be desirable to assist, such credits or ad-
vances to be used in payment for raw materials, railroad
supplies, machinery, etc., required from America. Modi-
fication of War Finance Corporation provisions may
accomplish this. The necessity of all such purchases,
and the method of purchase, should be supervised.
Such loans should not be available for military purposes
or for any form of public improvement or investment
in fixed property, but should be used solely to assist the
commerce of the country.

These loans should be made through the interested
governments with the guaranty of the borrowing govern-
ment, the guaranty of its banks, and on the individual
note or credit of the borrowing merchant or grouped
industry. This method is recommended not alone
that we may have a combined credit, but that we
may have the combined judgment and responsibility
of the government, the banker and the merchant in
passing upon the necessity for the loan. This will pre-
vent wild and unnecessary expenditures. An agent or
agency acting in cooperation (not joint agency)
should be established in each country to pass upon the
necessity of the commercial loans requested. It, in
conjunction with the government and the banks of the
borrowing country, should investigate the needs and see
that the money is expended for the purpose for which
it is advanced.

Each Allied, Associated or neutral government would
have an opportunity to take its share in any or all ad-
vances; but a country would make a loan only for pur-
chases from its nationals. There are already banks in

350 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

most of these countries, and others could be readily es-
tablished by the peoples of the countries in question.
The banks in the borrowing countries should not be per-
mitted to charge more than one per cent, in addition
to what the lending government would receive. It
would not be necessary to extend these credits for more
than three years. In most instances the money would
be paid back before this time.

It might appear on the surface that this is a compli-
cated and difficult plan, but it is not. The expenses
could be paid by a charge of something less than one-
quarter of one per cent. The organization could be quickly
formed, made to function and bring to the peoples whom
we desire to help the freedom and liberty of action that
would go further to bring about normal and peaceful
conditions than many times the money spent to restore
order by force of arms.

There will be great competition among the financial
and commercial interests of the various countries to make
these loans. In many cases the exporting or selling
house would assume part of the advance. Before long
the government's place would be taken by private concerns.
Once the plan is started,the final result will be that the
treasuries of the various countries will be obliged to ad-
vance less money than is now thought necessary.

Three: To the newer countries some advances will
have to be made in order to carry on their governments
until the revenues come in from their restored industrial
and economic life. But none of these monies should be
used for military works or public improvements, except
for such things as railroad facilities. The Secretary of
the Treasury should be, with the approval of the Presi-
dent, empowered to do this.

Whatever the amount may be, it is an obligation that
we cannot escape. It is a part of the obligation that the
rich nations of the world, and America in particular,
must carry out. America entered the war with a high
purpose. It has written that purpose into the terms
of the peace. It must now carry through that purpose,
in order that peace may be maintained by the restoration

BARUCH ON THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 351

of normal conditions and by the granting of an equal op-
portunity to all.

Economic inequality and barriers were among the
causes of the war. They have not been removed; in
many cases they have been increased. No greater use
can be made of our resources and I know of no more
fitting climax to the part that America has played in the
war, and to your own great work, than the accomplish-
ment of this project.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signed] BERNARD M. BARUCH.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
11, Place des Etats-Unis,
Paris.

DOCUMENT 51.

Printed memorandum of Norman H. Davis,
and Thomas W. Lamont, May 15, "Observations
upon the European [Economic] Situation: Pos-
sible Measures to Be Taken," with letter of
transmittal from Lamont (autographed original).
The idea of the American economic advisors as
to America's relation to the European situation.

May 15, 1919.

Financial Conditions in Europe.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT :

Attached to this note is the brief report which, some
little time ago, you suggested that we make to you. Mr.
McCormick, Mr. Baruch and Mr. Hoover have gone over
this and I believe them to be in substantial accord with
Mr. Davis and myself in this presentation.

We have not attempted to lay out a complete financial
plan; but rather to analyze the situation with sufficient
clearness to make certain solutions fairly manifest. If,
for instance, our British and French friends were to agree
with this analysis of ours, we are inclined to believe that
they might think it wise to make certain fresh proposals
far more reasonable than the original Keynes' suggestion.
We should prefer to have the British and French make
these new suggestions, as the matter is of even greater
concern to them than to America.

You may not deem it wise to hand a copy of this report
to Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Clemenceau, for the reason
that it is drawn up for your own private consideration and
embodies certain suggestions with reference to possible

rS52

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION 353

Congressional action. We can, however, readily revise
the text on these points.

If you were to find time before tomorrow to glance
through this draft report, we should then be in a position,
if you can see us tomorrow, to go over a few principal
points in it upon which we olesire to secure your personal
views.

With great respect, I am, dear Mr. President,

Sincerely yours,
[Signed] THOMAS W. LAMONT.

THE HONORABLE WOODROW WILSON,
President of the United States,
Paris.

For the President
(Secret)

OBSERVATIONS UPON THE EUROPEAN SITUATION
POSSIBLE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN.

ECONOMIC SITUATION.

The European states, with the exception of the neutrals
and Great Britain, are, speaking generally, in a most
difficult position. These states have been over-run by
war, raw materials are exhausted, the ordinary processes
of production and distribution are in chaos. The ques-
tion of feeding has, of course, been pressing; but the
Hoover organization, supplemented somewhat by Eng-
land's and France's efforts, has kept actual starvation
at bay. There will be great suffering before the next
crop is gathered, but if the industrial and trade situation
can be improved, food conditions will automatically
become better. Unless there is such economic improve-
ment, it is not too much to expect that industrial and
political revolutions will continue, with disastrous con-
sequences for Europe and for the world.

AMERICA'S RELATION TO EUROPE'S SITUATION.

America has a direct relation to the situation in Europe.
Not only is it true that no one great region of the globe

354 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

can remain in chaos, without such chaos vitally affecting
the other regions; but America's trade relations with
Europe are so extensive that many of its industries are
dependent for their success on stable conditions in Europe.
America's prosperity in the last decade has been largely
coincident with the growth of its export trade to the
Continent of Europe. Continuance of unstable con-
ditions in Europe, unrelieved by strong cooperation from
America, is bound to be reflected in serious business and
industrial depression in America itself. For the moment
Europe,, with great inherent wealth, is almost destitute
of goods. America has, or can produce, an exportable
surplus of such goods. It is almost inconceivable that
America should fail to make every effort to meet such
a situation. Every consideration of humanity, justice
and self-interest demands it.

PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH AMERICAN COOPERATION MUST

BE BASED.

If America is to assist in solving the European problem,
we must work along certain sound principles, definitely
stated :

Generous Credits

(a) Europe cannot pay cash for all raw materials she
vitally requires; she must, therefore, receive credit on a
liberal scale for her purchases.

Not too Restricted

(b) America's advances must not be strictly confined
to covering purchases made in America. More freedom
of action than this must be granted to Europe, if we are
to enable her to restart her economic life.

Normal Channels Preferable

(c) Credits to Europe should, so far as possible, be
extended through the normal channels of private enter-
prise, commercial and banking credits, etc. For the
moment, however, while the situation here is still so
unsettled and while, therefore, private credit will not be

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION 355

available in sufficient amount, some United States govern-
ment aid, on a limited scale, either direct or through the
medium of an existing agency like the War Finance Cor-
poration, must still be contemplated.

Governmental Guaranty Required

(d) The extension of private as well as public credits
should for the present be conditioned upon the guaranty
of the several governments in each instance where credit
is granted.

European Cooperation Necessary

(e) The situation in Europe financially is closely inter-
woven, and should be considered as a whole. Therefore
both governmental and private, commercial and banking
interests in Europe should understand the necessity for
co-operation among themselves, so as to be able to present
at all times an intelligent and comprehensive view of
the situation. There should be no duplication of effort.

In Extension of Credits

(f) To this end the leading European nations and the
Neutrals as well (which in general are enjoying unusual
prosperity) should co-operate in the extension of credits
for raw materials, etc. ; and in the case of the small nations
in the effort to establish their currencies upon a stable
basis.

Mobilization of America's Resources

(g) If America is to be able, in the long run, to extend
through private channels the credits necessary, then it
is absolutely essential that America's investment re-
sources should in turn be mobilized on a large scale, so as
to ensure, in America, the unity of action which is essential
to meet the situation.

Handling of Internal Conditions

(h) If the European countries as a whole are to be
justified in looking to America for credit, they must at
once address themselves so as to handle their internal

356 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

situations of currency, taxation, etc., in a way to com-
mand the confidence of American investors.

Loans to Be Used Exclusively for Upbuilding

(i) None of the proceeds of loans made to, or credits
established for, the European countries, shall be devoted
to military purpose or to public improvements, other than
the necessary reconstruction of transport facilities. The
rebuilding of industrial and commercial life shall be the
sole end in view.

No Discriminatory Tariffs

(j) Further, a condition precedent to America's active
cooperation, is that there shall exist no tariffs or secret
trade understandings between, or among, the European
nations, the effect of which will be discriminatory against
America and the lesser nations.

The Matter of Concessions

(k) In the same way, the question of private concessions
must be safeguarded. America does not purpose, in the
event she extends credit on a considerable scale, for in-
stance to the lesser nations, to make such advances condi-
tional upon obtaining any industrial or banking concessions.
But America would seriously object to the granting of
such concessions in a way that might prejudice the interest
of her own and other friendly nationals. Finally :

Situation Requires Immediate Action

(1) The situation is so critical that immediate measures
are necessary. Even though the granting of actual
credits may, in certain instances, have to await fresh
legislation, yet steps should be taken promptly, and knowl-
edge of such steps given immediate publicity: otherwise
it may prove quite impossible to prevent the present
situation from growing rapidly worse.

FIVE PROBLEMS TO CONSIDER.

There are five concrete situations to be handled,
to wit:

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION 357

(1) Credits for the newly constituted, or lesser nations,

such as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Greater Serbia,
Roumania and the Baltic States.

(2) Immediate credits for raw materials for France,

Belgium and Italy.

(3) Later credits to France and possibly Belgium for

reconstruction.

(4) Working capital for Germany and the other Enemy

States.

(5) Refunding by the United States Treasury of the

interest, for the next three to five years, on loans
to the Allied Governments up to November 11,
1918. Also, the funding of the principal of such
loans.

As to:

1. CREDITS FOR THE NEWLY CONSTITUTED, OR LESSER
NATIONS, SUCH AS POLAND, CZECHO-SLOVAKIA,
GREATER SERBIA, ROUMANIA AND THE BALTIC

STATES.

(1) The United States has been instrumental in con-
stituting these new nationalities. There is, therefore,
a certain moral obligation to help them to a fair start upon
their new national life. Credits for Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Greater Serbia, Roumania and the Baltic
States are essential for:

Pressing Needs

(a) The purchase of raw materials, railway stocks

and agricultural implements, required for the
resumption of industrial and agricultural pro-
ductivity;

Currency Reserve Necessary

(b) The establishment of a reserve sufficient to enable

these countries to establish a stable, circulating
medium. At present they have no gold reserve.
It will be necessary for them either to obtain

358 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

gold or to make such special credit arrangements
as can take the place of gold, as a reserve against
notes to be issued.

Amounts Required for Newer Nations

(c) The credits required for these countries, to cover

the next six months, should not exceed, and
may prove materially less than, the following
amounts :

Poland . ..... . . $250,000,000

Roumania ....... 50,000,000

Czecho-Slovakia . . . . . 50,000,000

Greater Serbia . . . . . 100,000,000

Baltic States . ..... 50,000,000

Total . . .- . . . . $500,000,000

(d) Any plan looking to the extension of credits, as

above, should (though forming part of the
whole plan) be through natural, commercial
and banking channels, so as surely to enlist the
combined judgment and responsibility of the
business man and banker. But every trans-
action should also carry the guaranty of the
government in question. Such a plan can be
carried through without the necessity of actual
endorsement by the government upon each credit
instrument; but by means of blanket legislation,
along the lines of a recent Belgian enactment,
guaranteeing commercial and banking credits
extended by America.

As to

2. IMMEDIATE RAW MATERIALS FOR FRANCE, BELGIUM

AND ITALY.

Estimates as to the total requirements for these
three countries vary considerably, but it is thought that
credits for $500,000,000 will be sufficient to cover their
requirements for this year. If the French estimates are

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION 359

to be accepted, it may be necessary for the United States
government to continue certain temporary advances.
Detailed estimates should be furnished by the three
Governments.

As to:

3. CREDITS TO FRANCE AND BELGIUM FOR RECON-

STRUCTION.

The amount of credits necessary in the next six months
to enable France and Belgium to make outside pur-
chases for these purposes will not be heavy; yet ample
provision for these requirements should be contemplated
and arranged in the general plan.

As to:

4. WORKING CAPITAL FOR GERMANY AND OTHER ENEMY

STATES.

Germany requires working capital: without it she will
be unable to restart her industrial life, and thus to make
any substantial progress in the way of reparation. But
the provisions of the reparation clauses of the proposed
Treaty demand that Germany shall deliver over at once
all her working capital, being practically the total of
her liquid assets. The only logical manner of meeting
Germany's requirements for working capital is obviously
to leave Germany with sufficient of her present working
capital to enable her to restore her industries. It is for
the Governments which expect to receive reparation to
consider this situation with respect to the enemy's working
capital. America has no further suggestion to make on
this point.

As to :

5. REFUNDING OF INTEREST OBLIGATIONS.

France, Italy and all of the other Allied and Associated
Governments, even perhaps including England, will be

360 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

unable for some time to meet in gold the interest on their
exterior obligations contracted during the war. These
loans are held principally by the United States and
England. Some provision should be made for tem-
porarily refunding the interest on such obligations held
by the United States or England. As the debtor gov-
ernments cannot apparently pay this interest for at least
three years, it will be a serious humiliation to them to
force them to acknowledge their inability to do so.
Therefore, from every practical point of view, it is ad-
visable to arrange the matter before it becomes a real
issue. England is already alive to this point, and as we
are informed, has no intention of attempting to collect,
for several years, the interest due her from those govern-
ments. In order for the United States Treasury to re-
lieve the situation in similar manner, certain legislation
will be required.

The funding, in part or in whole, of the principal of
these obligations (for which the Secretary of the Treasury
already possesses authority) would also be vastly helpful
to the exchange situation in both Europe and America;
and would impose upon the United States Treasury no
heavier burden than it now carries.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to deal effectively with the several situations,
as above set forth, we recommend the following immediate
steps :

A Non-Governmental European Committee

(1) The organization, with the general approval of
the British and French governments, of a small Special
Committee made up of bankers and men of affairs, to
coordinate, so far as possible, in Europe the general
scheme of credits that are to be extended through banking
and commercial channels. Such committee should con-
sider the situation of the lesser nations, which should, in
turn, engage to arrange their credits in accordance with
the whole general situation. This non-governmental
committee should keep in close contact with the man-

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION 361

agers of the proposed investment group in America as
follows :

Investment Mobilization in America.

(2) The organization in America of a country-wide
investment group of banks and bankers; the managers of
which, working in unison with commercial and manu-
facturing interests, shall

(a) act in co-operation with the Special European

Committee, and

(b) co-ordinate the American investment public in

broad plans for meeting the European situation.
Such American group to act under the general approval
of the United States Treasury, and American credit oper-
ations generally to function through this group.

Recommendations to Congress.

(3) To present the situation to Congress, in order to
secure such legislation as may be necessary:

(a) To grant total additional credits to any or all the

countries in Europe of sums not to exceed $ ,
on condition that any part of such credits as
shall not have been availed of by January 1st,
1921, shall thereupon be cancelled. If Congress
shall see fit to authorize such credits, that very
fact will lead to greater activity and confidence on
the part of American exporters, and will lessen the
amount of credits requested from the Treasury.

(b) To fund, without interest, for, say, three years,

interest payments, due or coming due, upon obli-
gations of European countries held by the United
States Treasury.

(c) To grant the War Finance Corporation power,

within prescribed limits, to assume the risk of
practically direct commercial credits against
American exports.

Educational Campaign Essential.

.baucational Campaign Essential.

(4) The organization of an active campaign of educa-
tion for the purpose of acquainting the American public

362 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

generally with the urgency of the whole European prob-
lem, the necessity for hearty co-operation in solving it,
and for handling the situation in a broad and generous
manner.

To-day there is no real conception in America of the
situation in Europe. Not only is the desperate character
of the situation not understood, but there is no apprecia-
tion of the fact that America's destinies are in a large
measure inseparable from those of the rest of the world.
Complete knowledge of the situation here can be gained
only through observation upon the spot. Sympathy,
however, and desire for co-operation can be cultivated
through the establishment of joint interests. If America
comes to feel that she has in Europe an interest that is
both material and spiritual, she will grow to have a more
kindly understanding of Europe's needs and of the ways
to help her.

The practical workings of the League of Nations will
be immensely stimulated if the citizens of America can
persuade themselves of the wisdom of taking a close
interest in the affairs of the European nations. Nothing
is more certain, for example, than that, in case the Ameri-
can people grant credits on a substantial scale to the
European countries, the close interest that will result
will surely prove a great permanent factor in increasing
the harmony and peace of the world.

To this manifestly desirable end, education, in the
broad sense of the word, is essential throughout the
United States. No one, at the present time, can set that
process of education under way so admirably or so effec-
tively as the President himself.

DOCUMENT 52.

Confidential report (printed), June 4, 1919,
from a Committee of Economists appointed by
the Four Heads of States to report on Europe's
requirements of food and raw materials, and the
means of financing such supplies. This report
was never seriously considered by The Four.

MR. NORMAN DAVIS \ £ TT .. , c.
MR. BARUCH I for United States"

LORD ROBERT CECIL/ £ T> -, • *
MR. KEYNES } for Bntlsh

M. LOUCHEUR [£ ^

M. run™™. J for France'

M.

SI

PROF. ATTOLICO

| for Italy.

having been appointed a Committee by the Four Heads of
States to report on Europe's requirements of food and
raw materials and the means of financing such supplies
beg leave to report as follows : —

1. They have considered separately the problems of
the new states and Eastern Allies, of the Enemy States,
and of the Western Allies.

2. In the case of the New States and Eastern Allies
(i. e., the Baltic States, Poland, Roumania, Czecho-
slovakia, and Jugo-Slavia), the Committee find that
private credit will be inadequate by itself to provide the
working capital necessary to restart industry, mainly for
the two reasons, first that the credit of the individual
firms is in itself not sufficient under present conditions to
enable them to obtain large funds abroad, and second
that, where the firms are in a satisfactory position to
manufacture and market their goods, they are likely to

363

864 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

receive in payment depreciated paper money which is
inconvertible into the foreign currency required to liqui-
date the credits so obtained. Both factors hinder mer-
chants or bankers outside these countries from lending on
a large scale, and the second factor deters prudent and
businesslike persons in them from incurring foreign ob-
ligations, even when they are in a position to do so, which
they see no likelihood of being able to discharge out of the
proceeds of selling their wares. Overriding all this are
the two political factors, that most of the Governments
are in an experimental stage, and general political move-
ments rendering all credit uncertain are at least a possi-
bility, and that, of the principal natural markets of these
countries, neither Russia nor Germany will be in a posi-
tion to purchase as before.

The Committee, is, however, of the opinion that no
lasting solution is possible which is not based upon a re-
establishment of international trade on the basis of
private rather than Government credit, and with this ob-
ject they recommend that: —

(i) Each of the principal Allied and Associated Gov-
ernments should seek out some appropriate method by
which their own traders can be partially relieved of the
credit risks of trading with these countries whether by
an insurance scheme, by some Governmental or semi-
Governmental body sharing the political as distinct from
the trading risks or otherwise. There should be an inter-
change of information between the Governments con-
cerned as to the progress of such arrangements. The
Committee is of opinion in this connection that it is more
necessary for Governments to share risks than to provide
funds, the latter being within the capacity of existing
banks.

(ii) A currency reorganization should be carried
through in these countries with a view to withdrawing
all the existing issues of currency and replacing them by
a new currency based on a definite unit of real value. The
Committee is of opinion that the Governments of all these
countries should, as a condition of receiving any further
financial assistance whatever, forego absolutely the pre-

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON EUROPE'S REQUIREMENTS 865

rogative of issuing currency or legal tender of any de-
scription for a period of not less than ten years.

The committee is of opinion that if this currency re-
organization is to be carried through it will be necessary
for the principal Allied and Associated Governments to
contribute a guarantee fund which might have to amount
to as much as £80,000,000 to £100,000,000. It would also
be desirable that the assisted Governments should under-
take to pay over to the guarantee fund a proportion of their
customs receipts or other revenue for a considerable period
of years. The issue of such currency should aim at being as
automatic and as much out of the control of the Govern-
ments of these countries as if it were actually composed of
full value metal; and to secure this the issue should be
under the control of some independent authority satisfac-
tory to the Governments contributing to the Guarantee
Fund.

3. Both of the above measures, especially the second,
must necessarily occupy many months before they can
come into effective operation. In the meantime pro-
visional measures are necessary, mainly for the supply
of raw material for industry, of tools for agriculture, and
of means for the restoration of communications, without
which there can be no employment. The Committee
is of the opinion that for the immediate future a sum of
from £30,000,000 to £40,000,000 might be adequate for
the whole of this group of countries. They do not be-
lieve that this sum could be obtained through private
channels, and, if provided, it would have to be by the
Allied and Associated Governments.

They suggest that it should be a condition of such
supplies that no expenditure be incurred by any of these
countries for munitions, except with the approval of the
Allied and Associated Governments, and that unauthor-
ized hostilities of any description should be followed by
an immediate stoppage of supplies.

There would be advantages in arranging that these
supplies, so far as they were required for commercial and
industrial purposes, should be made through private
firms who should obtain the best possible security from

366 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

the importers on the other side. If the supplies are made
direct by the Government the Committee suggest that
the goods should be supplied not against Government
bonds, but against the deposit and withdrawal from cir-
culation of existing paper money at rates of exchange
to be determined. Approved and properly backed com-
mercial bills, expressed in local currency, might also be
accepted in payment. If this plan were adopted, the
Governments concerned would have to agree to suspend
all further issues of currency pending currency reorgan-
ization as already proposed, in which case such reorgan-
ization would have to be undertaken immediately.

As regards food, they understand that the population
is cared for by existing arrangements up to next harvest,
with the exception of the supply of seed for autumn
sowing.

4. In making the above recommendations the Com-
mittee have assumed that these States will not be required
to shoulder any part of the responsibility of the enemy
States for Reparation payments. If this question is
decided otherwise, they are of opinion. that the above
proposals would be inadequate to meet the requirements
of the case. The Committee believe, indeed, that the
attempt to exact such payments from the newly consti-
tuted States is incompatible with their financial rehabili-
tation, the difficulties of which, even apart from this, will
be very formidable.

5. In the case of Germany, the financial situation is
overshadowed by the Reparation demands of the draft
Treaty of Peace. It appears, from recent negotiations
as to the finance of food supplies for Germany, that the
data on which the Reparation Commission recommend
a payment of £1,000,000,000 in the first two years after
peace will now probably have to be revised. There is,
for example, reason to fear that for various reasons the
German Government would be unable to deliver the
quantity of foreign securities contemplated by the Repa-
ration Commission.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Peace the German
Government is required to cede or deliver various specific

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON EUROPE'S REQUIREMENTS 367

forms of property, of which the mercantile marine is the
most valuable. But the Committee feel that they must
be prepared for the possibility of the Germans only being
able, in addition to the above cessions, to make inap-
preciable payments within two years. Even if no pay-
ment is required of her within this period, it might be
impossible for Germany, without some assistance, to pay
for the necessary importations which would place her
in a position later on to make considerable payments for
reparation.

Therefore, in the probable contingency of Germany
being (a) unable to pay off in liquid assets the total of
the first 20,000,000,000 of marks, (6) unable to import,
for lack of means or of credits, or (c) not in possession
of adequate working capital, the Committee think that
one or more of the following means of assistance would
have to be considered: —

(i) The various cessions of property could be treated
not as advances in respect of Reparation but as sales, and
the various Governments receiving this property might
make the value of it available to Germany in cash to
enable her to pay for importations, or, alternatively,
Germany might be permitted to retain a sufficient amount
of her existing assets to allow her to meet her requirements
for working capital; (ii) the Allied and Associated Gov-
ernments might advance a loan to Germany; or (iii) the
terms of the Reparation chapter might be so amended
as to permit Germany to sell bonds ranking in front of
all reparation payments and having a specific security,
as, for example, customs or foreign properties, attached
to them, or to direct the Reparation Commission to
accept part payment of the first 20,000,000,000 marks
in this form.

The Committee is aware of the great difficulties at-
tending each of the proposed alternatives, not least on
account of the large sums involved. But the problem
is unfortunately one of great urgency, of which a solution
will be necessary immediately upon the signature of
Peace by Germany. So far, no beginning has been made
with the supply of raw materials, the cost of which is

368 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

estimated by the Raw Materials Section of the Supreme
Economic Council at £180,000,000; and if the collapse
of Germany is to be avoided such supply must commence
immediately. Yet Germany is at present virtually
destitute of resources. The fulfilment of the food pro-
gramme up to the end of June will have reduced her gold
reserve from £110,000,000 to £60,000,000, below which
it cannot fall much further without the final collapse of
her currency system, and will also have exhausted all
of the known stock of immediately saleable or loanable
foreign securities so far obtained by requisition. The
Committee is not aware of any other resources available
for immediate payments, except such foreign securities
and properties as private German nationals may possess
outside the jurisdiction of their Government, the amount
of which available for this purpose cannot yet be esti-
mated. If it were not for Germany's obligations for
Reparation the Committee believe that through her
associations in foreign countries she would be able to
obtain large credits through private channels, but her
indefinite and very large Reparation obligations greatly
reduce such opportunities. The Finance Section of the
Supreme Economic Council is informed by the Neutral
Financiers' Committee that there is no expectation in
present circumstances of neutral countries extending
large credits to Germany, especially for the purchase of
raw materials not originating in those neutral countries
which is chiefly the case with those most urgently required.
The state of the German currency, already alluded to,
is a serious aggravation of the position. The value of
the mark in relation to the dollar has now fallen to less
than a third of its par value. As the price of raw materials
in terms of dollars has risen to two and a quarter times
pre-war level, it follows that imported raw materials will
cost in marks about seven times their pre-war price. As
Germany has been cut off from imports for a long period,
her internal prices have not adjusted themselves to this
state of affairs. In the case of imported food, the military
authorities in the occupied areas report that the price is
too high for the purchasing power, of all but five per cent.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON EUROPE'S REQUIREMENTS 369

of the population, so that even when food is available it
cannot be sold unless the German Government or the Ar-
mies of Occupation subsidise it. If, however, the German
Government sells imported commodities below cost price,
its financial position becomes desperate, and a further
inflation of the currency inevitable.

The Committee have devoted considerable space to the
German situation because, in their opinion, this is the
key to the whole European financial problem.

6. Some modification of the existing terms of the
Draft Treaty of Peace would be required to enable the
above proposals to be carried into effect, should they
receive the approval of the Four Heads of States.

7. Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria cannot be dealt
with in advance of the reparation proposals. The Com-
mittee is of opinion that it is impossible to expect any
appreciable payments from these countries in the near
future. They suggest that this fact should be recog-
nized, and that these countries should be dealt with on
the same general lines as the Eastern Allies, but much
less generously/

8. The French and Italian Representatives explained
to the Committee with great force the situation of their
respective countries, and called attention in particular to
the very heavy adverse balance of trade to which they
are at present subject.

The situation of France is characterized by two facts:

(a) The heavy adverse balance of her commerce.

(6) The devastation of war, the reparation of which
necessitates expenditures comparable to those of war
itself.

