BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRaov
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3 9999 06317 371 8
OFFICE OF NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION
DIVISION OF REVIEW
*
NRA POLICIES, STANDARDS AND CODE PROVISIONS ON BASIC
WEEKLY HOURS OF WORK
By
Solomon Barkin
(A Section of Part B: Control of Hours and Reemployment)
WORK MATERIALS NO. 45
THE LABOR PROGRAM UNDER THE NRA
Work Materials No. 45 falls into the following parts
Part A
Part B
Part C
Part D
Part E
Introduction
Control of Hours and Reemployment
Control of Wages
Control of Other Conditions of Employment
Section 7(a) of the Recovery Act
LABOR STUDIES SECTION
MARCH, 1936
OFFICE OF. NATIONAL 33C0VSHY ADMINISTRATION
DIVISIQH OF REVIEW
NRA POLICIES, STANDARDS AND CODE PROVISIONS OK BASIC
JESKLY HOURS OF WORK
By
Solomon Bark in '
9862
LABOR STUDIES SECTION
MARCH, .1936
U. S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
NOV 301950
JlOREWORD
This study of "1QA Policies, Standards and. Code Provisions on Basic
Weekly Hours of Work" was prepared by Mr. Solomon Barkin of tie Labor
Studies Section. It is one of three contemplated studies on NRA handling
of hours, the others being one on Seasonal and Peak Tolerance and one on
Occupational Exemptions from .lour Provisions. The latter two could not
be completed because of reductions made in personnel.
This study describes the development of policies and code provisions
with respect to the basic hours of work for employees. Special attention
is given to the negotiations in connection with the formation of codes and
to the effect of these negotiations upon code provisions.
The subject of this study is of course controversial. The author
was a member of the staff of the Labor Advisory Board throughout the period
covered by NBA. Other participants in the NRA experience might have pre-
sented a different account. It is assumed, however, that on such a pro-
blem the personal interpretation of an active participant in policy forma-
tion is of distinct value. The author would be the first to point out that
the opinions and conclusions reached are his own and not official utterances.
Part B of Work Materials No. 35 deals with, the content of the code pro-
visions in the codes. The data supplement this present report.
At the back of this report will be found a brief statement of the studies
undertaken by the Division of Review.
L.. C. Marshall,
Director, Division of Review
March 26, 1936
9862
•l-
TABLE 0? CONTENTS
CHAPTER Page
I. INTRODUCTION 4
II. THE THIRTY HOUR BILL 5
III. THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT 11
I. Purpose of the Bill in Relation to Regulation
of Hours 12
II. Administrative Provisions 13
III. The Thirty Hour Week Provision in the Public
Works Title 16
IV. FORMULATION OF POLICY AND DETERMINATION OP
ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY 18
I. Formulation of Policy 18
II. Statement of Standards 18
III. Administrative procedure 19
IV. Conclusion 19
V. SETTING OF STANDARDS ON BASIC HOURS AND THE FIRST
CODE; COTTON TEXTILE 2r
I. The Thirty- Two Hour Week Proposal 20
II. The Cotton Textile Code 20
VI. PRESIDENT'S REEMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 24
VII. THE CALCULATION OF CODE HOURS 28
VIII. CODES SUBMITTED DURING PERIOD FROM JULY 6, 1933
TO AUGUST 15, 1933 32
IX. HOURS PROVISIONS OF PRA SUBSTITUTIONS 34
I. Procedure for Substitution 34
II. Approved Substitutions 35
III. Basic Hours in Substitutions for Productive
Employees 38
IV. Seasonal Tolerances 39
9862
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CHAPTER Page
IX (Cont'd)
A. Plat Maximum Regulations 39
B. Averaging 41
C. Peak Period Tolerance 41
D. Averaging and Peak Period Tolerance 45
V. Occupational Exemptions 50
VI. Conclusion 50
X. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSIDERATION OF CODES 53
I. The Administrative Official 53
II. Voluntary Nature of Code System 53
III. Trade Practice and Labor Provisions 54
IV. Labor Participation 55
V. NRA Policy 55
XI. APPROVED CODES AMONG PIRST ONE HUNDRED 7ITH
SHORTER HOURS THAN ORIGINALLY PROPOSED 58
I. Hours Reduced by Direct Efforts of
Administration 58
A. Lumber and Timber Products 58
1. Management's Case 62
2. Contrary Positions 63
3. The Administration Modification of
the Code 63
B. Eire Extinguishing Appliance Industry 66
II. Reduction Effected by Administration and Labor
Representatives 67
A. Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Industry 67
1. Employers' Statements 68
2. Labor's Counterproposals and
Statements 70
~iii-
9862
CHAPTER Page
XI (Cont'd)
3. Administrative Recommendations 70
4. Negotiations 71
B. Petroleum 72
1. Labor and Independent's Proposals 74
2. Administrative Assistance in Adjust-
ment of Differences 75
C. Cast Iron Soil Pipe 77
D. Motor Vehicle Retailing Industry 77
III. Hours Determined by Collective Bargaining 79
A. Coat and Suit Industry 79
B. Men's Clothing Industry 81
C. Dress Industry 82
IV. Conclusion 84
XII. APPROVED CODES WITH LONGER HOURS THAN ORIGINALLY
PROPOSED 85
I. Bituminous Coal Industry Q5
A. Original Code 85
B. Other Proposals 86
C. Management's Position 56
D. Labor's Position 89
E. Negotiations 89
II. Gasoline pump Manufacturing Industry 93
III. Compressed Air, Heat Exchange, and Pump
Industries 96
IV. Retail Trade 99
A, President's Reemployment Agreement
Substitutions 99
-IV-
9862
CHAPTER Page
XII (Cont'd)
B. Public Hearing 100
C. Pinal Provisions 102
V. Conclusion 106
XIII. NEGOTIATIONS OF CODES IS WHICH BASIC HOURS
REMAINED THE SAME AS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED 107
I. Electrical Manufacturing 107
A. Industry's Position 107
B. Labor's Position 108
C. Negotiations 109
II. Hosiery Industry 111
III. Fishing Tackle Industry 114
IV. Iron and Steel 116
A. Public Hearing 116
B. Negotiations 117
V. Conclusion 120
XIV. REASONS FOR APPROVAL OF CODES WITH NO
MODIFICATION IN BASIC HOURS 121
I. Financial Inability to Reduce Hours 121
II. Business Recovery As the Means for
Reemployment 124
III. Existence of Precedents 129
IV. Reemployment Under Code in Respect to
Employment in 1929 132
V. Some Increase in Employment 134
VI. Conclusion 134
XV. THE BASIC HOURS IN THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED
APPROVED CODES 136
m.'yjm
9862
CHAPTER Page
XVI. ESTABLISHMENT OP STANDARDS 137
I. Policy Memorandum of February, 1934 137
II. Review Division Statement, July, 1934 138
III. Review Officer's Pinal Summary 139
IV. Conclusion 140
XVII. CODES WITH LONGER THAU PORTY HOUR EASIC WEEK 143
I. Retail Group 143
II. Motor Service 144
III. Motor Transportation 144
IV. Service 145
V. Other Codes 146
VI. Conclusion 147
XVIII. CODES WITH LESS THAN PORTY HOURS EASIC WORK WEEK 148
I. Collective Bargaining 148
A. Millinery 150
B. Fur Group 150
1. Par Dressing and Fur Dyeing 151
2. Fur Manufacturing 152
C. Pleating, Stitching and Bonnaz and
Hand Embroidery 152
D. Men's Neckwear 153
E. Covered Button 153
F. Undergarment and Negligee 154
G. Women's Neclcwear 155
H. Print Roller and Print Bloc1^ Manufacturing 156
II. Collective Bargaining and Precedents
for Shorter Work Week 156
-VI-
9862
CHAPTER Page
XVIII (Cont'd)
A. Blouse and Skirt 156
B. Shoulder Pad 158
C. Merchant and Custom Tailoring 158
III. Precedents 160
IV. Administrative Officials and Labor Advisers 161
V. Industry Proposals 162
VI. Conclusion 163
XIX. EFFORTS AT THE REVISION OF BaSIC WEEKLY HOURS 164
I. Administration Position 164
II. Code Authority Conference 166
III. Labor Advisorv Board 179
IV. January, 1935 Hearings 180
V. Individual Industry Reductions in Hours 182
A. Bituminous Coal Industry 182
B. Cottcn Garment Industry 183
C. Millinery Industry 134
VI. Conclusion ]_85
9862
-V11-
TABLES
NUMBER Page
I. Distribution cf Codes by Percentage Estimated Reemploy-
ment Under Codes of 1929, Employment in Individual Indus-
tries and By Basic Weekly Hours Used in Calculation of
Estimated Employment Under Codes in Division of Research
and Planning Reports 30
II. PRA Substitutions by Number of Modifications for
Individual Paragraphs of PRA 36
III. Summary of Hour Provisions of PPJl Substitutions By
Basic Hours, Tyne of Provision, and Industry Groups 37
IV. PRA Substitutions Containing Flat Maximum Hour Pro-
visions, by Maximum Hours and Industry Groups 40
V. Summary of PRA Substitutions Containing Averaging
Type of Hour provisions, by Basic Hours, Type of Pro-
visions, and Industry Groups 42
VI. PRA Substitutions with Averaging Type of Hour Pro-
visions, By Basic Hours and Averaging Periods 43
VII. PRA Substitutions with Averaging Type of Hour Pro-
vision, by Basic Hours and Hourly Differences Between
Basic and Maximum Weekly Hours 44
VIII. Hours Provisions of PRA Substitutions Containing Peak
Period Tolerances, by Basic Hours, Tolerances and
Industry Groups 46
IX. Peak Period Tolerance in PRA Substitutions, by Basic
Hours and Tolerance Periods 47
X. Peak Period Tolerances in PRA Substitutions, oy Basic
Hours and Difference Between Basic and Maximum Weekly
Hours 48
XI. Hours Provisions of PRA Substitutions Containing Both
Averaging and Peak Period Provisions, By Basic Hours,
Type of Provisions and Industry Groups 49
XII. Occupational Grouos Exempt from Basic Hour Provisions of
PRA Substitutions, By Industry Grouos and Exempt
Occupations 51
XIII. Distribution of Codes and Employees Among Industries
Classified According to Length of Basic Week 142
-VI 11-
9862
APPENDICES
(These appendices are not here reproduced. They are in NRA files
under the caption NRA Studies, Special Exhibits Work Materials,
No. 45, Part B. )
A. Maximum Hours Per Week Per Worker
A Method for their Determination for a Given Industry and
Applications to the Cotton Textile and the Electrical In-
dustries, by Alexander Sachs, Assisted by A. T. Court and
V. von Szeleski, July 22, 1933.
B. First Two Hundred Codified Industries
By Number of Employees in 1929 and June 15, 1933 pnd Average
Hours in June 15, 1933, and Hours Required to Absorb Employees
to 1929 Employment Level and Estimated Number of Employees
Reabsorbed by Code Hours.
C. Hours and Seasonal Differentials in Selected NRA Codes.
D. Hours Provisions in Code Proposals as Reported in the NRA Press
Digest from July 6, 1933 to August 15, 1933.
E. Administrative Revision of First One Hundred Approved Codes.
1. Drafts and Revisions of Hours Provisions of First Forty Codes.
2. Changes in Seasonal and Peak Period Provisions and Occupation-
al Exemptions of the First One Hundred Approved with Same
Basic Weekly Hours as Originally Proposed by Industry.
3. List of 35 Codes of First One Hundred Approved with Same
Basic Weekly Hours as Approved and no Significant Changes in
Supplementary Provisions.
F. Hours Provisions for Productive or Basic Groups of Employees in
PRA Substitutions (Prepared by Paul Hutchings). Tabulation of
Hours Provisions of PRA Substitutions.
G. Consumers' Industries Committee Report, Washington, D. C. ,
March 15, 1934.
H. 1. Letter of General H. S. Johnson, Administrator to Code
Authorities, March 28, 1934.
2. Shorter Work Week Analysis Sheet.
I. Durable Goods Industries Committee, Washington, D. C. ,
April 30, 1934.
J. Petition and Brief of Labor Advisor/ Board for Reduction in Hours
without Decrease m Earnings on the 1C /lO Principle.
K. Prevailing Hours of Labor per Week in Selected Code Industries,
1929 (Prepared by E. L. Greenbank).
-IX-
9662
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SUMMARY
The HI HA sought to achieve recovery, r^fora and stabilization in
industry and trade. Prior to i ts >as a :e a thirty hour bill was con-
sidered in Congress and pas e. . in t.ie Senate. 1/ianageinent opposed this
bill because it was too rigid and set up ;cvernmental regulation of in-
dustry. It preferred a procedure whereby employers would develop their
own terras of employment and administer theia. The III HA was supported by
management because it believed that the Act offered this instrumentality.
The 1IIHA was directed immediately at increasing employment in in-
dustry and trade through the shortening of hours and the stimulation of
industrial recovery. It set up a thirty hour week for public works pro-
jects. As for the method of determining the hours' provisions, the Act
provided two procedures: those prescribed by Sections 7(b) and 3(a).
The National Hecovery Administration reaffirmed the policy declared
at the time of the legislative consideration of the Act. In carrying out
tne policy, however, it sugBested as a standard for the determination of
hours of employment, reemployment of "employees normally attached to the
particular industry." As for administrative procedure it selected Section
3(a) providing for voluntary codes submitted b ,< employers as the means of
developing the labor provisions to effect the purposes of Title I.
More direct efforts to set standards led the Administrator to suggest
the 32 hour week. In the Cotton Textile Industry the first definitive
description of standards was made. Each industry was to be considered
individually and aaked to reemploy sufficient persons to bring its total
employment to the 1929 level. The forty-hour week in the Cotton Textile
Code was specifically designated as an exceptional case which was no pre-
cedent for future codes.
To secure immediate results, the PEA was adopted. It established
a basic 35-hsur week for productive employees, and a 40--iour week for
non-productive employees. In contrast with tie variable standard pre-
viously announced for codes, it established a uniform set of hours.
In contrast to the uniformity of basic hours set up in the PHA, tie
application of the 1929 employment basis to industry would have resulted
in a wide range of basic hours generally below forty. Most af the early
proposed code? did not follow the 1929 employment objective. They adooted
the Cotton Textile Code hours as a norm, and established long seasonal
and peak tolerances, and numerous occupational exemptions.
The conflict between these two approaches was first resolved in the
development of PHA substitutions. The principal substitutions dealt with
t.ie hours provisions of the PHA. The hours provision of the substitutions
generally established a basic 40-hour week instead of a 35-hour week.
Seasonal anl peak tolerances in 200 of the substitutions and occupational
exemptions modified the restrictions of the basic work week and permitted
a much longer actual maximum work we?k, usually 48 hours.
9862
Since Administration policy called for a careful study of each in-
dustry to develop a formula of hours likely to effect reemp±oyment to the
1929 level, and the industries typically presented codes with a 40-hour
basic week code negotiations and revisions were of' great importance to
reconcile the two. The Deputy Administrator carried tiie major burden of
this task. Upon his alertness, clearness and understanding of these ne-
gotiations tne results were dependent. He was faced by the fact that codes
were considered voluntary, but as a bargaining weapon lis possessed the
right to grant or disapprove trade practices desired by the industry. He
could also deny the industry a cod.e if the terms were inadequate. Most
Deputy Administrators did not undertake vigorously tne revision of pro-
posed codes. The most significant group pressing for the reduction of
hours were tne labor advisers. To the extent to which tney actively part-
icipated in the negotiations and had the sympathetic assistance of the
administrative officials, they were successful in raising the terms of
employment in the codes.
Only in nine of the first one-hundred approved codes were basic
weekly hours reduced below those originally proposed by Management. Two
of these reductions resulted from the direct efforts of the Administration,
four were effected by the Administration and labor representatives or ad-
visers, and three eventually through collective bargaining. Seven of these
codes established basic hours under forty (40) although most of them had
originally proposed forty (40) hour codes. Substantial reductions in hours
were made. Six of these downward revisions were made in codes included
among the first twenty approved. In achieving these reductions union strength
accounted for three; special bargaining advantage such as public funds and
trade practices; for three; precedent for one, and pressure for greater re-
employment, for two.
Six of tne first one hundred approved codes nad their basic hours in-
creased over those originally proposed by management. The establishment
of a forty hour norm for metal industries accounted for the increase in
hours of four codes, while tne need for assuring codification explains the
increase in the other two. All but one of these established a forty hour
week and represented an increase from original proposals of 35 and 36 hours.
In the sixth, tne retail trade, hours were increased from 40 to a schedule
ranging from 40 through 43.
In 85 of the first one hundred codes the approved basic hours were net
different from those first proposed. No changes were made in the basic hours
of these codes for various reasons. Only a small proportion actually measured
up to the goal of reemploying a total equal to the 1929 level. The others
were approved because it was believed, that the industries were financially
unable to carry the cost of shorter hours or could not be expected to reduce
hours since reemployment in the industry must result from general industrial
revival rather than from the shortening of weekly working hours. The hours
in otner codes were not modified since they followed the patterns of pre-
vailing approved codes. The force of precedent became increasingly important
as the number of approved codes increased. The original standards for the
determination of the basic work week were qualified by new principles. Uni-
formity of the basic work week was established. Eighty-three (83) of the
first one hundred approved codes established a forty hour week, only eleven
(11) established shorter hours than forty, and six (6) longer than forty
hours.
9862
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The precedent of this experience becmae established as new policy.
The forty hour week became the typical work week. Codes with less than
forty hours were considered unusual and needed special justification.
The influence of the goal of 1929 employment was markedly weakened. The
codes reflected the now approach. Pour hundred ml ninety (490) codes
adopted the forty hour week. Hie number with, a basic work week of more
than forty was forty- two, and those with les.- than forty was forty-one.
In the formulation of codes which established a longer than forty
hour basic work week precedent was largely determining. Codes were early
approved with longer than forty hours and kindred and subsidiary industries
followed with the sane basic hours. Several additional industries Iiad
longer licurs because of the alleged extraordinary nature of their products,
such as perishability, or their alleged extraordinary seasonality.
Several factors asserted themselves in t.±e formulation of codes with
less tnan forty hours. Hie most significant was organized labor, part-
icularly in the needle trades. Hie early approval of codes with 33 and 36
hours per week explains the adoption of a similar work week in a number of
later codes. In a. substantial number of cases, effective use of knowledge
of the industry and the services of tie labor adviser account for the short-
er weekly ..lours. Management recommended t..e establi shment of a 35 or 36
hour week in a nunber of instances.
I/iany officials within NSA iesired to sliorten -lours to effect a greater
amount of reemployment. 3fforts to this end were made at the February and
March, 193': meetings. The President and the Administrator appealed to manage-
ment to take the necessary, steps', Dut it refused. Seduction of hours only
in industries in a position to effect such reductions was recommended but
it proved impractical. The Labor Advisory 3oard made several efforts to
secure the general reduction in uo_ors. But its eficrts were in vain. The
January, 1955 searings proved to be only a sounding board for the appeal
for shorter .ours. Seductions were effected only in three industries, bitu-
minous coal, cotton garment and millinery. Organised labor in each ;f these
groups was largely responsible for this action.
9862
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chapter i.
i^t3oductio:t
The Hational Industrial Recovery Act was one of a series of measures
to meet the depression following the prosperity peal: in 1329. NI?A was
an effort to weld together measures for recovery, reform and stabilisation.
Revival of industrial activity was its initial objective. This goal was
to be attained "by the establishment under government guidance and super-
vision of higher standards of employment, for labor and fair trade prac-
tices to govern business relations. United action of .labor and management
was to be the abse for industrial relations, and properly supervised and
reviewed representative action by industry was to rehabilitate business
relations. The collection of information for public action was to come
with "industrial planning". Stabilization wag deemed necessary to stop the
downward spiral of prices, production, employment, wages and standard of
livin; .
The most pressing goal of this Act was to get millions of unemployed
bach to work. In this movement for reemployment, the reduction of hours
of work of employees was basic. It was the principal method of assuring
quick reemployment.
This study is concerned with the policy and practice in HRA with
respect to the basic hours of work in codes. As such this study does not
discuss in detail the policy on seasonal and peal; tolerances or occupation-
al exemptions from the hours provisions. Nor is this an examination of
administrative experience under the code provisions, or a survey of the
effects upon reemployment. It is not an analysis of the economic validity
of the hours program. It is concerned with the development of policy,
standards and forces determining the hours provisions in codes.
98fi2
-5-
CHAPTER II.
THIRTY HOUR SILL.
The ERA and the policy with respect to hours finds its immediate
origins in the events of 1932. After three, years of derjression and in-
creasing unemplojinent the Federal Government undertook the task of dir-
ecting industrial recovery and relief. In 1932, the Emergency Relief
and Construction Act was passed setting aside 300 million dollars for
loans to states, counties and cities upon application of the state govern-
ment, and for individual relief; and 1,500 million dollars for loans to
government agencies and building corporations for self-liquidating pro-
jects to provide unemployment relief upon the condition that a thirty
hour week be observed on such projects. Private industry also cooperated
in promoting a share-the-work movement in which an effort was made to in-
duce employers, particularly retailers, wholesalers, banks and public
utilities, to create more jobs by reducing the working hours of employees.
However, this movement failed to achieve the desired objectives since
voluntary co-operation could not be obtained from the employers to keep
down working hours and. hire more employees. Most firms were willing to
divide work rather than lay persons off, but were not disposed to reduce
hours in order to hire additional persons. (*)
These efforts proved only effective in a most limited manner. They
covered only small segments of the problem. As a result, organized labor,
liberal Senators and Representatives, and many outstanding industrialists
sponsored direct legislation which they hoped would more effectively meet
the problem of returning the unemployed to work. The Black Thirty Hour
Bill was the most significant of these pieces of legislation. This bill
after long consideration in the Senate was finally approved on April 6,
1933 by a vote of 53 to 30.(**) Various efforts to amend the Thirty Hour
Bill to increase the hours to 36 per week and 8 per day failed. (***).
Finally the Bill was reapproved by the Senate on April 17, 1933 by a vote
of 52 to 31. (****) The bill as it left the Senate specified that goods
could enter into interstate commerce if not produced under conditions
where the employees were "permitted to work more than six hours in any
one day." Exemption from this regulation could be issued by the Secretary
of Labor. (*****)
In the House of Representatives the bill was subject to a number of
amendments largely at first at the request of the Secretary of Labor, who
recommended greater flexibility of hours. She proposed a provision per-
mitting employees to work forty hours a week and eight hours a day for
ten weeks in a calendar year "if an extraordinary need in any plant or
industry can only be met by utilizing a longer work day or work week and
if permission is granted by an Hours-of-Work Board." (******) ln the
final revised draft of the Connery Bill of May 10, 1933, the thirty hour
week and the six hour day provision was retained. However, it contained
^ ___^__ ' i
(*) S. Sli enter,. Employment Conditions - The American Year 3ook Record
for the year 1932, N.Y. 1933, p. 575
(**) Congressional Record, April 6, 1933, Vol. 77 ,: Part 2, p. 1350
(***) Ibid. p. 1333 (****) iTaid, p. 1812. (*****) 73rd Congress
1st Session,. S. 158.
(******) -por COpy 0f proposed bill see: United Mine Workers Journali
9862 May 1, 1933, V. 44, No. 9, p. 9
the exception "that upon the submission of satisfactory proof of the
existence of special conditions making it necessary for certain workers
to work more time than herein provided" the Board may grant an exemption. (*)
The thirty hour bill had the endorsement of organized labor and of
many representatives of industry. In the hearings on the bill organised
labor presented testimony to support -its position. The American Feder-
ation of Labor had declared for the thirty hour week at its 1932 con-
vention; and at the hearings it averred that it is a question of either
a dole, a universal strike or legislative action, such as contemplated
by the Black Bill. (**) Representatives of constituent unions also
testified in favor of the bill. Similar action was concurrently urged
by organized labor in a number of state legislatures. Individual em-
ployers, particularly in the textile industry, appeared before the
Congressional Committees in favor of the bill.
During consideration of the Thirty Hour Bill there developed the
movement among employers for the regulation of hours on a longer work
week basis than that proposed in the Black-Connery Bill. In April, 1933,
the United States Chamber of Commerce, through its Special Committee on
Working Periods in Industry, declared that "during continuance of sub-
stantial unemployment, the hours of work should be restricted to not
more than forty a week." (***)■
This sentiment was reechoed during the hearings on the Thirty Hour
Week Bill before the House Committee on Labor on April 25-28 and May 1-5,
1933. One recommendation to the Committee proposed an average of
thirty-two hours per week over a six months period with a forty-eight
hour weekly maximum and an eight hour day. (****) Other employers
testified or furnished evidence in favor of restricted hours, though
they generally objected to the thirty hour wee]-: and favored a forty
hours' maximum work week. (*****)
(*) 73rd Congress, 1st Session, S.158, Report Ho. 124, House Calendar 49,
(**) Thirty Hour Work Week, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee of the Judiciary United States Senate, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session
on S. 525, January 5-19, 1933, pp. 1-22.
(***) Chamber of Commerce of the United States, "Working Periods in
Industry," Report of Special Committee, Washington, D. C. April 1933.
(****) 73r(3_ Congress, 1st Session, Hearings before the Committee on
Labor, House of Representatives on S. 158 and HR 4557 and Proposals
Offered by the Secretary of Labor, April 25-28, May 1-5, 1933, (Wash-
ington, 1933) (Statement by'G-erard Swope) , p. 92.
(*****) Some of the testimony was as follows:
1. Industrial Management Council of Rochester, N. Y. (Letter,
'. ril 26, 1933):
"Lost would favor a 40-hour week with flexibility to take
care of inevitable emergencies without limitation as to
hours per day. The largest section of them would approve
of an 8-hour day. Several would not oppose a 36-hour week.
One would not object to even a shorter week, although against
9862
~7-
(*****) .Tote continued.
against a 30-hour week. Our lar est corny ai;-, the Eastman
Kodak Co., says that due to the highly techincal character
of its easiness, its employees cannot on an average "be
placed on less than a 35-hour week" (ibid., p. 150).
2. Mystic Iron Works and Other Iron Companies:
"I would hope to see a 40-hour week provided in the
case of manufacturers operating 24 hours per day"
(ibid., p. 184) .
3. Mr. Lumbard, Chairman of the Board of Tanners1 Council of
America.
"I was in favor of the principle of a shorter working
week (l) of around 40 to 45 hours." (2)
(1) ibid., p. 282
(2) ibid., p. 293
4. William Goldman, Representing the Clothing Manufacturers' Research
Board, New York City:
" There is a considerable division in the clothing industry
with regard to what should be about this bill. The Rochester
market, for example, has recommended the 36-hour week, with
16 weeks a year in which they would be permitted to work
40 hours. My own feeling is that we should adopt the 40
hour week The Rochester market has looked at it more
largely from the standpoint of the clothing industry, which
works 44 hours a week, whereas we must consider the vast
number of industries which we have in this country that
work 50 hours and upward" (ibid., p.p. 313-314)
5. Charles B. Rockewell, Jr., Collins and Aikman Corporation:
"Mr. Ram speck: Your chief contention is about the pro-
posal we have under consideration - that it be 32 hours
and permitting '8 hours a day ....
"Mr. Rockwell: That and insistence that a minimum wage
be considered " (ibid., p. 336).
6. B. P. Disque, President, Anthracite Institute:
"I agree entirely that Mr. Swope's suggestions that the
maximum working hours in any 26 week period shall average
32 hours per week" (ibid., p. 394)
7. P. W . Hobbs, President, National Association of Wool Manufacturers:
"I am in favor of a national maximum hours-of-labor lav; of
some sort, (l), If we assume a 2 year limit (add that)
when it expired that a national 48-hour bill, with the
9062
(*****) Note continued.
elimination of women and minors from night work,
would then be- effective" (2).
(1) ibid., p. 291
(2) ibid., p. 437
8. E. IT. Hood, Treasurer, Pequot "'ills, Salem, Mass.
"I wish to go on record as being in favor of some
Federal regulation of the hours of labor (l). My
suggestion is that with a 48-hour week there would
be a uniform basis for the entire industry (2)
I mentioned 43 hours in my brief but there is
no particular magic in 4C hours. I would be willing
to concede something below that" (3)
(1) ibid., p. 496
(2) ibid., p. 498
(3) ibid., p. 499
9. W< er Teagle, Standard Oil Company:
"Most business would, I believe, prefer 32 hours a
week, no more than 8 hours to be worked per day,
or a total of 832 hours in a 6 months' period, with
a provision allowing employees in times of stress
to work up to 48 hours a week" (ibid., p. 511').
10. H. D. Cheney, Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the Silk
Association of America: (Heads resolution of Association) :
"The Board of Managers of the Silk Association of
America, Inc., favors a federal law, during the
existing emergency, forbidding the employment of any
person in all industry more than 30 hours per week"
(ibid., p. 528)
11. C. F. H. Johnson, President of the Botany Mills:
"I would say that possibly 40 hours a week would
accomplish the result the Committee is trying to reach"
(ibid., p. 535)
12. St. P.-ul Association of Commerce:
"It appears to us that 40 hours and -5 days would be a
better "basis" (ibid., 575)
13. S. B. Botsford, Vice President of the Buffalo Chamber of Commerce:
"Many of our manufacturers favor 36 hours rather than 30 hours
if any arbitrary limitation is to be made" (ibid., p. 606).
9862
-9-
(*****) i.'ote continued.
14. Phillips Baker Rubber Co ■ n; , Auo.de Island:
"We urge national 30-hour produeAAve-worker week appli-
cable intrastate and interst.'-te United to S hours daily"
(ibid. , p. 345) .
15. R. G. Khowland, 3igelow Sanford Carpet Company:
"If a single standard maximum working week were adopted
arbitrarily for all industries, it would . probably have
to be between 44 and 4G hours" (ibid., 650)
16. M. D. Harding, Representing the Institute of American Meat Packers:
"If Tire had a 40-hour week, with elasticity so that we
could go to 54- because, as I have told you, our capacities
are not sufficient for us to continue week after week on a
40-hour week, but I will say further that a 40-hour week
in our industry, with permission to go to 54 hours during
emergencies, would mean that more men would go to work in
ovr industry, because we would hold closer to the 40 hours"
(ibid. , 651) .
17. H. Kendall, President, Kendall Company, Cotton Textile Manufacturers:
"First, the President should seek immediate legislation
to regulate hours of work for men and women on the principle
of the 5-day week and the shorter working day. . . .We have no
objection to the 30-hour principle, as such, but we believe
that there should be so:^e flexibility in the number of weekly
hours allowed downward as well as upward to meet the needs
of particular industries." (ibid., p. 736).
18. C. E. Stuart, President Engineering Firm, Stuart, James & Cook,
itfew York City:
"First. A control of hours of labor, provided that
ample elasticity is permitted under this feature of
control — based not on any arbitrary standards but on
the needs of each industry and keyed to the requirements
of our national economy" (ibid.', p. 753).
10. Chamber of Commerce, iTewark, h'ew Jersey:
"In the event that it is decided to pass a bill 'restricting
the hours of labor on merchandise moving in interstate
commerce, it is urged that such bill be amended to (l), do
away with any limitation on the hours of labor per day....
(2) , if the bill arbitrarily determines the work hours per
week, the limitation should not be less than 36" (ibid.,
p. 763) .
9862
-10-
Following these hearings the cotton textile industry endorsed the prin-
ciple of the forty-hour week for its own plants. (*)
These and other leaders of industry appeared to recognize the need
for a restriction of hours hut recommended that development and admini-
stration of the shorter hours' provision be placed in the hands of trade
associations. (**)
They suggested the substitution of individual industry regulations
for the "statutory method" of hours' regulation prescribed by the Thirty
Hour Bill. They deemed the tolerances in hours suggested by the Secre-
tary of Labor to be inadequate and too rigid. In their place the United
States Chamber of Commerce proposed that the trade associations draw up
agreements among the members of an individual industry concerning maxi-
mum hours of labor. This procedure, they assured, "would bring about all
the benefits contemplated by the Thirty Hour Bill." (***) This method
in addition would "secure the necessary flexibility in standards of
hours called for by each industry. (****)
Interest and co-operation in the movement for the rediiction of
hours to meet the emergency were evident, but management control of the
hours provisions and of the administrative machinery for their regula-
tion was insisted upon as an alternative to legislation. Reduction^ in
hours were not to be rigid. Each industry was to be permitted to write
terms dictated by its individual needs instead of following a general
statute and applying for exemptions for exceptional cases.
(*****) Note continued from preceding page.
20. Alfred F. Sloan, President, General Motors Corporation, representing
the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, New York City:
"So my recommendation is that we be permitted to work a
maximum of 6 days for 8 hours, or 48 hours; providing
however, that the average over the year is not greater
than a total of 30 hours per week; although I would like
to have that made 32 hours, because in that way industry
can work 4 days of 8 hours each, which provides a little
more flexibility from the standpoint of the weekly set-up"
(ibid., p. 772)
(*) New York Times, May 11, 1933.
(**) Hearings on the Thirty Hour Bill, op. cit., page 92,
Mr. G-erard Swope.
(***) Ibid., p. 197.
(****) rcic_., p. 228.
9862
-11-
Chapter III.
THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL BECOYBHY ACT •
It was, in part, to meet industry's demands on these particular
issues that the K IRA was formulated as a substitute for the Black-Con-
nery Bill and other current proposals. The ITIBA appeared as a compromise
measure among the various proposals for industrial recovery. In fact,
many different groups had a. share in the drafting of the bill. (*)
Practically every shade of current, vocal opinion participated to a
greater or- lesser degree in formulation of the bill. »,.".'..'
In the first- discussions of the bill its presentation as a sub-
stitute for the Black Thirty-Hour Bill in order to provide greater flexi-
bility in hours' was emphasized. (**) The business press immediately so
interpreted the new proposal. It was characterized as a means of legaliz-
ing "trade agreements, more flexible with different hours in different
industries." _(,***) This aspect, the bill, as it went through its many
redrafts, came increasingly to resemble. While an early draft set up a
licensing system wherein the license set forth the terms of operation,
(****) that section was subsequently modified to provide a voluntary
system of codes proposed by a representative management group within
each industry. This later draft enunciated the concept of varying hours
among different industries which was in basic opposition to the Black-
Connery Bill... The provisions were summarized by the newspapers in the
following manner:
, "Flexible hours will be provided among. the various indus-
tries, but the differential between the 'maximum hours
industries', and the 'minimum hours, industries' , it was
said, will not be so large as to give one an advantage
s over the other" (*****)
(*) Including a small grouo centering about Professor Holey; a
somewhat larger group headed by Senator Robert Wagner; a
third group representing the Agriculture Department, includ-
ing Rexford A. Tugwell and Jerome Frank; the Department of
Commerce in the person of John Dickinson; and other interest-
ed groups, such as the United States Chamber of Commerce and
the National Association of Manufacturers and the American
Federation of Labor; representatives of the banking interests
and proponents of -oublic works measures, of the shorter work
week and of industrial self-government. (Hew York Times,
Hay 3, 1933).
(**) Hew York Times, April 15, 1933.
(***) The Kiplinger Letter, April 15, 1933.
(****) Presented by Professor iuoley; see Hew York Times, April 29,
1933.
(*****) IMd#
9862
-12-
The "bill as finally proposed was divided into two parts: Title I
was entitled "Industrial Recovery" and Title II was called "Public Works
and Construction Projects." (*) The declared purpose of the bill was
defined by the President in his message to Congress. He declared that
Congress should provide "for the machinery necessary for a great co-
operative movement throughout industry in order to obtain wide reemploy-
ment, to shorten the working week, to pay a decent wage for the shorter
week and to prevent unfair competition and disastrous competition". (**)
The bill and the Act as finally approved contained no explicit
standards. The Act set forth objectives and provided alternative methods
of procedure. It defined the policy of the Act among other things to
be to "reduce and relieve unemployment, (and) to improve standards of
labor." These goals were apparently, though not explicitly, to be
achieved oy the establishment of "maximum hours of labor" (Section 7
(a). Ho specific definition concerning maximum hours' regulation or
its relation to reduction of unemployment was contained in the bill.
Consequently the place of reduction of hours in the program of in-
dustrial recovery heralded by the NIRA appeared in the circumstances
and ideas conditioning passage of the bill rather than in it's own final,
definitive statements.
!'• Purpose of the Bi.ll in Relation to Regulation of Hours
The President , in his message to Congress had explicitly construed
the purpose to be "to obtain wide reemployment (and), to shorten the
working week." Senator Wagner had introduced the bill in the Senate
with the declaration that its "principal and immediate object is to open
opportunities for the employment of several million men and women and
thus distribute purchasing power which will be effective in starting
again the wheels of industry." In the specific codes presented by the
employers, Senator Wagner had indicated that the latter "must undertake
to reduce the hours of labor to that number which the President finds
will be most helpful in increasing employment in industry." Specific
standards of working hours were omitted from the bill in the light of
the prevailing theory among the bill's sponsors that such decisions were
the proper sphere of the Administrators of the Act so that "hours of
labor . . . may be accommodated to the varying needs in different in-
dustries,1^***) The bill was to provide the machinery for determination
of hours consistent with the intent of the Act, but no specific formula
or set of detailed guides was included. The major objectives were loose-
ly defined; the types of administrative machineries were suggested;
but the precise moves as to code content were to be left to administra-
tive machineries were suggested; but the precise moves as to code content
were to be left to administrative discretion. No specific recommendation
for a definitive set of hours was heard from the Congressional sponsors
of the bill.
(*) 73rd Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 5664. Introduced on Hay 17,
1933 by Mr. Bought on in the House of Representatives.
(**) Congressional Record, May 17, 1933, V.77, Part 4, p. 3549.
(***) Congressional Record, June 7, 1933, V.47, Part 5, p. 5154.
9362
-13-
In the absence of such recommendation, the discussions on the hill
best defined the objectives which governed and impressed its supporters.
The major objective was reemployment anticipated as resulting from the
shortening of hours. Among other reasons given for shorter hours was the
provision of "some leisure through. reasonable hours of labor." It was
also argued that the industrial chaos produced by the "recalcitrant 10
or 15 per cent of the industry" resulted from "cutthroat wages and the
long hours." In consequence, elimination of long hours was expected not
only to lead to the absorption of "a great deal of our unemployment" but
to set up the very terms of fair competition for industry itself. (*)
I I . Administrative Frovis ions
Two different sections of Title I outlined possible procedures to
be used in developing the standards. In the first place, Section 7
in subdivision (b) , declared:
"The President shall, so far as practicable, afford
every opportunity to employers and employees in any
trade or industry or subdivision thereof with respect
to which the conditions referred to in clauses (l) and
(2) of subsection (a) prevail, to establish by mutual
agreement, the standards as to the maximum hours of
labor, minimum rates of pay, and such other conditions
of employment as may be necessary in such trade or in-
dustry or subdivision thereof to effectuate the policy
of this title; and the standards -established in such
agreements, when approved by the president, shall have
the same effect as a code of fair competition, approved
by the president under subsection (a) of Section 3."
Its significance for determination of hours of labor was explained
by Representative Kelly of Pennsylvania in the debate on the floor of
the House of Representatives on May 25, 1933. He declared:
"Many plans have been offered for dealing with the problem of
hours of labor. The Black Bill provided for a 30-hour week.
There have been suggestions for the 36-hour week and the
^-hour week. The plan under this bill is not to fix a
rigid schedule for every industry alike but to permit the
employers and employees 'in each industry to work out the
hours of labor best suited to the exact conditions. It
is believed that collective action will result in fair
adjustment of working hours and balance -them with produc-
tion. . . It is the purpose to encourage the settlement
of the vitally important questions of hours, wages and
working conditions by mutual agreements between organiza-
tions of employers and employees. The responsibility
is put upon those who should have it. When the agreement
is made and approved it will have all the sanctions of
(*) Congressional Record, June 8, 1933, V. 47, Part 6, p. 5238.
9862
-14-
codes of fair competition. . . If in any trade or
industry there is neglect or refusal on the part
of one or both parties to make mutual agreements,
covering these important questions, power is given
the President through his agencies to investigate
labor practices, wages, hours of labor and working
conditions and prescribe fair standards." (*)
Before the House Ways and Means Committee, Senator Wagner also
stated that -
"The bill makes the following provisions respecting the
determination of hours, wages, and labor standards:
"A. Where the right of collective bargaining
prevails employers and employees are given the first
opportunity to agree upon maximum hours, minimum rates
of pay,' and other working conditions. That is, those
mutual agreements can only be recognized where these
rights of labor to collectively bargain prevail. When
such agreement is approved by the President, it acquires
the character of a code.
"B. Where no agreement can be reached or has
been approved, the President is authorized to investi-
gate and to prescribe by way of a limited code or as part
of a general code, the standards of hours, wages and
conditions." (**)
Section 7 (b) of the Act, however, was not proposed as the sole
nor the preferred method for determining labor conditions or establish-
ing maximum hours of labor.
The NIRA provided another technioue for developing standards,
primarily intended for trade practice regulation. Section 3 (a),
designed in early drafts of the law to implement the provision for sus-
pension of tho anti-trust law in cases where codes of fair competition
(*) Congressional Record, i;!ay 25, 1933, V. 77, Part 4, p. 4218
(**) National Industrial Recovery House Ways and Means Committee
Hearing on S.1712 and H.R.5755,
73rd Congress, 1st Session, pg. 95.
9862
-15-
were approved (*), permitted trade or industrial associations or groups
to present codes under the conditions of the Act. This method, during
the course of the Congressional hearings, became increasingly identified
by Administration representatives with the procedure for developing
labor standards as well. No provision in Section 3 prescribed this
procedure. However, LJr. Richberg, before the Senate Committee on
Finance, definitely confirmed such interpretation when he declared that:
He had "this vision of it, and that is that either
labor will participate in the drawing up of such
codes, or that labor will participate in the con-
sideration as to whether such codes are fair, and
perhaps management will regard it as desirable to
have labor participate at the first stage rather
than the second . . . (But) unfortunately there is
such an attitude toward labor in many industries
that perhaps the easiest practical method is (for
the employers) to work out a labor correction code
which is a code of what is unfair rather than original
labor participation. '»(**)
(*) Section 3 (a) of the Act reads!
"Upon the application to the president by one of more trade
or industrial associations or groups, the president may ap-
prove a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or
industry or subdivision thereof, represented \>y the appli-
cant or applicants, if the President finds (l) that such
associations or groups impose no inequitable restrictions
on admission to membership therein and are truly represent-
ative of such trades or industries or subdivisions thereof,
and (2) that such code or codes are not designed to promote
monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and
will not operate to discriminate against them, and will
tend to effectuate the policy of this title: PROVIDED, That
such code or codes shall not permit monopolies or monopolis-
tic practices: PROVIDED FURTHER, That where such code or
codes affect the service and welfare of persons engaged in
other steps of the economic process, nothing in this section
shall deprive such persons of the right to be heard prior
to approval by the president of such code or codes. The
President may, as a condition of his approval of any such
code, impose such conditions (including requirements for
the making of reports and the keeping of accounts) for
the protection of consumers, competitors, employees, and
others, and in furtherance of the public interest, and
may provide such exceptions to and exemptions from the
provisions of such code, as the President in his dis-
cretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy herein
declared."
(**) National Industrial Recovery Senate Hearings Report of the
Committee on Finance on S. 1712 and H.R. 5755, 73rd Congress,
1st Session, pg. 23.
9862
w
While organized labor believed that the procedure under Section 7 (b)
..as to govern the administrative routine within the NRA, leaders of busi-
ness considered Section 3 (a) as the prevailing procedure. Organized
labor declared that Section 7 (b) in -
"plain simple language . . . means that employers and employees
will be accorded the fullest opportunities to negotiate wage
scales and conditions of employment. In fact a simple sound
interpretation of this section means that the government ex-
pects employers and employees to work out wage agreements
through .collective bargaining." (*)
The employers, on the other hand, proceeded on the theory that the
entire NRA codification process would be. handled largely through Section
3. In fact, the National Association of Manufacturers prepared a guiding
statement outlining the contents of the code,, including "wage, hours,
conditions." (**)
Other contemporaneous publications and statements showed that this
position was widely held by industry. Many trade associations and in-
dustrial groups after consultation with General Johnson and his associates
prepared codes for submission to the Administration in the last week of
May and early June, 1933 containing provisions on hours, wages and work-
ing conditions.
The Act left decision as to the procedure and the criteria to the
Administration. There were no' restrictions or precise instructions.
Either of the two methods could be used. Any combination or adjustment
within the delimited areas would be' consistent with the law.
This fact was of enormous significance to determination of the hours
formulae in the codes. The collective bargaining procedure, if established,
would have introduced a revolutionary change. Labor as a group would have
become a direct participant in the determination Of conditions of employ-
ment. Section 7 (a), providing for the right of collective bargaining,
would have set the conditions for the formulation of the basic national
codes. The proposals submitted would have been the result of joint action
by labor and industry; the government acting as supervisor. On the con-
trary, , rejection of this method in favor of Section 3 (a), would reduce
labor's part to a relatively minor one, since the union would then have
participated expost facto as a critic rather than as a party to the pro-
posal.
III. The Thirty Hour Week Provision in the Public Works Title
While the hours pattern for private industry was only vaguely out-
lined, the regulations for the public works were definitely expressed in
the Act. It represented a direct continuation of the provisions of
(*) American Federationist,/Vol. 40, p. 693
July 1933
i • ...
(**) National Association of Manufacturers, "The National Industrial Re-
covery Act" prepared by John C. Gall, Associate Counsel, and Noel
Sargent, Economist. (May 23, 1933).
9862
-17-
Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 and a concession to the
principle of the thirty-hour week in the .31ack-Connery Bill. It speci-
fically provided in Section 20G (a) that "so far as practicable and
feasible, no individual directly employed on such uroject shall be per-
mitted to iror.k more than thirty hours in any one v;eek."
9862
-18-
CHAPTER IV.
K*£JLMlJ5Ii^^ :"'ACHINERY
I . Formulation of Policy
After the passage and approval of the Act, administrative develop-
ments determined the course of experience under the MBA. In the state-
ments "bearing on development of policy on the hours, the objectives ex-
pressed in the discussions before passage of the Act were not appreciably
changed by the Administrative Agencies. The President on signing the
Act on June 16, 1933, declared that the Act proposed to "our industry a
great spontaneous cooperation to put millions of men back to their regu-
lar jobs this summer. This idea is simply for employers to hire more
men-: to do the existing work by reducing the work hours of each man's
week and at the same time paying a living wage for the shorter week." (*)
Reduction of hours was accepted as the chief measure for reemployment.
Neither the basic work week to be adopted in the codes, however, nor the
standards to govern the Administration were outlined in that statement.
I I . Statement of Standards
The President's declaration was supplemented by more detailed pro-
cedure outlined by the National Industrial Recovery Board in NRA Bulletin
No. 2 of Juno 16, 1933. This document stated the purpose of the entire
Act as being "to effect an immediate reduction of unemployment and in-
crease of mass purchasing power." This Bulletin also for the first time
set up standards for determining the hours' provisions acceptable to NBA.
It declared the guiding principle in preparation of the basic codes to
be "consideration of the varying conditions and requirements of the sever-
al industries and the state of employment therein." It also specifically
asserted that the "average work week" in the codes "should be designed
so far as possible to provide for such a spread of employment as will pro-
vide work so far as practical for employees normally attached to the
particular industry." (**) The definition of standards implied two prin-
ciples: First, it accepted the proposition commonly advanced by the re-
presentatives of industry that no single standard could be applied uni-
formly to all industry. Each industry was to be considered individually
in terms of its special requirements and the extent of its prevailing
employment. The criteria were not defined, however, nor were guides pro-
vided. In the second place, it followed the premise that unemployed per-
sons normally attached to a given industry should be reabsorbed. No ex-
planation defined the term "normally attached." No suggestion was offered
to the few new industries, which were larger in 1933 than in 1929, to
govern their regulations. In this manner the program was launched by the
Administrators. Meanwhile some of the larger industries were busily
formulating the first drafts of their codes.
(*) New York Times, June 17, 1933.
(**) National Recovery Administration, Bulletin No. 2, Basic Codes of
Fair Competition (June 16, 1933).
9862
-19-
III. Admin i strativo Procedu.ro
Bulletin 116. 2 was more explicit with respect to -procedure for code
making than for hours1 provisions of the codes. It showed the organiza-
tion to be prepared for the receipt of codes of fair competition rather
than for agreements developed under Section 7 (b). It accented the code
procedure as the method of developing the standards as to maximum hours,
minimum wages and conditions of employment. It stated "It is not the
function of the National Recovery Administration to prescribe what shall
be in the codes to be submitted by associations or groups. The initia-
tive in all 'such matters is expected to come from within the industry
itself . . . Basic codes containing provisions respecting maximum hours
of labor, minimum rates of pay and other conditions of employment which
are in themselves satisfactory will be subject to approval, although
such conditions may not have been arrived at by collective bargaining."
Although the latter part of the Bulletin made reference to Section 7 (b) ,
its "place in the EISA frame-work was not defined. (*)
Administration acceptance of the code method as outlined in Section
3 (a) of the Act and failure to do more than recognize Section 7 (b)
had an important bearing uoon the development of the policies within
NBA, and the specific terms as to wages, hours and conditions of em-
ployment developed in the Individual codes. The resulting procedure
placed the initiative upon industry. Trade groups primarily through
trade associations were charged with the preparation and presentation
of -proposed codes. These were required to comply with the mandatory
sections of the Act, Section 3 (a) providing for an affirmation that
the associations and groups presenting the code impose no inequitable
restrictions on admission to •membership and are truly representative
and the codes are not designed to promote monopolies or eliminate or
oppress small enterprises and will tend to effectuate the policy of the
title and contain Section 7 (a). They were also called upon to specify
in such codes -minimum wage scr-l.es, maximum hours, and conditions of
employment. After the proposed 'code was in proper form a public hear-
ing was called wherein the interested -parties might offer evidence.
After such hearing, the code as modified, was presented to the Presi-
dent for a.-->Tproval, disapproval or modification. When approved by the
President it became binding as prescribed in the Act.
IV. SojlcJjisifilL.
NRA Administrators from the start defined the administrative pro-
cedure for code making in its most significant aspects. II o such de-
finite policies or standards existed to determine the specific code
provisions respecting hours of work. The Administration policy ex-
pected each code to contain regulation of the hours of work to absorb
the unemployed. These hours were to be shorter than those -prevailing.
They were to vary as among industries so as' to reabsorb the persons
"normally attached" to the specific industry.
(*) Ibid.
