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Full text of "The works of John Witherspoon, D.D., sometime minister of the gospel at Paisley, and late President of Princeton College, in New Jersey : containing essays, sermons, &c. on important subjects ... together with his lectures on moral philosophy, eloquence and divinity ; his speeches in the American Congress; and many other valuable pieces, never before published in this country"

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THE 


WORKS 


OF 


JOHN  WITHERSPOON,  D.  D. 

SOMETIME  MINISTER  OF  THE  GOS-PEL  AT  PAISLEY,    AND    LATE 
PRESIDENT  OF  PRINCETON  COLLEGE,  IN  NEW  JERSEY. 

CONTAINING, 

ESSAYS,  SERMONS,  ^c 


IMPORTANT  SUBJECTS ; 

INTENDED  TO  ILLUSTRATE  AND  ESTABLISH  THE  DOCTRIN'E 

OF  SALVATION  BY  GRACE,    AND  TO    POINT  OUT 

ITS  INFLUENCE  ON  HOLINESS  OF  LIFE. 

TOGETHER   WITH    BIS 

LECTURES  ON  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY, 
ELOQUENCE,  AND  DIVINITY  5 

HIS  SPEECHES  IN  THE  AMERICAN  CONGRESS 3 

AND  MANY  OTHER  VALUABLE  PIECES  NEVER  BEFORE 
PUBLISHED  IN   THIS  COUNTRY. 


VOL.     VIL 


EDINBURGH  '. 

PRINTED  FOR.  OGLE  AND  AIKMAN  J   J.  PILLANS  AND  SONS  ) 
J.  RITCHIE  J    AND  J.  TDRNBULL. 

1805. 


<^-^.,^^ 


/ 


ESSAYS 


ON 


INTERESTING    SUBJECTS. 


J.  Pillans  and  Sons^  Printers* 


C  O  Tsf  T  E  N  T  S 

OF 

VOLUME  VII. 

LECTURES  ON  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Fag, 

9 
16 

*3 

31 

38 

44 

51 
60 

66 

15 

86 

Relation  of  Parents  andChildren,      <;i 
Relation  of  Mafter  and  Servant,       93 
Le£lure  XII.  Of  Civil  Society,         -  -  94 

Of  the  Different  Forms  of  Govern- 
ment, -  -  97 
Le6lure  XIII.  Of  the  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations,  107 
Of  making  Peace,              -                115 
LeftureXIV.  Of  Jnrifprudence,          -         -         118 
Of  the  Sanction  of  the  Moral  Laws,  125 
Le6lure  XV.                 -                 -             -           129 
Contrafls^                 ^^             m            ih. 


Leaure  I. 

- 

n. 

- 

III. 

- 

IV. 

- 

V. 

- 

VI. 

- 

VII. 

- 

VIII. 

. 

IX. 

»                  •• 

X. 

- 

OF    POLITICS. 

Leclure  XI. 

. 

vl  CONTENTS 

Tag. 
Of  the  Marks  and  Signs  of  Con- 
trads,  -  -  134 

Le6lure  XVI.  Of  Oaths  and  Vows,  -  139 

Of  the  Ufe  of  Symbols  in  Contra6ls,  14  z 
Of  the  Value  of  Property,  th* 

Rights  of  Neceflity,  and  Common 

Rights,  -  -  145 

Recapitulation,         -  -  149 

LECTURES  ON  ELOQUENCE. 

Leaure  I.  -  -  '  "^^^ 

II.  ...  .  165 

III.  .  .  -  -  174 

IV.  -  -  -  185 

V.         -  -         -      -       194 

VI.                 -                -  -             205 

VII.         -                -  -            -          213 

Of  Figurative  speech,  -                219 

Of  Figures,              -  -                221 

VIII.  -           -              -              223 

IX-  -              -                -                227 

X.  -            -            -           -            ^39 

XI.  .              -                 -                 245 

XII.  .            .            -            -          257 

XIII.  -                -                .265 

XIV.      -        -       ,  -  -       273 

XV.  -  -  -  ^^4 


XVI. 


501 


LECTURES 


ON 


MOR^JL  FFIILOSOFMY. 


LECTURE  I. 

MORAL  Philofophy  is  that  branch  of  fcience 
which  treats  of  the  principles  and  laws  of 
duty,  or  morals.  It  is  called  Philosophy,  becaufe  it 
is  an  inquiry  into  the  nature  and  grounds  of  moral" 
obligation  by  reafon,  as  diIlin(El  from  revelation. 

Hence  arifes  a  queflion,  Is  it  lawful,  and  is  it  fafe 
or  ufeful,  to  feparate  moral  philofophy  from  reli- 
gion ?  It  will  be  faid,  it  is  either  the  fame,  or  dif- 
ferent from,  revealed  truth ;  if  the  fame,  unneceffary 
—if  different,  falfe  and  dangerous. 

An  author  of  New  England  fays,  *  Moral  philo- 
fophy is  jufl  reducing  infidelity  to  a  fyllem.'  But 
however  fpecious  the  obje£lions,  they  wiU  be  found 
at  bottom  not  folid.  If  the  fcripture  is  true,  the 
difcoveries  of  reafon  cannot  be  contrary  to  it  5  and 

Vol.  VIL  B 


10  LECTURES  ON  Lecl.   t. 

therefore  it  has  nothing  to  fear  from  that  quarter. 
And  as  we  are  certain  it  can  do  no  evil,  fo  there  is 
a  probability  that  it  may  do  much  good.  There 
may  be  an  illuftration  and  confirmation  of  the  in- 
fpired  writings  from  reafon  and  obfervation,  which 
.will  greatly  add  to  their  beauty  and  force. 

The  noble  and  eminent  improvements  in  natural 
philofophy,  which  have  been  made  fince  the  end 
of  tlie  lad  century,  have  been  far  from  hurting  the 
interefl  of  religion  ;  on  the  contrary,  they  have 
greatly  promoted  it.  Why  fhould  it  not  be  the 
fame  with  moral  philofophy,  which  is  indeed  no- 
thing elfe  but  th6  knowledge  of  human  nature  ?  It 
is  true,  that  iniidels  do  commonly  proceed  upon 
pretended  principles  of  reafon.  But  as  it  is  im- 
poflible  to  binder  them  from  reafoning  on  this  fub- 
je6l,  the  bell  way  is  to  meet  them  upon  their  own 
ground,  and  to  fhew  from  reafon  itfelf  the  fallacy 
of  their  principles.  I  do  not  know  any  thing  that 
ferves  more  for  the  fupport  of  religion,  than  to  fee, 
from  the  different  and  oppofite  fyftems  of  philo- 
fophers,  that  there  is  nothing  certain  in  their 
fchcmes,  but  what  is  coincident  with  the  word  of 
Cod. 

Some  there  are,  and  perhaps  more  in  the  prefent 
than  any  former  age,  who  deny  the  law  of  nature, 
and  fay,  that  all  fuch  fentiments  as  have  been 
ufually  afcribed  to  the  law  of  nature,  are  from  re- 
velation and  tradition. 

We  muft  diftinguilh  here  between  the  light  of 
nature  and  the  law  of  nature  :  by  the  firft  is  to  be 
underilood  what  we  can  or  do  dil'cover  by  our  own 
powers,  without  revelation  or  tradition :  by  the  fe- 


Le£l.  I.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  II 

cond,  that  which,  when  difcovered,   can  be  made 
appear  to  be  agreeable  to  reafon  and  nature. 

There  have  been  fome  very  fhrewd  and  able  , 
writers  of  late,  viz.  Dr  Wilfon  of  Newcaftle,  and 
Mr  Riccalton  of  Scotland,  who  have  written  a- 
gainft  the  light  of  nature,  fhewing  that  the  firll 
principles  of  knowledge  are  taken  from  informa- 
tion : — That  nothing  can  be  fuppofed  more  rude 
and  ignorarrt,  than  man  without  inftru^liori  : — That 
when  men  have  been  brought  up  fo,  thej  have 
fcarcely  been  fuperior  to  brutes.  It  is  very  difficult 
to  be  precife  upon  this  fubjedi,  and  to  diftinguiih. 
the  difcoveries  of  reafon  from  the  exercife  of  it. 
Yet  I  think,  admitting  all,  or  the  greatefl  part,  of 
what  fuch  contend  for,  we  may,  notwithftanding, 
confider  how  far  any  thing  is  confonant  to  rea- 
fon, or  may  be  proven  by  reafon  ;  though  perhaps 
reafon,  if  left  to  itfelf,  would  never  have  difco- 
vered it. 

Dr  Clark  was  one  of  the  greateft  champions  for 
the  law  of  nature ;  but  it  is  only  iince  his  time  that 
the  fhrewd  oppofers  of  it  have  appeared.  Tlie 
Hutchinfonians  (fo  called  from  Hutchinfon  of  Eng- 
land) infifl,  that  not  only  all  moral,  but  alfo  all  na-. 
tural  knowledge,  comes  frorn  revelation,  the  true 
fyftem  of  the  v/orld,  true  chronology,  all  human 
arts,  &:c.  In  this,  as  is  ufual  with  mofl  other 
claiTes  of  men,  they  carry  their  noftrums  to  extra- 
vagance. I  am  of  opinion,  that  the  fcripture  is 
perfectly  agreeable  to  found  philofophy  ;  yet  cer- 
tainly it  was  never  intended  to  teach  us  every  thing. 
The  political  laxv  of  the  Jews  contains  many  noble 
principles  of  equity,  and  excellent  examples  to  fu- 


12  LECTURES  ON  Lc(^.  I. 

ture  lawgivers  ;  yet  it  was  fo  local  and  peculiar, 
that  certainly  it  was  never  intended  to  be  immu- 
table and  univerfal. 

It  would  be  more  juft  and  ufeful  to  fay,  that  all 
fimple  and  original  difcoveries  have  been  the  pro- 
dudlion  of  Providence,  and  not  the  invention  of 
man.  On  the  whole,  it  feems  reafonable  to  make 
moral  philofophy,  in  the  fenfe  above  explained, 
a  fubjeft  of  ftudy.  And,  indeed,  let  men  think 
what  they  will  of  it,  they  ought  to  acquaint  them- 
felves  with  it.  They  muft  know  what  it  is,  ifl 
they  mean  even  to  fhew  that  it  is  falfe. 

The  Droision  of  the  Subject, 

Moral  philofophy  is  divided  into  two  great* 
branches,  ethics  and  politics ;  to  this  fome  add  ju- 
rifprudence,  though  this  may  be  confidered  as  a 
part  of  politics. 

Ethics  relate  to  perfonal  duties ;  politics  to  the 
conllitution,  government,  and  rights  of  focieties  ;  and 
jurifprudence,  to  the  adminiftration  of  juftice  in 
conftituted  Hates. 

It  feems  a  point  agreed  upon,  that  the  principles 
of  duty  and  obligation  muft  be  drawn  from  the  na- 
ture of  man.  That  is  to  fay,  if  we  can  difcover 
how  his  Maker  formed  him,  or  for  what  he  in- 
tended him,  that  certainly  is  what  he  ought  to  be. 

The  knowledge  of  human  nature,  however,  is 
either  perplexed  and  difficult  of  itfelf,  or  hath  been 
made  fo  by  the  manner  in  which  writers  in  all  ages 
have  treated  it.  Perhaps  this  circumftance  itfelf  is  a 
ftrong  prefumption  of  the  truth  of  the  fcripture- 


ted.  I.  MORAL  PHItOSOPfir*  23 

do£lrine  of  the  depravity  and  corruption  of  our  na- 
ture. Suppciing  tills  depravity,  it  muil  be  one  great 
caufe  ofdifficultj  and  confufion  in  giving  an  account 
of  human  nature  as  the  work  of  God. 

This  I  Take  to  be  indeed  the  cafe  with  the 
greateft  part  of  our  moral  and  theological  know- 
ledge. 

Thofe  who  deny  this  depravity,  will  be  apt  to 
plead  for  every  thing,  cr  for  many  things,  as  dic- 
tates of  nature,  which  are  in  reality  propenfities  of 
nature  in  its  prefent  ftate,  but  at  the  fame  time  the 
fruit  and  evidence  of  its  departure  from  its  original 
purity.  It  is  by  the  remaining  power 'of  natural 
confcience  that  we  mult  endeavour  to  detect  and  on- 
pofe  their  errors. 

I.  We  may  confider  man  very  generally  in  his 
fpecies  as  diltindt  from  and  fuperior  to  the  other 
creatures,  and  what  it  is,  in  which  the  difference 
truly  confifts.  2.  As  an  individual,  what  are  the 
parts  which  conftitute  his  nature. 

I.  Philofophers  have  generally  attempted  to  af- 
fign  the  precife  diflinction  between  men  and  the 
other  animals  ;  but  when  endeavouring  to  bring  it 
TO  one  peculiar  incommunicable  chara6teriitic,  they 
have  generally  contradicted  one  another,  and  fome- 
::mes  difputed  with  violence,  and  rendered  the  thing 
more  uncertain. 

The  difficulty  of  fixing  upon  a  precife  criterion, 
only  ferves  to  fhew,  that  in  man  v/e  have  an  ex- 
ample of  what  we  fee  alfo  every  where  elfe,  viz. 
a  beautiful  and  infenfible  gradation  from  one  thino- 
to  another,  fo  that  the  higheft  of  the  inferior  is,  as 
i-  were,  conneded  and  blended  with  the  loweft  of 
B  .^ 


14  LECTURES  ON  Left.  I, 

the  fiiperior  clafs.  Birds  and  beafts  are  conne<Eled 
bj  foine  fpecies,  fo  that  yoa  will  find  it  hard  to  fay 
-whether  they  belong  to  the  one  or  the  other.  So 
indeed  it  is  in  the  whole  vegetable  as  well  as  ani- 
mal kingdom,  (i.)  Some  fay  men  are  diftin- 
guillied  from  brutes  by  reafon^  and  certainly  this, 
either  in  kind  or  degree,  is  the  moft  honourable  of 
our  diftinftions.  (2.)  Others  fay,  that  many  brutes 
give  flrong  figns  of  rcafon,  as  dogs,  horfes,  and  ele- 
phants ;  but  that  man  is  diftinguilhed  by  memory 
and  forefight  :  but  I  apprehend  that  thefe  are  upon 
the  fame  footing  with  reafon^  if  there  are  fome 
glimmerings  of  reafon  in  the  brute  creation,  there 
are  alfo  manifefl:  proofs  of  memory^  and  fome  of 
forelight.  (3.)  Some  have  thought  it  proper  to 
diilinguilh  man  from  the  inferior  creatures  by  the 
ufe  of  fpeech,  no  other  creatures  having  an  articu- 
late language^  Here,  again,  we  are  obliged  to  ac- 
knowledge, that  our  diftin£lion  is  chiefly  the  excel- 
lence and  fulnefs  of  articulate  difcourfe  ;  for  brutes 
have  certainly  the  art  of  making  one  another  un- 
derfland  many  things  by  found.  (4.)  Some  have 
faid,  that  man  is  not  completely  diftinguifhed  by 
any  of  thefe,.  but  by  a  fenfe  of  religion.  And  I 
think  it  mufl  be  admitted,  that  of  piety,  or  a  fenfe 
©f  the  Supreme  Being,,  there  is  not  any  trace  to  be 
feen  in  the  inferior  creatures.  The  ftories  handed 
about  by  weak-nxinded  perfons,.  or  retailed  by  cre- 
dulous authors,  of  refpe£l  in  them  to  churches,  or 
facred  perfons,  are  to  be  difdained  as  wholly  fa- 
bulous and  vifionary.  (5.)  There  have  been  fome 
who  have  faid,  that  man  is  diftinguilhed  from  the 
brutes  by  a  fenfe  of  ridicule*. 


Left.  I.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  1^ 

The  whole  creation  (fays  a  certain  author)  is 
grave,  except  man,  no  one  aughs  but  himfelf. 
There  is  fomething  whimfical  In  fixing  upon  this  as 
the  criterion,  and  it  docs  not  feem  to  place  us  in  si 
•very  refpeclable  light.  Perhaps  it  is  not  improper 
to  fmile  upon  the  occalion,  and  to  fay,  that  if  this 
fentiment  is  embraced,  we  (hall  be  obliged  to  con- 
fefs  kindred  with  the  apes,  who  arc  certainly  them- 
felves  polTelTed  of  a  rifible  faculty,  as  well  as  qua- 
lified to  excite  laughter  in  us.  On  the  whole,  there 
feems  no  necefTity  of  fixing  upon  fome  one  crite- 
rion, to  the  exclufion  of  others. 

There  is  a  great  and  apparent  diftlnftion  between 
man  and  the  inferior  animals,  not  only  in  the  beau- 
ty of  his  form,  which  the  poet  takes  notice  of, 
Os  hcmini  sublime  dedity  &:c.  but  alfo  in  reafon, 
memory,  refledlion,  and  the  knowledge  of  God  and 
a  future  ft  ate. 

A  general  diftlnftion,  which  deferves  particularly 
to  be  taken  notice  of  in  moral  difquifitions,  is,  that 
man  is  evidently  made  to  be  guided,  and  prote£led 
from  dangers,  and  fupplied  with  what  is  ufeful 
more  by  reafon,  and  brutes  more  bymftlnft. 

It  is  not  very  eafy,  and  perhaps  not  neceflary,,  to 
explain  inftinft.  It  is  fomething  previous  to  reafon 
and  thought.  When  we  fay  the  birds  build  their 
nefls  by  inftinft,  and  man  builds  his  habitation  by 
refie£tion,  experience,  or  inftru£tion,  we  under- 
ftand  things  well  enough  ;  but  if  we  attempt  to  give 
a  logical  definitica  of  either  the  one  or  the  other, 
it  will  immediately  be  aiTaulted  by  a  thoufand  argu- 
ments. 


l6  LECTURES  ON  Lefl:.  2. 

Though  man  is  evidently  governed  by  fome- 
thing  elfe  than  inftlna:,  he  alfo  has  feveral  inftinc- 
tive  propenfities,  fome  of  them  independent  of,  and 
fome  of  them  intermixed  with  his  moral  difpofitions. 
Of  the  firft  kind  are  hunger,  thirft,  and  fome  others^ 
of  the  lad  is  the  storge,  or  parental .  tendcmefs 
towards  offspring. 

On  inftind  we  fhall  only  fay  farther,  that  it 
leads  more  immediately  to  the  appointment  of  the 
Creator,  and  whether^  in  man  or  in  other  crea- 
tures, operates  more  early  and  more  uniformly 
thanreafon. 


LECTURE  II. 

^^^  /CONSIDERING  man  as  an  individual, 
V->4  we  difcover  the  moil  obvious  and  re- 
markable circumftances  of  his  nature,  that  he  is  a 
compound  of  body  and  fpirit.  I  take  this  for 
granted  here,  becaufe  we  are  only  explaining  the 
nature  of  man.  When  we  come  to  hi^  fentiments 
and  principles  of  a£lion,  it  will  be  more  proper  to 
take  notice  of  the  fpirituality  and  immortality  of 
the  foul,  and  how  they.are  proved. 

The  body  and  fpirit  have  a  great  reciprocal  in- 
fluence one  upon  another  j  the  body  on  the  temper 
and  difpoiition  of  the  foul,  and  the  foul  on  the  ftate 
and  habit  of  the  body.  The  body  is  properly  the 
miniller  of  tjie  foul,  the  means  of  conveying  per- 
ception to  it,  but  nothing  without  it. 

It  is  needlefs  to  enlarge  on  the  ftruflure  of  the 
body ;  this  is  fullicicntly  known  to  all,  except  we 


Le£l.  2.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHr.  If 

defcend  to  anatomical  exadnefs,  and  then,  like  all 
the  other  parts  of  nature,  it  fhews  the  infinite  wif- 
dom  of  the  Creator.  With  regard  to  morals,  the 
influence  of  the  body  in  a  certain  view  maj  be  very 
great  in  enflaving  men  to  appetite,  and  yet  there 
does  not  feem  any  fuch  conneclion  with  morals  as  to 
require  a  particular  defcription.  I  think  there  is 
little  reafon  to  doubt  that  there  are  great  and  eflen- 
tial  diflferences  between  man  and  man,  as  to  the 
fpirit  and  its  proper  powers  ;  but  it  feems  plain^ 
that  fuch  are  the  laws  of  union  between  the  body 
and  fpirit,  that  many  faculties  are  weakened,  and 
fome  rendered  altogether  incapable  of  exercife, 
merely  by  an  alteration  of  the  ftate  of  the  body. 
Memory  is  frequently  loft  and  judgement  weakened 
by  old  age  and  difeafe.  Sometimes,  by  a  confu- 
iion  of  the  brain  in  a  fall,  the  judgement  is  whol- 
ly difordered.  The  inllindtive  appetites  of  hunger 
and  thirft,  feem  to  refide  direftly  in  the  body,  and 
the  foul  to  have  little  more  than  a  paflive  percep- 
tion. Some  pallions,  particularly  fear  and  rage, 
feem  alfo  to  have  their  feat  in  the  body,  immediate- 
ly producing  a  certain  modification  of  the  blood 
and  fpiriis.  This  indeed  is  perhaps  the  cafe  in  fome 
degree  with  all  pafTions  whenever  they  are  indulged  ; 
they  give  a  modification  to  the  blood  and  fpirits, 
which  make  them  eafily  rekindled  ;  but  there  are 
none  which  do  fo  inilantaneoufly  arife  from  the 
body,  and  prevent  deliberation,  will,  and  choice, 
as  thefe  now  named.  To  coniider  the  evil  paflions 
to  which  we  are  liable,  we  may  fay,  thofe  that  de- 
pend moll  upon  the  body,  are  fear,   anger,  volup- 


l8  LECTURES  ON  Led.  2. 

tuoufnefs ;   and  thofe  that  depend  leall  upon  it,  arc 
ambition,  envy,  covetoufnefs. 

The  faculties  of  the  mind  are  commonly  divided 
into  thefe  three  kinds,  the  underftanding,  the  will, 
and  the  affeftions ;  though  perhaps  it  is  proper  to 
obferve,  that  thefe  are  not  three  qualities  wholly 
diftind,  as  if  they  were  three  different  beings,  but 
different  ways  of  exerting  the  fame  fimple  prin- 
ciple. It  is  the  foul  or  mind  that  underflands, 
wills,  or  is  affecled  with  pieafure  and  pain.  The 
underftanding  feems  to  have  truth  for  its  objeft,  the 
difcovering  things  as  they  really  are  in  themfelves, 
and  in  their  relations  one  to  another.  It  has  been 
difputed,  whether  good  may  be  in  any  decree  the 
objeft  of  the  underftanding.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
feems  as  if  truth,  and  that  only,  belonged  to  the  un- 
derftanding; becaufe  we  can  eafily  fuppofe  perfons  of 
equal  intelledtual  powers  and  oppofite  moral  charac-^ 
ters.  Nay,  we  can  fuppofe  malignity  joined  to 
a  high  degree  of  underftanding,  and  virtue,  or  true 
goodnefs,  to  a  much  lower.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  choice  made  by  the  will  feems  to  have  the 
judgment,  or  deliberation  of  the  underftanding,  as  its 
very  foundation.  How  can  this  be,  it  will  be  faid, 
if  the  underftanding  has  nothing  to  do  with  good  or 
evil  ?  A  confiderable  oppofttion  of  fentiments  a- 
mong  phiiofophers  has  arifen  from  this  quefticn. 
Dr  Clark,  and  fome  others,  make  underftanding  or 
reafon  the  immedilate  principle  of  virtue.  Shaftf- 
bury,  Hutchinfon,  and  others,  make  affeftion  the 
principle  of  it.  Perhaps  neither  the  one  nor  th^ 
other  is  wholly  right.  Probably  both  are  ,41c- 
celTary. 


Lect.  2.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I^ 

The  conneclion  between  truth  and  goodnefs,  be- 
tween the  under  (landing  and  the  heart,  is  a  fubjeft 
of  great  moment,  but  alfo  of  great  difficulty.  I 
think  we  may  fay  with  certainty,  that  infinite  per- 
fection, intellectual  and  mortil,  are  united  and  infe- 
parable  in  the  Supreme  Being.  There  is  not,  how- 
ever, in  inferior  natures,  an  exa£t  proportion  be- 
tween the  one  and  the  other ;  yet  I  apprehend,  that 
truth  naturally  and  neceffarily  promotes  goodnefs, 
and  falfehood  the  contrary  ;  but  as  the  influence  is 
reciprocal,  malignity  of  difpofition,  even  with  the 
greatefl  natural  powers,  blinds  the  underilanding, 
^d  prevents  the  perception  of  truth  itfelf. 

Of  the  will  it  is  ufual  to  enumerate  four  a£ls ; 
defire,  averfion,  joy,  and  forrow.  The  two  lafl, 
Hutchinfon  fays,  are  fuperfluous,  in  which  he  feen^s 
to  be  right.  All  the  a£ls  of  the  will  may  be  re- 
duced to  the  two  great  heads  of  defire  and  averfion, 
or,  in  other  words,  chufing  and  refufing. 

•  The  afFe(Elions  are  called  alfo  palTions,  becaufe 
often  excited  by  external  objects.  In  as  far  as 
they  differ  from  a  calm  deliberate  decifion  of  the 
judgement,  or  determination  of  the  will,  they  may 
be  called  flrong  propenfities  implanted  in  our  na- 
ture, which  of  themfelves  contribute  not  a  little  to 
bias  the  judgement,  or  incline  the  will. 

The  afiedtions  cannot  be  better  underftood  than 
by  obferving  the  difference  between  a  calm,  deli- 
berate, general  inclination,  whether  of  the  felfifh  or 
benevolent  kind,  and  particular  violent  inclinations* 
Every  man  deliberately  wifhes  his  own  happinefs  ; 
but  this  differs  confiderably  from  a  pafTionate  at- 
tachmcr^t  to  particular  gratifications,  as   a  love  of 


20  LECTURES  oil  Led.  2. 

riches,  honours,  pleafures.  A  good  man  will  have 
a  deliberate  fixed  defire  of  the  welfare  of  mankind  ; 
but  this  diflfers  from  the  love  of  children,  relations, 
friends,  country. 

The  paflions  are  viry  numerous,  and  may  be 
greatly  diverliiied,  becaufe  every  thing,  however 
modified,  that  is  the  objed  of  defire  or  averfion, 
may  grow  by  accident  or  indulgence,  to  fuch  a  fize, 
as  to  be  called,  and  defei*ve  to  be  called,  a  pafiion. 
Accordingly  we  exprefs  ourfelves  thus  in  the  Eng- 
lifh  language  :    A  pafiion  for  horfes,  dogs,  play,  &c. 

However,  all  the  pafiions  may  be  ranged  under 
the  two  great  heads  of  love  and  hatred.  To  the  firfl 
belong  efieem,  admiration,  good-will,  and  every 
fpecies  of  approbation,  delight,  and  defire  ;  to  the 
other,  all  kinds  of  averfion,  and  ways  of  exprefling 
it,  envy,  malice y  rage,  revenge,  to  whatever  objeds 
they  may  be  directed. 

Hope  and  fear,  joy  and  forrow,  though  frequent- 
ly ranked  among  the  pafiions,  feem  rather  to  be 
ftates  Or  modifications  of  the  mind,  attending  the 
exercife  of  every  pafiion,  according  as  its  object  is 
probable  or  improbable,  pofle fifed  or  lofl:. 

Jealoufy  feems  to  be  a  pafiiion  of  a  middle  nature, 
which  it  is  not  eafy  to  fay  whether  it  fiiould  be 
ranked  under  the  head  of  love  or  hatred.  It  is  often 
faid  of  jealoufy  between  the  fexes,  that  it  fprings 
from  love  ;  yet,  it  feems  plainly  impofiible  that  it 
can  have  place  without  forming  an  ill  opinion  of 
its  obje£l,  at  leafi:  in  fome  degree.  The  fame  thing 
jnay  be  faid  of  jealoufy  and  fufpicion  in  frlendfiiip. 

The  paflions  may  [be  ranged  in  two  clafles  in  a  dif- 
ferent way,  viz.  as  they   are  felfifli  or  benevolent, 


Le£l.  2.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  21 

public  or  private.  There  will  be  great  occafion  to 
confider  this  diftin£l:ion  afterwards,  in  explaining 
the  nature  of  virtue,  and  the  motives  that  lead  to  it. 
What  is  obferved  now,  is  only  to  illuflrate  our  na- 
ture as  it  really  is.  There  is  a  great  and  real  dif- 
tinftion  between  paffions,  felfifti  and  benevolent. 
The  firfl  point  diredly,  and  immediately  at  our  own 
intereft  in  the  gratification;  the  others  point  imme- 
diately at  the  happinefs  of  others.  Of  the  firfl  kind, 
is  the  love  of  fame,  power,  property,  pleafure.  And 
of  the  fecond,  is  family  and  domeftic  aff*e6lion, 
friendfhip,  and  patriotifm.  It  is  to  no  purpofe  to 
fay,  thaft  ultimately  it  is  to  pleafe  ourfelves,  or  be- 
caufe  we  feel  a  fatisfa6lion  in  feeking  the  good  of 
others  ;  for  it  is  certain,  that  the  direft  obje6l  in 
view,  in  many  cafes,  is  to  promote  the  happinefs  of 
others  ;  and  for  this  many  have  been  willing  to  fa- 
crifice  every  thing,  even  life  itfelf. 

After  this  brief  furvey  of  human  nature,  in  one 
light,  or  in  one  point  of  view,  which  may  be  called 
its  capacity,  it  w^ill  be  neceffary  to  return  back,  and 
take  a  furvey  of  the  way  in  which  we  become  ac- 
quainted with  the  objedls  about  which  we  are  to  be 
converfant,  or  upon  which  the  above  faculties  are 
to  be  exercifed. 

On  this  it  is  proper  to  obfer^^e  in  general,  that 
there  are  but  two  ways  in  which  we  come  to  the 
knowledge  of  things,  viz.  ift,  Senfation,  2d,  Re- 
ilecbion. 

The  firfl  of  thefe  mufl  be  divided  again  into  two 
parts,  external  and  internal. 

External  arifes  from  the  immediate  impreflion  of 
obje£ls  from  without.    The  external  fenfes,  in  num- 

VoL.  VII.  C 


12  LECTURES  ON"  Le£i:. 


# 


ber,  are  five ;  feeing,  hearing,  feeling,  tailing,  and 
fmelling. 

In  thefe  are  obferrable  the  impreflion  itfelf,  or 
the  fenfation  we  feel,  and  the  fuppofition  infepa- 
rable  from  it,  that  it  is  produced  by  an  external  ob- 
jeft.  That  our  fenfes  are  to  be  trufled  in  the  in- 
formation they  give  us,  feems  to  me  a  firft  principle, 
becaufe  they  are  the  foundation  of  all  our  after  rea- 
fonings.  The  few  exceptions  of  accidental  irre- 
gularity in  the  fenfes,  can  found  no  jufl  objedion 
to  this,  as  there  are  fo  many  plain  and  obvious 
ways  of  difcovering  and  correfting  it. 

The  reality  of  the  material  fyftem,  I  think,  may 
be  eafily  eilabliflied,  except  upon  fuch  principles  as 
are  fubverlive  of  all  certainty,  and  lead  to  univerfal 
fcepticifm ;  and  perfons  who  would  maintain  fuch 
principles,  do  not  deferve  to  be  reafoned  with,  be- 
caufe they  do  not  pretend  to  communicate  know- 
ledge, but  to  take  all  knowledge  from  us. 

The  Immaterialifts  fay,  that  we  are  confcious  of 
nothing  but  the  imprefTion  or  feeling  of  our  own 
mind  ;  but  they  do  not  obferve,  that  the  impref- 
fion  itfelf  implies  and  fuppofes  fomething  external 
that  communicates  it,  and  cannot  be  feparatcd  from 
that  fuppofition.  Sometimes  fuch  rcaf oners  tell  us, 
that  we  cannot  Ihew  the  fubftance  feparate  from  its 
fcnfible  qualities ;  no  more  can  any  man  Ihew  me 
a  fenfible  quality  feparate  from  a  particular  fubje£l. 
If  any  man  will  ihew  me  whitenefs,  without  fhew- 
ing  me  any  thing  that  is  white,  or  roundnefs  with- 
out any  thing  that  is  round,  I  will  fhew  him  the 
fubftance  without  either  colour  or  Ihape. 

I 


Le6l.  2.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  2^ 

immateriaiifm  takes  away  the  diftinflion  between 
•ri'-h  and  falfehood.  I  have  an  idea  of  a  houfe  or  a 
tree  in  a  certain  place,  and  I  call  this  true,  that  is, 
1  am  of  opinion,  there  is  reallj  a  houfe  or  a  tree  in 
that  place.  Again,  I  fprm  an  idea  of  a  houfe  or  a 
tree,  as  what  may  be  in  that  place  ;  I  aik  what  is  the 
difference,  if  after  all,  you  tell  nie,  there  is  neither 
tree,  houfe,  nor  place,  any  where  exifting.  An 
advocate  for  that  fyftera  fays,  that  truth  coniiils  in 
the  livelinefs  of  the  idea,  than  which  nothing  can 
be  more  manifeflly  falfe.  1  can  form  as  diftin£l  an 
idea  of  any  thing  that  is  not,  as  any  thing  that  is, 
when  it  is  abfent  from  my  fight.  1  have  a  much 
more  lively  idea  of  Jupiter  and  Juno,  and  many  of 
their  a£lions,  froqii  Homer  and  Virgil,  though  I  do 
not  believe  that  any  of  them  ever  exifted,  than  I 
have  of  many  things  that  I  know  happened  within 
thefe  fev/  months. 

The  truth  is,  tho  immaterial  fyftem  is  a  wild  and 
ridiculous  attempt  to'cmfettlethe  principles  of  com- 
mon fenfe  by  metaphyfical  reafoning,  which  can 
hardly  produce  any  thing  but  contempt  in  the  gene- 
rality of  perfons  who  hear  it,  and  which,  I  verily 
believe,  never  produced  conviclion  even  on  the  per- 
fons who  pretend  to  efpoufe  it. 


LECTURE  III, 


INTERNAL  fenfation  is  whatMrPIutchinfon  calls 

the  finer  powers  of  perception.     It  takes  its  rife 

firgm  the  external  objects,  but,  by  abilraftion,  con- 


24  LECTURES  OX  Le£t.  3. 

fiders  Something  farther  than  merely  the  fenfible 
qualities 

1.  Thus,  with  refped  to  many  objefts,  there  is  a 
fenfe  of  beauty  in  the  appearance,  ftrufture,  or 
compofition,  which  is  altogether  diftinft  from  mere 
colour,  fhape,  and  extenfion.  How,  then,  is  this 
beauty  perceived  ?  It  enters  by  the  eye,  but  it  is 
perceived  and  relilhed  by  what  may  be  well 
enough  called  an  internal  fenfe,  quality,  or  capacity 
©f  the  mind. 

2.  There  is  a  fenfe  of  pleafure  in  imitation, 
whence  the  arts  of  painting,  fculpture,  poetry,  are 
often  called  the  imitative  arts.  It  is  eafy  to  fee,  that 
the  imitation  itfelf  gives  the  pleafure,  for  we  receive 
much  pleafure  from  a  lively  defcription  of  what 
would  be  painful  to  behold. 

3.  A  fenfe  of  harmony, 

4.  A  fenfe  of  order  or  proportion. 

Perhaps,  after  all,  the  wIioIq  of  thefe  fenfes  may 
be  confidered  as  belonging  to  one  clafs,  and  to  be 
the  particulars  which  cither  fingly,  or  by  the  union 
of  feveral  of  them,  or  of  the  whole,  produce  what 
is  called  the  pleafures  of  the  imagination.  If  fo, 
we  may  extend  thefe  fenfes  to  every  thing  that  en- 
ters into  the  principles  of  beauty  and  gracefulnefs. 
Order,  proportion,  fimplicity,  intricacy,  uniformity, 
variety — efpecially  as  thefe  principles  have  any 
thing  in  common  that  is  equally  applicable  to  all 
the  fine  arts,  painting,  ftatuary,  architecture,  mufic, 
poetry,  oratory. 

The  various  theories  upon  the  principles  of  beau- 
ty, or  what  it  is  that  properly  conftitutes  it,  are  of 
much  importance  on  the  fubjefl  of  tafte  and  cri- 


Le(^.  5.  TJORAL  PHILOSOFRrr.  ^5 

ticifm,  but  of  very  little  in  point  of  morals.  Whe- 
ther it  be  a  fimple  perception  that  cannot  be  ana- 
lyfed,  or  a  Te  ne  fcai  quoi,  as  the  French  call  it, 
that  cannot  be  difcovered,  it  is  the'  fame  thing  to  our 
prefent  purpofe,  iince  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  there 
is  a  perception  of  beauty,  and  that  this  is  very  dif- 
ferent from  the  mere  colour  or  dimenfions  of  the 
objeft.  This  beauty  extends  to  the  form  and  ihape 
of  vifible,  or  to  the  grace  and  motion  of  living  ob- 
jefts ;  indeed,  to  all  works  of  art,  and  productions 
of  genius. 

Thefe  are  called  the  reflex  fenfes  fometimcs,  and 
it  is  of  moment  to  obferve,  both  that -they  really  be- 
long to  our  nature,  and  that  they  are  very  different 
from  the  grolTcr  perceptions  of  external  fenfe. 

It  muft  alfo  be  obferved,  that  feveral  diflinguiftied 
'svriters  have  added,  as  an  internal  fenfe,  that  of  mo- 
rality, a  fenfe  and  perception  of  moral  excellence, 
and  our  oblicration  to  conform  ourf elves  to  it  in  our 


tondu6l. 


Though  there  is  no  occafion  to  join  Mr  Hutch- 
infon,  or  any  other,  in  their  oppofiiion  to  fuch  as 
make  reafon  the  principle  of  virtuous  conduft^  yet 
I  think  it  muft  be  admitted,  that  a  fenfe  of  moral 
good  and  evil,  is  as  really  a  principle  of  our  na- 
lure,  as  either  the  grofs  external  or  reflex  fenfes, 
and  as  truly  diilin6l  from  both,  as  they  are  from 
each  other^ 

This  moral  fenfe  is  precifely  the  fame  thing  \vixh. 
what,  in  fcripture  and  common  language,  we  call 
confcience.  It  is  the  law  which  our  Maker  has 
written  upon  our  hearts,  and  both  intimates  and  en- 
forces duty,  previous  to  all  reafoning.  The  op- 
C  cr 


26  LECTURES  ON  Le£l.  3. 

pofers  of  innate  ideas,  and  of  the  law  of  nature, 
are  unwilling  to  admit  the  reality  of  a  moral 
fenfe,  yet  their  objeftions  are  wliolly  frivolous. 
The  neceflity  of  education  and  information  to  the 
produdion  and  exercife  of  the  reflex  fenfes  or 
j^owers  of  the  imagination,  is  every  whit  as  great 
,  as  to  the  application  of  the  moral  fenfe.  Tf,  thcrefoie, 
any  one  ihould  fay,  as  is  often  done  by  Mr  Locke, 
If  there  are  any  innate  principles,  what  are  they  ? 
enumerate  them  to  me ;  if  they  are  effential  to  man, 
they  muft  be  in  every  man  ;  let  me  take  any  artlefs 
clown,  and  examine  him,  and  fee  if  he  can  tell  me 
what  they  are.  I  would  fay,  if  the  principles  of 
tafte  are  natural,  they  muft  be  univerfal.  Let  me 
try  the  clown,  then,  and  fee  Vs'hether  he  will  agree 
•with  us,  either  in  difcovering  the  beauty  of  a  poem 
or  pi6lure,  or  being  able  to  aftign  the  reafons  of  his 
approbation. 

There  are  two  fenfes  which  are  not  eafily  redu- 
cible to  any  of  the  two  kinds  of  internal  fenfes, 
and  yet  certainly  belong  to  our  nature.  They  are 
allied  to  one  another — A  fenfe  of  ridicule,  and  a 
fenfe  of  honour  and  Ihame.  A  fenfe  of  the  ridi- 
culous is  fomething  peculiar ;  for  though  it  be  ad- 
mitted, that  every  thing  that  is  ridiculous  is  at  the 
fame  time  unreafonable  and  abfurd  ;  yet  it  is  as  cer- 
tain the  terms  are  not  convertible,  for  any  thing 
that  is  abfurd  is  not  ridiculous.  There  are  an  hun- 
dred falfehoods  in  mathematics  and  other  fciences, 
that  do  not  tempt  any  body  to  laugh. 

Shaftefbury  has,  through  his  whole  writings,  en- 
deavoured to  eftablifli  this  principle,  that  ridicule  is 
tlie  tell  of  truth  ;  but  the  falfehood  of  that  opinion 


Lecl.  3.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  27 

appears  from  the  above  remark,  for  there  is  fome- 
thing  really  dlllinft  from  reafoning  in  ridicule.  It 
feems  to  be  putting  imagination  in  the  place  of  rea- 
fjn See  Brown's  Ellays  on  the  Characleriftics. 

A  fenfe  of  honour  and  Ihame  feems,  in  a  certain 
view,  to  fubjeft  us  to  the  opinions  of  others,  «s 
ihej  depend  upon  the  fentiments  of  our  fellow- 
creatures.  Yet,  perhaps  we  may  confider  this  fen- 
timent  as  intended  to  be  an  ailiftant  or  guard  to 
virtue,  by  making  us  apprehend  reproach  from 
others  for  what  is  in  itfelf  worthy  of  blame.  This 
fenfe  is  very  ftrong  and  powerful  in  its  effects,  whe- 
ther it  be  guided  by  true  or  falfe  principles. 

After  this  furvey  of  human  nature,  let  us  confider 
how  we  derive  either  the  nature  or  obligation  of 
duty  from  it. 

One  way  is  to  confider  what  indications  we  have 
from  our  nature,  of  the  way  that  leads  to  the  trueft 
happinefs.  This  mufl  be  done  by  a  careful  atten- 
tion to  the  feveral  clalTes  of  perceptions  and  affec- 
tions, to  fee  which  of  them  are  moll  excellent,  de- 
lightful, or  delirable. 

They  will  then  foon  appear  to  be  of  three  great 
clalTes,  as  mentioned  above,  eafily  diHinguifhable 
from  one  another,  and  gradually  riling  above  one 
another. 

1.  The  gratification  of  the  external  fenfes.  This 
affords  fome  pleafure.  We  are  led  to  defirfe  whai 
is  pleafing,  afnd  to  avoid  what  is  difgullful  to 
them. 

2 .  The  finer  powers  of  perception  give  a  delight 
■which  is  evidently  more  excellent,  and  which  we 
mufl  necefTarily  pronounce  more  noble.     Poetry, 


a3  LECTURES  ON"  LeSi,  ^, 

painting,  mufic,  &:c.  the  exertion  of  genius,  and 
Qxerc^fe  of  the  mental  powers  in  general,  give  a 
pleafure,  though  not  fo  tumultuous,  much  more  re- 
fined, and  which  does  not  fo  foon  fatiate. 

3.  Superior  to  both  thefe,  is  a  fenfe  of  moral  ex- 
cellence, and  a  pleafure  arifmg  from  doing  what  is 
dictated  bj  the  moral  fcnfe. 

It  muft  doubtlefs  be  admitted,  that  this  reprefen- 
tation  is  agreeable  to  truth,  and  that  to  thofe  who 
would  calmly  and  fairly  weigh  the  delight  of  moral 
a6lions,  it  muft  appear  fuperior  to  any  other  grati- 
fication, being  moll  ?ioble,  pure,  and  durable.  There- 
fore we  might  conclude,  that  it  is  to  be  preferred 
before  all  other  fources  of  pleafure,  that  they  are 
to  give  way  to  it  v/hen  oppofite,  and  to  be  no  other- 
wife  embraced  than  in  fubferviency  to  it. 

But  though  we  cannot  fay  there  is  any  thing 
falfe  in  this  theory,  there  are  certainly  very  eflen- 
tial  defe£ls.  As  for  example,  it  wholly  confounds, 
or  leaves  entirely  undillinguilhed,  a£ling  virtuoufly 
from  feeking  happinefs  :  fo  that  promoting  our  own 
happinefs  will  in  that  cafe  be  the  elTence  or  defini- 
tion of  virtue,  and  a  view  to  our  own  intereft  will 
be  the  fole  and  complete  obligation  to  virtue.  Now 
there  is  good  ground  to  believe,  not  only  that  reafon 
teaches  us,  but  that  the  moral  fenfe  did:ates  to  us, 
fomething  more  on  both  heads,  viz.  that  there  are 
difinterefted  affeftions  that  point  direftly  at  the  good 
of  others,  and  that  thefe  are  fo  far  from  meriting 
to  be  excluded  from  the  notion  of  virtue  altogether, 
that  they  rather  feem  to  claim  a  preference  to  the 
felfilh  afFe6lions.  I  know  the  friends  of  the  fcheme- 
of  felf-iutcreft  have  a  way  of  colouring  or  folving^ 


1.C&:,  3.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHT.  2^ 

this.  Thej  fay,  men  only  approve  and  delight  in 
benevolent  aiFeftions,  as  pleafing  and  delightful  to 
themfelves.  But  this  is  not  fatisfjing,  for  it  feems 
to  weaken  the  force  of  public  affeftion  very  much, 
to  refer  it  all  to  felf-intereft,  and  when  nature  feems 
to  -be  carrying  you  out  of  yourfelf,  by  ftrong  in- 
flinftive  ppopenfities  £>r  implanted  affections,  to 
turn  the  current  and  direction  of  thefe  into,  the 
ftream  of  felf-intereft,  in  which  experience  tells  us 
we  are  mofl  apt  to  run  to  a  vicious  excefs. 

Befides  it  is  affirmed,  and  I  think  with  good  rea- 
fon,  that  the  moral  fenfe  carries  a  good  deal  more  in 
it  than  merely  an  approbation  of  a  certain  clafs  of 
actions  as  beautiful,  praife-worthy,  or  delightful, 
and  therefore  finding  our  interell  in  them  as  the 
moft  noble  gratification.  The  moral  fenfe  implies 
alfo  a  fenfe  of  obligation,  thatfuch  and  fuch  things 
are  right,  and  others  wrong  ;  that  we  are  bound  in 
duty  to  do  the  one,  and  that  our  conduft  is  hatefiil, 
blame  able,  and  deferving  of  puniihment,  if  we  do 
the  contrary  ;  and  there  is  alfo  in  the  moral  fenfe  or 
confcience,  an  apprehenfion  or  belief  that  reward 
and  punifiiment  will  follow,  according  as  we  fball 
ad  in  the  one  way,  or  in  the  other. 

It  is  fo  far  from  being  true,  that  there  is  no  more 
in  virtuous  aftion  than  a  fuperior  degree  of  beauty, 
or  a  more  noble  pleafure,  that  indeed  the  beauty 
and  fweetnefs  of  virtuous  action  arifes  from  this 
very  circumllance — that  it  is  a  compliance  with 
duty  or  fuppofed  obligation.  Take  away  this,  and 
the  beauty  vanillies,  as  well  as  the  pleafure.  Why 
is  it  more  pleafant  to  do  a  jull  or  charitable 
ftftion,  than   to  fatisfy  my  palate  with   delightful 


30  LECTURES  ON"  Left.  3. 

meat,  or  to  walk  in  a  beautiful  garden,  or  read  aa 
cxquifite  poem  ?  only  becaufe  I  feel  myfelf  under 
an  obligation  to  do  it,  as  a  thing  ufeful  and  im- 
portant in  itfelf.  It  is  not  duty  becaufe  pleafing, 
but  pleaiing  becaufe  duty.  The  fame  thing  may 
be  fiiid  of  beauty  and  approbation.  I  do  not  ap- 
prove of  the  conduft  of  a  plain,  honeft,  induflrious^ 
pious  man,  becaufe  it  is  more  beautiful  than  tha. 
of  an  idle  profligate,  but  I  fay  it  is  more  beautiful 
and  amiable,  becaufe  he  keeps  v/ithin  the  bounds 
of  his  duty.  I  fee  a  higher  fpecies  of  beauty  in 
moral  adion  :  but  it  arifes  from  a  fenie  of  obliga- 
tion. It  may  be  faid,  that  my  intereft  and  duty 
are  the  fame,  becaufe  they  are  infeparable,  and  the 
one  arifes  from  the  other  ;  but  there  is  a  real  difr 
tindlion  and  priority  of  order.  A  thing  is  not  my 
duty,  becaufe  it  is  my  intereft,  but  it  is  a  wife  ap- 
pointment of  nature,  that  I  ihall  forfeit  my  intereft, 
if  I  negledt  my  duty. 

Several  other  remarks  might  be  made  to  confirm 
this.  When  any  perfon  has  by  experience  found, 
that  in  feeking  pleafure  he  embraces  a  lefs  plealing 
enjoyment,  in  place  of  one  more  delightful,  he 
may  be  fenlible  of  miftake  or  misfortune, '  but  he 
has  nothing  at  all  of  the  feeling  of  blame  or  felf- 
*;ondemnatlon  ;  but  %vhen  he  hath  done  an  immoral 
action,  he  has  an  inward  remorfe,  and  ft-els  that  lie 
lias  broken  a  law,  and  that  he  ought  to  have  don© 
i>tlierwifip. 


Left.  4.  KORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  3I 


LECTURE  IV. 


THIS  ,  therefore,  lays  us  under  the  neceffity  of 
fearching  a  little  further  for  the  principle  of 
moral  action.  In  order  to  do  this  with  the  greater 
accuracy,  and  give  you  a  view  of  the  chief  contro- 
verfies  on  this  fubjecl,  obfer%-e,  that  there  are  really 
three  queftions  upon  it,  which  mull  be  inquired 
into,  and  diflinguifhed.  I  am  fenlible,  they  are  fo 
intimately  connected,  that  they  are  fometimes  ne- 
ceffarilj  intermixed  ;  but  at  others,  not  diftinguilh- 
ing  leads  into  error.     The  queftions  relate  to, 

1 .  The  nature  of  \^ue. 

2.  The  foundation  of  \4rtue. 

3.  The  obligation  of  virme. 

When  we  inquire  into  the  nature  of  virtue,  we 
do  enough  when  we  point  out  what  it  is,  or  ihew 
how  we  may  come  to  the  knowledge  of  every  par- 
ticular duty,  and  be  able  to  diftinguilh  it  from  the 
opposite  vice.  When  we  fpeak  of  the  foundation 
of  virtue,  we  aik  or  anfwer  the  queftion.  Why  is 
it  fo  ?  Why  is  this  courfe  of  a£tion  preferable  to 
the  contrary  ?  What  is  its  excellence  ?  When  we 
fpeak  of  the  obligation  of  \-irtue,  we  aik,  By  what 
law  we  are  bound,  or  from  what  principles  we 
ought  to  be  obedient  to  the  precepts  which  it  con- 
tains or  prefcribes  ? 

After  fpe^iking  fomething  to  each  of  thefe — to 
the  controverfies  that  have  been  raifed  upon  tliem— . 
and  the  propriety  or  iic*^i:t4^ce   of  entering  far 

^-  .  A^ 


3  a  LECTURES  ON  Le(^.  4. 

into  thefe  controverlies,  or  a  particular  decifion  of 
them,  I  fhall  proceed  to  a  detail  of  the  moral  laws, 
or  the  feveral  branches  of  dutj,  according  to  the 
di\nfion  firft  laid  down. 

I .  As  to  the  nature  of  virtue,  or  what  it  is  ;  or, 
in  Other  words,  what  is  the  rulo  by  which  I  muft 
try  every  difputed  pra6lice — that  I  may  keep  clear 
of  the  next  queftion,  you  may  obferve,  that  upon 
all  the  fyftems  they  muft  have  recourfe  to  one  or 
more  of  the  following,  viz.  Confcience,  reafon,  ex- 
perience. All  who  found  virtue  upon  affection, 
particularly  Hutchinfon,  Shafteft)ury,  and  their  fol- 
lowers, make  the  moral  fenfe  the  rule  of  duty,  and 
very  often  attempt  to  exclude  the  ufe  of  reafon  on 
this  fubjed.  Thefe  authors  feem  alfo  to  make  be- 
nevolence and  public  affeclion  the  ftandard  of  virtue, 
in  diftin6lion  from  all  private  and  felfifh  pallions. 

Dr  Clark,  and  moft  Englifti  writers  of  the  laft 
age,  make  reafon  the  ftandard  of  virtue,  particu- 
larly as  oppofed  to  inward  fentiment  or  affeftion. 
They  have  this  to  fay  particularly  in  fupport  of  their 
opinion,  that  reafon  does  in  fa£t  often  controul  and 
alter  fentiment ;  whereas  fentiment  cannot  alter  the 
clear  deciiions  of  reafon.  Suppofe  my  heart  dic- 
tates to  me  any  thing  to  be  my  duty,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, to  have  compaffion  on  a  perfon  detefted  in 
the  commiflion  of  crimes ;  yet  if,  upon  cool  re- 
flection, I  perceive  that  fuftering  him  to  go  unpu- 
niftied  will  be  hurtful  to  tlie  community,  I  coun- 
terad  the  fentiment  from  the  deductions  of  reafon. 

Again  :  Some  take  in  the  aid  of  experience,  and 
chiefly  aft  upon  it.  All  particularly  who  are  upon 
the  felfifti  fcbeme,  find  it  neceflfary  to  opake  expe- 


Led.  4.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  ^^ 

rience  the  guide,  to  {hew  them  what  things  are  really 
conducive  to  happinefs,  and  what  not. 

We  ihall  proceed  to  confider  the  opinions  upon 
the  nature  of  virtue,  the  chief  of  which  are  as  fol- 
low. 

1.  Some  fay  that  virtue  coiifiils  in  a£ting  agree- 
ably to  the  nature  and  reafon  of  things  ;  and  that 
we  are  to  abftrad  from  all  affection,  public  and 
private,  in  determining   any  quellion  upon   it. — 

2.  Some  fay  that  benevolence  or  public  afFeftioa 
is  virtue,  and  that  a  regard  to  the  good  of  the  whole 
is  the  ftandard  of  virtue.  What  is  moll  remark- 
able in  this  fpheme  is,  that  it  makes  the  fenfe  of 
obligation  in  particular  inilances  give  w^ay  to  a  fup- 
pofed  greater  good. — Hutchifiso7i. 

3.  One  author  (Wollafton  Rel.  of  Nat.  delineated) 
makes  truth  the  foundation  of  virtue  ;  and  he  re- 
duces the  good  or  evil  of  any  adion  to  the  tinitli 
or  falfehood  of  a  proportion.  This  opinion  differs 
not  in  fubllance,  but  in  words  only,  from  Dr 
Clark's. 

4.  Others  place  virtuo  in  felf-love,  and  make  a 
well  regulated  felf-love  the  ftandard  and  foundation 
of  it.  This  fcheme  is  befl  defended  by  Dr  Camp- 
bell, of  St  Andrew's. 

5.  Some  of  late  have  made  fympathy  the  ftand- 
ard of  virtue,  particularly  Smith,  in  his  Theory  of 
Moral  Sentiments.  He  fays  we  have  a  certain 
feeling,  by  which  we  fympathife,  and,  as  he  calls 
it,  go  along  with  what  appears  to  be  right.  This 
is  but  a  new  phrafeology  for  the  moral  fenfe. 

Vol.  VII.  D 


34  LECTURES  0?i  Lccl.  4. 

6.  David  Hume  has  a  fcheme  of  morals  that  is 
peculiar  to  himfelf.  He  makes  every  thing  that  is 
agreccible  and  useful  virtuous,  and  vice  versay  by 
which  he  entirely  annihilates  the  difference  be- 
tween natural  and  moral  qualities,  making  health, 
iirength,  cleanlinefs,  as  really  virtues  as  integrity 
and  truth. 

7.  We  have  an  opinion  publlfhed  in  this  country, 
that  virtue  coniifts  in  the  love  of  being,  as  fuch. 

Several  of  thefe  authors  do  eafily  and  naturally 
incorporate  piety  with  their  fj-flem,  particularly 
Clark,  Hutchinfon,  pampbell,  and  Edwards. 

And  there  are  feme  Vv^ho  begin  by  eflabliihing 
natural  religion,  and  then  found  virtue  upon  piety. 
This  amounts  to  the  fame  thing  in  fubflance  ;  for 
reafoners  upon  the  nature  of  virtue  only  mean  to 
Ihew  what  the  Author  of  nature  has  pointed  out  as 
duty.  And  after  natural  religion  is  eilabliflied  on 
general  proofs,  it  will  remain  to  point  out  what  are 
its  laws,  which,  not  taking  in  revelation,  muft 
bring  us  back  to  confider  our  own  nature,  and  the 
rational  dedu£lion  from  it. 

•     2.  The  opinions  on  the  foundation  of  virtue  may 
be  fummed  up  in  the  four  following.  - 

I.  The  will  of  God.  2.  The  reafon  and  na- 
ture of  things.  3.  The  public  intereil.  4.  Private 
intereft. . 

I.  The  will  of  God.  By  this  is  not  meant  what 
was  mentioned  above,  that  the  intimations  of  the  di- 
vine will  point  out  what  is  our  duty  ;  but  that  the 
reafon  of  the  difference  between  virtue  and  vice  is 
to  be  fought  ho  where  elfe  than  in  the  good  plea- 
fure  of    God  ;   that  there  is  no  intrinfic  excellence 


Led.  4.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  35 

in  any  thing  but  as  he  commands  or  forbids  it. 
They  pretend  that,  if  it  were  otherwife,  there  would 
be  fomething  above  the  Supreme  Being,  fomeihing 
in  the  nature  of  tilings  that  would  lay  him  under 
the  law  of  neceiSty  or  fate.  But  notwiih Handing 
the  difficulty  of  our  forming  clear  conceptions  on 
this  lubjeft,  it  feems  very  harOi  and  unreafonable 
to  fay,  that  the  diilerence  between  virtue  and  vice  is 
no  other  than  the  divine  will.  This  would  be 
taking  away  the  moral  character  even  of  God  him- 
felf.  It  would  not  have  any  meaning,  then,  to  fay 
he  is  iniinitely  holy  and  infinitely  perfect.  But 
probably  thofe  who  have  alTerted  this,  did  not  mean 
any  more,  than  that  the  divine  will  is  fo  perfect  and 
excellent,  that  all  virtue  is  reduced  to  conformity 
to  it ;  and  that  v/e  ought  not  to  judge  of  good  and 
evil  by  any  other  rule.  This  is  as  true  as  that  the 
di^4ne  condud:  is  the  llandard  of  wifdom. 

2.  Some  found  it  in  the  reafon  and  nature  of 
things.  This  may  be  faid  to  he  true,  but  not  fuf- 
ficiently  precife  and  explicit.  Thofe  who  embrace 
tin's  principle  fucceed  beft  in  their  reafoning,  v.hen 
endeavouring  to  ihew  that  there  is  an  effentiai  dif- 
ference between  virtue  and  vice.  But  when  they 
attempt  to  ihew  wherein  this  difference  doth  or  can 
confift,  other  than  public  or  private  happinefs,  they 
fpeak  with  very  little  meaning. 

3.  Public  happinefs.  This  opinion  is,  that  the 
foundation  of  virtue,  or  that  which  makes  the  dif- 
tinftion  between  it  and  vice,  is  its  tendency  to  prc- 
rAote  the  general  good  ;  fo  that  utility  at  bonom  is 
the  principle  of  virtue,  even  with  the  great  patrons 
of  diiinterelled  afFeclion. 

D  2 


36  LECTURES  ON  Lect.  4. 

4.  Private  happinefs.  Thofe  who  choofe  to  place 
the  foundation  of  virtue  here,  would  have  us  to 
confider  no  other  excellence  in  it  than  what  imme- 
diately conduces  to  our  own  gratification. 

Upon  thefe  opinions  I  would  obferve,  that  there 
is  fomething  true  in  every  one  of  them,  but  that 
they  may  be  easily  puflied  to  an  error  by  excefs. 

The  nature  and  will  of  God  is  fo  perfed  as  to 
be  the  true  ftandard  of  all  excellence,  natural  and 
moral  :  and  if  we  are  fure  of  what  he  is  or  com- 
mands, it  would  be  prefumption  and  folly  to  reafon 
againft  it,  or  put  our  views  of  fitnefs  in  the  room 
of  his  pleafure  ;  but  to  fay,  that  God,  by  his  will, 
might  have  made  the  fame  temper  and  conducl 
virtuous  and  excellent,  which  we  now  call  vicious, 
feems  to  unhinge  all  our  notions  of  the  fuprem« 
excellence  even  of  God  himfelf. 

Again,  there  feems  to  be  in  the  nature  of  things 
an  intririic  excellence  in  moral  worth,  and  an  in- 
delible impreffion  of  it  upon  the  confcience,  dif- 
tin6l  from  producing  or  receiving  happinefs,  and 
yet  we  cannot  eafily  illuftrate  its  excellence,  but  by- 
comparing  one  kind  of  happinefs  with  another. 

Again,  promoting  the  public  or  general  good 
feems  to  be  fo  nearly  conne£led  wiih  virtue,  that 
we  miuft  necelTarily  fuppofe  that  univerfal  virtue 
could  be  of  univerfal  utility.  Yet  there  are  two 
excefles  to  which  this  has  fometimes  led.  One,  the 
fatalifl  and  necefTitarian  fchemes,  to  which  there 
are  fo  many  objedlions ;  and  the  other,  the  making 
the  general  good  the  ultimate  praftical  rule  to 
every  particular  pcrfon,  fo  that  he  may  violate  par- 


Left.  4.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  37 

ticular  obligations  with  a  view  to  a  more  general 
benefit. 

Once  more,  it  is  certain,  that  viitue  is  as  really 
connected  with  private  as  with  public  happinels, 
and  jet  to  make  the  intereil  of  the  agent  the  only- 
foundation  of  it,  feems  to  narrow  the  mind,  and  to 
be  fo  deftruclive  to  the  public  and  generous  affec- 
tions, as  to  produce  the  mofl  hurtful  effects. 

If  I  were  to  lay  down  a  few  propofitions  on  the 
foundation  of  \irtue,  as  a  philofopher,  they  fhould 
be  the  following. 

1.  From  reafon,  contemplation,  fentiment,  and 
tradition,  the  being,  and  infinite  perfection  and  ex- 
cellence  of  God,  may  be  deduced  ;  and  therefore 
what  he  is,  and  commands,  is  virtue  and  duty. 
Whatever  he  has  implanted  in  corrupted  nature  as 
a  principle,  is  to  be  received  as  his  will.  Propen- 
sities refilled  and  contradid:ed  by  the  inward  prin- 
-cipie  of  confcience,  are  to  be  coniidered  as  inhe- 
rent or  c outraged  vice. 

2.  True  virtue  certainly  promotes  the  general 
good  ;  and  this  may  be  made  ufe  of  as  an  argu- 
ment in  doubtful  cafes,  to  determine  whether  a 
particular  principle  is  right  or  wrong;  but  to  make 
the  good  of  the  whole  our  immediate  principle  of 
action,  is  putting  ourfelves  in  God's  place,  and  ac- 
tually fuperfeding  the  necefTity  and  ufe  of  the  par- 
ticular principle  of  duty  which  he  hath  imprefied 
upon  the  confcience.  As  to  the  whole,  I  believe 
the  univerfe  is  faultlefs  and  perfed,  but  I  am  un- 
willing to  fay  it  is  the  best  poflible  fyllem,  becaufc 
I  am  not  able  to  imderftand  fuch  an  argument,  and 
becaufe  it  feems  to  me  abfurd  that  infinite  perfect 

I>3 


38  LECTURES  ON"  LeSi.  4. 

tion  fliould  exhaufl  or  limit  itfelf  by  a  created  pro- 
duclion. 

3.  There  is  in  the  nature  of  things  a  difference 
between  virtue  and  vice  ;  and  however  much  virtue 
and  happinefs  are  connected  bj  the  divine  law, 
and  in  the  event  of  things,  we  are  made  fo  as  to 
feel  towards  them,  and  conceive  of  them,  as  dif- 
tincl.  We  have  the  fimple  perceptions  of  duty 
and  intereft. 

4.  Private  and  public  intereft  may  be  promoted 
by  the  fame  means,  but  they  are  diftinft  \aews  ; 
they  fliould  be  made  to  affift,  and  not  deftroy  each 
other. 

The  refult  of  the  whole  is,  that  we  ought  to 
take  the  rule  of  duty  from  confcience,  enlightened 
by  reafon,  experience,  and  every  way  by  which 
we  can  be  fuppofed  to  learn  the  will  of  our  Maker, 
and  his  intention  in  creating  us  fuch  as  we  are. 
And  we  ought  to  believe,  that  it  is  as  deeply 
founded  as  the  nature  of  God  himfelf,  being  a, 
tranfcript  of  his  moral  excellence,  and  that  it  is 
produdive  of  the  greateft  good. 


LECTURE  V. 

><.  XT  remains  only  that  we  fpeak  of  the  obligation 
of  virtue,   or  what  is  the  law  that  binds  us  to 
the   perform.ance,  and  from  what  motives  or  prin- 
ciples we  ought  to  follow  its  di<?:ates. 

The  fentiments  upon  this  fubje£l  differ,  as  men 
have  different  views  of  the  nature  and  foundation 


Left.  5.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHT.  39 

of  virtue,  yet  they  may  be  reduced  within  nar- 
rower bounds. 

The  obligation  of  virtue  may  be  eafily  reduced 
to  two  general  kinds,  duty  and  interefl.  The  firft, 
if  real,  implies  that  we  are  under  fome  law,  or 
fubjeft  to  fome  fuperior,  to  whom  we  are  account- 
able. The  other  only  implies  that  nature  points  it 
out  to  us  as  our  own  greateft  happinefs,  and  that 
there  is  no  other  reafon  why  we  ought  to  obey. 

Now,  I  think  it  is  very  plain,  that  there  is  more 
in  the  obligation  of  virtue,  than  merely  our  greateft 
happinefs.  The  moral  fentiment  itfelf  implies  that 
it  is  duty,  independent  of  happinefs.  This  pro- 
duces remorfe  and  difapprobation,  as  having  done 
what  is  blame  able  and  of  ill  defert.  We  have  two 
ideas  very  diitiiift,  when  we  fee  a  man  miflaking 
his  own  interefl,  and  not  obtaining  fo  much  happi- 
nefs as  he  might,  and  when  we  fee  him  breaking 
through  every  moral  obligation.  In  the  flrft  cafe, 
w^e  confider  him  as  only  accountable  to  himfelf ;  in 
the  fecond,  we  conlider  him  as  accountable  to  fome 
fuperior,  and  to  the  public.  Tiiis  fenfe  of  duty  is 
the  primary  notion  of  law  and  of  rights,  taken  in 
their  moft  extenfive  signification,  as  including  eve- 
ry thing  we  think  we  are  entitled  to  expe£l  from 
others,  and  the  negleft  or  violation  of  which  we 
coniider  as  wrong,  unjuft,  vicious,  and  therefore 
blameable.  It  is  aHb  affirmed  with  great  apparent 
reafon  by  many,  particularly  Butler,  in  his  Analogy 
and  his  Sermons,  that  we  have  a  natural  feeling  of 
ill  defert,  and  merited  pimifhment  in  vice.  The 
patron;*  of  the  felfifli  ideas  alone,  are  thofe  who  coilh. 
£ne  the  obligation  of  virtue  to  happinefs. 


40  LECTURES  OX  Led.  5. 

But  of  thofe  who  are,  or  would  be  thought,  of  tlie 
oppofite  fentiment,  there  arc  fome  who  differ  very 
confiderably  from  others.  Some  who  profefs  great 
oppofition  to  the  felfifh  fcheme,  declare  alfo  great 
ayerfion  to  founding  the  obligation  of  virtue  in  any 
degree  on  the  will  of  a  fuperior,  or  looking  for  any 
fanftion  of  punifliment,  to  corroborate  the  moral 
laws.  This  they  efpecially  treat  with  'contempt, 
when  it  is  fuppofed  to  be  from  the  Deity.  Shaftf- 
bury  fpeaks  with  great  bitternefs  againil  taking 
into  view  a  future  ilate  of  what  he  calls  more  ex- 
tended fclf-interefl.  He  fays  men  ihould  love  vir- 
tue for  its  own  fake,  without  regard  to  reward  and 
puniihment.  In  this  he  has  been  followed  by  many 
reafoners,  as  far  as  their  regard  to  religion  would 
permit  them. 

If,  however,  we  attend  to  the  dictates  of  coni- 
fcience,  we  fhall  find  evidently  a  fenfe  of  duty,  of 
felf-approbation,  and  remorfe,  which  plainly  fliew 
us  to  be  undfer  a  law,  and  that  law  to  have  a  fanc- 
tion  :  what  e1fe  is  the  meaning  of  the  fear  and  ter- 
ror, and  apprehenfions  of  guilty  perfons  ?  ^porum 
mentes.  si  recludaiitur,  Sec.  fays  Cicero. 

Nor  is  this  all,  but  we  have  all  certainly  a  natural 
fenfe  of  dependence.  The  belief  of  a  Divine  Being 
is  certainly  either  innate  and  neceflary,  or  handed 
dov/n  from  the  firll  man,  and  can  now  be  well  fup- 
ported  by  the  cleareft  reafon.  And  our  relation  to 
him  not  only  lays  the  foundation  of  many  moral 
fentiments  and  duties,  but  completes  the  idea  of 
morality  and  law,  by  fubj eating  us  to  him,  and 
teaching  us  to  conceive  of  him,  not  only  as  our 
Maker,  Preferver,  and  Benefador,  but  as  our  righ- 


Left.  5.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  4I 

teous  Governor  and  fupreme  Judge.  As  tKe  being 
and  perfections  of  God  are  irrefragably  eftabliihedj 
the  obligation  of  duty  muft  ultimately  reft  here. 

It  ought  not  to  be  forgotten,  that  the  belief  or  ap- 
prehenfion  of  a  future  ftate  of  rewards  and  punilh- 
ments  has  been  as  univerfal  as  the  belief  of  a  Deity, 
and  feems  infeparable  from  it,  and  therefore  muft 
be  confidered  as  the  fanftion  of  the  moral  law. 
Shaftfbury  inveighs  feverely  againft  this,  as  making 
man  virtuous  from  a  mercenary  view  ;  but  there 
are  two  ways  in  which  we  may  conlider  this  mat- 
ter, and  in  either  light  his  objections  have  little- 
force,  (i.)  We  may  connder  the  primary  obliga- 
tions of  virtue,  as  founded  upon  a  fenfe  of  its  own 
excellence,  joined  with  a  fenfe  of  duty  and  depend- 
ence on  the  Supreme  Being,  and  rewards  and  pu* 
nifhments  as  a  fecondary  motive,  which  is  found  ia 
fa6l  to  be  abfolutely  necefTary  to  reftrain  or  re- 
claim men  from  vice  and  impiety.  Or,  (2.)  We 
may  connder,  that,  by  the  light  of  nature,  as  well  as 
by  revelation,  the  future  reward  of  virtue  is  confi- 
dered as  a  ftate  of  perfed  virtue,  and  the  happinefs 
is  reprefented  as  ariling  from  this  circumftance. 
Here  there  is  nothing  at  all  of  a  mercenary  prin- 
ciple, but  only  an  expedlation  that  true  goodnefs, 
which  is  here  in  a  ftate  of  imperfection,  and  liable 
to  much  oppofition,  ftiall  then  be  improved  to  the 
higheft  degree,  and  put  beyond  all  poftibility  of 
change. 

We  may  add  to  thefe  obligations,  the  manifeft  ten- 
dency of  a  virtuous  conduct  to  promote  even  our 
prefent  happinefs  :  this,  in  ordinary  cafes,  it  does  ; 
and  when  joined  with  the  fteady  hope  of  futurity. 


4^  LECTUKES  ON  Left.  5. 

does  in  all  cafes  produce  a  happlnefs  fuperior  to 
what  can  be  enjoyed  in  the  praclice  of  vice.  Yet, 
perhaps,  the  Stoics  of  old,  v/ho  denied  pain  to  be 
any  evn'l,  and  made  the  wife  man  fuperior  to  all  the 
viciflitudcs  of  fortune,  carried  things  to  a  romantic 
and  extravagant  height.  And  fo  do  fome  perfons 
in  modern  times,  who,  fetting  afide  the  confideration 
of  a  future  ftate,  teach  that  virtue  is  its  own  re- 
ward. There  are  many  fituations  in  which,  if  you 
depiive  a  good  man  of  the  hope  of  future  happi- 
nefs,  his  ftate  feems  very  undefirable.  On  the 
contrary,  fometimes  the  worft  of  men  enjoy  prof- 
perity  and  fuccefs  to  a  great  degree  ;  nor  do  they 
feem  to  have  any  fuch  remorfe,  as  to  be  an  ade- 
quate puniftiment  to  their  crimes.  If  any  fiiould 
sniift,  that  a  good  man  has  always  fome  comfort 
from  within,  and  a  bad  man  a  felf-difapprobation 
and  inward  difquiet,  fuited  to  their  charafters,  I 
would  fay,  that  this  arifes  from  the  expeftation  of 
a  future  ftalfc,  and  a  hope  on  the  one  fide,  and  fear 
on  the  other,  of  that  condition  there. 

Thofe  who  declaim  fo  highly  of  ^^irtue  being  its 
ovvTi  reward  in  this  life,  take  away  one  of  the  moft 
confiderable  arguments  which,  from  the  dawn  of 
philofophy,  has  always  been  made  ufe  of  as  a 
proof  of  a  future  ftate,  viz.  the  unequal  diftribution 
of  good  and  evil  in  this  life.  Bjefides,  they  do  not 
feem  to  view  the  ftate  of  bad  men  properly.  When 
they  talk  of  remorfe  of  cciifcience  as  a  fufficient 
puniftiment,  they  forget  that  this  is  feldom  to  a  high 
degree,  but  in  the  cafe  of  fome  grofs  crimes.  Cru- 
elty and  murder,  frequent  a£ls  of  grofs  injuftice, 
are  fometimes  followed  with  deep  horror  of  con- 


Led.  5.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  4 J 

fcienc'e  ;  and  n.  courfe  of  intemperance  or  lull  is 
often  attended  with  fiicli  difmal  effefts  upon  the 
body,  fame,  and  fortmie,  that  thofe  who  fai^vive  it 
a  few  years  are  a  melancholy  fpeftacle,  and  a 
burden  to  themfelves  and  others.  But  it  would  be 
very  loofe  morality,  to  fuppofe  none  to  be  bad  men, 
but  thofe  who  were  under  the  habitual  condemna- 
tion of  confcience.  On  the  contrary,  the  far 
greater  part  are  blinded  in  their  underftandings,  as 
well  as  corrupt  in  their  praftice.  They  deceive 
themfelves,  and  are  st  peace.  Ignorance  and  in- 
attention keep  the  multitude  at  peace.  And  falfe 
principles  often  produce  felf-juftiiication  and  ill- 
founded  peace,  even  in  atrocious  crimes.  Even 
common  robbers  are  fometimes  found  to  juftify 
themfelves,  and  fay,  I  muft  live ;  I  have  a  right  to 
my  fhare  of  provifior;,  as  well  as  that  proud  fellow 
that  rolls  in  his  chariot. 

The  refult  of  the  whole  is,  that  the  obligation  to 
virtue  ought  to  take  in  all  the  following  particulars  : 
A  fenfe  of  its  own  intrinfic  excellence — of  its  hap- 
py confequences  in  the  prefent  life— a  fenfe  of  duty 
and  fubjeftion  to  the  Supreme  Being — and  a  hope 
of  future  happinefs,  and  fear  of  future  mifery,  fronj 
his  decifion. 

Having  conlidered  the  reafonings  on  the  nature, 
foundation,  and  obligation  of  virtue,  I  now  proceed 
to  a  more  particular  detail  of  the  moral  laws,  and 
fliall  take  them  under  the  three  heads  formerly  men- 
tioned, Ethics,  Politics,  and  Jurifprudence. 


44  LECTURES  ON  Le^.6, 


LECTURE  VI. 

AS  to  the  firii,  we  muft  begin  with  what  Is 
ufually  called  the  Hates  of  man,  or  the  feve- 
ral  lights  or  relatir>ns  in  which  he  may  be  confi- 
dered,  as  laying  a  foundation  for  duty.  Thefe 
ilates  may  be  divided  into  two  kinds,  i.  Natural. 
2.  Adventitious. 

The  natural  ftate  may  be  enumerated  thus :  i .  His 
ftate  with  regard  to  God,  or  natural  relation  to  him. 
2.  To  his  fellow-creatures.     3.  Solitude  or  fociety. 

4.  Peace  or  war.     Perhaps  we  may  add  to  thefe, 

5.  His  outward  proviiion,  plenty  or  want. 

Thefe  are  called  natural  Ilates,  becaufe  they  are 
neceffary  and  univerfal.  All  men,  and  at  all  times, 
are  related  to  God.  They  were  made  by  him,  and 
live  by  his  providence.  We  muft  alfo  necefiarily 
know  our  fellow-creatures,  and  their  ftate,  to  be  iimi- 
lar  to  ours  in  this  refpe£l:,  and  many  others.  A  man 
muft  at  all  times  be  independent,  or  conne£led  with 
fociety- — at  peace  with  others,  or  at  war  well — pro- 
vided, or  in  want. 

The  other  ftates  are  called  adventitious,  becaufe 
they  are  the  efFecl  of  choice  and  the  fruit  of  in- 
duftry,  as  marriage — family — mafter  and  fervant 
— particular  voluntary  focieties — callings  or  profef- 
fions — chara6lers  or  abilities,  natural  and  acquired 
— offices  in  a  conftituted  fociety— property — and 
many  particular  modifications  of  each  of  thefe. 

In  profecuting  the  fubjed  further,  and  giving  an 
analyfis  of  the  moral  duties  founded  upon   thefe 


Lecl.  6.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHT.  45 

ftatcs,  I  fhall  firft  take  notice  of  our  relation  to 
God,  with  the  proofs  of  his  being  and  perfecrions, 
and  then  confider  the  moral  laws  under  three  heads ; 
our  duty  to  God,  to  our  neighbour,  and  to  our- 
felves. 

I.  Our  duty  to  God.  To  this  place  I  have  re- 
ferved  what  was  to  be  faid  upon  the  proof  of  the 
being  of  God,  the  great  foundation  of  all  natural 
religion ;  without  which  the  moral  lenfe  would  be 
weak  and  infufHcient. 

The  proofs  of  the  being  of  God  are  general!}- 
di\'ided  into  two  kinds,  i.  A  priori,  2.  A  posteriori* 
The  firft  is,  properly  fpeaking,  metaphyncal  rea- 
foning  downward  from  the  firil  principles  of  fcience 
or  truth,  and  inferring  by  juft  confequence  the  being 
and  perfeftions  of  God.  Clark's  Demonftration^ 
&c.  (if  there  be  any  thing  that  ihould  be  called  a 
prioriy  and  if  this  is  a  conclufive  method  of  rea- 
foning),  is  as  complete  as  any  thing  ever  publiibed  ; 
perhaps  he  has  carried  the  principle  as  far  as  it 
will  go. 

This  way  of  arguing  begins  by  eftablifliing  our 
own  exiftence  from  confcioufnefs.  That  we  are 
not  neceflarily  exillent,  therefore  muft  have  a  caufe ; 
that  fomething  muft  have  exifted  from  all  eternity, 
or  nothing  ever  could  have  exifted  ;  that  this  Being 
muft  exift  by  an  iatemal  neceftlty  of  nature  ;  that 
what  exifts  neceft'arily  muft  exift  alike  every  where ; 
muft  be  perfect  ;  aft  every  where  ;  be  independent, 
omnipotent,  omnifcient,  infinitely  good,  j»ft,  true: 
Becaufe,  as  all  thefe  are  e\ddently  perfeftions  or 
excellencies,  that  which  exifts  by  a  neceftity  of  na- 
ture muft  be  poflefled  of  every  perfedion.     And 

Vol.  VII.  E 


46  LECTURES  ON  Lecl.  6. 

the  contrary  of  thefe  virtues,  implying  weaknefs 
or  iiifufficiency,  cannot  be  found  in  the  InjRnite 
Being. 

The  other  medium  of  proof,  commonly  called  a 
posteriori,  begins  with  contemplating  the  univerfe 
in  all  its  parts ;  obferving  that  it  contains  many 
irrefiftible  proofs  that  it  could  not  be  eternal,  could 
not  be  without  a  caufe  ;  that  this  caufe  mull  be  in- 
telligent; and  from  the  aftonilliing  greatnefs,  the 
wonderful  adjuflment  and  complication  of  things, 
concludes  that  we  can  fet  no  bounds  to  the  perfec-- 
tion  of  the  Maker,  becaufe  we  can  never  exhauft 
the  power,  intelligence,  and  benignity  that  we  fee 
in  his  works.  In  this  way  of  arguing  we  deduce 
the  moral  perfeftions  of  the  Deity  from  the  faint 
refemblances  of  them  that  we  fee  in  ourfelves.  As 
we  neceflarily  conceive  juftice,  goodnefs,  truth,  Sec. 
to  be  perfe£lions  or  excellencies,  we  are  warranted 
by  the  plaineit  reafon  to  afcribe  them  to  the  Divine 
Being  in  an  infinite  degree. 