One of the principal assets, to which she looked to aid
her in reestablishment of her equilibrium, was her claims
on Germany, the fate of which she linked with that of
Germany herself. The observations made above upon
the financial position of that country indicate that France
cannot hope to find in these claims alone any immediate
alleviation of her present and future burdens.

She must, therefore, look elsewhere for the resources nec-
essary to secure a prompt restoration of her economic life.

370 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

For the immediate future, it is understood that she
has sufficient dollar resources to meet her requirements
in the United States.

As for the other indispensable requirements, which she
must secure elsewhere, and in the main from the British
Empire, e. g., wool, coal, freights, her position is be-
coming serious. The means of payment in London,
arising in great part out of dollar and sterling resources,
the result of the presence of the British and American
armies in France, is constantly dwindling.

The French Representatives estimate that in July or
August France will not be able to make new purchases of
wool or coal, and that the French Government will find
itself, so far as its own engagements are concerned, in a
very difficult position.

The Italian situation is not less difficult and in some
respects more urgent. The external war debt of Italy
is heavier in proportion to her wealth than that of any
other country. She is also more dependent on imported
raw materials, having within her own borders neither
coal, nor iron ore, nor wool. Nor has she a large mer-
cantile marine. Her exports are mainly manufactured
articles, and certain unessential agricultural products,
for which Germany, Austria, and Russia, formerly her
principal markets, must be considered lost. Remit-
tances from emigrants, formerly so important, have
largely disappeared for the time being. The newly-
acquired provinces are not self-supporting from the point
of view of raw materials, and they therefore constitute
in this regard an additional burden on Italy. She has,
therefore, no possibility at present of balancing her
exports and imports, and is not in a position to purchase
the absolutely necessary raw materials without credit.
For the time being she is receiving substantial loans
from the United States and the British Government.

As regards the United Kingdom, the British Repre-
sentatives expressed the opinion that the assistance
already afforded them by the United States would meet
the case until the early autumn, and that they hoped
even then to be able to maintain their position without

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ON EUROPE'S REQUIREMENTS 371

further assistance from the United States Government,
provided they were not to become liable for any large
measure of assistance to others; the British Treasury
was not in a position to give any further assistance to
France or Italy.

The financial position, therefore, of these three countries
as well as that of Belgium, is full of anxiety.

The American Representatives pointed out to the Com-
mittee that the Secretary of the United States Treasury
is not empowered to establish credits after peace except
for the purchase of wheat in the United States, and only
for that purpose in so far as any balance may be left over
out of the appropriation of $10,000,000,000 for advances
to the Associated Governments; and also that, according
to advices received from Washington, it will be very diffi-
cult, and probably impossible, to obtain legislation em-
powering the Secretary of the Treasury to establish credits
for further advances to these countries. They also pointed
out, however, that Congress had, at the request of the
Secretary of the Treasury, extended the powers of the
War Finance Corporation by authorising it to extend
aid to American exporters up to a maximum of
$1,000,000,000, upon acceptable obligations maturing
within a limit of five years; and that in their opinion the
facilities thus provided (if supplemented by private
credit and initiative) should be sufficient to meet the
necessary purchases in the United States.

Some members of the Committee were doubtful if
private credits and enterprise would be adequate to meet
the situation.

Before concluding, the Committee considers it advis-
able to point out that, in spite of a well-organized cur-
rency and credit system, and of the private credits and
resources available to England, France, and Italy, it
will nevertheless be difficult, if not impossible, for them
(within the next two or three years) to pay for all the raw
materials which they may require and to overcome their
unfavourable trade balance to such an extent as to be
able also to cover the interest on their obligations held
abroad. Although it has been anticipated that funds to

372 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

meet these needs would be received from Germany on
account of reparation, the Committee now feels convinced
that it is impossible to count on any substantial financial
assistance from this source in the near future. The final
solution may, therefore, require a more comprehensive
plan than for the other portions of Europe, and it is most
advisable that immediate consideration should be given
by all concerned to meet the situations not already
provided for. The Committee also feels that until France
and Italy obtain the raw materials required, and until
England, France and Italy can cover their adverse trade
balances and meet the foreign interest payments due by
them for the next two or three years, the improvement
or stability in exchange and the confidence necessary to
stimulate private enterprise may be perhaps fatally re-
tarded.

DOCUMENT 53.

Cablegram from R. C. Leffingwell, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury to Norman H. Davis,
May 7, 1919, giving views of Treasury regarding
further financial assistance to Europe. Trans-
mitted to President Wilson May 9.

Dated, May 7, 1919.

For Davis from Leffingwell. Treasury 1030.

Referring to your D-259 and 266, there was never any
doubt here that your position was as outlined in D-266,
but we thought that it might help with Lloyd George for
you to have our views vigorously stated. It is perhaps
unfortunate, but nevertheless true, that public sentiment
in this country is in no mood to tolerate the assumption
by government of further financial burdens in aid of
Europe. One of the gravest difficulties in the way of the
success of the Victory Liberty Loan has been the inability
of our people to understand why we go on lending such
huge sums to the Allies. Since the armistice these have
been in the neighborhood of a billion and three quarters
dollars. Such loans in the month of April alone exceeded
$400,000,000. We are looking forward to making further
loans up to the statutory limit of $10,000,000,000. This
means that we shall have loaned to Europe in the neigh-
borhood of $3,000,000,000 since the cessation of hostilities,
our total loans to the time of the armistice having been
in the neighborhood of $7,000,000,000. You can imagine
that, having successfully carried on the fight for per-
mission to continue our foreign loans to the Allies after
the armistice, and having failed originally to obtain
general extension of authority for government loans to
the Allies, and believing that the very fact that we are
making these loans is a great obstacle to the success of the

373

374 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Victory Liberty Loan, I am strongly apprehensive of the
popular and political effect of any suggestion of govern-
ment loans or guaranties in aid of former enemies. The
American people have lived an existence of provincial
isolation for one hundred years; foreign trade has never
been an important factor in our commercial or industrial
life; we think of ourselves as having performed heroic
deeds and borne great sacrifices to save France and Italy
and hence England from annihilation by the Hun; and
now we are inclined to feel that there is a disposition on
Europe's part to exploit our generosity and to take ad-
vantage of us in financial matters. Unfortunate though
it be, these are partly views of the average American. On
the other hand the War Finance Corporation was recently
authorized by Congress to extend aid to American ex-
porters up to a maximum of $1,000,000,000. To this
extent the Treasury has been successful in obtaining
authority to meet the situation to which your D-259
refers and in which you say the President is interested,
namely devising some practicable plan for affording assist-
ance to Europe with especial reference to the Govern-
ments which have been newly constituted. The com-
mittees and members of both houses of Congress, though
unanimously opposed without distinction of party to
further government loans, were induced by the Treasury
to accept amendment to the War Finance Corporation
Act for this purpose. These amendments were incor-
porated in Victory Liberty Loan bill signed by the Presi-
dent March 3rd, last. The passing of this bill during the
closing days of Congress, in the midst of a bitter partisan
fight to force a special session, was thought here to be
an important achievement of the Treasury. It would
be very disappointing, not to say humiliating, to the
Treasury to have the means thus devised for meeting the
situation to which the President calls attention ignored,
and no serious effort made to take advantage of them.
You have already been fully advised as to the nature of
this War Finance Corporation legislation; it in effect
provides adequate machinery for reasonably long time
credit for the movement of goods out of America. The

ATTITUDE OF THE U. S. TREASURY 375

problem is, therefore, to get American exporters and the
business men in the territories which the President has
in mind in contact with each other for the purpose of
doing business. I think you can be helpful in suggesting
to the governments concerned that America is ready to
supply the goods and to finance their movement in the
way indicated and that the thing to do is to bring their
intelligent and substantial business men in contact with
American exporters for the purpose of developing some
real business. You can, I think, be helpful in bringing
the matter to the attention of such men now in Europe
as Alexander Legge, whom you know very well, and
whom we here regard very highly. If the Harvester
Company, the Steel Company, and Kyan Copper interest
would start something on these lines I believe we should
have taken a very important step towards the solution
of the problem during the period of war. Government
aid has furnished an easy and prompt cure for everybody's
troubles. It is hard for business men, even in this
country, to realize that the time has come for reliance
upon individual initiative. I realize how hard it must be,
therefore, for business men in the countries which have
been devastated by war to begin again. That is, however,
what must be done if sound and permanent relief is to
be given. We are doing all in our power to bring the
importance of this situation to the attention of American
business men and to make them realize that the War
Finance Corporation is prepared to finance their opera-
tions for a substantial period. The question is not, there-
fore, whether America will help, but whether Europe has
adaptability enough and vigor enough to work out some
business transactions and interest American business men
in their financial and economic restoration. There are
signs of increasing interest among our people such as
Farrell for steel, Ryan for copper, and among the cotton
people. I hope the War Finance Corporation will im-
mediately send two or three men to Europe with a view
to looking over the field and possibly making some helpful
suggestion for the purpose of expediting these operations.

POLK, Acting.

DOCUMENT 54.

Report, March 20, 1919, made by Norman H.
Davis, Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu, and Louis
Loucheur regarding the reparation settlement,
with special reference to Germany's capacity to

pay.

i

REPORT TO THE THREE HEADS OF STATE.
By MESSES. DAVIS, MONTAGUE, AND LOUCHEUR.

In endeavoring to arrive at what Germany can pay and
how she can pay it, it is necessary to take into considera-
tion the following questions :

(a) The future labor and political situation of Germany
and the length of time necessary for her to return to her
pre-war efficiency;

(b) Whether or not she can be made to work for the
next 30 years practically on a war basis, by restricting her
imports to absolute necessities and, in addition, be given
freedom of the markets of the world for the sale of her
products;

(c) To what extent such a plan will throw the burden
of reparation on England and France by closing Germany
as a market for their export products and making these
countries, together with other countries of the world, a
dumping ground for Germany's surplus products, to the
detriment of the trade of the countries concerned;

(d) Just what amount Germany would be willing to
undertake to pay without breaking off negotiations and
forcing military occupation or other similar action upon
the Allies.

Before the war Germany's exports were less than her
imports. In 1913 (the best year in her history), Ger-
many's imports exceeded her exports by 300 million

376

GERMANY'S CAPACITY TO PAY 377

dollars. Against this unfavorable balance, her receipts
from mercantile freights, profits of German enterprises
and investments abroad, insurance and remittances from
Germans living abroad, amounted to approximately 700 to
800 million dollars. This covered the trade deficit and
left a surplus of approximately 400 to 500 million dollars.
If her ships and her foreign investments are taken from
her, this source of income will be withdrawn, and accord-
ing to pre-war figures Germany would not be able to
make any payment abroad. However, Germany spent
approximately 400 million dollars per annum on her
Army and Navy, and if the amount of labor and material
thus consumed were turned into the production of essen-
tials, Germany could have produced an exportable sur-
plus, approximately sufficient to cover her trade deficit
and leave a balance of 100 million dollars — assuming
that a market could have been found for such exportable
surplus.

On the other hand, there was apparently, in 1913, no
unfilled demand for any further products, and if Germany
had exported such additional amount, it would have
been through a corresponding decrease in the exports of
other countries.

The question therefore resolves itself entirely into how
much can be saved by Germany confining her imports to
essentials, and how much can the consumptive power
of the world be increased.

On a liberal basis, we estimate that Germany might
possibly pay from 10 to 20 billion dollars over a period of
20 to 30 years.

As nearly as we can judge from the present estimates,
the damage done by Germany for which she is liable
under the strictest interpretation of the exchange of
notes between President Wilson and the German Gov-
ernment, as modified by the Allies on November 4 and
accepted by President Wilson, might amount to approxi-
mately 25 billion dollars. It is felt that Germany should,
if possible, be forced to pay at least this amount, and that,
if the demands are confined to this interpretation, which
the Germans have accepted, the moral opinion of the

\l

378 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

world would force Germany to pay this amount if she
can do so, no matter how many years it may take to do
so. On the other hand, it is felt that if Germany should
even reluctantly obligate herself to pay more than that,
she might, within a few years, repudiate the entire ob-
ligation as having been an imposition, and the moral
opinion of the world might support her in this. We
believe, however, that this will not arise, because Germany
would prefer an occupation rather than agree to any
greater amount.

As to the estimates which have been given by some
eminent bankers, to the effect that Germany would be
able, over a period of 30 years, to pay 3 or 4 billion
dollars per annum, we can say only that we are satisfied
that such a performance on the part of Germany is
utterly impossible, because in the first place she would
never agree to such an undertaking, and in the second
place, even if she were able to do so, which is improbable,
it could only be done by absolutely destroying the trade
of England and France and other countries of the world,
and in order to do so Germany would have to develop a
state of efficiency such as has never been known in the
history of the world, and if she can do this, there is nothing
we can do which would prevent Germany from over-
running the world thereafter.

We therefore recommend that a demand be made upon
Germany to pay a capital sum of 30 billion dollars, one-
half of which shall be paid in dollars or sterling or gold
marks at the standard of weight and fineness at the be-
ginning of the war, and that the other half should be
payable in German currency.

Of the 15 billion dollars to be paid in foreign currency,
we think that approximately 4 or 5 billion dollars might
be paid by Germany within the next two or three years,
through the liquidation of her foreign properties abroad,
including the amount credited to her for her merchant
fleet and German properties in ceded territories. The
balance of this amount, say 10 or 11 billion dollars, we
think should be paid, beginning in 5 years, and amortized
within 30 years.

GERMANY'S CAPACITY TO PAY 379

We are recommending that half of the 30 billion dollars
be paid in German currency, because we are satisfied it
cannot be paid in any other way. The German currency
received in this way could be reinvested to a certain
extent in Germany and could probably be withdrawn in
the next 30 to 60 years.

At the beginning of the war, the total national wealth
of Germany was estimated at 75 billion dollars, of which
15 billion dollars was invested in industrial enterprises.
Even if all of the German industries were purchased by
foreign capital, it would therefore be impossible to invest
more than 15 billion dollars now in such a way — which
is absolute proof of the impossibility of investing German
marks to the extent reckoned by the parties who have
made such high estimates as to Germany's ability to pay.

(We subsequently found Germany did not have 4 or 5
billion in foreign countries and all idea of this dropped.)

DOCUMENT 55.

Memorandum on reparations made by Nor-
man H. Davis for Mr. Lloyd George.

MR. DAVIS'S ARGUMENT TO LLOYD GEORGE.

I. The amount Germany can pay is not capable of
exact determination. It depends on uncertain factors,
e. g., the future prosperity of Germany, the willingness
of the German people to work over a period of years in
order to make payment, and the hidden resources of
the country.

It is fair to say, after an examination by experts, that
all agree that Germany can pay, within a short period,
such as two years, a sum of from $4,000,000,000 to
$5,000,000,000, by the use of such assets as its merchant
marine, property in ceded territories, gold reserve,
foreign securities, and credits. Probably all agree that
an additional amount of from $5,000,000,000 to $10,000-
000,000 can be paid over a period of years, making a
total amount of from $10,000,000,000 to $15,000,000,000
:(£3,000,000,000).

The amount that Germany can pay in excess of the
figures stated is a matter upon which there is a great
opportunity for difference of opinion, but there is a strong
probability that an additional amount of perhaps $15,000-
000,000 could be paid, making a total of $30,000,000,000
(£6,000,000,000) if Germany be permitted to pay, say,
50% of this in German currency.

II. The amount of damage to the persons and property
of the civilian population of the Allies for which Germany
is bound to make reparation under any construction of
the negotiations which preceded the Armistice, will prob-
ably be $30,000,000,000. It is not, therefore, of any

NORMAN H. DAVIS TO MR. LLOYD GEORGE 381

practical importance whether she has obligated herself to
pay an amount in excess of that.

III. The question of the amount which it is wise to
demand that Germany shall pay is affected by political
and economic considerations, such as the following:

(a) The danger of demanding so large a sum as to
induce the German Delegates to refuse to pay it, thereby
confronting the Allies with the alternative of publicly
reducing their demands or undertaking a military oc-
cupation for an indefinite period, in order either to force
acceptance of the demands or attempting to collect them-
selves the amount demanded.

(b) The possibility of causing economic damage to the
Allies. Germany can pay only by the labor of its subjects
and by becoming prosperous. The imports must be
reduced, thereby depriving the Allies of markets, and
exports must be increased, thereby causing severe com-
petition with the Allies. The consequence of forcing
Germany to a state of maximum efficiency and saving
for a long period of years in order to make large annual
payments may cause greater economic damage to the
Allies than the benefits they will derive from the repa-
ration.

(c) There is a strong probability that forcing an un-
willing people to work for a generation to discharge a
large debt will cause unrest which may again disturb the
peace of the world through agitation for repudiation,
and it may also in time produce an effect on the public
opinion of the world which will react upon the Allies.

IV. It seems probable, therefore, that $30,000,000,000
is the maximum which Germany can be asked to pay, in
the following manner:

4 to 5 billion dollars in next two years.
10 to 11 billion dollars (making a total in all of
$15,000,000,000) payable over a period of years,
in cash, foreign securities, credits, etc.
15 billion dollars additional in German currency.
There is a serious question whether the Allies can, with
safety, fix as large an amount as this.

V. In order to provide for future action which may

382 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

be rendered necessary by unforeseen circumstances, a
commission should be created from the Powers interested
with power to modify, suspend, extend, and possibly
even cancel, payments that may accrue over a long period
of years.

DOCUMENT 56.

Letter of Norman H. Davis, March 25,
1919 (autographed original), to President Wilson,
with memorandum of American experts on the
reparation settlement, their estimates, and those
of the French and British (typewritten original).

AMERICAN COMMISSION
TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

March 25, 1919.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT :

As you will recall, after Messrs. Loucheur, Montague
and myself had agreed upon and submitted a report to
you and the two Prime Ministers as to the amount which
Germany might be called upon to pay, Mr. Lloyd George,
in the absence of Mr. Montague, called into the last
meeting Lord Sumner, one of the British representatives
on the Reparation Committee, and Mr. Keynes of the
British Treasury. In an endeavor to arrive at a unani-
mous report by reconciling the views which had been
previously submitted by Lord Sumner, we have had
several meetings. We have agreed substantially upon
the form for the Peace Treaty and upon the plan for its
execution, but we have been unable to arrive at any
agreement with Lords Sumner and Cunliffe (who was
called in by Lord Sumner), because these two gentlemen
still stand upon their original estimate of eleven billion
pounds. Mr. Lloyd George told Mr. Lamont and myself
last Saturday that he thought five billion pounds would
be all right and that it would be quite acceptable to him
provided we could get Lords Sumner and Cunliffe to
agree to this amount, which he would like to have them
do for his own protection and justification. We have
handed our proposed wording to Colonel House who,

383

384 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

I understand, has transmitted it to you, with the various
schedules of figures which may be used after you agree
with the two Prime Ministers upon the exact sum which
shall be taken.

In our opinion it is very essential to have Sub-Com-
mittee No. 2 of the Reparations Committee (which is
to report on the amount which Germany can pay and
how it may be paid) make its report and get out of the
way. As Lord Cunliffe is the British representative on
this Sub-Committee, it is apparently going to be im-
possible to make a unanimous report; and even if it
were possible, it is, as I understand, your view as well
as that of Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Clemenceau that
it would be inadvisable now to have any fixed amount
reported by that Sub-Committee even if they could
agree upon it.

I therefore suggest the advisability of having this
Sub-Committee make a report to the General Committee,
in general as follows:

I. It is impossible to estimate with any accuracy
just how much Germany can pay, but the Sub-
Committee estimated that Germany could pay,
over a series of years, anywhere from one hundred
billion to two hundred fifty-five billion marks, de-
pending upon various factors, such as (a) the amount
of territory which may be taken from Germany;
(b) the number of years over which payment can
be exacted; (c) the extent to which German commerce
may be expanded without detriment to the creditor
nations.

II. That a Commission be provided for in the
Peace Treaty which shall have power, within certain
limits, to determine what can and should be paid
during certain periods by Germany.

III. Or we suggest, as an alternative plan, that,
instead of having any estimate made by the Sub-
Committee, they state in substance that, in view
of the uncertain elements involved and until it is
known what Germany will be left with, it is impossible
to make any accurate estimate, and it is therefore

NORMAN H. DAVIS TO PRESIDENT WILSON 385

recommended that the sub-committee be dissolved
and that the representatives of the respective Gov-
. ernments report directly to their chiefs from time
to time during the negotiations as to what, in their
opinion, might be collected from Germany.
Under such a general form of report, the embarrassment
of the present situation could be avoided, and you and
the two Prime Ministers could then appoint indepen-
dently a representative each to conduct the negotiations
and agree upon something more concrete and constructive,
because it is impossible to handle such a delicate matter
as this in so large a committee.

The foregoing is dictated hastily, but we are preparing
for submission to you today a more carefully prepared
plan of the whole situation.

This is now ready and is submitted herewith.

[Signed] NORMAN H. DAVIS.
THE PRESIDENT,

American Commission to Negotiate Peace,
Hotel Crillon, Paris.

P.S. I have shown this to Col. House who approves.

N. H. D.

The following are submitted as the joint views of
Messrs. Davis, Strauss & Lament.

REPARATION.

1. We believe that the Special Committee which has been
considering this matter has arrived at practical agree-
ment as to the form of its report. As to the figures,
however, they have been unable to agree. Therefore,
all three delegations have decided to submit the form to
their respective chiefs, together with figures showing
precisely the different ideas prevailing, suggesting that
the heads of the three Governments may wish to decide,
from among the sets of figures submitted, what schedule
shall finally be inserted in the Treaty; or may desire to
refer the matter back with further definite instructions
to the Special Committee.

386 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

2. To this end we attach Schedule A, being a form
which we have drafted for embodiment in the Treaty.
The British and French state that in a general way they
are in accord as to this form.

3. The chief points embodied in this form are:

(a) To fix the sums which the Enemy countries shall

pay over a series of years, and

(b) To establish a permanent Commission which shall

control the whole matter of Reparation pay-
ments and, within limitations, have power to
postpone and modify the sums which the Enemy
shall be called upon to pay.

4. Recognizing that the Commission may, in future
years, receive information not now available as to the
Enemy's capacity to pay, we propose that the Asso-
ciated Governments (whose representatives are to com-
pose the Commission) shall file with the Commission
immediate instructions, giving this Commission lati-
tude and discretion along certain lines, and specifically
authorizing it to reduce the payments down to what we
style a series of "minimum" payments. It is obviously
unwise to exhibit to the Enemy at Versailles the fact that
we contemplate the necessity for the course just de-
scribed. The proposed instructions should cover con-
siderable ground, and for your information we attach
(Schedule B) a copy of such a letter. You will note that,
among other things, this letter permits the proposed
Commission to accept payment (in general up to 50 per
cent) in the form of reichsmarks.

5. The constitution of such a commission presents
certain difficulties. Attached (Schedule C) is suggestion
as to how such a Commission shall be set up. You will
note that our suggestion is to name, as the Government's
representatives on this Commission, Great Britain, France
and Italy. This will very likely be objected to on the part
of these Governments, who will fear a deadlock and who
will then wish America to be represented. If this should
be deemed advisable, the Commission should be made to
include five members, one the representative of the
smaller powers. Further, provision should be made to

NORMAN H. DAVIS TO PRESIDENT WILSON 387

enable any Government to withdraw its representative
upon one year's notice. If America finds it necessary
to have a seat on such Commission in order to try to
maintain harmony, at least she should have an oppor-
tunity to retire if she deems it necessary.

6. It should be noted that in the estimates submitted
by the American Delegation this morning, it was assumed
that the Enemy States should not be hampered in their
manufactures and trade by embargoes and other re-
strictions.

SCHEDULE "A"

Copy sent to
Col. House

(Third revise

March 24).

TENTATIVE AND SUBMITTED WITH EVERY RESERVATION.

Total Damage for Which Enemy Responsible.

(1) The loss and damage to which the Allies and Associ-
ated Governments and their nationals have been subjected
as a direct and necessary consequence of the war imposed
upon them by the Enemy States, is upwards of 800
thousand million marks.

(2) It is recognized by all of the Allied and Associated
Governments that the financial and economic resources
of the Enemy States are not unlimited, and that it will
therefore be impracticable for the Enemy States to make
complete reparation for the loss and damage, above stated,
resulting from the aggression of such Enemy States.

What Enemy Obligated to Pay.

(3) The Allied and Associated Governments have made
a preliminary investigation of the material damage and of
the personal injury to civilians, which the Enemy States
have caused, and of the damage resulting from their acts
in violation of formal engagements and of the law of nations.
Such investigation shows that the aggregate of these
items alone is a sum in excess of million marks.

388 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT
What Enemy Can and Shall Pay.

(4) The Allied and Associated Governments have
determined that the Enemy States shall be called upon
to pay the sums as set forth below.

Initial Payment.

(5) The Enemy States shall pay within a period of two
years, beginning May 1, 1919, the sum of 20 thousand
million marks, and on account of the foregoing sum, shall
immediately hand over to a Commission (hereinafter pro-
vided for) of the Allied and Associated Governments:

(a) the whole of the Enemy mercantile marine;

(b) per cent, of the stock of Enemy gold in the
Government banks and in all other banks.
(N.B. What per cent, this shall be is a matter
for decision.)

(c) the whole of the Enemy property and rights of

Enemy nationals situated outside Germany,
including all foreign securities, properties, busi-
nesses and concessions.

Administration of Liquid Assets.

(6) The aforesaid assets shall be administered by the
Commission (hereinafter provided for), which shall have
power to restore, in whole or in part, to the Enemy
States, particular assets out of the above if such Commis-
sion are satisfied that it is in the interests of the Allied and
Associated Governments, having regard to the future
condition of the Enemy States, that such assets should
be so returned. The net proceeds, if any, of the assets
retained by the Commission, after meeting the cost of
supplies to the Enemy States, approved for payment by
the Allied and Associated Governments, also the cost
of the Armies of Occupation, shall be applied by the
Commission towards meeting instalments of annual
payments due as below.

Subsequent Payments.

(7) The Enemy States shall pay further sums in ac-
cordance with the following schedule:

NORMAN H. DAVIS TO PRESIDENT WILSON 389

(Here insert such schedule of maximum payments as
the Allied and Associated Governments may agree
upon).

Commission with Plenary Powers.

(8) With reference to the aforesaid payments by the
Enemy States, a Commission shall forthwith be consti-
tuted in the following manner:

(Here insert provisions relative to the constitution of
the Commission).

Such Commission shall have power:

(a) To handle, in the manner prescribed in the fore-
going paragraph (6) those Enemy assets that are to be
immediately handed over by the Enemy States;

(b) To fix the manner, form and place of the subse-
quent payments;

(c) In general to control and direct in all respects the
matter of payments in such manner as may be, in
the judgment of the Commission, most conducive to the
interests of the Allied and Associated Governments;
including the power, subject to such limitations as the
Allied and Associated Governments may fix, to suspend,
extend or cancel, in part or in whole, any payments due
or to become due.

Acknowledgment by Enemy.

(9) The Enemy States recognize that the very inten-
sity and extent of their aggression renders it impracti-
cable to express in precise pecuniary terms the full
measure of the loss and damage resulting therefrom, and
they further recognize, without qualification and reserve,
that the sums above set forth to be paid by them fall
short of adequate compensation for that damage which
the Enemy States should repay.

Undertaking by Enemy.

(10) The Enemy States hereby agree to make repara-
tion to the extent of the sums above set forth, as the
amounts to be paid by them, and to abide by and comply

390 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

with the decisions and directions of the Commission
above provided for and described.

SCHEDULE "B"

SUGGESTIONS FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMISSION.

March 25, 1919.
Maximum Payments.