98S:
-20*
CHAPTER V
SETTING 0E STANDARDS ON BASIC HOURS AND THE EIRST CODE: COTTON
TEXTILE
NRA statement of the purpose of the reduction of hours program was
clear and unequivocal. It was to reduce unemployment. The goal was
vaguely -nhrased but frequently set at three million returned to employ-
ment. No guides were furnished industry for the development of their
code provisions'. In fact Bulletin No. 2 remained the only formal state-
ment of directions for the greater part of NRA's history. As a result,
management in the development of codes could consider any one of a num-
ber of suggestions. There were the Thirty-Hour Bill, the U.S. Chamber
of _ Commerce "proposal for a basic 40-hour week, the average 32 hour week
recommended (*) in the testimony presented at the House Committee's
hearings on the Thirty-Hour Bill. Precise directions and definitions
were lacking.
I. The Thirty~Two Hour .Week FrosoSal
In response to the pressure for information, the Administrator
undertook to clarify the situation somewhat. The principle purpose of
the Act he declared was to persuade employers to take back workers by
spreading the available work over shorter shifts:
"The plan is for each industry to absorb the labor normally
attached to it at a living wage in fact and for that reason
the question "cannot bo answered for all industries or all con-
ditions by any inflexible rule. But in a general way and with-
out any coromi tment , we can say . . , that, under present con-
ditions, and as far as the lowest paid class of workers are
concerned, an average of about thirty-two hours a week at not
less than forty-five cents an hours for the lowest i aid typo
of worker would do this job." (**)
He also reaffirmed the previously enunciated policies, namely, the need
for different patterns of hours of work for each industry and for each
industry to absorb' the labor force normally attached to it. He further
suggested a basic average thirty-two hour week, without however, indicat-
ing its meaning, amplication or the range of permissible hours above or
below the basic standard.
1 1 • The Cotton 'Textile Codfl
The first application of NRA reemployment objectives and policies
appeared in the Cotton Textile Code. The .hearings began on June 27, 1933.
(*) By Gerard Swope
(**) Address of General Hugh S- Johnson made on June 25, 1933.
New York Times, June 25, 1933.
9862
-31-
This code on account of the accident of its being the first to be
approved exercised influence "beyond its intrinsic importance. The in-
dustry vss characterized by exceptionally low wages and long hours.
Furthermore it was experiencing a boom which raised the average hours
per worker per week t o 49.2. Here was a test of the announced NRA pro-
gram of reemployment through adaptation to the conditions of the indus-
try and the capacity of individual plants to reabsorb labor.
Ihe cotton textile industry presented a code providing for a basic
40 hour week with a number of exempted occupations, a standard already
proposed for itself by the industry before passage of the NIRA. (*)
This provision was questioned by organized labor and by some industrial
groups. In defense, the industry representatives maintained that less
than 40 hours would create a labor shortage in small communities, in-
crease labor cost unduly, require the recruiting of untrained labor from
other industries and recall the "graveyard shift." (**)
Labor representatives 'orotested. They urged that the work be
limited to 35 hours in order to effect reabsorotion of the unemployed,
to remove the strain r e suiting from the stretchout system and more closely
to adhere to the thirty-hour week standard of the public works title of
the Act. (***) Another labor representative recommended the thirty-
hour week to reabsorb the unemoloyed throughout American industry and a
single standard for all industries to which everyone would conform. (****)
Quoting HRA Bulletin Ho. 1 which emphasized reemployment, another de-
clared that "a. 40-hour week will not meet that nunose. (*****) ije
averred that it would result in "certain demoralization in other indus-
tries in their effort to establish a shorter work week". (******) He
discounted the possibility of labor shortage, declaring, "let there be
business and they will find labor*" (*******)
(*) Hew York Time, May 11, 1933
(**) Cotton Textile Hearings, Juno 27, 1933, pp. 59-63
(***) Statement of Thomas i\ McMahoh, President of the United Textile
Workers.
Ibr.do, June 38, 1933 - Release Ho. 18, p. 45
(****) Ibid., Juno 23, 1333 - Release Ho. 13, p. 106 and p. 6 of William
• Ere en* s speech.
(*****) Statement of Sidney Hillman
Ibid., Juno 23, 1933 - Rcler.se No. 1G,: p. 127
(******) Ibid., pp. 128-129
(*******) Ibid., p. 131
9862
Policy formulation for administrative action was confronted with tv;o
conflicting theories* On the one hand were emplo5^ers who argued for -pre-
vention of overproduction through rigid limitation on the machine hours
and the restriction of factory operations to two shifts. In defense of
this position they noted that the forty-hour week will "not only reabsorb
or absorb all the cotton mill workers who have been employed in part,
but will also absorb a great many thousands who have never been employed
by the industry .at all." (*) Any additional reduction would intensify
problems of hiring and of training new workers. Labor, on the other
hand, urged a shorter work week because of the widespread unemployment
in all industries. It discounted problems of training on the ground
that promotions within the ranks would more than suffice to meet situa-
tions. (**) Industry also was disturbed by the forty-hour week. The
counsel for certain trade associations characterized the forty-hour week
as a "severe blow" to the success of the IJIBA. No smaller industries,
he predicted, would accept a shorter week than forty if the textile code
was approved despite the fact that they had become reconciled to a
thirty-five hour week. He noted that "if the Administration desires to
have the aims of the Recovery Act fulfilled it must see to it that the
major industries are not granted too much leeway." (***)
On the other hand a question which persistently appeared in the Ad-
ministrator' s cross examination of witnesses was whether an industry
"should take back labor which is naturally attached to that industry" or
should "also reach into the other industries." (****) The question also
arose as to whether it was proper policy to ask an industry to do more
than reabsorb its "proportion of the unemployed." (*****) This point
of view was opposed to labor's thesis that the average work week in all
industries -was the proper basis for determining hours in the Cotton
Textile Code. The proposed alternative was to study each soparate indus-
try ?nd to determine its obligations to its own unemployed.
(*) Ibid., June 27, 1933 - Release Ho. 13, p. 17 - Testimony of
Mr. Robert Amory.
(**) Ibid., June 23,' 1933, pp.' 53, 113.
(***) Reported Statement of Mr. Sol Herzog, Counsel for a number of
trade associations. American Federation of Labor Weekly News
Service - July 3, 1933, quoting New York newspapers as the
source.
(****) Ibid., June 28, 1933 - p. 109, 113 - General Johnson's question
on p. 113 is: "What I am trying to get at is this question of
policy. I am trying to develop whether there is an onus on any
particular industry to take on more men than can be reasonably
expected to be employed in normal economics in the United States
under conditions we have seen."
(*****) Ibid., June 23, 1933 -p. 132, Statement of the Deputy Adminis-
trator.
9862
..-23-
The solution decided upon was to accept the forty-hour week in the
cotton textile industry for !'a four months' period," disregarding the
single standard for all industries. Instead conditions in the cotton
textile industry in 1929 were used to estimate the effect of a forty
hour week upon employment, resulting in the following conclusions:
"'Hie industry under the 40-hour week would presently absorb the
available corns of textile workers and assuming a continuation of
the present trend would -orovide openings for unemployed from re-
lated or nearby industries. The reduction in the working week to
forty hours will effect the reemployment of the hitherto unemployed
and -permit the substantial absorption from the outside of a poten-
tial 15 to 25 per cent emnloyment over and above the degression
level." (*)
This decision established the procedure for determining hours of
employment. Each industry was to be dealt with separately. Pursuant to
this -policy, it was announced that the -orooosed Cotton Textile Code was
not intended to constitute a -precedent for other industries. The ex-
planation given was that the cotton textile industry wss not operating
"nearly at full csnt city raid tnere is some question as to whether they
can find sufficient skilled employees for a full 40-hour week. It ought
to be obvious to bnybod:y that an industry at a low rate vould have to
have a shorter week to absorb its own unemployed workmen. A 40-nour week
in industry generally would not scratch the surface of our job of putting
large numoers of unemployed back to work. Indeed I know of no other in-
dustry in which v.e would even receive for consideration a code -proposing
a 40-hour week." (**)
This hearing therefore established the precedent of individual treat-
ment of an industry and defined the term, "normally attached", as meaning
the number of persons omoloycd by the industry in the year 1939. The in-
dustry was not called noon to absorb more than the total number of em-
ployees in 1929. If it took on more than that number it was to be par-
ticularly commended. No account was taken at that time of those who would
not be reabsorbed if the 1929 employment level were attained in each in-
dustry, or of the impossibility of attaining that level in industries
affected by a rapid rate of seasonal decline.
(*) National Recovery Administration, Codes of Fair Competition,
Vol. I, p. 5.
(**) Release No. 20 - June 28, 1933.
9862
-24-
chapti:, VI
PHESIEEHT'S E3EMPL0YMEM1 AG-PEBI ;E_:T
The acceptance of the Cotton Textile Code did not result in indication
of intent to follow suit on the part of the "ten large industries."
Apparent "indifference" prevailed among them and reluctance to act because
of "the ad.vi.oe of Chambers of Commerce and Merchant's Associations tc their
members to go d-u" , the lawyers' counsel to their "clients that there are
J ipholes in the law", (*) and the coolness to the entire move in view of
"the upswing in prices inspiring increased production and the desire of
manufacturers to benefit from the price rises." (**) Consequently, the
device of the PEA was used to stimulate activity. Eight reasons were given
for the adoption of this program: (l) the realization that action had to
be prompt and national in character, covering all industries; (3) the
absence of industrial organization; (3) the widespread anticipator;/ spec-
ula bory activity in industry; (4) the need for reaching into intrastate
businesses as well as interstate concerns; (5) the value of having public
opinion supporting the enforcement of the Act; (£) the need for immediate
action; (7) the importance of finding some method of getting the reluctant
industries to act; (8) finally, the need of some eas3r administrative
method, generally applicable and adaptable to all industry by means of
exemptions. (***)
To overcome inertia and indifference, the principles of a blanket
code for all industries were discussed by the Administrator with the three
"ERA Advisory Boards. In a private session of the Industrial Advisory
Board that day between the afternoon and night joint sessions, it deter-
mined that its policy with respect to the provisions of the blanket code
would' be that "no code should be approved that was higher in hours or
lower in' wages than expressed by the Cotton Textile Code recently signed"
(****) 'Likewise., it agreed that an average thirty-five hour maximum week
would be acceptable if provision was made for a forty hour maximum in a
single week with an eight-hour day. (*****) This recommendation for
averaging resulted from a. statement of the necessity of such averaging
within the automobile industry. (******) j\.t the joint meeting of the
several Boards and the Administrator that same evenin ', a subcommittee
was formed to formulate the provisions on the basis of the general dis-
cussion which had taken place. (*******) jfoe Committee presented to the
general committee the following agreement which was approved:
(*) Business Week, July 1, 1933
(**) Journal of Commerce, July % 1933
(***) H.S.Johnson, "The Blue Eagle from Eg; to Earth," (pew York: 1935),
i. 253-53.
(****) Minutes of Industrial Advisory Board, July 10, 1933.
(*****) Ibid.
(******) ibid. Statement of Mr. Sloan
(*******) The members of the subcommittee were: Labor, William Green and
Leo Wolman; Industry, 3-era 'd Swope and! Alfred P. Sloan; Consumers,
I Irs. Charles Bumsey.
93^2
"7or office employees, stores, banks, utilities, salesmen, except-
i : executive ar.d traveling; salesmen, maximum Lours of 40 per week
and a minimum vva, e of $1,3.00 per weed. Distinction mi, lit be made
according to size and locality of ooi.ir.kinity. Manufacturing
industries - maximum hours should be 35 per wee1; in the '13 week
period' out with the right to work _0 hours in any - weeks of
that period and not more than E hours in any one day." (*)
This hours provision remained substantially unaltered thou h the
proposals on wages underwent considerable revision in the hands of the
de-iutg administrators and other staff officers. The Administrator
reported to his staff of deputy administrators and advisers that "the
President has approved the plans for Bulletin do. 3, on the emergency
reemployment drive." (**) In the President's Reemployment Agreement as
finall* approved the following provisions concerning the hours of
ennloyment were included:
"(d) Hot to work an accounting, clerical, banking, office, service
or sales employees (except outside salesmen) in any store, office
department, establishment, or public utility, or on any automotive
or horse-drawn passenger, express, delivery, or freight service,
or in any other place o;. manner, for mo:, e than 40 hours in any 1
week and not to reduce the hours of any store or service operation
to below 52 hours in any 1 wee :, unless such hours were less than
52 hours per wee]: before July 1, 1933,- and in the latter case not to
reduce such hours at all.
"(3) Tlo.t to employ any factory or mechanical worker or artisan more
than a maximum week:of 3d hours until December 31, 1933, but with
the right to work a maximum week of 40 hours for any fi weeks within
this period; and not to employ any worker more than C hours in any
1 dag.
"(4) The maximum hours fixed in the foregoing paragraphs (2) and (3)
shall net apply to employees in establishments employing not more
than two persons in towns of less than 2,300 population which towns
are not part of a larger trace area; noV to registered pharmacists
or other professional persons employed in their profession; nor to
employees in a managerial or executive capacity, who now receive
more than 035 per week; nor to emolo "ees on emergency maintenance
and repair word; nor to very special cases where restrictions of
hours of hig'.l ' skilled workers on continuous processes would
i navoida'bly reduce production but, in any such special case, at
least time and one third shall be paid for hours worked in excess
of the maximum. Population for the purposes of this agreement shall
be determined by reference to the 1930 Federal census.
"(13) This agreement shall cease upon approval by the President of
a code to which the undersigned is subject; or, if the NRA so elects,
upon submission of a code to which the undersigned is subject and
substitution of any of its provisions for any of the terms of this
a/ reement.
(*) Minutes of the Industrial Advisory Board Meeting of July 10, 1933 -
Evening Meeting of Subcommittee.
(**) Report of Staff Meeting, July 17, 1933, First Session Bulletin do. 3
announced the president's Reemployment Agreement to the country and
9862 outlined procedure to be followed.
-26-
"(14) It is agreed that any person who wishes to do his part in the
President's reemployment drive "by signing this agreement, but who
asserts that some particular provision hereof, "because of peculiar
circumstances, will create great and unavoidable hardship, may
obtain the benefits hereof ^ signing this agreement and putting
it into effect and then, in a petition approved by a representative
trade association of his industry, or other representative organi-
zation designated "oj NBA, may apply for a stay of such provision
pending a summary investigation by NBA, if he agrees in such appli-
cation to abide by the decision c: such investigation. This agree-
ment is entered into pursuant to section 4(a) of the National
Industrial Becovery Act and subject to all the terms and conditions
required by sections 7(a) and 10(b) of that act."
In many respects, this statement introduced new principles into the
approved hours' formula. In the first place, it differentiated between
factory and non-factory personnel. It recognized a 35 hour week for
the factory workers. It set up a seasonal or peak tolerance in the
exemption to the forty hours' week comprising a six weeks' period during
the last five months of the year. (*) It established an 8-hour day for
factor}" workers but not for the non-factory employees. It exempted
completely large areas of industry consisting nf "establishments employ-
ing not more than 2 persons in towns of less than 2,500 population, which
towns are not part of a large trade area." It exempted specific classes
of employees. In this way there emerged the major elements of the NBA
policy with respect to hours. ' These included differentiation between
factory and non-factorv hours,' with exemptions for special periods and
classes of occupations.
The PRA also affected. policy on hours through provision, in Section
14, for an exemption procedure for cases where "great and unavoidable
hardships" would result from compliance with the original terms of the
agreement. The problem soon became significant though a -staff meeting of
the deputy administrators had declared that "the general policy will be
to avoid exemptions as far as possible." (**)
The 32 hour week having been suggested as a possible gaide, the
exception in the case of the cotton textile industry was at the time
specifically declared to be unusual. The Administrator meanwhile increas-
ingly suggested that the hours of labor should be set between 30 and -.0 per
week depending on the number of unemployed among those normally attached to
an industry (***) The next official document, the PEA, by setting up a
normal 35 hour week and a 40 hour maximum for peak periods, evidenced the
assumed theory that the Cotton Textile Code established a maximum.
' To meet the plan for immediate codification, the Administration
waived the principle of individual industry standards and approved a single
universal hours' provision barring unusual circumstances. In this respect
it returned to the original idea of the amended Black-Connery Bill except
f_o_r the, character _of the .arrangement and Tthe_ .idea of enfojreement jbhrou^i^
(*) In the hearings on the Cotton Textile Code, General H.S. Johnson in-
quired of one witness: "Wouldn't you be in a much better relation to
the actual business now existing, if v/e did have an average 3fi hours
over six months with a maximum of 3 hours in a day and a maximum of 40
hours a week?" (Cotton Textile Hearings, June 27,. 1933, Afternoon
Session, BeleaseJJo. 14, p. ft- ).
(**) ^ Report of Staff Meeting - July 22, 1933
(***) Meeting of July 8, 1933 with the Emergency National Committee of the
Lumber and Timber Products Industry - History of the Lumber and
38^2 Timber Products Code. Exhibit B,
•27-
voluntary public cooperation.
The proposals in the PHA were accepted as standards instead of the
3 2 hour week previously pro-osed by the Administrator, (*) as a report
of a staff meeting of deputy administrator? to consider general policies
showed. It contained the following statement:
"Standards for industrial nlants in general would seem to have been
arrived at approximately as follows : 55 hours per average week and
minimum ?/age of 30^ in low cost areas up to 40^ in metropolitan
areas. When an industry proposes a longer work wee]: or lower wages,
it is prober to suggest very strongly that the burden of oroof -Till
'be u?on them to establish their position." (**)
The P?_A as a standard tended to supercede the principle of variabil-
ity of hours amoiV' industries.
Developments following the PEA determined the degree of adherence to
the decision that the Cotton Textile Code should set the maximum terms of
employment and to the individual determination of the hours provision of
an industry on the absorption of those unemployed persons normall"/ attach-
ed to the industry. (***) it left unsettled fee issue of using the 1°29
employment record as a gauge of hours for the industry. The question
whether precedent, individual industry capacity for reemployment as
measured by the 1929 employment base, or collective bargaining was to
govern the provisions in the codes relating to hours of work remained
xinsettlec;..
(*) By radio address of June 25, and statement to the Shipbuilders on
July 22.
(**) Report of Staff Meeting, Jul,-- 22, 1935. Statement of Mr. Dudley
Cates.
(***) Report of Staff "Meeting of Deputy Administrators, July 22, 1933:
C-eneral Williams asked if the 35 hour maximum workweek in industry
"orcvided for in the President's reemployment program would apply
in the event of the filing of code by industry. It was agreed that
neither this nor any other provisions of the President's Reemployment
Agreement would apply to any code. The general policy would be to
work out maximum hours in each industry's code on a basis designed
to "rbsorb as many of the unemployed in that industry as possible."
0^:^
-25-
CHAPTER VII
3LHL A4Wi^ATI0N JOE CODE HOURS
le formulae for hours obtainable by the individual industry's
responsibility for raising employment to the 1929 level, although quite
'erent from organized labor's proposal of uniform hours for all indus-
tries to be determined by the extent of unemployment in the -.-.hole United
ptafc^u, required factual information for each industry separately.
Consequently, the Division of Research and Planning was ashed to
present the necessary estimates and calculations. The economic adviser
to the deputy administrator or officer handling a code helped to ascertain
minimum wages and shifts and maximum hours. These economic advisers were
requested by the Division of Research and Planning tc determine "the work-
ing hours required oo restore employment to the level of 1929 .or other
base period . . . (and the) numbers which would have been employed in
1331 and 1952 and at present if proposed maximum hour regulations had
been in effect." (*)
The resulting data varied in accurac;-. and reliability. Where infor-
mation.was available it was often inadequate for the purpose of the !'RA.
Frequently definitions of their industry by those presenting codes did
not coincide with those used in existing statistical materials. In man '
instances there was no information at all. Sometimes under such circura-
st ices, the Division of Research and Pis tning conducted special investi-
gations. (**) In many ca.ses the only information upon which conclusions
were based were the unverified estimates or guesses of code sponsors,
frequently unacquainted with conditions prevailing within the:' r own industry
(*) Research and Planning Staff 'Memorandum No. 5, (July 14, 1933' from
LIr. Von Szeleski, subject: "Outline for Industry Reports." In the
Staff Memorandum Ho. 7, (September 27, 1933) on "preparation of
Statistical Reports" fro:.; Mr. 'Von Szeleski, the following is included:
"3 Ordinarily the discussions would center around two main points:
(1) Maximum hour provision -which will contribute towards absorbing
the unemployed, the absorption ability of a single industry being
given due consideration.
(2) A minimum wage, so far as possible, will restore in lar ■
measure the purchasing power of 1929, but which should recognize
the prying ability and the price characteristics of the industry -
ability to absorb production at increased prices."
In Staff Memorandum :7o. 52 from V.S. Von Szeleski, (November 14, 1933)
on "Subjects for Reports," he suggests as subject (e): "How much
Reemployment will be effected by the Code? If you cannot calculate it,
at least guess."
(**) See "Wares and Hours in American Industry11 by Solomon Barkin and Anne
Page. Works Material nine
98fi2
These were the materials up™ which SEA decisions were founded. The first
two hundred approved codes showed the resulting problems (Appendix B) (*)
Most of those first t'"0 hundred approved codes covered industries for
which there was information on the number of employees, "but less "frequently
data with respect to actual and average hours. Estimates of the necessary
hours' standards to increase employment to the 1929 level were therefore
sometimes impossible. The accuracy of these estimates was further affected
by the fact that they were based upon estimated total man h-urs and number
of persons on the payroll, without allowances for occupational exemptions or
the seasonal flexibilities permitted in the code. The importance of this
omission may bo gauged from a study of 31 major industries employing some
4 million persons. It was found that 13. 0 per .cent of the employees worked
in occuoati >ns with limited exemptions and 13.0 with total exemptions per-
mitting work bey/ad the code basic hours; and 63.3 percent rbre were permitted
to work additional hours during seasonal or peak peri ds. (**) These exemption*
were sufficiently serious to modify the estimates on reemployment in the
code-, yet no allowance was made for them in the calculations. The figures
showed the probable effect of the single test of employment 'by each industry
equal to its 1939 level.
For forty-eight of the first two hundred approved codes the Division of
Research and Planning made definite recommendations concerning basic h-urs
required to reemploy at least up to the number on its 192 pay roll. The
recommendations were distributed according to the following frequency
distribution: two industries, hours between 5 and 9 per week (funeral supply;
and shovel, dragline andcrane); three industries, hours between 10 .and 14
per week (all metal insect screen; structural clay; and vitrified clay
sewer pipe); four industries, hours between 15 and 19 hours per week
(business furniture; office equipment; floor and wall cloy tile; and
scientific ap-oaratus); nine industries, weekly hours between 20 and 34;
three industries, weekly hours between 25 and 29; eight industries, weekly
hours between 30 and 32.4; seven industries, weekly hours between 32.5
and 34.9; three industries, weekly hours between 35 and 37.4; seven in-
dustries, weekly hours between 37.5 and 40; and one industry each for 43
and 50 hours (american match; and Jce industries, respectively.)
In 70 additional industries estimates were available of anticipated
reemployment following approved or proposed code hours. The estimates
were' mainly calculations of the percentage of accessions to the payroll
resulting from shortening of the hours to an 'indicated level of hoursto the
number on the pay roll in 1929. These figures, though frequently estimates
based upon estimates, were the "best data available for setting of standards
and determining MA policy.
Cf these 72 industries, it was estimate i thai 26 would nave ' crml oyed
under the code hours as many jr slightly more persons than were on their
pay rolls in 1929. (Table 1). That group contained several new or ex-
panding industries such as oil burner, domestic freight forwarding,
wholesale automotive, wax neper, and grain strip wood block, ark sanitary
(*) In iJRA St jj ies Special Exhibits - Work . htcriols .1). do - E
(**) u Hour and Seasonal Differentials in Selected N.E.A. Codes." (Ay endix C)
In MA Studies Special Exhibits - Work Material i'b. 45 - B
9862
TABLE 1
distribution cj co::e; sy ?edcd7y;^:: estimated employment
U.TDER CODES OP 1929 EMPLOY STI U INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRIES
AITD ET DASIC WEEKLY "OURS USED ET CALCUL.TI ~"T 0? ESTIMATED
E'-iFLOr-'ENT UNDER CODES I"7 DIVISION CD RESEARCH AITD
PLANNING REPORTS
Percentage Total
Estimated Emplo2/ment
Under Codes in Indus-
try of 1929 Employment
in the Incus try
Total
25 - 49;D"
50 - 59
60 - 69
70 - 79
80 - 89
,90-99
'100 - 109
110 - 119
120 - 149
150 and over
Basic Weekly Hours Used in Calculation
of Estimated Bnployment Un'er Codes
in Division of Research and Planning
Reports
Total
72
9
5
9
7
4
12
11
4
7
4 .
35
36
4
1
1
2
57
1
44
2
1
1
53
7
4
5
5
3
10
10
3
1
1
48
Source: A ondix B
In ITRA Studies Special Exhibits - Work Materials No. 45-B
54
9862
-31-
napkin industries. The rest, n the basis of estimates, would not have
incroasec their number of employees to the 19.-39 level. In f o.ct , 2^'
industries would have employed less than 70 ner cent of their 19 9 quota.
The conclusions concerning probable hours in the codes under rigid
adherence to this formula throughout all the code negotiati ons were:
(1) Basic hours per we I: would have varied widely in the codes ranging
from about ten to more than forty hours; (2) most of the codes would
hove est blished a basic standard of considerably less than forty hours
though individual industries night nave adopted forty hours or more; (3)
the impracticability of reducing hours to as low as ten or twenty was
patent and considerations in addition to the formula under consideration
would have been neen necessary; (4) additional criteria were required
for industries with excessive nre-IulA working hours since return to the
1929 level in some of them would still have left average hours out of
line with prevailing policy; (5) maintenance of a living "age on the
shorter work "feel: would have become "particularly acute in the very in-
dustries in which production and employment was at it? lowest ebb; (6)
a special nelicy '"ould have been necessary with resnect to the responsi-
bility of new or expanding industries for absorbing some of the increase
in working ponulation and some of those who could not be returned to the
industries where reduction of hours could not be practiced sufficiently to
raise employment to the 1939 level; and (7) s one provision would have been
required to employ those not reemployed through the shortening of hours,
the public works projects and the hoped for revival of industry resulting
from the industrial recovery measures.
J 8 62
-32-
CHAPT^R VIII
CODZS SUddlTTT duaT_'& HLLIOD THOy JULY 6, 195 ■ to AUC-SUT 15,
1955.
Wiiile the program established by NBA policy would have resulted in
a iride range of hours of labor among the various industries, the employer
proposals did not vary so markedly. The effect of the first 1IRA endeavors
and proclamation of its purposes is given in a sura ary review :f the early
code proposals as announced in the various newspapers and noted in the
NBA "Press Digest" (Ap-endix D). (*)
While the newspaper summaries were inexact, they showed the basic
work week contemplated cy industry. During the period1 covered extending
over more than a month, a range of industries includi . apparel and textile
industries, iron and steel, retail, trucking, an." construction, had drafted
and discussed codes. These industries were "almost universally asking for
forty (40) hour work week as a minirrvun work period. They evidently had
taken their cue from the cotton textile code." One newswriter declared
that "it is just as evident that theyxhose to ignore warnings by both
the President and I-Ir, Johnson .that a forty (40) hour week w-s not to be
taken for granted for all industries." (**)
Ync Press Digest repo.rts were corroborated by a review of the original
proposals of the first one-hundred approved codes. The basic hours' pro-
posals for the production employers for these industries indicated that
only ten contemplated a shorter basic week than forty hours (40) for their
production employees. Those reco. .tending a shorter week were;
30 hour basic week - cast iron soil pipe;
32 hour basic week - bituminous coal and oil burner;
35 hoar basic week - automobile and gasoline pump;
36 hour basic we k - electrical, laundry and dry cleaning mach-
inery mfg.; compressed air; heat exchange
and punro mfg.
Offsetting this group were the four industries which presented a longer
than forty (40) hour basic week in their propose:! codes. (***) All of the
other eighty-six codes were presented with a basic forty (40) hour week
for tae production employees. (See Appendix E)
(*) In NBA Studies Special Exhibits - Work Materials No. 45-3
(**) Philadelphia Public Ledger, (july 18, 1933) - "General Code Being
Hushed for L, , tr .s" - by '". W. Wheat on.
(***) T were: salt laanuf ac tur i ng with a basic forty-two (42) hour
k for processing and manufacturing, and a forty (40) and
forty-eight (48) hour week respectively for the North and the South;
the transit industry with forty-four (44) hours for the shop and
forty-eight (48) hours for )p rating divisions, and a forty-eight
(48) hour basic week for motor vehicle retailing and motor bus
industries.
9862
The ERA was in- part, intended to minimise the ii.T-iort7i.ncc of the
Cotton Textile Code as a precedent; "but the codes which we re submitted1
or even under consideration during the latter part of July and the early
part of August after the PSA '-'rive was proclaimed, only in a limited
number of cases, broke away from this forty (40 hour standard. In several
instances, they did pro ose a shorter work week, particularly in the
apparel industries, and in several metal manufacturing industries
opera oing at a very low rite 3f capacity.
An industry generally follower1 the first, precedent instead of devising
its own independent standards or trying to reach its employment levels
of 1939*. A general uniformity resulted unrelated to the amoun": of
unemployment in the respective branches of industry. Since the ITEA
pro ran was founded on the principle of voluntary cooperation by industry
these facts wore enormously significant for reemployment. 3JEA was pre-
sented with proposals n.t developed in accordance with its .standards.
The efiect of this drive toward uniformity in provisions concerning hours
of work unrelated to basic conditions or ability to absorb, raised the
question whether the Administrate :n should undertake and succeed in the
wholesale revision of the codes toward greater conformity with NBA
standards or whether the avalanche of similar codes presented by groups
unwilling to accept other terms was to modify 1IRA activity and policy.
!S6
-34-
CHAPTER IX .
3DTIS PROVISIONS OF P.R.A. SU3STITUTKLTS
The first indication of resoluti n )f this ^roblein appeared in
JRA action with respect t: the President's Reemployment A r nt. The
NRA organization turned its energies for a time towar ) alarizing
the PRA and making it succeed. This irivo had hardly 'otten underway,
however, before individual industries ;■■ c led to the NRA for exemptions
fro; th basic agreement. The significant test was at hand.
Industry generally approved PRA but sought exemptions from the ioasic
agreement. MRA at the start adopted "the general policy., to avoid exception
as far as possible." (*) But this policy was hardly proclaimed before it
was found necessary to develop some systematic machinery f--r handling
such exemption casus. Deputy a ministrators were considering exceptions
requested by industry and confusion became evident in the absence of uni-
form policy. Furthermore, thc'iLabor Advisory Board's inability to handle
the smaller industries was pointed out with the recommendation that "t i
policy of thcMRA should be to set uj some general principle which would
govern.11 (**) Finally, the iTRA Policy Board was established. (***) to
correlate policies and report upon petitions for substitutions of code
for PRA provisions.
I Procedure for Substitutions
I obtain a substitution the industry was required to file a copy of
its proposals for consideration by the Administration. In the handling
of these substitutions of the PRA standards by proposed code standards,
the root question was wheth r 1:?A should return to the cotton textile
precedent or accept hours' standards in terms ~f the condition of ench
specific industry. The Administrative stand was that "there would be no
blanket exceptions..." In those instances, however, where industry had a
code which appeared to come close bo meeting the general objectives of the
NRA of reemploying people in the industry and of setting an adequate
minimum wage to increase purchasing power, the industry was permitted to
obtain the insigni while following the usual code procodmro. The Admin-
istrator insist.- , h wever, that "this procehir: would not be permitted
to whittle aw . basic requirements of the h~A" (****)
The Policy Bo .rd, as established, interpreted its functions narrowly.
In instructions to petitioners, it declared that "the only function of the
Bo .rd is to pass on th Licability of the code provisions is writt. .
o docs not allow any bargaining for or negotiating or personal interviews
Such a procedure is not only ina ,- iri be but it does n t allow for the
(*) ' ' ' S1 V ::' . tine, July ttT'lOSS,"
(**) ■: of Staff Meeting, July 31, 1933. Statement of Dr. Leo Tfolman
(***) On August 7, 1333, Office Order Ho. 18.
(****) rt of St .ting, Kuly 31, 1933. Stat meat if Ocncral
J tins on.
-35-
pronr t tr; tment t .1 which all petitioners are entitled." (*)
In the instruct! ons-, the pri iary purpose of the PRA was reiterated.
It was noted that the "NRA -ill not elect to approve the substitutions
of the provisions of the e" < - for >ar ■■. is of P3A unless such code
provisions cover the sanfc ,_>' ■-.-.. j' v the F 14. paragr •«; .:. and unless the
substance of such provisi 11s is within the spirit of the PEA., i.e. to
shorten hours and raise wages, to incre sc crdr^eui nd purchasing
power to approximately the 1922 level." (**) In fact, it was hoped that
this procedure requiring the submission of a code previous to the re-
quest for a.n exemption would lead to the revision of the "wages and hour
provisi ns of a submitted code so as to nave it within the spirit of
PRA for substitution purposes." (***)
On the worksheet which was to he developed to support the substi-
tutions, the applicants were requested to furnish "data to show that these
provisi -is would bring wages and hours to approximately the 1939 level."
f ****\
II Approved Substitutions
In view of this frequent reiteration of the 1TRA position that
industry's proposals should be in harmony with the aims of ERA, the results
are of special interest. In all, 566 petitions for substitutions were
presenter by individual industries. Of this number 45 v/ere withdrawn by
the industry; for 3 there was no record of action; 131 were disapproved
by NRA; and 3 were rejected by the industry, iafter modification had been
made by NBA (*****) practically all the substitutions were approved during
August and September . 1933, principally during the former month.
The hours' provisions in the P?.A were the ones most seriously ques-
tioned by industry, as illustrated by the fact that -.est of the PHA
substitutions granted related to paragra; .s 3, 3, and4of the PEA which
governed the hours of non-productive employees, of productive employees,
and tnc hour exemptions for specific classes, respectively. All of the
substitutions modified one or .oovc of the hours provisions of the PRA.
In face, 353 of the substitutions, or 91 per cent, related to the hours
of productive employees, and 334 substitutions concerned paragraph 2,
governin; the hours for non-productive employees (Table 2). In contrast,
only 333 of the substitutions or 63 per cent modified the minimum wage
rates with respect to productive employees. The modifications for the
other paragraphs were relatively minor. The incidence of the PRA substi-
tutions was, therefore, principally ^n the hours provisions. (Appendix P)
( ****** \
(*) H. C. Hoover, "History of the President's Reemployment Agreement."
Organization Studies Section - Draft of December 2, 1935, p. 15
(**) Ibid., p. 44
(***) Ibid., p. 45.
(****) Ibid., quoted on p. 45.
(*****) Ibid., p. 49
(»*****) in ERA Studies Special Exhibits - Work Materials Ho. 45-B
-36-
TABLS 2
PSA SUBSTITUTIONS BY luJIBER OF MODIFICATIONS
FOR INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS OF PRA
piFagr^aph Modified Provisions
x£ P 3?.A, CO H IJ'S I Numbe_r of Substitutions
3. Chilcl Labor Restrictions II
2 Hours of ITon-Productive Emnloyees'
3 Hours of Productive Employees
4 Hour Exemptions (Population,
Skilled Worker & Executive) 54
5 Wages - ITon-productive Employees 56
6 Wages - Productive Employees 239
7 Maintenance of '.','-' e and
Equitable Adjustment 30
3 Subterfuge • 1
9 Price Increases 7
10 ■ Patronize ERA Establish ents 3
11 Cooperate in Submit tin;. C 4
12 ' Price Adjustments on Contracted Goods 3
13 Te r:n i n 1 1 L : n o f A{ ;reeme n t s 2
14 Undue Hardship Clause 3
-37-
TABL1 8
SUMMAHT OF HOUR PROVISIONS 07 PRA SUBSTITUTIONS, BT BASIC HOURS, TTPE OT PROVISION, 1TO
INDUSTRT QROUP
•e
•
•
4
o
|
•
•
t-l
«
•
1
2
■
0
o
»-l
u
o
1
•
4
•
4
Baale
Type of
h
•
J:
» ■
a
«4
M
s>
4»
1
o
e
■H
n
&
Howl
Provision
Total
i
5
4>
5
4*
■
a
►.
i
4
•
Pi
2
0,
at
•0
•
O
*4
o
3
•
s
3
8
•
h ■
if
a*
i
a
O
1
S
a
i:
o
1
ft.
i
i
■d
o
o
I
5
h4
a*
■
a
o
o
•
i
2
•
to
13
33 Ha* Max
35
Total
S
l
3
l
Plat Max
3
l
l
Pk. Par.
2
l
ATer««.
3
2
36
Total
n
■5
l
3
l l
Plat Max
k
3
Pk. Perd
k
1
3
Aver'g.
3
2
1
HO
Total
Plat Max
315 2/3
146 5/6
jjt ,
2
2
20
1
23
11
1
1
28
13
2k Ik
18
16
k
2
50 15
25 k
2
k
2
7
5
1*,
24
n
8 2/3
2
2
2 1/3
Pk. Perd.
25 1/3
3
1
2
5 1
1
2
l
\
6
3 1/3
Arar'jt.
13Si
5.
11
2
3
8
11
13
26 8
2
1
20
10
1
2
2
3*
7
3
**• * P*t
').
1
3
1
kz
ATer'g.
1
1
g.
kk
Total
Plat Max
11 1/6
1
7f
1
— £-
l
2/3
k 5/6
1
1*
1
5|
l,
i/3
Pk. Perd.
1/3
1/3.
Arer'jt.
3
3
At. ft Pk.
3
3
••5
Plat Max
2
n
l
l
us
Total
302/3
1
10
1
1
7
— 5-
M
2
2
H
k
t.lfi
Plat Max
20 1/3
1
5
1
1
3
P
3 1/3
Pk. Perd.
3 1/3
3
i/?
ATer'a.
6
2
k
G
AT. & Pk.
1
i :
50
Plat Max
*
ft
Arer'jt,
1
1
54
Plat Max
2
i
1
1
TOTAL
30
8
20
3
5
a
24
1
35
75 23
18
k
53 15
7
11
7
10
25
15
9863
-38-
III Bas i c In -jit- in Sub stitutions
The modificati sns made in the hours provisions radically changed the
"basic hours as conceive' by bho )ri ,;iv:l A r." . ent.
YJhilo a thirty-five (35) hour ". : i >r roanufaeturing industries
with a forty (40) hour we ■'■■; ncak perioc. exemption .iad been originally
conceived as ^-equate, thii proved unsatisfactory to the trade as-
sociation and employer groups. They filed requests for exemptions. Most
of the 384 substitutions granted increase! the "basic hours of employment
in addition to relaxing the peak period and seasonal tolerance permitted
under the original President's Reemployment Agreement. Only eight sub-
stitution- a opted the "basic hours of the PEA while one adopted a thirty-
three (33) hour week. The other substitutions, comprising 97.6 per cent
of all those approved adoptei a longer work week. The grouo providing for
a forty (40) hour week included 315-2/3 of the substitutions and consti-
tuted 8,J.l per cent of hie total number. (*)
Of the remaining 59-1/3 substitutions, eleven adopted a thirty-six
(36) hour wee]' an' the others obtained grants for a more than forty (40)
hour week. The latter group consisting of 48-1/3 substitutions mainly
provided for forty-four hours (11-1/6 substitutions) and forty-eight
(43) hours (30-2/ 3 substitutions). The longest week approved in the
substitutions -:. s for fifty-four (54) hours. (Table 3). This complete
departure from the basic hours prescribed by the original PRA was a
significant index of the industry's f orcefulnos<= in presenting to the
iTRA the oropriety of longer hours than agree" ten on as proper and, ^adequate
by the IRA and the Industrial Advisory Board in the original consideration
of the PEA. The fact that the code substitutions covered industries
employing . ore than seventeen rnilli n workers (**) showed how far
reaching the devi tions from the PRA substitutions were from the basic
agreement.
In these substitutions ~o^j industry groups a larger proportion of
the substitutions for the construction industry adopted the basic PRA
substitution than 'id any other groups, hext in order cane the equipment
and machinery group. In the following industriesail substitutions
provided for a Jasic forty (40) hour week: forest products, rubber, textile-
fabrics, textile-apparel, leather, furs, graphic arts, and finance. The
following addit; nal industrial groups included no substitution with more
than f rty (40) dours, and several with lessthan forty (40 hours; non-
metallic minerals, fuel, and equipment and machinery. The industries with
the largest proportion of substitutions with hours longer than forty (40)
were in the transportation end communication group. Next in order of the
longest proportion of hours beyond forty (40) was retail distribution
(*) The fractions refer to substitutions where two or more sets of basic
hours were established. If three different basic hours were provided
the substitution was noted in each hoar group as l/3
(**) Office o-f National Recovery Administration, Division of Review,
Substitutions in connection with the President's Reemployment
Agreement bj/ Paul Hatchings, Work Materials No. 30
)8S2
-39-
which also included the substitution specifying the longest hours or
fifty-four (54). The service trades and the food groups had. also a
significant number of subs ti tut. vis with longer hours. Few substi-
tutions in the other industrial .roups had longer than forty (4"1.) hours,
The forty (40) hour ;oat~ern, tn r< 'ore, -orevH-iled among the
industries which obtained substitutions. The number with shorter hours
was comparatively small; the number with "longer hours was relatively
larger. Of course, industries desiring a thirty-five (35) havr week
might not have requested a substitution. Howev r, the codes presented
duria , the first two months of 1IHA and those for the industries vhich
had not obtained substitutions indicated that they' had not, on the
whole, subscribed to a shorter week than forty (40) hours. The codes
with rare exceptions provided for a forty (40) hour week or lo iger.
17. Seas oaal Tolerances . , ;
However, the hours provisions of the PdA substitutions were not
found exclusively in terms of the basic hours. In fact the structure
of tie hours provisions was. so complicated that determination of the
actual average mao:imum honors for employees within a given industry
was difficult without detailed calculations and intimate ^knowledge of
the -rocticcs of the industry. Such computations must have taken
ace von t :f employment for an entire year. It necessitate', record of:
(a) bhe number of employees subject to flat maximum hours regulations;
(b ) of those granted se .sonal allowances, with the number of weeks of
the exemptions and the weekly tolerance and, (c) the occupational
exemptions from the ba.sic hours involvin calculation of the numbcr
of a.rpleyocs and the tolerance per wec*k.(*)fffee seasonal and occupational
exemptions permitted a Ion, er working week and, consequently, higher
average annual maximum hours for the industry than possible under the
flat maodmum rules without ex; qnti ms. Industries sought to increase
pea'.:, seasonal and occupati aal exemptions insofar as permitted. Basic
weekly hours leaat to many not the maximum, but the average attained
if slack and peaks were included. ' The conflict between these t"o con-
caots was a significant phase ia the history of 1IHA policy,
A. IFlat Maximum fieaulations
Of the entire 384 substitutions, 134.5 established flat maximum
regulations for their hours of work. (Table 4). Of these, eight had
lesc than (40) hours and 39-3/3 cod's more than forty (40) hours. In
n important industry grou- did the substitutions consist conclusively
jf flat i aximum regulation of hours, although -ibout forty per cent of
the substitutions in most groups consistoc of such fl.t maximum regulation.
In the textile apparel group sixteen :<f the eighteen substitutions eon-
bair.v 1 such specifications. The forest products (four out of five),
tcxtilc-fobrics (thirty- one jut ^f seventy- f our) and service trades
(6.^ out of ten) were next in proportion of their substitutions in this
group. The graphic arts and the oetals, ferrous and aon-fcrrous,
ncrally permitted wider seasonal variations then the other groups.
(*) Sc Appendix C for m an? lysis. seas aal anc' occupational cx-
e iptions for 31 selected codes. In L1BA Studios Special Exhibits
Work"- Materials '.To. 45-B
266..
-40-
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3
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9862
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the
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the
J- -, 4- 1
t .it
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-41-
Sincc the industries generally sought flexibility in hours provisions
at various times, the other substitutions, some 300 in number, included
provisions for peal" .:■'- seas v 1 c editions desi nated in the sub-
stitution. Cn the whole, these cases f II within two categories: averag-
ing and define1 c : ■•■erioc. tolerances. They considerably increased
the average maximum wort wc. :.
3. Avo raging
than three-quarters :.f the foregoing substitutions adopted
Ing method of seasonal t dcrrice, This procedure allowed
ig tine aggregating specific." Maxima in given weeks, but
iver a specified nuhber of weeks or months was not to exceed
average specific 1- in the code. Tno most frequent averaging
period adopted in the substitutions was eighc to ten weeks, although
the four to five weeks an 1 the thirteen ?/eeks period were common. In
twenty substitutions the averaging period was six months and in four,
one year. (Tables 5 and 6). In these industries the significant pro-
vision was frequently the maximum weekly hours rather than the basic
hours stated in the code, ■.-.incc slack periods permitted, the weekly
inaximum specified in the code to beco e the real operating hours for the
industry. The modal difference between the basic and the actual weekly
time was eight hours (109.5 substituti ons) . In the substitutions for
thirty industries weekly hours were unlimited so long as the average
over the designated period did nit exceed the specified, basic standard.
(Table 7). The averaging orocec.ure was later declared by NBA to be
the provision mo~t difficult to enforce and most subject to abuse. It
did. nuc.i to modify the basic hours est blished in cod.es, if not complete-
ly to nullify their intent.
C. Pari: Period. Tolerance
The second type )f toierooicc "oermitoed. definite -ocak periods during
specified periods if t _io year. This peak period tolerance was evidently
a more adequate administrative and comiliancc method than averaging for
meeting special and unusual cas r. The definite peak period tolerance
could. b< •■ accurately defined, and. therefore mire carefully safeguarded,
from rdouse o:aC restricted to the actual needs if the industry. The
whole procedure depended, >f coa.rse, upon development of standards and
)olicy concerning the proper grant or use of tolerances; but IfdA ex-
perience was too brief for their development and the insistent desire
of industry for tolerance toi strong to permit proper consideration of
this problem. Single formulae wore s ought irrespective of its short-
comings and its possible effect on the regular izat ion of emoloyment.
Of the total sxidstituti ons , 35 provided, peal: periods. The greatest
number were in the seasonal food industries, in wholesale distributing
and in the equipment and machinery classification. The propriety of a
peak period -orovision depends upon the degree of their adaptation to
the industry's requirements. This is shown by the length if the peak
period tolerance, (Tables 6 and 9). The most common duration was six
weeks, but twenty of the thrity-five codes established periods if twelve
wcehs or less. However, six substituti oas extended, the tolerance
provisi ni over an entire year or 1 >r m unlimited time. .Actually,
therefore, working time in these industries could be indefinitely .extended
without violating the provisions of the P3A substitution. Obviously a
9862
-42-
TABU 6
SUHUHT OT PHA SUBSTITUTIONS CONTAINING AVERAGING TTPE OF HOOT PROVISIONS, BT BiSIC
HOOTS, TTPE 01 PROVISION, AND INDUSTBT &B0UP
Ba-
Arer'g.
Mai.
• lo
Period
■kljr.
Ere.
Irs.
Total
§
g
i
BB
35 s jflgj ait&i
6 mo 8. 48
40
1 year 48
36 4 eke. 42
6 aoa. 42
He
4-5 wke. 55"
Total 138J,
5 11 2 3 8 11
13 26 8 2 1 20 10 1 2 2
^7 3
48
j£L
1 1
1 4
■ Unltd.
6
1
1
1
1
1
1
6 wks. 48
4
4
1
1
1
1
1
8
Unltd.
8
1
«
8-10 wks. 44
3
57
1
1
1
s
48
2
5
1
3
4
6
8
4
1
1
<}
3
1 63
Unltd.
7
1
1
4
1
13 rice. 44
1
1
48
17
2
2
1
1
2
4
2
1
1
g
1
Unltd.
3
1
2
0
4 moe. 48
2
1
ft
1
B
Unltd.
1
EH
6 moe. 44
1
i
48
12
2
1
1
2
1
5
54
1
Unltd.
1
1 Tear 45
1
42 13 wks. Unltd.
1
-#
44 6 idee. 48
2
6 mos, 48
1
48 4 ifee. unltd.
1
3 moe. Unltd.
3
6 moi. Unltd.
1
1 year 56
1
50 2 moe. Unltd.
1
TOTAL
I55i
6
13
2
3
8
11
15
32
8
2
1
21
10
2
6 2
3473
9862
-43-
TABLE 6
pra substitutions ":ii: Airaj jiitg 7- n o:
HOTillS Air A'Tj.I C;-I'tG
>:or:i; provisions, by b^sic
PERIODS
1 -
Basic
AVER
lG-1
1TC I-
BRI
OD
■
4-5
weeks
6
weeks
*
3 -
we el
10
:s :
13
weeks
: 4 mo.
: 6 mo.
: 1
j" ear
Total
: 155-1- :
35%
10
•
•
69
:
25
: 3
: : 20
3
35
3
-
-
1
-
-
1
1
35
3
1
-
-
-
-
2
~
40
138-|-
23lj
8
67
21
3
15
1
42
1
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
: ■ 44
' ' 3
'-
'2
-
-
-
1
-
48
6
1
~
»*
3
•^
1
1
50
1
-
-
1
—
—
—
""■
9362
-44-
TABLE 7
PRA SUBSTITUTIONS WITH AVERAGING IYF3 01 HOUR PROVISION, BY 3ASIC
HCU.S MI HOURLY DIJ^ZENCJi] BE'FSEEil BASIC Al~- AXI EUM
WEEKLY HOURS
Basic:
Total
Hours :
55
3
36
3
40
133>
42
1
44
3
48
6
50
1
Difference Be t we :- n 3 a sic and Maximum Weekly Hours
• • • ■ • i t
• • • • *• • •
4 hrs.:5 hrs.:6 hrs.;8 irs.:12 hrs.: 13 hrs. :14 hrs.:Unl.
3 - 1
2 - 1 -
6 1 108% - 1 22
5
1
Total 155%
2 109 \
30
9862
-45-
provision so easily evaded was of slight value in effecting reemploy-
ment.
The second aspect of the study of peak period tolerance was the
allowed maximum weekly hours during the tolerance period. The mode
here, as in averaging, was eight hours. Four substitutions .provided
a four hour difference from the basic week, while eight, on the other
hand, permitted unlimited hours during the peak period. The latter
substitutions with no restrictions during peak periods therefore
cancelled any possible effect upon unemployment achieved by shorten-
ing of the hours during normal operation. (Table 10).
D. Averaging and Peak Period Tolerance
Nine substitutions contained both peak oeriod tolerance and
averaging provisions. The industries concerned, largely in the fabri-
cating and food groups and ordinarily operating under averaging
arrangement s, were permitted for specific limited peak periods to
work special hours which were not counted in the normal averaging pro-
cess. Such substitutions still further expanded the hours pro-
visions. ( Table ll). ..