There  is,  perhaps,  at  bottom,  no  difference  be- 
tween thefe  ways  of  reafoning,  becaufe  they  mufl 
in  fome  degree  reft  upon  a  corhmon  principle, 
viz.  That  every  thing  that  exifts  muft  have  a  caufe. 
This  is  equally  necelTary  to  both  the  chains  of  rea- 
foning, arid  muft  itfelf  be  taken  for  an  original 
fentiment  of  nature,  or  an  impreffion  neceflarily 
made  upon  us  from  all  that  we  fee  and  are  con- 
verfant  with.  About  this  and  fome  other  ideas 
great  ftir  lias  been  made  by  fome  infidel  writers, 
particularly  David  Kume,  who  feems  to  have  in- 
duftrioufly  endeavoured  to  Ikake  the  certaiftty  of 
our  belief  upon  caufe   and   effedl,  upon    perfoi>al 


Left.  6.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  47 

identity,  and  the  idea  of  power.  It  is  eafy  to 
raife  mctaphjiical  fubtleties,  and  confound  the  un- 
dcrilandirig  on  fuch  fubjefts.  In  oppontion  to  this, 
fome  late  writeisi  have  advanced,  with  great  appa- 
rent reafon,  that  there  are  certain  firil  principles,  or 
dictates  of  common  fenfe,  which  are  either  limple 
perceptions,  or  feen^with  intuitive  eydence.  Thefe 
are  the  foundation  of  all  reafoning,  and  without 
them,  to  reaCon  is  a  word  without  a  meaning. 
Thej  can  no  more  be  proved  than  you  can  prove. 
an  axiom  in  mathematical  fcience.  Thefe  authors, 
of  Scotland  have  lately  produced  and  lupported 
this  opinion,  to  refolve  at  once  all  the  re5;iements 
and  metaphyfical  objections  of  fome  infidel  writers. 

Tliere  is  a  different  fort  of  argument  often  made 
ufe  of,  or  brought. in  aid  of  the  others,  for  the  be- 
ing of  God,  viz.  the  confent  of  all  nations,  and 
the  univerfal  prevalence  of  that  belief.  I  know 
not  whether  we  mufl  fay  that  this  argument  reds 
alfo  upon  the  principle,  that  nothing  can  exi6l 
without  a  caufe,  or  upon  the  plan  juil  now  men- 
tioned. If  it  is  an  univerfal  dictate  of  our  nature,, 
ive  mufl  take  it  as  true  immediately,  without  fur^ 
ther  examination. 

An  autlior  I  formerly  mentioned  has  fet  this  ar- 
gument in  a  peculiar  light,  (Dr  \Vilfon  of  New- 
caftle).  He  fajs  that  we  receive  all  om*  know- 
ledge, as  philofophers  admit,  by  fenfation  and  re- 
flexion. Now,  from  all  that  we  fee,  and  ail  the 
reflection  and  abftra£tion  upon  it  we  are  capaple  of,, 
he  afnrms  it  is  impofllble  we  could  ever  form  the 
idea  of  a  fpii'it  or  a  future  ftate.  JThey  have^ 
however,  been  early  and  univerfal,   and  therefore. 


4^  LECTURES  ON  Lect.  6. 

muft  have  been  communicated  at  firft,  and  handed 
down  by  information  and  inftru6lion  from  age  to 
age.  So  that,  unlefs  upon  the  fuppofition  of  the 
exiftence  of  God,  and  his  imparting  the  knowledge 
of  himfelf  to  men,  it  is  impolTible  that  any  idea  of 
him  could  ever  have  entered  into  the  human  mind. 
There  is  fomething  ingenious,  and  a  good  deal  of 
probability,  in  this  way  of  reafoning. 

As  to  the  nature-  of  God,  the  firft  thing  to  be 
obferved  is,  the  unity  of  God.  This  is  fufficiently 
eftabliflied  upon  the  reafonings  both  a  priori  and 
posteriori.  If  thefe  reafonings  are  jufl  for  the  be- 
ing of  God,  they  are  flriftly  conclulive  for  the 
unity  of  God.  There  is  a  necefiity  for  the  exift- 
ence of  one  Supreme  Being,  the  fIrft  caufe,  but 
no  necefiity  for  mere  ;  nay,  one  fupreme  indepen- 
dent Being  does  not  admit  any  more.  And  when 
we  view  the  harmony,  order,  and  unity  of  deiign, 
in  the  created  fyftem,  we  muft  be  led  to  the  belief 
of  the  unity  of  God. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  thought  an  objeflion  to  thi  , 
(efpecially  if  we  lay  any  ftrefs  on  the  univerfal 
fentiments  of  mankind),  that  all  nations  have  been 
fo  prone  to  the  belief  and  worfnip  of  a  pliurality  of 
gods.  But  this  argument  is  rather  fpecious  than 
folid  ;  as,  however  prone  men  were  to  worfhip  local 
inferior  deities,  they  feem  to  have  confidered  them 
only  as  intermediate  divinities  and  interceflbrs  be- 
tween them  and  the  Supreme  God. 

The  perfections  of  God  may  be  divided  into 
two  kinds,  Natural  and  Moral. 

I.  The  natural  perfeftions  of  God  are  fpirituali- 
ty,  immenfity,  wifdom,  and  power. 


Led.  6.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  49 

We  call  thefe  natural  perfections,  becaufe  they 
can  be  eauij  diitiiiguiilied,  and  in  idea  at  lead  le- 
parated,  from  goodnefs  of  dilpoiiiion.  It  is  highly 
probable,  indeed,  that  fupreme  excellence,  natural, 
and  moral,  muil  always  reflde  in  the  fame  fubjecl, 
and  are  truly  infeparable  :  yet  we  diftinguiih  thern^ 
not  only  becaufe  tlie  ideas  are  diflincl,  but  becaufe 
*hey  are  by  no  means  in  proportion  to  one  another 
in  inferior  natures.  Great  powers  of  mind  and 
perfection  of  body  are  often  joined  to  malignity  of 
difpofition.  It  is  not  fo,  however,  in  God  ;  for  as; 
Ills  natural  perfections  are  founded  on  reafcn,  fo 
liis  moral  excellence  is  evidently  founded  in  the 
moral  fenfe,  or  conicience,  which  he  hath  implanted 
in  us. 

Spirituality  is  what  we  may  call  the  -jcry  nature 
of  God.  It  mull  be  admitted  that  we  cannot  at 
)refent  form  any  complete  or  adequate  idea  of  a 
rpirit.  And  iome,  as  you  have  heard  formerly, 
^nlifl  that  without  revelation  we  could  never  have 
acquired  the  idea  of  it  that  we  have.  Yet  there 
are  many  who  have  reafoned  in  a  very  ftrong  and 
ieemingly  canclufive  manner,  to  ihew  that  mind  or 
intelligence  mull  be  a  fubilance  altogether  diHincl 
from  matter.  That  all  the  known  properties  of 
matter  are  incapable  of  producing  thought,  as  be- 
ing wholly  of  a  different  kind — that  maner  as  fuch^ 
and  univerfally,  is  inert  and  divinble  ;  thought  or 
intelligence,  active  and  uncompounded.  See  the 
bell  reafoning  on  this  fubjecl  in  Baxter's  Immate-r 
liality  of  the  Soul. 

ImmenHty  in  the  Divine  Being  is  that  by  whicb 
Kc  is  everv  vrhere,   and  equally  prefent..     Meta-- 


50  LECTURES  ON  Le^l.  6. 

phjficians,  however,  differ  greatly  upon  this  fub- 
jecl.  The  Cartefians  will  not  admit  that  place  is 
at  all  applicable  to  fpirits.  They  fay  it  is  an  idea 
wholly  arifing  from  extenfion,  which  is  one  of  the 
peculiar  and  eficntial  qualities  of  matter.  The 
Newtonians,  however,  who  make  fo  much  ufe  of 
the  idea  of  infinite  fpace,  confider  place  as  eflential 
to  all  fubftance,  fpirit  as  well  as  matter.  The  dif- 
ficulties are  great  on  both  fides.  It  is  hard  to  con- 
ceive of  fpirit  at  all,  feparating  from  it  the  qualities 
«f  matter  ;  and  after  we  have  attempted  to  do  fo, 
it  feems  to  be  bringing  them  back  to  talk  of  place. 
And  yet  it  feems  not  only  hard,  but  impoflible,  to 
conceive  of  any  real  being  without  fuppofing  it  in 
fome  place,  and  particularly  upon  the  immenfity 
of  the  Deity.  It  feems  to  be  putting  created  fpi- 
rits too  much  on  a  level  with  the  infinite  Spirit 
to  deny  his  immenfity.  It  is,  I  think,  certain, 
they  are  either  confined  to  a  place,  or  fo  li- 
mited in  their  operations,  as  is  no  way  fo  well 
exprefled  as  by  faying.  We  are  here,  and  no  where 
elfe.  And  in  this  fenfe  both  parties  muft  admit  the 
divine  immenfity — that  his  agency  is  equal,  uni- 
verfal,  and  irrefiftible. 

Wifdom  is  another  natural  attribute  of  God,  im^ 
plying  infinite  knowledge — that  all  things,  in  all 
their  relations,  all  things  exifting,  and  all  things 
polTible,  are  the  objects  of  the  divine  knowledge, 
Wifdom  is  ufually  confidered  as  refpe<^ing  fome 
end  to  be  attained  ;  and  it  implies  the  clear  difco- 
very  of  the  befl  and  moR  effedlual  means  of  at- 
taining it. 


heSi.  6.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  5I 

Power  is  the  being  able  to  do  all  things,  without 
limit  or  reftraint.  The  omnipotence  of  God  is  al- 
ways conlidered  as  an  eflential  perfection,  and 
feems  to  arife  immediately  from  creation  and  pro- 
vidence. It  is  common  to  fay  that  God  can  do  all 
things  except  fuch  as  imply  a  contradiction,  fuch 
as  to  make  a  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  at  the  fame 
time  ;  but  this  is  unnecefTary  and  foolifh  in  the 
way  of  an  exception,  for  fuch  things  are  not  the 
objects  of  power  at  all.  They  are  mere  abfurdities 
in  our  conception,  and  indeed  we  may  fay,  of  our 
own  creation.  All  things  are  poffible  with  God, 
nothing  can  withlland  his  power. 


LECTURE  VII. 

THE  moral  perfections  of  God  are,  holinefs^ 
juftice,  truth,  goodnefs,  and  mercy. 
Holinefs  is  fometimes  taken  in  a  general  and 
eomprehenlive  fenfe,  as  being  the  aggregate,  im- 
plying the  prefence  of  all  moral  excellence  ;  yet  it 
is  fometimes  ufed,  and  that  both  in  the  fcrip- 
ture-revelation  and  by  heathen  writers,  as  a  peculiar 
attribute.  In  this  Mmited  fenfe  it  is  extremely  dif- 
ficult to  define  or  explain.  Holinefs  is  that  charac- 
ter of  God  to  which  veneration,  or  the  moft  pro- 
found reverence  in  us,  is  the  correfpondent  affec- 
tion. It  is  fometimes  alfo  expreifed  by  purity  ; 
and  when  we  go  to  form  an  idea  of  it,  perhaps  we 
can  fcarce  fay  any  thing  better,  than  that  it  is  his 
being  removed  at  an  infinite  dillance  from  the 
groffelt  of  material  indulgence. 


52  LECTURES  ON  Lecl.  7^ 

Juftlce  is  an  invariable  determination  to  render 
to  all  their  due.  Juilice  feems  to  be  founded  on 
the  (Irong  and  unalterable  perception  we  have  of 
riglit  and  wrong,  good  and  evil,  and  particularly 
that  the  one  deferves  reward,  and  the  other  pu- 
nifhment.  The  internal  fandlion,  or  the  exter- 
nal and  providential  fanflion  of  natural  laws,, 
point  out  the  juftice  of  God.  The  chief  thing 
that  merits  attention  upon  this  fubjcd  is,  the  con- 
troverfj  about  what  is  called  the  vindictive  juftice 
of  God  :  That  is  to  faj,  is  there  in  God,  or  have 
we  a  natural  fenfe  of  the  propriety  of,  a  difpoiition 
to  in{li£l  puniihment,  independently  of  the  confe- 
quences,  viz.  the  reformation  of  the  offender,  or 
the  example  of  others.  This  loofe  moralills  often- 
declaim  againft.  Yet  it  feems  plain,  that  the  fenfe 
in  our  minds  of  good  and  ill  defert,  makes  guilt 
the  proper  objed  of  punifhment  limply  in  itfelf. 
This  may  have  a  relation  to  general  order  and  the 
good  of  the  whole,  which  however  is  out  of  our 
reach. 

Tfie  truth  of  God  is  one  of  his  perfections, 
greatly  infilled  upon  in  fcripture,  and  an  elTential 
part  of  natural  religion.  It  is  infeparable  from  in- 
finite perfection ;  for  any  departure  from  truth 
mull  be  confidered  as  arifing  from  weaknefs  or  ne- 
celTity.  What  end  could  be  fer^^ed  to  a  felf-fuffi- 
cient  and  all-fufficient  Being  by  falfehood  or  de-- 
ception  ? 

Goodnefs  in  God  is  a  difpofition  to  communicate 
happinefs  to  others.  This  is  eafily  underftood. 
The  creation  is  a  proof  of  it.     Natural  and  moral. 


Ledl.  7.  MORAL  FHrLOSOPHY.  53 

evil  is  no  juft  objedlion  to  it,  becaufe  of  the  pre- 
ponderance of  happinefs. 

Mercy,  as  diftinguifhed  from  goodnefs  or  benig- 
nity, is  his  being  of  a  placable  nature  ;  ready  to 
forgive  the  guilty,  or  to  remit  defer\^ed  punifh- 
ment.  It  has  been  difputed,  how  far  mercy  or 
placability  is  difcoverable  by  reafon.  It  is  not 
mercy  or  forgivenefs,  unlefs  it  would  have  been 
juft  -at  the  fame  time  to  have  puniihed.  There  are 
but  two  ways  by  which  men  from  reafon  may  in- 
fer the  attribute  of  mercy  to  belong  to  the  Deity. 
I.  Becaufe  we  ourielves  are  fenlible  of  this  dilpo- 
fition,  and  fee  in  it  a  peculiar  beauty.  2.  From 
the  forbearance  of  Providence,  that  finners  are  not 
immediately  overtaken  with  punifliment,  but  have 
fpace  given  them  to  repent.  Yet  as  all  the  con- 
clulions  drawn  from  thefe  principles  muft  be  vague 
and  general,  the  expectations  of  the  guilty  founded 
upon  them  muft  be  very  uncertain.  We  mufl 
conclude,  therefore,  that  however  ftable  a  founda- 
tion there  is  for  the  other  attributes  of  God  in  na- 
ture and  reafon,  the  way  in  which,  and  the  terms 
on  which,  he  will  fhew  mercy,  can  be  learned 
from  revelation  only. 

Having  conndered  the  being  and  perfections  of 
God,  we  proceed  to  our  duty  to  him. 

This  may  be  conlidercd  in  two  views,  as  gene- 
ral and  fpecial.  j .  By  the  firil  I  underftand  our 
duty  to  obey  liim,  and  fubmit  to  him  in  all  things. 
This  you  fee  includes  every  branch  of  moral  duty 
to  our  neighbour  and  ourielves,  as  well  as  to  God, 
and  fo  the  particular  parts  of  it  will  be  confidered 
afterwards.     But  in  this  place,  coniidering  every 


54  LECTURES  ON  Led.  7. 

good  aftion  as  an  a-fl  of  obedience  to  God,  we 
will  a  little  attend  to  the  divine  foYereigntj,  and  the 
foundation  of  it. 

In  fpeaking  of  the  foundation  of  virtue,  I  took 
in  a  fenfe  of  dependance  and  fubje£lion  to  God. 
But  as  men  are  not  to  be  deterred  from  bold  in- 
quiries, a  further  queflion  is  raifed  by  feme. 
What  is  properlj  the  foundation  of  lihe  divine  do- 
minion? I.  Some  found  it  dire£lly  upon  Omni- 
potence. It  is  impoffible  to  reiilt  his  power.  This 
feems  to  lay  us  under  a  neceffity,  rather  than  to 
convince  us  of  duty.  -We  ought,  however,  to  think 
and  fpeak  of  this  fubject  with  reverence,  and  cer- 
tainly Omnipotence  feems  to  oblige  us  to  a£tual,  if 
it  Ihould  not  bring  us  to  willing  obedience.  It  is 
fomewhat  remarkable,  that  in  the  book  of  Job, 
compofed  on  purpofe  to  refolve  fome  difficulties  in 
providence,  where  God  is  brought  in  as  fpeaking 
himfelf  out  of  the  whirlwind,  he  makes  ufe  of  no 
other  argument  than  his  tremendous  majelly  and 
irreliftible  powder.  Yet  to  reft  the  matter  wholly 
upon  this,  feems  much  the  fame  as  founding  virtue 
on  mere  will.  Therefore,  a.  Some  found  the  di- 
vine dominion  on  his  infinite  excellence  ;  they  fay 
it  is  the  law  of  reafon  that  tlie  wifefl  iliould  rule, 
and  therefore  that  infmite  perfection  is  entitled  to 
univerfal  fway.  Even  this,  taken  feparate  and 
alone,  does  not  feem  wholly  to  fatisfy  the  mind. 
If  one  perfon  is  wifer  than  another,  it  feems  reafon- 
able  that  the  other  Ihould  learn  of  him,  and  imitate 
him ;  but  it  fcarcely  feems  a  fufficient  reafon  that 
the  fu-ft  fhould  have  abfolute  authority.  But  per- 
haps the  weaknefs  of  the  argument,  taken  in  this 


LeS:.  7.  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY.  55 

\4e\v,  may  arife  from  the  inconiiderable  difference 
bet^veen  raan  and  man,  when  compared  to -the  fu- 
periority  of  iiniverfal  and  unchangeable  perfection. 
3.  Some  found  it  upon  creation.  They  faj  that 
God  has  an  abfolute  property  in  all  his  creatures  ; 
he  maj  therefore  do  what  he  will  with  his  own. 
This,  no  doubt,  goes  a  good  w^ay,  and  carries  con- 
fiderable  force  with  it  to  the  mind,  the  rather  that, 
as  vou  will  afterguards  fee,  it  is  fomething  fimilar 
to  this  in  us  that  lays  the  foundation  of  our  moft 
perfefl  rights,  \az.  that  the  product  of  our  own 
induftry  is  properly  at  our  own  difpofal. 

As  upon  the  foundation  of  virtue  I  thought  it 
necefiary  to  unite  the  principles  of  dilTerent  "'.vriters, 
fo  upon  this  fubje6l  I  think  that  all  the  three  par- 
ticulars mentioned  ought  to  be  admitted,  as  the 
grounds  of  the  divine  dominion.  Omnipotence, 
infinite  excellence,  and  the  original  production  and 
continual  prefer^'ation  of  all  creatures. 

2.  Oiu"  duty  to  God  may  be  confidered  more 
fpecially,  as  it  points  out  the  duties  we  ov/e  imme- 
diately to  liimfelf. 

Thefe  may  be  di^^ded  into  internal  and  exter- 
nal. I.  The  internal  are  all  included  under  the 
three  following,  love,  fear,  and  tnift. 

The  love  of  God,  which  is  the  firil  and  great 
duty  both  of  natural  and  revealed  religion,  may  be 
explained  in  a  larger  and  more  popular,  or  in  a 
more  precife  and  ftricler  way. 

In  the  firft,  love  may  be  refolved  into  ihc  four 
folloAving  afts,  (i.)  Efteem,  (2.)  Gratitude,  (3.) 
Benevolence,  (4.)  Defire. 


S^  LECTURES  ON  Led.  7. 

Thefe  four  will  be  found  infeparable  from  true 
love ;  and  it  is  pretty  much  in  the  fame  order 
that  the  a6ts  fucceed  one  another.  Love  is  founded 
on  efteem,  on  the  real  or  fuppofed  good  qualities 
of  the  objeft.  You  can  no  more  love  that  which 
you  defpife,  than  that  which  jou  hate.  Gratitude 
is  alfo  infeparable  from  it,  to  have  a  lively  fenfe 
of  favours  received,  and  to  efteem  them  for  the 
fake  of  the  perfon  from  whom  they  came.  Bene- 
volence, or  rejoicing  in  the  happinefs  and  wiftiing 
well  to  the  objeft.  And,  laftly,  a  defire  of  a  place 
in  his  efteem.  Whatever  we  love  we  defire  to 
poflefs,  as  far  as  it  is  fuited  to  our  faculties. 

The  ftricler  and  more  precife  method  of  confi- 
dering  the  love  of  God,  is  to  divide  it  into  two 
branches,  benevolence,  and  defire.  And  indeed 
our  afFeftions  to  God  feem  to  be  capable  of  the 
fame  divifion  as  our  affeftions  to  om*  fellow-crea- 
tures, benevolent  and  felfiQi.  I  think  it  unde- 
niable that  there  is  a  difinterefted  love  of  God, 
which  terminates  direftly  upon  himfelf,  without 
any  immediate  ^aew  to  our  own  happinefs,  as  well 
as  a  difcovery  of  our  great  intereft  in  his  favour. 

The  fecond  great  duty  to  God,  is  fear  ;  but  here 
we  muft  carefully  diftinguifti  this  affeftion  from 
one  which  bears  the  name,  and  is  difterent  from  it, 
at  leaft  in  a  moral  view  it  is  altogether  oppofite. 
Dutiful  fear  is  what  may  be  otherwife  called  vene- 
ration, and  hath  for  its  objeft  the  infinity  of  the 
divine  perfe^lion  in  general,  but  particularly  his 
majefty  and  greatnefs.  The  other  is  merely  a  fear 
of  evil  or  punifliment  from  him  :  thefe  are  called 
fometimes  a  filial  and  fervile  fear.     The  firft  in- 


Led.  7.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  37 

creafes,  as  men  improve  in  moral  excellence,  and 
the  other  is  deftroyed.  Perfeft  love  caileth  oiu 
fear.  Perhaps,  however  oppofite,  as  thej  have  the 
fame  name,  they  may  be  faid  to  be  the  fame  na- 
tural aiFedion,  only  as  it  takes  place  in  innocent  or 
holy,  and  in  guilty  creatures.  The  fame  majefty 
of  God,  which  produces  veneration  in  the  upright, 
produces  horror  and  apprehenfion  of  punifhment  in 
the  guilty. 

The  third  great  duty  is  tnift.  This  is  a  conti- 
nual dependence  on  God  for  every  thing  we  need, 
together  with  an  approbation  of  and  abfolute  re- 
fignation  to  his  providence. 

2.  The  external  duties  to  God,  I  fhall  briefly  pafs 
oyer,  being  only,  all  proper  and  natural  expreflions 
of  the  internal  fentiments. 

It  may  be  proper,  however,  to  take  notice  in  ge- 
neral of  the  worfhip  due  to  God,  that  whether  we 
coufider  the  nature  of  things,  or  the  univerfal  prac- 
tice of  mankind,  in  all  ages,  worfhip,  and  that  not 
only  private,  but  public  and  fecial  worfhip,  is  a  duty 
of  natural  religion. 

Some  ^f  the  enemies  of  revealed  religion,  have 
fpoken  with  great  virulence  againfl  this,  as  unrea-< 
fonable,  and  even  dilhouourable  to  the  Divine  Be- 
ing. The  fubftance  of  what  they  fay  is  this,  that 
as  it  would  be  no  part  of  the  character  of  an  emi- 
nent and  good  man,  to  defire  and  take  pleafure  in 
others  praiflng  him  and  recounting  his  good  quali- 
ties, fo  it  is  abfurd  to  fuppofe,  that  the  Supreme 
Being  is  pleafed  with  incenfe,  facrifices,  and  praif.s. 
But  it  ought  to  be  obfer^red,  that  he  does  not  require 
thefe  act?  and  exercifes  as  any  gi-atirication  to  him- 

VoL.VII.  F 


5^  LECTURKS  ON  Le£l.  7. 

felf,  but  ns   in  themfelves  jufl   and  neceflary,  and 
fiiitcd  to  the  relation  wc  Hand  in  to  him,  and  ufeful 
for  forming  our  temper  and  univerfal  praftice.    We 
ought  alfo  to  remember,  that  we  muft  not  immedi- 
ately and  without  difcrimination,  reafon  from  what 
would  be  praife  and  blame-worthy  among  men,  to 
what   would  be  juft  or  unjufl  in  God,  becaufe  the 
circumftances  are  very  different.     Befides,  though 
for  any  man  to  delire  the  applaufc   of  his  fellow- 
creatures,  or  be  plcafed  with  adulation,  would  be  a 
mean  and  contemptible  character,  becaufe  indeed 
there  is  fuch  unfpeakable  imperfeftion  in  the  bell 
of  men  ;  yet  when  any  duty  or  fentiment  is   fully 
and  manifeftly  due  from  man  to  man,  there  is  no- 
thing improper   or  difhonourable  in  requiring   or 
expedling  it.     Thus  a  parent  requires  refpe£l:  and 
fubmiflion  from  his   chi.Mren,  a   mafter   from  his 
fervants  ;  and  though  the  injury  is  merely  perfonal, 
he  thinks  himfelf  entitled  to  punifh  every  expreffion 
of  contempt  or  difregard.     Again,  every  man  who 
has  bellowed  lignal  favours  upon  another,  experts 
to  fee  evidence  of  a  grateful   and   fenfible  mind, 
and   feverely  condemns  every  fentiment  «r  adlion 
that  indicates  a  contrary  difpoiition. 

On  the  whole,  then,  we  fee,  that  if  the  worlhip  of 
God  be  what  is  due  from  us  to  him,  in  confequence 
of  the  relation  w^e  Hand  in  to  him,  it  is  proper  and 
necelTary  that  he  fliould  require  it.  To  honour  God, 
is  to  honour  fupreme  excellence ;  for  him  not  to 
expeft  and  demand  it,  would  be  to  deny  himfelf. 

One  other  diiEculty  I  fnall  touch  upon  a  little. 
It  refpefts  the  duty  of  prayer ;  and  the  obje6lions 
lie   equally  againll  it  on  the  footing  of  natural  re- 


Lecl.  7.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.    ^  59 

ligion  and  revealed.  The  objeclions  are  tv/o* 
I.  Why  does  God,  who  perfedlj  knows  all  our 
v^ants,  require  and  expedl  prayer  before  he  will 
fiipply  them  ?•  To  this  I  would  anfwer,  that  he 
fupplics  great  multitudes  of  our  wants  without  our 
alldng  it ;  and  as  to  his  requiring  the  duty  of 
prayer,  I  fay  the  fame  thing  as  of  worfhip  in 
general ;.  it  is  reafonable  and  neceffary  10  cxprefs, 
and  to  increafe  upon  our  minds,  a  fcnfe  of  depend- 
ence, and  thereby  lay  us  under  an  obligarion  of 
properly  improving  what  we  receive.  2.  The 
oiher  obligation  is  with  regard  to  the  force  or  efli- 
cacy  of  prayer.  Why,  it  is  faid,  Ihould  we  pray, 
when  the  whole  fyflem  of  divine  providence  is 
fixed  and  unalterable  ?  Can  we  poflibly  fuppofe 
that  God  will  change  his  purpofes,  from  a  regard 
to  our  cries  or  t€ars  ?  To  this  fome  anfwer  no 
otherwife  than  as  before,  that  without  having  any 
effect  upon  the  event,  it  has  only  an  effect  upon 
our  minds,  in  bringing  us  to  a  right  temper.  Dr 
Leechman  of  Glafgow,  in  his  difcourfe  on  prayer, 
makes  no  other  anfwer  to  this .  difficulty.  But  I 
lliink  to  reft  it  here,  and  admit  that  it  has  no  iij- 
fiuence  in  the  way  of  cafualty  upon  the  event, 
would  ift  a  great  meafure  break  the  force  and  fer- 
vency of  prayer.  I  would  therefore  fay  further, 
that  prayer  has  a  real  efficacy  on  the  event,  and 
juft  as  much  as  any  other  fecond  caufc.  The  ob- 
jeftion  arifes  from  going  beyond  our  depth,  and 
reafoning  from  the  unchangeable  purpofc  of  God 
to  human  anions,  which  is  always  unjuft  and  fal- 
lacious. However  unable  we  may  be  to  explain 
it^  notwitliftanding  the  fixed  plan  of  providence, 
F  z 


6o  LECTURES  ON  Le^l.  7. 

there  is  a  real  influence  of  fecond  caufes,  both  na- 
tural and  moral,  and  I  apprehend  the  connection 
between  caufe  and  efFe£t  is  fimilar  in  both  cafes. 
If  it  is  fixed  from  eternity  that  there  fhall  be  a 
plentiful  crop  upon  a  certain  field,  I  know  that 
nothing  whatfoever  can  prevent  it,  if  otherwife,  the 
efforts  of  the  whole  creation  cannot  produce  it ;  yet 
I  know  as  certainly  that,  hypothetically,  if  it  is 
not  ploughed  and  fown,  there  will  be  no  grain  upon 
it,  and  that  if  it  be  properly  manured  and  drefied, 
it  w411  probably  be  fruitful.  Thus,  in  moral  mat- 
ters, prayer  has  as  real  an  influence  in  procuring 
the  bleffing,  as  ploughing  and  fowung  lias  in  pro- 
curing the  crop  ;  and  it  is  as  confiftent  with  the 
eftablilhed  order  of  nature  and  the  certainty  of 
events  in  the  one  cafe,  as  in  the  other  :  for  this  rea- 
fon  the  Stoical  fate  of  old  was  called  the  ignava 
ratio  of  the  Stoics,  as  they  fometimes  made  ufe  of 
the  above  fallacious  reafoning. 


LECTURE  VIII. 

WE  come  now  to  our  duty  to  mart.  This 
may  be  reduced  to  a  Ihort  fum,  by  a- 
fcending  to  its  principle.  Love  to  others,  fmcere 
and  a6live,  is  the  fum  of  our  duty. 

Benevolence,  I  formerly  obferved,  ought  not  to 
be  confidered  as  the  whole  of  virtue,  but  it  certain- 
ly      the  principle  and  fum  of  that  branch  of  duty 
which  regards  others. 
We  may  diftinguifli  between,  (i.)  particular  kind 


Ltd:.  8.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  6l 

affe£lions,  and,  (2.)  a  calm  and. deliberate  good-will 
to  all.  The  panic ular  kind  afTeiiions,  as  to  family, 
friends,  .country,  leem  to  be  implanted  by  nature, 
to  llrengtlien  the  general  principle,  for  it  is  only 
or  chiefly  by  doing  good  to  thofe  we  are  particu- 
larly related  to,  that  we  can  promote  the  general 
happineis. 

Particular  kind  affeclions  fliould  be  retrained 
and  direded  by  a  calm  good-will  to  all.  Where- 
ever  our  attachments  to  private  perfons  prevent 
a  greater  good,  they  become  irregular  and  ex- 
ec llive. 

Some  tliink  that  a  calm  and  fettled  good-will  to 
others,  is  an  improvement  of  the  particular  affec- 
tions, and  ai'ifes  from  the  more  narrow  to  the  more 
exterxiive  ;  from  family,  friends,  country,  to  all 
our  fellow-creatures.  But  it  feems  more  reafon- 
able  to  fay,  that  the  geneial  afle£lion  is  a  didtatc 
of  our  confcience>)of  a  fuperior  kind.  If  it  were 
only  an  increafe  and  extenlion  of  private  afFedion, 
it  would  grow  more  weak,  as  the  diftance  from 
ourfelves  increafed,  whereas  in  fud  the  more  en- 
larged affeclions  are  intended  to  be  more  powerful 
than  the  confined. 

When  we  are  fpeaking  of  kind  aftedlons,  it  will 
not  be  improper  10  obfer^^e  that  fome  unbelievers 
have  obje6bed  againfl  the  gofpel,  that  it  does  not 
recommend  private  friendiliip  and  the  love  of  our 
country.  But  if  fairly  conlidered,  as  the  fcriptarc, 
both  by  example  and  precept,  recommends  all  par- 
ticular a{Fe£lions,  fo  it  is  to  its  honour,  that  it  fets 
the  love  of  mankind  above  them  every  one,  and  by 
fo  much  infilling  on  the  forgivencfs  of  injuries  and 
^3    ' 


6a  LECTURES  ON  Led:.  8. 

the  love  of  enemies,  it  has  carried  benevolence  to 
the  greateft  perfcftion.  The  parable  of  the  Sa- 
maritan, in  anfwer  to  the  quellion.  Who  is  my 
neighbour  ?  is  one  of  the  greatefl  beauties  in  moral 
painting  any  where  to  be  feen. 

The  love  of  our  country,  to  be  fure,  is  a  noble 
and  enlarged  afFedion  ;  and  thofe  who  have  facri- 
ficed  private  eafe  and  family-relations  to  it,  have 
become  illuflrious  ;  yet  the  lo^-e  of  mankind  is 
flill  greatly  fuperior.  Sometimes  attachment  to 
country  appears  in  a  littlenefs  of  mind,  thinking 
all  other  nations  inferior,  and  fooliOily  believing 
that  knowledge,  virtue,  and  valour  are  all  confined 
to  themfelves.  As  the  Romans  long  ago  made  the 
Piimcajides  to  mean  deceit,,  fo  there  are  not  want- 
ing among  us  thofe  who  think  that  all  the  French 
are  interefted,  treacherous,  and  cowardly. 

On  the  great  kw  of  Ibve  to  others,  I  fliall  only 
fay  further,  that  it  ought  to  have  for  its  objedl  their 
greateft  and  beft  intereft,  and  therefore  implies 
wiftiing  and  doing  them  good  in  foul  and  body. 

It  is  neceffary  now  to  defcend  to  the  application 
of  this  principle  to  particular  duties,  and.  to  exa- 
mine what  are  the  rights  or  claims  that  one  man 
has  upon  another..  Rights  and  obligations  are  cor- 
relative terms..  Whatever  others  have  a  juft  right 
or  title  to  claim  from  me,,  that  is  my  duty,  or  what 
I  am  obliged  to  do  to  them. 

Right  in  general  may  be  reduced,  as  to  its 
fource,  to  the  fupreme  law  of  moral  duty  ;  for 
whatever  men  are  in  duty  obliged  to  do,  that  they 
have  a  claim  to,  and  other  men  are  confidered  as 
under  an  obligation  to  permit  tliem.     Again,   r.r 


LeCt.  8.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  6^ 

our  own  happinefs  is  a  lawful  objed  or  end,  we  are 
fuppofed  to  have  each  a  right  to  profecute  this  ; 
but  as  our  profecution  may  interfere,  we  limit  each 
others  rights,  and  a  man  is  faid  to  have  a  right  or 
power  to  promote  his  own  happinefs  only  by  thofe 
means  which  are  not  in  themfelves  criminal  or  in- 
jurious to  others. 

Rights  may  be  divided  or  clafled  in  feveral  diffe- 
rent ways  ;  an  attention  to  all  of  which  is  of  ufe 
on  this  fubje6L.     Rights  may  be, 

(i.)  Natural  or  acquired.  Natural  rights  are 
fuch  as  are  effential  to  man,  and  univerfal ; — ac- 
quired are  thofe  that  are  the  fruits  of  induftry,  the 
effefts  of  accident  or  conqueft.  A  man  has  a  na- 
tural right  to  a£l  for  his  own  prefervation,  and  to 
defend  himfelf  from  injury,  but  not  a  natural  right 
to  domineer,  to  riches,  (comparatively  fpeaking) 
or  to  any  particular  office  in  a  conftituted  ftate. 

(2.)  Rights  are  confidered  as  perfeft  and  im- 
perfeft.  Thofe  are  called  perfect  rights  which 
can  be  clearly  afcertained  in  their  circumflances, 
and  which  we  may  make  ufe  of  force  to  obtain 
when  they  are  denied  us.  Imperfe£i:  rights  are 
fuch  as  we  may  demand,  and  others  ought  to  give 
us,  yet  we  have  no  title  to  compel  them.  Self- 
prefervation  is  a  perfect  right,  but  to  have  a  grate- 
ful return  for  a  favour  is  not  a  perfect  right. 

All  the  duties  of  juftice  are  founded  on  the  per- 
fed  rights  j  thofe  of  mercy  generally  on  the  imper- 
feft  rights. 

The  violation  of  an  imperfe£b  right  is  often  as 
great  an  a6l  of  immorality  as  that  of  a  perfect 
light.     It  is  often  as  immoral,  or  more  fo,.  to  refufe 


64  LECTURES  ON  Left.  8. 

to  fupplj  the  neccflitous,  or  to  do  it  too  fparmgly,- 
as  to  commit  a  fmall  injury  againft  a  man's  perfon 
or  fortune.  Yet  the  lall  is  the  breach  of  a  perfeft 
right,  and  the  other  of  an  imperfect. 

Human  laws  reach  only,  in  ordinary  cafes,  to  the 
perfeft  rights.  Sometimes  imperfe£l  rights,  by  be- 
ing carried  far,  become  perfect,  as  humanity  and 
gentlenefs  in  a  parent  to  a  child  may  be  fo  grofsly 
violated  as  to  warrant  the  interpoHtion  of  human 
•authority.  ' 

(3.)  Rights  are  alienable  and  unalienable.  The 
firfl  we  may,  according  to  juftice  and  prudence, 
furrender  or  give  up  by  oar  own  a(El  ;  the  others 
v/e  may  not.  A  man  may  give  away  his  own 
goods,  lands,  money.  There  are  feveral  things 
which  he  cannot  give  away,  as  a  right  over  his 
own  knowledge,  thoughts,  &:c.  Others,  which  he 
ought  not,  as  a  right  to  judgp  for  himfelf  in  all  mat- 
ters of  religion,  his  right  of  felf-prefer\^ation,  pro- 
viiion,  &c.  Some  fay  that  liberty  is  unalienable, 
und  that  thofe  who  have  even  given  it  away  m.ay 
lawfully  refume  it. 

The  diflinftion  between  rights  as  alienable  and 
unalienable  is  very  different  from  that  of  natural 
and  acquired.  Many  of  the  rights  which  are 
ilriftly  natural  and  univerfal,  may  be  alienated  in 
a  ftate  of  fociety  for  the  good  of  the  whole,  as  well 
as  of  private  perfons  ;  as  for  example,  the  right 
of  felf-defence  ;  this  is  in  a  great  meafure  given 
up  in  a  flate  of  civil  government  into  the  hands  of 
the  public,  and  the  right  of  doing  juftice  to  our- 
felves  or  to  others  in  matter  of  property,  is  wholly 
given  up. 


Lecl.  8.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHT.  6$ 

(4.)  Rights  may  be  confidered  as  they  differ 
with  regard  to  their  obje^l.  i.  Rights  we  have 
over  our  own  perions  and  aftions.  This  clafs  is 
called  liberty.  2.  Rights  over  things  or  goods 
which  belong  to  us.  This  is  called  property.  3. 
Rights  over  the  perfons  and  adions  of  other  men. 
This  is  called  authority.  4.  Rights  in  the  things 
which  are  the  property  of  others,  which  are  of  fe- 
veral  forts. 

When  we  come  to  the  fecond  great  diviiion  of 
moral  philofophy,  politics,  the  above  diftinftions 
will  be  more  fully  explained  ;  at  prefent  it  is  fuf- 
ficient  to  point  at  them  in  order,  to  {hew  what  are 
the  great  lines  of  duty  from  man  to  man. 

Our  duty  to  others,  therefore,  may  be  all  com- 
prehended in  thefe  two  particulars,  jullice  and 
mercy. 

Juflice  confift»  in  giving  or  permitting  others  to 
enjoy  whatever  they  have  a  perfect  right  to,  and 
making  fuch  an  ufe  of  our  own  rights  as  not  to  en- 
croach upon  the  rights  of  others.  There  is  one 
writer,  David  Hume,  who  has  derided  the  duty 
of  juftice,  refohnng  it  wholly  into  power  and  con- 
veniency  ;  and  has  affirmed  that  property  is  com- 
mon, than  which  nothing  can  be  more  contrary  to 
reafon ;  for  if  there  is  any  thing  clear  as  a  dictate 
of  reafon,  it  is,  that  there  are  many  rights  which 
men  feverally  pofTefs,  w^hich  others  ought  not  to 
\-iolate.  The  foundation  of  property  in  goods,  I 
wiU  afterwards  fhew  you,  is  plainly  laid  in  the  fo- 
ciai  ft  ate. 

Ar other  virtue  which  this  author  ridicules  is 
chaftity.     This,  however,  will  be  found  to  be  iu. 


66  LECTURES  ON  Le(fl.  8. 

eluded  in  juftice,  and  tcrbe  found  in  the  fentiments 
of  all  nations,  and  to  have  the  clearell  foundation 
hath  in  nature  and  public  utility. 

Mercy  is  the-  other  great  branch  of  our  duty  to 
man,  and  is  the  exercife  of  the  benevolent  prin- 
ciple in  general,  and  of  the  feveral  particular  kind 
aifecbions.  Its  acts,  generally  fpeaking,  belong  to 
the  clafs  of  imperfect  •  rights,  which  are  ftrongly 
binding  upon  the  confcience,  and  abfolutely  nccef- 
fary  to  the  fubiiftence  of  human  fociety  ;  yet  fuch 
as  cannot  be  enforced  with  rigour  and  precifion  by 
human  law^s. 

Mercy  may  be  generally  explained  by  a  readi- 
nefs  to  do  all  the  good  offices  to  others  that  they 
Hand  in  need  of,  and  are  in  our  power,  unlefs  they 
are  oppofed  to  fome  perfect  right,  or  an  imperfed^ 
one  of  greater  moment. 


LECTURE  IX. 

THE  third  clafs  of  moral  duties  is  what  con- 
tains our  duty  to  ourf valves. 

This  branch  of  duty  is  as  real  and  as  much 
founded  in  the  moral  principle,  as  any  of  the  for- 
mer. Confcience  as  clearly  lefliiies  the  evil  of  ne- 
glefting  it,  and  vicious  condud  in  this  refped  does 
generally  lead  us  diredly  not  only  to  mifery,  but 
to  fliame. 

We  may,  I  think,  divide  our  duties  to  ourfelves 
into  two  heads,  which   will  be  both  dlilind  and 


Led.  8.  MORAL  PHiLosoPHT.  6y 

comprehenfive,     i.   Self-government.      2.  Self-in- 
tereft. 

The  firil  of  thefe  is  to  keep  our  thoughts,  de- 
fires,  and  affeftions,  in  due  moderation.  If  it  be 
alked.  What  is  due  moderation  ?  I  anfwer,  it  may 
be  difcovered  three  ways,  (i.)  When  the  indul- 
gence interferes  with  our  duty  to  God,  (2.)  To 
ourfelves,  and,  (3.)  To  our  neighbour. 

When  our  thoughts  or  defires  are  fuch  as  to  be 
contrary  to  the  love,  fear,  or  truft  we  owe  to  God, 
then  they  are  to  be  reilrained  and  brought  into  fub- 
jeclion — Thus  are  generated  the  virtues  of  htimi- 
lity,  contcntjnenty  patience,  and  fuch  as  are  allied  to 
them. 

When  our  thoughts  and  inward  temper  are  fuch 
as  to  be  any  way  injurious  to  others,  they  muft  be 
governed  and  retrained ;  hence  arifes  the  obliga- 
tion to  guard  againft  all  the  immoral  paffions,  which 
will  produce  meeknefs  and  compofure  of  fpirit. 

And  when  we  have  got  but  a  little  experience, 
we  fball  fpeedily  find  that  an  exceffive  indulgence 
of  any  paflion,  Icve,  hatred,  anger,  fear,  difcom- 
pofes  us  exceedingly,  and  is  an  evil  inftead  of  a 
blefling.  We  fhall  therefore  perceive  the  neceffi- 
ty  of  continence,  felf-denial,  fortitude,  reftraint, 
and  moderation  in  every  thing  how  good  foever. 

2.  The  other  general  branch  of  duty  to  ourfelves 
may  be  called  felf-intereil.  This,  taking  in  natu- 
ral religion,  includes  our  relation  to  tlie  Divine 
Being,  and  attending  particularly  to  that  of  procTU- 
ring  liis  favour.  Therefore  it  is  a  prime  part  of 
our  duty  to  ourfelves,  to   guard   againfl  any  thing 


68  LECTURES  ON  Lecl.  5. 

that  may  be  hurtful  to  our  moral  characler,  or  reli- 
gious hopes. 

2.  We  ought  to  be  acSbive  and  diligent  in  acqui- 
ring every  thing  neceffary  for  life  and  comfort. 
Moll  of  our  duties  to  ourfelves,  refemble  the  du- 
ties of  juftice  and  mercy  to  others.  If  there  are 
certain  offices  due  them,  and  if  they  have  rights 
and  claims  in  confequence  of  their  flate  and  rela- 
tions, the  fame  is  the  cafe  with  ourfelves.  We 
are  therefore  to  take  all  proper  methods  to  preferve 
and  acquire  the  goods  both  of  mind  and  body.  To 
acquire  knowledge,  to  preferve  health,  reputation, 
pofTefTions. 

The  whole  muft  be  kept  within  fome  limits  ; 
chiefly  we  muft  guard  againft  interfering  with  the 
rights  of  others. 

It  will  be  proper,  before  concluding  this  part  of 
the  fubje£l,  to  take  notice  of  the  opinions  of  the 
ancients,  particularly  their  enumeration  of  what  are 
called  the  cardinal  virtues. 

Their  cardinal  virtues  were  justice^  temperance^ 
prudence,  -axidfoj'titude.  Juftice  included  the  whole 
of  our  duty  to  our  neighbour.  Humanity  or  bene- 
volence, you  fee,  is  kept  out  of  view,  though  a  vir- 
tue of  the  firft  clafs  ;  but  all  its  exercifes  are  with 
them  ranked  under  the  heads  of  juftice  ;  tempe- 
rance was  by  them  considered  as  much  more  exten- 
five  than  beinf{  moderate  in  the  ufe  of  meats  and 
drink,  to  which  the  Englilh  word  is  chiefly  con- 
fined. The  Egkrateia  of  the  Greeks,  fignified  not 
only  abflinence  in  meats  and  drink,  but  continence 
or  purity,  and  a  moderation  of  all  our  dcfires  of 
whatever  kind,  of  fame  and  riches,  as  well  as  plea- 


Le£l.  9.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  69 

fares.     Prudence,  even  in  the  way  they  generally 
explain  it,    feems  fcarcely  to  be   a  moral,   or  fo 
much  as  a  natural  quality.     Prudence,  they  fay,  is 
taking  the  wifeft  courfe  to   obtain  fome  good  end. 
The  placing  this   among  the   cardinal  virtues  will 
fliow  how  matters  flood  among  them.     Great  parts 
or  talents  were  in  high  efteem.     They  did  not  very 
fully  diftinguifli  between  a  good  man  and   a  great 
man.     Prudence  feems  rather  an  embellifliment  of 
an  illuftrious  charader,  than  a  moral  virtue.     An- 
other reafon    why   prudence   feems   to   have   held 
fuch  a  place  among  the  ancients  was,  that  their  chief 
foundation  for  virtue  was  interell,  or  what  will  pro- 
duce  happinefs.     The   inquiry   upon    this   fubjedl 
was,   what   is  the  summum  honum.     Now,  to   this 
prudence  is  very  neceffary.     Agreeably  to  all  this, 
they  commonly  called  the  virtuous  man,   the  wise 
7?:an,  and  he  was  always  an  hero. 

Fortitude  is  eafily  underftood,  and  may  be  con- 
fidered  in  two  lights,  as  active  and  pafiive,  which 
gives  the  two  great  virtues  of  patience  and  va- 
lour. 

■  One  of  the  moil  remarkable  qualities  in  morals 
among  the  ancients,  v;as  the  debate  upon  the  Sto- 
ical polition,  That  pain  is  no  evil,  nor  pleafure  any 
good.  This  arifes  from  comparing  external  thmgs 
w^ith  the  temper  of  the  mind,  when  it  appears 
without  doubt,  that  the  latter  is  of  much  more  con- 
fequence  to  happinefs  than  the-  former.  They 
ufed  to  reafon  thus  :  Outward  polTeflions,  "when  be- 
llowed upon  a  bad  man,  make  him  no  better,  but 
worfe,  and  finally  more  miferable.  How,  then,  cr.n 
thefe  be  goods  in  themfelves,  which  become  good 
Vol.  VII.  G 


70  LECTURES  o>5r  Le6l.  9, 

or  evil,  according  to  the  ftate  of  him  that  ufes 
them.  They  were  therefore  called  the  things  in- 
different. There  was  fomething  ftrained  and  ex- 
travagant in  fome  of  their  writings,  and  perhaps 
oftentatious,  yet  a  great  deal  of  true  and  juft  rea- 
foning.  The  moft  beautiful  piece  of  antiquity  in 
the  moral  way,  is  the  Tablature  of  Cebes. 

Let  us  now  recapitulate  what  we  have  gone 
through,  and  then  add  fome  obfervations,  or  corrol- 
laries,  on  the  morality  of  a£lions.  We  have  conft- 
dered, 

1 .  The  nature  of  man. 

2.  The  nature,  foundation,  and  obligation  ot 
virtue. 

3.  Have  given  a  fort  of  general  analylis  of  the 
moral  lav/s,  as  pointing  out  our  duty  to  God,  to  our 
neighbour,  and  to  ourf elves. 

We  miaft  now  conlider  all  morality  in  general  as 
conformity  to  a  law.  We  have  feen  above  whence 
^  this  law  is  coUecled,  -and  derives  its  authority. 
Men  may  differ,  not  only  as  to  the  foundation,  but 
as  to  the  import  or  meaning  of  the  law  in  fome 
particulars  •,  but  it  is  always  fuppofed  that  the  law 
exifts. 

The  morality  of  anions  may  be  confidered  in 
two  different  lights,  but  thefe  very  nearly  related  to 
each  other,  (i.)  As  they  are  ranked  and  difpofed 
of  by  the  law  itfelf ;  (2.)  In  the  conformity  or  op- 
pofition  of  the  a£lions  to  the  law. 

Under  the  firft  view,  an  aftion  is  either  com- 
manded, forbidden,  or  permitted. 

Commanded  duties  oblige  abfolutely,  and,  as  ca- 
fuifls  ufed  to  fay,  semper  non  vero  ad  semper;  that  is 
to  fay,  they  are  obligatory  upon  all  perfons,  at  the 


Left.  9.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  71 

feaToas  that  are  proper  for  them,  but  not  upon 
every  perfon  at  every  time  ;  becaufe  then  there 
could  be  but  one  moral  duty.  All  men  are  obliged 
to  worfhip  God,  but  this  only  at  certain  times  ; 
other  duties  have  aKo  their  place  and  feafon. 

Prohibitions  oblige  semtef  et  ad  semper^  all  per- 
fons  at  ail  times.  We  mufl  not  lie — this  obliges 
every  man  at  every  moment,  becaufe  no  time  or 
circumflances  can  make  it  lawful. 

On  permiffion  v>'e  may  obfer\-e  feveral  things. 

1.  There  is,  asfome  fay,  a  two-fold  permiiHon, 
the  cne  full  and  abiolute,  which  not  only  gives  us 
a  right  to  certain  things  with  impunity,  but  implies 
a  pofitive  approbation  of  the  legiilator,  and  the 
other  implies  only  that  the  aclion  is  left  at  large, 
being  neither  comrtanded  nor  forbidden. 

2.  PermiiTion  in  natural  law^s  always  implies  the 
approbation  of  the  legiilator  ;  and  whatever  is  done 
in  confequence  of  it,  is  innocently  done,  for  God 
and  conlcience  do  not  permit,  or  pafs  uncondemned, 
any  bad  aftions. 

3.  It  is  otherwife  in  human  laws  ;  if  they  leave 
any  aftion  open,  it  may  be  done  with  impunity, 
and  yet  by  no  means  with  approbation.  I  may 
have  a  right  by  human  laws  to  fay  things  in  a  co- 
vered and  couched  manner,  v.hich  yet  may  carry 
in  them  the  highefl  degree  of  malignity. 

4.  The  truth  is,  v-hen  we  confider  the  morality 
of  aclion  in  a  itricl  or  proper  manner,  the  whole 
clafs  of  permitted  actions  vaniihes.  They  become 
by  their  intention  and  application  either  good  or 
bad. 

G2 


7^  LECTURES  ON  Led:.  9. 

Confidering  a£lions  in  their  conformity  to  the 
laws,  a  diftin£)-ion  arifes  fimilar  to  the  former,  into 
good  or  jufl,'  bad  and  indifferent, 

A  good  aftion  muft  be  wholly  conformable  to 
the  law  in  its  fubftance,  and  in  all  its  circumftances. 
It  is  not  enough  that  it  be  materially  good,  the  time 
muft  be  proper,  and  the  intention  laudable. 

A  bad  a(Sl:ion  is  that  which,  either  in  fubftance 
or  in  any  circumftance,  is  contrary  to  the  law. 

In  confequence  of  this,  ftridly  and  properly 
fpeaking,  all  truly  good  or  juft  aftions  are  equally 
fo,  ariling  from  a  perfeft  conformity  to  the  la;/,  as 
all  ftraight  lines  are  equally  ftraight ;  but  all  bad 
aftions  are  not  equally  bad,  as  lines  may  be  bent 
in  a  different  degree  from  the  ftraight  diredlion. 

IndiiTerent  actions  (if  there  tre  any  truly  fuch) 
are  thofe  that  are  permitted,  and  neither  command- 
ed nor  forbidden  by  the  law  j  but  when  we  coniider 
the  fpirit  and  principles  of  true  morality,  we  ftiall 
find  no  actions  v/holly  indifferent,  becaufe  we  are 
under  an  obligation  to  promote  the  happinefs  of 
ourfelves  and  others,  to  which  every  aftion  may  be 
applied  immediately  or  remotely  ;  and  fubjedion 
to  the  divine  will  may  make  a  part  of  our  defign,  in 
doing  or  forbearing  any  thing  whatever. 

In  eftimating  the  morality  of  aftions,  feveral  cir- 
cumftances muft  be  considered,  (i.)  The  good 
done.  (2.)  The  principle  from  which  it  flows, — 
felf-intereft  of  the  con  traded  kind,  benevolence,  or 
hope  of  reward.  (3.)  The  hindrances  or  oppofi- 
tion  that  muft  be  furmounted,  as  intereft,  inclina- 
tion, diiTiCulty.  An  obje£lion  feems  to  arife  from 
this,  not  ealily  folved.     If  an  a£l:on  is  the  more 


Le£l.  9.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHT.  J§ 

virtnous,  the  more  oppofition,  internal  and  external^ 
that  is  overcome,  then  the  longer  a  man  has  had 
the  habit  of  virtue  ;  and  the  more  completely  it  is 
formed,  the  lefs  merit  in  his  adions.  It  feems  alfo 
to  take  away  ail  moral  excellence  from  the  Deity, 
who  cannot  be  fuppofed  to  have  the  leail  oppofition 
to  encounter,  either  from  within  or  without.  This 
objedion  cannot  be  eafily  removed,  but  by  faying, 
that  the  oppofition  is  in  no  other  refpeft  an  evi- 
dence of  the  good  moral  temper,  but  as  it  Ihews 
the  ftreno-th  of  that  inclination  that  overcomes  it ; 
and  therefore,  when  a  moral  habit  is  fo  ftrong  as 
to  overcome  and  annihilate  all  oppofition,  it  is  fo 
much  the  more  excellent. 

An  action  c^ood  in  itfelf,  may  be  made  criminal 
by  an  evil  intention. 

But  no  action,  in  itfelf  exil,  can  be  made  lawful 
or  laudable  by  a  good  intention. 

A  ma:i  is  obliged  to  follow  the  dictates  of  con- 
fciencc  ;  yet  a  mlftaken  confcicnce  does  not  wholly 
abfolve  from  guilt,  becaufe  he  ought  to  have  been 
at  more  pains  to  obtain  information. 

An  action  is  not  virtuous  in  proportion  to  its  op- 
pofite  being  vicious.  It  is  no  high  degree  of  vir- 
tue to  love  our  offspring,  or  pro%-ide  for  a  family  ;. 
but  to  negleft  either  is  exceedingly  vjcious. 

One  phenomenon  in  human  nature,  nearly  con* 
nected  with  the  moral  feelings,  has  been  particu- 
larly confidered  by  fome  writers,  viz.  That  tiiere  is 
fuch  a  difpofition  in  the  generality  of  men  to  crowd 
to  fee  objects  of  diftrefs,  as  an  extraordinary  public 
execution.  What  is  the  defire  that  prompts  to  it  ? 
Is  xhe  fight  of  mifery  a  pleafant  feeling  ?     Some 

G3 


74    .  LECTURES  ojj"  Le£l.  9. 

xefolve  it  merely  into  curiofity,  which  they  con- 
fider  as  a  natural  and  original  impreffion.  But 
there  feems  to  be  foracthing  in  it  different .  from 
novelty.  Others  fay  its  arifes  from  benevolence, 
and  is  an  exercife  of  compafFior,  and  that  we 
have  a  llrong  natural  impulfe  to  the  affeftion 
of  pity,  and  really  feel  a  pleafure  in  indulging 
it.  But  though  every  well-difpofed  mind  is  high- 
ly fufceptible  of  pity,  at  leafl  of  all  the  benevo- 
lence and  help  that  pity  fuggeits  when  the  obje^l: 
prefeiits  itfelf,  we  can  fcarcely  fay  that  the  feel- 
ing is  pleafant,  or  that  we  have  a  delire  after  fuch 
objeds,  in  order  to  the  gratification. 

They  who  re af on  on  the  felfifn  fcheme,  as  ufual, 
refolve  all  into  private  intereil  ;  they  fay  we  de- 
light to  fee  objefts  of  dillrefs,  becaufe  it  gives  us 
a  fecret  fatisfa6iion  in  reflecting  upon  our  own  dif- 
ferent lituation.  I  believe  there  is  fuch  a  fatisfac- 
tion  in  narrow  and  contrafted  minds ;  but  to  thofe 
tolerably  difpofed  it  has  an  oppofite  effeft ;  it 
makes  them  rather  confider  the  calamities  which 
they  themfelves  are  fubje6l  to,  than  thofe  from 
which  they  are  free. 

Perhaps  it  would  be  bed  to  take  more  than  one 
principle  to  account  for  this  elFe£t.  Curiofity  mufl 
make  a  part,  and  probably  humanity  and  compaf- 
fion  alfo  contribute  to  it.  It  feems  to  be  thought 
fome  little  alleviation  to  the  fufferer's  mifery  when 
others  pity  him.  Yet  prudent  perfons,  knowing 
how  unavailing  this  pity  is,  often  choofe  to  be  ab- 
fent. 

Sympathy  is  a  particular  a^edion  in  aid  of  be- 
nevolence. Yet,  like  all  other  private  aff:6t-oiis^ 


Left.  9.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  75 

•vhen  it  is  not  moderated,  it  prevents  its  own  c5e£l. 
One  deeplj  affefted  with  the  view  of  an  objecl  of 
diitrefs,  is  ofien  thereby  incapacitated  to  aflift 
him. 

Another  queftion  is  fometimes  fubjoined  to  the 
above,  Why  men  have  pleafur*  in  feeing  tragedy, 
which  is  a  llriking  reprefentation  of  a  melancholy 
cataftrophe  ?  As  far  as  the  fubjed  differs  from  co- 
medy, it  may  be  accounted  for  on  the  fame  prin- 
ciples with  the  defire  to  fee  objecls  of  diftrefs. 
But  one  powerful  principle  leads  both  to  ccniedy 
and  tragedy, — a  pleafure  in  the  imitative  arts  ;  an 
exa6t  portrait  of  any  cbjecr  whatever,  gives  the 
hlgheft  pleafure,  even  though  the  object  itfelf  were 
originally  terrible  or  difgulting. 

We  fee  plainly,  that  an  indulgence  of  the  plea- 
fure given  by  a  fine  performance,  is  what  crowds 
the  theatre.  Unhappily,  to  give  greater  pleafure 
to  a  corrupt  mind,  they  often  invent  fuch  fcenes, 
and  conduct  the  matter  fo,  as  to  make  the  ftage  the 
greatell  enemy  to  virtue  and  good  morals. 


LECTURE  X, 

OF    POLITICS. 


POLITICS  contain  the  principles  of  focial  u- 
nion,  and  the  rules  of  duty  in  a  ft  ate  of  fo- 
ciety.  This  is  but  another  and  more  complete 
\iew  of  the  fame  things,  drawn  out  more  fully^ 


76  LECTURES  omr  Left.  re. 

and  applied  to  particular  cafes.  Political  law  is 
the  authority  of  any  fociety  flamped  upon  moral 
duty. 

The  fifft  thing  to  be  confidered,  in  order  to  fee 
upon  what  principles  fociety  is  formed,  is  the 
ftate  immediately  previous  to  the  focial  ft  ate.  This 
is  called  the  ftate  of  nature.  Violent  and  unnc- 
ceflary  controverfies  have  been  made  on  thatfubjecl. 
Some  have  denied  that  any  fuch  thing  ever  exifted  ^ 
that  fince  there  v^ere  men,  they  have  always  been 
in  a  focial  ftate.  And  to  be  fure  this  is  fo  far  tme, 
that  in  no  example  or  fa£l  could  it  ever  Taft  long.. 
Yet  it  is  impoflible  to  consider  fociety  as  a  volun- 
tary union  of  particular  perfons,  without  filppoftng 
thofe  perfons  in  a  ftate  fomewhat  different  before 
this  union  took  place.  There  are  rights,  therefore, 
belonging  to  a  ftate  of  nature,  different  from  thofe 
of  a  focial  ftate. 

And  diftinft  focieties,  or  ftates  independent,  are 
at  this  moment  in  a  ftate  of  nature,  or  natural  li- 
berty, with  regard  to  each  other. 

Another  famous  queftion  has  been.  Is  the  ftate 
of  nature  a  ftate  of  war  or  peace  ?  Hobbes,  an 
author  of  conftderable  note,  but  of  very  illiberal 
fentiments  in  politics,  is  a  ftrenuous  advocate  for  a 
ftate  of  nature  being  a  ftate  of  war.  Hutchinfon 
and  Shaftft)ury  plead  ftrongly,  that  a  ftate  of  nature 
is  a  ftate  of  fociety.  However  oppofite  and  hoftile 
their  opinions  feem  to  be  with  regard  to  each  other,, 
it  feems  no  hard  matter  to  reconcile  them.  That 
the  principles  of  our  nature  lead  to  fociety,  that 
our  happinefs  and  the  improvement  of  our  powers 
are  only  to  be  had  in  fociety,  is  of  the  moft  un- 


Left.  10.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  ^7 

doubted  certainty  ;  and  that  in  our  nature,  as  it  is 
the  work  of  God,  there  is  a  real  good-will  and 
benevolence  to  others  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
our  nature  as  it  is  now,  when  free  and  independent, 
is  prone  to  injury,  and  confequently  to  war,  is 
equally  manifell  ;  and  that  in  a  ftate  of  natural  li- 
berty, there  is  no  other  way  but  force,  for  preferv- 
ing  fecurity  and  repelling  injury.  The  inconve- 
niences of  the  natural  llate  are  very  many. 

One  clafs  of  the  above-mentioned  writers  fay, 
that  nature  prompts  to  fociety  ;  and  the  other,  that 
necelliiy  and  interell  obliges  to  it ;  both  are  equally 
irue. 

Suppofing,  then,  the  flate  of  natural  liberty  ante- 
cedent to  fociety  to  be  a  reality,  let  us  conilder  the 
perfect  and  imperfedt  rights  belonging  to  that  ftate, 
that  we  may  fee  more  dillindly  hov.^,  and  why 
they  differ  in  a  focial  ftate. 

The  perfect  rights  in  a  ftate  of  natural  liberty, 
are,  (i.)  A  right  to  life.  (2.)  A  right  to  employ 
his  faculties  and  induftry  for  his  ov/n  ufe.  (3.)  A 
right  to  the  things  that  are  common  and  neceffary, 
as  air,  water,  earth.  (4.)  Aright  to  perfonal  liber- 
ty. (5.)  A  power  over  his  own  life,  not  to  throw  it 
away  unnecelTarily,  but  for  a  good  re af on.  (6.)  A 
right  of  private  judgement  in  matters  of  opinion. 
(7 .)  A  right  to  aftbciate,  if  he  fo  incline,  with  any  per- 
fon  or  perfoRS  whom  he  can  perfuadc,  (not  force)  ; 
under  this  is  contained  the  right  to  marriage.  (8.) 
A  right  to  charafter,  that  is  to  fay,  innocence,  (not 
fame).  It  is  eafy  to  perceive  that  all  thefe  rights 
belong  to  a  ftate  of  natural  libexty,  and  that  it  would 
be  unjuft  and  unequal  for  any  individual  to  hinder 


78  LECTURES  OK  Le&i.  10. 

or  abridge  another  in  any  one  of  them,  without 
confent,  or  unlefs  it  be  in  juit  retaliation  for  injury- 
received. 

The  imperfect  natural  rights  are  very  numerous, 
but  they  are  nearly  the  fame  in  a  flate  of  nature  as 
in  a  ftate  of  fociety,  as  gratitude,  compaflion,  mu- 
tual good  offices,  if  they  will  be  no  injury  to  the 
perfon  performing  them.  Indeed  they  muft  be 
the  fame  in  a  natural  and  in  a  focial  ftate,  becaufe 
the  very  definition  of  an  imperfe£l  right  is  fuch  as 
you  cannot  ufe  force  to  obtain.  Now,  what  you 
ought  not  to  ufe  force  to  obtain  in  a  ftate  of  na- 
tural liberty,  human  laws  in  a  well  conftituted 
ftate  will  not  give  yoti. 

Society  I  would  define  to  be  an  aflbciation  or 
eompaft  of  any  number  of  perfons,  to  deliver  up 
or  abridge  fome  part  of  their  natural  rights,  in  or- 
der to  have  the  ftrength  of  the  united  body,  to 
proteft  the  remaining,  and  to  beftow  others. 

Hobbes,  and  fome  other  writers  of  the  former 
age,  treat  with  great  contempt  this  which  is  gene- 
rally called  the  focial  compaft.  He  infifts  that 
monarchy  is  the  law  of  nature.  Few  are  of  liis 
fentiments  now,  at  leaft  in  Britain,  yet  it  is  proper 
to  trace  them  to  the  foundation. 

It  is  to  be  admitted,  that  fociety  began  firft  in- 
fenfibly  by  families,  and  almoft  necclTarily.  Hence 
parental  authority  was  the  firft  law,  and  perhaps  it 
extended  for  two  or  three  generations  in  the  early 
-ages.  Though  the  patrons  of  monarchy  ufe  this 
as  an  argument,  it  dpes  not  favour  iheir  fcheme. 
This  which  they  call  the  patriarchal  government, 
tould  not  extend  far  ;  or  fuppofing  it  could,  there 


Le£t.  10.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  79 

would  be  but  one  rightful  king  in  all  the  earth,  the 
lineal  defcendcnt  of  Adam's  eldeft  fon,  not  to  men- 
tion that  the  very  order  of  lucceflion  in  hereditary- 
right  has  never  been  uniform,  and  is  but  of  late 
fettled  in  the  European  nations. 

The  truth  is,  though  man,  for  wife  reafons,  after- 
v.'ards  to  be  noticed,  continues  longer  in  a  family- 
dependence  than  other  animals,  yet  in  time  he 
becomes  sui  juris  ;  and  when  their  numbers  are  in- 
creafed,  when  they  either  continue  together,  or  re- 
move and  form  diftind  focieties,  it  is  plain  that 
there  muft  be  fuppofed  an  exprefled  or  implied 
contra£l. 

Some  fay  there  is  no  trace  or  record  of  any  fuch 
contra£t  in  the  beginning  of  any  fociety.  But  this 
is  no  argument  at  all ;  for  things  infeparable  from, 
and  eflential  to  any  Hate,  commonly  take  place  fo 
infenfibly,   that  their  beginning  is  not  obferved. 

When  perfons  believe  themfelves,  upon  the  whole, 
raiher  oppreffed  than  protected  in  any  fociety, 
they  think  they  are  at  liberty,  either  to  rebel  a- 
gainft  it,  or  to  fly  from  it ;  which  plainly  implies, 
that  theii*  being  fubject  to  it  arofe  from  a  tacit 
confent. 

Befides,  in  migrations  and  planting  of  colonies,  in 
all  ages,  we  fee  evident  traces  of  an  original 
contra£t  and  confent  taken  to  the  principles  of 
union. 

From  this  view  of  fociety  as  a  voluntary  com- 
paft,  refults  this  principle,  that  men  are  originally 
and  by  nature  equal,  and  confequently  free. 

Liberty  either  cannot,  or  ought  not  to  be  given 


8©  LECTURES  ON  Le<^.  I®. 

Up  in  the  fecial  Hate.  The  end  of  the  union  fhould 
be  the  protection  of  liberty,  as  far  as  it  is  a  bleff- 
ing.  The  definition  of  liberty  in  a  conftituted  go- 
vernment, will  be  afterwards  explained. 

Some  obferve,  that  few  nations  or  focieties  in  the 
world  have  had  their  conflitutions  formed  on  the 
principles  of  liberty  :  perhaps  not  one  twentieth  of 
the  ilates  that  have  been  ellabliihed  lince  the  be- 
ginning of  the  world,  have  been  fettled  upon  prin- 
ciples altogether  favourable  to  liberty.  This  is  no 
juft  argument  againft  natural  liberty  and  the  rights 
of  mankind  ;  for  it  is  certain,  that  the  public  good 
has  always  been  the  real  aim  of  the  people  in  ge- 
neral, in  forming  and  entering  into  any  fociety.  It 
has  alfo  conflantly  been  at  leaft  the  profefled  aim 
of  legiflators.  Therefore  the  principle  feems  to 
have  been  admitted,  only  they  have  failed  or  been 
difappointed  in  practice  by  miftalie  or  deceit. 
Though  perhaps  not  one  twentieth  part  of  man- 
kind have  any  tolerable  Ikill  in  the  fine  arts,  it  does 
not  follow  that  there  are  no  fuch  arts,  or  that  the 
principles  of  them  are  not  founded  in  nature. 

Reafon  teaches  natural  liberty,  and  common 
utility  recommends  it.  Some  nations  have  feen 
this  more  clearly  than  others,  or  have  more  hap- 
pily found  the  means  of  eftabliiliing:  it. 

Here,  perhaps,  we  fhould  conlider  a  little  the 
queflion,  Whether  it  is  lawful  to  make  men  or  to 
keep  them  flaves,  without  their  confent  ?  This 
will  fall  afterwards  to  be  confidered  more  fully  :  in 
the  mean  time,  obferve,  that  in  every  flate  there 
jnufl  be  fome  fuperior  ^^and   others  inferior  j  and  it 


Ledt.   10.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  St 

IS  hard  to  fix  the  degree  of  fubje^tion  that  may  fall 
to  the  lot  of  particular  perfons.  Men  maj  "become 
flaves,  or  their  perfons  and  labour  be  put  wholly  in 
the  power  of  others  by  confent.  They  may  alfo 
fometimes,  in  a  conftituted  flate,  be  made  llaves  by 
force,  as  a  puniihnient  for  the  commiffion  of  crimes. 
But  it  is  certainly  unlawful  to  make  inroads  upon 
others,  unproved,  and  take  away  their  liberty,  by 
no  better  right  than  fuperior  power. 

It  has  fometimes  been  doubted,  whether  it  is  law- 
ful to  take  away  the  liberty  of  others  for  life,  even 
on  account  of  crimes  committed.  There  can  be 
no  flrong  reafon  given  againft  this,  except  that 
which  is  fuppofed  to  operate  in  Great  Britain  a- 
gainft  making  malefactors  Haves,  that  it  would  be 
unfavourable  to  rational  liberty  to  fee  any  rank  of 
men  in  chains.  But,  fetting  this  afide,  it  feems 
plain,  that  if  men  may  forfeit  their  lives  to  fo- 
ciety,  they  may  alio  forfeit  their  liberty,  which  is 
a  lefs  precious  bleifing.  It  feems  alfo  more  agree- 
able, both  to  equity  and  public  utility,  to  puniih 
fome  fort  of  crimes  with  hard  labour,  than  death. 
Imprifonment  for  life  has  been  admitted  and  prac- 
tifed  by  all  nations.  Some  have  pleaded  for  ma- 
king flaves  of  the  barbarous  nations,  that  they 
are  a<flually  brought  into  a  more  eligible  ftate, 
and.  have  more  of  the  comforts  of  life,  than  they 
would  have  had  in  their  own  country.  1  his  ar- 
gument may  alleviate,  but  does  not  juflify,  tlie 
praftice.  It  cannot  be  callifd  a  more  eligible  ftate, 
if  lefs  agreeable  to  ihbmfelves. 

Upon  the  whole,  there  are  not  only  many  unlawful 
ways  oi  making  flaves,  but  alfo  fome  that  are  laT/ful. 

VoL.Vil.  H 


82  LECTURES  ON  Led.  lO. 

And  the  praftice  feems  to  be  countenanced  in  the  law 
of  Mofes,  wliere  rules  are  laid  down  for  their  treat- 
ment, and  an  ellimation  of  injuries  done  to  them, 
different  from  that  of  free  men.  I  do  not  think 
there  lies  anj  neceflitj  on  thofe  who  found  men  in 
a  ft  ate  of  flavery,  to  make  them  free,  to  their  own 
ruin.  But  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  any  original 
caufe  of  fervitude  can  be  defended,  but  legal  pu- 
nifhment  for  the  commillion  of  crimes.  Humanity 
in  the  manner  of  treating  them  is  manifeftly  a  dic- 
tate of  reafon  and  nature,  and  I  think  alfo  of  pri- 
vate and  public  utility,  as  much  as  of  either. 

The  next  ftep  in  opening  the  principles  of  the 
fecial  ftate,  is  to  conlider  the  foundation,  eftablilli- 
ment,  and  extent  of  property.  Some  begin  this  by 
conlidering  the  property  of  man  in  general,  in  the 
inferior  creatures.  Has  he  any  right  to  ufe  the 
lower  irrational  animals  for  labour,  or  food,  or 
both  ? 

It  is  needlefs  to  refine  too  much  upon  this  fub- 
je£t.  To  ufe  them  for  labour  feems  evidently  law- 
ful, as  they  are  inferior,  with  ftrength  fitted  for  it, 
and  ftrength  which  they  could  not  employ  for  the 
improvement  and  cultivation  of  the  earth  without 
the  dire£lion  of  man.  They  feem  to  be  to  man, 
fome  how  as  the  body  to  the  mind.  They  help  to 
produce  food  to  themfelves,  and  fo  increafe  their 
number,  and  receive  much  more  fenfual  pleafure, 
fliaring  in  all  refpefls  with  their  mafters  the  fruit 
of  their  toil. 

To  ufe  them  for  food  is  thus  argued  to  be  law- 
ful. If  fuffered  all  to  live,  they  would  become  too 
numerous,    and   could   not    be   fuftained,   fo   that 


Le<5t.   10.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHT.  85 

death  to  many  of  them  in  a  much  worfe  way  muft 
be  the  certain  confequence.  Further,  nature  feems 
to  dictate  the  ule  of  them  for  food  in  the  plaineft 
manner,  for  they  are  food  for  one  another  in  a  re- 
gular gradation,  the  infecl  to  the  birds  and  fifties, 
many  of  them  to  the  beafts,  and  the  fmaller  to  the 
greater,  or  the  tamer  to  the  more  rapacious  of 
every  order. 

If  v/e  take  tradition  or  revelation  for  our  guide, 
the  matter  is  plain,  that  God  made  man  lord  of 
the  works  of  his  hands,  and  put  under  him  all  the 
other  creatures.  Only  it  appears  that  the  grant  of 
animal  food  was  made  no  earlier  than  to  Noah 
after  the  flood. 

.  Let  us  next  conlider  the  eftablifliment  of  private 
property.  Private  property  is  every  particular  per- 
fon's  having  a  confefled  and  exclufive  right  to  a 
certain  portion  of  the  goods  which  ferve  for  the  fup- 
port  and  conveniency  of  life. 

In  a  very  imperfe£l  flate  of  fociety,  community 
of  goods  may  fubfift  in  a  great  degree  ;  and  indeed 
its  fubfifting  is  one  of  the  fureft  figns  of  an  impcr- 
fed  flate  of  fociety.  Some  attempts  have  been 
made  in  ci-v-ilized  ftates  to  introduce  it,  but  without 
any  confiderable  effeft,  except  in  Sparta,  the  con- 
ftitution  of  which  was  very  fingular.  In  fmall  vo- 
luntary focieties,  efpecially  of  the  religious  kind, 
it  may  be  eftabliihed,  and  will  continue  fo  long  as 
the  morals  of  the  fociety  are  pure.  But  in  civil 
fociety  fully  formed,  efpecially  if  the  ft  ate  is  at  all 
extenfive,  or  intended  to  be  fo,  private  property  is 
effentially  neceiTary,  and  founded  upon  the  reafon 
of  things  and  public  uiility.  The  reafons  of  it  are, 
H2 


§4  LECTURES  ON  Le6l.  IC. 

1.  Without  private  property  no  laws  Would  be 
fufficient  to  compel  univerfal  induflrj.  There  ne- 
ver was  fuch  a  purity  of  manners  and  zeal  for  the 
public,  in  the  individuals  of  a  great  body,  but  thaf 
many  would  be  idle  and  ilothful,  and  maintain 
themfelves  upon  the  labour  of  others. 

2.  There  is  no  reafon  to  exped,  in  the  prefent 
Hate  of  human  nature,  that  there  would  be  a  juft 
and  equal  diftribution  to  every  one  according  to 
his  necelTity,  nor  any  room  for  difiindtion  according 
to  merit. 

3.  There  would  be  no  place  for  the  exercife  of 
fome  of  the  nobleil  affections  of  the  human  mind^ 
as  charity,  compallion,  beneficence,  &c. 

4.  Little  or  no  incitement  to  the  aiftive  virtues^ 
labour,  ingenuity,  bravery,  patience,  &c. 

Some  have  laid  down  fchemes  for  making  pro- 
perty common,  as  Sir  Thomas  Moore, in  his  Utopia; 
but  in  general  they  are  chimerical  and  impra6li- 
cable.  There  is  no  inftance  in  fa6l,  where  any 
Hate  that  made  a  figure  in  the  focial  life  had  their 
goods  wholly  in  commoa.  Sparta  had  the  mofl  of 
it,  but  it  was  a  very  fmall  ftate,  and  limited  in  its 
views ;  befides,  there  was  fomething  fo  fingular  in 
the  whole  conllitution  of  the  Spartan  government, 
that  its  fiibfifting  fo  long  remains  a  phenomenon 
for  politicians  and  reafoners  yet  to  account  for. 

Suppofing  private  property  to  be  effential,  or  at 
leail  ufeful  in  the  focial  ftate,  the  next  queftion  is. 
How  does  this  property  take  its  rife,  or  by  what 
ways  is  it  acquired  ? 

The  original  ways  of  acquiring  property  may  be 
reduced  to  thefe  two,  (i.)  Prior  occupation,  (2.) 
Our  own  induilry. 


Lt£t.  10.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  85 

As  to  the  firft  of  thefe,  it  may  be  analyfed  thus  : 
Of  the  things  that  lay  in  common  for  the  ufe  of 
man,  I  have  a  right  to  take  what  is  convenient  for 
me  ;  and  after  I  have  taken  it,  no  body  can  have  a 
better  right,  nor  confequently  any  title,  to  take  it 
from  me. 

But  many  queftions  diificidt  to  be  refolvcd  arife 
-from  the  application  of  this  principle.  How  far 
■  does  this  right  extend  ?  Muft  I  take  only  what  is 
fufficient  for  the  prefent  moments  ?  or  may  I  provide 
for  future  neceffities  and  enjoyments  ?  In  vacant 
lands,  muft  I  take  only  what  I  and  my  prefent  fol- 
lowers can  fafliciently  occupy  ?  or  may  I  touch  a 
continent,  and  call  it  mine,  though  I  iliall  not  be 
able  to  fill  it  in  many  ages  ?  I  anfwer,  common 
utility  muft  be  the  rule  in  all  thefc  cafe3  ;  and  any 
thing  more  particular  muft  be  referved  till  wc  come 
to  the  law  of  nations. 

