Skip to main content

Full text of "Work materials ..."

See other formats



3 9999 06317 371 8 




Solomon Barkin 

(A Section of Part B: Control of Hours and Reemployment) 


Work Materials No. 45 falls into the following parts 

Part A 
Part B 
Part C 
Part D 
Part E 


Control of Hours and Reemployment 

Control of Wages 

Control of Other Conditions of Employment 

Section 7(a) of the Recovery Act 

MARCH, 1936 



Solomon Bark in ' 


MARCH, .1936 


NOV 301950 


This study of "1QA Policies, Standards and. Code Provisions on Basic 
Weekly Hours of Work" was prepared by Mr. Solomon Barkin of tie Labor 
Studies Section. It is one of three contemplated studies on NRA handling 
of hours, the others being one on Seasonal and Peak Tolerance and one on 
Occupational Exemptions from .lour Provisions. The latter two could not 
be completed because of reductions made in personnel. 

This study describes the development of policies and code provisions 
with respect to the basic hours of work for employees. Special attention 
is given to the negotiations in connection with the formation of codes and 
to the effect of these negotiations upon code provisions. 

The subject of this study is of course controversial. The author 
was a member of the staff of the Labor Advisory Board throughout the period 
covered by NBA. Other participants in the NRA experience might have pre- 
sented a different account. It is assumed, however, that on such a pro- 
blem the personal interpretation of an active participant in policy forma- 
tion is of distinct value. The author would be the first to point out that 
the opinions and conclusions reached are his own and not official utterances. 

Part B of Work Materials No. 35 deals with, the content of the code pro- 
visions in the codes. The data supplement this present report. 

At the back of this report will be found a brief statement of the studies 
undertaken by the Division of Review. 

L.. C. Marshall, 
Director, Division of Review 

March 26, 1936 








I. Purpose of the Bill in Relation to Regulation 

of Hours 12 

II. Administrative Provisions 13 

III. The Thirty Hour Week Provision in the Public 

Works Title 16 



I. Formulation of Policy 18 

II. Statement of Standards 18 

III. Administrative procedure 19 

IV. Conclusion 19 



I. The Thirty- Two Hour Week Proposal 20 

II. The Cotton Textile Code 20 




TO AUGUST 15, 1933 32 


I. Procedure for Substitution 34 

II. Approved Substitutions 35 

III. Basic Hours in Substitutions for Productive 

Employees 38 

IV. Seasonal Tolerances 39 



IX (Cont'd) 

A. Plat Maximum Regulations 39 

B. Averaging 41 

C. Peak Period Tolerance 41 

D. Averaging and Peak Period Tolerance 45 
V. Occupational Exemptions 50 

VI. Conclusion 50 


I. The Administrative Official 53 

II. Voluntary Nature of Code System 53 

III. Trade Practice and Labor Provisions 54 

IV. Labor Participation 55 

V. NRA Policy 55 



I. Hours Reduced by Direct Efforts of 

Administration 58 

A. Lumber and Timber Products 58 

1. Management's Case 62 

2. Contrary Positions 63 

3. The Administration Modification of 

the Code 63 

B. Eire Extinguishing Appliance Industry 66 

II. Reduction Effected by Administration and Labor 

Representatives 67 

A. Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Industry 67 

1. Employers' Statements 68 

2. Labor's Counterproposals and 

Statements 70 


XI (Cont'd) 

3. Administrative Recommendations 70 

4. Negotiations 71 

B. Petroleum 72 

1. Labor and Independent's Proposals 74 

2. Administrative Assistance in Adjust- 
ment of Differences 75 

C. Cast Iron Soil Pipe 77 

D. Motor Vehicle Retailing Industry 77 
III. Hours Determined by Collective Bargaining 79 

A. Coat and Suit Industry 79 

B. Men's Clothing Industry 81 

C. Dress Industry 82 

IV. Conclusion 84 



I. Bituminous Coal Industry Q5 

A. Original Code 85 

B. Other Proposals 86 

C. Management's Position 56 

D. Labor's Position 89 

E. Negotiations 89 

II. Gasoline pump Manufacturing Industry 93 

III. Compressed Air, Heat Exchange, and Pump 

Industries 96 

IV. Retail Trade 99 

A, President's Reemployment Agreement 

Substitutions 99 



XII (Cont'd) 

B. Public Hearing 100 

C. Pinal Provisions 102 

V. Conclusion 106 



I. Electrical Manufacturing 107 

A. Industry's Position 107 

B. Labor's Position 108 

C. Negotiations 109 
II. Hosiery Industry 111 

III. Fishing Tackle Industry 114 

IV. Iron and Steel 116 

A. Public Hearing 116 

B. Negotiations 117 

V. Conclusion 120 



I. Financial Inability to Reduce Hours 121 

II. Business Recovery As the Means for 

Reemployment 124 

III. Existence of Precedents 129 

IV. Reemployment Under Code in Respect to 

Employment in 1929 132 

V. Some Increase in Employment 134 

VI. Conclusion 134 







I. Policy Memorandum of February, 1934 137 

II. Review Division Statement, July, 1934 138 

III. Review Officer's Pinal Summary 139 

IV. Conclusion 140 


I. Retail Group 143 

II. Motor Service 144 

III. Motor Transportation 144 

IV. Service 145 

V. Other Codes 146 

VI. Conclusion 147 


I. Collective Bargaining 148 

A. Millinery 150 

B. Fur Group 150 

1. Par Dressing and Fur Dyeing 151 

2. Fur Manufacturing 152 

C. Pleating, Stitching and Bonnaz and 

Hand Embroidery 152 

D. Men's Neckwear 153 

E. Covered Button 153 

F. Undergarment and Negligee 154 

G. Women's Neclcwear 155 

H. Print Roller and Print Bloc 1 ^ Manufacturing 156 

II. Collective Bargaining and Precedents 

for Shorter Work Week 156 



XVIII (Cont'd) 

A. Blouse and Skirt 156 

B. Shoulder Pad 158 

C. Merchant and Custom Tailoring 158 
III. Precedents 160 

IV. Administrative Officials and Labor Advisers 161 

V. Industry Proposals 162 

VI. Conclusion 163 


I. Administration Position 164 

II. Code Authority Conference 166 

III. Labor Advisorv Board 179 

IV. January, 1935 Hearings 180 

V. Individual Industry Reductions in Hours 182 

A. Bituminous Coal Industry 182 

B. Cottcn Garment Industry 183 

C. Millinery Industry 134 
VI. Conclusion ]_85 




I. Distribution cf Codes by Percentage Estimated Reemploy- 
ment Under Codes of 1929, Employment in Individual Indus- 
tries and By Basic Weekly Hours Used in Calculation of 
Estimated Employment Under Codes in Division of Research 
and Planning Reports 30 

II. PRA Substitutions by Number of Modifications for 

Individual Paragraphs of PRA 36 

III. Summary of Hour Provisions of PPJl Substitutions By 

Basic Hours, Tyne of Provision, and Industry Groups 37 

IV. PRA Substitutions Containing Flat Maximum Hour Pro- 
visions, by Maximum Hours and Industry Groups 40 

V. Summary of PRA Substitutions Containing Averaging 

Type of Hour provisions, by Basic Hours, Type of Pro- 
visions, and Industry Groups 42 

VI. PRA Substitutions with Averaging Type of Hour Pro- 
visions, By Basic Hours and Averaging Periods 43 

VII. PRA Substitutions with Averaging Type of Hour Pro- 
vision, by Basic Hours and Hourly Differences Between 
Basic and Maximum Weekly Hours 44 

VIII. Hours Provisions of PRA Substitutions Containing Peak 
Period Tolerances, by Basic Hours, Tolerances and 
Industry Groups 46 

IX. Peak Period Tolerance in PRA Substitutions, by Basic 

Hours and Tolerance Periods 47 

X. Peak Period Tolerances in PRA Substitutions, oy Basic 
Hours and Difference Between Basic and Maximum Weekly 
Hours 48 

XI. Hours Provisions of PRA Substitutions Containing Both 
Averaging and Peak Period Provisions, By Basic Hours, 
Type of Provisions and Industry Groups 49 

XII. Occupational Grouos Exempt from Basic Hour Provisions of 
PRA Substitutions, By Industry Grouos and Exempt 
Occupations 51 

XIII. Distribution of Codes and Employees Among Industries 

Classified According to Length of Basic Week 142 

-VI 11- 



(These appendices are not here reproduced. They are in NRA files 
under the caption NRA Studies, Special Exhibits Work Materials, 
No. 45, Part B. ) 

A. Maximum Hours Per Week Per Worker 

A Method for their Determination for a Given Industry and 
Applications to the Cotton Textile and the Electrical In- 
dustries, by Alexander Sachs, Assisted by A. T. Court and 
V. von Szeleski, July 22, 1933. 

B. First Two Hundred Codified Industries 

By Number of Employees in 1929 and June 15, 1933 pnd Average 
Hours in June 15, 1933, and Hours Required to Absorb Employees 
to 1929 Employment Level and Estimated Number of Employees 
Reabsorbed by Code Hours. 

C. Hours and Seasonal Differentials in Selected NRA Codes. 

D. Hours Provisions in Code Proposals as Reported in the NRA Press 
Digest from July 6, 1933 to August 15, 1933. 

E. Administrative Revision of First One Hundred Approved Codes. 

1. Drafts and Revisions of Hours Provisions of First Forty Codes. 

2. Changes in Seasonal and Peak Period Provisions and Occupation- 
al Exemptions of the First One Hundred Approved with Same 
Basic Weekly Hours as Originally Proposed by Industry. 

3. List of 35 Codes of First One Hundred Approved with Same 
Basic Weekly Hours as Approved and no Significant Changes in 
Supplementary Provisions. 

F. Hours Provisions for Productive or Basic Groups of Employees in 
PRA Substitutions (Prepared by Paul Hutchings). Tabulation of 
Hours Provisions of PRA Substitutions. 

G. Consumers' Industries Committee Report, Washington, D. C. , 
March 15, 1934. 

H. 1. Letter of General H. S. Johnson, Administrator to Code 
Authorities, March 28, 1934. 

2. Shorter Work Week Analysis Sheet. 

I. Durable Goods Industries Committee, Washington, D. C. , 
April 30, 1934. 

J. Petition and Brief of Labor Advisor/ Board for Reduction in Hours 
without Decrease m Earnings on the 1C /lO Principle. 

K. Prevailing Hours of Labor per Week in Selected Code Industries, 
1929 (Prepared by E. L. Greenbank). 





The HI HA sought to achieve recovery, r^fora and stabilization in 
industry and trade. Prior to i ts >as a :e a thirty hour bill was con- 
sidered in Congress and pas e. . in Senate. 1/ianageinent opposed this 
bill because it was too rigid and set up ;cvernmental regulation of in- 
dustry. It preferred a procedure whereby employers would develop their 
own terras of employment and administer theia. The III HA was supported by 
management because it believed that the Act offered this instrumentality. 

The 1IIHA was directed immediately at increasing employment in in- 
dustry and trade through the shortening of hours and the stimulation of 
industrial recovery. It set up a thirty hour week for public works pro- 
jects. As for the method of determining the hours' provisions, the Act 
provided two procedures: those prescribed by Sections 7(b) and 3(a). 

The National Hecovery Administration reaffirmed the policy declared 
at the time of the legislative consideration of the Act. In carrying out 
tne policy, however, it sug B ested as a standard for the determination of 
hours of employment, reemployment of "employees normally attached to the 
particular industry." As for administrative procedure it selected Section 
3(a) providing for voluntary codes submitted b ,< employers as the means of 
developing the labor provisions to effect the purposes of Title I. 

More direct efforts to set standards led the Administrator to suggest 
the 32 hour week. In the Cotton Textile Industry the first definitive 
description of standards was made. Each industry was to be considered 
individually and aaked to reemploy sufficient persons to bring its total 
employment to the 1929 level. The forty-hour week in the Cotton Textile 
Code was specifically designated as an exceptional case which was no pre- 
cedent for future codes. 

To secure immediate results, the PEA was adopted. It established 
a basic 35-hsur week for productive employees, and a 40--iour week for 
non-productive employees. In contrast with tie variable standard pre- 
viously announced for codes, it established a uniform set of hours. 

In contrast to the uniformity of basic hours set up in the PHA, tie 
application of the 1929 employment basis to industry would have resulted 
in a wide range of basic hours generally below forty. Most af the early 
proposed code? did not follow the 1929 employment objective. They adooted 
the Cotton Textile Code hours as a norm, and established long seasonal 
and peak tolerances, and numerous occupational exemptions. 

The conflict between these two approaches was first resolved in the 
development of PHA substitutions. The principal substitutions dealt with hours provisions of the PHA. The hours provision of the substitutions 
generally established a basic 40-hour week instead of a 35-hour week. 
Seasonal anl peak tolerances in 200 of the substitutions and occupational 
exemptions modified the restrictions of the basic work week and permitted 
a much longer actual maximum work we?k, usually 48 hours. 


Since Administration policy called for a careful study of each in- 
dustry to develop a formula of hours likely to effect reemp±oyment to the 
1929 level, and the industries typically presented codes with a 40-hour 
basic week code negotiations and revisions were of' great importance to 
reconcile the two. The Deputy Administrator carried tiie major burden of 
this task. Upon his alertness, clearness and understanding of these ne- 
gotiations tne results were dependent. He was faced by the fact that codes 
were considered voluntary, but as a bargaining weapon lis possessed the 
right to grant or disapprove trade practices desired by the industry. He 
could also deny the industry a cod.e if the terms were inadequate. Most 
Deputy Administrators did not undertake vigorously tne revision of pro- 
posed codes. The most significant group pressing for the reduction of 
hours were tne labor advisers. To the extent to which tney actively part- 
icipated in the negotiations and had the sympathetic assistance of the 
administrative officials, they were successful in raising the terms of 
employment in the codes. 

Only in nine of the first one-hundred approved codes were basic 
weekly hours reduced below those originally proposed by Management. Two 
of these reductions resulted from the direct efforts of the Administration, 
four were effected by the Administration and labor representatives or ad- 
visers, and three eventually through collective bargaining. Seven of these 
codes established basic hours under forty (40) although most of them had 
originally proposed forty (40) hour codes. Substantial reductions in hours 
were made. Six of these downward revisions were made in codes included 
among the first twenty approved. In achieving these reductions union strength 
accounted for three; special bargaining advantage such as public funds and 
trade practices; for three; precedent for one, and pressure for greater re- 
employment, for two. 

Six of tne first one hundred approved codes nad their basic hours in- 
creased over those originally proposed by management. The establishment 
of a forty hour norm for metal industries accounted for the increase in 
hours of four codes, while tne need for assuring codification explains the 
increase in the other two. All but one of these established a forty hour 
week and represented an increase from original proposals of 35 and 36 hours. 
In the sixth, tne retail trade, hours were increased from 40 to a schedule 
ranging from 40 through 43. 

In 85 of the first one hundred codes the approved basic hours were net 
different from those first proposed. No changes were made in the basic hours 
of these codes for various reasons. Only a small proportion actually measured 
up to the goal of reemploying a total equal to the 1929 level. The others 
were approved because it was believed, that the industries were financially 
unable to carry the cost of shorter hours or could not be expected to reduce 
hours since reemployment in the industry must result from general industrial 
revival rather than from the shortening of weekly working hours. The hours 
in otner codes were not modified since they followed the patterns of pre- 
vailing approved codes. The force of precedent became increasingly important 
as the number of approved codes increased. The original standards for the 
determination of the basic work week were qualified by new principles. Uni- 
formity of the basic work week was established. Eighty-three (83) of the 
first one hundred approved codes established a forty hour week, only eleven 
(11) established shorter hours than forty, and six (6) longer than forty 



The precedent of this experience becmae established as new policy. 
The forty hour week became the typical work week. Codes with less than 
forty hours were considered unusual and needed special justification. 
The influence of the goal of 1929 employment was markedly weakened. The 
codes reflected the now approach. Pour hundred ml ninety (490) codes 
adopted the forty hour week. Hie number with, a basic work week of more 
than forty was forty- two, and those with les.- than forty was forty-one. 

In the formulation of codes which established a longer than forty 
hour basic work week precedent was largely determining. Codes were early 
approved with longer than forty hours and kindred and subsidiary industries 
followed with the sane basic hours. Several additional industries Iiad 
longer licurs because of the alleged extraordinary nature of their products, 
such as perishability, or their alleged extraordinary seasonality. 

Several factors asserted themselves in t.±e formulation of codes with 
less tnan forty hours. Hie most significant was organized labor, part- 
icularly in the needle trades. Hie early approval of codes with 33 and 36 
hours per week explains the adoption of a similar work week in a number of 
later codes. In a. substantial number of cases, effective use of knowledge 
of the industry and the services of tie labor adviser account for the short- 
er weekly ..lours. Management recommended t..e establi shment of a 35 or 36 
hour week in a nunber of instances. 

I/iany officials within NSA iesired to sliorten -lours to effect a greater 
amount of reemployment. 3fforts to this end were made at the February and 
March, 193': meetings. The President and the Administrator appealed to manage- 
ment to take the necessary, steps', Dut it refused. Seduction of hours only 
in industries in a position to effect such reductions was recommended but 
it proved impractical. The Labor Advisory 3oard made several efforts to 
secure the general reduction in uo _ ors. But its eficrts were in vain. The 
January, 1955 searings proved to be only a sounding board for the appeal 
for shorter .ours. Seductions were effected only in three industries, bitu- 
minous coal, cotton garment and millinery. Organised labor in each ;f these 
groups was largely responsible for this action. 



chapter i. 

i^t3oductio: t 

The Hational Industrial Recovery Act was one of a series of measures 
to meet the depression following the prosperity peal: in 1329. NI?A was 
an effort to weld together measures for recovery, reform and stabilisation. 
Revival of industrial activity was its initial objective. This goal was 
to be attained "by the establishment under government guidance and super- 
vision of higher standards of employment, for labor and fair trade prac- 
tices to govern business relations. United action of .labor and management 
was to be the abse for industrial relations, and properly supervised and 
reviewed representative action by industry was to rehabilitate business 
relations. The collection of information for public action was to come 
with "industrial planning". Stabilization wag deemed necessary to stop the 
downward spiral of prices, production, employment, wages and standard of 
livin; . 

The most pressing goal of this Act was to get millions of unemployed 
bach to work. In this movement for reemployment, the reduction of hours 
of work of employees was basic. It was the principal method of assuring 
quick reemployment. 

This study is concerned with the policy and practice in HRA with 
respect to the basic hours of work in codes. As such this study does not 
discuss in detail the policy on seasonal and peal; tolerances or occupation- 
al exemptions from the hours provisions. Nor is this an examination of 
administrative experience under the code provisions, or a survey of the 
effects upon reemployment. It is not an analysis of the economic validity 
of the hours program. It is concerned with the development of policy, 
standards and forces determining the hours provisions in codes. 




The ERA and the policy with respect to hours finds its immediate 
origins in the events of 1932. After three, years of derjression and in- 
creasing unemplojinent the Federal Government undertook the task of dir- 
ecting industrial recovery and relief. In 1932, the Emergency Relief 
and Construction Act was passed setting aside 300 million dollars for 
loans to states, counties and cities upon application of the state govern- 
ment, and for individual relief; and 1,500 million dollars for loans to 
government agencies and building corporations for self-liquidating pro- 
jects to provide unemployment relief upon the condition that a thirty 
hour week be observed on such projects. Private industry also cooperated 
in promoting a share-the-work movement in which an effort was made to in- 
duce employers, particularly retailers, wholesalers, banks and public 
utilities, to create more jobs by reducing the working hours of employees. 
However, this movement failed to achieve the desired objectives since 
voluntary co-operation could not be obtained from the employers to keep 
down working hours and. hire more employees. Most firms were willing to 
divide work rather than lay persons off, but were not disposed to reduce 
hours in order to hire additional persons. (*) 

These efforts proved only effective in a most limited manner. They 
covered only small segments of the problem. As a result, organized labor, 
liberal Senators and Representatives, and many outstanding industrialists 
sponsored direct legislation which they hoped would more effectively meet 
the problem of returning the unemployed to work. The Black Thirty Hour 
Bill was the most significant of these pieces of legislation. This bill 
after long consideration in the Senate was finally approved on April 6, 
1933 by a vote of 53 to 30.(**) Various efforts to amend the Thirty Hour 
Bill to increase the hours to 36 per week and 8 per day failed. (***). 
Finally the Bill was reapproved by the Senate on April 17, 1933 by a vote 
of 52 to 31. (****) The bill as it left the Senate specified that goods 
could enter into interstate commerce if not produced under conditions 
where the employees were "permitted to work more than six hours in any 
one day." Exemption from this regulation could be issued by the Secretary 
of Labor. (*****) 

In the House of Representatives the bill was subject to a number of 
amendments largely at first at the request of the Secretary of Labor, who 
recommended greater flexibility of hours. She proposed a provision per- 
mitting employees to work forty hours a week and eight hours a day for 
ten weeks in a calendar year "if an extraordinary need in any plant or 
industry can only be met by utilizing a longer work day or work week and 
if permission is granted by an Hours-of-Work Board." (******) l n the 
final revised draft of the Connery Bill of May 10, 1933, the thirty hour 
week and the six hour day provision was retained. However, it contained 

^ ___^__ ' i 

(*) S. Sli enter,. Employment Conditions - The American Year 3ook Record 
for the year 1932, N.Y. 1933, p. 575 

(**) Congressional R e cord, April 6, 1933, Vol. 77 , : Part 2, p. 1350 
(***) Ibid. p. 1333 (****) iTaid, p. 1812. (*****) 73rd Congress 

1st Session,. S. 158. 
(******) -p or CO py f proposed bill see: United Mine Workers Journali 
9862 May 1, 1933, V. 44, No. 9, p. 9 

the exception "that upon the submission of satisfactory proof of the 

existence of special conditions making it necessary for certain workers 

to work more time than herein provided" the Board may grant an exemption. (*) 

The thirty hour bill had the endorsement of organized labor and of 
many representatives of industry. In the hearings on the bill organised 
labor presented testimony to support -its position. The American Feder- 
ation of Labor had declared for the thirty hour week at its 1932 con- 
vention; and at the hearings it averred that it is a question of either 
a dole, a universal strike or legislative action, such as contemplated 
by the Black Bill. (**) Representatives of constituent unions also 
testified in favor of the bill. Similar action was concurrently urged 
by organized labor in a number of state legislatures. Individual em- 
ployers, particularly in the textile industry, appeared before the 
Congressional Committees in favor of the bill. 

During consideration of the Thirty Hour Bill there developed the 
movement among employers for the regulation of hours on a longer work 
week basis than that proposed in the Black-Connery Bill. In April, 1933, 
the United States Chamber of Commerce, through its Special Committee on 
Working Periods in Industry, declared that "during continuance of sub- 
stantial unemployment, the hours of work should be restricted to not 
more than forty a week." (***)■ 

This sentiment was reechoed during the hearings on the Thirty Hour 
Week Bill before the House Committee on Labor on April 25-28 and May 1-5, 
1933. One recommendation to the Committee proposed an average of 
thirty-two hours per week over a six months period with a forty-eight 
hour weekly maximum and an eight hour day. (****) Other employers 
testified or furnished evidence in favor of restricted hours, though 
they generally objected to the thirty hour wee]-: and favored a forty 
hours' maximum work week. (*****) 

(*) 73rd Congress, 1st Session, S.158, Report Ho. 124, House Calendar 49, 
(**) Thirty Hour Work Week, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Com- 
mittee of the Judiciary United States Senate, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session 
on S. 525, January 5-19, 1933, pp. 1-22. 

(***) Chamber of Commerce of the United States, "Working Periods in 
Industry," Report of Special Committee, Washington, D. C. April 1933. 
(****) 73 r( 3_ Congress, 1st Session, Hearings before the Committee on 
Labor, House of Representatives on S. 158 and HR 4557 and Proposals 
Offered by the Secretary of Labor, April 25-28, May 1-5, 1933, (Wash- 
ington, 1933) (Statement by'G-erard Swope) , p. 92. 
(*****) Some of the testimony was as follows: 

1. Industrial Management Council of Rochester, N. Y. ( Letter , 
'. ril 26, 1933): 

"Lost would favor a 40-hour week with flexibility to take 
care of inevitable emergencies without limitation as to 
hours per day. The largest section of them would approve 
of an 8-hour day. Several would not oppose a 36-hour week. 
One would not object to even a shorter week, although against 


(*****) .Tote continued. 

against a 30-hour week. Our lar est corny ai;-, the Eastman 
Kodak Co., says that due to the highly techincal character 
of its easiness, its employees cannot on an average "be 
placed on less than a 35-hour week" (ibid., p. 150). 

2. Mystic Iron Works and Other Iron Companies: 

"I would hope to see a 40-hour week provided in the 
case of manufacturers operating 24 hours per day" 
(ibid., p. 184) . 

3. Mr. Lumbard, Chairman of the Board of Tanners 1 Council of 

"I was in favor of the principle of a shorter working 
week (l) of around 40 to 45 hours." (2) 

(1) ibid., p. 282 

(2) ibid., p. 293 

4. William Goldman, Representing the Clothing Manufacturers' Research 
Board, New York City: 

" There is a considerable division in the clothing industry 
with regard to what should be about this bill. The Rochester 
market, for example, has recommended the 36-hour week, with 
16 weeks a year in which they would be permitted to work 
40 hours. My own feeling is that we should adopt the 40 

hour week The Rochester market has looked at it more 

largely from the standpoint of the clothing industry, which 
works 44 hours a week, whereas we must consider the vast 
number of industries which we have in this country that 
work 50 hours and upward" (ibid., p.p. 313-314) 

5. Charles B. Rockewell, Jr., Collins and Aikman Corporation: 

" Mr. Ram speck : Your chief contention is about the pro- 
posal we have under consideration - that it be 32 hours 
and permitting '8 hours a day .... 

"Mr. Rockwell: That and insistence that a minimum wage 
be considered " (ibid., p. 336). 

6. B. P. Disque, President, Anthracite Institute: 

"I agree entirely that Mr. Swope's suggestions that the 
maximum working hours in any 26 week period shall average 
32 hours per week" (ibid., p. 394) 

7. P. W . Hobbs, President, National Association of Wool Manufacturers: 

"I am in favor of a national maximum hours-of-labor lav; of 

some sort, (l), If we assume a 2 year limit (add that) 

when it expired that a national 48-hour bill, with the 


(*****) Note continued. 

elimination of women and minors from night work, 
would then be- effective" (2). 

(1) ibid., p. 291 

(2) ibid., p. 437 

8. E. IT. Hood, Treasurer, Pequot "'ills, Salem, Mass. 

"I wish to go on record as being in favor of some 
Federal regulation of the hours of labor (l). My 
suggestion is that with a 48-hour week there would 

be a uniform basis for the entire industry (2) 

I mentioned 43 hours in my brief but there is 

no particular magic in 4C hours. I would be willing 
to concede something below that" (3) 

(1) ibid., p. 496 

(2) ibid., p. 498 

(3) ibid., p. 499 

9. W&lt er Teagle, Standard Oil Company: 

"Most business would, I believe, prefer 32 hours a 
week, no more than 8 hours to be worked per day, 
or a total of 832 hours in a 6 months' period, with 
a provision allowing employees in times of stress 
to work up to 48 hours a week" (ibid., p. 511'). 

10. H. D. Cheney, Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the Silk 
Association of America: (Heads resolution of Association) : 

"The Board of Managers of the Silk Association of 
America, Inc., favors a federal law, during the 
existing emergency, forbidding the employment of any 
person in all industry more than 30 hours per week" 
(ibid., p. 528) 

11. C. F. H. Johnson, President of the Botany Mills: 

"I would say that possibly 40 hours a week would 
accomplish the result the Committee is trying to reach" 
(ibid., p. 535) 

12. St. P.-ul Association of Commerce: 

"It appears to us that 40 hours and -5 days would be a 
better "basis" (ibid., 575) 

13. S. B. Botsford, Vice President of the Buffalo Chamber of Commerce: 

"Many of our manufacturers favor 36 hours rather than 30 hours 
if any arbitrary limitation is to be made" (ibid., p. 606). 


(*****) i.'ote continued. 

14. Phillips Baker Rubber Co ■ n; , Island: 

"We urge national 30-hour produeAAve-worker week appli- 
cable intrastate and interst.'-te United to S hours daily" 
(ibid. , p. 345) . 

15. R. G. Khowland, 3igelow Sanford Carpet Company: 

"If a single standard maximum working week were adopted 
arbitrarily for all industries, it would . probably have 
to be between 44 and 4G hours" (ibid., 650) 

16. M. D. Harding, Representing the Institute of American Meat Packers: 

"If Tire had a 40-hour week, with elasticity so that we 
could go to 54- because, as I have told you, our capacities 
are not sufficient for us to continue week after week on a 
40-hour week, but I will say further that a 40-hour week 
in our industry, with permission to go to 54 hours during 
emergencies, would mean that more men would go to work in 
ovr industry, because we would hold closer to the 40 hours" 
(ibid. , 651) . 

17. H. Kendall, President, Kendall Company, Cotton Textile Manufacturers: 

"First, the President should seek immediate legislation 
to regulate hours of work for men and women on the principle 
of the 5-day week and the shorter working day. . . .We have no 
objection to the 30-hour principle, as such, but we believe 
that there should be so:^e flexibility in the number of weekly 
hours allowed downward as well as upward to meet the needs 
of particular industries." (ibid., p. 736). 

18. C. E. Stuart, President Engineering Firm, Stuart, James & Cook, 
itfew York City: 

"First. A control of hours of labor, provided that 
ample elasticity is permitted under this feature of 
control — based not on any arbitrary standards but on 
the needs of each industry and keyed to the requirements 
of our national economy" (ibid.', p. 753). 

10. Chamber of Commerce, iTewark, h'ew Jersey: 

"In the event that it is decided to pass a bill 'restricting 
the hours of labor on merchandise moving in interstate 
commerce, it is urged that such bill be amended to (l), do 
away with any limitation on the hours of labor per day.... 
(2) , if the bill arbitrarily determines the work hours per 
week, the limitation should not be less than 36" (ibid., 
p. 763) . 



Following these hearings the cotton textile industry endorsed the prin- 
ciple of the forty-hour week for its own plants. (*) 

These and other leaders of industry appeared to recognize the need 
for a restriction of hours hut recommended that development and admini- 
stration of the shorter hours' provision be placed in the hands of trade 
associations. (**) 

They suggested the substitution of individual industry regulations 
for the "statutory method" of hours' regulation prescribed by the Thirty 
Hour Bill. They deemed the tolerances in hours suggested by the Secre- 
tary of Labor to be inadequate and too rigid. In their place the United 
States Chamber of Commerce proposed that the trade associations draw up 
agreements among the members of an individual industry concerning maxi- 
mum hours of labor. This procedure, they assured, "would bring about all 
the benefits contemplated by the Thirty Hour Bill." (***) This method 
in addition would "secure the necessary flexibility in standards of 
hours called for by each industry. (****) 

Interest and co-operation in the movement for the rediiction of 
hours to meet the emergency were evident, but management control of the 
hours provisions and of the administrative machinery for their regula- 
tion was insisted upon as an alternative to legislation. Reduction^ in 
hours were not to be rigid. Each industry was to be permitted to write 
terms dictated by its individual needs instead of following a general 
statute and applying for exemptions for exceptional cases. 

(*****) Note continued from preceding page. 

20. Alfred F. Sloan, President, General Motors Corporation, representing 
the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, New York City: 

"So my recommendation is that we be permitted to work a 
maximum of 6 days for 8 hours, or 48 hours; providing 
however, that the average over the year is not greater 
than a total of 30 hours per week; although I would like 
to have that made 32 hours, because in that way industry 
can work 4 days of 8 hours each, which provides a little 
more flexibility from the standpoint of the weekly set-up" 
(ibid., p. 772) 

(*) New York Times, May 11, 1933. 

(**) Hearings on the Thirty Hour Bill, op. cit., page 92, 

Mr. G-erard Swope. 
(***) Ibid., p. 197. 
(****) r c ic_., p . 228. 



Chapter III. 


It was, in part, to meet industry's demands on these particular 
issues that the K IRA was formulated as a substitute for the Black-Con- 
nery Bill and other current proposals. The ITIBA appeared as a compromise 
measure among the various proposals for industrial recovery. In fact, 
many different groups had a. share in the drafting of the bill. (*) 
Practically every shade of current, vocal opinion participated to a 
greater or- lesser degree in formulation of the bill. »,.".'..' 

In the first- discussions of the bill its presentation as a sub- 
stitute for the Black Thirty-Hour Bill in order to provide greater flexi- 
bility in hours' was emphasized. (**) The business press immediately so 
interpreted the new proposal. It was characterized as a means of legaliz- 
ing "trade agreements, more flexible with different hours in different 
industries." _(,***) This aspect, the bill, as it went through its many 
redrafts, came increasingly to resemble. While an early draft set up a 
licensing system wherein the license set forth the terms of operation, 
(****) that section was subsequently modified to provide a voluntary 
system of codes proposed by a representative management group within 
each industry. This later draft enunciated the concept of varying hours 
among different industries which was in basic opposition to the Black- 
Connery Bill... The provisions were summarized by the newspapers in the 
following manner: 

, "Flexible hours will be provided among. the various indus- 
tries, but the differential between the 'maximum hours 
industries', and the 'minimum hours, industries' , it was 
said, will not be so large as to give one an advantage 
s over the other" (*****) 

(*) Including a small grouo centering about Professor Holey; a 
somewhat larger group headed by Senator Robert Wagner; a 
third group representing the Agriculture Department, includ- 
ing Rexford A. Tugwell and Jerome Frank; the Department of 
Commerce in the person of John Dickinson; and other interest- 
ed groups, such as the United States Chamber of Commerce and 
the National Association of Manufacturers and the American 
Federation of Labor; representatives of the banking interests 
and proponents of -oublic works measures, of the shorter work 
week and of industrial self-government. (Hew York Times, 
Hay 3, 1933). 

(**) Hew York Times, April 15, 1933. 

(***) The Kiplinger Letter, April 15, 1933. 

(****) Presented by Professor iuoley; see Hew York Times, April 29, 

(*****) IMd# 



The "bill as finally proposed was divided into two parts: Title I 
was entitled "Industrial Recovery" and Title II was called "Public Works 
and Construction Projects." (*) The declared purpose of the bill was 
defined by the President in his message to Congress. He declared that 
Congress should provide "for the machinery necessary for a great co- 
operative movement throughout industry in order to obtain wide reemploy- 
ment, to shorten the working week, to pay a decent wage for the shorter 
week and to prevent unfair competition and disastrous competition". (**) 

The bill and the Act as finally approved contained no explicit 
standards. The Act set forth objectives and provided alternative methods 
of procedure. It defined the policy of the Act among other things to 
be to "reduce and relieve unemployment, (and) to improve standards of 
labor." These goals were apparently, though not explicitly, to be 
achieved oy the establishment of "maximum hours of labor" (Section 7 
(a). Ho specific definition concerning maximum hours' regulation or 
its relation to reduction of unemployment was contained in the bill. 
Consequently the place of reduction of hours in the program of in- 
dustrial recovery heralded by the NIRA appeared in the circumstances 
and ideas conditioning passage of the bill rather than in it's own final, 
definitive statements. 

!'• Purpose of the Bi.ll in Relati on to Regula tion of Hours 

The President , in his message to Congress had explicitly construed 
the purpose to be "to obtain wide reemployment (and), to shorten the 
working week." Senator Wagner had introduced the bill in the Senate 
with the declaration that its "principal and immediate object is to open 
opportunities for the employment of several million men and women and 
thus distribute purchasing power which will be effective in starting 
again the wheels of industry." In the specific codes presented by the 
employers, Senator Wagner had indicated that the latter "must undertake 
to reduce the hours of labor to that number which the President finds 
will be most helpful in increasing employment in industry." Specific 
standards of working hours were omitted from the bill in the light of 
the prevailing theory among the bill's sponsors that such decisions were 
the proper sphere of the Administrators of the Act so that "hours of 
labor . . . may be accommodated to the varying needs in different in- 
dustries, 1 ^***) The bill was to provide the machinery for determination 
of hours consistent with the intent of the Act, but no specific formula 
or set of detailed guides was included. The major objectives were loose- 
ly defined; the types of administrative machineries were suggested; 
but the precise moves as to code content were to be left to administra- 
tive machineries were suggested; but the precise moves as to code content 
were to be left to administrative discretion. No specific recommendation 
for a definitive set of hours was heard from the Congressional sponsors 
of the bill. 

(*) 73rd Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 5664. Introduced on Hay 17, 

1933 by Mr. Bought on in the House of Representatives. 
(**) Congressional Record, May 17, 1933, V.77, Part 4, p. 3549. 
(***) Congressional Record, June 7, 1933, V.47, Part 5, p. 5154. 



In the absence of such recommendation, the discussions on the hill 
best defined the objectives which governed and impressed its supporters. 
The major objective was reemployment anticipated as resulting from the 
shortening of hours. Among other reasons given for shorter hours was the 
provision of "some leisure through. reasonable hours of labor." It was 
also argued that the industrial chaos produced by the "recalcitrant 10 
or 15 per cent of the industry" resulted from "cutthroat wages and the 
long hours." In consequence, elimination of long hours was expected not 
only to lead to the absorption of "a great deal of our unemployment" but 
to set up the very terms of fair competition for industry itself. (*) 

I I . Administrative Fr ovi s i ons 

Two different sections of Title I outlined possible procedures to 
be used in developing the standards. In the first place, Section 7 
in subdivision (b) , declared: 

"The President shall, so far as practicable, afford 
every opportunity to employers and employees in any 
trade or industry or subdivision thereof with respect 
to which the conditions referred to in clauses (l) and 
(2) of subsection (a) prevail, to establish by mutual 
agreement, the standards as to the maximum hours of 
labor, minimum rates of pay, and such other conditions 
of employment as may be necessary in such trade or in- 
dustry or subdivision thereof to effectuate the policy 
of this title; and the standards -established in such 
agreements, when approved by the president, shall have 
the same effect as a code of fair competition, approved 
by the president under subsection (a) of Section 3." 

Its significance for determination of hours of labor was explained 
by Representative Kelly of Pennsylvania in the debate on the floor of 
the House of Representatives on May 25, 1933. He declared: 

"Many plans have been offered for dealing with the problem of 
hours of labor. The Black Bill provided for a 30-hour week. 
There have been suggestions for the 36-hour week and the 
^-hour week. The plan under this bill is not to fix a 
rigid schedule for every industry alike but to permit the 
employers and employees 'in each industry to work out the 
hours of labor best suited to the exact conditions. It 
is believed that collective action will result in fair 
adjustment of working hours and balance -them with produc- 
tion. . . It is the purpose to encourage the settlement 
of the vitally important questions of hours, wages and 
working conditions by mutual agreements between organiza- 
tions of employers and employees. The responsibility 
is put upon those who should have it. When the agreement 
is made and approved it will have all the sanctions of 

(*) Congressional Record, June 8, 1933, V. 47, Part 6, p. 5238. 



codes of fair competition. . . If in any trade or 
industry there is neglect or refusal on the part 
of one or both parties to make mutual agreements, 
covering these important questions, power is given 
the President through his agencies to investigate 
labor practices, wages, hours of labor and working 
conditions and prescribe fair standards." (*) 

Before the House Ways and Means Committee, Senator Wagner also 
stated that - 

"The bill makes the following provisions respecting the 
determination of hours, wages, and labor standards: 

"A. Where the right of collective bargaining 
prevails employers and employees are given the first 
opportunity to agree upon maximum hours, minimum rates 
of pay,' and other working conditions. That is, those 
mutual agreements can only be recognized where these 
rights of labor to collectively bargain prevail. When 
such agreement is approved by the President, it acquires 
the character of a code. 

"B. Where no agreement can be reached or has 
been approved, the President is authorized to investi- 
gate and to prescribe by way of a limited code or as part 
of a general code, the standards of hours, wages and 
conditions." (**) 

Section 7 (b) of the Act, however, was not proposed as the sole 
nor the preferred method for determining labor conditions or establish- 
ing maximum hours of labor. 

The NIRA provided another technioue for developing standards, 
primarily intended for trade practice regulation. Section 3 (a), 
designed in early drafts of the law to implement the provision for sus- 
pension of tho anti-trust law in cases where codes of fair competition 

(*) Congressional Record, i;!ay 25, 1933, V. 77, Part 4, p. 4218 

(**) National Industrial Recovery House Ways and Means Committee 
Hearing on S.1712 and H.R.5755, 
73rd Congress, 1st Session, pg. 95. 



were approved (*), permitted trade or industrial associations or groups 
to present codes under the conditions of the Act. This method, during 
the course of the Congressional hearings, became increasingly identified 
by Administration representatives with the procedure for developing 
labor standards as well. No provision in Section 3 prescribed this 
procedure. However, LJr. Richberg, before the Senate Committee on 
Finance, definitely confirmed such interpretation when he declared that: 

He had "this vision of it, and that is that either 
labor will participate in the drawing up of such 
codes, or that labor will participate in the con- 
sideration as to whether such codes are fair, and 
perhaps management will regard it as desirable to 
have labor participate at the first stage rather 
than the second . . . (But) unfortunately there is 
such an attitude toward labor in many industries 
that perhaps the easiest practical method is (for 
the employers) to work out a labor correction code 
which is a code of what is unfair rather than original 
labor participation. '»(**) 

(*) Section 3 (a) of the Act reads! 

"Upon the application to the president by one of more trade 
or industrial associations or groups, the president may ap- 
prove a code or codes of fair competition for the trade or 
industry or subdivision thereof, represented \>y the appli- 
cant or applicants, if the President finds (l) that such 
associations or groups impose no inequitable restrictions 
on admission to membership therein and are truly represent- 
ative of such trades or industries or subdivisions thereof, 
and (2) that such code or codes are not designed to promote 
monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and 
will not operate to discriminate against them, and will 
tend to effectuate the policy of this title: PROVIDED, That 
such code or codes shall not permit monopolies or monopolis- 
tic practices: PROVIDED FURTHER, That where such code or 
codes affect the service and welfare of persons engaged in 
other steps of the economic process, nothing in this section 
shall deprive such persons of the right to be heard prior 
to approval by the president of such code or codes. The 
President may, as a condition of his approval of any such 
code, impose such conditions (including requirements for 
the making of reports and the keeping of accounts) for 
the protection of consumers, competitors, employees, and 
others, and in furtherance of the public interest, and 
may provide such exceptions to and exemptions from the 
provisions of such code, as the President in his dis- 
cretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy herein 
(**) National Industrial Recovery Senate Hearings Report of the 

Committee on Finance on S. 1712 and H.R. 5755, 73rd Congress, 
1st Session, pg. 23. 



While organized labor believed that the procedure under Section 7 (b) to govern the administrative routine within the NRA, leaders of busi- 
ness considered Section 3 (a) as the prevailing procedure. Organized 
labor declared that Section 7 (b) in - 

"plain simple language . . . means that employers and employees 
will be accorded the fullest opportunities to negotiate wage 
scales and conditions of employment. In fact a simple sound 
interpretation of this section means that the government ex- 
pects employers and employees to work out wage agreements 
through .collective bargaining." (*) 

The employers, on the other hand, proceeded on the theory that the 
entire NRA codification process would be. handled largely through Section 
3. In fact, the National Association of Manufacturers prepared a guiding 
statement outlining the contents of the code,, including "wage, hours, 
conditions." (**) 

Other contemporaneous publications and statements showed that this 
position was widely held by industry. Many trade associations and in- 
dustrial groups after consultation with General Johnson and his associates 
prepared codes for submission to the Administration in the last week of 
May and early June, 1933 containing provisions on hours, wages and work- 
ing conditions. 

The Act left decision as to the procedure and the criteria to the 
Administration. There were no' restrictions or precise instructions. 
Either of the two methods could be used. Any combination or adjustment 
within the delimited areas would be' consistent with the law. 

This fact was of enormous significance to determination of the hours 
formulae in the codes. The collective bargaining procedure, if established, 
would have introduced a revolutionary change. Labor as a group would have 
become a direct participant in the determination Of conditions of employ- 
ment. Section 7 (a), providing for the right of collective bargaining, 
would have set the conditions for the formulation of the basic national 
codes. The proposals submitted would have been the result of joint action 
by labor and industry; the government acting as supervisor. On the con- 
trary, , rejection of this method in favor of Section 3 (a), would reduce 
labor's part to a relatively minor one, since the union would then have 
participated expost facto as a critic rather than as a party to the pro- 

III. The Thirty Hour W eek Provision in the Public Works Title 

While the hours pattern for private industry was only vaguely out- 
lined, the regulations for the public works were definitely expressed in 
the Act. It represented a direct continuation of the provisions of 

(*) American Federationist,/Vol. 40, p. 693 

July 1933 

i • ... 

(**) National Association of Manufacturers, "The National Industrial Re- 
covery Act" prepared by John C. Gall, Associate Counsel, and Noel 
Sargent, Economist. (May 23, 1933). 



Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 and a concession to the 
principle of the thirty-hour week in the .31ack-Connery Bill. It speci- 
fically provided in Section 20G (a) that "so far as practicable and 
feasible, no individual directly employed on such uroject shall be per- 
mitted to iror.k more than thirty hours in any one v;eek." 



K*£JLMlJ5Ii^^ : "'A CHINE RY 

I . Formulation of Policy 

After the passage and approval of the Act, administrative develop- 
ments determined the course of experience under the MBA. In the state- 
ments "bearing on development of policy on the hours, the objectives ex- 
pressed in the discussions before passage of the Act were not appreciably 
changed by the Administrative Agencies. The President on signing the 
Act on June 16, 1933, declared that the Act proposed to "our industry a 
great spontaneous cooperation to put millions of men back to their regu- 
lar jobs this summer. This idea is simply for employers to hire more 
men - : to do the existing work by reducing the work hours of each man's 
week and at the same time paying a living wage for the shorter week." (*) 
Reduction of hours was accepted as the chief measure for reemployment. 
Neither the basic work week to be adopted in the codes, however, nor the 
standards to govern the Administration were outlined in that statement. 

I I . Stateme nt of Standa rds 

The President's declaration was supplemented by more detailed pro- 
cedure outlined by the National Industrial Recovery Board in NRA Bulletin 
No. 2 of Juno 16, 1933. This document stated the purpose of the entire 
Act as being "to effect an immediate reduction of unemployment and in- 
crease of mass purchasing power." This Bulletin also for the first time 
set up standards for determining the hours' provisions acceptable to NBA. 
It declared the guiding principle in preparation of the basic codes to 
be "consideration of the varying conditions and requirements of the sever- 
al industries and the state of employment therein." It also specifically 
asserted that the "average work week" in the codes "should be designed 
so far as possible to provide for such a spread of employment as will pro- 
vide work so far as practical for employees normally attached to the 
particular industry." (**) The definition of standards implied two prin- 
ciples: First, it accepted the proposition commonly advanced by the re- 
presentatives of industry that no single standard could be applied uni- 
formly to all industry. Each industry was to be considered individually 
in terms of its special requirements and the extent of its prevailing 
employment. The criteria were not defined, however, nor were guides pro- 
vided. In the second place, it followed the premise that unemployed per- 
sons normally attached to a given industry should be reabsorbed. No ex- 
planation defined the term "normally attached." No suggestion was offered 
to the few new industries, which were larger in 1933 than in 1929, to 
govern their regulations. In this manner the program was launched by the 
Administrators. Meanwhile some of the larger industries were busily 
formulating the first drafts of their codes. 

(*) New York Times, June 17, 1933. 

(**) National Recovery Administration, Bulletin No. 2, Basic Codes of 
Fair Competition (June 16, 1933). 



III. Admin i strati vo 

Bulletin 116. 2 was more explicit with respect to -procedure for code 
making than for hours 1 provisions of the codes. It showed the organiza- 
tion to be prepared for the receipt of codes of fair competition rather 
than for agreements developed under Section 7 (b). It accented the code 
procedure as the method of developing the standards as to maximum hours, 
minimum wages and conditions of employment. It stated "It is not the 
function of the National Recovery Administration to prescribe what shall 
be in the codes to be submitted by associations or groups. The initia- 
tive in all 'such matters is expected to come from within the industry 
itself . . . Basic codes containing provisions respecting maximum hours 
of labor, minimum rates of pay and other conditions of employment which 
are in themselves satisfactory will be subject to approval, although 
such conditions may not have been arrived at by collective bargaining." 
Although the latter part of the Bulletin made reference to Section 7 (b) , 
its "place in the EISA frame-work was not defined. (*) 

Administration acceptance of the code method as outlined in Section 
3 (a) of the Act and failure to do more than recognize Section 7 (b) 
had an important bearing uoon the development of the policies within 
NBA, and the specific terms as to wages, hours and conditions of em- 
ployment developed in the Individual codes. The resulting procedure 
placed the initiative upon industry. Trade groups primarily through 
trade associations were charged with the preparation and presentation 
of -proposed codes. These were required to comply with the mandatory 
sections of the Act, Section 3 (a) providing for an affirmation that 
the associations and groups presenting the code impose no inequitable 
restrictions on admission to •membership and are truly representative 
and the codes are not designed to promote monopolies or eliminate or 
oppress small enterprises and will tend to effectuate the policy of the 
title and contain Section 7 (a). They were also called upon to specify 
in such codes -minimum wage, maximum hours, and conditions of 
employment. After the proposed 'code was in proper form a public hear- 
ing was called wherein the interested -parties might offer evidence. 
After such hearing, the code as modified, was presented to the Presi- 
dent for a.-->Tproval, disapproval or modification. When approved by the 
President it became binding as prescribed in the Act. 

IV. SojlcJjisifilL. 

NRA Administrators from the start defined the administrative pro- 
cedure for code making in its most significant aspects. II o such de- 
finite policies or standards existed to determine the specific code 
provisions respecting hours of work. The Administration policy ex- 
pected each code to contain regulation of the hours of work to absorb 
the unemployed. These hours were to be shorter than those -prevailing. 
They were to vary as among industries so as' to reabsorb the persons 
"normally attached" to the specific industry. 

(*) Ibid. 





NRA statement of the purpose of the reduction of hours program was 
clear and unequivocal. It was to reduce unemployment. The goal was 
vaguely -nhrased but frequently set at three million returned to employ- 
ment. No guides were furnished industry for the development of their 
code provisions'. In fact Bulletin No. 2 remained the only formal state- 
ment of directions for the greater part of NRA's history. As a result, 
management in the development of codes could consider any one of a num- 
ber of suggestions. There were the Thirty-Hour Bill, the U.S. Chamber 
of _ Commerce "proposal for a basic 40-hour week, the average 32 hour week 
recommended (*) in the testimony presented at the House Committee's 
hearings on the Thirty-Hour Bill. Precise directions and definitions 
were lacking. 

I. The Th irty~Two Hour .Week FrosoSal 

In response to the pressure for information, the Administrator 
undertook to clarify the situation somewhat. The principle purpose of 
the Act he declared was to persuade employers to take back workers by 
spreading the available work over shorter shifts: 

"The plan is for each industry to absorb the labor normally 
attached to it at a living wage in fact and for that reason 
the question "cannot bo answered for all industries or all con- 
ditions by any inflexible rule. But in a general way and with- 
out any coromi tment , we can say . . , that, under present con- 
ditions, and as far as the lowest paid class of workers are 
concerned, an average of about thirty-two hours a week at not 
less than forty-five cents an hours for the lowest i aid typo 
of worker would do this job." (**) 

He also reaffirmed the previously enunciated policies, namely, the need 
for different patterns of hours of work for each industry and for each 
industry to absorb' the labor force normally attached to it. He further 
suggested a basic average thirty-two hour week, without however, indicat- 
ing its meaning, amplication or the range of permissible hours above or 
below the basic standard. 

1 1 • The Cotton 'Textile Codfl 

The first application of NRA reemployment objectives and policies 
appeared in the Cotton Textile Code. The .hearings began on June 27, 1933. 

(*) By Gerard Swope 

(**) Address of General Hugh S- Johnson made on June 25, 1933. 
New York Times, June 25, 1933. 



This code on account of the accident of its being the first to be 
approved exercised influence "beyond its intrinsic importance. The in- 
dustry vss characterized by exceptionally low wages and long hours. 
Furthermore it was experiencing a boom which raised the average hours 
per worker per week t o 49.2. Here was a test of the announced NRA pro- 
gram of reemployment through adaptation to the conditions of the indus- 
try and the capacity of individual plants to reabsorb labor. 