9362
-46-
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-48-
TABLE 10
FEAK PEHIOD TOLEIL4I7CES Hi PEA SUBSTITUTION, BY BASIC HOURS AND
DIPEEBEITCE 3ET17EEN BASIC AND MAXILiULI UEEKLY HOURS
Total :
Ji:
Fference
Bet
ween Basic and "la:
:iraun
"eekly Hours
Basic
"lours
H
hrs
:U.S to
. : 5 hrs.
•
•
8 hrs. :
12
i b 111
•s.
*
•
*
•
Unlimited
35
2
-
1
-
-
1
36
H
1
-
-
-
3
Ho
25 1/3
3
2
isi *
1
l 1/3 **
kk
1/3
-
-
-
-
1/3
Us
3 1/3
~
-
-
1
2 1/3
Total
35
4
3
is*
i;-
s
* Includes one substitution giving one week of US hours during each
S~week period.
** Includes one substitution with peak limited to lkh hours per year.
9S62
-49-
TASLE 11
HOUR PROVISIONS Ojf PRA SUBSTITUTIONS CONTAINING BOTH AVERAGING
AND PEAK PERIOD PROVISIONS, BY BASIC HOURS, TYPE OF
PROVISION, AND INDUSTRY GROUP
Basic
Hours:
Averaging !
Peak
Total
Non :
Met :
Liin :
Eao :
Con •
str
Distr.
Trades
Retail :
Pood
Period
Maximum ■
Duration
Maximum
40
2 mo.
US
1 Unlt'd.
US
1
1 :
12 mo.
unit» a.
! U nfcs.
Us
1
i 1 !
10 wks.
US
! lb v:!:s.
5U
1
1
6 mo.
Unit ' d.
1 year
lUU •
extra hr
1
t
S wks.
Unlt'd.
:1 uk. ea.S
US
1
1
J
UU
12 mo.
US
: lo -.71: s.
52. S
7
3
US
12 mo.
Unlt'd.
: S \.'l:s.
5U
l
: 1
TOTAL.
o- '
l.:-3 : l
9862
-50-
V. 0c cunat icnal ^xerrot ior.s
These seasonal and ;ieal: period .provisions did not exhaust the list
of exemptions. The basic hours were further modified by the exceptions
of specific types of employees. Although analysis of their relative
importance is beyond the scope of this study, about a fourth of the
e: ployees under 31 codes for which evidence is availabe were either
totally or to a United degree exempt f~or. basic hours provisions, the
proportion being 1" per cent for each type. Since another 62.3 per
cent cane under seasonal raid peri: period provisions these exemptions
markedly effected the probabilities of 'reemployment for those indus-
tries. : Appendix C. (*) : :
Of the PPA substitutions 21 contained no modification of paragraph
4 providing for additional occupational exemptions, (Table 12). The
most common occupational exemptions under PuA --ere for watchmen (223);
engineers (122 substitutions); firemen (112 substitutions); and repair-
men (103 substitutions). These also tended to modify the hours' regu-
lations, reducing the necessity of hiring additional persons and, with
it, opportunities for reemployment.
VI. Conclusion :
The actual terms, of the T'A substitution brought out. the. gap be-
tween the original basic PHA agreement and the terms of the substitu-
tions under which industries actually operated. Instead of a simple
arrangement originally contemplated "ay the Agreement with a thirty-five
hour week for manufacturing and a forty (4n) hour week for service in-
dustries, the rule became fort;r (d-n) hours with substitutions more fre-
quently establishing a longer than 0. shorter work reek. Though it had
originally contemplated grant of but few substitutions, PHA became more
identified with the employment .standards of the substitutions than with
those in the original agreement. Hours of labor provisions -ere quali-
fied ~q-j longer basic hours and exemptions for seasonal and peri; periods
and for specific occupations.
The first test disclosed wholesale departure from original IIRA
standards. Uith these modif ications went the influence which the
agreements might have exerted upon future codes. In some codes PFA.
agreements, instead of temporary drafts subject to wholesale revisions,
became the standards for code negotiations, and PFA substitutions were
decisive in determining the hours pattern of the 1"HA codes.
A pattern was established for the basic hours. Unlike the one
contemplated by the rigid enforcement 0" the 1929 employment level theory,
these substitutions adopted uniform basic hours but varied largely in
terms of the seasonal or peri: period or occupational exemptions. The
short period available for the stud;- of these substitutions afforded no
opportunity for study or assurance that the exemptions really were
(*) In IRA Studies Special Exhibits - Tier!; ! .terials ITo. 45-B.
9862
-51-
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-52-
required "by the industry, The pressure of industry proposals over-
whelmed the Administration and forced it to yield to industry's own
proposals and did not permit it to effect pay wholesale revisions to
make then conform to JBJRA policy. While less than forty hours per week
would have been required according; to t.v. Division of Research and
Planning calculations, the substitutions provided generally for forty
hours or nore with few e::cppti' ns plus extended concessions in the form
of tolerances and occupational e^e.ipticns which in a definite number of
cases completely nullified all restrictions, and in other cases per-
mitted operations at levels far e::ceedin." those current in the industry.
In the PRA substitutions 1TRA gave up its goal of reemployment to the
192S level in e^ch industry and accepted a basic pattern uniform for
most inchutries above that originally contemplated. By excepting this
position "HA greatly reduced its opportunities for marked increases of
reenplojrnent. hevertheless, the reemployment achieved during the period
was marked, estimated at about two and three quarter millions in face of
a declining trend of production. (*)
(*) Avne Page's "UnemplojTnent and Reemployment", Division of Revie'
Work kateri-'ls 45, Part B. gee tables on PDA.
S362
-53-
CZ-IAPT&: X
ADkll'ISTSATIVE COllSIDETiATlLll CF COJLS
The above situation as depicted presents Hhl' s dilemma from the
start. liRA policies ■■."ere formulated; its objectives -ere clear; its
standards were but vaguely suggested. The PI1A set up a definitive
guide, "but its substitutions broke this down. I .dustriespproposed codes
with hours' provisions oased more on the Cotton Textile Code and on
certain views expressed at the inception oi' ITSA than on the principles
enunciated by 17IBA. Further, practice deviated still more fron ex-
pressed standards through the provisions for flexibility and occupation-
al exemptions anr? for longer hours.
I . The Administrative Cfficial
The proposal:- submitted to the ISA '"ere mostly unsatisfactory,
judged by pronounced standards. This discrepance between proposals and
Administration standards constituted the basis of the negotiations
carried on in ilEA. These -re re placed in the hands of the deputy or as-
sistant deputy administrator charged with the consideration of the code.
He played a manifold role. His first duty was to aid in shaping the c
code to square with the Administration's objectives; - recovery and
reemployment . He was to apply the standards set by the Administration.
At the same tine, he was usually free to form conclusions concerning the
capacity of the industry to carry the burden of increased pay rolls. In
actual practice he was generally unchecked in the early months by ad-
ministrative review. Cases arose where a deputy sought to increase
hours because of his own views concerning means toward recovery.
I I . Voluntary Hrtui-e of Code System
The deputy's power to make changes in any proposed code was limited
because the voluntary assent of the representative employer group was
the dominant factor. Though the history of HRA code negotiations is
full of instances where imposition of codes was threatened, no such
codes were actually imposed upon any industries. In cases where imposed,
they were rejected by industry and' rendered inoperative. (Structural
iron and steel fabricating industry and artificial limb industry). (*)
(*) For extended description of Structural Iron and Steel
Fabricating Industry Code see: Solomon Barkin' s "Labor
and the Codified Construction Industry under N.P..A."
Building Trades Department of American Federation of
Labor, Washington, 1935, pp. 5-10; for artificial limb
industry, see Code History for the Code of Fair .Compe-
tition for the Artificial Limb Industry by H. 1". Davies.
9362
-54-
This was important since a determined industry group could create unu-
sual problems of negotiations. In addition, the administrate e organi-
zation attempted quickly to complete the codification of industry.
Individual officials were urged to consummate negotiations, receiving
frequent administrative inquiries concerning delays experienced in codi-
tions of an industry. Llany- yielded to this pressure because the word
uas passed about in administrative circles, toward the end of 1932, that
there would be a period of wholesale reTision of codes when all of the
conflicts, inequalities, and contradictions would be straightened out.
Only in a limited number of cases was the Administration willing to
delay approval of codes in order to secure higher standards.
III. Trade Practice and Labor Provisions
Counteracting these tendencies was the desire of many industries
for special trade practice and price or production control provisions.
Under such circumstances deputy administrators or their assistants '.ere
in a position to negotiate for significant modification's of labor provi-
sions of the code, particularly if they were in full possession of the
economic data on the industry. Industrial groups were frequently will-
ing to go a considerable distance in exchanging concessions with respect
to labor provisions. The trade practice contiol provisions' in such
cases represented compromises which employers were willing to accept as
the price for the advantages of .a code. However, relatively- little ef-
fort was made to use the leverage of tra.de practice provisions to secure
higher labor standards.
-55-
I V . Labor Participation
It was the presence of the la.bor representatives which helped to
assure consideration for labor's interests and compliance with stated ad-
ministrative policy. Their relation to the code negotiations varied ac-
cording to the industries and the Administration officials in charge. In
all codes, labor representatives could present their case at a public
hearing and be represented at pre and post-public hearing conferences by
a person designated by the Labor Advisory Board. However, deputies not
entirely friendly to labor's position could minimise the opportunities for
the later meetings. At these conferences, the administrative official
could assume one of several attitudes. He could follow the principle, _ .
that determination of labor provisions could be most equitably developed
between the employer and the labor representatives, remaining in the
background unless differences became irreconcilable. He could adopt the
attitude that he was to revise the code according to his own idea, call-
ing upon the labor adviser only when he believed it desirable. In this
case he frequently restricted negotiations to specific unsettled matters.
Finally, some officials believed that their province was to make decisions
and carry on negotiations and that the adviser was merely to furnish
them with suggestions and supporting data, but not to participate in any
of the discussions. .
The course pursued was in part determined by the forcefulness of
the labor representative, the place of labor organization in the industry,
the industry's attitude, the personality of the deputy administrator,
and NRA administrative direction. The labor representatives comprised
(l) officials of unions in the specific industry; (2) officials of unions
claiming jurisdiction in the industry but representing only small numbers
of workers; (3) officials of unions in cognate industries in cases where
organization or competent leadership was absent in the particular indus-
try; (4) members of the Labor Advisory Board; and (5) members of the staff
of the Board. The burden of the negotiations fell particularly on the
fourth and fifth groups as many of the industries under consideration
were not unionized, and union officials were busy with their organization-
al duties, so that even when able to participate in the public hearing,
they were usually not free to follow through the many succeeding negotia-
tions, appear at the numerous conferences, or attend to the mounting de-
tail accompanying prolonged consideration of each code. Only in a limited
number of cases, where particular industries were well organized and codes
were early approved was there continuous participation of union officials.
It fell upon staff members to watch. NHA routine and policy, and to define
official procedures and to assure labor's participation in the negotia-
tions. It was the presence of organized labor on the Labor Advisory
Board plus the position of the Board to review each code which furnished its
major leverages.
V. MA Folic;-
No less imoortant v/as the "fish-bowl" concept of code development
9862
-56-
prevalent within NBA. The three Advisory Bocrds established to represent
the consumer, industry and labor interests were called into the negotia-
tions. In fact, during the early hearings supervised by the Administrator
himself, the post-hearing committees were almost formally constituted of
representatives from the Industrial and Lahor Advisory 3oards particular-
ly. The precise place of these Advisory Boards and detailed procedures,
including circumstances under which the deputy administrator nas called
upon to invite these Boards into the process of negotiation were set
forth in an early office order dated August 5, superseding an earlier one
of July 24. The Advisory Boards were to receive copies of the tentative
codes together with the code analysis suggestions. They were to partici-
pate in a conference with the deputy administrator and with the steering-
committee of the industry. For the public heariii-:, the Boards were to
designate an official adviser. After the public hearing, they were to
submit reports on each revision and to participate in whatever meetings
and conferences were called. This principle of participation by the ad-
visers was frequently reaffirmed by office memoranda, informal instruc-
tions and the activities of the advisers themselves.
Tlie resulting negotiations varied in character and effectiveness. A
few had the character of actual collective bargaining between labor and
employers before the code was presented to the administrator. A few others
developed into collective bargaining after submission of the code and during
consideration by the Administration. A third somewhat larger group, was the
product of negotiations between. employers and unions which were effectively
organized but could not bargain. for the entire industry, nor speak for all
the employers. Their control of parts of the industry, however, gave them
a bargaining leverage. This group concluded what were 'called "union-do ni-
nated" negotiations. L'ost com -only, in more than 35 per cent of the codes,
"representative bargaining" was conducted by a union or person designated
by the Labor Advisory Board representing labor in the negotiations. These
negotiations without the force of union backing had to rely on precedent,
argumentation, objective evidence and purported IDA policy and strength.
In this weaker bargaining position effectiveness depended upon the support
of the administrative official iOA policy and the industry' s desire for a
code. Heal collective bargaining power took place only in few cases. The
administrative official in charge of the code was the pivotal figure in the
administrative process if changes were to be made.
Actual operation of policy and determination of provisions concerning
basic hours of employment were evidenced, for one thing, in the changes
made in basic hours in the first one-hundred codes approved as compared with
the original proposals. These first hundred rerjresented indxistries submit-
ting codes before precedents became established and easily copied. In the
second place, the evolution of policy was apparent in the codes which devi-
ated from the dominant forty (40) hour pattern of the F2A substitutions
and from the early draft of codes.
Revisions during the period of the administr-.tive consideration of the
first one-hundred approved codes indicated that the basic hours' provisions
were not materially altered. Only nine codes were approved with shorter
basic weekly hours than originally proposed; — 50 codes were approved with
the same basic hours as propose':, but with more strictly defined seasonal
or occupational tolerances; — 35 codes were approved with the same basic
9862
W
-57-
.eekly hours as proposed and retaining- their recommended seasonal and
occupational tolerances; and six codes were approved with longer weekly
hours than originally proposed. (Appendix £.)(*) Only 15 out of the
first one-hundred approved codes had their basic hours changed from
the original >roposals. (Gee Appendix 1. ) (**) Six of the nine codes
in which hours were reduced were among the first twenty approved codes.
These first hundred coc.es showed the importance of expediency,
precedent and personalities, and the roles of labor and industry in
determining the orovisions regulating nours of work.
(*) In NBA' Studies Special Exhibits - Work Materials Ho. 45 = B.
(**) In ilHA Stucdes Special Exhibits - Work Materials No. 45 = B.
986^
-58-
CHAPTER XI. APPROVED COLES AtiQilC- EIR5T Q.I~E-IItJNDBSD WITH SHORTER TIOURS
TEAM ORI&r.'ALLY PROPOSED
Of the first approved cooes which contained shorter hours than
originally proposed comprised nine industries, viz. , shipbuilding and
shiprepairing, coat anu suit, lumber and timber products, petroleum,
men's clothing, cast iron soil pipe, motor vehicle retailing, cress,
and lire extinguishing appliance. The original craft, for the ship-
building and shiprepairing industry, for example, suggested forty
(40) hours; but these were reduced in the approved coce to an average
of thirty-six (,36) Lours for merchant building and of thirty- two (32)
for Government work. In shipbuilding and the coat and s uit industries
the reductions effected through the negotiations period were sub-
stantial; while in others, such as the lumber ana timber products and
fire extinguishing appliance industries, the reduction was not so great.
The questions raised in connection with approval of lours provi-
sions included: (l) Industry's position pnd it;; defense; (2) the
parties to the controversy; (3) the arguments and. the statistical
information presented; (-.'•) the position of the administration; (5) the
types of negotiations which led to the change; (6) the part p] yed by
various industry and labor ;roups in effecting the modification; (?) the
theory which underlay the final acce itance of the proposal by the
Administration if such w; s >v nounced. In general when discussion of
the codes brought about reduction in hours the results were mainly due
to: (l) efforts of the Administration; (2) combined pressure of the
Adaini strati on and the labor representatives; and (3) collective
bargaining.
I. Hours Reduced hy Direct Efforts of Administration.
A. Lumber and Timber Products.
In the lumber and timber products industry, the reduction in
conformity with ERA policy came about through administrative efforts
without the assistance of a substantial labor organisation and in face
of opposition from certain sections of the industry. The problem was
to maintain the forty (40) hour week. The conference of the southern
hardwood lumber industry, meeting June 15, 1933, set the eight (8)
hour day and the six dry week as its code requirement, (*) but excepted
woodsmen, who were to work not more than forty-eight (43) hours a
week. At the meeting of the National Lumber Manufacturers Association
two weeks later the main issue was the difference over hours of
employment. At that time, accorc Ln ; to the report of one industry
representative, "most of the mill owners ell agreed to a thirty-six
(36) hour wee]-; but west coast lumber nen, because snow makes their
season short, argue they need a forty-ei ;ht (^l0) -hour week". (**)
(*) Florida Times Union, June 16, 1933.
(**) Comment at this meeting aid in Chica ;o, June 15, 1933, ~oy
Mr. E. C. Mason, Secretary of the Western Pine Association.
"The Morning Ore onian" - Portland, Oregon (June 29, 1933).
9862
., ■ . , -61-
1:****) (Continued.)
West coast logging and lumber industry; 48 hours per week
is recognized as maximum working shift adapted to plants and
physical operating conditions in this industry. The present
maximum working shift shall be 48 hours per week in logging
camps and 40 hours per week in lumber manufacture.
Western pine industry, the sane as in west coast logging
and lumber industry, except in Arizona and New Mexico, where
standards shall be the same as in the southern pine industry.
Western red cedar shingle industry, the same as in the west
coast logging and lumber industry.
Woodwork industry: The present maximum shall be 40 hours
per week as an average for each half-year period, with 48 hours
the maximum for any one week.
Southern hardwood industry, 48 hours per week; mahogany
industry, 40 hours per week; oak flooring industry, 48 hours . . ...
per week; Philipine mahogany industry, 40 hours per week;
veneer industry, Southern zone 44 hours per week; Northern zone,
40 hours per week.
Walnut industry, 40 hours per week; northern hardwood
industry, 48 hours per week; maple flooring industry, 48 hours
per week; hardwood dimension industry, 48 hours per week;
northeastern hardwood industry, 48 hours per week.
9862
1. Management's Case
The representatives cf the industry declared that forty- eight
(43) hours were customary in the northwest and generally nearly
sixty (60) in the south. The southern lumber representatives
proposed a forty-eight (-18) hour week, estimating that this change
would reemploy some 31,250 persons but would still leave the total
number of workers in the industry at about seventy-five percent
(75,j) of those in 1S29. These southern representatives stated
that a "lesser work week" would bring "dislocations" as "manual
labor is predominant and the climatic conditions will not permit
of high practices. " (*)
The hours of employment in the northwest had been agreed upen
by the representatives of the employer and of the employee representa-
tion organization in the northwest, the Loyal Legion of loggers and
Lumbermen, who submitted it a.s complying with Section 7(b) of the
Act. (**) They proposed a thirty-six (36) hour week with elastic
provision for a forty (4C) hour week if required hy the job or to
balance production, consumption and employment. (***) Since in the
industry in the northwest daring the first six months of 1933,
"twenty-one percent (21;.-.) of (the) production was at shifts less
than thirty-six (36) hours; 13.75 percent at a forty (40 hour shift;)
13.69 at a furty-four (44) hour shift; sixteen percent (16;;) at
forty-eight (48) hours and twenty-one percent (21 ) at various
shifts in excess of forty-eight (4-8) hours." (****) A forty (40)
hour week was proposed for mills and a forty-eight (48) hour week
for logging camps* The short duration of lc camp operation
and the limited housing facilities were given as the reasons for
the particular exemptions, also impractability of a double shift
and the logging camp worker's need to earn a satisfactory yearly
income during the shorter period. It was estimated that the :.-C
hour week in the sawmills v/ould result in the reemployment in the
northwest of 14,000 workers. The forty (40) hour reel. s recom-
mended to assure flexibility "to permit practical adjustments of
the operating conditions to the desired volume of construction or
to the actual order file", "recognizing the fact tha.t a con-
siderable number of operations will actually observe a shorter week."
(*****) The 'eartern pine industry, however, averred that its problems
were particularly seasonal and that the fifty-four (54) hour maximum was
suited to its conditions that the forty-eight (48). C ther areas pro-
tested against differentiation between the logging and the mill areas
and asked for a flat forty-eight hour week for both. (******)
(*) Testimony of Mr. C. G. Sheppard - July 2C , 1933, Release No. 70
pp. 52-59.
(**) Testimony of Mr. Ruegnitz, President of the L.L.L.L. , ?. 39,
and Colonel W. B. Greely, of the "west Coast Lumber Manufacturers
Association, p. 1015.
(***) Testimony of Mr. Suegnitz - p. 89.
(****) Testimony of Mr. Greely, p. 1007.
(*****) Testimony of Colonel W. 3. . :ely, pp. 1000-10C4.
(******) Testimony of ff. S. Johnson, California White and Sugar Pine
Association, p. 4014.
9862
-63-
2. Contrary Positions.
Sharp protest against the proposed hours. was voiced by the rep-
resentative of the Coos Bay Lumber Com .-any, who recommended a thirty-
six (36) hour week for the loggin ; camp snd a thirty (30) hour week
for the. Sawmill, together v/itb a minimum wage of fifty (50<f) cents
which was considerably above the hi hest rate in the. proposed code.
He contended that the "effect of sn eight hour day on West coast
unemployment in the Douglas fir region (will be) no reemployment." (*)
As for the proposal for the logging operations, he contended that "no
one operates longer (than forty-eight hours) today and no one has
for years. " With reference to the sawmills, he remarked that "very
few operating units are or have recently been operating forty (40)
hours per week at full hourly capacity." He indicated that the
only mills operating on such basis or longer were those which
"kept the markets demoralized by a two hour shift. " (**)
the representative of organized labor (***) declared that "it
is impractical to consider a work week of forty (-40) to forty- eight
(48) hours when twelve million hove no way to earn their daily bread."
In recommending a shorter work week he remarked that the proposed
schedule "will not reemploy any of the unemployed in the industry." (****
3. The Administrative Modification of the Code.
The Administrator was critical of the proposals by the industry.
When the operators asked for approval on July. 22 of their proposal
"to give immediate consideration to the matter of at least a ten-
tative, ap iroval of waking effective immediately the schedules as
filed in relation to working hours and minimum wages," (*****) he
refused the request because he was dissatisfied with the provisions.
(******) As a result changes were made in the code after the public
hearings were completed on July 26. The revised draft was siibmitted
on July 28, after lengthy conferences by the Emergency National Com-
mittee. Strikes in the Pacific Northwest impelled the industry to
seek a speedy solution but no marked: concessions were made in the
hours provisions. (*****-**) in fact, except for a rephrasing of the
(*) Testimony of Mr. W. Denman, July 24, 1933, p. 3008.
(**) Ibid. , pp. 3008-3010.
(***) Mr. William Green was organized labor's principal rep-
resentative at this hearing.
(**»*) Ibid., July 21, 1933, p. 1032.
(*****) Ibid. , p. 2006.
(******) Journal of Commerce, July 25, 1933.
(•,******) Qn j^y 28, Mr. J. D. Tennant addressed General Johnson informing
him that the Emergency National Committee was extremely anxious
tn obtain early approval of the code in view of the "agitation
and strikes (which) are being fermented. Uncertainty of prospec-
tive wages and hours of work is causing much anxiety among both
employees and employers. " Code histroy Exhibit R. See also Journ-
al of Commerce, July 29, 1933, Tacoma Times, August 21, 1933.
9862
-64-
provision to define more specifically the nature of seasonal operations
and to require that allowances for them be granted by the administrative
ncies of the various division, no changes were made. Basically, the
code retained the principle of the forty hour week for sawmills in the
northwest and in certain minor cases, and the forty-eight (48) hours
for, logging operations and all other sawmills.
' Following this, on August 1, the Administrator definitely den-
ied the request for temporary approval of the wage and hour provisions
to allay uncertainty in the industry. He continued to negotiate for
a more complete revision of the labor provisions particularly with
respect to the low minimum wages arid the hours provisions. This stand
was based upon the conclusion that a forty (40) hour week applicable
t<-> all districts "as well as for the northwest" would be desirable
"although this represents an average shortening of hours approximately
1/5 for the south and north as compared with 3/l0 to l/6 for the
northwest." It was estimated that "an increase in volume of sales
•took place' permitting an increase of about fifty per cent of recent
rates of production," would "restore employment t? as many persons as
were occupied with lumber and timber products industries in the south
during 1929. (*)
As to the Douglas Fir industry, it was expected that the "re-
duction to forty (40) hours per wee1, in both mills and camps would
not provide as much employment, on a relative basis, as the same
schedule when applied to operations in- the south." (**) Therefore,
the forty (40) hour week was accepted by the Administration "after
giving due weight to all relevant considerations even though at the
prevailing rate of production reemi 1 yment could not be expected ~oy
such a work week." Another consideration was th . to .justify the
position of NRA, viz., that "about sixty-five per cent of total
lumber production is absorbed by the construction industry." (***)
This was interpreted to mean that a "considerable time must elapse
before the effects on volume of employment can be definitely shown."
(****) However, no statement of policy was made concerning the
workers "normally attached" to the industry who would not be absorbed
by this method.
(*) Statement of the deputy administrat >r - Codes of Fail- Competition,
Vol. I, pp. 1' 0-102.
(**] Ibid.
(***) Ibid.
(****) Ibid.
98G2
-65-
Tlie stand taken with respect to seasonal exemptions was that the
pronounced seasonal character of operations in some areas and the
variety of the exceptional and emergency conditions in the industry
general ly required "certain flexibility in the maximum hours of labor
per week accompanied by adequate restrictions to prevent such flexi-
bility from being made the vehicle of abuses. Fecessary safeguards are
provided 'oy requiring that average employment, in any seasonal opera-
tion shall not exceed the standard schedule of hours during any
calendar year." (*)
Several conferences were held with the leaders of the industry
and the representatives of the Labor Advisory Board. (**) Finally a
report was prepared (***) with the recommendations noted above. 'These
were worked out in greater detail with the industry representatives
who accepted them.
The final provisions in the Lumber Code relative to hours of
labor were the following:
(*) Codes if Fair Competition, Vol. I, pp. 1C1-102.
(**) Wall Street Journal, August 2, 1933.
(***) By Deputy Administrator Cates, Ibid., August 12, 1933.
9862
-66-
(a) General Provisions and Exc ptions
"exceptions to t . .-.rds in respect to raximur1 hours
of labor specified herein are authorized as follow:.:
(A) Executive, supervisory, traveling sales force and camp cooks.
(3) ular employment in excess nf such standards, for employees
suck as watchmen* . firemen, and repair crews, where required
the nature of their work, for not more, than 10' :>f the e -
ployees in any operation, "out tine ana a half shall be paid
for weekly avertible.
(C) " ;• r; r p loy 3nt in ca.se d ei ergency.
(D) Seasonal Operations - Seasonal operations are defined as those
• tich on account ji elevation or ither physical conditions or
de; en^ence upon climatic factors are Drdinarily limited to a
■I - :: n months or less of the calendar year.
The administrativ ency 3f a Division or Subdivision :r
rize 1 y ent i as - 1 aperation for e maxiumum
number of hours not exceedi . :S hours in any we el: with the
except io] of p rts of an oper tion - ; in climatic
conditions, such 1 s stream driving - ulin , in which
a rcater excess 1 y be ith riz d; pr J , t . t the aver-
a, e employment in any seasonal operation in any calendar Tar
shall not exceed the standard schedule.
(E) JIanufacturers of wooden : : for perishable fruits ad
vo; et; ties ! ay be uth riz by t'. ' inistrative ency
of the Wooden Pac - Division to dej *t fr the standi rd
schedule of ixii ui ours applicable to said1 xnuf- ?turers
for a perioc not to exceed four wi d;r for me - ' p, .en
:. pessary to furnish ack es for any ible crop; prov-
ided that the aver; e employment f an; individual in any
c lendar year shall not exceed the standard schedule.
(b) Subject to the foregoing exceptions, the maximum .hours of employ-
ment in the respective divisi - bdivisions shall be 40 hours
per week.
(i> ) JTire Ext in, eh shin;/ Appliance I, - .us try
The eire exti . uishing industr s one of t \ in - ich
A.dmi Loi ■ ■ :ation in th : 3 provisions
r u] ting louts before t folic hearing. The code as first
■ - sented by .the industrj .st 25, 1933, provide t t "nc
.-.."- itur rs shall employ n; actory, janical, r /ice
rker more than laximum week f f r1 (40) hours, exc
.tchmen who may mploye< ximum of forty-eight (43)
rs, :ept outsid o- lesmen r at rial
)r executive capacit; h now ■ ccive ..ore t u a thirty-five
($35) .hilars per week." (*) Afcor a ■• afer ;e wil iTBA
(*) Code of Fair C bition >r the !?ire Ext in, 1 ishi A plii
turinL I stry, Vol. II. Copy of Code de. istry do. 1314-01.
9862
-67-
)fficials, this provisions, was eha.nG.ed. to provide for a thirty-five (35)
hour "basic week averaged over a three months' period with a forty (40)
hour maximum. Clerical workers were to be overned by a forty (4C)
hour week. (*) This change was made largely because the fire extinguish-
ing appliance industry overlapped the motor fire apparatus industry
which had proposed a basic thirty-five (35) hour week and the hours
provisions of the latter were accepted for both to avoid conflict or
charge of discrimination. The industry's argument was that "figures
so indicate that on a basis of a factory work week of thirty-five (35)
hours this industry .would, on resumption of business comparable to the
average of 1928-1929-1930, when the average factory work week of the
industry was forty-six (46) hours plus, absorb one-third more workers
than the average number employed during the three years mentioned above." (**
Labor's counterproposal recommended, elimination of peak tolerances
and adotpion of a flat maximum. It called for "a thirty-five (35) hour
in fact .... to eliminate the averaging provision which makes it
possible to -work an employee forty (40) hours in any one week." ,
This recor.Tmendf.tion brought no further change in the hours provisions,
the primary cause for the decrease in hours being to standardize the
hours regulations for two inter-dependent industries.
II. Reduction Effected by Administration and Labor Representatives.
A. Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Industry
Industry's proposals were sharply criticised in the Shipbuilding
and. Shiprepairing Industry Code which was the second to be approved.
The issue has been formulated well in, advance. Despite the Adminis-
trator's ad ress of Juno 25, 1933 and statements that the Cotton Textile
Code was not to be considered a precedent, the industry had submitted a
code which provided, that "no individual will be employed in excess of
forty (40) hours in any one week except as exempted in the Act. "(***)')
The employers in the industry who, two years before, had gone from their
customary forty-eight (48) to a forty (40 ) hour week, recommended no fur-
ther reduction. In spite of Section 206-A of the Act to the effect
that the hours of labor were to be reduced, "where practicable and feas-
ible" to thirty (SO) hours in any one week :n "all contracts let for
construction projects and all loans and grants" made purusant to the
public' works section of the TTIRA, and of the fact that a large proportion
of the shipbuilding industry's anticipated activity was due to funds
(*) Ibid., October S, 1933, draft.
(**) ITatic :o.l Industrial Recovery Administration hearing on Code of
Fair Practice and Competition presented by the fire extinguishing
appliance industry - October 23, 1933, p. 12.
(***) New York Times, July 13, 1933. The Code was submitted July 12.
-.68-1
appropriated under the NIRA, the industry contended that the thirty (30)
hour week should not apply but that the forty (40) hour provision be
substituted.
In fact, at the time of the public hearing the indvistry went a
step further and proposed instead of a straight forty (40) hour week,
the following:
" I'To employee- on an hourly rate may work in excess
of an average of forty (40) hours a week, based
on a six months period. If any employee on an
hourly rate works in excess of eight hours in any
one day, the wage paid will be at the rate of one-
and-one-half (lj>) times the regular hourly rate
for such time as may be in excess of eight hours.
On bhe Great Lakes during the navigating season
an exception to the rule regarding, overtime is per-
missible The forty (40) hour week will . . .
not. apply for a period of six months to those em-
ployees of the Shipbuilders engaged in designing,
engineering and in mold loft and order departments
and such others as are necessary for the prepara-
tion of plans and ordering of materials to start
work on new snip construction." (*)
1 ■ ....
This code was the first one considered which proposed a definite provi-
sion for the averaging of hours. Also, occupational exemptions for
which the Cotton Textile Industry Code furnished a precedent were pre-
sented, in two forms: (a) employees working on a basis other than an
hourly rate were entirely excluded; and (b) specific exemptions were
provided for other employees.
1. Employer's Statements
The proposal for a basic forty (40) hour week was defend-
ed by the shipbuilders and shiprepairers on the ground that the ship-
building program contemplated by the NIPA would not only absorb their
(*) National Recovery Administration, Transcript of Proceedings,
Shipbuilding Code Hearing July 19, 1933, po.9-10
It is interesting to note in this regard that Mr. 0. H. Bugniazet,
Secretary of the International 3rotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers addressed a letter to President Poosevelt on July 27, 1933,
in which he declared that the Union had worked diligently on the
preparation of briefs, but . that at 6 P.M. preceding the day for the
scheduled hearing the Union officers "learned with amazement that
the original code had been withdrawn and. a substitute entered....
It is obvious tha.t appearance on any code published is difficult
enough, but making an appearance on a code never read nor seen
places opponents in an abject position. Yet the hearing on the
substituted code was neld as scheduled.!1 1T.Y. Times, 7/28/33. •
9862
-69-
own unemployed "out would raise their employment to about fifteen per
cent (15-) above the 1929 level. (*) They anticipated scarcity of
skilled men, which, they claimed, would hamper construction work in the
shipbuilding industry and in the United 3t?.tes Navy. (**) Both the in-
dustry and the representatives of the United States Navy disapproved
the six hour day on the ground of impracticability and impossibility be-
cause: (l) a six hour day r>revented continuous operation; (2) work
could not be completed w ithin a six hour period; (3) the supervisory
staff could not be proportionally expanded and consequently its load
would be too heavy; (4) a six hour work day would encourage labor turn-
over; (o) and increase the cost of merchant shipbuilding by thirty-three
percent (35'.-); (6) the industry could not survive ordinarily on a thirty
(30) hour week; (?) the contracts for public construction would extend
beyond the two years of the Act and the removal of the emergency would
create problems of " disturbance and unhappiness;" (8) a six hour work
day would complicate the housing situation, intensifying temporary con-
centration of labor; (9) employment even under the forty (40) hour week
would be increased some 2o0 percent because of the volume of government
contracts; (10) tne industry was adapted to the forty (40) hour week.(***)
Also, representatives of the Navy feared that a shorter work week would
excessively increase costs of construction. They considered it undesir-
able to employ persons "unsuited to tne work of shipyards and whose re-
turn to their own normal occupations should be the primary objective,"
and thought that a program of less than forty (40) hours would attract
persons belonging to other industries, ( ****)
This position on a basic forty (40.) hour week was the major con-
tention. The averaging provision was argued on the ground of the
character of the industry, since "there is a considerable amount of
work of an emergency or special type on which only one shift can work
and it is necessary either to work occasionally for longer hours or
seriously delay the progress of the whole." (*****) The exemption for
the planning section was declared to be necessary since "the expedition
with which the work on the naval program will be carried on depends upon
the ability to prepare plans, order materials and carry out work in mold
loft and the completion of this preliminary work determines the time
when workmen can start upon the actual construction of the ship." (******)
J*) Ibid., p. 48
(**) This position was supported by Hear Admiral E.S. Land, Bureau
of Construction Repair, U.S. Navy. Ibid, p. 98
(***) This consideration was most completely \:>resented by Mr. L.Y.
Spear of the Electric Boat Company. Ibid., pp. 50-66; and in
the letter of transmittal. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1933.
(****) Testimony of Captain H.L. Wyman, of the U.S. Navy, Ibid.,.
p. 105.
(*****) loir,., p. 17.
(******) Ibid., p. 18
9E52
"70-
Special exemption from the payment of overtime in the Great Lakes region
was asked "because "it has long been the practice of the Great Lakes
region to work nine or nine and one-half hours a day," and that they were
willing to work not in excess of eight hours in the winter months, but
would like the privilege of working nine hours without payment of over-
time on repair work in the summer. (*)
2. Labor's Counterproposals and Statement:
Organized labor, represented by the Metal Trades Department of the
American Federation of Labor, countered the proposal of the shipbuilders
and the shiprepairers with recommendations for a thirty (30) hour week
with a six hour day and a five day week. It further recommended deletion
of the overtime tolerances and substitution of the following clause:
"Wo overtime shall bp permitted, except the maintenance ani repair person-
nel and then only in case, of extreme emergency. All time worked in ex-
cess of scheduled number of hours shall be paid for at not less than
double time." (**) Organized labor considered the thirty (30) hour week
practical and feasible. It believed that Section 206 of the Act should
be applied without modification. Specifically it called attention to the
fact that the average work week in the industry was about thirty-one (3L)
hours, that employment stood at about 47 per cent (-7"-) of 1929, and
that part-time employment was widespread. It contended that the forty
(40) hour week would absorb "only a small portion of those who are now
out of work in the industry and if overtime work is permitted as freely
as employers suggest, those now employed part-time would be able to
handle practically all the available v/ork and over, - few of the unem-
ployed would be taken into the shipyards." It maintained that "if hours
of labor are to be reduced to provide employment, then overtime must be
prohibited except in case of emergencies." It asserted that a program
of reemployment should take into consideration not only those employed
in 1929 but also "the great majority of the mechanics employed in the
shipyards and Navy Yards during the construction period of 1918, 1919,
1920, and 1921 (who) are still in the United States." (***)
3. Administrative Recommendations
These two conflicting recommendations were submitted to the NBA
for consideration. On the one hand were the shipbuilders charged by
the Administration with the responsibility of submitting a code; and on
the other hand organized labor in the shipbuilding industry represent-
ing a significant group of workers asking for very different terms of
(*) Testimony of Mr. W.H. Gerhouser, President of the. Great Lakes
Shipbuilding and Repair Association, pp. 5.8-71
(**) Testimony of Mr. J. A. Franklin, Metal Trades Department of the
American Federation of Labor, July 20, 1933. Ibid., p. 123
(***) Testimony of F.A. Franklin, Ibid., pp. 125-129 and Mr. Frey,
p. 164. It may be indicated that several representatives of
employees appeared in support of the forty (40) hour week.
They included Mr. J.'.', liullin on behalf of the employees of the
York Shipbuilding Co., Camden, ":.J. , p. 316. Mr.W.G.
9862 iicDermott representing the employee^ of the Fore River Plant
of the Bethlehem Corp. of Quincy, Mass. p. 333.
-71-
employment. In this situation the Administrator offered the following
solution: "it has been our purpose to gauge the hours of work per week
at a figure that would absorb the labor which is normally attached to a
particular industry. You can see very well that on that formula the more
active and more nearly normal the operations in industry are, the longer
the work week, and vice versa. This industry seens to he on the verge
of a program which would take a great many men -.ho are normally listed
as in the shipbuilding: crafts. However, it is subject to the modifica-
tion that in the building trades there are a great many crafts whose
work is applicable to shipbuilding industry. (This industry) probably
will be looked to to absorb considerably more than at first glance seems
its normal quota of labor. "(*)
H. Negotiations
After the public hearings, the Administrator arranged a series of
conferences with labor and industry representatives. (**) After discus-
sions of the various proposals by both groups, the Administrator proposed
a thirty-two (32) hour week for the industry with no change in the wage
provisions. The industry refused to agree to this proposal though the
representatives of organised labor accepted it.(***) Daring the confer-
ences on the second day a solution was found. (****) It provided a
thirty-two (32) hour '.reel: for shipbuilding for the United States Govern-
ment and an average thirty-six (36) hour week based upon a six months
period with a maximum forty (ho) hour week for merchant shipbuilding and
shiprepairing. (*****) This compromise, according to the press, resulted
from the fact that "General Johnson threatened to recommend suspension
of the Navy's building program if they (the shipbuilders) adhered to
their program and that this position made the compromise more amenable
to the shipbuilders. "(******)
The problem of hours on government shipbuilding involved the Navy
Department and wa.s, therefore, not completely settled until Secretary of
the Navy Swanson had discussed the matter with the president. It is re-
ported that after this discussion the Navy Department "acquiesced in the
thirty- two (32) hour proposal" (*******) With this natter settled, the
(*) Ibid., July IS, 1933, P. 3
(**) These were held on July 22 and July 23, 1533.
(***) Code History for the Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Industry,
pp. 52~6l; Washington Star, July 23, 1333 •
(****) rp^g Administrator had insisted upon a thirty—two (32) hour
week, but at a conference with Deputy Administrator Whiteside
after a general meeting in the morning the final provision
was developed,
(*****) Code History op.cit. pp. 5S-61.
(******) New York limes, July 25, 1933 .
(*******) Salt L?i:e rnrijune, July 2g, 1933.
9S62
-72-
code was approved by the president on July 2b, 1933.
The final provision as adopted in the code was as follows:
"Merchant Shipbuilding & Shiprepairing: No employee on a hour rate
may work in excess of an average of thirty-six (36) hours per week, based
upon a six months' period; nor more than forty (40) hours during any one
week. If any employee on an hourly rate works in excess of eight hours
in any one day, the wage paid will be at the rate of not less than one
and one-half (I3) tines the regular hourly rate, but otherwise according
to the prevailing custom in each port, for such time as may be in excess
of eight hours.
"Shipbuilding for the United States Government: No employee on an
hourly rate may work in excess of thirty-two (32) hours per week. If
any employee on an hourly rate works in excess of eight hours in any one
day, the wage paid will be at the rate of not less than one and one-half
(la) times the regular hourly rate, but otherwise according to the pre-
vailing custom in each port, for such time as may be in excess of eight
hours.
"Exceptions: J'or a period of six months exceptions may be made in
the number of hours of employment for the employees of the shipbuilders
engaged in designing, engineering and in the mold loft and order depart-
ments and such others as are necessary for the preparation of plans and
ordering of meterials to start work- on new ship construction-, but in no
event shall tne number of workers worked be in excess of forty-eight (43)
nours per week, and in no case or class of cases not approved by the
Planning and Fair Practice Committee provided. for in Section (8)."
These negotiations showed that a concession was obtained from the
industry for a reduction of hours to thirty-six (36) per week for private
shipbuilding and thirty-two (32) for government shipbuilding. In the
latter case they were relieved of the requirements of the Act. In the
negotiations labor, industry and Government were the bargainers. The
final compromise was worked out by the Administration and the ship-
builders with labor acting chiefly as adviser. The Administration had
a strong weapon, the naval program, with which to bargain.- This Ship-
building Code also was the first to adopt a provision for the averaging
of hours. It established the eight hou day. It granted a six months'
exemption for employees preparing plans and ordering materials with the
qualification of a forty-eight (48) hour maximum and approval by the
Planning and Pair Practice Committee.
B. Petroleum Industry
The petroleum industry considered problems of production and trade
practices to be most important in drafting its code. The code forrau-
1- ted jointly by representatives of the American Petroleum Institute,
including many independent producers- and large oil companies, and by the
Marketing-Hef iner Natural Gasoline Association added to Section 7 (a)
the following clause: "During the depression the petroleum industry has
maintained a relatively high ratio of employment. To a Lrge extent it
has pursued the 'Share-The-Work' policy and has maintained a relatively
S862
-73-
high schedule of wages. Existing ■ :age schedules should not "be reduced,
but both employment and wages should be increased as soon as business
conditions permit.11 ("*) Because of these rather vague provisions, the
Administrator was reported to consider the code unsatisfactory and to
"demand that the proposed oil code be made more specific regarding hours
of labor and wages. (**)
As a result of the Administrator's insistence, the sponsors of the
code, through the Executive Committee of the American Petroleum Institute,
presented it en July 12, 1933 with -provisions concerning wages and hours
of labor included. The terms ,. however , had not been discussed by the
Board of Directors of tne American Petroleum Institute with the con-
stituent associations. (***) The code as proposed -orescribed for all
employees "of the Petroleum Industry, except executive and their immedi-
ate clerical forces, and pumpers on stripper wells, and others on isolated
properties" an average of not mere than forty (40) hours per week. The
Associations indicated that this averaging process was necessary since
"it may be necessary to work employees more than forty (40) hours per
week on occasion, but the weekly work for each envoloyee for each six
months' calendar period shall not exceed an average of more than forty
(40) hours per week." (****)
(*) The Tall Street Journal, July 13, 1933.
(**) Houston Press, June 29, 1933.
It is also of interest to note, the attitude expressed by one
leading member of the industry, who was amazed at General
Johnson's attitude; "The industry is concerned by the emphasis
which is being placed upon employment and wages by the National
Administrator in codes dealing with other industries heretofore
presented. The lecovery Act emphasizes collective bargaining,
but the Administrator apparently is urging industries which pre-
sent codes to agree with him on matters affecting labor instead
of agreeing with the employees of such industries. Before em-
ployers and employees have had an opportunity to reach an agree-
ment by collective bargaining, it is obviously inconsistent with
the Act for the National Administrator to insist that an industry
accept prescribed conditions relating to labor. Such a course is
inconsistent with mutual agreements between employers and em-
ployees relating to these subjects. Rules orescribed by the
Administrator in this manner may be unsatisfactory to both em-
ployers and employees and may prevent, instead of promote col-
lective bargaining". (Statement by C. B. Ames, Chairman, Board
of Directors, Texas Company, Journal of Commerce July 6, 1933.)
(***) "New York Times, July 15, 1933.
(****) Ibid>
-74-
These proposals 7>ere modified by the industry representatives at
the -Diiblic hearing to a forty-eight (48) hour maximum "reek. (*) Even
this longer week was exoected to reduce working hours enough to in-
crease employment nearly twenty-five ner cent (25^), or from the actual
working force of 1,025,000 up to 1,265,000 persons. Any other basis of
operation than forty (40) hours was objected to as inroractical as the
industry operated continuously "with equipment, machinery and men working
through the twenty-four ;:ours of the day." Thev claimed that "the
reduction to forty (40) hours means not only a tremendous increase in
the number of emoloyees -ith particular reference to those required to
handle the shift and tour jobs all of. which required' highly' trained men,
but it also means the tremendous increase in the expense and nay roll
cost of many companies and individual, engaged in' the business "dio al-
ready are on the verge of financial, col"! apse." The averaging hours were
declared necessary to meet "emergencies." (**)
■ 1. Labor and Independents' Proposals..
The codes proposed by the American Petroleum Institute and its
suoporters were met by t^o counter- orouosals, one. from organized labor
and the other from the independent uroducers and operators. These pro-
posals -/ere similar in many respects in their recommendations concerning
hours of work.
Several organized labor groups made proposals, the most detailed
coming from the Gil iorkers International Union. It proposed that "no
employee in the producing, pipe-line transportation or the refining
branches of the petroleum industry, except executives and their immedi-
ate clerical forces shall be employed in excess of thirty hours per week,
nor more than five days in any one calendar week, nor more than six
h^urs in any one day, save in cases of , emergency. In such emergency
cases, all time workers in excess of the scheduled maximum number of
hours ner day or week shall be regarded as overtime and shall be paid
for at the vrte of not less than double time." (***) This recommenda-
tion was supported by testimony that 39.6 hours constituted the average
in the uetroleum refineries for the first half of. 1933 and 42.6 hours
for the producing branch of the industry, while employment in June 1933
had 1»een 58 per cent of the average for 1929. It '-'as, therefore,
"calculated that it would be necessary to establish a working week with
a maximum of 24.4 hours" to reabsorb the men displaced since 1929. The
labor group proposed a thirty (30) hour week and protested the averaging
provision since "such a' provision may vitiate entirely any maximum hourly
provision which might be established.." (****) Labor also asserted that
(*) National Recovery Administration Transcript of -proceedings Petro-
leum Code, July 24, 1933, nap. 3048-3049.
(**) Ibid. , pp. 3052-3054.
(***) Ibid. , p. 3060. Similar provisions "'ere recommended by Mr. J.N.
Davis, representing the Metal Trades Department of the a. 2'. of
L. p. 3096.
(****) Ibid., pp. 3058 - 3066, Statement by Mr. rremming.
9862
-75-
double pay for overtime was the only effective method of checking that
■practice.
The independents in the oil industry, consisting of twenty-two
associations, presented the following vrcposal; "The employees of the
petroleum industry except those who occupy managerial or executive posi-
tions and their immediate clerical forces and pumpers on stripper wells,
and others on isolated properties will work on an average of not more
than thirty (30) hours per week. Provided, however, that employees of
retail filling stations will work on average of no more than thirty-six
(36) hours per week. Because of the exigencies of the oil industry, it
may he necessary to work employees more than said maximum hours on
occasion, but the weekly work for each six months' calendar period shall
not exceed an average of said minimum hour per week."
2. Administrative Assistance in Adjustment of Differences.
After hearing the proposals, counter-proposals and arguments, the
Administrator concluded that "the various suggestions are very far apart
and they do not really represent any opportunity to get together on
some kind of an agreement." He therefore proposed the organization of
three committees, one for the stripper wells and production, another
for refining and Pipe lines and a third for marketing and distribution,
each committee to consist of an equal number of employer and employee
representatives. The former were chosen by the Petroleum Institute
and independent organizations, while the latter, selected by the Labor
Advisory Board consisted of representatives of the Oil /orkers Inter-
national Union and of the staff of the appointing Board. The committees
were under the chairmanship of a representative of the Administration. (*)
Committee discussion soon effected a compromise. An agreement upon a
thirty-six (36) hour ^eek was reported in the production and refining
divisions and a forty (40) hour week in the marketing division of the
industry. (**) These proposals were submitted on August 1, 1933 when
the revised codes were considered. No substantial objections were
raised to the hours provisions, though some questions concerning wages
and adjustments appeared. (***) The differences were mostly ironed out
in the preceding conferences.
This was not true of the production provisions. Consequently, there
was delay in development of the production and trade practice provisions
of the code, a PliA agreement covering the labor provisions was approved
before the code itself. Issued on August 8, 1S33, the President's
Reemployment Agreement provided an average thirty-six hour week for
(*) Ibid. , pp. 3113-3121.
(**) Houston Post, July 26, 1933.
(***) Transcript of Hearing. See Petroleum News, August 9, 1933.
9862
-76-
production employees, forty (40) hour week for marketing operations and
a forty-eight (48) hour week for filling and service station employees. (*)
These terms, largely settled upon in the nost-hearing conferences, were
finally incorporated in the ^eneral Petroleum Code, approved August 19,
1933 and were widely a-ccajated by the industry.
