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BOSTON  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 


3  9999  06317  501  0 


A  ^3 


OFFICE  OF  NATIONAL  RECOVERY  ADMINISTRATION         i-''\ 
DIVISION  OF  REVIEW 


ECONOMIC  SURVEY  OF  THE  BITUMINOUS  COAL  INDUSTRY 
UNDER  FREE  COMPETITION  AND  CODE  REGULATION 


By 

F.  E.  Berquist 

and 

Associates 


WORK  MATERIALS  NO.  69 
VOLUME  I 


INDUSTRY  STUDIES  SECTION 
March,  1936 


OFFICE  OF  NATIONAL  RECOVERY  ADMINISTRATION 
DIVISION  OF  REVIEW 


ECONOMIC  SURVEY  OF  TIIE  BITUlvilNOUS  COAL  INDUSTRY 
UNDER  FREE  COMPETITION  AND  CODE  REGULATION 


By 
F.  E.  Berquist 
and 
Associates 


INDUSTRY  STUDIES  SECTION 
March,  1936 


9837 


U.S.    /Oopf  .  ^  Gd-- 


5;    I  7  ^^ 


FOREWORD 

This  stud^'  of  tlie  oit-.ijainous  coal  industry  v.ts  prepared  ■under  the 
supervision  of  ilr.  7.  2,   Jerquist  of  the  Ini.ustr-  Studies  Section, 
Mr.  I!.  D.  Vincent  in  c;:r-i\';e. 

The  report  is  j.-,red  upon  materials  prepared  Lp'  the  Bituminous  Coal 

Unit  as  a  r/hole;  the  ceveral  chapters  vrere  'rritten  "o^   the  follc^ing 

authors: 

EJuir'-ry  P.  E.  3er^uist 

Chrpter  I  E.  "S.  G-ordon  £Uid  E.  E.  Berquist 

Ch.p^^tor  II  Charles  ^.  Persons 

Cj.rp/oer  III  George  .x.  Lrr.p 

Chapter  I^'  (a)  (b)    Louis  Levine 

Chrpter  IV  (c)  Charles  '2.   Persons 

Chrpter  V  E.  3.  Gordon  r,nd  Tf.  T.  Crandell 

Chrpter  VI  George  A.  La'io 

^.p;:)cndi::  II  Charlotte  3.  '.Tamer 

In  addition  to  -.cnio-'ledgraent  of  the  '7ori:  of  the  several  authors, 
special  recog-nition  is  :::,de  of  the  assistpnce  of  Virpinip.  E.  KcArdle  in 
assembling  and  chechinp  the  materials  ^vhich  enter  into  the  report. 

Because  of  circru::strnces  beyond  control  of  tlie  Coal  Unit  -  princi- 
pally curtailment  of  personnel  and  requests  for  rscist-nce  arising  in 
connection  uith  ne-,;  coal  legislation  -  the  report  as  originally  planned 
was  rarterially  nodified  ruid  reduced  in  scope.   It  covers  the  salient  as- 
pects of  the  principal  phases  of  interest  relative  to  the  operations  of 
the  industry  under  the  oode  with  four  major  exceptions:   (l)  code  author- 
ity organization  p.iiC.   ad  ^.inistr.'ition,  (2)  functioning  of  labor  boards, 
(3)  transportation,  and  (U)  co:apliance  and  enforce-^ent .   The  main  atten- 
tion has  been  given  to  Ir.bor,  costs  and  price  fi::in,;'  p.spects.   The  effort 
has  been  directed  jc/ard  eveloping  these  topics  in  such  a  'lay   as  to 
illustrate  the  proble::s  encountered  and  methods  adopted  to  solve  them, 
rather  than  to  provide  a  comprehensive  treatment  of  all  the  cases  that 


3S37 


called  for  aioiinistr-^.Vlve  or  other  action. 

The  report  cotr:  ;rortl\  the  nature  of  the  prohle  ■.  of  'biturainous  coal 
and  trepts  the  tv.'o  ::r-^or  ierAies,  st-oili'^r.tion  :  a.  coordination  of  prices 
and  of  wages.   The  e::tc:i':  to  rrhich  these  oojecti^-cs  --ere  achieved  are 
discussed  in  dete.il  in  the  body  of  the  report  r.n'.  are  oriefly  svunraarized 
in  the  Sanmary. 

Many  of  the  c\evelo;o:  lents  under  the  Code  aros_e  in  connection  --ith 
administrption  by   coJ.e  ruthorities,  in  joint  conferences  hetiTeen  reprc- 
sent-^tives  of  the  sevGral  suocivisions,  and  in  the  v/a, /e  conferences. 
"Ihile  the  results  of  t'esc  activities  ultimately  oecp:ie  a  part  of  the 
records  of  the  IL'IA,  r  /^re.:.t  deal  of  the  records  of  proceedings  ('."/hen 
formally  kept)  -■enained  in  the  possession  of  code  ruthorities  and  their 
successors.   It  did  not  prove  possible  to  conduct  tj.e  field  ;Toi'k  \7ith 
innustrj'  and  lahor  rcnresent'  tives  necessp.ry  to  develop  such  materials. 

The  report  does  not  "n^rport  to  provide  sol'-.tions  to  such  serious 
questions  arisin;  "CMc.ei'   the  Code  ps  ''aininum  price  fining  p,nd  correlation 
of  prices  and  rnye  '.iff ercntials.   Ho>7ever,  the  ;_:rterials  contained  in 
the  report  tO;';ether  "ltd  cost  and  other  dp.t.a  developed  in  connection  rith 
the  Code  should  oe  ver;-  d.elpful  in  the  future  handling  of  these  problems 
under  any  ;oro,i'raj:  of  control. 

At  the  bacl:  of  this  report  will  be  found  a  brief  statement  of  the 
studies  under trj:en  "x'   the  'revision  of  Review. 


L.  C.  Harshall, 
Director,  "Ivision  of  Review. 


March  19,  193b. 


9837 


Pap-es 
foreword 
Summary 1 

Chapter  I  -   The  3iti\  inov.E   Coal   Iniiiisti--,    Its  '.'isborical 

3ac':groiuif.  me.  problems 13 

1.  'The   Iiv';:ic;try' s  Background 

2.  Intensive   Competition 

3.  i-cc' r.ninr.tion  of  ilines 
h,  l>ael  l:co:io:.iy 

5.      Tr-nspoi't-tion,    Freif^ht   Hates   rno.  .?.evenue 

fro:i  Goal 
b,      S^les  ;  .eclization  and  Prices 
7.      The  Proolea  of   the  Bituminous   CorJ.   Industry 

Chapter  II   -   The   Code    of  I'air   Coirrpetition  under   the  ITr.tional 

Industrirl  dccovery  Act .    of  1933 .....•• 7S 

1.  The  ?or" '.Illation  of  the   Code 

a..  Various  Drafts   Suomitted 

0,  Tlie  Geographical  Division 

c.  ..d-'inistrative  provisions 

d.  '.linimura  TJages  and  Ha::i:"n:.;-";  Hours 

e.  Condition  of  Employment 

f.  price   Standards   and  Re;;7Lilations 
;V.  Trr    e  Practices 

h.      :jiscussion  in  the  Paolic  clearing 

i.      Drafts  by  K.H.A.   Officials  and  Criti- 
cisLis   by  iliners   .-^-.d  Oper-tor   Spolres- 
::en 

j.       If  forts   to    secure  Agreej'.ent    on  a 
Sing;le   Code 

]",      Successive  P.evision  ".nd  final  Accep- 
tance 

2.  .;^'.end'cnts   to   the   Code:    Their  Pui-pose   and  History 

a,      ilos.    1,    2,    and  3  -  Hour  and  '.Tace   Standards 
h.      :"o.    k  ~  Providing   for   Statistical  Bureaus 

c.  I'o.    5  -  Porhidding  Contracting  below  Code 
fiates 

d.  To.    b  -  Iievision  of  Price   Control 

e.  "do,    7  -  Providing  for  a  f.epresentrtive   of 
Organized  La,bor   on  Code  .utliorities 

f.  ;'o.    8  -  r^xt ending  'Ta'^e,   Hour  and  Price 
l.:e;ulaticn  until  June  lo,    153:> 

Chapter  III  -  production  and  Distribution 1^5 

1.  Production  and  Mining  Capacity 

2.  Prodiiction  by  Areas 

3.  Distribi-.tion   of  Bituminous   Coal 

SS37  --iii- 


Pages 
Chapter  IV  -  Labor 153 

Section  A  -  General  and  Pre-Code 

1.  Collective  3pru:pining  -  wage  negoti-'^,tions  and 
indtistrial  disputes 

2.  Conditions  of  Emoloyment 

3.  Seasonal  and  C7clical  Aspects  of  Employment 

4.  Kovements  for  Shortening  the  T.'ork  Tay  and  \/eek 

Section  B  -  "..?ge  P.p.tes  pnd  Hours:  Emnloyment  rnd  Earnings 
Under  the  Code 

1.  Labor  Costs:  fajor  Factor  in  Costs,  Srles  P.ealizrtion 
and  Value  of  Product 

2.  Pre-r.R.A.  History  of  ^'ages,  Emplo;<nnent  and  Earnings 

3.  Code  history  of  l.'ages  and  Hours 

4.  Pre-Code  and  Code  TIage  Rates 

5.  Employment  Under  the  Code 

6.  Earnings  Under  the  Code 

7.  The  T.'age  Bill  Under  the  Code 

Section  C  -  \fage  Differentials:  Their  History:  Their  Influence 
on  Prices  a-nd  '/ages 

1.  The  His-(;orica.l  Development  of  this  Problem 

2.  L'age  Differentials  at  the  Code  Hearings 

3.  \Jage   Different ia.ls  in  the  Code  as  Approved 

4.  Modification  by  iViiendments  I'os.  1,  2  and  3. 

5.  Unsettled  Controversies  over  Mege   Differentials 

Chapter  V  -  Cost  of  Production,  Selling  and  Administration  During  the 
Code  Period 417 

1.  Effect  of  IT.E.A.  Code  on  Costs 

2.  Cost  Reporting  Under  the  Code 

3.  Factors  Affecting  Production  Cost 

4.  Average  Costs,  by  r.P.A.  Code  Divisions 

5.  Average  Costs  by  r.P.A.  Code  Subdivisions 

6.  Cost  Increases  recapitulated 

Chapter  VI  -  Prices  Under  the  Code 500 

1,  Original  Code  Price  Provisions 

2,  Administra.tion  of  Prices 

3,  Factors  in  Bituminous  Coa.l  Prices 

4,  Establishment  of  Prices 

5,  The  Price  Structures 

6,  Problems  in  Price  Control 

7,  The  national  Coal  Board  of  Arbitration 

8,  Eea.lization  Under  the  Code 

9 ,  Summary 


9837 


~iv- 


Pages 
Appendices 

Appendix  I   -  Statistical  reporting  tuider  r.E.A 552 

Appendix   II    580 

Appendix   III   -   Costs,  LeE.lization  and  I'argins 584 


9837 


SUMMARY 


Employment;   The  code  sought  to  increase  emnloyment  through  limita- 
tion of  the  working  hours  of  employees,  first  to  8  and  later  to  -7,  and 
the  number  of  days  to  5,  or  a  40-hour  week  from  October,  1933  tc  March, 
1334,  and  a  35-hour  week  thereafter.   Prior  to  the  Code  in  1933,  apcrox- 
iimately  7.4  per  cent  of  the  total  employees  were  engaged  in  mines  whose 
established  working  day  was  Q  or  10  hours.   The  change  to  the  8-hour  day 
for  these  mines  would  necessarily  result  in  additional  employees  or  days 
worked  if  output  were  to  be  maintained.  The  change  from  8  hours  to  7 
hours  in  April- 1934  affected  all  mines  and  necc-ssarily  required  either 
more  men,  more  days  worked  or  both  to  maintain  production  except  insofar 
as  mechanization  or  increases  in  strip  mining  operations  (higher  cutput 
per  man  per  day),  or  improvement  in  efficiency  might  tend  tc  Tffset  the 
reduced  working  time.   According  to  the  index  of  employment  of  the  Bureau 
of  Labor  Statistics,  the  average  number  employed  in  1934  was  13.7  per  cent 
greater  than  in  1333,  while  the  average  number  of  working  days  increased 
from  167  tj  178,  an'increase  of  6.6  per  cent,  according  to  the  U.  S.  Bur- 
eau of  Mines.   Th<->  combined  increase  of  men-  employed  and  days  worked 
w:5uld  indicate  an  increase  of  21,2  -oer  cent  in  man-days  of  employment. 
How  much  of  this  increase  is  attributable  to  tne  Code  provisions  and  how 
much  to  increased  production  in  1934  or  1933  cannot  be  definitely  ascer- 
tained.  Production  was  7.7  per  cent  greater  in  1934,  and  if  the  assump- 
tion is  made  that  only  this  increase  would  have  occurred  if  1933  employ- 
ment conditions  had  prevailed,  then  the  remaining  increase  may  be  attribu- 
ted to  the  Code. 

On  the  other  hand,  output  per  man  per  day  declined  only  approxi- 
mately 8  per  cent  in  1934  as  compared  with  1933,  according  to  the  Bureau 
of  Mines,   If  the  change  reflected  in  productivity  is  correct,  then  only 
3  per  cent  of  increased  employment  may  be  attributed  to  the  Cede.   While 
the  two  statistical  indications  each  reflect  increases  in  the  volume  of 
employment  (number  of  men  employed  and  days  of  work  afforded)  due  to  the 
Code  and  independent  of  increased  production,  there  is  considerable  vari- 
ance in  the  extent  of  such  improvement.   Considering  the  nature  of  the 
statistical  bases,  it  is  the  considered  opinion  of  the  Coal  Unit  of  the 
Division  of  Review  that  the  true  increase  falls  between  the  limits  of 
8  and  13  per  c^nt,  probably  nearer  the  lower  than  th"  upt)er  limit.   Such 
employment  data  as  are  available  indicate  that  apiDroEimately  41,006  men 
were  added  to  bituminous  coal  mining  payrolls  in  1934  as  against  1933. 
The  Bureau  of  Min^^s  reported  employment  in  1933  as  418,703  and  in  1934 
as  458,011  -  an  increase  of  39,208.   It  must  be  remembered  tnat  these 
figures  are  annual'  and  therefore  include  in  1933  th-^  influence  of  the 
N.I.R.A.  and  the  Code  during  tne  latt=r  montns  of  th-:-  year.   The  Bureau 
of  Labor' Statistics  indi^x  anlied  to  thp  C'^nsus  of  Unemioloyment ,  April, 
1930,  indicate  that  employment  increased  from  310,738  in  1933  to  353,290 
in  1934  or  42,452  men.   IVhile  these  two  estimates  of  thp  number  of  men 
employed  diffpr,  the  calculated  increases  in  employment  are  not  far  apart. 
For  a  detailed  discussion  of  employment  under  the  Code,  see  Chapter  IV, 

Wages:   Wage  rates  had  fallen  progressively  after  1923  until  the 
advent  of 'the  Codp.   In  the  area  east  of  the  Mississippi  River  (repre- 
senting approximately  90  -oer  cent  of  total  production)  average  hourly 
earnings  for  all  classes  of  employees  had  fallen  from  79.5  cents  in  1924 


(last  quarter)  to  41.2  cents  in  1933  (February).   This  decline  reflects 
tu-=  downwai'd  tr^-nd  in  prices  experienced  during  this  TDeriod,  which  cur- 
tail-id  tiip  incomf^  from  coal  sales  and  hence  the  ability  to  maintain  wage 
rates.   Wage  rates  Just  prior  to  tne  Code  were  at  tue  lowest  level  since 
191'6.  ■   . 

■Tne  Code  ■orovid'-d  for  a  schedule  of  minimum  rates  of  pay  for  inside 
skilled  day  labor  and  outside  common  day  labor  (Schedule  a) .   Except  for 
a  small  portion  of  .the  industry  in  which  union  agre.^m^nts-  were  in  e.ff ect 
and  continued  under  th"  Code,  the  incrr='ases..  provided  in  this  scnedul.e 
w«re  very,  substantial.   The  following,  indicates  tne  p.^rc^nt.age.- incr.-^ase 
resulting  in  ado-ot ion  of  Schedule  "A"^.  in  October,  1933,  and  contracts 
ex=^cuted  th.^-reunder  in  ar°as  east  of  't^ie  MississipiDi .   •  ,  . 

P^r  C-nt. 
Central  P-nnsylvania 
Maryland  &  Upper  Potomac 
Western  P'=nnsylvania 
Northern  Vu'est  Virginia 
Ohio 

Soutij-'-rn  Sub  division 
No.  2  (Hign  Volatile) 
Average  above         '50,4 
Alabama    ■   .    ;      '  64.3  , 

Illinois  &  Indiana      '  No  change . -  continued  operating- 
undf^r  existing  wag^^"  contract. 

Again,  in  Anril,  1934,  hours  were  reduced  from  8 'to  7,  and  wages 
were  increased,   '..'hile  no  composite  measurement  of  tne  daily  average 
increases  effected  can  be  mad-  ,  the  following  shows  tne  .increase  in  ttie 
wage  cost  per  ton  for 'imiiortant  ar^as:    .   , 


.  Eastern  Pennsylvania 
Vifestern  Pennsylvania 
Ohio 

Northern  'West  Virginia 
Southern  No.  1 
Southern  No.  ?. 
Maryland  &  Upber  Potomac 

Tne  wag--  cost  ner  ton  for  Division  I  (exclusive  of  Southern  Sub- 
division Nc .  l)-  ./'^stern  K  ntucky  and  Michigan,  after  th'^  two  wage  in- 
creases previously  indicat'^d.  av-^raged  vil,153  per  ton  as  compared  with 
the  estimated  wage  cost  of  61.4  c -nts  in  May,  1933.  Applying  this  in- 
crease in  Wage  cost  per  ton  to  the  total  production  in  these  area5  of 
Division  I  /or  tne  coal  year  April  1,  1934  to  March  31,  1935,  which 
amounted  to' 206 ,000,000  tons,  the  ihc'reas--  in  trie  wag-=>  bill  because  of 
nours  and  wage-rate  changes  in  the  Code  amounted'  to  the  tremendous  total 
of  $111,000,000.   The  estimated  number  of  employees  in  th"  subdivisions 
embrac=>d  in  tne-  above  mentioned  area  is  airnroximately  265,000.   On  the 
basis  of  tne  calculated  gain  in  earnings  for  April,  1934  -  March,  1935 
coal  year,  the  averagt^'  increase  per  worker  for  tnat  p-^riod  was  $419, 
compar'-^d  with  wnat  the  earnings  would  nav-^  been  if  May  1935  wage  rates 
and  hours  had  continued  during  this  period.   If  the  estimated  output 
per  man  per  day  be  tak'^n  as  4.2  tons,  th^-n  on  this  basis  the  daily  wage 

0837 


Per   Ton  Wage 

.  Per  Cent 

Cost 

Incr-as- 

Increase, 

22.9 

C<-nts 

21.5 

20.0 

20.2     . 

19.9 

20.9 

22.1 

28.5 

20.3 

■'  21.5 

21.2- 

24,2 

20.0 

n 

17.8 

increaGed  $2.26  after  April,  1934  as  a^rainst  tnat  wLicr:  mignt  hav^  b'^en 

secured  by  the  May,  19o3  rat-s.   Tne  oroduccion  for  wnich  tae  foregoing 

gains  ariToly  re-nr^-s -nted  aoout  57  per  c-nt  of  tne  total  production  of  the 
industrj'  during  tne  coal  year. 

Vfnile  tnp  experienc=^  in  this  ar^a  was  probably  outstanding  in  the 
industry,  th'=  oth^r  areas  also  reflected  substantial  increases  in  tne 
returns  to  labor  under  tn^  Code. 

It  is  also  significant  to  note  that  tn^  Cod=-  structure  of  wages 
continued  beyond  May  27,  1935,  when  tne  N.  I.  R.  A.  was  d'=clared  un- 
.constitutional  by  the  Suprem-'  Court.   Altnougli  operators  and  United 
Mine  Workers  failed  to  arriv-  at  agr^em-nts  before  tn^  expiration  of 
tneir  contracts  on  March  31,  1935,  by  a  s^-ries  of  truce  agreements  tne 
wag-  schedules  -ond'-^r  tne  Code  were  continued  until  October,  wnen  a  new 
series  of  conti'acts  b-carn"  eff ^ctiv- .   Thus,  tn-  momentum  gained  under 
th°  Code  as  to  w^g^  rat-s  carri~d  tnrough  the  intervening  period  oe- 
tween  the  collaps-  of  the  K.H.  A.  -ind  the  Passage  of  the  Bituminous 
Coal  Conservat.ion  Act  of  1935  and  laid  tn'^  foundation  for  new  contracts 
at  substantially  incr-^as-d  wage  rates.   Details  of  wage  ciianges  and 
earnings  are  discussed  in  diapter  IV. 

Wage  Differentials:'  Vt'ithout  -question  the  most  difficult  problem 
met  in  the  formulation  of  tne  Coal  Cod*-  was  the  matter  of  minimum  rates 
cf  pay  to  be  prescribed.   This  revolved  not  so  much  on  the  absolute 
level  of  wages  but  rather  on  the  relative  levels  for  thi^  different  areas, 
that  is,  as  to  the  differences  in  the  minimum  rates  among  the  various 
areas.   Since  wages  constitute  fiO-65  per  c-^nt  of  costs,  the  relative 
lev>^ls  of   wages  go  to  the  very  core  of  the  question  of  survival  in  the 
various  competitive  markets.   The  problem  of  relative  levels  of  wages, 
or  differentials,  is  affected  by  and  must  take  into  account  many  ele- 
ments, most  important  of  v;nich  are: 

1.  Productivity  of  labor  (output  per  man  per  day).   This 
is  affected  by  geological  conditions,  such  as  seam 
thickness,  pitch  of  seams,  partings  in  coal,  under- 
ground water  and  drainage,  character  of  roof,  etc. 
Mecnanization  is  also  a  very  important  factor. 

2.  Quality  of  coal.   This  involves  ciiemical  analysis, 
pnysical  structure,  fusibility,  etc.,  whicn  bear 
directly  on  th;-  relativ-'  values  of  coals  in  tne 
marke  t . 

3.  Freight-rate  differentials  or  tne  differences  in  cost 
to  place  coals  from  diffr-r^nt  producing  a.reas  into 
common  mark'=-ts. 

4.  Competing  fu'^'ls,  especially  natural  gas  and  fuel  oil. 
Tn-^  compptition  of  natural  gas  is  particularly  impor- 
t-mt  in  Divisions  III  and  IV  and  greatly  limits  the 
ability  to  pay  wages. 


0837 


Fast  history  of  the  industry  reflects  the  influtnce  of  the,se 
factors  in  the  consider-^ble  range  of  the  wage  rate  levels  which  existed 
amonf  the  various  areas  of  the  industry.   7rom  the  beginning  of  negotia- 
tions looking  to\7ard  the  formulation  of  a  code,  it  '^as  recognized  by  op- 
erators and  labor  alike  that  some  pattern  oi  vage  differentials  must  be 
developed,  to  give  exr)ression  to  the  purpose  of  MA   to  increase  real 
labor  income  as  greatly  as  the  ability  of  the  industry  permitted,  and 
at  the  same  time  to'  avoid  Durdening' any  section  of  the  industry  to  a 
point  of  destruction,   ^'actual  bases  for  such  a  determination  at  that 
time  were  scanty  indeed.  There  existed  practically  no  data  on  costs  of 
production  for  the  different  areas,  and  such  as  I'ere  available  were  too 
old  or  fragmentary  to  place  reliance  upon  i or  arriving  at  specific  min- 
inum  ra.tes.   Accordingly,  the  Question  of  difierentials  was  resolved 
through  prolonged  negotiations  a.nong, operators  representing  oiiferent 
areas,  labor  representatives,  and  the  NiiA.   The  end-product,  "Schedule 
A,  ivlinimum  Kates  of  -av",  was  a  coTOOsite  of  compromises,  in  some  in- 
stances reluctantly  made  and  agr^feed  upon  only  as  provisional  settlements 
until  such  time  as  the  -oroblem  could  be  worked  out  on  a  basis  of  facts. 
That  the  schedule  was  considered  tentative'  was  recognized  in  the  Code 
under  Article  V,  Section  (g)  which  provided  that  the  KaA  should  undertake 
an  investigation  and  report  on  or  before  December  31,  1933  on  the  "advis- 
ability of  revising  mege  diff erentialu  in  the.  various  divisions  and  dis- 
tricts of  the  industry  and  in  the  event  of  recommenced  change,  specifica- 
tion of  the  amount  thereof." 

Because  of  the  limited  time  afforded,  data  were  not  available 
in  time  for  the  -oreparation  of  a  report  with  recommendations  covering  dif- 
ferentials that  should  be  established.   It  should  also  be  pointed  out  that 
the  provision  in  the  original  Code  for  a  report  by  kr.A  on  differentials 
was  never  carried  out. 

V'hile  several  subdivisions  urged  that  tne  matter  of  differentials 
be  taken  up  at  a  public  hearing  by  VIA   prior  to  the  expiration  of  '"age 
agreements  on  March  31,  1934,  no  ac^'ion  in  this  direction  was  taken.   After 
a  series  of  meetings  late  in  llarch,  which  consisted  mainly  of  convening 
and  adjourning  until  a  later  day  or  hour,  the  Ohio,  'ivestern  Pennsylvania 
and  Eastern  Subdivisions,  on  l.Iarch  30,  submitted  to  a  conference  of  the 
whole  industry  a  pro-^osed  revisior  of  minimum  rates  of  pay  and  differen- 
tials for  the  entire  industry.   This  proposal  narrowed  differentials  gen- 
erally, though  in  differing  amounts  for  the  affected  areas.   Immediate 
and  vehement  protest  was  made  by  a  number  of  areas,  particularly  Divi- 
sions III  and  IV,  ■'/estern  Kentucky  and  Northern  ..est  'Virginia.   On  iviarch 
31,  the  Administrator  of  WrA   declared  that  an  emergency  was  threatened 
in  the  industry  because  the  wage  negotiations  had  not  been  concluded 
.and  no  agreement  had  been  reached  as  to  wages  beyond  larch  31,  ^nd 
thereupon  proioul  -ated  Amendment  1  to  tne  Code,  setting  forth  the  schedule 
of  rates  recommenced  by  the  three  Subdivisions  referred  to. 

This  action  on  the  part  oi ■ the  Administrator  was  widely  considered 
among  industry  members  as  arbitrary  and  precipitate.   The   outcome 
deiaonstrated  that  a  solution  ol  the  ciif erentials  question  niast  be 
founded  upon  adequate  facts  and  after  deliberate  consideration  among  the 
affected  parties.   jrour  major  alterations  of  the  Amerdi.ient  1  were  made: 

9837 


1.  The  increase  set  forth  in  the  basic  inside  skilled 
rate  for  Alab-'^ma  --ps  reciiced  fron  $1.?0  per  dpy  to 
40  cents  per  day. 

2.  The  increase  ol'  &b   cents  per  day  in  J^iVi.sion  IV  vtrs 
reduced  to  '-5  cents  for  deep  mines  and  60  'cents  for 
strix)  mines,  thus  recognizing  the  relative  ability 
to  ppy  as  a  factor  in  setting  rptes  i or  deep  as  op- 
posed to  sti'iD  mines. 

3.  The  increase  oi  50  cents  per  dry  for  . estern  Kentucky 
vas  not  recof:ni2ed  by  that  arer,  which  -as  successful 
in  the  j^eder^l  District  Court  in  having'  pn  injunction 
granted  agpinst  tiie  '"'ag"  rruvisions  of  the  Code. 

4.  .A  deterMination  oi  increases  for  ton'^'age  men  in  Northern 

West  Virginia  in  excess  oi  that  nDroviced  in  other  areas 
in  Division  I. 

That  these  adjustments  in  difi erentirls  ^ifered  no  final  solu- 
tion for  difierentipls  ^pb   reco.e:nized  in  Amenciaeht  2  -hich  provided  that 
p  special  unit  be  set  utd  in  tht  l-,.eseprch  rnc  plan'ning  Division  of  NRA. 
to  study  vrpge   rates  and  report  to  the  Adunisti  ptor  its  lindings  and  recom- 
mendations.  Also,  the  ATDoalacnian  '-'^age  Agreement  provided  for  the  estao- 
lishment  of  the  Fortn-South  Differentials  C-.miission,  com-osed  of  o-Dera- 
tors  from  Northern  and  Southern  Subdivisions  oi  Division  I  and  reriresen- 
tatives  of  ^'nited  dne  '".orkers. 

The  investigation  to  be  made  by  I'xJi  under  Amend  lent  2   was  unable 
to  get  under  vay  becfuse  the  Subdivisions  oi  Division  I  could  not  agree 
on  the  cortent  of  forms  to  be  used  in  collecting  necessary  data. 
The  Oiiio  and  Fennsylvrnia  Subdivisions  "ould  agree  to  the  collection  of 
only  limited  data  vhich  "'ere  considered  by  the  l.esearch  and  Planning  Di- 
vision to  be  cuite  ina.deo/aate  to  suncly  the  basis  for  a  factual  study. 
The  Southern  Subdivisions  were  vrilling  to  accent  tue  proo:,sals  of  t'HA. 
The  efforts  oi  TTi-.A  to  settle  the  controvtrsey  '"ert  wcrk,  vacillating 
and  futile, 

Tne  fate  of  the  ^ortii-South  Differentials   oranis-:ion  activities 
'"as  similar  to  that  oi  hPA.      Ivo  a-^reeiatnt  coulc  be  mace  as  to  the  basis 
upon  which  their  vork  'vas  to  procetd  'fith.the  result  that  nothing  was  ac- 
complished. 

Thus,  the  Code  -passed  into  history  '-ithout  carrying  out  any  of 
the  TDrovisions  in  the  original  Code  or  its  araencments  resriecting  the  study 
of  differentials  or  adjudicating  tht  many  claims  and  counter-claims  as  to 
the  economic  validity  of  the  rateF-  as  esta-jlished  during  the  Code.   In  the 
Ap-oalacnian  '  pf.e   Agreement  oi  Setitember,  1-/35,  as  i^as  true  in  the  April, 
1934  agreement,  provision  vrss   made  for  the  study  of  differentials,  thus 
picking  up  "^here  the  NrlA  left  off  in  the  matter  of  ultimate  solution  of 
the  -Droblem, 

9637 


Ho'i'ever,  the  unsettled  stptus  ox  ciii  erentipls  coes  not  '-arrant  the 
conclusion  that  the  schedule  oi'  .ainiinuLi  rates  established  vas  ^I'ithoat  merit. 
On  the  contrary  the  wage  pattern  '-'as  one  of  the  outstanding  achitveraents  of 
the  Code  in  that  it  substituted  a  deiinite,  solid  foundation  for  costs  in- 
stead of  the  shifting,  unstsblt,  uncoordinated  and  unpredictable  basis  that 
had  existed  previously.   It  set  de.initt,  standards  as  among  the  various  areas, 
vrhich,  when  tested  by  the  experience  of  tiiae,  '.-'ould  re-aal  any  ineaaities 
of  the  rates.   Claims  of  injustice  coulc  then  be  scrutinized  in  terms  of 
comparative  costs  and  the  relative  abilities  of  the  various  areas  to  main- 
tain their  Dositions  in  the  industry.   Such  data  as  were  collected  on 
costs  and  realization  under  the  Code  die  suggest  tne  necessity  for  modifi- 
cation.  If  an  adequate  fact-finding  program  under  the  WixA   had  been 
accepted  by  the  industry  (or  othen-^ise  made  a  pre-requisite  by  KEA  to 
the  continued  privilege  of  -Drice-i ixing  by  the  industry),  the  basis  for 
an  equitable  and  economic  vfage  structure  '■idtii  sound  differentials  '"ould 
have  been  laid.   Until  an  adeouate  basis  in  lact  is  estaDlished,  the  wage 
pattern  for  the  industrv  rests  uT:on  the  bargaining  strength  oi  the  oper- 
ators of  the  various  areas  and  the  representatives  of  the  emiDloyees,  '^dth 
probable  repercussions  as  developed  under  the  Coce.   Jor  detailed  dis- 
cussion of  differentials,  see  Charter  IV. 

Collective  Bargaining:   iollo'fing  the  ex-oiration  oi  the  Jacksonville 
'B.ge   Agreement  in  April  19?7,  tne  extent  of  collective  bargaining  in 
tne  bitu;iiinous  coal  industry  fell  to  the  lo'i^est  level  since  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  joint  conference  for  the  Central  Competitive  JTield  in  169b, 
Prior  to  the  Code  in  1933,  the  -orincipal  area  having  ^^age  agreements  com- 
prised the  States  of  Illinois,  Inc  iana  and  lovrr.   Some  contracts  were  also 
in  eftect  in  the  Soath--'est  Interstate  fields  (Arkansas,  Oklahoma  and 
Kansas)  and  in  the  Rock^'-  .lOuntain  pnp.      The  total  tonnage  rjroduced  under 
union  contracts  T'as  prooaoly  no  ^lore  than  15  percent  oi  the  total  for  the 
United  States.   Previous  to  approval  oi  the  code,  even  anticipating  the 
adoption  of  the  NIEA,  a  wavt  ol  union  organization  s^ept  over  the  industry, 
i:;ventu8llv  close  to  95  percent  oi    tne"  labor  emploved  ^as  T'orking  under 
coll'ective  bargaining  agreeiiients  entered  into  beti"een  the  representatives 
of  organized  labor  and  operators.  This  represented  tne  all-time  peak  of 
collective  bargaining  in  the  incustry  and  large  portions  of  the  incustry 
■:'ere  thus  served  which  had  hitherto  never  engaged  in  tnis  type  of  operator- 
labor  relationship. 

Another  important  feature  of  collective  bargainins:^  i-as  the  change 
irom  the  Central  Coapttitive  area  basis  to  the  Appalacx.ian  area  oasis. 
Hitherto,  the  principal  collective  bargaining  agree:.ient  applied  to  the 
Central  Competitive  lield  -  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio  and  '.estern  Fennsyl- 
vanip.   ',  ith  the  advent  of  the  Code,  the  principal  agreement  became  the 
Appalachian  Agreement,  "hich  recognized  the  gro'-ing  conviction  that 
stabilization  "'ithin  the  industrv  intolar  as  labor  aspects  were  con- 
cerned required  the  joint  solution  oi  Hortn-South  competitive  relations 
of  the  industry. 

Industrial  Peace:   One  of  the  outstanding  aciiievements  of  operation 
under  the  Code  was  the  high  degree  of  industrial  peace  v-nicn  prevailed. 
Laoor  relations  entered  a  new  phase  in  the  history  oi  the  industry. 

9b37 


-7- 


Sectiuns  of  the  industry  in  i^uich  collective  bprgainin^  had  never  existed, 
entered  into  w^ge  net;otiations  or  e  sincere  and  cooperptive  basis.  It  is 
trij.e  that  a  number  of  serious  situations  developed  at  different  times  and 
pl.-'cer,  but  these  veru  usurlly  of  short  exudation  and  extended  over  relativelv 
li:.iited  territory.  In  ter'as  of  the  industry  as  a  "'nole  and  compared  with 
previous  labor  disputes,  the  Code  period  compares  tavorablv  with  anv  in 
the  history  of  the  industry.  Wage  contrrcte  entered  into  vere  reiuarkaoly 
v"ell  observed  throughout  tneir  life„ 

It  is  significant  to  note  that  t'-o  contrr  ct  periods  exrired  without 
the  completion  of  contract  arrangements  for  the  industry  as  a  vhole. 
Yet- neither  in  the  spring  of  1934  or  19b£  did  this  situation  result  in 
a  -orolonr-ed  susrension  in  o-neratiors  as  hrd  occurred  on  so  many  similar 
occasions  in  tne  iiast.   Thir  was  TDarticularly  true  ^^t  the  end  of  narch, 
lyot.   Tnrough  the  good  on  ices  of  the  TaA,  extension  of  e.visting  agree- 
ments until  June  16,  -,/as  agreed  to,  obviating  the  necessity  oi  suspension 
because  oi  inability  to  agret  on  the  ter.is  of  r  new  contiact." 

The  Code  served  ^s  a  vcidcle  i'or  brir.^ing  together  the  various 
sections  of  the  irdustr-'-  anr  la^or,  "-hicn  had  never  occrarred  before  for 
the  industry  as  a  vrhole.   It  served  to  break  dorn  the  comrartraentalized 
barriers  '"nich  existed  rirev.i-Ously  and  cevelo-ped  a  considerable  STjirit  of 
"give  and  t^ke",  to  arcreciate  th._  r.roblems  of  other  sections  and  of  labor, 
and.  a  desire  to  -cromote  the  ^--eneral  vjeliare  of  the  industry  in  which  all 
segments  'ould  necessarily  ben^lit.   It  develoi^ed  a  recognition  that  ar- 
rangements as  to  wpg-es  or  'orices  which  tended  to  crinply  unduly  any  sec- 
tion '-'Ould  operate  as  a  booiaerang  to  otAer  sections.  T-^tter  enemies  of 
the  TDPst  vrere  ooligated  to  rather  around  the  conference  taole,  and  altnough 
a  grer't  manv  of  these  meetings  broke  ur-  without  accomrlishment,  others 
were  orodiictive  of  the  solution  of  -Derrilcxing  nroolems.   One  of  these  de- 
velorments  '"as  the  Apnalpchian  conference  which  brought  together  the 
northern  and  southern  sections  of  the  Appalachian  regi-jn.   For  the  first 
tii^e  in  history,  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  joined  with  V,est  Virginia  and 
Eastern  Kentucky  in  the  working  out  oi  a  joint  ^-age  agreement,  this  con- 
ference .-u-oerseding  tne  old  Central  Comet  titive  Conference  vaiich  no 
longL-r  served  the  economic  dtveloiriient  ox  the  industry. 

Prices:   The  concurrent  "-age  and  price  deflation,  beginning  in 
1924  nnd  continuing  until  the  suianer  of  193o,  cemonstiated  the  utter 
inability  oi  the  industry  to  achieve  a  staoilized  basis  short  of  complete 
bankruptcy  ol  operators  and  pau:-;erization  of  employees.   In  recognition 
of  the  interdependence  of  '-'age  costs  and  prices,  the  Code  granted  the 
privilege  of  minimum  price-fixing  to  efiectuate  the  minimum  rates  of 
-agts  established,  and  other  provisions  of  the  NIxiA  and  the  Code.   It 
'7as  argued  by  the  industry,  ano.  accepted  by  the  iMational  Recovery  Ad- 
mmisti'ation,  that  any  regalrlion  of  the  industry  affecting  wage  and  other 
costs,  or  otherwise  restraining  freedo).j  oi  "ction  through  trade  practice 
provisions,  mast  necessarily  be  accompanied  by  the  'uar-ntee  of  adequate 
income  to  support  such  additional  burdens.   Fo  spe«ific  standards  for 
prices  were  estaolished,  except  for  tne  general  terms  "faiC  market  price" 
as  determined  and  approved  under  the  Code. 

9837 


The  Code  "as  successful  in  materially  increasing;  the  level  of 
prices  in  the  industry.   In  19o?,  recording  to  tne  U.S.  Burepu  of  i.-ines, 
the  average  realization  for  ell  corl,  f.o.j.  mines  (captive  plus  commercial) 
vas  $1.31  as  compared  with  $1.7o  for  iy3'±.   Hovever,  the  increase  for  com- 
mercial production  alo^e  (with  r.'hich  the  Code  and  rrice-fixing  were 
primarily  concerned)  '-as  much  grefiter,  as  shown  for  Divisions  I,  II  and 
III,  which  represent  about  90  percent  of  the  total  production  of  the 
United  States: 

Aveiage  liealization      Average  Kealization 

Comraerci-'l  Hines         Coiamercial  ivlines 
1932 AT^r.  1934  -  Jan.  1935 

Division  I  $1.10  ^         $1.90 

(Fenna. ,  Ohio,  .vlich., 
Ky.,  -.Va. ,  Va.,  Kid., 
and  Northern  Tenn.) 

Division  II  1.53  1.69 

(III  '■,  Ind.  only.) 

Division  III  1.57  2.25 

(Ala.  ,  So.  Tenn.  .?-  Op.  ) 

\teighted  Averpge  1.87 

The  increase  in  realization  biou^lht  about  by  the  Code  was  even 
greater  than  indicated  in  the  preceding  figures  for  tr-o  reasons:  (l) 
During  the  first  half  of  1933  prices  fell  to  greater  reoths  tnan  1932. 
It  has  been  estimated  by  the  Coal  Unit  of  the  Division  of  xieview  that 
the  Average  realization  for  commercial  mines  of  Division  I  during  the 
9-month  period  prior  to  the  Code  (January  -  Septemoer  ly33)  was  only 
$1.03  per  ton  as  coaipai'ed  with  l^I.10  lor  1932.  (1)      The  average 
realization  under  the  Code  was  diminished  soiiie\"hat  because  of  deliveries 
made  on  contracts  entered  into  -prior  to  tne  Code  at  less  than  Code 
prices.  The  reductions;  per  ton  in  averrge  realization  resulting  from 
these  belov-Code-price  contracts  cannot  be  ascertained,  but  the  indica- 
tions are  that  these  ranged  iron  practically  no  diminuti-n  lor  some 
areas  to  rios.sibly  as  mucn  as  20  cents  per  ton  for  other  areas  in 
certain  months. 

Anotner  adverse  eiiect  on  realization  was  the  failure  oi  operators 
to  observe  at  all  times  the  Code  prices  m  effect'.  Tnis  non-compliance 
became  a  'natter  of  grave  concern  early  i'n  1935.   The  extent  to  i"hich 
Code  prices  vrere  not  observec  is  not  kno'-n,  but  common  gossip  among 
operators  was  that  prices  were  breaking:,  that  is,  the  "other  fellow's 
prices".   The  cc^mplaint  was  made  repeatedly  that  the  machinery  for 
compliance  enforcement  was  lacking  or  failed  to  function.   It  became 
evident  that  reliance  on  price-fixing  depended  almost  entirely  upon  the 
voluntary  observance  of  prices  by  producers  rather  than  upon  the  sanctions 
of  law  or  the  Code.   This  uncertainty  in  the  ability  to  maintain  what 
in  effect  was  a  voluntary  price  structure  raised  fears  in  the  minds  of 

9837 


Iffbor  that  the  wage  structilre  vould  be  jeoDP.rdized  if  the  situation 
continued.   Accordinjgly,  the  United  i.iine  workers  prepared  and  s-Donsored 
&    bill  for  regulation  with  "teeth"  in  it  to  brin^  about  compliance 
to  estpolished  prices.  This  later  became,  in  modiiied  form,  the  so- 
called  fraffey  Act,  or  the'  Bituminous  Coal  Conservation  Act  of  1S35. 
Because  of  the  weaknesses  in  tjrice-f ixing  under  the  VIA   Code,  a  majority 
of  the  operators  eventually  joined  with  the  United  Mine  ■■  orkers  in 
support  of  new  legislation.   For  details  of  price-fixing,  See  Chapter  VI. 

Costs:   Although  specific  standards  for  price-fixing  v.rere  not  set 
forth  in  the  Code,  the  test  of  costs  may  well  be  used  to  show  the 
reasonableness  or  unreasonableness  of  the  level  of  prices  established. 
As  indicated  in  the  resume  of  lorices,  Code  -prices  were  somewhat  higher 
thrm  would  otherwise  have  been  necessarv  had  not  part  of  the  coal  been 
sold  on  contracts  entered  into  prior  to  the  Code  at  less  than  Code 
prices.   However,  granting  at  this  point  some  degree  of  inecuity  as 
between  pre-Code  contract  -orices  and  Code  prices,  the  sliowing  of 
average  realization  for  all  sales  i"ith  the  average  cost  of  production 
indic-tes  on  the  "hole  ouite  reasonable  results.  There  appears  no  abuse 
of  the  privilege  of  price-fixing  in  the  sense  that  excessive  price 
levels  were  established  as  compared  witn  cost  of  production,  administra- 
tion, and  selling.  For  the  lO-month  period,  April  1934  through  January 
1935,  the  following  '-'eight ed  average  costs  and  realizations  resulted 
in  the  areas  representing  approximately  90  percent  of  the  nation's 
production: 

Total  Costs  (*)   Average  Realization 
Average _   Commercial  Tonnage 

Division  I         '  $1,692  t.1.897 

(70-72-;a  of  total  production 
of  U.S.) 

Division  II  (III.  c.   Ind.  only)      1.54-5  1.629 

(15-17;.  of  total) 

Division  III  2.296  2.254 

(Ala. ,  Southern  Tenn.  and  Georgia) 
(2-370  of  total) 


(*)    Costs  exclude'  capital  charges  (  interest  or  bones,  etc.) 


jhile  the  average  r'alization  increased  mrterially  under  the  Code 
as  compared  vith  pre-Codc,  it  is  evident  that  this  increase  was  necessary 
to  carry  the  costs  of  production  incurred  under  Code  provisions. 

Financial  Improvements  in  the  Industry;   The  financial  record  of 
the  bituminous  coal  industrv,  as  sho^n  oy  Internal  Revenue  Reports, 
reflects  the  ecoromic  decline  of  the  industry  after  1923.   In  the  gen- 
erally prosperous  years  of  1928  and  1929,  the  industry  reported  deficits 

9837 


•IG- 


of  $24, 50b, 000  and  $11, 62?, 000  resptctively.   In  the  succeeding  four 
years  the  deficits  ranged  fro.n  $42,071,000  to  $51,167,000.   This 
experience  'rp_s   in  marked  contrast  to  that  under  the  Code;  fhile 
"Statistics  of  Incone"  are  not  available  for  1934,  the  statistics 
of  cost  and  realization  collected  oy  the  FRA. ,  indicate  a  greatlv 
improved  financial  condition,  as  sho'-^n  in  the  Dteceding  comparison 
of  costs  and  realization. 

It  is  anticipated  thpt  vhen  Internal  Revenue  figures  for  1934 
are  available,  the  deficits  reported  vdll  be  greatly  reduced  as  compared 
with  the  preceding  four  years.   It  is  doubtful,  ho^^-ever,  whether  a  net 
income  for  the  industry  as  a  whole  will  be  sho^nn.  The  conclusion  of  im- 
proved financial  status  is  amply  fortified  by  many  statements  of  oper- 
ators to  that  effect  given  at  -oublic  herrings.   In  the  trade  -oreF-s  and 
otherwise.  The  improved  status  is  also  reflected  in  the  resolution 
adopted  by  the  National  Coal  Association  at  a  meeting  of  its  directors 
in  October,  1934,  v-hich  out  tne  Association  on  record  as  favoring  the 
continuation  of  the  Bitu^aincxis  Coal  Code. 

Another  evidence  ras  the  maintenance  of  wage  rates  under  the  Code. 
Vihereas  prior  to  the  Code  the  Trescure  to  reduce  vages  ";as  experienced 
'•■enerally  throughout  the  industrv,  the  record  under  the  Code  was  most 
im-oressive  in  terms  of  compliance  vdth  minimum  rates  of  pay  and  wage 
agreements  made  thereunder.   If  the  financial  status  of  the  industry  had 
not  improved  materially  after  adoption  of  the  Code,  the  likel.ihood  of 
increased  vages    in  April  1934  and  rgain  m  September  la35,  ipould  have 
been  remote.   However,  the  substpntial  increfvsas  at  the  times  indicated 
have  not  resulted  in  any  concerted  violations  in  any  arep,  -  in  ot?ier 
Fords,  the  industry  has  brien   financially  pble  to  carry  th=  increased 
costs  by  virtue  of  en   improved  econo.aic  status. 

Allocation  of  Tcnr,af.:&:   During  the  decrde  precedinf;  the  K-J,  the 
flovf  of  coal  from  the  various  producing  aroas  vas  tremendously  affected, 
some  areas  gaining  enormously  '-hile  coi'resooiidin^';  losses  occurred  in 
others.   (See  Chapter  I,  pa^je     .)   hiio  the  Code  did  not  provide  for 
the  allocation  of  tonnage  among  producerr,,  it  did'declaTe  that  in -deter- 
mining the  fair  market  price  conrideration  ?hould  be  taken  of  competition 
with  other  doals,  etc.    One  ot  th(.  first  proble  is  aj:ter  the  Code  was 
adopted  was -the  correlation  of  nrices  among  tht  various  Subdivisions, 
for  the  -purpose  of  estaulishmg  a  fair  ::Tarket  opportunity  for  the  dif- 
ferent producing  ^ reas.   Essentiallv,  this  resulted  ir  a  freezing  of  the 
flow  of  coal  as  it  existed  prior  to  the  Code.  Areas  which  had  lost 
heavily  in  their  share  of  total  production  after  1923  (Illinois,  Indiana, 
Otiio,  and  Fennsvlvania)  felt  that  they  were  entitled  to  a  greater  share 
to  restore  the  earlier  relationship,  while  est  Virginia  and  Kentucky 
argued  they  ^^ere  not  responsible  for  the  industrial  and  labor  policy  of 
t; e  north  which  resulted  in  shifts  in  tonnpge.  The  problem  of  so  adjust- 
ing prices  that,  the-  relative  market  opportunities  for  different  groups 
would  not  be  undulv  disturbed  become  very  difiicult  and  at  times  acute. 
Finally  in  the  summer  of  1934,  a  scheme  kno^n  as  the  "adaras  =lan"  was 
a/'Tf-ed  to  h'    the  sixbdivisions  of  Division  I,  in  which  the  percentages  of 
tonnage  that  each  area  should  enjoy  out  of  the  total  for  the  Division 
9837 


Fere  fixed.   As  each  Month's  production  becrnie  known,  the  results  were 
to  be  compared  with  the  percentages  fixed.   If  an  srea  fell  below  its 
share,  it  should  then  be  privile£:ed  to  reduce  its  prices  to  such  extent 
that  would  allo'-  it  to  recapture  the  deficiency  in  its- share.   In  other 
words,  the  -olan  was  essentially  an  effort  toward  rhysicrl  allocation 
through  the  indirect  method  of  adjusting  prices.   The  plan  continued  for 
six  months  beyond  which  .".'astern  Pennsylvania  Subdivision  rt  fused  to  agree. 

Any  plan  of  ;niniraum  price  fixing  in  the  bitu'.ainous.  coal  industry 
must  recognize  established  movements  of  coa!]-  if  certrin  sections  are 
not  to  be  destroyed  or  greatly  reduced  in  their  positions  in  the  indus- 
try. Therefore,  rrice-f ixing  becomes  a  roand-about  method  of  production 
control  or  allocation,  and  tends  to  preserve  the  wealrer  econcdc  sections 
of  the  industr^^  and  retards  tno  adjustment  of  excessive  capacity  to  the 
level  of  consumptive  demands.  '  hether  in  the  long  run  allocation  of 
tonnage  through  the,  indirect  method  of  :r ice-fixing  could  be  maintained 
is  highly  probleinatical.  The  difficulties  under  the  Code  appear  to  sup- 
port the  proponents  of  direct  allocation  oi  production. 

jactual  Basis  for  Promoting  Incustry  aefc:ulation:   One  of  the 
greatest  handicaps  in  tne  for;Talation  ana  administration  of  the  Code  was 
the  lack  of  certain  types  of  factual  information  upon  which  to  predicate 
minimum  '■■^'pge  and  price  determinations,  at  ivhat  relative  price  levels 
could  the  various  areas  compete  in  the  Different  markets  with  the  maximum 
of  equality  of  opportunity?   V.hat  relative  wage  rate  levels  could  the 
various  .areas  support  without  excessive  penalty  here  or  undue  advantage 
there?   These  two  questions  —  probable  income  per  ton  under  a  system  of 
correlated  price  fixing  on  the  one  hand,  the  costs  of  production  reEU.lt- 
ing  from  minimum  y"Pf;e   rates  and  raaxi/rum  hours  provisions  on  the  other  — 
required  precise  and  comprehensive  data  vhich  'lere  not  available.   The 
deteriaination  of  tnese  questions  when  first  presented  had  to  be  accom- 
plished through  a  process  of  negotiation  -  of  .^Ive  and  take.   The  Code  as 
adopted  in  September  1'j33,  recognized  the  need  for  the  collection  of  data 
on  costs,  realization  rnd  wages  in  order  to  establish  bench  marks  for 
future  action  and  a  review  of  the  ceter^iinations  made  in  establishing 
the  Code. 

Accordingl-.',  an  elaborate  program  of  statistical  reporting  was 
established  soon  after  the  adoption  of  the  Code,  e-ibracing  costs,  income 
from  coal  sales  and  employment  and  earnings  data.   Considering  earlier  ex- 
cursions in  the  field  of  costs  and  labor  earnings  statistics  by  the  Gov- 
ernment, the  response  in  the  early  months  to  the  program  was  quite  re- 
markable,  v.'hen  the  results  became  available,  however,  the  attitude 
towFrd  fact  finding  lani^uisiied  some^'hat,  pai  ticalarly  with  reference  to 
labor  statistics.   Here,  as  might  be  expected,  the  results  did  not 
justify  the  determinations  made  with  reference  to  minimum  rates  of  pay, 
or  so  at  least  it  was  argued  by  those  are-s  that  felt  thty  had  been 
discriminated  against.  The  difficulties  tnat  arose  from  the  showing  for 
different  areas  of  the  earnings  of  piece-workers  led  to  interminable 
wrangling  as  to  revision  of  methods  used  in  the  original  reporting,  with 
the  final  result  that  reporting  on  emplovm>int  and  earnings  data  was 
completely  discontinued. 

9637 


On  the  other  hand,  since  the  results  were  not  as  contentious  in 
their  nature,  the  reporting  of  costs  covered  a  rerioa  ox"  15  iiontns  -  from 
Eovemher  1933  throup-h  Jf^nuary  1935.  Trds  ppraliec  to  divisions  I,  II  and 
III,  '7ith  exceptions  iox  "  esterr  Iventuclo,'-  and  lea,  vhich  failed  to 
continue  after  the  first  3  or  4  months.   Like^"ise,  cost  reporting  failed 
to  carry  on  heyond  'arch  1934  in  Tivisions  IV  and  V.   Hie  results  of  the 
statistical  reporting  have  been  published  by  the  ¥BA   in  four  volumes. 

Vmatever  may  oe  said  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  fact  finding  program, 
the  statistics  on  cost  fill  a  significant  gap  in  the  records  of  the 
industry.   On  the  basis  of  the  cost  and  realization  information .made 
available,  it  is  possible  to  discover  fundamental  relations  in  the 
economic  status  among  the  various  si^ctions  of  the  industrv,  and  to 
arrive  at  reasonable  limits  i^ithin  vhich  the  decisions  of  regulation 
must  be  made. 

The  published  reports  have  been  eagerly  sought  by  members  of  the 
industry,  trade  fssociations  oi  operators,  \7a::e  conference  members, 
labor  representatives,  consumers,  students  of  the  econoaics  of  the  industrv 
and  others.   Undouotedly,  one  of  the  contrioutions  oi  Nx-lA  wps  an  in- 
crease in  knowledge  of  basic  facts  of  costs  and  realization  of  the 
industry  through  whicn  the  solution  of  its  problems  might  be  achieved 
i^-ith  a  maximum  dc€:r  ee   of  equity  among  the  various  contending  interests. 


9637 


CKAPTSR  I 


(.) 


THB  SI2in/:iM0US  COAL  IirifuSTHY.  ITS  HISTORICAL 
BACKi>H0Uin3  MB   FR0EL:^L3 

Intelligent  i-eviev;  and  understanding  of  the  bituminous  coal 
industry's  experience  under  the  KEA  requires  a  consideration  of  its 
prior  history  and  problems. 

THE  IlIDUSTRY'S  3ACEG-H0U1\TS 

The  United  States  possesses  withiu  its  borders  approximately  half 
of  the  coal  resources  of  the  world.  Except  for  relatively  inaccessible 
portions  of  the  public  co:iiain  in  the  Rocky  Mountains,  practically  all 
of  this  vast  storehouse  is  privately  ovmed.  ?^hile,  measured  in  terms 
of  aiinual  needs,  these  reserves  represent  a  supply  for  hundreds  of 
years,  the  urr'^e  of  the  present  generation  of  owners  has  been  to  reduce 
these  resource  assets  to  current  income.   In  many  cases,  the  burden  of 
coal-land  taxes  and  of  c,-?rrying  char^^es  on  investments  already  incurred 
compels  owners  to  develop  properties  without  jregard  to  the  economic  time- 
liness of  their  exploitation.  While  not  as  desti^ictive  economically  as 
the  law  of  the  capture  applied  to  oil  resources,  nevertheless  it  has 
fostered  excess  capacity,  overproduction  as  compared  with  demand,  low 
prices  for  coal,  and  resulting  starvrition  wages  for  workers. 

In  order  of  rank,  coals  fall  in  the  following  categories: 

Anthracite  (hardest) 
■  Semi-anthracite 

Semi-bituminous  (really  super-bituminous) 
Bitijininous 
Sub-bitu'Aiuous 
Lignite  (softest) 

(a  separate  group  commonly  known  as 
"cannel"  coal) . 

The  bituminous  eoal  mining  induotry,  as  contemplated  in  this  study, 
includes  the  recovery  of  all  kinds  of  coal  except  anthracite,  by  either 
underground  or  "stripping"  operations. 

This  basic  in'histry  has  occupied,  and  still  occupies,  a  strategic 
position  in  the  economic  life  of  the  nation.  The  families  of  over  half 
a  million  workers  represent  probably  well  over  two  million  people  who 
depend  directly  upon  this  industry  for  a  livelihood;  transportation  and 
distribution  services  raise  this  number  very  materially.  Millions  of 
our  population  rely  upon  an  unfailing  supply  for  heat,  both  in  homes  and 
in  offices;  railway's  consu'ne  upward  of  20  per  cent  of  the  total;  industry 
operates  very  largely  upon  energy  derived  from  coal. 


(*)   By  F.  E.  Berquist  and  Ellery  B.  Gordon. 


9837 


-14- 

Froduction.   Bep'inniiv^  v/ith  the  eighties,  production  kept  pace  with 
co-.siirnption,  approxinatelr'  douTjling  in  each  decade  dovm  to  the  beginning 
of  the  World  War.  Diiring  this  period  of  gradual  industrial  expansidnu, 
the  industry  developed  alonj-  with  the  growth  of  all  other  industries  and 
was  the  chief  soui'ce  of  en-rg:/  used  in  the  production  of  light,  heat  and 
power. 

In  the  pre-war  year  of  1913,  production  reached  the  total  of 
478,435,000  tons.  Beginning  v/ith  1916,  production  was  stepped  up  rapid- 
ly, due  to  v.'ar  activitv,  and  reached  its  all-time  peak  of  579,386,000 
tons  in  1918.   The  enormous  development  of  ner  mines  during  this  period, 
extension  of  railroads  to  serve  them,  and  formation  of  companies  to 
operate  them,  presaged  the  ruinoiis  deflation  which  he/jan  in  1923  and 
finally  came  into  full  effect  in  the  depression  years  from  1930  to  1933, 
In  a  futile  effort  to  retain  the  markets  whicii  had  beeii  opened  to  them, 
operators  cut  and  r:cut  their  prices.  Despite  their  "oest  efforts  pro- 
duction declined  until  the  low  figure  of  303,907,000  tons  was  reached  in 
1932,  the  lowest  production  in  any  year  since  1904.   (For  annual  pro- 
duction see  Chfpter  III). 

It  must  "be  home  in  mind  that  proauction  directly,  it  might  be  said 
almost  immedi£:.tely,  reflects  current  market  demand.   Coal  is  mined  and 
shipped  when  and  as  needed.   Storage  at  mines  is  practically  nil;  dock- 
'^.torage  is  maintained  on  the  Great  Lakes  and  at  some  coast  transshipping 
points;  public  utilities  and  steel  plants  maintain  storage  piles;  these 
represent  as  a  rule  only  15  to  60  days'  sup:nly.   Hetailers  possess  faci- 
lities for  stocking,  but  seldom  utili^ie  them  to  capacity  except  in  early 
fall  in  anticipation  of  the  first  cold  weather  demand.   In  times  of 
shortage  or  threatened  shortage  from,  whatever  cause,  stock  piles  have 
bean  built  up  far  beyond  normal  practice.   &enerally,  however,  dependence 
is  on  uninterrupted  mining  and  transportation.  YiTiti  the  exception  of 
coal  shipped  to  tidewater  docks,  aiid  to  lake  docks  duiiur,  the  open 
shipping  months,  it  may  be  state^~  that  coal  is  largely  purchased  before 
it  is  mined.  At  no  time  has  capacity  to  produce  been  fully  taxed. 

Excess  Cap^cit::  for  Production.  Kine  capacity  increased  with  the 
growing  development  of  the  industry,  was  stimulated  during  the  war 
period,  and  continued  unabated  until  1923.  Attractive  high  prices  for 
coal  furnished  the  incentive.   In  that  year  capacity  reached  its  peak, 
and  thereafter  receded  rapidly  ui~ til  193-''-,  due  to  closing  of  mines  by 


3837 


companies  unp.tle  longer  to  compete  in  tlie  mnrket  at  the  j\;oing  prices.  (*) 

The  bittiminous  coal  code  becan-.e  effective  in  October  1933.  Prices 
were  fixed  at  levels  relater'.  to  a  g,T.^atly  increased  wa-fce-bill  and  intended, 
approximate  at  least,  to  avera.je  the  production  cost.  After  years  of 
losses,  the  industry  entered  upon  a  code  period  of  substantially  higher 
prices.  Yfhile  5,427  operatin-;-;  mines  v/ere  recorded  in  1932,  in  the  next 
year  5,555  virere  operating  and  in  1934  there  were  6,258.  (**)   The  in- 
crease in  num.ber  of  m.ines 'vsras  due,  in  large  part,  to  reopening-  of  mines 
previously  idle,  though  some  of  the  increas  ■  may  hfve  been  new  mines. 
The  U.  S.  "ureau  of  Mines  has  this  to  say  in  3U.:i~!m-izing  the  pre-code 
decade  as  a  "period  of  liquid atibn:" 

"So  ..rrsat  an  excess  above  the  needs  of  the  raarket  made 
liquidation  Ihovitable  and  since  1923  the  industry  has 
been  involved  in  a  cntinuous  process  of  deflation, 
forcin-  heavy  financial  loss  and  sharp  reduction  in 
wages.  3etv/een  1923  and  1932  ***  the  net  reduction  in 
the  number  of  operatinj^  mines  -  commercial  mines,  not 
wacon  mines  -  Y/as  3,904  and  the  net  reduction  of  oper- 
ating capacity,  317,000,000  tons.   In  1932  alone,'  215 
mines  with  :xn   /-mnual  capricity  of  83,000,000  tons  shut 
do\m.***'^   (**+) 

This  liquidation  continued  through  the  early  months  of  1933,  but  v;ith 
the  coming  of  the  IJ.R.A.  Coal  Code,  and  much  i.nproved  prices  fixed 
thereunder,  many  marginal  mines,  previously  closed,  reopened. 


(*)    In  the'U.  S.  Bureau  of  Lanes  "Liinarals  Year  Book"  for  1932, 

;:ppears  on  page  393,  an  analysis  of  idle  mine  capacity  in  the 
country  and  its  availability  for  use  in  a  period  when  higher 
prices  may  bo  in  effect.   This  analysis  includes  the  following 
tabulation  of  mines  which  have  been  annually  reported  to  that 
Bureau  as  "idle"  rather  than  abanloiied  as  worked  out: 


Capacity, tons 
308  Days 

219  had  been  idle  since  1923 17,000,000 

118   "     "     "     "    1924 19 ,000 .000 

83  "    "    "    "    1925  13,000,000 

151  "    "    "    "    192r, 12,000,000 

313   "     "     "     "    1927 42,000,000 

210   "     "     "     "    1928 27,000,000 

251   "     "     "     "    1929 30.000.000 

Total  to  the  end  of  1930  160,000,000 


(***) 
9837 


These  mines  working  280  days  would  have  had  an  annual  capacity 
of  145,450,000  tons.  It  is  not  possible  to  estimate  dependably 
hov;  much  of  this  idle  mine  capacity  was  really  "suspended" 
capacity  rather  than  abandoned. 
"Bituminous  Coal  Tables  1934,"  U.  3.  Bureau  of  Mines,  November 

30,  1935,  p.  1 
Minerals  Year  Book  1934,  p. 571,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Mines. 


An  ever-present  capacity  to  produce  tonnage  far  in  excess  of  cur- 
rent coiiFivinption,  even  of  peal:  deaands,  has  "been  a  potent  influence  in 
the  unrestrained  conpetitive  str-o^/jgle  \7hiGh  typified  the  industrj^  in  the 
pre-ilHA.  decade. 

The  history  of  labor  in  bitunincus  coal  is  inseparable  fron  the 
industry's  historj?-.   It  is  narked  b3'-  hard-v."On  recognition  of  collective 
bargeaning,  repeated  periodic  strikes,  end.   suspensions  and  lockouts 
during  the  life  or  orgaiiized  negotiation.   Violence  and  bloodshed  often 
res'olted.   Unionized  areas  expended  their  influence  until  the  "central  ' 
competitive  field"  (Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  TTestem  Pennsylvania) 
negotiated  agreenents  that  formed  the  basis  for  all  uage  scales.  After 
1923,  long  continued  liquidation  of  productive  cai-jo.city,  intense  com- 
petition on  cut-price  bases  for  a  v.arket  steadily  trending  dovmvrard  in 
volu'ie,  has  their  effect  on  "ages;  '-age  contracts  Mere    revised,  broken, 
abandoned  by  oiiierators  in  one  field  after  field  until  in  early  1933, 
Illinois  a:id  Indiana  vrere   the  only  important  producing  fields  still 
adliering  to  union  contra.cts, 

T'iis  labor  storj'  is  essential  to  a  grasp  of  the  industry's  economic 
life  prior  to  KEA.   The  reader  is  referred  to  Chapter  IV  of  this  study 
treating  in  detail  the  entire  labor  histoiy.   Ho  brief  survey  can 
adeq-aately  convey  the  dominating  part  played  by  labor  relations  in  the 
entire  economic  development  of  coal. 

Intensive  Competition;  Consequent  Pressure  on 
l.iethods  and  Costs  of  Production 

Coal  flors  fron  its  many  producing  fields  by  a  maze  of  hauls  and 
crosshauls  to  meet  in  competition  for  the  iiarkets  of  the  G0untr;%   A 
conception  of  the  territorial  extent  and  complexity  of  the  distribution 
pattern,  as  it  has  gro\7n,  may  be  had  from  a  charting  of  ijtie  "Interstate 
hovement  of  Coal  in  1929,"  as  shovTn  in  reiTOrts  of  the  U,  S.  Bureau  of 
Liines, 

lb  v'ould  seem  unnecessar3r  at  this  point  to  enter  into  detailed 
statistical  analysis  of  distribxxti-^n,  since  it  will  be  exhaustively 
treated  in  a  later  section  of  t'-ds  study  devoted  to  "production  and 
distribution,"   Tli^  following  map  ,  irip^-essively  protra;^s  a  widespread 
inter;;ingling  in  interstate  com- lerce  of  coals  shipped  from  all  important 
producing  centers.     


In  1529,  the  last .year  for .which  detailed  distribution  data  are 
available,  about  74  percent  of  the  total  sales  entered  interstate  commerce. 
The  other  25  percent  w^re  intrastate  in  character. 

The  straggle  ar:iong  producers  and  districts  for  narlcets  and  for 
greater  shares  in  the  available  tonnage  in  the  consuming  centers  has  been 
a  bitter  one.   The  total  business  available  did  not  increase  in  propor- 
tion to  the  expansion  of  general  industrial  activity  and  prosperity  be- 
tween 1923  and  1S29.  A  glance  at  the  yearly  production  record,  shovm  in 
chapter  III  sufficiently  discloses  this  fact:   average  production  per 
year  in  the  6  years  1924  through  1929  was  522  million  tons,  only  a  7 
percent  increase  over  the  average  of  488  million  for  the  5  preceding 
years.  Many  factors  were  responsible  for  this  slow  growth,  among  them 

3837 


o 


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E  1  S  S  S  6  •  M  %     3 

s3    it:sscs   i 


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iiii 
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111 


If 


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;  mill 
i  finiijih 

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In 


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n 


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I  i"  i 

i 

8   tj       a 


-19- 


steadily  increasing  use  of  competing  fuels  and  notable  strides  in  fuel 
economy-o   Th,e  internecine  comoetition,  involving  freight-rate  structure 
with  its  differential  rates,  frozen  wag^-rate  levels  in  unionized 
territory  in  contrast  to  the  freedom  of  non-union  fields  to  maniiDulate 
wages  downward  to  conform  to  price  reductions,  and  other  considerations, 
resulted  in  major,  violent  shifts  in  the  relative  share  of  'narkpts  among 
the  producing  fields.   This  struggle  took  the  form  of  price  warfare; 
production  of  sized  coal  to  more  intensively  exploid  the  retailer  as 
an  outlet  for  domestic  sizes,  chemical  treatment  and  washing,  with  the 
same  objective — improved  merchandi singe 

This  bit<-er-  competition  from  both  within  and  without  the  bituminous 
coal  industry,  accompanied  by  orice  warfare,  pressed  so  heavily  urion 
costs  that  resort  was  had  to  every  possible  means  to  reduce  cost  of  pro- 
duction.  Labor,  as  the  major  cost  element,  offered  the  greatest  oppor- 
tunity and  consequently  stood  the  brunt  of  the  battle.   (See  Chapter  IV 
for  full  analysis  of  labor's  plight  during  the  pre-NRA  decade.) 

Merchanization  of  I.:ines  was  rapidly  develooed.   In  1922,  mechanically 
mined  tonnage,  both  underground  and  in  stripping  operations,  represented 
65.6  percent  tf  the  totil  output,  or  277  million  out  of  422  million  tons. 
By  1929,  it  har"  reached  79.2  percent,  or  424  out  of  535  million  tons. 
The  reduction  in  the  amount  of  mechanically  produced  coal  in  the  next  4 
years  was  attributable  to  depression.   Nevertheless  the  production  from 
stripping  mines  fell  off  little  below  the  20  million  of  1929  and  thereby 
showed  a  remarkable  percentage  gain  from  3.8  in  1929  to  5.5  percent  of 
total  output  in  1933.   Underground  machine-cut  production  also  showed 
gains  relative  to  the  total,  so  that  in  1933  the  total  mechanically  mined 
tonnage  reached  85.5  percent.   This  represents  a  relative  gain  of  30 
percent  in  1933  over  the  65. 6  percent  of  1922, 

Data  bearing  on  savings  in  labor  cost  incident  to  mechanization, 
are  scanty.   Stripping  operations  as  such,  show  a  striking  increase  in 
output  per  man  per  day  -  from  5,1  tons  in  1914  to  13  in  1928  and  to 
15,67  in  1932.   In  deep  mining  an  increase  in  prodaction  rate,  not  all 
attributable  to  mechanization  (some  influence  undoattedly  was  exerted  by 
changes  in  length  of  working  days),  was  experienced  -  the  average  per 
underground  man  per  day  was  4,98  tons  in  1922  in  contrast  to  5,78  in 
1932. 

In  a  study  by  the  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  (1933)  an 
attem.pt  was  made  to  measure  the  effect  of  mechanization  on  eraTDlojmient  in 
the  bituminous  coal  industry.  (*)   Says  that  study: 

"If  strip  mines  and  mechanized  loading  minps  were  re- 
placed "by  mines  producing  at  the  same  rate  per  day  of 
labor  as  other  mines  in  the  United  States,  an  average 
of  525,240  persons  would  have  been  necessary  in  1930 
instead  of  493,202  actually  emoloyed.   Thus  the  potential 
loss  in  jobs  due  to  the  efficiency  of  these  mines  alone 
amounts  to  about  32,000."  *** 


(*)   Monthly  Labor  Review,  Fpbruary  1933,  pp,  256-278 
9837 


"Had  the  man-day  oatput  remained  at  the  same  level  as 
■■  ■   ■  in  1910,  722,584  persons  instead  of  the  493,202  actually 
employed  would  have  been  required  to  produce  the  1930 
tonnage  in  187  days  (the  average  number  of  days  of  opera- 
tion in  that  year);  while  for  the  1929  output  706,^32 
instead  of  502,993  persons  would  have  been  required." 

The  paper  rightly  concluded  that  "many  of  the  improvements  in  methods 
and  mechanization  cannot  be  measured  statistically  in  their  effect  on 
employment  opportunities."  • 

In  some  states,  stripping  operations  account  for  a  major  -oortion  of 
the  coal  -oroduced.   This  method  of  coal  recovery  is  almost  entirely 
mechanical;  mining  is  by  steam  shovel  and  loading  is  mainly  by  revolving 
shovels.   Daily  output  per  man  is  high,  and  costs  per  ton  are  relatively 
low  in  this  type   of  operation.   This  low  cost  coal  enters,  into  com- 
petition with  deep-mined  coal  loroduced  at  higher  average  cost,  with  a 
rapidly  narrowing  margin  of  quality  disadvantage,  although  qualities 
vary  widely  among  stripped  coals,   Strioping  contributes  its  share  of 
downward  pressure  on  prices  under  any  scheme  of  free  comnetition. 
Although  in  1933  only  5.5  percent  of  the  United  States  total  production 
was. from  stripping  mines,  these  mines  occupied  commanding  positions  in 
certain  states,  such  as  Kansas,  Missouri  and  North  Dakota,  with  over 
.60  percent  of  the  total  coal  output;  over  35  percent  of  the  total  in 
Indiana  and  Montana;  over  15  percent  in  Illinois,  and  over  11  percent 
in  Ohio,   With  the  possible  exception  of  the  coal  deposits  in  Kansas,  . 
it  is  doubtful  whether  the,  coal  reserves  of  the  United  States  that  may 
be  orofita.bly  mined  by  stripping  are  even  near  exhaustion;  the  possi- 
bilities of  expanding  the  annual  output  are  considerable.  (*)  The  nro- 
gress  of  mechanical  mining  may  be  summed  up  in  tabular  form: 


(*)   See  f/iinerals  Yearbooks;  also  Economic  Taper  No.  11,  "The  Econom- 
ics of  Strip  Coal  Mining,"  p.  3;  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Mines, 


9837 


-21- 


1-^  CTvCVI    CVJ    O    O 
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-pj-  irNLTMrMX^LrMTMrMPvirMOi lc^ j- 


r^  I —  c^j  CO  CVI  t^  J-  O  LO>^  ro  LPi 


1—1  1— 1 

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to  LPiu:!  r^  r--  KMr>  cr.'^o  i7>  o  rH  to 

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9837 


CM  to  -f  ir^^X)  r^  to  cTi  o  r^  oj  ■•' ,  -+ 

CM   O]   CM   CM   rvJ   CM   OJ   CM   i'-N  t^>  to  ro  KA 

c-^  o-\  o-\  o  1  en  'TA  c^^  o■^  T^  c^  t.n  en  en 


Fuel  economy  is  of  first  importance  as  a  factor  in  reduced  demand 
for  coal.   Losses  sustained  ojl  this,  apcpunt.  have  not  been  as  large  as  through 
other  causes,  hut  these  losses  are  permanent. 

"For  a  time  the  effects  of  the  moveraont  were  ohscured  by  the 
munitions  prosoerity  and  .the  .disturbed  conditions  of  coal 
supply  from  1916  to  1920.   Interest  in  preparation  lagged 
at  a  time  when  'anything  black'  was  saleable;  thousands  of 
mushroomlike  small  mines  diluted  the  supply  with  dirty 
coal;  and  war-time .zoning  regulatioAs,  priority  orders, 
strikes,  and  car  shortages  often  forced  consumers  to  accept 
coal  ill-suited  to  their  ne.-ds.   Thus,  it  was  not  unti:. 
after  1920  that  the  effects  of  fuel  econora7  b'  g^n  to 
register  themselves  in  the  national  demand.   Thereafter  the 
movement  gathered  momentum,  and  for  10  years  it  has  remained 
perhaps  the  most  important  single  factor  in  the  market, 
its  effect  remaining  long  after  the  immediate  stimulus  of 
high  prices  has  disaopeared.   The  c-omulative  result  is 
summarized  in  the  following  statement,  which  shows  the 
average  percentage  reduction  in  fuel  consumed  per  unit  of 
product  from  the  beginning  of  the  fuel  economy  movement 
in  1909  to  the  end  of  the  'oost-war  boom  inl929,   (Tryon, 
F.G-.  ,  and  Rogers,  H.  .0,  ,  .Statistical  .Studies  of  Progress 
in  Fuel  Efficiency,  Transactions:   2nd  World  Power  Conf . , 
Vol.  6,  sec.  12,  1930,  pp.  343-365) 

Percent 
Reduction 

Electric  public  utility  power  plants  66 

Steam  railroads 40 

Petroleum  refining 36 

Iron  furnaces,  steel  works,  and'  rolling 

mills i 25 

Cement  mills 21 

All  other  manufacturing,  apbroxiraately  21 


(All  industries  and  railroads  combined,  apurox  .......  33 

"The  average  reduction  in  all  industrial  and  railroad  uses 
combined  is  33  percent.   Stated  another  way,  had  there  been 
no  advance  in  thermal  efficiency  during  the  20  years  and  had 
the  efficiencies  of  •1909-  continued  without  change.   Ajnerican 
business  would  have  consumed  210,000,000  tons  more  of  bituminous 
coal  in  1929  than  were  in  fact  required, 

"Savings  during  this  oeriod  were  not.  sc  much  due  to  the 
appearance  of  epoch-making  inventions  like  those  of  Watt 
and  Nielson  as  to  the  cumulative  effect  of  many  small 
economies  and  to  the  general  application  of  improvements 
and  practices  which  the  best  plants  had  alrea.dy  shown  to 


9837 


-23- 


"be  profitable.  "  (*) 

linproveraent  in  fuel  efficiency  in  the  electric  oublic  utility  power 
ol.gnts  of  the  Unitt-d  States;  the  fuel  efficeincy  of  locomotives  in  road 
service  on  steam  railroads;  the  striking  economies  in  by-iDrodact  coke 
ovens  and  in  pig  iron  manufacture  -  as  shown  in  the  following  t^ble 
from  'J,  S,  Bureau  of  Min-^s  reports  -  are  examples  of  savings  that  ad- 
versely affect  the  tonnage  demand. 


(*)   Minerals  Yearbook  1932-33;  U.  S.  Portaa  of  f-in-^s;  id.  400 


34- 


EXAI..TLES   OF  FUEL  EC0N0I-,1Y 


Electric  Ptitlic 

Steam 

?iailroad 

By-Pro 

duct 

I 

ron  &  Steel 

Utility  Pov/er 

Locoraotives 

Cooking- 

Coal 

Blast  Furnaces 

Plants-Pounds 

Pounds   of 

coal 

equi"va,lent   of 

Pounds   of   coal 

of  fuel    cons-omed 

i:er-— 

the  gas, 

tar, 

per  gross   ton 

tj 

^  fuel   stations 
^r  kilowatt  hour 

and  oil 
ered 

recov- 

of 

fe 

pig  iron  and 

•D« 

1,000 

Cr. 

Pass, 

rro   alloys 

Year 

ton  niles 

train 

ITo.of    t 

ons 

Freigiit 

serv 

.    car  mi 

Las      (OOO) 

ornitt 

ed) 

1913. . 

2,600 

3637.2 

1914. . 





2,461 

3519.3 

1915.. 

, 

,....-■ 



3,280 

3351.2 

1916. . 



17^.,.. 

18.5 

4,375 

3421.1 

1917.. 



19.4 

5,432 

3523.6 

1918.. 



174. 

19.2 

6,785 

3577.1 

1919.. 

3.2 

164. 

18.1 

7,575 

3427 . 6 

1920.. 

3.0 

174. 

18.8 

9,316 

3420.8 

1921.. 

2.7 

162. 

17.7 

6,461 

3236.2 

1922.. 

2.5 

163. 

17.9 

9,058 

3186.4 

1923.. 

2.4 

161. 

18.1 

12,417 

3323.4 

1924.. 

2.2 

149. 

17.0 

11 , 628 

3248.2 

1925.. 

2.1 

140. 

16.1 

13,786 

3125.6 

1926.. 

1.95 

137. 

15.8 

15,394 

3048.4 

1927.. 

1.84 

131. 

15.4 

15,642 

3093.7 

1928.. 

1.76 

127. 

15.0 

17,426 

3053.4 

1929.. 

1.68 

125. 

14.9 

19,262 

2983.5 

1930.. 

1.62 

121. 

14.7 

16,923 

2978.5 

1931.. 

1.55 

119. 

14.5 

12,482 

2923.0 

1932.. 

1.50 

123. 

14.9 

8,572 

2910.8 

1933.. 

1.50 

121. 

15.2 

10,287 

2875.7 

1934.. 

1.45 

122. 

15.2 

11,505 

2926.7 

Figures   taken  from  United  States  Bureau  of  I.Iines  reports. 


9837 


Similar  economies  in  combustion  of  coal  hr.ve  also  teen  practiced 
in  all  Drriiches  of  industry  &.nd  have  even  reached  the  sma.ll  domestic 
user  in  his  home.   Improvements  in  house  insulation;  in  more  efficient 
radiation;  in  automatic  heat  controls.;  in  ^^'reatlv  improved  standards 
of  furnace  construction,  hs-ve  in  recent  years  sharply  reduced  the  con- 
sumption of  domestic  coal  ner  capita.   Still  further  economies  in  this 
direction  may  "be  anticipated  as  econom;^'-  device's  are  promoted  "by  far- 
sighted  coal  men. 

As  a  corollary  to  all  of  the  factors  of  combustion,  efficiency 
and  econongr,  it  must  "be  borne  in  laind  tlift  they  lia.ve  been  forced  on 
the  'coa.l  o-oerators  by  the  active  comvietition  of  other  fuels  and  if  they 
had  not  been  encouraged  by  him,  losses  to  other  fuels  would  hr.ve  been 
much  greater. 

Com-^eting  Fuels.  It  is  obvious  tha.t  the  level  of  prices  wMch  will 
move  coal  -co  market,  is  not  determined  by  the  industry;  largely  but  by 
the  ability  or  agility  of  consumers  in  satisfying  their  requirements 
from  among  all  the  fuels  ordered.   The  truth  of  this  is  written  in  the 
records  of  the  industry  during  the  past  E5  years.   As  shown  in  the 
following  table,  bituminous  coal,  at  the  opening  of  the  century  and 
until  the  close  of  the  war  in  191G,  was  the  so-orce  of  about  70  per  cent 
of  the  total  energy-supply  of  the  country.   Emanding  industry,  car 
shortages,  va.T   causes  and  other  factors  increased  the  delivered  price 
of  coal  to  several  times  its  former  value  from  1917  through  1923.   This 
led  to  the  use  of  substitutes — other  sources  of  enerQr. 

Afforded  every  incentive  for  ej-^anding,  the  comncting  fuels 
promptly  increased  their  output  and  agg;ressively  entered  the  market  in 
competition  with  coal. 

Althout^h  bituminous  coal  is  still  the  principal  source  of  energy, 
its  shru-c  of  all  ener^^  has  stca.dily  receded  to  the  comnaratively  low 
point  in  1954  of  46  per  cent  of  total  energy.   This  does  not  mean  that 
coal  v;as  actually  replaced  in  every  instajice  by  the  total  production  of 
the  other  .sources.   Of  the  total  quantity  of  petroleum  produced  in  1929 
(1,007  million  barrels)  only  S72  million  barrels  of  fuel  oil,  or  36.9 
per  cent,  were  consumed.   Of  these  372  million  barrels,  56  nullion 
barrels  were  used  as  fuel  by  oil  comorjiies,  93  million  barrels  were 
used  by  steamships  and  tarJcers.   Eliminating  these  tv.'o  items  as  apart 
from  the  domestic  competitive  picture,  leaves  323  million  barrels  or 
the  equivalent  of  51.86  million  tons  of  coal  which  may  more  properly 
be  considered  as  in  coimietition  with  coal.   The  apparent,  magnitude  of 
the  displacement  of  coal  must  be  carefully  examined  in  terms  of  the 
nature  of  its  use  as  well  as  the  geography  of  its  consumption.   Of  this 
residual  ?23  million  barrels,  California  alone  consumed,  for  all 
pur-ioses,  SO  million  and  Texas  52  million  barrels.   While  it  is 
difficult  to  measure  the  prq-jortion  of  coal  displacement  in  the  1929 
consunroticn  of  oil  (314  million  barrels  excluding  tha,t  used  by  oil 
companies),  it  is  proba,bly  less  than  one  fciurth,  or  the  equivalent  of 
about  30  million  tons,  accordin;;  to  the  I's-tional  Industrial  Conference 
Board. 


9C37 


The  same  careful  examination  must  be  made  of  natural  gas.   Elimina- 
tin;^:  t:ie  ^as  used  in  cai-bon-tlack  rmnufacturc  (261,107  million  cubic 
foot)  ar.d  field  and  refinery  use  (C08,812  million  cubic  feet),  848,000 
million  cubic  feet  remain,  which  the  national  Industrial  Recovery  Board 
classifies  as  "conrpetitive  '.Tith  coal."  That  portion  v.-hich  is  consumed 
in  Texas,  California,  Oklahoma,  335  million  feet,  if  combined  with  the 
gas  consuiiiption  of  Kansas,  Arkansas  and  Louisiana,  leaves  onlj/-  about 
Imlf   the  total  entering,  directly  into  comx)etition  with  coal. 

notwithstanding  the  severe  depression  years  of  1929-33,  the 
natural  j,as  industry  expanded.   Since  1929  the  competition  of  natural 
gas  lia.s  been  extremely  acute  in  certain  markets.   Instances  have  been 
alleged  of  natural  gas  offered  to  consuraers  at  rates  which  meant  that 
coal,  to  compete,  would  find  it  necessary  to  sell  at  approximately  the 
cost  of  transportation  alone,  in  some  instances  at  best,  a  few  nickels 
or  diaes  per  ton  at  the  nine  for  the  producer.   The  offer  of  natural 
gas,  as  well  as  oil,  in  some  of  the:  coal  markets  at  practically 
"dnj-nping"  prices,  liad  disproportionately  depressed  coal  prices  before 
the-  institution  of  IIEIA.  codes  and  price-fixing  in  bituminous  coal. 