Some  fay,  that  the  water  in  large  bays  and  rivers 
ought  to  be  common  to  all,  becaufe  it  is  inexhau- 
ftible,  and  one's  ufmg  it  cannot  wafte  or  fpoil  it  for 
the  ufe  of  others.  But  the  fecurity  of  focieties  will 
point  out  the  mealure  of  prop'erty  that  muft  be  in 
all  thofe  things. 

The  extent  or  object  of  property  contains  three 
particulars. 

I.  A  right  to  the  fuUeft  ufe.  Whatever  is  a 
perfon's  property,' he  has  a  right  to  do  with  it. as  he 
pleafes,  with  this  fingle  exception,  if  it  may  be 
called  fo,  that  he  may  not  ufe  it  to  the  injury  of 
others.  Full  property  has  no  other  exception,  un- 
lefs  you  call  this  an  exception,  that  if  any  man 
would  wantonly  deftroy  the  fruits  of  the  earth,  or' 


85  LECTURES  ON  Le£l. 


10. 


his  habitation  j  in  that  cafe,  though  they  were  his 
own,  people  would  hinder  him,  as  fuppofing  him 
to  be  mad,  and  deprive  him  not  only  of  that  li- 
berty, but  of  all  others. 

2.  Property  implies  a  right  of  exclusion.  We 
jnay  hinder  others  from  any  way  intermeddling 
with  what  is  our  property.  This  feem-s  efTential  to 
the  idea.  Giving  a  full  right  to  one,  implies  that 
otliers  have  none. 

3.  It  implies  a  power  to  alienate  :  That  is  to 
fay,  a  right  of  alteration,  commutation,  donation 
during  life,  and  difpofal  at  death.  Thus  property 
is  faid  to  be  perpetual. 

There  are  certain  things  called  by  Civilians  Res 
7iullius ;  fuch  as,  templep,  public  edifices,  gates  and 
walls  of  cities,  &.c.  Temples  ufed  to  be  faid  to  be 
given  to  God,  and  in  the  laws  of  civilized  ftates 
attention  is  paid  to  this  circumflance.  But  as  to 
the  property  or  ufe,  the  cafe  of  them,  and  of  all  the 
other  things  mentioned,  is  very  clear.  They  are 
under  the  infpeftion  of  the  magiftrate,  or  fuch  per- 
fons  as  reprefent  the  community,  and  are  by  them 
kept  i^or  comnion  ufe. 


LECTURE  XI. 

IN  the  focial  life,   in  general,  we  may  confider, 
(i.)  Domelllc,  (2.)  Chil  fociety. 
The  firfl  of  thefe  we  muft  confider  as  implying 
and  made   up  of  Teveral   relations,   the   chief  of 


Ltc\:,  II.  mqRal  philosophy.  ^7 

which  are,  (i.)  The  relation  of  marriage,  (2.) 
That  of  parents  and  children,  (3.)  That  of  mafters 
»nd  fer^'ants. 

In  marriage  we  ought  to  obferve,  that  though  ail 
creatures  may  be  faid  to  be  propagated  in  a  way  in 
a  great  degree  fimilar,  yet  there  is  fomething  pe- 
culiarly diflinguiihed,  dignified,  and  folemn,  in  mar- 
riacre  among  men.  This  diilintlion  is  necelTary, 
and  founded  in  reafon  and  nature. 

Human  creatures  at  their  birth  are  in  a  flate 
weaker  and  more  helplefs  than  any  other  animals. 
They  alfo  arrive  much  more  flowly  at  maturity, 
and  need  by  far  mod  affillance  and  cultivation. 
Therefore  a  particular  union  of  the  parents  is  ab- 
folutely  neceiTary,  and  that  upon  fuch  powerful 
principles  as  will  fecure  their  common  care.  Mar- 
riage is  a  relation  exprefsly  founded  upon  this  ne- 
ceffity,  and  muft  be  fo  conducted  as  to  afcertain  the 
property  of  the  offspring,  and  to  promife  the  mofl 
afliduous,  prudent,  and  extenfive  care. 

This  is  the  foundation  of  m.arriage  drawn  from 
the  public  good.  Bnt  we  ought  alfo  to  obferve, 
that  man  is  manifellly  fuperior  in  dignity  to  the 
other  animals ;  and  it  was  intended  that  all  his  en- 
joyments, and  even  his  indulgence  of  inftintlive 
propenfities,  fhould  be  of  a  more  exalted  and  rational 
kind  than  theirs.  Therefore  the  propenfity  of  the 
fexes  to  one  another,  is  not  only  reined  in  by  mo- 
delly,  but  is  fo  ordered  as  to  require  that  reafon 
and  friendlhip,  and  fome  of  the  nobleil  affections, 
fhouid  have  place.  And  it  is  certain  that-  they 
have,  if  not  a  more  viojeat,  at  leaft  a  more  lafting 


88  LECTURES  OJJ  Le£l.  1 1, 

and  uniform  influence,  in  the  married  ftate,  than 
fenfual  deli  re. 

It  is  further  abferved  by  moral  writers,  that 
though  beauty  and  perfonal  attraftion  may  be  con- 
lidered  as  the  firft  motives,  yet  thefe  are  always 
fuppofed  to  be  indications  of  fomething  excellent 
in  the  temper  within.  So  that  even  love  of  beauty, 
in  man,  is  an  attachment  to  moral  excellence. 
Let  a  perfon  attend  with  ferioufnefs,  and  he  will 
find,  that  the  utmoft  perfedlion  of  form  in  an  idiot, 
or  one  thoroughly  known  to  be  of  a  very  bad  tem- 
per, is  really  no  objeft  of  defire  ;  though  in  thofe 
who  are  little  known,  it  is  apt  to  prejudice  the  ig- 
norant and  unwary  to  judge  favourably  of  the 
perfon. 

The  particulars  which  reafon  and  nature  point 
out,  relating  to  the  marriage -contract,  are  as  foU 
low^  : 

1.  That  it  be  between  one  man  and  one  woman* 
Polygamy  is  condemned  by  nature  ;  for  it  is  found, 
that  the  males  bom  are  to  the  females  as  13  to  12, 
or  as  fome  fay  as  20  to  19,  the  overplus  being  to 
fupply  the  greater  wafte  of  the  male  part  of  the  fpc- 
cies  by  war  and  dangerous  occupations,  hard  la- 
bour, and  travelling  by  land  and  fea. 

2.  The  fundamental  and  elTential  part  of  the 
contract  is  fidelity  and  chaftity.  This  muft  imme- 
diately appear  to  be  efiential  to  the  purpofe  of  the 
union.  Some  writers  fay  that  this  is  efpecially 
binding  upon  the  woman,  in  order  to  afcertain  the 
offspring  ;  but  every  body  muft  fee  the  abfurdity 
of  any  diftinftion,  becaufe  the  contraft  would  nei- 
ther be  e^ual,  nor  likely  to  be  fteadily  obferved,  if 


Lea.  II.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  89 

it  were  not  mutual.  Befides,  as  a  late  author  has 
weirobfer\-ed,  if  chaftity  be  a  female  v-irtue,  how 
can  men  be  unchaile  without  infringing  upon  it  ? 

3.  The  contrail  fhould  be  for  life,  otherwife  it 
would  be  ihort,  uncertain,  and  mutual  love  and  in- 
duftrj  greatly  weakened. 

4.  If  fuperiority  and  authority  be  given  to'  the 
man,  it  fhovdd  be  ufed  with  fo  much  gentlenefs  and 
love,  as  to  make  it  a  ilate  of  as  great  equality  as  pof- 
fible.  Hutchiiifon  and  fome  other  writers  fay  there 
fhould  be  no  fuperiority,  and  that  their  property, 
being  common,  Ihould  not  be  alienated  by  the  one 
without  the  other.  Others  think  that  perfed  equa- 
lity of  power  in  two  perfons  is  not  confiftent  with 
order,  and  the  common  intereft,  and  therefore  give 
authority  to  the  man  ;  and  the  laws  of  moil  nations 
give  the  man  the  diipofal  of  property,  w^th  the  re- 
fers ation  of  particular  rights  to  the  woman. 

Some  Heathen  writers  gave  the  man  power  of 
life  and  death  over  the  woman  5  a  thing  evidently 
barbarous  and  unjufl. 

5.  Maniages  are  fometimes  diffolved  by  di- 
vorces, which  our  law  permits  only  on  three  ac- 
counts— adultery,  wilful  and  obflinate  defertion,  and 
incapacity.  The  firft  two  of  thefe  are  fomided  on 
the  New  Teflament,  and  the  lail  on  reafon,  being 
not  fo  properly  a  diffolution  of  a  marriage,  as  a  de- 
claration that  it  was  void  from  the  beginning,  and 
never  took  place. 

Some  writers  of  moral  phiiofophy  add  as  caufes 
of  divorce,  contrariety  of  temf)er,  incurable  difeafes, 
and  fuch  as  would  infedl  the  oflfspring.  But  none 
of  ihem  feem  of  fuificient  moment.  The  firil  would 


90  LECTURES  ON  Led.  II. 

be  an  evident  temptation  to  caufelefs  and  wanton 
reparations  ;  and  all  the  three  may  be  guarded  a- 
gainft  by  previous  caution. 

Hutchinfon  obferves,  that  in  all  nations,  mar- 
rying in  near  degrees  of  confanguinity  or  affinity 
has  been  avoided  and  abhorred  ;  and  he  adds,  that 
the  natural  and  general  abhorrence  of  it  has  been 
greater  than  reafon  feems  to  dictate.  Hence  it  has 
been  conjectured  to  have  been  early  tradition  or  re- 
velation ;  and  men  have  exercifed  their  invento  •  m 
finding  out  the  true  reafoai  or  ground  of  the  pro- 
hibition. 

One  reafon  affigned  is,  becaufe  if  nlarriage  were 
lawful  to  near  relations,  their  frequent  intercourfe 
would  be  a  ftrong  temptation  to  uncleannefs. 

Another,  that  if  pennitted,  it  would  frequently 
confound  or  invert  the  duties  of  relations,  by  fet- 
ting  fome  above  others  whom  they  formerly  ufed 
to  obey. 

A  third  reafon,  and  perhaps  the  beft,  is,  that  ab- 
ftaining  from  blood  relations  in  this  voluntary  con- 
traft  extends  the  focial  ties,  and  produces  a  greater 
number  of  family-relations. 

Whatever  be  the  moral  reafons,  it  feems  to  have 
a  ftrong  fanClion  in  nature  ;  for  it  is  obferved,  that 
marriage  between  near  relations,  efpecially  if  re- 
peated, greatly  weakens  the  human  race. 

As  to  the  extent  of  this  prohibition,  it  has  been 
various  in  different  nations,  but  the  moft  prevailing 
has  been  to  forbid  all  within  three  degrees.  The 
degrees  are  reckoned  by  the .  fteps  of  defcent  be- 
tween the  parties  and  the  common  parent.  Parent 
and  child  is  the  firft  ;  child  and  child,  the  fecond  ; 


Left.  II.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  9I 

child  and  grand-child,  the  third  ;  and  two  grand- 
children, or  firil  coufins,  the'  fourth,  when  it  be- 
comes lawful. 

Relation  of  Parents  and  Children, 

The  firil  thing  to  be  obferved  is,  that  this  relation 
is  diftinguiflied  by  the  ftrongeft  inflind  of  parental 
affe£lion.  This  feems  neceflary,  as  the  education 
of  children  is  a  duty  requiring  fo  much  time,  care, 
and  expence,  which  nothing  but  the  mofl:  rooted  af- 
feftion  would  fubmit  to. 

The  rights  of  the  parent  may  be  fummed  up  in 
.hefe  tw^o  :  i.  Authority,  which  requires  fubjedlion 
in  the  children.  2.  A  right  to  a  grateful  return  in 
due  time  from  the  children.  The  firft  is  a  perfect 
right,  as  far  as  it  extends,  but  muft  be  limited. 

Some  nations  have  given  parents  the  power  of 
life  and  death  over  their  children  ;  and  Hobbes  in- 
fills, that  children  are  the  goods  and  abfolute  pro- 
perty of  their  parents,  and  that  they  may  alienate 
them  and  fell  them,  either  for  a  time  or  for  life. 
But  both  thefe  feem  ill  founded,  becaufe  they  are 
contrary  to  the  end  of  this  right,  viz.  inftruftion 
and  protection.  Parental  right  feems  in  moft 
cafes  to  be  limited  by  the  advantage  of  the  chil- 
dren. 

Children  are  no  doubt  to  judge  for  themfelves 
in  matters  of  religion,  when  they  come  to  years  ; 
though  the  parents  are  under  the  flrongell  obliga- 
tion to  inftruft  them  carefully  to  the  bell  of  their 
judgement.  Thofe  who  infill,  that,  to  leave  them 
their  judgement  free,  they  ought  not   to  be  taught 


92  LECTURES  ON  Left.  II. 

any  principles,  ought  to  coniider  that  their  fcheme 
is  impraflicable  and  abfurd.  If  the  parents  do  not 
inftruft  them,  they  will  imbibe  prejudices,  and  con- 
traft  habits,  perhaps  of  the  worfl  kind,  from  o- 
thers. 

Children  in  moft  nations  are  confidered  as  having 
a  right,  exclulive  of  their  parents,  to  property  given 
them  by  others. 

Many  nations  have  given  the  parents  a  right  to 
difpofe  of  their  children  in  mamage  ;  but  this 
feems  to  be  carrying  parental  authority  too  far,  if 
it  be  made  abfolute,  becaufe  it  puts  in  the  power 
of  the  parent  ta  difpofe  of  what  is  moft  effential 
to  their  happinefs  through  the  whole  of  their  future 
life.  Yet  it  feems  very  contrary  to  reafon  and 
nature,  that  children  in  early  life  fliould  difpofe  of 
themfelves  in  marriage  without  confulting  their  pa- 
rents. 

Since  we  have  denied  the  power  of  life  and 
death  to  parents,  it  will  be  alked,  What  is  the  fane- 
tion  of  their  authority  ?  I  anfwer.  Moderate  cor- 
rection in  early  life,  and,  as  the  very  higheft  pu- 
nilhment,  expullion  from  their  family,  or  a  for- 
feiture of  the  privileges  which  they  defpife. 

As  to  the  right  to  a  grateful  return,  it  is  an  im- 
perfeft  right,  but  of  the  ftrongeft  kind  ;  fometimes 
the  civil  authority  interpofes, ,  and  obliges  children 
to  maintain  their  aged  parents. 

To  the  difgrace  of  human  nature,  it  is  often  ob- 
ferved,  that  parental  afFedion  is  much  ftronger 
than  filial  duty.  We  muft  indeed  acknowledge  the 
wifdom  of  Providence  in  making  the  inftinftive  im- 
pure  ftronger  in  parents  towards  their  children; 


Lccl:.  II.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  93 

than  in  children  towards  their  parents  ;  becaufe  the 
firfl  is  more  necelTarj  than  the  other  to  the  public 
good  ;  jet  when  we  conlider  both  as  improved 
into  a  virtuous  difpofition,  bj  reafon  and  a  fenfe  of 
duty,  there  feems  to  be  every  whit  as  much  bafe- 
nefs  in  filial  insratitude,  as  in  want  of  natural  af- 
feclion. 

Relation  of  Master  and  Servant, 

This  relation  is  firft  generated  by  the  differ- 
ence which  God  hath  permitted  to  take  place  be- 
tween man  and  man.  Some  are  fuperior  to  others 
in  mental  powers  and  intelledual  improvement ; 
fome  by  the  great  increafe  of  their  property,  through 
their  own  or  their  predeceiTors  induftry  ;  and  lome 
make  it  their  choice,  finding  they  cannot  li>^ 
otherwife  better,  to  let  out  their  labour  to  others 
for  hire. 

Let  us  fhortly  confider,  (i.)  How  far  this  fubjec- 
tion  extends.     (2.)  The  duties  on  each  fide. 

As  to  the  firft,  it  feems  to  be  only  that  the  matter 
has  a  right  to  the  labours  and  ingenuity  of  the  fer- 
vant  for  a  limited  time,  or  at  mofl  for  life.  He 
gan  have  no  right  either  to  take  away  life,  or  to 
make  it  iniupportable  by  excellive  labour.  The 
fervant  therefore  retains  all  other  natural  rights. 

The  pradice  of  ancient  nations,  of  making  their 
prif oners  of  war  flaves,  was  altogether  imjuft  and 
barbarous  ;  for  though  we  could  fuppofe  that  thofe 
who  were  the  caufes  of  an  mijuil  war  deferred  to 
be  made  Haves  ;  yet  tliis  could  not  be  the  cafe  of 
all  wha  fought  on  their  fide  ;  befides,  the  doing  fo 

Vol.  VII.  I 


94  LECTURES  ON  Jjcdi,  II. 

in  one  inftance  would  authorlfe  the  doing  it  in  any 
other  ;  and  thofe  who  fought  in  defence  of  his 
country,  when  unjuftly  invaded,  might  be  taken 
as  well  as  others.  The  pra6lice  was  alfo  impolitic, 
as  flaves  never  are  fo  good  or  faithful  fervants, 
as  thofe  who  become  fo  for  a  limited  time  by  con- 
fent. 


LECTURE  XII, 


OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY. 


CIVIL  Society  is  diftinguifhed  from  domeftic, 
in  the  union  of  a  number  of  families  in  one 
ftate,  for  their  mutual  benefit. 

We  have  before  affirmed,  that  fociety  always 
fuppofes  an  exprefled  or  implied  contract  or  agree- 
ment. Let  us  now  fee  what  this  agreement  necef- 
farily  implies. 

(i.)  The  confent  of  every  individual  to  live  in, 
and  be  a  member  of  that  fociety.  (2.)  A  confent 
to  fome  particular  plan  of  government.  (3.)  A 
mutual  agreement  between  the  fubjefts  and  rulers  ; 
of  fubjeftion  on  the  one  hand,  of  proteftion  on 
the  other.  Thefe  are  all  implied  in  the  union  of 
every  fociety,  and  they  complete  the  whole. 

Any  objeftions  that  may  be  raifed  againfl  this 
are  eafily  folved..  Ex.  gr.  Though  every  indivi- 
dual has  not  given  an  adual  confent,  yet  his  deter- 
.mination  to  live  with  any  fociety  implies  it.  Again, 
if  it  be  aiked,  how  children  come  to  be  members  of 


Lecl.  12.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  95 

a  focietv  ?  ii  is  anfwered,  they  receive  the  benefits 
and  partake  of  the  rights  of  the  focietj  during  the 
whole  time  of  their  education  ;  and  as  they  conae  to 
the  ufe  of  reafon,  they  both  claim  the  privilege 
and  acquiefce  in  the  duty  of  citizens.  And  if  they 
find  any  thing  infupportable  in  their  condition, 
they  may  alter  it  at  their  pleafure. 

Have^  then,  all  fubjefts  a?  right,  when  they  fee  fit, 
to  remove  from  the  fociety  in  which  they  are  ?  I 
anfvver,  that  in  all  ordinary  cafes  they  ought  to  have, 
at  leaft  in  time  of  peace.  Perhaps  it  may  be  af- 
firmed with  juftice,  that  they  who  have  enjoyed 
the  privileges  of  any  fociety  in  time  of  peace,  if 
war  or  danger  to  the  public  fiiould  arife,  they  may 
be  hindered  from  emigrating  at  that  time,  and  com- 
pelled to  contribute  their  lliare  in  what  is  neceflary 
TO  the  common  defence. 

Whatever  is  the  form  of  government  in  any 
fociety,  the  members  may  be  divided  into  two 
claiTes,  the  ruUrs  and  the  ruled,  the  magiitrates  and 
fubjects. 

The  rights  of  rulers  may  be  divided  into  eflential 
and  accidental  :  the  cilential,  fuch  as  in  general  mull 
be  veiled  in  rulers  of  every  fociety ;  the  accidental, 
fuch  as  maybe  given  to  the  rulers  in  fome  focieties, 
but  not  in  others. 

The  eflential  rights  of  rulers,  are  what  require 
mod  to  be  enumerated  ;  and  thefe  again  by  fome 
good  writers '  are  divided  into  greater  and  lefTer  ef- 
ientials. 

Of  the  firft  kind  are,  (l.)  Legiflation.  (2.) 
Taxation  for  the  public  expence.  (3.)  Jurifdiction, 
or  the  adminiltration  of  juftice.  (4.)  Reprefen- 
1  2 


Cf6  LECTURES  ON  Left.  12. 

tation,  or  appearing  and  a£ling  in  name  of  the 
whole,  in  all  tranfaftions,  with  adjacent  indepen- 
dent flates,  chiefly  for  the  purpofes  of  making  wap 
or  peace. 

The  lefs  elTential  rights  of  rulers  are  many,  and 
they  are  called  lefs  effential,  becaufe  they  may  be 
more  varied  than  the  others  ;  fuch  as,  coining  of 
mone}',  pofTefling  or  managing  public  edifices,  con- 
ferring honours  on  officers.  Sec. 

The  rights  of  fubjects  in  a  focial  flate  cannot  be 
enumerated,  but  they  may  be  all  fummed  up  in 
protectio?i ;  that  is  to  fay,  thofe  who  have  furrendered 
part  of  their  natural  rights,  expedl  the  flrength 
of  the  public  arm  to  defend  and  improve  what  re- 
mains. 

It  has  been  often  faid,  that  government  is  carried 
on  by  rewards  and  punifliments  ;  but  it  ought  to  be 
obfer^ved,  that  the  only  reward  that  a  ftate  can  be 
fuppoftd  to  beflow  upon  good  fubjefts  in  general, 
is  prote6tion  and  defence.  Some  few  who  have 
diftinguifhed  themfelves  in  the  public  fervice,  may 
be  diftinguifhed  by  particular  rewards  ;  but  to  re- 
ward the  v/hole  is  impoffible,  becaufe  the  reward 
mull  be  levied  from  thofe  very  perfons  to  whom  it 
is  to  be  given. 

After  what  has  been  faid  on  the  foundation  of 
fociety,  viz.  confent,  perhaps  it  may  be  neceffary 
to  mention  two  exceptions. 

I.  It  is  faid  by  fome,  with  apparent  reafon,  that 
a  tew  perfons,  if  accidentally  armed  with  powder, 
may  conftrain  a  large  ignorant  rabble  to  fubmit  to 
laws  which  will  be  for  their  good.  This  I  would 
admit  in  fome  cafes,  when  there  is  an  evident  mad- 


Left.  12.  MORAL  rHiLosoriiY.  97 

nefs  and  diforder  in  the  multitude,  and  when  there 
is  a  moral  certainty  tliat  they  will  afterwards  be 
pleafed  with  the  violence  done  them.  But  in  ge- 
neral it  is  but  a  bad  maxim,  that  we  may  force 
people  for  their  good.  All  lovers  of  power  will 
be  difpofed  to  think,  that  even  a  violent  ufe  of  it  is 
for  the  public  good. 

2.  Though  people  have  a£l:ually  confented  to 
iiny  form  of  government,  if  they  have  been  effen- 
tially  deceived  in  the  nature  and  operation  of  the 
laws,  if  they  are  found  to  be  pernicious  and  de- 
ilruftive  of  the  ends  of  the  union,  they  may  cer- 
tainly break  up  the  fociety,  recal  the  obligation, 
and  refettle  the  whole  upon  a  better  footing. 

Of  the  different  Forms  of  Government. 

As  foon  as  men  began  to  confider  and  compare 
forms  of  government,  they  divided  them  into  three 
general  and  limple  kinds,  (i.)  Monarchy,  (2.) 
Ariftocracy,  (3.)  Democracy.  Thefe  are  called 
fmiple,  becaufe  they  are  clearly  difliing-uifliable 
from  each  other  in  their  nature  and  effeds.  The 
ancients  generally  divided  the  forms  of  govern- 
ment in  this  manner,  becaufe  moft  of  their  go- 
vernments were  of  one  or  other  of  thefe  kinds,  with, 
very  little  mixture. 

Monarchy  is  when  the  fupreme  power  is  veiled 
in  a  fmgle  perfon.  Mr  Hutchinfon  fays.  Monar- 
chy may  be  either  abfolute  or  limited  ;  but  this  is 
an  inaccuracy,  for  limited  monarchy  is  one  of  the 
mixed  kinds  of  government. 

But  moaarchr  may  be  either  temporary  or  for 

13 


98  LECTURES  ON  Le6l.  12. 

]if?.  The  Roman  dictators  were  abfolute  for  a 
time,  and  fo  long  as  they  continued,  the  government 
was  purel  monarchical,  all  other  powers  being 
dormant. 

Monarchy  may  alfo  be  either  hereditary  or  elec- 
tive. 

Ariftocracy  is^  that  form  of  government  in 
which  the  fiipreme  power  is  lodged  with  a  fmall 
number  of  nobles.  This  is  capable  of  the  fame 
variations  as  monarchy  ;  and  it  may  be  either  tem- 
porary or  perpetual,-  hereditary  or  elective,  witli 
this  difference,  that  a  temporary  or  elective  ari- 
llocracy  always  puts  fome  power  in  the  hands  of 
the  people.  The  moil  complete  arifhocracy  is 
when  the  ruling  party  have  the  power  of  co-opta- 
tiori  within  themfelves,  and  can  fill  up  as  they 
pleafe  the  vacancies  made  by  deaths  or  religna- 
tion. 

Democracy  is  when  the  fupreme  power  is  left  in 
the  multitude.  But  as  in  large  governments  the 
people  in  a  colle£tive  body  cannot  well  meet  to- 
gether, nor  could  they  tranfacl  bufinefs  with  any 
convenience  if  they  did,  they  may  meet  by  re- 
prcfentatives,  chofen  either  by  the  whole  or  by  par- 
ticular diftrifts. 

From  thofe  fimple  forms  are  generated  many 
complex  form.s  ;  two  of  them  may  be  compounded 
together,  either  in  equal  or  in  different  proportions, 
or  all  thefe  may  be  united,  as  in  the  Britilli  govern- 
ment. 

After  pointing  out  the  fimple  forms  of  govern- 
ment, it  will  be  proper  to  make  fome  general  ob- 
fers^ations  upon  government,  and  apply  them  to  the 


Leci.  12.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  99 

various  forms,  to  (hew  whether  any  of  tliem  is  pre- 
ferable to  the  other,  and  the  advantages  and  defedls 
of  each  in  particular. 

I.  There  are  four  things  that  feem  to  be  requi- 
fite  in-  a  fyflem  of  government,  and  every  form  is 
good  in  proportion  as  it  poffefles  or  attains  them. 
(1.5  Wifdom  to  plan  proper  meafares  for  the  pub- 
lic good.  (2.)  Fidelity  to  have  nothing  but  the 
public  intereft  in  view.  (3.)  Secrecy,  expedition, 
and  difpatch  in  carrying  meafures  into  execution. 
And,  (4.)  Unity  and  concord,  or  that  one  branch  of 
the  government  may  not  impede,  or  be  a  hindrance 
to  another. 

Monarchy  has  plainly  the  advantage  in  unity, 
fecrecy,  and  expedition.  Many  cannot  fo  eaiily 
nor  fo  fpeedily  agree  upon  proper  meafures,  nor 
can  they  expe6l  to  keep  their  deligns  fecret  ;  there- 
fore, fayfome,  if  a  man  could  be  found  wife  enough, 
and  juft  enough  for  the  charge,  monarchy  would 
be  the  bell  form  of  government.  Accordingly  we 
find,  that  in  the  command  of  a  fliip,  fleet,  or  army, 
one  perfori  is  commonly  intruded  with  fupreme 
power  ;  but  this  does  not  apply  to  Hates,  for  many 
reafons.  No  man  can  be  found  who  has  either 
ikill  fufficient,  or,  if  he  had,  could  give  attention  to 
the  whole  departments  of  a  great  empire.  Befides, 
in  hereditary  monarchies  there  is  no  fecurity  at  all 
for  either  wifdom  orgoodnefs;  and  an  elective  mo- 
narchy, though  it  may  feem  to  promife  ability^  has 
been  always  found  in  experience  worfe  than  the 
other,  becaufe  there  is  no  reafon  to  expedl  that  an 
elected  monarch  will   have    the    public   good   at 


ICO  LECTURES  ON  Le(^.  12. 

heart  ;  lie  will  probably  mind  only  private  or  fa- 
mily intereft. 

Ariftocracy  has  the  advantage  of  all  the  others 
for  wisdom  in  deliberations ;  that  is  to  fay,  a  number 
of  perfons  of  the  firft  rank  mull  be  fuppofed  by 
their  confultations  to  be  able  to  difcover  the  public 
intereft.  But  it  has  very  little  or  no  profpe£l  of 
fidelity  or  union.  The  moft  ambitious  projeds, 
and  the  moll  violent  and  in\;lacable  factions,  often 
prevail  in  fuch  Hates. 

Democracy  has  the  advantage  of  both  the  otliers 
for  fidelity  ;  the  multitude  colle<5lively  always  are 
true  in  intention  to  the  intereft  of  the  public,  becaufe 
it  is  their  own.  They  are  the  public.  But  at  the 
fame  time,  it  has  very  little  advantage  for  wifdom 
or  union,  and  none  at  all  for  fecrecy  and  expedition. 
Belides,  the  multitude  are  exceeding  apt  to  be  de- 
ceived by  demagogues  and  ambitious  perfons.  They 
are  very  apt  to  truft  a  man  who  ferves  them  well, 
with  fuch  power  as  that  he  is  able  to  make  them 
ferve  him. 

If  the  true  notion  of  liberty  is  the  prevalence  of 
law  and  order,  and  thefecurity  of  individuals,  none 
of  the  limple  forms  are  favourable  to  it. 

Monarchy,  every  one  knows,  is  but  another  name 
Sox  tyranriy,  w^here  the  arbitrary  will  of  one  capri- 
cious man  difpofes  of  the  lives  and  properties  of  all 
ranks. 

Ariftocracy  always  makes  vaftals  of  the  inferior 
ranks,  who  have  r.o  hand  in  governi^ient,  and  the 
great  commonly  rule  with  greater  feverit}^  than  ab- 
folute  monarchs.  A  monarch  is  at  fuch  a  diftance 
from  moft  of  his  fubjeds,  that  he  does  them  little 


Ledl.  12.  MORAL   PHILOSOPHY.  lOI 

injury  ;  but  the  lord  of  a  petty  feignory  is  a  rigo- 
rous tafk-mafter  to  hfs  unhappy  dependents.  The 
jealoufy  with  wliich  the  members  of  an  ariftocrati- 
cal  ftate  defend  their  own  privileges,  is  no  fecurity 
at  all  for  humanity  and  eafy  treatment  to  their  infe- 
riors. Example — the  Spartans ;  their  treatment  of 
the  Helots — and  the  barons  in  all  the  feudal  govern- 
ments, in  their  treatment  of  their  vaflals. 

Pure  democracy  cannot  fubfift  long,  nor  be  car- 
ried far  into  the  departments  of  ftate — it  is  very 
fubjed  to  caprice  and  the  madnefs  of  popular  rage. 
They  are  alfo  very  apt  to  chufe  a  favourite,  and 
veft  him  with  fuch  power  as  overthrows  their  ow^ii 
liberty, — examples,  Athens  and  Rome. 

Hence  it  appears,  that  every  good  form  of  govern- 
ment muft  be  complex,  fo  that  the  one  principle 
may  check  the  other.  It  is  of  confequence  to  have 
as  much  virtue  among  the  particular  members  of  a 
community  as  poffible  ;  but  it  is  folly  to  expeA  that 
a  ftate  ftiould  be  upheld  by  integrity  in  all  who  have 
a  ftiare  in  managing  it.  They  muft  be  fo  balanced, 
that  when  every  one  draws  to  his  own  intereft  or 
inclination,  there  may  be  an  over-poife  upon  the 
whole. 

II.  The  fecond  obfer\'ation  upon  the  forms  of 
government  is,  that  where  there  is  a  balance  of  dif- 
ferent bodies,  as  in  all  mixed  forms,  there  muft  bo 
always  fome  tiexus  imperii,  fomething  to  make  one 
of  them  neceOary  to  the  other.  If  this  is  not  the 
cafe,  they  will  not  only  draw  different  ways,  but 
will  often  feparate  altogether  from  each  other.  In 
order  to  produce  this  nexusy  fome  of  the  great  eften- 
lial  rights  of  rulers  muft  be  divided,  and  diftribut^d 


lOi  LECTURES  ON  Left.  12. 

among  the  different  branches   of  the  legiilature 

Example  in  the  Britiih  government — the  King  has 
the  power  of  making  war  and  peace,  but  the  Par- 
liament have  the  le\^ing  and  dillribution  of  money, 
which  is  a  fufficient  reftraint. 

III.  The  third  obfervation  is,  that  the  ruling 
part  of  any  ftate  muft  always  have  confiderable  pro- 
perty, chiefly  of  lands.  The  reafon  is,  property  has 
fuch  an  invariable  influence,  that  w^hoever  poflfeffes 
property  muft  have  power.  Property  in  a'ftate  is 
alfo  fome  fecurity  for  fidelity,  becaufe  intereft  thea 
is  concerned  in  the  public  welfare. 

For  this  reafon,  did  men  in  every  ftate  live  en- 
tirely by  agriculture,  an  agrarian  law  would  be  ne- 
celTary  to  liberty,  becaufe  if  a  vdk  proportion  of 
property  came  into  a  few  hands,  they  would  foon 
take  all  power  to  themfelves.  But  trade  and  com- 
merce fuperfede  the  neceflity  of  this,  becaufe  the 
great  and  fudden  fortunes  accumulated  by  trade 
caufe  a  rotation  of  property. 

IV.  In  a  well-formed  flate,  the  fubjccts  fiiould 
not  be  too  numerous,  nor  too  few.  If  very  nu- 
merous, the  principles  of  government  cannot  exert 
their  force  over  the  whole.  The  Roman  empire 
fell  by  its  own  weight.  If  the  fubjefts  are  toofew^ 
they  are  not  fufficient  to  fupprefs  internal  infurrec- 
tions,  or  repel  attacks  from  without. 

V.  It  is  frequently  obferved,  that  in  every  go- 
vernment there  is  a  fupreme  irrefiflible  power  lod- 
ged fomewhere,  in  king,  fenate,  or  people.  To 
this  power  is  the  final  appeal  in  all  quefiions.  Be- 
yond this  we  cannot  go.  How  far  does  this  autho- 
rity extend  ?    We  anfwer,  As  far  as  authority  in  * 


heS:.  12.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I03 

fecial  ilate  can  extend,  it  is  not  accountable  to  any 
other  tribunal ;  and  it  is  fuppofed  in  the  focial  com- 
pacl,  that  we  have  agreed  to  fubmit  to  its  deciiion. 
There  is,  however,  an  exception,  if  the  fuprenie 
power,  wherever  lodged,  come  to  be  exercifed  in  a 
manifeflly  tyrannical  manner,  the  fubjecls  may  cer- 
tainly, if  in  their  power,  refift  and  overthrow  it. 
But  this  is  only  when  it  becomes  manifeftly  more 
advantageous  to  unfettle  the  government  altogether, 
than  to  fubmit  to  tyranny.  This  refiflance  to  the 
fupreme  power,  hov/ever,  is  fubverting  the  fociety 
altogether,  and  is  not  to  be  attempted  till  the  go- 
vernment is  fo  corrupt,  as  that  anarchy  and  the  un- 
certainty of  a  new  fettlement  is  preferable  to  the 
continuance  as  it  is. 

This  doclrine  of  reiiliance  even  to  the  fupreme 
power  is  elTentiaily  conned:ed  with  what  has  been 
faid  on  the  focial  contract,  and  the  confent  necef- 
fary  to  political  union.  If  it  be  alked.  Who  mull 
judge  v/hen  the  government  may  be  refilled  ?  I  an- 
fwer,  The  fubjects  in  general,  every  one  for  himielf- 
This  may  feem  to  be  making  them  both  judge  and 
party,  but  there  is  no  remedy.  It  would  be  deny- 
ing the  ^privilege  altogether,  to  make  the  oppreffivc 
ruler  the  judge. 

It  is  eafy  to  fee,  that  the  meaning  of  this  is  not, 
that  any  little  miilake  of  the  rulers  of  any  fociety 
will  juftify  refiilance.  We  mult  obey  and  fubmit 
to  them  always,  till  tlie  corruption  becomes  intole- 
rable ;  for  to  fay  that  we  might  refut  legal  authori- 
ty every  time  we  judged  it  to  be  wrong,  would  be 
inconliilent  w^ith  a  ftate  of  fociety,  and  to  the  very 
iirft  idea  of  fubie6tion. 


104  LECTURES  ON  Le£l.  12. 

The  once  famous  controverfy  on  pafTive  obe- 
dience and  non-refiftance,  feems  now,  in  our  coun- 
try, to  be  pretty  much  over;  what  the  advocates 
for  fubmiffion  ufed  to  fay  was,  that  to  teach  the 
lawfulnefs  of  refifting  a  government  in  any  inftance, 
and  to  make  the  rebel  the  judge,  is  fubverfive  of 
all  order,  and  muft  fubjecl  a  flate  to  perpetual  fedi- 
tion ;  to  which  I  anfwer,  To  refufe  this  inherent 
right  in  every  man,  is  to  eftablifh  injuftlce  and  ty- 
ranny, and  leave  every  good  fubje<Sl:  without  he]p, 
as  a  tame  prey  to  the  ambition  and  rapacity  of 
others.  No  doubt  men  may  abufe  the  privilege, 
yet  this  does  not  make  it  void.  Befides,  it  is  not 
till  a  whole  people  rife,  that  refillance  has  any  ef- 
fect ;  and  it  is  not  eafy  to  fuppofe,  that  a  whole 
people  would  rife  againft  their  governors,  unlefs  when 
they  have  really  received  very  great  provocation. 
Whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  nothing  is  more  na- 
tural than  for  rulers  to  grafp  at  power,  and  their  ii- 
tuation  enables  them  to  do  it  fuccefsfully  by  flow 
and  infenfible  encroachments.  In  experience, 
there  are  many  "infliances  of  rulers  becoming  ty- 
rants, but  comparatively  very  few  of  caufelefs  and 
premature  rebellions.  There  are  occafional  and 
partial  infurre6lions  in  every  government.  Thefe 
are  eafily  raifed  by  interelled  perfons,  but  the  great 
majority  continues  to  fupport  order. 

VI.  Dominion,  it  is  plain  from  all  that  has  been 
faid,  can  be  acquired  juftly  only  one  way,  viz.  by 
confent.  There  are  two  other  ways  commonly 
mentioned,  both  of  which  are  defedlive,  inheri- 
tance and  conqueft.  Hereditary  power,  which  ori- 
ginally rofe  from  confent;  and  is  fuppofed   to  be 


Le£l.  12.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  IC5 

founded  upon  the  continuance  of  confent,  (as  tkat 
of  the  hereditary  power  in  a  limited  monarchy),  is 
as  lawful  as  any  ;  but  when  they  pretend  fuch  a 
right  from  nature  is  independent  of  the  people,  it 
is  aWurd. 

That  which  is  called  the  right  of  conqueil  ought 
to  be  exploded  altogether.  We  Ihall  fee  by  and 
by  what  is  the-  ri;:ht  of  a  conqueror  in  a  jull  war. 
It  was  his  right  before,  and  he  obtains  pofleffion  of 
it  by  conquefl.  But  to  found  any  claim  merely  on 
conqueft,  is  not  a  right,  but  robbery. 

Upon  the  whole,  I  will  conclude  with  a  few  re- 
marks upon  the  fpirit  and  tendency  of  different 
forms  of  government. 

1.  Monarchical  government  has  a  tendency  to 
poUtenefs  and  elegance  of  manners,  and  generally 
to  luxury.  The  fubmiflion  and  obfequioufnefs 
praftifed  at  the  court  of  a  monarch,  diffufes  itfelf 
thi'ough  the  whole  flate. 

2.  Ariftocracy  narrows  the  mind  exceedingly^ 
and  mdeed  cannot  long  fublill  in  a  large  flate.  A 
fmall  ariftocracy,  however,  may  fublifl  as  a  form 
of  government,  as  long  as  any  other  method,  or 
longer. 

3.  Democracy  tends  to  plainnefs  and  freedom  of 
fpeech,  and  fometimes  to  a  favage  and  indecent  fe- 
rocity. Democracy  is  the  nurfe  of  eloquence,  be- 
caufe,  when  the  multitude  have  the  power,  perfua- 
fion  is  the  only  way  to  govern  them. 

Let  us  now  afk  this  fhort  queftion,  What  is  the 
t^alue  and  advantage  of  civil  liberty  ? 

Is  it  neceffary  to  virtue  ?    This  cannot  be  fuppou 
VoL.VII.  K 


IC6  LECTURES  ON  Le£l.i«." 

fed.  A  virtuous  mind  and  virtuous  conduft  is  pof- 
fible,  arid  perhaps  equallj  poflible,  in  every  form 
of  government. 

Is  it  neceflary  to  perfonal  private  happinefs  ?  It 
may  feem  fo.  We  fee  the  fubjefts  of  arbitrary 
governments,  however,  not  only  happy,  but  very 
often  they  have  a  greater  attachment  to  their  form 
of  government  than  thofe  of  free  flates  have  to 
Iheirs.  And  if  contentment  be  neceflary  to  happi- 
oefs,  there  is  commonly  more  impatience  and  dif- 
content  in  a  free  Hate  than  in  any  other.  The  ty- 
ranny even  of  an  abfolute  monarch  does  not  afFe£l 
with  perfonal  injury  any  of  his  fabjedts  but  a  few, 
and  chiefly  thofe  who  make  it  their  choice  to  be 
ilear  him.  Perhaps  in  free  governments,  the  law 
and  the  mob  do  more  mifchief  to  private  property, 
than  is  done  in  any  abfolute  monarchy. 

What,  then,  is  the  advantage  of  civil  liberty  ? 
I  fuppofe  it  chiefly  confifl:3  in  its  tendency  to  put  in 
motion  all  the  human  powers.  Therefore  it  pro- 
motes indufliry,  and  in  this  refpeft  happinefs,  pro- 
duces every  latent  quality,  and  improves  the  hu- 
man mind.  Liberty  is  the  nurfe  of  riches,  litera- 
ture, and  heroifm. 


Le^.   13.  MOJIAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I07 

LECTURE  XIIL 

OF  THE  LAW  OF  NATURE  AND  NATIONS. 

THE  next  thing  in  order  is,  to  treat  of  what  is 
called  the  law  of  nature  and  nations.  It  has 
been  before  obferved,  that  feparate  and  independent 
flates  are,  with  regard  to  one  another,  in  a  ilate  of 
natural  liberty,  or  as  man  to  man  before  the  com- 
mencement of  civil  fociety.  On  this  feveral  que- 
flions  arife^  i.  Is  there  any  fuch  law  ?  2.  What 
is  the  law  ?  3.  What  is  its  fanclion,  or  how  is  it 
to  be  enforced  ? 

That  there  is  fuch  a  law,  is  plain  from  the  rea- 
fons  that  fliews  the  obligation  which  one  man  lies 
under  to  another.  If  there  are  natural  rights  of 
men,  there  are  natural  rights  of  nations.  Bcxiies 
politic  in  this  view,  do  not  differ  in  the  leaft  from 
individuals.  Therefore,  as  before,  reafon,  con- 
fcience,  and  common  utility,  ihow  that  there  is  a 
law  of  nature  and  nations. 

The  queilion.  What  it  is  ?  mull  be  confidered  in 
the  fame  manner.  I  am  not  able  to  recollecl  any 
perfeft  or  imperfect  right  that  can  belong  to  one 
man,  as  diilinguifhed  from  another,  but  what  be- 
longs to  nations,  fave  that  there  is  ufually  lefs  oc- 
cafion  for  the  imperfeiTt  rights.  If  we  read  over 
the  perfect  rights,  in  a  llate  of  natural  liberty, 
we  fhall  fee  they  all  apply  to  nations. 

It  will  alfo  appear,  that  the  imperfect  rights  ap- 
ply i  but  the  occafions  of  exerting  tl^^m  are  much 
-    Ki 


I08  LECTURES  ON  ^  Left.  13. 

more  rare.  For  example,  it  is  more  rare  to  fee  a 
nation  in  a  flate  of  general  indigence,  fo  as  to  re- 
quire a  fupplj.  Yet  this  fometimes  happens.  It 
did  fo  in  the  cafe  of  Portugal,  at  the  time  of  the 
great  earthquake  at  Lifbon  ;  and  the  other  nations 
of  Europe  lent  them  alTiilaace.  It  is  alfo  from  tliis 
principle  that  Ihips  of  different  nations,  meeting  at 
fea,  will  do  afts  of  humanity  to  one  another.  Some- 
times alfo  there  are  national  favours  that  deferve 
national  gratitude.  But  this  is  feldom  merited, 
and,  I  believe,  ftill  feldomer  paid. 

As  to  the  fan£lion  of  the  law  of  nature  and  na- 
tions, it  is  no  other  than  a  general  fenfe  of  duty, 
and  fuch  a  fenfe  of  common  utility,  as  makes  men 
fear,  that  if  they  notorioufly  break  t^efe  laws,  re- 
proach and  infamy  among  all  nations  will  be  the 
efFed,  and  probably  refentment  and  indignation  by 
common  confent. 

The  violation  of  the  natural  rights  of  mankind 
being  a  tranfgreflion  of  the  law  of  nature,  and  be- 
tween nations  as  in  a  ftate  of  natural  liberty,  there 
being  no  method  of  redrefs  but  force,  the  law  of 
nature  and  nations  has  as  its  chief  or  only  object 
jhe  manner  of  making  zvar  and  peace. 

In  war  it  is  proper  to  confider  diflin^tly,  I .  The 
caufes  for  which  a  juft  war  may  be  carried  on. 
2.  The  time  of  commencing.  3.  The  duration. 
4.  The  means  by  which  it  may  be  carried  on. 

As  to  the  fnft,  the  caufes  of  commencing  war 
arc,  according  to  the  principles  above  laid  down,  the 
violation  of  any  perfect  right — as  taking  away  the 
property  of  the  other  ftate,  or  the  lives  of  its  fub- 
jefts,  or  reftralning  them  in  their  induftry,  or  hin- 


Le£l.   13.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  IC9 

dering  tbem  in  the  ufe  of  things  common,  &:c. 
There  is  only  one  perlecl  right,  the  violation  pf 
wiiich  does  not  feem  to  be  a  caufe  of  war  ;  I  mean 
that  hj  which  we  have  a  right  to  charadcr.  Na- 
tional calumny  is  fcarcely  a  caufe  of  wjir,  becaufe 
it  cannot  be  frequent  or  of  great  eiFeft.  The  violation 
of  imperfecl  rights  cannot  ufually  be  a  caufe  of  war 
between  nations  ;  yet  a  cafe  may  be  fuppofed,  in 
which  even  thefe  would  be  a  juft  caufe  of  war. 
Suppofe  a  fhip  of  any  nation  Ihould  go  into  a  port 
of  another,  in  the  greateft  diftrefs,  and  not  only  the 
people  in  general,  but  the  governing  part  of  the  fo- 
ciety  fhould  deny  them  all  affillance  : — This  would 
be  an  acl:  of  fuch  notorious  inhumanity,  and  of 
fuch  evil  example,  that  it  may  juftify  national  re- 
fentment  ;  and  yet  even  here,  I  think  there  ihould 
firfl  be  a  demand  of  juftice  upon  the  offending 
perfons,  before  vengeance  fhould  be  taken  upon  the 
ilate. 

Thefeare  the  juft  and  legitimate  caufes  of  making 
war.  Some  add  to  them,  that  when  a  nation  is  feen 
to  put  itfclf  in  fuch  a  lituation  as  to  defence,  or  as 
to  the  means  of  annoying  others,  that  it  feems  to 
threaten  hoflilities,  then  we  are  not  obliged  to  wait 
till  it  hath  committed  adual  injury,  but  may  put  it 
in  a  ftate  of  incapacity  ;  but  there  is  no  other  truth 
in  this,  but  v/hat  is  founded  upon  the  other  ;  for 
the  piefervation  of  our  property  implies,  that  if 
others  take  fuch  meafures  as  are  not  to  be  accounted 
for,  but  upon  the  fuppofition  of  an  intention  of 
wronging  me,  it  is  often  eafier  and  fafer  to  prevent 
and  difarm  the  robber,  than  to  fuffer  him  to  com- 
K3 


*'-^  LECTURES  ov  Le6:.  13. 

mit  the  violence,  and  then  to  fliip  him  and  rob 
him  of  his  prey. 

Oiie  thing  more  is  to  be  added,  that  every  nation 
has  a  rii;ht  to  join  which  it  pleafes  of  two  contend- 
ing parties.  This  is  eafily  refolved  into  the  gene- 
ral principles  ;  for  the  injured  party  may  be  fup- 
pofed  to  go  to  war  in  defence  of  fome  perfect 
right ;  and  the  caufe  being  juft,  the  imperfeft  right 
of  humanity,  as  well  as  general  and  common  utili- 
ty, calls  for  alTiilance  to  the  oppreiled.  So  that, 
if  we  have  a  right  to  aflbciate  with  any  nation, 
we  may  be  entitled  to  protefl  their  property  and 
rights. 

2.  As  to  the  time  of  commencing  war,  itfeems 
to  be  no  way. contrary  to  natural  law,  to  fay  it  is 
at  any  time  the  injured  party  pleafes,  after  having 
received  an  injury  -,  but  accident  or  utilit}%  or  a  de- 
ilre  in  each  party  to  manifell  the  equity  of  their 
caufe,  has  introduced  imiverfally  the  cuilom  of  de- 
claring war.  This  begun  very  early,  and,  though 
not  of  abfolute  right,  having  been  generally  intro- 
duced, muft  be  continued,  though  there  is  often 
more  of  form  than  of  fub fiance  in  it ;  for  nations 
do  often  begin  both  attack  and  defence  before  de- 
claration, as  well  as  make  all  the  neeeffary  prepa- 
rations for  ftrikino:  the  moft  effeftual  blow.  Tire 
meaning  of  a  declaration  of  war  feems  to  be,  to 
call  upon  the  injured  party  to  prevent  it  by  repara- 
tion ;  likewife,  to  manifeft  to  all  other  ftates  tli€ 
juftice  of  the  caufe. 

3.  The  duration  of  a  war  fhould  be,  according 
to  natural  equity,  till  the  injury  be  completely  re- 
drcflcd,  and  reafonable  fecurity  given  againll  fu^ 


Le<5l.  IJ.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  Ill 

ture  attacks  ;  therefore  the  praftice,  too  common, 
of  contmui ng  a  v.^ar  for  the  acquifitlon  of  empire, 
is  to  be  condemned.  Becaufe  one  ftate  has  done 
fome  injury  to  another,  it  feems  quite  unreafonable 
that  thej  ihould  not  only  repair  the  injurr",  but 
fubvert  and  ruin  the  offending  ftate  altogether  ;  this 
would  be  unreafonable  between  man  and  man,  if 
one  had  wronged  another,  not  only  to  repair  the 
v,Tong,  but  to  rake  all  the  reft  that  he  had,  and  re- 
duce his  family  to  beggar}-.  It  is  ev^h  more  un- 
reafonable in  ftates,  becaufe  the  offenders  in  ftates 
are  not  to  be  fuppofed  to  be  the  whole  people,  but 
only  the  rulers,  or  perhaps  only  fome  indivi- 
duals. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  alkcd,  W^at  is  r^asGnable  fe- 
cuiity  againft  future  injury  ?  I^ anfwer.  Between 
equal  independent  natio^^s,  foiemn  treaties  cught  t© 
be  confidercd  as  fecurity  ;  but,  if  faitb  has  beea 
often  broken,  perhaps  fomething  more  may  be  re- 
quired. The  mutual  complaints  of  natio-is  againft 
each  other  for  breach  of  faith,  makes  conquerors 
often  demand  fuch  a  degree  of  fecurity,  as  puts 
the  conquered  altogether  in  their  power. 

4.  As  to  the  legitimate  means  of  carrying  oa 
the  war,  in  general,  it  may  be  faid  in  one  word,  by 
force  or  open  \"ioleiice.  It  is  admitted  on  all  hand% 
that  this  force  may  be  ufed  againft  the  perfon  and 
goods,  not  only  of  the  rulers,  but  of  every  member 
of  the  hoftUe  ftate.  This  may  feem  hard,  that  in- 
noceni  P-ibje£ls  of  "the  ftate  ftiould  fuller  for  the  fol- 
ly and  indifcreiion  of  the  rulers,  or  of  other  mem- 
bers of  the  fame  ftate  ;  but  it  is  ur.avoidable.  The 
whok  individuals  that  c^muofe  a  ftate  are   conftvi. 


112  LECTURES  ON  J-ed.  I3, 

dered  but  as  one  body  ;  it  would  be  impofTible  for 
an  enemy  to  diftinguifh  the  guilty  from  the  inno- 
cent ;  and  when  men  fubmit  to  a  government,  they 
riik  their  own  polTeffions  on  the  fame  bottom  with 
the  whole,  in  return  for  the  benefits  of  fociety. 

Open  violence  may  be  fald  to  liave  no  bounds, 
xind  therefore  eyery  method  that  can  be  invented, 
;md  the  moft  deadly  weapons  of  annoyance  may 
feem  to  be  permitted.  But,  from  v/hat  has  been 
faiJ  above,  and  upon  the  principles  of  general  e- 
qulty,  all  a6ls  of  cruelty  and  inhumanity  are  to  be 
blamed,  and  all  feverliy  that  Has  not  an  immediate 
elfecl  in  weakening  the  national  flrength  of  the 
enemy,  is  certainly  inhumanity  ;  fuch  as,  killing 
prifoners  whom  you  can  keep  fafely,— killing  w^o- 
men  and  children, — burning  and  dellroying  every 
thhio-  that  could  be  of  ufe  -in  life. 

o 

The  ufe  of  poifoned  weapons  has  been  alfo  ge- 
nerally condemned,  and  the  poifoning  of  fprings  or 
provifions. 

To  the  honour  of  modem  times,  and  very  pror 
bably,  I  think,  to  the  honour  of  Chriilianity, 
there  is  much  more  humanity  in  the  way  of  car- 
rying on  war  than  formerly. 

To  aim'  particularly  at  the  life  of.  a  leader,  or 
perfon  of  chief  note,  feems  to  have  in  it  nothing 
unjull  or  improper,  becaufe  the  more  important  the 
life,  it  does  more  toward  the  finifliing  of  the  war  ; 
but  what  many  feem  to  admit,  the  bribing  of  his 
own  people  to  ailafTmate  him  privately,  I  cannot 
think  honourable  or  fair. 

A  queflion  is  often  moved  in  morals.  How  far  it 
is  lawful  to  deceive  an  enemy,  efpecially  if  we 


Left.   13.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  113 

hold  the  general  and  univerfal  obligation  of  truth. 
To  this  it  maj  be  anfwered,  in  the  firft  place,  that- 
vre  maj  certainly  with  gi'eat  juftice  conceal  our 
own  deligns  from  an  enemy,  as.  indeed,  we  may 
generally  from  friends,  by  lilence,  and  guarding 
againft  every  circumftance  that  may  betray  them". 
Neither  do  I  think  there  is  any  thing  at  all  blame- 
worthy in  a  general  of  an  army  ufing  ambiguous 
iigns,  as  feigaed  marches  of  a  part  or  the  whole, 
putting  up  lights  or  fuch  things,  becaufe,  after  a 
declaration  of  war,  he  does  not  pretend  to  give  in- 
formation to  his  enemy  of  his  motions ;  nay,  it  is 
expefted  on  both  fides,  that  they  will  do  the  bell 
they  can  to  over-reach  one  another  in  point  of  pru- 
dence. Yet  I  can  fcarce  think  it  right  to  emploj^ 
people  to  go  to  the  enemy,  and,  profelling  to  be 
fincere,  tell  direft  falfehoods,  and  deceive  them  bjr 
that  falfe  intelligence. 

It  is  the  cuftom  of  all  to  fend  fpieS  to  difcover 
the  enemy's  defigns,  and  alfo  to  bribe  fome  of  the 
enemies  themfelves,  to  difcover  the  deligns  of  their 
leadeTs ;  the  lail  of  which  is,  I  think,  at  leaft  of  a 
doubtful  nature,  or  rather  unjufi:.  Though  fending 
fpies  is  by  -all  approved,  yet  (what  may  feem  a 
little  unaccountable)  fuch  fpies  are  always  punifh- 
ed  with  infhant  death  by  the  oppofite  party,  when 
detefted.  The  reafon  probably  is,  that,  pretend- 
ing frienddiip,  they  have  a  right  to  confider  them 
as  traitors ;  or,  as  they  are  in  an  aft  of  hoflihty, 
they  kill  their,  as  they  would  do  an  enemy  in 
battle,  when  in  their  power. 

.  Thefe  circumftanc;es  apply  to  all  v/ar  in  general ; 
but  there  is  a  diftinftion  of  wars  by  civilians  into 


114  LECTURES  ON  Le<n:.  I3. 

two  kinds,  solemn  and  civiL  The  firft  includes  all 
wars  between  ilates  formerly  independent ;  the 
other,  internal  infurredions  of  a  part  of  one  go- 
vernment againft  another. 

There  has  generally  been  a  great  difference  in 
the  behaviour  of  the  oppofite  parties  in  thefe  diffe- 
rent wars.  In  folemn  wars  there  is  a  prefumption 
of  integrity  in  the  plurality  on  both  fides  ;  each  be- 
lieves his  own  caufe  to  be  jull.  On  this  account 
they  are  to  be  treated  with  the  more  humanity.  In 
civil  wars,  the  infurgents  are  conlid^ed  as  making 
unjull  refiftance  to  the  ruling  part  of  the  fociety, 
and  therefore  guilty  of  the  greateft  crimes  againft 
fociety.  Therefore  they  are  often  treated  with 
great  rigour,  and,  when  taken  in  battle,  referved 
to  folemn  trial  and  public  execution.  There  i$ 
■(ome  reafon  for  this  in  many  cafes,  when  it  is  in^- 
deed  an  unreafonable  or  unprovoked  infurredlion  of 
diforderly  citizens  ;  but  there  are  many  cafes  in 
which  the  pretences  on  both  fides  are  fo  plaufible, 
that  the  war  fhould  be  in  all  refpeds  confidered  as 
folemn. 

It  fhould  be  obferved,  notwithltanding  the  hollile 
difpofition,  there  are  occalions,  both  in  a  treaty  for 
peace  and  during  the  continuance  of  the  war,  when 
enemies  are  under  the  flrongeft  obligations  to  fince- 
jfity  in  their  behaviour  to  each  other  ;  when  pro- 
pofals  are  made  for  accommodating  the  differences, 
for  a  fufpenfion  of  arms,  for  an  exchange  of  prifon- 
ers,  or  any  thing  fimilar. 

It  is  worth  while  to  inquire,  whether  the  greateft 
honour  and  candour  in  war,  with  a  fliicl  adherence 


Led.  13.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  II5- 

to  all  the  laws  above  laid  down,  would  give  any 
party  a  great  advantage  who  fhould  take  the  liber- 
ty of  tranlgrelTing  them ;  as  for  example,  who 
Ihould  life  poifoned  weapons,  fhould  fend  people  to 
tell  falfe  (lories,  fhould  bribe  fubjefts  to  affaflinate 

a  hoftile  prince I  anfwer,  that  they  would  have 

no  advantage  at  all,  but  probably  the  contrary. 
There  is  fomething  powerful  in  magnanimity,  which 
fubdues  the  hearts  of  enemies  ;  nay,  foraetimes  ter- 
rifies them,  and  particularly  infpires  a  general's 
army  with  invincible  courage.  Befides  thefe,  fini- 
iler  arts  are  not  fo  terrible  as  may  be  imagined  ; — 
telling  falfe  news  is  as  eafilj  difcovered  as  any  trick 
whatfoever. 

Prudence  and  integrity  have  no  need  of  any  af- 
fiflance  from  fraud  ;  a£ls  even  of  generolity,  from 
enemy  to  enemy,  are  often  as  ufeful  as  any  acts  of 
hoftility.  There  was  fomething  very  handfome  in 
the  Roman  general,  who  refufed  to  avail  himfelf  of- 
the  treachery  of  a  fchool-mafter,  as  well  as  whim- 
fical  in  the  way  in  which  he  puiiiihed  the  traitor. 

Of  Making  Peace, 

As  already  hinted,  all  prop  of als  tending  to^  thi* 
purpofe  ought  to  be  made  with  the  utmoft  fincerity. 
Of  all  deceits  in  war,  the  mod  infamous  is  that  of' 
making  a  treaty,  or  feeking  a  confidence,  only  to 
take  advantage  of  the  fecurity  of  one  party,  to  de- 
il:roy  him, — by  affailination,  or  by  breaking  a  truce- 
to  fight  with  advantage. 

The  terms  of  peace  ought  to  be  agreeable  to  the 


1.1^  LECTURES  ON  Left.  1 3. 

end  of  making  war.     Damages  ftiould  be  repaired, 
and  fecurity  given  againft  future  injury. 

We  have  often  faid,  that  nation  to  nation  is  as 
man  to  man  in  a  flate  of  natural  liberty  ;  therefore 
treaties  of  peace  between  nations  fliould  in  general 
proceed  upon  the  fame  principles  as  private   con- 
txads  between  man  and  man.     There  is,  however, 
an  exception,    that  contracts  between  individuals 
are  (at  leaft  by  law)  always  void  when  the)  are 
the  effe£t   of  conflraint  upon  one  fide.     Now,  this 
muft  not  hold  in  treaties  between  nations,  becaufe 
it  would  always  furniili  a  pretext  for  breaking  them. 
On  the  fide  of  the  conquered,  a  treaty  is  always  in 
a  great  degree  the  efFed  of  neceffity. 
.   It  is  generally,  however,  laid  down  in  moft  au- 
thors as  a  principle,  that  the  terms  impofed  and  fub- 
mitted  to  may  be  fome times  fo  rigorous  and  oppref- 
live,  as  to  juftify  the  injured  party  in  revolting  when 
they  are  able.     This  feems  to  me  to  be  very  lax 
in  point  of  morals.     It  would  be   better,  I  think, 
to  fay,  that  the  people  who  made  the  treaty  ihould 
not  recede  from  it.     Their  pofterity,  however,  at 
fome  diftaace,  cannot  be  fuppofed  bound  to  unjuft 
fervitude  by  the  deeds  of  their  fathers. 

Let  us  conclude  this  fubjed  by  a  few  remarks  on 
the  fituation  of  neutral  ftates. 

1.  Every  ftate  has  a  right,  when  others  are  con- 
tending, to  remain  neuter,  and  ailift  neither  party. 

2.  They  have  a  right  to  all  their  former  privi- 
leges with  both  the  contending  parties,  may  carry 
on  their  traiHc  with  both,  and  may  fhew  all  the 
ufual  marks  of  friendihip  to  both  ;  only,  it  has  beea 
generally  agreed  upon,  that  they  r.re  not  to  trade 


Left.  13.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  II7 

with  any  of  them  in  certain  articles  fuppofed  to  be 
of  confequence  in  carrying  on  war,  particularly 
proviiions  and  arms. 

3.  Neutral  powers  fliould  keep  their  harbours 
alike  open  to  both  for  common  refrefhment,  and  as 
an  afylum  to  lly  to.  And  it  is  held  necefTary,  that 
the  contending  powers  mull  not  carry  on  their 
quarrel,  nor  exercife  any  hoftilities,  within  the  ter- 
ritories of  a  neutral  Hate. 

4.  Neutral  ftates  may  purchafe  movetible  goods 
from  any  of  the  contending  parties,  which  have 
been  taken  from  the  other.  But  not  fo  with  re- 
fpeft  to  lands  or  forts  ;  becaufe,  if  the  other  party 
are  able,  they  will  re-take  their  poflefTions. 

5.  Deeds  of  a  violent  poflefTor  are  held  to  ba 
valid  ;  that  is  to  fay,  if  a  conqueror  prevails  for 
a  time,  and  levies  tribute  from  any  country,  and 
afterwards  the  rightful  poflefTor  prevails,  it  would 
be  unjuft  to  demand  the  tribute  again,  becaufe  the 
true  owner  w^as  not  able  to  give^  protection  to  tho 
fubjefts,  and  what  was  paid  was  loft  through  his 
weaknefs.  The  fame  thing  may  be  faid  of  a  de- 
pendent ftate  y  if  it  owes  any  money  and  fervice 
to  a  fupreme  ftate,  and  an  enemy  exaft  it  by  force, 
the  proper  creditor  cannot  juftly  demand  it  again. 

On  the  whole,  thofe  things  that  have  been  gene- 
rally received  as  the  law  of  nature  and  nations,  are 
founded  on  the  principles  of  equity,  and,  when 
well  obferved,  do  greatly  promote  general  utiiity. 

VoL.  VII.  L 


«i8  LECTURES  0}f  Lea.  14, 


LECTURE  XIV. 

JURISPRUDENCE. 

JURISPRUDENCE  is  the  method  of  enaaiiig  and 
adminiftering  civil  laws  in  any  conllitution. 

We  cannot  propofe  to  go  through  a  fjftem  of  ci- 
vil laws ;  and  therefore  what  I  have  in  view,  is  to 
make  fome  preliminary  remarks,  and  then  to  point 
out  the  object  of  civil  laws,  and  the  manner  of 
their  operation. 

I.  The  firfl  preliminary  remark  is,  that  a  con- 
flitution  is  excellent,  when  the  fpirit  of  the  civil 
laws  is  fuch,  as  to  have  a  tendency  to  prevent  of- 
fences, and  make  men  good,  as  much  as  to  puniih 
them  when  they  do  evil. 

This  is  necelTaiy  in  fome  meafm*c  ;  for,  when 
ihe  general  difpoiition  of  a  people  is  againft  the 
laws,  they  cannot  long  fubfift,  even  by  a  flri6l  and 
rigorous  execution  on  the  part  of  the  rulers. 
There  is,  however,  more  of  this  in  fome  conilita- 
tions  than  in  others.  Solon  and  Xenophon,  as 
well  as  Lycurgus,  feem  to  have  formed  their  plan 
very  much  with  this  view,  to  dire6l  the  manners 
of  the  people  in  the  firft  place,  which  will  always 
make  the  obfervance  of  particular  laws  eafy. 

But  how  fhall  the  magiilrate  manage  this  matter  ? 
or  what  can  be  done  by  law,  to  make  the  people 
of  any  ftatc  virtuous  ?  If,  as  we  have  feen  above^ 
virtue  and  piety  are  infeparably  connefted,  then  to 
promote  true  religion  is  the  bed  and  mofl  effcdual 


Le£t.   14.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  II9 

way  of  making  a  virtuous  and  regular  people. 
Love  to  God,  and  love  to  man,  is  the  fubftance  of 
religion  ;  when  thefe  .prevail,  civil  laws  will  have 
little  to  do. 

But  this  leads  to  a  very  important  difquifitioa, 
how  far  the  mao^iftrate  ouo-ht  to  interfere  in  matters 
of  religion.  Religious  fentiments  are  very  va- 
rious, and  we  have  given  it  as  one  of  the  perfe£l 
riglits  in  natural  liberty,  and  that  which  ought  not 
to  be  alienated  even  in  fociety,  that  every  one 
fliould  judge  for  himfelf  in  matters  of  religion. 

What  the  magiflrate  may  do  on  this  fubje£l:, 
feems  to  be  confined  to  the  three  following  particu- 
lars. 

(1.)  The  iftagiftrate  (or  niling  part  of  aiiy  fo- 
ciety) ought  to  encourage  piety  by  his  own  ex- 
ample, and  by  endeavouring  to  make  it  an  obje6t 
of  public  efteem.  Whenevjr  the  general  opinion 
is  in  favour  of  any  thing,  it  will  have  many  fol- 
lowers. Magiftrates  may  promote  and  encourage 
men  of  piety  and  virtue,  and  they  may  difcounte- 
nance  thofe  whom  it  w^ould  be  improper  to  pu- 
niih. 

(2.)  The  magiftrate  ought  to  defend  the  rights 
of  confcience,  and  tolerate  all  in  their  religious 
fentiments,  that  are  not  injurious  to  their  neio-h- 
hours.  In  the  ancient  heathen  ftates,  there  was 
lefs  occafion  for  this,  becaufe,  in  the  fyftem  of  po- 
"^ytheifm,  the  different  gods  and  rites  were  not  fup- 
pofed  to  be  oppofite,  but  co-ordinate  and  confiftent ; 
but  when  there  is  believed  to  be  but  one  God,  the 
fentiments  about  his  nature  and  worlhip  will  often 
L2 


120  i.ECTURES  ON  Led.  I4* 

be  confidered  as  effentially  repugnant  one  to  ano- 
ther. 

The  pretence  of  infidels,  that  perfecution  only 
belongs  to  the  Chriftian  religion,  is  abfurd ;  for 
the  Chriftian  was  the  firft  religion  that  was  perfe- 
©uted  ;  and  it  was  the  neceffary  confequence  of  fay- 
ing, that  the  gods  of  the  heathens  were  no  gods. 

At  prefent,  as  things  are  fituated,  one  of  the  mod 
important  duties  of  the  magiftracy  is,  to  proted  the 
rights  of  confcience. 

It  is  commonly  faid,  however,  that  in  cafe  any 
feft  holds  tenets  fubverfive  of  fociety,  and  incon- 
fiftent  with  the  rights  of  others,  that  they  ought 
not  to  be  tolerated.  On  this  footing  Popery  is  not 
tolerated  in  Great  Britain  ;  becaufe  they  profefs  en- 
tire fubjeftion  to  a  foreign  power,  the  fee  of  Rome  ; 
and  therefore  muft  be  in  oppofition  to  the  proper 
intereft  of  their  own  ftate  ;  and  becaufe  violence 
or  perfecution  for  religion  is  a  part  of  their  reli- 
gion, which  makes  their  profperity  threaten  ruin 
to  others,  as  well  as  the  principle  imputed  to  them, 
which  they  deny,  That  faith  is  not  to  be  kept  with 
heretics.  But,  however  juft  this  may  be  in  a  way 
of  reafoning,  we  ought  in  general  to  guard  againfl 
perfecution  on  a  religious  account  as  much  as  pof- 
iible,  becaufe  fuch  as  hold  abfurd  tenets  are  feldom 
clangerous.  Perhaps  they  are  never  dangerous, 
but  when  they  are  opprefled.  Papifts  are  tolerated 
in  Holland,  without  danger  to  liberty.  Ancfc- 
though  not  properly  tolerated,  they  are  now  con- 
nived at  in  Britain. 

In  ancient  times,  in  great  ftate s,  the  cenforial 
power  wcs   fecund  neceflary  to  their  continuance. 


Lecl.   14.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  l2l 

which  mfpe8:ed  the  manners  of  men.  It  feems 
probable,  that  fupporting  the  religious  feels  in  mo- 
dern times  anfvvers  this  end  ;  for  the  particular  dl'f- 
cipline  of  each  fed  is  intended  for  the  corredion 
of  manners. 

(3.)  The  magiftrate  may  ena£l  laws  for  the  pu- 
iiifhment  of  afts  of  profanity  and  impietj.  The 
different  fentiments  of  men  in  religion  olight  not 
by  any  means  to  encourage  or  give  a  fandion  to 
fuch  acls  as  any  of  them  count  profane. 

Many  are  of  opinion,  that,  belides  all  this,  the 
magiftrate  ought  to  make  public  pro^'ifion  for  the 
worfhip  of  God,  in  fach  manner  as  is  agreeable  to 
the  great  body  of  the  fociety  ;  though,  at  the  fame 
time,  all  who  diflent  from  it  are  fully  tolerated. 
And,  indeed,  there  feems  to  be  a  good  deal  of  rea*- 
f  jn  for  it,  that  fo  inftruftion  may  be  provided  for 
the  bulk  of  common  people,  who  would,  many  of 
them,  neither  fupport  nor  employ  teachers,  unlefs 
they  were  obliged.  The  magiftrate's  right  in  this 
cafe  feems  to  be  fomething  like  that  of  the  pa- 
rent ;  they  have  a  right  to  inilrud,  but  not  to  con- 
ilrain. 

2.  The  fecond  preliminary  remark  is,  that  laws 
fnould  be  fo  framed  as  to  promote  fuch  principles 
in  general  as  are  favourable  to  good  government^ 
and  particularly  that  principle,  if  there  be  one, 
that  gave  rife  to  the  conftitution,  axid  is  congenial 
to  it. 

Such  a  principle  as  I  have  in  view,  is  generally 
the  point  of  honour  in  a  country  ;  and  this  lawgi- 
vers aad  adniiniftrators  of  liw  fhould  e. id  savour  to 

L3 


4  2^  -      LECTURES  OK  '      Ledl.  I4. 

prcfei*vc  in  its  full  vigour,  for  wherxcver  it  is  un- 
ilermined  the  coiiftitution  goes  to  ruin. 
.  Of  tliefe  principles,  fobrietj,  induftry,  and  pu- 
blic fpirit,  are  tlie  chief.  Some  ftates  are  formed 
to  fubfifl  by  fobriety  and  parlimony,  as  the  Lace- 
demonians, 

Induftry  is  the  prevailing  principle  ih  others,  as 
in  Holland.  Public  fpirit  in  others,  as  in  Greece, 
ancient  Rome,  and  Britain.  Only  public  fpirit 
may  be  diyerfified  ;  fometimes  it  is  a  paiTion  for 
acquiring  glory  and  dominion,  as  in  Rome  ;  and 
fometimes  for  preferving  liberty,'  as  U).  Greece  and 
Britain. 

When  I  fay,  that,  in  the  management  of  a  Hate, 
the  utmoft  attention  fhould  be  given  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  conftitution,  to  preferve  it  in  its  vi- 
gour, I  mean,  that  though  all  other  cr  mes  are  bad, 
and  in  part  tend  to  the  ruin  of  a  flate,  yet  this  is 
much  more  the  cafe  with  crimes  againfl  that  prin- 
ciple, than  any  other.  Ajij  acl  of  immorality 
was  )?ad  at  Sparta  ;  but  to  make  poverty  and  parfi- 
mony  reproachful,,  and  to  introduce  fine  houfes  and 
furniture,  aad  .delicate  entertainments,  would  have 
been  inftant  ruin* 

Any  a<El  of  immorality  would  be  hurtful  in  Hol- 
land 3  but  to  make  fraudulent  bankruptcy  lefs  in- 
famous than  it  is^  would  immediately  deflroy 
them. 

Sobriety,  induftry,  and  public  fpirit,  are  nearly 
allied,  and  have  a  reciprocal  influence  upon  one  an- 
other. Yet  there  niay  be  a  great  degree  of  fome 
cf  them,  in  the  abfence  of  the  others.  In  Spartg^ 
there  was  much  fobricty  and  public  fpirit,  but  little 


Left.  14.  MORAL  PHIL030FHT.  1^3 

indurcrj.     In   Athens,  induftry   and  public  fpirit, 
but  very  little  parfimony. 

In  oppofition  to  the  whole  of  this,  Mandcvillc 
wrote  a  book,  called  The  Faole  of  the  Bees y  which 
feems  to  be  levelled  againft  fobriety,  induflry,  and 
public  fpirit,  all  at  once  ;  his  pofition  is.  That  pri- 
'■jate  inces  are  public  lenefitSy  and  that  the  waile  and 
luxury  of  one  man  fupplies  the  wants  of  another. 
But  it  is  eafy  to  overthrow  his  reafoning  ;  for, 
though  fober  and  induflrious  perfons  fpend  each  lefs 
than  a  profufe  perfon^,  yet  fobriety  and  induftrj 
tend  much  more  to  population,  and  by  that  means 
they  are  mutually  ferviceable  to  eacli  other.  Lux- 
ury and  vice  only  w^afle  and  deftroy,  they  add  no- 
tliing  to  the  common  Hock  of  property  or  of  hap- 
pineis.  Experience  fully  jufliiies  this  ;  for,  though 
from  the  luxury  of  one  man  another  may  reap 
fome  gain,  the  luxury  of  a  nation  always  tends  to 
the  ruin,  of  that  nation. 

3.  A  third  preliminary  remark  is,  that  laws 
may  be  of  two  kinds,  either  written,  or  in  the  breafts 
of  magiilrates.  In  every  conftitution  of  note,  there 
is  fomething  of  each  of  thefe  kinds.  It  is  uncertain, 
whether  it  is  better  to  have  many  or  few  fpecial  laws. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  feems  to  be  the  very  fpirit  of 
a  free  conftitution,  to  have  every  thing  as  ftrifl- 
ly  defined  as  poflible,  and  to  leave  little  in  the 
power  of  the  judge.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  2 
multiplicity  of  laws  is  fo  apt  to  lead  to  litigation, 
and  to  end  in  ambiguity,  that  perhaps  judges  o-f 
equity,  chofen  by  the  diilrid  in  which  they  live 
and  are  to  aci,  and  choferi  but  for  a  time^  would 
be  a  more  juft  and  etjuitable  method  of  ending  di£- 


124  LECTURES  oy  Le£l:,  14. 

ferences.  But  the  difficulty  of  fettling  a  conftitu- 
tion,  fo  as  always  to  fecure  the  eleftion  of  impar- 
tial judges,  has  made  modem  Hates,  where  there  is 
liberty,  prefer  a  multiplicity  of  written  laws. 

4.  The  laft  preliminary  remark  is,  that  no  hu- 
man conftitution  can  be  fo  formed,  but.  that  there 
mud  be  exceptions  to  every  law.  So  that  there 
may  be  in  every  nation  oppreilion  under  form  of 
law,  according  to  the  old  maxim,  Sunimum  jus^ 
summa  injuria.  This  further  fhews  the  neccffity  of 
forming  the  manners  of  a  people. 

After  having  laid  down  thefe  preliminaries,  we 
may  obferve,  that  the  objeft  of  civil  law^s  may  be 
divided  into  the  three  following  particulars. 

1 .  To  ratify  the  moral  laws  by  the  fanftion  of 
the  focietv.  The  tranfi^reffion  of  fuch  laws  are 
called  crimes,  as  profanity,  adultery,  murder,  ca- 
lumny, &:c.  And  they  are  profecuted  and  punifh- 
ed  by  order  of  the  public,  according  to  the  fpirit 
of  every  conftitution. 

2.  To  lay  down  a  plan  for  all  contrafts  in  the 
commerce  or  intercourfe  between  man  and  man ; 
to  {how  when  a  contra<^  is  valid,  and  how  to  be 
proved.     The  tranfgrefGons  of  fuch  laws  are  called 

frauds.     They  chiefly  regard  the  acquilition,  tranf- 
miflion,  or  alienation  of  property. 

3.  To  limit  and  direct  perfons  in  the  exercife  of 
their  own  rights,  and  oblige  them  to  fhew  refpeft 
to  the  interfering  rights  of  others'.  This  contains 
the  whole  of  what  is  called  the  police  of  a  coun- 
try. And  the  tranfgreffion  of  fuch  laws  is  called 
trespasses,  A  number  of  things  in  this  view  may 
become  illegal,  which  before  were  not  immoral. 


Left.  14.  •   MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  1 25 


Of  the  Sanction  of  the  Moral  Laws, 

In  all  polilhed  nations,  there  are  puoifhments 
annexed  to  the  tranfgrellioa  of  the  moral  laws, 
whether  againft  God,  our  neighbour,  or  ourfeLves  ; 
in  the  doing  of  which,  the  three  following  things 
sre  chieflj  neceflarj-. 

1.  To  determine  what  crimes,  and  what  de- 
gree of  the  fame  crime,  are  to  be  inquired  into 
bj  the  civil  magiftrate.  It  is  of  neceflity  that,  in 
a  free  ftate,  crimes  Ihould  be  precifelj  defined, 
that  men  maj  not  be  ignorantly  or  raihly  drawn 
into  them.  There  are  degrees  of  every  crime, 
profanity,  impurity,  violence,  flander,  that  are 
blame  able  in  point  of  morals,  nay,  even  fuch  as 
fall  under  the  difcipline  of  a  religious  fociety,  that, 
if  they  were  made  cognizable  by  the  civil  magi- 
ftrate, would  multiply  laws  and  trials  beyond  mea- 
fure. 

2.  To  appoint  the  methods  of  afcertaining  the 
commifllon  0/  crimes.  This  is  ufually  by  teltimo- 
ny,  in  which  we  are  to  confider  the  number  and 
charafter  of  the  witnelTes.  Generally  through 
ChriHendom,  and  indeed  moft  other  parts  of  the 
v»  orld,  two  witneffcs  have  been  efteemed  neceflary 
:o  fix  crimes  upon  an  accufed  perfon  ;  not  but  that 
*he  pofitive  evidence  of  one  perfon  of  judgement 
and  untainted  charafter  is,  in  many  cafes,  fufficient 
to  gain  belief,  and  often  ftrongtr  than  two  of  un- 
known or  doubtful  credit ;  but  it  was  neceflary  to 
lay  down  fome  rule,  and  two  are  required,  to 
guard  againft  the  danger  of  hired  evidence,  and  to 


126  LECTURES  ON  Ledl.  14. 

give  an  opportunity  of  trying  how  they  agree  to- 
gether. To  have  required  more  would  have  made 
a  proof  dlfHcult  or  impofnble  in  many  cafes. 