(*) Section 1. In drilling, production, refinery and pipe-line operas
tions, the maximum hours for clerical emolcyees shall not exceed'
40 -oer week and the rate of pay for ea eh geographic division shall
net he less than the minimum stated in Section 2. All other em-
ployees in these operations, except executives, supervisors, and •
their immediate, staffs and pumpers on "stripper" wells located so
as to make relief impracticable , shall "orv not more than 72 hours
in any 14 consecutive days, but net more than 16 hours in any two
days.
Section 2. In market operations all employees (other than those
employed in filling or service stations, garages, or other in-
stitutions which sell gasoline to the oublic) including clerical,
but excluding executives, supervisors and their immediate staffs,
and outside salesmen shall work not more than 40 hours per week.'
The minimum rates for such employees in each of the geographic
divisions above- specified shall be a s follows; t
Section 3-. No filling or service station employee, nor any em- •
ployee of any. garage or other institution selling gasoline to the
public shall work more than 48 hours ner week.
9862
-77-
0 • Oast . I r on Soil- P3cpe
The Cast Iron Soil Pipe Industry Code Illustrated the relation of
labor provisions to the industry's desire to set up trade practice con-
trols. At the public hearing on August 2, 1933, the industry proposed
a thirty-hour week for factory labor and a forty (40) hour week for
clerical workers. Those presenting the code stated that "it is their
intention to continue this (share the work) policy and as demand for the
products of the industry shall increase, they propose to give employment
to the maximum number of employees rather than request an extension of
the maximum working hours". (*)
The thirty (30) hour week was recommended because the industry was
suffering from over-production and "the present percentage of operating
capacity of the industry is only twenty-one per cent (21$). It would
therefore be inconsistent to propose a maximum working week greater than
thirty (SO) hours as 'provided in the code." (**) The limitation of both
working and production hours, which were identical in the code, was
suggested in order to control production and to prevent the monopoly of
the orders by a few concerns. Organized labor did not protest these
hours' provisions. However, in conference labor and the employers agreed
to lower working hours to twenty-seven (27) per week. This was satisfac-
tory to the employers since in the revision of the code they had speci-
fically limited -production to the maximum hours of labor permitted in a
single shift. s
D. hotor Vehicle Retailing Industry
The motor vehicle retailing industry represented certain characteris-
tic differences. No labor organization vas present to offer proposals,
the Labor Advisory Board staff representing the workers in the negotia-
tions. Also, it represented a service industry. Furthermore, the code
presented proposed a forty-eight (43) hour week.
The code' resulted from regional conferences held among automobile
dealers during the latter part of June and early July. Their major in-
terest was in used car -practices. With respect to hours of labor they
showed considerable unanimity. The Denver concerns (*•*) and the Mary-
land Automobile Trade Association (****) adopted a basic forty (40) hour
week.
(*) Uational Recovery Administration Hearing on Code of Pair Practices
and Competition, Presented by the cast iron soil pipe industry,
August 2, 1933, p. 61.
(**) Ibid., p. 63.
(***) Baltimore Sun, July 19, 1933.
(****) Denver Post, July 18, 1933.
qCM")
-78-
Their example was followed by the Automobile Trades Association of Greater
Kansas City (*) and the Michigan Automotive Trade Association. (**)
However, the final code, as drafted by the National Auto Dealero Acco-
ciation in St. Louis on August 13, 1933, provided for a forty-eight <48)
hour week. (***) In spite of strong sentiment for a straight forty (40)
hour week, "portions of the country where there is a summer peak and a
slack winter or the reverse sought to obtain a forty-eight (43) hour
maximum. In view of this uncertainty there was a disposition to leave
"the matter of hours of labor to the Administrator." (****)
The code was submitted to the Administrator on September 1, 1933.
Informal conferences were held with the various Advisory Boards but no
significant changes were made. The code as it went to public hearing
contained the following provision respecting hours of employment:
"No employee (except outside salesmen and watchmen) shall be em-
ployed for more than 48 hours in any one week. . . The maximum hours
fixed in the foregoing paragraph shall not apply to employees in a
managerial or executive capacity who now receives $25.00 a week or
more; to employees i-n a supervisory capacity or engaged in technical
work; to employees: engaged in energency repair and maintenance work
on automobiles for which, due to seasonal climatic conditions, there
are in certain localities insufficient trained workers available to
take care of consumer demands; in such localities sixty hours shall
not be exceeded in any one week. It is understood, however, that
the average in any six months' period will not be over forty-eight
(48) hours."
The reason given for the provision was the seasonal nature of the
industry and frequency of rush jobs. It was felt "that a maximum of
forty-eight (48) hours per week will take care of all conditions of
emoloyees and car owners and the peak and valley conditions of our work
be generally averaged to the point where it will not be a hardship to
anyone concerned." (*****) A slight modification introduced at the pub-
lic hearing raised the exerrmted class of executive from a $25.00 to
$30.00 minimum. (******)
(*) Kansas City Journal-Post, July 20,' 1933.
(**) Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1933.
(***) Chicago Tribune, August, 12, 1933.
(****) Detroit News, August 20, 1933.
(*****) National Recovery Administration hearing on Code of Pair Practices
and Competition, Presented by the motor vehicle retailing trade,
September 18, 1933, p. 1516.
(******) Ibid., p. 43.
9862
-79-
Labor's case at this hearing was presented by a staff m«*iber of the
Labor Advisory Board. In presenting labor's case, he did not sttoss the
trade union position on the thirty (30) hour week, but rather the prno.p..
dents developed in N2A codes. This represented a departure in policy and
tactics already evident even in arguments at code hearings. In place of
the original proposals to reduce hours there was growing tendency to sub-
stitute measures conforming with the pattern which was being developed.
In this case, a forty (40) instead of a forty-eight (46) hour week was
proposed, with a tolerance of ten per cent for watchmen, and exemption up
to forty-eight (48) for emergencies with corresponding overtime payment
at the rate of time and one-naif (l.V).(*) The argument presented on be-
half of labor was that "thousands of automobile dealers are now operating
their sales service, office and garage departments on the basis of forty
(40) hour maximum for employees" under the PEA. It was further claimed
that since the 1931 average hours in the industry was 51, the forty-eight
(48) hour week meant a reduction of only three hours per week or less
than six per cent of the average obtained in 1931. Since the "1931 aver-
age includes the hours of many employees. .. exempted from the restrictions
under the proposed code. ..the actual reduction in hours that would be ef-
fected by the proposed schedule would be even less than four per week
on the average. "(**) Clearer difinition of hours of work was recommended
in order to avoid ambiguities. The forty (40) hour week was accepted as
reasonable since "it conforms to the standard established in many approved
and submitted codes." (***)
Informal hearings after the public hearing offered opportunity for
consideration of the various proposals. Further discussions led to agree-
ment to reduce hours to forty-four ('44) per week. As finally approved
the coae provided in Article III, Section B, paragraphs 2 and 3 as fol-
lows:
"iJo employee (except outside commission salesmen and watch-
men) shall be employed for more than 44 hours in any 1 week.
These maximum hours refer to the availability of the employee
in the shop or premises of the employer at the latter' s re-
quest whether or not the employee is actively engaged in speci-
fic tasks throughout these hours. All places of business shall
be kept open not less than 52 hours a week, unless such hours
were less than 52 hours per week before July 1, 1933, and in
which case hours shall not be reduced at all.
"The maximum hours fixed in the foregoing paragraph shall not
apply to salaried employees in a managerial, executive, or
supervisory capacity who receive $30.00 per week or more."
Ill Hours Determined by Collective Bargaining
A. Coat and Suit Industry
In the coat and suit industry, unlike1 the industries described
above, the schedule of hours of emoloyment resulted from the negotiations
(*) Statement of L.H. Seltzer, Ibid., p. 67
(**) Ibid. , p. 70.
("**) Ibid., o. 74
9862 J
' -80*
of industry and union representatives under government supervision.
There resulted tne snortest hour schedule for private industry of the
first five codes. The industry centered in New York Oity where about
eighty per cent of the total annual outpxit 'vas produced and distributed.
There terras of e icloyraent had been fixed by collective bargaining for
nearly two decades. An agreement between tne International Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers Union and the employer organizations had terminated July 1,
1933 end negotiations for its renewal had been fruitless. The employers
had wanted to establish a piece-work system but tiie union had rejected
the suggestion. (*) In tne meantime, negotiations with MA for a code
were begun and all parties turned to it for a solution.
The employers proposed a forty (40) hour week in their code filed
July 1", 1933 by the three organizations in the industry. (**) The union
responded with a counter code calling for a thirty (30) hour week and
preparations for a general strike. (***) The employers' argument was
based on the estimate of three million hours' overtime worked in the
industry in 1932. They contended that elimination of this overtime
would abolish existing unemployment in trie industry, then estimated at
5,000, They feared that a shorter work week would create scarcity of
employees, "artifically high wages11 and consequent high costs. (****)
The union maintained that tne forty-hour week had long been customary and
would not effect unemployment. It proposed a thirty hour week on the
ground that only half of the 40,000 coat and suit workers were fully em-
ployed and tnat considerable reduction in hours was necessary to meet
the unemployment situation at all. It averred that shorter hours and
the elimination of overtime would permit realization of the aims of the
Act. (*****) Midway between the position of the employers and the union
was one independent employers' organisation's proposal for a thirty-five
hour week. (******) & Cleveland employer stated that the 40 hour week
would have no effect on employment in that city. (*******)
The conferences following the public hearing discussed among many
issues those relftive to the hours of work. Agreement was difficult and
negotiations at one time broken seemed impossible, with a strike threat-
ening. (********) The problem of the hours of work was resolved by the
negotiations between the employer organizations and the unions. Other
issues, however, including tne limitation of contracts and responsibil-
ity for standards in outside snops, were undecided. Agreement was fin-
ally obtained and the co. e was approved by the President on August 4, 193
(*) International Ladies' Garment Workers Union - Heport of the
General Executive Board to the 22nd Convention, Monday, May
28, 1934, Chicago, Illinois, pn. 25-26.
(**) Hew York Times, July 14, 1933."
(***) New York Times, July 17, 1933.
(****) Testimony by Mr. Maxwell Copelof. Coat and Suit Industry
Transcript of Public Hearing, d ted July 20, 1933, pp. 29-51,
(Morning). xlele«se No. 73, Section 2, Morning,
(*****) Testimon/ of Mr. D. Dub in sky, Ibid., pp. 10-13, July 21, 1933
(Morning)
(******) Testimony of Mr. Karl Blandstein, Ibid., Vol. I., p. 86.
July 20, 1933.
(*******) Ibid, Testimony of A. Printz, p. 79.
(*♦***»**) New york rrlraeS) July 26 f 193y#
9862
-81-
In its final form it orovicted for a thirty-five hour week for manufactur-
ing employees with specifically designated work hours. Non-manufacturing
employees were governed by a 40-hour week. Overtime was prohibited ex-
cept that the Administrator was permitted to "grant any extension of hours
in the busy season." (*)
The code as approved became "the basis for collective agreement
with employers. " The negotiations had resulted from collective bargain-
ing between the employer associations and the unions. The unions con-
sidered the thirty-five hour week "a tremendous achievement for a sea-
sonal industry" and it was the shortest work week established in an/ in-
dustry at tnat time. •(**')
B . lien's Slothing Industry
In this industry negotiations for a code began in May, 1933 be-
tween the manufacturers and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, while
Congress was still at work on the legislation. Progress was expected
to be rapid. However, the formation of a national trade association -
the first in the industry - precipitated the creation of a strongly op-
posed minority association of non-union -manufacturers. (***) Each asso-
ciation presented a code, the first resulting from collective bargaining,
the second without labor paticipation. Because of the respective strengths
of the associations, the outcome could not be doubtful. This large is-
sue between industry groups as to collective bargaining served to sub-
ordinate the bargaining on the details of code provisions.
The issue between the associations came to a he.jd at two points:
control of the code administration, and wages above the minimum. The
code of the majority group was practically agreed to by organized labor
when presented July 19, except for the length of the work week. Both
codes provided a 40-hour week. The union asked for 35 hours. Previous
union agreements in the industry, had set a 44-hour week, so that the un-
ion was asking a substantial reduction.
At the public hearing, July 26, 1927, the majority association sup-
ported statistically its contention that a 40-hour week was the least
the inuustry could operate upon without a labor shortage. Tne union, on
the contrary, estimated that the 40-hour week could reemploy only a small
part of the 50,000 idle workers. It argued that total man-hours worked
by those who worked in excess of the 40-hour limit in the fall season of
1932 were 134,511, equivalent, to 3,363 wage earners working 40 hours per
week.. On the same basis of computation a 35-hour week would afford em-
ployment to 11,981 workers. These figures, of course, took no account of
(*) N.S.A. Codes cf Fair Competition, Vol. I, p. 53 - no such exemp-
tions were' asked ~by tne code authority.
(**) Report. Op. cit. p. 25
(***) The majority association had non-union employers in its ranks.
The By-laws of the minority association forbade admission to it
of manufacturers who had agreements with tne Amalgamated' Cloth-
ing Workers of America. See iJ-en's Clothing Code Report trans-
mitting code, p. 11.
9862
-83-
partial employment in this industry, where in -union factories equal dis-
tribution of work is the rule. Ihe union "brief , however, pointed out that
54.8 per cent of all Hetge earhers^worked 40 hours or less in the fall of
1932, while aver 32 per cent worked 35 hours or less.('*)
The union position was supported "by a study prepared for the Admin-
istration oy the Division of Research and Planning. The conclusion of
this report was that the unemployed "cannot all be reemployed either on
a 40-hour week maximum *r a 35-ncur week maximum, unless there is a con-
siderable increased demand. A 40-hour maximum may give employment to
6,150, if the employed workers do not work more than the average of 27.5
hours per week worked in 1932. A 35-hour maximum may give employment to
19,504 people if the spread of work remains the same."(**)
In the prolonged controversy between tne two industry groups which
continued after the hearing, the hours controversy and its adjustment
were obscured. The final code set a 36-hour week, "3-h©ur day, ?;ith~no
overtime allowance. A special arrangement of overtime 'for small divi-
sions of the industry working on special order -business - tailors-td-
the-trade and uniform manufacturers - was' agreed to, the- number of hours
and weeks to be determined each season by the code authority.
In the final event, the majority having reached its agreements on al
points "by collective bargaining, the Administration accepted the result iij
ctde as the code for the industry and it was approve August 4, 1933. It
gave to the recalcitrate minority, which at length in the process of in-
dustry organization represented the employers of only 25,000 workers,
more than its proportionate share of representation on the code authority
as a peace promoting effort.
C Press Industry
The results gained oy the union in the dress industry were remark-
able in that organized labor's loss of strength during the depression
years showed in this industry particularly. A new industry, growing
rapidly in volume throughout the depression, it vras being decentralized
ia loc&tion and entering new fields of production through the use of cot-
ton and rayon. It was less stabilized than the long established coat anc
suit industry. The result was a chaos in prices, high mortality of bus!
ness units, and non-observance of existing union agreements. Tne Inter-
national Ladies' Garment Workers Union nad passed through a crisis of
dual unionism; but in tne spring of 1933 it was pulling its. forces- to-
gether successfully to -take advantage of the pending recovery legislatioi
Its agreements in New York City were expiring and it hoped to achieve im|
provement of terms and enforcement of a new agreement under the new mach-
ine ry,
A new National Dress ■Manufacturers' Association was formed in May IS
and negotiations started with this and;'sev,eral other associations
(*) Brief presented b/ tne Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America at
Public Herring July 26-27. Men's Clothing Code History, Vol. 3.
(**) Material bearing on Men's Clothing Industry. Morris Kolchin.
Division of Economic Research and Planning, August 10, 1933, p. 33.
9652
-83-,
representing inside end contracting snops and other special interests.
Four or five codes " ere submitted, one in June 1S33; the others in July.
The codes were presented by tne predominantly New York Associations, and
were all identical as to hours, asking a 40-hour 5-day week, and ex-
pressly forbidding overtime. A code submitted by a California asso-
ciation proposed merely to operate .under the California hour law, 48
hours per week, 8 per day. A Chicago -roup proposed a 40-hour week wiVn
12 weeks of 46 hours, and a minimum wage of 35^ an hour. (*)
The three codes witn identical nour provisions were undoubtedly
based on some negotiations with the union, "but the union was dissatis-
fied with their terms. There seems also to have been an inclination on
the part of the associations to let the code making process take the
place of a collective agreement. Meanwhile, the Administration, which
it must be noted was extremely helpful in adjusting difficulties in
forming tnis code, was negotiating with all the groups and with labor,
and preparing a combined code from all those submitted, with a 40-hour
provision. A hearing was set for August 22.
About a week before the he ring a^te tne union called a general
strike in New York City. This strike was effective, and well timed. (**)
Mr. Grover Whaler., 1IRA director m the New York metropolitan area, 'came
into tne situation as mediator, apparently at the request of the deputy
administrator handling tne code. At a conference with the industry at
the Hotel Pennsylvania on August 13, 1933, he delivered a message from
President Roosevelt urging tne industry to settle its difficulties. The
National Association of Dress Manufacturers replied by telegram to the
President that seme day as follows:
"At a meeting of our 500 members this mornining there was con-
veyed to us by the Hon. Grover Whalen a message from you
urging industry-wide adoption in the dress field of the prin-
ciple of collective bargaining with labor. Actuated by our
sincere desire to cooperate with your recovery program in a
manner thoroughly acceptable to you our membership voted unani-
mously to authorize the Board of Governors to proceed in formu-
lating • collective agreement through conferences with the In-
ternational Ladies' Garment Workers Union. It is our hope that
such negotiations will facilitate tne formulating and issuance
of a recovery code for the industry directly after the hearings
on this code in Washington on Tuesday. This association was
formed in May following /our radio address calling upon indus-
tries to organize to foster economic rehabilitation. Our sole
purpose was to prepare a recovery plan for this trade in col-
laboration with tne government. If this aim can be more ef-
fectively achieved through a collective labor agreement w«
readily accept that procedure. "(*** )
(*) These codes are to be found in Central Record Section: Dress Code
History, Vols. A. and 3.
(**) In this strike pickets carried placards reading "Let's write our
code on the picket line."
(***) Central Record Section. Vol. A. for the dress manufacturing in-
dus try .
9862
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Cn the prececins day, August l?th, }.:r. Whalen had Drought both
sides together at a conference, out some groups had expressed them-
selves cs uncertain that a collective agreement was necessary to
regularize the admitted disorder of the inaustry* Mr. Lubinsky,
President of the International Lrdies1 Garment '..orkers Union, statea
that the union res the only force capable ol policing the '-hole in-
dustry and making the code effective. At that time he asked: s
collective agreement, the 3C-hour reek, wages restored to the scale
of a normal not s depression year, and contractor regulations. (*)
The hearing was postponed one cay for completion of the agreement,
which wr,<5 signed on August 22, 1953. This called for a 25-hour week,
Ihe public hearing developed substantial agreement on the
question of hours. later difficulties that delayed code approval to
October 31, 1935, turned en the contractor jobber regulations largely.
IV. CONCLUSION.
Only nine of the iirst one hundred approved codes had their basic hours
duced from those originally or- posed 0^/ mai i.t. Six of t". ese v/ere
among the iirst twenty approved coder. The other three cases of reductions
on basic hours followed precedents established in other codes, or resulted
frbin collective bargaining or effective -r aining o^ a labor adviser in
the case where unusually long hours were proposed. ihe ea:rly drive for
shorter hours effected the reduction of hours in these industries.
In the case of the lumber industry, Administrative pressure to secure
a forty hour week was successful after a long cries of concessions. The
fire extinguishing industry agreec. to shorter hours because of its close
tie-up with the motor fire apparatus industry, which had adopted the thirty-
five hour week in the automobile manufacturing code. In the shipbuilding
industry, organized labor and the government reduced hours because both
groups were cetermined to have shorter hours ana the Government possessed
as a oargair.ing leverage the public funcs for government contract. In the
petroleum industry, labor with the aio. of the independents in the industry-
succeeded in reducing hours. Management' s aesire for production control
in the cast iron soil pipe industry conspired to set maximum hours at
twenty-seven. In motor vehicle retailing, an unprecedented long hours
schedule was i educed to forty-four by the efiorts of the labor acviser.
^uite different were the methods usee in the coat and suit, men's clothing
and dress industries.
A vigorous organization campaign to consolidate laoor' s strength and
bargaining power to coce making enabled the unions to present a formidable
show of power. Their influence in the chief manuf? cturing centers permitted)
them to carry on direct negotiations with the employers. Through the use of|
the threatened strikes at crucial moment they succeeded in bringing sub-
stantial and effective reductions of hours.
With the exception of cast iron soil pipe and motor vehicle retailing
industries the hours originally proposed "rere forty. The twr xceptions
originally proposed thirty hours and forty-eight respectively. The hours
finallj established in the codes varied. The shortest oasic ] urs were in
the cast iron soil pipe industry (27). Three cr. rovided for thirty-fivel
hours, (fire extinguisi Lng, coat and •■ it, and. drj ss) sue three, thirty-six
hairs ( 8hi|-.building, petroleum and men's clothing), one, forty (lumber and
timber products) and one, forty-four hours, (motor vehicles).
(*) Centr- 1 nee rd I cti :., V 1. A. £ r the cr< . cturing Lncustry.
9862
-85-
[OURS THAIi OEICIilALLY PROPOSED
In contrast to these industries ii. which the code basic hours
were lowar than criminally proposed, is a seccne, group of six
industries in which basic hours were _r.creased curing ne£ otiations.
Considering the goal °f the Administration to have "been shorter
hours, evolution of policy appeared in the modifications which
lengthened them, ' ':>
I . Pi i urinous Co-?l Industry
Tho bituminous coal industry negotiations illustrated the
resistance even in unionized industries to reduction of hours "below
forty. The United line Workers had Ion sought the 6-hour day and
and five dry reel.:. (*) It had sent out organizers into every unorgan-
ised field soon after the national Industrial Recovery Act was raider
serious consideration in Con.rees, and had secured raaribership claimed
to embrace veil over 90 nercent of the total tonnage.
A. Original Codei
The union and"a ; roup of bituminouc coal operators operating
in the States of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Iowa, Kentucky, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Montana and
Wyoming" (*^ began a series of conferences for the development of a
co;e during the first two weeks of July, 1933. The first took place
in Chicago, the rest, in Washington, D. C. A code was developed
jointly by the employer and cr.nioyee groups, differences arising
only with respect to the length of tho working c'ay. The operators
pro'.'osed an eight hour day, a thirty-two hour week for one six-
raonths' perioc and ? forty hour week for the second, with a yearly
average of thirty-six hours. (^ The United Mine Workers proposed a
(*) American Federation of Lrbor V/eeklj Hews Service,
(July 23, 1933).
(**) national Industrial Recovery Administration Hearing
on bode of Pair Practices ant Competition presented by
bituminous coal industry, August 10, 1933 - p. 222.
(***) The cot'c provision rer.d as follows!
"Ti ht hours work at the usual working places exclusive
of lunch ^e.-icd shall be the maximum per day for all
iployees whether they shall be paid by the hour or paid on
a bonna^e basis execot incase of accidents which temporarily
necessitate longer hours for those ei.nloyces required on
account thereof, and excortir rvoervisors, clerks, and
(Pootnotc continued)
9862
-86-
thirty hour week "based on a six hour day and. five day week. Both
sides agreed jointly to sponsor the other terms and to present argu-
ments supporting their respective positions on hours. The code was
presented to the Administration or. July 13, 1^33 by the industry
representative with the statement that it had been prepared "in con-
formity with the provisions of paragraph (d) of Section 7 of the
NI?JL,.(*)
2- Other Proposals
Other codes wore presented by various regional groups €.-fl\
by the non-onion operators. These generally proposed a forty hour
week, although one recommended a forty-eight hour wee":. (**) Actually
the controversy centered about the thirty or forty hour week, or
moreaccurately, the six or eight hour day. The employers1 argument
concerned regional differentials and administration.
C. Management ' s. Position
Management's approvs/l of the eight hour C'i-r av.dopDOc.it ion
(***) Continued
technicians, and also except that small number of
employees at each mine whose daily Fork includes the
handling of man trips and those who are required to
remain on duty while men' are entering or leaving the mine.
"ITo employee' shall be employed in excess of thirty-two
hours i~ any calendar week during a twenty-six consecutive weeks'
period, nor in excess of forty hours in .nay calendar week dur-
ing the other twenty-six consecutive weeks of such twelve months
periods; provided, however, that an employer may elect to oper-
ate any mine on a schedule of employment net to execoc thirty-
six hours per week throughout th« twelve months' period. Tx-
ceptions shall be made in case of accidents which temporarily
necessitate longer hours for those employees required on ac-
count thereof, and of that small number of employees whose
daily work includes handling of man trips and those who are
required to remain on duty while men are entering of leaving
the mine."
(llote: representatives' of the United Mine Workers reserved the
right to present orguments at the proper time to the Ad ministration
for the six hour day and the five day week instead of the eight
hour day as set out in the above paragraph.)
United Line workers Journal, V. 44, p. 4, August 1, 1933.
(*) national Industrial Recovery Administration, Hearin; on Code of "air j
Practices and Competition, Presented by George "'. Harrington on be-
half of the bituminous coal industry', Vol. II, p. 225f (August 10,1233
(**) Ibid. Vol. Ill (August 11, 1933), Statement of dice 17, Wilier,
Representing the Coal Producers' Association of Illinois, x>. 528.
9862
-37-
to the six hour day was based upon anticipated excessive increase in em-
ployment and increase in labor costs, beyond the industry's capacity to
pay (*\ in view of competition fro^i other fuels (**\ It averred that
the shorter working day would mean not merely higher wages, but would
increase other expenditures. For example, the cost of preparing a coal
mine for a shift's production was said to increase inversely with re-
duction in hours. Attention was also called to the fact that the trans-
portation costs per day mere unchanged. Furthermore, while workers
would lose as much time annually under the shorter work day, it was de-
clared that the tier diem costs of this lost time would increase inversely
with the reduction in the number of hours. One operator stated that the
periods of non-production would be the same regardless of the length of
the shift. (***) Other items of overhead, such as royalties, inrarance,
taxes and fixed expense were pointed out .(****) in addition the fear
("O State'ient of Mr. F.V. H.Collins, Rocky Mountain Pacific Coal
Operators Association:
11 we are confronted on the 8 hour situation, with con-
dition we cannot avoid. Anything that will add materially
to the cost of o-oera.tion in the Rocky Mountain Pacific Dis-
trict must result in coal mining casualty so far as the oper-
ator is concerned."
National Industrial Recovery Administration, Hearing on Code
of Fair Practices and Competition, presented by bituminous
coal industry, Vol. I, p. 162.
(**) Testimony of F. K. Tap Ian, Central Coal Association:
"I do not claim that it is too much money for one miner to
make It is a question of whether we can stand any such
cost and compete with fuel and with other competitive fuels,
and if, in trying to do it, it works out that vou had less
employment rather than more employment, and that it what
the act is created for, then we do not believe that ,_"0uld he
a very constructive. thing If it were not for the com-
petitive fuels, I don't believe we would have any argument
against the claim."'
National Industrial Recovery Administration, Hearing on Code
of Fair Practices and Competition, presented by bituminous
coal industry. Vol. II, p. 369. See also testimony of
Mr. D. W. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 360.
(a.***) Testimony of D. W. Buchanan, National Industrial Recovery
Administration, Hearing on Code of Fair Practices and Com-
petition, presented by biluminous coal industry, Vol. II, p.
389.
(****) Testimony of Frank laplari, -Ibid. n. 37' >, and testimony of
D. W. Buchanan, Hearing, V. II, Ihid-c. 38>J.
9862
-t :-
of the operators maintained that the raining industry had become ad-
justed to the prevailing eight hour day. Where recognized that a
shorter workday was not expected to present managerial difficulties,
one operator declared that he "would rather gave an eight hour day".
(*) Others maintained that specific physical difficulties would re-
sult from changing to a shorter day since "we are all laid out on the
8-hour basis. ¥a equip and size our rooms, make out cuts, arrange
our cutting machines, our method of loading and handling, all based in
the unionized districts and the other districts upon an 8-hour pro-
ductive clean up day". (**> Others contended that the industry had
developed "an eight hour cycle of operation to fit conditions of min-
ing" and to uoset it would mean a "long period of costly readjustment"
and "a less efficient method". (***) Reduction of the length of their
shift was opposed as an accident hazard, since "explosions in coal mines
occur most frequently during changes of shifts." With the increase
in the number of starts made, explosion hazards would increase. (***=0
These sentiments were summarized in the testimony ?>s follows:
"The eight hour shift in the operation of coal mines
is possibly the most important single element in
connection with the industry. It has become the
standard unit of operation, and any change therefrom
must mean decreased efficiency and greater cost in
the operation of mines.'1 (*****)
It was even declared that Ha change in the entire industry from 8
to 6, or even 7 hours evernight, savors of revolution. I hold that re-
volutions are always dangerous. Any such change must be made gradually
over a period of years." (****** >
The operators estimated, on the basis of the customary 48 hour
operation of the industry, that the 36 hour average work week through-
out the year would increase em-oloyraent approximately 2'"1 percent "when
there is anything like a normal dem-.nd for coal ...." This reduction
in hours "ought to take care of the big 'est part of the unemployment".
(*******) It was also noted that "the Administration has considerable
time to work these problems out.... It might not be a bad idea, to try a
*v Testimony of Frank Taplan, Vol. II, Ibid. p. 372.
**) Testimony of F.V.H. Collins, Ibid. Vol. I. p. 163.
***" Testimony of D.W.Buchanan, Ibid. Vol. II, p. 39'").
****) Testimony of D. W, Buchanan, Ibid. Vol. II, p. 392.
*****) Testimony of D.W.Buchanan, Ibid, p. 394.
******) Testimony of Eugene KcAuliffe, President of Union Pacific
Coal Company, Ibid. p. 410,
******* ) Testimony of Frank X. Taplan, Ibid. p. 268 and p. 369.
9862
-89-
36 hour wee in place of 43, and if we found there was still a big sur-
plus, it would not take very long to reduce the working time still fur-
ther." (*)
While the latter sentiment prevailed among the operators which had
participated in the draft of the "Harrington Code", quite another line
of reasoning was evident among other groups. The spokesmen for the
Northern and Appalachian group of operators contended that it is only by
11 increased volume of business" that reemployment would really be possible.
(**) They asked for a forty hour week.
D. Labor's Position
Organized labor presented its argument for the six hour day and the
thirty hour week. It comprised three major points: (l) the eight hours'
work underground "at the face" was excessive and the eight hour day was
the prevailing normal work day in the industry; (2) a shorter work day
would result in decreasing the accident rate and imorovement in the
health and efficiency of mine workers and such reduction in accidents
"would more than offset added overhead costs by the savings of losses
which otherwise would accrue to the operrtor through longer work day re-
sulting in more accidents"; (3) a maximum work week not to exceed thirty
hours was necessary to extend employment to available men, check over-
production, eliminate cutthroat competition, and stabilize costs. (-***)
E. : Negotiations
With the adjournment of the hearings, the problem was to weld the
motley proposals into one. To accomplish this the President called into
conference on August 17th the representatives of the operators and was
reported to have "demanded that they omit the qualification of the col-
lective bargaining provision of the Recovery Act" and insisted uuon a
single code. (***=0 At the general meeting beginning on August 18,
subcommittees were formed to consider the various differences. However,
no progress w-- s made until the open opposition of the non-union oper-
ators was cleared away and a joint conference wa.s organized. Independent
discussions relating to the Appalachain district beginning on August 24,
1933, facilitated the final solution of the labor issues. (*****) The
vigorous drive for unionization of the miners within the region had
("O Testimony of Frank K. Taplan, Ibid., p. 370.
(**") Testimony of Mr. Charles O'Neill, Ibid. Vol. I, p. 64.
(***) Statement of John L. Lewis, Ibid. pp. 343-362.
(****) n.y. Times, August 18, 1933. •
(*****) New York Times, August 25, 1933. While there was a larger
meeting in the afternoon, a subcommittee was formed consisting
of the following persons: Operators J.D.A. Morrow, Charles
O'Neill, H.'E.Taggard, and Duncan Kennedy; miners John L. Lewis,
Phillip Murray, Thomas Kennedy, and Van A. Bittner
9862
-9C~
finally led the previously opposing operators to accede to the necessity
of joint negotiations. The conference was undertaken under the super-
vision of the NBA. It was believed that once an agreement was written
in the form of a contract between the union miners and operators the
wording of the code itself would be easy. (*)
However, the conference had no sooner begun than a deadlock ap-
peared. The Administrator then suggested a forty (40^ hour week in-
stead of the thirty-six (36) hour average proposal by the operators of
unionized areas with the provision thrt a commission study the possib-
ilities of a shorter work week and report back within six months. The
recommendation included elaborate machinery for settling labor dis-
putes and establishing a firm basis of industrial relations. While the
non-union operators accepted the proposal regarding hours, they were
reluctant about the administrative feature and awaited the action with
respect to Section 7(a) in the Automobile Code. (**) When the Automo-
bile Code was adopted with the "iodified Section 7(a) the question was
reopened by certain bituminous coal employers' submission of a code
with Section 7(a) modified as in the Automobile Code. (***) However,
in the eleventh hour the issues were settled and an agreement was reach-
ed providing for a forty (40) hour week. (****)
After the major labor terms were set in the collective agreement
for the Appalachian district the labor provisions of the code itself
were quickly written. The basic hours developed in the Appalachian
agreement were incorporated in the code. The period between arrange-
ment of the basic agreement between organized labor and the Appalachian
mine operators and the development of the code was spent in settling Vac
(*) General Johnson declared on announcing these meetings:
"For the first time in industrial relations in the bituminous
coal industry, the leaders of the southern portion of the
Appalachian group which produces 70fo of the bituminous coal
of the United States have, at their own election, sat down
in a conference with the officers of the United Mine Workers
in an earnest effort to agree on all controversed matters
which have bedeviled this vital industry for years ....This
conference will proceed by direction of the President under
the supervision of the National Recovery Administration
which will lay down the program of negotiations and act as
mediator throughout."
(**) . New York Times, August 27, 1933.
(***) New York Times, August 28, 1933.
(***) New York Times, August 29, 1933.
General Johnson, announced: "Committees of the United Mine
Workers and of the operators in the Appalachian bituminous
field have reached the basis of an agreement covering the
principle points at issue and which this Administration is
willing to recommend to the President. This clears the way
to the preparation of an acceptable code. No announcement of
the provisions can be made until there is an agreement on the
actual working of the agreement and the code."
9862
-91-
issue of the check-off (*"> and the merit clause (**N' and the closed
shop. (***") in the midst of these discussions, the Administrator
announced a code, inviting criticism and giving notice of a -oublic
hearing on September 12, 1933. (****) The code contained the follow-
ing provisions with resoect to the hours of labor;
"No employee shall be employed in excess of thirty-
two hours in a Calendar week during a consecutive
period of twenty-six weeks in any twelve months' period
nor in excess of forty hours in any calendar week during
the other twenty-six consecutive weeks of such twelve
months' period; provided, however, that any employer
may elect to operate any mine on a schedule of employ-
ment of not to exceed thirty-six hours per week through-
out the twelve months' period. No employee shall be re-
quired to work more than eight hours in any one day at
the usual working places, exclusive of lunch period,
whether paid by the hcur or on a tonnage basis. There
shall be excepted from the foregoing limitations, (a}
employees required becuase of accidents which temporarily
necessitate a longer hour for them; (b) supervisory, clerks,
technicians and that small number of employees at each
mine whose daily work includes the handling of man trips
and those who are required to remain on duty while men
are entering ansL leaving the mine. If at any mine the
majority of the unemployed workers who are organized in
a manner required by Section 7(a^ of the NIRA expressed
their desire to share the available work with other bona
fide unemployed workers of the same min^ or a written
request to sharo the work is addressed to the mine man-
agement signed by a majority of the employed workers,
the number of hours work to be allotted to the unemployed
workers shall be determined oy conference of the mine
adjustment committee, or in case of disagreement by the
decision of the District Adjustment Committee and' dup-
licate copies of the" decision >f the ec;.nit'tee shall be
furnished to rfc-he local mine. rsana^en eat 'and .the local mine
mine employees duly -authorized representatives." (*****)
(*> New York Times September 2, 1933.
(**> New York Times September 7, 1933.
(***) New York Times, September 2, 1933.
(****) New York Times, September 8, 1933.
(***** ) Kew York Times, September 8, 1933.
9862
-92-
Meanwhile, the negotiations between the Appalachian operators and
the union continued. Proclamation of a coae by the Administration had
given pause to voluntary submission of a code; while collective agree-
ments in the industry hud been delayed on account of the unsettled
state of the coce negotiations. The oocrators criticized the NBA for
its announced code which they characterized as an attempt to relegate
to the background ownership, management and the substitute therefor
either by employees or by Federal authorities. "The mrooosed code
bristles with instances of departure from the time-honored supposition
that cne had a reasonable measure of nower and authority over his own
holdings. (*^
The public meeting on September 12 w s highly charged. The mine
workers were threatening strikes because of the delay and the union
operators were speaking disparagingly of the administration for yield-
ing to the "Mellon interests" in the Appalachian district (**) The
result of the public hearing was a. conference committer whi--.h met with
the 'Administrator. A labor committee (***) met with " rator groups
to '"ork out the labor provisions of the fvoal draft of si Dde. Under
governmental and Presidential pressure and shrike threats in the field,
the final draft was made. (***0
(*N New York Times, September 11, 1933.
(**^ Philadelphia Record, September 13, 1933.
(***") Consisting of John L*. Levis, Phillin Murray, Thom.?s Kennedy,
Percy Tetlow, and Van A. Bittner.
(***:iO A presidential statement was issued after a conference with both
groups on the 14th to the following effect:
"I have definitely outlined the urgent reasons for
immediate agreement on the coal code. Without ex-
ception the operators representing the major coal
rjroducing areas and recresenta-tives of the United
Mine Workers have given to me their assurance that
the code in its present form is for the large part
acceptable and that in all human probability this
code can be negotiated to a conclusion within the
next twenty-four hours - in other words, by Friday
night. Furthermore, the- wage agreements bet' een
the operators and the United lane Workers are so
close to being concluded that the same twenty-four
hour oeriod should bring them to a successful end.
In view of these assurances I am. awaiting the sig-
natures to the code and the agreements."
New York Times, September 15, 1933.
9862
-33-
As agreed upon, the code set forth the following provision re-
garding the hours of work:
"i'lo employee, except members of the ' executive, super-
visory, technical, and confidential personnel, shall
be employed in excess of forty (4'~),l hours in any
calendar week after the effective date of the code.
iJo emplovee shall be required or permitted to work more
than eight hours in any one day at the usual working
places or otherwise in or about the mine (exclusive
of lunch period\ whether paid oy the hour or on a
tonnage or other piecework basis.
"There shall be excepted from the foregoing limitations
(a^ employees required because of accidents which tem-
porarily necessitate longer hours for them: (b^ super-
visors, clerks, technicians and that small number of
employees at each mine whose daily work includes the
handling of man-trips and/ or haulage animals and coal
in transit and those who are required to remain on
duty while men are entering or leaving the mine.
"The foregoing maximum hours of work shall not be con-
strued as a minimum; and if at airy time a majority of the
employed workers express .their desire, by written re-
quest to the employer, to share available work with bona
fide unemployed workers of the same mine, the number
of hours., work nay be adjusted accordingly by mutual
agreement between such employed workers and their em-
ployers. "
The greatest obstacle in negotiating the code for the bituminous
coal industry had proved to be the non-union operators. They had ob-
jected to the joint code sponsored by labor and employers for an eight
hour day and an annual thirty-six (36 r hour average week, proposing in-
stead a forty (40^ hour week. They had been unwilling to yield to a
shorter than forty (40^ hours work week in spite of the Government's
proposal of thirty-six (36^ hours. The compromise to achieve cod-
ification and develop a union contract for the Appalachian district
was arranged. This provision called for a forty (40") hour if,eek and a
further study of the hours regulations. The reouirement for voluntary
compliance by employers with the leverage in the hands of significiant
groups, resulted in over-riding the previous agreement between labor
and union employer group and the development of the compromise.
The Bituminous Coal Code did not meet the union demand for the
thirty (30^ hour week and exceeded the hours originally proposed by
the code jointly sponsored by labor and industry. It continued the
forty (4"0 hour pattern.
I I . Gasoline Pump Mrnufacturing Industry
The gasoline nurap manufacturers presented a code with a provision
for thirty-five (35") hours per ?/eek. This code apparently had not
9862
-94-
undergone changes within the N3A before its submission for public hearinfl
(*s However, at the public hearing, the industry presented an amendment
to increase the hours to forty. (**N The industry argued thj t the
adoption of the forty (4<~^ hour codes for other products manufactured
in the same establishments (***^ made a thirty-five (35) hour week
in this industry impossible .
The labor representatives demanded a thirty (3*0 hour week (****)
and stated that the average working time in the industry in 1932 (*****>
was 37.333. They argued that "they should not be influenced by what
some other plant in their locality is doing, but they ought to carry
out the intent of the law and reduce the hours." (******) The ar-
gument for individual variation made this code significant in the
history of kRA policy.
At the public herring a fell discussion between the deputy ad-
ministrator and- his labor adviser took place. He questioned the fair-
ness of increasing the labor rates in this industry while other in-
dustries were going on a forty hour week. The labor adviser r>ointed
out the large amount of unemployment in this industry. He suggest-
ed that in "these different industries the labor costs should be the
same or at least the rates of pay. There should be some way of work-
ing it. out ' h?reby the hourly rate or the weekly rote in all the dif-
ferent plants should be the same." (******* ^
With evidence of the facts available that the other industries
had adopted a forty (40N, hour week, the gasoline pump manufacturing
industry demanded a similar work week. The administration was faced
with a serious problem. The Labor Advisory Board had declared that
"forty (4|,)) hours a week is too long for this industry if the intent
of the Reco-ery Act is to be fulfilled which is to absorb all labor
that was employed during the normal years from 1926 to 1929 and that
thirty {'60) hours a week is all that could be worked if that is to
be accomplished, or at the most a thirty-six (36) hour week with pro-
vision that not more than eight (8) hours in any one day shall be
worked," (*****#**}
(*) History of the Code of Fair Competition for the Gasoline
Manufacturing Industry, by E.R. Schaeffer, p. 9.
(**) National Recovery Administration hearings on the Code of
. Fair Competition and Practices presented bv the gasoline
pump manufacturing industry, August "'4, 1933 ; p. 11.
(***) Ibid, pp. 31, 43, 45, 48, 51, 55.
(****> Testimony of ii.R, 7ewham of the International Association of
Machinists, Ibid. p. 56.
(*****) Ibid, p. 61.
(******) IbxcL, p. 62.
(*******") Ibid, pp. 61-68
(******** "i Code History, for the Gasoline Fump Manufacturing Industry,
9862
Exhibit D.
-95-
The Administration followed precedents rather than the need for
individual variations. In its letter of transmittal of the codes it
explained that the forty (40^ hour Feek was approved despite the
fact th. tit will obviously add few employees to the payroll. How-
ever, in order to reabsoro the unemployment in this industry it would
be necessary to reduce the hours of em-clo^nent to less than thirty (3^)
per week. As a practical, workable proposition this would be de-
cidedly unfair to the industry because-
(1^ Some of the plants "oroduce 'oroducts which
are already governed by other forty (4')}
hour codes and shift their labor between the
different tynes of -oroduction.
(2^ i:ost of the plants are in localities where
the maximum is governed by forty (4'"^ hour
codes.
"Reducing the hours to a. point where the weekly earnings of
employees in this industry would not offset those of workers under
other forty (40N| hour codes in the same locality would infringe on
the available labor supply for this industry. Under present condi-
tions for practical consideration, the rea.bsorntion of the -unemploy-
ed in this industry is practically impossible. (*)
In this case hours were increased beyond the original crow sal
of the industry, not for economic reasons peculiar to the industry,
b" -t for fear of unfair competition among the various metal manufactur-
ing industries if they "ere not all governed noj the s "lie hours provi-
sions. This action was taken despite the fact that such extension of
hours reduced the possibility of ree:-nlo:aient in the industry.
9262
-96-
III Compressed Air, Heat Exchange and Pump Industries
Since these industries presented the same cods, the Cc.naressed Air
Industry code was representative of all three. In its draft code pre-
sented by the industry _n August 4th, the following provision was in-
clude::
"on and after the effective date no employer shall employ:
(a) an employee engaged in the processing of the products
of the compressed air industry and in labor operations directly
incident thereto in excess of thirty-six (36) hours per week;
(b) any other employees except executives administrative super-
visory and technical employees 'and their respective staffs and
traveling sales and service employees, in excess of forty (40)
hours per week. Provided, however, that these limitations shall
not apply to conditions of seasonal or peak demand which create
an unusual and temporary burden for production or installation;
in such special cases such number of .;ours may be worked as are
required by the necessities of the situation, but not to exceed
forty-eight (43) hours per week for any six weeks in any calen-
dar six months' period beginning July 1, 1933, provide! however,
t.iat in such special cases at least time and one-third shall be
paid for hours worked in excess of the maximum, and provided
further that these limitations shall not apply to employees on
emergency, maintenance or repair work, not to very special
cases where restriction of hours of highly skilled workers
would unavoidably reduce or delay production but in such special
cases at least time and one-third shall be paid for hours worked
in excess of the maximum.11 (*)
These provisions were similar to those of the Electrical Code. In
fact in transmitting these to the National Recovery Administration, the
Secretary of the Compressed Air Institute declared that "in view of the
fact that this code as well as the codes for the Hydraulic Institute and
heat Exchange Institute, follows very closely and is much the sane a.s the
Electrical Manufacturing code which has been approved by the President,
it is assumed that a preliminary conference will not be necessary and we
therefore ask that date for a public hearing be set." (**) Nevertheless,
conferences with Administrative officials led to revision and presentation
of a new code on August 26, 1933, This revision included a basic forty
(40) hour week, in place :f the previous thirty-six (36) hours and left
the exemptions unchanged. (***)
(*) Code of Pair Competition for Compressed Air Industry Vol. A,
NPA Files.
(**) Letter from Lir. C. II. Rohobach, Compressed Air Institute to
IhTA, August 11, 1933, Vol. A, IhlA Files.
(***) August ?.S draft in Vol. A.
-J7-
This latter draft providing for longer hours was the one submitted
to the public hearing on September 5, 1933. (*) The defense of the
change was that the revival of the capital goods industry "can only come
when consumers1 goods industries begin to show profits and have money
to spend for replacements, renewals or modification of plants and this
recovery is hastened "oy the creation of a capital goods market or the
improvement of the existing market." (**)
It was further contended that less than forty (40) hours per week
"will necessarily be reflected promptly in selling prices and immediately
act as a stoppage of the placing of business and cause further unemploy-
ment." (***) Hot much reemployment was promised by the industry because
of the hours' reduction. Only business revival could bring reemployment.
The labor representatives presented a brief but no oral argument against
this proposal. (****)
Conferences wore held with the labor advisers to the code follow-
ing the public Leaving and no important revisions resulted, except that
time and one-half pay for overtime above the daily ei^it hours was sub-
stituted for payment after the weekly maximum. A later draft reduced
the overtime rate to time and one- third.
The final draft of the code was protested by the Labor Advisory
Board which recommended a thirty-five (35) hour week. (*****-^ The Code
Analysis Division made the following comments upon the proposal:
"No clear statement appears in the transcript that would
support the belief that the present forty (40) hour maxi-
mum hour provision will actually tend to increase employ-
ment within the industry. It was stated by Mr, Neagle that
1500 men had been added to the industry payroll in a seven
months period, occurring between February and August of this
year, however, it was brought out by Deput i.Iuir that in-
creased volume was responsible rather than the adjustment
(*) national Recovery Administration hearing on Code of Fair
Practices and Competition by compressed air industry,
September 5, 1933, p. 8.
(**) Ibid, p. 23.
(***) loid, p. 24.
(****) Ibid,- p. 65, i.ir., Newham of the International Association of
Machinist.
(*****) Letter of September 22, 1933 to deputy administrator, Vol. 3.
D86i
of hours worked. The figures submitted by Mr. Neagle at
the hearing show that t e industry is considerably in ex-
cess of fifty (50 j) percent off in employment as compared
to the year 1939. The forty (40) hour maximum per week
is presumably designed by the industry to take up some
portion of this slack between employed and unemployed in
the industry. It is questionable wnet. er t.ie forty (40)
-our maximum will result in creating an appreciable take
up in that slack which will be satisfactory to the Admin-
istration. Therefore, it would seem that seme readjust-
ment of maximum hours night well be made to a point at
least net higher than thirty-six (56) per week, with, of
course, a corresponding increase in the minimum wage rates
that will provide for a living wage for all employees." (*)
In approving this code the leputy administrator in his report made
the following comment:
"In February 1955, there was a total of 2,690 employees in the
industry, marking the lev/ point. Jitn increased business after
March 4, 1935 and the adoption of the forty (40) hour week under
the President's Reemployment Agreement the total employees rcse
to 4,781 in August 1933, or about fifty (50) percent of the same
period in 1939 ... It is recommended that a statement be issued
to the effect that fce forty (40) hour week ml minimum rate of
forty cents (40?) an hour has been recommended oy the Administrator
and the Labor Advisory Board because they feel that the maximum
hour and minimum rate basis will be most effective in developing
volume of business in tins industry, and that a shorter week and
higher rate would tend to defeat the very purpose of the Act.
The only way in which this industry can reemploy and increase
rolls is through increased volume in business and the Admin-
istr tion and tne Labor Beard .ave had this in mind in approving
the codes." (**)
In all t.ree cases, the compressed air and also the heat exchange and
pump industries with similar codes, two reasons were given for administrate
ap roval of the increase in hours ~by the industry. These were, first, the
precedents set b ' similar industries for a forty hour week code and, second)
the belief that reduction in hours was not pertinent to reemployment in the
capital goods industries.
(*) Letter of September 22, 1933, Vol, A, from.PW. Taf t. to G. S., Brady.
(**) Letter from Mr. Malcolm Muir to General Hugh 3. Johnson, Administratol
Report on the Code of Pair Competition for the Compressed Air Inlustrj
October 9, 1933. Vol. II, No evidence in sup ort of the Labor Board's
ao :roval of this statement appears in the file.
