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W. D. ROSS, M.A. 









Oxfotd University Press, Amen House, London E.C.4 


Geoffrey Cumberlege, Publisher to the University 

First edition 1921 
Reprinted lithographically in Great Britain at the 
University Press, Oxford, 1946, 1952, from sheets 

of the first edition 







P O L I T I C A 






Piety towards Dr. Jowett, whose munificence has 
made possible the production of this translation of 
Aristotle, suggested that no new rendering of the 
Politics should be attempted, but that his translation 
should be re-issued. Much valuable work has been done, 
however, on the Politics since his translation was published 
in 1885, and of this I have endeavoured, in revising his 
translation, to take account, while preserving as far as 
possible the ease and grace of the original rendering. The 
revised translation is based on Immisch's edition in the 
Teubner series (1909), but I have not hesitated to depart 
from his text where he deserts the MSS. unnecessarily, 
or where a better emendation seemed possible ; all such 
departures have been indicated in the notes. In 
particular, I have added one more to the many attempts 
that have been made to emend the corrupt passage 
iv. i30o a 23~ b 5. 

By the kindness of Mr. H. W. C. Davis, Fellow of 
Balliol, I am permitted to use the table of contents 
prefixed to his edition of Dr. Jowett's translation. 

W. D. ROSS. 



cc. i, 2. Definition and structure of the State. 


1. The state is the highest form of community and aims at the 

highest good. How it differs from other communities will 
appear if we examine the parts of which it is composed. 

2. It consists of villages which consist of households. The house- 

hold is founded upon the two relations of male and female, 
of master and slave ; it exists to satisfy man's daily needs. 
The village, a wider community, satisfies a wider range of 
needs. The state aims at satisfying all the needs of men. 
Men form states to secure a bare subsistence ; but the 
ultimate object of the state is the good life. The naturalness 
of the state is proved by the faculty of speech in man. In 
the order of Nature the state precedes the household and 
the individual. It is founded on a natural impulse, that 
towards political association. 

cc. 3-13. Household economy. The Slave. Property. 
Children and Wives. 

3. Let us discuss the household, since the state is composed of 


4. First as to slavery. The slave is a piece of property which is 

animate, and useful for action rather than for production. 

5. Slavery is natural ; in every department of the natural universe 

we find the relation of ruler and subject. There are human 
beings who, without possessing reason, understand it. These 
are natural slaves. 

6. But we find persons in slavery who are not natural slaves. 

Hence slavery itself is condemned by some ; but they are 
wrong. The natural slave benefits by subjection to a master. 

7. The art of ruling slaves differs from that of ruling free men but 

calls for no detailed description ; any one who is a natural 
master can acquire it for himself. 

8. As to property and the modes of acquiring it. This subject 

concerns us in so far as property is an indispensable sub- 
stratum to the household. 


CH. t 

9. But we do not need that form of finance which accumulates 
wealth for its own sake. This is unnatural finance. It has 
been made possible by the invention of coined money. It 
accumulates money by means of exchange. Natural and 
unnatural finance are often treated as though they were the 
same, but differ in their aims ; 

10. Also in their subject-matter; for natural finance is only con- 

cerned with the fruits of the earth and animals. 

11. Natural finance is necessary to the householder; he must there- 

fore know about live stock, agriculture, possibly about the 
exchange of the products of the earth, such as wood and 
minerals, for money. Special treatises on finance exist, and 
the subject should be specially studied by statesmen. 

12. Lastly, we must discuss and distinguish the relations of husband 

to wife, of father to child. 

13. In household management persons call for more attention than 

things ; free persons for more than slaves. Slaves are only 
capable of an inferior kind of virtue. Socrates was wrong in 
denying that there are several kinds of virtue. Still the slave 
must be trained in virtue. The education of the free man 
will be subsequently discussed. 


cc. 1-8. Ideal Commonwealths — Plato, Phaleas, Hippodamus. 

1. To ascertain the nature of the ideal state we should start by 

examining both the best states of history and the best that 
theorists have imagined. Otherwise we might waste our 
time over problems which others have already solved. 
Among theorists, Plato in the Republic raises the most funda- 
mental questions. He desires to abolish private property 
and the family. 

2. But the end which he has in view is wrong. He wishes to 

make all his citizens absolutely alike ; but the differentiation 
of functions is a law of nature. There can be too much unity 
in a state. 

3. And the means by which he would promote unity are wrong. 
The abolition of property will produce, not remove, dissension. 
Communism of wives and children will destroy natural affection. 

4. Other objections can be raised ; but this is the fatal one. 

5. To descend to details. The advantages to be expected from 

communism of property would be better secured if private 
property were used in a liberal spirit to relieve the wants of 
others. Private property makes men happier, and enables 
them to cultivate such virtues as generosity. The Republic 




makes unity the result of uniformity among the citizens, 
which is not the case. The good sense of mankind has 
always been against Plato, and experiment would show that 
his idea is impracticable. 

6. Plato sketched anothd ideal state in the Laws \ it was meant 

to be more practicable than the other. In the Laws he 
abandoned communism, but otherwise upheld the leading 
ideas of the earlier treatise, except that he made the new 
state larger and too large. He forgot to discuss foreign 
relations, and to fix a limit of private property, and to restrict 
the increase of population, and to distinguish between ruler 
and subject. The form of government which he proposed 
was bad. 

7. Phaleas of Chalcedon made equal distribution of property the 

main feature of his scheme. This would be difficult to effect, 
and would not meet the evils which Phaleas had in mind. 
Dissensions arise from deeper causes than inequality of 
wealth. His state would be weak against foreign foes. His 
reforms would anger the rich and not satisfy the poor. 

8. Hippodamus, who was not a practical politician, aimed at 

symmetry. In his state there were to be three classes, three 
kinds of landed property, three sorts of laws. He also pro- 
posed to (1) create a Court of Appeal, (2) let juries qualify 
their verdicts, (3) reward those who made discoveries of 
public utility. His classes and his property system were 
badly devised. Qualified verdicts are impossible since jury- 
men may not confer together. The law about discoveries 
would encourage men to tamper with the Constitution. Now 
laws when obsolete and absurd should be changed ; but 
needless changes diminish the respect for law. 

cc. 9-12. The best existent states — Sparta, Crete, and 
Cartilage — Greek lawgivers. 

9. The Spartans cannot manage their serf population. Their 

women are too influential and too luxurious. Their property 
system has concentrated all wealth in a few hands. Hence 
the citizen body has decreased. There are points to criticize 
in the Ephorate, the Senate, the Kingship, the common 
meals, the Admiralty. The Spartan and his state are only 
fit for war. Yet even in war Sparta is hampered by the want 
of a financial system. 
10. The Cretan cities resemble Sparta in their constitutions, 
but are more primitive. Their common meals are better 
managed. But the Cosmi are worse than the Ephors. The 



Cretan constitution is a narrow and factious oligarchy ; the 
cities are saved from destruction only by their inaccessibility. 

11. The Carthaginian polity is highly praised, and not without 

reason. It may be compared with the Spartan ; it is an 
oligarchy with some democratic features. It lays stress upon 
wealth ; in Carthage all offices are bought and sold. Also, 
one man may hold several offices together. These are bad 
features. But the discontent .of the people is soothed by 
schemes of emigration. 

12. Of lawgivers, Solon was the best ; conservative when possible, 

and a moderate democrat. About Philolaus, Charondas, 
Phaleas, Draco, Pittacus, and Androdamas there is little to 
be said. 


cc. 1-5. Tfie Citizen, civic virtue, and the civic body. 

1. How are we to define a citizen ? He is more than a mere 

denizen; private rights do not make a citizen. He is ordi- 
narily one who possesses political power ; who sits on juries 
and in the assembly. But it is hard to find a definition which 
applies to all so-called citizens. To define him as the son 
of citizen parents is futile. 

2. Some say that his civic rights must have been justly acquired. 

But he is a citizen who has political power, however 

3. Similarly the state is defined by reference to the distribution of 

political power ; when the mode of distribution is changed 
a new state come3 into existence. 

4. The good citizen may not be a good man ; the good citizen is 

one who does good service to his state, and this state may 
be bad in principle. In a constitutional state the good 
citizen knows both how to rule and how to obey. The good 
man is one who is fitted to rule. But the citizen in a con- 
stitutional state learns to rule by obeying orders. Therefore 
citizenship in such a state is a moral training. 

5. Mechanics will not be citizens in the best state. Extreme 

democracies, and some oligarchies, neglect this rule. But 
circumstances oblige them to do this. They have no choice. 

cc. 6-13. The Classification of Constitutions ; Democracy and 

Oligarchy ; Kingship. 

6. The aims of the state are two : to satisfy man's social instinct, 

and to fit him for the good life. Political rule differs from 



that over slaves in aiming primarily at the good of those who 
are ruled. 

7. Constitutions are bad or good according as the common wtlfare 

is, or is not, their aim. Of good Constitutions there are 
three : Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity. Of bad there 
are also three : Tyranny, Oligarchy, Extreme Democracy. 
The bad are perversions of the good. 

8. Democracies and Oligarchies are not made by the numerical 

proportion of the rulers to the ruled. Democracy is the rule 
of the poor ; oligarchy is that of the rich. 

9. Democrats take Equality for their motto ; oligarchs believe that 

political rights should be unequal and proportionate to 
wealth. But both sides miss the true object of the state, 
which is virtue. Those who do most to promote virtue 
deserve the greatest share of power. 

10. On the same principle, Justice is not the will of the majority or 

of the wealthier, but that course of action which the moral 
aim of the state requires. 

11. But are the Many or the Few likely to be the better rulers ? It 

would be unreasonable to give the highest offices to the 
Many. But they have a faculty of criticism which fits them 
for deliberative and judicial power. The good critic need 
not be an expert ; experts are sometimes bad judges. More- 
over, the Many have a greater stake in the city than the 
Few. But the governing body, whether Few or Many, must 
be held in check by the laws. 

12. On what principle should political power be distributed? 

Granted that equals deserve equal shares ; who are these 
equals ? Obviously those who are equally able to be 
of service to the state. 

13. Hence there is something in the claims advanced by the wealthy, 

the free born, the noble, the highly gifted. But no one 
of these classes should be allowed to rule the rest. A state 
should consist of men who are equal, or nearly so, in wealth, 
in birth, in moral and intellectual excellence. The principle 
which underlies Ostracism is plausible. But in the ideal 
state, if a pre-eminent individual be found, he should be 
rnade a king. 

cc 14-18. The For ?ns of Monarchy. 

14. Of Monarchy there are five kinds, (1) the Spartan, (2) the 

Barbarian, (3) the elective dictatorship, (4) the Heroic, (5) 
Absolute Kingship. 

15. The last of these forms might appear the best polity to some ; 

that is, if the king acts as the embodiment of law. For he 



will dispense from the law in the spirit of the law. But this 
power would be less abused if reserved for the Many. 
Monarchy arose to meet the needs of primitive society ; it is 
now obsolete and on various grounds objectionable. 

16. It tends to become hereditary ; it subjects equals to the rule of 

an equal. The individual monarch may be misled by his 
passions, and no single man can attend to all the duties 
of government. 

17. One case alone can be imagined in which Absolute Kingship 

would be just. 

18. Let us consider the origin and nature of the best polity, now 

that we have agreed not to call Absolute Kingship the best. 

cc. 1- 10. Variations of the main types 0/ Constitutions. 

1. Political science should study (1) the ideal state, (2) those states 

which may be the best obtainable under special circum- 
stances, and even (3) those which are essentially bad. For 
the statesman must sometimes make the best of a bad 

2. Of our six main types of state, Kingship and Aristocracy have 

been discussed (cf. Bk. Ill, c. 14 fol.). Let us begin by 
dealing with the other four and their divisions, inquiring also 
when and why they may be desirable. 

3. First as to Democracy and Oligarchy. The common view that 

Democracy and Oligarchy should be taken as the main types 
of Constitution is at variance with our own view and wrong. 
So is the view that the numerical proportion of rulers to ruled 
makes the difference between these two types ; in a Demo- 
cracy the Many are also the poor, in an Oligarchy the Few 
are also the wealthy. In every state the distinction between 
rich and poor is the most fundamental of class-divisions. 
Still Oligarchy and Democracy are important types ; and 
their variations arise from differences in the character of the 
rich and the poor by whom they are ruled. 

4. Of Democracies there are four kinds. The worst, extreme 

Democracy, is that in which all offices are open to all, and 
the will of the people overrides all law. 

5. Of Oligarchies too there are four kinds ; the worst is that in 

which offices are hereditary and the magistrates uncontrolled 
by law. 

6. These variations arise under circumstances which may be 

briefly described. 



7. Of Aristocracy in the strict sense there is but one form, that in 

which the best men alone are citizens. 

8. Polity is a compromise between Democracy and Oligarchy, 

but inclines to the Democratic side. Many so-called Aris- 
tocracies are really Polities. 

9. There are different ways of effecting the compromise which 

makes a Polity. The Laconian Constitution is an example 
of a successful compromise. 
10. Tyranny is of. three kinds: (1) the barbarian despotism, and 
(2) the elective dictatorship have already been discussed ; 
in both there is rule according to law over willing subjects. 
But in (3) the strict form of tyranny, there is the lawless rule 
of one man over unwilling subjects. 

cc. 1 1 -1 3. Of the Best State both in general and under special 


11. For the average city-state the best constitution will be a mean 

between the rule of rich and poor ; the middle-class will be 
supreme. No state will be well administered unless the 
middle-class holds sway. The middle-class is stronger in 
large than in small states. Hence in Greece it has rarely 
attained to power ; especially as democracy and oligarchy 
were aided hy the influence of the leading states. 

12. No constitution can dispense with the support of the strongest 

class in the state. Hence Democracy and Oligarchy are the 
only constitutions possible in some states. But in these cases 
the legislator should conciliate the middle-class. 

13. Whatever form of constitution be adopted there are expedients 

to be noted which may help in preserving it. 

cc. 14-16. How to proceed in framing a Constitution. 

14. The legislator must pay attention to three subjects in par- 

ticular : (a) The Deliberative Assembly which is different in 
each form of constitution. 

15. (b) The Executive. Here he must know what offices are in- 

dispensable and which of them may be conveniently combined 
in the person of one magistrate ; also whether the same offices 
should be supreme in every state ; also which of the twelve 
or more methods of making appointments should be adopted 
in each case. 

16. (c) The Courts of Law. Here he must consider the kinds of 

law-courts, their spheres of action, their methods of procedure. 


cc. 1-4. Of Revolutions, and tfieir causes in general. 


1 . Ordinary states are founded on erroneous ideas of justice, which 

lead to discontent and revolution. Of revolutions some are 
made to introduce a new Constitution, others to modify the 
old, others to put the working of the Constitution in new 
hands. Both Democracy and Oligarchy contain inherent 
flaws which lead to revolution, but Democracy is the more 
stable of the two types. 

2. We may distinguish between the frame of mind which fosters 

revolution, the objects for which it is started, and the provo- 
cative causes. 

3. The latter deserve a more detailed account. 

4. Trifles may be the occasion but are never the true cause of 

a sedition. One common cause is the aggrandizement of 
a particular class ; another is a feud between rich and poor 
when they are evenly balanced and there is no middle-class 
to mediate. As to the manner of effecting a revolution : 
it may be carried through by force or fraud. 

cc . 5-12. Revolutions in particular States, and how revolutions 

may be avoided. 

5. (a) In Democracies revolutions may arise from a persecution 

of the rich ; or when a demagogue becomes a general, or 
when politicians compete for the favour of the mob. 

6. (b) In Oligarchies the people may rebel against oppression ; 

ambitious oligarchs may conspire, or appeal to the people, 
or set up a tyrant. Oligarchies are seldom destroyed except 
by the feuds of their own members ; unless they employ 
a mercenary captain, who may become a tyrant. 

7. (c) In Aristocracies and Polities the injustice of the ruling class 

may lead to revolution, but less often in Polities. Aristo- 
cracies may also be ruined by an unprivileged class, or an 
ambitious man of talent. Aristocracies tend to become 
oligarchies. Also they are liable to gradual dissolution ; 
which is true of Polities as well. 

8. The best precautions against sedition are these : to avoid 

illegality and frauds upon the unprivileged ; to maintain good 
feeling between rulers and ruled ; to watch destructive agen- 
cies ; to alter property qualifications from time to time ; to 
let no individual or class become too powerful ; not to let 
magistracies bea source of gain ; to beware of class-oppression. 



9. In all magistrates we should require loyalty, ability, and justice ; 
we should not carry the principle of the constitution to 
extremes ; we should educate the citizens in the spirit of a 

10. (d) The causes which destroy and the means which preserve 

a Monarchy must be considered separately. Let us first 
distinguish between Tyranny and Kingship. Tyranny com- 
bines the vices of Democracy and Oligarchy. Kingship 
is exposed to the same defects as Aristocracy. But both 
these kinds of Monarchy are especially endangered by the 
insolence of their representatives and by the fear or contempt 
which they inspire in others. Tyranny is weak against both 
external and domestic foes ; Kingship is strong against inva- 
sion, weak against sedition. 

11. Moderation is the best preservative of Kingship. Tyranny 

may rely on the traditional expedients of demoralizing and 
dividing its subjects, or it may imitate Kingship by showing 
moderation in expenditure, and courtesy and temperance in 
social relations, by the wise use of ministers, by holding the 
balance evenly between the rich and poor. 

12. But the Tyrannies of the past have been short-lived. 

Plato's discussion of revolutions in the Republic is inade- 
quate ; e.g. he does not explain the results of a revolution 
against a tyranny, and could not do so on his theory ; nor is 
he correct about the cause of revolution in an Oligarchy ; 
nor does he distinguish between the different varieties of 
Oligarchy and Democracy. 


cc. 1-8. Concerning the proper organization of Democracies 

and Oligarchies. 

1. (A) Democracies differ inter se (1) according to the character 

of the citizen body, (2) according to the mode in which the 
'characteristic features of democracy are combined. 

2. Liberty is the first principle of democracy. The results of 

liberty are that the numerical majority is supreme, and that 
each man lives as he likes. From these characteristics we 
may easily infer the other features of democracy. 

3. In oligarchies it is not the numerical majority, but the wealthier 

men, who are supreme. Both these principles are unjust if 
the supreme authority is to be absolute and above the law. 
Both numbers and wealth should have their share of 
influence. But it is hard to find the true principles of political 
justice, and harder still to make men act upon them. 



4. Democracy has four species (cf. Bk. IV, c. 4). The best is 

(1) an Agricultural Democracy, in which the magistrates 
are elected by, and responsible to, the citizen body, while 
each office has a property qualification proportionate to its 
importance. These democracies should encourage agri- 
culture by legislation. The next best is (2) the Pastoral 
Democracy. Next comes (3) the Commercial Democracy. 
Worst of all is (4) the Extreme Democracy with manhood 

5. It is harder to preserve than to found a Democracy. To pre- 

serve it we must prevent the poor from plundering the rich ; 
we must not exhaust the public revenues by giving pay for 
the performance of public duties ; we must prevent the 
growth of a pauper class. 

6. (B) The modes of founding Oligarchies call for little explanation. 

Careful organization is the best way of preserving these 

7. Much depends on the military arrangements ; oligarchs must 

not make their subjects too powerful an element in the army. 
Admission to the governing body should be granted on easy 
conditions. Office should be made a burden, not a source 
of profit. 

8. Both in oligarchies and democracies the right arrangement 

of offices is important. Some kinds of office are necessary 
in every state ; others are peculiar to special types of state. 


cc. 1-3. The Sumtnum Bonum for individuals and states. 

. Before constructing the ideal state we must know what is the 
most desirable life for states and individuals. True happiness 
flows from the possession of wisdom and virtue, and not from 
the possession of external goods. But a virtuous life must 
be equipped with external goods as instruments. These laws 
hold good of both states and individuals. 

>. But does the highest virtue consist in contemplation or in action ? 
The states of the past have lived for action in the shape 
of war and conquest. But war cannot be regarded as 
a reasonable object for a state. 

3. A virtuous life implies activity, but activity may be speculative 
as well as practical. Those are wrong who regard the life 
of a practical politician as degrading. But again they are 
wrong who treat political power as the highest good. 


cc. 4-1 2. A picture of the Ideal State. 


4. We must begin by considering the population and the territory. 

The former should be as small as we can make it without 
sacrificing independence and the capacity for a moral life. 
The smaller the population the more manageable it will be. 

5. The territory must be large enough to supply the citizens with 

the means of living liberally and temperately, with an abund- 
ance of leisure. The city should be in a central position. 

6. Communication with the sea is desirable for economic and 

military reasons ; but the moral effects of sea-trade are bad. 
If the state has a marine, the port town should be at some 
distance from the city. 

7. The character of the citizens should be a mean between that of 

Asiatics and that of the northern races ; intelligence and 
high spirit should be harmoniously blended as they are 
in some Greek races. 

8. We must distinguish the members of the state from those who 

are necessary as its servants, but no part of it. There must 
be men who are able to provide food, to practise the arts, to 
bear arms, to carry on the work of exchange, to supervise the 
state religion, to exercise political and judicial functions. 

9. But of these classes we should exclude from the citizen body 

(1) the mechanics, (2) the traders, (3) the husbandmen. 
Warriors, rulers, priests remain as eligible for citizenship. 
The same persons should exercise these three professions, 
but at different periods of life. Ownership of land should be 
confined to them. 

10. Such a distinction between a ruling and a subject class, 

based on a difference of occupation, is nothing new. It still 
exists in Egypt, and the custom of common meals in Crete 
and Italy proves that it formerly existed there. Most of the 
valuable rules of politics have been discovered over and over 
again in the course of history. 
In dealing with the land of the state we must distinguish 
between public demesnes and private estates. Both kinds 
of land should be tilled by slaves or barbarians of a servile 

11. The site of the city should be chosen with regard (1) to public 

health, (2) to political convenience, (3) to strategic require- 
ments. The ground-plan of the city should be regular 
enough for beauty, not so regular as to make defensive 
warfare difficult. Walls are a practical necessity. 

12. It is well that the arrangement of the buildings in the city 

should be carefully thought out. 


cc. 13-17. The Educational System of the Ideal State, its aim, 

and early stages. 

13. The nature and character of the citizens must be determined 

with reference to the kind of happiness which we desire them 
to pursue. Happiness was defined in the Ethics as the 
perfect exercise of virtue, the latter term being understood 
not in the conditional, but in the absolute sense. Now a man 
acquires virtue of this kind by the help of nature, habit, and 
Habit and reason are the fruits of education, which must 
therefore be discussed. 

14. The citizens should be educated to obey when young and to rule 

when they are older. Rule is their ultimate and highest 
function. Since the good ruler is the same as the good man, 
our education must be so framed as to produce the good 
man. It should develop all man's powers and fit him for 
all the activities of life ; but the highest powers and the 
highest activities must be the supreme care of education. 
An education which is purely military, like the Laconian, 
neglects this principle. 

15. The virtues of peace (intellectual culture, temperance, justice) 

are the most necessary for states and individuals ; war is 
nothing but a means towards securing peace. But education 
must follow the natural order of human development, begin- 
ning with the body, dealing next with the appetites, and 
training the intellect last of all. 

16. To produce a healthy physique the legislator must fix the age 

of marriage, regulate the physical condition of the parents, 
provide for the exposure of infants, and settle the duration of 

17. He must also prescribe a physical training for infants and 

young children. For their moral education the very young 
should be committed to overseers ; these should select the 
tales which they are told, their associates, the pictures, 
plays, and statues which they see. From five to seven years 
of age should be the period of preparation for intellectual 



cc. 1-7. Tht 'Ideal Education continued. Its Music and 


1. Education should be under state-control and the same for all 

the citizens. 

2. It should comprise those useful studies which every one must 

master, but none which degrade the mind or body. 

3. Reading, writing, and drawing have always been taught on the 

score of their utility ; gymnastic as producing valour. Music 
is taught as a recreation, but it serves a higher purpose. The 
noble employment of leisure is the highest aim which a man 
can pursue ; and music is valuable for this purpose. The 
same may be said of drawing, and other subjects of education 
have the same kind of value. 

4. Gymnastic is the first stage of education ; but we must not 

develop the valour and physique of our children at the 
expense of the mind, as they do in Sparta. Until puberty, 
and for three years after, bodily exercise should be light. 

5. Music, if it were a mere amusement, should not be taught to 

children ; they would do better by listening to professionals. 
But music is a moral discipline and a rational enjoyment. 

6. By learning music children become better critics and are given 

a suitable occupation. When of riper age they should aban- 
don music ; professional skill is not for them ; nor should 
they be taught difficult instruments. 

7. The various musical harmonies should be used for different 

purposes. Some inspire virtue, others valour, others enthu- 
siasm. The ethical harmonies are those which children 
should learn. The others may be left to professionals. The 
Dorian harmony is the best for education. The Phrygian is 
bad ; but the Lydian may be beneficial to children. 

Cetera desunt. 


1 Every state is a community of some kind, and every I252 f 
community is established with a view to some good ; for 
mankind always act in order to obtain that which they 
think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, 

the state or political community, which is the highest of 
all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a 5 
greater degree than any other, and at the highest good. 

Some people think l that the qualifications of a states- 
man, king, householder, and master are the same, and that 
they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their 
subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called 10 
a master ; over more, the manager of a household ; over 
a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were 
no difference between a great household and a small 
state. The distinction which is made between the king 
and the statesman is as follows : When the government 
is personal, the ruler is a king ; when, according to the 15 
rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are 
ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman. 

But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in 
kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the 
matter according to the method 2 which has hitherto 
guided us. As in other departments of science, so in 20 
politics, the compound should always be resolved into 
the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We 
must therefore look at the elements of which the state 
is composed, in order that we may see in what the 
different kinds of rule differ from one another, and 
whether any scientific result can be attained about each 
one of them. 

2 He who thus considers things in their first growth 

1 Cp. Plato, PoliticuSy 258 E-259 D. 2 Cp. 12 56 s 2. 

1252 s POLITICA 

25 and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain 
the clearest view of them. In the first place there must 
be a union of those who cannot exist without each other ; 
namely, of male and female, that the race may continue 
(and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate 
purpose, but because, in common with other animals and 
with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave 

3° behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler 
and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which 
can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature in- 
tended to be lord and master, and that which can with its 
body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by 
nature a slave ; hence master and slave have the same 
I252 b interest. Now nature has distinguished between the 
female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the 
smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses ; 
she makes each thing for a single use, and every instru- 
ment is best made when intended for one and not for 
5 many uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made 
between women and slaves, because there is no natural 
ruler among them : they are a community of slaves, male 
and female. Wherefore the poets say, — 

1 It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians ' * ; 

as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were 
by nature one. 

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, 
10 master and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, 
and Hesiod is right when he says, — 

1 First house and wife and an ox for the plough ', 2 

for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the 
association established by nature for the supply of men's 
everyday wants, and the members of it are called 
by Charondas ' companions of the cupboard ', and by 
Epimenides the Cretan, ' companions of the manger \ 3 
J 5 But when several families are united, and the association 

1 Eurip. Iphig. in Aul. 1400. 2 Op. et Di. 405. 

3 Or, reading in 1. 15 with some MSS. and the old translator 
(William of Moerbeke) o/uoKarn'ovr, ' companions of the hearth \ 

BOOK I. 2 I252 b 

aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, 
the first society to be formed is the village. And the 
most natural form of the village appears to be that of 
a colony from the family, composed of the children and 
grandchildren, who are said to be ' suckled with the 
same milk '. And this is the reason why Hellenic states 
were originally governed by kings ; because the Hellenes 20 
were under royal rule before they came together, as the 
barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, 
and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly 
form of government prevailed because they were of the 
same blood. As Homer says : a 
'Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.' 

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient 
times. Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, 
because they themselves either are or were in ancient 25 
times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not 
only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be 
like their own. 

When several villages are united in a single complete 
community, large enough to be nearly or quite self 
sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in 
the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the 
sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms 30 
of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of 
them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what 
each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, 
whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. 
Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, 
and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. I253 a 

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, 
and that man is by nature a political animal. And he 
who by nature and not by mere accident is without a 
state, is either a bad man or above humanity ; he is like the 

' Tribelcss, lawless, hearthless one,' 5 

whom Homer 2 denounces — the natural outcast is forthwith 

1 Od. ix. 114, quoted by Plato, Laws, iii. 680 B, and in N. Eth. 
x. ll8o a 28. 

2 //. ix. 63. 

B 2 


a lover of war ; he may be compared to an isolated piece 
at draughts. 

Now, that man is more of a political animal than 
bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, 
as we often say, makes nothing in vain, 1 and man is the 
only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of 

10 speech. 2 And whereas mere voice is but an indication of 
pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals 
(for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and 
pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no 
further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the 
expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the 

15 just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man 
that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just 
and unjust, and the like, and the association of living 
beings who have this sense makes a family and a 

Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the 
family and to the individual, since the whole is of 

20 necessity prior to the part ; for example, if the whole 
body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except 
in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand ; 
for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. 
But things are defined by their working and power; and 
we ought not to say that they are the same when they no 
longer have their proper quality, but only that they 

25 have the same name. The proof that the state is a 
creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the 
individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing ; and there- 
fore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he 
who is unable to live in society, or who has no need 
because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast 
or a god : he is no part of a state. A social instinct is 

3 o implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first 
founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For 
man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when 
separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all ; 
since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is 
1 Cp. I256 b 20. * Cp. vii. I332 b 5. 

BOOK I. 2 1253* 

equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by 
intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst 
ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most 35 
unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most 
full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men 
in states, for the administration of justice, which is the 
determination of what is just, 1 is the principle of order 
in political society. 

3 Seeing then that the state is made up of households, 
before speaking of the state we must speak of the 
management of the household. The parts of household 
management correspond to the persons who compose the 1253 15 
household, and a complete household consists of slaves 
and freemen. Now we should begin by examining every- 
thing in its fewest possible elements ; and the first and 5 
fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave, 
husband and wife, father and children. We have there- 
fore to consider what each of these three relations is and 
ought to be: — I mean the relation of master and servant, IO 
the marriage relation (the conjunction of man and wife 
has no name of its own), and thirdly, the procreative 
relation 2 (this also has no proper name). And there is 
another element of a household, the so-called art of 
getting wealth, which, according to some, is identical 
with household management, according to others, a 
principal part of it ; the nature of this art will also 
have to be considered by us. 

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the 15 
needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some 
better theory of their relation than exists at present. 
For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a 
science, and that the management of a household, and the 
mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as 
I was saying at the outset/' are all the same. Others -'o 
affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to 
nature, and that the distinction between slave and free- 

1 Cp. N. Eth. v. H34 a 3i. 

■ Reading TtKvmrotrjTiKrj in 1. 10 with the MSS. 

3 Plato in Pol. 25S E-259 D, referred to already in 1252* 7-16. 


man exists by law only, and not by nature ; and being 
an interference with nature is therefore unjust. 

Property is a part of the household, and the art 4 
of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing 
the household ; for no man can live well, or indeed live 

35 at all, unless he be provided with necessaries. And as 
in the arts which have a definite sphere the workers 
must have their own proper instruments for the accom- 
plishment of their work, so it is in the management of 
a household. 1 Now instruments are of various sorts ; 
some are living, others lifeless ; in the rudder, the pilot 
of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living 
instrument ; for in the arts the servant is a kind of in- 

30 strument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for 
maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the 
family, a slave is a living possession, and property a 
number of such instruments ; and the servant is him- 
self an instrument which takes precedence of all other 
instruments. For if every instrument could accom- 
plish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of 

35 others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods 
of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, 2 

' of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods ' ; 

if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plec- 
trum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief 
workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves. 
I254 a Here, however, another distinction must be drawn : the in- 
struments commonly so called are instruments of produc- 
tion, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The 
shuttle, for example, is not only of use ; but something 
else is made by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed 
5 there is only the use. Further, as production and action 
are different in kind, and both require instruments, the 
instruments which they employ must likewise differ in 
kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore 

1 Retaining ovtu> ko\ tu> oIkovohikw in 1. 27, and omitting tg> 
oixin'Ofjuxd) in 1. 31. 
J Horn. //. xviii. 376. 

BOOK I. 4 I254 a 

the slave is the minister of action. Again, a possession 
is spoken of as a pai t is spoken of ; for the part is not 
only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it ; 10 
and this is also true of a possession. The master is only 
the master of the slave ; he does not belong to him, 
whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, 
but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the 
nature and office of a slave ; he who is by nature not his 
own but another's man, is by nature a slave; and he 15 
may be said to be another's man who, being a human 
being, is also a possession. And a possession may be 
defined as an instrument of action, separable from the 

5 But is there any one thus intended by nature to be 
a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and 
right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature ? 

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on 20 
grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some 
should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only 
necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, 
some are marked out for subjection, others for rule. 

And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects 
(and that rule is the better which is exercised over 25 
better subjects— for example, to rule over men is better 
than to rule over wild beasts ; for the work is better which 
is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules 
and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work) ; 
for in all things which form a composite whole and which 
are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, 30 
a distinction between the ruling and the subject element 
comes to light. Such a duality exists in living creatures, 
but not in them only ; it originates in the constitution of 
the universe ; even in things which have no life there is 
a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we are 
wandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict 
ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place, 
consists of soul and body : and of these two, the one is 35 
by nature the ruler, and the other the subject. But then 

i254 a POLITICA 

we must look for the intentions of nature in things which 
retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. 
And therefore we must study the man who is in the 
most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we 
shall see the true relation of the two ; although in bad 
I254 b or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule 
over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural 
condition. At all events we may firstly observe in living 
creatures both a despotical and a constitutional rule ; for 
the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, whereas the 
intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal 
rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the 
5 body, and of the mind and the rational element over 
the passionate, is natural and expedient ; whereas the 
equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always 
hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to 

10 men ; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, 
and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled 
by man ; for then they are preserved. Again, the male 
is by nature superior, and the female inferior ; and the 

15 one rules, and the other is ruled ; this principle, of neces- 
sity, extends to all mankind. Where then there is such 
a difference as that between soul and body, or between 
men and animals (as 1 in the case of those whose business 
is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), 
the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for 
them as for all inferiors that they should be under the 

20 rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, 
another's, and he who participates in rational principle 
enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, 
is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot 
even apprehend a principle ; 2 they obey their instincts. 
And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals 

35 is not very different ; for both with their bodies minister 
to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish 
between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the 

1 Reading Statural 8e tovtov in 1. 17, with the 'old translation' 
and some MSS. 

2 Reading Xoyov in 1. 23 with some MSS. 

BOOK I. 5 1254' 

one strong for servile labour, the other upright, and 
although useless for such services, useful for political life 3° 
in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite often 
happens — that some have the souls and others have the 
bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from 
one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as 
the statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknow- 35 
ledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the 
superior. And if this is true, of the body, how much 
more just that a similar distinction should exist in the 
soul ? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the 1255' 
beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that 
some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and 
that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right. 

6 But that those who take the opposite view have in 
a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. 
For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. 
There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature. 5 
The law of which I speak is a sort of convention — the 
law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to 
belong to the victors. But this right many jurists im- 
peach, as they would an orator who brought forward an 
unconstitutional measure : they detest the notion that, 
because one man has the power of doing violence and is 
superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and 10 
subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of 
opinion. The origin of the dispute, and what makes the 
views invade each other's territory, is as follows : in some 
sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the 
greatest power of exercising force : and as superior power 
is only found where there is superior excellence of some 
kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to be 15 
sirnply one about justice (for it is due to one party iden- 
tifying 1 justice with goodwill, 2 while the other identifies 

1 No thoroughly satisfactory explanation has been given for 
8m tovto, 1. 17, and it appears better to read 8ta yap to . . . tvvoiav 
(or (v dvoia) 8oK(lv. 

2 i.e. mutual goodwill, which is held to be incompatible with the 
relation of master and slave. 


i255 a POLITICA 

it with the mere rule of the stronger). If these views are 
thus set out separately, the other views l have no force 

ao or plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue 
ought to rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they 
think, simply to a principle of justice (for law and custom 
are a sort of justice), assume that slavery in accordance 
with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same 
moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the war 

35 be unjust ? And again, no one would ever say that he is a 
slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, 
men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children 
of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken 
captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call 
Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, 

3° in using this language, they really mean the natural slave 
of whom we spoke at first ; 2 for it must be admitted that 
some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The same 
principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves 
as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, 

35 but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, 
thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility 
and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The 
Helen of Theodectes says : 3 

' Who would presume to call me servant who am on 
both sides sprung from the stem of the Gods ? ' 

What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom 
4 o and slavery, noble and humble birth, by the two 
l 2 ce b principles of good and evil ? They think that as men 
and animals beget men and animals, so from good men a 
good man springs. But this is what nature, though she 
may intend it, cannot always accomplish. 

We see then that there is some foundation for this 

5 difference of opinion, and that all are not either slaves 

by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is 

in some cases a marked distinction between the two 

1 i. e. those stated in 11. 5-12, that the stronger always has, and that 
he never has, a right to enslave the weaker. Aristotle rinds that these 
views cannot maintain themselves against his intermediate view, 
that the superior in virtue should rule. 

2 Chap. 5. 3 Helena, fr. 3, Nauck 2 . 

BOOK I. 6 1255 

classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to 
be slaves and the others to be masters : the one practis- 
ing obedience, the others exercising the authority and 
lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse 
of this authority is injurious to both ; for the interests of 
part and whole, 1 of body and soul, are the same, and the 10 
slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part 
of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master 
and slave between them is natural they are friends 
and have a common interest, but where it rests merely 
on law and force the reverse is true. 15 

7 The previous remarks are quite enough to show that 
the rule of a master is not a constitutional rule, and 
that all the different kinds of rule are not, as some 
affirm, the same with each other. 2 For there is one rule 
exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another 
over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule 
of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under 
one head : whereas constitutional rule is a government 
of freemen and equals. The master is not called a 20 
master because he has science, 3 but because he is of 
a certain character, and the same remark applies to the 
slave and the freeman. Still there may be a science for 
the master and a science for the slave. The science of 
the slave would be such as the man of Syracuse taught, 
who made money by instructing slaves in their ordinary 
duties. And such a knowledge may be carried further, 25 
so as to include cookery and similar menial arts. For 
some duties are of the more necessary, others of the 
more honourable sort ; as the proverb says, ' slave before 
slave, master before master \ 4 But all such branches of 30 
knowledge are servile. There is likewise a science of 
the master, which teaches the use of slaves ; for the 
master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, 
but with the use of them. Yet this so-called science is 

1 Cp. 1254*8. 

2 Plato, Polit. 258 E-259 1), referred to already in 1252*7-16, 
I253 b 18-20. 

3 Polit. 259 C, 293 C 

4 Philemon. Pancratiastes, fr. 2, Meineke. 



not anything great or wonderful ; for the master need 
only know how to order that which the slave must know 

35 how to execute. Hence those who are in a position 
which places them above toil have stewards who attend 
to their households while they occupy themselves with 
philosophy or with politics. But the art of acquiring 
slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both 
from the art of the master and the art of the slave, being 
a species of hunting or war. 1 Enough of the distinction 

4° between master and slave. 

1256 s Let us now inquire into property generally, and into 8 
the art of getting wealth, in accordance with our usual 
method, 2 for a slave has been shown 3 to be a part of 
property. The first question is whether the art of getting 
wealth is the same with the art of managing a household 
or a part of it, or instrumental to it ; and if the last, 
whether in the way that the art of making shuttles is 
- instrumental to the art of weaving, or in the way that 
the casting of bronze is instrumental to the art of the 
statuary, for they are not instrumental in the same 
way, but the one provides tools and the other material ; 
and by material I mean the substratum out of which any 
work is made ; thus wool is the material of the weaver, 

10 bronze of the statuary. Now it is easy to see that the 
art of household management is not identical with the art 
of getting wealth, for the one uses the material which the 
other provides. For the art which uses household stores 
can be no other than the art of household management. 
There is, however, a doubt whether the art of getting 
wealth is a part of household management or a distinct 

15 art. If the getter of wealth has to consider whence wealth 
and property can be procured, but there are many sorts 
of property and riches, 4 then are husbandry, and the 
care and provision of food in general, parts of the wealth- 
getting art 5 or distinct arts? Again, there are many 

1 Cp. vii. I333 b 38. 

2 Of understanding the whole by the part, cp. 1252* 17. 

3 Chap. 4. 4 Reading a comma after ecrrat in 1. 16. 
5 Reading ttjs xpW aTl<TTlK 'l s m '• l 7 w ' tn tne MSS. 

BOOK I. 8 i256 £ 

sorts of food, and therefore there are many kinds of lives 
both of animals and men ; they must all have food, and jo 
the differences in their food have made differences in 
their ways of life. For of beasts, some are gregarious, 
others are solitary ; they live in the way which is best 
adapted to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivor- 
ous or herbivorous or omnivorous : and their habits are 2 5 
determined for them by nature in such a manner that 
they may obtain with greater facility the food of their 
choice. But, as different species have different tastes, the 
same things are not naturally pleasant to all of them ; 
and therefore the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous 
animals further differ among themselves. In the lives 3° 
of men too there is a great difference. The laziest are 
shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get their subsis- 
tence without trouble from tame animals ; their flocks 
having to wander from place to place in search of pas- 
ture, they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a 
sort of living farm. Others support themselves by hunt- 35 
ing, which is of different kinds. Some, for example, are 
brigands, others, who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers 
or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and 
others live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The 
greater number obtain a living from the cultivated fruits 
of the soil. Such are the modes of subsistence which 4° 
prevail among those whose industry springs up of itself, 
and whose food is not acquired by exchange and retail I256 b 
trade — there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the 
brigand, the fisherman, the hunter. Some gain a comfort- 
able maintenance out of two employments, eking out the 
deficiencies of one of them by another : thus the life of 
a shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the 5 
life of a farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of 
life are similarly combined in any way which the needs 
of men may require. Property, in the sense of a bare 
livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both 
when they arc first born, and when they are grown up. io 
For some animals bring forth, together with their offspring, 
so much food as will last until they are able to supply 

i256 b POLITICA 

themselves ; of this the vermiparous or oviparous animals 
arc an instance ; and the viviparous animals have up to 
a certain time a supply of food for their young in them- 

T5 selves, which is called milk. In like manner we may 
infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for 
their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake 
of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all, 
at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the 

20 provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if 
nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, 
the inference must be that she has made all animals for 
the sake of man. And so, in one point of view, the art 
of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art of 
acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to 
practise against wild beasts, and against men who, though 

25 intended by nature to be governed, will not submit ; for 
war of such a kind is naturally just. 1 

Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which 
by nature is a part of the management of a household, in 
so far as the art of household management must either 
find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary 

30 to life, and useful for the community of the family or 
state, as can be stored. They are the elements of true 
riches ; for the amount of property which is needed for 
a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his 
poems says that * 

' No bound to riches has been fixed for man \ 2 

But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other 
35 arts ; for the instruments of any art are never unlimited, 
either in number or size, and riches may be defined as 
a number of instruments to be used in a household or 
in a state. And so we see that there is a natural art 
of acquisition which is practised by managers of house- 
holds and by statesmen, and what is the reason of this 

40 There is another variety of the art of acquisition which 9 
is commonly and rightly called an art of wealth-getting, 

1 Cp. I255 b 38, I333 b 38. The brackets round 17 yap fypevriKr) 
fitpos airfis in 1. 23 should be removed. 

2 Bergk, Poet. Lyr.*, Solon, 13. 71. 

BOOK I. 9 I257 a 

and has in fact suggested the notion that riches and 1257' 
property have no limit. Being nearly connected with 
the preceding, it is often identified with it. But though 
they are not very different, neither are they the same. 
The kind already described is given by nature, the other 
is gained by experience and art. 

Let us begin our discussion of the question with the 5 
following considerations : 

Of everything which we possess there are two uses : 
both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same 
manner, for one is the proper, and the other the im- 
proper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is 
used for wear, and is used for exchange ; both are uses of 
the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money 10 
or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe 
as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, 
for a shoe is not made to be an object 6f barter. The 
same may be said of all possessions, for the art of ex- 
change extends to all of them, and it arises at first from 15 
what is natural, from the circumstance that some have 
too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that 
retail trade is not a natural part of the art of getting 
wealth ; had it been so, men would have ceased to ex- 
change when they had enough. In the first community, 
indeed, which is the family, this art is obviously of no 20 
use, but it begins to be useful when the society increases. 
For the members of the family originally had all things 
in common ; later, when the family divided into parts, 
the parts shared in many things, and different parts in 
different things, which they had to give in exchange for 
what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still practised 
among barbarous nations who exchange with one another 25 
the necessaries of life and nothing more ; giving and re- 
ceiving wine, for example, in exchange for corn, and the 
like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth- 
getting art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed 
for the satisfaction of men's natural wants. The other 30 
or more complex form of exchange grew, as might have 
been inferred, out of the simpler. When the inhabitants 


of one country became more dependent on those of 
another, and they imported what they needed, and 
exported what they had too much of, money necessarily 

35 came into use. For the various necessaries of life arc 
not easily carried about, and hence men agreed to 
employ in their dealings with each other something 
which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the 
purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. 
Of this the value was at first measured simply by size and 

4 o weight, but in process of time they put a stamp upon it, 
to save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value. 
I257 b When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of 
the barter of necessary articles arose the other art of 
wealth-getting, namely, retail trade ; which was at first 
probably a simple matter, but became more complicated 
as soon as men learned by experience whence and by 
what exchanges the greatest profit might be made. 

5 Originating in the use of coin, the art of getting wealth 
is generally thought to be chiefly concerned with it, 
and to be the art which produces riches and wealth ; 
having to consider how they may be accumulated. In- 
deed, riches is assumed by many to be only a quantity 
of coin, because the arts of getting wealth and retail 

10 trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that 
coined money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, 
but conventional only, because, if the users substitute 
another commodity for it, it is worthless, and because it 
is not useful as a means to any of the necessities of life, 
and, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want 
of necessary food. But how can that be wealth of which 

15 a man may have a great abundance and yet perish with 
hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer 
turned everything that was set before him into gold ? 

Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of 
the art of getting wealth than the mere acquisition of coin, 
and they are right. For natural riches and the natural 
art of wealth-getting are a different thing ; in their true 

20 form they are part of the management of a household ; 
whereas retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not 

BOOK I. 9 I257 b 

in every way, but by exchange. And it is thought 
to be concerned with coin ; for coin is the unit of ex- 
change and the measure or limit of it. And there is 
no bound to the riches which spring from this art of 
wealth-getting. 1 As in the art of medicine there is no 25 
limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts 
there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for 
they aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost 
(but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always 
the limit), so, too, in this art of wealth-getting there is no 
limit of the end, which is riches of the spurious kind, 
and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of wealth- 30 
getting which consists in household management, on the 
other hand, has a limit 2 ; the unlimited acquisition of 
wealth is not its business. And, therefore, in one point 
of view, all riches must have a limit ; nevertheless, as a 
matter of fact, we find the opposite to be the case ; for all 
getters of wealth increase their hoard of coin without limit. 
The source of the confusion is the near connexion between 
the two kinds of wealth-getting ; in either, the instrument 35 
is the same, although the use is different, and so they pass 
into one another : for each is a use of the same property, 
but with a difference : accumulation is the end in the one 
case, but there is a further end in the other. Hence some 
persons are led to believe that getting wealth is the 
object of household management, and the whole idea of 
their lives is that they ought either to increase their 
money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The 4 o 
origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent 
upon living only, and not upon living well ; and, as their 1258 s 
desires are unlimited, they also desire that the means of 
gratifying them should be without limit. Those who do 
aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily 
pleasures ; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to 5 
depend on property, they are absorbed in getting wealth : 
and so there arises the second species of wealth-getting. 
For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they seek an art 

1 Cp. i256 b 32. 

2 Reading at for 011 in 1. 30, with Bernays. 

04617 r 


which produces the excess of enjoyment ; and, if they 
are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of getting 
wealth, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty 

10 in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, 
for example, is not intended to make wealth, but to 
inspire confidence ; neither is this the aim of the general's 
or of the physician's art ; but the one aims at victory and 
the other at health. Nevertheless, some men turn every 
quality or art into a means of getting wealth ; this they 
conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end 
they think all things must contribute. 

Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth- 

15 getting which is unnecessary, and why men want it ; and 
also the necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have 
seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural 
part of the art of managing a household, concerned with 
the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, 
unlimited, but having a limit. 

And we have found the answer to our original ques- 10 
tion, 1 Whether the art of getting wealth is the business 
of the manager of a household and of the statesman or 

20 not their business ? — viz. that wealth is presupposed by 
them. For as political science does not make men, but 
takes them from nature and uses them, so too nature 
provides them with earth or sea or the like as a source of 
food. At this stage begins the duty of the manager 
of a household, who has to order the things which nature 

2 5. supplies ; — he may be compared to the weaver who has 
not to make but to use wool, and to know, too, what sort 
of wool is good and serviceable or bad and unserviceable. 
Were this otherwise, it would be difficult to see why the 
art of getting wealth is a part of the management of 
a household and the art of medicine not ; for surely the 
members of a household must have health just as they 

30 must have life or any other necessary. The answer is 
that as from one point of view the master of the house 
and the ruler of the state have to consider about health, 

1 i256 a 3. 

BOOK I. 10 1258 s 

from another point of view not they but the physician ; 
so in one way the art of household management, in 
another way the subordinate art, has to consider about 
wealth. But, strictly speaking, as I have already said, 
the means of life must be provided beforehand by 
nature ; for the business of nature is to furnish food to 35 
that which is born, and the food of the offspring is always 
what remains over of that from which it is produced. 1 
Wherefore the art of getting wealth out of fruits and 
animals is always natural. 

There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said 2 ; 
one is a part of household management, the other is retail 
trade : the former necessary and honourable, while that 4° 
which consists in exchange is justly censured ; for it I258 b 
is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one 
another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest 
reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, 
and not from the natural object of it. For money was 
intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at 
interest. And this term interest, 3 which means the 5 
birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding 
of money because the offspring resembles the parent. 
Wherefore of all modes of getting wealth this is the 
most unnatural. 

11 Enough has been said about the theory of wealth- 
getting ; we will now proceed to the practical part. 
The discussion of such matters is not unworthy of philo- 10 
sophy, but to be engaged in them practically is illiberal 
and irksome. 4 The useful parts of wealth-getting are, 
first, the knowledge of live-stock, — which are most profit- 
able, and where, and how, — as, for example, what sort of 
horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals are most 
likely to give a return. A man ought to know which of 15 
these pay better than others, and which pay best in par- 
ticular places, for some do better in one place and some 
in another. Secondly, husbandry, which may be either 

1 Cp. i256 b io. 2 I256 a i5-I258 il iS. 3 tokos, lit. ' offspring '. 
4 Or, 'We are free to speculate about them, but in practice we 
are limited by circumstances.' (ISernays.) 

C 2 


tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and of fish, 
or fowl, or of any animals which may be useful to man. 

20 These are the divisions of the true or proper art of 
wealth-getting and come first. Of the other, which con- 
sists in exchange, the first and most important division 
is commerce (of which there are three kinds — the 
provision of a ship, the conveyance of goods, exposure 
for sale — these again differing as they are safer or more 

25 profitable), the second is usury, the third, service for hire 
— of this, one kind is employed in the mechanical arts, 
the other in unskilled and bodily labour. There is still 
a third sort of wealth-getting intermediate between this 
and the first or natural mode which is partly natural, but 
is also concerned with exchange, viz. the industries that 
make their profit from the earth, and from things growing 

30 from the earth which, although they bear no fruit, are 
nevertheless profitable ; for example, the cutting of timber 
and all mining. The art of mining, by which minerals 
are obtained, itself has many branches, for there are 
various kinds of things dug out of the earth. Of the 
several divisions of wealth-getting I now speak generally; 
a minute consideration of them might be useful in practice, 
but it would be tiresome to dwell upon them at greater 
length now. 

35 Those occupations are most truly arts in which there 
is the least element of chance ; they are the meanest 
in which the body is most deteriorated, the most 
servile in which there is the greatest use of the body, 
and the most illiberal in which there is the least need 
of excellence. 

Works have been written upon these subjects by 

40 various persons ; for example, by Chares the Parian, and 
Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage 
1259* and Planting, while others have treated of other branches ; 
any one who cares for such matters may refer to their 
writings. It would be well also to collect the scattered 
stories of the ways in which individuals have succeeded in 
5 amassing a fortune ; for all this is useful to persons who 
value the art of getting wealth. There is the anecdote 

BOOK I. ii 1259" 

of Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which 
involves a principle of universal application, but is attri- 
buted to him on account of his reputation for wisdom. 
He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed 
to show that philosophy was of no use. According to io 
the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was 
yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives 
in the coming year ; so, having a little money, he gave 
deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and 
Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one 
bid against him. When the harvest-time came, and many 
were wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them 15 
out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity 
of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers 
can easily be rich if they like, but that their ambition 
is of another sort. He is supposed to have given a 
striking proof of his wisdom, but, as I was saying, his 
device for getting wealth is of universal application, and 20 
is nothing but the creation of a monopoly. It is an art 
often practised by cities when they are in want of money ; 
they make a monopoly of provisions. 

There was a man of Sicily, who, having money de- 
posited with him, bought up all the iron from the iron 
mines ; afterwards, when the merchants from their various 25 
markets came to buy, he was the only seller, and with- 
out much increasing the price he gained 200 per cent. 
Which when Dionysius heard, he told him that he might 
take away his money, but that he must not remain at 
Syracuse, for he thought that the man had discovered 3° 
a way of making money which was injurious to his own 
interests. He made the same discovery as Thales ; they 
both contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. And 
statesmen as well ought to know these things ; for a state 
is often as much in want of money and of such devices for 
obtaining it as a household, or even more so ; hence 35 
some public men devote themselves entirely to finance. 

12 Of household management we have seen 1 that there 
are three parts — one is the rule of a master over slaves, 

1 I253 b 3~ii. 

i259 a POLITICA 

which has been discussed already, 1 another of a father, 
and the third of a husband. A husband and father, we 

40 saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule 
differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his 
l2 59 b w 'fe a constitutional rule. For although there may be 
exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature 
fitter for command than the female, just as the elder 
and full-grown is superior to the younger and more 
immature. But in most constitutional states the citizens 
5 rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a con- 
stitutional state implies that the natures of the citi- 
zens are equal, and do not differ at all. 2 Nevertheless, 
when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavour to 
create a difference of outward forms and names and titles 
of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of 
Amasis about his foot-pan. 3 The relation of the male 
to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality 

10 is permanent. The rule of a father over his children 
is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the 
respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. 
And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus 
' father of Gods and men ', because he is the king of them 
all. For a king is the natural superior of his subjects, 

15 but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, 
and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father 
and son. 

Thus it is clear that household management attends 13 
more to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, 
and to human excellence more than to the excellence 

20 of property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of 
freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A question 
may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at 
all in a slave beyond and higher than merely instrumental 
and ministerial qualities — whether he can have the virtues 
of temperance, courage, justice, and the like ; or whether 

=5 slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, 

1 I253 b i4-i255 b 3y. 2 Cp. ii. 1 26i J * 39, iii. I288 a i2. 

3 Herod, ii. 172. 

BOOK I. 13 1259 

whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises ; 
for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from 
freemen ? On the other hand, since they are men and 
share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that 
they have no virtue. A similar question may be raised 
about women and children, whether they too have virtues : 30 
ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and 
is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or not ? 
So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the 
natural subject, whether they have the same or different 
virtues. For if a noble nature is equally required in both, 
why should one of them always rule, and the other always 35 
be ruled ? Nor can we say that this is a question of 
degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is 
a difference of kind, which the difference of more and less 
never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the 
one ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue ! 
For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he 40 
rule well ? if the subject, how can he obey well ? If he 1260 
be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his 
duty. It is evident, therefore, that both of them must 
have a share of virtue, but varying as natural subjects also 
vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of the 
soul 1 has shown us the way ; in it one part naturally rules, 5 
and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we 
maintain to be different from that of the subject ;— the 
one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the 
irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle 
applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and 
are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule 
differs; — the freeman rules over the slave after another 
manner from that in which the male rules over the female, 
or the man over the child ; although the parts of the soul 10 
are present in all of them, they are present in different 
degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all ; 
the woman has, but it is without authority,- and the 
child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be 

1 Reading (ra) ntfA t>jv tyvx'iv in 1. 4 with Schiitz. 

2 Or, with Bernays, ' inconclusive '. 



i26o a POLITICA 

15 supposed to be with the moral virtues also ; all should 
partake of them, but only in such manner and degree 
as is required by each for the fulfilment of his duty. 
Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, 
for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master 
artificer, and rational principle is such an artificer ; the 
subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of 

20 virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, 
moral virtue belongs to all of them ; but the temperance 
of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of 
a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained, 1 
the same ; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, 
of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other 
virtues, as will be more clearly seen if we look at them in 

25 detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists 
in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or 
the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such 
definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, 2 
enumerate the virtues. All classes must be deemed to 
have their special attributes ; as the poet says of women, 

30 ' Silence is a woman's glory ', 3 

but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is im- 
perfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative 
to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his 
teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave is 
relative to a master. Now we determined 4 that a slave 
is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obvi- 

35 ously require only so much virtue as will prevent him 
from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack of 
self-control. Some one will ask whether, if what we are 
saying is true, virtue will not be required also in the 
artisans, for they often fail in their work through the lack 
of self-control ? But is there not a great difference in the 

40 two cases ? For the slave shares in his master's life ; 
the artisan is less closely connected with him, and only 
attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. 

1 Plato, Menq, 72 A-73 c. 2 Meno, 71 E, 72 A. 

3 Soph. Aj. 293. 4 I254 b 16-39, cf. I259 b 25 sq. 

BOOK I. 13 ia6o b 

The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and separate ia6o b 
slavery ; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so 
the shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then, 
that the master ought the source of such excellence 
in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of master- 
ship which trains the slave in his duties. 1 Wherefore 5 
they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves 
and say that we should employ command only, 2 for slaves 
stand even more in need of admonition than children. 

So much for this subject ; the relations of husband and 
wife, parent and child, their several virtues, what in their 
intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, 10 
and how we may pursue the good and escape the evil, 
will have to be discussed when we speak of the different 
forms of government: 3 For, inasmuch as every family is 
a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of 
a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to 
the virtue of the whole, women and children must be 15 
trained by education with an eye to the constitution, 4 if 
the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any 
difference in the virtues of the state. And they must 
make a difference : for the children grow up to be 
citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women. s 

Of these matters, enough has been said ; of what 20 
remains, let us speak at another time. Regarding, then, 
our present inquiry as complete, we will make a new 
beginning. And, first, let us examine the various theories 
of a perfect state. 

1 Cp. I255 b 23, 31-35. ' Plato, Laws, vi. 777 e. 

3 The question is not actually discussed in the Politics. 
' Cp. v. i3io a 12-36, viii. 1337* 11-18. 
6 Plato, Laws, vi. 781 A. 

I26o l 


OUR purpose is to consider what form of political I 
community is best of all for those who are most able to 
realize their ideal of life. We must therefore examine 

30 not only this but other constitutions, both such as 
actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical 
forms which are held in esteem ; that what is good and 
useful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose 
that in seeking for something beyond them we are anxious 
to make a sophistical display at any cost ; we only under- 

35 take this inquiry because all the constitutions with which 
we are acquainted are faulty. 

We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. 
Three alternatives are conceivable : The members of a 
state must either have (1) all things or (2) nothing in 
common, or (3) some things in common and some not. 
That they should have nothing in common is clearly 

40 impossible, for the constitution is a community, and 
I2 " 1 must at any rate have a common place — one city will be 
in one place, and the citizens are those who sh ire in that 
one city. But should a well-ordered state have all things, 
as far as may be, in common, or some only and not 
others ? For the citizens might conceivably have wives 
5 and children and property in common, as Socrates pro- 
poses in the Republic of Plato. 1 Which is better, our 
present condition, or the proposed new order of society ? 