Ihe cotton textile industry presented a code providing for a basic 
40 hour week with a number of exempted occupations, a standard already 
proposed for itself by the industry before passage of the NIRA. (*) 
This provision was questioned by organized labor and by some industrial 
groups. In defense, the industry representatives maintained that less 
than 40 hours would create a labor shortage in small communities, in- 
crease labor cost unduly, require the recruiting of untrained labor from 
other industries and recall the "graveyard shift." (**) 

Labor representatives 'orotested. They urged that the work be 
limited to 35 hours in order to effect reabsorotion of the unemployed, 
to remove the strain r e suiting from the stretchout system and more closely 
to adhere to the thirty-hour week standard of the public works title of 
the Act. (***) Another labor representative recommended the thirty- 
hour week to reabsorb the unemoloyed throughout American industry and a 
single standard for all industries to which everyone would conform. (****) 
Quoting HRA Bulletin Ho. 1 which emphasized reemployment, another de- 
clared that "a. 40-hour week will not meet that nunose. (*****) ije 
averred that it would result in "certain demoralization in other indus- 
tries in their effort to establish a shorter work week". (******) He 
discounted the possibility of labor shortage, declaring, "let there be 
business and they will find labor*" (*******) 

(*) Hew York Time, May 11, 1933 

(**) Cotton Textile Hearings, Juno 27, 1933, pp. 59-63 

(***) Statement of Thomas i\ McMahoh, President of the United Textile 
Workers., June 38, 1933 - Release Ho. 18, p. 45 

(****) Ibid., Juno 23, 1333 - Release Ho. 13, p. 106 and p. 6 of William 
• Ere en* s speech. 

(*****) Statement of Sidney Hillman 

Ibid., Juno 23, 1933 - No. 1G, : p. 127 

(******) Ibid., pp. 128-129 

(*******) Ibid., p. 131 


Policy formulation for administrative action was confronted with tv;o 
conflicting theories* On the one hand were emplo5^ers who argued for -pre- 
vention of overproduction through rigid limitation on the machine hours 
and the restriction of factory operations to two shifts. In defense of 
this position they noted that the forty-hour week will "not only reabsorb 
or absorb all the cotton mill workers who have been employed in part, 
but will also absorb a great many thousands who have never been employed 
by the industry .at all." (*) Any additional reduction would intensify 
problems of hiring and of training new workers. Labor, on the other 
hand, urged a shorter work week because of the widespread unemployment 
in all industries. It discounted problems of training on the ground 
that promotions within the ranks would more than suffice to meet situa- 
tions. (**) Industry also was disturbed by the forty-hour week. The 
counsel for certain trade associations characterized the forty-hour week 
as a "severe blow" to the success of the IJIBA. No smaller industries, 
he predicted, would accept a shorter week than forty if the textile code 
was approved despite the fact that they had become reconciled to a 
thirty-five hour week. He noted that "if the Administration desires to 
have the aims of the Recovery Act fulfilled it must see to it that the 
major industries are not granted too much leeway." (***) 

On the other hand a question which persistently appeared in the Ad- 
ministrator' s cross examination of witnesses was whether an industry 
"should take back labor which is naturally attached to that industry" or 
should "also reach into the other industries." (****) The question also 
arose as to whether it was proper policy to ask an industry to do more 
than reabsorb its "proportion of the unemployed." (*****) This point 
of view was opposed to labor's thesis that the average work week in all 
industries -was the proper basis for determining hours in the Cotton 
Textile Code. The proposed alternative was to study each soparate indus- 
try ?nd to determine its obligations to its own unemployed. 

(*) Ibid., June 27, 1933 - Release Ho. 13, p. 17 - Testimony of 
Mr. Robert Amory. 

(**) Ibid., June 23,' 1933, pp.' 53, 113. 

(***) Reported Statement of Mr. Sol Herzog, Counsel for a number of 
trade associations. American Federation of Labor Weekly News 
Service - July 3, 1933, quoting New York newspapers as the 

(****) Ibid., June 28, 1933 - p. 109, 113 - General Johnson's question 
on p. 113 is: "What I am trying to get at is this question of 
policy. I am trying to develop whether there is an onus on any 
particular industry to take on more men than can be reasonably 
expected to be employed in normal economics in the United States 
under conditions we have seen." 

(*****) Ibid., June 23, 1933 -p. 132, Statement of the Deputy Adminis- 



The solution decided upon was to accept the forty-hour week in the 
cotton textile industry for !'a four months' period," disregarding the 
single standard for all industries. Instead conditions in the cotton 
textile industry in 1929 were used to estimate the effect of a forty 
hour week upon employment, resulting in the following conclusions: 

"'Hie industry under the 40-hour week would presently absorb the 
available corns of textile workers and assuming a continuation of 
the present trend would -orovide openings for unemployed from re- 
lated or nearby industries. The reduction in the working week to 
forty hours will effect the reemployment of the hitherto unemployed 
and -permit the substantial absorption from the outside of a poten- 
tial 15 to 25 per cent emnloyment over and above the degression 
level." (*) 

This decision established the procedure for determining hours of 
employment. Each industry was to be dealt with separately. Pursuant to 
this -policy, it was announced that the -orooosed Cotton Textile Code was 
not intended to constitute a -precedent for other industries. The ex- 
planation given was that the cotton textile industry wss not operating 
"nearly at full csnt city raid tnere is some question as to whether they 
can find sufficient skilled employees for a full 40-hour week. It ought 
to be obvious to bnybod:y that an industry at a low rate vould have to 
have a shorter week to absorb its own unemployed workmen. A 40-nour week 
in industry generally would not scratch the surface of our job of putting 
large numoers of unemployed back to work. Indeed I know of no other in- 
dustry in which v.e would even receive for consideration a code -proposing 
a 40-hour week." (**) 

This hearing therefore established the precedent of individual treat- 
ment of an industry and defined the term, "normally attached", as meaning 
the number of persons omoloycd by the industry in the year 1939. The in- 
dustry was not called noon to absorb more than the total number of em- 
ployees in 1929. If it took on more than that number it was to be par- 
ticularly commended. No account was taken at that time of those who would 
not be reabsorbed if the 1929 employment level were attained in each in- 
dustry, or of the impossibility of attaining that level in industries 
affected by a rapid rate of seasonal decline. 

(*) National Recovery Administration, Codes of Fair Competition, 
Vol. I, p. 5. 

(**) Release No. 20 - June 28, 1933. 



chapti:, VI 

The acceptance of the Cotton Textile Code did not result in indication 
of intent to follow suit on the part of the "ten large industries." 
Apparent "indifference" prevailed among them and reluctance to act because 
of "the of Chambers of Commerce and Merchant's Associations tc their 
members to go d-u" , the lawyers' counsel to their "clients that there are 
J ipholes in the law", (*) and the coolness to the entire move in view of 
"the upswing in prices inspiring increased production and the desire of 
manufacturers to benefit from the price rises." (**) Consequently, the 
device of the PEA was used to stimulate activity. Eight reasons were given 
for the adoption of this program: (l) the realization that action had to 
be prompt and national in character, covering all industries; (3) the 
absence of industrial organization; (3) the widespread anticipator;/ spec- 
ula bory activity in industry; (4) the need for reaching into intrastate 
businesses as well as interstate concerns; (5) the value of having public 
opinion supporting the enforcement of the Act; (£) the need for immediate 
action; (7) the importance of finding some method of getting the reluctant 
industries to act; (8) finally, the need of some eas3 r administrative 
method, generally applicable and adaptable to all industry by means of 
exemptions. (***) 

To overcome inertia and indifference, the principles of a blanket 
code for all industries were discussed by the Administrator with the three 
"ERA Advisory Boards. In a private session of the Industrial Advisory 
Board that day between the afternoon and night joint sessions, it deter- 
mined that its policy with respect to the provisions of the blanket code 
would' be that "no code should be approved that was higher in hours or 
lower in' wages than expressed by the Cotton Textile Code recently signed" 
(****) 'Likewise., it agreed that an average thirty-five hour maximum week 
would be acceptable if provision was made for a forty hour maximum in a 
single week with an eight-hour day. (*****) This recommendation for 
averaging resulted from a. statement of the necessity of such averaging 
within the automobile industry. (******) j\.t the joint meeting of the 
several Boards and the Administrator that same evenin ', a subcommittee 
was formed to formulate the provisions on the basis of the general dis- 
cussion which had taken place. (*******) jfoe Committee presented to the 
general committee the following agreement which was approved: 

(*) Business Week, July 1, 1933 

(**) Journal of Commerce, July % 1933 

(***) H.S.Johnson, "The Blue Eagle from Eg; to Earth," (pew York: 1935), 

i. 253-53. 
(****) Minutes of Industrial Advisory Board, July 10, 1933. 
(*****) Ibid. 

(******) ibid. Statement of Mr. Sloan 
(*******) The members of the subcommittee were: Labor, William Green and 

Leo Wolman; Industry, 3-era 'd Swope and! Alfred P. Sloan; Consumers, 

I Irs. Charles Bumsey. 


"7or office employees, stores, banks, utilities, salesmen, except- 
i : executive ar.d traveling; salesmen, maximum Lours of 40 per week 
and a minimum vva, e of $1,3.00 per weed. Distinction mi, lit be made 
according to size and locality of Manufacturing 
industries - maximum hours should be 35 per wee 1 ; in the '13 week 
period' out with the right to work _0 hours in any - weeks of 
that period and not more than E hours in any one day." (*) 

This hours provision remained substantially unaltered thou h the 
proposals on wages underwent considerable revision in the hands of the 
de-iutg administrators and other staff officers. The Administrator 
reported to his staff of deputy administrators and advisers that "the 
President has approved the plans for Bulletin do. 3, on the emergency 
reemployment drive." (**) In the President's Reemployment Agreement as 
finall* approved the following provisions concerning the hours of 
ennloyment were included: 

"(d) Hot to work an accounting, clerical, banking, office, service 
or sales employees (except outside salesmen) in any store, office 
department, establishment, or public utility, or on any automotive 
or horse-drawn passenger, express, delivery, or freight service, 
or in any other place o;. manner, for mo:, e than 40 hours in any 1 
week and not to reduce the hours of any store or service operation 
to below 52 hours in any 1 wee :, unless such hours were less than 
52 hours per wee]: before July 1, 1933,- and in the latter case not to 
reduce such hours at all. 

"(3) Tlo.t to employ any factory or mechanical worker or artisan more 
than a maximum week : of 3d hours until December 31, 1933, but with 
the right to work a maximum week of 40 hours for any fi weeks within 
this period; and not to employ any worker more than C hours in any 
1 dag. 

"(4) The maximum hours fixed in the foregoing paragraphs (2) and (3) 
shall net apply to employees in establishments employing not more 
than two persons in towns of less than 2,300 population which towns 
are not part of a larger trace area; noV to registered pharmacists 
or other professional persons employed in their profession; nor to 
employees in a managerial or executive capacity, who now receive 
more than 035 per week; nor to emolo "ees on emergency maintenance 
and repair word; nor to very special cases where restrictions of 
hours of hig'.l ' skilled workers on continuous processes would 
i navoida'bly reduce production but, in any such special case, at 
least time and one third shall be paid for hours worked in excess 
of the maximum. Population for the purposes of this agreement shall 
be determined by reference to the 1930 Federal census. 

"(13) This agreement shall cease upon approval by the President of 
a code to which the undersigned is subject; or, if the NRA so elects, 
upon submission of a code to which the undersigned is subject and 
substitution of any of its provisions for any of the terms of this 
a/ reement. 

(*) Minutes of the Industrial Advisory Board Meeting of July 10, 1933 - 
Evening Meeting of Subcommittee. 

(**) Report of Staff Meeting, July 17, 1933, First Session Bulletin do. 3 
announced the president's Reemployment Agreement to the country and 

9862 outlined procedure to be followed. 

"(14) It is agreed that any person who wishes to do his part in the 
President's reemployment drive "by signing this agreement, but who 
asserts that some particular provision hereof, "because of peculiar 
circumstances, will create great and unavoidable hardship, may 
obtain the benefits hereof ^ signing this agreement and putting 
it into effect and then, in a petition approved by a representative 
trade association of his industry, or other representative organi- 
zation designated "oj NBA, may apply for a stay of such provision 
pending a summary investigation by NBA, if he agrees in such appli- 
cation to abide by the decision c: such investigation. This agree- 
ment is entered into pursuant to section 4(a) of the National 
Industrial Becovery Act and subject to all the terms and conditions 
required by sections 7(a) and 10(b) of that act." 

In many respects, this statement introduced new principles into the 
approved hours' formula. In the first place, it differentiated between 
factory and non-factory personnel. It recognized a 35 hour week for 
the factory workers. It set up a seasonal or peak tolerance in the 
exemption to the forty hours' week comprising a six weeks' period during 
the last five months of the year. (*) It established an 8-hour day for 
factor}" workers but not for the non-factory employees. It exempted 
completely large areas of industry consisting n f "establishments employ- 
ing not more than 2 persons in towns of less than 2,500 population, which 
towns are not part of a large trade area." It exempted specific classes 
of employees. In this way there emerged the major elements of the NBA 
policy with respect to hours. ' These included differentiation between 
factory and non-factorv hours,' with exemptions for special periods and 
classes of occupations. 

The PRA also affected. policy on hours through provision, in Section 
14, for an exemption procedure for cases where "great and unavoidable 
hardships" would result from compliance with the original terms of the 
agreement. The problem soon became significant though a -staff meeting of 
the deputy administrators had declared that "the general policy will be 
to avoid exemptions as far as possible." (**) 

The 32 hour week having been suggested as a possible gaide, the 
exception in the case of the cotton textile industry was at the time 
specifically declared to be unusual. The Administrator meanwhile increas- 
ingly suggested that the hours of labor should be set between 30 and -.0 per 
week depending on the number of unemployed among those normally attached to 
an industry (***) The next official document, the PEA, by setting up a 
normal 35 hour week and a 40 hour maximum for peak periods, evidenced the 
assumed theory that the Cotton Textile Code established a maximum. 

' To meet the plan for immediate codification, the Administration 
waived the principle of individual industry standards and approved a single 
universal hours' provision barring unusual circumstances. In this respect 
it returned to the original idea of the amended Black-Connery Bill except 
f_o_r the, character _of t he .a rrangement and T the_ .idea of enfojreement jbhrou^i^ 
(*) In the hearings on the Cotton Textile Code, General H.S. Johnson in- 
quired of one witness: "Wouldn't you be in a much better relation to 
the actual business now existing, if v/e did have an average 3fi hours 
over six months with a maximum of 3 hours in a day and a maximum of 40 
hours a week?" (Cotton Textile Hearings, June 27,. 1933, Afternoon 
Session, BeleaseJJo. 14, p. ft- ). 
(**) ^ Report of Staff Meeting - July 22, 1933 
(***) Meeting of July 8, 1933 with the Emergency National Committee of the 

Lumber and Timber Products Industry - History of the Lumber and 
38^2 Timber Products Code. Exhibit B, 


voluntary public cooperation. 

The proposals in the PHA were accepted as standards instead of the 
3 2 hour week previously pro-osed by the Administrator, (*) as a report 
of a staff meeting of deputy administrator? to consider general policies 
showed. It contained the following statement: 

"Standards for industrial nlants in general would seem to have been 
arrived at approximately as follows : 55 hours per average week and 
minimum ?/age of 30^ in low cost areas up to 40^ in metropolitan 
areas. When an industry proposes a longer work wee]: or lower wages, 
it is prober to suggest very strongly that the burden of oroof -Till 
'be u?on them to establish their position." (**) 

The P?_A as a standard tended to supercede the principle of variabil- 
ity of hours amoiV' industries. 

Developments following the PEA determined the degree of adherence to 
the decision that the Cotton Textile Code should set the maximum terms of 
employment and to the individual determination of the hours provision of 
an industry on the absorption of those unemployed persons normall"/ attach- 
ed to the industry. (***) it left unsettled fee issue of using the 1°29 
employment record as a gauge of hours for the industry. The question 
whether precedent, individual industry capacity for reemployment as 
measured by the 1929 employment base, or collective bargaining was to 
govern the provisions in the codes relating to hours of work remained 

(*) By radio address of June 25, and statement to the Shipbuilders on 

July 22. 

(**) Report of Staff Meeting, Jul,-- 22, 1935. Statement of Mr. Dudley 

(***) Report of Staff "Meeting of Deputy Administrators, July 22, 1933: 

C-eneral Williams asked if the 35 hour maximum workweek in industry 
"orcvided for in the President's reemployment program would apply 
in the event of the filing of code by industry. It was agreed that 
neither this nor any other provisions of the President's Reemployment 
Agreement would apply to any code. The general policy would be to 
work out maximum hours in each industry's code on a basis designed 
to "rbsorb as many of the unemployed in that industry as possible." 




le formulae for hours obtainable by the individual industry's 
responsibility for raising employment to the 1929 level, although quite 

'erent from organized labor's proposal of uniform hours for all indus- 
tries to be determined by the extent of unemployment in the -.-.hole United 
ptafc^u, required factual information for each industry separately. 

Consequently, the Division of Research and Planning was ashed to 
present the necessary estimates and calculations. The economic adviser 
to the deputy administrator or officer handling a code helped to ascertain 
minimum wages and shifts and maximum hours. These economic advisers were 
requested by the Division of Research and Planning tc determine "the work- 
ing hours required oo restore employment to the level of 1929 .or other 
base period . . . (and the) numbers which would have been employed in 
1331 and 1952 and at present if proposed maximum hour regulations had 
been in effect." (*) 

The resulting data varied in accurac;-. and reliability. Where infor- 
mation. was available it was often inadequate for the purpose of the !'RA. 
Frequently definitions of their industry by those presenting codes did 
not coincide with those used in existing statistical materials. In man ' 
instances there was no information at all. Sometimes under such circura- 
st ices, the Division of Research and Pis tning conducted special investi- 
gations. (**) In many the only information upon which conclusions 
were based were the unverified estimates or guesses of code sponsors, 
frequently unacquainted with conditions prevailing within the:' r own industry 

(*) Research and Planning Staff 'Memorandum No. 5, (July 14, 1933' from 
LIr. Von Szeleski, subject: "Outline for Industry Reports." In the 
Staff Memorandum Ho. 7, (September 27, 1933) on "preparation of 
Statistical Reports" fro:.; Mr. 'Von Szeleski, the following is included: 

"3 Ordinarily the discussions would center around two main points: 

(1) Maximum hour provision -which will contribute towards absorbing 
the unemployed, the absorption ability of a single industry being 
given due consideration. 

(2) A minimum wage, so far as possible, will restore in lar ■ 
measure the purchasing power of 1929, but which should recognize 
the prying ability and the price characteristics of the industry - 
ability to absorb production at increased prices." 

In Staff Memorandum : 7 o. 52 from V.S. Von Szeleski, (November 14, 1933) 
on "Subjects for Reports," he suggests as subject (e): "How much 
Reemployment will be effected by the Code? If you cannot calculate it, 
at least guess." 

(**) See "Wares and Hours in American Industry 11 by Solomon Barkin and Anne 
Page. Works Material nine 


These were the materials up™ which SEA decisions were founded. The first 
two hundred approved codes showed the resulting problems (Appendix B) (*) 

Most of those first t'"0 hundred approved codes covered industries for 
which there was information on the number of employees, "but less "frequently 
data with respect to actual and average hours. Estimates of the necessary 
hours' standards to increase employment to the 1929 level were therefore 
sometimes impossible. The accuracy of these estimates was further affected 
by the fact that they were based upon estimated total man h-urs and number 
of persons on the payroll, without allowances for occupational exemptions or 
the seasonal flexibilities permitted in the code. The importance of this 
omission may bo gauged from a study of 31 major industries employing some 
4 million persons. It was found that 13. per .cent of the employees worked 
in occuoati >ns with limited exemptions and 13.0 with total exemptions per- 
mitting work bey/ad the code basic hours; and 63.3 percent rbre were permitted 
to work additional hours during seasonal or peak peri ds. (**) These exemption* 
were sufficiently serious to modify the estimates on reemployment in the 
code-, yet no allowance was made for them in the calculations. The figures 
showed the probable effect of the single test of employment 'by each industry 
equal to its 1939 level. 

For forty-eight of the first two hundred approved codes the Division of 
Research and Planning made definite recommendations concerning basic h-urs 
required to reemploy at least up to the number on its 192 pay roll. The 
recommendations were distributed according to the following frequency 
distribution: two industries, hours between 5 and 9 per week (funeral supply; 
and shovel, dragline andcrane); three industries, hours between 10 .and 14 
per week (all metal insect screen; structural clay; and vitrified clay 
sewer pipe); four industries, hours between 15 and 19 hours per week 
(business furniture; office equipment; floor and wall cloy tile; and 
scientific ap-oaratus); nine industries, weekly hours between 20 and 34; 
three industries, weekly hours between 25 and 29; eight industries, weekly 
hours between 30 and 32.4; seven industries, weekly hours between 32.5 
and 34.9; three industries, weekly hours between 35 and 37.4; seven in- 
dustries, weekly hours between 37.5 and 40; and one industry each for 43 
and 50 hours (american match; and Jce industries, respectively.) 

In 70 additional industries estimates were available of anticipated 
reemployment following approved or proposed code hours. The estimates 
were' mainly calculations of the percentage of accessions to the payroll 
resulting from shortening of the hours to an 'indicated level of hoursto the 
number on the pay roll in 1929. These figures, though frequently estimates 
based upon estimates, were the "best data available for setting of standards 
and determining MA policy. 

Cf these 72 industries, it was estimate i thai 26 would nave ' crml oyed 
under the code hours as many jr slightly more persons than were on their 
pay rolls in 1929. (Table 1). That group contained several new or ex- 
panding industries such as oil burner, domestic freight forwarding, 
wholesale automotive, wax neper, and grain strip wood block, ark sanitary 

(*) In iJRA St jj ies Special Exhibits - Work . htcriols .1). do - E 

(**) u Hour and Seasonal Differentials in Selected N.E.A. Codes." (Ay endix C) 
In MA Studies Special Exhibits - Work Material i'b. 45 - B 



distribution cj co::e; sy ?edcd 7 y;^:: estimated employment 


Percentage Total 
Estimated Emplo2/ment 
Under Codes in Indus- 
try of 1929 Employment 
in the In cus try 


25 - 49;D" 

50 - 59 

60 - 69 

70 - 79 

80 - 89 
'100 - 109 
110 - 119 
120 - 149 
150 and over 

Basic Weekly Hours Used in Calculation 

of Estimated Bnployment Un'er Codes 
in Division of Research and Planning 



4 . 













Source: A ondix B 

In ITRA Studies Special Exhibits - Work Materials No. 45-B 




napkin industries. The rest, n the basis of estimates, would not have 
incroasec their number of employees to the 19.-39 level. In f o.ct , 2^' 
industries would have employed less than 70 ner cent of their 19 9 quota. 

The conclusions concerning probable hours in the codes under rigid 
adherence to this formula throughout all the code negotiati ons were: 
(1) Basic hours per we I: would have varied widely in the codes ranging 
from about ten to more than forty hours; (2) most of the codes would 
hove est blished a basic standard of considerably less than forty hours 
though individual industries night nave adopted forty hours or more; (3) 
the impracticability of reducing hours to as low as ten or twenty was 
patent and considerations in addition to the formula under consideration 
would have been neen necessary; (4) additional criteria were required 
for industries with excessive nre-IulA working hours since return to the 
1929 level in some of them would still have left average hours out of 
line with prevailing policy; (5) maintenance of a living "age on the 
shorter work "feel: would have become "particularly acute in the very in- 
dustries in which production and employment was at it? lowest ebb; (6) 
a special nelicy '"ould have been necessary with resnect to the responsi- 
bility of new or expanding industries for absorbing some of the increase 
in working ponulation and some of those who could not be returned to the 
industries where reduction of hours could not be practiced sufficiently to 
raise employment to the 1939 level; and (7) s one provision would have been 
required to employ those not reemployed through the shortening of hours, 
the public works projects and the hoped for revival of industry resulting 
from the industrial recovery measures. 

J 8 62 



CO DZS SUddlTTT duaT_'& HL LIOD THOy JU LY 6, 195 ■ to AU C-SUT 15, 

Wiiile the program established by NBA policy would have resulted in 
a iride range of hours of labor among the various industries, the employer 
proposals did not vary so markedly. The effect of the first 1IRA endeavors 
and proclamation of its purposes is given in a sura ary review :f the early 
code proposals as announced in the various newspapers and noted in the 
NBA "Press Digest" (Ap-endix D). (*) 

While the newspaper summaries were inexact, they showed the basic 
work week contemplated cy industry. During the period 1 covered extending 
over more than a month, a range of industries includi . apparel and textile 
industries, iron and steel, retail, trucking, an." construction, had drafted 
and discussed codes. These industries were "almost universally asking for 
forty (40) hour work week as a minirrvun work period. They evidently had 
taken their cue from the cotton textile code." One newswriter declared 
that "it is just as evident that theyxhose to ignore warnings by both 
the President and I-Ir, Johnson .that a forty (40) hour week w-s not to be 
taken for granted for all industries." (**) 

Ync Press Digest repo.rts were corroborated by a review of the original 
proposals of the first one-hundred approved codes. The basic hours' pro- 
posals for the production employers for these industries indicated that 
only ten contemplated a shorter basic week than forty hours (40) for their 
production employees. Those reco. .tending a shorter week were; 

30 hour basic week - cast iron soil pipe; 

32 hour basic week - bituminous coal and oil burner; 

35 hoar basic week - automobile and gasoline pump; 

36 hour basic we k - electrical, laundry and dry cleaning mach- 

inery mfg.; compressed air; heat exchange 
and punro mfg. 

Offsetting this group were the four industries which presented a longer 
than forty (40) hour basic week in their propose:! codes. (***) All of the 
other eighty-six codes were presented with a basic forty (40) hour week 
for tae production employees. (See Appendix E) 

(*) In NBA Studies Special Exhibits - Work Materials No. 45-3 

(**) Philadelphia Public Ledger, (july 18, 1933) - "General Code Being 
Hushed for L, , tr .s" - by '". W. Wheat on. 

(***) T were: s alt laanuf ac tur i ng with a basic forty-two (42) hour 
k for processing and manufacturing, and a forty (40) and 
forty-eight (48) hour week respectively for the North and the South; 
the transit industry with forty-four (44) hours for the shop and 
forty-eight (48) hours for )p rating divisions, and a forty-eight 
(48) hour basic week for motor vehicle retailing and motor bus 


The ERA was in- part, intended to minimise the ii.T-iort7i.ncc of the 
Cotton Textile Code as a precedent; "but the codes which we re submitted 1 
or even under consideration during the latter part of July and the early 
part of August after the PSA '-'rive was proclaimed, only in a limited 
number of cases, broke away from this forty (40 hour standard. In several 
instances, they did pro ose a shorter work week, particularly in the 
apparel industries, and in several metal manufacturing industries 
opera oing at a very low rite 3f capacity. 

An industry generally follower 1 the first, precedent instead of devising 
its own independent standards or trying to reach its employment levels 
of 1939*. A general uniformity resulted unrelated to the amoun": of 
unemployment in the respective branches of industry. Since the ITEA 
pro ran was founded on the principle of voluntary cooperation by industry 
these facts wore enormously significant for reemployment. 3JEA was pre- 
sented with proposals n.t developed in accordance with its .standards. 
The efiect of this drive toward uniformity in provisions concerning hours 
of work unrelated to basic conditions or ability to absorb, raised the 
question whether the Administrate :n should undertake and succeed in the 
wholesale revision of the codes toward greater conformity with NBA 
standards or whether the avalanche of similar codes presented by groups 
unwilling to accept other terms was to modify 1IRA activity and policy. 




The first indication of resoluti n )f this ^roblein appeared in 
JRA action with respect t: the President's Reemployment A r nt. The 
NRA organization turned its energies for a time towar ) alarizing 
the PRA and making it succeed. This irivo had hardly 'otten underway, 
however, before individual industries ;■■ c led to the NRA for exemptions 
fro; th basic agreement. The significant test was at hand. 

Industry generally approved PRA but sought exemptions from the ioasic 
agreement. MRA at the start adopted "the general policy., to avoid exception 
as far as possible." (*) But this policy was hardly proclaimed before it 
was found necessary to develop some systematic machinery f--r handling 
such exemption casus. Deputy a ministrators were considering exceptions 
requested by industry and confusion became evident in the absence of uni- 
form policy. Furthermore, thc'iLabor Advisory Board's inability to handle 
the smaller industries was pointed out with the recommendation that "t i 
policy of thcMRA should be to set uj some general principle which would 
govern. 11 (**) Finally, the iTRA Policy Board was established. (***) to 
correlate policies and report upon petitions for substitutions of code 
for PRA provisions. 

I Procedure for Substitutions 

I obtain a substitution the industry was required to file a copy of 
its proposals for consideration by the Administration. In the handling 
of these substitutions of the PRA standards by proposed code standards, 
the root question was wheth r 1:?A should return to the cotton textile 
precedent or accept hours' standards in terms ~f the condition of ench 
specific industry. The Administrative stand was that "there would be no 
blanket exceptions..." In those instances, however, where industry had a 
code which appeared to come close bo meeting the general objectives of the 
NRA of reemploying people in the industry and of setting an adequate 
minimum wage to increase purchasing power, the industry was permitted to 
obtain the insigni while following the usual code procodmro. The Admin- 
istrator insist. - , h wever, that "this procehir: would not be permitted 
to whittle aw . basic requirements of the h~A" (****) 

The Policy Bo .rd, as established, interpreted its functions narrowly. 
In instructions to petitioners, it declared that "the only function of the 
Bo .rd is to pass on th Licability of the code provisions is writt. . 

o docs not allow any bargaining for or negotiating or personal interviews 
Such a procedure is not only ina ,- iri be but it does n t allow for the 

(*) ' ' ' S1 V ::' . tine, July ttT'lOSS," 

(**) ■: of Staff Meeting, July 31, 1933. Statement of Dr. Leo Tfolman 

(***) On August 7, 1333, Office Order Ho. 18. 

(****) rt of St .ting, Kuly 31, 1933. Stat meat if Ocncral 
J tins on. 


pronr t tr; tment t .1 which all petitioners are entitled." (*) 

In the instruct! ons-, the pri iary purpose of the PRA was reiterated. 
It was noted that the "NRA -ill not elect to approve the substitutions 
of the provisions of the e" < - for >ar ■■. is of P3A unless such code 
provisions cover the sanfc ,_>' ■-.-.. j' v the F 14. paragr •«; .:. and unless the 
substance of such provisi 11s is within the spirit of the PEA., i.e. to 
shorten hours and raise wages, to incre sc crdr^eui nd purchasing 
power to approximately the 1922 level." (**) In fact, it was hoped that 
this procedure requiring the submission of a code previous to the re- 
quest for a.n exemption would lead to the revision of the "wages and hour 
provisi ns of a submitted code so as to nave it within the spirit of 
PRA for substitution purposes." (***) 

On the worksheet which was to he developed to support the substi- 
tutions, the applicants were requested to furnish "data to show that these 
provisi -is would bring wages and hours to approximately the 1 939 level." 

f ****\ 

II Approved Substitutions 

In view of this frequent reiteration of the 1TRA position that 
industry's proposals should be in harmony with the aims of ERA, the results 
are of special interest. In all, 566 petitions for substitutions were 
presenter by individual industries. Of this number 45 v/ere withdrawn by 
the industry; for 3 there was no record of action; 131 were disapproved 
by NRA; and 3 were rejected by the industry, iafter modification had been 
made by NBA (*****) practically all the substitutions were approved during 
August and September . 1933, principally during the former month. 

The hours' provisions in the P?.A were the ones most seriously ques- 
tioned by industry, as illustrated by the fact that -.est of the PHA 
substitutions granted related to paragra; .s 3, 3, and4of the PEA which 
governed the hours of non-productive employees, of productive employees, 
and tnc hour exemptions for specific classes, respectively. All of the 
substitutions modified one or .oovc of the hours provisions of the PRA. 
In face, 353 of the substitutions, or 91 per cent, related to the hours 
of productive employees, and 334 substitutions concerned paragraph 2, 
governin; the hours for non-productive employees (Table 2). In contrast, 
only 333 of the substitutions or 63 per cent modified the minimum wage 
rates with respect to productive employees. The modifications for the 
other paragraphs were relatively minor. The incidence of the PRA substi- 
tutions was, therefore, principally ^n the hours provisions. (Appendix P) 
( ****** \ 

(*) H. C. Hoover, "History of the President's Reemployment Agreement." 
Organization Studies Section - Draft of December 2, 1935, p. 15 

(**) Ibid., p. 44 

(***) Ibid., p. 45. 

(****) Ibid., quoted on p. 45. 

(*****) Ibid., p. 49 

(»*****) in ERA Studies Special Exhibits - Work Materials Ho. 45-B 




piFagr^aph Modified Provisions 

x£ P 3?.A, CO H IJ'S I Numbe_r of Substitutions 

3. Chilcl Labor Restrictions II 

2 Hours of ITon-Productive Emnloyees' 

3 Hours of Productive Employees 

4 Hour Exemptions (Population, 

Skilled Worker & Executive) 54 

5 Wages - ITon-productive Employees 56 

6 Wages - Productive Employees 239 

7 Maintenance of '.','-' e and 

Equitable Adjustment 30 

3 Subterfuge • 1 

9 Price Increases 7 

10 ■ Patronize ERA Establish ents 3 

11 Cooperate in Submit tin;. C 4 

12 ' Price Adjustments on Contracted Goods 3 

13 Te r:n i n 1 1 L : n o f A{ ;reeme n t s 2 

14 Undue Hardship Clause 3 

TABL1 8 


























Type of 




» ■ 







































h ■ 


























33 Ha* Max 







Plat Max 




Pk. Par. 












l l 

Plat Max 



Pk. Perd 









Plat Max 

315 2/3 
146 5/6 

jjt , 









2k Ik 



50 15 
25 k 







8 2/3 



2 1/3 

Pk. Perd. 

25 1/3 




5 1 






3 1/3 










26 8 











**• * P*t 











Plat Max 

11 1/6 




— £- 


2 /3 

k 5/6 







Pk. Perd. 






At. ft Pk. 




Plat Max 













— 5- 






Plat Max 

20 1/3 







3 1/3 

Pk. Perd. 

3 1/3 








AT. & Pk. 


i : 


Plat Max 







Plat Max 















75 23 



53 15 









III Bas i c In -jit- in Sub s titutions 

The modificati sns made in the hours provisions radically changed the 
"basic hours as conceive' by bho )ri ,;iv:l A r." . ent. 

YJhilo a thirty-five (35) hour ". : i >r roanufaeturing industries 
with a forty (40) hour we ■'■■; ncak perioc. exemption .iad been originally 
conceived as ^-equate, thii proved unsatisfactory to the trade as- 
sociation and employer groups. They filed requests for exemptions. Most 
of the 384 substitutions granted increase! the "basic hours of employment 
in addition to relaxing the peak period and seasonal tolerance permitted 
under the original President's Reemployment Agreement. Only eight sub- 
stitution- a opted the "basic hours of the PEA while one adopted a thirty- 
three (33) hour week. The other substitutions, comprising 97.6 per cent 
of all those approved adoptei a longer work week. The grouo providing for 
a forty (40) hour week included 315-2/3 of the substitutions and consti- 
tuted 8,J.l per cent of hie total number. (*) 

Of the remaining 59-1/3 substitutions, eleven adopted a thirty-six 
(36) hour wee]' an' the others obtained grants for a more than forty (40) 
hour week. The latter group consisting of 48-1/3 substitutions mainly 
provided for forty-four hours (11-1/6 substitutions) and forty-eight 
(43) hours (30-2/ 3 substitutions). The longest week approved in the 
substitutions -:. s for fifty-four (54) hours. (Table 3). This complete 
departure from the basic hours prescribed by the original PRA was a 
significant index of the industry's f orcefulnos<= in presenting to the 
iTRA the oropriety of longer hours than agree" ten on as proper and, ^adequate 
by the IRA and the Industrial Advisory Board in the original consideration 
of the PEA. The fact that the code substitutions covered industries 
employing . ore than seventeen rnilli n workers (**) showed how far 
reaching the devi tions from the PRA substitutions were from the basic 

In these substitutions ~o^j industry groups a larger proportion of 
the substitutions for the construction industry adopted the basic PRA 
substitution than 'id any other groups, hext in order cane the equipment 
and machinery group. In the following industriesail substitutions 
provided for a Jasic forty (40) hour week: forest products, rubber, textile- 
fabrics, textile-apparel, leather, furs, graphic arts, and finance. The 
following addit; nal industrial groups included no substitution with more 
than f rty (40) dours, and several with lessthan forty (40 hours; non- 
metallic minerals, fuel, and equipment and machinery. The industries with 
the largest proportion of substitutions with hours longer than forty (40) 
were in the transportation end communication group. Next in order of the 
longest proportion of hours beyond forty (40) was retail distribution 

(*) The fractions refer to substitutions where two or more sets of basic 
hours were established. If three different basic hours were provided 
the substitution was noted in each hoar group as l/3 

(**) Office o-f National Recovery Administration, Division of Review, 
Substitutions in connection with the President's Reemployment 
Agreement bj/ Paul Hatchings, Work Materials No. 30 



which also included the substitution specifying the longest hours or 
fifty-four (54). The service trades and the food groups had. also a 
significant number of subs ti tut. vis with longer hours. Few substi- 
tutions in the other industrial .roups had longer than forty (4" 1 .) hours, 

The forty (40) hour ;oat~ern, tn r< 'ore, -orevH-iled among the 
industries which obtained substitutions. The number with shorter hours 
was comparatively small; the number with "longer hours was relatively 
larger. Of course, industries desiring a thirty-five (35) havr week 
might not have requested a substitution. Howev r, the codes presented 
duria , the first two months of 1IHA and those for the industries vhich 
had not obtained substitutions indicated that they' had not, on the 
whole, subscribed to a shorter week than forty (40) hours. The codes 
with rare exceptions provided for a forty (40) hour week or lo iger. 

17. Sea s oaal Tolerances . , ; 

However, the hours provisions of the PdA substitutions were not 
found exclusively in terms of the basic hours. In fact the structure 
of tie hours provisions was. so complicated that determination of the 
actual average mao:imum honors for employees within a given industry 
was difficult without detailed calculations and intimate ^knowledge of 
the -rocticcs of the industry. Such computations must have taken 
ace von t :f employment for an entire year. It necessitate', record of: 

(a) bhe number of employees subject to flat maximum hours regulations; 

(b ) of those granted se .sonal allowances, with the number of weeks of 
the exemptions and the weekly tolerance and, (c) the occupational 
exemptions from the ba.sic hours involvin calculation of the numbcr 

of a.rpleyocs and the tolerance per wec*k.(*)fffee seasonal and occupational 
exemptions permitted a Ion, er working week and, consequently, higher 
average annual maximum hours for the industry than possible under the 
flat maodmum rules without ex; qnti ms. Industries sought to increase 
pea'.:, seasonal and occupati aal exemptions insofar as permitted. Basic 
weekly hours leaat to many not the maximum, but the average attained 
if slack and peaks were included. ' The conflict between these t"o con- 
caots was a significant phase ia the history of 1IHA policy, 

A. IFlat Maximum fieaulations 

Of the entire 384 substitutions, 134.5 established flat maximum 
regulations for their hours of work. (Table 4). Of these, eight had 
les c than (40) hours and 39-3/3 cod's more than forty (40) hours. In 
n important industry grou- did the substitutions consist conclusively 
jf flat i aximum regulation of hours, although -ibout forty per cent of 
the substitutions in most groups consistoc of such fl.t maximum regulation. 
In the textile apparel group sixteen :<f the eighteen substitutions eon- 
bair.v 1 such specifications. The forest products (four out of five), 
tcxtilc-fobrics (thirty- one jut ^f seventy- f our) and service trades 
(6.^ out of ten) were next in proportion of their substitutions in this 
group. The graphic arts and the oetals, ferrous and aon-fcrrous, 
ncrally permitted wider seasonal variations then the other groups. 

(*) Sc Appendix C for m an? lysis. seas aal anc' occupational cx- 
e iptions for 31 selected codes. In L1BA Studios Special Exhibits 
Work"- Materials '.To. 45-B 













1— I 






W co 

§ 9 

3 Ph 
n c5 















Jlr dl 
in b OJ 


° £ : 



to d|Hk« 

J- o o 


in d cm 

J- o 

OJ *_0 

O d 

.3 o 

v.o d 

m o 



i i i i i i I : j i i i i i i i i ti i h 

I I I I I I I I h|(V i I I j | | | | | t | 


I t I I i-i I I 1 m I I I i-H I I t^v I oj .zf m 

I I I I I I I I I I ! 1 I I I I I HH | 


I I I t I rH I I rH | .! . .! H | I I I 



Ln d| 


m d 
m o 



CD Ci fn 

fn crt o d 

£3 -P W, OJ 



O d 
J- o.h- , 

a h ! j 

to " ": i 

OJ OJ I CM (TiH H r~> — i_=i- J"U) (\J in.H/ | CV in H H Ol 
rH rH OJ rH rH CU rH 

I" r^-S illttlllittii— ill iii 

I i-H I I I ! .1 •!-« I I I I I I r-t | I III 

I I 1 I I I I rH I I | I I I I | | Ti I | | 



O m 

u --. 

P< OJ 

I I 1 I rH rH | | h t I I OJ | H^ | <1 LOlLn^l- 


C rHl m 

O HP' 

cj oj i w (TiH h m j3r j- vxj oj inj- i ai in -h h h w 

rH rH OJ rH rH OJ -P rH 


! oj s h 

I cj cj o d 

co rf J$ o 

hi ^ M 






I -=f 1 I ! I 1 CM I 1 I I I I CJ t J cj ; j i 

O rijTO 

CM VD o w o w HinnJ-vooi r—j^r \o, in m ^ >6>.o r • 

rH rH rH m rH rH OJ rH 








CO rH 





rH -H 






OJ d 
rH -P 



















1 1 















01 OJ 







M -P 











c u 




T~i -d 





fn oy 

•h <; 







[ ' 






■ ■' 


r< rH 




Pi fn 

«J O 





Eh EH 








ft o 

O -H 






• • 








i; ; 

•H ,c! 






rH rH 







r o 




I -H 





-P -P 





ft rQ 



1 1 

« rj 






OJ 0J 











cd u 






•H -H 

f— 1 

! . 




1 1 


EH t-q 

N c 

C • 




v ) 

(h n 



aver -j 


wo rid 


J- -, 4- 1 

t .it 

" 1 C 


Sincc the industries generally sought flexibility in hours provisions 
at various times, the other substitutions, some 300 in number, included 
provisions for peal" .:■'- seas v 1 c editions desi nated in the sub- 
stitution. Cn the whole, these cases f II within two categories: averag- 
ing and define 1 c : ■•■erioc. tolerances. They considerably increased 
the average maximum wort wc. :. 

3. Avo raging 

than three-quarters :.f the foregoing substitutions adopted 
Ing method of seasonal t dcrrice, This procedure allowed 
ig tine aggregating specific." Maxima in given weeks, but 
iver a specified nuhber of weeks or months was not to exceed 
average specific 1- in the code. Tno most frequent averaging 
period adopted in the substitutions was eighc to ten weeks, although 
the four to five weeks an 1 the thirteen ?/eeks period were common. In 
twenty substitutions the averaging period was six months and in four, 
one year. (Tables 5 and 6). In these industries the significant pro- 
vision was frequently the maximum weekly hours rather than the basic 
hours stated in the code, ■.-.incc slack periods permitted, the weekly 
inaximum specified in the code to beco e the real operating hours for the 
industry. The modal difference between the basic and the actual weekly 
time was eight hours (109.5 substituti ons) . In the substitutions for 
thirty industries weekly hours were unlimited so long as the average 
over the designated period did nit exceed the specified, basic standard. 
(Table 7). The averaging orocec.ure was later declared by NBA to be 
the provision mo~t difficult to enforce and most subject to abuse. It 
did. nuc.i to modify the basic hours est blished in, if not complete- 
ly to nullify their intent. 

C. Pari: Period. Tolerance 

The second type )f toierooicc "oermitoed. definite -ocak periods during 
specified periods if t _io year. This peak period tolerance was evidently 
a more adequate administrative and comiliancc method than averaging for 
meeting special and unusual cas r. The definite peak period tolerance 
could. b< •■ accurately defined, and. therefore mire carefully safeguarded, 
from rdouse o:aC restricted to the actual needs if the industry. The 
whole procedure depended, >f coa.rse, upon development of standards and 
)olicy concerning the proper grant or use of tolerances; but IfdA ex- 
perience was too brief for their development and the insistent desire 
of industry for tolerance toi strong to permit proper consideration of 
this problem. Single formulae wore s ought irrespective of its short- 
comings and its possible effect on the regular izat ion of emoloyment. 

Of the total sxidstituti ons , 35 provided, peal: periods. The greatest 
number were in the seasonal food industries, in wholesale distributing 
and in the equipment and machinery classification. The propriety of a 
peak period -orovision depends upon the degree of their adaptation to 
the industry's requirements. This is shown by the length if the peak 
period tolerance, (Tables 6 and 9). The most common duration was six 
weeks, but twenty of the thrity-five codes established periods if twelve 
wcehs or less. However, six substituti oas extended, the tolerance 
provisi ni over an entire year or 1 >r m unlimited time. .Actually, 
therefore, working time in these industries could be indefinitely .extended 
without violating the provisions of the P3A substitution. Obviously a 








• lo 










35 s jflgj ait&i 

6 mo 8. 48 


1 year 48 

36 4 eke. 42 

6 aoa. 42 


4-5 wke. 55" 

Total 138J, 

5 11 2 3 8 11 

13 26 8 2 1 20 10 1 2 2 

^7 3 



1 1 

1 4 

■ Unltd. 








6 wks. 48 












8-10 wks. 44 



















1 63 







13 rice. 44 




















4 moe. 48 









6 moe. 44 















1 Tear 45 


42 13 wks. Unltd. 



44 6 idee. 48 


6 mos, 48 


48 4 ifee. unltd. 


3 moe. Unltd. 


6 moi. Unltd. 


1 year 56 


50 2 moe. Unltd. 


















6 2 





pra substitutions ":ii: Airaj jiitg 7- n o: 

HOTillS Air A'Tj.I C;-I' t G 

>:o r: i; provisions, by b^sic 


1 - 




1TC I- 








3 - 
we el 

:s : 


: 4 mo. 

: 6 mo. 

: 1 

j" ear 


: 155-1- : 







: 3 

: : 20 






































: ■ 44 

' ' 3 

































Hours : 















Difference Be t we :- n 3 a sic and Maximum Weekly Hours 

• • • ■ • i t 

• • • • *• • • 

4 hrs.:5 hrs.:6 hrs.;8 irs.:12 hrs.: 13 h rs. :14 hrs.:Unl. 

3 - 1 

2 - 1 - 

6 1 108% - 1 22 


Total 155% 

2 109 \ 




provision so easily evaded was of slight value in effecting reemploy- 

The second aspect of the study of peak period tolerance was the 
allowed maximum weekly hours during the tolerance period. The mode 
here, as in averaging, was eight hours. Four substitutions .provided 
a four hour difference from the basic week, while eight, on the other 
hand, permitted unlimited hours during the peak period. The latter 
substitutions with no restrictions during peak periods therefore 
cancelled any possible effect upon unemployment achieved by shorten- 
ing of the hours during normal operation. (Table 10). 

D. Averaging and Peak Period Tolerance 

Nine substitutions contained both peak oeriod tolerance and 
averaging provisions. The industries concerned, largely in the fabri- 
cating and food groups and ordinarily operating under averaging 
arrangement s, were permitted for specific limited peak periods to 
work special hours which were not counted in the normal averaging pro- 
cess. Such substitutions still further expanded the hours pro- 
visions. ( Table ll). .. 

























1— 1 

i ! 











; ; 

< -i 






CO [H 


[ i 



iJ I— i 


FH Eh 

! H 

<r; in 

H B 








; c l 

1— 1 
















i -1 

r : 











I Viqsxcr 

CM H 7h 



sap-jjj, *j:q.sTQ; 

LT\ H - ,— ; - 



sq-if OT-qcT-SJ-E) 



rH H 

g jcatTq/aai 




•• •• -. 



r-l r ' rH rH rH 

CM rH 

=§> q.tcarjt5!fTU)rj 


H rH 



:y sSrutci ' 'naiTQ 

(H rH rH 





rH rH 

r^, rH 

hJ?3 i-:!'.. 1 r^ 
HaiHOIHHriHHWHH rH rH -~-- 



C\J H"^ 










rH O 

rH O 

j-^h-j-j-j-j-j-j-j-^h-j-j- cm 3- ct> r: 

LP. Lo 


• TO • 
rH • rH 

a cm a 



— w 

rH F 




• M 

■d i| 

- "P 




• • rvj . 

W W W ^xj W ^rj W.- W W W W CO Cd C/3 

jy ,M •*! & c Es • 0-PMAiidi!>!| o^ 

ts £ & s a h & f & t t >> r 

cvj _=f S rt 
H;U) W HJ (\1 1 — £> -=r U5 60 1 - 1 C | , . | u . 

VO rH 


CO to CO 
kJ y m 

te P.: r 






















o w 

n R 


t t-H 

EH Fh 

^ p 









o w 





















*• • • 







• * • • 


i— i 












• • •• 










.. .. 






» • » * 

















O W 

•H U 

M rj 

Cv! Q 








ro r^i r^\ 

rH H rH 

r*^ r*~, rr> 

OJ J- m 












Total : 




ween Basic and "la: 


"eekly Hours 




:U.S to 
. : 5 hrs. 



8 hrs. : 


i b 111 




















25 1/3 



isi * 


l 1/3 ** 









3 1/3 





2 1/3 








* Includes one substitution giving one week of US hours during each 
S~week period. 

** Includes one substitution with peak limited to lkh hours per year. 






Averaging ! 



Non : 
Met : 
Liin : 

Eao : 

Con • 

Retail : 



Maximum ■ 




2 mo. 


1 Unlt'd. 



1 : 

12 mo. 

unit» a. 

! U nfcs. 



i 1 ! 

10 wks. 


! lb v:!:s. 




6 mo. 

Unit ' d. 

1 year 

lUU • 
extra hr 



S wks. 


:1 uk. ea.S 






12 mo. 


: lo -.71: s. 

52. S 




12 mo. 


: S \.'l:s. 



: 1 


o- ' 

l.:-3 : l 



V. 0c cunat icnal ^xerrot ior.s 

These seasonal and ;ieal: period .provisions did not exhaust the list 
of exemptions. The basic hours were further modified by the exceptions 
of specific types of employees. Although analysis of their relative 
importance is beyond the scope of this study, about a fourth of the 
e: ployees under 31 codes for which evidence is availabe were either 
totally or to a United degree exempt f~or. basic hours provisions, the 
proportion being 1" per cent for each type. Since another 62.3 per 
cent cane under seasonal raid peri: period provisions these exemptions 
markedly effected the probabilities of 'reemployment for those indus- 
tries. : Appendix C. (*) : : 

Of the PPA substitutions 21 contained no modification of paragraph 
4 providing for additional occupational exemptions, (Table 12). The 
most common occupational exemptions under PuA --ere for watchmen (223); 
engineers (122 substitutions); firemen (112 substitutions); and repair- 
men (103 substitutions). These also tended to modify the hours' regu- 
lations, reducing the necessity of hiring additional persons and, with 
it, opportunities for reemployment. 

VI. Conclusion : 

The actual terms, of the T'A substitution brought out. the. gap be- 
tween the original basic PHA agreement and the terms of the substitu- 
tions under which industries actually operated. Instead of a simple 
arrangement originally contemplated "ay the Agreement with a thirty-five 
hour week for manufacturing and a forty (4n) hour week for service in- 
dustries, the rule became fort; r (d- n ) hours with substitutions more fre- 
quently establishing a longer than 0. shorter work reek. Though it had 
originally contemplated grant of but few substitutions, PHA became more 
identified with the employment .standards of the substitutions than with 
those in the original agreement. Hours of labor provisions -ere quali- 
fied ~q-j longer basic hours and exemptions for seasonal and peri; periods 
and for specific occupations. 

The first test disclosed wholesale departure from original IIRA 
standards. Uith these modif ications went the influence which the 
agreements might have exerted upon future codes. In some codes PFA. 
agreements, instead of temporary drafts subject to wholesale revisions, 
became the standards for code negotiations, and PFA substitutions were 
decisive in determining the hours pattern of the 1"HA codes. 