9862
-99-
IV. Retail Trade
Retail trade presented a unique problem to I'RA because of its large
number of small units. Though the outstanding retail trade association had
considered a forty-eight (48) hour week, IITA pressure to effect reemployment
led to the adoption and \ resentation of a code based upon a forty (40) hour
rree1:. This code as finally submitted was sponsored by si::: of the national
trade .associations with recommendation that "all retell trades of the country
be brought under one composite code. "A forty (40) hour week "'a established
but with provision for a forty—eight (48) hour peak during three weeks in
each si:: months period. In submitting this proposal, however, the sponsoring
trade associations noted that "the code should, provide a longer week, but in
order to expedite compliance with the President's Reemployment Agreement, we
are submitting the cod.e on the basis of-forty (40) hours." They reserved the
right, they declared, to submit a complete code at a later date providing
for a longer week than forty (40) hours. (*) Opposition has heard from many
sources to the forty (40) hour week proposal. The Chicago retail '-roup was
reported to be in favor of a forty-eight (48) hour wee::. (**) Two groups, the
food dealers and the drug group abstained from sponsoring the code and sought
independent coc.es. It was reported in some of the ' newspapers that "the food
dealers representatives satisfied. Deputy Administrator A. D. TThi'teside that
a fort-*~eight (43) hour work— week was necessary in groceries and. related
establi shments. " ( ***)
A . President's Reemployment Agreement Substitution
The result of these negotiations was the issuance of a ??A substitution
to the retail trades which provided the following:
"On and after the effective date of this code no individual or
organization selling at retail shall work any employee (excepting
executives whose salaries exceed $35.00 per week, or registered
pharmacists or other professional persons employed in their pro-
fession or outside salesmen, and. except outside deliver;'- men and
maintenance employee's who nay". be anjpJ.oyecl forty-eight (48) hours
weekly or more, if paid time and one-third, for all hours over forty-
eight hours weekly) for more than forty (40) hours per -reek, except-
ing at Christmas, inventory and other peak periods employees ma-' work
forty-eight (43) hours per week for a maximum of not to exceed three
weeks in each six months The maximum fixed in Paragraph OA (above
cited) shall not apply to employees in establishments employing not
more than t -o persons, in towns of less than 2,500 population which
towns are not part of a large trade area. "(****)
(*) history of the Cod.e of -"'air Competition for the Retail Trade
Appendix "13" Proposed Code of July 29, 1933, proposed by six
national retail associations.
(**) i".Y. Daily hews Record, July 26, 1933.
(***) Houston Chronicle, July 30, 1953. herald Tribune, July 30, 1933
(****) National Recovery Administration - Substituted wages and Hours
Provisions of the President's Reemployment Agreement, Bulletin
ho. 3, Washington, 1933. p. 175.
936^
-1( -
Another substitution was issued to retr.il grocers. They were allowed
a basic fort—eight (48) hour week with more liberal allowances, of daily hour
(*)
The P3A substitution for the general retailer represented sub strati ally!
the provisions of the Retailers' Ocde, presented to the Administration on
A Utit 4, 1933. (**) Many changes were made, however, in a subsequent draft
submitted cr. August 14, 1933, which went to public hearing on August 22,
1933. (***) At the public hearing additional changes in hours' -orovisicns
"ere presented by the sponsors. They resulted from the pressure brought by
small stores in larger cities and practically all types of stores in smaller
cities. (****)
3 . Public Hearing
The new proposal made b" ti e employers at the public herring was the
following:
(A) On and after the effective date of this code no individual or
organization shall work any eraplo3ree ercept executives whose salaries
■e not less than $30.00 per week, and except registered pharmacists
and other professional persons employed in their profession and except
outside salesmen, and except maintenance and outside delivery en lo-ees
may be employed forty— eight (43) hours weekly or more, if paid time
end one-third for all hours over forty-four (44) hours per week, ercept-
ing, at Christmas, inventor-- and other peal: periods employees may work
forty-eight (48) hours per week for a maximum of not to exceed three
weeks in each six months. It is understood and agreed that if any other
groups of retailers (except food retailers who have been granted forty-
eight (48) hours weekly) are granted hours in e:.:cess of those stated
above that these same hours will automatically apply to the groups of
retailers coming under this code The maximum hours fixed in para-
graph 3(a) shall not apply to employees in retail establishments in
towns of less than 10,000 population (when such towns are not part of
a larger trade area) in which case forty-eight (48) hours wee1:!- for all
employees is permitted." (*****)
In explaining this change the six sponsoring retail organizations declar
that "the experience of many stores has indicated to associations tha.t such
stores, especially those in smaller places cannot comply with the rigorous
restrictions of a fort- (40) hour wee!;. (******)
(*) Ibid, p. 175.
(**) '..'( 11 Street' Journal, August 5, 1933
(***) history of the Code of ?air Competition for the Retail Trade,
p. 29
(****) Daily Hews ftecori , Au ust 21, 1933.
(*****) ia.tional " rial 'Recovery Administration hearing on Code of
Fair Competition and Practices presented by retail trades, August
' 2, 1933^ Vol. 1, p.2 .
(******) Ibid< p< 26
986<
In supporting the proposal for a forty-four (44) hour T/ee1: with an exception
for a forty-eight (43) hour wee:-: in specific areas, the retailers contended
that the above hours'' schedule "would enable the present firms in this joint
retail group to reestablish their 1929 volume of employment. It has been
felt that the absorption of employes of firms that have -one out of business
shoxild be taken care, of normally with the increase of business that is under
way. " ( *) The decline in reto.il employment "as stated to be much smaller than
in other fields since as a service industry it must be prepared for customers
at all times and cov25 release few persons, ilo information v/as presented on
the extension of hours during the depression.
The change in basic weekly hours from fort" (40) to forty— four (44) per
xee".: was not satisf actor"', however, to many groups within the trade. Those
protesting the forty-four hour week and urging a forty-eight (43) hour week
included the hardware stores, neighborhood dry goods stores, shoe stores and
other classes. The arguments most commonly used were the following: (l) the
retail business was one engaged in rendering a public service and conforming
to customer requirements for earl;- openings and late closings; (2) individual
brer ores of the industry would reemploy a total equal to or more than their
1S29 employment level with a for'; --eight (43) hour week largely because
displacement among surviving firms in the retail industry was comparatively
small during the depression; (o) the new demands for skilled personnel could
not be filled and the training of such personnel would be burdensome; (4)
o. shorter reel; would so increase costs as to cause a large number of failures
in the retailing industry, parti cularly in the smaller towns, and among smaller
retailers who would succumb either because the overhead would be too burden-
some or because the department and chain stores would be able to compete more
readily; (n) competition with the owner-operator stores which would remain
unregulated as to hours would make competition for the regulated stores keener
and sharper; (6) a reduction in weekly hours below forty-eight (40) is too
drastic since working hours in many branches are far in excess of sixty and
reductions are undesired b~r the huge proportion of members of the trade; (7)
uniformity of hours with competing industries selling similar .articles is
imperative. There was a strong, sentiment among several groups for a. differ-
ential of maximum hours of employment for stores maintaining longer operating
hours. (**)
Only one group of employers raised a voice in protest against the propos-
al for a fort" (40) or larger number of hours. They were the Hew York detail
Furniture Association. They proposed, a thirty (30) hour week for the industry
since, they • rgued, "it is obvious it will tax but slightly the ingenuity of
the proprietors of the stores to avoid the employment o^ additional help by
limiti: the hours of employment to fort-- (40) hours.'" (***) The;r contended
that "b- staggering the hoursof labor among the fen employees no additional
working people will be required." However, this position was met with amaze-
ment by the deputy linistrator who exclaimed that "that woul<? increa.se the
selling expe se about 200 percent." (****)
Testimony of Dr. fjavid Friday, Ibid, ;o.55
(**) Ibid, Hearings
(***) Ibid, a. 275
(****) Ibid, p. 28
. . .
-102-
Labor groups likewise raised their voice aginst the proposal.
They protested the lengthening of hours fron forty (40) to forty-four
(44) hours and called the coc1e "reactionary" urging that the -protest
of th<= snail cities .shoulc result in an exemption for them rather than
in the granting of a differential of hours to all groups, large and
small, they spoke out against the exemptions granted to special occu-
pations and the absence of any special maximum number of hours regu-
lating this group. (*)
C. Final Provisions
As a result of tiiese hearings nine retail associations, including
three nen groups, sponsoring the code submitted a new draft on the la.st
day of the hearings, August 24, 1933. These provisions were made by
a committee of retailers largely at Lhe suggestion of the Administra-
tion. The new provisions regarding hours specified a forty (40) hour
week for stores electing to remain open for business fifty-two (52)
hours or less, whereas a forty-four (44) hour week was established for
those electing to operate between fifty- six (56) hours and sixty (60)
business hours, and those operating for sixty- three (63) hours or more
were allowed a forty-eight (48) hour basic r;or'': week for their employees.
Exempt from this maximum were executives earning $30.00 per week or
more, registered pharmacists, other professional persons, outside sales-
men, and delivery and maintenance empl03re.es who were permitted a forty-
eight (43) hour maximum. A seasonal exemption of three (3) weeks of
forty-eight (48) hours in each six months was permitted for each em-
ployee. (**) ijhe "principle of elective provisions respecting wages
and hours was recommended at the public hearing but was more specifically
developed by the Admini strati on and proposed to the industry." (***)
Labor did not participate in the development of these terms. The
Administrator found the industry agreeable to these proposals and dur-
ing the following month, the major terms were elaborated. The problem
of "loss limitation" and "stop loss" features of the code delayed the
final approval. Or. September 20, revisions incorporating these
changes were presented. They were included in the final code (****)
with 'practically no significant change.
(*) Testimdnjr of hiss Rose Schneiderman of the Labor Advisory
Board, pp. 418-431.
(**) Ibid, p. 782.
(***) History of the Code of Fair Competition for the Retail Trade, p. 3..
(****) .ARTICLE V
SECTIOh 1- Basic Store and Working Hours
On and after the effective date of this Code establishments in
the retail trade shall elect tc oper- te upon one of the following
schedules of store hours and hours of labor:
Group A. -Any establishment nay elect to remain open for business less
than fifty-six (56) hours but not less than fifty-two (52) hours per
week, unless its store hours were less than fifty-two (52) hours prior
to June 1,1933, in which case such establishment shall not reduce its
store hours; no employee of these establishments shall work more than
forty (40) hours per wee!:, nor more than eight (8) hours per day,
nor more than six (6) days per week.
(****) Footnote continued on next page.
9862
- 103 -
(***#) -Footnote continued from preceding page.
Group 3. — Any establishment may elect to- lemain open for business
fifty-six (56) hours or more per week bat less than sixty-three
(63) hours per week; no employee of such establishment shell work
more than i'orty-four (44) hours per week, nor more than nine (9)
hours per day, nor more then six (6) days per week.
Group C.; — Any establishment may elect to remain open for business
sixty-three (63) hours cr more per week; no employee of such
establishment shall work more than forty-eight (48) hours per
week, nor more than ten (10) hours per day, nor more than six
(6) days per week,
... . Group B.-.-Any establishment may elect to remain open for
business fifty-six (56) hours or more per week but less than
sixty-three (63) hours per week; no employee of such establish-
ment shall work more than forty-four (44) hours per week, nor
more than nine (9) hours per day, nor more than six (6) days
per 'week.
Group' C. — Any establishment may elect to remain open for
business sixty- three (63) hours or more per week; no employee
of such establishment shall work more than forty-eight (48)
hours per week, nor more than ten (10) hours per day, nor
more than six (6) days per week,
Ho employee shall work for two or more establishments a greater
number of hours, m the aggregate,' than he would be permitted to
work for that one of such establishments which operates upon the
lowest schedule of working hours.
No employee not included in the foregoing paragraphs, and not
specifically excepted hereinafter, shall work more than forty (40)
hours per week, nor more than eight (6) hours per day, nor more
than .six (6) day's per week.
Section 2. Schedule of hours to be posted. — On or within one
week after the effective date of this Code every retail establish-
ment shall designate under which of the Groups set forth in the
preceding Section it elects to operate a,nd shall post and maintain
in a conspicuous place in the establishment a copy of such election
showing its store hours and employee working hours.
Section 3. Cnang s in store hours and employee working hours. —
(a) No establishment may change from the Group in which it
has elected to operate except upon December 31 of every year.
(b) Any establishment, however, may at any time increase its
store hours, provided it maintains the ba'cic employee work week
of the Group in which it originally elected to operate.
(c) Any establishment may, for a period not to exceed three (3)
months during the Summer, temporarily reduce its store hours,
(****) Footnote continued on next page.
9862
-104-
(****) Footnote continued from previous page.
but the weekly wages of its employees shall not on that account be
the weekly wages of its employees shall not on that account be re-
duced.
Section 4. Exceptions to maximum periods of labor.—*
(a.) Professional persons, outside salesmen, outside collectors,
watehmen, guards, and store detectives. —The maximum periods of
labor prescribed in Section 1 of this Article shall not apply to p|
fessional persons employed and working at their profession, or to
outside salesmen, outside collectors, watchmen, guards, and store
detectives.
(b) Maintenance and outside service employees. — The maximum
periods of labor prescribed ir. Section 1 of this Article shall npt
apply to maintenance and outside service employees; but such em-
ployees shall not work more than six (6) hours per week above the
maximum hours per week otherwise prescribed by Section 1 unless
they are paid at the rate of time and one-third for all hours over
such additional six (5) hours per week.
(c) Executives. — Subject to the conditions set forth in Section
5 of this Article, executives receiving $35.00 or more per v/eek in
cities of over 500,000 population, or receiving $30.00 or more
per v/eek in cities of 100,000 to 500,000 population, or receiving
G27.50 or more per week in cities of 25,000 to 100,000 population,
or receiving S25.00 or more per week in cities, towns, villages, and
other places under 25,000 population, may work in excess of the max-
imum periods of labor prescribed in Section 1 of this Article. In
the South executives paid not less than ten (10) per cent below the t
wages just specified may work in excess of such maximum periods.
(d) Peak periods. — At Christmas, inventory, and other peal: times,
for a period not to exceed two (2) weeks in the first six (5) months
of the calendar year and not to exceed three (3) weeks in the secona
six (6) months, an employee whose basic work week is forty (40) houri
may work not more than fort~-eight (48) hours per week and nine (9) |
hours per day; an employee whose basic work v/eek is forty-*four (44) j
hours may work not more than fifty-two (52) hours per week and nine I
and one-half (9v) hours per day; an employee whose basic work week I
is forty-eight (48) hours may work not more than fifty* six (56) hours
per week and ten (10) hours per day. All such work may be without
the payment of overtime.
Section 5. Limitation upon number of persons working unrestricted
hours. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing sections of
this Article, and regardless of the number of persons otherwise per-«
mitted to work unrestricted hours, the total number of workers ir. any
establishment (whether such workers are executives, proprietors, paifl
ners, persons not receiving monetary :, or others) who shall be ]
jf mitted to work unrestricted hours shall not exceed the following I
ratio: In establishments, comprised of twenty (20) workers or less
the total number of workers who may work unrestricted hours (not in-l
eluding those workers specified in Section' 4 of tliis Article)"
(****) Footnote continued on next page.
;852
-105-
In pre sent in,.0, this code with its hours provisions to the president,
the Administrator declared that "the elective provisions regarding ,_Ta~:es,
hours of work and store hours suggested by the Administration were generally
accepted as equitable. The working hours may not be entirely satisfactory
from a purely social viewpoint; but they represent a substantial reduction
from the hours which prevailed at the retail trade. This reduction in
working hours will restore employment in retailing to the 1929 level." (*)
TThile the final code represented an extension of hours over tnose
.originally proposed, it also was a compromise among the contentions of the
various interested trade groups. The fort" (40) hour ^eek provision was
observed by a considerable section of the retail trade in the large cities.
(****) Footnote continued
shall not exceed one worker for every five (5) workers or fraction thereof;
in establishments comprised of more than twenty (20) workers the total
number of workers who may work unrestricted hours (not including those
workers specified in Section 4 (a) of this Article.) shall not exceed one
worker for every five (o) workers for the first twenty (20) workers, and
shall not exceed one worker for every eight (8) workers above twenty (20).
Section 6. Hours of work to be consecutive. — The hours worked by any
employee during each day shall be consecutive, provided that an interval not
longer than one hour may be allowed for each regular meal period, and such
interval not counted as part of the employee's working time. Any rest period
which may be given employees shall not be deducted f£om such employee's work-
ing time.
Section 7. Extra working hour on one day a week. — On one day each week
employees may work one extra hour, but such hour is to be included within
the maximum hours permitted each week.
Section 8. Conflict with State laws. — T71ien any State law prescribes for
an~r class of employees shorter hours of labor than those prescribed in
this Article no employee included within such class shall be employed with-
in such State for a greater number of hours than such State law allows.
(*) Codes of Fair Competition Vol. I, p. 29
352
-106- '
V. COrCLUSIOK
The fact that in si:: cases hours were increased over those originally J
proposed by the industry is significant. Management's pressure for longerll
hours v;as -unrelenting. Even where they had agreed to a basic formula for j
snorter hours, later pressure for extension was great. Strong employer
groups reduced the number of codes establishing a shorter than forty hour
week. Five of the codes in this group first proposed a 35 or 35 hour week
as the basic work week, but these proposals were modified and the hours ex
tended to 40. The sixth was presented as a 40 hour code and when finally
approved provided for a range of hours extending from 40 to 48.
In effecting these changes industry pointed to approved precedents
in competitive industries and ashed for uniformity in basic hours. The
four metal manufacturing industries in this group had their hours increased
because the prevailing norm for similar industries was forty hours and the
administrative officials handling these codes were unsympathetic to drastic
reductions in normal full time working hours. In the case of the other two
industries hours were lengthened as a compromise among contending -roups
and to assure the codification of industry. The longer hours were approve
despite the recognition that they would not increase employment in these
industries to the 1929 level. These increases in basic hours foreshadowed!
the basic changes in ITEA standards for the determination of basic hours in
codes.
DS52
-107-
CHAPTZ3. XIII
Negotiations of Codes in which Basic Hours
P.emained the Same as Originally Proposed.
In. contrast to the preceding t^o grouos, there were 25 codes in
which the negotiations resulted in no modification of the basic
weekly hours. Explanation's given by the Administration for approval
of these codes indicated the reasons for and the circumstances giving
rise to the resistance to change. The negotiations of four codes
in this group are described. .
I . Electrical L'a.nuf a.c tur ing
The electrical manufacturing industry presented a code pro-
viding for a basic thirty-six hour reek for employees in "the pro-
cessing of products and in operations incident thereto"; a forty hour
week for all other employees except executive, administrative and
supervisory; for a tolerance of lUH hours oer year in excess cf the
maximum to meet seasonal and peak demand, and a complete exemption
for emergency periods. In the last ca.se, reports of such v/ork were
required. (*) No substantial change was maae in o-sic hours' pro-
visions in the final code; only the seasonal and peak tolerance was
altered. The development of the hours provisions in this code is of
special interest since this was the first capital goods industry up
for consideration.
A. Industry* s Position
VJhile the industry had considered the possibilities of a J>0
hour are .k, no such action was taken. Tho suggestion was filed
away for comments. (**) The hours as proposed were supported by
the contention that
"since the average number of hours per "eel: oer employee being
worked at the present time, because the subnormal volume of
business, is under 36 hours oer week, so that if any material
improvement in the electrical manufacturing industry, is de-#
sired which will bring back into employment a large number of
the employees which were engaged in the industry during 1S29>
we must have an improvement in" the capital goods branch of the
industry and for that we must wait on improvement in other
industries." (***)
(*) New York Times. July lk, 1933
(**) Hationa.l Recovery Administration, Electrical Code Hearing,
Vol. 1, pp. 10-11+.
(***) Ibid V. I., p. 12, Testimony by C. L. Collins, President
Reliance Electric: 1 Engineering Company v
986'
-1-08-
It was anticipated that improvement in the industry would be limited
to the consumer branches .^nd would result in the employment of an addi-
tional 25 i 000 persons. For the capital goods branch the only solution
visualized Fas "a real improvement in business in other industries".
The industry estimated that it would only require about 50 Per cent
increased volume of business over the average that existed in June, or
a volume of business that would be an equivalent of 60 per cent of the
volume of business ■ hich the industry employed in 1929. (*) The
seasonal tolerance was advocated for certain branches in the industry, such
as refrigerators, where storage of their product -nd therefore regu-
larization was difficult, and for small to~'nc' to which migration of
employees seemed unwise. (**)
B . Labor' s Position
L-bor countered this proposal T,dth a thirty-hour week and the
elimination of the proposed seasonal tolerance. In support of their
stand, labor representatives pointed out the average of 3^*9 hours per
employee in the industry in April 1933» nn^- a prevailing volume of
oroduction that would necessitate an 11-hour week to reabsorb enough
oersons to raise total employment in the industry to the 1929 level.
However, for practical purposes they recommended a 30~hour week. In
respect to the seasonal tolerance the labor representatives also
suggested that more could be done to stabilize the industry, and tha.t
furthermore, "under present conditions where men and -omen are glad to
have any employment" it is wise to hire them "even temporarily even
though you have to dunro them out unemployed at the end of the season". (**
Furthermore, labor emphasized the need for establishing shorter
hours of employment so as to take up the slack of general unemployment,
and affirmed that the code as it stood would have no effect on unemploy-
ment. (****)
(*) Ibid p. 13.
(**) Ibid, op. 21-25. Testimony by G. ',7. Mason, President, The
Kelvinator Company.
***
) Ibid pp. lUO-153. Testimony of Mr. C. L. Seed and i.ir. C. D.
Keaveney of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
(****)lbid, p. 205, Statement of '.Tilliam Green.
9362
-109-
C . ■ Negotiations
The code committee was a.sked to reconcile its proaosal with the
criticisms which had' been presented. A meeting was held with members of
the Labor Advisory Eoard (*), but the industry made no substantial
change in the hours provisions. (**) Ag--in the labor representatives
criticized these pro-oosals (***). Another appeal was made by the
deputy admini.str9.t0r for reconsideration of the wage and hour pro-
visions "in the light of the evidence already in and anything addi-
tional that has been presented" (****); but in the afternoon session
the industrial representatives -gain indicated their unanimous stand
against changing the thirty-six hour provision, but stated their will-
ingness to reconsider the provision for lUH hours tolerance. (*****)
Throughout the proceedings, the deputy administrator was apparently
impressed by industry' position. In preparing the background for a
question to the labor representative, he declared "industry cannot be
expected to do much until it has some chance of getting a volume of
business which would enable them to get their people reemployed
This capital goods end of the industry cannot by writing a ticket or
pjiy other gesture increase their hours of work, even up to 36 hours,
until they can. get some business" . (******) In the consideration of
the seasonal tolerance the Administration evidenced a. disposition to
recognize the difficulties of eliminating the sea.sonal varie.tions(*******)
(*) Mr. "Tilliam Green and Dr. Leo ",/olman.
(**) National Recovery Administration Electrical Code Hear in--:,
V. II, a. 1007
(***) Ibid, pp.lOUU-1057, July 21, I933.
(****) Ibid, p. IO65.,
(*****) Ibid, p. IO67.
(******) |. ;.,;,;., pp. '207-8.
SSo2
-110-
Coiiferences were held in ied.ia.tely after the public hearings. They
dealt prinarily with the minimum wage rate and the seasoned tolerance
provided in the code. The basic 36 hours week was approved by the
Chairman o:r the Labor Advisor;- Board because it "could be expected to
result in material ree. iployr.ent in the industry should any iinprovement
in business develop". He did. oppose the seasonal variation of lUU hours
per year because such provision --as not required, by all branches of the
industry and because it was difficult, if not impossible, to cLetemine
the amount of seasonal tolerance necessary to meet the industry' s need.s.
Furthermore, "the extent to which the industry could level out the
seasonal peaks insofar as production was concerned had not yet been
determined and could not be ejected to be fully d.eveloped until some
restrictions were imposed upon then which would r puire the fullest
application of their ingenuit to this pro bio ,u.
In its revision -the industry accepted, the proposal of the Chairman
of the Labor Advisor" hoard, that each firm report to the supervisory
agency at the end of each month (*) its hours in excess of the stipula-
ted.- maximum of 3S per week, Specifically, the ne1.- provision permitted
a ember firms to work "such number of hours.;, as are required by the
necessities of the situation, but at the end of each calendar month,
every emplo;rer shall report to the Administrator, through the Board of
Governors of the National Electrical Ltanufacturers Association, in such
detail as nay be required., the number of man-hours worked in that month,
and. the ratio which said, nan-hours bear to the total number of man-hours
of labor during said month". (**)
The agreements on both wages and. hours were d.eveloped. jointly ~o~j
a committee (***). j- approving the code, the deputy administrator
stated, that "immediate reemployment of not less than 10 per cent more
persons and as much as 'jO per cent in some of the consumer goods branches
will result; a complete reemployment of the number to he found, in the
industry in the year 1929 should result 'Men, through an improvement in
the capital goods division, unfilled, ord.ers of the industry (which on
June 1, 1933 , stood at Ho per cent of 1929 level) shall reach 60 per
cent of the I929 volume". (****)
Although this was one of the first industries, to be codified, no
real effort was made to revise the basic hours downward.. There was
prevailing sentiment against farther reduction. There was evident
conviction that the capital goods industry must look to the general
revival of industry for substantial reemployment. Forth reduction of
hours in this industry was not considered, vital to recovery.
(*) National Recovery Administration, Code of Fair Competition for the
Electrical - acturiny Industry, Vol. II, Report of Deputy Administra-
tor 17. L. Allen, August 12, 1933.
(**) National Recovery Administration, Codes of fair Co -.petition, Vol.
If ?• ^7.
(***) Consistin ; of G. "J. S.wo"oe, William Green an Leo TTolman.
•111-
1 1 Hosiery Industr-;
In the hosier;- industr;r, the preliminary conference "between orga-
nized labor sn^. the employers brought the two parties to clear under-
standing: of their respective points of vie; an;' resulted in agreement
upon certain specific issues. The final changes nade after the public
hearing representee" further narrowing of the differences which had to
some extent already been conposed.
The employers were represented in the negotiations "by the National
Association of Hosier;- Manufacturers. Labor wa.s represented by the
American Federation of Hosiery Workers which had organized largely in
the full fashioned branch of the industry. At conferences between the
two organizations under the guidance of the National Recovery Admini-
stration officials during the last two weeks in June, many differences
were reconciled. Sone of the issues resolved were the establishment of
wages for semi-skilled and skilled occupations, the abolition of child
labor, and the regulation of the stretchout. (*) No solution was
reached with respect to the hours of employment. Industry proposed a
forty, and labor a thirty-hour week. The agreement arrived at in the
earlier conference was confirmed ^j an industry-wide conference held in
New York City on July 12, 1933 (**)• The resulting code provided that
productive operations of plants were to he limited to two shifts of
fort" hours each except in the full fashioned mills where the work of
the footing machine was to be restricted to one forty-hour shift.
In vie" of the general unanimity in the industry and the drive
for early codification an Executive Order was issued on July 26, 1933s
approving the terms of the code accepted by the industry pending the
approval of the permanent code. This temporary code formally included
the terms already accepted by the industry.
The hours provisions o^ this code read as follows:
"On and after the date on which this Code goes into
effect, no person in the hosiery industry 'shall employ any
employee in productive operations on a schedule of hours
of labor which shall' exceed forty (Uo) hours per week.
"It is understood that the above limitation on hours
of work shall not apply to office employees, supervisors,
foreman, engineers, firemen, electricians, repairshop men,
dyers, shipping force, watchmenv. gleaners, _ outside workers,
sales force, and those engaged in emergency ma.intens.nce or
repair work,
"The productive operations of a plant shall not exceed
t'-To shifts of forty (ho) hours each per week.
(*) History of Code of Fair Competition for the Hosiery Industry,
Vol. I, p. 17.
(**) New York Herald Tribune, July 13, 1533.
3SS2
-112-
"Manufacturers of woolen hosiery may operate their
knitting equipment not to exceed three (3) shifts of forty
(Mo) hours each until December 31. 1533 > after which tine
their knitting operations shall be United to two (2) shifts
of fort"" (Uc) hours each. This exception applies only to the
nanufrcture of hosiery which contains at least twenty per
cent (?.Cfo) of wool. Manufacturers of xoolen hosiery ma-- op-
erate their car din "•; equipment not ,o exeed three shifts of
Uo honvr «ewjh vuati3 p.. code for the woolen industry yoes into
it n
ie
work week for productive operations, except d; ex. :
shs.ll consist of five days of eight hours each. These cays
shall he Hon day to Friday.
"From the date that this article shall he put into ef-
efect tentatively and until the date on which the Code s .all
;o into effect full fashioned foot:';--" eduipuent which is
operating one shift shall continue to opeirte one shift only,
and full fashioned footing equipment "fix. is operating nore
than one shift shall operate not to exceed two shifts." (*)
The labor groups through the Lahor Advisory 3oard agreed to the
tenoorar- order after the compromise had heen worked out on the shift
regulation of footers. (**)
At the public hearings held on August 10, 1333, serious effort was
made by organized labor's represntatives to obtain a shorter work week;
but industry's proposal was finally modified only in one important
respect. It was provided that the full fashioned hosiery plants operat-
ing their footing equipment for two shifts were to he restricted to 36
hour shifts. The labor representatives took objection to the loose
nanner in which the forty hour week provision '-as phrased, asked for
the application of the forty-hour week to all employees including those
not^ engaged on production, suggested a 30-hour shift for the footing
machine operation, and reconnendec adjustment in '-ages to give the
latter employees the earnings of a hC-hour week. (***)
The industry stated its belief that the forty-hour week would
absorb the persons normally attached in I329. It estimatec". the reduc-
tion in hours to amount on the average, to about 27 per cent. It sug-
gested that not only would the total 1923 employment be re: died but
"that the hour restrictions will operate in the direction of materially
reducing the seasonal variations in the number of workers employed, thus
assuring the workers in the industry a more stead; employment throughout
the calender pear". (****)
(*) Codes of Fair Competition - Vol. I, pp. 21+1-2H2.
(**) hew York Tines, July 25, 1933-Philadelphia Record, July 25, 1933
(***) National Industrial Recovery Administration Hearing on Code of
Pair Practices .and Competition presented bv hosier;- Indus tr* August 10,
1533 - P. 51.
(****) Ibid, pp. 6-9 Testimony of Mr. Constantine.
9S62
At the conference durin : the two days following the public hearing,
many or the issues remaining unsettled were ironed out by the labor and
industry groups, A 33 hour > -eck was established' for the footing machines,
with two shifts and specific provision of Ho hours' pay. This agreement,-
intended to discourage the second shift, resulted fron a compromise be-
tween the employer and union representatives. Provision was also made
for the establishment of hours regulations for the various exempted groups
of employees, (*)
(*) The hours provisions of the Hosiery Code as Finally approved were as
follows:
"1, On and after the date on which this Code goes into effect, no
person in the hosiery industry shall employ any employee in produc-
tive operations on a Schedule of hours of labor which shall exceed
forty (Ho) hours per week,
2, It is understood that the above limitation on hours of work shall
not apply to office employees, supervisors, foremen, engineers, fire-
men, electricians, repairshop men, dyers, shipping force, watchmen, ,
cleaners, outside worhers, sales force, arid those engaged in emer-
gency maintenance or repair work,
3. Ori and after September H, 1S:33i ^ie maximum number of hours for
office employees in the hosiery industry shall not exceed an average
of forty (Ho) hours per reel: over each period of six months,
H. On or before January 1, IpoH, the code authority shall prepare ._,
and submit to the Administrator suggestions for a schedule of maxim-
um hours and minimum wages to apply to those employees excepted under
Section 2 of this Article,
5, It is interpreted that the' provisions for maximum hours establi-
sh a maximum of hours of labor per wee]: for every employee covered,
so that under no circumstances will such an employee be employed or
permitted to work for one1 or more employers in the industry in the
aggregate in excess of the prescribed number of hours in a single
week,
b. The productive operations of a plant shall not exceed two shifts
Of forty (Ho) hours each per week. The work week for productive
operations, except dyeing, shall not exceed five (5) days of eight
(S) hours each. These days shall be Honda;.' to Friday, inclusive,
except in those states where the state laws operate to prevent the
operation of two forty (Ho) hour shifts within the mentioned five (5)
days. In such str.tes, the employer may operate one shift on Satur-
day, not to' exceed four (H) hours, it being definitely understood
that his total machine hours shall not exceed eighty (£0) hours per
week,
7, For a period of six (S) months following the date on which this
code goes into effect, full-fashioned hosiery plants whose footing
equipment on July 2H, 1933* "a3 being operated on a two-shift basis,
but the length of each of these shifts shall not exceed thirty-five
(35) hours per week. The rates paid to knitters, knitting-helpers,
and toppers working on these thirt---five (33) hour shifts, shall be
such as to provide then darnings equal to those which they would
receive if working on forty (Ho) hour shifts. Fall- fashioned hosiery
mills whose footing equipment on July 2H, 1933» was being operated
9SS2 . ,
-114-
These latter regulations were finally added in Amendment Ho. 5,
approved March 8, 1933* The deputy administrator in accepting this
proposal adopted the industry's position. lie concluded that ""by
restricting hours of work per worker to fort;- (Uo) per week, it is
anticipated that 'employment can be got back to the 1923 level and that
the e;:tent of short tine work for any large number of employees will
be materially lessened". (*)
III Fishin ■ Tackle Industry
This industry, employing a little over 3>0G0 perrons, was one of
the first to be codified. Its code was submitted on August U after
several preliminary discussions with KHA officials, (**) At the public
hearing held on August lU, 1333 > industry was represented ^,-j the
Association of Fishing Tackle Manufacturers. r.l\\o spokesman for labor
(***) was a Special Representative of the International Association of
Machinists, a union with interests in similar industries, who had been
designated by the Labor Advisory Board.
The industry proposed a fort". hour week aver aged over a si:: .months
period. The labor representative's recommendation of a thirty hour"
^eek was not taken account of in consideration of the code. The admini-
stration officials carried on the negotiations with the industry on the
terns of employment with infrequent consultation with the labor adviser.
In defense of the average fort" hour, 'reel:, the industry represen-
tatives contended that the exclusive fishing tackle manufacturers
"must of necessit.y have some provision for reasonable overtime opera-
tions during the season's peak"* ['■•'■'-'■■') The;- acknowledged, however, that
elimination of the seasonal tolerance "would be an ideal situation for
a manufacturer who produces a diversified! line of productions in ad-
dition to fishing tackle ark has a surplus o'f labor in certain depart-
ments during the slack season of these departments which he can transfer
(*) Foot Note Continued
on a one-shift basis shall not, during said si:: (6) months, operate
such equipment more than one shift of fort" (Uo) hours' per week.
Hot later than thirty (30) days before^ the expiration' of the men-
tioned si::, (o) months, the code authority shall submit, for the
Administrator's approval^ a recommendation for determining a more
permanent policy respecting; footer operation designed to effect a
reasonable balance between production and demand,
c. manufacturers of woolen hosiery may operate their knitting
equipment not to exceed three (j) shifts of forty (kO) hours
each until December 31» T-S33» after which time their knittitf
operations shall be limited to two (2) shifts of forty (UO) hours
each. This exception applies only to the manufacture of hosier-
which contains at least twenty per cent (20'/;) of wool."
(*) Report on a Code for the Hosiery Industry by 'Lindsay Re ;ers,
August 25, 1933 ~ Code for the Hosier- Industry, Vol. A.
(**) Code History for the Fishing Tackle Industry Compiled by L. 3.
Mitchell, -p-o. 10-12
(***) Mr.~R. S. Newhan.
(****) Statement of J. K. Kinnear, President American Fork and Hoe Co.
Public Hearing Transcript - p. 4.
9£62
-115-
to the tackle department during its busy season" . Son.e manufacturers
urged a flat fort- hour r.vr,::i urn "orl; week "because it "would tend to
stabilize the industr; by forcing the jobbing purchaser to place his
order sufficiently far in advance to be assured of the deliver"" of
his merchandise and would result in a more balanced, yearly production".
lurthermore, the-" pointed out that the codes were being developed for
manufacturers producing other products as well as fishiny ta.ckle T7I10
were estrolishin ■ a fort" hour weel: (*) in other parts of their ■busi-
ness.
The administration officials attempted during the hearing to
obtain a revision of the various provisions. In the first place, they
secured the industry's assent to placiny firemen-, watchmen, . janitors
and office enplo"rees, originally er.empt from hours clauses, uader the
general restrictions and to defining the tolerance for office workers
specifically. (**) In the second place, the" attempted to secure a
more rigid provision regulating hours. They considered the average
too liberal in "comparison to the other codes" and. feared a tendencv
"to work up to your peaks and then let people out entirely during the
lern season". The;- pointed out that the skilled workers in the indu-
stry "could "be laid off temporarily, particularly in smaller communities,
and. there would he a d.icposition to work for 12 straight "eeks for 4g
hours a week". (***)
In view of this criticism from the administration, the sponsors
of the coc.e agreed to drop the averaging provision for production
workers and to substitute the following:.
"No manufacturer shall operate upon a schedule of hours of lahor
for his employees, e::cept office, supervisory staff and. sales
force, in ercess of 40 hours. ~oer -feel: and. g hours per day. The
maximum hours of lahor for office employees shall not ercceed 40
hours a week average over a period 0" sir. nonths." (****)
Da.il"T limit 0:0 hours was included at the recuest of administrative
officials. (*****)
In appraising the code, the administration ind.ica.ted that in
theory "nore than 500 additional persons" would he added, thus bring-
ing the total well over that for the peak period, of: 192S "in view of
the reduction in hours from era average of 47 in 1J25 to the maximum of
40 in the code". (******)
(*) Testimony of B« II. Jack, Vice President Union Hardware Co pany
Ibid, *ra. 22-23.
(**) Ibid, p. 47.
(***) Ibid, Statements by iir. "hiteside, pp. px)-53«
(*****) Ibid, p. 56.
(******) Report of Hearing srfxiitted to National Recover"" Administrator
Johnson by Deput- Ad. linistrator frhiteside.
9S62
-116.
IV. Iron and Steel Industry
This industry v?as an outstanding case of negotiations which ended
with no modification in the basic hours. Labor and governmental repre-
sentatives nere eager to make it a precedent for lower hours, but the
effort failed.
It took two months to complete the negotiations, though .the labor
provisions of the final co'-'e were similar to those in the earlier draft
of July 6. Protracted negotiations over modification of Section 7(a)
prior to the public hearing, delayed its calling, "."."lie the draft -of
July 6 was the first to be formally presented to IZ1A, two previous ones ,
containing a kS hour weok had been submitted. The Administrator had
questioned the desirability of such a long week and its effect upon re-
employment. In conseraer_.ee, the draft of July 6 set a ho-hour week.(*)
The codes, underwent considerable subsequent revision, "out the basic hours
remained the same.
A . Publi c Hearing
The public hearing took place on July Jl, 1933* While the
major interest centered on J;he question of the modification of Section
7(a), the problems of the hours also received much discussion. The Sec-
retary of Labor observed, "It is not my purpose to suggest the exact
number of hours that the industry ought to set as the maximum, (but) I
am convinced that the maximum of forty is too great to accomplish the
purposes of wide reemployment. . .... ..." "Thirty- sis: hours per week which
is six hours a day for six days, or thirty hours, which is six hours a
day for five days, offer interesting opportunities for reemployment of
large numbers of persons." Steel workers she had found also favor the
six-hour day.- Shorter working hours, she contended, were required to
eliminate the seven day week in the industry and the unduly long hours
and to "provide employment for more than 150,000 iron and steel employ-
ees now out of work". 1!he rverage hours of employment as reported by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the Iron and Steel industry for ;
May 1933 had been 3^.7 and for June, 37-9 according to estimates worked
out by the Research and Planning Division of the national Recovery Ad-
ministration. "This means that those working are only partially employed
and if a forty hour week were permitted, a great deal of additional pro-
duction would be turned out by increasing the hours from the present
average to forty per week. If this '^ere done very few new men from among
the unemployed would be needed, even if orders justified increased pro-
duction." She disapproved of the averaging of hours over the six months
period. (**)
(*) Cleveland hews,. June 21, 1933.
(**) Address of Secret;.:.-' of Labor Prances Perkins before th.5 National
Recovery Administration, July 31. 1933* " 'tment of .abor,
Office of the Secretary. .
9262
-117-
Organized labor (*) recommended a thirty-hour week with the exemp-
of executives, supervisors and technicians and emergency workers provi-
ded tine and one half were paid for all hours over si:: per day. It was
contended that "there are not nore than 30 hours of work per week and
there are probably less than 3^ for the workers who should "be absorbed
"by the iron and steel industry". The Uo hours per week was expected to
help little as a reemployment- measure. "The only sensible, the only
humane, course of action", the argument continued, "is to set the hours
at a point, 30 Per week that gives some substantial promise of prompt
absorption of a goodly number of the unemployed. " The proposal of the
Institute is not really for Uo hours, but insofar as practicable' and
having due regard for the varying demands of the consuming and processing
industries for the respective products, (**) The Steel and Lietal Workers
Industrial Union also presented a brief calling for a thirty hour week
instead of the fort;/' proposed "ay the Institute,
3. Negotiations
Following the hearing, conferences were held by the industry alone
and then with the administration. In the process of revision the admini-
stration apparently was eager to achieve two major changes. The first
was to eliminate the averaging of hours and to establish s. real forty
hour week. (***) Secretary Perkins was insistent upon this point. The
second was to increase minimum wages, especially for the southern district
and to reduce the number of geographical wage districts. Industry balked
at both suggestions. In a communication addressed to the Administration,
a representative of the industry (****) declared, "We call attention to
the fact, tha.t , in accomplishing the great purpose of the National Reco-
very Act, the members of the code have already gone beyond anything that
can be justified by present conditions, The- can justify themselves to
their stockholders onl;,r oy the rea.liza.tion of the ijopes aroused ~oy the
efforts of the National 'Administration. They cannot go further." (*****)
With respect to the maximum hours of labor and minimum rates of pay, he
declared that
' "practical, not theoretical, questions are involved
and they cannot be solved merely by mathematical com-
putation since there is probably no industry in the
countr;r involving so many variable factors as the
steel industry." (******)
By August 6 negotiations on the Steel Code had come to a standstill.
The Administrator indicated that the Government might write the code for
the industry. (*******)' Qn August 1^, members of the American Iron and
(*) Mr. William Green presented labor's case.
(**) National Recovery Administration, Transcript of Proceedings Steel
Code Hearings, July jlt 1333«
(***) Philadelphia Public Ledger, August"?,' 1.9.3?; and.Ta-'shiiigtoh~Po6t,
August 2, 1933.
(****) Mr. R. P. Lamont,
(*****) Des iioines Tribune, August H, 1933 and Philadelphia Public
Ledger, August 5, 1933» .;■
(******) Philadelphia Public Led-er, August 5, 1933.
(*******) New York Journal of Commerce, August 9i 1933* '
1 1
RS62
-118-
Steel Institute met in conference on hours and wages at the offices of
the Secretary of Labor upon her invitation. (*) Upon the arrival of the
representative of labor the steel members immediately left the confer-
ence, and the meeting was continued in another room without him. (**)
At the conference with the Secretary of Labor a Committee was appoint*
ed to continue the study of hours and wages. This Committee consisted of
representatives of the Division of Research and Planning, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the Iron and Steel Institute, and of the Iron and
Steel Division of the Department of Commerce, but no representatives of
the Labor Advisory Board or of organized labor. The Committee met con-
tinually until the night of August 17. but reached no agreement. The
industry representatives refused to cooperate, and offered no information
on questions at issue, such as freight charges, costs of processing and
assembling materials or data used by the industry to justify its requests
for regional wage differentials. They protested that the figures could
not be obtained except after laborious calculations and that tney would
even then be of little value. The Administration sought infor lation con-
cerning the 35 cents minimum rate proposed for the northwestern part of
the United States and the other wage differentials.
The Administration's findings with respect to hours presented to
these conferences were as follows:
1. Number of workers attached t-o the steel industry.
The NBA experts had arrived at an estimate of' 420, COO workers
for those normally to be attached to the iron -sM/Suteel industry,
largely on the basis of the average number employed in the industry
in 1929. The Administration members pointed out that this figure
was conservative, since in May 1929 the industry was giving work to
429,000 people. Industry, on the other hand, contended that these
figures included men Y/orking on construction, normally belonging to
the construction industry and not to the steel industry. A compro-
mise of 400,000 employees "attached" to the industry was reached.
2. The extent to which the industry had already reemployed its fair
share of the unemployed.
(*) The conferees were the Secretary of Labor, Deputy Administrator
Simpson, Donald Richberg and William Green.
(**) Hew York Times, August 15, 1933; Washington Post, August 16, 1933;
A.jT.L. Weekly News Service, August 19, 1933. It is interesting to
note that this incident caused considerable controversy. Labor con-
sidered it a slap and a challenge to the Government and the NRA. The
Labor Advisory Board took official notice of the development and is-
sued a statement in which it declared that it deemed this: action an
affront not only to Mr. Green and the Board, but also to the Recovery
Administration. The Board protested the right .of the steel industry
to maintain such an attitude and requested the Administrator to make
the matter a subject of conference and consideration with the Board.
The Washington correspondent of the magazine ."Steel" explained this
action as representing the desire of the industry to avoid giving any
impression that the "Big Bosses" "were hobnobbing in .conference rooms
with the President of the American Federation of Labor."
9862
- 119 -
The statement of 32 reporting companies, presented by the Incu-.try,
for the week ending July 29, showec they had for that week employed
217, o38 out of 338,682 available for service. "Therefore," it was
argued b\ industry's representative ? t the conference "these companies
haa employed ell but 6: of their full quota. " This conclusion was
held invelic ov the Administration's experts. These companies had
about 94r'- of the industry's emuloveci v-orkers; furthermore,- 317,538 em-
ployed during the week ending July 29 includec salaried, office and
supervisory employees. If office employees were aooed to the base
figure of those attached to the ir.o.ustr,y , the 317,000 employed by
these 32 companies fell 29n short of the b;:se figure, inducing office
employees, for these 32 companies.
Appaiently no agreement coula oe reachec on this matter between
industry and the Acministia tion.
3. Possibility of operating under a 40-hour week and 8-hour day.
The question at issue here was how many aaditional workers will a
maximum 40-hour week require; fna what, if any difficulties would there
be in obtaining the necessary skilled workers. Taking -n estimate of
July emoloyment, of 272,000 based on U. S. bureau of Labor Statistics
data, and applying to it the e timate of an average of 43.4 hours per
week per men for the month of July, as claimed by the industry, the
report arrived ?t the simple arithmetic conclusion as follows:
272,000 x 43.4 equals 295,000. In other words, a 40 hour week would
40
add 23,000 more wage earners to the oe.yroll. however, this re-sult
wss too mechanical anc did not lead to the correct result. Not ell work-
men could possibly work exactly 40 hours; the average would have to be
considerably less then 40 hours. In ad .ition, there t? s considerable part
time work. On the basis of this calculation, the report arrived at the
conclusion that reunoloyment coula occur even when en industry on en
average is working below the maxLuum. "with 273,'OCO working at say 43
hours, and cut down by a 40 hour week, perhaps 36 employment would
jump to 325,000.
■ In the face of this demonstration of how considerably employment
might be increased by lowering the hours of work per week, industry's
representatives esserted thet non-fluidity of labor generally, and the
relatively quick exhaustion of trained workers in env locality, would
with a 40-hour week create bottle-neck's. The highly integrated character
of steel operations made it impracticable with present available supply
of si-cilled and semi-skilled worker s to institute a maximum 40-hour
week. The Administration members argued that the industry exaggerated
the difiiculty of netting skillec labor; ana even though it were true
that there were not at the time sufficient trained men to run the mills
at a. maximum 40-hour week, the situation could be remedied. Several
suggestions re r e mr de as to how the necessary supply of trained workers
could be created. (*)
(*) Summery of National Recovery Administration Division of Research
and Planning. The Labor "revisions of the Steel Code reported
ov Victor von Szeliski, August 19, 1333.
9862
-12C-
Bollo"in : a report of lad: of progress, the President entered the
discussion, (*) After the interview the Administrator declared that he
rras prepared to "go to the mat" rrith the steel industry. (**) However,
at this point the natter uas placed before the Labor Advisory Board at
an extraordinary night session on August IS. The Board finally approved
the labor provisions of the code nith the following memorandum:
"Bhile ne foers of the Labor Advisor" heard believe that
higher standards of labor should have been achieved in
the Steel Code, they are gratified that the eight hour
day is about to be substituted for the longer norlz day
in this industry. In vie-- o:' the ;reat possibility of
having the steel industry cone under a code o:' fair prac-
tice immediately, as Chairman of the L'bor Advisory Board,
I hereby approve the Steel Code." It --a- signed by Leo
jblnan.
The code itself r/as approved on August 19, 1933, "°h ^ne President of the
United States. As finally signed it differed but little from that sub-
mitted for hearing. It provided a forty hour nee!:, -1th averaging of
hours over a si:; months period, Kor/ever, the maximum --orhing tlie per
vreelz --as set. at ^5 hours anc sir. days. It --as affirmed that "on or afte:
November -1, 1333> as soon as the plrnts shall be operating at SO per
cent of capacity, operations shall be adjusted so that, encept as to
executives, those employed in supervisory capacities and in technical
vforl: and their respective staffs anc those employed in emergency -'orh,
the eight hours for all other employees nay be established. " These
provisions fell far short 0:" the demands -resented by the Secretary of
Labor anc the A. f. of L.
V. Conclusion
The negotiations of the above codes are illustrative of the unsuc-
cessful efforts made in a number of industries to reduce basic hours.
Organized labor pushec insistently torrarc" bhis goal. The. administrative
officials -ere no i .ovoizealous in reducing hours belcn forty after the
basic precedents -Tere established. In none belo • forty after the basic
precedents --ere established. In none of the four nere major changes in
basic hours effected. The most outstandin" case in this group rzas the
iron and steel industi- .
(*) On August' lo, 1933* ™lG conference included the Administrator of
the H3A, Liyron Taylor, Chairman of the U. S. Steel Corporation a
Charles Schwab- of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. (Chicago Daily Tri-
bune, An -,ust 13, 1333.
(**) Washington Herald, August 17, 1933*
3S62
-121-
CHAPTER XIV
E3AS0ITS FOE AP-ROVAL OF CODES ".'IT': NO MODIFI CAT* OK IN 3ASIC
HOURS
The survey of the efforts at the reduction of hours indicates
that in many of the early codes, serious effort was made -to reduce hours,
especially "by labor. The results were limited. In only 9 codes were
hours reduced from those originally proposed, whereas in 6 codes hours
were actually increased over the original proposal.
Developing policies in the first hundred approved codes were
brought out in the reasons presented to the Administrator or to the
President of the United States for approval af the other 85 without
changing the basic hours. The reasons noted in the letter of transmittal
were frequently not those governing approval, but were more tyoical of
rationalization of a course already taken. However, they did indicate
the type of modification of basic hours policy which was acceptable to
the Administration.