It  feems  to  be  a  maxim  in  law,  and  founded  on 
reafon,  That  in  the  cafe  of  what  are  called  occult 
crimes,  fuch  as  murder,  adultery,  forgery,  and 
fome  others,  where  the  nature  of  the  thing  lliows 
that  there  muft  be  a  penury  of  evidence,  they  fome- 
times  content  themfelves  with  fewer  witnelTes,  if 
1?here  are  corroborating  circumftances  to  flrengthen 
their  teftimony. 

It  feems  to  be  a  matter  not  cafily  decided,  w^he- 
ther  it  be  agreeable  to  reafon  and  juftice,  in  the 
cafe  of  very  atrocious  crimes,  that,  on  account  of 
the  atrocity,  lefs  evidence  fhould  be  fufficient  for 
convi<Elion,  or  that  more  fhould  be  required.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  more  atrocious  the  crime,  the 
greater  the  hurt  to  fociety,  and  the  more  need  of 
public  vengeance.  On  the  other  hand,  the  more 
atrocious  the  crime,  and  the  heavier  the  punifli^ 
ment,  it  feems  agreeable  to  juftice,  that  the  con- 
viction fhould  be  upon  the  more  unqueflioned  evi- 
dence. Lawyers  are  feen  to  take  their  common 
places,  fometimes  the  one  way,  fometimes  the 
other.  It  is  often  thought,  that  in  praftice  lefs 
evidence  is  fufficient  to  convift  a  man  of  murder, 
forgery,  rape,  and  other  crimes  of  a  deep  dye. 
But  I  am  perfuaded,  that  the  appearance  is  owing 
to  the  greater  and  more  general  eagemefs  to  difco- 
ver  the  perpetrators  of  fuch  crimes.  Others  arc 
fuffered  to  efcape  more  eafily  ',  not  that  more  evi-- 
dence  is  neceffary,  but  that  it  is  mere  difficult  to 
get. at  the  evidence. 


L^^t.  14.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  lit 

Evidence  maj  be  diilinguiilied  into  two  kindsj 
dir-^ct  and  circumstantiaL  Dire£l  evidence  is  when 
the  witnefles  fwear  to  their  fight  or  knowledge  of 
the  accufed  committing  the  crime.  Circumiiantial, 
when  they  only  fwear  to  certain  fafts  which  cannot 
be  fuppofed  to  have  exifted,  unlefs  the  crime  had 
been  committed  ;  as,  a  man  found  dead,  another 
found  near  the  place,  wuth  a  weapon  bloody,  or 
clothes  bloody,  &c.  Some  have  affirmed,  that 
circumftantial  evidence  is  ftronger  than  direct: ;  but 
it  mull  be  taken  with  very  great  caution  and  judge^ 
ment. 

3.  The  law  is  to  proportion  and  appoint  the 
punifhment  due  to  every  crime,  when  proven. 

PuTulliment  in  all  regular  flates,  is  taken  wholly 
out  of  the  hands  of  the  injured  perfons,  and  com- 
mitted to  the  magiftrate,  though  in  many  or  mod 
cafes  the  injured  party  is  fuffered  to  join  the  magi- 
ftrate in  the  profecution,  and  to  have  a  certain 
claim,  by  way  of  reparation,  as  far  as  that  is  prac- 
ticable. 

Therefore  the  puniibment  in  general  muft  con- 
fift  of  two  parts  :  (i.)  The  reparation  to  the  fuf- 
ferer  :  (2.)  The  'u'mdicta  public  ay  which  has  foaie- 
times  two  ends  in  view,  to  be  an  example  to  others, 
and  to  reclaim  and  reform  the  offender,  as  in  cor- 
poral puniiliment  lefs  than  death  ;  fometunes  b\it 
one,  the  good  of  others  in  the  example,  as  in  ca- 
pital punifhments,  and  banifhment. 

The  kind  of  punifliment,  and  the  degree,  is  left 
wholly  to  different  lawgivers,  and  the  fpirit  of  dif- 
ferent conftitutions.  Public  utility  is  the  rule. 
Punifhment  is  not  always  proportioned  to  the  atro- 


1^8  LECTURES  ON  Left.  I4. 

cioufnefs  of  the  crime  in-  point  of  morals,  but  to 
the  frequency  of  it,  and  the  danger  of  its  prevail- 
ing. 

Some  nations  require,  and  fome  will  bear,  great- 
er fe verity  in  punifhments  than  others. 

The  fame,  or  fimilar  conduct,  often  produces 
oppofite  effefts.  Severe  laws,  ancl  fevere  punifh- 
"ments,  fometimes  banifh  crimes,  but  very  often 
the  contrary.  When  laws  are  very  fanguinary,  it 
often  makes  the  fubjefls  hate  the  law  more  than 
they  fear  it ;  and  the  tranfitlon  is  very  eafy,  from 
hating  the  law,  to  hating  thofe  who  are  entrufled 
with  the  execution  of  it.  Such  a  ftate  of  things 
threatens  infurreftions  and  con\Tilfions,  if  not  the 
difTolution  of  a  government. 

Another  ufual  efFeft  of  excelTive  feverity  in  law? 
is,  that  they  are  not  put  in  execution.  The  public 
is  not  willing  to  lend  its  aid  to  the  difpovery  and 
convi£lion  &i  offenders  ;  fo  that  in  time  the  law 
itfelf  becomes  a  mere  hrutum  fulijieuy  and  lofes  its 
authority. 

I  may  make  one  particular  remark,  that,  though 
many  things  are  copied  from  the  law  of  Mofes  in- 
to the  laws  of  the  modern  nations,  yet,  fo  far  as  I 
know,  none  of  them  have  introduced  the  lex  taHo- 
mV  in  the  cafe  of  injuries,  an  eye  for  an  eye,  a 
tooth  for  a  tooth,  &c. ;  and  yet  perhaps  there  are 
many  inftances  in  which  it  would  be  very  proper. 
The  equity  of  the  puniihment  would  be  quite  ma- 
nifeft,  and  probably  it  would  be  as  etfeftual  a  re- 
ftraint  from  the  commifiion  of  injury,  as  any  that 
could  be  chofen. 

The  concluding  remark  fhall  be,  that  it  is  but 


Left.  14.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHT.  I29 

feldom  that  very  fevere  and  fanguinarj  laws  are  of 
fervice  to  the  good  order  of  a  ftate  ;  but,  after  laws 
have  been  fixed  with  as  much  equity  and  modera- 
tion as  poiBble,  the  execution  of  them  fhould  be 
ilridl  and  rigorous.  Let  the  laws  be  jufl,  and  the 
magiflrate  inflexible. 


LECTURE  XV. 

THE  fecond  obje£t  of  civil  laws  being  to  regu- 
late the  making  of  contracts,  and  the  whole 
intercourfe  between  man  and  man,  relating  to  the 
acquifition,  pofTeffion,  and  alienation  of  property, 
we  mull  couiider  carefully  the  nature  of 

Contracts, 

A  contmct  is  a  ftipulation  between  two  parties, 
before  at  liberty,  to  make  fome  alteration  of  pro- 
perty, or  to  bind  one  or  both  parties  to  the  perform- 
ance of  fome  fer\'ice. 

Contracts  are  abfolutely  iieceflary  in  focial  life. 
Every  tranfaction  almoft  may  be  confidered  as  a 
contract,  either  more  or  lefs  explicit. 

The  principal  thing  which  conftitutes  a  contrail 
is  confent.  But,  in  fome  kinds  of  contracts,  viz. 
the  gratuitous,  the  confent  of  the  receiver  is  pre- 
fumed.  In  the  tranfmifiion  of  eftates  by  donation 
or  teftament,  this  is  prefumed  j  and  thofe  who  arc 

Vol.  VII.  M 


ijo  LECTURES  ON  Le£l:.  15, 

incapable  of  giving  their  confent  through  infancy, 
Inaj,  notw'ithilanding,  acquire  property  and  rights. 
When  a  man  comes  into  a  fettled  country,  and  pur- 
chafes  property,  he  is  fuppofed,  befides  every  other 
part  of  the  bargain,  to  purchafe  it  under  fuch  con- 
ditions, and  fabje<5l  himfelf  to  fuch  laws  as  are  in 
force  in  that  country. 

Contrails  are  faid  to  be  of  three  degrees,  in 
point  of  fulnefs  and  precifion.  (i.)  A  fimple  af- 
firmation of  a  defign  as  to  futurity ;  as  when  I  fay 
to  any  one,  that  I  fhall  go  to  fuch  a  place  to-mor- 
row ;  this  is  not  properly  binding  ;  and  it  is  fappo- 
fed,  that  many  things  may  occur  to  make  me  alter 
my  refolution.  Yet  a  frequent  alteration  of  pro- 
fefled  purpofes  gives  the  chara6ler  of  levity  ;  there- 
fore a  prudent  man  will  be  cautious  of  declaring 
his  purpofes,  till  he  is  well  determined.  (2.)  A 
gratuitous  prornife  of  doing  fome  favour  to  me. 
This  is  not  made  binding  in  law,  nor  does  it  ufually 
convey  a  perfcil  right,  becaufe  it  fuppofes  that  the 
perfon  who  w^as  the  objeft  of  good-will,  may,  hy 
altering  his  behaviour,  forfeit  his  title  to  it,  or  that 
the  perfon  promifing  may  find  it  much  more  incon- 
venient, coftly,  or  hurtful  to  himfelf,  than  he  fup- 
pofed ;  or,  laflly,  that  what  was  intended  as  a  fer- 
vice,  if  performed,  appears  plainly  to  be  an  injury. 
In  the  laft  cafe,  every  one  mull  fee  that  it  cannot  be 
binding  ;  but  in  the  two  former,  I  apprehend,  thai 
in  all  ordinary  cafes,  a  diftant  prornife  is  binding 
in  confcience,  though  it  may  not  be  necellary  to 
make  it  binding,  in  lav/.  I  faj-,  all  ordinary  cafes, 
becaufe  it  is  eafy  to  figure  a  cafe  in  which  I  may 
make  a  prornife  to  another,  and  fuch  v.ircumflances 


Lecl,  15*  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I3I 

may  afterwards  occur,  as  I  am  quite  confident,  if 
the  perfon  knew,  he  would  not  hold  me  to  my  pro- 
mife.  (3.)  The  third  degree  i$  a  complete  con- 
trad,  with  confent  on  both  iides,  and  obligation 
upon  one  or  both. 

The  elTentials  of  a  contrail  which  render  it  va- 
lid, and  any  of  which  bemg  wanting  it  is  void, 
are  as  follow. 

That  it  be,  i.  Free.  2.  Mutual.  3.  Po5ible. 
4.  Careful.  5.  With  a  capable  perfon.  6.  For- 
mal. 

1.  It  muil  be  free.  Contrafls  made  by  unjuiL 
force  are  void  always  in  law,  and  fometimes  in 
confcience.  It  muft,  however,  be  unjuft  force, 
becaufe,  in  treaties  of  peace  between  nations,  as 
we  have  feen  before,  force  does  not  void  the  con- 
tract ;  and  even  in  private  life,  fometimes  men  are 
forced  to  enter  into  contracts  by  the  order  of  a 
magiitrate,  fometimes  by  the  threatening  of  legal 
profecutioxV,  which  does  not  make  them  void. 

2.  They  mult  be  mutual,  that  is,  the  confent  of 
the  one  as  well  as  that  of  the  other  muft  be  had. 
Contracts  in  this  view  become  void,  either  by 
fraud  on  one  iide,  or  by  elTential  error.  If  any 
man  contrives  a  contra^,  fo  as  to  bind  the  other 
party,  and  keep  himfelf  free,  this  fraud  certainly'- 
nullifies  the  agreement ;  or  if  there  is  an  elTential 
error  in  the  perfon  or  the  thin^,  as  if  a  perfon 
fiiould  oblige  himfelf  to  one  man,  fuppofing  him 
to  be  another. 

3.  Contracts  fhould  be  of  things  evidently  pof- 
fible,   and   probably  in  our  power.     Contracts   by 

M2 


13^  LECTURES  ON  Le61:.  15. 

which  men  oblige  themfelVes  to  do  things  impof- 
fible,  are,  no  doubt,  void  from  the  beginning  -, 
but  if  the  impoflibilitj  was  known  to  the  contradl- 
ing  party,  it  muft  have  been  either  abfurd  or  frau- 
dulent. When  things  engaged  for  become  impof- 
iible  by  the  operation  of  providence,  without  a  man's 
own  fault,  the  contrail  is  void,  and  he  is  guilt- 
lefs  ;  as  if  a  man  fhould  covenant  to  deliver,  at  a 
certain  place  and  time,  a  number  of  cattle  ;  and, 
when  he  is  almoft  at  the  place  of  deftination,  they 
Ihould  be  killed  by  thunder,  or  any  other  accident 
out  of  his  power. 

4.  Contradls  muft  be  of  things  lawful.  All  en- 
gagements to  do  things  wilawful,  are  from  the  be- 
ginning void  ;  but  by  unlawful  muft  be  undei-ftood 
the  violation  of  perfe<Sl  rights.  If  a  man  oblige 
himfelf,  for  a  reward,  to  commit  murder,  or  any 
kind  of  fraud,  the  engagement  is  void  ;  but  it  was 
criminal  in  the  tranfa£ling,  and  the  reward  ought 
to  be  returned,  or  given  to  public  ufes.  There  are 
many  contrads,  however,  v/hich  are  very  blame- 
able  in  makin-;,  that  muft,  notwithftanding,  be 
kept,  and  muft  not  be  made  void  in  law  ;  as  -rafti 
and  faoliih  bargains,  where  there  was  no  fraud  on 
the  other  fide.  If  fuch  were  to  be  voided,  great 
confufion  would  be  introduced.  The  cafes  of 
this  kind  are  numerous,  and  may  be  greatly  diver- 
fified. 

3.  Contrails  muft  be  made  with  a  capable  per- 
fon,  that  is  to  fay,  of  age,  underftanding,  at  liber- 
ty, Sec.  It  is  pa'-i  of  the  civil  law,  or  rather  mu*. 
iiicipal  law,  o  every  country,  to  fix  the  time  of 
life  whei.  pcrfons  arc  fuppofed  capable  of  tranfact- 


Le^.  15.  mohal  philosophy.  133 

ing  their  own  affairs.  Some  time  mufl  be  fixed, 
otherwife  it  would  occafioii  numberlefs  difputes, 
tjilTicult  to  be  decided.  A  man  at  the  age  of  four- 
teen, and  a  woman  at  twelve,  may  chufe  guardians, 
who  can  alienate  their  property  ;  but",  at  the  age  of 
twenty-one,  they  have  their  eilates  wholly  in  their 
own  hand. 

6.   Contracts  mufl  be  formal. 

The  laws  of  every  country  limit  a  great  many 
circuniilances  of  ihe  nature,  obligation,  extent,  an4 
duration,  of  contracls. 

Having  pointed  out  fonierhing  of  the  elTential 
characlcrs  of  all  lawful  contracls,  I  obferve,  they 
may  be  di\-ided  two  di^ercnt  ways,  (i.)  Con-, 
trads  are  either  abfolut2  or  conditional.  The  ab- 
folute  are  fuch  as  are  fufpended  upon  no  condition, 
but  fuch  as  are  effential  to  every  cDntra;£l:  which 
have  been  mentioned  above.  Such  as,  when  a 
perfon  makes  a  fettlemcnt  upon  another,  without 
referve,  then,  whether  he  behave  well  or  ill,  whe- 
ther it  be  convenient  or  inconvenient,  it  muil  be 
fulfilled.  Conditional  contrads  are  thsfe  that  arc 
fufpended  on  any  uncertain  future  contingency,  or 
fome  performance  by  the  oppofite  party.  Of  this 
laft  fort  are  almoft  all  tranfa^ions  in  the  way  of 
commerce  ;  which  leads  to  the  (2.)  way  of  di'v-i- 
ding  contracls,  into  beneficent  and  onerous.  Tl;d 
firfl  is,  when  one  freely  brings  himfelf  under,  an 
obligation  to  beftow  any  favour,  or  do  any  fervice, 
as  donations  or  legacies,  and  undei-taking  the  ofEjce 
of  guardian  of  another  perfon's  eilate. 

The  oaerous  contrad  is,  wlien  an  caual  vaL:c  13 

M3 


134  LECTURES  ow  Left.  1 5, 

fuppofed  to  be  given  on  both  fides,  as  is  the  cafe, 
for  the  moft  part,  in  the  alienation  of  property,  and 
the  tranfaftions  between  man  and  man,  and  between 
fociety  and  fociety. 

To  this  place  belongs  the  queftion  about  the 
lawfulnefs  of  lending  money  upon  intereft.  If  we 
confider  money  as  an  inftrument  of  commerce,  and 
giving  an  opportunity  of  making  profit,  there  feems 
plainly  to  be  nothing  unjuft  that  the  lender  fhould 
ihare  in  the  advantage  ariling  from  his  own  pro- 
perty. 

The  chief  thing  neceflfary  is,  that  the  ftate,  or 
governing  part  of  the  fociety,  fliould  fettle  tlie  rate 
of  intereft,  and  not  fuifer  it  to  depend  upon  the  ne- 
ceflity  of  the  poor,  or  the  covetoufnefs  of  the  rich. 
If  it  is  not  fettled  by  law,  ufury  will  be  the  certain 
confequence. 

The  law  of  Mofes  does  not  feem  to  have  admit- 
ted the  taking  of  intereft  at  all  from  an  Ifraelite. 
It  is  thought,  however,  that  the  main  reafon  of 
this  muft  have  been  drawn  from  fomething  in  their 
conftilution,  as  a  ftate  that  rendered  it  improper ; 
for,  if  it  had  been  in  itfelf  immoral,  they  would 
not  have  been  permitted  to  take  it  of  ftrangers. 

Of  the  Marh  or  Signs  of  Contracts . 

All  known  and  intelligent  marks  of  confent  are 
the  figns  and  means  of  completing  contrafts.  The 
chief  of  thefe,  however,  are  words  and  writing,  as 
being  found  \\\^  moft  eafy  and  ufeful.  Words 
arc,  of  all  others,  the  moft  natural  and  proper  for 
gi\ing  immediste  confefit,  and  writing  to  perpetuate 


Le£l.  15.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I35 

the  memory  of  the  tranfa6llon.  There  are,  how- 
ever, many  other  figns  that  may  be  made  ufe  of, 
and  wherever  there  is  a  real  purpcfe  of  fignifying 
our  intention,  by  which  others  are  brought  to  de- 
pend upon  it,  the  engagement  is  real,  and  we  are 
bound  in  confcience,  though  the  law  in  every 
country  muft  of  neceflity  be  more  limited.  The 
whole  refts  uhimately  oa  the  obligation  to  ficcerity 
in  the  focial  life. 

This  obligation  arifes  from  the  teflimony  of 
confcience,  and  from  the  manifeft  utility,  and  even 
neceflity,  of  fincerity  to  focial  intercourfe. 

Signs  are  divided  into  natural^  instituted,  and 
customary.  Natural  {ig-ns  are  thofe  which  have 
either  a  real  likenefs  to  the  thing  fignified,  or  fuch 
a  known  and  univerfal  relation  to  it,  that  all  men 
mull  naturally  be  led  from  the  one  to  the  other,  as 
a  picliure  is  a  natural  fign,  becaufe  a  reprefentation 
of  the  thing  painted.  An  inflamed  fuUen  counte- 
nance and  fiery  eyes,  are  natural  figns  of  anger, 
becaufe  they  are  the  univerfai  efFedls  of  that  paf- 
fion. 

Inilituted  figns  are  thofe  that  have  no  other  con- 
neclion  with  the  thing  fignified,  than  what  has 
been  made  by  agreement ;  as,  if  two  perfons  ihall 
agree  between  themfelves,  that  if  the  one  wants  to 
fignify  to  the  other  at  a  diftance,  that  he  wifhes 
him  to  come  to  his  afliftance,  he  will  kindle  a  fire 
upon  a  certain  hill,  or  hang  out  a  flag  upon  a  cer- 
tain pinnacle  of  his  houfe,  or  fome  part  of  his  ihip. 
Words  and  writing  are  properly  inilituted  figns,  for 
they  h?.ve  no  relation  to  the  ihing  fignified,  but 


13^  LECTURES  ON  Left.  15. 

wliat  origmal  agreement  and  long  cufiom  has  given 
them. 

Cuftomarj  figns  are  no  other  th^in  inilituted  fign^ 
which  have  long  prevailed,  and  whote   inftitution 
has  cither  been  accidental,  or  has  been  forgotten. 
It  is  alfo  ufaal  to  apply  the  word  customary  to  fuch 
figns  as  depend  upon  the  mode  and  faihion  of  par-' 
ticular  countries.     There  are  feme  figns  and  pof- 
tures,  which,  though  they  may  feein  perfectly  ar- 
bitrary, have  obtained  very  generally,  perhaps  Uni- 
verfally  ;  as,  bending  dov/n  the  body,  or  proflra- 
tion,  as  a  {\gvii  of  refpect  and  reverence  ;  kneeling, 
and  lifting  up   the   hands,  as  a  fign  of  fubmiffion 
and  fupplication.     Perhaps,  both  thefe  are  natural, 
as  they  put  the  perfon  into   the  fituatioa  leaft  ica- 
pable  of  refiftance. 

Sometimes  there  is  a  mixture  of  natural  and  in- 
ftitiited  figns ;  as,  if  a  man  fends  a  pair  of  wings, 
or  the  figure  of  them,  to  a  friend,  to  intimate  his 
danger,  and  the  necefTity  of  fleeing. 

In  the  ule  of  figns,  the  great  rule  of  fincerity  is, 
that  wherever  we  are  bound,  and  wherever  we 
profefs  to  communicate  our  intention,  we  ought  to 
life  the  figns  in  the  leaft  ambiguous  manner  pof- 
fible.  When  we  have  no  intention,  and  are  under 
no  obligation,  to  communicate  any  thing  to  others, 
it  is  of  fmall  moment  what  appearances  are  ;  it  is 
their  bufinefs  not  to  make  any  unnecefiary  or  uncer- 
tain inferences.  A  light  in  a  houfe,  inr  the  middle 
of  the  night,  will  perhaps  fuggeft  moft  probably, 
to  a  traveller  accidentally  pafiing,  that  there  is 
fome  body  fick  ia  Ifhat  houfe  ;  yet  perhaps  it  is  ex- 


Left.   15.  MORAL  PHIXOSOPHY.  I57 

traordinary  ftudy  or  buiinefs  that  keeps  fome  per- 
fons  awake. 

Naj,  when  there  is  no  obligation  to  give,  nor 
any  reafon  for  the  party  to  expe6V,  true  information, 
it  is  held  generally  no  crime  at  all  to  ufe  fuch 
figns  as  we  have  reafon  to  fuppofe  will  be  mifiaken  ; 
as,  when  one  who  does  not  defire  to  be  diftm"bed, 
keeps  his  chamber  clofe  fhut,  that  people  may 
conclude  he  is  not  there  ;  when  a  general  of  an- 
army  puts  a  fire  in  the  camp,  to  conceal  his  march 
or  retreat.  And  probably  none  would  think  it 
faulty,  when  there  was  an  apprehension  of  thieves, 
to  keep  a  light  burning  in  a  chamber,  to  lead 
them  to  fuppofe  ihe  whole  family  is  not  at  reft. 

There  are  fome  who  place  in  the  fame  rank,  e- 
vafive  phrafes,  when  there  is  an  apparent  intention 
to  fpeak  our  mind,  but  no  right  in  the  other  to 
obtain  it.  Such  expreflions  may  be  ftriclly  true, 
and  yet  there  is  all  probability  that  the  hearer  will 
mifunderftand  them  ;  as,  if  one  fliould  alk  if  a 
perfon  was  in  any  houfe,  and  ILould  receive  for 
anfwer,  he  went  away  yeflerday  morning ;  when, 
perhaps,  he  returned  the  fanie  evening.  I  look 
upon  tliefe  evaiions,  however,  as  very  doubtful, 
and,  indeed,  rather  not  to  be  chofen,  becaufe  they 
feem  to  contain  a  profeilioa  of  telling  our  real 
mind. 

Some  mention  ironical  fpeech  as  an  exception  to 
the  obligation  to  fincerity.  But  it  is  properly  no 
objection  at  all,  becaufe  there  is  no  deception. 
Truth  lies  not  in  the  words  themfelves,  but  in  the 
ufe  of  them  as  figns.  Therefore,  if  a  man  fpeak 
his  words  in  fuch  a  tone  and  manner,  as  the  hearer 


138  LECTURES  ON  Led.  15, 

immediately  conceives  they  are  to  be  tak^n  in 
an  oppofite  fenfe,  and  does  really  take  them  in  the 
fenfe  the  fpeaker  means  them,  tliere  is  no  falfchood 
ax  all. 

Mr  Hutchinfon,  and  fome  others,  alfow  a  vo- 
luntary intended  departure  from  truth,  on  occafion 
of  fome  great  ueceillty  for  a  good  end.  This  I 
apprehend  is  wrong,  for  we  cannot  bat  confider  de- 
>ception  as  in  itfelf  bafe  and  unworthy,  and  there- 
fore a  good  end  cannot  juflify  it.  Beiides>  to  fup- 
pofeit  were  in  men's  power,  on  a  fufTicient  occa- 
fion, to  violate  truth,  would  greatly  deltroy  its  force 
in  general,  and  its  ufe  in  the  focial  life. 

There  are  two  forts  of  falfehood,  which,  becaufe 
no  doubt  they  are  lefs  aggravate^  than  malicious 
interefted  lies,  many  admit  of,  but  I  think  without 
fufiicient  reafon. 

1.  Jocular  lies,  when  there  is  a  real  deception 
intended,  but  not  in  any  thing  material,  nor  intend- 
ed to  continue  long.  However  harmlefs  thefe  may 
feem,  I  reckon  they  are  to  be  blamed,  becaufe  it 
is  uiing  too  much  freedom  with  fo  facred  a  thing  as 
truth.  And  very  often  fuch  perfons,  as  a  righteous 
punifhment  in  Providence,  are  left  to  proceed  fur- 
ther, and  eiiher  to  carry  their  folly  to  fuch  excefs, 
as  to  become  contemptible,  or  to  go  beyond  folly 
into  malice. 

2.  Officious  lies,  telling  falfehoods  to  children 
or  iick  perfons,  for  their  good.  Thefe  very  fel- 
dom  anfvver  the  end  that  is  propofed.  They  lefien 
the  reverence  for  truth  ;  and,  particularly  with  re- 
gard to  children,  are  exceedingly  pernicious  ;  fpr, 
as  th^y  muft  foon  be  difcovercd,  they  lofe  their 


Le6l.  15.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHT.  I39 

force,  and  teach  them  to  deceive.  Truth  and  au- 
thority are  methods  infinitely  preferable,  in  deal- 
ing with  children,  as  well  as  with  perfons  of  riper 
years. 


LECTURE  XVI. 
Of  Oaths  and  Vows, 

A?>IONG   the  figns  and  appendages  of  con- 
tracts, are  oaths  and  vows. 

An  oath  is  an  appeal  to  God,  the  Searcher  of 
hearts,  for  the  truth  of  what  we  fay,  and  always 
exprefTes  or  foppofes  an  imprecation  of  his  judge- 
ment upon  us,  if  we  prevaricate. 

An  oath,  therefore,  implies  a  belief  in  God,  and 
his  pro\-idence,  and  indeed  is  an  a5:  of  wonnip, 
and  fo  accounted  in  fcripture,  as  in  that  expreflion, 
"Ihcu  shall  fear  the  Lord  God,  and  shalt  swear  by 
his  jiaJ7ie.  Its  ufe  in  human  affairs  is  very  great, 
when  managed  with  judgement.  It  may  be  ap- 
plied, and  indeed  has  been  commonly  ufed,  i.  In 
the  contra6ts  of  independent  ftates,  who  have  no 
common  earthly  fuperior.  In  ancient  times,  it 
was  ufual  always  to  clofe  national  treaties  by  mu- 
tual oaths.  This  form  is  not  fo  common  in  mo- 
dem times,  yet  the  fubflance  remains  ;  for  an  ap- 
peal is  always  fuppofed  to  be  made  to  God,  againil 
the  breach  of  public  faith. 

2.  It  has  bten  adopted  by  all  nations,  in  tbeir 


14®  LECTURES  ON  Led.  l6. 

adminiilration  of  juftice,  in  order  to  difcover  truth. 
The  mofl  common  and.miiverfal  application  of  it 
has  been,  to  add  greater  folemnity  to  the  teftimony 
of  witnefles.  It  is  alfo  fometimes  made  ufe  of 
with  the  parties  themfelves,  for  conviction  or  pur- 
gation. The  laws  of  every  country  point  out  the 
cafes  in  which  oaths  are  required  or  admitted  in 
public  judgement.  It  is,  however,  lawful,  and  in 
common  practice,  for  private  perfons,  voluntarily, 
on  folemn  occafions,  to  confirm  what  they  fay  by 
oath.  Perfons  entering  on  public  offices,  are  alfo 
often  obliged  to  make  oath,  that  they  will  faith- 
fully execute  their  truft. 

Oaths  are  commonly  divided  into  two  kinds,  as^ 
sertory  and  promissory  ;  thofe  called  purgatory  fall 
under  the  firft  of  thefe  divifions.  There  is,  per- 
haps, little  neceflity  for  a  divifion  of  oaths,  for 
they  do  not  properly  Hand  by  themfelves  ;  they 
are  confirmations  and  appendages  of  contrafts,  and 
intended  as  an  additional  fecurity  for  fmcerity,  in 
the  commerce  between  man  and  man. 

Therefore  oaths  are  fabjedl:  to  all  the  fame  regu- 
lations as  contrails,  or  rather  oaths  are  cnly  law- 
ful when  they  are  in  aid  or  confirmation  of  a  law- 
ful contradi:.  What,  therefore,  voids  the  pne,  will 
void  the  other,  and  nothing  elfe.  A  contrad,  o- 
therwifc  unlawful,  cannot  be  made  binding  by  an 
.oath  ;  but  there  muft  be  a  very  great  caution  ufed 
not  to  make  any  unlawful  centred,  much  lefs  to 
confirm  it  by  an  oath. 

It  is  eafy  to  fee  the  extreme  abfurdlty  of  our 
being  obliged  to  fulfil  a  criminal  engagement  by 
oath  J  for  it  would  imply,  that  out  of  reverence  to 


L^£l:.  l6.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I4I 

God  we  ought  to  bteak  his  commands  ;  but  nothing 
can  be  more  abominable  than  the  principle  of 
tliofe  who  think  thej  maj  fafelj  take  an  unlawful 
oath,  becaufe  it  is  not  binding  ;  this  is  aggravating 
grofs  injuftice  by  deliberate  profanity. 

I  have  faid,  that  oaths  are  appendages  to  all  law- 
ful contracts  ;  but  in  aflertorj  oaths,  which  are  only- 
confirmations  of  our  general  obligation  to  fincerity, 
it  is  neceflary,  not  only  that  what  we  fay  be  true, 
but  that  the  occalion  be  of  fufficient  nioment  to  re- 
quire or  juftify  a  folemn  appeal  to  God.  Swearing 
on  common  occafions  is  unneceiTary,  rafh,  profane, 
and  deftru6live  of  the  folemnity  of  an  oath,  and  its 
real  ufe. 

From  the  general  rule  laid  down,  that  oaths  are 
lawful  when  applied  to  lawful  contrails,  it  will 
follow,  that  they  become  unlawful  only  w^hen  the 
fulfilling  of  them  would  be  violating  a  perfed 
right ;  but  perhaps  an  additional  obfervation  is  ne- 
celTary  here.  Contrails  mull  be  fulfilled,  when 
they  violate  an  imperfe6t  right ;  whereas  fome 
oaths  may  be  found  criminal  and  void,  though 
they  are  only  contrary  to  imperfect  rights  ;  as  for 
example,  fome  perfons  bind  themfelves  rafhly  by 
oath,  that  they  will  never  fpeak  to,  or  forgive 
their  children,  who  have  offended  them.  This  is 
fo  evidently  criminal,  that  nobody  v.-ill  plead  for  its 
being  obligatory,  and  yet  it  is  but  the  violation  of 
an  imperfe£l  right.  The  fame  perfons,  however, 
might  in  many  ways  alienate  their  property,  to 
the  prejudice  of  their  children,  by  contracts  which 
the  law  would  oblige  them  to  fulfil. 

Vol.  VII.  N 


141  LECTURES  0!T  Lecl:»  l6. 

In  vow?,  there  is  no  party  but  God,  and  the 
perfon  himfelf  who  makes  the  vow.  For  this  rea- 
fon,  Mr  Hutchinfon  relaxes  their  obligation  very 
much  ;  fuppoiing  any  perfon  had  folemnly  vowed 
to  give  a  certain  part  of  his  fubftance  to  public  or 
pious  ufes,  he  fays,  if  he  finds  it  a  great  inconve- 
nience to  himfelf  or  family,  he  is  not  bound.  This, 
I  apprehend,  is  too  lax.  Men  ought  to  be  cau- 
tious in  making  fuch  engagements  ;  but  I  appre- 
hend, that  when  made,  if  not  dire£lly  criminal^ 
they  ought  to  be  kept. 

Of  the  Use  of  Symhols  in  Contracts, 

Besides  promifes  and  oaths,  there  is  fometimes, 
in  contrails,  a  ufe  of  other  vifible  figns,  called 
fymbols  ;  the  mofl  common  among  us  are,  figning 
and  fealing  a  written  deed.  There  is  alfo,  in  fome 
places,  the  delivery  of  earth  and  ftone  in  making 
over  land,  and  fundry  others.  In  ancient  times,  it 
was  ufual  to  have  folemn  fymbols  in  all  treaties, 
mutual  gifts,  fscrifices,  feafts,  fetting  up  pillars. 
The  intention  of  all  fuch  things,  whenever  and 
wherever  they  have  been  pra6lifed,  is  the  fame. 
It  is  to  afcertain  and  keep  up  the  memory  of  the 
tranfaftion.  They  were  more  frequent  and  folemn 
in  ancient  times  than  now,  becaufe  before  the  in- 
vention of  writing  they  were  more  necelTary. 

Of  the  Value  of  Property. 

Before  we  finifli  the  fubjedl  of  contra(9:s,  it  may 
te  proper  to  fay  a  little  of  the  nature  and  value  of 


Led.  l6.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  1 43 

property,  which  is  the  fubjecl  of  them.  Nothing 
has  any  real  value,  unlefs  it  be  of  fome  ufe  in  hu- 
man life,  or,  perhaps  we  may  fay,  unlefs  it  be 
fuppofed  to  be  of  ufc,  and  fo  becomes  the  object 
of  human  defire  ;  becaufe,  at  particular  times,  and 
in  particular  places,  things  of  very  little  real  im- 
poutance  acquire  a  v^lue,  which  is  commonly  tem- 
porary and  changeable.  Shells  and  baubles  are  of 
great  value  in  fome  places ;  perhaps  there  are 
fome  more  baubles  highly  valued  in  every  place. 

But,  though  it  is  their  ufe  in  life  that  gives 
things  their  value  in  general,  it  does  not  follow, 
tliat  thofe  things  which  are  of  moil  ufe  and  necef- 
fity,  are  therefore  of  greateft  value  as  property,  or 
in  commerce.  Air  and  water,  perhaps  we  may 
add  fire,  are  of  the  greatell  ufe  and  neceffity  ;  but 
they  are  alfo  in  greateil  plenty,  and  therefore  are 
of  little  value  as  a  polTeilion  or  property.  Value  is 
in  proportion  to  the  plenty  of  any  commodity,  and 
the  demand  for  it ;  the  one  taken  in  the  inverfe, 
and  the  other  in  the  dired  proportion. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  money  is  of  no  real  va- 
lue. It  is  not  wealth  properly,  but  the  lign  of  it, 
and,  in  a  fixed  ilate  of  fociety,  the  certain  means 
of  procuring  it.  In  early  times,  traffic  was  car- 
ried on  by  exchange  of  goods  ;  but,  being  large, 
not  eafily  divided  or  tranfported,  they  became  very 
troublefome.  Therefore,  it  foon  became  neceffary 
to  fix  upon  feme  fign  of  wealth,  to  be  a  Handard 
by  which  to  rate  different  commodities. 

Any  thing  that  is  fit  to  anfwer  the  purpofe   of  a 
common  fign  of  wealth,  mufl  have  the  following 
N  a 


144  LECTURES  ow  Le^,  16, 

properties:  It  mufl:  be,  i.  Valuable;  that  is, 
have  an  intrinfic  commercial  value,  and  rare,  o- 
therwile  it  could  have  i>o  comparative  value  at  all. 
2.  Durable,  otherwife  it  could  not  pafs  from 
hand  to  hand.  3.  Divifible,  fo  that  it  might  be 
in  larger  or  fmaller  quantities,  as  are  required. 
4.  Portable,  it  muft  not  be  of  great  fize,  other- 
wife  it  would  be  extremely  inconvenient. 

Gold  and  iilver  were  foon  found  to  have  all  thefe 
properties,  and  therefore  are  fixed  upon  as  the  fign 
of  wealth.  But,  befides  being  the  fign  of  the  va- 
lue of  other  commodities,  they  themfelves  are  alfo 
matters  of  commerce,  and  therefore  increafe  or  de- 
creafe  in  their  value,  by  their  plenty  or  fcarce*. 
nefs. 

It  may  feem  to  belong  to  the  ruling  part  of  any 
fociety,  to  fix  the  value  of  gold  and  filver,  as  figns 
of  the  value  of  commodities  ;  and,  no  doubt,  they 
do  fix  it  nominally  in  their  dominions.  But  in  this 
they  are  obliged  to  be  ftri£lly  attentive  to  the  value 
of  thefe  metals  as  a  commodity,  from  their  plenty 
or  fcarcenefs,  otherwife  their  regulations  will  be 
of  little  force  ;  other  nations  will  pay  no  regard  to 
the  nominal  value  of  any  particular  country  ;  and 
even  in  internal  commerce,  the  fubjefl  would  fix 
a  value  upon  the  figns,  according  to  their  plenty. 

It  is  as  prejudicial  to  commerce  to  make  the 
nominal  value  of  the  coin  of  any  country  too  fmall, 
fts  too  great. 

We  {hall  clofe  this  part  of  the  fubje^,  by  fpeak- 
ing  a  little  of  the 


Le<a.  16.  MORAL  PUlLOSOPHt.  14j| 

Righu  of  Necessity,  and  Common  Rights. 

These  are  tjertain  powers  afiumed  both  bj  pri- 
vate perfons  and  communities,  which  are  fuppofed 
to  be  authorifed  by  the  neceflitj  of  the  cafe,  and 
fupported  by  the  great  law  of  reafon. 

There  will  remain  a  great  number  of  cafes,  in 
which  thofe  rights  of  necellitj  are  to  be  ofed,  even 
in  the  beil  regulated  civil  fociety,  and  after  the 
moll  mature  deliberation  and  forefight  of  pro- 
bable events,  and  provifion  for  them  by  fpecific 
laws. 

Were  a  man  perifiiing  with  hunger,  and  denied 
food  by  a  perfon  who  could  ealily  afford  it  him, 
here  the  rights  of  neceiHty  would  juilify  him  in  ta- 
king it  by  violence.  Were  a  city  on  fire,  and  the 
blowing  up  of  an  houfe  would  fave  the  far  greater 
part,  though  the  owner  was  unwilling,  men  vTould 
think  themfehxs  juflified  in  doing  it  whether  he 
would  or  not.  Much  more  would  men,  in  cafes  of 
urgent  necellity,  make  free  with  the  property  of 
others,  without  afldng  their  confent,  but  prefuming 
upon  it. 

In  our  own  government,  where,  by  the  love  of 
liberty  general  among  the  people,  and  the  nature 
of  the  conflitution,  as  many  particulars  have  been 
determined  by  fpecial  laws,  as  m  any  government 
in  the  world  ;  yet  inflanccs  of  the  rights  of  necef- 
ijty  occur  every  day.  If  I  fee  one  man  rob  ano* 
ther  upon  the  high-way,  or  am  iriformed  of  it,  if 
I  have  courage  and  ability,  I  purfue  the  robber^ 
N3 


14^  LECTURES  0!f  Left.  1 6. 

and  apprehend  him  without  any  warrant,  and  car- 
ry  him*  before  a  magiftrate,  to  get  a  warrant  for 
"what  I  have  already  done.  Nothing  is  more  com- 
rnon  in  Britain  than  to  force  people  to  fell  their  in- 
heritance, or  a  part  of  it,  to  make  a  road  or  flreet 
ilraight  or  commodious.  In  this  inftance,  it  is 
not  fo  much  neceffity  as  great  utility. 

The  quellion  of  the  greateft  moment  here  is. 
Whether  the  eflablifliing  thefe  rights  of  neceffity 
does  not  derogate  from  the  j^erfeftion  and  immuta- 
bility of  the  moral  laws  ?  If  it  be  true,  that  we 
may  break  in  upon  the  laws  of  juftice  for  the  fake 
of  utility,  is  not  this  admitting  the  exploded  maxim. 
That  we  may  do  evil,  that  good  may  come  ?  I  an- 
fwcr,  That  thefe  rights  of  neceffity  have  in  general 
property  as  their  object,  or  at  moft  the  life  of  par- 
ticular perfons  ;  and  it  feems  to  be  infeparable 
from  the  eflablifhment  of  property  in  the  focial 
ftate,  that  our  property  is  to  be  held  only  in  fuch 
manner,  and  to  fuch  a  degree,  as  to  be  both  con- 
fiftent  with,  and  fubfervient  to,  the  good  of  others. 
And  therefore,  thefe  extraordinary  cafes  are  agree- 
able to  the  tacit  or  implied  conditions  of  the  focial 
contrail. 

In  rights  of  neceffity,  we  are  to  confider,  not 
only  the  prefent  good  or  evil,  but  for  all  time  to 
come,  and  particularly  the  fafety  or  danger  of  the 
example.  Where  the  repetition  of  the  thing  in  fi- 
mllar  circumflances  would  have  a  fatal  effe£V,  it 
ought  not  to  be  done.  If  a  city  were  under  all  the 
miferies  of  famine,  and  a  fhip  or  two  fhould  arrive 
with  grain,  the  owner  of  which  would  not  fell  it, 
but  at  a  moll   exorbitant   price,    perhaps   ecjuitj 


Lecl.  i6.  MORAL  PHiLOSofHr.  if47 

might  admit  that  they  fhould  be  compelled  ;  but  if 
any  fuch  thing  were  done,  it  would  prevent  others 
from  going  near  that  place  again. 

It  would  be  of  no  confequence  to  determine  thefe 
rights  of  neceffity  by  law.  If  the  law  defcribed 
circumftantially  what  might  be  done,  it  would  be 
no  longer  a  right  of  neceflity,  but  a  legal  right. 
To  forbid  them  by  law  would  be  either  ineffechial, 
or  it  would  abolilh  them  altogether,  and  deprive 
the  fociety  of  the  benefit  of  them,  when  the  cafes 
fhould  occur.  Things  done  by  the  rights  of  necef. 
fity,  are,  by  fuppofiiion,  illegal  ;  and  if  the  necef- 
fity does  not  excufe,  the  perfon  who  pretends  them 
may  be  punifned.  If  I  am  aiding  in  pulling  down 
a  man's  houfe,  on  pretence  of  flopping  a  fire,  if  he 
afterwards  makes  it  appear,  that  there  was  not  the 
leaft  occafion  for  it,  or  that  I,  being  his  enemy, 
took  the  opportunity  of  this  pretence  to  injure  him, 
he  will  obtain  reparation. 

As  property,  or  at  moll  life,  is  concerned  in  the 
rights  of  neceffity,  ftill  the  moral  laws  continue  in 
force.  Whatever  expreiTes  an  evil  difpofition  of 
mind  does  not  fall  under  the  rule,  becaufe  it  caa 
never  be  neceiTary  to  the  doing  of  any  good.  The 
pretence  of  its  being  necefiary  in  lome  cafes  is  ge- 
nerally chimerical  ;  and  even  were  it  real,  the  ne- 
ceffity could  not  juilify  the  crime  ;  as,  fuppofe  a 
robber,  very  profane,  Ihould  threaten  a  man  with 
death,  unlefs  he  would  blafpheme  God,  or  curfc 
his  parents,  &c. 

There  are  certain  things,  called  common  rights, 
which  the  public  is  fuppofed  to  have  over  every 
member  i     the  chief  of  them  are,   i,  Diligeace. 


148  LECTURES  ON  "LcQ:,  16. 

As  a  man  mufl  eat,  the  community  have  a  right 
to  compel  him  to  be  ufeful ;  and  have  a  right  to 
make  laws  airainfl  fuicide.  2.  They  have  a 
right  to  the  difcover}^  of  ufeful  inventions,  provided 
an  adequate  price  be  paid  to  the  difcoverer.  5. 
They  have  a  right  to  infift  upon  fuch  things  as  be- 
long to  the  dignity  of  human  nature.  Thus  all  na- 
tions pay  rcfpedl  to  dead  bodies,  though  there  is 
no  reafon  for  it,  but  that  we  cannot  help  aflbciating 
with  the  body,  even  dead,  the  ideas  which  arife 
from  it,  and  belonged  to  the  whole  perfon  when  a- 
live. 

3.  The  third  and  laft  objecl  of  civil  laws  is,  li- 
miting citizens  in  the  exercife  of  their  rights,  fo 
that  they  may  not  be  injurious  to  one  another,  but 
that  the  public  good  may  be  promoted. 

This  includes  the  giviiig  directions  in  what  way 
arts  and  commerce  may  be  carried  on,  and  in  fome 
Hates  extends  as  far  as  the  poffeflions  of  private 
perfons. 

It  includes  the  whole  of  what  is  called  the  police 
of  a  community  ;  the  manner  of  travelling,  build- 
ing, marketing,  time  and  manner  of  holding  all 
forts  of  afiemblies  ;  in  arts  and  commerce,  parti- 
cularly, the  police  fhows  its  power. 

It  will  only  be  neceflary  here  to  make  a  few 
remarks  on  the  nature  and  fpirit  of  thofe  laws. 

I.  Thofe  things  in  themfelves  are  arbitrary  and 
mutable,  for  there  is  no  morality  in  them,  but 
what  arifes  from  common  utility.  We  may  fome- 
times  do  things  in  a  way  better  than  that  appoint- 
ed by  law,  and  yet  it  is  not  allowed*. 
.    2.  Men  ijn  general  have  but  a  very  light  feiife  of 


Le«fl:.  l5.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  I4<> 

the  malignity  of  tranfgrefiing  thefe  laws,  fuch  a% 
running  of  goods,  breaking  over  a  fence,  &.c. 

3.  In  the  beft  conftitutions,  fome  fandlions  are 
appointed  for  the  breach  of  thcfe  laws.  Wherever 
a  Hate  is  founded  upon  the  principles  of  liberty, 
fuch  laws  are  made  with  feverity,  and  executed 
with  ftridlnefs. 

Finally,  a  man  of  real  probity  and  virtue  adopts 
thefe  laws  as  a  part  of  his  duty  to  God  and  the  fo- 
ciety,  and  is  fubjedl,  not  only  for  wrath,  but  aKo 
for  confcience  fake. 


,   RECAPITULATION. 

Having  gone  through  the  three  general  divifion^ 
of  this  fubjeft,  Ethics,  Politics,  and  Jurifprudence, 
I  fhall  conclude  with  a  few  remarks  upon  the 
whole,  and  mention  to  you  the  chief  writers  who 
have  diftinguiihed  themfelves  in  this  branch  of 
fcience. 

I.  You  may  plainly  perceive,  both  how  exten- 
five,  and  how  important  moral  philofophy  is.  As 
to  extent,  each  of  the  diviHons  we  have  gone 
through  might  have  been  treated  at  far  greater 
length.  Nor  would  it  be  unprofitable  to  enter  into  a 
fuller  dlfquifition  of  many  points  j  but  this  mud  be 
left  to  every  fcholar's  inclination  and  opportmiitie-s 
in  future  life.  Its  importance  is  manifell  from 
this  circumflance,  that  it  not  only  points  out  perfo- 
nal  duty,  but  is  related  to  the  whole  bufinefs  of  ac- 
tive life.     The  languages,  arxd  even  mathematical 


tS^  LECTURES  ow  Left.  l5. 

and  natural  knowledge,  are  but  hard  words  to  this 
fuperlor  fcience. 

2.  The  evidence  which  attends  moral  difquifi- 
tions,  is  of  a  different  kind  from  that  which  attends 
mathematics  and  natural  philofophy  ;  but  it  re- 
mains as  a  point  to  be  difculTed,  whether  it  is  more 
uncertain  or  not.  At  iirll  fight,  it  appears  that  au- 
thors differ  much  more,  and  more  effentially,  on 
the  principles  of  moral  than  natural  philofophy. 
Yet  perhaps  a  time  may  come,  when  men,  treat- 
ing moral  philofophy  as  Newton  and  his  fucceffors 
have  done  natural,  may  arrive  at  greater  precifion. 
It  is  always  fafer,  in  our  reafonings,  to  trace  fafts 
upwards,  than  to  reafon  downwards  upon  metaphy- 
seal principles.  An  attempt  has  been  lately  made 
by  Beatty,  in  his  Effay  on  Truth,  to  eftablifh  cer- 
tain impreflions  o^  common  fenfe,  as  axioms  and 
firfl  principles  of  all  our  reafonings  on  moral  fub*^ 
je£ls. 

3.  The  differences  about  the  nature  of  virtue  are 
not,  in  faiSl,  fo  great  as  they  appear  ;  they  amount 
to  nearly  the  fame  thing  in  the  iffue,  when  the  par- 
ticulars of  a  virtuous  life  come  to  be  enumerated. 

4.  The  different  foundations  of  virtue  are  many 
of  them  not  oppolite  or  repugnant  to  each  other, 
but  parts  of  one  great  plan  ^  as  benevolence  and 
felf-love,  &.C.  They  all  confpire  to  found  real 
virtue  j  the  authority  of  God,  the  dictates  of  con- 
fcience,  public  happinefs,  and  private  intereff,  all 
coincide. 

5.  There  is  nothing  certain  or  valuable  in  moral 
philofophy,  but  what  is  pericifliy  coincident  with 
the  fcripture,  where  the  glory  of  God  is  the  firil 


Left,  1 6.  MORAL  PHILOSOPHY.  Ijl 

principle  of  aftion,  arifing  from  the  fubjeftion  of 
the  creature  ;  -where  the  good  of  others  is  the  great 
objed  of  duty,  and  our  ovm  intereft  the  necellary 
confequence. 

In  the  firll  dawn  of  philofophy,  men  began  to 
write  and  difpute  about  virtue.  The  great  inquiry 
among  the  ancients  was,  what  was  the  iummum  ho» 
num  /  by  which,  it  fecms,  they  took  it  for  grant- 
ed, that  vinue  and  happinefs  were  the  fame  thing. 
The  chief  combatants  here,  were  the  ftoics  and  e- 
picureans.  The  firft  infifted  that  virtue  was  the 
summum  honuniy  that  pleafure  was  no  good,  and 
pain  no  evil  ;  the  other  faid,  that  the  summum  hc^ 
num  confifled  in  pleafure,  or  rather  that  pleafure 
was  virtue ;  the  academics  and  Platonifls  went  a 
middle  way  between  thefe. 

I  am  not  feniible  that  there  is  any  thing  among 
the  ancients,  that  wholly  correfponds  with  the  mo- 
dem difpute  upon  the  foundation  of  virtue. 

Since  the  difputes  arofe  in  the  fixteenth  and 
feventeenth  centuries,  fome  of  the  moft  coniider- 
able  authors,  chiefly  Britifh,  are,  Leibnitz,  his 
Theodicee  and  his  Letters  ; — Hutchinfon's  Inqui- 
ries into  the  Ideas  of  Beauty  and  Virme,  and  his 
Syftem  ; — Wollafton's  Religion  of  Nature  delinea- 
ted : — Collins  on  Human  Liberty  ; — Nettleton  on 
Virtue  and  Happinefs  j — David  Hume's  Eflavs  ; 
— Lord  Kames's  EiTays  ; — Smith's  Theory  of  Mo- 
ral Sentiments  ; — Reid's  Inquiry  ; — Balfour's  De- 
lineation of  Morality  ; — Butler's  Analogy  and  Ser- 
mons ;— Balguy's  Tra£ls  ; — Theory  of  Agreeable 
Senfations,  from  the  French  ; — Beatty  on  Truth  j 
— EiTay  on  Virtue  and  Harmony. 


152  LECTURES  ON,  &c.  Left.  t6» 

To  thefe  maj  be  added  the  whole  deiftical  wri- 
ters, and  the  anfwers  written  to  each  of  them  in 
particular,  a  brief  account  of  which  may  be  feen 
in  Leland's  View  of  the  Deiftical  Writers. 

Some  of  the  chief  writers  upon  government  and 
politics  are,  Grotius,  PufFendorf,  Barberac,  Cum- 
berland, Selden,  Burlamaqui,  Hobbes,  Machiavel, 
Harrington,  Locke,  Sydney — and  fome  late  books, 
Montefquieu's  Spirit  of  LaVs  ;  Fergufon's  Hiftory 
of  Civil  Society  ;  Lord  Karnes's  Political  Eflays  ; 
Grandeur  and  Decay  of  the  Roman  Empire  ;  Mon- 
tague's Rife  and  Fall  of  Ancient  Republics  ;  Go- 
guet's  Rife  and  Progrefs  of  Laws,  Arts,  and 
Sciences. 


JLECTIJR^ES 


ON 


ELOQUENCE. 


Vol.  Vri. 


,  I 


LECTURES 


ON 


ELOQUENCE. 


Gentlemen, 
T  T  TE,  are  now  vo  enter  on  the  ftudj  of  eloquence, 
^  '      or,  as  perhaps  it  ought  to  be   called,  from 
the- manner  in  which  you  will  find  it  treated.  Com- 
l^ofition,  Tafte,  and  Criticifm. 

Eloquence  is  undoubtedly  a  very  noble  art,  and 
.when  poiTell'ed  in  a  high  degree,  has  been,  I  think, 
in  all  ages,  one  of  the  moll  admired  and  envied  ta- 
Jents.  It  has  not  only  been  admired  in  all  age?-, 
but,  if  I  am  not  miilaken,  among  all  ranks.  Its 
power  is  univerfally  felt,  and  therefore  probably 
the  talent  more  univerfally  elleemed  than  either  ge- 
nius or  improvement  in  feveral  other  kinds  of  hu- 
man excellence.  Military  Ikill  and  political  wif- 
dom  have  their  admirers-,  but  far  inferior  in  num- 

03 


15^  LECTURES  OK  Left.  1. 

ber  to  thofe  who  admire,  envy,  or  would  wifli  to 
imitate,  him  that  has  the  power  of  perfuafion. 

Plato,  in  his  Republic,  or,  Idea  of  a  well-regu- 
lated State,  has  baniflied  orators,  under  pretence 
that  their  power  over  the  minds  of  men  is  danger- 
ous, and  liable  to  abufe.  Some  moderns  have 
adopted  the  fame  fentiments. 

Sir  Thomas  More,  in  his  Utopia,  I  believe, 
(though  I  am  not  certain),  has  embraced  it.  But 
this  is  a  manner  of  thinking  and  reafoning  altoge- 
ther fuperficial.  It  v/ould  militate  equally  againfl 
all  cultivation  of  the  mind,  and  indeed  againfl  eve- 
ry human  excellence,  natural  and  acquired.  They 
are,  and  have  been,  and  may  be,  abufed  by  men 
of  vicious  difpolitions.  But  how  (hall  this  be  pre- 
X^ented  ?  It  is  impoflible.  How  Ihall  it  be  counter- 
acted ?  Only  by  affifting  the  good  in  the  cultiva- 
tion of  their  powers,  and  then  the  fame  weapons 
will  be  ufed  in  defence  of  truth  and  virtue,  with 
much  greater  advantage  than  they  can  be  in  fuppor^ 
of  falfehood  and  vice.  Learning  in  general,  pof- 
fefied  by  a  bad  man,  is  unfpeakably  pernicious, 
and  that  very  thing  has  fometimes  made  weak 
3)eople  fpeak  againft  learning  ;  but  it  is  juft  as  ab- 
furd,  as  if,  in  the  confines  of  a  country  expofed  to 
hoftile  inroads,  the  inhabitants  fhould  fay,  We  will 
build  no  forts  for  protection,  becaufe,  if  the  enemy 
get  into  poffeflion  of  them,  they  will  become  the 
means  of  annoyance  :  we  will  ufe  no  arms  for  de- 
fence ;  for,  if  the  enemy  take  them  from  us,  they 
will  be  turned  againft  us. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  proper  to  take  notice  of  what 
the  apoflle  Paul  fays,  ia  his  firll  epiftle  to  the  Cc- 


Lea     I.  ELOQUEjrCE.  t|f 

rinthians,  in  feveral  places,  particularly  from  the 
beginning  of  the  2d  chapter,  <^  And  I,  brethren,^ 
&:c.  and  in  the  4th  chapter,  nth  verfe,  "  And  my 
Ipeech  and  my  preaching  was  not,"  &.c.  I  have 
mentioned  this,  to  prevent  any  of  you  miftaking, 
or  being  prejudifed  againil,  the  fubjed,  and  fliall 
obferve  upon  it,  that  the  meaning  of  the  apoftle  in 
this  and  other  fimilar  paiTages,  is  fully  comprehend- 
ed in  one  or  more  of  the  following  particulars  : 
I.  That  he  came  not  to  the  Corinthians  with  an 
artful  delufive  eloquence,  fucli  as  the  fophiils  of 
thofe  days  made  ufe  of  to  varnilh  over  their  fooliih 
fentiments.  2,  That  he  came  not  to  Ihew  his  fkiii 
in  fpeaking  for  and  againfl  any  tiling,  as  many  of 
them  did,  not  to  difcover  or  communicate  truth, 
but  to  difplay  their  own  talents.  3.  That  the 
truths  he  had  to  communicate  needed  no  ornaments 
to  fet  them  off,  and  were  not  by  any  means  adapt- 
ed to  the  proud  fpirit  of  the  world.  And,  4.  That 
he  would  ufe  the  greateft  felf- denial,  and  not  by 
any  means  attempt  to  recommend  himfelf  as  a  man 
of  ability  and  learning,  but  content  himfelf  with  the 
humble  and  limple  doftrine  of  the  crofs.  And  the 
truth  is,  after  the  higheil  improvement  in  the  art 
of  fpeaking,  there  muft  be  the  greateft  referve  and 
felf-denial  in  the  ufe  of  it,  otherwife  it  will  defeat 
its  own  purpofe.  Rhetoricians  do  ufually  give  it 
among  the  very  precepts  of  the  art,  to  appear  to  be 
in  earneft,  and  to  have  the  fubjeft  or  the  intereit 
of  the  audience  at  heart,  and  not  their  own  fame  ; 
and  this  can  nev-erbe  attained  to  fo  great  perfection, 
as  when  there  is  the  humility  of  a  true  dilcipl^ 

03 


*5*  LECTURES  ON  Le(5l.  I. 

and  the  difmterefled  zeal  of  a  faithful  minifter  of 
Chrill.  That  this  is  not  contrary  to  the  moft  dili- 
gent application  for  the  improvement  of  our  powers, 
is  manifefl  in  itfelf,  and  appears  from  the  many- 
exhortations  of  the  fame  apoftle  to  his  young  dif- 
ciples,  Timothy  and  Titus,  i  Tim.  iv.  13.  **  Till 
I  come,  give  attendance,"  &.c.  and  ver.  15.  "  Me- 
ditate," &.C. 

I  know  not  whether  any  apology  is  neceflary  foi' 
my  undertaking  to  fpeak  on  this  fubjed,  or  the 
manner  of  treating  it.  Some  may  expeft,  that  dif- 
tourles  on  eloquence  flioukl  be  diftinguifhed  exam- 
ples of  the  art  of  which  they  treat.  Such  may 
juft  be  pleafed  to  obferve,  that  a  cool,  plain,  and 
fimple  manner  of  fpeaking,  is  neceflary  in  teaching 
this,  as  wxU  as  every  other  art.  No  doubt,  a  juft- 
nefs  and  preciiion  of  expreflion,  will  be  of  great 
benefit  in  thefe  difcourfes ;.  but  there  will  be  no 
need  of  that  high  and  complete  polifh  that  might 
be  expelled  in  what  is  prepared  for  publication. 
Nor  would  the  fame  brevity  and  concifenefs  be  any 
advantage  to  difcourfes  once  delivered,  that  would 
be  reckoned  a  beauty  in  what  is  in  every  body*s 
hands,  and  therefore  may  be  often  read. 

Before  entering  on  the  ftrift  and  methodical  dif- 
cuflion  of  the  fubjed,  I  have  commonly  begun  the 
courfe  by  two  or  three  preliminary  difcourfes,  coft- 
taining  fuch  general  obfervations  as  may  be  moft 
intelligible,  and  may  ferve  to  prepare  the  way  for 
-what  fhall  be  afterwards  introduced. 

The  fubjeft  of  the   iirlt   preliminary   difcourfc 
(ball  be  the  following  ^uellion  ;    Whether  does  ait 


Le£l.  I.  ELO(itiEycE.  159 

or  nature  contribute   moll  to  the  produ£lion  of  a 
complete  orator? 

This  is  a  queftion  often  afked,  and  many  things 
have  been  faid  upon  it  ;  yet,  to  difcufs  it  as  a  mat- 
ter of  controverfy,  and  adduce  the  arguments  on 
each  fide,  in  order  to  a  decifion  in  favour  of 
the  one,  and  prejudice  of  the  other,  I  take  to  be 
of  very  little  confequence,  or  rather  improper  and 
abfurd.  It  feems  to  be  jull  as  if  one  ihould  pro- 
pofe  an  inquiry,  whether  the  foil,  the  climate,  or 
the  culture,  contributes  molt  to  the  production  of 
ihz  crop  ?  Therefore,  inftead  of  treating  the  que- 
ftion as  if  one  fide  of  it  were  tnie,  and  the  other 
falfe,  I  fhall  make  a  few  obfervations  on  the  in- 
fluence of  nature  and  art,  in  order  to  your  forming 
jufl  apprehenfions  cf  the  fubje<51:,  and  to  direft  you 
in  your  future  condudl  and  ftudies. 

2 ,  Some  degree  of  natural  capacity  is  evidently 
neceflary  to  the  inftruflion  or  ftudy  of  this  art,  in 
order  to  produce  any  effeft.  A  Ikilful  labourer 
may  fubdue  a  very  ftubborn,  or  meliorate  a  very 
poor  foil  J  but  when  there  is  no  foil  at  all,  as  on  a 
bare  and  folid  rock,  his  labour  would  be  impoffible 
or  fruitlefs.  There  muil  therefore,  doubtlefs,  be 
fome  capacity,  in  general,  and  even  fome  turn  for 
this  very  branch  of  knowledge.  In  this  fenfe,  it 
is  true  of  every  other  art,  as  well  as  oratory,  that  a 
man  mult  be  bom  to  it. 

There  are  fome  fo  deftitute  of  oratorical  powers^ 
that  nothing  can  pofiibly  be  made  of  them.  It 
will  be  ftrange,  however,  if  this  is  not  eafily  dif- 
covered  by  themfelves,  and  if  it  does  not  make- 
the  Itudy  as  unplsafant  as  it  is  difficult,  fo  Uiat  thej 


t6o  LECTURES  oy  Lei^.  I, 

will  fpeedilj  give  it  over.  I  have  known  fome 
examples,  but  very  few,  of  minifters,  whofe  prin- 
cipal deled  was  mere  barrennefs  of  invention. 
This  is  exceedingly  rare,  becaufe  tlie  far  greateft 
number  of  bad  fpeakers  have  enough  to  fay,  fuch 
as  it  is  ;  and  generally  the  more  abfurd  and  inco- 
herent, the  greater  the  abundance. 

When  fpeaking  on  this  obfervation,  I  muft  make 
one  remark,  that  a  total  want  of  capacity  for  one 
branch  of  fcience,  is  not  inconfillent  even  with  a 
great  capacity  for  another.  We  fometimes  fee 
great  mathematicians  who  make  miferable  orators. 
Jsfay,  it  is  reckoned  by  fome  of  the  belt  judges, 
that  this  fludy  is  unfriendly  to  oratory.  The  de- 
finite preciHon  of  methematical  ideas,  which  may 
all  be  ultimately  referred  to  menfuration,  feems  to 
be  contrary  to  the  freedom  and  boldnefs  of  imagi- 
nation, in  which  the  ftrength  of  oratory  Ijes.  There 
are,  however,  exceptions  to  this,  in  fact.  Dr 
Clark,  and  Dr  Barrow,  two  of  the  moll  eminent 
mathematicians  of  the  laft  age,  were  alfo  eminent 
orators ;  that  is  to  fayj  the  firft  was  a  very  accurate 
writer,  the  wother  a  very  fervent  preacher. 

I  have  only  further  to  obferve,  that  many  have 
thought  academical  teaching  not  to  be  favourable 
to  oratory  ;  that  is  to  fay,  thofe  who  are  ac- 
cuftomed  to  the  cool  difpaffionate  manner  of  fpeak- 
hig,  ufual  and  neceffary  in  the  inftru<£lion  of  youth, 
frequently  lofe  a  good  deal  of  that  fire  and  impe- 
tuofity  which  they  might  naturally  poffefs,  and 
which  is  of  fo  much  importance  in  fpeaking  to  a 
large  and  promifcuous  aflembly. 

2.  To  make  what  is  c<illed  a  complete  orator, 


Le(S.   I.  ELOQUENCE.  l6l 

very  great  natural  powers  are  neceiTary,  and  great 
cultivation  too.  The  truth  is,  when  we  fpeak  of 
a  complete  orator,  we  generally  form  an  idea  of 
perfeftion  fuperior  to  any  thing  that  ever  exifted, 
by  aflembling  together  all  the  excellencies  of  every 
kind  that  have  been  feen  in  different  perfons,  oi 
that  we  are  able  from  what  we  have  feen  to  form 
an  imagination  of.  We  can  eafily  enumerate  many 
of  thefe  ;  for  example,  great  penetration  of  mind,— 
great  literature,  and  extenlive  knowledge, — a  ftrong 
and  lively  imagination,  reined  in  by  a  correftnefs 
of  judgement,  a  rich  invention,  and  retentive  me- 
mory, tendemefs  and  fenfibility  of  afFedion,  an  ac- 
quaintance with  the  world,  and  a  thorough  know- 
ledge of  the  human  heart.  To  thefe  we  muft  add 
all  external  perfections,  an  open  countenance,  3 
graceful  carriage,  a  clear,  articulate,  ftrong  melo- 
dious voice.  There  is  not  one  of  thefe  but  is  ca- 
pable of  great  improvement,  by  application  and 
ftudy,  as  well  as  by  much  praflice.  In  all  the 
great  orators  of  whom  we  read,  there  appears  to 
have  been  an  union  of  natural  talents,  and  acquired 
ikill,  as  Pericles,  Demollhenes,  Cicero,  Hortentius. 
To  thefe  you  may  add  all  the  fpeakers  mentioned 
by  Cicero  and  (^uintilian,  taking  their  talents  and 
performances  to  have  been  as  related  by  thefe  au- 
thors. 

3.  Perhaps  the  mofl  extraordinary  appearances 
in  this,  as  well  as  in  other  branches,  have  been 
£*om  nature  wholly,  or  but  with  little  ftudy.  Thefe 
fpontaneous  productions  are  as  fo  many  prodigies. 
It  is  commonly  believed,  that  the  orators  and  fage« 
at  the  SltH  fcrmaticn  of  fociety,  were  more  power- 


l62  LECTURES  ON?  Left.  I. 

fill  in  their  elocution,  than  in  more  poliflied  times. 
This,  however,  I  am  apt  to  think,  is  in  fome  de- 
gree founded  on  a  miftake.  There  might  be  more 
extraordinary  efFe6ls  of  eloquence,  becaufe  the  ig- 
norant or  fuperftitious  herd  were  then  more  eafilj 
moved  ;  but  this  was  as  much  owing  to  the  ftate  of 
the  audience,  as  the  power  of  the  fpeakers.  The 
fame  fire  that  would  burn  a  heap  of  dry  brufh, 
would  not  make  any  imprelTion  upon  a  heap  of 
green  logs.  It  might  alfo  be  owing  to  another  cir- 
cumflance,  which  I  ihall  have  occafion  afterwards 
to  explain  more  fully,  the  narrowueis  of  language, 
and  the  ufe  of  figures,  which  have  fo  great  an  effect 
open  the  imagination. 

But,  allowing  very  great  force  to  uncultivated 
prodigies  of  genius  in  every  kind,  I  am  apt  to 
think  it  is  lefs  powerftil,  comparatively  fpeaking, 
in  oratory  than  in  poetry.  It  has  been  an  old  fay. 
ing,  Poeta  nascitur  ct  noiifit.  There  are  two  rea- 
fons  why  the  poetry  of  nature^  without  art,  feems 
to  be  much  admired,  i.  That  in  fuch  a  poet,  a 
ftrong  imbounded  fancy  muft  be  the  prevailing 
charafter  ;  and  this  is  what  chiefly  captivates  the 
mind.i  It  muft  be  a  very  ftrong  inward  impulfe 
that  induces  a  man  to  become  a  poet  without  ex- 
ample, and  without  inftruftion.  2.  It  is  found  in 
fa£l,  that  the  knowledge  of  the  rules  of  art,  fome- 
how  cramps  and  deters  the  mind,  and  reftrains  that 
boldnefs,  or  happy  extravagance,  that  gives  fuch 
general  delight.  It  is  an  obfervation  of  an  inge- 
nious author,  that  in  no  poiiftied  nation,  after  the 
rules  of  criticifm  were  fully  fettled,  and  generally 
underflood,  v»-as  tliere  ever  any  great  v/crk  cf  ge- 


Le<3:.  I.  ELOQUENCE.  i6j 

nius  produced.  This,  however,  mufl  be  under* 
flood  chkflj  of  what  are  called  the  higher  fpecies 
of  poetiy,  epic  poetj,  and  tragedy  ;  and,  for  the 
reafons  juft  now  given,  it  muft  be  fo  in  them.  Ho* 
mer  is  the  great  poet  of  nature  ;  and  it  is  generally 
thought,  that  there  is  greater  fire  in  him  than  in 
Virgil,  juft  becaufe  he  lived  at  a  time  when  the 
rules  of  writing  were  unknown.  The  fame  thing 
is  faid  of  Shakefpeare,  of  our  own  country  ;  and 
perhaps  the  late-difcovered  poems  of  OiHan  may 
be  confidered  as  another  example.  After  all,  per- 
haps the  comparifon  made  between  the  effedls  of 
nature  and  art,  is  at  bottom  wrong,  and  that  they 
produce  beauties  of  different  kinds.  A  wild  uncul-  ^ 
tivated  foreft,  a  vaft  precipice,  or  fleep  cataraft 
or  water-fall,  is  fuppofed  to  be  an  objeG  more  au- 
guft  and  flriking,  than  any  ornaments  produced  by 
human  fkill.  The  order  and  fymmetry,  however, 
of  architecture  and  gardening,  are  highly  pleafing, 
and  ought  not  properly  to  be  compared  with  the 
other,  as  pleafing  the  imagination  in  a  different  de- 
gree, fo  much  as  in  a  different  kind. 

The  effefls  of  the  poetry  of  nature,  therefore,  in 
one  view,  are  very  great,  and  continue  to  be  fo  in 
all  ages,  becaufe  they  touch  the  foul  in  one  way, 
which  continues  to  be  univerfally  felt :  but  I  doubt 
much  whether  eloquence  ever  arrived  at  much  ex- 
cellence, without  confiderable  ftudy,  or  at  leafl 
previous  patterns  on  which  to  form.  The  firfl 
great  poets  were  before  all  criticifm,  and  before 
even  the  polifhing  of  human  manners  ;  but  the  firil 
g^eat  orators  appeared  in  improved,  civilized  flates^ 


1^4  LECTURES  ON  Left. 


I. 


and  were  the   confequence   of  the  knowledge  of 
mankind,  and  the  lludy  of  the  human  heart. 

4.  When  perfons  are  meanly  qualified  in  point  of 
natural  capacity  for  any  art,  it  is  not  very  proper 
to  attempt  to  inftrud  them  in  it.  It  is  not  only 
difficult  to  inflruft  thofe  who  have  a  radical  inca- 
pacity for  any  fludy,  but  fometimes  they  are  much 
the  worfe  for  application  ;  juft  as  fine  clothes,  and 
a  courtly  drefs  upon  a  clown,  renders  him  un- 
fpeakably  ridiculous.  Some  who  are  utterly  void 
of  tafte  for  fpeaking,  after  long  ftudy,  and  fome- 
times even  by  great  literature,  become  more  ob- 
fcure,  more  tedious,  and  more  given  to  fwelling 
and  bombaft,  than  the  moll  uncultivated  perfon  in 
the  world.  The  want  of  a  fund  of  good  fenfe  and 
genuine  tafte,  makes  ignorant  perfons  fools,  and 
fcholars  pedants.  A  plain  man  will  tell  you  of 
taking  a  purge,  or  a  dole  of  phyfic,  and  you  nei- 
ther miftake  him,  nor  laugh  at  him.  A  quack  of 
a  phyfician  will  tell  you  of  a  mucilaginous  decoc- 
tion, to  fmooth  the  acid  particles,  and  carry  oiF  the 
acrimonious  matter  that  corrodes  and  irritates  the 
internal  coats  of  the  ftomach. 

5.  In  the  middle  regions  of  genius,  there  arc 
often  to  be  found  thofe  who  reap  the  greateil  bene- 
fit from  education  and  ftudy.  They  improve  their 
power  by  exercife ;  and  it  is  furprifing  to  think 
what  advances  are  to  be  made  by  the  force  of  refo- 
lution  and  application.  I  might  give  you  many  ex- 
amples of  this  in  the  annals  of  literature  ;  but  the 
one  moft  fuited  to  our  purpofe  is,  that  Demofthenes 
himfelf  is  faid  at  firft  to  have  laboured  under  almoft 
infuperable  difficulties  :  it  is  faid  he  could  not  even 


Le^l.  I.  ELOQUENCE.  1 65 

pronounce  at  firll  all  the  letters  of  the  Greek  al- 
phabet, particularly  the  letter  R,  the  firft  letter  of 
his  art,  as  the  critics  have  called  it. 

Perfons  of  the  middle  degrees  of  capacity,  do 
alfo,  perhaps  generally,  fill  the  moil  ufeful  and 
important  ftations  in  human  life.  A  verj  great 
genius,  is  often  like  a  very  fine  flower,  to  be  won- 
dered at,  but  of  little  fervice  either  for  food  or  me- 
dicine. A  very  great  genius  is  alfo  often  accom- 
panied with  certain  irregularities,  fo  that  we  only 
confider  with  regret,  what  he  might  have  been,  if 
the  lively  fallies  of  his  imagination  had  been  reined 
in  a  little,  and  kept  under  the  direction  of  fober 
judgement. 

On  the  whole,  you  may  plainly  perceive  what 
great  encouragement  there  is  for  diligence  in  your 
lludies,  and  be  perfuaded  to  attend  to  the  inftruc- 
tions  to  be  given  you,  on  this  fubjecl  in  panicular, 
with  afliduity  and  care. 


LECTURE  II, 


IN  this,  which,  as  the  former,  I  confider  as  a  pre- 
liminary difcourfe,  I  will  endeavour,  to  give 
you  fome  general  rules,  which,  as  they  belong 
equally  to  all  forts  of  writing,  would  not  ccme  in 
fo  properly  under  the  divifions  of  the  fubjedl. 

I.  Study  and  imitate  the  greatell  examples.  Get 
the   mod  approved  authors  for   compofition,  read 
them  often,    and  with    care.     Imitation   is    what 
Vol.  VII.  P 


l66  LECTURES  ON  Le£l.  2. 

commonly  give  us  our  firft  ides s. upon  any  fubje£l. 
It  is  by  example  that  ambition  is  kindled,  and 
youth  prompted  to  excel.  It  is  by  remarks 
upon  aftual  productions,  that  criticifm  itfelf  is 
formed.  Men  were  not  firft  taught  by  mafters  to 
fpeak,  either  in  oratory  or  poefy  ;  but  they  firft  felt 
the  impulfe,  and  did  as  they  could,  and  their  reflec- 
tion and  obfervation,  by  making  the  comparifon, 
found  out  what  was  beft.  And  after  the  exiftence 
of  precepts,  it  is  by  examples  that  precepts  are 
made  plain  and  intelligible.  An  acquaintance  with 
authors,  will  alfo  be  the  beft  mean  of  determining 
what  is  your  own  turn  and  capacity,  for  you  will 
probably  moft  relifti  thofe  writers,  and  that  man- 
ner, that  you  are  beft  able  to  imitate. 

For  this  purpofe,  let  the  beft  authors  be  chofen, 
^ncient  and  modern,  A  controverfy  has  often  rifen 
among  critics  and  men  of  letters,  upon  the  prefe- 
rence being  due  to  ancient  or  modern  writers.  This 
queftion  was  debated,  ex  pTofesso,  in  the  laft  age, 
and  feme  very  great  men  engaged  in  it.  The  fa- 
mous M.  Fenelon,  Archbiftiop  of  Cambray,  has 
written  a  treatife  upon  it,  called,  The  Wars  of  the 
Poets  ;  and  Dean  Swift  wrote  his  account  of  the 
Battle  of  the  Books  in  St  James's  Library,  on  the 
fame  fubjedl:.  I  reckon  it  is  wrong  to  be  opiniona- 
tive  in  fuch  a  controverfy,  and  very  eafy  to  pufti 
it  to  excefs  on  both  fides.  No  doubt,  the  few  re- 
mains of  remote  antiquity  have  furvived  the  wrecks 
of  time,  in  a  ?reat  meafure  bv  their  excellence 
itfelf,  and  therefore  will  always  be  confidercd  as 
ftandards.  And  as  they  are  chiefly  works  of  ima- 
gination that  have  been  fo  prefer^^ed,  and  true  tafte 


Lect.  2.  ELOQUENCE.  167 

is  the  fame  in  all  ages7  thej  muft  deferve  real  e- 
fteem  ;  and  this  will  be  fo  me  what  augmented,  by 
the  veneration  felt  for  their  antiquity  itfelf.  Ho- 
mer is  the  firft  and  great  pattern  of  writing,  to 
whom  the  higheft  commendations  have  been  given 
in  every  age.  Horace  fays,  Vos  exemplaria  Greca 
(meaning  chieily  Homer)  nocturna  versate  inanu^ 
versate  diurtia  ;  and  Mr  Pope  fays, 

*'  Be  Homer's  works  your  ftudy  and  delight, 
"  Read  him  by  day,  and  meditate  by  night." 

Now,  the  beauties  of  Homer  we  are  eafily  ca- 
pable of  perceiving,  though,  perhaps,  not  his  faults.- 
The  beauty  of  a  defcription,  the  force  of  a  fimili- 
tude,  we  can  plainly  fee  ;  but,  whether  he  always 
adhered  to  truth  and  nature,  we  cannot  tell,  be- 
caufe  we  have  no  other  way  of  knowing  the  man- 
ners and  cuftoms  of  his  times,  but  from  what  he 
has  written.  ' 

The  powers  of  mankind,  however,  are  certainly 
the  fame  in  all  ages,  but  change  of  circumftances 
may  create  diveriity  in  the  appearance  and  produc- 
tion of  genius.  Thefe  circumftances  tend  to  pro- 
duce excellence  of  different  kinds.  The  boldnefs, 
and  almoft  exceffive  flights  of  imagination  in  un- 
cultivated times,  give  way  to  beauties  of  a  different 
nature,  to  order,  judgement,  and  precifion.  A 
mafterly  judgement  will  endeavour  to  underftand 
the  reafons  on  both  fides.  It  is  certain,  however, 
that  there  are  great  and  excellent  patterns  to  form 
upon,  both  ancient  and  modern.  And  it  is  very 
P2 


i68  lECTURES  ON  Le(5i:.  2. 

proper  for  young  perfons  to  read  authors,  after  they 
liave  heard  critcifms  and  remarks  made  upon  them. 
Thefe  criticifms  you  may  take  at  firft  either  from 
books  or  converfation.  Try  if  you  can  obferve  the 
genius,  or  peculiar  and  charafteriftic  turn  of  an 
author,  not  only  his  excellencies,  but  wherein  they 
are  peculiar  to  him,  and  different  from  thofe  of 
others.  Cicero  is  flowing,  fervent,  ornate — fome- 
what  vain  and  oftentatious,  but  mafterly  in  his 
way.  Demoflhenes  is  fimple,  clofe,  nervous,  ra- 
pid, and  irrefiilible.  Livy  has  a  bewitching  knack 
of  telling  a  ftory  ;  he  is  fo  expreffive  and  defcrip- 
tive,  that  one  cannot  help  being  pleafed  with  it, 
even  after  feveral  times  reading. 