10 There are many difficulties in the community of women. 2 
And the principle on which Socrates rests the neces- 
sity of such an institution evidently is not established 
by his arguments. Further, as a means to the end 
which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally, 
is impracticable, and how we are to interpret it- is 

1 Rep. iv. 423 E, v. 457 c, 462 B. 

2 Reading in 1. 14 dit\di>, with good MS. authority. 

BOOK II. 2 I26i a 

nowhere precisely stated. I am speaking of the premiss 15 
from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, ' that the 
greater the unity of the state the better'. Is it not 
obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree 
of unity as to be no longer a state ? — since the nature of 
a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, 
from being a state, it becpmes a family, and from being 
a family, an individual ; for the family may be said to be 20 
more one than the state, and the individual than the 
family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity 
even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the 
state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many 
men, but of different kinds of men ; for similars do not 
constitute a state. It is not like a military alliance. The 2 5 
usefulness of the latter depends upon its quantity even 
where there is no difference in quality (for mutual 
protection is the end aimed at), just as a greater weight 
of anything is more useful than a less (in like manner, 
a state differs from a nation, when the nation has not 
its population organized in villages, but lives an Arcadian 
sort of life) ; but the elements out of which a unity is to 
be formed differ in kind. Wherefore the principle of 3° 
compensation, 1 as I have already remarked in the 
EtJiics, 1 is the salvation of states. Even among freemen 
and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, 
for they cannot all rule together, but must change at the 
end of a year or some other period of time or in some 
order of succession. The result is that upon this plan 
they all govern ; just as if shoemakers and carpenters were 35 
to exchange their occupations, and the same persons did 
not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. And 
since it is better ;J that this should be so in politics as 
well, it is clear that while there should be continuance of the 
same persons in power where this is possible, yet where 
this is not possible by reason of the natural equality I26i b 
of the citizens, and 4 at the same time it is just that 

1 Or, ' reciprocal proportion '. - N. Eth. v. H32 b 32. 

3 Omitting the brackets in il 37, b 4, and the marks of a lacuna 
in a 37. 
* Reading in 1. 1 apa 8i with the MSS. 

*26i b POLITICA 

all should share in the government (whether to govern be 
a good thing or a bad '), an approximation to this is that 
equals should in turn retire from office and should, apart 
from official position, be treated alike. 2 Thtfs the one 
party rule and the others are ruled in turn, as if they were 
5 no longer the same persons. In like manner when they hold 
office there is a variety in the offices held. Hence it is 
evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which 
some persons affirm ; and that what is said to be the greatest 
good of cities is in reality their destruction ; but surely 
the good of things must be that which preserves them. 3 

10 Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification 
of the state is clearly not good ; for a family is more self- 
sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family, and 
a city only comes into being when the community is 
large enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency 
is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more 

15 desirable than the greater. 

But, even supposing that it were best for the com- 3 
munity to have the greatest degree of unity, this unity 
is by no means proved to follow from the fact 'of all 
men saying " mine " and " not mine " at the same instant 
of time', which, according to Socrates, 4 is the sign of 

20 perfect unity in a state. For the word c all ' is ambiguous. 
If the meaning be that every individual says ' mine ' and 
' not mine ' at the same time, then perhaps th,e result at 
which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished ; 
each man will call the same person his own son and the 
same person his own wife, and so of his property and of all 
that falls to his lot. This, however, is not the way in which 
people would speak who had their wives and children in 

25 common ; they would say ' all ' but not ' each '. In like 
manner their property would be described as belonging 
to them, not severally but collectively. There is an 
obvious fallacy in the term ' all ' : like some other words, 
' both', ' odd ', ' even ', it is ambiguous, and even in abstract 

1 Cp. PI. Rep. i. 345-6. 2 Cp. i. I259 b 4, iii. I288 a 12. 

3 Cp. PI. Rep. i. 353. 4 PI. Rep. v. 462 c. 

BOOK II. 3 I26i h 

argument becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all 3 o 
persons call the same thing mine in the sense in which 
each does so may be a fine thing, but it is impracticable ; 
or if the words are taken in the other sense, such a unity 
in no way conduces to harmony. And there is another 
objection to the proposal. For that which is common to 
the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. 
Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the 
common interest ; and only when he is himself concerned 
as an individual. For besides other considerations, every- 35 
body is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects 
another to fulfil ; as in families many attendants are often 
less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand 
sons who will not be his sons individually, but anybody 
will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be I262 a 
neglected by all alike. Further, upon this principle, 
every one will use the word ' mine ' of one who is prosper- 
ing or the reverse, 1 however small a fraction he may 
himself be of the whole number ; the same boy will be 
1 my son ', ■ so and so's son ', the son of each of the 
thousand, or whatever be the number of the citizens ; 
and even about this he will not be positive ; for it is 5 
impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or 
whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. But 
which is better — for each to say ' mine ' in this way, 
making a man the same relation to two thousand or ten 
thousand citizens, or to use the word ' mine ' in the 
ordinary and more restricted sense? For usually the 
same person is called by one man his own son whom ro 
another calls his own brother or cousin or kinsman — blood 
relation or connexion by marriage either of himself or of 
some relation of his, and yet another his clansman or 
tribesman ; and how much better is it to be the real 
cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato's 
fashion ! Nor is there any way of preventing brothers 
and children and fathers and mothers from sometimes 15 
recognizing one another ; for children are born like their 
parents, and they will necessarily be finding indications of 

1 Cp. Rep. v. 463 e. 


their relationship to one another. Geographers declare 
such to be the fact ; they say that in part of Upper Libya, 
20 where the women are common, nevertheless the children 
who are born are assigned to their respective fathers on 
the ground of their likeness. 1 And some women, like 
the females of other animals — for example, mares and 
cows — have a strong tendency to produce offspring 
resembling their parents, as was the case with the 
Pharsalian mare called Honest. 2 

35 Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors 4 
of such a community to guard, will be assaults and 
homicides, voluntary as well as involuntary, quarrels and 
slanders, all which are most unholy acts when committed 
against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not 

30 equally unholy when there is no relationship. Moreover, 
they are much more likely to occur if the relationship is 
unknown, and, when they have occurred, the customary 
expiations of them cannot be made. Again, how 
strange it is that Socrates, 3 after having made the 
children common, should hinder lovers from carnal 
intercourse only, but should permit love and familiarities 

35 between father and son or between brother and brother, 
than which nothing can be more unseemly, since even 
without them love of this sort is improper. How 
strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no other reason than 
the violence of the pleasure, as though the relationship of 
father and son or of brothers with one another made no 

4 o This community of wives and children seems better 
suited to the husbandmen than to the guardians, for if 
I262 b they have wives and children in common, they will be 
bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class 
should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel. 4 
In a word, the result of such a law would be just the 

5 opposite of that which good laws ought to have, and the 
intention of Socrates in making these regulations about 

1 Cp. Herod, iv. 180. 2 Cp. Hist. Anim. vii. 586* 13. 

s Rep. iii. 403 A-C. * Cp. vii. I330 a 28. 

BOOK II. 4 1262* 

women and children would defeat itself. For friendship 
we believe to be the greatest good of states 1 and the 
preservative of them against revolutions ; neither is 
there anything which Socrates so greatly lauds as the 
unity of the state which he and all the world declare to 10 
be created by friendship. But the unity which he com- 
mends ~ would be like that of the lovers in the Sympo- 
sium? who, as Aristophanes says, desire to grow together 
in the excess of their affection, and from being two to 
become one, in which case one or both would certainly 
perish. Whereas in a state having women and children 15 
common, love will be watery ; and the father will certainly 
not say ' my son ', or the son ' my father \ 4 As a little 
sweet wine mingled with a great deal of water is 
imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of com- 
munity, the idea of relationship which is based upon 
these names will be lost ; there is no reason why the so- 20 
called father should care about the son, or the son about 
the father, or brothers about one another. Of the 
two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection — 
that a thing is your own and that it is your only one — 
neither can exist in such a state as this. 

Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born 
from the rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of 2 5 
guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower 
rank,"' will be very difficult to arrange ; the givers or 
transferrers cannot but know whom they are giving and 
transferring, and to whom. And the previously men- 
tioned ° evils, such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, ?>° 
will happen more often amongst those who are transferred 
to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned to 
them among the guardians ; for they will no longer call 
the members of the class they have left brothers, and 
children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, 
therefore, be afraid of jommitting any crimes by reason 
of consanguinity. Touching the community of wives 35 
and children, let this be our conclusion. 

1 Cp. N. Kth. viii. ii55 u 22. 2 Cp. c. 2. 

s Symp. 191 A, 192 c. * Cp. c. 3. * Rep. iii. 415 B. 9 "25-40. 

ia62 b POLITICA 

Next let us consider what should be our arrangements 5 
about property : should the citizens of the perfect state 
40 have their possessions in common or not ? This question 
may be discussed separately from the enactments about 
1263 s1 women and children. Even supposing that the women 
and children belong to individuals, according to the 
custom which is at present universal, may there not be 
an advantage in having and using possessions in 
common? Three cases are possible: (1) the soil may 
be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for 
consumption into the common stock ; and this is the 

5 practice of some nations. Or (2), the soil may be 
common, and may be cultivated in common, but the 
produce divided among individuals for their private use ; 
this is a form of common property which is said to exist 
among certain barbarians. Or (3), t the soil and the 
produce may be alike common. 

When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case 

10 will be different and easier to deal with ; but when they 
till the ground for themselves the question of ownership 
will give a world of trouble. If they do not share 
equally in enjoyments and toils, those who labour much 
and get little will necessarily complain of those who 

15 labour little and receive or consume much. But indeed there 
is always a difficulty in men living together and having all 
human relations in common, but especially in their having 
common property. The partnerships of fellow-travellers 
are an example to the point ; for they generally fall 
out over everyday matters and quarrel about any 

20 trifle which turns up. So with servants : we are most 
liable to take offence at those with whom we most 
frequently come into contact in daily life. 

These are only some of the disadvantages which 
attend the community of property ; the present arrange- 
ment, if improved as it might be by good customs 1 and 
laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages 

25 of both systems. Property should be in a certain sense 

' Reading in 1. 23 tx el «ru«xrfnj0o» t8e<n, with some good MSS. 

BOOK II. 5 1263* 

common, but, as a general rule, private ; for, when every 
one has a distinct interest, 1 men will not complain of one 
another, and they will make more progress, because 
every one will be attending to his own business. And yet 
by reason of goodness, and in respect of use, ' Friends ', 
as the proverb says, ' will have all things common.' - Even 3° 
now there are traces of such a principle, showing that it 
is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists 
already to a certain extent and may be carried further. 
For, although every man has his own property, some 
things he will place at the disposal of his friends, while 
of others he shares the use with them. The Lace- 35 
daemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and 
horses, and dogs, as if they were their own ; and when 
they lack provisions on a journey, they appropriate what 
they find 3 in the fields throughout the country. It is 
clearly better that property should be private, but the 
use of it common ; and the special business of the 
legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition. 
Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a 40 
man feels a thing to be his own ; for surely the love of self i 
is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain, 1263 
although selfishness is rightly censured ; this, however, 
is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess,' 
like the miser's love of money ; for all, or almost all, 
men love money and other such objects in a measure. 
And further, there is the greatest pleasure in doing 5 
a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, 
which can only be rendered when a man has private 
property. These advantages are lost by excessive unifica- 
tion of the state. The exhibition of two virtues, besides, is 
visibly annihilated in such a state: first,temperancetowards 
women (for it is an honourable action to abstain from 10 
another's wife for temperance sake) ; secondly, liberality 
in the matter of property. No one, when men have all 
things in common, will any longer set an example of 

1 Cp. Rep. ii. 374. 2 Cp. Rep. iv. 424 A. 

3 Reading (toij) iv rolr nypoiy, with Vahlen. 

4 Cp. A'. Eth. ix. 8. 

r.4. r . 17 D 


liberality or do any liberal action ; for liberality consists 
in the use which is made of property. 1 

15 Such legislation may have a specious appearance of 
benevolence; men readily listen to it, and are easily 
induced to believe that in some wonderful manner every- 
body will become everybody's friend, especially when 
some one 2 is heard denouncing the evils now existing in 

20 states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, 
flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise 
out of the possession of private property. These evils, 
however, are due to a very different cause— the 
wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there 
is much more quarrelling among those who have all 

25 things in common, though there are not many of them 
when compared with the vast numbers who have private 

Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from 
which the citizens will be saved, but also the advantages 
which they will lose. The life which they are to lead 

30 appears to be quite impracticable. The error of Socrates 
must be attributed to the false notion of unity from 
which he starts. 3 Unity there should be, both of the 
family and of the state, but in some respects only. For 
there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree 
of unity as to be no longer a state, or at which, without 
actually ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state, 

35 like harmony passing into unison, or rhythm which has 
been reduced to a single foot. The state, as I was 
saying, is a plurality, 4 which should be united and made 
into a community by education ; and it is strange that 
the author of a system of education which he thinks will 
make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his 
citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy 
40 or by customs and laws, like those which prevail at 
Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, whereby 
1264* the legislator has made property common. Let us 
remember that we should not disregard the experience 

1 Cp. N. Eth. iv. 1 1 19'' 22. 2 Rep. v. 464, 465. 

3 Cp. c. 2. < Cp. I26i a i8. 

BOOK II. 5 1264 s 

(if ages; in the multitude of years these things, if they 
were good, would certainly not have been unknown ; 
for almost everything has been found out, although 
sometimes they are not put together ; in other cases men 
do not use the knowledge which they have. Great light 5 
would be thrown on this subject if we could see such 
a form of government in the actual process of construction ; 
for the legislator could not form a state at all without 
distributing and dividing its constituents into associations 
for common meals, and into phratries and tribes. But 
all this legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to 10 
the guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedaemonians 
try to enforce already. 

But. indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to 
decide, what in such a community will be the general 
form of the state. The citizens who are not guardians 
are the majority, and about them nothing has been 
determined : are the husbandmen, too, to have their 
property in common? Or is each individual to have his 15 
own ? and are their wives and children to be individual 
or common? If, like the guardians, they are to have all 
things in common, in what do they differ from them, or 
what will they gain by submitting to their government ? 
Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed ^o 
the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the 
Cretans, who give their slaves the same institutions as 
their own, but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the 
possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior 
classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriage 
and property, what will be the form of the community? 
Must it not contain two states in one, 1 each hostile to .'5 
the other? He makes the guardians into a mere 
occupying garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans 
and the rest are the real citizens. But if so the suits 
and quarrels, and all the evils which Socrates affirms 2 to 
exist in other states, will exist equally among them. 
He says indeed that, having so good an education, the 30 
citizens will not need many laws, for example laws about 

1 Cp. Rep. iv. 422 E. 2 Rep. v. 464, 465. 

D 2 

ia64 a POLITICA 

the city or about the markets ; l but then he confines 
his education to the guardians. Again, he makes the hus- 
bandmen owners of the property upon condition of their 
paying a tribute. 2 But in that case they are likely to 
be much more unmanageable and conceited than the 

35 Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general. 3 And whether 
community of wives and property be necessary for the 
lower equally with the higher class or not, and the 
questions akin to this, what will be the education, form 
of government, laws of the lower class, Socrates has 
nowhere determined : neither is it easy to discover this, 
nor is their character 4 of small importance if the common 

4° life of the guardians is to be maintained. 
I264 b Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and 
retains private property, the men will see to the fields, 
but who will see to the house? And who will do so if 
the agricultural class have both their property and their 
wives in common ? Once more : it is absurd to argue, 
5 from the analogy of the animals, that men and women 
should follow the same pursuits, 5 for animals have not to 
manage a household. The government, too, as constituted 
by Socrates, contains elements of danger ; for he makes 
the same persons always rule. And if this is often a 
cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, how much 

io more among high-spirited warriors ? But that the 
persons whom he makes rulers must be the same is 
evident ; for the gold which the God mingles in the souls 
of men is not at one time given to one, at another time 
to another, but always to the same : as he says, ' God 
mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their 
very birth ; but brass and iron in those who are meant 

15 to be artisans and husbandmen.' Again, he deprives 
the guardians even of happiness, and says that the 
legislator ought to make the whole state happy. 7 But 
the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some 
of its parts enjoy happiness. 8 In this respect happiness 

1 Rep. iv. 425 D. ' Rep. v. 464 C. 

3 Cp. 1269*36. 4 Reading ttoiov<: rivns in 1. 39 with some MSS. 

"• Cp. Rep. v. 45 j D. " Cp. Rep. iii. 415 A. 

7 Rep. iv. 419, 420. " Cp. vii. 1329*23. 

BOOK II. 5 1264* 

is not like the even principle in numbers, which may 2 ° 
exist only in the whole, but in neither of the parts ; not 
so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who 
are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people. 
The Republic of which Socrates discourses has all these 
difficulties, and others quite as great. 25 

6 The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to 
Plato's later work, the Laws, and therefore we had better 
examine briefly the constitution which is therein described. 
In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in all 
a few questions only ; such as the community of women 3° 
and children, the community of property, and the 
constitution of the state. The population is divided into 
two classes — one of husbandmen, and the other of 
warriors ; ! from this latter is taken a third class of 
counsellors and rulers of the state. 2 But Socrates has 
not determined whether the husbandmen and artisans 
are to have a share in the government, and whether they, 35 
too, are to carry arms and share in military service, or 
not. He certainly thinks a that the women ought to 
share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by 
their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with 
digressions foreign to the main subject, and with 40 
discussions about the education of the guardians. In the I265 E 
Laws there is hardly anything but laws ; not much is 
said about the constitution. This, which he had intended 
to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings 
round to the other or ideal form. For with the 
exception of the community of women and property, he 5 
supposes everything to be the same in both states ; there 
is to be the same education ; the citizens of both are to 
live free from servile occupations, and there are to be 
common meals in both. The only difference is that in 
the Lazvs, the common meals are extended to women,' 1 
and the warriors number 5000, 5 but in the Republic 
only iooo. r ' 

1 Rep. ii. 373 E. 2 Rep. iii. 4121;. 3 Rep. y. 451 E. 

1 Laws, vi. 780 E. '" Laws, v. 737 E. " Rep. iv. 423 A 

ia65 a POLITICA 

10 The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; 
they always exhibit grace and originality and thought ; 
but perfection in everything can hardly be expected. 
We must not overlook the fact that the number of 5000 
citizens, just now mentioned, will require a territory as 

15 large as Babylon, or some other huge site, if so many 
persons are to be supported in idleness, together with 
their women and attendants, who will be a multitude 
many times as great. In framing an ideal we may 
assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities. 1 

It is said that the legislator ought to have his eye 
directed to two points, — the people and the country. 2 

jo But neighbouring countries also must not be forgotten 
by him, 3 firstly because the state for which he legislates 
is to have a political and not an isolated life. 4 For 
a state must have such a military force as will be 
serviceable against her neighbours, and not merely 

25 useful at home. Even if the life of action is not admitted 
to be the best, either for individuals or states, 5 still a city 
should be formidable to enemies, whether invading or 

There is another point : Should not the amount of 
property be defined in some way which differs from this by 
being clearer ? For Socrates says that a man should have 

30 so much property as will enable him to live temperately,'' 
which is only a way of saying 'to live well ' ; this is too 
general a conception. Further, a man may live tem- 
perately and yet miserably. A better, definition would 
be that a man must have so much property as will 
enable him to live not only temperately but liberally ; 7 if 
the two are parted, liberality will combine with luxury ; 
temperance will be associated with toil. For liberality 
and temperance are the only eligible qualities 8 which 

35 have to do with the use of property. A man cannot use 
property with mildness or courage, but temperately and 

1 Cp. vii. I325 b 38. 

2 Perhaps Laws, iv. 704-709, and v. 747 D. 3 Cp. I267 a 19. 

4 Cp. vii. i327 a 4l. 6 Cp. vii. c. 2. and 3. 6 Laws, v. 737 D. 

7 Cp. vii. I326 b 30. 

8 Reading «£<<$■ aiptrui in 1. 35 with Vettori. 

BOOK II. 6 1265* 

liberally he may ; and therefore the practice of these 
virtues is inseparable from property. There is an in- 
consistency, too, in equalizing the property and not 
regulating the number of the citizens ; * the population is 
to remain unlimited, and he thinks that it will be suffi- 4° 
ciently equalized 2 by a certain number of marriages being 
unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he I265 b 
finds this to be the case in existing states. But greater 
care will be required than now ; for among ourselves, 
whatever may be the number of citizens, the property is 
always distributed among them, and therefore no one is 
in want ; but, if the property were incapable of division 
as in the Laxvs, the supernumeraries, whether few or 5 
many, would get nothing. One would have thought 
that it was even more necessary to limit population than 
property ; and that the limit should be fixed by calculating 
the chances of mortality in the children, and of sterility 
in married persons. The neglect of this subject, which 10 
in existing states is so common, is a never-failing cause 
of poverty among the citizens ; and poverty is the parent 
of revolution and crime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who 
was one of the most ancient legislators, thought that the 
families and the number of citizens ought to remain the 
same, although originally all the lots may have been of 15 
different sizes: but in the Laws the opposite principle is 
maintained. What in our opinion is the right arrange- 
ment will have to be explained hereafter. 3 

There is another omission in the Laws: Socrates does 
not tell us how the rulers differ from their subjects ; he 
only says that they should be related as the warp and 20 
the woof, which are made out of different wools. 4 He 
allows that a man's whole property may be increased 
fivefold, 5 but why should not his land also increase to 
a certain extent ? Again, will the good management of 
a household be promoted by his arrangement of home- 

1 But see Laws, v. 740 B-741 A. 

8 Reading uvo^ixtKiab^uo^iv^v, in 1. 40, with Madvig. 

3 Cp. vii. i326 b 26-32, 1330*9-18, I335 b 19- 26 ; Dut tne promise 
is hardly fulfilled. 

4 Laws, v. 734 E, 735 A - ° Laws, v. 744 E. 

i265 b POLITICA 

35 steads ? for he assigns to each individual two homesteads 
in separate places, 1 and it is difficult to live in two houses. 
The whole system of government tends to be neither 
democracy nor oligarchy, but something in a mean 
between them, which is usually called a polity, and is 
composed of the heavy-armed soldiers. Now, if he 
intended to frame a constitution which would suit the 

.^o greatest number of states, he was very likely right, but 
not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came 
nearest to his first or ideal state ; for many would prefer 
the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aris- 
tocratic government. Some, indeed, say that the best 
constitution is a combination of all existing forms, and 

35 they praise the Lacedaemonian - because it is made up of 
oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king forming 
the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy, 
while the democratic element is represented by the 
Ephors ; for the Ephors are selected from the people. 

4° Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, 
and find the element of democracy in the common meals 
I266 a and in the habits of daily life. In the Laws 3 it is 
maintained that the best constitution is made up of 
democracy and tyranny, which are either not constitutions 
at all, or are the worst of all. But they are nearer the 
truth who combine many forms ; for the constitution is 
better which is made up of more numerous elements. 
5 The constitution proposed in the Laws has no element 
of monarchy at all ; it is nothing but oligarchy and 
democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy. This is seen in 
the mode of appointing magistrates; 4 for although the 
appointment of them by lot from among those who have 
been already selected combines both elements, the way 
io in which the rich are compelled by law to attend the 
assembly 5 and vote for magistrates or discharge other 
political duties, while the rest may do as they like, and 

1 Linus, v. 745 c, but cp. infra, vii. i33o a 9~l8. 

2 Cp. iv. I293 b i6, 1294^18-34. 

3 iii. 693 D, 701 E, iv. 710, vi. 756 E. 
' Laws, vi. 756, 763 E, 765. 

b Laws, vi. 764 A ; and Pol. iv. 1294*37, 1298° 16. 

BOOK II. 6 1266' 

the endeavour 1 to have the greater number of the magis- 
trates appointed out of the richer classes and the highest 
officers selected from those who have the greatest 
incomes, both these are oligarchical features. The 
oligarchical principle prevails also in the choice of the 
council, 2 for all are compelled to choose,, but the com- 15 
pulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class, 
and of an equal number out of the second class and out 
of the third class, but not in this latter case to all the 
voters but to those of the first three classes; 3 and the 
selection of candidates out of the fourth class is only 
compulsory on the first and second. Then, from the 
persons so chosen, he says that there ought to be an 
equal number of each class selected. Thus a preponder- 20 
ance will be given to the better sort of people, who have 
the larger incomes, because many of the lower classes, 
not being compelled, will not vote. These considerations, 
and others which will be adduced 4 when the time comes 25 
for examining similar polities, tend to show that states 
like Plato's should not be composed of democracy and 
monarchy. There is also a danger in electing the magis- 
trates out of a body who are themselves elected ; 5 for, if 
but a small number choose to combine, the elections will 
always go as they desire. Such is the constitution which 
is described in the Laius. 3° 

7 Other constitutions have been proposed ; some by 
private persons, others by philosophers and statesmen, 
which all come nearer to established or existing ones 
than either of Plato's. No one else has introduced such 
novelties as the community of women and children, or 35 
public tables for women : other legislators begin with 
what is necessary. In the opinion of some, the regula- 
tion of property is the chief point of all, that being 
the question upon which all revolutions turn. This 

1 Laius, vi. 763 D E. - Laws, vi. 756 B-E. 

3 Reading rois 8' (k iu>v rpiiov [f/ rfTiipTw] in 1. 17, cp. Laws, vi. 
756 c 8. 

4 iv. 7-9, 12. 1296 1 ' 34-38, i2i;7 ; '7-i3. 
•'' Laius, vi. 753 1j. 


danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who 
was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state 

•jo ought to have equal possessions. He thought that in 
I266 b a new colony the equalization might be accomplished 
without difficulty, not so easily when a state was already 
established ; and that then the shortest way of com- 
passing the desired end would be for the rich to give 
and not to receive marriage portions, and for the poor 
not to give but to receive them. 

5 Plato in the Laws 1 was of opinion that, to a certain 
extent, accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as 
I have already observed, 2 any citizen to possess more 
than five times the minimum qualification. But those 
who make such laws should remember what they are 
apt to forget, 3 — that the legislator who fixes the amount 

10 of property should also fix the number of children ; for, 
if the children are too many for the property, the law 
must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, 
it is a bad thing that many from being rich should 
become poor ; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to 
stir up revolutions. That the equalization of property 

•5 exercises an influence on political society was clearly 
understood even by some of the old legislators. Laws 
were made by Solon and others prohibiting an indi- 
vidual from possessing as much land as he pleased ; and 
there are other laws in states, which forbid the sale of 
property : among the Locrians, for example, there is a 

-° law that a man is not to sell his property unless he can 
prove unmistakably that some misfortune has befallen 
him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the pre- 
servation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the 
island of Leucas, and the abrogation of it made the con- 
stitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the 
prescribed qualification. Again, where there is equality 

2 5 of property, the amount may be either too large or too 
small, and the possessor may be living either in luxury 
or penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only 

1 v. 744 K. 2 I26s b 2i. 3 Cp. I265 a 38- b i6. 

BOOK II. 7 i 2 66 v 

to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation 
in their amount. Further, if he prescribe this moderate 
amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark ; 
for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind 
which require to be equalized, 1 and this is impossible, 3° 
unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws. 
But Phaleas will probably reply that this is precisely 
what he means ; and that, in his opinion, there ought to 
be in states, not only equal property, but equal education. 
Still he .should tell us what will be the character of his 
education ; there is no use in having one and the same 
for all, if it is of a sort that predisposes men to avarice, 35 
or ambition, or both. Moreover, civil troubles arise, not 
only out of the inequality of property, but out of the 
inequality of honour, though in opposite ways. For the 4° 
common people quarrel about the inequality of property, I267 c 
the higher class about the equality of honour ; as the poet 
says, — 

' The bad and good alike in honour share.' 2 

There are crimes of which the motive is want ; and 
for these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equaliza- 
tion of property, which will take away from a man the 
temptation to be a highwayman, because he is hungry or 
cold. But want is not the sole incentive to crime ; men 5 
also wish to enjoy themselves and not to be in a state of 
desire — they wish to cure some desire, going beyond the 
necessities of life, which preys upon them ; nay, this is not 
the only reason — they may desire superfluities a in order 
to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with pain, and there- 
fore they commit crimes. 

Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of 
the first, moderate possessions and occupation ; of the 
second, habits of temperance ; as to the third, if any io 
desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they will 
find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in 
philosophy ; for all other pleasures we are dependent 
on others. The fact is that the greatest crimes are 
caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not 
1 Cp. I263 b 22. 2 //. ix. 319. 3 Keeping &v iiriOvpoUv. 


become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold ; 

'5 and hence great is the honour bestowed, not on him 
who kills a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus 
we see that the institutions of Phaleas avail only against 
petty crimes. 

There is another objection to them. They are chiefly 
designed to promote the internal welfare of the state. 
But the legislator should consider also its relation to 
neighbouring nations, and to all who are outside of 

20 it. 1 The government must be organized with a view to 
military strength ; and of this he has said not a word. 
And so with respect to property : there should not only 
be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but 
also to meet dangers coming from without. The pro- 
perty of the state should not be so large that more 

2«i powerful neighbours may be tempted by it, while the 
owners are unable to repel the invaders ; nor yet so small 
that the state is unable to maintain a war even against 
states of equal power, and of the same character. Phaleas 
has not laid down any rule ; but we should bear in mind 
that abundance of wealth 2 is an advantage. The best limit 
will probably be, that a more powerful neighbour must 

30 have no inducement to go to war with you by reason of 
the excess of your wealth, but only such as he would 
have had if you had possessed less. There is a story that 
Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to besiege 
Atarneus, told him to consider how long the operation 
would take, and then reckon up the cost which would be 
incurred in the time. ' For ', said he, ' I am willing for 
a smaller sum than that to leave Atarneus at once.' 

35 These words of Eubulus made an impression on Auto- 
phradates, and he desisted from the siege. 

The equalization of property is one of the things that 

tend to prevent the citizens from quarrelling. Not that the 

gain in this direction is very great. For the nobles will be 

dissatisfied because they think themselves worthy of more 

40 than an equal share of honours ; and this is often found 

1 Cp. 1265*20. 

2 Or, reading o ti in 1. 28 with Stahr, ' what amount of wealth. 

BOOK II. 7 1267* 

to be a cause of sedition and revolution. 1 And the 
avarice of mankind is insatiable ; at one time two obols I267 b 
was pay enough ; but now, when this sum has become 
customary, men always want more and more without 
end ; for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, 
and most men live only for the gratification of it. The 5 
beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property 
as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, 
and to prevent the lower from getting more ; that is to 
say, they must be kept down, but not ill-treated. Be- 
sides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas is imperfect ; 10 
for he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be rich 
also in slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abun- 
dance of what are called his movables. Now either all 
these things must be equalized, or some limit must be 
imposed on them, or they must all be let alone. It 
would appear that Phaleas is legislating for a small city '5 
only, if, as he supposes, all the artisans are to be public 
slaves and not to form a supplementary part of the body 
of citizens. But if there is a law that artisans are to be 
public slaves, it should only apply to those engaged on 
public works, as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on the plan 
which Diophantus once introduced. 

From these observations any one may judge how far 20 
Phaleas was wrong or right in his ideas. 

8 Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, 
the same who invented the art of planning cities, and 
who also laid out the Piraeus, — a strange man, whose 
fondness for distinction led him into a general eccen- 
tricity of life, which made some think him affected (for 25 
he would wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments ; but 
these were worn on a cheap but warm garment 2 both in 
winter and summer) ; he, besides aspiring to be an adept 
in the knowledge of nature, was the first person not a 
statesman who made inquiries about the best form of 

The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 3° 

1 Cp. 1. 1. 2 Reading ivi for Iti in 1. 26. 

1267 13 POLITICA 

citizens divided into three parts, — one of artisans, one of 
husbandmen, and a third of armed defenders of the 
state. He also divided the land into three parts, one 
sacred, one public, the third private:— the first was set 
apart to maintain the customary worship of the gods, 

35 the second was to support the warriors, the third was the 
property of the husbandmen. He also divided laws 
into three classes, and no more, for he maintained that 
there are three subjects of lawsuits, — insult, injury, and 
homicide. He likewise instituted a single final court of 

40 appeal, to which all causes seeming to have been impro- 
perly decided might be referred ; this court he formed 
I268 a of elders chosen for the purpose. He was further of 
opinion that the decisions of the courts ought not to be 
given by the use of a voting pebble, but that every one 
should have a tablet on which he might not only write 
a simple condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a 
simple acquittal ; but, if he partly acquitted and partly 

5 condemned, he was to distinguish accordingly. To the 
existing law he objected that it obliged the judges to be 
guilty of perjury, whichever way they voted. He also 
enacted that those who discovered anything for the good 
of the state should be honoured ; and he provided that 
the children of citizens who died in battle should be 
maintained at the public expense, as if such an enactment 

10 had never been heard of before, yet it actually exists 
at Athens l and in other places. As to the magistrates, 
he would have them all elected by the people, that is, 
by the three classes already mentioned, and those who 
were elected were to watch over the interests of the 
public, of strangers, and of orphans. These are the 
most striking points in the constitution of Hippodamus. 

f 5 There is not much else. 

The first of these proposals to which objection may 
be taken is the threefold division of the citizens. The 
artisans, and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all 
have a share in the government. But the husbandmen 
have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, 

1 Cp. Thuc. ii. 46. 

BOOK II. 8 1268' 

and therefore they become all but slaves of the warrior 
class. That they should share In all the offices is an im- 20 
possibility ; for generals and guardians of the citizens, 
and nearly all the principal magistrates, must be taken 
from the class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the two 
other classes have no share in the government, how can 
they be loyal citizens ? It may be said that those who 25 
have arms must necessarily be masters of both the 
other classes, but this is not so easily accomplished unless 
they are numerous ; and if they are, why should the 
other classes share in the government at all, or have 
power to appoint magistrates ? Further, what use are 
farmers to the city ? Artisans there must be, for these 30 
are wanted in every city, and they can live by their 
craft, as elsewhere ; and the husbandmen, too, if they 
really provided the warriors with food, might fairly 
have a share in the government. But in the republic of 
Hippodamus they are supposed to have land of their own, 
which they cultivate for their private benefit. Again, as 35 
to this common land out of which the soldiers are main- 
tained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, 
the warrior class will be identical with the husband- 
men, although the legislator intended to make a dis- 
tinction between them. If, again, there are to be other 
cultivators distinct both from the husbandmen, who have 
land of their own, and from the warriors, they will make 
a fourth class, which has no place in the state and no 
share in anything. Or, if the same persons are to cul- 4° 
tivate their own lands, and those of the public as well, 
they will have a difficulty in supplying the quantity of 
produce which will maintain two households : l and why, 1268 
in this case, should there be any division, for they might 
find food themselves and give to the warriors from the 
same land 2 and the same lots ? There is surely a great 
confusion in all this. 

Neither is the law to be commended which says that 5 
the judges, when a simple issue is laid before them, 

1 Reading fl^o olictats in 1. I. 

2 Reading u-ni>Tr)s (ni-rf;?) yfjs in 1. 2 with Rocker. 

!268 b POLITICA 

should distinguish in their judgement ; for the judge is 
thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitra- 
tion, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with 
one another about the decision, and therefore they can 
distinguish ; but in courts of law this is impossible, and, 
10 indeed, most legislators take pains to prevent the judges 
from holding any communication with one another. 
Again, will there not be confusion if the judge thinks 
that damages should be given, but not so much as the 
suitor demands ? He asks, say, for twenty minae, and the 
judge allows him ten minae (or in general the suitor asks 
for more and the judge allows less), while another judge 

is allows five, another four minae. In this way they will go on 
splitting up the damages, and some will grant the whole 
and others nothing: how is the final reckoning to be 
taken ? Again, no one contends that he who votes for 
a simple acquittal or condemnation perjures himself, if 
the indictment has been laid in an unqualified form ; and 

20 this is just, for the judge who acquits does not decide that 
the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the 
twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks 
that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and 
yet condemns him. 

To honour those who discover anything which is useful 
to the state is a proposal which has a specious sound, 
but cannot safely be enacted by law, for it may encourage 
informers, and perhaps even lead to political commotions. 

25 This question involves another. It has been doubted 
whether it is or is not expedient to make any changes in 
the laws of a country, even if another law be better. Now, 
if all changes are inexpedient, we can hardly assent to the 

30 proposal of Hippodamus ; for, under pretence of doing 
a public service, a man may introduce measures which 
are really destructive to the laws or to the constitution. 
But, since we have touched upon this subject, perhaps we 
had better go a little into detail, for, as I was saying, there 
is a difference of opinion, and it may sometimes seem de- 

35 sirable to make changes. Such changes in the other arts 
and sciences have certainly been beneficial ; medicine, for 

BOOK II. 8 I268 b 

example, and gymnastic, and every other art and craft 
have departed from traditional usage. And, if politics be 
an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art. 
That improvement has occurred is shown by the fact 
that old customs are exceedingly simple and barbarous. 
For the ancient Hellenes went about armed l and bought 4° 
iheir brides of each other. The remains of ancient laws 
which have come down to us are quite absurd ; for I26g a 
example, at Cumae there is a law about murder, to the 
effect that if the accuser produce a certain number of 
witnesses from among his own kinsmen, the accused shall 
be held guilty. Again, men in general desire the good, 
and not merely what their fathers had. But the primaeval 
inhabitants, whether they were born of the earth or 5 
were the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed 
to have been no better than ordinary or even foolish people 
among ourselves (such is certainly the tradition 2 con- 
cerning the earth-born men) ; and it would be ridiculous 
to rest contented with their notions. Even when laws 
have been written down, they ought not always to remain 
unaltered. As in other sciences, so in politics, it is im- i° 
possible that all things should be precisely set down in 
writing ; for enactments must be universal, but actions 
are concerned with particulars. 3 Hence we infer that 
sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed ; 
but when we look at the matter from another point of 
view, great caution would seem to be required. For 
the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, is 
when the advantage is small, some errors both of law- 
givers and rulers had better be left ; the citizen will not 
gain so much by making the change as he will lose by 
the habit of disobedience. The analogy of the arts * is 
false ; a change in a law is a very different thing from 
a change in an art. For the law has no power to com- *° 
mand obedience except that of habit, which can only be 
given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to 

1 Cp. Thucyd. i. 5 and 6. 

2 Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 677 B ; Polit. 274 C ; Tim. 22 D. 

3 Cp. Plato, Polit. 295 a. I268 b 34 sqq. 

84»M7 F 


new laws enfeebles the power of the law. Even if we 
admit that the laws are to be changed, are they all to 
35 be changed, and in every state ? And are they to be 
changed by anybody who likes, or only by certain 
persons? These are very important questions; and 
therefore we had better reserve the discussion of them to 
a more suitable occasion. 1 

In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and 9 

30 indeed in all governments, two points have to be con- 
sidered : first, whether any particular law is good or bad, 
when compared with the perfect state ; secondly, whether 
it is or is not consistent with the idea and character 
which the lawgiver has set before his citizens. That in 
a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and 

35 not have to provide for their daily wants is generally 
acknowledged, but there is a difficulty in seeing how this 
leisure is to be attained. The Thessalian Penestae 
have often risen against their masters, and the Helots 
in like manner against the Lacedaemonians, for whose 
misfortunes they are always lying in wait. Nothing, 
however, of this kind has as yet happened to the Cretans ; 

40 the reason probably is that the neighbouring cities, even 
I269 b when at war with one another, never form an alliance 
with rebellious serfs, rebellions not being for their interest, 
since they themselves have a dependent population. 2 
Whereas all the neighbours of the Lacedaemonians, 
whether Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, were their 
5 enemies. In Thessaly, again, the original revolt of the 
slaves occurred because the Thessalians were still at 
war with the neighbouring Achaeans, Perrhaebians and 
Magnesians. Besides, if there were no other difficulty, 
the treatment or management of slaves is a troublesome 
affair ; for, if not kept in hand, they are insolent, and think 

10 that they are as good as their masters, and, if harshly 
treated, they hate and conspire against them. Now it is 
clear that when these are the results the citizens of a 

1 These questions are not actually d'scussed in the Politics. 

2 Cp. I27i b 4l. 

BOOK II. 9 I26g b 

state have not found out the secret of managing their 
subject population. 

Again, the licence of the Lacedaemonian women de- 
feats the intention of the Spartan constitution, and is 
adverse to the happiness of the state. For, a husband 
and a wife being each a part of every family, the state 15 
may be considered as about equally divided into men 
and women ; and, therefore, in those states in which the 
condition of the women is bad, half the city l may be 
regarded as having no laws. And this is what has 
actually happened at Sparta ; the legislator wanted to 
make the whole state hardy and temperate, and he has 20 
carried out his intention in the case of the men, but 
he has neglected the women, who live in every sort of 
intemperance and luxury. The consequence is that in 
such a state wealth is too highly valued, especially if the 
citizens fall under the dominion of their wives, after the 25 
manner of most warlike races, except the Celts and a few 
others who openly approve of male loves. The old 
mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting 
Ares and Aphrodite, for all warlike races are prone to 
the love either of men or of women. This was exempli- 3° 
fied among the Spartans in the days of their greatness ; 
many things were managed by their women. But what 
difference does it make whether women rule, or the rulers 
are ruled by women ? The result is the same. Even in 
regard to courage, which is of no use in daily life, and is 35 
needed only in war, the influence of the Lacedaemonian 
women has been most mischievous. The evil showed 
itself in the Theban invasion, when, unlike the women in 
other cities, they were utterly useless and caused more 
confusion than the enemy. This licence of the Lacedae- 
monian women existed from the earliest times, and was 40 
only what might be expected. For, during the wars of 1270 s 
the Lacedaemonians, first against the Argives, and after- 
wards against the Arcadians and Messenians, the men 
were long away from home, and, on the return of peace, 
they gave themselves into the legislator's hand, already 

1 Cp. i. i26o b i8. 
E 2 


5 prepared by the discipline of ft soldier's life (in which 
there are many elements of virtue), to receive his enact- 
ments. But, when Lycurgus, as tradition says, wanted to 
bring the women under his laws, they resisted, and he gave 
up the attempt. These then are the causes of what then 
happened, and this defect in the constitution is clearly to 
be attributed to them. We are not, however, considering 

10 what is or is not to be excused, but what is right or wrong, 
and the disorder of the women, as I have already said, 1 not 
only gives an air of indecorum to the constitution con- 
sidered in itself, but tends in a measure to foster avarice. 

15 The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism 
on the inequality of property. While some of the 
Spartan citizens have quite small properties, others have 
very large ones ; hence the land has passed into the 
hands of a few. And this is due also to faulty laws ; 

ao for, although the legislator rightly holds up to shame the 
sale or purchase of an inheritance, he allows anybody 
who likes to give or bequeath it. Yet both practices 
lead to the same result. And nearly two-fifths of the 
whole country are held by women ; this is owing to 
the number of heiresses and to the large dowries which 

35 are customary. It would surely have been better to 
have given no dowries at all, or, if any, -but small or 
moderate ones. As the law now stands, a man may 
bestow his heiress on any one whom he pleases, and, if 
he die intestate, the privilege of giving her away descends 
to his heir. 2 Hence, although the country is able to 

30 maintain 1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the whole 
number of Spartan citizens 3 fell below 1000. The result 
proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property ; 
for the city sank under a single defeat ; the want of men 
was their ruin. There is a tradition that, in the days of 
their ancient kings, they were in the habit of giving the 

35 rights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in spite 
of their long wars, no lack of population was experienced 

1 i269 b 12, 23. 

1 i. e. to the person who ' inherits ' the heiress. Cf. Newman adloc. 

3 At the time of the Theban invasion. 

ROOK II. 9 i27o a 

by them ; indeed, at one time Sparta is said to have 
numbered not less than io,ooo citizens. Whether this 
statement is true or not, it would certainly have been 
better to have maintained their numbers by the equaliza- 
tion of property. Again, the law which relates to the 
procreation of children is adverse to the correction of this 4° 
inequality. For the legislator, wanting to have as many i270 b 
Spartans as he could, encouraged the citizens to have 
large families ; and there is a law at Sparta that the 
father of three sons shall be exempt from military service, 
and he who has four from all the burdens of the state. 
Yet it is obvious that, if there were many children, the 5 
land being distributed as it is, many of them must 
necessarily fall into poverty. 

The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another 
point ; I mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has 
authority in the highest matters, but the Ephors are 
chosen from the whole people, and so the office is apt to fall 
into the hands of very poor men, who, being badly off, io 
are open to bribes. There have been many examples at 
Sparta of this evil in former times ; and quite recently, 
in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who 
were bribed did their best to ruin the state. And so 
great and tyrannical is their power, that even the kings 
have been compelled to court them, so that, in this way 15 
as well, together with the royal office the whole constitu- 
tion has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has 
turned into a democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does 
keep the state together ; for the people are contented 
when they have a share in the highest office, and the 
result, whether due to the legislator or to chance, has been 
advantageous. For if a constitution is to be permanent, all 2 ° 
the parts of the state must wish that it should exist and 
the same arrangements be maintained. 1 This is the case 
at Sparta, where the kings desire its permanence because 
they have due honour in their own persons ; the nobles 
because they are represented in the council of elders (for 

1 Reading Stauevtiv ravrd in 1. 22 with most MSS. Cp. iv. 
I294 b 38, v. 1309k 17. 



35 the office of elder is a reward of virtue) ; and the people, 
because all are eligible to the Ephoralty. The election 
of Ephors out of the whole people is perfectly right, but 
ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which is 
too childish. Again, they have the decision of great causes, 
although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore 
they should not determine them merely on their own 

3° judgement, but according to written rules, and to the laws. 
Their way of life, too, is not in accordance with the spirit 
of the constitution — they have a deal too much licence ; 
whereas, in the case of the other citizens, the excess of 
strictness is so intolerable that they run away from the 
law into the secret indulgence of sensual pleasures. 

35 Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. 
It may be said that the elders are good men and well 
trained in manly virtue ; and that, therefore, there is an 
advantage to the state in having them. But that judges 
of important causes should hold office for life is a disput- 

40 able thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body. 
1271 s And when men have been educated in such a manner 
that even the legislator himself cannot trust them, there 
is real danger. Many of the elders are well known to 
have taken bribes and to have been guilty of partiality 
5 in public affairs. And therefore they ought not to be 
irresponsible ; yet at Sparta they are so. But (it may 
be replied), ' All magistracies are accountable to the 
Ephors.' Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, 
and we maintain that the control should be exercised in 
some other manner. Further, the mode in which the 

10 Spartans elect their elders is childish ; and it is im- 
proper that the person to be elected should canvass 
for the office ; the worthiest should be appointed, whether 
he chooses or not. And here the legislator clearly in- 
dicates the same intention which appears in other parts 
of his constitution ; he would have his citizens ambitious, 
and he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of 

15 the elders ; for no one would ask to be elected if he were 
not. Yet ambition and avarice, almost more than any 
other passions, are the motives of crime. 

BOOK II. 9 1271* 

Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, 
I will consider at another time ! ; they should at any rate -° 
be chosen, not as they are now, but with regard to their 
personal life and conduct. The legislator himself obvi- 
ously did not suppose that he could make them really 
good men ; at least he shows a great distrust of their 
virtue. For this reason the Spartans used to join 
enemies with them in the same embassy, and the quarrels 2 5 
between the kings were held to be conservative of the 

Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, 
called ' phiditia ', regulate them well. The entertainment 
ought to have been provided at the public cost, as in 
Crete 2 ; but among the Lacedaemonians every one is 
expected to contribute, and some of them are too poor to 3° 
afford the expense ; thus the intention of the legislator is 
frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a 
popular institution, but the existing manner of regulating 
them is the reverse of popular. For the very poor can 
scarcely take part in them ; and, according to ancient 35 
custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed to 
retain their rights of citizenship. 

The law about the Spartan admirals has often been 
censured, and with justice ; it is a source of dissension, 
for the kings are perpetual generals, and this office of 4° 
admiral is but the setting up of another king. 

The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws? against I27i b 
the intention of the" legislator, is likewise justified ; the 
whole constitution has regard to one part of virtue only, 
— the virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war. 
So long as they were at war, therefore, their power was 
preserved, but when they had attained empire they fell, 4 5 
for of the aits of peace they knew nothing, and had never 
engaged in any employment higher than war. There is 
another error, equally great, into which they have fallen. 
Although they truly think that the goods for which men 
contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, 

1 iii. 14 17. 2 Cp. 1272*13-21. 

3 Laws, i.625 K, 630. 4 Cp. vii. I334 a 6. 



they err in supposing that these goods are to be pre- 
ferred to the virtue which gains them. 

10 Once more : the revenues of the state are ill-managed ; 
there is no money in the treasury, although they are 
obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to 
pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the 
hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one 

'5 another's contributions. The result which the legislator 
has produced is the reverse of beneficial ; for he has 
made his city poor, and his citizens greedy. 

Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which 
these are the principal defects. 

20 The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan, 10 
and in some few points is quite as good ; but for the 
most part less perfect in form. The older constitutions 
are generally less elaborate than the later, and the Lace- 
daemonian is said to be, and probably is, in a very great 
measure, a copy of the Cretan. According to tradition, 

J 5 Lycurgus, when he ceased to be the guardian of King 
Charillus, went abroad and spent most of his time in Crete. 
For the two countries are nearly connected ; the Lyctians 
are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and the colonists, 
when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which 

30 they found existing among the inhabitants. Even to 
this day the Perioeci, or subject population of Crete, are 
governed by the original laws which Minos is supposed 
to have enacted. The island seems to be intended by 
nature for dominion in Hellas, and to be well situated ; 
it extends right across the sea, around which nearly all 

35 the Hellenes are settled ; and while one end is not far 
from the Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to 
the region of Asia about Triopium and Rhodes. Hence 
Minos acquired the empire of the sea, subduing some of 
the islands and colonizing others ; at last he invaded 
Sicily, where he died near Camicus. 

The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. 

4 o The Helots are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci 

1272 s of the other, and both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have 

BOOK II. 10 I272 a 

common meals, which were anciently called by the Lace- 
daemonians not ' phiditia ' but ' andria ' ; and the Cretans 
have the same word, the use of which proves that the 
common meals originally came from Crete. Further, the 
two constitutions are similar ; for the office of the Ephors 5 
is the same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only differ- 
ence being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi 
are ten in number. The elders, too, answer to the elders 
in Crete, who are termed by the Cretans the council. 
'And the kingly office once existed in Crete, but was 
abolished, and the Cosmi have nOw the duty of leading 
them in war. All classes share in the ecclesia, but it can 10 
only ratify the decrees of the elders and the Cosmi. 

The common meals of Crete are certainly better 
managed than the Lacedaemonian ; for in Lacedaemon 
every one pays so much per head, or, if he fails, the law, 15 
as I have already explained, 1 forbids him to exercise the 
rights of citizenship. But in Crete they are of a more 
popular character. There, of all the fruits of the earth 
and cattle raised on the public lands, and of the tribute 
which is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is assigned to 
the gods and to the service of the state, and another to the 
common meals, so that men, women, and children are all .10 
supported out of a common stock. 2 The legislator has 
many ingenious ways of securing moderation in eating, 
which he conceives to be a gain ; he likewise encourages 
the separation of men from women, lest they should have 
too many children, and the companionship of men with 
one another — whether this is a good or bad thing I shall 25 
have an opportunity of considering at another time. 3 
But 4 that the Cretan common meals are better ordered 
than the Lacedaemonian there can be no doubt. 

On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse insti- 
tution than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils 
without the good. Like the Ephors, they are any chance 
persons, but in Crete this is not counterbalanced by a 3° 

1 1 27 1 ° 35. s Cp. vii. 1330*5. 

3 The question is nowhere discussed by Aristotle. 
* Reading on 6V in 1. 26, with the MSS. 


corresponding political advantage. At Sparta every one 
is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in 
the highest office, want the constitution to be permanent. 1 
But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain families, 
and not out of the whole people, and the elders out of 
those who have been Cosmi. 

35 The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, 
which has been already made about the Lacedaemonian 
elders. 2 Their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great 
a privilege, and their arbitrary power of acting upon their 
own judgement, and dispensing with written law, is dan- 
gerous. It is no proof of the goodness of the institution 
that the people are not discontented at being excluded 

4 o from it. For there is no profit to be made out of the 
I272 b office as out of the Ephoralty, since, unlike the Ephors, 
the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed from 

The remedy by which they correct the evil of this in- 
stitution is an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close 
oligarchy than to a constitutional state. For the Cosmi 
are often expelled by a conspiracy of their own col- 
leagues, or of private individuals ; and they are allowed 
also to resign before their term of office has expired 
5 Surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by 
law than by the will of man, which is a very unsafe rule. 
Worst of all is the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a 
device to which the nobles often have recourse when 
they will not submit to justice. This shows that the 
Cretan government, although possessing some of the 

10 characteristics of a constitutional state, is really a close 

The nobles have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; 3 
they get together a party among the common people 
and their own friends and then quarrel and fight with 
one another. What is this but the temporary destruction 
15 of the state and dissolution of society? A city is in a 
dangerous condition when those who are willing are also 

1 Cp. supra, i27o b 25. 2 i2yo h 35-1271* 18. 

3 Reading povapxiav in 1. 12, with the MSS. 

BOOK II. 10 i272 b 

able to attack her. But, as I have already said, 1 the 
island of Crete is saved by her situation ; distance has 
the same effect as the Lacedaemonian prohibition of 
strangers ; and the Cretans have no foreign dominions. 
This is the reason why the Perioeci are contented in 
Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. 
But when lately foreign invaders found their way into 20 
the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was 
revealed. Enough of the government of Crete. 

II The Carthaginians are also considered to have an ex- 
cellent form of government, which differs from that of any 
other state in several respects, though it is in some very 25 
like the Lacedaemonian. Indeed, all three states — the 
Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian — nearly 
resemble one another, and are very different from any 
others. Many of the Carthaginian institutions are excel- 
lent. The superiority of their constitution is proved by 30 
the fact that the common people remains loyal to the 
constitution ; the Carthaginians have never had any 
rebellion worth speaking of, and have never been under 
the rule of a tyrant. 

Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitu- 
tion resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following : — 
The common tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phi- 
■ditia, and their magistracy of the 104 to the Ephors ; but, 35 
whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the magis- 
trates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit 
— this is an improvement. They have also their kings 
and their gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to 
the kings and elders of Sparta. Their kings, unlike the 
Spartan, are not always of the same family, nor that 
an ordinary one, but if there is some distinguished 4° 
family they are selected out of it and not appointed by 
seniority — this is far better. Such officers have great 
power, and therefore, if they arc persons of little worth, 1273 s 
do a great deal of harm, and they have already done 
harm at Laccdaemon. 

1 a 4i sq. 


Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, 
for which the Carthaginian constitution would be cen- 
sured, apply equally to all the forms of government 
which we have mentioned. But of the deflections from 

5 aristocracy and constitutional government, some incline 
more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and 
elders, if unanimous, may determine whether they will or 
will not bring a matter before the people, but when they 
are not unanimous, the people decide on such matters as 
well. And whatever the kings and elders bring before 
the people is not only heard but also determined by them, 

i° and any one who likes may oppose it ; now this is not 
permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistracies 
of five who have under them many important matters 
should be co-opted, that they should choose the supreme 

15 council of 100, and should hold office longer than other 
magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and 
after they hold office) — these are oligarchical features ; 
their being without salary and not elected by lot, and any 
similar points, such as the practice of having all suits 

20 tried by the magistrates, 1 and not some by one class of 
judges or jurors and some by another, as at Lacedaemon, 
are characteristic of aristocracy. The Carthaginian con- 
stitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to olig- 
archy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their 
side. For men in general think that magistrates should 
be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth : a 
man, they say, who is poor cannot rule well, — he has not 

25 the leisure. If, then, election of magistrates for their 
wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit 
of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the 
constitution of Carthage is comprehended ; for the Car- 
thaginians choose their magistrates, and particularly the 

30 highest of them — their kings and generals — with an eye 
both to merit and to wealth. 

But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from 
aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. No- 
thing is more absolutely necessary than to provide tnat 

1 Cp. iii. I275 b 8-i2. 

BOOK II. ii I273 a 

the highest class, not only when in office, but when out 
of office, should have leisure and not disgrace themselves 
in any way ; and to this his attention should be first 
directed. Even if you must have regard to wealth, in 35 
order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing that 
the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, 
should be bought. The law which allows this abuse 
makes wealth of more account than virtue, and the 
whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever the chiefs 
of the state deem anything honourable, the other citizens 4° 
are sure to follow their example ; and, where virtue has 
not the first place, there aristocracy cannot be firmly I273 b 
established. Those who have been at the expense of 
purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying 
themselves ; and. it is absurd to suppose that a poor and 
honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a 
lower stamp of man who has incurred a great expense 
will not. Wherefore they should rule who are able to 5 
rule best. And even if the legislator does not care 
to protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate 
secure leisure for them when in office. 1 

It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same 
person should hold many offices, which is a favourite 
practice among the Carthaginians, for one business is 
better done by one man. 2 The legislator should see to 10 
this and should not appoint the same person to be a 
flute-player and a shoemaker. Hence, where the state 
is large, it is more in accordance both with constitutional 
and with democratic principles that the offices of state 
should be distributed among many persons. For, as I 
said, 15 this arrangement is fairer to all, and any action 
familiarized by repetition is better and sooner performed. 
We have a proof in military and naval matters; the i.v 
duties of command and of obedience in both these 
services extend to all. 

The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, 
but they successfully 'escape the evils of oligarchy by 

1 Cp. 1269*34. J Cp. Plato, Rep ii. 374 A. 3 I26l b l. 


enriching one portion of the people after another by- 
sending them l to their colonies. This is their panacea 

20 and the means by which they give stability to the state. 
Accident favours them, but the legislator should be able 
to provide against revolution without trusting to acci- 
dents. As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and 
the bulk of the subjects revolted, there-would be no way 
of restoring peace by legal methods. 

25 Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, 
and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly cele- 

Of those who have- treated of governments, some 12 
have never taken any part at all in public affairs, but 
have passed their lives in a private station : about most 
of them, what was worth telling has been already told. 2 

30 Others have been lawgivers, either in their own or in 
foreign cities, whose affairs they have administered ; 
and of these some have only made laws, others have 
framed constitutions ; for example, Lycurgus and Solon 

35 did both. Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I have 
already spoken. 3 As to Solon, he is thought by some to 
have been a good legislator, who put an end to the 
exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, 
established the ancient Athenian democracy, and har- 
monized the different elements of the state. According 
to their view, the council of Areopagus was an oligarchical 

4 o element, the elected magistracy, aristocratical, and the 
1274* courts of law, democratical. The truth seems to be that 
the council and the elected magistracy existed before the 
time of Solon, and were retained by him, but that he 
formed the courts of law out of all the citizens, thus 
creating the democracy, which is the very reason why he 
is sometimes blamed. For in giving the supreme power 
to the law courts, which are elected by lot, he is thought 

5 to have destroyed the non-democratic element. When 

1 Reading tb n\ovri(eiv aid ti in I. 19, with Schneider; cp. iv. 
I320 b 4. 

2 cc. 1-8. 3 c. 9. 

BOOK II. 12 I274 a 

the law courts grew powerful, to please the people who 
were now playing the tyrant the old constitution was 
changed into the existing democracy. Ephialtes and 
Pericles curtailed the power of the Areopagus ; Pericles 
also instituted the payment of the juries, and thus every 
demagogue in turn increased the power of the demo- 10 
cracy until it became what we now see. All this is true ; 
it seems, however, to be the result of circumstances, and 
not to have been intended by Solon. For the people, 
having been instrumental in gaining the empire of the 
sea in the Persian War, 1 began to get a notion of itself, 
and followed worthless demagogues, whom the better 
class opposed. Solon, himself, appears to have given 15 
the Athenians only that power of electing to offices and 
calling to account the magistrates which was absolutely 
necessary ; 2 for without it they would have been in a 
state of slavery and enmity to the government. All the 
magistrates he appointed from the notables and the nen 
of wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni, 
or from the class called zeugitae, 3 or from a third class 20 
of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth class were* 
labourers who had no share in any magistracy. 

Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the 
Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated 
for his own city of Catana, and for the other Chalcidian 
cities in Italv and Sicily. Some people attempt to 2 5 
make out that Onomacritus was the first people who 
had any special skill in legislation, 4 and that he, although 
a Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived 
in the exercise of his prophetic art ; that Thales was his 
companion, ar d that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were dis- 
ciples of Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But their ?,° 
account is quite inconsistent with chronology. 

There was also Philolaus, the Corinthian, who gave 
laws to the Thebans. This Philolaus was one of the 

1 Cp. v. I304 a 20, viii. 1341*29. 2 Cp. iii. I28i b 32. 

" Because they kept a yoke of oxen. 

4 Or (with Bernays), 'to make out an unbroken series of great 
legislators, Onomacritus being considered the first.' 


family of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diodes, the 
Olympic victor, who left Corinth in horror of the inces- 
tuous passion which his mother Halcyone had conceived 

35 for him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends 
together ended their days. The inhabitants still point 
out their tombs, which are in full view of one another, but 
one is visible from the Corinthian territory, the other 
not. 1 Tradition says the two friends arranged them thus, 

4° Diodes out of horror at his misfortunes, so that the land 
of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb ; Philolaus 
I2 74 that it might. This is the reason why they settled at 
Thebes, and so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, 
and, besides some other enactments, gave them laws 
about the procreation of children, which they call the 
; Laws of Adoption'. These laws were peculiar to him, 
and were intended to preserve the number of the lots. 
5 In the legislation of Charondas there is nothing re- 
markable, except the suits against false witnesses. He 
is the first who instituted denunciation for perjury. His 
laws are more exact and more precisely expressed than 
even those of our modern legislators. 

(Characteristic of Phaleas is the equalization of pro- 
perty ; of Plato, the community of women, children, and 

io property, the common meals of women, and the law 
about drinking, that the sober shall be masters of the 
feast ; 2 also the training of soldiers to acquire by practice 
equal skill with both hands, so that one should be as 
useful as the other.) 3 

1 5 Draco has left laws, but he adapted them to a consti- 
tution which already existed, and there is no peculiarity 
in them which is worth mentioning, except the greatness 
and severity of the punishments. 

Pittacus, too, was only a lawgiver, and not the author 
of a constitution ; he has a law which is peculiar to him, 
that, if a drunken man do something wrong, he shall be 

20 more heavily punished than if he were sober ; 4 he looked 

Reading rov fitv o-vvonrov tov &' ov avvimrnv in I. 38. 
2 Cp. Laws, i. 64a D, ii. 671 D-672 A. s Cp. Laws, vii. 794 D. 
4 Cp. A r . Eth. ill3 b 3l. 