I. Financial Inability to Reduce Hours
One of the common reasons given for accepting the basic hours pro-
poser, by management was the industry's financial inability to meet the
cost of shorter hours (*). The more typical, arguments given were that in-
come v/as limited, by l^w or type of enterprise, that the business was
seclining, that demand for the product was particularly elastic and
sensitive to price-change, or that shorter hours would cause' large in-
creases in price.
The first group comprised two transportation industries for which
a longer than 40 hour week was approved. The Transit Industry Code pro-
vided for a 44 hour week for general shop employees and 48 hours for the
operating force„ The Bus Industry Code permitted a 48 hour week. The
hours of the Transit Industry Code was approved as presented on the
ground that the industry showed "a net loss, of about $6,110,000 in 1932
as against net income of about $01,570,000 in 1929. Becau.se of this fin-
ancial situation it is believed that the burden of increased wages, which
the industry seemed willing to ascume under the code, is all that can
be fairly expected at the present time"(**). In the motor bus industry,
(*) The industries with code numbers where this reason was noted in the
letter of transmittal v/ere: Transit (28); farm equipment (39); elec-
tric storage and wet primary battery industry (40); luggage and fancy
leather gooes (42); saddlery (45); optical manufacturing (49); motor
bus (S3); toy and playthings (86); funeral supply (90)-; piano (91).
(*«*) Code of Fair Competition for the Transit Industry, Vol. II, Letter
(September 15, 1933) from Mr. Malcolm Muir to General Hugh S. John-
son.
9862
justific tion for the 48 hour week was "based upon the ground that the
industry "is competitive with steam rail passenger transportation not
operating under the provisions of the National Recovery Act. To adopt
a schedule of less hours at this time would undoubtedly result in a
greet hardship to the industry". In elaborating this argument, the Ad-
ministrator declared that the industry "has suffered not only from the
depression hut also from its disadvantageous competitive position with
other passenger carriers". The forty-eight hour week was recommended
because it was all that could be reasonably expected at the time (*)•
Similarly limited by competition was the saddlery industry.
The basic forty hour week was approved for this industry because it was
all the industry could bear "in face of competition for new material
(from one-man saddlery and harness shoos not subject to the hour restric-
tions of the code) and the possibility for repairing new material (**)•
Likewise, though for different reasons, the funeral supply industry
qualified for a forty hour week, since "the forty hour week, with two
hour tolerance, represents probably the maximum burden possible at this
time without danger of disturbance of the orderly recovery of this ind-
ustry". The Administrator further explained that the public's lagging
buying power made it impossible for this industry to increase its prices,
the only way for it to recoup its costs since it "cannot increase its
business thich is represented uy the human, dead". He concluded that
further reduction in iiours would therefore "demoralize the weaker element
in the -industry and result in further unemployment "(***) •
In the toy and playthings industry the argument for not re-
ducing the hours below forty per week was that the "industry would re-
ceive no benefit from the operation of the code until the year 1934
because of outstanding contracts which are made early in the year for
the manufacture and delivery of products of the industry to the trade.
The additional expense which must be aosorbed due to the higher wages
and shortened hours is a very definite burden until such times as these
outstanding contracts are con3umated"(****) .
The second group of ino.sutries consisted of those declining
in importance. Further reduction of hours was ruled out in the piano
industry when a less than forty hour week was proposed because the vol-
ume of business in the indu'stry had decreased radically. It was stated
thrt "a grea.tly increased cost of labor would decrease still further the
number of sales to consumers". A 10. S hour week was estimated as neces-
sary to raise employment to the 1339 level, but at "prohibitive" expense
(*) National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition
Vol. II, pp. 108-109
(**) Ibid. Vole I, p. S4.
(***) Ibid. Vol. II, pp. 422-423.
(****) Ibid>j Vol# n>. pp#1 354-355,
9852
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since "the cost of labor constitutes about 33 percent of the total cost
of the finished article" (*).
The third category included industries' selling merchant3! se
where tne volume of sales was particularly sensitive to "orice. The lug-
gage and fancy leather gooes industry resisted reduction of hours below
forty because "any drastic shortening of hours which would result in a
material price increase of the final product would probably result in a
shrinkage in volume which would tend to offset the expected increases in
employment1'. An additional reason for keeping the hours at forty in this
industry was the fact that unemployed skilled workers had "set up inde-
pendent small shops in which they repair and actually produce a limited
amount of luggage". This competition made further reduction in hours
unwise. (**).
The report of the deputy administrator on the electric storage
and wet primary battery industry indicated that "if the existing work
is spread too thinly, average weekly wages and hence purchasing power
will not be satisfactory. If wage rates are increased too much in order
to offset this broader distribution of work, small manufacturers in
certain sections of this country would be unduly penalized, with possible
failure and further unemployment the result".
Finally, in the optical industry "the 40 hour week was ap-
proved as the most reasonable basis to use in establishing hours of
labor for this industry in order to benefit the greatest number of wage-
earners without unduly burdening the consuming public"(*** ) . The same
contention with respect to increase in price was made in the farm equip-
ment industry. The farmers' purchasing power was said to be the key to the
prosperity of the industry which had suffered with their financial con-
dition. The deputy recommended that "too great a strain cannot be placed
on the ind.sutry", since the depression's effects could not be overcome
in a short period. (****).
The principal of setting hours in the code according to un-
employment in the industry was modified by the Administrator in a number
of cases because of fear of increased costs to the indsutry. In these
cases, deviations from the prevailing policy standards were approved.
Forty hours per week in most cases and forty-eight for the transportation
(*) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 436-437
(**) Ibid., Vol. I, p. 521
(***) Ihid.s, Vol. I, pp. 50C-501
(****) Code of Foir Competition for the Farm Equipment Industry, Vol.
II, Letter from Malcolm Muir to General Hugh S, Johnson, Septem-
ber 25, 1933 - A Rep-ort on the Code.
?3S:
-124-
coc.es. seemed acceptable. Though the hours were approved, no positive
statement appeared in explanation of tne acce it'ance of the specific
hours. ITor was proof of the alleged justifying economic conditions ex-
haustively presented. Hours standards in tne codes were apparently neg-
otiated rjiainly on the basis of precedent and bargaining.
1 1 Bus i nes s Recovery as the cleans for Reemployment
The second type of justification for accepting the industry's
proposals was that reemployment to the 19 ;9 level was dependent upon
reviv-1 in the industries which furnished the demand for their "oroduct.
This croup consisted principally of capital goods industries.
This argument was significant because its logic was in direct
conflict with the position of ERA. The Act assumed reemployment through
the shortening of hours. Nevertheless many Administration officials and
the Administrator himself, at times, seemed to follow the theory that in
some cases reemployment could not be attained by reducing hours but only
through general industrial revival. So widespread was the conviction
within IffiA that one Division actually undertook to have industries in
its group increase their proposed basic hours on the theory that such
increase would lower cost ana thereby induce industrial revival. This
occurrec. in tne builoin; materials, particularly, lime, pluming fixtures,
structural clay, limestone, terra, cotta, and crushed stone and gravel
and in the construction industries.
These agents of the FA argued that the only means of stim-
ula birig construction was to lower wage rates. They took the oosition
that the problem of the construction industry was "to fine" a method of
borrowing part of this excess of construction from the future to in-
crease the volume in the construction industry immediately and as rap-
idly as plssible." This could not be done "if the codes, as submitted,
create the uneconomical!/ high, construction cost which v.ill result from
wage and hour provisions together with provisions prohibiting selling
below cose that includ.es overhead". To gove eifect to the ab^ve propo-
sal one deputy administrator gave the following instructions to tne code
assistants on methods of preparing cod.es for final approval:
"Immediate shortening of hours of labor and setting'
of hi -h hourly rates will not be iroductive of increase
in employment and increase of purch; i power. Reasonable
hourly -rates of wages such as those proposed by the industry
in former preliminary conferences shall be made -effective
September 1, 1934, at which time the maximum hours of apprx-
imately 20 percent more will be provided for. It shall also
be stated that on September 1, 1934, based upon the volume
and trend of the industry, a further increase in minimum
hourly rates will be provided for in an amendment to_the
code to become effective March 1, 1935, and that on inarch
1, 1935, the maximum hours of work shall be thirty (30)
per week" .
98S2
-135-
Th e provision with respect to prevention of selling below cost
Would define cost as "direct cost, exclusive of any depreciation, in-
surance, taxes, reserves for contingencies or other purposes, interest
on investment or selling or administrative expense." This plan was to
create a "step-up" increase in cost of production which, in effect, is
a guaranteed hull market for construction.
In actual concrete application it meant in the lime industry the
alteration of the original proposal of a forty (40) hour week to forty**
eight (48) and the recommendation of 37.5 cents and 30 cents per hour
for the North and South, respectively, to 30 cents and 25 cents; for
the plumbing fixture indsutry, a revision from thirty-six (36) hours
to forty-eight (48), and a. revision of a minimum wage scale of 40 cents
to 30 cents and 25 cents, North and South respectively.
This point of view was supported within the administration. The
cure for inactivity in tha- captial gccds industry was thought to be re-
duction of wages.
The building materials industries to which this recommendation
was especially, presented rejected it as impractical and conducive of
labor unrest. Organized labor and the staff of the Labor Advisory Board
likewise resisted the proposal. During the last week of September, 1933
when the basic construction code and its supplements were being revised
in terms of the formula outlined above, the labor adviser tried to
induce the deputy administrator to change his policy. Testimony was
presented to challenge validity of the official position. The Convention
of the American Federation of Labor, on October 3, 1933, unanimously
adopted a resolution to the effect that labor protested the action of the
"officials of NRA" who "are attempting to undermine living standards
under the cloak of an argument that such acting would stimulate build-
ing construction'^*) .
The proposal resulted in general' public discussion. The Wall
Street Journal of September 30, 1933, carried the story that labor view-
ed it favorably. Another newspaper stated that the chairman of the Labor
Advisory Board had discussed the plan with the Building Trades Union
and found them amenable. This assertion was promptly denied, the chair-
man stating that he was unalterably opposed to it as unsound iii practice
and theory. Nevertheless the deputy's report on the Compressed Air Code
carried the comment that the Labor Advisory Board and the Administrator
felt that "the irast effective" way of increasing volume of business for
the industry was through the approval of the revised working week, i.e.,
lengthened to forty hours. The deputy reported "a shorter week and high-
(*) Report of the Proceedings of the Fif rr-5hird Annual Convention
ef the American Federation of Labor held at Washington, B.C.,
October 2,3,1933; p. 482.
98S2
-126-
er rate would tend to defeat the very purpose of tiie Act" (*).
Organized labor in the construction industry vigorously
protested this "orono sal . At the public hearing of the tile and mantel
division of the industry on rc"cober 9, 1933, the deputy administrator
asked labor and industry to adopt the rinciple of the "step up" plan.
In reply the union representatives charged the deputy with action not
in keeping with the Act nor with the policies of the Administrator.
They asked whether labor's brief would "receive any consideration at
all". The President of the Iricklayers International Union declared:
"Men who have battled to preserve wage rates in the
face of the worst depression can continue that struggle
if need be, inspired by the leadership found in the Re-
covery Act itself and in the heartening words of the
President of; the United States".
He proposed, instead if borrowing from the future at the expense of
labor, to borrow by slum clearance and other similar public works. A
conference between the deputy administrator an; the union representa-
tives on October 12, 1933, at which the former asked the latter to sup-
port his proposal, ended in complete disagreement.
Union officials told the Administrator, on October 16, that
the deputy' s proposals were "a negation of the very underlying purposes
of the entire recovery movement." Drganized labor prevented further ap-
plication of this principle to the construction industry.
Though the proposals failed in both the building materials
and the construction industry proper, it apparently affected administra-
tive thinking. Official handling of the codes in the capital goods
industry reflected the idea., that the reduction of hours could not stim-
ulate reemployment there. It evidenced the attitude that increases in
hourly, rates might raise costs, and that this must not be done through
the nodes . This attitude appeared in the letters of transmittal and
i
(*) Code of Fair Competition for the Compressed Air Industry,
Vol. II, Letter from Malcolm Muir, Deputy Administrator to
General Hugh S. Johnson - October 9, 1933.
9862
-127-
reports recommending the approval of cedes in this division. (*)
Characteristic of the position was the report of the deputy
for the Laundry and Dry Cleaning Machinery Manufacturing Industry Cede,
the only one of the group which set a 36 hour week. He declared that
"it would he utterly impractical, and injurious to the, industry to re-
duce hours of lahor and raise minimum rates of pay to a point where
1929 purchasing power' would immediately be restored. Only a restora-
tion of the industry's normal business volume can effect this objective.
Hence the wage and hour provisions have been allowed to stand as set
forth in the code as originally submitted by the industry" (**) .
letters of transmittal for other industries contained similar
observations. The conclusion for the plumbago crucible industry was
that "only by increasing business which will depend largely upon acti-
vity in the metal industry where these products are used can this indus-
try put a large percentage of employees back to work" (***). in the
road machinery industry, dependence was placed upon "highway construction
activities1^****); in the rock crusher, terra cotta, hair and jute
felt and floor and wall clay tile industries, upon the " construction
industry" (*****)• in the buff and polishing wheel and buffing and pcl-
(*) The industries in which these letters of transmittal or
deputy reports stressed tiis reason are: Electrical manu-
facturing (4); iron and steel (ll); wallpaper (19); laundry
and dry cleaning machinery manufacturing (24); textile
machinery manufacturing (31); plumbago crucible (67); ferti-
lizer (67); road machinery manufacture (63); hair and jute
felt (73); terra cotta (74); canning and packing machinery
(75); rock crusher manufacturing (76); steel casting (82);
business furniture, storage and equipment and filing sup-
ply (33); office equipment manufacturers (89); floor'"and".
wall clay tile (92); buff and polishing wheel (96); buff
and polishing composition (97).
(**) Code of Fair Competition for the Laundry and Dry Cleaning
Machinery Manufacturing - Vol. II, Letter from Malcolm Muir,
Deputy Administrator to General Hugh S. Johnson, September
25, 1933.
( *** ) National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair .Competition;,
Vol. II, pp. 68-69.
(****) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 139. '
(*****) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 201, 233, 210-211, 444-445.
9862
-128-
ishing composition industries, upon the revival of the "capital goods
industries" (*); in the canning and packing machinery industry, upon the
amount of "surplus vegetable fruit or animal products which might other-
wise deteriorate" (**); in the fertilizer industry, upon ""better prices
• of the products of agriculture (which) will permit the purchase of in-
creased quantities of fertilizer" (***)« and in the- wall paper industry,
upon the increase!? "consumption of wall paper" (****•).
Letters of transmittal for other industries though not so
explicit reflected the same underlying "belief. The report on the pro-
posed code in the textile machinery manufacturing industry concludes
that an immediate increase through the employment of 4,700 persons would
follow, "out that this would not "bring the total to the 1939 employment
level. The deputy administrator observed, "the representatives of the
industry (state) that with an improvement in the "business situation
and the number of workers employed within the industry will exceed the
number on the payroll in 1929" (*****). They depended upon revival of
business to bring employment to the 1929 level, rather than expecting
shorter hours to cause reemployment and business recovery. This same
reasoning appeared in the steel casting industry where it was observed
that "should production reach the normal figure of 68 percent of cap-
acity on the basis of a 40 hour week it is estimated the industry would
require an average total of 54,209 employees rr 143,000 more than were
required in 1929" (******) . Similar statements v/ere made in the letters
of transmittal for the electrical manufacturing, iron and steel, busi-
ness furniture, storage equipment and filing sup ly and tie office
equipment industries^ *******) .
(*) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 492-493, G :2~503.
(**) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 220-221.
(***) Ibid., Vol. I, p. 102.
(****) Ibid., V0i. i( 258
(*****.) Code of Pair Competition for the Textile Machinery Manufacture
ing Industry, Vol.. II, Letter from Malcolm Muir to G-eneral Hugh
S. Johnson, September 21, 1933, - a Report.
(******) Codes of Fair Competition, Vol., II, pp. 30C-501.
(t******) Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 45, 174; Vol. II, pp. 284 and 414.
-129-
III. The Existence of precedents
Precedents not only determined the basic hours of codes in several
cases where hours were increased over the original proposal but also
affected many proposed codes end PRA substitutions which followed early
statements of industry groups. This occurred in part because the in-
dustries preparing drafts had no -.■■ell-defined standards nor officially
aporoved provisions as guides. In consequence they had to rely upon
existing approved or tentative codes that were considered acceptable.
During negotiations, it frequently happened that codes were revised by
the groups presenting them to incorporate more concessions granted re-
cently in approved codes. A case in point Was the merit clause modi-
fication of Section 7 (a). After the iron and steel and the automobile
industries had inserted qualifying provisions with respect to Section
7 (a), most codes coming up for public hearing followed their example. (*)
Even after the Presidential disapproval of such modification, many
persisted in copying the clause as originally proposed by the iron and
steel and automobile industries.
The importance of the hours provisions of the early approved codes
as precedents and in their relation to the desire to establish com-
petitive equality was frequently not indicated in the reasons for the
approval of specific codes in the letters of approval. In a number
of cases, however, there was specific confirmation of the influence of
precedent (**).
The Cotton Textile Code was a dominant factor in the development
of the other textile codes. The letter of transmittal of the Underwear
and Allied Products Manufacturing Code, for example, declared:
"The labor provisions in this code are substantially the
same as the labor provisions in the Code for the Cotton Textile
Industry. It is clearly evident that the labor conditions should
be substantially tne same premises that these yarns are knitted
into or converted into underwear either partially or wholly
finished. To establish any difference in the minimum wage or the
working hours for employees in the manufacture of underwear would
cause difficulty in the labor conditions" (***).
(*) See Raymond S. Hubinow "Section 7 (a) of the Recovery Act",
Chapter IV, Work Materials #45.
(*.*) The industries in which the argument above was presented in the
letter of transmittal or the report of the deputy administrator
were; Underwear and allied'products (28); textile bag (27);
throwing (54); cap and closure (58); steel tabular and firebox
boiler (62); paint varnish and lacquer manufacturing (71);
nottingham lace curtain (78); and paperboard (100).
( * * * ) national Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition
Vol. I, p. 312.
S862
-130- '"
Similarly in the textile bag industry the letter of transmittal repeated
that a "number of textile bag manufacturers operate their own cotton
mills and many of the bag manufacturing plants are located in textile
area.s, (and) the class of labor in the textile bag industry is similar
to that in the textile industry". From these observations the con-
clusion is drawn that "the labor conditions should be substantially the
same". (*) In the silk industry the problem appeared in the form of
competition between the weaving of "rayoi cloth in so-called silk mills"
and in so-called cotton mills.
"It was constantly testified that weaving must be on the same
cost basis for both sets of mills."
It was noted that "the wage level proposed in this code is identical
with that, in the Cotton Textile Code under which the National layon
Weavers Association is operating." In fact, the deputy stressed the
fact that "objection to the wages and hours provisions relied on the
contention that both the cotton code and the silk code, if adopted,
would provide too low a level rather than that silk alone should bear
a higher rate". Consideration of one section in the textile industry
as a whole raised these problems. (**)
In the throwing industry, the problem of competition with other
textiles was particularly acute. Consequently the mills throwing rayon
for their own use were exempt from the provisions concerning special
wage rates for night work. The need for coordination among the various
textiles codes was specifically mentioned. (***)
The effect of previously approved codes was not limited to the
textiles. The cap and closure industry secured approval of its labor'
provisions because, they were essentially similar to the glass container
industry with which it is "closely interrelated". (****) Similarly,
the letter. of transmittal of the Steel Tubular and Firebox Boiler In-
dustry Code reported that "tae labor provisions of this code conform,
as agreed, to those of the Boiler Manufacturing Code". (*****) The
labor provisions of the paint, varnish and lacquer manufacturing in-
dustry were ^declared adequate since they were "generally in line with
(*) Ibid., Vol. I, p. 363, - similar observations to be found in
letter of transmittal for nottingham lace curtain industry -
Vol. II, p. 254.
(**) Ibid., Vol. I, -p-p. 588-589.
(***) Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 644-645.
(****) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 23.
(*****) I-bid# ( Vol> Hi pp# 58_5g4
5862
-131-
approved codes employing labor of the same quality and under similar
conditions." (*) The paperboard industry. secured modification of its
labor provisions to conform frith those of the paper and pulp industry
since "the process of manufacture is identical . . • and working1 con-
ditions are the same in both industries". This similarity between the
two codes obtained even in spite of the paperboard industry's willingness
to set higher minimum wage rates than those proposed in the Paper and
Pulp Industry Code. The hours were approved despite the recognition
that "it is improbable that production will ever again reach the 1929
level" and reabsorption of the unemployed was consequently the more
imperative. (**)
Precedent, though important in the first one hundred, became a
still more controlling factor in the subsequent codes. In fact, code
negotiation became a problem of studying competing industries and work-
ing out a set of equitable provisions. Individual industries wanted
special advantages and in many cases succeeded in using precedent to
secure lower standards. Representatives of the Labor Advisory Board
used similar tactics to raise labor standards.
These early precedents exerted great influence. The individual
industry approach tended to be lost in the argument over provisions in
approved codes in competing industries. Bargaining in code negotiations
was restricted and new efforts to reduce hours below the prevailing
terms met with increasing difficulty unless supported by exceptional
pressure within the industry or conflicting provisions among competing
industries. Discussion of hours provisions in codes shifted from basic
hours to seasonal and peak tolerances.
(*) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 170-171.
(**) Ibid. , Vol. II, p. 538.
9862
-132-
IV Reemployment tinder Code in Respect to Employment in 1929
Certain codes were approved on the ground that the proposed hours
would raise total employment within the industry to or above the 1929
level. The industries in this category were almost exclusively within
the consumer goods and service group. (*)
Most numerous were the textiles including the cotton textile,
rayon and synthetic yarn producing, and hosiery industries. In the
cotton textile industry, the exception from the policy prevailing during
June 1933 was granted because "the 40 hour limit would not only call
back to work those who became unemployed since 1929 but would call for
13 percent more employees than the average in the peak of 1927 when
467,000 were employed. . . . The industry under the 4-hour week would
presently absorb the available corps of textile workers and assuming
a continuation of the present trend would provide openings for unemploy-
ed from related and nearby industries whose absorption would require a
considerable apprenticeship". (**) Similarly in the hosiery i ldustry
the 40-hour week was accepted on the assumption that it would "reemploy
workers skilled in the hosiery manufacture who nave been forci i to
leave the industry and insure more nearly full time employment for the
great majority of the workers who remained in the industry". (***)
The rayon producing industry in contrast was growing in importance
and employed more persons in the days prior to the code than it had in
1929. The report estimated that "after giving effect to the maximum
hours in the code, the numbers of employees will exceed by more than
ten percent the greatest number previously employed in the industry" . (****)
A similar situation was found in the leather and boot and shoe
industries. For the leather industry it was estimated that "over SO
percent of the workers at current levels of operation will have their
hours of labor shortened, and total employment in the industry will rise
again to the 1929 peak levels 52,000 employees in leather tanning alone
without any further increase in business. If business expands, as we
expect it to, the employment will soon exceed even the 1929 peak for the
industry. If we should go any further in shortening of the hours of
v/ork in this industry, there would be considerable danger of creating
severe shortages of suitable types of trained labor in many plants,
particularly those located in isolated rural communities. (*****)
(*) The industries in which it was indicated in the letters of transmittal
or reports that employment under the code would attain the 1929 level
or exceed it were: Cotton textile (l); rayon and synthetic yarn pro-
ducing (14); fishing tackle (13); hosiery (16); leather (21); oil
burner (25); linoleum and felt base (50); boot and shoe (44); bankers
(47); mutual savings banks (52); copper and bras,; mill products (81);
soap and glycerine (83); washing and ironing machine (93); stock and
exchange girms (95) ; asphalt shingle and roofing (99) .
(**) Ibid, Vol. 2, p. 5.
(***) Codes of Fair Competition, Vol. 2 - Hosiery industry report on a code
for the hosiery industry - from Lindsay Rogers to General H. S.
Johnson, August 25, 1933.
(****) Ibid, Vol. I, p. 225.
(*****) Ibid, Vol. I, p. 239.
9862
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In the "boot and shoe industry a similar situation was said to
exist, so that "the number of workers employed in the industry should,
reach the highest point of approximately 225,000, which was the
number employed, in September 1929. In view of the drifting away of
workers from the industry that has taken place since 1929 it seems
probable that some small amount of recruiting must result from the
hours established. (*)
In the same category were also a number of industries recently
organized or with new outlets for their products. These were the
oil burner, washing and ironing ma.chine manufacture, copper and brass
mill products and asphalt shingle and roofing manufacture industries.
In each case reemployment was estimated to approximate or exceed the
1929 level. '(**)
The following mixed group of industries also belonged to this
class; fishing tackle, linoleum and felt base, ice, and soap and
glycerine industries. (***) The report on the last industry was.
particularly interesting in view of the declining employment due to the
mechanization of processes. The deputy's report observed that "the
reduction of hours as provided in the code to an average of 40 per
week should increase total employment to a figure better than that
of 1929 which will mean a reversal of the shrinking trend of the
previous thirteen years." (****) Finally the. finance group, in-
cluding the bankers, mutual savings banks, and stock exchange firms
were in this category. In these cases, specially trained employees
were required and the 1929 level could be attained through a forty-
hour week. (*****)
In these industries approval of the proposed hours was based on
the original ERA standard of reemployment as the proper guide for the
(*) Ibid, Vol. I. p. 543.
(**) Oil burner, Ibid, Vol. I. p. 341 - increase in employment esti-
mated at 8,000; washing and ironing machine; Ibid Vol. II, p. 463-
increase estimated at over 3,250 employees; 100 in excess of
1929; asphalt shingle and roofing manufacturing, Vol. II, pp.
525-526 - rise to 6,950 of fifteen per cent more than the
number in 1929; copper and brass mill products, Vol. II, pp.
290-291 - increase of 5,000 additional persons bring to 1929 level,
(***) Fishing tackle - Vol.11, Codes of Fair Competition; Report of
August 16, 1933; linoleum and felt base; codes of fair com-
petition Vol. I, pp. 390-391; ice, codes cf fair competition
Vol. II, Report of R.B .Paddock, October 12, 1933.
(****) Ibid Vol. II, p. 319.
(*****) Mutual savings banks: Code of Fair Competition for the Mutual
Savings Banks, Vol. II, Report of Deputy Administrator
A.D. White side, October 3, 1933. Bankers: Code of Fair Com-
petition for Bankers, Vol. II, Report of A. D. White side, Deputy
Administrator, October 21, 1933: Stock exchange firms: Codes of
Fair Competition Vol. II, p. 482.
9862
-134-
determination of hours. The smallness of the group complying with this
standard indicated the extent of deviation from the original goal set.
V. Some Increase in Employment
In a final group were the host of industries in which the letters
of transmittal merely indicated that some increase in employment was
anticipated "but also affirmed definitely or indirectly that the new
employment level would fall short of the 1329 mark. Ho further ex-
planations wore offered justifying approval of the code.(*) Perhaps
the most representative letter of transmittal of the entire series was
that for the fabricated metal products manufacturing industry. It
recommended approval of the code "because "It materially reduced the
normal hours of operation for employees ir] the industry. . .set up
uniform wage and hours conditions over this "broad industry and will
assure an increase in the number t»f persons employed on the same basis
of activity" . (**)
In some instances the proposed hours clause was accepted by NBA
because no information indicating the desirability of shorter hours
was available. These letters of transmittal do not show any justifi-
cation for the small contribution of these industries to reemployment.
In several cases, the advisers' recommendation -as cited as the basis
of final approval.
VI • Conclusion
Failure to live up to early statement of policy in MBA pro-
cedure is disclosed by the huge proportion of industries in which basic
hours proposed by management were not modified. This conviction is re-
inforced by the study in this section. The basic philosophy underlying
NBA action was radically modified during the period of code writing. The
orignal tenets were changed in practice by exceptions and supplementary
principles. Only a small proportion of hour provisions in th codes
were approved on the grounds that employment would be brought back to
the 1929 level in the industry. In the other cases, one or another new
(*) The industries in which this position was expressed in the letter
of transmittal were; Wool textile (3); lace (6); legitimate full
length dramatic and musical theatrica-1 (8); photographer (12);
motion picture labratory (22); salt producing (20); artificial
flower and feather industry (29); lime (31); knitting, braiding
and wire covering machine (32); retail lumber, lumber products,
building materials, and building: specialties trade (53), glass
container (36); builders supply (37); women's belt (41);
umbrella (51); handkerchief (53); marking devices (59); indus-
trial supplies and machinery distributors trade (61); advertising
specialty (65); gas cock (70); packaging machinery industry
and trade (72); crown (77); novelty curtain, draperies, bed-
spreads and novelty pillows (79); asbestos (80); fabricated
metal products manufacturing and met-1 finishing and metal
coating industry (84); american petroleum equipment industry
and trade (85); leather and woolen knit glove (87); men's
garter, suspender and belt manufacturing (94).
(**) Codes of Fair Competition, Vol, II, pp. 330-331.
9862
'".'. -135-
principle was introduced to exempt the industry from the rigid appli-
cation of the first standards. Probably the most significant of forces
leading to the modification of the 1929 employment goal was the adoption
"by a group of administrative officials of the "belief that "business re-
covery aloma could "bring a"bout reemployment within their division of
codes and that shorter hours would have adverse effects upon "business
"by possi"bly raising costs unduly rather than increase employment.
Moderate decreases in the nominal "basic rork week, they "believed, was
all that was permissable. In other cases financial inability to carry
the cost of the shorter work week was recognized. In "both of these
instances, it was the pro"ba"ble wage increase that might have "been re-
quired of the employer "by the introduction of the shorter work week and
the probable demand by labor for maintaining the same full time earnings
that led the administrative officials to the above conclusions and to
their coldness to the establishment of a shorter than forty-hour work
week. Industry proposed the "basic work week and HEA did not revise the
basic hours. With the approval of increasing numbers of approved codes
the strength of precedent became evident. Though not explicitly af-
firmed its force was widely evident. Precedent exercised its influence
because it offered the industrial representatives an opportunity to
present an apparently legitimate and cogent case in support of their
proposal and in opposition to shorter hours Any reduction of hours
below forty, it was frequently observed, would create competitive in-
equalities since many industries were overlapping and competing for
similar labor and markets. Industrial representatives a.t times pro-
posed provisions and supported them by arguing that similar provisions
had been approved by the administration in other codes rather than
demonstrating their inherent merit.
As approved codes increased in number the approved patterns be-
came the guides for the codification of new industries. The result was
great uniformity in the basic work week established in NBA codes.
9862
-136-
CHAPTEE xv
The Basic Hours in the First One Hundred Approved Codes
TTith nire of the first 100 coder, reducing, six increasing and 85
keeping the "basic hours originally proposed "by the industry the pattern
of hours developed in the first oiE-hundred a proved codes was as follows:
83 had a "basic 40 hour week; of these
77 were originally presented with a 40-hour week
1 originally presented with 43 was reduced to 40 hours
5 originally presented with 35 or 36 were increased to
40 hours.
11 had loss than 40 hours; of these
1 had a 27-hour week
4 had a 35-hour week
6 had a 36-hour week
al so
4 had originally proposed their short week
7 had adopted their schedule as a result of negotiations
6 had a longer than 40-hour week; of these
1 had a 42-hour week
1 had a 44-hour week
4 had a 43-hour week
also •
1 represented a reduction from 48 hours to 44
1 represented an increase from 40 hours to a range of
.... 44 to 48
4 were as originally proposed by the industry.
These hours correspond more nearly to the provisions of the PEA, sub-
stitutions than to those originally contemplated by either the thirty-two
(32) hour proposal made in June by the Administrator, or to the thirty-five
(35) hours of the original PEA..
Of the first 100 codified industries,
57 had first been governed by a PEA. substitution; of these
43 had a 40 hour week in both substitution and code
2 had a 36 hour week in both substitution and code
2 had a 43 hour week in the substitution and substan-
tially the same under the code
1 had increased hours from 33 in the substitution to
40 under the code
2 had increased hours from 36 in the substitution to
40 under the code
1 had increased hours from 35 in the substitution to
36 under the code.
1 had increased hours from 40 in the substitution to
44 under the code
The PEA. substitutions we're, therefore, percursors of the basic hour
provisions of codes later adopted in the codes. The pattern was predom-
inentlv a forty (40) hour week, with more e;;ce:)tions for longer hours than
for shorter hours. The variations between the PEA substitutions and codes
with respect to seasonal and occupational tolerances were more marked.
9862
"137-
Chapter XVI ,
ESTABLISH:. 'NT OF STAHDAPDS
Experience in negotiation of. the i'irst one-hundred approved
codes and their provisions influenced later codes. Precedent came to
govern code writing and the need for establishing equality in competi-
tion and simplifying administration made for uniformity.
No new formulation of policy was made during the year 1933. The
policy statement of October 25, 1S33 which was made by the Policy Board
and covered many controversial subjects did not refer to the problem of
hours. At that time it was taken fo'r granted that definitive policy
statements were unnecessary and that bargaining and negotiations would
tend to assure proper results. No account was taken of the fact that the
leverages which the Administration possessed were few in number, and not
of extraordinary strength and that a.dministration officials were more
prone to acquiesce to industry's demands than resist their proposals or
support the counterdenands for sharp reductions in basic hours.
I .. Pol i cy Memorandum qjf JFeb_ruary__ 1_934
The first formulation of standards by the Administration tin the basis
of the experience was stated in the policy memorandum of February 13, 1934. (*)
These conclusions developed out of a conference held on January 29, 1934
including representatives of the Labor and Industrial Advisory Board, (**)
Assistant Administrators for Labor and Industry, and the Executive Officer.
The findings of this group were as follows:
1. Hours of Labor
It is recommended except for pea]: periods,
maximum hours shall not .^e greater than 40 per
v/eex and 8 per day except in the following cases:
(a) Maintenance employees, firemen, engineers,
shi-o;-<ing crews, truck ,driv or s, and such like -
43 per week; 9 per day.
(b) L'atchmen - 5^ Tier week.
(*) Heport of Alvin 3rown to General Johnson.
(**) Dr. Wolman, Mr. 3arrett, Mr. iicG-rady, Colonel Lea and Mr. Brown.
93^2
-138-
(c) "~r.nl 03" ee s 0:1 emergency maintenance rer-uired
for continued operation of plant and equipment,
or for safety and ktcalth of employees; - no limi-
tation, but time and one-half for excesses over
• ' hour per week, or 9 per d 3 .
(d) "executives and supervisory employees, and
their secretarial assistants, foremen, and pro-
fessional and scientific employees (but no others)
receiving not lees than $35.00 per week, and
ou.toidvs calranen - no limitation. (*)
2. Peaks
It is recommended that exception to the above hours
during peak periods should not be greater than 48
per v/eek and 9 per day; and the peak allowance should
not be longer than 12 weeks in any year.
3. Averaging of Hours
It is recommended that except upon showing of .
necessity hours may not be averaged, but must be
definite for each week.
4. Days
It is recommended that codes should prohibit working
more than 6 days a week, except in emergencies, and
except that watchmen may be worked 13 days out of
two weeks.
II. HEVIEW LI VI SIC" STATEMENT, July 1S34
wa
The approval of the forts^ (40) hour week in the above memorandum
concurrent with the Admini: bration's move to induce industry to
accept the ten percent (10') decrease in hours, as announced by the
Administrator in an address of February 27, 1334. je.spite continuous
effort to reduce hours on the pa,rt oi the Admini stra.tio; and the La
Advisoi r<" Curing the first half of the year 1334, the forty (40)
r week persisted as policy; As a result of the conflict between
practice and hope, the P.eview Division reformulated guiding principles
in July 135^; but its statement was not widely used within the Admin-
istration.
IJ e formula re .6 as follows:
"TThen the forty (40) hour v/eek will not, in th
opinion of the Research and Planning Division,
restore employment to the 1929 level, in an indus-
try, generally prosperous, wh< .. L )or costs are
relatively low, it is permissible and desira'bli
that the _q 1 1 authority be 1 ':orPA \°. rcoort
(*) Mr. Barrett for the Industrial Advisory ¥oard object 1 to the
limitation in paragraph (a) of 9 hours iaer day)
98«2
-139-
within some period as 90 days, the feasibility
of further reducing hours with a view of providing
employment for at least as many persons as in 1929.
Such a procedure is consistent with the general
purposes of the Act. Tnen a code submitted for
approval contains labor provisions not consistent
with present policy, but an industry, operating
under a code containing like or similar provisions,
so that cisasterous hardship and discrimination
would inevitably result if the code in question
was unapproved, it is permissible on a clear showing
of such condition to allow such otherwise objection-
able provisions." (*)
The forty (40) hour wee:: was thus again confirmed and the
limiting effect of precedents recognized. Further serious efforts at
reduction of hours were not made. Though the desirability of such
reduction in hours was acknowledged in the qualification that study
was needed of cases raising the question of shorter hours, the state-
ment had little influence since the process of code making was largely
completed by July 1934.
Even the principle of reemployment to the 1939 level was less
discussed as time passed. The report of the Assistant Deputy
Administrator for Labor Policy to the Administrative Officer on the
Package Medicine Industry Code presented, May 14, 1934, stated:
"until such time as the Administrator declares it a fixed industry
policy that 1929 levels of employment should be favored it is within
the discretion of the Division Administrator to ootain the highest degree
of reemployment that he considers an industry can be burdened with. " (**)
III. He vi ew Officer 'js JPinal Summary
The Administrative policy as crys tali zed through the mass
of negotiations and the development of codes was finally summarized
in the following manner by the Review Officer:
"The limitation placed upon hours must necessarily be
a compromise between the requirement of reemployment
and the bility of the industry to adjust itself to
the change in operating conditions. Experience
under present codes shows that for the majority of
industry, forty (40) hours per week is the lowest
(*) Statement- of Policy classified under Code Provisions. This compilation
of -policy is for use only in the Review Division, and although in-
tended to represent the policy requirements of the Administration in
respect to code provisions and related subjects is not to be considered
as having been officially approved by F?A. This publication was
dated July ,1-93 U.
(**) Compendium of Abstracts of Policy and Other Statements Issued by the
Policy Group Mimeograph No. 1">37, p. 14
93*2
-140-
maximum presently practicable. Accordingly, in the
absence nf convincing showing to the contrary, no
employee will be permitted to work more than forty
(40) hours oer wee!:.
"Wht-ro hours have been estoblisned in o:ie code, there
is a ijresunoti on for similar hours in codes of allied
industries with like conditions, both because of the
finding of fact in the first instance and because
d.i p-uarnte hours mi.'-ht be discriminator".''.
"MaximuT" hours may be fixed in particular industries
at r^'re or less tnan forty (40) hours upon convincing
evidence or reason therefor. The following are some
examples cf acceptable cases:
(a) Continuous process industries 36 hours. Some in-
dustries operate continuous processes employing
for shifts. In such cases, where it is practicable
to suspend operation on Sundays, each employee will
work 35 hours per week, and ds hours may properly
be so limited.
(b) Continuous process industries 42 hours. If the
impracticability of suspension of operation on
Sunday is demonstrated, maximum hours 'of 42 may
be permitted.
(c) Retail Trades- Employment in retail trade has
customarily been at longer hours than in industry
generally, and to reduce such hours presently to
a maximum of 4^ is recognized, as impracticable.
The hours permitted should be reasonably propor-
tioned to the customary hours of store operation. "(*)
IV Conclusion
This statement conclude^ the development- of policy on basic hours
within the URA. In many respects it was" in direct conflict with early
tests -mid standards guidin; code negotiations and administrative action.
It did portray the policy that evolved in practice, over the course of
the two year oeriod. S '• '■e of t Le departures rf this position from the
early tenets of HRA were: (1) the arinciple of considering ench indus-
try individual]"/" was lost; (2) the early reluctance to set a uniform
standprd of hours except in general terms and as a possible maximum gave
way to acceptance, of a prevailing 4p. hour form for practically all
(*) National Recovery Administration division of Review Polic
Statements Concerning Code Provisions via Related Subject:
T.'orlrs i aterials Ilo, 2n, December 1935, p. 13..
9862
-141-
all industries; (S) the declaration that each industry was to absorb
its otto unemployed was succeeded by emphasis upon similarity in terms
of employment; (4) in place of the blunt disavowal of the precedent
gre'- recognition of a uniform basis of operation for competing .and
overlapping industries (*); (5) insistence upon lens than 40 hours a
week ceased even though such a program might encourage reemployment;
shorter hours reauired. as much justification as the longer week; (S)
the belief in reducing hours to effect reemployment was qualified, in
case of certain administrative officials, by the conviction that the
capital goods industries should be excepted from such reductions; (7)
the enthusiasm for reemployment through the shortening of hours waned;
(8) the goal of the. 192£ level of employment receded; (9) industry by
its pressure and "1A through- its desire for rapid codification com-
pletely revised ISA policy; (10) and finally, the PRA substitutions
generally foreshadowed the labor provisions of the final codes.
The policy as above stated grew out of the experience of code
making. It reflected Practice rather than goals; it suggested what was
really being accomplished rather than guides for future revision.
In a study of 557 codes, IS joint AAA 'and IIRA codes and extra
divisions of the Petroleum Code; it was found that 49 had adooted the
40 hour week. These industries employed 13,o37 persons or 60.5 per
cent of tie total. (Table 13). In five industrial groups, i.e., metals,
forest products, textile fabrics, construction and finance, the codes
were exclusively "forty (40) hour week" codes. In seven additional
industrial groups the codes consisted exclusively of those "under forty
(40)" or "fort}'- (40) hours" for the basic wee1-:. ITon-metallic, chemical,
paper, rubber, equipment, textile apparel, graphic arts. The longer
than,f ort - (40) hour wee': codes were significant in the trans-oortation,
retail trades and territorial codes.
(*) One of the most impressive administrative results -of ":3HA
history was the discovery of extensive and significant
overlapping of processes among industries.
9862
-142-
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.. -143-
CHAPT2R XVII
CODES TJITH LONGER THAI! FORTY HOUR BASIC EEEK
The prevailing trend toward the adoption of a fort-- hour work week
was modified in several cases by establishment of longer basic hours.
Forty-two ERA codes provided for a longer week (*). The factors determin-
ing approval of a working week in excess of 40 hours illustrated the cir-
cumstances, including precedent, that shaped code standards.
I. RETAIL GROUP
The most numerous group of codes with a longer work week were in re-
tailing. The Retail Code (Code. Eo. 50), written after extended consideration
of the problems of the industry set a basic scale of hours ranging from
forty (40) to forty-eight (48), per week depending upon the number of store
hours (**). The position taken in the letter of transmittal for these codes
was:
"The hour and wage provision of the code are substantially the same
as those adopted and approved in the Code of Fair Competition for
the Retail Trade."
Following this statement departures from the pattern adopted were usually-
noted. Modifications related especially to seasonal and peak period tol-
erances adopted to the. needs of the industry and to limitations on the
numbers of persons working on an unrestricted weekly schedule. The Retail
Solid Fuel Code provided for a forty (40) hour week for four months and
fort3r-eight (48) hours for an eight months' period.. This was acceptable to
the industry largely because of the four months' slack season, but it did
not otherwise alter the fundamental pattern of hours.
(*) For comparison, see Ruth Reticker, "Labor Provisions in ERA Coo.es" -
TTork Materials Eo. 55. The number given above is slightly smaller than
that indicated by the latter study since five of the agricultural
codes with longer hours have been omitted and the codes for the Uood
Preserving, Stock Exchange and Investment Bankers were considered
forty (40) hour week codes in this study, while the Air Transport
and Commercial Aviation Industry Codes were noted as longer than forty
(40) hour week codes. It is significant that such differences of
opinion could exist with respect to the actual number of basic hours.
The exemptions in many codes were so profuse that they affected the
major proportion of the codes and nullified the actual basic week
usually in the first section of the paragraph. In estimating the
basic work week, it was necessar;' to determine the basic group of
employees as well as define the provision which might legitimately
be considered to represent basic hours and those which were seasonal
tolerances. In many cases this determination was not easy to make.
Furthermore, legitimate differences of opinion might exist because
of the manner in which the clauses were written so that uncertainty
appeared as to the actual meaning of the provision.
(**) Footnote continued on next page.
9862
-144-
ii. motor SERVICE
A second group followed the pattern established in the I.Iotor Vehicle
Retailing Trade Code which had. -provided a forty-four (44) hour week. In
these codes the possible conflict with the Motor Vehicle Retailing Code was
definitely recognized. In fact the Motor Vehicle Maintenance Trade Code
made special reference to it, and instructed the deputy to inquire into
the sources of the conflict (*).
III. MOTOR TR&MSPORTATIOi:
A third groxip conrorised the motor transportation codes. The Transit
and the Bus Codes set the basic hours which were considered as the prece-
dents in the la.ter motor vehicle codes. In part the forty-eight (48) hour
week for these codes had also been predetermined by the exemptions to truck-
men and shipping employees from the basic nours of most codes. The motor
transportation codes were governed by these occupational precedents as well
as by the special motor transportation codes. The forty-eight (48) hour
week with loose seasonal allowances permitting much longer actual weekly
hours prevailed in these industries (**)•
(**) Footnote continued from preceding page.
The codes in this group were: Retail trade (50); retail jewelry
(142); retail food and grocery tra.de (132); retail farm equipment
trade (197); retail rubber tire and batter-;'- (410); retail toba„cco
trade (456); surgical distributors trade (507); retail trade in the
Territory of Hawaii (323); and retail meat trade (540). In this
class was also the Pilling Station Division of the Petroleum Code.
(*) The codes in this group were: Motor vehicle retailing (145); motor
vehicle storage and .parking trade (147); wholesale automotive trade
(lSo); motor vehicle maintenance (543); and the auto -rebuilding and
refinishing trade (544).
(**) The codes in this group were! Cinder, ash and scavenger trade (191);
- later amalgamated with the Trucking Industry Code; domestic freight
forwarding industry (152); trucking industry (278); and the house-
hold goods storage and moving trade (399) ; refrigerated warehousing
(499).
9362
-145-
Closely akin to the above group were the air transport (111) and
comnercial aviation (513) industries in which a forty-eight (48) hour
week was established, and the merchandise warehousing (232) with a forty-
five (45) hour week (*). The first secured approval of its hours because
"the Post Office Department's mail payments which form the largest item of
the airline income have been reduced approximately 28^ for 1933" (**).
IV. SERVICE
In the service codes long hours, low wages and. sweated labor -oondi-
tions had prevailed prior to the TJRA. In these industries competition
with owner operators, whose self-directed labor could be controlled only
through special opening and closing hours or similar devices, made the
shortening of hours particularly difficult. Furthermore, these shops took
on the character of the retail industry, serving the public and were fre-
quently located in and about the same places and at times competing with
the later (***). The letter of transmittal for the hotel industry contained
the following statement:
"The work hours may not be entirely satisfactory from a purely
social standpoint but they represent a substantial reduction
from the hours which prevailed in the hotel industry" (****)
The letter from the restaurant industry xvas almost identical (*****)
( *) National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition
Vol. V, p. 496
(**) Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 2
(***) The industries in this group are: Ice (43); hotel (121);
restaurant (282); bowling and billiard operating trade (546);
shoe rebuilding (372) and barber shop (398).
(****) national Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition
Vol. Ill, p. 176.
(*****) Ibid., Vol. XI, p. 510
"The work hours may not be entirely satisfactory from
a purely social standpoint but they represent a very
substantial reduction from the hours which prevailed
in the restaurant industry and will result in an esti-
mated employment of between 125,000 and 150,000 persons
in the industry above the number employed on June 15,
1933. The code provides for a six day work week which
is a definite innovation in the industry."
9862
-146-
V. OTHTd 301IG
The wholesale food anc1 . rocery industry, unlike the other
wholesale codes, obtained a forty-five (43) hour week or the sane
reasons that similar retail stores secured a forty-eight (43) hour
week and _;eneral stores a forty (40), forty-four (44), forty-eight
(48) hour ran,_e. The perishability of trie articles su^ested the
justification, for the longer v:ee: :. The Toil Trie _e .'.'ode contained
a nominal forty-four (44) hour week with exemptions to the operating
and maintenance workers, the rrajor roup of employees, permitting
forty-eight (48) hours. Acknowledgement of the forty (40) hour
nrinciple -as due to tl.e insistence of the labor adviser for the
code. In this case financial capacity anc" the connarabilit;' with
the transportation and service industries ap- eared to justify the
forty-ei ,ht (Z-C) hours in the e^res of the Administration.
The forty-five (4.) hour week in the artificial limb manu-
facturm ; industry resulted fro;.i - lor. controversy over the service
features of the industry. The man?.; ement declared that they had to
service customers on Saturday mornir anc" therefor required the addi-
tional five hour tolerance over forty (40). They emphasized that these
were not ..curs for maimfacturin but for service. The Advisory Boards,
however, disa; "roved of the suggestion. As a result the final code was
amended in the "Incentive Order to provide for a forty (40) hour week.
However, the industry di" not accede to the change. Protests were
lodged and the industry refused to accept the code. Investigations
were made to determine the justification for the desired partial exten-
sion. The admi: istrative Official succeeded, over the 'protest of the
Advisory boards, i:i haviiv. the amendment for forty-five (43) hours
approved. (*)
Another £ roxcp comprised the territorial industries including
six codes with longer hours than forty (40) . (*A) The conditions in
these territories varied strikingly from those of continental United
States so that the hours established in these codes represented reduc-
tions for the employees concerned, even though the hours were longer
than those in the other codes.
Several other individual codes had Ion :er hours for reasons
(*) History of the Coc'e of lair Competition for the Artificial
Limb Llanufacturint Industr; , Conniled by ?.. i.I. Davis, to. 8,
?6, 3d, 44.
(**) 1 trace of Hawaii (333); bakir. in if Puerto Rico
("" ); ■ lauufacturing industry" of [awaii ( 0) ; resturant trade
of Hawaii (333); rap hie arts industry of Hawaii (554) ?v.v.
Vfholesi I - c" retail automobile sales suit 1;' repair maintenance
and service of Hawaii (556).
9862
-147-
peculiar to the industry. The average forty-four (44) hour week was
approved for the fishery industry ""because of the perishable nature of
the product handled in the industry and the uncertainty as to the tine
when the product is available for processing" . However, it was provided
that, "Some division of the industry will (find) it necessary to revise
these provisions to make them applicable to these respective divisions" . (*)
Several of the code supplements established a 40 hour while others pro-
vided for a 48 hour week.
The Fur Trapping Contractors' Industry Code did not provide
for any maximum hours because the industry "is purely a seasonal one,
operating only three months in the year, and during this period weather
conditions may either lengthen or shorten the number of hours worked
in any one day". (**)
CCMCLUSI01!