The Commission is hereby instructed as follows:

(1) Attached hereto and made a part hereof and
marked "A" is a schedule of payments for which, pur-
suant to Article of the Treaty, the enemy govern-
ments are liable.

Minimum Payments.

(2) Attached hereto and made a part hereof and marked
"B" is a further schedule of payments, which schedule
is not embodied in the Treaty itself. The Commission
shall not authorize payments by the enemy govern-
ments to fall below those in said Schedule "B" set forth,
except as in the next succeeding paragraph provided.

Exceptional Deferment of Principal Sums and
Waiver of Interest During First 5-yr. Period.

(3) In the event that the Commission shall judge that
the enemy governments are incapable of making the
payments which said Schedule "B" contemplates shall
be made within the period May 1, 1921-April 30, 1926,
then, and as an exception to the next preceding paragraph,
the Commission, in its discretion, may

(a) Authorize the postponement, to the extent and in
the manner that the Commission may determine, of the
payment of the principal sums contemplated by said
Schedule "B" to be payable within the period of May 1,
1921-April 30, 1926.

(b) Waive permanently payment of all or any part of
interest which said Schedule "B" may contemplate to
become due during the period May 1, 1921-April 30,
1926,

NORMAN H. DAVIS TO PRESIDENT WILSON 391

Proportion Payable in Reichsmarks.

(4) The Commission, in fixing the method in which
payments under either Schedule "A" or Schedule "B"
shall be made, may authorize up to, but not more than,
66 - f per centum of the payments in any year up to and
including the year 1931 to be made in the currency of
enemy countries (reichsmarks) which shall be accepted
at the par of exchange, and it may authorize up to, but not
more than, 50 per centum of the payments in any year
subsequent to the year 1931 to be made in such currency,
and at the same rate of exchange.

SCHEDULE "C"

Reference to Treaty.

Whereas, Article of the Treaty contemplates the
constitution by the Governments of Great Britain, France
and Italy of a Commission, now, therefore, the said
Governments do hereby constitute said commission as
follows :

Name of Commission.

(1) The said Commission shall be known as "High
Commission on Reparation."

Its Membership.

(2) The said Commission shall be composed of three
members. Each of the Governments of Great Britain,
France and Italy shall appoint one member upon such
Commission. The Government or Governments en-
titled to appoint members may fix the tenure of office of
their appointees.

Expenses Borne by Enemy Governments.

(3) Proper provision shall be made by the Enemy
States for the compensation and expenses of the Commis-
sion and of such staff as it may find it necessary to employ.

Procedure.

(4) The Commission shall act by the affirmative vote
of not less than two members. Otherwise the Commis-

392 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

sion shall fix its own procedure and the time and place
of its meetings. The first meeting of the Commission
shall be held on the first day of May, 1919, at the City
of Paris.

Powers.

(5) The Commission shall have power, subject to the
instructions, if any, of the undersigned Governments of
them:

(a) To receive and control in the manner already
described in Article of the Treaty the initial pay-
ments and property to be handed over by the Enemy
States;

(b) To fix the manner, form and place of the subsequent
payments, pursuant to Article of the Treaty :

(c) In general to control and direct in all respects the
matter of payments in the manner, in the judgement of
the Commission, most conducive to the interests of the
Allied and Associated Governments including the Power
subject to such limitations as the Allied and Associ-
ated Governments may fix, to suspend, extend or cancel,
in part or in whole, any payments due or to become
due;

(d) In general to do such acts and things as, in the
judgment of the Commission, may be necessary or use-
ful to permit of the effective exercise of the foregoing
powers.

Duties.

(6) It shall be the duty of the Commission to exercise
its powers to give effect to the provisions of Articles of
the Treaty and the provisions of such directions, if any,
as may be given the Commission by the undersigned
Governments or of them.

Responsibility.

(7) Each member of the Commission shall be respon-
sible only to the Government or Governments having
appointed him.

NORMAN H. DAVIS TO PRESIDENT WILSON 393

Termination of Commission's Life.

(8) The Commission shall cease to exist whenever the
undersigned Governments or of them shall so
determine.

Amendment.

(9) This instrument is subject to amendment by the
undersigned Governments or of them.

FRANCE IN 1908.

Lands, and Forests £3,020,000,000

Animals and Agricultural material 357,000,000

Buildings (including factories) 2,317,000,000

Businesses (including mines) 381,000,000

Bonds, including public bonds represented by

property1 1,657,000,000

Foreign Securities 1,520,000,000

Gold and Silver 347,000,000

Furniture, Jewelry, Automobiles, Horses, Carriages 890,000,000

£10,489,000,000
Deduct foreign securities and gold and silver . 1,867,000,000

say £8,600,000,000

of which 5 per cent, is £430,000,000

Double this for increase of value and prices

since 1908 £860,000,000

1. The estimates contained below must be taken with
the reservation that, in our opinion, long before the
amounts are collected, the Allied Governments may,
and probably will, find that such collection is doing to
them as much damage as to the enemy, and that the
Allied Governments will find it to their interest volun-
tarily to reduce or suspend such payments. It must
also be recognized that any such estimates involve large
elements of conjecture.

Subject as the above,

2. It is our opinion that Germany can pay the minimum,

'Omitting dead weight public debt.

394 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

and may be able to pay the maximum, amounts per
annum set forth in the American annexed schedule, it
being understood that the Financial Commission to be
appointed will have the power to fix the amount of the
payments between the maximum and minimum limits
and to modify the methods of payment, and if necessary
will exercise its power to permit one-half thereof to be
paid in paper reichsmarks at the par of exchange.

3. These payments may be continued for as many
years as is necessary to produce the sum adjudged to be
due in respect of reparation under the definitions con-
tended for by the United States.

4. If it is deemed wise not to extend said payments
beyond a fixed number of years (say 30 years) whether
or not the present value thereof reached the amount due
for reparation, then the present value of said maximum
and minimum payments running over a period of 30
years will amount respectively to $25,000,000, and
$35,000,000.

5. The original estimate of $30,000,000,000 which
Messrs. Davis, Strauss and Lamont unanimously arrived
at several weeks ago, is still, in their judgment, the most
reasonable basis. But they have expressed their willing-
ness to raise this estimate to the maximum figures submit-
ted herewith, in order to try to meet the British and
French views.

AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR MINIMUM.

PAYMENTS (TO BE REDUCED TO THE FOLLOWING WITHIN
DISCRETION OF COMMISSION).

STERLING

Cash Payments (up to May, 1921) .... £ 1,000,000,000
10 annual payments of £200,000,000, each, 1922-

1931 2,000,000,000

10 annual payments of £300,000,000 each, 1932-

1941 3,000,000,000

10 annual payments of £270,000,000 each 1942-

1951 . . 2,700,000,000

Total payments (including interest and sinking

fund) £ 8,700,000,000

NORMAN H. DAVIS TO PRESIDENT WILSON 395

The present worth (as of May, 1921) of this series of payments is
£5,000,000,000 or $25,000,000,000

It should be noted that the initial sum above mentioned
(£1,000,000,000) will probably be reduced to £600,000,000
because of the necessary cash payments to be allowed
from it, covering food for Germany, cost of army of
occupation and raw materials necessary to permit Ger-
many to resume industrial work.

AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR MAXIMUM
PAYMENTS TO BE INSERTED IN PEACE TREATY.

STEELING

Cash Payment (up to May, 1921) £ 1,000,000,000

10 annual payments of £300,000,000 each, 1922-

1931 3,000,000,000

10 annual payments of £400,000,000 each, 1931-

1941 4,000,000,000

10 annual payments of £500,000,000 each, 1942-

1951 5,000,000,000

Total payments (including interest and sinking

fund) £13,000,000,000

The present worth (as of May, 1921) of this series of payments is
£7,000,000,000 or $35,000,000,000

It should be noted that the initial sum above men-
tioned (£1,000,000,000) will probably be reduced to
£600,000,000 because of the necessary cash payments to
be allowed from it, covering food for Germany, cost of
army of occupation and raw materials necessary to permit
Germany to resume industrial work.

396 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT
FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR MINIMUM.

STERLING

Cash Payment (up to May, 1921) .... £ 1,000,000,000

In 1921 200,000,000

1922 240,000,000

1923 280,000,000

1924 320,000,000

1925 360,000,000

1926 400,000,000

From 1927-1961 inclusive (34 years) .... 13,400,000,000

Total payments (including interest and sinking
fund) £16,400,000,000

The present worth (as of May, 1921) of this series of payments is
£6,200,000,000 or $31,000,000,000

FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR MAXIMUM.

STERLING

Cash Payment (up to May, 1921) .... £ 1,000,000,000

In 1921 400,000,000

1922 440,000,000

1923 480,000,000

1924 520,000,000

1925 " . 560,000,000

1926 600,000,000

From 1927 to 1961 inclusive (34 years) annual

payments of £600,000,000 each 20,400,000,000

Total payments (including interest and sinking

fund) £24,400,000,000

The present worth (as of May, 1921) of this series of payments is
£9,400,000,000 or $47,000,000,000

BRITISH PROPOSALS (N.B.)

STERLING

Cash Payment (up to May, 1921) £ 1,000,000,000

1921-1926 not stated

Thereafter, for a period of 33 years, annual pay-
ments of £600,000,000 each 21,800,000,000

Total payments (including interest and sinking
fund) £22,800,000,000

The present worth (as of May, 1921) of this series of payments is
£11,000,000,000 or $55,000,000,000

N. B. The British proposals are in the form of a memorandum from Lord Sumner, the text of which is
not entirely clear as to the total term of payments, nor to the present worth of such payments. No mini-
mum proposals were submitted.

DOCUMENT 57.

Memorandum of progress with the reparation
settlement, April 1, with Anglo-American draft
of Reparations Clauses (typewritten copies).

April 1, 1919.

British, United States, French and Italian financial
representatives met yesterday morning.

After preliminary discussion, the conference was ad-
journed, to enable Mr. Klotz to submit amendments to
Mr. Lloyd George's proposals. Since then, the United
States representatives and the British representatives
have been in almost continuous session.

It has been agreed between them that Mr. Lloyd
George's plan shall be in substance adopted, that is to
say:

1. That Germany shall be compelled to admit her

financial liability for all damage done to the
civilian population of the Allied and Associated
Powers and their property by the aggression of
the Enemy States by land, by sea and from the
air, and also, for damage resulting from their acts
in violation of formal engagements and of the Law
of Nations.

2. That a commission should be established to decide:

(1) The value of the claims in the categories agreed

by the Allies as falling within Germany's
liabilities as above.

(2) The total amount which Germany was capable

of paying to satisfy these claims.

(3) That the commission should report by the end

of 1921, but should have power to modify,
from time to time, the time and mode of Ger-
many's payments subsequent to 1921.

397

398 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

(4) That payments should be made by an initial
sum and annual instalments over a period of
not more than thirty years.

It was further agreed that an interpretation document
should be prepared, to be handed to the Germans as an
explanation of what the Allied and Associated Powers
regarded as the liabilities payment for which they were
in a position to enforce under the above clause, subject
to Germany's capacity to pay as determined by the com-
mission. The United States and British representatives
agreed that among the categories to be included should
be the cost of pensions and the cost of damage to prop-
erty.

It was understood that Mr. Lloyd George and Mr.
Clemenceau have agreed that pensions shall be calcu-
lated on the French basis of payments.

In order to avoid the challenging and putting forward
of doubtful claims, we think it would be expedient to
agree at once between the Allies a proportionate dis-
tribution of all payments received from Germany.

We propose to meet further in order:.

1. To draft the interpretation clause and to consider

Mr. Klotz's amendments which are directed
towards this end, and

2. To make proposals as to the proportionate distribu-

tion of receipts between the Allies.

TEXT TENTATIVELY AGREED UPON BY THE BRITISH
AND AMERICAN DELEGATES.

1. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm the
responsibility of the Enemy States for causing all the
loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated
Governments and their nationals have been subjected
as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the
aggression of the enemy states.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments recognize
that the financial resources of the enemy states are not
unlimited and, after taking into account permanent
diminutions of such resources which will result from other
treaty clauses, they judge that it will be impracticable for

ANGLO-AMERICAN DRAFT OF REPARATIONS 399

enemy states to make complete reparation for all such
loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Govern-
ments, however, require that the enemy states, to the
extent of their utmost capacity, make compensation for
all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied
and Associated Powers and to their property by the ag-
gression of the Enemy States by land, by sea, and from
the air.

(See Annex for interpretation clause
prepared by the British.)

3. The amount of such damage for which compensa-
tion is to be made shall be determined by an inter-allied
commission, to be constituted in such form as the Allied
and Associated Governments shall forthwith determine.
This commission shall examine into the claims and give to
the enemy states a just opportunity to be heard. The
findings of the commission as to the amount of damage
defined in Article 2 shall be concluded and communicated
to the enemy states on or before May 1st, 1921. The
commission at the same time shall also draw up a schedule
of payments up to or within the total sum thus due,
which in their judgment Germany should be able to
liquidate within a period of thirty years, and this schedule
of payments shall then be communicated to Germany as
representing the extent of her obligations.

4. The inter-allied commission shall further have dis-
cretion to modify from time to time the date and mode
of the schedule of payments fixed in clause 3 and, if neces-
sary, to extend them in part beyond thirty years, by
acceptance of long period bonds or otherwise, if subse-
quently such modification or extension appears necessary,
after giving Germany a just opportunity to be heard.
Payment may be required and, with the approval of the
commission, accepted in the form of properties, chattels,
businesses, rights, and concessions in ceded territory;
of ships, of gold and silver, of properties, chattels, busi-
nesses, rights and concessions, of bonds, shares and
securities of all kinds, of foreign currencies or the cur-

400 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

rency of the enemy state, or of German Government
bonds.

5. In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers
to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial
and economic life, pending the full determination of their
claim, the enemy states shall pay in such instalments
and in such manner (whether in gold, commodities,
ships, securities or otherwise) as the inter-allied com-
mission may fix, in 1919 and 1920 the equivalent of
$5,000,000,000 gold towards the liquidation of the above
claims, out of which the expenses of the army of occupa-
tion, subsequent to the Armistice, shall first be met,
provided that such supplies of food and raw materials
as may be adjudged by the Allied and Associated Gov-
ernments to be essential to enable Germany to meet
her obligations for reparation may, with the approval
of the Allied and Associated Governments, be paid for
out of the above sum.

6. The successive instalments paid over by the enemy
states in satisfaction of the above claims shall be divided
by the Allied and Associated Governments in proportions
which have been determined upon by them in advance,
on a basis of general equity, and of the rights of each.

7. The payments mentioned above do not include
restitution in kind of cash taken away, seized or seques-
tered, nor the restitution in kind of animals, objects of
every nature and securities taken away, seized or seques-
tered, in the cases in which it proves possible to identify
them in enemy territory. If at least half the number of
the animals taken by the enemy from the invaded territories
cannot be identified and returned, the balance, up to a
total of half the number taken, shall be delivered by
Germany by way of restitution.

The attention of the four Chiefs of the respective Gov-
ernments is to be called to the following:

(a) That necessary guarantees to insure the due col-

lection of the sums fixed for reparation should be
planned; and

(b) That there are other financial clauses which this

conference has not been charged to deal with.

ANGLO-AMERICAN DRAFT OF REPARATIONS 401

ANNEX TO CLAUSE 2.
Personal Injury.

(1) Personal injury to or death of civilians resulting
from military operations or mistreatment by the enemy.

Pensions.

(2) Damage to the civilian population resulting from
the absence, incapacitation or death, in military service,
of persons upon whom they are dependent and which
damage is met by pensions or payments of like nature
made by the State. (French scale to govern.)

Damage to Labor.

(3) Damage to civilians resulting from their being
forced by the enemy to labor without just remuneration,
or to abstain from labor.

Damage to Property.

(4) Damage to non-military property and property
rights caused by military operations or illegal act of
the enemy or war measures in the nature of requisitions
or sequestrations, taken by the enemy.

Fines, etc.

(5) Damage in the form of levies, fines and other
similar extractions imposed by the enemy upon the civi-
lian population.

Violations of Law and Engagements.

(6) Damage resulting from acts in violation of inter-
national law (as found by the Commission on Responsi-
bilities) and in violation of formal engagements.

Note: Where the State or other public authority has
already itself made compensation for the damage, it may
present the claim in its own behalf.

INTERPRETATION OF CLAUSE 2.

April 2nd.

Compensation may be claimed under Clause 2 under
the following categories of damage:

402 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

I.

(a) Damage caused to civilian victims of acts of war
(including bombardments or other attacks on land, on sea
or from the air and all the direct consequences thereof
and of all operations of war by the two groups of bellig-
erents wherever arising) and to the surviving dependents
of such victims.

(b) Damage caused to civilian victims of acts, cruelties,
violence, or maltreatment (including injuries to life or
health as a consequence of imprisonment, deportation,
internment, or evacuation, of exposure at sea, or of being
forced to labor by the enemy) committed or ordered by
the enemy wherever arising and to the surviving depend-
ents of such victims.

(c) Damage caused to civilian victims of all acts of the
enemy in occupied, invaded or enemy territory, injurious
to health or capacity for work or to honor and to the
surviving dependents of such victims.

n.

(a) All pensions and compensations in the nature of
pensions to naval and military victims of war, whether
mutilated, wounded, sick or invalided, and to the de-
pendents of such victims.

(b) Cost of assistance by the State to prisoners of war
and to their families or dependents.

(c) Allowances by the State to the families and depend-
ents of mobilized persons, or persons serving with the
forces.

in.

Damage in respect of all property belonging to any of
the Allied and Associated States or to any of their sub-
jects, with the exception of military works or material,
which has been carried off, seized, injured or destroyed
by the acts of the enemy on land, on sea, or from the air,
or damaged directly in consequence of hostilities or any
operation of war.

DOCUMENT 58.

Letter of Norman H. Davis and Vance McCor-
mick to President Wilson, April 4 (autographed
original), with draft clauses, comments and reser-
vations (typewritten copy).

AMERICAN COMMISSION
TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

April 4, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

Supplementing our conversation with you of last night,
we hand you herewith a schedule showing the basic text
of the reparation clauses and categories of damage, to-
gether with the comment and reserves in regard thereto
made by the representatives of the Four Powers who have
been participating in the discussions.

These comments and reserves are taken from the record
and may appear to you to be somewhat formidable. As
a matter of fact we believe that serious question exists
only with reference to Article 3, to which the French
appear to make serious objection. There is also the
hesitation of the British relative to the acceptance of the
categories. We have reason to believe that the Italians
are prepared to accept our text in toto.

Sincerely yours,

\Sianed\ /NORMAN H. DAVIS
^ \VANCE McCoRMicK

HON. WOODROW WILSON,

President of the United States,
Paris.

403

404 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

REPARATION CLAIMS.

TEXT.

1. The Allied and Associated
Governments affirm the respon-
sibility of the enemy States for
causing all the loss and damage
to which the Allied and Asso-
ciated Governments and their
nationals have been subjected as
a consequence of the war imposed
upon them by the aggression of
the enemy States.

2. The Allied and Associated
Governments recognize that the
financial resources of the enemy
States are not unlimited, and,
after taking into account per-
manent diminutions of such re-
sources which will result from
other treaty clauses, they judge
that it will be impracticable for
enemy States to make complete
reparation for all such loss and
damage. The Allied and As-
sociated Governments, however,
require that the enemy States, to
the extent of their utmost ca-
pacity, make compensation for
all damage done to the civilian
population of the Allied or As-
sociated Powers and to their
property by the aggression of
the enemy States by land, by sea,
and from the air.

(Reference to Categories may be
inserted here.)

3. The amount of such damage
for which compensation is to be
made should be determined by

BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN AND
U. 8. COMMENT AND RESERVES.

Article 1 is agreed to subject to :

(a) Italian reserve with re-
spect to substituting for "enemy
States" where it first occurs, the
word " Germany ", thus proclaim-
ing the liability of Germany for
all consequences of the war of
herself and her Allies;

(b) French reserve as to po-
litical policy of incorporating
Article 1 and the first half of
Article 2, as this is in the nature
of a preamble and might be
omitted or placed in the general
preambles of the Treaty.

Article 2 is agreed to, subject
to the observation of the French
that the phrase "to the extent of
their utmost capacity" is incon-
sistent with the 30-year limita-
tion in Article 3.

With regard to the parenthet-
ical reference to categories, it is
left undetermined as to whether
these shall or shall not be incor-
porated in the first instance in
the treaty as to be proposed to
Germany. The British, French
and Italians regard this as indis-
pensable; the United States re-
served their view as being a
question of strategy to be sub-
sequently decided.

Article 3 is agreed to, except as
to France, which rejects the
paragraph particularly in that it

DAVIS AND McCORMICK TO WILSON, APRIL 4

405

an inter-allied commission, to be
constituted in such form as the
Allied and Associated Govern-
ments shall forthwith determine.
This commission shall examine
into the claims and give to the
enemy States a just opportunity
to be heard. The findings of the
commission as to the amount of
damage defined in Article 2
shall be concluded and com-
municated to the enemy States
on or before May 1, 1921. The
commission shall also, concur-
rently, draw up a schedule of
payments up to or within the
total sum thus due, which in
their judgment Germany should
be able to liquidate within a
period of thirty years, and this
schedule of payments shall then
be communicated to Germany as
representing the extent of her
obligations.

4. The inter-allied commission
shall further have discretion to
modify from time to time the
date and mode of the schedule of
payments fixed in clause 3, and,
if necessary, to extend them in
part beyond thirty years, by ac-
ceptance of long period bonds or
otherwise, if subsequently such
modification or extension appear
necessary, after giving Germany
a just opportunity to be heard.

5. In order to enable the Allied
and Associated Powers to proceed
at once to the restoration of their
industrial and economic life,
pending the full determination
of their claim, Germany shall
pay in such instalments and in
such manner (whether in gold,
commodities, ships, securities or
otherwise) as the inter-allied
commission may fix, in 1919 and

does not insure the complete
payment of the debt to be es-
tablished in accordance with
Article 2. The French contend
that the Commission should be
required to secure complete pay-
ment but have discretion so as to
permit such proportion of this as
may be necessary to be paid in
marks and German internal
bonds.

Article 4 is accepted, subject
to any modifications which might
be required if Article 3 is changed
in accordance with the French

view.

Article 5 is accepted by the
British and Americans. The
French and Italians propose the
following alternative text:

"Germany shall pay, in such
instalments and in such manner
(either in gold, commodities,
ships, securities or otherwise) as
the inter-allied commission may
fix, in 1919 and 1920, the equiv-
alent of $5,000,000,000 gold, of

406 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

1920, the equivalent of $5,000,
000,000 gold towards the liqui-
dation of the above claims, out of
which the expenses of the Army
of Occupation subsequent to the
Armistice shall first be met, pro-
vided that such supplies of food
and raw materials as may be
judged by the Allied and Asso-
ciated Governments to be essen-
tial to enable Germany to meet
her obligations for reparation
may, with the approval of the
Allied and Associated Govern-
ments, be paid for out of the
above sum.

6. The successive installments
paid over by the enemy States in
satisfaction of the above claims
shall be divided by the Allied
and Associated Governments in
proportions which have been de-
termined upon by them in ad-
vance, on a basis of general
equity, and of the rights of each.

7. The payments mentioned
above do not include restitution
in kind of cash taken away,
seized or sequestrated, nor the
restitution in kind of animals,
objects of every nature and se-
curities taken away, seized, or
sequestrated in the cases in which
it proves possible to identify
them in enemy territory. If at
least half the number of animals
taken by the enemy from the in-
vaded territories cannot be iden-
tified and returned, the balance,
up to a total of half the number
taken, shall be delivered by Ger-
many by way of restitution.

N. B. The attention of the four
chiefs of the respective Govern-
ments is to be called to the fol-
lowing:

which $4,500,000,000 shall be
applied to meet the expenses of
the Armies of Occupation and
the reparation of damage above
contemplated, and $500,000,000
shall be applied to the payment
of supplies of food and raw mate-
rials, approved and controlled by
the Allied and Associated Powers
for the purpose of supplying
Germany up to May 1, 1921."

Article 6 is agreed to, subject
to the Italian reservation that in
the event of the inability of the
Allied and Associated Govern-
ments to agree upon a division
of the reparation payments, the
question shall be arbitrated by
or under the direction of the
President of the United States.

Article 7 is agreed to, subject to
the British reservation of the word
"cash" in the first sentence.
The British have proposed that
the propriety of including cash
be decided by the American dele-
gation. The French reserve the
question of their willingness to
accept such decision.

DAVIS AND McCORMICK TO WILSON, APRIL 4 407

(a) That necessary guarantees
to insure the due collection
of the sums fixed for repara-
tion should be planned; and

(b) That there are other finan-
cial clauses which this con-
ference has not been charged
to deal with.

ANNEX.

Compensation may be claimed under Article 2 for the
following categories of damage:

(1) Personal injury to or death of civilians resulting
from acts of war on land and sea and from the air or mis-
treatment by the enemy.

(2) Damage to the civilian population resulting from
the absence, incapacitation or death of persons serving
with the forces and which damage is met by pensions or
allowances of like nature made by the State (French
scale to govern).

(3) Damage to civilians resulting from their being
forced by the enemy to labor without just remuneration
or abstain from labor.

(4) Damage to or interference with non-military prop-
erty, as from date of damage or interference, directly
caused by acts of war on land and sea and from air, or
illegal acts of the enemy or war measures in the nature
of requisitions or sequestrations, taken by the enemy.

(5) Damage in the form of levies, fines and other
similar exactions imposed by the enemy upon the civilian
population.

(6) Damage resulting from acts in violation of inter-
national law (as found by the Commission on Responsi-
bilities) and in violation of formal engagements.

Note: Where the State or other public authority has
already itself made compensation for the damage,
it may present the claim in its own behalf.
(These categories are accepted, subject to the following:
(a) British do not oppose, but state present instruc-
tions from Mr. Lloyd George do not permit them
to accept all of the categories;

408 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

(b) French propose additional categories: (1) expense

of relief to prisoners of war, (2) expense involved
in repurchase of marks;

(c) Italians state they construe Category 6 to permit

a claim for expense in providing defense against
air raids and gas attack. Other delegations do
not accept this construction).

DOCUMENT 59.

French memorandum, April 5, criticizing the
Anglo-American draft of Reparations Clauses
(carbon copy, translation).

April 5, 1919.

REMARKS OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION

ABOUT THE SCHEME
OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN DELEGATIONS

ARTICLE I. — The French Delegation makes all reserves
concerning the political advisableness of asserting amongst
the financial clauses of the treaty Germany's incapacity
of discharging the whole of her debt.

ARTICLES II AND III. — The note brought forward by
Mr. Lloyd George on the 29th of March 1919 and the
memorandum of the British and American Delegation
of the 1st of April asserted both the right for the Allied
and Associated Governments of getting full reparation
for all the loss and damage caused to the persons and to the
property whatever may be the cost for the enemy states.
But the terms of Article III were inconsistent with that
principle, since they compelled the interallied commission
to limit the amount of the payments to be made by the
enemy by taking into account its financial capacity during
30 years. If, for instance, Germany's liability towards the
Allied and Associated Governments, for compensating
the damage defined in Article II, is found to be 50 billions
of dollars, and if her financial capacity during 30 years is
estimated by the interallied commission to be 40 billions of
dollars, the indebtedness of Germany toward the Allies
would be declared to amount to 40 billions instead of
50 billions of dollars. Therefore the fixing of the amount
of the damage for which compensation is to be given

409

410 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

becomes useless, and [to] assert in Article II the principle
of the complete reparation by the enemy leads only to
misleading the peoples.