This  inter-fuel  corrnctition.  calls  not  for  imposition  of  sup- 
pressing methods  so  much  ^s  for  coordinated  planning  and  the  develop- 
ment of  a  program  to  deal  constructively  with  the  problems  of  these 
natural  resources. 

number  of  I.Ijhes  and  Relative  Production  by  Size  Groups.   During 
the  post-v/ar  years,  a  large  but  diminishing  number  of  mines  remained 
in  operation.   The  accompanj'-ing  table  shows  the  number  of  mines  whose 
production  in  selected  years  placed  them  in  one  of  6  size  groups.  The 
figures  after  1923  a.re  not  strictly  coranoarable  with  those  for  1922  and 
1923  because  after  those  years  the  annual  survey  took  no  count  of  wagon 
mines  producing  less  than  1,000  tons  a  yea-T.      Uhile  the  total  volume  of 
such  mines  v.'as  almost  negligible  (between  1  and  2  million  tons),  the 
number  of  mines  was  considerable.   This  is  the  kinc.  of  mine  that,  in 
periods  of  tem.porarily  high  prices,  operates  as  long  as  the  market 
holds,  then  disappears  until  o-T^ortunity  again  appears. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  the  shift  in  percentage  of  total  number 
of  mines  thpt  occurred  during' the  years  1926  feo"1933,  when  liquidation 
in  bituminous  coel  was  continuous.   Mines" of  larger  tonnage  output, 
v/orking  on  reduced  schedule,  fell  into  a  size  group  v/ith  lower  pro- 
duction, Betv/een  1929  and  1932,  for  instance,  the  number  and  per- 
centage of  total  mines  in  the  largest  output  group  fell  from  209  to 
82,  from  3,4  per  cent  to  1.5  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of  mines,  and 
from  29,6  per  cent  to  17,9  per  cent  of  total  production.  At  the  same 
time,  although  the  number  of  mines  in  the  second  largest  output  group 
also  fell  from  618  to  383,  their  share  of  total  production  increased 
from  35,6  per  cent  to  37,8  per  centj  and  in  turn  the  number  of  mines 
in  the  100,000  -  200,000  ton  grou;n  dropped  from  845  in  1929  to  660 
in  1932,  but  the  latter  group's  sli£'.rc  of  total  production  increased  from 
17.9  per  cent  to  21.8  per  cent.   This  sMfting  undoubtedly  explains  in 
part  the  failure  of  the  "less  than  10,000  tons"  group  to  shrinli  pro- 
portionately in  numbers,  many  of  those  v/hich  dropped  out  of  the 
operating  statistics  being  offset  by  mines  whose  annual  output  under 

9837 


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9837 


depression  conditions  had  fallen  fro'i  over  10,000  tons  to  less  thp^n 
""that  lij.urc. 

The  openin^i  of  mines  formerly  closed  and  their  return  to  opera- 
tion under  the  recovery  influence  or  1934  is  clearly  shov/n,  par- 
ti cula.rly  in  the  small-mine  group. 

Consmnerr-ovmed.  or.  "Ca:otive"  ■  Mines .  .The  principal  industries  that 
operate  captive  mines  are  the  railroads,  puhlic  utilities,  'by-product 
coke  plants,  and  steel  plants.   In  ^'eneral  it  may  he  said  that  captive 
mines  are  operated  hy  industries  in  which  fuel  is  a  major  item  of  cost 
or  \7hich  require  an  unfailing  supply  of  special  quality  coal.   Ko 
published  statistics  v/ere- available  for -these  mines  until  a  detailed 
study  (*)  a,nd  report  uas   made  by  two  members  of  the  U..  S.  Bvireau  of 
Mines,  covering  in  detail  the  operations  of  19.?,4  and,  in  general,  the 
years  1915-1926.   Since  1929  statistics  of  the  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Mines 
are  partially  segregated  betv/een  captive  and  commercial  mines.   The 
follov/ing  table  summarized  the  available  6_ata  \7ith  respect  to  ca.ptive 
and  commercial  mine  operations  for  selected  years. 

From  these  da.tao  it  is  apparent  tha.t  a-oproximately  20  per  cent  of 
the  bituminous  coal  mined  in  the  United  States  is  talcen  from  mines 
that  are  operated  by  industries  whose  principal  business  is  other  than 
coal  mining.   Most  of  this  fuel , (87 .per . cent  in  1924)  is  used  by  the 
consumer-owner,  and  does  not  enter  directly  into  'the  competitive  market 
with  operator-owned  coal.   Indeed,  most  of  the  coal  rained  by  consumer- 
owners  in  1924  came  from  mines  that  offered  none  of  their  output  in  the 
commercial  markets.   The  ca.ptive  mines  east  of  the  Mississippi  are 
concentrated  principally  around  the  large  steel  producing  and  other 
industrial  center^. 

The  principal  consumer-owners  in  1924  were  steel  plants  with  232 
mines  which  produced  11.9  per  cent  of  all  bitiminous  coal  in  tha,t  year; 
railroads  v/ith  135  mines  and  5.6  per  cent  of  the  total  production; 
other  public  utilities  with  53  mines  and  1.9  per  cent;  by-product  coke 
plants  with  3§' mines  and  1.6  per  cent;  all  others  owning  191  mines  and 
2  per  cent;  total  captive  production  representing  23.1  per  cent  of  all 
coal  in  tha.t  year. 


(*)   Mineral  Resources' 1926,  Part  II,  p.  465 


98S7 


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PRODUCTIOr  OF  GAPTIVS  BITUl.'IilOUS  COAL  IH 
UITITBD   STaT-:]S  3Y  TSrZ  0?   Q::13R.    1924 


Pioduction 

:To.  of  ."lines 

Amount  (OOO) 

1>   of  Ca-otive 

\   of  Total 

Railroads 

135 

25,965 

24.15 

5.58 

Public  Utilities 

53 

9,039 

8.10 

1.87 

Sy-Product  Coke 

Plant  s 

38 

7,902 

7.08 

1.63 

Steel  Plants 

232 

57,593 

51.58 

11.91 

All  Other 

191 

10,154 

9.09 

2.10 

111,554 

100.00 

23.09 

9837 


-32-   -;.  ■ 

The  great  decrease  in  steel  production,  reaching  a  depression  low 
of  about  26  per  cent  of  capacity,  undouttedly  contributed  a  heavy  share 
of  the  decline  in  captive  coal  production  in  1931  and  1932.   It  also 
materially  affected  the  output  of  many  commercial  mines  whose  coking 
coal,  particularly  in  the  Pittsburgh  and  nearby  fields,  goes  to  the 
minor  steel  operations  and  to  supplement  the  captive  tonnage  used  by  the 
larger  steel  plants. 

The  average  value  per  ton  f.o.b.  mines  is  reported  at  a  higher 
level  than  that  of  strictly  commercial  coal.   Op>tive  mines  also  normally 
enjoy  a  more  dependable  outlet  for  their  production  and  show  a  larger 
number  of  days  operated  annually  than  do  commercial  mines.   In  1934, 
captive  mines  worked  an  average  of  194  days,  while  commercial  mines 
averaged  only  165  days.  In  Alabama,  in  1924,  37  captive  mines  averaged 
250  days,  although  commercial  mines  averaged  only  200  days. 

Transportation,  Freight  Hates.  Hevenue  from  Coal-(*) 

Labor,  the  largest  item,   constitutes  nearly  tv/o-thirds  of  the 
cost  of  production  at  the  mines.   The  transportation  cost,  or  freight 
rate,  is  the  largest  item,  on  the  average,  in  delivered  cost.   It  is 
surprising  to  note,  from  studies  by  the  Interstate  Commerce  Department 
in  1930,  that  the  transportation  charges  on  bituminous  coal  equalled 
approximately  56  per  cent  of  the  delivered  value  thereof,  which  com- 
pared with  5  per  cent  on  all  other  similar  commodities,  except  like 
mine  products.   By  1932  this  percentage  had  increased  to  64  per  cent  by 
reason  of  the  steadily  dropping  coal  prices. 

The  following  table  compares  average  value  of  coal  f.o.b.  mine 
with  freight  revenue  per  net  ton  received  from  bituminous  coal  by  rail- 
roads of  the  United  States: 


Year 


Avera^Tie  Value     Freight  Revenue 
per  Het  Ton       per  Net  Ton  from 
Bituminous  Coal   Bituminous  Coal 
f.o.b.  Mines 


1923 

1927 

1929 

1930 

1931 

1932 
Decrease  1923  to  1932 
Decrease  in  percentage 


$2.68 

$2.30 

1.99 

2.30 

1.78 

2.25 

1.70 

2.23 

1.54 

2.22 

1.27 

2.26 

$1.41 

$0.04 

52.6fo 

\.l1o 

T7hile  during  the  decade  1923-1932,  the  average  f.o.b.  mine  value 
of  bituminous  coal  declined  52.6  per  cent,  average  railroad  freight 
revenue  from  coal  remained  practically  the  same. 

(*)   Report  of  Research  and  Plaiining  Division  on  the  Bit\aminous  Coal 
Industry,  September  1933;  pages  27-30;  files  of  N.R.A.  Bituminous  Coal 
Unit. 


9837 


Prior  to  1923,  d-uring  the  1917-1920  period,  railroad  freights  on 
coal  almost  doutled,  lagging  behind  coal  price  increases  diiring  that 
period.  After  1920,  however,  coal  i^rices  steadily  trended  dovmward  until 
the  coming  of  the  K.E.A.  code  prices.   By  1932  they  virere  far  "below  the 
1917  level  of  $2.26,  to  say  nothing  of  the  1920  average  of  $3.75;  hut  the 
high  freight  rates  still  remained  in  effect,  the  only  general  reduction 
being  one  of  10  per  cent  in  1922. 

This  situation  clearly  pu.t  upon  bituninous  coal  the  burden  of 
meeting  competitive  fuel  prices  at  destination  points,  although  such 
fuels  contributed  little  revenue  to  the  railroads.   In  the  case  of  gas 
and  hydro-electric  power,  in  fact,  they  use  their  own  pipe  lines  and 
wires. 

The  decline  in  average  market  value  of  coal,  from  which  the  operator 
must  subtract  the  freight  rate,  had  by  1932  produced  an  almost  unbelievable 
distortion  in  the  relative  percentage  of  transportation  charge  to  the 
delivered  value  of  the  coal.   For  a  striking  example:   in  1914  Poca- 
hontas Riui-of-Mine  (from  smokeless  field  of  West  Virginia)  showed  an 
average  mine  value  of  $1.09  per  ton;  freight  rate  to  Hampton  Roads, 
Virginia,  tidewater,  was  $1.25;  the  skilled  wage  rate  was  25  cents  per 
hour.  A  comparison  of  these  figures  with  those  for  1932  shows  the 
following: 

1914         1932      Per  Cent  1932 

_1 is  of  1914 

Average  mine  value  of 

W.  Va.  Low  Volatile 
Freight  Hate  to  tidewater 
Skilled  Wage  Hate  per  hour 

Similar  comparisons  for  some  of  the  northern  coal  fields  would  be 
even  more  startling  in  the  relation  of  wage  rates  because  a  large  sus- 
tained advance  took  place  from  1914  on.   It  was  stated  that  these  figares 
do  not  mean  that  the  coal  business  was  profitable  in  1914,  but  do  mean 
that  all  the  progress  in  the  v/ay  of  efficiency  and  economies  at  coal 
mines  have  been  paid  out  largely  to  labor  and  for  supplies.   The  facts 
certainly  pointed  to  the  necessity  for  raising  coal  prices,  if  the  op- 
erators then  in  business  were  to  continue. 

An  idea  of  the  effect  of  the  recovery  program  for  bitiominous  coal 
under  K.R.A.  code  may  be  had  for  this  same  Pocahontas  field: 

Per  Cent  Increase 
over  1914 


1.09 

1.13 

104 

1.25 

2.25 

180 

.25 

.35 

140 

1914     1932     1934(*)  1932      1934 

Average  mine  value 

per  net  ton,  W.Va.  $1.09    $1.13    $1.87  4.        72 

Freight  Rate  to  tide- 
water, per  net  ton  1.25     2.25     2.25  80.        80. 

Skilled  Wage  Rate  per  Ist^   .525  110. 

ton  .25      .35  Last|:,657  40.       113. 

(*)   Source  of  this  coluim:  value,  U.S.  Bureau  of  Mines,  unpublished; 

Wage  Rates:  Schedule  A  of  N.R.A.  Code  for  Bitiominous  Coal  Intustry 
and  Schedule  A  of  Amendment  1  thereto. 

9837 


Were  the  figures  for  1935  available,  it  is  probable  that  the 
average  mine  value  y/ould  arppear  somewhat  less  than  the  $1.87  realized 
in  1934,  since  it  is  common  knowledge  that  coal  prices,  after,  the  code 
expired,  went  greatly  below  the  code  prices  in  eff&ct,  at  that  time. 
May  27,  1935.   The  freight  rate  to  tidewater,  on  the  other  hand,  was  in- 
creased by  a  15-cents  per  ton  surcharge  allowed  about  May  1935,  so  that 
the  1935  freight  to  tidewater  from  Pocahontas  field  w,^s  192  per  cent  of 
the  1914  rate. 

Unquestionably  freight  still  represents,  at  this  writing  (early  in 
1936)  more  than  half  the  destination  value  of  coal.   Although  the  1935 
average  freight  revenue  figure  is  not  yet  available,  it  must  be  rem.embered 
that  a  surcharge  of  from  3  to  15  cents  per  ton  on  bituminous  coal  was 
effective  in  May  1935,  thus  raising  freight  rates  in  a  year  featured  by 
a  collapse  of  mine  prices. 

Consumption:   Prior  to  the  world  war  consumption  of  bituminous 
cOal  followed  very  closely  the  curve  of  production.  There  vras  compara- 
tively little  storage  of  coal  -ontil  prices  began  to  rise  in  1917. 

If  the  pre-war  rate  of  growth  in  annual  production  had  continued 
uninterrupted,  the  annual  requirements  would  have  reached  760  million 
tons  by  1932,  or  about  2-^  times  the  tonnage  absorbed  by  the  market  in 
that  year.   The  following  table  shows  the  production,  changes  in  stocks, 
and  consumption  of  bituminous  coal  in  the  United  States  from  1917  to 
1934,  inclusive. 


9837 


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7Tcm   1929  all  "branches  of  conGumption  felt  the  effect g  of  depression 
until  cue  recovery  program  in  1933,  vmen  the  tide  v;as  stemmed  and  the  curve 
again  started  upv/ards.   The  decline  was  least  in  heating  of  huildings,  in 
domestic  tonna^^^-e  and  in  the  generation  of  central-stntion  power.   It  v;as 
greatest  in  the  metallurgical  industries  and  the  maniifact-ure  of  furncae 
coke . 

An  exrmple  of  the  effects  of  the  depression  on  changes  in  -practice 
in  some  industries  and  consequent  radical  reduction  in  the  consumption  of 
coal  may  he  found  in  the  use  of  scrap  iron  a.nd  steel  instead  of  pig-iron. 
The  U.  S,  Bureau  of  Mines  report  for  1?32  says: 

"Among  the  causes  of  the  flattening  of  coal  demand  after 
the  v;ar  is  the  increasing  use  of  scrap-iron  and  steel, 
v/hich  was  acted  to  slow  down  the  former  grov/th  of  pig- 
iron  ipanufacture  and  therefore  the  consumption  of  "blast- 
furnace Golce,   ***  while  the  output  of  steel  increased 

■  30  13  r  cent  from  the  :oeriod  1916-20  to  the  j^jriod  1926-30, 

.  the  output  of  pig-iron  increased  only  8  per  cent.   This 
did  not  meaij  that  the  .,Amei;iQan>  p,eopl.e  .we.rq,  using  less 
ir^n  tut  rather  tliat  an  increasing  proportibn  of  each 
year's  requirement'  was''  being  met  ■  froA  scrap.   Since'  iron- 
"blast  furnaces  are  ravenous  consimiers  of  fuel,  the  clia.ngc 

,had  a  powerful  influence  An  tiie  demand  for  coal^   Couples 
T/ith  advances  in  efficiency  of  furnace  operation  and  coke 

■*manufact:-ar..e ,  ,it  meant  that,  in  spite  of  a  large  'increase 
in  the-  constmiption  of  .steel,  the  country  actually  needed 
less  coking  stee"!  "td.  smelt:  j^ig-i'rph  in  192'9  "thiit  it  did 

•in  1316,   In  1916  the  "blast  furnaces  required  56,500,000 
tons  of  coking  coal  to  make  59,435,000  tons  of  iron.   In 
,  1929  they  got  along  with  63,200,000  tons  of  coking  coal 
to_ make -42,614,000  tons  of  iron,  yet  the  production  of 
steel  ;t/as  32  per  cent  greater  in  1929  than  it  v/as  in  1916, 

"Fortunately  for  the  producers  of  coking,  co.al,  tlicr6-ihas 
"been  a  lirge  .increase  In  the  CQna.uii¥'"fciO'n  .of.  coke  for  do-     • 
mestic  and  miscellaneous  industrial  uses,  vfaich  has  helped 
to  offset  the  stationery  or  declining  demand  for  metallur- 
gical coke," 

Consumption  "by  classes  of  consumers,  in  so  far  as  data  a.re  avail- 
a'ble  is  shov;n  in  the  follov;ing  tahle: 


9837 


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The  "all  other"   designation  includes  'both  industrial  and  household  or 
doiuestic  coal,  ITo  definite  data  are  c.vailahle  upon  which  to  make  a 
segregation  of  tne  domestic  tonnat~;e.   It  is  variously  estimated  to  run 
heijween  -  60  and  70  million  tons,  tne  writer's  oninioii  being  that  the 
figure  of  70,000,000  tons  is  perhaps  not  unreasonahle  for  1934,  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  ahout  S**, 000, 000  tons  of  antliracite  were  shipped  in 
tlTs.t  year  and  the  Retail  Solid  Fuel  Code  letter  of  transmittal  carried 
an  estimate  tf  the  total  of  retail  tonnati.e  as  125,000,000  tons.  (*) 

Stoolrs.  As  has  heen  previously  stated,  the  practice  of  mine 
storage  is  not  generally  followed.  Although  there  have  frequently  "been 
heavy  a,ccu-nulations  of  unbilled  car  loads  on  the  tracks,  this  practice 
has  proDahly  hecn  somev/nat  reduced  -onder  the  provision  of  the  II. H. A. 
Code's  trade  practice  rules,  forhidding  shipments  on  consignment , (**) 

By  far  the  largest  element  in  current  "bituminous  coal  stocks  is 
the  tonnage  in  the  hands  of  cor/imercial  consimiers  and  retail  coal  dealer: 
During  the  years  since  October  1,  1916,  covered  by  statistical  records, 
the  commercial  reserves  have  ranged  from  20,000,J00  to  75,000,000  tons. 
Since  1928  they  have  fluctuated  within  rather  narrow  limits,  ranging 
from  a  net  shrinkage  of  1,500,000  tons  in  1929  to  a  nat  gain  of 
3,174,000  tons  in  1933  and  another  gain  of  1,636,000  tons  in  1934.  (See 
table  of  Consumption  and  Stocks,  under  discussion  of  Cons-amption,ante) . 

A  comprehensive  sta.tistical  summary  by   significant  dates  from 
Octo"t'er  1,  1916  through  1934  is  shown  in  the  following  ta'ble: 


(*)   Code  of  Fair  Competition  for  the  Retail  Solid  Fuel  Industry; 
letter  of  transmittal;  Oodc  Record  files  of  li.E.A. 

(**)  IT.R.A.  Code  of  Fair  Competition  for  tiie  Bituminous  Goal  Industry, 
Article  VI,  S  ection  6 

9837 


STOCKS  OF  Biroumons  coal  is  hasps  ot  comherciji. 


S^snuEEs  ABS  IB  BmiL  iuLsas' 

lAEDS.  i,;^l,^  (. 

0 

tota  stock,  BBtlmatad, 
(thonaanda  of  tons)  i/ 

Days'    SodtdIt  at  Currnnt  lUte  of  Commnrotlon   on  Datn   of   Stnry  TnMii» 

By-Product 

Stael 

other  In- 

Coal  Cas 

nectrlc 

Batsll 

Sail- 

Total 

Dat. 

Coke  Plants 

Plant 

6     dustrles 

riants 

Utilities 

Dealers 

roads 

BltimlnouB 

1916  -  Oct. 

27.000 

Ho  data 

25 

Bo  data 

Ho  data 

Ho  data 

20 

(a) 

1917  -  Oct. 

15 

28.100 
39.700 

Be  data 
28 

27 

Bo  data 
72 

Ho  data 
39 

Ho  data 
15 

IB 

(b) 

I9I8  -  Jnl? 

27 

1*8 

31 

-  Oct. 

59.000 

32 

'^5 

71 

84 

'^7 

28 

29 

13 

-  Hov. 

11 

63.000 

35 

"^S 

71 

85 

49 

37 

31 

'•5 

1919  -  Jan. 

57,900 

32 

42 

65 

81 

49 

39 

32 

42 

-i*r. 

uo.Uoo 

23 

35 

47 

58 

48 

25 

Ho  data 

31 

1920  -  Bar. 

2U.000 

15 

9 

27 

31 

a 

13 

11 

18 

-  l-m»  1 

20.000 

8 

11 

24 

22 

10 

10 

15 

1921  -  Jan. 

U5.8OO 

29 

42 

64 

55 

44 

30 

11 

-^r. 

39.500 

28 

51 

'♦7 

66 

48 

26 

36 

-Hov. 

48,500 

^ 

67 

87 

5^ 

46 

31 

•♦3 

1922  -  Jan. 

w.ooo 

48 

51 

89 

51 

3i 

^ 

41 

-liar. 

52.500 

11 

43 

56 

82 

5>» 

23 

'*3 

-  Oct. 

26,000 

17 

^ 

38 

30 

18 

15 

21 

192}  -  Jan. 

l^Z 

19 

27 

60 

g 

18 

16 

26 

-  JT1I7I 

26 

35 

46 

89 

39 

28 

^ 

-  Oct. 

1 

60,000 

33 

11 

56 

91 

49 

36 

41 

192U  -  Jan. 

1 

62.000 

35 

11 

91 

51 

11 

44 

46 

-  Sapt 

.  1 

47.000 

30 

42 

90 

58 

42 

1*5 

1925  -  Itor. 

1 

44,000 

25 

30 

40 

78 

51 

33 

35 

37 

-Hoy. 

1 

48,000 

26 

32 

44 

78 

46 

30 

30 

35 

1926  -  Jan. 

1 

49,000 

26 

28 

39 

72 

48 

20 

27 

30 

-  if  Til   1 

40.000 

a 

24 

32 

60 

46 

14 

23 

26 

-  Oct. 

43.000 

26 

37 

11 

70 

1*5 

33 

35 

1927  -  Jan. 

55.000 

3>» 

50 

69 

'»7 

i 

37 

-ipr. 

75.000 

38 

73 

62 

77 

70 

59 

53 

-  Oct. 

61,900 

40 

^ 

62 

93 

69 

»*3 

48 

S 

192s  -  Jan. 

^^ 

3« 

44 

!2 

58 

27 

41 

-Apr. 

25 

35 

39 

60 

40 

3H 

-Oct. 

41,100 

27 

31 

37 

72 

56 

33 

35 

1929  -  Jan. 

41,800 

27 

3i» 

33 

72 

53 

26 

26 

31 

-  Apr. 

36.000 

19 

25 

26 

57 

^ 

17 

23 

25 

-  Oct. 

^.•3^ 

26 

27 

32 

64 

35 

20 

30 

1930  -  Jan. 

30 

31 

32 

67 

i2 

23 

a 

28 

-^p. 

33.100 

22 

25 

26 

58 

16 

19 

23 

-  Oct. 

35.900 

32 

32 

36 

68 

^ 

44 

22 

35 

1931  -  Jan. 

37.200 

38 

37 

31 

65 

27 

24 

31 

-  Apr. 

29.500 

26 

29 

27 

59 

1*7 

15 

20 

24 

-  Oct. 

3^.500 

49 

^ 

^ 

65 

52 

^ 

23 

39 

1932  -  Jan. 

35,500 

51 

62 

53 

31 

28 

37 

-Apr. 

30,050 

39 

H5 

35 

57 

60 

22 

30 

33 

—  Oct. 

27,500 
29.666 

55 

50 

38 

61 

52 

40 

23 

38 

1933  -  Jan. 

53 

38 

30 

68 

56 

18 

23 

27 

-  Apr. 

23,608 
34.137 

40 

37 

25 

63 

65 

21 

a 

27 

-  Oct. 

44 

41 

40 

70 

58 

43 

30 

40 

193^  -  Jan. 

32.71U 

53 

33 

J2 

71 

57 

23 

24 

32 

from  "Coal  tn  1930",  Ulneral  BasoxLTces,  I93O  Fart  II,  p.  682;  and  snoceedlcg  annoals,  U.  S.  Boreau  of  H 

B.B.A.  Bituminous  Coal  Unit. 

Tlgnres  for  1918  are  based  on  actual  connt.  Beginning  with  April  1,  1919,  figures  are  tiased  on  reports 

list  of  5,000  oonsmoers  Aose  stodcs  In  I9I8  bore  a  known  relation  to  the  knoim  total  stocks. 

Data  Incomplete.  Istlisatsd  as  22  da^s. 

Data  Inconplete.  Istlmated  as  21  da^s. 


fron  a  selected 


-40- 

Sales  Realization  and  Prices.   When  the  den  and  for  coc.l,  stiinulated 
diaring  the  war  rnd  post-war  period,  slowed  dovm  to  "  peace-time  rate  of 
activity,  tne  industry  was  left  with  the  greatly  espanded  productive 
ca,pa-city  previously  described.  At  the  same  time,  the  market  v/as  "being 
seriously  cuj:-ts.iled  hy  increasing  sxihstitution  of  other  fuels  and  rapid- 
ly improving  methods  of  coal  conhustion,  both  encouraged  by  the  high 
coal  prices. 

From  1913  to  1916  the  average  value  of  bituminous  coal  in  the 
United  States  varied  from  $1.13  to  $1,32  "but. in  1917  jumped  to  $2.26, 
just  doubling  the  1913  average.  Prices  continued  to  increase  until 
1920  when  the  average  value  reached  $3,75. 

These  averages  do  not  disclose  the  movements  of  Gpot-m.a,rket  prices. 
The  average  spot-market  climbed  from  $1.25  for  1913  to  $3.25  for  1917, 
when  Fuel  Adininictration  price  control  took  nold  and  held  it  on  an  even 
keel.   In  the  later  months  of  1916  and  earlier  months  of  1917,  in  fact, 
the  spot-price  averages  iia.d  run  v:p   rapidly  from  $2.26  to  over  $4.u0 
per  ton,  but  v/ere  set  back  to  $2.02  in  October  of  1917.   The  averages 
for  1918  a,nd  1919,  control  iuwing  been  removed  and  la,ter  reinstated, 
the  average  ran  $2.58  and  $2.59.   The  runaway  market  of  1920,  due  to 
a  switchmen's  strike  and  car  shortage,  boosted  prices  beginning  in  April, 
to  $3,85,  then  to  $7,18  for  June,  $9,51  for  August,  $8,52  for  September, 
and  by  December  had  settled  bac]c  to  $4,38,  for  a  year's  average  of  $5,64, 
After  that,  except  for  a  simila,r  flurry  the  last  lialf  of  1922  and  ex- 
tending over  the  first  quarter  of  1923,  during  v/hich  the  peak  was  $6,13 
for  August  1922,  the  trend  of  spot-prices  li3.s  been  generally  downward, 
A  brief  flurry  of  export  demis/nd,  due  to  a  British  coal  strike  in  1926, 
strengthened  spot-prices  temporarily,  after  whcih  the  sectional  price- 
war  described  in  the  second  part  of  this  chapter,  gradually  drove  both 
the  spot-and  contract-market  dovni  to  the  rxilmsias   depths  of  early  1933, 

Beginning  in  1923,  total  average  value,  or  re.alization,  of  bitujiiin- 
ous  coal  continuously  moved  covrnv'rard  under  the  combined  pressure  of 
competition  from  other  f.uels  and  gre3.t  strides  in  fuel  economy,  ably 
aided  and  abetted  by  the  price  and  wage-sca.le  battle  between  the  north- 
ern cju.  southern  coal  operators.  At  the  same  time,  operators  expended 
large  sums  of  modern  plants  to  increase  the  fuel  value  of  coal  by  better 
preparation;  a  part  of  their  despera.te  stru^jgle  against  loss  of  market, 
(Detailed  price  and  realization  treatment  will  be  found  in  the  second 
part  of  this  chapter  discussing  the  problems  of  the  industry;  also  in 
the  chapter  of  Realization  from  Sa.lcs  Under  the  Code.) 

Belovj  is  presented  a  tabular  presentation  of  the  average  value 
(realization  or  price),  and,  for  comparison,  the  average  spot-prices, 
by  years  beginning  v^ith  1913, 


f5837 


Averaf;e  Spot  Prices  and  Avera,?:e  Value,  at  Mines , 
for  Bi tuiTiinous  Coal,  1915  to  1935.  (*) 


Average 

$  1.18 
1.17 
1.15 
l.S 
2.26 
2.58 
2.49 
3.75 
2.89 
3.02 
2.68 
2.20 
2.04 
2.06 
1.99 
1.86 
1.78 
1.70 
1.54 
1.31 
1.34 


After  10  years  of  rvinous  decline,  the  average  value  per  ton  for 
the  United  States  as  a  vrtiole  turned  upward  in  1933  \mder  the  influence 
of  prices  fixed  in  accordance  with  the  N.H.A.  code  for  "bituminous  coal. 
For  purposes  of  comparison,  the  average  value  per  ton  at  mines  is  shown 
ty  I\f,E.A.  suhdivisional  ares.s  in  the  following  tahley  covering  the  pre- 
cede decade  and  ca.rrying  thro-ugh  1934, 


Average 

Year 

Spot 

Prices 

1913 

Prc-War 

$ 

1.23 

1914 

II 

1.14 

1915 

11 

1.12 

1916 

II 

1.85 

1917 

War 

3.25 

1918 

n 

2.58 

1919 

Post-War 

2.59 

1920 

II 

5.64 

1921 

II 

2.55 

1922 

II 

3.64 

1923 

II 

2.77 

1924 

II 

2.08 

1925 

II 

2.06 

1926 

II 

2.21 

1927 

II 

1.99 

1928 

II 

1.80 

1929 

II 

1.79 

1930 

II 

1.75 

1931 

1932 

1933 

(*)   From  Mineral  Resources;  1913-1922  U.  S.  Geological  Survey;  1924-31 
U.S.  Biu-eau  of  Mines;  1932-53  Minerals  Yearbook,  U.  S.  Bureau  of 
Mines;  Depa/rtment  of  Commerce  Lihrary 


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-43- 
THE  PIlOBLEM  of  THE  BITUMIMOUS  COAL  ITOUSTRY 


The  Bituminous  Coal  Code  effec6--d  tr-raendous  changes  in  the 
economic  status  of  zh^   coal  industry.   Free  competitive  -oractices  in 
the  marketing  of  coal,  as  well  as  labor  relations  in  the  industry,  were 
suT^erseded  by  entirely  new  arrangements.   In  place  of  fierce  competition 
for  markets  among  producers,  resulting  in  prices  almost  witnout  any  lower 
limit,  price-fixing  at  materially  higher  levels  was  established .   In 
place  of  an  uncoordinated,  chaotic  wage  structure,  with  its  many  attendant 
evils  in  th^  conditions  and  terms  of  employment,  an  overall  patern  of 
wage  rates  was  developed.   It  is  doubtful  if  any  industry  operating  under 
under  an  N.E.A.  code  experienced  greater  change  in  the  transition  from 
pre-God^"  to  code  operation. 

In  order  properly  to  appraise  the  effects  of  the  cral  cede,  it 
is  highly  desirable  to  describe  and  analyze  the  general  status  of  the  in- 
dustry prior  to  the  code;  and  to  se^k  out  and  present  the  economic  forces 
which  were  responsible  for  conditions  as  they  prevailed.   Even  prior  to 
the  depression  coal  was  termed  a  "sick"  industry.   V/hile  most  industries 
enjoyed  expansion  and  prosperity  diiring  the  decade  ending  in  1929,  the 
coal  industry,  after  1923,  experienced  an  ever-increasing  deflation  and 
liquidation.   The  urge  for  regulation  and  governmental  assistance  in  most 
industries  was  a  direct  product  of  the  depression;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
depression  merely  accentuated  the  problems  of  the  coal  industry  which  were 
already  producing  distress  tc  operators  and  employees  alike.   The  roots 
of  instability  in  coal  are  co  be  found  primarily  in  the  nature  of  industrial 
organization  for  the  exploitation  of  this  resource,  the  effects  produced 
by  the  World  War,  and  th^  development  along  geograpnical  lines  of  uncor- 
related  wag-^  and  labor-relations  policies. 

The  analysis  of  the  problem  of  bit\iminous  coal  as  it  existed 
prior  to  the  Code  will  b^'-  divided  for  purposes  of  this  presentation  into 
thr-^-e  parts  or  periods: 

a.  Economic  Developments  prior  to  1916. 

b.  Economic  Developments  from  1915  through  1923. 

c.  Economic  De  elopments  after  1923. 

Economic  Developments  prior  _to_  191_6 

The  bituminous  coal  industry  experienced  a  remark- 
ably steady  growth  up  to  1916.   In  only  two  years  since  189b  did  there 
occur  any  marked  r^cesr.ion  from  th?  upward  tPtend  -  in  1908  and  1915. 
Also  characteristic  of  th^  industry  as  far  back  as  th<=  statistical  record 
goes  (1880),  was  th^  condition. of  over-capacity  -  the  ability  to  produce 
from  existing  mines  in  excess  of  market  demands.   As  production  (demand) 
increased,  new  capacity  came  into  being,  with  the  result  that  average 
•perating  time  (d'>ys  worked)  of  mines  remained  relatively  constant.   This 
relationship  is  shown  statistically  in  the  following  table  which  gives 
the  average  annual  production,  average  capacity,'  and  average  number  of 

days  worked  for  5-year  periods  beginning  with  -1890. (*) - 

(*)   See  also  Cnarts  and  accompanying  tables,  which  follcw. 


9837 


production 

(Millions  of 

--^Ie.t.-T.Q;isl_ 

1390  -  94 

121 

1895  -  99 

155 

1900  -  04 

252 

1905  -  09 

353 

1910  -  14 

435 

44  - 

C?lcu.lated  Cai:^'^cit7  AverR,-;e  7o.  of 
(■.:il lions  of  tons  Days  V.'orl:ed  oy 
a.t  _308„Dciz?l-.-  -_:.^  -  Jiine s. 

ISl  208 

233  205 

350  221 

513  212 

622  215 


The  average  annual  increment  in  -oroduction  during  this  period 
v^as  over  15  million  tons,  while  that  for  capac.ity  grew  at  an  average  rate 
of  22  million  tons.   The  change  in  relationship  of  capacity  to  ^:>roduction 
is  expressed  in  the  average  vrorking  ti.ae  afforded  the  mines.   This  con- 
tinued at  a-:)proXliaately  70  loer  cent  of  theoretical  maximum  of  308  days. 
If  allowances  he  made  for  seasonal  demand  and  hreaicdowis  in  mine  operation, 
265  days  may  oe  considered  as  the  maximum  "ootential  operating  time  for 
the  industry.  (*)   On  this  corrected  h^sis  of  available  operating  time, 
the  mines  in  the  -n-e-war  -leriod  '.;ere  utilized  at  a'^nro::imaxely  80  ner 
cent  of  their  coacity. 

This  characteristic  relationship  of  production  ca.-oacity  to  mar- 
ket requirements  reflects  the  desire  on  the  ^lart  of  owners  of  coal  lands 
to  convert  their  fixed  resources  into  current  income.   The  national  re- 
serves of  coal  are  very  great  and  Toractically  all  of  those  east  of  the 
Rocl^y  liountains  are  privately  ovmed.  Even  nt  a  modest  estimate  of  two 
or  three  centuries  of  economically  availa'cle  rev,erves  (or  if  it  were 
only  100  years),  and  'vith  ovrnershi-o  vested  in  thousands  of  different  en- 
tities (coal  companies,  land  holders,  and  farmers)  the  ur  e  to  develop 
holdings  in  coal  lands  has  been  very  great.   Individual  operators  and 
o\7ners  have  often  found  the  burden  of  carrying  charges  and  taxes  very 
onerous  and  sought  to  mal:e  their  -properties  carry  themselves  by -put ting 
them  in  -oroduction.   Purthei-more,  owners  do  not  find  it  attractive  to 
hold  property  indefinitely  to  satisfy  demands  of  a  remote  fu.ture.  If 
f-unds  could  be  raised  through  bonds  or  stocks  to  finance  nev;  enterprise, 
there  v.'as  alv/ays  t"ne  o^:!-oortunity  for  promoters' '  prof  its,  to  say  nothing 
of  iDOSsible  profits  from  operation.   Thus,  as  the  demand  forged  ahead, 
capacity  maintained  roughly  its  "oroportion  in  advance  of  it.   The  allevi- 
ating element  under  these  circmistances-  \.'as  that  -oroduction  did  trend  uo- 
v/ard..  As  long,  as  production  increased  year  by  year  and  the  ratio  of 
capacity  to  production  did  not  materially  change,  the  burden  of  over- 
capacity could  not  be  considered  as  becoming  more  onero\is  or  difficult. 

Tlie  continued  expansion  of  ca-;:iacity  cannot  be  attributed  to  in- 
creased lorosperity  in  the  industry,  as  these  may  be  reflected  in  average 
realization  for  coal  af  the  mines  and  the  trend  of  wage  costs  uid  to  1916. 
Average  realization  remained  relatively  constpjit  for  the  15-year  period, 
1900  -  14,  as  follows: 

(*)-  F.  Or.    Tryon,  Anerica's  Caiiacity  to  Produce,  BrooJring'o  Institution, 


9837 


BITUMINOUS    COAL  PRODUCTION,  REALIZATION  ^ 
MINE    CAPACITY   .n  the   UNITED  STATES   1899-193^. 

1,000 


2.00 


K 

Net  income            J^ 

¥-  - 

B 

CT..«^-..,            1 

J 

o  '•• 

qt. 

Tr 

,       .r.^r.n 

""^"uoiyyulu 

Defied 

SOURCE:  U.S.GEOLOGICAi- S(J13VEY<ANO  U.S. BUREAU  Or  MINES. 
paCtVkRCD    BY     BITUMINOUS    COAL    UNIT 
DIVWCW   or  MVIEW.NR.A.       UNOEB    DI8ECT10N  OF    F.E.BEWJUIST. 


■CAR4CITY  UNDER  N.R.A.  CONDITIONS  AND 
WORKING  TIME  NOT  AVAILABi.E  .  DEFICIT 
EiTirvlATEO 


9837 


r 


^46- 


BITUMINOUS   C0,4L  PEODUCTIOW,   REALIZATION  Affl)  MINE  CA^^ACITY 
IN  THE  UITIT^,D  STATES.    1899-1934 


(C 


)iled   from   thp   annual   coal   r^ 


Production 
(Milliono  of 
net  tons) 

Calculating 
(Millions  •f 

ca-pacity 
net  tons) 

Value 
per  ton 

At  308  days 

At  280  days 

1899 

193 

212 
225 
260 
283 
279 

315 
543 
395 
333 
380 

417 
406 
450 
478 
^.23 

«  443 

•  503 

552 

579 

466 

569 
416 
422 
565 
^84 

520 
573 
518 
501 
535 

468 
382 
310,, 
334 
1/  3L.8 

254 

279 

309 
348 
387 
425 

460 
496 
520 
'  -.    531 
560 

592 
593 
622 

635 
668 

672 
673 
699 
719 
736 

796 
860 
916 
970 
871 

822 
821 
835 
760 
752 

770 
736 

653 

515 
2/ 

23d 

255 

281 
316 
350 
386 

417 
451 
473 
482 
510 

538 
538 
566 
577 
608 

610 
613 
636 
650 
669 

725 
781 
832 
885 
792 

748 
747 
759 
691 
679 

700 
669 
5C4 

559 
2/ 

$0.87 

1900 

1981 

1.04 
1.05 

1902 

1903 

1.12 
1.24 

1904 

1?05 

1^06 

1907 

190P 

1.10 

1.06 
1.11 
1.14 
1.12 

1909 

1910 

1.07 
1.12 

1911 

1.11 

1912 

1.15 

1913 

1.18 

1914 

1915 

1916 

1.17 

1.13 
1.32 

1917.... 

1918  . 

2.26 
■2.58 

1919 

1920 

2.49 
■  5.75 

1921 

2.89 

1922 

1923 

3.02 
2.58 

1924 

2.20 

1925. 

2.04 

1926 

2.06 

1927 

1.99 

1928 

1929 

1930 

1.86 
1.78 

i.ro 

1931 

1.54 

1932 

1.31 

1933 

1934 

1.54 
1/   1.82 

1^;  Preliminary 
2 '  No  data 

By  F.  G.  Tyron  a£Z.   V». 
Coal  Economics  Divlt: 

L*n^ 

U.S.   Bureau  of  Mi  nee 
October  28,   1935. 


9R37 


MEN 
(000) 


'9.000  900 


TRENDS    OF    EMPLOYMENT.   WORKING    TIME,   WAGE 
RATES    AND    LABOR    PRODUQTIVITY.     1899-1934 


900 

,. 

800 

/ 

\ 

/ 

1 
1 

<ih 

E 

S 

3E 
W< 

DR 

O 
Kl 

NG 

- 

-I- 

1 

\ 

\ 

/ 
i 
1 

^ 

^ 

y 

/ 

</ 

/^ 

\ 

\ 

^, 

":\ 

/^ 

^ 

1 

'/ 

< 

s 

^ 

'/ 

N 

\ 

S 

V^ 

■^ 

- 

■ 

^ 

/ 

^ 

/. ' 

1     1     1 

\ 

\ 

/ 

400 

ion 

^IIMII 

/ 

/ 

/ 

S( 

1 
)N 
^E 

D 
-1 

AY 
-L 

IN 

01 

G 

S 

1 — 1 
E_ 

~ 

—\ 

hj 

I 

"■v 

.. 

-1 

c 

.. 

200 

7 

; 

AY 

E 
ME 

WEST   VIRGIN 
DAYMEN'S    EAR 

A 

Mir 

•JG 

S 

- 

100 
0 

... 

- 

•■• 

K- 

D 

N^ 

5 

:a 

R^ 

l^ 

G 

5 

^ 

' 

- 

- 

\ 

~- 

' 

' 

- 

- 

' 

_ 

''^ 
J 

_i 

re 

_1 

_ 

-J 

R 
-J 

-J 

\N 

A 

1 
-J 

VE 

... 

R 

DA 

Y 

S   S   S   o  o    o 


DAILY 
WAGE 


TONS 
PER 
MAN 


.50  4.0 


(MOJNN(VfMW(^      rtPiS^ 


fl ^--D^^S 

IDLE       .IN        LABOR        DISPUTES-^ 

0                                           D 

■  nnii  niiiiii    ■ 

AYS         IDLE     -      OTHER  BCAUSES" 

J^^^^      ^^1 

^^^^1   ill  ^T     .   ^ 

0                        ^  _  ^  „  ^v'^ 

1  —  ,  ~  '"" 

1           •""  T 

DAYS          MINES           WORKED 

Mil       \ 

nSi^iiiilii 

iiiiiiliiiiiiiiiily^^i^^l 

8  ~siS!SKs;;i;ssSmP{;? 


mziiss  01  BiFLOTuziiT,  fOBKuo  foa,  uai  siTB  Aim  Luoa  FBomciiTin  ki : 


_  _  MWUIWHra  OttlL  WSB  IH  THJ  DSITE)  SliTB,  1899-193U 

(Col»a.  (1)   to  (6)  from  axmi^'r.poru'of  ib.  B.  8.  »ir«a  of  Uln..;  Colmn.  (7)  and  (g)  coopafd  from  rq»rt.  of  th.  U.  S.  »«•««  of  L 
Stallitlci;  Ooluim  (9)   froo  Report  of  th»  U.  3.   Coal  CobhImIod  end  Eli  Cod«) 

(3) ^!U)  (5)  (6)  _  _JJL  '*'  ^'^        


(1) 


(2) 


Average  number  of  dn/il 


I       Idle 


Lipatet» 


Average  dally  eamln«« 
all  daymen  covered  by 
Baroau  of  Leiior  Statll- 
tlot.  eanple  eurveyi 


Illlnoli  ecale 
Inside  daymen 
(tmcbaan} 


1905  . 

1906  , 
1907 
19O8 
1909 

1910 
1911 
1912 

1913 
IJIU 

1915 
1916 
1917 
1915 
1919 


1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 

\93U 


301. 

231. 

5 

3W 

lit 

225 

3 

1(38 

202 

8 

¥il 

211 

2 

1*78 

213 

SI  3 

231* 

1 

«ilfa 

193 

51*3 

209 

1 

-,^(, 

217 

35 

'i'^0 

211 

SU9 

223 

10 

572 

232 

5 

58U 

195 

19 

557 
■iSl 

203 

It 

230 

601 

2^3 

M^ 

21*9 

1 

622 

195 

25 

6140 

220 

6 

bbU 

11*9 

3 

bsa 

1U2 

73 

70-^ 

179 

2 

620 

171 

7 

^s 

195 

2 

■i44 

21'^ 

1 

'191* 

191 

1*5 

',22 

203 

503 

219 

(d) 

k^^ 

187 

2 

kV 

160 

3 

Mt 

11*6 

19 

1*19 

167 

9 

1.50 

5,813 
5.887 
5.71*7 
5.776 

5.592 

5.902 

5.726 
6,939 
3.319 


6.921 

8.033 

9.299 
9.331 

7.586 


5.891 
5.61*2 
5.1*27 
5.555 


(c) 
(c) 
(c) 

$i*.09 

(c) 

$5.37 


(c) 

$U.91 


(c) 

$l*.57 

(c) 

$3-25 


$3-55 

(c) 

$3.35 


(0) 

$3-19 

(c) 

$2.66 


2.28 
2.28 
2.28 

2.56 
2.1*2 

2.1)2 
2.56 
2.56 
2.56 
2.56 

2.70 
2.70 
2.85 
2.35 
2.85 


5.70  Nov. 

6.00  Apr..   7.50  Aii^. 

7.50 

7.50 

7-50 

7-50 


7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
6.10  I 


6.10 
6.10 
5.00     Aug. 

5.00 
5.00 


£  Includes  strikes,   suspensions,  and  lockouts. 

b  Includes  no  market  car  shortage,  mine  Irenlo-doimB .  and  all  - 

i  »o  dntr. 

d  Less   than  J  day. 

±  Surveys  made  between  Jpniurj-  and  liy. 

X  Surreys  made  between  October  1.   I921  anil  February  15.  1922. 

£  Barveys  made  between  October  and  December. 

h  Surveys  made  between  November  26.  I926  and  March  22.  1927. 

^  Survoyw  made  In  first  q-iarter. 

J,  Surveys  made  In  first  quarter. 

k  Surveys  made  In  February 

1  Utlmated. 

9337 


time  except  labor  die 


Prepared  byi  J.  d.  Tryon  and  W.  H.  Young, 
Coal  Iconomlce  Plvlilon, 
U.  S.  Bureau  of  Uinei. 
October  27,*  1935. 


19CC  - 

.  O-l- 

1.11 

1905  - 

-  ''>9 

i.  Iv.' 

1910  - 

-  14  — 

1.1- 

Resiats  for  incavidur.l  years  dep-.rted  somewhat  froni  these  averages, 
the  mr:xii.-va.i  in  1903  at  vl.24  per  ton  pnO.   the  minim-ojB  in  1900  rt 
Hil.04,   The  rbsence  of  rny  rppreciaole  upwrxd  trend  vould  appear 
to  favor  a  conclusion  that  the  extent  to  which  new  capacity  crjne 
into  hein-'j  r;as  hardly  justified.   Such  a  conclusion  cannot  bo  made 
without  evidence  of  the  profits  in  the  industry  daring  this  period 
pnd.   the  trend  of  costs.   In  this  connection  the  only  available  lines 
of  evidence  r.rc:  (a)  the  trend  of  wages  in  unionized  areas  (wages 
representin.'_;  roughly  two-thirds  of  cosy)  and,  (h)  costs  as  reported 
in  the  Cenna-.scs  of  Mines  and  Quarries  for  1902  ,^jid  1909. 

During  the  period  \3nder  review,  the  great  hulk  of  tonnage 
under  union  contract  T;as  in  the  Central  Competitive  Field  (com- 
prising Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio  and  Western  Poi-m?ylvania)  and  rep- 
resented for  this  period  over  a  third  of  the  national  output. 
Therefore,  tne  clmnges  in  v/agc  rates  for  this  area  are  signifi- 
cant as  indicating  the  trend  in  vagc  costs,  and  hence  total  costs. 
The  following  shows  the  union  scale  (haxic  rate)  in  Illinois  for 
inside  day  men  (traclonon): 

)er  day 


1900  -  02 

':'2.28 

1903 

2.56 

1904  -  05 

2.42 

1906  -  09 

2.56 

1910  -  11 

2.70 

1912  -  15 

2.85 

This  schedule  of  rates  for  Illinois  was  also  adopted,  with  minor 
variations,  in  tne  other  States  of  the  Central  Cem;octitive  Field 
and  represents,  in  a  general  way,  the  increases  in  wage  rates  that 
took  place  during  this  "cried.   These  increases  are  reflected  in 
the  laoor  cost  per  ton  for  the  industry  as  a  whole  as  hotv^een  the 
years  of  1902  and  1909.  For  those  years  the  labor  cost  per  ton 
for  all  production  was  70  cents  and  78  cents,   respectively,  ac- 
cording to  the  results  of  the  Ctmsus  of  Mines  and  Quarries.    The 
increased  cost  due  to  labor  alone  v/as  therefore  greater  than  the 
corresponding  incrca-se  in  the  realization  per  ton  over  this  period. 
The  Census  reports  also  shov;  certain  other  costs  besides  labor  costs, 
inclttdin^  salaries,  sup23lies  and  materials,  miscellaneous  expenses 
and  contract  work,  but  exclude  other  items  such  as  selling  e::ponscs, 
insurance,  taxes,  interest,  depreciation  and  depletion  charges.  The 
total  of  costs  covex"ed,  increased  from  92  cents  per  ton  in  1903  to 
$1.00  per  ton  in  1009.   As  between  those  two  years,  then,  the 
reported  costs  increased  8  cents  per  ton  while  realization  remained 
at  practically  the  came  levels. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  while  tne  opportunity  for,  and 
range  of,  profits  were  apparently  aiminishing  during  the  pre-war 


9837 


-50- 


period,    capacity  v/as  nevertheless  2ro^7ing  apace  v.'ith  prodv.ction. 
This   condition  of  chronic  ovorcapacity  has   come   to  he  accepted 
as  a  natrual,    if  not  necessary  resultant,    -uiider  laissez-faire   eco- 
nomic policy  for  this   industry-.      The   significant  point   to  be  de- 
rived from  the   foregoing  discussion  is   tiiat  under  a  condition  of 
expanding  markets  for  coal,    as  existed  prior  to   the  war,    and  the 
free  play  of  individual   enterprise  and  competitive  forces,    the 
■oossihility  of  an  eccnomic  "balance  "between  capacity  and  consixmp- 
tive   demand  appears   remote  of  accomplishment. 

Econom.ic  Developments   from  1916   to   1925 

Contrasted  with   the  preceding  historj"  of   the    coal 
industry,    the  pei-iod  from  1916   to   1923  stands  out  as  one  crowded 
with  unusual  developm.ents  with  tremendous   repercusoiona  through- 
out  the  industry,   as   the  events   transpired.        For  a  detailed  des- 
cription of  these  years,    reference   is  made   to   the  annua.l   coal 
cliapters   in  "Mineral  Hosourcos  of  the  United  States",   published 
by   the  U.    S.    Geological   Survey.     Among   the   important   features 
in   chronoligical   sequence  were: 

1916  -  Car  shortage   developed  in  October. 

Demands   of  cons\jmers   could  not  be 
fully  met. 

1917  -  Production  jumped   to   552,000   tons. 

Acute   car  shortage  and  coal   short- 
ago.      3stablishmont   of  Committee 
on  Coal  Prodiiction  of  the  Counsel 
of  National  Defense   to   regulate 
prices. 

I'Xiol  Administrator  appointed  to 
regulate  prices,   production  and 
distribution. 
.    Miners  granted  increased  wages   to 
cover  increased  living  costs. 
Average   realization  for  1917  was 
$2.26  per  ton  as   coi".pared  with 
$1.S2  in  1916  and  $1.14   for 
6--;rear  average   from  1910  -  15. 

,1918  -  Car  shortage    conti-.:ued   through 
early  months. 

1919  -  Strike   of  miners,    ITcvembcr  1,    to 
December  12,    tying  up  operations 
employing  415,000  men  in  22 
States,    shortage  of  coal   result- 
ing. 

Ro-cstablishment   of  powers   of  Fuel 
Adi^inist.-ation   to   cope  with  prices 


9837 


-51- 


ancl  distribution. 

1930  -  Switclmien's   stril:o  ■beginning 

April   1,    resultin,,   in  acute   car 
shortage. 

3uiiav7ay  prices   in   spot  rnarltet. 
Wage  increase  granted  "by  U.    S. 
BitiMninous  Coal  Commission,    aver- 
aging 27  per  cent. 
Average  realization  for  the  year 
was   $3.75  per  ton,    the   highest   for 
any  year  in  history. 

1921  -  Acute  post-war  depression 

1922  -  General   strike  affecting  460,000 

miners  and  73  per   cent   of  produc- 
tive  capacity,    lasting  almost   five 
months. 

Strike  of  railway  shopmen     beginning 
July  1,    resulting  in  acute   car  short- 
age. 

Average   sales   realization  was   ;^3.02 
per   ton,    second  only   to    that  for 
1920. 

In   terms  of  the  problem  which  later  encompassed  the   in- 
dustry,     the  most   important   developments  during   the   1916  -  23 
period  relate   to  prices,   profits,    capacity  and  wage   rates. 

Prices;      Althou^^h  demand  leaped  forward  in  1916,    1917  and 
1918,    the   effect  on  prices  was  accentuated  "by   factors  other   than   the 
physical   capacity  of  the  mines.      Difficulties   in   rail   transportation 
and   the   supply  of  cars   to   the  mines  made   for  actual   shortage   of   coal 
to   consumers  as  well  as  developing   fears   of  inade'q\3ate   supplies   in 
the   future.      The   inadequacy  of   transportation   facilities  plus   the 
miners'    strikes   of  1919  and  1922   resulted  in  a  material  diminution 
of   the   supply  of  coal   tliat   otherwise  might   liave  been  available   for 
consumption  and  the  maintenance   of  adequate   stocks  by  consumers. 
With  the  uncertainties   of   coal   supply  brought  about  by   the   events 
previously  listed,   prices   took  a  very  irregular  course.      This  lack 
of   stability   in  prices   is   shown   in  the   following  Chart  and  Table, 
which  give   the  average  monthly   spot-prices    (sales   on   the   open  mar- 
ket).     It  will  be  noted  that   from  the  middle   of  1S16   through  1923 
the   course   of  spot-prices  was  very  irregular  s.nd  reached,    at  differ- 
ent periods,    fantastic  levels.      The  important   causes  of  sharp  changes 
are   shov.Ti  on   the   cliart. 


9837 


•  s  as   follows: 

01.15 

per  ton 

1.32 

It        11 

2.26 

II        II 

2.58 

M            II 

2.4S 

11            II 

3.75 

II            II 

2.89 

n         II 

3.02 

n         11 

2.68 

II         II 

-52- 


The  tonnage  represented  "bv  spot  sales  ordinarily  averages  about 
25  per  cent  of  the  total  tonnage,  the  remaining  73  per  cent  "be- 
ing sold  on  contracts  and  not  sutject  to  vide  fluct-uations  in 
prices.   The  average  realization  for  all  sales  (spot  plus  con- 
tract) during  this  period  was 

1910  -  15 

1916 

1917 

1918  ■   ■ 

1919 

1920 

1921 

1922 

1S23 

VJhile  prices  from  1917  to  1S23  average  well  over  double 
those  of  the  pre-',7ar  y.cars,  labor  and  supply  costs  also  were  advan- 
cing.  The  only  evidence  of  the  rolatiwo  prosperity  of  the  indtistry 
is  to  be  fo-ond  in  the  reports  of  the  Internal  Hgvcnuc  Bureau  of  the 
U.  S.  Treasury  Department. 

Profits;    The  first  shoring  of  income  data  for  the  indus- 
try is  for  the  year  1917,   In  that  and  the  four  succeeding  years, 
the  industry  reported  enonnous  not  profits,  aggregating  $29,000,000 
over  deficits  even  in  the  depression  year  1921,  and  a  quarter  of  a 
billion  dollars  in  1920.  Although  data  are  not  available  for  1922 
and  1923,  these  years  were  undoubtedly  more  profitable  than  1921, 
judging  from  the  comparative  production  and  price  levels.   These 
huge  profits  served  as  inducement  to  increased  investment  in  the 
industry.   liany  operators  extended  their  holdings  to  the  limit  of 
their  resources,  and  the  alluring  prospects  drevj  in  many  i.'ho  previous- 
ly had  ha,d  no  connection  with  the  industrj^. 

Increase  in  ITimber  of  Minos  and  Capacity;   Although  the  all- 
time  peak  in  production  was  reached  in  1918, the  continued  high 
prices  and  liberal  profits  brought  in  new  increments  of  capacity 
until  1923,   The  following  sliows  the  growth  in  the  number  of  mines, 
annual  capacity,  vrith  annua.l  "oroduction,  days  operated  and  number  of 
men  cnrploycd  from  1315  to  1923:  (*) 


V. 


(*)  rroi.-.  annur>.l  reports  "Mineral  Resources  of  United  States",  U.  S. 
Geological  Survey 


9837 


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Production 

(Millions    llo.  of   at  308  days 

of  ijet  Tons)  Minos   (Million  Tons) 


Ann-ua.l  Capacity   Avg.  IIo.   Av;i;.  llo.  Men 
Days       Employed 
Operated   (Thousands) 


1915 

443 

5,502 

672 

1916 

503 

5,726 

673 

1917 

552 

6,939 

699 

1918 

579 

8,319 

717 

1919 

466 

8,994 

736 

1920 

569 

8,921 

796 

1921 

416 

8,038 

860 

1922 

422 

9,299 

916 

1923 

565 

9,331 

970 

20S 

557 

230 

561 

243 

603 

.  249 

615 

195 

622 

.220 

640 

149 

664 

142 

688 

179 

705 

Between  1915  and  1923  the  number  of  mines  increased  "by 
4829  and  capacity  increased  by  almost  300  million  tons.   In  1918, 
the  year  of  peak  production,  the  average  operating,  time  Y7as  249 
daysi  the  highest  for  any  year  of  record.   Had  new  developments 
been  halted  at  that  time,  the  industry  would  have  achieved  a  great- 
ly improved  economic  porforms.nce,   Hcvevor,  during  the  succeeding 
5  years  ending  vdth  1923,  .the  number  of  mines  increased  by  1,029, 
and  capacity  increased  by  253  million  tons,  to  the  all-time  peak 
of  970  million  tons  on  a  308-day  basis.  Although  1923  production 
was  only  14  million  tons  less  than  tliat  for  1918,  the  working 
time  averaged  only  179  days.   Conversly, ,  as  the  working  time  dimin- 
ished additional  men  were  being  -'.dded  to  the  rolls  of  the  industry, 
with  the  result  that  90,000  more  were  employed  in  1923  than  1918. 

Wage  Iteitcs;   Wage  rates  were  advanced  rapidly  during  the 
1916  -  23  period.    It  lias  been  pointed  out  earlier  in  this  discus- 
sion that  wage  rates  were  moving  up  gradually  during  the  pre-war 
years,  the  rates  for  skilled  inside  men  in  the  Central  Competitive 
Field  increasing  from  $2.28  to  $2.85  per  day,  or  25  per  cent,  be- 
tween 1900  and  1915.   During  the  ensuing  years,  the  increases  were 
much  sharper.  Cornparison  of  rates  for  inside  skilled  labor  (track- 
men) for  Illinois  (unionized)  and  for  Logan  and  Pocahontas  fields 
in  West  Virginia  (non-uiiion)  give  the  general  trend  in  the  Appalachian 
and  Central  regions,  which  embrace  over  35  per  cent  of  the  nation's 
total  nroduction. 


9837 


Illinois  pj 

1915 

$2.85 

1916 

3.00 

1917 

-..60  Apr, 

5.00   Oct, 

1918 

5.00 

1919 

5.70  ITov, 

1920 

6.00  Apr. 

7.50  A-ug. 

-56- 
Logan  Field  t/ 


3.20  J-une 
4.00  Dec. 


4.00 


4.00  J-ojie 
5.44  Dec. 


5.00  JiJiiie 
7.04  Dec. 


Pocahontas   Field  \l 

$1.80 

1.96 

2.40  J-une 
3.73  Doc. 

3.78 

3.73  J-unc 
4.80  Dec. 


5.60  June 
7.12  Doc. 


1921 


7.50 


7.04  J-ono 
J. 12  Dec. 


7.12  June 
5.35  Doc. 


1922 
1923 


7.50 


7.50 


5.13  JiJJie 
7.04  Doc. 


4.00  J-une 
6.60  Dec. 


a/     From  U.   M.   W.    oi  A.    contracts 

t/     From  U.    S.    Coal  Commission  reports.    For  dotailed  v/agc  data,    sec 
Cha-Dtcr  IV  ■ 


S tat-as  of  the   Industry   in  1935 

The  year  1923   stands  as  a  lino   of  demarcation  "b  e  two  on  two 
periods  of  contrasting  tendencies  in   the  coal   industry.      During  1916 
to   1922   the  industry  v/as  "besot  v/ith  events  which  greatly  modified 
the  earlier  trends.      The  characteristic  growth  in  pte-war  produc- 
tion ceased  after  the   forward  surge  of  1916,    1917  and  1918.     Car 
shortages  and  far-reaching  strikes  hold  in  check  the  normal  produc- 
tive activities  of  the  minrjs,    which  in  turn  made  1915  to   1923  a' 
period  -      characterized     hy  actual  or  threatened  scarcity  in  the 
nation's' coal   supplies.     Prices  and  profits   reached  levels  never 
remotely  approached  in  pre-war  days.     As  a  consequence,    hew  invest- 
ment in  the  industry  expanded  mine   capacity  tremendously,    so   tliat  in 
1923,    in  which  production  was  only  i;lightly  under  the  1918  peak, 
the   excess  of  capacity  was  greater  than  for  any  ye&.r  in  the  history 
of  the  industry.        The  n-uraher  of  men  employed  also  at'taincd  an  all- 
time  peak. 

This   condition  of  great  capacity  was   further  acccnt-uated  by  the 


9837 


freedom  from  shortages  of  transportation  facilities.   Thro-ughout 
raacli  of'  the  1916  -  22  period,  the  limiting  factor  in  production 
was  the  ahility  to'  get  empty  cars  at  the  mines.  By  the  second 
q-uarter  of  1923,  this  Gittiation  disappeared  as  a  check  on  mining 
activities.   From  that  time  on  the  transportation  facilities  h^ave 
"been  adequate  to  handle  any  demand  on  the  part  of  the  coal  indus- 
try.  Competitive  activity  in  the  coal  markets  were  thus  freed 
from  a  most  important  restriction  of  the  preceding  years,  a  re- 
striction wMch  had  operated  to  materially  increase  and  sustain 
prices  of  the  preceding  seven  years.       .       /•■.■, 

Significant  also  in  terms  of  developments  in  succeeding 
years,  was  the  level  of  wages  in  the  industry.  Generally  speak- 
ing, the  peak  of  wage  rates  for  the  industry  as  a  whole  was  attain- 
ed in  1920.   In  the  union  areas  these  continued  in  force. in  1923. 
In  the  non-union  areas,  the  rates  had  dropped  materially  in  1921 
but  were  restored  in  1922,  cither  in  their  entirety  or  very  suhstan- 
tially,  so  that  these  rates  were,  on  the  average,  not  materially 
below  the  1920  levels.   As  compared  with  1915  and  1916,  the  evi- 
dence would  seem  to  support  the  conclusion  that  the  general  wage 
levels  in  1923  were  double  or  more,  those  of  the  earlier  years. 
The  exact  increase  is  not  important  --the  fact  that  large  increases 
had  occurcd  made  possible  considerable  cuts  in  the  rates  in  the 
competitive  straggle  that  developed  in  succeeding  years. 

S-urrmarzing  the  general  situation  in  1923  we  find: 

1.  The  number  of  mines,  n-umbor  of  errroloyecs  and  productive 
capacity  at  their  all-time  peaks, 

2.  Prices  at  high  levels, 

3.  Wages  at  high  levels,  and 

4.  Car  shortages  and  other  impediments  of  the  preceding  years 
removed. 

Hindsight  clearly  indicates  tlmt  the  developments  of  succeeding 
years  were  incvita,ble. 

Economic  Developments  from  1924  to  1933 

Trend  of  Production;   The  peak  of  production  in  the  industry 
was  reached  in  1918  after  which  the  production  curve  flattened  out, 
with  the  trend  from  1S18  to  1929  slightly  downward.   While  details 
of  production  and  other  data  for  the  industry  a.rc  covered  in  other 
chapters,  attention  is  here  called  to  broad  clianges.    The  average 
annual  output  for  5-year  periods  beginning  with  1911  is  as  follows: 

1911  -  15  ~  440,000,000  tons  ■ 

1916  -  20  ~  534,000,000  tons 

1921  -  25  ~  483,000,000  tons 

1926  -  30  —  519,000,000  tons 


9837 


Only  rne.year,  1926,  during  the  iDeriod  of  deflation,  achieved  production 
in  excess  of  550, 000, 000-  tons,  while  this  achievement  ^■7as  reached  in 
four  years  of  the  preceding  period,  1917,  1918,  1920  and  1923.   This 
levelling  off  in  production  is  in  mprked  contrast  to  the  relatively 
steady  growth  up  to  the  nar.   The  pverage  annual  increase  from  1900 
through  191S  was  ap-oroximately  20  million  tons  per  year.   It  is  signi- 
ficant to  note  that  had  this  annual  increment  continued  until  1929,  the 
production  for  that  year  would  have  "been  in  the  aporoximate  magnitude 
of  800,000,000  tons.   The  actual  production  for  1929,  a  year  of  excep- 
tionally high  industrial  activity,  was  only  555,000,000  tons.   Thus, 
it  is  seen  that  during  the  period  under  review,  the  industry  did  not 
"benefit  from  the  increments  of  demand  so  characteristic  in  the  rre-war 
years. 

Tnere  is  no  doubt  that  many  operators  and  students  of  the  indus- 
try expected  that  the  growth  of  the  pre-vrar  days  would  assert  itself 
again  after  the  post-war  readjustments  were  complete.   The  failure  of  tnis 
expectation  or  hope  is  of  fundamental  significance  in  the  evaluation  of 
the  factors  which  loroduced  the  problem  of  bituminous  coal. 

Although  the  total  fuel  and  energy  requirements  of  the  country  did 
increase  until  1929,  the  proportion  supplied  bv  bituminous  coal  de- 
creased.  The  trends  of  production  and  consumption  are  treated  in  detail 
elsewhere  in  this  report.   Suifice  at  this  point  to  mention  the  major 
factors  which  operated  to  cheek  the  growth  of  coal  consumiTtion.   Most 
important  has  been  increased  efficiency  in  the  utilization,  particularly 
by  large  industrial  plants,  electric  public  utilities,  and  railroads. 
As  the  result  of  improvements  in  fuel  burning  equipment  by  steam  rail- 
roads, the  average  requirements  per  1000  gross  tontrmiles  of  freight 
were  reduced  bv  28.8  per  cent  bet'-een  1919  and  1933;  in  electric  power 
plants  the  coal  used  to  generate  one  kilo'-'att  hour  of  power  was  reduced 
53  per  cent.   Changes  in  the  fuel-using  industries,  such  as  the  substitu- 
tion of  scrap-iron  for  virgin  pig-iron,  has  reduced  ttie  use  of  coke; 
the  amount  of  cokin.-:  coal  to  smelt  one  ton  of  pig  iron  was  reduced  19.6  per 
cent  "between  1919  and  1933.   The  use  of  b^-product  ovens  in  place  of  the 
bee-hive  coke  ovens  account  for  a  saving  of  19  per  cent  in  that  fuel  use. 
Another  factor  has  been  the  substitution  of  cetroleum  products  and  natural 
gas,  and  the  rapid  development  of  hydro-electric  power,  all  of  which  has 
resulted  in  considerable  displacement  in  the  utilization  of  coal.   The 
exact  measure  of  the  influence  of  all  these  factors  on  the  trend  of  coal 
consumption  is  not  ascertainable,  but  the  evidence  is  clear  thut  the 
aggregate  effect  has  been  to  appreciablv  reduce  what  otherwise  "'ould  have 
been  tne  demand  for  coal. 

Mine  Realization  (Value  of  Coal,  feO.b.  Mines)!   The  prices  of 
bituminous  coal  went  to  unprecedented  levels  during  the  wpr  and  post- 
war years,  and  beginning  with  1924  and  thereafter,  until  the  Summer  of 
1933,  went  through  a  continuous  do-'-n^'ard  spiral  of  deilation.   The  fol- 
lowing table  shows  tne  trend  of  averr::;e  mine  realization  for  th(?  indus- 
try as  a  whole: 


9837 


Per  Ton 

1900  - 

04 

^- 

$.1.11 

1905  - 

09 

— 

1.10 

1910  - 

14 



-1.14 

1915 



.1.13 

1916 



1.32 

1917 



2.25 

1918 

— 

2.58 

1919 

— 

2.49 

1920 



3.75 

1921 

— 

2.89 

1922 

— 

3.02 

Fer  Ton 

1923  — 

$  2.66 

1924  — 

2*20 

1925  — 

2.04 

1925  — 

2.06 

1927  — 

1.99 

1926  ~ 

1.86 

1929  — 

1.76 

1930  — 

1.70 

1931  ~ 

1.54 

1932  — 

1.31 

1933  — 

1.34  (*) 

1934  — 

1.75  (** 

Prices  from  1917  reflect  the  unusual  conditions  in  the  iniastry 
until  1923.   Car  shortpges,  strikes  of  miners  and  of  rpilway  switchmen 
pnd  shopmen,  zoning  and  budgeting  of  the  industry  under  the  J?uel  Ad- 
ministration, anthracite  strike,  British  coal  miners'  strike  and  other 
factors,  along  rith  unprecedented  war  demands,  kept  lorices  at  unusual  le- 
vels.  Normal  competitive  pressure  of  available  capacity  agr-inst  the 
market  demands  of  this  period  failed  because  unusual  circumstances 
thwarted  their  expression.   By  the  latter  half  of  1923,  we  find  the  be- 
ginnings of  readjustments  from  the  abnormal  developments  of  the  pre- 
ceding seven  years.   The  enormously  built-UD  capacity  for  production 
was  then  freed  to  exert  its  pressure  uron  a  more  or  less  stabilized  demand. 
The  result  i^-as  a  continuous  deflation  from  1924  to  the  Su  iraer  of  1933 
(except  for  the  year  1926~).   From  1923  to  1929  realization  decreased  one- 
third,  and  for  1932  it  "ras  less  than  one-half  oi  1923.   The  decline  from 
1923  to  1929  took  -place  in  a  period  of  general  business  prosperity  when  th^ 
average  of  commodity  prices  '='ps  relatively  stable.   Co:nDarison  of  the 
index  of  wholesale  prices  for  all  commodities  (Bureau  of  Labor  Statis- 
tics) with  that  of  avera  :e  realization  for  bituminous  coal  folloi"s: 

(Index  Number  1923  =  lO'j) 


All  Commodities 
Wholesale 
Price 
Index 


Bituminous 
Coal,  f.o.b. 
Mines,  Avg. 
Sales  Realiza- 
tion 


Bituminous 
Coal  under 
All-Commodity 
Index  


1923 

1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 


100 
97.4 

132.9 
99.4 
94.8 
95.1 
94.7 


100 
82 


1 

76.1 
76.9 
74.3 
59.4 
56.4 


0 
-15.3 

-25.6 
^22.5 
-20.5 
-25.7 
-28.3 


Financial  Losses  in  the  Industry;   As  a  consequence  of  intense 
competition  and  the  fall  in  prices  indicated  in  the  preceding  paragraphs, 
(*)   Code  adopted  Octoc  r  2,  1933,  —  fixed  prices  thereafter  until 
(**)  May  27,  1935 


9837 


-60- 

the  'biturainous  coal   industry  as  a  whole   slio'Ted  deficits  during  the 
prosperous  years  for   industry  generally,   which  carried  through  1S29. 
For   three  years    (1925-28-29),    concerning  which  Bureau  of   Internal  Re- 
venue figures   are   availahle  for  "bituminous  coal,    the 'industry   showed  net 
deficits,    that   is,    deficits  of  deficit-reporting  corporations  exceeded 
the  net   income  of   income-reporting  corporations.     Only  4  other  industries 
in  1928,    as   classified  oy  the  Bureau  of   Internal  Revenue    (out   of  91    in- 
dustry groups),    namely,    woolen  and  worsted  goods,    shipbuilding  ,and  re- 
pairing,   aerial   transportation  and  joint    stock  lend  hajihs,    showed  net 
deficits  during  the  period  1925  to  1929.      This  e:cperience  of  the  coal 
industry  is   in  marked  contrast   to  the  five  year  record  of  1917  to  1921, 
when  profits  of  the  industry  were  enormous.      (See  following  Chart   cjid 
Table.) 


9837 


Decreane^  in  Number  of  Ivanes.jyL.d  CgjgaXiiJXi   The  high  prices  and 
enormous  orofits  in  the  industry  served  as  ajrole  inducement  for  nev;  en- 
terprises to  enter  uoon  coal  jaining  .-uid  for  those  already  established  to 
increase  their  -oroductive  capacity  either  by  opening  ne\i   mines  or  en- 
larging the  rate  of  outnut  of  those  already  in  existence.  As  a  result, 
the  number  of  mines  grer?  from  5,502  in  1915  to  9,331  in  1923,  exclusive 
of  those  mines  (country  banks)  whose  out-out  i.7as  less  than  1000  tons  per 
yeai-.  After  1923  the  nunber  of  mines  decrear,ed  year  by  year,  numbering 
6,057  in  1929  and  5,427  in  1933.  Productive  capacity  also  folloTred  the 
same  trend,  increasing  from  672  million  tons  on  a  308-d8y  basis  in  1915 
to  970  million  tons  in  1923.   It  is  significant  that  capacity  continued 
to  increase  for  five  years  after  the  pealc  demand  year  of  1918,  not  in 
terms  of  increasing  demand  for  coal  but   in  response  to  the  continued 
high  level  of  prices.   Ctipacity  declined  to  752  million  tons  in  1929  and 
615  million  tons  in  1933. 

Tilth  ca-Dacity  sjid  demand  so  far  out  of  balance  in  1923  and  with  the 
checks  of  previous  years  removed,  it  i.7as  but  natijj"al  that  prices  should 
fall.  And  as  orices  fell,  operating  mines  found  it  necessary  to  curtail 
costs,  go  into  bankru-otcy,  or  voltintarily  retire  from  o-oeration.   The 
principal  item  of  cost  is  labor,  v/hich  is  also  the  one  most  easily  adjust- 
ed.  In  spite  of  the  .great  dor/n'7ai-d  revisions  of  T7ages  which  took  place 
after  1923,  many  mines  could  not  survive  the  continued  deflation  in  pri- 
ces.  The  problem  of  bituminous  coal  after  the  inflated  war  and  post-wax 
periods  may  be  considered  as  focusing  on  three  factors:  (l)  excess  capa- 
city against  a  limited  market,  resulting  in  (2)  intense  price  competition 
to  hold  a  share  in  the  market,  resulting  in  (3)  the  brealiing  down  in  the 
wage  structure  in  order  to  obtain  lo'-'er  costs  and  preserve  existence. 
The  situation  thus  naturally  developed  into  a  vicious  spiral.   Continued 
operation  was  dependent  on  reducing  prices  low  enough  to  retain  markets; 
reduction  of  prices  was  dependent  upon  ability  to  keep  costs  at  a  level 
no  higher  than  prices,  in  order  to  remain  solvent.   Thus  developed  the 
situation  sjnong  producers  in  which  survival  raepjit  ability  to  cut  costs 
and  as  labor  constitutes  60  -  65  per  cent  of  total  costs,  this  item  con- 
sequently bore  the  brunt  of  attack,  iioreover,  many  of  the  other  items 
of  cost  such  as  ta^-es,  s-apolies,  pov.'er,  insiira^ice  and  other  items,  are 
fixed  and  outside  the  power  of  the  operator  to  cut. 


9837 


Net  Income  °^  Deficit  °^^^^  Bituminous  Coal  industry. 

Prior  to  Deductions  ^^^  Tax,  ^^^  Specif ied  Years 

4                                          1917   -  1934^                                 1 

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9837 


The  Center  of  the  Coal  problem;   Althoiigh  other  sections  of 
industry  passed  through  similar  experience,  the  main  prohlem  in  coal 
has  "been  concentrated  on  the  great  Appalachian  Region  and  Central  Re- 
gion, comprising  the  States  of  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois, 
Kentuc!-^,  West  Virginia  and  Virginia.   This  area  has  represented  since 
the  var  period  "between  85  and  90  per  cent  of  the  total  production  in 
the  industry.   It  constitutes  the  great  economic  unit  or  entity  of  the 
industry,  and  the  various  sections  thereof  are  affected  directly  or  in- 
directly by  the  competition  of  every  other  section.  A  drastic  wage  or 
price  cut  in  one  area  eventually,  often  immediately,  makes  itself  felt 
in  the  other  arer.s,  through  loss  of  tonnage,  price  and  wage  cuts,  and 
an  effect  on  the  established  flow  of  coal  to  markets.   Therefore,  an 
analysis  of  the  trends  of  production,  capacity,  employment,  prices  ?.nd 
Traces  for  this  area  will  serve  to  picture  the  problem  and  analyze  the 
nature  of  the  conflicting  forces  within  the  industry,  with  their  in- 
evitable consequences. 

Shifts  in  production  from  Area  to  Area;   Both  a  cause  and  effect 
of  insta.bility  in  the  bituminous  coal  industry,  has  been  the  shifting 
of  production  from  one  ares  to  ajiother,  changes  in  the  natxire  of  con- 
sumer demand,  to  strikes,  suspensions  and  lockouts,  changes  in  freight- 
rate  structure,  and  chpnges  in  the  competitive  relationship  in  prices. 
Of  these,  the  most  imoortant  in  cumulative  effect  has  been  that  result- 
ing from  changes  in  price  rela.tionships,  T'hich  in  turn  were  made  possi- 
ble through  disparities  developed  in  the  wage  structure. 

The  outstanding  example  of  shifts  in  production  is  that  which 
occ'.'xred  among  the  seven  sta.tes  under  discussion,  and  took  place  duiring 
the  period  of  the  Jacksonville  Wage  Agreement  (1924-27).   The  explana- 
tion of  this  convulsion  within  this  area,  resulting  as  it  did  from  price 
and  wage  instability,  goes  to  the  very  core  of  the  bituminous  coal  prob- 
lem. 

The  statistical  record  of  shifts  in  production  are  given  in  the 
following  tables  and  ch?rt.   For  convenience  in  these  and  later  tables 
and  charts,  the  four  states  north  of  the  Ohio  River  are  labelled  Group 
"A"  States,  vihile  Kentucky,  Yvest  Virginia  and  Virginia  comprise  Group 
"B"  States.   First,  attention  is  called  to  the  record  of  production 
from  1898  to  1916.   It  will  be  seen  that  production  in  Group  "A"  States 
increased  188,000,000  tons  between  the  two  years,  and  119,000,000  tons 
in  Group  "B"  States.   Though  in  absolute  magnitude  Group  "A"  States 
forged  ahead  more  rapidly,  the  ra.te  of  increase  was  much  greater  in 
Group  "B"  States.   The  greater  rate  of  increase  is  accounted  for  mainly 
by  the  fact  that  several  of  the  important  producing  areas  in  the  south 
were  first  tapped  during  this  period.   Much  of  the  railroad  development 
occurred  during  this  time  in  the  Group  "E"  States,  whereas  in  the  Group 
"A"  Ste.tes  the  railroad  network  was  already  relatively  complete.   It  is 
significant  to  note  that  production  gained  simultaneously  in  both  groups 
during  this  entire  period.   In  contrast,  the  increase  in  Grouo  I'A"  States 
ceased  with  the  peak  production  reached  in  1918,  while  the  trend  con- 
tinu.ed  uTD^ard  in  the  Group  "E"  States  through  1927. 


9837 


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9837 


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Omitting  from  consideration  the  trends  during-  the  war  end. 
su.cceeding  years  through  1922,  daring  vhich  unusual  circ\i!nstances 
already  referred  to  held  ST7ay,  the  course  of  production  after  1923 
deserves  special  attention.   For  Group  "E"  States,  production  in- 
creased from  164  milliou  in  1923  to  221  million  tons  in  1926,  an  in- 
crease of  57  million  tons,  while  during  the  same  period  production 
dripped  44  million  tons  in  Group  "A"  States.   The  pre-war  cha,racter- 
istic  of  simultaneous  growth  in  the  tv/o  areas  was  replaced,  after  1923, 
ty  the  most  rapid  incree^se  ever  achieved  by  the  Group  "B"  States,  end 
large  absolute  losses  in  Group  "A".  Exsraination  of  price  levels  for 
the  t\70  areas  sheds  significant  light  on  the  new  trends, 

delation  of  Price  and  Shipment  Changes;   During  the  pre-war 
period,  the  differentials  in  prices  (mine  realization)  "between  the  tY/o 
areas  remained  relatively  stable  and  narrow.  For  the  entire  period, 
the  average  of  annual  realizations  for  Group  "B"  mines  was  only  10 
cents  a  ton  below  tha^t  of  Group  "A"  mines,  with  a  maximum  of  15  cents 
in  13S9  and  1900.  During  the  1917  -  1923  years,  the  average  of  annual 
ree.lization  v;as  greater  for  the  southern  mines  than  the  northern.   In 
the  su.cceeding  yee.rs  the  differential  in  realization  favoring  the  Groxip 
I'B"  States  v/as  as  follovrs; 

1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 

1Q29  

1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 

These  spread.s  are  in  marked  contrc.st  to  those  of  earlier  years 
?:ad  are  of  sucn  magnitude  a-  to  .aodify  tlie  currents  of  flow  in  coal  in 
the  highly  competitive  markets.  The  relationships  of  prices  and  the 
chr^nges  in  production  between  the  t\70  areas  during  the  1923  -  1953 
period,  o.re  shown  in  the  follov-ing  table  and  charts. 

In  these  the  da.ta  for  realization  and  production  are  converted 
into  indexes,  with  1923  as  base  for  each  series.   For  1924  and  1925 
the  divergence  in  price  levels  between  the  two  areas  in  greatest  a.nd 
reflects  the  greater  ability  to  reduce  pr:».ces  in  Group  "B"  axea.   The 
narrowing  of  the  differential  in  1926  reflects  the  active  demand  of 
th:,t  year,  production  being  only  second  to  that  in  1913.  At  the  sane 
tiine  the  relation  of  the  production  curves  vra,s  reversed,  the  index  num- 
ber for  Group  "L"  rising  to  134  and  that  for  Group  "A"  falling  to  85, 
THiile  the  price  relationship  in  1927  rema^ined  practically  the  same,  the 
proc.uction  curves  grew  wider  apart,  due  mainly  to  the  prolonged  strike 
-  follovring  the  erpiration  of  the  Jacksonville  Wage  Agreement  in  Group 
"A"  States.   In  1928  Pennsylvania  ojid  Ohio  were  non-\mion,  therefore 


38 

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9837 


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alDle  to  reduce  woge  costs  and  prices.   The  drop  in  the  level  in  that 
year  for  Group  "A"  is  largely  determined  by  the  reductions  in  those 
tno  St  tes.   Ho'^ever,  this  drop  vas  met  "by  Group  "B"  States,  so  the 
relationship  of  prices  remained  practically  the  same.   The  production 
cu-rves  rrere  also  affected  in  1928  due  to  strikes  in  Illinois,  Indiana 
and  Ohio  adversely  affecting  the  year's  shoeing  in  Group  "A"  and  favor- 
ing Group  "E" .  After  1928,  the  differential  in  realiza,tion  reduced  con- 
siders.bly.   Wliile  prices  in  general  if/ere  falling,  those  in  Group  "A" 
dropped  more  rapidly.  As  a  conseauence,  the  production  in  these  Sta.tes 
did  not  decline  r,s  rapidly  as  that  in  the  southern  states.   In  other 
uords,  the  trends  of  1924-26  v;ere  then  reversed,  both  as  to  realization 
s.nd  production.   In  the  keen  competition  for  markets  after  1923,  it  is 
apparent  that  the  Group  "B"  States  had  a  distinct  advantage  in  prices 
a,nd  gained  a  larger  share  of  the  market.   The  question  na,turally  arises, 
~hy  1,761-6  not  the  Group  "A"  States  able  to  meet  the  level  of  realization 
of  the  Groiip  "B"  States  a,nd  thus  retain  their  proportionate  share?   The 
principal  reason  appears  to  lie  in  the  relative  ability  to  reduce  costs 
of  production,  thereby  creating  opportunities  for  reduction  in  prices. 

Trend  of  Vfege  Rates  and  Labor  Costs;   Since  labor  costs  consti- 
tute 60  to  65  per  cent  of  total  costs  of  production,  the  relation  of 
wage  rentes  to  prices  cpn  be  readily  appreciated.  Moreover,  much  of  the 
remainder  of  costs  is  made  up  of  fixed  elements,  such  as  royalties, 
taxes,  power,  insurance  and  worlvtien's  compensation  payments,  etc.   It 
was  natural,  therefore,  that  the  efforts  of  operators  to  meet  the  price 
competition  should  be  accompanied  by  pressure  on  the  most  vulnerable 
part  of  their  costs  and  the  one  \¥hich  offered  the  possibilities  of  sig- 
nificant reduction.   In  the  deflation  of  prices  resulting  from  intense 
competition  after  1923,  '7age  rates  ?rere  progressively  reduced  to  the 
low  levels  of  the  first  half  of  1933. 