BOOK II. 12 1274° 

not to the excuse which might be offered for the 
drunkard, but only to expediency, for drunken more 
often than sober people commit acts of violence. 

Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the Chalci- 
dians of Thrace. Some of them relate to homicide, and 
to heiresses ; but there is nothing remarkable in them. 25 

And here let us conclude our inquiry into the various 
constitutions which either actually exist, or have been 
devised by theorists. 

i2 7 4 b 


He who would inquire into the essence and attributes I 
of various kinds of government must first of all determine 
' What is a state ? ' At present this is a disputed question. 
Some say that the state has done a certain act ; others, 

35 no, not the state, 1 but the oligarchy or the tyrant. And 
the legislator or statesman is concerned entirely with the 
state ; a constitution or government being an arrangement 
of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is composite, 
like any other whole made up of many parts ; — these 

40 are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, therefore, 

1275 s tnat we roust begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and 

what is the meaning of the term ? For here again there 

may be a difference of opinion. He who is a citizen in a 

democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy. 

5 Leaving out of consideration those who have been made 
citizens, or who have obtained the name of citizen in any 
other accidental manner, we may say, first, that a citizen 
is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, 
for resident aliens and slaves share in the place ; nor is 
he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing 

10 and being sued ; for this right may be enjoyed under 
the provisions of a treaty. Nay, resident aliens in many 
places do not possess even such rights completely, for 
they are obliged to have a patron, so that they do but 
imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them 
citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the 
term to children who are too young to be on the register, 

15 or to old men who have been relieved from state duties. 
Of these we do not say quite simply that they are citizens, 
but add in the one case that they are not of age, and in 
the other, that they are past the age, or something 

so of that sort ; the precise expression is immaterial, for 

J Cp. i276 a 8. 

BOOK III. i I275 a 

our meaning is clear. Similar difficulties to those 
which I have mentioned may be raised and answered 
about deprived citizens and about exiles. But the 
citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in 
the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can 
be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares 
in the administration of justice, and in offices. Now of 
offices some are discontinuous, and the same persons 
are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold 25 
them after a fixed interval ; others have no limit of time, 
— for example, the office of dicast or ecclesiast. 1 It may, 
indeed, be argued that these are not magistrates at all, 
and that their functions give them no share in the 
government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that those 
who have the supreme power do not govern. Let us not 
dwell further upon this, which is a purely verbal question ; 
what we want is a common term including both dicast 30 
and ecclesiast. Let us, for the sake of distinction, call it 
'indefinite office', and we will assume that those who share 
in such office are citizens. This is the most comprehen- 
sive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who 
are generally so called. 

But we must not forget that things of which the un- 35 
derlying principles differ in kind, one of them being first, 
another second, another third, have, when regarded in 
this relation, nothing, or hardly anything, worth men- 
tioning in common. Now we see that governments 
differ in kind, and that some of them are prior and that 
others are posterior ; those which are faulty or perverted 1275* 
are necessarily posterior to those which are perfect. 
(What we mean by perversion will be hereafter ex- 
plained. 2 ) The citizen then of necessity differs under 
each form of government ; and our definition is best 5 
adapted to the citizen of a democracy ; but not neces- 
sarily to other states. For in some states the people are 
not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, 

1 ' Dicast '=juryman and judge in one : ' ecclesiast ' = niember of 
the ccclesia or assembly of the citizens. 

2 Cp. 1279 11 19. 

F 2 


but only extraordinary ones ; and suits are distributed 
by sections among the magistrates. At Lacedaemon, for 
instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, 

io which they distribute among themselves, while the elders 
are judges of homicide, and other causes are decided 
by other magistrates. A similar principle prevails at 
Carthage ; 1 there certain magistrates decide all causes. 
We may, indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so 
as to include these states. In them it is the holder 

»5 of a definite, not of an indefinite office, who legislates 
and judges, and to some or all such holders of definite 
offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging 
about some things or about all things. The conception 
of the citizen now begins to clear up. 

He who has the power to take part in the deliberative 
or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be 

20 a citizen of that state ; and, speaking generally, a state is 
a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life. 

But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom 2 
both the parents are citizens ; others insist on going 
further back ; say to two or three or more ancestors. 

25 This is a short and practical definition ; but there are 
some who raise the further question : How this third or 
fourth ancestor came to be a citizen ? Gorgias of Leon- 
tini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony, 
said—' Mortars are what is made by the mortar-makers, 
and the citizens of Larissa are those who are made by the 
magistrates ;' 2 for it is their trade to make Larissaeans.' 3 

30 Yet the question is really simple, for, if according to the 
definition just given they shared in the government, 4 they 
were citizens. This is a better definition than the other. 
For the words, ' born of a father or mother who is a 
citizen ', cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or 
founders of a state. 

1 Cp. ii. 1273* 19. 

2 An untranslatable play upon the word fi^joupyos, which means 
either « a magistrate ' or ' an artisan '. 

3 Reading in 1. 30 Aaiucraionoiovs, which seems to have been read 
by Aretinus. 4 C P- *■ l8. 

BOOK III. 2 1275 13 

There is a greater difficulty in the case of those who 
have been made citizens after a revolution, as by 35 
Cleisthenes at Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants, 
for he enrolled in tribes many metics, both strangers and 
slaves. The doubt in these cases is, not who is, but 
whether he who is ought to be a citizen ; and there 1276 s1 
will still be a further doubt, whether he who ought 
not to be a citizen, is one in fact, for what ought not 
to be is what is false. Now, there are some who 
hold office, and yet ought not to hold office, whom 
we describe as ruling, but ruling unjustly. And the 
citizen was defined l by the fact of his holding some kind 
of rule or office, — he who holds a judicial or legislative 
office fulfils our definition of a citizen. It is evident, 5 
therefore, that the citizens about whom the doubt has 
arisen must be called citizens. 

Whether they ought to be so or not is a question 
which is bound up with the previous inquiry. 2 
For a parallel question is raised respecting the state, 
whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state ; 
for example, in the transition from an oligarchy or a 
tyranny to a democracy. In such cases persons refuse 10 
to fulfil their contracts or any other obligations, on the 
ground that the tyrant, and not the state, contracted 
them ; they argue that some constitutions are established 
by force, and not for the sake of the common good. But 
this would apply equally to democracies, for they too 
may be founded on violence, and then the acts of the 
democracy will be neither more nor less acts of the state in J 5 
question than those of an oligarchy or of a tyranny. This 
question runs up into another : — on what principle shall we 
ever say that the state is the same, or different ? It would 
be a very superficial view which considered only the place 
and the inhabitants (for the soil and the population may 
be separated, and some of the inhabitants may live in one »o 
place and some in another). This, however, is not a very 

1 1275*22 sqq. 2 Cp. I274 b 34. 


serious difficulty ; we need only remark that the word 
' state ' is ambiguous. 1 

35 It is further asked : When are men, living in the same 
place, to be regarded as a single city — what is the limit ? 
Certainly not the wall of the city, for you might surround 
all Peloponnesus with a wall. Like this, we may say, 
is Babylon, 2 and every city that has the compass of a 
nation rather than a city ; Babylon, they say, had been 
taken for three days before some part of the inhabitants 

30 became aware of the fact. This difficulty may, however, with 
advantage be deferred 3 to another occasion ; the states- 
man has to consider the size of the state, and whether it 
should consist of more than one nation or not. 

Again, shall we say that while the race of inhabitants, 

35 as well as their place of abode, remain the same, the city 
is also the same, although the citizens are always dying 
and being born, as we call rivers and fountains the same, 
although the water is always flowing away and coming 
again ? Or shall we say that the generations of men, like 

40 the rivers, are the same, but that the state changes ? For, 
1276 13 since the state is a partnership, and is a partnership of 
citizens in a constitution, when the form of the government 
changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed 
that the state is no longer the same, just as a tragic differs 
5 from a comic chorus, although the members of both may 
be identical. And in this manner we speak of every union 
or composition of elements as different when the form of 
their composition alters ; for example, a scale containing 
the same sounds is said to be different, accordingly as 

10 the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. And if 
this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state 
consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution, and 
it may be called or not called by the same name, whether 
the inhabitants are the same or entirely different. It is 
quite another question, whether a state ought or ought 

1 i. e. noXis means both ' state ' and ' city '. 

2 Cp. ii. 1265*14. 

3 The size of the state is discussed in vii. I326 a 8-1327* 3 ; the 
question whether it should consist of more than one nation is 
barely touched upon, in v. 1303 11 25- b 3. 

BOOK III. 3 1276* 

not to fulfil engagements when the form of government >5 

There is a point nearly allied to the preceding : 
Whether the virtue of a good man and a good citizen 
is the same or not. 1 But, before entering on this discus- 
sion, we must certainly first obtain some general notion 
of the virtue of the citizen. Like the sailor, the citizen 20 
is a member of a community. Now, sailors have different 
functions, for one of them is a rower, another a pilot, and 
a third a look-out man, a fourth is described by some 
similar term ; and while the precise definition of each 
individual's virtue applies exclusively to him, there is, at 2 5 
the same time, a common definition applicable to them 
all. For they have all of them a common object, which 
is safety in navigation. Similarly, one citizen differs from 
another, but the salvation of the community is the 
common business of them all. This community is the 
constitution ; the virtue of the citizen must therefore be 3° 
relative to the constitution of which he is a member. If, 
then, there are many forms of government, it is evident 
that there is not one single virtue of the good citizen 
which is perfect virtue. But we say that the good man 
is he who has one single virtue which is perfect virtue. 
Hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of 
necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man. 

The same question may also be approached by another 35 
road, from a consideration of the best constitution. If the 
state cannot a be entirely composed of good men, and yet 
each citizen is expected to do his own business well, and 
must therefore have virtue, still, inasmuch as all the citizens 4° 
cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the good 1277 s 
man cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the 
good citizen — thus, and thus only, can the state be 
perfect ; but they will not have the virtue of a good 
man, unless we assume that in the good state all the 
citizens must be good. 

1 Cp. N. Eth. v. ii3o b 28. 

2 Reading a^vvarov in 1. 38 with the MSS. 

i277 a POLITICA 

S Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be com- 
pared to the living being : as the first elements into which 
a living being is resolved are soul and body, as soul is 
made up of rational principle and appetite, the family of 
husband and wife, property of master and slave, so of all 
these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the state is 

10 composed ; and. therefore, the virtue of all the citizens 
cannot possibly be the same, any more than the excel- 
lence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the 
performer who stands by his side. I have said enough 
to show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely 
and always the same. 

But will there then be no case in which the virtue of 
the good citizen and the virtue of the good man coin- 

15 cide ? To this we answer that the good ruler is a good 
and wise man, and that he who would be a statesman 
must be a wise man. And some persons say that even 
the education of the ruler should be of a special kind ; 
for are not the children of kings instructed in riding and 
military exercises? As Euripides says : 

' No subtle arts for me, but what the state requires.' 1 

As though there were a special education needed by 
20 a ruler. If then 2 the virtue of a good ruler is the same 
as that of a good man, and we assume further that the 
subject is a citizen as well as the ruler, the virtue of the 
good citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be 
absolutely the same, although in some cases they may ; for 
the virtue of a ruler differs from that of a citizen. It 
was the sense of this difference which made Jason say 
that ' he felt hungry when he was not a tyrant ', meaning 
that he could not endure to live in a private station. 
35 But, on the other hand, it may be argued that men are 
praised for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, 
and he is said to be a citizen of approved virtue who is 
able to do both. Now if we suppose the virtue of a 
good man to be that which rules, and the virtue of the 

1 Aeolus, fr. 16, Nauck*. 

2 Reading « 8r] in I. 20, with some good MSS. 


BOOK III. 4 1277 

citizen to include ruling and obeying, it cannot be said 
that they are equally worthy of praise. Since, then, it is 3° 
sometimes thought that the ruler and the ruled must 
learn different things 1 and not the same, but that the 
citizen must know and share in them both, the in- 
ference is obvious. There is, indeed, the rule of a 
master, which is concerned with menial offices, 2 — the 
master need not know how to perform these, but may 
employ others in the execution of them : the other would 35 
be degrading ; and by the other I mean the power actually 
to do menial duties, which vary much in character and are 
executed by various classes of slaves, such, for example, 
as handicraftsmen, who, as their name signifies, live by 
the labour of their hands : — Under these the mechanic is 1277 
included. Hence in ancient times, and among some 
nations, the working classes had no share in the govern- 
ment — a privilege which they only acquired under the ex- 
treme democracy. Certainly the good man and the 
statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the 
crafts of inferiors except for their own occasional use ; 3 5 
if they habitually practise them, there will cease to be a 
distinction between master and slave. 4 

This is not the rule of which we are speaking ; but 
there is a rule of another kind, which is exercised over 
freemen and equals by birth — a constitutional rule, which 
the ruler must learn by obeying, as he would learn 10 
the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the 
orders of a general of cavalry, or the duties of a general 
of infantry by being under the orders of a general of 
infantry, and by having had the command of a regiment 
and of a company. It has been well said that ' he who 
has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander '. 
The two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to 
be capable of both ; he should know how to govern like a 
freeman, and how to obey like a freeman— these are the 15 
virtues of a citizen. And, although the temperance and 

1 Reading u/i$w trepa for a/x0or«pa in 1. 30, with Bernays. 

2 Cp. i. 1255k 20-37. 3 Cp. viii. I337 b 15. 
* Reading tov fiiv . . . t6v &i in 11. 6, 7, with the MSS. 


justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the 
virtue of a good man will include both ; for the virtue of 
the good man who is free and also a subject, e.g. his 
justice, will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds, 
the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and dif- 

20 fering as the temperance and courage of men and women 
differ. 1 For a man would be thought a coward if he had 
no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman 
would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more 
restraint on her conversation than the good man ; and 
indeed their part in the management of the household 
is different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the 

35 other to preserve. Practical wisdom only is characteristic 
of the ruler : 2 it would seem that all other virtues must 
equally belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the 
subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion ; 
he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his 
master is like the flute-player or user of the flute. 3 

3° From these considerations may be gathered the answer 
to the question, whether the virtue of the good man is 
the same as that of the good citizen, or different, and 
how far the same, and how far different. 4 

There still remains one more question about the 5 

citizen : Is he only a true citizen who has a share of 

35 office, or is the mechanic to be included ? If they who 

hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen 

can have this virtue of ruling and obeying ; for this man 

is a citizen. And if none of the lower class are citizens, 

in which part of the state are they to be placed ? For 

they are not resident aliens, and they are not foreigners. 

1278 s May we not reply, that as far as this objection goes 

there is no more absurdity in excluding them than in 

excluding slaves and freedmen from any of the above- 

' mentioned classes ? It must be admitted that we cannot 

consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the 

existence of the state ; for example, children are not 

1 Cp. i. 1260*20. 2 Cp. Rep. iv. 428. ' Cp. Rep. x. 601 D, E. 
4 Cp. i278 a 4o, I288 a 39, iv. I293 b 5, vii. 1333* n. 

BOOK III. 5 1278 11 

citizens equally with grown-up men, who are citizens 
absolutely, but children, not being grown up, are only 5 
citizens on a certain assumption. 1 Nay, in ancient times, 
and among some nations, the artisan class were slaves or 
foreigners, and therefore the majority of them are so now 
The best form of state will not admit them to citizen- 
ship ; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the 
virtue of a citizen will not apply to every citizen, nor to 
every free man as such, but only to those who are freed 10 
from necessary services. The necessary people are either 
slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or 
mechanics and labourers who are the servants of the 
community. These reflections carried a little further 
will explain their position ; and indeed what has been said 
already 2 is of itself, when understood, explanation enough. 

Since there are many forms of government there must 15 
be many varieties of citizens, and especially of citizens 
who are subjects ; so that under some governments the 
mechanic and the labourer will be citizens, but not in 
others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-called 
government of the best (if there be such an one), in 
which honours are given according to virtue and merit ; 
for no man can practise virtue who is living the life of a 20 
mechanic or labourer. In oligarchies the qualification 
for office is high, and therefore no labourer can ever be 
a citizen ; but a mechanic may, for an actual majority of 
them are rich. At Thebes 3 there was a law that no man 25 
could hold office who had not retired from business for 
ten years. But in many states the law goes to the length 
of admitting aliens ; for in some democracies a man is 
a citizen though his mother only be a citizen ; and a 
similar principle is applied to illegitimate children ; the 
law is relaxed when there is a dearth of population. 30 
But when the number of citizens increases, first the 
children of a male or a female slave are excluded ; then 
those whose mothers only are citizens ; and at last the 

1 Sc. that they grow up to be men. 2 1275* 38 sqq. 

3 Cp. vi. 132^28. 


right of citizenship is confined to those whose fathers and 
mothers are both citizens. 

35 Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of 
citizens ; and he is a citizen in the highest sense who 
shares in the honours of the state. Compare Homer's 
words ' like some dishonoured stranger ' ; l he who is 
excluded from the honours of the state is no better than 
an alien. But when this exclusion is concealed, then the 
object is that the privileged class may deceive their 
fellow inhabitants. 

40 As to the question whether the virtue of the good man 
1278 15 is the same as that of the good citizen, the considerations 
already adduced prove that in some states the good man 
and the good citizen are the same, and in others 
different. When they are the same it is not every citizen 
who is a good man, but only the statesman and those 
who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with 
5 others, the conduct of public affairs. 

Having determined these questions, we have next to 6 
consider whether there is only one form of government 
or many, and if many, what they are, and how many, 
and what are the differences between them. 

A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a 

10 state 2 , especially of the highest of all. The government 
is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the constitution 
is in fact the government. For example, in democracies 
the people are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, 
therefore, we say that these two forms of government 
also are different : and so in other cases. 

*5 First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, 
and how many forms of government there are by which 
human society is regulated. We have already said, in 
the first part of this treatise, 3 when discussing house- 
hold management and the rule of a master, that man is 

20 by nature a political animal. And therefore, men, even 

1 Achilles complains of Agamemnon's so treating him, 77. ix. 
648, xvi. 59. 
'* Cp. I274 b 38, iv. 1289 11 15. 3 Cp. i. I253 a 2. 

BOOK III. 6 1278* 

when they do not require one another's help, desire to 
live together ; not but that they are also brought together 
by their common interests in proportion as they severally 
attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly 
the chief end, both of individuals and of states. And 
also for the sake of mere life (in which there is possibly 3 ? 
some noble element so long as the evils of existence do 
not greatly overbalance the good) mankind meet together 
and maintain the political community. And we all see 
that men cling to life even at the cost of enduring 
great misfortune, seeming to find in life a natural sweet- 
ness and happiness. 

There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various 30 
kinds of authority ; they have been often defined already 
in discussions outside the school. The rule of a master, 
although the slave by nature and the master by nature have 
in reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised 
primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but 35 
accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, 
the rule of the master perishes with him. On the other 
hand, the government of a wife and children and of a 
household, which we have called household management, 
is exercised in the first instance for the good of the 
governed or for the common good of both parties, but 
essentially for the good of the governed, as we see to 4° 
be the case in medicine, gymnastic, and the arts in 1279 s 
general which are only accidentally concerned with the 
good of the artists themselves. 1 For there is no reason 
why the trainer may not sometimes practise gym- 
nastics, and the helmsman is always one of the crew. The 
trainer or the helmsman considers the good of those com- 
mittee) to his care. But, when he is one of the persons 5 
taken care of, he accidentally participates in the ad- 
vantage, for the helmsman is also a sailor, and the trainer 
becomes one of those in training. And so in politics: 
when the state is framed upon the principle of equality 
and likeness, the citizens think that they ought to hold 10 
office by turns. Formerly, as is natural, every one would 
2 Cp. PI. Rep. i. 341 u. 


take his turn of service ; and then again, somebody else 
would look after his interest, just as he, while in office, 
had looked after theirs. 1 But nowadays, for the sake 
of the advantage which is to be gained from the public 
revenues and from office, men want to be always in office. 

15 One might imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were 
only kept in health while they continued in office ; in 
that case we may be sure that they would be hunting 
after places. The conclusion is evident : that govern- 
ments which have a regard to the common interest are 
constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice, 
and are therefore true forms ; but those which regard 

20 only the interest of the rulers are all defective and 
perverted forms, for they are despotic, whereas a state is 
a community of freemen. 

Having determined these points, we have next to con- 7 
sider how many forms of government there are, and 
what they are ; and in the first place what are the true 
forms, for when they are determined the perversions of 

2 5 them will at once be apparent. The words constitution 
and government have the same meaning, and the govern- 
ment, which is the supreme authority in states, must be 
in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many. The true 
forms of government, therefore, are those in which the 
one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the 

30 common interest ; but governments which rule with a 
view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the 
few, or of the many, are perversions. 2 For the members of 
a state, if they are truly citizens, ought to participate 
in its advantages. Of forms of government in which one 
rules, we call that which regards the common interests, 
kingship or royalty ; that in which more than one, but 

35 not many, rule, aristocracy ; and it is so called, either 
because the rulers are the best men, or because they 
have at heart the best interests of the state and of the 
citizens. But when the citizens at large administer the 

1 Cp. ii. I26l a 37- b 6. 2 Cp.N. Eth. viii. 10. 

BOOK III. 7 I279 a 

state for the common interest, the government is called by 
the generic name, — a constitution. And there is a reason 
for this use of language. One man or a few may excel 4 o 
in virtue ; but as the number increases it becomes more 
difficult for them to attain perfection in every kind of I27g b 
virtue, though they may in military virtue, for this 
is found in the masses. Hence in a constitutional 
government the fighting-men have the supreme power, 
and those who possess arms are the citizens. 

Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as 
follows : — of royalty, tyranny ; of aristocracy, oligarchy ; 5 
of constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny 
is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of 
the monarch only ; oligarchy has in view the interest of 
the wealthy ; democracy, of the needy : none of them the 
common good of all. 10 

8 But there are difficulties about these forms of govern- "^ 
ment, and it will therefore be necessary to state a little 
more at length the nature of each of them. For he 
who would make a philosophical study of the various 
sciences, and does not regard practice only, ought not to 
overlook or omit anything, but to set forth the truth in 15 
every particular. Tyranny, as I was saying, is monarchy 
exercising the rule of a master over the political society ; 
oligarchy is when men of property have the government 
in their hands ; democracy, the opposite, when the in- 
digent, and not the men of property, are the rulers. 
And here arises the first of our difficulties, and it relates 
to the distinction just drawn. For democracy is said to 20 
be the government of the many. But what if the many 
are men of property and have the power in their hands? 
In like manner oligarchy is said to be the government 
of the few ; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich, 
and have the power in their hands because they are 
stronger ? In these cases the distinction which we have 25 
drawn between these different forms of government 
would no longer hold good. 

Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few 


and poverty to the many, and name the governments 
accordingly — an oligarchy is said to be that in which 
the few and the wealthy, and a democracy that in which 

30 the many and the poor are the rulers — there will still be 
a difficulty. For, if the only forms of government are 
the ones already mentioned, how shall we describe those 
other governments also just mentioned by us, in which 
the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the 
fewer, and both govern in their respective states ? 

35 The argument seems to show that, whether in oli- 
garchies or in democracies, the number of the governing 
body, whether the greater number, as in a democracy, 
or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident 
due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and 
the poor numerous. But if so, there is a misapprehen- 
sion of the causes of the difference between them. For 

40 the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is 
I28o a poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of 
their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an 
oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy. 
But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many ; for 
few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, 
5 and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the 
oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim 
power in the state. 

Let us begin by considering the common definitions 9 
of oligarchy and democracy, and what is justice oli- 
garchical and democratical. For all men cling to justice 

10 of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect and 
they do not express the whole idea. For example, 
justice is thought by them to be, and is, equality, not, 
however, for all, but only for equals. And inequality is 
thought to be, and is, justice ; neither is this for all, but 
only for unequals. When the persons are omitted, then 
men judge erroneously. The reason is that they are 

15 passing judgement on themselves, and most people are 
bad judges in their own case. And whereas justice 
implies a relation to persons as well as to things, and 

BOOK III. 9 i28o a 

a just distribution, as I have already said in the Ethics} 
implies the same ratio between the persons and between 
the things, they agree about the equality of the things, 
but dispute about the equality of the persons, chiefly for 
the reason which I have just given, — because they are bad *o 
judges in their own affairs; and secondly, because both 
the parties to the argument are speaking of a limited and 
partial justice, but imagine themselves to be speaking of 
absolute justice. For the one party, if they are unequal 
in one respect, foi example wealth, consider themselves 
to be unequal in all ; and the other party, if they are 
equal in one respect, for example free birth, consider 
themselves to be equal in all. But they leave out the 25 
capital point. For if men met and associated out of 
regard to wealth only their share in the state would be 
proportioned to their property, and the oligarchical 
doctrine would then seem to carry the day. It would 
not be just that he who paid one mina should have the 
same share of a hundred minae, whether of the principal 30 
or of the profits, as he who paid the remaining ninety- 
nine. But 2 a state exists for the sake of a good life, and 
not for the sake of life only : if life only were the object, 
slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they 
cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life 
of free choice. Nor does a state exist for the sake of 
alliance and security from injustice, nor yet for the 35 
sake of exchange and mutual intercourse ; for then the 
Tyrrhenians and the Carthaginians, and all who have 
commercial treaties with one another, 1 ' would be the 
citizens of one state. True, they have agreements about 
imports, and engagements that they will do no wrong 
to one another, and written articles of alliance. But 40 
there are no magistracies common to the contracting i28o b 
parties who will enforce their engagements ; different 
states have each their own magistracies. Nor does one 

1 v. U3i a 15. 

8 The sentence in the original becomes involved in so many 
parentheses that there is no true apodosis to the protasis beginning 
in 1. 31. In sense the apodosis comes at 1281*4. 

3 Cp. I275 :l 10. 

845-17 G 

i28o b POLITICA 

state take care that the citizens of the other are such 
as they ought to be, nor see that those who come under 
the terms of the treaty do no wrong or wickedness at 
all, but only that they do no injustice to one another. 
5 Whereas, those who care for good government take into 
consideration virtue and vice in states. Whence it may 
be further inferred that virtue must be the care of a state 
which is truly so called, and not merely enjoys the name : 
for without this end the community becomes a mere 
alliance which differs only in place from alliances of which 
the members live apart ; and law is only a convention, 

io ■ a surety to one another of justice,' as the sophist 
Lycophron says, and has no real power to make the 
citizens good and just. 

This is obvious ; for suppose distinct places, such as 
Corinth and Megara, to be brought together so that their 
walls touched, still they would not be one city, not even 

15 if the citizens had the right to intermarry, which is one 
of the rights peculiarly characteristic of states. Again, 
if men dwelt at a distance from one another, but not so 
far off as to have no intercourse, and there were laws 
among them that they should not wrong each other in 

20 their exchanges, neither would this be a state. Let us 
suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a husband- 
man, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their 
number is ten thousand : nevertheless, if they have nothing 
in common but exchange, alliance, and the like, that 
would not constitute a state. Why is this ? Surely not 

25 because they are at a distance from one another : for even 
supposing that such a community were to meet in one 
place, but that each man had a house of his own, which 
was in a manner his state, and that they made alliance 
with one another, but only against evil-doers ; still an 
accurate thinker would not deem this to be a state, if their 
intercourse with one another was of the same character 

30 after as before their union. It is clear then that a state is not 
a mere society, having a common place, established for the 
prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. 1 

1 Cp. Pro tag. 322 B. 

BOOK III. 9 1280 1 

These are conditions without which a state cannot exist ; 
but all of them together do not constitute a state, which 
is a community of families and aggregations of families 
in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing 
life. Such a community can only be established among 35 
those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence 
arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, common 
sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But 
these are created by friendship, for the will to live together 
is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and 
these are the means towards it. And the state is the 4° 
union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing I28i a 
life, 1 by which we mean a happy and honourable life. 2 

Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists 
for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere com- 
panionship. Hence they who contribute most to such 
a society have a greater share in it than those who have 5 
the same or a greater freedom or nobility of birth but 
are inferior to them in political virtue ; or than those 
who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in 

From what has been said it will be clearly seen that 
all the partisans of different forms of government speak 
of a part of justice only. ro 

10 There is also a doubt as to what is to be the 
supreme power in the state : — Is it the multitude ? Or 
the wealthy ? Or the good ? Or the one best man ? 
Or a tyrant ? Any of these alternatives seems to involve 
disagreeable consequences. If the poor, for example, 
because they are more in number, divide among them- 
selves the property of the rich, — is not this unjust? No, 15 
by heaven (will be the reply), for the supreme authority 
justly willed it. But if this is not injustice, pray what 
is ? Again, when in the first division all has been taken, 
and the majority divide anew the property of the 
minority, is it not evident, if this goes on, that they will 
ruin the state ? Yet surely, virtue is not the ruin of those 
1 Omitting xupiv in 1. 1. " Cp. i. 1252'' 27; N. Elh.'x. I097 b 6. 

G 2 

ia8i a POLITICA 

who possess her, nor is justice destructive of a state ; 

20 and therefore this law of confiscation clearly cannot be 
just. If it were, all the acts of a tyrant must of neces- 
sity be just ; for he only coerces other men by superior 
power, just as the multitude coerce the rich. But is it 
just then that the few and the wealthy should be the 

25 rulers ? And what if they, in like manner, rob and 
plunder the people, — is this just ? If so, the other case 
will likewise be just. But there can be no doubt that all 
these things are wrong and unjust. 

Then ought the good to rule and have supreme 

30 power ? But in that case everybody else, being excluded 
from power, will be dishonoured. For the offices of a 
state are posts of honour ; and if one set of men always 
hold them, the rest must be deprived of them. Then 
will it be well that the one best man should rule ? Nay, 
that is still more oligarchical, for the number of those 
who are dishonoured is thereby increased. Some one 
may say that it is bad in any case for a man, subject as 

35 he is to all the accidents of human passion, to have the 
supreme power, rather than the law. But what if the law 
itself be democratical or oligarchical, how will that help 
us out of our difficulties P 1 Not at all ; the same conse- 
quences 2 will follow. 

Most of these questions may be reserved for another 11 
40 occasion. 3 The principle that the multitude ought to be 
supreme rather than the few best is one that is main- 
tained, and, though not free from difficulty, 4 yet seems 
to contain an element of truth. For the many, of 
I28i b whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when 
they meet together may very likely be better than the 
few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, 
just as a feast to which many contribute is better 
than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For 
each individual among the many has a share of virtue 

1 Cp. I282 b 6. 2 Cp. 11. 11-34. 3 cc. 12-17, iv., vi. 

4 Reading in 1. 41 Xeyeaffm, as suggested by Richards, and 
anopiav, with the MSS. 

BOOK III. ii 128^ 

and prudence, and when they meet together, they be- 5 
come in a manner one man, who has many feet, and 
hands, and senses ; that is a figure of their mind and 
disposition. Hence the many are better judges than a 
single man of music and poetry ; for some understand 
one part, and some another, and among them they un- 
derstand the whole. There is a similar combination of 10 
qualities in good men, who differ from any individual of 
the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from those 
who are not beautiful, and works of art from realities, 
because in them the scattered elements are combined, 
although, if taken separately, the eye of one person or 
some other feature in another person would be fairer 
than in the picture. Whether this principle can apply to 15 
every democracy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear. 
Or rather, by heaven, in some cases it is impossible of 
application ; for the argument would equally hold about 
brutes ; and wherein, it will be asked, do some men differ 
from brutes ? But there may be bodies of men about iQ 
whom our statement is nevertheless true. And if so, the 
difficulty which has been already raised, 1 and also another 
which is akin to it — viz. what power should be assigned 
to the mass of freemen and citizens, who are not rich and 
have no personal merit — are both solved. There is still 3 5 
a danger in allowing them to share the great offices 
of state, for their folly will lead them into error, and 
their dishonesty into crime. But there is a danger also 
in not letting them share, for a state in which many poor 
men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of 3° 
enemies. The only way of escape is to assign to them 
some deliberative and judicial functions. For this reason 
Solon ' l and certain other legislators give them the power 
of electing to offices, and of calling the magistrates to 
account, but they do not allow them to hold office 
singly. When they meet together their perceptions 
are quite good enough, and combined with the better 35 
class they are useful to the state (just as impure food 
when mixed with what is pure sometimes makes the 
1 c. 10. a Cp. ii. I274 a 15. 

ia8i b POLITICA 

entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of 
the pure would be), but each individual, left to himself, 
forms an imperfect judgement. On the other hand, the 
popular form of government involves certain difficulties. 
40 In the first place, it might be objected that he who can 
judge of the healing of a sick man would be one who 
could himself heal his disease, and make him whole — 
I282 a that is, in other words, the physician ; ana so in all pro- 
fessions and arts. As, then, the physician ought to be 
called to account by physicians, so ought men in general 
to be called to account by their peers. But physicians 
are of three kinds : — there is the ordinary practitioner, and 
there is the physician of the higher class, and thirdly the 
intelligent man who has studied the art : in all arts there 
5 is such a class; and we attribute the power of judging to 
them quite as much as to professors of the art. Secondly, 
does not the same principle apply to elections ? For 
a right election can only be made by those who have 
knowledge ; those who know geometry, for example, will 
choose a geometrician rightly, and those who know how 
10 to steer, a pilot ; and, even if there be some occupations 
and arts in which private persons share in the ability to 
choose, they certainly cannot choose better than those 
who know. So that, according to this argument, neither 
the election of magistrates, nor the calling of them to 
account, should be entrusted to the many. Yet possibly 
these objections are to a great extent met by our old 
15 answer, 1 that if the people are not utterly degraded, 
although individually they may be worse judges than 
those who have special knowledge — as a body they are 
as good or better. Moreover, there are some arts whose 
products are not judged of solely, or best, by the 
artists themselves, namely those arts whose products are 
recognized even by those who do not possess the art ; 
20 for example, the knowledge of the house is not limited 
to the builder only ; the user, or, in other words, the 
master, of the house will even be a better judge than the 

1 ia8i a 4o- b 2i. 

BOOK III. ii 1282 1 

builder, just as the pilot will judge better of a rudder 
than the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of 
a feast than the cook. 

This difficulty seems now to be sufficiently answered, 
but there is another akin to it. That inferior persons -5 
should have authority in greater matters than the good 
would appear to be a strange thing, yet the election and 
calling to account of the magistrates is the greatest of 
all. And these, as I was saying, 1 are functions which in 
some states are assigned to the people, for the assembly 
is supreme in all such matters. Yet persons of any age, 
and having but a small property qualification, sit in the 3° 
assembly and deliberate and judge, although for the 
great officers of state, such as treasurers and generals, 
a high qualification is required. This difficulty may be 
solved in the same manner as the preceding, and the 
present practice of democracies may be really defensible. 
For the power does not reside in the dicast, or senator, 
or ecclesiast, but in the court, and the senate, and the 35 
assembly, of which individual senators, or ecclesiasts, 
or dicasts, are only parts or members. And for this 
reason the many may claim to have a higher autho- 
rity than the few ; for the people, and the senate, and 
the courts consist of many persons, and their property 
collectively is greater than the property of one or of a few 4° 
individuals holding great offices. But enough of this. 

The discussion of the first question 2 shows nothing so I282 b 
clearly as that laws, when good, should be supreme ; and 
that the magistrate or magistrates should regulate those 
matters only on which the laws are unable to speak with 
precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle 5 
embracing all particulars. 3 But what are good laws has 
not yet been clearly explained ; the old difficulty re- 
mains. 4 The goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of 
laws varies of necessity with the constitutions of states. «° 
This, however, is clear, that the laws must be adapted to 
the constitutions. But if so, true forms of government 

1 I28l b 32. • c. 10. 

a Cp. N. Eth. v. H37 b 19. 4 Cp. 1281*36. 


will of necessity have just laws, and perverted forms of 
government will have unjust laws. 

>5 In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the 12 
greatest good and in the highest degree a good in the most 
authoritative of all ! — this is the political science of which 
the good is justice, in other words, the common interest. 
All men think justice to be a sort of equality ; and to a 
certain extent 2 they agree in the philosophical distinctions 

20 which have been laid down by us about Ethics. 3 For 
they admit that justice is a thing and has a relation to 
persons, and that equals ought to have equality. But 
there still remains a question : equality or inequality of 
what? here is a difficulty which calls for political 
speculation. For very likely some persons will say 
that offices of state ought to be unequally distributed 

25 according to superior excellence, in whatever respect, of 
the citizen, although there is no other difference between 
him and the rest of the community; for that those who 
differ in any one respect have different rights and claims. 
But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or height of 
a man, or any other advantage, will be a reason for his 

30 obtaining a greater share of political rights. The error 
here lies upon the surface, and may be illustrated from 
the other arts and sciences. When a number of flute- 
players are equal in their art, there is no reason why 
those of them who are better born should have better 
flutes given to them ; for they will not play any better 
on the flute, and the superior instrument should be re- 
served for him who is the superior artist. If what I am 
saying is still obscure, it will be made clearer as we 

35 proceed. For if there were a superior flute-player who 
was far inferior in birth and beauty, although either of 
these may be a greater good than the art of flute-playing, 

40 and may excel flute-playing in a greater ratio than he 

excels the others in his art, still he ought to have the 

1283 s1 k est A utes given to him, unless the advantages of wealth 

1 Cp. i. I252 a 2 ; N. Eth. i. 1094° 1. s Cp. 1280*9. 

3 Cp. N. Eth. v. 3. 

BOOK III. 12 1283 s 

and birth contribute to excellence in flute-playing, which 
they do not. Moreover, upon this principle any good 
may be compared with any other. For if a given height l 
may be measured against wealth and against freedom, 5 
height in general may be so measured. Thus if A 
excels in height more than B in virtue, even if virtue 
in general excels height still more, all goods will be 
commensurable ; for if a certain amount is better than 
some other, it is clear that some other will be equal. 
But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident 10 
that there is good reason why in politics men do not 
ground their claim to office on every sort of inequality 
any more than in the arts. For if some be slow, and 
others swift, that is no reason why the one should have 
little and the others much ; it is in gymnastic contests 
that such excellence is rewarded. Whereas the rival 
claims of candidates for office can only be based on the 15 
possession of elements which enter into the composition 
of a state. A nd therefore the noble, or free-born, or rich, 
may with good reason claim office • for holders of offices 
must be freemen and tax-payers : a state can be no more 
composed entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. But 
if wealth and freedom are necessary elements, justice 
and valour arc equally so ; 2 for without the former 
qualities a state cannot exist at all, without the latter 
not well. 2 ° 

13 If the existence of the state is alone to be considered, 
then it would seem that all, or some at least, of these 
claims are just; but, if we take into account a good 
life, then, as I have already said, 3 education and virtue 25 
have superior claims. As, however, those who are equal 
in one thing ought not to have an equal share in all, nor 
those who are unequal in one thing to have an unequal 
share in all, it is certain that all forms of government 
which rest on either of these principles are perversions. 
All men have a claim in a certain sense, as I have 

1 Omitting fiaXXnv in 1. 4 with Ridgeway. 

2 Cp. iv. i29i u ly-33. J Cp. i2i>l a 4. 


30 already admitted, 1 but all have not an absolute claim. 
The rich claim because they have a greater share in the 
land, and land is the common element of the state ; also 
they are generally more trustworthy in contracts. The 
free claim under the same title as the noble ; for they are 
nearly akin. For the noble are citizens in a truer sense 
than the ignoble, and good birth is always valued in a 

35 man's own home and country. 2 Another reason is, that 
those who are sprung from better ancestors are likely to 
be better men, for nobility is excellence of race. Virtue, 
too, may be truly said to have a claim, for justice has 
been acknowledged by us to be a social 3 virtue, and it 

4° implies all others. 4 Again, the many may urge their 
claim against the few ; for, when taken collectively, and 
compared with the few, they are stronger and richer and 
I283 b better. But, what if the good, the rich, the noble, 
and the other classes who make up a state, are all 
living together in the same city, will there, or will there 
not, be any doubt who shall rule? — No doubt at all 
in determining who ought to rule in each of the above- 
5 mentioned forms of government. For states are cha- 
racterized by differences in their governing bodies — one 
of them has a government of the rich, another of the 
virtuous, and so on. But a difficulty arises when all these 
elements coexist. How are we to decide ? Suppose the 

10 virtuous to be very few in number : may we consider 
their numbers in relation to their duties, and ask whether 
they are enough to administer the state, or so many 
as will make up a state? Objections may be urged 
against all the aspirants to political power. For those 

T5 who found, their claims on wealth or family might be 
thought to have no basis of justice ; on this principle, if 
any one person were richer than all the rest, it is clear 
that he ought to be ruler of them. In like manner he 
who is very distinguished by his birth ought to have the 
superiority over all those who claim on the ground that 

20 they are freeborn. In an aristocracy, or government of 

1 1280*9 sqq. 2 Cp. i. 1255*32. 3 Cp. i. 1253*37. 

* Cp. TV. Eth. v. H29 b 25. 

BOOK III. 13 i283 b 

the best, a like difficulty occurs about virtue ; for if one 
citizen be better than the other members of the govern- 
ment, however good they may be, he too, upon the same 
principle of justice, should rule over them. And if the 
people are to be supreme because they are stronger than 
the few, then if one man, or more than one, but not a 25 
majority, is stronger than the many, they ought to rule, 
and not the many. 

All these considerations appear to show that none of 
the principles on which men claim to rule and to hold all 
other men in subjection to them are strictly right. To 3° 
those who claim to be masters of the government on the 
ground of their virtue or their wealth, the many might 
fairly answer that they themselves are often better and 
richer than the few — I do not say individually, but 
collectively. And another ingenious objection which is 35 
sometimes put forward may be met in a similar manner. 
Some persons doubt whether the legislator who desires 
to make the justest laws ought to legislate with a view 
to the good of the higher classes or of the many, when 
the case which we have mentioned occurs. 1 Now what 40 
is just or right is to be interpreted in the sense of 'what 
is equal ' ; and that which is right in the sense of being 
equal is to be considered with reference to the advantage 
of the state, and the common good of the citizens. And 
a citizen is one who shares in governing and being- 
governed. He differs under different forms of govern- I284 a 
ment, but in the best state he is one who is able and 
willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the 
life of virtue. 

If, however, there be some one person, or more than 
one, although not enough to make up the full com- 
plement of a state, whose virtue is so pre-eminent 
that the virtues or the political capacity of all the rest 5 
admit of no comparison with his or theirs, he or they 
can be no longer regarded as part of a state; for justice 
will not be done to the superior, if he is reckoned only 

1 i.e. when the many collectively are better than the few. 
Cf. J. 33. The brackets in 11. 36, 39 should be removed. 


as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in 

10 virtue and in political capacity. Such an one may truly 
be deemed a God among men. Hence we see that 
legislation is necessarily concerned only with those who 
are equal in birth and in capacity ; and that for men 
of pre-eminent virtue there is no law — they are them- 
selves a law. Any one would be ridiculous who 

*5 attempted to make laws for them : they would prob- 
ably retort what, in the fable of Antisthenes, the lions 
said to the hares, 1 when in the council of the beasts the 
latter began haranguing and claiming equality for all. 
And for this reason democratic states have instituted 

20 ostracism ; equality is above all things their aim, ' and 
therefore they ostracized and banished from the city for 
a time those who seemed to predominate too much 
through their wealth, or the number of their friends, or 
through any other political influence. Mythology tells 
us that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a similar 

2 5 reason ; the ship Argo would not take him because she 
feared that he would have been too much for the rest of 
the crew. Wherefore those who denounce tyranny and 
blame the counsel which Periander gave to Thrasybulus 
cannot be held altogether just in their censure. The 
story is that Periander, when the herald was sent to ask 
counsel of him, said nothing, but only cut off the tallest 

3° ears of corn till he had brought the field to a level. The 
herald did not know the meaning of the action, but came 
and reported what he had seen to Thrasybulus, who 
understood that he was to cut off the principal men in 
the state;' 2 and this is a policy not only expedient for 
35 tyrants or in practice confined to them, but equally 
necessary in oligarchies and democracies. Ostracism 3 is 
a measure of the same kind, which acts by disabling and 
banishing the most prominent citizens. Great powers 
do the same to whole cities and nations, as the Athenians 
4° did to the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians ; no sooner had 
they obtained a firm grasp of the empire, than they 

' i. e. ' where are your claws and teeth ? ' 2 Cp. v. 1311° 20. 

3 Cp. v. I302 b i8. 

BOOK III. 13 I284 b 

humbled their allies contrary to treaty ; and the Persian I284 b 
king has repeatedly crushed the Medes, Babylonians, and 
other nations, when their spirit has been stirred by the 
recollection of their former greatness. 

The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns 
all forms of government, true as well as false ; for, 
although perverted forms with a view to their own 
interests may adopt this policy, those which seek the 5 
common interest do so likewise. The same thing may 
be observed in the arts and sciences ; x for the painter will 
not allow the figure to have a foot which, however beau- 
tiful, is not in proportion, nor will the ship-builder allow IO 
the stern or any other part of the vessel to be unduly 
large, any more than the chorus- master will allow any- 
one who sings louder or better than all the rest to sing 
in the choir. Monarchs, too, may practise compulsion 
and still live in harmony with their cities, if their own 
government is for the interest of the state. Hence where 15 
there is an acknowledged superiority the argument in 
favour of ostracism is based upon a kind of political 
justice. It would certainly be better that the legislator 
should from the first so order his state as to have no need 
of such a remedy. But if the need arises, the next best 
thing is that he should endeavour to correct the evil by 
this or some similar measure. The principle, however, 20 
has not been fairly applied in states ; for, instead of 
looking to the good of their own constitution, they have 
used ostracism for factious purposes. It is true that 
under perverted forms of government, and from their 
special point of view, such a measure is just and expedient, 
but it is also clear that it is not absolutely just. In the a 5 
perfect state there would be great doubts about the use 
of it, not when applied to excess in strength, wealth, 
popularity, or the like, but when used against some 
one who is pre-eminent in virtue, — what is to be done 
with him ? Mankind will not say that such an one is 
to be expelled and exiled ; on the other hand, he ought 30 
not to be a subject — that would be as if mankind should 
1 Cp. v. I302 b 34, I309 b 2i ; vii. 1326*35 ; Rep. iv. 420. 


claim to rule over Zeus, dividing his offices among them. 
The only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such 
a ruler, according to what seems to be the order of 
nature, and that men like him should be kings in their 
state for life. 

35 The preceding discussion, by a natural transition, leads 14 
to the consideration of royalty, which we admit to be 
one of the true forms of government. Let us see 
whether in order to be well governed a state or country 
should be under the rule of a king or under some other 
form of government ; and whether monarchy, although 
40 good for some, may not be bad for others. But first we 
must determine whether there is one species of royalty or 
1285 s1 many. It is easy to see that there are many, and that the 
manner of government is not the same in all of them. 

Of royalties according to law, (1) the Lacedaemonian is 
thought to answer best to the true pattern ; but there the 
5 royal power is not absolute, except when the kings go 
on an expedition, and then they take the command. 
Matters of religion are likewise committed to them. 
The kingly office is in truth a kind of generalship, irre- 
sponsible and perpetual. The king has not the power 
of life and death, except in a specified case, 1 as for 
instance, in- ancient times, he had it when upon a 
10 campaign, by right of force. This custom is described 
in Homer. For Agamemnon is patient when he is 
attacked in the assembly, but when the army goes out 
to battle he has .the power even of life and death. Does 
he not say ? — ' When I find a man skulking apart from 
the battle, nothing shall save him from the dogs and 
vultures, for in my hands is death.' 2 

This, then, is one form of royalty — a generalship 
15 for life: and of such royalties some are hereditary 
and others elective. 

(2) There is another sort of monarchy not uncommon 
among the barbarians, which nearly resembles tyranny. 

1 Reading tv ran. without any noun, as proposed by Bernays. 

2 //. ii. 391-393. The last clause is not found in our Homer. 

ROOK III. 14 1285" 

But this is both legal and hereditary. For barbarians, 
being more servile in character than Hellenes, and 20 
Asiatics than Europeans, do not rebel against a despotic 
government. Such royalties have the nature of tyran- 
nies because the people are by nature slaves ; a but there 
is no danger of their being overthrown, for they are here- 
ditary and legal. Wherefore also their guards are such 
as a king and not such as a tyrant would employ, that is 25 
to say, they are composed of citizens, whereas the guards 
of tyrants are mercenaries. 2 For kings rule according to 
law over voluntary subjects, but tyrants over involuntary ; 
and the one are guarded by their fellow-citizens, the 
others are guarded against them. 

These are two forms of monarchy, and there was a 30 
third (3) which existed in ancient Hellas, called an 
Aesymnetia or dictatorship. This may be defined 
generally as an elective tyranny, which, like the barbarian 
monarchy, is legal, but differs from it in not being here- 
ditary. Sometimes the office was held for life, sometimes 
for a term of years, or until certain duties had been per- 
formed. For example, the Mytilenaeans elected Pittacus 35 
leader against the exiles, who were headed by Antime- 
nides and Alcaeus the poet. And Alcaeus himself shows 
in one of his banquet odes 3 that they chose Pittacus 
tyrant, for he reproaches his fellow-citizens for ' having 
made the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless and 
ill-fated city, with one voice shouting his praises'. 1285* 

These forms of government have always had the 
character of tyrannies, because they possess despotic 
power ; but inasmuch as they are elective and acquiesced 
in by their subjects, they are kingly. 

(4) There is a fourth species of kingly rule — that of 
the heroic times — which was hereditary and legal, and 
was exercised over willing subjects. For the first chiefs 5 
were benefactors of the people 4 in arts or arms; they 
either gathered them into a community, or procured 
land for them ; and thus they became kings of voluntary 

1 Cp. i. I2$2 h 7. 2 Cp. v. 131 i a 7. 

s fr. 37 A, Hergk 4 . ' Cp. v. I3I0 1 ' 10. 


subjects, and their power was inherited by their descend- 
ants. They took the command in war and presided 

10 over the sacrifices, except those which required a priest. 
They also decided causes either with or without an 
oath ; and when they swore, the form of the oath was 
the stretching out of their sceptre. In ancient times 
their power extended continuouslytoallthingswhatsoever, 
in city and country, as well as in foreign parts ; but at a 

15 later date they relinquished several of these privileges, and 
others the people took from them, until in some states 
nothing was left to them but the sacrifices ; and where 
they retained more of the reality they had only the right 
of leadership in war beyond the border. 

20 These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. First the 
monarchy of the heroic ages ; this was exercised over 
voluntary subjects, but limited to certain functions ; the 
king was a general and a judge, and had the control of 
religion. The second is that of the barbarians, which is 
an hereditary despotic government in accordance with 

25 law. A third is the power of the so-called Aesymnete 
or Dictator ; this is an elective tyranny. The fourth 
is the Lacedaemonian, which is in fact a generalship, 
hereditary and perpetual. These four forms differ from 
one another in the manner which I have described. 

(5) There is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one 

30 has the disposal of all, just as each nation or each state 
has the disposal of public matters ; this form corresponds 
to the control of a household. For as household manage- 
ment is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule * is the 
household management of a city, or of a nation, or of 
many nations. 

Of these forms wc need only consider two, the Lace- 15 
35 daemonian and the absolute royalty ; for most of the 
others lie in a region between them, having less power 
than the last, and more than the first. Thus the in- 
quiry is reduced to two points : first, is it advantageous 
to the state that there should be a perpetual general, 
1 Reading j3«<nX«c'n in I. 32, with the MSS. 

BOOK III. 15 1285 13 

and if so, should the office be confined to one family, or 
open to the citizens in turn ? T Secondly, is it well that a 1286' 1 
single man should have the supreme power in all things? 
The first question falls under the head of laws ratherthan of 
constitutions; for perpetual generalship might equally exist 
under any form of government, so that this matter may be 
dismissed for the present. 2 The other kind of royalty 5 
is a sort of constitution ; this we have now to consider, and 
briefly to run over the difficulties involved in it. We 
will begin by inquiring whether it is more advantageous 
to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws. 3 

The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak 10 
only in general terms, and cannot provide for cir- 
cumstances ; and that for any science to abide by written 
rules is absurd. In Egypt 4 the physician is allowed to 
alter his treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner, he 
takes the risk. Hence it is clear that a government 15 
acting according to written laws is plainly not the best. 
Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the general 
principle which exists in law ; and that is a better ruler 
which is free from passion than that in which it is innate. 
Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway 
the heart of man. Yes, it may be replied, but then on the 20 
other hand an individual will be better able to deliberate 
in particular cases. 

The best man, then, must legislate, and laws must be 
passed, but these laws will have no authority when they 
miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining their 
authority. But when the law cannot determine a point at 25 
all, or not well, should the one best man or should all 
decide? According to our present practice assemblies 
meet, sit in judgement, deliberate, and decide, and their 
judgements all relate to individual cases. Now any 
member of the assembly, taken separately, is certainly 
inferior to the wise man. But the state is made up of 
many individuals. And as a feast to which all the guests 

1 Reading f) Kara fitpos in 1. 39, with the best MSS. 

2 It is not discussed later. 9 Cp. Plato, Polit. 294 A-295 c. 
4 Omitting n-cuj in 1. 12, with some MSS. 

6«-17 j I 


contribute is better than a banquet furnished by a single 

30 man, 1 so a multitude is a better judge of many things 
than any individual. 

Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; 
they are like the greater quantity of water which is less 
easily corrupted than a little. The individual is liable to 
be overcome by anger or by some other passion, and then 

35 his judgement is necessarily perverted ; but it is hardly 
to be supposed that a great number of persons would all 
get into a passion and go wrong at the same moment. 
Let us assume that they are the freemen, and that they 
never act in violation of the law, but fill up the gaps 
which the law is obliged to leav£. Or, if such virtue is 
scarcely attainable by the multitude, we need only 
suppose that the majority are good men and good 
citizens, and ask which will be the more incorruptible, 

40 the one good ruler, or the many who are all good ? 
I286 b Will not the many ? But, you will say, there may be 
parties among them, whereas the one man is not divided 
against himself. To which we may answer that their 
character is as good as his. If we call the rule of many 
5 men, who are all of them good, aristocracy, and the rule 
of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be better for 
states than royalty, whether the government is supported 
by force or not, 2 provided only that a number of men 
equal in virtue can be found. 

The first governments were kingships, probably for this 
reason, because of old, when cities were small, men of 

10 eminent virtue were few. Further, they were made kings 
because they were benefactors, 3 and benefits can only 
be bestowed by good men. But when many persons 
equal in merit arose, no longer enduring the pre-emi- 
nence of one, they desired to have a commonwealth, and 
set up a constitution. The ruling class soon deteriorated 
and enriched themselves out of the public treasury ; 

1 5 riches became the path to honour, and so oligarchies 
naturally grew up. These passed into tyrannies and 
tyrannies into democracies ; for love of gain in the ruling 

1 Cp. 1281*42. 2 Cp. 1. 27. 3 Cp. i285 b 6. 

BOOK III. 15 1286 1 

classes was always tending to diminish their number, and 
so to strengthen the masses, who in the end set upon 
their masters and established democracies. Since cities 20 
have increased in size, no other form of government 
appears to be any longer even easy to establish. 1 

Even .supposing the principle to be maintained that 
kingly power is the best thing for states, how about the 
family of the king? Are his children to succeed him? 
If they are no better than anybody else, that will be 
mischievous. But, says the lover of royalty, the king, 25 
though he might, will not hand on his power to his chil- 
dren. That, however, is hardly to be expected, and is 
too much to ask of human nature. There is also a diffi- 
culty about the force which he is to employ ; should a 
king have guards about him by whose aid he may be 
able to coerce the refractory ? if not, how will he 30 
administer his kingdom ? Even if he be the lawful 
sovereign who does nothing arbitrarily or contrary to 
law, still he must have some force wherewith to main- 
tain the law. In the case of a limited monarchy there 
is not much difficulty in answering this question; the 35 
king must have such force as will be more than a match 
for one or more individuals, but not so great as that of 
the people. The ancients observed this principle when 
they gave guards to any one whom they appointed 
dictator or tyrant. Thus, when Dionysius asked the 
Syracusans to allow him guards, somebody advised that 
they should give him only such a number. 40 

16 At this place in the. discussion there impends the 1287 s 
inquiry respecting the king who acts solely according to 
his own will ; he has now to be considered. The 
so-called limited monarchy, or kingship according to law, 
as I have already remarked, 2 is not a distinct form of 
government, for under all governments, as, for example, 5 
in a democracy or aristocracy, there may be a general 
holding office for life, and one person is often made 
supreme over the administration of a state. A magistracy 

1 Cp. iv. I293 a I, I297 b 22. - I286°2. 

II 2 

i287 a POLITICA 

of this kind exists at Epidamnus, 1 and also at Opus, but 

10 in the latter city has a more limited power. Now, 
absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign 
over all the citizens, in a city which consists of equals, is 
thought by some to be quite contrary to nature ; it is 
argued that those who are by nature equals must have 
the same natural right and worth, and that for unequals 
to have an equal share, or for equals to have an unequal 

15 share, in the offices of state, is as bad as for different 
bodily constitutions to have the same food and clothing. 
Wherefore it is thought to be just that among equals every 
one be ruled as well as rule, and therefore that all should 
have their turn. We thus arrive at law ; for an order of 
succession implies law. And the rule of the law, it is 

20 argued, is preferable to that of any individual. On the 
same principle, even if it be better for certain individuals 
to govern, they should be made only guardians and 
ministers of the law. For magistrates there must be, — 
this is admitted ; but then men say that to give authority 
to any one man when all are equal is unjust. Nay, there 
may indeed be cases which the law seems unable to 

25 determine, but in such cases can a man ? Nay, it will 
be replied, the law trains officers for this express purpose, 
and appoints them to determine matters which are left 
undecided by it, to the best of their judgement. Further, 
it permits them to make any amendment of the existing 
laws which experience suggests. Therefore he who bids 
the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason 
alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of 

30 the beast ; for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts 
the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. 
The law is reason unaffected by desire. We are told 2 that 
a patient should call in a physician ; he will not get 
better if he is doctored out of a book. But the parallel 

35 of the arts is clearly not in point ; for the physician does 

nothing contrary to rule from motives of friendship ; he 

only cures a patient and takes a fee ; whereas magistrates 

do many things from spite and partiality. And, indeed, 

1 Cp. v. i3oi b 2i. 2 Cp. 1286* 12-14, Polit. 296 b. 

BOOK III. 16 1287 s 

if a man suspected the physician of being in league with his 40 
enemies to destroy him for a bribe, he would rather have 
recourse to the book. But certainly physicians, when they 
are sick, call in other physicians, and training-masters, 1287'' 
when they are in training, other training-masters, as if 
they could not judge truly about their own case and 
might be influenced by their feelings. Hence it is 
evident that in seeking for justice men seek for the mean or 
neutral, 1 for the law is the mean. Again, customary laws 5 
have more weight, and relate to more important matters, 
than written laws, and a man may be a safer ruler than 
the written law, but not safer than the customary law. 

Again, it is by no means easy for one man to super- 
intend many things ; he will have to appoint a number 
of subordinates, and what difference does it make whether 10 
these subordinates always existed or were appointed by 
him because he needed them ? If, as I said before, 2 the 
good man has a right to rule because he is better, still 
two good men are better than one : this is the old 
saying — 

'two going together, 3 
and the prayer of Agamemnon, — 

' would that I had ten such counsellors ! ' 4 

And at this day there are magistrates, for example judges, 15 
who have authority to decide some matters which the 
law is unable to determine, since no one doubts that the 
law would command and decide in the best manner what- 
ever it could. But some things can, and other things 
cannot, be comprehended under the law, and this is the -jo 
origin of the vexed question whether the best law or the 
best man should rule. For matters of detail about which 
men deliberate cannot be included in legislation. Nor 
does any one deny that the decision of such matters must 
be left to man, but it is argued that there should be many 
judges, and not one only. For every ruler 6 who has been 25 
trained by the law judges well ; and it would surely seem 

1 Cp. A'. Eth. v. 1132*22. - I283 b 2i, i284 b 32. 

" //. x. 224. 4 //. ii. 372. 

5 Cp. for similar arguments I2t>6 il 28- b 7. 



strange that a person should see better with two eyes, or 
hear better with two ears, or act better with two han'ds 
or feet, than many with many ; indeed, it is already the 
practice of kings to make to themselves many eyes and 

3° ears and hands and feet. For they make colleagues of 
those who are the friends of themselves 1 and their govern- 
ments. They must be friends of the monarch and of his 
government ; if not his friends, they will not do what he 
wants ; but friendship implies likeness and equality ; and, 
therefore, if he thinks that his friends ought to rule, he 
must think that those who are equal to himself and like 

35 himself ought to rule equally with himself. These are 
the principal controversies relating to monarchy. 