A pattern was established for the basic hours. Unlike the one 
contemplated by the rigid enforcement 0" the 1929 employment level theory, 
these substitutions adopted uniform basic hours but varied largely in 
terms of the seasonal or peri: period or occupational exemptions. The 
short period available for the stud;- of these substitutions afforded no 
opportunity for study or assurance that the exemptions really were 

(*) In IRA Studies Special Exhibits - Tier!; ! .terials ITo. 45-B. 





■* 8* 

© o 









y '* « 

(3 CO 

•H • 

♦ go 

d P o 

o o u 

O p Pj 




w <5 


CO P< 

Y *" «3 

► - 

■re >>M 

rH U O 

« • M 


y ™ • 


4 9 A 

a ■•* d 


« "3 

... ? . 

y** ■ 

u i d 

rH U -H 

.. .. .. 

« d 

M V 

i-l Q 


y j ~ 

•h t* y 

*H> *• •• 


o d 

4* «D 

<6 a 
























WH l<V 

I «-l r-l 

I ir»ir\rHrHCvj<yOir\r'\c\jvo t irv rH rH .p- cvj 

h r^ cvj 

rH^tlr-Hltlllltlllll III 

lltlr-tl|(M|||||lll| I I rH 

|mirlKV|H»UVni^r4Nl I I I Pl, I I I 





t I I H 1^ h trty) W H H* N I I I rH o kv t? 



I U5 rH 

I I— r-l 

I -P I 

<D I 

t i-- I 

A- ir» | 


O • 

N « l^i |VD H W W |OC\J | CM I i-tr-tHfO ® O, 
rH iH fci rH ® P 

M r-l W 

Wr-f-Hr-ih-HOtO WMW I CVI I 6-i | N I 
rH r-l rH OT 

I -a 



^J-HWOMT>r-Hrl» | I lf\ 1 'ed P, 

r-l H „ « 


■h d 
♦> p 


rH cy cvj « • >d 

* 9 


r<\ O CJ> r-l J" tfV O OV N H H I I I rH <T* I fl fl 


4» 4» 

itvm> cvj r-i cvi rH cvj «o r*\vr> vo r-i ir> i-h 

lH r-l CVJ .p- rH K\ 






















rH SJ 
CO | rH 





• * 

1 » 

f>H Pl 


O . 






h • 
M • P, 

■ ,0 tj «p 

Q, rP P\ O 

aT p o* o 

fe ft H N 

rH I 



•h H «B 








a) A 
c « 

M ♦» o 

P Jh, «H 

v4 << 4* 


O iH C 

»< 4 f 

§• s 

Ja ° 










d u 
o e< 


4» «> 

P O 

C9 -H 

s t 

9 CD 

e rH 
rH -H 

eo P 

I I 



rl U 

O" EH 

(i r< 

+> 4* 

CO (O 

▼I -H 

•a •a 

•H iH 

o u 


o c 
d d 
o o 

■ <a 
e eo 


rH rH 
O O 

d d 


required "by the industry, The pressure of industry proposals over- 
whelmed the Administration and forced it to yield to industry's own 
proposals and did not permit it to effect pay wholesale revisions to 
make then conform to JBJRA policy. While less than forty hours per week 
would have been required according; to t.v. Division of Research and 
Planning calculations, the substitutions provided generally for forty 
hours or nore with few e::cppti' ns plus extended concessions in the form 
of tolerances and occupational e^e.ipticns which in a definite number of 
cases completely nullified all restrictions, and in other cases per- 
mitted operations at levels far e::ceedin." those current in the industry. 
In the PRA substitutions 1TRA gave up its goal of reemployment to the 
192S level in e^ch industry and accepted a basic pattern uniform for 
most inchutries above that originally contemplated. By excepting this 
position "HA greatly reduced its opportunities for marked increases of 
reenplojrnent. hevertheless, the reemployment achieved during the period 
was marked, estimated at about two and three quarter millions in face of 
a declining trend of production. (*) 

(*) Avne Page's "UnemplojTnent and Reemployment", Division of Revie' 
Work kateri-'ls 45, Part B. gee tables on PDA. 





The above situation as depicted presents Hhl' s dilemma from the 
start. liRA policies ■■."ere formulated; its objectives -ere clear; its 
standards were but vaguely suggested. The PI1A set up a definitive 
guide, "but its substitutions broke this down. I .dustriespproposed codes 
with hours' provisions oased more on the Cotton Textile Code and on 
certain views expressed at the inception oi' ITSA than on the principles 
enunciated by 17IBA. Further, practice deviated still more fron ex- 
pressed standards through the provisions for flexibility and occupation- 
al exemptions anr? for longer hours. 

I . The Admin is trative Cfficial 

The proposal:- submitted to the ISA '"ere mostly unsatisfactory, 
judged by pronounced standards. This discrepance between proposals and 
Administration standards constituted the basis of the negotiations 
carried on in ilEA. These -re re placed in the hands of the deputy or as- 
sistant deputy administrator charged with the consideration of the code. 
He played a manifold role. His first duty was to aid in shaping the c 
code to square with the Administration's objectives; - recovery and 
reemployment . He was to apply the standards set by the Administration. 
At the same tine, he was usually free to form conclusions concerning the 
capacity of the industry to carry the burden of increased pay rolls. In 
actual practice he was generally unchecked in the early months by ad- 
ministrative review. Cases arose where a deputy sought to increase 
hours because of his own views concerning means toward recovery. 

I I . Voluntary Hrtui-e of Code System 

The deputy's power to make changes in any proposed code was limited 
because the voluntary assent of the representative employer group was 
the dominant factor. Though the history of HRA code negotiations is 
full of instances where imposition of codes was threatened, no such 
codes were actually imposed upon any industries. In cases where imposed, 
they were rejected by industry and' rendered inoperative. (Structural 
iron and steel fabricating industry and artificial limb industry). (*) 

(*) For extended description of Structural Iron and Steel 

Fabricating Industry Code see: Solomon Barkin' s "Labor 
and the Codified Construction Industry under N.P..A." 
Building Trades Department of American Federation of 
Labor, Washington, 1935, pp. 5-10; for artificial limb 
industry, see Code History for the Code of Fair .Compe- 
tition for the Artificial Limb Industry by H. 1". Davies. 



This was important since a determined industry group could create unu- 
sual problems of negotiations. In addition, the administrate e organi- 
zation attempted quickly to complete the codification of industry. 
Individual officials were urged to consummate negotiations, receiving 
frequent administrative inquiries concerning delays experienced in codi- 
tions of an industry. Llany- yielded to this pressure because the word 
uas passed about in administrative circles, toward the end of 1932, that 
there would be a period of wholesale re T ision of codes when all of the 
conflicts, inequalities, and contradictions would be straightened out. 
Only in a limited number of cases was the Administration willing to 
delay approval of codes in order to secure higher standards. 

III. Trade Practice and Labor Prov isions 

Counteracting these tendencies was the desire of many industries 
for special trade practice and price or production control provisions. 
Under such circumstances deputy administrators or their assistants '.ere 
in a position to negotiate for significant modification's of labor provi- 
sions of the code, particularly if they were in full possession of the 
economic data on the industry. Industrial groups were frequently will- 
ing to go a considerable distance in exchanging concessions with respect 
to labor provisions. The trade practice contiol provisions' in such 
cases represented compromises which employers were willing to accept as 
the price for the advantages of .a code. However, relatively- little ef- 
fort was made to use the leverage of practice provisions to secure 
higher labor standards. 


I V . Labor Participation 

It was the presence of the la.bor representatives which helped to 
assure consideration for labor's interests and compliance with stated ad- 
ministrative policy. Their relation to the code negotiations varied ac- 
cording to the industries and the Administration officials in charge. In 
all codes, labor representatives could present their case at a public 
hearing and be represented at pre and post-public hearing conferences by 
a person designated by the Labor Advisory Board. However, deputies not 
entirely friendly to labor's position could minimise the opportunities for 
the later meetings. At these conferences, the administrative official 
could assume one of several attitudes. He could follow the principle, _ . 
that determination of labor provisions could be most equitably developed 
between the employer and the labor representatives, remaining in the 
background unless differences became irreconcilable. He could adopt the 
attitude that he was to revise the code according to his own idea, call- 
ing upon the labor adviser only when he believed it desirable. In this 
case he frequently restricted negotiations to specific unsettled matters. 
Finally, some officials believed that their province was to make decisions 
and carry on negotiations and that the adviser was merely to furnish 
them with suggestions and supporting data, but not to participate in any 
of the discussions. . 

The course pursued was in part determined by the forcefulness of 
the labor representative, the place of labor organization in the industry, 
the industry's attitude, the personality of the deputy administrator, 
and NRA administrative direction. The labor representatives comprised 
(l) officials of unions in the specific industry; (2) officials of unions 
claiming jurisdiction in the industry but representing only small numbers 
of workers; (3) officials of unions in cognate industries in cases where 
organization or competent leadership was absent in the particular indus- 
try; (4) members of the Labor Advisory Board; and (5) members of the staff 
of the Board. The burden of the negotiations fell particularly on the 
fourth and fifth groups as many of the industries under consideration 
were not unionized, and union officials were busy with their organization- 
al duties, so that even when able to participate in the public hearing, 
they were usually not free to follow through the many succeeding negotia- 
tions, appear at the numerous conferences, or attend to the mounting de- 
tail accompanying prolonged consideration of each code. Only in a limited 
number of cases, where particular industries were well organized and codes 
were early approved was there continuous participation of union officials. 
It fell upon staff members to watch. NHA routine and policy, and to define 
official procedures and to assure labor's participation in the negotia- 
tions. It was the presence of organized labor on the Labor Advisory 
Board plus the position of the Board to review each code which furnished its 
major leverages. 

V. MA Folic;- 

No less imoortant v/as the "fish-bowl" concept of code development 


prevalent within NBA. The three Advisory Bocrds established to represent 
the consumer, industry and labor interests were called into the negotia- 
tions. In fact, during the early hearings supervised by the Administrator 
himself, the post-hearing committees were almost formally constituted of 
representatives from the Industrial and Lahor Advisory 3oards particular- 
ly. The precise place of these Advisory Boards and detailed procedures, 
including circumstances under which the deputy administrator nas called 
upon to invite these Boards into the process of negotiation were set 
forth in an early office order dated August 5, superseding an earlier one 
of July 24. The Advisory Boards were to receive copies of the tentative 
codes together with the code analysis suggestions. They were to partici- 
pate in a conference with the deputy administrator and with the steering- 
committee of the industry. For the public heariii-:, the Boards were to 
designate an official adviser. After the public hearing, they were to 
submit reports on each revision and to participate in whatever meetings 
and conferences were called. This principle of participation by the ad- 
visers was frequently reaffirmed by office memoranda, informal instruc- 
tions and the activities of the advisers themselves. 

Tlie resulting negotiations varied in character and effectiveness. A 
few had the character of actual collective bargaining between labor and 
employers before the code was presented to the administrator. A few others 
developed into collective bargaining after submission of the code and during 
consideration by the Administration. A third somewhat larger group, was the 
product of negotiations between. employers and unions which were effectively 
organized but could not bargain. for the entire industry, nor speak for all 
the employers. Their control of parts of the industry, however, gave them 
a bargaining leverage. This group concluded what were 'called "union-do ni- 
nated" negotiations. L'ost com -only, in more than 35 per cent of the codes, 
"representative bargaining" was conducted by a union or person designated 
by the Labor Advisory Board representing labor in the negotiations. These 
negotiations without the force of union backing had to rely on precedent, 
argumentation, objective evidence and purported IDA policy and strength. 
In this weaker bargaining position effectiveness depended upon the support 
of the administrative official iOA policy and the industry' s desire for a 
code. Heal collective bargaining power took place only in few cases. The 
administrative official in charge of the code was the pivotal figure in the 
administrative process if changes were to be made. 

Actual operation of policy and determination of provisions concerning 
basic hours of employment were evidenced, for one thing, in the changes 
made in basic hours in the first one-hundred codes approved as compared with 
the original proposals. These first hundred rerjresented indxistries submit- 
ting codes before precedents became established and easily copied. In the 
second place, the evolution of policy was apparent in the codes which devi- 
ated from the dominant forty (40) hour pattern of the F2A substitutions 
and from the early draft of codes. 

Revisions during the period of the administr-.tive consideration of the 
first one-hundred approved codes indicated that the basic hours' provisions 
were not materially altered. Only nine codes were approved with shorter 
basic weekly hours than originally proposed; — 50 codes were approved with 
the same basic hours as propose':, but with more strictly defined seasonal 
or occupational tolerances; — 35 codes were approved with the same basic 




.eekly hours as proposed and retaining- their recommended seasonal and 
occupational tolerances; and six codes were approved with longer weekly 
hours than originally proposed. (Appendix £.)(*) Only 15 out of the 
first one-hundred approved codes had their basic hours changed from 
the original >roposals. (Gee Appendix 1. ) (**) Six of the nine codes 
in which hours were reduced were among the first twenty approved codes. 

These first hundred showed the importance of expediency, 
precedent and personalities, and the roles of labor and industry in 
determining the orovisions regulating nours of work. 

(*) In NBA' Studies Special Exhibits - Work Materials Ho. 45 = B. 
(**) In ilHA Stucdes Special Exhibits - Work Materials No. 45 = B. 




Of the first approved cooes which contained shorter hours than 
originally proposed comprised nine industries, viz. , shipbuilding and 
shiprepairing, coat anu suit, lumber and timber products, petroleum, 
men's clothing, cast iron soil pipe, motor vehicle retailing, cress, 
and lire extinguishing appliance. The original craft, for the ship- 
building and shiprepairing industry, for example, suggested forty 
(40) hours; but these were reduced in the approved coce to an average 
of thirty-six (,36) Lours for merchant building and of thirty- two (32) 
for Government work. In shipbuilding and the coat and s uit industries 
the reductions effected through the negotiations period were sub- 
stantial; while in others, such as the lumber ana timber products and 
fire extinguishing appliance industries, the reduction was not so great. 

The questions raised in connection with approval of lours provi- 
sions included: (l) Industry's position pnd it;; defense; (2) the 
parties to the controversy; (3) the arguments and. the statistical 
information presented; (-.'•) the position of the administration; (5) the 
types of negotiations which led to the change; (6) the part p] yed by 
various industry and labor ;roups in effecting the modification; (?) the 
theory which underlay the final acce itance of the proposal by the 
Administration if such w; s >v nounced. In general when discussion of 
the codes brought about reduction in hours the results were mainly due 
to: (l) efforts of the Administration; (2) combined pressure of the 
Adaini strati on and the labor representatives; and (3) collective 

I. Hours Reduced hy Direct Efforts of Administration. 

A. Lumber and Timber Products. 

In the lumber and timber products industry, the reduction in 
conformity with ERA policy came about through administrative efforts 
without the assistance of a substantial labor organisation and in face 
of opposition from certain sections of the industry. The problem was 
to maintain the forty (40) hour week. The conference of the southern 
hardwood lumber industry, meeting June 15, 1933, set the eight (8) 
hour day and the six dry week as its code requirement, (*) but excepted 
woodsmen, who were to work not more than forty-eight (43) hours a 
week. At the meeting of the National Lumber Manufacturers Association 
two weeks later the main issue was the difference over hours of 
employment. At that time, accorc Ln ; to the report of one industry 
representative, "most of the mill owners ell agreed to a thirty-six 
(36) hour wee]-; but west coast lumber nen, because snow makes their 
season short, argue they need a forty-ei ;ht (^ l 0) -hour week". (**) 

(*) Florida Times Union, June 16, 1933. 

(**) Comment at this meeting aid in Chica ;o, June 15, 1933, ~oy 
Mr. E. C. Mason, Secretary of the Western Pine Association. 
"The Morning Ore onian" - Portland, Oregon (June 29, 1933). 


., ■ . , -61- 

1:****) (Continued.) 

West coast logging and lumber industry; 48 hours per week 
is recognized as maximum working shift adapted to plants and 
physical operating conditions in this industry. The present 
maximum working shift shall be 48 hours per week in logging 
camps and 40 hours per week in lumber manufacture. 

Western pine industry, the sane as in west coast logging 
and lumber industry, except in Arizona and New Mexico, where 
standards shall be the same as in the southern pine industry. 

Western red cedar shingle industry, the same as in the west 
coast logging and lumber industry. 

Woodwork industry: The present maximum shall be 40 hours 
per week as an average for each half-year period, with 48 hours 
the maximum for any one week. 

Southern hardwood industry, 48 hours per week; mahogany 
industry, 40 hours per week; oak flooring industry, 48 hours . . ... 
per week; Philipine mahogany industry, 40 hours per week; 
veneer industry, Southern zone 44 hours per week; Northern zone, 
40 hours per week. 

Walnut industry, 40 hours per week; northern hardwood 
industry, 48 hours per week; maple flooring industry, 48 hours 
per week; hardwood dimension industry, 48 hours per week; 
northeastern hardwood industry, 48 hours per week. 


1. Management's Case 

The representatives cf the industry declared that forty- eight 
(43) hours were customary in the northwest and generally nearly 
sixty (60) in the south. The southern lumber representatives 
proposed a forty-eight (-18) hour week, estimating that this change 
would reemploy some 31,250 persons but would still leave the total 
number of workers in the industry at about seventy-five percent 
(75,j) of those in 1S29. These southern representatives stated 
that a "lesser work week" would bring "dislocations" as "manual 
labor is predominant and the climatic conditions will not permit 
of high practices. " (*) 

The hours of employment in the northwest had been agreed upen 
by the representatives of the employer and of the employee representa- 
tion organization in the northwest, the Loyal Legion of loggers and 
Lumbermen, who submitted it a.s complying with Section 7(b) of the 
Act. (**) They proposed a thirty-six (36) hour week with elastic 
provision for a forty (4C) hour week if required hy the job or to 
balance production, consumption and employment. (***) Since in the 
industry in the northwest daring the first six months of 1933, 
"twenty-one percent (21;.-.) of (the) production was at shifts less 
than thirty-six (36) hours; 13.75 percent at a forty (40 hour shift;) 
13.69 at a furty-four (44) hour shift; sixteen percent (16;;) at 
forty-eight (48) hours and twenty-one percent (21 ) at various 
shifts in excess of forty-eight (4-8) hours." (****) A forty (40) 
hour week was proposed for mills and a forty-eight (48) hour week 
for logging camps* The short duration of lc camp operation 
and the limited housing facilities were given as the reasons for 
the particular exemptions, also impractability of a double shift 
and the logging camp worker's need to earn a satisfactory yearly 
income during the shorter period. It was estimated that the :.-C 
hour week in the sawmills v/ould result in the reemployment in the 
northwest of 14,000 workers. The forty (40) hour reel. s recom- 
mended to assure flexibility "to permit practical adjustments of 
the operating conditions to the desired volume of construction or 
to the actual order file", "recognizing the fact tha.t a con- 
siderable number of operations will actually observe a shorter week." 
(*****) The 'eartern pine industry, however, averred that its problems 
were particularly seasonal and that the fifty-four (54) hour maximum was 
suited to its conditions that the forty-eight (48). C ther areas pro- 
tested against differentiation between the logging and the mill areas 
and asked for a flat forty-eight hour week for both. (******) 

(*) Testimony of Mr. C. G. Sheppard - July 2C , 1933, Release No. 70 
pp. 52-59. 

(**) Testimony of Mr. Ruegnitz, President of the L.L.L.L. , ?. 39, 

and Colonel W. B. Greely, of the "west Coast Lumber Manufacturers 

Association, p. 1015. 

(***) Testimony of Mr. Suegnitz - p. 89. 

(****) Testimony of Mr. Greely, p. 1007. 

(*****) Testimony of Colonel W. 3. . :ely, pp. 1000-10C4. 

(******) Testimony of ff. S. Johnson, California White and Sugar Pine 

Association, p. 4014. 


2. Contrary Positions. 

Sharp protest against the proposed hours. was voiced by the rep- 
resentative of the Coos Bay Lumber Com .-any, who recommended a thirty- 
six (36) hour week for the loggin ; camp snd a thirty (30) hour week 
for the. Sawmill, together v/itb a minimum wage of fifty (50<f) cents 
which was considerably above the hi hest rate in the. proposed code. 
He contended that the "effect of sn eight hour day on West coast 
unemployment in the Douglas fir region (will be) no reemployment." (*) 
As for the proposal for the logging operations, he contended that "no 
one operates longer (than forty-eight hours) today and no one has 
for years. " With reference to the sawmills, he remarked that "very 
few operating units are or have recently been operating forty (40) 
hours per week at full hourly capacity." He indicated that the 
only mills operating on such basis or longer were those which 
"kept the markets demoralized by a two hour shift. " (**) 

the representative of organized labor (***) declared that "it 
is impractical to consider a work week of forty (-40) to forty- eight 
(48) hours when twelve million hove no way to earn their daily bread." 
In recommending a shorter work week he remarked that the proposed 
schedule "will not reemploy any of the unemployed in the industry." (**** 

3. The Administrative Modification of the Code. 

The Administrator was critical of the proposals by the industry. 
When the operators asked for approval on July. 22 of their proposal 
"to give immediate consideration to the matter of at least a ten- 
tative, ap iroval of waking effective immediately the schedules as 
filed in relation to working hours and minimum wages," (*****) he 
refused the request because he was dissatisfied with the provisions. 
(******) As a result changes were made in the code after the public 
hearings were completed on July 26. The revised draft was siibmitted 
on July 28, after lengthy conferences by the Emergency National Com- 
mittee. Strikes in the Pacific Northwest impelled the industry to 
seek a speedy solution but no marked: concessions were made in the 
hours provisions. (*****-**) in fact, except for a rephrasing of the 

(*) Testimony of Mr. W. Denman, July 24, 1933, p. 3008. 

(**) Ibid. , pp. 3008-3010. 

(***) Mr. William Green was organized labor's principal rep- 
resentative at this hearing. 

(**»*) Ibid., July 21, 1933, p. 1032. 

(*****) Ibid. , p. 2006. 

(******) Journal of Commerce, July 25, 1933. 

(•,******) Q n j^y 28, Mr. J. D. Tennant addressed General Johnson informing 
him that the Emergency National Committee was extremely anxious 
tn obtain early approval of the code in view of the "agitation 
and strikes (which) are being fermented. Uncertainty of prospec- 
tive wages and hours of work is causing much anxiety among both 
employees and employers. " Code histroy Exhibit R. See also Journ- 
al of Commerce, July 29, 1933, Tacoma Times, August 21, 1933. 



provision to define more specifically the nature of seasonal operations 
and to require that allowances for them be granted by the administrative 

ncies of the various division, no changes were made. Basically, the 
code retained the principle of the forty hour week for sawmills in the 
northwest and in certain minor cases, and the forty-eight (48) hours 
for, logging operations and all other sawmills. 

' Following this, on August 1, the Administrator definitely den- 
ied the request for temporary approval of the wage and hour provisions 
to allay uncertainty in the industry. He continued to negotiate for 
a more complete revision of the labor provisions particularly with 
respect to the low minimum wages arid the hours provisions. This stand 
was based upon the conclusion that a forty (40) hour week applicable 
t<-> all districts "as well as for the northwest" would be desirable 
"although this represents an average shortening of hours approximately 
1/5 for the south and north as compared with 3/l0 to l/6 for the 
northwest." It was estimated that "an increase in volume of sales 
•took place' permitting an increase of about fifty per cent of recent 
rates of production," would "restore employment t? as many persons as 
were occupied with lumber and timber products industries in the south 
during 1929. (*) 

As to the Douglas Fir industry, it was expected that the "re- 
duction to forty (40) hours per wee 1 , in both mills and camps would 
not provide as much employment, on a relative basis, as the same 
schedule when applied to operations in - the south." (**) Therefore, 
the forty (40) hour week was accepted by the Administration "after 
giving due weight to all relevant considerations even though at the 
prevailing rate of production reemi 1 yment could not be expected ~oy 
such a work week." Another consideration was th . to .justify the 
position of NRA, viz., that "about sixty-five per cent of total 
lumber production is absorbed by the construction industry." (***) 
This was interpreted to mean that a "considerable time must elapse 
before the effects on volume of employment can be definitely shown." 
(****) However, no statement of policy was made concerning the 
workers "normally attached" to the industry who would not be absorbed 
by this method. 

(*) Statement of the deputy administrat >r - Codes of Fail- Competition, 

Vol. I, pp. 1' 0-102. 

(**] Ibid. 
(***) Ibid. 
(****) Ibid. 



Tlie stand taken with respect to seasonal exemptions was that the 
pronounced seasonal character of operations in some areas and the 
variety of the exceptional and emergency conditions in the industry 
general ly required "certain flexibility in the maximum hours of labor 
per week accompanied by adequate restrictions to prevent such flexi- 
bility from being made the vehicle of abuses. Fecessary safeguards are 
provided 'oy requiring that average employment, in any seasonal opera- 
tion shall not exceed the standard schedule of hours during any 
calendar year." (*) 

Several conferences were held with the leaders of the industry 
and the representatives of the Labor Advisory Board. (**) Finally a 
report was prepared (***) with the recommendations noted above. 'These 
were worked out in greater detail with the industry representatives 
who accepted them. 

The final provisions in the Lumber Code relative to hours of 
labor were the following: 

(*) Codes if Fair Competition, Vol. I, pp. 1C1-102. 

(**) Wall Street Journal, August 2, 1933. 

(***) By Deputy Administrator Cates, Ibid., August 12, 1933. 



(a) General Provisions and Exc ptions 

"exceptions to t . .-.rds in respect to raximur 1 hours 
of labor specified herein are authorized as follow:.: 

(A) Executive, supervisory, traveling sales force and camp cooks. 

(3) ular employment in excess nf such standards, for employees 
suck as watchmen* . firemen, and repair crews, where required 

the nature of their work, for not more, than 10' :>f the e - 
ployees in any operation, "out tine ana a half shall be paid 
for weekly avertible. 

(C) " ;• r; r p loy 3nt in d ei ergency. 

(D) Seasonal Operations - Seasonal operations are defined as those 
• tich on account ji elevation or ither physical conditions or 
de; en^ence upon climatic factors are Drdinarily limited to a 

■I - : : n months or less of the calendar year. 

The administrativ ency 3f a Division or Subdivision :r 

rize 1 y ent i as - 1 aperation for e maxiumum 
number of hours not exceedi . :S hours in any we el: with the 
except io] of p rts of an oper tion - ; in climatic 
conditions, such 1 s stream driving - ulin , in which 
a rcater excess 1 y be ith riz d; pr J , t . t the aver- 
a, e employment in any seasonal operation in any calendar Tar 
shall not exceed the standard schedule. 

(E) JIanufacturers of wooden : : for perishable fruits ad 
vo; et; ties ! ay be uth riz by t'. ' inistrative ency 
of the Wooden Pac - Division to dej *t fr the standi rd 
schedule of ixii ui ours applicable to said 1 xnuf- ?turers 
for a perioc not to exceed four wi d;r for me - ' p, .en 
:. pessary to furnish ack es for any ible crop; prov- 
ided that the aver; e employment f an; individual in any 

c lendar year shall not exceed the standard schedule. 

(b) Subject to the foregoing exceptions, the maximum .hours of employ- 
ment in the respective divisi - bdivisions shall be 40 hours 
per week. 

(i> ) JTire Ext in, eh shin;/ Appli anc e I, - .us try 

The eire exti . uishing industr s one of t \ in - ich 

A.dmi Loi ■ ■ :ation in th : 3 provisions 
r u] ting louts before t folic hearing. The code as first 
■ - sented by .the industrj .st 25, 1933, provide t t "nc 
.-.."- itur rs shall employ n; actory, janical, r /ice 
rker more than laximum week f f r1 (40) hours, exc 
.tchmen who may mploye< ximum of forty-eight (43) 
rs, :ept outsid o- lesmen r at rial 

)r executive capacit; h now ■ ccive ..ore t u a thirty-five 
($35) .h ilars per week ." (*) Afcor a ■• afer ;e wi l iTBA 

(*) Code of Fair C bition >r the !?ire Ext in, 1 ishi A plii 

turin L I stry, Vol. II. Copy of Code de. istry do. 1314-01. 


)fficials, this provisions, was eha.nG.ed. to provide for a thirty-five (35) 
hour "basic week averaged over a three months' period with a forty (40) 
hour maximum. Clerical workers were to be overned by a forty (4C) 
hour week. (*) This change was made largely because the fire extinguish- 
ing appliance industry overlapped the motor fire apparatus industry 
which had proposed a basic thirty-five (35) hour week and the hours 
provisions of the latter were accepted for both to avoid conflict or 
charge of discrimination. The industry's argument was that "figures 
so indicate that on a basis of a factory work week of thirty-five (35) 
hours this industry .would, on resumption of business comparable to the 
average of 1928-1929-1930, when the average factory work week of the 
industry was forty-six (46) hours plus, absorb one-third more workers 
than the average number employed during the three years mentioned above." (** 

Labor's counterproposal recommended, elimination of peak tolerances 
and adotpion of a flat maximum. It called for "a thirty-five (35) hour 
in fact .... to eliminate the averaging provision which makes it 
possible to -work an employee forty (40) hours in any one week." , 
This recor.Tmendf.tion brought no further change in the hours provisions, 
the primary cause for the decrease in hours being to standardize the 
hours regulations for two inter-dependent industries. 

II. Reduction Effected by Administration and Labor Representatives. 

A. Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Industr y 

Industry's proposals were sharply criticised in the Shipbuilding 
and. Shiprepairing Industry Code which was the second to be approved. 
The issue has been formulated well in, advance. Despite the Adminis- 
trator's ad ress of Juno 25, 1933 and statements that the Cotton Textile 
Code was not to be considered a precedent, the industry had submitted a 
code which provided, that "no individual will be employed in excess of 
forty (40) hours in any one week except as exempted in the Act. "(***)') 
The employers in the industry who, two years before, had gone from their 
customary forty-eight (48) to a forty (40 ) hour week, recommended no fur- 
ther reduction. In spite of Section 206-A of the Act to the effect 
that the hours of labor were to be reduced, "where practicable and feas- 
ible" to thirty (SO) hours in any one week :n "all contracts let for 
construction projects and all loans and grants" made purusant to the 
public' works section of the TTIRA, and of the fact that a large proportion 
of the shipbuilding industry's anticipated activity was due to funds 

(*) Ibid., October S, 1933, draft. 

(**) ITatic :o.l Industrial Recovery Administration hearing on Code of 

Fair Practice and Competition presented by the fire extinguishing 
appliance industry - October 23, 1933, p. 12. 

(***) New York Times, July 13, 1933. The Code was submitted July 12. 


appropriated under the NIRA, the industry contended that the thirty (30) 
hour week should not apply but that the forty (40) hour provision be 

In fact, at the time of the public hearing the indvistry went a 
step further and proposed instead of a straight forty (40) hour week, 
the following: 

" I'To employee- on an hourly rate may work in excess 
of an average of forty (40) hours a week, based 
on a six months period. If any employee on an 
hourly rate works in excess of eight hours in any 
one day, the wage paid will be at the rate of one- 
and-one-half (lj>) times the regular hourly rate 
for such time as may be in excess of eight hours. 
On bhe Great Lakes during the navigating season 
an exception to the rule regarding, overtime is per- 

missible The forty (40) hour week will . . . 

not. apply for a period of six months to those em- 
ployees of the Shipbuilders engaged in designing, 
engineering and in mold loft and order departments 
and such others as are necessary for the prepara- 
tion of plans and ordering of materials to start 
work on new snip construction." (*) 

1 ■ .... 

This code was the first one considered which proposed a definite provi- 
sion for the averaging of hours. Also, occupational exemptions for 
which the Cotton Textile Industry Code furnished a precedent were pre- 
sented, in two forms: (a) employees working on a basis other than an 
hourly rate were entirely excluded; and (b) specific exemptions were 
provided for other employees. 

1. Employer's Statements 

The proposal for a basic forty (40) hour week was defend- 
ed by the shipbuilders and shiprepairers on the ground that the ship- 
building program contemplated by the NIPA would not only absorb their 

(*) National Recovery Administration, Transcript of Proceedings, 
Shipbuilding Code Hearing July 19, 1933, po.9-10 

It is interesting to note in this regard that Mr. 0. H. Bugniazet, 
Secretary of the International 3rotherhood of Electrical Work- 
ers addressed a letter to President Poosevelt on July 27, 1933, 
in which he declared that the Union had worked diligently on the 
preparation of briefs, but . that at 6 P.M. preceding the day for the 
scheduled hearing the Union officers "learned with amazement that 
the original code had been withdrawn and. a substitute entered.... 
It is obvious tha.t appearance on any code published is difficult 
enough, but making an appearance on a code never read nor seen 
places opponents in an abject position. Yet the hearing on the 
substituted code was neld as scheduled.! 1 1T.Y. Times, 7/28/33. • 



own unemployed "out would raise their employment to about fifteen per 
cent (15-) above the 1929 level. (*) They anticipated scarcity of 
skilled men, which, they claimed, would hamper construction work in the 
shipbuilding industry and in the United 3t?.tes Navy. (**) Both the in- 
dustry and the representatives of the United States Navy disapproved 
the six hour day on the ground of impracticability and impossibility be- 
cause: (l) a six hour day r>revented continuous operation; (2) work 
could not be completed w ithin a six hour period; (3) the supervisory 
staff could not be proportionally expanded and consequently its load 
would be too heavy; (4) a six hour work day would encourage labor turn- 
over; (o) and increase the cost of merchant shipbuilding by thirty-three 
percent (35'.-); (6) the industry could not survive ordinarily on a thirty 
(30) hour week; (?) the contracts for public construction would extend 
beyond the two years of the Act and the removal of the emergency would 
create problems of " disturbance and unhappiness;" (8) a six hour work 
day would complicate the housing situation, intensifying temporary con- 
centration of labor; (9) employment even under the forty (40) hour week 
would be increased some 2o0 percent because of the volume of government 
contracts; (10) tne industry was adapted to the forty (40) hour week.(***) 
Also, representatives of the Navy feared that a shorter work week would 
excessively increase costs of construction. They considered it undesir- 
able to employ persons "unsuited to tne work of shipyards and whose re- 
turn to their own normal occupations should be the primary objective," 
and thought that a program of less than forty (40) hours would attract 
persons belonging to other industries, ( ****) 

This position on a basic forty (40.) hour week was the major con- 
tention. The averaging provision was argued on the ground of the 
character of the industry, since "there is a considerable amount of 
work of an emergency or special type on which only one shift can work 
and it is necessary either to work occasionally for longer hours or 
seriously delay the progress of the whole." (*****) The exemption for 
the planning section was declared to be necessary since "the expedition 
with which the work on the naval program will be carried on depends upon 
the ability to prepare plans, order materials and carry out work in mold 
loft and the completion of this preliminary work determines the time 
when workmen can start upon the actual construction of the ship." (******) 

J*) Ibid., p. 48 

(**) This position was supported by Hear Admiral E.S. Land, Bureau 

of Construction Repair, U.S. Navy. Ibid, p. 98 
(***) This consideration was most completely \:>resented by Mr. L.Y. 

Spear of the Electric Boat Company. Ibid., pp. 50-66; and in 

the letter of transmittal. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1933. 
(****) Testimony of Captain H.L. Wyman, of the U.S. Navy, Ibid.,. 

p. 105. 
(*****) loir,., p. 17. 
(******) Ibid., p. 18 



Special exemption from the payment of overtime in the Great Lakes region 
was asked "because "it has long been the practice of the Great Lakes 
region to work nine or nine and one-half hours a day," and that they were 
willing to work not in excess of eight hours in the winter months, but 
would like the privilege of working nine hours without payment of over- 
time on repair work in the summer. (*) 

2. Labor's Counterproposals and Statement: 

Organized labor, represented by the Metal Trades Department of the 
American Federation of Labor, countered the proposal of the shipbuilders 
and the shiprepairers with recommendations for a thirty (30) hour week 
with a six hour day and a five day week. It further recommended deletion 
of the overtime tolerances and substitution of the following clause: 
"Wo overtime shall bp permitted, except the maintenance ani repair person- 
nel and then only in case, of extreme emergency. All time worked in ex- 
cess of scheduled number of hours shall be paid for at not less than 
double time." (**) Organized labor considered the thirty (30) hour week 
practical and feasible. It believed that Section 206 of the Act should 
be applied without modification. Specifically it called attention to the 
fact that the average work week in the industry was about thirty-one (3L) 
hours, that employment stood at about 47 per cent (-7"-) of 1929, and 
that part-time employment was widespread. It contended that the forty 
(40) hour week would absorb "only a small portion of those who are now 
out of work in the industry and if overtime work is permitted as freely 
as employers suggest, those now employed part-time would be able to 
handle practically all the available v/ork and over, - few of the unem- 
ployed would be taken into the shipyards." It maintained that "if hours 
of labor are to be reduced to provide employment, then overtime must be 
prohibited except in case of emergencies." It asserted that a program 
of reemployment should take into consideration not only those employed 
in 1929 but also "the great majority of the mechanics employed in the 
shipyards and Navy Yards during the construction period of 1918, 1919, 
1920, and 1921 (who) are still in the United States." (***) 

3. Administrative Recommendations 

These two conflicting recommendations were submitted to the NBA 
for consideration. On the one hand were the shipbuilders charged by 
the Administration with the responsibility of submitting a code; and on 
the other hand organized labor in the shipbuilding industry represent- 
ing a significant group of workers asking for very different terms of 

(*) Testimony of Mr. W.H. Gerhouser, President of the. Great Lakes 
Shipbuilding and Repair Association, pp. 5.8-71 

(**) Testimony of Mr. J. A. Franklin, Metal Trades Department of the 
American Federation of Labor, July 20, 1933. Ibid., p. 123 

(***) Testimony of F.A. Franklin, Ibid., pp. 125-129 and Mr. Frey, 
p. 164. It may be indicated that several representatives of 
employees appeared in support of the forty (40) hour week. 
They included Mr. J.'.', liullin on behalf of the employees of the 
York Shipbuilding Co., Camden, " : .J. , p. 316. Mr.W.G. 
9862 iicDermott representing the employee^ of the Fore River Plant 
of the Bethlehem Corp. of Quincy, Mass. p. 333. 


employment. In this situation the Administrator offered the following 
solution: "it has been our purpose to gauge the hours of work per week 
at a figure that would absorb the labor which is normally attached to a 
particular industry. You can see very well that on that formula the more 
active and more nearly normal the operations in industry are, the longer 
the work week, and vice versa. This industry seens to he on the verge 
of a program which would take a great many men -.ho are normally listed 
as in the shipbuilding: crafts. However, it is subject to the modifica- 
tion that in the building trades there are a great many crafts whose 
work is applicable to shipbuilding industry. (This industry) probably 
will be looked to to absorb considerably more than at first glance seems 
its normal quota of labor. "(*) 

H. Negotiations 

After the public hearings, the Administrator arranged a series of 
conferences with labor and industry representatives. (**) After discus- 
sions of the various proposals by both groups, the Administrator proposed 
a thirty-two (32) hour week for the industry with no change in the wage 
provisions. The industry refused to agree to this proposal though the 
representatives of organised labor accepted it.(***) Daring the confer- 
ences on the second day a solution was found. (****) It provided a 
thirty-two (32) hour '.reel: for shipbuilding for the United States Govern- 
ment and an average thirty-six (36) hour week based upon a six months 
period with a maximum forty (ho) hour week for merchant shipbuilding and 
shiprepairing. (*****) This compromise, according to the press, resulted 
from the fact that "General Johnson threatened to recommend suspension 
of the Navy's building program if they (the shipbuilders) adhered to 
their program and that this position made the compromise more amenable 
to the shipbuilders. "(******) 

The problem of hours on government shipbuilding involved the Navy 
Department and wa.s, therefore, not completely settled until Secretary of 
the Navy Swanson had discussed the matter with the president. It is re- 
ported that after this discussion the Navy Department "acquiesced in the 
thirty- two (32) hour proposal" (*******) With this natter settled, the 

(*) Ibid., July IS, 1933, P. 3 

(**) These were held on July 22 and July 23, 1533. 

(***) Code History for the Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing Industry, 
pp. 52~6l; Washington Star, July 23, 1333 • 

(****) rp^g Administrator had insisted upon a thirty—two (32) hour 

week, but at a conference with Deputy Administrator Whiteside 
after a general meeting in the morning the final provision 
was developed, 

(*****) Code History op.cit. pp. 5S-61. 
(******) New York limes, July 25, 1933 . 
(*******) Salt L?i:e rn r ijune, July 2 g, 1933. 



code was approved by the president on July 2b, 1933. 

The final provision as adopted in the code was as follows: 

"Merchant Shipbuilding & Shiprepairing: No employee on a hour rate 
may work in excess of an average of thirty-six (36) hours per week, based 
upon a six months' period; nor more than forty (40) hours during any one 
week. If any employee on an hourly rate works in excess of eight hours 
in any one day, the wage paid will be at the rate of not less than one 
and one-half (I3) tines the regular hourly rate, but otherwise according 
to the prevailing custom in each port, for such time as may be in excess 
of eight hours. 

"Shipbuilding for the United States Government: No employee on an 
hourly rate may work in excess of thirty-two (32) hours per week. If 
any employee on an hourly rate works in excess of eight hours in any one 
day, the wage paid will be at the rate of not less than one and one-half 
(la) times the regular hourly rate, but otherwise according to the pre- 
vailing custom in each port, for such time as may be in excess of eight 

"Exceptions: J'or a period of six months exceptions may be made in 
the number of hours of employment for the employees of the shipbuilders 
engaged in designing, engineering and in the mold loft and order depart- 
ments and such others as are necessary for the preparation of plans and 
ordering of meterials to start work- on new ship construction - , but in no 
event shall tne number of workers worked be in excess of forty-eight (43) 
nours per week, and in no case or class of cases not approved by the 
Planning and Fair Practice Committee provided. for in Section (8)." 

These negotiations showed that a concession was obtained from the 
industry for a reduction of hours to thirty-six (36) per week for private 
shipbuilding and thirty-two (32) for government shipbuilding. In the 
latter case they were relieved of the requirements of the Act. In the 
negotiations labor, industry and Government were the bargainers. The 
final compromise was worked out by the Administration and the ship- 
builders with labor acting chiefly as adviser. The Administration had 
a strong weapon, the naval program, with which to bargain.- This Ship- 
building Code also was the first to adopt a provision for the averaging 
of hours. It established the eight hou day. It granted a six months' 
exemption for employees preparing plans and ordering materials with the 
qualification of a forty-eight (48) hour maximum and approval by the 
Planning and Pair Practice Committee. 

B. Petro l eum Industry 

The petroleum industry considered problems of production and trade 
practices to be most important in drafting its code. The code forrau- 
1- ted jointly by representatives of the American Petroleum Institute, 
including many independent producers- and large oil companies, and by the 
Marketing-Hef iner Natural Gasoline Association added to Section 7 (a) 
the following clause: "During the depression the petroleum industry has 
maintained a relatively high ratio of employment. To a Lrge extent it 
has pursued the 'Share-The-Work' policy and has maintained a relatively 



high schedule of wages. Existing ■ : age schedules should not "be reduced, 
but both employment and wages should be increased as soon as business 
conditions permit. 11 ("*) Because of these rather vague provisions, the 
Administrator was reported to consider the code unsatisfactory and to 
"demand that the proposed oil code be made more specific regarding hours 
of labor and wages. (**) 

As a result of the Administrator's insistence, the sponsors of the 
code, through the Executive Committee of the American Petroleum Institute, 
presented it en July 12, 1933 with -provisions concerning wages and hours 
of labor included. The terms ,. however , had not been discussed by the 
Board of Directors of tne American Petroleum Institute with the con- 
stituent associations. (***) The code as proposed -orescribed for all 
employees "of the Petroleum Industry, except executive and their immedi- 
ate clerical forces, and pumpers on stripper wells, and others on isolated 
properties" an average of not mere than forty (40) hours per week. The 
Associations indicated that this averaging process was necessary since 
"it may be necessary to work employees more than forty (40) hours per 
week on occasion, but the weekly work for each envoloyee for each six 
months' calendar period shall not exceed an average of more than forty 
(40) hours per week." (****) 

(*) The Tall Street Journal, July 13, 1933. 

(**) Houston Press, June 29, 1933. 

It is also of interest to note, the attitude expressed by one 
leading member of the industry, who was amazed at General 
Johnson's attitude; "The industry is concerned by the emphasis 
which is being placed upon employment and wages by the National 
Administrator in codes dealing with other industries heretofore 
presented. The lecovery Act emphasizes collective bargaining, 
but the Administrator apparently is urging industries which pre- 
sent codes to agree with him on matters affecting labor instead 
of agreeing with the employees of such industries. Before em- 
ployers and employees have had an opportunity to reach an agree- 
ment by collective bargaining, it is obviously inconsistent with 
the Act for the National Administrator to insist that an industry 
accept prescribed conditions relating to labor. Such a course is 
inconsistent with mutual agreements between employers and em- 
ployees relating to these subjects. Rules orescribed by the 
Administrator in this manner may be unsatisfactory to both em- 
ployers and employees and may prevent, instead of promote col- 
lective bargaining". (Statement by C. B. Ames, Chairman, Board 
of Directors, Texas Company, Journal of Commerce July 6, 1933.) 

(***) "New York Times, July 15, 1933. 
(****) Ibid> 


These proposals 7>ere modified by the industry representatives at 
the -Diiblic hearing to a forty-eight (48) hour maximum "reek. (*) Even 
this longer week was exoected to reduce working hours enough to in- 
crease employment nearly twenty-five ner cent (25^), or from the actual 
working force of 1,025,000 up to 1,265,000 persons. Any other basis of 
operation than forty (40) hours was objected to as inroractical as the 
industry operated continuously "with equipment, machinery and men working 
through the twenty-four ;:ours of the day." Thev claimed that "the 
reduction to forty (40) hours means not only a tremendous increase in 
the number of emoloyees -ith particular reference to those required to 
handle the shift and tour jobs all of. which required' highly' trained men, 
but it also means the tremendous increase in the expense and nay roll 
cost of many companies and individual, engaged in' the business "dio al- 
ready are on the verge of financial, col"! apse." The averaging hours were 
declared necessary to meet "emergencies." (**) 

■ 1. Labor and Independents' Proposals.. 

The codes proposed by the American Petroleum Institute and its 
suoporters were met by t^o counter- orouosals, one. from organized labor 
and the other from the independent uroducers and operators. These pro- 
posals -/ere similar in many respects in their recommendations concerning 
hours of work. 

Several organized labor groups made proposals, the most detailed 
coming from the Gil iorkers International Union. It proposed that "no 
employee in the producing, pipe-line transportation or the refining 
branches of the petroleum industry, except executives and their immedi- 
ate clerical forces shall be employed in excess of thirty hours per week, 
nor more than five days in any one calendar week, nor more than six 
h^urs in any one day, save in cases of , emergency. In such emergency 
cases, all time workers in excess of the scheduled maximum number of 
hours ner day or week shall be regarded as overtime and shall be paid 
for at the v r te of not less than double time." (***) This recommenda- 
tion was supported by testimony that 39.6 hours constituted the average 
in the uetroleum refineries for the first half of. 1933 and 42.6 hours 
for the producing branch of the industry, while employment in June 1933 
had 1»een 58 per cent of the average for 1929. It '-'as, therefore, 
"calculated that it would be necessary to establish a working week with 
a maximum of 24.4 hours" to reabsorb the men displaced since 1929. The 
labor group proposed a thirty (30) hour week and protested the averaging 
provision since "such a' provision may vitiate entirely any maximum hourly 
provision which might be established.." (****) Labor also asserted that 

(*) National Recovery Administration Transcript of -proceedings Petro- 

leum Code, July 24, 1933, nap. 3048-3049. 

(**) Ibid. , pp. 3052-3054. 

(***) Ibid. , p. 3060. Similar provisions "'ere recommended by Mr. J.N. 
Davis, representing the Metal Trades Department of the a. 2'. of 
L. p. 3096. 

(****) Ibid., pp. 3058 - 3066, Statement by Mr. rremming. 


double pay for overtime was the only effective method of checking that 

The independents in the oil industry, consisting of twenty-two 
associations, presented the following vrcposal; "The employees of the 
petroleum industry except those who occupy managerial or executive posi- 
tions and their immediate clerical forces and pumpers on stripper wells, 
and others on isolated properties will work on an average of not more 
than thirty (30) hours per week. Provided, however, that employees of 
retail filling stations will work on average of no more than thirty-six 
(36) hours per week. Because of the exigencies of the oil industry, it 
may he necessary to work employees more than said maximum hours on 
occasion, but the weekly work for each six months' calendar period shall 
not exceed an average of said minimum hour per week." 

2. Administrative Assistance in Adjustment of Differences. 

After hearing the proposals, counter-proposals and arguments, the 
Administrator concluded that "the various suggestions are very far apart 
and they do not really represent any opportunity to get together on 
some kind of an agreement." He therefore proposed the organization of 
three committees, one for the stripper wells and production, another 
for refining and Pipe lines and a third for marketing and distribution, 
each committee to consist of an equal number of employer and employee 
representatives. The former were chosen by the Petroleum Institute 
and independent organizations, while the latter, selected by the Labor 
Advisory Board consisted of representatives of the Oil /orkers Inter- 
national Union and of the staff of the appointing Board. The committees 
were under the chairmanship of a representative of the Administration. (*) 
Committee discussion soon effected a compromise. An agreement upon a 
thirty-six (36) hour ^eek was reported in the production and refining 
divisions and a forty (40) hour week in the marketing division of the 
industry. (**) These proposals were submitted on August 1, 1933 when 
the revised codes were considered. No substantial objections were 
raised to the hours provisions, though some questions concerning wages 
and adjustments appeared. (***) The differences were mostly ironed out 
in the preceding conferences. 

This was not true of the production provisions. Consequently, there 
was delay in development of the production and trade practice provisions 
of the code, a PliA agreement covering the labor provisions was approved 
before the code itself. Issued on August 8, 1S33, the President's 
Reemployment Agreement provided an average thirty-six hour week for 

(*) Ibid. , pp. 3113-3121. 

(**) Houston Post, July 26, 1933. 

(***) Transcript of Hearing. See Petroleum News, August 9, 1933. 



production employees, forty (40) hour week for marketing operations and 
a forty-eight (48) hour week for filling and service station employees. (*) 
These terms, largely settled upon in the nost-hearing conferences, were 
finally incorporated in the ^eneral Petroleum Code, approved August 19, 
1933 and were widely a-ccajated by the industry. 

(*) Section 1. In drilling, production, refinery and pipe-line operas 
tions, the maximum hours for clerical emolcyees shall not exceed' 
40 -oer week and the rate of pay for ea eh geographic division shall 
net he less than the minimum stated in Section 2. All other em- 
ployees in these operations, except executives, supervisors, and • 
their immediate, staffs and pumpers on "stripper" wells located so 
as to make relief impracticable , shall "or v not more than 72 hours 
in any 14 consecutive days, but net more than 16 hours in any two 

Section 2. In market operations all employees (other than those 
employed in filling or service stations, garages, or other in- 
stitutions which sell gasoline to the oublic) including clerical, 
but excluding executives, supervisors and their immediate staffs, 
and outside salesmen shall work not more than 40 hours per week.' 
The minimum rates for such employees in each of the geographic 
divisions above- specified shall be a s follows; t 

Section 3-. No filling or service station employee, nor any em- • 
ployee of any. garage or other institution selling gasoline to the 
public shall work more than 48 hours ner week. 



• Oast . I r on So il- P3cpe 

The Cast Iron Soil Pipe Industry Code Illustrated the relation of 
labor provisions to the industry's desire to set up trade practice con- 
trols. At the public hearing on August 2, 1933, the industry proposed 
a thirty-hour week for factory labor and a forty (40) hour week for 
clerical workers. Those presenting the code stated that "it is their 
intention to continue this (share the work) policy and as demand for the 
products of the industry shall increase, they propose to give employment 
to the maximum number of employees rather than request an extension of 
the maximum working hours". (*) 

The thirty (30) hour week was recommended because the industry was 
suffering from over-production and "the present percentage of operating 
capacity of the industry is only twenty-one per cent (21$). It would 
therefore be inconsistent to propose a maximum working week greater than 
thirty (SO) hours as 'provided in the code." (**) The limitation of both 
working and production hours, which were identical in the code, was 
suggested in order to control production and to prevent the monopoly of 
the orders by a few concerns. Organized labor did not protest these 
hours' provisions. However, in conference labor and the employers agreed 
to lower working hours to twenty-seven (27) per week. This was satisfac- 
tory to the employers since in the revision of the code they had speci- 
fically limited -production to the maximum hours of labor permitted in a 
single shift. s 

D. hotor Vehicle Retailing Ind ustry 

The motor vehicle retailing industry represented certain characteris- 
tic differences. No labor organization vas present to offer proposals, 
the Labor Advisory Board staff representing the workers in the negotia- 
tions. Also, it represented a service industry. Furthermore, the code 
presented proposed a forty-eight (43) hour week. 