Beginning  in  1920,  the  Central  Competitive  Field  was  under  con- 
tract at  the  highest  level  of  wages  ever  achieved.   These  rates  were 
continued  until  April  1,  1924,  at  T.'hich  time  they  were  extended  under 
the  Jacksonville  Agreement  until  April  1,  1927.   On  tlie  other  hand,  onlj 
four  districts  ha.d  wage  contracts  in  1920  -  Ksn-'wha,  JMew  Pdver  and  Fair- 
mont in  Uest  Virginia,  and  Western  Kentuclcy  -  and  these  were  only  par- 
tially under  agreements.   Contractual  relations  continued  until  1921 
in  the  Hew  Hiver  Field;  April,  1924  in  Kanawha  Field;  April,  1325  in 
TTestern  Kentack^r.   The  wage  scale  in  northern  West  Virginia  was  extended 
by  the  Baltimore  Agreement  from  April  1,1924,  until  April  1,  1927.   All 
other  areas  in  Grcap  "B"  States,  comprising  the  bulk  of  production  in 
this  area,  were  without  -anion  v/age  agreements  throughout  this  entire 
period.  Therefore,  as  far  as  the  influence  of  wage  contracts  on  the 
xie^e   scales  in  concerned.  Group  "B"  States  may  be  considered  as  prac- 
tically freed  from  the  restrictions  of  wage  agreements  while  Grovip  "A" 
Sta.tes  were  tied  to  contracts. 


9837 


After  the  signing  of  the  Jacksonville  Agreement  in  1924,  the 
Sou-thern  States  vrere  in  a  preferred  position  in  cutting  prices  "by  re- 
ducing 'vages.   In  the  keen  competition  resulting  from  the  great  excess 
of  mine  capacity,  the  Group  I'B"  States  i--ere  atle  to  cut  further  than 
the  Group  "A"  States,  as  already  described.  T/ithin  a  year  f)i"ter  the 
signing  of  the  Jacksonville  Agreement,  V,estern  Pennsylvania  operators 
deuanded  a  revision  of  the  contract  heca.use  of  loss  of  "business  to 
southern  rivals.   Failing  this,  many  of  the  mines  ^ere    closed  in  April, 
reopening  in  August  on  a  non-union  "basis  with  reduced  wage  scale.   There 
\7as  also  some  "brerl:dov/n  in  Ohio,  and  in  the  Fairmont  district  of  northern 
■Jest  Virginia..  3y  the  end  of  the  contract,  all  those  operators  thF.t 
carried  through  the  Agreement  refused  to  continue  and  a  large  strike 
ensued.  As  a  conseqaence ,  all  of  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  (with  minor  ex- 
ceptions) "became  non-union  and  Illinois  and  Indiana  continued  their  con- 
tracts to  the  end  of  the  coal  year,  flarch  31,  1928.  After  another  strike, 
Illinois  and  Indiaxia  renewed  contracts  on  a  reduced  "basis  of  $6.10  ysr 
day  for  the  "basic  inside  skilled  (tracl-onen)  classification,  as  compared 
\7ith  the  $7.30  ra.te  "onder  the  old  agreement. 

In  the  meantime,  wage  rates  in  the  non-ujiion  areas  of  Group  "3" 
ha/,  little  of  permanence  or  stability  in  them.  As  it  "becajne  necessta-'y 
to  cut  costs  to  keep  or  gaan  mr,r':ets,  wage  ra,tes  "became  subject  to  at- 
tack. 

The  best  indication  of  the  trend  of  wage  rates  is  to  be  found 
in  the  series  of  reports  published  by  the  IT.  S.  Burea.u  of  Labor  Statis- 
tics, entitled  "Hours  and  Earnings  in  Eitiominous  Coal  kining",  beginning 
with  1919.   In  order  to  simplify  the  presentation  of  these  data  a,  cha.rt 
.,nd  tahle  have  been  prepared  combining  the  results  for  Group  "A"  oiul 
Gro'LTo  "li"  States. 


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Unfortunately  the  data  on  ho-urly  es.rning-s  are  not  available 
for  each  year,  and  represent  only  the  earnings  at  the  period  in  'hich 
talren,  therefore  failing  to  note  variations  within  the  year.   Consider- 
ing first  the  earnings  for  all  men  in  Group  "A",  it  will  be  seen  on  the 
chart  that  hourly  earnings  continued'  fairly  constant  from  the  1921~22 
observation  until  the  1926-27  observation.   The  straight  drop  reflects 
the  brealcing  away  by  some  producers  in  Group  "A",  notably  in  the  Pitts- 
burgh district,  beginning  in  1925.   The  observation  in  1S29  shows  a 
marked  decline  from  1936-27,  showing  the  break  which  took  place  after 
the  expiration  of  the  Jacksonville  Agreement  in  1927.   Contrasted  with 
the  trend  in  Group  I'A"  States)  we  find  a  sharp  break  after  1921-22  in 
the  Group  "B"  States,  which  reflects  the  exercise  of  freedom  to  modify 
wa/:'e  scr.les  in  the  latter  area.  The  disparity  in  the  hourly  earnings 
attained  in  1924  continued  with  slight  change,  until  the  1926-27  observa- 
tion. Thereafter  the  spread  in  hourly  earnings  materially  lessens  as 
shown  in  the  observation  for  1929*.  "  Thereafter,  the  disparity  remains 
relatively  constant,  the  cutting  in  wages  in  one  area  being  offset  by 
decreases  in  the  other.  After  1927,  the  two  curves  fairly  nose-dive, 
so  that  by  1933  hourly  earnings  in  Group  "A"  States  were  49  per  cent 
less  then  in  1921-22  and  54,3  per  cent  less  for  Group  "B"  States, 

The  ratios  of  hourly  earnings  in  Group  "B"  States  to  those  in 
Group  "A;"  are  sho^n  also  in  the  table  and  chart.   Ftilling  from  91.5 
per  cent  in  1921-22  to  79  per  cent  in  1924,  the  level  dropped  slightly 
in  the  1925-27  observation  and  rose  sharply  in  1929,  followed  by  further 
decline, 

Financial  Status  of  Industry  1924  -  1953;   In  the  process  of 
declining  prices  and  liquidation  of  wages,  what  of  the  financial  pin- 
tu.re  of  the  industry?  Referring  again  to  the  Chart  and  Table  following 
page  no,__^  the  story  of  income  as  reported  by  the  Bureau  of  Internal 
Sevenue  is  shown.  Unfortunately  data  are  not  available  'for  -bituminous 
coel   alone  for  several  of  the  years,  but  it  should  be  noted  that  for 
the  generally  prosperous  years  of  1928-29,  the  industry  showed  con- 
siderable net  deficits. 

Summary  of  1934  -  .1933  Period;   From  the  discussion  of  shifts 
in  production,  prices,  T/,?ges  and  financial  status  of  the  industry,  it 
is  clecr  that  these  elements  are  closely  interwoven  in  the  fabric  of 
the  industry.   The  evidence  indicates  that  the  .iridu.stry  is  one  of 
chronic  over  capacity,  which  in  tifrn  results  in  intense  competitive 
pressure  to  gain  a  share  of  a  limited  market.   In  order  to  gain  and 
hold  a  share  that  will  afford  reasonable  running  time  and  costs,  prices 
8.re  slashed  to  satisfy  a  bijyer's  market,  and  vvith  the  lowering  income 
from  coal  sales  the  wages  of  miners  must  be  slashed. 

In  a  sitos.tion  in  which  a  p.-rrt  of  the  industry  is  -under  wage 
a^gree.viont  and  another  is  not,  the  former  is  placed  at  the  mercy  of  the 
latter,  TJ'ithout  any  stabilized  v/age  or  price  levels,  the  industry  is 


9837 


doomed  to  endless  confusion  and  despair,  as  vitness  the  developments 
after  1927.   It  is  often  argued  that  the  industry  should  he  permitted 
to  carry  out  its  competitive  struggle  to  the  hitter  end,  thus  elimina- 
ting the  economically  weak  "ijnits.   This  process  continued  for  ten  years 
after  1923  without  any  approach  to  a  stahilized  condition.   In  1932^ 
the  capacity  of  mines  in  operation  was  ahout  douhle  the  requirements 
of  that  year.  With  any  improvement  in  demand  and  in  prices,  many  idle 
idle  mines  representing  millions  in  capacity  are  ready  to  return  to 
active  operation  and  continue  the  previous  chaotic  conditions.   If 
mines  were  automatically  and  permanently  withdrawn  from  future  activity 
"by  virtue  of  inability  tc  withstand  financially  the  stress  of  declining 
prices,  the  argument  for  liquidation  might  he  acceptable.  But  inability 
to  meet  fixed  obligations  often  merely  results  in  financial  reorganiza-  - 
tion  cud  the  wiping  out  of  all  or  part  of  these  obligations,  and  con- 
tinx-'^.tion  in  operation.   The  inability  to  maintain  wage  levels  offers 
but  the  choice  of  reduction  of  wages  or  closing  down.   In  most  instances 
miners  as  well  as  operators  are  willing  to  concede  that  a  half  loaf  is 
better  than  none,  and  so  the  wages  are  forced  within  the  limits  imposed 
by  en   ever  declining  realization  for  coal. 


S837 


-78- 
TEE  FOHLULATION  0?   THS  CODE  OF  ?XI.R  CO'TETITIOIT  lugER  TH5  NATIONAL 

iMi)Us?::iAL  TS:COY£:'::  :M  of  i93g 


Activities  in  the  coal  industry  looking  toward  the  formulation  of  a  Code 
of  Fair  C«mnetition  were  initiated  at  an  early  date,  -ore ceding  "by  sorae  two 
weeks  the  Tjassage  of  the  National  Industrial  Eecovery  Act,   On  June  5,  1933 
over  a  h-'ondred  coal  operators  asserahled  in  Washington  on  the  occasion  of  a 
meeting  of  the  National  Association  of  Manufacturers.   They  were  addressed  hy 
General  Johnson,   A  Committee  was  named  "to  prepare  the  outline  of  a  Code  that 
would  serve   as  a  guide  to  all  -oroducing  fields  that  decided  to  submit  a  code 
to  the  Government"  .   This  sugjested  code  was  raaile'"'^  to  the  memhersnir)  of  the 
National  Coal  Association  that  same  week.   On  June  15  this  Committee  re-oorted 
to  the  National  Association  meeting  at  Chicago.  (*)  'This  so  called  model  code 
was  later  descrioed  as  "a  very  general  and  much  exnuri^'ated  affair  Tsractically 
ignoring  the  controversial  -ooints  in  connection  with  collective  hergaining, 
hours,  wages  and  prices".  (**) 

By  June  24  it  was  reported  that  code  work  was  making  substantial  progress. 
Meetings  were  in  progress  or  arranged  for:  at  Denver  for  the  Colorado  -  New 
Mexico  operators,  for  Uta.h  and  Southern  Wyoming  operators;  at  Fort  Smith  for 
the  Arkansas  -  Oklahoma  Association;  for  Kansas-Missouri  o-oerators  who  had 
reached  an  agreement  in  wages  and  hoMrs  with  the  United  Mine  'Workers;  at 
Terre  Haute  for  three  Indiana  operators'  associations;  at  Pittsburgh,  attended 
by  operators  from  Western  Pennsylvania  and  Ohio;  at  Washington,  D.  C.  of 
Central  Pennsylvania  operators;  at  Comberland,  Maryland  for  Georges  Creek 
and  Upper  Potomac  operators;  Smokeless  operators  met  at  Fnite  Sulphur  Springs 
and  arranged  a  conference  with  Appalachian  operators;  and  Alabama  coal  mine 
operators  met  a  Birmingham.   The  National  Coal  Association  forecast  the  sub- 
mission of  codes  present^  d  with  substantial  accuracy,  predicting  five  major 
districts: 

Rocky  Mountain  District  -  Utah,  Montana,  Wyoming,  Colo- 
rado and  New  Mexico. 

Southwest  -  Ar':ansas,  Oklahoma,  Kansas,  and  Missouri. 

Central  -  Icwa,  Illinois,  Indiana. 

Northern  -  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  Maryland  and  Fairmont,  W.Va. 

Southern  -  Southern  West  Virginia,  Virginia,  Eastern  Ken- 
tucky and  Tennessee. 

The  reporter  pointed  out  that  this  left  several  states  unprovided  for: 
Washington,  North  Dalcota,  Texas,  Alabama,  Western  Kentucky  and  Michigan.  (***) 


(*)    Bulletin  No.  1197,  National  Coal  Convention,  June  10,  1933, 

(**)   By  Mr,  George  Harrington,  Code  Hearing  Transcript,  August  10,  1933, 

Vol.  II,  p.  228. 
(***)   National  Coal  Association  Bulletin  No.  1199.  June  24,  1935. 


9837 


In  the  outcome  the  National  Recovery  Administration  received  for  con- 
sideration only  one  code  intended  to  "be  of  general  a-oiDlication.   This  was 
filed  July  13th,  was  known  as  the  "^eeneral  code"  and  resulted  from  extended 
deliberations  Isy,  a  grout)  of  bituminous  o-oerators  and  United  Mine  Worker 
Union  representatives.   The-  operators  were  active  in  the  "States  of  Penn- 
sylvania, West  Virginia,  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Michigan,  Tennessee, 
Kentucky,  Arkansas,  Oklahoma,  Colorado,  Montana,  and  Wyoming".   They  claimed 
to  riroduce  "in  the  aggregate  a  substantial  prot)ortion  of  the  bituminous  coal 
tonnage  of  the  United  States."  (*)   The'other  codes  submitted  were  intended 
•to  be  of  regional'  or  local  ap-nlication.   Measured  by  tonnage  represented,- 
largest  importance  attaches  to  the  code  jointly  presented  by  the  Northern 
Coal  Control  Association  with  membership  in  Pennsylvania,  Ohio  and  Northern 
West  Virginia,  producing  srme  60  per  cent  of  the  total  tonnage  in  that  area 
.in  1932,  and  the  Smokeless  and  Appalachian  Coal  Association  including 
operators  producing  70  to  75  per  cent  of  the  bituninous  coal  for  those  fields. 
For  convenience  this  will  be  referred  to  as  the  "Appalachian  Code".   Other 
important  districts  filing  codes  were  the  Rocky  Motmtain  and  Pacific  fields, 
which,  with  the  exception  of  the  State  of  Washington,  had  combined  in  a  single 
code  except  for  difference  en  wage  scales.   These  codes  were  submitted  by  the 
following  associations: 

COLORADO  AND  NEW  IvIEXICO  COAL  OPERATORS  ASSOCIATION,  voluntary  association 
of  representative  producers  and  wholesale  distributors  of  Colorado  and  New 
Mexico  coal; 

NORTHERN  COLORADO  COAL  PRODUCERS  ASSOCIATION,  voluntary  association  of 
representative  producers  and  wholesale  distributors  of  N.orthern  Colorado 
coal; 

UTAH  COAL  PRODUCERS  ASSOCIATION,  a  corporation  organized  and  existing 
under  the  laws  of  Utah,  its.  membership  comprising  a  representative  group  of 
producers  'and  wholesale  distributors  of  Utah  coal; 

S0UTI31RN  WYOMINO  COAL  OPERATORS  ASSOCIATION,  a  voluntary  association  of 
representative  producers  and  wholesale  distributors  of  northern  Wyoming  coal; 

MONTANA  COAL  OPERATORS  ASSOCIATION,  a  voluntary  association  of  rep- 
resentative producers  and  wholesale  distributors  of  Montana  coal,  and 

WASHINGTON  COAL  OPERATORS  ASSOCIATION,  a  voluntary  association  of  rep- 
resentative producers  and  wholesale  distributors  of  Washington  coal. 

As  noted,  the  Washington  Coal  Operators'  Code  was  different  in  content 
from  the  general  model. 

Southwestern  Coals,  a  voluntary  association  of  opei-ators  claiming  to 
represent  "over  75  per  cent  of  the  tonnage  of  bituminous  coal  in  the  States 
of  Missouri,  Kansas  and  Oklahoma",  presented- a  code  on  July  27th.   The 
failure  to  secure  the  adherence  of  ArkansS.s  and  Texas  will  be  noted.   Operator" 
in  Alabama  whose  combined  tonnage  amo-onted  to  75  per  cent  of  the  commercial 
production  cf  the  State,  submftted  a  code  which  is  best  regarded  as  an  ex- 
pression of  the  views  of  operators  in  the  Southern  Field.   The  letter  of 

(*)   Testimony  of  George  3.  Hg-rrington  at  Coal  Hearings,  Transcript  Vol.  II, 

p.  223. 
9837 


-80- 

transraittal,  dated  July  SSth,  asserted  "no  general  code  hfis  "been  stiggested  or 
can  be  pror)Osed  which  would  bear  any  reasonable  relation  to  the  existing  or 
■Drosnective  conditions  affecting  the  Alabama  commercial  coal  industry  or 
ca-oable  of  effective  enforcement  with  reference  to  tbnt  coal  field,  either 
as  to  the  emergency  or  -oermancntly". 

The  exoected  Central  Code  failed  to  materialize.   For  this  result  several 
factors  were  resnonsible.   Several  of  the  most  influential  Illinois  orjerators 
had  shared  in  the  formulation  of  the  general  code.   The  ot)erators  of  both 
Indiana  and  Iowa  found  their  interests  divergent  from  those  of  Illinois  and 
in  each  state  there  existed  a  triangular  coraoetitive  situation  which  extended 
beyond  the  area  com-orehended  in  the  Central  district.   Iowa's  severest  cora- 
TDetitors  were  Missouri  and  Illinois;  Indiana's  were  Illinois  and  Western 
Kentucky,  (*)   Cedes  were  sent  in  from  both  Iowa  and  Indiana.   These,  however, 
were  so  largely  auoted  from  the  general  code  as  to  be  in  effect  the  same  code. 
The  princiiDal  point  of  difference,  aside  from  the  wage  levels  rtronosed,  was 
in  the  more  advanced  statement  on  the  establishment  of  minimum  -prices.   Wage 
proToosals  are  discussed  in  Chanter  IV  and  will  receive  only  incidental  mention 
here. 

0-nerators  in  Illinois  who  had  maee  contracts  with  the  Progressive  Miners 
Union,  formed  an  organization  loiown  as  the  Coal  Producers'  Associaticn  of 
Illinois  and  submitted  a  code  which  followed  exactly  the  nhraseology  of  the 
general  code  excent  for  the  substituting  of  the  wages  in  their  agreements 
with  the  Progressive  Miners  Union  for  the  minimum  wage  standards  of  the 
original  document. 

Operators  in  the  State  of  Korth  Dakota  through  their  Indet)endent  Lignite 
Operators'  Association,  worked  out  and  submitted,  AuTUst  30th,  a  code  based 
on  the  peculiar  conditions  and  nrobleras  encountered  in  that  State,   The  letter 
of  transmittal  contained  the  following  anology: 

"In  submitting  this  Code,  I  shall  be  frank  to  admit 
that  in  some  details  the  Code  will  not  measure  up  to 
the  reqiiirements  and  conditions  of  the  National  Recovery 
Act.   In  that  connection  I  wish  to  inform  you  that  the 
State  of  North  Dakota  ha^  suffered  from  drought  and 
adverse  weather  conditions  for  the  last  three  years; 
that  our  farmers,  laboring-men  and  business-men  are 
all  in  equally  depressed  financial  circajnstances. 
Therefore,  it  wo\ild  create  a  hardshiri  on  a  large 
part  of  the  ppoulace  of  North  Dakota  to  increase  the 
cost  of  coal  and  fuel  sufficiently  to  make  possible 
any  material  advance  in  wages.  However,  the  prices 
embodied  in  the  Code  submitted  are  slightly  in  excess 
rf  what  hi"is  been  paid  in  nearly  every  mining  district. 
Then,  en  the  other  hand,  the  o-oerators  who  are  re-oresented, 
and  who  are  a  party  of  this  association,  are.  small  mine 
owners  ...  most  of  them  serving  a.  local  trade  territory, 
being  termed  'wagon  and  truck  mines',  who  are  comnellcd 
to  sell  their  coal  in  competition  with  the  large  strip 
mine  operators  whose  labor  cost  ner  ton  is  comparatively 

(*)   These  triangular  situations  are  discussetl  more  at  length  in  Chanter  VI 

9837 


-81- 

srnall  compared  to  the  independent  o-oerators  . . .  the  latter 
not  being  affected  by  an  increased  labor  coet.   In  addi- 
tion to  the  above  handicaps,  the  large  strit)  mine  o-oer- 
ators,have  been  enjoying  a  free  rein  in  their  discrimina- 
tory method  of  selling  coal;  they  are  selling  coal  within 
hp.uling  distance  of  the  wagon  and  truck  mines  at  a  "orice 
much  lower  than  their  general  r)rice." 

Various  sub-marginal  district,  mainly  P^oerated  by  hand  methods,  submitted 
codes.  .  Their  chief  interest  was  in  wage  differentials  and  these  documents 
seldom'  made  significant  contributions  to  the  principles  of  code  making.   In 
most  Cases  these  codes  can  be  dismissed  with  very  brief  discussion. 

The  Coal  Control  Association  of  Georges  Creek  and  Up-oer  Potomac  subscribe 
to  the  Ap-oalachian  Code.   Their  sole  reason  for  a,  ser)arate  presentation  was 
the  matter  of  wage  differentials. 

The  Preston  County  Coal  Operators  Association  of  West  Virginia  nresented 
a  fairly  com-olete  code,  based  on  the  model  sent  out  by  the  National  Coal  As- 
sociation.  It  inconoorated  the  current  wage  .standard"  of  the  district. 

Southern  Ohio  Coals,  Inc.,  comprising  a  representative  grout)  of  producers 
and  wholesale  distributors  of  bituminous  coal  from  Southern  Ohio,  submitted  a 
code  closely  similar,  except  for  wage  standards,  to  that  from  Preston  County. 

Choefators  of  coal  mines  in  Hamilton-,  Sequatchie,  Bledsoe,  and  Rhea  CountiGfe 
in  Tennessee,  and  Walker  and  Dade  Counties  in  Georgia  also  followed  this  model. 
Their  code  was  signed  by  ten  .operators  and  no  formal  organization  seems  to  havt 
been  formed.  With  one  exception,  all  these  mines  were  hand  o-oerated  and 
"practically  none  of  the  coal  was  shipped  interstate".  Although  a  different 
code  was  -oresented,  the  subscribers  professed  their  willingness  to  agree  to  all 
provisions  of  the  A-opalachian  Code,  except  the  wage  clauses. 

The  West  Kentucky  Coal  Association  presented  a  Code  of  like  c'ontent. 
Their  chief  interests  seem  to  be  twc;  the  wage  standards,  and  the  matter  of 
administration,  whi'ch  they  wished  to  be  under  the  direction  of  the  Board  of 
Directors  of.  the  Wes-tern  Kentucky  Coal  Associatiors. 

The  Off  Railroad  Coal  Mine  O-oerators  of  Saline,  Jackson,  Williamson  and 
Jackson  Counties,  Illinois,  117  in  number,  submitted  a  code  with  original  pro- 
visions.  They  felt  that  small  mines  such  as  they  operated  must  have  a  wage 
differential  in  order  to  compete  with  the  large  operators.   Altho-ugh  their 
organization  was  loca.l  they  seemed  to  have  hoped  for  a  national  administration 
for  "Off  Railroad"  mines.   The  Code  provides  for  Divisions  of  the  Off  Rail- 
read  Coal  Mining  industry  with  separate  administrative  agencies.   These  were 
to  send  representatives  to  an  Emergency  National  Committee  which  was  to  be 
the  "general  planning  and  coordinating  agency  for  the  industry". 

The  Verr.iilion  County,  Illinois,  Small  Coal  O-oerat  ors '  Association  was  a 
similar  group,   They  aspired  to  rexiresent  113  such  mines  in  the  county,  em- 
ploying 950  men  and  producing  250,000  tons  of  coal  in  1932.   They  presented  the 
model  code. 

The  Progressive  Miners'  Union  submitted  a  document  headed:   "A  Statement 
9837 


and  Information  Relative  to  the  Activities  of  the  Progressive  Miners  of 
America,  including  a  Code  of  Fair  Comioetition" .   Judged  as  a  code,  it  was  a 
very  fragmentary  document  having  no  r)ror)OPals  on  marketing  or  administration, 
"but  confined  to  Ifbor  relations,  to  support  of  the  Progressive  organization, 
and  to  suggestions  that  during  the  continiiance  of  the  "-oresent  national 
emergency"  em-nloyment  should  he  increased  "by  the  substitution  of  hand  l?bor 
for  machinery  whenever  possible".- 

The  Coal  Orjerators  Association  of  An-nanoosc  and  lYayne  Counties,  Iowa, 
indorsed  the  general  code  and  asked  for  recognitiovi  of  their  d  istrict  afe  one 
entitled  to  a  differential  below  the  base  rate  "due  to  mining  conditions". 

Three  small  coal  com-oanies  in  Jefferson  County,  Colorado,  each  emnloying 
at  a  maximum  less  than  35  men,  had  been  advised  by  the  Northern  Colorado  Coal 
Producers  Association  that  they  were  not  acceptable  as  members  of  that  or- 
ganization "due  to  differences  in  situation,  mining  operations  and  coal  veins". 
Accordingly  they  formed  the  Littleton  Colora^do  Coal  O-nerators  Apsociation  and 
submitted  a  code.   This  code,  ho-^ever,  was  the  standard  Rocky  Moimtain  Pacific 
one  without  even  such  elementary  modification  as  might  have  adapted  it  to  this 
situation  of  the  small  group.   The  only  distinguisliing  feature  was  In  the  wage 
proposals. 

The  above  summary  statement  will  disclose  that  the  multiplicity  of  codes, 
sometimes  stated  as  23  in  number,  submitted  for  the  BitnJminous  Coal  Industry, 
is  reduced  to  four  essential  forms:  the  fjeneral  code  with  wJiich  the  Iowa  Code, 
that  of  the  Coal  Producers  Associatioi  of  Illinois  and  of  Wayne-Appanoose  are 
in  agreement;  the  model  code  followed  exactly  or  in  large  part  by  Southwestern 
Coals,  the  Coal  Trade  Association  of  Indiana,  the  Western  Kentucky  Coal  As- 
sociation, Southern  Ohio  Coals,  the  small  mine  owners  of  Vermilion  County, 
Illinois,  and  the  Preston  County  Coal  Operators  Association;  the  Appalachian 
Code,  subscribed  to  by  the  Coal  Control  Association  of  Georges  Creek  and  Up-'-^er 
Potomac  and  the  Southern  Tennessee  and  Georgia  operators;  and  the  T.ocky 
Mountain  Pacific  Code,  subscribed  to  by.  the  western  states  and  which  was  ; 
adopted  by  the  three  operators  from  Jefferson  County,  Colorado.   The  Code 
presented  by  the  Coal  Producers  Association  of  Washington  calls  for  some  cor- 
relating comment.   Those,  for  Alabama,  the  Illinois  Off  Railroad  Coal  Mine 
Operators,  and  North  Dakota  are  highly  original  in  content,  deeply  stamped  with 
the  convictions  of  their  operator  authors  and  an  outgrowth  of  indigenous 
conditions  and  problems. 

For  convenience,  the  follovring  topical  discussion  of  the  contents  of 
proposed  codes  follo'-'s  the  outline  furnished  by  the  general  code.  North 
Dakota's  Code  is  sui  generis  and  is  reserved  for  discussion  in  a  separate 
paragraph.  Wage  matters  are  referred  to  the  chapter  dealing  with  wages. 
Details  of  minor  significance  are,  of  necessity,  omitted.   After  a  general 
declaration  of  intention  to  effectuate  the  nurp.ose  of  W.  I.  B.  A.   this  general 
code  in  section  I  declares  its  general  purpose  o f  stabilizing  the  coal  in- 
dustry. A  sentence- may  be  quoted:-  "Fair  and  constructive  competition  is  to 
be  encouraged,  but  unfair  competition  must  be  eliminated."  There  is  a 
cautionary  paragraph  as  to  the  importance  of  labor, costs  and  the  dangers  aris- 
ing from  competitive  fuels  and  other  sources  of  energy. 


9837 


■The  geographical  hasis  pro-nosed  for  administration  .deserves  full  st-'te- 
ment  'becaiise  of  its  relation  to  that  established  in  the  approved  Code: 


Nor theastern  Division 


The  New  England  States,  the  States  of 
Hew  York,  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  Penn- 
sylvania, Maryland,  Ohio  (exce-ot  the 
City  of  Cincinnati) ,  and  Michigan,  and 
the  coal  fields  of  Northern  West  Virginia 
lyine  north  of  the  Kanawha  district. 


Ap-oalachian  Division 


Virginia,  the  high  volatile  field  of 
Southern  V'est  Virginia,  the  Pocahontas, 
Tug  River,  Winding  Gulf  and  New  River 
low  volatile  fields  of  Souther-n  West 
Virginia;  that  portion  of  Kentucky  lying 
East  of  a  North  and  South  line  drawn 
along  the  West  line  of  the  City  of  Louis- 
ville, and  the  States  of  Tennessee,  Ala- 
bama, North  Carolina,  South  Carolina, 
Georgia,  Florida,  Mississippi,  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  and  the  City  of  Cin- 
cinnati, Ohio. 


Central  Division 


Southwestern  division 


Indiana  and  Illinois,  that  portion  of 
Kentucky  lying  West  of  a  North  and  South 
line  drawn  along  the  West  line  of  the  City 
of  Louisville,  and  the  States  of  Iowa, 
Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  North  Dakota,  South 
Dakota  and  Nebraska,  and  the  City  of  St. 
Louis,  the  County  of  St.  Louis  and  the 
City  of  St.  Charles,  Missouri. 

Missouri  (except  the  City  of  St.  Louis, 
the  County  of  St.  Louis  and  the  City  of 
St.  Charles),  and  Kansas,  Arkansas, 
Oklahoma,  Texa,s  and  Louisiana. 


Western  Division 


Montana,  Wyoming,  Colorado,  New  Mexico, 
Arizona,  Utah,  Nevada,  Idaho,  Washington, 
Oregon  and  California. 


Machinery  for  administration  was  proposed;  consisting  of  a  central  Bi- 
tuminous Coal  Industry  Board  of  five;  two  operators  designated  by  N.R.A.   In- 
dustrial Advisory  Board;  two  representatives  of  labor  named  by  the  Labor  Ad- 
visory Board;  and  a  fifth  member  named  by  the  Administrator.   All  matters 
affecting  the  administration  of  the  Code  were  to  be  heard  by  the  Board  whose 
rulings  were  to  be  "final  and  conclusive".  Each  of  the  five  Divisions  was 
"to  establisn  its  own  administrative  agency  or  agencies  for  the  determination 
of  its  own  buriness  affairs  with  appeals  from  this  agency's  rulings  to  the 
Bituminous  Coal  Industry  Board.   Subdistricts  might  be  established  if  deemed 
advisable  by  the  Divisions.   Thoughtful  critics  will  find  these  provisions 
slight  for  the  management  of  an  industry  as  complex  and  far  flung  as  the 
Bituminous  Coal  Industry.   Nevertheless  they  represent  the  high  water  mark  for 
administrative  provisions  in  the  codes  submitted.   The  codes  following  the 
model  furnished  by  the  Operators'  Committee  frequently  omit  any  reference  to 


9837 


administrative  pro"blems.   Yfhen  mentioned,  power  is  lodged  in  the  operators* 
association  concerned,  which  "shall  have  all  the  po^vern  necessary  and  ^Droper 
to  effectue.te  its  purposes".   The  Alabama  Code  lod^-^ed  control  in  the  Board 
of  G-overnors  of  the  Alahama  i'ining  Institute.   Tnere,  as  in  the  Appalachian 
Code,  some  agency  for  joint  control  was  ooviously  necessary,  a  Central  Code 
Committee  was  proposed.   But  the  o-oerators  v.'ere  chary  of  delegatin,.';  authority. 
This  Central  Committee  was  limited  to  "the  administration  of  such  matters  of 
common  interest  to  ooth  territories  as  may  "be  s-'Decif icslly  referred  to  it  for 
that  purpose  by  the  respective  Code  Administration  Committees".   The  'Roc^x^r- 
■lountain-Pacif ic  Code  is  especially  interesting  at  this  point.   The  various 
districts  "ere  stated  above.   "^ach  party  to  this  Code",  reads  that -document, 
"is  pledged  to  the  enforcement  of  its  -orovisions".   Each  district,  by  its 
own  methods,  was  to  select  a  District  Control  Committee  to  administer  and 
-oolice  the  provisions  of  the  Code  and  "make  such  regjulation  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  carry  out  the  intentions  of  this  Code".  There  was  also  provision 
for  a  Central  Advisory  Committee  consisting  of  two  members  from  each  district. 
Consider  the  statement  of  its  authority:   "It  su?ll  be  the  duty  of  the 
Central  Advisory  Committee  to  consider  and  attemiot  to  adjust  and  harmonize 
all  problems  which  may  arise  under  the  Code  as  between  the  several  districts," 
The  T/ashington  Code  omits  even  such  saado^■^^  delegation  of  centralizing 
authority.   The  Code  is  to  be  administered  b;r  the  loard  of  Trustees  of  the 
Coal  Producers  Association  of  Washington.   There  were,  however,  to  be  five 
divisions  in  the  State,  each  with  a  district  committee  whose  acts  were  sub- 
ject to  revision  by  the  Board  of  Trustees.   Siich  weakness  of  central  adminis- 
tration, joined  to  the  numerous  cases  in  which  districts  of  minor  importance 
in  coal  production,  jealously  sought  independence  of  control,  are  highly 
significant  in  the  light  of  the  Drovision  for  administration  later  included 
in  the  approved  code  and  of  the  troubled  and  ineffective  administrative 
history  of  that  code. 

As  a  feature  of  administrative  control,  the  provisions  for  the  filing 
of  reports  by  operators  may  be  mentioned  here.   This  was  a  matter  ^'enerally 
touched  uiDon.  But  the  requirements  varied  from  the  general  code  which  read: 
"51ach  employer  shall  furnish  reports  to  the  designated  agency  in  such  sub- 
stance and  form  as  may  from  time  to  time  be  required"  to  carefu!l.ly  hedged 
statements  that  the  officials  of  the  district  coal  association  should  be 
the  custodian  of  the  reports  and  sho;ild  determine  their  character  and  con- 
tent. All  the  codes  agree  in  nrovioing  for  secrec3''  for  the  individual 
reports. 

In  the  matter  of  hours  the  Codes  were  in  substantial  agreement  on 
dail-'-  hours  set  at  eight.   Exceptions  are  found  in  the  Progressive  Miners 
Code,  the  Off  Pa,ilroad  Operators  of  Illinois  Code  and  in  the  presentation 
of  the  case  of  the  United  Mine  7or!:ers.  (*)   It  may  be  noted  in  rjassing 
that  the  Progressive  I'iners  controlled  the  region  from  which  tl^e  6-hour 
day  and  30-hour  week  proposal  originated.  Al"i  the  .groups  not  proposing 
the  S-hour  day  favored  this  schedule  and  this  was  the  only  exception  stip- 
ulated by  the  United  iiine  TJorlcers  to  the  general  code.  (**)  On  weekly 
hours  wide  divergence  developed.   Indiana  operators  stood  alone  with  a 
proposal  for  32  hours  per  week.   Since  these  maximum  hoars  were  conditioned 
upon  the  esta-blishraent  of  competitive  hour  and  wage  scales  in  Ohio,  '"Jestern 
Pennsylvania.,  West  Virginia,  Virginia,  Tennessee  and  Kentuclqy,  this  was  not 
a  firm  commitment  on  the  part  of  the  Indiana  r>roducers.   The  general  code 
and  7ayne  arid  Ap->-)anoose  Counties,  Iowa,  suggested  6  months  at  32  hours 
per  week  and  6  at  40  hours.  Proposals  for  40  and  48  hours  h<?,d  the  adher- 
ents indico-ted  below: 

(*)    Transcript  of  Code  Hearing,  Vol.  II,  pp»  346  et  seq. 
(**)   See  the  letter  of  transmittal. 
9837 


40  Hours  48  TJpiirs 

A-D-nalachian  Code  All  Rocky  Mountain-Pacific  dis- 

Soutb-restem  Code  tricts  except  Washington  but  in- 

Alabama  eluding  Littleton. 

Washing-ton  ■  lo^ra 

Western  Kontiicky  Southern-, Ohio     •_ 

^        .        „        .      ■  Tennessee  and  Georgia 

Preston  County  Illinois  Coal  Producers  Association 

Vermilion  County,  Illinois 

North  Dakota  operators  nominally  ToroTOscd  a  40-hour  week  hut  there  was  a  -oro- 
vision  that  "any  eimoloyee  may  from  time  to  time  work  a  48-hour  week  so  long 
as  ills  a.vera-.e  40-hour  week  is  not  e^xeeded  through  any  16  weeks  rieriod". 
Familiarity  with  the  peculiar  conditions  existing  in  North  Dakota's  lignite 
industry  will  suggest  that  with  this  exception  the  40-hour  week  would  seldom 
prove  "burdensome  to  North  Dakota  o-oerators.   As  a  samnle  of  numerous  exception 
to  the  8-hour  day,  further  reference  may  be  made  to  this  code.   Supervisory 
staff  and  monthly  employees  were  to  "work  the  number  of  hours  reouired  for  the 
proper  completion  of  their  work  in  accordance  with'  the  customary  practics"; 
employees  transporting  men  and  coal  "the  additional  time  necessary"  to  handle 
the  men  and  all  coal  mined  in  the  8  hours  of  actual  work;  outside  employees  we 
to  work  the  additional  time  necessary  "to  dump  and  i^repare  the  coal  delivered 
to  the  tipple  each  day".   Besides  all  this,  there  \ms   a  clause  to  cover  ac- 
cidents or  emergencies.  (*)   The  Appalachian  Code  included  these  exemptions  an 
also  carried  a  provision  for  working  a  48-hour  week  at  will  so  long  as  the 
40-hour  weekly  average' was  not  exceeded  in  p„ny  year.   Such  exemptions  will 
have  a  familiar  ring  to  anyone  'exnerienced  in  the  bu.siness  of  code  formulation 

The  weekly  hour  proposals  were  affected  by  the  nature  of  demand.   Fields 
which  served  the  domestic  trade  most  largely  were  inclined  to  put. a  high  limit 
on  hours  in  order  that  the  highest  seasonal  demand  might  be  met.   This  tendenc 
was  at  the  maximum  in  the  Rocky  Mountain  areas  where  extremes  of  temperature 
and  of  distances  transported  were  fo-und.   This  was  the  argument  of  the  posi- 
tive brief  presented  August  1,  1933  by  operators  in  Southern  Wyoming  relating 
to  hours  of  work  to  be  determined  in  the  proposed  code  for  bituminous  coal. 
"The  purpose  of  this  brief",  said  the  operators,  "is  to  show  conclusively  the 
necessity  for  maintaining  a  work  day  of  eight  hours  in  the  coal  mines  of 
Wyoming,  and  likewise  to  continue  the  privilege  of  working  a  maximum  of  six 
days  per  week  during  the  brief  peak  demand  periods  when  work  is  available." 
In  the  case  of  lignite  and  sub-bituminous  producing  fields  such  as  Northern 
Colorado  and  North  Dakota,  this  problem  was  intensified  by  the  difficulty, 
or  impossibility,  of  producing  in  anticipation  of  demand  and  storing  this  fuel 
since  its  high  moisture  content  causes  excessiye  degradation. 

As  would  be  expected  of  a  code  formulated  under  United  Mine  Worker  aus- 
pices, the  general  code  included  liberal  standards  on  conditions  of  employment. 
It  incorporatci"  Article  7a  without  q/aalif ications;  provided  for  a  universal 
2000  pound  ton  for  checlOTeighmen;  for  semi-monthly  wage  payments  "in  lawful 
money  or  par  caecks;  for  the  check  off  of  union  dues;  for  freedom  from  re- 
quirement to  trade  at  company  stores  or  to  live  in  company  houses;  and  for  the 
making  of  district  agreements.   In  contrast  to  these  liberal  provisions  was 
the  child  labor  clause:   "No  person  under  16  years  of  age  shall  be  employed 
inside  a  mine".   To  the  Southwestern  Code  belongs  the  honor  of  proposing  an 
18  year  minimum  age  limit  for  employment  "in  or  about  a  mine".  Claims  to 
r*y"''Cf71he~LTt"tleTon~~Cc'de.   ~ 
9837 


-36- 
honorable  mention  are  weakoned,  ho"'ever,  ty  the  use  of  the  hoary  legalistic 
device  limiting  responsibility  for  violations  to  t"iose  "Icno'^ingly"  violating 
this  clause. 

Other  codes  formulated  uyider  exclusively  operator  ausnices  displayed 
distinctively  anti--'anion  tendencies  and  gave  grudging  compliance  to  the 
requirement  that  Article  7a  he  incorporatec"  in  the  codes.   Thus  the  Ap- 
palachian Code,  representing  about  two-thirds  of  totfl  production,  added  the 
following  two  paragraphs: 

"Tlie  foregoin;  provisions  shall  aprjly  to  each  em-nloyer 
in  his  relations  to  his  o^7n  em-nloyees,  but  no  employer 
shall  be  required  to  deal  jointly  with  other  employers, 
or  with  re'oresenta.tives  of  any  emnloye'^s  other  t^ia.n  his 
own,  and  any  collective  bargaining'  shall  be  on  behalf 
of  only  those  employees  participating  therein,  the 
em^oloyer  being  free  to  deal  separately  with  any  other 
of  his  employees  not  so  partici'ia.ting. 

"Sec.  ^.   It  is  a  condition  of  this  code  that  no  per- 
son shall  be  rcouired  to  join  pxij   labor  organization  to 
secure  or  retain  employment  or  to  receive  the  benefits  of 
this  code;  ajid  the  right  of  every  individual  to  refuse  to 
join  p    labor  organization,  and   his  right  to  bargain  with 
his  employer  eigher  indiviriually  or  collectively  with  his 
fellow  employees,  free  from  the  interference,  restraint  or 
corrcion  of  any  labor  organization  or  its  a  ents,  are 
hereby  pxnressly  recognized." 

The  Western  Kentucky  Coc'.e  also  incomorated  these  provisions.   Tlie 
Sou th^Tes tern  Code  had  a  substitute  for  the  first  of  those  two  pairagraphs 
reading: 

"It  is  expressly  understooc!  by  anrl  between  all  of  the 
subscribers  hereto  that  no  provision  of  this  code  has  • 
been  ador)ter'  '"ith  any  intent  whatsoever  to  limit,,  ab- 
ridge or  destroy  the  right  of  em^iloyer  a.nd  employee  to 
continue  to  bargain  individually  or  collectively  a.s 
they  may  mutually  agree  u^on." 

The  Alabama  Code  stated  the  position  of  its  adherents  unequivocally  and 
pushed  its  statement  to  a  logical  conclusion  in  a  demand  for  "employee  ren- 
resentation"  systems  or,  more  bltmtly  stated,  for  com-nany  unionism.  As  a 
representative  and  frank  proposal  from  a  center  of  non-uiiion  production  this 
statement  is  ouoted  in  full: 

"For  the  reasons  st'  ted  in  Section  1,  the  acceptance 
of  said  conditions  shall  not  oe  construed  as  abrogat- 
ing the  unemimous  conclusion  and  unrierstanding  of  the 
members  subscribing  to  this  Code  that  it  is  in  the 
interest  of  the  public,  of  the    coal  industry,  and  its 
employees,  based  on  i.iany  years  of  harmonious  relations 
and  freedom  from  centrali-^ed  or  standardized  inter- 
ferencer  directeil  from  other  rc,:ions  (a)  that  the 
plants  of  the  members  sJiall  'be  o^ien  to  ca-nable  worlcmen, 

9837 


-87- 

without  discrimination  "by  reason  of  their  memtershiTn 
or  non-mem'bershir)  in  a.ny  lator  organization;  ("b)  that 
the  emiDloyees  of  members  •  shall  he  eaually  as  free  from 
interference,  restraint  or  coercion  to  join  as  not 
to  join  any  lahor  organization  and  that  the  right  to 
freedom  from  such  coercion  shall  not  be  waived  by  this 
Code;  (c)  that  no.  member  sl^all  be  under  any  obligation 
to  deal  with  any  labor  organization,  or  its  ret)rcsent- 
atives,  directly  or  indirectly,  \7hich  shall  violate 
these  -nrinci-oles;  (d)  that  no  reauirement  of  any  or- 
ganization or  re-oresentation  of  employees  shall  be 
received  or  considered  which  would  have  the  effect  of 
violating  or  concurring  in  the  violation  of  the  State 
law  or  rules  ado-oted  -Dursioant  thereto  or  unlawfully 
delegating  the  duty  or  res-oonsibility  of  the  em-  ' 
"oloyer  under  the  law;  and  (e)  that  the  conditions 
adopted  shall  not  inroair  in  any  -oarticular  the  rights 
of  employer  and  em-oloyee  to  bargain  individually  or 
collectively  as  may  be  mutually  satisfactory  to  them 
or  tjrevent  the  Selection,  retention  or  advancement  of 
emr)loyees  based  on  their  individual  merit  without 
regard  to  thgir  affiliation  with  any  organization. 

"Section  3.;  .In  addition  to  any  means  of  discxission 
or  negotiations  established  consistently  with  Sections 
1  and  2  of  this  Article,  each  member  shall  establish 
and  maintain  a  -olan  and  system  for  emt)loyee  re-o- 
resentation,  to  the  end  that  discussion  of  wages  and 
working  conditions  may  be  conducted  and  concluded 
■ororantly  between  the  member  and  the  emoloyees  of  each 
member  (or  their  re-oresentatives)  who  shall  be  in- 
formed of  local  conditions  and  are  directl.y  affected, 
such  -olans  to  be  submitted  to  and  subject  to  axj-Droval 
or  mo(?if ication  by  the  i^oard  to  assure  their  adequacy." 

There  was  a  large  amount  of  agreement  in  regard  to  sales  t)olicies.   The 
standard  -Dro-oosal  was  that  it  should  be  deemed  a  violation  of  the  Code  to 
sell  below  "the  fair  average  cost  of  -oroduction  amd  sale  (of  the  -oroducer) 
■olus  a  reasonable  margin  of  -orofit".   Costs  were  to  be  computed  "in  ac- 
cordance with  standard  accounting  loractice  and  the  rules  and  regulations 
promulgated  by  the  Bureau  of  Internal  Revenue  for  the  determination  of  Federal 
income  taxes".   Both  the  general  code  and  the  model  codes  as  well  as  codes 
oased  on  them  contained  standard  contract  clauses. 

Such  provisions  for  price  contr'.i  a.prieareri  in  the  great  majority  of  the 
codes,   Indiana  operators  added  the  phrcije  "and  the  cost  of  competing  fuels" 
to  the  fair  average  cost  of  production.   Southwestern  Coal  preferred  the 
"mine  run  cost  of  production"  as  a  basis  for  nrice  making.   They  added  a  pro- 
vision to  the  effect  that  "the  Board  of  Directors  shall,  from  time  to  time, 
determine  fair  and  reasonable  minimum  prices  on  the  several  grades,  sizes  and 
classifications  of  coal".   This  was  concurred  in  by  the  Indiana  and  Wayne 
and  Appanoose  Codes.   The  Applachian,  Western  Kentuclcy  and  Alabama  Codes  also 
provided  for  t:ie  fixing  of  minimum  prices  but  preferred  that  the  respons- 
ibility be  lodged  in  a  Marketing  Agency  formed  on  the  model  of  Appalachian 
Coals  and  including  "coal  producers  representing  the  major  portion  of  the 

9837 


--88- 

tonnage  of  the  district".   Evidence  of  severe  competitive  pressure  in 
Ala"bsrQa  is  given  by  the  standards  for  price  fixing  uy  the  Marketing 
Agency  set  up  in  the  Code.   Sale  is  to  "be  "at  prices,  limited  hy  freight 
rates,  "by  competition  with  other  fuels  and  other  fields  and  other  pro- 
ducers" as  determined  by  the  agency.  And  again,  "the  agency  shall  "be 
authorized  to  provide  for  permitted  variations  from  the  price  schedules 
determined,  "by  it  from  time  to  time  to  meet  competition".   Any  violation 
of  the  price  provisions  entailed  a  penalty  of  50  cents  per  ton  as  liquid- 
ated damages. 

Trie   2ocky  Mountain-Pacific  Code  carried  its  price  provisions  forward 
';vith  a  holdness  that  approached  temerity.   There  was  to  "be  standardization 
of  contracts  of  sale,  and  of  sizies  prepared,  as  well  as  definite  price 
lists.  Moreover,  these  standard  sizes  and  minimum  prices  were  incorporated 
in  the  Code.  District  Control  Committees  were  to  revise  the  price  lists, 
esta"blishing  from  time  to  time  "fair  and  reasona"ble  minimum  prices  on  the 
several  grades,  sizes  and  classifications  of  coal  produced,  such  prices 
to  be  based,  upon  the  cost  of  production  and  competitive  inequalities". 
The  Code  further  provided  for  a  truck  differential  to  be  added  to  the 
mine  price.   This  v?as  based  primarily  on  the  additional  costs  of  loading 
this  coal  and  carrying  on  at  the  mines  vv'hat  v/as  essentially  a  retail 
business,  but  there  v/as  clear  reference  also  to  the  dependence  of  the 
coal  consuming  public  and  coal  producers  on  the  service  of  retail  dealers 
and  of  railroads.  Here  are  materials  for  nice  moralistic  accounting  of 
competing  interests  and  for  careful  determination  of  the  essential  duties 
and  privileges  of  code  mal<:ers.  Finally  an  article  provided  that  the  open- 
ing, developing  or  operating  of  new  mines  should  be  a  violation  of  the 
code  unless  it  were  first  clearly  shovm  that  such  action  would  serve 
public  convenience  and  necessity.   This  pi-oposal  was  based  on  a  declara- 
tion that  existing  mines  had  "an  annual  productive  capacity  of  several 
times  tiie  qxiantity  of  coal  pi-oduced  therefrom  and  sold  in  any  year  hereto- 
for"  .  It  may  be  noted  here  that  the  Washington  Code,  v/hile  it  shows  some 
differences  in  form,  vras  in  complete  agreement  with  all  these  price  con- 
trol provisions. 

The  Off.  Railroad  Coal  Mine  Operators  of  Illinois  went  a  stage  further 
and  provided  for  allocating  tonntjge.   It  v/as  made  the  duty  of  the  Emer- 
gency National  Committee,  subject  to  the  approval  of  N.R.A. ,  to  maJce 
periodic  "estimates  of  expected  Off  Hailroad  Coal  Mine  consuj-ription;  and 
based  thereon  to  establish  ...  an  equitable  production  quota  for  the  Off 
Hailroad  Coal  Mine  Operators  industry  and  for  each  division  thereof." 

All  the  codes  agree  in  submitting  ,  miamerous  items  of  unfair  trade 
practices.   Tiiere  was  substantial  agreement  as  to  the  content  of  this  sec- 
tion. They  did  not  contribute  to  the  difficulties  encountered  in  form- 
ulating a  code  of  general  application  and  vdth  one  exception  did  not  draw 
fire  in  the  code  her.rings.  Kence  this  review  is  content  with  a  general- 
ized statement.   The  operators  v/ere  concerned  that  unordered  coal  should 
not  be  forwarded,  that  there  should  be  no  rebates  allowed  below  established 
prices,  under  any  subterfuge,  that  "business  should  not  be  bought  by  special 
concession  or  services,  that  coal  should  not  be  misrepresented  or  sold 
under  a  competitive  trade  name  without  authorization,  and  that  breaches 
of  contract  should  not  be  induced.  The  item  v/hich  drew  fire  in  the 
code  hearin:;s  pertained  to  the  growing  practice  of  trucking  coal.  The 
model  code  carried  a  positive  section  declaring! 

9837 


-89- 

"The  retail  distribution  of  coal  is  a  necessary 
agency  in  the  marketing  and  distribution  of  the 
product,  and 'is  a  -nublic  necessity  to  the  con- 
.  su-.ier  thereof.   The  distribution  of  coal  by  motor 
trucks  from  mines  to  consumer  direct  eliminates 
rail  trans'oortation  and  o-oeratep  to  make  the 
retail  distribution  un-n r of i tabic  and  destroys 
such  agency.   The  sale  and  distribution: of  coal 
in  motor  trucks  at  less  than  the  nori:i£-il  rail 
freight  rate  on  such  coal  and  the  retail  dis- 
tributor's cost  and  -orofit  in  hanc'ling  at 
destination  is  hereby  declared  to  be  an  imfair 
tr'Tde  -oractice.  " 

This  attempt  to  fix  retail  tdtIcps  for  trucked  coal  at  levels  rletermined 
by  the  cost  of  shiioping  over  railroads  and  handling  through  retailors  ha.d 
im-nlications  of  manifestly  dubious  T)ro-oriety.   In  the  general  code  it  was 
softened  to  a  proviso  that  a  representative  committee  be  a-nnointed  to  in- 
vestigate the  subject  and  file  rcco;:ainendations  within  thirty  days.   Even  so 
modified,  it  was  attached  by  those  entrusted  with  the  interests  of  trucking 
companies. 

The  ITorth  Daxota  Code  crar)hasized  the  peculiar  featiires  of  lignite  mining 
and  distribution.   It  made  the  Worth  Dakota  Independent  Lignite  Operators 
Association  the  administrative  head.   As  a  significant  element  in  the 
"peculiar  features"  it  may  be  noted  in  passing  that  although  this  Association 
included  over  a  hundred  operators  its  members  employed  approximately  1000  men 
or  an  average  of  10  per  operator.   In  Exhibit  C  this  Code  designates  as  a 
"corrupt  practice"  the  selling  of  lignite  coal  at  a  lower  rate  in  one  market 
than  in  another.   Allowance  was,  to  be  made  for  difference  in  grade  or  quality 
and  in  the  actual  cost  of  transportation.   The  letter  of  transmittal  explains 
that  this  provision  was  aimed, at -the  practice  of  the  large  strip  mine  operatoi 
who  are  alleged  to  liave  been  accustomed  to  make  (Quotations  lower  than  these 
general  prices  within  the  territory  of  small  mine  owners. 


9837 


-90- 

Tli9  I^iA  Chief  and.  Iiis  aides  foimd  time  in  the  midst  of  feverish 
activities  during  late  June  and  Jul"/,  to  keep  close  touch  '.7ith  the  com- 
mittee of  o-ierators  and  of  union  officials  engaged  in  the  v.'ork  of  code 
formulation,   hention  has  "been  made  above  of  General  Johnson's  appear- 
ances before  the  bituminous  coal  Ouerators  in  Tashington  on  June  5, 
1933.   Me  also  addressed  the  annual  meeting  of  the  National  Coal  Asso- 
ciation on  Jime  16th,  commending  its  action  in  recommending  a,  mod.el  cod.e. 
On  several  occasions  he  held  conferences  ^.-ith  operator's  cominittees  in 
TTashington.   On  Julj'-  Cth,  spealiing  to  the  conference  of  opera.tors  a,nd 
union  officials  engaged^  in  formulating  the  general  code,  he  declared 
"that  it  r/as  the  hope  of  the  G-overrjnent  tha,t  codes  could  be  worked  out 
covering  the  major  fields  and  that  after  thorough  study  ajid  analysis  it 
might  be  possible  to  "eave  them  into  a  single  code  making  due  a].lo'"'ance 
for  ddffering  living  costs  and  other  factors  in  the  several  prod.ucing 
areas".   This  hope  of  the  Adjnini  strati  on  :7as  never  lost  sight  of  and  '.va.s 
brought  forward  nith  increasing  insi stance  as  code  msJcing  progressed.. 
Thus  on  Jul]'-  12th,  President  Hoosevelt  at  his  press  conference,  su,ggested 
that  if  regional  codes  for  the  industr.7  vere  adopted  there  then  arose  a 
host  of  neT/  problems  as  to  territorial  divisions  and  as  to  the  assignment 
of  various  coal  fieldts  to  one  or  pjiother  territorj^.   At  the  close  of  the 
code  hearings  on  August  12th,  it  -.as  authoritativel"/  stated  that  every 
possible  effort  rrould  be  made  to  bring  the  industry  under 'a  single  code.(*) 
On  August  17th,  the  President,  the  Administrator  and  Deput-"-  Administrator. 
Simpson  conferred  rrith  a  cominittee  representing  the  Appalachian  code. 
The  President  sto^ted.  that  he  "anted  a  "universal  codie". 

Despite  these  hopes  and  efforts  the  Adoninistration  had  a  lively, 
sense  of  the  ddfficulties  involved  in  securing  so  large  a  measure  of  co- 
operation, "hen  the  Appalachio.n  code  v/as  submitted,  General  Johnson  and 
Deputy  Administrator  Simpson  assured  the  Committee  that  they  considered 
their  achievement  .in  combining  over  t'JO-thirds  of  the  industr;'-  measured 
b;?-  tonn04"e  "miraculous". 

I:arl3'  in  August  strikes  broke  out  in  the  steel-corapanj^  mines  v/ithin 
the  Connelsville  district  of  Pennsj^lvania.   The  danger  that  this 
disturbance  of  labor  relations  might  spread  v.'idely  aroused  the  apprehen- 
sion of  the  Administration  and  led  to  the  intervention  of  ilEA.  Adminis- 
trator Johnson  and  to  the  formo,tion  of  a  special  board  of  F.rbitration. 
Since  the  truce  r/as  arranged  to  hold  "pending  hearing  and  determination 
by  the  President  on  the  coaJ  codes  no^/  filed  rrith  K?Jl,  "  it  v;as  advis- 
able that  tnis  business  be  expedited.   Hence  the  hearing  date  originally 
set  for  Aiogust  14-th  v.'as  advanced  to  August  9th.   This  nas  Hearing  To.  26. 
The  official  notice  -.vas  carefiJL  to  state  that  "the  Codes  for  the  Bitiimi- 
nous  Coal  Industr"/  in  their  present  forms  merely  reflect  the  proposals 
of  the  industr^',  and  none  of  the  provisions  contained  tlierein  are  to  be 
regarded  as  having  received  the  a"oproval  of  the  i'ational  Hecover^^  Adjnin- 
istration  as  ai^plying  to  this  indu.stry". 


( *)   See  the  Bulletins  of  the  rational  Coal  Association  at  appropria.te 
dx).tes. 


9837 


-91- 

Tlie  hearing  lasted  four  days  from  August  9th  to  12th  inclusive. 
Some  50  v;itnesses  v.'ere  heard  and  a  '.;ealth  of  exliibits,,  statistical  and 
graphic,  were  presented.   The  chief  impression  gained  from  a  survey  of 
the  material  is  that  the  hearing  r.-as  dominated  b;^  the  prohlera  of  inter- 
district  v/age  differentials.   (This  question  is  discussed  in  Chapter  71 
of  this  study.)   In  addition  every  district  spolcesman  felt  ooligrted  to 
give  detailed  evidence  of  the  difficulties  and  losses  met  b"/  operators 
in  his  area,  to  strte  -the  technical  diff icijJ-ties  encoantered  because  of 
adverse  geological  conditions,  to  relate  the  burdens  imposed  by  freight 
differentials,  to  disclose  the  inroads  made  by  competing  fuels  and  to 
defend!  the  vage  ajid  labor  -nolicies  of  his  adherents.   i.Iuch  can  be  learned 
of  the  industrial  situation  here  but  digesting  of  the  material  \7ill  not 
be  attempted  in  this  chapter.   On  other  questions  of  capital  importance 
there  v/as  little  discussion  at  the  hearing.   Several  district  spokesmen 
expressed  their  conviction  that  general  administration  of  the  industrj^ 
V7as  impra.cticable.   This  was  not  only  true  of  spokesmen  for  smal-l  oper- 
ators, as  in  Preston  Cotmty,  7est  Virginia,  who  feared  the  domination  of 
large  operators  and  "long  ra,nge  control"  considere'd  both  geographi call;'- 
and  in  the  business  sense;  (*)  for  detached  fields,  as  "estern  Kentuclqy, 
which  preferred  a  sepa.rate  code  but  allowed  that  the  conditions  might 
be  met  by  "special  treatment";  (**)  nor  yet   of  those  spealcing  for 
associations  of  operators  in  individual  states,  such  as  Indiana  and  Ala- 
bama.  In  the  former  the  plea  was  for  local  autonomy  with  no  control  by 
other  districts  although  willingness  was  e:rpressed  to  submit  to  govern- 
mental administration.  (***)  In  Alabama  the  e^rpression  was  less  restrained. 
"Tlie  non-representative  character  as  to  Alabama  of  ?my  national  or  inter- 
regiona.l  coal  code  and  the  exceptional  status  of  the  industr;^  (was  felt 
to  be)  demonstrated  by  the  analysis  of  the  economic  condition  of  the  in- 
dustry in  Alabama"  a.3  outlined.   The  Alaba^na  representative  spoke  of  the 
"necessity  for  a  separate  code  for  the  field  reLated  to  the  necessities 
an-d  adjninisterod  loaally".   Less  helpful  was  his  reference  to  the 
"truculent  intention  to  sciittle  the  area"  manifested  by  competitive 
interests.  (****)  He  gave  only  grudging  a.ss6nt,  under  questioning,  to 
the  "orinciple  of  government  supervision  but  agreed  that  there  might  be 
permojient  machinery'  for  daily  consultation  with  IIRA  and  that  that  agency 
might  have  the  right  of  approval  in  detail,  as  the  work  of  code  adminis- 
tration progressed. 


(*)  Transcript  of  Code  Hearing,  Vol.  IV,  p.  200. 

(**)  Ibid,  pp.  581-2. 

(***)  Transcript  ut  siipra.,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  515-6. 

(****)  Transcript  ut  supra,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  478  et  seq. 


9837 


-92- 

Biit  opposition  to  a  ~enerrl  Code  ertendad  to  representatives  of 
great  area.s  v/iiose  achievements  in  securing  the  adherence  of  various  dis- 
tricts to  a  single  code  might  have  "been  enpected  to  incline  their 
thou~hts  to  a  na.tional  scheme.   Thus  the  I^ocl^;-  Ilountain  P3,cific  repre- 
sentative vc.s   requested  to  malce  a  most  earnest  appeal  to  the  Administrator 
that  his  territorjr  be  considered  as  an  cntit,7  and  not  hrought  under  any 
Code  uritten  for  pjay   other  area  in  the  United  States.   The  hasis  of  this 
opposition  r-as  declared  to  be  their  hopes  for  effective  adininistra,tion.  (*) 
Host  impressive  of  all  such  e:-oression  Tias  that  of  the  sponsors  of  the 
Appalachia.n  Code.   IIot'Tith standing  their  Inclusion  of  70  per  cent  of  the 
nationa.1  output  ^jmder  a  single  code,  their  ritnesses  i7ere  committed  to 
a  demand  for  a  separate  code  and  an  independent  administration.   They 
'".'ould  meet  the  131A.  staff  on  "pii  eqaa.l  footing  but  not  in  a  supervisory 
capacity".   Agrin  more  bluntly'  stated  in  response  to  questioning,  the 
spokesman  said:  "T."e  don't  v:ant  (the  administration)  to  have  poner  to  tell 
us  hoT,  to  run  our  mines,  or  hov:  to  sell  our  coal."   It  v/as  conceded  that 
"any  nanted  facts  ^.Tould  "be  made  availaole  to  the  Government".  (**)   In 
some  part  the  attitude  of  this  group  v/as  due  to  the  belief  that  price  and 
market  proolems  v/ould  be  handled  'by   marketing  agencies  on  the  model  of 
the  Appalachian  Coals,  Inc.   They  had  been  engrged  in  actively  promoting 
such  organizations  in  1933  before  codes  v:ere  in  prospect  and  they   expected 
these  B::oncies  to  function  successfull;'-  v/ithout  other  measures  of  in- 
diist:-;,^  or  of  govGrr„.ient  control.  (***) 

Advocates  of  a  single  code  for  the  industi^^  "ere  limiter  to  those 
^"'ho  had  assisted  in  the  form^xlation  of  thi  general  code.   Their  attitude 
V7as  positive  ano.  vigorousl:"  errpressed.   Thi^s  Kr.  Harrington  stated  that 
the  "general  code  gathering  'u-as  clearly?-  of  the  opinion  that  one  national 
basic  code  for  the  industry  '.jE'.s   caviled  for  ''oy   ever"^  practical  cor-> 
sideraticn  of  the  nev;  attempt  to  restore  pros^iority".  (****)   Mr.  C.  F. 
Hosford  T/a-G  equa.ll"-  positive.   "I  quite  agree",  said  he,  "that  '..'hen  3^ou 
ta3:e  the  uhole  greater  Apps.l.achian  ?xi,nge,  it  is  absolutely  impracticable 
to  divide  that  into  various  districts  and  to  set  up  a  number  of  codes  for 
competing  districts  becruse  they  arc  overlapping  both  in  production  a.nd 
in  marketing,  and  that  the  adoption  of  numerous  codes  varying  in  their 
provisions  Till  serve  only  to  bring  confusion".  (*****)  Mr,  Taplin  con- 
curred in  these  statements  and  added  to  it  a  declaration  of  desire  that 
the  "government  supervise  and  direct  not  onl''-  t'le  cool  indxistr;"-  but  com- 
petitive fuc-ls,  s^ach  as  oil  and  gas,  and  have  provide-;"^  in  this  Code  a 

(*)     Transcript  ut  siipra,  Yol._I,  -pp.  lo7-8. 

(**)  ^   Transcript,  "t   nupra,  Vol.  I,-r^p.  48  to  70  Pascim 

(***)    See  the  tcstiraor^r  of  Charles  F.  O'lieil,  Ibid  Vol.  I,  pp.  10  et  seq. 

Par.r.im. 
(****)   Ibid,  Vol.  II,  p.  229. 

(*****)  Ibid,  Vol.  Ill,  .3p.  438-9. 


-93- 

planning  board  for  that  purpose".  (*)   President  John  L.  Lewis  placed 
the  United  liine  TJorkers  on  record  as  favoring  the  administration  of  the 
entire  industry  by  one  board  and  said  "it  is  our  opinion  that  there 
should  be  added  to  the  Board  the  function  of  economic  planninj'^  for  the 
industry".  (**)        . 

The  ciuestion  of  hours  v'e^s  discussed  a.t  sone  length.   On  the  one 
hand  representatives  of  all  the  union  factions  agreed  in  demanding  the 
6-hour  day  and  5-do;y  veek.   This  T7as  an  old  issue  with  union  men.   Their 
argument,  originally  based  on  the  desire  to  spread  their  limited,  \7ork 
opportunities  evenl3'-  over  the  ;''ear,  '.;?s  strengthened  iraneasurably  by  the 
emphasis  placed  by  i'.I.Pu.A.  on  measures  for  spreading  employment.  (***) 
Operators'  representatives  urged  an  3-hour  day  pointing  out  that  the 
mine  le-fov.t   and  equipment  xiere   adjusted  to  that  period.   The  problems  of 
loading  and  hauling  'vere  central  in  their  arguments.   Hooms  could  not  be 
cleaned  up  and  jDrepared  for  the  ne::t  shift  of  cutting  and  shooting  men 
in  less  than  eight  hours.   There  v?as  vigorous  protest  from  certain 
sections  also  against  a  rigid  limitation  of  Tieekly  hours.   Seasonality' 
of  demand  joined  to  the  diff icxilt^r  and  e:rpense  of  storing  coal,  the^r 
declared,  made  necessar;'-  an  extension  of  the  mpximum  v:eekly  hours  to  48 
in  the  months  of  highest  consumption.  (****) 

Questions  of  price  control  might  vrell  have  been  er^Dected  to  receive 
extensive  attention  in  the  Code  hearing  since  practically  a,ll  the  pro- 
posed codes  s"uggested  as  a  price  basis  the  cost  of  production  and  since 
a  majority  of  them  asked  for  the  setting  up  of  actual  minimum  prices. 
Some  codes,  e.g.  those  included  in  the  Hocl^j^  fountain  Pacific  group, 
carried  actual  minimun  price  lists.   At  the  hea.ring,  horTever,  ver;-  slight 
attention  v/as  given  to  problems  of  price  fixing.   The  eastern  operators 
ex;oected  this  matter  to  be  handled  by  marketing  agencies.   l.Ir.  Harrington, 
in  presenting  the  general  code,  declared  the  minimum  coal  price  article 
to  be  one  of  the  most  important  in  the  Code.   He  described  the  evils  re- 
quiring correction.   "In  the  stress  of  competition",  said  he,  "pxid    in  the 
effort  to  keep  mines  in  operation,  even  prepared  coals,  at  times,  have 
been  sole  belon  cost,  amd  v/ith  slack  or  fine  coal,  this  has  been  the  I'ule 
rather  thxin  the  exception".  (*'****)   But  of  discussion  of  methods  and 

(*)      Ibid,  Vol.  II,  -yp.    278  -  9.  ~ 

(**)     Ibid,  p.  310. 

(***)  See   the   testimony  of  Jolm  L.    Leuis,    Vol.    II,    p.    347   et    seq.    of 

Progressive  liiners'    representatives,    7ol.    Ill,    p.    555   et    seq. 
of  rational  Iliners'   Union,   Vol.    IV,    p.    593   et    seq. 

(****)        Cn   the   8-hour  day  issue,    see   the   infor.ning   testimony  of  lir. 

"uchanan,    an  operator  in  Illinois,    TJest  Virginia,    Kentucl^  and 
Arkansa.s,    Vol.    II,    pp.   384  et    seq.      On  neekly  hours,    see  i.ir. 
Collins  of   the  Hociry  liountain  Pacific  group,    Vol.    I,    p.    164   et    seq. 
I'.T.    I.icAuliffe  from  TTyoming,    Vol.    II,    p.    399;    Ilr.   Heaps  of   lona. 
Vol.    IV,   p.    540   et    seq. 

(*****)      Ibid,    Vol.    II,    p.    242. 
9837 


-94- 

agencies  or  of  economic  and  industrie.1  dif f iciilties,  there  '7as  rarel5r 
a  hint  e.t    the  headings.   The  representative  of  Southern  Ohio  Coals  Inc., 
possibly  "because  this  s.gency   T,-a.s  directly'-  concerned  with  price  making, 
made  some  contrihution  at  this  point.   As  noted  above,  he  stiggested  the 
inclixsion  of  the  competition  of  other  fuels  as  a  factor  in  basic  prices. 
TJiiile  an  independent  operator  interested  in  mines  located  in  Indiana 
and  Illinois  called  a.ttention  to  the  difficulties  inherent  in  csij   attempt 
to  set  a  single  basic  price  for  all  mines,  he  preferred  to  appl;^  the 
"average  cost  of  production  to  ea.ch  individual  mine  operation  and  not  to 
the  avera^ge  of  all  the  mines  in  a  district".   Since  this  contribution  to 
scientific  price  fixing  stands  almost  alone,  a  further  quotation  is 
justified.  Perhaps  the  moral  is  that  open  code  hearings  are  not  the 
place  for  such  discussion. 

"There  are  four  or  five  different  veins  in  Indiana  and 
Illinois  and  it  is  easy  to  see  that  p„  lov;  cost  operation  in  one 
vein,  bj'-  reason  of  high  cost  operations  else\7here  in  the  same  vein 
might  have  a  high  minimum  cost  placed  ^ipon  it  vmich  vrould  prevent 
it  from  competing  rrith  its  neighbor  mines,  in  a  different  vein  even 
though  his  ov/n  low  cost  uonld  othervrise  permit  him  to  live.   It 
notild  follow  therefore  that  the   minimura  cost  as  betvreen  the  different 
veins  v;ould  have  to  be  relr.teo.  to  each  other  and  fair  differentials 
established.   All  these  in  turn  would  have  to  be  related  to  all 
other  veins  from  aav  other  districts  competing  in  a.  common  market 
with  the  necessarj'-  differentials.   You  can  rea.dily  see  that  it  would 
soon  become  the  worst  complicated  and  complex  structure  imaginable. 
'lO,    differentials  are  bad  enoiigh  in  wage  scales  vathout  bringing 
them  into  the  question  of  'orices. 

"I  would  further  point  oiit  that  a  slight  mistake  in  classifying 
any  mine  v/ith  p,  higher  grade  of  coal  wotild  prevent  such  mine  from 
selling  its  product  until  all  the  other  mines  with  the  better  grade 
had  been  sold  out,  even  thoiv'^/i  the  cost  of  production  of  the  e::amole 
mine  v.-ould  permit  it  to  sell  its  coal  at  less  price  than  the  minimum 
fixed  and  still  make  a  fair  profit."  ( *) 

A  significant  event  at  the  herring,  in  view  of  later  difficulties 
in  correlating  the  four  codes  dealing  v;ith  coal,  \/as  the  fire  dravm 
from  wholesaling  and  trucking  interests  by  certain  features  of  suggested 
codes.   The  geographical  set  up  had  been  drawn  to  cover  the  entire  United 
States,  bi\t  certain  cities  were  separated  from  their  natural  affiliation 
on  geographical  lines  and  included  in  neighboring  divisions  "because  of 
their  effect  on  the  marketing  of  the  product".  (**)   This  was  true  of 
Cinciimati  and  of  St.  Louis.'  The  origineJ  map  suggested  an  intent  to 
create  marketing  areas  'Tith  attached  producing  territory  on  the  lines  of 
war  tiirfe  control.   The  attitude  of  the  objectors  is  best  presented  in 
their  ov/n  '/ords.   "Eae  Code  purports",  said  one,  "to  be  a  Code  for  coal 
producers  but  the  districts  cover  not  only  the  coal  producing  parts  of 


(*)    V-AC,    Vol.  Ill,  pp.  435-6. 
(**)   Ibid,  Vol.  II,  p.  234. 


9337 


-95- 

the  United  States,  but  the  coa.1  consuming  prrts,  end.   it  is  thought  by 
manj'-  of  the  vholesalers  tha.t  these  acijninistrators  may  in  some  na;^  intei— 
fere  r/ith  the  wholesale  coal  trade.   Especiallj^  i:a  this  the  case  in  St. 
Louis."  (*)   In  St.  Louis  the  objection  was  to  a  "foreif'^n  administration" 
since  the  city  had  been  attached  to  Illinois. 

The  trucking  interests  rere  similarly  positive  in  voicing  objection. 
They  called  attention  to  the  fe.ct  that  a  code  for  the  motor  truck  trans- 
portation industry/  tras  in  t>-e  making  and  uere  convinced  "that  any  motor 
truck  transportation  clause  vas  irrelevant  to  the  purpose  and  intentions 
of  a  coal  industr-y  code.   It  would  be  discriminatory  in  character,  and 
would  have  f.  tendenc^y  to  harrass  and  opioress  the  local  coal  mines  ... 
using  the  motor  tn.i.ck  as  a  means  of  transportation  in  the  movement  of 
coal  to  their  natural  ms.rkets."  (**) 

Another  matter  presented  v;as  the  child  labor  clause.   Effective 
presentation  was  made  of  the  vicious  charsxter  of  including  the  vrord 
"knowingly"  in  the  act  and  of  the  desirabilitv  of  a  minimum  age  of  18 
years  for  inside  vforkers  and  for  those  engaged  in  hazardous  operations. 
To  these  sLiggestions  the  operators  were  amenable.   There  was  some  pre- 
sentation of  safety  conditions  and .desirable  neasures  of  betterment. 
The  cause  of  the  negro  miners  was  adequately  discussed.   The  different 
union  factions  aired  their  mutiial  grievances  and,  to  a  degree,  declared 
their  relative  strength.   Incio.entally,  some  operE,tors,  notably  of 
Alabama,  (see  Transcript  of  Code  Hearing  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  503-5)  voiced 
stern  opposition  to  union  contracts.   In  such  discussions,  the  current 
auestion  of  including  in  codes  language  qualifying  7  (a)  was  seldom 
candidly  faced.   The  head  of  "J.R.A.'s  section  on  Research  and  Planning 
contributed  a  statistical  snjnmary  of  historical  and  competitive  con- 
ditions drawin,'5  to  the  follovang  conclusion: 

"Throiigh  organization  of  tiie  factions  within  the  industr]?- 
under  a. code  and  providing  an  instrumentality  for  the  gradual 
development  of  economic  planning  v-'ithin  tlie  industry  and  in  re- 
lation to  competing  or  pa.rellel  fuel  and  energy  indiistries,  an 
opportunity  is  now  afforded  for  the  conservation  of  the  natural 
resource  of  coal  and  for  the  conservation  of  the  human  and  capital 
resource  so  that  instead  of  continuous  decline  and  waste,  disem- 
ployment  rather  than  eraplojTnent  and  even  unemployment,  banlcruptcy 
rather  than  profits  or  even  bare  solvency  —  instead  of  continuing 
the  descent  toward  economic  zero  coal  can  enter  upon  a  new  era  of 
recovery."  (***) 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  hearing,  interested  proponents  of  codes 
were  requested  to  be  available  on  AiJgust  22nd.   It  was  understood  that 
the  Administration  would  present  a  code  at  that  time  and  such  a  document 


(*)  Ibic,  Vol.  I,  p.  147. 

(**)  Ibid,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  454. 

(***)  Ibid,  Vol.  IV,  P.  682. 

9837 


v?r,s  -orei^erec  b-  Aiigust  lotl\   "but  never  released.   On  tlipt  date  a  con- 
ference comprising  some  200  interested  T)arties  met  for  a  brief  session 
T7ith  Deput7  Ac^ministrator  Simpson  and  Gensral  Coxmsel  Pdcliberg.   The 
press  had  annoimced  th?.t  a,  code  uoald  be  presented.   Instead  the  pre- 
siding officials  asked  for  the  selection  of  representatives  from  each 
district  to  attend  a  conference  the  ne;:t  o.&i''.     TJhen  these  delegates  met 
the^r  uere  addressed  by  General  Johnson,  Deputy  Administrator  Simpson 
and  General  Counsel  Richberg.   The  burden  of  these  speeches  seems  to 
have  been  the  desire  of  the  government  represente.tives  to  alla-'^  fears 
that  e.  code  '.7as  about  to  be  imposed  on  the  industry  and  to  give  assurance 
that  each  of  the  large  producing  districts  of  the  countr;'-  ^.Tould  enjoy 
"absolute  autonomy".  (*) 

There  ensued  a  period  of  medv/   conferences.   Representatives  of  \^A 
v.-ere  meeting  daily  'v.'ith  representatives  of  the  various  districts  in  an 
endeavor  to  secure  agreement  on  a  system  of  vage   differentials.   In  the 
event,  the;,'-  uere  successful  in  securing,  acquiescence,  if  not  agreement, 
by  the  representatives  of  all  districts,  a2:cept  Alabpjna.   The  governjnent 
in  tha-t  case  prescribed  a  rate  of  $3,40  although  the  operators  could  not 
be  induced  to  agree  to  a  higher  rate  than  $3.20.   The  four  men  repre- 
senting the  Appa-lachian  Code:  Messrs.  J.  D.  Trancis;  J.  D.  A.  llorrovr; 
Charles  C  lei  11;  and  R.    E.  Taggart,  'by   their  unceasing  activity'-  earned 
for  themselves  the  sobriqu.et  of  the  four  horsemen.  Representatives  of 
a.11  the  districts  vrere  constant].y  in  VJashington  and  from  the  nearly 
continuous  conference,  the. outlines  of  an  acceptable  code  gradually 
emerged. 

It  is  evident  that  the  questions  of  labor  costs  and  interdistrict 
nage  differentials  v.'as  the  major  factor  in  delaj'-ing  agreement.   In  late 
August  and  early  September  ;the-  Appalachian  operators,  north  end   south, 
rrere  engaged  in  '.Tage  negotiation  v.'ith  the  United  iane  T.'orkers'  Union. 
The  successful  negotiation  of  a  vfage  agreement  covering  this  highly  im- 
portant coal  producing  area,  settled  manv  controverted  nage  questions 
and  furnished  a  solio.  foundation,  comparable  to  the  earlier  Central  Com- 
"oetitive  l^ield  agreements  for  basic  vages  in  outl3'-ing  districts.   This 
agreement  T:as  signed  September  21,  1933.   There  is  interesting  comment 
from  General  Johnson  ijaider  date  of  Au^'ust  21st,  regarding  the  character 
of  these  conferences.  After  referring  to  the  ijilierent  difficulty  of 
reconciling- differences  on  such  issues  as  tht.t  of  the  open  and  closed 
shop,  he  continued: 

"i"otr/ithst£:nding  this  there  has  been  majiif ested  no  dis- 
position to  obstruct.   On  the  contrar}^,  everybod}^  is  sincerel3^ 
seeking  agreement.  Our  conferences  have  been  amiable  and  the 
arguncnts  ha.ve  been  earnest  '..Ithout  being  a.crimonious.  The 
delegations  arc  composed  of  reasonable  men,,  'jho.  realize  that  their 
points  of  vic'7  are  in  conflict,  but  vho  are  equally  concerned 
v.'ith  the  '.7  elf  are  of  the  industr-y  end  .the  eucccss  of  the  iIRA  pro- 
■^ram.   Under  these  circiunstances,  I'm  -oorfectly  stiro  i/e  \7ill 


(*)  Bulletin  iTetional  Coal  Association,  August  19,  193C 


9837 


-97- 

reach  a  conforta'ble  arran£:ement,  and  that  a  code  '"'ill  issue 
presently. "  (*) 

A  full-  record  of  the  conferences  could  onlv  Tae  uritten  at  this 
date  loy  one  of  the  central  figures  therein.   It  \/ill  he  most  regrettahle 
if  the  inside  historj'-  of  these  meetings  is  not  preserveci..  As  an  example 
of  the  educative  effort  necessary  to  "bring  into  agreement  many  men,  re- 
presenting diverse  interests,  cjid  for  r;hom  clear  vision  of  essentials 
T/as  often  obscured  liy   the  memories  of  old  conflicts, .  such  a  record  v;ould 
be  of  transcendent  interest.   However,  the  stages  in  the  development  of 
the  code  are  fairl^^  clearly  marked.  As  noted  above,  TEA   officials  drafted 
a  tentative  co6.e   August  18th  which  they  were  careful  to  label:  "This 
tentative  draft  has  not  been  a'op roved  in  any  respect  by  anyone  connected 
vfith  IHA,  but  is  made  available  only  as  a  basis  for  discussion  and  to 
facilitate  the  formulation  of  a  basic  code  for  the  bit-ominous  coal  in- 
dustry'-".  This  draft  was  never  released,  as  a  whole,  but  on  A-'Jgust  24th 
four  sections  dealing  with  administrative  features  were  given  out..   On 
September  7th  a  so-called  basic  bituminous  coal  code  was  -published  over 
the  name  of  Administrator  Hugh  S.  Johnson,  together  \7i.th  notification 
that  written  statements  offering  objections,  or  amendments,  to  its  "oro- 
visions  woulci.  be  received  until  6  P.il.  of  September  9th.   In -fiie  light 
of  such  comment,  the  Code  was  to  be  revised  and  presented  at  a  public 
hearing  on  September  11th.   A  hearing  of  the  character  suggested  did  not 
event-ua-te  but  on  September  13th  revision  of  the  -previously  published 
four  sections  was  put  out.   On  September  15th  an  agreement  on  a  nev/ly 
drafted  form  was  reached  liy   representatives  of  Divisions  II,  IV  and  Y 
and  on  September  18th  received  the  approval  of  President  Roosevelt,  with 
some  modifico.tions  by  executive  order. 

The  request  for  criticism  of  the  September  7th  Code  aroused  a  storm 
of  objections.   As  stated  by  G-eneral  Counsel  Pdchberg  at  a  hearing  on 
September  12th  at  which  he  made  the  only  speech:   "TJe  have  had  filed  a 
great  many  helpful  statements  and  suggestions  of  improvements  of  that 
code.   That  was  desired.   7e  have  had  filed  a  certain  number  of  somewhat 
impassioned  arguments  and  criticisms  of  code  provision  that  rie   had  not 
presented  and  criticism  of  an  administrative  machinery  which  we  had  not 
thought  of  setting  up,  all  of  which  has  been  quite  a  waste  of  time." 
Plainly  the  atmos-phere  of  conference  rooms  had  grown  heated.   There  was 
discontinuance  of  plans  for  public  hearings.   Hereafter  the  Administra- 
tion relied  on  conferences  to  discover  and  compose  difference  of  opinion. 
In  these  efforts,  131A  officia-ls  were  greatly  helped  throught  the  forma- 
tion, at  their  suggestion,  on  September  12th  of  two  Basic  Code  Committees, 
one  on  adjnini  strati  on  of  the  Code,  the  other  to  consider  the  content  of 
the  Code  as  r.  v:hole.   This  vfas  outside  of  the  question  of  the  minimum 
wages,  to  which  separate  treatment  was  given.   On  ■  each  Cormnittee,  Divi- 
sion I  was  to  have  four  members;  Division  II,  two;  and  each  of  the  others, 
one.   Separate  groups,  desiring  to  do  so,  might  also  send  representatives 
to  the  meetings  of  these  committees.   In  a  large  measure  this  was  the 

"("*)   Press  release,  August  21,  1933. 


9837 


raachiner]-   through  Trtaich  the   final   forin   of   the   Code  vras  rrorked  out. 