But may not all this be true in some cases and not in 17 
others? for there is by nature both a justice and an 
advantage appropriate to the rule of a master, another to 
kingly rule,'- another to constitutional rule ; but there is 
none naturally appropriate to tyranny, or to any other 
perverted form of government ; for these come into being 
4° contrary to nature. Now, to judge at least from what 
has been said, it is manifest that, where men are alike 
I288 a and equal, it is neither expedient nor just that one man 
should be lord of all, whether there are laws, or whether 
there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law. 
Neither should a good man be lord over good men, nor 
a bad man over bad ; nor, even if he excels in virtue, 
should he have a right to rule, unless in a particular case, 
at which I have already hinted, and to which I will 
5 once more recur. 3 But first of all, I must determine 
what natures are suited for government by a king, and 
what for an aristocracy, and what for a constitutional 

A people who are by nature capable of producing a race 
superior in the virtue needed for political rule are fitted for 
kingly government ; and a people submitting to be ruled 

1 Reading al/Tols in 1. 31, with Schol. in Anstoph. Acharn. 92. 

2 Reading dfa-noTiKuv <a\ «XAo (iacriXtvTiKov in 1. 38. 
8 I284 a 3, and 1288*15. 

BOOK III. 17 w88 a 

as freemen by men whose virtue renders them capable 10 
of political command are adapted for an aristocracy : 
while the people who are suited for constitutional freedom 
are those among whom there naturally exists 1 a warlike 
multitude - able to rule and to obey in turn by a law 
which gives office to the well-to-do according to their 
desert. But when a whole family, or some individual, 15 
happens to be so pre-eminent in virtue as to surpass all 
others, then it is just that they should be the royal family 
and supreme over all, or that this one citizen should be 
king of the whole nation. For, as I said before, 3 to give 
them authority is not only agreeable to that ground of 20 
right which the founders of all states, whether aristo- 
cratical, or oligarchical, or again democratical, are ac- 
customed to put forward (for these all recognize the 
claim of excellence, although not the same excellence), 
but accords with the principle already laid down. 4 For 25 
surely it would not be right to kill, or ostracize, or exile 
such a person, or require that he should take his turn in 
being governed. The whole is naturally superior to the 
part, and he who has this pre-eminence is in the relation 
of a whole to a part. But if so, the only alternative is 
that he should have the supreme power, and that mankind 
should obey him, not in turn, but always. These are the 30 
conclusions at which we arrive respecting royalty and its 
various forms, and this is the answer to the question, 
whether it is or is not advantageous to states, and to 
which, and how. 

18 We maintain 5 that the true forms of government are 

three, and that the best must be that which is ad- 35 

ministered by the best, and in which there is one man, or 

a whole family, or many persons, excelling all the others 

together in virtue, and both rulers and subjects are fitted, 

the one to rule, the others to be ruled, in such a manner 

as to attain the most eligible life. We showed at the 

1 Retaining «Vw . . . n-X^or in 1. 12. 2 Cp. 1279'' 2. 

3 i283 b 2o, 1284 11 3-17, b 25. 

* Cp. 1284'' 28. iravrr) . . . rqv avrrjv in 1. 23 is parenthetical. 
6 Cp. I279 a 22- b 4. 


commencement of our inquiry 1 that the virtue of the good 
man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of 
the perfect state. Clearly then in the same manner, and by 
40 the same means through which a man becomes truly good, 
I288 b he will frame a state that is to be ruled by an aristocracy 
or by a king, and the same education and the same habits 
will be found to make a good man and a man fit to be a 
statesman or king. 

Having arrived at these conclusions, we must proceed 
5 to speak of the perfect state, and describe how it comes 
into being and is established. 

1 cc. 4, 5. 

I288 1 


I In all arts and sciences which embrace the whole of 10 
any subject, and do not come into being in a fragmentary- 
way, it is the province of a single art or science to con- 
sider all that appertains to a single subject. For example, 
the art of gymnastic considers not only the suitableness 
of different modes of training to different bodies (2), but 
what sort is absolutely the best (1); (for the absolutely 
best must suit that which is by nature best and best 
furnished with the means of life), and also what common 
form of training is adapted to the great majority of men 15 
(4) And if a man does not desire the best habit of body, 
or the greatest skill in gymnastics, which might be 
attained by him, still 1 the trainer or the teacher of 
gymnastic should be able to impart any lower degree of 
either (3). The same principle equally holds in medicine 
and ship-building, and the making of clothes, and in the 20 
arts generally. 2 

Hence it is obvious that government too is the subject 
of a single science, which has to consider what govern- 
ment is best and of what sort it must be, to be most in 
accordance with our aspirations, if there were no external 
impediment, and also what kind of government is adapted 
to particular states. For the best is often unattainable, 25 
and therefore the true legislator and statesman ought to 
be acquainted, not only with (1) that which is best in the 
abstract, but also with (2) that which is best relatively to 
circumstances. We should be able further to say how a 
state may be constituted under any given conditions (3) ; 
both how it is originally formed and, when formed, how it 
may be longest preserved ; the supposed state being so far 30 

1 Reading in 1. 18, with Bekker's 2nd edition, dywvlav, ov6(vt)ttov 
roii ncuboTptliov. 

J The numbers in this paragraph are made to correspond with 
the numbers in the next. 


from having the best constitution that it is unprovided 

even with the conditions necessary for the best ; neither is 

it the best under the circumstances, but of an inferior type. 

He ought, moreover, to know (4) the form of govern- 

35 ment which is best suited to states in general ; for 
political writers, although they have excellent ideas, are 
often unpractical. We should consider, not only what 
form of government is best, but also what is possible and 
what is easily attainable by all. There are some who 
would have none but the most perfect ; for this many 

40 natural advantages are required. Others, again, speak 
of a more attainable form, and, although they reject the 
constitution under which they are living, they extol 
some one in particular, for example the Lacedaemonian. 1 
1289 s Any change of government which has to be introduced 
should be one which men, starting from their existing 
constitutions, will be both willing and able to adopt, since 
there is quite as much trouble in the reformation of an 
old constitution as in the establishment of a new one, just 
5 as to unlearn is as hard as to learn. And therefore, in 
addition to the qualifications of the statesman already 
mentioned, he should be able to find remedies for the 
defects of existing constitutions, as has been said before. 2 
This he cannot do unless he knows how many forms of 
government there are. It is often supposed that there 
is only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy. 

10 But this is a mistake; and, in order to avoid such mis- 
takes, we must ascertain what differences there are in the 
constitutions of states, and in how many ways they are 
combined. The same political insight will enable a man 
to know which laws are the best, and which are suited 
to different constitutions : for the laws are, and ought to 
be, relative to the constitution, and not the constitution 

15 to the laws. A constitution is the organization of offices 
in a state, and determines what is to be the governing 
body, and what is the end of each community. But 
laws are not to be confounded with the principles of the 
constitution ; they are the rules according to which the 
1 Cp. ii. i265 b 35. 2 Cp- I288 b 29- 

BOOK IV. i 1289* 

magistrates should administer the state, and proceed, 
against offenders. So that we must know the varieties, 
and the number of varieties, of each form of government, if -° 
only with a view to making laws. For the same laws 
cannot be equally suited to all oligarchies or to all 
democracies, since there is certainly more than one form 
both of democracy and of oligarchy. 2 5 

2 In our original discussion : about governments we 
divided them into three true forms : kingly rule, aris- 
tocracy, and constitutional government, and three corre- 
sponding perversions — tyranny,oligarchy, and democracy. 
Of kingly rule and of aristocracy we have already spoken,'- 3° 
for the inquiry into the perfect state is the same thing 
with the discussion of the two forms thus named, since 
both imply a principle of virtue provided with external 
means. We have already determined in what aristocracy 
and kingly rule differ from one another, and when the 
latter should be established. 3 In what follows we have 3F 
to describe the so-called constitutional government, which 
bears the common name of all constitutions, and the 
other forms, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. 

It is obvious which of the three perversions is the 
worst, and which is the next in badness. That which is 
the perversion of the first and most divine is necessarily 4° 
the worst. And just as a royal rule, if not a mere name, I28g b 
must exist by virtue of some great personal superiority 
in the king/ so tyranny, which is the worst of govern- 
ments, is necessarily the farthest removed from a well- 
constituted form ; oligarchy is little better, for it is a long 
way from aristocracy, and democracy is the most toler- 
able of the three. 

A writer 5 who preceded me has already made these 5 
distinctions, but his point of view is not the same as 
mine. For he lays down the principle that when all the 
constitutions are good (the oligarchy and the rest being 

1 iii. 7; cp. N. Eth. viii. io. 2 iii. 14-18. 

3 iii. 1279" 32-37, i286 b 3-5, I284 a 3- b 34, ch. 17. 

4 Cp. iii. I284 a 3- b 34, chs. 17, 18, v. i3io b 10 sq., vii. . 

I325 b 10-12. 


Plato, Polit. 302 E, 303 A. 

i28g b POLITICA 

virtuous), democracy is the worst, but the best when all 
are bad. Whereas we maintain that they are in any 

10 case defective, and that 1 one oligarchy is not to be 
accounted better than another, but only less bad. 

Not to pursue this question further at present, let us 
begin by determining (i) - how many varieties of constitu- 
tion there are (since of democracy and oligarchy there are 

'5 several) ; (2) 3 what constitution is the most generally ac- 
ceptable, and what is eligible in the next degree after the 
perfect state ; and besides this what other there is which 
is aristocratical and well-constituted, and at the same 
time adapted to states in general ; (3) 4 of the other forms 
of government to whom each is suited. For democracy 
may meet the needs of some better than oligarchy, and 

■20 conversely. In the next place (4) "' we have to consider 
in what manner a man ought to proceed who desires to 
establish some one among these various forms, whether 
of democracy or of oligarchy ; and lastly, (5) ° having 
briefly discussed these subjects to the best of our power, 
we will endeavour to ascertain the modes of ruin and 
preservation both of constitutions generally and of each 

25 separately, and to what causes they are to be attributed. 

The reason why there are many forms of government 3 
is that every state contains many elements. In the first 
place we see that all states are made up of families, 

30 and in the multitude of citizens there must be some 
rich and some poor, and some in a middle condition ; 
the rich are heavy-armed, and the poor not. Of the 
common people, some are husbandmen, and some traders, 
and some artisans. There are also among the notables 
differences of wealth and property — for example, in the 

35 number of horses which they keep, for they cannot 
afford to keep them unless they are rich. And therefore 
in old times the cities whose strength lay in their cavalry 
were oligarchies, and they used cavalry in wars against 
their neighbours ; as was the practice of the Eretrians 

1 Reading tx flv m '• IO > with Richards. 8 C. 3-10. 

* C. II. * C. 12. 5 Book vi. 1-7. ° Book v. 

BOOK IV. 3 ia8g b 

and Chalcidians, and also of the Magnesians on the river 
Meander, and of other peoples in Asia. Besides dif- 40 
ferences of wealth there arc differences of rank and 
merit, and there are some other elements which were 1290*" 
mentioned by us when in treating of aristocracy we 
enumerated the essentials of a state. 1 Of these elements, 
sometimes all, sometimes the lesser and sometimes the 
greater number, have a share in the government. It is 5 
evident then that there must be many forms of govern- 
ment, differing in kind, since the parts of which they are 
composed differ from each other in kind. For a constitu- 
tion is an organization of offices, which all the citizens dis- 
tribute among themselves, according to the power which 
different classes possess, for example the rich or the 
poor, or according to some principle of equality which 10 
includes both. There must therefore be as many forms 
of government as there are modes of arranging the offices, 
according to the superiorities and the differences of the 
parts of the state. 

There are generally thought to be two principal forms : 
as men say of the winds that there are but two — north 
and south, and that the rest of them are only variations 
of these, so of governments there are said to be only two 15 
forms — democracy and oligarchy. For aristocracy is con- 
sidered to be a kind of oligarchy, as being the rule of 
a few, and the so-called constitutional government to be 
really a democracy, just as among the winds we make 
the west a variation of the north, and the east of the 
south wind. Similarly of musical modes there are said 20 
to be two kinds, the Dorian and the Phrygian ; the other 
arrangements of the scale are comprehended under one or 
other of these two. About forms of government this is 
a very favourite notion. But in cither case the better 
and more exact way is to distinguish, as I have done, 2 the 
one or two which are true forms, and to regard the others 25 
as perversions, whether of the most perfectly attempered 
mode or of the best form of government : we may 

1 iii. 1283* 14 sq., and cp. vii. 8, 9. 

2 1 289*31 -33, 40 sqq.,cp. viii. I340 a 4°- b 5, I342 a 28sqq., b 29 sqq. 

i2go a POL I TIC A 

compare the severer and more overpowering modes to 
the oligarchical forms, and the more relaxed and gentler 
ones to the democratic. 

30 It must not he assumed, as some are fond of saying, 4 
that democracy is simply that form of government in 
which the greater number are sovereign, 1 for in oligar- 
chies, and indeed in every government, the majority rules ; 
nor again is oligarchy that form of government in which 
a few are sovereign. Suppose the whole population of a 

35 city to be 1300, and that of these 1000 are rich, and do 
not allow the remaining 300 who are poor, but free, and 
in ail other respects their equals, a share of the govern- 
ment — no one will say that this is a democracy. In like 
manner, if the poor were few and the masters of the rich 
who outnumber them, no one would ever call such a 
government, in which the rich majority have no share of 

40 office, an oligarchy. Therefore we should rather say 
l2qo b that democracy is the form of government in which the 
free are rulers, and oligarchy in which the rich ; it is 
only an accident that the free are the many and the rich 
are the few. Otherwise a government in which the 
offices were given according to stature, as is said to be 
5 the case in Ethiopia, or according to beauty, would be 
an oligarchy ; for the number of tall or good-looking 
men is small. And yet oligarchy and democracy are 
not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two charac- 
teristics of wealth and freedom. Both of them contain 
many other elements, and therefore we must carry our 
analysis further, and say that the government is not 

10 a democracy 2 in which the freemen, being few in number, 
rule over the many who are not free, as at Apollonia, on 
the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera ; (for in each of these 
states the nobles, who were also the earliest settlers, 
were held in chief honour, although they were but a few 
out of many). Neither is it a democracy when the rich 
have the government because they exceed in number ; 

15 as was the case formerly at Colophon, where the bulk of 
1 Cp. iii. I279 b 2i. 2 Reading 8^0? in 1. 11, with the MSS. 

ROOK IV. 4 i290 b 

the inhabitants were possessed of large property before 
the Lydian War. But the form of government is a 
democracy when the free, who are also poor and the 
majority, govern, and an oligarchy when the rich and the 
noble govern, they being at the same time few in number. 20 

I have said that there are many forms of government, 
and have explained to what causes the variety is due. 
Why there are more than those already mentioned, 1 and 
what they are, and whence they arise, I will now pro- 
ceed to consider, starting from the principle already 
admitted, 2 which is that every state consists, not of one, 
but of many parts. If we were going to speak of the 25 
different species of animals, we should first of all de- 
termine the organs which are indispensable to every 
animal, as for example some organs of sense and the 
instruments of receiving and digesting food, such as the 
mouth and the stomach, besides organs of locomotion. 
Assuming now that there are only so many kinds of 
organs, but that there may be differences in them — I 3° 
mean different kinds of mouths, and stomachs, and per- 
ceptive and locomotive organs — the possible combinations 
of these differences will necessarily furnish many varieties 
of animals. (For animals cannot be the same which have 
different kinds of mouths or of ears.) And when all the 
combinations are exhausted, there will be as many sorts 35 
of animals as there are combinations of the necessary 
organs. The same, then, 3 is true of the forms of govern- 
ment which have been described ; states, as I have 
repeatedly said, 4 are composed, not of one, but of many 
elements. One element is the food-producing class, who 4° 
are called husbandmen ; a second, the class of mechanics I2gi a 
who practise the arts without which a city cannot exist ; 
— of these arts some are absolutely necessary, others con- 
tribute to luxury or to the grace of life. The third class 
is that of traders, and by traders I mean those who are 
engaged in buying and selling, whether in commerce or 5 

1 i. e. democracy and oligarchy, cp. 1290 11 13. 2 I289 b 27 sq. 

3 Reading tov alrbv bq rpnrrov in 1. 37, with Coraes. 
* ii. 1261*22 sqq., iii. 1283*14 sqq., iv. I289 b 27- 1290*5, 
I290 b 23 sq., cp. iii. 1277* 5 sqq. 


in retail trade. A fourth class is that of the serfs or 
labourers. The warriors make up the fifth class, and 
they are as necessary as any of the others, if the country 
is not to be the slave of every invader. For how can a 
state which has any title to the name be of a slavish 
nature ? The state is independent and self-sufficing, 

io but a slave is the reverse of independent. Hence we 
see that this .subject, though ingeniously, has not been 
satisfactorily treated in the Republic. 1 Socrates says 
that a state is made up of four sorts of people who are 
absolutely necessary ; these are a weaver, a husbandman, 
a shoemaker, and a builder ; afterwards, finding that 

rg they are not enough, he adds a smith, and again a 
herdsman, to look after the necessary animals ; then 
a merchant, and then a retail trader. All these together 
form the complement of the first state, as if a state were 
established merely to supply the necessaries of life, rather 
than for the sake of the good, or stood equally in need 
of shoemakers and of husbandmen. But he does not 

20 admit into the state a military class until the country 
has increased in size, and is beginning to encroach on its 
neighbour's land, whereupon they go to war. Yet even 
amongst his four original citizens, or whatever be the 
number of those whom he associates in the state, there 
must be some one who will dispense justice and de- 
termine what is just. And as the soul may be said to be 

3 g more truly part of an animal than the body, so the higher 
parts of states, that is to say, the warrior class, the class 
engaged in the administration of justice, and that engaged 
in deliberation, which is the special business of political 
common sense/ — these are more essential to the state than 
the parts which minister to the necessaries of life. Whether 
their several functions are the functions of different citi- 

30 zens, or of the same, — for it may often happen that the 
same persons are both warriors and husbandmen, — is im- 
material to the argument. The higher as well as the lower 
elements are to be equally considered parts of the state, 
and if so, the military 'element at any rate must be 

1 Ref>. ii. 369. 

ROOK IV. 4 i29i H 

included. There are also the wealthy who minister to 
the state with their property ; these form the seventh 
class. The eighth class is that of magistrates and of 
officers ; for the state cannot exist without rulers. And 35 
therefore some must be able to take office and to 
serve the state, either always or in turn. There only 
remains the class of those who deliberate and who judge 
between disputants ; we were just now distinguishing 
them. If presence of all these elements, and their fair 40 
and equitable organization, is necessary to states, then 
there must also be persons who have the ability ofi29i b 
statesmen. Different functions appear to be often com- 
bined in the same individual ; for example, the warrior 
may also be a husbandman, or an artisan ; or, again, 
the counsellor a judge. And all claim to possess 5 
political ability, and think that they are quite competent 
to fill most offices. Rut the same persons cannot be rich 
and poor at the same time. For this reason the rich and 
the poor are regarded in an especial sense as parts of 
a state. Again, because the rich are generally few in 
number, while the poor are many, they appear to be 10 
antagonistic, and as the one or the other prevails they 
form the government. Hence arises the common opinion 
that there are two kinds of government — democracy and 

I have already explained 1 that there are many forms 
of constitution, and to what causes the variety is due. 
Let me now show that there are different forms 15 
both of democracy and oligarchy, as will indeed be 
evident from what has preceded. For both in the com- 
mon people and in the notables various classes are 
included ; of the common people, one class are hus- 
bandmen, another artisans ; another traders, who are 
employed in buying and selling ; another are the sea- 20 
faring class, whether engaged in war or in trade, as 
ferrymen or as fishermen. (In many places any one of 
these classes forms quite a large population ; for example, 
fishermen at Tarentum and Byzantium, crews of triremes 

1 Cp. iii.c. 6. 

64517 t 


at Athens, merchant seamen at Aegina and Chios, 

25 ferrymen at Tenedos.) To the classes already men- 
tioned may be added day-labourers, and those who, 

- owing to their needy circumstances, have no leisure, or 
those who are not of free birth on both sides ; and there 
may be other classes as well. The notables again may 
be divided according to their wealth, birth, virtue, educa- 
tion, and similar differences. 

30 Of forms of democracy first comes that which is said 
to be based strictly on equality. In such a democracy 
the law says that it is just for the poor to have no more 
advantage than the rich ; 1 and that neither should be 
masters, but both equal. For if liberty and equality, as is 

35 thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, 
they will be best attained when all persons alike share in 
the government to the utmost. And since the people are 
the majority, and the opinion of the majority is decisive, 
such a government must necessarily be a democracy. 
Here then is one sort of democracy. There is another, 2 
in which the magistrates are elected according to a cer- 

40 tain property qualification, but a low one ; he who has 
the required amount of property has a share in the 
government, but he who loses his property loses his 
1292 s rights. Another kind is that in which all the citizens 
who are under no disqualification share in the govern- 
ment, but still the law is supreme. In another, everybody, 
if he be only a citizen, is admitted to the government, 
but the law is supreme as before. A fifth form of de- 

5 mocracy, in other respects the same, is that in which, not 
the law, but the multitude, have the supreme power, and 
supersede the law by their decrees. This is a state of 
affairs brought about by the demagogues. For in de- 
mocracies which are subject to the law the best citizens 

10 hold the first place, and there are no demagogues ; but 

1 Or, reading »p\(iv in 1. 32 with Vettori, 'that the poor should 
no more govern than the rich '. The emendation is not absolutely 
necessary, though supported by vi. 131s 11 6 lo-ov yap to pqdev pa\\oi> 
apxcip tovs cmopovs r) roiis cvTropavs, fiTjoi Kvpiovs fivai fwvovs uXXA TTtivrm 
( £ "crov kcit* upiBpov. 

2 Retaining «7XXo 8e in 1. 39. 

BOOK IV. 4 I292 a 

where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring 
up. For the people becomes a monarch, and is many in 
one ; and the many have the power in their hands, not 
as individuals, but collectively. Homer says that « it is 
not good to have a rule of many V but whether he means 
this corporate rule, or the rule of many individuals, is 
uncertain. At all events this sort of democracy, which 15 
is now a monarch, and no longer under the control of 
law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into 
a despot ; the flatterer is held in honour ; this sort of 
democracy being relatively to other democracies what 
tyranny is to other forms of monarchy. The spirit of 
both is the same, and they alike exercise a despotic rule 
over the better citizens. The decrees of the demos 
correspond to the edicts of the tyrant ; and the dema- 20 
gogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other. Both 
have great power ; — the flatterer with the tyrant, the 
demagogue with democracies of the kind which we are 
describing. The demagogues make the decrees of the 
people override the laws, by referring all things to the 
popular assembly. And therefore they grow great, 25 
because the people have all things in their hands, and 
they hold in their hands the votes of the people, who are 
too ready to listen to them. Further, those who have 
any complaint to bring against the magistrates say, ' let 
the people be judges'; the people are too happy to 
accept the invitation; and so the authority of every 
office is undermined. Such a democracy is fairly open 30 
to the objection that it is not a constitution at all ; for 
where the laws have no authority, there is no constitu- 
tion. The law ought to be supreme over all, and the 
magistracies should judge of particulars, and only this 
should be considered a constitution. So that if democracy 
be a real form of government, the sort of system in which 35 
all things are regulated by decrees is clearly not even 
a democracy in the true sense of the word, for decrees 
relate only to particulars. 2 

These then are the different kinds of democracy. 
1 11. ii. 204. 2 Cp. N. Eth. v. ii37 b *7 

I » 

i 2 g2 a POLITICA 

Of oligarchies, too, there are different kinds : — one 5 

40 where the property qualification for office is such that the 
poor, although they form the majority, have no share in 
the government, yet he who acquires a qualification may 
I2g2 b obtain a share. Another sort is when there is a qualifi- 
cation for office, but a high one, and the vacancies in 
the governing body are filled by co-optation. If the 
election is made out of all the qualified persons, a con- 
stitution of this kind inclines to an aristocracy, if out of 
a privileged class, to an oligarchy. Another sort of 

5 oligarchy is when the son succeeds the father. There 
is a fourth form, likewise hereditary, in which the magis- 
trates are supreme and not the law. Among oligarchies 
this is what tyranny is among monarchies, and the last- 
mentioned form of democracy among democracies ; and 

10 in fact this sort of oligarchy receives the name of a 
dynasty (or rule of powerful families). 

These are the different sorts of oligarchies and demo- 
cracies. It should however be remembered that in many 
states 1 the constitution which is established by law, 
although not democratic, owing to the education and 
habits of the people may be administered democrati- 

15 cally, and conversely in other states the established 
constitution may incline to democracy, but may be ad- 
ministered in an oligarchical spirit. This most often 
happens after a revolution : for governments do not 
change at once ; at first the dominant party are content 

20 with encroaching a little upon their opponents. The 
laws which existed previously cbntinue in force, but 
the authors of the revolution have the power in their 

From what has been already said we may safely infer 6 
that there are so many different kinds of democracies and 
of oligarchies. For it is evident that either all the classes 
whom we mentioned 2 must share in the government, or 
25 some only and not others. When the class of husband- 
men and of those who possess moderate fortunes have 
1 Cp. v. i3oi b io. 2 i29i b 17-30. 


BOOK IV. 6 1292 

the supreme power, the government is administered 
according to law. For the citizens being compelled to live 
by their labour have no leisure ; and so they set up. the 
authority of the law, and attend assemblies only when 
necessary. They all obtain a share in the government 
when they have acquired the qualification which is fixed 
by the law— the absolute exclusion of any class would be 30 
a step towards oligarchy ; hence all who have acquired 
the property qualification are admitted to a share in the 
constitution. But leisure cannot be provided for them l 
unless there are revenues to support them. This is one 
sort of democracy, and these are the causes which give 
birth to it. Another kind is based on the distinction 
which naturally comes next in order ; in this, every one 35 
to whose birth there is no objection is eligible, but actually 
shares in the government only if he can find leisure. Hence 
in such a democracy the supreme power is vested in the 
laws, because the state has no means of paying the 
citizens. A third kind is when all freemen have a right 
to share in the government, but do not actually share, 
for the reason which has been already given ; so that in 4 o 
this form again the law must rule. A fourth kind of 
democracy is that which comes latest in the history ofi293 u 
states. In our own day, when cities have far outgrown 
their original size, and their revenues have increased, all 
the citizens have a place in the government, through 
the great preponderance of the multitude ; and they 
all, including the poor who receive pay, and therefore 5 
have leisure to exercise their rights, share in the ad- 
ministration. Indeed, when they are paid, the common 
people have the most leisure, for they are not hindered 
by the care of their property, which often fetters the 
rich, who are thereby prevented from taking part in 
the assembly or in the courts, and so the state is 
governed by the poor, who are a majority, and not by 
the laws. So many kinds of democracies there are, and 10 
they grow out of these necessary causes. 

1 Placing &<J . . . pfTixdv after okiyup\iKav in 1. 32, and omitting 
the second tf-tivai in 1. 32 with Thurot. 

i293 a POLITICA 

Of oligarchies, one form is that in which the majority 
of the citizens have some property, but not very much ; 
and this is the first form, which allows to any one who 
obtains the required amount the right of sharing in 

15 the government. The sharers in the government being 
a numerous body, it follows that the law must govern, 
and not individuals. For in proportion as they are 
further removed from a monarchical form of government, 
and in respect of property have neither so much as to be 
able to live without attending to business, nor so little 

20 as to need state support, they must admit the rule of 
law and not claim to rule themselves. But if the men 
of property in the state are fewer than in the former 
case, and own more property, there arises a second form 
of oligarchy. For the stronger they are, the more power 
they claim, and having this object in view, they them- 
selves select those of the other classes who are to be ad- 

25 mitted to the government ; but, not being as yet strong 
enough to rule without the law, they make the law 
represent their wishes. 1 When this power is intensified 
by a further diminution of their numbers and increase of 
their property, there arises a third and further stage of 
oligarchy, in which the governing class keep the offices 
in their own hands, and the law ordains that the 

30 son shall succeed the father. When, again, the rulers 
have great wealth and numerous friends, this sort of 
family despotism approaches a monarchy ; individuals 
rule and not the law. This is the fourth sort of oli- 
garchy, and is analogous to the last sort of democracy. 

35 There are still two forms besides democracy and 7 
oligarchy ; one of them is universally recognized and 
included among the four principal forms of govern- 
ment, which are said to be (1) monarchy, (2) oligarchy, 
(3) democracy, and (4) the so-called aristocracy or 
government of the best. But there is also a fifth, which 
retains the generic name of polity or constitutional 

1 i. e. they make a law that the governing class shall have the 
power of co-optation from other classes. 

BOOK IV. 7 I293 a 

government ; this is not common, and therefore has not 40 
been noticed by writers who attempt to enumerate the 
different kinds of government ; like Plato, 1 in their books I293 b 
about the state, they recognize four only. The term 
1 aristocracy ' is rightly applied to the form of government 
which is described in the first part of our treatise ; - for 
that only can be rightly called aristocracy which is a 
government formed of the best men absolutely, and not 
merely of men. who are good when tried by any given 
standard. In the perfect state the good man is absolutely 5 
the same as the good citizen ; whereas in other states the 
good citizen is only good relatively to his own form of 
government. But there are some states differing from 
oligarchies and also differing from the so-called polity or 
constitutional government; these are termed aristocracies, 
and in them magistrates are certainly chosen, both 
according to their wealth and according to their merit. 10 
Such a form of government differs from each of the two 
just now mentioned, and is termed an aristocracy. For 
indeed in states which do not make virtue the aim of the 
community, men of merit and reputation for virtue may 
be found. And so where a government has regard to 
wealth, virtue, and numbers, as at Carthage, 3 that is 15 
aristocracy ; and also where it has regard only to two 
out of the three, as at Lacedaemon, to virtue and num- 
bers, and the two principles of democracy and virtue 
temper each other. There are these two forms of aris- 
tocracy in addition to the first and perfect state, and 
there is a third form. viz. the constitutions which incline 20 
more than the so-called polity towards oligarchy. 

8 I have yet to speak of the so-called polity and of 
tyranny. I put them in this order, not because a polity 
or constitutional government is to be regarded as a 
perversion any more than the above-mentioned aris- 
tocracies. The truth is, that they all fall short of the 25 
most perfect form of government, and so they are 
reckoned among perversions, and the really perverted 

1 Rep. viii, ix. 2 iii. 1279* 34, 1286 b 3, cp. vii. 1328'' 37. 

3 Cp. ii. 1273*21-30. 


forms are perversions of these, as I said in the original 
discussion. 1 Last of all I will speak of tyranny, which I 
place last in the series because I am inquiring into the 
constitutions of states, and this is the very reverse of a 

30 Having explained why I have adopted this order, 
1 will proceed to consider constitutional government ; of 
which the nature will be clearer now that oligarchy and 
democracy have been defined. For polity or constitu- 
tional government may be described generally as a 
fusion of oligarchy and democracy; but the term is 

35 usually applied to those forms of government which 
incline towards democracy, and the term aristocracy to 
those which incline' towards oligarchy, because birth and 
education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth. 
Moreover, the rich already possess the external ad- 
vantages the want of which is a temptation to crime, 
and hence they are called noblemen and gentlemen. 

40 And inasmuch as aristocracy seeks to give predominance 
to the best of the citizens, people say also of oligarchies 
that they are composed of noblemen and gentlemen. 
I294 a Now it appears to be an impossible thing that the state 
which is governed not by the best citizens but by the 
worst should be well-governed, and equally impossible 
that the state which is ill-governed should be governed 
by the best. But we must remember that good laws, if 
they are not obeyed, do not constitute good government. 
Hence there are two parts of good government ; one is 

5 the actual obedience of citizens to the laws, the other 
part is the goodness of the laws which they obey ; they 
may obey bad laws as well as good. And there may be 
a further subdivision ; they may obey either the best 
laws which are attainable to them, or the best absolutely. 
The distribution of offices according to merit is a 

10 special characteristic of aristocracy, for the principle of 
an aristocracy is virtue, as wealth is of an oligarchy, and 
freedom of a democracy. In all of them there of course 
exists the right of the majority, and whatever seems 

1 iii. 7. 

BOOK IV. 8 1294- 

good to the majority of those who share in the govern- 
ment has authority. Now in most states the form called 15 
polity exists, 1 for the fusion goes no further than the 
attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth 
of the rich, who commonly take the place of the noble. 
Rut as there are three grounds on which men claim an 
equal share in the government, freedom, wealth, and virtue 
(for the fourth or good birth is the result of the two last, 20 
being only ancient wealth and virtue), it is clear that 
the admixture of the two elements, that is to say, of the 
rich and poor, is to be called a polity or constitutional 
government ; and the union of the three is to be called 
aristocracy or the government of the best, and more 
than any other form of government, except the true and 
ideal, has a right to this name. 

Thus far I have shown the existence of forms of states 25 
other than monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, and 
what they are, and in what aristocracies differ from one 
another, and polities from aristocracies— that the two 
latter are not very unlike is obvious. 

9 Next we have to consider how by the side of oligarchy 3° 
and democracy the so-called polity or constitutional 
government springs up, and how it should be organized. 
The nature of it will be at once understood from a com- 
parison of oligarchy and democracy ; we must ascertain 
their different characteristics, and taking a portion from 
each, put the two together, like the parts of an indenture. 
Now there are three modes in which fusions of govern- 35 
ment may be effected. In the first mode we must 
combine the laws 2 made by both governments, say 
concerning the administration of justice. In oligarchies 
they impose a fine on the rich if they do not serve as 
judges, and to the poor they give no pay , but in 
democracies they give pay to the poor and do not fine 4° 
the rich. Now (1) the union of these two modes' 1 is 
a common or middle term between them, and is 

1 Retaining xaXtiTm in 1. 15. 

- Reading a in 1. 36 with some good MSS. 3 Cp. I2y7 a 38. 



I294 b therefore characteristic of a constitutional government, 
for it is a combination of both. This is one mode 
of uniting the two elements. Or (2) a mean may be 
taken between the enactments of the two: thus demo- 
cracies require no property qualification, or only a small 
one, from members of the assembly, oligarchies a high 
5 one ; here neither of these is the common term, but 
a mean between them. (3) There is a third mode, in 
which something is borrowed from the oligarchical and 
something from the democratical principle. For example, 
the appointment of magistrates by lot is thought to be 
democratical, and the election of them oligarchical ; 
democratical again when there is no property qualification, 

io oligarchical when there is. In the aristocratical or 
constitutional state, one element will be taken from 
each — from oligarchy the principle of electing to offices, 
from democracy the disregard of qualification. Such 
are the various modes of combination. 

There is a true union of oligarchy and democracy 

15 when the same state may be termed either a democracy 
or an oligarchy ; those who use both names evidently 
feel that the fusion is complete. Such a fusion there is 
also in the mean ; for both extremes appear in it. The 
Lacedaemonian constitution, for example, is often de- 

20 scribed as a democracy, because it has many democratical 
features. In the first place the youth receive a demo- 
cratical education. For the sons of the poor are brought 
up with the sons of the rich, who are educated in such a 
manner as to make it possible for the sons of the poor to 
be educated like them. A similar equality prevails in 

35 the following period of life, and when the citizens are 
grown up to manhood the same rule is observed ; there 
is no distinction between the rich and poor. In like 
manner they all have the same food at their public 
tables, and the rich wear only such clothing as any poor 
man can afford. Again, the people elect to one of the 
two greatest offices of state, and in the other they share ; 1 

30 for they elect the Senators and share in the Ephoralty. 

1 Cp. ii. i27o b 17. 

BOOK IV. 9 1294" 

By others the Spartan constitution is said to be an 
oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical elements. 
That all offices are filled by election and none by lot, is 
one of these oligarchical characteristics ; that the power 
of inflicting death or banishment rests with a few persons 
is another ; and there are others. In a well attempered 
polity there should appear to be both elements and 35 
yet neither ; also the government should rely on itself, 
and not on foreign aid, and on itself not through the 
good will of a majority ! — they might be equally well- 
disposed when there is a vicious form of government — 
but through the general willingness of all classes in the 
state to maintain the constitution. 

Enough of the manner in which a constitutional 4° 
government, and in which the so-called aristocracies 
ought to be framed. 

10 Of the nature of tyranny I have still to speak, in order 1295* 
that it may have its place in our inquiry (since even 
tyranny is reckoned by us to be a form of government), 
although there is not much to be said about it. I have 
already in the former part of this treatise 2 discussed 
royalty or kingship according to the most usual meaning 5 
of the term, and considered whether it is or is not ad- 
vantageous to states, and what kind of royalty should be 
established, and from what source, and how. 

When speaking of royalty we also spoke 3 of two forms 
of tyranny, which are both according to law, and there- 10 
fore easily pass into royalty. Among Barbarians there 
are elected monarchs who exercise a despotic power ; 
despotic rulers were also elected in ancient Hellas, called 
Aesymnetes or dictators. These monarchies, when com- 
pared with one another, exhibit certain differences. And 15 
they are, as I said before, 4 royal, in so far as the monarch 
rules according to law over willing subjects ; but they 
are tyrannical in so far as he is despotic and rules accord- 
ing to his own fancy. There is also a third kind of tyranny, 

1 Omitting (£a>0a> in I. 37, with Thurot. 

- iii. 14-17. 3 iii. 1285* i6- b 3. iii. 1285'' 2. 


which is the most typical form, and is the counterpart of 
the perfect monarchy. This tyranny is just that arbitrary 
30 power of an individual which is responsible to no one, 
and governs all alike, whether equals or betters, with a 
view to its own advantage, not to that of its subjects, 
and therefore against their will. No freeman, if he can 
escape from it, will endure such a government. 

The kinds of tyranny are such and so many, and for 
the reasons which I have given. 

05 We have now to inquire what is the best constitution 11 
for most states, and the best life for most men, neither 
assuming a standard of virtue which is above ordinary 
persons, nor an education which is exceptionally favoured 
by nature and circumstances, nor yet an ideal state 
which is an aspiration only, but having regard to the life 

3 o in which the majority are able to share, and to the form 
of government which states in general can attain. As to 
those aristocracies, as they are called, of which we were 
just now speaking, 1 they either lie beyond the possibilities 
of the greater number of states, or they approximate to 
the so-called constitutional government, and therefore 
need no separate discussion. And in fact the con- 
clusion at which we arrive respecting all these forms 

33 rests upon the same grounds. For if what was said 
in the Ethics a is true, that the happy life is the life 
according to virtue lived without impediment, and that 
virtue is a mean, then the life which is in a mean, and in 
a mean attainable by every one, must be the best. And 
• the same principles of virtue and vice are characteristic 

40 of cities and of constitutions ; for the constitution is in 

i2Q5 b a fig ure tne 'tf e °f tne Clt y- 

Now in all states there are three elements : one class is 

very rich, another very poor, and a third in a mean. It 

is admitted that moderation and the mean are best, and 

therefore it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of 

5 fortune in moderation ; for in that condition of life men 

1 I293 1 '7-2i, cp. I293 b 36-i294 :l 25. 

2 N. Eth. i. 1098" 16. vii. 1153'' to, x. 1177*12. 

BOOK IV. ii I295 b 

are most ready to follow rational principle. But he who 
greatly excels in beauty, strength, birth, or wealth, or on 
the other hand who is very poor, or very weak, or very 
much disgraced, finds it difficult to follow rational 
principle. 1 Of these two the one sort grow into violent 
and great criminals, the others into rogues and petty 10 
rascals. And two sorts of offences correspond to them, 
the one committed from violence, the other from roguery. 
Again, the middle class is least likely to shrink from rule, or 
to be over-ambitious for it ; both of which are injuries to 
the state. Again, those who have too much of the goods of 
fortune, strength, wealth, friends, and the like, are neither 15 
willing nor able to submit to authority. The evil begins at 
home ; for when they are boys, by reason of the luxury in 
which they are brought up,' 2 they never learn, even at 
school, the habit of obedience. On the other hand, the very 
poor, who are in the opposite extreme, are too degraded. 
So that the one class cannot obey, and can only rule 
despotically ; the other knows not how to command and 20 
must be ruled like slaves. Thus arises a city, not of 
freemen, but of masters and slaves, the one despising, 
the other envying ; and nothing can be more fatal to 
friendship and good fellowship in states than this : for 
good fellowship springs from friendship ; when men are at 
enmity with one another, they would rather not even share 
the same path. But a city ought to be composed, as far 25 
as possible, of equals and similars ; and these are generally 
the middle classes. Wherefore the city which is com- 
posed of middle-class citizens is necessarily best consti- 
tuted in respect of the elements of which we say the fabric 
of the state naturally consists. 3 And this is the class of 
citizens which is most secure in a state, for they do not, 30 
like the poor, covet their neighbours' goods ; nor do others 
covet theirs, as the poor covet the goods of the rich ; and 
as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves 
plotted against, they pass through life safely. Wisely 
then did Phocylides pray, 4 — ' Many things are best in 

1 Cp. PI. Rep. iv. 421 d ff. "- Cp. v. 1 310" 22. 

3 Cp. 11. 1-3. ' Fr. 12, Bergk*. 


the mean ; I desire to be of a middle condition in my 

35 Thus it is manifest that the best political community 
is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those 
states are likely to be well-administered, in which the 
middle class is large, and stronger if possible than both the 
other classes, or at any rate than either singly ; for the 
addition of the middle class turns the scale, and prevents 
either of the extremes from being dominant. Great then 

40 is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have 
1296 s a moderate and sufficient property ; for where some 
possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an 
extreme democracy, or' a pure oligarchy ; or a tyranny 
may grow out of either extreme, — either out of the most 
rampant democracy, or out of an oligarchy ; but it is not 
so likely to arise out of the middle constitutions and those 
5 akin to them. I will explain the reason of this hereafter, 
when I speak of the revolutions of states. 1 The mean con- 
dition of states is clearly best, for no other is free from 
faction ; and where the middle class is large, there are 
least likely to be factions and dissensions. For a similar 
reason large states are less liable to faction than small 

10 ones, because in them the middle class is large; whereas 
in small states it is easy to divide all the citizens into two 
classes who are either rich or poor, and to leave nothing 
in the middle. And democracies are safer 2 and more 
permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle 

15 class which is more numerous and has a greater share in 
the government ; for when there is no middle class, and 
the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the 
state soon comes to an end. A proof of the superi- 
ority of the middle class is that the best legislators 
have been of a middle condition ; for example, Solon, as 

20 his own verses testify ; and Lycurgus, for he was not a 
king ; and Charondas, and almost all legislators. 

These considerations will help us to understand why 
most governments are either democratical or oligarchical. 
The reason is that the middle class is seldom numerous in 
1 v. 1308*18-24. a Cp. v. 1302*8, 1307*16. 

BOOK IV. ii 1296" 

them, and whichever party, whether the rich or the com- 25 
mon people, transgresses the mean and predominates, 
draws the constitution its own way, and thus arises either 
oligarchy or democracy. There is another reason — the 
poor and the rich quarrel with one another, and which- 
ever side gets the better, instead of establishing a just 
or popular government, regards political supremacy as 30 
the prize of victory, and the one party sets up a 
democracy and the other an oligarchy. Further, both the 
parties which had the supremacy in Hellas looked only 
to the interest of their own form of government, and 
established in states, the one, democracies, and the other, 
oligarchies ; they thought of their own advantage, of the 35 
public not at all. For these reasons the middle form of 
government has rarely, if ever, existed, and among a very 
few only. One man alone of all who ever ruled in Hellas ! 
was induced to give this middle constitution to states. 
But it has now become a habit among the citizens of 40 
states, not even to care about equality ; all men are I296 b 
seeking for dominion, or, if conquered, are willing to 

What then is the best form of government, and what 
makes it the best, is evident ; and of other constitutions, 
since we say 2 that there are many kinds of democracy and 
many of oligarchy, it is not difficult to see which has the 5 
first and which the second or any other place in the order 
of excellence, now that we have determined which is the 
best. For that which is nearest :! to the best must of 
necessity be better, and that which is furthest from it 
worse, if we are judging absolutely and not relatively to 
given conditions: I say ' relatively to given conditions', 10 
since a particular government may be preferable, but 
another form may be better for some people. 

12 We have now to consider what and what kind of 

government is suitable to what and what kind of men. 

1 Retaining t<f) rj-ytfiovia ytvantvwv in 1. 39. The reference is 
probably to Theramenes. 

' l 1289*8, b I3, I20,I b I5-I292 b IO, I20,2 b 22-I293 a IO. 

3 Reading (yyvram in 1. 8 with most MSS. 


I may begin by assuming, as a general principle common 

15 to all governments, that the portion of the state which 
desires the permanence of the constitution ought to be 
stronger than that which desires the reverse. Now every 
city is composed of quality and quantity. By quality 
I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and by 

20 quantity, superiority of numbers. Quality may exist in 
one of the classes which make up the state, and quantity 
in the other. For example, the meanly-born may be 
more in number than the well-born, or the poor than the 
rich, yet they may not so much exceed in quantity as 
they fall short in quality ; and therefore there must be 

25 a comparison of quantity and quality. Where the 
number of the poor is more than proportioned to the 
wealth of the rich, there will naturally be a democracy, 
varying in form with the sort of people who compose it 
in each case. If, for example, the husbandmen exceed in 
number, the first form of democracy will then arise ; if 

30 the artisans and labouring class, the last ; and so with 
the intermediate forms. But where the rich and the 
notables exceed in quality more than they fall short in 
quantity, there oligarchyarises, similarly assuming various 
forms according to the kind of superiority possessed by 
the oligarchs. 

35 The legislator should always include the middle class 
in his government ; if he makes his laws oligarchical, to 
the middle class let him look ; if he makes them demo- 
cratical, he should equally by his laws try to attach this 
class to the state. There only can the government ever 
be stable where the middle class exceeds one or both of 

40 the others, and in that case there will be no fear that 
1297* the rich will unite with the poor against the rulers. For 
neither of them will ever be willing to serve the other, 
and if they look for some form of government more 
suitable to both, they will find none better than this, for 
the rich and the poor will never consent to rule in turn, 
5 because they mistrust one another. The arbiter is always 
the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an 
arbiter. The more perfect the admixture of the political 

BOOK IV. 12 1297" 

elements, the more lasting will be the constitution. Many 
even of those who desire to form aristocratical govern- 
ments make a mistake, not only in giving too much power 
to the rich, but in attempting to overreach the people. 
There comes a time when out of a false good there 10 
arises a true evil, since the encroachments of the rich 
are more destructive to the constitution than those of the 

13 The devices by which oligarchies deceive the people 
are five in number; they relate to (1) the assembly; 15 
(2) the magistracies ; (3) the courts of law ; (4) the use 
of arms ; (5) gymnastic exercises. (1) The assemblies 
are thrown open to all, but either the rich only are fined 
for non-attendance, or a much larger fine is inflicted 
upon them. (2) As to the magistracies, those who are 
qualified by property cannot decline office upon oath, 
but the poor may. (3) In the law-courts the rich, and 20 
the rich only, are fined if they do not serve, the poor are 
let off with impunity, or, as in the laws of Charondas, a 
larger fine is inflicted on the rich, and a smaller one on 
the poor. In some states all citizens who have registered 
themselves are allowed to attend the assembly and to 
try causes ; but if after registration they do not attend 25 
either in the assembly or at the courts, heavy fines are 
imposed upon them. The intention is that through fear 
of the fines they may avoid registering themselves, and 
then they cannot sit in the law-courts or in the assembly. 
Concerning (4) the possession of arms, and (5) gymnastic 
exercises, they legislate in a similar spirit. For the poor 30 
are not obliged to have arms, but the rich are fined for 
not having them; and in like manner no penalty is in- 
flicted on the poor for non-attendance at the gymnasium, 
and consequently, having nothing to fear, they do not 
attend, whereas the. rich are liable to a fine, and there- 
fore they take care to attend. 

These are the devices of oligarchical legislators, and in 35 
democracies they have counter devices. They pay the 
poor for attending the assemblies and the law-courts, 

C4617 K 


and they inflict no penalty on the rich for non-atten- 
dance. It is obvious that he who would duly mix the 
two principles should combine the practice of both, and 
provide that the poor should be paid to attend, and the 

4° rich fined if they do not attend, for then all will take 
part ; if there is no such combination, power will be in 
I297 b the hands of one party only. The government should 
be confined to those who carry arms. As to the property 
qualification, no absolute rule can be laid down, but we 
must see what is the highest qualification sufficiently 
5 comprehensive to secure that the number of those who 
have the rights of citizens exceeds the number of those 
excluded. Even if they have no share in office, the 
poor, provided only that they are not outraged or de- 
prived of their property, will be quiet enough. 

But to secure gentle treatment for the poor is not an 
easy thing, since a ruling class is not always humane. 

10 And in time of war the poor are apt to hesitate unless 
they are fed ; when fed, they are willing enough to 
fight. In some states the government is vested, not only 
in those who are actually serving, but also in those 
who have served ; among the Malians, for example, the 

15 governing body consisted of the latter, while the magis- 
trates were chosen from those actually on service. And 
the earliest government which existed among the Hel- 
lenes, after the overthrow of the kingly power, grew up 
out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the 
knights (for strength and superiority in war at that time 
depended on cavalry ; l indeed, without discipline, in- 

20 fantry are useless, and in ancient times there was no 
military knowledge or tactics, and therefore the strength 
of armies lay in their cavalry). But when cities increased 
and the heavy-armed grew in strength, more had a 
share in the government ; and this is the reason why 
the states which we call constitutional governments 

35 have been hitherto called democracies. Ancient con- 
stitutions, as might be expected, were oligarchical and 
royal ; their population being small they had no con- 
1 Cp. 128^36, vi. 1321*8. 

BOOK IV. 13 I297 b 

siderablc middle class ; the people were weak in numbers 
and organization, and were therefore more contented 
to be governed. 

I have explained why there are various forms of 
government, and why there are more than is generally 
supposed ; for democracy, as well as other constitutions, 30 
has more than one form : also what their differences 
are, and whence they arise, and what is the best form of 
government, speaking generally, and to whom the various 
forms of government are best suited ; all this has now 
been explained. 

14 Having thus gained an appropriate basis of discussion 35 
we will proceed to speak of the points which follow next 
in order. We will consider the subject not only in 
general but with reference to particular constitutions. 
All constitutions have three elements, concerning which 
the good lawgiver has to regard what is expedient for 
each constitution. When they are well-ordered, the con- 
stitution is well-ordered, and as they differ from one 
another, constitutions differ. There is (1) one element 40 
which deliberates about public affairs ; secondly (2) that 1298 
concerned with the magistracies — the questions being, 
what they should be, over what they should exercise 
authority, and what should be the mode of electing to 
them ; and thirdly (3) that which has judicial power. 

The deliberative element has authority in matters of war 
and peace, in making and unmaking alliances ; it passes 5 
laws, inflicts death, exile, confiscation, elects magistrates 
and audits their accounts. These powers must be assigned 
either all to all the citizens or all to some of them (for 
example, to one or more magistracies, or different causes 
to different magistracies), 1 or some of them to all, and 
others of them only to some. That all things should be 
decided by all is characteristic of democracy ; this is the 10 
sort of equality which the people desire. But there are 
various ways in which all may share in the government; 

1 Reading in 1. 8 (olov . . . nXtioa-iv, f) it e pais irepas) with the 
best MSS. 

K 2 



they may deliberate, not all in one body, but by turns, as 
in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian. There are 
other constitutions in which the boards of magistrates meet 

15 and deliberate, but come into office by turns, and are 
elected out of the tribes and the very smallest divisions 
of the state, until every one has obtained office in his turn. 
The citizens, on the other hand, are assembled only for the 
purposes of legislation, and to consult about the constitu- 
tion, and to hear the edicts of the magistrates. In another 

20 variety of democracy the citizens form one assembly, but 
meet only to elect magistrates, to pass laws, to advise 
about war and peace, and to make scrutinies. Other 
matters are referred severally to special magistrates, who 
are elected by vote or by lot out of all the citizens. Or 

25 again, the citizens meet about election to offices and about 
scrutinies, and deliberate concerning war or alliances 
while other matters are administered by the magistrates, 
who, as far as is possible, 1 are elected by vote. I am 
speaking of those magistracies in which special knowledge 
is required. A fourth form of democracy is when all the 

30 citizens meet to deliberate about everything, and the 
magistrates decide nothing, but only make the preliminary 
inquiries ; and that is the way in which the last and worst 
form of democracy, corresponding, as we maintain, 2 to 
the close family oligarchy and to tyranny, is at present 
administered. All these modes are democratical. 

On the other hand, that some should deliberate about 

35 all is oligarchical. This again is a mode which, like the 
democratical, has many forms. When the deliberative 
class being elected out of those who have a moderate 
qualification are numerous and they respect and obey the 
prohibitions of the law without altering it, and any 
one who has the required qualification shares in the 
government, then, just because of this moderation, the 

40 oligarchy inclines towards polity. But when only selected 

individuals and not the whole people share in the 

I2g8 b deliberations of the state, then, although, as in the former 

1 Sc. in an advanced democracy. Cp. vi. I3i7 b 2l. 

2 1292* 17-21, b 7~lo, 1293*32-34. 

BOOK IV. 14 1298* 

case, they observe the law, the government is a pure 
oligarchy. Or, again, when those who have the power 
of deliberation are self-elected, and son succeeds father, 
and they and not the laws are supreme — the government 
is of necessity oligarchical. Where, again, particular 5 
persons * have authority in particular matters ; — for 
example, when the whole people decide about peace and 
war and hold scrutinies, but the magistrates regulate every- 
thing else, and they are elected by vote — there the govern- 
ment is an aristocracy. And if some questions are decided 
by magistrates elected by vote, and others by magistrates 
elected by lot, either absolutely or out of select candidates, 
or elected partly by vote, partly by lot — these practices 
are partly characteristic of an aristocratical government, ro 
and partly of a pure constitutional government. 

These are the various forms of the deliberative body ; 
they correspond to the various forms of government. 
And the government of each state is administered 
according to one or other of the principles which have 
been laid down. Now it is for the interest of democracy, 
according to the most prevalent notion of it (I am speak- 
ing of that extreme form of democracy in which the 
people are supreme even over the laws), with a view to 15 
better deliberation to adopt the custom of oligarchies 
respecting courts of law. For in oligarchies the rich who 
are wanted to be judges are compelled to attend under 
pain of a fine, whereas in democracies the poor are paid 
to attend. And this practice of oligarchies should be 
adopted by democracies in their public assemblies, for 
they will advise better if they all deliberate together, — 20 
the people with the notables and the notables with the 
people. It is also a good plan that those who deliberate 
should be elected by vote or by lot in equal numbers out 
of the different classes ; and that if the people greatly 
exceed in number those who have political training, pay 
should not be given to all, but only to as many as would 35 
balance the number of the notables, or that the number 

1 Retaining nvis in 1. 5 and omitting the comma before ttuvth in 

iag8 b POLITICA 

in excess should be eliminated by lot. But in oligarchies 
either certain persons should be co-opted from the mass, 
or a class of officers should be appointed such as exist 
in some states, who are termed probuli and guardians 
of the law ; and the citizens should occupy themselves 
exclusively with matters on which these have previously 

30 deliberated ; for so the people will have a share in the 
deliberations of the state, but will not be able to disturb 
the principles of the constitution. Again, in oligarchies 
either the people ought to accept the measures of the 
government, or not to pass anything contrary to them ; 
or, if all are allowed to share in counsel, the decision 
should rest with the magistrates. The opposite of what 
is done in constitutional governments should be the rule 

35 in oligarchies ; the veto of the majority should be final, 
their assent not final, but the proposal should be re- 
ferred back to the magistrates. Whereas in constitutional 
governments they take the contrary course ; the few have 

40 the negative, not the affirmative power ; the affirmation 
1299 s of everything rests with the multitude. 

These, then, are our conclusions respecting the deli- 
berative, that is, the supreme element in states. 

Next we will proceed to consider the distribution of 15 
offices ; this, too, being a part of politics concerning 
5 which many questions arise : — What shall their number 
be? Over what shall they preside, and what shall be 
their duration? Sometimes they last for six months, 
sometimes for less ; sometimes they are annual, whilst in 
other cases offices are held for still longer periods. Shall 
they be for life or for a long term of years ; or, if for a 
short term only, shall the same persons hold them over and 
10 over again, or once only ? Also about the appointment to 
them, — from whom are they to be chosen, by whom, and 
how ? We should first be in a position to say what are 
the possible varieties of them, and then we may proceed 
to determine which are suited to different forms of 
government. But what are to be included under the 
term ' offices ' ? That is a question not quite so easily 

BOOK IV. 15 1299 

answered. For a political community requires many 15 
officers ; and not every one who is chosen by vote or by 
lot is to be regarded as a ruler. In the first place there 
are the priests, who must be distinguished from political 
officers ; masters of choruses and heralds, even ambas- 
sadors, are elected by vote. Some duties of superinten- 20 
dence again are political, extending either to all the 
citizens in a single sphere of action, like the office of 
the general who superintends them when they are in the 
field, or to a section of them only, like the inspectorships 
of women or of youth. Other offices are concerned 
with household management, like that of the corn 
measurers who exist in many states and are elected 
officers. There are also menial offices which the rich 
have executed by their slaves. Speaking generally, those 25 
are to be called offices to which the duties are assigned 
of deliberating about certain measures and of judging and 
commanding, especially the last-; for to command is the 
especial duty of a magistrate. But the question is not of 
any importance in practice ; no one has ever brought 
into court the meaning of the word, although such 
problems have a speculative interest. 30 

What kinds of offices, and how many, are necessary to 
the existence of a state, and which, if not necessary, yet 
conduce to its well-being, are much more important con- 
siderations, affecting all constitutions, but more especially 
small states. For in great states it is possible, and indeed 35 
necessary, that every office should have a special func- 
tion ; where the citizens are numerous, many may hold 
office. And so it happens that some offices a man holds 
a second time only after a long interval, and others 
he holds once only ; and certainly every work is better 
done which receives the sole, and not the divided 1299* 
attention of the worker. But in small states it is 
necessary to combine many offices in a few hands, since 
the small number of citizens does not admit of many 
holding office: — for who will there be to succeed them? 
And yet small states at times require the same offices 5 
and laws as large ones ; the difference is that the one 



want them often, the others only after long intervals. 
Hence there is no reason why the care of many offices 
should not be imposed on the same person, for they will 
not interfere with each other. When the population is 

io small, offices should be like the spits which also serve to 
hold a lamp. 1 We must first ascertain how many 
magistrates are necessary in every state, and also how 
many are not exactly necessary, but are nevertheless 
useful, and then there will be no difficulty in seeing 2 
what offices can be combined in one. We should also 

! 5 know over which matters several local tribunals are to 
have jurisdiction, and in which authority should be 
centralized: for example, should one person keep order 
in the market and another in some other place, or should 
the same person be responsible everywhere? Again, 
should offices be divided according to the subjects with 
which they deal, or according to the persons with whom 
they deal : I mean to say, should one person see to good 
order in general, or one look after the boys, another after 

20 the women, and so on ? Further, under different consti- 
tutions, should the magistrates be the same or different ? 
For example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, mon- 
archy, should there be the same magistrates, although 
they are elected, not out of equal or similar classes 
of citizens, but differently under different constitutions 
— in aristocracies, for example, they are chosen from the 

25 educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, and in demo- 
cracies from the free,; — or are there certain differences in 
the offices answering to them as well, 3 and may the same 
be suitable to some, but different offices to others ? For 
in some states it may be convenient that the same office 
should have a more extensive, in other states a narrower 

30 sphere. Special offices are peculiar to certain forms of 
government : — for example that of probuli, which is not 
a democratic office, although a bule or council is. There 
must be some body of men whose duty is 'to prepare 

1 Cp. i252 b 2. * Reading <rvvi8ui in 1. 12 with Bojesen. 

3 Reading in 1. 27 oZcrm kqi Kara ravras (with some good MSS.) 
dm(f)opai (with Vettori). 

BOOK IV. 15 I299 b 

measures for the people in order that they may not be 
diverted from their business ; when these are few in 
number, the state inclines to an oligarchy : or rather the 
probuli must always be few, and are therefore an 35 
oligarchical element. But when both institutions exist 
in a state, the probuli are a check on the council ; for 
the counsellor is a democratic element, but the probuli 
are oligarchical. Even the power of the council dis- 
appears when democracy has taken that extreme form in 1300* 
which the people themselves are always meeting and 
deliberating about everything. This is the case when 
the members of the assembly receive abundant pay ; for 
they have nothing to do and are always holding 
assemblies and deciding everything for themselves. A 
magistracy which controls the boys or the women, or any 
similar office, is suited to an aristocracy rather than to 5 
a democracy ; for how can the magistrates prevent the 
wives of the poor from going out of doors ? Neither is 
it an oligarchical office ; for the wives of the oligarchs 
are too fine to be controlled. 

Enough of these matters. I will now inquire into 
appointments to offices. The varieties depend on three 10 
terms, and the combinations of these give all possible 
modes : first, who appoints ? secondly, from whom ? and 
thirdly, how ? Each of these three admits of three 
varieties : (A) All the citizens, or (B) only some, 15 
appoint. Either (1) the magistrates are chosen out of 
all or (2) out of some who are distinguished either by 
a property qualification, or by birth, or merit, or for 
some special reason, as at Megara only those were eligible 
who had returned from exile and fought together against 
the democracy. They may be appointed either (a) by 
vote or (j8) by lot. Again, these several varieties may 
be coupled, I mean that (C) some officers may be elected by 20 
some, others by all, and (3) some again out of some, and 
others out of all, and (y) some by vote and others by lot. 
Each variety of these terms admits of four modes. 