The code' resulted from regional conferences held among automobile 
dealers during the latter part of June and early July. Their major in- 
terest was in used car -practices. With respect to hours of labor they 
showed considerable unanimity. The Denver concerns (*•*) and the Mary- 
land Automobile Trade Association (****) adopted a basic forty (40) hour 

(*) Uational Recovery Administration Hearing on Code of Pair Practices 
and Competition, Presented by the cast iron soil pipe industry, 
August 2, 1933, p. 61. 

(**) Ibid., p. 63. 

(***) Baltimore Sun, July 19, 1933. 

(****) Denver Post, July 18, 1933. 



Their example was followed by the Automobile Trades Association of Greater 
Kansas City (*) and the Michigan Automotive Trade Association. (**) 
However, the final code, as drafted by the National Auto Dealero Acco- 
ciation in St. Louis on August 13, 1933, provided for a forty-eight <48) 
hour week. (***) In spite of strong sentiment for a straight forty (40) 
hour week, "portions of the country where there is a summer peak and a 
slack winter or the reverse sought to obtain a forty-eight (43) hour 
maximum. In view of this uncertainty there was a disposition to leave 
"the matter of hours of labor to the Administrator." (****) 

The code was submitted to the Administrator on September 1, 1933. 
Informal conferences were held with the various Advisory Boards but no 
significant changes were made. The code as it went to public hearing 
contained the following provision respecting hours of employment: 

"No employee (except outside salesmen and watchmen) shall be em- 
ployed for more than 48 hours in any one week. . . The maximum hours 
fixed in the foregoing paragraph shall not apply to employees in a 
managerial or executive capacity who now receives $25.00 a week or 
more; to employees i- n a supervisory capacity or engaged in technical 
work; to employees: engaged in energency repair and maintenance work 
on automobiles for which, due to seasonal climatic conditions, there 
are in certain localities insufficient trained workers available to 
take care of consumer demands; in such localities sixty hours shall 
not be exceeded in any one week. It is understood, however, that 
the average in any six months' period will not be over forty-eight 
(48) hours." 

The reason given for the provision was the seasonal nature of the 
industry and frequency of rush jobs. It was felt "that a maximum of 
forty-eight (48) hours per week will take care of all conditions of 
emoloyees and car owners and the peak and valley conditions of our work 
be generally averaged to the point where it will not be a hardship to 
anyone concerned." (*****) A slight modification introduced at the pub- 
lic hearing raised the exerrmted class of executive from a $25.00 to 
$30.00 minimum. (******) 

(*) Kansas City Journal-Post, July 20,' 1933. 

(**) Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1933. 

(***) Chicago Tribune, August, 12, 1933. 

(****) Detroit News, August 20, 1933. 

(*****) National Recovery Administration hearing on Code of Pair Practices 
and Competition, Presented by the motor vehicle retailing trade, 
September 18, 1933, p. 1516. 

(******) Ibid., p. 43. 



Labor's case at this hearing was presented by a staff m«*iber of the 
Labor Advisory Board. In presenting labor's case, he did not sttoss the 
trade union position on the thirty (30) hour week, but rather the prno.p.. 
dents developed in N2A codes. This represented a departure in policy and 
tactics already evident even in arguments at code hearings. In place of 
the original proposals to reduce hours there was growing tendency to sub- 
stitute measures conforming with the pattern which was being developed. 
In this case, a forty (40) instead of a forty-eight (46) hour week was 
proposed, with a tolerance of ten per cent for watchmen, and exemption up 
to forty-eight (48) for emergencies with corresponding overtime payment 
at the rate of time and one-naif (l.V).(*) The argument presented on be- 
half of labor was that "thousands of automobile dealers are now operating 
their sales service, office and garage departments on the basis of forty 
(40) hour maximum for employees" under the PEA. It was further claimed 
that since the 1931 average hours in the industry was 51, the forty-eight 
(48) hour week meant a reduction of only three hours per week or less 
than six per cent of the average obtained in 1931. Since the "1931 aver- 
age includes the hours of many employees. .. exempted from the restrictions 
under the proposed code. ..the actual reduction in hours that would be ef- 
fected by the proposed schedule would be even less than four per week 
on the average. "(**) Clearer difinition of hours of work was recommended 
in order to avoid ambiguities. The forty (40) hour week was accepted as 
reasonable since "it conforms to the standard established in many approved 
and submitted codes." (***) 

Informal hearings after the public hearing offered opportunity for 
consideration of the various proposals. Further discussions led to agree- 
ment to reduce hours to forty-four ('44) per week. As finally approved 
the coae provided in Article III, Section B, paragraphs 2 and 3 as fol- 

"iJo employee (except outside commission salesmen and watch- 
men) shall be employed for more than 44 hours in any 1 week. 
These maximum hours refer to the availability of the employee 
in the shop or premises of the employer at the latter' s re- 
quest whether or not the employee is actively engaged in speci- 
fic tasks throughout these hours. All places of business shall 
be kept open not less than 52 hours a week, unless such hours 
were less than 52 hours per week before July 1, 1933, and in 
which case hours shall not be reduced at all. 

"The maximum hours fixed in the foregoing paragraph shall not 
apply to salaried employees in a managerial, executive, or 
supervisory capacity who receive $30.00 per week or more." 

Ill Hours Determined by Collective Bargaining 

A. Coat and Suit Industry 

In the coat and suit industry, unlike 1 the industries described 
above, the schedule of hours of emoloyment resulted from the negotiations 

(*) Statement of L.H. Seltzer, Ibid., p. 67 
(**) Ibid. , p. 70. 
("**) Ibid., o. 74 

9862 J 

' -80* 

of industry and union representatives under government supervision. 
There resulted tne snortest hour schedule for private industry of the 
first five codes. The industry centered in New York Oity where about 
eighty per cent of the total annual outpxit 'vas produced and distributed. 
There terras of e icloyraent had been fixed by collective bargaining for 
nearly two decades. An agreement between tne International Ladies' Gar- 
ment Workers Union and the employer organizations had terminated July 1, 
1933 end negotiations for its renewal had been fruitless. The employers 
had wanted to establish a piece-work system but tiie union had rejected 
the suggestion. (*) In tne meantime, negotiations with MA for a code 
were begun and all parties turned to it for a solution. 

The employers proposed a forty (40) hour week in their code filed 
July 1", 1933 by the three organizations in the industry. (**) The union 
responded with a counter code calling for a thirty (30) hour week and 
preparations for a general strike. (***) The employers' argument was 
based on the estimate of three million hours' overtime worked in the 
industry in 1932. They contended that elimination of this overtime 
would abolish existing unemployment in trie industry, then estimated at 
5,000, They feared that a shorter work week would create scarcity of 
employees, "artifically high wages 11 and consequent high costs. (****) 
The union maintained that tne forty-hour week had long been customary and 
would not effect unemployment. It proposed a thirty hour week on the 
ground that only half of the 40,000 coat and suit workers were fully em- 
ployed and tnat considerable reduction in hours was necessary to meet 
the unemployment situation at all. It averred that shorter hours and 
the elimination of overtime would permit realization of the aims of the 
Act. (*****) Midway between the position of the employers and the union 
was one independent employers' organisation's proposal for a thirty-five 
hour week. (******) & Cleveland employer stated that the 40 hour week 
would have no effect on employment in that city. (*******) 

The conferences following the public hearing discussed among many 
issues those relftive to the hours of work. Agreement was difficult and 
negotiations at one time broken seemed impossible, with a strike threat- 
ening. (********) The problem of the hours of work was resolved by the 
negotiations between the employer organizations and the unions. Other 
issues, however, including tne limitation of contracts and responsibil- 
ity for standards in outside snops, were undecided. Agreement was fin- 
ally obtained and the co. e was approved by the President on August 4, 193 

(*) International Ladies' Garment Workers Union - Heport of the 

General Executive Board to the 22nd Convention, Monday, May 

28, 1934, Chicago, Illinois, pn. 25-26. 

(**) Hew York Times, July 14, 1933." 

(***) New York Times, July 17, 1933. 

(****) Testimony by Mr. Maxwell Copelof. Coat and Suit Industry 

Transcript of Public Hearing, d ted July 20, 1933, pp. 29-51, 

(Morning). xlele«se No. 73, Section 2, Morning, 

(*****) Testimon/ of Mr. D. Dub in sky, Ibid., pp. 10-13, July 21, 1933 


(******) Testimony of Mr. Karl Blandstein, Ibid., Vol. I., p. 86. 

July 20, 1933. 

(*******) Ibid, Testimony of A. Printz, p. 79. 
(*♦***»**) New y ork r rlraeS) July 26 f 19 3y # 



In its final form it orovicted for a thirty-five hour week for manufactur- 
ing employees with specifically designated work hours. Non-manufacturing 
employees were governed by a 40-hour week. Overtime was prohibited ex- 
cept that the Administrator was permitted to "grant any extension of hours 
in the busy season." (*) 

The code as approved became "the basis for collective agreement 
with employers. " The negotiations had resulted from collective bargain- 
ing between the employer associations and the unions. The unions con- 
sidered the thirty-five hour week "a tremendous achievement for a sea- 
sonal industry" and it was the shortest work week established in an/ in- 
dustry at tnat time. •(**') 

B . lien's Slothing Industry 

In this industry negotiations for a code began in May, 1933 be- 
tween the manufacturers and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, while 
Congress was still at work on the legislation. Progress was expected 
to be rapid. However, the formation of a national trade association - 
the first in the industry - precipitated the creation of a strongly op- 
posed minority association of non-union -manufacturers. (***) Each asso- 
ciation presented a code, the first resulting from collective bargaining, 
the second without labor paticipation. Because of the respective strengths 
of the associations, the outcome could not be doubtful. This large is- 
sue between industry groups as to collective bargaining served to sub- 
ordinate the bargaining on the details of code provisions. 

The issue between the associations came to a he.jd at two points: 
control of the code administration, and wages above the minimum. The 
code of the majority group was practically agreed to by organized labor 
when presented July 19, except for the length of the work week. Both 
codes provided a 40-hour week. The union asked for 35 hours. Previous 
union agreements in the industry, had set a 44-hour week, so that the un- 
ion was asking a substantial reduction. 

At the public hearing, July 26, 1927, the majority association sup- 
ported statistically its contention that a 40-hour week was the least 
the inuustry could operate upon without a labor shortage. Tne union, on 
the contrary, estimated that the 40-hour week could reemploy only a small 
part of the 50,000 idle workers. It argued that total man-hours worked 
by those who worked in excess of the 40-hour limit in the fall season of 
1932 were 134,511, equivalent, to 3,363 wage earners working 40 hours per 
week.. On the same basis of computation a 35-hour week would afford em- 
ployment to 11,981 workers. These figures, of course, took no account of 

(*) N.S.A. Codes cf Fair Competition, Vol. I, p. 53 - no such exemp- 
tions were' asked ~by tne code authority. 
(**) Report. Op. cit. p. 25 
(***) The majority association had non-union employers in its ranks. 
The By-laws of the minority association forbade admission to it 
of manufacturers who had agreements with tne Amalgamated' Cloth- 
ing Workers of America. See iJ-en's Clothing Code Report trans- 
mitting code, p. 11. 



partial employment in this industry, where in -union factories equal dis- 
tribution of work is the rule. Ihe union "brief , however, pointed out that 
54.8 per cent of all Hetge earhers^worked 40 hours or less in the fall of 
1932, while aver 32 per cent worked 35 hours or less.('*) 

The union position was supported "by a study prepared for the Admin- 
istration oy the Division of Research and Planning. The conclusion of 
this report was that the unemployed "cannot all be reemployed either on 
a 40-hour week maximum *r a 35-ncur week maximum, unless there is a con- 
siderable increased demand. A 40-hour maximum may give employment to 
6,150, if the employed workers do not work more than the average of 27.5 
hours per week worked in 1932. A 35-hour maximum may give employment to 
19,504 people if the spread of work remains the same."(**) 

In the prolonged controversy between tne two industry groups which 
continued after the hearing, the hours controversy and its adjustment 
were obscured. The final code set a 36-hour week, "3-h©ur day, ?;ith~no 
overtime allowance. A special arrangement of overtime 'for small divi- 
sions of the industry working on special order -business - tailors-td- 
the-trade and uniform manufacturers - was' agreed to, the- number of hours 
and weeks to be determined each season by the code authority. 

In the final event, the majority having reached its agreements on al 
points "by collective bargaining, the Administration accepted the result iij 
ctde as the code for the industry and it was approve August 4, 1933. It 
gave to the recalcitrate minority, which at length in the process of in- 
dustry organization represented the employers of only 25,000 workers, 
more than its proportionate share of representation on the code authority 
as a peace promoting effort. 

C Press Industry 

The results gained oy the union in the dress industry were remark- 
able in that organized labor's loss of strength during the depression 
years showed in this industry particularly. A new industry, growing 
rapidly in volume throughout the depression, it vras being decentralized 
ia loc&tion and entering new fields of production through the use of cot- 
ton and rayon. It was less stabilized than the long established coat anc 
suit industry. The result was a chaos in prices, high mortality of bus! 
ness units, and non-observance of existing union agreements. Tne Inter- 
national Ladies' Garment Workers Union nad passed through a crisis of 
dual unionism; but in tne spring of 1933 it was pulling its. forces- to- 
gether successfully to -take advantage of the pending recovery legislatioi 
Its agreements in New York City were expiring and it hoped to achieve im| 
provement of terms and enforcement of a new agreement under the new mach- 
ine ry, 

A new National Dress ■Manufacturers' Association was formed in May IS 
and negotiations started with this and ; 'sev,eral other associations 

(*) Brief presented b/ tne Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America at 
Public Herring July 26-27. Men's Clothing Code History, Vol. 3. 
(**) Material bearing on Men's Clothing Industry. Morris Kolchin. 

Division of Economic Research and Planning, August 10, 1933, p. 33. 



representing inside end contracting snops and other special interests. 
Four or five codes " ere submitted, one in June 1S33; the others in July. 
The codes were presented by tne predominantly New York Associations, and 
were all identical as to hours, asking a 40-hour 5-day week, and ex- 
pressly forbidding overtime. A code submitted by a California asso- 
ciation proposed merely to operate .under the California hour law, 48 
hours per week, 8 per day. A Chicago -roup proposed a 40-hour week wiVn 
12 weeks of 46 hours, and a minimum wage of 35^ an hour. (*) 

The three codes witn identical nour provisions were undoubtedly 
based on some negotiations with the union, "but the union was dissatis- 
fied with their terms. There seems also to have been an inclination on 
the part of the associations to let the code making process take the 
place of a collective agreement. Meanwhile, the Administration, which 
it must be noted was extremely helpful in adjusting difficulties in 
forming tnis code, was negotiating with all the groups and with labor, 
and preparing a combined code from all those submitted, with a 40-hour 
provision. A hearing was set for August 22. 

About a week before the he ring a^te tne union called a general 
strike in New York City. This strike was effective, and well timed. (**) 
Mr. Grover Whaler., 1IRA director m the New York metropolitan area, 'came 
into tne situation as mediator, apparently at the request of the deputy 
administrator handling tne code. At a conference with the industry at 
the Hotel Pennsylvania on August 13, 1933, he delivered a message from 
President Roosevelt urging tne industry to settle its difficulties. The 
National Association of Dress Manufacturers replied by telegram to the 
President that seme day as follows: 

"At a meeting of our 500 members this mornining there was con- 
veyed to us by the Hon. Grover Whalen a message from you 
urging industry-wide adoption in the dress field of the prin- 
ciple of collective bargaining with labor. Actuated by our 
sincere desire to cooperate with your recovery program in a 
manner thoroughly acceptable to you our membership voted unani- 
mously to authorize the Board of Governors to proceed in formu- 
lating • collective agreement through conferences with the In- 
ternational Ladies' Garment Workers Union. It is our hope that 
such negotiations will facilitate tne formulating and issuance 
of a recovery code for the industry directly after the hearings 
on this code in Washington on Tuesday. This association was 
formed in May following /our radio address calling upon indus- 
tries to organize to foster economic rehabilitation. Our sole 
purpose was to prepare a recovery plan for this trade in col- 
laboration with tne government. If this aim can be more ef- 
fectively achieved through a collective labor agreement w« 
readily accept that procedure. "(*** ) 

(*) These codes are to be found in Central Record Section: Dress Code 
History, Vols. A. and 3. 
(**) In this strike pickets carried placards reading "Let's write our 
code on the picket line." 
(***) Central Record Section. Vol. A. for the dress manufacturing in- 
dus try . 



Cn the prececins day, August l?th, }.:r. Whalen had Drought both 
sides together at a conference, out some groups had expressed them- 
selves cs uncertain that a collective agreement was necessary to 
regularize the admitted disorder of the inaustry* Mr. Lubinsky, 
President of the International Lrdies 1 Garment '..orkers Union, statea 
that the union res the only force capable ol policing the '-hole in- 
dustry and making the code effective. At that time he asked: s 
collective agreement, the 3C-hour reek, wages restored to the scale 
of a normal not s depression year, and contractor regulations. (*) 
The hearing was postponed one cay for completion of the agreement, 
which wr,<5 signed on August 22, 1953. This called for a 25-hour week, 

Ihe public hearing developed substantial agreement on the 
question of hours. later difficulties that delayed code approval to 
October 31, 1935, turned en the contractor jobber regulations largely. 


Only nine of the iirst one hundred approved codes had their basic hours 
duced from those originally or- posed 0^/ mai i.t. Six of t". ese v/ere 
among the iirst twenty approved coder. The other three cases of reductions 
on basic hours followed precedents established in other codes, or resulted 
frbin collective bargaining or effective -r aining o^ a labor adviser in 
the case where unusually long hours were proposed. ihe ea:rly drive for 
shorter hours effected the reduction of hours in these industries. 

In the case of the lumber industry, Administrative pressure to secure 
a forty hour week was successful after a long cries of concessions. The 
fire extinguishing industry agreec. to shorter hours because of its close 
tie-up with the motor fire apparatus industry, which had adopted the thirty- 
five hour week in the automobile manufacturing code. In the shipbuilding 
industry, organized labor and the government reduced hours because both 
groups were cetermined to have shorter hours ana the Government possessed 
as a leverage the public funcs for government contract. In the 
petroleum industry, labor with the aio. of the independents in the industry- 
succeeded in reducing hours. Management' s aesire for production control 
in the cast iron soil pipe industry conspired to set maximum hours at 
twenty-seven. In motor vehicle retailing, an unprecedented long hours 
schedule was i educed to forty-four by the efiorts of the labor acviser. 
^uite different were the methods usee in the coat and suit, men's clothing 
and dress industries. 

A vigorous organization campaign to consolidate laoor' s strength and 
bargaining power to coce making enabled the unions to present a formidable 
show of power. Their influence in the chief manuf? cturing centers permitted) 
them to carry on direct negotiations with the employers. Through the use of| 
the threatened strikes at crucial moment they succeeded in bringing sub- 
stantial and effective reductions of hours. 

With the exception of cast iron soil pipe and motor vehicle retailing 
industries the hours originally proposed " r ere forty. The twr xceptions 
originally proposed thirty hours and forty-eight respectively. The hours 
finallj established in the codes varied. The shortest oasic ] urs were in 
the cast iron soil pipe industry (27). Three cr. rovided for thirty-fivel 
hours, (fire extinguisi Lng, coat and •■ it, and. drj ss) sue three, thirty-six 
hairs ( 8hi|-.building, petroleum and men's clothing), one, forty (lumber and 
timber products) and one, forty-four hours, (motor vehicles). 

(*) Centr- 1 nee rd I cti :., V 1. A. £ r the cr< . cturing Lncustry. 



In contrast to these industries ii. which the code basic hours 
were lowar than criminally proposed, is a seccne, group of six 
industries in which basic hours were _r.creased curing ne£ otiations. 
Considering the goal °f the Administration to have "been shorter 
hours, evolution of policy appeared in the modifications which 
lengthened them, ' ':> 

I . Pi i urin ous Co-?l Industry 

Tho bituminous coal industry negotiations illustrated the 
resistance even in unionized industries to reduction of hours "below 
forty. The United line Workers had Ion sought the 6-hour day and 
and five dry reel.:. (*) It had sent out organizers into every unorgan- 
ised field soon after the national Industrial Recovery Act was raider 
serious consideration in Con.rees, and had secured raaribership claimed 
to embrace veil over 90 nercent of the total tonnage. 

A. Original Code i 

The union and"a ; roup of bituminouc coal operators operating 
in the States of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, Iowa, Kentucky, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Montana and 
Wyoming" (*^ began a series of conferences for the development of a 
co;e during the first two weeks of July, 1933. The first took place 
in Chicago, the rest, in Washington, D. C. A code was developed 
jointly by the employer and cr.nioyee groups, differences arising 
only with respect to the length of tho working c'ay. The operators 
pro'.'osed an eight hour day, a thirty-two hour week for one six- 
raonths' perioc and ? forty hour week for the second, with a yearly 
average of thirty-six hours. (^ The United Mine Workers proposed a 

(*) American Federation of Lrbor V/eeklj Hews Service, 
(July 23, 1933). 

(**) national Industrial Recovery Administration Hearing 

on bode of Pair Practices ant Competition presented by 
bituminous coal industry, August 10, 1933 - p. 222. 

(***) The cot'c provision rer.d as follows! 

"Ti ht hours work at the usual working places exclusive 
of lunch ^e.-icd shall be the maximum per day for all 

iployees whether they shall be paid by the hour or paid on 
a bonna^e basis execot incase of accidents which temporarily 
necessitate longer hours for those ei.nloyces required on 
account thereof, and excortir rvoervisors, clerks, and 

(Pootnotc continued) 



thirty hour week "based on a six hour day and. five day week. Both 
sides agreed jointly to sponsor the other terms and to present argu- 
ments supporting their respective positions on hours. The code was 
presented to the Administration or. July 13, 1^33 by the industry 
representative with the statement that it had been prepared "in con- 
formity with the provisions of paragraph (d) of Section 7 of the 

2- Other Proposals 

Other codes wore presented by various regional groups €.-fl\ 
by the non-onion operators. These generally proposed a forty hour 
week, although one recommended a forty-eight hour wee":. (**) Actually 
the controversy centered about the thirty or forty hour week, or 
moreaccurately, the six or eight hour day. The employers 1 argument 
concerned regional differentials and administration. 

C. Management ' s. Position 

Management's approvs/l of the eight hour C'i-r ion 

(***) Continued 

technicians, and also except that small number of 
employees at each mine whose daily Fork includes the 
handling of man trips and those who are required to 
remain on duty while men' are entering or leaving the mine. 

"ITo employee' shall be employed in excess of thirty-two 
hours i~ any calendar week during a twenty-six consecutive weeks' 
period, nor in excess of forty hours in .nay calendar week dur- 
ing the other twenty-six consecutive weeks of such twelve months 
periods; provided, however, that an employer may elect to oper- 
ate any mine on a schedule of employment net to execoc thirty- 
six hours per week throughout th« twelve months' period. Tx- 
ceptions shall be made in case of accidents which temporarily 
necessitate longer hours for those employees required on ac- 
count thereof, and of that small number of employees whose 
daily work includes handling of man trips and those who are 
required to remain on duty while men are entering of leaving 
the mine." 

(llote: representatives' of the United Mine Workers reserved the 
right to present orguments at the proper time to the Ad ministration 
for the six hour day and the five day week instead of the eight 
hour day as set out in the above paragraph.) 
United Line workers Journal, V. 44, p. 4, August 1, 1933. 

(*) national Industrial Recovery Administration, Hearin; on Code of "air j 
Practices and Competition, Presented by George "'. Harrington on be- 
half of the bituminous coal industry', Vol. II, p. 225 f (August 10,1233 

(**) Ibid. Vol. Ill (August 11, 1933), Statement of dice 17, Wilier, 

Representing the Coal Producers' Association of Illinois, x>. 528. 



to the six hour day was based upon anticipated excessive increase in em- 
ployment and increase in labor costs, beyond the industry's capacity to 
pay (*\ in view of competition fro^i other fuels (**\ It averred that 
the shorter working day would mean not merely higher wages, but would 
increase other expenditures. For example, the cost of preparing a coal 
mine for a shift's production was said to increase inversely with re- 
duction in hours. Attention was also called to the fact that the trans- 
portation costs per day mere unchanged. Furthermore, while workers 
would lose as much time annually under the shorter work day, it was de- 
clared that the tier diem costs of this lost time would increase inversely 
with the reduction in the number of hours. One operator stated that the 
periods of non-production would be the same regardless of the length of 
the shift. (***) Other items of overhead, such as royalties, inrarance, 
taxes and fixed expense were pointed out .(****) in addition the fear 

("O State'ient of Mr. F.V. H.Collins, Rocky Mountain Pacific Coal 
Operators Association: 

11 we are confronted on the 8 hour situation, with con- 
dition we cannot avoid. Anything that will add materially 
to the cost of o-oera.tion in the Rocky Mountain Pacific Dis- 
trict must result in coal mining casualty so far as the oper- 
ator is concerned." 

National Industrial Recovery Administration, Hearing on Code 
of Fair Practices and Competition, presented by bituminous 
coal industry, Vol. I, p. 162. 

(**) Testimony of F. K. Tap Ian, Central Coal Association: 

"I do not claim that it is too much money for one miner to 

make It is a question of whether we can stand any such 

cost and compete with fuel and with other competitive fuels, 
and if, in trying to do it, it works out that vou had less 
employment rather than more employment, and that it what 
the act is created for, then we do not believe that ,_ "0uld he 
a very constructive. thing If it were not for the com- 
petitive fuels, I don't believe we would have any argument 
against the claim."' 

National Industrial Recovery Administration, Hearing on Code 
of Fair Practices and Competition, presented by bituminous 
coal industry. Vol. II, p. 369. See also testimony of 
Mr. D. W. Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 360. 

(a.***) Testimony of D. W. Buchanan, National Industrial Recovery 
Administration, Hearing on Code of Fair Practices and Com- 
petition, presented by biluminous coal industry, Vol. II, p. 

(****) Testimony of Frank laplari, -Ibid. n. 37' >, and testimony of 
D. W. Buchanan, Hearing, V. II, Ihid-c. 38>J. 


-t :- 

of the operators maintained that the raining industry had become ad- 
justed to the prevailing eight hour day. Where recognized that a 
shorter workday was not expected to present managerial difficulties, 
one operator declared that he "would rather gave an eight hour day". 
(*) Others maintained that specific physical difficulties would re- 
sult from changing to a shorter day since "we are all laid out on the 
8-hour basis. ¥a equip and size our rooms, make out cuts, arrange 
our cutting machines, our method of loading and handling, all based in 
the unionized districts and the other districts upon an 8-hour pro- 
ductive clean up day". (**> Others contended that the industry had 
developed "an eight hour cycle of operation to fit conditions of min- 
ing" and to uoset it would mean a "long period of costly readjustment" 
and "a less efficient method". (***) Reduction of the length of their 
shift was opposed as an accident hazard, since "explosions in coal mines 
occur most frequently during changes of shifts." With the increase 
in the number of starts made, explosion hazards would increase. (***=0 
These sentiments were summarized in the testimony ?>s follows: 

"The eight hour shift in the operation of coal mines 
is possibly the most important single element in 
connection with the industry. It has become the 
standard unit of operation, and any change therefrom 
must mean decreased efficiency and greater cost in 
the operation of mines.' 1 (*****) 

It was even declared that H a change in the entire industry from 8 
to 6, or even 7 hours evernight, savors of revolution. I hold that re- 
volutions are always dangerous. Any such change must be made gradually 
over a period of years." (****** > 

The operators estimated, on the basis of the customary 48 hour 
operation of the industry, that the 36 hour average work week through- 
out the year would increase em-oloyraent approximately 2'" 1 percent "when 
there is anything like a normal dem-.nd for coal ...." This reduction 
in hours "ought to take care of the big 'est part of the unemployment". 
(*******) It was also noted that "the Administration has considerable 
time to work these problems out.... It might not be a bad idea, to try a 

* v Testimony of Frank Taplan, Vol. II, Ibid. p. 372. 

**) Testimony of F.V.H. Collins, Ibid. Vol. I. p. 163. 

***" Testimony of D.W.Buchanan, Ibid. Vol. II, p. 39'"). 

****) Testimony of D. W, Buchanan, Ibid. Vol. II, p. 392. 

*****) Testimony of D.W.Buchanan, Ibid, p. 394. 

******) Testimony of Eugene KcAuliffe, President of Union Pacific 
Coal Company, Ibid. p. 410, 

******* ) Testimony of Frank X. Taplan, Ibid. p. 268 and p. 369. 


36 hour wee in place of 43, and if we found there was still a big sur- 
plus, it would not take very long to reduce the working time still fur- 
ther." (*) 

While the latter sentiment prevailed among the operators which had 
participated in the draft of the "Harrington Code", quite another line 
of reasoning was evident among other groups. The spokesmen for the 
Northern and Appalachian group of operators contended that it is only by 
11 increased volume of business" that reemployment would really be possible. 
(**) They asked for a forty hour week. 

D. Labor's Position 

Organized labor presented its argument for the six hour day and the 
thirty hour week. It comprised three major points: (l) the eight hours' 
work underground "at the face" was excessive and the eight hour day was 
the prevailing normal work day in the industry; (2) a shorter work day 
would result in decreasing the accident rate and imorovement in the 
health and efficiency of mine workers and such reduction in accidents 
"would more than offset added overhead costs by the savings of losses 
which otherwise would accrue to the operrtor through longer work day re- 
sulting in more accidents"; (3) a maximum work week not to exceed thirty 
hours was necessary to extend employment to available men, check over- 
production, eliminate cutthroat competition, and stabilize costs. (-***) 

E. : Negotiations 

With the adjournment of the hearings, the problem was to weld the 
motley proposals into one. To accomplish this the President called into 
conference on August 17th the representatives of the operators and was 
reported to have "demanded that they omit the qualification of the col- 
lective bargaining provision of the Recovery Act" and insisted uuon a 
single code. (***=0 At the general meeting beginning on August 18, 
subcommittees were formed to consider the various differences. However, 
no progress w-- s made until the open opposition of the non-union oper- 
ators was cleared away and a joint conference wa.s organized. Independent 
discussions relating to the Appalachain district beginning on August 24, 
1933, facilitated the final solution of the labor issues. (*****) The 
vigorous drive for unionization of the miners within the region had 

("O Testimony of Frank K. Taplan, Ibid., p. 370. 

(**") Testimony of Mr. Charles O'Neill, Ibid. Vol. I, p. 64. 

(***) Statement of John L. Lewis, Ibid. pp. 343-362. 

(****) n.y. Times, August 18, 1933. • 

(*****) New York Times, August 25, 1933. While there was a larger 

meeting in the afternoon, a subcommittee was formed consisting 
of the following persons: Operators J.D.A. Morrow, Charles 
O'Neill, H.'E.Taggard, and Duncan Kennedy; miners John L. Lewis, 
Phillip Murray, Thomas Kennedy, and Van A. Bittner 



finally led the previously opposing operators to accede to the necessity 
of joint negotiations. The conference was undertaken under the super- 
vision of the NBA. It was believed that once an agreement was written 
in the form of a contract between the union miners and operators the 
wording of the code itself would be easy. (*) 

However, the conference had no sooner begun than a deadlock ap- 
peared. The Administrator then suggested a forty (40^ hour week in- 
stead of the thirty-six (36) hour average proposal by the operators of 
unionized areas with the provision thrt a commission study the possib- 
ilities of a shorter work week and report back within six months. The 
recommendation included elaborate machinery for settling labor dis- 
putes and establishing a firm basis of industrial relations. While the 
non-union operators accepted the proposal regarding hours, they were 
reluctant about the administrative feature and awaited the action with 
respect to Section 7(a) in the Automobile Code. (**) When the Automo- 
bile Code was adopted with the "iodified Section 7(a) the question was 
reopened by certain bituminous coal employers' submission of a code 
with Section 7(a) modified as in the Automobile Code. (***) However, 
in the eleventh hour the issues were settled and an agreement was reach- 
ed providing for a forty (40) hour week. (****) 

After the major labor terms were set in the collective agreement 
for the Appalachian district the labor provisions of the code itself 
were quickly written. The basic hours developed in the Appalachian 
agreement were incorporated in the code. The period between arrange- 
ment of the basic agreement between organized labor and the Appalachian 
mine operators and the development of the code was spent in settling Vac 

(*) General Johnson declared on announcing these meetings: 

"For the first time in industrial relations in the bituminous 
coal industry, the leaders of the southern portion of the 
Appalachian group which produces 70fo of the bituminous coal 
of the United States have, at their own election, sat down 
in a conference with the officers of the United Mine Workers 
in an earnest effort to agree on all controversed matters 
which have bedeviled this vital industry for years ....This 
conference will proceed by direction of the President under 
the supervision of the National Recovery Administration 
which will lay down the program of negotiations and act as 
mediator throughout." 

(**) . New York Times, August 27, 1933. 

(***) New York Times, August 28, 1933. 

(***) New York Times, August 29, 1933. 

General Johnson, announced: "Committees of the United Mine 
Workers and of the operators in the Appalachian bituminous 
field have reached the basis of an agreement covering the 
principle points at issue and which this Administration is 
willing to recommend to the President. This clears the way 
to the preparation of an acceptable code. No announcement of 
the provisions can be made until there is an agreement on the 
actual working of the agreement and the code." 



issue of the check-off (*"> and the merit clause (** N ' and the closed 
shop. (***") in the midst of these discussions, the Administrator 
announced a code, inviting criticism and giving notice of a -oublic 
hearing on September 12, 1933. (****) The code contained the follow- 
ing provisions with resoect to the hours of labor; 

"No employee shall be employed in excess of thirty- 
two hours in a Calendar week during a consecutive 
period of twenty-six weeks in any twelve months' period 
nor in excess of forty hours in any calendar week during 
the other twenty-six consecutive weeks of such twelve 
months' period; provided, however, that any employer 
may elect to operate any mine on a schedule of employ- 
ment of not to exceed thirty-six hours per week through- 
out the twelve months' period. No employee shall be re- 
quired to work more than eight hours in any one day at 
the usual working places, exclusive of lunch period, 
whether paid by the hcur or on a tonnage basis. There 
shall be excepted from the foregoing limitations, (a} 
employees required becuase of accidents which temporarily 
necessitate a longer hour for them; (b) supervisory, clerks, 
technicians and that small number of employees at each 
mine whose daily work includes the handling of man trips 
and those who are required to remain on duty while men 
are entering ansL leaving the mine. If at any mine the 
majority of the unemployed workers who are organized in 
a manner required by Section 7(a^ of the NIRA expressed 
their desire to share the available work with other bona 
fide unemployed workers of the same min^ or a written 
request to sharo the work is addressed to the mine man- 
agement signed by a majority of the employed workers, 
the number of hours work to be allotted to the unemployed 
workers shall be determined oy conference of the mine 
adjustment committee, or in case of disagreement by the 
decision of the District Adjustment Committee and' dup- 
licate copies of the" decision >f the ec;.nit'tee shall be 
furnished to rfc-he local mine. rsana^en eat 'and .the local mine 
mine employees duly -authorized representatives." (*****) 

(*> New York Times September 2, 1933. 
(**> New York Times September 7, 1933. 
(***) New York Times, September 2, 1933. 
(****) New York Times, September 8, 1933. 
(***** ) Kew York Times, September 8, 1933. 



Meanwhile, the negotiations between the Appalachian operators and 
the union continued. Proclamation of a coae by the Administration had 
given pause to voluntary submission of a code; while collective agree- 
ments in the industry hud been delayed on account of the unsettled 
state of the coce negotiations. The oocrators criticized the NBA for 
its announced code which they characterized as an attempt to relegate 
to the background ownership, management and the substitute therefor 
either by employees or by Federal authorities. "The mrooosed code 
bristles with instances of departure from the time-honored supposition 
that cne had a reasonable measure of nower and authority over his own 
holdings. (*^ 

The public meeting on September 12 w s highly charged. The mine 
workers were threatening strikes because of the delay and the union 
operators were speaking disparagingly of the administration for yield- 
ing to the "Mellon interests" in the Appalachian district (**) The 
result of the public hearing was a. conference committer whi--.h met with 
the 'Administrator. A labor committee (***) met with " rator groups 
to '"ork out the labor provisions of the fvoal draft of si Dde. Under 
governmental and Presidential pressure and shrike threats in the field, 
the final draft was made. (***0 

(* N New York Times, September 11, 1933. 

(**^ Philadelphia Record, September 13, 1933. 

(***") Consisting of John L*. Levis, Phillin Murray, Thom.?s Kennedy, 
Percy Tetlow, and Van A. Bittner. 

(***:iO A presidential statement was issued after a conference with both 
groups on the 14th to the following effect: 

"I have definitely outlined the urgent reasons for 
immediate agreement on the coal code. Without ex- 
ception the operators representing the major coal 
rjroducing areas and recresenta-tives of the United 
Mine Workers have given to me their assurance that 
the code in its present form is for the large part 
acceptable and that in all human probability this 
code can be negotiated to a conclusion within the 
next twenty-four hours - in other words, by Friday 
night. Furthermore, the- wage agreements bet' een 
the operators and the United lane Workers are so 
close to being concluded that the same twenty-four 
hour oeriod should bring them to a successful end. 
In view of these assurances I am. awaiting the sig- 
natures to the code and the agreements." 

New York Times, September 15, 1933. 



As agreed upon, the code set forth the following provision re- 
garding the hours of work: 

"i'lo employee, except members of the ' executive, super- 
visory, technical, and confidential personnel, shall 
be employed in excess of forty (4'~) , l hours in any 
calendar week after the effective date of the code. 
iJo emplovee shall be required or permitted to work more 
than eight hours in any one day at the usual working 
places or otherwise in or about the mine (exclusive 
of lunch period\ whether paid oy the hour or on a 
tonnage or other piecework basis. 

"There shall be excepted from the foregoing limitations 
(a^ employees required because of accidents which tem- 
porarily necessitate longer hours for them: (b^ super- 
visors, clerks, technicians and that small number of 
employees at each mine whose daily work includes the 
handling of man-trips and/ or haulage animals and coal 
in transit and those who are required to remain on 
duty while men are entering or leaving the mine. 

"The foregoing maximum hours of work shall not be con- 
strued as a minimum; and if at airy time a majority of the 
employed workers express .their desire, by written re- 
quest to the employer, to share available work with bona 
fide unemployed workers of the same mine, the number 
of hours., work nay be adjusted accordingly by mutual 
agreement between such employed workers and their em- 
ployers. " 

The greatest obstacle in negotiating the code for the bituminous 
coal industry had proved to be the non-union operators. They had ob- 
jected to the joint code sponsored by labor and employers for an eight 
hour day and an annual thirty-six (36 r hour average week, proposing in- 
stead a forty (40^ hour week. They had been unwilling to yield to a 
shorter than forty (40^ hours work week in spite of the Government's 
proposal of thirty-six (36^ hours. The compromise to achieve cod- 
ification and develop a union contract for the Appalachian district 
was arranged. This provision called for a forty (40") hour if, eek and a 
further study of the hours regulations. The reouirement for voluntary 
compliance by employers with the leverage in the hands of significiant 
groups, resulted in over-riding the previous agreement between labor 
and union employer group and the development of the compromise. 

The Bituminous Coal Code did not meet the union demand for the 
thirty (30^ hour week and exceeded the hours originally proposed by 
the code jointly sponsored by labor and industry. It continued the 
forty (4"0 hour pattern. 

I I . Gasoline Pump Mrnufacturing Industry 

The gasoline nurap manufacturers presented a code with a provision 
for thirty-five (35") hours per ?/eek. This code apparently had not 



undergone changes within the N3A before its submission for public hearinfl 
(* s However, at the public hearing, the industry presented an amendment 
to increase the hours to forty. (** N The industry argued thj t the 
adoption of the forty (4<~^ hour codes for other products manufactured 
in the same establishments (***^ made a thirty-five (35) hour week 
in this industry impossible . 

The labor representatives demanded a thirty (3*0 hour week (****) 
and stated that the average working time in the industry in 1932 (*****> 
was 37.333. They argued that "they should not be influenced by what 
some other plant in their locality is doing, but they ought to carry 
out the intent of the law and reduce the hours." (******) The ar- 
gument for individual variation made this code significant in the 
history of kRA policy. 

At the public herring a fell discussion between the deputy ad- 
ministrator and- his labor adviser took place. He questioned the fair- 
ness of increasing the labor rates in this industry while other in- 
dustries were going on a forty hour week. The labor adviser r>ointed 
out the large amount of unemployment in this industry. He suggest- 
ed that in "these different industries the labor costs should be the 
same or at least the rates of pay. There should be some way of work- 
ing it. out ' h?reby the hourly rate or the weekly rote in all the dif- 
ferent plants should be the same." (******* ^ 

With evidence of the facts available that the other industries 
had adopted a forty (40 N , hour week, the gasoline pump manufacturing 
industry demanded a similar work week. The administration was faced 
with a serious problem. The Labor Advisory Board had declared that 
"forty (4 |,) ) hours a week is too long for this industry if the intent 
of the Reco-ery Act is to be fulfilled which is to absorb all labor 
that was employed during the normal years from 1926 to 1929 and that 
thirty {'60) hours a week is all that could be worked if that is to 
be accomplished, or at the most a thirty-six (36) hour week with pro- 
vision that not more than eight (8) hours in any one day shall be 
worked," (*****#**} 

(*) History of the Code of Fair Competition for the Gasoline 

Manufacturing Industry, by E.R. Schaeffer, p. 9. 

(**) National Recovery Administration hearings on the Code of 

. Fair Competition and Practices presented bv the gasoline 
pump manufacturing industry, August "'4, 1933 ; p. 11. 

(***) Ibid, pp. 31, 43, 45, 48, 51, 55. 

(****> Testimony of ii.R, 7ewham of the International Association of 

Machinists, Ibid. p. 56. 
(*****) Ibid, p. 61. 

(******) IbxcL, p. 62. 

(*******") Ibid, pp. 61-68 
(******** "i Code History, for the Gasoline Fump Manufacturing Industry, 


Exhibit D. 


The Administration followed precedents rather than the need for 
individual variations. In its letter of transmittal of the codes it 
explained that the forty (40^ hour Feek was approved despite the 
fact th. tit will obviously add few employees to the payroll. How- 
ever, in order to reabsoro the unemployment in this industry it would 
be necessary to reduce the hours of em-clo^nent to less than thirty (3^) 
per week. As a practical, workable proposition this would be de- 
cidedly unfair to the industry because- 

(1^ Some of the plants "oroduce 'oroducts which 
are already governed by other forty (4')} 
hour codes and shift their labor between the 
different tynes of -oroduction. 

(2^ i:ost of the plants are in localities where 
the maximum is governed by forty (4'"^ hour 

"Reducing the hours to a. point where the weekly earnings of 
employees in this industry would not offset those of workers under 
other forty (40 N| hour codes in the same locality would infringe on 
the available labor supply for this industry. Under present condi- 
tions for practical consideration, the rea.bsorntion of the -unemploy- 
ed in this industry is practically impossible. (*) 

In this case hours were increased beyond the original crow sal 
of the industry, not for economic reasons peculiar to the industry, 
b" -t for fear of unfair competition among the various metal manufactur- 
ing industries if they "ere not all governed n oj the s "lie hours provi- 
sions. This action was taken despite the fact that such extension of 
hours reduced the possibility of ree:-nlo:aient in the industry. 


III Compressed Air, Heat Exchange and Pump Industries 

Since these industries presented the same cods, the Cc.naressed Air 
Industry code was representative of all three. In its draft code pre- 
sented by the industry _n August 4th, the following provision was in- 

"on and after the effective date no employer shall employ: 

(a) an employee engaged in the processing of the products 
of the compressed air industry and in labor operations directly 
incident thereto in excess of thirty-six (36) hours per week; 

(b) any other employees except executives administrative super- 
visory and technical employees 'and their respective staffs and 
traveling sales and service employees, in excess of forty (40) 
hours per week. Provided, however, that these limitations shall 
not apply to conditions of seasonal or peak demand which create 
an unusual and temporary burden for production or installation; 
in such special cases such number of .;ours may be worked as are 
required by the necessities of the situation, but not to exceed 
forty-eight (43) hours per week for any six weeks in any calen- 
dar six months' period beginning July 1, 1933, provide! however, 
t.iat in such special cases at least time and one-third shall be 
paid for hours worked in excess of the maximum, and provided 
further that these limitations shall not apply to employees on 
emergency, maintenance or repair work, not to very special 
cases where restriction of hours of highly skilled workers 
would unavoidably reduce or delay production but in such special 
cases at least time and one-third shall be paid for hours worked 
in excess of the maximum. 11 (*) 

These provisions were similar to those of the Electrical Code. In 
fact in transmitting these to the National Recovery Administration, the 
Secretary of the Compressed Air Institute declared that "in view of the 
fact that this code as well as the codes for the Hydraulic Institute and 
heat Exchange Institute, follows very closely and is much the sane a.s the 
Electrical Manufacturing code which has been approved by the President, 
it is assumed that a preliminary conference will not be necessary and we 
therefore ask that date for a public hearing be set." (**) Nevertheless, 
conferences with Administrative officials led to revision and presentation 
of a new code on August 26, 1933, This revision included a basic forty 
(40) hour week, in place :f the previous thirty-six (36) hours and left 
the exemptions unchanged. (***) 

(*) Code of Pair Competition for Compressed Air Industry Vol. A, 
NPA Files. 

(**) Letter from Lir. C. II. Rohobach, Compressed Air Institute to 
IhTA, August 11, 1933, Vol. A, IhlA Files. 

(***) August ?.S draft in Vol. A. 


This latter draft providing for longer hours was the one submitted 
to the public hearing on September 5, 1933. (*) The defense of the 
change was that the revival of the capital goods industry "can only come 
when consumers 1 goods industries begin to show profits and have money 
to spend for replacements, renewals or modification of plants and this 
recovery is hastened "oy the creation of a capital goods market or the 
improvement of the existing market." (**) 

It was further contended that less than forty (40) hours per week 
"will necessarily be reflected promptly in selling prices and immediately 
act as a stoppage of the placing of business and cause further unemploy- 
ment." (***) Hot much reemployment was promised by the industry because 
of the hours' reduction. Only business revival could bring reemployment. 
The labor representatives presented a brief but no oral argument against 
this proposal. (****) 

Conferences wore held with the labor advisers to the code follow- 
ing the public Leaving and no important revisions resulted, except that 
time and one-half pay for overtime above the daily ei^it hours was sub- 
stituted for payment after the weekly maximum. A later draft reduced 
the overtime rate to time and one- third. 

The final draft of the code was protested by the Labor Advisory 
Board which recommended a thirty-five (35) hour week. (*****-^ The Code 
Analysis Division made the following comments upon the proposal: 

"No clear statement appears in the transcript that would 
support the belief that the present forty (40) hour maxi- 
mum hour provision will actually tend to increase employ- 
ment within the industry. It was stated by Mr, Neagle that 
1500 men had been added to the industry payroll in a seven 
months period, occurring between February and August of this 
year, however, it was brought out by Deput i.Iuir that in- 
creased volume was responsible rather than the adjustment 

(*) national Recovery Administration hearing on Code of Fair 
Practices and Competition by compressed air industry, 
September 5, 1933, p. 8. 

(**) Ibid, p. 23. 

(***) loid, p. 24. 

(****) Ibid,- p. 65,, Newham of the International Association of 

(*****) Letter of September 22, 1933 to deputy administrator, Vol. 3. 


of hours worked. The figures submitted by Mr. Neagle at 
the hearing show that t e industry is considerably in ex- 
cess of fifty (50 j) percent off in employment as compared 
to the year 1939. The forty (40) hour maximum per week 
is presumably designed by the industry to take up some 
portion of this slack between employed and unemployed in 
the industry. It is questionable wnet. er forty (40) 
-our maximum will result in creating an appreciable take 
up in that slack which will be satisfactory to the Admin- 
istration. Therefore, it would seem that seme readjust- 
ment of maximum hours night well be made to a point at 
least net higher than thirty-six (56) per week, with, of 
course, a corresponding increase in the minimum wage rates 
that will provide for a living wage for all employees." (*) 

In approving this code the leputy administrator in his report made 
the following comment: 

"In February 1955, there was a total of 2,690 employees in the 
industry, marking the lev/ point. Jitn increased business after 
March 4, 1935 and the adoption of the forty (40) hour week under 
the President's Reemployment Agreement the total employees rcse 
to 4,781 in August 1933, or about fifty (50) percent of the same 
period in 1939 ... It is recommended that a statement be issued 
to the effect that fce forty (40) hour week ml minimum rate of 
forty cents (40?) an hour has been recommended oy the Administrator 
and the Labor Advisory Board because they feel that the maximum 
hour and minimum rate basis will be most effective in developing 
volume of business in tins industry, and that a shorter week and 
higher rate would tend to defeat the very purpose of the Act. 
The only way in which this industry can reemploy and increase 

rolls is through increased volume in business and the Admin- 
istr tion and tne Labor Beard .ave had this in mind in approving 
the codes." (**) 

In all t.ree cases, the compressed air and also the heat exchange and 
pump industries with similar codes, two reasons were given for administrate 
ap roval of the increase in hours ~by the industry. These were, first, the 
precedents set b ' similar industries for a forty hour week code and, second) 
the belief that reduction in hours was not pertinent to reemployment in the 
capital goods industries. 

(*) Letter of September 22, 1933, Vol, A, from.PW. Taf t. to G. S., Brady. 

(**) Letter from Mr. Malcolm Muir to General Hugh 3. Johnson, Administratol 
Report on the Code of Pair Competition for the Compressed Air Inlustrj 
October 9, 1933. Vol. II, No evidence in sup ort of the Labor Board's 
ao :roval of this statement appears in the file. 


IV. Retail Trade 

Retail trade presented a unique problem to I'RA because of its large 
number of small units. Though the outstanding retail trade association had 
considered a forty-eight (48) hour week, IITA pressure to effect reemployment 
led to the adoption and \ resentation of a code based upon a forty (40) hour 
rree 1 :. This code as finally submitted was sponsored by si::: of the national 
trade .associations with recommendation that "all retell trades of the country 
be brought under one composite code. "A forty (40) hour week "'a established 
but with provision for a forty—eight (48) hour peak during three weeks in 
each si:: months period. In submitting this proposal, however, the sponsoring 
trade associations noted that "the code should, provide a longer week, but in 
order to expedite compliance with the President's Reemployment Agreement, we 
are submitting the cod.e on the basis of-forty (40) hours." They reserved the 
right, they declared, to submit a complete code at a later date providing 
for a longer week than forty (40) hours. (*) Opposition has heard from many 
sources to the forty (40) hour week proposal. The Chicago retail '-roup was 
reported to be in favor of a forty-eight (48) hour wee::. (**) Two groups, the 
food dealers and the drug group abstained from sponsoring the code and sought 
independent It was reported in some of the ' newspapers that "the food 
dealers representatives satisfied. Deputy Administrator A. D. TThi'teside that 
a fort-*~eight (43) hour work— week was necessary in groceries and. related 
establi shments. " ( ***) 

A . President' s Reemployment Agreement Substitution 

The result of these negotiations was the issuance of a ??A substitution 
to the retail trades which provided the following: 

"On and after the effective date of this code no individual or 
organization selling at retail shall work any employee (excepting 
executives whose salaries exceed $35.00 per week, or registered 
pharmacists or other professional persons employed in their pro- 
fession or outside salesmen, and. except outside deliver;' - men and 
maintenance employee's who nay". be anjpJ.oyecl forty-eight (48) hours 
weekly or more, if paid time and one-third, for all hours over forty- 
eight hours weekly) for more than forty (40) hours per -reek, except- 
ing at Christmas, inventory and other peak periods employees ma - ' work 
forty-eight (43) hours per week for a maximum of not to exceed three 

weeks in each six months The maximum fixed in Paragraph OA (above 

cited) shall not apply to employees in establishments employing not 
more than t - o persons, in towns of less than 2,500 population which 
towns are not part of a large trade area. "(****) 

(*) history of the Cod.e of -"'air Competition for the Retail Trade 

Appendix "13" Proposed Code of July 29, 1933, proposed by six 

national retail associations. 
(**) i".Y. Daily hews Record, July 26, 1933. 