Salluft  excels  in  giving  chara£lers,  which  he 
flrikes  off  in  fingle  epithets,  or  very  concife  re- 
marks. Tacitus  is  chiefly  remarkable  for  judicious 
and  fagacious  obfervations  on  human  life  ;  and 
Xenophon  is  fuperior  to  almofl:  every  author,  in 
dignity,  elegance,  and  fweetnefs  in  the  narration, 

Of  modern  authors  in  our  own  language,  Mr 
Addifon  is  a  noble  pattern  of  elegance,  dignity, 
and  flmplicity.  Swift,  in  his  political  pieces,  WTites 
vv'ith  great  ftrength  and  force,  and  is  perhaps  a  pat- 
tern of  ftyle,  which  has  fcarcely  been  exceeded 
ilnce  his  time.  Hervey,  in  his  Meditations,  has  a 
rreat  deal  of  very  lively  and  animated  defcription  ; 
but  it  is  fo  highly  ornamented,  that  it  is  fomewhat 
da  igerous  in  the  imitation.  Dr  Robertfon,  in  his 
Hillory,  has  as  jufl  a  mixture  of  ftrength  and  ele- 
gance, as  any  other  author  I  know^  in  the  Engliih 
language.  I  cannot  help  here  cautioning  you 
agaiiift  one  modern  author  of  fome  eminence,  John- 


Left.  2.  ELOQUENCE.  l6^ 

fon,  the  author  of  the  Rambler.  He  is  fo  ilifF  and 
abilradled  in  his  manner,  and  fuch  a  lover  of  hard 
words,  that  he  is  the  woril  pattern  for  young  per- 
fons  that  can  be  named. 

It  has  been  given  fometimes  as  a  rule,  to  form 
one's  felf  upon  a  particular  author,  who  may  be 
moft  agreeable  to  a  {Indent's  tafte,  and  perhaps 
congenial  (if  I  may  fpeak  fo)  to  his  capacity.  It 
is  pretty  common  to  fall  into  this  without  defign, 
by  a  natural  propeniity.  It  is  faid,  that  Demoft- 
henes  wrote  over  the  hiilory  of  Thucydides  eight 
times,  that  he  might  the  more  effectually  form  him- 
felf  to  his  flyle  and  manner.  I  cannot  fay  I  would 
reconmiend  this,  it  feems  to  be  too  much  honour 
to  give  to  any  one  perfon.  I  would  not  be  guilty 
of  idolatry  of  any  kind,  A  comprehenfive  know- 
ledge of  many  authors,  or  at  leafl  a  confiderablc 
number  of  the  bell,  is  certainly  far  preferable.  If 
there  be  any  advantage  in  particular  imitation,  it 
is,  that  it  is  the  eafieft  way  of  coming  to  a  fixed  or 
formed  llyle.  One  will  foon  run  into  an  imitatioa 
of  an  author  with  whom  he  is  much  converfant^ 
and  of  whom  he  is  a  great  admirer ;  and,  in  this 
view,  to  fome  perfons  of  moderate  capacitv,  it  may 
not  be  an  improper  method.  But  perfons  of  real 
and  original  genius,  fhould  be  rather  above  fuch 
a  practice,  as  it  will  certainly  make  them  fall  fliort 
of  what  they  would  otherwile  attain. 

To  this  we  may  add,  that  particular  imitatior  i» 

liable  to  feveral  very  great  dangers,     (i.)   It  leuus 

to  fervility  of  imitation.     Such  perfons  often  n.ay 

be  faid  to  borrow  the  piece,  inilead  of  imitaimg 

P3 


170  LECTURES  ON  Le£l.  2. 

iLc  pattern.  When  a  fervile  imitation  is  perceived, 
which  it  always  will  be,  it  is  certain  to  be  def- 
pifed.  Even  a  manner  ever  fo  excellent,  if  merely 
^  ^^PYi  brings  no  credit  to  a  fpeaker.  And  if  a 
writer  retail  the  verj  fentiments  and  language  of 
another,  it  is  conlidered  as  an  abfurdity.  (2.)  Ser- 
vile imitation  leads  to  copying  defeds.  There  nei- 
ther is,  nor  ever  was,  any  fpeaker  or  writer  free 
from  defe6ls,  or  blemifhes  of  fome  kind.  Yet, 
fervib  imitators  never  fail  to  copy  the  defects  as 
■well  as  beauties.  I  fliould  fuppofe,  that  any  one 
who  made  Cicero  his  particular  model,  would  very 
probably  transfiife  a  proportion  of  his  vanity  and 
oilentation,  and  probably  more  of  that  than  of  his 
fire. 

But  of  all  forts  of  imitation,  the  moft  dangerous 
is  the  imitation  of  living  fpeakers,  and  yet  to  this 
young  fcholars  are  moft  prone,  fometimes  by  de- 
f^gn,  and  fometimes  quite  infcnfibly.  It  is  attended 
in  the  higheft  degree  with  the  difadvantage  of  co- 
pying defecls.  In  living  fpeakers,  there  are  not 
only  peculiarities  of  ftyle,  and  blemifhes  in  com- 
pofition,  to  copy,  but  in  looks,  tone,  and  gefture. 
It  is  a  matter  of  conftant experience,  that  imitators 
catch  the  blemifhes  eaiieft,  and  retain  them  longeft. 
And  it  is  to  be  obferved,  that  defefts,  when  they 
are  natural  and  undefigned,  appear  very  inconfider- 
sble  ;  but,  when  they  are  copied,  and  adopted  vo- 
^ntarily,  we  cannot  help  defpifing  the  folly  and 
nbfurdity  of  one  that  judges  fo  ill.  Further,  when 
defeds  are  occaiional  and  undefigned,  they  are  ge- 
jierally  inconliderable  ;  but  when  they  are  copied, 
they  are  commonly  aggra-vated  and  overcharged, 


Lect.  2.  ZLO^.rE:rcE.  171 

and  fo  appear  quite  monflrous.  This  mud  be  fo; 
for  even  the  very  befl  manner  looks  iillj  in  the 
imitator,  although  jull  and  gracefal  in  the  origi- 
nal. 

2.  An  excellent  general  rule  is,  to  accuflom  your- 
felves  earlj  and  much  to  compofition,  and  exer- 
cife  in  pronunciation.  Practice  is  necelTary  in' 
order  to  leani  any  thing  to  perfection.  There  is 
fomething  to  be  learned  from  prafllce^  which  no 
inilruvlion  can  impart.  It  is  fo  in  everj  other 
art  as  Vv-ell  as  this — mathematics,  geometry, 
and  in  navigation  j  after  you  have  learned  the 
theory  in  the  moil  perfect  manner,  there  is  ftill  a 
Hamelefs  fomething,  which  nothing  but  experience 
can  beftow.  You  muil  not  vrait  till  you  are  ir.a- 
flers  of  the  rules  of  art,  before  you  begin  to  put 
them  in  praflice.  Exercife  mufl  go  hand  in  hand 
v/ith  inflru<5lion,  that  the  one  may  give  meaning, 
force,  and  direftion  to  the  other.  I  do  not  mean 
that  you  fliould  be  fond  of  entering  very  foon  upon 
real  life,  but  that  you  fnould  be  afTiduous  in  prepara- 
tory exercifes.  This  is  a  rule  given  by  Cicero,  in 
liis  book  De  Oratore^  w-hich  he  reckons  of  great 
importance — Scrihcndum  quam  phrimum  ;  and  he 
declares  it  to  liave  been  his  own  practice. 

Since  we  are  upon  private  exercifes  of  compofi- 
tion, it  may  perhaps  give  you  a  clearer  view  of 
the  matter,  to  mention  fome  of  the  various  ways 
in  which  it  may  be  feparately  tried.  It  may  be 
tried  in  tranflation  ;  perhaps  it  may  be  belt  to  try- 
it  lirft  here.  Tranflation  will  accuftom  you  to  at- 
tend to  the  various  idioms  of  language,  and  to 
aadeiitand  the  genius  of  your  own  language  :  for. 


172  LECTURES  ON  Le(^.  2. 

when  tranflating,  jou  will  fpeedily  find,  that  to  ren- 
der out  of  any  one  language  into  another  ad  'uer" 
bum,  would  be  very  ferry  compofition.  It  may 
be  tried  alto  in  narration.  This,  I  think,  Ihould 
be  the  next  ftep  to  tranflation,  to  learn  to  give  a 
naked  account  of  fa£ls  with  fimplicity  and  preci- 
fion.  This,  alfo,  though  certainly  in  itfelf  more 
obvious,  and  eafier  than  fome  other  kinds,  yet  it 
is  by  no  means  fo  eafy  as  fome  imagine.  Imita- 
tion of  a  particular  palTage,  or  compoiition  of  fome 
author,  by  writing  upon  fomething  quite  iimilar^ 
may  perhaps  be  the  next  in  order.  To  under- 
ftand  what  this  is,  you  need  only  look  into  an  ad- 
mirable example  of  it  in  poetry,  Mr  Pope's  imita- 
tion of  a  fatire  in  Horace,  beginning,  ^ice  vh'tus 
et  quanta,  &c.  After  this  comes  defcription,  paint- 
ing fcenes,  or  drawing  characters.  Then  argu- 
mentation :  And,  lailly,  perfuafion,  I  believe  it 
would  be  a  great  improvement  of  the  laudable 
praftice  in  this  college  of  daily  orations,  if  they 
were  chofen  with  more  judgement,  and  better  fuit- 
ed  to  the  performers.  Almofl  all  the  pieces  we 
have  delivered  to  us,  are  of  the  laiT;  or  higheft 
kind,  warm  pafTionate  ^declamations.  It  is  no 
wonder  that  fome  Ihguld  perform  thefe  ill,  who 
have  never  tried  the  plainer  manner  of  fimple  nar- 
ration. Suppoling  a  Undent  to  have  tried  all  thefe 
ways  of  compofition  for  his  own  improvement, 
would  he  not  be  by  that  means  fenfible  in  what 
way  he  is  moft  able  to  excel  ?  as  alfo  having 
made  trial  of  them  feparately,  he  is  more  able  to 
vary  his  di«Sl:ion,  and  give  compafs  to  his  difcourfe 
upon  a  general  fubjedl.     Thefe  are  like  an  analy* 


Lecl.  2.  ELOQUENCE.  173 

fis,  or  limple  divifion  of  composition  ;  and  as  per- 
fons  read  beft,  who  have  been  firfl  taught  to  re- 
folve  words  into  fyllables,  and  fjllables  into  let- 
ters, fo  the  eafieft  and  completeft  way  of  any  to 
compofition,  is  to  begin  it  in  this  order. 

In  fuch  exercifes,  let  me  by  all  means  recom- 
mend to  you,  early  to  acquire^  and  always  to  pre- 
ferve,  a  certain  patience  and  refolution  of  mind, 
which  will  enable  you  to  apply  with  vigour,  not 
only  for  a  time,  but  to  review  and  corredl  your 
pieces,  and  bring  them  to  fome  degree  of  perfec- 
tion, and  your  tafte  to  fome  degree  of  accuracy. 
To  explain  this  a  little,  there  are  three  things 
equally  contrary  to  it,  and  perhaps  equally  preju- 
dicial, (i.)  Mere  weaknefs,  and  want  of  courage, 
which  finding  one  attempt  unfuccefsful,  will  hardly 
be  brought  to  make  another.  When  a  ycung  per- 
fon  firft  goes  to  exercife  himfelf  in  compofition, 
he  finds  the  thing  fo  uncouth  and  difficult,  that  he 
is  apt  to  confider  it  as  altogether  impolfible.  (a.) 
There  is  a  fault  contrary  to  this,  a  vanity  of  mind, 
which  is  fo  pleafed  with  any  thing  it  does,  as  nei- 
ther to  fee  its  own  faults,  nor  be  willing  to  hear 
them.  There  are  fome,  who,  from  the  beginning 
of  life,  think  it  a  great  pity  that  any  of  iheir  pro- 
ductions fhould  be  blotted  or  crafcd.  It  is  net  to 
be  fuppofed,  that  they  will  make  great  progrefs  in 
knowledge  or  tafte.  (3.)  There  is  another  fort, 
perhaps  diftinft  from  both,  v.  ho  are  of  a  locfe,  de- 
fultory  difpofition,  fo  unftayed,  that  they  cannot 
fpend  long  enough  time  upon  any  thing  to  do  it 
well,  or  fometimes  even  to  bring  it  to  a  conclu- 
fion.     They  Vv'ill   begin   an   efiay  upon  a  fubjeft, 


174  LECTURES  OK  Le6t.  2. 

but  are  prefently  out  of  conceit  with  it,  and  there- 
fore will  do  it  very  carelefsly,  or  before  it  is  finifh- 
ed  muft  away  to.  another,  which  flruck  their  fan- 
cy more  lately. 

That  fteady  application  which  I  have  recom- 
'  mended,  fome  of  the  ancients  were  very  remarkable 
for.  Some  of  them  indeed  feemed  to  carry  it  to 
an  excefs.  They  would  fometimes  fpend  as  much 
time  in  polifhing  an  epigram,  or  little  trifling  pane- 
gyric, as  might  have  been  fuflicient  for  the  produc- 
tion of  a  work  of  extenfive  utility.  However,  this 
is  not  the  moft  common  error ;  running  over  a 
great  deal  in  a  fuperficial  way,  is  the  bane  of  com- 
pofition.  Horace,  with  his  ufual  elegance,  ridi- 
cules this  difpofition,  when  he  fays,  Detur  nohis  lo- 
tus,  &.C.  ;  and  fomewhere  elfe,  he  brings  in  a  vain- 
glorious poet,  boafting  how  many  verfes  he  had 
Hiade,  or  could  make,  while  Handing  upon  one 
foot. 


LECTURE  III. 

IN  this  difcourfe,  I  intend  to  finifli  what  I  began 
ii  the  laft,  viz.  laying  down  fome  general 
rules  to  form  the  tafte,  and  dired  the  condud  of  a 
ftudent. 

3.  Be  careful  to  acquaint  yourfelves  well,  and 
to  be  as  perfeft  as  poflible,  in  the  branches  that  are 
fubordinate  to  the  ftudy  of  eloquence.  Thefe,  be- 
caufe  they  ought  to  be  learned  in  the  earlieft  ftages, 
if  they  are  then  neglefted,  fome  are  unwilling  or 


Le5:.  3'  ELOQUENCE.  175 

afhamed  to  go  back  to  them.  What  I  have  here 
in  view  chiefly,  are  the  grammar,  orthograpy, 
and  punftuation  of  the  Englifh  language.  It  is  not 
uncommon  to  find  orators  of  confiderable  name, 
both  in  the  pulpit  and  at  the  bar,  far  from  being 
accurate  in  point  of  grammar.  This  is  e\4dentlj  a 
very  great  blemilh.  Perhaps  it  may  be  occafion- 
ed,  in  fome  meafure,  by  the  Englifli  feldom  or 
never  being  taught  grammatically  to  children. 
But  thofe  who  have  learned  the  principles  of 
grammar,  in  the  Greek  and  Latin  languages, 
fliould  be  more  ready  to  attend  to  it.  I  am 
fenlible,  that  the  grammar  of  every  langage  is  ul- 
timately fixed  by  cuftom  ;  with  regard  to  which, 
Horace  fays,  ^uem  penes  arbitrium  est,  &:c.  But 
even  here,  we  muft  attend  to  the  meaning  of  the 
fentiment.  It  is  not  the  cuftom  of  the  \Til2:ar  that 
eftablilLes  either  the  grammar  or  pronunciation  of 
any  language,  but  that  which  is  received  and  efta- 
bliflied  by  the  beft  writers.  You  will  fay,  Kow 
do  thefe  writers  determine  themfelves  ?  Are  not 
they  alfo  guided  by  practice  ?  They  are  in  a  great 
meafure  ;  and  it  is  generally  faid,  that  the  practice 
of  the  capital  of  a  nation,  or  of  the  court  in  that 
capital,  fettles  the  grammar.  This  muft  in  fub- 
ftance  be  agreed  to,  yet  judgement  and  analogy 
will  frequently  fuggeft  improvements,  and  intro- 
duce a  good,  or  abolifti  an  ill  cuftom.  You  muft 
not  fuppofe,  that  all  the  phrafes  of  the  \'Tilgar  in 
London,  are  therefore  agreeable  to  the  grammar 
of  the  Englifti,  or  even  that  at  court  all  the  nobi- 
lity, male  and  female,  fpeak  with  perfeft  proprie- 
ty.    It  is  in  the  laft  refort,  the  men  of  literature. 


17^  LECTURES  ON  Le£l.  3. 

particularly  the  authors,  who,  taking  cullom  as  a 
.general  rule,  give  it  all  the  direction  they  can,  by 
their  reafoning  and  example. 

To  make  you  underftand  this  by  fome  inftances, 
jou  Jee  Mr  Addlfon,  Dean  Swift,  and  Mr  Pope, 
have  endeavoured  to  attend  to  the  genius  of  the 
Englifti  language,  to  Ihew  where  it  was  harfh  and 
unpoliflied,  and  where  improprieties  might  be  cor- 
refted  ;  and  they  have  fucceeded  in  a  great  mea- 
fure.  It  was  obferved  by  all  thofe  great  men,  that 
the  Engliih,  and  all  the  northern  languages,  are 
harfh,  by  the  numbers  of  confonants  meeting  with- 
out intervening  vowels  ;  therefore,  that  it  is  a  great 
barbariim  to  ilrike  out  the  vowels  that  we  have,  as 
in  thefe  words,  don't,  can't,  didn't,  wouldn't, 
fliouldn't,  rebuk'd,  drudg'd,  fledg'd.  Several  oF 
thefe  words  may  yet  be  lieard  in  fome  places,  and 
I  have  even  feen  them  in  print  in  America  ;  but 
no  good  fpeaker  or  tolerable  writer  would  ufe  them 
in  Great  Britain.  I  give  another  example  when 
the  fenfe  and  analogy  of  the  words  fugged s  the  im- 
provement. Averfe  and  averfion,  were  often  for- 
merly ufed  with  to  or  at ;  he  is  very  averfe  to  it ; 
he  has  a  great  averfion  at  it.  But,  as  averfe  pro- 
perly figniiies  turned  away,  it  feems  an  evident  im- 
provement to  fay,  averfe  from.  What  I  mean  by 
this  obfervation,  is  to  turn  your  attention  to  fuch 
remarks,  when  you  meet  with  them  in  reading  or 
converfation. 

I  will  make  an  obfervation  or  two  more.  It  is  of 
fome  importance  to  attend  to  the  ufe  of  words  nearly 
related,  or  in  fome  degree  fynonymous.  It  is  not 
uncommon  to  hear  people  fay,  a  man  is  incident  to 


Lea.  3.  ELOQUENCE.  177 

fuch  and  facli  a  thing  ;  the  evil"  is  incident  to  the 
perfon,  the  perfon  liable  to  the  evil,  or  fubjed  to 
it ;  this  may  be  feen  by  the  original  meaning  of 
the  word,  of  Latin  derivation,  and  figniiies,  to  fall 
upon.  The  word  notify  is  often  ufed  v^Tong,  par- 
ticularly in  America  ;  they  fpeak  of  notifying  the  pu- 
blic, that  is  to  fay,  making  known  the  public;  inilead 
of  this,  we  ihould  fay,  notify  any  thing  (or  make 
it  known)  to  the  public.  You  advertife  a  perfon, 
or  inform  him  of  a  thing, — acquaint  him  with  it. 
The  verb  consist,  in  Englilh,  has  two  diilinft 
meanings,  and  two  conftruclions  ;  when  it  figniiies 
to  agree  or  correfpond,  it  is  joined  to  icith.  It 
confifts  iinth  my  knowledge.  When  it  fignifies  to 
compofe  or  make  up  a  total,  it  is  conftru6ted  either 
with  i;i  or  0/'/  as,  his  eilate  confifts  ofxir  in  houfes, 
lands,  &.C.  This  and  that,  and  these  and  those,  vrhen 
together  in  a  fentence,  are  ufed  with  diftindlion  ; 
this  and  these  for  the  neareft,  and  that  and  those,  for'" 
the  moft  remote  antecedent ;  but  otherwife,  these 
and  those  are  ufed  indifcriminately,  but  those  more 
frequently;  ^s,  those  authors  uho  are  of  different  opi^ 
mons. 

In  ^11  matters  doubtful,  you  ought  to  obfer%'e  how 
the  current  of  good  authors  go.  So  far  as  I  have 
been  able  to  obferve,  colleclive  words  in  Englifli 
are  indifferently  conftiiicted,  either  with  a  verb  lin- 
gular or  plural,  as  number,  multitude,  partr— a  great 
number  were  prefent,  or  was  prefent ;  though  I 
fhould  prefer  the  laft 

As  to  orthography,  it  is  of  the  utmoft  moment ;  not 
but  that  a  man  may  be  fuppoied  to  fpeak,  though 
he    cannot  fpell  ;     but  becaufe  a  public  fpeaker 

Vol.  Vll.  O 


J 7^  LECTURES  ON  Led.  3. 

muft  be  always  in  fome  degree  converfant  in  pub- 
lic life,  and  then  bad  fpelling  is  exceedingly  re- 
proachful. It  is  not  only  neceflary  to  underftand, 
in  all  ordinary  cafes,  the  orthography  of  our  own 
language,  but  a  fcholar  and  critic,  I  think,, fhould 
be  able  to  obferve  the  variations  that  have  been 
made  in  fpelling  from  time  to  time.  Between  thir- 
ty and  forty  years  ago,  an  attempt  was  made  to  alter 
the  fpelling  of  the  Englifli  language  very  confider- 
ably,  by  bringing  it  nearer  to  the  way  of  pronounc- 
ing ;  but  it  did  not  fuccced,  being  oppofed  by  fome 
of  the  greateil  eminence,  as  likely  to  deftroy  or 
hide  the  etymology  of  words.  There  have  fome 
fmall  alterations  obtained  a  good  deal  in  my  remem- 
brance, fuch  as  taking  away  the  final  k  in  public, 
€ccleiiaflic,  &c.  There  is  alfo  jult  now  an  attempt 
making  to  change  the  fpelling  of  feveral  words.  I 
have  feen  an  example  of  it  in  a  very  late  edition  of 
Middleton's  Life  of  Cicero  ;  fuch  as,  revele,  repete, 
explane — honor,  favor,  candor,  &:c.  This  feems 
upon  the  principle  of  bringing  words  nearer  to  their 
Latin  derivation. 

Puncluatlon  is  a  thing  that  a  fcholar  fhould  ftrive 
to  underftand  a  little ;  though  there  are  few  gen- 
tlemen or  fcholars  who  ufe  it  much,  either  in  let- 
ters or  in  their  compolition.  The  reafon  of  this 
is,  that  it  is  looked  upon  as  too  formal,  and  unne- 
ceflary  to  ufe  it  in  writing  letters,  except  a  full 
Hop.  It  is  always  the  beft  language  that  has  leafl 
need  of  points  to  be  underflood.  Points  are,  I  be- 
lieve, a  modern  invention,  fubfequent  to  the  in- 
vention of  printing  ;  very  ufeful,  however,  in 
Reaching  young  perfons  to  read  with  proper  paufes. 
Another  reafon  why  points  are  little  ufed  in  pri- 


Lecl.  3.  teLOQUENCE.  179 

vate  writing,  is,"  that  fuch  papers  as  are  fent  to  the 
prefs,  (in  Britain),  do  not  need  them,  the  printers 
themfelves  underftanding  that  matter  at  leaft  as 
well,  if  not  better,  than  any  writer. 

4.  It  is  a  good  rule,  to  obferve  early,  and  fludy 
to  guard  ^gainft  fome  of  the  moft  remarkable  ble- 
mifhes  hi  writing  and  fpeaking,  which  are  fallen 
into  by  defign  or  accident,  and  continued  by  habit. 
It  is  not  difficult  for  anv  perfon,  as  foon  as  he  be- 
gins to  obferve  and  reflecV,  to  difcover  thefe  in 
others  ;  and  as  he  will  perceive  the  abfurditj  clear- 
ly in  them,  let  him  be  very  careful  to  find  out 
whether  there  is  not  fometliing  of  the  fame  kind  in 
himfelf.  That  you  may  underftand  what  I  mean, 
I  will  mention  fome  particulars. 

I.  Peculiar  phrases. — Such  as  have  nothing  in 
them  but  what  is  juft,  and  decent,  and  proper, 
when  ufed  once,  or  now  and  then  ;  but  when  a 
fpeaker  falls  fo  into  any  of  them,  that  the  practice  is 
known  for  his  own,  and  he  is  known  by  it,  they  become 
unfpeakably  ridiculous.  It  is  very  difficult  to  avoid 
fomething  of  this  kind  ;  there  are  few,  if  any,  bat 
in  common  difcourfe  ufe  fome  phrafes  more  thant 
others.  A  cautious  perfcn,  as  foon  as  he  perceives 
a  habit  of  uling  any  one  coming  upon  him,  will  en- 
deavour to  alter  or  avoid  it.  Even  the  greateft  men 
are  not  wholly  free  from  th^.  defecl.  It  is  obfer- 
ved  of  Cicero,  that  esse  videatur  occurs  in  almoll. 
every  three  or  four  fentences,  be  the  fubje6l  whai 
it  will.  I  knew  a  preacher  that  uftd  the  word 
sedate,  fo  very  frequently,  that  he  was  called  ge- 
nerally where  he  was  known,  by  the  name  of  tlic 
Q  2 


^8o  LECTURES  01^  Le^,  3. 

le^kte  preacher.  I  fay  the  fame  thing  of  particular 
motions  and  geflures,  which  if  they  be  in  any  degree 
out  of  the  way,  are  a  great  blemifli  in  a  fpeaker : 
both  the  one  and  the  other  of  thefe  are  commonly 
2t  firfl:  taken  up  as  graces,  and  retained  fo  long  in 
that  view,  that  they  acquire  an  irrefiilible  power 
from  habit. 

2.  Another  blemifh  of  this  kind,  is  ufing  impro- 
per epithets.  This  is  very  common :  fome,  efpe- 
cially  young  perfons,  are  apt  to  think  a  difcourfe 
lean  and  poor,  unlefs  there  be  a  great  number  of 
epithets  -,  and  as  they  will  let  no  fubflantive  go 
without  an  adjeflive,  it  is  a  great  chance  that 
fome  of  them  are  improper:  they  cannot  fay 
the  Iky,  without  the  azure  iliy,  or  the  lofty  fky, 
or  the  wide  expanded  Iky  ;  and  though  all  thefe 
epithets  may  belong  to  the  fky,  they  may  not  be 
equally  proper  in  the  place  where  they  are  intro- 
duced. A  certain  gentleman,  of  no  mean  rank  in 
Great  Britain,  in  drawling  an  addrefs  from  a  bo- 
rouph  to  his  Majefly,  on  the  peace,  told  him,  that 
tl^e  terror  of  his  arms  had  fpread  to  the  moil  dif- 
tant  parts  of  the  terraqtieoiis  globe.  Now,  though  it 
be  certainly  true  that  the  globe  is  terraqueous,  it 
was  exceedingly  ridiculous  to  tell  the  king  fo  ;  it 
looked  as  if  his  Majcily  were  a  boy,  and  the  bo- 
rough-magiflrates  were  teaching  him :  or  they 
theuifelves  W'cre  boys,  who  had  juft  learned  the 
firft  lefTon  in  geography,  that  the  globe  confifts  of 
land  and  water,  and  therefore  were  defirous  of  let- 
ting it  be  known  that  they  were  fo  far  advanced. 

3.  Another  vifiblc  blemilh  is,    a  multitude   of 
unncccfn^ry  v/crds  of   any  kind,  particularly   the 


Le£l.  3.  ELOQJJENCE.  181 

vain  repetition  of  fynonymous  pbrafes.     Some  do 
not  think  their  fentences  full  and  round   enough, 
without  a  number  of  thefe  phrafes.     But  though  it 
be  true,  that  there  is  a  fulnefs  of  a  fenteace,  anvl*.  the 
claufes  of  a  fentence,  which  is  neceiTarj  to  pleafe 
:iie  ear,  yet  it  is  but  an  ill  way  to  make  up  the 
fbape  with  what  is  without  fenfe  or  force.     The 
moil  common  of  this  kind  are  the  double  epithets, 
which  men   are    led.  into  bj   the   introduction  of 
words    deiived    from   the   Latin    or   Greek,    into 
I  he  Engliih  language.     Thefe  words   difTering  in 
I'ound,  are  often  coupled  together,  as  if  diiTerent 
in  meaning  aKo — As  happinefs,  and  felicity, — fhii-. 
tion  and  enjoyment, — greatnefs  and  magnificence, 
-^eafe   an  J    facility — way  and  manner, — 'end  and 
concluiion, — fmall  and   minute, — boimtiful  and  li- 
beral, &c.     Sometimes,  from  your  lofiy  fpeakers^ 
we  hear  a  whole  firing  of  ^vords,  of  fo  little  dif- 
ference in  meaning,  that  it  is  almofl:  impolHble  to 
perceive   it.     Thus   I   have  lately   heard,  "  Thi$ 
grand,  capital,  important,  and  fundamental  truth  ;'* 
—  all  proper  epithets  ;  and  though  any  one  of  them 
would  have  made  the  dilcourfe  nen-ous,  as  well  as 
juft,  by  the  addition  of  them  all  it  becomes  fwell- 
ed  and  filly  *. 


*  list  0/ Synonymous  Terms  fre^u€i:tly  to  he  m<t  luith. 

Speakers  and  writers,  Worth  and  value, 

Tvlotives  and  arguments,  Lafiing  and  abiding. 

Benefit  and  ad'vantage,  Command  and  order, 

Small  ahd  minute,  Order  ar^d  appoint, 
^3 


l82  LECTURES  ON  Le6l.  3. 

4.  VulgarLfms.  I  have  "been  furprifed  to  fee 
fome  perfons  of  education  and  chara£ler,  introduce 
the  mere  vulgarifms  of  difcourfe  in  the  pulpit,  or 
at  the  bar  ;  fuch  as,  I  an't,  I  can't,  I  Ihan't.  An 
author,  who  entitles  his  book  Lexiphanes,  and  has 
very  fuccefsfully  expofed  Johnfon's  long  and  hard 
words,  let  flip  a  vulgarifm  into  his  own  difcourfe, 
for  which  he  was  feverely  handled  by  the  review- 
ers. Between  you  and  I.  J  there  is  a  governed 
cafe  ;  and  if  it  were  to   be  ufed,  it  fliould  be,  Be- 


Bountiful  and  liberal, 
Right  and  title, 
Order  and  method, 
Sharp  and  acute. 
Pain  and  anguilh, 
Moment  and  importance, 
Delight  and  fatisfaclion, 
Joy  and  pleafure, 
Profit  and  advantage, 
Refolution  and  purpofe, 
Juftice  and    equity, 
Truth  and  fmeerity, 
•Wealth  and  riches, 
Penury  and  want, 
Odious  and  hateful, 
Poor  and  indigent, 
Order  and  regularity. 
Rules  and  Regulations, 
Caufes  and  Reafons, 
Ufeful  and  profitable, 
Amiable  and  lovely, 
"Wife  and  prudent, 


Sin  and  guilt, 
Chearfulnefs  and  alacrity, 
Greatnefs  and  magnificence 
Joy  and  delight. 
Fruition  and  enjoyment, 
Juft  and  righteous, 
End  and  dtilgu, 
Open  and  explain. 
Lading  and  durable. 
Clear  and  manifeft, 
Marks  and  figns. 
Plain  and  perfpicuous, 
Eafe  and  facility, 
End  and  conclufion, 
A  final  iiTue, 
Motives  and  reafons, 
Diminifhed  and  leflened. 
Excellence  and  perfe^licn-. 
Benevolence  and  good-will, 
Dcmonilrate  and  prove, 
Cover  and  conceal, 
Eoolifh  and  unwife, 


Left.  3.  ELOQUENCE.  iSj 

tween  you  and  me.  But  the  truth  is,  the  phrafe  is 
altogether  a  vulgarifm,  and  therefore  not  to  be 
ufed,  except  in  particular  circumftances,  defcribing 
familiar  chat.  There  are  alfo  certain  cant  phrafes 
which  come  into  repute  and  ufe  in  the  courfe  and 
the  cihanges  of  fafhion. 

Thefe  have  been  fufficiently  expofed  by  Swift 
and  Addifon,  and  therefore  1  fliall  fay  nothing  at 
all  further  on  them,  at  prefent,  as  an  opportunity 
will  afterwards  occur  of  mentioning  them  to  advan- 
tage. 

5.  The  fifth  and  lad  general  rule  I  fhall  jud 
mention,  is,  to  follow  nature.  This  is  a  rule  often 
given,  and  greatly  inliiled  on  by  the  ancients. 
Every  body  has  heard  of  it,  nay,  fometimes  thofe 
who  have  not  heard  of  it  will  fpeak  as  if  they  had, 
and  fay,  "  This  was  quite  natural — This  was  al- 
together unnatural."  But  it  is  fomewhat  difficult 
to  underfland.  Nature  feems  in  this  rule  to  be 
oppofed  to  art.  Is  f^/llowing  nature,  then,  to  do 
as  untaught  perfons  generally  do  ?  Will  the  mofl 
ignorant  perfons  make  the  moft  plain  and  the  bell 
conne6ted  difcourfe  ?     Will  they  tell  a  ftory  with 

^erms  and  Phrasss  to  he  noted  for  remarks. 

Happifying, — fufceptive, — fellow-countryman,— fell- 
cites, — to  be  found  in  the  Monitor. 

"  Unfexed  thy  mind,"  in  a  Poem. 

"  Senfibilities,"  Aikin's  Magazine,  Ocl.  vol.  i.  468, 
469. 

"  Thefe   commendations  will  not,  I   am   perfuaded> 
make  you  vain  and  coxcomicaJy 
Knickknackically,  firaplify,  domefticate,  pultpitically. 


^§4  LECTURfeS  ON  Le^.  ^ 

the  moft  genuine  fimplicity,  and  at  tlie  fame  time 
xvith  perfpicuity  ?  We  find  it  is  quite  otherwife. 
Perhaps  it  would  be  be  ft  to  fay,  it  is  following  truth, 
or  following  that  wliich  is  eafiefl  and  plaineli,  and 
probably  would  be  followed  by  all,  but  for  affec- 
tation. 

On  this  fubjeft   I  can  think  of  nothing  fo  good 
as  to  fay,  Realize  and  fuppofe  you  faw  the  thing 
you  would  defcribe,  and  put  j^ourfelf  in  the  very 
ftate  of  him  v»^hofe   fentiments  you  would  fpeak. 
Clear  conceptions  make  diflind    expreffions,  and 
reality   is   a   great  afliftant    to    invention.     If  you 
were  bid  to  iludy  a  fubjeft  abflraclly,  it  would  be 
with  great  difEciTlty  that  things  proper  and  fuitable 
to   it  would  come  into  your  mind.     But   if  you 
yourfelf  were   in  the  fituation  that  is  to  be  fuppo- 
fed,  the  fentiments  pertinent  to  it  would  crowd  upon 
you  immediately.     Let  me  try  to  make  this  fami- 
liar by  an  example  :   Suppofe  I  were  to  aik  any  of 
you  juft  now,  what  are  the  circumftances  that  ag- 
gravate fm,  or  make  it  more  heinous,  and  deferving 
of  fevere  punifliment  ?    It   is  highly   probable   he 
would  either  be  at   a  lofs  altogether,  or  at  leall 
would  omit  many  of  them.     But  if  any  of  you  had 
received  an  injury  from  another,  in  explaining  of 
it,  he  would  not  fail  to  come  over  them  every  one. 
He  would  fay  it  was  unprovoked. — If  he  had  done 
him  fervice,  he  would  not  fail  to  upbraid  him  with 
it,  and  nothing   would  be    forgotten  between  the-, 
two  that  could  aggravate  the  crime. 

Supposing  the  reality  of  every  thing,  alfo,  ferves 
particularly  to  deliver  a  fpeaker  from  affecled  or- 
naments, and  every  thing  in  language  or  carriage 


Le(Jl.  3.  ELOQUENCE.  18^ 

that  is  improper  :  If  you  were  pleading  the  caufc 
of  one  accufed  of  a  capital  crime,  it  would  be  beii 
to  fuppofe  that  you  yourfelf  were  the  a<:cufed  per- 
fon,  ai?d  that  you  were  fpeaking  for  your  own  life. 
This  would  give  an  earneftnefs  of  fpirit,  and  a  juft- 
nefs  and  corre^lnefs  to  the  manner,  infinitely  dif- 
tant  from  that  theatrical  pomp,  which  is  fo  pro- 
perly faid  to  be  a  departure  from  the  limplicity  o£ 
nature. 


LECTURE    IV. 

HAVING  given  you  fome  preliminary  difcour- 
fes  on  fuch  points  as  I  thought  would  ferve 
to  prepare  you  for  what  might  be  afterwards  faid, 
I  proceed  to' treat  the  fubjecl  more  methodicallyv 
and  more  fully.  There  are  various  ways  of  di- 
viding the  fubjed,  which  yet  may  each  of  them  be 
faid  to  take  in  the  whole,  in  one  way  or  other. 
Several  of  thefe  muft  be  combined  together  j  as  it 
is  not  fuilicient  to  view  a  building  only  from  one 
ftation.  If  you  would  underfland  it  thoroughly, 
you  mull  view  it  from  different  Rations,  and  even 
take  it  in  profile,  and  leani  not  only  its  outward 
appearance,  but  its  inward  llruciure.  The  me- 
thod I  have  refolved  to  follow,  and  w^hich  feems 
to  me  as  complete  as  any  I  could  fall  upon,  is 
this — 

I.  To  treat  of  language  in  general,  its  ouali. 


•l86  LECTURES  ON  LciH:.  4. 

ties,  and  pcwers— eloquent  fpeech — and  its  hiftory 
^nd  pradlices  as  an  art. 

II.  To  coniider  oratory  as  divided  into  its  three 
great  kinds,  the  fublime — fimple — and  mixed,-^ 
their  characters — their  diilinftions — ^their  beauties 
—and  their  ufes. 

III.  To  confider  it  as  divided  into  its  conftituent 
parts — invention — difpolition — ftjle— pronunciation 
— and  gefture. 

IV.  To  confider  it  as  its  objecl  is  different — in- 
formation— demonilration — perfuafion  —  entertain- 
ment. 

V.  As  its  fubjed  is  different — the  pulpit — the 
bar — and  the  fenate,  or  any  deliberate  affembly. 

VI.  To  confider  the  flrufture  and  parts  of  a  par- 
.ticular  difcourfe, — their  order,— *cbnne6lioti—pi*6- 

portion — and  ends. 

VIL  Recapitulation,  and  an  inquiry  into  the 
principles  of  tafte,  or  of  beauty  and  gracefulnefs, 
-as  applicable  not  only  to  oratory,  but  to  all  ihc 
other  (commonly  called)  fine  arts. 

In  the  firfl  place,  then,  I  am  to  tr&at  of  language 
jn  genera] — its  qualities  and  powers — eloquent 
ipeech — and  its  hiftory  and  pra<Elice  as  an  art. 

Language  is  what  in  a  great  meafure  diftinguifhes 
man  from  the  inferior  creatures.  Not  but  that  al- 
moft  all  animals  have  certain  founds  by  which 
they  can  communicate  fomething  to  one  another. 
But  thefe  founds  are  evidently  only  fimple,  and 
fomeiimes  fmgle  exertions,  differing  in  one  crea- 
ture from  another,  according  to  the  different  con- 
formation of  their  organs.     Articulate  fpeech  has  a 


Le£l.  4.  ELOQUENCE.  187 

far  greater  compafs,  and  is  able  to  exprefs  a 
vaft  multitude  of  complex,  as  well  as  fimple 
ideas  ;  perhaps  we  may  even  faj,  that  articulate 
fpeech  is  little  lefs  extenfive  than  thought  itfelf, 
there  being  hardly  any  idea  that  can  be  formed  but 
it  may  be  exprefled,  and  by  that  means  communi- 
cated. In  this  there  is  a  wide  and  uianifeft  diilinc- 
tion  between  the  rational  and  irrational  creatures. 

Articulate  language  is  intended  to  communicate 
our  fentiments  one  to  another.  This  may  be  con- 
fldered  as  fully  explained,  by  faying  it  includes  in- 
formation and  perfuafion.  A  conception  in  my 
mind,  when  •  fpoken,  its  excellence  confifts  in  ma- 
king another  perceive  what  I  perceive,  and  feel 
towards  it  as  I  feel.  They  may  be  afterwards  am- 
pliiied  and  extended  ;  but  thefe  two  particulars  fhew 
the  true  original  purpofe  of  fpeech.  Eloquence  is 
commonly  called  the  art  of  perfuafion,  but  the 
other  muft  he  taken  in.  We  nrnft  inform,  before 
we  can  perfuade  ;  or  if  there  be  any  fuch  thing  as 
perfuafion  without  information,  it  is  only  a  blind 
impulfe. 

Articulate  fpeech  is  reprefenting  our  ideas  by 
arbitrary  founds  ;  that  is  to  fay,  there  is  no  real 
or  natural  conne(Sion  between  the  found  and  figni- 
fication,  but  what  is  the  effeft  of  compact  and  ufe. 
In  this,  articulate  fpeech  is  diflinguiihed  from  figns 
or  natural  founds,  as  alphabetical  writing  (of 
which  more  aftei\vards)  is  diflinguilhed  from  hie- 
roglyphical.  Natural  founds  may  lignify  joy, 
fear,  anger  ;  but  language,  in  general,  has  no  fuch 
natural  conneclion  ^vith  its  meaning.  The  words 
sun  and  ?720Qp  might  have  had  different  noeanings, , 


xSS  LECTUx^Es  o>r  Lecl.  4. 

snd  ferved  the  fame  purpofe.  The  word  heith  in 
Hebrew,  oikos  in  Greek,  domus  in  Latin,  maison  in 
French,  and  house  in  Englifli,  though  all  of  them 
different,  are  equally  proper  for  fignifying  the  fame 
thing,  when  once  they  ate  fixed  by  the  cuftom  of 
the  feveral  nations.  Some  have  attempted  to  re- 
duce the  original  words  of  a  fuppofed  original  lan- 
guage, and  even  the  letters  of  the  alphabet,  to  a 
natural  refemblance  of  the  things  to  be  fignified ; 
but  their  attempts  have  been  fruitlefs,  and  ridicu- 
lous. It  was  in  ancient  times  a  pretty  general  ima- 
gination, that  there  was-  a  certain  language  that 
was  original  and  natural  to  man  ;  that  this  was  the 
firft  language  in  ufe  ;  and  that  if  men  were  not 
taught  another  language  by  example,  they  would 
all  fpeak  this  language.  But  experience,  after 
trial  had  been  made  by  feveral  curious  perfons, 
fhowed  this  imagination  to  be  vain  ;  for  thofe  who 
were  brought  up  without  any  communication  with 
men,  were  always  dumb,  and  fpoke  none  at  all, 
except  fometimes  imitating  the  natural  founds  of 
fome  beafts  or  birds,  which  they  might  occafional- 
ly  hear,  Herodotus's  ftory  is  either  a  fable,  or  it 
proves  nothing,  of  a  king  of  Egypt  having  two 
children  nouriilied  by  goats,  and  pronouncing  the 
word  Bee,  or  Beecos,  which,  they  faid,  fignified 
bread  in  the  Phrygian  language.  This  was  a  thing 
merely  accidental,  if  true  ;  yet,  at  any  rate,  of  very 
doubtful  authority. 

The  words  in  articulate  fpeech,  therefore,  are 
arbitrary;  nor  is  there  any  poflibility  of  thfeir  being 
otherwife,  for  words  are  only  founds  ;  and  though 
it  is  poflible  in  fome  few  particulars  to  fix  upon 


Led.  4.  ELOQUENCE.  1B9 

words  with  a  natural  relation  ;  as  for  example, 
perhaps  the  names  of  animals  might  fometimes  be 
given  them,  with  lome  refemblance  of  found  to 
the  natural  founds  which  thefe  animals  utter  ;  vet 
even  this  w^ith  difadvantages,  as  anj  bcdj  maj 
perceive,  bj  trying  to  make  a  word  that  fliall  re- 
femble  the  neighing  of  a  horfe,  the  lowing  of  a 
bull,  &c.  But  as  to  all  inanimate  viJible  objeds, 
it  is  impoffible  to  reprefent  them  by  found  ;  light 
and  found,  the  eye  and  the  ear,  being  totally  diffe-- 
rent  in  kind.  I  can  recolledl  nothing  that  makes 
any  dilRculty  in  this  matter,  unlefs  that  fome  may 
fay.  How  then  do  you  find  place  for  that  particu- 
lar beauty  of  poetry,  and  other  defcriptions,  in 
making  the  found  an  echo  to  the  fenfe  ?  But  this  is 
eafily  refolved.  In  fome  cafes,  the  paflions  give  a 
modulation  to  foimd ;  and  in  the  quantity  of  the 
iyllables,  and  eafe  or  difficulty  of  pronouncing 
ihem,  there  may  be  a  refemblance  to  llownefs  and 
labour,  or  their  oppoiites,  or  both  :  As  in  the  fa- 
mous paflage  of  Homer,  Ton  men  Tissiphon ;  or, 
iu  Mr  Pope,  who  exemplifies  the  rule  in  gi^Tug  it. 

*'  'Tis  not  enough,  no  harfhnefs  gives  offence,"  &c. 

If  words  are  arbitrary,  it  ^may  be  aiked,  ho've 
language  came  firfl  into  ufe  ?  in  which  the  opi- 
nions are  \^rious,  but  the  controverfy  is  not  of  any 
great  moment.  Some  think  it  was  in  the  fame 
way  as  other  creatures  exert  their  natural  powers, 
ihat  man  by  practice  gradually  came  to  the  ufe  of 
fpeech,  and  fettled  the  meaning  of  words  by  cuf- 
lom.  Others  think  that  this  would  either  never 
have  happened,  or  have   taken  a  very  long  tijne. 

Vol.  VJI.  r 


19^  LECTURES  ovf  Lecl.  4. 

and  fuppofe  that  tlieir  Maker  taught  them  at  leaft 
fome  degree  of  practice,  which  fliould  open  the 
way  to  a  more  extenfive  ufe  of  the  facuhj.     And 
the  confideration,  that  founds  in  language  are  arbi- 
trary, in  fome  degree  favours  this  fuppofition,  be- 
caufe  it  may  be  obferved,  that  as  mankind  are  ca- 
pable by  inftruftion  of  the  greateft  and  •  moll  mul- 
tifarious improvement,  fo  without  iiiilruftion  they 
are  capable  of  doing  leaft.     A  human  infant,  when 
firft  brought   forth,    is  more   helplefs,  and  longer 
helplefs,  than  other  animal  that  we  know.     It  does 
not  feem  to  be  of  much  importance  to  form  a  de- 
terminate opinion  of  this  queftion.     It   occurs   in 
the   very   fame   way  again,  and  may  be   reafoned 
upon  the  fame  principles,  whether  alphabetical  wri- 
ting was  an  invention  and  difcovery  of  man,  or  re- 
vealed  by  God.     Thofe  who  hold  the  laft  opinion 
obferve,  that  hieroglyphic  writing,  or  writing  by 
figns  or  pictures,  was  before  alphabetical ;  and  that 
the  improvement  of  hieroglyphics  does  not  lead  to, 
but  from  alphabetical  writing  :  That  the  one  coniiils 
of  natural  emblems,  and  vifible  figns  of  fentiments, 
and  the  other  of  arbitrary  or  artificial  figns  for  fimple 
founds ;  fo  that  the  more    complex  you  make  the 
hieroglyphic,  you  differ  the  more  from  the  alpha- 
bet.    It  feems  probable,  that  this,  and   indeed  the 
radical   principles    of   all   great   difcoveries,    were 
brought  out  by  accident,  that  is   to  fay,  by  Provi- 
dence :   therefore  it  is  probable,  that  God  gave  to 
our  firll  parents,  who  were  found  in  a  Hate   of  full 
growth,  aU  the  inftrudion  neceflary  for  proceeding 
upon,    and   exercifing  the  faculty   of   fpeech,    the 
kngth  that  w^as  necefifary  for  the  purpofes  of  hu- 


LcSi,  4.  EL0QJ7ENCX.  19! 

man  life.  It  is  alfo  probable,  from  the  analogy  of 
providence,  that  he  left  as  much  to  the  exercife  of 
the  human  powers,  as  convenience  and  application 
could  convenient! J  fuppl j. 

I  will  not  enter  much  into  the  formation  and 
conflniction  of  language  in  general.  It  is  formed 
bj  a  certain  number  of  f.mple  founds,  which,  whea 
varioufl  J  combined,  produce  that  variety-  of  words, 
"U'hicli,  though  certainly  not  ftri£lly  infinite,  jet  have 
been  hitherto  inexhauHed  bj  all  ihct  langujiges  in  the 
world.  The  letters  are  di-^dded  into  vowels  andi 
confonants,  the  fiift  having  a  found  of  themfelves, 
and  the  other  only  giving  a  fort  of  modification  to 
that  found.  Some  great  philologifls  are  of  opinion, 
that  in  the  Hebrew,  and  feveral  other  ancient  lan- 
guages, their  whole  letters  are  coiiiona^/s,  tending 
to  mark  the  different  conngurations  of  the  organs 
of  found  at  the  beginning  of-  pronunciation,  and 
the  vowels  are  the  founds  themfelves,  which  they 
fay  men  were  taught  to  adopt  by  habit,  firft  in 
fpeaking,  and  then  in  writing,  and  afterwards  were 
diftinguiflied  by  marks  or  figns,  for  the  fake  of 
readers.  Hence  the  controverfy  about  the  Hebrew 
points,  and  indeed  reading  the  dead  languages  in 
general,  which  is  attended  with  great  uncertaintv, 
particularly  from  ,the  following  circumftances. 
Vowels  have  in  general  been  but  five  or  fix  in 
number,  which  ihould  exprefs  all  the  fimple  founds, 
and  yet  they  do  not ;  and  perhaps  there  is  not  a 
language  in  which  there  is  greater  confufion  in  this" 
matter,  than  our  own,  which  m.akes  the  Englifli  fo 
exceedingly  difficult  for  a  foreigner  to  attain.  Several 
R  2 


19^  LECTURES  ON  Le£l:.  zj. 

Engliih  vowels  have  three  or  four  dlfFerent  founds  ; 
and,  as  Sheridan  fays,  fome  of  them  the  length 
of  five  ;  /  has  three  in  one  word,  viz.  infinite, 
Thefe  things  not  being  ncceflary  to  my  main  pur- 
pofe,  I  only  point  at  themv/ithout  enlarging. 

It  is  plain,  that  in  whatever  manner  languages 
were  fiiil  formed,  we  can  eafily  fee  that  they  came 
ilowly  and  by  degrees  to  perfection.  An  eminent 
French  author.  Father  Lamy,  fays,  the  Hebrew 
language  was  perfect  in  its  original ;  but  he  ad- 
vances no  proof  of  this,  but  fhowing  indeed  by  very 
juft  hiilorical  remarks  and  criticifms,  that  the  He- 
brew was  anterior  in  point  of  time  to  the  Greek  ; 
and  thA.t  in  writing,  the  letters  were  taken  from 
ihe  Hebrew,  and  employed  in  the  Greek.  Hiflo- 
ry  fays,  that  Cadmus  was  a  Phenician,  and  he  has 
generally  among  the  Greeks  the  honour  of  introdu- 
cing letters.  It  is  alfo  obferved,  that  as  the  let- 
ters of  the  alphabet  were  ufed  in  expreffing  numbers, 
the  Greeks,  after  they  had  in  procefs,  of  time  al- 
tered or  left  out  the  letter  vau  in  Hebrew,  which 
{lands  fixth  in  order,  they  put  a  new  mark  j*  fof 
fix,  that  the  reft  might  retain  their  powers  ;  which 
plainly  iliews,  that  the  Hebrew  alpliaoet  was  older 
than  the  Greek,  as  it  now  Hands. 

But,  for  my  own  part,  I  do  not  underftand  the 
meaning  of  faying,  that  the  Hebrew  language  was 
perfed  at  firft  ;  it  might  be  fitted  for  all  the  pur- 
pofes  of  them  that  ufed  it  firft,  and  is  probably  at 
this  day  as  good  as  any  other  language,  fo  far  as  it 
goes  ;  but  it  is  plain,  that  this  and  all  the  other 
languages  of  the  -firft  ages  were  narrow,  fiiort,  and 
fimpie.     They  muft  have  been  fo  from  the  nature 


Le£t.  4.  ELOQUENCE.       ^  jgj 

of  the  thing  ;  moft  probably  they  confiiled  chiefly 
of  monofyllables,  reprefenting  fimple  ideas.  What 
occalion  had  they, for  complex  or  compound  words, 
when  they  had  few,  if  any,  complex  or  compound 
ideas  ?  This  appears  very  plainly  from  the  flate 
of  the  Hebrew  language,  fome  of  the  othei:  orien- 
tals, and  the  language  of  all  uncultivated  people. 
It  holds  likewile  in  the  cafe  of  the  Chinefe  lan- 
guage, which,  though  the  people  are  not  unculti- 
vated, properly  fpeaking,  is  yet  in  an  unimproved 
ftate,  from  their  having  had  little  intercourle  with 
other  nations.  All  fuch  languages  have  few  ad- 
j^61ives  ;  and  when  they  do  ufe  words  as  adjec- 
tives, they  are  commonly  figurative.  There  is  an 
ingenious  and  probable  deduction  how  a  fcanty 
narrow  language  might  be  firft  ufed  in  Shuckford's 
Conne^lions.  They  might  exprefs  qualities  by  the 
name  of  fome  animal  remarkable  for  them — as  a 
lion-man,  for  a  violent  or  fierce  man.  This  is 
wholly  agreeable  to  the  genius  of  the  Hebrew  lan- 
guage. The  Hebrews  defcribe  every  thing  that  is 
very  great,  by  adding  the  name  of  God  to  it,  as — 
the  trees  of  God — ^the  river  of  God.  It  follows^ 
that  ill  all  uncultivated  languages,  the  figures  are 
frequent,  and  very  ftrong.  The  Indians  in  Ame- 
rica have  a  language  full  of  metaphors.  They  take 
up  the  hatchet,  for  going  to  war  j  and  they  brighten 
the  chain,  when  they  confirm  a  peace. 

Hence  it  appears,  that  in  the  earliell  times,  if 
they  ufed  figures,  it  was  the  efflid  of  neceffity,  ra- 
ther than  choice.  But  what  men  did  at  firfl  out 
of  neceffity,,  orators  afterwards  returned  to  fiom 

R3 


•194  LECTURES  ON         _  Ltd..  4. 

choice,  in  order  to  increafe  the  beauty  or  force  of 
their  cli£lion,  or  both.  In  fa^t,  figures  do  make 
the  greateft  impixffion  on  men's  minds.  They  are 
fenfible,  and  therefore  level  to  every  man's  capa- 
city :  for  the  fame  reafon  they  make  a  ftrong  im- 
preffion  on  the  imagination.  They  likewife  leave 
a  great  deal  of  room  for  the  creative  power  of  fan- 
cy to  make  additions.  A  fign,  or  fymbol,  feen 
by  a  multitude,  on  a  fubje6l  that  is  underftood, 
carries  the  contagion  of  enthufiafm,  or  rage,  ex- 
ceedingly far.  In  the  19th  of  Judges,  you  fee  the 
Levite  took  his  concubine,  and  cut  her  into  twelve 
parts,  and  fent  them  to  all  the  tribes  of  Ifrael.  The 
Roman  alfo,  holding  up  the  ftump  of  his  hand 
which  he  loft  in  the  fervice  of  the  public,  pleaded 
for  his  brother  with  a  power  vaftly  fuperior  to  any 
language  whatever. 


LECTURE  V. 

HAviKG  given  you  a  fhort  view  of  language 
in  general,  if  it  were  not  too  long,  I  would 
confider  the  ftrudure  of  particular  languages  ;  in- 
llead  of  which,  take  the  few-  following  fhort  re- 
marks : 

I.  The  nature  of  things  neceflarily  fuggefts 
many  of  the  ways  of  fpeaking,  which  conftitutes 
the  grammar  of  a  language,  and  in  every  language 
there  is  nearly  the  fame  number  of  parts  of  fpcech, 


Lc£l.  5.  ELOQUENCE.  I95 

as  they  are  enumerated  in  the  Latin  grammar ; 
noun,  pronoun,  verb,  participle,  adverb,  prepofi- 
tion,  interjection,  conjundion. 

2.  In  the  ufe  cT  thefe,  there  is  a  very  great  varie- 
ty. Nouns,  to  be  fure,  are  declined  nearly  the 
fame  way  in  all,  by  cafes  and  numbers  ;  though 
(he  Greeks  in  this  differ  a  little,  uftng  three  num- 
bers inflead  of  two,  having  a  particular  infle£^ion 
of  the  word,  when  there  are  but  two  perfons 
meant ;  and  another  for  the  plural  or  more  :  but 
in  the  verbs,  there  is  a  very  great  diverfity  ;  in  the 
adive  and  pafTive  figniUcation,  they  generally 
agree,  but  fome  exprefs  the   perfons  by   termina- 

■ons,  and  fome  by  pronouns  and  nominatives  ex- 
preifed.  Some  have  moods,  which  others  have 
not.  The  Greeks  have  an  optative  mood  ;  the 
Latins  have  gerunds  ;  the  Hebrevrs,  v>4th  fewer 
differences  of  moods,  have  conjugations  that  carry 
fome  variety  of  fignification  to  the  fame  word.  In 
oie  word,  fUiiser,  (he  delivered),  there  is  not  only 
ilils  and  its  pafuve,  but  anotlier,  he  delivered  di- 
ligently, and  the  paffive  ;  another,  he  made  to  de- 
liver ;  another,  he  delivered  himfelf.  Tlie  Greek:;, 
bcfides  the  adive  and  paffive,  have  a  media  vox^ 
of  Vv'hich  perhaps  the  ufe  is  not  fully  underflood  ; 
fnicG  fome  of  the  beft  grammarians  fay  it  fignifies 
doing  a  think  to  one's  felf ;  Tupsofnai^  I  fhall  flrike 
myfelf.  Moil  of  the  modern  languages  decline 
their  verbs,  not  by  infledion  of  the  termination, 
as  the  Greek  and-  Latin,  but  by  auxiliary  verbs, 
as  the  Englilh  and  French.  The  CLinefe  language 
is  perhaps  the  leall  improved  of  any  language  that 
Jias'fubfilted  for  any  time  ;  this  probably  is  owing 


Jg6  LECTURES  ow  Le£l.  5. 

to  their  want  of  alphabetical  writing;  every  word 
among  them  had  a  characler  peculiar  to  it.  fo  that 
letters  and  words  were  the  fame  in  number  in  their 
language  ;  this  rendered  it  of  immenfe  difficulty  to 
underfland  their  writing  among  themfelves,  and 
quite  impoiTible  to  foreigners  ;  but  they  were  vaft- 
ly  furprifed  to  iind^  that  the  Jefuits  from  Europe, 
that  came  among  them,  could  eafily  write  their 
language  by  our  alphabet ;  and  as  they,  ufe  the 
fame  word  in  different  tones,  for  different  meanings, 
thefe  fathers  alfo  foon  found  a  way  of  diftinguifh- 
ing  thefe  in  writing,  by  certain  markjs  and  accents, 
placed  over  the  word,  differing  as  it  was  to  be  dif- 
ferently taken. , 

3.  Some  have  amufed  themfelves  with  inventing 
a  language,  with  fuch  a  regular  grammar  as  might 
be  eafily  underflood,  and  having  this  language 
brought  into  general  ufe.  We  have  a  remark  of 
this  kind,  in  Father  Lami's  Rhetorique,.  in  French, 
and  he  fays  the  grammar  of  the  Tartai-  language 
comes  neareft  ta  it.  We  have  alfo  had  fome 
fchemes  and  proportions  of  this  kind  in  Englifh,  but 
it  feems wholly  chimerical.  I  fliall  only  obferve  fur- 
ther, that  fome  few  have  imagined,  that  the  Hebrew 
language  itfelf  was  originally,  a:iid  when  complete,  a 
perfe£llanguage,and  that  we  now  have  it  only  maim- 
ed, and  but  a  fmall  part  of  it.  The  e  fuppofe  the 
language  to  be  generated  thus,  by  taking  the  letters 
of  the  alphabet,  and  iirft  going  through  them  re- 
gularly by  two,  and  then  by  three,  ^%  ng,  ad,  &c. 
aba,  ahby  Sec.  All  thefe  fchemes  are  idle,  becaufe 
no  perfon  can  pofTibly  lay  dowa  rules  beforehand^ 


Lecl.  5.  ELOQUENCE.  I97 

for  every  thing  that  may  be  hereafter  thought  and 
fpoken ;  and  therefore,  when  they  are  brought 
out,  they  will  be  expiePicd  as  thofe  to  whom  they 
liril  occur  fnall  incline  ;  and  cullom  will  finally  fix 
them,  and  give  them  their  authority. 

Leaving  thefe  things,  therefore,  as  matters  of 
more  curiofity  than  ufe,  I  proceed  to  fpeak  of  elo- 
quent fpeech,  and  its  hillory  as  an  art.  It  is  plain, 
that  in  the  progrefs  of  fociety,  and  the  commerce 
of  human  life,  it  would  foon  appear,  that  fome 
fpoke  wuth  more  grace  and  beauty,  and  fo  as  more 
to  incline  the  hearers  to  their  fentiments,  than 
others ;  neither  is  it  hard  to  perceive,  that  it  would 
be  early  in  repute.  In  the  firft  alTociations  of  man- 
kind, they  muft  have  been  chiefly  governed  bj 
thofe  who  had  the  pov/er  of  perfuafion.  In  uncul- 
tivated focieties,  it  is  fo  ilill  ;  in  an  Indian  tribe, 
the  fachem  or  wife  man  direfts  their  councils. 
The  progrefs  of  oratory  towards  perfedion  mull 
have  been  evidently,  in  fact,  like  the  proprefs  of 
all  other  human  arts,  gradual,  and  in  proportion 
to  the  encouragement  given  to  its  exercife.  It  pre- 
vailed where  the  ftate  of  things,  and  conftitiition 
of  government,  favoured  it,  but  not  othervviis. 

It  is  to  be  ocferved  here,  that  by  the  confent  of 
all,  and  by  the  memorials  of  antiquity  that  are 
kfr,  poetry  v/as  moic  ancient  than  oratory  j  oir 
.rhaps  we  may  rather  fay,  that  the  firfi  exertions 
cf  genius  in  eloquent  expreiSon  v^ere-in  poetry,  not 
in  profe.  It  has  frequently  been  made  matter  of 
critical  inquiry,  why  poetry  was  prior  to  oratory, 
id  why  fooner  brouglit  to^  perfection?  I  do  not 
perceive  very  clearly  what  great  advantage   there 


igS  LECTURES  017  Le£t.  5. 

is  in  determining  this  queftlon,  ftippofing  we  fliould 
hit  upon  the  true  reafons  ;  one  reafon  I  take  to  be, 
that  the  circumftance  in  poetry  that  gives  generally 
the  higheft  pleafure,  viz.  a  ftrong  and  vigorous 
fancy,  is  leail  indebted  to  application,  inftriidion, 
or  time,  for  its  perfeftion  ;  therefore  poetical  pro- 
ductions in  general,  and  that  fpecies  of  them  in 
particular,  which  have  moil  of  that  qualitj^  mull 
be  as  ealily  produced  in  uncultivated  times,  as  any 
other  ;  and,  for  fome  reafons  given  in  a  former  dif- 
courfe,  mud  appear  then  v/ith  the  greatefl  efFe£l. 
Whereas,  to  fuccefs  in  oratory,  fome  knowledge 
of  the  human  l^eart,  and  even  fome  experience  in 
the  ways  of  men,  is  neceifary.  Another  difference 
is  plain  ;  poetical  produftions  having  generally 
pleafure  or  imirxcdiate  entertainment  as  their  defign, 
may  produce  that  effecl  in  any  age  ;  whereas,  the 
circnmflances  that  rendered  the  orator's  difcourfe 
interefling,  are  all  gone. 

Perhaps  to  this  we  may  add,  that  the  incitements 
to  poetry  are  more  general.  A  poet  pleafes,  and 
obtains  fame  from  every  fingle  perfon  who  reads  or 
hears  his  produclions ;  but  an  affembly,  bulinefs, 
and  an  occasion,  are  neceijary  to  the  orator.  This 
lall  Is  Hkewife  limited  in  point  of  place  and  fitua- 
tion.  Oratory  could  not  thrive  in  a  (late  where  ar- 
bitrary power  prevails,  becaufe  then  there  is  no^ 
thing  left  for  large  affemblies,  and  a  diffufive  pu- 
blic, to  determine  ;  whereas  poetry  is  pleafmg 
to  perfons,  under  any  form  of  government  what- 
ever. 

Thofe  who  have  given  the  hiflory  of  orator\% 
have  rather  given  us  the  hiilory  of  the  teachers  ot 


Lec^.  5.  ELOQUENCE.  I99 

tliat  art,  than  its  progrefs  and  effc6ls.  It  muft  be 
obferv-ed,  however,  that  in  this,  as  well  as  in  poe- 
trj,  criticifm  is  the  child,  and  not  the  father  of 
genius.  It  is  the  fruit  of  experience  and  judge- 
ment, bj  relleclion  upon  the  fpontaneous  produc- 
tions of  genius.  Criticifm  inquires  what  was  the 
caufe  of  things  being  agreeable,  after  the  effeft  has 
been  fcen.  \Vard  brings  a  citation  from  Cicero,  to 
fliow  that  the  orator's  art  was  older  than  the  Trojan 
war.  The  purport  of  this  is,  that  Homer  attributes 
force  to  UljiTes'  fpeeches,  and  fweetnefs  to  Neftor's; 
perhaps  alfo  he  has  cliaracterifed  Menelaus'  mainer 
as  fimple,  ihort,  and  unadorned.  There  is  not, 
liowever,  any  certainty  in  this  art  being  much  ftu- 
died  or  explained  in  thefe  early  times  from  this  ci- 
tation ;  for  though  Homer  is  an  excellent  poet,  of 
inimitable  fire  and  great  flrength  of  natural  judge- 
ment, it  is  not  certain  that  he  kept  fo  perfectly  to 
propriety,  as  to  defcribe  only  the  manner  and  flyle* 
of  things  at  the  time  of  the  Trojan  war,  which  was 
250  years  before  his  own.  I  fhould  be  more  apt 
to  conclude,  that  he  had  defcribed  manners,  charac- 
ters, and  fpeakers  as  they  were  in  his  own  time,  with 
a  little  air  of  antiquity. 

We  are,  however,  told  by  Paufanias,  that  the  firfl 
fchool  of  oratory  in  Greece  was  opened  in  the  fchool 
of  Thefeus,  the  age  preceding  that  war.  If  there 
be  any  certainty  in  this,  its  being  taught  in  Greece 
has  been  very  ancient  indeed  ;  but  thefe  being 
fabulous  times,  it  is  fcarcely  to  be  depended  upon. 
However,  it  is  certain  that  oratory  flouriihed  early, 
and  was  improved  greatly  in  Greece.  Many  cir- 
<:unuftances  concurred  to  produce  this  effe^.     The 


fOO  LECTURES  ON  Le^l.  5. 

fpirlt  and  capacity  of  the  people — ^the  earlj  intro- 
du£lion  of  letters — but  chiefiy  their  political  litua- 
tion — the  freedom  of  their  ftates — the  frequency  of 
public  affemblies — and  the  importance  of  their  de- 
ciiions.  There  is  much  faid  of  the  fpirit  and  capa- 
city of  the  Greeks  for  all  the  arts  ;  and  to  be  fure 
their  climate,  fo  ferene  and  temperate,  might  have 
all  the  effe£l  that  a  climate  can  have  :  but  I  rekon 
the  two  other  caufes  much  more  conliderable.  The 
introdu£lion  of  letters  is  necelTary  to  the  improve- 
ment and  perfection  of  a  language  ;  and  as  they 
were  early  blefled  with  that  advantage,  they  had 
the  bell  opportunity  of  improving.  However,  the 
iaft  caufe  of  all  is  much  more  powerful  than  both 
the  former,  though  perhaps  literature  is  neceffary 
to  be  joined  with  it  to  produce  any  great  effect. 
As  to  fome  of  the  other  arts,  particularly  painting 
and  ftatuary,  an  eminent  modern  critic  fays,  the 
Greeks  could  not  but  excel,  becaufe  they,  of  all 
others,  had  the  belt  images  from  nature  to  copy. 
He  fays  that  the  games  in  Greece,  in  which  the 
bell  formed  bodies  for  agility  and  llrength  in  the 
whole  country  were  feen  naked,  and  llriving  and 
exerting  themfelves  to  the  very  utmoll,  mull  have 
prefentedr-to  perfons  of  genius  originals  to  draw  from, 
fuch  as  in  moll  other  nations  never  are  to  be  feen. 
If  this  remark  is  jull  in  the  other  arts,  the  influence 
of  eloquence  in  the  public  affemblies  of  thefe  free 
Hates  mull  have  had  a  fmiilar  effed  in  the  art  of 
fpeaking. 

The  art  of  fpeaking  in  Greece,  however,  does  not 
feem  to  have  rifen  high  till  the  time  of  Pericles,  and 
he  is  faid  to  have  been  fo  powerful  an  orator,  that 


Led.  5.  ELOQUENCE.  101 

he  kept  up  his  influence  in  the  citj  as  much  by  his 
eloque^nce  as  tyrants  did  by  their  power.  There  is 
a  paflage  of  Cicero,  which  feems  to  fa;-  that  he  was 
the  firft  who  prepared  his  difcoorfes  ir.  writing ;  and 
fome  have  been  fimple  enough  to  beheve  that  he 
read  them ;  but  nothing  can  be  a  more  manifeft  mif- 
take,  becaufe  action  or  pronunciation  was  by  all  the 
ancients  coniidered  as  the  great  point  in  oratory. 
There  were  to  be  feen  in  Cicero  and  Qiiintilian's 
times,  orations  faid  to  be  of  Pericles  ;  but  both  thefe 
great  orators  feem  to  be  of  opinion  that  they  were 
not  his,  becaufe  they  did  not  at  all  feem  to  come  up 
to  the  great  fame  of  his  eloquence.  Mr  Bayle,  a 
\  ery  eminent  critic,  fays  juil:l7,  that  thefe  great  men 
might  be  miilaken  in  that  particular ;  for  a  very 
indifferent  compofition  may  be  the  work  of  a  very 
great  orator.  The  grace  of  elocution  and  the  power 
of  a£tion  might  not  only  acquire  a  man  fame  in 
fpeaking,  but  keep  up  his  influence  in  public  affem- 
blies.  Of  this  we  have  two  very  great  Britifh  ex- 
amples, Mr  Whitfield  in  the  pulpit,  and  Mr  Pitt 
in  the  fenate. 

After  Pericles  there  were  many  great  orators  in 
Greece,  and  indeed  all  their  flatefmen  were  orators 
till  the  time  of  Demofthenes,  when  the  Grecian 
eloquence  feems  to  have  attained  its  perfeclion. 
Tlie  praifes  of  this  great  fpeaker  are  to  be  fo  ge- 
pcrally  met  with,  that  I  fhali  not  iniift  upon  them  at 
fill,  fiirther  than  reminding  you,  that  though  no 
doubt  eminently  qualified  by  nature,  he  needed  and 
received  great  improvement  from  art. 

The  Roman  eloquence  was  of  much  fhorter  durar- 
VoL.  VII.  S 


20r  LECTURES  ON  LeiH:.  5. 

tion.  It  is  true  that  the  Roman  flate  being  free, 
and  the  aflemblies  of  the  people  having  much  in 
their  power,  it  feems,  according  to  the  principles 
we  have  gone  upon,  that  public  fpeaking  mui\  have 
been  in  efteem ;  but  there  is  fomething  peculiar. 
The  Romans  were  for  many  ages  a  plain,  rough, 
unpolifhed  people.  Valour  in  war  was  their  idol; 
and  therefore,  though  to  be  fure  from  the  earliell 
times  the  afTemblies  muft  have  been  manaored  in 
their  deliberations  by  their  fpeakers,  yet  they  were 
concife  and  unadorned,  and  probably  confifted  more 
of  telling  them  their  ftory,  and  fliowing  their  wounds, 
ivhich  was  of  frequent  pra£lice  among  them,  than 
any  artful  or  pailionate  harangues.  The  tiril  fpeak- 
ers of  any  eminence  we  read  of  in  the  Roman 
hiftory,  were  the  Gracchi.  Cicero,  I  believe,  makes 
little  mention  even  of  them.  Anthony  and  CralTus 
were  the  firfl  celeorated  orators  among  the  Romans, 
and  they  were  but  in  the  age  immediately  befort- 
Cicero  himfclf,  and  from  his  time  it  rather  fell  into 
decay. 

1  have  faid  above,  that  genius  and  excellence  was 
before  criticifm.  This  is  very  plain  ;  for  though 
we  read  cf  fdiools  and  rhetoricians  at  difTere!;' 
times  and  places,  thefe  are  confidered  by  the  gre <■ 
mafters  as  perfons  quite  contemptible.  Of  di: 
kind  therein  a  remarkable  paflage  in  Cicero,  in  h'.- 
Brutus,  "  At  hunc  (fpeaking  of  Pericles)  non  dc- 
clamator,"  &.c.  The  firft  juft  and  truly  eminent 
crliic  in  Greece  ^Vas  Ariilotle,  who  flourillied  as 
late  as  the  time  of  DemoHhenes ;  and  Cicero 
hinifelf  was  the  lirlt  eminent  critic  among  the 
Romans.     Ariflotle  has  laid  open  the  principles  ci 


Left.  5.  ELOQUEVCE.  203^ 

eloquence  and  perfuafion  as  a  logician  and  philofo- 
pher,  and  Cicero  has  done  it  iii  a  ftill  more  mafterly 
manner,  as  a  philofopher,  fcholar,  orator,  and  ftatef- 
xnan ;  and  I  confefs,  unlefs  he  has  had  many  authors 
to  confult  that  we  know  nothing  of,  his  judgement 
and  penetration  are  quite  admirable,  and  his  books 
De  Oratore,  &.c.  more  nniihed  in  their  kind  thaa 
ajij  of  his  orations  themfelves. 

As  to  the  effefts  of  oratory,  they  have  been  and 
are  furely  very  great ;  but  as  things  feen  through  a 
mill,,  or  at  a  great  diilance,  are  apt  to  be  miftaken 
in  their  fize  ;  I  am  apt  to  think  many  fay  things  in- 
credible, and  n'iake  fuppoiitions  quite  contrary  to 
nature  and  reafon,  aud  therefore  to  probability. 
Some  fpeak  and  write  as  if  all  the  ancient  orators 
had  a  genius  more  than  human,  and  indeed  by  their 
whole  flrain  feem  rather  to  extinguifh  than  excite, 
an  ardour  to  excel.  Some  alio  feeai  to  me  to  go 
upon  a  fuppofition  as  if  all  the  people  in  the  ancient 
republics  had  been  fagesj  as  well  as  their  ftatefmen 
orators. — There  is  a  remark  to  be  found  in  many 
critics  upon  a  flory  of  Theophraftus  the  pliilofopher, 
from  which  they  infer  the  delicacy  of  the  Athe- 
nians. That  philofopher,  it  feems,  went  to  bny 
fomething  of  an  herb-woman,  at  a  flail,  and  £he  in 
her  anfwer  to  him,  it  feems,  called  him  ftranger. 
This,  they  fay,  ihows  that  (he  knew  him  by  his 
accent  not  to  be  a  native  of  Athens,  although  he  had 
lived  there  thirty  years.  But  we  are  not  even  cer- 
tain that  her  calling  him  ftranger  implied  any  more 
than  that  he  was  unknown  to  her.  Eefides,  though- 
it  were  true  that  fhc  difcovercd  him  not  to  be  an 
Sa 


204  LECTURES  ON  Left.  5. 

Athenian  boril,  this  is  no  more  than  what  happens 
in  every  populous  country,  that  there  is  fomething 
in  tilt  accent  which  will  determine  a  man  to  be  of 
one  country  or  province,  rather  than  another;  and  I 
am  fomething  of  opinion,  that  this  would  be  more 
difcernible  in  Greece  than  any  where  elfe.  The 
different  ctialeds  of  the  Greek  tongue  were  not 
reckoned  reproachful,  as  many  local  differences  aye 
in  Britain,  which  therefore  people  will  endeavour  to 
rid  themfelves  of  as  well  as  they  can.  In  fliort,  I 
take  it  for  granted,  that  an  alTembly  of  the  vulgar 
in  Athens  was  juft  like  an  aflembly  of  commcm 
people  among  us,  and  a  fenate  at  Athens  in  under- 
itanding  and  taile  was  not  fuperior  to  the  fenate  of 
Great  Britain,  and  that  fome  of  them  v/ere  but  mere 
mobs  ;  and  that  they  were  very  difovderly,  is  plain 
from  what  we  read  of  Plato  being  pulled  down  from 
the  delk,  when  he  went  up  to  defend  Socrates. 

The  moft  remarkable  flory  of  the  effed  of  oratory 
is  that  told  of  Cicero's  power  over  Caefar,  in  his 
oration  for  C.  Ligarius.  This  is  very  pompoufly 
told  by  fome  critics,  that  Cccfar  came  to  the  judge- 
ment-feat determined  to  condemn  him,  and  even 
took  the  pen  in  his  hand  to  fign  his  condemnation  j 
but  that  he  was  intercfled  by  Cicero's  eloquence, 
and  at  laft  fo  moved  that  he  dropped  the  pen,  and 
granted  the  orator's  requeft.  But  fuppofing  the 
facls  to  have  happened,  I  am  very  doubtful  of  the 
jullnefs  of  the  remark.  Cacfar  was  a  great  politi- 
''cian,  and  as  we  know  he  did  attempt  to  eftabliih  his 
authority  by  m.ercy,  it  is  not  unlikely  both  that  he 
determined  to  pardon  Ligarius,  and  to  flatter  Cicera's 
vanity  by  giving  him  the  honour  of  obtaining  it.    la 


Ihort,  oratory  has  its  chief  power  in  proTnilcuous  af- 
femblies,  and  there  it  reigned  of  old,  and  reigns 
ftill,  b/  its  viiible  efTeel. 


LECTURE  VI. 


WE  now  proceed  to  confider  eloquence  as 
divided  into  its  three  great  kinds — the  fu- 
blime,  the  limple,  and  tlie  mixed.  This  is  very 
unhappily  exprefled  by  Ward,  who  divides  flyle 
into  the  low,  the  middle,,  and  the  fublime.  Low 
is  a.  word  which,  in  itsfiril  and  literal  fenfe,  figniiles 
lltuation,  and  when  applied  metapliorically,  never  is 
in  any  inilance  ufed  in  a  good  fenfe,  but  always 
ftgnifies  what  is  either  unhappy,  or  bafe  and  con- 
temptible, as  we  lay  a  man's  or  a  flate's  finances 
are  low.  We  fay  a  man  is- in  a  low  Hate  of  health. 
We  fay  he  is  guilty  of  low,  mean  pra£lices  j  has 
alow,  mean,  paltry  llyle^  It  was  therefore  con- 
veying a  very  wrong  idea  to  make  low  one  of  th& 
different  kinds  of  ftyle.  You  may  obferve  that  I 
have  introduced  this  diilinftion  in  a  manner  fome» 
what  different  from  him  and  other  authors.  They 
confider  it  as  a  divifion  of  ftyle.  I  choofe  rather  to 
fay,  vhere  are  three  different  great  kinds,  ii.to  which 
eloquence  and  eompofition  may  be  divided.  The 
reafcxi  is,  1  believe,  the  word  styk^  which  was  ufed 
both  by  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  but  ef^e.  allv  the 
latter,  has,  like  many  others,  gradually  chanc,ed  its- 
jaeaaing.     At  ^il  it  signified  the  manner  of  wri»- 

S3 


2ra5  lECTURES  ON  Lee!.  6, 

ting  in  general,  and  Is  even  fometimes  ufed  fo  ftil], 
but  more  commonly  now  in  Engiilli  it  is  confined  to 
the  diftion.  Nothing  is  more  common  than  to  fay, 
fublimity  in  fentiments  and  ftyle,  fo  as  to  diillnguifli 
the  one  from  the  other.  I  am  fenfible  that  even  in 
this  confined  fcnfe  there  is  a  fublimity,  fimpliclty, 
and  mediocrity  in  language  itfelf,  which  will  na- 
tiu-ally  enough  fall  to  be  explained;  but  it  is  better, 
upon  the  whole,  to  confider  them  as  different  kinds 
of  eloquence,  for  feveral  reafons. 