For either (A 1 a) all may appoint from all by vote, or 
(A 1 (3) all from all by lot, or (A a a) all from some by 

i3oo a POLITICA 

vote, or (A 2 p) all from some by lot (and if from all, 

25 either by sections, as, for example, by tribes, and wards, 
and phratries, until all the citizens have been gone 
through ; or the citizens may be in all cases eligible indis- 
criminately) ; or again (A 1 y, A 2 y) to some offices in the 
one way, to some in the other. Again, if it is only some 
that appoint, they may do so either (B 1 a) from all by 
vote, or (B 1 /3) from all by lot, or (B 2 a) from some by vote, 
or (B 2 /3) from some by lot, or to some offices in the 
one way, to others in the other, i.e. (B 1 y) from all, to some 
offices by vote, to some by lot, and (B 2 y) from some, 

30 to some offices by vote, to some by lot. Thus the modes 
that arise, apart from two(C,3) out of the three couplings, 
number twelve. Of these systems two are popular, that 
all should appoint from all (A 1 a) by vote or (A 1 /3) by 

35 lot, — or (A 1 y) by both. That all should not appoint 
at once, but should appoint from all or from some 
either by lot or by vote or by both, or appoint to some 
offices from all and to others from some (' by both' mean- 
ing to some offices by lot, to others by vote), is character- 
istic of a polity. And (B 1 y) that some should appoint 
from all, to some offices by vote, to others by lot, is also 
characteristic of a polity, but more oligarchical than the 

40 former method. And (A 3 a, (3, y, B 3 a, /3, y) to appoint 
from both, to some offices from all, to others from some, 
is characteristic of a polity with a leaning towards 
1300 13 aristocracy. That (B 2) some should appoint from some 
is oligarchical, — even (B 2 /3) that some should appoint 
from some by lot (and if this does not actually occur, it is 
none the less oligarchical in character), or (B 2 y) that 
some should appoint from some by both. (B 1 a) that 
some should appoint from all, and (A 2 a) that all 
should appoint from some, by vote, is aristocratic. 1 
5 These are the different modes of constituting magis- 
trates, and these correspond to different forms of govern- 

1 1300* lo- b 5. It is recognized by all the commentators that this 
passage requires considerable emendation. The text presupposed 
by the translation in a 23- b 5 will be found at the end of this 
note, and it will be observed that practically all the corruptions 
presumed to have occurred are such as may well have resulted 

BOOK IV. 15 i3°o b 

ment : — which are proper to which, or how they ought to 

be established, will be evident when we determine the 

nature of their powers. 1 By powers I mean such powers 

from homoioteleuton or from dittography ; most of the emendations 
have been anticipated by earlier scholars, though none has given 
quite the same interpretation of the passage as a whole. 

The logic of the passage is as follows. The modes of appoint- 
ment to office depend on three variants, each of which may have 
any one of three values. Twenty-seven modes are therefore possible. 
But one value of each variant is an intermediate between the other 
two, and it would seem that at first Aristotle means to ignore these 
intermediates. He therefore says, 1300*22, that each variety 
has four, not nine, modes. In fact, however, in 11. 23-30 he 
introduces one of the intermediates (y), and thus exhibits each of 
two varieties as having six, i.e. 2 x 3 modes. Thus, omitting two of 
the intermediates, he gets \2 (2 x 2 x 3) modes (1. 30). 

It seems clear that the number 12 is arrived at solely by con- 
sideration of the original variants, and therefore that the further 
distinction drawn in 11. 24-26 is purely incidental. 1300*34-38 
is likewise incidental. 

On our interpretation of the passage, all the 27 possible combina- 
tions are in 1300* 3i- b 5 assigned to their appropriate constitutions 
except : 

1. The cases in which all appoint out of some by lot, or to some 
offices by vote, to others by lot (A2(3,A2 y). 

2. The case in which some appoint out of all by lot (B I /3). 

3. The cases in which all appoint to some offices, some to other 
offices (the nine combinations involving C). 

(3) seems to be omitted as an unnecessary refinement. (1) could 
be introduced by adding Kai to navras cTc rivmv fj icXfipa> fj dptpotv after 
ap<poiv in 1. 33. As regards (2) the distinction between appointment 
by lot by all and by some is somewhat unmeaning. (2) could, 
however, be introduced by excising rds piv alpetrei in a 38, and by 
reading fj KXf)pq> (with some authority) and retaining fj dp<poIp (rds 
piv K\r)pa> rds 8' alpeaei) in a 39. 

1300*23-^5 fj yap napTfs (K ituvtwv alpiaei fj navres i< ndvrwv 
Kkrjpco (fj ndvres (K rivSav uipicrti fj navres in Tivwv KXfjpcpy (*<"> « *'£ 
dndvrav, fj iy dva pepos . . . fj dei e'£ dndvrojv), fj Ka\ ra piv ovrws to. 
8i fKtivtos' ndXiv el rives 01 Kadiaravrfs, fj tn ndvrcov a\pto~ti fj (K ndvrav 
KXfjpa fj (k nvav atpicrti fj «k tivwv Kk-qpat, fj ra piv ovrais rd 8i tutivas, 
Xe'-yto 8i rd piv t'< mivra>v alpevet rd 8i K.Xr)pa> (tciii rd piv eVc 
rivcov a'tpicrei rd 8i nXrjpa)). ware 8d>8(K.a ol rpunot yivovrai \oyp\s 
rlitv 8vo O~\)v8vao~p5iv. tovtwv 8* at piv 8vo Karacrruo'fii 8r}portKai,ru ndvras 
(K ndvroiv ulpecrei fj KXfjpco [yivtadai], — 17 dpcpoiv, ras piv tcXfjpa 
rds 8' alpicrti ra>v dp\a>v' to be pfj ndvras apa piv Ka6io~rdvai, e'£ 
dndvrcav 8' ij «k riveov f) acAjj/jw fj alpeaei Jj dpCpo'iv, fj rds piv eK ndvrav 
rds 8' (K nva>v [dp(poiv] (rd 8i dp(po'iv Xe'yoi rds piv KXfjpco rds 
8' oiptVfi), noXiriKov, km to rivds (k ndvrcov rds piv atpe'crei KaBicrrdvai 
ras 8i nXfjpco [fj dptyo'iv, rds piv K\f]pa> rds 8' a'ipio~(i' okiyap^iKop] 
(dXiyapxtKurtpov 8i). Kai rd f£ dp<toiv f xas piv tK ndvrav rds 
8 t\ rivoiv, ttoXitikov apicr^Kpar ikg>s [17 ray piv ulpiarti rds 8i kAij/jw]. 
to 8i rivds (K rtvoiv dXiyapxiKuv, Kai rd rivds (K rivuv (cAijpa) [pi] 
yivdpevov 5' Spolas) xa\ rd rivds ('k tivuv dp<po'iv. rd 8i rtvds (£ 
dTrdvroiv to re ex rivoiv ndvras <ilpio~ei apiaroKpariKov. 

1 The promise is not fulfilled in the Politics. 

i3oo b POLITICA 

as a magistrate exercises over the revenue or in defence 
10 of the country ; for there are various kinds of power: the 
power of the general, for example, is not the same with 
that which regulates contracts in the market. 

Of the three parts of government, the judicial remains 16 
to be considered, and this we shall divide on the same 
principle. There are three points on which the varieties 

1 5 of law-courts depend : The persons from whom they 
are appointed, the matters with which they are concerned, 
and the manner of their appointment. I mean, (i) are 
the judges taken from all, or from some only ? (2) how 
many kinds of law-courts are there? (3) are the judges 
chosen by vote or by lot ? 

First, let me determine how many kinds of law-courts 
there are. They are eight in number : One is the court 

20 of audits or scrutinies ; a second takes cognizance of 
ordinary offences against the state ; a third is concerned 
with treason against the constitution ; the fourth 
determines disputes respecting penalties, whether l raised 
by magistrates or by private persons; the fifth decides 
the more important civil cases ; the sixth tries cases of 

25 homicide, which are of various kinds, (a) premeditated, 
(b) involuntary, (c) cases in which the guilt is confessed 
but the justice is disputed ; and there may be a fourth 
court {d) in which murderers who have fled from justice 
are tried 2 after their return ; such as the Court of Phreatto 
is said to be at Athens. But cases of this sort rarely 

3° happen at all even in large cities. The different kinds of 
homicide may be tried either by the same or by 
different courts. (7) There are courts for strangers :— of 
these there are two subdivisions, (a) for the settlement 
of their disputes with one another, (b) for the settlement 
of disputes between them and the citizens. And besides 
all these there must be (8) courts for small suits about 
sums of a drachma up to five drachmas, or a little more, 
which have to be determined, but they do not require 
many judges. 

1 Retaining Kai in 1. 21. 

2 For a second murder. Cf. Dem. c. Aristocr. c. 77. 

BOOK IV. 16 i3oo b 

Nothing more need be said of these small suits, nor of 35 
the courts for homicide and for strangers: — I would 
rather speak of political cases, which, when mismanaged, 
create division and disturbances in constitutions. 

Now if all the citizens judge, in all the different cases 
which I have distinguished, they may be appointed by 
vote or by lot, or sometimes by lot and sometimes by 40 
vote. Or when a single class of causes are tried, the 
judges who decide them may be appointed, some by 
vote, and some by lot. These then are the four modes 1301 s 
of appointing judges from the whole people, and there 
will be likewise four modes, if they are elected from a 
part only ; for they may be appointed from some by vote 
and judge in all causes; or they may be appointed from 
some by lot and judge in all causes ; or they may be 
elected in some cases by vote, and in some cases taken 
by lot, or some courts, even when judging the same causes, 
may be composed of members some appointed by vote 
and some by lot. These modes, then, as was said, answer 1 5 
to those previously mentioned. 

Once more, the modes of appointment may be com- 
bined ; I mean, that some may be chosen out of the whole 
people, others out of some, some out of both ; for ex- 
ample, the same tribunal may be composed of some 
who were elected out of all, and of others who were 
elected out of some, either by vote or by lot or by both. 

In how many forms law-courts can be established has 10 
now been considered. The first form, viz. that in which 
the judges are taken from all the citizens, and in which 
all causes are tried, is democratical ; the second, which is 
composed of a few only who try all causes, oligarchical ; 
the third, in which some courts are taken from all classes, 
and some from certain classes only, aristocratical and 15 

1 Inserting avriarpocpoi after rponoi in 1. 6, with Newman. 

i3Qi a 


The design which we proposed to ourselves is now I 

20 nearly completed. 1 Next in order follow the causes of 
revolution in states, how many, and of what nature they 
are ; what modes of destruction apply to particular states, 
and out of what, and into what they mostly change ; also 
what are the modes of preservation in states generally, 
or in a particular state, and by what means each state 
may be best preserved : these questions remain to be 

25 In the first place we must assume as our starting-point 
that in the many forms of government which have sprung 
up there has always been an acknowledgement of justice 
and proportionate equality, although mankind fail in 
attaining them, as indeed I have already explained. 2 
Democracy, for example, arises out of the notion that 
those who are equal in any respect are equal in all 

3° respects ; because men are equally free, they claim to 
be absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion 
that those who are unequal in one respect are in all 
respects unequal ; being unequal, that is, in property, 
they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The 
democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be 
equal in all things ; while the oligarchs, under the idea 
that they are unequal, claim too much, which is one form 

35 of inequality. All these forms of government have a 
kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they 
are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their 
share in the government does not accord with their pre- 
conceived ideas, stir up revolution. Those who excel in 

40 virtue have the best right of all to rebel (for they alone 

I30l b can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal), 3 but then 

they are of all men the least inclined to do so. 4 There 

1 Cp. iv. c. 2. 2 iii. i282 b 18-30, cp. 1280*9 sqq. 

3 Cp. iii. I284 b 28-34. 4 Cp. 130404. 

BOOK V. i I30i b 

is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank ; 
for they are thought noble because they spring from 
wealthy and virtuous ancestors. 1 Here then, so to speak, 
are opened the very springs and fountains of revolution ; 5 
and hence arise two sorts of changes in governments ; the 
one affecting the constitution, when men seek to change 
from an existing form into some other, for example, from 
democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into demo- 
cracy, or from either of them into constitutional govern- 
ment or aristocracy, and conversely ; the other not 10 
affecting the constitution, when, without disturbing the 
form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or 
any other, they try to get the administration into their 
own hands. 2 Further, there is a question of degree ; an 
oligarchy, for example, may become more or less oligar- 
chical, and a democracy more or less democratical ; and 15 
in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of 
government may be more or less strictly maintained. 
Or the revolution may be directed against a portion of 
the constitution only, e.g. the establishment or overthrow 
of a particular office : as at Sparta it is said that Lysander 
attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and king Pausa- 20 
nias, 3 the ephoralty. At Epidamnus, too, the change 
was partial. For instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes, 
a council was appointed ; but to this day the magistrates 
are the only members of the ruling class who are com- 
pelled to go to the Heliaea when an election takes place 
and the office of the single archon 4 was another oligar- 25 
chical feature. Everywhere inequality is a cause of revo- 
lution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion — 
for instance, a perpetual monarchy among equals ; and 
always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion. 
Now equality is of two kinds, numerical and propor- 
tional ; by the first I mean sameness or equality in 30 
number or size; by the second, equality of ratios. For 
example, the excess of three over two is numerically equal 
to the excess of two over one ; whereas four exceeds two 

1 Cp. iv. 1294*21. 2 Cp. iv. I292 b n. 

• Cp. vii. I333 b 34- * Cp. iii. 12870 7. 


in the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for two is the 

35 same part of four that one is of two, namely, the half. 
As I was saying before, 1 men agree that justice in the 
abstract is proportion, but they differ in that some think 
that if they are equal in any respect they are equal 
absolutely, others that if they are unequal in any respect 
they should be unequal in all. Hence there are two 

40 principal forms of government, democracy and oligarchy; 
1302* for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and numbers 
are more common. In what city shall we find a hundred 
persons of good birth and of virtue ? whereas the rich 
everywhere abound. That a state should be ordered, 
simply and wholly, according to either kind of equality, is 
not a good thing ; the proof is the fact that such forms of 
5 government never last. They are originally based on 
a mistake, and, as they begin badly, cannot fail to end 
badly. The inference is that both kinds of equality should 
be employed ; numerical in some cases, and proportionate 
in others. 

Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to 
revolution than oligarchy. 2 For in oligarchies 3 there is 

10 the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among 
themselves and also with the people ; but in demo- 
cracies 4 there is only the danger of a quarrel with 
the oligarchs. No dissension worth mentioning arises 
among the people themselves. And we may further 
remark that a government which is composed of the 
middle class more nearly approximates to democracy 

15 than to oligarchy, and is the safest of the imperfect forms 
of government. 

In considering how dissensions and political revolutions 2 
arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and 
causes of them which affect constitutions generally. They 
may be said to be three in number ; and we have now 
20 to give an outline of each. We want to know (1) what 
is the feeling? (a) what are the motives of those who 
make them ? (3) whence arise political disturbances and 
1 a 26. 2 Cp. iv. 1296* 13. 3 Cp. c. 6. 4 Cp. c. 5. 

BOOK V. 2 I302 a 

quarrels ? The universal and chief cause of this revolu- 
tionary feeling has been already mentioned ; 1 viz. the 
desire of equality, when men think that they are equal to 25 
others who have more than themselves ; or, again, the 
desire of inequality and superiority, when conceiving 
themselves to be superior they think that they have not 
more but the same or less than their inferiors ; preten- 
sions which may and may not be just. Inferiors revolt in 
order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be 30 
superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revo- 
lutions. The motives for making them are the desire of 
gain and honour, or the fear of dishonour and loss ; the 
authors of them want to divert punishment or dishonour 
from themselves or their friends. The causes and reasons 
of revolutions, whereby men are themselves affected in 35 
the way described, and about the things which I have 
mentioned, viewed in one way may be regarded as seven, 
and in another as more than seven. Two of them have 
been already noticed ; 2 but they act in a different manner, 
for men are excited against one another by the love of 
gain and honour — not, as in the case which I have just 40 
supposed, in order to obtain them for themselves, but at i302 b 
seeing others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them. Other 
causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, 
contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the 
state; causes of another sort are election intrigues, 
carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimilarity of ele- 

3 What share insolence and avarice have in creating 5 
revolutions, and how they work, is plain enough. When 
the magistrates are insolent and grasping they conspire 
against one another and also against the constitution 
from which they derive their power, making their gains 
cither at the expense of individuals or of the public. It 10 
is evident, again, what an influence honour exerts and 
how it is a cause of revolution. Men who are them- 
selves dishonoured and who see others obtaining honours 
1 1301*33 sqq., b 35 sqq. 2 1. 32. 

G4B-17 L 


rise in rebellion ; the honour or dishonour when un- 
deserved is unjust ; and just when awarded according to 

15 merit. Again, superiority is a cause of revolution when 
one or more persons have a power which is too much for 
the state and the power of the government ; this is a 
condition of affairs out of which there arises a monarchy, 
or a family oligarchy. And therefore, in some places, 
as at Athens and Argos, they have recourse to ostracism. 1 
But how much better to provide from the first that there 

20 should benosuch pre-eminent individuals instead of letting 
them come into existence and then finding a remedy. 

Another cause of revolution is fear. Either men have 
committed wrong, and are afraid of punishment, or they 
are expecting to suffer wrong and are desirous of anti- 
cipating their enemy. Thus at Rhodes the notables 
conspired against the people through fear of the suits 

25 that were brought against them. 2 Contempt is also a 
cause of insurrection and revolution ; for example, in 
oligarchies — when those who have no share in the state 
are the majority, they revolt, because they think that they 
are the stronger. Or, again, in democracies, the rich 
despise the disorder and anarchy of the state ; at Thebes, 
for example, where, after the battle of Oenophyta, the 

30 bad administration of the democracy led to its ruin. At 
Megara the fall of the democracy was due to a defeat 
occasioned by disorder and anarchy. And at Syracuse 
the democracy aroused contempt before the tyranny of 
Gelo arose; at Rhodes, before the insurrection. 

Political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate 

35 increase in any part of the state. For as a body is made 
up of many members, and every member ought to grow 
in proportion, 3 that symmetry may be preserved ; but 
loses its nature if the foot be four cubits long and the 
rest of the body two spans ; and, should the abnormal 
increase be one of quality as well as of quantity, may even 

40 take the form of another animal : even so a state has many 

1303 11 parts, of which some one may often grow imperceptibly ; 

for example, the number of poor in democracies and in 

1 Cp. iii. 1284 s 17. 2 Cp. I304 b 27. 3 Cp. iii. I284 b 8. 

BOOK V. 3 1303* 

constitutional states. And this disproportion may some- 
times happen by an accident, as at Tarcntum, from a de- 
feat in which many of the notables were slain in a battle 
with the Iapygians just after the Persian War, the consti- 5 
tutional government in consequence becoming a demo- 
cracy ; or as was the case at Argos, where the Argives, 
after their army had been cut to pieces on the seventh day 
of the month by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, were 
compelled to admit to citizenship some of their perioeci ; 
and at Athens, when, after frequent defeats of their 
infantry at the time of the Peloponnesian War, the 
notables were reduced in number, because the soldiers 
had to be taken from the roll of citizens. Revolutions 10 
arise from this cause as well, in democracies as in other 
forms of government, but not to so great an extent. 
When the rich grow numerous or properties increase, the 
form of government changes into an oligarchy or a govern- 
ment of families. Forms of government also change — 
sometimes even without revolution, owing to election con- 
tests, as at Heraea (where, instead of electing their magis- rs 
trates, they took them by lot, because the electors were 
in the habit of choosing their own partisans) ; or owing 
to carelessness, when disloyal persons are allowed to find 
their way into the highest offices, as at Oreum, where, 
upon the accession of Heracleodorus to office, the oli- 
garchy was overthrown, and changed by him into a 
constitutional and democratical government. 

Again, the revolution may be facilitated by the slight- 20 
ness of the change ; I mean that a great change may 
sometimes slip into the constitution through neglect of 
a small matter ; at Ambracia, for instance, the qualifica- 
tion for office, small at first, was eventually reduced to 
nothing. For the Ambraciots thought that a small 
qualification was much the same as none at all. 

Another cause of revolution is difference of races 25 
which do not at once acquire a common spirit ; for a 
state is not the growth of a day, any more than it grows 
out of a multitude brought together by accident. Hence 
the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of 

L % 


their foundation or afterwards, has generally produced 
revolution ; for example, the Achaeans who joined the 
Troezenians in the foundation of Sybaris, becoming later 
30 the more numerous, expelled them ; hence the curse fell 
upon Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled with 
their fellow-colonists ; thinking that the land belonged to 
them, they wanted too much of it and were driven out. 
At Byzantium the new colonists were detected in a con- 
spiracy, and were expelled by force of arms ; the people 
of Antissa, who had received the Chian exiles, fought with 
35 them, and drove them out ; and the Zancleans, after 
having received the Samians, were driven by them out of 
their own city. The citizens of Apollonia on the Euxine, 
after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists, had 
a revolution; the Syracusans, after the expulsion of 
1303 13 their tyrants, having admitted strangers and mercenaries 
to the rights of citizenship, quarrelled and came to 
blows ; the people of Amphipolis, having received Chal- 
cidian colonists, were nearly all expelled by them. 

Now, in oligarchies the masses make revolution under 

5 the idea that they are unjustly treated, because, as I said 

before, 1 they are equals, and have not an equal share, and 

in democracies the notables revolt, because they are not 

equals, and yet have only an equal share. 

Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution 
when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve 
the unity of the state. For example, the Chytians at 
Clazomenae did not agree with the people of the island ; 
and the people of Colophon quarrelled with the Notians ; 
10 at Athens, too, the inhabitants of the Piraeus are more 
democratic than those who live in the city. For just as 
in war the impediment of a ditch, though ever so small, 
may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, how- 
15 ever slight, makes a breach in a city. The greatest 
opposition is confessedly that of virtue and vice ; next 
comes that of wealth and poverty ; and there are other 
antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is this 
difference of place. 

1 i3 0ia 33- 

BOOK V. 4 i303 b 

4 In revolutions the occasions may be trifling, but great 
interests are at stake Even trifles are most important 
when they concern the rulers, as was the case of old at 20 
Syracuse ; for the Syracusan constitution was once 
changed by a love-quarrel of two young men, who were in 
the government. The story is that while one of them was 
away from home his beloved was gained over by his 
companion, and he to revenge himself seduced the other's 
wife. They then drew the members of the ruling class 25 
into their quarrel and so split all the people into portions. 
We learn from this story that we should be on our guard 
against the beginnings of such evils, and should put an 
end to the quarrels of chiefs and mighty men. The mis- 
take lies in the beginning — as the proverb says — ' Well 
begun is half done ' ; so an error at the beginning, though 3° 
quite small, bears the same ratio to the errors in the other 
parts. In general, when the notables quarrel, the whole 
city is involved, as happened in Hestiaea after the Persian 
War. The occasion was the division of an inheritance ; 
one of two brothers refused to give an account of 35 
their father's property and the treasure which he had 
found : so the poorer of the two quarrelled with him 
and enlisted in his cause the popular party, the other, 
who was very rich, the wealthy classes. 

At Delphi, again, a quarrel about a marriage was the 
beginning of all the troubles which followed. In this I3°4 
case the bridegroom, fancying some occurrence to be of 
evil omen, came to the bride, and went away without 
taking her. Whereupon her relations, thinking that they 
were insulted by him, put some of the sacred treasure 
among his offerings while he was sacrificing, and then 
slew him, pretending that he had been robbing the 
temple. At Mytilene, too, a dispute about heiresses 
was the beginning of many misfortunes, and led to the 5 
war with the Athenians in which Paches took their city. 
A wealthy citizen, named Timophanes, left two daughters ; 
Dexander, another citizen, wanted to obtain them for his 
sons ; but he was rejected in his suit, whereupon he 
stirred up a revolution, and instigated the Athenians (of 


io whom he was proxenus) to interfere. A similar quarrel 
about an heiress arose at Phocis between Mnaseas the 
father of Mnason, and Euthycrates the father of Ono- 
marchus ; this was the beginning of the Sacred War- 
A marriage-quarrel was also the cause of a change in the 
government of Epidamnus. A certain man betrothed his 
15 daughter to a person whose father, having been made a 
magistrate, fined the father of the girl, and the latter, 
stung by the insult, conspired with the unenfranchised 
classes to overthrow the state. 

Governments also change into oligarchy or into demo- 
cracy or into a constitutional government because the 
magistrates, or some other section of the state, increase 
20 in power or renown. Thus at Athens the reputation 
gained by the court of the Areopagus, in the Persian War, 
seemed to tighten the reins of government. On the other 
hand, the victory of Salamis, 1 which was gained by the 
common people who served in the fleet, and won for the 
Athenians the empire due to command of the sea, strength- 
's ened the democracy. At Argos, the notables, having dis- 
tinguished themselves against the Lacedaemonians in the 
battle of Mantinea, attempted to put down the demo- 
cracy. At Syracuse, the people, having been the chief 
authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians, 
changed the constitutional government into democracy. 
30 At Chalcis, the people, uniting with the notables, killed 
Phoxus the tyrant, and then seized the government. At 
Ambracia, 2 the people, in like manner, having joined 
with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant Periander, 
transferred the government to themselves. And gene- 
rally, it should be remembered that those who have 
35 secured power to the state, whether private citizens, or 
magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the 
state, are apt to cause revolutions. For either envy of 
their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they them- 
selves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to remain 
on a level with others. 

Revolutions also break out when opposite parties, e.g. the 
1 Cp. ii. I274 a 12 ; viii. I34l a 29. 2 Cp. 1311*39. 

BOOK V. 4 I304 b 

rich and the people, are equally balanced, and there is I304 b 
little or no middle class ; for, if either party were mani- 
festly superior, the other would not risk an attack upon 
them. And, for this reason, those who are eminent in 
virtue usually do not stir up insurrections, always a 
minority. Such are the beginnings and causes of the 5 
disturbances and revolutions to which every form of 
government is liable. 

Revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by 
fraud. Force may be applied either at the time of 
making the revolution or afterwards. Fraud, again, is 10 
of two kinds ; for (i) sometimes the citizens are deceived 
into acquiescing in a change of government, and afterwards 
they are held in subjection against their will. This was 
what happened in the case of the Four Hundred, who 
deceived the people by telling them that the king would 
provide money for the war against the Lacedaemonians, 
and, having cheated the people, still endeavoured to re- 
tain the government, (a) In other cases the people are 15 
persuaded at first, and afterwards, by a repetition of the 
persuasion, their goodwill and allegiance are retained. 
The revolutions which effect constitutions generally 
spring from the above-mentioned causes. 1 

5 And now, taking each constitution separately, we must 
see what follows from the principles already laid down. 

Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by 20 
the intemperance of demagogues, who either in their 
private capacity lay information against rich men until 
they compel them to combine (for a common danger 
unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming forward 
in public stir up the people against them. The truth 
of this remark is proved by a variety of examples. At 25 
Cos the democracy was overthrown because wicked 
demagogues arose, and the notables combined. At 
Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the 
multitude, but prevented them from making good to 
the trierarchs the sums which had been expended by 

1 Cp. 1302 11 17. 


them ; and they, in consequence of the suits which were 

3° brought against them, were compelled to combine and 
put down the democracy. 1 The democracy at Heraclea 
was overthrown shortly after the foundation of the colony 
by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the 
notables, who came back in a body and put an end to 
the democracy. Much in the same manner the demo- 

35 cracy at Megara 2 was overturned ; there the demagogues 
drove out many of the notables in order that they might 
be able to confiscate their property. At length the 
exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and, engaging and 
defeating the people, established the oligarchy. The 
J 3°5 a same thing happened with the democracy of Cyme, which 
was overthrown by Thrasymachus. And we may observe 
that in most states the changes have been of this 
character. For sometimes the demagogues, in order to 
curry favour with the people, wrong the notables and so 
force them to combine ; — either they make a division of 
their property, or diminish their incomes by the impo- 
5 sition of public services, and sometimes they bring 
accusations against the rich that they may have their 
wealth to confiscate. 3 

Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then 
democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient 

10 tyrants were originally demagogues. 4 They are not so 
now, but they were then ; and the reason is that they 
were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet 
come into fashion. Whereas in our day, when the art of 
rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the 
people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents 
them from usurping power ; at any rate instances to the 

15 contrary are few and slight. Tyrannies were more 
common formerly than now, for this reason also, that great 
power was placed in the hands of individuals ; thus a 
tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Prytanis, 
who had supreme authority in many important matters 

1 Cp. I302 b 23. 2 Cp. I302 b 3i, iv. i30o a 17. 

Cp. 1309* 14. * Cp. i3io b 14; Plato, Rep. viii. 565 D. 


Cp. i3io b 2o. 

BOOK V. 5 1305 

Moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the 
people dwelt in the fields, busy at their work ; and their a° 
chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the 
opportunity, and winning the confidence of the masses 
by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they suc- 
ceeded in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens 
Peisistratus led a faction against the men of the plain, 1 
and Theagenes at Megara slaughtered the cattle of the 
wealthy, which he found by the river side, where they 25 
had put them to graze in land not their own. Dionysius, 
again, was thought worthy of the tyranny because he 
denounced Daphnaeus and the rich ; his enmity to the 
notables won for him the confidence of the people. 
Changes also take place from the ancient to the latest 
form of democracy ; for where there is a popular election 3° 
of the magistrates and no property qualification, the 
aspirants for office get hold of the people, and contrive at 
last even to set them above the laws. A more or less 
complete cure for this state of things is for the separate 
tribes, and not the whole people, to elect the magistrates. 

These are the principal causes of revolutions in demo- 35 

6 There are two patent causes of revolutions in oligar- 
chies : (1) First, when the oligarchs oppress the people, 
for then anybody is good enough to be their champion, 
especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy, as 
Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. 40 
But revolutions which commence outside the governing 1305 1 
class may be further subdivided. Sometimes, when the 
government is very exclusive, the revolution is brought 
about by persons of the wealthy class who are excluded, 
as happened at Massalia and Istros and Heraclea, and 5 
other cities. Those who had no share in the government 
created a disturbance, until first the elder brothers, and 
then the younger, were admitted ; for in some places 
father and son, in others elder and younger brothers, do 
not hold office together. At Massalia the oligarchy 10 

1 See Herod, i. 59. 



became more like a constitutional government, but at 
Istros ended in a democracy, and at Heraclea was en- 
larged to 600. At Cnidos, again, the oligarchy under- 
went a considerable change. For the notables fell out 
among themselves, because only a few shared in the 
government ; there existed among them the rule already 
mentioned, that father and son could not hold office 

15 together, and, if there were several brothers, only the 
eldest was admitted. The people took advantage of the 
quarrel, and choosing one of the notables to be their 
leader, attacked and conquered the oligarchs, who were 
divided, and division is always a source of weakness. 
The city of Erythrae, too, in old times was ruled, and 

20 ruled well, by the Basilidae, but the people took offence 
at the narrowness of the oligarchy and changed the 

(2) Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is 
the personal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to 
play the demagogue. Now, the oligarchical demagogue 
is of two sorts : either (a) he practises upon the oligarchs 
themselves (for, although the oligarchy are quite a small 

2 5 number, there may be a demagogue among them, as at 
Athens Charicles' party won power by courting the Thirty, 
that of Phrynichus by courting the Four Hundred) ; or 
(b) the oligarchs may play the demagogue with the 
people. This was the case at Larissa, where the guardians 
of the citizens endeavoured to gain over the people be- 

30 cause they were elected by them ; and such is the fate of 
all oligarchies in which the magistrates are elected, as at 
Abydos, not by the class to which they belong, but by 
the heavy-armed or by the people, although they may 
be required to have a high qualification, or to be mem- 
bers of a political club ; or, again,, where the law-courts 
are composed of persons outside the government, the 

35 oligarchs flatter the people in order to obtain a decision 
in their own favour, and so they change the constitution ; 
this happened at Heraclea in Pontus. Again, oligarchies 
change whenever any attempt is made to narrow them ; 
for then those who desire equal rights are compelled to 


BOOK V. 6 1305 

call in the people. Changes in the oligarchy also occur 
when the oligarchs waste their private property by 
extravagant living ; for then they want to innovate, and 40 
either try to make themselves tyrants, or install some 1306" 
one else in the tyranny, as Hipparinus did Dionysius at 
Syracuse, and as at Amphipolis l a man named Cleotimus 
introduced Chalcidian colonists, and when they arrived, 
stirred them up against the rich. For a like reason in 
Aegina the person who carried on the negotiation with 
Chares endeavoured to revolutionize the state. Sometimes 5 
a party among the oligarchs try directly to create a poli- 
tical change ; sometimes they rob the treasury, and then 
either the thieves or, as happened at Apollonia in Pontus, 
those who resist them in their thieving quarrel with the 
rulers. But an oligarchy which is at unity with itself is 
not easily destroyed from within ; of this we may see an 10 
example at Pharsalus, for there, although the rulers are 
few in number, they govern a large city, because they 
have a good understanding among themselves. 

Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oli- 
garchy is created within the original one, that is to 
say, when the whole governing body is small and yet 
they do not all share in the highest offices. Thus at 15 
Elis the governing body was a small senate ; and very few 
ever found their way into it, because the senators were 
only ninety in number, and were elected for life and out 
of certain families in a manner similar to the Lacedae- 
monian elders. Oligarchy is liable to revolutions alike 20 
in war and in peace ; in war because, not being able to 
trust the people, the oligarchs are compelled to hire 
mercenaries, and the general who is in command of them 
often ends in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did at 
Corinth ; or if there are more generals than one they 
make themselves into a company of tyrants. Sometimes 25 
the oligarchs, fearing this danger, give the people a share 
in the government because their services are necessary to 
them. And in time of peace, from mutual distrust, the 
two parties hand over the defence of the state to the 

1 Cp. i3Q3 b 2. 

i3o6 a POLITICA 

army and to an arbiter between the two factions, who 
often ends the master of both. This happened at Larissa 
when Simos the Aleuad had the government, and at 
Abydos in the days of Iphiades and the political clubs. 
Revolutions also arise out of marriages or lawsuits which 
lead to the overthrow of one party among the oligarchs 
by another. Of quarrels about marriages I have already 
35 mentioned * some instances ; another occurred at Eretria, 
where Diagoras overturned the oligarchy of the knights 
because he had been wronged about a marriage. A revo- 
lution at Heraclea, and another at Thebes, both arose out 
of decisions of law-courts upon a charge of adultery ; in 
both cases the punishment was just, but executed in the 
l3o6 b spirit of party, at Heraclea upon Eurytion, 2 and at Thebes 
upon Archias ; for their enemies were jealous of them 3 and 
so had them pilloried in the agora. Many oligarchies 
have been destroyed by some members of the ruling 
5 class taking offence at their excessive despotism ; for 
example, the oligarchy at Cnidus and at Chios. 

Changes of constitutional governments, and also of 
oligarchies which limit the office of counsellor, judge, or 
other magistrate to persons having a certain money quali- 
fication, often occur by accident. The qualification may 
have been originally fixed according to the circumstances 
10 of the time, in such a manner as to include in an oli- 
garchy a few only, or in a constitutional government the 
middle class. But after a time of prosperity, whether 
arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same 
property becomes many times as valuable, and then 
everybody participates in every office; this happens 
15 sometimes gradually and insensibly, and sometimes 
quickly. These are the causes of changes and revolutions 
in oligarchies. 

We must remark generally, both of democracies and 
oligarchies, that they sometimes change, not into the 
opposite forms of government, but only into another 

1 i303 b 37-1 304a 17. 

2 Reading LvpunWos in 1. 39 with some MSS. 

s Reading avrois in 1. 2, as suggested by Liddell and Scott. 

BOOK V. 6 1306 11 

variety of the same class ; I mean to say, from those 
forms of democracy and oligarchy which are regulated 20 
by law into those which are arbitrary, and conversely. 

7 In aristocracies revolutions arc stirred up when a few 
only share in the honours of the state ; a cause which 
has been already shown 1 to affect oligarchies ; 2 for an 
aristocracy is a sort of oligarchy, and, like an oligarchy, 25 
is the government of a few, although few not for the same 
reason ; hence the two are often confounded. And revolu- 
tions will be most likely to happen, and must happen, 
when the mass 3 of the people are of the high-spirited 
kind, and have a notion that they are as good as their 
rulers. Thus at Lacedaemon the so-called Partheniae, 
who were the sons 4 of the Spartan peers, attempted 3° 
a revolution, and, being detected, were sent away to 
colonize Tarentum. Again, revolutions occur when great 
men who are at least of equal merit are dishonoured by 
those higher in office, as Lysander was by the kings of 
Sparta ; or, when a brave man is excluded from the 
honours of the state, like Cinadon, who conspired against 35 
the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus; or, again, when 
some are very poor and others very rich, a state of society 
which is most often the result of war, as at Lacedaemon 
in the days of the Messenian War ; this is proved from 
the poem of Tyrtaeus, entitled ' Good Order ' ; for he 1307 s 
speaks of certain citizens who were ruined by the war and 
wanted to have a redistribution of the land. Again, 
revolutions arise when an individual who is great, and 
might be greater, wants to rule alone, as, at Lacedaemon, 
Pausanias, who was general in the Persian War, or like 
Hanno at Carthage. 

Constitutional governments and aristocracies are com- 5 
monly overthrown owing to some deviation from justice 
in the constitution itself; the cause of the downfall 
is, in the former, the ill-mingling of the two elements 

1 I305 b 2 sqq. 2 Reading a comma after dXiyapxias in 1. 24. 
s Reading ™ wX^os in 1. 28 with the MSS. 
4 i.e. the illegitimate sons. 


democracy and oligarchy ; in the latter, of the three ele- 

io ments, democracy, oligarchy, and virtue, but especially 
democracy and oligarchy. For to combine these is the 
endeavour of constitutional governments ; and most of 
the so-called aristocracies have a like aim, 1 but differ 
from polities in the mode of combination ; hence some 

15 of them are more and some less permanent. Those 
which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, 
and those which incline to democracy constitutional 
governments. And therefore the latter are the safer of 
the two ; for the greater the number, the greater the 
strength, and when men are equal they are contented. 
But the rich, if the constitution gives them power, are 

20 apt to be insolent and avaricious ; .and, in general, which- 
ever way the constitution inclines, in that direction it 
changes as either party gains strength, a constitutional 
government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy an 
oligarchy. But the process may be reversed, and aris- 
tocracy may change into democracy. This happens 
when the poor, under the idea that they are being 
wronged, force the constitution to take an opposite form. 

35 In like manner constitutional governments change into 
oligarchies. The only stable principle of government 
is equality according to proportion, and for every man to 
enjoy his own. 

What I have just mentioned actually happened at 
Thurii, 2 where the qualification for office, at first high, 
was therefore reduced, and the magistrates increased in 
number. The notables had previously acquired the 

30 whole of the land contrary to law ; for the government 
tended to oligarchy, and they were able to encroach. . . . 
But the people, who had been trained by war, soon got 
the better of the guards kept by the oligarchs, until 
those who had too much gave up their land. 

Again, since all aristocratical governments incline to 

35 oligarchy, the notables are apt to be grasping ; thus at 
Lacedaemon, where property tends to pass into few hands, 3 
the notables can do too much as they like, and are 
1 Cp. iv. c. 7. 2 Cp. 1303*31. 3 Cp. ii. 1270 s 18. 

BOOK V. 7 1307 

allowed to marry whom they please. The city of Locri 
was ruined by a marriage connexion with Dionysius, 
but such a thing could never have happened in a de- 
mocracy, or in a well-balanced aristocracy. 

I have already remarked that in all states revolutions 4° 
are occasioned by trifles. 1 In aristocracies, above all, they I3°7 
are of a gradual and imperceptible nature. The citizens 
begin by giving up some part of the constitution, and so 
with greater ease the government change something else 
which is a little more important, until they have under- 5 
mined the whole fabric of the state. At Thurii thers 
was a law that generals should only be re-elected after 
an interval of five years, and some young men who 
were popular with the soldiers of the guard for their mili- 
tary prowess, despising the magistrates and thinking that 
they would easily gain their purpose, wanted to abolish *° 
this law and allow their generals to hold perpetual 
commands ; for they well knew that the people would be 
glad enough to elect them. Whereupon the magistrates 
who had charge of these matters, and who are called 
councillors, at first determined to resist, but they after- 
wards consented, thinking that, if only this one law was "5 
changed, no further inroad would be made on the 
constitution. But other changes soon followed which 
they in vain attempted to oppose ; and the state passed 
into the hands of the revolutionists, who established 
a dynastic oligarchy. 

All constitutions are overthrown either from within or 
from without ; the latter, when there is some govern- 20 
ment close at hand having an opposite interest, or at a 
distance, but powerful. This was exemplified in the 
old times of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians ; the 
Athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies, and 
the Lacedaemonians the democracies. 2 

I have now explained what are the chief causes of 
revolutions and dissensions in states. 2 5 

8 We have next to consider what means there are of 
1 I302 b 4, 1303 s 20-25, bl 7- a Cp. iv. 1296*32. 




preserving constitutions in general, and in particular cases. 
In the first place it is evident that if we know the causes 
which destroy constitutions, we also know the causes which 
preserve them ; for opposites produce opposites, and de- 
struction is the opposite of preservation. 1 

3° In all well- attempered governments there is nothing 
which should be more jealously maintained than the 
spirit of obedience to law, more especially in small 
matters ; for transgression creeps in unperceived and at 
last ruins the state, just as the constant recurrence of 
small expenses in time eats up a fortune. The expense 
does not take place all at once, and therefore is not 

35 observed ; the mind is deceived, as in the fallacy which 
says that ' if each part is little, then the whole is little '. 
And this is true in one way, but not in another, for the 
whole and the all are not little, although they are made 
up of littles. 

In the first place, then, men should guard against the 

4° beginning of change, and in the second place they should 
I3°8 a not rely upon the political devices of which I have 
already spoken, 2 invented only to deceive the people, 
for they are proved by experience to be useless. Further, 
we note that oligarchies as well as aristocracies may last, 
not from any inherent stability in such forms of govern- 
5 ment, but because the rulers are on good terms both 
with the unenfranchised and with the governing classes, 
not maltreating any who are excluded from the govern- 
ment, but introducing into it the leading spirits among 
them. 3 They should never wrong the ambitious in a 
matter of honour, or the common people in a matter of 

10 money ; and they should treat one another and their 
fellow-citizens in a spirit of equality. The equality which 
the friends of democracy seek to establish for the multi- 
tude is not only just but likewise expedient among 
equals. Hence, if the governing class are numerous, 

15 many democratic institutions are useful ; for example, 
the restriction of the tenure of offices to six months, that 

1 Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 1129 s1 13. 2 Cp. iv. I297 a 13-38. 

3 Cp. vi. 1321 s1 26. 

BOOK V. 8 i3o8 a 

all those who are of equal rank may share in them. 
Indeed, equals or peers when they are numerous be- 
come a kind of democracy, and therefore demagogues 
are very likely to arise among them, as I have already 
remarked. 1 The short tenure of office prevents oli- 
garchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands of 
families ; it is not easy for a person to do any great harm 
when his tenure of office is short, whereas long pos- 20 
session begets tyranny in oligarchies and democracies. 
For the aspirants to tyranny are either the principal 
men of the state, who in democracies are demagogues 
and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those 
who hold great offices, and have a long tenure of them. 2 

Constitutions are preserved when their destroyers are 25 
at a distance, and sometimes also because they are near, 
for the fear of them makes the government keep in hand 
the constitution. Wherefore the ruler wHo has a care of 
the constitution should invent terrors, and bring distant 
dangers near, in order that the citizens may be on their 
guard, and, like sentinels in a night-watch, never relax 
their attention. He should endeavour too by help of 3° 
the laws to control the contentions and quarrels of 
the notables, and to prevent those who have not hitherto 
taken part in them from catching the spirit of contention. 
No ordinary man can discern the beginning of evil, 3 but 
only the true statesman. 

As to the change produced jn oligarchies and constitu- 35 
tional governments 4 by the alteration of the qualification, 
when this arises, not out of any variation in the quali- 
fication but only out of the increase of money, it is well 
to compare the general B valuation of property with that 
of past years, annually in those cities in which the census 40 
is taken annually, and in larger cities every third or fifth i3o8 b 
year. If the whole is many times -greater or many 
timesless than when the ratings recognized by the constitu- 
tion were fixed, there should be power given by law to raise 5 
or lower the qualification as the amount is greater or less. 

1 I305 b 23 sqq. 2 Cp. 1305*7- s C P- I3°3 bl 7"3i. 

4 Cp. i3o6 b 6-i6. B Reading koivov in 1. 39 with the MSS. 

B4!i)7 M 

i3o8 b POLITICA 

Where this is not done x a constitutional government 
passes into an oligarchy, and an oligarchy is narrowed to 
a rule of families ; or in the opposite case constitutional 
government becomes democracy, and oligarchy either 
constitutional government or democracy. 

10 It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy, and 
every other form of government not to allow the dispro- 
portionate increase of any citizen, but to give moderate 
honour for a long time rather than great honour for a 
short time. For men are easily spoilt ; not every one 

15 can bear prosperity. But if this rule is not observed, at 
any rate the honours which are given all at once should 
be taken away by degrees and not all at once. Especially 
should the laws provide against any one having too 
much power, whether derived from friends or money ; if 

20 he has, he should be sent clean out of the country. 2 And 
since innovations creep in through the private life of 
individuals also, there ought to be a magistracy which will 
have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with 
the government, whether oligarchy or democracy or any 
other. And for a like reason an increase of prosperity in 

25 any part of the state should be carefully watched. The 
proper remedy for this evil is always to give the manage- 
ment of affairs and offices of state to opposite elements ; 
such opposites are the virtuous and the many, or the 
rich and the poor. Another way is to combine the poor and 
the rich in one body, or to increase the middle class : thus 

30 an end will be put to the revolutions which arise from 

But above all every state should be so administered 
and so regulated by law that its magistrates cannot 
possibly make money. 3 In oligarchies special precautions 
should be used against this evil. For the people do not 
take any great offence at being kept out of the govern- 

35 ment — indeed they are rather pleased than otherwise at 
having leisure for their private business — but what irri- 
tates them is to think that their rulers are stealing the 

1 Reading in 1. 7 ^17 Tnnniivrav ptv ovtcos, tv6a /i«V, with the MSS. 

2 Cp. 1302M8; iii. 1284 s 17. 3 C P- 1316*39. 

BOOK V. 8 i3o8 b 

public money; then they are doubly annoyed ; for they 
lose both honour and profit. If office brought no profit, 
then and then only could democracy and aristocracy be 
combined ; for both notables and people might have 40 
their wishes gratified. All would be able to hold office, 1309* 
which is the aim of democracy, and the notables would 
be magistrates, which is the aim of aristocracy. And 
this result may be accomplished when there is no possi- 
bility of making money out of the offices ; for the poor 
will not want to have them when there is nothing to be 
gained from them — they would rather be attending to 5 
their own concerns; and the rich, who do not want 
money from the public treasury, will be able to take 
them ; and so the poor will keep to their work and grow 
rich, and the notables will not be governed by the lower 
class. In order to avoid peculation of the public money, 10 
the transfer of the revenue should be made at a general 
assembly of the citizens, and duplicates of the accounts 
deposited with the different brotherhoods, companies, 
and tribes. And honours should be given by law to 
magistrates who have the reputation of being incor- 
ruptible. In democracies the rich should be spared ; not 1 5 
only should their property not be divided, but their 
incomes also, which in some states are taken from them 
imperceptibly, should be protected. It is a good thing 
to prevent the wealthy citizens, even if they are willing, 
from undertaking expensive and useless public services, 
such as the giving of choruses, torch-races, and the like. 
In an oligarchy, on the other hand, great care should be 20 
taken of the poor, and lucrative offices should go to 
them ; if any of the wealthy classes insult them, the 
offender should be punished more severely than if he had 
wronged one of his own class. Provision should be 
made that estates pass by inheritance and not by gift, and 
no person should have more than one inheritance ; for in 25 
this way properties will be equalized, and more of the 
poor rise to competency. It is also expedient both in a 
democracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who 
have less share in the government (i. e. to the rich in a 

M 2 

i3og a POLITICA 

democracy and to the poor in an oligarchy) an equality 
30 or preference in all but the principal offices of state. 
The latter should be entrusted chiefly or only to members 
of the governing class. 

There are three qualifications required in those who 9 
have to fill the highest offices, — (1) first of all, loyalty to 

35 the established constitution ; (2) the greatest administra- 
tive capacity ; (3) virtue and justice of the kind proper to 
each form of government ; for, if what is just is not the 
same in all governments, the quality of justice must also 
differ. There may be a doubt, however, when all these 

40 qualities do not meet in the same person, how the selec- 
I309 b tion is to be made ; suppose, for example, a good general 
is a bad man and not a friend to the constitution, and 
another man is loyal and just, which should we choose ? 
In making the election ought we not to consider two 
points ? what qualities are common, and what are rare. 
Thus in the choice of a general, we should regard his 
5 skill rather than his virtue ; for few have military skill, 
but many have virtue. In any office of trust or steward- 
ship, on the other hand, the opposite rule should be 
observed ; for more virtue than ordinary is required in 
the holder of such an office, but the necessary knowledge 
is of a sort which all men possess. 

It may, however, be asked what a man wants with 

10 virtue if he have political ability and is loyal, since these 
two qualities alone will make him do what is for the 
public interest. But may not men have both of them 
and yet be deficient in self-control? If, knowing and 
loving their own interests, they do not always attend to 
them, may they not be equally negligent of the. interests 
of the public ? 

Speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal 

15 enactments are held to be for the interest of various 

constitutions, all these preserve them. And the great 

preserving principle is the one which has been repeatedly 

mentioned, 1 — to have a care that the loyal citizens 

' iv. I296 b 15, vi. 1320** 14, cp. ii. i27o b 2i sq., iv. 1294*37. 

BOOK V. 9 1309 

should be stronger than the disloyal. Neither should we 
forget the mean, which at the present day is lost sight of 
in perverted forms of government ; for many practices 
which appear to be democratical are the ruin of demo- -° 
cracies, and many which appear to be oligarchical are the 
ruin of oligarchies. Those who think that all virtue is 
to be found in their own party principles push matters 
to extremes ; they do not consider that disproportion 
destroys a state. A nose which varies from the ideal of 
straightness to a hook or snub may still be of good shape 
and agreeable to the eye ; but if the excess be very 25 
great, all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases to 
be a nose at all on account of some excess in one direc- 
tion or defect in the other ; and this is true of every 
other part of the human body. The same law of propor- 30 
tion equally holds in states. Oligarchy or democracy, 
although a departure from the most perfect form, may 
yet be a good enough government, but if any one attempts 
to push the principles of either to an extreme, he will 
begin by spoiling the government and end by having 
none at all. Wherefore the legislator and the statesman 35 
ought to know what democratical measures save and 
what destroy a democracy, and what oligarchical measures 
save or destroy an oligarchy. For neither the one nor 
the other can exist or continue to exist unless both rich 
and poor are included in it. If equality of property is 
introduced, the state must of necessity take another form ; 4 o 
for when by laws carried to excess one or other element 1310* 
in the state is ruined, the constitution is ruined. 

There is an error common both to oligarchies and to 
democracies: — in the latter the demagogues, when the 
multitude are above the law, are always cutting the city 
in two by quarrels with the rich, whereas they should 5 
always profess to be maintaining their cause ; just as in 
oligarchies the oligarchs should profess to maintain the 
cause of the people, and should take oaths the opposite 
of those which they now take. For there are cities in 
which they swear — ' I will be an enemy to the people, 
and will devise all the harm against them which I can ' ; 


i3io a POLITICA 

10 but they ought to exhibit and to entertain the very 
opposite feeling ; in the form of their oath there should 
be an express declaration — ' I will do no wrong to the 

But of all the things which I have mentioned that which 
most contributes to the permanence of constitutions is the 
adaptation of education to the form of government, 1 and 
yet in our own day this principle is universally neglected. 

J 5 The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the 
state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by 
habit and education in the spirit of the constitution, 
if the laws are democratical, democratically, or oligar- 
chically, if the laws are oligarchical. For there may be 
a want of self-discipline in states as well as in in- 
dividuals. Now, to have been educated in the spirit 

20 of the constitution is not to perform the actions in 
which oligarchs or democrats delight, but those by which 
the existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made 
possible. Whereas among ourselves the sons of the 
ruling class in an oligarchy live in luxury, 2 but the sons 
of the poor are hardened by exercise and toil, and hence 
they are both more inclined and better able to make a 

35 revolution. 3 And in democracies of the more extreme 
type there has arisen a false idea of freedom which is 
contradictory to the true interests of the state. For two 
principles are characteristic of democracy, the govern- 

30 ment of the majority and freedom. Men think that 
what is just is equal ; and that equality is the supremacy 
of the popular will ; and that freedom means the doing 
what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives 
as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, 4 ' according 
to his fancy.' But this is all wrong ; men should not 

35 think it slavery to live according to the rule of the con- 
stitution ; for it is their salvation. 

I have now discussed generally the causes of the revo- 
lution and destruction of states, and the means of their 
preservation and continuance. 

1 Cp. viii. 1337*14- 2 C P- iv - I295 b i7- 

3 Cp. PI. Rep. viii. 556 D. 4 fr. 891, Nauck 2 . 

BOOK V. 10 1310' 

10 I have still to speak of monarchy, and the causes of its 
destruction and preservation. What I have said already 40 
respecting forms of constitutional government applies 1310' 
almost equally to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal 
rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, and a tyranny is 
a compound of oligarchy and democracy in their most 
extreme forms ; it is therefore most injurious to its sub- 5 
jects, being made up of two evil forms of government, 
and having the perversions and errors of both. These 
two forms of monarchy are contrary in their very origin. 
The appointment of a king is the resource of the better 
classes against the people, and he is elected by them out 10 
of their own number, because either he himself or his 
family excel in virtue and virtuous actions ; whereas a 
tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector 
against the notables, and in order to prevent them from 
being injured. History shows that almost all tyrants 
have been demagogues who gained the favour of the 15 
people by their accusation of the notables. 1 At any rate 
this was the manner in which the tyrannies arose in the 
days when cities had increased in power. Others which 
were older originated in the ambition of kings wanting to 
overstep the limits of their hereditary power and become 
despots. Others again grew out of the class which were 2 ° 
chosen to be chief magistrates; for in ancient times 
the people who elected them gave the magistrates, 
whether civil or religious, a long tenure. Others arose 
out of the custom which oligarchies had of making some 
individual supreme over the highest offices. In any of 
these ways an ambitious man had no difficulty, if he 
desired, in creating a tyranny, since he had the power in 2 5 
his hands already, either as king or as one of the officers 
of state. 2 Thus Pheidon at Argos and several others 
were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants ; 
Phalaris, on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, 
acquired the tyranny by holding great offices. Whereas 
Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth, Peisistratus 3° 

1 Cp. 1305*8 ; Plato, Rep. viii. 565 D. 
* Cp. 1305*15. 

1310 15 POLITICA 

at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and several others who 
afterwards became tyrants, were at first demagogues. 

And so, as I was saying, 1 royalty ranks with aristo- 
cracy, for it is based upon merit, whether of the indi- 
vidual or of his family, or on benefits conferred, 2 or on 
these claims with power added to them. For all who 

35 have obtained this honour have benefited, or had in 
their power to benefit, states and nations ; some, like 
Codrus, have prevented the state from being enslaved in 
war ; others, like Cyrus, have given their country free- 
dom, or have settled or gained a territory, like the Lace- 

4° daemonian, Macedonian, and Molossian kings. The 
1311 s idea of a king is to be a protector of the rich against 
unjust treatment, of the people against insult and op- 
pression. Whereas a tyrant, as has often been repeated, 1 ' 
has no regard to any public interest, except as conducive 
to his private ends ; his aim is pleasure, the aim of a king, 
5 honour. Wherefore also in their desires they differ ; the 
tyrant is desirous of riches, the king, of what brings 
honour. And the guards of a king are citizens, but of a 
tyrant mercenaries. 4 

That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy 
and oligarchy is evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny, 

10 the end is wealth ; (for by wealth only can the tyrant 
maintain either his guard or his luxury). Both mistrust 
the people, and therefore deprive them of their arms. 
Both agree too in injuring the people and driving them 

15 out of the city and dispersing them. From democracy 
tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the 
notables and destroying them secretly or openly, or of 
exiling them because they are rivals and stand in the 
way of their power ; and also because plots against them 
are contrived by men of this class, who either want to 

20 rule or to escape subjection. Hence Periander advised 
Thrasybulus 5 by cutting off the tops of the tallest ears of 
corn, meaning that he must always put out of the way the 

1 1. 2 sq. 2 Cp. iii. I285 b 6. 

3 iii. 1279'' 6 sq., iv. I295 a i9. ' Cp. iii. 1 285*24. 

5 Cp. 1 284*26. 

BOOK V. 10 i3H a 

citizens who overtop the rest. And so, as I have already 
intimated, 1 the beginnings of change are the same in 
monarchies as in forms of constitutional government ; *■> 
subjects attack their sovereigns out of fear or contempt, 
or because they have been unjustly treated by them. 
And of injustice, the most common form is insult, another 
is confiscation of property. 

The ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies, 
whether tyrannies or royalties, arc the same as the ends 
sought by conspiracies against other forms of govern- 
ment. Monarchs have great wealth and honour, which 3° 
are objects of desire to all mankind. The attacks are 
made sometimes against their lives, sometimes against 
the office ; where the sense of insult is the motive, against 
their lives. Any sort of insult (and there arc many) 
may stir up anger, and when men are angry, they com- 
monly act out of revenge, and not from ambition. For 35 
example, the attempt made upon the Peisistratidae arose 
out of the public dishonour offered to the sister of Har- 
modius and the insult to himself. He attacked the 
tyrant for his sister's sake, and Aristogeiton joined in 
the attack for the sake of Harmodius. A conspiracy 
was also formed against Periander, the tyrant of Am- 4° 
bracia, because, when drinking with a favourite youth, he I3ii b 
asked him whether by this time he was not with child by 
him. Philip, too, was attacked by Pausanias because he 
permitted him to be insulted by Attalus and his friends, 
and Amyntas the little, by Derdas, because he boasted 
of having enjoyed his youth. Evagoras of Cyprus, 
again, was slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult ; for 5 
his wife had been carried off by Evagoras's son. Many 
conspiracies have originated in shameful attempts made 
by sovereigns on the persons of their subjects. Such 
was the attack of Crataeas upon Archelaus ; he had 
always hated the connexion with him, and so, when 
Archelaus, having promised him one of his two daughters 10 
in marriage, did not give him either of them, but broke 
his word and married the elder to the king of Elymeia, 

1 i3io u 40 sqq. 



when he was hard pressed in a war against Sirrhas and 
Arrhabaeus, and the younger to his own son Amyntas, 
under the idea that Amyntas would then be less likely to 
'5 quarrel with his son by Cleopatra — Crataeas made this 
slight a pretext for attacking Archelaus, though even a 
less reason would have sufficed, for the real cause of 
the estrangement was the disgust which he felt at his 
connexion with the king. And from a like motive 
Hellanocrates of Larissa conspired with him; for when 
Archelaus, who was his lover, did not fulfil his promise of 
restoring him to his country, he thought that the connexion 
between them had originated, not in affection, but in the 
2° wantonness of power. Pytho, too, and Heracleides of 
Aenos, slew Cotys in order to avenge their father, and 
Adamas revolted from Cotys in revenge for the wanton 
outrage which he had committed in mutilating him when 
a child. 

Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person 
which they deemed an insult, have either killed or 
25 attempted to kill officers of state and royal princes by 
whom they have been injured. Thus, at Mytilene, 
Megacles and his friends attacked and slew the Pen- 
thilidae, as they were going about x and striking people 
with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who had been 
beaten and torn away from his wife by Penthilus, slew 
3° him. In the conspiracy against Archelaus, Decamnichus 
stimulated the fury of the assassins and led the attack ; 
he was enraged because Archelaus had delivered him to 
Euripides to be scourged ; for the poet had been irri- 
tated at some remark made by Decamnichus on the 
foulness of his breath. Many other examples might be 
35 cited of murders and conspiracies which have arisen from 
similar causes. 

Fear is another motive which, as we have said, 2 has 
caused conspiracies as well in monarchies as in more 
popular forms of government. Thus Artapanes conspired 
against Xerxes and slew him, fearing that he would 

1 Reading irepuomas in 1. 27 with some MSS. 

2 Cp. I302 b 2, 21, I3Il a 25. 

BOOK V. 10 I3ii b 

be accused of hanging Darius against his orders. — he 
having been under the impression that Xerxes would 
forget what he had said in the middle of a meal, and that 
the offence would be forgiven. 

Another motive is contempt, as in the case of Sarda- 4° 
napalus, whom some one saw carding wool with his I3 12a 
women, if the story-tellers say truly ; and the tale may 
be true, if not of him, of some one else. 1 Dion attacked 
the younger Dionysius because he despised him, and saw 5 
that he was equally despised by his own subjects, 
and that he was always drunk. Even the friends of a 
tyrant will sometimes attack him out of contempt ; for 
the confidence which he reposes in them breeds con- 
tempt, and they think that they will not be found out. 
The expectation of success is likewise a sort of contempt ; 
the assailants are ready to strike, and think nothing of 10 
the danger, because they seem to have the power in their 
hands. Thus generals of armies attack monarchs; as, 
for example, Cyrus attacked Astyages, despising the 
effeminacy of his life, and believing that his power was 
worn out. Thus again, Seuthes the Thracian conspired 
against Amadocus, whose general he was. 