(***) Houston Chronicle, July 30, 1953. herald Tribune, July 30, 1933 
(****) National Recovery Administration - Substituted wages and Hours 

Provisions of the President's Reemployment Agreement, Bulletin 

ho. 3, Washington, 1933. p. 175. 


-1( - 

Another substitution was issued to grocers. They were allowed 
a basic fort—eight (48) hour week with more liberal allowances, of daily hour 

The P3A substitution for the general retailer represented sub strati ally! 
the provisions of the Retailers' Ocde, presented to the Administration on 
A Utit 4, 1933. (**) Many changes were made, however, in a subsequent draft 
submitted cr. August 14, 1933, which went to public hearing on August 22, 

1933. (***) At the public hearing additional changes in hours' -orovisicns 
"ere presented by the sponsors. They resulted from the pressure brought by 
small stores in larger cities and practically all types of stores in smaller 
cities. (****) 

3 . P ublic H ea ring 

The new proposal made b" ti e employers at the public herring was the 

(A) On and after the effective date of this code no individual or 
organization shall work any eraplo3 r ee ercept executives whose salaries 

■e not less than $30.00 per week, and except registered pharmacists 
and other professional persons employed in their profession and except 
outside salesmen, and except maintenance and outside delivery en lo-ees 
may be employed forty— eight (43) hours weekly or more, if paid time 
end one-third for all hours over forty-four (44) hours per week, ercept- 
ing, at Christmas, inventor-- and other peal: periods employees may work 
forty-eight (48) hours per week for a maximum of not to exceed three 
weeks in each six months. It is understood and agreed that if any other 
groups of retailers (except food retailers who have been granted forty- 
eight (48) hours weekly) are granted hours in e:.:cess of those stated 
above that these same hours will automatically apply to the groups of 
retailers coming under this code The maximum hours fixed in para- 
graph 3(a) shall not apply to employees in retail establishments in 
towns of less than 10,000 population (when such towns are not part of 
a larger trade area) in which case forty-eight (48) hours wee 1 :!- for all 
employees is permitted." (*****) 

In explaining this change the six sponsoring retail organizations declar 

that "the experience of many stores has indicated to associations tha.t such 

stores, especially those in smaller places cannot comply with the rigorous 
restrictions of a fort- (40) hour wee!;. (******) 

(*) Ibid, p. 175. 

(**) '..'( 11 Street' Journal, August 5, 1933 

(***) history of the Code of ?air Competition for the Retail Trade, 

p. 29 

(****) Daily Hews ftecori , Au ust 21, 1933. 

(*****) ia.tional " rial 'Recovery Administration hearing on Code of 

Fair Competition and Practices presented by retail trades, August 

' 2, 1933^ Vol. 1, p.2 . 
(******) Ibid< p< 26 


In supporting the proposal for a forty-four (44) hour T/ee 1 : with an exception 
for a forty-eight (43) hour wee:-: in specific areas, the retailers contended 
that the above hours'' schedule "would enable the present firms in this joint 
retail group to reestablish their 1929 volume of employment. It has been 
felt that the absorption of employes of firms that have -one out of business 
shoxild be taken care, of normally with the increase of business that is under 
way. " ( *) The decline in employment "as stated to be much smaller than 
in other fields since as a service industry it must be prepared for customers 
at all times and cov25 release few persons, ilo information v/as presented on 
the extension of hours during the depression. 

The change in basic weekly hours from fort" (40) to forty— four (44) per 
xee".: was not satisf actor"', however, to many groups within the trade. Those 
protesting the forty-four hour week and urging a forty-eight (43) hour week 
included the hardware stores, neighborhood dry goods stores, shoe stores and 
other classes. The arguments most commonly used were the following: (l) the 
retail business was one engaged in rendering a public service and conforming 
to customer requirements for earl;- openings and late closings; (2) individual 
brer ores of the industry would reemploy a total equal to or more than their 
1S29 employment level with a for'; --eight (43) hour week largely because 
displacement among surviving firms in the retail industry was comparatively 
small during the depression; (o) the new demands for skilled personnel could 
not be filled and the training of such personnel would be burdensome; (4) 
o. shorter reel; would so increase costs as to cause a large number of failures 
in the retailing industry, parti cularly in the smaller towns, and among smaller 
retailers who would succumb either because the overhead would be too burden- 
some or because the department and chain stores would be able to compete more 
readily; ( n ) competition with the owner-operator stores which would remain 
unregulated as to hours would make competition for the regulated stores keener 
and sharper; (6) a reduction in weekly hours below forty-eight (40) is too 
drastic since working hours in many branches are far in excess of sixty and 
reductions are undesired b~ r the huge proportion of members of the trade; (7) 
uniformity of hours with competing industries selling similar .articles is 
imperative. There was a strong, sentiment among several groups for a. differ- 
ential of maximum hours of employment for stores maintaining longer operating 
hours. (**) 

Only one group of employers raised a voice in protest against the propos- 
al for a fort" (40) or larger number of hours. They were the Hew York detail 
Furniture Association. They proposed, a thirty (30) hour week for the industry 
since, they • rgued, "it is obvious it will tax but slightly the ingenuity of 
the proprietors of the stores to avoid the employment o^ additional help by 
limiti: the hours of employment to fort-- (40) hours.'" (***) The; r contended 
that "b- staggering the hoursof labor among the fen employees no additional 
working people will be required." However, this position was met with amaze- 
ment by the deputy linistrator who exclaimed that "that woul<? the 
selling expe se about 200 percent." (****) 

Testimony of Dr. fjavid Friday, Ibid, ;o.55 
(**) Ibid, Hearings 
(***) Ibid, a. 275 
(****) Ibid, p. 28 

. . . 


Labor groups likewise raised their voice aginst the proposal. 
They protested the lengthening of hours fron forty (40) to forty-four 
(44) hours and called the coc 1 e "reactionary" urging that the -protest 
of th<= snail cities .shoulc result in an exemption for them rather than 
in the granting of a differential of hours to all groups, large and 
small, they spoke out against the exemptions granted to special occu- 
pations and the absence of any special maximum number of hours regu- 
lating this group. (*) 

C. Final Provision s 

As a result of tiiese hearings nine retail associations, including 
three nen groups, sponsoring the code submitted a new draft on the 
day of the hearings, August 24, 1933. These provisions were made by 
a committee of retailers largely at Lhe suggestion of the Administra- 
tion. The new provisions regarding hours specified a forty (40) hour 
week for stores electing to remain open for business fifty-two (52) 
hours or less, whereas a forty-four (44) hour week was established for 
those electing to operate between fifty- six (56) hours and sixty (60) 
business hours, and those operating for sixty- three (63) hours or more 
were allowed a forty-eight (48) hour basic r; or'': week for their employees. 
Exempt from this maximum were executives earning $30.00 per week or 
more, registered pharmacists, other professional persons, outside sales- 
men, and delivery and maintenance who were permitted a forty- 
eight (43) hour maximum. A seasonal exemption of three (3) weeks of 
forty-eight (48) hours in each six months was permitted for each em- 
ployee. (**) ijhe "principle of elective provisions respecting wages 
and hours was recommended at the public hearing but was more specifically 
developed by the Admini strati on and proposed to the industry." (***) 

Labor did not participate in the development of these terms. The 
Administrator found the industry agreeable to these proposals and dur- 
ing the following month, the major terms were elaborated. The problem 
of "loss limitation" and "stop loss" features of the code delayed the 
final approval. Or. September 20, revisions incorporating these 
changes were presented. They were included in the final code (****) 

with 'practically no sign i ficant change . 

(*) Testimdnjr of hiss Rose Schneiderman of the Labor Advisory 
Board, pp. 418-431. 

(**) Ibid, p. 782. 

(***) History of the Code of Fair Competition for the Retail Trade, p. 3.. 

(****) .ARTICLE V 

SECTIOh 1- Basic Store and Working Hours 

On and after the effective date of this Code establishments in 
the retail trade shall elect tc oper- te upon one of the following 
schedules of store hours and hours of labor: 

Group A. -Any establishment nay elect to remain open for business less 
than fifty-six (56) hours but not less than fifty-two (52) hours per 
week, unless its store hours were less than fifty-two (52) hours prior 
to June 1,1933, in which case such establishment shall not reduce its 
store hours; no employee of these establishments shall work more than 
forty (40) hours per wee!:, nor more than eight (8) hours per day, 
nor more than six (6) days per week. 
(****) Footnote continued on next page. 

- 103 - 
(***#) -Footnote continued from preceding page. 

Group 3. — Any establishment may elect to- lemain open for business 
fifty-six (56) hours or more per week bat less than sixty-three 
(63) hours per week; no employee of such establishment shell work 
more than i'orty-four (44) hours per week, nor more than nine (9) 
hours per day, nor more then six (6) days per week. 

Group C. ; — Any establishment may elect to remain open for business 
sixty-three (63) hours cr more per week; no employee of such 
establishment shall work more than forty-eight (48) hours per 
week, nor more than ten (10) hours per day, nor more than six 
(6) days per week, 

... . Group B.-.-Any establishment may elect to remain open for 

business fifty-six (56) hours or more per week but less than 
sixty-three (63) hours per week; no employee of such establish- 
ment shall work more than forty-four (44) hours per week, nor 
more than nine (9) hours per day, nor more than six (6) days 
per 'week. 

Group' C. — Any establishment may elect to remain open for 
business sixty- three (63) hours or more per week; no employee 
of such establishment shall work more than forty-eight (48) 
hours per week, nor more than ten (10) hours per day, nor 
more than six (6) days per week, 
Ho employee shall work for two or more establishments a greater 
number of hours, m the aggregate,' than he would be permitted to 
work for that one of such establishments which operates upon the 
lowest schedule of working hours. 

No employee not included in the foregoing paragraphs, and not 
specifically excepted hereinafter, shall work more than forty (40) 
hours per week, nor more than eight (6) hours per day, nor more 
than .six (6) day's per week. 

Section 2. Schedule of hours to be posted. — On or within one 
week after the effective date of this Code every retail establish- 
ment shall designate under which of the Groups set forth in the 
preceding Section it elects to operate a,nd shall post and maintain 
in a conspicuous place in the establishment a copy of such election 
showing its store hours and employee working hours. 

Section 3. Cnang s in store hours and employee working hours. — 

(a) No establishment may change from the Group in which it 
has elected to operate except upon December 31 of every year. 

(b) Any establishment, however, may at any time increase its 
store hours, provided it maintains the ba'cic employee work week 
of the Group in which it originally elected to operate. 

(c) Any establishment may, for a period not to exceed three (3) 
months during the Summer, temporarily reduce its store hours, 

(****) Footnote continued on next page. 



(****) Footnote continued from previous page. 

but the weekly wages of its employees shall not on that account be 
the weekly wages of its employees shall not on that account be re- 

Section 4. Exceptions to maximum periods of labor.—* 
(a.) Professional persons, outside salesmen, outside collectors, 
watehmen, guards, and store detectives. —The maximum periods of 
labor prescribed in Section 1 of this Article shall not apply to p| 
fessional persons employed and working at their profession, or to 
outside salesmen, outside collectors, watchmen, guards, and store 

(b) Maintenance and outside service employees. — The maximum 
periods of labor prescribed ir. Section 1 of this Article shall npt 
apply to maintenance and outside service employees; but such em- 
ployees shall not work more than six (6) hours per week above the 
maximum hours per week otherwise prescribed by Section 1 unless 
they are paid at the rate of time and one-third for all hours over 
such additional six (5) hours per week. 

(c) Executives. — Subject to the conditions set forth in Section 
5 of this Article, executives receiving $35.00 or more per v/eek in 
cities of over 500,000 population, or receiving $30.00 or more 
per v/eek in cities of 100,000 to 500,000 population, or receiving 
G27.50 or more per week in cities of 25,000 to 100,000 population, 
or receiving S25.00 or more per week in cities, towns, villages, and 
other places under 25,000 population, may work in excess of the max- 
imum periods of labor prescribed in Section 1 of this Article. In 
the South executives paid not less than ten (10) per cent below the t 
wages just specified may work in excess of such maximum periods. 

(d) Peak periods. — At Christmas, inventory, and other peal: times, 
for a period not to exceed two (2) weeks in the first six (5) months 
of the calendar year and not to exceed three (3) weeks in the secona 
six (6) months, an employee whose basic work week is forty (40) houri 
may work not more than fort~-eight (48) hours per week and nine (9) | 
hours per day; an employee whose basic work v/eek is forty-*four (44) j 
hours may work not more than fifty-two (52) hours per week and nine I 
and one-half (9v) hours per day; an employee whose basic work week I 
is forty-eight (48) hours may work not more than fifty* six (56) hours 
per week and ten (10) hours per day. All such work may be without 
the payment of overtime. 

Section 5. Limitation upon number of persons working unrestricted 
hours. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing sections of 
this Article, and regardless of the number of persons otherwise per-« 
mitted to work unrestricted hours, the total number of workers ir. any 
establishment (whether such workers are executives, proprietors, paifl 
ners, persons not receiving monetary :, or others) who shall be ] 
jf mitted to work unrestricted hours shall not exceed the following I 
ratio: In establishments, comprised of twenty (20) workers or less 
the total number of workers who may work unrestricted hours (not in-l 
eluding those workers specified in Section' 4 of tliis Article)" 

(****) Footnote continued on next page. 



In pre sent in,. 0, this code with its hours provisions to the president, 
the Administrator declared that "the elective provisions regarding ,_T a~:es, 
hours of work and store hours suggested by the Administration were generally 
accepted as equitable. The working hours may not be entirely satisfactory 
from a purely social viewpoint; but they represent a substantial reduction 
from the hours which prevailed at the retail trade. This reduction in 
working hours will restore employment in retailing to the 1929 level." (*) 

TThile the final code represented an extension of hours over tnose 
.originally proposed, it also was a compromise among the contentions of the 
various interested trade groups. The fort" (40) hour ^eek provision was 
observed by a considerable section of the retail trade in the large cities. 

(****) Footnote continued 

shall not exceed one worker for every five (5) workers or fraction thereof; 
in establishments comprised of more than twenty (20) workers the total 
number of workers who may work unrestricted hours (not including those 
workers specified in Section 4 (a) of this Article.) shall not exceed one 
worker for every five (o) workers for the first twenty (20) workers, and 
shall not exceed one worker for every eight (8) workers above twenty (20). 

Section 6. Hours of work to be consecutive. — The hours worked by any 
employee during each day shall be consecutive, provided that an interval not 
longer than one hour may be allowed for each regular meal period, and such 
interval not counted as part of the employee's working time. Any rest period 
which may be given employees shall not be deducted f£om such employee's work- 
ing time. 

Section 7. Extra working hour on one day a week. — On one day each week 
employees may work one extra hour, but such hour is to be included within 
the maximum hours permitted each week. 

Section 8. Conflict with State laws. — T71ien any State law prescribes for 
an~ r class of employees shorter hours of labor than those prescribed in 
this Article no employee included within such class shall be employed with- 
in such State for a greater number of hours than such State law allows. 

(*) Codes of Fair Competition Vol. I, p. 29 


-106- ' 


The fact that in si:: cases hours were increased over those originally J 
proposed by the industry is significant. Management's pressure for longerll 
hours v;as -unrelenting. Even where they had agreed to a basic formula for j 
snorter hours, later pressure for extension was great. Strong employer 
groups reduced the number of codes establishing a shorter than forty hour 
week. Five of the codes in this group first proposed a 35 or 35 hour week 
as the basic work week, but these proposals were modified and the hours ex 
tended to 40. The sixth was presented as a 40 hour code and when finally 
approved provided for a range of hours extending from 40 to 48. 

In effecting these changes industry pointed to approved precedents 
in competitive industries and ashed for uniformity in basic hours. The 
four metal manufacturing industries in this group had their hours increased 
because the prevailing norm for similar industries was forty hours and the 
administrative officials handling these codes were unsympathetic to drastic 
reductions in normal full time working hours. In the case of the other two 
industries hours were lengthened as a compromise among contending -roups 
and to assure the codification of industry. The longer hours were approve 
despite the recognition that they would not increase employment in these 
industries to the 1929 level. These increases in basic hours foreshadowed! 
the basic changes in ITEA standards for the determination of basic hours in 



Negotiations of Codes in which Ba sic Hours 
P.emained the Same as Originally Proposed. 

In. contrast to the preceding t^o grouos, there were 25 codes in 
which the negotiations resulted in no modification of the basic 
weekly hours. Explanation's given by the Administration for approval 
of these codes indicated the reasons for and the circumstances giving 
rise to the resistance to change. The negotiations of four codes 
in this group are described. . 

I . Electri cal L'a. nuf a.c tu r ing 

The electrical manufacturing industry presented a code pro- 
viding for a basic thirty-six hour reek for employees in "the pro- 
cessing of products and in operations incident thereto"; a forty hour 
week for all other employees except executive, administrative and 
supervisory; for a tolerance of lUH hours oer year in excess cf the 
maximum to meet seasonal and peak demand, and a complete exemption 
for emergency periods. In the last, reports of such v/ork were 
required. (*) No substantial change was maae in o-sic hours' pro- 
visions in the final code; only the seasonal and peak tolerance was 
altered. The development of the hours provisions in this code is of 
special interest since this was the first capital goods industry up 
for consideration. 

A. Industry* s Position 

VJhile the industry had considered the possibilities of a J>0 
hour are .k, no such action was taken. Tho suggestion was filed 
away for comments. (**) The hours as proposed were supported by 
the contention that 

"since the average number of hours per "eel: oer employee being 
worked at the present time, because the subnormal volume of 
business, is under 36 hours oer week, so that if any material 
improvement in the electrical manufacturing industry, is de- # 
sired which will bring back into employment a large number of 
the employees which were engaged in the industry during 1S29> 
we must have an improvement in" the capital goods branch of the 
industry and for that we must wait on improvement in other 
industries." (***) 

(*) New York Times. July lk, 1933 

(**) Hationa.l Recovery Administration, Electrical Code Hearing , 
Vol. 1, pp. 10-11+. 

(***) Ibid V. I., p. 12, Testimony by C. L. Collins, President 
Reliance Electric: 1 Engineering Company v 



It was anticipated that improvement in the industry would be limited 
to the consumer branches .^nd would result in the employment of an addi- 
tional 25 i 000 persons. For the capital goods branch the only solution 
visualized Fas "a real improvement in business in other industries". 
The industry estimated that it would only require about 50 P er cent 
increased volume of business over the average that existed in June, or 
a volume of business that would be an equivalent of 60 per cent of the 
volume of business ■ hich the industry employed in 1929. (*) The 
seasonal tolerance was advocated for certain branches in the industry, such 
as refrigerators, where storage of their product -nd therefore regu- 
larization was difficult, and for small to~'n c ' to which migration of 
employees seemed unwise. (**) 

B . Labor' s Position 

L-bor countered this proposal T, dth a thirty-hour week and the 
elimination of the proposed seasonal tolerance. In support of their 
stand, labor representatives pointed out the average of 3^*9 hours per 
employee in the industry in April 1933» nn ^- a prevailing volume of 
oroduction that would necessitate an 11-hour week to reabsorb enough 
oersons to raise total employment in the industry to the 1929 level. 
However, for practical purposes they recommended a 30~hour week. In 
respect to the seasonal tolerance the labor representatives also 
suggested that more could be done to stabilize the industry, and tha.t 
furthermore, "under present conditions where men and -omen are glad to 
have any employment" it is wise to hire them "even temporarily even 
though you have to dunro them out unemployed at the end of the season". (** 

Furthermore, labor emphasized the need for establishing shorter 
hours of employment so as to take up the slack of general unemployment, 
and affirmed that the code as it stood would have no effect on unemploy- 
ment. (****) 

(*) Ibid p. 13. 

(**) Ibid, op. 21-25. Testimony by G. ',7. Mason, President, The 
Kelvinator Company. 


) Ibid pp. lUO-153. Testimony of Mr. C. L. Seed and C. D. 
Keaveney of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. 

(****)lbid, p. 205, Statement of '.Tilliam Green. 



C . ■ Negotiations 

The code committee was a.sked to reconcile its proaosal with the 
criticisms which had' been presented. A meeting was held with members of 
the Labor Advisory Eoard (*), but the industry made no substantial 
change in the hours provisions. (**) Ag--in the labor representatives 
criticized these pro-oosals (***). Another appeal was made by the 
deputy admini.str9.t0r for reconsideration of the wage and hour pro- 
visions "in the light of the evidence already in and anything addi- 
tional that has been presented" (****); but in the afternoon session 
the industrial representatives -gain indicated their unanimous stand 
against changing the thirty-six hour provision, but stated their will- 
ingness to reconsider the provision for lUH hours tolerance. (*****) 

Throughout the proceedings, the deputy administrator was apparently 
impressed by industry' position. In preparing the background for a 
question to the labor representative, he declared "industry cannot be 
expected to do much until it has some chance of getting a volume of 

business which would enable them to get their people reemployed 

This capital goods end of the industry cannot by writing a ticket or 
pjiy other gesture increase their hours of work, even up to 36 hours, 
until they can. get some business" . (******) In the consideration of 
the seasonal tolerance the Administration evidenced a. disposition to 
recognize the difficulties of eliminating the sea.sonal varie.tions(*******) 

(*) Mr. "Tilliam Green and Dr. Leo ",/olman. 

(**) National Recovery Administration Electrical Code Hear in--: , 
V. II, a. 1007 

(***) Ibid, pp.lOUU-1057, July 21, I933. 

(****) Ibid, p. IO65., 

(*****) Ibid, p. IO67. 

(******) |. ;.,;,;., pp. '207-8. 



Coiiferences were held in ied.ia.tely after the public hearings. They 
dealt prinarily with the minimum wage rate and the seasoned tolerance 
provided in the code. The basic 36 hours week was approved by the 
Chairman o: r the Labor Advisor;- Board because it "could be expected to 
result in material ree. iployr.ent in the industry should any iinprovement 
in business develop". He did. oppose the seasonal variation of lUU hours 
per year because such provision --as not required, by all branches of the 
industry and because it was difficult, if not impossible, to cLetemine 
the amount of seasonal tolerance necessary to meet the industry' s need.s. 
Furthermore, "the extent to which the industry could level out the 
seasonal peaks insofar as production was concerned had not yet been 
determined and could not be ejected to be fully d.eveloped until some 
restrictions were imposed upon then which would r puire the fullest 
application of their ingenuit to this pro bio ,u . 

In its revision -the industry accepted, the proposal of the Chairman 
of the Labor Advisor" hoard, that each firm report to the supervisory 
agency at the end of each month (*) its hours in excess of the stipula- 
ted.- maximum of 3S per week, Specifically, the ne 1 .- provision permitted 
a ember firms to work "such number of hours.;, as are required by the 
necessities of the situation, but at the end of each calendar month, 
every emplo; r er shall report to the Administrator, through the Board of 
Governors of the National Electrical Ltanufacturers Association, in such 
detail as nay be required., the number of man-hours worked in that month, 
and. the ratio which said, nan-hours bear to the total number of man-hours 
of labor during said month". (**) 

The agreements on both wages and. hours were d.eveloped. jointly ~o~j 
a committee (***). j- approving the code, the deputy administrator 
stated, that "immediate reemployment of not less than 10 per cent more 
persons and as much as 'jO per cent in some of the consumer goods branches 
will result; a complete reemployment of the number to he found, in the 
industry in the year 1929 should result 'Men, through an improvement in 
the capital goods division, unfilled, ord.ers of the industry (which on 
June 1, 1933 , stood at Ho per cent of 1929 level) shall reach 60 per 
cent of the I929 volume". (****) 

Although this was one of the first industries, to be codified, no 
real effort was made to revise the basic hours downward.. There was 
prevailing sentiment against farther reduction. There was evident 
conviction that the capital goods industry must look to the general 
revival of industry for substantial reemployment. Forth reduction of 
hours in this industry was not considered, vital to recovery. 

(*) National Recovery Administration, Code of Fair Competition for the 
Electrical - acturiny Industry, Vol. II, Report of Deputy Administra- 
tor 17. L. Allen, August 12, 1933. 
(**) National Recovery Administration, Codes of fair Co -.petition, Vol. 

If ?• ^7. 

(***) Consistin ; of G. "J. S.wo"oe, William Green an Leo TTolman. 


1 1 Hosiery Industr-; 

In the hosier; - industr; r , the preliminary conference "between orga- 
nized labor sn^. the employers brought the two parties to clear under- 
standing: of their respective points of vie; an;' resulted in agreement 
upon certain specific issues. The final changes nade after the public 
hearing representee" further narrowing of the differences which had to 
some extent already been conposed. 

The employers were represented in the negotiations "by the National 
Association of Hosier;- Manufacturers. Labor wa.s represented by the 
American Federation of Hosiery Workers which had organized largely in 
the full fashioned branch of the industry. At conferences between the 
two organizations under the guidance of the National Recovery Admini- 
stration officials during the last two weeks in June, many differences 
were reconciled. Sone of the issues resolved were the establishment of 
wages for semi-skilled and skilled occupations, the abolition of child 
labor, and the regulation of the stretchout. (*) No solution was 
reached with respect to the hours of employment. Industry proposed a 
forty, and labor a thirty-hour week. The agreement arrived at in the 
earlier conference was confirmed ^j an industry-wide conference held in 
New York City on July 12, 1933 (**)• The resulting code provided that 
productive operations of plants were to he limited to two shifts of 
fort" hours each except in the full fashioned mills where the work of 
the footing machine was to be restricted to one forty-hour shift. 

In vie" of the general unanimity in the industry and the drive 
for early codification an Executive Order was issued on July 26, 1933 s 
approving the terms of the code accepted by the industry pending the 
approval of the permanent code. This temporary code formally included 
the terms already accepted by the industry. 

The hours provisions o^ this code read as follows: 

"On and after the date on which this Code goes into 
effect, no person in the hosiery industry 'shall employ any 
employee in productive operations on a schedule of hours 
of labor which shall' exceed forty (Uo) hours per week. 

"It is understood that the above limitation on hours 
of work shall not apply to office employees, supervisors, 
foreman, engineers, firemen, electricians, repairshop men, 
dyers, shipping force, watchmenv. gleaners, _ outside workers, 
sales force, and those engaged in emergency ma.intens.nce or 
repair work, 

"The productive operations of a plant shall not exceed 
t'- T o shifts of forty (ho) hours each per week. 

(*) History of Code of Fair Competition for the Hosiery Industry, 

Vol. I, p. 17. 
(**) New York Herald Tribune, July 13, 1533. 



"Manufacturers of woolen hosiery may operate their 
knitting equipment not to exceed three (3) shifts of forty 
(Mo) hours each until December 31. 1533 > after which tine 
their knitting operations shall be United to two (2) shifts 
of fort"" (Uc) hours each. This exception applies only to the 
nanufrcture of hosiery which contains at least twenty per 
cent (?.Cfo) of wool. Manufacturers of xoolen hosiery ma-- op- 
erate their car din "•; equipment not ,o exeed three shifts of 
Uo honvr «ewjh vuati3 p.. code for the woolen industry yoes into 

it n 


work week for productive operations, except d; ex. : 
shs.ll consist of five days of eight hours each. These cays 
shall he Hon day to Friday. 

"From the date that this article shall he put into ef- 
efect tentatively and until the date on which the Code s .all 
;o into effect full fashioned foot:';--" eduipuent which is 
operating one shift shall continue to opeirte one shift only, 
and full fashioned footing equipment "fix. is operating nore 
than one shift shall operate not to exceed two shifts." (*) 

The labor groups through the Lahor Advisory 3oard agreed to the 
tenoorar- order after the compromise had heen worked out on the shift 
regulation of footers. (**) 

At the public hearings held on August 10, 1333, serious effort was 
made by organized labor's represntatives to obtain a shorter work week; 
but industry's proposal was finally modified only in one important 

respect. It was provided that the full fashioned hosiery plants operat- 
ing their footing equipment for two shifts were to he restricted to 36 
hour shifts. The labor representatives took objection to the loose 
nanner in which the forty hour week provision '-as phrased, asked for 
the application of the forty-hour week to all employees including those 
not^ engaged on production, suggested a 30-hour shift for the footing 
machine operation, and reconnendec adjustment in '-ages to give the 
latter employees the earnings of a hC-hour week. (***) 

The industry stated its belief that the forty-hour week would 
absorb the persons normally attached in I329. It estimatec". the reduc- 
tion in hours to amount on the average, to about 27 per cent. It sug- 
gested that not only would the total 1923 employment be re: died but 
"that the hour restrictions will operate in the direction of materially 
reducing the seasonal variations in the number of workers employed, thus 
assuring the workers in the industry a more stead; employment throughout 
the calender pear". (****) 

(*) Codes of Fair Competition - Vol. I, pp. 2 1 +1-2H2. 

(**) hew York Tines, July 25, 1933-Philadelphia Record, July 25, 1933 

(***) National Industrial Recovery Administration Hearing on Code of 

Pair Practices .and Competition presented bv hosier;- Indus tr* August 10, 

1533 - P. 51. 

(****) Ibid, pp. 6-9 Testimony of Mr. Constantine. 


At the conference durin : the two days following the public hearing, 
many or the issues remaining unsettled were ironed out by the labor and 
industry groups, A 33 hour > -eck was established' for the footing machines, 
with two shifts and specific provision of Ho hours' pay. This agreement,- 
intended to discourage the second shift, resulted fron a compromise be- 
tween the employer and union representatives. Provision was also made 
for the establishment of hours regulations for the various exempted groups 
of employees, (*) 

(*) The hours provisions of the Hosiery Code as Finally approved were as 

"1, On and after the date on which this Code goes into effect, no 
person in the hosiery industry shall employ any employee in produc- 
tive operations on a Schedule of hours of labor which shall exceed 
forty (Ho) hours per week, 

2, It is understood that the above limitation on hours of work shall 
not apply to office employees, supervisors, foremen, engineers, fire- 
men, electricians, repairshop men, dyers, shipping force, watchmen, , 
cleaners, outside worhers, sales force, arid those engaged in emer- 
gency maintenance or repair work, 

3. Ori and after September H, 1S : 33i ^ ie maximum number of hours for 
office employees in the hosiery industry shall not exceed an average 
of forty (Ho) hours per reel: over each period of six months, 

H. On or before January 1, IpoH, the code authority shall prepare ._, 
and submit to the Administrator suggestions for a schedule of maxim- 
um hours and minimum wages to apply to those employees excepted under 
Section 2 of this Article, 

5, It is interpreted that the' provisions for maximum hours establi- 
sh a maximum of hours of labor per wee]: for every employee covered, 
so that under no circumstances will such an employee be employed or 
permitted to work for one 1 or more employers in the industry in the 
aggregate in excess of the prescribed number of hours in a single 

b. The productive operations of a plant shall not exceed two shifts 
Of forty (Ho) hours each per week. The work week for productive 
operations, except dyeing, shall not exceed five (5) days of eight 
(S) hours each. These days shall be Honda;.' to Friday, inclusive, 
except in those states where the state laws operate to prevent the 
operation of two forty (Ho) hour shifts within the mentioned five (5) 
days. In such str.tes, the employer may operate one shift on Satur- 
day, not to' exceed four (H) hours, it being definitely understood 
that his total machine hours shall not exceed eighty (£0) hours per 

7, For a period of six (S) months following the date on which this 
code goes into effect, full-fashioned hosiery plants whose footing 
equipment on July 2H, 1933* " a3 being operated on a two-shift basis, 
but the length of each of these shifts shall not exceed thirty-five 
(35) hours per week. The rates paid to knitters, knitting-helpers, 
and toppers working on these thirt---five (33) hour shifts, shall be 
such as to provide then darnings equal to those which they would 
receive if working on forty (Ho) hour shifts. Fall- fashioned hosiery 
mills whose footing equipment on July 2H, 1933» was being operated 

9SS2 . , 


These latter regulations were finally added in Amendment Ho. 5, 
approved March 8, 1933* The deputy administrator in accepting this 
proposal adopted the industry's position. lie concluded that ""by 
restricting hours of work per worker to fort;- (Uo) per week, it is 
anticipated that 'employment can be got back to the 1923 level and that 
the e;:tent of short tine work for any large number of employees will 
be materially lessened". (*) 

III Fishin ■ Tackle Industry 

This industry, employing a little over 3>0G0 perrons, was one of 
the first to be codified. Its code was submitted on August U after 
several preliminary discussions with KHA officials, (**) At the public 
hearing held on August lU, 1333 > industry was represented ^,-j the 
Association of Fishing Tackle Manufacturers. r .l\\o spokesman for labor 
(***) was a Special Representative of the International Association of 
Machinists, a union with interests in similar industries, who had been 
designated by the Labor Advisory Board. 

The industry proposed a fort". hour week aver aged over a si:: .months 
period. The labor representative's recommendation of a thirty hour" 
^eek was not taken account of in consideration of the code. The admini- 
stration officials carried on the negotiations with the industry on the 
terns of employment with infrequent consultation with the labor adviser. 

In defense of the average fort" hour, 'reel:, the industry represen- 
tatives contended that the exclusive fishing tackle manufacturers 
"must of necessit.y have some provision for reasonable overtime opera- 
tions during the season's peak"* ['■•'■'-'■■') The;- acknowledged, however, that 
elimination of the seasonal tolerance "would be an ideal situation for 
a manufacturer who produces a diversified! line of productions in ad- 
dition to fishing tackle ark has a surplus o'f labor in certain depart- 
ments during the slack season of these departments which he can transfer 

(*) Foot Note Continued 
on a one-shift basis shall not, during said si:: (6) months, operate 
such equipment more than one shift of fort" (Uo) hours' per week. 
Hot later than thirty (30) days before^ the expiration' of the men- 
tioned si::, (o) months, the code authority shall submit, for the 
Administrator's approval^ a recommendation for determining a more 
permanent policy respecting; footer operation designed to effect a 
reasonable balance between production and demand, 
c. manufacturers of woolen hosiery may operate their knitting 
equipment not to exceed three (j) shifts of forty (kO) hours 
each until December 31» T-S33» after which time their knittitf 
operations shall be limited to two (2) shifts of forty (UO) hours 
each. This exception applies only to the manufacture of hosier - 
which contains at least twenty per cent (20'/;) of wool." 

(*) Report on a Code for the Hosiery Industry by 'Lindsay Re ;ers, 

August 25, 1933 ~ Code for the Hosier- Industry, Vol. A. 

(**) Code History for the Fishing Tackle Industry Compiled by L. 3. 

Mitchell, -p-o. 10-12 

(***) Mr.~R. S. Newhan. 

(****) Statement of J. K. Kinnear, President American Fork and Hoe Co. 

Public Hearing Transcript - p. 4. 



to the tackle department during its busy season" . Son.e manufacturers 
urged a flat fort - hour r.vr,::i urn "orl; week "because it "would tend to 
stabilize the industr; by forcing the jobbing purchaser to place his 
order sufficiently far in advance to be assured of the deliver"" of 
his merchandise and would result in a more balanced, yearly production". 
lurthermore, the - " pointed out that the codes were being developed for 
manufacturers producing other products as well as fishiny ta.ckle T7I10 
were estrolishin ■ a fort" hour weel: (*) in other parts of their ■busi- 
ness . 

The administration officials attempted during the hearing to 
obtain a revision of the various provisions. In the first place, they 
secured the industry's assent to placiny firemen - , watchmen, . janitors 
and office enplo" r ees, originally er.empt from hours clauses, uader the 
general restrictions and to defining the tolerance for office workers 
specifically. (**) In the second place, the" attempted to secure a 
more rigid provision regulating hours. They considered the average 
too liberal in "comparison to the other codes" and. feared a tendencv 
"to work up to your peaks and then let people out entirely during the 
lern season". The; - pointed out that the skilled workers in the indu- 
stry "could "be laid off temporarily, particularly in smaller communities, 
and. there would he a d.icposition to work for 12 straight "eeks for 4g 
hours a week". (***) 

In view of this criticism from the administration, the sponsors 
of the coc.e agreed to drop the averaging provision for production 
workers and to substitute the following:. 

"No manufacturer shall operate upon a schedule of hours of lahor 
for his employees, e::cept office, supervisory staff and. sales 
force, in ercess of 40 hours. ~oer -feel: and. g hours per day. The 
maximum hours of lahor for office employees shall not ercceed 40 
hours a week average over a period 0" sir. nonths." (****)" T limit 0:0 hours was included at the recuest of administrative 
officials. (*****) 

In appraising the code, the administration ind.ica.ted that in 
theory "nore than 500 additional persons" would he added, thus bring- 
ing the total well over that for the peak period, of: 192S "in view of 
the reduction in hours from era average of 47 in 1J25 to the maximum of 
40 in the code". (******) 

(*) Testimony of B« II. Jack, Vice President Union Hardware Co pany 

Ibid, *ra. 22-23. 

(**) Ibid, p. 47. 

(***) Ibid, Statements by iir. "hiteside, pp. p x)-53« 

(*****) Ibid, p. 56. 

(******) Report of Hearing srfxiitted to National Recover"" Administrator 

Johnson by Deput- Ad. linistrator frhiteside. 



IV. Iron and Steel Industry 

This industry v?as an outstanding case of negotiations which ended 
with no modification in the basic hours. Labor and governmental repre- 
sentatives nere eager to make it a precedent for lower hours, but the 
effort failed. 

It took two months to complete the negotiations, though .the labor 
provisions of the final co'-'e were similar to those in the earlier draft 
of July 6. Protracted negotiations over modification of Section 7(a) 
prior to the public hearing, delayed its calling, "."."lie the draft -of 
July 6 was the first to be formally presented to IZ1A, two previous ones , 
containing a kS hour weok had been submitted. The Administrator had 
questioned the desirability of such a long week and its effect upon re- 
employment. In, the draft of July 6 set a ho-hour week.(*) 
The codes, underwent considerable subsequent revision, "out the basic hours 
remained the same. 

A . Publi c Hear ing 

The public hearing took place on July Jl, 1933* While the 
major interest centered on J ;he question of the modification of Section 
7(a), the problems of the hours also received much discussion. The Sec- 
retary of Labor observed, "It is not my purpose to suggest the exact 
number of hours that the industry ought to set as the maximum, (but) I 
am convinced that the maximum of forty is too great to accomplish the 
purposes of wide reemployment. . .... ..." "Thirty- sis: hours per week which 

is six hours a day for six days, or thirty hours, which is six hours a 
day for five days, offer interesting opportunities for reemployment of 
large numbers of persons." Steel workers she had found also favor the 
six-hour day.- Shorter working hours, she contended, were required to 
eliminate the seven day week in the industry and the unduly long hours 
and to "provide employment for more than 150,000 iron and steel employ- 
ees now out of work". 1!he rverage hours of employment as reported by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the Iron and Steel industry for ; 
May 1933 had been 3^.7 and for June, 37-9 according to estimates worked 
out by the Research and Planning Division of the national Recovery Ad- 
ministration. "This means that those working are only partially employed 
and if a forty hour week were permitted, a great deal of additional pro- 
duction would be turned out by increasing the hours from the present 
average to forty per week. If this '^ere done very few new men from among 
the unemployed would be needed, even if orders justified increased pro- 
duction." She disapproved of the averaging of hours over the six months 
period. (**) 

(*) Cleveland hews,. June 21, 1933. 

(**) Address of Secret;.:.-' of Labor Prances Perkins before th. 5 National 
Recovery Administration, July 31. 1933* " 'tment of .abor, 
Office of the Secretary. . 



Organized labor (*) recommended a thirty-hour week with the exemp- 
of executives, supervisors and technicians and emergency workers provi- 
ded tine and one half were paid for all hours over si:: per day. It was 
contended that "there are not nore than 30 hours of work per week and 
there are probably less than 3^ for the workers who should "be absorbed 
"by the iron and steel industry". The Uo hours per week was expected to 
help little as a reemployment- measure. "The only sensible, the only 
humane, course of action", the argument continued, "is to set the hours 
at a point, 30 P er week that gives some substantial promise of prompt 
absorption of a goodly number of the unemployed. " The proposal of the 
Institute is not really for Uo hours, but insofar as practicable' and 
having due regard for the varying demands of the consuming and processing 
industries for the respective products, (**) The Steel and Lietal Workers 
Industrial Union also presented a brief calling for a thirty hour week 
instead of the fort;/' proposed "ay the Institute, 

3. Negotiations 

Following the hearing, conferences were held by the industry alone 
and then with the administration. In the process of revision the admini- 
stration apparently was eager to achieve two major changes. The first 
was to eliminate the averaging of hours and to establish s. real forty 
hour week. (***) Secretary Perkins was insistent upon this point. The 
second was to increase minimum wages, especially for the southern district 
and to reduce the number of geographical wage districts. Industry balked 
at both suggestions. In a communication addressed to the Administration, 
a representative of the industry (****) declared, "We call attention to 
the fact, tha.t , in accomplishing the great purpose of the National Reco- 
very Act, the members of the code have already gone beyond anything that 
can be justified by present conditions, The- can justify themselves to 
their stockholders onl;, r oy the rea.liza.tion of the ijopes aroused ~oy the 
efforts of the National 'Administration. They cannot go further." (*****) 
With respect to the maximum hours of labor and minimum rates of pay, he 
declared that 

' "practical, not theoretical, questions are involved 
and they cannot be solved merely by mathematical com- 
putation since there is probably no industry in the 
countr; r involving so many variable factors as the 
steel industry." (******) 

By August 6 negotiations on the Steel Code had come to a standstill. 
The Administrator indicated that the Government might write the code for 
the industry. (*******)' Qn August 1^, members of the American Iron and 

(*) Mr. William Green presented labor's case. 

(**) National Recovery Administration, Transcript of Proceedings Steel 

Code Hearings, July jl t 1333« 

(***) Philadelphia Public Ledger, August"?,' 1.9.3?; and.Ta-'shiiigtoh~Po6t, 

August 2, 1933. 

(****) Mr. R. P. Lamont, 

(*****) Des iioines Tribune, August H, 1933 and Philadelphia Public 

Ledger, August 5, 1933» .;■ 

(******) Philadelphia Public Led-er, August 5, 1933. 

(*******) New York Journal of Commerce, August 9i 1933* ' 

1 1 


Steel Institute met in conference on hours and wages at the offices of 
the Secretary of Labor upon her invitation. (*) Upon the arrival of the 
representative of labor the steel members immediately left the confer- 
ence, and the meeting was continued in another room without him. (**) 

At the conference with the Secretary of L a bor a Committee was appoint* 
ed to continue the study of hours and wages. This Committee consisted of 
representatives of the Division of Research and Planning, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, the Iron and Steel Institute, and of the Iron and 
Steel Division of the Department of Commerce, but no representatives of 
the Labor Advisory Board or of organized labor. The Committee met con- 
tinually until the night of August 17. but reached no agreement. The 
industry representatives refused to cooperate, and offered no information 
on questions at issue, such as freight charges, costs of processing and 
assembling materials or data used by the industry to justify its requests 
for regional wage differentials. They protested that the figures could 
not be obtained except after laborious calculations and that tney would 
even then be of little value. The Administration sought infor lation con- 
cerning the 35 cents minimum rate proposed for the northwestern part of 
the United States and the other wage differentials. 

The Administration's findings with respect to hours presented to 
these conferences were as follows: 

1. Number of workers attached t-o the steel industry. 

The NBA experts had arrived at an estimate of' 420, COO workers 
for those normally to be attached to the iron -sM/Suteel industry, 
largely on the basis of the average number employed in the industry 
in 1929. The Administration members pointed out that this figure 
was conservative, since in May 1929 the industry was giving work to 
429,000 people. Industry, on the other hand, contended that these 
figures included men Y/orking on construction, normally belonging to 
the construction industry and not to the steel industry. A compro- 
mise of 400,000 employees "attached" to the industry was reached. 

2. The extent to which the industry had already reemployed its fair 
share of the unemployed. 

(*) The conferees were the Secretary of Labor, Deputy Administrator 
Simpson, Donald Richberg and William Green. 

(**) Hew York Times, August 15, 1933; Washington Post, August 16, 1933; 
A.jT.L. Weekly News Service, August 19, 1933. It is interesting to 
note that this incident caused considerable controversy. Labor con- 
sidered it a slap and a challenge to the Government and the NRA. The 
Labor Advisory Board took official notice of the development and is- 
sued a statement in which it declared that it deemed this: action an 
affront not only to Mr. Green and the Board, but also to the Recovery 
Administration. The Board protested the right .of the steel industry 
to maintain such an attitude and requested the Administrator to make 
the matter a subject of conference and consideration with the Board. 
The Washington correspondent of the magazine ."Steel" explained this 
action as representing the desire of the industry to avoid giving any 
impression that the "Big Bosses" "were hobnobbing in .conference rooms 
with the President of the American Federation of Labor." 


- 119 - 

The statement of 32 reporting companies, presented by the Incu-.try, 
for the week ending July 29, showec they had for that week employed 
217, o38 out of 338,682 available for service. "Therefore," it was 
argued b\ industry's representative ? t the conference "these companies 
haa employed ell but 6 : of their full quota. " This conclusion was 
held invelic ov the Administration's experts. These companies had 
about 94 r '- of the industry's emuloveci v-orkers; furthermore,- 317,538 em- 
ployed during the week ending July 29 includec salaried, office and 
supervisory employees. If office employees were aooed to the base 
figure of those attached to the ir.o.ustr,y , the 317,000 employed by 
these 32 companies fell 29n short of the b;:se figure, inducing office 
employees, for these 32 companies. 

Appaiently no agreement coula oe reachec on this matter between 
industry and the Acministia tion. 

3. Possibility of operating under a 40-hour week and 8-hour day. 

The question at issue here was how many aaditional workers will a 
maximum 40-hour week require; fna what, if any difficulties would there 
be in obtaining the necessary skilled workers. Taking -n estimate of 
July emoloyment, of 272,000 based on U. S. bureau of Labor Statistics 
data, and applying to it the e timate of an average of 43.4 hours per 
week per men for the month of July, as claimed by the industry, the 
report arrived ?t the simple arithmetic conclusion as follows: 
272,000 x 43.4 equals 295,000. In other words, a 40 hour week would 

add 23,000 more wage earners to the oe.yroll. however, this re-sult 
wss too mechanical anc did not lead to the correct result. Not ell work- 
men could possibly work exactly 40 hours; the average would have to be 
considerably less then 40 hours. In ad .ition, there t? s considerable part 
time work. On the basis of this calculation, the report arrived at the 
conclusion that reunoloyment coula occur even when en industry on en 
average is working below the maxLuum. "with 273,'OCO working at say 43 
hours, and cut down by a 40 hour week, perhaps 36 employment would 
jump to 325,000. 

■ In the face of this demonstration of how considerably employment 
might be increased by lowering the hours of work per week, industry's 
representatives esserted thet non-fluidity of labor generally, and the 
relatively quick exhaustion of trained workers in env locality, would 
with a 40-hour week create bottle-neck's. The highly integrated character 
of steel operations made it impracticable with present available supply 
of si-cilled and semi-skilled worker s to institute a maximum 40-hour 
week. The Administration members argued that the industry exaggerated 
the difiiculty of netting skillec labor; ana even though it were true 
that there were not at the time sufficient trained men to run the mills 
at a. maximum 40-hour week, the situation could be remedied. Several 
suggestions r e r e mr de as to how the necessary supply of trained workers 
could be created. (*) 

(*) Summery of National Recovery Administration Division of Research 
and Planning. The Labor "revisions of the Steel Code reported 
ov Victor von Szeliski, August 19, 1333. 



Bollo"in : a report of lad: of progress, the President entered the 
discussion, (*) After the interview the Administrator declared that he 
rras prepared to "go to the mat" rrith the steel industry. (**) However, 
at this point the natter uas placed before the Labor Advisory Board at 
an extraordinary night session on August IS. The Board finally approved 
the labor provisions of the code nith the following memorandum: 

"Bhile ne foers of the Labor Advisor" heard believe that 
higher standards of labor should have been achieved in 
the Steel Code, they are gratified that the eight hour 
day is about to be substituted for the longer norlz day 
in this industry. In vie-- o:' the ;reat possibility of 
having the steel industry cone under a code o:' fair prac- 
tice immediately, as Chairman of the L'bor Advisory Board, 
I hereby approve the Steel Code." It --a- signed by Leo 

The code itself r/as approved on August 19, 1933, "°h ^ ne President of the 
United States. As finally signed it differed but little from that sub- 
mitted for hearing. It provided a forty hour nee!:, -1th averaging of 
hours over a si:; months period, Kor/ever, the maximum --orhing tlie per 
vreelz --as set. at ^5 hours anc sir. days. It --as affirmed that "on or afte: 
November -1, 1333> as soon as the plrnts shall be operating at SO per 
cent of capacity, operations shall be adjusted so that, encept as to 
executives, those employed in supervisory capacities and in technical 
vforl: and their respective staffs anc those employed in emergency -'orh, 
the eight hours for all other employees nay be established. " These 
provisions fell far short 0:" the demands -resented by the Secretary of 
Labor anc the A. f. of L. 

V. Conclusion 

The negotiations of the above codes are illustrative of the unsuc- 
cessful efforts made in a number of industries to reduce basic hours. 
Organized labor pushec insistently torrarc" bhis goal. The. administrative 
officials -ere no i .ovoizealous in reducing hours belcn forty after the 
basic precedents - T ere established. In none belo • forty after the basic 
precedents --ere established. In none of the four nere major changes in 
basic hours effected. The most outstandin" case in this group rzas the 
iron and steel industi- . 

(*) On August' lo, 1933* ™ lG conference included the Administrator of 
the H3A, Liyron Taylor, Chairman of the U. S. Steel Corporation a 
Charles Schwab- of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. (Chicago Daily Tri- 
bune, An -,ust 13, 1333. 
(**) Washington Herald, August 17, 1933* 






The survey of the efforts at the reduction of hours indicates 
that in many of the early codes, serious effort was made -to reduce hours, 
especially "by labor. The results were limited. In only 9 codes were 
hours reduced from those originally proposed, whereas in 6 codes hours 
were actually increased over the original proposal. 

Developing policies in the first hundred approved codes were 
brought out in the reasons presented to the Administrator or to the 
President of the United States for approval af the other 85 without 
changing the basic hours. The reasons noted in the letter of transmittal 
were frequently not those governing approval, but were more tyoical of 
rationalization of a course already taken. However, they did indicate 
the type of modification of basic hours policy which was acceptable to 
the Administration. 

I. Financial Inability to Reduce Hours 

One of the common reasons given for accepting the basic hours pro- 
poser, by management was the industry's financial inability to meet the 
cost of shorter hours (*). The more typical, arguments given were that in- 
come v/as limited, by l^w or type of enterprise, that the business was 
seclining, that demand for the product was particularly elastic and 
sensitive to price-change, or that shorter hours would cause' large in- 
creases in price. 

The first group comprised two transportation industries for which 
a longer than 40 hour week was approved. The Transit Industry Code pro- 
vided for a 44 hour week for general shop employees and 48 hours for the 
operating force„ The Bus Industry Code permitted a 48 hour week. The 
hours of the Transit Industry Code was approved as presented on the 
ground that the industry showed "a net loss, of about $6,110,000 in 1932 
as against net income of about $01,570,000 in 1929. of this fin- 
ancial situation it is believed that the burden of increased wages, which 
the industry seemed willing to ascume under the code, is all that can 
be fairly expected at the present time"(**). In the motor bus industry, 

(*) The industries with code numbers where this reason was noted in the 

letter of transmittal v/ere: Transit (28); farm equipment (39); elec- 
tric storage and wet primary battery industry (40); luggage and fancy 
leather gooes (42); saddlery (45); optical manufacturing (49); motor 
bus (S3); toy and playthings (86); funeral supply (90)-; piano (91). 