The codes which provided for a longer than fort;/' hour basic
work week were, with the exception of the territorial codes, for non-
manufacturing industries. The industries concerned were almost exclusively
in the service, retail and transportation group, or they were essentially
out of the ordinary, as in case of fishing and fur trapping, gven in the
case of the artificial limb industry extension of the week beyond' forty
hours was designed to provide a tolerance for the service brancn of the
industry. The early codes in these industries set the precedent for
basic hours in those approved at a later date. The codes in this ^roup
v/hich did not follow a precedent did so on account of special circumstances,
such as perishability of products, or extraorc'inary seasonality, like fur
trappin^. Pro-!T7A hours in tkisc industries had been unusually long and
the industries vigorously resisted further reduction of hours other than
that adonced in the codes.
(*) ITationrl recovery Administration Codes of Fair Cormctition
Vol. VII, p. "30.
(**) Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 152.
9862
- 148. - . .
CRAPTIiR XVIII
C0D33 WITH LESS TEAS FORTY HOUH3 3.^SIC WORK WEEK.
An almost equal number of codes to those with longer hours were those in
which shorter hours had "been adopted. Forty-^one (41) codes prescribed a less
than forty (40) hour week. (*)
These codes provided principally for a thirty -five (35) and a thirty-six
(36) hour week; (10) and (23) respectively. Jne established a twenty-seven
(27) hour week; two a thirty-two (32) hour week; four a thirty-seven point five
(37.5) hour week; and one a thirty-eight (38) hour .veek. The most significant
industrial groups were apparel (ll) and equipment and machinery (ll), with the
nonmetalic group, the leather and fur, and the fabricating groups following in
importance. (Table 13) .
The analysis of the circumstances determining the establishment of the
shorter work week will be made in terns of the occasion when the shorter work
week was adopted by the various industries. The causes for the shorter work
week may be set forth as follows: (l) collective bargaining: (2) precedents
with strong union influence; (3) precedents; (4) Administrative Officials and
Labor Advisers; and (5) industry proposals.
I. Collective Bargaining
The most outstanding of the factors leading to the establishment of the
less than forty (40; hour week codes was the presence of a strong group of or-
ganized labor within an industry. However, such a group did not assure the
attainment of the goal of such shorter hours. It has already been noted that
three (**) of the nine codes i:. which hours were reduced over those originally
proposed of the first one-hundred approved codes were attained by means of col-
lective bargaining. The most dominant factor in the establishment of the short
er work week in manv other codes was either union strength itself or in asso-
ciation with the force of precedents already establisned in unionized
industries. (***)
Tlie most important industries, in this group are the apparel industries. -
Orga-.ized labor was par' cicularly effective in bargaining in these industries.
They amassed their entire strength for the negotiations of these codes. Fn^y
clearly recognized that bhe uo&a results would in part determine the character
of the local agreements. Like ':'• s .liars they associated the development of
the labor agreement with rne forrralation of the code.
(*) The report by Ruth Reticker on hage and Hours Provisions in HRA codes in-
dicates a large number 43. The difference is due vo the fact that the above
report is based on the hours in the final code. Changes made in the basic
hours between those first approved and t.iose finally approved in the code as
recorded in the above report are as follows: change from 40 to 3o in the bitu-
minous Coal Code; from 40 to 36 in the Refractories Code and Cotton Garment
Code; from 37.5 in the millinery industry and from 36 to 40 hours in the cedent
industry. The latter change was from a 35 average week with a 42 hour maximum
to a flat 40 hour week. It "may also be noted that a number of other industries
had established shorter- "basic hours either for specific periods or for specific
groups of employees such as the pyrotechnic industry (148); metal lath (344);
infants and childrens' wear (373); and wrecking and salvage (318;.
(**) Coat .and suit; men's clothing, and dress industries.
(***) The industries in this group are coat and suit (5); men's clothing (la);
dress (54); fur dressing and dyeing (151); pleating, stitching and bonnaz and
hand embroidery (276); men's neckw 33); millinery (151); print roller and
print block (368); covered button (356); undergarment and negligee (408); Fur (4
women's neckwear and scarf (536) .
9862
-149-
cedents already established in unionized industries. (*)
The most important industries in this group are the apparel
industries. Organized labor was particularly effective in bargaining
in these industries. They amassed their entire strength for the nego-
tiations of these codes. They clearly recognized that the code results
would in part determine the. character of the local agreements. Like
the miners they associated the development of the labor agreement with
the formulation of the code.
The unions in this industry (**) were well established in the
principal and strategic markets of the industry ant had had long deal-
ings with employers in these areas. Under the favorable circumstances
which existed at time of the ERA "'hen national uniformity of labor pro-
visions was envisaged and labor was being organized very successfully,
the unions were particularly 'jell situated. They could obtain the
desired terms of employment for the principal markets and could depend
upon the support of the employers in these regions in their efforts to
raise the standards for labor in the other markets. This bargaining-
position was further strengthened by the addition of thousands of mem-
bers to these unions in many of the outlying areas and many new bran-
ches of the apparel industries, 'Labor's demands in the negotiations
of these codes was largely. governed by the terms which they could ef-
fectively realize within the major markets in which they were well
organized. In the above respects they differed radically from the
position in which other 'jell organized areas found themselves.
These unions were also aided in their negotiations by the fact
that they sent down to the NEA some of their most experienced person-
nel. In fact, several persons attached to the labor organizations of
these industries v-ere on the Labor Advisory Board itself and actively
participated in negotiations of many codes ^.^ac. familiarized themselves
with its procedures. Ac a result of the strength of the union, the
particula.rl3" strategic role of the dominant Hew York City unionized
markets, and the sympathetic administrative officials, the administra-
tive influence was strongly responsive to the active cooperation and
aid of the labor advisers and representatives.
In the discussion of the individual codes, it must be borne in mind
that they were being formulated! almost simultaneously with all of the
conflicting pressures being brought at once. The determination of the
hours provisions was only one of a series of complicated elements in the
negotiations of these cedes.
(*\ The industries in this group are coat and suit (s) men's
clothing (15); dress (6-I-); dressing and dyeing (l6l);
pleating, stitching and bonnaz' and hand' embroidery (27$);
men's neckwear (3o3)i millinery ( 151) ;' print roller and
print block (936S) ; covered button (336); undergarment and
negligee (UOS) ; fur (1+3S) ; and women's neck-ear and scarf (533).
(**) The two chief unions were the International Ladies' Garment Workers
International Union, anc the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union.
SS62
-150-
A. Millinery:
This industry had skilful union leadership, With a history of successj
collective bargaining in the past, the industry had declined, and with it
the union, in a period of bitter competition. It struggled with increasing
seasonal unemployment. Shile a city industry, it was spread over many markc
of which only the New York market was organized. It was estimated in early
1933 that thirty per cent of the industry, all in Hew York City, operated
under collective agreements. Between 1922 and 1932 collective agreements
were absent, hut the union - The Cap and Millinery Workers - had taken a
new start in 1932.
There were several associations in the industry but in May 1933, a new
National Millinery Council was formed as an association of associations,
but predominantly New York in interest and influenced by the state of union
ization in New York City. On July 5, "1933, the Council presented a thirty-
five (35) hour code. This was withdrawn, apparently on the question of re-
presentativeness. The Council proceeded to extend its membership, and on
July 18, presented another code with forty (40) hours and substantial al-
lowance of overtime.
At the public hearing of August 2, the most contested point_was the pre
posed occupational minima. To try to settle the wide difference Deputy
Howard prepared a compromise draft of his own, in which hears were left for
later decision. Labor protested and negotiations proceeded throughout
August. The assistant deputy then working on the code ias since described
the next step:
"The impasse was broken by tne Millinery Union, . Labor had
recognized before anyone e! se the fundamental controversy
and aad been conducting since the middle of August a vig-
orous campaign of unionization. As a result of that cam-
paign the union consolidated its hitherto dubious strength
in New York City and brought a majority of manufacturers
in Cleveland, St. Louis, and Chicago under collective agree-
ments.' By mid-September the effects of the campaign on the
code making process had become apparent." (*)
Early in October an agreement was reached and a new code drafted at a
joint conference. Hours were compromised at thirty- seven and one-half (37-^f
per week, seven and one-half (7:1-) per day, with possible overtime for six
(6) weeks in each season at a time and one-half (lv) rate, only on the re-
commendation of the code authority which was to determine the amount needed
for each market. (**)
B. Far Group:
Two codes in the fur industry are included in this group. The gains max!
by labor in this field were due to organization; and they were notable since
they were won in the face of great difficulties. The chaotic competition in
(*) Millinery Industry, by J, C. Worthy, p. 63. Work Materials No. 53
(**) See section five for labor hour amendment.
9862
-151-
the industry after several years of depression; mounting unemployment in
the main center together with claims of shortage of skilled workers in
outside areas; the traditional exaggeration of seasonality; various de-
grees of unionization in branches of the trade, and a rising crisis of
dual unionism. These elements made any code agreements in this field al-
most a triumph.
The two unions here were the International Fur Makers' Union, affi-
liated with the A. F. of L. , and the Industrial Fur Ifekers' Union, both
with elements of strength and at odds since 1926. However, in spite of
their differences their combined pressure told for the same end in regard
to labor provisions. (*) Early .attempts of the various trade associations
to combine and offer one code for the whole industry failed, and in each
subdivision of the industry the employer groups divided to the end along
union and non-union lines.
1. Fur Dressing and Far Dyeing
Separate codes were submitted by two trade associations, one repre-
senting the union, the other* the non-union shops. The code was to cover
five industry divisions, in which the organized strength varied from com-
plete unionism to none at all. The Habbit Fur Dyers Association, without
consulting labor, proposed a forty (40) hour week, and a forty-six (46)
hour week for eight (8) weeks before Easter, and during July, August,
September, and October.
The Fur Dyers Trade Council brought in a code, stating that its
labor terms represented "full and complete agreement with the union."
The code called for forty (40) hours per week for the six (6) seasonal
months, thirty-five (35) hours for the rest of the year! in adiiticn
eight (8) hours overtime per week could be worked during seasonal peaks
to take care of continual chemical processes.
In spite of the Council's claim of agreement with the union, both
unions asked a thirty (30) hour week. A thirty-five (35) hour week had
supposedly been in effect for a year in union shops, without much effect
on employment. The industry admitted that average days of employment
per year were not more than one-hundred (100), and that days as long as
fifteen and sixteen hours were worked at times.
It was finally agreed to establish a basic thirty-five (35) hour week
and seven (7) hour day. As for overtime a new provision was secured.
During the thirty-five (35) hour week period all overtime beyond the daily
and weekly hours was to be paid time and one-half (I-J3). During seven (7)
weeks of each six (6) months period forty (40) hours per week could be
worked with time and one-half (1-5) overtime pay for any work in excess cf
eight (8) hours per day.
(*) The later settlement of this dual situation may be partly
attributed to the NBA experience.
SOURCE: J. Brodinsky' s "Negotiations of tae Fur Code" (Typewritten)
9862
~152~
2. Fur Manufacturing
In this co.de again the final hours agreed to represent a compromise
between the conflicting interests of employing groups with the chief
gain in the control and reduction of overtime. Again the pressure of the
unions was very effective.
Two oodoc were presented. That of the Hew York Associati >ns pro-
vided the basic thirty-five (35) hour week of existing union agreements;
that of tie western group a forty (40) hour week. After long code negoti-
ations, delayed by the fact that the dispute between the two unions came
to a head at this time, a final agreement was reached on the hours pro-
vision. To this end labor coordinated its effort for- a thirty (30) hour
week, and was upheld by the opinion of the He search and Planning Division
that "it is practically impossible to effectuate a spread in employment
without reducing the hours in the fur manufacturing industry to a ridic-
ulously low level." (*) The immediate gains to be looked for, therefore,
lay in equalization and restriction of hours as between industry groups.
Though labor was not satisfied with the outcome, it had made gains never-
theless. Hours in the final code provision were: thirty-five (35) per
•week, seven (7) per day, five (5) days per week. Overtime at one and
one-half (hjr) times the normal rate of pay was to be used by members of
the industry only if recommended by a regional industrial relations com-
mittee and granted by the code authority.
C . Pleating, Stitching and Bonnaz and .land Embroidery
.In this industry, a luxury service to women's apparel, union in-
fluence had declined during the depression, and some problems of dual
unionism had crept in. There were eight (8) trade associations and a
number of codes were submitted for the industry in the summer of 1933.
However, two New York Associations represented about seventy-five per
cent (75%) of the industry. The hours first proposed were similar to
those proposed by branches of the apparel industries: a forty (40) hour
week, eight (8) hour day, five (5) day week, with overtime not to exceed
six (6) hours a week or seventy-five (75) hours for any six (6) months
period. Even as late as the hearing, however, the Ohio group intended
in a brief: "Since past experience demonstrates the fact that fifty-four
or sixty-six hour weeks have been unavoidable during the past year in
our western areas we should be permitted a fifty (50) hour week, twelve
(12) weeks in each six (6) months period."
At this time the bonnaz workers' agreement in the Chicago area re-
quired a forty- four (44) xiour week. By September this agreemtn was re-
placed with one requiring a forty (40) hour week. In Hew York the Inter-
national Ladies' Garment Workers Union had been organizamp t xe scattered
forces of the bonnaz groups, and in September through the mediatory ser-
vices of Mr. Grover Whalen, the union signed new agreements with the two
chief associations in the city.
(*) Research and Planning Report. March 1934.
9362
-153-
After many weeks of negotiations nours were finally set: thirty-five
(35) hour per week, eight (3) per day, a five (5) day week. No overtime
was allowed, but the cede authority was empowered to determine and re-
commend rules for vertime in the various markets to he later incorporated
in the code. In this case the industrial adviser specifically used his
influence against the overtime provision.
D. Lien' s Neckwear Industry.
This industry was operating in New York City under a union agree-
ment. However, only fifty per cent (50,j) of tlie industry was located
there and the-proportion of the production in this area had been con-
stantly decreasing. (*) Unemployment of neckwear workers :.ad been a
serious problem in New York City, while in the newer centers there was
a smaller surplus. The result was a conflict of interests in regard
to hours and wages that required skillful labor statesmanship. The
compromise necessary as to hours for the "outside" production areas
concerned overtime. A thirty-six (36) hour week was agreed to; but it
was provided that four (4) nours overtime above the thirty-six (36)
hours might be worked for not more than eight (3) weeks in each six
months period in instances where an' employer could not supply his needs
with unemployed neckwear workers in his community. Such overtime nad
to be immediately reported.
E. Covered Button.
This industry is a service and supply industry to women's apparel
and the workers belong to the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union.
Individual agreements were in existence covering a large part of the in-
dustry, but were not strong or well observed. Several :f the largest
of the New York firms were non-union. There was no trade association
and the industry, fairly scattered through the major clothing markets,
found cooperation difficult. The proposed code was drawn up by a pro-
fessional proposed code maker. lours proposed were forty (A0) per week,
eig»it (3) per day, with overtime of ten (10) liours during twenty (20)
weeks of the busy season. Hours had previously run as long as sixty
(60) arid the busy season was short. Bat the industry accepted tlie
tliirty-f ive (35) hour week in tie PSA and seemed to be prospering.
By October 1933, the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union
had organized -about ninety-five per cent of tlie workers in the Button
and Novelty Workers' Union, and labor negotiated the terms of the code,
through the -anion, hours finally agreed upon were thirty-seven and one-
half (37y?) per week, seven and one-half (7->) per day, five (5) days per
week; overtime at time and one-half (l^) for not more than sixteen (16)
weeks each year, ten (10) hours in any one week, but not to exceed one-
hundred- twenty (120) hours per year. Tlie overtime rate was the chief
gain over the union contracts. (**)
(*) See William Lawson - A Study of Wages above the Minimum in
the Men's Neckwear Industry - Works Material 45, Part C.
(**) The crux of this settlement was industry's interest in price
fixing.
9862
-154-
F. Undergarment and Negligee Code
The question of liours here hinged on a limitation of the industry
definition to coincide with union influence, with a result of raising
standards fcr a larger majority of the workers. The underwear industry,
closely associated with the cotton textile industry, had from July 21,
1933, operated under that code. Its owr proposed code, including "all
types of underwear" was .earl August 11. The code setting a forty (40)
hour week when approved September 13 seemed to exclude women1 s under-
garments, hut this dispute was never settled during hhA' s activity.
Other groups actively concerned in this field were the cotton garment
and infants' and children's wear, both of which were then campaigning
for separate codes.
Both the associations for the manufacturers of undergarments and
negligees, newly formed for code mailing, presented codes in August with
forty (40) hour provisions ana long allowances fcr overtime. There
were no previous negotiations with labor. The International Ladies'
Garment Workers Union started organizaing vigorously in the summer of
1933. A hearing was held on September 5, 1933, for the undergarment
industry. This was immediately followed by a strike in hew York City
resulting in the signing of agreements with the union. Administrator
Jonnson' s letter of transmittal sunuiarizes the situation as follows:
"The code as originnaly submitted by the Undergarment
League, Inc., in August, 1933 was a simple one - providing
in general for a forty (40) hour week and a ,)13.00 basic
minimum. The sponsorship was fairly complete and the cede
would have been quickly ap proved, had it not been for the
outbreak of a strike in the New York area which was terrninat-
• ed by the writing of collective agreements with labor. These
collective agreements raised the scale of wages in the New
York area in some cases as much as forty per cent or more and
brought about a substantial reduction in working hours." (*)
At this point the Undergarment League, largely Hew York in interest
presented a new code of thirty-seven and one-half (37f;) hours, in line
with the New York agreement., Classified wage scales were included to try
to restore to a degree the previous differentials wi th-out-of-town manu-
facturers. Tiie negligee group then affiliated with the League, for this
code. From now on labor actively figured in the negotiations, which con-
tinued for months with the active leadership of the International Ladies'
Garment Workers Union and the Unite Goods Workers' Union.
' Meanwhile a large group of non-union manufacturers formed the Cotton
Garment and Sleeping Garment Associated Manufacturers, attempting first
to go under the Underwear Code raid finally appling for admission to the
Cotton Garment Code. The union was then faced with a choice. Mr. Dubinsky,
President of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, decided to
(*) Codes of Fair Competition, Vol. IX, p. 494 .
9862
-155-
agree to a compromise. Manufacturers of one-hundred per cent cotton
garments were allowed to withdraw. Thus the shorter week and basing
points in wages were saved for the large majority of workers (27,000)
in the industry. (*)
G. Women' s Neckwear
This industry, concentrated to about eighty-five per cent in the
New York area, was unorganized in every respect before the NIHA. It ex-
tended into the blouse field and into the pleating and stitching field,
serviced the dress industry, but in turn it was subject to competition
from the handkerchief industry, a still more unorganized industry than
itself. Hours were very long, and homework had increased during the de-
pression to large proportions.
An active association was formed, at first entirely of New York
manufacturers; but every effort was made to bring in all groups. There
was no labor organization.
The first draft of a code, August 28, 1933, proposed a forty (40)
hour week, with forty-eight (48) hours for ten (10) weeks in each of
the spring and fall ^seasons. Between that date and October 10, the
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union organized the industry almost
completely. On October 8, a union agreement was signed with the associa-
tion, and over ten or fifteen individual agreements with small firms.
Conferences were then held with the union and the Administration and a
revised code was agreed to with hours substantially as in the final code.
These were: a thirty-seven and one-half (37^) hour week, seven and one-
half (7,|) hour day, and. a five (5) day week; overtime to be permitted up
to ten (10) weeks each season, five (5) hours per week, under careful
checking, with overtime pay at one and cne-half (l-g-) times the regular
rate. . A small group of western manufacturers stood cut for a rate of
one and one-third (l-l/o), though the larger differences were on wage
rates.
Further negotiations in this instance were unusual. The association
asked the union counsel to act for them in the final negotiations with
the Administration. From this point on delay in this code's approval
was the fault of the Administration - chiefly the Legal Division's query
of the homework control provision. It was finally ap jroved by the Advisory
Council as one of the best c ntrol provisions devised. The responsiveness
of this industry to cooperation, its quick and genuine organization, and
its successful administration of its were noteworthy. (**)
(*) In spring of 1935, negotiations were in progress to reduce hours
to 36; to Cotton Garment Code already having been amended to 36.
(**) The letter of transmittal reads: "the wages and hour provisions
set forth in this code are in accordance with this agreement".
(October 8, 1935) - Codes of Fair Competition Vol. XIX, p. 82
9862
-156-
j - • Print Ho Her and Print ..31 o ck i,lanufactur:..ng Industry .
The oiT.3 industry in this group outside di the apparel division
was the Tint roller and >rint block manufacturing industry. It is a
small industry employing about 300 persons. Organized labor was well
entrenched in the industry end bad long standing relations with the
industry. While the code aad been originally presented for a forty
(40) hour week and labor had asked for a thirty (30) Hour we .k a mutually
satisfactory compromise was developed at a post hearing conference at
which the thirty-five (35) hour week was accepted. A thirty-four per
cent increase, in employment was forecast by this reduction in work. (*)
II. Collective Bargaining and Precedents for Shorter ",7ork Week.
In a number :f cases, organized labor succeeded in establishing the
shorter .work week during the courses of the negotiations not only by
means of its own power but also with the aid of the precedents which had
already been established in the coat and suit,' men's clothing, and the
dress industries. The effectiveness of these precedents was enhanced
by the fact that the unions in these industries also had large groups of
members in )ther apparel industries, and these industries were either
competing in the same market, or for the same labor, or were servicing
the major industries. (**)
A. Blouse and Skirt
Tie chief desire of the manufacturers in wanting a separate code
was to avoid the labor standards of the Coat and Suit and Dress Codes.
T'.ie Coat and Su^ t Code had included all skirts. During July 1933, the
deputy administrator tried to persuade blouse manufacturers to consolid-
ate wit] the dress industry in its code. But the Dress Code, approved
October 31, 1933, definitely excluded blouses except "when used with
ensembles. "
On July 27; 1933, the secretary of the newly formed Blouse Associa-
tion wrote, to the deputy that "Labor has not been en suited in the form-
ation of our code." (***) He added that organization in New York was
"negligible", in Philadelphia, "considerable." On August 15, 1933, a
Blouse Code was submitted, setting a work week of forty (40) hours. I-Iours
worked in the industry had been very long, variously estimated as from
forty-four (44) to sixty (60). (****)
(*) Code of Pair Competition - Vol. VIII, p. 540.
shoulder pad (262);
,**) These industries are blouse and skirt (194); shoulder pad (262);
merchant and custom tailoring (494).
(***) Blouse and Skirt History - Appendix p. 5.
(****) Ibid, Appendix, p. 3, 20, 64, 72.
9362
-157-
Between the date of submission and the hearing on August 25, the
industry was widely organized. (*) The union then came definitely into
the picture. The day before the hearing the employers and the union
conferred but without agreement. (**) At the hearing the Skirt Manu-
facturers' Association decided to join the Blouse Association in submit-
ting a joint code. Between August 25, and September 7, 1933, a strike
was called. Following the dress strike of the middle of August, it was
successfully concluded with agreements signed with the two associations
of manufacturers and also the contractor's association. The agreements,
following the settlement in the dress industry, called for a thirty-five
(35) hour week.
From that point the sole argument on hours occurred in regard to the
overtime rate, which was set at one and one- third (l-l/3) in the draft
for the September 7, hearing, Article II, Section 6, provided that the
code authority might allow overtime of five (5) hours a week, one (l)
hour a day for sixteen (16) weeks in any one year. Agreement on this
and. other points was not very far advanced by ■ the hearing, "but was worked
out in post hearing conferences." (***.)
In this connection the report of the industrial adviser, supporting
the union's contention for the time and one-half (l^) rate, is significant:
"In the Dress Code the allowances for overtime is one and one-half (l-g)
times the normal wage. As these workers are engaged in practically the
same operations and are members of the same union, the difference in pay-
ment will probably cause resentment." (****)
Over/'time under this code was little used. Minutes of the code authority
indicated permission was granted from time to time. But the report of the
administration member, June 24, 1935, states: "Hours were reduced from
44.50 and 55 per week to 35, but through, strict compliance on the part of
a great majority of the industry, this worked no hardship. The code pro-
vided a tolerance in hours for peak periods, but due to union domination
in the metropolitan area, the industry did suffer somewhat. It was dif-
ficult to secure union cooperation so that these tolerances could be
utilized- when needed."
(*) Ibid - History, p. 34.
(*•■) Ibid - History, p. 8.
(***) Ibid - History, p. 8.
(****) Ibid - History - Appendix p. 20.
9862
-I -
B. Shoulder Pad Iihuctry
Thic is a sifoply industry to men's clothing, though also to sone
extent to women' s coats. Canvas fronts and shoalder pads are often made
in the same shops; canvas fronts wer<^ under thf : en's Clothing Code. Like
all sun ily items o:ta products are also mad- by manufacturers for their
own use.
An association, formed in Aug st 1933, applied to the Administrator
as follows: "95$ ">f tne product handled by oar industry is cotton. ..the
hours and wages provisions of t .e Cotton Textile Code are applicable -and
should be applied at once," There must ha"e been some reluctance on the
part of the Administration, for the association presented its own code
proposing a forty-five (45) hour week, with overtime not in exces. of one
(1) hour per day, five (5) hours oer week , fifty (5<~0 ner year at the rate
of time and one-half (l}). This in the light cf a statement from the in-
dustry, that it had "not had forty (40) hours employment a week for sever-
al ye ts, M These terms were revised in tne s^me month to forty (4n) per
week with the same overtime provision.
There seems tr have been nr labor organization in the industry, at les
in the part of it outside of clothing plants. At the hearing on October
31 8 "anion representative appeared to state that shoulder o^d makers were
already bound by tne Men's Clothing Code. The hearing recessed for a rul-
ing from tne Legal Division which ruled against this position. After this
decis'on he took the' position that he would not object to - separate trade
practice code, but labor conditions must be the same. Before final appro-
val the Labor Advisory Board persisted in correction of the definition to
read: "The articles enumerated herein when made in clothing factories or
used in conjunction with garments- manufact .red in sich factories, are ex-
empted from the provisions of this code." The hours in the final code were
closely rel^t-^d to those in the Hen's Clothing Code; thirty-six (3d) and
eight (3); overtime of twenty-five (25) hours in six (6) months; one (l)
per d-y, five (5) ner week at time and one-half (1 ) rate. (*) In this
case t \e shorter hou s were attained largely by the overlapping of this
industry ith the men's clothing industry and the persisting attention
of organized labor which sa" ' to it that no significant differences in labor
provisions would appear,
C. Merchant an: Custom Tailoring
We have an interesting example in the cise of this industry of the
influence of orececent in code making, against the efforts of the Admini-
stration. This industry's cr,de was in charge cf the retail division, which
for leng persisted in regarding the industry as purely retail.
The i n's Clothing Code included custom tailoring by definition, and
this industry opposed a separate code for custom tailoring. At the time
of tne men's clothing hearing on July 26, 1933, some f -act inns in the custom
branch of the industry protested against inclusion of custom tailoring in
(*) Codes of Fair Competition, Vo. VI, p. 233.
9862
-159-
that code. Difficulties attending the Men's Clothing Code subordinated
the problem. Meanwhile in August 1933, tne National Associates of Mer-
chant Tailors of America, an old organization with many local affiliates,
approaching the Administration from the retail angle, received sympathetic
consideration and encouragement. The hoars proposed in this code - and in
this case hours and not wages were the crucial point - were forty (40)
per week, eight (8) per day, with a t?/enty (20) week peak period of
forty-eight (48) hour per week, eight (3) hours oer day, with a further
allowance of daily overtime.
The union situation in this industry can be only briefly suggested.
The old traditional anion in the industry "as the Journeymen's Tailor
Union. It had, however, fallen to a low membership and wag chiefly
influential on the western coast. In the Hew York area workers were
largely organized in the Needle Trades iorkers Industrial Union, and
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union. Tne Industrial Union inclined
to support the Amalgamated Clothing '.Yorkers Union. It is supposed that
the association consulted the Journeymen Tailors Union. At the same
time this union went into the Hew York Area and signed an agreement with
certain employers. The industrial union threatened a general strike.
By December 1933, tne Men's Clothing Code Authority, the Amalgamated
Clothing 'Jorkers Union, and the division of NRA responsible for the ap-
parel codes could turn its attention to the situation. Long negotia-
tions followed. The historjr of this code states:
"Tne Labor Advisory Board and the Men's Clothing Code Authority
began t o assert their opposition. Mr. Sidney ' Hillman , then
jrincipal labor adviser on the code, insisted that no separate code
for this industry w->s necessary and only after long and somewhat
. bitter negotiation ne -greed to a code on condition that the
industry accept a definition far different f rom t he one originally
proposed. "
The definition originally proposed vaguely included men's clothes
"made to individual measure. " It must be understood there was no real
conflict of interest between the strictly hand tailored clothes made
by the genuine custom tailor and the mass machine production of the
manufacturer. The conflict lay in an important and growing overlapping
group. No one disputed that; "tailors to the trade" belonged to the manu-
facturing group. They were included with a special allowance of over-
time for their peak periods, under the Men's Clothing Code. But a large
group of so-called custom tailors whose methods of manufacture were indis-
tinguishable and ™ho could not qualify under the definition of the custom
code refused to operate under the Men's Clothing Code. The negotiations
dragged on. In May 1934, the Assistant deputy administrator in the re-
tail division, in charge of thp code, resigned. A new draft of the code
was completed that day and agreed to by all the interests. Its definition
limited the adherents to hand work "except for the operations of a plain sew-
ing machine," and set hours at thirty-six (36) per week, eight (8) per day,
with peak period oyerti ie t o be determined each seison by a joint' committee
-1'' -
of employers and labor. (*)
III. Precedents.
Aside from the apparel trades groups, the effect of precedent in
establishing shorter than forty (40) hours per week was comparatively
slight. This fact stands out in sharp contrast to the importance of
rro.-cvinnt in the group providing longer than forty (40) hours. This
state of affairs obtained not because of the absence of precedents.
There were several outstanding ones in the machinery group; shipbuilding
and shiprepairing (36 hours); electrical manufacturing (36 hours); auto-
mobile ('35 hours) ; oil burner (36 hours) and laundry and dry cleaning
machinery manufacturing (36 hours). Except for the gasoline jump manu-
facturing and the knitting braiding and wire covering machine industries,
the machinery codes through the first thirty-four (34), all established
a less than forty (40) hour week.
The failure must be charged to the administrative officials who
embarked upon a new philosophy .which did not recognize the need for short-
ening hours in the capital goods industries! It has already been observed
that in the case of the Gasoline Pump Manufacturing Industry Code,
(36 hours) , the first draft was modeled after the Electrical Manufacturing
Industry Code, but the later drafts and revisions followed the outline of
the other machine manufacturing industries with longer basic hours than
forty (40) per week.
The three (3) industries where the effect of precedent is readily
discernible are, fire extinguishing appliance manufacturing, motor fire
apparatus manufacturing, and boat building and repairing. The first we
have already discussed, - indicated the effect of the Motor Fire Apparatus
Manufacturing Code which had been presented by the industry as a thirty-five
(35) hour week to correspond to the Automobile Code. In the case of the
boat building and repairing industry, the effect of the Shipbuilding
Industry Code was readily discernible. In fact, every effort was made to
iron out the differences between the two codes so that they would not con-
flict. The major difference in the hours provisions are in the seasonal
tolerances. While the Shipbuilding Code allows forty (40) hours in any
one week, the Boat Building Code allowed for forty-four (44). It is
interesting to note the controversy which developed within the Labor
Advisory Board. The majority of the Board contended that the same seasonal
peak as in the Shipbuilding Code should be approved, while the Chairman
of the Board maintained that since the industry "is highly sec ^onal and
dependent upon service and- price" the forty-four (44) week would be
appropriate. (**)
(*) Of course this solution was chiefly useful in delimiting the problem.
Without doubt the industry would ultimately have come under the
Men's Clothing Code. In the amendments later under consideration both
code authorities had agreed to a joint committee to pass on doubtful
cases and to try to settle the problem of overlapping.
(**) Report of the Labor Advisory Board, March 23, 1934. Code of Fair
Competition for the Boat Building and Boat Repairing Industry,
Volume II.
9852.
-161-
IV. Administrative Officials and Labor Advisers.
It has "bean noted that in the early drive for codification the
reduction of hours was kept uppermost in the minds of the adrntniotrs^
tive officials. Organized labor representatives played an active
role in prodding the Administration along to secure such shorter hours,
and in supporting the efforts of the officials by data or actual con-
ditions within the industry. This conclusion would apply with par-
ticular appropriateness to the shipbuilding, petroleun and cast iron
soil pipe industries. (*)
'Fae efforts of Administrative Officials to obtain a shorter work
week appeared to wane after the first one-hundred (lO"0 codes were
approved. By this time the forty (40) hour week had become dominant
in most codes. In place 01' the conviction that further shortening of
hours was necessary there was general skepticism, particularly in the
capital goods industries about the efficacy of reducing hours to effect
reemployment. In many industries the opposition of the deputies to
the consideration of shorter than forty (40) hours Was strong, and the
strength of precedents was outstanding so that the labor advisers found
it futile to contest the fort;- (40) hour week.
There were, however, individual cases of administrative officials
whose convictions of- 'the requirements of the original declared pur-
poses of the Act persisted. The reduction of hours of five codes in
this group was effected largely through the determination of the assis-
tant deputy administrator to adapt the hours provision to the individual
capacity of the industry. Wherever supporting data presented by the
labor aclviser and the information obtained at the public hearing
suggested the justification of a shorter than a forty (40) hour week,
he pressed for its adoption with tne assistance of the labor adviser.
He was so successful in this effort that more than fifty per cent (50$)
of the total number of codes which he developed provided for shorter
than forty (40) hours even though the hours provisions of the codes
handled by other assistant deputies within the same division all had a
fofty (40) hour week. Had all K3A officials operated in a similar
manner the hours [provisions of codes might have been markedly different
since there were also precedents for a thirty-five (35) or thirty-six
(36) hour week. Many other industries were in a similar economic
position to these in which a less than forty (40) hour week was adopted.
(*) Tne industries in which the reduction of hours was effected by the
Administrative' officials generally with the assistance of the labor
adviser were the following: shipbuilding and shiprepairing (2);
petroleum ( 10) ; cast iron soil pipe (18); pipe nipple (131); rolling
steel door (171); cast iron pressure pipe (192); pasted shoe stock (413);
canning (446) ; wholesale confectionery (458) ; public seating (477) ;
upward acting door (502); bituminous road material distributing ( 530) ;
music publishing (552).
9 £62
•163-
Hie February and . orch 1954 Cole A- endment hearings and the dis-
cussion of the "10-10" plan for the reduction of hours was also in part
responsible for the shortening of hours. Directly associated with this
movement is the thirty-six (36) hour week in the Fasted Shoe Stock Codo,
the Can ling Code and the Wholesale Confectionery Code. (*) Since it
was generally felt then that the reduction in hours was to be generally
applied, the deputy, at the request of the labor adviser, urged industries
to accept the reduction immediately. The above industries adopted the
proposal. It may, however, be noted that the seasonal tolerances in
the canning industry virtually nullify the shorter hours. In the seasonal
packing branches sixty (60) hours was established as a basic norm. (**)
l!'ae adoption of the thirty-six ('36) hour week in the wholesale confection-
ery industry was outstanding since the other wholesale codes had adopted
a forty (40) hour week, with the wholesale food and grocery branch on a
forty-four (44) hour week.
Tiie thirty-two (32) hour week in the bituminous road material dis-
tributing industry was acceptable to the industry since it affected only
their unskilled employees numbering less than twenty-five per cent (25$)
of their total force. It was adopted in exchange for more liberal con-
ditions relative to their skilled ".employees (bituminous road materal
distributor operators) in whom the employers were principally interested
and who constitute the backbone of their force. (***)
V. Industry Proposals.
A number of industries themselves proposed less than forty (40)
hour codes to the Administration. (****) These industries were dominated
by one of two characteristics J low use of factory capacity or continuous
process operation based. on a six (6) hour day. The provisions which
they recommended permitted very liberal seasonal and peak tolerances,
either through averaging provisions or specific peak periods or occupa-
tional exemptions so that they virtually established either a forty (40) ,
forty-two (42) , or forty-eight (43) hour or longer weekly maximum.
Experience in the above industries suggest that there was no rigid ob-
servance of the basic ..work week. The provisions in these codes must be
contrasted, to the flat maximum hour regulations in the codes establish-
ing less than forty (40) hours maxima developed through collective bar-
gaining.
(*) NJ tional Recovery Administration Codes of Pair Co petition '
Vol. XI, p. 207.
(**) Ibid., Vol. XI, p. 28.
(***) Ibid.., Vol. XVIII, p. CO.
(****) Electrical manufacturing (4); automobile (17); laundry and. dry-
cleaning machinery manufacturing (34) ; structural clay products
(123); portland cement (12.8) ; rubber tire (174); envelope (220); processed
or refined fish oil (500); window glass* (533); and flat glass (54l) .
9862
~163~
VI . CONCLUSION
The circumstances which "brought about the shorter hours in the forty-
one (41) codes varied considerably. In all "but ten cases, the reductions
to the shorter than forty hour week were made during the course of code
negotiations. The most vital element in effecting such shorter hours
was organized labor. In at least fourteen codes, it was the aggressive
policy pursued by organized labor, particularly in the needle trades,
that effected the reductions. In most of these cases the negotiations
of both trade agreements and codes were concurrent. The provisions of
the code determined also the contents of the agreement. It was this
association of the two which gave to the negotiations of these codes all
the appearance of collective bargaining proceedings under governmental
guidance. But aside from the influence of the union strength, most crucial
was the precedent established in the three basic approved codes: Coat
and suit, men's clothing, and dress. The fact that they had established
the shorter week was most consequential. In these codes particularly,
the influence was direct and determining.
The effect of precedent was also evident in other cases. Basic
codes were instrumental in predetermining the hours of subsidiary and
associated industries. However, in cases where the precedents prescribed
shorter hours than forty, the Administrative official and the labor
adviser had to be particularly vigilant in assuring observance of the
weekly hours of the basic code. In the case of 13 codes the Administra-
tion official assisted by the labor adviser effected the reductions in
basic hours. The industries in which these reductions were made are in
no substantial manner different from those in which the forty hour week
had been adopted. It was the effective use by the deputy administrator
of the services of the labor adviser and the available information in
the industry and his understanding of the terras the industry was in
position to accept that accounted for these shorter hours. The codes
v.'ith shorter hours than forty recommended by industry were in industries
where there was low use of factory capacity or where continuous process
operations prevailed.
9862
-164-
••.r?-jp.TS vi' •:: mvisicr of :;asic wrr/n 'ttjrs
Dissatisfaction with the prevailing code standards of basin hours
was wide spread. At the Convention of the American Federation of Labor
in October, 1933, organized labor declared that "the hours of labor are
too long to assure absorption of the millions without jobs". "Forty and
forty-eight hours and even longer in those^ercemoted groups.'- such as Match
E»nd repair crews - have been set by codes and agreement's when the figures
showed that no longer than tMrty hours oer re.'h could be allowed , if ,-,e
are to find -jobs for all". (*)
Labor's' st?nd on the thirty— hour week was specifically reaffirmed
in a resolution as "the most essential solution in coping with the un-
employment problem." (**) This notion was also supported by the Building
Trades and Letal Trades Department. (*** )
I. ADhliTISTRATIO" POSITION
ITithin administrative circles similar dissatisfaction was voiced.
One official declared at the rublic hearing of the Tholesale Code that:—
"Reduction of unemployment this winter is vitally
necessary. . If in !odi to improvement is not noticed
it will probably be n &e •" r ' tr< reduce the hours
of all industries whether they are operating under
codes or not." (****)
However, administrative officials saw any difficulties in undertaking the
wholesale revision of the codes. It was observed that -
"In many instances it has been difficult to
bring about agreement to the hour reductions
now in effect. An attempt at further slashes
would stir ur controversy t' e ]T.2A. night
find it almost impossible to surmount." (*****)
There was feeling in some quarters, that the hotirs schedule adooted
■.ad ended "T-.R.A. * s "•period of immediate aid to employment I1 . (****** \
(*) Report of the Proceedings of the 53rd Annual Convention of the
American Federation of Labor, October 2 to 13, 1933, p. 69
(**) Ibid, p. 358
(***) Philad lohia Ledger (September 28, 1933)
(****) Statement of Deputy Administrator •Thiteside, quoted in American
Federntio ' Labor ITeekly ne"S Service (November 18, 1933).
(*****) Tall Street Journal November 16, 19
(******) ibid.
-165-
This conclusion impelled the Administrator to declare:
"I am for a still shorter week than in any of .the codes.
I believe that even after this country is restored to normal
prosperity there -ill be millions of unemployed in this
mechanized land of ours I am for getting those shorter
hours just as soon as increased prices, increased profits,
increased business permits." (*)
As the NRA discussion grew warmer, an independent body of engineers
published" the results of their investigation based on data for the major
industries. The conclusions reported "ere:
"Oar study of working hours absolutely supports the doctrine
of the short work period. The lower limit of the optimum
range for maximum effectiveness has been found to be between
thirty to thirty-five hours ner week. The advocates of the
thirty hour week are thus supported in their position by our
findings. "(**)
Toward the end of 1933 both organized labor snd the Administration
agreed that shorter hours were necessary. Labor asked for uniform leg-
islation applicable to all industries, but the Administrator was opposed
to a national program of maximum working hours. He observed that —
"You can't lay down one rale for all industry. To try to
impose a 30-hour week or any hour week universally on all-
industry would just raise the dickens. It simply cannot
be done. «(***)
In the midst of this discussion a statement of the actual achieve-
ments of the NBA program declared that -
"As a result of this vast administrative process, the last
accurate reports show that some 4 million workers have been
restored to gainful employment." (****)
However, results were considered inadequate in view of the remaining
volume of unemployment and the condition of industry appeared propitious
for further action. It was for this reason that the February and Larch,
1934 conferences were conceived. They represented the first real effort
to revise the codes in order to absorb more workers by shortening hours.
(*) Address by General H. S. Johnson, December 2, 1933, Central Labor
Union, Philadelphia, Pa. (FPA Release No. 2136)
(**) Study ^oy L. P. Alport and J. E. H annum, conducted under the auspicies
of the American Engineering Council. Few York Times, (December 14,
1933)
(***) Washington Herald, (December 27, 1933)
(****) Cjuoted in American Federation of Labor Weekly News Service,
(January 6, 1934). Report by the rational Recovery Administration.
9861
-166-
II. CODT AUTHORITY COEFEHENCE
Early i» January, 1934, when the conference w&o being planned the
Administrator, in his newspaper conferences, declared tn*,t steps '-rould
shortly be taken to reduce maximum working hours under all cocu»c_ jje
indicated that -
"The average work ^eek under the codes approved to date is
forty hours and ... the Administration's goal v'Ould be to
reduce that to an average work <-reek of thirty-two hours
"The whole country, in my opinion, has got to go on a shorter
work week. "
He declared himself in favor of the eight-hour day, but indicated that
a uniform week ^ould be undesirable, as it -ould push many into bank-
ruptcy and create "a kick-back that would nullify the whole effort".
Nor did he approve of imposing uniform hours upon all industry. (*)
Lluch NBA interest during the next several months centered about the
activities of the Code Authority Conference and its results. Invitations
were sent out to code authorities to attend the Conference which was to
include "the consideration in public sessions of the poscibilites of in-
creasing employment. "(**) ,
By the beginning of February, the program for the conference had
taken shape. The Administrator declared that among the chief objectives
were the coordination of the cpde authorities to harmonize conflicts in
closely related industries and the reduction of hours. He declared at
his press conference on February 9, 1934, that:
"American industry is geared- to run on an eight-hour day and
that the working week that would serve best would be one that
was fixed on a multiple of eight."
Since nost of the codes had an average of forty hours a week, exceptions
being permitted for peak production, the General's remark was accepted
as favoring the thirty- two hour week. However, he emphasized that "the
reduction of hours should come from the experience of the industries
themselves rather that governmental fiat". (***) He thought that:
"'."e can't do anything about that (the bulk of unemployment
in the heavy industries) here ... "ha.tever we do will have
to be in the ^kite-collar class and in the large measure in
trade because consumers goods industries will employ people." (****)
(*") Baltimore Sun (January 11, 1934).
(**) NBA Press Release No. 3244.*'
(***) Hew York Times (February 10, 1934). Press Conference Report.
(****) Baltimore Sun, (February 10, 1934) - In accepting the capital goods
industry argument, the Administrator considerably modified his earlier
position.
9862
-167-
The conferences "ere divided into t^o sections. lnhe fir&t was a
public meeting beginning on February 27th and the second, a series of
meetings of code authorities and code committees beginning on March 5„
1934. The same problem was addressed to both groups. Of particular
interest '"as one group which dealt rith the "possibilities of increasing
enroloyment ; rages and hours; comparative situation of capital goods and
consumer goods industries."
The General began the conferences rath a statement of objectives.
He declared that the "National Recovery Act is an attempt to spread em-
ployment, increase wa^es, cut out unfair and destructive trade and in-
dustrial practices and make definite the rights of labor." It had made
progress to these goals but there ™as need of additional changes. The
meetings vrere the occasion for "a roand-up of every kind of helpful com-
ment that has been produced as a result of six months of operation under
the President's fie employment Agreement and the codes." There were, how-
ever, twelve matters which required "immediate attention". One of these,
and the one of most significance, was the "further reduction in hours
per week and further increase in hourly wages. "(*)
During the public meetings of the week of February 27, 1934, many
speeches iavored the shorter work-week. (**)
(*) Address on February 27, 1934 by General Johnson. Release No. 3307.
(**) Some of these were:
Harry Kline, R. C. A. - Victor Employees Union (30 hours);
W« Leader, Central Labor Union of Philadelphia (30 hours);
Alexander McKeon, American Federation of Hosiery Y/orkers (30 hours);
F. T. Rockwell, Frigidaire Employees Association (25 hours);
Fred Hewitt, International Association of Machinists (30 hours);
Louis " aldraan, Chairman, Public Affairs Committee of the Socialist
Party (30 hours) ;
John J. Klaber, Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and
Technicians (30 hours);
C.7, "Ihitmore, Chairman, People's Unemployment League of karyland
(30 hours);
John P. Frey, Letals Trades Department of the A. F. of L. (30 hrs, );
Samuel Kapustin, Knit Goods Union of Philadelphia, (30 hours);
Sidney E. Goldstein, Chairman, Joint Committee on unemployment (30 hrs»);
James J. Ryan, President, Amalgamated Association of Bridge, Struct-
ural, Ornamental Iron and Bronze Erectors and Affiliated Trades
of .America.;
John P. Coyne, International Union of Operating Engineers;
C.L. Rosemund, President, Federation of Technical Engineers, archi-
tects and Draftsmen's Unions, A. F, of L. ;
VJm. Kuehne, Federation of Building Trades Workmen (30 hours);
Urn. Filene, Boston, Mass.;
Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Technicians (50 hrs«);
jBdrrard B, Abbott, Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Ukrs»;
St. Louis Printing Pressmen's Union 46 (32 hours);
Adelard Dumas, Independent Sheeting '.Yorkers of America;
(Only with qualifications: )
Ray Hudson, Industrial Committee .of Hew England Council;
9862 (Footnote cont'd, on next page)
- 153 -
They generally advocated a thirty hour week for most industries, though
in individual cases 32 hours was also proposed. The principal propon-
ents were union leaders. Opposition was offered "by some representatives
of industry. Among their contentions were ( l) that industries could not
finance this decrease in hours (*) , (2) that there was a shortage of
skilled labor (**) , (3) that increases in prices would result (***), and
(4) that such increased prices would lessen demand (****) .
These conferences were only preliminary to the major meeting of
Code Authorities on March 5-7, 1934. The personnel consisted almost
exclusively of representatives of management. The meeting opened with
an appeal by President Roosevelt to the code authorities to reduce hours
in all industries:
"You and I are now conducting a great test to find out how
the business leaders, in all groups of industry, can develop
capacity to operate for the general welfare. Personally, I
am convinced that with your help the test is succeeding
"With millions still unemployed the power of our people to
purchase and xise the products of industry is still greatly
curtailed. It can be increased and sustained only by striving
for the lowest schedule of prices on which higher wages and
increasing employment can be maintained.
"Therefore, I give to industry today this challenge:
It is the immediate task of industry to re- employ more
people at purchasing wages and to do it now. Only thus
can we continue recovery and restore the balance we seek
"Ever;" examination I make, and all the information I receive
leads me to the inescapable conclusion that we must now con-
sider immediate cooperation to secure increase in wages and
shortening of hours. I am confident that your deliberations
will lead you also to this conclusion. Reduction in hours
coupled with a decrease in weekly wages will do no good at
all, for it amounts merely to a forced contribution t.o un-
employment relief by the class least able to bear it. I have
never believed that we should violently impose flat, arbitrary,
and abrupt changes on the economic structure, but we can never-
theless work together in arriving at; a common objective.
(**) (llote continued from preceding page)
Joe Kiss, Furniture Industry (30 hours);
V. H. Stevenson, International Kol&ers Union (32 hours) ;
S. Klein, Retail Trade, Employer (40 hours-5 day week);
Charles Oberkirsch, Food Workers Industrial Union.
(*) Texas Retail Dry Goods Association, I". J. Motor Truck Association and
Texas Retail Furniture Association.
(**) Chamber of Commerce, Kansas City - Mister Electro Platers Insti-
tute of the United States.
(***) (j, g, Houston, Baldwin Locomotive Works.
(****) H. L. Carpenter, N.Y.C. Committee on Subway Completion;
G-. H.. Houston.
-169-
Government cannot forever continue to absorb the wl*ole burden
of -on employment. The thing to do nor is to get more pt^i.e
to work. "
Organized labor and several labor representatives on the apparel
code authority appeared in favor of the President's program. The Pres-
ident of the American Federation of Labor concentrated on the points
stressed by the President, saying:
"The oroblem before you is' now we shall cope with the facts?
What practical steps shall be tahen to shorten hours and in-
crease purchasing power? .... We have put 3,000,000 idle men
bad: to work. Our ;oroblem is no^ to put the remaining 9,000,000
or 10,000,000 back to work, and I do not believe that the
American people, having put their hand to the plo^, fill turn
back. Tie must find the way', and we must consider the remedy,
and when we have decided '-hat the remedy really is, I think
-~e -must, like courageous men, apply it. We must make a choice
between two or three things. first, shall we find a way by
which we may put these 9,000,000 or 13,000,000 back to work,
or shall r,e resign ours '/Ives to this, it seems to me, awful
fate of deciding to maintain on our relief rolls, an army of
10,000,000 unemployed., with all their dependents? Now, ^hat
shadl we do. Shall we find them work, or keep? It is incon-
ceivable that here in America we can successfully maintain
an amy of unemployed, amounting to 10,000,000 or 12,000,000
idle workers permanently.