The Anglo-American scheme, in the new shape in
which it was brought forward on the 3rd of April, leaves
aside the declaration that the Allied and Associated
Governments are entitled to get full reparation of the
damage denned in Article II, by omitting the words:
"At whatever cost."

It gives to the financial interallied Commission a double
task: on the one hand it has to fix the total amount of
the German debt, such as the Allied and Associated
Governments have agreed upon; on the other hand it has
to reduce that debt by taking into account Germany's
eventual ability to pay in 30 years.

The French Delegation which has already admitted
Germany's debt to be reduced to the amount of the war
costs cannot now agree to a new reduction. This last
one is based on the assumption; which it is impossible to
verify; in 1921 as well as in 1919; on Germany's incapacity
to discharge the whole of her debt in 30 years.

It is of a bad policy as well as dangerous concerning
the people of the Allied and Associated Governments as
well as the German people; to declare in one of the
clauses of the treaty that the Allied and Associated Gov-
ernments shall take into account Germany's eventual
incapacity to compensate the damage for which she has
herself admitted to be responsible by signing the armistice
of the llth of November 1918.

It amounts to tempting Germany into declaring herself
bankrupt and shifting to the allied populations, for genera-
tions, the burden which would be spared to the enemy.

It is contrary to the engagements taken by the four
great Powers as well as to President Wilson's Points 7
and 8, to admit that Germany may restore neither Bel-
gium nor the invaded territory,

It is contrary to the principles of Laws to admit that a
debt may be considered as cancelled or remitted because
the debtor could not discharge it in a fixed amount of
time.

FRENCH MEMORANDUM ON REPARATIONS CLAUSES 411

Such being the case, the rule is that delays of payments
ought to be granted to the debtor. Therefore it is neces-
sary to do away with the 30 years limit.

The French Delegation gets back, in Article 2, to the
wording proposed the first of April by the British and
American delegations.

As for remainder of Article 2 the French Delegation
calls the attention to the necessity of inserting immedi-
ately, at least as an annex, the list of the categories of
damage. If not, the financial interallied Commission
shall have to deal continually with Germany's disputes,
when the time shall come for her of fulfilling her ob-
ligations.

It is to be added that the Commission ought to be
given full executive powers.

ARTICLE IV. — The wording of the first paragraph of
Article IV depends from the wording of Article III in fine.

ARTICLE V. — It is of a bad policy as well as dangerous,
after having declared to the populations of the invaded
countries, that Germany, in order to allay their sufferings,
shall pay a provision of 5 billions of dollars, to add that
she may charge on that sum, beyond the expenses of the
armies of occupation, all supplies of food and raw ma-
terials which shall be granted to her.

It amounts practically to reducing to nothing the
advantage promised to those unhappy populations, by
presenting them with a tumbler such as all the liquid
poured into flows immediately away through a hole:

It amounts to adding to the provision asked from
Germany sums which shall be spent for her own
advantage.

It amounts to tempting Germany not to make any
endeavor for paying through her labor as represented
by her exports.

M. CLEMENCEAU:

I do not accept that the Commission should have
power to declare the capacity of payment of Germany.
I would say this: Germany owes me X for damages to
persons and property. The governments will have the

412 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

right to reduce that sum in the course of years if they
deem it just. But we are not prepared to accept any
reduction now. We shall see what is possible and what is
not, we shall take into account the question of accumu-
lated interest (we may have to abandon our claim to
interest altogether). We are willing to let the door open
to every liberal solution.

But I ask, in the name of the French Government,
after consultation with my colleagues, that what the
enemy owes to us should be declared (if not by means of
sum, at least by determining categories of
damages to be compensated for). We shall retain our
faculty of allowing time to pay. Let us fix a limit of 30
years, as thought desirable by most of us. If everything
has not been paid for after 30 years, then the Commission
will have the right to extend the period.

CATEGOEIES OF DAMAGE.

As to categories of damage the French Delegation
accepts the draft submitted on April 3rd by the Ameri-
can Delegation, suggesting only that the two following
clauses be added:

(1st) Damage arising, for the Allied Powers, out of
the necessity of redeeming the securities and generally
speaking all credits expressed in enemy currency belong-
ing to the inhabitants (corporations or individuals) of
the invaded territories, or belonging to prisoners of war
or civilians interned.

(2nd) Cost of upkeep, by the Allied Powers, of enemy
prisoners of war, officers or soldiers, and of interned
enemies (this category had been accepted by the American
Delegation on April 2nd).

GUARANTEES.

The guarantees have not been studied, the American
and British experts having stated that they had no powers
to discuss the subject.

They ought to be determined in the shortest delay.

DOCUMENT 60.

French memorandum (printed; no date) sub-
mitted to the Economic Commission, on per-
manent economic relations, together with draft
clauses for the treaty of peace. In French:
translated by Dr. J. V. Fuller.

PRELIMINARY PEACE CONFERENCE.

ECONOMIC COMMISSION.
PROJECT.

Presented by the French Delegation to the Commis-
sion of the Peace Conference concerning the economic
regime.

The French Delegation having sought for the general
idea expressed in:

1. President Wilson's third point, as follows:

"The removal, so far as possible of all economic barriers, and the
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its main-
tenance."

2. Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
adopted by the Peace Conference on President Wilson's
proposition, which is as follows:

" Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity
of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional
understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the main-
tenance of peace."

3. The programme of work for the Commission adopted
by the Delegates of the Great Powers on February 21,

Submits the following propositions to the examination

413

414 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

of the Peace Conference as the basis of the new economic
State, composed, to begin with, of the Allied Countries,
and later of all the peoples admitted into the League of
Nations :

DECLARATION.

In conformity with Article 23 of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, the Conference has decided to estab-
lish a special Commission of the League of Nations "to
secure and maintain freedom of communications and of
transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all
members of the League," as well as to insure the observ-
ance of the special arrangements which may be taken in
consequence of the needs of regions devastated during the
war of 1914-1918."

PROPOSITION.

1. During the period of economic restoration of the
world, especially difficult for countries which have suf-
fered devastation by the enemy, it is proper that the
Allied and Associated peoples, who have carried on to-
gether the war against the common enemy, should retain
the right to take all tariff and fiscal measures required
for their own economic revival.

2. During this period, the Allied and Associated
Countries will render to each other all the collaboration
necessary to shorten its duration. They will study, on
the basis suggested by the League of Nations, the measures
to be taken with a view to hastening the re-establishment
of world economic equilibrium and normal conditions
as regards production and expansion in the case of each.

3. In order to put an end, as far as possible, to eco-
nomic rivalries among the nations in the search for raw
materials, suppress the numerous causes of economic
rivalry which endanger the peace of the world, and
neutralize the natural economic inequalities resulting
from the geographic distribution of wealth throughout
the world, the Allied and Associated Countries agree
that henceforward the raw materials of industry shall be
free of both import and export duties.

in lumps, ingots, pigs, or
cathodes;

FRENCH MEMORANDUM TO ECONOMIC COMMISSION 415
These raw materials are as follows:

Undressed hides and skins;

Wool in bulk or on skins;

Unfinished hair and bristles;

Silk in cocoons, raw silk, silk-floss or in bulk;

Natural and artificial fertilizers;

Gums in their raw state, rubber, guttapercha;

Undressed timber;

Rough cork;

Raw cotton;

Flax, hemp, jute and other fibrous plants in their raw

state;

Mineral ores;
Iron
Copper
Zinc
Tin
Nickel

Gold, platinum, silver
Mercury;
Arsenic;
Filings, scales, chips, and waste of all metals and their

alloys;

Stone and earths used in the arts and crafts;
Pit coal;
Oleaginous seeds and fruits used in other industries

than those of food products.

Food and forage products are not included in this list,
in recognition of the vital necessity for each country to
assure its own food supply at all times and in the largest
possible degree through its national agriculture and stock
raising.

4. Nevertheless, each of the Allied and Associated
Countries reserves the right to regulate by internal
measures the exploitation of its national resources, with
a view to preventing their too rapid depletion.

5. In order to safeguard the loyalty of commercial
transactions, each of the Allied and Associated Countries
agrees to prohibit the entrance into its territory, the

416 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

circulation in transit, and the export of products or goods
bearing marks, signs, or indications of such as would
cause them to appear to have an origin or source other
than their real origin or source.

Each of the High Contracting Parties is forbidden to per-
mit the manufacture or sale in its territory, under a name
indicating origin, of products which have not — by reason
of their composition — an integral right to that designation.

6. The Allied and Associated Nations agree to take,
each on its own territory, all necessary measures to frus-
trate manoeuvres such as dumping or other action re-
sulting in distortion of the export sale price.

SPECIAL CLAUSES TO BE IMPOSED ON GERMANY.

In the preliminaries of peace and likewise to be in-
serted in the treaty of peace with the other enemy powers.

ARTICLE ONE. — The German Government undertakes
not to subject goods, raw or finished products of the
territories of any of the Allied and Associated States
imported into the territory of Germany, as determined
by the Peace Conference, from whatever place arriving,
to duties or charges other or higher than those to which
are subjected the same goods, raw or finished products of
any other of the said States or of any other foreign
country.

The German Government will not maintain or impose
any prohibition or restriction on the importation into
German territory, as above defined, of any goods, raw
or finished product, of the territories of any of the Allied
and Associated States, from whatever place arriving,
which does not apply equally to the importation of the
same goods, raw or finished product of any other of the
said States or any other foreign country.

ARTICLE Two. — The German Government under-
takes, in addition, to establish no discrimination as
regards the treatment of imports, even by indirect means,
such as the regulation of customs procedure, or adminis-
trative methods of classification or interpretation of
tariffs.

ARTICLE THREE. — As regards export, the German
Government undertakes not to impose on goods, raw
or finished products exported from German territory
into the territories of any of the Allied and Associated
States duties or charges other or higher than those paid
on the same goods exported to any other of the said States
or any other foreign country.

It will not maintain or impose any prohibition or re-
striction on the export of goods from German territory
into any of the Allied and Associated States which does
not apply equally to the export of the same goods, raw
or finished products into any other of the said States
or any other foreign country.

ARTICLE FOUR. — The German Government under-
takes not to take any measures which, directly or in-
directly, would have the effect of preventing or even
hindering the free transit across German territory of
products or goods coming from one of the Allied and
Associated Countries and bound for any other country.

ARTICLE FIVE. — The German Government undertakes
to prohibit, prevent, or counteract all manoeuvres such
as dumping or other proceeding, having the effect of
interfering with the normal course of competition by
lowering the sale price for export.

ARTICLE Six. — By reason of the devastations committed
by Germany on the territory of certain of the belligerent
countries, the effect of which is to render especially diffi-
cult and to delay the economic restoration of these
countries, the latter reserve the right to impose an export
duty on such of their raw materials as are shipped di-
rectly or indirectly to destinations in German territory.

ARTICLE SEVEN. — In order that Germany may not
prevent or retard, by the use of the undamaged means
of production at her disposal, the material reconstruc-
tion of the industries she has destroyed on the territory
of countries where she has carried on war, the importa-
tion of raw materials into German territory and the
exportation of manufactured products from those terri-
tories is placed: (a) for the duration of the Preliminaries
of Peace, under the control of the Allies; (b) ultimately,

418 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

that is to say after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace,
under the control of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE EIGHT. — For a period of ten years dating
from the ratification of the Preliminaries of Peace, manu-
factured products coming from the territories of Alsace-
Lorraine reunited with France shall be received into
German territory free of all customs duties.

The French Government shall fix every year, by decree
communicated to the German Government, the kind and
quantity of the products to enjoy this exemption.

ARTICLE NINE. — The above stipulations shall be sub-
ject to revision by the Council of the League of Nations;
but that revision may not take place within a period of
five years after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace.

DOCUMENT 61.

Draft convention submitted to the Aero-
nautical Commission by the American members,
Rear-Admiral H. S. Knapp and Major General
Mason M. Patrick (carbon copy).

AMERICAN.

ARTICLE 1. — The Contracting States recognise the full
and absolute sovereignty and jurisdiction of every State
in the air space above its territory and territorial
waters.

ARTICLE 2. — The Contracting States recognise the right
of every State to establish such regulations and restrictions
as appear to the State to be necessary in order to guar-
antee its own security or that of the lives and property
of its inhabitants, and its right to exercise such juris-
diction and supervision as will secure observance of its
municipal legislation. These regulations shall be im-
posed on foreign aircraft without discrimination, but it
is agreed that any one Contracting State may refuse to
accord to the aircraft of any other Contracting State
any facilities which the latter does not itself accord under
its regulations.

ARTICLE 3. — Each Contracting State shall have the
right to impose special restrictions by way of reservation
or otherwise with respect to the public conveyance of
persons and goods between two points on its territory.

ARTICLE 4. — Each Contracting State undertakes in
time of peace to accord the liberty of innocent passage
above its territories to the aircraft of the other Contract-
ing States, subject to the conditions established by this
Convention.

ARTICLE 5. — Each Contracting State has the right to

419

420 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

prohibit the aircraft of other Contracting States from
flying over certain zones of its territory.

If a State exercises this right, it must publish and
notify beforehand to the other Contracting States the
location and extent of the forbidden zones. All of the
aircraft of a State except those belonging to its military
establishment and other state-owned aircraft engaged
in public business, shall be excluded from any zones which
are forbidden to foreign aircraft.

ARTICLE 6. — Every aircraft which finds itself over a
forbidden zone shall at once give signal of distress pro-
vided for in Article of the regulations annexed here-
to, and as soon as possible shall land at a station outside
the prohibited zone but as near as possible thereto and
within the territory of the State within which the pro-
hibited zone is located.

Any aircraft when called upon to land by signal or
otherwise, must do so at once. Each state shall publish
and notify to the other Contracting States the landing sig-
nals adopted by it.

ARTICLE 7. — The present Convention applies solely
to aircraft possessing the nationality of a Contracting
State. No Contracting State shall, except by special
and temporary authorization, permit any aircraft to fly
over its territory unless such aircraft does possess the
nationality of a Contracting State.

ARTICLE 8. — An aircraft shall possess the nationality
of the State upon which official register it is borne.
Every aircraft of a Contracting State which leaves its
jurisdiction and enters the jurisdiction of another Con-
tracting State shall be borne upon the official register of
the State whose nationality it possesses. No aircraft
of a Contracting State shall be permitted to enter the
jurisdiction of another Contracting State unless it be-
longs wholly to nationals of a single Contracting State.

Joint Stock Companies, Limited Liability Companies,
and all other incorporated or associated bodies shall be
considered nationals of the State under the laws of which
they are created. At least two-thirds of the stock of
all such companies which operate aircraft in inter-state

CONVENTION FOR AERONAUTICAL COMMISSION 421

traffic shall be owned by nationals of the State under
the laws of which they are created, and all of their di-
rectors shall be nationals of such State.

ARTICLE 9. — So long as an aircraft possesses the nation-
ality of one of the Contracting States in accordance with
Article , no other State shall confer its nationality
upon it. In cases where the home station of an aircraft is
in the territory of a Contracting State whose nationality
it does not possess, the latter State shall be immediately
notified of its registration by the State in which it is
registered.

ARTICLE 10. — The Contracting States will exchange
and will forward to the Permanent International Aerial
Commission every month lists of new entries on their
registers and of the annulment of entries made on their
registers during the preceding month.

ARTICLE 11. — The aircraft of a Contracting State
when within the jurisdiction of another Contracting
State must bear their nationality and registration marks
and the name and address of their owners.

ARTICLE 12. — Every aircraft which passes from the ju-
risdiction of the State whose nationality it possesses into
the jurisdiction of another Contracting State shall be
provided with a certificate of airworthiness issued or
authorized by the State whose nationality it possesses.

ARTICLE 13. — All Commanding Officers, pilots, en-
gineers, and other members of the operating crew of an
aircraft of a Contracting State which passes into the
jurisdiction of another Contracting State must be pro-
vided with certificates of their competency and licenses
issued or authorized by the State whose nationality the
aircraft possesses.

ARTICLE 14. — Certificates of airworthiness and certi-
ficates of competency and licences issued or authorized
by the State conferring nationality upon an aircraft will
be recognized as valid by the other Contracting States
provided they are issued in accordance with the condi-
tions of this Convention and the regulations appended
thereto.

Each Contracting State shall have the right to refuse

422 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

to recognize certificates of airworthiness or certificates
of competency or licenses issued to any of its own nationals
by another Contracting State.

Such non-recognition shall immediately be notified to
the State which had issued the certificates and to the
State where the aircraft has its home station.

ARTICLE 15. — Every aircraft engaged in inter-state
navigation must carry: —

(a) A certificate of nationality.

(b) A certificate of airworthiness.

(c) Certificates of competency and licenses for its

operating crew.

(d) If merchandise is carried, a bill of lading and a

manifest.

(e) A log book.

ARTICLE 16. — All aircraft log books shall be kept for
two years after the last entry and shall be presented
when demanded by the public officials of any Contract-
ing State within whose jurisdiction the aircraft may be.

ARTICLE 17. — The proper authorities of a Contracting
State shall verify the documents which its aircraft must
carry and it is their duty to verify the quantity, quality,
weight and measure of any merchandise carried and to
furnish the manifest.

ARTICLE 18. — Each Contracting State agrees to take
all necessary measures to assist aircraft in distress.

ARTICLE 19. — Each Contracting State agrees to allow
aircraft belonging to other Contracting States to land
on all landing fields in its territory which are available
for general use by its own nationals. The landing charges
and charges for sojourn will apply equally to all aircraft
of the other Contracting States without distinction on
account of nationality.

ARTICLE 20. — Transportation by aircraft of explosives,
arms and ammunition, and of any other dangerous ma-
terial is prohibited in international traffic.

ARTICLE 21. — Each Contracting State has the right
to prohibit the use of photographic apparatus above its
territory, and also the right to develop any films or plates
found on board an aircraft, and the right to take posses-

CONVENTION FOR AERONAUTICAL COMMISSION 423

sion of any apparatus and plates which have been used
above its territory.

ARTICLE 22. — The following will be considered as
state-owned aircraft: —

(a) Military aircraft.

(b) Aircraft used for State service other than military,

such as customs and postal service, police, etc.

(c) All other aircraft which are the property of the

State.

All other aircraft are considered as private aircraft.

ARTICLE 23. — Without special authorization which
may be granted by any Contracting State, military air-
craft belonging to one Contracting State will not enter
the jurisdiction of another Contracting State. Any
military aircraft which finds itself, or which without such
authorization is found, within the jurisdiction of a Con-
tracting State shall be subject to all of the conditions
contained in this Convention.

ARTICLE 24. — There shall be created under the name
of a central office at . The

expenses connected therewith shall be borne by the Con-
tracting States in such proportions as shall be fixed by the
permanent Commission provided for in Article

ARTICLE 25. — This bureau shall be under the control
of a permanent commission consisting of two repre-
sentatives each of the United States , France, the British
Empire, Italy and Japan, with five other representa-
tives nominated by the remainder of the Contracting
States.

This Commission is empowered to collect, collate, pub-
lish and distribute information of every kind concerning
aerial navigation; to render opinions upon questions in
dispute at the request of the Contracting States con-
cerned; to examine proposals for any modification of the
provisions of this Convention; to recommend such modi-
fications as may seem necessary; in general, to conduct
such investigations or carry on such other work as may be
for the benefit of the international aerial traffic of the
Contracting States.

ARTICLE 26. — To this Convention there are attached

424 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

regulations which have the same force and effect as the
convention itself and which will be put in force at the same
time. The provisions of this convention and of the at-
tached regulations may be modified at any time after
agreement between the Contracting States.

DOCUMENT 62.

Cablegram of Postmaster General A. S. Bur-
leson to President Wilson (forwarded through
Secretary Tumulty, March 14), regarding
American policy and control of international
cable lines.

CIPHER CABLE

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington No. 11

THE PRESIDENT,

March 14; 8 P. M. Following from Postmaster General:
"I beg to suggest following for incorporation in peace
treaty or separate treaty or treaties: 'In order that the
cable service of the world may be properly developed
and made available to the countries signatory hereto,
under proper and reasonable regulation and supervision
consistent with sovereign rights, and such as will not
interfere with the transaction and privacy of business
in normal times, insuring priority to government busi-
ness and equality in all commercial business; each country
signatory hereto will give to duly authorized corporations
of other countries reciprocal rights to land and operate
cables, erect open stations, with the right and authority to
arrange for and to operate lines exclusively for business in
transit to interior or exterior points. Each country may
respect exclusive landing rights, concessions or transit
rights heretofore made and now existing, but no conces-
sions, landing or transit rights inconsistent with the obli-
gations herein assumed shall be hereafter made.'

"As showing importance attached by England to the
control of cables, I quote from recent issue of [London]
Standard: 'Too speedy relaxation of the censorship of com-
mercial messages might work great injury to Allied inter-

425

426 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ests. That the secret of its potency is in the fact that it
gives power to survey the trade of the world and as a
result of that survey to facilitate those activities which are
to the interest of the Allies and impede those which are
not. That the maintenance of control of the cables will
enable us to prevent our enemies from cornering the
markets of the world against us by making contracts for
post bellum delivery. That it is essential that during
the reconstruction period the powerful weapon of cable
control should not be wholly scrapped. Thanks to the
present administration, the commercial interests of the
country (England) demand that it should in some form
continue to exist.'

"This indicates the reliance that commercial England
puts upon cable facilities in connection with items of
commerce.

"Without quick, reliable intercommunication, foreign
commerce cannot be built up. Our ships and merchant
marine now have to depend upon the courtesy of foreign
controlled means of communication to get home connec-
tions. The world system of international electric com-
munication has been built up in order to connect the
old world commercial centers with that world business.
The United States is connected on one side only. A new
system should be developed with the United States as
a center. This would give the United States business a
determined communication with all the trade of the world,
and all the countries direct communication with the
United States, instead of over the present indirect ex-
pensive foreign-controlled lines. There should be an in-
ternational comity or reciprocal arrangement by which
the electric carriers of communication should have under
proper regulation the same rights that citizens, ships,
mails and parcels have of landing and transit."

[Signed] TUMULTY.

DOCUMENT 63.

Memorandum on cables and radio, submitted
to President Wilson by Walter S. Rogers, com-
munications expert of the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace on February 12th, 1918
(typewritten original, with autographed letter).

MEMORANDUM

ON
WIRE AND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

Paris,
12 February, 1919.

SYLLABUS.

Letter of Transmittal

General Statement Relation Wire and Radio Communi-
cation to League of Nations

Immediate Communication Problems before Peace Con-
ference

Radio: Present Importance as Means of World Com-
munication; Need for Broad Statesmanship and
Constructive Policy

Cables: Present Obstacles in the Way of Cable Extension
and Suggestions for Their Removal

Disposition of German Cables Seized During War

Proposal for International Ownership and Operation of
Trans-Pacific Cables

Suggestions for Incorporation in Programme of League
of Nations to Meet Present Day Communication
Needs

Conclusion

427

428 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Paris, 12 February, 1919.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith I hand you a discussion of an important
matter bearing on the Peace Conference and the pro-
posed League of Nations, namely, international communi-
cations by wire and radio.

The world-wide distribution of your addresses and of
other American news has played a considerable part in
bringing the war to a conclusion, in clearing the way for
a common understanding, and in conveying to the world
America's purposes and ideals.

This work had to be done by a government agency,
as outside a few metropolitan centers and two or three
countries, the press of the world cannot afford a foreign
news service adequate to place the reader in contact with
world activities.

A League of Nations exercising power through appeal
to the public sentiment of the world, may fail unless
provision is made for its reports being distributed promptly
throughout the world. Certainly no public document,
however important, if merely handed to the press
will receive anything like universal textual publication.
Most of the world will receive but hastily made sum-
maries.

When communication facilities are lacking, an oppor-
tunity is left for growth of international misunderstand-
ing.

When communication facilities are controlled by one
nation which gives its commerce and its press prefer-
ential service or rates, misunderstandings are sure to
arise.

The attached memorandum contains constructive sug-
gestions aimed to prevent animosities growing out of
unfair use of communication facilities, or arising from a
lack of facilities, and to provide for the generous flow of
intelligence in all directions.
I am,

Yours respectfully,

[Signed] WALTER S. ROGERS.

MEMORANDUM ON CABLES AND RADIO 429

GENERAL STATEMENT.

The conception of a League of Nations includes not
only a central organization endowed with power, but
behind that organization a world of people acquainted
with each other, cognizant of each other's needs and
problems.

Barriers to the flow of news from nation to nation due
to lack of communication facilities, to prohibitive charges,
to preferential or discriminatory services or rates, to
private or national efforts to "guide" the character of
news, should be removed in the general public interest.

The ideal is a world-wide freedom for news, with im-
portant news going everywhere. The breaking down of
existing barriers resulting from selfishness, chauvinism or
a lack of vision is but part of present day needs.

There is a call to the imagination and organizing
talents of the press of the world to develop the business
of news gathering and distribution to the point where
the individual newspaper reader in the remotest nook
will have daily before him interesting items from all over
the world. The newspaper man himself must carry with
him a vision of a world reading newspapers — a world in
which more and more political power is passing to the
common man.

There is also a call to the newer world statesmanship
not only to further the breaking down of barriers, but
actively to assist in the development of wire and radio
communications. Science stands ready to do its part.

Not only is the flow of intelligence in the form of news
mainly dependent on quick transmission, but shipping
and trade and finance are becoming more and more
associated with telegraph, cable, and radio communica-
tion. Fraught with danger is a situation in which the
commerce of some nations languishes through lack of
means of communication, while the commerce of others
is subventioned through control of communication
facilities. And there must be direct, unhampered com-
munication lest suspicion lurk that intermediaries profit
by trade information passing through their hands.

430 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS BEFORE PEACE

CONFERENCE.

Specific questions having to do with telegraph, cable
and radio come up in connection with the terms of the
peace treaty itself:

I. Germany owned an extensive cable system which
was seized by the Allies early in the war. There were
two German cables between Germany and the United
States via the Azores.

There is an extensive German cable system in the
South Atlantic.

Another German cable extends from Shanghai to Yap
to the Celebes, where it connects with cables owned by
the Netherlands. A short cable connects Yap and Guam.

II. Germany owns cable-laying and repair ships. A
German cable-laying ship is interned in Spain. Both
types of ships are needed by the British and the American
cable companies.

III. Provision will have to be made for the ultimate
reestablishment of radio communications between the
enemy countries and the balance of the world. In this
connection it should be kept in mind that Germany
can communicate by radio with the Far East and with
America.

IV. Provision will have to be made for the reestablish-
ment of interrupted telephone, telegraph and cable
services.

V. In any disposition of the German colonies their
possible availability as cable landing points and as sites
for radio stations should not be overlooked.

RADIO.

It is quite possible to erect a radio station so powerful
that its signals can be read all over the world. As receiv-
ing apparatus is inexpensive and requires no great space,
there is no technical reason why a radio message broad-
casted cannot be intercepted in every house in the world.

It remains to be seen whether statesmanship has the
imagination to grasp the possibilities of such an agency.

MEMORANDUM ON CABLES AND RADIO 431

The exigencies of the war furnished an extraordinary
impetus to radio development. Illimitable possibilities
loom ahead.

Here is a new tool for the use of the civilized world.
A laissez-faire policy may result in slow progress, con-
fusion, and a monopolistic control, with selfish interest
rather than the general good of humanity furnishing the
directive motive.

There is little ground for belief that in the foreseeable
future radio will render the cable obsolete. There is
the distinct danger, however, that radio exploitation
and hit-or-miss competition may cause capital to hesitate
from financing cable extensions. Both the radio and
the cable has its own sphere and each will act as a feeder
to the other.