It  T-i".].   he   convenient    to   follov:   the   cLian£v.es  mr.ce   in   successive 
drafts   of   irn'oortant    sections  of   the  code.      ITirst   as   to   the  geographical 
basis,    it  '..ill   "be  rer.embered  that   the    "general  code"  had  proioosed  a  five 
area  division  covering  the   entire  country.      Tlie  August   13th  draft  made 
six.      Of   these,    the  last   three,    the   Southern  or  Division  III   in  the   ap- 
■oroved  Code,    including  Alabajna,    Georgia  and  Southern  Tennessee;    the 
Southnestern  or  Division  IV,    i;issouri,    Kansas,    Oklahoma,    Arkansas  and 
Texas;    and  the  Uestern  or  Division  V,    including  all  Roclq'-  I.Iouhtain  and 
Pacific   States;    remaineo   v;ith  little    subsequent  change.      Horth  and  South 
Dalcota  uhich  had  been  included  vdth  Iowa,    Illinois  and  Indiana,    i/ere 
added  to    the  Western  Division  in  the   September  7th  draft   ojid  thereafter 
that  Division  remained  unchanged.     During  August  and  early  September, 
operators   in  Torth  Dakota,    by  letters   and   telegrajns,    nere   seeking  ap- 
proval  of   a   separate   code   for  their  lignite   industr3'-.      Besides  the 
Dak:otas  the   Central  Division  in  the  August   IBth  draft   included  Western 
2[entu.cky  as  x.'ell  as   the   three   States,    Iov.fa,    Illinois  and  Indiana,    vjhich 
finall-/-  made  u.p  Division  II.      The  first  proposal  vas   to   divide  the 
Appalachian  Code  territory  into   tv;o  divisions;    the  rortheastern,    in- 
cluding Pennsylvania,    I.iar3rland,    Ohio,    Hichigan  and  TTest  Virginia  north 
of  the  Kanav/ha,  district;    and  the  Appal achiaji,    comprising  the  rest  of   the 
territorj'-  of  Division  I    except  for  '.."estern  Kentucls;^.      The  next  revision, 
that  of  August  24th,    provided  five  Divisions,    combining  all  the 
Appalachian  territors'-  including  '.".'estern  KentucJc.^  but   throwing  Ilichigan 
into  Division  II.     3y  the   September  7th  revision,    these  Divisions  had 
talcen  their  final  form. 

Aci-ministrative  provisions  of   tlie   original   draft   included  a  national 
Bituminous  Coal  Administrative  Board   "consistiiifg  of  members  representing 
the   three  parties  at   interest,    namel;7,    producers,    emplo3^3es  and  con- 
sumers.     The  number  of   such  members  and  the   specific  diities  to  be  per- 
formed shr.ll  be  determined  b"  joint  conference  at  v.'hich  the  three   such   , 
classes  of  parties  at   interest   are   represented,    together  with  repre- 
sentatives  of   the  AcjTiinistrator".      Zach  Division,    by  action  of   the  pro- 
d.ucers  in   the   district,   was   to  establish  its  own   single  administrative 
agency  "for  the  ad:ninistrrtion  of  its  own  affairs  within  the  limitation 
of   the  T.1.3..A.    and  this  Code".      Ap'oeal  was   to  be   from   these  divisional 
boards  to    the  rational  Board  v/hich,    subject   to  revie*..'  by  the  At'minis- 
trator,    '.vas   "to   constitute  a  court  of  last    resort  on  all  matters  re- 
ferred to   it   and  its  findings  sliall  be  binding  on  all    subscribers  to 
this  Code".      To  provision  was  made  for  districts  within  divisions  nor 
for  local   control  within  divisions.      The    second  draft  was  materially 
changed.      Vo  general  boa.rd  was  provided.      3ach  division  v.'as  to   establish 
a  Divisional   Code  Authority  "for  the  arlministration  of   its  own  affairs 
to  the  extent  authorized  in  liM  and  tliis  Code".     Here   is  found  the  first 
mention  of  Presidential  Members.      One  wr.r.  to  be  appointed  in  each  Code 
Authorit''-.      The  President   also  was  to  have  po\rer  of  modification  or  veto 
over  every  action  of  the   code  authorit.y.      In  each  Division,    Marketing 
Agencies  might  be  established  and  controlled  by  the  Code  Authority. 
These  provisions  v.'ere  repeated  in  the    September  7th  proposals  and  in 
addition  provision  was  again  made  for  a  national  Bitiominous  Coal  Board 
of  ten  members;    five  to  be  awnointed  by  the  president   from  nominations 


9837 


made  by  each  of  the  Code  Authorities,  and  the  others  to  he  the  Presidential 
Members  of  such  Code  Aut/.oritics.   Powers  granted  to  this  hoard  were  in- 
definite and  shf.dowy.   It  was  "to  have  the  ^^oi-^ers  provided  in  the  Code  and 
reriort  from  time  to  time  to  the  Presicient  urion  the  o'Dcrf'tion  of  the  Code". 

Such  administrative  -oro-iosals  aroused  the  sponsors  of  the  Appalachian 
Code.   Their  criticism  submitted  Se-otember  9th  s-oeslis  of  "paternalistic 
interference  of  the  Administration  in  management"  and  of  "management 
obliteration".   They  exi:)ressed  their  a.ttitude  to^rard  tae  nrooosal  that  acts 
of  Code  Authorities  should  be  subject  to  modification  or  veto  by  the  Ad- 
ministrator as  follows:   "It  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  of  any  more 
abject  state  to  which  management  can  be  relegated".   "Our  first  fundamental 
objection",  said  they,  "is  based  on  the  fact  that  the  Code  as  -nro-nosed 
de-nrives  the  owners  of  the  -orODerty  of  "oractically  all  the  rights  of 
managers".'  They  "oointed  out  that  while  they  re-oresented  some  70  -oer  cent  of 
the  -oroduction,  they  were  -olaced  on  a  par  with  each  of  the  othe^"  four  Divis- 
ions in  administrative  re-iresentation  and  that  their  one  member  of  the 
■oro-oosed  board  eat  in  a  board  of  ten,  five  of  whom  were  governmental  an- 
T)ointees.   "The  result  is",  read  their  iDrotest,  "that  the  70  -oer  cent  of  the 
inr'ustry  which  we  re-oresent  will  have  a  10  per  cent  rei^resentation  on  the 
National  Bituminous  Coal  Board."  Later  '  they  declare:  "We  are  not  willing 
that  any  other  coal  -nroducing  section  should  nartici-oate  in  the  control  of 
the  affairs  of  the  Appalachian  district". 

Of  similar  tenor  was  the  protest  of  the  Alabama  operators.   "This  basic 
code",  said  they,  "'^ould  displace  the  machinery  for  real  self-determination 
proposed  by  the  Alabama  Code  and  would  substitute  control  by  the  Ad- 
ministration".  In  their  opinion  "the  sole  fuh'ttion,  of  the  Government  is 
political".   They  make  their  position  clear:   "We  must  insist  that  any  code 
with  which  our  division  is  exioected  to  com-ily  must  contain  provisions  for 
actual  self-determination  or  we  will  manage  without  it."   Modification  or 
veto  of  the  acts  of  Divisional  Code  Authorities  by  the  Administration,  in 
their  opinion,  reduced  tjiose  authorities  to  a  "fi;;ure  of  speech".   "The 
audacity  of  that  clause",  reads  their  protest,  "is  sufficient  to  disclose  the 
theory  of  the  Code".   In  concluding  they  state  their  belief  that  "the  purpose 
and  effect  (of  the  Code)  would  be  the  transfer  to  political  control  of  the 
basic  functions  of  wa^es,  prices  and  distribution". 

The  tentative  draft  of  September  13th  showed  the  effect  of  criticism 
received  on  the  preceding'  form.   The  Divisional  Code  Authorities  were  to 
consist  of  not  more  than  15.  members,  all  but  one  to  be  elected  by  a  di- 
visional association  or  a  committee  of  producers.   Voting  was  to  be  primarily 
by  tonnage  under  regulations  prescribed  by  the  Administrator.   Marketing 
Agencies  might  be  established  v/ithin  a  division  by  a  voluntary  association 
of  producers  f^'anctionin:;  under  general  rules  and  regulations  prescribed  by 
the  Divisional  Code  Autiiority  but,  be  it  noted,  not  directly  dependent  upon 
that  body  for  its  organii^iation.   The  Industrial  Boart"  also  was  made  over  to 
allow  £rreater  representation  to  the  districts  of  largest  Production  and  to 
place  control  securely  in  the  hands  of  the  ind\istry.   Four  members  "were  to 
be  designated"  by  the  Code  Authority  of  Division  I;  two  from  Division  II; 
and  one  from  each  of  the  other  Divisions.   Membership  for  the  five  Presidentia 
Members  was  retained.   Inasmuch  as  the  ill-defined  po^'ers  of  the  Board  were 
neither  enlarged  nor  strengthened,  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to  understa^nd  the 
importance  attached  to  its  composition  by  the  operators.   As  stated  in  this 
draft,  it  was  to  meet  on  call  of  the  administrator,  wl.o  was  ex-officio  Cha-irma 

9837 


to  consider  and  ranke  recorn.aendation  "of  a.nendnents  or  other  measures  vrliich 
iTip.:/  statilize  and  inmrove  tlie  conditions  of  the  industry  and  riroraote  the 
p"'i"jlic  interest  therein". 

These  "TDvisions  remained  substantially  unchanged  when  the  Code  reached 
t.ie  President  e'xceT)t  that  the  final  draft  allowed  the  formation  of  Suh- 
divisions  i«rith  a  Code  Authority  in  "peopra-niiical  areas"  within  the  Division. 
The  desirability  of  such  a,ction  had  been  forcibly  stated  by  the  siDonsors 
of  the  Arj^ialachian  Code  in  their  -protest  of  Sentember  9th.   As  their  fifth 
fundamental  objection  they  state:  "that  the  -nro-nosed  code  undertakes  to 
control  the  coal  industry  along  national  lines  rather  than  u?3on  the  natural 
district  lines  estaolished  by  the  location  of  coal  deposits."   They  called 
attention  to  the  /reat  dic-narity  in  size,  measured  by  tonnage,  of  the  Livisior. 
set  UTD  and  say  of  their  o'^i   Division: 

"No  one  board  can  adequately  hfmdle  the  com- 
plicated labor,  rnarketi 'ig  nnd  "oroduction  areas 
of  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  eastern  Kentucky,  Vir- 
ginia, T'lest   Virginia,  and  Northern  Tennessee, 
involving  70  -per  cent  of  the  country's  output, 
and  give  attention  to  the  needs  of  Horth  Caro- 
lina, lo""cr  Michigan  and  Western  Kentucky.   The 
solution  is  to  be  foimd  in  splitting  the 
so-called  divisions  into  units  less  un^Tieldy  and 
with  co.:i-:ion  problems." 

Prior  to  the  Code  hearing  of  August  9th  to  l,?th,  the  Proposed  codes  had 
practically  all  provided  for  the  collection  of  data  and  generally  had  allowed 
that  it  might  be  available  to  governmental  agencies.  The  unfortunate  draft 
of  August  18th  proposed  thet  each  employer  in  the  industry  should  "furnish 
duly  certified  report  to  the  President  or  to  such  other  figency  as  he  may 
designate,  in  such  substance  and  form  fs  may  from  time  to  time  be  required". 
Such  reouireraents  disappear  entirely  from  the  September  7th  draft  except  that 
the  records  and  the  data  of  Marketing  Agencies  and  Code  Autliorities  were  to 
be  open  to  inspection  by  the  regularly  ap'nointed  agents  of  the  Administration. 
In  the  approved  form  this  requirement  was  again  written  in.   It  was  further 
provided  that  the  Code  Authority  must  collect  and  com-nile  any  reports  reouired. 
and  that  the  Presidential  Member  was  to  lavf  autliority  to  examine  books  and 
records  of  the  producers  in  h.is  Division. 

In  this  record  of  successive  changes  in  the  Centr^'l  Adm.-i.nistrative  pro- 
visions may  be  clearly  seen  the  play  of  opposing  forces.   On  the  one  hand, 
the  operator:  were  jealous  of  governinental  control.   Indeed  t'ley  resented  any 
sort  of  central  control,  even  industrial.   Each  district  and  group  desired 
complete  self  government.   Such  an  attitude  was  both  natural  and  inevita,ble, 
but  unfortunately  it  was  incompatible  with  the  necessities  of  the  situation. 
'Tills  "sick  industry"  needs  not  only  centralized  control  but  a  strong  ad- 
ministration.  This  its  leaders  consistently  refused  to  recognize.   Instead 
the  tendency  was  toward  localizpd  control.   In  addition  the  small  or)era-tors 
feareri  domination  of  the  industry  by  the  large  companies  and  their  own 
elimination.  The  large  companies  were  aroused  by  any  'iroposal  which  based 
control  on  voting  by  members  rather  tlia.n  by  tonnage.  At  the  same  time  they 
rebelled  against  any  proposed  set  up  which  gave  the  C-overnment  a  majority  vote 
in  any  board  or  authority.  Any  siog'gcstion  that  control  should  pass  to  the 
administration  aroused  tlie  "imrjassioned"  outbursts  to  which  General  Counsel 

9837 


-I'Jl- 

RichlDerg  referred.   Their  feeling  reached  its  logical  exnression  in  the 
recalcitrant  attitude  dis-olar/ed  toward  furnishing  the  government  with  renorts 
and  data.   This  record  is.  reminiscent  of  the  successful  legal  "battles  which 
o-oerators  waged  against  the  collection  of  cost  data  by  the  Federal  Trade  Com- 
mission in  r)Ost-war  days.   Fro^^osed  codes  had  frcauently  provided  for  as- 
sembling of  cost  aata  but  almost  always  under  carefully  devised  -olans  for 
lodging  them  in  o-^erator  orgpnizations.   Tiie  line  between  that  and  reT)orting 
direct  to  the  G-overnment  wr  s  one  which  the  -nroducers  stubbornly  refused  to 
cross. 

The  formulating  of  measure;s  for  the  settlement  of  labor  dis-outes  makes 
an  interesting  story.   Here  the  administration  code  drafters  had  a  greater 
measure  of  success.   Develo-pmcnts  e't  the  tim.e  generally  strengthened  their 
hand.   Union  organizers  were  extrpordinarily  active  and  threatened  strikes 
were  numerous.   The  xiationol  L?bor  Board  had  been  set  uo   on  August  5th,  1933, 
and  had  intervened  in  certain  coal  strikes.   Under  these  circumstances, 
agencies  for  strike  settlement  were  welcomed  and  the  bituminous  coal  indus- 
try held  a  strong  preference  for  its  own  agencies  as  contrasted  with  a  na- 
tional board  operating  in  industry  generally.   iNTone  of  the  codes  "oroposed 
by  the  industry  had  contained  any  section  dealing  with  the  settlement  of 
labor  dis-nutes;  but  the  four  sections  published  August  24th  calle;!  for  a 
complete  set  uv:   mine,  local  and  divisional  adjustment  boards  and  a  National 
Bituminous  Coal. Labor  Board.   The  adjustment  boards  were  to  be  comr)osed  of 
representatives  of  emt)loyers  and  employees:   The  National  Board  of  three  ap- 
■oointed  by  the  President  was  to  have  an  im-nartial  Chairman.   The  divisional 
adjustment  boards  were  to  settle  local  and  oistrict  dis-outes  if  possible. 
Wheii  such  efforts  failed  the  dispvites  arising  in  any  of  the  five  divisions 
were  to  be  passed  on  finally  'oy   the  National  Board.   In  effect  this  set  up 
was  retained  in  the  September  7th  draft.  This  -olan  for  adjustment  and  labor 
boards  drew  fire  from  the  o-nerators'  representatives.  The  objction  of  the 
AiD-nalachian  Code  sponsors  can  best  be  stated  in  their  own  words: 

"The  set-UT)  for  ho.ndling  distjutes  affecting  hours, 
wages  and  conditions  of  em-olo^/ment  involves  un- 
necessary ste'os  and  ■'jnjustif iable  expense.   It 
tends  to  delay  and  to  -orolongation  of  disputes. 
It  gives  the  oioportunity  for  considera-tion  of 
comparatively  sira-ole  -nroblem-s  by  too  many  tri- 
bunals.  It  takes  no  account  of  the  rights  of 
the  individual  em-oloyee  or  of  any  grou-o  of  un- 
organized employees.   It  is  peculiarly  designed  to 
drive  em-nloyees  into  a  union.   We  believe  the 
manner  of  handling  mine  disputes  can  and  should 
be  simplified  and  made  applicable  to  all  employees, 
regardless  of  their  affiliation  or  non-eff illation 
with  any  organization. 

"The  Article  lacks  any  provision  prohibiting  stop- 
page of  work  at  the  mine  while  a  labor  dispute  is 
under  consideration  by  the  pe-^sons  or  tribunal  to 
whom  or  to  which  it  is  referred  to  adjustment. 
Absence  of  such  provision  makes  for  sporadic  or 
protracted  ptoppage  of  worx  at. the  mines  as  the 
case  may  be. 


9837 


-102- 
"The  section  treating  of  lal^or  relations  does  not 
provide  any  suitable  method  whereby  the  obligations 
of  labor  can  be  made  enforceable  against  the  enialoyee 
or  em-nloyees." 

In  like  temper  the  Alobaraa  Ofierators  attack  the  idea  of  divisional  and 
district  adjtistment  boards.   These,  as  they  see  the  matter,  could  "be  created 
only  by  orjranized  collective  bargainin,';".   They  are  opposed  to  a  National 
Bituminous  Coal  Labor  Board  whose  conclusion  is  made  final.   "This",  says  the 
protest,  "is  not  mediation.   It  is  final  determination  by  political  authority 
and  should  be  eliminated  or  amended. ...  it  presupposes  unionization  of  the 
entire  industry  within  ten  days  of  its  effective  date." 

These  criticisms  played  a  part  in  causing  a  ret'iraf ting  to  the  extent  of 
setting  UP  a  Bituminous  Coal  Labor  Board  in  each  of  the  five  Divisions.   The 
members  of  these  Boards  might  meet  as  a  Kational  Board  to  handle  inter- 
divisional  controversies,  or  matters  affecting  more  than  one  division  because 
of  its  effects  on  competitive  marketing,  or  matters  affecting  the  general 
public  or  the  welfare  of  the  industry  as  a  whole.  All  these  Boards  were  to  be^ 
ap-oointed  by  the  President  and  each  of  the  Divisional  Boards  had  three  members' - 
one  selected  from  nomination  by  the  Code  Authority;  one  from  nomination  by 
organizations  of  employees;  and  an  impartial  Chairman.   The  approved  draft 
added  a  second  board  for  Division  I  so  that  in  the  final  set-up,  that  Divisiori 
hsd  a  North  and  a  South  Board.   It  may  be  noted  in  passing  that  the  anti- 
cipated press  of  business  for  these  boards  due  to  strikes  did  not  eventuate  an 
the  provision  of  six  Labor  Boards,  proved  unnecessarily  cumbe'i^some. 

In  the  draft  of  August  IPth  and  in  that  of  September  7th,  had  been  in- 
corporated decidedly  liberal  p'-ovi'-^ions  governing  conditions  of  employment. 
These  included  Article  7  (a)  of  K.I.H.A.  without  qualification  as  well  as  all 
the  sections  written  into  the  "general"  proposed  code.  This,  it  will  be 
remembered,  had  been  largely  influenced  during  its  comi^osition  by  delegates 
from  the  United  Mine  Worke:^s '  Union.   Such  clauses  in  any  case  must  have 
been  expected  to  draw  fire  from  operators  of  non-union  territories,  but  the 
situation  was  complicated  'oy   current  discussion,  developing  much  more  heat 
than  light,  as  to  the  inner  meaning  of  Section  7(a)  itself.  About  this  time  ^ 
also  the  emnloyers  had  succeeded  in  writing  into  the  At\tomobile  Code  a  state- 
ment qualifying  7(a)  to  the  extent  of  declaring  thn,t  "employers  in  the 
industry  may  exercise  their  right  to  select,  retain,  or  advance  employees 
on  the  basis  of  individual  merit,  without  regard  to  their  membership  or  non- 
membership  in  any  organization".   In  conrnon  with  other  employers  engaged  in 
code  formulation,  the  operators  sought  similar  inclusion  in  the  Bituminous 
Coal  Code.   Thus  the  Appalachian  representa.tives  strted: 

"We  still  insist  that  this  clausp  must  be 
included  in  any  code  of  fair  competition  to 
which  we  are  to  agree.  A  similar  statement 
in  the  Automobile  Code  has  been  approved  by 
the  Administrator  and  the  President,  and  there 
is  even  more  reason  for  its  inclusion  in  this 
Code." 


9837 


-103- 
Their  second  fundnment^l  objection  re.ndp:  "tne  Ip.bo-  r,rovisions  are 
throughout  desiOTed  foi-  o-oerf-tors  only  iu  connection  ^itli  p    lahor  union" 
giving  no  recojrnition  to  the  rights  of  individxip,!  emnloyoes  or  grour)s  of  t 
eirmloyees.   Later  they  declares- their  belief  that  Article  7(a)  of  N.I.R.A. 
"not  only  does  not  require  that  workers  organize  hut  exoressly  recognizes 
their  right  to  deal  individually".   The  riarafT'inh  calling  for  organizrtien,  the 
reel  must  "be  eliminrted  if  they  "are  to  continue  to  operate  their  mines. 
.Otherwise  as  owners  of  these  ^roTjerties,  re  canr.ot  "be  res-oonsi"hle  for  either 
the  safety  of  the  emnloyees  or  the  control  and  management  of  the  properties." 
The  Alabama  operators  manifested  a  similar  viewpoint  ^nd  called  for  the 
inclusion  in  the  Code  of  an  interoret^"  tion  '^f   7(a)  jointly  issued  by  the 
Administration  and  the  Crenerf  1  Counsel  of  I'.IuA.  on   August  24th.   In  the  draft 
sent  to  the  President,  this  statement  was  iiiclude.'  as  Scl'^edule  B. 

It  was  a  some^-fhat  labored  docioment.   Tlic  initial  statement  declared  tlmt 
"the  plain  meaning  of  Section  7(a)  cannot  bo  changed  by  any  inter-ore  tat  ion 
by  anyone".   The  words  "onen  suo'o"  and  "closed  shop"  ali'^e  "are  not  used  in 
the  law  and  cannot  be  written  into  the  Irw".   Subsequent  rihrases  endeavorad 
to  steer  a  course  between  the  declaration  that  employees  are  to  ha.ve  the  right 
to  orga.nize  and  bargain  collectively  through  reT5resenta,tives  of  their  own 
choosing  and  to  be  free  from  the  requirements  of  emrjloyers  that  they  join 
company  unions,  and  the  rights  claimed  for  em-ployers  to  deal  with  individuals 
or  with  their  own  men.  if  they  so  desired,  and,  "oerha-os,  if  their  em-olpyecu 
s'nould  nrove   amenable  in  that  desire.   Local  imi  ons  were  legitimate  pnd  might 
be  called  com.pany  unions,  reads  the  statement,  but  these  must  be  free  from 
em-oloyer  control  and  must  be  truly  rcnresentativo  ':^f  the  em-ao-ees  affected. 
To  determine  such  facts  "the  I'.H.A.  "dll  offer 'its  service  to  conduct  an 
imr)artial  investigation  and  if  necessary,  "  secret  ballot .  to  se;ttle  the 
question".   Lihewise,  IT.R.A.  would  "oromote  and  aid  coonerrtion  between  emrjloyer; 
and  era-nloye^s  in  the  making  and  maintenance  of  agreements.   This  meticulous 
stating  of  the  respective  rights  of  the  two  riarties  had  no  more  effect  on  the 
irrepressible  controversy  than  did  the  voluminous  and  o f ten  acrimonious 
discussion  at  the  time.   The  essential  qu.e"stion  was,  and  is,  what  hap-nens  when 
the  rights  of  two  narties  to  a  conflict  are  both  ima^iestionable  and  ir- 
reconcila.ble.   In  this  i:)ragmatic  world  when  that  situation  is  foiond  in  the 
field  of  industrial  relation  strikes  and-  lockouts  follo-v.   ITo  other  solution 
was  discovered  by  the  "Srtional  "Recovery  Administration. 

Maximum  hour  provisions  were  first  stated  as  in  the  gene^^al  code  at  ^2 
hours  per  week  for  '6  weeks  and  40  hours  for  the  rest  of  the  year,  with  a 
■oroviso  that  the  emr)loyer  might  elect   to  or)erate  36  hours  per  week  through- 
out the  year.   At  no  stage  of  code  f or.aulation  was  a  s\ig.;estion  made  for  any 
othe-  daily  standard  than  3  hours.   The  September  7th  basic  code  repeated 
these  limitations.   This  drew  from  the  !"^orth  Dakota  operators  an  original 
criticism.   They  would  suspend  the  limitation  on  hours  "during  emergencies 
caused,  or  restilting  from  .bli7.za,rds,  below  zero  temperature  or  other  similar 
conditions  beyond  the  control  of  the  employer".   However,  the  final  revision 
contained  a  fL^^t  requirement  for  an  .l-hour  day  and  40-hour  week.   The  first 
administration  draft  also  contained  a  clause  -"hich  would  allow  employers  and 
employees  to  join  in  petitioning  the  administra,tion  for  a  su.spension  or 
mocif ication  of  the  limitation  on  weekly  hours.   3y  September  7th  the  plan 
was  advanced  of  allowing  employed  miners  to  propose  sharing  work  with  un- 
em-nloyed  workers  attached  to  the  mine.   Such  plans  might  be  sanctioned  by 
district  adju.stment  committees  in  case  of  fai].ure  of  agreement  in  mine 
conferences.   Emplo?/"ers  assailed  this  as  a  clear  case  of  invasion  of  the  rights 

9837 


-104- 

of  management,   The  final  dral't  af'',ded  a  United  list  of  exemp.ted  occxnpa- 
ti.ons,  "sxt^^ervisors,  clerks,  technicianG"  -uid  employees  handling,  man 

'  trips  or  c?.rin,:;  for  haulat^e  anuinals.   It  retained  the  sliarin^;  of  work 
provicion  out  limited  its  effect  to  cases  in  which  "mat-uaJ  afo-reomcnt" 

.  cordd  be  secured. 

Wage  clauses  shoved  an  interesting  development.   The  first  adjnin- 
istration  draft  proceeded  on  the  "basis  of  setting  up  a  basic  rate  (unspeci- 
fied in  the  draft)  to  be  applied  to  "tracklayers,,  bottom  cagers,  drivers, 
trip  riders,  grip;')ers,  vmter  ha.ulers,  r'lachine  haulers  and  timbermen".   It 
further  stated  that  "existing  relative  differentials"  for  other  classes 
were  to  be  maintained.   Outside  workers  wore  a^lso  to  have  a  minim'um  day 
wage  which,  however,  had  not  been  determined  and  written  into  the  Code. 
Jour  adjustments  iiere   allowable  on  lines  sr^-gested  in  the  general  code: 
a  percentage  differential  below  basic  rates  for  districts  south  of  the 
Ohio  r.ivor  not  including  Division  III  territory;  rates  by  joint  agreement 
for  the  Southwest;  existing  rates  above  the  basic  levels  for  western 
states;  and  percentage  rates  below  for  Division  III,   The  September  7th    (^, 
model  marked  the  inio.tion  of  Schediilo  A.  for  v^ages  quoted  by  districts. 
It  was  confined  to  quotations  for  inside  men.   Other  classifications 
were  covered  by  the  req"i.ireraent  tiiat  "customary  differentials"  above  or 
below  the  basic  rainin-uxn  rates  must  be  maintained.   It  v/as  further  "oro- 
vided  that  contract  rates  negotiated  collectively  should  not  be  changed. 

The  employers  att-.c]-:ed  the  occupa'tional  listing  as  based  on  an 
obsolete  classification.   A  better  statement  would  h^vo  been  to  the 
effect  that  no  generally  adhered  to  classification  existed.   The  different 
fields  and  .districts  ha.ve  always  fxii-nished  the  greatest  variety  of  wage 
and  occupational  clasc.es.   They  also  assailed  the  requirement  tliat 
differentials  be  ma.intained,  as  a  scheme  necessarily  resulting  in 
rigidity  of  v7ago  structure,  and  developed,  at  some  length,  an  argument 
current  at  the  time  that  II. 1. 3. A.  did  not  provide  for  the  setting  up  of 
a  sched'ole  of  wages  but  'rather  intended  to,  have  a  single  ba.sic  minimum 
wage  established  .for  unskilled  men.   This  v/ould  apply  under  mining  con- 
ditions to  outside  -labor  alone.   Conti^ol  of  differentials  "is  to  fix       ^ 
ma.ximxim  as  well  as  rainimu-n  rates"  in  direct  contravention  of  the  H.I.R.A. 
clause  which  provided  that  "no  attempt  sh^.ll  be  made  to  introdvxce  any 
classification  according' to  the  nature  of  the  work  involved  that  might 
tend  to  set  a  maximuri  as  well  as  a  minimujTi  wa^ge". 

Despite  these  ;orotests  tiie  fina-1  draft  containcid  daily  and  hourly 
rates  for  each  district  for  both  outside  and  inside  workers  and  called  for 
the  maintenance  of  customary  differentials  not  only  for  other  classifica- 
tions of  errrrloyocs  but  for  tonnage  and  piece  workers.   Even  at  that  last 
date,  September  16th,  Schedule  "A"  was  incoirrplete.  For  fourteen  districts, 
including  all  the  submarginal  -reas,  no  rates  were  stated  but  were  "to  be 
:orescribcd  by  the  President  nrior  to  the  effective  date  of  the  Code". 
Seemingly  in  an  endeavor  to  soften  the  asi^erities  of  wage  differential  con- 
torvcrsy  or  norhcps,  to  r)ostpone  the  evil  day  of  final  settlement,  pro- 
posal had  been  included  in  these  administrative  drafts  for  provisional  hour 
and  wage  determinations  to  be  modified  according  to  the  results  of  an 
early  investigation.   In  September  16th  draft,  this  paragraph  was  in  the 
following  form: 


-105- 

"As  soon  as  possible  after  the  adoption  of  this  Code, 
the  national  Recovery  Administration  shall  nndertal-o, 
through  a  designated  committee  or  agency,  an  investiga- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  reporting  on  or  hefore  December 
31,  1933;  upon  (a)  the  practicability  and  cost  -(assuming 
the  maintenance  of  existing  re.tos  of  pay)  of  applying 
to  bit'ominous  coal  mining  a  shorter  work  day  and  work 
week,  (b)  the  effect  of'an  advisability  of  revising 
wage  differentials  in  the  various  divisions  and  districts 
of  ti-^  industry  and  in  the  event -of  recommend';",  cliange 
Gpoci'.ication  of  the  amouiit  thereof;  (c)  the  z'^J.::s   prices 
obtai.-.ed  for  coal,  or  reasonably  to  be  anticj-pa^ed,  up  to 
the  time  of  the  reiDort,  for  the  purpose  of  dc'^erming  whether 
v^agos  and  em^^^loyment  can  be  fu.rther  increased  or  maintained 
without  inriosing  undue  burdens  upon  the  industry." 

The  sections  dealing  v;ith  the  setting  of  minimum  prices  contained 
to  receive  less  attention  tlia.n  their  importance  should  have  dictated. 
Throughout  the  period  of  code  formulation  wage  and  labor  matters  -csorbcd 
the  major  part  of  the  time  and  attention  vf   all  parties  in  inter-.i>.,. 
Under  administrative  liandling,  however,  price  matters  were  given  nore 
space  and  the  procedure  for  fixing  prices  became  more  definite.   i'lnce 
these  clauses  were  not  essentially  changed  it  will  be  sufficient  \o   state 
in  outline  the  provisions  of  the  proposed  basic  code  of  Septemlor  7. 
The  basis  of  lorice  fixing  was  the  fair  market  price.   This  T>ras  not  to  bo 
measured  by  costs  of  production  but  rather  by  the  amounts  "ncr^n-— ry  to 
carry  out  tho  purpose  of  the  N.I.R.A.j  the  paj'Tr.ont  of  miniratim  -atos 
herein  established,  and  other  wages  properly  based  thereon,  and  t:^o  fur- 
nishing of  stable  employment  for  the  workers  necessary  to  maintain  the 
industry".   In  addition  account  might  be  taken  of  "competition  v-i '.h 
other  coals,  fuels,  and  forms  of  energy  and  heat  production".  Prices  and 
classifications  were  to  be  established  cither  by  marketing  agericics  re- 
presenting at  least  two-thirds  of  the  produci;rs  of  the  commercial  tonnage 
of  a  district,  nr   in  the  lack  of  such  agencies  by  the  Divisional  Code 
Authorities.  Prices  were  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Administrator. 
In  order  that  he  might  be  well  informed,  tho  Presidential  Members  of 
Code  Aiithoritics  were  givon  adequate  au.thori-y  to  investigate  tho  records 
and  data  of  marketing  agencies  and  of  Code  Authorities. 

Coramc  ;t  on  those  provisions  was  scanty  and  inadequate.   Some  excuse 
is  found  fir  this  in  the  fact  tl:!at  operators,  at  the  time,  anticipated 
that  they,'would  bo  allowed  opportunity  to  discuss  these  features  at 
length  in  a  public  hearing.  Ihe  Appalachian  protest  found  the  basis  pro- 
posed for  price  fixing  to' be  "visionary  and  impractical".   They  feared 
the  obstructionist  activity  of  minorities  which  might  be  larger  than  one- 
third,  vifhen  marketing  agencies  were  to  be  set  u.p,  and  they  flatly  stat« 
their  conviction  tl:a,t  a  Code  Authority  is  not  a  proper  body  either  to  es- 
tablish a  minimum  price  or  to  classify  coals.   This  belipf  was':not  elabo- 
rated beyond  saying  that  "the  size  of  the  Appalachian  Division  is 
sufficient  reason  for  this  statement".   The  Alabama  spokesmen  objected  to 
having  all  prices  subject  "to  revision  at  will  by  the  Administrator." 


9837 


-106- 

Certain  other  features  nay  be  "briefly  stated.'  The  child  labor  pro- 
iiiLiticn  was  set  at  17  years  in  the  first  draft,  reduced  to  16  years  on 
September  7  and  a^^ain  raised  to  17  years  for  inside  workers  or  for  those 
cn/saged  in  hs.zardous  occupations  and  witn  a  provi'so  that  any  higher  re- 
quirement iniposed  by  state  law  should  prevail.   The  proposed  planning 
board  for  all  interrelated  fuel  and  energy  industries  found  favor  in  the 
first  draft  but  disappeared  thereafter.  Provision  for  an  investigation 
of  conditions  surroujiding  trucking  of  coal  was  written  into  both  the 
August  18th  and  September  7th  drafts.   Humerous  vigorously  worded  pro- 
tests were  received  alleging  that  siich  action  would  be  detrimental  to 
small  mines  and  was  an  invasion  of  the  field  of  the  trucking  code.   The 
clause  was  omitted  from  the  fina.l  revision. 

It  must  be  uiiderstood  that  unceasing  efforts  were  carried  on  by 
agents  of  N.H.A.  and  by  cooperating  representatives  of  the  industry  to  se- 
cure an  acceptable  adjustment  of  the  wage  differential  question.   Serious 
doubts  were  expressed  as  to  the  adeq-uacy  of  the  adjustment  finally  reach- 
ed. ■(*)   It  must  be  granted  that  the  problem  was  one  of  enormoiis  difficulty 
and  that  any  definite  settlement  was  a  long  advance  over  the  pre-code 
cliftos  in  the  wage  situation.   Soipe  union  districts  were  not  provided  for 
in  Schedule  "A",  e.  g.  Warrick  and  Vanderburgh  Cotinties  in  Indiana,  and 
some  others  accepted  the  solution  reached  with  great  r eluctance.   It  may 
be  noted  further  that  Schedule  A  was  effective  only  until  April  1,  1934.  (**) 

On  trade  practices  no  controversies  arose.   This  was  not  because 
of  any  feeling  that  these  provisions -were  of  slight  importance.   It  rather 
meant  that  general  agreemicnt  existed  3-s  to  desirable  standards.   The  first 
five  of  the  13  sections  on  Unfair  Practices  were  concerned  with  prices. 
The  ten  following  were  adopted  with  clarifying  revisions  form  the  model 
code  reported  June  16,  1933  by  the  Code  Cotomittee  of  the  national  Coal 
Association.   They  included  all  the  matters  proscribed-  in  that  report. 
The  remaining  three  sections  had  been  developed  in  the  discussions  held 
since  that  date.  Ho.  16  provided  that  special  prices  might  be  made  on 
overseas  exports;  Ko.  17  and  Ho.  18  forbade  Hidden  discounts  through 
Commissions  to  shove  middlemen  in  sales  to  industrial  consumers  or  to 
retailers. 

On  the  16th  of  September  the  teclinical  advisor  of  the  Indxistrial 
Advisory  Board  recommended  acceptance  of  the  Code  as  .drafted  on  that 
date.  He  expressed  doubts  as  to  it's  effect  on  prices,  affecting  the 
use  of  competing  fuels, '  and  as  to  the  results  on  wages  and  employment  af- 
fecting industrial  relations.  He  thought  the  greatest  threat  lay  in  the 
development  of  small  trucking  mines.   "I  am  sorry",  said  he,  "to  see  the 
national  Government  ha.ve  to  supervise  the  industry  but  under  the  sliao.tic 
conditions,  I  see  no  other  way  out."  Ho  v;as  also  "sorry  to  see  prices, 
fixed  but  time  will  tell  if  its  workable".   This  recommendation  was 'con- 
cufred  in  by  the  officials  of  the  Industrial  Advisory  Board.  (***)" 

(*)   In  the  report  of  Dean  Elmer  A. .Holbrook,  Technical  Advisor  on  Coal 

to  the  Industrial  Advisory  Board, 
(**)  Full  discussion  of  the  wage  differentials  is  found  in  Cliaptcr  IV. 
(***)5ee  the  report  in  H.R.A.  files. 


9837 


-10?-. 

On  the  following  day,  Deputy  Administrator  Sinroson  reported  the  code 
for  presentation  to. the  President  and  Administrator  Johnson  approved  his 
report.   It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  Deputy  Administrator  claimed  credit 
for  N.H.A.  ,in  promoting  cooperation  vvithin  the  indvistry.   "It  was  largely 
in  response'  to  H.R.A.  effort",  says  the  letter  of  transmittal,  "tliat  there 
came  into  t  ing  the  ilorthorn  Coal  Control  Association  and  the  Smokeless 
Appalachian  Coal  Association  representing  almost  all  producers  in  the 
Appalachian  Coal  ax-ea  which  produces  approximately  70  per  cent  of  the 
national  bitiU'-dnous  coal  tonnage.  These  associations  join  in  present- 
ing a  Code  of  Fair  Corajoetition,  this  heing  a  romarls.hle  exliibition  of 
cooperation  among  coal  producers  who  have  heen  engaged  for  a  generation 
in  competitive  operations."  The  letter  states  also  "that  the  Administra- 
tion was  active  in  facilitating  the  negotiation  of  the  Appalachian 
V/age  Agreement  vmich  "was  of  the' utmost  importance  in  "bringing  about  the 
submission  of  the  Code  for  the  industry  as  a  whole".   Certain  recommenda- 
tions follow,  all  of  which  were  carried  out  by  President  Roosevelt's 
Executive  Orders  of  September  18th  and  23th: 

1.  It  was  definitely  stated  that  all  coal  producers  were  obligated 
to  finish  designated  governmental  agents  "such  statistical  information 
as  t  he  Adjninistrator  ma-y  deem  necessary  as  well  as  to  transmit  "P.eports 
and  ether  information  compiled  by  the  Code  Authorities". 

2.  Provision  v;as  made  for  the  appointment  of  the  three  members  of 
the  Industrial  Board  in  additio:-!  to  or  in  substitution  for  the  five  Pres- 
idential Members  of  Code  Authorities. 

3.  '  Schedule  B,  being  the  Johnson-Richberg  explanation  of  Section 
7(a)  of  H.I.R.A.,  was  eliminated  since  attenrptod  interpretation  of  that 
section  "lead  to  confusion  and  misunderstanding". 

4.  On  September  29.th  the  conroleted  Schedule  A  of  basic  mdnimum 
rates  was  a-rjroyed  znd  voting  membership  in  the  hational  Bituminous 
Coal  Labor  "^oard  was  restricted  to  the  "impartial  representatives  of  the 
President".   Other  members  participated  only  in  an  advisory  capacity. 

The  agreement  reached  on  this  date  with  tne  operators  of  captive  mines 
in  the  steel  industry  may  fairly  be  regarded  as  a  constituent  part  of  the 
Code,   It  will  be  remembered  that  the  outbreak  of  industrial  "disputes  in 
those  mines  caused  the  advance  of  the  code  hearings 'and  that  the  formula- 
tion of  a  code  was  expected  to  aid  in  the  settlement  of  these  strikes. 
The  employers  in  this  branch  of  the  coal  industry,  without  subscribing  to 
the  Bituminous  Coal  Code,  agreed  to  conraly  with  the  ma,xim\-ira  hours  of  labor 
and  the  mini:„Tjm  rates  of  pay  so  long  as  tiiat  Code  remained  in  effect.   The 
President's  approval  was  made  with  the  understanding  that  hours,  wages  and 
working  conditions  were  to  be  as  favorable  to  the  emrployees  as  Ihose  pre- 
vailing in  the  district  in  which  such  mines  were  located.   The  agreement 
was  signed  for  21  steel  companies,  including  all  v/hich  had  been  concerned 
in  the   ■...•.  strike,  and  comprising  a  substantial  majority  of  the  steel 
ind-astry  captive  tonnage.  ' 


9837 


1 1 .    a::3it3:.z:'ts  '::>  'jkz  jobz;  :]heiii  yonosz  Aia  histoity 

Iii^riiY:  the  ::erioc.  of  aooii'-,  eif^hteen  nontlis  -.'hile  the  Sitxrnnous 
Goal  Code  -'as  in  opera.tion  it  --aS  noJ-if iet.  "oy  ei,c:ht  ar.iencjients.   The 
first  of  these  approvec.  iirrch  jl,    13 jh   i-ecuced  the  naxinui.!  hours  to  7 
per  Co.y   and  55  per  v?eek,  and  iia^de  £.   general  revision  of  vrage  rates. 
Anenoj.ients  2  and  3  approved  April  22  and  June  U  respective!;'-,  revised 
these  rates  in  certp,in  districts.  -  The  Uth  .anenc'-.-ient  approved  IToverfoer 
5»  lS3^l->  provided  for  the  estaolisliment  of'  statistical  bureaus  "oy   each 
code  r.uthorit3^  for  the  furnishin;;  of  infor..:atiO:a  fron  ea,ch  code  nenher 
to  the  ac:j!iinistr£ttor  and  for  pa^nnent  of  the  errpense  o-  a.d-:iinisterin,'-j  the 
code  ''02^   the  producers,   llie  fifth  a;nencu-.ient ,  approved  January  S,  1535. 
forhade  the  naJcing  of  contracts,  v/hether  for  i. ir.ediate  or  future  delivery, 
at  prices  iDelor?  the  fair  narhet  price  at  the  date  of  such  contract. 
Ainendnent  si::,  effective  Januarjr  25,  lS55r  inclu.ded  a  conprehensive 
revision  of  the  iiethod  of  esta.hlishing  fair  /larhet  prices  and  provided 
Boards  of  Arhitrs-tion  to  settle  price  natters  in  dispute.   The  seventh, 
a.s  approved  ilarch  l';-,  lS35f  directed  that  each  code  autliority  should 
have  one  nenlDer  representative  of  organized  labor.   The  eighth  and  last     ft. 
axiendment  e-tended  the  probisions  of  the  Code,  vrhich  otiierrise  termi- 
nated April  1,  to  June  l6,  1935*   This  had  particular  reference  to  nage 
and  hour  clauses.         '  .   .  ■ 

The  Code  ■ -as  adopted  ma,6.e  the  nage  and  hour  provision  effective 
only  until  April  1,  153^'+.   It  stated  also  that  a  conference  'vas  to  be 
held  on  Jajn.ua.rj'-  5  "between  representa-tives  of  enoloyers  and  enployees 
opera.ting  under  the  Code,  toget.ier  ^rith  representatives  of  the  N. H.A. 
for  the  purpose  of  deternining  vrhat,  if  any,  revisions  na.y  be  desira.ble 
of  the  \7ages,  hours,  or  differentia.ls. "  It  'vas  anticip.ated  tha.t  reports 
fron  IT.E.A. 's  statistical  Section  Tfould  be  available  by  that  date  to 
guide  the  conferees  in  their  deliberations.   Largely  because  it  \7as  not 
possible  to  collect  and  compile  these" data  in  tine,  this  conference  nas 
successively  postponed  to  Febraa.ry  12,  February  21,  ilarch  1,  and  uas 
finally  assembled  ..'arcli  26,.  A  special  study  made  l)y   six  mining  engineers 
vras  published  under  date  of  February  12. '  The  field  examination  i7as  ma.de  in  ^ 
Kovember  and  December,  1933*   The  enginesi-B  had  been  instructed  "to        P' 
determine  the  effect  of  the  Bituninous  Coal- Code  on  the  industry  and.  the 
practica-bility  of  substituting  a  shorter  v;ork-day  and  nork-ueeh"  for 
'he-  code  hours.   Their  conclusion  nas  adverse  to  the  shorter  hour  propo- 
sed and  read  as  folloT^s: 

"With  full  appreciation  of  the  (desirability 
of  crea.ting  additional  e/Tploj'ment,  vfe  have 
concluded  from  the  fpxts  brought  forth  by 
this  investigation,  tha^t  the  Bituminous 
Coal  Industry  is  not,  at  this,  time,  finan- 
cially or  competitively  able  to  decrease 
the  nork-da;.''  or  'vork-'.'eek  without  detrimental 
consequences  to  employers  and  employees." 

In  addition  to  this  report,  cost  data  compiled  by  the  rI.R,A.  Bitumi- 
nous Coal  Statistical  Section  for  the  iionth  of  November  1933»  ^-^d. 
emplo^'-ient  and  earnings  reports  for  the  period  November  1  to  I5  had 
been  released  at  various  dates  prior  to  Ilarch  31» 

9237 


-109- 

A  further  fr.ctor  caasinc  (iela;"  and  -uncertainty  resialted  from  the 
ouality  of  control  over  ninintiin  v/ac:e  rates.  On   the  other,  hand  these 
rates  '7ere  definitely  set  do'm  in  the  Code;  on  the  other  they  vere 
suDject  ot  the  ri^jht  of  employees  to  hargain  collectively..   The  original 
Appalachian  agreement,  sifnad  Septenher  21,  1933  has  rerved  as  a  "basis 
in  fixing  code  i7age  rates.   Its  effective  period  e:ctended  only  to  April 
1  anc"  its  coverage,  while  siihstantial,  did  not  include  sone  30  per  cent 
of  production.   The  prohlem  arising  was  a  difficult  one.   Hou  v/as 
agreenent  to  he  sectired  in  the  Appalachian  fields  without  assurance  that 
other  conpetin-':  fields  would  adopt  provisions  consistent  with  the  agree- 
ment there  reached?.   Similar  qriestions  were  pronptly  raised  when  the 
joint  conference  a,ssenhled  on  Jehruary  21.   Smokeless  operators, 
desiring  to  negotiate  ceps.rately,  ■■.•ere  not  represented.   Whereupon  one  of 
the  nost  influential  operators  declared  th-at  assurances  of  the  estahlish- 
nent  of  proper  competitive  relationship  with  the  Snohele^s  Field  would  he 
a  necessary  prereaaisite  for  the  participation  of  the  interests  he 
represented  ir:  an  agreenient.   This  difficulty  was  r.iet  hy  a  suggestion  of 
President  Le-is,  of  the  United  I'inc  T:7or:cers,  that  the  two  conferences  pro- 
as to  the  relationship  of  wage  rates 
outside  districts  remained  an  open 


ceed  conciirrently. 

Ihat   the   duestio: 

in  the  A-o'oalachian 

field  to   those   i: 

one. 

A  further  corTolicrtion  arose  fro:!  the  conclusion  of  a  -jage  contract 
in  the  Ala.hp,na  district  on  ilarch  lb.   This  -'as  a  result  of  strikes  ini- 
tiated on  -rehi-aa-ry  I9.   The  disputes  led  to  much  disorder  and  it  was 
necessary  to  call  out  -the  naxional  ruard  to  police  the  mine  field.   At 
the  height  of  the  disturhance  lOpOO  men  were  on  strike.   The  settlement, 
which  was  to  hold  until  April  1,  1935,  '-"^as  -i^-fi-e  on  the  hasis  of  the  wages 
existing  in  commercial  nines.   This,  is  to  say  at  co.de  minima.  (*)   Although 
.the  &greenent  contained  a  clause  to  the  effect  that  it  was  suhject  to 
modification  "::,■/  further  oxder  of  the  Aojninistrator  or  the  President,  it 
.was  the  clear  understanding  of  the  opero.tors  and  of  the  medip^tor  who 
induced  the  .miners  and  operators  to  negotiate  the  agreement  that  the  miners' 
representatives  had  dis.clai^.ied  any  intention  to.  seek  further  increases  in 
the  wage  scales.  (**)   This  ri.vif'>-ity  in  the  wage  scale  in  a  district 
closely  competitive  with  the  southern  Appalachian  added  materic.lly  to  the 
difficulties  m.et.  hoth  hy  .the  Joint  TTage  Conference  and  by  the  Code  Con- 
ference which  assembled  on  Ilarch  2.5.. 

Proceedings  on  that  day  and  on  ilarch  2S  were  devoted  to  presentation 
of  the  opnions  of  various  districts  regarding  desirable  amendr.ients.   So 
far  as  these  la-tterr,  touched  hours,  the  sentiment  e:-roressed  was  favorable 
to  a  modification  in  the  direction  of  greater  fle.pibility,  with  longer 
mar.imu:-!  hours  in  the  busy  season  rather  than  to  a  shortening  of  m.azcimum 
hours.   Comprehensive  a.rgur.ients  of  this  character  ;7ere  made  by  spokesmen 
for  Korth  Dakota  and  for  the  Socky-Liountain-Pacif ic  Coal  Association. 
There  was  e.n  undercurrent  of  a"G"or.ehension,  however,  based  on  persistent 


(*)   Coal  Age,  k'arcn  193-I-,  -  p.  II5..  7age  rates  are  st?tec'.  in  issue 
for  Aoril,  -  r).    I52. 

(**)  See  the  testimony  in  the  Transcrir-t  on  the  kadif ication  Proposal 
(April  9*,  Voluj-ae  I,  pp.  31  et  seq.  and  the  affidavit  ,of  General  J.  C. 
Persons.   Ibidd  pp.  35~"7« 

9S37 


-110- 

r-.:nors  that  the  Ac'ninistration  vas  aooiit  to  present  oi-o_.:.osals  for  raclica,l 
notification  of  ho^Jirs  and  v:ages.   At  the  close  of  the  second  day  of  the 
heai-in(2,  Deputy  AcL:.iinistratoi-  Ellis,  in  response  to  a  o_uestion,  declared: 

"The  acjiinistration  feels  that  "oeca.use 
o.f  the  short  leiifctL  of  tine  represented 
oy  the  cost  state-.ients,  it  is  in  no  po- 
sition at  this  tii.ie  to  nal:e  definite 
recori  lendations.  " 

Tnen  the  hearings  convened  on  the  afternoon  of  ".iarch  30,  the 
character  of  the  r.eeting  hed  radically  chan;:;ed.   There  ivas  a,  nev; 
chairman  or  "npderator",  assistant  Chief  Counsel  Snith,  '7ho  announced 
th?,t  the  neetin^  constituted,  the  first  conference  provided  in  the  Code  to 
raeet  January  5«   Ee  reported  that  the  Appalachian  Joint  Conference  had 
signed  a.n  agreement  last  evenin,';;  .'alcinr'  sulDstantial  changes  in  the  pro- 
visions as  to  ma::iav!j-i  hours  and  ninim^aia  -jages.   These  changes  nere  incor- 
porated into  &  proposed  a:.iend-:ient  to  the  Code  sponsored  "by  three  sub- 
divisions of  Division  I:  Eastern  suhdivision,  7estern  Pennsylvania,  and 
Ohio  and  "by  all  districts  of  the  Central  ".line  'v7orl:ers'  organization. 
The  changes  proposed  -.7ere  to  appjly  to  all  five  divisions.  Hours  Tere  to 
"be  reduced  to  f   per  day  and  35  P^r  'veel:.   The  clauses  as  to  excepted 
classes  had  been  revrritten  in  the  light  of  code  er'perience.   Schedule  A 
had  "been  largely,  and  in  oone  districts,  radically  revised.   In  Division  II 
ninina  day  r/age  rates,  "both  inside  and  outside,  rere  not  to  be  changed. 
Hourly  rates  'vere  increased  since  the  pa^'inent  originally  applied  to  eight 
hoxirs  nor;  covered  "out  seven.'  In  Division  V,  for  the  ;iost  part,  a  similar 
statement  applies.   In  district  K,   ho^iever,    comprising  South  Colorado 
and  re'.7  iie.-:ico,  inside  day  rates  -vere  to  "be  raised  from  $U,U!+  and  $U,US 
to  $5.10;  outside  rates  from  $3-75  ^^   c?H,10.   Norta  .and  South  Drkota 
inside  rates  :/ere  to  "be  stepped  up  [50  cents  per  day  from  $U.00  to  $U.50. 
A  similar  increase  on  oiitsic'e  rates  'vas  to  "oring  them  up  to  $3.70  from 
$3»20.   In  Division  I,  a.s  a  generaJ.  statement,  "both  inside  and  oxitside 
minima  rates  -'ere  to  be  advanced  ko   cents.   This  'jould  raise  the  inside 
rates  in  District  A,  comprising  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  iiichigan,  and  the 
Panhandle  District  of  TJest  "Virginia  from  $U,  bO  to  .'?5,00,   The  otxtside 
rate  in  this  district  had  "been  $3,S0;  it  was  to  "become  $U.00,   In 
District  C,  incliiding  all  the  rest  pf  Division  I  e::cept  ITorthern  7est 
Virginia  and  7estern  Kentucky,  t"ne  corresponding  increases  -lere   from 
$4.20  to  $U.60  and  from  $3,20  to  $3,60.   Northern  "Jest  Virginia,  which 
had  enjoyed  a  2U-cent  per  day  differential  under  District  A,  nas  given 
the  same  rates,  $5,00  on  inside  and  $'l-,00  ou-tside.  For  T7ostern  Kentucky 
inside_day  rates  'Piich  had"becn  $U,00  became  $U,60;  outside  rates  of 
$3tOO  "became  $3«75»   '^I'^e  radical  revisions  v,'ere  applied  to  Divisions  III 
and  IV,   In  the  latter  insic'c  c.'^jy   rates  of  $3.75  ^lere   to  "be  raised  to 
$U,60  or  to  theiates  of  '.District  C.   Outside  rates,  honever,  were  to 
"be  raised  to  the  level  of  Distript  A,  $U,00  or  kO   cents  above  District 
C's  ne'7  rate.   In  Division  III,  the  severest  increases  were  proposed. 
The  inside  day  rate  was  to  "be  $4, 60  and  the  outside  day  v/age  $3,60 
;throughout  that  territory'-.  District  J,  or  Ala"bajna,  Georgia,  and  two 
counties  of  Southern  Tennessee  hac"'  had  an  inside  rate  of  $3.^0  and  an 
outside  rate  of  02,Uo,   The  proposal  thus  '-'as  to  advance  outside  rates 
"by  50  per  cent,  inside  das'-  wages  l^y  over  35  P®^  cent.   In  District  J-1, 
conprising  the  remaining  counties  of  Southern- Tennessee,  the  code  rates 

9S37 


hr.d  ^oee::.  set  at  03.C4  inside  pt.c   $2.84  outside.  ITMlc  these  -iroposed 
adva:  ces  were  less  severe  f.ie  rartlu-r  -n-obler.  of  erasir.^  an  intra- 
divisior.f.l  difi  ere:  :tial  v.'a,s  ii-volved. 

r,:.rther  chaii/,es  v^ere  -iro-^osed  affecti:-.__  t o:-.:-.a.r-e   and  other  tIocc 
rates  ;iay;ients.   In  the  Code  these  rates  had  not  been  prescribed  beyond 
the  _£neral  declcaration  that  "exist oniar"  differentials"  v/ere  to  be 
nai.-.tained.   In  Amendixient  i'o.  1  "  an  increase  of  10  cents  ^er  ton  for 
-^ic;x:inini-;  8  cents  :oer  tons  foi-  raacMne  mining;  1  cent  per  ton  for 
c-atting  and  of  9  per  cent  of  all  yardage  and  dead  v/or!"  rates  v/as  pro- 
vided."  In  addition  it  v.'as  s-iecificall3'-  stated  that  in  the  districts 
where  vr&^.e  increases  were  to  be  laost  pro?:ounced,  nar.iely:  northern  West 
Vir,l:-,ia,  Vfestern  Kentuc]:;^  the  Southwestern  States  and  in  Division  III, 
the  tonnage  and  piece  worh  rates  should  Hbe  further  increased  by  an 
amount  sufficient  to  ma.intain  the  parity"  between  these  --layraents  and  the 
new  daj'  wa^e  rates.   These  areas  becane  storn  centers  of  the  ensuring 
discussion. 

Wiuh  this  anncunceraent  by  "Moderator"  Snith,  the  hitherto  somewhat 
huadruiTi  proceeding  became  aniri^.ted,  to  use  a  mild  ejroression.   It  nust  be 
understood  the,t  the  proposed  ainendi-aent  had  not  been  so  much  as  seen 
before  it  was  rea.d  in  the  ODcn  meetin_:  by  the  representatives  of  the  dis- 
tricts most  affected.   Copies  were  not  available  for  their  use- in  the 
hearing  of  March  50.   'he  extraordinarily  rrpid  march  of  events  "orecluded 
such  norni£vl  'orocedure.   As  stated  in  the  hearin;;  by  one  of  the  Chief 
actors:   "The  agreement  wa,s  finished  s.nd  signed  at  3  o'clock  this  morning 
and  a  code  sjnendment  came  out  of  the  Divisional  Code  Authority  at  noon 
today."  (*)   The  conferees  were  further  -mzzled  to  understand  the  :TOsition 
of  the  auninistration.   Mr.  Smith  stated:   "We  arc  forced  to  act  very 
q.uichly  in  this  situation,  at  Icest  to  the  extent  of  putting  out  a  pro- 
posal.  So  for  the  pur;>ose  of  puttin.:  out  a  •^roposal  v,-hich,  in  its  nature, 
v;ill  be  more  difficult  to  change  after  it  is  out  tlian  before,  we  are  forced 
to  :.re5uxie  that  anyone  './ho  rer.iiains  silent  ^ives  his  assent."  Again  in 
respanse  to  a  question  he  a.nsv;ered:   "The  ac'iministration  has  no  thou_Jit 
of  putting  out  this  proposed  sjnendTient  as  it  is  tead  today,  as  the 
Acxiinistration  proposal  at  this  time.   We  are  going  to  confer,  in  the 
li.^ht  of  v/hat  ha,s  been  said  today,  aiid  will  be  said,  tomorrow.   Before 
the  end  of  the  day,  I  thieZ:  en  announcement  can  be  expected.  "(**) 

Although  somevrhat  dumbfounded  by  the  suddenness  of  the  proposed 
s.raend'iient ,  the  representatives  manifested  s-  degree  of  self-possession 
and  self-restraint.   The  general  attitude  was  one  of  loyalty  to  the  Code 
and  to  the  administration,  joined  with  a  feeling  that  such  important  matters 
could  not  be  decided  without  sufficient  sime  for  consideration  a.nd  for 
consultation  with  their  constituency.   Some  of  the  districts  most  deeply 
concerned  exniressed  a  more  vigorous  rea.ction.   ^'he  Southwest 's  represen- 
tatives contented  themselves  with  a  statement  that  they  objected  to  the 
a-mendj-.ient  and  desired  tine  to  consult  v/ith  their  members  before  cjnressing 
their  o-r;osit ion.(***)  Northern  T7est  Yiginia  sent  in  a  letter  and  brief 

(*)   Johni  L.  Lewis,  Transcrip.t,  March  50,  Volfjie  III,  P.  559. 

(**)   Transcri-it,  Voliuae  II,  :.Tp.  306  a.id  3'//. 

(**1)  Ibid,  :o.  313. 


-112- 

under  date  of  llarch  2S,  statin£:  their  conviction  that  "an;/  attempted 
changes  in  \:a^ze   differentials  at  this  ti:.ie  are  to  tie  deprecated."  (*) 
The  spol:es:.ian  for  TJestern  iLentucl:;-  found  the  proposed  rjiendjnent  "anaz- 
ing"  in  "that  certain  gentlenen  have  vmdertalien  to  fix  the  na/^es 
and  TTorkin,"  conditions  for  evcryliody  in  the  coal  industr:"-  in  the  United 
States  and  e.slied  that  it  be  -lade  effective  on  April  1,"   This  proposal, 
if  adopted,  he  declared,  "^-ould  "be  aosol\itely  destiiictive  to  the  T7estern 
Kent^^ck7  coal  field."  (**)   The  Alahaia  representative  felt  that  'the 
ajiiencj.ient  'Tould  "be  destructive  to  the  industry  of  his  state.   Bet^Teen 
da-ys  Division  III  Code  Authority  held  a  neeting  and  passed  resolutions 
read  into  the  record  of  the  next  day's  proceedings  'rhich  "challenged 
and  denied  the  validity/  and  the  propriety  of  the  proposal  and  the  right 
of  the  Adninistrator  or  the  Presicent  to  prontilgate  or  declare  the  sa '.e 
effective,"  Should  such  action  he  trken,  read  these  resolutions,  "eadi 
producer  located  in  this  Division  shall  oe  and  is  hereby  released  fron 
any  obligation  to  observe  the  sane  a.nd  shall  be  free  to  teice  any  action 
■,'hich  it  iiarj   be  advised  to  challenge  the  validity  of  any  such  change, 
proclanation,  order  or  axiendnent. "  (***)   'Jhatever  else  this  action  nay 
signif-y  it  proves  the  capacity  of  the  representatives  of  Division  III 
to  nr.tch  the  Aclnini  strati  on  and  the  proponents  of  the  anendjnent  in 
celerity.   At  the  last  Day's  procead.ings,  Ilarch  3I,  a  public  hearing 
on  the  ajnendnent  had  been  aniio^inced  for  April  3. 

However,  the  anenc^nent  as  proposed  I  larch  30  na-s  approved  by 
Adninistrator  Jolmson  on   lia.rch  3I  ■'"-i^-c  becaj.ie  effective  April  1, 
"subject  to  further  nodif ication***on  the  ba'':ic  of  cause  shonn,  either 
at  a  public  hearing  thereon  -.'hich  shall  be  held  on  April  S,  133^,  or  . 
other-vise."  The  apology  for  r:uch  s'adden  action  I'as  stated  as  follcTs:' 
"a  serious  ejergency  beinf;  threatened  in  the  Dituninous  Coal  Industry." 
The  cha.racter  of  that  energency  nay  perhaps  be  deduced  fron  a  Statement 
of  President  Le-rris,  of  the  United  liine  liTorkers,  read  in  the  light  of 
the  traditional  policy  of  that  organization  to  cea-se  norJ:  nhen  contracts 
ter-^inate.  "An  energency,  "  said  he  on  ilarch  30,  "confronts  tlie  industry 
no:7.   The  contract  is  e:rplring  in  a  great  "geogrrp.nca.l  area  of  the 
industry,  _  The  code  'rages  aa-e  errpiring  in  other  a.rea.s.   It  is  essential 
that  the  G-overn^-ient  nove  at  once  to  protect  this  situation  fron  possible 
confusion, . (****) 

Hearings  on  the  nodification  proposals  lasted  three  da-'s,  April  9 
to  11  inclusive.   There  rras  considerable  discussion  not  ge mane  to 
A^iendnent  ¥.0,    \   and  considei'able_  tine  given  to  e:'tend  presentation  of 
the  "age  differential  situa.tion  in  particular  districts.  This  problem 
is  discussed  later  in  this  study.  All  that  rrill  be  attei.ipted  here  is 
to  follon  the  developnents  lead.ing  to  anencbients  llos,  2  and  "j.      Spokesnen 
for  certain  districts,  notably  iTorth  Dakota  and  Io'7a,  arg-aed  that 


(*)   Ibid,  Volune  III,  p.  320 
(**)  Ibid,  p.  312. 
{***)l\A6.,   pp.  3os-3S2-3S^-. 
(****) Ibid,  p.  370. 


SS37 


•He 

reduction  of  hours  "belo'T  G  per  C.c.y   '7as  i  roractice.l.   Feinted  and  repeated 
references  ^'ere  lade  to  the  en;:ineers'  report  in  this  connection.   The 
operators  association  on  Montana  sent  resolutions  endorsing  the  Adjninistra- 
tor's  order  of _  iiarch  31.   Aside  fron  these  expressions,  participation 
by  representa-tives  of  Division  V  \7a,s  linited  to  discassion  oy  spolresnen 
for  tTorthern  Colorado  and  for  the  Southern  Colorado-iTe'T  i;e::ico  districts 
o.f  their  relative  'jage  situation  and  their  competitive  position  as 
conapa-red  to  the  So"atb.7estern  fields.   The;,-  -^ere  not  seriously  disturbed 
"bjr  the  anendnent  "out   felt  as  sta,ted  "o'j   the  representative  fron  Southern 
Colora.d.o  and  Kei7  iIe::ico  thr.t  in  case  their  basic  '7ages  vere  changed  they 
shoiild  be  put  on  the  SEuie  I'ates  as  the  southwest,  ( -')   In  sij.iilar  fa,shion 
the  representatives  of  operators  in  Division  II  ^lere  :ore  concerned  uith 
rela,tive  ■:Tages  bet';een  thenselves  and  closely  competitive  a,rea,s  than  they 
T7ere  v/ith  the  bs,sic  na-ge  price.   It  '7ill  be  reneubered  that  the  changes 
na.de  effective  April  1  had  all  beeM  in  the  direction  of  strengthening 
the  '7age  cost  position  of  operations  in  this  Division. 

Qiaite  different  '7ere  the  presenta.tions  for  the  t'-'o  stori-i  centers 
in  Division  I:   'Jestern  Ilentucky  and  Northern  "Jest  Virginia.   Fron  the 
fir^t  it  -/as  declared,  that  the  ne'-  '7age  scale  neant  the  slou  stranguJation 
'.7as  Trilling  to  go  along  on  the  Y^J'^o'^J^  clay  a.n6.  -.'oulc,  try,  at  least,  to  pay 
the  original  code  -.'ages  for  the  shorter  6.ay.   This  vas   felt  to  be 
equivalent  to  the  change  accepted  b-  Indiana  and  Illinois  and  the  ;ia::inu::i 
increase  vrhich  'Testern  hentucliy  should  be  as^:ed  to  assuie.   A  sentence 
ma,y  be  quoted  as  illustrative  of  the  temper  of  the  presentation:   "V'e 
earnestly  request,"  said  one  re:.jresontative,  "a  careful  consideration  of 
our  situation  i7hich  contains  lany  eleuents  tha,t  are  local  and  peculiar.  "(**) 

In  Northern  'Test  Virginia  the  a.tmo sphere  had  gro'7n  decidedly  :.iore 
heated.   The  ba.c;:ground  of  the  controversy  for  tha.t  district  vas   laid 
in  the  joint  '7age  conf e'..ence.   On  ;  Larch  I7,  the  delegates  fron  Dlorthern 
ITest  Virginia  rrere  called  upon  to  justify  their  nage  differentials. 
After  some  discussion  of  this  issue,  they  '■'ithdre-7  fron  the,  conference 
o,nd  did  not  participate  in  the  agreement  a-s  si';ned  inarch  30»   I-^  the 
amencbment  hea.ring  they  repeated  a  p.vomosal,  made  to  the  United  hine 
"iTorhers  avnd  rejected  b;'-  th.eia  that  tlie  operators  '7o\i.ld  agree,  under  protest, 
to  'pc.j   the  Korthern  Appr-lachir,n  dry  rates  and  '70uld  apply  the  same  piece 
'7orl:  raises  as  became  effective  in  Division  I,   This  position  they  justi- 
fied by  data  sho'-ing  the  high  outpu.t  per  mian  per  day  from  their  mines. 
At  the  tine  of  the  hearing  the  mines  of  the  district  ■7ere  generally  closed; 
12,000  miners  nere  idle  and  the  operators'  spokesy.iaji  felt  themselves  to 
be  "fighting-  for  the  verj'  life  of  the'  fistrict,"   They  called  for  an 
immedia.te  order  restorin;;'  previous  conditions  pending  an  investigation 
of  the  facts  presented, (***) 


(*)  .  Tra.nscript  of  hearing,  Volirie  II,  p.  51U. 

(**)   Transcript,  Voluie  I,  -gp.    1^7-217. 

(***)  SeQ  the  testim.ony 'of  Tred  A.  hrafft,   Volnjue  I,  p.  267,  et  seq 
and  of  J,  Hoble  Snider,  Ibid,  p.  28U  et  seo. 


9S37 


Fron  Division  IV  crjae  spokesnen  to  rGher,rs3  at  iGn^th  the  doleful 
history  of  their  losin^r;  coiipetitive  sti-u.^^'le  Trith  oil  and  gas  and,  since 
the  code  ■'oeca'.ie  effective,  r/ith  producers  of  coal  in  Illinois.   They  placed 
emphasis  also  on  the  fact  tha.t  the  '7a.,-;e  rates  incorporated  in  the  anendnent 
abrogated  their  contracts  rrii;!!  the  United  h'ine  7orhers.   In  the  iTords  of  one 
Titness:   "In  the  absence  of  intervention  hy  the  Administration,  lu-,  Le'vis, 
and  his  or-anisation  are  ::orally -and  legally  hound  to  xrorh  under  the  con- 
tracts nhich  they  have  solicited  and  sirjned  e.nd  i7hich  they  h?ve  continously 
assured  us  nould  he  carried  out  to  Aoril  1,  1535,"  The  spohesnen  vera 
sincerelj^  convinced  that  the  deep  nines  of  this  territory  coulc'  not  operate 
under  the  ne-7  rates  and  that  the  application  of  such  rates  '-rould  nahe   in- 
possible  the  accompli sbnent  of  the  prir:e  purposes  of  the  Code.   These 
statements  were  nade  in  e::cellent  tenper,  considerijig  that  all  shaft,  slope 
and  drift  nines  r^ere  closed.   The  appeal  rras  to  the  aoxiinistrator  to  give 
the  situation  in  the  field  cr.re"ul  consideration  before  ncJcin,';'  permanent 
the  rates  provided  in  the  amondaent. (*) 

Division  III  presented  the  r.ost  difficult  situation  of  all  the  storn 
centers.   The  operators,  as  stated  by  then  on  liarch  31,  \-ere  fully  deter- 
mined that  the  amendnent  should  not  C'o  into  effect.   They  had  closed  their 
mines  as  a  first  move  and  later  applied  to  the  federal  courts  for  a,  tern'oo- 
rary  injunction  restraining  the  S, 2.A.  from  enforcing  the  amendment. . This 
order  nas  iss\ied  April  S,  after  rn  all  c\-- -ir   hearing.   The  operators  rttenpted 
to  reopen  the  mines  April  5,  uncer  thr-  ter'is  of  their  contract  signed 
ilarch  17.   This  move  -.'as  ballced.  ^q-j   the.niners  refusal  to  v,'orh,  '  In  the 
April  hearing  the  Division  presented  a  solid  front,  Alabrjna  being  joined  by 
Southern  Tennessee  and  Georgia  both  in  prohibitin:;  the  nsg-e  increase  and 
in  e:rpressing  their  belief  that  the  ra.iendiaent  procedure  ijas  both  irregular 
and  illegal.   The  position  of  the  Southern  Tennessee  operators  uas  tem- 
perp.tely  if  positively  stated,   "TJc  do  not  deny,  "  said  their  spokesman, 
"that  our  position  is  improved  and  that  our  chance  for  economic  salvation 
is  brighter  today  than  it  uas  prior  to  October  3,  I532,"  They  prerented 
"the  simple  and  specific  request  that  in  any  revision  of  the  Code  of  Fair 
Competition  their  territory  should  be  continued  in  the  present  relation- 
ship to  the  inciustry, "  (**)   The  Alaban.a  operators,  'judging  from  the 
presentation  nade  by  their  rep^resGntatives,  ijere  outra.':ed  both  oy   the  proce- 
dure adopted  in  puttin-";  thro\igh  the  Amenc;  lent  and  by  the  la--oxit  of  the 
nage  increase  proposed  for  their  employees.   The  latter  ■:ove  nas  character- 
ized as  an  "effort  to  blanlret  Alabama  tinder  a  revolutionary  rate  increase, 
'-'hich,  it  must  be  kno-vn  to  every   nan  in  the  room  and  every  member  of  the 
ao-ministration,  vras  utterly  imjoss'ible  for  them  to  pay,  "(***)  In  the  plea 
first  n.ado  by  Ala.bama  nothing  further  vras  advanced  than  a  request  for  a 
rescinding  of  the  amendment  as  applied  to  Alaba.ma  to  be  follo^Ted  by  care- 
ful consideration  of  the  '.-'age  and  hour  situation  in  the  light  of  all 
available  data.  Then  it  became  evident  later  that  the  hearing  rra?:,   to  close 
rrithout  sv.ch  action  a  final  declaration  v/as  -rritten  into  the  record. 


(*)  Transcript,  .Voluic  2  testimony  of  :;ossrs.  TT.  C.  Shanl;,  p.  hkj, 
kr.  Charles  S.  keith,  p.  l-l'!-!-;  nr.  rutorbaugh,  p.  Uy..,  and  kr.  S.  k. 
Thompson,  p.  51U. 

(**)  Transcript,  Voluie  I,  pp.  03-S5. 

(***)Transcript,  Volume  I,  p.  25. 

9237 


Tills   ^tptoH'^nt  '7a3    larred  "b;"  sor-'e   ertrava/iance   o'"  lc:n.rj.i3.rjc   e:rolained,    if 
not   e::cu.3ec'.,    'b;-  the   enoticnal   cvesznve  under  nhich  the   spol-esnan 
lajorcc.   A  pas'je,2;o  nore  positive   than  yiolont,    read: 

"So   frr  as  -^.'e   are   concerned  i7e  nave"  de::'initel'-  and 
finally  detemined  that  ■'Te  rill  not   conforM  any 
f\irther  to   an-'-  one  nan  detemination  of  polic"  and 
dictation   in  rep-adis.tion  of  the   essentie-1  hasis 
r.nd  covenant   of  the   code.      That   conl-asion  on  our 
part   is  final   and  \re  are  prepared  to   tahe   the   con- 
sequences  to   save  the   indiTstry  fro:.-!  a  destination 
Y7orse   than  the   econo'Tic   chaos   of  the  past."(*) 

A  later' ste^tenent   froT  the   Code  Authority  of  Division  III   -.Till 
give  another  an;~lc   of   the  position  of   sox\thern  operators.      It   concludes: 

"In  conclusion,    \ie   respectfiLll],.-  point   out   tha-t   any 
policy  of  TDlanl:eting.  wa^-jes   south  of   the  Ohio   is   a 
social   rather   than  an  econonic  C'-sture   and  is  not 
warranted  ty  the   econo-iic   oasis   of   the  Recovery  Act, 
Congress  plainly  did,  not   iiitend   tha-t   the  Act   should 
he   employed  to   relocate   industry  or  distrihution, 
or  close  do^'.'n  industry  in  the   South,      In  vier  of  the 
certaint;r  that  Alaha'ia  has  not   tahen  an.d  does   not 
propose   to   ta're  advanta;je  of   its   lo'/er   scales   to 
tahe  any  coiipetitive  hiisiness   on  a  lorer  nine  price 
hasis,    it  -'ould  he  unjust   and  not   in  harnony  rith 
the   economic  "basis   of  the  Act   to   inpose   any  scale 
on  Alahana  rhich  the   recorded  fpcts   do   not   JListify.  "(**) 

?ron   e"ch  of'  these  risbricts   and  for   the   ind-istry  r;enerally, 
representatives   of   the  niners'    orf5;rni:i-s.tion   spohe.  in   suoport   of   the 
anend-uents   and  defended  the  "a^ie  rates  written  therein.      It   is   no 
reflection  on. the   cappcit:/  of   these   spphesnan  to    state  that    their 
ar/^meiite  "ould  have  "been  nore   effective   in  a  rage   negotiation   than  in 
the   current  proceedings.      They  ("id  not  present   a  scientific  justifica- 
tion for  the  proposed,  rates  hut   rather  addressed  their  attention  to   the 
needs   of  rdners.      The"  did  not  imdertrhe  an   errposition  of   the'  comparati- 
ve natlirrl   diff  icu].ties,"  marhet   coi.ipetition,    or  freight   rate   situations 
of  cMfferent   districts.      Rather   they  enlarged  upon  the  desiraoility  of 
larger  nage-earners   incoiies. 

In  extenuation  of  the   fail-i-.rc   of  ijjai'on   spohemen   to  nahe  acc^arate 
and  scientific  argoojients  :;ay  "be   cited  th:?   errpert   testimony  of   the 
head    of  i''I.E,A,''s   Research  and  Planning  Division  to  the    effect    that   the 
essential  c.ata  vere  not   avp,ila,"ble  for   such  an  exposition.      Und.er  d.ate 
of  harch  30,    153^>    this   official  reported  to  Ad; linist rater  Johnson 
•.-.'ith  reference   to   the  Snolreles-^i   fielct,      "The   evic.ence   of   the  report 
i'or   the  ITovemher  I-I5  payroll   indicates   inequalities    in  the   tonnog:e  . 

(*)      Tranr.cript,    Yolx.-ie   III,    p,    7'o. 

(**)    iiemorandu.-!,    1T..:.A.    fileo,   under  date  of  Arril   ik,    I33U. 


o7 


-lib- 
rates  lietveen  ITortli  anr.  Sov.tli.   Ho'7:ver,  it  is  f-lt  that  the  results  for 
one  oerioc.  aro  not  adeo-aate  or  conclv.sive  at  least  for  definitive  and 
precine  deter-aination.  "  (*)   At  the  close  of  this  hearini];  the  sane,  of- 
ficial '.7as  handed  the  thorn;;'  covriission  to  .'.al:e  findin^js  as  to  the  pro- 
priety of  the  -je-:;e   diff erentiFJs  inco3.-po rated  into  Ai-iencxient  llo,  1.   In 
his  report  dated  April  IQ,  he  stated  arain  and  more  precisely  the  "basic 
data  sittiation.   "It  rTiist  ho  erphatically  stated,"  reads  this  docunent, 
"tliat  the  statistics  conpiled  oy  the  Coal  Unit  of  Hesearch  and  Planning 
carmot  he  used  as  an  autonatic  deter:iinator  of  rate  differentials.   The 
taoles  conpiled  to  date  cover  only  the  nonth  of  Hovenher,  e,nCi   for  sorae 
of  the  data  only  one  pay  period,  Novenoer  I-I5,  is  included.   The  naterial 
included  ho'7ever,  is  the  hest  in  existence.   The  iJoveraoer  fiyiires  are 
decideo.l;'-  inadequate  as  a  hasis  for  forecasting  the  results  "Thich  ni^ht 
obtain  fron  any  changes  grov/ing  out  of  the  Anendiont.  "( **)   The  report 
nahes  four  ."prelr.iine-ry  recoraaenda,tions,  "  as  fcllo'-'s: 

1.  The  :;iaarirru':i  increase  in  hasic  ;iini'iuin  day 
rates  to  he  SO  cents. 

2.  A  concerted  effort  "be  nade  to  have  rail- 
roads pay  higher  prices  for  coel  no'i 
"being  delivered  on  contract. 

3.  So".ie  attempt  "Ije  -.lao-e  to  prevent  "duinping" 
of  natural  /-as. 

U.   l>To  cha.nge  he  :iac.3  in  the  n  even-hour  c'ay. 

The  report  also  viade  d,-finite  reco'i'.ondation  for  day  rates  in  each 
of  the  four  storrn  centers.   Tha/c  for  "Jest  Ilentucky  \7as  as  hrief  as 
positive.   "It  is  recor.i;.iended, "  reads  t"ue  report,  "that  no  charge  fron 
the  Ar:ienc'j:ent  he  ..lade."  Kort"iiern  'Jest  "Vir  :ini;?,  having  accepted  the  dajr 
rates  of  t"ne  a:.-!cnd:ent,  this  natter  is  asrni^ied  to  be  settlec"^.   As  to 
piece  v;orl:  rates  the  recomendation  is  that  the  natter  be  referred  to 
the  Illation?!  2itf:.vinoa.iE  Coal  Lahor  "joard  for  consideration,  Tor  the 
Southwest,  relief  fron  the  '-'Sge  increase  to  the  extent  of  25  cents  per 
day  T/as  considered  to  be  justified.   This  reduced  their.ise  to  60  cents 
per  day  in  conformity  '7ith  IJo.  1  above.   "The  increase  of  60  cents,  from 
03 .7?  "to  $U.35  per  day  for  inside  shilled  labor,"  reads  the  Pieport,  "is 
■■jarranted  by  econouic  juo^nent  of  all  factors,"  and  is  "necessary'-  to 
naintain  a  proper  relationship  ''ith  coriosting  districts."  3econ".endation 
for  Division  III  '7as  divided  but  in  both  cases_  lolloped  the  rijile  of  a 
So   cent  p3r  day  -.iar.inv.n  increase.   Por' Soufnern  Tennessee  this  neant  a 
suggested  increase  fron  $3.oU  to  $U.UU  per  dpy:}  for  Alabaaa,  from  $3.'+0 
to  $^.00,   These  reco-r':enda.tions  for  "Jestern  Ilentuchy  and  for  the  So^ith- 
•jest  ^7ere  follo'vcd  exactly  by  the  Acninistrator  in  Ara(jn&-.ient  No.  2,  vrhich 
he  approved  April  22.   '"?he  difficalties  of  Northern  .'Je.st.  Virginia 
oeeungly  uere  not  submitted  to  arbitration.   In  that  district,  as  i7ell 
as  in  Division  III,  a  compipriise  see  -.s  to  "liave  been  reached  through 
private  conference  of  '7hich  no  record  is  avrilable.   In  Northern  'Jest 
Virginia  the  (.'xiy  rates  of  Atiendient  No,  1  ^rere  accepted.   The  clause 
comanding  further  increases  in  'oiEce  rates  to  maintain  oarity  of 


(*)   QvLoted  in  the  Transcript,  April  3,  Volume.  I,,  p.  25O. 

(**)  Heport,  p.  1. 

Sc^37 


-117- 

earniiv;s,  ho'^evei-,  i7as  noc'.iriec".  to  ■ci-escri"'oe  definite  increc.sec  of  ?;" 
cents  on  loaC.in;:;  rates  and  -g   cent  on  the  cutting:  rates.   These  increases 
i-'cre  accepted,  liy   the  operators  and  the  majority  o"  the  nines  in  the 
district,  imich  had  "been  closed  since  April  1,  reopened  on  the  23rd. 
3y  a  rrage  agreenent  concludec".  •'7ith  the  United  liine  'iTorhers  on  April  27, 
the  district  cane  into  the  ;;ener3l  Appalachian  agreenent,   The  Northern 
West  Vir:-;inia  operators  reserved  the  rij-^-ht  to  protest,  at  a  later  date, 
a.-'^ainst  these  -'a^-e  increases  in  case  any  iniustice  hscane  apparent  hy 
Seuteuher  l.(*) 


In  Division  III  a  further  reduction  of  20  cents  on  day  rates 
belor;  those  reconnended  'oy   liesearch  and  P-lannin^  va-s  nade.   This  "brought 
inside  day  rates  in  Southern  Tennessee  to  OU. 2U;  in  the  oslance  of  the 
Division  to  $3.^0.   On  the  'basis  of  these  rates  Alatama  operators 
entered  into  nef^otiations  with  the  United  Iline  V/orliers.   The  district 
had  "been  harassed  iDy  riotin-'^;,  necessitating  the  decla.ration  of  martial 
la\7.   Settlenents  -;ere  finally  reached  in  liay  and  the  Livision  returned 
to  nor;.:al  operations. 

In  ".Testern  ::entuc;-.y  Aiienderient  iJos.  1  and  2  led  to  a  coiralete  and 
final  rupture  on  -Ta/.'e  rates  oet\Teen  the  operators  .in  the  district  and 
E. H.A.   The  operators  fil.."  an  application,  on  April  26,  in  the  United 
Ststes  District  Coiu-t  at  Louisville.   It  nas  granted  on  Hay  2  and  a 
^Tritten  opinion  filed  liay  ig,   Judt;;e  Dauson  chara.cterized  the  application 
of  K.R.A.  orders  to  the  ..lines  of  Kentucl:;^  as  the  "holdest  kind  of 
ustirpation. "  He  quoted  opinions,  of  the  Supreue  Cou.rt  to  the  effect 
tha.t  "nining  is  not  interstate  co:T''.erce  a,nd  the  po^'er  of  Congress  does 
not  extend  to  its  re;g-alatibn  as  such."  liines  reopened  Liay  3,  altiiough 
the  United  Mine' '.Torhers  laintained  a.strihe  in  Ohio  and  J  ulilen'berg 
Counties  until  late  in  Hay.   The  original  pasic  code  rate  of  $U.OO 
'vas  paid  ap/clyin.^-  to  the  7-hour  da:^.   Thus  regretably  closed  the  his- 
torj-  of  Western  I'entuciv' s  participation  in  the  Code  v,'ag3  and  hour 
strj-cture.   Thror.';hout  the  re;-,mxning  period  the  district  pu.rsued  an 
inde-oendent  course,  pres'unahl:'  lalntainin^""  the  hours  ajid  nages  just 
stated. (**) 

The  Scuth-'estern  strtes  re'Tused  to  '^  cceot  the  adjustnent  proposed 
"by  Amendment  ITo.  2  and  the  deep,  -lines  re.ip.ined  closed,  although  strip 
operations  '-'ere  generally  'forlung.   This  neant  aho\it  lG,OGO  r.en  id.le  and 
2,000  on.sy.   The  operators  '7ere  loath  to  resort  to  court  proceedings. 
Instead  tney  strongly  desired  to  contiirae  und.er  the  Code.   An  acceiDtalile 
coLirse  of  procedure  was  foiind  'jhen  the  administrator  proposed  to.  send  his 
technical  assistant  to  :jal:e  an  investigation  of  the  field  and  report 
direct  to  him.   Such  an  investi.^ation  ivas  carried  on  during  June.  (***) 


(^)   Protest  to  i:.I.~.3.  ,  Octoher  j ,    ISy'-. 

{**)      Coal  Age,  iiay,   p.  ISS ,  June,   pp.  ^5^-5 

(***)   The  report  of  Ut,    Godfrey  li.  S.  Trit  has  not  Tseen  foimd. 