"ITor what shall we do as reasonable, sensible men? I am cer-
tain, absolutely certain, from my experience in industrial
anc from my study of the economic situation that the one remedy
for unem-'doyment is a further reduction in the hours of labor.
That reduction to be made in a vise, and sensible way, with an
increase in buying -oower. If there is anyone that can offer
a, better remedy for unemployment, I '-'ould like them to present
it to General Johnson. ... •■
"Then the cooes ^ere originally formed, '-ere the hours set
sufficiently lov even in the light of facts then known and
presented? In the impending revision of the codes, "ill ,you
courageously reduce hours to the general level that will re-
sult in r-ork for all?"(*)
Opposition to the increase in hours vas set forth in an initial, ad-
dress at the general conference held on the first day, in which the ob-
jection was offered that:
"It is difficult to see how a compensating rise in wages in
an industry which shortens its hours for soecia.1 reasons can
have anything more than a harmful effect on recovery on a
small scale, that the general policy irould have on a general
scale, as already described. »(**) .
(*) United States News, V'. II, #2, (March 16, 1934). Extra NBA Edition, p. 20,
(**) Statement of '...r. R. E. Flanders, Ibid., p. 11.
9862
~170~
It --as repor.ted that this speech, coming from a member nf the 1TRA. Indust-*
rial Advisory "Board, took on the air of administrative sanction, thereby
bolstering the opposition. Many industrial representatives were reuurced.
to have spent half the night after the public hearing rewriting their
speeches to include a stiff attack on labor's demands. (*)
The arguments presented by the lengthy discussions '"ere not unlike
those at the public hearing. It was maintained: (l) that industry could
not finance the decrease in hours(**); (2) that decrease in hours would
decrease purchasing power even, though weekly dollar earnings were main-
tained(***); (3) that there was a shortage of skilled labor(****); (4)
that increases in wage rates would have been covered by an increase in
prices(*****); (5) that increased prices would lessen demand (******),
(*) Business TTeek (March ?, 1934).
(**) The speakers presenting this view '"ere as follows:
A. P. Haake, furniture Code Authority;
Association of Newsprint Manufacturers of U. S. ;
The Paper Industry Authority;
P. A. Lorenz, Steel Castings Code; ■
E. S. Yates, Steam Engine Manufacturers Code Authority;
Edgar Eickard, Hewspring Code Authority;
Ellwood Kieser, Automotive Maintenance Code Committee;
John ;J. O'Leary, Lachinery and Allied Products;
P. G. Patterson, "hole sale Automotive Trade Code Authority;
George C. Keidich,. Millinery and Press Trimming, Braid and Textile
Indus try;
Janes L. Tri, Director, Toy and Playthings Industry Code Authority;
Kidie Hover Manufacturing: Co, , - Telegram;
Challenge Machinery Co. , - Telegram; ■
Peerless Novelty Co., - Telegram;
Superintendent of a Cotton Garment Plant, - -Telegram;
Periodical Publisners Institute - Brief;
Buckeye Glove Co., - Telegram;
i . B. Hamilton Mfg. Co. , - Letter
I. S. Adams, Knitted Outerwear Code Authority;
P. P. Ploadley, Gray Iron Foundry Industry.
(***)A. J. Hettinger, Research and Planning Division, P.P.A. ;
Robert W. Irwin, Robert '.'. Irwin Co., Gr-nd Rapids, Mich*;
A. P. Haake, Furniture Coce Authority;
'7. J. Peed, Diesel Engine Manufacturer's Association;
Richard Harte, General Tool and Implement Association.
(****) Col. George Brady, NRA;
R. P. Pauntleroj'', malleable Poundry Code Authority;
R. L. Putnam, Packaging Machinery Code Authority;
Sam Traylor, Kiln Coolers and Dryers Industry;
P. A. Lorenz, Steel Castings Industry;
17. J. Cronin, Automobile Mfg. Industry;
J. M. Wells, Porcelain and Chinaware Industry Code Authority;
'.Tallace Kimball, Packaging i.achinery Institute Code Authority.
(*****)'.:. J. Cronin, Automotive Mfg. Industry Code Authority;
Sidney L. Walloon Paper Industry Authority;
J. M, Wells, Porcelain and Chinaware Industry;
(Footnote cont'd, on next >age.)
9062
-171-
and (S) that foreign competition was so serious as to threaten American
Industry -ere such a plan for shorter hours promulgated^* ) «
Some posed the question of the alternative between thirty hours and
the commonly discussed ten percent reduction in hours in favor of the
latter as "only a choice of evils" (**). Tnere appeared throughout a
disposition to accept the existing reduction in hours as reasonable but
to fear further reductions. It was reiterated that -
"KRA has had a large measure of usefulness,"
but -
"The processes of recovery (from now on) are outside the NBA
procedure so far as introducing any new untried or unusual
methods of procedure. " (***)
Some, while expressing approval of shorter hours, believed that the
scarcity of skilled workers required an extension of basic hours for those
employees. One such plan suggested a 36 hour week with permission for
employment of skilled workers for 50 hours per week, (****) Another re-
commended a maximum ranging from 30 to 40 ^ith unlimited overtime depend-
ing on the hourly rate. (*****)
Toward the end of the conference another general meeting was held
at which the modus operandi was described by the Administrator. The
problem was that of absorbing into industry the existing unemployed but
not by any arbitrary manner. He indicated that in
"this emergency and until payrolls catch uo with employment
.... it is proper to encourage increased wages and reduced
hours of work..... There are many (industries) that obviously
can - and ought to - meet the suggestion to work on a 10 percent
decrease in hours per week and a ten percent increase in hourly
rates."
(*****) (Cont'd from preceding page) (also footnote 6)
P. A. Bloomer, Lumber Code Authority;
Richard Harts, President, Ames Baldwin Wyoming Company.
(******) I. S. Adams, Knitted Outerwear Code Authority;
Sam Traylor, Kiln Coolers & Dryers Industry;
A. 3. Haake, Furniture Code Authority;
Fred H. Clausen, Farm Equipment Industry;
Robert Gayloe, National Machine Tool Industry;
P. R. Fauntleroy, Malleable Foundry Code Authority;
Arthur D. O'Shea, National Retail Code Authority;
7. J. Cronin, Automobile Manufacturing Industry;
J. Ivl. "Jells, Chinaware & Porcelain Industry,
(*) S. P. Hoyle, Fishing Tackle Industry;
Edgar Packard, Newsprint Code Authority;
George G. Neidich, Lillinery and Dress Trimming, Braid & Textile Ind. ;
J. M. Wells, Porcelain and Chinaware Industry.
(**) United States News, V. II, No. 2, (March 16, 1934). Extra N.R.A.
Edition, - p. 20, Remarks by A. J. Hettinger.
9862 (Footnote cont'd, on next page)
-172-
The Administrator recognized the need for resiliency in application
of such a rule since in some industries "business is so slight that if
they did adopt the rule, it wouldn't make any difference to employment", (*)
In order to define these -procedures for unemployment two committees of
industry representatives were organized, one representing the consumers
and another the capital goods industries, In their commissions they '.-'ere
instructed to find "some other way than any yet suggested" of creating
jobs. Tbo-n&h this conciliatory challenge was made, the Administrator
df>f.lare-dj
"Lierely for an administrative reason, our proposal is (when
all the evidence is digested ond a conclusion reached) that
the final suggestions be announced as a Presidential ruling,
governing all codes, and that a definite period be stated
during which any industry, or company, -hich finds reasons
why it cannot comply, shall be given an opportunity to pre-
sent those reasons and why (as to that industry - or company
within an industry) there should be a modification, stay or
exemption. I must emphasize that this applies to all tr alve
■ points and not merely to the question of hours and wages, "(**)
Turning the problem over to the industry groups, made possible a
period of procrastination and discussion rhich converted the entire move
into an abortive effort, A program founded on the right of individual
groups of industry to withhold assent and/or the need of individual
treatment inhibited action.
The adoption of an Executive Order for the direct application of
the "10/10" plan was set aside for consideration of the reports of trie
above committees. (***) The most significant re-nort was that made "by the
Consumers Industries Committee. (**** ) With respect to the proposal to
reduce hours that committee reported a.s follows: ■ ■ . .
(i) that it disapproved of an Executive order applicable to all
industries, with such exemptions as seemed appropriate! as "an arbitrary
exercise of authority and unwise form of procedure"; (2) that the problem
of increasing employment be approached through the "voluntary cooperation
betwee:'. the code authorities and the Government after prompt analysis of
the peculiar problems in each industry to determine the necessary flexi-
bility in working out the governing -principle for each industry"; (3)
that since "more than nine-tenths of the unemployment burden is oxvtside
the consumers goods industries, ... it is obviously impossible to load the
great bull: of unemployment upon the consumers good's industry"; (4) that
(***) (Cont'd from preceding page — also 4 & o)
Ibid. , p. 22.
(****) George Brady IT P. A. . •
(*****) ~. D. Kimball, Code Authority of the. Packaging Machine Ind. & Trade.
(*) United States Hews, V. II, #2 (Larch 15, 1934). Extra NEA. Edition, p. 18.
(**) Ibid.
(***) Stew York Times, (Larch 13, 1334).
(****) Consisting of Messrs. Kirstein, 7illiais, Lor row, Smith, Francis,
Lead, Selby, duPont, Edlund, Stride, Her'zog, and 'Sloan, March 15,
1934.
9352
-173- -
each code authority be invited to submit information necessary to deter-
mine its ability to raise wages and lower hours and to make the read-
justments involved. (*)
Submission of this report raised the problem of the next move. In-
dustry was opposed to the "ten-ten" plan and proposed the individual in-
dustry approach of this general order. NRA had appealed to them to ac-
cept a "self-imposed" shorter week in place of the thirty hour week bill
which Congress was then considering. Inspired by a belief that "the
Government will not 'crack down' and industry may take their time", in-
dustry had postponed action, "..'ithin the Administration, disapproval of
this individual industry method was current as "not the most practical
method to secure reemployment and increase purchasing power", A memoi—
nadum to the Administrator noted that the selection of industries would
be open to charges of being "arbitrary and unfair". An alternative sug-
gested was that "ail industries subject to approved codes shall, within
30 days, reduce hours 10 percent, with a ten percent increase in hourly
rates, provided that modifications and exemptions from this blanket order
may be granted those industries which can demonstrate that such reduction
in hours end increase in wage rates would not accomplish the purpose of
the program. " (**)
The refusal of the consumers' goods industries to support the "10/10"
plan led the Administration to move more hesitantly. It soon yielded to
(*) Report of the Consumers' Industries Committees (March 15, 1934)
(Appendix G) In NBA Studies Special Exhibits Work Materials #45B«
(**) Memorandum from Leon Henderson to General Hugh S. Johnson, (March 14,
1934), Subject: "Revision of Hours and Wages." There is a pencilled
note from the Administrator on this letter which reads:
"This is the method which we have used from the beginning and
which to my mind is the only solution."
The plan proposed by Mr. Henderson, Director of the Division of Economic
Research and Planning was as follows:
1. Issue order requiring 10fi reduction in hours and 10$ increase in
wages, rates effective within 30 days. Provide that modifications
and exceptions may be obtained by shoeing cause before Code Revision
Board, set up as below.
2. Designate Board with one member from each Advisory Board, along
lines of NR& Policy Board. This Board will have technical staff
of industrial engineers to settle borderline cases.
3. Industry may appeal decision but must go to public hearing at which
time the entire code mill be opened for revision.
4. Publicity accompanying this order should invite acceptance from
those industries who are willing to comply at once. It should also
bo designated to stimulate response from new companies who are
willing to comply if the rest of their industry does so.
5. This Division is already at work on forms to secure information
necessary to test the claims of those industries which request
modifications and exemptions.
9862
-174-
the demand for dealing with the problem on an individual industry "basis.
As a result, a questionnaire was addressed to 189 code authorities ask-
ing information "to help detprmine promo tly whether your industry has
the ability to meet the President's request for reducing hours 11 per
cent without reduction of weekly pay. ',' (*1 Specific statistical data
were reauested.
The answers disclosed an attitude more clearly unfavorable even
than that of the Consumers' Goods Industries. The majority of the
letters in reply declared opposition to the proposal for the reduc-
tion of hours and a compensatory increase in wages. Of 44 code author-
ity replies, only one, that of the paperboard industry, favored such
action; Ten others were willing to consider the proposal under cer-
tain circumstances. One agreed to the principle if the kindred in-
dustries also adopted the provision (**). Others suggested a reduction
of an hour per month (***v; a forty-eight hour seasonal peek for a
-oeriod of peak seasonal activity; (****) a forty-eight hour seasonal
peak for a. period of eighteen weeks; (***** ^ a general enforcement drive
. (***** ^ (#*****) min-rom full protection; (*******') protection against
imports; (*******'> i opportunity to develop means for adjusting industry,
(*********■) or jLpfining the extent of changes reouired. (**********>
One proferred wage increases but no reduction in hours. (************)
The other replies opoosed reduction in hours and the increase in wages
(*) ■ Letter of H. S. Johnson, Administrator, to Code Author-
, ities, March 28, 1934 (Appendix-HV In NBA Studies .
Special Exhibits - Work Material No. 45-3
(*=0 Paper Distributing
(***) Hosiery
(♦***) Fertilizer
(***** ) precious jewelry producing
(******} Business furniture storage equipment.
(*******") Builders supply
(******** ) Chinaware and porcelain
(***#****#") SaW
(**********^ Advertising specialty
(***********) Textile machinery
9862
■175-
for one or more of the following reasons: (1^ Competitive positions;
(2) inability to absorb increased costs; (3) absence of skilled per-
sonnel; (4} impossibility of controlling hours; (b) inability to pass
on increased prices; (6) and necessity for adjusting hours to indus-
tries services. (*)
(.*) These industries were:
Asphalt and Mastic Tile Industry Code Authority
Fur Trapping Contractors' Indus try
Photo-Engraving Industry Code Authority
Electrical Storage and Wet Primary Battery Industry Code
Authority
Cast Iron Soil Pipe Association
Hair Cloth Manufacturing Industry Code Authority
Marking Device Industry Code Authority
Cotton Textile Industry Code Authority
Fishing Tackle Industry Code Committee
Nottingham Lace Curtain Industry Code Authority
Wool Textile Industry Coae Authority
Folding Box Code Authority
Paper Distributing Trade Code Authority
The National Fertilizer Association Code Authority
Commercial Refrigerator Code Authority
Gas Appliance Institute Code Authority
Ladder Manufacturing Industry Code Authority
Toy Manufacturers of the U.S.A. Inc., Code Authority
National Association cf Ice Industries
Throwing Industry Code Administration Committee
Hosiery Code Authority
Pipe Nipple Manufacturing Industry Code Authority
Excellsior Products Code Authority
Boot and Shoe Code Authority
Silk Textile Code Authority
Business Furniture, Storage Equipment and Filing
Supply Code Authority
Piano Manufacturing Industry Code Authority
Gasoline Pump Manufacturing Industry Code Authority
Rayon and Synthetic Yarn Producers Code Authority
Salt Producing Industry Code Committee
7/axed Paper Industry Code Authority
Leather and Woolen Knit Gloves Industry Code Authority
Domestic Freight Forwarding Industry Code
Lime Manufacturing Industry Code Authority
Men'.s Clothing Industry Code Authority
Manufacturers of Pianoforte Industry Code Authroity
Glass Container Code Authority
Silverware Manufacturing Code Authority
Cap and Closure Industry Code Authority
Soap and Glycerine Manufacturing Industry
Shoe Shank Manufacturing Industry Code Authority
National Saw Code Authority
Paper and Pulp
Source: National Recovery Administration, Division of Research and
Planning, Preliminary Study of the Ability of Industries to
9862 Reduce Hours by G.B.Galloway, April 17, 1934.
-176-
These replies were not particularly suggestive as to a prober
course of action for the shorter week program. On the heel of these
re-olies came the report of the Durable Goods Industries Committee. (*)
It' commented on each of the 12 suggestions made by the Administrator.
With respect to hours they recommended that "no attempt should be msde
to oiTcct blanket, increases in wages or reduction in code hours by
Ex<=>nn>.j v-c order." As a unit they believed that "farther increases in
costs and resultant increased selling pr'.ces would tend to reduce the
volume of sales and employment", inasmuch as the financial conditions
of the firms would not permit absorption of any additional costs but
would necessitate passing them on to the buyer. They claimed that there
was a riuHded shortage of skilled labor. They stated further that the
number of employees added and wage increases had substantially exceeded
sales trends. (**)
Within the Administration definite programs were being considered
in the event action was determined uocn. One proposal contained the
following suggestions:
"I. Cut hours of industries showing marked increases
in profits or reduced losses or net income plus
depreciation and interest.
II. Eliminate or reduce exemptions and exceptions to
maximum hours provisions in codes.
III. Cut hours in adolescent industries and those in their
prime.
IV. Cut hours in return for other reasonable concessions
sought by industry.
V. Cut hours of those industries whose actual reemploy-
ment under their codes has fallen short of the reemploy-
ment they estimated at the time of code approval or
lagged behind output.
VI. Cut hours of those industries whose reemployment
record since 1929 has fallen short of the average
reemployment performance of their group.
VII. Adopt measures to stimulate the capital goods industries
which account for the bulk of current unemployment.
(*"> Consisting of Messrs. C-.K. Houston, J. 7. Hook, L.K. Brown, F.H.
Hoadley, C.R. Hook, R.W. Irwin, H.S. Kimball, '«'. J.Kohler, F.A.
Lorenz, C.R. Messinger, C.C. Sheppard, H.G.Smith, G.P. Torrence,
J.S. Tuttle, S.T. Voorhees.
(**) Letter of the Durable Goods Industries Committee of April 26,
1934 to General H.S. Johnson, Administrator, (Appendix-l") .
In 1TRA Studies Special Exhibits - Work Material IJO; 45-3
9862
-177- "'
VIII* Cut hours of those industries whose payrolls have not
increased in proportion to production.
IX. Cut hours and raise wages in industries whose rate
of return on net worth exceeded 6 per cent in 1933.
X. Cut hours of industries in the light of inter-indus try-
competition so as to preserve or readjust pre-existing
competitive relationships.
XI. Eliminate averaging-of-hours feature in codes for con-
sumer goods industries.
XII. Eliminate weekly limit on maximum hours and provide a
penalty rate for overtime above normal weekly hours.
XIII. Ask each consumer goods industry to submit data essen-
tial to form a basis for an intelligent judgment in the
matter." (*)
Another recommendation was to list the industries believed cap-
able of reducing hours. (**)
(*) Galloway Report op. cit.
(**) The industries suggested by Unit Chiefs of the Division of Re-
search and Planning as able to reduce their hours are as follows:
Food:
Beet Sugar
Southern Rice Milling
Macaroni
Coffee
Mayonnaise
Brewing
Distilled Spirits
Rectifiers
Wine
Alcoholic Beverage - Importing and Wholesale
Textiles and Their Products:
Wool
Silk
Rayon
Most of Minor Textiles
Textile Dyeing and Finishing (3 Codes^
Surgical Dressings
Apparel Industries (Except Cotton Garments')
Knit Goods - Hosiery
Underwear
Outerwear
Footnote Continued Next r?age (**^
9862
Footnote (**^ cont'd.
Building Materials:
Lumber and Timber Products
Glass - Flat
Asphalt Shingle and Roofing
Paper and Allied Products:
Paper and Pulp
Folding Paper Boxes
Paper Bags
Sanitary Napkins and Cleansing Tissue
Cellophane
Shipping Containers, Corrugated end. Solid
Paperboard
Chemicals and Allied Products :
Chemical Manufacturing
Fertilizer
Furniture, and Flcor Wax and Folish
Paint, Varnish, and Lacquer Manufacturing
Printing Ink Manufacturing
Soap and Glycerine
Minerals:
Iron and Steel
Aluminum
Leather and Its Manufactures:
Leather
Boots and Shoes
Luggage and Fancy Leather Goods
Saddlery Manufacturing
Electrical Manufacturing:
Master Code
Supplemental Codes
Transportation Equipment:
Automobile Parts - Master Code
Supplemental Codes
Amusements:
Burlesque
Carnival
Circus
Fairs and Ex-positions
Legitimate Theatre
Footnote Continued Next page
9862
-179-
However, no action was taken. The movement began as a determin-
ed effort at the general reduction of hours to thirty-two was side-
tracked. The public meetings had been centered about the "10-1011 plan.
Industry's resistance had been stiff. But a few individual indus-
tries had responded to the program suggested. (*"* The Administration
had been led to accept the principle of a "self- imposed" reduction
by all industries. When this had failed, it had turned to the principle
of individual industry handling. This plan had brought no greater
results. Industries had refused to act individually. One industry
could not be disassociated from all others. Stunned by this resistance,
impeded by the belief th-\t action must be voluntary, and recognizing
that legal instrumentalities were inadequate, the agents of the NRA
allowed the entire project to rest without action.
III. LABOR ADVISORY BOARD
The Labor Advisory Board carried on the effort to reduce hours.
While there was still hope for administrative action, the Board re-
quested the Administrator to take steps to secure further reduction of
hours on the contemplated "lO-l'l" basis. (**) Since no action had been
taken nor reply received, the Board, two weeks after its first move,
urged the Administrator to issue an order reducing hours in all indus-
tries simultaneously and decided to make a public issue of the matter.
(***.; To this end a brief wps drawn uo and submitted by the Board to
the Administrator on May 17,1934. It strongly urged immediate 10^
reduction in hours and I0<f0 increase in wage rates, accompanying its
statement with an analysis of profits to show the industry's ability to
Footnote cont'd (**N
Motion Picture
Motion Picture Laboratory
Kon- Theatrical Film
Outdoor Amusement Parks, Pools, and Beaches
Radio Broadcasting
Miscellaneous;
Oil Burners
G-lass Containers
Ice
Toys and Playthings
Scientific Apparatus
Source: Ibid
(*) Refractories, pasted shoe stock, wholesale confectioners, and
canning.
(*<0 Minutes of the Labor Advisory Board Meeting, April 12, 1934.
(***) Ibid, April 26, 1934.
9862
-180-
adjust to the program. It stated:
"The reduction in hours will have the following results:
first, in anticipation of increasing labor costs, pi ices
will tend to rise, thus stimulating spending, as pn. /ed
in the first experiment; secon ly, we estimate that it
will reabsorb about a million and a half workers on the
same level of production; thirl, the absorption of these
workers should still further stimulate demand, production
and employment."
It pointed out further that the original hours' provisions in
codes were experimental and moderate; that it was time to take the
second step; that during the first NBA period due to the national Rec-
overy Administration, production had increased slightly while employ-
ment and payrolls had increased considerably more, reversing the ex-
perience, of former recovering periods; and thrt with all manufactur-
ing industries working an average of only 34.1 hours, a 36-hour week
would not be difficult to initiate, in view od rapidly increasing
profits.
In conclusion, the brief stated:
"When the President called the meeting of the Code Author-
ities, he expressed his intention of proceeding further
along this line . . .As these meetings proceeded, elements not
•favorable to the program became more articulate and raised
the traditional objection of not being able to do it
We believe that the Administration made a serious mistake
in failing to pursue its intended course. Weeks have
passed and the psychological moment may well have been
missed. We feel it necessary to say thrt the failure to
proceed has not been due to the unearthing of any new
facts, but rather to the ability of unsympathetic interests
to capture the play and to weaken the purpose of the Admin-
istration. .. .We urge the immediate pursuit of the "10-10"
program". (*)
No response was obtained to this appeal for action. One last
effort was made to secure action by presenting the matter to the Labor
Policy Board. Here again, however, discussion of the issue aroused
no response on the part of the Administrator and his immediate subor-
dinates. The first real effort at the wholesale reduction of hours
died aborning.
IV. JANUARY 1935 HEARINGS. .
A less promising move was again made in January, 1935 when the
(*) Petition and Brief of Labor Advisory Board for Reduction in
Hours without decrease in Earnings on the »lO_inn principle.
(6318) p. 6 (Apoendix-j) In FRA Studies Special Exhibits -
Work Material No. 45-B
9862
-181-
National Industrial Recovery Board called a series of open policy hear-
ings to collect evidence "on the operation of major code provisions and
the advisability of amendment or continuation". The subject of the
first hearing was price control and price fixing, announced December
17, 1934, and called for January 9, 1935. (*) On January 17, 1935,
a second policy hearing was announced, on the subject of "employment
provisions in codes". Fourth on the list of major problems suggested
in the announcement for discussion at the conference was:
"That the maximum hours provisions of the codes have
made a definite contribution to reemployment and that
the principle of limitation of hours should be upheld.
The maximum hours limits actually set in the various
codes may or may not be the test or optimum limits.
However, any suggestion for change either in the direc-
tion of shortening or of lengthening the work week should
be supcorted by evidence." (**}
The Labor Advisory Board had hoped that this hearing would lead
to action; but as the conference went on it became evident that the
hearings were purely fact-finding and that further reduction in hours
was not imminent. The sole labor member of the National Industrial
Recovery Board (***) at that time bore down day after day upon this
aspect of policy; but his efforts in that body were practically single-
handed. Other members of the Labor Advisory Board sooke to the same
purpose. The President of the United Mine YiTorkers, made a moving appeal
for swift, effective action by the National Recovery Administration to
open work to these and the other unemployed millions. He said in part:
"Code maximum hours on the whole merely confirmed
the normal working week in manufacturing industry.
They placed no pressure upon employers to increase
employment when production increased to normal.
They exerted an effect only when production increased
to capacity or to seasonal peaks. Maximum hours must
be put into the codes providing for emergency needs,
not the normal work week, in which 1929 production
can be maintained in the 1934 work week.
Second, shortening hours of work per week in order
to put people back to work is the method contemplated
by Congress and supported by the President in his
speech to the Code Authorities last March. The advantage
of the codes over legislation is that attention may be
given to the requirements of individual industries. But
instead of cooperating, almost to a man, industry is
(*") NRA Release, December 17, 1934. No. 9292.
(**) Notice of Public Hearing on Policy of the National Industrial
Recovery Board Relating to Employment Provisions. (January
17, 1935.)
( + **:>• Mr_ Sidney Hillman.
9862
-132-
resisting any attempt to croen up the codes to consider
the basic hours provisions. This can only mean that the
National Recovery Admmi Titration will no longer be a
factor in the Recovery Program's further attempts at
reemployment.
Emergency situations call for emergency action. The
average hours per week in all manufacturing industries
in October, 1934, stood at 34.5. Emergency action-
means something like reducing maximum weekly hours in
the codes to those average weekly hours... I speak,
Mr. Chairman, with heat on this subject; .... I must
ask you this direct question; how much longer are
you going to continue with this do-nothing policy
on this question, of providing employment for every
American who wants to work?
...Has any manager or leader of industry arisen
in this country and advanced any suostitute for
the formula of organized labor, which clIIs for
a shortening of hours?
If there are forty or forty-five million individuals
gainfully employed "in the United States, if there
are only about eight or nine billion working days
throughout the year available for distribution to
these forty-five million people, then obviously
from every human and economic standpoint there is ■
only one answer in order to orocide them with emalov-
ment, and that is to permit them to share such
employment ■ s may exist." (*">
Despite the argument and discussion, no substantial results fol
lowed the -oublic hearings. No new formulation of labor oolicy was
issued. No general reduction of hours in industry was undertaken.
V. INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRY REDUCTIONS IN HOURS.
A. Bituminous Coal Industry.
Action taken to reduce hours resulted from the efforts of organ-
ized labor in individual industries. In the discussion of the bitu-
minous coal negotiations the compromise had provided for a re-view od
the hours provisions of the codes beginning with January 5, 1£34. The
forthcoming NRA reoort on the practicability and cost of a shorter work
day and week w; s not ready on December 31, 1933, and the conferences
were consequently postponed. When finally published, that report proved
to be merely an arithmetical computation based on the theory that a lSg
(*") Statement of John L. Lewis, at the Hearings on Employment
Provisions of Codus, NRA (January 30, 1935). 1672, pp. 1-5.
9862
- 183 -
for cert reduction in hours would cause a 12| per cent reduction in
total coal tonnage. Conferences "between operators and miners began
about Karen 1, 1934. About 75 per cent of the total tonnage of the
United States was represented. While these conferences were under way,
the Presidential appeal for s reduction in hours was made. As a result
an agreement was reached by the mine workers and operators to revise
the bituminous coal code, putting into effect a 7 hour day and 35 hour
week, with an increase in wage rates proportional to the reduction
in hours. (*) The revised Appalachian Agreement Agreement was signed
on March 20, 1934.
The conference between representatives of employers and employees
and ilHA. originally scheduled for January 5th was held on March 26th.
After a four day session, it was decided to hold a public hearing on
the proposed amendment to the code as contained in the Appalachian
Agreement. 'The amendment was approved on March 31, 1934 subject to
modification. (**) At the public hearing the proposed reduction in
hours was generally approved but there was considerable dissatisfaction
with the wage provisions for the southern districts. A subsequent
modification of the amendment brought about an adjustment of these
rates. (***) The most significant reduction in hours effected under
the ERA was achieved through the process of collective bargaining and
had the approval of all elements in the industry.
3. Cotton Garment Industry.
The second outstanding example is that of the cotton garment in-
dustry. Tne code, as originally approved, called for an investigation
into the effects on employment of the 40-hour provision,, "so that
the Administrator may determine whether or not the provisions of this
article shall be ohanged" . (****) A hearing was held on June 18, 1934,
to consider this report and amendments to the Dress, Men's Clothing,
and Cotton Garment Industries Codes. The Administrator announced that
the above hearings showed that "no material reemployment" had taken
place in this industry subsequent to the effective date of the code.
"The forty-hour work week of the Cotton Garment Industry Code has re-
sulted in unfair competition between members of the apparel industry
under it and members under other apparel codes which have provisions
for thirty-five and thirty-six hour work weeks." In order to effectu-
ate the purposes of the Act, "to bring about more reemployment and
correct the unfair competition existing because of the forty-hour work
week of the Cotton Garment Code", the Administrator recommended
"a reduction to thirty— six hours, and at the same time a
(*) Transcript of Public Hearings of April 9, 1934, p. 82
(**) National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition,
Vol. IX, p. 665..
(***) Ibid, Vol. X, p. 431
(****) National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition,
Vol. Ill, p. 92.
9362
-184-
proportionate increase in the pay of employees so as to maintain the
same weekly wage rates as is provided in the code as approved on Nov-
ember 17, 1933". (*). The amendments resulted largely from the activ-
ities of the labor organizations and the interested .code authorities
of industries overlapping the cotton garment industry. The industry,
at first reluctant, finally accepted the terms of the amendment after
court proceedings by a minoritjr group had failed and an investigation
by an NBA Board had. reaffirmed the original Administrative findings.
The amendment went into effect on December 1, 1934.
C. Millinery Industry.
The third industry in which changes in basic hours were made was
the millinery industry. The original code had provided that "the pro-
visions of this code shall be in force and effect only until May 15,
1954. Prior to that date-, the code authority shall make recommenda-
tions to the Administrator in regard to the "continuance or amendment
of any or all provisions of this code". As already indicated, the
thirty-seven and one-half hours per week was adopted because of the
feeling that it was "better to all (such a work week) at the present
time and in the future to reduce the hours still further should con-
ditions so reouire and so permit". (**^
While the code authority was formulating its amendment, organ-
ized labor threatened to strike for a 35-hour week. In New York City,
they actually were on strike for a day. XPi the final amendment
drafted by the code authority, a 35-hour week was proposed.
At the public hearing held to consider this proposed amendment on
June 4 and 5, serious objections were "raised a.s to the proposed labor
provisions", particularly, the wage, but also the hours provisions, by
some of the important markets and areas. At the request of the in-
terested parties, including l^bor, the special Millinery Board, created
by an Executive Order of December 15, 1953, was charges "with the
duty and responsibility of making recommendations as to the labor pro-
visions to be included in the proposed code. All interested parties
agreed unaniraously to abide by the recomnendations of the Board". (***)
The Board conducted a public hearing and special incuiries. On July
6, 1934, it reported to the Administrator the recommendations: That
the 35-hour week should become a part of this code. The facts at hand
(**> Amendment 7, National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair
Competition, Vol. XV, p. 387.
(**N National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition,
Vol. IV, p. 4.
(***) Report to the president on Amend^nt No. 2, National
Recovery Administration Codt;s of Fair Competition', Vol.
XIX, p. 113.
9862
-,185-
showed that inadequate sud spotty reemployment, in genoral smaller
than anticipated. This -as because ."we have taken into considera-
tion the fear of employers in markets away from, metropolitan areas
that they will not be able to secv.ro help at the height of the
season". lut the Board had no misgivings on that score and stated;
"we are satisfied that the "provisions which we recommend in the code
for an apprentice system, for overtime and other provisions will
build vn adequate, skilled working forces and that the introduction
will cause no hardship to the industry1! • (*) These findin.s were upheld
^ay the Board after various objections from the industiT' and. labor groups
had been -resented. The recommendations were finally incorporated in
Amendment ITo. ,"': to the Milliner;/ Code.
Other efforts were made to redr.ee hours, principally in the textile
and apparel i:idus tries; but noiie yore effected before the invalidation
of 1THA. In each case, it vas organized labor, the labor Advisory 'Joard
and code a-o.tkorities of industries which experienced overlapping with
less favorable labor provisions vhich were active ir the effort to re-
duce wbrki:i_ hours. The movement came nearest to successful conclusion
where labor was strongly or significantly organised.
(*) Ibid, p. li:
-18&r
VI. CONCLUSION
NHA recognized that the hours provisions in the codes -w^re
hastily furmulated. Wholesale revision was contemplated at various
times. It was expected that the codes would be rewritten to make their
meaning more specific and exact and to improve their enforcement and
effectiveness in promoting reemployment. The original codes were
developed under pressure of the desire for rapid codification. Industry
was at the time financially exhausted and, in many instances, unable
to meet actual or feared increases in costs. The Administration
yielded quickly to the industry's demands. The first standards were
given up. The forty, hour week became the prevailing norm for basic
hours.
The Administration and organized labor approved of the extensive
code coverage and the application of limitations on working hours.
Both, however, felt that as soon as recovery was discernible, further
steps must be taken to assure reemployment of a. greater number of
persons. Action was conceived largely in terms of reduction in the
basic hours of employment, following organized labor's attempt to
secure a uniform thirty hour week by legislation with provision for
exemptions in necessary cases. The Administrator disapproved of the
six hour day and recommended instead an eight hour day. The thirty-two
hour week therefore became the goal. Voluntary action by industry was
sought.
Conferences were called in February and March 1934. At these,
the President appealed for a reduction of hours. Evidence was amassed
in favor of such action. Industry, supported by the position of the
NHA Industrial Advisory Board, resisted this move. Committees of
consumer end durable goods industries were appointed to obtain indus-
trial cooperation, but they became the means of stiffening resistance
in hours. The consumer industries' group suggested individual industry
action instead of wholesale reduction. The Administration tried to
follow this course and prepared elaborate studies for applying formulae
to test the propriety of reducing hours in individual industries. Here
again reductions had to be wholesale rather than by codes since indus-
tries were overlapping and intercompetitive and since consequently
unfair relationships would result from different patterns, adopted for
closely interrelated industries. Many of the problems in the apparel
industries arose from these conflicts. Greater pressure for uniformity
of hours existed than was previously suspected. Though large differ-
ences were written into the seasonal and peak period tolerances, the
basic hours were uniform.
As the difficluties of reducing hours grew, enthusiasm for the
"10-10" plan (ten percent reduction in hours and ten percent increase
in hourly rates) declined. By the end of June 1934, the entire move was
relegated to the background. The Labor Advisory Board tried to revive
interest in the program of shorter hours, but could not capture the
attention of the Administration. By this time, a Board had replaced
the single Administrator. The January 1935 public hearings proved to be
only a sounding board for the demand for snorter hours. Industry was
9852
-187-
strongly adverse to the move.
The result of this growing coolness to the entire plan to reduce
hours was that further reduction was restricted to industries in
which organized labor was strong. Such was true in the "bituminous
coal, cotton garment and millinery industries. A concerted drive
for reduction was made in a number of apparel industries which
overlapped with the three basic codes but the reductions were not
consumated. Conflict of provisions in overlapping codes provided
opportunity for reopening codes to consider reduction in hours.
However, the individual industry method encountered difficulties
irrespective of the merits of the case, i-tost codes overlapped
with directly contiguous and more remote industrial groups. Action
on a single industry was complicated.
The results were reflected in the employment figures. Factory
employment in 1934 and the first four months of 1935 varied only
slightly. While the employment index considering the average 1923-
1935 as 100, was 58.8 in March 1935, the employment index rose to
66.9 in June, and 80.0 in September 1933; the average for the last
five months in 1933 was 77.3. Daring the year 1934 the range of
employment index numbers was between 73.3 to 82.5, with an average
of 78.8; while during the first five montns of 1935, the range of
employment index numbers was 78.8 to 82.6 and the average was 81.3.
Employment did not increase proportionally with the volume of ?r junc-
tion. The initial momentum to reemployment was spent in liberal tol-
erances for seasonal and peak periods which frequently nullified the
basic hour regulations.
The KRA showed possibilities of uniform reduction of basic
hours. It illustrated the dangers to an accepted standard of too
liberal tolerances and exemptions. It showed industrial resiliency
and resourcefulness to meet problems presented by the reduction of
hours.
9862#
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION
THE DIVISION OF REVIEW
THE WORK OF THE DIVISION OF REVIEW
Executive Order No. 7075, dated June 15, 1935, established the Division of Review of the
National Recovery Administration. The pertinent part of the Executive Order reads thus:
The Division of Review shall assemble, analyze, and report upon the statistical
information and records of experience of the operations of the various trades and
industries heretofore subject to codes of fair competition, shall study the ef-
fects of such codes upon trade, industrial and labor conditions in general, and
other related matters, shall make av ailable for the protection and promotion of
the public interest an adequate review of the effects of the Administration of
Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the principles and policies
put into effect thereunder, and shall otherwise aid the President in carrying out
his functions under the said Title. I hereby appoint Leon C. Marshall, Director of
the Division of Revie w.
The study sections set up in t he Division of Review covered these areas: industry
studies, foreign trade studies, labor studies, trade practice studies, statistical studies,
legal studies, administration studies, m isce llaneous studies, and the writing of code his-
tories. The materials which were produc ed by these sections are indicated below.
Except for the Code Histories, all items mentioned below are scheduled to be in mimeo-
graphed form by April 1, 1936 .
THE CODE HISTORIES
The Code Histories are documented accounts of the formation and administration of the
codes. They contain the definition of the industry and the principal products thereof; the
classes of members in the industry; the history of code formation including an account of the
sponsoring organizations, the conferences, negotiations and hearings which were held, and
the activities in connection with obtaining approval of the code; the history of the ad-
ministration of the code, covering the organization and operation of the code authority,
the difficulties encountered in administration, the extent of compliance or non-compliance,
and the general success or lack of success of the code; and an analysis of the operation of
code provisions dealing with wages, hours, trade practices, and other provisions. These
and other matters are canvassed not only in terms of the materials to be found in the files,
but also in terms of the experiences of the deputies and others concerned with code formation
and administration.
The Code Histories, (including histories of certain NRA units or agencies) are not
mimeographed. They are to be turned over to the Department of Commerce in typewritten form.
All told, approximately eight hundred and fifty (850) histories will be completed. This
number includes all of the approved codes and some of the unapproved codes. (In Work Mate-
Iial§ No^. 1§, Contents of Code Histories . will be found the outline which governed the
preparation of Code Histories.)
(In the case of all approved codes and also in the case of some codes not carried to
final approval, there are in NRA files further materials on industries. Particularly worthy
of mention are the Volumes I, II and III which constitute the material officially submitted
to the President in support of the recommendation for approval of each code. These volumes
9768— 1.
-ii -
set forth the origination of the codes, the sponsoring group, the evidence advanced to sup-
port the proposal, the report of the Division of Research and Planning on the industry, the
recommendations of the various Advisory Boards, certain types of official correspondonce ,
. the transcript of the formal hearing, and other pertinent matter. There is also much offi-
cial information relating to amendments, interpretations, exemptions, and other rulings. The
materials mentioned in this paragraph were of course not a part of the work of the Division
of Review, )
THE WORK MATERIALS SERIES
In the work of the Division of Review a considerable number of studies and compilations
of uata (other than those noted below in the Evidence Studies Series and the Statistical
Material Series) have been made. These are listed below, grouped according to the char-
acter of the material. (In Work Materials No. 17, Tentative Outlines and Summaries of
Studies in Process, the materials are fully described) .
Industry Studies
Automobile Industry, An Economic Survey of
Eituminous Coal Industry under Free Competition and Code Regulation, Ecnomic Survey of
Electrical Manufacturing Industry, The
Fertilizer Industry, The
Fishery Industry and the Fishery Codes
Fishermen and Fishing Craft, Earnings of
Foreign Trade under the National Industrial Recovery Act
Part A - Competitive Position of the United States in International Trade 1927-29 through
1934.
Part B - Section 3 (e) of NIRA and its administration.
Part C - Imports and Importing under NRA Codes.
Part D - Exports and Exporting under NRA Codes.
Forest Products Industries, Foreign Trade Study of the
Iron and Steel Industry, The
Knitting Industries, The
Leather and Shoe Industries, The
Lumber and Timber Products Industry, Economic Problems of the
Men's Clothing Industry, The
Millinery Industry, The
Motion Picture Industry, The
Migration of Industry, The: The Shift of Twenty-Five Needle Trades From New York State,
1926 to 1934
National Labor Income by Months, 1929-35
Paper Industry, The
Production, Prices, Employment and Payrolls in Industry, Agriculture and Railway Trans-
portation, January 1923, to date
Retail Trades Study, The
Rubber Industry Study, The
Textile Industry in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan
Textile Yarns and Fabrics
Tobacco Industry, The
Wholesale Trades Study, The
Women's Neckwear and Scarf Industry, Financial and Labor Data on
9768—2
Women's Apparel Industry, Some Aspects of the
Trade Practice Studies
Commodities, Information Concerning: A Study of NRA and Related Experiences in Control
Distribution, Manufacturers' Control of: Trade Practice Provisions in Selected NRA Codes
Distributive Relations in the Asbestos Industry
Design Piracy: The Problem and Its Treatment Under NRA Codes
Electrical Mfg. Industry: Price Filing Study
Fertilizer Industry: Price Filing Study
Geographical Price Relations Under Codes of Fair Competition, Control of
Minimum Price Regulation Under Codes of Fair Competition
Multiple Basing Point System in the Lime Industry: Operation of the
Price Control in the Coffee Industry
Price Filing Under NRA Codes
Production Control in the Ice Industry
Production Control, Case Studies in
Resale Price Maintenance Legislation in the United States
Retail Price Cutting, Restriction of, with special Emphasis on The Drug Industry.
Trade Practice Rules of The Federal Trade Commission (1914-1936): A classification for
comparision with Trade Practice Provisions of NRA Codes.
Labor Studies
Cap and Cloth Hat Industry, Commission Report on Wage Differentials in
Earnings in Selected Manufacturing Industries, by States, 1933-35
Employment, Payrolls, Hours, and Wages in 115 Selected Code Industries 1933-35
Fur Manufacturing, Commission Report on Wages and Hours in
Hours a nd Wages in American Industry
Labor Program Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, The
Part A. Introduction
Part B. Control of Hours and Reemployment
Part C . Control of Wages
Part D. Control of Other Conditions of Employment
Part E. Section 7(a) of the Recovery Act
Materials in the Field of Industrial Relations
PRA Census of Employment, June, October, 1933
Puerto Rico Needlework, Homeworkers Survey
Administrative Studies
Administrative and Legal Aspects of Stays, Exemptions and Exceptions, Code Amendments, Con-
ditional Orders of Approval
Administrative Interpretations of NRA Codes
Administrative Law and Procedure under the NIRA
Agreements Under Sections 4(a) and 7(b) of the NIRA
Approved Codes in Industry Groups, Classification of
Basic Code, the — (Administrative Order X-61)
Code Authorities and Their part in the Administration of the NIRA
Part A. Introduction
Part B. Nature, Composition and Organization of Code Authorities
9768—3.
- iv -
Part C. Activities of the Code Authorities
Part D. Code Authority Finances
Part E. Summary and Evaluation
Code Compliance Activities of the NRA
Code Making Program of the NRA in the Territories, The
Code Provisions and Related Subjects, Policy Statements Concerning
Content of NIRA Administrative Legislation
Part A. Executive and Administrative Orders
Part B. Labor Provisions in the Codes
Part C. Trade Practice Provisions in the Codes
Part D. Administrative Provisions in the Codes
Part E. Agreements under Sections 4(a) and 7(b)
Part F. A Type Case: The Cotton Textile Code
Labels Under NRA, A Study of
Model Code and Model Provisions for Codes, Development of
National Recovery Administration, The: A Review of its Organization and Activities
NRA Insignia
President's Reemployment Agreement, The
President's Reemployment Agreement, Substitutions in Connection with the
Prison Labor Problem under NRA and the Prison Compact, The
Problems of Administration in the Overlapping of Code Definitions of Industries and Trades.
Multiple Code Coverage, Classifying Individual Members of Industries and Trades
Relationship of NRA to Government Contracts and Contracts Involving the Use of Government
Funds
Relationship of NRA with States and Municipalities
Sheltsred Workshops Under NRA
Uncodified Industries: A Study of Factors Limiting the Code Making Program
Legal Studies
Anti-Trust Laws and Unfair Competition
Collective Bargaining Agreements, the Right of Individual Employees to Enforce
Commerce Clause, Federal Regulation of the Employer-Employee Relationship Under the
Delegation of Power, Certain Phases of the Principle of, with Reference to Federal Industrial
Regulatory Legislation
Enforcement, Extra-Judicial Methods of
Federal Regulation through the Joint Employment of the Power of Taxation and the Spending
Powe r
Government Contract Provisions as a Means of Establishing Proper Economic Standards, Legal
Memorandum on Possibility of
Industrial Relations in Australia, Regulation of
Intrastate Activities Which so Affect Interstate Commerce as to Bring them Under the Com-
merce Clause, Cases on
Legislative Possibilities of the State Constitutions
Post Office and Post Road Power — Can it be Used as a Means of Federal Industrial Regula-
tion?
State Recovery Legislation in Aid of Federal Recovery Legislation History and Analysis
Tariff Rates to Secure Proper Standards of Wages and Hours, the Possibility of Variation in
Trade Practices and the Anti-Trust Laws
Treaty Making Power of the United States
War Power, Can it be Used as a Means of Federal Regulation of Child Labor?
9768—4.
THE EVIDENCE STUDIES SERIES
The Evidence Studies were originally undertaken to gather material for pending court
cases. After the Schechter decision the project was continued in order to assemble data for
use in connection with the studies of the Division of Review. The data are particularly
concerned with the nature, size and operations of the industry; and with the relation of the
industry to interstate commerce. The industries covered by the Evidence Studies account for
more than one-half of the total number of workers under codes. The list of those studies
follows:
Automobile Manufacturing Industry
Automotive Parts and Equipment Industry
Baking Industry
Boot and Shoe Manufacturing Industry
Bottled Soft Drink Industry
Builders' Supplies Industry
Canning Industry
Chemical Manufacturing Industry
Cigar Manufacturing Industry
Coat and Suit Industry
Construction Industry
Cotton Garment Industry
Dress Manufacturing Industry
Electrical Contracting Industry
Electrical Manufacturing Industry
Fabricated Metal Products Mfg. and Metal Fin-
ishing and Metal Coating Industry
Fishery Industry
Furniture Manufacturing Industry
General Contractors Industry
Graphic Arts Industry
Gray Iron Foundry Industry
Hosiery Industry
Infant's and Children's Wear Industry
Iron and Steel Industry
Leather Industry
Lumber and Timber Products Industry
Mason Contractors Industry
Men's Clothing Industry
Motion Picture Industry
Motor Vehicle Retailing Trade
Needlework Industry of Puerto Rico
Painting and Paperhanging Industry
Photo Engraving Industry
Plumbing Contracting Industry
Retail Lumber Industry .
Retail Trade Industry
Retail Tire and Battery Trade Industry
Rubber Manufacturing Industry
Rubber Tire Manufacturing Industry
Shipbuilding Industry
Silk Textile Industry
Structural Clay Products Industry
Throwing Industry
Trucking Industry
Waste Materials Industry
Wholesale and Retail Food Industry
Wholesale Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Indus-
try
Wool Textile Industry
THE STATISTICAL MATERIALS SERIES
This series is supplementary to the Evidence Studies Series. The reports include data
on establishments, firms, employment, payrolls, wages, hours, production capacities, ship-
ments, sales, consumption, stocks, prices, material costs, failures, exports and imports.
They also include notes on the principal qualifications that should be observed in using the
data, the technical methods employed, and the applicability of the material to the study of
the industries concerned. The following numbers appear in the series:
9768—5.
— VI -
Asphalt Shingle and Roofing Industry Fertilizer Industry
Business Furniture Funeral Supply Industry
Candy Manufacturing Industry Glass Container Industry
Carpet and Rug Industry Ice Manufacturing Industry
Cement Industry Knitted Outerwear Industry
Cleaning and Dyeing Trade Paint, Varnish, ana Lacquer, Mfg. Industry
Coffee Industry Plumbing Fixtures Industry
Copper and Brass Mill Products Industry Rayon and Synthetic Yarn Producing Industry
Cotton Textile Industry Salt Producing Industry
Electrical Manufacturing Industry
THE COVERAGE
The original, and approved, plan of the Division of Review contemplated resources suf-
ficient (a) to prepare some 1200 histories of codes and NRA units or agencies, (b) to con-
solidate and index the NRA files containing some 40,000,000 pieces, (c) to engage in ex-
tensive field work, (d) to secure much aid from established statistical agencies of govern-
ment, (e) to assemble a considerable number of experts in various fields, (f) to conduct
approximately 25% more studies than are listed above, and (g) to prepare a comprehensive
summary report.
Because of reductions made in personnel and in use of outside experts, limitation of
access to field work and research agencies, and lack of jurisdiction over files, the pro-
jected plan was necessarily curtailed. The most serious curtailments were the omission of
the comprehensive summary report; the dropping of certain studies and the reduction in the
coverage of other studies; and the abandonment of the consolidation and indexing of the
files. Fortunately, there is reason to hope that the files may yet be carec" for under other
auspices.
Notwithstanding these limitations, if the files are ultimately consolidated and in-
dexed the exploration of the NRA materials will have been sufficient to make them accessible
and highly useful. They constitute the largest and richest single body of information
concerning the problems and operations of industry ever assembled in any nation.
L. C. Marshall,
Director, Division of Review.
9768—6.
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