And sometimes men are actuated by more than one 15 
motive, like Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobar- 
zanes, partly out of contemptand partly from the love of gain. 

Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high 
military position, are most likely to make the attempt in 
the expectation of success ; for courage is emboldened 
by power, and the union of the two inspires them with 20 
the hope of an easy victory. 

Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise in a 
different way as well as in those already mentioned. 
There are men who will not risk their lives in the hope of -5 
gains and honours however great, but who nevertheless 
regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary 
action which will make them famous and honourable in 
the world ; they wish to acquire, not a kingdom, but 3° 
a name. It is rare, however, to find such men ; he who 

1 Cp. i. 1259" 7. 


would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose his life if he 

35 fail. He must have the resolution of Dion, who, when 
he made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few 
troops, saying ' that whatever measure of success he 
might attain would be enough for him, even if he were 
to die the moment he landed ; such a death would be 
welcome to him'. But this is a temper to which few can 

4° Once more, tyrannies, like all other governments, are 
I3 12 destroyed from without by some opposite and more 
powerful form of government. That such a government 
will have the will to attack them is clear ; for the two are 
opposed in principle ; and all men, if they can, do what 
they will. Democracy is antagonistic to tyranny, on 
the principle of Hesiod, 1 'Potter hates Potter', because 
5 they are nearly akin, for the extreme form of democracy 
is tyranny ; and royalty and aristocracy are both alike 
opposed to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a 
different type. And therefore the Lacedaemonians put 
down most of the tyrannies, and so did the Syracusans 
during the time when they were well governed. 

Again, tyrannies are destroyed from within, when the 

10 reigning family are divided among themselves, as that 
of Gelo was, and more recently that of Dionysius ; in the 
case of Gelo because Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, 
flattered the son of Gelo and led him into excesses in 
order that he might rule in his name. Whereupon the 
family got together a party to get rid of Thrasybulus and 

15 save the tyranny ; but those of the people who conspired 
with them seized the opportunity and drove them all out. 
In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, attacked 
and expelled him with the assistance of the people ; he 
afterwards perished himself. 

There are two chief motives which induce men to 
attack tyrannies — hatred and contempt. Hatred of 

20 tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is also a frequent 
cause of their destruction. Thus we see that most of 
those who have acquired, have retained their power, 

1 Op. et Dies 25. 

BOOK V. 10 I3i2 b 

but those who have inherited, 1 have lost it, almost at 
once ; for, living in luxurious ease, they have become 
contemptible, and offer many opportunities to their 
assailants. Anger, too, must be included under hatred, 25 
and produces the same effects. It is oftentimes even 
more ready to strike — the angry are more impetuous in 
making an attack, for they do not follow rational prin- 
ciple. And men are very apt to give way to their passions 
when they are insulted. To this cause is to be attributed ?,° 
the fall of the Peisistratidae and of many others. Hatred 
is more reasonable, for anger is accompanied by pain, 
which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred is 
painless. 2 

In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned 3 as 
destroying the last and most unmixed form of oligarchy, 35 
and the extreme form of democracy, may be assumed to 
affect tyranny; indeed the extreme forms of both are 
only tyrannies distributed among several persons. Kingly 
rule is little affected by external causes, and is therefore 
lasting ; it is generally destroyed from within. And 40 
there are two ways in which the destruction may come 
about ; (1) when the members of the royal family quarrel 13^ 
among themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to 
administer the state too much after the fashion of a 
tyranny, and to extend their authority contrary to the law. 
Royalties do not now come into existence ; where such 
forms of government arise, they are rather monarchies or 
tyrannies. For the rule of a king is over voluntary subjects, 5 
and he is supreme in all important matters ; but in our 
own daymen are more upon an equality, and no one is so im- 
measurably superior to others as to represent adequately 
the greatness and dign'ty of the office. Hence mankind 
will not, if theycan help, endure it, and any one who obtains 
power by force or fraud is at once thought to be a tyrant. IO 
In hereditary monarchies a further cause of destruction is 
the fact that kings often fall into contempt, and, although 
possessing not tyrannical power, but only royal dignity, 

1 Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 695. 2 Cp. Rhetoric, ii. 1382* 12. 

s i302 h 25-33, i304 b 2o-i3o6 b 2i. 


are apt to outrage others. Their overthrow is then 
'5 readily effected ; for there is an end to the king when his 
subjects do not want to have him, but the tyrant lasts, 
whether they like him or not. 

The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to 
these and the like causes. 

And they are preserved, to speak generally, by the 11 
opposite causes ; or, if we consider them separately, 
(i) royalty is preserved by the limitation of its powers. 

20 The more restricted the functions of kings, the longer 
their power will last unimpaired ; for then they are more 
moderate and not so despotic in their ways ; and they 
are less envied by their subjects. This is the reason why 
the kingly office has lasted so long among the Molossians. 

25 And for a similar reason it has continued among the 
Lacedaemonians, because there it was always divided 
between two, and afterwards further limited by Theo- 
pompus in various respects, more particularly by the 
establishment of the Ephoralty. He diminished the 
power of the kings, but established on a more lasting 
basis the kingly office, which was thus made in a certain 

30 sense not less, but greater. There is a story that when 
his wife once asked him whether he was not ashamed to 
leave to his sons a royal power which was less than he 
had inherited from his father, ' No indeed/ he replied, ' for 
the power which I leave to them will be more lasting.' 
As to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most 

35 opposite ways. One of them is the old traditional 
method in which most tyrants administer their govern- 
ment. Of such arts Periander of Corinth is said to have 
been the great master, and many similar devices may be 
gathered from the Persians in the administration of their 
government. There are firstly the prescriptions men- 
tioned some distance back, 1 for the preservation of a 
tyranny, in so far as this is possible ; viz. that the tyrant 

40 should lop off those who are too high ; he must put to 

1 i3ii a 15-22. 

ROOK V. ii I3i3 b 

death men of spirit ; he must not allow common meals, I3 T 3 
clubs, education, and the like ; he must be upon his guard 
against anything which is likely to inspire either courage 
or confidence among his subjects ; he must prohibit 
literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion, and 
he must take every means to prevent people from 
knowing one another (for acquaintance begets mutual 5 
confidence). Further, he must compel all persons staying 
in the city to appear in public and live at his gates ; then he 
will know what they are doing : if they are always kept 
under, they will learn to be humble. In short, he should 
practise these and the like Persian and barbaric arts, 
which all have the same object. A tyrant should also 10 
endeavour to know what each of his subjects says or does, 
and should employ spies, like the 'female detectives' at 
Syracuse, and the eavesdroppers whom Hiero was in the 
habit of sending to any place of resort or meeting ; for 15 
the fear of informers prevents people from speaking their 
minds, and if they do, they are more easily found out. 
Another art of the tyrant is to sow quarrels among the 
citizens ; friends should be embroiled with friends, the 
people with the notables, and the rich with one another. 
Also he should impoverish his subjects ; he thus provides 
against the maintenance of a guard by the citizens, and 
the people, having to keep hard at work, are prevented 20 
from conspiring. The Pyramids of Egypt afford an ex- 
ample of this policy; also the offerings of the family of 
Cypselus, and the building of the temple of Olympian 
Zeus by the Peisistratidae, and the great Polycratean 
monuments at Samos ; all these works were alike in- 
tended to occupy the people and keep them poor. 25 
Another practice of tyrants is to multiply taxes, after the 
manner of Dionysius at Syracuse, who contrived that 
within five years his subjects should bring into the 
treasury their whole property. The tyrant is also fond 
of making war in order that his subjects may have 
something to do and be always in want of a leader. 
And whereas the power of a king is preserved by his 30 
friends, the characteristic of a tyrant is to distrust his 


friends, because he knows that all men want to overthrow 
him, and they above all have the power. 

Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of 
democracy 1 are all found in tyrannies. Such are the 
power given to women in their families in the hope that 
they will inform against their husbands, and the licence 
which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray 

35 their masters ; for slaves and women do not conspire 
against tyrants ; and they are of course friendly to 
tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they 
have a good time. For the people too would fain be a 
monarch, and therefore by them, as well as by the tyrant, 

40 the flatterer is held in honour ; in democracies he is the 
demagogue ; and the tyrant also has those who associate 
1314 s with him in a humble spirit, which is a work of flattery. 
Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, 2 because 
they love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit 
of a freeman in him will lower himself by flattery ; 
good men love others, or at any rate do not flatter them. 
Moreover, the bad are useful for bad purposes ; 'nail 
5 knocks out nail ', as the proverb says. It is characteristic 
of a tyrant to dislike every one who has dignity or inde- 
pendence ; he wants to be alone in his glory, but any 
one who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence 
encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as 

10 an enemy to his power. Another mark of a tyrant is 
that he likes foreigners better than citizens, and lives 
with them and invites them to his table ; for the one arc 
enemies, but the others enter into no rivalry with him. 

Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which 
he preserves his power ; there is no wickedness too great 
for him. All that we have said may be summed up 

15 under three heads, which answer to the three aims of the 
tyrant. These are, (1) the humiliation of his subjects; 
he knows that a mean-spirited man will not conspire 
against anybody : (2) the creation of mistrust among 
them ; for a tyrant is not overthrown until men begin to 

1 Cp. vi. i3i9 b 27. 

2 Reading novt]p6(j>i\ov in 1. 1 with the MSS. 

BOOK V. ii I3i4 a 

have confidence in one another ; and this is the reason 
why tyrants are at war with the good ; they are under 
the idea that their power is endangered by them, not 20 
only because they will not be ruled despotically, but also 
because they are loyal to one another, and to other men, 
and do not inform against one another or against other 
men : (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be 
incapable of action, for no one attempts what is impossible, 
and they will not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, if they 
are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy 25 
of a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other of 
them all his ideas may be referred : (1) he sows distrust 
among his subjects ; (2) he takes away their power ; (3) 
he humbles them. 

This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies 30 
are preserved ; and there is another which proceeds upon 
an almost opposite principle of action. The nature of 
this latter method may be gathered from a comparison 
of the causes which destroy kingdoms, for as one mode 
of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king 
more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make 
it more like the rule of a king. But of one thing the 35 
tyrant must be careful ; he must keep power enough to 
rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for 
if he once gives this up he gives up his tyranny. But 
though power must be retained as the foundation, in all 
else the tyrant should act or appear to act in the 
character of a king. In the first place he should pretend l 4° 
a care of the public revenues, and not waste money in I3!4 b 
making 2 presents of a sort at which the common people 
get excited when they see their hard-won earnings 
snatched from them and lavished on courtesans and 
strangers and artists. He should give an account of 5 
what he receives and of what he spends (a practice which 
has been adopted by some tyrants) ; for then he will seem 
to be a steward of the public rather than a tyrant ; nor 
need he fear that, while he is the lord of the city, he will 

1 Reading KaXott — npatrov fxe v ftoict'iv in 1. 40. 
1 Omitting tls in i. I. 

64B11 N 



ever be in want of money. Such a policy is at all events 
much more advantageous for the tyrant when he goes 

10 from home, than to leave behind him a hoard, for then 
the garrison who rerhain in the city will be less likely to 
attack his power ; and a tyrant, when he is absent from 
home, has more reason to fear the guardians of his 
treasure than the citizens, for the one accompany him, 
but the others remain behind. In the second place, he 
should be seen to collect taxes and to requirepublic services 

15 only for state purposes, and that he may form a fund in 
case of war, and generally he ought to make himself the 
guardian and treasurer of them, as if they belonged, not 
to him, but to the public. He should appear, not harsh, 
but dignified, and when men meet him they should look 

20 upon him with reverence, and not with fear. Yet it is 
hard for him to be respected if he inspires no respect, and 
therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at least he 
should maintain the character of a great soldier, and 
produce the impression that he is one. Neither he nor 
any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least 
offence against modesty towards the young of either sex 

25 who are his subjects, and the women of his family should 
observe a like self-control towards other women ; the 
insolence of women has ruined many tyrannies. In the 
indulgence of pleasures he should be the opposite of our 
modern tyrants, who not only begin at dawn and pass 

30 whole days in sensuality, but want other men to see them, 
that they may admire their happy and blessed lot. 
In these things a tyrant should if possible be moderate, 
or at any rate should not parade his vices to the world ; 
for a drunken and drowsy tyrant is soon despised and 

35 attacked ; not so he who is temperate and wide awake. 
His conduct should be the very reverse of nearly 
everything which has been said before 1 about tyrants. 
He ought to adorn and improve his city, as though he 
were not a tyrant, but the guardian of the state. Also 
he should appear to be particularly earnest in the service 

40 of the Gods ; for if men think that a ruler is religious 

1 I3i3 a 35-i3i4 a 29. 

ROOK V. n 1315 s 

and has a reverence for the Gods, they arc less afraid of 1315* 
suffering injustice at his hands, and they are less disposed 
to conspire against him, because they believe him to have 
the very Gods fighting on his side. At the same time 
his religion must not be thought foolish. And he should 
honour men of merit, and make them tnink that they 5 
would not be held in more honour by the citizens if they 
had a free government. The honour he should distribute 
himself, but the punishment should be inflicted by 
officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which is 
taken by all monarchs not to make one person great ; 
but if one, then two or more should be raised, that they 
may look sharply after one another. If after all some one 10 
has to be made great, he should not be a man of bold 
spirit ; for such dispositions are ever most inclined to 
strike. And if any one is to be deprived of his power, 
let it be diminished gradually, not taken from him all at 
once. 1 The tyrant should abstain from all outrage; in 15 
particular from personal violence and from wanton con- 
duct towards the young. He should be especially 
careful of his behaviour to men who are lovers of honour ; 
for as the lovers o( money are offended when their 
property is touched, so are the lovers of honoui and the 
virtuous when their honour is affected. Therefore a 20 
tyrant ought either not to commit such acts at all ; or 
he should be thought only to employ fatherly correction, 
and not to trample upon others, — and his acquaintance 
with youth should be supposed to arise from affection, 
and not from the insolence of power, and in general he 
should compensate the appearance of dishonour by the 
increase of honour. 

Of those who attempt assassination they are the most 2 5 
dangerous, and require to be most carefully watched, who 
do not care to survive, if they effect their purpose 
Therefore special precaution should be taken about any 
who think that either they or those for whom they care 
have been insulted ; for when men are led away by 
passion to assault others they are regardless of themselves 

1 Cp. i3o8 b i5. 
n a 


30 As Heracleitus says, ' It is difficult to fight against anger ; 
for a man will buy revenge with his soul.' : 

And whereas states consist of two classes, of poor men 
and of rich, the tyrant should lead both to imagine that 
they are preserved and prevented from harming one 

35 another by his rule, and whichever of the two is stronger 
he should attach to his government ; for, having this 
advantage, he has no need either to emancipate slaves or 
to disarm the citizens ; either party added to the force 
which he already has, will make him stronger than his 

4 o But enough of these details ; — what should be the 
general policy of the tyrant is obvious. He ought to show 
himself to his subjects in the light, not of a tyrant, but 
I3i5 b of a steward and a king. He should not appropriate 
what is theirs, but should be their guardian ; he should 
be moderate, not extravagant in his way of life ; he 
should win the notables by companionship, and the multi- 
tude by flattery. For then his rule will of necessity be 
5 nobler and happier, because he will rule over better men - 
whose spirits are not crushed, over men to whom he 
himself is not an object of hatred, and of whom he is not 
afraid. His power too will be more lasting. His 

10 disposition will be virtuous, or at least half virtuous; 
and he will not be wicked, but half wicked only. 

Yet no forms of government are so short-lived as 12 
oligarchy and tyranny. The tyranny which lasted 
longest was that of Orthagoras and his sons at Sicyon ; 
this continued for a hundred years. The reason was 

15 that they treated their subjects with moderation, and to 
a great extent observed the laws ; and in various ways 
gained the favour of the people by the care which they 
took of them. Cleisthenes, in particular, was respected 
for his military ability. If report may be believed, he 
crowned the judge who decided against him in the 

20 games ; and, as some say, the sitting statue in the Agora 
of Sicyon is the likeness of this person. (A similar story 
1 Fragm. 85 (ed. Diels). 2 Cp. i. 1254*25. 

BOOK V. 12 1315 

is told of Peisistratus, who is said on one occasion to 
have allowed himself to be summoned and tried before 
the Areopagus.) 

Next in duration to the tyranny of Orthagoras was 
that of the Cypselidae at Corinth, which lasted seventy- 
three years and six months : Cypselus reigned thirty 
years, Periander forty and a half, and Psammetichus the 25 
son of Gorgus three. Their continuance was due to 
similar causes : Cypselus was a popular man, who during 
the whole time of his rule never had a body-guard ; 
and Periander, although he was a tyrant, was a great 
soldier. Third in duration was the rule of the 
Peisistratidae at Athens, but it was interrupted ; for 3° 
Peisistratus was twice driven out, so that during three 
and thirty years he reigned only seventeen ; and his sons 
reigned eighteen — altogether thirty-five years. Of other 
tyrannies, that of Hiero * and Gelo at Syracuse was the 
most lasting. Even this, however, was short, not more 35 
than eighteen years in all ; for Gelo continued tyrant 
for seven years, and died in the eighth ; Hiero reigned 
for ten years, and Thrasybulus was driven out in the 
eleventh month. In fact, tyrannies generally have been 
of quite short duration. 

I have now gone through almost all the causes by which 40 
constitutional governments and monarchies are either 
destroyed or preserved. I3'6 

In the Republic of Plato, 2 Socrates treats of revolutions, 
but not well, for he mentions no cause of change which 
peculiarly affects the first, or perfect state. He only says 
that the cause is that nothing is abiding, but all things 
change in a certain cycle ; and that the origin of the 5 
change consists in those numbers ' of which 4 and 3, 
married with 5, furnish two harmonies', 2 — (he means when 

1 Omitting r<ov in 1. 34. 

2 This is an extract from the much fuller account in Rep. viii. 
546 B.C. eirirpiTos nvdfMTjv is ' the ratio 4:3 in its lowest terms ', 
1. e. the numbers 4, 3. These numbers when ' married ' with 5 
produce the right-angled triangle whose sides are as 3, 4, 5. 
When the ' number of this figure ' is made solid, i. e. cubed, either 
by adding the cubes of the sides, or by cubing the area, the number 
216 is produced, which gives in days the minimum period of 



1316 11 POLITICA 

the number of this figure becomes solid) ; he conceives 
that nature at certain times produces bad men who will 
not submit to education; in which latter particular he may 
very likely be not far wrong, for there may well be some 

10 men who cannot be educated and made virtuous. But 
why is such a cause of change peculiar to his ideal state, 
and not rather common to all states, nay, to everything 
which comes into being at all ? And is it by the agency 
of time, which, as he declares, makes all things change, 

15 that things which did not begin together, change to- 
gether ? For example, if something has come into being 
the day before the completion of the cycle, will it change 
with things that came into being before ? Further, why 
should the perfect state change into the Spartan ? x 
For governments more often take an opposite form than 

ao one akin to them. The same remark is applicable to the 
other changes ; he says that the Spartan constitution 
changes into an oligarchy, and this into a democracy, and 
this again into a tyranny. And yet the contrary happens 
quite as often ; for a democracy is even more likely to 

35 change into an oligarchy than into a monarchy. Further, 
he never says whether tyranny is, or is not, liable to 
revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them, or into 
what form it changes. And the reason is, that he could 
not very well have told : for there is no rule ; according 
to him it should revert to the first and best, and then 
there would be a complete cycle. But in point of fact a 

30 tyranny often changes into a tyranny, as that at Sicyon 
changed from the tyranny of Myron into that of 
Cleisthenes ; into oligarchy, as the tyranny of Antileon 
did at Chalcis ; into democracy, as that of Gelo's family 
did at Syracuse ; into aristocracy, as at Carthage, and the 

35 tyranny of Charilaus at Lacedaemon. Often an oligarchy 

gestation in man, and therefore, according to Plato's fancy, is the 
source of degeneration. The two harmonies are the square with 
sides of 3,600, and the rectangle with sides of 4,800, 2,700, the 
area of each of which, viz. 12,960,000, = (3X4><5) 4 - For a full 
discussion of the Nuptial Number in Plato cf. Adam's ed. of 
the Republic, vol. ii, pp. 201-209, 264-312, and in particular see the 
discussion of the Aristotelian passage on pp. 306-312. 
1 Rep. viii. 544 C 

BOOK V. 12 I3i6 a 

changes into a tyranny, like most of the ancient oligar- 
chies in Sicily ; for example, the oligarchy at Leontini 
changed into the tyranny of Panaetius ; that at Gela into 
the tyranny of Cleander ; that at Rhegium into the 
tyranny of Anaxilaus ; the same thing has happened in 
many other states. And it is absurd to suppose that 
the state changes into oligarchy merely because the ruling 4° 
class are lovers and makers of money, 1 and not because I3l6 b 
the very rich think it unfair that the very poor should 
have an equal share in the government with themselves. 
Moreover, in many oligarchies there are laws against 
making money in trade. But at Carthage, which is a 5 
democracy, there is no such prohibition ; and yet to thfs 
day the Carthaginians have never had a revolution. It 
is absurd too for him to say that an oligarchy is two 
cities, one of the rich, and the other of the poor. 2 Is 
not this just as much the case in the Spartan con- 
stitution, or in any other in which either all do not 
possess equal property, or all* are not equally good men? io 
Nobody need be any poorer than he was before, and yet 
the oligarchy may change all the same into a democracy, 
if the poor form the majority ; and a democracy may 
change into an oligarchy, if the wealthy class are stronger 
than the people, and the one are energetic, the other 
indifferent. Once more, although the causes of the 15 
change :J are very numerous, he mentions only one,* 
which is, that the citizens become poor through dissipa- 
tion and debt, as though he thought that all, or the 
majority of them, were originally rich. This is not true : 
though it is true that when any of the leaders lose the ir 
property they are ripe for revolution ; but, when any- 
body else, it is no great matter, and an oligarchy does 20 
not even then more often pass into a democracy than 
into any other form of government. Again, if men are 
deprived of the honours of state, and are wronged, and 
insulted, they make revolutions, and change forms of 

1 Rep. viii. 550 E. x\ ) W ari(J ' Tn *- should be retained in 1. 40. 

2 Rep. viii. 551 D. 3 Sc. from oligarchy to democracy. 
4 Rep. viii. 555 D. 

I3i6 b 


government, even although they have not wasted their 
substance because J they might do what they liked — of 
which extravagance he declares excessive freedom to be 
the cause. 2 
25 Finally, although there are many forms of oligarchies 
and democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as 
though there were only one form of either of them. 

1 A lacuna need not be supposed to exist at 1. 23. 

2 Rep. viii. 557 c, 564. 



I We have now considered the varieties of the delibera- 
tive or supreme power in states, and the various arrange- 
ments of law-courts and state offices, and which of 
them are adapted to different forms of government. 1 We 
have also spoken of the destruction and preservation of 
constitutions, how and from what causes they arise. 2 35 

Of democracy and all other forms of government there 
are many kinds ; and it will be well to assign to them 
severally the modes of organization which are proper 
and advantageous to each, adding what remains to be said 
about them. 3 Moreover, we ought to consider the various 40 
combinations of these modes themselves ; for such com- 1317 s 
binations make constitutions overlap one another, so that 
aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitu- 
tional governments incline to democracies. 4 

When I speak of the combinations which remain to be 
considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, 
I mean such as these: — when the deliberative part of 5 
the government and the election of officers is constituted 
oligarchically, and the law-courts aristocratically, or 
when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are 
oligarchical, and the election to offices aristocratical, or 
when in any other way there is a want of harmony in 
the composition of a state. 5 

I have shown already 6 what forms of democracy are 10 

suited to particular cities, and what of oligarchy to 

particular peoples, and to whom each of the other forms 

of government is suited. Further, we must not only 

show which of these governments is the best for each 

state, but also briefly proceed to consider 7 how these 15 

and other forms of government arc to be established. 

1 Bk. iv. 14-16. 2 Bk. v. 

s I3i8 b 6-i3i9 a 6. * Cp. iv. I293 b 34. 

5 These questions are not actually discussed by A. 

* iv. 12. 7 Cp. iv. I28o. b 20. 


First of all let us speak of democracy, which will also 
bring to light the opposite form of government commonly 
called oligarchy. For the purposes of this inquiry we 
need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics of 

20 democracy, since from the combinations of these the 
varieties of democratic government arise. There are 
several of these differing from each other, and the 
difference is due to two causes. One (1) has been already 
mentioned, 1 — differences of population ; for the popular 

25 element may consist of husbandmen, or of mechanics, or 
of labourers, and if the first of these be added to the 
second, or the third to the two others, not only does the 
democracy become better or worse, but its very nature 
is changed. A second cause (2) remains to be mentioned : 

30 the various properties and characteristics of democracy, 
when variously combined, make a difference. For one 
democracy will have less and another will have more, and 
another will have all of these characteristics. There is 
an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes 
to establish some new form of democracy, or only to re- 

35 model an existing one. 2 Founders of states try to bring 
together all the elements which accord with the ideas of 
the several constitutions ; but this is a mistake of theirs, 
as I have already remarked 3 when speaking of the 
destruction and preservation of states. We will now set 
forth the principles, characteristics, and aims of such 

40 The basis of a democratic state is Hberty ; which, 2 
according to the common opinion of men, can only be 
I3I7 enjoyed in such a state ; — this they affirm to be the 
great end of every democracy. 4 One principle of liberty 
is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed demo- 
cratic justice is the application of numerical not propor- 
5 tionate equality ; whence it follows that the majority 
must be supreme, and that whatever the majority 
approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen, it 

1 iv. I29i b 17-28, I292 b 25 sqq., I296 b 26-31. 2 Cp. iv. 1289" 1. 
8 v. I309 b 18-1310*36. 4 Cp. Plato, Rep. viii. 557 sqq. 

BOOK VI. 2 1317 15 

is said, must have equality, and therefore in a democracy 
the poor have more power than the rich, because there 
are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. 
This, then, is one note of liberty which all democrats JO 
affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that 
a man should live as he likes. 1 This, they say, is the 
privilege of a freeman, since, on the other hand, not to live 
as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second 
characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim 
of men to be ruled, by none, if possible, or, if this is im- 15 
possible, to rule and be ruled in turns ; and so it contri- 
butes to the freedom based upon equality. 

Such being our foundation and such the principle from 
which we start, the characteristics of democracy are as 
follows : — the election of officers by all out of all ; and 
that all should rule over each, and each in his turn over 20 
all ; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those 
which require experience and skill,'- should be made by 
lot ; that no property qualification should be required for 
offices, or only a very low one ; that a man should not 
hold the same office twice, or not often, or in the case of 
few except military offices : that the tenure of all offices, 
or of as many as possible, should be brief ; that all men 25 
should sit in judgement, or that judges selected out of all 
should judge, in all matters, or in most and in the great- 
est and most important, — such as the scrutiny of accounts, 
the constitution, and private contracts ; that the assembly 
should be supreme over all causes, or at any rate over the 
most important, and the magistrates over none or only 
over a very few. :! Of all magistracies, a council is the 30 
most democratic 4 when there is not the means of paying 
all the citizens, but when they are paid even this is robbed 
of its power ; for the people then draw all cases to them- 
selves, as I said in the previous discussion. ' The next 35 
characteristic of democracy is payment for services ; 
assembly, law-courts, magistrates, everybody receives 

1 Cp. v. 1310*31. - Cp. iv. 1298*27. 

3 Reading with the MSS. in 11. 29, 30 TrtivTitiv — apx*!" • • • <>^<yurra)i/ 
— t\ tu>v fityiaruiv Kvpiav. 

* Cp. iv. I299 b 32. ° Cp. iv. i299 b 3S. 


pay, when it is to be had ; or when it is not to be had for 
all, then it is given to the law-courts and to the stated 
assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at 
least to any of them who are compelled to have their 
meals together. And whereas oligarchy is characterized 

40 by birth, wealth, and education, the notes of democracy 
appear to be the opposite of these, — low birth, poverty, 
mean employment. Another note is that no magistracy 
1318 s is perpetual, but if any such have survived some, ancient 
change in the constitution it should be stripped of its 
power, and the holders should be elected by lot and no 
longer by vote. These are the points common to all 
democracies ; but democracy and demos in their truest 
5 form are based upon the recognized principle of demo- 
cratic justice, that all should count equally ; for equality 
implies that the poor should have no more share in the 
government than the rich, and should not be the only 
rulers, but that all should rule equally according to their 
numbers. 1 And in this way men think that they will 

10 secure equality and freedom in their state. 

Next comes the question, how is this equality to be 3 
obtained ? Are we to assign to a thousand poor men 
the property qualifications of five hundred rich men ? 
and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that 
of the five hundred ? or, if this is not to be the mode, 

i 5 ought we, still retaining the same ratio, to take equal 
numbers from each and give them the control of the 
elections and of the courts ? — Which, according to the 
democratical notion, is the juster form of the consti- 
tution, — this or one based on numbers only ? Democrats 
say that justice is that to which the majority agree, 

20 oligarchs that to which the wealthier class ; in their 
opinion the decision should be given according to the 
amount of property. In both principles there is some 
inequality and injustice. For if justice is the will of the 
few, any one person who has more wealth than all the 
rest of the rich put together, ought, upon the oligarchical 

1 Cp. iv. i29i b 3o. 

BOOK VI. 3 I3i8 a 

principle, to have the sole power — but this would be 
tyranny ; or if justice is the will of the majority, as I was 25 
before saying, 1 they will unjustly confiscate the property 
of the wealthy minority. To find a principle of equality 
in which they both agree we must inquire into their 
respective ideas of justice. 

Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided 
by the majority of the citizeris is to be deemed law. 
Granted : — but not without some reserve ; since there are ?,o 
two classes out of which a state is composed, — the poor 
and the rich, — that is to be deemed law, on which both 
or the greater part of both agree ; and if they disagree, 
that which is approved by the greater number, and by 
those who have the higher qualification. For example, 
suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and 
some measure is approved by six of the rich and is dis- 
approved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of 35 
the rich join with the party of the poor, and the remain- 
ing five of the poor with that of the rich ; in such a case 
the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides 
are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn 
out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at 
present, when, if the assembly or the courts are divided, 4° 
recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. IS 1 ^ 1 
But, although it may be difficult in theory to know what 
is just and equal, the practical difficulty of inducing those 
to forbear who can, if they like, encroach, is far greater, 
for the weaker are always asking for equality and justice, 
but the stronger care for none of these things. 5 

4 Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the 
previous discussion, 2 the best is that which comes first in 
order ; it is also the oldest of them all. I am speaking 
of them according to the natural classification of their 
inhabitants. For the best material of democracy is an 
agricultural population ; ;; there is no difficulty in forming 10 
a democracy where the mass of the people live by agri- 
culture or tending of cattle. Being poor, they have no 
1 Cp. iii. 1281* 14. 2 iv. 1292'' 22-1293*10. 3 Cp. iv. I292 b 25-33. 


leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, 
and not : having the necessaries of life they are always at 
work, and do not covet the property of others. Indeed, 
they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of 

15 government or office where no great gains can be made 
out of them, for the many are more desirous of gain than 
of honour. 2 A proof is that even the ancient tyrannies 
were patiently endured by them, as they still endure oli- 
garchies, if they are allowed to work and are not deprived 

20 of their property ; for some of them grow quickly rich and 
the others are well enough off. Moreover, they have the 
power of electing the magistrates and calling them to 
account ; 3 their ambition, if they have any, is thus satis- 
fied ; and in some democracies, although they do not all 
share in the appointment of offices, except through repre- 
sentatives elected in turn out of the whole people, as at 

2 5 Mantinea ; — yet, if they have the power of deliberating, 
the many are contented. Even this form of government 
may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at 
Mantinea. Hence it is both expedient and customary 
in the afore-mentioned 4 type of democracy that all 
should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in 

30 the law-courts, but that the great offices should be filled 
up by election and from persons having a qualification ; 
the greater requiring a greater qualification, or, if there 
be no offices for which a qualification is requited, then 
those who are marked out by special ability should be 
appointed. Under such a form of government the citizens 
are sure to be governed well (for the offices will always 
be held by the best persons ; the people are willing 

35 enough to elect them and are not jealous of the good). 
The good and the notables will then be satisfied, for 
they will not be governed by men who are their inferiors, 
and the persons elected will rule justly, because others 
will call them to account. Every man should be re- 
sponsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to 

40 do just as he pleases ; for where absolute freedom is 

1 Retaining \u) in 1. 13. 2 Cp. iv. i297 b 6. 

3 Cp. ii. 1 274*15. * 1.6. 

BOOK VI. 4 I3i8 b 

allowed there is nothing to restrain the evil which is 
inherent in every man. But the principle of responsibility 1319* 
secures that which is the greatest good in states ; the 
right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, 
and the people have their due. It is evident that this is 
the best kind of democracy, and why ? because the people ft 
are drawn from a certain class. Some of the ancient laws 
of most ! states were, all of them, 2 useful with a view to 
making the people husbandmen. They provided either 
that no one should possess more than a certain quantity 
of land, or that, if he did, the land should not be within 
a certain distance from the town or the acropolis. For- to 
merly in many states there was a law forbidding any one 
to sell his original allotment of land. 3 There is a similar 
law attributed to Oxylus, which is to the effect that there 
should be a certain portion of every man's land on which 
he could not borrow money. A useful corrective to the 
evil of which I am speaking would be the law of the 15 
Aphytaeans, who, although they are numerous, and do 
not possess much land, are all of them husbandmen. 
For their properties are reckoned in the census, not entire, 
but only in such small portions that even the poor may 
have more than the amount required. 

Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects 
similar, are a pastoral people, who live by their flocks ; 20 
they are the best trained of any for war, robust in body 
and able to camp out. The people of whom other 
democracies consist are far inferior to them, for their life 25 
is inferior ; there is no room for moral excellence in any of 
their employments, whether they be mechanics or traders 
or labourers. Besides, people of this class can readily 
come to the assembly, because they are continually moving 
about in the city and in the agora ; whereas husband- 50 
men are scattered over the country and do not meet, or 
equally feel the want of assembling together. Where the 
territory also happens to extend to a distance from the city, 

1 Retaining rolt in 1. 7. 

9 Reading mivrts in 1. 8 with the MSS. Cp. v. 131 5 b 38. 

8 Cp. ii. I266 b 2i. 

i3ig a POLITICA 

there is no difficulty in making an excellent democracy or 

35 constitutional government; for the people are compelled to 
settle in the country, and even if there is a town population 
the assembly ought not to meet, in democracies, 1 when 
the country people cannot come. We have thus explained 
how the first and best form of democracy should be 

4° constituted ; it is clear that the other or inferior sorts 
I 3 I 9 b will deviate in a regular order, and the population which 
is excluded will at each stage be of a lower kind. 

The last form of democracy., that in which all share 
alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and 
will not last long unless well regulated by laws and 
customs. The more general causes which tend to de- 
5 stroy this or other kinds of government have been 
pretty fully considered. 2 In order to constitute such a 
democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have 
been in the habit of including as many as they can, and 
making citizens not only of those who are legitimate, but 
even of the illegitimate, and of those who have only one 

to parent a citizen, whether father or mother; 3 for nothing 
of this sort comes amiss to such a democracy. This is 
the way in which demagogues proceed. Whereas the 
right thing would be to make no more additions when 
the number of the commonalty exceeds that of the 
notables and of the middle class, — beyond this not to go. 
When in excess of this point, the constitution becomes 

15 disorderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient 
of the democracy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene ; for 
no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it 
strikes the eye. Measures like those which Cleisthenes 4 

20 passed when he wanted to increase the power of the 
democracy at Athens, or such as were taken by the 
founders of popular government at Cyrene, are useful in 
the extreme form of democracy. Fresh tribes and 
brotherhoods should be established ; the private rites of 

1 Reading in 1. 37 ^ iroidv (MSS.) ev mis S^/io^pa-nat? (Lambinus) 
fKKXrjalas (some MSS.). 

2 v. 2-7, I3il a 22-I3i3 a i6. 3 Cp. iii. 1278 s 27. 
4 Cp. iii. I275 b 35. 

BOOK VI. 4 I3ig b 

families should be restricted and converted into public 
ones ; in short, every contrivance should be adopted 2 5 
which will mingle the citizens with one another and get 
rid of old connexions. Again, the measures which are 
taken by tyrants appear all of them to be democratic ; 
such, for instance, as the licence permitted to slaves 
(which may be to a certain extent advantageous) and also 
that of women and children, and the allowing everybody 
to live as he likes. 1 Such a government will have many 3° 
supporters, for most persons would rather live in a dis- 
orderly than in a sober manner 

5 The mere establishment of a democracy is not the 
only or principal business of the legislator, or of those 
who wish to create such a state, for any state, however 35 
badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days ; a far 
greater difficulty is the preservation of it. The legislator 
should therefore endeavour to have a firm foundation 
according to the principles already laid down concerning 
the preservation and destruction of states ; 2 he should 
guard against the destructive elements, and should make 40 
laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain 1320 s 
all the preservatives of states. He must not think the 
truly democratical or oligarchical measure to be that 
which will give the greatest amount of democracy or 
oligarchy, but that which will make them last longest. 3 
The demagogues of our own day often get property 5 
confiscated 4 in the law-courts in order to please the 
people. But those who have the welfare of the state 
at heart should counteract them, and make a law that 
the property of the condemned should not be public and 
go into the treasury but be sacred. Thus offenders will 
be as much afraid, for they will be punished all the same, 
and the people, having nothing to gain, will not be so to 
ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be 
taken that state trials are as few as possible, and heavy 
penalties should be inflicted on those who bring ground- 

1 Cp. v. I3i3 b 32. 2 Cp. Bk. v. 

3 Cp. v. 1313*20-33. * Cp. v. 1305*3. 

64617 O 

i32o a POLITICA 

less accusations ; for it is the practice to indict, not 
members of the popular party, but the notables, ai- 
rs though the citizens ought to be all attached to the 
constitution as well, 1 or at any rate should not regard their 
rulers as enemies. 

Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy 
the citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made 
to assemble unless they are paid, and to pay them when 
20 there are no revenues presses hardly upon the notables (for 
the money must be obtained by a property-tax and con- 
fiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which 
have before now overthrown many democracies) ; where, I 
say, there are no revenues, the government should hold 
few assemblies, and the law-courts should consist of many 
persons, but sit for a few days only. This system has 
two advantages : first, the rich do not fear the expense, 
25 even although they are unpaid themselves when the 
poor are paid ; and secondly, causes are better tried, 
for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be 
long absent' from their own affairs, do not mind going 
for a few days to the law-courts. Where there are 
revenues the demagogues should not be allowed after 
30 their manner to distribute the surplus ; the poor are 
always receiving and always wanting more and more, 
for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. 
Yet the true friend of the people should see that they 
be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the cha- 
35 racter of the democracy ; measures therefore should be 
taken which will give them lasting prosperity ; and as this 
is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the 
public revenues should be accumulated and distributed 
among its poor, if possible, in such quantities as may 
enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, 
I320 b make a beginning in trade or husbandry. And if this 
benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be 
distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, 
and in the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the 
attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies ; and 
1 Sc. ' as to ol Kvpioi under it ■ (Newman). Omit raviy in 1. 1 5. 

BOOK VI. 5 1320 

should in return be excused from useless public services. 
By administering the state in this spirit the Cartha- 
ginians retain the affections of the people ; their policy is 5 
from time to time to send some of them into their de- 
pendent towns, where they grow rich. 1 It is also worthy 
of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor 
amongst them, and give them the means of going to 
work. The example of the people of Tarentum is also 
well deserving of imitation, for, by sharing the use of to 
their own property with the poor, they gain their good 
will.' 2 Moreover, they divide all their offices into two 
classes, some of them being elected by vote, the others 
by lot ; the latter, that the people may participate in 
them, and the former, that the state may be better ad- 
ministered. A like result may be gained by dividing 
the same offices, so as to have two classes of magistrates, 
one chosen by vote, the other by lot. j 5 

Enough has been said of the manner in which demo- 
cracies ought to be constituted. 

5 From these considerations there will be no difficulty 
in seeing what should be the constitution of oligarchies. 
We have only to reason from opposites and compare 
each form of oligarchy with the corresponding form of 20 

The first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to 
a constitutional government. In this there ought to be 
two standards of qualification ; the one high, the other 
] ow — the lower qualifying for the humbler yet indispens- 
able offices and the higher for the superior ones. He who 25 
acquires the prescribed qualification should have the rights 
of citizenship. The number of those admitted should be 
such as will make the entire governing body stronger 
than those who are excluded, and the new citizen should 
be always taken out of the better class of the people. 
The principle, narrowed a little, gives another form of 
oligarchy ; until at length we reach the most cliquish 30 
and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme 

1 Cp. ii. I273 b 18. a Cp. ii. I263 a 37 

O 2 


i32o b POLITICA 

democracy, which, being the worst, requires vigilance in 
proportion to its badness. For as healthy bodies and ships 
35 well provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps 
and survive them, whereas sickly constitutions and rotten 
ill-manned ships are ruined by the very least mistake, so 
do the worst forms of government require the greatest 
I32l a care. The populousness of democracies generally pre- 
serves them (for number is to democracy in the place of 
justice based on proportion) ; whereas the preservation of 
an oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite principle, 
viz. good order. 

5 As there are four chief divisions of the common people, 7 
— husbandmen, mechanics, retail traders, labourers ; so 
also there are four kinds of military forces, — the cavalry, 
the heavy infantry, the light-armed troops, the navy. 1 
When the country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong 

10 oligarchy is likely to be established. For the security of 
the inhabitants depends upon a force of this sort, and only 
rich men can afford to keep horses. The second form 
of oligarchy prevails when the country is adapted to 
heavy infantry; for this service is better suited to the 
rich than to the poor. But the light-armed and the 
naval element are wholly democratic ; and nowadays, 

15 where they are numerous, if the two parties quarrel, 
the oligarchy are often worsted by them in the struggle. 
A remedy for this state of things may be found in the 
practice of generals who combine a proper contingent of 
light- armed troops with cavalry and heavy-armed. And 
this is the way in which the poor get the better of the 

ao rich in civil contests ; being lightly armed, they fight 
with advantage against cavalry and heavy infantry. An 
oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower classes 
raises a power against itself. And therefore, since the 
ages of the citizens vary and some are older and some 
younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while 
they are still young, taught the agile movements of light- 

25 armed troops ; and these, when they have been taken 

1 Cp. iv. i289 b 32-40. 

BOOK VI. 7 1321' 

out of the ranks of the youth, should become light-armed 
warriors in reality. The oligarchy should also yield 
a share in the government to the people, either, as I said 
before, to those who have a property qualification, 1 or, 
as in the case of Thebes, 2 to those who have abstained 
for a certain number of years from mean employments, 30 
or, as at Massalia, to men of merit who are selected 
for their worthiness, whether previously citizens or not. 
The magistracies of the highest rank, which ought to be 
in the hands of the governing body, should have expensive 
duties attached to them, and then the people will not 
desire them and will take no offence at the privileges 
of their rulers when they see that they pay a heavy fine 
for their dignity. It is fitting also that the magistrates 35 
on entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices or 
erect some public edifice, and then the people who 
participate in the entertainments, and see the city 
decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not 
desire an alteration in the government, and the notables 
will have memorials of their munificence. This, however, 40 
is anything but the fashion of our modern oligarchs, who 
are as covetous of gain as they are of honour ; oligarchies 
like theirs may be well described as petty democracies. 1321' 
Enough of the manner in which democracies and olig- 
archies should be organized. 

8 Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, 
their number, their nature, their duties, of which indeed 5 
we have already spoken. 3 No state can exist not 
having the necessary offices, and no state can be well 
administered not having the offices which tend to pre- 
serve harmony and good order. In small states, as we 
have already remarked, 4 there must not be many of 
them, but in larger there must be a larger number, and 10 
we should carefully consider which offices may properly 
be united and which separated. 

First among necessary offices is that which has the care 

1 i32o b 25. 2 Cp. iii. 1278*25. 

3 iv. 15. 4 iv. 1299" 34-° 10. 



of the market ; a magistrate should be appointed to in- 
spect contracts and to maintain order. For in every state 

15 there must inevitably be buyers and sellers who will 
supply one another's wants ; this is the readiest way to 
make a state self-sufficing and so fulfil the purpose for 
which men come together into one state. 1 A second 
office of a* similar kind undertakes the supervision and 

20 embellishment of public and private buildings, the main- 
taining and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention 
of disputes about boundaries, and other concerns of a like 
nature. This is commonly called the office of City- 
warden, and has various departments, which, in more 

25 populous towns, are shared among different persons, one, 
for example, taking charge of the walls, another of the 
fountains, a third of harbours. There is another equally 
necessary office, and of a similar kind, having to do 
with the same matters without the walls and in the 
country : — the magistrates who hold this office are called 
Wardens of the country, or Inspectors of the woods 

3° Besides these three there is a fourth office of receivers of 
taxes, who have under their charge the revenue which is 
distributed among the various departments ; these are 
called Receivers or Treasurers. Another officer registers 

35 all private contracts, and decisions of the courts, all public 
indictments, and also all preliminary proceedings. This 
office again is sometimes subdivided, in which case one 
officer is appointed over all the rest. 2 These officers are 
called Recorders or Sacred Recorders, Presidents, and 
the like. 

4° Next to these comes an office of which the duties are 
the most necessary and also the most difficult, viz. that 
to which is committed the execution of punishments, or 
the exaction of fines from those who are posted up accord- 
I322 a ing to the registers ; and also the custody of prisoners. 
The difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which 
is attached to it ; no one will undertake it unless great 
profits are to be made, and any one who does is loath to 

1 Cp. i. 1252'' 27; Nic. Eth. v. 1134*26; PI. Rep. ii. 369. 

2 Omitting ov in 1. 38. 

BOOK VI. 8 1322* 

execute the law. Still the office is necessary ; for judicial 5 
decisions are useless if they take no effect ; and if society 
cannot exist without them, neither can it exist without 
the execution of them. It is an office which, being so 
unpopular, should not be entrusted to one person, but 
divided among several taken from different courts. In 
like manner an effort should be made to distribute among 
different persons the writing up of those who are on the 
register of public debtors. Some sentences should be 10 
executed by the magistrates also, and in particular 
penalties due to the outgoing magistrates should be 
exacted by the incoming ones ; and as regards those due 
to magistrates already in office, when one court has 
given judgement, another should exact the penalty; for 
example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines 
imposed by the wardens of the agora, and others again 
should exact the fines imposed by them. For penalties 15 
are more likely to be exacted when less odium attaches 
to the exaction of them ; but a double odium is incurred 
when the judges who have passed also execute the 
sentence, and if they are always the executioners, they will 
be 1 the enemies of all. 

In many places, while one magistracy executes the 
sentence, another 2 has the custody of the prisoners, as, for 
example, ' the Eleven ' at Athens. It is well to separate 20 
off the jailorship also, and try by some device to render the 
office less unpopular. For it is quite as necessary as 
that of the executioners ; but good men do all they can to 
avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be trusted 
with it ; for they themselves require a guard, and are not 25 
fit to guard others. There ought not therefore to be 
a single or permanent officer set apart for this duty ; but 
it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are 
organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates 
acting in turn should take charge of it. 

These a^e the indispensable officers, and should be 
ranked first : — next in order follow others, equally neces- 30 

1 Inserting nou'i after avrovs in 1. 18, with Welldon. 

2 Rending de StijpqTm in I. 19 with the MSS. 


sary, but of higher rank, and requiring great experience 
and fidelity. Such are the offices to which are committed 
the guard of the city, and other military functions. Not 
35 only in time of war but of peace their duty will be to 
defend the walls and gates, and to muster and marshal 
the citizens. In some states there are many such offices ; 
in others there are a few only, while small states are con- 
tent with one ; these officers are called generals or com- 
I322 b manders. Again, if a state has cavalry or light-armed 
troops or archers or a naval force, it will sometimes 
happen that each of these departments has separate 
officers, who are called admirals, or generals of cavalry or 
of light-armed troops. And there are subordinate officers 
called naval captains, and captains of light-armed troops 
5 and of horse ; having others under them : — all these are 
included in the department of war. Thus much of 
military command. 

But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle 
the public money, there must of necessity be another 
office which examines and audits them, and has no other 

i° functions. Such officers are called by various names, — 
Scrutineers, Auditors, Accountants, Controllers. Besides 
all these offices there is another which is supreme over 
them, and to this is often entrusted both the introduction 
and the ratification of measures, or at all events it pre- 
sides, in a democracy, over the assembly. For there 

15 must be a body which convenes the supreme authority 
in the state. . In some places they are called ' probuli ', 
because they hold previous deliberations, but in a 
democracy more commonly 'councillors'. 1 These are 
the chief political offices. 

Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance 

20 of religion ; priests and guardians see to the preservation 
and repair of the temples of the gods and to other matters 
of religion. One office of this sort may be enough in small 
places, but in larger ones there are a great many besides 
the priesthood ; for example superintendents of public 

25 worship, guardians of shrines, treasurers of the sacred 

1 Cp. iv. i299 b 3i. 

BOOK VI. 8 I322 b 

revenues. Nearly connected with these there are also the 
officers appointed for the performance of the public 
sacrifices, except any which the law assigns to the priests ; 
such sacrifices derive their dignity from the public hearth 
of the city. They are sometimes called archons, some- 
times kings, 1 and sometimes prytanes. 

These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be 3° 
summed up as follows : offices concerned with matters of 
religion, with war, with the revenue and expenditure, 
with the market, with the city, with the harbours, with 
the country ; also with the courts of law, with the records 
of contracts, with execution of sentences, with custody of 35 
prisoners, with audits and scrutinies and accounts of 
magistrates ; lastly, there are those which preside over 
the public deliberations of the state.' 2 There are likewise 
magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful 
and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to 
good order : such as the offices of guardians of women, 
guardians of the laws, guardians of children, and directors 
of gymnastics ; also superintendents of gymnastic and I323 a 
Dionysiac contests, and of other similar spectacles. Some 
of these are clearly not democratic offices ; for example, 
the guardianships of women and children 3 — the poor, 5 
not having any slaves, must employ both their women 
and children as servants. 

Once more : there are three offices according to whose 
directions the highest magistrates are chosen in certain 
states — guardians of the law, probuli, councillors, — of 
these, the guardians of the law are an aristocratical, the 
probuli an oligarchical, the council a democratical 
institution. Enough of the different kinds of offices. 10 

1 Cp. iii. I285 b 23. 

2 Reading tlari nt/A tuv in 1. 37, with Richards. 

3 Cp. iv. 1300*4. 

i323 a 


He who would duly inquire about the best form of a I 

15 state ought first to determine which is the most eligible 
life; while this remains uncertain the best form of the 
state must also be uncertain ; for, in the natural order of 
things, those may be expected to lead the best life who 
are governed in the best manner of which their circum- 
stances admit. We ought therefore to ascertain, first of 

30 all, which is the most generally eligible life, and then 
whether the same life is or is not best for the state and 
for individuals. 

Assuming that enough has been already said in 
discussions outside the school concerning the best life, we 
will now only repeat what is contained in them. Certainly 
no one will dispute the propriety of that partition of goods 

■25 which separates them into three classes, 1 viz. external 
goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, or deny 
that the happy man must have all three. For no one 
would maintain that he is happy who has not in him a 
particle of courage or temperance or justice or prudence, 
who is afraid of every insect which flutters past him, 

30 and will commit any crime, however great, in order to 
gratify his lust of meat or drink, who will sacrifice his 
dearest friend for the sake of half-a-farthing, and is as 
feeble and false in mind as a child or a madman. These 
propositions are almost universally acknowledged as soon 

35 as they are uttered, but men differ about the degree or 
relative superiority of this or that good. Some think 
that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but 
set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, 
reputation, and the like. To whom we reply by an appeal 

40 to facts, which easily prove that mankind do not acquire 
or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but 

1 Cp. Laws, iii. 697 B, v. 743 E ; N. Eth. i. 1098 b l2. 

BOOK VII. i i323 b 

external goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, I323 b 
whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more 
often found with those who are most highly cultivated 
in their mind and in their character, and have only a 
moderate share of external goods, than among those 
who possess external goods to a useless extent but are 5 
deficient in higher qualities; and this is not only matter 
of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to 
be in accordance with reason. For, whereas external 
goods have a limit, like any other instrument, 1 and all 
things useful are of such a nature that 2 where there is too 
much of them they must either do harm, or at any rate 
be of no use, to their possessors, every good of the soul, 10 
the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet useful 
as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects. No 
proof is required to show that the best state of one thing 
in relation to another corresponds in degree of excellence 
to the interval between the natures of which we say 15 
that these very states are states : so that, if the soul 
is more noble than our possessions or our bodies, both 
absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that 
the best state of either has a similar ratio to the other. 
Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external 
and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise 
men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and 20 
not the soul for the sake of them. 

Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so 
much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and 
of virtuous and wise action. God is a witness to us of 
this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of 
any external good, but in himself and by reason of his 25 
own nature. And herein of necessity lies the difference 
between good fortune and happiness ; for external goods 
come of themselves, and chance is the author of them, one is just or temperate by or through chanced 
In like manner, and by a similar train of argument, 3° 

1 Cp. i. i256 b 35. 

2 Reading (without brackets) nav Se to xph Vi ^ v toriv <*v in 1. 8, 
with the MSS. 

3 N. Eth. i. io99 b 2o. 

i323 b POLITICA 

the happy state may be shown to be that which is 
best and which acts rightly ; and rightly it cannot act 
without doing right actions, and neither individual nor 
state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom. 
Thus the courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have 

35 the same form and nature as the qualities which give 
the individual who possesses them the name of just, wise, 
or temperate. 

Thus much may suffice by way of preface : for I 
could not avoid touching upon these questions, neither 
could I go through all the arguments affecting them ; 
these are the business of another science. 

40 Let us assume then that the best life, both for indi- 
viduals and states, is the life of virtue, when virtue has 
I3 2 4 external goods enough for the performance of good 
actions. If there are any who controvert our assertion, 
we will in this treatise pass them over, and consider their 
objections hereafter. 

5 There remains to be discussed the question, Whether 2 
the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the 
state, or different? Here again there can be no doubt — 
no one denies that they are the same. For those who 
hold that the well-being of the individual consists in his 
wealth, also think that riches make the happiness of the 

10 whole state, and those who value most highly the life of a 
tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the 
greatest number ; while they who approve an individual 
for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city is, the 
happier it is. Two points here present themselves for con- 

15 sideration : first (1), which is the more eligible life, that 
of a citizen who is a member of a state, or that of an 
alien who has no political ties ; and again (2), which is 
the best form of constitution or the best condition of a 
state, either on the supposition that political privileges 
are desirable for all, or for a majority only ? Since the 

20 good of the state and not of the individual is the proper 
subject of political thought and speculation, and we are 
engaged in a political discussion, while the first of these 

ROOK VII. 2 I324 a 

two points has a secondary interest for us, the latter will 
be the main subject of our inquiry. 

Now it is evident that the form of government is best 
in which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live 
happily. But even those who agree in thinking that the 25 
life of virtue is the most eligible raise a question, whether 
the life of business and politics is or is not more eligible 
than one which is wholly independent of external goods, 
I mean than a contemplative life, which by some is 
maintained to be the only one worthy of a philosopher. 
For these two lives — the life of the philosopher and the 
life of the statesman — appear to have been preferred 3° 
by those who have been most keen in the pursuit of 
virtue, both in our own and in other ages. Which is the 
better is a question of no small moment ; for the wise 
man, like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his life 
according to the best end. There are some who think 35 
that while a despotic rule over others is the greatest 
injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule over them, even 
though not unjust, is a great impediment to a man's 
individual well-being. Others take an opposite view ; 
they maintain that the true life of man is the practical 
and political, and that every virtue admits of being 40 
practised, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as by 1324 15 
private individuals. Others, again, are of opinion that 
arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone consists with happi- 
ness ; indeed, in some states the entire aim both of 
the laws and of the constitution l is to give men despotic 
power over their neighbours. And, therefore, although 5 
in most cities the laws may be said generally to be in 
a chaotic state, still, if they aim at anything, they aim at 
the maintenance of power : thus in Lacedaemon and Crete 
the system of education and the greater part of the laws 
are framed with a view to war. 2 And in all nations which 10 
are able to gratify their ambition military power is held 
in esteem, for example among the Scythians and Persians 

1 Reading in 1. 4 6' ovtos koi tcov v6pu>v ko\ rijs noXirtias Spot, with 
the 'old translator' and one MS. 
3 Cp. Plato, Laws, i. 633 ff. 

I 3 24 b POLITICA 

and Thracians and Celts. In some nations there are even 
laws tending to stimulate the warlike virtues, as at Carthage, 
where we are told that men obtain the honour of wear- 

15 ing as many armlets as they have served campaigns. There 
was once a law in Macedonia that he who had not killed 
an enemy should wear a halter, and among the Scythians 
no one who had not slain his man was allowed to drink 
out of the cup which was handed round at a certain 
feast. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, the number 
of enemies whom a man has slain is indicated by the 

20 number of obelisks 1 which are fixed in the earth round 
his tomb ; and there are numerous practices among other 
nations of a like kind, some of them established by law 
and others by custom. Yet to a reflecting mind it must 
appear very strange that the statesman should be always 

25 considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over 
others, whether they will or not. How can that which 
is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or 
the legislator? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without 
regard to justice, for there may be might where there is 
no right. The other arts and sciences offer no parallel ; 

30 a physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his 
patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Yet most 
men appear to think that the art of despotic govern- 
ment is statesmanship, and what men affirm to be unjust 
and inexpedient in their own case they are not ashamed 

35 of practising towards others ; they demand just rule for 
themselves, but where other men are concerned they 
care nothing about it. Such behaviour is irrational ; 
unless the one party is, and the other is not, born to 
serve, in which case men have a right to command, not 
indeed all their fellows, but only those who are intended 
to be subjects ; just as we ought not to hunt mankind, 
whether for food or sacrifice, but only the animals which 

40 may be hunted for food or sacrifice, 2 that is to say, such 

wild animals as are eatable. And surely there may be 

1325 s a city happy in isolation, which we will assume to be 

well-governed (for it is quite possible that a city thus 

1 Or ' spits '. 2 ra in I. 40 (Immisch) is a misprint for to. 

BOOK VII. 2 1325 

isolated might be well-administered and have good laws) ; 
but such a city would not be constituted with any view 
to war or the conquest of enemies, — all that sort of 
thing must be excluded. Hence we see very plainly 5 
that warlike pursuits, although generally to be deemed 
honourable, are not the supreme end of all things, but 
only means. And the good lawgiver should inquire 
how states and races of men and communities may par- 
ticipate in a good life, and in the happiness which is 
attainable by them. His enactments will not be always 10 
the same ; and where there are neighbours l he will have 
to see what sort of studies should be practised in relation 
to their several characters, or how the measures appro- 
priate in relation to each are to be adopted. The end at 
which the best form of government should aim may be 
properly made a matter of future consideration. 2 15 

3 Let us now address those who, while they agree that 
the life of virtue is the most eligible, differ about the 
manner of practising it. For some renounce political 
power, and think that the life of the freeman is different 20 
from the life of the statesman and the best of all ; but 
others think the life of the statesman best. The argument 
of the latter is that he who does nothing cannot do well, 
and that virtuous activity is identical with happiness. 
To both we say ■ ' you are partly right and partly wrong.' 
The first class are right in affirming that the life of the 
freeman is better than the life of the despot ; for there 25 
is nothing grand or noble in having the use of a slave, in 
so far as he is a slave ; or in issuing commands about 
necessary things. But it is an error to suppose that 
every sort of rule is despotic like that of a master over 
slaves, for there is as great a difference between the rule 
over freemen and the rule over slaves as there is between 
slavery by nature and freedom by nature, about which I 30 
have said enough at the commencement of this treatise. 3 
And it is equally a mistake to place inactivity above 

1 Cp. ii. 1265*20, 1267*19. 2 I333* 11 s <\<i' S '■ 4*7- 


action, for happiness is activity, and the actions of the 
just and wise are the realization of much that is noble. 

But perhaps some one, accepting these premises, may 
still maintain that supreme power is the best of all things, 

35 because the possessors of it are able to perform the 
greatest number of noble actions. If so, the man who is 
able to rule, instead of giving up anything to his neigh- 
bour, ought rather to take away his power ; and the 
father should make no account 1 of his son, nor the son of 
his father, nor friend of friend ; they should not bestow 
a thought on one another in comparison with this higher 

40 object, for the best is the most eligible and ' doing well ' 
is the best. There might be some truth in such a view 
I 3 2 5 b if we assume that robbers and plunderers attain the chief 
good. But this can never be ; their hypothesis is 
false. For the actions of a ruler cannot really be 
honourable, unless he is as much superior to other 
men as a husband is to a wife, or a father to his children, 
5 or a master to his slaves. And therefore he who violates 
the law can never recover by any success, however great, 
what he has already lost in departing from virtue. For 
equals the honourable and the just consist in sharing 
alike, as is just and equal. But that the unequal should 
be given to equals, and the unlike to those who are like, 
is contrary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to 

10 nature is good. If, therefore, there is any one 2 superior 
in virtue and in the power of performing the best actions, 
him we ought to follow and obey, but he must have the 
capacity for action as well as virtue. 