Sublimity  in  writing  confif^s  with  all  ftyles,  and 
particularly  many  of  the  hfgheft  and  mofl  admired 
\  examples  of  fublimity  are  in  the  utmoft  fimplicity 
of  flyle.  Sometimes  they  are  fo  far  from  loling  by 
jt,  that  they  owe  a  great  part  of  their  force  to  it. 
That  remarkable  example  of  fublimity  in  the  fcrip- 
ture,  h  wholly  in  the  fimple.  "  Let  there  be  light, 
**  and  there  was  light. *^  There  are  alfo  many  others 
in  fcripture  :  "  The  gods  of  the  Gentiles  are  vanity 
**  and  lies," — "  I  am  thit  I  am."" 

Some  of  the  other  kinds  alfo,  even  the  fimpleil, 
do  fometimes  admit  great  force  of  expreffion,  though 
more  rarely  j  and  there  is  a  great  danger  in  the 
fimple  manner  of"  writing,  hy  admitting  lofty  ex- 
prellions  to  fwell  into  bombaft.  The  mixed  kind 
frequently  admits  of  fublimity  of  ftyle,  and  indeed 
is  called  mixed,  as  confifling,  as  it  were,  alten.ately 
of  the  one  and  the  other,  or  being  made  up  of  a 
proportion  of  each. 

The  fublime  kind  of  writing  chiefly  belongs  to 
the  following  fubjefts  :  Epic  poetry,  tragedy,  ora- 
tions on  great  fubjefts,  and  then  particularly  the 
peroration.      Nothing  can  be  too  great  for  theJGs 


L<:ct.  6.  ELOQUENCE.  107 

fubjects;  and  unlefs  thej  are  treated  with  fublimit;,v 
they  are  not  treated  fuitablj.  The  limple  kind  of 
writing  belongs  to  fcientitic  writing,  epiftoiary  wri- 
ting, eflaj  and  dialogue,  and  to  the  whole  inferior 
ipecies  of  poetiy,  pallorals,  epigrams,  epitaphs,  &:c. 
The  mixed  kind  belongs  to  hiflorj,  fjilem,  and 
controverfj.  The  firil  fort  mufl  be  always  fablime 
in  fentiment  or  language,  or  both.  The  fecoud 
may  be  often  fablime  ia  fentiment ;  fometimes,  and 
very  rarely,  in  language.  The  mixed  admits  of 
both  forts  with  full  propriety,  and  may  be  often 
fublime  boih  in  fentiment  and  language. 

Let  us  now  coniider  thefe  three  great  kinds  of 
compofitioiL,  feparately,  in  the  order  in  which  I 
have  named  them. 

I.  Of  the  fublime  manner  of  writing. — This  is 
very  difficult  to  defcribe  or  treat  of ,  in  a  critical 
manner.  It  is  very  remarkable,  that  all  writers  oa 
this  fubjeft,  not  excepting  tliofe  of  the  greatefl 
judgement,  accuracy,  and  precilion,  when  they 
come  to  explain  it, have  ufed  nothing  but  metapho- 
rical expreHions.  It  is,  however,  certain  in  general, 
that  metaphor  fliould  be  kept  as  much  as  poiiibls 
out  of  definition  or  explication.  Thefe  all  agrec« 
ing,  therefore,^  in  this  circumflance,  feems  to  fhow, 
that  fublimity  is  a  fingle  or  fimple  idea,  that  cannot 
be  refolved,  divided,  or  analyfed,.  and  that  a  tafie 
for  it  is,  in  a  good  meafure,  a  feeling  of  nature. 
The  critics  tell  us,  that  mblimity  is  that  which  fiir- 
prifes,  raviihes,  tranfports :  thefe  are  words  fre- 
quently applied  to  its  effects  upon  the  hearers,,  and 
greatnefs,  loftinefs,  majefty,  are  afcribed  to  the  fen- 
timects,  to  the  character^  to  the  perfon.    An  ora- 


208  LECTURES  C>f  Lecl.  6, 

tion,  or  tlie  fuLlimc  parts  of  a  pocm^  have  beea 
eomparcd  to  the  voice  of  thunder,  or  penetration  of 
lightning:,  to  the  impetuoiitj  of  a  torrent ;  this  laft 
ts  one  of  the  b^ll  metaphorical  exprelTions  for  fub- 
liniity  in  eloquence,  bcfcaufe  it  carries  in  it,  not 
only  the  idea  o-f  great  force,  but  of  carrying  away 
every  thing  with  it  that  oppofes  or  lies  in  its  wa}^ 
That  may  be  faid  to  be  fublime,  that  has  an  irrefift- 
ible  influence  on  ttie  hearers,  and  when  exasmined 
carries  it  in  the  idea  of  great  power  and  abilities  in 
the  fpeaker  :  yet  even  this  is  not  fufficient,  it  has 
the  cliaracler  of  greatnefs,.  as  diftinft  from  that  of 
beauty,  fweetnefs,  or  ufe.  Burke,  on  the  Sublime, 
has  endeavoured  to  Ihow,  that  fublimity  and  beauty, 
though  generally  united  in  our  apprehenfions,  are 
diftindt  qualities-,,  and  to  be  traced  to  a  different 
fource.  Of  fublimity  in  particular,  he  fays  it  is 
always  allied  to  fuch  things  asraife  the  paflion  of 
terror  :  but  of  this  I  will  fpeak  more  fuUy  upon  a 
head  I  have  referved  fc*  that  purpofe  ;  in  which  I 
propofe  to  inquire  into  the  firft  principles  of  tafle  or 
approbation,  common  to  this  and  all  other  arts. 

Longinus  mentions  no  lefs  than  five  different 
fources  of  the  fublime.  i.  Greatnefs  or  elevntioa 
of  mind,  2.  Pathos  or  pafiloa.  3.  Figure.  4- 
Noblenefs  of  language.  5.  Compofition,  or  ar- 
rangement of  words.  But  though  the  laft  two  of 
thefe  are  of  confiderable  moment,  and  greatly  con- 
tribute to  augment  the  force  as  well  as  beauty  of  a 
difcouifc,  I  do  not  think  they  are  of  ihrt  ;  ature  as. 
to  be  confidercd  upon  the  fame  footing  with  the 
other  three.     Therefore,  leaving  what  is  to  be  i"aid 


Lc£l.  6.  ELOQUENCE.  2C9 

upon  them  to  the  next  head,  when  it  will  properly 
occur,    I  fliall  conlider  the  others  in  their  order. 

I.  Greatnefs  or  elevation  of  mind. — This  is  in- 
deed the  firft  and  radical  fource  of  fublimity.  It  is 
quite  impoflible  for  a  man  to  attain  to  fublimitj  of 
compofition,  unlefs  his  foul  is  great,  and  his  concep- 
tions noble  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  he  that  pof- 
felTes  thefe  can  hardly  exprefs  himfelf  meanlj. 
Longinus  gives  it  as  an  advice,  that  a  man  fhould 
accuilom  his  mind  to  great  thoughts.  But  if  you 
alk  me,  what  are  great  thoughts  ?  I  confefs  myfelf 
unable  to  explain  it,  and  unlefs  the  feeling  is  na- 
tural, I  am  afraid  it  is  impoffible  to  impart  it ;  yet 
it  feems  to  be  pretty  generally  underilood.  It  is 
common  to  fay,  fuch  a  man  has  a  great  foul,  or  fuch 
another  has  a  mean  or  little  foul.  A  great  foul 
afpires  in  its  hopes ;  is  not  eafily  terrified  by  enemies, 
or  difcouraged  by  difiiculties.  It  is  worth  while  to 
confider  a  little  the  effed  of  a  man's  outward  cir- 
cumflances.  The  mind,  to  be  fure,  cannot  be  whol- 
ly made  by  any  circumilances.  Sentiments  and 
flate  are  different  things.  Many  a  great  mind  has 
been  in  narrow  circumilances,  and  many  a  littl? 
rafcal  has  been  a  king  ;  yet  education  and  maimer 
have  a  fenfible  effect  upon  men  in  general.  I 
imagine  I  have  obferved,  that  when  perfons  of  rank 
have  been  at  the  fame  time  men  of  real  genius, 
they  have  generally  excelled  in  majefly  and  dignity 
of  fentiments  and  language.  This  was  an  advan- 
tage generally  enjoyed  by  the  ancients  whofe  writ- 
ings remain  to  us  ;  having  but  their  own  language 
to  ftudy,  and  being  early  introduced  into  public 
life,  and  i;ven  into  the  condud  of  the  greateil  aflfairs. 


210  LECTURES  OxV  Lecl.  ^. 

they  were  led  into  noblcnefs  of  fenliment.     Xeno- 
phon,  Domofthenes,  Cicero,  Csefar,  were  all  of  them 
great  llatefmen,  and  two  of  them  great  generals,  as 
well  as  writers.      In  modern  times,  there  is  a  more 
complete    partition   of  employments,   fo    that   tlie 
ftatefman,  general,  and  fcliclar,  are  feldom  found 
united  in  the  fame  pcrfon ;  yet  I  think  it  appeara 
in  fa6t,  that  when  ftatefmen  are  alfo  fcholars,.  they 
make,  upon  the  whole,  greater  orators  and  nobler 
•writers,  than  thofe  who  are  fcholars  merely,  though 
of  the  greateit  capacity.     In  e^rery  flation,  how- 
ever, this  remark  has  place,  that  it  is  of  importance 
to  fublimity  in  writing,  to  endeavour  to  acquire  a 
large  and  liberal  manner  of  thinking.     Whilfl  I 
am  making  ufe  of  this  language,  I  would  caution 
-you  againil  thinking,  that  pride  and  vanity  of  mind 
are  at  all  allied  to  greatnefs,  in  this  refpeft.     There 
is  a  fet  of  men  called  free-thinkers,  w^ho  are  pleafed 
to  arrogate  to  themfelves  a  large  and  liberal  manner 
of  thinking;  and  the   generality  of  them  are  as 
little   creatures  as   any   on  the   face   of  the  earth. 
Mr  Addifon  compares  them  to  a  fly,  which  lighting 
upon  a  great   building,   and  perceiving  the  fmall 
interftices  between   the  ftones,    cries  out    of  vaft 
chafms  and  irregularities,  which  is  wholly  owing  to 
the  extreme  littlenefs  of  his  fight,  that  is  not  able  to 
fee  the  dignity  and  grandeur  of  the  whole  building. 
When  I  am  upon  this  fubje6l  of  greatnefs   and 
elevation  of  thought,  as  one  fource  of  the  fublinie, 
you  will  naturally  exped  that  I  ihould  give  fome 
examples  to  illuftrate  it.     I  fliall  begin  with  fome 
out  of  the  fcriptures,   where   indeed  there   is  the 
greateft  number,  ruid  theft;  the  nobleil  that  can  well 


Left.  6.  ELOQUTLKCE.  211 

be  conceived.  "  I  am  God  alone,  and  beddes  me 
there  is  no  Saviour.  —Who  is  this  that  darkeneth 
counfel  by  words  without  knowledge  ? — W  ho  will 
fet  the  briars  and  thorns  agauill  me  in  battle  :'*  &.C. 
See  aU'o  two  paffages  inimitably  grand. — Ita.  xli 
12.  and  ver.  2  1.  and  onwards. 

To  mention  fome  of  the  fajings  in  heathen  an- 
tiquity,— Alexander's  faying  to  Parmenio  is  cer- 
tainly of  the  great  kind,  yet  perliaps  with  a  confider- 
able  mixture  of  pride  as  w^U  as  greatnefs.  Par- 
menio told  him,  if  he  were  Alexander  he  would  act 
in  a  cenain  manner.  Anfwer  i  So  would  I,  if  I 
were  Parmenio*  That  of  Poms,  the  Indian  king, 
to  Alexander,  however,  was  much  greater.  When 
he  was  Alexander's  prifoner,  and  was  afked  by  that 
prince  how  he  expected  to  be  treated  ?  he  anfwer- 
ed,  Like  a  king.  Caefar's  famous  faying  of  Vent, 
*oidiy  vifi\  has  often  been  quoted  as  a  concife  and 
noble  defcription  of  the  rapidity  of  his  conquells  ; 
yet  I  confefs  I  think  it  very  dubious  ;  it  had  not 
only  an  air  of  improper  vanity,  but  looks  like  an 
intended  and  filly  play  upon  the  words,  and  what 
we  call  alliteration.  They  are  three  words  of  the 
fame  length,  the  fame  tenfe,  and  the  fame  begin- 
ning and  ending.  Cicero,  in  one  of  his  orations,  I 
believe  in  that  for  Marcellus,  has  a  very  noble 
compliment  to  Caefar,  whr^n  he  fays,  the  gods  had 
given  nothing  lo  men  fo  great  as  a  difpoiition  to 
(hew  mercy.  Bat  of  all  great  fayings  on  record, 
there  is  none  that  ever  made  fuch  an  imprefTion 
upon  mc  as  that  of  AylifFe  to  king  James  III. 
He  had  been  detected  in  fome  of  the  pl6ts,  &.C. 
The  king  fa  id  to  him,  Mr  AylifFe,  d^n't  you  know 


212  LECTURES  ON  Liidi.  6. 

it  is  in  my  power  to  pardon  you  ?  Yes,  (fays  he),  I 
know  it  is  in  your  power,  but  it  is  not  in  your  na- 
ture ! 

It  is  neceflary  to  put  you  in   mind,   in   reading 
books  of  criticifm,  that  when  examples  of  greatnefs 
of  fentiment   are   produced  from  Homer  and  the 
other  ancient  writers,  that  all  circumftances  mull 
be  taken  in,  in  order  to  form  a  juft  opinion  con- 
cerning them.     We  muft  remember  his  times,  and 
the  general  belief  of  his  countrymen  with  regard  to 
theolog}^,  and  many  other  fubjedls.     There  muft 
be  a  probability  to  make  a  thing  natural,  otherwife 
it  is  not  great  or  noble,  but  extravagant.     Homer, 
in  defcribing   the  goddefs   Difcord,  fays,   Her  feet 
were  upon  the  eartli,  and  her  head  was  covered  with 
rhe  clouds.     He  makes  Pluto  look  up  and  affirm, 
that  Neptune  would  open  hell  itfelf,  and  make  the 
light  to  ftiine  into  that  dark  abode.    There  are  fome 
of  thefe  that  appear  tome  fufpicious  even  in  Homer 
himfelf ;  fuch  as,  when  he  makes  Jupiter  brag,  that 
if  all  the  other  gods  were  to  hang  at  the  bottom  of  a 
chain,  and  earth  and  fea,  and  all  along  with  them, 
he  would  tofs  them  all  up  as  eafily  as  a  bail.  How- 
ever it  w^as  with  regard  to  him,  who  was  taught  to 
believe  in  Jupiter  fitting  upon  Mount  Olympus,  or 
quaffing  Neclar  in  the  council  of  the  gods,  modern 
and  Chriftian  writers  and  fpeakers  fliould  be  careful 
to  avoid  any  thing  that  is  extravagant  and    ridicu- 
lous, or  even  fuch  allufions  to  the  heathen  theology 
as  could  only  be  proper  Jo  thofe  who  believed  in  it. 
—There  is  the  more  reafon  to  infift  upon  this,  that 
as  grandeur  and  fublimity  is  commonly  a  great  ob- 
jed  of  ambition,   particularly  with  young  perfons, 


Lecl.  6.  ELOC^JENCE.  213. 

they  are  very  ready  to  degenerate  into  bombaft. 
You  ought  always  to  remember,  thai  the  lan'g  age 
ought  to  be  no  higher  than  the  fubje6l,  or  the  part 
of  the  fubjed  that  is  then  immediately  handled. 
See  an  example  of  the  different  ways  of  a  fimple 
and  a  turgid  writer,  upon  the  very  fame  fentiment, 
where  the  Roman  empire  was  extended  to  the  wef- 
tern  coaft  of  Spain :  Sextus  Rufus  fimply  tells  it 
thus — Hispanias  per  Decinmm  Brutum  ohtinuimus^ 
tt  usque  ad  Gades  et  oceanum  perueni?nus,  Florus, 
taking  a  more  lofty  flight,  fays — Decimus  Brutus 
aliquant 0  totius,  &lc. 

I  have  only  further  to  obferve,  that,  in  fublime 
defcriptions,  great  care  fliould  be  taken  that  they 
be  all  of  a  piece,  and  nothing  unfuitable  brought 
into  view.  Longinus  juilly  blamed  the  poet  Hefiod, 
that  after  he  had  faid  every  thing  he  could,  to  ren- 
der the  goddefs  of  darknefs  terrible,  he  adds,  that  a 
blinking  humour  ran  from  her  nofe — a  circumilance 
highly  difgufling,  but  no  way  terrible. 


LECTURE    VII. 

1C0ME  now  to  the  fecond  fource  of  the  fub- 
lime, which  is  pathos,  more  commonly  called 
in  Englifh  the  pathetic,  that  is,  the  power  of  mo«- 
ving  the  paffions.  This  is' a  very  important  part  of 
the  fubje6l  :  a  power  over  the  paffions  is  of  the 
utmoll  confequence  to  a  poet  ;  and  it  is  all  in  all  to 
an  orator.  This  every  one  will  perceive,  if  he  only 
V-OL.  VII.  T 


214  LECTURES  ON  Le(ft.  7. 

recollects  what  influence  paffion  or  fentiment  has 
upon  reafon,  or,  in  other  words,  inclination  upon 
the  praftical  judgeanent.  He  that  polTelles  this 
power  in  a  high  degree  has  the  highell  capacity  of 
ufefulnefs,  and  is  likewife  able  to  do  the  greatefl 
miichief.  Sublime  fentiments  and  language  may- 
be formed  upon  any  fubje(Sl:,  and  they  touch  the 
lieart  with  a  fenfe  of  fympathy  or  approbation ;  but 
to  move  the  paffions  of  others,  fo  as  to  incline  their 
choice,  or  to  alter  their  purpofe,  is  particularly  the 
defign  of  eloquence. 

The  chief  pailions  eloquence  is  intended  to  work 
upon  are,  rage,  terror,  pity,  and  perhaps  defire  in 
general ;  though  occafionally  he  may  have  occafion 
to  introduce  every  afFedion.  In  a  heroic  poem, 
£very  affedion  may  be  faid  to  take  its  turn ;  but  the 
different  fpecies  of  oratory,  or  the  different  objefts 
and  fubje6ls  of  it,  may  be  faid  to  divide  the  paffions. 
A  fpeaker  in  political  or  deliberative  affemblics 
may  be  faid  to  have  it  in  view  to  excite  the  paflion 
of  rage  :  he  may  naturally  defire  to  incenfe  his 
hearers  againll  their  enemies,  foreign  and  domeftic, 
reprefenting  the  firll  as  terrible  and  dangerous,  to 
excite  averfion  and  hatred;  and  the  other  as  weak  or 
worthlefs,  to  excite  contempt.  An  example  of  this 
you  have  in  the  great  fubjed  of  Demofthenes's 
Orations,  Philip,  king  of  Macedon — another  in 
Cicero's  difcourfes  againff  Catil  e  and  Anthony. 
Pity  is  the  chief  paffiou  attempted  to  be  raifed  at 
the  bar,  unlefs  in  criminal  cafes,  where  indignation 
againll  vilhiiny  of  every  kind  is  the  part  of  the 
accufcr.  Terror  and  its  attendants  belong  ery 
much  to  a  fpeaker  in  the  pulpit ;  rage  he  has  no- 


Left.  7.  ELOQUENCE.  21 5 

thing  to  do  with  but  in  an  improper  fenfe,  to  raife 
a  ftrong  and  fteadj,  but  uniform,  indignation 
againft  evil.  But  even  this  a  fpeaker  from  the 
pulpit  ihould  endeavour  to  convert  into  compaflion 
for  the  follj  and  wretchednefs  of  the  guilty  perfonr 
Pity  feems  to  be  the  fingle  objccl  in  tragedy. 

One  talent  of  great  moment  towards  raifmg  the 
pa -lions,  is  a  ftrong  and  clear  imagination,  and  a 
defcrlptive  manner  of  fpeaking,  to  paint  fcenes 
and  objefts  ftronglj,  and  fet  them  before  the  ejes 
of  the  hearers  ; — to  feleft  fuch  circumftances  as 
will  have  the  moft  powerful  effeft,  and  to  dwell 
only  upon  thefe.  We  have  not  any  where  in  Eng- 
lifli  a  finer  example  of  the  pathetic,  and  the  choice 
and  ufe  of  circumftances,  than  the  fpeecli  which 
Shakefpeare  has  made  for  Anthony,  in  the  tragedy 
of  Ccefar.  It  appears  from  the  hiftory,  that  An- 
thony did  fuccefsfuUy  raife  the  fury  of  the  Romans 
againft  thofe  who  killed  Caefar  ;  and,  I  think,  he 
could  hardly  feleft  better  images  aini  language^ 
than  thofe  we  have  in  the  Englifti  poet : 

«  But  yefterday,"  &c. 

I.  To  railing  the  paflions  with  fuccefs,  much 
peiietration  and  knov;ledge  of  human  nature  is  nc- 
celTary.  Without  this,  every  attempt  muft  fail.  In 
confirmation  of  this  remark,  though  there  are  per- 
fons  much  better  fitted  for  it  by  nature  than  others, 
the  moft  powerful  in  raifing  the  paflions  liave  ge- 
nerally been  thofe  who  have  had  much  acquaint- 
ance v/ith  mankind,  and  praftice  in  life.  Reclufe 
T  2 


2l6  LECTURES  ON  Ledl.  7. 

fludents,  and  profefTed  fcholars,  will  be  able  to 
difcover  truth,  and  to  defend  it,  or  to  write  moral 
precepts  with  clearnefs  and  beauty  ;  but  they  are 
feldom  equal  for  the  tender  and  pathetic,  to  thofe 
who  have  been  much  in  what  is  called  the  world 
— by  a  well  known  ufe  of  that  word,  though  al- 
moft  peculiar  to  the  Engliih  language.  There  is 
perhaps  a  double  reafon  for  perfons  well  verfed  in 
the  ways  of  men,  having  the  greateil  power  upon 
the  paffions.  They  not  only  know  others  better, 
and  therefore  how  to  touch  them,  but  their  own 
hearts,  it  is  likely,  have  been  agitated  by  more 
paffions  than  thofe  whofe  lives  have  been  more 
calm  and  even. 

2.  To  raifmg  the  paffions  of  others,  it  is  necef- 
fary  the  orator  or  writer  fliould  feel  what  he  would 
communicate.  This  is  fo  well  known  a  rule,  that 
I  am  almoft  afhamed  to  mention  it,  or  the  trite 
quotation  commonly  attending  it.  Si  vis  me  flere^ 
dolendum  est  primum  ipsi  tibi.  You  may  as  well  ^ 
kindle  a  fire  with  a  piece  of  ice,  as  raife  the  paf- 
fions of  others  while  your  own  are  ft  ill.  I  fuppofe 
the  reafon  of  this,  if  we  would  critically  examine 
it,  is,  that  we  believe  the  thing  to  be  a  pretence 
or  impofition  altogether,  if  we  fee  that  he  who 
wifhes  us  to  be  moved  by  what  he  fays,  is  notwith- 
ilanding  himfelf  unmoved.  The  offence  is  even 
fomething  more  than  barely  negative  in  fome  cafes. 
If  we  hear  a  man  fpeaking  with  coldnefs  and  indif- 
ference, where  we  think  he  ought  to  be  deeply 
interefted,  we  feel  a  certain  difappointment,  and 
are  filled  with  difpleafure  ;  as  if  an  advocate  was 
pleading  for  a  perfon  accufed  of  a  capital  crime,  if 


Led.  7.  ELOQUENCF.  ^l*j 

he  fhould  appear  T\'ith  an  air  of  IndifTerence  and 
unconceri>,  let  his  language  and  compofition  be 
what  they  will,  it  is  always  faulty  and  difgulling  ; 
or,  let  a  minifter,  when  fpeaking  on  the  weighty 
fubjecl  of  eternity,  ihow  any  levity  in  his  carriage, 
it  muli  weaken  the  force  of  the  mofl  moving 
truths  ;  whereas,  when  we  fee  the  fpeaker  wholly 
engaged  and  pofleiTed  by  his  fubjed,  feeling  every 
paflion  he  wiines  to  communicate,  we  give  our- 
felves  up  to  him  without  rcferve,  and  are  formed 
after  his  xqtj  temper,  by  receiving  his  inftruc- 
ticiis. 

3.  It  is  a  direction  nearly  allied  to  this,  that  a 
man  iliould  never  attempt  to  raife  the   paffions  of 
his  hearers  higher  than   the   fubjed  plainly  merits 
it.     There  are  fome  fubjeds  that,  if  we  are   ablc^ 
are  of  fuch  moment,  as  to  deferve  all  the  zeal  and 
fire  we  can  poflibly  beftow  on   them,  of  w-liich  we 
may  fay,  as  Dr  Young,  '*  Paffion  is  reafon,  tranfport 
temper  here." — A  lawyer  for  his  client,  whom  he 
believes  to  be  innocent  j  a  patriot  for  his  country, 
which  he  believes  to  be  in  danger:  but,  above  all, 
a  minifter,  for  his  people''s  everlafling  welfare,  may 
fpeak  with  as  much  force  and   vehemence  as  his 
temper  and  frame  are  fufceptible  of ;  but  in  many 
other  cafes,  it  is  eafy  to  tranfcend   tlie  bounds  of 
reafon,  and  make  the  language  more  lofty  than  the 
theme.     We  meet  often,  for  example,  with  raifed 
and  laboured  encomiums  in  dedications,  a  fpecies 
of  writing  the  moil  difficult  to  fucceed  in  of  any 
almoft  that  can  be  named.     The  perfon  honoured 
by  this  mark  cf  the  author's  efleem,  is  very  fel» 

T3. 


^^S  LECTURES  ON  Le^.  7. 

dom  placed  in  the  fame  rank  by  the  public  that 
he  is  by  him.  Befides,  though  he  were  really  me- 
ritorious, it  feldom  comes  fairly  up  to  the  repre- 
fentation  :  the  truth  is,  to  correfpond  to  the  plclure, 
he  fhould  be  almoft  the  only  meritorious  perfon  of 
the  age  or  place  in  which  he  lives.  Now,  confi- 
dering  how  cold  a  compliment  this  is  to  all  the 
reft,  and  particularly  to  thofe  who  read  it,  tliere  is 
little  wonder  that  fuch  rhapfodies  are  treated  with 
contempt.  I  have  often  thought  the  fame  thing 
of  funeral  panegyrics  :  when  a  man  dies,  whofe 
name  perhaps  was  hardly  ever  heard  of  before,  wc 
have  a  fplendid  character  of  him  in  the  newfpapers, 
where  the  prejudice  of  relations,  or  the  pai'tiality 
of  friendfhip,  do  juA  what  they  pleafe.  I  remem- 
ber, at  the  death  of  a  perfon  whom  I  Ihall  not 
name,  who  was,  it  mull  be  confelTed,  not  inconil- 
derable  for  literature,  but  otherwife  had  not  much 
that  was  either  great  or  amiable  about  him,  an  ele- 
giac poem  was  publifhed,  which  began  wiih  this 
line,  "  Whence  this  aftonilhment  in  every  face  ?" 
Had  the  thing  been  really  true,  and  the  public  had 
been  deeply  affected  with  the  lofs,  the  introduelion 
had  not  been  inelegant ;  but  on  fuch  a  pompous  ex- 
preffion,  when  the  reader  recolle6led  that  he  had 
feen  no  marks  of  public  aftonifhment,  it  could  not 
but  tempt  him  to  fmile. 

4.  Another  important  remark  to  be  made  here, 
is,  that  a  writer  or  fpeaker,  in  attempting  the  pa- 
thetic, fjiould  confider  his  own  natural  turn,  as  well 
as  the  fubje<^.  Some  are  naturally  of  a  lefs  warm 
and  glowing  imagination,  and  in  themfelves  fuf- 
ceptible  of  a  lefs  degree  of  paflion  than  others  \ 


Le£l.  7.  £LO()UBNCE.  219 

thefe  ihould  take  care  not  to  attempt  a  flight  that 
they  cannot  finifli,  or  enter  upon  fuch  fentiments 
and  language,  as  they  will  probably  link,  as  it  were, 
and  fall  away  from  in  a  little  time,  '  Such  fhould 
fubftitute  gravity  and  folemnity,  inftead  of  fire, 
and  only  attempt  to  make  their  difcourfe  clear  to 
the  underilanding,  and  convincing  to  the  confcience  ; 
perhaps,  this  is  in  general  the  bed  way  in  ferious 
difcourfes,  and  moral  writings  ;  becaufe,  though  it 
maj^  not  produce  fo  ftrong  or  ardent  emotions,  it 
often  leaves  a  deeper  and  more  laiiing  impreflioa* 


Of  Figurative  Speech. 

It  Is  common  to  meet  with  this  exprellion,  ''  The 
tropes  and  figures  of  rhetoric."  This  expreflion  is 
not  juft  :  the  terms  are  neither  fynonytnous,  nor 
ai'c  they  two  diftipft  fpecies  of  one  genus.  Figure 
is  the  general  exprefiion  ;  a  trope  is  one  of  the  fi- 
gures, but  there  are  many  more.  Every  trope  is 
a  figure,  but  every  figure  is  not  a  trope  :  perhaps 
we  may  fay,  a  trope  is  an  expedient  to  render  lan- 
guage more  extenlive  and  copious,  and  may  be 
ufed  in  tranquillity  ;  v/hereas,  a  figure  is  the  efFe(^l 
of  paffion.  This  diftin6tion,  however,  cannot  be 
univerfally  maintained  ;  for  tropes  are  oftentimes 
the  efFe6l  of  pafiTion,  as  well  as  of  the  narrownefs 
of  language.  Figures  may  be  defined,  any  depar- 
ture from  the  plain  direO:  manner  of  expreffion, 
and  particularly  fuch  as'  are  fuggefted  by  the  paf- 
£ons,  and  differ,  on  that  account,  from  the  way  in 


220  LECTDRKS  ON  Lect.  7. 

which  we  would  have  fpoken,  if  in  a  >late  of  per- 
fe<ft  tranquillity.  Tropes  are  a  fpecies  of  figures, 
in  which  a  word  or  phrafe  is  made  ufe  of  in  a  fenfe 
different  from  its  firft  and  proper  fignlfication  ;  as, 
"  The  Lord  is  a  fun  and  ihield  ;"  where  the  words 
"  fun  and  fhicld"  are  ufed  tropically.  There  are 
feveral  different  tropes. 

1.  Metonymy. — This  is  a  very  general  kind  of 
trope,  comprehending  under  it  feveral  others ;  the 
meaning  of  it  is  a  change  of  name,  or  one  name  for 
another.  This  may  be  done  feveral  ways:  i. 
The  caufe  may  be  put  for  the  effect,  or  the  cffe6l 
for  the  caufe  ;  as  when  we  fay,  cold  death,  be- 
caufe  death  makes  cold  :  Old  age  kept  him  be- 
hind, that  is,  made  him  weak,  &.c.  2.  The 
author  for  his  works.  3.  The  thing,  containing, 
for  the  thing  contained  ;  as,  drink  the  cup,  that  is, 
the  liquor  in  the  cup.  4.  A  part  is  taken  for 
the  whole,  or  the  whole  for  a  part ;  as,  my  roof, 
for  my  houfe  ;  my  houfe  is  on  fire,  when  only  a 
fmall  part  of  it  bums.  This  is  called  Synecdoche. 
5.  A  general  term  for  a  particular;  a  hundred 
veafons  may  be  given,  that  is,  many  reafons  may 
be  given.  6.  A  proper  name  for  a  chara6terif- 
tlc  name  ;  as,  he  is  a  Nero,  for  a  cruel  man  ;  or, 
a  Sardanapalus,  for  a  voluptuous  monarch.  All 
thefe  and  many  more  are  metonymies. 

2,  Metaphor. — This  might  as  well  have  been 
the  general  term,  as  trope  ;  for  it  alfo  fignifies 
change  of  expreffion  :  it  is  a  fpecies  of  trope,  by 
which  any  term  is  applied  in  a  fenfe  different  from 
its  natural  import  ;  as  when  we  fay,  a  tide  of  plea- 
furc,  to  exprcfs  the  impetuofity  of  pleafure  j  when 


Lecl.  7.  ELOQUENCE.  22X 

the  heavens  are  faid  to  be  over  our  heads  as  brafs, 
and  the  earth  under  our  feet  as  iron. 

3.  Allegory. — This  is  continuing  the  metaphor, 
and  extending  it  by  a  variety  of  expreilions  of  the 
fame  kind  ;  as,  '*  The  Lord  is  my  lliepherd,  he 
maketh  me  to  lie  down  in  green  paftures — he  ma- 
keth  me  to  feed  hefide  the  ftill  waters." 

4.  Irony. — In  ufing  words  direftly  contrary  to 
their  meaning  ;  a?,  "  No  doubt  you  are  the  people, 
and  wifdom  fhall'die  with  you." 

5.  Hyperbole. — When  things  are  carried  beyond 
their  truth,  to  exprefs  our  fcntiments  more  ilrong- 
ly ;  as,  "  Swifier  than  the  wind,  whiter  than 
fnov/." 

6.  Catachrefis — is  the  firil  trope  of  all,  when 
words  are  ufed  in  an  pppofite,  and  fometimes  in  an 
impoilible  fenfe  ;  as,  when  chains  and  fhackles  are 
called  bracelets  of  iron. 


Figures* 

Figures  cannot  be  fuUy  enumerated,   becaufe 
they  are  v/ithout  number  ;  and  each  figure  may  be 

ufed    feveral    different   ways.      I.  Exclamation 

This  is  notliing  elfe  than  a  way  of  exprefling  ad- 
miration, or  lamentation  5  as.  Oh  1  Alas  !  Hea- 
vens I  8cc.  ufed  by  perfons  much  moved,  z. 
Doubt. — Tliisis  frequently  the  expreffion  of  a  doubt- 
ful mindj  in  fufpcnce  what  to  do.  This  is  defcri- 
bed  by  Virgil,  in  the  diftrefs  of  Dido,  when  Eneas 
left  her  :  *«  Shall  I  go  to  the  neighbouring  kings, 
whom  I  have  fo  often  defDifed?"     JSometimes  it 


222  LECTURES  ON  Le6l.  7. 

15  a  beautiful  figure,  and  obliges  perfons  to  take 
notice  of  it,  and  fometimes  of  what  thej  would 
otherwife   have  omitted :     "  Who  is  this  that   co- 

meth    from    Edom?"     3.  Epanorthofis This  is 

a  corre6^ion  or  improvement  of  what  has  been  faid  : 
**  You  are  not  truly  the  fon  of  a  goddefs,  naj,  you 
muft  liave  fucked  a  tygrefs."  4.  Pleonafm. — 
This  is  a  redundancy  ;  as,  "I  have  heard  it  with 
my  ears,  he  fpake  it  with  liis  mouth.'*  5.  Si- 
militude.— This  is  comparing  one  thing  wuth  an- 
other -,  as,  "  He  fhall  be  like  a  tree  planted,"  &:c. 
6.  Diftribution. — This  ^onfifts  of  a  particular 
enumeration  of  feveral  correfpondent  images : 
"  Their  throat  is  an  open  fepulchre,  their  tongues 
have  uied  deceit.'*  7.  Profopopeia When  per- 
fons dead  or  abfent,  or  different  from  the  fpeaker, 
are  brought  in  fpeaking  ;  as,  Cicero  fuppofes  his 
coimtry  or  Italy,  and  all  the  public  faying  to  him, 
**  Marcus  Tullius,  what  are  you  doing  ?'*  8. 
Apoftrophe — When  perfons  dead  or  abfent,  or 
any  inanimate  things,  are  fpoken  to  ;  as  Cicero 
fays,  "  0  I  'vos ;"  or,  "  Hear,  O  heavens  !  and 
give  ear,  O  earth  !"  9.  Communication. — When 
a  fpeaker  calls  upon  his  hearers  to  fay  what  ad- 
vice they  would  give,  or  what  they  would  have 
done  different  from  what  he,  or  the  perfon  whom 
he  defends,  has  done  :  What  could  you  have  done 
in  this  cafe?  What  fhould  I  do  now?  10.  In- 
terrogation.— Putting  a  thing  home  to  the  readers  ; 
asj  "  What  fruit  had  you  then  in  thofe  things  of 
which  you  are  now  afhamed  r" 


Lecl.  8.  ELOQUENCE.  223 


LECTURE    VIII. 

1HAVE  now  gone  through  the  account  given 
in  the  fjftems,  of  the  tropes  and  figures  of  rhe- 
toric, by  which  you  will  fufficiently  underftand  the 
meaning  of  both.  The  proper  applications,  how- 
ever, of  them,  is  a  matter  of  much  greater  mo- 
ment, and  of  much  greater  difficulty.  I  will  make 
a  few  remarks  before  I  clofe  the  fubje£t,  in  addi- 
tion to  what  hath  been  already  interfperfed  through 
tlie  different  parts  of  it. 

I.  Perhaps  it  will  not  be  improper  to  conflder 
what  is  the  purpofe  intended  by  figures.  I  have 
introduced  them  here  as  a  means  of  giving  fubli- 
mity  to  a  difcourfe  ;  but  may  there  not  be  fome 
little  analyfis  and  refolution  of  that  purpofe  ?  may 
we  not  inquire,  what  are  the  particular  efFe£ls  of 
figures  ?  Are  the  effects  of  figures  in  general,  and 
of  all  figures,  the  fame  ?  It  is  certain,  that  figura- 
tive fpeech  is  very  powerful  in  raifing  the  paffions. 
And  probably,  different  figures  are  proper  to  ex- 
prefs  or  excite  different  paffions  ;  admiration,  de- 
fire,  pity,  hatred,  rage,  or  difdain.  This  appears 
from  the  explication  of  figures  formerly  given.  But, 
befides  this,  we  may  obferve,  that  there  are  fome 
effeds  of  figures  that  feem  to  be  wholly  unconne6l- 
ed  with  paffion  ;  of  thefe  I  fhall  mention  three,  or- 
nament, explication,  conviftion.  Sometimes  figure 
is  made  ufe  of  merely  for  ornament.  Of  this  RoUin 
gives  us  an  example,  in  which  an  author  fays, 
**  The  king,  to  give  an  eternal  mark  of  the  eileem 


224  LECTURES  ON  Led.  8. 

and  firlendfliip  with  which  he  honoured  a  great  ge- 
neral,   gave    an    ilKiftrious   place    to    his  glorious 
afhes,  amidfl  thofe  mafters  of  the  earth,  who  pre- 
ferve  on  the  magnificence  of  their  tombs  an  image 
of  the  lullre  of  their  thrones."     Under  this  head 
may  be  reckoned  all  the  examples  of  the  ufe  of  fi- 
gures, to  raife  things  that   are  mean  and   low  in 
themfelves,  to  fome  degree  of  dignity,  by  the  phra- 
feology,  or  to  give  a  greater  dignity  to   any  thing 
than  the  fimple  idea,  or  the  proper  name  would 
convey,  as  if  one   fhould  fay.  Looking  round  the 
fcene,  and  obferving  the  bounteous  gifts  of  Provi- 
dence for  the  fupport    of  innumerable    creatures, 
inftead  of.  The  grafs  and  corn  every  where  growing 
in    abundance.      Perhaps,    alfo,    under   the    fame 
head    may  be  reckoned,    the   cloathing    in    other 
terms,  any  thing  that  might  be  fuppofed  difagree- 
able,  or  difgufting  ;  as  when  Cicero  confefles,  that 
the  fervants  of  Milo  killed   Clodius,  he   does  not 
fay,  intersecemntf   but   he   fays,    "   They  did  that 
which  every  good  man  would  wifh  his  fervants  to 
do  in  like  circumftances."     I  fliall   only  obferve, 
that  the  greateft  delicacy  and  judgement   imagin- 
able is  necelTary  in  the  ufe  of  figures  with  this  view, 
becaufe  they  are  very  apt  to  degenerate  into  bom- 
baft.     Young  perfons,  in  their  firft  compo'fitions, 
and  efpecially  when  they  have  a  good  deal  of  an- 
cient literature  frefh  in  their  heads,  are  very  apt  to 
be  faulty  in  this  particular.     A  common  word,  or 
fentiment,  which   any  body  might  ufe,  and  every 
body  would  underftand,  they  think  mean   and  be-, 
low  them,  and  therefore  they  have  recour'e  to  un- 
tieceffary  figures,  and  hard  ox  learned  phrafes.     In- 


Lecl.  S.  ELOQUENCE.  125 

ftead  of  walking  about  the  fields,  they  perambulate 
them  ;  they  do  not  difcover  a  thing,  but  recognife 
it.  Johnfon,  the  author  of  the  Rambler,  is  the 
moll  faulty  this  way  of  any  writer  of  charader. 
A  little  play  of  wit,  or  a  few  ilrokes  of  railleiy, 
he  calls  a  reciprocation  of  smartness. 

Another  ufe  of  figures  is,  for  explication,  to 
make  a  thing  more  clearly  conceived.  This,  in 
general,  may  be  faid  to  be  the  ufe  of  the  fimilitude  ; 
only,  I  think,  when  figures  are  ufed  for  illuilra- 
tion,  it  is  as  much  to  affifl  the  imagination  as  the 
judgement,  and  to  make  the  impreflion,  which 
was  before  real  and  juft,  very  ilrong.  For  ex- 
ample, when  Solomon  fays,  "  Let  a  bear  robbed 
of  her  whelps  meet  a  man,  rather  than  a  fool  in 
his  folly."  *'  If  you  bray  a  fool  in  a  mortar,  he 
wull  return  to  his  folly."  "  The  fooiiih  man  waiketh 
by  the  way,  and  he  faith  to  every  one  that  he  is  a 
fool." 

A  third  ufe  of  figures  may  be  faid,  although  im- 
properly, to  be  for  con\4clion,  or  to  make  us  more 
readily  or  more  fully  yield  to  the  truth  ;  as  when, 
to  fupport  what  we  have  faid,  that  perfons  of  found 
judgement  are  refer\*ed  in  fpeech,  we  add,  deep 
waters  move  without  noife — or  that  men  in  emi- 
nent ftations  are  expofed  to  obfervation  and  cenfure. 
"  A  city  that  is  fet  on  a  hill  cannot  be  hid."  In 
all  fuch  cafes,  therefore,  it  is  certain,  that  a  fimi- 
-iitude  is  not  an  argument,  yet  the  analogy  of  nature 
leems  to  carry  in  it  a  good  deal  of  evidence,  and 
adds  to  the  imprellion  made  upon  the  mind. 

2.  A  fecond  remark  is,  that  fieures  of  every 
Vol.  VII.  U 


226  LECTURES  ON  Led.  8. 

'kind  fhould  come  naturally,  and  never  be  fought 
for;  The  dcfig n  of  explaining  the  feveral  kinds  of 
figures,  is  not  to  teach  you  to  make  them,  but  to 
corred  them.  Arguments  and  illuflrations  we 
mull  endeavour  to  invent,  but  figures  never.  If 
they  do  not  flow  fpontaneons,  they  are  always  for- 
ced. If  a  man,  having  proceeded  too  far  in  a  fub- 
jed,  bethinks  himfelf,  that  he  will  here  introduce 
a  fimilitude,  or  an  allegory,  or  a  profopopeia,  &:c. 
he  will  either  mifs  of  it  altogether,  or  he  will  pro- 
duce fomething  vaflly  more  jejune  and  infipid,  than 
it  is  poflible  for  any  man  to  make  without  figures. 
It  puts  me  in  mind  of  the  ridiculous  chafms  that 
fome  perfons  bring  themfelves  to  in  converfation, 
when  they  offer  to  bring  a  fimilitude  which  has 
not  yet  occurred  to  them.  They  will  fay,  <*  He 
raged,  and  raved,  and  roared,  juil  like — I  don't 
know  what.''  Figures  fhould  be  the  native  ex- 
prefllon  of  palTions  or  conceptions  already  felt,  as 
they  are  the  means  of  raifing  pafTions  in  thofe  to 
wliomy  ou  fpeak.  They  fhould,  therefore,  be  pof- 
terior  in  point  of  time  to  the  feelings  of  the  fpcak- 
er,  although  prior  to  thofe  of  the  hearers.  The 
great  purpofe,  therefore,  of  criticifm  on  this  part 
of  the  fubjed,  is  to  prune  the  luxuriancies  of  nature, 
and  fee  that  the  figures  be  juft  and  natural. 

3.  I  have  already,  in  fpeak ing  upon  the  tropes, 
had  occafion  to  give  fome  rules  as  to  the  ufe  of 
them,  particularly  as  to  the  propriety  and  confiflency 
of  them.  But  there  are  fome  things  to  be  obferved 
further  for  explaining  them.  There  are  two  cha- 
raders  frequently  given  to  tropes,  efpecially  to  me- 
taphors, which  defervx  to  be  confidered.     The  one 


Lecl.  8.  ELOQUENCE.  227*^ 

is  ftrength,  the  other  is  boldnefs.  Thefe  are  by 
no  means  the  fame.  That  is  a  ftrong  metaphor, 
or  image,  that  gives  us  a  very  lively  impreiiion  of 
the  thing  reprefented.  As  that  of  the  wife  man, 
"  A  ftone  is  hea\y,  and  the  fand  is  weighty,  but  a 
fool's  wrath  is  heavier  than  both."  A  bold  image, 
or  metaphor,  is  that  which,  upon  the  whole,  is 
juft  and  ftrong,  but  is  confiderably  removed  from 
common  obfer\-ation,  and  would  not  eafily  or  rea- 
dily have  occurred  to  another.  It  is  aLfo  called  a 
bold  image,  when  the  refemblance  is  but  in  one 
fingle  point.  There  is  not  any  where  to  be  feen  a 
colleftion  of  bolder  images,  than  in  the  book  of 
Job,  particularly  in  the  defcription  of  the  war- 
liorfe,  among  which  in  particular  the  following 
feems  to  excel :  "  Haft  thou  'cloathed  his  neck 
with  thunder?"  To  liken  the  mane  of  a  horfe 
to  thunder,  would  not  have  occurred  to  every 
one  ;  neither  in  idea  does  the  refemblance  hold  but 
in  one  particular,  that  the  flowing  and  wa\'ing  of 
the  mane  is  like  the  flieets  and  forked  flakes  of 
lightning. 


LECTURE    IX. 

I  NOW  come  to  confider  the  fimple  manner  of 
writing.  If  I  could  explain  this  fully,  fo  as 
to  make  every  one  clearly  to  underftand  it,  and  at 
the  fame  incline  you  to  admire  and  ftudy  it,  I 
fhould  think  a  very  difficult  and  important  point 

U    2 


aaft  LECTURES  ON  Left.  ^, 

was  gained.  It  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  bring 
young  perfons,  efpecially,  to  a  tafle  for  the  fimple 
"Way  of  writing.  They  are  apt  to  think  it  of  little 
n^oment,  not  fo  much  the  objeft  of  ambition,  as 
an  exercife  of  felf-denial,  to  fay  a  thing  plainly, 
when  they  might  have  faid  it  nobly.  I  would  ob- 
ferv^e,  therefore,  in  the  very  beginning,  that  it  is 
a  miilake  to  confider  fimplicity  and  fublimity  as 
univerfally  oppofite  ;  for,  on  the  contrary,  there  is 
not  only  a  gTeat  excellence  in  fome  performances, 
which  we  may  call  wholly  of  the  fimple  kind, 
fuch  as  a  flory  told,  or  an  epifde  written,  with  all 
the^  beauty  of  fimplicity,  but,  in  the  mofl  fublime 
and  animated  compofitions,  fome  of  the  greatefl 
fentiments  derive  their  beauty  from  being  cloathed 
in  fimple  language.  Simplicity  is  even  as  necelTa- 
ry  to  fome  parts  of  an  oration,  as  it  is  to  the  whole 
of  fome  kinds  of  compofition.  Let  the  fubjeft:  be 
ever  fo  great  and  interefting,  it  is  prudent,  decent, 
neceiTary,  to  begin  the  difcourfe  in  a  cool  and  dif- 
paflionate  manner.  That  man  who  fliould  begin 
an  oration  with  the  fame  boldnefs  of  figure,  and 
the  fame  high  pitch  of  voice  that  would  be  proper 
towards  the  clofe  of  it,  woiild  commit  one  of  the 
greateil  faults  againft  propriety,  and,  I  think, 
would  wholly  prevent  its  efFed  upon  the  hearers. 

But  how  fhall  we  explain  the  fimple  manner  of 
writing  ?  It  is,  fay  many  authors,  that  which  is 
likefl  to  and  lead  removed  from  the  language  of 
€ommon  life.  It  mufl  be,  therefore,  eafy  and  ob- 
•^nous,  few  or  no  figures  in  the  exprefCon,  nothing 
obfcure  in  the  fentiments,  or  involved  in  the  me- 
thod.    Long  fcntences  arc  contrary   to  it,  words 


Le£t.  9.  ELOQUENCE.  21f> 

either  difficult  or  uncommon  are  inconfiilent  with 
it.  Cicero  and  Horace  have  both  faid,  and  all 
critics  have  faid  after  them,  it  is  that  which,  when 
men  hear,  thej  think  that  they  themfelves  could  only 
have  faid  the  fame,  or  that  it  is  juft  a  kind  of  ex- 
preffion  of  their  own  thoughts.  Thej  generally 
remai-k  further,  that  it  is  what  feems  to  be  eafy, 
but  yet  is  not  ;  as  Horace  fays,  Ut  sibi  quivis  speret 
iderriy  &cc.  We  may  further  obferve,  that  what  is 
truly  fimple,  always  carries  in  it  the  idea  of  being 
eafy  in  its  production,  as  ^vell  as  in  imitation  ;  and 
indeed  the  one  of  thefe  feems  necefTarily  to  fuppofe 
the  other.  Whatever  feems  to  be  the  effedt  of 
iludy  and  much  invention,  cannot  be  fimple.  It 
is  finely  exemplified  in  the  introduction  of  An- 
thony's fpeechin  Shakefpeare  :  "I  am  no  orator,  as 
Brutus  is,"  &c.  Rollin  has  given  us  an  admirable 
example  of  a  ftory  told  with  a  beautiful  fknplicity, 
from  Cicero's  Offices.  There  is  an  example  alfo 
in  Livy's  account  of  the  battle  of  the  Horatii  and 
Curiatii,  only  with  a  little  more  force  of  expref- 
fion,  as  the  importance  and  folenmity  of  the  fub- 
jecl  feemed  to  require  it.  But  it  requires  a  very 
mafterly  knowledge  of  the  Latin  language,  to  per- 
ceive the  beauties  fully,  that  are  pointed  at  by 
Rollin  in  the  firil  inftancc,  or  might  eafily  be  men* 
tioned  in  the  laft.  There  is  no  author  in  our  lan- 
guage who  excels  more  in  fimplicity  than  Addifon, 
The  Spedator,  in  general,  indeed,  but  efpecially 
the  papers  written  by  him,,  excel  in  this  quality, 
Eafe  and  elegance  are  happily  joined  in  them,  and 
nature  itfelf,  as  it  were,  feems  to  fpeak  in  theiiu 

U3 


230  LECTURES  ON  Lefl.  9. 

If  fome  of  the  later  periodical  writers  have  equal- 
led, or  even  excelled  them,  in  force  or  elegance^ 
not  one  has  ever  come  up  to  them  in  fimplicitj. 

The  fubjefts,  or  the  fpecies  of  writing  in  which 
fimplicitj  chiefly  fhines,  are,  narration,  dialogue, 
epiftolary  writing,  effay  writing,  and  all  the  light- 
er fpecies  of  poetry,  as  odes,  fongs,  epigrams,  ele- 
gies, and  fuch  like.  The  ancients  were  remark- 
able for  a  love  and  admiration  of  iimplicity,  and 
fome  of  them  remain  to  us  as  eminent  examples  of 
its  excellence.  Xenophon,  in  his  inftitution  of 
Cyrus,  is  particularly  remarkable  for  a  fweet  and 
dignifled  fimplicity.  He  ufes  neither  language  nor 
ideas  that  are  difficult  and  far-fetched.  In  the 
fmaller  compofitions  of  the  ancients,  as  odes,  epi- 
grams, &c.  they  were  at  prodigious  pains  to  polifh 
them,  and  make  them  quite  eafy  and  natural. 
They  pla(?ed  their  great  glory  in  beftowing  much 
art,  and  at  the  fame  time  making  it  to  appear  quite 
eafy  and  artlefs,  according  to  the  faying  now 
growTi  into  a  proverb,  Artis  est  celare  artem.  The 
beauty  of  fimplicity  may  not  appear  at  firft  light, 
or  be  at  all  perceived  by  perfons  of  a  vitiated  tafte ; 
but  all  perfons  of  good  judgement  immediately^ 
and  the  bulk  of  mankind  in  time,  are  cliarmed 
with  what  is  quite  eafy,  and  yet  truly  accurate  and 
elegant. 

It  ought  to  be  carefully  obferved,  that  fimplicity 
is  quite  a  different  thing  from  lownefs  and  meannefs, 
and  the  great  art  of  a  writer  is  to  preferve  the  one, 
without  degenerating  into  the  other.  It  is  the  eafiefl 
thing  in  the  world  to  fpeak  or  write  viilgarifms,  but  a 
perfon  of  true  talle  will  carefully  avoid  every  thin^ 


Le£l.  9.  ELOQUENCE,  23I 

of  that  kind.  For  example,  one  v/ho  would  vrrite 
Innplj,  and  as  near  the  language  of  plain  people 
in  ordinary  difcourfe  as  pofTible,  would  jet  avoid 
every  abfurdity  or  barbarifm  that  obtains  a  place 
in  common  converfation,  as  to  fay,  "  This  here 
table,  and  that  there  candle."  It  is  alfo  quite  con- 
trary to  fimplicity,  to  adopt  the  qua,ini  expreiTions, 
or  cant  phrafes,  that  are  the  children  of  faihion, 
and  obtain  for  a  little,  or  in  fome  particular  places, 
and  not  in  others.  The  .  Spe£bator  attacked,  with 
^eat  fpirit  and  propriety,  feveral  of  thofe  that 
were  introduced  into  converfation  and  writing  in 
his  time,  fuch  as  moh,  rep,  pos,  hite^  bamhQO%ley  and 
feveral  others.  Molt  of  ihem  he  fairly  defeated, 
but  one  or  two  of  them  got  the  better  of  him,  and 
are  now  freely  iniroduced  into  the  language,  fuch 
as  mob,  JoLnfon  alfo  has  put  bamboozle  in  his  Dic- 
tionary, which  he  calls,  indeed,  a  low  word.  Ar- 
buthnot  is  his  authority,  but  it  was  plainly  ufed  by 
him  in  the  way  of  ridicule  ;  and  therefore  it  fiiould 
either  not  have  been  in  ihe  Dictionary  at  all,  or 
fuch  an  authority  Ihould  not  have  been  given  for 
it. 

It  is  exceedingly  difficult,  and  requires  an  excel- 
lent judgement,  to  be  able  to  defcend  to  great  fim- 
plicity,  and  yet  to  keep  out  every  low  expreflion 
or  idea.  I  do  not  think  it  is  eafy  to  be  a  thorough 
judge  of  pure  didion  in  any  language  but  our  own, 
and  not  even  in  that,  without  a  good  deal  of  the 
knowledge  of  human  life,  and  a  thorough  acquaint- 
ance with  the  beft  authors.  Writers  and  fpeakers 
of  little  judgement  are  apt  at  times  to  go  into  ex- 
tremes, to  fweli  too  much  on  the  one  hand,  and 


.23 2  LECTURES  ON  Le£c.  9. 

to  fall  into  what  is  vulgar  and  offenfive   on  the  o- 
ther. 

When  fpeaking  on  iimplicity,  I  obferve,  that 
there  is  a  fimplicity  in  the  tafte  and  compofition  of 
a  whole  difcourfe,  different  from  fimplicity  of  fen- 
timent  and  language  in  the  particular  parts.  This 
will  incline  a  man  to  avoid  all  unneceiTary  orna- 
ment, particularly  the  ornaments  of  faftiion,  and 
the  peculiar  drefs  or  mode  of  the  times.  We  fay 
in  architecture,  that  a  building  is  in  a  fimple  ftyle, 
when  it  has  not  a  great  multiplicity  of  ornaments,  or 
is  not  loaded  with  beauties,  fo  to  fpeak.  It  is  very 
remarkable,  that  books  written  in  the  fame  aee 
w^ill  differ  very  much  one  from  another  in  this  re- 
fpeft  ;  and  thofe  which  have  leafh  of  the  orna- 
ments then  in  vogue,  continue  in  reputation  when 
the  others  are  grown  ridiculous.  I  will  give  you 
an  inllance  of  this — A  fmall  religious  treatife, 
Scougal's  Life  of  God  in  the  Soul  of  Man,  which 
is  written  with  great  fimplicity,  and  yet  dignity, 
and  may  now  be  read  with  pleafure  and  approba- 
tion by  perfons  of  the  beft  tafte  ;  while  mofl:  of  the 
other  writers  of  his  age  and  counti'y  are  ridiculous, 
or  hardly  intelligible. 

Perhaps  it  may  help  us  to  form  right  notions  of 
fimplicity,  to  coiifidijr  what  are  the  oppofites,  or 
the  greateft  enemies  to  it. 

I.  One  is,  abilraclion  of  fentiment,  or  too  great 
refinement  of  any  kind  ;  of  this  the  greateft  ex- 
ample in  an  author  of  merit,  is  the  writer  of  the 
Rambler  ;  almoft  every  page  of  his  writings  fur- 
Diilics  us  with  iiiftances  of  departure  from  fimpli- 


Lea.  9.  ELOQUENCE.  233 

city,    partly  in  the  fentiment,  and  partly  in  the 
diftlon. 

2.  Another  is,  allegory,  and  efpecially  far-fetch- 
ed allufions,  as  in  the  example  which  the  Spectator 
gives  of  a  poet,  who  fpeaks  of  Bacchus'  call  coat ; 
this  is  little  better  than  a  riddle  ;  and  even  thofe 
who  difcern  it,  will  take  a  little  time  to  reflet, 
that  according  to  the  heathen  mythology,  Bacchus 
was  the  god  of  wine  ;  wine  is  kept  in  calks,  and 
therefore  an  empty  cafk,  or  at  leail  an  ufelefs  one, 
may  be  called  Bacchus'  cafl  coat. 

3.  A  third  enemy  to  fimplicity  is,  an  affeftation 
of  learning.  This  fpoils  fimplicity  many  ways  ;  it 
introduces  terms  of  art,  which  cannot  be  underflood 
but  by  thofe  who  are  adepts  in  a  particular  branch. 
Such  perfons  have  been  long  expofed  to  ridicule, 
under  the  name  of  pedants.  Sometimes,  indeed, 
the  word  pedantry  has  been  in  a  manner  confined 
to  thofe  addicted  to  claflic  literature,  and  who  in- 
termix every  things  they  fay  with  fcraps  taken  from 
the  learned  languages  ;  but  this  is  quite  improper, 
for  lawyers,  phyficians,  dunces,  or  fchool mailers, 
are  equally  ridiculous,  when  they  fill  their  difcourfe 
with  words  drawn  from  their  particular  art. 

4.  The  only  other  enemy  to  fimplicity  I  fhall. 
mention  is,  an  ambition  to  excel.  This,  perhap??, 
ihould  not  have  been  fo  much  divided  from  the 
reft,  as  made  the  great  principle  from  which  the 
reil  proceed.  Nothing  more  certainly  renders  a 
man  ridiculous,  than  an  over  forwardnefs  to  difplay 
his  excellence  ;  he  is  not  content  v/ith  plain  things, 
and  particularly  wi;h  fuch  tilings  as  every  body 


234  LECTURES  OJJ  Le£l.  9. 

might   fay,    becaufe    thcfe  would    not    diflinguiili 
him. 

On  the  whole,  as  I  obferved  on  fublimity,  that 
one  of  tlie  befl  and  furefl  ways  to  attain  it  was  to 
think  nobly  ;  fo  the  befl  way  to  write  fimply,  is  to 
think  fimply,  to  avoid  all  alleviation,  to  attempt  to 
form  your  manner  of  thinking  to  a  noble  felf-dc- 
nial.  A  man  little  folicitous  about  what  people 
think  of  him,  or  rather  having  his  attention  fixed 
Upon  quite  another  purpofe,  viz.  giving  information, 
or  producing  conviftion,  will  only  attain  to  a  fimple 
manner  of  writing ;  and  indeed  he  will  write  bell 
in  all  refpe6ls. 

As  to  the  mixed  flyle  or  manner  of  writing,  as 
it  confills  of  the  mixture  of  the  other  two,  I  fliali 
not  need  to  fay  any  thing  by  way  of  explaining  it, 
but  only  make  a  remark  or  two,  of  the  ufe  and 
application  of  it.  The  mixed  kind  of  writing 
chiefly  confifts  of  hiftory  and  controverfy.  The 
great  quality  neceflary  to  execute  it  properly,  is 
foundnefs  of  judgement,  to  determine  on  what  fub- 
je6ls,  and  on  what  parts  of  fubjeiSls,  it  is  proper 
to  write  with  iimplicity,  and  on  w^hat  with  force  ; 
one  would  wifh  ntot  to  go  beyond,  but  juft  to  gra, 
tify  a  reader's  inclination  in  this  refpeft. 

There  are  many  cafes  in  hiftory,  where  the 
greateft  fublimity  both  of  fentiments  and  language 
is  both  admitted  and  required  -,  particularly  all  the 
beauty  and  all  the  force  that  can  be  admitted  into 
defcription,  is  of  importance  in  hiftory.  Thofe 
who  will  read,  in  Robertfon's  Hiftory  of  Scotland, 
the  account  he  gives  of  the  aftonifliment,  terror, 
and    indignation,    that   appeared    in   the    Englifti 


Lea.  9.  ELOQUENCE.  235 

court,  *  when  news  was  brought  of  the  maflacre  at 
Paris,  or,  in  the  fame  author,  the  account  of  the 
execution  of  Marj  Queen  of  Scots,  will  fee  the 
force  and  fublimity  of  defcription.  The  difference 
between  fublimitj  of  fentimcnt  and  language  in  an 
hiftorian,  and  in  a  poet  or  orator,  feems  to  me  to 
refemble  the  difference  between  the  fire  of  a  ma- 
naged horfe,  when  reined  in  by  the  rider,  and 
marching  with  a  firm  and  ftately  pace,  and  the 
fame  when  flraining  every  nerve  in  the  eager  con- 
tention in  a  race.  We  ihall  enter  a  little  into  this 
matter,  if  we  confidcr  the  different  images  that  are 
made  ufe  of  in  the  different  arts.  In  poetry  we 
fay,  a  beautiful,  ftriking,  fhining  metaphor,  fer- 
vent, glowing  imagery-  In  oratory  w^e  fay,  warm, 
animated,  irrefiftible.  In  hiftory  we  ufe  the  words 
force,  noblenefs,  dignity,  and  majefly,  particular- 
ly thofe  lafl  attributes  of  dignity  and  majelly.  He- 
rodotus has  been  often  called  the  father  of  hiflory, 
though,  I  confefs,  I  apprehend  he  has  obtained 
this  title  chiefly  becaufe  of  his  antiquity,  and  Ins 
being  the  firft  that  ever  gave  any  thing  of  a  regu- 
lar hiftory  ;  but  though  he  has  fome  things  augufl 
enough,  yet  he  has  admitted  fo  many  incredible 
llories,  and  even  peculiarities  into  his  work,  ns 
very  much  detracts  from  its  dignity  ;  we  muff,  in- 
deed, impute  a  good  deal  of  this  to  the  age  in 
which  he  lived,  and  the  impoffibUity  of  their  dif- 
tinguiihing  truth  from  falfehood,  fo  well  as  thofe 
of  later  ages,  who  have  had  the  advantage  of  all 
pall  experience. 

Hiftory,  indeed,  is  not  only  of  the  mixed  kind 
of  writing,  fo  as  to  admit  fometimes  fublimity,  and 


236  LECTURES  ON  Left.  9. 

fometlmes  (implicity,  but  thofe  ftyles  fliould  be  real- 
ly blended  together,  in  every  part  of  it.  The  mofl 
noble  and  animated  fentiments,  charafters,  or  defcrip- 
tions  in  hiftory,  Ihould  yet  be  cloathed  with  fuch  a 
gravity  and  decency  of  garb,  fo  to  fpeak,  as  to  give 
an  air  of  fimplicity  to  the  whole.  It  is  an  advantage 
to  a  poem,  that  the  author  fays  but  little  in  his  own 
perfon,  but  makes  the  charafters  fpeak  and  fay 
all  ;  and  in  an  orator  it  is  an  advantage,  when  he 
can  carjry  the  hearers  off  from  himfelf  to  his  fub- 
je£t ;  but  above  all,  an  hiftorian  fliould  not  fo  much 
as  wi{h  to  fhine,  but,  with  the  coolnefs  of  a  philofo- 
pher,  and  the  impartiality  of  a  judge,  fliould  fet  the 
a6lors  and  tranfadions  before  the  reader. 

Controverfy  is  another  fubj eel  of  the  mixed  kind, 
which  ought  to  be  in  general  written  with  fimplicity, 
yet  will  fometimes  admit  of  the  ornaments  of  elo- 
quence :  of  this  I  fhall  fpeak  a  little  more  after- 
wards, and  therefore  fhall  now  only  add,  that  con- 
troverfy differs  from  hiflory,  in  that  it  fometimes 
admits  of  pafTion  and  warmth,  when  there  feems  to 
be  a  fufficient  foundation  laid  for  it ;  a  controverfial 
WTiter  will  endeavour  to  iutereft  his  reader,  and 
excite  either  contempt  or  indignation  againfl  his  ad- 
verfary. 

After  having  given  you  this  view  of  the  three 
great  kinds  of  writing,  or,  as  they  are  fometimes 
called,  different  flyles,  it  may  not  be  amifs  to  ob- 
ferve,  that  there  are  diflinftions  of  ftyle,  which  it  is 
proper  that  an  able  waiter  fhould  obferve,  that  do 
not  range  themfelves,  at  leafl  not  fully  and  properly, 
under  thefe  three  heads,  but  may  be  faid  to  run 
through  all  the  kinds  of  eloquence. 


Lecl.  9.  ELOQUENCE.  237 

Many  eminent  authors  have  faid,  that  the  climates 
have  fome  efTea  upon  the  flyle ;  tliat  in  the  warmer 
countries  the  flyle  is  more  animated,  and  the  figures 
more  bold  and  glowing  :  and  nothing  is  more  com- 
mon,  than  to  afcribe  a  peculiarity  of  ftyle,  and  that 
particularly  elevated  and  full  of  metaphor,  to  the 
orientals,  as  if  it  belonged  to  that  part  of  the  globe. 
But  if  I  am  not  miflaken,  both  this  and  other  things, 
fuch  as  courage,  that  have  been  attributed  to  the 
climate,  belong  either  not  to  the  climate  at  all,  or  111 
a  fmall  meafure,  and  are  rather  owing  to  the  ilate  of 
fociety  and  manners  of  men.  We  have  before  had 
occafion  to  fee  that  all  narrov/  languages  are  figu- 
red. In  a  flate  where  there  are  few  or  no  abflrad 
ideas,  how  fhould  there  be  abflrad  terms  ?  If  any 
body  will  read  the  poem  of  Fingal,  which  appears 
to  have  been  compofed  on  the  bleak  hills  of  the 
north  of  Scotland,  he  will  find  as  many  figures,  and 
as  bold,  as  in  any  thing  compofed  in  Arabia  or 
Perfia.  The  flate  of  fociety,  then,  is  what  gives  a 
particular  colour  to  the  flyle ,  and  by  this  the  flylesof 
different  ages  and  countries  are  diftinguifhed.  That 
the  climate  does  but  little,  may  be  feen  j  ufl  by  compar- 
ing ancient  and  modern  Italy;  what  difference  between 
the  flrength  and  force  of  the  ancient  Latin  tongue, 
and  the  prefent  Italian  language,  in  the  exprefTion  of 
fentiments  I  It  mufl  therefore  vary  with  fentiments 
and  manners;  and  what  difference  between  the  flern 
and  inflexible  bravery  of  a  free  ancient  Roman,  and 
the  effeminate  foftnefs  of  a  modern  Italian  I  vet 
they  brsathed  the  fame  air,  and  were  nurfed  by  the 
fame  foil.  I  will  jufl  go  a  little  off  frpm  the  fub- 
Vou  VII.  X 


238  LECTURES  ON  Le*^:.  9. 

je6l  to  fay,  that  a  very  late  author  (Lord  Karnes) 
feems  to  think  that  the  courage  of  mankind  is  go- 
verned by  the  climates ;  he  fays,  that  the  northern 
climates  produce  hardened  conftitutions,  and  bold 
and  firm  minds ;  that  invafions  have  been  made 
from  north  to  fouth :  but,  I  apprehend,  he  may  be 
miftaken  here,  both  in  his  fa6ts  and  the  reafons  of 
them. — Invafions  have  not  always  been  made  from 
north  to  fouth :  for  the  Roman  arms  penetrated  very 
far  to  the  north  of  their  territory ;  the  firfl  great 
conquerors  of  the  eafl  in  Egypt  and  Babylon  car- 
ried their  arms  to  the  north  :  and  where  the  conqueft 
ran  the  other  wa}",  it  was  owing  to  other  circum- 
itances  ;  and  Dean  Swift  fays,  much  nearer  the 
truth,  it  was  from  poverty  to  plenty. 

The  defign  of  this  digreflion  is  to  fliow,  that  not 
only  the  circumftances  that  appear  in  a  language, 
but  feveral  bthers  that  have  alfo  been  attributed  to 
climate,  owe  very  little  to  it,  but  to  the  ftate  of  man- 
kind and  the  progrefs  of  fociety.  The  maxim  of 
that  great  modern  writer,  Montefquieu,  which  he 
applies  to  population,  is  alfo  true  of  language— 
that  natural  caufes  are  not  by  far  fo  powerful  as 
moral  caufes.  Allowing,  therefore,  as  fome  have 
afBrmed,  that  the  northern  climates  may  give  a 
roughnefs  and  harfhnefs  to  the  accent  and  pronuncia- 
tion, I  believe  it  is  all  that  we  can  expe6l  from 
climate ;  the  diflinftion  of  flyles  and  compofition 
mufl  come  from  another  original. 


Lea.  10.  ELOQUENCE.  23f 


LECTURE  X. 

HAVING  in  a  great  meafure  rejefted  the  fup^ 
pofition  of  the  ftjle  in  writing  being  afFedcd 
hy  the  climate,  and  fhown  that  it  rather  takes  its 
colour  from  the  ftate  of  fociety,  and  the  fentiments 
and  manners  of  men,  it  follows,  tliat  all  the  great 
diilinftions  that  take  place  in  manners  will  have  a 
correfpondent  efFe£l  upon  language  fpoken  or  writ- 
ten. When  the  manners  of  a  people  are  little  po- 
lifhed,  there  is  a  plainnefs  or  a  roughnefs  in  the 
lljle.  Abfolute  monarchies,  and  the  obfequious 
fubje£lion  introduced  at  the  courts  of  princes,  oc- 
cafions  a  pompous  fwelling  and  compliment  to  be 
in  requeft,  different  fram  the  boldnefs  and  fome- 
times  ferocity  of  republican  ftates. 

Seneca,  in  remarking  upon  the  Roman  language, 
fays.  Genus  dicefidi  7nutatur  per  puhlicos  moresy 
Sec.  This  he  exemplifies  in  the  Roman  language, 
which  was  fhort  and  dry  in  the  earlieft  ages,  after- 
wards became  elegant  and  ornate,  and  at  lafl  loofe 
and  diffufe. 

The  flyle  of  an  age  alfo  is  fometimes  formed  by 
fome  one  or  more  eminent  perfons,  who,  having 
obtained  reputation,  every  thing  peculiar  to  them  is 
admired  and  copied,  and  carried  much  into  excefs. 
Seneca  has  remarked  this  alfo,  that  commonly  one 
author  obtains  the  palm,  and  becomes  the  model, 
and  all  copy  him.  Hccc  vitia  unus  aliquis  inducit^ 
And  he  gives  a  very  good  example  of  it,  of  which 
;we  may  now  judge  in  Salluft.     He  alfo  very  pro- 

X2 


2"4^  LECTURES  ON  Left.  I©. 

perly  obferves,  that  all  the  faults  that  arife  from 
imitation  become  worfe  in  the  imitator  than  in  the 
example  :  thus  reproving^the  fault  jufl:  now  men- 
tioned in  our  anceilors. 

It  is  remarkable  that  Seneca  himfelf  was  another 
example  of  the  fame  thing.  His  manner  of  wTi- 
ting,  which  is  peculiar,  came  to  be  the  llandard  of 
the  age.  His  manner  has  been  called  by  critics, 
point,  and  antitheiis  ; — a  fliort  fentence  containing  a 
ilrong  fentiment,  or  a  beautiful  one,  as  it  were,  like 
a  maxim  by  itfelf.  For  an  example  or  two  of 
this  :  To  exprcfs  the  definition  of  Lyons,  he  fays, 
Liigdumim  quod  ostendehatur,  &:c.  That  Lyons, 
which  v/as  formerly  fhown,  is  now  fought.  And 
on  the  fame  fubjeft, —  Una  nox,  &:c.  There  was 
but  one  night  between  a  great  city  and  none,  ^uid! 
est  eques  Rom  anus,  &.c.  What  !  is  a  Roman 
knight  a  freed  man  or  ilave  ?  names  generated  by 
ambition  or  oppreffioa. 

The  fault  of  this  fententious  manner  of  writing 
does  not  lie  in  the  particulars  being  blameable,  but 
in  the  repetition  and  uniformity  becoming  tedious ; 
—when  every  paragraph  is  flulFed  with  fentences 
and  bright  fayings,  generally  having  the  fame  tune, 
it  wearies  the  ear.  The  moil  remarkable  book 
in  the  Englifli  language  for  putting  continual  fmart- 
nefs,  fentence,  and  antithefis,  for  elegance,  is  the 
Gentleman  Inftrufted.  I  fnall  read  you  one  para- 
graph—" The  miiyfortune  of  one  breathes  vigour  into 
the  others  :  They  carry  on  manfully  the  attack. 
Their  heads  run  round  with  the  glalles.  Their 
tongues  ride  poll.  Their  wits  are  jaded.  Their 
reafon  is  diilanccd.     Brutes  could  not  talk  better. 


Left.  10.  ELOQUEN-CE.  141 

nor  men  worfe.  Like  fl^ippers  in  a  ftomi,  they 
rather  hallooed  than  fpoke.  Scarce  one  heard  his 
neighbour,  and  not  one  uuderflood  him ;  fo  that  noife 
flood  for  fenfe,  and  every  one  pafled  for  a  virtuofo, 
becaufe  all  played  the  fool  to  extravagance." 

I  fhall  not  enlarge  much  farther  upon  the  differ- 
ence of  ftyle  arifino  from  the  characler  of  an  age, 
as  in  the  ages  before  the  Reformation,  called  the  times 
of  chivalry,  when  military  prowefs  vas  the  great 
thing  in  rcqueft — their  gallantry  and  heroifm  were 
to  be  feen  in  every  writer. — At  the  time  of  the  Re- 
formation and  the  revival  of  learning,  their  cita- 
tions of  the  ancient  writers  and  allufions  to  tlie  clafTic 
phrafes  diftinguifhed  every  author.  In  the  age  of 
the  civil  wars  in  England,  of  which  religion  was  fo 
much  the  caufe,  allufions  to  lingular  expreffions  and 
theological  opinions,  are  every  where  to  be  met 
with,  of  which  the  great  Milton  is  an  example. 