Radio from ship to ship and between ship and shore
gives a service important for convenience, commerce,
safety, and navigation. Such radio service ought always
to be available, quite apart from any prospects of direct
profit making.

High-power radio, with its unlimited possibilities for
broadcasting messages to the ends of the earth, pre-
sents a startling opportunity for disseminating intel-
ligence.

Its availability for permitting direct communications
between inland nations and those far beyond their im-
mediate neighbors should not be overlooked.

The full utilization of the possibilities of high-power
radio raises a series of problems requiring the highest or-
ganizing ability joined to world-wide perspective. While
direction sending and other technical improvements are
being worked out, the demand for communication facili-
ties is likely to keep ahead of the scientists.

Countries far distant from the great centers should be
provided not only with receiving apparatus, but with
sending stations capable of reaching a high power station,
which in turn can re-send messages. Such facilities
should be established quite apart from possibilities of
financial gain.

The working out of such a comprehensive system of

432 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

radio communication, the making of schedules, the stand-
ardization of practice, and so forth, goes beyond the
possibilities of private enterprise or of the interest of any
one nation.

It is therefore suggested that each of the nations should
nationalize its radio facilities, and that the nations of
the world acting together develop a truly world-wide
radio service. National ownership is in accord with the
general trend in this field.

A start can be made by approving radio relations
which have been formed during the war, and by providing
for an exchange of government messages by radio for
the League of Nations and between the members of the
League. Next a comprehensive plan can be devised for
transmitting commercial press messages at low, uniform
rates, so that the people of the world may have the op-
portunity of becoming informed regarding each other.
Later arrangements can be made for transmission of
general commercial and private messages.

Such an arrangement for development and control of
radio will not injure the cable companies, but will stabilize
communications, provide fair competition, and through
such competition afford the regulation now so lacking
over cable rates and services. Such an arrangement offers
great advantages to the cable companies, for as against
some such an arrangement, they are confronted either with
going into the radio field, or withstanding a disorganized
and possibly demoralizing competition.

Such an arrangement also provides the necessary basis
for exchange of traffic between different modes of com-
munication, and insuring continuous communication even
when one channel of communication is interrupted.

CABLES.

Part of the present cables of the world are privately
owned and part governmentally owned. Because of
their international aspects privately owned cables have
largely escaped the supervision that has been imposed
upon other public utilities. Cable systems have grown

MEMORANDUM ON CABLES AND RADIO 433

up by extension. No attempt has been made to develop
cable communication from a comprehensive world view-
point. Cable tariff rates have grown up like "Topsy"
and are in some instances excessive and discriminatory.
Many places which should be connected by direct cables
are not.

Great Britain early saw the political and commercial
importance of cable communication, particularly the
desirability of linking together the British Empire by
cables. Naturally enough, British cable systems were
built with British interests primarily in view. As Ger-
many became a factor in world trade that country un-
dertook cable development. The only important cable
manufacturing establishments are in England and Ger-
many. Both these countries realize that the extension
of foreign trade and the development of communication
facilities must go hand in hand.

The suggestion has been made that the important
cables of the world be internationalized and put under
the control of the League of Nations, and that the League
undertake the development of cable communication for
the general welfare. Beyond its political aspects this
suggestion opens up a wide vista of administrative and
financial problems.

No attempts will be made here to discuss the argu-
ments in favor of such a proposal or to enumerate the
many difficulties in the way. This memorandum is
presented with a view to suggesting readily worked out
possibilities for extending means of communication along
already established lines. However, cable communi-
cation between the Orient and America presents a dis-
tinct problem, and the internationalization of transpacific
cables is recommended. This subject is discussed in a
separate section.

Far-seeing cable officials, anticipating competition
from radio and a greatly increased demand for communi-
cation facilities, realized that they must extend their
operations and must pass from a basis of a limited amount
of traffic at high rates to a basis of a huge volume of busi-
ness at low rates. As a cable official put it, "We should

434 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

give such service as to make obsolete the letter between
Europe and America."

There are certain obstacles to cable development—

(a) The fear of future ruinous competition from radio:
This point will be discussed in a section on radio.

(b) Exclusive landing rights: Obviously in a world

which needs more and more communication fa-
cilities exclusive landing rights, resulting, as they
do, in monopolies and consequent inadequate
service and high rates, should no longer be toler-
ated. Existing exclusive cable landing rights
should not be renewed, and wherever power
exists to revoke such exclusive rights, the power
should be exercised.

(c) Hesitancy to cable touching intermediate countries :

Cable messages between two countries that pass
through a third country in transit should not
in peace times be subject to inspection or control
by the third country. In times of war neutrals
should have the right to relay their cables so
as to avoid control on the part of any belligerent.
As an illustration of the bearing of these points,
the cable from Vancouver to the Fanning Islands
is too long for the most effective use. From the
standpoint of good technical practice the cable
should touch en route at the Hawaiian Islands.
This British cable, however, does not touch the
Hawaiian Islands because of the possibility of the
American Government at some time undertaking
to interfere with its operation.

(d) Lack of Land Line Extensions: Cable companies

and government owned cables should be allowed
land line extensions, not carrying local business
and not competing with local telegraph systems,
to central points within or beyond a given juris-
diction. Inland countries would thus be given
freedom from dependence upon their neighbors
for communication with parts of the world be-
yond.
Such an extension of cable service will greatly stim-

MEMORANDUM ON CABLES AND RADIO 435

ulate cable traffic and further the extension of
cable facilities. Important inland places will be
provided with direct cable communications.

(e) Unfair practices: There should be uniform pub-

lished rates, no discriminations, no rebates, no
special or wholesale rates. The principle of low
rates for press matter should be applied to all
cable companies.

(f) Refusal to exchange business: Every cable and

telegraph administration should be compelled
to exchange business with every other adminis-
tration. All traffic agreements should be made
public. No exclusive or preferential agreements
should be allowed.

(g) Lack of government spur : The great nations should

commit themselves to encourage extensions and
technical improvements.

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN CABLES SEIZED DURING WAR.

If the League of Nations is given any jurisdiction over
cables, the disposition of the German cables should be
determined in the light of that jurisdiction.

GERMAN CABLE SYSTEM OF NORTH ATLANTIC.

Before the war there were two good German cables
between Germany and the United States via the Azores.
Both were cut. One now extends from Canada to Eng-
land via the Azores; the other, in possession of the French,
extends from the United States to the Azores, but the
cut section beyond the Azores has not been connected
with France.

The two German cables were the only means of cable
communication between Germany and the United States,
other than through England or France, the latter route
being unimportant, as the two French cables are poor in
quality and inefficiently operated.

Leaving these German cables in their present ownership
not only penalizes Germany but injures the United States.

The United States has undoubted claims to those

436 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

portions of these cables lying within the territorial waters
of the United States.

In the landing permits granted for these cables, the
United States reserves the right to modify or to revoke
such landing permits.

The United States might well insist in its own interest
on the return of these cables to their original location or
at least upon being left in such position that other cables
may be laid between the United States and Continental
Europe. For this latter purpose it is required that the
exclusive landing rights for the Azores held by a British
company should be cancelled and that Great Britain
and France should each agree to permit the landing of
cables between the United States and Continental Europe
when such landings are necessary for relay purposes and
agree not lo exercise any supervision or scrutiny over
messages in transit through such relay stations, and to
further agree not to attempt to regulate the services or
charge on messages in transit over such cables.

GERMAN CABLE SYSTEM IN SOUTH ATLANTIC.

This cable system extends from Germany to the Canary
Islands and thence to various points on the west coast
of Africa and from Monrovia to Pernambuco.

Brazil has an immediate interest in this cable system.
As American cable companies are extending to Brazil,
the United States also acquires a direct interest.

Whatever disposition is made of the German South
Atlantic cable system, whether returned to Germany,
turned over to some other country, leased or sold, the
transaction should carry with it stipulations requiring a
waiver of all exclusive rights, full publicity for all its trans-
actions and agreements, prohibition of any preferential
treatment as to rates or service, and an agreement to
submit to full regulatory control, including fixing of rates,
by the League of Nations.

GERMAN CABLE SYSTEM IN THE PACIFIC.

This system extends from Shanghai to Yap thence to
the Celebes where it connects with a cable system owned

MEMORANDUM ON CABLES AND RADIO 437

by The Netherlands, which in turn connects with cable
systems extending to Australia and to India and beyond.
A short cable connects Guam and Yap. The system is
of great commercial and political importance.

Upon the seizure of Yap by the Japanese this cable
system became dominated by that country.

While the ownership of the cable does not follow neces-
sarily the ownership of the island of Yap, nevertheless
the possession of the island carries with it a considerable
measure of control over the cable.

Were the island and cable left in the control of the
Japanese, that country would no doubt lay a cable direct
from Japan to Yap and give her commerce and press
special rates and services. Such a course of action would
stir up innumerable animosities and might be a con-
tributing cause to serious international difficulties.

The Japanese government owns and operates cables
and is alert to the political and commercial value of con-
trolling communications. It is quite possible that Japa-
nese eagerness for the former German islands north of the
equator is partially stimulated by a desire for control
of the German cable system.

The following suggestions are offered: —

1 . International ownership and operation of this cable
as part of an international Trans-Pacific cable system.
This suggestion is discussed in a separate section.

If this suggestion is not adopted: —

2. That whatever the fate of the island of Yap may be,
that under proper guarantees the cable system be turned
over to The Netherlands, as the system is in a way an
extension of the cable system now owned and operated
by that country.

3. If by any mischance the cable should fall into Japa-
nese control, before consent is given, Japan should be
compelled to agree to grant cable landings on Japanese
territory; to agree to exchange business with all cable and
radio administrations on equal basis and to cancel any
exclusive landing rights or privileges that Japan may have
in Continental Asia; and further to agree to permit cable
landings on any of the islands taken over.

438 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

4. Whatever disposition is made of the German Pacific
Cable system, whether returned to Germany, turned
over to some other country, leased or sold, the transaction
should carry with it stipulations requiring a waiver of
all exclusive rights, full publicity for all its transactions
and agreements, prohibition of any preferential treatment
as to rates or service, and an agreement to submit to full
regulatory control, including fixing of rates by the League
of Nations.

While it may be advantageous for the United States to
own and control this cable system, so long as it is not the
established policy of the United States to own and operate
cables, there is not much point in seeking a remote cable
system.

GERMAN CABLE LAYING AND REPAIR SHIPS.

These ships should be turned over jointly to Great
Britain and the United States, as these two countries
can make the greatest use of them.

PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND
OPERATION OF TRANSPACIFIC CABLES.

The lack of adequate cable facilities across the
Pacific not only retards the development of business but
prevents the peoples of the countries concerned coming
to understand each other.

Very little Chinese or Japanese news reaches the Ameri-
can press. Prior to the establishment of an American gov-
ernment news service to the Orient, the Chinese and
Japanese press received less than a hundred words a day
from America. This small amount contained a high
percentage of sensational news. The periodic Japanese
outbursts against America are to some extent explained
by the character of the news reaching Japan.

No greater contribution can be made to Japanese-
American relations than the making possible of a generous
exchange of news between the two countries. Japan is
almost as much a newspaper reading country as is America.

There are two cables crossing the Pacific. The Com-

MEMORANDUM ON CABLES AND RADIO 439

mercial-Pacific Company's cable extends from San Fran-
cisco to Honolulu to Guam; from Guam a cable extends
to Peel Island where it connects with a Japanese govern-
ment cable; from Guam another cable extends to Manila
and thence to Shanghai.

The rates charged by the Commercial-Pacific Cable
Company are extortionate. From New York to Manila
the rate is $1.12 a word; New York to Tokyo $1.33; New
York to Shanghai $1.22.

It is actually cheaper to cable from New York to Lon-
don and thence from London to the Orient via the Medi-
terranean than by the direct Pacific route. British
cable companies are alleged to be interested in the Com-
mercial-Pacific Cable Company. Certainly American
business suffers not only from high rates but from unjust
discrimination. Not only are rates high, but the service
is inadequate and occasionally interrupted for weeks at
a time.

In granting landing rights to the Commercial-Pacific
Cable Company the United States reserved the right to
purchase the cables and property of the Company at
an appraised value.

The other cable crossing the Pacific is owned by Great
Britain and connects Canada and Australia. Rates are
low, business is encouraged and the cable looked upon
as an important aid in linking together the British Em-
pire.

There is need for a cable from Seattle to the Aleutian
Islands with branches extending to Japan and to Asiatic
Russia which cannot now be reached directly from the
United States. There is need for connecting cables
which would ensure service despite any given section
being out of order.

With low rates there would be in a short time a suffi-
cient volume of business to justify the laying of other
cables. There is no reasonable expectation that private
enterprise will meet the political and commercial com-
munication needs of the Pacific.

Great Britain, Japan, China and the United States
ought to get together and formulate and develop a com-

440 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

prehensive cable scheme with a view to providing ample
facilities at low rates.

A number of cables in various parts of the world are
owned and operated jointly by two countries.

If the four countries most immediately concerned work
out a joint program for cable development and opera-
tion in the Pacific, then the German cable system in that
part of the world should be turned over to the four
countries for incorporation in a general system. The
location of the German cables is such that their maximum
use would come from such an arrangement.

SUGGESTIONS FOR INCORPORATION IN PROGRAM
OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

I.

Section 1. Each member nation agrees to further the
extension of telephone, telegraph, cable and radio com-
munications between the members of the League of
Nations.

Section 2. Each member nation agrees to prevent dis-
crimination as to rates and services and to provide for the
interchange of business between telephone, telegraph,
cable and radio.

Section 3. Each member nation agrees, with special
reference to communication by wire, to permit the landing
of cables and to revoke when possible or at least not to
renew any agreement or lease giving exclusive landing
rights; and to authorize the maintenance or leasing of
land line extensions of cables to principal inland points
in its own jurisdiction and beyond, provided such lines
handle no local business and do not compete with local
telegraph administrations; and not to read or to interfere
with messages in transit across its territory.

II.

Each member nation agrees to maintain such govern-
ment radio stations as may be needed to receive and for-
ward distress calls and other messages from ships at sea.

MEMORANDUM ON CABLES AND RADIO 441

III.

Each member nation agrees to maintain radio facil-
ities for the handling of official messages of the League
of Nations, and official messages between members of
the League of Nations at a uniform rate.

Section 2. Each member nation agrees to handle
through its radio service a reasonable amount of com-
mercial press matter of general interest at a uniform rate.

Section 3. Each member nation holds itself ready to
negotiate with other member nations for establishment
of commercial radio communications.

IV.

Section 1. With special reference to communication
by telephone, telegraph, cable and radio the League of
Nations is authorized: to investigate complaints arising
in connection therewith; in case of international disputes
to determine rates, practices and schedules; to fix the
rates indicated in Paragraph III, Sections 1 and 2; to
act as a center for the exchange of technical information;
to call special conferences, or to recognize existing con-
ferences such as the International Telegraph Convention
and International Radio-Telegraph Convention.

CONCLUSION.

The steady extension of democratic forms of govern-
ment and the increasing closeness of contact between all
parts of the world point to the conclusion that the ulti-
mate basis of world peace is common knowledge and
understanding between the masses of the world. Hence
the distribution of intelligence in the form of news be-
comes of the utmost importance.

The extent of news dissemination is determined largely
by availability of wire and radio facilities and by rates
charged for press matter. The existence of adequate
facilities and low rates to all parts of the world would
bring about a generous flow of news.

Inadequate facilities and high rates leave a situation

442 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

where the press of many parts of the world remains
provincial owing to lack of general news and at the same
time leave the press of such sections easy victims to the
propagandist.

Modern business with its world-wide ramifications
likewise demands an extension of communication facilities.

Abuses in connection with existing communication
facilities should be removed and adequate facilities es-
tablished with rates that are fair to every user.

If statesmanship has the vision and the organizing
ability, the most widely separated communities can be
made neighbors, trading with each other, interested in
each other, understanding each other, learning from
each other.

DOCUMENT 64.

Letter of Walter S. Rogers, communications
expert of the American Commission to Negotiate
Peace, to President Wilson, dated May 2, 1919,
discussing the problem of the disposition of the
captured German oceanic cables.

AMERICAN COMMISSION
TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Paris, May 2, 1919.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

As I see the matter, the problem regarding the German
cables can be summarized as follows:

1. The German cable systems have been largely broken
up. Certain of the cables have been cut or sealed;
others are being used in situ by the Allies; others have
been taken up and used elsewhere; others have been
diverted to new points ; on at least one cable (Pernambuco-
Monrovia) an ally has spent considerable money.

2. While it is very questionable whether the Allies have
any legal justification for their actions, nevertheless the
dispersal of the German cable systems has been carried
to a point where it is quite impossible to return the cables
to Germany in anything like their former condition.
Nor can it be forgotten that German cables were laid
partly for political reasons.

3. The British attitude is largely influenced by a desire
to retain the former Emden-Azores-New York cable,
which has been diverted to Land's End-Azores-Halifax.
This cable can be of considerable importance to Canada,
for the Dominion, like the United States, needs additional
cable facilities. Should the Canadian and British Govern-
ments operate this cable in such a way as to force down
trans-Atlantic cable rates, the United States would benefit.

443

444 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

4. As to the question arising over the ownership of the
other trans-Atlantic cables, the immediate ownership
of a cable or group of cables is not especially significant.
Every cable is a part of the world system of communi-
cations, and as such it is operated in conjunction with
other telegraph and cable administrations. The cable
business has grown up without plan or supervision, so
that every cable company is enmeshed in a snarl of
inter-relationships which limit individual action. Speak-
ing generally, it is true that the British cable companies
dominate the cable business. A certain amount of gov-
ernmental supervision is exercised over cable companies
through the control of landing rights. The American
operated trans-Atlantic cables could not live a day except
for their arrangements with the British Government tele-
graph system for the interchange of business.

5. The Japanese attitude is largely influenced by their
desire to retain the cable running from Shanghai to Yap
to Menado and the cable connecting Guam and Yap.
The Japanese Government owns other cables and no
doubt wants the German cables to further Japanese
trade and influence in the Dutch East Indies and beyond.
These German cables do not pay; incorporated in a well
worked out system of Pacific cables, they probably would
prove profitable.

6. The French attitude is largely influenced: (a) By
a desire to retain the former Emden-Azores-New York
cable, which now runs Brest-Azores-New York. There
are already two French cables crossing the Atlantic, both
inefficiently operated. These French cables have not
been used to bring down rates or to force an improvement
of service, (b) By a desire to retain the Pernambuco-
Monrovia cable or to be reimbursed for money expended
upon it.

7. Looking at the cable situation broadly, there is a
great human need for more cables, for lower rates and
for better service. Low, uniform rates and adequate
service would do much to bring about a common under-
standing throughout the world. Every country should
have direct, unfettered communication with every other

DISPOSITION OF GERMAN OCEANIC CABLES 445

country. Cable development is checked largely by British
control of gutta-percha, by combinations between pres-
ent telegraph and cable administrations, and by exclusive
landing rights held by certain companies.

8. As a step toward giving the world better cable facil-
ities, the German cables and the new lines based on them
might well be turned over to the "Big Five" as trustees
with power to own and operate them or, if later thought
advisable, to dispose of them.

9. If the trustee arrangement is not agreed upon, there
is nothing left but to divide the cables among the powers.
In any such arrangement the United States should in-
sist that guarantees be given (a) that every cable user be
given equal service and equal rates and that there be no
secret or preferential rates; and (b) that assurances be
given that arrangements will be made for the interchange
of traffic upon a uniform basis with all telegraph, cable
and radio administrations. These provisions will be in
the direction of introducing into the cable business now
generally recognized principles of fair dealing. In any
parcelling out of the cables the United States should
insist as a very minimum upon having a half interest in
the Yap-Guam cable, the ownership of the Brest-Azores—
New York cable, and assurances of cable connections
from Brest to Emden. If the Japanese should obtain
the Yap-Guam cable, they would insist upon going to
Guam — a strategic point now closed to all outsiders.
Ownership of the Brest-Azores-New York cable would
give the American Government a certain amount of
power over the trans-Atlantic cable situation, such as
Great Britain and Canada would obtain through re-
taining the Land's End-Azores-Halifax cable. The French
Government, through the present French cables, already
has such a lever, and then it is presumed that France
would receive the Pernambuco -Monrovia cable. The
United States should also receive the former German
cable now derelict off New York.

10. It is probable that to the suggestion that the Ger-
man cables be turned over to the Big Five as trustees, that
Great Britain will insist on keeping out of the trust the

446 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Land's End-Azores-Halifax cable on the ground that it is
no longer German, having been incorporated into the Brit-
ish cable system. The French will probably argue that they
should not give up the Pernambuco-Monrovia cable until
they have been compensated for their expenditures on
it. The Japanese may claim that the island of Yap is
theirs and that the ownership of the cable is an incident
to the ownership of the island. It is entirely clear that
no trust arrangement can be satisfactory unless all the
German cables are included and in addition such cables
as have resulted from the division of German cables.

1 1. In any event it should now be decided to hold later in
the year an international conference to deal with the
entire subject of international communication by tele-
phone, telegraph, cable and radio. Such a conference
should be charged especially with devising ways and
means of providing small nations with adequate service
and further with the development of plans for facilitating
the distribution of intelligence throughout the world at
uniform, nominal rates.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Sincerely yours,

[Signed] WALTER S. ROGERS.

PART IX
GERMANY AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE

DOCUMENT 65.

Memorandum of Major General Tasker H.
Bliss for President Wilson, "Some Considerations
for the Peace Conference before They Finally
Draft Their Terms," dated March 25, 1919
(typewritten original).

SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE
BEFORE THEY FINALLY DRAFT THEIR TERMS

When nations are exhausted by wars in which they
have put forth all their strength and which leave them
tired, bleeding and broken, it is not difficult to patch up
a peace that may last until the generation which experi-
enced the horrors of the war has passed away. Pictures
of heroism and triumph only tempt those who know
nothing of the sufferings and terrors of war. It is there-
fore comparatively easy to patch up a peace which will
last for 30 years.

What is difficult, however, is to draw up a peace which
will not provoke a fresh struggle when those who have
had practical experience of what war means have passed
away. History has proved that a peace which has been
hailed by a victorious nation as a triumph of diplomatic
skill and statesmanship, even of moderation, in the long
run has proved itself to be shortsighted and charged with
danger to the victor. The Peace of 1871 was believed by
Germany to ensure not only her security but her perma-
nent supremacy. The facts have shown exactly the
contrary. France itself has demonstrated that those
who say you can make Germany so feeble that she will
never be able to hit back are utterly wrong. Year by
year France became numerically weaker in comparison
with her victorious neighbor, but in reality she became

449

450 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

ever more powerful. She kept watch on Europe, she
made alliance with those whom Germany had wronged
or menaced; she never ceased to warn the world of its
danger and ultimately she was able to secure the over-
throw of the far mightier power which had trampled so
brutally upon her. You may strip Germany of her
colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force
and her navy to that of a fifth rate power; all the same
in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated
in the peace of 1919 she will find means of exacting
retribution from her conquerors. The impression, the
deep impression, made upon the human heart by four
years of unexampled slaughter will disappear with the
hearts upon which it has been marked by the terrible
sword of the great war. The maintenance of peace will
then depend upon there being no causes of exasperation
constantly stirring up the spirit of patriotism, of justice
or of fair play to achieve redress. Our terms may be
severe, they may be stern and even ruthless, but at the
same time they can be so just that the country on which
they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right
to complain. But injustice, arrogance, displayed in the
hour of triumph will never be forgotten or forgiven.

For these reasons I am, therefore, strongly averse to
transferring more Germans from German rule to the rule
of some other nation than can possibly be helped. I can-
not conceive any greater cause of future war than that
the German people, who have certainly proved themselves
one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world
should be surrounded by a number of small states, many
of them consisting of people who have never previously
set up a stable government for themselves, but each of
them containing large masses of Germans clamouring
for reunion with their native land. The proposal of the
Polish Commission that we should place 2,100,000 Ger-
mans under the control of a people which is of a different
religion and which has never proved its capacity for
stable self-government throughout its history must, in
my judgment, lead sooner or later to a new war in the
East of Europe. What I have said about the Germans

GENERAL BLISS TO PRESIDENT WILSON, MARCH 25, 1919 451

is equally true of the Magyars. There will never be
peace in South Eastern Europe if every little state now
coming into being is to have a large Magyar Irredenta
within its borders. I would therefore take as a guiding
principle of the peace that as far as is humanly possible
the different races should be allocated to their mother-
lands, and that this human criterion should have prece-
dence over considerations of strategy or economics or
communications which can usually be adjusted by other
means. Secondly, I would say that the duration for the
payments of reparation ought to disappear if possible
with the generation which made the war.

But there is a consideration in favour of a long-sighted
peace which influences me even more than the desire to
leave no causes justifying a fresh outbreak 30 years
hence. There is one element in the present condition of
nations which differentiates it from the situation as it was
in 1815. In the Napoleonic war the countries were
equally exhausted but the revolutionary spirit had spent
its force in the country of its birth and Germany had
satisfied the legitimate popular demands for the time
being by a series of economic changes which were in-
spired by courage, foresight and high statesmanship. Even
in Russia the Czar had effected great reforms which were
probably at that time even too advanced for the half
savage population. The situation is very different now.
The revolution is still in its infancy. The extreme figures
of the Terror are still in command in Russia. The whole
of Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution. There
is a deep sense not only of discontent, but of anger and
revolt amongst the workmen against pre-war conditions.
The whole existing order in its political, social and eco-
nomic aspects is questioned by the masses of the popula-
tion, from one end of Europe to the other. In some
countries, like Germany and Russia, the unrest takes the
form of open rebellion, in others, like France, Great Britain
and Italy it takes the shape of strikes and of general
disinclination to settle down to work, symptoms which
are just as much concerned with the desire for political
and social change as with wage demands.

452 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

Much of this unrest is healthy. We shall never make a
lasting peace by attempting to restore the conditions of
1914. B ut there is a danger that we may throw the masses
of the population throughout Europe into the arms of the
extremists whose only idea for regenerating mankind
is to destroy utterly the whole existing fabric of society.
These men have triumphed in Russia. They have done
so at a terrible price. Hundreds and thousands of the
population have perished. The railways, the roads,
the towns, the whole structural organization of Russia
has been almost destroyed, but somehow or other they
seem to have managed to keep their hold upon the masses
of the Russian people, and what is much more significant,
they have succeeded in creating a large army which is
apparently well directed and well disciplined, and is, as
to a great part of it, prepared to die for its ideals. In
another year Russia, inspired by a new enthusiasm, may
have recovered from her passion for peace and have at
her command the only army eager to fight, because it
is the only army that believes that it has any cause to
fight for.

The greatest danger that I see in the present situation
is that Germany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism
and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing
power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics whose
dream it is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force
of arms. This danger is no mere chimera. The present
government in Germany is weak; it has no prestige; its
authority is challenged; it lingers merely because there is
no alternative but the spartacists, and Germany is not
ready for spartacism, as yet. But the argument which
the spartacists are using with great effect at this very
time is that they alone can save Germany from the in-
tolerable conditions which have been bequeathed her
by the war. They offer to free the German people from
indebtedness to the Allies and indebtedness to their own
richer classes. They offer them complete control of
their own affairs and the prospect of a new heaven and
earth. It is true that the price will be heavy. There
will be two or three years of anarchy, perhaps of blood-

GENERAL BLISS TO PRESIDENT WILSON, MARCH 25, 1919 453

shed, but at the end the land will remain, the people will
remain, the greater part of the houses and the factories
will remain, and the railways and the roads will remain,
and Germany, having thrown off her burdens, will be
able to make a fresh start.