(*«*) Code of Fair Competition for the Transit Industry, Vol. II, Lette r 
(September 15, 1933) from Mr. Malcolm Muir to General Hugh S. John- 


justific tion for the 48 hour week was "based upon the ground that the 
industry "is competitive with steam rail passenger transportation not 
operating under the provisions of the National Recovery Act. To adopt 
a schedule of less hours at this time would undoubtedly result in a 
greet hardship to the industry". In elaborating this argument, the Ad- 
ministrator declared that the industry "has suffered not only from the 
depression hut also from its disadvantageous competitive position with 
other passenger carriers". The forty-eight hour week was recommended 
because it was all that could be reasonably expected at the time (*)• 

Similarly limited by competition was the saddlery industry. 
The basic forty hour week was approved for this industry because it was 
all the industry could bear "in face of competition for new material 
(from one-man saddlery and harness shoos not subject to the hour restric- 
tions of the code) and the possibility for repairing new material (**)• 
Likewise, though for different reasons, the funeral supply industry 
qualified for a forty hour week, since "the forty hour week, with two 
hour tolerance, represents probably the maximum burden possible at this 
time without danger of disturbance of the orderly recovery of this ind- 
ustry". The Administrator further explained that the public's lagging 
buying power made it impossible for this industry to increase its prices, 
the only way for it to recoup its costs since it "cannot increase its 
business thich is represented uy the human, dead". He concluded that 
further reduction in iiours would therefore "demoralize the weaker element 
in the -industry and result in further unemployment "(***) • 

In the toy and playthings industry the argument for not re- 
ducing the hours below forty per week was that the "industry would re- 
ceive no benefit from the operation of the code until the year 1934 
because of outstanding contracts which are made early in the year for 
the manufacture and delivery of products of the industry to the trade. 
The additional expense which must be aosorbed due to the higher wages 
and shortened hours is a very definite burden until such times as these 
outstanding contracts are con3umated"(****) . 

The second group of ino.sutries consisted of those declining 
in importance. Further reduction of hours was ruled out in the piano 
industry when a less than forty hour week was proposed because the vol- 
ume of business in the indu'stry had decreased radically. It was stated 
thrt "a grea.tly increased cost of labor would decrease still further the 
number of sales to consumers". A 10. S hour week was estimated as neces- 
sary to raise employment to the 1339 level, but at "prohibitive" expense 

(*) National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition 

Vol. II, pp. 108-109 
(**) Ibid. Vole I, p. S4. 
(***) Ibid. Vol. II, pp. 422-423. 
(****) Ibid>j Vol# n> . pp#1 354-355, 



since "the cost of labor constitutes about 33 percent of the total cost 
of the finished article" (*). 

The third category included industries' selling merchant 3 ! se 
where tne volume of sales was particularly sensitive to "orice. The lug- 
gage and fancy leather gooes industry resisted reduction of hours below 
forty because "any drastic shortening of hours which would result in a 
material price increase of the final product would probably result in a 
shrinkage in volume which would tend to offset the expected increases in 
employment 1 '. An additional reason for keeping the hours at forty in this 
industry was the fact that unemployed skilled workers had "set up inde- 
pendent small shops in which they repair and actually produce a limited 
amount of luggage". This competition made further reduction in hours 
unwise. (**). 

The report of the deputy administrator on the electric storage 
and wet primary battery industry indicated that "if the existing work 
is spread too thinly, average weekly wages and hence purchasing power 
will not be satisfactory. If wage rates are increased too much in order 
to offset this broader distribution of work, small manufacturers in 
certain sections of this country would be unduly penalized, with possible 
failure and further unemployment the result". 

Finally, in the optical industry "the 40 hour week was ap- 
proved as the most reasonable basis to use in establishing hours of 
labor for this industry in order to benefit the greatest number of wage- 
earners without unduly burdening the consuming public"(*** ) . The same 
contention with respect to increase in price was made in the farm equip- 
ment industry. The farmers' purchasing power was said to be the key to the 
prosperity of the industry which had suffered with their financial con- 
dition. The deputy recommended that "too great a strain cannot be placed 
on the ind.sutry", since the depression's effects could not be overcome 
in a short period. (****). 

The principal of setting hours in the code according to un- 
employment in the industry was modified by the Administrator in a number 
of cases because of fear of increased costs to the indsutry. In these 
cases, deviations from the prevailing policy standards were approved. 
Forty hours per week in most cases and forty-eight for the transportation 

(*) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 436-437 

(**) Ibid., Vol. I, p. 521 

(***) Ihid.s, Vol. I, pp. 50C-501 

(****) Code of Foir Competition for the Farm Equipment Industry, Vol. 

II, Letter from Malcolm Muir to General Hugh S, Johnson, Septem- 
ber 25, 1933 - A Rep-ort on the Code. 


-124- seemed acceptable. Though the hours were approved, no positive 
statement appeared in explanation of tne acce it'ance of the specific 
hours. ITor was proof of the alleged justifying economic conditions ex- 
haustively presented. Hours standards in tne codes were apparently neg- 
otiated rjiainly on the basis of precedent and bargaining. 

1 1 Bus i nes s Recovery as t he cle ans for Reemployment 

The second type of justification for accepting the industry's 
proposals was that reemployment to the 19 ;9 level was dependent upon 
reviv-1 in the industries which furnished the demand for their "oroduct. 
This croup consisted principally of capital goods industries. 

This argument was significant because its logic was in direct 
conflict with the position of ERA. The Act assumed reemployment through 
the shortening of hours. Nevertheless many Administration officials and 
the Administrator himself, at times, seemed to follow the theory that in 
some cases reemployment could not be attained by reducing hours but only 
through general industrial revival. So widespread was the conviction 
within IffiA that one Division actually undertook to have industries in 
its group increase their proposed basic hours on the theory that such 
increase would lower cost ana thereby induce industrial revival. This 
occurrec. in tne builoin; materials, particularly, lime, pluming fixtures, 
structural clay, limestone, terra, cotta, and crushed stone and gravel 
and in the construction industries. 

These agents of the FA argued that the only means of stim- 
ula birig construction was to lower wage rates. They took the oosition 
that the problem of the construction industry was "to fine" a method of 
borrowing part of this excess of construction from the future to in- 
crease the volume in the construction industry immediately and as rap- 
idly as plssible." This could not be done "if the codes, as submitted, 
create the uneconomical!/ high, construction cost which v.ill result from 
wage and hour provisions together with provisions prohibiting selling 
below cose that overhead". To gove eifect to the ab^ve propo- 
sal one deputy administrator gave the following instructions to tne code 
assistants on methods of preparing for final approval: 

"Immediate shortening of hours of labor and setting' 
of hi -h hourly rates will not be iroductive of increase 
in employment and increase of purch; i power. Reasonable 
hourly -rates of wages such as those proposed by the industry 
in former preliminary conferences shall be made -effective 
September 1, 1934, at which time the maximum hours of apprx- 
imately 20 percent more will be provided for. It shall also 
be stated that on September 1, 1934, based upon the volume 
and trend of the industry, a further increase in minimum 
hourly rates will be provided for in an amendment to_the 
code to become effective March 1, 1935, and that on inarch 
1, 1935, the maximum hours of work shall be thirty (30) 
per week" . 



Th e provision with respect to prevention of selling below cost 
Would define cost as "direct cost, exclusive of any depreciation, in- 
surance, taxes, reserves for contingencies or other purposes, interest 
on investment or selling or administrative expense." This plan was to 
create a "step-up" increase in cost of production which, in effect, is 
a guaranteed hull market for construction. 

In actual concrete application it meant in the lime industry the 
alteration of the original proposal of a forty (40) hour week to forty** 
eight (48) and the recommendation of 37.5 cents and 30 cents per hour 
for the North and South, respectively, to 30 cents and 25 cents; for 
the plumbing fixture indsutry, a revision from thirty-six (36) hours 
to forty-eight (48), and a. revision of a minimum wage scale of 40 cents 
to 30 cents and 25 cents, North and South respectively. 

This point of view was supported within the administration. The 
cure for inactivity in tha- captial gccds industry was thought to be re- 
duction of wages. 

The building materials industries to which this recommendation 
was especially, presented rejected it as impractical and conducive of 
labor unrest. Organized labor and the staff of the Labor Advisory Board 
likewise resisted the proposal. During the last week of September, 1933 
when the basic construction code and its supplements were being revised 
in terms of the formula outlined above, the labor adviser tried to 
induce the deputy administrator to change his policy. Testimony was 
presented to challenge validity of the official position. The Convention 
of the American Federation of Labor, on October 3, 1933, unanimously 
adopted a resolution to the effect that labor protested the action of the 
"officials of NRA" who "are attempting to undermine living standards 
under the cloak of an argument that such acting would stimulate build- 
ing construction'^*) . 

The proposal resulted in general' public discussion. The Wall 
Street Journal of September 30, 1933, carried the story that labor view- 
ed it favorably. Another newspaper stated that the chairman of the Labor 
Advisory Board had discussed the plan with the Building Trades Union 
and found them amenable. This assertion was promptly denied, the chair- 
man stating that he was unalterably opposed to it as unsound iii practice 
and theory. Nevertheless the deputy's report on the Compressed Air Code 
carried the comment that the Labor Advisory Board and the Administrator 
felt that "the irast effective" way of increasing volume of business for 
the industry was through the approval of the revised working week, i.e., 
lengthened to forty hours. The deputy reported "a shorter week and high- 

(*) Report of the Proceedings of the Fif r r -5hird Annual Convention 
ef the American Federation of Labor held at Washington, B.C., 

October 2,3,1933; p. 482. 



er rate would tend to defeat the very purpose of tiie Act" (*). 

Organized labor in the construction industry vigorously 
protested this "orono sal . At the public hearing of the tile and mantel 
division of the industry on r c"cober 9, 1933, the deputy administrator 
asked labor and industry to adopt the rinciple of the "step up" plan. 
In reply the union representatives charged the deputy with action not 
in keeping with the Act nor with the policies of the Administrator. 
They asked whether labor's brief would "receive any consideration at 
all". The President of the Iricklayers International Union declared: 

"Men who have battled to preserve wage rates in the 
face of the worst depression can continue that struggle 
if need be, inspired by the leadership found in the Re- 
covery Act itself and in the heartening words of the 
President of; the United States". 

He proposed, instead if borrowing from the future at the expense of 
labor, to borrow by slum clearance and other similar public works. A 
conference between the deputy administrator an; the union representa- 
tives on October 12, 1933, at which the former asked the latter to sup- 
port his proposal, ended in complete disagreement. 

Union officials told the Administrator, on October 16, that 
the deputy' s proposals were "a negation of the very underlying purposes 
of the entire recovery movement." Drganized labor prevented further ap- 
plication of this principle to the construction industry. 

Though the proposals failed in both the building materials 
and the construction industry proper, it apparently affected administra- 
tive thinking. Official handling of the codes in the capital goods 
industry reflected the idea., that the reduction of hours could not stim- 
ulate reemployment there. It evidenced the attitude that increases in 
hourly, rates might raise costs, and that this must not be done through 
the nodes . This attitude appeared in the letters of transmittal and 

(*) Code of Fair Competition for the Compressed Air Industry, 
Vol. II, Letter from Malcolm Muir, Deputy Administrator to 
General Hugh S. Johnson - October 9, 1933. 



reports recommending the approval of cedes in this division. (*) 

Characteristic of the position was the report of the deputy 
for the Laundry and Dry Cleaning Machinery Manufacturing Industry Cede, 
the only one of the group which set a 36 hour week. He declared that 
"it would he utterly impractical, and injurious to the, industry to re- 
duce hours of lahor and raise minimum rates of pay to a point where 
1929 purchasing power' would immediately be restored. Only a restora- 
tion of the industry's normal business volume can effect this objective. 
Hence the wage and hour provisions have been allowed to stand as set 
forth in the code as originally submitted by the industry" (**) . 

letters of transmittal for other industries contained similar 
observations. The conclusion for the plumbago crucible industry was 
that "only by increasing business which will depend largely upon acti- 
vity in the metal industry where these products are used can this indus- 
try put a large percentage of employees back to work" (***). in the 
road machinery industry, dependence was placed upon "highway construction 
activities 1 ^****); in the rock crusher, terra cotta, hair and jute 
felt and floor and wall clay tile industries, upon the " construction 
industry" (*****)• i n the buff and polishing wheel and buffing and pcl- 

(*) The industries in which these letters of transmittal or 
deputy reports stressed tiis reason are: Electrical manu- 
facturing (4); iron and steel (ll); wallpaper (19); laundry 
and dry cleaning machinery manufacturing (24); textile 
machinery manufacturing (31); plumbago crucible (67); ferti- 
lizer (67); road machinery manufacture (63); hair and jute 
felt (73); terra cotta (74); canning and packing machinery 
(75); rock crusher manufacturing (76); steel casting (82); 
business furniture, storage and equipment and filing sup- 
ply (33); office equipment manufacturers (89); floor'"and". 
wall clay tile (92); buff and polishing wheel (96); buff 
and polishing composition (97). 

(**) Code of Fair Competition for the Laundry and Dry Cleaning 

Machinery Manufacturing - Vol. II, Letter from Malcolm Muir, 
Deputy Administrator to General Hugh S. Johnson, September 
25, 1933. 

( *** ) National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair .Competition; , 
Vol. II, pp. 68-69. 

(****) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 139. ' 

(*****) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 201, 233, 210-211, 444-445. 



ishing composition industries, upon the revival of the "capital goods 

industries" (*); in the canning and packing machinery industry, upon the 
amount of "surplus vegetable fruit or animal products which might other- 
wise deteriorate" (**); in the fertilizer industry, upon ""better prices 
• of the products of agriculture (which) will permit the purchase of in- 
creased quantities of fertilizer" (***)« and in the- wall paper industry, 
upon the increase!? "consumption of wall paper" (****•). 

Letters of transmittal for other industries though not so 
explicit reflected the same underlying "belief. The report on the pro- 
posed code in the textile machinery manufacturing industry concludes 
that an immediate increase through the employment of 4,700 persons would 
follow, "out that this would not "bring the total to the 1939 employment 
level. The deputy administrator observed, "the representatives of the 
industry (state) that with an improvement in the "business situation 
and the number of workers employed within the industry will exceed the 
number on the payroll in 1929" (*****). They depended upon revival of 
business to bring employment to the 1929 level, rather than expecting 
shorter hours to cause reemployment and business recovery. This same 
reasoning appeared in the steel casting industry where it was observed 
that "should production reach the normal figure of 68 percent of cap- 
acity on the basis of a 40 hour week it is estimated the industry would 
require an average total of 54,209 employees rr 143,000 more than were 
required in 1929" (******) . Similar statements v/ere made in the letters 
of transmittal for the electrical manufacturing, iron and steel, busi- 
ness furniture, storage equipment and filing sup ly and tie office 
equipment industries^ *******) . 

(*) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 492-493, G :2~503. 
(**) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 220-221. 
(***) Ibid., Vol. I, p. 102. 
(****) Ibid., V i. i ( 258 

(*****.) Code of Pair Competition for the Textile Machinery Manufacture 

ing Industry, Vol.. II, Letter from Malcolm Muir to G-eneral Hugh 
S. Johnson, September 21, 1933, - a Report. 

(******) Codes of Fair Competition, Vol., II, pp. 30C-501. 

(t******) Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 45, 174; Vol. II, pp. 284 and 414. 

III. The Existence of precedents 

Precedents not only determined the basic hours of codes in several 
cases where hours were increased over the original proposal but also 
affected many proposed codes end PRA substitutions which followed early 
statements of industry groups. This occurred in part because the in- 
dustries preparing drafts had no -.■■ell-defined standards nor officially 
aporoved provisions as guides. In consequence they had to rely upon 
existing approved or tentative codes that were considered acceptable. 
During negotiations, it frequently happened that codes were revised by 
the groups presenting them to incorporate more concessions granted re- 
cently in approved codes. A case in point Was the merit clause modi- 
fication of Section 7 (a). After the iron and steel and the automobile 
industries had inserted qualifying provisions with respect to Section 
7 (a), most codes coming up for public hearing followed their example. (*) 
Even after the Presidential disapproval of such modification, many 
persisted in copying the clause as originally proposed by the iron and 
steel and automobile industries. 

The importance of the hours provisions of the early approved codes 
as precedents and in their relation to the desire to establish com- 
petitive equality was frequently not indicated in the reasons for the 
approval of specific codes in the letters of approval. In a number 
of cases, however, there was specific confirmation of the influence of 
precedent (**). 

The Cotton Textile Code was a dominant factor in the development 
of the other textile codes. The letter of transmittal of the Underwear 
and Allied Products Manufacturing Code, for example, declared: 

"The labor provisions in this code are substantially the 
same as the labor provisions in the Code for the Cotton Textile 
Industry. It is clearly evident that the labor conditions should 
be substantially tne same premises that these yarns are knitted 
into or converted into underwear either partially or wholly 
finished. To establish any difference in the minimum wage or the 
working hours for employees in the manufacture of underwear would 
cause difficulty in the labor conditions" (***). 

(*) See Raymond S. Hubinow "Section 7 (a) of the Recovery Act", 
Chapter IV, Work Materials #45. 

(*.*) The industries in which the argument above was presented in the 
letter of transmittal or the report of the deputy administrator 
were; Underwear and allied'products (28); textile bag (27); 
throwing (54); cap and closure (58); steel tabular and firebox 
boiler (62); paint varnish and lacquer manufacturing (71); 
nottingham lace curtain (78); and paperboard (100). 

( * * * ) national R ecovery Adminis t ration Codes of Fair Competition 
Vol. I, p. 312. 


-130- '" 

Similarly in the textile bag industry the letter of transmittal repeated 
that a "number of textile bag manufacturers operate their own cotton 
mills and many of the bag manufacturing plants are located in textile 
area.s, (and) the class of labor in the textile bag industry is similar 
to that in the textile industry". From these observations the con- 
clusion is drawn that "the labor conditions should be substantially the 
same". (*) In the silk industry the problem appeared in the form of 
competition between the weaving of "rayoi cloth in so-called silk mills" 
and in so-called cotton mills. 

"It was constantly testified that weaving must be on the same 
cost basis for both sets of mills." 

It was noted that "the wage level proposed in this code is identical 
with that, in the Cotton Textile Code under which the National layon 
Weavers Association is operating." In fact, the deputy stressed the 
fact that "objection to the wages and hours provisions relied on the 
contention that both the cotton code and the silk code, if adopted, 
would provide too low a level rather than that silk alone should bear 
a higher rate". Consideration of one section in the textile industry 
as a whole raised these problems. (**) 

In the throwing industry, the problem of competition with other 
textiles was particularly acute. Consequently the mills throwing rayon 
for their own use were exempt from the provisions concerning special 
wage rates for night work. The need for coordination among the various 
textiles codes was specifically mentioned. (***) 

The effect of previously approved codes was not limited to the 
textiles. The cap and closure industry secured approval of its labor' 
provisions because, they were essentially similar to the glass container 
industry with which it is "closely interrelated". (****) Similarly, 
the letter. of transmittal of the Steel Tubular and Firebox Boiler In- 
dustry Code reported that "tae labor provisions of this code conform, 
as agreed, to those of the Boiler Manufacturing Code". (*****) The 
labor provisions of the paint, varnish and lacquer manufacturing in- 
dustry were ^declared adequate since they were "generally in line with 

(*) Ibid., Vol. I, p. 363, - similar observations to be found in 
letter of transmittal for nottingham lace curtain industry - 

Vol. II, p. 254. 

(**) Ibid., Vol. I, -p-p. 588-589. 

(***) Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 644-645. 

(****) Ibid., Vol. II, p. 23. 

(*****) I - bid# ( Vol> Hi pp# 5 8 _ 5 g 4 



approved codes employing labor of the same quality and under similar 
conditions." (*) The paperboard industry. secured modification of its 
labor provisions to conform frith those of the paper and pulp industry 
since "the process of manufacture is identical . . • and working 1 con- 
ditions are the same in both industries". This similarity between the 
two codes obtained even in spite of the paperboard industry's willingness 
to set higher minimum wage rates than those proposed in the Paper and 
Pulp Industry Code. The hours were approved despite the recognition 
that "it is improbable that production will ever again reach the 1929 
level" and reabsorption of the unemployed was consequently the more 
imperative. (**) 

Precedent, though important in the first one hundred, became a 
still more controlling factor in the subsequent codes. In fact, code 
negotiation became a problem of studying competing industries and work- 
ing out a set of equitable provisions. Individual industries wanted 
special advantages and in many cases succeeded in using precedent to 
secure lower standards. Representatives of the Labor Advisory Board 
used similar tactics to raise labor standards. 

These early precedents exerted great influence. The individual 
industry approach tended to be lost in the argument over provisions in 
approved codes in competing industries. Bargaining in code negotiations 
was restricted and new efforts to reduce hours below the prevailing 
terms met with increasing difficulty unless supported by exceptional 
pressure within the industry or conflicting provisions among competing 
industries. Discussion of hours provisions in codes shifted from basic 
hours to seasonal and peak tolerances. 

(*) Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 170-171. 
(**) Ibid. , Vol. II, p. 538. 



IV Reemployment tinder Code in Respect to Employment in 1929 

Certain codes were approved on the ground that the proposed hours 

would raise total employment within the industry to or above the 1929 

level. The industries in this category were almost exclusively within 
the consumer goods and service group. (*) 

Most numerous were the textiles including the cotton textile, 
rayon and synthetic yarn producing, and hosiery industries. In the 
cotton textile industry, the exception from the policy prevailing during 
June 1933 was granted because "the 40 hour limit would not only call 
back to work those who became unemployed since 1929 but would call for 
13 percent more employees than the average in the peak of 1927 when 
467,000 were employed. . . . The industry under the 4-hour week would 
presently absorb the available corps of textile workers and assuming 
a continuation of the present trend would provide openings for unemploy- 
ed from related and nearby industries whose absorption would require a 
considerable apprenticeship". (**) Similarly in the hosiery i ldustry 
the 40-hour week was accepted on the assumption that it would "reemploy 
workers skilled in the hosiery manufacture who nave been forci i to 
leave the industry and insure more nearly full time employment for the 
great majority of the workers who remained in the industry". (***) 

The rayon producing industry in contrast was growing in importance 
and employed more persons in the days prior to the code than it had in 
1929. The report estimated that "after giving effect to the maximum 
hours in the code, the numbers of employees will exceed by more than 
ten percent the greatest number previously employed in the industry" . (****) 

A similar situation was found in the leather and boot and shoe 
industries. For the leather industry it was estimated that "over SO 
percent of the workers at current levels of operation will have their 
hours of labor shortened, and total employment in the industry will rise 
again to the 1929 peak levels 52,000 employees in leather tanning alone 
without any further increase in business. If business expands, as we 
expect it to, the employment will soon exceed even the 1929 peak for the 
industry. If we should go any further in shortening of the hours of 
v/ork in this industry, there would be considerable danger of creating 
severe shortages of suitable types of trained labor in many plants, 
particularly those located in isolated rural communities. (*****) 

(*) The industries in which it was indicated in the letters of transmittal 
or reports that employment under the code would attain the 1929 level 
or exceed it were: Cotton textile (l); rayon and synthetic yarn pro- 
ducing (14); fishing tackle (13); hosiery (16); leather (21); oil 
burner (25); linoleum and felt base (50); boot and shoe (44); bankers 
(47); mutual savings banks (52); copper and bras,; mill products (81); 
soap and glycerine (83); washing and ironing machine (93); stock and 
exchange girms (95) ; asphalt shingle and roofing (99) . 

(**) Ibid, Vol. 2, p. 5. 

(***) Codes of Fair Competition, Vol. 2 - Hosiery industry report on a code 
for the hosiery industry - from Lindsay Rogers to General H. S. 
Johnson, August 25, 1933. 

(****) Ibid, Vol. I, p. 225. 

(*****) Ibid, Vol. I, p. 239. 



In the "boot and shoe industry a similar situation was said to 
exist, so that "the number of workers employed in the industry should, 
reach the highest point of approximately 225,000, which was the 
number employed, in September 1929. In view of the drifting away of 
workers from the industry that has taken place since 1929 it seems 
probable that some small amount of recruiting must result from the 
hours established. (*) 

In the same category were also a number of industries recently 
organized or with new outlets for their products. These were the 
oil burner, washing and ironing ma.chine manufacture, copper and brass 
mill products and asphalt shingle and roofing manufacture industries. 
In each case reemployment was estimated to approximate or exceed the 
1929 level. '(**) 

The following mixed group of industries also belonged to this 
class; fishing tackle, linoleum and felt base, ice, and soap and 
glycerine industries. (***) The report on the last industry was. 
particularly interesting in view of the declining employment due to the 
mechanization of processes. The deputy's report observed that "the 
reduction of hours as provided in the code to an average of 40 per 
week should increase total employment to a figure better than that 
of 1929 which will mean a reversal of the shrinking trend of the 
previous thirteen years." (****) Finally the. finance group, in- 
cluding the bankers, mutual savings banks, and stock exchange firms 
were in this category. In these cases, specially trained employees 
were required and the 1929 level could be attained through a forty- 
hour week. (*****) 

In these industries approval of the proposed hours was based on 
the original ERA standard of reemployment as the proper guide for the 

(*) Ibid, Vol. I. p. 543. 

(**) Oil burner, Ibid, Vol. I. p. 341 - increase in employment esti- 
mated at 8,000; washing and ironing machine; Ibid Vol. II, p. 463- 
increase estimated at over 3,250 employees; 100 in excess of 
1929; asphalt shingle and roofing manufacturing, Vol. II, pp. 
525-526 - rise to 6,950 of fifteen per cent more than the 
number in 1929; copper and brass mill products, Vol. II, pp. 
290-291 - increase of 5,000 additional persons bring to 1929 level, 

(***) Fishing tackle - Vol.11, Codes of Fair Competition; Report of 
August 16, 1933; linoleum and felt base; codes of fair com- 
petition Vol. I, pp. 390-391; ice, codes cf fair competition 
Vol. II, Report of R.B .Paddock, October 12, 1933. 

(****) Ibid Vol. II, p. 319. 

(*****) Mutual savings banks: Code of Fair Competition for the Mutual 
Savings Banks, Vol. II, Report of Deputy Administrator 
A.D. White side, October 3, 1933. Bankers: Code of Fair Com- 
petition for Bankers, Vol. II, Report of A. D. White side, Deputy 
Administrator, October 21, 1933: Stock exchange firms: Codes of 
Fair Competition Vol. II, p. 482. 



determination of hours. The smallness of the group complying with this 
standard indicated the extent of deviation from the original goal set. 

V. Some Increase in Employment 

In a final group were the host of industries in which the letters 
of transmittal merely indicated that some increase in employment was 
anticipated "but also affirmed definitely or indirectly that the new 
employment level would fall short of the 1329 mark. Ho further ex- 
planations wore offered justifying approval of the code.(*) Perhaps 
the most representative letter of transmittal of the entire series was 
that for the fabricated metal products manufacturing industry. It 
recommended approval of the code "because "It materially reduced the 
normal hours of operation for employees ir] the industry. . .set up 
uniform wage and hours conditions over this "broad industry and will 
assure an increase in the number t»f persons employed on the same basis 
of activity" . (**) 

In some instances the proposed hours clause was accepted by NBA 
because no information indicating the desirability of shorter hours 
was available. These letters of transmittal do not show any justifi- 
cation for the small contribution of these industries to reemployment. 
In several cases, the advisers' recommendation -as cited as the basis 
of final approval. 

VI • Conclusion 

Failure to live up to early statement of policy in MBA pro- 
cedure is disclosed by the huge proportion of industries in which basic 
hours proposed by management were not modified. This conviction is re- 
inforced by the study in this section. The basic philosophy underlying 
NBA action was radically modified during the period of code writing. The 
orignal tenets were changed in practice by exceptions and supplementary 
principles. Only a small proportion of hour provisions in th codes 
were approved on the grounds that employment would be brought back to 
the 1929 level in the industry. In the other cases, one or another new 

(*) The industries in which this position was expressed in the letter 
of transmittal were; Wool textile (3); lace (6); legitimate full 
length dramatic and musical theatrica-1 (8); photographer (12); 
motion picture labratory (22); salt producing (20); artificial 
flower and feather industry (29); lime (31); knitting, braiding 
and wire covering machine (32); retail lumber, lumber products, 
building materials, and building: specialties trade (53), glass 
container (36); builders supply (37); women's belt (41); 
umbrella (51); handkerchief (53); marking devices (59); indus- 
trial supplies and machinery distributors trade (61); advertising 
specialty (65); gas cock (70); packaging machinery industry 
and trade (72); crown (77); novelty curtain, draperies, bed- 
spreads and novelty pillows (79); asbestos (80); fabricated 
metal products manufacturing and met-1 finishing and metal 
coating industry (84); american petroleum equipment industry 
and trade (85); leather and woolen knit glove (87); men's 
garter, suspender and belt manufacturing (94). 

(**) Codes of Fair Competition, Vol, II, pp. 330-331. 


'".'. -135- 

principle was introduced to exempt the industry from the rigid appli- 
cation of the first standards. Probably the most significant of forces 
leading to the modification of the 1929 employment goal was the adoption 
"by a group of administrative officials of the "belief that "business re- 
covery aloma could "bring a"bout reemployment within their division of 
codes and that shorter hours would have adverse effects upon "business 
"by possi"bly raising costs unduly rather than increase employment. 
Moderate decreases in the nominal "basic rork week, they "believed, was 
all that was permissable. In other cases financial inability to carry 
the cost of the shorter work week was recognized. In "both of these 
instances, it was the pro"ba"ble wage increase that might have "been re- 
quired of the employer "by the introduction of the shorter work week and 
the probable demand by labor for maintaining the same full time earnings 
that led the administrative officials to the above conclusions and to 
their coldness to the establishment of a shorter than forty-hour work 
week. Industry proposed the "basic work week and HEA did not revise the 
basic hours. With the approval of increasing numbers of approved codes 
the strength of precedent became evident. Though not explicitly af- 
firmed its force was widely evident. Precedent exercised its influence 
because it offered the industrial representatives an opportunity to 
present an apparently legitimate and cogent case in support of their 
proposal and in opposition to shorter hours Any reduction of hours 
below forty, it was frequently observed, would create competitive in- 
equalities since many industries were overlapping and competing for 
similar labor and markets. Industrial representatives a.t times pro- 
posed provisions and supported them by arguing that similar provisions 
had been approved by the administration in other codes rather than 
demonstrating their inherent merit. 

As approved codes increased in number the approved patterns be- 
came the guides for the codification of new industries. The result was 
great uniformity in the basic work week established in NBA codes. 




The Basic Hours in the First One Hundred Approved Codes 

TTith nire of the first 100 coder, reducing, six increasing and 85 
keeping the "basic hours originally proposed "by the industry the pattern 
of hours developed in the first oiE-hundred a proved codes was as follows: 

83 had a "basic 40 hour week; of these 

77 were originally presented with a 40-hour week 
1 originally presented with 43 was reduced to 40 hours 
5 originally presented with 35 or 36 were increased to 
40 hours. 

11 had loss than 40 hours; of these 
1 had a 27-hour week 
4 had a 35-hour week 

6 had a 36-hour week 

al so 
4 had originally proposed their short week 

7 had adopted their schedule as a result of negotiations 

6 had a longer than 40-hour week; of these 
1 had a 42-hour week 
1 had a 44-hour week 
4 had a 43-hour week 

also • 
1 represented a reduction from 48 hours to 44 
1 represented an increase from 40 hours to a range of 
.... 44 to 48 

4 were as originally proposed by the industry. 

These hours correspond more nearly to the provisions of the PEA, sub- 
stitutions than to those originally contemplated by either the thirty-two 
(32) hour proposal made in June by the Administrator, or to the thirty-five 
(35) hours of the original PEA.. 

Of the first 100 codified industries, 

57 had first been governed by a PEA. substitution; of these 
43 had a 40 hour week in both substitution and code 
2 had a 36 hour week in both substitution and code 
2 had a 43 hour week in the substitution and substan- 
tially the same under the code 

1 had increased hours from 33 in the substitution to 

40 under the code 

2 had increased hours from 36 in the substitution to 

40 under the code 
1 had increased hours from 35 in the substitution to 

36 under the code. 
1 had increased hours from 40 in the substitution to 

44 under the code 

The PEA. substitutions we're, therefore, percursors of the basic hour 
provisions of codes later adopted in the codes. The pattern was predom- 
inentlv a forty (40) hour week, with more e;;ce : )tions for longer hours than 
for shorter hours. The variations between the PEA substitutions and codes 
with respect to seasonal and occupational tolerances were more marked. 


Chapter XVI , 


Experience in negotiation of. the i'irst one-hundred approved 
codes and their provisions influenced later codes. Precedent came to 
govern code writing and the need for establishing equality in competi- 
tion and simplifying administration made for uniformity. 

No new formulation of policy was made during the year 1933. The 
policy statement of October 25, 1S33 which was made by the Policy Board 
and covered many controversial subjects did not refer to the problem of 
hours. At that time it was taken fo'r granted that definitive policy 
statements were unnecessary and that bargaining and negotiations would 
tend to assure proper results. No account was taken of the fact that the 
leverages which the Administration possessed were few in number, and not 
of extraordinary strength and that a.dministration officials were more 
prone to acquiesce to industry's demands than resist their proposals or 
support the counterdenands for sharp reductions in basic hours. 

I .. Pol i cy Memorandum qjf JFeb_ruary__ 1_934 

The first formulation of standards by the Administration tin the basis 
of the experience was stated in the policy memorandum of February 13, 1934. (*) 
These conclusions developed out of a conference held on January 29, 1934 
including representatives of the Labor and Industrial Advisory Board, (**) 
Assistant Administrators for Labor and Industry, and the Executive Officer. 

The findings of this group were as follows: 

1. Hours of Labor 

It is recommended except for pea]: periods, 
maximum hours shall not .^e greater than 40 per 
v/eex and 8 per day except in the following cases: 

(a) Maintenance employees, firemen, engineers, 
shi-o;-<ing crews, truck ,driv or s, and such like - 
43 per week; 9 per day. 

(b) L'atchmen - 5^ Tier week. 

(*) Heport of Alvin 3rown to General Johnson. 

(**) Dr. Wolman, Mr. 3arrett, Mr. iicG-rady, Colonel Lea and Mr. Brown. 



(c) " 03" ee s 0:1 emergency maintenance rer-uired 
for continued operation of plant and equipment, 
or for safety and ktcalth of employees; - no limi- 
tation, but time and one-half for excesses over 

• ' hour per week, or 9 per d 3 . 

(d) "executives and supervisory employees, and 
their secretarial assistants, foremen, and pro- 
fessional and scientific employees (but no others) 
receiving not lees than $35.00 per week, and 
ou.toidvs calranen - no limitation. (*) 

2. Peaks 

It is recommended that exception to the above hours 
during peak periods should not be greater than 48 
per v/eek and 9 per day; and the peak allowance should 
not be longer than 12 weeks in any year. 

3. Averaging of Hours 

It is recommended that except upon showing of . 
necessity hours may not be averaged, but must be 
definite for each week. 

4. Days 

It is recommended that codes should prohibit working 
more than 6 days a week, except in emergencies, and 
except that watchmen may be worked 13 days out of 
two weeks. 



The approval of the forts^ (40) hour week in the above memorandum 
concurrent with the Admini: bration's move to induce industry to 
accept the ten percent (10') decrease in hours, as announced by the 
Administrator in an address of February 27, 1334. je.spite continuous 
effort to reduce hours on the pa,rt oi the Admini stra.tio; and the La 
Advisoi r<" Curing the first half of the year 1334, the forty (40) 

r week persisted as policy; As a result of the conflict between 
practice and hope, the P.eview Division reformulated guiding principles 
in July 135^; but its statement was not widely used within the Admin- 

IJ e formula re .6 as follows: 

"TThen the forty (40) hour v/eek will not, in th 
opinion of the Research and Planning Division, 
restore employment to the 1929 level, in an indus- 
try, generally prosperous, wh< .. L )or costs are 
relatively low, it is permissible and desira'bli 

that the _q 1 1 authority be 1 ' :or PA \°. rcoort 

(*) Mr. Barrett for the Industrial Advisory ¥oard object 1 to the 

limitation in paragraph (a) of 9 hours iaer day) 


within some period as 90 days, the feasibility 
of further reducing hours with a view of providing 
employment for at least as many persons as in 1929. 
Such a procedure is consistent with the general 
purposes of the Act. Tnen a code submitted for 
approval contains labor provisions not consistent 
with present policy, but an industry, operating 
under a code containing like or similar provisions, 
so that cisasterous hardship and discrimination 
would inevitably result if the code in question 
was unapproved, it is permissible on a clear showing 
of such condition to allow such otherwise objection- 
able provisions." (*) 

The forty (40) hour wee:: was thus again confirmed and the 
limiting effect of precedents recognized. Further serious efforts at 
reduction of hours were not made. Though the desirability of such 
reduction in hours was acknowledged in the qualification that study 
was needed of cases raising the question of shorter hours, the state- 
ment had little influence since the process of code making was largely 
completed by July 1934. 

Even the principle of reemployment to the 1939 level was less 
discussed as time passed. The report of the Assistant Deputy 
Administrator for Labor Policy to the Administrative Officer on the 
Package Medicine Industry Code presented, May 14, 1934, stated: 
"until such time as the Administrator declares it a fixed industry 
policy that 1929 levels of employment should be favored it is within 
the discretion of the Division Administrator to ootain the highest degree 
of reemployment that he considers an industry can be burdened with. " (**) 

III. He vi ew Offi cer 'js JPinal Su mmary 

The Administrative policy as crys tali zed through the mass 
of negotiations and the development of codes was finally summarized 
in the following manner by the Review Officer: 

"The limitation placed upon hours must necessarily be 
a compromise between the requirement of reemployment 
and the bility of the industry to adjust itself to 
the change in operating conditions. Experience 
under present codes shows that for the majority of 
industry, forty (40) hours per week is the lowest 

(*) Statement- of Policy classified under Code Provisions. This compilation 
of -policy is for use only in the Review Division, and although in- 
tended to represent the policy requirements of the Administration in 
respect to code provisions and related subjects is not to be considered 
as having been officially approved by F?A. This publication was 
dated July ,1-93 U. 

(**) Compendium of Abstracts of Policy and Other Statements Issued by the 
Policy Group Mimeograph No. 1">37, p. 14 



maximum presently practicable. Accordingly, in the 
absence nf convincing showing to the contrary, no 
employee will be permitted to work more than forty 
(40) hours oer wee!:. 

"Wht-ro hours have been estoblisned in o:ie code, there 
is a ijresunoti on for similar hours in codes of allied 
industries with like conditions, both because of the 
finding of fact in the first instance and because 
d.i p-uarnte hours mi.'-ht be discriminator".''. 

"MaximuT" hours may be fixed in particular industries 
at r^'re or less tnan forty (40) hours upon convincing 
evidence or reason therefor. The following are some 
examples cf acceptable cases: 

(a) Continuous process industries 36 hours. Some in- 
dustries operate continuous processes employing 
for shifts. In such cases, where it is practicable 
to suspend operation on Sundays, each employee will 
work 35 hours per week, and ds hours may properly 
be so limited. 

(b) Continuous process industries 42 hours. If the 
impracticability of suspension of operation on 
Sunday is demonstrated, maximum hours 'of 42 may 
be permitted. 

(c) Retail Trades- Employment in retail trade has 
customarily been at longer hours than in industry 
generally, and to reduce such hours presently to 
a maximum of 4^ is recognized, as impracticable. 
The hours permitted should be reasonably propor- 
tioned to the customary hours of store operation. "(*) 

IV Conclusion 

This statement conclude^ the development- of policy on basic hours 
within the URA. In many respects it was" in direct conflict with early 
tests -mid standards guidin; code negotiations and administrative action. 
It did portray the policy that evolved in practice, over the course of 
the two year oeriod. S '• '■e of t Le departures rf this position from the 
early tenets of HRA were: (1) the arinciple of considering ench indus- 
try individual]"/" was lost; (2) the early reluctance to set a uniform 
standprd of hours except in general terms and as a possible maximum gave 
way to acceptance, of a prevailing 4 p . hour form for practically all 

(*) National Recovery Administration division of Review Polic 
Statements Concerning Code Provisions via Related Subject: 
T.'orlrs i aterials Ilo, 2 n , December 1935, p. 13.. 



all industries; (S) the declaration that each industry was to absorb 
its otto unemployed was succeeded by emphasis upon similarity in terms 
of employment; (4) in place of the blunt disavowal of the precedent 
gre'- recognition of a uniform basis of operation for competing .and 
overlapping industries (*); (5) insistence upon lens than 40 hours a 
week ceased even though such a program might encourage reemployment; 
shorter hours reauired. as much justification as the longer week; (S) 
the belief in reducing hours to effect reemployment was qualified, in 
case of certain administrative officials, by the conviction that the 
capital goods industries should be excepted from such reductions; (7) 
the enthusiasm for reemployment through the shortening of hours waned; 
(8) the goal of the. 192£ level of employment receded; (9) industry by 
its pressure and "1A through- its desire for rapid codification com- 
pletely revised ISA policy; (10) and finally, the PRA substitutions 
generally foreshadowed the labor provisions of the final codes. 

The policy as above stated grew out of the experience of code 
making. It reflected Practice rather than goals; it suggested what was 
really being accomplished rather than guides for future revision. 

In a study of 557 codes, IS joint AAA 'and IIRA codes and extra 
divisions of the Petroleum Code; it was found that 49 had adooted the 
40 hour week. These industries employed 13,o37 persons or 60.5 per 
cent of tie total. (Table 13). In five industrial groups, i.e., metals, 
forest products, textile fabrics, construction and finance, the codes 
were exclusively "forty (40) hour week" codes. In seven additional 
industrial groups the codes consisted exclusively of those "under forty 
(40)" or "fort}'- (40) hours" for the basic wee 1 -:. ITon-metallic, chemical, 
paper, rubber, equipment, textile apparel, graphic arts. The longer 
than,f ort - (40) hour wee': codes were significant in the trans-oortation, 
retail trades and territorial codes. 

(*) One of the most impressive administrative results -of ":3HA 
history was the discovery of extensive and significant 
overlapping of processes among industries. 

















• H 








J) ri ^ 
Fh CO 
O £\ O 

Pj ^ 
O ts © 
^± O <a 



■d O 





Xi O 

o t> co 
j- o © 






d .d 


A o 












I I m 

r — r^-% O O 

I I I 

NOI o 
CM tO to 



.d- I 1 



CTvO O O LT\r^J- 

po O vo ^t f\ r— cm 
I r— rH cm OJ O 

cm t^j- IT\ cm _=f en J- i~- r^ O 

60 J" r— VD Hr-CrtHr-MO 

rH Oj" 

(T\ OJ 

rH CT\ 
I rH OJ 


r~— r— o~\ 

oj^o ir% , 


LT\ f^ O 
rH OJ 

I I I 

VO CO CPi to to jt \T\^r MD LTWO CTv O LTMTiH h- Cn^t f— CX\ J" 
t — jrj- OJ O t\) CMTi'O J- (\l CAO ITi I — VO LT\ l~— LT\ LO OJ I*— CM 
LPvJ- .d" yQ OJ OJ rH VO rH O ff\l^iC\J t-^i Li.^ r — l*-\,-J- M H f-H 



I rH O 1 

I ItO I IrHrH I lOOrHCM (^ij- \D 



cm r- r<-\ r— cm r-\ r^rH 

rH ^t H (Af^l ^ 

CPvO^t- h- tO LP, O f~\ LT\ J- O O t.3 
n^_j- r^, r— rH h oj 

I LPl rH \ rA ^-\ r-\ r-\ r-\ I 

nr^iH I I I I 1 

OJ OJ LPi I — ,AWJ CM to OlO 

H lO Hf^r^ ctv-j- <=r j- i 

CM '-O O rO LP\ LPv <M ^f (^N 
tO rH r-H rH CM CM 








rH r« 




+3 • 


CD 2 





o o 

• H 

^1 «H 







d -p 









■d o 



t^) -p 






1 1 




p, fl 

•S ^ 








Fh CO 



cd co 









pH rH 













CD ^ 

cd o 










-P O 




rH CD 

O -H 









00 -H 





•H ^3 

■H ^1 





• H 







cd Q 



■rH T3 


•P -P 

Fh Ph 











Fh 0) 



S o 


K cc 

rQ Cd 












o ,d 



C7 1 O 


CD 0) 

Cd Fh 











P-h o 



H Ph 



Fh O 









.. -143- 



The prevailing trend toward the adoption of a fort-- hour work week 
was modified in several cases by establishment of longer basic hours. 
Forty-two ERA codes provided for a longer week (*). The factors determin- 
ing approval of a working week in excess of 40 hours illustrated the cir- 
cumstances, including precedent, that shaped code standards. 


The most numerous group of codes with a longer work week were in re- 
tailing. The Retail Code (Code. Eo. 50), written after extended consideration 
of the problems of the industry set a basic scale of hours ranging from 
forty (40) to forty-eight (48), per week depending upon the number of store 
hours (**). The position taken in the letter of transmittal for these codes 

"The hour and wage provision of the code are substantially the same 
as those adopted and approved in the Code of Fair Competition for 
the Retail Trade." 

Following this statement departures from the pattern adopted were usually- 
noted. Modifications related especially to seasonal and peak period tol- 
erances adopted to the. needs of the industry and to limitations on the 
numbers of persons working on an unrestricted weekly schedule. The Retail 
Solid Fuel Code provided for a forty (40) hour week for four months and 
fort3r-eight (48) hours for an eight months' period.. This was acceptable to 
the industry largely because of the four months' slack season, but it did 
not otherwise alter the fundamental pattern of hours. 

(*) For comparison, see Ruth Reticker, "Labor Provisions in ERA" - 

TTork Materials Eo. 55 . The number given above is slightly smaller than 
that indicated by the latter study since five of the agricultural 
codes with longer hours have been omitted and the codes for the Uood 
Preserving, Stock Exchange and Investment Bankers were considered 
forty (40) hour week codes in this study, while the Air Transport 
and Commercial Aviation Industry Codes were noted as longer than forty 
(40) hour week codes. It is significant that such differences of 
opinion could exist with respect to the actual number of basic hours. 
The exemptions in many codes were so profuse that they affected the 
major proportion of the codes and nullified the actual basic week 
usually in the first section of the paragraph. In estimating the 
basic work week, it was necessar;' to determine the basic group of 
employees as well as define the provision which might legitimately 
be considered to represent basic hours and those which were seasonal 
tolerances. In many cases this determination was not easy to make. 
Furthermore, legitimate differences of opinion might exist because 
of the manner in which the clauses were written so that uncertainty 
appeared as to the actual meaning of the provision. 

(**) Footnote continued on next page. 


ii. motor SERVICE 

A second group followed the pattern established in the I.Iotor Vehicle 
Retailing Trade Code which had. -provided a forty-four (44) hour week. In 
these codes the possible conflict with the Motor Vehicle Retailing Code was 
definitely recognized. In fact the Motor Vehicle Maintenance Trade Code 
made special reference to it, and instructed the deputy to inquire into 
the sources of the conflict (*). 


A third groxip conrorised the motor transportation codes. The Transit 
and the Bus Codes set the basic hours which were considered as the prece- 
dents in the la.ter motor vehicle codes. In part the forty-eight (48) hour 
week for these codes had also been predetermined by the exemptions to truck- 
men and shipping employees from the basic nours of most codes. The motor 
transportation codes were governed by these occupational precedents as well 
as by the special motor transportation codes. The forty-eight (48) hour 
week with loose seasonal allowances permitting much longer actual weekly 
hours prevailed in these industries (**)• 

(**) Footnote continued from preceding page. 

The codes in this group were: Retail trade (50); retail jewelry 
(142); retail food and grocery (132); retail farm equipment 
trade (197); retail rubber tire and batter-;'- (410); retail toba„cco 
trade (456); surgical distributors trade (507); retail trade in the 
Territory of Hawaii (323); and retail meat trade (540). In this 
class was also the Pilling Station Division of the Petroleum Code. 

(*) The codes in this group were: Motor vehicle retailing (145); motor 
vehicle storage and .parking trade (147); wholesale automotive trade 
(lSo); motor vehicle maintenance (543); and the auto -rebuilding and 
refinishing trade (544). 

(**) The codes in this group were! Cinder, ash and scavenger trade (191); 
- later amalgamated with the Trucking Industry Code; domestic freight 
forwarding industry (152); trucking industry (278); and the house- 
hold goods storage and moving trade (399) ; refrigerated warehousing 



Closely akin to the above group were the air transport (111) and 
comnercial aviation (513) industries in which a forty-eight (48) hour 
week was established, and the merchandise warehousing (232) with a forty- 
five (45) hour week (*). The first secured approval of its hours because 
"the Post Office Department's mail payments which form the largest item of 
the airline income have been reduced approximately 28^ for 1933" (**). 


In the service codes long hours, low wages and. sweated labor -oondi- 
tions had prevailed prior to the TJRA. In these industries competition 
with owner operators, whose self-directed labor could be controlled only 
through special opening and closing hours or similar devices, made the 
shortening of hours particularly difficult. Furthermore, these shops took 
on the character of the retail industry, serving the public and were fre- 
quently located in and about the same places and at times competing with 
the later (***). The letter of transmittal for the hotel industry contained 
the following statement: 

"The work hours may not be entirely satisfactory from a purely 
social standpoint but they represent a substantial reduction 
from the hours which prevailed in the hotel industry" (****) 

The letter from the restaurant industry xvas almost identical (*****) 

( *) National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition 

Vol. V, p. 496 
(**) Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 2 
(***) The industries in this group are: Ice (43); hotel (121); 

restaurant (282); bowling and billiard operating trade (546); 
shoe rebuilding (372) and barber shop (398). 
(****) national Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition 

Vol. Ill, p. 176. 
(*****) Ibid., Vol. XI, p. 510 

"The work hours may not be entirely satisfactory from 
a purely social standpoint but they represent a very 
substantial reduction from the hours which prevailed 
in the restaurant industry and will result in an esti- 
mated employment of between 125,000 and 150,000 persons 
in the industry above the number employed on June 15, 
1933. The code provides for a six day work week which 
is a definite innovation in the industry." 



V. OTHTd 301IG 

The wholesale food anc 1 . rocery industry, unlike the other 
wholesale codes, obtained a forty-five (43) hour week or the sane 
reasons that similar retail stores secured a forty-eight (43) hour 
week and _;eneral stores a forty (40), forty-four (44), forty-eight 
(48) hour ran,_e. The perishability of trie articles su^ested the 
justification, for the longer v:ee: :. The Toil Trie _e .'.'ode contained 
a nominal forty-four (44) hour week with exemptions to the operating 
and maintenance workers, the rrajor roup of employees, permitting 
forty-eight (48) hours. Acknowledgement of the forty (40) hour 
nrinciple -as due to tl.e insistence of the labor adviser for the 
code. In this case financial capacity anc" the connarabilit;' with 
the transportation and service industries ap- eared to justify the 
forty-ei ,ht ( Z -C) hours in the e^ r es of the Administration. 

The forty-five (4.) hour week in the artificial limb manu- 
facturm ; industry resulted fro;.i - lor. controversy over the service 
features of the industry. The man?.; ement declared that they had to 
service customers on Saturday mornir anc" therefor required the addi- 
tional five hour tolerance over forty (40). They emphasized that these 
were not ..curs for maimfacturin but for service. The Advisory Boards, 
however, disa; "roved of the suggestion. As a result the final code was 
amended in the "Incentive Order to provide for a forty (40) hour week. 
However, the industry di" not accede to the change. Protests were 
lodged and the industry refused to accept the code. Investigations 
were made to determine the justification for the desired partial exten- 
sion. The admi: istrative Official succeeded, over the 'protest of the 
Advisory boards, i:i haviiv. the amendment for forty-five (43) hours 
approved. (*) 

Another £ roxcp comprised the territorial industries including 
six codes with longer hours than forty (40) . (*A) The conditions in 
these territories varied strikingly from those of continental United 
States so that the hours established in these codes represented reduc- 
tions for the employees concerned, even though the hours were longer 
than those in the other codes. 

Several other individual codes had Ion :er hours for reasons 

(*) History of the Coc'e of lair Competition for the Artificial 
Limb Llanufacturint Industr; , Conniled by ?.. i.I. Davis, to. 8, 
?6, 3d, 44. 

(**) 1 trace of Hawaii (333); bakir. in if Puerto Rico 

("" ); ■ lauufacturing industry" of [awaii ( 0) ; resturant trade 
of Hawaii (333); rap hie arts industry of Hawaii (554) ?v.v. 
Vfholesi I - c" retail automobile sales suit 1;' repair maintenance 
and service of Hawaii (556). 



peculiar to the industry. The average forty-four (44) hour week was 
approved for the fishery industry ""because of the perishable nature of 
the product handled in the industry and the uncertainty as to the tine 
when the product is available for processing" . However, it was provided 
that, "Some division of the industry will (find) it necessary to revise 
these provisions to make them applicable to these respective divisions" . (*) 
Several of the code supplements established a 40 hour while others pro- 
vided for a 48 hour week. 