But  there  is  another  diftinftion  of  llyles,  which 
is  chiefly  pcrfonal,  and  will  dilHnguiih  one  author 
from  another,  in  the  fame  age,  and  perhaps  of  the 
fame  or  nearly  the  fame  abilities.  There  are  feve- 
ral  different  epithets  given  to  ftyle  in  our  languao-e, 
which  I  Ihall  mention  in  a  certain  order,  which  I 
fuppofe  will  contribute  fomething  to  explain  the 
meaning  of  them.  We  call  a  ftj^le,  fimple  or  plain, 
fmooth,  fweet,  concife,  elegant,  ornate,  juft,  nervous, 
chafle,  fevere.  Thefe  are  all  different  epithets 
which  will  each  of  them  convey  to  a  nice  critical 
ear  fomething  different ;  though  I  confefs  it  is  not 
eafy  to  define  them  clearly,  or  explain  them  fully. 
Plainnefs  and  fimplicity  is,   when  the  author  does 

■X3 


24^  LECTURES  ON  Le6t.   10. 

not  feem  to  have  had  any  thhig  in  view,  but  to  .-be 
underflood,  and  that  by  perfons  of  the  v/eakeft  un- 
derftanding.  That  ought  to  be  in  view  in  many 
writings,  and  indeed  perfpicoity  will  be  found  to  be 
a  chara£ler  of  many  ftyles,  when  there  are  other 
great  qualities  ;  but  we  call  that  plain  and  fmiple, 
when  there  is  no  difcovery  of  literature,  and  no 
attempt  at  the  pathetic.  Seougal's  Life  of  God  in 
the  Soul  of  Man,  and  Dr  Evans's  Sermons,  are  ad- 
mirable patterns  of  tliis  mar.ner.  2.  I  would  call 
that  a  fmooth  ftyle,  when  the  utmoft  care  had  been 
taken  to  meafure  the  periods,  and  to  confult  the  ear 
on  the  ftrufture  of  the  fentence  ;  for  this  1  know 
no  author  more  remarkable  than  Hervey,  in  his 
Meditations,  3.  Sweetnefs  feems  to  me  to  differ 
from  the  former  only  in  that  the  fubjefls  and  the 
images  are  generally  of  a  pleafmg  or  footliing  na- 
ture, fuch  as  may  particularly  be  feen  in  Mrs  Rowe's 
Letters;  perhaps  alfo  in  a  m-ore  modem  compofition 
by  a  lady.  Lady  Mary  V/.  Montague's  Letttrs. 
And  indeed  v^^hen  female  authors  have  excelled, 
they  generally  do  excel  in  fweetnefs.  4.  The 
fiext  is  coiicifenefs.  This  is  eafily  underflood ;  A  is 
juft  as  much  brevity  as  is  confiflent  with  perfpicuity. 
It  is  a  beauty  in  every  writing,  when  other  qualities 
are  not  hurt  by  it.  But  it  is  peculiarly  proper  for 
critical  or  fcleutific  writing,  becaufe  there  we  do 
not  fo  much  expeft  or  want  to  know  the  author's 
fentimcnts,,but  as  foon  as  poilible  to  learn  the  fafts, 
to  understand  them  fully,  and  range  them  metho- 
dically. There  are  many  more  authors  who  excel 
in  this  refped  in  the  French,  than  in  the  Engli(h 
language.     Not  tlie  fgicatific  writings,   but    tivea 


Leci.  10.  ELOQUENCE.  243 

political  and  moral  writings,  are  drawn  up  "by  tliera 
with  great  concifenefs.     There   cannot   be  greater 
concifenefs  than  in  Montefquieu's  Spirit  of  Laws. 
Brown's  Eftimate  of  the  Manners  and  Principles 
of  the  Times,  feems  to  be  an  imhation  of  that  au- 
thor in  his  manner.     In  elTaj-WTiting,  D3\Hd  Hanie 
feems  to  have  as  happily  joined  concifenefs  and  per- 
fpicuity  as  moft   of  our  Engliib  writers.     Some 
pious  writers  have   been  as  faccefsful  this  way  as 
moil  of  our  nation  ;  fuch  as  Mafon's  Sayings,  and 
Tvlafon   on   Self-knowled.;e.      c.  A  ftyle  is  called 
elegant,  when  it  is  formed  by  the  principles  of  true 
taile,  -and  much  pains  is  taken  to  ufe  the  beft  and 
pureft  exprelHons  that  the  language  will  afford.     It 
is  very  common  to  join  together  eafs  and  elegance. 
The  great  patterns  we  have  of  thefe  are  Addifon 
and  Tillotfon.     Seed's  Scniions,  too,  may  be  men- 
tioned here,  as  very   much  excelling  in  both  thefe 
qualities  ;  fo  alfo  does  David   Hume.     The  other 
Hume,  author  of  the  Elements  of  Criticifm,  though 
a  very  good  judge  ox   writing,   feems  in  point  of 
ftyle  to  be  very  deieclive  himfelf.     If  he  has  any 
talent,  it  is  concifenefs  and  plainnefs  -^  but  he  is  at 
the    fame  time   often   abrupt   and   harlh.     6.   An 
ornate  llyle  may  be  fai  J  to  be  fomething  more  than 
elegsnt,  introducing  into  acompofition  all  the  beau- 
ties of  language,  where  they  can  fmd  a  place  with 
propriety.     I  mendoned  before,  that  Hervey's  ftyle^ 
in  his   Meditations,  w^as  exceedingly  fmooih  and 
fiowing.     I  may  add,  it  has   alfo  the   qualities  of 
elegant  and   ornate.     That  ftjle  is  elegant  which 
is  correct  and  free  from  faults ;  that  is  ornate  w^hicji 
•bounds   with  bijautics.      'j.   The  next   cbaradlor 


^44  LECTURES  oy  Le6l.  lO. 

of  ftjle  is,  fhat  it  is  jufl.     By  this  I  underftand,  a 
particular  attention"  to  the   truth   and  meaning  of 
every  expreiTion.    Juftnefs  is  frequently  joined  with, 
or  othcrwife  exprefTed  by  precifion  ;  fo  that,  (if  I 
may  fpeak  fo),  together  with  a  tafte  which  will 
relifh  and  produce  an  elegance  of  language,  there 
is  a  judgement  and  accuracy  which  will  abide  the 
fcnitiny  of  philofophy  and  criticifm.     Many  well- 
turned  periods  and  ihowy  expreffions  will  be  found 
defev51:ive  here.     This  jullnefs  of  ftyle  is  fcarcely 
ever  fouhd  without  cleaniefs  of  underftanding,  fo 
that  it  appears  in  accuracy  of  method,  in  the  whole 
difcourfe,  as  well  as  in  the  flyle  of  particular  parts. 
Dr   Samuel   Clark  was  a  great  example  of  this« 
He  was  one  of  thbfe  few  mathematicians  who  were 
good  writers,  and,  while  he  did  not  lofe  the  life  and 
fervour  of  the  orator,  preferved  the  precifion  of  the 
natural  philofopher.       8.   Nervous    or   ftrong,    is 
the  next  character  of  ftyle;  and  this  implies  that  in 
which  the  author  does  not  wholly  negle^l  elegance 
und  precifion.     But  he  is  much  more  attentive  to 
dignity  and  force.     A  ftyle  that  is  very  ftrong  and 
nervous,  might  often  receive  a  little  additional  polifh 
by  a  few  more  epithets  or  copulatives,  but  cannot 
defcend  to  fuch  minutenefs.     It  is  a  fine  expreflion 
of  Richard  Baxter,   upon  ftyle,   "  May   I  fpeak 
plai]ily  and  pertinently,  and  fomewhat  nervoufly, 
T   have  my   purpofe."      Baxter  was    a  great  ex- 
ample of  a  nei*vous  ftyle,  with  great  negleft  of  ele- 
gance; and  Dean  Swift  is  an  illuftrious  example  of- 
the  fame  fort  of  di£lion,  with  a  very  confiderable 
attention  to  elegance.     Both  the  one  and  the  other 
feem  to  write  in  the  fulnefs  of  their  hearts ";  and  to 


Lefl.   10.  ELOQUENCE.  24^ 

me  without  fcruple  thofe  terms  arc  commonly  beft, 
that  firft  prefeiit  ihemielves  t(5  a  fertile  invention 
and  warm  imagination,  without  waiting  to  choofe 
in  their  room  thole  that  might  be  more  fmooth  or 
Ibnorous,  but  lefs  emphatic.  9.  Chaftity  of  ftyle, 
I  think,  ftands  particularly  oppofed  to  any  embellilb- 
meuts  that  are  not  natural  and  necelTary.  Nay, 
we  generally  mean  by  a  very  chafte  writer,  one 
who  does  not  admit  even  all  the  ornaments  that  he 
might,  and  what  ornaments  he  does  admit  are  al- 
ways of  the  moft  decent  kind,  and  the  moil  pro- 
perly executed.  10.  Severity  of  ftyle  has  this 
title  only  by  way  of  comparifon.  That  is  a  fevere 
ftyle  which  has  propriety,  elegance,  and  force,  but 
feems  rather  to  be  above  and  to  difdain  the  orna- 
ments which  every  body  elfe  would  approve,  aijci 
the  greateft  piirt  of  readers  would  deftre. 


LECTURE  XI. 

T^^E  come  now  to  the  third  general  head, 
^  ^  which  was,  to  fpeak  of  oratory  as  it  is  divid- 
ed into  the  feveral  parts  which  conftitute  the  art. 
Tliefe  have  been  generally  tlie  following,  inven- 
tion, difpofition,  ftyle  or  compofition,  pronunciation, 
including  gefture. 

1 .  Invention.  This  is  nothing  elfe  but  fmding 
out  tlie  fentiments  by  which  a  fpeaker  or  writer 
would  explain  wha-t  he  has  to  propofe,  and  the 
arguments  by  which  he  would  enforce  it.  This 
fubje^l  is  treated  of  very  largely,  in  moft  of  the  books 


t^6  LECTURES  ON  Led.   II. 

of  oratory,  In  which  I  think  they  judge  very  wrong,' 
In  by  far  the  greateft  number  of  cafes,  there  is  no 
neceffity  of  teaching  it ;  and  where  it  is  neceflary,  I 
believe  it  exceeds  the  power  of  man  to  teach  it  with 
efre<a:.  The  very  firft  time,  indeed,  that  a  young 
perfon  begins  to  compofe,  the  thing  is  fo  new  to 
him,  that  it  is  apt  to  appear  dark  and  difficult,  and  in 
a  manner  impofiible.  But  as  foon  as  he  becomes  » 
little  accuftomed  to  it,  he  finds  much  more  difficulty 
in  felecting  what  is  proper,  than  in  inventing  fome- 
thing  that  feems  to  be  tolerable.  There  are  fome 
perfons,  I  confefs,  whom  their  own  ilupidity,  or 
that  of  their  relations,  forces  to  attempt  public 
fpeaking,  who  are  entirely  barren,  and  not  able  to 
bring  out  any  thing  either  good  or  bad ;  but  this  is 
exceedingly  rare,  and  when  it  does  happen,  it  will 
be  fo  burdenfome  to  the  man  himfelf,  that  he  muft 
fpeedily  give  over  the  attempt.  There  are  infinite- 
ly more  who  have  plenty  of  matter,  fuch  as  it  is, 
but  neither  very  valuable  in  itfclf,  nor  cloathed  in 
proper  language.  I  think  it  happens  very  general- 
ly that  thofe  who  are  leaft  concife  and  accuiate, 
are  moft  lengthy  and  vokiminouSi 

I  will  therefore  not  fpend  much  time  upon  in- 
vention, leaving  it  to  the  fpontaneous  produ6lion  of 
capacity  and  experience ;  only  obferve,  that  it  is 
called  a  common  place,  from  whence  you  draw 
your  argument.  That  principle  of  law,  nature, 
tafte,  experience,  from  which  you  fetch  yom*  topic, 
and  apply  it  to  your  particular  cafe,  is  a  common 
place  ;  as  for  example,  if  I  want  to  prove  that  a 
ftridl:  difcipline  in  a  fociety  is  bed,  I  fay,  that  dif- 
cipliae   which  will  iu  the   moll  eflre6lual  manner 


Lea.  II,  ELOQUENCE.  t^J 

reftrain  ofFences  is  certainlj  the  beft ;  this  is  the 
topic,  or  common  place. 

It  would  be  needlefs  to  point  out  the  fources  of 
invention,  or  fhow  from  whence  arguments  may  be 
drawn,  for  they  may  be  drawn  from  all  the  charac- 
ters and  qualities  of  an  a6lion  or  perfon,  and  from 
all   the    circumftances   that   accompany    it.     If  I 
mean  to  aggravate  a  crime  or  injury,  I  fay  it  was 
done  deliberately,  obftinately,  repeatedly,  -without 
temptation,  againfl  many  warnings,  and  much  kiud- 
nefs ;  that  its  efFefts  are  very  bad  to  a  man's  felf,  tp 
others,  to  the  charadler,  the  perfon,  the  eftate,  &cc. 
If  I  want  to  fpeak  in  praife  of  a  free  government, 
I  mention  its  happy  effects  in  giving  fecurity  and 
happinefs,  promoting  induftry,  encom-aging  genius, 
producing  value  ;  and  then  I  apply  to  experience, 
and  ihow  the  happinefs  of  free  Hates,  and  the  mi- 
fery  of  thofe  that  have  been  kept  in  flavery :  but 
I  repeat   the  remark,  that  invention  need  not  be 
taught,  unlefs  it  be  to  one  that  never  yet  compofed 
a  fentence.      There  have  been  books  of  common 
places  publiihed,  containing  arguments  and  topics 
for  illuftration,  and  even  fimilitudes,  fayings  of  the 
ancients,  &.c.  but  they  are  of  ver\-  little  ufe,  unlefs 
to  a  perfon  that  has  no  fund  of  his  own,  and  then 
one  that  makes  ufe  of  them  is  like  a  man  walking 
on  ftilts  ;  they  make  him  look  very  big,  but  he 
\valks  very  feebly. 

2.  The  next  divifion  of  the  oratorial  art,  is  dif- 
pofition  or  diilribution.  This  is  a  matter  of  the 
utmoil  moment,  and  upon  which  inftru61:ion  is  both 
neceifary  and  ufeful.  By  difpofidon  as  a  part  of 
the  oratorial  art,  I  mean  order  in  general,  in  the 


114^  LECTURES  ON  Left. 


II, 


whole  of  a  difcourfe,  or  any  kind  of  compo- 
fition,  be  it  what  it  will.  As  to  the  parts  of  which 
afingle  fpeech  or  oration  confifts,  they  will  be  after- 
wards confidered.  Before  I  proceed  to  explain  or 
point  out  the  way  to  attain  good  order,  I  would  jufl 
mention  a  few  of  its  excellencies. 

(i.)  Good  order  in  a  difcourfe  gives  light,  and 
makes  it  eafily  underftood.  If  things  are  thrown 
together -without  method,  each  of  them  will  be  lefs 
underftood,  and  their  joint  influence  in  leading  to  a 
concluiion  will  not  be  perceived.  It  is  a  noble 
expreflion  of  Horace,  who  calls  it  lucidus  ordoy  clear 
order.  It  is  common  to  fay,  w^hen  v/e  hear  a  con- 
fufed  difcourfe,  "  It  had  neither  head  nor  tail,  I 
could  not  underftand  what  he  would  be  at." 

(2.)  Order  isneceftary  to  force,  as  well  as  light. 
This  indeed  is  a  neceftary  confequence  of  the  other, 
for  we  Ihall  never  be  perfuaded  by  what  we  do  not 
underftand.  Very  often  the  force  of  reafoning 
depends  upon  the  united  influence  of  feveral  diftin6t 
propofitions.  If  they  are  ranged  in  a  juft  order, 
they  will  all  have  their  effect,  and  fupport  one 
another  ;  if  otherwife,  it  will  be  like  a  number  of 
men  attempting  to  raife  a  weight,  and  one  pulling 
at  one  time,  and  another  at  another,  which  will  do 
juft  notliing;  but  if  all  exert  their  power  at  once,  it 
will  be  eafily  overcome. 

(3.)  Order  is  alfo  ufeful  for  aftifting  memory. 
Order  is  neceflfary  even  in  a  difcourfe  that  is  to  ha\'€ 
a  tranfient  effect ;  but  if  any  thing  is  intended  to  pro- 
duce a  lafting  conviction,  and  to  have  a  dally  in- 
fluence, it  is  ftill  more  neceflJarj'-.  When  things  are 
difpofe:!  in  a  proper  order,  the  fame  concatenation 


Led.  II.  ELOQUENCE.  ^4^ 

that  is  in  the  difcourfe,  takes  place  in  the  memory, 
fo  that  when  one  thing  is  remembered,  it  immediate- 
ly brings  to  remembrance  what  has  an  eafy  and 
obvious  connexion  with  it.  The  affbciation  of  ideas 
linked  together  by  any  tie  is  very  remarkable  iu 
our  conftitmion,  and  is  fuppofed  to  take  place  from 
fome  impreffion  made  upon  the  brain.  If  we  have 
feen  two  perfons  but  once,  and  feen  them  both  at 
the  fame  time  only,  or  at  the  fame  place  only,  the 
remembrance  of  the  one  can  hardly  be  feparated 
from  the  other.  I  may  alfo  illuftrate  the  fubjed. 
by  another  plain  inftance.  Suppofe  I  defire  a  per- 
fon  going  to  a  city,  to  do  three  or  four  things  for 
me  that  are  wholly  linconneded,  as  to  deliver  a 
letter  to  one  perfon — to  \'iiit  a  friend  of  mine,  and 
to  bring  me  notice  how  he  is — to  buj^  a  certain  book 
-  for  me,  if  he  can  find  it — and  to  fee  whether  any 
fhip  be  to  fail  for  Britain  foon, — it  is  very  poffiblehe 
may  remember  fome  of  them,  and  forget  the  others  ^ 
but  if  I  defire  him  to  buy  me  a  dozen  of  iilver 
fpoons,  to  carry  them  to  an  engraver  to  put  my 
name  upon  them,  and  get  a  cafe  to  put  them  in,  if 
he  remembers  one  article,  it  is  likely  he  will  re- 
member all  of  them.  It  is  one  of  the  beft  evidences 
that  a  difcourfe  has  been  compofed  with  diilinftnefs 
and  accuracy,  if  after  you  go  away  you  can  remem- 
ber a  good  -deal  of  it ;  but  there  are  fometimes  dif- 
courfes  which  are  pompous  and  declamatory,  and 
which  you  hear  with  pleafure,  and  fome  fort  of  ap- 
probation, but  if  you  attempt  to  recollect  the  truths 
advanced,  or  the  alignments  in  fupport  of  them, 
there  is  not  a  trace  of  tlic.n  to  be  found. 
Vol.  VII.  y 


2 so  LECTURES  ON  Led'.  11. 

(4.)  Order  conduces  alfo  very  much  to  beauty. 
Order  Is  i^ever  omitted  when  men  give  the  princi- 
ples of  beauty,  and  coufufion  is  difgufled  jufl  on  its 
own  account,  whatever  the  nature  of  the  confufed 
things  may  be.  If  you  were  to  fee  a  vail  heap  of 
fine  furniture  of  different  kinds  lying  in  confufion> 
you  could  neither  perceive  half  fo  diftinftly  what 
was  there,  nor  could  it  at  all  have  fuch  an  effeft,  as 
if  every  thing  was  difpofed  in  a  juft  order,  and  pla- 
ced where  it  ought  to  fland  ;  nay,  a  much  fmaller 
quantity,  elegantly  difpofed,  would  exceed  in  gran- 
deur of  appearance  a  heap  of  the  moll  collly  things 
in  nature. 

(5.)  Order  is  alfo  neceflary  to  brevity.  A  con- 
fufed difcourfe  is  almoll  never  fhort,  and  is  always 
jfilled  with  repetitions.  It  is  with  thought  in  this 
refpe£l,  as  with  things  viiible,  for,  to  return  to  the 
former  fimilitude,  a  confufed  heap  of  goods  or  furni- 
ture fills  much  more  room  than  when  it  is  ranged 
and  claffed  in  its  proper  order,  and  every  thing 
carried  to  its  proper  place. 

Having  Ihown  the  excellence  of  precifion  and  me- 
4hod,  let  us  next  try  to  explain  what  it  is  ;  and  that 
J  may  have  fome  regard  to  method  while  I  am 
fpeaking  of  the  very  fubjeft,  I  fhall  take  it  in  three 
lights:  I.  There  muft  be  an  attention  to  order  in 
the  difpofition  of  the  whole  piece.  Whatever  the 
parts  be  in  themfelves,  they  have  alfo  a  relation  to 
one  another,  and  to  the  whole  body,  (if  I  may  fpeak 
.io),  that  they  are  to  compofe.  Every  work,  be  it 
xvhat  it  will,  hiflory,  epic  poem,  dramatic  poem, 
oration,  epiflle,  or  efiay,  is  to  be  confidered  as  a 
whole ;  and  a  clearnefs  of  judgement  in  point  of 


Led.  II.  £LOQU£NCE.  251 

method,  will  decide  the  place  and  proportion  of  the 
feveral  parts  of  which  they  are  compofed.  The 
loofeft  elTay,  or  where  form  is  lea  ft  pro  fe  (Ted  or 
ftudied,  ought  yet  to  have  fome  fhape  as  a  whole  j 
and  we  may  fay  of  it,  that  it  begins  abruptly  or  ends 
abruptly,  or  fome  of  the  parts  are  mifplr.ced.  There 
are  often  to  be  feen  pieces  in  which  good  things  are 
faid,  and  well  faid,  and  have  only  this  fault,  that 
they  are  unfeafonable  and  out  of  place.  Horace 
fays,  in  his  Art  of  Poetry,  what  is  equally  applicable 
to  every  fort  of  compofition,  Dcnique  sit  quod  vis 
simp/ex  duntaxat  et  unum ;  and  fhortly  after,  Infelix 
operis  summay  quia  ponere  totum  riesczet» 

This  judgment  in  planning  the  whole,  will  par- 
ticularly enable  a  perfon  to  determine  both  as  to  the 
place  and  proportion  of  the  particular  parts,  whether 
they  be  not  only  good  in  themfelves,  but  lit  to  be 
introduced  in  fuch  a  work  j  and  it  will  alfo  (if  I  may 
fpeak  fo)  give  a  colour  to  the  whole  compofition. 
The  neceility  of  order  in  the  whole  ftrudlure  of  a 
piece,  {hows  that  the  rule  is  good  which  is  given, 
by  fome,  that  an  orator,  before  he  begin  his  dif- 
courfe,  fliould  concentrate  the  fubjedt  as  it  were,  and 
reduce  it  to  one  fingle  propofition,  either  exprefTed, 
or  at  leaft  conceived  in  his  mind.  Every  thing 
fhculd  grow  out  of  this  as  its  root,  if  it  be  in  another 
principle  to  be  explained ;  or  refer  to  this  as  its  end, 
if  it  be  a  point  to  be  gained  by  perfuafion.  Ha- 
ving thus  ftated  the  point  clearly  to  be  handled,  it 
will  afford  a  fort  of  criterion  whether  any  thing  ad- 
duced is  proper  or  improper.  It  wiD  fuggeft  the 
topics  that  are  jufl  and  fuitable,  as'well  as  enable 
Y2 


252  LECTURES  ON  Left.  II. 

US  to  rejed  whate-er  is  in  fubftancc  improper,  or  in 
lize  difproportionate  to  the  defign.  Agreeably  to 
this  principle,  I  think,  that  not  only  the  fubjed  of  a 
fingle  dlfcourfe  iliould  be  reduceable  to  one  pro- 
portion, but  the  general  diviiions  or  principal  heads 
Ihould  not  be  many  in  number.  A  great  number 
of  general  heads  both  burdens  the  memory,  and 
breaks  the  unity  of-the  fubjed,  and  carries  the  idea 
of  fevcral  little  difcourfes  joined  together,  or  to  fal- 
low after  one  another. 

2.  Ofder  is  necelTary  in  the  fubdivifions  of  a  fub- 
je£t,  or  the  way  of  ftating  and  marlhalling  of  the 
feveral  portions  of  any  general  head.  This  is  ap- 
plicable to  all  kinds  of  compolition^  and  all  kinds 
of  oratory,  fermons,  law- pleadings,  fpeeches.  There 
is  always  a  divifion  of  the  parts,  as  well  as  of  the 
whole,  either  expreli'ed  formally  and  numerically, 
or  fuppofed,  though  fuppreffed.  And  it  is  as  much 
here  as  any  where,  that  the  confulion  of  inaccurate 
writers  and  fpeakers  appears.  It  is  ahvays  necef- 
fary  to  have  fome  notion  of  the  wliole  of  a  piece  ; 
and  the  larger  divinons  being  more  bulky,  (fo  to 
fpeak),  difpofitioninthemismore  eafily  perceived; 
but  in  the  finailer,  both  their  order  aiid  liz.e  is  m 
danger  of  being  Icfs  attended  to.  Obferve,  there- 
fore, that  to  be  accurate  and  jull,  the  fubdivifions 
of  any  con^spofition,  fuch  I  mean  as  are  (for  exam- 
ple) introduced  in  a  numerical  feries,  i,  2,  3,  &.c. 
lliould  have  the  following  properties. 

(t.)  They  Ihould  be  clear  and  plain.  Every 
thing  indeed  fliculd  be  clear  as  far  as  he  can  make 
it,  but  precifion  and  diftindnefs  Ihould  efpecially 
appear  in  the  fubdivifions,  juft  as  the  bounding  lines 


Le6l.  II.  ELOQUENCE.  2^^f 

of  countries  in  a  map.  For  this  reafon  the  firfl 
part  of  a  fabdivifion  fliould  be  alike,  a  fhort  deli- 
nition,  and,  when  it  can  be  done,  it  isbeft  exprefled 
in  a  lingle  term  ;  for  example,  in  giving  the  charac- 
ter of  a  man  of  learning,  I  maj  propofe  to  fpeak 
of  his  genius,  his  erudition,  his  induftry  or  applica- 
tion. 

(2.)  They  fiiould  be  truly  diflin£l ;  that  is, 
every  body  fliould  perceive  that  they  are  really 
different  from  one  another,  not  in  phrafe  or  word 
only,  but  in  fentiment.  If  you  praife  a  man  firft 
for  his  judgement,  and  then  for  his  underftanding, 
they  are  either  altogether  or  fo  nearly  the  fame,  or 
fo  nearly  allied,  as  not  to  require  diftinclion.  I 
have  heard  a  minifter,  on  John,  x\di.  11."  Holy  Fa- 
ther," 8ic.  in  fliowing  how  God  keeps  his  people, 
fay,  1.  He  keeps  their  feet :  **  He  fhall  keep  thy- 
feet  from  falling."  2.  He  keeps  their  w^ay :  "  Thou 
Ihalt  keep  him  in  all  his  ways."  Now,  it  is  plain^ 
that  thefe  are  not  two  different  things,  but  two  me- 
taphors for  the  fame  thing.  This  indeed  was  faulty 
alfo  in  another  refpeft  ;  for  a  metaphor  ought  not 
to  make  a  divifion  at  all. 

(3.)  Subdiviiions  fhould  be  neceifary^,  that  i.s 
to  fay,  taking  the  word  in  tlie  loofe  and  popular 
fenfe,  the  fubjeft  fhould  feem  to  demand  them. 
To  multiply  divifions,  et^en  where  they  may  be 
made  really  difiincl,  is  tedious,  and  difguflful,  un. 
lefs  where  they  are  of  ufe  and  importance  to  our 
clearly  comprehending  the  meaning,  or  feeling 
the  force  of  what  is  faid.  If  a  perfon,  in  the  map 
of  a  country^  Ihould  give  a  different  colour  to  every 

Y3 


254'  LECTURES  ON  Left.   II. 

three  miles,  though  the  equality  of  the  proportion 
would  make  the  divifion  clear  enough,  yet  it  would 
appear  difguftingly  fuperfluous.  la  writing  the 
hiftorj  of  an  eminent  perfon's  life,  to  divide  it 
into  fpaces  of  ten  years,  perhaps,  would  make 
the  view  of  the  whole  more  exa6b  ;  but  to  di- 
vide it  into  fingle  years  or  months,  would  be  fini- 
cal and  difagreeabie.  The  increafe  of  divifions 
leads  almoll  unavoidably  into  tedioafnefs. 

(4.)  Subdivifions  fhould  be  co-ordinate ;  that 
is  to  fay,  thofe  that  go  on  in  a  feries,  i,  2,3,. 
&c.  fhould  be  as  near  as  pofTible  fimilar,  or  of  the 
fame  kind.  This  rule  is  tranfgreffed,  when  either 
the  things  mentioned  are  wholly  different  in  kind, 
or  when  they  include  one  another.  This  will  be 
well  perceived,  if  we  confider  how  a  man  would 
defcribe  a  fcnfible  fubje61,  a  county  for  example  y 
New-Jerfey  contains,  i.  Middlefex.  2.  So- 
merfet  county.  3.  The  townfhips  of  Prince- 
ton. 4.  Morris  county.  So,  if  one,  in  defcribing 
the  charafter  of  a  real  Chriftian,.  fliould  fay,  faith,, 
holinefs^  chai^ty,  juftice,  temperance,  patience,  this, 
would  not  do,  becaufe  holinefs  includes  juftice,  &^c.. 
When,  tiierefore,  it  feems  necelTary  to  mention 
different  particulars  that  cannot  be  made  co-ordi- 
nate, they  iliould  be  made  fubordinate. 

(5.)  Sub-divifions  fhould  be  complete^  and  ex- 
hauil  the  fubjecft.  This,  indeed,  is  common  to  all 
civiiions,  but  is  of  moH  importance  here,  where  it 
is  mofl  negleded.  It  may  be  faid,  perhaps.  How 
can  we  propofe  to  exhaufl  any  fubjeft  ?  By  ma- 
king the  divifions  fuitable,  particularly  in  point  of 
comprehenfion,  to  the  nature  of  the  fubjeft  i  as  aa 


Le£b.  II.  ELOQUENCE.  2j5 

example,  and  to  make  ufe  of  the  image  "before  in- 
troduced, of  giving  an  account  of  a  country,  I  ma^r 
faj,  the  province  of  Nevv-Jerfey  confilis  of  two 
parts,  Eaft  and  Weft  Jerfey.  If  I  faj  it  coiilifts 
of  the  counties  of  Someriet,  &.c.  I  muft  continue 
till  I  have  enumerated  all  the  counties,  otherwife 
the  divifion  is  not  complete.  In  the  fame  man- 
ner, in  public  fpeaking,  or  any  other-  compolition,^ 
whatever  divifion  is  made,  ii  is  not  legitimate,  if 
it  does  not  include  or  exhauft  the  whole  fubjeft  j 
which  may  be  done,  let  it  be  ever  fo  great.  For 
example  :  True  religion  may  be  divided  various 
ways,  fo  as  to  include  the  whole  j  I  niay  fay,  that 
it  confifts  of  our  duty  to  G<xl,  our  iK;ighbour,  and 
ourfelves  ;  or,  I  may  make  but  two,  our  duty  ta 
God  and  man,  and  divide  the  lail  into  two  fubor- 
dinate  heads,  our  neighbour,  and  oiirielves  ;  or,  I 
may  fay,  it  confifts  of  faith  and  praftice  ;  or,  that 
it  confiUs  of  two  parts,  a  right  frame  and  temper  of 
mind,  and  a  good  life  and  converfation. 

(6.)  Lallly,  the  fubdivifions  of  any  fubjeiS: 
fhould  be  connefted,  or  iliould  be  taken  in  a  feries- 
or  order,  if  they  will  pofubly  admit  of  it.  In  fome 
moral  and  intellectual  fubjects,  it  may  not  be  eafy 
to  find  any  feries  or  natural  order,  as  in  an  enumera- 
tion of  virtues,  juftice,  temperance,  and  fortitude* 
Patience,  perhaps,  might  as  well  be  enumerated  in 
any  other  order ;  yet  there  is  often  an  order  that 
will  appear  natural,  and  the  inverfion  of  it  unna- 
tural ;  as  we  may  fay,  injuries  are  done  many 
■ways  to  a  man's  perfon,  charafter,  and  poffeffions. 
Love  to  others  includes  the  relation  of  family,  kin- 
dred, citizeniJ  countrymen,  IcIIqw- creatures. 


aj^  LECTURES  ON  Left.  11. 

3.  In  the  lafl  place,  there  is  alfo  an  order  to 
"be  obferved  in  the   fentiments,  which  makes  the 
illuftratioH  or  amplification   of  the  divifions  of  a 
difcourfe.     This  order  is  never  exprefled  bj  nume- 
rical divifions,  yet  it  is  of  great  importance,  and  its 
beauty  and  force  will  be  particularly  felt.     It  is, 
if  I  may  fpeak  fo,  of  a  finer  and  more  delicate  na- 
ture than  any  of  the    others,    more   various,  and 
harder  to  explain,     I  once  have  faid,  that  all  rea- 
foning  is  of  the  nature  of  a  fyllogifm,  which  lays 
down  principles,    makes    comparifons,    and  draws 
the  conclufion.     But  we   mufl  particularly  guard 
againll  letting  the  uniformity  and  formality   of  a 
fyllogifm  appear.     In  general,  whatever  eftablifhes 
any  connection,  fo  that  it  makes  the  fentiments  give 
rife  to  one  another,  is  the  occafion  of  order  ;  fome- 
times  neceffity  and  utility  point  out  the  order  as  a 
good  meafure  :     As  in  telling  a  ftory,  grave  or  hu- 
morous, you  muft  begin  by  defcribing  the  perfons 
concerned,  mentioning  juft   as  many  circumftances 
of  their  charafter  and  fituation  as  are  neceflary  to 
make  us  underftand  the  fafts  to  be   afterwards  re- 
lated.    Sometimes  the  fenfible   ideas  of  time  and 
place  fuggeft  an  order,  not  only  in  hiflorical  narra- 
tions, and  in  law-pleadings,  which  relate  to  fa61s, 
but  in  drawing  of  charafters,  defcribing  the   pro- 
grefs  and  efiefts  of  virtue   and  vice,  and   even  in 
other  fabje6ts,  where  the  connexion  between  thofe 
ideas  and  the  thing  fpoken  of  is  not  very  ftroAg. 
Sometimes,  and  indeed  generally,  there  is  an  order 
which  proceeds  from   things  plain,  to  things  ob- 
fcure.     The  beginning  of  a  paragraph  fliould  be 
like  the  Iharp  point  of  a  wedge,  which  gains  ad* 


LeCl.  II.  ELOQUENCE.  257 

mittance  to  the  bulky  part  behind.  It  firft  affirms 
what  every  body  feels,  or  muit  confefs,  and  pro-* 
ceeds  to  what  follows  as  a  necellary  conieqiience. 
In  fine,  there  is  an  order  in  perfuaiion  to  a  particu- 
lar choice,  which  may  be  taken  two  ways  with" 
equal  advantage,  proceeding  from  the  weaker  to 
ilie  flronger,  or  from  the  flronger  to  the  weaker  : 
As  in  recommending  a  pious  and  virtuous  life,  we 
may  firil  fay  it  is  amiable,  honourable,  pleafant, 
profitable,  even  in  ihe  prefent  life  ;  and,  to  crown 
all,  makes  death  iifelf  a  friend,  and  leads  to  a  glo- 
licus  immortality :  or,  we  may  begin  the  other 
way,  and  fay  it  is  the  one  thing  needful,  that  eter- 
nity is  the  great  and  decifive  argument  that  fliould 
determine  our  choice,  though  everj  thing  elfe  were 
in  favour  of  vice  ;  and  then  add,  that  even  in  the 
prefent  life,  it  is  a  great  miitake  to  J:hink  that  bad 
men  are  gainers,  &Ci  This  is  called  fometimes 
the  afcending  and  defc ending  climax.  Each  of 
them  has  its  beauty  and  ufe.  It  mufl  be  left  tO 
the  orator's  judgement  to  determine  which  of  tha 
two  is  either  fitteft  for  the  prefent  purpofe,  or  which 
he  finds  himfelf  at  that  time  jible  to  o^ecute  to  th» 
greatefl  advantage. 


LECTURE    XII. 

THE  next  branch  of  this  divifion,  is  ftyle,  or 
compofition'.  This,  which  is  fo  great  a  par^ 
of  the  fubjcd,  has  already  been  confidered  in  x>ne 
view,  under  {he  three  ^reat  kinds  of  writing,  and 


^5^  LECTURES  ON  Left.  1 2-. 

will  again  be  mentioned  under  the  two  following 
heads,  as  well  as  the  remarks  at  the  clofe :  yet  I 
will  drop  a  few  hints  upon  it  in  this  place. 

I.  It  is  neceffary  that  a  writer  or  fpeaker  fhould 
be  well  acquainted  with  the  language  in  which  he 
fpeaks  ;  its  charafters,  properties,  and  defefts,  its 
idioms,  or  peculiar  terms  and  phrafes,  and  likewife 
with  as  many  other  languages  as  poflible,  particu- 
larly fuch  as  are  called  the  learned  languages,  the 
Latin  and  Greek.  Our  own  language  is  the  Eng- 
lifh.  A  thorough  acquaintance  with  it  mail  be 
acquired  by  extcnfive  reading  in  the  beft  authors^ 
giving  great  attention  to  the  remarks  made  by  cri- 
tics of  judgement  and  erudition,  and  trying  it  our- 
felves  in  practice.  Our  language,  like  moft  of  the 
northern  languages,  is  rough,  w4th  a  frequent 
meeting  of  confonants,  difficult  of  pronunciation  ; 
it  abounds  in  monofyllables.  You  may  write  a 
whole  page,  and  fcarce  ufe  one  word  that  has  more 
than  one  fyllable  ;  this  is  a  defeft,  and  to  be  avoid- 
ed when  it  can  be  done  confiftently  with  other  pro- 
perties, particularly  fimplicity  and  perfpicuity. 
Our  language  is  faid  to  have  an  over  proportion 
of  the  letter  j-,  and  therefore  called  a  biffing  lan- 
guage. This  a  writer  of  judgement  will  endeavom* 
to  avoid,  w^henever  he  can  do  it  with  propriety 
and  elegance.  A  thorough  acquaintance  with  the 
genius  and  idioms  of  our  own  language,  can  fcarcely 
be  attained  without  fome  acquaintance  with  others, 
l)ecaufe  it  is  comparifon  of  one  with  another  which 
illuftrates  all.  There  are  not  only  fmaller  diffe- 
rences between  one  language  and  another,  but  there 
are  fome  general  difference  sin  the  arrangement  of 


Lq^,  12.  ELOQUENCE.  259 

words,  in  the  ancient  and  modern  languages  :  in 
the  Greek  and  Latin,  the  governed  words  are  pretty- 
generally  before  the  verb.  It  is  a  miflake  for  us 
to  fay,  that  the  Englifti  order  is  the  natural  order, 
as  fome  have  done.  It  is  certain  that  they  ai'e  either 
both  alike  natural  and  equally  obvious,  when  once 
cuftom  has  fixed  them,  or  that  the  ancient  order  is 
the  more  natural  of  the  two.  There  are  two  things, 
the  adion  and  the  object,  to  be  conjoined  j  and  it  is 
fully  as  proper  to  turn  your  attention  firfl  to  the 
obje6t,  before  you  tell  what  you  are  to  fay  of  it,  or 
what  you  would  have  done  with  it,  as  after.  Istud 
scalpellum  quod  in  maim  babes y  commoda  mihipaulisper^ 
si  placet:  and  in  longer  and  more  involved  fentences, 
the  fufpending  the  fentiment  for  fome  time  till  it  be 
completed,  is  both  more  pleafing  and  more  for- 
cible. Our  own  language  admits  of  a  little  tranfpofi- 
tion,  and  becomes  grander  and  more  fonorous  by  it, 
both  in  poetry  and  profe. 

2.  We  may  attend  to  the  arrangement  of  the 
claufes  of  a  fentence,  and  their  proportion  and  found. 
Every  fentence  may  be  coniidered  as  having  fo 
many  claufes  or  members,  \>^hieh  have,  each  of  them, 
fome  meaning,  but  which  is  not  complete  till  it  is 
clofed.  Every  fentence  is  capable  of  receiving 
fome  degree  of  harmony,  by  a  proper  ftrudure  ; 
this  it  receives  when  the  moft  important  ideas,  and 
the  moft  fonorous  exprelTions,  occupy  the  chief 
places ;  but  what,  you  will  fay,  are  the  chief  places  ? 
We  naturally,  fays  an  eminent  French  author  on 
this  fubjedl,  love  to  prefent  our  moft  interefting 
ideas  firft  ;  but  this  order,  which  is  didtated  by  felf- 
love,  is  contrary  ♦to  wha:  we  are  dircfted  to  by  the 


16C>  LECTURES  ON  Left.  12. 

art  of  pleaflng.  The  capital  law  of  this  art,  is  to 
prefer  others  to  oiirfelves,  and  therefore  the  mofl 
ilriking  and  interefting  ideas  come  with  the  greateft 
beauty,  as  well  as  force,  in  the  clofe.  Where  the 
difference  does  not  lie  in  the  ideas,  the  words  or 
phrafes  that  are  moft  long  and  fonorous  ought  to  be 
fo  diftinguifhed  ;  this  rule,  however,  will  admit 
fome  exception,  when  we  are  to  perfuade  or  inftruft, 
for  we  muft  never  feem  to  have  fweetnefs  and 
cadence  chiefly  in  view. 

The  rule  of  placing  in  a  fentence  the  moft  im- 
portant ideas  and  exprefFions  laft..  was  taken  notice 
of  by  ancient  writers.  I?i  verbis  obser'vandum  est^ 
fays  one  of  them,  ut  a  majoribus  ad  minus  descejidat 
uratio,  melius  enim  dicetur^  mr  est  optimus,  quam  "jir 
optimus  est.  Sometimes  feveral  monofyllables  ter- 
minate a  fentence  well  enoughj  becaufe  in  pronun- 
ciation they  run  into  one,  and  feem  to  the  hearers 
little  different  from  a  lingle  word.  It  is  an  obfer- 
vation,  that  the  ear  itfelf  often  directs  to  the  rule 
upon  this  fubjedl.  Some  French  critics  obferve, 
that  fome  fyllables  in  their  language  which  are 
ufually  fliort,  are  produced  in  the  end  of  a  fentence ; 
for  inftance,  ^e  suis  votre  servitcur  Monsieur ^  je  suis 
le  voire  ;  where  votre  is  fliort  in  the  firft  fentence, 
and  long  in  the  fecond ;  and  I  believe  the  fame  thing 
would  happen  in  tranflating  that  fentence  literally 
into  Engliih. 

The  harmony  of  fentcnces  is  preferved  cither  by 
a  meafured  proportion,  or  regular  gradation  of  the 
claufes  :  Cicero  fays  upon  this  fubjeft.  Si  f?i^mbra^ 
&:c.  In  every  fentence  confifting  of  two  members 
only,   every  body's  ear  will  make  them  fenftble, 


I 


Lcc\:.  12.  ELOQUENCE.  26 1 ' 

that  the  lail  claufe  after  the  paufe  of  the  voice  ought 
to  belongeft;  as  in  Shakcfpeare,  "  But  yefterdaj," 
Sec.  In  longer  fentences  there  muft  be  a  greater  varie- 
ty, and  feveral  caufes  mull:  contribute  to  determine 
the  length  of  the  ciaufes  ;  but  it  is  plain,  the  laft 
muft  be  longer  than  the  preceding ;  and  fometimes  a 
regular  gradation  of  more  than  two  ciaufes  has  a 
very  happy  efFeft  ;  fuch  as  thefe  of  Cicero,  ^/o- 
rum  qucvstor  fueram^  Stc.  Again  he  fays  in  the 
fame  oration,  Hahct  honor  em  ^  &c.  There  is  an- 
other order  in  which  there  are  two  equal,  and  one- 
unequal  member,  and  in  that  cafe,  when  the  unequal 
member  is  fliorteft,  it  ought  to  be  placed  firfl ; 
when  it  is  longeft,  it  ought  to  be  placed  laft,  as  iix 
the  two  following  examples  :  Testis  est  Africa^  &c. 
and  Eripite  nos  ex  miseris,  &:c.  There  is  another 
ftruclure  of  the  members  of  a  fentence,  in  which 
this  rule  is  departed  from,  and  yet  it  pleafes,  be- 
caufe  of  a  eertainexaft  proportion,  as  that  of  Mon- 
fieur  Fenelon,  Dans  s a  douleur^  &:c.  The  firft  and 
laft  members  are  equal,  and  that  which  is  in  the 
middle  is  juft  double  to  each  of  them. 

Perhaps  it  will  be  alked,  Muft  an  author  then 
give  attention  to  this  precife  meafure  ?  Muft  he 
take  a  pair  of  fcales  or  compalTes  to  meafare  every 
period  he  compofes  ?  By  no  means.  Nothing 
would  be  more  frigid  and  unfuccefsful,  but  it  was 
proper  thus  to  analyfethe  fubjeft,  and  fhow  in  what 
manner  the  ear  is  pleafed ;  at  the  fame  time  there 
is  fo  great  a  variety  and  compafs  in  the  meafures 
of  profe,  that  it  is  eafy  to  vary  the  ftrudure  and  ca- 
dence, and  make  every  thing  appear  quite  fimplc 

Vol.  VII.  Z 


26s-  LECTURES  ON  Left.  12. 

and  natural.     This  leads  me  to  the  third  remark 
uDon  ftvle. 

3.  That  variety  is  to  be  particularly  fludied. 
If  a  writer  thinks  any  particular  ilru«5lure  neceiTary, 
and  forces  every  thing  he  has  to  fay  juft  into  that 
form,  it  will  be  highly  difagreeable  ;  or  if  he  is 
much  enamoured  with  one  particular  kind  of  orna- 
ment, and  brings  it  in  too  frequently,  it  will  imme- 
diately difguft.  There  is  a  mixture  in  the  principles 
of  tafle,  a  defire  of  uniformity  and  variety,  fimpli- 
city  and  intricacy ;  and  it  is  by  the  happy  union  of  all 
thefe,  that  delight  is  moft  efFe£lually  produced. 
What  elfe  is  neceflary  upon  ftyle,  will  fall  very 
properly  under  fome  of  the  following  heads. 

The  lafl  part  of  the  oratorial  art  is  pronunciation, 
including  gefture.  This  is  of  the  utmoft,  and  in- 
deed of  univerfally  confefTed  importance.  The 
effects  of  the  different  manner  of  delivering  the 
fame  thing  are  very  great.  It  is  a  famous  fubjeft, 
largely  treated  of  by  all  critical  writers.  It  feems 
to  have  been  nicely  fludied  by  the  ancients ;  and  if 
we  may  judge  from  fome  circumllances,  their  ac- 
tion has  been  often  very  violent.  We  are  told  of 
Cicero,  that  when  he  firfl  went  to  the  bar,  the  vio- 
lence of  his  aftion,  and  what  is  called  contentio 
laterum,  was  fucli  as  endangered  his  couflitution,  fo 
that  he  took  a  journey  for  his  health,  and  on  his 
return  took  to  a  more  cool  and  managed  way  of 
fpeaking.  There  is  alfo  fomewhere  in  his  wri- 
tings, an  expreflion  to  this  purpofe,  Nee  fuit  etiam^ 
quod  minimum  est,  supplosio  pedis  ;  as  if  llamping 
with  the  foot  had  been  one  of  the  leaft  violent  mo- 
tions then  in  ufe.     We  cannot  judge  qf  this  matter 


Led.  12.  ELOQUENCE.  263 

very  well  at  fiich  a  diftance.  There  is  a  difference 
in  the  turn  of  different  nations  upon  this  fabje6l. 
The  French  and  Italians  have  much  more  warmth 
and  fire  in  their  manner  than  the  Briiiili.  I  re- 
member once  to  have  been  told  that  no  man  could 
perceive  the  beauty  of  Raphael's  picturv*  of  Paul 
preaching  at  Athens,  unlefs  he  had  feen  a  French- 
man or  Italian  in  the  pulpit.  Leaving  you  to  read 
and  digeil  all  the  criticifms  and  remarks  upon  this 
fubjeft  to  be  met  with  in  different  authors,  I  ihall 
only  give  a  few  dii'e£lions  ihat  I  efteem  mofl  ufe- 
ful  for  avoiding  improprieties,  and  attaining  feme 
degree  of  excellence  in  this  refpeft. 

1.  Study  great  (incerity  -,  try  to  forget  every 
pm*pofe  but  the  very  end  of  fpeaking,  information, 
and  perfuading.  Labour  after  that  fort  of  prefence 
of  mind  which  arifes  from  felf-denial,  rather  than 
from  courage.  Nothing  produces  more  aukward- 
nefs  than  confulion  and  embarrailment.  Bring  a 
clown  into  a  magnificent  palace,  and  let  him  have 
to  appear  in  the  prefence  of  perfons  of  high  rank, 
and  the  fear  and  folicitude  he  has  about  his  own 
carnage  and  difcourfe,  makes  both  the  one  and  the 
other  much  more  abfurd  and  aukward  than  it  would 
have  otherwife  been. 

2.  Learn  diitindl  articulation,  and  attend  to  all 
the  common  rales  of  reading,  which  are  taught  in 
the  Engliih  grammars.  Articulation  is  giving  their 
full  force  and  pov.crs  to  the  confonants  as  well  as 
the  vowels.  The  difference  between  a  well  articu- 
lated difcoiLirfe  and  one  defective  in  this  refpe^,  is, 
that  the  firft  you  will  hear  diflinftly  as  far  as  you 

Z  2 


264  LECTURES  ON  Le<^, 


12, 


can  hear  the  voice  ;  the  other  you  will  hear  found 
enough,  yet  not  underftand  almoft  any  thing  tliat  is 
faid.  Piactice  in  company  is  a  good  way  to  learn 
this  and  feveral  other  excellencies  in  difcourfe. 

3.  Another  rule  is,  to  keep  to  the  tone  and  key 
of  dialogue,  or  common  converfation,  as  much  as 
pofTible.  In  common  difcourfe,  where  there  is  no 
aiiedlation,  men  fpeak  properly.  At  leaft,  thougli 
even  here  there  are  dilTerences  from  nature,  fome 
fpeaking  with  more  fweetnefs  and  grace  than  others, 
yet  there  is  none  that  falls  into  any  of  thofe  unna- 
tural rants  or  ridiculous  geilures,  that  are  fometiiues 
to  be  feen  in  public  fpeakers. 

4.  It  is  of  coiifiderable  confequence  to  be  accuf- 
tomed  to  decency  of  manners  in  the  befl  company. 
This  gives  an  eafe  of  carriage  and  a  fenfe  of  delicacy, 
which  is  of  great  ufe  in  forming  the  deportment  of 
an  orator. 

5.  In  the  lail  place,  every  one  fliould  coniider 
not  only  what  is  the  manner,  bell  in  itfelf,  or  even 
befl  fuited  to  the  fubjedl,  but  what  is  alfo  beii  fuit- 
ed  to  his  own  capacity.  One  of  a  quick  animated 
fpirit  by  nature,  may  allow  himfelf  a  much  greater 
violence  of  a£lion,  than  one  of  a  colder  difpolitiou. 
If  this  lad  works  himfelf  up  to  violence^  or  lludies 
to  exprefy  much  paffion,  he  will  not  probably  be 
able  to  carry  it  through,  but  will  relapfe  into  his 
own  natural  manner,  and  by  the  fenfible  difference 
between  one  part  of  his  difcourfe  and  another,  ren- 
der himfelf  ridiculous.  Solemnity  of  manner 
ihould  bo  fubflituted  by  all  fuch  perfcns  in  the  room 
of  fu-c. 


Led.  13.  ELOQUENCE.  2^5 


LECTURE   XIII. 

WE  come  now  to  the  fourth  general  division 
of  this  fubjecl:,  which  is,  that  its  object  or 
end  is  ditFerent.  The  ends  a  writer  or  fpeaker  may 
be  faid  to  aim  at,  are  informarlon,  demonilration, 
perfiiafion,  and  entertainment.  I  need  fcarce  tell 
you,  that  thefe  are  not  fo  wholly  diilinft,  bat  that 
they  arc  frequently  intermixed,  and  that  more  than 
one  of  them  may  be  in  view  at  the  fame  time. 
Perfuafion  is  aifo  ufed  in  a  fenfe  that  includes  them 
all.  The  intention  of  ail  ipeech,  or  wriiiag,  which 
is  but  recorded  fpeech,  is  to  perfuade,  taking  the 
word  with  latitude.  Yet  I  think  you  will  ealily 
perceive  that  there  are  very  different  fons  of  com- 
pofition,  in  fome  of  v.'hich  one  of  the  above-men- 
tioned purpofes,  and  in  others  a  difFcrent  one, 
takes  the  lead,  and  gives  the  colour  to  the  whole 
performance.  Great  benefit  will  arife  from  keep- 
ing a  clear  view  of  what  is  the  end  propofed.  It 
will  preferve  the  writer  from  a  vitious  and  mLfta- 
ken  tafte.  The  fame  thoughts,  the  fame  phrafeology,- 
the  fame  fpirit  in  general,  running  through  a  wri- 
ting, is  highly  proper  in  one  cafe,  and  abfurd  in 
another.  There  is  a  beauty  in  every  kind  of  wri- 
ting when  it  is  well  done,  and  impropriety  or  bad 
tafte  will  fometiraes  fliow  themfelves  in  pieces  very 
iiiconiiderable.  If  it  were  but  inditing  a  meflagc- 
card,  penning  an  article  in  a  newfpaper,  or  draw- 
ing up  an  advertifement,  perfons  accuilomed  to 
each  of  thefe  will  be  able  to  keep  to  the  common 


\2t6  LECTURES  ON  Le^t.    1 3. 

form,  or  beaten  track  ;  but  if  any  thing  different  is 
to  be  faid,  good  fenfe  and  propriejtj,  or  their  con- 
traries, will  foon  fhow  themfelves. 

The  writings  which  have  information  as  their 
chief  purpofe,  are  hiflory,  fable,  epiftolary  writing, 
the  common  intercourfe  of  bufinefs  or  frieadihip, 
^nd  all  the  lower  kinds.  The  properties  which 
•Ihould  reign  in  them,  are  the  following,  i.  Plain- 
nefs  ;   2.  Fulnefs  ;  3.  Preciiion  ;  and,  4.  Order. 

1 .  Plainnefs  it  is  evident  they  ought  to  have  ;  and 
indeed  not  barely  perfpicuity,  fo  as  to  be  intelligible, 
but  an  unaffeded  fimplicity,  fo  as  not  to  feem  to 
have  any  thing  higher  in  view  than  to  be  uiider- 
ilood. 

2.  AVhen  we  fay  that  fulnefs  is  a  property  of 
writings  which  have  information  as  their  purpofe^ 
it  is  not  meant  to  recommend  a  long  or  diffufe  nar- 
ration, but  to  intimate  that  nothing  fhould  be  omit- 
ted in  giving  an  account  of  any  thing,  which  is  of 
importance  to  its  being  truly  and  completely  under- 
ftood.  Let  a  writer  be  as  large  as  he  pleafes  in 
what  he  fays,  if  he  omits  circumftances  as  effential 
as  thofe  he  mentions,  and  which  the  reader  would 
naturally  defire  to  know,  he  is  not  full.  Many  are 
very  tedious,  and  yet  not  full.  The  excellence  of 
a  narrative  is  to  contain  as  many  ideas  as  poffible, 
provided  they  are  interefling,  and  to  convey  them 
in  as  few  words  as  poffible,  confiflently  with  per- 
ipicuity. 

3.  Precifion,  as  a  quality  of  narration,  belongs 
chiefly  to  language.  Words  ihould  be  chofen  that 
are  truly  expreflive  of  the  thing  in  view,  and  all 
Rnibigubus  as  well  a^  fuperiluous  phrafes  carefully 


Left.  13.  ELOQUENCE.  257 

avoided.  The  reader  is  impatient  to  get  to  the  end 
of  a  ftory,  and  therefore  he  null  not  be  flopped  by 
any  thing  but  what  you  are  fure  he  would  be  glad 
to  know  before  he  proceeds  further.*" 

4.  The  lafl  particular  is  order,  which  is  necef* 
fary  in  all  writings,  but  efpecially  in  narration. 
There  it  lies  chiefly  in  time  and  place,  and  a  breacJi 
of  order  in  thefe  refpects  is  more  eafilydifcerned  < 
and  more  univerfally  offenfive  than  in  'any  other. 
Comnaon  hearers  do  no't  always  k^ow  when  you 
violate  order  in  ranging  the  arguments  on  a  moral 
fubjeft  ;  but  if  you  bring  in  a  ftory  abruptly,  or  tell 
it  corifufedly,  either  in  a  letter  or  a  difcourfe,  it  will 
be  inftantly  perceived,  and  thofe  will  laugh  at  you 
>vho  could  not  tell  it  a  whit  better  therafelves. 

Imagination  is  not  to  be  much  ufed  in  wiitings 
of  the  narrative  kind.  Its  chief  ufe  in fuch  writings 
is  in  defcription.  A  man  of  a  warm  fancy  will 
paint  firongly,  and  a  man  of  a  fentimental  turn  will 
intereft  the  afteclions  even  by  a  mere  recital  of 
facts.  But  both  tlie  cne  and  the  other  iliould  be 
kept  in  great  moderation  j  for  a  warm  fancy  is 
often  joined  to  credulity,  and  the  fentimental  perfan 
is  given  to  invention  ;  fo  that  he  will  turn  a.  real 
hiilory  into  a  romance.  In  hiftory  a  certain  cool 
and  difpalHonate  dignity  is  the  leading  beauty.  The 
writer  fhould  appear  to  have  no  intereft  in  characters 
or  events,  but  deliver  them  as  he  finds  them.  The 
character  which  an  illuftrious  hiftorian  acquires 
from  this  felf-denia],  and  being,  as  it  were,  fuperior 
to  all  the  perfonages,  how  great  foever,  of  whom 
he  treats,  has  fomettiing  awful  and  venerable  in  it. 


268  LECTURES  ON  Leci:.  I3, 

It  is  dlftinguifhed  by  this  circumflance  from  the 
applaufe  given  to  the  poet  or  orator. 

Demonftration  is  the  end  in  vaew  in  all  fcientific 
■writings,  whether  eflajs,  fyftems,  or  controverfy. 
The  excellencies  of  this  kind  of  writing  maj  be 
reduced  to  the  three  following  :  Perfpicuity,  order, 
and  ftrength.  The  two  firft  are  neceflary  here  as 
every  where  elfe,  and  the  compofition  fhould  be 
ilrong  and  nervoKS  to  produce  a  lafting  conviftion  ; 
more  force  of  language  is  to  be  admitted,  at  lead 
more  generally  in  this  kind  than  in  the  former  j 
but  a  grent  deal  lefs  of  imagination  and  fancy  than 
even  there.  Whenever  a  fcientific  writer  begins 
to  paint  and  adorn,  he  is  forgetting  himfelf  and  dif- 
guiling  his  reader.  This  will  be  fenfibly  felt  if 
you  apply  it  to  the  mathematics.  The  mathema- 
tician is  converfant  only  with  fenfible  ideas,  and 
tlierefore  the  more  naked  and  unadorned  every 
thing  that  he  fays  is,  fo  much  the  better.  How 
would  itlook  if  a  mathematician  fhould  fay,  Do  you 
fee  this  beautiful,  fmall,  taper,  acute  angle  ?  It 
always  approaches  to  this  abfurdity,  when,  in  fearch- 
ing  after  abflrad  truth,  writers  introduce  imagina- 
tion and  fancy.  I  am  fenfible  that,  having  men- 
tioned controverfy  as  belonging  to  this  clafs,  many 
may  be  furprifed  that  I  have  excluded  ijn agination 
altogether,  fl nee  commonly  all  controverfial  waiters 
do,  to  the  utmofl  of  their  ability,  enlift  imagination 
in  the  fervice  of  Reafon.  There  is  nothing  they 
are  fo  fond  of  as  expofing  the  weaknefs  of  their  ad- 
verfaries  by  Urokes  of  raillery  and  humour.  This  I 
did  on  purpofe  that  I  may  ftatc  this  matter  to  you 
clearly.     Controverfy  fliould  mean,  and  very  ge* 


Lecl.  13.  ELOQUENCE.  269 

ntTally  fuch  writers  pretend  to  mean,  v/eighiiig  the 
arguments  on  each  lide  of  a  contelled  queiiion,  in 
order  to  difcover  the  tmth.  What  llrong  profef- 
fions  of  impartiality  have  we  fometimes  from  the 
very  champions  of  a  party- quarrel  I  while  yet  it  is 
plain,  that  fearching  after  truth  is  what  they  never 
.think  ofy  but  maintaining,  by  every  art,  the  caufe 
v.hich  tliey  have  already  efpoufed. 

I  do  not  deny  that  there  are  fometimes  good 
reafons  for  making  ufe  of  fatlre  and  ridicule,  in 
trontroverfies  of  the  political  kind,  and  fometimes  it 
is  necelTary  in  felf-defence.  If  any  writer  in  behalf 
of  a  party,  attempts  to  expofe  his  adverfaries  to 
public  fcorn,  he  ought  not  to  be  furprifed  i^  the 
meafure  he  metes  to  others,  is  meafured  out  to  him 
again.  What  is  unlawful  in  the  aggreilor,  becomes 
•piliiiabre,  if  not  laudable,  in  the  defender.  Some- 
times it  is  necefiary  to  expofe  tyrants,  or  perfons  in 
power,  who  do  not  reafon,  but  puniih ;  and  fome- 
-times  it  is  neceil'ary  to  bring  down  felf-fuflicient 
perfons,  ^Hth  whom  there  is  no  dealing  till  their 
pride  is  levelled  a  little  with  tills  difmaying  vreapon. 
Dr  Brown  has  fct  this  matter  in  a  very  clear  light, 
in  his  ElTays  on  the  Characleriftics,  where  he  fays, 
that  ridicule  is  not  the  tell  of  truth,  but  it  may  he 
r.  ry  ufeful  to  expofe  and  difgrace  known  falfehood. 
But  when  controverfy  is  rjeally  an  impartial 
arch  after  tnith,  it  is  the  farthefl  diftant  imagin- 
able, either  from  pailionate  declamation  on  the  one 
hand,  or  fallies  of  wit  and  humour  on  the  other, 
Tiiere  is  one  inflance  of  a  controverfy  carried  on 
between  Dr  Sutler  and  Br  Clark,  upon  the  fub- 
'::c1  of  fpace  and  perfcnal  identity,  in  which  there 


<L*J0  LECTURES  ON  Lecl.  I3. 

did  not  fceni  to  be  any  defign,  upon  either  fide,  but 
to  difcover  the  truth.  It  ended  m  -he  entire  con- 
vidtion  and  fatisfadion  of  one  of  ihein,  which  he 
readily  and  openly  acknowledged  :  and  I  think  in 
fuch  an  inftance  there  is  much  greater  glory  to  be 
had  in  yielding  than  in  conquering.  There  is 
great  honour  in  candidly  acknowledging  a  miftake, 
but  not  much  in  obtaining  a  vidory  in  fapport  of 
truth.  It  is  w^orth  while  juft  to  mention,  that  this 
was  far  from  being  the  cafe  in  another  controverfy 
between  two,  who  were  alfo  very  great  men,  Mr 
Locke  and  Dr  Stillingfleet,  upon  innate  ideas.  They 
not  only  fupported  each  his  fentimcnts,  with  warmth 
and  keennefs,  but  defcended  to  all  the  malice  of 
perfonal  reproach,  and  all  the  n'ttlenefs  of  verbal 
criticifm. 

The  next  great  end  that  may  be  in  view,  is  per- 
fuafion.  This  being  the  great  and  general  fubjsdt 
of  oratory,  has  had  mod  faid  upon  it  in  every  age. 
That  you  may  underftand  what  I  mean  by  diftin- 
guifhing  it  from  information,  demon  fir  ation,  and  en- 
tertainment, obfervc,  that  perfuafion  is,  when  we 
would  bring  the  reader  or  hearer  to  a  determinate 
choice,  either  immediately  upon  the  fpot  for  a  par- 
ticular decifion,  as  in  an  aUembly  or  court  of  juflice, 
or  in  a  more  fiow  and  lading  way,  as  in  religious 
and  moral  writings.  But  particularly  perfualion  is 
underftood  to  be  in  view,  as  the  effect  of  a  fingle 
i^ifcourfe.  When  this  is  the  purpofe,  there  arc  op- 
portunities for  all  the  ways  of  fpeaking  within  the 
compafs  of  th2  oratorial  att.  There  are  times 
•when  an  orator  mufl  narrate  {imply — there  are 
times  when  he  mufl  reafon  flrongly — and  there  are 


Lecl.  13.  ELOQUENCE.  27! 

times  when  he  may  wound -Tatiric ally.  It  rauft  be 
remembered,  however,  that  too  great  an  infiilion  of 
wit  takes  away  both  from  the  dignity  and  force  of 
an  oration.  We  fliall  fee  under  the  next  head,  that 
it  cannot  be  admitted  in  religious  inftruclion ;  but 
when  you  are  fpeaking  againll  an  adverfary  that  is 
proud  and  conceited,  or  when  you  w'ant  to  make 
your  hearers  defpife  any  perfon  or  thing,  as  well  as 
hate  them,  wit  and  fatire  may  be  of  ufe.  A  mini- 
fter  of  ftate  is  very  often  attacked  in  this  w^ay  with 
propriety  and  fuccefs.  It  is  fometimes  allowed  to 
relieve  the  fpirits  of  the  audience  when  they  begin 
to  flag.  In  this  view  Cicero  recommends  the  ur-^ 
hanitas,  and  practifes  it  himfelf  j  and  at  the  fame 
times  he  intimates  that  it  ihould  be  done  fparingly, 
and  with  caution— J^z/o  tanquam  sale  conspergatur 
oratio.  Wit,  therefore,  is  to  be  abfolutely  excluded 
from  Ccientiiic  writings,  and  very  rarely  to  be  ufed 
in  ferious  perfualion. 

The  lafl  end  of  fpeaking  and  writing  I  fliall 
mention,  is  entertainment.  This  includes  all  fuch 
writings  as  have  the  amufement  or  entertainment  of 
the  hearers  or  reader-s  as  the  only,  the  chief,  or  at 
leaft  one  great  end  of  the  compofition.  This  is  the 
cafe  with  all  poetical  compofitions.  Tliey  may  pre- 
tend to  write  for  the  inftruftion  of  others,  but  to 
pleafe  them  and  obtain  their  favour  is  probably 
more  their  purpofe.  At  any  rate,  they  mufl  con- 
tent  themfelves  with  taking  in  both,  and  fay  with 
Horace,  Et prodesse  volunt  et  delectare poeta^.  Sweet- 
nefs,  tendernefs,  and  elegance  of  ftyle,  ought  to 
charaderize  thefe  forts  of  compofition.  Here  is  the 
greatefl  room  for  imagination  and  fancy.     Here  is 


272  LECTURES  oy  Led.  13. 

the  dominion  of  wit  and  hunlour.  It  is  an  obferva- 
tion  of  fomc,  that  the  word  humour  is  peculiar  to  the 
Englifli  language  ;  that  the  eutrapelia  in  Greek, 
sales  et  urbanitas^  in  Latin,  have  all  the  fame  mean- 
ing with  our  general  term  wit ;  but  that  humour 
denotes  a  particular  kind  of  wit,  coniilling  chiefly 
of  irony.  But  if  the  word  is  peculiar  to  the  Eng- 
lifli language,  it  is  certain  that  the  thing  itfelf  is 
far  from  being  peculiar  to  the  Englifh  nation. 
Perhaps  Homer's  Batrychomachia  may  be  faid  to 
be  the  moft  ancient  example  of  it  upon  record. 
Lucian's  Dialogues  have  it  ;in  high  perfecilion; 
though  it  muft  be  owed  that  it  feems  particularly 
to  have  flouriihed  in  modern  times.  Fontenelle's 
Dialogues  of  the  Dead,  and  Boileau's  Satires,  are 
famous  examples  of  it  ;  but  none  ever  exceeded 
Cervantes,  the  celebrated  author  of  Don  Ouixotte. 
That  piece 'S"*"  highly  entertaining  to  an  Englilh 
reader,  under  two  great  difadvantages.  One  is,  its 
being  tranflated  into  another  language.  Now,  wit 
is  more  difficult  to  tranllate  than  any  other  fubje£l 
of  compoiition.  It  is  eaiier  to  tranllate  undiminifh- 
cd  the  force  of  eloquence,  than  the  poignancy  of 
wit.  The  other  difadvantage  is,  its  being  written  in 
ridicule  of  a  character  that  now  no  more  exifts  ;  fo 
that  we  have  not  the  opportunity  of  comparing  the 
copy  with  the  original. 

We  muft  alfo  obferve,  that  wit  in  general,  and 
this  fpecies  of  it  in  particular,  has  often  appeared 
in  the  higheft  perfection  in  Britain,  both  in  profe 
and  poetry  ;  Shakefpeare's  dramatic  pieces  abound 
with  it,  and  Dr  Donnes'  Satires.  It  is  in  ^high 
perfedion  in  Marvel's  Rehearfal  Tranfpofed  ;>  Al- 


Le£t.   13.  ELOQUENCE.  273 

fop's  Melius  Inquirendum ;  but,  above  all,  in  Swift's 
writings,  profe  and  verfe. 

It  is  obferv'ed  fometimes,  that  the  talent  of  humour 
is  often  pofTefled,  in  a  very  high  degree,  by  perfons 
of  the  meaneft  rank,  who  are  themfelves  ignorant  of 
it ;  in  them  it  appears  chiefly  in  converfation,  arid 
in  a  manner  that  cannot  be  eaflly  put  upon  paper. 
But  as  to  thofe  who  think  fit  to  try  this  manner 
from  the  prefs,  they  fhould  be  well  affured  before- 
hand, that  they  really  pofTefs  the  talent.  In  many 
other  particulars,  a  real  tafte  for  it,  and  a  high  ad- 
miration of  any  thing,  is  a  coniiderable  fign  of  fome 
degree  of  the  talent  itfelf ;  but  it  is  far  from  being 
fo  in  wit  and  humour.  Mr  Pope  tells  us,  that 
"  gentle  dullnefs  ever  loves  a  joke  :"  and  we  fee 
every  day  people  aiming  at  wit,  who  produce  the 
moft  miferable  and  fhocking  performances  :  fome- 
times they  do  not  excite  laughter,  but  loathing  or 
indignation ;  fometimes  they  do  excite  laughter, 
but  it  is  that  of  contempt.  There  is  a  diftin<5lion 
which  every  one  fhould  endeavour  to  underftand 
and  remember,  between  a  wit  and  a  droll ;  the  firft 
makes  you  laugh  at  what  he  fays,  and  the  objeft  of 
his  fatire,  and  the  fecond  makes  you  laugh  at  his 
own  expence,  from  his  abfurdity  and  meanuefs. 


LECTURE    XIV. 

"V^TE  come  now  to  the  fifth  general  divifion  of 
^  '      eloquence,  as  its  fubjeft  is  diflferent ;  under 
which  we  may  confider  the  three  great  divifions  of 
Vol.  VII.  A  a 


174  LECTURES  ON  Le£l.  I4. 

the  pulplf,  the  bar,  and  promifcuous  aflemblies. 
All  the  general  principles  of  compofition  are  com- 
mon to  thefe  three  kinds,  nor  can  any  man  make  a 
truly  diftinguiflied  figure  in  any  one  of  them,  with- 
out being  well  acquainted  with  literature  and  tafte. 
Some  peculiarities  in  different  ways  of  writing  have 
been  already  touched  at,  all  which  I  fuppofe  you 
gave  attention  to  ;  but  there  are  flill  fome  differ- 
ences, as  the  fcene  in  which  a  man  is  to  move  in 
life  is  different,  which  are  highly  worthy  of  obfer- 
vation.  I  will,  therefore,  confider  each  of  thefe 
feparately,  and  try  to  point  out  the  qualities  for 
which  they  ought  to  be  diflinguifhed  ;  or  delineate 
the  chara6ler  of  an  accomplilhed  miniller,  lawyer, 
and  fenator. 

I  begin  with  the  pulpit.  Preaching  the  gofpel 
of  Chrifl  is  a  truly  noble  employment,  and  the  care 
©f  fouls  a  very  important  trufl.  The  qualities  of 
mofl  importance,  I  think,  are  as  follow. 

I.  Piety— To  have  a  firm  belief  of  that  gofpel  he 
Is  called  to  preach,  and  a  lively  fenfe  of  religion 
upon  his  own  heart.  Duty,  intereft,  and  utility,  all 
eonfpire  in  requiring  this  qualification  ;  it  is  of  the 
utmofl  moment  in  itfelf,  and  what  men  will  the  leafl 
difpenfe  with  in  one  of  that  profeflion.  All  men, 
good  and  bad,  agree  in  defpifing  a  loofe  or  profane 
minifler.  It  difcovers  a  terrible  degree  of  depravity 
of  heart,  and  thofe  that  begin  fo  feldom  alter  for  the 
better.  The  very  familiar  acquaintance  which 
they  acquire  with  ferious  thoughts  and  fplrltual  fub- 
jefts,  ferves  to  harden  them  againfl  the  arrows  of 
conviction ;  and  it  is  little  wonder  that  for  fuch  da- 
ring wickednefs,  God  fhould  leave  them  to  them- 


Le£l.  14.  ELOQJJENCE.  275 

felves,  or  fentence  them  to  perpetual  barrennefs. 
But  whilft  I  think  it  my  duty  thus  to  warn  you,  I 
mufl  beg  leave  to  guard  it  againft  abufe,  left,  while 
we  are  aggravating  the  fin  of  profane  minifters, 
others  fhould  think  themfelves  at  liberty,  who  have 
no  view  to  that  facred  offic:^.  We  have  even  feen 
perfons  decline  the  facred  office,  becaufe  they  did 
not  think  they  had  true  religion,  and  then,  with 
feeming  eafe  and  quietnefs,  fet  themfelves  to  fome 
other  bufmefs,  as  if  in  that  there  was  no  need  of 
reliction  at  all.  Alas  !  after  all  that  can  be  faid  of 
the  guilt  and  danger  of  an  irreligious  minifter,  there 
is  an  infinite  danger  to  every  one  who  fhall  go  out 
of  this  life  an  irreligious  man.  Will  it  not  be  poor 
confolation,  think  you,  in  the  hour  of  ficknefs  or 
death,  that  though  you  mull  perifh  everlaftingly, 
you  go  to  hell,  not  as  a  minifter,  but  a  lawyer 
or  a  phyfician  ?  I  do  truly  think,  this  has  been 
a  pillow  of  fecurity  to  many  poor  thoughtlefs 
fouls,  and  that  they  have  actually  rid  themfelves  of 
conviftion,  by  this  miftaken  comfort,  as  if  there 
was  much  merit  in  it,  that  they  would  not  be  mi- 
nifters, becaufe  they  wanted  religion.  Remember 
this,  then,  in  a  fingle  word,  that  there  is  neither 
profeftion  nor  ftation,  from  the  king  on  the  throne 
to  the  beggar  on  the  dunghill,  to  whom  a  concern 
for  eternity  is  not  the  one  thing  needful. 

But,  let  me  juft  take  notice  of  the  great  advan- 
tage of  true  religion  to  one  deftined  for  tbe  work 
of  the  miniftry. 

(i.)  It  gives  a  man  the  knowledge  that  is  of 
moft  fervice  to  a  minifter.  Experimental  know- 
A  a  2 


27^  LECTURES  ON  Lc6i.  I4. 

ledge  is  fuperior  to  all  other,  and  necefTarj  to  the 
perfedion  of  every  other  kind.  It  is  indeed  the 
very  pofTefTion,  or  daily  exercife  of  that  virhich  it  is 
the  bulinefs  of  his  life,  and  the  duty  of  his  office, 
to  explain  and  recommend.  Experimental  know- 
ledge is  the  beft  fort  in  every  branch,  but  it  is  ne- 
ceflary  in  divinity,  becaufe  religion  is  Vvhat  cannot 
be  truly  underftood,  unlefs  it  is  felt. 

(2.)  True  piety  will  direft  a  man  in  the  choice 
of  his  ftudies.  The  objedl  of  human  knowledge  is 
fo  extenfive,  that  nobody  can  go  through  the  whole, 
but  religion  will  dired  the  ftudent  to  what  may  be 
moft  profitable  to  him,  and  will  alfo  ferve  to  turn 
into  its  proper  channel  all  the  knowledge  he  may 
otherwife  acquire. 

(3.)  It  will  be  a  powerful  motive  to  diligence 
in  his  ftudies.  Nothing  fo  forcible  as  that  in  which 
eternity  has  a  part.  The  duty, to  a  good  man  is  fo 
prefling,  and  the  objeft  fo  important,  that  he  will 
fpare  no  pains  to  obtain  fuccefs. 

(4.)  True  religion  will  give  unfpeakable  force 
to  what  a  minifter  fays.  There  is  a  piercing  and 
a  penetrating  heat  in  that  which  flows  from  the 
heart,  which  dlftinguifties  it  both  from  ihe  coldnefs 
of  indifference,  and  the  falfe  fire  of  enthufiafra  and 
vain-glory.  We  fee  that  a  man  truly  pious  ha^ 
often  efteem,  inHuence,  and  fuccefs,  though  his 
pails  may  be  much  inferior  to  others,  who  are 
more  capable,  but  lefs  confcientious.  If,  then, 
piety  makes  even  the  weakeft  venerable,  what 
muft  it  do  when  added  to  the  finell  natural  talents, 
and  the  beft  acquired  endowments  ? 

(^.)  It  adds  to  aminifter's  inftrudion,  the  weight 


Lect.  14.  ELOQJJENCE.  Iff 

of  his  example.  It  is  a  trite  remark,  that  example 
teaches  better  than  precept.  It  is  often  a  more  ef- 
fectual reprimand  to  vice,  and  a  more  inciting  ar- 
gument to  the  pradice  of  virtue,  than  the  bell  of 
reafoning.  Example  is  more  intelligible  than  pre- 
cept. Precepts  are  often  involved  in  obfcuritj,  or 
warped  bj  controverfj  ;  but  a  holy  life  immediately 
reaches,  and  takes  poiTeilion  of  the  heart. 

If  I  have  lengthened  out  this  particular  beyond 
the  proportion  of  the  reft,  I  hope  you  will  forgive 
it  for  its  importance,  and  obferv'e,  as  the  conclu- 
fion  of  the  whole,  that  one  devoted  to  the  ferries 
of  the  gofpel  fliould  be  really^  visibly ,  and  eminently 
holy. 

2.  Another  character  which  fliould  diflingnifii 
pulpit-eloquence,  isfimplicity.  Simplicity  is  beau- 
tiful every  where  ;  it  is  of  importance  that  young 
perfons  Ihould  be  formed  to  a  taile  for  it,  and  more 
difpofed  to  exceed  here  than  in  the  oppofite  ex- 
treme ;  but,  if  I  am  not  miilaken,  it  is  more  beau- 
tiful, and  the  tranfgreilions  of  it  mere  offenfive, 
in  the  pulpit,  than  any  where  elfe.  If  I  heard  a 
lawyer  pleading  in  fuch  a  flyle  and  manner,  as  was 
more  adapted  to  -difplay  his  own  talents,  than  to 
carry  his  client's  caufe,  it  would  con£derably  leilen 
him  in  my  efteem ;  but  if  I  heard  a  miniftcr  aiEling 
the  fame  pan,  I  fhould  not  be  fatisfied  with  con- 
tempt, but  hold  him  in  deteftation. 

There  are  feveral  ob\-ious  reafons  why  Cm- 
plicity  is  more  efpecially  necefiary  to  a  minifter 
than  any  other.  1.  Many  of  his  audience  are  poor- 
ignorant  creatures.  If  he  mean  to  do  them  any 
fervice,  he  muil  keep  to  what  they  ucderlland,  ^d 
Aaj 


2*}%  LECTURES  ON  Lecl.  1 4. 

that  requires  more  iimplicity  than  perfons  without 
experience  can  eafily  imagine.  It  is  remarkable, 
that  at  the  firfl  publication,  it  was  a  chara6ler 
of  the  gofpel,  that  it  was  preached  to  the  poor. 
In  this  our  blefled  Mafter  was  diftinguiihed,  both 
from  the  heathen  philofophers  and  Jewifh  teachers, 
who  confined  their  inflruftions  in  a  great  meafure 
to  their  fchools,  and  imparted  what  thej  elleemed 
their  moft  important  difcoiurfes,  to  only  a  few  cho-- 
fen  difciples.  2.  Simplicity  is  neceffary  to  pre- 
ferve  the  fpeaker's  character  for  fincerity.  You 
heard  before  how  neceffary  piety  is,  which  is  the 
proper  parent  of  fincerity  in  the  pulpit.  Now,  it 
is  not  eafy  to  preferve  the  opinion  of  piety  and  fin- 
cerity in  the  pulpit,  when  there  is  much  ornament. 
Befides  the  danger  of  much  affefted  pomp,  or  fop- 
pery of  ftyle,  a  difcourfe  very  highly  poliilied, 
even  in  the  truell  tafte,  is  apt  to  fuggeft  to 
the  audience,  that  a  man  is  preaching  himfelf, 
and  not  the  crofs  of  Chrifi:.  So  nice  a  matter 
is  this  in  all  public  fpeaking,  that  fome*  cri- 
tics fay,  that  Demofihenes  put  on  purpofe  fome 
errors  in  grammar  in  his  difcourfes,  that  the  hear- 
ers might  be  induced  to  take  them  for  the  im- 
mediate effufions  of  the  heart,  without  art,  and 
with  little  premeditation.  1  doubt  much  the  foli- 
dity  of  this  remark,  or  the  certainty  of  the  facl  ; 
but  however  it  be,  there  is  no  occafion  for  it 
in  the  cafe  of  a  minifter,  becaufe  preparation  and 
premeditation  are  expe«3:ed  from  him  ;  and  in  that 
cafe  he  may  make  his  difcourfes  abundantly  plain 
and  fimple,  without  any  affected  blunders.  3. 
Simplicity  is  alio  neceffary,  as  fuited  to  the  gofpel 


Le6l.  14.  ELOQUENCE.  ^79 

itfelf,  the  fubjecl  of  a  miniiler's  difcourfes.  No- 
thing more  humbling  to  the  pride  of  man,  than  the 
do£lnne  of  the  crofs  ;  nothing  more  imbecoming 
that  doftrine,  than  too  much  finery  of  language. 
The  apoftle  Paul  chofe  to  preach  "  not  with  the 
words  which  man's  wifdom  teacheth  ;"  and  again, 
*^  not  with  excellency  of  fpeech,  or  wifdom  •,'* 
which  though  I  admit  that  it  does  not  condemn 
ftudy  and  found  knowledge,  yet  it  certainly  fnows, 
that  the  ftyle  of  the  pulpit  fhould  be  the  moft  fimplc 
and  felf-denicd  of  any  other. 

3.  Another  qualification  for  a  minifter  is  accu- 
racy, from  the  utmoft  diligence  in  his  important 
work.  I  place  this  imnnediately  after  the  other, 
to  guard  it  againft  abufe  by  excefs.  To  avoid  vain 
affetled  ornaments,  is  a  very  different  thing  from 
negligence  in  preparation.  The  very  fame  apoftle 
who  fpeaks  with  fo  much  contempt  of  human  wif- 
dom, yet  greatly  infifts,  in  writing  to  Timothy 
and  Titus,  on  their  giving  them.felves  to  ftiidy, 
to  exhci-tation,  to  do£lrine,  *'  Meditate  upon  thofe 
things,"  fays  he,  &c. 

Study  and  accuracy,  indeed,  is  neceffary,  that 
a  minifter  may  procure  and  keep  up  the  attention 
of  his  hearers  ;  that  he  may  inform  the  judge- 
ment, as  well  as  convince  the  confcience.  The  an- 
cient fathers  have  generally  infifted  upon  this,  as  of 
much  moment.  And  in  our  own  times,  I  obferve, 
that  it  is  neceffary  to  avoid  ofTending  perfons  of 
finer  tafte,  who  are  too  much  attached  to  the  out^ 
fide  of  things,  and  are  immediately  difgufted  with 
every  error  againft  propriety,  and  are  apt  to  re- 
proach religion  itfelf,  for  the  weak»nefs  or  abfurdi- 


^8o  LECTURES  ON  Lecl.  I4. 

iy  of  thofe  who  fpeak  in  its  behalf.  Let  no  man 
feek  to  avoid  that  reproach  which  may  be  his  lot, 
for  preaching  the  truths  of  the  everlafting  gofpel, 
but  let  him  alwajs  avoid  the  jufl  reproach  of  han- 
dling them  in  a  mean,  flovenly,  and  indecent  man- 
ner. 