If Germany goes over to the spartacists it is inevitable
that she should throw in her lot with the Russian Bol-
shevists. Once that happens all Eastern Europe will
be swept into the orbit of the Bolshevik revolution and
within a year we may witness the spectacle of nearly
three hundred million people organized into a vast red
army under German instructors and German generals
equipped with German cannon and German machine guns
and prepared for a renewal of the attack on Western
Europe. This is a prospect which no one can face with
equanimity. Yet the news which came from Hungary
yesterday shows only too clearly this danger is no fantasy.
And what are the reasons alleged for this decision? They
are mainly the belief that large numbers of Magyars are to
be handed over to the control of others. If we are wise,
we shall offer to Germany a peace, which, while just,
will be preferable for all sensible men to the alternative
of Bolshevism. I would, therefore, put it in the fore-
front of the peace that once she accepts our terms, es-
pecially reparation, we will open to her the raw materials
and markets of the world on equal terms with ourselves,
and will do everything possible to enable the German
people to get upon their legs again. We cannot both
cripple her and expect her to pay.

Finally, we must offer terms which a responsible Gov-
ernment in Germany can expect to be able to carry out.
If we present terms to Germany which are unjust, or
excessively onerous, no responsible Government will
sign them; certainly the present weak administration
will not. If it did, I am told that it would be swept away
within 24 hours. Yet if we can find nobody in Germany
who will put his hand to a peace treaty, what will be the
position? A large army of occupation for an indefinite
period is out of the question. Germany would not mind
it. A very large number of people in that country would

454 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

welcome it as it would be the only hope of preserving
the existing order of things. The objection would not
come from Germany, but from our own countries. Neither
the British Empire nor America would agree to occupy
Germany. France by itself could not bear the burden
of occupation. We should therefore be driven back
on the policy of blockading the country. That would
inevitably mean spartacism from the Urals to the Rhine,
with its inevitable consequence of a huge Red Army
attempting to cross the Rhine. As a matter of fact, I
am doubtful whether public opinion would allow us de-
liberately to starve Germany. If the only difference
between Germany and ourselves were between onerous
terms and moderate terms, I very much doubt if public
opinion would tolerate the deliberate condemnation of
millions of women and children to death by starvation.
If so the Allies would have incurred the moral defeat of
having attempted to impose terms on Germany which
Germany had successfully resisted.

From every point of view, therefore, it seems to me
that we ought to endeavour to draw up a peace settlement
as if we were impartial arbiters, forgetful of the passions
of the war. This settlement ought to have three ends in
view. First of all it must do justice to the Allies, by
taking into account Germany's responsibility for the
origin of the war, and for the way in which it was fought.
Secondly, it must be a settlement which a responsible
German government can sign in the belief that it can
fulfil the obligations it incurs. Thirdly, it must be a
settlement which will contain in itself no provocations
for future wars, and which will constitute an alternative
to Bolshevism, because it will commend itself to all reason-
able opinion as a fair settlement of the European problem.

II. It is not, however, enough to draw up a just and
far-sighted peace with Germany. If we are to offer
Europe an alternative to Bolshevism we must make the
League of Nations into something which will be both a
safeguard to those nations who are prepared for fair

GENERAL BLISS TO PRESIDENT WILSON, MARCH 25, 1919 455

dealing with their neighbours, and a menace to those who
would trespass on the rights of their neighbours, whether
they are imperialist empires or imperialist Bolshevists.
An essential element, therefore, in the peace settlement
is the constitution of the League of Nations as the effective
guardian of international right and international liberty
throughout the world. If this is to happen the first thing
to do is that the leading members of the League of Nations
should arrive at an understanding between themselves
in regard to armaments. To my mind it is idle to en-
deavour to impose a permanent limitation of armaments
upon Germany unless we are prepared similarly to impose
a limitation upon ourselves. I recognise that until Ger-
many has settled down and given practical proof that
she has abandoned her imperialist ambitions, and until
Russia has also given proof that she does not intend to
embark upon a military crusade against her neighbours, it
is essential that the leading members of the League of
Nations should maintain considerable forces both by
land and sea in order to preserve liberty in the world.
But if they are to present an united front to the forces
both of reaction and revolution, they must arrive at
such an agreement in regard to armaments among them-
selves as would make it impossible for suspicion to arise
between the members of the League of Nations in regard
to their intentions towards one another. If the League
is to do its work for the world it will only be because the
members of the League trust it themselves and because
there are no rivalries and jealousies in the matter of ar-
maments between them. The first condition of success
for the League of Nations is, therefore, a firm under-
standing between the British Empire and the United
States of America and France and Italy that there will
be no competitive building up of fleets or armies between
them. Unless this is arrived at before the Covenant is
signed the League of Nations will be a sham and a mock-
ery. It will be regarded, and rightly regarded as a proof
that its principal promoters and patrons repose no con-
fidence in its efficiency. But once the leading members
of the League have made it clear that they have reached

456 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

an understanding which will both secure to the League
of Nations the strength which is necessary to enable it
to protect its members and which at the same time will
make misunderstanding and suspicion with regard to com-
petitive armaments impossible between them its future
and authority will be ensured. It will then be able to
ensure as an essential condition of peace that not only
Germany, but all the smaller states of Europe undertake
to limit their armaments and abolish conscription. If
the small nations are permitted to organize and maintain
conscript armies running each to hundreds of thousands,
boundary wars will be inevitable and all Europe will be
drawn in. Unless we secure this universal limitation
we shall achieve neither lasting peace, nor the permanent
observance of the limitation of German armaments which
we now seek to impose.

I should like to ask why Germany, if she accepts the
terms we consider just and fair, should not be admitted
to the League of Nations, at any rate as soon as she has
established a stable and democratic Government. Would
it not be an inducement to her both to sign the terms
and to resist Bolshevism? Might it not be safer that she
should be inside the League than that she should be
outside it?

Finally, I believe that until the authority and effective-
ness of the League of Nations has been demonstrated, the
British Empire and the United States ought to give to
France a guarantee against the possibility of a New Ger-
man aggression. France has special reasons for asking for
such a guarantee. She has twice been attacked and
twice invaded by Germany in half a century. She has
been so attacked because she has been the principal
guardian of liberal and democratic civilization against
Central European autocracy on the continent of Europe.
It is right that the other great Western democracies should
enter into an undertaking which will ensure that they
stand by her side in time to protect against invasion,
should Germany ever threaten her again or until the
League of Nations has proved its capacity to preserve
the peace and liberty of the world.

GENERAL BLISS TO PRESIDENT WILSON, MARCH 25, 1919 457

III. If, however, the Peace Conference is really to
secure peace and prove to the world a complete plan of
settlement which all reasonable men will recognise as an al-
ternative preferable to anarchy, it must deal with the Rus-
sian situation. Bolshevik imperialism does not merely
menace the States on Russia's borders. It threatens the
whole of Asia and is as near to America as it is to France.
It is idle to think that the Peace Conference can separate,
however sound a peace it may have arranged with Ger-
many, if it leaves Russia as it is today. I do not propose,
however, to complicate the question of the peace with
Germany by introducing a discussion of the Russian
problem. I mention it simply in order to remind our-
selves of the importance of dealing with it as soon as
possible.

Paris

March 25, 1919.

DOCUMENT 66.

Letter of General J. C. Smuts to the Prime
Minister, Lloyd George, May 22, criticizing
the terms of the Treaty as drawn and suggesting
changes (carbon copy).

22nd May, 1919.
The Prime Minister.

I append a list of the most important provisions of the
Peace Treaty which in my opinion call for amendment.

1. The Occupation Clauses (Paras. 428-432).

The most dangerous provision of the whole Treaty is
the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine for 15 years—
and even thereafter — at the option of the Allies, or in
case the Germans have not (as they will not) have ful-
filled all the terms of the Treaty. In the first place the
size of the French army is not fixed, and it would be pos-
sible for France for the next 15 years to put most of her
military expenditure on to German shoulders by keeping
the bulk of her troops in the occupied area. In the
second place the military regime to be followed is not
fixed, and a system of martial law may and probably will
be adopted which will be most irksome and irritating to
the population and hampering to industry. The least
that should be done if the Occupation Clauses are to
remain is that the French army of occupation should be
limited to reasonable numbers, that provision should be
made that the civil population and administration should
not in any way be under military law, order or regulation,
and that the German Government should remain in un-
disturbed civil administration of the occupied area. Both
this area and the Saar basin should remain in the German
Customs system.

458

SMUTS CRITICIZES THE TREATY, MAY 22, 1919 459

Military occupation and martial law for such a long
period will, however, be so productive of friction and
mischief, and involve such risks to Peace, that I would
very strongly urge that the occupation be dropped in
favour of the proposed Treaty of Guarantee. France
should not have the double insurance of both the occupa-
tion and the guarantee. The Allies will have military,
naval and air commissions going over Germany with
full powers for an indefinite time. The League of Nations
also has powers of investigation. The Reparation Clauses
will effectively prevent military manufacture for 30 years.
All fortifications are to be razed and no troops may be
assembled within 50 km. east of the Rhine (paras. 42-3).
In view of all this and also the proposed Guarantee, the
Occupation provisions should be deleted.

2. The Saar Basin.

With the Occupation Clauses are associated the special
provisions for the administration of the Saar Basin for
15 years. The German character of the great bulk of
the population is beyond question, and there is no neces-
sity to hold a referendum at the end of fifteen years. I
consider the special administration a clumsy device and
really uncalled for so long as France has full powers in
respect of the coal mines. But if the special administra-
tion is to be established, it should automatically cease
after fifteen years as soon as Germany can repurchase
the coal mines. (I understand that the drastic Penalty
Clause in case the mines are not paid for in gold in six
months after the valuation will be dropped.)

3. The Reparation Clauses.

I am advised that while a very large amount of repara-
tion could be obtained from Germany in the long run,
the actual scheme adopted in our Reparation Clauses is
unworkable, and must kill the goose which is to lay the
golden eggs. We could not get anything like one milliard
sterling out of Germany within the first two years. Apart
from ships, foreign securities and certain raw material,
we could get nothing but worthless paper. So far from

460 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

getting anything more out of Germany the first couple
of years, the real practical problem is to find credit for
Germany wherewith she could purchase food and the
necessary raw materials to restart her industrial life.
There is actually sitting a Commission, whose object it
is to find out how to finance Germany and other European
countries in the immediate future.

Besides the impossibility of paying this milliard in two
years, I am also advised that the scheme of the five
milliard bonds is unworkable and should be scrapped.

I think we should be prepared to listen to what the
Germans have to say in criticism of our scheme of Repara-
tion, and to modify it with a view to making it practicable
and not crippling German industry irreparably in the next
few years. Our policy should rather be to begin nursing
German industry and finance in order to obtain heavy con-
tributions from them when they have become productive.

In particular I think the coal demands we are making
on Germany are too heavy, and must seriously cripple
her industry. Three separate commissions have taken
coal from Germany: one confiscated the Saar Basin,
another cut off the Silesian coal fields, and the third laid
heavy contributions on the Westphalian fields in favour
of France, Belgium and Italy. The combined result of
all this is a burden which it will probably be too heavy for
German industry to bear. All this requires reconsidera-
tion, and would probably have received it but for the
hurry in which the Treaty was finally put together from
the various Commission Reports.

While sticking generally to our scheme of Reparation,
I would eliminate the above objectionable or unworkable
features, and in particular I would scrap the schedules
dealing with the future delivery of coal and coal products,
and the future construction of ships. I would give the
Reparation Commission full power to settle not only
the amount but also the form in which the payments are
to be made (in money or kind). I would certainly take
away the power from the French and Belgian manu-
facturers to rove about German factories in order to
despoil them of machinery which they may allege to be

SMUTS CRITICIZES THE TREATY, MAY 22, 1919 461

necessary for their works (para. 4 of the Fourth Annex
to Reparation Clauses). This industrial looting would
be most mischievous, and could not in peace time be jus-
tified as a reprisal for crimes committed in war time.
The proper reprisal is to make the Germans pay.

4. Germany's Eastern Frontier.

I am convinced that in the undue enlargement of
Poland we are not only reversing the verdict of history,
but committing a cardinal error in policy which history
will yet avenge. The new Poland will include millions
of Germans (and Russians) and territories which have
a German (or Russian) population, or which have for
very long periods been part of Germany (or Russia).
It is reasonably certain that both Germany and Russia
will again be great Powers, and that, sandwiched between
them the new Poland could only be a success with their
good will. How, under these circumstances, can we ex-
pect Poland to be other than a failure, even if she had
that ruling and administrative capacity which history
has proved she has not? Even now while the Confer-
ence is sitting, the Poles are defying the Great Powers.
What is going to happen in future with the Great Powers
divided and at loggerheads? I think we are building a
house of sand. And in view of these and many other
considerations, I would revise the boundaries of Poland
as provisionally settled in the Treaty, leave Upper
Silesia and all real German territory to Germany, con-
tract the boundaries of the Free City of Danzig, and
instead of placing her under the suzerainty of Poland
as we propose doing, leave her under the suzerainty
of Germany with an administration under the League of
Nations. I think the two cardinal errors in policy of
this Treaty are the long occupation of the Rhine, and
the enlargement of Poland beyond anything which we
had contemplated during the war. These two errors
are full of menace for the future peace of Europe, and I
urge that every means be taken to remove them before
it is too late. It is not yet too late. There is no doubt
that the German Delegates are going to make a stiff

462 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

fight, perhaps a condition for signature of the Treaty,
that the Settlement of their Eastern frontiers in Silesia,
East and West Prussia, should be revised. I would
advise that we consider the case to be put forward by
them most carefully on its merits.

5. The Punishment Clauses.

While I am all in favour of the policy laid down in the
Punishment Clauses, I feel that for the German Govern-
ment to agree to them as they stand must be almost, if
not quite, impossible. An indefinite obligation to sur-
render any person whom any Ally might name, and
actually to have to supply the evidence for his conviction
is more than any Government with a sense of honour
and regard for its people could sign. The demand should
be limited to a definite, reasonably short list of war
criminals, whose position or whose crimes were really
outstanding. And when the Germans press for such an
amendment I hope we shall meet them fairly.

The above are the most important alterations which
I would suggest to the Peace Treaty. There are, however,
a number of other more or less important provisions to
which I wish to draw attention.

6. The Military and Air Clauses.

I think we are doing wrong in trying to bind down Ger-
many to a maximum army of 100,000 men. For a popu-
lation so large, and in such a state of internal ferment,
and with frontiers and neighbours such as Germany
has, I think such a force totally inadequate for necessary
police and defense purposes. It took us more than
100,000 men to maintain order in Ireland during the
latter part of the war, and Germany's case is much more
serious. We should be prepared to listen to the case
which the German delegates may make on this matter.

I think it is also quite wrong to deprive her completely
of tanks and military aircraft. These things have be-
come part of the equipment of a properly organized army,
and we should be prepared to leave her the necessary
quota of tanks and aircraft for her small army. A

SMUTS CRITICIZES THE TREATY, MAY 22, 1919 463

similar argument applies to the airships and seaplanes
necessary for her reduced navy.

There is a provision that all aerodromes within 150 km.
of the eastern, western and southern boundaries of
Germany should be demolished. This is far too drastic,
and indeed unnecessary, if not impracticable. The
Treaty bristles with similar pinpricks which embody
merely the whims of minor officials and should not remain
in the Treaty in its final form.

7. International Rivers and Railways.

While the internationalization of the rivers and rail-
ways of Germany which provide outlets for the new
States is perfectly sound in principle, the administration
laid down for these rivers and railways is entirely in-
defensible. These rivers are to be administered by
Boards which contain a small minority of German rep-
resentatives, and this even in the case of rivers which
are exclusively German. English, Italian, French, Scan-
dinavian and Belgian representatives form a great
majority in these Boards. It is as if the Thames Con-
servancy consisted almost entirely of representatives of
foreign Governments! Principles are laid down for the
fixing of rates over German railways which are almost
unintelligible, and, so far as I understand them, un-
workable. Generally most of the provisions in respect
of German rivers and railways are hopelessly one-sided,
and seem intended merely to bring the whole principle of
internationalization into disrepute. They require drastic
revision. I would suggest that the principle laid down
in the case of the Kiel Canal be generally followed. That
is to say, the administration of these international rivers
and railways in German territory should be German, but
a right given to an aggrieved party to appeal to the League
of Nations, who shall have power to appoint an adminis-
tering Commission in a proper case.

8. Pin Pricks.

As I have said, the Treaty is full of small, compara-
tively unimportant provisions which serve no useful

464 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

purpose, but must be unnecessarily galling and wounding
to the feelings of a defeated enemy. While making the
Treaty as hard and stiff as Germany deserves after the
manner of her warfare, we should be careful to eliminate
from it all trace of petty spite and ill-feeling, which cannot
serve so great a cause as ours, nor promote the interests
of future goodwill and peace. I am for drastic revision
of all such pin pricks; they relate largely to the treatment
of German nationals and German property and rights.
But they are found in almost every chapter of the Treaty.

9. Procedure for Alterations.

I have set out what I think should be done with this
Treaty. I add a few words as to the method which I
think should be followed in the necessary revision.

I am very anxious, not only that the Germans should
sign a fair and good Peace Treaty, but also that, for the
sake of the future, they should not merely be made to
sign at the point of the bayonet, so to speak. The
treaty should not be capable of moral repudiation by
the German people hereafter. And for this purpose I
consider it important that we should as far as possible
carry the German Delegates with us, that we should
listen to what they have to say, that we should give all
necessary explanations to them, and that where our
Clauses appear really untenable, we should be prepared
to accept alterations or compromises. In order to do
this, it will be necessary to meet them in oral discussion.
And the suggestion I would make for this purpose is that
a small Committee of minor delegates be appointed to
meet the Germans after they have handed in their final
note on the 29th May, and confer with them in regard to
the Treaty as a whole. This Committee to make a
report to the Supreme Council of the alterations they
recommend after hearing the German side. In this way
the Supreme Council will avoid direct negotiations with
the German Delegates, but will have before them rec-
ommendations arrived at after full cognisance has been
taken of the German case. Necessarily much will depend

SMUTS CRITICIZES THE TREATY, MAY 22, 1919 465

on the personnel of this Committee. I would suggest
that it consist of three delegates, one nominated by the
United States, the British Empire and France respectively.
It is essential for rapid work that the Committee be as
small as possible, and Italy and Japan are not sufficiently
interested in the German Treaty to make it worth while
overloading the Committee with two additional represen-
tatives. If the three Delegates are carefully selected,
their work may be of first-class importance, not only in
securing the necessary modifications in the Treaty, but
in listening to and considering the German case, and
thereby removing from the making of the peace all ap-
pearance of one-sidedness, and unnecessary dictation.
The moral authority of the Treaty will be all the greater
and more binding on that account. And not only the
enemy, but the public opinion of the world will accept
it more readily as an honorable ending of the most awful
and most tragic dispute in history. The final sanction
of this great instrument must be the approval of man-
kind.

[Sd] J. C. SMUTS.

DOCUMENT 67.

Letter of General Smuts to President Wilson
(autographed original), dated May 30, 1919,
criticizing the Treaty and asserting that it "is
against the letter and spirit of your points."

BRITISH DELEGATION
PARIS

30th May, 1919.
DEAR PRESIDENT WILSON,

Even at the risk of wearying you I venture to address
you once more.

The German answer to our draft Peace Terms seems
to me to strike the fundamental note which is most
dangerous to us, and which we are bound to consider most
carefully. They say in effect that we are under solemn
obligation to them to make a Wilson Peace, a peace in
accordance with your Fourteen Points and other Prin-
ciples enunciated in 1918. To my mind there is abso-
lutely no doubt that this is so. Subject to the two
reservations made by the Allies before the Armistice, we
are bound to make a peace within the four corners of
your Points and Principles, and any provisions of the
Peace Treaty which either go contrary to or beyond their
general scope and intent would constitute a breach of
agreement.

This seems to my mind quite clear, and the question
of fact remains whether there are any such provisions.
If there are, then our position is indeed serious, as I
understand it. This war began with a breach of a solemn
international undertaking, and it has been one of our
most important war aims to vindicate international law
and the sanctity of international engagements. If the
Allies end the war by following the example of Germany

466

XETTER OF SMUTS TO WILSON, MAY SO, 1919 467

at the beginning, and also confront the world with a
"scrap of paper," the discredit on us will be so great that
I shudder to think of its ultimate effect on public opinion.
We would indeed have done a worse wrong than Germany
because of all that has happened since August, 1914,
and the fierce light which has been concentrated on this
very point.

The question becomes, therefore, most important
whether there are important provisions of the Treaty
which conflict with or are not covered by, but go beyond,
your Points and Principles. I notice a tendency to put
the whole responsibility for deciding this question on
you, and to say that after all President Wilson agrees to
the Treaty and he knows best what the Points and Prin-
ciples mean. This is most unfair to you, and I think we
should all give the gravest consideration to the question
whether our Peace Treaty is within the four corners of
your Speeches of 1918.

Frankly I do not think this is so, and I think the
Germans make out a good case in regard to a number of
provisions. All the one-sided provisions, which exclude
reciprocity or equality, and all the pinpricks, with which
the Treaty teems, seem to me to be both against the
letter and the spirit of your Points. I cannot find any-
thing in the Points or the Principles which should cover,
for instance, the one-sided internationalization of German
rivers, and the utterly bad and one-sided administration
arranged in respect of them. Reparation by way of
coal cannot cover the arrangements made in respect of
the Saar Basin and its people. I even doubt whether
the Occupation of the Rhine for fifteen years could be
squared either with the letter or the spirit of your Points
and Principles. And there are many other points to
which I shall not refer, but which no doubt your Advisers
will consider.

There will be a terrible disillusion if the peoples come
to think that we are not concluding a Wilson Peace, that
we are not keeping our promises to the world or faith
with the public. But if in so doing we appear also to
break the formal agreement deliberately entered into

468 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

(as I think we do), we shall be overwhelmed with the
gravest discredit, and this Peace may well become an even
greater disaster to the world than the war was.

Forgive me for troubling you with this matter, but
I believe it goes to the root of our whole case.
Yours very sincerely,

[Signed] J. C, SMUTS.

DOCUMENT 68.

Stenographic report of meeting between
President Wilson, the Peace Commissioners and
technical advisers of the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace, Hotel Crillon, June 3, 1919,
at 11:00 o'clock A. M. This was the meeting in
which President Wilson sought advice upon sug-
gested changes in the Treaty (mimeograph).

Book No. 4.

Secret.

STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF MEETING BETWEEN THE
PRESIDENT, THE COMMISSIONERS, AND THE TECHNICAL
ADVISERS OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE
PEACE, HOTEL CRILLON, PARIS, JUNE 3, 1919, AT 11:00
O'clock A. M.

PRESENT

THE PRESIDENT.
HONORABLE ROBERT LANSING.
HONORABLE HENRY WHITE.
HONORABLE EDWARD M. HOUSE.
GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS.

ADMIRAL W. S. BENSON, U. S. N.
REAR-ADMIRAL H. S. KNAPP, U. S. N.
REAR-ADMIRAL A. T. LONG, U. S. N.
MAJOR-GENERAL M. M. PATRICK, U. S. A.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. H. McKiNSTRY, U. S. A.
HONORABLE JOHN W. DAVIS.
MR. BERNARD M. BARUCH.
MR. VANCE MCCORMICK.
MR. NORMAN H. DAVIS.

469

470 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

MR. THOMAS W. LAMONT.
MR. HERBERT HOOVER.
DR. JAMES BROWN SCOTT.
MR. LELAND L. SUMMERS.
DR. FRANK W. TAUSSIG.
MR. JOHN FOSTER DULLES.
MR. JEREMIAH SMITH, JR.
MR. E. L. DRESEL.

MR. OSBORNE.

DR. C. H. HASKINS.
DR. R. H. LORD.
DR. CLIVE DAY.
CAPTAIN S. K. HORNBECK.
MR. G. L. BEER.
DR. CHARLES SEYMOUR.
MR. M. O. HUDSON.
COLONEL T. H. DILLON.
COLONEL S. D. EMBICK.
MR. B. W. PALMER.
MR. F. K. NIELSEN.
MR. LELAND HARRISON.
MR. C. A. HERTER.
MR. A. C. KIRK.
CAPTAIN JAMES GARFIELD.
MR. RAY STANNARD BAKER.

THE PRESIDENT : Gentlemen, we have come together in
order that we may hear from you on the question of the
German counter-proposals. We all have moving recol-
lections of the struggles through which we have gone in
framing the treaty, and the efforts we made that were
successful, and the efforts we made that were unsuccess-
ful to make the terms different from what they are,
and I have come here not to express an opinion but to
hear opinions, and I think perhaps the best course to
follow will be to get a general impression from each other
as to which parts of the German counter-arguments have
made the greatest impression upon us.

Just as a guide, I find that the parts that have made
the greatest impression on our British colleagues are the

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 471

arguments with regard to the eastern frontier with Poland,
the parts with regard to reparations, the parts about the
period of occupation, together with the point about the
League of Nations, their impression being that the Ger-
mans might very well be given reasonably to expect that
the period of their probation would not be long in the
matter of admission into the League. Those are the four
points, the four subjects upon which the German counter-
proposals have made the deepest impressions upon them.
That might be the start.

The reparation is the biggest point. That involves
left-overs of the financial clauses. I would be glad to hear
from anyone of our financial group who would like to
express himself on that point.

MR. NORMAN H. DAVIS: We feel that the Germans
have really given us a basis for getting together properly
on reparation, by coming back with a fixed sum. It is
a rather rigid fixed sum, which can be modified and made
more workable. There is a considerable possibility of
getting together there, if we can get the French to agree
upon a fixed sum. As you know, we have always in-
sisted on the necessity of having a fixed sum, because
by leaving it indefinite we had to give considerable powers
to the Reparations Commission, and that is what seems
to worry the Germans more than anything else — the
powers given to the Reparations Commission, which,
as they claim, are rather destructive than constructive,
and if we come back and make a fixed amount, it will be
possible to do away with the functions of the Reparations
Commission which most worry the Germans, and it will
avoid the necessity of interfering with their internal
affairs, and so on.

COLONEL HOUSE : Have not the Germans misconstrued
what the treaty says on that point? That it really does
not go as far as the Germans think it goes, and if the
matter were explained to them personally, that they
would understand it differently from what they now
understand it?

MR. THOMAS W. LAMONT: I believe that they could
be made to understand that, Colonel House. Certainly

472 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

the intent of the Reparations Commission is nothing like
as inquisitorial nor as arbitrary as the Germans have con-
strued it to be, and I believe that we could explain that
to a very large extent, provided, as Mr. Davis says, there
was coupled with it the change from an indefinite, vague
sum to be determined two years from now, to a definite
sum to be determined to-day, because that very change
would do away with a large part of the necessity of such
a commission.

THE PRESIDENT : May I ask if you saw Messrs. Tardieu
and Loucheur this morning?

MR. LAMONT: We saw Mr. Tardieu. Mr. Loucheur
did not come.

THE PRESIDENT: What was his statement?

MR. LAMONT: Mr. Tardieu's first reply was that they
could consider no change, because Mr. Lloyd George
had brought up so many changes. He alluded to the
conference at the President's house yesterday afternoon.
But during the last part of the conference he finally came
around and said that if it were a question of reparation
alone and not a question of the Army of Occupation and
these other things, he did not know but that they could
devise with us the machinery that could work out the
idea of a fixed sum, provided the sum were adequate
enough. He alluded to the first answer, Mr. President,
that you made to the first German note, in which you
indicated that execution might be changed somewhat,
or made to conform, and he said that if we could work
reparation under the head of execution rather than change
of principle, "I believe we could be with you."