SG37 


-113- 

Ag  a  result,  seemingl/  of  this  re-oovi,    Ain^uirlment  i'o.  3  vns   s-;?provecl  June 
4,  becoLdnt;  efiectivs  a  v/eel:  lator.   It  -JTrovided  a  f-artlier  decrer.se  in  day 
rates  in  Heev   rainea  frora  $4.35  to  $4.00  for  inside  labor  and  from  $3.75 
to  $3.55  for  outside  For]-er5.   It  should  be  noted  that  this  action  created 
a  new  r/age  differential  since  strip  mines  ■■/ere  continued  on  the  rates  of 
Amendment  llo.  2   or  $4.35  and  $3.75.   Tnere  was-  further  revision  aff act- 
ing:- "oiece  rates.   This  v;as  required  in  the  interest  of  maintaining  parity 
bet\;een  day  wa^^'es  and  T)iece  work  earnings  because  of  the  very  consider- 
able reduction  made  in  the  day  rates  -oro-oosed  for  the  Southwest  in  Division 
IV.   It  is  not  anparent  how  this  revisi'^'n  of  -liece  rates  fitted  into  the 
Code  amendment  lefjal  oicture,  since  the  ne'v/  rater,  v/ere  never  incor-^orated 
into  the  Code.  They   were,  however,  made  effective  in  the  Division 
through  the  De^-iuty  Administrator  and  the  Labor  3oard.   It  seems  that  an 
agreement  was  reached  at  VJashington  on  Juiie  13,  betv.'een  the  Deputy  Admin- 
istra.tor,  the  miner  and  the  orierator  renrerent-^.tive  on  the  Labor  Board 
for  the  Division.   This  agreement  fired  the  oicla'/dning  rate  at  3  cents 
above  the  ori^\;in-'l  Code  rate.   The  combined  machine  cutting  and  loading 
rate  was  to  be  advanced  7  cents  from  that  base,  while  yardage  and  dead- 
work  rates  were  to  be  increased  9  oer  cent.   This  adju:^tment,  while  not 
fully  satisfactory  to  o-ierators  in  the  Southwest,  was  ■icce^ited  and  an 
agreement  in  conformance  with  it  ;.-a:.'  wor]:od  out  between  the  Arkansps- 
OklaJioma  Coal  Ooeratorc'  Af; '-.oci- tion  ajid  the  United  Idne  Workers.  (*)■ 

There  had  been  incori^orated  into  Amendrients  ITos.  2   and  3,  a  i^ro- 
vision  aprjlied  to  Soiithern  Tennessee,  to  '.Vojtern  Kentucky  and  to  the 
Southwestern  St:\te3  which  read: 

"PURTHES  GEDIRSD  tht^t,  in  view  of  the  differentials  ac- 
corded Distric',  G,  and  in  vie'.v  of  the  situation  e::isting 
in  District  H,  pending  further  order  there  shall  be  no  sales 
by  operators  of  said  Districts  into  the  normal  cons^'oming 
markets  of  another  District  which  is  subject  to  higher  rates 
of  T)ay,  at  any  prices  for  coal  of  comparable  grade  and 
Duality,  less  than  the  -rice  for  such  coal  in  said  market 
charged  by  such  other  District,  and  there  shall  be  no  de- 
structive invasion  of  such  other  consuining  markets  and,  in 
the  absence  of  satisfactory  agreements  governing  this  matter, 
the  determination  of  the  Administ:L-ator  on  coruol-int  of  any 
such  destructive  invasion  skall  be  conclusive." 

This  summary  stat-m.ent  of  the  stormy  events  atteiiding  the  passage 
of  Amendments  ITos.  1,  2,,  and  3,  cjffinot  indicate  the  intensity  of  the 
controversies  aroused.   Ike  chief  i)n!3ression  o;ained  from  a  review  of  the 
transcrir)ts,  briefs,  and  corres-^ondence  is  to  the  effect  that  the  Code 
during  its  first  months  of  oper- tion  had  conferred  substantial  benefits 
on  its  members.   These  benefits  they  were  reluctant  to  forego  even 
thou^gh  they  were  outraged  by  the  methods  ado-Ued  in  formulating  and 
■oromulgating  Amendment  Ho.  1  and  \rere  sincerely  convinced  that  the  a;?- 
-5lication  of  the  wage  and  hour  orovisions  would  re.m.lt  in   their 

(*)   Corres-'^ondence  in  II.H.A.  Piles,  and  Arkansas-Oklakoma  Wage  Agree- 
ment.  See  Voluiie,  V/age  Agree-ients  in  Bituminous  Coal  Industry, 
p^.  407-19. 


9837 


•119- 


financio.l   o.GGtr-action.      In   '.-ny   c-vcnt   all   -^-.b-e   'Mstricts,    erice'ot  ".Testern 
IZentiic'."'',    fouglit  -.mtterc   out   to   an  acceptaoli^   co:ipro::ise  -ritiiin  the 
fraiie-^orl:  of  tlie   Coce  anc.    :r'i--.tr.ined  tlleir  place   is   a  re:;^Alatec    in- 
dustry.     In  the  lir'.'ht  of  the   cai-lier  hir^tory  of  that   Code,    during  its 
forna-tivc  perioc.,    as  '-ell  as   in   this   story  o;"   tha   st:.-u/;yle  over  anend- 
inc  ^7a.':;e  and  hour  clraises,    this   result   testified  iiipressivcly  of  the 
stren^'th  of   their  attrchiient   to   code-procGCure, 

A..':end;.ient  ITo.    U  ha.d  reference   to    the   collection  of .  statistica-1 
data,    the  a/;encies   co':pilin^'   then,    the   nature   of   reports   to    oe   suh;.iitted 
and  the  apportion: :ent   of   ercpenses   incurred  in  such  ^70 rl,:.      It  "as   defi- 
nitely declared  th?.t   failure   to   six"bnit   siich  reports  v.'ould  l)e  a.  violation 
of   the   Code.      Discussion  lerdin;;  to   such  proposals  iTa.s  had  at   the  neetlng 
of  the  "Jational  lituninov.s   Coal   Industrial  Board  on  Janua.ry  lo   and  I9, 
IvJjU.      At   that   ti  le  De.:uty  Idninistrator  Ellis,    called  up   the  i.iatters 
of  assesp'-ients   and  reports  with  reference   to   their  hearing  on  enforce- 
:ient.      He   stated  that   in  several   cases   operators   refusec    to   furnish 
eithei    assessnents   or  reports .and  that   as  a  conseruence  Code  Au-thorities 
'.Tere  ]iandicap;jed  in  carryinr  on  their  '-or!:.  (*)      In  part,    difficulties 
arose  "because   such  failures   to   report  hac.    ^ot  teen  declared  definitely 
to  he  violations   of   the   Code  ,   in  part,    "becuise   th.e   smaller  conpanies 
did  not  heep   records. vhich.  lurnished  the   sv.l)stEntial  rolune  of  data 
called  for.      Tl-;ese  na-tters  ^rere   referred  to   a  cornittee   considering 
the  forniilation  of  a  definite  plan  for  enforce!:ent  "'Thich  reported 
rij-linQS   on  January  15   to   he   issued  hy  the  Acuinistration  to   all   Code 
Aiithorities.      These   ru.lin^js   caJ.led  "cpon  every  producer  of   coal   to 
fu.rnish  such  statistic?!   information  as   the  Aciiijtistrator  dee:.ied  neces- 
sary,        "The  failure,    ne£;lect   or  ref"..sa.l   of  any  cor.!  producer   to   fur- 
nish the   statistical   infor;.mtion  required"  T/as   to   he  a  viola.tion   of 
the   Code, (**) 

The  Appalachian  'Jarie  A;';;reehGnt   si.-jned  inarch  30s    153^+  contained  a 
provision  for  a.  i'"orth-So\ith  Corraission  to   investir^'iate   the   e::istin^: 
differentials   on  tonnaye   and  Crr;  '.■a,;:e '  rates.      In  that   connection  there 
was   incorporatec.  in  the   s^^reeiaent   thie   follciny   clause: 

"The  Appalachian  'Ja-e  Conference  jointly 
reco:tiends  to  1>I,2,A.  that  the  fdtu;-iinous 
Coal  Code  Unit  of  the  f.esearch  and  Plan- 
ning :  Division  he  continued  for  the  pur- 
pose of  asse  f^lin;^-  rnd  conpilinr;  proper 
statistical   data. "(***) 

TThen  the  Deputy  Administrator  announced  at   the  anendr.ent  hearin;^  on 
April   11,    that   the  Administration  could  no   longer  assume  the  cxoense 
of  collecting  f.nd  conpiling   cost   rnd  -TO.ye  datr,    the  president   of  the 
United  nine  Workers   declared  his  helief  that    "their  reports  -'ere  very, 
valuable,"     He   stated  also   the  desire  of  his   organization  for  three 
specific  foms   of   infornation:      one  for  a  detailed  report   on  earnings; 
another  for  costs   of  prodiiction  correlated  -jith  earnings;    and  a  third 
a   "brief  end  s-i:role   su.Tiar3'  of  nine   realira-tion  f.o.o,    the  nines,"     He 
Tras  further  of  tjie  opinion  tliat   such  infoi'nation  '.'Of.ld  prove   the  only 

(*)        Transcript   of  heeting,    January  I'L,        p.    20,    et    see. 

(**)      Ihid,   January  12,        p,    3. 

^g**)   ■^E'dJe  Agree:-.ients,   ut    supra,  p.    32. 


-120- 


safegiiard  for  the  Government  in  certifying  minimum  prices  with  fairness 
to  both  iDroducers  and  consumers.   For  the  use  cf  the  Korth-South  Commis- 
sion, it  was  essential  that  the  d-'ta  be  collected  and  compiled  by  an  im- 
partial agency.   The  Deputy  Administrator  canvassed  the  representatives 
present  and  received  assurance  from  spokemen  for  Division  III;  Division 
V;  ".Testern  Pennsylvania;  and  from  the  Sou.thwest  that  they  desired  the 
statistic^  reporting  to  be  continued.  (*) 

Following  a  suggestion  made  at  this  time  a  conference  of  represent- 
atives of  all  code  authorities  and  of  II.  R.  A.  was  held  in  Washington, 
April  18, to  20.   Consideration  was  had  of  the  statistical  forms  and  of 
the  data  to  be  furnished.   "It  was  decided  to  decentralize  the  collection 
and  compilation  of  the  statistics  and  to  have  the  wor^:  done  by  the  organi- 
zation of  the  Divisional  or  Sub-Divisional  Code  Authorities,  under  the 
authorization  of  the  Presidential  L'erabers.   The  supervision  of  field 
offices,  the  final  assembling  and  review  of  the  reports  will  be  made  by 
a  separate  Bituminous  Coo.l  Section  of  the  Research  and  Plaining  Division 
in  "..'ashington. "   Since  some  of  the  smaller  Sub-Divisions  were  not  equipoed 
to  handle  the  work  of  compilation  a  canvass  was  to  be  made  to  discover 
ho^r   rarny  code  authorities  would  desire  to  hrve  this  work  dene  bv  the  Coal 
Section  in  'Jashington.   Questions  of  the  Budget  were  discussed  a-ad  a  pro- 
visional division  of  e--:penses  made  under  which  the  "Government  assumed 
the  expense  of  the  'Tashington  office  rent,  printing  and  distribation  of 
forms,  and  miscellaneous  office  reouirements  (except  payrolls')."  (**)   In 
these  arrangements,  the  desire  of  the  representatives  of  the  industry  to 
retain  control  of  statistical  work  deserves  notice. 

Under  date  of  May  7,  IT.H.A.  out  out  a  program  for  Continuation  of 
Statistical  Reporting  under  the  Bit\iminous  Coal  Code.   The  recorar.aendations 
summarized  above  had  "been  carefully  reviewed  and  analyzed  from  the  view- 
point that  the  statistical  progr^-m  should  contribute  os':much  as  possible 
to  the  solution  of  the  problems  confronted  in  the  administr  tion  of  the 
Coal  Code  and  should  be  organized  as  to  methods  of  compilation  and  veri- 
fication to  merit  unquestioned  acceptance  by  the  various  areas  within  the 
industry,  by  labor  and  by  the  cublic."  After  discussion  of  the  forms  to 
be  used  and  a  careful  definition  of  "iian  Starts"  the  prc^ram  proceeded 
to  lay  down  the  method  of  collecting  and  compiling  statistics.   Code  Au- 
thorities were  to  be  offered  a  choice  between:  sending  the  reports  direct 
to  IT.H. A.  for  review  and  tabulation;  or  handling  the  reports  in  the  Code 
Authority  statistical  office  and  se.-iding  results  to  i'.R.A.  for  review 
and  certification.   It  was  estimated  that  12  offices  would  elect  to  per- 
form this  statistical  work  in  the  Code  Authority  office.   In  these  cases, 
"to  provide  adequate  bases  for  checking,  and  verifying  reported  data 
and  permit  \anqualifiea  aporoval  of  results  by  i'J.R.A.,  two  representatives 
of  the  Administration  were  provided  for  each  of  these  twelve  districts. 
One  of  these  was  to  be  an  office  representative  whose  duty  was  to  b©  « to 
supervise  the  work  of  collection,  review,  compilation  and  forwarding  of 
statistical  material  and  to  carry  cut  instructions  as  to  checking  individ- 
ual mine  reports,  and  preparation  of  unifor-.i  tabulation.'"  This  suggests 

,,i*)      Transcript,  April  11,  Day  Session,  op.  611-616 
(**)   Minutes  of  Meeting,  'J.R.A.  Files 


9837 


-ir,;i- 


that  aside  from  the  matters  of  verification  and  i.-noartiality,".  these  were 
Questions  of  uniformity  of  Dreparatiori  aiid  comDorability  of  data  to  con- 
sider.  The  second  Administration  official  was  to  be  a  field  auditor  who 
was  to  "verify  reports  at  individioal  mines,  assisting  in  the  iDreiDaration 
of  mine  reports  whenever  necessary,  and  otherv/ise  assist  in  the  collect- 
ion of  reports  and  the  verification  of  results."  '.iith  this  organization 
it  was  proposed  to  collect  monthly  reports  through  ivovember  1954.   A 
detailed  budget  was  submitted  with  this  program  amounting  to  $207,500 
per  annum.   This  amount  would  be  reduced  to  $172,917  or  .53  mills  per 
ton  of  1933  nroduction,  on  the  basis  that  the  industry  finance  emr)loyees 
salaries  from  J-ane  1,  1934  to  April  1,  1935.  (*) 

This  set  uo  had  been  criticized  by  the  chief  of  the  K.R.A.  coal  re- 
search section  on  the  basis  that  the  12  field  auditors  and  office  repres- 
entatives mrould  not  insure  accurate  and  comparable  results.   Twelve  new 
men  might  be  exoected  to  differ  in  "abilitv,  zeal  and  energy  in  super- 
vising the  work  of  the  various  offices."  Past  exroerience  had  indicated 
that  work  done  in  the  Code  Authority  offices  might  have  to  be  done  over 
in  Yi'ashington  because  of  "many  errors  and  discrepancies."  (**)  At  a 
later  date  these  objections  were  restated  and  enlarged  by  the  technical 
adviser  appointed  to  carry  out  the  investigrticn  of  wage  differentials 
provided  for  in  amendments  llos.  1  and  2.   "I  do  not  see  how,"  said  this 
official,  "the  Central  Statistical  Bureau  could  be  respo-isible  for  the 
collection,  compilation  and  sn.iilysis  of  the  da.ta  celled  for  ***  --jnless 
it  was  in  a  position  to  supervise  all  the  "orocesses  involved."   Again  with 
reference  to  his  own  function;   "The  study  of  differentials  would  he 
greatly  impeded  and  might  even  be  subject  to  challenge  if  the  data  now 
being  collected  were  dis-oersed  i.mong  the  several  Code  Authorities  and 
subject  merely  to  local  control.  (***) 

The  original  oroposal,  out  of  which  Amendment  I^Io.  4  came,  was  sub- 
mitted under  date  of  July  7,  oy  Eastern  Subdivision  of  Division  No.  1. 
This  draft  provided  for  the  setting  up  of  statistical  bureaus  in  each  Sub- 
division under  e,  Ivianoging  Director  who  might  be  secretary  of  the  Code  Auth- 
ority but  might  not  "be  an  officer,  director  or  erai::loyee  of  any  Producer.  " 
This  agencv  was  to  receive  and  compile  all  data  and,  if  violations  of  the 
Code  were  revealed  by  the  data  received,  wo<g  to  make  reriorts  to  the  Sub- 
divisional  Code  Authority.   The  Presidential  member  of  the  Code  Authority 
was  to  be  given  access  to  the  records  "to  the  extent  necessary  to  deter- 
mine the  validity  of  any  complaint."   Expenses  were  to  be  assessed  to  the 
industry  on  a  tonnage  basis.   This  driift  was  submitted  to  the  va.rious  code 
authorities  and  had  been  endorsed  on  Jul^r   27  by  6  Subdivisions  of  Division 
I,  by  Illinois  Subdivision  of  Division  II,  by  Division  III,  by  both  Sub- 
divisions of  Division  IV,  and  Dv  the  Northern  Colorado  Division  of  Division 
V.   Opposition  was  expressed  by  all  the  Subdivisions  of  Division  V,  except 
one,  by  2  states  in  Division  II  and  by  the  ».ichigan  and  ^estern  Kentucky 


(*)   Pro3,Tam,  etc..  Bulletin  II  o .  27,  II. R. A.,  Lay  7,  1954,  N.R.A.  Piles 

(**)   Memorandua,  ?.  ^.  Berauist  to  Leon  Henderson,  May  2,  1934,  11. 'R.  A. 
Piles 

(***">   iiemorandum,  W.E.  Hctchl^iss  to  Leon  Hendersoii,  Aug^ast  12,  1934, 

II.  R.  A.  :^iles 
9837 


— ]  22— 


Subdivisions  of  Division  IV   The  last  named  district  ex  iressed  its  vie'Js 
f.s  follows: 

"Me   believe  tne  ict  itself  and  the  Code  are  sufficiently  compre- 
hensive to  nro-^iae  for  whatever  statistics  each  Code  Authority 
deems  necessary  to  its  individual  reouirement. " 

The  OTDoosition,  of,  Indiana  was  bv-.a  nine  to  eight  vote.   The  Smokeless 
Code  Authority  .yoteo.  'onanimously  for  adoption  of  t.:e  ?  leiid'ient'^  The 
disapproval  of  division  V  was  based  "upon' '-the  fact  that  the  arnendiaent 
was  not  necessary  to  proper  Code  Administration  in  the  various  districts 
of  this  Division  and  b:cause  of  the- ei-rpEnae  involved."   It  will  be  noted 
that  this  action  waa  a.  revers-l  of  the  comment  f  rora  this  area  expressed 
at  the  Hearing  .on -April  11.   (*"* 

The  proposed  amencjnent  was  ne?:t  sent  out  to  the  industry  under  date 
of  August  1,  tog:thor  with  a  notice  of  opporljunitv  to  bj  heard.   Instead, 
of  a  public  herrln^,  hcwcver,  the  proced'ore  was  adopted  of  inviting 
"criticisms,  objections, or  suggestions,"  to  be  submitted  prior  to  August 
11.   The  Administration  reserved  the  right  to  modify  the  proposal  in  the 
light  of  information  received.  (**''   On  Au^ist  14,  a  revision  was  made 
at  the  instance  of  the  Legal  Division.   The  essential  change  was  to  make 
the  Presidential  L'ember  of  each  Code  Authority  resDOnsible  for  "collect- 
ing and  corapilin.5  all  reriorts."   The  iianagin^^  Director,  of .  each  statis- 
tical bureau  was  to  "operate  under  the- direction  of  Presidential  L^emher." 
The  Legal  Division  was  of  the  opinion  that  such  enlargement  of  Adminis- 
tration Control  was  essential  to  make  the  statistical  records  legal  as 
a  basis  for  compliance  suits.   The  revised  form  enco^untered  "many  ob,ject- 
ions  from  Code  Authorities."  (***)  Quotations  from  the  protest  of  the 
Code  Authority  of  the  Subdivision  which  sponsored  the  original  proposal 
will  indicate  the  character  of  thes?  objections.   "The  revision,"  reads 
the  letter,  "is  entirely  unacceptable  to  our  Code  Authority.   Our  Code 
Authority  is  opposed  to  nailing   a  Presidential  j_i;.ibef  the  .sole  custodian 
and  agent  for  tne  receipt  of  trade  association  reports.   Our  Code  Author- 
ity prefers  that  the  st,'itistic-nl  informpticn  collected  by  it  from  its  raen- 
bers  shall  be  handled  jy  the  official  staff  of  the  Code  Authority,  as  it 
is  paid  for  by  the  operators  directly."  The  Subdivision  was  not  opposed, 
however,  "to  the  establishment  of  a  Division  of  tesearch  and  Planning  to 
do  such  statistical  work  and  research  v/or^:  as  would  be  properly  na.tional 
or  inter-district  in  scope."  (****) 

Under  stimulus  of  these  objections  the  f iua.l  draft  of  the  proposed 
amendment  was  sent  out  on  September  17.   "This  final  >",raf t,  "  said  the 
covorin-^^  letter,  "incorporates  practicall-'-  all  the  coitents  of  the  original 


(*"!  Letters  and  Tele  :rams,  J.R.A.  Files 

(***)  Administrative  Order,  ilo.  24-52 

(***)  i.lenora.ndum,  Deouty  A^Jninistrator,  lilllis,  September  18,  "^lA  Tiles 

(****■)  Letter  of  Charles  O'lliell,  Chairirian,  Code  A-ithority,  t'.R  A.  Files 
9837 


•123- 


proposed  amendment  which  was  airproved  by  the  major  portion  of  the  industry, 
and  omits  the  features  which  were  objectianal  to  the  Code  Authorities,  but 
includes  points  deemed  necessary  by  the  Legal  Division."   This  revision 
placed  custody  of  cost  and  "orice  data  in  the  hands  of  the  statistical  bureaus 
set  up  in  each  divisional  and  subdivisional  area.   It  charged  such  bureaus 
with  the  duty  of  compiling  such  records.   The  Llanaging  Director  was  to  rsDOrt 
any  violation  of  the  Code  disclosed  b^'  these  d- ,ta  to  the  Presidential  T'em- 
bers,  who  was  given  oov:er  to  reauire  cthor  re-oorts  and  who  was  given  access 
to  inspect  the  books  and  records  of  producers.   A  new  section  (9)'  was  writ- 
ten in  as  follows; 

"All  producers  subject  to  the  Code  shall  furnish  to  any  government 
agencies  designated  by  the  Administrator  such  statistical  information 
as  the  Administrator  may  from  time  to  time  deem  necessary." 

This  will  be  recignized  as  a  copy  o:'  the  clause  on  this  subject  in  the 
proposed  general  code. 

This  finaJ  revision  received  the  at)ijroval  of  all  divisions  of  '".H.A. 
These  were  not  unqualified  In  all  instances.   Thus  the  Labor  Advisory  . 
Board  was  of  the  opinion  that  it  would  be  fpr  ^ireferable  to  have  the  collect- 
ion and  comiDilation  of  reoorts  nle.ced.   iinder  "the  direct  suTDervision  of  a 
central  statistical  agency  of  the  Administration  if  only  for  aake  of  uniform- 
ity and  comparability  betwe  n  the  several  divisions  pjid  subdivisions."   The 
Consumer  Advisory  'Board  su  :gested  that  the  oroposal  should  be  so  amended 
"as  to  give  gre;:.ter  assurance  of  impartiality."   The  Director  of  Research 
and  Planning  added  the  following  comment  to  his  aooroval* 

"It  is  understood  thrt  this  in  no  way  overla;os  or  replaces  the 
Bitui'iinous  Coal  Statistical  Unit  of  the  Division  of  Research  and 
planning  nor  takes  away  a,ny  of  its  functions." 

This  qualified  aor^roval  was  o^r  ted  October  5\    1934  and  seems  to  represent 
the  last  barrier  to  final  action,   j.iost  of  these  aporovals  bear  dates  near 
September  20.   On  ilovenber  5,  the  Araendnient  received  the  apioroval  of  the 
I'Jaticnal  Industrial  Recovery  Board  and  became  immediately  effective. 

This  recital  has  significance  for  the  light  it  throws  on  the  deep 
seated  nature  of  the  bituminous  coal  operators'  determination  to  control 
their  own  affairs  with  the  mini  luin  of  governj.;eata.l  restraint.   Kot  even 
the  acknowledged  benefits  of  tne  Code  and  their  evident  keen  desire  to 
continue  and  enlarge  those  benefits  could  shake  their  conviction  that  the 
confidential  data  reported  must  repose  in  the  keeping  of  men  drawn  from 
the  industry,'  n-.'t  in  governmental  files.   From  their  vievrpoint  it  v/as  un- 
fortunate that  such  convictions  regarding  the  private  character  of  price 
and  cost  data  do  not  square  with  the  desire  of  these  oioerators  to  have 
governmental  aooroval  and  authority  oehind  their  system  of  fixed  prices 
and  of  a  regulated  industry.   If  fixed  orices  are  to  be  relieved  from  the 
taint  of  monopolistic  oractice  they  jaust  be  authorized  by  fully  informed 
governmental  agencies. 

Amendments  Kos.  5  and  6  wer-:  resultant  "roM  the  continual  difficulties 
e:ooerieiced  uiider  the  Bitiiiuinous  Coal  Code  over i. the  raaintainance  of  fair 
lorices.   Full  treatment  of  this  subject  will  be  found  in  the  discussion  of 

9837 


■124- 


prices  under  the  Code.   At  this  point  only  a  sup.nary  statement  of  events 
preceding  the  adootion  of  these  amendments  will  be  presented.   The  Code  as 
approved  September  18,  1933  had  no  provisions  for  administering  these  fair 
market  prices  beyond  their  determination  by  raarketin-5  agencies  or  code 
authorities  with  indefinite  powers  of  aoiDroval  and  review  by  Presidental 
f'iembers  and  the  Administrator.   Contests  iraiediately  developed  between  com- 
peting districts  over  their  relative  prices.  {*)     By  June  19S4  these  dis- 
putes he.d  reached  an  acute  stage,  requiring  machinery  for  settlement.   Tem- 
porary expedients  wer-^  adopted  in  Division  I  and  II  at  the  suggestion  of 
the  Deoutv  Administrator,  providing  for  the  publication  of;  price  changes 
at  a  sufficiently  early  d:  te  to  allow  of  their  review  by  interested  oarties. 
Thereafter  an  attempt  to  correlate  cor-ipetitive  -orices  might  ;'be  made  in 
meeting  of  joint  marketing  committees.   Later  in  the  same  month  the  Presi- 
dential ;  embers  of  the  subdivisioaa.1  Code  Authorities  in  Division  I  (ex- 
cepting w'estern  ''entucky"),  were  constituted  a  Board  of  Review.   Decision 
of  this  Beard  to  be  binding  must  be  unanimous.    In  July  the  so-called 
Adams  plan  v/as  set  un  in  Division  I  r-roviding  for  an  allocation  of  tonnage 
to  the  different  subdivisions.   H^intenance  cf  this  allcction  was  to  be 
effectea  D"-  periodic  rjrice  adjustments.   The  immediate  cause  for  amendments, 
IIos.  5  and  6  was  the  announcement  on  December  12  of  the  lestern  Pennsylvania 
subdivision  that  they  ^-'ould  not  continue  their  support  of  the  Adams  plan 
after  December  31,  1934. 

Further  com-olications  a  rose  because  of  the  laublication  of  statements 
by  TDrorainent  il.l.A.  cf/icials  to  the  effect  that  orice-fixing  provisions 
in  all  codes  would  be  discontinued.  In  response  to  representations  made 
formally  in  resolution  sponsored  by  the  Code  Authorities  of  Divisions  I, 
II,:  and  III,  r,nd  informally  by  interested  groups  of  operators  to  members 
of  the  Administration,  the  i^ationsl  Industrial  Recovery  Board  issued  a 
statement  in  October  declaring: 

"The  Bituminous  Coal  Code  of  7rir   Coipetition  and  all  its  provisions 
are  in  full  force  and  effect.-  If  at  any  time  it  should  develop  that 
changes  should  be  considered,  none  will  be  made  by  the  National 
Recovery  Administration  until  the  industry  has  been  consulted  and 
has  been  given  an  opoortunity  to  be  heard.  "••  (**) 

By  this  tine  a  serious  abuse  had  developed  threatenin;  the  disruption  of 
the  entire  price  structure.  *  Orders  were  being  solicited  for  contracts 
riinning  beyond  the  termination  of  the  Code,  at  Code  prices  until  June  16, 
1935,  ana  at  prices  after  that  date  which  made  the  entire  contract  an 
attractive  proposition.   Complaint  was  made  also  that  contracts  effective 
before  the  Code  was  adopted  were  being  extended  for  a  yeir  or  more  from 
April  1,  1934,  thus,  in  effect,  ijjidercutting  the  code  prices. 


(*)   See  the  Records  of  the  first  meeting  of  the  national  Bituminous  Coal 
Industrial  Board,  January  16-19,  1934,  il.  R.  A.  Piles 

(**)   Bulletin,  "'r.tionr-1  Coal  Associatioa,  Octobor  13,  1934. 


9837 


These  practices  led  uiroctly  to  the  prcoos;  1  of  an  rraendment  by  the 
SmokSless  SuDdivisicn  by  v^hich  the  rarJcing  of  a  contract  for  future  delivery, 
carrying  a  price  below  the  fair  market  nrice  effective  on  the  date  of  the 
contract,  because  a  violation  of  the  Code.   The  covering  letter  exoressed 
the  belief  of  the  Code  Authority  that  this  proposed  amendment  would  "pre- 
vent and  set  p.t  rest  a  great  deal  of  uneasiness  that  will  become  more  notice- 
able in  tiie  industry  as  we  a-oproach  the  contract  period  for  the  coming 
year,"   This  proposal  was  londer  date  cf  llovember  20.   It  was  sent  out  to- 
the  Code  Authorities  and  secared  ar)-orovals:   in  Division  I;  Eastern  sub- 
division, Northern  Panhandle  of  '.Vest  ''"irginin,  Ohio,  northern  'Test  ■''irginia, 
Southern  I'umber  2,  7estern  Kentucky  and  Hichigan;  Division  III;  Division 
IV,  Arkansas-Oklahoma;  Division  V,  Utah.   Anprovsl  of  the  Eastern  subdivi- 
sion was  by  iinaniraous  vote.  {*)    The  o-ilv  record  of  disap-oroval  foxond  was 
that  of  "Jestprn  Pennsylvania,  also  bv  a  unanimous  vote.   On  December  27, 
notice  of  -oublic  hearing  on  January  4  was  issuer"..   This  covered  the  above 
proposal  as  "Schedule  A"  and  also  a  r3roiosed  ".mendment  "Schedule  3"  writ- 
ten in  the  N.R. A./Legal  Department,  the  essential  clauses  of  which  pro- 
vided that  the  "National  Industrial  Recovery  Board  through  such  agencies 
as  it  may  designate,  shall  iivestigat^i  costs  and  thereafter  shall  proceed 
to  determine  and  publish  stated  raini^aum  trices." 

Meanwhile  the  Legislative  Cciuiittee  of  the  'latiinal  Coal  Association 
had  been  busily  considering  these  m-tters.   The  Committee  reported  h.  ving 
held  sixteen  meetings  between  June  and  October.   They  reported  in  the 
latter  month,  among  other  conclusions,  that  "the  nadntentince  of  fair  min- 
imum market  prices  is  essential  for  the  protection  of  hours  cf  labor, 
rates  of  pay  and  condition  of  employment  set  uo  for  the  industry  under  the 
provisions  of  the  Code."  La.ter  this  Committee  drafted  a  leE,gthy  proposal 
for  amendments  to  Atticle  VI  and  tII  of  the  Code  covering  the  methods  of 
determining,  publishing  and  administeriie;  Coce  prices.   This  proposal  incl- 
uded provisions  for  setti-'.g  up  of  suodivisionr.l,  divisional  and  of  a 
National  Coal  3oa.rd  of  Arbitration  to  which  boards  m'atters  in  dispute 
could  be  taken  for  deeision.   These  drafted  omendiaents  V7ere  approved  by 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Association  ^n  Januarv  3,  and  submitted  to 
the  National  Bituminous  Coal  Industrial  Board  meeting  in  Washington  on  that 
date.   This  Board  debated  the  proposals  at  length  in  day  and  evening  sessions, 
made  certain  modifications  and  injected  their  new  version  into  the  public 
hearing  which  convened  on   tne  follov/ing  day.   Their  draft  agreed  in  es- 
sential provisions  with  the  I'ationf.l  Coal  Association  version.   However,  it 
provided  for  a  sin-;le  National  Board  of  iixbitration  to  which  indivldua.l 
producers,  subdivisiois  or  divisions  might  appeal.   Hearings  were  to  be 
arranged  before  price  ranking  bodies,  '  either  ma.rketing  agencies  or  code 
authorities,  in  the  case  of  coi.rola.ints  regarding  published  prices  by  interest- 
ed parties. 

Neither  in  the  paolic  hear  in  ~  on  Ja^nu-^try  4  nor  in  the  much  more  im- 
portant meetings  of  the  "ationa.l  Bituminous  Coal  Indistrial  Board  on  January 
3  and  4  was  an3r  oDjection  encountered  to  "Schedule  a"  beyond,  that  of  the 
Vfestern  Pe;iis^''lvania  Code  Authority.   Tne  Jational  Coal  Association  draft 

(*)   S-'^e  statement  by  the  chairman,'  Transcript  of  Hearing,  January  4, 
p.  102 

9837 


included  these  provisions  also.   Accordingly,  this  rmendjaent  rncved  prompt- 
ly to  adoption.   Under  aaoe  of  January  7,  1935,  the  aooro-val  of  il.R.A. 
Advisory  Boards  v:as  secured.   This  was  usually  routine  and  unaualified. 
Heseprch  and  Planniu^'  e::oressed  its  approval  in  more  vigorous  fashion. 
"The  Division  feels,"  reads  the  letter,  "th-t  this  aiasndnant  is  absclnt;=ly 
essential  to  effectua.ts  the  -ourposes  o±  tne  Code  and  accordingl;'-  reconraends 
the  adoption  of  the  amendment  at  the  earliest  possible,  date . "   Inasmuch 
as  this  odoption  took  place  ne""t  da^'^  nnd  provided  that,  the  anendjnent  be 
immediately  effective,  the  action  .tn^cen  may  be  regarded  ns  -^n  e'xilicit 
adoption  of  this  suggestion. 

Despite  the  press^jj-e  for  iriedi'^te  action  tha  .'-mendment  of  price- 
fixing  meas-ores,  which  v^ere  the  subj3ct  of  i\jiiendment  No.  6,  proved  a  more 
difficult  and  len.-^.'thy  process.   The  fundamental  difficulties  were  t\''0.   On 
the  one  hajid  the  whole  'latter  of  price-fi:-:ing  ds  e   public  policy  wa,s  under 
heavy  fire;  on  the  othe:.  there  was  the  oerennirl  contest  betvreen  advocates 
of  governmental  orice-f Ij.in?;  and  these  who  would  retain  control  of  price 
matters  in  the  hands  of  representr-tives  from  the  industry.   This  fundamental 
difference  of  vie'/rpoint  is  cles,rly  illustrated  in  the  two  proposals  under      / 
discussion,   ijovern-i^ntal  price-f  ixin.i;  v.'ps  def  initelj?-  written  into  "Sched- 
ule B."   Control  of  prices  by  the  operators  was  the  i":evn>"te  of  the  amend- 
ment proposals  originated  oy  the  Iv  tional  Coal  Association  and  adopted 
with  modifications  by  the  ..lational  Bituminous  Cor  1  Industrial  Board,   a 
direct  Quotation  will  be  helpful.   "I  think  it  is  perfectly  plain,"  said 
one  member  of  the  board,  "to  everv  operator  in  this  roou  -nd  to  all  other 
represente.tives  that  it  is  very  necessary  to  hc'ive  so';e  sort  of  price-fixing." 
"V/e  are  for  price-fixing  c.efinitely  vfithin  the  industry,  suoject  to  all 
the  necessry  veto  pov/ers  of  the  Government  in  order  to  protect  the  public.  "(* 
These  Quotations  seem  to  represent  fairly  the  opinio':s  erroressed  at  the 
board  meeting  oy  industry  members  v/ith  one  exceotion.   xUi  operator  from 
the  Panhrjidle  of  ..'est  Vn-ginia  attending  the  same  meeting  expressed  him- 
self vigorously  on  this  question.   "  ..'e  are  very  much  in  favor,"  said  he, 
"of  the  governments'  fixing  the  prices.   l?e  do  not  feel  that  the  Govern- 
ment or  any  other  group  could  make  such  a  colossal  blunder  in  fixing  and 
carrying  out  price-fixing  arrangements  as  ther^e  Code  Authoi'i ties,  as  pre- 
sently constituted,  h-ve  done.   V/e  welcome  the  opjcrtunitv  to  wor'-'  with        ^ 
the  Government  on  a  price-fixing  program  such  as  they  outline  here  in 
their  proposed  auiendment."  (**") 

Despite  these  difficulties  ana  differences  of  opinion  fairly  prompt 
action  v/as  secured.   After  the  public  hearing  on  January  4,  the  y'ational 
Bit-ominous  Coal  In'^ustripl  "oard  held  further  unavailing  meetings  and 
conferences  with  '.R.a.  offici;\ls.  Axi   adjournment  was  then  talcen  to  allow 
the  operator  representatives  to  return  home  and  consult  with  their  consti- 
tuents. On  returning  January  9  their  recalcitrant  attitude  toward  govern- 
mental price-fixing  had  been  reenforced.   The  record  of  the  public  meeting 
on  that  date  indicates  an  almost  complete  iripasse.   Spokeraen  for  the  in- 
dustry made  an  effective  point  of  the  need  for  iraiaediate  action  coupled 
with  the  statement  that  "a  change  in  the  price-fixing  machinery  and  methods 


{*)      Mr.  D.  C.  ''.eay,  ".  eeting  of  IT.B.C.I.B.,  January  9,,  1935,  p.  18 
(**)      Hr.  ?,.  G.  l.athiott,  Ibid,  p.  19 
9837 


at  this  time  would  only  add  confusion,  rather  than  be  helpful."  (*)   In  an 
effort  to  find  a  wav  through,  the  essential  feature  of  the  II. R. A.  proposal, 
price-fixing  by  the  National  Indu- trial  Recovery  Board;  was  incorporated  in  . 
the  ITational  Bittaninous  Coal  Industrial  Board  draft.  .This  clause  read: 
"The  national  Industrial  Recovery  Board,  through  such  instrumentality  as  it 
nay  designate,  shall  establish  and  -oublish  schedules  of  ainiraum  fair  market 
prices  for 'the  various  grades,  sizes  and  classifications  of  coal."   This 
compromise  proposal  was  debated  on  January  10,  and  after  a  night's  dela,y, 
to  allow  some  consideration  and  communication  by.  wire  with  the  home  front, 
came  to  a  vote  on  January  11.   It  was  defeated  by  aji  8  to  6  vote.   The  labor 
representative  was  recorded  as  "passing." 

In  order  that  the  attitude  of  members  of  the  Board  may  be  clearly  pre- 
sented, it  will  be  appropriate  to  include  here  a  direct  quotation  from  a 
leading  member. 

"I  want  it  clearly  understood  that  the  gentlemen  who  voted  against 
that  motion -are,  not  doing  so  because  they  wanted  this  nrice  structure 
to  break  down.  ,  .1  think  that  most  of  us  feel  that  it  is  a  peculiarly 
inappropriate  tim.e  for  this-  proposal  to  be  advanced. 

"•Vfe  are  all  on  notice  that  there  will  be  legislation  in  this  present 
session  of  C'ongress,  the  question  of  whether  price  control  in  this 
industry  shsAl  'be  exercised  with  the  initiative  proceedings  from  the 
operators,  or  whether  it  Is  to  be  ii.roosed  by  the  Government  being  one 
of  the  issues  around  which  that  legislation  will  be  fought. 

"Therefore,  we  feel  that  it  is  peculiarly  unfortunate  that  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Government  at  this  time  should  propose  the  initiation 
of  the  Government  control  and  fixing  of  prices,  ^and  that  it  'bs  done 
under  the  implied  threat  of  a  withdrawal  of  any  price  stabilization  in 
the  industry,  if  it  is  not  acceded  to."  (**) 

The  member  just  quoted  moved  that  a  small  committee  from  the  Board  be 
appointed  to  confer  with  the  National  Industrial  Recovery  Board  "  with  a  view 
to  seeing  if  it  is  not  possible  to  continue  price  stabilization,  either  as 
it  is  now  or  with  the  amendments  proposed  by  the  riational  Coal  Associationo 
or  some  other  appropriate  amendments  that  are  in  accord  with  the  present  code." 

On  January  16  this  committee  reported  back  to  the  following  effect:   "If 
we  can  say  to  the  National  Industrial  Recovery  Board  that  the  members  of  this 
Board,  without  a  dissenting  voice,  advocate  putting  into  effect  the  proposals 
which  we .made  a  week  ago  Friday,  that  these  will  be  put  into  effect,  if  not 
for  an  indefinite  period,  certainly  for  a  period  .of  three  months,  from  now.(***^ 
Such  a  unanimous, vote  was  accordingly  secured.   The  proposal  was  submitted  to  ■ 
the  Advisory  Boards  and  secured  their  assent  albeit,  in  some  cases,  grudg- 
ingly given.   The  Industrial  Advisory  Board  gave  an  unqualified  approval. 
The  Labor  Advisory  Board  "had  no  comments  to  offer."  The  Legal  Advisory 


(*)  Ibid,  p.  3,  Statement  of  Hr.  O'^'eill 

{**)  Mr.,  Morrow,  Transcript  of  He- ring,  January  11,  p.;  20 

{***)  Transcript  of  Meeting,  January  16,  ,1935,  p..  3 
9837 


Board  "passed  the  subject"  on  the  basis  of  facts  presented  to  inducate  that 
the  existing  provieions  are  entirely  inadequate  and  ir.sufficient  to  main- 
tain the  hours  and  wage  provision  of  the  Code  and  "with  the  determination 
of  the  Board  that  the  subject  will  be  effective  only  through  April  30,  1935. 
In  similar  tenor  tne  Research  and  Planning  approval  limited  the  effective 
period  to  90  days  and  expressed  the  belief  of  this  section  that  the  amend- 
ment "did  not  give  material  promise  of  improving  the  stability  of  the  price 
structure  in  the  coal  industry."   Wider  proposals  were  made  by  the  Consum- 
er Advisory  Board,   Its  members  had  been  "given  to  understand  that  the 
National  Industrial  Recovery  Board  has  promised  this  industry  a  further 
opportunitj'-  to  experiment  in  self  government."  Although  they  felt  in 
some  measure  con.strained  by  this  promise  they  considered  that  the  amend- 
ment "failed  to  afj'ord  adequate  protection  of  the  public  interest  and  would 
undermine  confidence  in  the  administration  of  the  Act."   They  proposed  to 
add  representatives  of  consumers  to  the  Board  of  Arbitration,  nominated 
by  their  'Board,  together  with  others  responsible  for  statistical  inform- 
ation to  be  nominated  by  the  Division  of  Research  and  Planning.   In  ad- 
dition to  these  precautions  the  3oa.rd  decreed  that  W.R.A.  should  retain 
the  right  of  i*eviewing  decisions  of  the  Arbitration  Board,  and  Code  Au- 
thorities.  These  approvals  bear  dates  between  January  21  and  24,  inclus- 
ive.  On  January  25,  Amendment  Ko.  6  was  approved.   The  report  of  the 
National  Industrial  Recovery  Board  to  the  President  cites  two  reasons  for 
the  amendment:   the  existing  provisions  "are  entirely  inadequate  in  view 
of  the  necessity  for  changing  and  improving  the  methods  and  procedure  in 
establishing  fair  market  prices;"  and  "an  extreme  emergency  confronts  the 
Industry  occasioned  by  the  custom  of  malcing  forward  contracts,  under  which 
the  price  for  the  delivery  of  coal  might  jeopardize  the  hour  and  wage  pro- 
visions of  the  Code,  resulting  in  serious  labor  disturbances  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  public."  V/ith  reference  to   the  last  clause,  it  may  be  perti- 
nent to  interject  here  that  wage  agreements  lapsed  April  1,  1935,  and 
that  the  President  of  the  United  i;ine  "Yorkers  ha.d  been  a  member  of  the 
small  committee  which  dealt  with  the  national  Industrial  Recovery  Board 
in  the  final  negotiations  for  this  proposal.   The  Amendment  became  effect- 
ive immediately  and  remsaned  effective  only  until  April  3'\  1935. 

Amendment  No.  7  provio.ed  that  each  diArisional  and  subdivisional  Code 
Authority  should  "have  one  member  who  shall  be  selected  from  nomination 
submitted  by  the  accredited  and  recognized  organization  of  employees." 
Although  this  provision  was  not  incorporated  into  the  Code  until  late  in 
its  history,  it  must  not  be  "oresuraed  that  labor  representatives  were  with- 
out influence  in  the  Bituminous  Coal  Industry  throu^out  Code  history. 
Prom  the  organization  cf  N.R.A.  the-  President  of  the  United  Mine  '.Vorkers 
had  been  one  of  the  most  influential  and  forceful  members  of  the  Labor 
Advisory  Board.   On  January  15,  1934  he  was  a.ppointed  to  the  National 
Bituminous  Coal  Industrial  Board.   Next  day  he  si^jnalized  his  entry  into 
the  councils  of  this  Board  by  the  following  pronouncement: 

"I  would  like  to  participate  as  a  menber   of  this  Board  in  a  constr- 
uctive way.   I  don't  want  in  any  way  to  embarrass  the  ne:nbers  of 
the  Board  v/ho  are  operators  by  being  too  forward  in  making  suggest- 
ions.  I  recognize  that  the  primary  obligation  for  the  management 
of  the  commercial  side  of  the  industry  lies  with  the  operators.   I 
want  to  encourage  them  and  to  assist  them  to  make  good  their' obli- 
gation, but  I  want  it  thoroughly  understook  that  failing  in  their 

9937 


attempt  to  regulate  this  industry  ninder  the  self-government  plan  that 
the  interest  I  represe.it  ik  not  disposed  to  sit  idly  by  and  see  the 
structm-e  v/hich  has  -ororaised  so  nich  for  rai  the  poeple  of  the  industry, 
who  have  been  in  misery  f  ^r  ^'•ears,  -ulled  do';7n  inch  by  inch  and  step 
by  step  to  the  state  of  demoralisation  that  existed  before  we  \inder- 
took  this  grea.t  exoeriment .  "  (*') 

He  put  his  thou.-;ht  ex-plicitly  in  another  "Dissafre.   "If  the  Bituminous 
Coal  Industry,"  said  he,  "is  lonable  to  govern  its'-^lf  to  a  DOint  where  it 
can  orotect  the  price  structure,  the  interest  I  rerresent  will  re?;ard  the 
situation  as  a  breach  of  the  contract,  pjid  will  -andertake  to  withdraw  our 
members  from  the  mines  in  the  coal  areas  where  the  situation  exists  until 
such  time  as  the  situation  can  be  ironed  out."  (**)   The  immediate  emerg- 
ency was  met  without  callin-^;  upon  the  union  to  make  good  this  commitment. 
But  the  possibility  persisted  a:id  was  renewed  in  a  letter  written  by  the 
union  president  to  the  Administrator  under  date  of  December  17,  1934.   The 
paragraph  of  significance  here  read: 

"Failure  unon  the  oart  of  the  Ifetional  .Recovery  Administration  to 
take  effective  steps  to  most  the  menacing  situation  in  the  Bituminous 
Coal  Industry  will  comriel  the  United  iline  workers  of  ./^jnerica  upon 
its  own  initiative,  to  take  sach  ste'DS  as  may  be  deemed  necessary  to 
protect  the  interests  of  its  aenbership . " 

This  letter  was  mimeographed  oy  certain  Co^-e  Authorities  and  went  out  to 
"a  great  number  of  the  represent'itives  of  the  Industry."  (***) 

It  will  be  noted  from  the  date  of  this  communication  that  it  made 
part  of  the  discussion  leading  to  the  adoption  of  a:nendraents  Nos.  5  and  6. 
The  letter  had  called  for  a  meeting  of  the  National  3it\iminous  Coal  Indust- 
rial Board  to  consider  appropriate  amendments.   The  writer  of  the  letter 
took  occasion  at  the  following  meeting  of  this  Board  to  propose  the  amend- 
ment prcviiing  for  labor  representation  on  code  authorities.   This  was  first 
done  at  the  close  of  the  second  day's  meeting,  January  4,  1935,  without 
sufficient  opportunity  for  discussion.   It  was  defeated  by  an  8  to  7  vote.(***' 
On  January  11,  l.ir.  Lewis  reneved  his  motion  v/hich  was  carried,  without  de- 
bate, by  p  vote  of  10  to  4.  (*****)  Negative  votes  came  from  the  South  and 
the  Southwest. 

Failin,^;  an  er-noression  of  arguments  at  the  meeting  a  summary  of  Mr.  Lewis' 


(   (*)  L'linutes  of  Meeting  of  National  Bituminous  Coal  Inudstrial  Board, 
January  16,  1934,  t).  44 
(**;)   Ibid,  p.  41 

(***)  TranscriT3t  of  Hearing,  January  4,  1935,  vv.    79-81  Full  text  of 
letter  on  or).  94-97 


(****)  Transcriot,  "o.  .368 
(*****)  Transcript,  pp.  34-36 


9837 


remarks  to  this  point  before  the  oublic  hearing  on  ":iiDlovTnent  Provisions 
in  Codes  of  Fair  Comretition  may  be  st-^ted.   He  siDOl'e  on  January  30  as 
a  representative  both  of  the  United  Mine  T/orkers  and  of  the  aT.H.A.  Labor 
Advisorv  Board.   His  renarks  on  this  subject  have  been  officially  svon- 
marized  as  follows: 

"The  Rational  Coal  Industrial  Board  has  endorsed  an  amendment  for 
labor  represent?, tion  on  the  coal  code  authority.   Labor  has  a  right 
to  reiDresentaticn  on  code  authorities  because  labor  is  the  residual 
sufferer  from  erro^-s  of  laanage  :ient;  Inbor  has  a  stake  in  industry, 
in  intelligent  management  and  operpticn  and  has  an  eaual  right  to 
contribute  to  an  intelligent  solution  of  the  problems.   The  only 
objection  which  industry  can  have  is  that  they  do  not  wish  to 
associate  with  representatives  of  labor  in  orivate  councils  which 
dominate  industry."  (*) 


i*^      Abstracts  of  Soeeches  at  the  He-ring,  p.  16 


c 


9837 


-131- 

Pursuaiit  to  the  favorable  vote  received  in  the  Ilationo.l  Bit-uminouG 
Coal  Ind-dstrial  Loard,  the  i^roposed  aijendnent  was  sent  out  to  the  in- 
dustry.  There  'va.s  considerahle  opposition.   This  v/as  stuimarized  ty 
the  Actinia  Deputy  Administrator  in  the  follov/ing  terms: 

"A  fev/  protests  to  the  Amen&nent  Irnve  been  received, 
including  Code  Authorities  v;hich  represent  a  rela- 
tively small  minority  of  the  total  coal  tonnage  pro- 
duction of  the  co-'jntry.   The  nature  of  the  protests 
against  labor  representation,  as  received,  is  briefly 
summarized  as  follows: 

'No  demand  and  unnecessary;  might  lixait  open  and  con- 
fldentia.l  discussions;  might  deter  code  support  and  en- 
forcement; no  substantial  reasons  for;  violation  of 
principles  and  policy  of  Code  for  self-control  of  In- 
dustry under  Governmental  suroervision;  ui'.fair  and  un- 
warranted; breach  of  spirit  of  the  Code;  not  serve 
any  useful  purpose;  employees*  interests  amply  secured 
by  labor  Boards;  Presidential  Members  suff?.cient  on 
Code  Authorities;  no  labor  rratters  before  Code  Authori- 
ties; contracts  'give  pmple  in-otection  to  labor  and  cover 
all  angles  of  relationship;  nothing  to  do  with  marketing 
of  coal.'"  (*)         .  . 

By  this  time  the  movement  for  labor  representation  in  the  Bitumin- 
ous Coal  Industry  had  reached  the  point  where  two  Code  Authorities  had 
voluntarily  elected  labor  members  and  a,  third  xia.d  initiated  steps  for 
such  election,  Kotice  of  opportunity  "to  submit,  criticisms,  objections 
or  suggesrtions"  before  February  11  v/as  sent  out  February  2,      The  La.bor 
Advisory  Board  and  Research  and  Plannin,:^  Division  gave  unqualified 
approval.   The  Legal  Division  found  it  necessary  to  reconsider  a  pre- 
viously expressed  opinion.   They  were  troubled  by  the  absence  of  any 
provision  tlmt  the  National  Industrial  Recovery  Board  should  "accredit 
and  recogiiize  the  organization  of  employees"  submitting  nominations. 
On  reconsideration  the  Division  found  tiiv.t  the  langua.gc  might  be  "validly 
subjected  to  this  interj^rctation"  and  passed  the  'Iraft  submitted.   The 
Consumers'  Advisory  Board  took  a.dvantage  of  the  opportunity  to  suggest, 
again,  the  inclusion  of  (!;on3i:iiners '  representatives  on  code  authorities. 
The  Board's  letter  f^arthcr  suggested  that  these  additional  members 
might  appropriately  be  nominated  by  the  Labor  Advisory  Board  and  the 
ConsuiTiers'  Advisory  Boards  respectively.  '  The  Industrial  Advisory  Board 
gave  disapproval  to  the  mea.sure,   Its  members  were  not  'r»illing  "to 
acceiDt  the  principle  that  labor  shou.ld  Ir've  the  right  to  participate  on 
an  equs.l  basis  with  management  tinder  )9r>y  pl-xn  of  industrial  self-govern- 
ment." -They  recognized  tkat  certain  highly  orga.nized  industries  have 
labor  representatives  on  code  authorities  both  with  and  without  vote,(**) 


(*)   Volume  II,  Amendment  ITo,  7,  p.  2 

(**)  Volume  II  on  An:iendment  Ho.  6  in  N.R.-^.  Files 

9837 


-13:5- 

The  reconsideration  of  the  Legr.l  Division's  opinion,  dated  I.ferch 
23,  seems  to  Imve  removed  the  lest  barrier  to  final  rqovrovD.l   since  this 
action  vms  taken  next  day.   The  Administrative  Officer  of  the  llationc.1 
Industrial  Recovery  Board  took  occasion  in  his  letter  to  the  President, 
recoranending  approval  to  say; 

"This  is  a,  hi,;,hly  organized  Industry  and  the  request 
of  the  ITational  Bitimiinous  Coal  Industrial  Board  for 
a  representative  to  be  a  member  of  each  Divisional 
and  Subdivisional  Code  Authority  is  considered  to  be 
fair,  and  it  is  believed,  end.   we  hp.ve  accordingly  so 
found,  that  the  services  of  members  upon  each  Code 
Authority  selected  from  organizations  of  employees 
***  vnll  tend  to  facilitate  the  Administration  of 
the  Code  and  procure  conrpliance  therev/ith." 

The  Amendment  was  .-.  ccordingly  approved  by  the  President  to  be  effective 
immediately. 

The  final  ajiiendment  to  the  Code  which  was  ITo,  8,  did  not  change 
the  substance  of  any  part  of  the  Code.  It  simply  provided  tlmt  certain 
provisions  should  be  extended  unchanged  to  June  16,  1935,  v^hich  was 
the  termination  date  of  i'l.I.R.A.   The  wage  and  hour  provisions  were 
to  expire  April  1,  1935.   The  Joint  Wr.ge  Conference  sitting  at  this 
time  he,d  felled  to  reach  agreement  on  March  30,   In  this  emergency  the 
National  Bittiminous  Coal  Industrial  Board  was  hastily  called  to  consider 
the  situation.   They  proposed,  with  t'le  sanction  of  representatives  from 
both  the  union  and  the  operators,  tha.t  the  existing  provisions  be  ex- 
tended as  stated.   Since  the  fadr  tra.de  practices,  method  of  estcblish- 
ing  prices  and  administration  set  up  by  Amendi-nent  ITo.  6  were  to  expire 
by  limitation  on  April  30,  the  same  extension  was  recommended  for  these 
sections.  Action  of  the  Board  v.'as  unanimous  except  for  the  qualified 
votes  of  the  two  representatives  of  Division  III,   They  had  asked  for  a 
review  of  their  wage  and  hour  situation  and  did  not  wish  their  accord 
with  the  proposed  ajiiendment  to  prejudice  tlTr.t  case. 

The  urgency  was  so  great  that  no  attempt  was  made  to  secure  public 
expression  regarding  the  amendment.   The  Advisory  Boards  were  asked  to 
pass  on  -the  proposal  and  gave  unqualified  approval  except  in  the  case 
of  the  Consumers*  Advisory  Board.   Tliat  body  repeated  its  recommendation 
for  comsvirner  members  on  Code  Authorities  inade  in  connection  with  Amend- 
ments Hos,  6  and  7,   Tlie  Acting  Deputy  Achninistrator  in  his  letter  rooom- 
mending  ap-oroval  included  the  following  statement: 

"The  Ifetional  Bittiminous  Coal  Industrial  Board,  con- 
sisting of  represent', tives  of  eiirployers ,  of  err^jloyees, 
and  of  the  G-overioment,  believes  th;,t  an  extension  of 
the  presently  existing  rates  provided  in  the  Code  to 
June  16,  1935  will  afford  at  least  a  continued  oppor- 
tunity to  secure  agreement  upon  a  new  schedule  of  min- 
imum rates  without  the  tremendous  economic  loss  to 
the  nation  which  closing  a  large  number  of  mines  on 
April  1,  1935,  by  reason  of  lack  of  provision  therefor, 
would  certainly  occasion. 


9837 


"The  proxiiTiity  of  the  expiration  date,  April  1,  1935,  of 
the  provisions  involved  and  the  emergency  confronting  the 
Industry  do  not  penriit  of  holding  a  public  hearing." 

It  is  worthy  of  note  tlxit  this  A:iicndment  met  the  emergency  success- 
fully by  passing  through  all  its  sts.ges  in  a  single  day.   The  minutes 
of  the  meeting  of  the  iM>.tional  Bi tui-r.inous  Coal  Industrial  Board,  all 
the  letters  of  approval  "by  advisory  "ooards,  the  covering  letter  recom- 
mending approval,  and  the  final  approval  of  the  National  Industrial 
Recovery  Board  all  hear  the  date  of  March  30.   In  the  light  of  this 
evidence  the  conclusion  seems  warranted  tiiEtt  hy  tliat  date  H.R.A. 
ma,chinery  had  heen  keyed  up  to  a  high  pitch  of  efficiency. 


9337 


134 

BITUMINOUS    COAL  PRODUCTION,  REALIZATION  ^ 
MINE   CAPACITY  ,n  thi  UNITED  STATES  1899  -  193A 

A 

1 

Full-t«l>«  c« 

« 

'^''\-'\ 

(V 

MUIT 

1 

1 

da 

1^ 

i,  ^_. 

\ 

, 

/ 

--- 

-/ 

y 

r 

\\ 

r 

1- 

/ 

/' 

/ 

/ 

-^ 

\ 

/i 

/\,/v 

\ 

2  500 

/ 

/"^ 

/' 

'\ 

p 

•0( 

uct 

V 

ion-« 

r 

Z 

/ 

/ 

/ 

/ 

\/ 

/^ 

\ 

-iu. 

200 

100 

0 

1 

/ 

> 

•^ 

/ 

/■ 

y 

\ 

/ 

/ 

'••.  ^  ^ 

^'  •• 

•- ~ 

I 

/er 

.„ 

val 

ufl  per  ton 

n 

ill 

ill 

Ill  sill 

SOURCE:  U.S. 6E01-0GICA1.  SUBVEY  /VSD   U.S.BUREAU  OF  MINES. 

PBCnAStC     BY      BITUMINOUS     COAI.    UNIX 

OF  RCVIEW,  N.R.A,       UNDEI3   PIRECTION  OF    F.E.BET?(}UIST. 


'capacity    under     N.R.A    CONDITIONS    AND 
WORKINO    TIME    NOT  AVAILABLE 


-135- 
CHApgEH  III   1/ 

PRODUCTIOIT  AXTD   L'IST?J3U?I0r  B^CTOHZ  A1!D  UnyZR   TEE  CODE 


A.   rroc'jj.ction  and  Ilinin^-  Cg/oacity:   The  trend  of  biturainous  coal 
Ijroduction  shows  a  continuous  ups'^/inj^  until  the  V/ar  -oeriod,  and  then 
flattens  out  for  the  suhsoquent  years.   The  onlj^  serious  deviation  from 
the  level  estcOjlished  "by  the  War  occurred  after  1929.   Another  feature 
is  that  mining  capacity  has  al'vays  c;Kceeded  rctual  production,  and 
often  by  Icxre   amounts.   The  trend  of  ca-oacity,  however,  fails  to 
follo\7  the  same  course  as  thrt  of  production.   Where  production  tends 
to  reach  a  given  level  during  the  War  years,  mining  capacity  con- 
tinues to  increase,  jui.iping  shariply  upwaj-d  after  1919,  and  failing  to 
shape  hacj:  towards  its  former  relationship  v/ith  output  until  after  1933. 

The  upswing  in  the  trend  of  bituminous  coal  production  was  ra.pid. 
Output  practically  doubled  in  each  of  the  two  decades  following  1890. 
Production  during  the  latter  year  ajnoimted  to  111  million  tons  and  this 
was  increased  to  212  millions  for  1900,  and  417  millions  for  1910.  The 
half  billicn  iTia.rl:  v:as   reached  for  the  first  time  in  1916,  about  the 
time  the  trend  bega,n  to  flatten.   It  v;ill  be  notices  for  the  suc- 
ceeding years,  until  the  depression  tha.t  annual  output  shows  a  tendency 
to  fluctuate  around  the  500  million  mark.   During  the  depression  output 
dropped  to  310  million  tons  for  1932,  the  lowest  annual  output  since  1904. 
Improvement  is  noted  for  the  next  two  years,  production  advancing  to 
334  million  tons  for  1933,  and  358  million  cons  for  1934. 

The  mining  capacity  indez  shows  the  possible  production  of  the 
existing  labor  force  over  a  given  number  of  days.   G-cncrally  a  base  of 
either  300  woi'king  days  or  230  -worsting  days  is  used  in  setting  up  the 
measure.   The  former  is  a  full  working  year,  while  the  base  of  280  days 
makes  allo\;ance  for  break-down  or  other  operating  disruptions.   Capacity 
based  either  way  has  always  exceeded  actual  production.   By  using  the 
measure  of  280  working  days,  capa.city  was  nearly  twice  as  great  as 
production  in  19g2,  and  27  per  cent  greater  in  1929.   Wot  only  has 
capacity  been  above  x^roduction  over  a,  year  but  also  during  seasonal 
production  pealcs.   (See  "Americans  Capacity  to  Produce",  llourse  & 
Associa.tes,  p.  448).   It  is  to  be  noted,  hov/ever,  that  mining  capacity 
has  not  always  been  a  measure  of  the  possible  amount  of  coal ' that  could 
be  raa.de  available  to  consuraers.   Production  v;as  limited  during  many  of 
the  months  of  the  War  and  Post-War  periods  by  transportation  shortages. 

Production  and  Industrial  Activity;  At  least  four-fifths  of  the 
bituminous  coal  tonnage  is  consumed  by  industry.   ITot  only  is  there 
little  or  no  storage  at  the  nines,  but  a  large  part  of  industry  has  no 
facilities  for  storage  over  any  considerable  period.   Purcha,sing  coal 
accordin_  to  present  needs  is  accepted  pra-cticc.   As  a  result,  coal 
mining  is  sensitive  to  genert.l  changes  in  general  industrial  production. 

The  relation  of  bituminous  coal  production  to  general  business 
activity  is  measured  i:i  the  annual  indexes  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board. 

1/   Pre-or.red  by  George  A.  Lamb. 


9837 


-Ic5- 

indexes.      For   inst-.^nce,   m-".uy  of   the   coLn.iodities   in   tlig^   goner "  1   index  v/ere 
stil?.   in   ■-,   stv.e   of  developraent   for   soiae  ye^rs   -^ftcr   1919,    \7Mle  "bitiominous 
co"l  had   re-.ched  ,-■,  -■er'!'  c.v.ri-v;:  the  '7ar. 

I'TLBX  OF  EITI^ilfoUS   COAL  rAO'oCTrV  AS 

coi,!>.^-H:r"  v/iTr  I.::::::  of  iiV  usthial 

FFO]^UC''IC  -,  BY  niAlS.    1919-1934 

(1933-1925    -,ver-ro  =  100) 

Bituininous 
Index  Indiistri-'.l  Frodi'iction  CoaL 


SOUECF: 


'Totr.l  M-.nui--.ct-.ires    Hinerrls 


t'eder^.l  Zoser-re  Boarc 


lude:; 


.1919  85  34  77  89 

1920  87  87  89  109 

1921  67  67  70  79 

1922  SG  86  74  73 

1923  ■  101  101  105  108 

1924  95  94  96  93 

1925  104  105  99  99 

1926  108  .  108  108  110 

1927  106  106  107  99 

1928  111  112  106  96 

1929  119  119  115  102 

1930  96  95  .  99  89 

1931  81  30  84  73 
1952  64  63  71  59 

1933  76  75  82  64 

1934  79  73  86  69 


9837 


-ib?.. 

The  chanres  of  the  two  indo:ces  are  generally  similar.  E>'ceptions  are 
founJL  for  tv;o  different  periods;  1919.^19^1,  and  1927«19,?9.  A  partial 
exjlanaticn  for  these  differences  may  he  found  in  the  mrlce-ups  of  the 
indexes.  Por  instance,  raaxi.3-  of  the  commodities  in  the  general  index 
vere  still'  in  a  stcge  of  development  for  some  years  after  1919,  v/hile 
hitu.3inous  coal  had  reached  a  peal:  during  the  War. 

The  narhed  seasonal  character  of  l)ituminous  C'al  production  is 
indicated  in  the  accompanying  taole.   These  figures  renrcscnt  an 
average  index  for  monthly  production  for  the  years  1920  to  1954.   Tne 
index  uas  figured  by  using  monthly  data  for  the  years  shovm,  adjusting 
with  a  13-month  moving  average,  and  then  obtaining  the  arithiacthic 
means  of  tlie  '  items,  of  each  month  after  extremes  had  heen  eliminated. 
It  will  he  seen  that  Octoher,  on  the  average,  was  the  "ncalv  month, 
followed  in  order  by  Jamiary,  D-scember,  and  November.   A  difference 
of  37  points  separated  .the  low  month  of  April  from  the  Octr-bcr  high. 
An  average. monthly  index  for  general  industrial  production  is  not 
available  for  a  corapaxable  "oeriod,  but  those  published  fail  to  show 
as  wide  a-  range  between  the  high  and  low  faonths  as  do  thr  bituminous 
coal  indexes,  or  dor^hd  industrial  indexes  correspond  generally  to  the 
bituminous  coal  indexes. 

Average  Monthly  Indexes  for  Bituminous  Coal 
Production  in  the  United  5tateg.,_192P-19"^4  (*). 

January 115,0 

February -.,..101. 7 

March.- 1^*3.1 

April 80.9 

May 85.2 

June 87.5 

July 89.2 

August 98.1 

September 103,2 

October. 117.9 

ITovember 107.5 

December. 109,7 


(*)  Tonnap;e  Data  from  U.S. Bureau  of  Mines 

B.   Production  of  Ai-eas; 

Mining  areps  lend  themselves  to  various  classifications  of  both 
geographical  and  geological  nature  each  of  which  is  used  at  nnc  time 
or  rnother, 

G-eological  Provinces;   The  northern  and  Middle  Appalachian  province, 
generally  referred  to  as  the  Appalachian  region,  includps  the  bi-^ 
tuminous  coal  fields  in  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  flajryland,  West  Virginia,^ 
Eastern  hentucliy,  Virginia,  and  Tennessee.   This  province  accounts  for 
70  por  cent  of  the  production  of  the  United  Statos,   The  next  region  in 
importance  is  the  Eastern  Interior,  including  Illinois,  Indiana,  and 
Western  ICentuchy,  which  mines  17  per  cent.   Another  3.0  per  cent  is 
produced  in  the  mines  in  Alabama,  sometimes  termed  the  Southern 


9  857 


-138- 

^rml'\chit,n  :;royi:ice.  T/.e   reinainint^;  prodMction,  less  than  10  ;ner  cent, 
cones  fro.i  areas  sce.ttered  throughout  the  country,  the  nost  inporte.nt 
of  T.'hich  is  the  Roclc;,'  I'ounfcp.in  re^Tiion  with  5  ;Tcr  cent  of  the  total. 
The  rest  of  the  tonnage  includes  the  output  of  hichigen,  Iowa,  Ilissouri, 
Kansas,  Aihansas,  Ovlahoma,  YJashir.iton,  and  of  the  lignite  fields  in 
irorth  LE-'xta  and  Texas. 

Production  hy  States:   As  between  states  for  the  year  1934,  West 
Virginia  vrs  theleadint^  cor.l  producer  with  27.4  x^er  cent  of  the 
total  output,  with  Pennsvlvania  as  a  close  second  with  24,9  per  cent. 
The  standing  of  other  leading  states  in  ;oroduction  is  as  follows: 
Illinois  with  11.4  per  cent;  Kentucl-v,  10.6  per  cent;  Ohio,  5.8  per 
cent;  Indiana,  4.2  per  cent;  and  Alabama,  2.7  per  ce2~.t.  'For   the 
states  v;ect  of  the  i.Iississip"^i  Eivcr,  .Kansas  and  Colorado,  1.6  per  cent 
a,nd  1.5  ;)er  cent  respectively,  lead  in  output.   The  relative  positions 
of  the  cofl  producing  states  hr.ve  shifted  at  various  times.   Pennsylvania 
was  the  leading  producer  until  1927,  when  TTest  Virginia  advanced  to  the 
lead  for  the  first  time.   The  former  state  returned  as  leader  oy  a  slight 
margin  i::.  1929  and  1930,  end  .then  gave  wa^^  to  West  Virginia  for  the  suc- 
ceeding yeaxs.   The  relative  imi^ortance  of  Illinois  laas.  decrea,sed  in  the 
last  decade.   ?or  a  n^.-moer  of  years  :)rior  to  1922,  Illinois  produced 
about  the  saxne  ?mo'ojit  of  coal  as  Tiest  Virginia,  while  until  1926,  it 
exceeded  Kentucly.   During  the  time  that  Illinois  had  decreasing 
tonnages,  both  ^iest   Virginio.  a.nd  Kentucl:;'  were  enjoying  increased  out- 
puts, the  former  pushin^_  rbove  Illinois  by  1922,  and  Kentuck;^  reaching 
the  Illinois  level  by  1926,  a  losition  it  has  since  held.   Ohio  pro- 
duced at  fbout  the  saiue  level  as  Ecntucl^^  until  1923,  but  thereafter 
showed  a  decrease,  while  Kentucly  advanced  to  a  higher  position,  Thus, 
since  the  War,  Pennsylvania,  Illinois  and  Ohio  ha.ve  lost  in  relative 
sta.nding  among  the  leading  coal  producing  states,  while  West  Virginia, 
and  Kentuclqy  have  bettered  their  positions.  '  Indiana  has  shown  little 
tendency  to  change  its  rani:  in  production,  but  Alabama,  from  about  1924, 
has  exr_ierienced  a.  steady  decline  in  out")ut  until  1933,  when  it  appears 
that  its  downward  course  v/as.  checked. .  Kansas  enjoyed  a  better  position 
in  1934  th^n  for  many  years, , while  the  other  large  western  producer, 
Colorado,  h£,s  shown  little  absolute,  change  for  many  years. 

Production  by  Fields:   Designations  for  coal  fields  have  been  adopted 
by  the  United  States  Coal  Commission  and  defined  in  detail  in  Part  IV 
of  its  reports.   The  leader  for  manj'-  years  has  been  the  Pittsburgh  field 
which  rained  about  21  million  tons  in  1935,  or  6  per  cent  of  the  total 
tonna^^e  in  the  country.  Other  leading  .fields  are  Connellsville; 
Central  Pennsylvania;  Fairmont  in  northern  West  Virginia;  Panlmndle  - 
Pittsburgh  llo.  G  in  West  Virginia  and  Eastern  Ohio;  Pocahontas,  Tug 
River,  and  Windin^,  Gulf,  the  low  volatile  group  in  Southern  West 
Virginia;  ?nd  Kanawlia  and  Logan  of  the  high  volatile  fields  in  Southern 
West  Virginia.  Ohio's  tonnage  is  fairly  v/ell  distributed  over  a  half 
dozen  fields.  Eastern  Kentuclrij'  is  largely  made  up  of  ITortheast  Kentucl^y, 
Hazard  cj;d  Harlan.   Central  and  Southern  are  the  largest  fields  in 
Illinois.  As  to  the  Appalachian  region,  the  designation  ITorthern  and 
Southern  fields  s.re  often  used.  A  line  draivn  from  east  to  ¥/cst  through 
the  center  of  West  Virginia  roughly  is  the  division  between  the  tv/o 
groups,  with  Eastern  Kcntuclqy  falling  in  with  the  Southern  fields. 


9837 


-139- 

Proc-uction  b:^  CoC.e  Areas-   5". .e  cccle  areas,  v.-cre  set  lo  usu£.lly  vdtli 
.re£;ard  to  {i,eolOf;:lcal  and  £eo£ra,phical  characteristics,  and  for  that 
rea.son  t'lie    Lonnage  corroarisons  a,lready  made  may  "be  applied  to  the  Code 
Divisions  and  Subdivisions  for  general  purposes..  Production  figures 
for  the  code  territories,  however,  have  lieen  con^iled  for  the  years 
1.920  -  1934.   In  regard  to  Division  I,  it  may  be  said  that  the  largest 
losses  for  tiie  area  of  the  ITortherr  Subdivisions  tool:  place  in  the 
first  lia,lf  of  the  1920  to  1934  period,  vYith  the  important  gains  for 
the  area  of  the  Southern  Subdivisions  being  registered  at  the.t  time. 
The  decreases  in  the  ITorthern  Subdivisions  were  less  than  the  in- 
creases ir.  the  Southern  Subdivisions.   In  general,  it  may  be  con- 
cluded that  the  largest  losses  for  the  ITorthern  Subdivisions  took  place 
in  the  first  half  of  the  1920  to  1934  period,  and  thr^t  the  important 
increases  in  the  Southern  fields  were  also  registere'^  at  that  time. 
The  decreases  in  the  Southern  field«  were  also  registered  at  that  time. 
The,  dacreanes  in  the  Jfortharn  Subdivisions  ver.    leoe  tr^n  tiie  m- 
(jreaSBS  in  the  Southern  Subdivir'ions.  ; 

Over  the  1920  -  1934  period,  mines  falling  in  Division  II  lost 
a  lar^'c  part  of  their  proportion  of  the  national  tonnage.   These  mines 
accounted  for  22  r)cr  cent  of  the  total  production  in  1920,  -as  against 
16  per  cent  in  1934.   Illinois  was  the  largest  loser.   It  i's  evident 
that  the  losses  encoiontered  in  Division  II  were  to  the  gain  of 
Division  I  and,  in  tui-n,  the  gains  in  Division  I  were  made  by  the 
Southern  Subdivisions. 

The  depression  affected  all  the  mining  ^reas  in  about  the  same 
manner.   The  slirres  of  the  various  Divisions  in  the  tota.l  tonnage 
chp.nged  little  after  192.9,.  and  the  sane  is  true  of  the  Subdivisions. 
Neither  did  a  great  deal  of  change  appear  after  the  Code.   Western 
Pennsylvania,,  which  hit  r  low  point  due  to  the  depression,  advanced 
ags.in  by  1934,  while  the  Onio  Subdivision  apparently  v.ras  able  to  better 
itself  uaidcr  the  Code  o-ocration. 

C .   Distribution  of  Bituminous  Coal :  " 

Data  that  give  the  flow  of-  bituminous  coal  from  mines  to  markets 
are  not  conrolete  for  any.  single  year,  though  for  1929  information  is 
available  for  the  origin  of  tonnage  consumed  by  states,  exclusive  of 
raiiv/ciy  fuel  and  bunker  fuel.-  This  is  the  most  detailed  record  of 
movements  for  any  of  the  years  since  the  Wai-.  In  addition,  there  is 
also  ava.ilable  for  1929  the  origin  of  bituminous  coal  used  by  all 
railroads  of  the  v.arious  districts  designated' for  reporting  purposes 
by  the  Interstate  Comiaerce  Coiiimission.   Statistics  on  particular  move- 
ments liavc  been  recorded  for  other  years  and  provide  helpful  measures 
of  changing  conditions  talring  place  in  the  distribution  of  bituminous 
coal. 

The  flow  from  the  Appalachian-,  fields,  because  of  varied  trans- 
portation facilities  and  location  of  markets,  ass-unies  a  nnjnber  of 
definite  movements.   One  of  those  is  the  tidewater  mov.cment  which 
consists  of  the  tonnage  moved  to  eastern  ports  by  rail,  durapfed  over  the 
piers,  rnd  loaded  on  vessels  for  rcsliipmcnt  or  use.   In  1934,  this 
ajnountcd  to  29  million  tons,  .or  slightly  over  11  per  cent  of  the  coa.l 


9837 


-140- 

procluced  in  the  Appalachian  fields.   Another  movenent  is  to  the  G-reat 
Lalzes  v/here,  lil:e  the  tidev/ater  toiinai^e,  the  coal  is  reshipped  by 
vessel,  or  used  as  ■hunlver  fuel,   Coinmercial  tonnage  shipped  to  Lalce  Erie 
for  transhipment  is  known  as  Irlze   cargo  con,l,  and  accounted  for  36 
million  tons  in  1934,  or  14  per  cent  of  the  AppalacMan'  production. 
Coal  ship;}ed  all-rail  to  ITev;  Englard  points  is  compiled  currently,  but 
not  by  fields  of  origin.   This  movement  amouitted  to  5^  million  tons  for 
1934.   For  the  same  year,  all-rail  coal  to  Canada,  which  is  separate 
from  l?I:e  cargo  coal,  ex^Torted  to  that  country,  amounted  to  730  thousand 
tons.  A  Eiovement  distinct  in  character  is  in  connection  v/ith  the  tonnage 
origine.ted  by  vessels  on  the  Ohio  River  and  its  tributaries,  which 
amounted  to  12\  million  tons  in  1933,  the  latest  yecr  of  available  dat^s,. 
Most  of  this  river  tonnage  moves  but  a  short  distance,  though  part, 
hnown  as  ex-rivcr  coal,  is  reshipr)ed  by  rail.   The  rest  of  the 
Appalachian  coal  moves  to  market  all-rail,  except  for  trucked  tonnage 
which  lias  become  prominent  in  late  years  and  represented  about  5  per 
cent  of  the  shipments  in  1933.   A  majorit;-  of  the  trucked  shipments 
moves  fron  mines  to  adjacent  mai^kets.   An  important  all-rail  movement 
reported  currently  is  v;estbound  from  the  Ap-ialachians.   This  movement, 
eraountin  ,  to  69  million  tons  in  1934,  not  only  reflects  the  important 
competitive  situation  between  the  Appalachian  fields  as  to  the  large 
western  rmrket,.  but  also  shov/s  how  these  fields  compete  in  a  common 
territory  with  those  mines  located  in  Illinois,  Indiana  and  Western 
Kentucl^-.   Concentrated  movements  arc  not  general  for  fields  outside  the 
Appalachians  where,  instead,  a  smaller  amount  of  coal  is  produced  and 
distributed  to  many  markets  over  a  v/ide  area. 

i.Iovements  of  Bituminous  Coal  in  1929;  The  detailed  statistics  for 
1929  provide  an  excellent  cross-section  of  the  flow  of  bitiaminous  co»,l. 
This  material  shows  the  wide  market  for  che  larger  fields,  and  the 
general  interstate  character  of  bituminous  coal  marketing.  It  indicates 
that  not  a  single  coal  producing  state  furnished  its  ovra  coal  re- 
quirements, and  thiat  there  was  not  one  producing  field  not  in  competition 
with  one  or  inore  other  fields. 

According  to  the  state  groupings,  the  largest  amount  of  coal  con- 
sumption is  in  the  East  ITorth  Central  States:  Illinois,  Indiana, 
I.Iichig'.ui,  Ohio  and  Wisconsin,  which  used  163  million  tons  in  1929,  These 
figures  exclude  railway  and  bun],:cr  fuel,  v/hich  by  nature  cannot  be 
classified  by  state  consumption,  though  two  of  the  reporting  railw^ 
districts,  rc\.  England  and.  Southern,  may  be  made  cornparablc  because  they 
follov/  state  boundaries.   In  the  larger  consuming  areas,  railroad  con- 
sunntion  follows  the  direction"  of  general  consumption.  Bunker  fuel  is 
too  small  in  tonnage  to  have  great  influence  on  the  total  results.  The 
next  largest  amount  of  coal  v;as  used  in  the  Eastern  States.  Both  of 
these  groups,  East  I'orth  Central  r-d  Eastern,  together  used  280' 
million  tons,  or  72  per  cent  of  the  total,  a  proportion  that  probably 
would  change  little  if  railroad  fuel  could  be  figu.rcd  in.   The  order  of 
importance  as  to  coal  consumption  of  the  remaining  groups  are:  V/cst 
llorth  Central  and  Southeast,  each  of  which  used  atout  the  s.ame  tonnage; 
and  ITow  England;  Intermountain:  Southwest;  and  Pacific. 

The  l(„rgc  market  consisting  of  the  East  ITorth  Central  States  re- 
ceived 72  per  cent  of  its  coal  from  the  Appalachian  fields,  over 

3837 


-141- 


f our-i-ifths  Leing  delivered  all-rail,    and   the   rest,  .except -.for  a   small 
a;-ouiit   of  ex-river  fonraft'e,    v'as   siiip;,ied  via  the   G-reat  Lahes.      ?lie  princijpal 
A-ipalachipji  fields  -chipping  r21-rail   into   this   territory  i^ere  Ilanawha  Lo^'^n; 
Kenova  Thacher;    PocEiliontas,    Tn,-;  River,    and  Western  Pennsj^lvania.      Tonnarce 
noving  fro;;.:   the   G-reat  Lakes   is  not   listed  03^  fields   of  ori^jin.      The   re- 
:iainder  of  the   coal   enterini-i   this   territory,    aside   from   a  few  thousand 
tons  originatins  in  niscollaneous   fields,    cfj-e  fron    Illinois,    Indiana  .and 
TJestern  Zcntuclry,      Nearly  all   the   coal   from   the  latter .  States,   ho-ever, 
•.•as  confinfed  to   the   Illinois,    Indisjio,  siid: 'iTi  scons  in  narhets. 

3it-aj-;ino\is   coal   ccnsvjned  oy  the  last'ern   States   ori:;;inated  in  the 
Appalachiali  fields,    aside   fron  a   a'.all    tonnage   imported.      Tlie  lar.i'er  part 
of  this   to'nnage  xi&s  mine'd  in  the  llcrthem  fields,    of  T/hich  Western  . 
Pennc3^1vania,    Central  PenncylvnXiia  and  Jlorthern  West   Virginia  r'ere   the 
nost   i'.roortant.      As  "betveen   the   Southern  fields,    the  Kanawha-Logan-,Kenova- 
Thacker  district   supplied  the   Irrgest   ton.age,    follo'jed  by  Hew  River- 
Winding   G-'Lilf  and  Pocaiiontas  -  Tug  River.      The   So^athern  fields,   hovrever, 
h^.d  a  sizea.'ble   share    in   il'.e   tidewater  coal   c on siu-.ed  in   tlie  Eastern  States, 

The  West  IJorth  Central   Strte?   nttained  their  coal   from  nany   sources, 
the  largest   amoiuit  originating    •in  Illinois,    'dth  finother  heavj'"  movenent , 
of  the  lal:e   cargo   coal.     All-rail   shipments   originatir^g   in   the  Appalachian 
region  consisted  alnost   entirely  of   tcnna.-.e   iron  the   Southern  fields. 
Pfodueing   states,    such  as  Kansas,   Missouri   and  Iowa,   marketed  most  of 
their- tonnage  in  thc^West  Ilorth  Central  States  while*   also   competing  in 
this  territory,   were,  heavy   shipments  from  Arkansas,  '  Oklahoma,   llewtle-ico, 
Colora,do   and  Wyoming. 

Alabama  supplied  11;-  million  tons  of   the  hitui.iinoLis   coal   consumed  in 
the   Southeast,   hut  nearly  twice   as  rra-;h'  cn:ie   to.  the   sane   territory  from 
the   Soutliern  Ap^jalachiaJi  fields.,     Vfestern  Kentucrijr  also    shared  in  the 
market   to   the   extent   of  nearly  d-'.  million   tons.      Railroad  coal  used  in  the 
Southeast  originated   in   the    sa;)e  general  way  as  did  the   commercial   tonno.ge. 

Of   the   remaining  groups  of  States,   llev;  England  is   the  most   important 
cons'ca;ier,      ApT)roximately  three-fourths  of   t.ie  hituninous   coal   consumed  in 
Hew  England  was   tidewater,    including  so'ie   rmported  coal,   nen.rly  all   •^•he 
i-est  ; roving  all-ra,il   from   the  Hnrthem  Anpalachiaii  fields.      New  England 
railroad  coal   originating  in   i:h_   oou^cnern  fields  aJio\-uitiug  to   50  percent 
of  the   total,    was   tidewater   tonnage.      The   la'x'ger  prodacin::    states   in   the 
far  west  ;:arket   their  tonnage  over  r,^  vado  area, 

Zie   sources  of  coal  used  for  rodlroad  i'uel  are   given  in  Table  . 

Illinois  was   the   leading  producer  of  railroad  coal,    followed  oy  northern. 
West  Virginia,    Central  Pennsylvania,    and  Pittsburgh.      The   Southern  fields 
were   able   to   share  less   in   the  railroad  -'cirliet  as   compared  \.-ith  other  mar- 
kets.     Information  supplied  by  the  Bi^reau  of  I.'ines   shows   that   freight   was 
paid  on   only  31  percent   of  the   railroad  coal. 