The Fur Trapping Contractors' Industry Code did not provide 
for any maximum hours because the industry "is purely a seasonal one, 
operating only three months in the year, and during this period weather 
conditions may either lengthen or shorten the number of hours worked 
in any one day". (**) 


The codes which provided for a longer than fort;/' hour basic 
work week were, with the exception of the territorial codes, for non- 
manufacturing industries. The industries concerned were almost exclusively 
in the service, retail and transportation group, or they were essentially 
out of the ordinary, as in case of fishing and fur trapping, gven in the 
case of the artificial limb industry extension of the week beyond' forty 
hours was designed to provide a tolerance for the service brancn of the 
industry. The early codes in these industries set the precedent for 
basic hours in those approved at a later date. The codes in this ^roup 
v/hich did not follow a precedent did so on account of special circumstances, 
such as perishability of products, or extraorc'inary seasonality, like fur 
trappin^. Pro-!T7A hours in tkisc industries had been unusually long and 
the industries vigorously resisted further reduction of hours other than 
that adonced in the codes. 

(*) ITationrl recovery Administration Codes of Fair Cormctition 
Vol. VII, p. "30. 

(**) Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 152. 

- 148. - . . 

An almost equal number of codes to those with longer hours were those in 
which shorter hours had "been adopted. Forty-^one (41) codes prescribed a less 
than forty (40) hour week. (*) 

These codes provided principally for a thirty -five (35) and a thirty-six 
(36) hour week; (10) and (23) respectively. Jne established a twenty-seven 
(27) hour week; two a thirty-two (32) hour week; four a thirty-seven point five 
(37.5) hour week; and one a thirty-eight (38) hour .veek. The most significant 
industrial groups were apparel (ll) and equipment and machinery (ll), with the 
nonmetalic group, the leather and fur, and the fabricating groups following in 
importance. (Table 13) . 

The analysis of the circumstances determining the establishment of the 
shorter work week will be made in terns of the occasion when the shorter work 
week was adopted by the various industries. The causes for the shorter work 
week may be set forth as follows: (l) collective bargaining: (2) precedents 
with strong union influence; (3) precedents; (4) Administrative Officials and 
Labor Advisers; and (5) industry proposals. 

I. Collective Bargaining 

The most outstanding of the factors leading to the establishment of the 
less than forty (40; hour week codes was the presence of a strong group of or- 
ganized labor within an industry. However, such a group did not assure the 
attainment of the goal of such shorter hours. It has already been noted that 
three (**) of the nine codes i:. which hours were reduced over those originally 
proposed of the first one-hundred approved codes were attained by means of col- 
lective bargaining. The most dominant factor in the establishment of the short 
er work week in manv other codes was either union strength itself or in asso- 
ciation with the force of precedents already establisned in unionized 
industries. (***) 

Tlie most important industries, in this group are the apparel industries. - 
Orga-.ized labor was par' cicularly effective in bargaining in these industries. 
They amassed their entire strength for the negotiations of these codes. Fn^y 
clearly recognized that bhe uo&a results would in part determine the character 
of the local agreements. Like ':'• s .liars they associated the development of 
the labor agreement with r ne forrralation of the code. 

(*) The report by Ruth Reticker on hage and Hours Provisions in HRA codes in- 
dicates a large number 43. The difference is due vo the fact that the above 
report is based on the hours in the final code. Changes made in the basic 
hours between those first approved and t.iose finally approved in the code as 
recorded in the above report are as follows: change from 40 to 3o in the bitu- 
minous Coal Code; from 40 to 36 in the Refractories Code and Cotton Garment 
Code; from 37.5 in the millinery industry and from 36 to 40 hours in the cedent 
industry. The latter change was from a 35 average week with a 42 hour maximum 
to a flat 40 hour week. It "may also be noted that a number of other industries 
had established shorter- "basic hours either for specific periods or for specific 
groups of employees such as the pyrotechnic industry (148); metal lath (344); 
infants and childrens' wear (373); and wrecking and salvage (318;. 

(**) Coat .and suit; men's clothing, and dress industries. 

(***) The industries in this group are coat and suit (5); men's clothing (la); 
dress (54); fur dressing and dyeing (151); pleating, stitching and bonnaz and 
hand embroidery (276); men's neckw 33); millinery (151); print roller and 
print block (368); covered button (356); undergarment and negligee (408); Fur (4 
women's neckwear and scarf (536) . 



cedents already established in unionized industries. (*) 

The most important industries in this group are the apparel 
industries. Organized labor was particularly effective in bargaining 
in these industries. They amassed their entire strength for the nego- 
tiations of these codes. They clearly recognized that the code results 
would in part determine the. character of the local agreements. Like 
the miners they associated the development of the labor agreement with 
the formulation of the code. 

The unions in this industry (**) were well established in the 
principal and strategic markets of the industry ant had had long deal- 
ings with employers in these areas. Under the favorable circumstances 
which existed at time of the ERA "'hen national uniformity of labor pro- 
visions was envisaged and labor was being organized very successfully, 
the unions were particularly 'jell situated. They could obtain the 
desired terms of employment for the principal markets and could depend 
upon the support of the employers in these regions in their efforts to 
raise the standards for labor in the other markets. This bargaining- 
position was further strengthened by the addition of thousands of mem- 
bers to these unions in many of the outlying areas and many new bran- 
ches of the apparel industries, 'Labor's demands in the negotiations 
of these codes was largely. governed by the terms which they could ef- 
fectively realize within the major markets in which they were well 
organized. In the above respects they differed radically from the 
position in which other 'jell organized areas found themselves. 

These unions were also aided in their negotiations by the fact 
that they sent down to the NEA some of their most experienced person- 
nel. In fact, several persons attached to the labor organizations of 
these industries v- ere on the Labor Advisory Board itself and actively 
participated in negotiations of many codes ^.^ac. familiarized themselves 
with its procedures. Ac a result of the strength of the union, the 
particula.rl3" strategic role of the dominant Hew York City unionized 
markets, and the sympathetic administrative officials, the administra- 
tive influence was strongly responsive to the active cooperation and 
aid of the labor advisers and representatives. 

In the discussion of the individual codes, it must be borne in mind 
that they were being formulated! almost simultaneously with all of the 
conflicting pressures being brought at once. The determination of the 
hours provisions was only one of a series of complicated elements in the 
negotiations of these cedes. 

(*\ The industries in this group are coat and suit (s) men's 
clothing (15); dress (6-I-); dressing and dyeing (l6l); 
pleating, stitching and bonnaz' and hand' embroidery (27$); 
men's neckwear (3o3)i millinery ( 151) ;' print roller and 
print block (936S) ; covered button (336); undergarment and 
negligee (UOS) ; fur (1+3S) ; and women's neck-ear and scarf (533). 
(**) The two chief unions were the International Ladies' Garment Workers 
International Union, anc the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union. 



A. Millinery : 

This industry had skilful union leadership, With a history of successj 
collective bargaining in the past, the industry had declined, and with it 
the union, in a period of bitter competition. It struggled with increasing 
seasonal unemployment. Shile a city industry, it was spread over many markc 
of which only the New York market was organized. It was estimated in early 
1933 that thirty per cent of the industry, all in Hew York City, operated 
under collective agreements. Between 1922 and 1932 collective agreements 
were absent, hut the union - The Cap and Millinery Workers - had taken a 
new start in 1932. 

There were several associations in the industry but in May 1933, a new 
National Millinery Council was formed as an association of associations, 
but predominantly New York in interest and influenced by the state of union 
ization in New York City. On July 5, "1933, the Council presented a thirty- 
five (35) hour code. This was withdrawn, apparently on the question of re- 
presentativeness. The Council proceeded to extend its membership, and on 
July 18, presented another code with forty (40) hours and substantial al- 
lowance of overtime. 

At the public hearing of August 2, the most contested point_was the pre 
posed occupational minima. To try to settle the wide difference Deputy 
Howard prepared a compromise draft of his own, in which hears were left for 
later decision. Labor protested and negotiations proceeded throughout 
August. The assistant deputy then working on the code ias since described 
the next step: 

"The impasse was broken by tne Millinery Union, . Labor had 
recognized before anyone e! se the fundamental controversy 
and aad been conducting since the middle of August a vig- 
orous campaign of unionization. As a result of that cam- 
paign the union consolidated its hitherto dubious strength 
in New York City and brought a majority of manufacturers 
in Cleveland, St. Louis, and Chicago under collective agree- 
ments.' By mid-September the effects of the campaign on the 
code making process had become apparent." (*) 

Early in October an agreement was reached and a new code drafted at a 
joint conference. Hours were compromised at thirty- seven and one-half (37-^f 
per week, seven and one-half (7 : 1 -) per day, with possible overtime for six 
(6) weeks in each season at a time and one-half (lv) rate, only on the re- 
commendation of the code authority which was to determine the amount needed 
for each market. (**) 

B. Far Group : 

Two codes in the fur industry are included in this group. The gains max! 
by labor in this field were due to organization; and they were notable since 
they were won in the face of great difficulties. The chaotic competition in 

(*) Millinery Industry, by J, C. Worthy, p. 63. Work Materials No. 53 

(**) See section five for labor hour amendment. 



the industry after several years of depression; mounting unemployment in 
the main center together with claims of shortage of skilled workers in 
outside areas; the traditional exaggeration of seasonality; various de- 
grees of unionization in branches of the trade, and a rising crisis of 
dual unionism. These elements made any code agreements in this field al- 
most a triumph. 

The two unions here were the International Fur Makers' Union, affi- 
liated with the A. F. of L. , and the Industrial Fur Ifekers' Union, both 
with elements of strength and at odds since 1926. However, in spite of 
their differences their combined pressure told for the same end in regard 
to labor provisions. (*) Early .attempts of the various trade associations 
to combine and offer one code for the whole industry failed, and in each 
subdivision of the industry the employer groups divided to the end along 
union and non-union lines. 

1. Fur Dressing and Far Dyeing 

Separate codes were submitted by two trade associations, one repre- 
senting the union, the other* the non-union shops. The code was to cover 
five industry divisions, in which the organized strength varied from com- 
plete unionism to none at all. The Habbit Fur Dyers Association, without 
consulting labor, proposed a forty (40) hour week, and a forty-six (46) 
hour week for eight (8) weeks before Easter, and during July, August, 
September, and October. 

The Fur Dyers Trade Council brought in a code, stating that its 
labor terms represented "full and complete agreement with the union." 
The code called for forty (40) hours per week for the six (6) seasonal 
months, thirty-five (35) hours for the rest of the year! in adiiticn 
eight (8) hours overtime per week could be worked during seasonal peaks 
to take care of continual chemical processes. 

In spite of the Council's claim of agreement with the union, both 
unions asked a thirty (30) hour week. A thirty-five (35) hour week had 
supposedly been in effect for a year in union shops, without much effect 
on employment. The industry admitted that average days of employment 
per year were not more than one-hundred (100), and that days as long as 
fifteen and sixteen hours were worked at times. 

It was finally agreed to establish a basic thirty-five (35) hour week 
and seven (7) hour day. As for overtime a new provision was secured. 
During the thirty-five (35) hour week period all overtime beyond the daily 
and weekly hours was to be paid time and one-half (I-J3). During seven (7) 
weeks of each six (6) months period forty (40) hours per week could be 
worked with time and one-half (1-5) overtime pay for any work in excess cf 
eight (8) hours per day. 

(*) The later settlement of this dual situation may be partly 
attributed to the NBA experience. 

SOURCE: J. Brodinsky' s "Negotiations of tae Fur Code" (Typewritten) 



2. Fur Manufacturing 

In this again the final hours agreed to represent a compromise 
between the conflicting interests of employing groups with the chief 
gain in the control and reduction of overtime. Again the pressure of the 
unions was very effective. 

Two oodoc were presented. That of the Hew York Associati >ns pro- 
vided the basic thirty-five (35) hour week of existing union agreements; 
that of tie western group a forty (40) hour week. After long code negoti- 
ations, delayed by the fact that the dispute between the two unions came 
to a head at this time, a final agreement was reached on the hours pro- 
vision. To this end labor coordinated its effort for- a thirty (30) hour 
week, and was upheld by the opinion of the He search and Planning Division 
that "it is practically impossible to effectuate a spread in employment 
without reducing the hours in the fur manufacturing industry to a ridic- 
ulously low level." (*) The immediate gains to be looked for, therefore, 
lay in equalization and restriction of hours as between industry groups. 
Though labor was not satisfied with the outcome, it had made gains never- 
theless. Hours in the final code provision were: thirty-five (35) per 
•week, seven (7) per day, five (5) days per week. Overtime at one and 
one-half (hjr) times the normal rate of pay was to be used by members of 
the industry only if recommended by a regional industrial relations com- 
mittee and granted by the code authority. 

C . Pleating, St itching and Bonnaz a nd .land Embroidery 

.In this industry, a luxury service to women's apparel, union in- 
fluence had declined during the depression, and some problems of dual 
unionism had crept in. There were eight (8) trade associations and a 
number of codes were submitted for the industry in the summer of 1933. 
However, two New York Associations represented about seventy-five per 
cent (75%) of the industry. The hours first proposed were similar to 
those proposed by branches of the apparel industries: a forty (40) hour 
week, eight (8) hour day, five (5) day week, with overtime not to exceed 
six (6) hours a week or seventy-five (75) hours for any six (6) months 
period. Even as late as the hearing, however, the Ohio group intended 
in a brief: "Since past experience demonstrates the fact that fifty-four 
or sixty-six hour weeks have been unavoidable during the past year in 
our western areas we should be permitted a fifty (50) hour week, twelve 
(12) weeks in each six (6) months period." 

At this time the bonnaz workers' agreement in the Chicago area re- 
quired a forty- four (44) xiour week. By September this agreemtn was re- 
placed with one requiring a forty (40) hour week. In Hew York the Inter- 
national Ladies' Garment Workers Union had been organizamp t xe scattered 
forces of the bonnaz groups, and in September through the mediatory ser- 
vices of Mr. Grover Whalen, the union signed new agreements with the two 
chief associations in the city. 

(*) Research and Planning Report. March 1934. 



After many weeks of negotiations nours were finally set: thirty-five 
(35) hour per week, eight (3) per day, a five (5) day week. No overtime 
was allowed, but the cede authority was empowered to determine and re- 
commend rules for vertime in the various markets to he later incorporated 
in the code. In this case the industrial adviser specifically used his 
influence against the overtime provision. 

D. Lien' s Neckwear Industry . 

This industry was operating in New York City under a union agree- 
ment. However, only fifty per cent (50,j) of tlie industry was located 
there and the-proportion of the production in this area had been con- 
stantly decreasing. (*) Unemployment of neckwear workers been a 
serious problem in New York City, while in the newer centers there was 
a smaller surplus. The result was a conflict of interests in regard 
to hours and wages that required skillful labor statesmanship. The 
compromise necessary as to hours for the "outside" production areas 
concerned overtime. A thirty-six (36) hour week was agreed to; but it 
was provided that four (4) nours overtime above the thirty-six (36) 
hours might be worked for not more than eight (3) weeks in each six 
months period in instances where an' employer could not supply his needs 
with unemployed neckwear workers in his community. Such overtime nad 
to be immediately reported. 

E. Covered Button . 

This industry is a service and supply industry to women's apparel 
and the workers belong to the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union. 
Individual agreements were in existence covering a large part of the in- 
dustry, but were not strong or well observed. Several :f the largest 
of the New York firms were non-union. There was no trade association 
and the industry, fairly scattered through the major clothing markets, 
found cooperation difficult. The proposed code was drawn up by a pro- 
fessional proposed code maker. lours proposed were forty ( A 0) per week, 
eig»it (3) per day, with overtime of ten (10) liours during twenty (20) 
weeks of the busy season. Hours had previously run as long as sixty 
(60) arid the busy season was short. Bat the industry accepted tlie 
tliirty-f ive (35) hour week in tie PSA and seemed to be prospering. 

By October 1933, the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union 
had organized -about ninety-five per cent of tlie workers in the Button 
and Novelty Workers' Union, and labor negotiated the terms of the code, 
through the -anion, hours finally agreed upon were thirty-seven and one- 
half (37y?) per week, seven and one-half (7->) per day, five (5) days per 
week; overtime at time and one-half (l^) for not more than sixteen (16) 
weeks each year, ten (10) hours in any one week, but not to exceed one- 
hundred- twenty (120) hours per year. Tlie overtime rate was the chief 
gain over the union contracts. (**) 

(*) See William Lawson - A Study of Wages above the Minimum in 
the Men's Neckwear Industry - Works Material 45, Part C. 

(**) The crux of this settlement was industry's interest in price 



F. Undergarment and Negligee Code 

The question of liours here hinged on a limitation of the industry 
definition to coincide with union influence, with a result of raising 
standards fcr a larger majority of the workers. The underwear industry, 
closely associated with the cotton textile industry, had from July 21, 
1933, operated under that code. Its owr proposed code, including "all 
types of underwear" was .earl August 11. The code setting a forty (40) 
hour week when approved September 13 seemed to exclude women 1 s under- 
garments, hut this dispute was never settled during hhA' s activity. 
Other groups actively concerned in this field were the cotton garment 
and infants' and children's wear, both of which were then campaigning 
for separate codes. 

Both the associations for the manufacturers of undergarments and 
negligees, newly formed for code mailing, presented codes in August with 
forty (40) hour provisions ana long allowances fcr overtime. There 
were no previous negotiations with labor. The International Ladies' 
Garment Workers Union started organizaing vigorously in the summer of 
1933. A hearing was held on September 5, 1933, for the undergarment 
industry. This was immediately followed by a strike in hew York City 
resulting in the signing of agreements with the union. Administrator 
Jonnson' s letter of transmittal sunuiarizes the situation as follows: 

"The code as originnaly submitted by the Undergarment 
League, Inc., in August, 1933 was a simple one - providing 
in general for a forty (40) hour week and a ,)13.00 basic 
minimum. The sponsorship was fairly complete and the cede 
would have been quickly ap proved, had it not been for the 
outbreak of a strike in the New York area which was terrninat- 
• ed by the writing of collective agreements with labor. These 
collective agreements raised the scale of wages in the New 
York area in some cases as much as forty per cent or more and 
brought about a substantial reduction in working hours." (*) 

At this point the Undergarment League, largely Hew York in interest 
presented a new code of thirty-seven and one-half (37f;) hours, in line 
with the New York agreement., Classified wage scales were included to try 
to restore to a degree the previous differentials wi th-out-of-town manu- 
facturers. Tiie negligee group then affiliated with the League, for this 
code. From now on labor actively figured in the negotiations, which con- 
tinued for months with the active leadership of the International Ladies' 
Garment Workers Union and the Unite Goods Workers' Union. 

' Meanwhile a large group of non-union manufacturers formed the Cotton 
Garment and Sleeping Garment Associated Manufacturers, attempting first 
to go under the Underwear Code raid finally appling for admission to the 
Cotton Garment Code. The union was then faced with a choice. Mr. Dubinsky, 
President of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, decided to 

(*) Codes of Fair Competition, Vol. IX, p. 494 . 



agree to a compromise. Manufacturers of one-hundred per cent cotton 
garments were allowed to withdraw. Thus the shorter week and basing 
points in wages were saved for the large majority of workers (27,000) 
in the industry. (*) 

G. Women' s Neckwear 

This industry, concentrated to about eighty-five per cent in the 
New York area, was unorganized in every respect before the NIHA. It ex- 
tended into the blouse field and into the pleating and stitching field, 
serviced the dress industry, but in turn it was subject to competition 
from the handkerchief industry, a still more unorganized industry than 
itself. Hours were very long, and homework had increased during the de- 
pression to large proportions. 

An active association was formed, at first entirely of New York 
manufacturers; but every effort was made to bring in all groups. There 
was no labor organization. 

The first draft of a code, August 28, 1933, proposed a forty (40) 
hour week, with forty-eight (48) hours for ten (10) weeks in each of 
the spring and fall ^seasons. Between that date and October 10, the 
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union organized the industry almost 
completely. On October 8, a union agreement was signed with the associa- 
tion, and over ten or fifteen individual agreements with small firms. 
Conferences were then held with the union and the Administration and a 
revised code was agreed to with hours substantially as in the final code. 
These were: a thirty-seven and one-half (37^) hour week, seven and one- 
half (7,|) hour day, and. a five (5) day week; overtime to be permitted up 
to ten (10) weeks each season, five (5) hours per week, under careful 
checking, with overtime pay at one and cne-half (l-g-) times the regular 
rate. . A small group of western manufacturers stood cut for a rate of 
one and one-third (l-l/o), though the larger differences were on wage 

Further negotiations in this instance were unusual. The association 
asked the union counsel to act for them in the final negotiations with 
the Administration. From this point on delay in this code's approval 
was the fault of the Administration - chiefly the Legal Division's query 
of the homework control provision. It was finally ap jroved by the Advisory 
Council as one of the best c ntrol provisions devised. The responsiveness 
of this industry to cooperation, its quick and genuine organization, and 
its successful administration of its were noteworthy. (**) 

(*) In spring of 1935, negotiations were in progress to reduce hours 
to 36; to Cotton Garment Code already having been amended to 36. 

(**) The letter of transmittal reads: "the wages and hour provisions 
set forth in this code are in accordance with this agreement". 
(October 8, 1935) - Codes of Fair Competition Vol. XIX, p. 82 



j - • Print Ho Her and Print ..31 o ck i,lanufact ur: Industry . 

The oiT.3 industry in this group outside di the apparel division 
was the Tint roller and >rint block manufacturing industry. It is a 
small industry employing about 300 persons. Organized labor was well 
entrenched in the industry end bad long standing relations with the 
industry. While the code aad been originally presented for a forty 
(40) hour week and labor had asked for a thirty (30) Hour we .k a mutually 
satisfactory compromise was developed at a post hearing conference at 
which the thirty-five (35) hour week was accepted. A thirty-four per 
cent increase, in employment was forecast by this reduction in work. (*) 

II. Collective Bargaining and Precedents for Shorter ",7ork Week. 

In a number :f cases, organized labor succeeded in establishing the 
shorter .work week during the courses of the negotiations not only by 
means of its own power but also with the aid of the precedents which had 
already been established in the coat and suit,' men's clothing, and the 
dress industries. The effectiveness of these precedents was enhanced 
by the fact that the unions in these industries also had large groups of 
members in )ther apparel industries, and these industries were either 
competing in the same market, or for the same labor, or were servicing 
the major industries. (**) 

A. Blouse and Skirt 

Tie chief desire of the manufacturers in wanting a separate code 
was to avoid the labor standards of the Coat and Suit and Dress Codes. 
T'.ie Coat and Su^ t Code had included all skirts. During July 1933, the 
deputy administrator tried to persuade blouse manufacturers to consolid- 
ate wit] the dress industry in its code. But the Dress Code, approved 
October 31, 1933, definitely excluded blouses except "when used with 
ensembles. " 

On July 27; 1933, the secretary of the newly formed Blouse Associa- 
tion wrote, to the deputy that "Labor has not been en suited in the form- 
ation of our code." (***) He added that organization in New York was 
"negligible", in Philadelphia, "considerable." On August 15, 1933, a 
Blouse Code was submitted, setting a work week of forty (40) hours. I-Iours 
worked in the industry had been very long, variously estimated as from 
forty-four (44) to sixty (60). (****) 

(*) Code of Pair Competition - Vol. VIII, p. 540. 

shoulder pad (262); 

,**) These industries are blouse and skirt (194); shoulder pad (262); 
merchant and custom tailoring (494). 

(***) Blouse and Skirt History - Appendix p. 5. 
(****) Ibid, Appendix, p. 3, 20, 64, 72. 



Between the date of submission and the hearing on August 25, the 
industry was widely organized. (*) The union then came definitely into 
the picture. The day before the hearing the employers and the union 
conferred but without agreement. (**) At the hearing the Skirt Manu- 
facturers' Association decided to join the Blouse Association in submit- 
ting a joint code. Between August 25, and September 7, 1933, a strike 
was called. Following the dress strike of the middle of August, it was 
successfully concluded with agreements signed with the two associations 
of manufacturers and also the contractor's association. The agreements, 
following the settlement in the dress industry, called for a thirty-five 
(35) hour week. 

From that point the sole argument on hours occurred in regard to the 
overtime rate, which was set at one and one- third (l-l/3) in the draft 
for the September 7, hearing, Article II, Section 6, provided that the 
code authority might allow overtime of five (5) hours a week, one (l) 
hour a day for sixteen (16) weeks in any one year. Agreement on this 
and. other points was not very far advanced by ■ the hearing, "but was worked 
out in post hearing conferences." (***.) 

In this connection the report of the industrial adviser, supporting 
the union's contention for the time and one-half (l^) rate, is significant: 
"In the Dress Code the allowances for overtime is one and one-half (l-g) 
times the normal wage. As these workers are engaged in practically the 
same operations and are members of the same union, the difference in pay- 
ment will probably cause resentment." (****) 

Over/'time under this code was little used. Minutes of the code authority 
indicated permission was granted from time to time. But the report of the 
administration member, June 24, 1935, states: "Hours were reduced from 
44.50 and 55 per week to 35, but through, strict compliance on the part of 
a great majority of the industry, this worked no hardship. The code pro- 
vided a tolerance in hours for peak periods, but due to union domination 
in the metropolitan area, the industry did suffer somewhat. It was dif- 
ficult to secure union cooperation so that these tolerances could be 
utilized- when needed." 

(*) Ibid - History, p. 34. 

(*•■) Ibid - History, p. 8. 

(***) Ibid - History, p. 8. 

(****) Ibid - History - Appendix p. 20. 


-I - 

B. Shoulder Pad Iihuct ry 

Thic is a sifoply industry to men's clothing, though also to sone 
extent to women' s coats. Canvas fronts and shoalder pads are often made 
in the same shops; canvas fronts wer<^ under thf : en's Clothing Code. Like 
all sun ily items o:ta products are also mad- by manufacturers for their 
own use. 

An association, formed in Aug st 1933, applied to the Administrator 
as follows: "95$ ">f tne product handled by oar industry is cotton. ..the 
hours and wages provisions of t .e Cotton Textile Code are applicable -and 
should be applied at once," There must ha"e been some reluctance on the 
part of the Administration, for the association presented its own code 
proposing a forty-five (45) hour week, with overtime not in exces. of one 
(1) hour per day, five (5) hours oer week , fifty (5<~0 ner year at the rate 
of time and one-half (l}). This in the light cf a statement from the in- 
dustry, that it had "not had forty (40) hours employment a week for sever- 
al ye ts, M These terms were revised in tne s^me month to forty (4 n ) per 
week with the same overtime provision. 

There seems tr have been nr labor organization in the industry, at les 
in the part of it outside of clothing plants. At the hearing on October 
31 8 "anion representative appeared to state that shoulder o^d makers were 
already bound by tne Men's Clothing Code. The hearing recessed for a rul- 
ing from tne Legal Division which ruled against this position. After this 
decis'on he took the' position that he would not object to - separate trade 
practice code, but labor conditions must be the same. Before final appro- 
val the Labor Advisory Board persisted in correction of the definition to 
read: "The articles enumerated herein when made in clothing factories or 
used in conjunction with garments- manufact .red in sich factories, are ex- 
empted from the provisions of this code." The hours in the final code were 
closely rel^t-^d to those in the Hen's Clothing Code; thirty-six (3d) and 
eight (3); overtime of twenty-five (25) hours in six (6) months; one (l) 
per d-y, five (5) ner week at time and one-half (1 ) rate. (*) In this 
case t \e shorter hou s were attained largely by the overlapping of this 
industry ith the men's clothing industry and the persisting attention 
of organized labor which sa" ' to it that no significant differences in labor 
provisions would appear, 

C. Merchant an: Custom Tailoring 

We have an interesting example in the cise of this industry of the 
influence of orececent in code making, against the efforts of the Admini- 
stration. This industry's c r, de was in charge cf the retail division, which 
for leng persisted in regarding the industry as purely retail. 

The i n's Clothing Code included custom tailoring by definition, and 
this industry opposed a separate code for custom tailoring. At the time 
of tne men's clothing hearing on July 26, 1933, some f -act inns in the custom 
branch of the industry protested against inclusion of custom tailoring in 

(*) Codes of Fair Competition, Vo. VI, p. 233. 


that code. Difficulties attending the Men's Clothing Code subordinated 
the problem. Meanwhile in August 1933, tne National Associates of Mer- 
chant Tailors of America, an old organization with many local affiliates, 
approaching the Administration from the retail angle, received sympathetic 
consideration and encouragement. The hoars proposed in this code - and in 
this case hours and not wages were the crucial point - were forty (40) 
per week, eight (8) per day, with a t?/enty (20) week peak period of 
forty-eight (48) hour per week, eight (3) hours oer day, with a further 
allowance of daily overtime. 

The union situation in this industry can be only briefly suggested. 
The old traditional anion in the industry "as the Journeymen's Tailor 
Union. It had, however, fallen to a low membership and wag chiefly 
influential on the western coast. In the Hew York area workers were 
largely organized in the Needle Trades iorkers Industrial Union, and 
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union. Tne Industrial Union inclined 
to support the Amalgamated Clothing '.Yorkers Union. It is supposed that 
the association consulted the Journeymen Tailors Union. At the same 
time this union went into the Hew York Area and signed an agreement with 
certain employers. The industrial union threatened a general strike. 

By December 1933, tne Men's Clothing Code Authority, the Amalgamated 
Clothing 'Jorkers Union, and the division of NRA responsible for the ap- 
parel codes could turn its attention to the situation. Long negotia- 
tions followed. The historjr of this code states: 

"Tne Labor Advisory Board and the Men's Clothing Code Authority 
began t o assert their opposition. Mr. Sidney ' Hillman , then 
jrincipal labor adviser on the code, insisted that no separate code 
for this industry w->s necessary and only after long and somewhat 
. bitter negotiation ne -greed to a code on condition that the 
industry accept a definition far different f rom t he one originally 
proposed. " 

The definition originally proposed vaguely included men's clothes 
"made to individual measure. " It must be understood there was no real 
conflict of interest between the strictly hand tailored clothes made 
by the genuine custom tailor and the mass machine production of the 
manufacturer. The conflict lay in an important and growing overlapping 
group. No one disputed that; "tailors to the trade" belonged to the manu- 
facturing group. They were included with a special allowance of over- 
time for their peak periods, under the Men's Clothing Code. But a large 
group of so-called custom tailors whose methods of manufacture were indis- 
tinguishable and ™ho could not qualify under the definition of the custom 
code refused to operate under the Men's Clothing Code. The negotiations 
dragged on. In May 1934, the Assistant deputy administrator in the re- 
tail division, in charge of thp code, resigned. A new draft of the code 
was completed that day and agreed to by all the interests. Its definition 
limited the adherents to hand work "except for the operations of a plain sew- 
ing machine," and set hours at thirty-six (36) per week, eight (8) per day, 
with peak period oyerti ie t o be determined each seison by a joint' committee 

-1'' - 

of employers and labor. (*) 
III. Precedents. 

Aside from the apparel trades groups, the effect of precedent in 
establishing shorter than forty (40) hours per week was comparatively 
slight. This fact stands out in sharp contrast to the importance of 
rro.-cvinnt in the group providing longer than forty (40) hours. This 
state of affairs obtained not because of the absence of precedents. 
There were several outstanding ones in the machinery group; shipbuilding 
and shiprepairing (36 hours); electrical manufacturing (36 hours); auto- 
mobile ('35 hours) ; oil burner (36 hours) and laundry and dry cleaning 
machinery manufacturing (36 hours). Except for the gasoline jump manu- 
facturing and the knitting braiding and wire covering machine industries, 
the machinery codes through the first thirty-four (34), all established 
a less than forty (40) hour week. 

The failure must be charged to the administrative officials who 
embarked upon a new philosophy .which did not recognize the need for short- 
ening hours in the capital goods industries! It has already been observed 
that in the case of the Gasoline Pump Manufacturing Industry Code, 
(36 hours) , the first draft was modeled after the Electrical Manufacturing 
Industry Code, but the later drafts and revisions followed the outline of 
the other machine manufacturing industries with longer basic hours than 
forty (40) per week. 

The three (3) industries where the effect of precedent is readily 
discernible are, fire extinguishing appliance manufacturing, motor fire 
apparatus manufacturing, and boat building and repairing. The first we 
have already discussed, - indicated the effect of the Motor Fire Apparatus 
Manufacturing Code which had been presented by the industry as a thirty-five 
(35) hour week to correspond to the Automobile Code. In the case of the 
boat building and repairing industry, the effect of the Shipbuilding 
Industry Code was readily discernible. In fact, every effort was made to 
iron out the differences between the two codes so that they would not con- 
flict. The major difference in the hours provisions are in the seasonal 
tolerances. While the Shipbuilding Code allows forty (40) hours in any 
one week, the Boat Building Code allowed for forty-four (44). It is 
interesting to note the controversy which developed within the Labor 
Advisory Board. The majority of the Board contended that the same seasonal 
peak as in the Shipbuilding Code should be approved, while the Chairman 
of the Board maintained that since the industry "is highly sec ^onal and 
dependent upon service and- price" the forty-four (44) week would be 
appropriate. (**) 

(*) Of course this solution was chiefly useful in delimiting the problem. 

Without doubt the industry would ultimately have come under the 
Men's Clothing Code. In the amendments later under consideration both 
code authorities had agreed to a joint committee to pass on doubtful 
cases and to try to settle the problem of overlapping. 
(**) Report of the Labor Advisory Board, March 23, 1934. Code of Fair 

Competition for the Boat Building and Boat Repairing Industry, 
Volume II. 



IV. Administrative Officials and Labor Advisers. 

It has "bean noted that in the early drive for codification the 
reduction of hours was kept uppermost in the minds of the adrntniotrs^ 
tive officials. Organized labor representatives played an active 
role in prodding the Administration along to secure such shorter hours, 
and in supporting the efforts of the officials by data or actual con- 
ditions within the industry. This conclusion would apply with par- 
ticular appropriateness to the shipbuilding, petroleun and cast iron 
soil pipe industries. (*) 

'Fae efforts of Administrative Officials to obtain a shorter work 
week appeared to wane after the first one-hundred (lO"0 codes were 
approved. By this time the forty (40) hour week had become dominant 
in most codes. In place 01' the conviction that further shortening of 
hours was necessary there was general skepticism, particularly in the 
capital goods industries about the efficacy of reducing hours to effect 
reemployment. In many industries the opposition of the deputies to 
the consideration of shorter than forty (40) hours Was strong, and the 
strength of precedents was outstanding so that the labor advisers found 
it futile to contest the fort;- (40) hour week. 

There were, however, individual cases of administrative officials 
whose convictions of- 'the requirements of the original declared pur- 
poses of the Act persisted. The reduction of hours of five codes in 
this group was effected largely through the determination of the assis- 
tant deputy administrator to adapt the hours provision to the individual 
capacity of the industry. Wherever supporting data presented by the 
labor aclviser and the information obtained at the public hearing 
suggested the justification of a shorter than a forty (40) hour week, 
he pressed for its adoption with tne assistance of the labor adviser. 
He was so successful in this effort that more than fifty per cent (50$) 
of the total number of codes which he developed provided for shorter 
than forty (40) hours even though the hours provisions of the codes 
handled by other assistant deputies within the same division all had a 
fofty (40) hour week. Had all K3A officials operated in a similar 
manner the hours [provisions of codes might have been markedly different 
since there were also precedents for a thirty-five (35) or thirty-six 
(36) hour week. Many other industries were in a similar economic 
position to these in which a less than forty (40) hour week was adopted. 

(*) Tne industries in which the reduction of hours was effected by the 

Administrative' officials generally with the assistance of the labor 
adviser were the following: shipbuilding and shiprepairing (2); 
petroleum ( 10) ; cast iron soil pipe (18); pipe nipple (131); rolling 
steel door (171); cast iron pressure pipe (192); pasted shoe stock (413); 
canning (446) ; wholesale confectionery (458) ; public seating (477) ; 
upward acting door (502); bituminous road material distributing ( 530) ; 
music publishing (552). 

9 £62 


Hie February and . orch 1954 Cole A- endment hearings and the dis- 
cussion of the "10-10" plan for the reduction of hours was also in part 
responsible for the shortening of hours. Directly associated with this 
movement is the thirty-six (36) hour week in the Fasted Shoe Stock Codo, 
the Can ling Code and the Wholesale Confectionery Code. (*) Since it 
was generally felt then that the reduction in hours was to be generally 
applied, the deputy, at the request of the labor adviser, urged industries 
to accept the reduction immediately. The above industries adopted the 
proposal. It may, however, be noted that the seasonal tolerances in 
the canning industry virtually nullify the shorter hours. In the seasonal 
packing branches sixty (60) hours was established as a basic norm. (**) 
l!'ae adoption of the thirty-six ('36) hour week in the wholesale confection- 
ery industry was outstanding since the other wholesale codes had adopted 
a forty (40) hour week, with the wholesale food and grocery branch on a 
forty-four (44) hour week. 

Tiie thirty-two (32) hour week in the bituminous road material dis- 
tributing industry was acceptable to the industry since it affected only 
their unskilled employees numbering less than twenty-five per cent (25$) 
of their total force. It was adopted in exchange for more liberal con- 
ditions relative to their skilled ".employees (bituminous road materal 
distributor operators) in whom the employers were principally interested 
and who constitute the backbone of their force. (***) 

V. Industry Proposals. 

A number of industries themselves proposed less than forty (40) 
hour codes to the Administration. (****) These industries were dominated 
by one of two characteristics J low use of factory capacity or continuous 
process operation based. on a six (6) hour day. The provisions which 
they recommended permitted very liberal seasonal and peak tolerances, 
either through averaging provisions or specific peak periods or occupa- 
tional exemptions so that they virtually established either a forty (40) , 
forty-two (42) , or forty-eight (43) hour or longer weekly maximum. 
Experience in the above industries suggest that there was no rigid ob- 
servance of the basic week. The provisions in these codes must be 
contrasted, to the flat maximum hour regulations in the codes establish- 
ing less than forty (40) hours maxima developed through collective bar- 

(*) NJ tional Recovery Administration Codes of Pair Co petition ' 

Vol. XI, p. 207. 
(**) Ibid., Vol. XI, p. 28. 
(***) Ibid.., Vol. XVIII, p. CO. 

(****) Electrical manufacturing (4); automobile (17); laundry and. dry- 
cleaning machinery manufacturing (34) ; structural clay products 
(123); portland cement (12.8) ; rubber tire (174); envelope (220); processed 
or refined fish oil (500); window glass* (533); and flat glass (54l) . 




The circumstances which "brought about the shorter hours in the forty- 
one (41) codes varied considerably. In all "but ten cases, the reductions 
to the shorter than forty hour week were made during the course of code 
negotiations. The most vital element in effecting such shorter hours 
was organized labor. In at least fourteen codes, it was the aggressive 
policy pursued by organized labor, particularly in the needle trades, 
that effected the reductions. In most of these cases the negotiations 
of both trade agreements and codes were concurrent. The provisions of 
the code determined also the contents of the agreement. It was this 
association of the two which gave to the negotiations of these codes all 
the appearance of collective bargaining proceedings under governmental 
guidance. But aside from the influence of the union strength, most crucial 
was the precedent established in the three basic approved codes: Coat 
and suit, men's clothing, and dress. The fact that they had established 
the shorter week was most consequential. In these codes particularly, 
the influence was direct and determining. 

The effect of precedent was also evident in other cases. Basic 
codes were instrumental in predetermining the hours of subsidiary and 
associated industries. However, in cases where the precedents prescribed 
shorter hours than forty, the Administrative official and the labor 
adviser had to be particularly vigilant in assuring observance of the 
weekly hours of the basic code. In the case of 13 codes the Administra- 
tion official assisted by the labor adviser effected the reductions in 
basic hours. The industries in which these reductions were made are in 
no substantial manner different from those in which the forty hour week 
had been adopted. It was the effective use by the deputy administrator 
of the services of the labor adviser and the available information in 
the industry and his understanding of the terras the industry was in 
position to accept that accounted for these shorter hours. The codes 
v.'ith shorter hours than forty recommended by industry were in industries 
where there was low use of factory capacity or where continuous process 
operations prevailed. 



••.r?-jp.TS vi' •:: mvi sicr of :;asic w rr/n ' t tjrs 

Dissatisfaction with the prevailing code standards of basin hours 
was wide spread. At the Convention of the American Federation of Labor 
in October, 1933, organized labor declared that "the hours of labor are 
too long to assure absorption of the millions without jobs". "Forty and 
forty-eight hours and even longer in those^ercemoted groups.'- such as Match 
E»nd repair crews - have been set by codes and agreement's when the figures 
showed that no longer than tMrty hours oer re.'h could be allowed , if ,-, e 
are to find -jobs for all". (*) 

Labor's' st?nd on the thirty— hour week was specifically reaffirmed 
in a resolution as "the most essential solution in coping with the un- 
employment problem." (**) This notion was also supported by the Building 
Trades and Letal Trades Department. (*** ) 


ITithin administrative circles similar dissatisfaction was voiced. 
One official declared at the rublic hearing of the Tholesale Code that:— 
"Reduction of unemployment this winter is vitally 
necessary. . If in !odi to improvement is not noticed 
it will probably be n &e •" r ' tr< reduce the hours 
of all industries whether they are operating under 
codes or not." (****) 
However, administrative officials saw any difficulties in undertaking the 
wholesale revision of the codes. It was observed that - 

"In many instances it has been difficult to 
bring about agreement to the hour reductions 
now in effect. An attempt at further slashes 
would stir ur controversy t' e ] T .2A. night 
find it almost impossible to surmount." (*****) 

There was feeling in some quarters, that the hotirs schedule adooted 
■.ad e nded "T-.R.A. * s "•perio d of immedi ate a id to employment I 1 . (****** \ 

(*) Report of the Proceedings of the 53rd Annual Convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, October 2 to 13, 1933, p. 69 

(**) Ibid, p. 358 

(***) Philad lohia Ledger (September 28, 1933) 

(****) Statement of Deputy Administrator •Thiteside, quoted in American 
Federntio ' Labor ITeekly ne"S Service (November 18, 1933). 

(*****) Tall Street Journal November 16, 19 

(******) ibid. 

This conclusion impelled the Administrator to declare: 

"I am for a still shorter week than in any of .the codes. 

I believe that even after this country is restored to normal 

prosperity there -ill be millions of unemployed in this 

mechanized land of ours I am for getting those shorter 

hours just as soon as increased prices, increased profits, 
increased business permits." (*) 

As the NRA discussion grew warmer, an independent body of engineers 
published" the results of their investigation based on data for the major 
industries. The conclusions reported "ere: 

"Oar study of working hours absolutely supports the doctrine 
of the short work period. The lower limit of the optimum 
range for maximum effectiveness has been found to be between 
thirty to thirty-five hours ner week. The advocates of the 
thirty hour week are thus supported in their position by our 
findings. "(**) 

Toward the end of 1933 both organized labor snd the Administration 
agreed that shorter hours were necessary. Labor asked for uniform leg- 
islation applicable to all industries, but the Administrator was opposed 
to a national program of maximum working hours. He observed that — 

"You can't lay down one rale for all industry. To try to 
impose a 30-hour week or any hour week universally on all- 
industry would just raise the dickens. It simply cannot 
be done. «(***) 

In the midst of this discussion a statement of the actual achieve- 
ments of the NBA program declared that - 

"As a result of this vast administrative process, the last 
accurate reports show that some 4 million workers have been 
restored to gainful employment." (****) 

However, results were considered inadequate in view of the remaining 
volume of unemployment and the condition of industry appeared propitious 
for further action. It was for this reason that the February and Larch, 
1934 conferences were conceived. They represented the first real effort 
to revise the codes in order to absorb more workers by shortening hours. 

(*) Address by General H. S. Johnson, December 2, 1933, Central Labor 
Union, Philadelphia, Pa. (FPA Release No. 2136) 

(**) Study ^oy L. P. Alport and J. E. H annum, conducted under the auspicies 
of the American Engineering Council. Few York Times, (December 14, 

(***) Washington Herald, (December 27, 1933) 

(****) Cjuoted in American Federation of Labor Weekly News Service, 

(January 6, 1934). Report by the rational Recovery Administration. 




Early i» January, 1934, when the conference w&o being planned the 
Administrator, in his newspaper conferences, declared tn*,t steps '-rould 
shortly be taken to reduce maximum working hours under all cocu» c _ jj e 
indicated that - 

"The average work ^eek under the codes approved to date is 
forty hours and ... the Administration's goal v 'Ould be to 
reduce that to an average work <- r eek of thirty-two hours 

"The whole country, in my opinion, has got to go on a shorter 

work week. " 

He declared himself in favor of the eight-hour day, but indicated that 
a uniform week ^ould be undesirable, as it -ould push many into bank- 
ruptcy and create "a kick-back that would nullify the whole effort". 
Nor did he approve of imposing uniform hours upon all industry. (*) 

Lluch NBA interest during the next several months centered about the 
activities of the Code Authority Conference and its results. Invitations 
were sent out to code authorities to attend the Conference which was to 
include "the consideration in public sessions of the pos c ibilites of in- 
creasing employment. "(**) , 

By the beginning of February, the program for the conference had 
taken shape. The Administrator declared that among the chief objectives 
were the coordination of the cpde authorities to harmonize conflicts in 
closely related industries and the reduction of hours. He declared at 
his press conference on February 9, 1934, that: 

"American industry is geared- to run on an eight-hour day and 
that the working week that would serve best would be one that 
was fixed on a multiple of eight." 

Since nost of the codes had an average of forty hours a week, exceptions 
being permitted for peak production, the General's remark was accepted 
as favoring the thirty- two hour week. However, he emphasized that "the 
reduction of hours should come from the experience of the industries 
themselves rather that governmental fiat". (***) He thought that: 

"'."e can't do anything about that (the bulk of unemployment 

in the heavy industries) here ... "ha.tever we do will have 

to be in the ^kite-collar class and in the large measure in 

trade because consumers goods industries will employ people." (****) 

(*") Baltimore Sun (January 11, 1934). 

(**) NBA Press Release No. 3244.*' 

(***) Hew York Times (February 10, 1934). Press Conference Report. 

(****) Baltimore Sun, (February 10, 1934) - In accepting the capital goods 
industry argument, the Administrator considerably modified his earlier 



The conferences "ere divided into t^o sections. l n he fir&t was a 
public meeting beginning on February 27th and the second, a series of 
meetings of code authorities and code committees beginning on March 5„ 
1934. The same problem was addressed to both groups. Of particular 
interest '"as one group which dealt rith the "possibilities of increasing 
enroloyment ; rages and hours; comparative situation of capital goods and 
consumer goods industries." 

The General began the conferences rath a statement of objectives. 
He declared that the "National Recovery Act is an attempt to spread em- 
ployment, increase wa^es, cut out unfair and destructive trade and in- 
dustrial practices and make definite the rights of labor." It had made 
progress to these goals but there ™as need of additional changes. The 
meetings vrere the occasion for "a roand-up of every kind of helpful com- 
ment that has been produced as a result of six months of operation under 
the President's fie employment Agreement and the codes." There were, how- 
ever, twelve matters which required "immediate attention". One of these, 
and the one of most significance, was the "further reduction in hours 
per week and further increase in hourly wages. "(*) 

During the public meetings of the week of February 27, 1934, many 
speeches iavored the shorter work-week. (**) 

(*) Address on February 27, 1934 by General Johnson. Release No. 3307. 
(**) Some of these were: 

Harry Kline, R. C. A. - Victor Employees Union (30 hours); 

W« Leader, Central Labor Union of Philadelphia (30 hours); 

Alexander McKeon, American Federation of Hosiery Y/orkers (30 hours); 

F. T. Rockwell, Frigidaire Employees Association (25 hours); 

Fred Hewitt, International Association of Machinists (30 hours); 

Louis " aldraan, Chairman, Public Affairs Committee of the Socialist 
Party (30 hours) ; 

John J. Klaber, Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and 
Technicians (30 hours); 

C.7, "Ihitmore, Chairman, People's Unemployment League of karyland 
(30 hours); 

John P. Frey, Letals Trades Department of the A. F. of L. (30 hrs, ); 

Samuel Kapustin, Knit Goods Union of Philadelphia, (30 hours); 

Sidney E. Goldstein, Chairman, Joint Committee on unemployment (30 hrs»); 

James J. Ryan, President, Amalgamated Association of Bridge, Struct- 
ural, Ornamental Iron and Bronze Erectors and Affiliated Trades 
of .America.; 

John P. Coyne, International Union of Operating Engineers; 

C.L. Rosemund, President, Federation of Technical Engineers, archi- 
tects and Draftsmen's Unions, A. F, of L. ; 

VJm. Kuehne, Federation of Building Trades Workmen (30 hours); 

Urn. Filene, Boston, Mass.; 

Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Technicians (50 hrs«); 

jBdrrard B, Abbott, Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Ukrs»; 

St. Louis Printing Pressmen's Union 46 (32 hours); 

Adelard Dumas, Independent Sheeting '.Yorkers of America; 

(Only with qualifications: ) 

Ray Hudson, Industrial Committee .of Hew England Council; 
9862 (Footnote cont'd, on next page) 

- 153 - 

They generally advocated a thirty hour week for most industries, though 
in individual cases 32 hours was also proposed. The principal propon- 
ents were union leaders. Opposition was offered "by some representatives 
of industry. Among their contentions were ( l) that industries could not 
finance this decrease in hours (*) , (2) that there was a shortage of 
skilled labor (**) , (3) that increases in prices would result (***), and 
(4) that such increased prices would lessen demand (****) . 

These conferences were only preliminary to the major meeting of 
Code Authorities on March 5-7, 1934. The personnel consisted almost 
exclusively of representatives of management. The meeting opened with 
an appeal by President Roosevelt to the code authorities to reduce hours 
in all industries: 

"You and I are now conducting a great test to find out how 
the business leaders, in all groups of industry, can develop 
capacity to operate for the general welfare. Personally, I 
am convinced that with your help the test is succeeding 

"With millions still unemployed the power of our people to 
purchase and xise the products of industry is still greatly 
curtailed. It can be increased and sustained only by striving 
for the lowest schedule of prices on which higher wages and 
increasing employment can be maintained. 

"Therefore, I give to industry today this challenge: 

It is the immediate task of industry to re- employ more 

people at purchasing wages and to do it now. Only thus 

can we continue recovery and restore the balance we seek 

"Ever;" examination I make, and all the information I receive 
leads me to the inescapable conclusion that we must now con- 
sider immediate cooperation to secure increase in wages and 
shortening of hours. I am confident that your deliberations 
will lead you also to this conclusion. Reduction in hours 
coupled with a decrease in weekly wages will do no good at 
all, for it amounts merely to a forced contribution t.o un- 
employment relief by the class least able to bear it. I have 
never believed that we should violently impose flat, arbitrary, 
and abrupt changes on the economic structure, but we can never- 
theless work together in arriving at; a common objective. 

(**) (llote continued from preceding page) 

Joe Kiss, Furniture Industry (30 hours); 
V. H. Stevenson, International Kol&ers Union (32 hours) ; 
S. Klein, Retail Trade, Employer (40 hours-5 day week); 
Charles Oberkirsch, Food Workers Industrial Union. 

(*) Texas Retail Dry Goods Association, I". J. Motor Truck Association and 

Texas Retail Furniture Association. 
(**) Chamber of Commerce, Kansas City - Mister Electro Platers Insti- 
tute of the United States. 
(***) (j, g, Houston, Baldwin Locomotive Works. 
(****) H. L. Carpenter, N.Y.C. Committee on Subway Completion; 
G-. H.. Houston. 


Government cannot forever continue to absorb the wl*ole burden 
of -on employment. The thing to do nor is to get more pt^i.e 
to work. " 

Organized labor and several labor representatives on the apparel 
code authority appeared in favor of the President's program. The Pres- 
ident of the American Federation of Labor concentrated on the points 
stressed by the President, saying: 

"The oroblem before you is' now we shall cope with the facts? 
What practical steps shall be tahen to shorten hours and in- 
crease purchasing power? .... We have put 3,000,000 idle men 
bad: to work. Our ;oroblem is no^ to put the remaining 9,000,000 
or 10,000,000 back to work, and I do not believe that the 
American people, having put their hand to the plo^, fill turn 
back. Tie must find the way', and we must consider the remedy, 
and when we have decided '-hat the remedy really is, I think 
-~e -must, like courageous men, apply it. We must make a choice 
between two or three things. first, shall we find a way by 
which we may put these 9,000,000 or 13,000,000 back to work, 
or shall r, e resign ours '/Ives to this, it seems to me, awful 
fate of deciding to maintain on our relief rolls, an army of 
10,000,000 unemployed., with all their dependents? Now, ^hat 
shadl we do. Shall we find them work, or keep? It is incon- 
ceivable that here in America we can successfully maintain 
an amy of unemployed, amounting to 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 
idle workers permanently. 