If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed 

I5 to be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best, 
both for every city collectively, and for individuals. Not 
that a life of action must necessarily have relation to 
others, as some persons think, nor are those ideas only 
to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the 
sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts 

1 Reading vnokoyov ?x ea/ in '• 39> as suggested by Dindorf and 

2 Cp. iii. I284 b 32 and I288 a 28. 

BOOK VII. 3 J 325 b 

and contemplations which arc independent and complete 20 
in themselves ; since virtuous activity, and therefore 
a certain kind of action, is an end, and even in the case 
of external actions the directing mind is most truly said 
to act. Neither, again, is it necessary that states which 
are cut off from others and choose to live alone should 
be inactive ; for activity, as well as other things, may 25 
take place by sections ; there are many ways in which 
the sections of a state act upon one another. The same 
thing is equally true of every individual. If this were 
otherwise, God and the universe, who have no external 
actions over and above their own energies, would be far 
enough from perfection. Hence it is evident that the 30 
same life is best for each individual, and for states and 
for mankind collectively. 

a Thus far by way of introduction. In what has pre- 
ceded l I have discussed other forms of government ; in 
what remains the first point to be considered is what 35 
should be the conditions of the ideal or perfect state ; 
for the perfect state cannot exist without a due supply 
of the means of life. And therefore we must pre- 
suppose many purely imaginary conditions, 2 but nothing 
impossible. There will be a certain number of citizens, 
a country in which to place them, and the like. As the 40 
weaver or shipbuilder or any other artisan must have 
the material proper for his work (and in proportion as I326 a 
this is better prepared, so will the result of his art be 
nobler), so the statesman or legislator must also have the 
materials suited to him. 

First among the materials required by the statesman 5 
is population : he will consider what should be the 
number and character of the citizens, and then what should 
be the size and character of the country. Most persons 
think that a state in order to be happy ought to be large; 
but even if they are right, they have no idea what is a 
large and what a small state. For they judge of the 10 

1 Bk. ii. 2 Cp. ii. I26s a i7. 

645-17 P 

I326 £ 


size of the city by the number of the inhabitants ; 
whereas they ought to regard, not their number, but 
their power. A city too, like an individual, has a work 
to do ; and that city which is best adapted to the fulfil- 
ment of its work is to be deemed greatest, in the same 
15 sense of the word great in which Hippocrates might be 
called greater, not as a man, but as a physician, than 
some one else who was taller. And even if we reckon 
greatness by numbers, we ought not to include every- 
body, for there must always be in cities a multitude of 
20 slaves and sojourners and foreigners ; but we should in- 
clude those only who are members of the state, and who 
form an essential part of it. The number of the latter is 
a proof of the greatness of a city ; but a city which pro- 
duces numerous artisans and comparatively few soldiers 
cannot be great, for a great city is not to be confounded 
25 with a populous one. Moreover, experience shows that a 
very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed ; 
since all cities which have a reputation for good govern- 
ment have a limit of population. We may argue on 
grounds of reason, and the same result will follow. For 
30 law is order, and good law is good order ; but a very 
great multitude cannot be orderly : to introduce order 
into the unlimited is the work of a divine power — of such 
a power as holds together the universe. Beauty is 
realized in number and magnitude, 1 and the state which 
combines magnitude with good order must necessarily 
35 be the most beautiful. To the size of states there is a 
limit, as there is to other things, plants, animals, imple- 
ments ; for none of these retain their natural power 
when they are too large or too small, but they either 
40 wholly lose their nature, or are spoiled. For example, 2 
a ship which is only a span long will not be a ship at 
all, nor a ship a quarter of a mile long ; yet there may 
I326 b be a ship of a certain size, either too large or too small, 
which will still be a ship, but bad for sailing. In like 
manner a state when composed of too few is not, as a 
state ought to be, self-sufficing; when of too many, 
1 Cp. Poet. i45o b 36. 2 Cp. v. I309 b 23. 

BOOK VII. 4 1336 1 

though self-sufficing in all mere necessaries, as a nation may 
be, it is l not a state, being almost incapable of constitu- 5 
tional government. For who can be the general of such a 
vast multitude, or who the herald, unless he have the voice 
of a Stentor ? 

A state, then, only begins to exist when it has attained 
a population sufficient for a good life in the political 
community: it may indeed, if it somewhat exceed this '=> 
number, be a greater state. But, as I was saying, there 
must be a limit. What should be the limit will be easily 
ascertained by experience. For both governors and 
governed have duties to perform ; the special functions 
of a governor are to command and to judge. But if the 15 
citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices 
according to merit, then they must know each other's 
characters ; where they do not possess this knowledge, 
both the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits 
will go wrong. When the population is very large they 
are manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought 
not to be. Besides, in an over-populous state foreigners 20 
and metics will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for 
who. will find them out ? Clearly then the best limit of 
the population of a state is the largest number which 
suffices for the purposes of life, and can be taken in at a 
single view. Enough concerning the size of a state. 25 

5 Much the same principle will apply to the territory of 
the state : every one would agree in praising the territory 
which is most entirely self-sufficing; and that must be 
the territory which is all-producing, for to have all things 
and to want nothing is sufficiency. In size and extent it 3° 
should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at 
once temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of leisure. 2 
Whether we are right or wrong in laying down this limit 
we will inquire more precisely hereafter, 3 when we have 
occasion to consider what is the right use of property 35 
and wealth : a matter which is much disputed, because 

1 Reading <JoTrep etffor, «W in 1. 4, with the MSS. 

2 Cp. ii. I265 a 32. 3 This promise is not fulfilled. 

P 2 


men arc inclined to rush into one of two extremes, some 
into meanness, others into luxury. 

It is not difficult to determine the general character of 

the territory which is required (there are, however, some 

4° points on which military authorities should be heard) ; it 

should be difficult of access to the enemy, and easy of 

1327 s egress to the inhabitants. Further, we require that the 

land as well as the inhabitants of whom we were just now 

speaking 1 should be taken in at a single view, for a 

country which is easily seen can be easily protected. As 

to the position of the city, if we could have what we wish, 

5 it should be well situated in regard both to sea and land. 

This then is one principle, that it should be a convenient 

centre for the protection of the whole country : the other 

is, that it should be suitable for receiving the fruits of the 

soil, and also for the bringing in of timber and any 

10 other products that are easily transported. 

Whether a communication with the sea is beneficial to 6 
a well-ordered state or not is a question which has often 
been asked. It is argued that the introduction of strangers 
brought up under other laws, and the increase of popula- 
tion, will be adverse to good order; the increase arises 
from their using the sea and having a crowd of merchants 
coming and going, and is inimical to good government. 2 
Apart from these considerations, it would be undoubtedly 
better, both with a view to safety and to the provision 
20 of necessaries, that the city and territory should be 
connected with the sea ; the defenders of a country, if 
they are to maintain themselves against an enemy, 
should be easily relieved both by land and by sea ; and 
even if they are not able to attack by sea and land at once, 
they will have less difficulty 3 in doing mischief to their 
assailants on one element, if they themselves can use both. 
25 Moreover, it is necessary that they should import from 
abroad what is not found in their own country, and that 
they should export what they have in excess ; for a city 

1 i326 b 22-24. 2 Cp. Plato, Laws, iv. 704 D-705 B. 

s Omitting npos in 1. 23, with Argyriades. 

BOOK VII. 6 i327 a 

ought to be a market, not indeed for others, but for 

Those who make themselves a market for the world 
only do so for the sake of revenue, and if a state ought 30 
not to desire profit of this kind it ought not to have 
such an emporium. Nowadays we often see in countries 
and cities dockyards and harbours very conveniently 
placed outside the city, but not too far off ; and they are 
kept in dependence by walls and similar fortifications. 35 
Cities thus situated manifestly reap the benefit of inter- 
course with their ports ; and any harm which is likely to 
accrue may be easily guarded against by the laws, which 
will pronounce and determine who may hold communi- 
cation with one another, and who may not. 

There can be no doubt that the possession of a 40 
moderate naval force is advantageous to a city ; the 
city should be formidable not only to its own citizens I3 2 7 
but to some of its neighbours, 1 or, if necessary, able to 
assist them by sea as well as by land. The proper 
number or magnitude of this naval force is relative to the 
character of the state ; for if her function is to take a 
leading part in politics, her naval power should be 5 
commensurate with the scale of her enterprises. The 
population of the state need not be much increased, since 
there is no necessity that the sailors should be citizens : 
the marines who have the control and command will be 
freemen, and belong also to the infantry ; and wherever 10 
there is a dense population of Perioeci and husbandmen, 
there will always be sailors more than enough. Of this 
we see instances at the present day. The city of Heraclea, 
for example, although small in comparison with many >5 
others, can man a considerable fleet. Such are our 
conclusions respecting the territory of the state, its 
harbours, its towns, its relations to the sea, and its 
maritime power. 

7 Having spoken of the number of the citizens, 2 we will 
proceed to speak of what should be their character, 
1 Cp. ii. 1265*20. 2 I326 a 9- b 24. 


20 This is a subject which can be easily understood by 
any one who casts his eye on the more celebrated states 
of Hellas, and generally on the distribution of races in 
the habitable world. Those who live in a cold climate 
and in Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelli- 

25 gence and skill ; and therefore they retain comparative 
freedom, but have no political organization, and are in- 
capable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of 
Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting 
in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of sub- 
jection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is 
situated between them, is likewise intermediate in cha- 

3° racter, being high-spirited and also intelligent. 1 Hence 
it continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation, 
and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able 
to rule the world. There are also similar differences in 
the different tribes of Hellas ; for some of them are of a 
one-sided nature, and are intelligent or courageous only, 

35 while in others there is a happy combination of both 
qualities. And clearly those whom the legislator will 
most easily lead to virtue may be expected to be both 
intelligent and courageous. Some z say that the 
guardians should be friendly towards those whom 

40 they know, fierce towards those whom they do not 
know. Now, passion is the quality of the soul which 
I328 a begets friendship and enables us to love ; notably the 
spirit within us is more stirred against our friends and 
acquaintances than against those who are unknown to 
us, when we think that we are despised by them ; for 
which reason Archilochus^ complaining of his friends, 
very naturally addresses his soul in these words, 

5 ' For surely thou art plagued on account of friends.' 

The power of command and the love of freedom are 
in all men based upon this quality, for passion is com- 
manding and invincible. Nor is it right to say that the 
guardians should be fierce towards those whom they do 
not know, for we ought not to be out of temper with 

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. iv. 435 E, 436 A. 2 Rep. ii. 375 C 

3 Fr. 67, liergk 4 . 

BOOK VII. 7 1328 s 

any one; and a lofty «spirit is not fierce by nature, but 
only when excited against evil-doers. And this, as I 10 
was saying before, is a feeling which men show most 
strongly towards their friends if they think they have 
received a wrong at their hands : as indeed is reason- 
able ; for, besides the actual injury, they seem * to be 
deprived of a benefit by those who owe them one. 
Hence the saying, r 5 

' Cruel is the strife of brethren ', 2 
and again, 

' They who love in excess also hate in excess V 

Thus we have nearly determined the number and 
character of the citizens of our state, and also the size 
and nature of their territory. I say ' nearly ', for we 
ought not to require the same minuteness in theory as 20 
in the facts given by perception. 4 

8 As in other natural compounds the conditions of a 
composite whole are not necessarily organic parts of it, 
so in a state or in any other combination forming a unity 
not everything is a part, which is a necessary condition. 5 
The members of an association have necessarily some one 25 
thing the same and common to all, in which they share 
equally or unequally ; for example, food or land or any 
other thing. But where there are two things of which 
one is a means and the other an end, they have nothing 
in common except that the one receives what the other 
produces. Such, for example, is the relation in which 3° 
workmen and tools stand to their work ; the house and 
the builder have nothing in common, but the art of the 
builder is for the sake of the house. And so states 
require property, but property, even though living beings 35 
are included in it, G is no part of a state ; for a state 
is not a community of living beings only, but a com- 
munity of equals, aiming at the best life possible. Now, 
whereas happiness is the highest good, being a realization 

1 novi(<w(rii> in 1. 15 (Immisch) is a misprint for vofiL£ov<riv. 

2 975,Nauck 4 . 3 Fr. adesp. 78, Nauck 4 . * Cp. 1331'' 18. 
6 Cp. iii. 1278*2. . ti Cp. i. 1253'' 32. 


and perfect practice of virtue, which some can attain, while 
others have little or none of it, the various qualities of 

40 men are clearly the reason why there are various kinds 
of states and many forms of government ; for different 
I328 b men see k after happiness in different ways and by different 
means, and so make for themselves different modes of 
life and forms of government. We must see also how 
many things are indispensable to the existence of a state, 
for what we call the parts of a state will be found among 
the indispensables. 1 Let us then enumerate the functions 
of a state, and we shall easily elicit what we want : 
5 First, there must be food ; secondly, arts, for life re- 
quires many instruments ; thirdly, there must be arms, 
for the members of a community have need of them, and in 
their own hands, too, in order to maintain authority both 

10 against disobedient subjects and against external assail- 
ants ; fourthly, there must be a certain amount of revenue, 
both for internal needs, and for the purposes of war ; 
fifthly, or rather first, there must be a care of religion, 
which is commonly called worship ; sixthly, and most 
necessary of all, there must be a power of deciding what 
is for the public interest, and what is just in men's 
dealings with one another. 

15 These are the services which every state may be said to 
need. For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but 
a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life ; and 
if any of these things be wanting, it is as we maintain - 
impossible that the community can be absolutely self- 
sufficing. A state then should be framed with a view to 
the fulfilment of these functions. There must be husband- 

20 men to procure food, and artisans, and a warlike and a 
wealthy class, and priests, and judges to decide what is 
necessary 3 and expedient. 

Having determined these points, we have in the next 9 
place to consider whether all ought to share is every sort 

Reading iv tovtois hv t'lr} a avayKalov vndp^fiv in 1. 4, with 

8 Cp. ii. I26i b i2, iii. I275 b 20, v. 1303*26. 

3 Reading uixiy/cuiW koi o-unfapovTwv in 1. 23, with the MSS. 

BOOK VII. 9 1328 15 

of occupation. Shall every man be at once husbandman, 35 
artisan, councillor, judge, or shall we suppose the several 
occupations just mentioned assigned to different persons ? 
or, thirdly, shall some employments be assigned to indi- 
viduals and others common to all ? The same arrange- 
ment, however, does not occur in every constitution ; as 
we were saying, all may be shared by all, or not 3° 
all by all, but only some by some ; and hence arise 
the differences of constitutions, for in democracies all 
share in all, in oligarchies the opposite practice prevails. 
Now, since we are here speaking of the best form of 
government, i.e. that under which the state will be most 
happy (and happiness, as has been already said, cannot 35 
exist without virtue 1 ), it clearly follows that in the state 
which is best governed and possesses men who are just 
absolutely, and not merely relatively to the principle of 
the constitution, the citizens must not lead the life of 
mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and 4° 
inimical to virtue. 2 Neither must they be husbandmen, 
since leisure is necessary both for the development 0^329* 
virtue and the performance of political duties. 

Again, there is in a state a class of warriors, and 
another of councillors, who advise about the expedient 
and determine matters of law, and these seem in an 
especial manner parts of a state. Now, should these 5 
two classes be distinguished, 3 or are both functions to be 
assigned to the same persons? Here again there is no 
difficulty in seeing that both functions will in one way 
belong to the same, in another, to different persons. To 
different persons in so far as these employments are 
suited to different primes of life, 4 for the one requires 
wisdom and the other strength. But on the other hand, 
since it is an impossible thing that those who are able 
to use or to resist force should be willing to remain 10 
always in subjection, from this point of view the persons 
are the same ; for those who carry arms can always 

1 Cp. 1323* 21-1324* 4, 1328*37 sq. 

2 Cp. Plato, Laws, xi. 919 c-E. u Omitting ircpuis in 1. 5. 
* i. e. the physical and the mental. 



determine the fate of the constitution. It remains there- 
fore that both functions should be entrusted by the ideal 
constitution to the same persons, 1 not, however, at the same 
time, but in the order prescribed by nature, who has given 

15 to young men strength and to older men wisdom. Such 
a distribution of duties will be expedient and also just, 
and is founded upon a principle of conformity to merit. 
Besides, the ruling class should be the owners of property, 
for they are citizens, and the citizens of a state should be 

20 in good circumstances ; whereas mechanics or any other 
class which is not a producer of virtue have no share 
in the state. This follows from our first principle, 2 for 
happiness cannot exist without virtue, and a city is not 
to be termed happy in regard to a portion of the citizens, 
but in regard to them all. 3 And clearly property should 

25 be in their hands, since the husbandmen will of neces- 
sity be slaves or barbarian Perioeci. 4 

Of the classes enumerated there remain only the 
priests, and the manner in which their office is to be 
regulated is obvious. No husbandman or mechanic 
should be appointed to it ; for the Gods should receive 

30 honour from the citizens only. Now since the body of 
the citizens is divided into two classes, the warriors 
and the councillors, and it is beseeming that the worship 
of the Gods should be duly performed, and also a rest 
provided in their service for those who from age have given 
up active life, to the old men of these two classes should 
be assigned the duties of the priesthood. 5 

We have shown what are the necessary conditions, 

35 and what the parts of a state: husbandmen, craftsmen, 
and labourers of all kinds are necessary to the existence 
of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and 
councillors. And these are distinguished severally from 
one another, the distinction being in some cases perma- 
nent, in others not. 

40 It is no new or recent discovery of political philo- 10 

1 Reading a^ortpa in 1. 1 3, as suggested by Susemihl. 

2 Cp. xs28 b 35. 3 Cp. ii. 1264'' 17-24. 4 Cp. infra, 1330* 25-31. 
8 Reading tovtois, with the MSS., and ras lepuxrvms (with the 

third Basel edition) in 11. 33, 34« 


BOOK VII. 10 1329 

sophers that the state ought to be divided into classes, I32g b 
and that the warriors should be separated from the 
husbandmen. The system has continued in Egypt and 
in Crete to this day, and was established, as tradition 
says, by a law of Sesostris in Egypt and of Minos in 
Crete. The institution of common tables also appears 5 
to be of ancient date, being in Crete * as old as the reign 
of Minos, and in Italy far older. The Italian historians 
say that there was a certain Italus king of Oenotria, 
from whom the Oenotrians were called Italians, and 10 
who gave the name of Italy to the promontory of 
Europe lying within the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, 2 
which are distant from one another only half a day's 
journey. They say that this Italus converted the Oeno- 
trians from shepherds into husbandmen, and besides 15 
other laws which he gave them, was the founder of their 
common meals ; even in our day some who are derived 
from him retain this institution and certain other laws of 
his. On the side of Italy towards Tyrrhenia dwelt the 
Opici, who are now, as of old, called Ausones ; and on the 20 
side towards Iapygia and the Ionian Gulf, in the district 
called Siritis, the Chones, who are likewise of Oenotrian 
race. From this part of the world originally came the 
institution of common tables ; the separation into castes 
from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris is of far greater 
antiquity than that of Minos. It is true indeed that 
these and many other things have been invented several 25 
times over 3 in the course of ages, or rather times without 
number ; for necessity may be supposed to have taught 
men the inventions which were absolutely required, and 
when these were provided, it was natural that other 
things which would adorn and enrich life should grow 
up by degrees. And we may infer that in political 3° 
institutions the same rule holds. Egypt 4 witnesses to 

1 Omitting the comma after Kpi)Ti)v in 1. 6. 

2 i. e. between these gulfs and the Strait of Messina. 

3 Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 676; Aristotle, Metaph. xii. io74 b io; 
and Pol. ii. 1264*3. 

* Cp. Mctaph. i. o.Si b 23; Meteor, i. 14. 352 b i9; Plato, Tiinacus, 
22 U ; Laws, ii. 656, 657. 


the antiquity of all these things, for the Egyptians appear 
to be of all people the most ancient ; and they have laws 
and a regular constitution existing from time immemorial. 
We should therefore make the best use of what has 

35 been already discovered, and try to supply defects. 

I have already remarked that the land ought to belong 
to those who possess arms and have a share in the 
government, 1 and that the husbandmen ought to be a 
class distinct from them ; and I have determined what 
should be the extent and nature of the territory. Let me 
proceed to discuss the distribution of the land, and the 

4° character of the agricultural class ; for I do not think that 

I330 a property ought to be common, as some maintain, 2 but 

only that by friendly consent there should be a common 

use of it ; and that no citizen should be in want of 


As to common meals, there is a general agreement 
that a well-ordered city should have them ; and we will 
hereafter explain what are our own reasons for taking 
5 this view. 3 They ought, however, to be open to all the 
citizens. 4 And yet it is not easy for the poor to con- 
tribute the requisite sum out of their private means, and 
to provide also for their household. The expense of 
religious worship should likewise be a public charge. 

io The land must therefore be divided into two parts, one 
public and the other private, and each part should be 
subdivided, part of the public land being appropriated to 
the service of the Gods, and the other part used to 
defray the cost of the common meals ; while of the 

15 private land, part should be near the border, and the 
other near the city, so that, each citizen having two lots, 
they may all of thern have land in both places ; there 
is justice and fairness in such a division, 5 and it tends 
to inspire unanimity among the people in their border 

1 1 328 b 33-1329*2, 1329*17-26, i326 b 26-32. 

2 Cp. ii. 5, Rep. iii. 416 D. 

3 Aristotle does not give any explanation in the Politics. 
*■ Cp. ii. 1271*28. 

5 Cp. Plato, Laws, v. 745, where the same proposal is found. 
Aristotle, in Book ii. 1265b 24, condemns the division of lots which 
he here adopts. 

BOOK VII. 10 i33o a 

wars. Where there is not this arrangement, some of 
them are too ready to come to blows with their neigh- 
bours, while others are so cautious that they quite lose 20 
the sense of honour. Wherefore there is a law in some 
places which forbids those who dwell near the border to 
take part in public deliberations about wars with neigh- 
bours, on the ground that their interests will pervert 
their judgement. For the reasons already mentioned, 
then, the land should be divided in the manner de- 
scribed. The very best thing of all would be that the 2 5 
husbandmen should be slaves taken from among men 
who are not all of the same race 1 and not spirited, for if 
they have no spirit they will be better suited for their 
work, and there will be no danger of their making a 
revolution. The next best thing would be that they 
should be perioeci of foreign race, 2 and of a like inferior 3° 
nature ; some of them should be the slaves of individuals, 
and employed on the private estates of men of property, 
the remainder should be the property of the state and 
employed on the common land."' I will hereafter ex- 
plain 4 what is the proper treatment of slaves, and why it 
is expedient that liberty should be always held out to 
them as the reward of their services. 

II We have already said that the city should be open to 
the land and to the sea/' and to the whole country as 35 
far as possible. In respect of the place itself our wish 
would be that its situation should be fortunate in four 
things. The first, health — this is a necessity : cities which 
lie towards the east, and are blown upon by winds 
coming from the east, are the healthiest ; next in health- 4 o 
fulness are those which are sheltered from the north 
wind, for they have a milder winter. The site of the 
city should likewise be 7 convenient both for political I33° b 

1 Cp. Plato, Laws, vi. 777 C, D. 2 Cp. I329 a 26. 

3 Cp. ii. I267 b l6. 

4 A. does not do so in the Politics, but cp. Oec. 1344'' 15. 

8 Reading 7rp6r avrfjv in 1. 36 with the MSS., and omitting clvm 
with one MS. and apparently with William of Moerbeke. 
7 Reading (\ftv in 1. 2, with the MSS. 


administration and for war. With a view to the latter it 
should afford easy egress to the citizens, and at the 
same time be inaccessible and difficult of capture to ene- 
mies. 1 There should be a natural abundance of springs 
5 and fountains in the town, or, if there is a deficiency of 
them, great reservoirs may be established for the collec- 
tion of rain-water, such as will not fail when the in- 
habitants are cut off from the country by war. Special 
care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, 
which will depend chiefly on the healthiness of the 
locality and of the quarter to which they are exposed, 

10 and secondly, on the use of pure water ; this latter point 
is by no means a secondary consideration. For the 
elements which we use most and oftenest for the sup- 
port of the body contribute most to health, and among 
these are water and air. Wherefore, in all wise states, 

15 if there is a want of pure water, and the supply is not all 
equally good, the drinking water ought to be separated 
from that which is used for other purposes. 

As to strongholds, what is suitable to different forms 
of government varies : thus an acropolis is suited to an 

20 oligarchy or a monarchy, but a plain to a democracy ; 
neither to an aristocracy, but rather a number of strong 
places. The arrangement of private houses is con- 
sidered to be more agreeable and generally more con- 
venient, if the streets are regularly laid out after the 
modern fashion which Hippodamus 2 introduced, but for 

25 security in war the antiquated mode of building, which 
made it difficult for strangers to get out of a town and 
for assailants to find their way in, is preferable. A city 
should therefore adopt both plans of building : it is pos- 
sible to arrange the houses irregularly, as husbandmen 
plant their vines in what are called ' clumps '. The whole 

30 town should not be laid out in straight lines, but only 
certain quarters and regions ; thus security and beauty 
will be combined. 

As to walls, those who say" that cities making any 

1 Repetition of I326 b 40. 2 Cp. ii. I267 b 22. 

3 Cp. Plato, Laws, vi. 778 D. 

BOOK VII. ii i33o b 

pretension to military virtue should not have them, are 
quite out of date in their notions ; and they may see the 
cities which prided themselves on this fancy confuted 
by facts. True, there is little courage shown in seeking 35 
for safety behind a rampart when an enemy is similar in 
character and not much superior in number ; but the 
superiority of the besiegers may be and often is too much 
both for ordinary human valour and for that which is 
found only in a few ; and if they are to be saved and to 4° 
escape defeat and outrage, the strongest wall will be the I33 1 
truest soldierly precaution, more especially now that 
missiles and siege engines have been brought to such 
perfection. To have no walls would be as foolish as to 
choose a site for a town in an exposed country, and to 
level the heights ; or as if an individual were to leave his 5 
house unwalled, lest the inmates should become cowards. 
Nor must we forget that those who have their cities sur- 
rounded by walls may either take advantage of them or 
not, but cities which are unwalled have no choice. 

If our conclusions are just, not only should cities io 
have walls, but care should be taken to make them 
ornamental, as well as useful for warlike purposes, and 
adapted to resist modern inventions. For as the as- 
sailants of a city do all they can to gain an advantage, T 5 
so the defenders should make use of any means of 
defence which have been already discovered, and should 
devise and invent others, for when men are well pre- 
pared no enemy even thinks of attacking them. 

12 As the walls are to be divided by guard-houses and 
towers built at suitable intervals, and the body of citizens 20 
must be distributed at common tables, 1 the idea will 
naturally occur that we should establish some of the 
common tables in the guard-houses. These might be 
arranged as has been suggested ; while the principal 
common tables of the magistrates will occupy a suitable »5 
place, and there also will be the buildings appropriated to 
religious worship except in the case of those rites which 

' Cp. i33° a 3- 


the law or the Pythian oracle has restricted to a special 
locality. 1 The site should be a spot seen far and wide, 
which gives due elevation to virtue 2 and towers over the 

30 neighbourhood. Below this spot should be established 
an agora, such as that which the Thessalians call the 
' freemen's agora ' ; from this all trade should be excluded, 
and no mechanic, husbandman, or any such person allowed 

35 to enter, unless he be summoned by the magistrates. It 
would be a charming use of the place, if the gymnastic 
exercises of the elder men were performed there. For 
in this noble practice different ages should be sepa- 
rated, and some of the magistrates should stay with the 
boys, while the grown-up men remain with the magis- 

40 trates ; for the presence of the magistrates is the best mode 
of inspiring true modesty and ingenuous fear. There 
I33l b should also be a traders' agora, distinct and apart from 
the other, in a situation which is convenient for the recep- 
tion of goods both by sea and land. 

But in speaking of the magistrates we must not forget 
5 another section of the citizens,* viz. the priests, for whom 
public tables should likewise be provided in their proper 
place near the temples. The magistrates who deal with 
contracts, indictments, summonses, and the like, and 
those who have the care of the agora and of the city re- 

10 spectively, ought to be established near an agora and 
some public place of meeting; the neighbourhood of the 
traders' agora will be a suitable spot ; the upper agora 
we devote to the life of leisure, the other is intended for 
the necessities of trade. 

The same order should prevail 4 in the country, for 

15 there too the magistrates, called by some ' Inspectors 
of Forests ' and by others ' Wardens of the Country ', 
must have guard-houses and common tables while they 
are on duty ; temples should also be scattered through- 
out the country, dedicated, some to Gods, and some to 

1 Cp. Plato, Laws, v. 738 B-D, vi. 759 c, 778 C, viii. 848 D-E. 

2 Reading 717)6? rr\v rfjs operas dtcriv in 1. 29, with the MSS. 
s Reading in 1. 4 to tt\t]8os, with the MSS. 

4 Reading vevt^a-Bm in 1. 13 with some MSS. 


BOOK VII. 12 1331 

But it would be a waste of time for us to linger over 
details like these. The difficulty is not in imagining 
but in carrying them out. We may talk about them as 20 
much as we like, but the execution of them will depend 
upon fortune. Wherefore let us say no more about 
these matters for the present. 

13 Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to de- 
termine out of what and what sort of elements the state 25 
which is to be happy and well-governed should be com- 
posed. There are two things in which all well-being 
consists : one of them is the choice of a right end and 
aim of action, and the other the discovery of the actions 
which are means towards it ; for the means and the end 
may agree or disagree. Sometimes the right end is set 30 
before men, but in practice they fail to attain it ; in 
other cases they are successful in all the means, but they 
propose to themselves a bad end ; and sometimes they 
fail in both. Take, for example, the art of medicine; 
physicians do not always understand the nature of health, 35 
and also the means which they use may not effect the 
desired end. In all arts and sciences both the end and 
the means should be equally within our control. 

The happiness and well-being which all men mani- 
festly desire, some have the power of attaining, but 4° 
to others, from some accident or defect of nature, the 
attainment of them is not granted ; for a good life 
requires a supply of external goods, in a less degree 1332* 
when men are in a good state, in a greater degree 
when they are in a lower state. Others again, who 
possess the conditions of happiness, go utterly wrong 
from the first in the pursuit of it. But since our 
object is to discover the best form of government, that, 
namely, under which a city will be best governed, and 5 
since the city is best governed which has the greatest 
opportunity of obtaining happiness, it is evident that we 
must clearly ascertain the nature of happiness. 

We maintain, and have said in the Ethics} if the 
1 Nic. Eth. i. 1098*16, x. H76 b 4; and cp. 1328*37. 

845 17 Q 


arguments there adduced are of any value, that happiness 
is the realization and perfect exercise of virtue, and this 

10 not conditional, but absolute. And I used the term ' con- 
ditional ' to express that which is indispensable, and 
' absolute ' to express that which is good in itself. Take 
the caseof just actions; just punishments and chastisements 
do indeed spring from a good principle, but they are 
good only because we cannot do without them — it would be 
better that neither individuals nor states should need any- 

15 thing of the sort — but actions which aim at honour and 
advantage are absolutely the best. The conditional action 
is only the choice 1 of a lesser evil ; whereas these are 
the foundation and creation of good. A good man may 
make the best even of poverty and disease, and the other 

30 ills of life ; but he can only attain happiness under the 
opposite conditions 2 (for this also has been determined in 
accordance with ethical arguments, 3 that the good man 
is he for whom, because he is virtuous, the things that are 
absolutely good are good ; it is also plain that his useof these 

3 5 goods must be virtuous and in the absolute sense good). 
This makes men fancy that external goods are the cause of 
happiness, yet we might as well say that a brilliant per- 
formance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instrument 
and not to the skill of the performer. 

It follows then from what has been said that some 
things the legislator must find ready to his hand in a 
state, others he must provide. And therefore we can 
only say: May our state be constituted in such a manner 
as to be blessed with the goods of which fortune dis- 

30 poses (for we acknowledge her power) : whereas virtue 
and goodness in the state are not a matter of chance 
but the result of knowledge and purpose. A city can 
be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share 
in the government are virtuous, and in our state all the 
citizens share in the government ; let us then inquire 

35 how a man becomes virtuous. For even if we could 

1 Retaining the MS. reading alpea-ts in 1. 17. 

2 Nic. Eth. i. uoo b 22, uoi a i3. 

s Nic. Eth. iii. 1113* 22- b I ; E. E. vii. I248 b 26; M. M. ii. 
I207 b 3i. 

BOOK VII. 13 1332" 

suppose the citizen body to be virtuous, without each of 
them being so, yet the latter would be better, for in the 
virtue of each the virtue of all is involved. 

There are three things which make men good and 
virtuous ; these are nature, habit, rational principle. 1 In 4° 
the first place, every one must be born a man and not 
some other animal; 2 so, too, he must have a certain 
character, both of body and soul. But some qualities 
there is no use in having at birth, for they are altered I332 b 
by habit, and there are some gifts which by nature are 
made to be turned by habit to good or bad. Animals 
lead for the most part a life of nature, although in lesser 
particulars some are influenced by habit as well. Man 
has rational principle, in addition, and man only. Where- 5 
fore nature, habit, rational principle must be in harmony 
with one another ; for they do not always agree ; men do 
many things against habit and nature, if rational principle 
persuades them that they ought. We have already 
determined what natures are likely to be most easily 
moulded by the hands of the legislator. 3 All else is the 
work of education ; we learn some things by habit and 10 
some by instruction. 

14 Since every political society is composed of rulers and 
subjects, let us consider whether the relations of one to 
the other should interchange or be permanent. 4 For 15 
the education of the citizens will necessarily vary with 
the answer given to this question. Now, if some men 
excelled others in the same degree in which gods and 
heroes are supposed to excel mankind in general (having 
in the first place a great advantage even in their bodies, 
and secondly in their minds), so that the superiority of the ao 
governors was undisputed and patent to their subjects, it 
would clearly be better that once for all the one class should 
rule and the others serve. 5 But since this is unattain- 
able, and kings have no marked superiority over their 

1 Cp. N. Eth. x. ii79 b 2o. 

2 Reading a comma after (jaw in 1. 41. * I327 b 36. 
4 Cp. iii. I279 a 8. 9 Cp. i. 1254*" 16, 1284*3. 

Q 2 


subjects, such as Scylax affirms to be found among the 

2 5 Indians, it is obviously necessary on many grounds that 
all the citizens alike should take their turn of governing 
and being governed. Equality consists in the same 
treatment of similar persons, and no government can 
stand which is not founded upon justice. For if the 
government be unjust every one in the country unites 
with the governed in the desire to have a revolution, 

30 and it is an impossibility that the members of the govern- 
ment can be so numerous as to be stronger than all their 
enemies put together. Yet that governors should excel 
their subjects is undeniable. How all this is to be effected, 
and in what way they will respectively share in the 

35 government, the legislator has to consider. The subject 
has been already mentioned. 1 Nature herself has 
provided the distinction when she made a difference 
between old and young within the same species, 
of whom she fitted the one to govern and the 
other to be governed. No one takes offence at being 
governed when he is young, nor does he think himself 

4° better than his governors, especially if he will enjoy the 
same privilege when he reaches the required age. 

We conclude that from one point of view governors and 
governed are identical, and from another different. And 
1333* therefore their education must be the same and also dif- 
ferent. For he who would learn to command well must, 
as men say, first of all learn to obey. 2 As I observed 
in the first part of this treatise, there is one rule which 
is for the sake of the rulers and another rule which is for 
5 the sake of the ruled ; 3 the former is a despotic, the 
latter a free government. Some commands differ not in 
the thing commanded, but in the intention with which 
they are imposed. Wherefore, many apparently menial 
offices are an honour to the free youth by whom they 
are performed ; for actions do not differ as honourable 

10 or dishonourable in themselves so much as in the end 
and intention of them. But since we say 4 that the virtue 

1 1329*2-17. 2 Cp. iii. I277 b 9. 

* iii. I278 b 32-1279*8, cp. i277 a 33~ b 3o. 4 Cp. iii. 4, 5. 

BOOK VII. 14 1333' 

of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good 
man, and that the same person must first be a subject 
and then a ruler, the legislator has to see that they 
become good men, and by what means this may be '5 
accomplished, and what is the end of the perfect life. 

Now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one of 
which has a rational principle in itself, and the other, not 
having a rational principle in itself, is able to obey such 
a principle. 1 And we call a man in any way good 
because he has the virtues of these two parts. In which 
of them the end is more likely to be found is no matter ;o 
of doubt to those who adopt our division ; for in the 
world both of nature and of art the inferior always exists 
for the sake of the better or superior, and the better or 
superior is that which has a rational principle. This 
principle, too, in our ordinary way of speaking, is divided 
into two kinds, for there is a practical and a speculative 25 
principle. 2 This part, then, must evidently be similarly 
divided. And there must be a corresponding division of 
actions ; the actions of the naturally better part are to 
be preferred by those who have it in their power to attain 
to two out of the three or to all, for that is always to 
every one the most eligible which is the highest 
attainable by him. The whole of life is further divided 3° 
into two parts, business and leisure, 15 war and peace, and 
of actions some aim at what is necessary and useful, and 
some at what is honourable. And the preference given 
to one or the other class of actions must necessarily be 
like the preference given to one or other part of the soul 
and its actions over the other ; there must be war for the 35 
sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things use- 
ful and necessary for the sake of things honourable. All 
these points the statesman should keep in view when he 
frames his laws ; he should consider the parts of the soul 
and their functions, and above all the better and the end ; 
he should also remember the diversities 4 of human lives 40 

1 Cp. iXic. Eth. i. ii02 b 28. 2 Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. Ii39 :i 6. 

8 Nic. Eth. x. 1177'' 4. 

4 Reading 8uupia<ts in 1. 41 with the MSS. 

i333 a POLITICA 

and actions. For men must be able to engage in 
I333 b business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better ; 
they must do what is necessary and indeed what is use- 
ful, but what is honourable is better. On such principles 
children and persons of every age which requires edu- 
5 cation should be trained. Whereas even the Hellenes 
of the present day who are reputed to be best governed, 
and the legislators who gave them their constitutions, 
do not appear to have framed their governments 
with a regard to the best end, or to have given them 
laws and education with a view to all the virtues, but in 
a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those which promised 

10 to be more useful and profitable. Many modern writers 
have taken a similar view : they commend the Lace- 
daemonian constitution, and praise the legislator for 
making conquest and war his sole aim, 1 a doctrine 

15 which may be refuted by argument and has long ago 
been refuted by facts. For most men desire empire 
in the hope of accumulating the goods of fortune ; and 
on this ground Thibron and all those who have written 
about the Lacedaemonian constitution have praised their 

jo legislator, because the Lacedaemonians, by being trained 
to meet dangers, gained great power. But surely they 
are not a happy people now that their empire has passed 
away, nor was their legislator right. How ridiculous is 
the result, if, while they are continuing in the observance 
of his laws and no one interferes with them, they have 

25 lost the better part of life ! These writers further err 
about the sort of government which the legislator should 
approve, for the government of freemen is nobler and 
implies more virtue than despotic government. 2 Neither 
is a city to be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised 

30 because he trains his citizens to conquer and obtain 
dominion over their neighbours, for there is great evil in 
this. On a similar principle any citizen who could, 
should obviously try to obtain the power in his own 
state, — the crime which the Lacedaemonians accuse king 

1 Cp. Plato, Laws, i. 628, 638. 2 Cp. i. 1254 s 25. 

BOOK VII. 14 1333 

Pausanias of attempting, 1 although he had so great 
honour already. No such principle and no law having 35 
this object is either statesmanlike or useful or right. 
For the same things are best both for individuals and for 
states, and these are the things which the legislator ought 
to implant in the minds of his citizens. Neither should 
men study war with a view to the enslavement of those 
who do not deserve to be enslaved ; but first of all they 40 
should provide against their own enslavement, and in the 
second place obtain empire for the good of the governed, 
and not for the sake of exercising a general despotism, 1334' 
and in the third place they should seek to be masters 
only over those who deserve to be slaves. Facts, as 
well as arguments, prove that the legislator should direct 
all his military and other measures to the provision of 5 
leisure and the establishment of peace. For most of 
these military states are safe only while they are at war, 2 
but fall when they have acquired their empire ; like un- 
used iron they lose their temper in time of peace. And 
for this the legislator is to blame, he never having taught 10 
them how to lead the life of peace. 

15 Since the end of individuals and of states is the same, 
the end of the best man and of the best constitution 
must also be the same ; it is therefore evident that there 
ought to exist in both of them the virtues of leisure ; for 
peace, as has been often repeated, 3 is the end of war, 15 
and leisure of toil. But leisure and cultivation may be 
promoted, not only by those virtues which are practised 
in leisure, but also by some of those which are useful to 
business. 4 For many necessaries of life have to be 
supplied before we can have leisure. Therefore a city 
must be temperate and brave, and able to endure : for 10 
truly, as the proverb says, ' There is no leisure for slaves,' 
and those who cannot face danger like men are the slaves 
of any invader. Courage and endurance are required for 

1 Cp. v. i30i b 2o, 1307*3. 2 Cp. ii. I27i b 3. 

3 I 333 a 35> I334 a 2- 

1 i.e. 'not only by some of the speculative but also by some of 

the practical virtues'. 



business and philosophy for leisure, temperance and 

25 justice for both, and more especially in times of peace and 
leisure, for war compels men to be just and temperate, 
whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure 
which comes with peace tend to make them insolent. 
Those then who seem to be the best-off and to be in the 
possession of every good, have special need of justice 

30 and temperance, — for example, those (if such there be, 
as the poets say l ) who dwell in the Islands of the Blest ; 
they above all will need philosophy and temperance and 
justice, and all the more the more leisure they have, living 
in the midst of abundance. There is no difficulty in 

35 seeing why the state that would be happy and good 
ought to have these virtues. If it be disgraceful in men 
not to be able to use the goods of life, it is peculiarly 
disgraceful not to be able to use them in time of leisure, 
— to show excellent qualities in action and war, and when 
they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves. 

40 Wherefore we should not practise virtue after the manner 
of the Lacedaemonians. 2 For they, while agreeing with 
*334 b other men in their conception of the highest goods, differ 
from the rest of mankind in thinking that they are to be 
obtained by the practice of a single virtue. And since 
(they think) these goods and the enjoyment of them 

5 greater than the enjoyment derived from the virtues . . . 
and that (it should be practised) for its own sake, 3 is 
evident from what has been said ; we must now consider 
how and by what means it is to be attained. 

We have already determined that nature and habit 
and rational principle are required, 4 and, of these, the 
proper nature of the citizens has also been defined by us. 
But we have still to consider whether the training of early 
life is to be that of rational principle or habit, for these 
two must accord, and when in accord they will then 

1 Cp. Hes. Op. et Dies, 170; Pind. Olymp. ii. 53. 

- Cp. ii. 1271*41. 

3 Newman suggests that the lacuna in 1. 4 may be filled as 
follows : ' they practise only the virtue which is thought to be useful 
as a means to these. Now, that the whole of virtue should be practised' 

* I332 a 39 SC 1<1- 6 c - 7- 

BOOK VII. 15 1334 

form the best of harmonies. The rational principle may 10 
be mistaken and fail in attaining the highest ideal of life, 
and there may be a like evil influence of habit. Thus much 
is clear in the first place, that, as in all other things, birth 
implies an antecedent beginning, 1 and that there are 
beginnings whose end is relative to a further end. 
Now, in men rational principle and mind are the end 
towards which nature strives, 2 so that the birth and moral ig 
discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered with a view 
to them. In the second place, as the soul and body are 
two, we see also that there are two parts of the soul, the 
rational and the irrational, and two corresponding states — 
reason and appetite. And as the body is prior in order of 20 
generation to the soul, so the irrational is prior to the 
rational. The proof is that anger and wishing and desire 
are implanted in children from their very birth, but reason 
and understanding are developed as they grow older. 
Wherefore, the care of the body ought to precede that of 25 
the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should 
follow : none the less our care of it must be for the sake of 
the reason, and our care of the body for the sake of the soul. 

16 Since the legislator should begin by considering how 
the frames of the children whom he is rearing may be as 
good as possible, his first care will be about marriage — 3° 
at what age should his citizens marry, and who arc fit to 
marry? In legislating on this subject he ought to con- 
sider the persons and the length of their life, that their 
procreative life may terminate at the same period, and 35 
that they may not differ in their bodily powers, as will 
be the case if the man is still able to beget children while 
the woman is unable to bear them, or the woman able to 
bear while the man is unable to beget, for from these 
causes arise quarrels and differences between married 
persons. Secondly, he must consider the time at which 
the children will succeed to their parents ; there ought 
not to be too great an interval of age, for then the 40 

1 i.e. the union of the parents. 

2 i.e. the birth of the offspring, which is the end of the union of 
the parents, points to a further end, the development of mind. 


i334 b POLITICA 

parents will be too old to derive any pleasure from their 
I 335 a affection, or to be of any use to them. Nor ought they 
to be too nearly of an age ; to youthful marriages there 
are many objections — the children will be wanting in 
respect to the parents, who will seem to be their contem- 
poraries, and disputes will arise in the management of the 
household. Thirdly, and this is the point from which 
5 we digressed, 1 the legislator must mould to his will the 
frames of newly-born children. Almost all these objects 
may be secured by attention to one point. Since the 
time of generation is commonly limited within the age 
of seventy years in the case of a man, and of fifty in the 

10 case of a woman, the commencement of the union should 
conform to these periods. The union of male and female 
when too young is bad for the procreation of children ; 
in all other animals the offspring of the young are small 
and ill-developed, and with a tendency to produce female 

15 children, and therefore also in man, as is proved by the 
fact that in those cities in which men and women are 
accustomed to marry young, the people are small and 
weak ; in childbirth also younger women suffer more, 
and more of them die ; some persons say that this was 
the meaning of the response once given to the 

20 Troezenians 2 — the oracle really meant that many died 
because they married too young ; it had nothing to do 
with the ingathering of the harvest. It also conduces 
to temperance not to marry too soon ; for women who 
marry early are apt to be wanton ; and in men too the 

35 bodily frame is stunted if they marry while the seed is 
growing (for there is a time when the growth of the seed, 
also, ceases, or continues to but a slight extent). 3 
Women should marry when they are about eighteen 
years of age, and men at seven and thirty ; then they 

3° are in the prime of life, and the decline in the powers of 
both will coincide. Further, the children, if their birth 
takes place soon, as may reasonably be expected, will 
succeed in the beginning of their prime, when the fathers 

1 I334 b 29 sqq. 2 ' Plough not the young field'. 

3 Transferring r) micpop from 1. 29 to 1. 27 after In, with Gottling. 

BOOK VII. 16 I335 a 

are already in the decline of life, and have nearly reached 
their term of three-score years and ten. 

Thus much of the age proper for marriage : the season 35 
of the year should also be considered ; according to our 
present custom, people generally limit marriage to the 
season of winter, and they are right. The precepts of 
physicians and natural philosophers about generation 4° 
should also be studied by the parents themselves ; the 
physicians give good advice about the favourable con- 
ditions of the body, and the natural philosophers about *335 
the winds ; of which they prefer the north to the south. 

What constitution in the parent is most advantageous 
to the offspring is a subject which we will consider more 
carefully 1 when we speak of the education of children, 
and we will only make a few general remarks at present. 
The constitution of an athlete is not suited to the life 5 
of a citizen, or to health, or to the procreation of children, 
any more than the valetudinarian or exhausted con- 
stitution, but one which is in a mean between them. A 
man's constitution should be inured to labour, but not to . 
labour which is excessive or of one sort only, such as is 
practised by athletes ; he should be capable of all the io 
actions of a freeman. These remarks apply equally to 
both parents. 

Women who are with child should be careful of them- 
selves ; they should take exercise and have a nourishing 
diet. The first of these prescriptions the legislator will 
easily carry into effect by requiring that they shall take '5 
a walk daily to some temple, where they can worship the 
gods who preside over birth. 2 Their minds, however, 
unlike their bodies, they ought to keep quiet, for the 
offspring derive their natures from their mothers as 
plants do from the earth. 

As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there 20 
be a law that no deformed child shall live, but that on 
the ground of an excess in the number of children, if the 
established customs 3 of the state forbid this (for in our 

1 A. does not actually do so. a Cp. Plato, Laws, vii. 789 E. 

2 Reading t'Owv in I. 21 with the MSS. 


state population has a limit), no child is to be exposed, 
but when couples have children in excess, let abortion be 

25 procured before sense and life have begun ; what may or 
may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the 
question of life and sensation. 

And now, having determined at what ages men and 
women are to begin their union, let us also determine 
how long they shall continue to beget and bear offspring 
for the state ; men who are too old, like men who are 

3° too young, produce children who are defective in body 
and mind ; the children of very old men are weakly. 
The limit, then, should be the age which is the prime of 
their intelligence, and this in most persons, according to 
the notion of some poets who measure life by periods of 

35 seven years, is about fifty ; l at four or five years later, 
they should cease from having families ; and from that 
time forward only cohabit with one another for the sake 
of health, or for some similar reason. 

As to adultery, let it be held disgraceful, in general, 

40 for any man or woman to be found in any way unfaithful 

I336 a when they are married, and called husband and wife. 

If during the time of bearing children anything of the 

sort occur, let the guilty person be punished with a loss of 

privileges in proportion to the offence. 2 

After the children have been born, the mariner of 17 
rearing them may be supposed to have a great effect 

5 on their bodily strength. It would appear from the 
example of animals, and of those nations who desire to 
create the military habit, that the food which has most 
milk in it is best suited to human beings ; but the less 
wine the better, if they would escape diseases. Also all 
the motions to which children can be subjected at their 

10 early age are very useful. But in order to preserve 
their tender limbs from distortion, some nations have had 
recourse to mechanical appliances which straighten their 
bodies. To accustom children to the cold from their 

1 Cp. Solon Fragm. 27 Bergk 4 . 

2 Cp. Laws, viii. 841 D, E. 

BOOK VII. 17 1336 s 

earliest years is also an excellent practice, which greatly 
conduces to health, and hardens them for military ser- 
vice. Hence many barbarians have a custom of plunging 15 
their children at birth into a cold stream ; others, like 
the Celts, clothe them in a light wrapper only. For 
human nature should be early habituated to endure all 
which by habit it can be made to endure ; but the pro- 
cess must be gradual. And children, from their natural 20 
warmth, may be easily trained to bear cold Such care 
should attend them in the first stage of life. 

The next period lasts to the age of five ; during this 
no demand should be made upon the child for study or 
labour, lest its growth be impeded ; and there should 2 5 
be sufficient motion to prevent the limbs from being 
inactive. This can be secured, among other ways, by 
amusement, but the amusement should not be vulgar 
or tiring or effeminate. The Directors of Education, as 30 
they are termed, should be careful what tales or stories 
the children hear, 1 for all. such things are designed 
to prepare the way for the business of later life, and 
should be for the most part imitations of the occupa- 
tions which they will hereafter pursue in earnest. 2 
Those are wrong who in their laws attempt to check 
the loud crying and screaming of children, for these con- 35 
tribute towards their growth, and, in a manner, exercise 
their bodies. 3 Straining the voice has a strengthening 
effect similar to that produced by the retention of the 
breath in violent exertions. The Directors of Education 40 
should have an eye to their bringing up, and in particular 
should take care that they are left as little as possible 
with slaves. For until they are seven years old they I336 b 
must live at home ; and therefore, even at this early age, 
it is to be expected that they should acquire a taint of 
meanness from what they hear and see. Indeed, there 
is nothing which the legislator should be more careful to 
drive away than indecency of speech ; for the light 5 
utterance of shameful words leads soon to shameful 

1 Plato, Rep. ii. 377 ff. a Plato, Laws, i. 643. 

3 Plato, Laivs, vii. 792 A. 

i336 b POLITICA 

actions. The young especially should never be allowed 
to repeat or hear anything of the sort. A freeman who 
is found saying or doing what is forbidden, if he be too 
young as yet to have the privilege of reclining at the 

io public tables, should be disgraced 1 and beaten, and an 
elder person degraded as his slavish conduct deserves. 
And since we do not allow improper language, clearly we 
should also banish pictures or speeches from the stage 
which are indecent. Let the rulers take care that there 

15 be no image or picture representing unseemly actions, 
except in the temples of those Gods at whose festivals 
the law permits even ribaldry, and whom the law also 
permits to be worshipped by persons of mature age on 
behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives. But 

20 the legislator should not allow youth to be spectators 

of iambi or of comedy until they are of an age to sit at 

» the public tables and to drink strong wine ; by that time 

education will have armed them against the evil influences 

of such representations. 

We have made these remarks in a cursory manner, — 

25 they are enough for the present occasion ; but hereafter 2 
we will return to the subject and after a fuller dis- 
cussion determine whether such liberty should or should 
not be granted, and in what way granted, if at all. 
Theodorus, ihe tragic actor, was quite right in saying 
that he would not allow any other actor, not even if he 

30 were quite second-rate, to enter before himself, because 
the spectators grew fond of the voices which they first 
heard. And the same principle applies universally to 
association with things as well as with persons, for we 
always like best whatever comes first. And therefore 
youth should be kept strangers to all that is bad, and 

35 especially to things which suggest vice or hate. When the 
five years have passed away,during the two following years 
they must look on at the pursuits which they are hereafter 
to learn. There are two periods of life with reference to 
which education has to be divided, from seven to the age 
of puberty, and onwards to the age of one and twenty. 
1 Retaining aufuais in 1. 10. 2 An unfulfilled promise. 

BOOK VII. 17 I336 b 

The poets who divide ages by sevens 1 are in the main 40 
right : but we should observe the divisions actually I337 n 
made by nature ; for the deficiencies of nature are what 
art and education seek to fill up. 

Let us then first inquire if any regulations are to be 
laid down about children, and secondly, whether the 
care of them should be the concern of the state or of 
private individuals, which latter is in our own day the 5 
common custom, and in the third place, what these regu- 
lations should be. 

1 Cp. i335 b 33- 

I337 a 


No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his I 
attention above all to the education of youth ; for the 
neglect of education does harm to the constitution. The 
citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government 
under which he lives. 1 For each government has a 

15 peculiar character which originally formed and which 
continues to preserve it. The character of democracy 
creates democracy, and the character of oligarchy creates 
oligarchy ; and always the better the character, the 
better the government. 

Again, for the exercise of any faculty or art a previous 

20 training and habituation are required ; clearly therefore 
for the practice of virtue. And since the whole city has 
one end, it Is manifest that education should be one and 
the same for all, and that it should be public, and not 
private, — not as at present, when every one looks after 

25 his own children separately, and gives them separate in- 
struction of the sort which he thinks best ; the training 
in things which are of common interest should be the 
same for all. Neither must we suppose that any one 
of the citizens belongs to himself, 2 for they all belong to 
the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and 

30 the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the 
whole. In this particular as in some others 3 the Lace- 
daemonians are to be praised, for they take the greatest 
pains about their children, and make education the 
business of the state. 4 

That education should be regulated by law and should 2 
be an affair of state is not to be denied, but what should 
be the character of this public education, and how young 

1 Cp. v. l3lo a 12-36. 2 Reading avrov nvrov in 1. 28. 

3 Reading <cm roP™ in I. 31 with the MSS. 

4 Cp. Nic. Eth. x. n8o a 24. 

BOOK VIII. 2 1337* 

persons should be educated, are questions which remain 
to be considered. As things are, there is disagreement 
about the subjects. For mankind are by no means 35 
agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look 
to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear whether 
education is more concerned with intellectual or with 
moral virtue. The existing practice is perplexing ; no 
one knows on what principle we should proceed— should 4° 
the useful in life, or should virtue, or should the higher 
knowledge, be the aim of our training ; all three opinions 
have been entertained. Again, about the means there is 1337 
no agreement ; for different persons, starting with different 
ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally disagree about 
the practice of it. There can be no doubt that children 
should be taught those useful things which are really 
necessary, but not all useful things ; for occupations are 5 
divided into liberal and illiberal ; and to young children 
should be imparted only such kinds of knowledge as will 
be useful to them without vulgarizing them. And any 
occupation, art, or science, which makes the body or soul 10 
or mind of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise 
of virtue, is vulgar ; wherefore we call those arts vulgar 
which tend to deform the body, and likewise all paid 
employments, for they absorb and degrade the mind. 
There are also some liberal arts quite proper for a freeman 15 
to acquire, but only in a certain degree, and if he attend 
to them too closely, in order to attain perfection in them, 
the same evil effects will follow The object also which 
a man sets before him makes a great difference ; if he 
does or learns anything for his own sake 7 or for the sake 
of his friends, or with a view to excellence, the action 
will not appear illiberal ; but if done for the sake of 20 
others, the very same action will be thought menial and 
servile. The received subjects of instruction, as I have 
already remarked, 2 are partly of a liberal and partly of 
an illiberal character. 

/'3 The customary branches of education arc in number four; 
1 Cp. iii. I277''3. 2 a 39-''3. 

6«17 R 


they are — (i) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, 

35 (3) music, to which is sometimes added (4) drawing. Of 
these, reading and writing and drawing are regarded as 
useful for the purposes of life in a variety of ways, and 
gymnastic exercises are thought to infuse courage. Con- 
cerning music a doubt may be raised — in our own day most 
men cultivate it for the sake of pleasure, but originally 

30 it was included in education, because nature herself, as 
has been often said, 1 requires that we should be able, not 
only to work well, but to use leisure well ; for, as I must 
repeat once again, the first principle of all action is 
leisure. Both are required, but leisure is better than 
occupation and is its end ; and therefore the question 
must be asked, what ought we to do when at leisure? 

35 Clearly we ought not to be amusing ourselves, for then 
amusement would be the end of life. But if this is incon- 
ceivable, and amusement is needed more amid serious 
occupations than at other times (for he who is hard at 
work has need of relaxation, and amusement gives re- 
laxation, whereas occupation is always accompanied with 

40 exertion and effort), we should introduce amusements 
only at suitable times, and they should be our medicines, 
for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxa- 
1338* tion, and from the pleasure we obtain rest. But leisure 
of itself gives pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of 
life, which are experienced, not by the busy man, but by 
those who have leisure. For he who is occupied has 

5 in view some end which he has not attained ; but happi- 
ness is an end, since all men deem it to be accompanied 
with pleasure and not with pain. This pleasure, how- 
ever, is regarded differently by different persons, and 
varies according to the habit of individuals ; the plea- 
sure of the best man is the best, and springs from the 
noblest sources. It is clear then that there are branches of 

10 learning and education which we must study merely with 
a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and these 
are to be valued for their own sake ; whereas those kinds of 
knowledge which are useful in business are to be deemed 

ii. I27i a 4i sqq., vii. 1333 11 i6-l334 b 3 ; N.Eth. x. 6. 

BOOK VIII. 3 I338 B 

necessary, and exist for the sake of other things. And 
therefore our fathers admitted music into education, not 
on the ground either of its necessity or utility, for it is not 
necessary, nor indeed useful in the same manner as read- 15 
ing and writing, which are useful in money-making, in the 
management of a household, in the acquisition of know- 
ledge and in political life, nor like drawing, useful for a 
more correct judgement of the works of artists, nor again 
like gymnastic, which gives health and strength ; for 20 
neither of these is to be gained from music. There re- 
mains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoyment 
in leisure; which is in fact evidently the reason of its 
introduction, this being one of the ways in which it is 
thought that a freeman should pass his leisure ; as Homer 
says — 

1 But he who alone should be called 1 to the pleasant 25 
feast ', 

and afterwards he speaks of others whom he describes as 

' The bard who would delight them all \ 2 

And in another place Odysseus says there is no better 
way of passing life than when men's hearts are merry and 

'The banqueters in the hall, sitting in order, hear the 
voice of the minstrel'. 3 

It is evident, then, that there is a sort of education in 30 
which parents should train their sons, not as being useful 
or necessary, but because it is liberal or noble. Whether 
this is of one kind only, or of more than one, and if 
so, what they are, and how they are to be imparted, 
must hereafter be determined. 4 Thus much we are 
now in a position to say, that the ancients witness to us ; 35 
for their opinion may be gathered from the fact that 
music is one of the received and traditional branches of 
education. Further, it is clear that children should be 
instructed in some useful things, — for example, in reading 

1 Reading d\\' olov fiovov in 1. 25, with Newman. The line 
does not occur in our text of Homer, but in Aristotle's text it 
probably came instead of, or after, Od. xvii. 383. 

2 Od. xvii. 385. 8 Od. ix. 7. 4 An unfulfilled promise. 

R 2 


and writing, — not only for their usefulness, but also be- 
cause many other sorts of knowledge are acquired 
4° through them. With a like view they may be taught 
drawing, not to prevent their making mistakes in their 
own purchases, or in order that they may not be im- 
^So posed upon in the buying or selling of articles, but perhaps 
rather because it makes them judges of the beauty of the 
human form. To be always seeking after the useful does 
not become free and exalted souls. 1 Now it is clear 
5 that in education practice must be used before theory, 
and the body be trained before the mind ; and therefore 
boys should be handed over to the trainer, who creates 
in them the proper habit of body, and to the wrestling- 
master, who teaches them their exercises. 