Interstate   Chara-ctejr  of  Shijaiejnts,^  1,9_29:      The   e::tent   to  w'-iich  bi- 
tamino^us   coal    shipments  are    ii^terstate   or   intrastate  ha.ve  been  calculated 
'by  the  Bureau  of  Lines  for  1929.      Res-alts  of  this   studj?"   show  that   74  pei^ 
cent  of   the   total   distribution  was   in  the   form  of  interstate   shipments  and 
railroad  fuel,    a  conservative  fig-j.re, 

9837 


•142- 


BITUlvilWOUS  COAL   SHIFPEI)  TO  ITEW  ElJGLAiro  BY  RA.IL  MD  BY  l-TORTHEEU 
Aim  SOUTHEHM  TILEYjATEK  POETS,    191S  -   1934,    III  ITET  TONS 
(Compiled  from  published  reports   of  the  U.    S.    Bureau  of  Mines) 


Tide-;ater   si 

lip-.ients   to  IJEW  Elx^GLAM)  b 

:  All-rail 
receipts   in 

_  GRAM  TOTAL 

From 

i^EW  ENGMHD 

Nev7  York 

Prom 

Philadelphia 

Hnjnpton  Roads 

Total 

£; 

and  Baltimore 

and  Charleston 

Tidewater 

Net   Tons 

1919 

9,555,000 

3,132,213 

5,253,169 

8,385,382 

18,040,382 

1920 

12,223,000 

4,308,085 

6,148,359 

10,456,444 

22,579,444 

1921 

8,374,000 

2 , 840 , 707 

6,017,924 

8,858,631 

17,232,531 

1922 

5,812,000 

1,715,523 

9,175,835 

10,892,458 

16,704,458 

1923 

9,634,000 

3,702,907 

9,571,415 

13,374,320 

23,003,320 

1924- 

6,985,000 

2,108,325     , 

9,379,905 

11,488,230 

18,473,230 

1925 

7,756,000 

2,257,249 

11,205,213 

13,453,452 

21,219,462 

1926 

8,0-x5,000 

2,443,082 

10,505,856 

12,948,938 

20,993,938 

1927 

7,232,000 

2,239,410 

12,589,571 

14,828,981 

22,060,931 

1928 

6,473,000 

1,645,656 

11,798,96'^ 

13,44-x,520 

19,917,620 

1929 

6,781,000 

1,569,976 

12,874,909 

14,444,885 

21,225,885 

1930 

6,149,000 

1,646,628 

12,379,796 

14,026,424 

20,175,424 

1931 

5,611,000 

1,098,673 

11,547,464 

12,646,137 

18,257,137 

1932 

4,5-14,000 

703,976 

9,913,663 

10,617,639 

15,151,639 

1933 

4,767,000 

791,171 

10,559,355 

11,350,526 

16,137,526 

1934 

5,422,000 

1,083,718 

10,662,416 

11,751,134 

17,173,134 

9837 


BITOiniTOUS  COAL  SKIPPED  TO  i^W  ElIGMND  BY  MIL  AND  BY  WORTHEBIT 

AKD  SOUTHSM  TIDEWATER  POETS,    1919  -   1934,    IK  I'ffiT  TOWS 
(Coin;oiled  from  published  reports   of   the  U.    S.   Bureau  of  Mines) 


(Contiraied  from  i^age 


Tidewater 

shipments 

to  lim  ENGLAira  b 

All-rail 
receipts   ii 

G-PAJ'ID  TOTAL 

Year 

1       from 

IffiW  EKGLAH 

D     IJew  York 

From 

Philadelphia  : 

Ka?-pton  Roads 

Total 

:          a 

and  Baltimore 

and  Charle 

3  ton 

Tidevrater 

percent 
^lof  Total 

1919 

53.5 

17.4 

29.1 

46.5 

100,0 

1920 

53.9 

19,0 

27.1 

46.1 

100.0 

1921 

48.6 

16.5 

34=9 

51,4 

100.0 

1922 

34.8 

10,5 

54.9 

65.2 

100.0 

1923 

41.9 

16a 

42,0 

58»0 

100.0 

192-1- 

37.8 

llo4 

50.8 

62.2 

100.0 

1925 

36.6 

10.6 

52.8 

65.4 

100.0 

1926 

38.3 

11.5  _ 

50.1 

61,7     , 

100,0 

1927 

32.8 

10.2" 

57.0 

67.2 

100.0 

1928 

32.5 

8,3 

59.2 

67.5 

100.0 

1929 

31.9 

7.4  , 

60.7 

68.1 

100.0 

1930 

30.5 

88.2  ' 

61.3 

§1.5 

100.0 

1931 

30.7 

■        6.0 

63.3 

69.3 

100.0 

1932 

30.0 

4,5 

65.4 

70.0 

100.0 

1933 

29.7 

4.9 

65.4 

70.3 

100.0 

1^  1934 

51.6 

■     6o3 

62.1 

68.4 

100,0 

a     From   records  of   the   Coraraonvrealth  of  Massachusetts,    Division  on   the 
Necessariqs  of  Life, 

b     Cargo   coal   diimped  into   vessels   consigned  to   l\ev  England  as   reported  by  the 
railroads   operating  tiderrater  piers, 

Bj/  F.    C-.    Tryon  pjid  ¥.    H.   Young 

Coal   Economics  Division 
United  States  Bureau  of  Mines. 

November  4,    1935, 


9837 


•144- 


Tidetrater  Move^.ent;   The  data  on  particular  movenents,  1920  -  1934, 
adds  further  information  to  the  data  on  orodaction  by  areas.   Fnere  the 
production  figures  by  years  indicate  shifts  as  between  states,  areas*  or 
subdivisions,  the  data  on  novements  show  how  these  shifts  have  been  related 
to  changes  in  market  areas. 

Changes  that  have  taken  place  in  the  origin  of  tideijater  coal  are 
readily  apparent  in  the  table  entitled  "Shipments  of  Bituminous  Coal  to 
Tidewater,  1920  to  1934  Inclusive",  and  the  accompanying  chart.   Southern 
Subdivisions  No.  1  and  ITo,  2  have  slightly  increased  their  proportions, 
while  the  northern  areas  have  lost.   The  annual  tonnages  of  the  tidewater 
move^ient  have  fluctuated  a  great  deal,  reaching  a  high  of  58  million  tons 
in  1926,  wlien  exports  increased  due  to  the  British  strike. 

The  final  destination  of  tidewater  tonnage  has  varied  notice- 
ably since  1920,   I;aring  the  ea.rlier  years  of  this  period,  both  bunker  and 
foreign  fuel  were  of  importance,  and  the  rest  of  the  coal  was  divided  as 
to  "inside  ca^es",  New  England,  and  "other  tonnage"  or  that  coal  shipped 
beyond  the  capes  and  destined  to  ports  Of.tside  of  New  England.   The 
tendency  over  the  15  years,  bo^^evcr,  has  been  for  the  New  England  coal 
and  "other  tonnage"  to  gain  in  importance  until  accounting  for  most  of 
the  tidewater  movement,  and  for  all  the  other  divisions  to  decrease. 

Interesting  fa.cts  Are   brought  out  when  the  effect  of  tidewater  coal 
on  the  New  England  market  is  given  consideration.   The  proportion  of  all- 
rail  receipts,  which  originate  alQOst  entirely  in  the  northern  fields, 
decreased  after  1920,  while  the  yiarj  of  tidev.'r.ter  coal  is  increased. 
Likewise,  the  tonnage  shipped  from  Hampton  Roads,  the  port  used  by  the 
southern  fields,  also  'increases  ov3r  the  period.  Hence,  the  southern 
tidewater  coal  was  increased  in  the  New  England  market  both  at  the 
expense  of  the  northern  all~rail  rjid  tidewater  tonnage. 

Lake  Cargo  Movement;   Bitwr.inous  coal  shipped  to  Lake  Erie  makes  up 
the  largest  concentrated  coal  movement,  A  separa.te  lalce  movement,  thoia^ 
of  far  less  volume,  is  found  from  Lalce  Ontario  ports,  but  this  caJinot  be 
included  in  the  lake  cargo  description  due  to  the  absence  of  data. 

The  r:arked  shifts  as  bet'-reen  the  mining  areas  originating  lake 
coal  has  been  one  of  the  outstnuding  events  in  the  history  of  this  move** 
ment,  Eyen  since  1920  large  fluctuations  are  noticed  for  the  producing 
regions.   It  will  be  seen,  for  instsjice,  that  the  Ohio  Subdivisions, 
which  produced  one-third  of  the  lake  coal  in  1920,  accounted  for  only 
3  percent  of  the  tonnage  in  1927,  end.   was  not  successful  in  regaining 
anything  like  its  former  status  in  the  later  years.  Western  Pennsylvania 
has  sharp  reductions  after  1923,  and  did  not  begin  to  regain  its  old 
share  in  the  lalce  business  until  after  1927,  Northern  lest  Virginia's 
proportion  varied  over  the  oeriod,  with  a  tendency  to  lessen  in  the 
recent  3-ears,   Southern  Subdivisions  No.  2  gained  rapidly  after  1923, 
and  though  having  some  decrease  after  1927.  renains  the  leading  producer 
of  la]:e  coal.   The  trend  for  Southern  Subdivision  No,  1  over  the  period 
h8,s  been  a  gradual  increase  in  its  proportion, 

9837 


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Toledo  is  the  main  port  for  lake  cargo  coal,  handling  52  -perc  ^nt  of 
the  tonnage  in  1925,  49  percent  in  17.2?j  ar.d  tetTraen  40  and_  45      •,*•. 
percent  for  the  other  years  snown.   This  port  is  used  mostly  by  the 
southern  fields.   The  rest  of  the  tonnage  is  dumped  at  various  ports 
hetneen  Toledo  and  Buffa.lo,  the  T-qost  important  oeing  Sandusky. 

Hearly  one-third  of  the  coal  transhipped  hy  vessel  from  Lake  Erie 
ports  goes  to  ports  on  Lake  ivachigaii.  while  another  fourth  goes  to  Lalce 
Superior  ports.  The  proportion  for  the  latter  has  decreased  sharply 
since  1927,  a  condition  not  caused  hy  a  declining  market  hut  because  the 
Lake  Superior  absolute  tonnage  changed  little  while  the  general  lal^e 
movement  vras  increasing,,   Proportionate  increases  are  recorded  for  tonnage 
moving  to  the  Welland  Canal  and  beyond,  to  Lake  Erie  ports,  and  to  the 
St,  Clair  River,  Lake  St.  Clair  and  Detroit  River  ports.   The  movement  to 
Lake  Huron  and  Georgian  Bay  ports  has  changed  little,  while  the  tonnage 
to  Sault  Ste.  Marie  and  River  ports  has  declined.   Eighty-two  percent  of 
the  lake  coal  was  destined  finally  to  domestic  points  in  1934,  the  rest 
going  to  Canada. 

The  distribution  of  bituminous  coal  from  the  Laices  is  traced  for 
1929  in  a  study  of  the  Bureau  of  IJines,  (*)   This  study,  while  only 
separating  the  Lalce  Superior  ports,  fiimishes  a  picture  of  the  movement 
of  coal  from  the  Lakes,   The  major  part  of  the  Lake  Michigan  coal  is 
consmied  in  Wisconsin  ajid  Illinois.   Coal  from  Lai-re  Superior  docks  is 
used  largely  in  Minnesota,  though  large  amounts  are  shipped  to  Wisconsin, 
North  Dakota  and  South  Dakota,  and  a  heavy  tonnage  is  used  as  railroad 
fuel.   This  Lake  coa,l,  in  competition  with  all-rail  coal  from  Illinoisj 
Indiana,  Western  Kentucky,  and  the  Appalachians,  makes  the  Northwest 
one  of  the  complicated  market  areaso   Other  large  shipments  from  the 
Lakes  go  to  Michigan,  Ohio  and  ITew  York,  but  a  smaller  part  of  these 
movements  is  again  reshipped  by  rail.   The  total  lake  cargo  coal  going 
to  Canada  in  1929  amoun.ted  to  6  million  tons. 

Shipments  Westbound;   T7estboun.d  tonnage  from  the  Appalachians  in- 
cludes all  shipments  destined  to  points  west  of  Pittsburgh,  Erie  and 
Buffalo  to  the  Rocky  Mountain  States;  and  all  north  of  the  Ohio  River, 
The  far  vrestern  states  include  Kansas,  Nebraska,  South  Dakota  and  North 
Dakotao  All  coal  from  Illinois,  Indiana  and  Western  Kentuctiy  moving 
into  this  market  territory  is  part  of  the  total. 

In  a  comparison  restricted  to  Northern  and  Southern  Appalachian 
fields,  it  is  seen  that  the  latter  increased  their  proportion  in  the 
westbound  movement  -until  around  1927,  after  ^^hich  there  is  little 
change.   The  Northern  raining  areas,  in  the  aggregate,  suffered  decreases 
until  1924,  and  then  had  little  ch.-=Jige. 

A  different  resiilt  appears  when  Division  II  is  included  in  the 
comparisons.  From  1923  to  1934,  the  proportions  of  the  Northern  Appala- 
chian  fields  change  little,  ranging  between  21  and  25  percent.   The 
Southern  Appalachian  areas,  however,  increase  until  1927,  and  then 
follow  a  level  ranging  betv/een  43  and  46  percent.   Illinois  and  Indiana, 
particularly  the  former,  decrease  as  the  Southern  Appalachian  increase, 

(*)   m.  C.  D.  No.  3,  Supp. 
9837 


-150- 


raalcing  it  appear  that  the   lose  of  Illinois  was  the  gain  of  the  Southern 
Appalachians. 

(The  reader  will   observe   that  there   is  a  statistical  appendix  to 
Chapter  III.) 


3837 


Shipments  °f  Westbound  Bituminous  Coal  "'-*••  Appdlachians 
and  from  Illinois.  Indiana,  ^'^  Western  Kentucky:  Relative  ' 
Importance  °^  N.R.A.  Subdivisions- 1920  -  1934 

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CHAPTER   IV.    (*) 

LA30R  -  G3L.-E2AL  A13  FRS-C0D5 

SECTIOI-I-A. 

1 .   Collective  Bargaining  -  ".Yais;e  I-Iegiotiations  and  Industrial 
Disputes. 

Introduction:   The  Bituminous  Coal  Code  soiight  to  stabilize 
the  bituminous  coal  mining  industry  by  effecting  a  stabilization  of  wages 
adjusted  between  competing  districts  and  b;r  fixing  and  stabilizing  prices. 
Such  stabilization  of  the  industry  could  not  be  achieved  without  recourse 
to  collective  bargaining.   It  is  impossible  to  comprehend  the  fundamental 
problems  which  the  N.S.A.  faced  in  the  formulation  and  administration  of 
the  Code  without  giving  considerable  attention  to  the  tradition  and  his- 
torical background  of  collective  bargaining  in  the  coal  industry.  Un- 
like some  other  industries,  collective  bargaining  in  the  coal  industry 
did  not  arise  de  novo  with  tue  passage  of  the  National  Industrial  Ee- 
covery  Act.   However,  by  1933  collective  bargaining  in  the  coal  industry 
had  almost  disappeared,  despite  the  fact  that  such  bargaining  on  an  ex- 
tensive scale  harked  back  to  the  year  1898.   Although  the  N.R.A.  did  not 
initiate  collective  bargaining  in  the  industry,  it  revived,  extended  and 
gave  neT/  em.phasis  to  the  procedure.   In  order  to  facilitate  the  wide 
acceptance  of  collective  bargaining,  the'  IT.H.A.  did  not  make  radical 
innovations,  but  rather  took  advantage  of  the  past  procedure.   It  is 
therefore,  necessary  to  consider  the  conflicts  and  struggles  for  collect- 
ive bargaining  in  some  detail  if  the  problem  under  the  Code  is  to  be 
understood.   The  principle  of  collective  bargaining  as  set  forth  in 
Section  7(a)  of  the  National  Industrial  Recovery  Act  and  in  paragraph 
(a)  of  the  Bituminous  Coal  Gode(**)  is  of  basic  significance  for  the 
bituminous  coal  mining  industry.   The  interrelationship  between  prices 
and  wage  costs  plus  the  high  proportion  which  mine  labor  cost  represents 
of  total  production  cost  require  stabilized  wage  levels.   Moreover, 
since  a  large  amount  of  coal  is  sold  on  contracts  extending  for  one 
year  or  more,  it  becomes  absolutely  necessary  that  labor  costs,  as  ex- 
pressed in  wage  rates,  be  known  in  advance.   The  collective  bargaining 
principle  of  the  N.I.R.A.  was,  therefore,  of  peculiar  significance  for 
the  bituminous  coal  industry.  Perhaps  more  than  any  other  industry,  the 
bituminous  coal  industry  had  struggled  to  arrive  at  ,an  understanding 
between  employers  and  employees  which  should  apply  over  wide  geograph- 
ical areas. 

00   .P.-i-ji?  :'doy  IO-/--3  Irrino. 

(**)   Employees  shall  have  the  right  to  organize  and  bargain  collectively 
through  representatives  of  their  own  choosing,  and  shall  be  free  from  the 
interference,  restraint,  or  coercion  of  employees  of  labor  or  their  agents, 
in  the  desig-nation  of  such  representatives  or  in  self-organization  or  in 
other  concerted  activities  for  the  purpose  of  collective  bargaining  or 
other  mutual  aid  or  protection;  (2)  no- employee  and  no  one  seeking  em- 
ployment shall  be  required  as  a  condition  of  employment  to  join  any  com- 
pany union  or  to  refrain  from  joining,  organizing,  or  assisting  a  labor 
organization  of  his  own  choosing;  and  (3)  employers  shall  comply  with  the 
maximum  hours  of  labor,  minimum  rates  of  pay,  and  other  conditions  of 
employment  approved  or  prescribed  by  the  President. 

9837 


The  long  history  of  efforts  to  estahl-ish  contractual  relations 
"between  operators  and  mine  v.'orkers  "based  upon  agreements  "by  collective 
action  regarding  wages,  hours,  asidrrarking  conditions  is  fraught  vifith 
violence  and  "bloodshed  to  sec^ure  union  recognition,  intense  and  often 
unfair  competitive  conditions,  introduction  of  new  producing  fields, 
mechanization  and  rearrangement  of  the  competitive  pattern.   These 
collective  "bargaining  agreements  are  predicated  upon  the  existence  of 
organizations  of  operators  and  mine  workers  and  upon  the  willingness  of 
tile  employer  to  surrender  some  of  the  advantage  held  "by  him  when  making 
individual  targains  with  each  employee.   Collective  "bargaining  may  also 
"be  attri"buted  to  the  operator's  desire  that  Ms  competitors  pay  a  wage 
scale  comparable  to  his  ov/n  so  as  to  assure  fair  price  competition.   The 
transcript  of  the  Bituminous  Coal  Code  Hearings  of 'August  9-12,  1933  con- 
tain many  references  to  the  competitive  relationships  arising  out  of 
wage  differentials  as  esta"blished  "by  wage  agreements  dating  back  a  great 
number  of  years.   In  addition,  by  the  time  the  Bituminous  Coal  Code  was 
adopted  both  industry  and  the  N.H.A.  recognized  the  need  of  union  organi- 
zation and  collective  bargaining  in  order  to  secure  stabilization  of 
wages.  (*) 

A  proper  understanding  of  the  problems  relating  to  collective  bar- 
gaining as  they  arose  dioring  the  period  when  the  Bituminous  Coal  G'ode  was 
formulated  as  well  as  when  the  Code  operated,  requires  a  rather  detailed 
description  and  exposition  of  the  negotiations  from  the  earliest  years 
forward.   Closely  related  to  and,  indeed,  a  part  of  the  collective  bar- 
gainii^  procedure  are  the  numerous  stoppages  in  minijig  operations  when 
negotiations  have  failed  or  when  existing  wage  agreements  have  been  vio- 
lated.  These  strikes  and  lockouts  affect  widespread  fireas  because  the 
industrial,  disputes  arise  out  of  collective  bargaining  negotiations 
which  are  interstate  in  character.   Because  these  industrial  disputes 
interfere  with  the  flovr  of  interstate  commerce  of  a  basic  cominodity 
essential  to  many  industries  and  to  a.  large  .number  of  domestic  consumers 
and  also  because  these ■ disputes  have 'often  been  attended  by  destruction 
of  life  and  property,  they  have  necessitated  governmental  intervention 
upon  many  occasions  and  have  made'  a  deep  impression  on  public  thinking. 
The  H.E.A.  recognized  that  peace  in  the  industry  or  continuity  of  oper- 
ation was  essential  to  attaining  its  objectives  of  increased  purchasing 
power  and  increased  employment.  i!iius,    even  before  the  Bituminous  Coal 
Code  Trent  into  effect  the  i'liR.A.  cooperated  in  every  way  with  the  United 
Mine  Workers  and  the  captive  mine  operators  to  settle  the  strike  in 
Western  Pennsylvania  (August  and  September,  1933).   Similarly,  the  I-I.R.A, 
established  Divisional  Coal  Labor  Boards  and  a  National  Coal  Labor  Board 
so  that  labor  disputes  might  be  settled  expeditiously  without  resulting 
in  stoppage  of  work.   In  a  sense  the  N.R.A.  sought  to  re-enact  the  role 
of  the  U.S.  Pael  Administration  when  the  emergency  war  time  demand  re- 
quired uninterrupted  mining  activity.  . 

Only  by  studying  the  traditional  militancy  of  the  mine  workers  and 
the  constant  resistance-  of  the  operators  can  one  understand  £ind  appreciate 
how  remarkable  was  the  scope  and  degree  of  collective  bargaining  effected 
•under  the  influence  of  the  N.I.H.A.  and  the  Bituminous  Coal  Code.  When 
one  recalls  the  breakdown  of  union  organization  and  the  depths  to  which 
collective  bargaining  had  fallen  after  1957,  the  revival  of  collective 
(*)   See  discussion  of  wages,  hours  of  v/ork  and  collective  bargaining 
under  the  Code  in  the  follov/ing  section.  Wage  differentials  are  treated 
in  a  separate  section. 
9837  I 


■bargaining  in  the  industry  with  the  T'assage  of  the  IT.I.H.A.  stands  out 
even  more  as  a  great  accomplishment. 

One  of  the  serious  difficulties  in  tne  Dituminous  coal  industry 
regarding  collective  bargaining  becaiae  increasingly  apparent  after  1919 
v/ith  the  rising  importance  of  the  coal  producing  areas  south  of  the 
Ohio  Hiver.   The  traditional  basic  wnge  negotiating  unit  for  several 
decades  was  the  Central  Competitive  Field.   Collective  bargaining  for 
this  area  -  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio  and.   Western  Pennsylvania  -  was  pre- 
mised upon  an  East  vs.  West  co:;:petition.   This  competitive  pattern  had 
shifted  to  North  vs.  South,  but  labor  insisted,  in  opposition  to  union 
operators,  in  maintaining  the  outmoded  relationship  while  non-union 
southern  competition  increased.   The  expiration  of  the  Jacksonville 
Agreement  (March  31,  1927)  found  the  union  greatly  weakened  and  in  sub- 
sequent years  the  disintegration  was  more  complete.   Not  unt:' 1  the  advent 
of  the  N.R.A.  was  the  new  competitive  pattern  formally  recognized  in  the 
Appalachian  Wage  Agreement  of  September  21,  1933.   Thus,  the  II. H. A.  served 
as  the  vehicle  whereby  the  collective  bargaining  structure  could  be  re- 
habilitated and  modernized  to  meet  the  new  competitive  situation. 

1861  -  1898. 

Inasmuch  as  collective  bargaining  reouires  organizod  action,  it  is 
necessary  to  recount  briefly  the  organization  of  the  mine  workers.   The 
period  1861  to  1890  was  featured  by  a  great  number  of  local  and  national 
miners'  unions,  all  of  which  were  pcorly  organized  and  short-lived.   The 
areas  in  which  this  intermittent  organization  took  place  were  primarily 
Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio  and  ViTestern  Pennsylvania.   The  mine  workers 
attempted  to  hold  joint  wage  conferences  with  the  operators,  but  were 
generally  unsuccessful  because  of  internecine  rivalries  and  poor  operator 
representation.   The  first  joint  conference  for  the  above  named  areas 
was  held  in  1886.   The  conference  idea  was  of  short  duration  and  by  1889 
it  had  been  abandoned. 

The  failure  of  the  joint  conference  of  1889  and  the  subsequent  un- 
successful local  strikes  emphasized  the  need  for  collective  bargaining  in 
dealing  with  the  chaotic  competitive  conditions  existing  in  the  industry. 
A  joint  convention  of  the  National  Progressive  Union  and  the  National 
Trades  Assembly  No.  135  (Knights  of  Labor)  on  January  23,  1890  laid  the 
foundation  for  uniting  the  two  organizations  under  tne  name  of  the  United 
Mine  Workers  of  America.   The  union  was  of  the'  industrial  tj'pe  including 
all  workers  in  and  around  the  mines. 

The  United  Mine  Workers  sougiit  to  reestablish  the  Interstate  Joint 
Conference  in  1891  but  v/ere  unsuccessful.   From  1891  to  1897  only  district 
bargaining  could  be  effected.   The  m.iners'  convention  of  1897  decided  to 
call  a  general  suspension  of  work  beginning  July  4.   The  strike  was 
successful  in  that  it  was  settled  by  calling  an  Interstate  Joint  Confer- 
ence of  the  entire  Central  Competitive  Field.  (*) 

(*)        State  Basing  Point 

Ohio  Hocking  Valley 

Indiana  Indiana  and  Indiana  Brazil  Block 

Western  Pennsylvania  Thin  Vein  Mines 

Illinois  Danville,  district 

9837 


—155— 

The   Central  'Competitive  Field  iDecFjne   the  -unit   in  v;hich  the  agree- 
ment v/as  negotiated  that    substantially  fined  the  basic  wages,    the  hours, 
and  the  method  of  payment   for  the  a^^reement  period  throughout   the  'bitu- 
minous coal   indut^tr;'. 

1398   to   1916 

Central  Competitive  Jield;  The  jrear  1893  marhs  the  real  'beginning 
of  the  Centi-al  Competitive  Pield  agreements.   The  joint  conference  of 
1898  laid  the  foiindrtion  of  an  institution  for  collective  bargaining 
in  the  Central  Competitive  Field  which  functioned  for  almost  thirtj'-  years. 
It  broTjght  about  uniformity  in  day  rates  and  working  hours  and  standard- 
ized the  screens  use  it  to  obtain  Itijn^o  coal.  (*) 

Yearly  agreements  v;ere  GUccGssfull}^  made  in  the  Central  Competitive 
Field  from  1898  to  1903  with  increasing  advantage  to  miners  in  rages  and 
working  conditions.   In  1904,  a  tTro  3'-es:r  agreement  was  made  at  a  slightly 
reduced  wrge  scale  because  of  the  moderate  industrial  de:oression.   The 
1906  conference  broke  tip  over  the  question  of  the  wage  scale  and  the  joint 
conference  was  unable  to  agree  ixpon   a  new  scale.   The  miners  wished  to       ( 
recover  the  loss  sustained  in  1904  and  an  advance  over  the  1903  scale, 
while  the  operators  were  only  willing  to  renew  the  1904  ws^e  scale.   The 
deadlock  was  broken  by  the  opero^tors  agreeing  to  pay  the  1903  scale,  but 
contracts  were  negoti-ated  locall;.'  in  each  district.   In  1908  Illinois  re- 
f Lised  to  be  a  party  to  the  joint  conference  and  formulated  a  separate  scale. 
It  is  interesting  to  note,  however,  that  the  Illinois  agreement  was  made 
after  the  agreement  of  the  joint  conference  and  was  based  upon  the  latter 
contract.   The  agreement  made  hy   Indiana,  Ohio,  and  Western  Pennsylvania  was 
based  on  the  1907  .scale  established  by  V£irious  states  and  districts  and  re- 
mained in  effect  until  1910. 

At  the  1910  Joint  Conference,  the  miners  asked  for  a  10  cent  increase  per 
ton  for  tonnage  rates.   Illinois  again  refused  to  join  the  conference.   The 
failure  of  the  conference  to  rgree  resulted  in  an  rdjournment  v/ithout  setting 
a  rate.   Each  state  or  district  made  a  separate  settlement  with  the  result  thai 
a  5.5  per  cent  increase  was  obtained  in  most  instances. 

In  1912  all  the  operators  in  the  Central  Competitive  Field  entered  the 

joint  conference  and  an  increase  was  granted  to  the  nine  workers.  (**) 

(*)   Uniform  day  rate  for  inr.ide  skilled  la.bor  ^^as  $1.90  throughout 

Central  Competitive  Field. 
(**)  Interstate  Joint  Agreement,  'Indiana  poles,  April  25,    1913  between  Indiana, 

Illinois,  Ohio  and  TJestern  Pennsylvania  and  United  Mine  TiTorkers  of  Americ 

Picknining  Piclcmining 

(Screened  lump)  (Hun  of  mine) 

5  cents  a  ton  increase  3  cents  a  ton  increase 

"e stern  Pennsylvania  (thin  vein)  Illinois 

Ohio  -  Hocking  Valley  Indiana  -  Bitur.dnous 

Indiana.  -  Block  and  Bittiminous 

I.Iachine  i  lining  I.Iachine  I  lining 

(Screened  Itimp)  (Run  of  nine) 

4  cents  a  ton  increase  5  cents  a  ton  incroase 

TJestern  Pennsylvaiiia  (thin  vein)  Illinois 

Ohio  -  Hocking  Valley  Indiana  -  Bituminous 


Indiana  -  Block  and  Bit^ominous 


9837 


The  1914  Joint  Sonference  gave  rise  to  consideralile  controversy 
over  the  v/age  scale  for  mine  run  coal  "both  jjick  and  machine  mined. 
Failure  to  reach  an  agreement  resulted  in  adjournment  and  individual 
district  "bargaining. 

Southwestern  Interstate  Field:   The  United  'line  Workers  in  1898 
organized  a  district  in  Arkansas  and  the  Indian  Territory  (District  Si)* 
At  the  saxne  time  District  14  (Kansas)  and  District  25  (i  issouri)  were 
organized.   In  1903  Texas  was  organized  and  joined  to  District  21. 
This  latter  state,  however,  is  not  considered  a  part  of  the  Southwestern 
Interstate  FieM. 

In  1900  Kansas  and  Mssouri  held  a  joint  wage  conference  and 
negotiated  a  wage  scale.   The  operators  in  iirkansas  and  in  the  Indian 
Territory  refused  to  enter  into  the  negotiations.  (*)   The  large  opera- 
tors were  willing  to  psy  50  cents  per  ton,,  which  was  5  cents  lower  than 
the  union  demand,  arid  also  wished  a  10-hour  day  as  against  the  union 
request  for  an  S-hour  day.   Failure  to  come  to  an  agreement  was  followed 
"by  a  disruption  of  mining  operations  in  Arkansas  and  in  the  Indian 
Territory  which  lasted  until  1902.   Considerahle  vidlejice  accompanied 
the  industrial  dispute.   The  disturhances  were  ended  in  1902  when  the 
president  of  District  21  met  with  the  large  operators  in  St.  Louis  and 
reached  an  agreement  which  provided  for  an  S-hoxu"  day,  semi-monthly  pay 
days,  and  a  55  cent'  tonnage  rate. 

The  operators  in  Lassouri  and  Kansas  met  in  Kansas  City,  Missouri, 
on  JvJie   19,  1903  for  the  purpose  of  organizing  an  association..  This 
meeting  agreed  to  adjourn  to  a  later  date  and. to  invite  operators  from 
Arkansas  and  the  Indian  Territory.  At  the  next  meeting  on  July  9,  1903, 
in  Pittsburg,  Kansas,  71  operators  from  4  states  representing  80  per  cent 
of  the  coal  output  and  50  per  cent  of  the  operators  were  present.   The 
Southwestern  Interstate  Coal  Operators'  Association,  ¥/hich  was  formed 
at  this  meeting,  entered  into  a  joint  conference  with  the  United  Mine 
Workers.   An  agreement  was  signed  applying  to  Districts  14,  21  and  25 
and  effective  from  September  1,  1903  to  August  31,  1904.   Tiiis  agree- 
ment was  the  beginning  of  a  collective  bargaining  procedure,  patterned 
after  that  of  the  Central  Competitive  Field,  v/hich  continued  with  slight 
interruptions  until  1924.  (**) 

In  1906,  the  Southwest  asked  admittance  into  the  Central  Competitive 
Field,  but  its  request  was  denied.  (***)   Wage  conferences  were  arranged 
and  agreements  were  made  periodically  after  1903.   Representatives  of 
Districts  14,  21  and  25  of  the  U.M.W.A.  and  the  operators  biennially 
formulated  wage  scales  and  agreed  on  conditions  of  labor  in  1904,  1906,  etc, 

(*)  Hyan,  Frederick!.,  "The  Development  of  Coal  Operators'  Associations 
in  the  Southv;est" ,  Southwestern  Social  Science  Quarterly.  September,  1933. 
(**)   Ibid,  supra. 
(***)   Co.ql  Age,  October  29,  1925,  p.  597. 


9837 


-153- 

Collective  "bargaining  in  the  Southwest  was  complicated  "by  the  dom- 
inance of  four  large  producers.   A:i  additional  conplicating  factor  was 
the  existence  of  some  20  operators  Icnown  as  "independents",  who  refused 
to  join  the  operators'  association,  but  paid  the  union  scale  and  main- 
tained union  operating  conditions.   These  latter  operators  embarrassed 
the  United  Mine  Workers'  position  when  joint  conferences  and  negotiations 
were  taking  place.   The  operators'  association,  in  1910,  in  order  to 
effect  a  stronger  organization  sought  to  bring  all  operators  into  the 
association.   In  the  spring  of  1910,  the  United  Mine  Workers  asked  for 
a  10  cents  per  ton  wage  increase.  Tlie   operators  refused  to  accede  to  the 
request  and  stoppage  of  v/ork  ensued.   The  operators'  association  then 
proposed  a  program  for  the  operators  which  stated  that: 

1.  Only  non-union  labor  be  employed. 

2.  Large  operators  should  control  the  market  and  that  smaller 
operators  should  receive  a  bonus  when  their  share  of  the 
market  was  not  secured. 

The  industrial  dispute  continued  for  5  months.  When  the  dispute  was 
settled  the  operators  agreed  to  grant  a  3  p'ent.per  ton  wage  increase  and 
to  m.aintain  union  conditions. 

Slight  attention  has  been  given  to  the  industrial  disputes  during 
the  period  1898  to  1916.   This  period  is  treated  for  piirposes  of  back- 
ground information.  Wage  negotiations  during  this  period  are  considered 
significant  since  they  served  as  precedents,  but  labor  disputes  during 
this  period  did  not  have  the  same  significance.  Most  stoppages  of  work 
during  these  years  grew  out  of  the  biennial  wage  contract  negotiations 
and  were  suspensions  awaiting  a  new  contract  rather  than  an  actual  strike. 
For  example,  the  year  1912,  notwithstanding  a  general  suspension  in  the 
union  fields  which  lasted  about  35  days,  was  an  exceptionally  good  year 
for  the  soft  coal  industry  and  the  suspension  did  not  indicate  fundamental 
labor  unrest. 

The  suspensions  which  occurred  in  the  even  years  when  wage  con- 
tracts expired  from  1900  to  1912  were  all  similfir  in  character.   The 
usual  procedure  in  these  suspjensions  has  been  described  in  the  following 
language: 

"They  (the  suspensions)  began  with  the  formulation 
of  demands  in  the  biennial  convention  of  the  union, 
astutely  timed  to  fall  in  "even"  .years  -  years  marked 
by  national  elections.   This  was  followed  in  regular 
order  by  resistance  of  the  operators  to  an  increase, 
apprehension  of  buyers  over  interruption  of  supply, 
active  buying  to  accumulate  reserve  stocks,  advance  in 
price,  then  idleness  at  the, mines  for  one,  two,  three 
months  or  longer.   The  early  weeks  of  a  suspension  were 
frequently  marked  by  a  slackening  of  demand;  then  as 
consumers  began  to  exliaust  their  stocks  the  price  again 
rose,  inducing  the  importation  of  coal  from  the  outside. 
Press\ire  of  consumers  to  bring  about  a  settlement  appeared; 
sometimes  it  was  exerted  directly,  where  the  railroads 
owned  mines  to  supply  locomotive  fuel;  sometimes  it  was 


9837 


■159- 


exerted  indi^ectl;^^  through  the  usual  channels  of 
distribution.   The  u:iion  operator  was  moved  to  grant 
the  miners'  demand  -  first,  "by  the  spectacle  of  other 
coals,  sometimes  from  a  union  district  that  had  made 
an  early  settlement  with  the  union,  invading  his  own 
territory,  and  second,  by  the  desire  to  participate 
in  the  active  market  and  obtain  the  attractive  prices 
created  by  the  temporary  shortage."  (*) 

Although  the  consumer  bore  the  burden  of  increased  prices  attending 
the  suspension,  the  price  rise  was  not  great.   Even  in  the  industrial  dis- 
pute of  1910  when  union  miners  in  five  states  were  out  for  nearly  five 
months,  spot  delivery  prices  rarely  rose  above  25  to  50  cents  per  ton. 

The  decline  in  business  activity,  be-.3inning  in  the  last  half  of 
1913,  was  not  irainediately  r-eflected  in  the  bituminous  coal  industry. 
By  April,  1914,  however,  conditions  in  the  coal  industry  were  unsoun.d. 
Twenty-five  per  cent  of  the  tonnage  in  Illinois  wns  in  banl-oruptcy,  aiid 
the  southwestern  interstate  region  was  in  little  better  condition.  (**) 
In  Ohio,  a  prolonged  and  serious  labor ■ dispute  beginning  early  in  1914 
kept  the  mines  in  much  of  the  state  shut  down  well  into  the  year  1915. 
Tile  dispute  was  waited  over  the  method  of  establishing  wage  rates  to  con- 
form with  the  Green  Anti-Screen  Law  which  required  that  the  miners  in 
that  state  be  paid  for  ,all  coal  mined- rather  than  only  for  the  coal 
passing  over  screens.  (***)   The  adjustment  finally  agreed  upon  resulted 
in  a  reduction  of  wage  rates  in  that  field. 

1916  -  1934.  , 

The  Central  Competitive  Field  wage  contract  of  1916  for  the  tvjo 
year  period,  April  1,  1916  to  March  31,  1918,  reflected  the  improvements 
in  the  coal  industry  arising  from  the  European  War.   The  liew  York  Agree- 
ment, as  it  is  generally  termed,  provided  for  an  increase  of  3  cents  per 
ton  to  tonnage  workers  and  a  5  per  cent  increase  to  day  men.   It  also 
■provided  for  the  run  of  mine  system  of  pa^/ment  for  the  entire  Central 
Competitive  Field.  (****) 

(*)   Tryon,  F.  G. ,  "The  Effect  of  Competitive  Conditions  on  Labor  Relations 
in  Coal  Mining".   The  Annals  of  The  American  Academy  of  Political  and 
Social  Science.  Vol.  CXI;  No.  200,  Jfoiuary,  1924,  p.  38, 
(**)   Tryon,  F.  G.  op.  cit.  p.  89       ' 

(***)   Fisher,  Waldo  E.  and  Bezanson,  Anne,  Wage  Rates  and  Working  Time 
in  the  Bituminous  Coal  Industry  1912-1922,  University  of  Pennsylvania 
Press,  1932,  p.  53 

(****)   Previous  to  this  timie  the  screened  method  of  -payment  v;as  in  effect 
in  this  area,  except  where  state  legislation  as  in  Illinois  provided  for 
the  run  of  mine  basis.   The  miners  had  been  trying  for  many  years  to  have 
the  wage  scale  based  on  the  weight  of  coal  as  it  came  from  the  mine.   They 
claimed  that  the  pa^.Tnent  of  wage  rates  based  on  the  amount  of.  coal  which 
would-pass  over  screens  of  a  certain  mesh  and  area  was  subject  to  abuse. 
The  area  in  square  feet  varied;  the  size  of  the  mesh  was  not  uniform; 
spreaders  placed  on  the  screens  broke  up  the  coal  and  made  a  disproportion- 
ate amount  of  fine  coal  pass  through  the  screens;  and  the  screens  were 
not  kept  in  repair. 

9837. 


-160- 

Hov/ever,  it  soon  'became  apparent,  as  early  as  the  autumn  of  1916, 
that  the  increase  in  wages  received  by  the  miners  v;as  not  equal  to  the 
increase  in  the  rapidly  rising  cost  cf  living.   The  miners  "became  dis- 
satisfied because  wages  in  other  industries  were  mounting  and  profits 
in  the  coal  industry  were  increasing  in  excess  of  those  anticipated 
when  the  contract  was  signed  while  their  wage  rate  remained  stationery. 
Furthermore,  non-union  employers  were  voluntarily  advancing  wages, 
throwing  o\it  of  line  the  wage  adjustments  in  neighboring  fields. 

In  the  Southwest,  some  16  operators  (later  joined  by  Oklaiioma  and 
Arkansas  operators  making  over  70  in  all)  brought  their  grievances  against 
dom.ination  by  the  large  operators  before  the  joint  meeting  in  Kansas  City, 
The  miners  objected  to  the  automatic  penalty  clause  in  their  contract 
which  provided  for  a  fine  to  be  deducted  from  pa^^  when  the  mine  worker 
was  absent  from  work  without  cause  (strike  or  wrlkout) .   These  Oklahoma 
operators  indicated  an  intention  to  separate  from  the  Southwestern  Inter- 
state Coal  Operators'  Association.   As  a  result,  the  Joint  Wage  Agree- 
ment for  1916  -  1918  contained  a  provision  to  the  effect  tiiat  its  terms 
were  effective  only  while  the  operators  were  members  of  the  Association. 
Shortly  after  1916,  Oklahoma  withdrew  from  the  Association  and  organized 
the  Oklahoma  Coal  Operators'  Association.   The  joint  contracts  made  by 
this  group  and  the  United  i'ine  V/orkers  duplicated  the  provisions  in  the 
agreements  for  Kansas,  Missouri,  aiid  Arkansas. 

Labor  difficulties  in  Central  Pennsylvania  and  in  ilorthern  West 
Virginia  made  evident  the  need  for  a  readjustment  before  the  expiration 
of  the  1916  agreement.   Tlaere  was  a  considerable  increase  in  the  amount 
of  time  lost  due  to  strikes  and  lockouts  in  the  non-union  States  of 
Alabama,  eastern  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and  Virginia,  as  well  as  in  the 
union  stronghold  of  Illinois. 

On  April  12,  1917,  a  joint  conference  for  the  Central  Competitive 
Field  was  held  in  which  the  operators  e,greed  to  aii  advance  of  10  cents 
per  ton  for  pick  and  machine  mining  rates  and  60  cents  for  day  men, 
effective  until  April  1,  1918.   ITo  increase  was  allowed  for  yardage  and 
deadwork.   Although  this  joint  conference  led  to  a  general  wage  increase, 
it  was  only  temporarily  satisfactory.   3y  the  summer  of  1917  the  miners 
were  again  asking  for  an  increase  in  wages.   In  Auf;ust  new  labor  dis- 
turbances occurred  in  Illinois,  eastern  Kentucky, and  Tennessee. 

The  passage  of  the  Lever  Act  on  Au^^st  10,  1917  was  significant 
in  its  applications  to  the  coal  industry.   The  legislation  gave  the  Pres- 
ident power  to  fix  prices,  tfike  over  and  operate  plants  and  maintain  con- 
trol over  the  production,  distribution  and  consumption  of  necessities. 
Even  more  significant  was  the  creation  of  the  Fuel  Administration  on 
August  23,  1917  with  Dr.  Harry  A.  Garfield  as  Chief. 

The  maladjustment  between  wages  and  cost  of  living  led  the  mine 
workers  to  demand  an  advance  of  15  cents  per  ton  for  pick  and  machine 
men  and  $1.90  for  day  men,  plus  a  20  per  cent  increase  in  yardage  and 
deadwork  rates.   The  operators  were  willing  to  maJ-e  new  agreements  but 
only  on  the  condition  that  increased  costs  should  be  offset  by  increased 
prices. 


9837 


The  joint  conference  which  reconvened  in  Washington  Septemher  25,  1917, 
at  the  request  of  the  Tael   Administrator  resulted  in  the . "Washington 
Agreement".   This  agreement  is  sometimes  called  the  "Garfield  Agreement" 
and  should  not  be  confused  with  the  Garfield  Awai'd  'mich  vms  made  in 
December, 1919. 

The  TiTashington  Agreement  was  made  on  October  6  aaid  established  a 
new  wage  scale  effective  IJoveraber  1st.   Rates  for  pick  and  machine  mining 
were  advanced  10  cents  per  ton;  in  the  Block  Coal  Field  in  Indiana  the 
screened  coal  price  advanced  12^  cents  per  ton;  day  labor  received  an 
increase  amounting  to  $1.40  per  day;  and  yardage  and  deadwork  rates  were 
advanced  15  per  cent.   The  following  table  shows  the  increase  for  November 
over  April  of  1917: 


Piclaninin^;  (R.O.M.) 


Illinois  (Danville) 
Indiana  ( except  Block) 
Ohio  (Hocking  Valley) 
Western  Fenn.  (Tiiin  Vein) 


Apr.  16.  1917 
Cents  per  ton 
74.0 
74.0 
77.64 
77.64 


lov.  1.  1917 
Cents  per  ton 

84.0 

84.0 

87.64 

87.64 


Tractanen   (   Irisida   Skilled  Labor) 


Apr.  16.  1917 
Dollars  per  Da^, 


I^ov.  1.  1917 
Dollars  per  Day 


Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio 
and  Western  Penna. 


3.60 
Outside  Common  Labor 


.00 


Apr.  16.  1917 
Dollars  per  Day 


IIov.  1.  1917 
Dollars  per  Day 


Illinois,  Indiana 

Ohio 

Western  Fenna. 


2.96 
3.35 
2.70 


4.36 
4.75 
4.10 


The  objectives  of  the 
following  language: 


Fashington  Agreement  were  set  forth  in  the 


"Tlie  following  agreement,  supplemental  to  the  existing 
Interstate  and  District  agreements,  is  entered  into  with 
the  hope  and  belief  that  the  advance  in  wages  will  result 
in  an  increased  production  of  coal  and  the  abolition  of 
local  strikes." 

Several  provisions  of  the  agreement  gave  rise  to  later  difficulties 
in  labor  relations  because  of  differences  in  interpretn.tion  and  dissatis- 
faction.  One  provision  stated  that,  "Subject  to  the  next  Biennial  Con- 
vention of  the  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  the  Ivline  Workers'  repre- 
sentatives agree  that  the  present  contract  be  extended  during  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  War,  and  not  to  exceed  two  years  from  April  1,  1918." 


9837 


-162- 

Another  provision,  known  as  the  "penalty  clause",  was  intended  to  in- 
sure continuity  of  production  during  an  emergency  period.   This  clause 
in  its  final  form  provided  tha.t  if  mine  workers  should  strike  at  any 
time  without  first  cringing  their  grievances  to  the  Coal  Administration 
for  settlement,  each  striker  v;as  to  he  fined  one  dollar  per  day.   The 
employer  after  collecting  these  fines  "by  deductions  from  the  pay  en- 
velopes, was  to  pay  them  over  to  the  Red  Cross.   Similarly,  a  lockout 
by  ail  employer  was  also  subject  to  a  fine  of  one  dollar  per  day  for 
each  man  affected.   The  Washington  Agreement  also  carried  a  clause 
stating  that  it  wr;S  to  become  effective,  "only  if  the  selling  price  of 
coal  shall  be  advanced  by  the  U.  3.  G-overnm.ent  sufficient  to  cover  the 
increased  costs  in  the  different  districts  affected  aaid  will  tal'e 
effect  on  the  first  day  of  the  period  following  the  order  advancing 
such  increased  prices".  President  Wilson  on  October  27,  1917,  issued 
an  order  stating  that  the  "scale  of  prices  prescribed  August  21,  1917.... 
is  hereby  amended  by  adding  the  sum  of  45  cents  to  prices  so  pre- 
scribed."  The  Washington  Agreement  was  officially  accepted  by  the 
United  Kine  Workers  at  their  biennial  convention  in  January,  1918. 

The  details  of  the  Washington  Agreement  as  to  wage  scale  and 
labor  provisions  are  significant  because  they  represent  the  first 
serious  attempt  of  the  Federal  Government,  through  the  Agency  of  the 
U.  S.  Fuel  Administration,  to  regulate  the  bitu-minous  coal  industry. 
Although  this  regulation  arose  out  of  a  war  em.ergency  situation  it 
faced  many  of  the  same  problems  faced  by  the  NHA  in  a  peace  time 
depression  emergency.   It  should  be  noted  also  that  at  the  time  the 
Bituminous  Coal  Code  was  formulated,  wage  rates  in  the  few  union  con- 
tracts then  extant  had  fallen  to  the  level  of  the  llovember,  1917  v/age 
scale. 

Stabilization  in  labor  conditions  in  1918,  while  motivated  by 
patriotism,  was  (greatly  influenced  by  the  Government  through  the  Fuel 
Administrator  by  anticipating  and  adjusting  grievances.   In  August, 
however,  the  miners  appealed  directly  to  the  Fuel  Administration  for  an 
increase  in  wages  because  of  the  continued  rise  in  the  cost  of  living. 
The  request  was  denied  on  the  ground  that  dealing  with  wages  "in  each 
industry  separately  is  inevitably  and  constantly  to  increase  the  cost 
of  living".   They  appealed  to  the  President  on  November  15,  but  were 
refused  because  the  Government  was  "stabilizing  vifages"  . 

Dissatisfaction  with  the  Washington  Agreement  was  clearly  evident 
among  the  miners  in  1919.   This  discontent  arose  out  of  the  contention 
that  a  new  wage  agreement  was  necessary  since  the  war  had  ended.   Con- 
siderable controversy  existed  over  the  interpretation  of  the  clause 
stating  that  the  Washington  Agreement  shall  be  in  effect  for  the  duration 
of  the  war  and  not  to  exceed  two  years  from  April  1,  1918.  Mine  labor 
contended  that  the  war  ended  on  ilovember  11,  1918,  whereas  the  operators 
held  that  a  state  of  war  legally  existed  \mtil  the  Government  ratified 
a  treaty  of  peace.   The  mine  workers  argued  that  the  Fuel  Administration's 
control  over  prices  had  been  relinquished  (abolished  on  January  21,  1919) 
and  that  operators  were  therefore  free  to  raise  prices. (*) 

^  ^As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  U.S.  Geological  Survey  shows  that  the  average 
realization  per  ton  f.o.b.  tnine  for  bituminous  coal  in  1919  was  $2.49  as 
against  $2.58  in  1918.   Furthermore  the  average  snot  price  per  ton  was 
lower  than  the  January,  1919  price  in  each  succeeding  month  until 
August  when  strike  threats  raised  the  price. 

9837. 


-163- 
Tiie  labor  unrest  was  further  displayed  "by  the  disturhances  vithin 
the  organization  of  the  United  Mine  Workers.   An  insurrection  against 
the  international  union  was  led  "by  .the  officials  in  District  12 
(Illinois).   The  United  Mine  Workers  Convention  of  September,  1919  wrs 
also  the  scene  of  a  bitter  struggle  regarding  the  seating  of  a  delegate, 
Alexander  Howat,  who  had  previously  been  erroelled  from  the  presidency  of 
District  14  (P^ansas)  . 

The  rebellion  among  the  miners  fo\ind  expression  in  their  demands 
at  the  convention.   These  demands  were: 

1.  A  60  per  cent  increase  in  tonnage  and  yardage  rates  and 
for  day  men. 

2.  A  6-hour  day  and  a  five  day  week.(*). 

3.  Time  and  one-half  for  overtime  eui6.   double  time  for 
Sundays  and.   holidays. 

4.  Abolition  of  the  "penalty  clause". 

5.  llo  sectional  settlements  to  be  allov/ed. 

6.  All  new  controcts  in  districts  should  e:qpire  on  the 
same  date. 

7.  District  agreements  should  be  retroactive  and  effective 
from  date  of  the  interstate  contract. 

The  operators  based  their  oprosition  to  the  mine  workers'  demands 
upon  the  following  arguments:  , 

1.  Production  costs  vjere  already  excessive  and  a  60  per  cent 
increase  in  wage  rates  T;ould  double  these  costs. 

2.  A  decrease  in  working  time  '--ould  cut  production  :nd  further 
increase  costs. 

3.  Strike  threats  were  being  vised  as  a  weapon  to  force  a  new 
agreement.   (The  operators  interpreted  the  term.ination  date 
of  the  %shin:.iton  Agreement  to  be  April  1,  1920  and  refused 
to  grant  any  increase  before  that  date.) 

Ho  agreement  could  be  reached  at  the  reconvened  session  of  the 
joint  conference  on  October  9,  1919  ^nd  on  October  15th  a  strike  call 
was  issued  to  tftke  effect  iJovember  1st. 

The  issuance  of  the  strike  call  gave  rise  to  governmental  interest 
in  the  situation.   A  meeting  of  the  joint  scale  conir.ittees  to  be  held  at 

(*)  This  demand  for  the  30-hour  week,  although  it  aro^e  out  of  insurgent 
groups  in  1919,  became  a  basic  argument  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  in  the 
Bituminous  Coal  Code  Kearii'.gs  in  1935. 


9837 


the  Department  of  La'bor  on  October  Sls't  v.'as  called  "by  Secretary  Wilson. 
This  meeting  continued  for  foi-ir  days.   Despite  even  the  President's 
intervention  efforts,  the  meeting  adjourned  on  October  24,  v^'ithout 
agreement. 

Attorney  G-eneral  Palmer,  meantime  on  October  21st,  petitioned  the 
U.  S.  District  Court  in  Indianapolis  for  an  injunction  restraining  the 
officers  and  members  of  the  United  Mine  V'orkers  from  carrying  on  the 
proposed  strike.   The  petition  was  based  upon  the  Lever  Act  providing 
for  war-time  control  of  food  and  fuel.  (*)   The  Attorney  General  stated 
(October  29)  that  the  government  had  a  right  to  prevent  the  strike  be- 
cause of  its  ille;3ality.   He  held  that  the  Arm.istice  had  not  ended  the 
war  and  pointed  out  that  war  emergency  statutes  were  still  in  effect 
according  to  the  courts. 

President  Wilson  requested  that  the  strike  order  be  recalled  since 
it  had  not  been  approved  by  the  individual  members  of  the  United  I'ine 
Workers  and  since  it  interfered  with  the  efforts  of  the  government  to 
restore  normal  economic  conditions. 

Labor  was  seriously. opposed  to  the  government's  action  on  the 
ground  that  the  Lever  Act  hfid  been  intended  to  prevent  hoarding  and 
profiteering  in  war  time  and  that  e  promise  har"  been  made  that  it  yrould 
not  be  used  to  bring  action  against  workmen. 

Judge  A.  B.  Anderson,  of  the  federal  Court  at  Indianapolis,  on 
October  31st  handed  down  a  temporary  restraining  order  that  was  operative 
until  November  8th  when  a  hearing  on  the  temporally  injunction  was  to  b  e 
held.  The  hearing  on  the  government's  motion  for  a  temporary  injunction 
resulted  in  the  granting  of  an  injunction.   In  the  new  restraining  order 
the  defendants  were  required  to  issue  a  withdrawal  and  cancellation  of 
the  strike  order  vhich  wr.s  to  be  distributed  and  circulated  among,  dis- 
trict and  local  unions  in  the  same  manner  as  the  strike  order  had  been 
issued  and  this  to  be  done  by  Hovember  11,  1919. 

(*)  Section  4  of  the  Lever  Act  made  it  unlawful  "■.to  conspire,  combine, 
agree  or  arrange  with  any  other  person  (a)  to  limit  the  f.ricilities  for 
transporting,  producii-g,  harvesting,  manufacturing,  supplying,  storing, 
or  dealing  in  any  necessaries,  (b)  to  restrict  the  supply  of  any  neces- 
saries, (c)  to  restrict  the  distribution  of  saiy  necessaries,  (d)  to 
prevent,  limit,  or  lessen  the  raanuf.acture  or  production  of  any  neces- 
saries in  order  to  enhance  the  "orice  thereof"  . 


9337 


-161 


The  United  Mine  Workers'  officials  issued  craicellation  orders 
plong  the  lines  laid  down  by  the  court,  hut  the  strike  preparations 
went  forward.  (*)   The  Bureau  of  Mines  estimated  that  418,279  men  or 
67.2  per  cent  of  the  total  numher  of  men  employed  in  the  industry  were 
engaged  in  the  industrial  dispute  of  1919.   The  strike  at  its  naximura 
tied  up  71  per  cent  of  the  coal  producing  capacity  of  the  coimtry.   In 
many  fields  --  Northern  Pennsylvania,  Fitts''o\argh  district,  Ohio,  Michigan, 
Southern  Appalachian,  Indiana,  Illinois,  lov/a,  Arkansas,  Oklahoma  and 
YiFashington  —  the  strike  was  100  per  cent  effective.  Fnile  in  part  of 
central  Pennsylvania,  Curnherland-Piedmont ,  Pairmont,  l;ew  River,  Missouri, 
Kansas,  Monttoia  and  Wyoming,  the  strike  at  its  height  affected  90  per 
cent  or  more  of  the  productive  capacity.   In  some  fields  the  strike  was 
100  per  cent  effective  from  ITovernber  1st  to  the  middle  of  December.   In 
other  areas  the  men  were  out  only  a  week  or  two.   (For  a  statistical  pre- 
sentation of  strike  effectiveness  in  1919  see  Table  I.) 

_  Since  a  joint  meeting  beginning  on  November  18,  h-d  reached  a 
deadlock  the  Secretary  of  Labor  proposed  a  i:;;eneral  wage  increase  of 
31.6'  per  cent  as  a  basis  of  settlement   This  amount  supposedly  represented 
the  increase  in  wages  to  tonna^ge  v/orkers  necessary  to  correlate  with 
increased  living  costs  a:id  extended  to  day  workers.   The  proposal  was 
accepted  by  the  miners  and  approved  by  the  operators  on  the  condition 
that  the  Fuel  Administration  would  increase  prices  sufficiently  to  yield 
a  profit.   The  conference  adjourned  and  Secretary  of  Labor  Wilson's  pro- 
posal was  referred  to  Dr.  G-arfield.   The  latter  stated  his  conclusions 
to  the  miners  and  operators  on  November  25,   He  refused  to  approve  the 
31.6  per  cent  increase  and  offered  instead  a  14  per  cent  increase 
(&arfield  Award) .   The  new  figure  was  derived  from  the  same  Bureau  of 
Labor  data  used  by  the  Secretary  of  Labor  but  was  based  on  a  weighted 
average  increase  to  all  miners  necessary  to  adjust  to  the  increased 
cost  of  living.   Tiie  miners  refused  this  proposal  but  the  operators 
readily  accepted  it. 

Federal  troops  were  sent  to  West  Virginia,  Pennsylvania,  Tennessee, 
Wyoming,  Utah,  New  Mexico,  Oklahoma,  Kansas  and  Washington  to  protect  all 
men  who  desired  to  work  in  the  mines.   A  public  statement  urging  strike 
settlement  was  issued  by  President  Wilson  on  December  6th.  After  a  con- 
ference with  government  officials,  the  labor  representatives  announced 
on  December  10th  that  the  miners  would  return  to  work  with  a  14  per  cent 
wage  increase.   They  resumed  work  on  the  coiidition  that  the  President 
of  the  United  States  should  appoint  a  commission  of  three,  representatives 
of  the  miners,  operators  and  the  public,  whose  report  should  b e  accepted 
as  a  basis  of  a  new  wage  agreement  and  of  an  adjustment  in  prices,  if 
necessary. 

The  Cor.i.nission,  known  as  the  United  States  Bituminous  Coal  Commission 
was  appointed  on  December  19,  1919  and  began  hearings  on  January  12,  1920 
and  reported  iiarcn  10,  1920,  v.hich  was  within  the  60  day  limit  set  for 
its  activities. 


(*)   Considerable  controversy  developed  over  the  v.'ording  of  the  union 
order.   It  was  argued  that  the  order  was  so  worded  that  the  local  unions 
paid  no  attention  to  the  cancellation  order  from  the  international  union. 


9837 


-166- 

TABLE   I 


Liaxinum  extent  to  v;hioh   the   productive   capacity  of  the   cool 
districts  vms   curtailed  during  the    great  strikes    191C   and   1922 


st.   Capacity 
"e  strike 


Central   Fen-.rylvania 

neotior.s 
Section  B   (ir.Y.C.S.R.  "     " 
Section  C   (Buffalo,   Rochester 
and   rittsbur^h  R.R.   c: 
others) 
I'orthern  Pennsylvania 
Pittsburj^h,    Fa. 
r^n:.andle,    .est  Virginia 
estraoreland,   Latrobe,   Greens- 
hurg,    Legonier 
Connellsville 
Somerset 

Cunberland  -   I-ie'.nont 
Fairmont,     .est  Va,   e/ 
l^orthern,    Ohio 
Liohigan 
Southern,   Oi'.io 
:.ortheastem  Lontuciy 
Kasord,    Kentucky 

Konova  -  Vhackor 

Logan 

■..e-.v  River 

"finding  C-ulf 

Pocahontas  '•■  Tu.-;   iliver 

:;outhv.'ostem  Virginia 

Southern  Appalachian      ^ 

iilabpma  and  Georgia 

V.'estern  Kontuo!:y 

Indiana 

Illinois 

loiTa 

ICissouri 

Kansas 

Arkansas 

Oklahoma 

1  orth  T'akota 

l.ontana 

Colorado 

Utah 

".:ev;  I.exico 
'..ashington 
"  ."y oraing 

Total  United  States 


100 

a/G7 

100 

o/'95 

61 

44 

5 

a/35 

0 

a/81 

6 

it>8 

38       / 
90  S/ 

85 
87 

100 

95 

100 

100 

100 

o/lOO 

98 

a/'5S 

0 

a/15 

0 

y 

Zy 

57 

48 



58 

100 

c/lOO 

100 

o/lOO 

100 

100 

99 

93 

99 

94 

100 

96 

100       , 

79 

50^, 

-J 

25 

37 
98 

Jist.   Prod, 
in  1918 


71.4 


73.3 


61,629,000 
a/  25,000,000 

a/  16,000,000 


a/  20,629,000 
8,051,000 
48,299,000 
3,255,000 

17,701,000 
35,677,000 
7,194,000 
7,073,000 
20,104,000 
50,287.000 
1,465,000 
15,768,000 
7,109,000 
2,364,000 
13,324,000 
7,024,000 
10,307,000 
9,292,000 
5,156,000 
23,120,000 
9,041,000 
11,712,000 
3,202,000 
19,252,000 
10,833,000 
30,679,000 
89,291,000 
8,192,000 
5,638,000 
7,562,000 
2,227,000 
4,813,000 
2,261,000 
720,000 
4,533,000 
12,408,000 
5,137,000 
4,023,000 
4,082,000 
9,438,000 

579,281,000  ■ 


a/  Fartly  estimated. 

^  Of  the  capacity  of  the  iiarlan  County  Operators  iissoc.  61>  ivas  closed  but  the  LjTici. :.  ines 

continued  to  operate, 
c/  Certain  stripping  pits  and  lines  serving  purely  local -trade  continued  to  operate, 
d/  Less  than  iialf  of  1  per  cent. 

e/  Includes  all  of  "i.orthom  'lest  Virginia  except  Panhandle  and  Cumberland-riednont  Districts. 
f/  Inolu-':es  all  high-volatile  coal  produced  in  Southern  .I'est  Virginia  except  that  in  Tew 

River,  Logan  h   i'.enove- i'hacher  districts. 
^     Includes  Tennessee  and  all  of  SoutheastJCentuol:y  except  harlan  County 
h/  Exclusive  of  production  in  Alaska,  California,  Idaho,  '.."o.  Carolina,  Oregon  and 

South  Dakota. 


Source:   "Coal  in  1919,  1020,  1921"  pp.  505-506;  "Coal  in  1922",  pp.  510-61S.  Based  on 
vreekly  production  fi,-;ures. 

;i'j:v,:  Those  figu-es  represent  not  the  •  ercontage  of  the  mines  closed  dcvm  by  the  strike 
but  rafrer  the  percentage  of  miners  that  v;ere  absent  from  vrork  ar.d  therefore  show 
the  lart  of  the  nonoal  producing  po-Jfer  of  the  district  shut  off  by  the  strike. 
It  does  not  mean  that  81,.  of  the  mines  in  the  Connellsville  district  v^ere  thrown 
idle  by  strike  for  a  large  number  continued  to  operate  with  depicted  forces.  It 
does  mean  that  something  like  81.;  of  the  employees  vrere  e.hsent  from  vfork  at  the 
na-.ent  of  maximum  effectiveness  of  the  strike  and  that  potential  shipments  v.- ere 
out  to  something  like  15>  of  v/hat  had  been  possible  before.  Because  ti»e  moment  of 
maximum  effectiveness  did  not  come  in  all  districts  at  the  same  time,  the  shut- 
dovm  over  the  country  as  a  vfhole  vms  never  quite  as  great  ns  is  here  indicated. 
9837 


-167- 

Despite  efforts  to  hnve  the  U.  S.  Bitminoas  Goal  Conmission  arrive 
at  unanimous  conclusions,  such  agreement  "?3  not  reached.   The  Coranission 
presented  -lajority  and  minority  awards.   The  majority  awa.rd  provided  for 
an  increase  of  31  per  cent  to  tonna£:e  nen  and  20  per  cent  to  day  wori^ers  over 
over  the  rates  prevailing;  on  Cctoher  31,  1919  prior  to  the  G-arfield  Award. 
This  award  meant  a  wage  increase  of  24  cents  per  ton  for  mine  run  coal, 
pick  and  machine,  20  per  cent  on  yardage  and  deadwork,  a  ;-1.00  per  day 
increase  to  day  men.   It  refused  to  grant  the  six-hour  day,  recommended 
setting  un  of  hipprtite' -  groups  in  various  districts  to  study  wage  rates 
and  T/orking  conditions,  and  stated  that  the  awc.'.rd  shoujd  "be  effective  for 
two  years  from  April  1,  1920.   The  minority  award  differed  primarily  on 
the  low  increase  to  day  workers.   The  Commission's  award  applied  only  to 
the  Central  Competitive  Field  and  the  outlying  districts  under  the  control 
of  the  union.   But  the  award  recommended  that  operators  in  Alabama, 
Tennessee,  Eastern  Kentuclcj'-,  and  Marjrland  should  arrange  to  effectuate 
the  provisions  of  the  award  in  order  to  maintain  industrial  ;oeace"  and 
tranquility. 

A  suDsequent  joint  conference  held  in  New  Yor^-  on  March  29  led  to 
the  formulation  of  a  joint  interstate  agreement  (effective  April  1,  1920 
to  Ilarch  31,  1922)  which  incorporated  the  Co-mission's  award. 

Despite  the  joint  agreement,  however,  the  award  "as  received  with 
considerable  dissatisfaction  in  Illinois,  Indiana  and  Ohio.   The  chief 
causes,  of  discontent  were  the  use  of  each  district  to  adjust  internal 
differences,  the  retention  of  the  penalty  clause,  and  the  inequality  of 
the  T.'age  increase  to  day  workers  as  against  tonnage  men.   The  refusal  of 
the  Illinois  operators  to  accede  to  the  mine  worker' s 'demand  for  ?r2.00 
per  day  increase  was  followed  by  strikes  in  many  Illinois  mines.   The 
operators  held  that  these  walkouts  were  illegal  and  in  violation  of  the 
Commission's  award.   They  petitioned  the  Fresidert  to  take  action  in 
checking  the  strike.   The  matter  rm.s   referred  to  the  Secretary  of  Labor 
who  on  July  25rd,  appointed  three  conciliators  to  go  to  Illinois  to 
attempt  to  end  the  strike. 

Meantime  the  strike  had  spread  to  Indiana,  Iowa,  Ilansas,  Arkansas, 
and  parts  of  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania,   president  TTilson  stated  t'lat  upon 
resum-ption  of  work  by  the  miners  he  v.'ould  invite  the  interested  narties 
to  a  meeting  of  the  joint  scale  committees  for  consideration  of  any  in- 
equalities '.Thich  may  have  developed  from  the  Commission's  award. 

Following  the  receipt  of  this  statement ,^  the  union  ordered  the  men 
to  return  to  work.   By  August  3rd,  50  per  cent  of  the  Illinois  mines 
were  operating  s,nd  a  week  later  po^actically  all  the  mines  in  Illinois  and 
Indiana  had  resumed  work. 

A  meeting  of  the  joint  scale  committees  was  called  by  the  President 
on  August  10th.   This  meeting  was  held  August  14th  in  Cleveland,   Four 
days  later  the  conference  adjourned  without  agreement.   Separate  district 
agreements  were  then  authorized.   A  joint  agreement  in  Indiana  led  to  an 
increase  of  $1.50  per  day  for  day  workers.   Similar  settlements  were 
made  in  the  other  three  states  in  the  Central  Com-oetitive  Field,  as  well 
as  in  the  Southwestern  Interstate  Field. 


9837 


-168- 

Aside  from  the  dispute  arisin£^  over  the  day  men  wage  scale,  the 
union  r/as  exerting  its  efforts  to  retain  and  organize  areas  in  the  South. 
The  international  executive  "board  of  the  United  Mine  Workers,  upon  peti- 
tion of  the  Alabama  officials,  surveyed  the  conditions  there  on  Septemher 
1st,  and  authorized  a  strike  on  Septeinoer  7,  1920.   The  union  stated 
that  its  "basis  for  the  strike  was  the  refusal  of  Ala"bama  operators  to 
accept  the  Bituminous  Coal  Commission's  award.   The  operators  regarded 
\inion  recognition  as  the  dominant  issue.   Thj  strike  involved  8,490  men 
for  an  average  of  94  days,  ending  Pehruary  22,  1921.   Several  months 
after  the  strike  had  "been  in  effect,  it  was  suhmitted  to  Governor  Kilty 
of  Ala"bama  for  ar"bitration.   The  C-overnor's  award  was  unfavora"ble  to  the 
miners.   The  strike  marked  the  loss  of  Ala"baraa  to  the  United  Mine  Workers. 

Perhaps  the  most  "bitterly  contested  strike  of  the  year  occurred  in 
the  Kenova-Thacker  (Mingo  Countjr,  'Jest  'V"irginia)  in  the  Tug  River  "Valley, 
"between  West  "'/irginia  and  I[entuc!:y. 

The  depressed  economic  conditions  of  1921  resulted  in  two  trends  of 
development  (1)  operator  dema.nds  for  wage  agreement  revision  with  union 
refusal  in  m3.nj   coal  fields  (2)  in  other  areas  agreements  with  the  United 
i.iine  Workers  were  "broken.   John  L.  Lewis  annoiinced  a  policy  of  no  wage 
reduction  and  no  step  "baclrward. 

By  the  middle  of  the  summer  of  1921,'  demands  for  wage  reductions 
came  from  operators  in  Pennsylvania,  Washington",  Iowa,  Kansas,  Colorado, 
West  "Virginia,  Tennessee,  Ala"baraa,  Texas,  and  Missouri,   producers  in 
the  Central  Competitive  Field  (with  exception  of  Ohio)  were  a"ble  to 
withstand  the  competition  from  the  non-union  producing  areas,  "but  the 
areas  "bordering  on  the  non-union  fie!lds  were  hard  hit.   Central 
Pennsylvania  producers  com-oe  ting  with  the  non-union  fields  of  Westmore- 
land and  Somerset  requested  wage  reductions,  as  did  Georges  Creek  and 
Fairmont  operators  facing  similar  competition.   These  requests  were 
not  granted. 

In  Washington,  Texas,  and  Colorado  wage  agreements  were  changed 
without  union  ssJiction.   Washington  operators  announced  a  return  to  the 
Octo"ber,  1919,  wage  scale  and  contract  rates  effective  March  15,  1921. 
The  union  refused  to  accede  and  many  m.ines  "began  operating  on  a  non- 
\inion  "basis.   Colorado  Fiiel  and  Iron  Company  announced  (August,  1921) 
a  return  to  the  1917-1919  scale.   It  was  approved  "by  the  Employees 
Representation  Plan,  "but  the  union  employees  went  out  on  strike. 
In  Texas  some  800  miners  were  engaged  i;i  a  strike. 

The  United  Mine  Workers  continued  their  efforts  to  organize  the 
non-uni'on  coal  fields  of  West  Virginia,  centering  in  Mingo  County. 
The  emplojTnent  of  Baldwin-'Felts  detectives  "by  operators  and  the  eviction 
of  striking  miners  from  company  owned  houses,  intensified  hostilities. 
The  Governors  of  "both  West  Virginia  and  Kentuclcj'-  requested  federal  aid. 


9837 


In  June  more  violence  occurred.  About  Auf^ast  20th  hundreds  of  union 
miners  assenbled  at  Marmet,  U'est  Virginia  vdth  the  intention  of  marching 
on  Mingo  County,  some  eighty  miles  distant.  The  march  began  August  23rd 
and  two  days  later  it  was  reported  that  4,0C0  miners  were  in  the  assem- 
blage. Hundreds  of  individuals  were  deputized  by  the  Logan  County  sheriff 
preparatory  to  halting  the  advancco  The  Governor  appealed  to  the  War 
Tepartment  for  troops.  A  liVar  Department  representative  investigated  the 
situation  and  interviewed  the  district  union  officials  which  resulted 
in  halting  the  advance.  The  alleged  firing  by  state  troopers  upon  some 
armed  miners  (August  28)  resulted  in  a  renewal  of  the  march.  A  proclama- 
tion issued  by  the  Presic'ent  on  August  30th  ordered  the  marchers  to 
disperse.  The  area  was  placed  under  martial  control  a  few  days  later 
when  some  2,000  troops  arrived.  Conditions  soon  quieted  down  and  by 
September  8th  some  of  the  troops  v;ere  withdrawn.  All  the  troops  left  the 
strike  zone  by  December  6th,  but  many  miners  continued  on  strike. 

The  wage  agreement,  made  in  1920,  called  for  an  interstate  joint 
conference  to  be  held  prior  to  April  1,  1922.  As  the  expiration  date 
(March  31,  1922  )  of  the  joint  agreement  approached,  efforts  were  made 
to  begin  new  negotiations.  The  mine  workers  extended  invitations  to  the 
operators  to  meet  in  a  joint  conference  at  Pittsburgh  on  itanuary  6th, 
Indiana  and  Illinois  operators  accepted  the  invitation,  but  the  Pitts- 
burgh Coal  Producers  Ass'-ciation  and  the  Southern  and  Eastern  Ohio  Coal 
Operators  Association  refused  to  attend.  Because  of  inadequate  represent- 
ation the  meeting  was  called  off. 

The  coal  operators  were  becoming  increasingly  dissatisfied  with 
the  collective  bargaining  arrangements  with  the  union.  The  business 
depression  beginning  in  1921  was  attended  by  decreasing  sales  realiza- 
tions for  coal,  while  wage  costs  were  fixed  and  inflexible.  Moreover, 
the  operators  argued  that  the  interstate  agreement  for  the  Central 
Competitive  Field  was  unsatisfactory.  They  argued  that  mine  labor  was 
demanding  negotiation  in  unwieldy  units,  whereas  the  proper  basis  for 
negotiation  was  the  individual  district  because  of  the  differences  in 
competitive  conditions  affecting  each  one.  The  operators  also  contended 
that  the  original  conditions  -  East  -  West  competition  -  which  resulted 
in  the  Central  Competitive  Field  arrangement  had  gradually  disappeared. 
The  increasing  significance  of  the  southern  coal  producing  areas,  "m- 
pecially  West  Virginia  and  Kentucky,  in  the  competitive  markets  plus 
the  fact  that  these  areas  were  largely  non-union  and  so  not  subject 
to  fixed  i='age  agreements  made  for  a  North-South  competition  rather  than 
the  East- lest  which  had  previously  prevailed. 

Despite  the  fact  that  the  mine  operators'  contentions  continued 
for  more  than  a  decade  and  that  they  were  besoming  increasingly  opposed 
to  collective  bargaining  under  the  old  Central  Competitive  Field  pattern, 
the  United  Mine  Vvorkers  strenuously  resisted  any  rearrangement  of  the 
collective  bargaining  procedure.  The  union  was  aware  of  its  ineffective- 
ness in  bargaining  on  a  Korth-South  basis  bacause  the  southern  fields 
were  mostly  unorganized. 


9837 


-170- 

The  union  did  not  agree  to  a  clian.j:e  in  the  collective  'b&rgaining  policy 
Tontil  1928  0;^  vhlch   time  it  ha.d  "been  grectlj'-  rea'rened  and  manj'-  operators 
had  tiirned  to  open-siiop  operation.  The   inaoility  of  the  industrj?-  and 
lator  to  rer.cgusf  thenselves  to  the  changing  competitive  relationships  rras 
perhaps  a  primar/  eiirplanation  of  tlis  disintegi^aticn  of  collecive  "bargaining. 
It  was  not  imtil  the  passage  of  the  T.I.Ti.A.   TThen  Section  7  (a)  of  that  Act 
operated  to  unionize  areas  both  north  and  south  of  the  Ohio  Hiver  that  the 
collective  bargaining  pattern  rjas  changed  sc  as  to  recognize  the  Forth- 
South  competition.   The  mine  rrorkers,  follov/ing  the  dictates  of  a  reconvened 
convention,  renewed  their' invitation  to  the  operators  to  meet  in  a  joint 
corjference  on  Llarch  2,  1922.  President  Harding  on  Jehruarz  24th  instructed 
Secret? rj-  of  Labor  Davis  to  use  his  efforts  in  bringing  about  a  joint  con~ 
ference.   Secretary"  Davis  found  the  response  to  his  efforts  unsatisfactory. 

Tlie  refusal  b;-  the  operators  to  meet  in  joint  conference  v:as  folloi'ed 
by  an  official  strike  call  issued  on  Uarch  20th  to  be  effective  Llarch  31, 
1932.   Tlie  strike  begsji  April  1  and  soon  became  fairly  complete.   (See 
Table  II.)   For  the  countr:>-  as  a'whole,  460,589  men  or  67  per  cent  of  the 
total  number  of  men 'employed  in  the  industr:,'-  rere  engaged  in  the  strike.  (*) 
The  averrge  number  of  da;-s  lost  per  nan  on  strike  amounted  to  117.   The 
strike  was  100  per  cent  effective  in  Michigan,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Iowa  en.d 
!7yorair^  (see  Table  I  ).   Other  areas  which  were  almost  corapletelj'-  sliut  down 
(90  per  cent  or  more)  were  Central  Perjisyivania,  Pittsburgh  district,  Ohio, 
Kanawha,  iiissouri,  ICansas,  Arkansas,  and  i.Iontana. 

A  nijjnber  of  factors  combined  to  make  the  1922  strike  the  greatest  in 
the  industr;;-' s  histor;'-.  Although  the  United  I.Iine  'Workers  had  been  losing 
strength,  especially  in  the  fields  south  of  the  Ohio  River,  strong  support 
for  the  strike  was  gained  In/   the  walkout  of  approximately  100,000  miners  in 
the  non-union  areas  of  Connellsville  and  Somerset  in  Pennsylvania.   These 
areas,  producing  more  than  4-0,000,000  tons  annually,  had  talcen  a  negligible 
part  in  the  1919  strike,  but  more  tlian  80  per  cent  of  their  production  was 
curtailed  in  the  1922  strike.  In  contrast  to  this  support  are  the  losses  in 
strike  effectiveness  in  1922  as  against  1919  in  Panhandle,  {1.   Va.);  North- 
eastern Kentucky'-;  rew  Hiver  (TT.  Va.);  Southern  Appalachian,  (T7.  Va.  and  S. 
IC;^.);  Harlan,  (l^'-.);  Alabama  and  G-eorgia;  and '7e stern  Xentuclr,'-  fields.  Op- 
ponents of  the  international  union  claimed  tha.t  the  union  officials  had 
betra:-ed  the  strike  by.  allowing  District  23  (TJestern  Kentucl;^^  to  continue 
production  on  the  old"  wcge  scale  until  April,  1S23,  ( **)  and  b-'-  signing  a 
two-;'err  contract  in  District  19  (Southeastern  Kentuclc;''  and  Tennessee). 


(*)    Coal  in_  1922,  U.  3.  3rj:-eru  cf  I!incs 

(**)   Since  the  7est"rn  IZentuclcy  contract  did  not  expire  until  April  1, 

1C23,  the  United  liine  'Tor!:er  officials  held  that  they  '-ere  obligated 
to  uphold  the  tradition  of  not  violating  an  existing  agreement. 


9837 


-171- 

Tatle  II 

Percentage  of  F'^ssible  Full  Time  Q-peration 

of  Union  Bituminous  Coal  Mines  Before , 

During,  and  After  Strike  of  1922  1/ 


Jan.l 

Coal  Districts 

Apr.l 

Ar)r. 

May 

July 

July 

Aug 

Sept. 

1922ay   29 

27 

1 

29  lb/ 

19 

2 

Oklphoma 

59.6 

15.0  : 

.3)2.0 

16.4 

11.9 

16.0 

42.6 

Iowa 

76.4 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

97.1 

Ohio,  eastern* 

46.6 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

47.7 

Missouri 

66.6 

0.0 

2.0 

4.1 

5.0 

7.0 

53.8 

Illinois* 

54.5 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

62.8 

Kansas 

54.9 

12.0 

14.0 

24.3 

21.6 

14.7 

84.5 

Indiana* 

53.8 

0.0, 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

m 

Pittsburgh,  rail* 

39.8 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

m 

Central  Pennsylvania 

50.2  • 

11.9 

11.1 

11.6 

11.6 

14.4 

72.7 

Fairmont 

40.0 

3.8 

5.5 

m 

4.1 

10.9 

41.8 

Kentucky,  western 

c/ 

37.7 

59.3 

76.1 

70.5 

52.9 

51.9 

45.7 

Pittstur?:  ,  rail  &  river* 

31.9 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

m 

Kanawha 

15.0 

2.1 

6.1 

10.0 

6.1 

8.7 

19.5 

t)lxio„  southern* 

24.3 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

49.4 

1/  Wyckoff,  Vertrees  J,,  The  Wage  Policies  of  Labor  Organization  in  a 

Period  of  Industrial  Depression,  1926,  Johns  Hookins  Press,  Based  upon 
U.S.  Geological  Survey  reports  in  Coal  Age  for  period  covered, 

aj    Strike  began  April  1,  1922. 

b/  Strike  ended  August  19,  1922.  September  2nd  was  nearest  to  a  complete 
report  fcr  the  districts  listed. 

c/  Western  Kentucky  worked  under  a. no-strike  agreement. 

*  Members  of  Central  Competitive  xaeld, 

NR  No  Report. 


9637 


The  transportption  situation  in  1922  addud  greatly  to  the  effect- 
iveness of  the  co,-^l  strike.  On  July  1,  1922  the  Hsilray  Shopmen  went 
on  strike  in  protest  ng.iinst  wr.ge  reductions^  .In  addition,  the  rail- 
roads were  iacv,'d  vdtna  gtnerai  car' shortage  at  its  iiiaxiraaia  exceeding 
179,000  cars.  The  supply  of  cars  '''as  wnollj  inadequate  to  meet  the 
demands  of  the  increased  outuut  in  the  non-union  fields.  Even  after 
the  coal  strike  end.d  (August  19,  1922  ),  the  car  "shortage  continued 
bocause  of  the  unusual  consumer'  demand. 

Fear  of  a  coal  shortage  plus  the  violence  which  attended  the  strike 
as  at  Herrin,  Illinois  and  at  Clif tonville,  V/est  Virginia,  led  to 
government  intervention.  The  President  on  Juno  28th  called  for  a  confer- 
ence at  the  Vv'hite  Eouse  for  July  1st.  The  operators'  and  minurs'  rep- 
resentatives met  with  the  President'again  on  July  10th-,  .'at  which  time  the 
President  pro-oosed  that: 

1,  The  miners  return  to  work  at  the  wage  level  of  March 
31st  until  August  10,  1922. 

2,  A  coal  .commission  he  created  consisting  of  three  -mine 
worker  representatives-;  thrc?e  operator  representatives 
and  five  Presidential  appointees.  The  decision  of  this  • 
grou-o  to  he  final.         ' 

3,  Tne   comjiission  shall  detLrraihe  within  30  days  frgm 
July  10,  if  possible,  a  temporary  basic  wage  scale  1d 
be  effective  until  l,'arch  1,  1923.  If  this  scale  cottld 
not  be  effected,  then  the  commission  should  continue 
the  1922  scale,         '    "     , 

4,  All  phas.es  of  the  industry  should  be  studied  by  the  commission. 

The  miners  and  operators  indicated  willingness  to  accept,  but  the 
miners  withheld  acceptance  of  arbitration.  Pittsburgh  operators,  on  the 
other  hand,  suggested  separate  arbitration  for  their  district,  1917 
wage  scale  and  elimination  of  tiic  check-off.  . 

The  operators  were  assured  of  'governmental  support  where  mines  - 
were  run  with  strike-breakers.  Telegrams  were  sent  to  the  governors  f,? 
twenty  coal  producing  states  offering  federal  sunport  v,'herc  state 
agencies  were  inadequate.  Troops  '^ere  held  in  readiness  for  strike  du1:y. 

On  August  1st,  the  luiners  invited' the  Central . Competitive  Field 
operators  to  a  joint  conierence  to  be  held  in  Cleveland  Augu.st  7th. 
Illinois  operators  refused  to  attend,  insisting  on  arbitration.  'Less 
than  20  per  ccnl;  of  the  Central  Competitive  Field's  tonnage,  mostly 
from  Ohio,  was  represented  at  the  conference.  Later  .on  producers  in 
the  outlying  fields  were  admitted  to  the  meeting.  A  sub-committee  report, 
favoring  a  renewal  of  the  March  31,  1922,  contract  and  a,  re;sumption 
of  work  met  with  a  pproval  on  August  15ti-i.  It  was  also  agreed  to  hold  a 
joint  conference  in  Cleveland  on  October  2nd.  At  the  latter  meeting, 
provision  was  made  for  a  commission  to  formulate  n  method  to  negotiate 
a  wage  agreement  for  April  I,    1923  and  that  a  joint  conference  be 
hold  January  3,  1923. 