"ITor what shall we do as reasonable, sensible men? I am cer- 
tain, absolutely certain, from my experience in industrial 
anc from my study of the economic situation that the one remedy 
for unem-'doyment is a further reduction in the hours of labor. 
That reduction to be made in a vise, and sensible way, with an 
increase in buying -oower. If there is anyone that can offer 
a, better remedy for unemployment, I '-'ould like them to present 
it to General Johnson. ... •■ 

"Then the cooes ^ere originally formed, '-ere the hours set 
sufficiently lov even in the light of facts then known and 
presented? In the impending revision of the codes, "ill ,you 
courageously reduce hours to the general level that will re- 
sult in r-ork for all?"(*) 

Opposition to the increase in hours vas set forth in an initial, ad- 
dress at the general conference held on the first day, in which the ob- 
jection was offered that: 

"It is difficult to see how a compensating rise in wages in 
an industry which shortens its hours for soecia.1 reasons can 
have anything more than a harmful effect on recovery on a 
small scale, that the general policy i r ould have on a general 

scale, as already described. »(**) . 

(*) United States News, V'. II, #2, (March 16, 1934). Extra NBA Edition, p. 20, 
(**) Statement of '...r. R. E. Flanders, Ibid., p. 11. 



It --as repor.ted that this speech, coming from a member nf the 1TRA. Indust-* 
rial Advisory "Board, took on the air of administrative sanction, thereby 
bolstering the opposition. Many industrial representatives were reuurced. 
to have spent half the night after the public hearing rewriting their 
speeches to include a stiff attack on labor's demands. (*) 

The arguments presented by the lengthy discussions '"ere not unlike 
those at the public hearing. It was maintained: (l) that industry could 
not finance the decrease in hours(**); (2) that decrease in hours would 
decrease purchasing power even, though weekly dollar earnings were main- 
tained(***); (3) that there was a shortage of skilled labor(****); (4) 
that increases in wage rates would have been covered by an increase in 
prices(*****); (5) that increased prices would lessen demand (******), 

(*) Business TTeek (March ?, 1934). 

(**) The speakers presenting this view '"ere as follows: 

A. P. Haake, furniture Code Authority; 

Association of Newsprint Manufacturers of U. S. ; 

The Paper Industry Authority; 

P. A. Lorenz, Steel Castings Code; ■ 

E. S. Yates, Steam Engine Manufacturers Code Authority; 

Edgar Eickard, Hewspring Code Authority; 

Ellwood Kieser, Automotive Maintenance Code Committee; 

John ; J. O'Leary, Lachinery and Allied Products; 

P. G. Patterson, "hole sale Automotive Trade Code Authority; 

George C. Keidich,. Millinery and Press Trimming, Braid and Textile 

Indus try; 
Janes L. Tri, Director, Toy and Playthings Industry Code Authority; 
Kidie Hover Manufacturing: Co, , - Telegram; 
Challenge Machinery Co. , - Telegram; ■ 
Peerless Novelty Co., - Telegram; 

Superintendent of a Cotton Garment Plant, - -Telegram; 
Periodical Publisners Institute - Brief; 
Buckeye Glove Co., - Telegram; 
i . B. Hamilton Mfg. Co. , - Letter 
I. S. Adams, Knitted Outerwear Code Authority; 
P. P. Ploadley, Gray Iron Foundry Industry. 
(***)A. J. Hettinger, Research and Planning Division, P.P.A. ; 
Robert W. Irwin, Robert '.'. Irwin Co., Gr-nd Rapids, Mich*; 
A. P. Haake, Furniture Coce Authority; 
'7. J. Peed, Diesel Engine Manufacturer's Association; 
Richard Harte, General Tool and Implement Association. 
(****) Col. George Brady, NRA; 

R. P. Pauntleroj'', malleable Poundry Code Authority; 

R. L. Putnam, Packaging Machinery Code Authority; 

Sam Traylor, Kiln Coolers and Dryers Industry; 

P. A. Lorenz, Steel Castings Industry; 

17. J. Cronin, Automobile Mfg. Industry; 

J. M. Wells, Porcelain and Chinaware Industry Code Authority; 

'.Tallace Kimball, Packaging i.achinery Institute Code Authority. 
(*****)'.:. J. Cronin, Automotive Mfg. Industry Code Authority; 

Sidney L. Walloon Paper Industry Authority; 

J. M, Wells, Porcelain and Chinaware Industry; 

(Footnote cont'd, on next >age.) 


and (S) that foreign competition was so serious as to threaten American 
Industry -ere such a plan for shorter hours promulgated^* ) « 

Some posed the question of the alternative between thirty hours and 
the commonly discussed ten percent reduction in hours in favor of the 
latter as "only a choice of evils" (**). Tnere appeared throughout a 
disposition to accept the existing reduction in hours as reasonable but 
to fear further reductions. It was reiterated that - 

"KRA has had a large measure of usefulness," 

but - 

"The processes of recovery (from now on) are outside the NBA 
procedure so far as introducing any new untried or unusual 
methods of procedure. " (***) 

Some, while expressing approval of shorter hours, believed that the 
scarcity of skilled workers required an extension of basic hours for those 
employees. One such plan suggested a 36 hour week with permission for 
employment of skilled workers for 50 hours per week, (****) Another re- 
commended a maximum ranging from 30 to 40 ^ith unlimited overtime depend- 
ing on the hourly rate. (*****) 

Toward the end of the conference another general meeting was held 
at which the modus operandi was described by the Administrator. The 
problem was that of absorbing into industry the existing unemployed but 
not by any arbitrary manner. He indicated that in 

"this emergency and until payrolls catch uo with employment 
.... it is proper to encourage increased wages and reduced 
hours of work..... There are many (industries) that obviously 
can - and ought to - meet the suggestion to work on a 10 percent 
decrease in hours per week and a ten percent increase in hourly 

(*****) (Cont'd from preceding page) (also footnote 6) 
P. A. Bloomer, Lumber Code Authority; 

Richard Harts, President, Ames Baldwin Wyoming Company. 
(******) I. S. Adams, Knitted Outerwear Code Authority; 
Sam Traylor, Kiln Coolers & Dryers Industry; 
A. 3. Haake, Furniture Code Authority; 
Fred H. Clausen, Farm Equipment Industry; 
Robert Gayloe, National Machine Tool Industry; 
P. R. Fauntleroy, Malleable Foundry Code Authority; 
Arthur D. O'Shea, National Retail Code Authority; 
7. J. Cronin, Automobile Manufacturing Industry; 
J. Ivl. "Jells, Chinaware & Porcelain Industry, 
(*) S. P. Hoyle, Fishing Tackle Industry; 

Edgar Packard, Newsprint Code Authority; 

George G. Neidich, Lillinery and Dress Trimming, Braid & Textile Ind. ; 
J. M. Wells, Porcelain and Chinaware Industry. 
(**) United States News, V. II, No. 2, (March 16, 1934). Extra N.R.A. 
Edition, - p. 20, Remarks by A. J. Hettinger. 

9862 (Footnote cont'd, on next page) 


The Administrator recognized the need for resiliency in application 
of such a rule since in some industries "business is so slight that if 
they did adopt the rule, it wouldn't make any difference to employment", (*) 
In order to define these -procedures for unemployment two committees of 
industry representatives were organized, one representing the consumers 
and another the capital goods industries, In their commissions they '.-'ere 
instructed to find "some other way than any yet suggested" of creating 
jobs. Tbo-n&h this conciliatory challenge was made, the Administrator 

"Lierely for an administrative reason, our proposal is (when 
all the evidence is digested ond a conclusion reached) that 
the final suggestions be announced as a Presidential ruling, 
governing all codes, and that a definite period be stated 
during which any industry, or company, -hich finds reasons 
why it cannot comply, shall be given an opportunity to pre- 
sent those reasons and why (as to that industry - or company 
within an industry) there should be a modification, stay or 
exemption. I must emphasize that this applies to all t r alve 
■ points and not merely to the question of hours and wages, "(**) 

Turning the problem over to the industry groups, made possible a 
period of procrastination and discussion rhich converted the entire move 
into an abortive effort, A program founded on the right of individual 
groups of industry to withhold assent and/or the need of individual 
treatment inhibited action. 

The adoption of an Executive Order for the direct application of 
the "10/10" plan was set aside for consideration of the reports of trie 
above committees. (***) The most significant re-nort was that made "by the 
Consumers Industries Committee. (**** ) With respect to the proposal to 
reduce hours that committee reported a.s follows: ■ ■ . . 

(i) that it disapproved of an Executive order applicable to all 
industries, with such exemptions as seemed appropriate! as "an arbitrary 
exercise of authority and unwise form of procedure"; (2) that the problem 
of increasing employment be approached through the "voluntary cooperation 
betwee:'. the code authorities and the Government after prompt analysis of 
the peculiar problems in each industry to determine the necessary flexi- 
bility in working out the governing -principle for each industry"; (3) 
that since "more than nine-tenths of the unemployment burden is oxvtside 
the consumers goods industries, ... it is obviously impossible to load the 
great bull: of unemployment upon the consumers good's industry"; (4) that 

(***) (Cont'd from preceding page — also 4 & o) 

Ibid. , p. 22. 
(****) George Brady IT P. A. . • 

(*****) ~. D. Kimball, Code Authority of the. Packaging Machine Ind. & Trade. 
(*) United States Hews, V. II, #2 (Larch 15, 1934). Extra NEA. Edition, p. 18. 
(**) Ibid. 

(***) Stew York Times, (Larch 13, 1334). 

(****) Consisting of Messrs. Kirstein, 7illiais, Lor row, Smith, Francis, 
Lead, Selby, duPont, Edlund, Stride, Her'zog, and 'Sloan, March 15, 



-173- - 

each code authority be invited to submit information necessary to deter- 
mine its ability to raise wages and lower hours and to make the read- 
justments involved. (*) 

Submission of this report raised the problem of the next move. In- 
dustry was opposed to the "ten-ten" plan and proposed the individual in- 
dustry approach of this general order. NRA had appealed to them to ac- 
cept a "self-imposed" shorter week in place of the thirty hour week bill 
which Congress was then considering. Inspired by a belief that "the 
Government will not 'crack down' and industry may take their time", in- 
dustry had postponed action, "..'ithin the Administration, disapproval of 
this individual industry method was current as "not the most practical 
method to secure reemployment and increase purchasing power", A memoi— 
nadum to the Administrator noted that the selection of industries would 
be open to charges of being "arbitrary and unfair". An alternative sug- 
gested was that "ail industries subject to approved codes shall, within 
30 days, reduce hours 10 percent, with a ten percent increase in hourly 
rates, provided that modifications and exemptions from this blanket order 
may be granted those industries which can demonstrate that such reduction 
in hours end increase in wage rates would not accomplish the purpose of 
the program. " (**) 

The refusal of the consumers' goods industries to support the "10/10" 
plan led the Administration to move more hesitantly. It soon yielded to 

(*) Report of the Consumers' Industries Committees (March 15, 1934) 

(Appendix G) In NBA Studies Special Exhibits Work Materials #45B« 

(**) Memorandum from Leon Henderson to General Hugh S. Johnson, (March 14, 
1934), Subject: "Revision of Hours and Wages." There is a pencilled 
note from the Administrator on this letter which reads: 

"This is the method which we have used from the beginning and 
which to my mind is the only solution." 

The plan proposed by Mr. Henderson, Director of the Division of Economic 
Research and Planning was as follows: 

1. Issue order requiring 10fi reduction in hours and 10$ increase in 
wages, rates effective within 30 days. Provide that modifications 
and exceptions may be obtained by shoeing cause before Code Revision 
Board, set up as below. 

2. Designate Board with one member from each Advisory Board, along 
lines of NR& Policy Board. This Board will have technical staff 
of industrial engineers to settle borderline cases. 

3. Industry may appeal decision but must go to public hearing at which 
time the entire code mill be opened for revision. 

4. Publicity accompanying this order should invite acceptance from 
those industries who are willing to comply at once. It should also 
bo designated to stimulate response from new companies who are 
willing to comply if the rest of their industry does so. 

5. This Division is already at work on forms to secure information 
necessary to test the claims of those industries which request 

modifications and exemptions. 


the demand for dealing with the problem on an individual industry "basis. 
As a result, a questionnaire was addressed to 189 code authorities ask- 
ing information "to help detprmine promo tly whether your industry has 
the ability to meet the President's request for reducing hours 11 per 
cent without reduction of weekly pay. ',' (*1 Specific statistical data 
were reauested. 

The answers disclosed an attitude more clearly unfavorable even 
than that of the Consumers' Goods Industries. The majority of the 
letters in reply declared opposition to the proposal for the reduc- 
tion of hours and a compensatory increase in wages. Of 44 code author- 
ity replies, only one, that of the paperboard industry, favored such 
action; Ten others were willing to consider the proposal under cer- 
tain circumstances. One agreed to the principle if the kindred in- 
dustries also adopted the provision (**). Others suggested a reduction 
of an hour per month (*** v ; a forty-eight hour seasonal peek for a 
-oeriod of peak seasonal activity; (****) a forty-eight hour seasonal 
peak for a. period of eighteen weeks; (***** ^ a general enforcement drive 
. (***** ^ (#*****) min-rom full protection; (*******') protection against 
imports; (*******'> i opportunity to develop means for adjusting industry, 
(*********■) or j L pfi n i n g the extent of changes reouired. (**********> 
One proferred wage increases but no reduction in hours. (************) 
The other replies opoosed reduction in hours and the increase in wages 

(*) ■ Letter of H. S. Johnson, Administrator, to Code Author- 

, ities, March 28, 1934 (Appendix-HV In NBA Studies . 
Special Exhibits - Work Material No. 45-3 

(*=0 Paper Distributing 

(***) Hosiery 

(♦***) Fertilizer 

(***** ) precious jewelry producing 

(******} Business furniture storage equipment. 

(*******") Builders supply 

(******** ) Chinaware and porcelain 

(***#****#") SaW 

(**********^ Advertising specialty 

(***********) Textile machinery 



for one or more of the following reasons: (1^ Competitive positions; 
(2) inability to absorb increased costs; (3) absence of skilled per- 
sonnel; (4} impossibility of controlling hours; (b) inability to pass 
on increased prices; (6) and necessity for adjusting hours to indus- 
tries services. (*) 

(.*) These industries were: 

Asphalt and Mastic Tile Industry Code Authority 

Fur Trapping Contractors' Indus try 

Photo-Engraving Industry Code Authority 

Electrical Storage and Wet Primary Battery Industry Code 

Cast Iron Soil Pipe Association 

Hair Cloth Manufacturing Industry Code Authority 

Marking Device Industry Code Authority 

Cotton Textile Industry Code Authority 

Fishing Tackle Industry Code Committee 

Nottingham Lace Curtain Industry Code Authority 

Wool Textile Industry Coae Authority 

Folding Box Code Authority 

Paper Distributing Trade Code Authority 

The National Fertilizer Association Code Authority 

Commercial Refrigerator Code Authority 

Gas Appliance Institute Code Authority 

Ladder Manufacturing Industry Code Authority 

Toy Manufacturers of the U.S.A. Inc., Code Authority 

National Association cf Ice Industries 

Throwing Industry Code Administration Committee 

Hosiery Code Authority 

Pipe Nipple Manufacturing Industry Code Authority 

Excellsior Products Code Authority 

Boot and Shoe Code Authority 

Silk Textile Code Authority 

Business Furniture, Storage Equipment and Filing 
Supply Code Authority 

Piano Manufacturing Industry Code Authority 

Gasoline Pump Manufacturing Industry Code Authority 

Rayon and Synthetic Yarn Producers Code Authority 

Salt Producing Industry Code Committee 

7/axed Paper Industry Code Authority 

Leather and Woolen Knit Gloves Industry Code Authority 

Domestic Freight Forwarding Industry Code 

Lime Manufacturing Industry Code Authority 

Men'.s Clothing Industry Code Authority 

Manufacturers of Pianoforte Industry Code Authroity 

Glass Container Code Authority 

Silverware Manufacturing Code Authority 

Cap and Closure Industry Code Authority 

Soap and Glycerine Manufacturing Industry 

Shoe Shank Manufacturing Industry Code Authority 

National Saw Code Authority 

Paper and Pulp 
Source: National Recovery Administration, Division of Research and 
Planning, Preliminary Study of the Ability of Industries to 
9862 Reduce Hours by G.B.Galloway, April 17, 1934. 


These replies were not particularly suggestive as to a prober 
course of action for the shorter week program. On the heel of these 
re-olies came the report of the Durable Goods Industries Committee. (*) 
It' commented on each of the 12 suggestions made by the Administrator. 
With respect to hours they recommended that "no attempt should be msde 
to oiTcct blanket, increases in wages or reduction in code hours by 
Ex<=>nn>.j v-c order." As a unit they believed that "farther increases in 
costs and resultant increased selling pr'.ces would tend to reduce the 
volume of sales and employment", inasmuch as the financial conditions 
of the firms would not permit absorption of any additional costs but 
would necessitate passing them on to the buyer. They claimed that there 
was a riuHded shortage of skilled labor. They stated further that the 
number of employees added and wage increases had substantially exceeded 
sales trends. (**) 

Within the Administration definite programs were being considered 
in the event action was determined uocn. One proposal contained the 
following suggestions: 

"I. Cut hours of industries showing marked increases 
in profits or reduced losses or net income plus 
depreciation and interest. 

II. Eliminate or reduce exemptions and exceptions to 
maximum hours provisions in codes. 

III. Cut hours in adolescent industries and those in their 

IV. Cut hours in return for other reasonable concessions 
sought by industry. 

V. Cut hours of those industries whose actual reemploy- 
ment under their codes has fallen short of the reemploy- 
ment they estimated at the time of code approval or 
lagged behind output. 

VI. Cut hours of those industries whose reemployment 
record since 1929 has fallen short of the average 
reemployment performance of their group. 

VII. Adopt measures to stimulate the capital goods industries 
which account for the bulk of current unemployment. 

(*"> Consisting of Messrs. C-.K. Houston, J. 7. Hook, L.K. Brown, F.H. 

Hoadley, C.R. Hook, R.W. Irwin, H.S. Kimball, '«'. J.Kohler, F.A. 
Lorenz, C.R. Messinger, C.C. Sheppard, H.G.Smith, G.P. Torrence, 
J.S. Tuttle, S.T. Voorhees. 

(**) Letter of the Durable Goods Industries Committee of April 26, 
1934 to General H.S. Johnson, Administrator, (Appendix-l") . 
In 1TRA Studies Special Exhibits - Work Material IJO; 45-3 


-177- "' 

VIII* Cut hours of those industries whose payrolls have not 
increased in proportion to production. 

IX. Cut hours and raise wages in industries whose rate 
of return on net worth exceeded 6 per cent in 1933. 

X. Cut hours of industries in the light of inter-indus try- 
competition so as to preserve or readjust pre-existing 
competitive relationships. 

XI. Eliminate averaging-of-hours feature in codes for con- 
sumer goods industries. 

XII. Eliminate weekly limit on maximum hours and provide a 
penalty rate for overtime above normal weekly hours. 

XIII. Ask each consumer goods industry to submit data essen- 
tial to form a basis for an intelligent judgment in the 
matter." (*) 

Another recommendation was to list the industries believed cap- 
able of reducing hours. (**) 

(*) Galloway Report op. cit. 

(**) The industries suggested by Unit Chiefs of the Division of Re- 
search and Planning as able to reduce their hours are as follows: 

Food : 

Beet Sugar 

Southern Rice Milling 





Distilled Spirits 



Alcoholic Beverage - Importing and Wholesale 

Textiles and Their Products : 




Most of Minor Textiles 

Textile Dyeing and Finishing (3 Codes^ 

Surgical Dressings 

Apparel Industries (Except Cotton Garments') 

Knit Goods - Hosiery 


Footnote Continued Next r?age (**^ 


Footnote (**^ cont'd. 

Building Materials : 

Lumber and Timber Products 

Glass - Flat 

Asphalt Shingle and Roofing 

Paper and Allied Products : 

Paper and Pulp 

Folding Paper Boxes 

Paper Bags 

Sanitary Napkins and Cleansing Tissue 


Shipping Containers, Corrugated end. Solid 


Chemicals and Allied Product s : 

Chemical Manufacturing 


Furniture, and Flcor Wax and Folish 

Paint, Varnish, and Lacquer Manufacturing 

Printing Ink Manufacturing 

Soap and Glycerine 

Minerals : 

Iron and Steel 

Leather and Its Manufactures: 


Boots and Shoes 

Luggage and Fancy Leather Goods 

Saddlery Manufacturing 

Electrical Manufacturing: 

Master Code 
Supplemental Codes 

Transportation Equipment : 

Automobile Parts - Master Code 

Supplemental Codes 

Amusements : 


Fairs and Ex-positions 
Legitimate Theatre 
Footnote Continued Next page 



However, no action was taken. The movement began as a determin- 
ed effort at the general reduction of hours to thirty-two was side- 
tracked. The public meetings had been centered about the "10-10 11 plan. 
Industry's resistance had been stiff. But a few individual indus- 
tries had responded to the program suggested. (*"* The Administration 
had been led to accept the principle of a "self- imposed" reduction 
by all industries. When this had failed, it had turned to the principle 
of individual industry handling. This plan had brought no greater 
results. Industries had refused to act individually. One industry 
could not be disassociated from all others. Stunned by this resistance, 
impeded by the belief th-\t action must be voluntary, and recognizing 
that legal instrumentalities were inadequate, the agents of the NRA 
allowed the entire project to rest without action. 


The Labor Advisory Board carried on the effort to reduce hours. 
While there was still hope for administrative action, the Board re- 
quested the Administrator to take steps to secure further reduction of 
hours on the contemplated "lO-l'l" basis. (**) Since no action had been 
taken nor reply received, the Board, two weeks after its first move, 
urged the Administrator to issue an order reducing hours in all indus- 
tries simultaneously and decided to make a public issue of the matter. 
(***.; To this end a brief wps drawn uo and submitted by the Board to 
the Administrator on May 17,1934. It strongly urged immediate 10^ 
reduction in hours and I0<f increase in wage rates, accompanying its 
statement with an analysis of profits to show the industry's ability to 

Footnote cont'd (** N 

Motion Picture 

Motion Picture Laboratory 

Kon- Theatrical Film 

Outdoor Amusement Parks, Pools, and Beaches 

Radio Broadcasting 

Miscellaneous ; 

Oil Burners 

G-lass Containers 


Toys and Playthings 

Scientific Apparatus 

Source: Ibid 

(*) Refractories, pasted shoe stock, wholesale confectioners, and 

(*<0 Minutes of the Labor Advisory Board Meeting, April 12, 1934. 

(***) Ibid, April 26, 1934. 



adjust to the program. It stated: 

"The reduction in hours will have the following results: 
first, in anticipation of increasing labor costs, pi ices 
will tend to rise, thus stimulating spending, as pn. /ed 
in the first experiment; secon ly, we estimate that it 
will reabsorb about a million and a half workers on the 
same level of production; thirl, the absorption of these 
workers should still further stimulate demand, production 
and employment." 

It pointed out further that the original hours' provisions in 
codes were experimental and moderate; that it was time to take the 
second step; that during the first NBA period due to the national Rec- 
overy Administration, production had increased slightly while employ- 
ment and payrolls had increased considerably more, reversing the ex- 
perience, of former recovering periods; and thrt with all manufactur- 
ing industries working an average of only 34.1 hours, a 36-hour week 
would not be difficult to initiate, in view od rapidly increasing 

In conclusion, the brief stated: 

"When the President called the meeting of the Code Author- 
ities, he expressed his intention of proceeding further 
along this line . . .As these meetings proceeded, elements not 
•favorable to the program became more articulate and raised 

the traditional objection of not being able to do it 

We believe that the Administration made a serious mistake 
in failing to pursue its intended course. Weeks have 
passed and the psychological moment may well have been 
missed. We feel it necessary to say thrt the failure to 
proceed has not been due to the unearthing of any new 
facts, but rather to the ability of unsympathetic interests 
to capture the play and to weaken the purpose of the Admin- 
istration. .. .We urge the immediate pursuit of the "10-10" 
program". (*) 

No response was obtained to this appeal for action. One last 
effort was made to secure action by presenting the matter to the Labor 
Policy Board. Here again, however, discussion of the issue aroused 
no response on the part of the Administrator and his immediate subor- 
dinates. The first real effort at the wholesale reduction of hours 
died aborning. 


A less promising move was again made in January, 1935 when the 

(*) Petition and Brief of Labor Advisory Board for Reduction in 
Hours without decrease in Earnings on the »lO_inn principle. 
(6318) p. 6 (Apoendix-j) In FRA Studies Special Exhibits - 
Work Material No. 45-B 



National Industrial Recovery Board called a series of open policy hear- 
ings to collect evidence "on the operation of major code provisions and 
the advisability of amendment or continuation". The subject of the 
first hearing was price control and price fixing, announced December 
17, 1934, and called for January 9, 1935. (*) On January 17, 1935, 
a second policy hearing was announced, on the subject of "employment 
provisions in codes". Fourth on the list of major problems suggested 
in the announcement for discussion at the conference was: 

"That the maximum hours provisions of the codes have 
made a definite contribution to reemployment and that 
the principle of limitation of hours should be upheld. 
The maximum hours limits actually set in the various 
codes may or may not be the test or optimum limits. 
However, any suggestion for change either in the direc- 
tion of shortening or of lengthening the work week should 
be supcorted by evidence." (**} 

The Labor Advisory Board had hoped that this hearing would lead 
to action; but as the conference went on it became evident that the 
hearings were purely fact-finding and that further reduction in hours 
was not imminent. The sole labor member of the National Industrial 
Recovery Board (***) at that time bore down day after day upon this 
aspect of policy; but his efforts in that body were practically single- 
handed. Other members of the Labor Advisory Board sooke to the same 
purpose. The President of the United Mine YiTorkers, made a moving appeal 
for swift, effective action by the National Recovery Administration to 
open work to these and the other unemployed millions. He said in part: 

"Code maximum hours on the whole merely confirmed 
the normal working week in manufacturing industry. 
They placed no pressure upon employers to increase 
employment when production increased to normal. 
They exerted an effect only when production increased 
to capacity or to seasonal peaks. Maximum hours must 
be put into the codes providing for emergency needs, 
not the normal work week, in which 1929 production 
can be maintained in the 1934 work week. 

Second, shortening hours of work per week in order 
to put people back to work is the method contemplated 
by Congress and supported by the President in his 
speech to the Code Authorities last March. The advantage 
of the codes over legislation is that attention may be 
given to the requirements of individual industries. But 
instead of cooperating, almost to a man, industry is 

(*") NRA Release, December 17, 1934. No. 9292. 

(**) Notice of Public Hearing on Policy of the National Industrial 
Recovery Board Relating to Employment Provisions. (January 
17, 1935.) 

( + **:>• Mr _ Sidney Hillman. 



resisting any attempt to croen up the codes to consider 
the basic hours provisions. This can only mean that the 
National Recovery Admmi Titration will no longer be a 
factor in the Recovery Program's further attempts at 

Emergency situations call for emergency action. The 
average hours per week in all manufacturing industries 
in October, 1934, stood at 34.5. Emergency action- 
means something like reducing maximum weekly hours in 
the codes to those average weekly hours... I speak, 
Mr. Chairman, with heat on this subject; .... I must 
ask you this direct question; how much longer are 
you going to continue with this do-nothing policy 
on this question, of providing employment for every 
American who wants to work? 

...Has any manager or leader of industry arisen 
in this country and advanced any suostitute for 
the formula of organized labor, which clIIs for 
a shortening of hours? 

If there are forty or forty-five million individuals 
gainfully employed "in the United States, if there 
are only about eight or nine billion working days 
throughout the year available for distribution to 
these forty-five million people, then obviously 
from every human and economic standpoint there is ■ 
only one answer in order to orocide them with emalov- 
ment, and that is to permit them to share such 
employment ■ s may exist." (*"> 

Despite the argument and discussion, no substantial results fol 
lowed the -oublic hearings. No new formulation of labor oolicy was 
issued. No general reduction of hours in industry was undertaken. 


A. Bituminous Coal Industry. 

Action taken to reduce hours resulted from the efforts of organ- 
ized labor in individual industries. In the discussion of the bitu- 
minous coal negotiations the compromise had provided for a re-view od 
the hours provisions of the codes beginning with January 5, 1£34. The 
forthcoming NRA reoort on the practicability and cost of a shorter work 
day and week w; s not ready on December 31, 1933, and the conferences 
were consequently postponed. When finally published, that report proved 
to be merely an arithmetical computation based on the theory that a lSg 

(*") Statement of John L. Lewis, at the Hearings on Employment 
Provisions of Codus, NRA (January 30, 1935). 1672, pp. 1-5. 


- 183 - 

for cert reduction in hours would cause a 12| per cent reduction in 
total coal tonnage. Conferences "between operators and miners began 
about Karen 1, 1934. About 75 per cent of the total tonnage of the 
United States was represented. While these conferences were under way, 
the Presidential appeal for s reduction in hours was made. As a result 
an agreement was reached by the mine workers and operators to revise 
the bituminous coal code, putting into effect a 7 hour day and 35 hour 
week, with an increase in wage rates proportional to the reduction 
in hours. (*) The revised Appalachian Agreement Agreement was signed 
on March 20, 1934. 

The conference between representatives of employers and employees 
and ilHA. originally scheduled for January 5th was held on March 26th. 
After a four day session, it was decided to hold a public hearing on 
the proposed amendment to the code as contained in the Appalachian 
Agreement. 'The amendment was approved on March 31, 1934 subject to 
modification. (**) At the public hearing the proposed reduction in 
hours was generally approved but there was considerable dissatisfaction 
with the wage provisions for the southern districts. A subsequent 
modification of the amendment brought about an adjustment of these 
rates. (***) The most significant reduction in hours effected under 
the ERA was achieved through the process of collective bargaining and 
had the approval of all elements in the industry. 

3. Cotton Garment Industry. 

The second outstanding example is that of the cotton garment in- 
dustry. Tne code, as originally approved, called for an investigation 
into the effects on employment of the 40-hour provision,, "so that 
the Administrator may determine whether or not the provisions of this 
article shall be ohanged" . (****) A hearing was held on June 18, 1934, 
to consider this report and amendments to the Dress, Men's Clothing, 
and Cotton Garment Industries Codes. The Administrator announced that 
the above hearings showed that "no material reemployment" had taken 
place in this industry subsequent to the effective date of the code. 
"The forty-hour work week of the Cotton Garment Industry Code has re- 
sulted in unfair competition between members of the apparel industry 
under it and members under other apparel codes which have provisions 
for thirty-five and thirty-six hour work weeks." In order to effectu- 
ate the purposes of the Act, "to bring about more reemployment and 
correct the unfair competition existing because of the forty-hour work 
week of the Cotton Garment Code", the Administrator recommended 
"a reduction to thirty— six hours, and at the same time a 

(*) Transcript of Public Hearings of April 9, 1934, p. 82 

(**) National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition, 

Vol. IX, p. 665.. 
(***) Ibid, Vol. X, p. 431 

(****) National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition, 
Vol. Ill, p. 92. 



proportionate increase in the pay of employees so as to maintain the 
same weekly wage rates as is provided in the code as approved on Nov- 
ember 17, 1933". (*). The amendments resulted largely from the activ- 
ities of the labor organizations and the interested .code authorities 
of industries overlapping the cotton garment industry. The industry, 
at first reluctant, finally accepted the terms of the amendment after 
court proceedings by a minoritjr group had failed and an investigation 
by an NBA Board had. reaffirmed the original Administrative findings. 
The amendment went into effect on December 1, 1934. 

C. Millinery Industry. 

The third industry in which changes in basic hours were made was 
the millinery industry. The original code had provided that "the pro- 
visions of this code shall be in force and effect only until May 15, 
1954. Prior to that date-, the code authority shall make recommenda- 
tions to the Administrator in regard to the "continuance or amendment 
of any or all provisions of this code". As already indicated, the 
thirty-seven and one-half hours per week was adopted because of the 
feeling that it was "better to all (such a work week) at the present 
time and in the future to reduce the hours still further should con- 
ditions so reouire and so permit". (**^ 

While the code authority was formulating its amendment, organ- 
ized labor threatened to strike for a 35-hour week. In New York City, 
they actually were on strike for a day. X Pi the final amendment 
drafted by the code authority, a 35-hour week was proposed. 

At the public hearing held to consider this proposed amendment on 
June 4 and 5, serious objections were "raised a.s to the proposed labor 
provisions", particularly, the wage, but also the hours provisions, by 
some of the important markets and areas. At the request of the in- 
terested parties, including l^bor, the special Millinery Board, created 
by an Executive Order of December 15, 1953, was charges "with the 
duty and responsibility of making recommendations as to the labor pro- 
visions to be included in the proposed code. All interested parties 
agreed unaniraously to abide by the recomnendations of the Board". (***) 
The Board conducted a public hearing and special incuiries. On July 
6, 1934, it reported to the Administrator the recommendations: That 
the 35-hour week should become a part of this code. The facts at hand 

(**> Amendment 7, National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair 
Competition, Vol. XV, p. 387. 

(**N National Recovery Administration Codes of Fair Competition, 
Vol. IV, p. 4. 

(***) Report to the president on Amend^nt No. 2, National 

Recovery Administration Codt;s of Fair Competition', Vol. 
XIX, p. 113. 



showed that inadequate sud spotty reemployment, in genoral smaller 
than anticipated. This -as because ."we have taken into considera- 
tion the fear of employers in markets away from, metropolitan areas 
that they will not be able to help at the height of the 
season". lut the Board had no misgivings on that score and stated; 
"we are satisfied that the "provisions which we recommend in the code 
for an apprentice system, for overtime and other provisions will 
build vn adequate, skilled working forces and that the introduction 
will cause no hardship to the industry 1 ! • (*) These findin.s were upheld 
^ay the Board after various objections from the industiT' and. labor groups 
had been -resented. The recommendations were finally incorporated in 
Amendment ITo. ,"': to the Milliner;/ Code. 

Other efforts were made to hours, principally in the textile 
and apparel i:idus tries; but noiie yore effected before the invalidation 
of 1THA. In each case, it vas organized labor, the labor Advisory 'Joard 
and code a-o.tkorities of industries which experienced overlapping with 
less favorable labor provisions vhich were active ir the effort to re- 
duce wbrki:i_ hours. The movement came nearest to successful conclusion 
where labor was strongly or significantly organised. 

(*) Ibid, p. li: 



NHA recognized that the hours provisions in the codes -w^re 
hastily furmulated. Wholesale revision was contemplated at various 
times. It was expected that the codes would be rewritten to make their 
meaning more specific and exact and to improve their enforcement and 
effectiveness in promoting reemployment. The original codes were 
developed under pressure of the desire for rapid codification. Industry 
was at the time financially exhausted and, in many instances, unable 
to meet actual or feared increases in costs. The Administration 
yielded quickly to the industry's demands. The first standards were 
given up. The forty, hour week became the prevailing norm for basic 

The Administration and organized labor approved of the extensive 
code coverage and the application of limitations on working hours. 
Both, however, felt that as soon as recovery was discernible, further 
steps must be taken to assure reemployment of a. greater number of 
persons. Action was conceived largely in terms of reduction in the 
basic hours of employment, following organized labor's attempt to 
secure a uniform thirty hour week by legislation with provision for 
exemptions in necessary cases. The Administrator disapproved of the 
six hour day and recommended instead an eight hour day. The thirty-two 
hour week therefore became the goal. Voluntary action by industry was 

Conferences were called in February and March 1934. At these, 
the President appealed for a reduction of hours. Evidence was amassed 
in favor of such action. Industry, supported by the position of the 
NHA Industrial Advisory Board, resisted this move. Committees of 
consumer end durable goods industries were appointed to obtain indus- 
trial cooperation, but they became the means of stiffening resistance 
in hours. The consumer industries' group suggested individual industry 
action instead of wholesale reduction. The Administration tried to 
follow this course and prepared elaborate studies for applying formulae 
to test the propriety of reducing hours in individual industries. Here 
again reductions had to be wholesale rather than by codes since indus- 
tries were overlapping and intercompetitive and since consequently 
unfair relationships would result from different patterns, adopted for 
closely interrelated industries. Many of the problems in the apparel 
industries arose from these conflicts. Greater pressure for uniformity 
of hours existed than was previously suspected. Though large differ- 
ences were written into the seasonal and peak period tolerances, the 
basic hours were uniform. 

As the difficluties of reducing hours grew, enthusiasm for the 
"10-10" plan (ten percent reduction in hours and ten percent increase 
in hourly rates) declined. By the end of June 1934, the entire move was 
relegated to the background. The Labor Advisory Board tried to revive 
interest in the program of shorter hours, but could not capture the 
attention of the Administration. By this time, a Board had replaced 
the single Administrator. The January 1935 public hearings proved to be 
only a sounding board for the demand for snorter hours. Industry was 



strongly adverse to the move. 

The result of this growing coolness to the entire plan to reduce 
hours was that further reduction was restricted to industries in 
which organized labor was strong. Such was true in the "bituminous 
coal, cotton garment and millinery industries. A concerted drive 
for reduction was made in a number of apparel industries which 
overlapped with the three basic codes but the reductions were not 
consumated. Conflict of provisions in overlapping codes provided 
opportunity for reopening codes to consider reduction in hours. 
However, the individual industry method encountered difficulties 
irrespective of the merits of the case, i-tost codes overlapped 
with directly contiguous and more remote industrial groups. Action 
on a single industry was complicated. 

The results were reflected in the employment figures. Factory 
employment in 1934 and the first four months of 1935 varied only 
slightly. While the employment index considering the average 1923- 
1935 as 100, was 58.8 in March 1935, the employment index rose to 
66.9 in June, and 80.0 in September 1933; the average for the last 
five months in 1933 was 77.3. Daring the year 1934 the range of 
employment index numbers was between 73.3 to 82.5, with an average 
of 78.8; while during the first five montns of 1935, the range of 
employment index numbers was 78.8 to 82.6 and the average was 81.3. 
Employment did not increase proportionally with the volume of ?r junc- 
tion. The initial momentum to reemployment was spent in liberal tol- 
erances for seasonal and peak periods which frequently nullified the 
basic hour regulations. 

The KRA showed possibilities of uniform reduction of basic 
hours. It illustrated the dangers to an accepted standard of too 
liberal tolerances and exemptions. It showed industrial resiliency 
and resourcefulness to meet problems presented by the reduction of 





Executive Order No. 7075, dated June 15, 1935, established the Division of Review of the 
National Recovery Administration. The pertinent part of the Executive Order reads thus: 

The Division of Review shall assemble, analyze, and report upon the statistical 
information and records of experience of the operations of the various trades and 
industries heretofore subject to codes of fair competition, shall study the ef- 
fects of such codes upon trade, industrial and labor conditions in general, and 
other related matters, shall make av ailable for the protection and promotion of 
the public interest an adequate review of the effects of the Administration of 
Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the principles and policies 
put into effect thereunder, and shall otherwise aid the President in carrying out 
his functions under the said Title. I hereby appoint Leon C. Marshall, Director of 
the Division of Revie w. 

The study sections set up in t he Division of Review covered these areas: industry 
studies, foreign trade studies, labor studies, trade practice studies, statistical studies, 
legal studies, administration studies, m isce llaneous studies, and the writing of code his- 
tories. The materials which were produc ed by these sections are indicated below. 

Except for the Code Histories, all items mentioned below are scheduled to be in mimeo- 
graphed form by April 1, 1936 . 


The Code Histories are documented accounts of the formation and administration of the 
codes. They contain the definition of the industry and the principal products thereof; the 
classes of members in the industry; the history of code formation including an account of the 
sponsoring organizations, the conferences, negotiations and hearings which were held, and 
the activities in connection with obtaining approval of the code; the history of the ad- 
ministration of the code, covering the organization and operation of the code authority, 
the difficulties encountered in administration, the extent of compliance or non-compliance, 
and the general success or lack of success of the code; and an analysis of the operation of 
code provisions dealing with wages, hours, trade practices, and other provisions. These 
and other matters are canvassed not only in terms of the materials to be found in the files, 
but also in terms of the experiences of the deputies and others concerned with code formation 
and administration. 

The Code Histories, (including histories of certain NRA units or agencies) are not 
mimeographed. They are to be turned over to the Department of Commerce in typewritten form. 
All told, approximately eight hundred and fifty (850) histories will be completed. This 
number includes all of the approved codes and some of the unapproved codes. (In Work M ate - 
Iial§ No^. 1§, Contents of Code His to ries . will be found the outline which governed the 
preparation of Code Histories.) 

(In the case of all approved codes and also in the case of some codes not carried to 

final approval, there are in NRA files further materials on industries. Particularly worthy 

of mention are the Volumes I, II and III which constitute the material officially submitted 

to the President in support of the recommendation for approval of each code. These volumes 

9768— 1. 

-ii - 

set forth the origination of the codes, the sponsoring group, the evidence advanced to sup- 
port the proposal, the report of the Division of Research and Planning on the industry, the 
recommendations of the various Advisory Boards, certain types of official correspondonce , 
. the transcript of the formal hearing, and other pertinent matter. There is also much offi- 
cial information relating to amendments, interpretations, exemptions, and other rulings. The 
materials mentioned in this paragraph were of course not a part of the work of the Division 
of Review, ) 


In the work of the Division of Review a considerable number of studies and compilations 
of uata (other than those noted below in the Evidence Studies Series and the Statistical 
Material Series) have been made. These are listed below, grouped according to the char- 
acter of the material. (In Work Materials No. 17, Tentative O utlines and Sum maries of 
Studies in Process , the materials are fully described) . 

I ndustry Studies 

Automobile Industry, An Economic Survey of 

Eituminous Coal Industry under Free Competition and Code Regulation, Ecnomic Survey of 

Electrical Manufacturing Industry, The 

Fertilizer Industry, The 

Fishery Industry and the Fishery Codes 

Fishermen and Fishing Craft, Earnings of 

Foreign Trade under the National Industrial Recovery Act 

Part A - Competitive Position of the United States in International Trade 1927-29 through 

Part B - Section 3 (e) of NIRA and its administration. 
Part C - Imports and Importing under NRA Codes. 
Part D - Exports and Exporting under NRA Codes. 
Forest Products Industries, Foreign Trade Study of the 
Iron and Steel Industry, The 
Knitting Industries, The 
Leather and Shoe Industries, The 

Lumber and Timber Products Industry, Economic Problems of the 
Men's Clothing Industry, The 
Millinery Industry, The 
Motion Picture Industry, The 
Migration of Industry, The: The Shift of Twenty-Five Needle Trades From New York State, 

1926 to 1934 
National Labor Income by Months, 1929-35 
Paper Industry, The 

Production, Prices, Employment and Payrolls in Industry, Agriculture and Railway Trans- 
portation, January 1923, to date 
Retail Trades Study, The 
Rubber Industry Study, The 

Textile Industry in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan 
Textile Yarns and Fabrics 
Tobacco Industry, The 
Wholesale Trades Study, The 

Women's Neckwear and Scarf Industry, Financial and Labor Data on 

Women's Apparel Industry, Some Aspects of the 

T rade P ractic e Studies 

Commodities, Information Concerning: A Study of NRA and Related Experiences in Control 

Distribution, Manufacturers' Control of: Trade Practice Provisions in Selected NRA Codes 

Distributive Relations in the Asbestos Industry 

Design Piracy: The Problem and Its Treatment Under NRA Codes 

Electrical Mfg. Industry: Price Filing Study 

Fertilizer Industry: Price Filing Study 

Geographical Price Relations Under Codes of Fair Competition, Control of 

Minimum Price Regulation Under Codes of Fair Competition 

Multiple Basing Point System in the Lime Industry: Operation of the 

Price Control in the Coffee Industry 

Price Filing Under NRA Codes 

Production Control in the Ice Industry 

Production Control, Case Studies in 

Resale Price Maintenance Legislation in the United States 

Retail Price Cutting, Restriction of, with special Emphasis on The Drug Industry. 

Trade Practice Rules of The Federal Trade Commission (1914-1936): A classification for 

comparision with Trade Practice Provisions of NRA Codes. 

Labo r Studies 

Cap and Cloth Hat Industry, Commission Report on Wage Differentials in 

Earnings in Selected Manufacturing Industries, by States, 1933-35 

Employment, Payrolls, Hours, and Wages in 115 Selected Code Industries 1933-35 

Fur Manufacturing, Commission Report on Wages and Hours in 

Hours a nd Wages in American Industry 

Labor Program Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, The 

Part A. Introduction 

Part B. Control of Hours and Reemployment 

Part C . Control of Wages 

Part D. Control of Other Conditions of Employment 

Part E. Section 7(a) of the Recovery Act 
Materials in the Field of Industrial Relations 
PRA Census of Employment, June, October, 1933 
Puerto Rico Needlework, Homeworkers Survey 

Administrative S tudie s 

Administrative and Legal Aspects of Stays, Exemptions and Exceptions, Code Amendments, Con- 
ditional Orders of Approval 

Administrative Interpretations of NRA Codes 

Administrative Law and Procedure under the NIRA 

Agreements Under Sections 4(a) and 7(b) of the NIRA 

Approved Codes in Industry Groups, Classification of 

Basic Code, the — (Administrative Order X-61) 

Code Authorities and Their part in the Administration of the NIRA 
Part A. Introduction 
Part B. Nature, Composition and Organization of Code Authorities 


- iv - 

Part C. Activities of the Code Authorities 

Part D. Code Authority Finances 

Part E. Summary and Evaluation 
Code Compliance Activities of the NRA 
Code Making Program of the NRA in the Territories, The 
Code Provisions and Related Subjects, Policy Statements Concerning 
Content of NIRA Administrative Legislation 

Part A. Executive and Administrative Orders 

Part B. Labor Provisions in the Codes 

Part C. Trade Practice Provisions in the Codes 

Part D. Administrative Provisions in the Codes 

Part E. Agreements under Sections 4(a) and 7(b) 

Part F. A Type Case: The Cotton Textile Code 
Labels Under NRA, A Study of 

Model Code and Model Provisions for Codes, Development of 

National Recovery Administration, The: A Review of its Organization and Activities 
NRA Insignia 

President's Reemployment Agreement, The 

President's Reemployment Agreement, Substitutions in Connection with the 
Prison Labor Problem under NRA and the Prison Compact, The 
Problems of Administration in the Overlapping of Code Definitions of Industries and Trades. 

Multiple Code Coverage, Classifying Individual Members of Industries and Trades 
Relationship of NRA to Government Contracts and Contracts Involving the Use of Government 

Relationship of NRA with States and Municipalities 
Sheltsred Workshops Under NRA 
Uncodified Industries: A Study of Factors Limiting the Code Making Program 

Legal Studies 

Anti-Trust Laws and Unfair Competition 

Collective Bargaining Agreements, the Right of Individual Employees to Enforce 

Commerce Clause, Federal Regulation of the Employer-Employee Relationship Under the 

Delegation of Power, Certain Phases of the Principle of, with Reference to Federal Industrial 
Regulatory Legislation 

Enforcement, Extra-Judicial Methods of 

Federal Regulation through the Joint Employment of the Power of Taxation and the Spending 
Powe r 

Government Contract Provisions as a Means of Establishing Proper Economic Standards, Legal 
Memorandum on Possibility of 

Industrial Relations in Australia, Regulation of 

Intrastate Activities Which so Affect Interstate Commerce as to Bring them Under the Com- 
merce Clause, Cases on 

Legislative Possibilities of the State Constitutions 

Post Office and Post Road Power — Can it be Used as a Means of Federal Industrial Regula- 

State Recovery Legislation in Aid of Federal Recovery Legislation History and Analysis 

Tariff Rates to Secure Proper Standards of Wages and Hours, the Possibility of Variation in 

Trade Practices and the Anti-Trust Laws 

Treaty Making Power of the United States 

War Power, Can it be Used as a Means of Federal Regulation of Child Labor? 



The Evidence Studies were originally undertaken to gather material for pending court 
cases. After the Schechter decision the project was continued in order to assemble data for 
use in connection with the studies of the Division of Review. The data are particularly 
concerned with the nature, size and operations of the industry; and with the relation of the 
industry to interstate commerce. The industries covered by the Evidence Studies account for 
more than one-half of the total number of workers under codes. The list of those studies 

Automobile Manufacturing Industry 
Automotive Parts and Equipment Industry 
Baking Industry 

Boot and Shoe Manufacturing Industry 
Bottled Soft Drink Industry 
Builders' Supplies Industry 
Canning Industry 
Chemical Manufacturing Industry 
Cigar Manufacturing Industry 
Coat and Suit Industry 
Construction Industry 
Cotton Garment Industry 
Dress Manufacturing Industry 
Electrical Contracting Industry 
Electrical Manufacturing Industry 
Fabricated Metal Products Mfg. and Metal Fin- 
ishing and Metal Coating Industry 
Fishery Industry 
Furniture Manufacturing Industry 
General Contractors Industry 
Graphic Arts Industry 
Gray Iron Foundry Industry 
Hosiery Industry 

Infant's and Children's Wear Industry 
Iron and Steel Industry 

Leather Industry 

Lumber and Timber Products Industry 
Mason Contractors Industry 
Men's Clothing Industry 
Motion Picture Industry 
Motor Vehicle Retailing Trade 
Needlework Industry of Puerto Rico 
Painting and Paperhanging Industry 
Photo Engraving Industry 
Plumbing Contracting Industry 
Retail Lumber Industry . 
Retail Trade Industry 
Retail Tire and Battery Trade Industry 
Rubber Manufacturing Industry 
Rubber Tire Manufacturing Industry 
Shipbuilding Industry 
Silk Textile Industry 
Structural Clay Products Industry 
Throwing Industry 
Trucking Industry 
Waste Materials Industry 
Wholesale and Retail Food Industry 
Wholesale Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Indus- 
Wool Textile Industry 


This series is supplementary to the Evidence Studies Series. The reports include data 
on establishments, firms, employment, payrolls, wages, hours, production capacities, ship- 
ments, sales, consumption, stocks, prices, material costs, failures, exports and imports. 
They also include notes on the principal qualifications that should be observed in using the 
data, the technical methods employed, and the applicability of the material to the study of 
the industries concerned. The following numbers appear in the series: 

— VI - 

Asphalt Shingle and Roofing Industry Fertilizer Industry 

Business Furniture Funeral Supply Industry 

Candy Manufacturing Industry Glass Container Industry 

Carpet and Rug Industry Ice Manufacturing Industry 

Cement Industry Knitted Outerwear Industry 

Cleaning and Dyeing Trade Paint, Varnish, ana Lacquer, Mfg. Industry 

Coffee Industry Plumbing Fixtures Industry 

Copper and Brass Mill Products Industry Rayon and Synthetic Yarn Producing Industry 

Cotton Textile Industry Salt Producing Industry 

Electrical Manufacturing Industry 


The original, and approved, plan of the Division of Review contemplated resources suf- 
ficient (a) to prepare some 1200 histories of codes and NRA units or agencies, (b) to con- 
solidate and index the NRA files containing some 40,000,000 pieces, (c) to engage in ex- 
tensive field work, (d) to secure much aid from established statistical agencies of govern- 
ment, (e) to assemble a considerable number of experts in various fields, (f) to conduct 
approximately 25% more studies than are listed above, and (g) to prepare a comprehensive 
summary report. 

Because of reductions made in personnel and in use of outside experts, limitation of 
access to field work and research agencies, and lack of jurisdiction over files, the pro- 
jected plan was necessarily curtailed. The most serious curtailments were the omission of 
the comprehensive summary report; the dropping of certain studies and the reduction in the 
coverage of other studies; and the abandonment of the consolidation and indexing of the 
files. Fortunately, there is reason to hope that the files may yet be carec" for under other 

Notwithstanding these limitations, if the files are ultimately consolidated and in- 
dexed the exploration of the NRA materials will have been sufficient to make them accessible 
and highly useful. They constitute the largest and richest single body of information 
concerning the problems and operations of industry ever assembled in any nation. 

L. C. Marshall, 
Director, Division of Review.