THE PRESIDENT: May I ask that what I say by way
of reference to our British colleagues be not repeated
outside of this room, because I am at liberty to use it
only for the purposes of this conference. But here are
the alternative methods of reparation which were sug-
gested: first, that the Germans should undertake as a
contract the whole task of restoration, that is to say, the
physical restoration of the ravaged parts of northern
France, and that a sum should be fixed in the treaty of
peace, under several items in the category of damages,

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 473

the principle being that inasmuch as it was impossible
now to estimate what the actual restoration would cost,
that they should be put under contract to restore northern
France within a definite period, and that, since the rest
of the categories would perhaps hold them, a definite sum
ought to be arrived at in regard to that.

The alternative plan was — and it is a rather vague one
— that the Germans should sign the reparation clauses
as they stand, but that three months should be given
them to effect an arrangement for fixing a definite sum in
cash as a compensation of all claims. That the repara-
tion clauses were to stand, giving them three years for
proposals as to the definite sum.

MR. BARUCH: We discussed those two alternatives
that you speak of, Mr. President, yesterday, but we still
feel that the best solution would be to come to a fixed
sum now, to start with. We went over this yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT: And reject the idea of a contract for
restoration?

MR. DAVIS: It would be difficult, as a matter of prac-
tice, to carry that out.

MR. SUMMERS : There is an economic unsoundness in it,
because many of the districts and places that were dev-
astated and destroyed were located many years ago,
and have now no economic basis for being there. For
instance, they could combine into one steel mill several
destroyed mills. Many of the existing mills could be
combined into one; one could be substituted for many.
Unless there was a latitude given, it would be economi-
cally unsound.

MR. LAMONT: Mr. President, with all respect to Mr.
Lloyd George, he is simply trying to postpone the evil
day, as far as public opinion is concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: I think he has stated the way it is
to be gone about.

MR. LAMONT: Still, whichever way one looks at it,
from the Allied point of view or from the German point
of view, it is better to make it definite. Germany cannot
start her economic and industrial life, cannot gain any
credit, as long as it remains open.

474 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

MR. DAVIS: He is trying to play both ways undoubtedly
there, and as a matter of practice, it is very hard to work
that out, because we can never get together as to the
distribution of this fixed amount, because they would
have to calculate all the time what would be France's
share in the restoration of the Germans.

COLONEL HOUSE: It would be something like rewriting
the treaty.

MR. DAVIS: We are convinced, Mr. President, that
on account of Europe's financial situation to-day it is a
most important thing to fix an amount, and an amount
which Germany and the world itself have some hope of
her being able to pay, and carrying out, which can be
used as a basis for France and Italy and the other coun-
tries getting on their feet and meeting their require-
ments.

Under the present arrangements, as the Germans very
properly state, if they are not prosperous and cannot get
back to work they will pay nothing, but on the other
hand, if they buckle down to work and work hard and
save, the harder they work and the more they save, the
more they will pay. And that is a rather poor incentive
for the Germans to buckle down and work hard. But
if there is a fixed amount which will let them see a chance
of getting from under some day, I believe that would be
a better incentive for them.

THE PRESIDENT: How about the other side of it: a
fixed sum will form a basis of credit for the other nations,
but what will form a basis for Germany's credit?

COLONEL HOUSE : It was practically a fixed sum.

THE PRESIDENT : Yes, there would be that definiteness
in it, but where would her assets be?

MR. DAVIS: We must insist upon her being left with
sufficient assets as a working capital.

THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact the Reparations
Commission can do that.

MR. DAVIS: They are permitted to leave her with
certain assets, except the ships. We feel that some ar-
rangement certainly must be made whereby Germany
can at least have a sufficient number of those ships, either

"WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 475

retaining them or making some arrangement for getting
them back, so that she will have enough for her own
trade, and which I understand amounts to about one-
third of the ships which she has turned over.

SECRETARY LANSING: Now Germany offers a fixed
sum, does she?

MR. DAVIS: Yes.

SECRETARY LANSING: It is 100 milliards of marks?

MR. DAVIS: Yes. Of course they make quite a large
amount of deductions. They say that they will pay the
first sum of 20 milliards of marks in the first seven years,
but that you must deduct from that the war materials
they have turned over and everything else they have
turned over and will turn over under the treaty, and also
the proportionate share of the pre-war and the war debt
of Alsace-Lorraine and of that part of the territory that
Poland gets, which they estimate roughly would amount
to about three million dollars.

MR. LAMONT: Still, Mr. Secretary, it is very striking
that they have made two definite offers: the offer of 20
milliards, and the further offer to devote to reparations a
sum annually amounting approximately to the total
net peace budget of the German Empire, between
$750,000,000 and one billion dollars.

SECRETARY LANSING: As I recall it, they offer to pay
20 milliards of marks on or before May 1st, 1926, and
then they offer to pay one milliard a year after that.
But they will increase it, on the basis that their people
shall not be taxed more than the greatest amount paid
by any injured country.

MR. DAVIS: They say that as a result they will be
compelled, according to that, to tax that heavily; but
at least 20 milliards they offer to pay within seven years,
and without interest. That is not a capital sum. If
you reduce that to a capital sum that will amount to
12J or 15 milliards. We feel, from a practical standpoint,
that it is better to have it interest bearing. Of course
you have to give them a few years before they can af-
ford to pay interest, because otherwise it would run so
fast against them that they could not catch up.

476 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

SECRETARY LANSING: It does not come so very far
from the 15 billions of dollars talked about.

MR. LAMONT: It is a little bit less. After you take
away deductions it would amount to the capital sum of
10 billion dollars.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you understand that the French
this morning were not willing to consider an alteration or
change of that sort?

MR. LAMONT: I think they are willing to consider a
change of that sort if some one will tell them that that
is the only change that would be discussed. At least
that was Mr. Tardieu's attitude. Mr. McCormick could
better tell us that.

MR. VANCE McCoRMiCK: He said that every modi-
fication proposed by the British was against the French.
The British never mentioned any concession regarding
ships or the colonies, and Mr. Tardieu called Mr. Lloyd
George's attention to that fact. Mr. Tardieu's position
was that they should not agree to a change in the present
treaty; that during these five months the experts have
discussed these questions pro and con, and having finally
come to a decision, it would be fatal to change any prin-
ciple whatever. The question of machinery of execu-
tion, as you stated in your note, might be considered;
that was the position the French took. And as he went
out of the room he intimated to Mr. Lamont that he
might consider such questions as the question of the
reparation clauses, along the line we have just been dis-
cussing, provided it was not opening the door to con-
cessions along the other lines. France could not afford
to concede anything further.

THE PRESIDENT : Would he regard fixing a capital sum
as a modification of principle, or a method?

MR. McCoRMiCK: A method. Didn't you gather that?
(Addressing Mr. Lamont.)

MR. LAMONT: Yes. Mr. Loucheur, of course, has more
to say about that than Mr. Tardieu has. If it had not
been for the British "Heavenly Twins" we could have
gotten together with Loucheur months ago.

MR. DAVIS: Now he is a little bit worried about that

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 477

political aspect of it, but if there are some changes made
which would affect the British I think it would have a
certain influence on the French, but, as Tardieu says,
the only changes that are proposed are practically those
that affect the French.

COLONEL HOUSE: Premier Clemenceau told me last
night that he was willing to discuss Silesia. He was not
willing to discuss the period of occupation, and he was
not willing to discuss any of the other things that Lloyd
George wanted.

THE PRESIDENT: Did he say that he would not discuss
reparation?

COLONEL HOUSE: No, and I gathered that he would. I
think we could get him to discuss reparation. And I
also think — much to my surprise — that he would about
the League of Nations. He said he would not consider
for a moment letting the Germans in now, and I said:
"Well, your attitude about that I think is the worst
attitude for France, and I cannot understand it. It
seems to me that you can see that the sooner the League
of Nations gets its grip on Germany the better it would
be for France." He said: "I concede that; that is all
right; but not for the moment. Presently." So I don't
think he is going to be very bad on that. I think the
Germans could be told privately that Germany will come
in very shortly. I think we could get him to consent
to that.

THE PRESIDENT : Well, if you gentlemen of the repara-
tion group had a free hand — if only we ourselves were
concerned — what would you propose with regard to the
reparation?

MR. DAVIS : Well, we have not definitely agreed among
'ourselves as to just what we would propose, but we cer-
tainly are in accord with this, that we would propose
and insist upon a fixed sum, and that that fixed sum
would be as high as we really could get Germany to agree
to without having a bayonet at her throat, because, after
all, the important thing, as stated before, is to get some-
thing which can be used as a basis for France and Italy
to get more credit, and which will not be so burdensome

478 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

as will prevent Germany from going ahead with restoring
her industrial life, because, after all, what they need to
do more than anything is to get people to work, and they
have pretty nearly all exhausted their credit. Loucheur
is worried about that now, and the important thing is
not so much what Germany can pay now, really just now,
as fixing a reasonable amount which the German people
are willing to buckle down to attempting to pay, and
which the investors of the world think she will pay,—
and they are rather apt to believe that Germany will
pay what she undertakes to pay.

THE PRESIDENT: The aspect of the subject which
interests me is the world aspect of it. Unless these
securities that Germany is going to give are known to be
worth something they cannot be used as a basis for
credit, and somebody else will have to supply the credit.
Now they cannot be made worth anything unless Ger-
many has the means of going to work and producing.
Which is the result of saying that they cannot be made
worth anything unless she has assets to begin with to
establish her own credit. And therefore the thing has
two sides to it; not only the aspect of Germany and
France and Italy — but the world aspect; working out
a method by which this sum would be made not only
definite but worth something, by having means for Ger-
many to get to work.

MR. DAVIS: Yes, we think so.

THE PRESIDENT: Now it seems to me that we could
have made it evident to the Germans, by explaining to
them, that the real functions of the Reparations Com-
mission, are, as I understand them to be, to help them
in carrying out their obligations. The only trouble is,
that it is one thing to say that this is the way the
Reparations Commission is going to work, and another
thing to find it in the treaty. Because we, of the present
group of persons, are putting a certain interpretation on
the treaty, but there will be others following us who may
not put the same interpretation upon it.

MR. DAVIS: We probably have not got in there as
clear a picture of what our idea was as to the policy that

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 479

would be followed by the Reparations Commission as we
should have, and it would be well, and it would undoubt-
edly affect the Germans, if they could be told.

THE PRESIDENT: Why not write — I don't know what
the language would be — an accompanying memorandum,
agreed to by all the powers, as to the method of adminis-
tration by the Reparations Commission?

MR. BARUCH : Of course if we fixed a sum the Repara-
tions Commission would die. If we fixed a definite sum,
and Germany agreed to it, and she delivered, the Repara-
tions Commission, as we have got it set up, would die,
and another would be set up to receive the funds and
bonds.

Mr. DAVIS: The Reparations Commission was set up
principally because they were leaving this matter indefi-
nite, and because we were imposing a burden upon Ger-
many concerning which there was some doubt as to
her capacity to meet. But as it was clearly understood
that they must follow a constructive policy, and that
Germany could not pay anything unless she was given
facilities and working capital it was absolutely neces-
sary to set up this commission, with the idea of getting
all they could out of Germany, but doing this in a broad
way. But that is not the picture that is really conveyed
in there (i. e., in the Treaty). The powers of the
Reparations Commission are, in a sense, destructive as
far as Germany is concerned — they could be — but it
ought to be explained to the Germans that no intelligent
people could perform its destructive powers unless Ger-
many wilfully failed to comply.

There is no limitation on what the Reparations Com-
mission can do, and since the armistice the agreements
with the Germans have been outrageously violated by the
French, as for instance, the Luxembourg protocol, etc.,
and the Germans have had an experience of what the
giving of this power has meant, and they complained
of it, to which I responded and asked them if they did
not think they were entitled to it. They have got evi-
dence to show that the commissions have thus far been
outrageously unfair.

480 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

THE PRESIDENT: You think that difficulty would be
met then by a fixed sum?

MR. SUMMERS: Unquestionably. We have always re-
warded, by pensions and in similar ways, deeds of heroism,
and each nation has chosen to reward its heroes as it saw
fit, and to place that on the Germans on the basis that
the French have awarded theirs is unprecedented in the
history of the world. And if we had stood for actual
reparation we might get some place within a rational sum,
which Germany could pay, and we would have a basis
for understanding upon that amount.

MR. LAMONT: Mr. President, I believe our difficulties
with Germany would fade away if you and Mr. Clemen-
ceau and Mr. Lloyd George would instruct your technical
committees to arrive at a definite sum within twenty-
four hours instead of two years, and at the same time to
reach an agreement as to how much working capital
should be left in Germany's hands.

THE PRESIDENT: We instructed them once to find a
definite sum. And then we got Klotz-on the brain.

MR. LAMONT : Mr. Lloyd George kicked over the traces,
but now he has come back to the fold.

MR. DAVIS: You remember they used to change com-
missions such as this, in times gone by, every time they
decided against the wishes of the heads of the states.

COLONEL HOUSE: Do you remember how we always
knew, when the individual members would come into a
meeting just what the trend of the meeting was going to
be that day?

THE PRESIDENT: Now the joke of it is that Lord
Sumner was one of those who contributed to the unani-
mous counsel of the British the other day, and he takes
a different position now.

MR. LAMONT: I believe we could get together on this
point.

MR. DAVIS: Of course on those constructions you
should make the necessary consequential changes in the
Reparations Commission, and if possible do something
to get away with it. I am afraid you will have to have
a reparations commission for a while.

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 481

But it is necessary to have a commission, really, to
receive the funds and the bonds, and open the trust for
the proper distribution at the proper time.

THE PRESIDENT: Now what about the eastern borders
of Germany?

DR. R. H. LORD : I must confess that the general tenor
of the German argument about the cession to be made
to Poland struck me as a rather weak attempt to escape
from the principle laid down in the fourteen points with
regard to the united Polish state, containing all Polish
territories, and a secure access to the sea.

The territories which the treaty proposes to give to
Poland are so indisputably Polish that in general the
Germans have not been able to pick very serious flaws
in the treaty from the point of view of nationality, sta-
tistics or the principle of uniting indisputably Polish ter-
ritories to Poland. They have gone out to find all, what
they call, the purely German districts which are awarded
to Poland under this treaty, and what they have been
able to find is very little. They have been able to detect
a small district here and another small district there
where there is a German majority. Sometimes they
use very bad figures in establishing that. But, at any
rate, here and there they have found places where, owing
to necessities of topography or of railway communica-
tions, or in order to secure a half-way compact frontier,
the proposal incorporated in the treaty had been to give
slight areas of German majority to Poland. There are
a couple of such cases where it is possible that recti-
fications in the line proposed by the treaty might be
made without serious consequences to the integrity of
the whole solution. Here is one case where there is a
short bit of railway line (exhibiting on map) that might
be rectified.

But, as everyone knows, the linguistic border between
Germans and Poles is an extremely sinuous and contorted
one. There has been an immense admixture of the two
races in this part of the world, — an admixture which has

482 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

been largely due to the systematic work of the Prussian
government, with its colonization methods, which has
flooded certain portions with Germans by purely artificial
means, and kept the Germans there by purely artificial
means.

Now it was impossible for the Commission on Polish
Affairs in making the proposals of the boundaries here, to
avoid including in the frontiers of Poland some — not
large — regions of Germans. Otherwise no compact fron-
tier could have been reached. The Commission in its
proposals left out a number of regions that were on the
other side, and it made quite consistent efforts to be fair
in its proposals. We can see only two places where
slight changes might be made without serious results, and
even in one of them, because of its character, I think a
change would be quite questionable because it would
make dangerously narrow and insecure that access to the
Baltic Sea which is, I think, one of the cardinal and in-
dispensable elements of the general Polish settlement.

The point which the Germans lay most stress on, per-
haps, is the question of Upper Silesia, and perhaps that
is a question on which it is better

COLONEL HOUSE: (Interrupting) They ask for a pleb-
iscite there, and following that plebiscite, what in your
opinion would be the result?

DR. LORD: My opinion is that it would result favor-
ably to Poland — I have very little doubt about that—
if it could be arranged under conditions that would ensure
a fair expression of the popular will.

I cannot forbear, however, laying before you the very
great practical difficulties in the way of that. I think
everyone recognizes that a plebiscite in German terri-
tory cannot be held while the territory is occupied by
German troops and by German officials. Just at present,
in spite of the republican government of Germany, they
are having a veritable reign of terror in Upper Silesia which
is as bad as anything that went on under the Imperial
Government, and such a state exists there that they have
been arresting every prominent Polish leader; they have
been placing people on trial charged with being guilty of

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 483

high treason for the crime of having made speeches in
favor of union with Poland, or collecting money in favor
of Polish national causes.

So, under present conditions it is impossible to have
a fair plebiscite. You would have to occupy the country
with Allied troops, and I wonder whether the Allied and
Associated Governments are prepared to do that. Con-
sequently, even under those present conditions there is
this difficulty about a plebiscite.

Upper Silesia is a country where a very great part of
the land and a great part of the industries of the country
are in the hands of a very small group of great magnates.
There is such a concentration of property in the hands
of a few great families as you find almost nowhere
else in Germany. They are in the hands of such families
as the Hohenlohe, von Pless, and half a dozen others.
And then the great industries of the country are also con-
trolled by German capital. It means that the Polish
population is economically, without a doubt, in great
dependence upon German land owners and capitalists,
and as the experience of every election that comes from
that country shows, it is extremely difficult for them to
vote as they please without ruining their chances of
a livelihood. I can think of few countries where the
countryman finds it so dangerous to express his opinion
at the polls.

As for the other general fact about the Upper Silesian
situation, the part of Upper Silesia which the treaty pro-
poses to give to Poland has a ratio of Polish majority of
two to one, and in fact, decidedly more than that accord-
ing to the revision of the German statistics which the Brit-
ish experts have prepared. It comes as near to being indis-
putably Polish territory as any part of eastern Europe.

The chief value of that territory to Germany, of course,
lies in its immense mineral wealth, which is undoubtedly
the fact, as their response says that Upper Silesia pro-
duces 23 percent of the total coal output of the German
Empire, and I think it is something like four-fifths of the
production of zinc, and a large part of the production of
iron.

484 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

It is true that the loss of that territory might be a very
serious economic blow to Germany, but I would like to lay
before you this other fact that if Upper Silesia contains
about one-quarter of Germany's coal output, it contains
about three-quarters of the coal output of the territories
of Polish nationality, so the loss to Germany on the one
hand would also mean that it would be a serious blow and
a loss to Poland on the other. Three-quarters of her coal
would be a far more decisive thing.

MR. LAMONT : I don't see how that could be a loss to
Poland, because she never had it.

THE PRESIDENT : But it is theoretically Polish.

COLONEL HOUSE: That was never a part of Poland,
was it?

THE PRESIDENT: Creating a state out of Polish popu-
lation in some places like Upper Silesia which never
constituted a part of ancient Poland, isn't that right,
Dr. Lord?

DR. LORD : Not entirely, Mr. President. The German
memorandum is an extremely fallacious article in its
historical data. It states repeatedly that Upper Silesia
belonged to Germany for 750 years, which is not at all true.
Upper Silesia was Polish from the beginning; was Polish
for several centuries.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean it was part of the Polish
state, or only Polish in population?

DR. LORD: Part of the Polish state, and it resulted in
there being there a Polish population. It passed from
Poland to Bohemia some time in 1500; from Bohemia it
passed to Austria in 1600, and it passed to the Germans in
1700; so it belonged to the German state, to the Germans,
about 200 years.

MR. LAMONT: It has not belonged to Poland for 400
years.

SECRETARY LANSING: Isn't the real point the question
where the coal is used after it is mined? Is it used mainly
in Poland to-day?

DR. LORD: No. There was a considerable export to
Poland, but in the main the coal was used in eastern
Germany, in the region east of Berlin. Now they point

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 485

out that a great part of that territory which is wholly
dependent on Silesia is going to Poland. Poland and West
Prussia do consume a great part of it. A great part of it
went to Austria-Hungary also.

SECRETARY LANSING: Where did what is now new
Poland get her coal if she did not get it from Silesia?

DR. LORD: Russian Poland got about six million tons
a year in the Dombrowka district. There is a coal
mining region in Russian Poland and also a smaller coal
mining region in Galicia.

SECRETARY LANSING: And German Poland got how
much of its coal from this region?

DR. LORD : All of it.

SECRETARY LANSING: How much did they use?

DR. LORD : I cannot give you the exact figures.

SECRETARY LANSING: Approximately?

DR. LORD: I know that in Poland this winter they
were practically without coal.

SECRETARY LANSING : Then Poland will get a good deal
more coal than she had before, if she gets this area?

DR. LORD: It depends on what you mean by "Poland."

SECRETARY LANSING: I am speaking of this territory
that is now embraced in the new boundaries.

DR. LORD: Yes.

SECRETARY LANSING: She would get a good deal more
coal?

DR. LORD : Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: After all that is probably susceptible
of solution in a different way; by guarantees obtained
as to the supply of coal, that is, putting no restrictions
on the supplying of coal to Germany.

MR. BARUCH : It is true that the coal and the iron is more
or less locked up in the mines of Germany, and, as sug-
gested by you, in the division of this territory it should
be guaranteed that the coal and iron should go, anyhow
for a number of years until there is a chance for readjust-
ment, to the places it had gone before.

THE PRESIDENT: That no restrictions should be placed
on it.

MR. DAVIS: Where it goes naturally. To do that,

486 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

under the present treaty Poland has a right to take over
all this property, the privately owned property, after the
war, which is a rather unusual procedure; while the Ger-
mans have developed this, the Polish government can
come and purchase all this property and turn it over to
Polish citizens.

THE PRESIDENT : They have to pay for it.

MB. DAVIS: That is true, but Germany has to pay
for it.

THE PRESIDENT: How do you mean?

MR. SUMMERS: Germany agrees to reimburse her
nationals.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the property can be
expropriated?

MR. DAVIS: Not for public use but for private use.
In other words, the German government has to pay its
citizens for the property which the Polish government
wants to take from them.

MR. TAUSSIG: The Polish government may take it
from the people who now own it, and the valuation is
fixed by the Polish government, without any control or
supervision of any kind. I think that is one of the worst
provisions of the treaty.

MR. PALMER: That is one of the unexpected results
of the application of the general clauses to a case with
which we have not been concerned at all. The general
committee on Alien Enemy Property hadn't anything
to do with Alsace-Lorraine or Poland, which we under-
stood were to be covered by different clauses entirely —
as took place in the case of Alsace-Lorraine. It is aston-
ishing to me that there should exist in Silesia any such
effect as has been outlined, and I think Silesia ought to be
treated by itself. A large territory like that should have
its own special clauses covering it, because this particular
language which we have adopted for application under
totally different circumstances, has an unexpected effect.

THE PRESIDENT: That had escaped my notice.

MR. PALMER: I am not sure that it has that result, Mr.
President, but if it has, it should be provided for.

MR. BARUCH: The economic feature of the Silesian

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 487

question should be taken up and have special treatment
as regards the distribution of the assets, and also the
questions of private property and other matters of that
kind, and I think that it does require and is entitled to
special treatment.

MR. DAVIS: It is not supposed that the Polish gov-
ernment should take that

THE PRESIDENT: That is not in the Polish part of the
treaty.

MR. DAVIS: It is not in the Polish part, Mr. Presi-
dent. Poland has been construed in this treaty as one
of the Allied Governments. It is in the economic clauses.

MR. TAUSSIG: Poland figures as one of the Allied and
Associated Powers, and in drafting those provisions of the
Allied and Associated Powers, I don't believe that it was
expected that it would be a constituted state, figuring
in every respect as a duly constituted Allied and Asso-
ciated Power, but they had it in the treaty draft. I do
not think, Mr. President, there would be any serious
difficulty in disposing of that problem. I think the dis-
position of the German property, after it came under
Polish jurisdiction, would not be difficult. I think it
is more a matter of sentiment. The sentimental features
of it are more important, — the fact of depriving the Ger-
mans of property which has been German for many
centuries presents a more serious difficulty; there is a
sentimental difficulty on both sides.

THE PRESIDENT: Now is there not in Paris some Polish
representative with whom you could discuss these eco-
nomic aspects of the matter at once so as to see if there
is not some arrangement that would not be so objection-
able in regard to raw materials, and this matter of ex-
propriation?

MR. BARUCH: This might affect reparations, Mr.
Pjesident. This property that is taken over by the
Polish government, that is not to be held under the
economic clauses.

SECRETARY LANSING: I want to ask another thing in
connection with the Polish coal supply. Northeast of
Teschen there is a large area which I understand is coal

488 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

bearing and undeveloped which will come to Poland.
Is that correct?

DR. LORD: In the northeastern part of Teschen?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

SECRETARY LANSING: Northeast of Teschen.

THE PRESIDENT: It does not mean the Teschen coal
basin. As they show the area on the map I should
think it is about one-fifth of a large coal area that ex-
tended northeastward into Poland. Is that well estab-
lished that there is a large coal bearing region there in
Poland that is undeveloped?

DR. LORD: There is a considerable area, in Galicia
especially, where I think they expect a large development.
In general this coal area comes just at the intersection
of the old frontiers of Austria, Russia and Prussia. The
basin is divided between the three powers, most of it
being on the Prussian side, all of it being in Polish terri-
tory with very slight exceptions, and the undeveloped
parts are mainly towards the east, in Austria, and, to a
very slight extent, in what was formerly Russian territory.

SECRETARY LANSING : About one-twelfth of that area is
developed. I do not mean to say one-twelfth of the
wealth, but one-twelfth of the area.

THE PRESIDENT: The other most prominent subject
is the subject of the occupation of the Rhenish Provinces
for five, ten and fifteen years. And I say in the same
confidential way that I indicated a moment ago, that
Mr. Lloyd George represented his military advisers and
his cabinet as all together a unit that the period of oc-
cupation should extend over a period of only two years,
with a possibility of extending it further in case the
Germans refused to carry out the terms of the treaty,
or in any deliberate way failed to carry out the terms.
That creates a very serious impasse between the British
and French opinion.

If I may just say a word of explanation, the French
military opinion, as it has been interpreted to me, does not
believe that the fifteen-year occupation is in any way

489

satisfying. As I understand it, Marshal Foch wanted to
occupy the Rhenish provinces for thirty years, the proba-
ble period of payment of reparation, and it was a com-
promise, I infer, which reduced it to fifteen years. And
they have made an arrangement under which this inter-
esting comment has been made, that the areas of occupa-
tion, one for five, one for ten and one for fifteen years, —
all abutting on the Rhine, of course — extend in a line
northwest and southeast, not east and west, and the
reason given me for that was that extending that way
they would always protect the direct route from Germany
to Paris. But the direct route is not the route that is
at all likely to be taken.

The route that has usually been taken, and that was
taken this time, is the northern route, across which lies
the area which is to be first evacuated, and the territory
next most likely to be used, from a military point of view,
is to be evacuated in ten years, and the territory which
would certainly not be used is to be evacuated in fifteen
years. And the intimation was that the real object was
the control of the navigation of the Rhine. That is the
last area, and all this occupation touches, of course, Lor-
raine and the commercial interests of France that center
on the Rhine.

So that the question of occupation has this drawback
to it: it is not strictly speaking a military question, ap-
parently. It is a means of quieting public opinion during
the period that Germany is certainly not going to be able
to do anything in a military line, and withdrawing their
forces just at about the time when she is likely to recu-
perate, which is not, if I am stating it correctly, a military
proposition at all.