9837 


-173- 

.  Pri-op  iro   this  time,  hoAfever,  the  United  Mine  Worker  President 
recogniztd  the  inpbility  to  tring  the  Central  Com-oetitive  Field 
operptors  in  line  as  a  unit.  He,  therefore,  made  it  possible  for  any 
groups  or  individual  operp'tors  in  the.  i'ield  to  enter  into  the  agreement. 
As  a  result,  it  -^as  said  thpt  the  Central  Competitive  Field  could  no 
longer  be  considered  as  a  basic  unit.  The  1922  wage  agreenient  exteaid^-J 
the  previously  existing  (1920)  basic  day  ^vage  rate  of  $7,50  and  was 
based  upon  ccllectivc  bargaining  rather  than  arbitration. 

By  August, 19,  the  agreement  had  been  signed  by  the  majority  of 
operators  in  Ohio,  Fairmont  field,  Liicnigan,  and  in  part  of  Central 
Pennsylvania  so  that  coal  was  already  beginning  to  move.  During  the 
following  week  (August  20-25),  additional  agreeiaents  were  signed  in 
Kanawha,  Michigan,  i.lontana,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Wyoming,  and  Southwest 
Interstate  Field.  Several  days  later  agreoraents  were  signed  in  the 
State  of  Washington  and  by  important  producers  in  the  Pittsburgh  district. 

Althor.gn  the  strongly  organized  fields  had  resximed  work   the  strike 
continued  in  fields  of  t?/o  types: 

lo   Formerl;/  non-union  areas  where  men  had  struck  and 
continued  to  hold  out  for  recognition  and  wage  con- 
tracts. This  group  was  represented  by  the  Ccnnells- 
ville  district  and  parts  of  V/estmoreland,  Somerset 
and  Central  Pennsylvania. 

2,   Areas  where  operators  were  unwilling  to  renew  the 
agreements  formerly  in  effect  that  had  expired  on 
March  31st.  In  this  group  belonged  the  Chesrcekkc 
and  Ohio  section  of  Kanawha  and  part  of  the  Georges 
Creek  and  Upper  Potomac  region. 

Meantime,  President  R arding  in  his  address  to  Congress  on  August 
18th,  asked  that  a  law  be  enacted  providing  for  a  commission  to 
investigate  the  industry.  Enactment  took  place  on  September  22nd  and 
on  October  10th,  the  President  named  the  members  of  the  U.S.  Coal 
Commission.  This  agency  was  to  make  its  first  report  by  Jaajrary  15,19^.-^. 

The  general  freedom  from  industrial  disputes  during  the  year  1923 
was  largely  attributable  to  the  urgent  request  made  by  the  U.S.  Coal 
Commission  that  operators  and  miners  meet  in  joint  conference.  The 
meeting  took  place  from  January  17  to  21st,  1923.  A  tri-state  agreement 
was  signed  by  the  operators  of  Illinois,  Indiana,  and  Ohio.   Sonewhat 
later  the  Pittsburgh  Producers'  Association  and  the  Pittsburgh  Coal 
Company  joined  in  the  agreement.  The  contract  was  made  effective  until 
April  1,  1924  and  provided  for  a  continuation  of  the  wage  rates  in  the 
previous  ag  eement.  It  also  provided  for  a  readjustment  of  inequitable 
differentials  ih  the  various  districts.  The  Southwestern  Interstate 
Field  alsP  continued  its  agreement. 

Perhaps  the  only  important  industrial  dispute  in  1923  was  that  in 
Gvunberland  -  Piednont  fields  of  Maryland  and  West  Virginia.  This  dis- 
pute was  really  a  heritage  of  the  1922  strike,  having  begun  on  April  1, 
1922.  It  was  not  declared  ended  until  November  22,  1923. 


9837 


1924  -  1933 

A  j':int   ccnference   of   operator'-   a,nci^  inin3rs'    r3'-)reRent?tiv8s 
for   Illinois,    Indiana,    Oliio,    and.  Western  Pennsylvani?  began  on 
Fotruary  19,    1924  at  Jacksonville,   Florida.      This   conferenca   renev/ad 
tlx8  -previously  existing  wa^^ie   rates  for  tae  period  April   1,   1924  to 
Marc:.  31,    i?27.      In   the   testimony  presented  tefore   the   Senate   Com- 
mittee  on   Interstate   Coanerce,    v-ihich  v/as   investigating  conditions 
in   the   coal   fields   of  Pennsylvania,    West  Virginia,    and  Ohio, 
Johai  L.   Levifis,   United  liine   Worker  President,    stated   taat   tne  a.gree- 
ment  was  ra;vde  possihle   thro^ig^.i   tue   cooperation   of    the  agencies  of 
t.-ie  Pederal    Government,    tie  Depa,rt  nent   of  Justice,    Coiitaerce  and 
Lahor    ^^a-ticip?  ting.    (*) 

'',7-ien   te  Jacksonville  Agree:nent  was  negotiated,    the  '.Yestern 
Kentuclq/j   Kanavua  fields   in   Southern  West  Virginia,    and  Fairmont   o.nd 
Morguitown  fields   in  Northern  West  Virginia  operated  on  a  union  hasis. 
Tlie  ICana,vii£i  and   Western  Kentucky  operators   refused   to  "become  parties 
to   tie  Jacksonville  .Agreement  and  closed  down   their  mines.      Since 
the   sit-'.ia.tiai    involved  the    survival  of   the  iinion   in   these  fields,   a 
bitter  struggle   ensued.      The    industrial   dispute  dragged  on  many  months 
and  resulted  in   the   elinuno.ti  ,n   ■,  f    the  United  Mine  Workers  from  taose 
fields. 

At   tie    time  of   tlie   Baltimore  Agreement    (co.unterpart   of   the 
Jacksonville  Agreement  for  Northern  West  Virginia),    liL^rch,    1924,    t-iere 
were  79  union  and  74  non-union   companies   operating   in  Northern  West 
Virginia,   (2C2  coirroanies  were   idle).    (**)      The  union  mines  produced 
70  percent   of   the   tonnage.      One  month   later,    it  was   s,ahd,    that   the 
union  ccmpc'.nies  ur.d  decreased  from  79   to  49   anr]    that    taeir  tonfietge  had 
fallen  tc   60  percent.      Tiie  passage  of,  less,  than  a  year   (January,    1925) 
found  onl-y  24  union  companies,  continuing  operations,   while  non-union 
.comp.?Jiies  h?,d   increased  to  129.      John  L.    Lev/is   estimated,  that   25,000 
men  were  effected   in   this   area.(***) 


(*)  ■  har.ings  before    the   Com.uttee  on   Interstate   Coiiimerce, 

■'■    United  States   Senate,   70t.ii  Congress,    1st   Session,    S. 
■■Has.    105,    Vol.    I,   p.    378.     Mr.   Lewis  pointed  out   that 
t:  a  government  assistance  is>  confirmed  in   the  twelfth 
annualrcport  of   the   Secretary  of  Commerce  for  the 
VtTCcl   year  ending  June  ZO,    1924,    pp.13  and  14. 

(**)        Coal   Age,   January  14,    19,]6,    p.    45   et    scq. 

(***)      ■.;er.rings   on    S.    Res.    10-5,    70th   Congress,    1st   Session, 
Vol.    I,    p.    331. 


9337 


•17£ 


Tlie   struggle  between   the  union   and  non-union  operations  was 
characteristic  of   the   industry   throudiout   the  period  1924   to  1927. 
Por  raanjr  -laiths  after  the   strike   of  1922,    wage  rates   in  non-union 
fields  approximated  union   rates,   but  late   in  1923  wage   cuts  were   re- 
ported.     Socn  after  the   signing  of   the  Jacksonville  Atireement,   most 
non-i-aii-'n   opera,tors  reduced   the   rates   first   to    the  1919    scale  and 
later   to    the  1917  level   or  lower.      Tnus  while  many  non-union  mines 
were  paying  between   $4.00  and  $5.00  for  inside  day  labor,    the  union 
fields  wer2  faced  with  a   standard  day  V7age  of  $7.50.      Many  operators 
in  onicn  fields  felt    they  could  not  pay   the  Jacksonville    scale  and 
shut  dovrn    their  mines,      heavy  stocks   of  coal   accumulated  in  1923   in 
antici;Dr.ticn  cf  a  suspension  of  activities  were  carried  over  into 
192<':  and  served  to  depress   the  market.      .4n   example   of   the  competitive 
advrntr.ge   cf   the  lo¥/er  wage    scale   in   the  non-union:  field  may  be 
seen   m   tie  fact   that   in  1924  non-union    Western  Kentucky   sold  coal 
at   an  average   sales   realization   of   $1.73   f.o.b.    mine,   whereas   in 
Indiajia,    its  union  coiUpetitor,    the  average   sales   realization  was   $2.16, 
a  difference  cf  38   cents  per   ton.      By  1925,    t-ie   competitive  advantage 
had  increased   to   58   cents  per   ton   (•;il.44   in  Western  Kentucky  as  against 
$2.02   in   Indiana).    (*)      In  addition   to    the  advantage   in  wage   rates, 
the  non-union  fields    (primarily  east   of   tlie  Mississipoi   River  and 
South   of   t-  e  Ohio   Siver)   were  better  off    since   they  were  newly  developed, 
havin\,   entered   into  production  ma^  e  recently   than   the  central   competi- 
tive  region,    and  also  because   they  produced,    in  general,    a  coal   of 
superior  qv-ality. 

The  differences   in   the  cost   of  production  were   reflected  in   the 
fact   t.iat  business  v/as  diverted  from  the  northern   to    the   southern 
fields.      Between  1923  and  1926  production   in  Ohio  decreased  31   percent, 
in   Indiana  12  percent,    and  in   Illinois  13  percent.    (**)      As  against 
these  decreases.   West  Virginia   showed  an   increase   of   33  percent, 
Kentucky  41   percent,    and  Virginia  20  percent. 

The  coaipetitive  conditions  described  above  were  evidenced  by 
constant   efforts  on   the  part   of   the  union  operators   to    secure  wage 
rate   revisions.      Since   the  union  v/as'  adamant   in   its  opposition   to 
wage   scale  changes,    three    separate  developments  were  undertaken   to 
break   the  United  Mine  Worker  contractsi    (***) 

(a)      Indiana  -     A  number  of  mines   in  Knox  Co'iinty  entered 
into   cooperaiive  mining   sciemes   in  order   to   circum- 
vent  the  contract  wage   scale.      Mines  were   "leased" 
to   groups   of  miners  and  former   subordinate   officials 
of    the  operating  companies.      Tie  lease   set  up   stand- 
ards cf  work  for   t^e  lessees    (miners)    and  provided 


(*)      C:cl    in  1925,    p.    397. 

(**)      Coal    m   1926,    p.    429. 

(***)      Coal   Age,    October  8,    19?5,    pp.    491   -   495. 

9837 


-176- 


tiat   f-ie  sales  agent  of   tie  lessors    (operator?) 
sa^uld  receive  10,  cents  per  ton.      Tae  United  iline 
"Torkers   opposed   tae  plan  and   t.ireatened  miners    ' 
witli  loss  of  union  mernbersnip.      A  temporary  in- 
jvjicticn,    seeking   to    restrain  United  iiine   '/'iTcrker 
s,cticn,    was   later  dissolved.      The  union  was 
successful   in   its  attack. 

(b)  ?:.i:ieroy  Bend-Qliio  -        Tlie   Ohio   district   conven- 
,    tion   of   the  United  i/iine  Workers    (19-^5)    resolved 

t„  "bar  miners   engaged  in   cooperative  mining 
sa/.e^aes  from  union  membership.      Cooperative  mining 
in   'hio  v;as  li.aited  to  .  small   enterprises,      i.iore 
si:^-nific£jit   tlian  cooperative  raininj;  was   tie   open 
e^ttack  made  by  Pomeroy  Bend  operators  aj^ainst   the 
Jacksonville  Agreement.      The  lea.der   in   the  move- 
■■"aent   to   return   to   the  l\Tovember,    1927   v;age    scale 
was   tie  Pittsburgh  Goal    Company.      Soon  a  nu:nber 
of  other  companies  followed  suit.      Considerable 
;property  damage  and  ph.ysical  violence  occurred 
in   th.e   effort   to  maintain    the   contract   sale. 

(c)  7o?tei-n  Pennsylvania  -     Tne  Pitt  spur  gxi   Coal    Com- 
pany,   on  i.iay  1,9,    19^5,    closed   tne  last  of   its 

■5<'.-  mines   operating.,  on   t.  e  Jacksonville   scale. 
It  be^an   reopening   its  mines    (August   20)    ori  an 
open   sncp  basis  with   reduced  weige   rates    (1917 
scale).      Other  companies   in   t..ie  district   follow- 
ed  suit. 

According  to    the   testimony  offered  by  a  United  Mine  Worker 
official   at   a   Senate   Co:-i.rdttee  hearing,    tne  Pittsburgli   Coal    Company  ei:*- 
ployed  16,000  men  prior  to  August,    1925.    (*)    '  After   the   mines  were 
reopened  on  an  open   shop  basis,  union  miners  were  bitterly  opposed. 
By  1927,    the  company  was   employing  9,000  men.(**) 

Tlie   Consolidation   Coal    Coiiipany,    operating   in   thrj  Fairmont   field. 
of  '.Test  Virginia,    coased  to   operate  on  the  United  Mine   Worker  contract 
on  June  1,    1925.    (***)     Other  operators  in   that  region  as  well  as  in 
tie  adjoining  Mcrgantown  fieldg  .entered  upon  a  similar  prograin. 


(*)  Ibid,    supra,    Vcl.    I,    p.    13. 

(**)        Ibid,    supra,    Vol.    II,    p.    3323. 
(***)      Ibid,    supra,    Vol.    I,    p.    576. 


9837 


T.ie  ant.:racite   strike  wliic]i  began  on   September  1st   served  as   a 
temporary  relief  for   te   depressed  bitu'nmous  market.      The   chief 
beneficiaries  were   tiie    smokeless  coal   fields   in   So-athern  '.Test  Virginis 
and  Central   Pennsylvania  and  higli  volatile   lump  coal   producers   close 
enoUi^^i   to    t>-e  anthracite   region   to   participate   in   tiie    demand. 

Tlie    situation  in   the   Southwest   Interstate  Field  during  tne 
period  1924  -  1927  was   similar   to   tnat   in   other  areas.      The  non- 
union movement  began  when   tiie  operators  delayed  from  March  28,   1924- 
to.l'^yS,    1S24  before  consenting  to   a  3-yaar  extension  of   the   rates 
which  had  applied  from  1920-1923   (Kansas   City  Agreensnt).      Operators 
had  re-uested  a  reduction  in  day  rates  from  $7.50   to   $6.00  in  order 
to  meet   th.e  losses   to   competing  fuels   and   the  lack  of   a  home  market. 

■Tit.', in  less   than  s.  :aonth  after   t/:e   sign^n^  of    t  .3  Kansas   City 
Agreehient,  .mines   in   tae  i/icCalester-Wilburton  district    (OkLaiioma) 
reverted  tc    tl'.e  November ,    1917    scale.      B.y  Jul.y,    the  open   shop  move- 
ment was  fully  loiider  way  and  violence   occurred.      At   the   end  of  the 
year   (19.54)    onl.y  the   ■lenryetta  district   in  Oklalioma  continued   to 
retain   the   agreed   scale.      Eirly   in  1925   the  "'enryetta  district 
ceased  t:v   maintain   the  Jackscnville-Xansas   City  Agreerrent.      A  strike 
order  was   issued  in  August,    1925  against   all  mines   in  District  21 
(Oklahoma-^urkansas)   paying  less   than   tae  Jacksonville    scale. 

The   r/oen   shop  movement   in  Arkansas  wa,s  not   really   in  full 
swing  until   1925,    alt-iough  one  operator  broke  witi   tne  union  in 
January,   1S.54.      Industrial   dispu.te  data   Si.LOW   tiat   32percent  of   the 
men  in   the  Arkansas  fields  were   on   strike   in  1924  and  over  15  percent 
in  1925.    (*)        The  average  days  lost  per  man  on   strike   in   that  area 
were  75   in  1924  and  8   in  1925.      Although   the  percentage  of  men  repre- 
sented as   striking  in  Oklahoma  was  lower   than  in  .Arkansas    (21    in 
1924  and  5   in  1925)      the  dura.tion  of   the  dispute  was  longer   (110 
days   lu  1324  and  48   days   in  1925  -  average  days  lost   per  man  on 
strike) . 

Labor  conditions  in  1926  were   alleviated   somevThat  by  several 
factors  working   together.      One  factor  was   the   increase   in   industrial 
consumption  at  home.      Despite   the  fuel   economy  and   the   competition 
of   oil   said  water  pov/er,   home   industry  demand  exceeded   that  of   the 
imi-nediately  preceeding  years.      Some  additional  12,000,000   tons  of 
bituminous   coal  were  needed   to   replace   the  loss   resulting  from  the 
ant];.ra,cite   suspension  vmich   continued  from  the  preceding  year   into 
early  1926.      Added  to   these  factors  w,'?.s   the  general   walkout  of   the 
British  miners  on  Ife,y  1,    1926,    resulting  in  an  expansion  of   sea- 
borne exports,    total    exports  of  bituminous  coal   in  1926  reached 
21,510,000   tens,    an   increase   of  450  percent  over  1925.    (**)      The 
expert   tr^-^.de  was  beneficial    to    tue   eastern  bitUiiiinous   coal   fields, 
especially  these  of  Pennsylvania  and  lest  Virginia.      Interior 


(*)        Coal    in  19.26,    pp.   422,    4,23. 
(**)      Ibid,    Supra,    p.    -^.24. 

9837 


fields  also  lienefitted  Eiiice  the  cometitive  -oressure  from  eastern  sliiioT>ers 
was  lessened.  Alabama  --iro  duct  ion  was  stimulated' in  tlie  late  fall  when 
delay  in  loading  e::nort  coal  at  eastern  -loorts  caused  diversion  of  foreit,-n 
vessels  to  Pensacola. 

Tlie  market  conditions  caused  07  the  British  strike  resulted  in  a 
tem-porary  increase  in  non-union  wat;e  rates.  A  numoer  of  -anion  mines  in 
Pennsylvania  and  Ohio  had  closed  dovm,  but  with  hi^,her  prices  res\uned 
production  at  the  Jacksonville  scale,  llearov  open  shon  operations  were 
soon  contiDelled  to  increase  their  wage  rates.   One  lar^e  conrpany  in  the 
Pittshur^i  district,  which  had  been  operatint^-  open  shoT  since  August, 
1925,  aimounced^  a-i  increase  in  wa.;;e  rates  (effective  October,  1926)  to 
a  level  5  per  cent  above  the  Jacksonville  scale.  (*)   This  exannle  v;as 
follo?/ed  by  other  -j-iroducers  in  the  same  region  and  in  the  Connellsville, 
Panhandle,  and  Kanawha  fields  and  even  in  kentiiclcj/,  Tennessee  and  Virginia. 

Tiie  relief  to  the  northern  fields  and  union  operations  was  temporary. 
Before  the  end  of  the  year  declining  selling  -prices  brought  wage  reductions 
in  the  Cumberland-Piedmont,  Somerset,  Cambria,  and  Freeport  districts,  and 
at  some  o->3erations  in  West  Virginia  and  Kentucky/. 

Those  o-perators  who  co-iitinued  to  -nay  the  wage  rates  siiecified  in  the 
Jackso-nville  Agreement  demanded  a  reductio-n  in  wages  w-Jien  the  old  contract 
e:oDired  on  liarch  31,  1927.  At  a  meeting  of  the  Ohio  Coal  Operators'  Asso- 
ciation held  at  Columbus,  Ohio  on  January  6,  1927,  a  r^ro-nosal  was  adopted 
which  provided  that  the  o-perators  should  have  a  nev/  wage  scale  which  would 
be  sliding  rather  than  fir.ed  and  v/hicii  virould  be  "continuously  competitive" 
with  wages  paid  in  the  non-union  fields  of  the  South  (see  Figure  I).   Tliis 
proposal  was  again  submitted  to  a  i.ieetiaj  01  representatives  of  operators 
for  the  Central  CoiTipetitive  Field  at  Toledo,  Ohio,  on  January  19  and  was 
approved  on  the  behalf  of  Illinois,  Indians  and  Tfestern  Pennsylvania.   The 
oiperators  were  generally  agreed  that  the  Central  Competitive  Field  as  a 
wage  making  unit  was  dead  and  -chat  competition  was  no  longer  east-west , but 
rather  north-south. 

Piirsuant  to  the  terms  of  the  Jacksonville  Agreement,  representatives 
of  o-Derators  and  miners  met  in  joint  conference  at  i'Aecmi,   Florida  on  Feb- 
ruary 14,  1927,  for  the  -puriDOse  01  negotiatin;  a  new  agreement.   The  con- 
ference was  deadlocked  over  the  operators'  proposal  for  a  reduced  sliding 
scale  which  was  strongly  su-nported  ''oy   Ohio  and  Western  Pennsylvania  and 
was  formally  endorsed  by  Indiana  and  Illinois.   This  proiposal  was  rejected 
'o-j   the  miners  upon  the  ground  that  it  offered  them  no' protection  against 
having  to  accent  the  wages,  hours,  and  working  conditions  of  non-union 
miners  employed  under  individual  contract,  in  non-union  territory.   The 
conference  adjourned  sine  die  on  February  22nd. 


(*)   Coal  Age,  i'ovembcr  4,  192S,  p.  541. 
3837 


■i?;}- 


T.s  tini:n  policy,  corninittee   announced  on  Febriaary  23rd   that  any 
outly..ni'  -.1:'. strict   could  continue   on   tlie   old   scale  after  i.Iarch  31, 
witicut    prejudice  pending  a   settlement   in   the   Central   Competitive 
Field.      Central   Pennsylva,nia  and  Lvi'di^an  accepted   this   proposal, 
as  did  pridiicers   in  Wyo■-"ain^t;  and  ot-ier  far  7ifestern   States.      T.ie 
Soutl-v/eet   end.  Iowa  declined.      At  a,  ;ne5tins  neld   in  Indianapolis  on 
Febru-ary  Sotli,    tlie  policy  coavnittee   extended  tne   same  privilege   to 
districts  and   individual   operators   in   the   Central    Competitive 
Field.      Individual   agreements  wer3  made   by   some   companies  in   India/na 
and   Illinois.      In  lestern  Pennsylvania  t>-e   steel   affiliated  opera- 
tors  slmt  down  on  March  31. 

'Titli   tie  legal   expiration   of   the   Jacksonville  Agreement,    a  sus- 
pension  of  bitu-minous  coal   mining  began   on  April  1,    1927.      The  dispute 
involved  directly  about  175,000  men,    exclusive   of  15,000  miners  in 
Central   Pennsylvania  who    suspended  work  on  July  1st.      It  affected 
more   or  less  directly  mining  operations   in  a  widely   scattered  number 
of   states  —   Illinois,    Pennsylvania,    Ohio,    Indiana,    Kansas,    Missouri, 
and  Iowa. 

In   Illinois  a  large  nuxnber  of   tlie  miners   suspended  work  from 
April  imtil    the  follovi^ing  October.      Baring   this  period   there  were 
various  attempts  at  negotiation.      Finally  a   third  conference,    late 
in   Septeir.ber,    led  to    tie    signing  of  a   truce   agreement   on   October  1, 
efiect:.ve  ujitil  April   1,    1938  maintaining   the  Jacksonville    scale. 

T--e   Indiana  miners  and  operators  faced   the    saiiie  difficulties 
in  negotiation.      A   strip  pit   contract  was   successfully  negotiated 
in  April,   but    shaJt  mine  conferences  broke  up  over  the   scale  of 
wages   tc  be  paid.      Finally,    on  October  7,    Indiana  also  made  a   tem- 
pore.ry  r.greem.ent  with  the  union.      Similar   settlements  were  made 
in  Iowa  on   October  4th  and  in   the    Southwestern  district  on  October  6th. 
Operat:rs   in   Ohio,   Pennsylvania,    and  West  Virginia  refused  to  meet 
union  demands.      Ohio   operators   issued  an  ultimatum  that   fornier   em- 
ployees were   to   return   to  work  before  July  15  on  1927  wage   scale. 
Oliio,    wit.-,   a  few  exceotions,    and  Western  Pennsylv-ania  had  definitely 
broken  with    the  union   erA  were  operating  open   shop.    (*) 

Tlie  major  part   of   t.ie  decline   in   total   out^Dut  after   tne  be- 
ginning of   the   suspension  may  be  attributed   to    tne  cessation  of 
work   in   the  union  fields  north  of   the   G-iio   River.      While   these  areas 
showed  a   sliarp  decline   in  production,    important  non-union   states 
south   :i    tlj.e  Ohio  Hiver   shewed  increased  productivity.  (**)      A  com- 
parison 01   production  for  the    seven  ma:  t::.s,   April    to   October,    1937, 
with   t,:e  corresponding  period  in  1926,    showed  a  decline  of  77.8  per- 


(*)        14  operators   in   Ohio    (middle   district   and  few   small   operations 
in  riocking)    signed  an  agreement  with   tne   union  which   ran 
from   September  1,    1923    to   i.iarch  31,    1930.      The  basic   inside 
scale  was   .$5.00  per  day  and   the  pickmining  rate  was  87   cents 
per   ton. 

(**)      Coal    in  1927,    p.    333.      See    statistical   discussion   of   strikes 

and  lockouts  at   t-.e   end  of   tnis   section. 
9837 


cent   in   Illinnis;    46.9  -rercent   in   Indiana'^  .14.1 ,  percent,  in  Pennsylvani 
and  67. G  'tiercent   in  GMo.      Contrary  to   tiiis   recpr'^.  of   i.sclining  pro- 
duction,  IZentucky  tonnage   increcsed  19.2  percent   and  :/e?t  Virginia 
6  percent.      T's.e   two  largest   producing   states   souti  61"   tae   a'lio   Hiver 
and  nearest   tc   the  markets  norurall./  served  "oy  tae  llGrtiiern   States 
counteracted  tlie   restriction    m  tlie  union   areas.      Consequently   the 
strike  did  not  carry  the   threat  of  a  coal    shortage.      In  fact,   lietv/een 
April  and  GctclDer,    only  some  13, 000, COO  tons  were  withdrawn  from 
storage.    M 


(*)      iDid.    svcpra.  P.    33  3 


L 


9837 


-181- 


FIOTHE      I 


Wage  proposal    Submitted  to    the  Joint  "Tage   Con- 
ference  of  Operators  and.  Mine  "iforlcers   s.t  I.iiami, 
Florida,    February  14-32,    13,^7 


('Raskins'  (operators')  Resolution) 


2e   it  resolved, 

(1)   That  the  wage   scale  for  the  Central  Competitive 
Field  couiinencin^  April  1,  1927,  must  be  continuing  and  at 
all  times  a  co npetitive  scale  wita  tae  wages  and  conditions 
prevailing  in  "/est  Virginia  and  Kentucky. 

(  ":)   That  in  order  to  make  effective  Cia/use  1  a  Goai- 
missicn  be  selected  by  the  resoective  'oarties  to  t..iis  Agree- 
ment consisting  of  four  L'iners  and  four  Operators  and  firee 
mediators  to  be  mutually  chosen  by  such  Commission;  or  should 
such  Conraission  be  unable  to  agree  upon  three  persons  to  act 
as  med?.ators,  or  for  any  rea.son  whatsoever  shall  f a,il ,  neg- 
lect or  refuse  tc  select  such  mediators,  then  the  Chief 
Ju-stice  of  tie  United  States  Supreme  Court  shall  at  once 
select  such  mediators,  and  sucn  selection  shall  be  accepted 
by  bot;.L  pe-rties  to  this  contract. 

(5)   That  the  duties  of  such  Com:nissio  n  shall  be  as  fol- 
lows: 

{^.)      To  determine  a  competitive  wage  scale  for  the  Cen- 
tral Competitive  Field. 

(b)  To  readjust  such  scale  from  time  tc  time  in  order 
to  mainta-in  comnetitive  conditions. 

(c)  To  have  final  jurisdiction  in  all  grievances  appealed 
from  the  several  districts. 

(d)  To  perform  such  other  duties  as  may  be  -.greed  u'con  by 
the  Jo'.nt  Conference  of  Miners  and  Oioerators. 


9837 


TilBLE   III 


I'luiriber  of  Men  and  Average  ITumber   of   Days 
Lost  Per  i.Ian   on   Strike   in   Selected   Joal 
Producing   State?   in  1927 

(Derived  fro:n  Bixreau  of  Llines   DrJzz) 


i  of   Total 

Avg. 

No.    D?,ys 

Approximate 

men  employed 

lost 

"oer  man 

Stc.te 

nmnber   of  men 

who   went   on 

on 

?trike 

strike 

North 

Illinois 

67,000 

37 

150 

Indiana- 

17,000 

71 

136 

Icwa 

5,600 

64 

145 

Ol-i-. 

26,000 

74 

214 

Pennsylvania 

1/ 

41,700 

27 

158 

Sour tj. west  2/ 

Arkansas 

390 

10 

107 

Kansas 

3,000 

43 

130 

:,iissouri 

2,650 

43 

127 

Okla'-iouia 

163 

3 

156 

Sout:-. 

JLla'oc^'na 

N 

0           S  T  .^  I  K  :3 

Kentu-ckir 

1,300 

3 

14 

Tennessee 

50 

C.7 

60 

Yir'-inia 

K 

0            S  T    ^  I  K  -^ 

•7e-=t  Y  .r^inia 

08O 

0.8 

48 

1/      Centrr.l   Pennsylvania  -  13,000  uien  v/ent   r.n    strike  July  1st. 

2/     Vj^iXf   Iterations  in  these  areas  coeratei  open   shop  between 
19-/-   exi'X  1927. 


9837 


•182- 


Tj"r/;-3  negotip.tions  "based  upon  the   Central  Competitive  Field  as  a 
unit  no  longer  being  possible,  collective  bargaining  took  place  for 
individual  districts  of  areas  r^here  union  organization  v^ras  still  effec- 
tive. By  1928  most  of  the  operators  in  tne  States  of  Pennsylvania, 
Ohio,  end   pprt  of  Indiana,  reopened  their  mines  on  an  open-shop  basis 
at  lover  wage  rates  in  order  to  meet  the  competition  of  the  'onorganized 
districts. 

The  expiration  of  the  "truce"  egreements  on  April  1,  1S28,  marked 
the  cii.rtailment  of  mining  activitj'^  in  a  number  of  union  districts.   The 
most  important  areas  thus  affected  were  Indiana  and  Illinois.   The  na.jor 
portion  of  the  time  lost  due  to  industrial  disputes  in  1928  may  be  ex- 
plained by  the  renewal  in  that  yerr   of  the  suspension  that  had  prevailed, 
during  the  middle  of  the  preceding  year. 

On  February  8,  1928,  a  joint  conference  of  Illinois  operators  and 
miners  sought  to  negotiate  a.  ne'"  contract  but  adjourned  v/ithout  naicing 
an  agreeiiient.   The  operators  offered  $6.00  per  day  for  day  men,  and  34 
cents  tonnage  rate,  a  ne'"  ra.te  for  v/orkers  in  mechanized  mines  and  im- 
proved working  conditions,  but  these  were  rejected  by  the  miners.   Strip- 
ping operations  and  machine  mines  were  informed  that  they  i-'ere  permitted 
to  operate  on  the  Jacksonville  scale  after  March  31st.  The  Illinois 
operators  at  a  meeting  on  Karch  28,  agreed  to  make  no  state  association 
a^^roenient  except  at  a  wage  which  would  modify  the  Jacksonville  scale 
ajid  allow  Illinois  to  regain  its  markets.   Strip  mine  operations,  however, 
renewed  the  truce  agreement  until  Karch  31,  1929. 

ilany  minirag  operations  in  Illinois  were  suspended  after  April  1, 
1928.   The  international  policy  ccmmittee  of  the' United  Mine  Workers 
on  Ju.ly  18th  released  district  organizations  from  adherence  to  the 
Jacksonville  scale  as  a  basis  for  ne-'  negotiations.   Prior  to  the  policy 
co:ni:iittee  aJinouncement  (May  ,  1928),  a  number  of  miners'  local  unions 
in  various  parts  of  Illinois  broke  with  the  United  Mine  Workers  ond 
negotiated  agreements  on  a  lower  basis  than  the  Jacksonville  scale. 

Although  the  United  Mine  Workers  had  made  agreements  with  some  in- 
dividual operators,  no  general  resiLmption  of  work  took  place  until 
September  1st  when  a  joint  committee  of  operators  and  miners  in  Illinois 
annoiuiced  an  agreement!  The  new  wage  scale  reduced  basic  day  ra.tes  from 
$7.50  to  $6.10  and  tonnage  rates  from  $1.08  to  91  cents  (piclonining) . 
The  contract  was  to  beco.iie  effective  September  15,  1  =  28,  and  continue 
ULitil  1  larch  51,  1932. 

In  Indiana  a  similar  situation  applied  and  an  agreement  ?^as  reached 
at  Terre  Haute  on  October  18,  1928,  between  the  Indiana  Goal  Operators' 
Association  and  the  miners.   The  contract  was  effective  from  I'lover-rber  1, 
1928,  to  March  31,  1930.   The  wa^e  scale  ¥;as  the  ssjne  as  in  Illinois. 
This  contract  was  twice  extended  (one  year  each  time)  and  so  was  in 
effect  raitil  March  31,  1932. 


5837 


-13^ 


In  Septemter,  l'J28,  under  left-v.'ing  leadership,  rank  and  file 
miners  from  eleven  sta.tes  organized  the  riational  lUners  '  Union.   It 
represented  an  insurgent  movenent,  essentially  revolutionary  in  char- 
acter, and  arose  out  of  the  "Save  the  Union"  activities  of  progressive 
and  left-uing  miners  who  demanded  a  more  militant  policy  from  the 
United  i'ine  '.Torkers .( *)   The  organization  took  advantage  of  the  des- 
perate condition  of  the  bituminous  coal  miners  owing  to  low  wages, 
short  time,  and  unemplojnnent .   A  number  of  spontaneous  local  strikes 
in  the  Pittsburgh  district  about  J-une,  1831,  led  to  a  strike  wave  '^^hich 
spread  into  Southeastern  Ohio  and  northern  West  Virginia.   Mass  picket- 
ing c'jid  demonstrations  occurred.  Ey  the  middle  of  June  some  20,000 
miners  r/ere  involved.   In  an  effort  to  counteract  this  labor  upheaval, 
it  is  said  that  the  mine  operators  turned  to  the  United  Mine  Workers. (**) 
The  Creighton  Fuel  Company  and  the  Pittsburgh  Terminal  Coal  Corporation 
signed  contracts  with  the  United  Mine  Workers  in  July,  1931.   In  the 
Scotts-Run  field  of  Monongalia  Co-onty,  northern  West  Virginia,  some  28 
companies  made  a  similar  agreement. 

About  this  time  (June  27,  1331),  Hr.  Prank  Taplin,  President  of 
the  Pittsburgh  Terminal  Coal  Corporation,  wrote  a  letter  which  has 
become  public  information  and  ^'hich  indicates  why  his  company  returned 
to  collective  bargaining  negotiations  and  also  shows  the  close  relation- 
ship between  wage  and  price  competition.   This  letter  stated  in  part 
that : 

"For  the  past  four  years  these  operators  who  have 
dispensed  with  Union  agreements  have  had  plenty  of 
time  to  view  the  experience  of  running  without  any 
fixed  wage  scale  or  without  having  any  labor  organi- 
zation to  deal  with.   It  must  be  admitted  that  the 
situation  is  even  worse  than  when  we  dealt  vdth  the 
union.  I.iaiiy  operators  try  to  keep  their  properties 
operating  by  cutting  -orices  to  ridiculous  figures,  x 
then  go  back  and  cut  the  wages  of  the  miners,  and 
this  continues  until  the  level  of  the  miners  hf^s 

been  brought  down  so  lovr  in  some  places  e.s  to  be  ( 

a  disgrace  to  the  co'ontry.  Personally,  I  v/ould 
much  prefer  to  deal  with  the  United  Mine  Workers 
than  with  these  ruthless,  price-cutting,  wage-cutting 
operators  who  are  a  detriment  to  the  industry." 


C 


(*)  Watkins,  Harold  H.,  Coal  and  :.:en,  1931,  p.  230. 
(**)  Lor.vin,  Lewis,  The  American  Federation  of  Labor,  1833,  p.  263, 


9837 


"The  Southern  High  Volc.tile  fields  have  "been  cutting 
vrages  as  well  as  the  Torthern  fields,  aJid  they  are 
likely  to  get  'into  trouhle  '/'ith  the  communistic  ele- 
ment of  miners,  r-.nd  "before  v.'e  get  throTjgh  we   may  find 
that  the  only  vay  to  solve  the  wage  pro-tlem  is  to  put 
all  competitive  fields  under  a  vrell  mane-ged  union  V7ith 
a  fixed  living  wage  scale,  to  ^-Thich  the  miners  are  en- 
titled, hut  T.'hich  never -can  he  done  without  a  union 
Dscause  the  operators  nill  not  stick  to  any  decent 
fixed  wage  seale  if  they  are  left  to  their  own  devices, "(*) 

The  Pittshurgh  Terminal  Coal  Corporation  renevred  its  contract 
in  1932  and  1933. 

Another  insurrectionist  movement  against  the  internationa.l  or- 
ganization of  the  United  Mine  Workers  came  to  a  head  in  March,  1930, 
when  the  district  union  officirls  of  Illinois  (District  12)  held  a 
convention  at  Springfield,  Illinois  for  the  purpose  of  reorganising 
the  United  Mine  Workers.   The  feu?,  between  the  district  officials  oJid 
the  international  administration  headed  hy  John  L.  Lewis  was  of  long 
standing. (**)   The  Springfield  Convention  delegates  chose  Alexander 
Hovrat  as  chairman  and  later  as  president  of  the  "reorganized"  union. 
Ho^7at  liad  heen  president  of  District  14  (Kansas) -and  had  heen  expelled 
hy  Lewis.   It  was  claimed  that  all  of  Illinois,  Ife.nsas,  and  the  Soiith- 
vrest  irere  with  the  reorgpnized  union.  (***)   The  district  officials 
held  that  the  nation^jl  officers  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  had  abrogated 
the  constitution  hy  not  calling  a  biennial  convention  in  1929.  The 
national  officers,  meantime,  demanded  that  the  officers  of  the  Illinois 
miners  relinquish  their  authority  and  possessions  to  a.   provisional  dis- 
trict government  set  up  by  the  national  executive  board. (****)   The 
charter  of  District  12  hsd  been  revoked  on  October  10,  1929  and  the 
Intern^,tional  President  had  appointed  provisional  officers.   The  dis- 
trict officers  asked  for  and  secured  an  injunction  restraining  the  In- 
terna-tional  Union  and  its  af^ents  from  revoking  the  charter  of  inter- 
fering in  district  affairs.   The  attorneys  for  the  International  Union 
sorgjht  to  have  the  injunction  dissolved.   The  hearing  took  place  on 


( *)  liitujQinous  Coal  Code  Hearings,  August  10,  1933,  Vol.  II,  p.  27:1 

(**)   Cf.  events  of  1919  Convention  -  the  rebelling  elements  in  that 
convention  had  the  same  leadership  as  appeared  in  the  1930 
Springfield  meeting. 

(***)   Watkins,  Harold  M.,  Co-1  and  Men,  1931,  p.  229, 

(****)  Bloch  Louis,  Labor  Ag-reeraents  in  Coal  Mines,  Fore'-'ord  by 
"liary  Van  Kleeck. 


9837 


Decera'Dsr  16,-  19.29  a,nd  on  January  30,  1930,  the  court  refused  to  dis- 
solve the  injunction.  ( *)  '•        '   ■ 

At  the  saine  time  as  tne  Springfield  meeting,  ■  a  regular  conven- 
tion of  the  United  iv'ane  T7orl-.ers,  was  held  at  Indianapolis  to  strengthen 
the  constitu.tional  and  tactical  position  of  the'  administration.  Loth 
conve:itions  appealed  to  the  A'nerican  Federation  of  Lahor  for  support. 
President .  G-re  en  made  efforts  to  hariiionize  the  two  fpxtions  and  to  sup- 
press dual  unionism. 

After  a  year  of  hitter  fighting,  most  officers  of  the  Illinois 
district  made  their  peace  "ith  the  International  Union.  However,  a 
"r.c-ix^.-  rnd  file"  convention  Tvas  held  at  St.  Louis  on  April  15,  19"1,  at 
rpich  somg  30,000  miners  were  represented,  some  25  per  cent  of  whom 
T:ere  Illinois  miners.   The  convention  was  unsuccessful  in  launching  a 
nev;  ujiion, 

Scne  of  the. most  sorious  lahor  disputes^  involving  representation 
of  lahor  for  collective  ■bargaining  i^nd  validity  of  union  contracts, 
r/hich  \7ere  presented  to  the  lituninous  Coal  Lahcr  Boards  d.ijjring  the 
V:3A  period  arose  in  Illinois  het^'een  the  United  iane  Workers  and  the 
•  Progressive  Iliners.  At  the  present  T^riting,  the  controversy  het'^een 
these  t".70  unions  continues  imahatedj   Issues  and  personalities  are  so 
intei-vie-'ed  th-t  no  real  solution  has  thus  fpr  heen  possible. 

.  The  year  1532  marked  the  lo^^est  dei.iand  for  uitmninous  coal  since 
1904.   It  was  a  year  of  falling  prices  and  heavy  financial  losses. 
P.elief  of  the  uneuployed  was  especially  sr-rious  in  many  communities  in 
tiie  hituiainous  coal  fields,  i-'here  other  industries  to  fall  hack  upon 
',:ere  lac'r.ing  and  resor.rces  .ere  already  exiia,usted  "by  yerxs  of  depres- 
sion dating  hack  to  1924. (**)  ,  The  Ajnerican  Priends  Service  Coy.iuittee 
recognized  the  situation  as  a  special  relief  problem.   With  the  aid 
of  hoth  ::;uhlic  and  private  funds,  the  .committee  at  the  peaJ-c  of  its  ac- 
tivities in  1932  fed  miners'  children  in!  :353  commxmities  in  41  co\m- 
ties  of  '.■est  Virginia,  Kentucky,  Pennsylvania,  Southern  Illinois, 
Tennessee,  and  Ii;aryland.   This  relief  work  wa,s  supplernented  by  other 
agencies  covering  coal  p,s  well  a.s  other  ind-us tries. 

Tlie  3\  year  contract  in  Illinois  expired  on  I'arch  31,  1932.   On 
Au^gust  10,  1932,  after  a.  suspension  of  19  weeks  and  a  referendum  vote 
of  the  miners,  a  nev;  contract  was  effectuated  '-hich  extended  until 
.r-rch  31,  1933.  By  the  terras  of  this  contract  the  pickraining  rate 
was  reduced  to  68^  per  ton  (Danville  basing  point)  and  the  sca.le  for 
inside  sJcilled  men  "was  set  '."t  $5.00.  On  December  22,  1933,  the  fori.ier 


( *)   proceedings  of  the  United  I'ine  I/orlrera  of  Anierica,  1930. 
(**)   hinurals  Year  Book,  1932  -  li.33,  pt .  Ill,  p.  381. 


9837 


contract  ''as  extended  until  I->rch  31,  193':>. 

VJlien  the  wage  scale  v/aa  dra'-n  up  und.^r  the  Bituminous  Coal  Code, 
Illinois,  being  already  under  contra,ct  until  1'3?5,  kept  the  saxae  ccale. 
Under  the  amendment  to  tne  Gof:l  Code,  April  1,  1934,  the  day  rates  re- 
mained the  same  "but  the  hours  worked  per  day  were  reduced  from  8  to  7, 
thus  resulting  in  an  hourly  increase.   The  rates  for  pick  and  machine 
mined  coal  were  increased  IC  and  8  cents  respectively. 

'Jiien   the  Indiana  contract  expired  a  suspension  occurred  v/hich 
lasted  imtil  September  10,  1952,  when  the  Indiana  operators  and  miners 
negotiated  a  new  contract  to  be  in  effect  until  March  51,  1935.  J?or 
the  first  time  the  scale  for  day  men  dropped  below  that  of  Illinois  or 
$4, 575  a.s  against  $5. SO.   The  rate  for  piclonining  v;as  68  cents. 

Under  the  Goal  Code  Indiana  retained  its  contract  rates  althoiigh 
the  amend-nent  of  April  1,  1934,  rdded  10  pents  to  the  piclvmining  and 
e  cents  to  the  loading  rates,  while  hours  worked  per  day  v/ere  red-'.ced 
from  8  to  7. 

By  1952  labor  organization  in  the  bituminous  coal  mining  indus- 
try was  almost  completely  demoralized.   The  brepkdown  of  the  Jackson- 
ville Agreement  (1924-1927)  tmd  the  subseouent  reopeing  of  mines  on 
an  open  shop  basis  ?/as  a  severe  blow  to  collective  bargaining  for  the 
United  i:ine  7/orkers.   The  spread  of  non-union  operations  meant  declin- 
ing mevflbership  and  increasing  finpncial  distress  for  the  United  Mine 
TJorker  organization.   In  addition,  the  disaffection  existing  within  the 
rpjiks  of  the  organization  weakened  its  collective  bargaining  power. 
Per  exojnple,  the  Unite  Mine  "./orkers  in  1J23  claimed  an  average  paid-'^i-P 
me-,.foership  (exclusive  of  members  exonerated  from  paying  dues  because  of 
strikes,  etc.)  of  445,734  men,  3ret  by  1929  their  membership  had  fallen 
to  400,000  and  by  1932  their  claimed  membership  was  308,300.  (*)   A 
United  liine  Worker  official  stated  that  the  auditor's  report  showed 
163,793  members  in  the  orgsjiization  for  1952. (**)   Another  indication 
of  the  declining  strength  in  the  United  iiine  '.Yorkers  may  be  gotten  from 
a  survey  of  the  financial  statements  submitted  at  the  conventions. 
These  statements  are  not  su.f- iciently  detailed  in  character  to  disclose 
txact  information  as  to  the  income  and  expenditures  of  the  United  L'ine 
YJorkers.   They  do  sho'-',  however,  a  definite  decrease  in  the  balance 
on  hand  for  almost  every  audit  after  1925.   Thus  on  December  31,  1923, 
the  United  Mine  Y^orl-cers  reported  that  the  balance  on  hand  amounted  to 
$1,177,021  and  that  no  finpjicial  indebtedness  existed,  yet  by  December  31, 
1953  (even  after  the  increased  membership  arising  under  NHA)  the  bal- 


(*)  Lorwin,  Lewis,  op.  cit.,  pp.  476-477.  This  author  estimated  that 
t;io  dues  paying  merabersiiip  in  1932  was  nearer  150,000  (p. 497). 
(*=:<)  proceedings  of  the  United  Kine  V?orker  Convention  of  1932.  Strte- 
ment  made  by  Mr.  Eindmarsh. 


.857 


ance   on  h^nd  pjiio-untec  to   only  $311,E6-j>.      This   financial  T^eahening  aay 
De   r.ttriouted  to   declinin~  m.3nitsi-sliip   and  losses   in  union  areas. 

In  Septemtsr,  1932,  the'  Profre;:sive  I'iners  of  America  ^tere  or- 
^rr.ised  from  the  elements  I'hich  had  not  ret-urned  to  the  United  i:ine 
TTorker  fold.  A  hitter  anttgonism  continued  het^'een  these  two  rival 
■Lmions. 

1933 

The  most  important  events  of  the  year  1333  for  the  hituninous 
corvl  industry  centered  around  the  President's  HecmplojTnent  A^reeuent 
and  the  pas'sai5.;e  of  the  National  Industrial  Hecover'y  Act.   The  months 
ir.ii.:ediately  precedinr:  the  emergence  of  a  single  code  for  the  hituninous 
co^l  industry  pnd  its  approval  "by  the  President  on  Septemher  18th  ver© 
er.CGedingly  important  for  the  United  Mine  T-iorlcers..   The  union  engaged 
in  a  r,'hirlA7ind  Cfimpaign  using  all  its  energy  p.nd.   f-'onds  to  bring  the 
miners  into  the  union  fold,  ,  , 

The  union  organizers  vere  remarkahly  successful • in  their  efforts, 
Uith-the  exception  of  the  cpptive  mines  affiliated  r'ith  the  steel  in- 
dxistry,  no  very  s-'rious  resistance  against  the  United  hine  -jorkers  nas 
mads.  The  organization  campaign  among  the  mine  workers  in  the  Appala- 
chian coal  fields  did,  ho'vever,  have  to  contend  rith  strikes  in  Central 
Pennsylvania,  vfestern  Pennsylvania.,  Ohio,  Northern  V.'est  Virginisi  Xent\icl<y, 
Tennessee  and  Virginia.   In  general,  the  appeal  to  Section  7  (a)  of  the 
ITirA  as  a  recognition  of  the  right  to  assemble  and  to  organize  \7as  ef- 
fective.  Six  veeks  after  the  passage  of  the  Act,  the  United  nine  Work- 
ers claimed  that  their  membership  included  more  than  30  per  cent  of  the 
mine  vorkers  in  the  country. 

The  officers  of  the  union  aovealed  to  the  President  tha.t  a  con- 
ference be  organized  under  the  a-ispices  of  the  Government  to  effectu-  , 
ate  a  ^Trge  agreement.   Thin  conference  convened  in  'v/ashington  in  July, 
1935,  and  continued  through  August  '.nd  the  major  part  of  September.       / 
The  meeting  of  the  Appalachian  coal  opera.tors  and  representatives  of      ^ 
the  United  Jiine  Workers,  respectiveli",  representing  more  than  70  per 
cent  of  the  national  tonnage  and  of  the  employees  negotia^ted  a  v^age 
a/greenent  Fhich  becaj'ae  effective  October  2,  1S33.   It  established  a 
more  closely  competitive  wage  relationship  than  had  ever  prevailed  in 
■the  industry.   It  established,  in  general,  a  base  rate  for  skilled  in- 
side day  men — tracklpyers — of  $4,2^  in  states  south  of  the  Ohio  Pdver 
cnc.   ;?4,6C  in  the  northern  states  in  the  Appalachian  region.   It  was 
effective  until  March  31,  1931.  Schedules  as  to  basic  day  wa^es  ( in- 
sic.e  [^killed  and  outside  common  labor)  for  all  districts  in  the  United 
Str.tc-3  -'ere  vritten  into  the  pitmoinour;  Goal  Code..(*) 


(*)  The  rctual  details  of  wr.ges  and  hours  under  the  IMRA  are  discussed 
in  the  follovinr  sections. 


9337 


Tli3  imion  drive  in  Pen 'sylvMiia  to  orgrnize  the  mine  vorkers  -rorer.d 
to  tp2:e  in  r.ll  o-errtions  in  I:---Gtte  Coiint;-,  Pen"  s"-lv?-Aia,  ?,s  '-'ell  o.s  c, 
nurater  of  ::ines  in  TeGtmorcl&i:".,  Greene,  "iVr- shin?'ton  -.n.:-  Alleghany  Covjities.(  *) 
A  stirke  followed  involving  considerp.'ble  violence.  Fen.r  that  the  strike 
might  spread  to  all  nining  regions  ea.st  of  the  !  ississippi  led  the  ?.?..A. 
to  intervene.  A  truce  pgreenient,  aoproved  hy  the  President  on  August  5th 
was  intended  to  have  the  miners  ret"ui'n  to  trork  A'ugust  7th,  but  ^nas   not 
rholl  •  s-iiccessful. 

A  ne-"  strike,  involving  some  55,000  miners,  hroke  out  in  Western 
Pennsylvania  after  a  meeting  at  Pricedale  on  Septernher  13th.   The  strike 
w,as  originally  directed  at  the  delay  in  adopting  the  Code,  "but  was  la.ter 
trfijasfor:.ied  into  a  demand  for  union  recognition,  \'hen  the  steel  comp":.:ies 
operating  crptive' mines  hesitated  to  sign  v/pge  agreeme-its.  (**) 

i'he  strike,  once  under  v;\y,  spread  rapidly  to  "practically  all  uines 
in  VJestern  /nd  Southwestern  ^ennsylvrnia.   At  its  height  the  strike  involved 
ahout  75,000  men,  of  '"horn  20,000,  largely  in  central  Pennsylvania,  returned 
to  vork.  on  October  3rd.   Cla.shes  heti/een  pickets  and  mine  gua.rds  occtu-red  in 
severd  instances.   After  intervention  of  United  Tine  Worker  officials  and 
the  ;■,?.  .A.,  the  steel  coino,anies  (Seote, iher  2;)  signed  an  agreement  to  observe 
the  hovers  ajnd  wage'  provisions  of  the  Coal  Code  and  to  observe  Section  7(a) 
of  the  iy.I,.?..A.  Further  difficulty  arose  over  the  question  of  the  check-off. 
President  Roosevelt  on  October  6th  sirrjaoned  steel  representatives  to  a 
White  House  conference  v'here'  conditions  governing  future  negotiations  Mere 
discussed.  Ey  October  TSth,  or.  acticalli"  all  the  coinmercicl  mines  reopened, 
exceot  those  in  the  Coniellsville  field.   The  ca.ntive  mines  vrere  shut  down 
until  after  October  30th  r.he'n  tne  Presid.ent  held  another  conference  a.t  ^rhich 
the  cueck-off  was  conceded.  (***) 

So.ie  12  o^oerators  in  SoutJ-iern  Ohio  had  resu^-ied  contrr.ctua.l  relations 
with  the  United  kine  Wor.kers.   This  contr-.ct  mss   entered  into  on  June  15, 
1933  and  -as  effective  "until  such  time  as  state  agreements  could  be  :.iade," 
The  scala  for  inside  skilled  nen  was  -^3.23  per  day. 

The  Progressive  kiners  of  A.ierica  negotiated  a,  wage  contract  '-ith  the 
Illinois  Coal  Producers'  Associati^'n  on  April  1,  1933  which  was  effective 
until  karch  51,  1935.   The  contract  -rovided  for  the  sai^e  scale  as  in  the 
United  kine  jorker  agreeiieat. 

A  noir.ber  of  operations  in  tne  Pocaliontas  and  Tug  Hiver  districts,  in 
Southern  Uest  Virginia,  alsq  ■►--re  closed  by  strikes  early  in  October.   Some 
1,50,:  to  5,000  miners  in  Arkansas  and  Oklahoma  stopped  work  in  Septe/.ber 
in  protest  against  the  wage  scale  set  up  in  txie  Code  and  returned  to  work  only 
on  the  promise  of  an  upward  wsg-e  revision.   Some  strikes  in  Lee  and  TTise 
Counties,  Virginia,  took  place  over  the  auestion  of  vjaion  activity. 

Industrial  disputes  in  tae  Soutn  centered  arouiid  the  questions  of  union 
recognition,  the  check-off,  and  employment  of  checkweighnen.   Ten  Alabajaa 
mines,  employing  2,000  men,  were  affected  by  a  strike  in  October  whic/i  continued 
until  the  middle  of  the  month.   The  strike  was  ended  by  the  esta.blishne-at  of 

J*)      Coal  Aii.e,  Aujaist,  1953,  p.  285.  """^ 

(**)   Co^a  Aj:e,  October,  1935,  p.  354. 

(***)   Coal  Age,  Kovenber,  193':,  p.  355. 

9837  I 


-190- 

collective  "Dargair.ing:_nr,chine::7.   In  Southern  Tennessee  (Octoter)  .nines  \-ere 
closed  dovTi  "becaiise  of  distrereeraent  regarding  the  chec]:-off .   This  strike 
ended  Octooer  25th  "hen  the'^fe.'^e  p,gree;Ment  included  the  check-off < 

Soi.ie  disturbances  occurreo.  in  the  'hoc'.:/   'Ount'.'.in  re^^ion  vhere  the 
N-tion.  1  :  iners  Union  organized  strikes  in  Gallup,  m-i   i  exico,  and  in  Carbon 
Coiuit;-,  '^t-^h. 

Tlis  industrial  dis'outes  described  c,bove,  even  thoiigh  mp'.ny   of  them 
occurred  after  the  Bit-uminous  Co-^l  Code  becjiae  effective  (October  2), 
chc.r.acterize  the  stresses  ;,nd  strpins  vrhich  had  to  be  adjiasted  bet'"'een 
ooer -.tors  and  miners  after  years  of  chaos  anu  disorganization.   Thej^ 
rejrjsent  _:robleuis  of  local  rearrejigernent .   Once  these  difficulties  'Tere 
settled,  production  for-:'ed  ahead. 

Regarding  the  coal  industry,  it  has  been  said  that: 

"In  no  Ouher  industry,  T'ith  the  possible  exception  of  agricultiu-e, 
iia.s  the  classik;al  conceot  of  unr3strictec  competition  as  the  automatic  , 
rnc.  beneficent  regmlctor  of  prices  and  wage  rates  sh0T,7n  more  serious    ^- 
defects."  (*) 

The  Corl  Industry,  oerhaps  more  thrn  any  other  brEnch  of  industrial  activity, 
stood  to  gain  from  the  control  of  wageij  ano  v.:rice  cutting. 

1334 

Prior  to  the  e:cDiration  date  (i'arch  31,  1934)  of  the  Appalachipn 
Agreoiient  a  ne-'  wpge  contr-ct  r-as  negotiated  providing  in  general  a  basic 
inside  skilled  day  r^te  of  $4.60  for  states  south  of  the  Ohio  River  and 
$5.00  in  states  north  of  the  Gnio  diver.  (**)   It  also  provided  for  an 
increase  of  10  cents  per  ton  for  picbnining,  8  cents  per  ton  for  machine 
mining,  riz   increg^se  of ,  1  cent  -per  ton  for  cutting,  t^nd  for  all  yardage  e-nd 
deadvor::  rates  an  incre.-^se  of  S  obrcent.   It  est'blished  a  ■uniform  7-hor.r 
daj'"  prid  a  five-d?^-  ^reek  for  mine  vorkers  in  the  Appalachian  coal  fields, 
with  exemption  granted  to  certain  classifications  of  labor.   This  schedr.le    '^ 
?/as  rrritten  into  the  Bituminous  CopI  Code. 

Tao  3-ear  l'd34  represented  the  first  full  yeci.r  under  the  Bitnminoixs  Coal 
Code.   In  terms  of  the  industry  ^en3Tsll'-,    coraparrtive  peace  prevailed.   In 
soecific  instances,  ho^^ever,  industrial  disputes  carried  over  from  the 
preceding  ye?r  still  harassed  the  industry.   Controversies  regercdng  the 
captive  nine  O'cerations  in  Division  I  pnd  the  United  hine  Tvorkers  vs. 
Fro';res3ive  Liners  of  Aiierica.  in  Illinois  (Division  II)  had  their  origins 
prior  to  1934.  i;iother  group  of  distn.rbances  srose  out  of  dissatisfaction 
Fith  the  ^endment  to  the  Code  (April  1,  1934)  and  its  changes  in  hears  and 
W'ves.   In  many  cases  mines  Fere  shut  down  as  a  protest.  Later  modifications 
of  the      dment  alleviated  conditions,  although  certain  areas  '?uch  as 
Western  Kentucky  were  definit'ily  alienated  (sec  Chapter  VI). 


(*)   ::iner-ls  Ycrrbook,  1934,  Part  III,  p.  55r.. 

(**)   The  situations  arising  under,  this  nev;  '7jtge  agreement  are  treatec 

Chapter  VI. 
9837 


Consic.eralDle  -ancertfanti^  existed  as  to  the  proper  p.uthority  having- 
jarisdiction  over  tiia  co-ptive  mine  operations  in  Western  Pennsylvania.   Tlie 
National  Labor  Bof-rd  held  thab  it  had  no  authority  over  these  mines  imtil 
freec.om  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Biturainous  Coal  Code  could  he  estah- 
lishec.,   The  Divisional  Co-il  Lr.oor  Board,  on  the  otner  hand,  stated  that 
since  tnese  mines  had  signrpd  the  Prasident's  Reemployment  Agreement,  they 
were  not  suhject  to  the  Coal  Code.  The  prohlem  concerned  captive  mine  "'age 
a,55re3,.ients  gjid  vrhether  the-se  should  he  niade  with  the  union  officials  as 
individuals  representing  the  employees  or  as  officials  of  the  United  :;ine 
Workers.   The  ITaticnal  Lahor  Board  held  hearings  on  H .  C.  Prick  Coke 
Compan;-  ;  nd  affiliates  Januar-  4th  and  8th  end  rendered  its  decision  on 
January  IStl:.   The  Board  set  up  a  contract  vdiich  r^as  a  compromise.  As  to 
the  check-off,  the  Board  declared  taat  the  check-off  clfuse  in  commercial 
mine  ac-seraents  should  apply  to  captive  oper'^tions,  hut  in  deference  to  the 
opevp.tor's  contentions  added  that; 

^nothing  in  the  foregoin;;  shall  "be  construed  to  deny  to  rny  employee 
not  a  memher  of  the  United  Mine  Workers  the  right  to  make  voluntarjr 
assignments  of  his  vages  for  dues  or  payments  to  any  organization  of 
7/hich  he  may  he  a  memher,  or  for  any  other  purpose". 

The  findings  in  the  Fric' :,  ^^Vational  Kining  and  Sharon  Coal  &  Linestone 
cases  Tjere  applied  by  s-apalementary  order  to  the  Inland  Collieries,  Consumers 
i.Iinin;-^-,  Republic  Steel,  A-lleghrny  Corl  &  Coke,  Crucible  Fuel,  Weirton, 
Shannopin  sjid  Vesta  Coal  cases.  (*)   The  ll-tional  Lrhor  Board  during  Jan-'j^.ry 
also  ordered  elections  to  be  held  ?t  several  mines  in  Tfestern  Pennsylvania. 

In  Illinois  violent  outbux-sts  in  the  controversy  between  the  United  ilne 
Workers  ■.nd  the  Progressive  L'iners  continued  to  occar.   Especially  tro^^ble- 
some  v/as  the  question  of  which  union  should  represent  the  miners  for  the 
purpose  of  collective  bargaining.   Petitions  vere  received  demanding  a 
state  T'ide  referendum.   The  State  Legisl",t-!.u-e  also  pas'^ed  a  resolution 
calling  for  such  a  referendiitn  under  national  ^"uspices.   The  Chairmen  of  the 
Divisional  Coal  Labor  Boord  (Division  II)  declsTed  in  fey  that  no  authority 
existed  in  lT.a.A.  or  the  Bitn^iinoxis  Coal  Code  for  a  state  wide  referendum. 
He  held  that  a  vote  could  bo  held  in  determining  the  relationship  between  pn 
employer  and  his  men  in  a  given  plant  but  that  no  authorization  existed 
ap'clying  to  all  employees  of  -11  employers  in  a  given  industry. 

In  specific  instances,  the  board  ruled  that  when  a  contract,  arising 
out  of  collective  gargaining,  was  in  force  at  a  given  mine,  the  contract 
must  continue  imtil  its  expiration  date.   Where  no  such  contract  existed, 
an  election  was  authorized  to  deter.jine  the  employees'  representatives. 

A  strike  for  union  recognition  hegaji  in  Alabama  at  two  operations  on 
February  ISth  and  spread  so  tiiat  it  included  approximately  2,0CC  men  in 
Bibb  and  Shelb?'-  Counties.  (**)   National  Crua.rd  troops  were  ordered  into 
Coleanor,  Alabama  on  February  25th  to  maintain  order.  Delegates  from  25 
locals  voted  a  strike  on  March  4th  at  operations  in  7»alker  and  Jefferson 
Counties.   The  strike,  ad  its  height,  involved  over  40  mines  and  10,000 
men.  A  wage  contract  patterned  after  the  Fpick  agreement  was  signed' iiarch 
16th  b^-  Alabajna  operators  representing  80  percent  of  the  commercial  tonnage 
in  the  ^tate.   The  Division  III  Laboi  Eoarc.  had  held  by  a  2  to  1  decision 
that  the  walkout  was  a  violation  of  the  Bituminous  Code  and  ha,d  ordered 
a  ret-u-n  to  vrork  by  .  arch  12th.   The  contract  contained  check-off,  check- 

weighien.  and  pit  committee  orovisionr, . 

9837  (*)  Coal  Age, Feb. 1934, p. 82.  (**)  Coal  A^e,  I  .arch, 1934, p.  115. 


Lp.lior  difficulties  in  lr,te  Ap'.il  vn<i."';.y-   revolved  1,-^gely  n.roiond 
revisions  in  the  ur.Te   rrtes  embodies  in  tile  T.H.A.  nodifying  order  of  April 
22nd.  Sone  violent  oufbrea'.s  occtirred  in  Al-.Ofma.  The  DeBardelelien  Coal 
Corporr.tion,  one  of  the  two  large  .compajiies  not  ;oa.rties  to  the  i>rch 
agreenent,  signed  a  contract  on  Ta:'  23rd  ;g::'antin.g  the  check-off.  (*) 

'.Jestern  -i-entuclr'  mines  in  Hophins,  T/eoster,  Union  and  Christian 
Counties,  iThich  had  shut  doni  in  protest  to  the  $4,50  day  scale  esta.hlished 
in  the  AP^il  22nd.  order,  reopened  on  ley-  3rd  under,  the  protection  of  a 
Federal  Coxirt  restraining  order.   The  unionized  nines  in  Ohio  and  ^uhl- 
enherg  Counties  renained  closed  until  May  14th,  when  a  fev/  mines  reopened, 

Ifegotiationshetneen  Harlan  (Kentuckjr)  ooerators  and  the  United  Kine 
Workers  in  April  failed.  This  district  continued  to  he   troublesome  and 
on  I'ay  4th,  lI.Ii.A.  representatives  reouestsd  an  investiga.tion.   !^o 
investigration  was  made  for  ,,l::ost  a.  year.  (**)   The  report  resultin-  from 
this  investigation  depicts  such  o-eplor^ahle  conditions  as  dishonest  elections 
and  denial  of  individiial  riyhts  and  lioerties. 

In  the  South^rest,  shaft  .-liner;  r^-nained  idle  in  lay,  "hile  operators 
threatened  court  action  and  a'v7aited  the  completion  of  m   '-.R.A.  investi- 
gation TThether  the  $4.35  day  scale  in  the  April  22nd  order  \7as  ercessive. 
Strip  mines  continued  to  opera.te  although  a  strij-:e  at  the  open  pits  in 
Llinden,  yissoiu-i  in  '.'.r:/   evidenced  miner  discontent. 

The  Roslyi'i  -  Cle  Elu-i  field  in  Washington  v;as  affected  "by  a  strike 
call  on  ^ril  1st  i.ia,de  h-j   tlie  'Jestern  L'iners'  Union.   The  Division  V  Lahor 
Bor.rd  declared  that  yny  United  Pine  TiTorkers  joining  the  insurgent  union 
T7ere  hound  h^'-  the  contr.act  made  h;/  the  regulp,r  orgaaiizr.tion. 

Statistical  SuoDleuent  —  Industrial  iPismtes;   The  effect  of  industrial 
disputes  upon  the  prooueti  :n  of  oituninoiis  coal  is  clearly  illustrated  v^hen 
monthly  production  dr.ta  are  plotted  r.gainst  ma.n-da.y3  lost  r^er  je^r   due  to 
strikes  and  lockouts.  These  data,  shorring  the  inverse  rela.tionship  hetreen 
ind.ustrial  disputes  and  production  for  the  period  of  1917  -  1'935,  are  set 
forth  in  Chart  I  (Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  and  ''est  Virginia.),  Chart  II  (Indiana, 
Illinois,  and  ^^entucicj^) , .  and  their  accompanying  ts-hles.   The  selected  states 
vrere  so  grouped  as  to  "bring  states  together  nhich  a.ra  generally  recognized 
as  entering  into  direct  competition  v:ith  one  another.   In  ea.ch  chs.rt,  two 
states,  Tisua.lly  considered  unionized,  are  cojaparod  -'ith  a  state  that  has 
"been  predomina.fel;'-  non-union. 

The  first  major  disturbance  in  the  oroduction  of  coal  shown  in  Chart 
I  occurred  during  the  strike  of  1213  which  lasted  from  IJovemher  1  to 
Decemher  12.   The  strike  was  effective  in  most  of  the  important  coal 
producing  arenas  of  the  United  States.   It  will  he  noted  that  in  Pennsyl- 
vania the  monthly  production  imnediately  prior  to  the  strike  was  over 
17,000,000  tons.  During  the  strike  period  this  production  declined  to 
approximately  7,000,000  tons.   In  Ohio,  for  the  sane  period,  monthly 
production  decreased  froii  sliyhtT/  mare  th-^n  5,000,000  tons  to  a, negligible 
sjiount.  The  'production  decline  in  VIest  Vir  .-inia  was  less  sharp  than  in 


(*)   Coal  A:;e,  Jvaie ,    1934,  p.  254. 

(•**)  -.'; port  of  Governor's  Inviestigation  Commission  on  Harlan  County  Coal 
FiL-lds,  June  7,  1935. 

9037 


either  fenns.ylvania  or  Ohio,   Similarly,  the  raan-dn^'-s  lost  due  to  strikes 
and  lockouts  in  '."est  Virgini.^  were  not  as  sif-nif ic^nt  c.s   in  the  other 
tno  states.   The  threat  of  ■•.  suspension  of  mining  aclivities  existed 
several  months  orior  to  the  ;i.ct-c:/jl  strike  and  monthlv  "oroduction  in  all 
three  states  anticipated  the  threatened  strike.   In  Penns^^lvania  the 
strike  was  very  effective  in  the  organized  fields,  hut  did  not  apply 
to  raa,ny  of  the  non-union  or  captive  operations.  Ohio,  ^'hich  was  a 
strongly  organized  state,  had  j;n  eliaost  complete  suspension.   Since  >'est 
Virginia  was  less  unionized  then  the  other  states,  the  strike  was  less 
effective  there. 

Following  the  de-oression  year  of  1921,  the  tnreat  of  a  strike  in 
the  early  months  of  1922  was  clearly  reflected  hy  the  sharp  rise  in 
monthly  proouction  in  all  three  states.   On  April  1,  the  suspension 
took  place  and  it  continued  ".o  aoout  the  middle  of  j-Ugust ,  1922,   The 
number  of  man-days  lost  due  to  industrial  disputes  in  Pennsylvania  during 
this  year  amounted  to  18,039,000,   Despite  the  fact  that  the  strike  call 
a-Qplied  primarily  to  union  men,  a  niJ-raher  of  non-ionion  miners  in  the  coking 
fields  in  the  vicinity  of  "estmoreland  and  Somerset  also  went  out  on 
strike.  As  a  result  the  decrease  in  "oroduction  durin,i:  the  strike  :oeriod 
is  more  pronounced  in  1922  than  in  the  strike  of  1919, 

In  Ohio  the  nui.iher  of  rarn-doys  lost  during  the  year  1922  amounted 
to  ap-oroximately  5,503,000  anr  the  decrease  in  monthly  production  is 
indicated  h-  a  decline  from  over  3,000,000  tons  to  almost  nothing.   The 
man-days  lost  during  1922  in  -"est  Virginia  exceeded  5,000,000,   The 
production  data,  ho-jevor,  do  not  show  a  very  sharp  decline  during  the 
strike  period.   The  less  sharr)  decline  may  he  explained  hy  the  fact  that 
the  strike  was  effective  only  in  the  unionized  portions  of  the  state. 
The  non-union  arep.s  in  I7est  Virginio.  gained  hy  the  strike  and  exerted  all 
efforts  to  increase  their  out-^ut. 

After  1922,  we  find  no  major  lahor  distm-hances  in  Pennsylvrnia  or 
Ohio  until  1927,  althou;:h  sor.ie  operations  in  "Jestern  Pennsylvrnia  ^7ent 
on  a  non-union  basis  after  a  shut  do'jn  early  in  1925.   In  'Test  Virginia, 
however,  a  more  serious  labor  dispute  took  iDlace  during  the  year  1924  and 
continued  into  1925,   This  dispute  arose  out  of  the  fact  that  many  mining 
operations  ¥rere  shut  down  cue  to  thu  contention  of  the  o"oerators  that 
they  were  unable  to  "oay  the  scale  of  wages  set  by  the  ""altimore  Agreement 
(counterpart  of  Jacksonville)  and  continue  to  compete  with  non-union 
operators. 

The  Jacksonville  Agreement  terminated  legall?'"  on  Auril  1,  1927,  and 
the  failure  to  arrive  at  a  new  wa^e  agreement  resulted  in  a  suspension 
of  mining  in  Pen?isylvari.ia  and  Ohio.  The  man-da^-s  lost  in  1927  in 
Pennsylvania  aporoximated  6,500,000,   In  Ohio  the?/  amounted  to  5,605,000, 
Monthly  production  declined  sharply,  indicating  the  degree  to  which  the 
suspension  was  effective.   It  will  be  noted,  however,  that  in  neither 
Pennsylvania  nor  Ohio  v/as  the  suspension  as  pronounced  during  1927  as  in 
the  industrial  disioutes  of  1919  and  1922.   The  ery^lanation  is  largel"-  to 
be  found  in  the  disorgonization  of  the  union  in  both  areas.   The  loss  of 
man-days  in  1927  in  "est  Virginia  was  negligible  \7hile  monthl-  production 
rose  to  a  high  level,  indicating  the  degree  to  vrhich  Hest  Virginia 
benefitted  from  the  suspension  of  mining  in  the  cor.roeting  States  of 
Pen;isylvani8-  and  Ohio, 

9837 


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A  slight  rise  in  the  numoer  of  lar.n-da'^s  lost  due  to  strikes  and 
lockouts  occurred  dui-inc:  19C1  in  both  Pen^isvlv-nia  and  ''est  Virginia. 
This  rise  reflects  scattered  and  sooradic  labor  disturb.vnces  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  lairmout  field  in  '''Gst  Virginia  and  in  the  Western 
Pennsylvrnia  district.   In  a  large  'oart  these  disturb'inces  grei?  out  of 
the  discontent  eidstin-^  among  the  miners  because  of  low  irage  rates  and 
threatened  reductions  in  wa.q;es,  as  ■'all  as  the  lack  of  em^^loyment 
accompanying  the  general  depression  e-dstinf.;  tlii^oughout  the  country'-. 

In  Ohio  in  1932  a  similar  situa,tion  a„rose.   Lian-days  lost  due  to 
strikes  snd  lockouts  mo-unted  in  excess  of  2, 000,000  and  production 
declined  sharply,   Tlie  labor  dispute  vas  not  successful  in  averting  wage 
reductions  nor  in  securing  a  collective  bargaining  agreement. 

The  sharp  rise  in  the  loss  of  man-days  during  the  summer  months  of 
1933  in  Pennsylvania  is  a  "oai't  of  the  discussion  of  collective  bargain- 
ing under  IJ.H.A.  and  v/ill  be  treated  in  Chapter  VI. 

The  statistical  data  on  monthl"-  production  and  maji-days  lost  due  to 
strikes  and  lockouts  during  the  period  1917  -  1935  for  Indiana,  Illinois, 
and  Kentucky-  are  set  forth  in  Chart  II  and  Table  II.  These  three  states 
compete  directl-  v.'ith  one  ajiother.   Indiejia  and  Illinois  represent  highly 
organized  areas,  vhile  Zentuclr  (exce-ot  for  'Testern  Kentucky  uo  to  1925) 
is  predominately  non-union. 

Daring  the  strike  of  1919  -oroduction  in  Indiana  and  Illinois 
declined  almost  to  zero,  '.Thile  in  Kentuckr^  any  loss  in  tonnage  due  to 
striking  union  labor  in  TTestarn  ^^entuclr^  is  concealed  b"^  the  increased 
output  in  non-union  Eastern  ifentucic:--  which  produces  the  major  portion  of 
the  state's  tonnage.   It  shoixLd  be  noted  that  in  consequence  of  the  strike 
threat  TDroduction  mounted  rapidly  immediately  prior  to  the  effective  date 
of  the  strike.   Indeed,  monthl-^  -oroduction  in  Illinois  increased  from 
slightly  over  4,000,000  tons  in  the  middle  of  1919  to  over  8,500,000  tons 
during  October,  1919,   One  mic-  also  observe  that  with  the  ending  of  the 
strike  and  the  resumption  of  Liining  activities,  production  hit  a  relatively 
high  point,  indicating  effortu  to  recoup  the  losses  that  occiirred  during 
the  strike  period. 

The  great  industrial  dispute  of  1922  is  cle€a-l>-  reflected  in  the 
production  data  for  Indiana  and  Illinois  where  effective  union  organization 
bro-ught  a  complete  susr^ension  of  mining  activities.   The  sharply  curtailed 
production  is  reflected  in  the  increased  nunoer  of  man-days  lost  during  the 
year,  in  Illinois  amounting  to  11,548,000  and  in  ^ndiana  approximately 
3,924,000.  j>aring  the  same  "oeriod,  Kentucky  production  increased  from 
ap:oroximatel^^  3,000,000  tons  a  month  to  over  5,000,000  tons.   This 
increase  is  e:qplained  b;-  the  fact  that  the  organized  miners  in  VJestern 
Kentuck"-  worked  under  a  no-strike  agreement  and  therefore  continued  to 
produce  tonnage  which  replaced  much  of  that  lost  in  Indiana  and  Illinois. 
In  the  non-union  fields  of  Kentuclc"-  production  continued  at  an  even  greater 
rate  during  and  because  of  the  strike  in  the  contiguous   states  of  Indiana 
and  Illinois, 

The  next  industrial  disoute  as  reflected  in  lost  man-days  occurred 
in  Kentucky/  in  1924,   Tliis  situation  arose  out  of  the  contention  that  the 
OToerators  were  no  longer  able  to  pay  the  \7age  scale  specified  in  contract 

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for  1923  -  1925.   ConsideraMe  discontent  develo-oed  among  the  organized 
miners  and  in  many  instances  mines  v/ere  shut  do'vn  to  "be  reo-oened  later 
upon  an  open  shop  "basis.  After  1925  the  State  of  KuntuclC'^  as  a  whole 
was  almost  entirely  non-unioii. 

The  period  1934  -  1927  sho',7s  very  few  man-days  lost  in  Indiana  and 
Illinois.'  The  e:q3lojiation  for  this  situation  is  to  he  found  in  the 
Jacksonville  Agreement  which  was  in  effect  during  this  period  and  which 
represented  a  joint  agreement  "between  miners  and  operators. 

The  next  indication  of  labor  unrest  is  found  in  1927,  On  April  1st 
of  tha.t  year  the  Jacksonville  Agree  ent  terminated  and  the  conference 
held  in  Miami  which  sought  to  negotiate  a  new  agreement  ended  in  failiu-e. 
The  organized  miners  in  Indiana  and  Illinois  suspended  work  on  April  1st 
on  the  "basis  that  they  had  no  contract.   The  industrial  dispute  lasted 
from  April  1st  to  September  and  into  October.  As  a  result,  for  the  year 
1927  man-days  lost  in  '^ndiana  approximated  2,500,000  and  in  Illinois 
exceeded  10,000,000.   In  Kentuclc^'",  to  the  contrary,  man-days  lost 
were  negligible  and  prodviction  rose  sharply.  Uon-union  Kentuck^.^  gained 
in  production  diu-ing  the  dispute  period  at  the  expense  of  the  neighboring 
organized  states.   The  termination  of  the  strike  in  1927  came  with  a 
"truce"  agreement  for  Indiana  and  Illinois  which  provided  for  a 
continuation  of  the  previous  contract  wage  until  April  1,  1928.   It  will 
be  noted,  therefore,"  that  earl"  in  the  year  1928  rjroduction  in  both 
Indiana  and  Illinois  increased,  antici-oating  the  possibility  of  a 
strike  with  the  termination  of  the  "truce"  agreement.  TThile  the  new  wage 
agreement  was  made  in  1928,  there  were  scattered  interruptions  but  no 
major  dispute  equivalent  to  those  of  1919,  1922  and  1927. 

The  next  sharp  rise  in  man-days  lost  occors  in  Illinois  in  1932  and 
to  a  lesser  degree  in  Indiana.   To  a  large  extent  this  loss  is  attribu- 
table to  the  ending  of  wage  agreements  in  both  states  and  the  development 
of  new  v;age  contracts.   The  loss  in  man-days  and  in  production  during 
this  -oeriod  was  also  due  in  riart  to  the  refusal  of  some  miners  in  Illinois 
to  accept  the  reduced  ?/age  scale  in  the  new  United  ^■'■ine   "Torker  Contract, 

The  data  presented  in  Chni^t  III  and  Table  III  illustrate  graphically 
the  effect  of  the  three  major  strikes  oh  production  for  selected  com.r)eting 
states.   The  production  data  for  the  strikes  of  1919  (November  and  half 
of  December) ,  1922  (April  to  August) ,  and  1927  (April  to  September)  are 
compai-ed  with  that  of  the  comparable  months  in  the  base  years  of  1918, 
1920  and  1925. (*)   The  losses  and  gains  in  production  during  the  strike 
periods  are  indicated  by  percentage  deviations  from  the  base  line. 

During  the  1P19  strike,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  Penns^-lvania,  and 
West  Virginia  showed  losses  in  production,  while  for  the  same  period 
Virginia  and  Kentucky  showed  gains.   The  percentage  losses  in  production 


(*)   Each  base  year  was  selected  with  the  view  toward  its  representativeness 
and  freedom  from  disturbing  factors.   The  year  1918  was  chosen,  even 
though  production  was  subjected  to  war  time  demand,  because  it  was  a 
full  year  of  government  regulation  and  continuous  production.   The 
choice  of  1920  as  a  base  year  rests  on  the  assumption  that  it  was  more 
representative  than  the  depression  year  of  1921,   The  year  1925  was 
chosen  as  being  closest  to  the  strike  year  1927  without  having  a 
disturbing  element  as  the  British  strike  in  1925, 

9837 


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i-i  Illinois  ap-nrordmnted  73,4;  in  Indiana,  74.1;  pnd  in  Ohio,  76.5.   In 
..V.n:is2'lv:'nia  the  loss  .••no■unte^  to  37.0  oercent,  and  in  Uest  Virginia  it 
amo-unted  to  only  4,9  pex-cent.   Tiie  losses  in  Illinois,  -ndiana  and  Ohio 
were  more  -Dronoimced  thtm  in  Pennsylvania,  and  "'est  Virr';inia  "beca^uso  the 
former  states  were  more  hi^^;hl•'^  unionized  --nd  sus'oensions  were  therefore 
more  conmlete,  Virginia,  tonnai^e,  d:''jLin>^  the  strike  period,  gained  15.7 
percent  and  Kentucky,  despite  tno  fact  that  the  V/estern  Kentucky  field 
was  organized,  gained  0.3  percent.   Virginia,  "being  completel;'-  non-union 
in  character,  \rorked  a.t  capa.cit-'-  and  took  advantage  of  the  situation 
existin-?;  in  the  strike  areas. 

In  the  strike  of  1922,  the  percentage  loss  in  production  in 
Illinois  was  94.0;  in  Indiajia,  96.4;  ir.  Ohio,  83,5;  in  Pennsylvania  65.1; 
and  in  West  Virginia  10.5.   It  will  he  noted  in  this  instance  that  all 
the  areas  show  increased  strike  effectiveness  dui'ing  1922  as  compared  with 
1919,  (*)  Again  the  States  of  Virfdnia  and  Kentucky  show  tonnage  gains 
diiring  the  strike  period,  Virginia  gained  8,2  percent  while  Kentucky, 
where  oiganized  lahor  continaed  to  i^ork  under  their  contract,  gained 
48.6  percent  in  production. 

Tile    strike  of  1927  ?/as  not  as  effective  as  that  of  1922.   Illinois 
showed  a  loss  of  89.7  rjercent  in  production,   Indiana  showed  a  loss 
of  42.4  percent  and  Ohio  69  percent,  v/hile  Pennsylvajaia,' s  loss  ajnoxmted 
to  only  2.5  -oercent.   The  striking  decrease  in  Pennsylvaxiia  strike 
effectiveness  is  largel;'  ezxlained  by  the  increase  of  non-union  operations 
in  that  State.  17est  Virginia,  which  ha.d  normally  shown  losses  during 
strike  periods,  in  1927  showed  a  gain  in  production  amotuiting  to  26 
percent.   In  this  instance,  again  the  e:qplrnation  lies  in  T7est  Virginia 
having  'become  a  non-imion  State.  Virginia.' s  gain  in  production  was  6.6 
oorccnt  and  Kentuck;,^  gained  57,5  percent. 


(*)   The  significant  increase  in  strike  effectiveness  in  Pennsylvania 
during  1922  is  to  "be  attributed  to  the  walkoat  of  non-Tonion  men 
at  the  captive  operations  in  the  v;estern  ^^ortion  of  the  state. 


9837 


2.   CO'JDITIOrS  OF  EMPLOYl.EEi^TT 

Introduction;  A  c^eat  variety  of  factors  influence  the  conditions 
of  enrploynent  in  tlie  3it"aminous  Coa,l  Industry,   Soir.e  of  these  factors 
B.Te   natuxal  in  clia.racter,  ^vhile  others  are  social  or  institutionalized. 
For  example,  coal  mining  must  necessa,rily  take  place  where  coal  de- 
posits occur.   It,  therefore,  follows  that  in  ma.ny  instances  mining 
cohDTiuiiities  will  he  located  in  isolated  mouiitainous  areas,  often  far 
from  any  normal  center  of  population.  Mine  workers . frequently  are 
located  in  cnmmunities  v;hich  are  unincorporated  and  where  all  the  prop- 
erty is  OT/ned  hy  the  operating  company.   Opportunities  to  live  in  houses 
or  trade  in  stores  not  woned  "by  the  comp-ry  are  often  not  ave-ilahle. 
In  the  mountainous  or  isolated  r reas ,  onport-unity  to  engage  in  colla- 
tere.1  employment  does  not  exist  so  tii£,t  the  miner  ]:iex-haps  more  than  in 
any  other  occxp^tion  is  wholly  dependent  u^on  the  emjTloyer,   Thus,  it 
is  not  surprising  tlia.t  to  many  investigators  the  company  tov/n  talres  on 
the  appearance  of  a  feudal  estate.!./  Where  the  employer  maintains  his 
own  police  force  and  owns  every  square  foot  of  land,  as  v/ell  as  the 
houses  and  stores,  and  v/here  he  controls  all  T/orlc  opportunity  and  may 
even  dominate  the  school  and  church,  the  che.racteristics  of  a  feudal 
domain  T-ecome  evident.   The  ch•^racter  and  policy  of  the  e'raployers  urder 
these  circumstances,  'become  es^ieciolly  significant  for  the  m.inor. 