4.  Another  quality  of  a  miniiler's  eloquence, 
fhould  be  force  and  vehemence.  I  have  in  fome 
former  parts  of  the  general  fubje£l,  fhown  you  how 
and  when  this  is  to  be  moft  exerted.  The  delign 
of  the  prefent  remark  is  to  let  you  know,  that 
there  is  no  fpeaker  who  has  a  greater  right  to  ex- 
ert himfelf  to  the  utmoft,  or  who  may  properly 
intereft  his  hearers  more,  than  a  minifler  of  the  go- 
fpel. No  fpeaker  has  fubje£ts  or  arguments  more 
proper  for  producing  this  eife£l.  To  coniider  the 
fubjedls  which  a  fpeaker  from  the  pulpit  has  to 
handle,  one  would  think  that  it  mull  be  the  eafiefl 
thing  imaginable  to  fpeak  from  them  in  a  power- 
ful and  interefting  manner.  The  eternal  God— 
the  greatnefs  of  his  works — the  univerfality  of  his 
providence — his  awful  juftice — hisirrefiftible  power 
-^his  infinite  mercy* — and  the  wifdom  of  God  in 
the  my  fiery  of  redeeming  grace — the  condition  of 
faints  and  finners  while  on  earth — and  the  final 
decifion  of  their  eternal  ilate  in  the  day  of  judge- 
ment. The  truth  is,  the  fubjeds  are  fo  very  great 
in  themfelves,  that  it  is  not  poffible  to  equal  them 
by  the  manner  of  handling  them.  Probably  for 
this  very  reafon  many  fall  fiiort.  Difcouragcd  by 
the  immenfity  of  the  theme,  they  fall  below  what 
they  might  have  done  on  fubje6ls  lefs  awful.  This, 
h9wever,  ihews,  with  v.hat  a  holy  ambition  thofc 


Left.   14.  ELOQUENCE.  281 

"who  are  employed  in  the  fervice  of  Chrifl  in  the 
gofpel,  Ihould  endeavour  to  exert  themfelves  in  the 
glorious  caufe.  Provided  they  are  themfejves  in 
eameft,  and  take  truth  and  nature  as  their  guide, 
they  can  fcarcely  exceed  in  zeal  and  ardour  for  the 
glory  of  God  and  the  good  of  precious  fouls. 

5.  Another  excellent  quality  of  pulpit-eloquence 
is,  to  be  under  the  reftra'nt  of  judgement  and  pro- 
priety. I  place  this  afterj^^-the  former,  as  its  coun- 
terpart, and  neceffary  to  give  its  proper  efFe<^« 
And  it  may  be  obferved,  that  as  religious  and  mo- 
ral fubjecls  give  the  fureft  and  the  fulleft  fcope  to 
zeal  and  fervour,  fo  they  need,  as  much  as  any,  the 
ftri(St  government  of  prudence  and  experience.  I 
do  not  mean  only  by  this,  to  guard  minifters  from 
the  irregular  ferv'-ours  of  enthufiafm,  but  to  give,  if 
poffible,  a  degree  of  folidity  and  real  truth  to  their 
inlln^dlions.  They  ought  to  avoid  all  turgid  de- 
clamation, to  keep  to  experience,  and  to  take  things 
as  they  really  are.  Let  fome  people,  for  ex- 
ample, fpeak  of  riches,  and  what  Iball  you  hear 
from  them  ?  Gold  and  filver,  what  are  they,  but 
ihining  drofs,  fparkling  metals,  a  thing  of  no  real 
value  ?  that  in  the  eye  of  reafon  and  philofophy, 
they  are  of  no  extcnfive  ufe,  and  altogether  con- 
temptible. And,  indeed,  to  take  things  in  a  certain 
philofophical  abflra6lion,  they  are  good  for  no- 
thing. Mere  gold  or  filver  you  can  neither  eat 
nor  wear.  Their  value,  yon  will  fay,  depends  all 
upon  opinion,  the  changeable  fancy  of  men.  But 
ihis  manner  of  fpeaking,  and  all  that  is  related  to 
it,  feeming  to  be  phliofophy  and  reafon,  is  really 
abfurdity  and  nonfeufe.      For   though  it  be   true. 


282  LECTURES  ON  Le<El.  I4. 

that  gold,  abflradled  from  the  opinion  of  mankind, 
is  not  a  whit  more  valuable  than  ftones,  and  that  if 
I  was  in  the  midft  of  a  foreft,  furrounded  with 
wild  beafls,  a  whole  bag  full  of  gold  would  do  me 
no  fervice  ;  yet  it  is  as  certain,  that  in  our  prefent 
fituation,  it  is  of  that  real  value  as  to  procure  all 
the  conveniencies  of  life.  The  way,  then,  to  treat 
fuch  fubjeds,  is  not  to  ufe  thefe  rhetorical  phrafes 
in  contempt  of  riches,  but  to  fhow  from  experience, 
that  they  are  good  or  evil,  according  to  the  temper 
of  him  that  ufes  them  ;  and  that  we  fee  difcontent 
and  ungoverned  paffion  find  as  eafy  accefs  to  the 
anti- chamber  of  the  prince,  as  the  cottage  of  the 
poor.  The  fame  thing  I  would  fay  of  fame,  that 
it  is  eafy  to  fay  fame  is  no  more  but  idle  breath, 
&c. ;  but  the  great  matter  is  to  view  thofe  things  in 
a  fober  and  rational  light,  to  give  to  every  outward 
mercy  its  proper  value,  and  only  ftiow  how  much 
they  are  counterbalanced  by  things  of  infinitely 
greater  moment. 

But  what  I  have  often  obferved  with  moft  regret 
upon  this  fubje(5l  is,  young  perfons  carrying  the 
things  that  are  really  true  and  excellent  to  a  cer- 
tain excefs  or  high  pitch,  that  is  beyond  nature, 
and  does  not  tend  in  the  leaft  to  promote  convic- 
tion, but  rather  hinders  it.  When  men  fpeak  of 
virtue  or  true  goodnefs,  they  are  apt  to  raife  the 
defcription  beyond  the  life  in  any  real  inflance  j  and 
when  they  fpeak  of  vice  and  its  confequences,  they 
are  apt  to  draw  the  charader  fo  as  it  will  apply 
only  to  a  few  of  the  moil  defperate  profligates,  and 
the  miferable  ftate  to  which  they  reduce  themfelves. 
This  ratlier  feems  to  fortify  the  generality  of  per- 


Le£l.   14.  ELOQUENCE.  2S3 

fons,  to  whom  thefe  defcriptions  do  not  apply,  in 
their  carelefs  and  fecure  flate. 

Once  more,  I  have  often  obferved  young  per- 
fons  frequently  choofe  as  their  fubje£l  affliftions,  of 
which,  probably,  they  have  had  very  little  expe- 
rience, and  fpeak  in  fuch  a  high  ftyle,  as  if  every 
good  man  were,  as  the  heroes  of  old,  above  the 
reach  of  every  accident.  And  it  is  true,  that  an 
eminent  faint  is  fometimes  made  fuperior  to  all  his 
fufFerings  ;  but,  generally  fpeaking,  we  ought  to  be 
very  tender  of  fufferers,  till  we  ourfelves  have  been 
in  the  furnace  of  aSliclion  ;  and  after  that,  we  fhall 
not  need  be  told  fo.  On  the  whole,  a  ftri£l  adhe- 
rence to  truth  and  nature,  and  taking  the  world 
juft  as  it  is,  will  be  an  excellent  mean  to  dire6l  us 
in  every  part  of  our  public  fervice. 

6.  Laftly,  A  minifter  ought  to  have  extenflve 
knowledge.  Every  thing  whatever,  that  is  the 
obje£b  of  human  knowledge,  may  be  made  fubfer- 
vient  to  theology.  And,  confidering  that  a  mini- 
(iev  is  in  public  life,  and  has  to  do  vnih  friends  and 
enemies  of  all  ranks,  he  ought  to  be  well  furniflied 
with  literature  of  every  kind.  At  the  fame  time, 
I  would  have  this  well  underftood,  it  is  not  necef- 
fary,  and  I  think  it  is  not  defirable,  that  a  mini- 
fter ftiould  be  quite  an  adept  in  particular  branches 
of  knowledge,  except  thofe  that  are  clofely  related 
to  his  proper  work.  The  reafon  of  this  is,  it  takes 
more  time  to  be  a  perfeft  mafter  of  fome  of  the 
particular  fciences,  than  he  has  to  fpare  from  his 
duty,  and  therefore  with  a  tafte  of  the  feveral 
fciences,  general  knowledge  is  mofl  fuited  to  his 
circumftances,  and  moll  neceiTary  to  his  ufefulnefs. 


ft84  LECTURES  ON  Le(5l.  15. 


LECTURE  XV. 

1  Proceed  now  to  the  eloquence  of  the  bar. 
The  profefTion  of  the  law  is  of  great  import- 
ance in  the  Britiih  dominions.  There  is,  therefore, 
great  room  for  this  fort  of  eloquence.  This,  in- 
<3eed,  may  be  faid  to  be  the  country  of  law,  not 
only  on  account  of  its  being  a  free  ftate,  the  cha- 
racter of  which  is,  that  not  man,  but  the  laws, 
have  dominion,  which  is  our  glory,  but  becaufe,  by 
the  great  multiplicity  of  our  ftatutes,  it  becomes  an 
important  and  difficult  fcience.  For  both  thefe 
reafons,  there  are  great  hopes  propofed  to  perfons  of 
ability  in  this  department.  They  have  not  only 
the  reafonable  profpe6l,  if  of  tolerable  abilities, 
with  diligence,  to  provide  an  honourable  fubiiftence 
to  themfelves,  but  it  is  the  diredb  road  to  promo- 
tion, and  the  way  of  obtaining  the  higheft  offices  in 
the  ftate. 

Here,  as  in  the  former  particular,  we  muft  con- 
fider  every  thing  as  already  faid,  that  belongs  to 
the  fubje£l  in  general ;  and,  indeed,  by  far  the 
greateft  number  of  valuable  books  on  the  fubje6i  of 
eloquence  having  been  drawn  up  by  pleaders  at  the 
bar,  they  muft  be  at  leaft  as  much,  or  perhaps  more 
direftly  applicable  to  this  fpecies  than  any  other.  I 
cannot  help,  however,  taking  notice  of  a  prepofte- 
rous  praftice  in  this  country,  of  fome  who  take 
their  children  from  literature,  before  they  have  fi- 
niftied  their  courfe,  becaufe  they  intend  to  put  them 
to  the  law.  This  muft  be  voluntarily  confining 
them  to  the  very  loweft  fort  of  pradlice  in  that  pro- 


Lecl.  15.  ELOQUENCE.  I85 

feffion,  for  if  any  whatever  ftand  in  need  of  litera- 
ture, it  muft  be  the  lawyers.  Suppofing,  there- 
fore, all  that  has  been  faid  of  compofition,  and 
fpeaking  in  general,  there  are  a  few  particular 
charafters  of  moft  importance  in  men  of  that  clafs. 
I.  Probity,  or  real  untainted  integrity.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  integrity  is  the  firfl  and  moll 
important  character  of  a  man,  be  his  profeHion 
what  it  will ;  but  I  have  mentioned  it  here  becaufe 
tnere  are  many  not  fo  fenlible  of  the  importance  of 
it  in  the  profeflion  of  the  law,  and  think  it  is  ne- 
ceflary  to  make  a  good  man,  but  not  a  good  law- 
yer. On  the  contrary,  I  am  perfuaded,  not  only 
that  a  man  lofes  nothing  in  any  capacity  by  his 
integrity,  but  that  a  lawyer  fhould  in  general  ftudy, 
by  probity  and  real  worth,  to  obtain  refpedl  from 
the  public,  and  to  give  weight  to  every  thing  he 
fays.  This  integrity  fhould  fhow  itfelf  in  under- 
taking caufes.  There  are  many  that  think  there  is 
no  ground  of  fcruple  in  this  refpe6V,  and  fometimes 
they  are  found  to  boaft  w^ith  what  addrefs  they  con- 
duced, and  with  what  fuccefs  they  carried  through^ 
a  very  weak  caufe.  I  apprehend  this  is  truly  dif- 
honourable  ;  and  as  there  are  plenty  of  caufes  la 
which  the  equity  is  doubtful,  every  one  who  lliould 
make  it  a  point  of  honour  not  to  undertake  a  caufe 
which  they  knew  not  to  be  juft,  it  would  give  un- 
fpeakable  influence  to  hijs  management  and  plead- 
ings. The  fame  probity  fhould  appear  in  the 
manner  of  conducing  caufes  ; — no  fmifler  arts,  no 
equivocation  or  concealment  of  the  truth.  Perhaps^ 
fome  may  think  that  thofe  who  fliould  be  confcience- 
Vol.  VII.  B  b 


2S6  LECTURES  ON  Le^l.  75. 

bound  in  this  manfter,  would  give  roguifti  perfons 
an  evident  advantage  over  them  ;  but  it  is  a  great 
miftake.  Let  them  ufe  but  prudence  and  firmnefs, 
joined  with  integrity,  and  they  are  an  over-match 
for  all  the  villains  upon  earth.  The  common  pro- 
verb is  certainly  juft,  '*  Honefty  is  the  befl  policy." 
The  arts  of  chicanery  can  only  fucceed  once  or 
twice.  As  foon  as  a  man  gets  the  reputation  of 
cimning,  its  effed  is  over,  for  nobody  will  truft  him, 
and  every  body  counter-works  him. 

2.  Another  excellent  quality  for  a  lawyer,  is  af- 
fiduity  and  method  in  bufinefs.  This  is  of  great 
advantage  to  the  very  befl  genius.  I  the  rather  in- 
fift  upon  it,  that  there  prevails  often  a  fuppofition 
that  it  is  not  the  quality  of  a  great  man.  Becaufe 
there  are  fome  perfons  of  very  middling  abilities, 
who  give  great  application,  and  are  lovers  of  or- 
der, therefore  fome  are  pleafed  to  call  thofe  dull 
plodding  fellows,  and  think  it  is  a  mark  of  fire  and 
vivacity  to  be  irregular  both  in  their  bufinefs  and  in 
their  lives.  There  are  alfo  fome  few  men  of  real 
and  great  capacity,  who  are  negligent,  and  even 
loofe  in  their  pradice,  who  rife  by  the  mere  force 
of  fingular  parts.  .  Thefe  are  an  unhappy  example 
to  thofe  fuperficial  creatures,  wlio  think,  by  imi- 
tating them  in  their  folly,  that  they  will  become 
as  great  geniafes  as  they.  But  fiiifer  me  to  obferve 
to  you,  that  the  greatefl  geniufes  here  have  been 
remarkable  for  the  mofl  vigorous  application  ;  and 
the  greatefl  men  have  been,  and  are,  remarkable 
for  order  and  method  in  every  thing  they  do. 
There  is  a  certain  dignity  which  arifes  from  a 
aaan's  word  being  facred,  even  in  keeping  an  ap- 


Le£l.  15.  ELOQUENCE.  ^87 

polntment,  or  the  mofl  trilling  circumftance  ;  and 
for  people  of  bafuiefs,  order  and  puncluality  gives 
fo  much  eafe  to  therafelves,  and  pleafure  to  all 
who  have  to  do  with  them,  that  it  is  a  wonder 
there  ftiould  be  any  body  that  does  not  fludy  it.  Is 
there  any  genius,  think  you,  in  throwing  down  a 
thing  fo  unthinkingly,  that  you  do  not  know  how 
to  take  it  up  again  ?  The  great  Archbiihop  of  Cam- 
bray  looks  upon  it  as  one  of  the  mod  important 
things  to  teach  young  perfons  to  put  every  thing  in 
its  proper  place.  As  every  thing  that  belongs  to 
furniture,  drefs,  books,  and  implements,  mufl'  be 
in  fome  place,  they  are  always  bed  difpofed  whea 
each  is  in  its  own  place.  They  will  give  leall  dif- 
turbance  there  when  ihey  are  not  ufed,  and  they 
will  be  moil  readily  found  when  they  ought  to  be 
ufed. 

But  when  we  come  to  loofe  and  vicious  pr api- 
ces, it  is  truly  entertaining  to  meet  with  riotous  dif- 
orderly  fellows,  who  are  pleafed  to  fpeak  with 
contempt  of  thofe  who  love  form  and  good  order, 
as  if  they  themfelves  were  men  of  great  acutenefs. 
Now,  I  almoft  never  knew  an  example  of  your 
mifchief-workers,  but  they  were  thick  fculls.  I 
have  known  fome,  who  could  neither  write  a  jefl 
nor  fpeak  a  jell  in  all  their  life,  but  had  tricks  e- 
ncugh  they  could  play,  to  difturb  a  fober  neigh- 
bourhood. I  have  thus  been  led  back  to  the  irre- 
gularities of  youth,  from  fpeaking  of  method  in 
bufinefs,  as  of  importance  to  lawyers.  I  fl:all 
conclude  the  obfervation  with  faying,  that  there  is 
no  great  prcfpecl  of  a  man's  ever  being  Lord  Chan- 
cellor, who  fpends  his  time  in  fcouring  the  flreets^ 
Bb  2 


2S8  LECTURES  ON  Le^.  T5. 

and  beating  the  watch,  when  he   is  at  the  inns  of 
court. 

3.  Another  quality  ufeful  to  a  law3^er  is,  addrefs, 
and  delicacy  in  his  manners  and  deportment  in  ge- 
neral, and  the  conduct  of  his  bulinefs  in  particular, 
and  above  all  in  pleading  and  public  fpeaking. 
The  addrefs  and  delicacy  I  mean,  are  fuch  as  are 
acquired  by  the  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and 
fome  acquaintance  with  human  life.  They  are 
ufeful,  I  admit,  for  every  public  fpeaker ;  but,  if 
I  am  not  miftaken,  much  more  needful  to  the  law- 
yer than  the  clergyman.  The  clergyman  pro- 
ceeds upon  things  of  acknowledged  moment,  a 
certain  dignity  of  charafler  is  allowed  him,  and 
expelled  from  him.  A  pretended  delicacy  is 
-fometimes  oifeniive  in  him.  A  certain  firmnefs, 
not  to  call  it  boldnefs,  and  impartiality  in  admi- 
niftering  in{tru6lion  and  reproof,  are  ornaments  in 
him.  But  a  lawyer  mufl  always  confider  the  pro- 
priety of  time  and  place  ;  what  belongs  to  him 
lliat  fpeaks,  or  to  him  or  them  that  are  fpoken  to, 
or  that  are  fpoken  of.  There  are  fome  fine  ex- 
amples of  addrefs  and  delicacy  in  Cicero,  particu- 
larly in  his  orations  pro  Roscio,  pro  Mi/one,  et  de 
lege  agraria. 

4.  A  fourth  quality  neccffary  for  a  lawyer  is, 
cxtenfive  knowledge  in  the  arts  and  fciences,  in 
hiftory,  and  in  the  laws.  A  perfon  that  means  to 
rife,  or  attain  to  fome  of  the  liigheft  degrees  of 
"this  prcfellion,  mull  ftrive  to  accomplifli  himfelf  by 
knowledge  in  the  arts  and  fciences.  His  bulinefs 
is  of  a  pul)lic  kind,  the  caufes  he  may  have  occa- 
fioii  to  treat  are  exceedingly  various.     What  ad- 


Lcift.  15.  ELO<lUENCf.  289 

verfaries  be  may  meet  with,  he  is  altogether  un- 
certain. I  do  not  mean  that  a  lawyer  need  to  be 
an  adept  in  particular  branches  of  fcience,  but  the 
principles  of  knowledge  in  general  are  very  necef- 
fary,  otherwife  he  will  frequently  expofe  himfelf. 
Grofs  ignorance  in  the  fciences  will  lay  him  open 
to  blunders  in  language,  which  he  could  not  other- 
wife  avoid.  Hiftory  alfo  is  a  branch  of  literature 
that  a  lawyer  fliould  make  his  favourite  fludy  ;  as 
his  bufmefs  lies  in  canvafling  the  various  relations 
of  men  in  fecial  life,  he  will  be  befl  able  to  reafon 
on  the  meaning  and  propriety  of  laws,  and  their 
application,  if  he  be  well  acquainted  with  hiftory^ 
which  points  out  the  ftate  of  fociety,  and  human 
aftairs  in  every  age.  As  to  knowledge  of  the 
laws,  this  is  what  lawyers  cannot  do  without,  and 
what  therefore  they  do  necelTarily  (iudy  ;  but  it 
would  be  much  to  their  advantage,  if  they  would 
add  to  the  knowledge  of  the  municipal  laws  of 
their  own  country,  a  knowledge  of  the  great  prin-. 
ciples  of  equity,  and  of  natural  and  political  laWj 
as  applied  in  general. 

3.  The  lail  quality  I  fhali  mention  as  of  ufe  ta 
a  lawyer,  is,  quicknefs  and  vivacity.  It  is  of  ufe 
to  him  to  have  an  acutenefs  and  penetration  to  ob- 
ferve  the  turns  of  a  caufe.  To  deted  tlie  plots  and 
fallacy  of  adverfaries,  as  well  as  to  aiifwer  upoa 
the  fpot,  whatever  may  be  throvvn  up.  I  am  fen- 
fible  that  this  of  quicknefs  is  entirely  a  natural 
quality,  and  cannot  be  learned  ;  but  I  thought  k 
befh  to  obferve  it,  becaufe  it  is  of  more  ufe  to  a 
iawyer  than  to  moft  other  men.  A  minifter  is  on* 
•B  b  3 


^^0  LECTURES  ON  Le6l.  15. 

I7  called  to  fpeak  what  he  has  deliberately  prepa- 
red, and  fullj  digefted  ;  but  a  lawyer  quite  in- 
capable of  extemporary  produftioiis,  would  not  do 
fo  well.  It  is  alfo  certain,  that  wit,  which  is  in- 
tolerable in  the  pulpit,  is  often  not  barely  pardon- 
able in  a  lawyer,  but  very  ufeful.  There  is,  how- 
ever, fuch  a  difference  in  the  capacity  of  men, 
that  one  may  be  eminent  in  one  branch,  and  de- 
fective in  another.  A  man  of  coolnefs,  penetra- 
tion, and  application,  is  often  eminent  in  chamber- 
councils;  and  one  of  vivacity,  paffion,  and  elocu- 
tion, eminent  in  pleading  caufes,  efpecially  in  crimi- 
nal courts. 

The  third  and  laft  diviilon  of  this  clafs,  is  the 
eloq.uence  of  promifcuous  deliberative  aflemblies. 
1  fliall  not  be  very  long  upon  this  fubje£l,  but  as  it 
is  far  from  being  improbable  that  fome  here  pre- 
fent  may  in  future  life  have  occalion  to  a£l  in  that 
fphere,  and  to  be  members  of  the  provincial  alTem- 
blies,  I  Ihall  make  a  few  remarks  upon  it  to  that 
purpofe.  In  large  deliberative  aflemblies  of  the 
political  kind,  there  is  nearly  as  much  opportunity 
for  fervour  and  paffion,  as  there  is  to  the  divine,  and 
more  fcope  for  wit  and  humour  than  to  the  lawyer. 
For  though  no  matters  of  a  merely  temporal  kind, 
are  of  equal  moment  in  themfelves  with  the  things 
a  minifler  has  to  treat  of,  yet  men's  paffions  are 
almoft  as  much,  and  in  many  cafes  more,  excited 
and  interefted  by  them.  The  fate  of  nations,  the 
welfare  of  our  country,  liberty,  or  fervitude,  may 
often  feem  to  want  as  violent  an  exertion  of  the 
paflionate  kiiid  of  eloquence,  as  any  fubje^  wliaU 
ever. 


Le£l.  15.  ILOQJJENCE,  29? 

It  is  worth  while  to  obferv^e,  that  Icveral  writers, 
in  fpeaking  of  the  ancient  and  modern  eloquence, 
have  taken  it  for  granted,  that  the  circumdances  of 
things  are  changed  ;  that  the  violent  pailionate  elo- 
quence that  prevailed  in  Greece  and  Rome,  would 
not  do  in  modern  times.     They  will  tell  you,  that 
in  a  modern  fenate,  or  other  deliberative  alTembly, 
people  come  all  prepared  by  private  intereft,  and 
will  vo*e  jull  as  they  are  engaged,  without  regard 
to  either  eloquence  or  truth  -,  but  fome  very  able 
writers  have  delivered  a  contrary  qpinion,  particu- 
larly David  Hume,  who,  though  an  iniidel  in  opi- 
nion, is  of  great  reach  and  accuracy  of  judgement  in 
matters  of  criticifm.     He  has  faid,  that  human  na- 
ture is   always   the   fame,   and   that  the  eloquence 
which  kindles  and  governs  ihe  paflions  will  always 
have  great  influence  in  large  aifemblies,  let  them 
be  of  what  ilation  or  rank  foever.     I  apprehend, 
that  experience,  fince  his  writing  the  above,  has 
fully  juflified  it  by  two  fignal  examples ;  one  in 
the  flate,   and  the  other  in  the   church.     Mr  Pitt, 
now  Earl  of  Chatham,  from  being   a  colonel  of 
dragoons,  rofe  to  the  higheft  flation  in  the  Britifh 
Empire,  merely  by  the  power  of  a  warm  and  paf. 
(ionate   eloquence.     There  was  never  any  thing  in 
his  difcourfes  that  was  remarkable,  either  for  flreno-th 
of  reafoning,  or  purity  and  elegance  of  ftyle  ;  but 
a  very  great  impetuofity  and  fire,  that  carried  his 
point  in  the  Eritilh  Houfe  of  Commons.    The  other 
inllance  is  the  late   Mr  Whitfield,  who  acquired 
and  preferved  a  degree  of  popularity,  to  which  the 
prefent  age  never  faw  any  thing  that  could  be  com- 
jpared,  The  happy  ends  that  were  promoted  by  this 


a9*  LECTURES  oir  Left.  15. 

in  providence,  I  omit,  as  a.  fabjea  of  a  different 
nature  ;  but  the  immediate  and  fecond  caufes  that 
produced  it  were  a  power  of  elocution,  and  natural 
talents  for  public  fpeaking,  fuperior  bj  far  to  any 
that  ever  I  faw  polTeired  by  any  man  on  earth. 

To  fucceed  in  fpeaking  in  public  deliberative 
affemblies,  the  following  are  the  moft  important 
qualities. 

1.  Dignity  of  charader  and  difmtereftednefs.  In 
public  deliberations,  it  is  not  eafy  to  procure  atten- 
tion, unlefs  there  is  fome  degree  of  character  pre- 
ferved  ;  and  indeed,  wherever  there  is  a  high  opi- 
nion of  the  candour  and  Sincerity  of  the  fpeaker,  it 
wiU.  give  an  inconceivable  weight  to  his  fentiments 
in  debate. 

2 .  There  is  a  necefTity  of  knowledge  of  the  moft 
liberal  kind,  that  is,  the  knowledge  of  men  and 
manners,  of  hiftory,  and  of  human  nature.  The 
moil  fuccefsful  fpeakers  in  fenates,  are  generally 
thofe  who  know  mankind  beft ;  and  if  a  man 
would  uniformly  preferve  his  chara6ler  and  influence 
in  this  light,  he  muft  addict  himfelf  to  the  ftudy  o£ 
hiftorv,  and  the  exercife  of  refleftion. 

.  3.  To  this  fort  of  eloquence  is  particularly  necef- 
fary,  a  power  over  the  paffions.  This  is  one  of 
the  moft  important  charadlers  of  eloquence  in  gene- 
ral ;  yet  it  is  more  peculiarly  neceflary,  and  more 
eminently  powerful,  in  promifcuous  deliberative 
affemblies,  than  in  any  other.  In  religious  dif- 
courfes,  the  eft*e6l  is  expefted  to  be  cool,  deep,  and 
permanent.  Even  preachers  in  fingle  difcourfes, 
rather  choofe  to  fpeak  as  writers,  than  as  pleaders; 
and  lawyers,  except  in  fome  few  inaances;  may 


Le£l.  15.  ELOQUENCE.  295 

expect  to  have  their  aflertions  taken  to  pieces,  can- 
vaiTed  and  tried  one  after  another ;  but  in  meetings 
of  the  political  kind,  the  decilion  is  to  be.  by  a  vote, 
before  the  dillblution  of  the  aflembly,  and  cannot 
be  altered  afterwards  though  the  majority  fiiould 
change  their  fentiments.  In  thefe  alTemblies,  there- 
fore, to  be  fure,  a  power  over  the  pafTions  mull  b« 
of  the  utmoft  moment. 

I  ihall  conclude  this  particular  by  two  fubordi- 
nate  remarks  on  the  fame  fubjecl.  i.  That  to 
fucceed  in  fpeaking  in  fenates  or  large  affemblies, 
there  is  much  need  of  great  difcernment,  both  to 
proportionate  men's  attempts  to  their  capacity,  and 
to  choofe  the  proper  time  for  exerting  it.  When 
information  is  demanded,  any  perfon  who  can  give 
it  will  be  heard  with  patience  upon  it:  but  on  fub- 
jeds  of  high  political  importance,  where  there  are 
many  eminent  champions  on  each  fide,  even  perfons 
of  moderate  abilities  would  run  a  rifk  of  being 
affronted.  2.  The  other  direction  is,  that  all 
who  intend  to  be  fpeakers  in  political  affemblies, 
muft  begin  early.  If  they  delay  beginning  till 
years  ftiall  add  maturity  to  their  judgement,  and 
weight  to  their  authority,  the  confequence  will  be, 
that  years  will  add  fo  much  to  their  caution  and 
diffidence,  that  they  will  never  begin  at  all. 

We  come  now  to  confider  the  ff  ruclure  of  a  par- 
ticular difcourfe — the  order,  proportion,  and  mutual 
relation  of  the  feveral  parts.  ^  Orators,  or  critics  on 
oratory,  very  early  learned  to  analyfe  a  difcourfe, 
and  to  enumerate  the  parts  of  which  it  is  compofed. 
They  are  a  little  difftrently  flated  by  different  au- 
thors j  fome  reckon  four — iiitroducVicn,  propoliuon, 


^94  LECTURES  ON  Left.  1 5. 

confirmation,  and  conclufion  ;  others,  five,  adding 
tiarrp.tion  ;  others,  fix,  adding  refutation ;  and  there 
are  fome  difcourfes  in  which  you  may  eafily  have 
each  of  thefe  different  thi-.-gs  ;  but  confidering  that 
we  muft  take  this  matter  fo  generally,  as  to  include 
till  kinds  of  compofition,  it  would  be,  1  think,  as 
well  to  adopt  the  divifion  in  poetical  criticifm,  and 
fay,  that  every  regular  difcourfe,  or  compofition  of 
every  kind,  muft  have  a  beginning,  a  middle,  and 
tin  end.  Every  performance,  however  ftiort,  muil 
be  capable  of  fome  fuch  divifion,  otherwife  it  is 
called  abrupt  and  irregular.  The  reafon  why  I 
would  make  the  divifion  in  this  manner  is,  that  the 
beginning  is  properly  the  introdudion  ;  the  middle 
includes  every  thing,  however  various,  that  is  taken 
into  the  body  of  a  difcourfe ;  now,  thefe  may  be  very 
many,  propofition,  narration,  explication,  confirma- 
tion, illuftration,  and  refutation  ;  but  thefe  are  not 
all  requifite  in  every  difcourfe,  and  are  to  be  intro- 
duced in  propofitions  variable  and  accidental,  ac- 
cording to  the  nature  of  every  particular  fubjecl. 

Let  us  fpeak  firil:  of  the  introdudlion. — This  is 
the  more  neceffary,  that  it  is  of  very  confidcrable 
importance,  efpecially  to  an  orator ;  it  is  alfo  diffi- 
cult, at  leaft  fpeakers  have  generally  faid  fo.  We 
find  it  faid  in  fome  of  the  books  of  oratory,  that  the 
introdudlion,  though  firft  pronounced,  ought  to  be 
laft  compofed. — that  it  comes  to  be  confidered  after 
the -difcourfe  isfinillied  ;  but  this  does  not  appear  to 
me  to  be  either  natural  or  necelTary,  except  in  a 
qualifiedfenfe;  the  introdudion  is  commonly  fettled 
after  the  fubjed  is  pitched  upon,  the  diitributiou 


Left.  15.  ELOQUENCE.  295 

planned  and  digefted,  and  luch  reflexion  upon  the 
whole  as  precedes  writing. 

The  ends  in  an  introdu£lion,  are  faid  by  Cicero 
to  be  thefe,  Redder  e  auditor  em  attentum,  benevolum  et 
docilem  ; — to  make  the  reader  attentive  to  the  dif- 
courfe,  favourable  to  the  fpeaker,  and  willing  to 
receive  inftruftion  upon  the  fubject.  Thefe  differ- 
ent views  may  not  only  be  altered  in  their  order,  at 
the  judgement  of  the  orator,  but  any  of  them  may 
be  left  out  when  it  is  unneceffary ;  if,  for  example, 
I  have  no  reafon  to  fufpefl  difaffe£lion  in  any  of  my 
hearers,  long  apologies,  efpecially  if  any  way  perfo- 
nal,  are  raiher  difgufting. 

The  ways  of  procuring  either  attention,  a  favour, 
or  making  the  hearers  teachable,  are  fo  various^ 
that  "they  can  neither  be  enumerated  nor  claffed. 
In  this  the  orator  muft  exercife  his  invention,  judge** 
ment,  and  good  tafte.  The  mofl  ufual  mamier  of 
introduction,  is  a  common  place  upon  the  import- 
ance of  the  fubjed  ;  the  introduftions  drawn  from 
the  circumftances  of  time,  place,  and  perfon,  are 
generally  the  moft  ftriking  ;  fometimes  an  unufual 
ftroke  is  happy  in  an  introduftion,  as  alfo  a  weighty 
reflexion  or  bold  fentiment  on  the  fabjeft  itfelf. 
A  funeral  fermon  was  happily  begun  by  Mr  Bax- 
ter, in  this  manner  :  **  Death  is  the  occafion  of  our 
prefent  meeting,  and  death  {hall  be  the  fubjeft  of 
the  following  difcourfe;  I  am  to  fpeak  of  that 
which  fliail  fhortly  filence  me,  and  you  are  to  hear 
of  that  which  fhall  fpeedily  flop  your  ears."  Dr 
Evans  begins  a  fermon  on  Ecclef.  xii.  10.  "  Re- 
joice, O  young  man  I"  &:c,  by  telling  a  ftory  of  a 
Ibldier  whofe  lijfe  was  faved  by  a  Bible  in  his  pocke^ 


1^6  LECTURES  ON  Led.  1$. 

and  his  converfion  produced  by  the  accident ;  the 
Bible  faved  him  from  being  (hot  through  with  a 
bullet,  and,  when  he  examined,  it  had  juft  pierced 
the  leaves  through,  till  it  Hopped  at  that  paflage, 
which  no  doubt  he  read  with  particular  emotions. 
A  difcourfe  of  a  lawyer  in  a  law-fuit,  is  generally 
befl  begun  by  a  narrative  of  the  occafion  of  the 
quarrel,  and  the  introducing  of  any  common -place 
topics  would  be  reckoned  afFeftation.  A  clergy- 
man may  often  have  an  introduclion  to  his  fubje£l 
with  advantage,  and  may  alfo  often  begin  by  a 
concife  view  of  the  context,  or  the  occafion  of  the 
words  lie  has  chofen  to  difcourfe  upon. 

Perhaps  what  will  be  of  mofl  ufe  here,  will  be  to 
point  out  feveral  ways  by  which  an  introdu6lion 
may  be  faulty  :  of  thefe  I  Ihall  mention. the  follow- 
ing. 

I.  An  introduftion  may  be  faulty,  by  being  too 
pompous  and  extravagant.  This  is  one  of  the  mofl 
common  faults  in  the  prefaces  or  introdu6lions  to 
books.  When  an  author  is  to  write  upon  any  fub- 
je£t,  he  thinks  it  necelTary  to  Ihow,  not  only  that 
his  fubjed  is  worth  the  handling,  but  that  it  is  better 
than  all  gther  fubjeds.  Weak  and  pedantic  writers 
are  often  guilty  of  this  to  a  degree  that  is  ridiculous. 
A  treatife  on  arithmetic,  fometimes  is  introduced 
by  a  pompous  proof  that  the  knowledge  of  numbers 
is  either  fuperior  to,  or  the  bafis  of  all  other  know- 
ledge ;  the  fame  thing  is  done  with  grammar  ;  and 
there  is  often  a  general  truth  or  plaufibility  from 
which  the  ridicule  to  which  they  expofe  themfelves 
takes  its  rife ;  for,  to  be  fure,  number  is  everywhere ; 
every  thing  that  ever  was  or  can  be^  mufl  be  either 


Le^.  15.  ELOQUENCE.  I97 

one  or  more.  As  to  grammar,  all  good  fenfe  mufl 
certainly  be  grammar  ;  vet  there  are  fometimes 
perfons  who  would  be  thought  to  underfland  both, 
thefe  fubjecls  very  well,  who  could  not  fpeak  five 
fentences,  or  write  a  letter,  without  being  defervedly 
laughed  at. 

2.  An  introdu£tion  may  be  faulty,  by  being  ge- 
neral. We  fee  often  refledions  in  the  introductioa 
to  a  diicourfe,  that  would  be  juft  as  proper  for  one 
fubjedb  as  for  another.  Such  fentimcnts  may  be 
faid  to  go  before,  but  they  cannot  be  faid  to  intro- 
duce their  fubjed.  Sometimes  you  will  hear  the 
introdudion  almoll  out,  before  you  can  conjedure 
w^hat  is  to  be  the  fubjed  ;  and  fome  are  fo  unhappy 
in  the  choice  of  introdudory  fentiments,  that  you 
would  think  they  intend  fomething  that  is  very 
different  from  what  really  appears  in  the  piece  itfelf. 

3.  It  is  a  fault  in  an  introdudion,  to  be  filled  with 
remarks  quite  beaten  and  hackneyed,  if  I  mav  fpeak 
fo.  Thefe  may  have  been  very  good  remarks  or 
fentiments  when  firit  conceived  and  uttered,  but  by 
perpetual  repetition  have  loft  their  force,  and  fron\ 
the  very  commonnefs  appear  mean  and  defpicable. 
They  are  many  of  them  founded  upon  fayings  in 
the  claflic  authors,  and  in  the  paft  age  were  com- 
monly produced  as  quotations,  with  tlijir  paraphrafe, 
fuch  as,  "  Omne  tulit punctum  qui  miscuit  utile  dulciJ'^ 
'*  Ingratum  si  dixeris^  omnia  dixeris,^"* 

4.  An  introdudion  may  be  forced  and  unnatural ; 
that  is  to  fay,  fuch  rem.arks  may  be  made,  as  it  re- 
quires a  great  deal  of  pains  to  ihow  any  relation 
between  them  and  the  fubjed  to  be  treated. 

Vol,  VII.  C  c 


298  LECTURES  ON  Le£l.   1 5. 

5.  It  may  be  fanciful  or  whimfical.  There  was 
an  age  when  thefe  fort  of  introdudions  were  to  the 
tafte  of  the  public.  This  fancy  or  whim,  or,  as  I 
may  call  it,  a  finical  way  of  entering  upon  a  fubje6t 
publicly,  may  be  bed  illuftrated  by  an  example. 
An  author  of  the  lafl  age  begins  a  difcourfe  upon 
ch.  viii.  of  the  Epillle  to  the  Romans,  v.  28.  to  this 
purpofe  :  "  The  fcriptures  may  be  confidered  as  a 
large  and  rich  garden. — The  New  Teftament  is 
the  moft  valuable  divifion  of  that  garden. — The 
Epiftle  to  the  Romans  is  the  richeft  compartment  of 
that  diviiion  ;  the  8th  chapter  is  the  moft  delightful 
border  of  that  compartment,  and  the  28th  verfe  the 
fineft  flower  of  that  border." 

6.  An  introdu61ion  may  be  faulty  by  being 
tedious.  An  introduftion  is  deligned  to  whet  the 
attention,  and  excite  impatience  for  what  is  to  fol- 
low. But  when  it  is  very  long,  it  not  only  difgufts 
by  the  difappointment,  but  waftes  that  attention 
which  fliould  be  prefer\'ed  in  full  vigour,  or  raifes  a 
high  expectation,  which  is  probably  for  that  reafon 
difappointed. 

As  to  the  middle  or  body  of  a  difcourfe,  the  chief 
thing  to  be  attended  to  in  this  place  is,  to  make 
you  fenfible  of  what  it  confifts.  The  former  dif- 
courfes  have  all  been  intended  to  teach  you  the 
way  of  compofition,  both  as  to  materials  and  ftruc- 
ture  ;  yet  as  to  the  method  of  conducting  a  particu- 
lar difcourfe^  I  would  make  the  three  following  re- 
marks : 

(1.)  Be  careful  of  the  order  of  the  feveral  parti- 
culars mentioned.  You  may  not  fee  it  proper  to 
introduce  all  in  the  compafs  of  a  fingle  difcourfe, 
but  fo  far  as  they  are  introduced,  they  iliould  be  in 


Le«fl.  15.  ELOQUENCE.  299 

the  following  order :  Propolition,  narration,  illuftra- 
tion,  confirmation,  refutation.  You  will  fpeedil/ 
perceive  this  to  be  the  order  of  nature,  to  lay  down 
the  method,  narrate  the  facls,  illuftrate  them  by 
whatever  may  have  that  effect,  adduce  the  proofs, 
refolve  objeftions.  A  perfon  of  a  clear  head  will 
range  his  fentiments  in  this  order  ;  yet  there  are 
fome  exceptions  to  be  admitted.  Sometimes  it  is 
ufeful  in  a  caufe  to  referve  a  part  of  the  llory  itfelf, 
to  apply  or  illuftrate  an  argument  ;  and  in  fome  few 
inftances  it  is  beft  to  anfwer  objeclions,  or  remove 
prejudices,  before  you  adduce  your  proofs. 

(2.)  It  is  a  moft  ufeful  diredion  to  the  greatefl 
part  of  writers  and  fpealiers,  to  guard  againil  in- 
troducing every  thing  that  they  might  fay,  or  being 
fo  formal  that  they  will  fay  fomething  in  the  way 
of  form  in  every  one  of  their  divifions.  This  ana- 
lyfis  of  a  difcourfe  is  good  for  making  the  judgement 
clear  ;  but  if  it  be  applied  merely  to  make  the  in- 
vention copious,  it  will  probably  produce  an  unne- 
cefTary  load.  Some  people  will  needs  anfwer  ob- 
jec"lions  on  any  fubjeft,  and  frequently  teach  their 
hearers  to  make  objeftioas  which  they  never  would 
have  thought  of. 

(3.)  Learn  to  keep  clofe  to  a  fubjeft,  and  bring 
in  nothing  but  what  is  truly  of  force  to  the  point  to 
be  proved.  I  the  rather  mention  this  as  a  rule  for 
the  middle  or  body  of  a  difcourfe,  bccaufe  the  mofl 
are  there  apt  to  tranfgrefs  it.  In  the  introdudioa 
a^.d  the  conclafion,  every  one  but  thofe  who  are 
perfedly  ftupid  keep  their  fubject  direilly  in  their 
eye ;  whereas  in  the  body,  when  they  are  entered 
C  c  a 


300  LECTURES  ON  Left.  I5. 

Upon  argument  and  amplification,  they  are  apt  td 
be  led  aftray,  and  either  to  fall  into  what  may  be 
called  abfolute  digreflions,  or  at  leaft  to  lengthen 
fome  parts  more  than  true  proportion  requires.  ' 
As  to  the  conclufion  or  peroration,  to  this  may  be 
applied  particularly  all  that  was  faid  upon  pathos, 
or  raifing  the  paffions,  to  which  1  add  the  following 
ihort  obfer  vat  ions  : 

1.  The  conclufion  Ihould  be  by  far  the  warmed 
and  mofl  animated  part  of  the  difcourfe.  It  is  not, 
I  think,  defirable  to  attempt  to  raife  the  paffions  of 
an  audience  high,  till  towards  the  clofe  of  a  dif- 
courfe, becaufe,  if  it  be  begun  fooner,  there  is  an 
evident  hazard  of  not  being  able  to  preferve  them 
in  the  fame  pitch  till  the  end. 

2.  The  conclufion  fhould  colle£t  into  one  point 
of  view,  byfome  well-chofen  expreilions,  the  force 
of  what  has  gone  before  ;  and  the  greateft  fkill  in 
the  fpeaker  is  ftiown  by  concentrating  the  whole 
in  this  manner.  Before  the  illuftration  it  could  not 
be  faid  fo  briefly ;  but  by  the  help  of  what  went 
before,  it  ;nay  be  recalled  to  memory  in  lefs  room. 

3.  Towards  the  conclufion  the  fentences  fhould  be 
fludied,  the  tone  of  voice  higher,  and  the  pronuncia- 
tion more  rapid  than  towards  the  beginning. 

4.  I.aftly,  great  care  fiiould  be  taken  in  moral 
difcourfcs  to  have  no  far-fetched  inferences. 


Lea.   1 5.  ELOQUENCE.  30j' 


LECtURE   XVI. 

1AM  now  to  conclude  the  diicourfes  upon  this 
fubject  by  an  inquiry  into  the  general  principles 
of  talie  and  criticifm.  In  the  former  difcourfes,  we 
liave  kept  clofe  to  the  arts  of  writing  and  fpeaking, 
and  have  attempted  to  defcribc  the  various  kinds  of 
compoiition,  their  charaflers,  diilinclions,  beauties, 
blemiilies,  the  means  of  attaining  ilvill  in  them,  and 
the  ufes  to  which  they  iliould  ba  applied.  But  is  it 
not  proper  to  confider  the  alliance,  if  there  be  any 
tuch,  between  this  and  ot>-cr  arts  ?  This  will  ferv:^ 
greatly  to  improve  and  perfect  our  judgement  a.d 
taile.  It  was  very  early  obferved,  that  there  was  a. 
relation  between  the  different  arts,  and  fome  com- 
mon principles  that  determine  their  excellence.. 
Cicero  mentions  this  in  the  introdudion  of  his  ora- 
tion for  Archias  the  poet.  Ktenim  omnes  artes  qu  v 
ad  huniari'tatein  pertinent^  haheiit  quoddam  comurune 
-jinculum^  et  quasi  cognatlonc  quadam  inter  se  conti- 
7imtui\ 

Thefe  arts,  which,  Cicero  fays,  ad  Immaiiitatevi 
pertine?iti  are  called  by  the  moderns  the  fine  arts» 
This  is  to  diilinguilh  them  from  thofe  commonly 
called  the  mechanic  arts,,  making  the  utenfils  and 
conveniences  of  common  life.  And  yet  even  thefe 
may  be  included,  as  tafte  and  elegance,  or  the  v/ant 
of  it  may  plainly  be  difcerned  in  every  production 
of  human  Ikill.  Hov.-e^-er,.  thofe  called  the  fine  arts 
are  the  following  :  Poetry,,  oratory,,  mufic,  paints 
ing,  fculpture,  archite£lure.  It  mud  be  allowed, 
C  c  3 


50-2  LECTURES  ON  Le6l.  l6. 

that  though  thefe  arts  have  fome  common  princi- 
ples of  excellence,  there  are  fome  perfons  who  have 
a  ftrong  inclination  after,  and  even  a  capacity  of 
performing  in  fome  of  them,  and  not  in  others. 
There  are  good  orators  who  are  no  muficians,  or 
perhaps  who  have  very  little  tafbe  for  the  beauties 
of  architefture.  Yet  commonly  complete  critics, 
and  thofe  who  have  a  well-formed  tafte,  are  able  to 
perceive  the  beauty  of  the  whole,  and  the  relation  of 
one  to  another.  It  is  remarkable,  that  the  expref- 
fions  in  compofition  are  frequently  borrowed  from 
one  art,  and  applied  to  another.  We  fay,  a  fmooth, 
polifhed  ftyle,  as  well  as  a  polilhed  furface  ;  and 
we  fay,  a  building  is  fweet  or  elegant,  as  well  as  an 
oration.  We  fay,  the  notes  in  muiic  are  bold  and 
fwelling,  or  warm  and  animated. 

One  of  our  modem  authors  on  eloquence,  has 
thought  fit  to  take  exception  at  the  ufe  of  the  word 
taste y  as  being  of  late  invention,  and  £is  implying 
nothing  but  what  is  carried  in  judgement  and  genius. 
But  I  apprehend  that  the  application  of  it,  though 
it  Ihould  be  admitted  to  be  modern,  is  perfectly 
juft^  It  came  to  us  from  the  French.  The  hon  gout 
among  them  was  applied  firft  to  claflic  elegance, 
and  from  thence  to  all  the  other  arts.  And  as  a 
fenfe  of  the  beauty  of  the  arts  is  certainly  a  thing 
often  diftin^l  from  judgement,  as  well  as  from  erudi- 
tion, the  term.feems  not  only  to  be  allowable,  but 
well  chofen.  We  find  perfons  who  can  reafon  very 
ftrongly  upon  many  fubjeds,  v/ho  yet  are  incapable 
of  elegance  in  compofition,  and  indeed  of  receiving 
much, delight  from  the  other  fine  arts.  Nay,  we 
find  perfons  of  uncommon  acutenefs  in  mathematics 


Ld^»  16.  ILOQUENCE.  303 

and  natural  philofophy,  who  yet  are  incapable  of 
attaining  to  a  fine  tafte. 

It  has  been  fometimes  faid,  that  tade  is  arbitrary. 
Some  will  have   it,  that  there  is  no  fuch  thing  as  a 
flandard  of  tafte,  or  any  method  of  improving  it. 
It  is  a  kind  of  common  proverb  with  many,  that 
there  is  no  difputing  about  tafte  :  that  it  is  of  this 
intelledual  as  of  natural  tafte  ;  according  as  the  pa- 
late or  orc^ans  are  differently  formed,  what  gives  an 
agreeable  reliih  to  one,  gives  a  difagreeable  one  to 
another.      They  fay  that  the  modes   of  tafte   are 
temporary  and  variable — that  different  nations,  cli- 
mates, governments,  and  ages,  have  different  ways 
of  fpeaking  and  writing,  and  a  diff*erent  turn  in  all 
the  arts — that  chance,  or  particular  perfons,  will  be 
able  to  give  a  turn  to  the  mode  in  all  thefe.     Even 
fo  great  a  man  as  Dr  Warburton  has  embraced  this 
fentiment,  and  to  thofe  who  attack  the  fcriptures  as 
not  being  a  complete  model  of  eloquence  he  anfwers, 
there  is  no  fixed  ft  andard  of  eloquence  \  that  eloquence 
is  one  thing   in   Arabia,  another  in  Greece,   and 
another  in  England.     For  this  reafon  he  condemns 
thofe  who,  after  the  example  of  Mr  Blackwall,  in 
his  Sacred  Claflics,  vindicate  the  fcriptures  from 
objeftions  of  this  kind,  or  produce  inftances  of  their 
fublimity  and  beauty.     But  though  I  have  ftiown 
you  in  fome  of  the  former  difcourfes,  that  the  ftyle 
and  manner  in 'vogue   will  receive  fome  tindlure, 
and  be  liable  to  fome  variation,   ifrom  all  the  par- 
ticulars mentioned  ;    yet   there    is  certainly  a  real 
beauty  or  deformity  in  nature,  independent  of  thefe 
partial  changes,  which,  when  properly  explained, 
and  examples  of  it  eihibited,  will  obtain  more  oni-. 


5^4  LECTURES  ON  L8<51.  l6; 

verfcil  approbation,  and  retain  it  longer  than  the 
others.  The  poetry  and  oratory  of  the  ancients,  and 
their  painting  and  ilatuary,  are  inllances  and  proofs 
of  this.  It  may  alfo  appear  from  wliat  I  mention- 
ed to  you  formerly,  that  thofe  compofitions  whicli 
have  moil  fimplicity,  and  fuch  excellencies  as  are 
moll  folid,  witli  feweil  of  the  cafual  ornaments  of 
falhion,  and  the  peculiarities  of  their  own  age,  will 
pleafe,  when  tlicir  contemporaries  are  loft  in  ob- 
livion. The  fame  thing  holds  with  pieces  of  furni- 
ture that  are  elegant  but  plain.  Such  have  the 
beauties  of  nature,  which  belong  to  every  age.  But 
to  ihow  this  more  fully,  even  the  remarks  upon 
natural  tafte  are  not  true  in  fuch  a  fenfe  as  to 
weaken  what  has  been  fald.  For  though  it  is  cer- 
tain, that  perfons  ufed  to  the  cOarfeft  kind  of  food, 
which  they  have  often  eaten  v/ith  reliih,  may  fhow 
at  iirft  an  averlion  to  the  delicacies  of  cookery,  yet 
after  a  perfon  has  been  a  little  accuftomed  to  that 
kind  of  preparation  of  viftuals  in  which  regard  is 
had  to  the  mixtures  that  are  ipoft  proper  to  gratify 
the  palate,  he  will  not  eafily  return  to  his  flovenly 
provilion.  But  though  there  were  lefs  in  this  re- 
mark, it  feems  plain,  that  there  is  a  tafte  in  the  fine 
arts,  and  a  real  foundation  for  it  in  nature. 

But  fuppofing  that  there  is  a  foundation  in  nature 
for  tafte  and  criticifm,  there  is  another  queftion  that 
arifes,  viz.  Can  we  tell  what  it  is  ?  Can  we  reach 
the  original  principles  which  govern  this  matter  I 
Can  we  'fay,  not  only  that  fuch  and  fuch  things 
pleafe  us,  but  why  they  do  fo  ?  Can  we  go  any- 
further  than  we  have  already  done,  as  to  compofi- 
tion  ?  gome  have  refufed  that  we  can  with  certainty 


Lea.  16.  ELOQUENCE.  3O5 

reach  the  fource  of  this  fubjecl.  When  the  caufc 
is  aiked,  whj  one  perfon,  one  thing,  or  one  com- 
pofition,  is  more  excellent  than  another,  they  fay  it 
is  an  immediate  and  fimple  perception,  a  je  ne  scats 
quoiy  as  the  French  fay ;  which  phrafe  feems  to  have 
taken  its  rife  from  the  circumflance  which  often 
occurs,  that  in  a  houfe,  a  garden,  a  ftatue  or  paint- 
ing, or  even  in  a  perfon's  countenance  and  carriage, 
you  perceive  fomething  agreeable  upon  the  whole, 
and  yet  cannot  fuddenly  tell  wherein  it  lies,  the  parts 
are  not  better  proportioned  perhaps,  nor  the  features 
better  formed,  than  in  another,  and  yet  there  is 
fomething  in  the  compofition  of  the  whole  that  gives 
the  moft  exquiiite  delight. 

Others,  how^ever,  and  the  far  greateft  number, 
have  thought  it  proper  to  go  a  great  deal  further, 
and  to  inquire  into  human  nature,  its  perceptions 
and  powers,  and  endeavour  to  trace  cut  the  princi- 
ples of  tafte,  which  apply  in  general  to  all  the  fine 
arts,  or  in  greater  or  lefs  proportion  to  each  of 
them,  for  fome  apply  more  to  one  than  to  others. 
As  for  example,  if  the  fenfe  of  harmony  is  an  origi- 
nal perception,  it  applies  chiefly  to  mufic,  and  re- 
motely to  the  pronunciation  of  an  orator,  and  ftill 
more  remotely  to  the  compofition  of  an  orator. 
Thefe  powders  or  perceptions  in  human  nature  have 
been  generally  called  the  powers  of  imagination. 
Mr  Hutchinfon  calls  them  reflex  fenfes,  finer  inter- 
nal fenfations  ;  and  upon  examination  we  fhall  find, 
that,  befides  the  internal  fenfes,  there  are  certain 
finer  perceptions,  which  we  are  capable  of,  which 
may  be  faid  to  take  their  rife  from  outward  objeds^ 


306  LECTURES  01^  Le(^.  16, 

and  to  fuppofe  the  external  fenfation,  but  yet  to  be 
additions  to,  and  truly  diftind  froin  it.  As  for  ex- 
ample, I  fee  a  beautiful  perfon.  My  eye  immediate- 
ly perceives  colour,  and  fhape  varioufly  difpofe^; 
but  I  have  further  a  fenfe  of  beauty  in  the  whole. 
I  hear  the  found  of  mulical  inilruments  ;  my  ear  re- 
ceives the  noife  ;  every  body's  ear  who  is  not  deaf 
does  the  fame.  If  I  have  a  fenfe  of  harmony,  I 
take  a  pleafure  in  the  compofition  of  the  founds. 
The  way  to  examine  the  principles  of  talle,  is  to 
confider  which  of  thefe  perceptions  are  limple,  im- 
mediate, and  original ;  which  of  them  are  depend- 
ent upon  others  ;  and  how  they  may  be  combined 
and  compounded,  and  afford  delight  by  fuch  com- 
poiition. 

This  is  an  extenfive  fubje£l:,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
treat  it  concifely,  and  yet  plainly  ;  and  indeed,  after 
all  the  pains  I  can  take,  there  will  be  reafon  to  ap- 
prehend fome  obfcurity  wull  remain  to  perfons  not 
ufed  to  fuch  kind  of  difquifitions.  The  way  I  fhall 
take  is,  to  llate  to  you  critically  or  hiilorically  the 
way  in  which  this  matter  hath  been  treated  by  fome 
of  the  moft  celebrated  writers.  The  Spectator, 
written  by  Mr  Addifon,  on  the  Pleafures  of  the  Ima- 
gination, reduces  the  fources  of  delight  or  appro- 
bation to  three  great  clailes,  novelty,  greatnefs,  and 
beauty.  He  fays,  that  fuch  is  our  denre  after  no- 
velty, that  all  things  that  were  before  unknown, 
are  from  this  circumftance  recommended  to  us,  and 
that  we  receive  a  delight  in  the  difcovery  and  con* 
templation  of  what  we  never  faw  before,  except 
fuch  objeds  as  are  painful  to  the   organs  of  fight  •, 


Left.  1 6.  ELOQUENCE.  307 

that  children  run  from  one  play-thing  to  another, 
not  becaufe  it  is  better,  but  new  ;  that  it  is  the  fame 
cafe  with  men;  and  that  authors  in  particular  are  at 
great  pains  to  have  fomething  new  and  flriking  in 
their  manner,  which  is  the  more  difficult  to  be  at- 
tained that  they  muft  make  ufe  of  known  words, 
and  that  their  ideas  too  muft  be  fuch  as^  are  eafily 
intelligible.  There  is  fomething  here  that  would 
require  a  good  deal  of  explication.  I  do  not  think 
that  any  object  is,  properly  fpeaking,  painful  to  the 
organs  of  fight,  except  too  much  light  j  but  we  do 
not  confider  this  as  a  fault  in  the  objeft,  Ijut  feel  it 
as  a  weaknefs  in  ourfelves.  And  further,  if  there 
be  fuch  a  thing  as  beauty,  one  would  think,  that  if 
beauty  be  agreeable,  it  muft  have  a  contrary,  which 
is  uglinefs,  and  that  muft  be  difagreeable.  As  ta 
greatnefs,  this  has  been  always  confidered  as  a 
fource  of  admiration.  The  moft  ancient  critics 
obferve,  that  we  do  not  admire  a  fmall  ri\^et,  but 
we  admire  the  Danube,  the  Nile,  the  ocean.  This  I 
udll  afterwards  confider.  As  to  beauiy,  it  has  been 
confidered  as  of  all  other  things  moft  inconceiv- 
able, and  therefore  made  a  firft  and  immediate  per- 
ception. 

Others  have  taken  beauty  and  grace  as  the  ge- 
neral terms,  including  every  thing  that  pleafes  us. 
Thus  we  fay,  a  beautiful  poem,  ftatue,  landfcapc. 
Thus  alfo  v.e  fay,  a  fublime  and  beautiful-fentlment. 
Thus  they  have  taken  in  under  it,  novelty  and  great- 
nefs, and  every  other  agreeable  quality.  Many 
eminent  critics  havcacled  in  this  manner,  particu- 
iTirly  the  ancients.     Longinus,  on  the  Sublime,  ia* 


308  LECTURES  oN  Left.  i6. 

troduces  feveral  things  which  do  not  belong  to  it, 
as  diftinguifhed  from  beauty.  Taking  beauty  as 
the  general  objecl  of  approbation  or  fource  of  de- 
light, and  as  applicable  to  all  the  fine  arts,  it  has 
been  varioufly  analyfed, 

A  French  writer,  Croufaz,  Traite  de  Beau,  ana- 
lyfes  beauty  under  the  following  principles :  Varie- 
ty, unity,  regularity,  order,  proportion.  Variety 
is  the  firft.  This  feems  to  be  related  to,  or  perhaps 
in  fome  refpe6ls  the  fame  with  novelty,  which  was 
formerly  mentioned.  It  is  certain,  that  a  dead  uni- 
formity cannot  produce  beauty  in  any  fort  of  per- 
formance, poem,  oration,  llatue,  pifture,  building. 
Unity  is,  as  it  were,  the  bound  and  reftraint  of 
variety.  Things  mull  be  connected  as  well  as  va- 
rious ;  and  if  they  are  conneded,  the  variety  is  no- 
thing but  confufion.  Regularity  is  the  fimilarity 
of  the  correfpondent  parts  ;  order  is  the  eafy  grada- 
tion from  one  to  another  ;  and  proportion  is  the 
fuitablenefs  of  each  part  to  the  whole,  and  to  every 
other  part.  I  think  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  all 
thefe  have  their  influence  in  producing  beauty. 

»  One  of  the  mod  celebrated  pieces  upon  this  fub- 
jed,  is  the  famous  painter  Hogarth's  Analyfis  of 
Beauty.  He  firil  produced  his  fyftem  in  a  fort  of 
enigma,  drawing  one  curved  line,  with  the  title  of 
the  line  of  beauty,  and  another  with  a  double  wave, 
•Vvhich  he  called  the  line  of  grace.  He  afterwards 
publilhed  his  Analyfis  of  Beauty,  which  he  refolves 
into  the  following  principles :  Fitnefs,  variety,  uni- 
formity, fimplicity,  intncapy,  and  quantity.  The 
foft  principle  is  fitnefs  j  under  which  he  Ihows,  that 


Le£l.  16.  ELOQUENCE.  3C9 

we  always  conceive  of  a  thing  as  intended  for  fome 
ufe,  and  tlierefore  there  muft  be  a  ccn-efpondencc 
or  fuitablenefs  to  the  ufe,  otherwife,  whatever  be  its 
appearance,  we  rejedt  it  as  not  beautiful.     He  in- 
fiances  failors,  who,  whenever  there  is  a  fhip  that 
fails  well,  they  call  her  a  beauty.     The  fame  thing 
will  apply  perfectly  to   all  kinds  of  writing  :   for 
whatever  fine  fentiments  and  noble  expreflion  be  in. 
any  compofition,  if  they  are  not  fuited  to  the  feafoa 
and  fubjecL,  we  fay  with  Horace,  Sed  nunc  non  erat 
his  locus.     Variety  and  uniformity  mufl  be   com- 
pounded together  ;   and  as  he  has  made  no  mention 
of  order  and  proportion,  it  is  to  be  fuppofed,  that  by 
variety  he  meant  that  which  changes  in  a  gradual 
and  infenlible  manner;  for  variety  without  order  is 
undiflinguilhable,  and  a  heap  of  confufion.     Sim- 
plicity means  that  which  is  eafy,  and  which  the  eye 
travels  over  and  examines  without  difficulty  ;  and 
intricacy  is  that  which  requires  fome  exercife  and 
attention  to   follow  it ;   thefe   two   muft  limit  one 
another.     In  reprefenting  beauty  as  a  viiible  figure, 
he  obferves,  that  a  ftraight  line  has  the  leaft  beau- 
ty ;  that  which  has  a  w^ave  or  eafy  declination  one 
way   begins  to  be   beautiful ;    that  which   has   a 
double  wave  has  ftill  greater  grace.     The  truth  is, 
if  thefe  two  things  do  not  deftroy  the  one  the  other, 
fimplicity  and  intricacy  improve  and  beautify  one 
another.      Mr  Hogarth  obferves,    that  ringlets  of 
hair  waving  in  the  vdnd  have  been  an  exprelfion  of 
grace  and  elegance  in  every  age,  nation,   and  lan- 
guage ;  which  is  juft  a  contrafted  wave,  firft,  that 
Vol.  VH.  D  d 


3^0  LECTURES  OtT  Le£l.  16, 

of  the  curls,  and  this  again  rendered  a  little  more 
intricate  by  the  motion  of  the  breeze.  If  one  would 
have  a  view  of  this  principle  as  exhibited  in  a  fingle 
kind,  let  him  look  at  the  flouriflies  with  which  the 
mafters  of  the  pen  adorn  their  pieces,  and  he  will 
fee,  that  if  thej  are  eafy  and  gradual  in  their 
flexions,  and  jufl  as  intricate  as  the  eye  can  follow 
without  confuiion,  any  thing  lefs  than  that  is  lefs 
beautiful,  and  any  thing  more  deftroys  the  beauty 
by  diforder.  I  might  fliow  you  how  this  principle 
applies  to  all  the  art,  but  fliall  only  mention  com- 
pofition,  where  the  fimplicity  muft  be  combined 
with  refinement,  and  when  the  combination  is  juft, 
there  refults  the  moft  perfed  elegance.  Mr  Ho- 
garth adds  quantity  ;  that  a  thing  having  the  other 
qualities,  pleafes  in  proportion  as  it  is  great  ;  as  we 
fay,  a  magnificent  building,  where  the  proportions 
are  truly  obferved,  but  every  part  is  large. 

I  have  only  to  obferve,  that  Mr  Hogarth  has  very 
well  illuftrated  the  principles  of  beauty ;  but  at  the 
fame  time  he  feems  to  have  introduced  two,  which 
belong  to  other  fources  of  delight,  vaz.  fitnefs  and 
quantity,  as  will  be  fhown  afterwards. 

It  is  to  be  obferved,  that  in  the  enumeration  of 
the  principles  of  beauty,  there  are  to  be  found  in 
fome  authors  things  not  only  different,  but  oppolite. 
A  French  author,  not  many  years  ago,  to  the  prin- 
ciples mentioned  by  others,  adds  ftrength,  which 
he  illuftrates  in  this  manner :  He  confiders  it  as  a 
principle  of  grace  and  beapty  in  motion,  and  fays 
that  every  thing  that  we  do  with  great  difficulty, 
gnd  that  feems  to  require  our  utmoll  effort,  is  feea 


Lecl.  16.  ELOQUENCE.  311 

with  uneafincfs,  and  not  with  pleafure.  For  this 
reafon,  he  fajs  the  motions  of  young  people  in  ge- 
neral are  more  graceful  than  thofe  of  old ;  and  agree- 
ably to  this  we  join  the  word  ease  to  gracefulnefs  as 
explicatory ^ — a  graceful,  eafy  carriage.  With  this 
explication  it  feems  abundantly  proper  to  admit  the 
remark.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  fome  who 
have  made  comparative  weaknefs  a  principle  of 
beauty,  and  fay,  that  the  more  light  and  flendt^r  any 
thing  is,  unlefs  it  be  remarkably  weak,  it  is  the 
more  beautiful,  and  that  things  remarkably  Urong 
rather  belong  to  another  clafs.  Thus  we  fay,  a 
fine,  tender,  delicate  fliape — and,  on  the  contrary, 
we  fay,  a  ilrong,  coarfe,  robuil  make — a  flrong, 
coarfe,  mafculine  woman.  Perhaps  we  may  recon- 
cile thefe  two,  and  fay,  they  are  both  principles,  be- 
caufe  there  fliould  be  juft  as  much  of  each  as  is  fuit- 
able  to  the  thing  in  queftion,  that  a  perfon  may 
have  either  too  ilrong  or  too  weak  a  frame,  for  be- 
ing efleemed  beautiful — that  a  pillar  or  dome  may 
be  too  delicate  to  be  durable,  or  too  ftrong  and 
bulky  to  be  elegant. 

Again:  Many  writers,  as  you  have  feen,  make 
greatnefs  a  principle  of  beauty;  yet  there  are  others 
who  make  littlenefs  one  of  the  conftitucnts'of  beau- 
ty. Thofe  who  do  fo  tell  us,  that  /:ft/e  is  a  tern^ 
of  endearment,  in  every  nation  and  language  vec 
known  ;  that  it  is  the  language  of  the  vulgar,  and 
therefore  the  undefigned  expreflion  of  nature. 
They  inftance  the  diminutive  appellations  wjiich 
are  aUvays  ufed  in  fondling  j—j^.VsZv.v,  ^-^//c /a,  have 
Dd  2 


3^2  LECTURES  ON  Ltd:.  j6* 

more  affeclion,  than  J^/ius  and  Jilia — my  dear  little 
creature — it  is  a  pretty  little  thing.  To  enumerate 
the fe  different  appearances,  fome,  particularly  Burke 
on  the  Sublime,  affirms,  that  the  ideas  of  fublimity 
and  beauty  are  ideas  of  a  clafs  radically  different  ; 
that  the  firft,  fublimity,  ultimately  arifes  from  the 
paflion  of  terror,  and  the  other  from  that  of  love 
and  delight ;  he,  with  a  good  deal  of  ingenuity,  re- 
folves  all  the  fources  of  the  fublime  into  what  is 
either  terrible,  or  allied  to  this  paflion,  exciting  it 
either  immediately  in  fome  degree,  or  by  alTocia- 
tion.  It  is  however  uncertain,  whether  we  fhould 
reduce  what  we  receive  fo  much  delight  from,  to  a 
paflion,  which  in  itfelf,  or  in  its  purity,  fo  to  fpeak, 
is  painful.  This  objection  he  endeavours  to  remove, 
by  fhewing  that  the  exercife  of  all  our  pafEons  in  a 
moderate  degree,  is  a  fource  of  pleafure  ;  but  per- 
haps we  may  diftinguifh  the  ideas  of  fublime  and 
beautiful,  without  having  recourfe  to  the  paflion  of 
terror  at  all,  by  faying,  that  there  is  an  aiTeclion 
fuited  to  ih2  greatnefs  of  objects,  without  coniider- 
ing  them  as  terrible,  and  that  is,  veneration  :  na}^, 
perhaps  v/e  may  go  a  little  further,  and  fay,  that 
veneration  is  the  afTeftion  truly  correfpondent  to 
greatnefs,  in  innocent  creatures,  which  becomes  terror 
In  the  guilty.  I  cannot  go  through  the  particulars 
of  Burke's  theory.  He  feems  rightly  to  devide  the 
ideas  of  fublime  and  beautiful ;  by  the  union  of  which, 
fome  have  made  one  thing,  otliers  direftly  its  con- 
trary, to  belong  to  beauty.  One  thing  remarkable 
in  Burke's  Efiay  is,  that  he  denies  proportion  to  be 
any  of  the  caufes  of  beauty,  \\dnch  yet  almoft  every 


LcS:.  i6.  ELOQUENCE.  315 

other  writer  has  enumerated  among  them;  and 
what  he  fays  of  the  infinitelj  various  proportion  in 
plants  and  animals,  feems  to  be  much  in  fupportof 
his  opinion  :  yet  in  works  of  art,  proportion  feems 
of  much  moment ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  fay  to  what 
fource  to  refer  it.  I  view  a  building,  and  if  the  parts 
are  not  in  a  regular  proportion,  it  otTends  mj  eye, 
even  though  I  'could  fuppofe  that  the  difproportioii 
was  voluntary,  in  order  to  obtain  fome  great  con- 
venience. 

I  (houldbe  inclined  to  think,  that  there  are  a  con- 
fiderable  number  of  llmple  principles,  or  internal 
fenfations,  that  contribute  each  its  prirt  in  formiiifj 
our  tafte,  and  are  capable  of  being  varioufly  combin- 
ed, and  by  this  combination  arc  apt  to  be  confounded 
one  with  another.  One  of  the  moH  diftincl  and  com- 
plete enumerations,  we  have  in  Gerard's  EiTay  on 
T&fte,  and  is  as  follows :  A  fenfe  of  novelty,  fublimit  y, 
beauty,  imitation,  harmony,  ridicule,  and  virtue.  I 
cannot  go  through  all  thefe  in  order,  but  liiall  make 
a  few  remarks,  and  fliow  where  the  diviiion  is  juil 
or  defective.  His  diftinguifhing  all  thefe  from  one 
another,  is  certainly  juft  ;  but  there  are  fome  thinp^s 
that  he  introduces  under  wrong  heads  ;  fitnefs,  for 
example,  he  introduces  under  the  head  of  beauty ; 
and  this  feem.s  rather  a  fource  of  approbation  dif- 
tin<Sl  in  itfelf ;  as  alfo  proportion,  if  that  is  not  in- 
cluded in  fitnefs.  Perhaps  a  more  complete  enume- 
ration than  ?.ny  of  them,  may  be  given  thus :  Novel- 
ty, fublimity,  beauty,  proportion,  imitation,  harmony, 
ridicule,  utility,  and  virtue. 


3M  LECTURES  ON  Lefl.  i6. 

Vv^e  fliall  now  proceed  to  thofe  we  have  not  fpo- 
ken  of  before  ;  imitation  certainly  gives  great  plea- 
fure  to  the  mind,  and  that  of  itfelf,  even  independent 
of  the  obje6l  imitated.  An  exceedingly  well  imita- 
ted refemblance  of  any  obje6l,  of  that  which  is  in- 
different or  even  difagreeable  in  itfelf,  gives  the 
higheft  pleafure,  either  from  the  ad  of  comparifon, 
as  fome  fay,  or  from  its  fuggefling  the  idea  of  fkill 
and  ingenuity  in  the  imitator.  The  arts  of  painting- 
and  flatuary  derive  their  excellence  from  the 
perfeftion  of  imitation  j  and  it  is  even  thought  that 
poetry  and  oratory  may  be  confidered  in  the  fame 
light,  only  that  the  firft  imitates  form,  and  paflions 
by  the  means  of  form,  and  the  other  imitates  adions 
and  affections  by  language,  as  the  inftrument. 

Harmony  is  the  mofl:  diflin£l  and  feparate  of  all 
the  internal  fenfes  that  have  been  mentioned  ;  it  is 
concerned  only  in  found,  and  therefore  muft  be  but 
remotely  applicable  to  the  writer  and  fpeaker. 
What  is  remarkable,  that  although  harmony  may 
be  faid  to  be  of  much  importance  in  fpeaking,  there 
are  many  examples  of  the  moil  excellent  fpeakers, 
that  yet  have  no  mufical  ear  at  all,  and  I  think  the 
inftances  of  thofe  who  have  a  remarkably  delicate 
mufical  ear,  and  at  the  fame  time  are  agreeable 
fpeakers,  are  not  many. 

The  fenfe  of  ridicule  is  not  very  eafily  explained, 
but  it  is  eafily  underftood  when  fpcken  of,  becaufc 
it  is  univerfally  felt.  It  differs"  in  this  from  moft 
other  of  our  conftitutional  powers,  that  there  is 
fcarcely  any  man  who  is  not  fenfible  of  the  ridicu- 
lousp  or  may  be  made  eafily  fenfible  of  it  j  and  jet 


Led.  16.  ELOQi-ESCE.  31^ 

the  number  of  good  performers  in  the  srt  of  ridicu- 
ling others,  or  in  v/it  and  humour,  is  but  ver  j  f  malL 
The  multitude  ^vho  cannot  follow  fpecuiative  rea- 
foning,  and  are  .hard  to  be  moved  bv  eloquence,  are 
all  ftruck  with  works  of  humour.  Mod  people  ^ 
are  apt  to  think  thej  can  do  fomething  in  the  way 
of  humour  ;  and  yet  we  have  many  who  render 
themfelves  ridiculous  by  tVe  attempt. 

As  to  a  fenfe  of  virtue,  by  mentioning  it,  '^r  is  by 
no  means  from  my  joining  whh  thofe  who  would 
place  moral  approbation  entirely  on  the  fame  foot- 
in  cr  with  the  internal  fenfes,  that  are  the  foundation 
of  tafte.     Hatchinfon  and  Shafiefbiiry  mcline  very 
much  this  way  ;  on   the  contrary,  I  think  we  are 
evidently  fenfible   that  the  morality  of  actions  is  a 
different  fpecies,  and  arifes  from  the  fenfe  of  a  law, 
and  obligation  of  a  luperior   nature  :    yet  I  have 
mentioned  it  here,  becaufe  tliere  is  certainly  a  rela- 
tion, or  connecting  tie,  between  the  fentiments   of 
the  one  kind  and  of  the  other.     The  beauties  of 
nature,  w^e  are  fenfible,  are  greatly  heightened  by 
adding  to  their  delightful  appearance,  a  reflection 
on  their  utility,   and  the   benevolent   intention   of 
their  author.     In  perfons  capable  of  morality,  as  in 
human  nature,  we  confider  fine  features  and  an  ele- 
gant carriage,  as  indications  of  the  moral  difpofition 
or  the  mental   powers ;  and  as  the  whole   of  the 
foufces  of  delight  mentioned  above   may  be  com- 
bined in  a  greater  or  leffer  degree,  as  novelty,  fub- 
limity,    beauty,    Sic.    fo    the    governing    principle 
which  ought  to  direct  the  application  of  the  whole, 
is  what  gives  them  their  higheil  excellence,  and 


3l6  LECTURES  o>^  Lecl.  ^i6. 

indeed  only  is  their  true  perfe6lion.  The  gratifica- 
tion even  of  our  internal  fenfes  is  highly  improved, 
when  united  with  tafte  and  eleo-ance  ;  as  the  moil 
delicious  food,  when  ferved  up  with  neatnefs  and 
order,  accompained  with  politenefs  of  manners,  and 
feafoned  with  fprightlj  conVerfation.  In  the  fame 
manner,  the  line  arts  themfelves  acquire  a  double 
beauty  and  higher  rellfh,  when  they  are  infepara- 
bly  conneded  with,  and  made  fubfervient  to  purity 
of  manners.  An  admirable  poem,  or  an  eloquent 
difcourfe,  or  a  fine  pi  ft  are,  would  be  ft  ill  more  ex- 
cellent, if  the  fubjefl  of  them  were  interefling  and 
valuable ;  and  when  any  of  them  are  perverted  to 
impious  or  wicked  purpofes,  they  are  juft  objects 
of  deteiliation. 

After  having  thus  attempted  the  analyiis  of  the 
principles  of  tafle  and  elegance,  I  would  obferve, 
that  as  nature  feems  to  delight  in  producing  many 
great  and  different  efFefts  from  fimple  caufes,  per- 
haps we  may  find  an  ultimate  principle  that  governs 
all  thefe.  A  French  author  has  written  a  treatife 
called  the  Theory  of  Agreeable  Senfations,  in  which 
he  fays,  that  the  great  principle  is,  whatever  ex- 
ercifes  our  faculties,  without  fatiguing  them,  gives 
pleafure  ;  and  that  tliis  principle  may  be  applied  to 
our  bodily  form,  and  to  tlie  conflitution  of  our  mind, 
to  objefts  of  external  fenfation,  to  objedf  s  of  tafte, 
and  even  to  our  moral  conduct.  It  may  no  doubt 
be  carried  through  the  whole  of  criticifm ;  and  we 
may  fay,  this  ftates  the  bounds  between  variety  and 
uniformity,  fimplicity  and  intricacy,  order,  propor- 
tion, and  hcirniony. 


Le<^.  l5.  ELOQUENCE.  3x7 

Neither  would  it  be  difRciilt  to  fliow,  that  this 
principle  maj  be  applied  to  morality,  and  that  an 
inflnitelj  wife  and  gracious  God  had  fo  ordered 
matters,  that  the  moderate  exercife  of  all  our  powers 
fhould  produce  at  once  virtue  and  happinefs,  and 
that  the  leaft  tranfgrefTion  of  the  one  mud  prove  of 
neceffitj  an  injury  to  the  other. 

You  may  fee  from  the  preceding  remarks,  that 
the  foundation  is  laid  for  tafte  in  our  nature  ;  yet 
there  is  great  room  for  improvement  and  cultiva- 
tion ; — by  inv^eftigating  the  grounds  of  approbation; 
by  comparing  one  thing  with  another  ;  by  ftudying 
the  beft  examples  ;  and  by  refledlion  and  judgement, 
men  may  corred  and  reiine  their  tade  upon  the 
whole,  or  upon  particular  confined  fubje£ls. 

Carrying  tafte  to  a  finical  nicety  in  any  one 
branch,  is  a  thing  cot  only  undefirable,  but  con- 
temptible; the  reafon  of  which  may  be  eafily  feen: 
when  a  perfon  applies  his  attention  fo  much  to  a 
matter  of  no  great  moment,  it  occafions  a  neceiTary 
negleft  of  other  things  of  mtich  greater  value. 
After  you  pafs  a  certain  point,  attachment  to  a  par- 
ticular purfait  is  ufelefs,  and  then  it  proceeds  to  be 
hurtful,  and  at  lafl  ccntcn.ptibie. 


END  OF  VOLUME  VH. 


♦  • 


p^