And another very serious drawback to it — at least from
the point of view of several of the powers, on reparations
—is that Germany is to pay for this Army of Occupation,
and it would cost several hundreds of millions to maintain
it, and those millions would come out of the reparations,
and if you have a fixed sum — not otherwise — it would be
that much in addition to the French portion of the repara-
tions, because everyone contends that the Army of Occupa-

490 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

tion will be French. They would not expect Great Britain
and ourselves to furnish more than some small number
that would be sufficient to keep the colours afloat and jus-
tify the name of an inter-allied force.

So I do not know who it calls for to discuss it, if I am
right that it is not strictly a military question, and if
it is a civil question it is a question involving many
embarrassments, chiefly embarrassments of French public
opinion.

But I would be very glad if the military people would
fire away at it if they have anything to say.

COLONEL HOUSE : How serious is this republic that they
have formed there?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know how serious it is.

COLONEL HOUSE : You see if that would get agoing that
would settle that question, because that is what they
asked for.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't believe it is at all genuine — I
mean spontaneous. I would be very suspicious of it in
the present circumstances.

COLONEL HOUSE: Yes, I think it is an imposture.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is.

GENERAL BLISS: Mr. President, I would like to say one
word on that subject. I think as you just stated, it is
almost entirely a political question rather than a military
one, because no essential military objects will be accom-
plished by the military occupation of the territories pro-
posed to be occupied under the proposed conditions. And
I have never been in favour of the prolonged military
occupation and I base my views on two considerations:
the first is the matter of good sound policy, and the other
sound business.

As a matter of policy I have always — and a good many
other military men agree with me on that — looked with
apprehension on the possibilities of a military occupation
of a territory, the people of which we will be officially at
peace with for a long time. It is so likely to result in in-
cidents that will bring about the very thing that we want,
of course, to avoid, and that is a resumption of war. It
has always seemed to me that it is almost a slap in the

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 491

face of the League of Nations, in which we are all so in-
terested, to assume that the execution of this treaty,
extending over a long term of years, can only be accom-
plished by a military force instead of by this League of
Nations, which presumably at an early date will be in
operation.

Then you have yourself pointed out the reason why it
is not sound business.

Mr. Ribot in the speech that he made in the French
Senate the other day used figures which I have no doubt
are exaggerated, but they still, after making a due allow-
ance for exaggeration, indicate a wasteful amount of
money that would be simply eaten up in the collection of
the remainder, and he estimated that out of the first 25
milliards of francs that would come from Germany, partly
to the French and partly to the Belgians, at least 15 mil-
liards of it would be eaten up in the expense of the army
of occupation. I think that figure is exaggerated, and he
probably assumes a continuance of an army of occupation
approximating the present force there, which now num-
bers a million men — a grossly exaggerated and unnecessary
number for any purpose that it is agreed it may be called
upon to accomplish.

The Marshal's demand is that after the signature of
peace there be maintained an army of thirty infantry di-
visions, and not to exceed five cavalry divisions, which,
together with all the attached services, would amount to
somewhere in the neighbourhood of 600,000 men. It is
not enough for war, on the supposition that Germany
could resume the war — which she cannot do — and it is
entirely unnecessary on the assumption that she cannot
resume the war. He proposes to keep that army there
during the period of disarmament in Germany. Now no
one knows how long that will be. The Germans in their
reply have said that it is technically impossible to execute
the clauses of the treaty on which time limit was imposed,
within the time limits imposed; that the time limits should
be prolonged, and they say the matter should be subject
of negotiations. And in the Marshal's office yesterday
afternoon in the conference which we had, it was agreed

492 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

by all that it was absolutely impossible to comply with
the terms, so far as the time limits are concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: Did the French agree to that?

GENERAL BLISS: Oh, yes. Now how long that will
continue, nobody knows. But during its continuance,
during all this period, military control of commissions will
be kept in operation, which will also be contributing to
the diminution of the available funds that they get out
of Germany for reparations and otherwise.

Now those who have read the German counter-proposals
on the subject of military, naval and air terms, know that
they accept everything in principle subject to their ad-
mission into the League of Nations, and in regard to this
term of occupation — whatever it be — if Germany is at
any time to be admitted into the League of Nations, cer-
tainly that occupation in Germany must cease the moment
she is so admitted. It would be intolerable, and there is
no provision in any part of the Covenant for the occupa-
tion of territory of a nation which has been accepted into
membership in the League of Nations, which acceptance
is only done after you are satisfied that she has given
every guarantee to comply with the League's obliga-
tions.

I understand that there has been some consideration
given to a very material reduction in the period of occupa-
tion, and I hope that it can be carried through, and that
whatever that time will be

THE PRESIDENT: (Interrupting) By whom, General?

GENERAL BLISS : Based on the German proposals, there
has been more or less consideration given

THE PRESIDENT: By the French?

GENERAL BLISS: Well, it has been discussed. I don't
think the French are willing to consider it now, but to
take not to exceed four months to consider that. It might
be prolonged long after that and still come within the lim-
its proposed in the treaty, and I take it if any change is
made at all, or if the present figures are kept to five, ten
or fifteen years, occupation should cease the moment Ger-
many becomes a member of the League of Nations.

Personally I hope very much that the term of occupa-

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 493

tion made by common agreement will be very materially
reduced.

THE PRESIDENT : The only door for consideration which
Mr. Clemenceau said he was willing to leave open yester-
day, was the cost. I was interested to know just what
he would consider, and he said at first that he would not
consider the reduction of the term of occupation at all,
that was impossible for him, and then he subsequently
said he would consider it from the point of view of the
cost. Now just what and how much that meant I do not
know; we did not go into it. But of course that is a very
serious side. If they agree to a fixed sum of reparation,
then every dollar of what has been spent on occupation
is a reduction of that sum.

MR. DAVIS: It goes to support their army.

THE PRESIDENT : It goes to support their army, yes, but
they would not otherwise be paid to support so large an
army. I don't know how large an army they would other-
wise have. Can you tell us, General?

GENERAL BLISS: Under their organic law they would
have 800,000 men, and I have not seen nor heard any word
from any source nor have I heard of any proposition being
before their legislature to modify that.

COLONEL HOUSE: Don't you suppose it would be possi-
ble upon these disputed questions, that is, not upon all
the German questions, but upon some of them, to appoint
committees of the experts and see what modifications, if
any, could be made and agreed upon?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the plan I had in mind was to
have our own conference, as we were advised that Mr.
Orlando was having his this morning, and Mr. Clemenceau
is having his, — in order that we might, without having any
of the usual round-about expressions of international
intercourse, learn each others' minds, real minds, and then
my idea was that each one of our groups would either re-
tire, and they, or some representatives whom they would
select, would meet the corresponding groups of the other
countries and have an exchange of views.

COLONEL HOUSE: That was what I had in mind.

THE PRESIDENT : Have a clearing house.

494 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

COLONEL HOUSE: Wouldn't it modify the general se-
lection if we knew what the commission that Mr. Davis
is on is doing?

THE PRESIDENT: John W. Davis?

COLONEL HOUSE: Yes.

MR. JOHN W. DAVIS: I don't know that that commis-
sion has any more to do than to recommend the size of
the army. All they have to do is to draw up a scheme
of the organization of the army and the size.

THE PRESIDENT: That might soften the blow to them.

MR. JOHN W. DAVIS : Yes, make it a little bit less Dra-
conian.

SECRETARY LANSING: Is it possible to fix the time when
Germany can be admitted into the League of Nations?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't honestly think it is. I think
it is necessary that we should know that the change in
government and the governmental method in Germany is
genuine and permanent. We don't know either of them
yet.

SECRETARY LANSING: When are we going to know?
When are you going to get consent from all these countries,
from France or the Executive Council?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that France would be one of
the first.

MR. DAVIS: Do you think it would if it were condi-
tioned upon withdrawing the Army of Occupation? That
is mentioned as a condition upon Germany coming into
the League of Nations.

THE PRESIDENT : Except as to Germany paying for the
army. I think she would be sick of the Army of Occupa-
tion.

MR. DAVIS: She wants to control this from an economic
standpoint too.

THE PRESIDENT : But I don't see how they can do that
without a proper convention.

MR. DAVIS: We have a convention now, you know,
with them, and they are all the time springing the Eco-
nomic Council, and they do not stand by the convention.

THE PRESIDENT: Convention of what?

MR. DAVIS: Among the Allied and Associated Powers.

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 495

THE PRESIDENT : But the convention I am speaking of
is the permanent convention, the fifteen-year convention
under which there wo'uld be no interference with the eco-
nomic or industrial life of the country whatever.

MR. DAVIS: But now I see there is a convention be-
tween the Allied and Associated Powers that there would
not be an interference, and the French are not living up
to it.

THE PRESIDENT: My only hope is that when we sign
peace those things will be settled.

DR. C. H. HASKINS: Is it proper to ask at this time if
that Erzberger letter which appeared in the Chicago
Tribune, Paris Edition, some days ago, is genuine? I ask
that because it has a great deal of popular effect as to the
attitude of the German government.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know. I asked that same
question myself and did not find anybody who could give
me a satisfactory answer.

COLONEL HOUSE: Where did we get it from?

MR. DRESEL: It came from Berne. I think undoubt-
edly from the Poles there. My private opinion is — and
I have studied it very carefully — that it is not genuine.
I think that if the language in regard to Poland is carefully
studied it would appear more and more as a piece of Polish
propaganda. And knowing the probable source from
which it came, and the fact that the Poles are still en-
deavouring to circulate it — it came from our legation only
yesterday again, from the Polish legation at Berne, and
it got to England and was published there — I can have
very little doubt that it is an organized frameup.

COLONEL HOUSE: Can you not get somebody to ask
Erzberger directly?

MR. DRESEL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it not stated in the Tribune — that
is the way I got it — that it was supposed to have been an
interview in the last

COLONEL HOUSE: The first of April.

MR. DRESEL: It came through the military about three
weeks ago, and then it came again in the Tribune yester-
day, but we have had it for three or four weeks.

496 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

THE PRESIDENT: It is said to be an interview with him,
and not a letter?

MR. DRESEL: It was supposed to 'be a circular sent to
the different German authorities. It is not like Erz-
berger's style, however. I question also whether Erz-
berger had a right to send out such a circular; it was not
within his province. The whole thing was very much
out of his province.

MR. LAMONT : Shall we hear further from you, or go to
the Allied groups directly?

THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be better if you
would take the initiative and seek a conference.

MR. McCoRMicK: Express a fixed sum?

THE PRESIDENT: Find out if you can get a common
agreement. As I was pointing out in the beginning, they
(the British) have taken the American position at last,
and that is a pretty good position.

MR. HOOVER: Did Mr. Dresel say what points the Ger-
mans are most insistent upon the modification of? If we
take their reply, they contend as vigorously for things of
no moment as for things of great moment.

MR. DRESEL: When I was in Germany more than a
month ago the thing that struck me most was the Saar
Basin, but that may be because that had come out and
the others had not yet come out. They did not know
about the eastern Silesian coal mines at that time, but the
Saar Basin was the one point on which they laid the most
stress. They said they would give up the coal, but did
not want to give up the control to France entirely.

MR. HOOVER: I had a consultation, and there are
three or four points which they raised most insistently:
the fixed indemnity at some sum; the modification of the
Saar Basin terms; the period of occupation, and the
Silesian coal mines. They seemed to be more insistent
upon that than Dantzig.

DR. HASKINS: I got the same impression from reading
the German proposals in the original.

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 497

SECRETARY LANSING: I think it brings out just those
points also.

DR. HASKINS: They raise the question of the colonies
also, and ask to be appointed as mandatory.

COLONEL HOUSE: Clemenceau conceded that point,
didn't he?

THE PRESIDENT: We have been bearing on this point
of the Saar Basin, and we have gotten concessions on
other points. Are there any points that anybody would
like to raise?

ADMIRAL BENSON: The naval representatives have
gotten together on some points, and no change has been
made. Of course they do not make any point, except
the destruction of the harbours in Heligoland, and the
other nationalities think we ought to stand on that and
recommend that no change be made in that at all.

THE PRESIDENT: Except for the technical impossi-
bility of carrying out the military terms they do not
seem to make any objection to the military terms.

GENERAL BLISS: They base it all on their acceptance
into the League, conditioned on their acceptance into
the League of Nations.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but they do not raise specific
points.

GENERAL BLISS: They will not accept the military
points unless they are admitted into the League. If
they are admitted they will accept, and they undertake
to go ahead of the terms in one or two cases.

MR. TAUSSIG: There runs through the German pro-
posals a criticism or complaint that in matters of exe-
cution of the treaty there is no consultation at all with
the Germans. It lays down that the amount should be
fixed by the Allied and Associated governments; that the
details should be regulated by the Allied and Associated
governments. And they, in a succession of clauses, com-
plain that that was put in with deliberate intent to keep
the Germans from giving their views. As the treaty is
framed, in a succession of clauses that does appear, and
does look as if it is a deliberate attempt to keep Germany
from having anything to say upon questions of execution.

498 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

They complain about the way the quota or amount of
shipping that Germany shall have is to be arrived at;
the Kiel harbour shall be commanded by the Rhine Com-
mission, having a larger representation of Frenchmen
than Germans.

THE PRESIDENT: Those things, I think, will all work
themselves out in operation. But it is necessary to con-
sult the army with regard to them.

MR. WHITE : Another concession which might be made
comes under "Ports, Waterways and Railways."

THE PRESIDENT: Are they new points that they raise?

MR. WHITE : Kiel harbour principally.

MR. TAUSSIG: It is an illustrative case.

MR. WHITE: It is an illustrative case. It would take
too long to interfere—

THE PRESIDENT: (Interrupting) Mr. Lansing was ask-
ing me if I did not think it would be a good idea to ask
each of our groups to prepare a memorandum of what
might be conceded, and while I do not want to be il-
liberal in the matter, I should hesitate to say "yes" to
that question. The question that lies in my mind is:
"Where have they made good in their points?" "Where
have they shown that the arrangements of the treaty
are essentially unjust?" Not "Where have they shown
merely that they are hard?", for they are hard — but the
Germans earned that. And I think it is profitable that
a nation should learn once and for all what an unjust war
means in itself.

I have no desire to soften the treaty, but I have a very
sincere desire to alter those portions of it that are shown
to be unjust, or which are shown to be contrary to the
principles which we ourselves have laid down.

Take the Silesian question, for example: we said in so
many words in the documents which were the basis of
the peace, that we would make a free Poland out of the
districts with Polish population. Now where it can be
shown that the populations included in Poland are not
indisputably Polish, then we must resort to something
like a plebiscite. I agree with Dr. Lord that in the terri-
tory like northern Silesia the sincerity of the plebiscite

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 499

might be questioned — in fact it might be very difficult to
have a plebiscite that was a real expression of opinion,
and therefore we would have to go by what we believed
was the preponderance of the wishes of the population.

But I believe that where we have included Germans un-
necessarily, the border ought to be rectified. Or where
we have been shown to have departed from our principles,
then we must consider what adjustments are necessary
to conform to those principles.

Take Poland's access to the sea. For strategic reasons
our Polish experts — the group of Allied experts — rec-
ommended a corridor running up to Dantzig and it in-
cluded some very solid groups of German populations.
We determined in that case to leave the Dantzig district
to the Germans and to establish a plebiscite.

Where the railway track from Dantzig to Warsaw runs,
notwithstanding the capital strategic importance of that
railway to Poland, that railway is to remain German if
its population votes to remain German.

I think that we have been more successful than I sup-
posed we could possibly be in drawing ethnographic lines,
because races are terribly mixed in some parts of Germany
where we tried to draw the line. But wherever we can
rectify them we ought to rectify them.

Similarly, if the reparations clauses are unjust because
they won't work — not because they are putting the heavy
burden of payment upon Germany (because that is just)
—but because we are putting it on them in such a way
that they cannot pay, then I think we ought to rectify
that.

I put it this way : We ought to examine our consciences
to see where we can make modifications that correspond
with the principles that we are putting forth.

SECRETARY LANSING: That is what I say, Mr. Presi-
dent, but I should not confine it to "injustice"; where we
have made a mistake I should not say it was an injustice.
I should say that where it is something that is contrary
to good policy that I do not think that is unjust; I simply
think that we made an error, and we ought to correct
it. That was my idea of what modifications should be

500 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

suggested; not that we would adopt them, but to say
whether it was wise to adopt them, so that we would have
something in writing, something to work with. It is
all in the air now.

THE PRESIDENT: The great problem of the moment
is the problem of agreement, because the most fatal
thing that could happen, I should say, in the world,
would be that sharp lines of division should be drawn
among the Allied and Associated Powers. They ought
to be held together, if it can reasonably be done, and
that makes a problem like the problem of occupation
look almost insoluble, because the British are at one
extreme, and the French refusal to move is at the opposite
extreme.

Personally I think the thing will solve itself upon the
admission of Germany to the League of Nations. I
think that all the powers feel that the right thing to do
is to withdraw the army. But we cannot arrange that
in the treaty because you cannot fix the date at which
Germany is to be admitted into the League. It would
be an indefinite one.

SECRETARY LANSING: Would that be done only by
unanimous consent?

MR. HOOVER: The document provides that on two-
thirds vote of the Council she should be admitted.

SECRETARY LANSING: But France, being on the Coun-
cil, would have the decision.

COLONEL HOUSE: I agree with the President: let
Germany in, and when she gets in, the other follows.

SECRETARY LANSING: And the army is to be paid for
by Germany, because the French nation would not con-
sent to making it so long if they had to pay for it.

COLONEL HOUSE : In a way she has to pay for it. They
are going to make Germany pay all she can pay. Every
dollar that is taken out for the army is taken away from
French indemnities.

THE PRESIDENT: Every man in the French army is
taken away from French industries too.

What is necessary is to get out of this atmosphere of
war, get out of the present exaggerated feelings and

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 501

exaggerated appearances, and I believe that if we can
once get out of them into the calmer airs it would be
easier to come to satisfactory solutions.

MR. DAVIS: You assume, Mr. President, that the
other chiefs of state are instructing their other technical
delegations to get together with us in the same way?

THE PRESIDENT: I am assuming it without any right;
I am taking it for granted.

COLONEL HOUSE: I don't think it will make any
difference. You are doing it anyway.

THE PRESIDENT: Now I hope anybody else who has
been convinced by the German arguments will speak up.

MR. HOOVER: Apart from all questions of justice, how
far does the question of expediency come in?

THE PRESIDENT: In order to get them to sign, do you
mean?

MR. HOOVER: In order to get them to sign. It strikes
me that that is a more important thing than the question
of justice or injustice, because the weighing of justice
and injustice in these times is pretty difficult.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, nobody can be sure that they
have made a just decision. But don't you think that
if we regard the treaty as just, the argument of expedi-
ency ought not to govern, because after all we must not
give up what we fought for. We might have to fight
for it again.

MR. HOOVER: But we look at expediency in many
lights. It may be necessary to change the terms of the
reparation in view of getting something, rather than to lose
all. And it is not a question of justice; justice would
require, as I see it, that they pay everything they have
got or hope to get. But in order to obtain something
it may be expedient to do this, that and the other. Much
the same might apply to the Saar and the Silesian coal
basins.

THE PRESIDENT: I admit the argument that it might
be expedient to do certain things in order to get what you
are after. But what you mean is the question of ex-
pediency in order to obtain the signature?

MR. HOOVER: I would go even further than the point I

502 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

mention, — that if it was necessary to alter the Saar and
the Silesian terms, that such alteration would not contra-
vene the principles of justice.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not see any essential injustice in
the Saar Basin terms.

DR. HASKINS: I believe that everyone feels that the
League of Nations has something very real and very im-
portant to do. The Saar Basin is something for the
League of Nations to do.

THE PRESIDENT: We have removed the only serious
element of injustice in that arrangement as it stood.
Germany had to pay a certain sum in gold at the end of
the period for the mines, or else the plebiscite was of no
practical result. France obtained sovereignty over the
region. We have altered that.

MR. WHITE : There is still the question of the vote.

DR. HASKINS: There are two or three minor modifica-
tions in the clauses that are necessary in the matter of
clarity, — Mr. White has raised one of them — where the
language did not seem perfectly clear.

THE PRESIDENT: In order to obtain what we intended?

DR. HASKINS: Yes.

MR. DAVIS : It is necessary to get peace as soon as pos-
sible. If Europe does not get together, the situation is
going to be awful. Our appropriations have run out,
practically; in about another month we won't have any
money at all.

THE PRESIDENT: We won't have any appropriated
money, you mean?

MR. DAVIS: We won't have any money appropriated
for that purpose. When real war is not being conducted
it is much more difficult to get money. The way people
now feel about bonds, it would be difficult to get money.
And the sooner they can get something and issue some
obligations which these countries can use as a basis of
credit, the better off we will be.

MR. WHITE: If we make certain modifications in the
financial and economic clauses, would that not be enough,
don't you think?

MR. DAVIS : We feel it would, if we can get together on

WILSON SEEKS ADVICE UPON THE TREATY 503

that. Now whether these other questions are such that
Germany will not agree to sign, we don't know. But I
mean their reply makes us feel rather hopeful that we can
certainly get together on reparations.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't want to seem to be un-
reasonable, but my feeling is this : that we ought not, with
the object of getting it signed, make changes in the treaty,
if we think that it embodies what we were contending for;
that the time to consider all these questions was when we
were writing the treaty, and it makes me a little tired for
people to come and say now that they are afraid the Ger-
mans won't sign, and their fear is based upon things that
they insisted upon at the time of the writing of the treaty ;
that makes me very sick.

And that is the thing that happened. These people
that over-rode our judgment and wrote things into the
treaty that are now the stumbling blocks, are falling
over themselves to remove these stumbling blocks. Now,
if they ought not to have been there I say, remove them,
but I say do not remove them merely for the fact of having
the treaty signed.

MR. WHITE: Do the French remind you of that?

THE PRESIDENT : Not so much as the British. Here is
a British group made up of every kind of British opinion,
from Winston Churchill to Fisher. From the unreason-
able to the reasonable, all the way around, they are all
unanimous, if you please, in their funk. Now that makes
me very tired. They ought to have been rational to begin
with and then they would not have needed to have funked
at the end. They ought to have done the rational things,
I admit, and it is not very gracious for me to remind them
• — though I have done so with as much grace as I could
command.

MR. DAVIS: They say that they do not quite under-
stand why you permitted them to do that.

COLONEL HOUSE: So they say you are responsible for
their doing it.

THE PRESIDENT: I would be perfectly willing to take
the responsibility if the result is good. But though we
did not keep them from putting irrational things in the

504 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

treaty, we got very serious modifications out of them. If
we had written the treaty the way they wanted it the
Germans would have gone home the minute they read it.

Well, the Lord be with us.

Thereupon, at 1.15 P. M., the meeting adjourned.

DOCUMENT 69.

Letter of General Tasker H. Bliss to President
Wilson, June 6, 1919, making "A Brief Analysis
of the German Proposals on the Military Terms
of the Draft Treaty" (autographed original).

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Hotel de Crillon, Paris,

June 6th, 1919.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

The following is a brief analysis of the German Counter-
Proposals on the military terms of the draft Treaty.

1. Germany accepts the fundamental principles of the
military, naval and air terms, subject to the condition
that, on the conclusion of Peace, she be admitted with
equal rights into the League of Nations.

2. If admitted to the League, she voluntarily waives
her equality of rights in the following regards; — she
agrees to disarm at once and to abolish universal military
service provided the other States of the League under-
take, within two years from the conclusion of Peace, to
also disarm and abolish universal military service.

3. In agreeing to reduce her armed forces to the number
required by the Treaty, she asks that a transition period
be granted to her, to be arranged by a Special Convention
and, if necessary, confirmed by the League of Nations,
during which period she may maintain such armed
forces as may be shown to be necessary and are agreed
upon in order to preserve internal order "which," she says,
"is at present seriously shaken."

4. In the League, she demands the right conceded to
every other member to organize and arm such forces as
the League permits her to have according to her judg-
ment.

505

506 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

5. On condition of admission to the League, she agrees
to the provision for dismantlement of certain fortresses
and the establishment of the zone which is to remain
unoccupied by military forces.

6. With reservation as to necessary financial measures,
Germany agrees to surrender not only the force specifi-
cally required by Article 185 of the Treaty, "but also all
ships of the line."

7. She says that the time-limits imposed for the exe-
cution of certain clauses are technically impossible of
observance and their necessary prolongation must be
the subject of negotiation. This also applies to the
conversion of war material released from the army and
navy to peaceful, and especially to economic, objects.

8. As regards aerial navigation, she accepts any limi-
tations to which all members of the League are sub-
jected and will grant equal and reciprocal rights to these
members as regards flight over and landing upon German
territory.

9. In regard to many unmentioned details connected
with the foregoing she proposes immediate verbal ne-
gotiations.

COMMENTS.
Paragraph 1 above.

It seems to be the general opinion that Germany will
be far less a menace to the peace of the world if she is
inside rather than outside of the League. If the question
of the future status of Germany with respect to the League
were a matter for present decision by the Council of the
Powers, I should venture to suggest the following for
consideration.

It seems to me to be good policy to avoid, as far as
possible, anything which continues the status of Ger-
many as that of a probable enemy for an indefinite time
after the signature of peace. Therefore, while it is
proper to deny her admission into the League of Nations
until she has indicated her good faith, it might be wise
to tell her the conditions under which we shall decide
whether or not she is showing good faith.

"A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF GERMAN PROPOSALS" 507

The terms of the Treaty may, broadly, be divided into
two general classes. The first class includes those terms
the object of which is to put Germany in such a position
of military weakness as will enable us to enforce (if she
should secretly intend not to act in good faith) the other
class of terms. If Germany faithfully executes this first
class of terms, it seems to me that it is reasonable evi-
dence of her good faith in complying with all the other
terms.

It might, therefore, not be unwise to say to Germany
that on the complete execution of all the military, naval
and air terms, she will be admitted into the League.

Paragraph 2 above.

If this proposal could be agreed to, it would bring the
world at once into near sight of assured and continued
peace.

Paragraph 3 above.

This proposition has a better basis of sound sense than
the one to fix an arbitrary figure to last an indefinite time
although we should feel sure that this figure is too small
at present and too large for the future. The maintenance
of the peace of Europe depends upon the establishment
and continuance of a stable and orderly government in
Germany. While the present forces of disruption are at
work, it is the general opinion that the military force
proposed in the Treaty to be left to Germany is too small
for the present. Yet, if we fix in the Treaty a military
force for Germany, it can only be modified subsequently
by having the Treaty provide for a subsequent conven-
tion to pass upon the question. This is, in reality, the
substance of the German proposition. Of course it all
depends upon whether the Powers will agree to take into
consideration at the end of two years the proposition for
their own disarmament and abolition of universal military
service. If they refuse to do this while Germany, on
the other hand, proposes to immediately disarm and
abolish military service, I am afraid that it puts Germany

508 WOODROW WILSON AND WORLD SETTLEMENT

in a better light as regards her intention to abolish mili-
tarism than it does the Powers.

In short, if there could only be some satisfactory agree-
ment as to a definite time for the admission of Germany
into the League, on the fulfillment of such conditions as
will establish her good faith, there should be no difficulty
about the military, naval and air terms. If it be a fact
that there is a considerable element in Germany now
looking towards and striving for better things, their
hands will be strengthened by liberality of treatment on
this subject, — a liberality which will not in the slightest
degree prejudice the fulfillment of the other clauses of the
Treaty and which, on the other hand, will probably assure
their more exact fulfillment.

Cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS.

THE END

Due Date Bookmark

Robarts Library

DUE DATE:

Apr. 3, 1 994

D

664

B27

v.3

For telephone renewals
call

978-8450

Hours:
Monday to Thursday

9 am to 9 pm
Friday & Saturday
9 am to 5 pm

Sunday
1 pm to 5 pm

Fines 500
per day

How to...

Find journal articles.