Certain  practices  'nsivc   developed  in  the  coal  mining  industry  v/hich 
through  custom  and  hahitua.tion  h:^ve  come  to  Tbe  recognized  in  the  union- 
ized areas  as  requisites  of  er.TOlor.Tuent,   The  method  and  manner  of  pay- 
ment and  the  deductions  from  the  miners'  pay  ha.ve  become  traditional 
in  certain  areas.   The  union  in  its  collective  "bargaining  process  and 
in  the  wage  agreements  lias  recognised  this  situation.  I'any  v^age  con- 
tracts go  into  considerahle  detail  as  to  checteeigliraen,  pay  periods, 
scrip  pa^-TTient ,  the  check-off,  company  house  rent,  pay  deductions,  etc. 
These  aspects  of  the  industry  as  they  affected  the  operator-miner  rela- 
tions will  he  set  forth  in  the  following  pa.ges. 

Method  and  Ifenner  of  payment;  7/eighing  and  )[e_asurin^  -  (Checkreighmen) 

The  three  basic  occupations  in  bituminous  coal  m.ining  are  those  of 
hand  or  i^ick  miners,  machine  miners  (cutters),  and  'land  loaders.   They 
represent  between  60  and  65  per  cent  of  all  the  vi&ge   earners  in  the  in- 
dustry ,i/  These  occupations  are  usually  paid  a  rate  per  ton  of  2,000 
pounds,  ru  of  mine.   These  men  are  k..o\TO  in  the  industry  as  tonnage  men 
in  contrast  to  the  day  men  whose  pay  is  based  upon  a  daily  ra.te.   Since 
payment  is  rade  on  a  per  ton  oasis,  it  becomes  necessary  that  the  measure- 
ment of  the  work  performed  !■©  demonstrably  accurate.   This  requirement  is 
significant  also  in  view  of  the  fact  fhr.t  cars  are  counted  or  weighed 
on  fae   surface  at  some  distance  from  the  miners'  worlcing  places.  Simil- 
arly, yardage  and  deadwork  sometimes  referred  to  ?.s  non-productive  labor 
requires  carefrJ.  measurement.   The  question  of  weighing  and  measuring 
work  performed  ga,ve  rise  to  frequent  complaint  and  labor  discontent, 
Y/hore  care  are  counted  rather  than  ?reighed,  the  lack  cnf  -uniformity^^in 
^   U.S.  Coal  Commission,  Part  1,  p,169;  Seport  on  Special  Policirg  in  ^ 

Industry  in  Pennsylvania,  p. 8. 
1/  U.S.  Coal  Coranission,  Part  III,  p,  1318. 

Reports  to  IT.R.A.  ("C"  Perm  of  Coal  Section)  show  thjat  in  the  period 
December  1-15,  1933,  61fJ  of  all  men  em;;.loyed  were  paid  by  the  ton, 

9837  ■   '    ■ 


-204- 

the  size  of  the  car  led  tomany  a"buses  or   the  siispicion  of  aTDuses, 
Another  cau.se  of  dispute  hetv/een  the  miners  and  o'lerators  was  the 
screened  method  of  payment.   "It  v/as  claimed  "by  the  miners  th'i.t  the 
payment  of  wages  "based  on  the  ajnomit  of  coal  v;hic"n  would  pags  over 
screens  of  a  certain  mesh  a.nd  area  v;as  su'bject  to  a"buse.   The  area 
in  square  feet  varied;  the  size  of  the  mesh  was  not  uniform;  spread- 
ers placed  on  the  screens  "broke  up  the  coal  and  made  a  disproportion- 
ate amonjit  of  fine  coal  pass  through  the  screens;  and  the  screens 
were  not  kept  in  repair."  l/   The  miners  demanded  payment  on  a,  r\m-of-  • 
mine  basis-coal  as  it  came  from  the  mine  including  lump  and  fine  coal 
without  any  preparation.   In  1916  the  run  of  mine  basis  of  pajonent 
went  into  effect  for  the  entire  Central  Competitive  field  although 
Illinois  lip.d  "been  paying  on  this  "basis  prior  to  1916.   This  situation 
was  of  long  standing,  aJthough  the  unionized  areas  ^•' ere  a,"ble  to  "bring 
a"bout  improvement.  An  illustratiovL  of  the  conditions  v/hich  existed  in 
the  latter  quarter  of  the  19th  Centviry  may  "be  quoted  here: 

"False  weights  v/ere  used.   Large  wagons,  or  pit- 
cars,  v.'ere  frequently  put  in  ,  containing  more 
coal  tlia,n  served  as  a.  "basis  of  pa^nnent  to  the 
miners;  and,  in  many  instances,  a  v/idening  of 
the  spa-ces  in  the  screens  was  resorted  to,  allow- 
ing an  extra  amount  of  coal  to  pass  through  for 
which  the  miner  received  nothing.   So  flagrant 
]na,d  these  a,huses  "become  that  in  Illinois,  Ohio, 
and  Pennsylvania-the  miners  sought  redress  through 
legislation  vfhich  should  require  pajanent  "by  run  of 
mine  or  gross  weight.   Such  a  law  ,v/as  passed  in 
Illinois  in  June,  1897;  a'jd,  later,  similar  laws 
were  passed  in  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania,"  2/ 

Siwrtv/eighting  v/as  not  only  unfa.ir  to  la"bor,  "but  it  also  represented 
an  ui.fr.ir  competitive  advanta^ge  among  operators.   Thus  for  example,  an 
opera'. 'r.  -  Col.  U.  P.  Rand  -  vra.s  a  leader  in  the  esta"bliGhment  of  the 
checlc=:'?i^',r,raan  system  in  the  ?Iocking  Valley  coal  fields  of  Ohio  in  1880.  (") 

L-.-sputes  over  v/eights  in  the  union  fields  iia.ve  1.  rgely  disappeared, 
ov/ing  to  the  universal  practice  of  providing  for  a  checlofreightma-n  and  . 
the  constant  v/atchfulness  to  insure  the  accuracy  of  the  scales.  A^ 
typical  exsjirple  of  a  clause  dealing  v;ith  the  checlCY/eightman  in  r.   union 
contract  is  as  follows: 

"Checlcv/eightman  selected  as  required  "by  law  from 
among  employees  at  the  mine,  may  "be  placed  on  each 
tipple  at  the  expense  of  the  miners,  and  their  duties 
shall  "be  only  those  presori'bed  "by  the  lavfs  of  the 
State  of  ^.Vest  Virginia.  Ho  checlcvreighman  shall  "be 
'■        placed  on-  any  tipple  except  where  same  is  selected      .  . 
"oy  "ballot  by  a  majority  vote  of  jbhe.  miners  worldng 

1/   Sufiern,  A.  E.,  "The  Coal  Miners'  Struggle  for  Industrial  Stat  us, "p. 15. 
2/  George,  J.  ";.  "Settlement  in  the  Coal-Mining  Industry"  .Qimrterly 

Jourr^l  of  Ecconomics,  Vol.  12  (1897-1898),  p. 448 
(*)  Evans,  Chris,  History  of  the  United  Mine  Yforkcrs  of  America, 

Vol.  I,  pp. 91-93 

9837 


-205- 

in  said  mine,  Checlrweightmen  sha.ll  in  no  way  inter- 
fere vdtli  the  y/or.'ing  force  or  the  operation  of  the 
mine  a,nd  shall  De  suhject  to  all  the  -oenp.lties  pro- 
vided in  this  scale  contract"  against  other  niemhers 
of  the  vrorking  force."  _l/ 

The  use  of  checlaveig-hmen  vk:,s  not  confined  only  to  the  -union  fields. 
In  some  instp.nces,  non-union  operators  allov/ed  checlcvveighmen  at  the 
mines,  but  this  measure  was  not  genera-lly  true.   During  the  1920' s,  as 
the  -ojiion  lost  strength,  the  loss  of  checkir/eighmen  in  the  formerly  union 
areas  v.as  keenly  felt.   This  need  v,'as  recognized  in  the  Bituminous  Coal 
Code,  Article  V  h),  vdicrein  provision  v/as  rnaode  for  checl::v;eigh:-nen. 

Fay  Periods:  The  matter  of  ;ia,y  periods  is  quite  important  to  the  miners 
and  al=:o  has  som.e  significance  for  the  operating  company.   In  the  earlier 
days  of  the  coal  mining  industry,  it  was  fairly  common  to  pay  miners  once 
a  month.   The  relatively  long  interval  octween  pij'  led  to  considerahle 
hardships  among  miners.  Miners,  lacking  in  foresight  and  neglecting 
budgeting,  often  fouiid  that  they  lacked  sufficient  fxuids  to  carry  them 
to  the  next  p.ay.  As  a  result,  these  miner:?  were  compelled  to  seek  ad- 
vances a:-;aiast  their  pp.y.   In  such  instances  a  condition  of  perpetual 
indebtedness  developed  which  tended  -co  hind  the  miner  to  the  operator 
and  to  restrict  his  freedom.  Y/here  the  company  paid  in  scrip,  the  miner's 
pay  advance  was  discounted  so  that  his  earnings  A«;ere  reduced.   In  those 
areas  where  the  compa^ny  operated  stores  in  competition  viiith  independent 
enter^prises,  the  miner  who  received  an   advance  felt  influenced  to  trade 
at  the  company  store.   The  length  of  time  between  pay  therefore  served 
to  augxnent  the  operator's  profit  at  the  compa/ny  store. 

In  the  union  areas  considerable  agitation  developed  for  m^ore  fre- 
quent pay  periods, (*/   Semi-monthly  pay  periods  have  become  increasingly 
characteristic  of  the  industry.   (See  Table  l)  As  a  result,  manyn of 
the  conditions  de?-cribed  above  liave  been  alleviated,   'The  Bitimiinous 
Coal  Code  specificc.lly  'orovides  for  semi-monthly  payment  of  wages, 
(Article  Y  (c)). 

Another  practice,  quite  coraraon  in  both  union  and  non-union  fields, 
w.as  to  hold  back  a  miner's  pay  for  the  initial  pay  period,   ."(See  Ta.ble  II). 
Although  the  miner  could  claim  this  pay  for  work  performed,  the  operator 
could  hold  the  wage  reserve  over  the  miner's  head  and  threaten  its  loss 
to  the  miner  v;here  the  miner's  action  vra.s  against  the  interests  of  the 
company.   It  must  also  be  remembered  tliat  a  lengthy  pay  period  and  a 
wage  hold-back  worked  in  favor  of  the  oj^erating  company  since  additional 
fronds  were  available  to  it. 


1/  Agreement  betv?cen  Northern  West  Virginia  Coal  Opercitors'  Association 
and  District  Ho.  17,  United  Iline  Workers  of  America,  Febri.iary  10,  1923, 

(*)   Evan,  Chris,  History  of  United  Mine  Workers  of  America,  Vol.  II, 
pp.  120-121;  Illinois  Weekly  Pay  Fair,  1891 


9837 


-  SOS- 
Teal)!  e  I 


Len^l 

uli 

of  Pa;: 

■  Period 

of 

Parent 

Compan 

ies 

as 

Shown 

^y 

He 

;-oort.s 

of  Compj- 

my 

Stores 

in  the 

Bit-uminous 

Coal  I 

:ndustry, 

,  "b^ 

r   States  in  19: 

34 

1 

State 


Total 


IT-umljer  of  Stores  Whose  Pa,rent  Companies 
Had  Specified  Length  of  Pay  Period 


One    Two   Semi-     Tliree 
T/eelr  Weeks  monthly   weeks 


Monthly 


Ala'osma 

37 

Colorado 

5 

Illinois 

4 

Kentucky.' 

3)00 

New  Mexico 

5 

Ohio 

9 

Pennsylvania  ' 

161 

Tennessee 

13 

Utah 

6 

Virginia 

33 

Washington 

6 

West  Virginia 

263 

Wyoming 

8 

All  others 

8 

4 

18 

209 
2 
5 


2 

79 

5 

2 

IE 

6 

52 

6 

3 


658 


458 


198 


\j      Derived  from  Tahle  17  (p,116).  The  Economic  and  Social -Implications 
•of  the  Company  Store  ai^d  Scrip  System,  il.R.A.  ,  1934,  Based  on 
Questionnaire  of  the  Bureau  of  Census, 


9837 


-207- 
ratle  II 


llvxaber 

of 

Days   for 

fcich 

Wafi^es  a 

re 

Wi trie Id 

hy 

Parent 

Companies   as    Shovra 

by 

Hei3orts 

of 

Company 

St' 

3res 

in 

the 

1  Bit-urnin 

OlAS 

Coal    Irxtus 

iiz 

,   by  States 

in 

UTjiTiher   ( 

Df   Store: 

3   Wliose 

Parent 

Cpnipanies  With- 

0 

held 

Pay  for 

Specif 

ied  IJrtmber   of 

Days 

Over 

1-5 

^1-7 

8-11 

12-15 

16-21 

22-28 

28 

Total 

da; 

Ys 

days 

days 

days 

days 

days 

days 

days 

Ala.taraa 

37 

13 

11 

13 

Colorado 

5 

1 

_ 

I 

1 

2 

_ 

„ 

Illinois 

3 

- 

_ 

_ 

5 

„ 

_ 

Kentuclcy 

95 

1 

„ 

4 

20 

70 

1 

xTew  Mexico 

5 

_ 

_ 

„ 

1 

4 

^ 

Ohio 

9 

- 

„ 

„ 

5 

4 

^ 

_ 

Pennsylvania 

154 

1 

o 

7 

56 

76 

2 

_ 

Tennessee 

12 

_ 

_ 

„ 

1 

11 

_ 

Utah 

6 

- 

1 

lo 

2 

1 

„ 

„ 

Virginia 

35 

- 

- 

« 

8 

25 

„ 

„ 

Washington 

6 

- 

_ 

„ 

„ 

6 

„ 

_ 

West   Virginia 

256 

4 

2 

4 

105 

128 

10 

„ 

Wyoming 

e 

^ 

„ 

_. 

„    ■ 

8 

5 

All   others 

8 

- 

" 

2 

3 

5 

" 

Total 

638 

7 

5 

33 

221 

354 

13 

5 

1/  Derived  from  Tahle  17  (p. 115),  The  Sconomic  and  Social  Implications  of 
the  Company  Store  aj:d  Scri-o  System,  o-m.  cit. 


9837 


-2C8- 

Peductions  frcm  Waj'^es;   It  is  a. custom  of  long  standin.;^  in  the  coal 
mining  industry  (both  union  and  non-utiion  areas)  for  operators  to  make 
certain  deductions  from  the  v/ages  of  miners.   These  deductions  fall 
into  two  general  classes  -  those  for  occupational  charges  and  those  for 
domestic  or  personal  charges.   The  former  class  includes  charges  for 
hlaclcsmi thing,  powder,  dynamite,  electric  exploders,  fuse,  caps,  carhide, 
lamp,  oil,  iTiachine  oil,  and  payment  for  the  wages  of  p.  checl3/eiglTman. 
The  second  group  includes  charges  for  household  coal,  rent,  hills  at 
the  company  store,  and  in  some  instances,  cha,rges  for  tne  support  of  the 
doctor,  hospit?,l,  school,  and  hatlilaouse. 

The  agreements  made  in  the  union  areas  usually  specify  .  . 
the  nature  and  the  amount  of  the  deductions  which  may  he  made.   Since 
these  provisions  ai'e  fixed' hy  bargaining  between  the- union  and  the 
operator,  they  Imve  ceased  to  be  factors  of  discontent. 

In  the  non-union  areas  these  deductions  are  often  refer- 
red to  as  the  operators'  check-off  because  the  charges  are  fixed  by  the 
operator.   It  was  frequently  asserted  that  the  operator  made  an  undue 
profit  .on  the  supplies  furnished  and  that. .the  charges  for  services  were 
excessive.  Miners  in  many  cases  objected. to  making  compulsory  contribu- 
tions for  the  upkeep  of  recreation  halls,  batlihouses,  and  hospitals 
which  were  normally  maintained  by  employers  in  other  industries  vathout 
charge  to  the  employees. 

The  deductions  for  occupational,  expenses  differed  v/ith  . 
the  various  occupationa.l  groups.   For  example  outside  daymen  have  no 
charges,  v;hile  inside  daymen's  charges  were,  found  to  be  seldom  in  ex- 
cess of  1  per  cent  of  the  gross  earnings  (normally  from  one-lialf  of  1 
per  cent  to  one  per  cent),  — '  Deductions  for  occupational  supplies  for 
machine  runners  generally  avei-aged  about  1;^  per  cent  of  the  gross  earn- 
ings. Pick  miners  and  loaders  are  t  le  ones  most  affected  by  occupational 
charges.   Since  these  v/orkers  represent  approximately  55  per  cent  of 
the  total  number  of  employees  engaged  in  coal  mining,  it  can  be  seen 
that  these  deductions  become  quite  significaht^  .S^  Piclaniners  pay  for 
blacksmithing  and  for  powder,  carbide,  caps,  and  other  supplies.   Where 
the  blacksmithing  cliarge  is  made  at  a  flat  rate  of  25  or  50  cents  r. 
month,  the  burden  decreases  with  increasing  tonnage  output  but  during 
a  period  of  fev/  tipple  starts  this  cliarge  ma,y  be  excessive.   Some  mines 
base  the  blacksmithing  ciiarge  on  tonnage  or  each  dolla.r  earned.  Occupa- 
tional items  tisua.lly  cost  the  pick  miner  or  loader  5  to  10  per  cent  of 
his  gross  earnings.   3/ 

Differences  in  occupationa-l  expenses  are  not  due  primar- 
ily to  the  differences  in  clia.rges  for  supplies.  For  ex<ample,  the  powder 
cost  will  differ  with  the  shooting  quiilities  of  the  coal  a.nd  the  methods 
of  mining.  At  some  mines  certain  expenses  are  borne  by  the  companj'^. 


l/^U.  S.  Coal  Cor.im.ission,  Part  III,  p.  1243. 

2j   Based  upon  reports  to  i\f.R.A.  ("C"  Form  of  Coal  Section)  covering 

253,136  employees  for  December  1-15,  1933. 
If/  U.  S,  Coal  Commission,  Fart  III,  p.  1243 


9837 


-209- 

Again,  some  companies  may  pay  "tonnage"  men  on  a  day  "baGis  and  furnish 
them  vrith  supplies.  This  situation  is,  however,  not  corranon  in  the  in- 
dustry. 

One  type  of  deduction  iias  not  heen  discussed  here  previously.  This 
deduction,  knovm  as  the  "check-off "  ,'lias  been  the  subject  of  consider- 
able controversy  and  deserves  separate  treatment.   The  check-off  is  a 
system  v/hereby  the  operator  deducts  or  checks  off  from  the  mdners*' 
v,'ages  his  union  dues  and  assessm.ents ,  turning  over  the  money  thus 
collected  to  a  representative  of  the  union.  Under  this  system  the  •'Ji:iion 
miners  authorize  the  employer  to  dedu.ct  from  their  pay  the  employees' 
financial  obligations  to  the  union,  whiich  usually  include  national  and 
local  dues,  special  assessments,  and  fines. 

The  check-off  is  said  to  i:iave  originated  in  Indiana  in  1866,  its 
purpose  being  to  eliminate  disturbances  v/hich  us-oa.lly  accompanied  pay 
da;%  i/  Prior  to  this  time  a  committee  of  miners  stationed  itself  at 
the  mouth  of  the  shaft  to  collect  dues  fron  incoming  m.en.   Individuals, 
refusing  to  pay,  v/ere  subjected  to  severe  criticism  and  in  some  inst- 
ances, union  men  refused  to  enter  the  mines  with  non-payers. 

Several  factors  lia.ve  contributed  to  tne  controversy  concerning  the 
cneck-off.   The  operator  objects  to  acting  as  a  collecting  agency  for 
the  union.   Originally  the  check-off  system  v/as  used  only  for  dues,  but 
it  v/as  gradually  extended  to  include  fines  and  special  assessments,  the 
latter  usually  for  strike  funds.   Thus,  the  operator  felt  that  he  was 
directly  providing  the  weapons  Y/hich  might  later  be  used  against  him. 
ilon-union  operators  argued  that  union  operators  conspired  with  the  union 
to  organize  non-u.iion  fields  by  agreeing  to  the  check-off,  S^  •  Similarly, 
v/hile  the  check-off  bears  no  essential  or  necessarj^  relationship  to 
either  the  open  or  closed  shop,  it  has  often  actually  resulted  in  a 
closed  shop,  shutting  out  ncn-imion  miners. 

It  :Tas  been  stated  that  a  universal  Ciieck-off  system  is  unsound 
from  the  standpoint  of  long-time  union  policy  on  the  grounds  tliat  it 
weakens  union  stamina  and  lessens  close  contact  with  union  men,-'^'  Be 
tliat  as  it  may,  the  check-off  system  insures  to  the  union  a  steady  and, 
within  limits,  definite  income.   In  the  bituminous  fields  the  check-off 
has  become  an  established  institution, 

Y/ith  the  advent  of  the  l.R,A, ,  the  United  Mine  Workers  made  rreat 
gains  in  the  unionization  of  coal  fields.   The  check-off,  usually  with 
a  protective  clE.use,  was  included  in  one 'form  or  another  in  the  majority 
of  the  new  wage  agreements  and  \?as  included  in  all  the  old.  The  foll9w- 
ing  areas  agreed  to  the  check-off:  ^-J   Arkansas-Oklahoma;  ITorthern  Colo- 
rado; Soiithcrn  Colorado  (including  Colorado  Fuel  and  Iron  Agreement); 


ij     Enmiet,  Boris,  Labor  Relations  in  the  Fairmont,  "'est  Virginia, 

Bituminous  Coal  Field,  U.S,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Ju.ly,  1924,-p,6. 

2/   Gasaway  vs.  Borderland  Coal  Corporation,  U.  S*.  Circuit  Court  of 
Appeals,  Seventh  Circuit,  1921  -273  Fed,  56, 

3/  U.  S.  Coal  Commission,  Part  III,  p.  1337, 

4/  Union  Gains  -  Establish  Collective  Bargaining  in  Almost  All  Bituminous 

Fields,  Coal  Age,  March,  1934, 
9837 


Kansas-i  issouri;  Illinois;  Indiana;  Appmoose  and  Wayne  •Counties,  other 
Iowa;  Big  Sandy-Elkhorn;  Hazard;  Harlm;  Southern  Appalachian;  Western 
Kentucky;  Michigan,  Ray  axid  Clr.y  Cour^ties  (iiissouri);  ilontana;  Hocking, 
Coshocton,  Hassilon,  Eastern  Ohio;  Central  Pennsylvania;  Somerset 
County  (Pennsylvania),  Western  Pennsylvania;  Ut,ah;  Virginia;  T/ashington; 
Greenbrier,  Kanar/ha,  Logan,  Ken  River,  PocaJhontas  -  Tug  River;  Williaii- 
son;  Winding  Gulf;  Korthern  West  Virginia;  Northern  T/est  Virginia  Pan- 
handle; Southern  Wyoming  (inclv.ding  Union  Pacific  Coal  Conpany  Agree- 
ment), and  Northern  Wyoming. 

llo  check-off  provisions  i-^ere  included  in  the  follov/ing  agreements; 
Southern  Tennessee;  Tennesi-ee-Georgia;  Georges  Creek-Upper  Potomac. 

The  check-off  clause  usually  specifies  tha.t  the  employees  must 
notify  the  mine  mffnagement  in  V7riting  that  they  are  agreeable  to  the 
wage  assignment."' In  the  case  of  the  Southern  Appalachian  Agreement, 
provision  is  .made  that  the  United  Mine  ITorkers  will  defend  and  -orotect 
the  operator  against  expenses,  repayments  or  losses  on  account  of  con- 
tention that  the  check-off  was  wrongful  or  illeg.al 

Although  the  Bituiainous  Coal  Code  in  K.R.A.  did  not  specifically 
mention  the  check-off,  it  did  provide  that  any  deductions  from  em-  • 
ployees'  pay,  if  not  a  matter  of  agreement,  must  he  in  confornitj'  to 
the  general  rules  and  regulations  Tjrescrihed  hy  the  Administrator. 
(Article  V,  (c)). 

A  comparison  of  some  contract  provisions  dealing  vith  occupational 
and  personal  expenses,  check-off,  checlci:eighmen  and  -nay  days  is  shown 
in  Tahle  III. 

Scrip  Payment;   The  practice  of  scrip  payiTient  in  the  "bituminous  industry 
has  long  "been  a  subject  of  comyjlaint.   Since  payment  in  scrip,  made 
in  the  form  of  trade  checks,  coupons  or  tokens,  is  usually  taJ'en  out 
in  merchandise,  numerous  abuses  nay  arise.   The  most  common  abuses  are 
the  discounting  of  scrip  by  compajiy  stores  or  individuals  and  the 
limitation  of  the  employee's  trade  to  the  company  store.   As  a  result 
regulatoi-y  or  prohibitary  legislation  vras-  enacted,  seeking,  to  control 
the  issuance  of  scrip  and  the  practices  of  the  comToany  store,  Ilary- 
land  enacted  a  regulatory  statute  in  18G8,  Pour  years  later  Penn- 
sylvania passed  a  statute  attempting  to  control  wage  pajnnents^  scrip 
issuance  and  company  store  practices  in  the  coal  mining  industry. 2.' 
During  the  decade  of  the  eighties,  tv.'elve  states,  among  which  i-ere 
Tennessee,  West  Virginia,  O?iio,  Kansas  and  Washington,  passed  similar 
legislation.   At  present  32  states  have  laws  relrting  to  comDrny  stores. 


|1/   wage  .-^.-reenents  in  Bit.  Coal  Inf]ustr^r  in  1934.  U.' ..I.'.  ,  p. 134 

2./  The  Economics  and  Social  Im-olications  of  the  Company  Store  and 
Scrip  System,  IT.R.A. ,  llovember  16,  1934,  o.lS 


9837 


Talkie  III 


COMFAPJ SPIT  OF  PROVISIOHS   CT    S:]LECTED   COl'TTRACTS 
■■•HIGH  AFK]CT  COIIDITIOITS  OF  S  PLOTrliTViT     l/ 


PERSOITAL  EOCPE-SES 


House  Goal 

House  Rents 

Mouse  Lights     Garbage 

$2.  PC 

Smokeless 

month  -olus 

■Jot 

TTot 

Not 

del'  chgs. 

mentioned 

mentioned 

mentioned 

Central 

Code 

not 

-=ot 

Hot 

Pennsylvanir. 

Price 

mentioned 

mentioned 

mentioned 

lestern  Penna. 

ic^; 

IC^o 

iTot 

ivlot 

Districts  5-4-5 

Increase 
25(^per 

Increase 

mentioned 

mentioned 

Ohio 

ton  in- 

■Tot 

Hot 

Kot 

crease 

mentioned 

mentioned 

mentioned 

$2.90  per 

rot 

Hot 

not 

tiicnigan 

ton  for 
steam  ip. 

mentioned 

mentioned 

mentioned 

Karylend 

Code 

1C> 

TTot 

not 

Price 

Increase 

mentioned 

mentioned 

■Mo  rt  hern 

Same  as 

$2.00  per 

35(f'  Tier  drop 

Harried  men 

W.  Virginia 

Smokeless 

room  per 

where  not 

$1.50  per  mo. 

month 

metered 

single  men, 
$1.00  -oer  mo. 

Kanawlia, 

Same  as 

Same  as 

not 

Sout  hern 

Logan  and 

Sraokeless 

Snokeless 

mentioned 

Hio-h 

Williamson 

Except  Eig 

except  Big 

except  in 

Volatile 

same  as 

Sandy  IG . 

Sandy  35 rf 

So.  AiToal. 

Smokeless- 

Increase 

drop,  Harlan 

i-'here  men 

all  others 

&  So.  Ar)pal. 

elect  Hr. 

on  a  ton 

45^  droT  iHith 

rate  dp  sis 

6C  7J  ma-:innjn 
-oer  light 

\l      Coal  Age,   March,    1934,    editorial   sup-clement 
9837 


Ill  Continued 


OCCUPATIOTMAL  E:<PFTSES 


Smokeless 


Central 
Pennsylvania 


Emlosives 

Operator  disignates 
explosives   and   sells 
to   loader  at   cost    olus 
hfindling;  charges 


Sane  as 
Smokeles 


Smithing   Charges 

r  of  Ifo  of  lo-der 
earnings  per  month 


^d  per  ton   for  pick 
Coal   -  -""d;  per  ton 
for  machine   coal 


Electric 
cat)  Ism-QS 

8(f:   per  da;r  per 
shift  ^7orhed- 
loader  res-oons- 
itle  for  an;^ 
dampse 

75!^  per  day  per 
shift  \7orked  - 
era^oloyee  respons 
ihle  for  any 

damage 


Western  Penna, 
Dists.  5-4-5 


Same  as 
Smokeless 


Same  as  Central 
Pennsylvania 


6(f:   per  day  per 
shift  -  en  jlo5'"ee 
responsihle  for 
any  dam.age 


Ohio 

Michigan 
Maryland 


Same  as   Smokeless 

Cost   of  Explosives 

stjecified  in   con- 

ITot 

tract 

mentioned 

Hot 

lio    charge 

m'-ntioned 

for   blacksmith 

Same  as 
Smokeless 


^ame   .ns   Central 
Pennsylvania 


Sane  as   Central 
Pennsjrlvania 

Hot 
mentioned 

6. 8^  per  day  per 
shift   -   enployees 
responsihle   for 

any  dpjnage 


ITorthem 
W.    Virgini-: 


Same  as 
Smokeless 


Same  as 
Smokeless 


Sane 
Smokeless 


Southern 


Volatile 


Same  as 
Snokelef 


Same  as  Smokeless 
except  Harl'-^n  (no 
charge  unless 
■blacksmith  is 
fu.mished 


Same  as 
Smokeless 


9837 


Ill  b 


OTHTCa  PHOVISIQIS 


penalties            Disposal  of 

Check             Pay 

a.nd  fines            fines    collected 

Check-off 

"re  i  oilman       < 

J-ays 

Smokeless 

32.00  per 

all   fines 

,1.00  per 

miners 

Semi- 

day per  inrn. 

collected  are 

month  for 

h-^ve  the 

monthly 

for   illegal 

to   he  donated 

dues-maxi- 

right   to 

and   at 

lockout   of 

to    charity 

m^im  of   $10 

elect   any 

least 

mine   -   $4.00 

hy  mutual 

initiation 

employee 

t'7ice 

penalty  if 

agreeuent 

and  no   lim- 

as  check- 

each 

operator  fails 

it   to    s'oe- 

weigliman 

month 

to    collect   pny 

cial  assess- 

fine 

ment  by  dis- 
trict  offi- 
cials 

Central 

$1.00  -ler  day 

All   fines 

Same   -s 

must  be  an 

Pennsyl- 

oor man  for   il- 

go   to   opera- 

above - 

employee 

3a,me 

vania 

legr.l   locliout 

tors  or  uriion 

$r5.00  limit 

at   time  of 

as 

of  mine--$2.00 

den ending  on 

for   special 

the   elec- 

Smoke- 

pen.':lty per  nan 

■"•liich  side 

assessment 

tion 

less 

if  operator   fail 

scar.sed  lock- 

to collect   any 

out 

fines 

Western 

Same  as   Cen. 

SaiT'e.as 

Same  as 

Cannot 

Same 

Penna. 

Fenrisylvania 

Ce-.tral  ?a. 

Smokeless 

interfere 

as 

Di  st  s .    5-4-5 

with  the 
operators 
in   any 

Sjiol:e- 
less 

Ohio 

$1.00  per  day 

All   fines 

Opcraxtor 

ma.nner 

on   10th 

oer  man  for 

collected 

must 

c";    25th 

illegal   lock- 

to  he  used 

collect   - 

Specified 

of  mo.    - 

out  -  no 

for   the 

anouiat   not 

subject    to 

1  day 

; penalty  for 

burial  Fund, 

specified 

state  la\7s 

e-.rlier 

failure  to 

f^afety  or 

paid  by 

collect   fines 

charity 

checl: 

kichi^an 

j^Iot   mentioned 

Fines  for 

Hot 

Not 

On  Fri. 

loadlni'-;  of 

mentioned 

mentioned 

nearest 

im-'mrities  go 

10th    f: 

to    aid  aged  & 

25th  ea. 

infirm.  cri-Q-oles 

month 

only 

by  cash 
or  par 
check 

Maryland      Sa.ne  a.s         Spr-g  ^^  $1. .10  per  mo*  !Tot_       !"ot 

Central  Pa.      Centra.!  Pa.     no  limit  to  mentioned  mention- 
assessments  ed 


9837 


'214- 


CT^B  F?0VISIP;T3 


III  "b   Continued 


Penalties 
and  fines 


Hortiiern  Spjne   as 

W.    Virginia       Smokeless 


Disposal  of 
fines   collected 


Sane   as 
SmohelesE 


Southern 

Hish 

Volatile 


Kana'7ha,    Log?n 
Uilli^-'inson  & 
Big  Sandy  SPine 
as   Smokeless. 
So .   ADpal . 
$1,00  per  dajr 


Kanawha, 
Logan  Tfilliam- 
son   A  Big 
Sp.ndj''   sane  a.s 
Snokoless 
So .    AiDpal. . 
sare   as 
Centrr~l  Pa. 


Check 

Pay 

?d          Check-off     -reii^hman 

da^^s 

51.50  -oer  mo        Same   as 

-t   least 

no   limit   to          Snokeless 

tvuce   ea. 

sEsessments 

no.    1st 

T)^  day 

on  or  be- 

fore 15th 

Kanar/ha,    Logan      Sane   :is 

S-ne   as 

1-      ■■illianson          S  okeles 

s      Snoke- 

sane as   Snoke- 

less 

less.   Va.    $1.25 
n?.    all   others 
$1.50  mo.   -  no 
limit   to   assess- 
ments 


and   scrip.      The   legislrtion   is  -ooorly  drarm   and  easilj'  circumvented. 

State  legislation  vsries   as  to   negotiability  or  non-negotiahilit;- 
of   scrip.      Five   coal  producing   states    (Alabama,    Tentucky,    Oklaiioma, 
Virginia,,    md  TJest   Virginia)    require   th?t  the   scrip  be  non-negotiable; 
that   is,    only  scrip  presented  for  redemption  by  the  original  holder 
may  be  honored.      This  measure  may  reduce  discounting  of  scrip  with  in- 
dividuals nho   make   a  living  therefrom,    but    it   also  places   the   compejiy 
store  in  a  monopoly  position  and  has  the  effect  of  comr)elling  the  em- 
ployee to  trade  ?t   the  conp=>ny   store.     Discounts  on  scrip  are  Tjrohibited 
in   tro    coal  producing  states    (Illinois  and  TTa.shington). 

CociDlaints  leveled  against    certain  -nrovisions  in  the  Retail  Code 
gave   ris©  to   an   investigation   regarding  the  methods  of  using   scrip   and 
the   social  and  economic  effects,    1/        The   stiidy  disclosed  a  great  num- 
ber and  variety  of  arguments   in  favor  of  scrir)  payment    and  in  opposition 
to   it.      The  investigation  was  not    concerned  only  '-rith  the  bituminous 
coal  industry.      It   also   studied  the  iron  -nd   steel,    lumber,    te::tile,    and 
other  industries. 


Some  of  the   ar^^^ients  against   the   issuance  of   scrip 


2/ 


1»   EmTJloyees  who  do  not  use  comx)  ny  scrip  are  less  apt  to 

trade  at  company  stores  and  so  may  face 

_1  Economic  -nd  Social  Imolications  of  the  Comnany  Store  and  Scrip 
System.  iT.R.A.  1934 


2  Ibid,  supra,  pp.  7-10 


-215- 

the   threat   of  discrimnation  as   to   "'ork  assignment,    lay-offs   pud  dis- 
chrxges. 

2.  Scrii:"  limits   tr/^de   to   comp-ny   stores  rrhere  prices  pre 
higher   thm   at    inde-oendent   stores. 

3.  Use  of   scrip  means  assignment   of   en-oloyee's  vrages  gjid  the 
lack  of  cash  mades   it    impossible  for  him  to    secure   credit    elsev'iere. 

4.  Scrip'  as  a  credit  -oractice  kee^os   the   employee   in  debt   to 
the   com.'oriij''  store.      In   some   cases   en'oloj/ers   deliberately  "oursue   this 
-Qolicy  by  maintaining  -^n  unnecosspry  large   labor  force  and  bj^  limiting 
the   v'ork  p.ssigned  to   each  em->loyee. 

The  arguments   in  favor  of   scri^D  -^nd  the   consequent   credit  practices 
ar  e ; 

.1,      Scrip-is  p.  convenience  for  the   eirroloyees.      It    sim-olifies 
bookkeeping  ?nd  rediices  occa.sions   for  disoutes. 

2.  The  use  of   serin  h?.s  been  long  established  and  the   em- 
ploj'-ees  hs,ve  become  hpbitup.ted  to   it    so   that   they  have   adjusted  their 
economic  beha.vior  accordingly.      A  change   in   this   customary  practice 
T,'otild  resu.lt   in  wides-oread  hardship   and  genera-1  discontent. 

3.  The   credit   system  red'ices  the   ris]:  of   robbery  since 
large  amouLits  of   cash  in  the   store  or  office  b.ecome  less  necessary. 

4.  ComiD'nies   are   in   better  "oosition  to  make   credit   ad- 
vances  since   they  do  not   face   much  risk  of  loss,    than  a.re   independent 
merchants. 

5.  Employees  during  period  of   illness  or  unemployment   or 
other   emergencies   can.  rely  upon   company  credit  without   being  ex- 
ploited by  loan    sharks  or  becoming  public   charges, 

A  lengtliy  vpy  noeriod  and   the  '-'itholding -of  nages  for   the   initial 
pr.y  period  often  result  -in  recourse  to    scrip  or   s-^me  other  form  of 
credit.      Scrip,    vhich  is  redeemable   in  cash  one  month  from  date  of 
issue,    is  often  discounted  because   the  em-oloyee   cannot   hold  out   for 
that   length  of   time,    especially  d-M-ing  "oeriods  vhen  the  mine   is  operat- 
ing only  paTt    time.      In.   some   cases  Tvhere   "non-transferable"    scrip  rras 
issu'ed,    it  va.s  found  that /the.  operating"  comi>"ny  arranged  to   redeem  it 
at   face  vaa.lue  nhen  ^srpsent-ed  for  .conim.odities   or  at   a  discount   of  from 
5   to    20  pr  cent   "lien  -presented  for  ca.sh  redem-otion  .by  inde-pendent 
merchants    (Alabama,    Kentucky,    ^est   A^irginia)!'    "Tiers  this  practice 
prevails,    t'"o   sets   of   orices  are  kept   -   cash  and  scrip  -   the   latter 
averaging  10  to   15  per  cent   higher  thpjithe  former.      Of  the  658 
bituminous   coal   comir-ny  stores  "hi c.h  reported,    153  or  23,3  per  cent   of 
the   total   stated  that   they  did  not  use   scrip,    but  kept   open   charge 


1/      Idem,    -0.    6i 
9837 


-216- 

accounts.— '      In   some  instaiices  certain  services  sucli  as  medical   services 
or   insvLTance  -oremiums   cajinot    be   secured  for   scrip  ^nd  it  "becomes  necessary'- 
to  discount   scrip  at  a  loss,    normally  from  15  to  25  per  cent. 2/      rpj-^g 
traffic  in   scrip   in   some   comr.Tanities   is   considerable  in  amount. 

Some  347   stores  or   57.7  per   cent   of  the   6C1  'bituiinous   coal   con- 
v^nj  stores  reoorting,    stated  that   their  parent   com-o-.iies   issued  scrip 
on  pay  da.j-s.^   T/here  this  procedure  is  follo-'ed,    it   is  possible  for 
some  of  the  i?orkers  to  be  chronically  indebted  to  the  parent   compr-ny 
and  not   receive   pny  cash  for  long  "oeriods  of  time.      In  one   case  a  com- 
pany in  ■''■est   Virginia  "ent   for   t^o  years  without   even  the  formalities 
of   r.   cash  -oo.y  day. 

The  investigating  comnittees  recoin^i:nded  a  change   in   the  provisions 
of  the  detail   Code,      This  recorr  lend-tion  '•'as:^' 

""To    com-o^nj'-  store  or  retail    store   shall   collect 
•  by  offset   in  the  form  of  scrip,    book  credit   or 
othervrise,    a,gainst   the  -'ages   of   any  person   other 
than  its  own  employees  engaged  exclusively  in  the 
retail  tr-^de,    an  amoujat  for  merch^^ndise  sold  by 
s-id   store  in   excess  of  25  "Der   cent   of   such  pay 
earned  in  any  pay--oeriod. 

Fo    store   shall  -mrchase  or  receive  or  accept   for 
cash  or  consideration  in  trade  or  in  pa:$'TQent   of 
indebtedness  any  scri-o  at   less   than  its  par  or 
face  value." 

In  addition   the   com:aittee   recommended  that   regulations  be  designed 
to   insiire  tlia.t    the  vrarker  receive   a  reasonable   oortion  of  his  wages  in 
cash  on  -p'j  day  and  tlia.t  pay  periods  and  pa,y  hold-backs  be  limited  to 
one  week.      It  also   recoMaended  that  v/ages  due   should  be  paid  only  in 
lawful  money  or  par  check.      This   latter  provision  vras  already  a  paxt 
of   the  Eituminous   Coal   Code   (Article  ?,    (c)).      Its  effective  date, 
ho-ever,    we^s  postponed  from  time  to   time  pnd  finally  ?n  indefinite 
stay  was  granted. 

Con-QPny  Stores;      The   comprny   store  or  industrirl   commissary  is.  closely 
related  to   the  histor  "  of  the  bitujninous   coal   industry.      Many  of  the 
richest   coal  deposits  "ere  found  in  isolated  and  often  mountainous 
regions  and  could  only  be  developed  by  business  men  who  were  willing 
to   make  the  necessary  cp-oital    investments   and  ftirnish  labor  ^-fith  houses 
and  provisions.      There  is  little  reason  to   doubt  that   the   comprny  store 
was   originally  motivated  by  the   concewt   of   service  to   the   mining 
TDO-oulation. 


1/  Idem,  0.    90 

2/  Idem,  -o.    69 

3/  Idem,  ;o.98 

4/  Idem,  p. 2 


The  oldest    Ditiiminous   co-.l   fields  are   thoss  of  the   Central   con- 
Detitive  field,    coin^risin^;  "Te stern  Pe-ins7lvania,    Ohio,    Indiana,    and  Ill- 
inois.    Prodv.ction   in  these  fields   or-c-iiie   increasingly  iinrjort5.-it   during 
the   la.st.  tT.'o   deca/Ies  of  the  nineteenth  .cevitury.      iiany  of  the  mining 
opera.tions  '-'ere   located  in  reiiiote  regions   so   that   the'  operating  com- 
•Da'--'.ies  "■'ere   compelled  to    auild  houses  for   the  miners,    set  up   company 
stores,    ano   provide  other  essential   services   to   the  mining  comraujiitj'. 
Conditions   in  these  fields  "-fere  remarhably  had  ujitil  the   end  of  the   cen~ 
tury,]^/.   Iiany  changes,    ho'Tever,    ha.ve  tril;en  pl^ce   in  these   fields  as  a 
result   of  their  unioni ".action   ?nd  the  development  of   surroiinding  com- 
munities.     Conpfny  controlled   communities  "ith  company  houses  r-nd  com- 
pany  stores  have    oecome  relatively  insignificant. 

The  development  of  nener   coal   fields   in   the   early  years  of  this 
century  h:,s   Drought   '-'ith  it   a '  continuation  of   the   characteristics   first 
foTxnd  in  the  older   coal  fields.      Llaaiy  rich  coal   deposits  ^ere  found  in 
the  moujatainous   areas  of  Ilaryland,    "est  Virginia,    VirginiPv,    Kentuclcy, 
Tennessee,   Alahama,,,    Arksnsa.s,    and  Colorado.      These  neii.  coal   fields  pre 
more  nountainous   and  in  general  more  distantly  located  from  large   settle- 
ments than  vras   true  of  the  older  fields.      The   development   of   ca-otive 
mines  in  these  nen  coal  0.reas  hy  large  ind-o.strial   coroorations  ha-s  meajit 
the   develo;ome-:.t   of  a  ,gre«^t   many  comp-ny  to^-rns.      In  addition,    it  must   he 
reraenhered  ihfit    these  regions  i^ere  mainly  on  a  non-union  basis  ujitil  the 
advent   of  the  F.H.A.    ;-'nd  the  Bitixninous   Coal   Code.  3/   These  ne^er   coal 
fields,    then,    are   the  ones  vhere  the   comD^ny   controlled  coranunitj'-, 
compan;^  houses,    and  coraprny   stores   still  persist. 

Any  discussion  of  the  corai^^^ny   store   is   necessarily  closely  rela-ted 
to    credit  policy  and   scri-o  p';:yraent.      It   is  necessary,    therefore,    to  m?Ice 
reference  to   the  loreceding  section  of  this  manuscript.      The  distinguish'- 
ing  fea.tu.re  of  the   company  store   is   its   exclusive  right   to    collect  m.oney 
ovred  to   it  hy  its   customers  hy  ded^icting  sr.ch  ohligations   from  the  pay- 
roll  of  the  operating  comTD-ny. 

The   ccnpany   store  may  he   O'^ned  hy   the  parent   compc''ny,    a  department 
of  the  opera.ting   company,    a,  subsidiary,,    or   semi-dependent    store. 
In  those   cases  -rfhere  the   comisrny  store   is   semi-independent,    the  operat- 
ing comp  ny  malces   a  v^age  deduction  agreement   Vrith  the   store.      Commissary 
rights  are  sold  to   outsiders  for  a  percentage  return  (varying  from  5  to 
10  per   cent)   on   the   sa.lei;  made   for   scrip  or   other   tj'pes  of   credit.      The 
study  of  the   company  store   system  foi'^nd  that   for  653  bituminous   coa.l 
stores   in  1934.    66  per  cent  .^^ere  under  a  department   of  the  pareiit   com- 
pany;   2C,6  per   cern;   nei'e   subsidiaries  of  the   company,    and  13.4  per   cent 

The  pra.ctices  of  the  com-oany  stores  have  been  touched  upon   in  a 
number  of  invest iga.tions   carried  on  by  the  Fed.eral   Government.      The 
outstanding  reports  vrhich  made  reference   to    company  stores   in  the 
bituminous   coal   industry  T7ere   those  of  the  United  States  Bituminous   Coal 


1/      G-eorge,    J.    E.    The  Co-^1  hiners'    Strik.e  of   1897,    Qu'^rterly  Journal  of 

Economics,    Vol.    12  pp.    187-191. 
2/      Cf.    Section   dealing  '^ith  history  of  i^age  negotiations   and  of  in- 

dusti-ial  disputes. 
^/      The  'Lconomic  and  Social   Im^ilications   of   Company  Store   and  Script   System. 

0-1.    cit.   t).    80     . 

9837 


Co:-.ission   (i::'20),    the  Unitec.  States   Cor.l   Co.  r:i scion   (I32O)  ,   U.    S.    Senate 
Investif;ation  0;."   conc.itionr.    in'  the   coal  ■fielc.s   01"  Pennsylvr.nia,   'Test 
Vir,-:;inia,    and  Ohio    (S.ncs.    lO^)-  7.0th  Con^'resr,,    1st   Session,    lS2o), 
Davis-Eell:"  3ill   (lS2i2),    anc.  the.  .U.;  S..   Senate   Investi';ation  of   conc.itions 
in  the   coal   fields   of  Harlo.n  rnd.,  Bell.  Counties,    rientuck3-   (S.    1:^65.    I7S,    Y^^i'-"'- 
Con/-resG,    1st   Session,    1S"2.) 

Hix-ieroiis   argu-'ients   for  and  a£;a.inst   the'  coroanj   stores  have  lieen    lade. 
So"-e  of   these   contentions  have  alread;'-.  .'bee-.i  oresent'Bd  in  the  preceding 
section  c'ealin^;,'  ■7ith  scrip  paynehts.  '    So;ie  additional  vievs   op'oosinc  the 
conpon--  store  are: 

1.  Co;jpan7   store  practices   reswlt   in  reducinif;   the   self- 
reliance   0"   the  -eMployee   ?/id  shift    the 'Ve.s -.on,si''oilit;-  of  iDtidgetini;;  fa:iily 
inco:.ie  fron  the  houscTife   to   the   store  nanaj^er.. 

2.  , Co: ipan--   stores   foster   economic  ■oeona;je   and  are  only  a 
perpetuation  of  the    "true"':"    systeii. 

5.      Co. :pany,  store  prices   are  hi;;;her  than  those   of  neighhoring 
independent    stores.  ,  ^   ,■ 

U,      Parent   coupan;"  o-med  stores   represent   a  dual   enterprise 
■"'hich  reclains' '/ages  'that  :iight   other-."ise  he   retained  hy  the   e"ip3.oyee, 

A.gainst   these   statements   a-opear   those  "hich  hold   thr.t: 

1.      The   credit   s"sten  helps   the   enplo3'ee   to   hudget  his   o-'.Tn 
expenses. 

'     2,      The  covipan;-  store' .protects   ei.iployees  .frou   ercor'bitant 
prices  -.'Inch    .:ight   other- use  he,  charged  h;.''  irresponsihle   independent 
;-nerchants  '  in  isolated  coirranities. 

3.  The  profits   0"   the   coupany   store   result   in   the   eiiployer 
paying  'better  rra  'es. 

U.      The   coviprny  store,,  .throu.gh   its  patronage,    cncourrges   locp.l 
agriculture   anc    industry. 

This   controllers-/  apoeared  again  vhen  euoloy tent   conc.itions   and 
-provisions  '.--ere   discussed  at   the  hearings   held  to   for-.mi.ate   the   cor.l 
code.      One   large  northern  operator'  stated: 

"lTo'7,    p.ll   over   the  liiddle  '.Test,    and  I   p.n  -pretty 
s-are   in  other   districts,    o'.ie  of   the    -eanest 
.lethods  of  u.nfair  co-ipetition  is  ^agreeing  to  -pay 
the    len  the   standard  scale  a-nd  then  pay  thera 
in  -phoney  .lone;,'  or  tr,he  had:  his   security  "jy 
rn.ising  their   rents   or   i  •;   sorae   other  "ay. . ,  "l/ 

Another  ooerator  "ith  headquarters   in  Ohio,    speal:inr:  :"or   the   Central 
Coal  Association,    said: 

"In  the  non-union  nines   it   is   the    --eneral  practice, 
that   is,    our  raines  a-nd  eve-ryhody  else's  non-u'nion 
■'.ines,   -.'hen'  the  men  do  not   trade  at   the  conpany- 
store  cjfid  pay  -/hatever  prices  "are  asiied,    they  are 
let  out.      That   is  particularly ■ true  in  the  Souths 
I'^j.rtherr.iore,    there   is   the  'oractice   of  -oayin  •  the    len 


1/     Bituii-nous  Coal   Code  Hearings,    Au-,u.5t   10,    1533,    -  p.'   lOlj) 


-219*i 

"itli  scri':.  "Idcli  ic  ,;oof-  ohl"  n.t   the   co-ipa:i7  store,  "l/ 

Tlie  U.S.A.    investi;;'atio2i  O-'   CQ-:',;xr  rtoi'es  fjenerr.ll'"',     ir.de   in  1S5^> 
found  that   returns   :P"ro:  i   the   oituiinouG   cor.l  "'iclds  -'ere   concentrated  in 
the   strtes   of  "Test  Vir-:i:iir; ,   FG-.vis--lvr.nia  and  llcntuch;'.?/      "^he  retu.rns 
fron   each  o".'    three  otlier  coal  prof-.icin,-,  st.-.tes   represented  a  little   ovei 
one  per  cent   of  the  total  nufoer  of  3%p      The  IZepstone  Coal  Director"/, 
1^32,    recorc  ed  a  total   of  C3?   coiipm;./  stores.      The   distrihution  h/ 
states  of  t'le  co:ro.''n7  '-tores   is   sho-'n   nn  the  f ollo-.-in^-^  tahle.^/ 

Trjie   IV 

3istrij-tion  of  C^o  Bitvuiinous   Coal   Co '.san"  Stores 
:r-  States.    1^3'!- 


I'ufjer  irercenta^^'e 

of  of 

Stores  Total 


Alaha-ia  37  5.0 

Colorado  5                                   '  0.3 

Illinois  ■      U  O.S 

Ksn-tud:7  100                            _  IS.  2 

Ne'-'  ;;e::ico  5  '^•7 

Ohio  S  ^'^ 

Pennsplvrnia  iSl  2U.5 

Tennessee  13  2.0 

Utah  G  0.9 

Vir-';inia  ;3  5*0 

■Jashi  n^';;t  0  n  6  0.5 

j'est  Vir-inia  2G3  Uo.O 

■J^'-o.-.iinf;  £  1.2 

All   others                                    £  1^2 

^otrl  >o  100.0 


It  has   Ion;-;  heen  arivaed  that   conpan"   stores   are   nocessp.r^-  to    serve 
isolated  co  rrtuiities.      The   investicatin;-;  co-riittee   found  for  the  "bitu- 
.unous   corl   industr"  that   57.2  per  cent   of   the   co:rpan:'-  r.tores  ^7ere  one- 


___   .    _      .  .  lid 

seePa   thp.t  "ith  -.nodern  i.rprovc  lents   in  trrjisportation  and  co;.L.iunication 
facilities,    isolation  ca-n  no   lon;'_:er  he  l^eld  as   a  valid  ar^oj-.-.ent   for 
co:voa-n-.^   stores. 


1/  Ibid,   Supra,  . Pi   10U3i   ..... 

2/  r.cono.-.i:;  and  Social   Inplication;:,   etc.    op.    cit.   p.    77. 

2/   Ihid,    r.ipra,   p,    7^ 

5/   Itic,   r.'S2. 

SS37 


-220- 

rrequent   couplr.ints  lir?ve    ocen  ;:r.c.e   to   the   effect   tlir.t   corop.ny 
stores   chr.rrjeC  iii'jher  prices   for  vie-.rciar.ndise   thp,n  rid  independent 
enterprises.      This   chr,i";e     ir/-  have   soue  vrlic-itp  in  vie-'  of   the  fp.ct 
that   sorie   five-  states  have   le;'.;iGlated  en  the    ;atter   of  prices   chr.r/"jed 
for  £:oods   at   conpan;'-  stores    (Ar'-rnsas,    Conr.ectic-iit,    Indiana,    Ohio, 
•and  Vir-inia).      -''o\ir  of   these   strtes  produce   coal. 

A  field   inveT  ti{;,'ation  -ras  Made   of  the  prices   charged  Id^  102 
representative   con;issaries   and  ?'5  independent    .    'jrivatelp  ovrnec. 
stores,!/      The   stud;--  compared  coM.:issar;-  prices  -'ith   those   of   the 
neeirest   independent   cor.petitor  £;ivinr;  rue   regard  to   coMpr.rahle  ser- 
vice,   such  as   credit,    deliver;-,    and  locption.      In  f^eneral   the   sane 
foodstuffs,   -rhich  the  U.   A.    Coal   Co;.-!ission  liad   studied,    '-ere   in- 
cluded.     Since  the   investip-ators   fotvn'"    little   difference   in"  the 
general   char   cter   o:"   con:  lis  sari  es,    a   '-;eopraphic:il   i-atner   than  inc.ustrial 
(■^.Toupin;;  '.7as   'lade.      The   averrre  prices   chrr^'^ed   op  conpanp  stores  and 
"bp  incependents  nere  ,piven  the   sr  ^.e  veights  -/hich  the   Con-iission  used. 2/ 
In  those  instances  'There  a.n  are?  '7<as   investigated,    -Viich   the  Coal 
Connission  had  not   stuoied,    the  n:ost   cappropriate  'Teight   of  another 
area  '-'hose  people  has   similar  hahits  '7as  used.      The   follov'ing   tahle 
is  a  su.uiariza;tion  of   the  price   con.-.crison  for   those   areas  predoninately 
interested  in  coal  production. 


1/   Iden,    p.    S3.       , 

2/   Cf.    u,    S.    Co.al  Co  •  .issian,   Part   III,  pp.    l57?-7o 

SS57 


-C21- 


Tr 

"o^ 

.e  V 

Coinr.ri: 

?.on  o:^  V'etril 

,  J 

'ricer    of 

roods   in 

3o:T}roiv 

Stores   and  i 

,n 

:iei-;hbor 

inf  Inde- 

penc 

"-2  nL^  Stor  e  s_i 

.n_ 

J:^    (1) 

Per  Ce-t   Increase 

of  Co -.pan;:  Store 

■orices   over   Inde- 

"Tv.-rjer   F tores 

Af.::re: 

'■:ate  of 

-oendent   Store 

re" 

ortecl 

vvrht's   i 

avr.   -vrices 

Prices 

District 

■Co  nr-- 

Inde-'jendent 

Co^Toan:' 

Indeoendent 

Independent. 

stores 

storec 

Gtore-. 

-.stores 

store  priCBBi 

Alabana 

lU 

Ik 

UU.21 

'+i;  7^ 

■        5.9 

(3irnin^"'' 

ban) 

-y      S 

■7 

UU.r;i 

:ii.So 

Eastern  : 

Kentuc,; 

7.7 

Er stern  ' 

lennes 

r.ee      S 

u 

3-r.7?    • 

ji.kS 

10. U 

Vir  'T-^ 

i  r.     11 

11 

^^2.77 

Ui.ST 

2.1 

::ana-'.ia  ,",  ^^  '     U?  :;7  .  ^^0.52  U.6 

lTe-7  Taver  2S 

dnco  10 


15      ^2.37 


10 


.OS      25.23  7.1 


(1)  The  Icononic  and  Social  Implications  of  the  Conpany  store  and  Scri'^ 
Svste:,  >T.  P.A.  ,  153^,  p.  So.  These  areas  '-ere  selected  as  l)eing  Irrfel; 
coal  -roducinv  in  charrcter.  The-  Bir?'.iin:';hrj-.i  -."istrict  proljaol;--  also  in- 
cluded rs-jorts  for  the  steel  ir-tustr;-. 


The  avera.-;;e  prices  chrrf,'ed  h'*  co  rpany  stores,  -'hen  al^.  itens  vere 
wei;:;hted  and  considered  collectivelp,  -vere  hi'-hrr  than  those  cliarr:ed  "by 
indepenc'ents  in  all  areas  -^-liich  "ere  st-u.ied.   The  range  of  difference 
varied  fro':  2.1  in  Vir."inis,  to  10. U  in  flastern  Tennessee.   It  nust  1)6 
re-.ie  iterec"  that  cor.ipany  stores  (iiany  of  ■-'hon  are  :e-iT3ers  of  a  co:v.iss<T.ry 
chain)  •■esc   co  v.Dred  -Titn  ir/ependent  stores.   If  chain  stores  had  'been 
included  ■■  .  the  study,  the  difference  in  -trices  -'ould  have  teen  .oven 
greater. 

The'  i.egree  to  i-'hich  conpany  stores  a,re  really  "conpany^  nay  "be   seen 
in  the  fact  that  63.6  per  cent  of  the  6U2  l)ituninous  coal  company  stores 
reported'  that  55  f©^  cent  or  norc  of  their  total  sales  -rere  made  to 
con -.any  enployees  in  1933-1/  Appro-.inately  S3  per  cent  of  all  the 


1/     Sconoifiic  and  Social  luplications,  etc.  op.  cit.  p.  SU 
9^37 


stores   c'-eclrrcc.   th''t  'lore   tli-'^.n  '^Cf    :ei-    ce:,it    o:"    uiiei?'   tot;'l    srj.es  •lei-e 
:ir.ce   to   co  rcr.n;'-  c-:3lo:'ees.      Onl-j  I.5  ;3er   cent   0:"   the   stores   reported 
,'?';■  _-er  cei.t   0"  les-:   of   totrl  lousiness  --itla  co'-ior.n--  enplo7ees.      T'-'O 
vie-'s  -ir-j   he   t;\':cn  of   t].is   r,nr..l-sis  -   one,    t'lat   in   these   cor  dimities, 
corJ  ;:ininf:  '7,-,s   the   sole   sov.rce   of   e:rolo" '.ent   r,nc.  therefore  rll   store 
hr.sir.ess  ■•oiili",  ta  --fith  the   c  :-'A.o'jce   or  his  household,    the   other,    that 
erolo^ees    in   the   co-imiinit",    'lot   en-r/ied  in  cor.l  -rinin-,   '-referred  to 
ti^r.de  a.t   nei -hoorin:-^;;   indeprr.-^?  "/'gg    oeccv.se   of  price   or   service   considera- 
tions.     A'lother  indication  of   the    jrtrcrr;;o  of   tlie   co  roany  r-itores  :'-P:j  he 
■otten  fro'i   ar.  rnal^'sis   of   tlie   t' pe   of   sa"'.es   -'ade.      A  lp.r.';e   credit 
"br.siness   i:idicatos  conpanp   e  iplopee   tra;'e..    Apr/ro-'inatelp  G2  per   cent 
of   the   stores   reported  that    c."sh  s'\lcs    in  1535   repi'osented  10  per  cent 
or  less   of   total   sales    (no  per   cent   o:    all   the    stores   had  5  per  cent 
or  leso    in  c^sh  srles.)l/      Only  h   ;:e::   cent   O""   the   stores   reported  cash 
srlos   aiountinf;  to   20  per   cent   o:.-    !oro   of   the   totrl   sales. 

It   is   of   interest   to   note   the   relati    isfj/j   o:"   vora.fvnj   ctore   sai.es 
to   cor-ipanj'  papro^'ls.      for   3^2   stores   repQrti.\'    jo   "ii   sales   anc"   payroll 
fipares,    tae  percentage  --hich  srles   to   e  ';:0-opccr,   re'-resented  of  the 
annual  payroll   .-'or  1^33   'vas  33«^'-'-  2/     h'ncn   tliese  /ercentapes   are 
analysed  hy  states,    it  "i"i.l  he   ;iotec'    t'lat    those   rreas  --hich  are  hetter 
orpanised  or   closer   to  urom   '.;ettlo    onts   have  lo--er  percentayes 
(Ohio',    7.S;    Illinois  15.3).      I^li^i  hi  --est  ,percenta.-;es   are   found  in 
Tennessee,    Vir^l'ii." ,   Alahai2-,    a"id  hentucl.:y. 


Trole  VI 

' '    Percent 

.r.- 

e   of  Ani 

rj.al   Sr.les   to   Co:r:.^n-''  Ijnlo-'ees  hv 

-£2 

Co 

:ror,ny  S" 

tores   to-  Total  Annual  Payroll   of 

P 

arent   Ci 

ar.jrnies   in  1933.    "^r'  States 

lAl-f 

jer      tores                                Percentaye  Srolo-'ee 

Strte 

^^e;: 

Dortlny                                       Srles   to   totrl   annual     ' 
.         .       ^-or-roll     .    . 

Alataia 

3S                •                                      U2.- 

Colorado 

5                                                  37.U 

Illinois 

2                                                                7.3 

ZZentuchy 

S7                                                          kO.G 

he'7    :e::ico 

3                                              23 . 0 

Ohio 

7                                                15.5 

Pennsylvania 

133                                                        P-^^'O 

Tennessee 

13                                                ?3.5 

JJtoh 

•  6                                                52.0 

Virr.-inia 

30                                    •            UU.7 

Hashinc'ton 

3                                                21.0 

'Jest  Virpinia 

213                                                             ^C.o 

'.lyoninc: 

S                                                23.1 

All  others 

__  3         .                              ■         2^-^ 

532 


1/     Ihid,   P.   23. 
2/      Ide:,   P.    SI. 


-223- 

'./aen  r.  •.7or::er  c'.esires    cr-  cMt  r/':   a  co  vcriV'  store,    a/;/.ic;  tion  is 
::r,oe   to   th'-   "ooo'. lioeoer  or  store     'rnc:,"e:;.      Acvrnces  are  usv.all;     lac^.e 
a^Tinst  na  -OS   alrejc:".;;'  earnoc",    "but   not   c.we  v.ntil  ne::t  payday,      "Tlie   p;-iOiint 
of  unrssi-ri-.od  •.•'a;;;es   ar'ainat  v.'liich  credit    ir."  "be   e::tended  in  v.s-aall:' 
ascertaine:"   1)7  tlio  s  toro   rc-_:. rose- tat, ives.      Occaslonr.ll--   credit   is  :;ivon 
a,<';ainst   f-ature  or  unearned  '■veC,    durii, ;  -periods   of   tejiporar7  unen- 
plo^^-'ent   or  i''   case   of   incividiial   e..ier';encie3   s'acii  as   illness.      Gut   of 
a  totrl   652   stores   roportin,-,    3^2  or  52.5  pc-r   cent   stated  that   they 
had  access   to   the   coinpanp  eirplopees'    earninps.l/      Miere   the  payroll 
laster   of   a  parent   covrpany  issLies  a  store   order   to   r.n  enployee,    there 
is   no   need  to  have   ?/:cess   to    earninf^s '  recorc's.      Accessi^oility  of 
eaminps   records   is   inportant   s.s  a  checL  or  credit   ertension  and  on 
the  vol^aiae  of  purchases  :^ade  "xj  each  e.iployeo.      It   is   cirir.ed  that   the 
latter  checL:  is  used  as  a  threat   of  ciscrir.ination  p/jainst   the   enployee 
Tho  dees   not  huy  at   the   conpa.n;-   store.      T'he  lI.fl.A.    investi^.-atin/j 
coivr.ittee   :''ound   jut   -^e"  cases   of  direct   and  indirect  pressure   e::erted 
on  the   e-.roloyee   to   trade   at   the   co'-.an--  store.  2/ 

In  fj-eneral,      issuance  of   credit  hy  co-rpany  stores   is  :';adc  on  a 
■business   oasis   rather   than  a  philanthropic   Dr.sis.      An  analysis   of 
bad  dehts   inclcr.tos   that   the   ratio   0:'    losses  frj   total   sales   for   the 
perioc"   1^31,    1S32,    l!^33,    ^'^'i'-    '5ix    lonths   of  153'l-  rnoL-.nted  to   only  one 
per   ccnt._3/      fhe   losse'-.   include  hoth  hac    dehts  and  enploj/ee   relief 
hecruse   -lost   corrpany  stores   do  not   separate   these   itens.      In  the  uajority 
of   cases  J    enployee   relief  is   not  an  outri-:;ht  p-rant,    out   rather  a  forn 
of  crec'-it  "ith  the  vie^  of  liquidation  frora  f^itare   carninf,'s.      The 
follo'-in,"   tahle  '-'ill   indicate  hy  states   the   total   sales   and  the   losses 
on  had  accounts   and  erjoloyee   relief   for  the  Year  1S33» 


1/      I  den,   p.    53. 
2/      Idem,   -c,    1^. 
i/      Ideu,   p.    S5. 


■31 


j24- 


:o\e   VII 


Anoant   nf  3ac".  De'ots  end  Ih:lo:7ee  5elie:?  anc  Totr.1 
Sr.les  of  I^it-aiinous  Cop.?l   Cor -.en--'  Stores   in. 


Lo!:?os   ry:.  "or.c 

Iletio   looses 

Str.te 

■accn-nts   r,n(;. 

C?ot;;.l 

to 

e::--lo--ecs   roll  of 

srlcs 

total   sr.les 

Alp.'ba-a 

Colorrf.o 

Illinois 

llentv.C- --' 

iTe'7  '."erzico 

Ohio 

?enns7lvr?nir. 

Tennessee 

Utrli 

Vir'-inir. 

7c.s)ain'-ton 

7est  Vii  nnin 

■^ycnir;:: 

All  others 


0   3?,^?5. 

$2,31-, SOS 

O.S 

^'Gl 

233, 2B3 

0.1 

•       2,20^: 

2G-,S90 

0.1 

Go.T&o 

5,cc2,k36 

O.U 

3,ao-:- 

527,035 

0.0 

^00,307 

0.2 

I.  ■•■;^  7'R 

.lV,S'!-7,c35 

1.6 

:,-:7 

653,155 

O.S 

UUd  ^^1   ' 

1.5 

lj;,0^' 

?,7o5,53S    . 

O.j) 

1,202 

:i%375 

0.0 

lo!-:-,U21 

20,lS3,SoS 

0.5' 

2,1';.2 

7S5.753 

o.k 

^7^... 

223,221 

Q^ 

■1,067,241 


1/      Zconoiic   rnc    Sccir^l   I:  ralico.tionc;..      op.cit. 


O? 


Co:n-i?fny  Houses:   The  housing;  fpcilities  offered  "by  various  mining 
co:anranities  are  cuite  iinxortant  to  the  mine  worker  and  his  family. 
Tnty  pre  significant  not  only  in  terms  of  general  living  conditions, 
but  also  have  a  ouaring  uron  the  conoitions  of  employment.   The 
conditions  in  bituminous  coal  mining  rhicn  led  onerators  to  establish 
company  stores  operated  in  a  similar  manner  in  the  building  of  company 
houses,   kining  o-oerations  distantly  ■  located  from  large  settlements 
or  mining  comirrj.nities  which  are  company  controlled  are  apt  to  have  a 
hif;h  percentage  of  company  oi'Tied  houses. 

The  U.S.  Coal  Commission  in  its  investigation  of  the  bituminous 
miners  and  their  homes  found  three  distinct  territorial  characteristics 
in  the  coal  fields.  (*)   Pennsylvania  and  Ohio  v^ere  fairly  well  settled 
before  mining  operations  began  and  although  there  are  numerous  normal 
communitie.:  scattered  tiirou.ih  the  coal  lields,  between  a  fourth  and  a 
h^lf  of  th',:  laire  ^'-orkers  live  in  coapfny  houses.   Tnt  cjouthern  A'cpalachian 
Area  (-..est  Virginia,  Eastern  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  Virginia,  iiaryland, 
and  Alaoama)  is  more  distantly  lucated  troi  normal  settlements  and 
larger  proportions  of  mine  --orkers  -  fivo-t/.irds  to  threo-iourths  live 
in  company  controlled  comnranities.   The  third  pi  Lt>  Qvoar    (Illinois, 
Indiana,  Kansas,  Missouri,  an-'  lea)  '-ntre  p^:riculture  and  industry  had 
established  independent  to'-'ns,  '-nere  satisfrctorT  transportation  fac- 
ilities existed,  and  '-here  the  mining  population  ■•as  predoniratelv 
n?tive-born,  onlv  r  s'.v^ll  ^ro'-orti  vji  (ppproxinately  10  'ercent^*  of  the 
mi'-'ers  live  in  comT.'any  houses. 

Tatural  location  ox  'ninin.-;  operations  determines  to  a  large 
extent  the  tvpe  of  con-rranity  and  the  housin.:;  facilities  whicn  are  pro- 
vided, '.-here  flat,  open  spaces  or  softlv  rolling  hills  are  the  locale 
of  the  miring  to'-n  'ar,  in  the  addle  Western  States  anc  paits  of  Ohio 
and  Pennsylvf '^ia) ,  considerable  opportunity  exists  for  providing 
houses  with  fair  sized  vards,.  play  grounds,  etc.   Fnere,  hov-ever,  the 
mi'^ing  operf-tion  is  loc.-ted  along  a  '"incing  creek  in  a  narro"  valley, 
'-ith  shari-lv  rising  iiills,  th.^-  com  .unity  and  housing  facilities  are 
distinctly  limited.   Such  locations  ai  e  luite  com  ;on  in  the  Southern 
Appalachian  Area.   '..hile  natural  limitations  do  exist,  most  raininr 
co-amunities  evidence  a  lack  of  planning  and  pn   inadeau-cy  of  epuipment.  (**) 
The  houses  are  often  poorly  located,  being  close  to  tht,  railroad  tracks 
and  thf  tipple.  Tnuy  are  usuallv  constructed  o:  the  ci'.e.-pest  material  - 
i-'ood  i-'ith  the  outside  linisned  consistinf'  of  '  tataerboara  "ailed  cirectly 
to  the  frame  and  often  lackin^;  m  any  sneathin  •,  except  pernaps  paper, 
.ost  01  the  roofs  aie  of  coapositiun  pape)  .   .mly  a  very  small  percentage 
01  the  hop  ,es  '-'e:  e  furnisiiec  ^--ith  inside  flush  toilets,  bath  tuDs,  and 
running  '^rter,   i  any  of  the  nouses  are  in  a  strte  oi  disrepair  and  the 
pairting  is  oiten  neglected.  These  latter  condition  ai  e  not  memt  to  be 
descriptive  oi  all  co  rrany  nouses.   It  .rrust  be  lemtmjered  that  some 
operating  Cpi.ipanies  lollof^  a  policy  oi  iurnisnin.:-  neat  houses  to  mine 


(*)    U.S.Co^l  Com  liscion.  Fart  III,  pp.  l'i-1  ci-14Jb.  ■ 

(**)    See  TeFtimony  in  James  'iTalter  Jarter  vs.  Garter  Goal  ^o:ip.-ny, 

Transcript  of  lecord.  No.' 636,  Sapreme  Gourt  oi  tue  United  States, 
October  1935,  pp.  505-508;  pp.  520-5:1,  etc. 


-226- 


"orkei;s  and  rapintririing  these-  houses  in  p  sptisf ^ctor '■  condition.   To 
some  extent  the  housing  concitrons  pre  renenc'.nt  uoon  tne  miner  pnd  his 
fp.'iiilv  insoiar  as  they  are  '"illiniv  to  coonerate  in  hpvimj  cltpnliness 
pnd  to  tpke  food  care  of  the -rented  urorjerty. 

ore  important  for  thf.  -curposes  of  this  section  dealing  rdth  the 
conditions  of  eimolov-aent  is  a  disoussion  of  the  terms  upon  vrhich  the 
uituiainous  raine  workers  live  in  couiprny  hoases.   Before  entering  upon 
the  discussion,  it  imist  'be  pointed  out  that  the  range  and  level  of 
rentals  for  company  ovned  houses  are  lov^er  than  for  others.   In  pddition, 
the  occupant  of  the  comcany  o-ned  house  secures  nis  fuel  arc  often  his 
light  at  a  lower  cost  t-.pn  other  'age  earners.  in   some  instances,  no 
pocitiona"'  cnai'ge  is  mace  for  '."pter  even  tiiour::h  it  oe  "oicec  to  the 
cre.aises. 

The  mam  objective  of  a  coal  coviranv  •  nich  ouilrs  houses  in  the 
Vicinity  oi  its  OTerations  is  to  ke<;r3  a  suoi:lv  o^  mine  -oi-kers.   hen 
p  mpn   and  his  fa'Ti:!^.'-  .lovf  i-r-to   one  oi  these  houses,  it  is  on  that  opsis 
that  he  is  e:anl0"-ed  or  -ill  De  eiacloyed  by  the  comoany.   Unlest  the 
corapanv's  mines  shut  ^oyr.,    the  miner  ^-ho  ceases  to  '--ork  in  the  mine 
rirast  surrender  his  house  to  the  man  ^'ho  re-plpces  him  in  the  mine.   Ir 
this  i-'py  the  -iiiner  living  in  a  co  r^-ar-r  ho\i<.:e  difiers  in  status-  fro  a 
otne?  individuals  renting  indcDe^ncentlv  o-'ned  houses.   The  mi^-er,  in 
these  instances,  does  not  rent  the  house  ander  tne  ordmarv  tenancv 
la^'s,  r^hich  in  everv  state  assure  security  of  tenure,  cays  of  grace 
defore  eviction  even  for  -oroven  oreach  ox  contract,  and  pn   America" 
citizen's  doi.iinion  ovf  r  his  O'-n  -ojemises  during  legal  tenure  thereof.  (*) 

The  house  leases  used  by  copI  coiana'^ies  .ar^r   riifer  sone^-'hpt  in 
■onraseolocv,  but  the  "^roviKions-  difxer  unly  in  tne  degree  to  i-'hich  the 
company's  rights  are  ixolicitlv  stated  and  the  .m-'^nner  in  ^i^hich  claims 
Oj  orcinar^'-  tenancy  are  abrogated.    The  leases  shoi-'  that:  (**) 

1.  Tae   lease  tei  d'-'ates  automatic- ll/  '  iienver  the  mine  '"orker 
ceases,  from  any  cause  ■'•'hat soever,  to  --/uri-  for  tiie  coal  company. 

2.  'Tile  lease  can  usu^ll  f  bt  terhiinated  by  either  -party, 
ordinarily  ur;on  five  davs'  notice. 

3.  Tne  co!fl-oany  mpv  leg:--!'!.'"'  i^ut  the  mine  -orker  ano  iiis  family 
out  01  the  house  at'  tr.L  ternii-ia':ion  of  the  lease  "-ithout  prejudicing 
its  claim  for  .- nv  rental  arrears  and  v-itnout  incurring  liabilitv  for 
damage  resultin.'^  to  the  mine  '-orker;  '  jelon.-^-ings  through  eviction. 


(*)   U.S.  Coal  CJomusfiion,  Part  III,  t?.  l-;.:.?. 

(**)   Ibid,  L-arra,  p.  Ivbt.  CoTjif,:.-of  con^jany  houre  leases  nio^r   be  found 
in  the  a-mendix  to  the  same  rfoort,  cr-.  11.-79  -  16b6.   Also  testi- 
mony in  Carter  Coal  Case,  jctober,  Ibo;.-,  Transeript  of  r.ecord, 
Supreme  Court  of  U'^itrc  :^jtates,  n.  44.-.  and  -^1:40. 


4.  The  company  rany  nwy  itself  out  oi  mine  workers'  WF,-es  for  . 
rent  due  pna  fIso  for  dpraa^ies  to  rroueity.    The  co;appny  insy  glso, 
pccordin,F'  to  some  lepsvs,  "dthnold  all  unpaid  'rages  at  the  termina- 
tion of  a  lease,  until  the  ^rendses  are  surrendered,  According  to 
others,  the  coimDeny  'nay  retain  oerrflpnently  $r,.vJO  for  ercli  day  tne 
■Dre;nises  are  occu-.iec  by  the  iiine  '-orker  or  iiis  f a  nily  alter  the 
lease  '-r  s  teriainated. 

5.  The  com'.^any  reserves  the  right  to  enter  ano  inspect  the 
-ore'nises  at  anv  time  and  to  make  and  enforce  rules  ano  regalr- 
tions  ailectinr  the  r.trtetr.  or  roads  utior  i-nich  the  premisep  abut. 

6.  The  /line  '"orkers,  accon  ing  to  soae  lenses,  nust  not  enter- 
tain or  harbor  u:?on  tuc  crcp.ises  rersons  objectionable,  to  tnt-  com-oany. 
Some  leases  urohibit  ta'rinf-  lodgers  or  uOard.ers  unle^tnese  are 
eraplOTees  of  the  corarian-^r.   Other  leaseK  strte  that  the  mine  "orhers ' 
rights  in  the  rremises  are  only  ^s  -leans-  oi  in.-rfcss  or  egress  for 
himself  and  family. 

These  -provisiv-nv,  "hether  they  be  in  the  interests  of  la'"  and 
order  or  to  inrure  inore  eiitctive  control  over,  l-bor  sivrrly,  do 
make  for  legal  insecurity  of  house  tenure  lanc  limited  dominion  ot 
premises  during  tenure,  A  provision  ''hich  st.-tes  that  a  miner  '"ho 
loses  or  gives  up  his  job  ''for  any  reason  '-matsoever"  loses  the 
right  to  occup-r  his  nouse  irom  the  d-^y  ne  ceases  to  '-ork,  is  open 
to  aDuse.  ;  sudden  'altercatior  v^ith  the  iiine  boss  may  end  in  dis- 
charge for  the  miner  anr  loss  oi  .lome  for  the  miner's  family.   Like- 
"•ise,  the  mine  '."orker  approaches  the  bai'gaining  process  with  consider- 
able timidity  since  not  Only  iiis  job  out  also  shelter  for  ni  s  familv 
mr^v  be  in  jeopard^^.   Some  o-"er^tors  hpYe   contender  th-^t  these  pro- 
visions "'ere  mere  for.'is  anc  rarely  used.   Senate  investigations  con- 
cerning conoitions  in  coal  lielcs  have  f ounc  ,  ho'-'ever,  that  in  some 
instances  where  co-.iipanies  went  irom  a  union  to  non-union  basis  (*)  or 
'-•nere  companies  soueht  to  prevent  unionization  (**)  eviction  oi  miners 
irom  their  homes,  of  ttjn  in  the  ''inter  season,  '7as  not  uncoiaT.on.   It 
is  not  lair  to  cite  such  evictions  as  illustrative  oi  the  general 
situation,  out  thej>-  do  represtnt  a  tni'eat  against  the  miner's 
security.  Thus,  the  miner  and  his  familv  face  not  only  a  cessation 
of  inco.me,  but  a  loss  of  sh.^lter  ^nc  the  expense  of  moving. 

Industrirl  Police  -  (a)  CopI  ptiC    Iror  Police:   The  svstem  of 
incustrial  police  (more  ccm:ionly  i-:no'-n  as  coal  and  iron  police),  has 
been  the  suojtct  of  bitter  controversy  in  the  bituminous  coal  industry, 
especially  in  "ennsvlvania.   rhile  thi.  industrial  police  svstera  is  not 
peculiar  to  the  coal  incustrv,  it  nrs  received  lore  iTuDlicity  '-ith 


(*)   Hearings  on  S,  -es.  105,  Investirjation  ol  :,onditions  in  'joal 
Fi-lds  of  Pennsylvania,  .est  Vir-;inia,  and  0,;io.  ly.-b. 

(**)  re    rings  on  S,  Res,  17b,  Irve- tigation  ol  Conditions  in  Coal 
,  iulds  of  'Jarlan  anc  'ell  Counties,  Kentucky,  1932, 


reference  to  this  inrustry  than  perhap;.^  for  any  other  excepting  the 
steel  inoustry.   Tiie  incustrial  iDolice  haa  three   attribut'.s  vnich 
especially  oistin^xii&her  tnem  from  i-'atchmen  guarding  taeir  emDlovers' 
proiDerty.  (*)   Thev  had  the  pover  to  arrest  on  a  ^^-prrant;  their  emioloyers 
'•'■ere  not  liatle  for  their  unla^"ful  acts  unless  dune  in  -Darsur'nce  of 
cir-ect  orders;  and,  pDove  -^11,  they  had  the  title  anc  the  unifor:n  of  a 
police  officer  pnc'pn   authority  v^r^ieh  soruHc:  fro^a  the  Co.nuion"eplth 
itseli. 

The  first  statute  in  Pennsylvania  peri.uttin.'r;  private  persons  and 
corporations  to  -opy  and  direct  their  o-n  '-'olice  '"ita  commissions  granted 
oy  the  governor  wps  enacted  in  IboS.  This  Act  related  to  I'plroads. 
In  1866  the  systea  '"as  extended  to  operators  oi  any  "colliery,  furnace, 
or  rolling  ;nill",  anc  later  it  '^^as  extended  to  certain  utility  coiTOanies. 
The  various  statutues,  f-xcept  tnose  dealin.--  '^itn  rp^lroad  police,  "-ere 
.assembled  in  a  sin^rle  stp*ute  providing  for  "Industrial  Police"  fAct 
Oi  Anril  16,  19S9  F.E.  E46.) 

This  Act  aut;;.  ■fi7ed  the  i>overnor  to  a-n'c0i.nt  incustrial  police 
on  the  application  of  "any  corporation,  ssi-.ociptiun  o:-  indivirual 
O'-ning,  leasing  or  being  in  --OEsession  of  any  collier^',  furnace  or 
rolling  mill,  and  any  "-ater  coicipany,  i-ater  supply  coinpanv,  wpter  po"'er 
coapany,  electric  light  companv,  electric  PO'^fer  co  ipany,  electric 
trpnsmission  co  ipany,  mineral,  mirine^:  or  qurriyxn.:;  comprm'',  or  express 
cojiprny,  ifithin  its  Corai.ion"'eplth" .  (**)   A  requirement  of  residence 
in  Pennsylvania  for  at  le-~st  one  yer^r  prior  to  the  appointment  '^'as 
made  and  the  Governor  "'as  reouired  to  inverti^pte  the  tappointee's 
Qualifications.   The  a^'-^ointee  hac  to  r:ive    bona  --ith  a  corporate  surety, 
Tiie  'T-overnor  could  revo]:e  any  com.iission  at  his  pleasure.   Tne  industrial 
policeman  ^'ts  paid  by  the  coiapany  securin.-;  his  appomtiat  nt.  ■  He  had  "the 
powers  and  prerogatives  conierred  by  lav  upon  me'-ioers  oi  the  police  force 
01  cities  01  tht  first  clasF,   nd  upon  constables".   He  ''ore  a  uniform 
^■pi'^roved  L-y  the  Governor  and  a  badge  bearing  the  vorcs  "Industrial 
rolice"  anr  the  employers'  npie.      Tne  Act  -'as  an  imnrovement  on  the 
previous  statutes  in  that  it  reouired  ever/  industrial  roliceman  to 
nave  been  a  bona  lide  resident  of  the  Com:.iOn"'e?  1th  for  one  year  and 
it  reouired  a  surety  bond  for  each  appointee. 

The  coal  and  iron  police  "ere,  in  lost  instances,  ar:ried  men 
employed  by  certain  co  .ipanies  to  protect  their  interests.   Since  their 
police  pover s  '"ere  ■■•ranted  by  la"'  and  their  coi.'i;.iissions  '-■"'ere  issued 
by  the  C-overnor,  their  ei.  ectiveness  as  a  kind  oi  private  militi-'^  '^'as 
consic"  rrbly  inci  eased.   Abuse  oil  autnority  cid  not  .aake  the  t-aplover 
liable  for  damages  unless  speciiic  directions  for  unla"'iul  acts  nad 
beer  issued.  (***) 


(*)    Iieport  to  G-overnor  Gifford  Finchpt  oy  the  ^ouiisr^ion  on  Special 
Policing  in  Industry,  Special  bulletin  Vo.    3d,  1934,  page  18, 
Harrirburg,  Fennsvlvania. 

(**)    loir,  EUPra,  p.  19 

(***)    -:agan  v,  "ittsburgh  Ter.iinal  Coal  oorporation,  :77,  Pa.  109;  1930, 

9637 


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