Of those states which in our own day seem to take the 4 
greatest care of children, some aim at producing in them 
10 an athletic habit, but they only injure their forms and 
stunt their growth. Although the Lacedaemonians have 
not fallen into this mistake, yet they brutalize their chil- 
dren by laborious exercises which they think will make 
them courageous. But in truth, as we have often re- 
ts peated, 2 education should not be exclusively, or princi- 
pally, directed to this end. And even if we suppose 
the Lacedaemonians to be right in their end, they do 
not attain it. For among barbarians and among animals 
courage is found associated, not with the greatest ferocity, 
but with a gentle and lion-like temper. There are 
20 many races who are ready enough to kill and eat men, 
such as the Achaeans andHeniochi, who both live about 
the Black Sea ; 3 and there are other mainland tribes, as 
bad or worse, who all live by plunder, but have no courage. 
25 It is notorious that the Lacedaemonians themselves, while 
they alone were assiduous in their laborious drill, were 
superior to others, but now they are beaten both in 
war and gymnastic exercises. For their ancient supe- 

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. vii. 525 ff. 

a ii. 1271 s 4i- b 10, vii. I333 b 5sqq., 1334*40 sqq. 

3 Cp. A'. Eth. vii. H48 b 2i. 

BOOK VIII. 4 1338* 

riority did not depend on their mode of training their 
youth, but only on the circumstance that they trained 
them when their only rivals did not. Hence we may 
infer that what is noble, not what is brutal, should have 
the first place ; no wolf or other wild animal will face 30 
a really noble danger ; such dangers are for the brave 
man. 1 And parents who devote their children to gym- 
nastics while they neglect their necessary education, in 
reality vulgarize them ; for they make them useful to 
the art of statesmanship in one quality only, and even in 35 
this the argument proves them to be inferior to others. 
We should judge the Lacedaemonians not from what 
they have been, but from what they are ; for now they 
have rivals who compete with their education ; formerly 
they had none. 

It is an admitted principle, that gymnastic exercises 
should be employed in education, and that for children 4° 
they should be of a lighter kind, avoiding severe diet or 
painful toil, lest the growth of the body be impaired. 
The evil of excessive training in early years is strikingly 
proved by the example of the Olympic victors ; for not 1339* 
more than two or three of them have gained a prize both 
as boys and as men ; their early training and severe 
gymnastic exercises exhausted their constitutions. When 
boyhood is over, three years should be spent in other 
studies ; the period of life which follows may then be 5 
devoted to hard exercise and strict diet. Men ought 
not to labour at the same time with their minds and with 
their bodies ; 2 for the two kinds of labour are opposed to 
one another ; the labour of the body impedes the mind, 
and the labour of the mind the body. 10 

5 Concerning music there are some questions which we 
have already raised ; :i these we may now resume and 
carry further ; and our remarks will serve as a prelude to 
this or any other discussion of the subject. It is not 
easy to determine the nature of music, or why any one >5 

1 Cp. N. Eth. iii. 1115*29. 3 Cp. Plato, Rep. vii. 537 B. 

8 I337 b 27-1338*30. 


should have a knowledge of it. Shall we say, for the sake 
of amusement and relaxation, like sleep or drinking, 
which are not good in themselves, but are pleasant, and 
at the same time ' make care to cease ', as Euripides l 
says? And for this end men also appoint music, and 

20 make use of all three alike, — sleep, drinking, music, — to 
which some add dancing. | Or shall we argue that music 
conduces to virtue, on the ground that it can form our 
minds and habituate us to true pleasures as our bodies 
are made by gymnastic to be of a certain character? 

2 5 Or shall we say that it contributes to the enjoyment of 
leisure and mental cultivation, which is a third alternative ? 
Now obviously youths are not to be instructed with a view 
to their amusement, for learning is no amusement, but is 
accompanied with pain. Neither is intellectual enjoyment 

3° suitable to boys of that age, for it is the end, and that 
which is imperfect cannot attain the perfect or end. But 
perhaps it may be said that boys learn music for the sake 
of the amusement which they will have when they are 
grown up. If so, why should they learn themselves, 

35 and not, like the Persian and Median kings, enjoy the 
pleasure and instruction which is derived from hearing 
others? (for surely persons who have made music the 
business and profession of their lives will be better 
performers than those who practise only long enough to 
learn). If they must learn music, on the same principle 

40 they should learn cookery, which is absurd. And even 
granting that music may form the character, the 
objection still holds : why should we learn ourselves ? 
I 339 b Why cannot we attain true pleasure and form a correct 
judgement from hearing others, like the Lacedae- 
monians?— for they, without learning music, nevertheless 
can correctly judge, as they say, of good and bad 
melodies. Or again, if music should be used to promote 

5 cheerfulness and refined intellectual enjoyment, the 
objection still remains — why should we learn ourselves 
instead of enjoying the performances of others? We 
may illustrate what we are saying by our conception of 

1 Bacchae, 381. 

BOOK VIII. 5 *339 b 

the Gods ; for in the poets Zeus does not himself sing or 
play on the lyre. Nay, we call professional performers 
vulgar ; no freeman would play or sing unless he were 
intoxicated or in jest. But these matters may be left 
for the present. 1 1D 

The first question is whether music is or is not to be 
a part of education. Of the three things mentioned in our 
discussion, which does it produce ? — education or amuse- 
ment or intellectual enjoyment, for it may be reckoned 
under all three, and seems to share in the nature of all of 
them. Amusement is for the sake of relaxation, and relax- 15 
ation is of necessity sweet, for it is the remedy of pain 
caused by toil ; and intellectual enjoyment is universally 
acknowledged to contain an element not only of the noble 
but of the pleasant, for happiness is made up of both. All 30 
men agree that music is one of the pleasantest things, 
whether with or without song ; as Musaeus says, 

' Song is to mortals of all things the sweetest.' 

Hence and with good reason it is introduced into social 
gatherings and entertainments, because it makes the 
hearts of men glad : so that on this ground alone we 
may assume that the young ought to be trained in it. 25 
For innocent pleasures are not only in harmony with 
the perfect end of life, but they also provide relaxation. 
And whereas men rarely attain the end, but often rest 
by the way and amuse themselves, not only with a view 
to a further end, but also for the pleasure's sake, it may be 30 
well at times to let them find a refreshment in music. 
It sometimes happens that men make amusement the 
end, for the end probably contains some element of 
pleasure, though not any ordinary or lower pleasure; 
but they mistake the lower for the higher, and in seek- 
ing for the one find the other, since every pleasure has 
a likeness to the end of action. 2 For the end is not 35 
eligible for the sake of any future good, nor do the 
pleasures which we have described exist for the sake of 
any future good but of the past, that is to say, they are 
1 Cp. c. 6. a Cp. N. Eth. vii. iiS3 b 33. 


the alleviation of past toils and pains. And we may 
infer this to be the reason why men seek happiness from 
40 these pleasures. But music is pursued, not only as an 
alleviation of past toil, but also as providing recreation. 
And who can say whether, having this use, it may not 
1340* also have a nobler one? In addition to this common 
pleasure, felt and shared in by all (for the pleasure given 
by music is natural, and therefore adapted to all ages 

5 and characters), may it not have also some influence 
over the character and the soul ? It must have such an 
influence if characters are affected by it. And that they 
are so affected is proved in many ways, and not least 

10 by the power which the songs of Olympus exercise ; for 
beyond question they inspire enthusiasm, and enthusiasm 
is an emotion of the ethical part of the soul. Besides, when 
men hear imitations, even apart from the rhythms and 

15 tunes themselves, their feelings move in sympathy. Since 
then music is a pleasure, and virtue consists in rejoicing 
and loving and hating aright, there is clearly nothing which 
we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as 
the power of forming right judgements, and of taking 
delight in good dispositions and noble actions. 1 
Rhythm and melody supply imitations of anger and 

20 gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, and of 
all the qualities contrary to these, and of the other 
qualities of character, which hardly fall short of the 
actual affections, as we know from our own experi- 
ence, for in listening to such strains our souls undergo a 
change. The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere 
representations is not far removed from the same feeling 

25 about realities ; 2 for example, if any one delights in the 
sight of a statue for its beauty only, it necessarily follows 
that the sight of the original will be pleasant to him. 
The objects of no other sense, such as taste or touch, 

3° have any resemblance to moral qualities ; in visible 
objects there is only a little, for there are figures which 
are of a moral character, but only to a slight extent, and 

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. iii. 401, 402 ; Laws, ii. 659 C-E. 

2 Cp. Plato, Rep. iii. 395. 

BOOK VIII. 5 1340 

all do not participate in the feeling about them. Again, 
figures and colours are not imitations, but signs, of moral 
habits, indications which the body gives of states of 
feeling. The connexion of them with morals is slight, 35 
but in so far as there is any, young men should be taught 
to look, not at the works of Pauson, but at those of 
Polygnotus, 1 or any other painter or sculptor who 
expresses moral ideas. On the other hand, even in mere 
melodies there is an imitation of character, for the 4° 
musical modes differ essentially from one another, and 
those who hear them are differently affected by each. 
Some of them make men sad and grave, like the 1340 1 
so-called Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind, like the 
relaxed modes, another, again, produces a moderate and 
settled temper, which appears to be the peculiar effect of 
the Dorian ; the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm. The 
whole subject has been well treated by philosophical 5 
writers 2 on this branch of education, and they confirm 
their arguments by facts. The same principles apply to 
rhythms ; 3 some have a character of rest, others of 
motion, and of these latter again, some have a more 
vulgar, others a nobler movement. Enough has been 10 
said to show that music has a power of forming the 
character, and should therefore be introduced into 
the education of the young. The study is suited to 
the stage of youth, for young persons will not, if they 15 
can help, endure anything which is not sweetened by 
pleasure, and music has a natural sweetness. There 
seems to be in us a sort of affinity to musical modes and 
rhythms, which makes some philosophers say that the 
soul is a tuning, others, that it possesses tuning. 

6 And now we have to determine the question which 20 
has been already raised, 4 whether children should be 
themselves taught to sing and play or not. Clearly 
there is a considerable difference made in the character 
by the actual practice of the art. It is difficult, if not 

1 Cp. Poet. 1448* 5, 1450° 26. - Cp. Rep. 398 li sqq. 

3 Rep. iii. 399 E, 400. * I339 a 33- b i°- 


N b 


impossible, for those who do not perform to be good 

25 judges of the performance of others. 1 Besides, children 
should have something to do, and the rattle of Archytas, 
which people give to their children in order to amuse 
them and prevent them from breaking anything in the 
house, was a capital invention, for a young thing cannot 
be quiet. The rattle is a toy suited to the infant mind, 

30 and education is a rattle or toy for children of a larger 
growth. We conclude then that they should be taught 
music in such a way as to become not only critics but 

The question what is or is not suitable for different ages 
may be easily answered ; nor is there any difficulty in 
meeting the objection of those who say that the study of 

35 music is vulgar.- We reply (1) in the first place, that 
they who are to be judges must also be performers, and 
that they should begin to practise early, although when 
they are older they may be spared the execution ; they 
must have learned to appreciate what is good and to 
delight in it, thanks to the knowledge which they 

40 acquired in their youth. As to (2) the vulgarizing effect 
which music is supposed to exercise, this is a question 
which we shall have no difficulty in determining, when 
we have considered to what extent freemen who are 
being trained to political virtue should pursue the art, 
1341 s what melodies and what rhythms they should be allowed 
to use, and what instruments should be employed in 
teaching them to play ; for even the instrument makes a 
difference. The answer to the objection turns upon these 
distinctions ; for it is quite possible that certain methods 
of teaching and learning music do really have a 
5 degrading effect. It is evident then that the learning of 
music ought not to impede the business of riper years, or 
to degrade the body or render it unfit for civil or 
military training, whether for bodily exercises at the 
time or for later studies. 

IO The right measure will be attained if students of 
music stop short of the arts which are practised in pro- 
1 <~"p. 1339*42. 2 Cp. I339 b 8, I34i b 14- 


BOOK VIII. 6 134* 

fessional contests, and do not seek to acquire those 
fantastic marvels of execution which are now the fashion 
in such contests, and from these have passed into educa- 
tion. Let the young practise even such music as we 
have prescribed, 1 only until they are able to feel delight in 
noble melodies and rhythms, and not merely in that 
common part of music in which everv slave or child and 15 
even some animals find pleasure. 

From these principles we may also infer what instru- 
ments should be used. The flute, or any other instru- 
ment which requires great skill, as for example the harp, 
ought not to be admitted into education, but only such 
as will make intelligent students of music or of the other 20 
parts of education. Besides, the flute is not an instru- 
ment which is expressive of moral character ; it is too ex- 
citing. The proper time for using it is when the per- 
formance aims not at instruction, but at the relief of the 
passions. 2 And there is a further objection ; the im- 
pediment which the flute presents to the use of the voice 
detracts from its educational value. The ancients therefore 25 
were right in forbidding the flute to youths and freemen, 
although they had once allowed it. For when their 
wealth gave them a greater inclination to leisure, and 
they had loftier notions of excellence, being also elated 
with their success, both before and after the Persian War, 30 
with more zeal than discernment they pursued every 
kind of knowledge, and so they introduced the flute into 
education. At Lacedaemon there was a choragus who 
led the chorus with a flute, and at Athens the instru- 
ment became so popular that most freemen could play 
upon it. The popularity is shown by the tablet which 35 
Thrasippus dedicated when he furnished the chorus to 
Ecphantides. Later experience enabled men to judge 
what was or was not really conducive to virtue, and they 
rejected both the flute and several other old-fashioned 
instruments, such as the Lydian harp, the many-stringed 4° 
lyre, the ' heptagon', ' triangle', ' sambuca', and the like 
— which are intended only to give pleasure to the hearer, 1341 1 
1 Omitting /x>j in 1. 13. 2 Cp. I34i b 38. 


and require extraordinary skill of hand. 1 There is a 
meaning also in the myth of the ancients, which tells 
how Athene invented the flute and then threw it away. 
5 It was not a bad idea of theirs, that the Goddess disliked 
the instrument because it made the face ugly ; but with 
still more reason may we say that she rejected it because 
the acquirement of flute-playing contributes nothing to 
the mind, since to Athene we ascribe both knowledge 
and art. 

Thus then we reject the professional instruments and 
also the professional mode of education in music (and 

10 by professional we mean that which is adopted in con- 
tests), for in this the performer practises the art, not for 
the sake of his own improvement, but in order to give 
pleasure, and that of a vulgar sort, to his hearers. For 
this reason the execution of such music is not the part of 
a freeman but of a paid performer, and the result is that 
the performers are vulgarized, for the end at which they 

15 aim is bad. 2 The vulgarity of the spectator tends to 
lower the character of the music and therefore of the per- 
formers ; they look to him — he makes them what they 
are, and fashions even their bodies by the movements 
which he expects them to exhibit. 

We have also to consider rhythms and modes, and 7 
20 their use in education. Shall we use them all or make a 
distinction? and shall the same distinction be made for 
those who practise music with a view to education, or 
shall it be some other ? :1 Now we see that music is 
produced by melody and rhythm, and we ought to know 
25 what influence these have respectively on education, and 
whether we should prefer excellence in melody or 
excellence in rhythm. But 4 as the subject has been 
very well treated by many musicians of the present day, 
and also by philosophers "' who have had considerable 

1 Cp. Plato, Rep. iii. 399 c, D. ~ Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 700. 

3 Omitting rpirov bd in 1. 23. 

4 Reading in 11. 23-27, with Bonitz, nva htpov. end Sq . . . 
n<u8tiav } Km noTtpoy . . . tvpvSpov, vopiaavris kt\. 

8 Cp. Rep. iii. 398 D sqq. 

BOOK VIII. 7 I34i h 

experience of musical education, to these we would refer 3° 
the more exact student of the subject ; we shall out- 
speak of it now after the manner of the legislator, stating 
the general principles. 

We accept the division of melodies proposed by cer- 
tain philosophers into ethical melodies, melodies of 
action, and passionate or inspiring melodies, each having, 
as they say, a mode corresponding to it. But we main- 35 
tain further that music should be studied, not for the 
sake of one, but of many benefits, that is to say, with 
a view to(i) education, (2) purgation (the word ' purgation ' 
we use at present without explanation, but when hereafter 
we speak of poetry, 1 we will treat the subject with more 
precision) ; music may also serve (3) for intellectual en- 4° 
joyment, for relaxation and for recreation after exertion. 
It is clear, therefore, that all the modes must be employed I34 2rt 
by us, but not all of them in the same manner. In 
education the most ethical modes are to be preferred, 
but in listening to the performances of others we may 
admit the modes of action and passion also. For feelings 5 
such as pity and fear, or, again, enthusiasm, exist very 
strongly in some souls, and have more or less influence 
over all. Some persons fall into a religious frenzy, whom 
we see as a result of the sacred melodies — when they 
have used the melodies that excite the soul to mystic IO 
frenzy — restored as though they had found healing and 
purgation. Those who are influenced by pity or fear, 
and every emotional nature, must have a like experi- 
ence, and others 2 in so far as each is susceptible to such '5 
emotions, and all are in a manner purged and their 
souls lightened and delighted. The purgative melodies 
likewise give an innocent pleasure to mankind. Such 
are the modes and the melodies in which those who 
perform music at the theatre should be invited to com- 
pete. But since the spectators are of two kinds — the 
one free and educated, and the other a vulgar crowd 

1 Cp. Poet. 1449b 27, though the promise is really unfulfilled 
The reference is probably to a lost part of the Poetics. 

2 Retaining 8' in 1. 13. 

i342 a POLITICA 

20 composed of mechanics, labourers, and the like — there 
ought to be contests and exhibitions instituted for the 
relaxation of the second class also. And the music will 
correspond to their minds ; for as their minds are perverted 
from the natural state, so there are perverted modes and 

25 highly strung and unnaturally coloured melodies. A 
man receives pleasure from what is natural to him, and 
therefore professional musicians maybe allowed to practise 
this lower sort of music before an audience of a lower 
type. But, for the purposes of education, as I have 
already said, 1 those modes and melodies should be 
employed which are ethical, such as the Dorian, as we 

30 said before ; 2 though we may include any others which 
are approved by philosophers who have had a musical 
education. The Socrates of the Republic* is wrong 
in retaining only the Phrygian mode along with the 
1342 13 Dorian, and the more so because he rejects the flute ; 
for the Phrygian is to the modes what the flute is 
to musical instruments — both of them are exciting and 
emotional. Poetry proves this, for Bacchic frenzy and 
5 all similar emotions are most suitably expressed by the 
flute, and are better set to the Phrygian than to any 
other mode. The dithyramb, for example, is acknow- 
ledged to be Phrygian, a fact of which the connoisseurs 
of music offer many proofs, saying, among other things, 
that Philoxenus, having attempted to compose his 

10 Mysians^ as a dithyramb in the Dorian mode, found 
it impossible, and fell back by th£ very nature of things 
into the more appropriate Phrygian. All men agree 
that the Dorian music is the gravest and manliest. And 

*5 whereas we say that the extremes should be avoided and 
the mean followed, and whereas the Dorian is a mean 
between the other modes, 5 it is evident that our youth 
should be taught the Dorian music. 

Two principles have to be kept in view, what is 
possible, what is becoming : at these every man ought 

1 1342*2. 2 I340 b 3 sq. 3 Plato, Rep. iii. 399 A. 

4 Reading fudvpa^ov rovs Mvcrovs in 1. 10, with Schneider. 
6 Cp. 1340*42. 

BOOK VIII. 7 134a 

to aim. But even these are relative to age ; the old, 20 
who have lost their powers, cannot very well sing the 
high-strung modes, and nature herself seems to suggest 
that their songs should be of the more relaxed kind. 
Wherefore the musicians likewise blame Socrates, 1 and 
with justice, for rejecting the relaxed modes in educa- 
tion under the idea that they are intoxicating, not in the 25 
ordinary sense of intoxication (for wine rather tends to 
excite men), but because they have no strength in them. 
And so, with a view also to the time of life when men 
begin to grow old, they ought to practise the gentler 
modes and melodies as well as the others, and, further, 
any mode, such as the Lydian above all others appears 30 
to be, which is suited to children of tender age, and 
possesses the elements both of order and of education. 
Thus it is clear 2 that education should be based upon 
three principles — the mean, the possible, the becoming, 
these three. 

1 Rep. iii. 398 E sqq. 

2 Reading fj 8r)\oi> in 1. 33, with Gottling ; cf. ii. I272 b 9. 



52-99=1252-1299, 0-42=1300-1342. 

Abydos, revolution in thegovern- 
ment of, 5 b 33 ; power of the 
clubs, 6 a 31. 

Account, power of calling magis- 
trates to, in Sparta exercised 
by the Ephors, 7 i a 8; given by 
Solon to the people, 74 a 1 5, 
8l b 32; and justly claimed by 
them, 8i a 39-82 b i3; when 
exercised by all, a mark of 
democracy, 98*9-28, I7 b 27, 
l8 b 21-38, or of aristocracy, 
98 b 6 ; special courts for, o b 19. 

Accountants, 22 b 1 1, 36. 

Achaea [in Peloponnesus] ; 
treachery of the Achaeans to 
the Troezenians at the founda- 
tion of Sybaris, 3*29. 

Achaea [Phthiotis] ; wars of the 
Achaeans with the Thessa- 
lians, 69 b 6. 

Achaeans, the (in Colchis), said 
to be cannibals, 38 b 22. 

Achilles, complaint of, against 
Agamemnon (//. ix. 648), 
quoted, 78*37. 

Acquisition, the art of, (i) the 
natural, 57 b 19, 58 b 9-20, in- 
cludes war [in certain cases] 
and hunting, 55 b 37, 56 b 23, 
34*2; a part of household 
management, 53 b 23, 56 b 26- 
57 a 41, 58*19-38, b i2; has a 
limit, 56 b 31, 57 b 30-58* 18: 
(ii) that ivhich is contrary to 
nature, including (a) exchange 
which goes beyond the needs 
of life, 57*6-19, 58*40, b 2i; 
{b) usury, 58 b 2, 25 ; (V) trade, 
57 a 17, 58*39, b 22 (d) service 
for hire, 58 b 25 : (iiij the inter- 
mediate kind, 58 b 27. 

Action, the slave a minister of, 
54* i-i7, b 20; the life of,— is it 
the best? 65*25, 24 a 5-25 b 32. 

Actions, divided into a superior 


and an inferior class, 33* 

24- b 3. 
Adamas, aided in the murder of 

Cotys, u b 22. 
Admiral, office of (at Sparta), 


Adoption, laws of, enacted by 
Philolaus at Thebes, 74 b 4. 

Adultery, punishments for, caus- 
ed revolutions at Heraclea 
and Thebes, 6* 36 ; law which 
should be adopted about, 

35 b 38- 

Aegina, number of merchant sea- 
men at, 9i b 24 ; plot of Chares 
to overturn the government, 

Aenos, in Thrace, n b 2i. 

Aesymnetes, the, or dictators of 
ancient Hellas, 85* 30- b 3, b 25, 
95*14; always received a 
guard, 86'' 38. 

Affection, would be destroyed 
by communism, 62 b 3-24; the 
two qualities which chiefly in- 
spire, 62 b 22. 

Agamemnon, 78 a 37, 85 s1 1 1 , 


Age, offices to be divided among 
the citizens, according to, 
29*2-34, 32 b 34-41 ; the poets 
right in dividing ages by 
sevens, 35 b 33, 36 b 40 ; propri- 
ety of different kinds of music 
for different ages, 42 b 20-34. 

Age for marriage, 34 b 29-35* 35 ', 
to sit at the public tables, 
36 b 2 1 . 

Age, old, tells upon the mind as 
well as the body, 7o b 40. 

Agesilaus, King of" Sparta, 6 b 35. 

Agora, 'freemen's,' 3 ia 3 I ; 
' traders,' b 1 ; wardens of 
the, 99 b i7, 22" 14, 3i b 9- 

Agriculture, the employment fol- 
lowed by the greater part of 
mankind, 56* 38 ; works upon, 


58 b 39; ancient legislation to 
encourage, 19*6-19. 

Air, pure, necessity of, 3o b 1 1. 

Alcaeus, songs of, against 
Pittacus, 85*37. 

Alcyone, mother of Diodes the 
Corinthian, 74* 35. 

Aleuadae, the, at Larissa, 6 a 30. 

Aliens, resident, how distin- 
guished from citizens, 75 a 7; 
obligedtohaveapatron,75 a 11; 
enrolled by Cleisthenes in the 
tribes, 75 b 37 ; admitted to 
citizenship at Syracuse, 3 a 38. 

All, fallacy in the word, 6i b 27 
(cp. 32*36). 

Alliance, an, how different from 
a state, 6i a 24, 8o a 34~ b 10. 

Almsgiving, demoralizing effects 

of, 20 a 29- 

Alternation in office, charac- 
teristic of constitutional gov- 

6i a 32- b 5, 

52*14, 59° 4, 
77*25, b 7-20, 

79*8-13, 87 a 10-18, 88*12, 
I7 b 2, 19, 32 b 12-41. 

Amadocus (king of the Odry- 
sians), conspiracy of Seuthes 
against, 12* 14. 

Amasis, king of Egypt, story of, 
59 b 8. 

Ambassadors, enmities between, 
fostered by Spartan state 
policy, 71*24; not to be con- 
sidered magistrates, 99 s 19. 

Ambition, a cause of crime, 
66 b 38-67* 17, 67*39, 7i a i6; 
encouraged by the Spartan 
lawgiver, 71*13; a motive of 
revolutions, 66 b 38, 67*39, 
7*2, io b 18. 

Ambracia, democratical revolu- 
tion at, and expulsion of the 
tyrant Periander, 3* 23, 4* 31, 

Amphipolis, the citizens of, ex- 
pelled by a Chalcidian colony, 
3* 2, 6* 2. 

Amyntas the Little, conspiracy 
of Derdas against, 1 i b 3. 

Analysis, the method of know- 
ledge, 52*18, 24, 56*2. 

Anaxilaus, tyranny of, at 
Rhegium, 16*38. 

Andria, ancient name of the 
common meals at Sparta, 
72 a 3« 

Androdamas, of Rhegium, gave 
certain laws to the Chalcidian 
cities of Thrace, 74 b 23. 

Andros ; affair of the Andrians, 
70 b 1 2. 

Anger, is insensible to reason, 
I2 b 28, 15*29; most bitter 
against friends who have done 
a wrong, 28*10; exists even in 
very young children, 34 b 22. 

Animals, the, intention of 
Nature in denying speech to, 
53 a 9-i8; under the dominion 
of man, 54 b 1 1 ; tame better 
than wild, 54 b io; only differ 
from slaves in not being able 
to apprehend reason, 54 b 23 ; 
their various modes of life, 
56 a 20-29 5 supply their off- 
spring with food in different 
ways, b io; created for the 
sake of man, 16-22 ; produce 
offspring resembling their 
parents, 62 a 2 1 ; cannot form 
a state, 80*32; lead a life of 
nature, not of reason, 32 b 3 ; 
the parts of animals an illustra- 
tion of the parts of the state, 
90 b 25-37; the offspring of 
young animals often small and 
ill-developed, 35* 12. 

Antileon, tyrant at Chalcis, 

Antimenides, brother of Alcaeus, 

Antissa, in Lesbos, quarrel at, 

between the old citizens and 

the Chian refugees, 3* 34. 
Antisthenes, his fable of the lion 

and the hares, 84" 15. 
Aphrodite, why connected with 

Ares in mythology, 69 b 2g. 
Aphytaeans, the (in Pallene), 

agrarian legislation among, 

I9 a 14. 
Apollodorus of Lemnos, author 

of a work on Agriculture, 

59 a i- 
Apollonia (on the Adriatic), early 

government of, 9o b 1 1 . 
Apollonia (on the Euxine), 

quarrels at, between the old 

and new citizens, 3* 36 ; in the 

oligarchy, 6*9. 
Appeal, a court of, allowed by 

Hippodamus, 67 b 39. 
Appetitive principle, the, of the 


soul, 54 b 5, 77 a 7, &7 a 3°> 
34 b 20-27. 

Arbitrator, the judge should not 
be made into an, 68'' 6 ; the 
middle class the arbitrators of 
the state, 97 a 5« 

Arcadia ; the Arcadians not 
organized in villages, 6i a 29 ; 
their wars with the Lacedae- 
monians, 69'' 4, 70* 3. 

Archelaus, king of Macedonia, 
conspiracy of Crataeas and 
Decamnichus against, 1 i b 8, 

3°- . . 

Archias, of Thebes, pilloried in 

the Agora, 6 b I. 

Archilochus, quoted, 28* 3. 

Archons, the duties of, 22 b 29 ; 
the single Archon at Epidam- 
nus, 87 a 7, l b 25. 

Archytas, of Tarentum, invented 
the children's rattle, 4o b 26. 

Areopagus, the, at Athens : see 
Council of Areopagus. 

Ares, why connected with Aphro- 
dite in mythology, 69 b 28. 

Argo, the, refused to take 
Heracles, 84 s 24. 

Argos, use of ostracism at, 2 b 18 ; 
the political changes after 'the 
seventh', 3 a 6; the oligar- 
chical revolution after the 
battle of Mantinea, 4 a 25 ; 
the tyranny of Pheidon, io b 27; 
enmity of the Argives to the 
Lacedaemonians, 69 b 4, 70* 2. 

Ariobarzanes, conspiracy of 
Mithridates against, I2 a 1.6. 

Aristocracy, characterized by 
election for merit, 73 a 26, 41, 
94 a 9,6 b 25 ; distinguished from 
the perfect state, as being a 
government of men who are 
only good relatively to the 
constitution, 93 b 3 [but cp. 
76° 37) ; so called because the 
best rule, or the best interests 
of the state are consulted, 
79 a 35> not a perversion, 
93 b 24; analogous to oligarchy 

(1) because the few rule, 6 b 24; 

(2) because birth and educa- 
tion commonly accompany 
wealth, 93 b 36 ; to royalty as 
a government of the best, 
lo b 2, 31 ; preferable to royalty, 
because the good are more 

than one, S6 b 5 ; how distin- 
guished from oligarchy and 
constitutional government, 

93 a 35-94 a i9, 9^ 5> 7 a S~33 
(cp. 73 a 4~37) ; usually degene- 
rates into oligarchy, 79 b 5, 
S6 b 14, 89 b 3, 7 a 20;— causes of 
revolutions in aristocracies, 
6 b 22~7 b 25; the- means of 
their preservation, 8 a 3-24; 
aristocracy less stable than 
constitutional government, 
7 a 16 ; might be combined 
with democracy if the 
magistrates were unpaid and 
office open to all, 8 b 38 (cp. 
i8 b 32); — magistracies pecu- 
liar to aristocracy, 99 b 20, 
22 b 37, 23 a 8; aristocratical 
modes of appointing magis- 
trates and judges, o a 4i- b 5, 
l a 1 3 ; practice of trying all 
suits by the same magistrates, 
aristocratical, 73 a 19,— the 
people naturally suited to an 
aristocracy, 88 a 6-l2. 

Aristogeiton, conspiracy of 
Harmodius and, I I a 38. 

Aristophanes, speech of, in the 
Symposium, quoted, 62 b 11. 

Aristotle : Ethics, the Nicoma- 
chean, quoted : 
io98 a 16 ; Pol. 95 a 36, 32* 8 ; 
ui3 a 22- b l ; „ 32 a 2l ; 
v. 3; „ 82 b i9; 

1131M5; „ 8o a i8; 
ii32 b 32; „ 6i a 31 ; 
1153 1 ' 10; „ 95 a 36; 
H76 b 4; „ 32 a 8; 

1177*12; „ 95 a 36; 
Poetics, referred to, 41 b 39. 

Arrhabaeus, king of the Lyn- 
cestians, war of, against 
Archelaus, ii b 12. 

Art, works of, wherein different 
from realities, 8l b 12. 

Ai tapanes, conspiracy of, against 
Xerxes, 1 i b 38. 

Artisan, the employments of the, 
devoid of moral excellence, 
6o a 39, 7S a 20, I9 a 26, 28 b 39, 
29 a i9; artisans sometimes 
public slaves, 67'' 15; only 
admitted to office in demo- 
cracies, 77 h 1 ; often acquire 
wealth, 78 a 24 ; the question 
whether they are citizens, 

S 2 


78*17; necessary to the 
existence of the state, 9l a i, 
b 1 9 ; not a part of the state, 
26* 22 ; should be debarred 
from the ' Freemen's Agora ', 

3l a 33- 

Arts, the, require instruments, 
both living and lifeless, 53 b 23 
-54* 17; some arts subservient 
to others, 56* 10, 58* 19-38 ; 
the arts have a limit in their 
means though not in their 
end, 56 b 3i, 57 b 23; both the 
means and the end ought 
to be within our control, 
3i b 26 ; amount of knowledge 
which a freeman is permitted 
in the arts, 58 b 10, 37 b i5; 
degrees of excellence in them, 
58 b 35, 37 b n-2i; changes 
in, advantageous, 68 b 34, 
86 a 1 1 ; the analogy of, not 
to be extended to the laws, 
69*19, 86 a i6; exist for the 
benefit of those under them, 
78 b 37-79* 13 ; by whom 
should the artist be judged ? 
8 i b 38-82* 23 (cp. 4o b 23-39); 
the arts aim at some good, 
82 b 14 ; justice of the different 
claims to political superiority 
illustrated from the arts, 
82 b 3a-83 a 14 ; law of propor- 
tion in the arts, 84 b 7 ; the 
problems of the arts, an 
illustration of the problems of 
politics, 88 b 10-37; the arts 
have to supply the deficiencies 
of Nature, 37 a 1. 

Asia, 7i b 36, 89 b 40 ; the Asiatics 
better fitted for slavery than 
the Hellenes, 85*21, 27 b 27 ; 
cannibal tribes in Asia, 38 b 19. 

Assembly, the, payment of, evil 
effects of the practice, 67*41, 
93 a 5, I7 b 31 ; how they may 
be counteracted, 20* 22 ; — 
power monopolized by, in ex- 
treme democracies, 93 a i, 
98*28, 5*29, 6 b n, 10*25, 
I7 b i7, I9 b i (cp. 74*5, I3 b 32- 
14* 1) ; meetings should be 
infrequent, 20* 12 (cp. 98* 1 7- 
22) ; character of, in the 
different kinds of democracies, 
98*11-34, 1 7 b 17-38; in 
oligarchies, 98* 34- b 1 1 (cp. 

75 b 7) ; provision in case of 
equal voting in assemblies, 
i8 a 38:— at Carthage, 73*6- 
13; in Crete, 72*10, 73*12; 
at Sparta, 73 a 12. 

Astyages, dethroned by Cyrus, 
12* 12. 

Atarneus (in Mysia), siege of, 

67* 32. 
Athene, story of, and the flute, 

4i b 3- 
Athens ; payment of the dicas- 
teries commenced by Pericles, 
74*8 (cp. 93*5, I7 b 3i); evil 
effects of the practice, 67*41 ; 
plan introduced by Diophantus 
for the regulation of the 
public slaves, 67 b 18 ; mainte- 
nance at the public expense 
of the children of citizens who 
had fallen in battle, 68* 10 ; 
the Solonian constitution, 
66 b i7, 73 b 34-74 a 21, 8i b 32; 
the Areopagus (see Council of 
Areopagus) ; the Court of 
Phreatto, o b 28; effect of the 
Persian War upon Athens, 
74* I2,4 a 20, 41*28; introduc- 
tion of flute-playing at Athens 
after the Persian War, 41* 34 ; 
the legislation of Draco, 74 b 1 5 ; 
the expulsion of the tyrants, 
75 b 36, 5 b 3o; the use of 
ostracism, 2 b i9 (cp. 84 a I7); 
number of sailors in the 
population, 9l b 24; new citi- 
zens introduced by Cleis- 
thenes, 75 b 35 ; the tribes 
redivided by him, I9 b 2i; 
treatment of the subject cities 
by Athens, 84 s 39; democrati- 
cal governments forced upon 
the allies by the Athenians, 
96 a 32, 7 b 22; great losses of 
the nobility in the Peloponne- 
sian War, 3 a 8 ; difference of 
sentiment between the Athen- 
ians and the citizens of the 
Piraeus, b lo; origin of the 
war between Athens and 
Mytilene, 4*6; defeat of the 
Athenian expedition to Sicily, 
a 28 ; government of the Four 
Hundred, b i2, 5 b 26; of the 
Thirty, 5 b 25 ; rise of Peisistra- 
tus to the tyranny, * 23, lo b 3o ; 
his trial before the Areopagus, 


1 5 1 ' 21 ; conspiracy of Har- 
modius and Aristogeiton, 
I l a 36 ; magistracy of the 
Eleven, 22* 20. 

Athlete, the temperament of an, 
not suited to the life of the 
citizen, 35 b 5, 38** 9-39"* 10. 

Athletics : see Gymnastic Exer- 

Attalus (the favourite of Philip 
of Macedon), 1 i b 3. 

Auditors, 22 b II, 36. 

Ausones,the, or Opici, in south- 
ern Italy, 29 b 20. 

Authority, the supreme, varies 
with each form of government, 
78 b io-79 b 10, 83b 5, 94 a 11 ; 
difficulties upon the sub- 
ject, 8i a 1 i-84 b 34, i8 a u- b 5; 
how to be divided among the 
young and the old, 29 a 2-34, 

32 b 35- 
Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, 

story of his siege of Atarneus* 
Avarice, encouraged at Sparta, 
70 a l4, 7l b 16 ; at Carthage, 
73 a 38 ; a frequent cause of 
crime, 67 a 4l, 7i a 16 ; of revo- 
lution, 2*38, b 5- 


Babylonia, 65 a 14 ; Babylon, 76 a 

28 ; Babylonians, 84 b 1. 
Bacchiadae, the, at Corinth, 74 a 


Barbarians, the, do not dis- 
tinguish the female and the 
slave, 52 b 5; generally under 
kingly rule, b i9 (cp. 85* 16) ; 
regarded by the Hellenes as 
natural slaves, 55* 28 ; their 
nobility not recognized by 
the Hellenes, a 34 ; prevalence 
of barter among them, 57* 24. 

Barter : see Exchange. 

Basilidae, the, an oligarchy at 
Erythrae, 5 b 19. 

Bequest, freed9m of, at Sparta, 
70*18; should be forbidden 
by law, 9* 23. 

Birth, the Gods who preside 
over, 35 b i5- 

Birth, good : see Nobility. 

Birth, illegitimate, not a dis- 
qualification for citizenship in 

extreme democracies, 78" 28, 
I9 b 9. 
Blest, the Islands of the, 34 a 


Body, the, ruled according to 
nature by the soul, 54*34- 
b l6 ; the body of the freeman 
not always distinguished by 
nature from that of the slave, 
b 32 ; the beauty of the body 
more obvious than that of the 
soul, b 38 ; the interest of, 
identical with that of the soul, 
55 b 9 ; the goods of, for the 
sake of the soul, 23 b 18 ; prior 
to the soul, 34 b 2o; must not 
be educated at the same time 
as the mind, 3^ b 5, 39*7. 

Body, habit of. to be required in 
the citizen, 3 5 b 5 , 38 b 6. 

Boys, love of, prevalent among 
warlike races, 69 b 29 ; encour- 
aged in Crete, 72*24. 

Bribery, common at Sparta, 
7 o b 9, 71*3, 72*41. 

Byzantium, number of fishermen 
at, 91 b 23; quarrel between old 
and new colonists there, 3*33- 

Camicus, death of Minos at, 

7i b 4o. 
Cannibal tribes in Pontus, 38'' 

Carthage, the constitution of, 
analogous to those of Lace- 
daemon and Crete, 72 b 24, 
73 a 2 ; an aristocracy with 
oligarchical and democratical 
features, 73* 2-37, 93 b 1 5, i6 b 5; 
never had a revolution, 72° 
30, 73 b 20, l6 b 5 ; never under 
a tyranny, 72 b 32 (but cp. l6 a 
34) ; the kings partly chosen 
for ability, 72 b 38, 73*29; in- 
fluence of wealth, 73*25~ b 7; 
plurality of offices, b 7; the 
magistrates judges in criminal 
cases, 7^ 1 9, 7 5° 1 1 ; honours 
paid to military merit, 24 b 1 3 ; 
the conspiracy of Hanno, 7* 
5 ; custom of sending out the 
poorer citizens to the colonies, 
73 b 1 8, 20 b 4 ; treaties between 
the Carthaginians and the 
Tyrrhenians, 8o ;i 36. 


Caste, an Egyptian institution, 
29 h 2, 23. 

Catana, received laws from Cha- 
rondas, 74 a 23- 

Cavalry, importance of, in the 
ancient oligarchies, 89 b 36, 
97 b 17, 2i a 8 (cp. the govern- 
ment of ' the knights ' in Ere- 
tria, 6 a 35). 

Celts, the : their warlike char- 
acter, 69 b 26, 24 b I2; harden 
their children to cold, 36* 

Chalcidian cities, the (in Italy 
and Sicily), received their laws 
from Charondas, 74" 24; — (of 
Thrace); legislation of An- 
drodamas, b 24 ; expulsion of 
the old citizens of Amphipolis 
by a Chalcidian colony, 3 b 2, 

Chalcis, in Euboea, famous for 
cavalry in ancient times, S9 b 
39 ; democratic revolution, 4 a 
29 ; tyranny of Antileon, and 
subsequent oligarchical revo- 
lution, 16*31. 

Chares, the Athenian general, 
concerned in a plot against 
the government of Aegina, 6 a 

— of Paros, a writer on Agri- 
culture, 58 b 4o. 

Charicles, leader of a party 
among the Thirty at Athens, 
5 b 26. 

Charilaus (or Charillus), king of 
Sparta, 7l b 25. l6 a 34. 

Charondas, used the word 
Spoainvoi for the members of 
a family, 52 b 14 ; legislated for 
Catana and the other Chalci- 
dian cities in Italy and Sicily, 
74* 23 ; said to have been 
the disciple of Zaleucus, a 29 ; 
the first to make laws against 
perjury, b 5 ; famous for the 
accuracy of his legislation, 
b 7; belonged to the middle 
class, 96 s1 21; compelled the 
rich to attend the law-courts, 

97 a 23. 
Child, the, relation of, and the 
parent, 53 b 7 ; the virtue of, 
59 b 28-60* 33 ; ruled like a 
king by the elder or parent, 
52 b 20, 55 b 19, 59 b 10 ; has the 

deliberative faculty, but im- 
mature, 6o a i3 (cp. 34 b 24). 

Childbirth, especially fatal to 
young women, 35" 17. 

Children, ought to be educated 
with regard to the constitution, 
6o b i5, io a 12-36, 37* 11-32 ; 
recognized in certain countries 
by their resemblance to their 
parents, 62 a i8; the children 
of citizens who died in battle 
reared at the public expense, 
68 a 8 ; children, in what sense 
citizens, 75 a 14, 78 a 4 ; educa- 
tion of the children of kings, 
77 a 17 ; bad education of the 
children of the rich, 95 b 16-25, 
10*12-36; licence permitted 
to children in democracies and 
tyrannies, I9 b 29; exposure of 
deformed children, 35 b 19 ; 
way in which children should 
be reared, 36* 3-37* 7 ; they 
should not see or hear any- 
thing indecent, 36 a 39~ b 23, 
40*35 ; what their education 
should include, 37 a 33~38 b 8 ; 
why they ought to learn music 
and drawing, 37 b 25 ; degree 
to which they should carry 
musical proficiency, 40 b 20- 
41* 17 ; must not carry gym- 
nastic exercise too far, 38 b 9- 
39M0; must not labour with 
body and mind at once, 39* 7 ; 
restlessness of young children, 
40 b 29; their toys, b 25; their 
crying not to be checked, 36 a 


— Plato's community of: see 
Women and Children. 

Children, Guardians of, 99 a 22, 
b i9, o a 4,22 b 39, 36 a 32, 40. 

Chios, humbled by the Athen- 
ians, 84* 40 ; popular revolu- 
tion at, 6 b 5 ; number of 
merchant seamen there, 91 b 
24 ; Chian refugees received 
at Antissa and afterwards ex- 
pelled, 3*34. 

Chones, the, in southern Italy, 

29 b 2I. 

Choragus, the Lacedaemonian, 
who led the chorus with a 
flute, 41*33 ; Thrasippusonce 
choragus to Ecphantides at 
Athens, a 35- 


Chytum, a part of Clazomenae, 

3 b 9- 

Cinadon, conspiracy of, at Lace- 
daemon, 6 b 34. 

Cities, art of planning, invented 
by Hippodamus, 67 b 22, 30'' 

Citizen, the, must both rule and 
obey, 52*14, 59 b 4, 6i n 30- b 5, 
73 b i2, 77 a 25- b 2i, b 34, 79*8- 
13, 83 b 42, 87* 10-20, 88*12, 
I7 b 19, 29*2-26, 32'' 12-33* 
16 ; must have leisure, 69*34, 
73*32, b 6, 29*1, 18, 3i b i2; 
belongs to the state, 37* 27 ; 
necessity of defining the word, 
74 b 40, foil. ; children and old 
men, in what sense citizens, 
75*14,78*4; residence and 
legal rights, inadequate de- 
finitions, 75*7-14; not enough 
that the parents were citizens, 
b 22~34 ; the citizen must share 
in the administration of the 
state, a 22- b 2i, b 30-76 a 6, 77 h 
33~78 b 5, 83 b 42; differs under 
each form of government, 75 b 
3, 78*15, 84*1, 93 b 5; the 
question about citizens admit- 
ted after a revolution, 75 b 34- 
76* 6 ; — the virtue of the good 
citizen : is it identical with 
that of the good man ? 76 b 16- 
77b 32, 78*40, 88*37,33*11; 
the virtue of the citizen in the 
perfect state, 76 b 37, 84* 1 ;— 
not all citizens who are neces- 
sary to the state, 78* 2, 29* 
34 ; the artisans not to be 
citizens, 77 b 33-78 b 5, 28 b 39; 
nor the sailors, 27 b 8-15 ; is 
the life of the citizen the best ? 
24* 5-25'' 32 ; the character 
necessary in the citizens, 27'' 
19-28*20; their habit of body, 

Citizens, guardians of, 68 a 22, 

5 b 29- 
Citizenship, rights of, conferred 
on strangers in early times at 
Sparta, 70* 34 ; lost at Sparta, 
by failure to contribute to the 
common meals, 71*35, 72*15 ; 
given to persons of illegitimate 
birth in extreme democracies, 
78*28, I9 b 6; exclusion from, 
sometimes concealed; 78*38; 

easily pretended in a large 
state, 26 b 20. 

City, the : see State. 

City Wardens, 2l b 23, 22*13, 
b 33,3i b io. 

Clazomenae, quarrels at, be- 
tween the people of the island 
and the Chytrians, 3 b 9- 

Cleander, tyrant of CJela, 16*37. 

Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, 
I5 b 16, 16*31. 

— the Athenian, new citizens 
created by, at Athens, 75'' 36 ; 
his redivision of the tribes, 

I9 b 2I. 

Cleomenes (king of Sparta), de- 
feated the Argives, 3* 7. 

Cleopatra (the widow of Perdic- 
cas), 11*15. 

Cleotimus, leader of a revolution 
at Amphipolis, 6* 2. 

Clubs : at Carthage, 72'' 34 ; at 
Abydos, 5 b 32, 6*31; hated 
by tyrants, 13*41. 

Cnidus, democratical revolution 
at, 5 b 12, 6 b 5 ; 

Codrus, king of Athens, lo b 37. 

Cold, children should be inured 
to, 36*12-21. 

Colonies, of Carthage, 73'' 18, 
20 b 4; oligarchies formed in 
colonies by the first settlers, 
90 b 9 ; dissensions in, a cause 
of revolutions, 3*27^3. 

Colophon, ancient wealth of, 
90° 1 5 ; quarrel between the 
Colophoniansandthe Notians, 
3 b io. 

Combination ; superiority of the 
many combined to the in- 
dividual, 8i*39-82 b i3, 92* 

Command, the right to, given 
by previous obedience, 77*29, 
b 8, 33 a 2. 

Commerce, divisions of, 58 b 2i ; 
its advantages and disadvan- 
tages, 27* Il- b l5 ;— commer- 
cial treaties, 80*37. 

Common meals, hostility of the 
tyrant to, 13*41 ; first estab- 
lished in Italy, 2g b 5-35 ; how 
they should be arranged, 30* 
3-23 ; the young not allowed 
to share in them, 36'* 10;— 
of the magistrates, 17'' 38, 
31* 25 ; of the priests, 3i b 5 ; 


—(.it Carthage), 72 b 33 ;— (in 
Crete), 63 b 4l ; the original of 
the Spartan, 72 a 2; maintained 
at the public cost, a i2-27 ; — 
(at Sparta), make property to 
some degree common, 63 b 4i ; 
badly regulated, 7 1*26-37, 72* 
14; a democratic element in the 
Spartan constitution, 65^ 41, 
94 b 27 ; proposed by Plato, 
65*8, 66 a 35, 74 b u; in 
Aristotle's ideal state, 31* 19, 
b i6 ; anciently called ' andria ', 

72 a 3- 

Community of women and 
children, the, proposed by 
Plato, 6i a 4; arguments a- 
gainst, b i6-62 b 36 ;— of pro- 
perty, 62 b 37-64 b 25, 20, b 4i. 

Compensation, the principle of, 
in the state, 6i a 30- b 9, 90 a 7. 

Compound, the : see Whole. 

Conditions, the, not the same 
as parts of a state, 28 a 2l- b 23. 

Confederacy, difference between 
a, and a "state, 6l a 24, 8o a 34- 

Confiscation, afavourite practice 
of the demagogues, 4 b 20-5 a 7, 

l8 a 25, 20 a 4-22. 

Conquest unnecessary to the hap- 
piness of states, 24 a 35, 2 5 b 2 3> 
33 b i2-34 a io(cp. 7i a 4l). 

Constitution, regard must be had 
to the, in education, 6o b 12, 
io a 12-36, 37 a 1 1-32; the best 
constitution supposed by some 
to be a combination of all 
existing forms, 65 b 33 (cp. 93 b 
14) ; the permanence of a 
constitution only secured by 
the consent of all classes, 
7 o b 2i, 94" 38, 9 7 a 7, 8 a 5, 
9 b i6-io a 12, 20 b 2l, 2l a 26; 
older constitutions more 
simple than later, 7i b 23; 
contentment with a constitu- 
tion not always a proof of its 
excellence, 72 a 39 {but cp. b 3o, 
73 b 18); in each constitution 
the citizen different, 75 b 3, 
78*15, 84 a l,*93 fc 5 ; relation 
of the constitution and the 
state, 74 b 32, 76 b 9, 78 b 8, 79 a 
25, 89 s 15, 90*7; definition 
of the word, 74 b 38, 78 b S, 8y a 
15, 90 a 7 ; the constitution the 

life of the state, 95 a 4o; the 
people naturally suited to 
each constitution, 87 b 36-88* 
32 ; the constitution some- 
times nominally unchanged 
after a revolution, 92 b n-2l 
(cp. l b 10) ; the encroach- 
ments of the rich often more 
dangerous to the constitution 
than those of the. poor, 97 a l I ; 
life according to the constitu- 
tion no slavery, io a 34, 25* 

Contemplation, the life of, 
opposed to that of action, 24 a 
5-25* 15, 32 b i2-34 a ro. 

Contracts, suits respecting, tried 
at Sparta by the Ephors, 75 b 
9 ; often disavowed after a 
revolution, 76 a 8. 

Cookery, the art of, 55 b 26. 

Corinth, 8o b 1 5 ; tyranny of 
Tim'ophanes, 6 a 23 ; tyranny 
of the Cypselids, lo b 29, I3 a 
37; its duration, I5 b 22; 
family of the Bacchiadae, 

74* 33- 

Corn Measures ; name of cer- 
tain magistrates, 99 a 23. 

Cos, overthrow of the democracy 
at, 4 b 25. 

Cosmi, the (in Crete), analogous 
to the Ephors, 72 a 6 ; a worse 
institution, a 28-4i ; have the 
command in war, a io; some- 
times forced by the nobles to 
resign or abdicate, b 3~II. 

Cotys, king of the Odrysians in 
Thrace, murdered by Parrhon 
and Heracleides, 11° 21. 

Council of Areopagus, the, an 
oligarchical element in the 
Athenian constitution, 73 b 39; 
its power curtailed by Pericles 
and Ephialtes, 74 a 7 ; acquired 
credit during the Persian War, 
4 a 20 ; appearance of Peisis- 
tratus before, 1 5 b 22. 

Council of Elders, the (at Car- 
thage), analogous to the 
Spartan, 72 b 38, 73 a 8; their 
powers (in Crete) analogous 
to the Spartan, 72 a 7; criti- 
cized, a 35- b i ; (at Elis), 6 a 17 • 
(at Sparta), its defects, 70" 
3 5-7 1 a 12 ; the mode of elec- 
tion childish, 71 s 9; (cp. 6* 


16) ; decides in cases of homi- 
cide, 7S b 10 (cp. 7o b 38, 94 b 
33) ; an oligarchical feature in 
the constitution, 65 b 38, 7o b 

Council, the supreme, called in 
oligarchies ' the Probuli ', 98'' 
2 9> 99 b 31, 22 b 16, 23*8; in 
democracies the ' Boule', 99 b 

^32, 22 b l6, 23 a 9 (cp. I b 23). 

Councillors and warriors, the 
two highest classes in the 
state, 9i a 6- b 2, 28 b 7, 29*2- 

.39- . 

Councillors, magistrates at 
Thurii, y h 14. 

Courage, different in the man 
and the woman, 60*22-31, 
77 b 20-25; wanting in the 
Spartan women, 69 b 34; found 
in the masses, 79 b 1 ; em- 
boldened by power, 12*19; 
not inconsistent with a proper 
use of fortifications, 30 b 32- 
3i a 14; always associated with 
gentleness, 27 b 38-28* 16, 38 b 
17 (see Valour). 

Courts, the extravagance of, 
causes discontent in the 
people, I4 b 2. 

Cowardice of the Spartan 
women, 69 b 34. 

Crataeas, one of the assassins 
of Archelaus, ll b 8. 

Crete, favourable position of, 7i b 
32, 72*40, b i6; visit of 
Lycurgus to, 7l b 24;— the 
Cretan constitution the ori- 
ginal of the Lacedaemonian, 
b 22~32 ; analogous to the 
Carthaginian, 72 b 28 ; the at- 
tention of the legislator 
directed solely to war, 24 b 8 ; 
— the common tables intro- 
duced into Crete by Minos, 
29 b 4, 22; called by the 
Cretans avdpm, 72* 3 ; object 
of the institution, 63 b 4i ; 
better managed in Crete than 
at Lacedaemon, 71*26-37, 
72* 12-27 ;— frequency of ^edi- 
tion in Crete, 72 b u-i6; — 
sla'ves in Crete forbidden 
gymnastic exercises and the 
use of arms, 64* 20 ; the 
Perioeci in Crete well man- 
aged, 69* 39, 72 b 16-20 ; 

governed by the laws of 
Minos,7i b 3i; analogy of the 
Cretan Perioeci with the 
Helots, b 4i ; — existence of 
caste in Crete, 29 b 3. 

Crime, the causes of, 63 b 22 
66 b 38-67* 17, 67* 39, 7i a 

Cumae, in Italy, ancient law of 
murder there, 69* I. 

Custom, power of, 69*20, 92 b 

13, 32 a 38- b n 

sort of 

justice, 55*22. 
Cycle, the, of change, in Plato's 

Republic, 16* i- b 27> 
Cyclopes, the, Homer's account 

of, 52 b 22. 
Cyme, in Aeolis, overthrow of 

the democracy at, 5* 1. 
Cypselids, the, offerings of, I3 b 

22 ; duration of their tyranny, 

1 5 b 22-29. 
Cypselus of Corinth, origin of 

his tyranny, io b 29 ; its dura- 
tion, I5 b 24. 
Cyrene, oligarchical insurrection 

at, 1 9 b 1 8 ; establishment of 

the democracy, b 22. 
Cyrus, king of Persia, the 

liberator of his people, io b 38 ; 

attacked his master Astyages, 

12* 1 : 


Daedalus, the statues of, 53 b 35. 

Dancing, sometimes ranked with 
music as an amusement, 39* 

Daphnaeus, of Syracuse, over- 
thrown by Dionysius, -5*26. 

Darius, son of Xerxes, execu- 
tion of, by Artapanes, n b 


Debts, should they be paid after 
a revolution ? 76* 10. 

Decamnichus, the instigator of 
the conspiracy against Arche- 
laus, n b 30. 

Deliberation, the right to share 
in, essential to the citizen, 
75*26- b 2i, 76*3, 83 b 42 (cp. 
2 8 b i3). 

Deliberative element, the, in the 
state, 92 b 35-99* 2. 

Deliberative faculty, the, present 
to some degree in the woman 


and child, but not in the 
slave, 6o a 12. 

Delphi, the seditions at, 3 b 37 ; 
the Delphian knife, 52 b 2. 

Demagogues, the authors and 
flatterers of theextreme demo- 
cracy, 74 a 5-i5, 92 a 4-37> i° a 
2 > *3 b 39> x 9 b 6-19 ; confiscate 
the property of the rich, 5*3, 
20 a 4; often bring about revolu- 
tions, 2 b 2i, 4 b 20~5 a 7; in 
ancient times became tyrants, 
5 a 7-3-> i° b i4> 23 :~in oli- 
garchies, 5 b 22. 

75 b 29. 

Democracy, the government of 
the many in their own inter- 
ests, 79 b 6, 18, 96*27; akin 
to tyranny, 92*17, n a 8, I2 b 
4, 37, I3 b 38 ; the only possible 
government in large states, 
86 b 20, 93* I, 97 b 22 (cp. 20 a 
17) ; the perversion of con- 
stitutional government, 79 b 4, 
89* 28- b 5 ; Plato wrong in 
calling democracy the worst 
of good constitutions, but the 
best of bad ones, 89 b 6 ; 
insufficiency of the common 
definitions of democracy, 79 b 
n-?o a 6, 90 a 3o- b i7; more 
forms of democracy than one, 
89 a 8, 91 b 15-30, 96 b 4, 26, 97 b 
30, i6 b 36 ; the forms enumer- 
ated, 9i b 3o-92 a 38, 92 b 23- 
93 tt io, 96 b 28, 98 a 11-33, i8 b 
6-ig b 32; growth of the last 
and worst form, 74 a 5, 77 h 3, 
79 a 13, 92 b 41, 5 a 10-32, io a 2, 
1 7 b 17-18*3, I9 b 1-32 (cp. li a 
1 5, I3 b 32) ; — democracy more 
stable than oligarchy, 96* 13, 
2 a 8, 7 a 13 (cp. 3 a 10); causes 
of revolution in democracies : 
anarchy, 2 b 27, I9 b 14 ; de- 
magogic practices, 2 b 22, 4 b 
l9-5 a 36, io a 2, 20 a i7; dis- 
proportionate increase, 2 b 33- 
3 1 * 13 ; dissatisfaction of the 
notables 3 b 6 (cp. 66 b 38, 67 11 
39) ; long tenure or greatness 
of office, 5 a l5, 8*20; the 
means of their preservation, 

96 b 34, 97 a 35- b 8,9S b i3. 7 b 
26~9 a 32, I9 b i2, 33-2o b i7; 
democracy (especially the ex- 

treme form) apt to pass into 
tyranny, 96 a 2, 5 a 7-28, 8 a 20, 
I2 b 4 ; Plato censured for sup- 
posing that the change is 
necessary to tyranny, i6 a 22 ; 
— Athens the champion of 
democracy in Hellas, 96*32, 
7 b 22; the democratic principle 
represented at Sparta by the 
Ephoralty, 65 b 39, 7o b 17, 72* 
31, 94 b 3l ; — characteristics of 
democracy : liberty and equal- 
ity for all, 8o a 5, 9i b 30-38, 
94* II, i a 28, 8 a 11, io a 25-36, 
i7 a 4o- b i7, i8 a 5, i9 b 3o; the 
use of the lot, 73*18, 74 a 5, 
94 b 7, o a 33, 17'' 20, iS* 2 ; em- 
ployment of a large number 
of magistrates, 73 b l2; short 
tenure of office, 8*15, I7 b 24, 
41 ; payment of the citizens, 

67 b i,74 a 8, 93 a 5. 94 a 39. i? b 
31-38, 20' 1 17 ; carelessness in 
the admission of artisans and 
persons of illegitimate birth to 
citizenship, 77 b 2, 78*28, ig b 
9 ; licence allowed to women 
and children, I3 b 33, I9 b 29 ; — 
ostracism originally a demo- 
cratic institution, 84* 1 7, 2 b 1 8 ; 
democratical tricks to keep the 
power in the hands of the 
people, 97 a 35 ; suggestions 
for the improvement of demo- 
cracy, 98'* 13, 20 a 22- b l6; — 
the magistrates peculiar to 
democracy, 99 b 32, 22 b 14, 23* 
9 ; democratical modes of 
appointing magistrates and 
judges, 0*31, I* II;— char- 
acter and powers of the as- 
sembly, 98 a 3-33;— the best 
material of a democracy, 92 b 
25, i8 b 6; the position suit- 
able to a democracy, 30 b 20 ; 
democracy always supported 
by the sailors and light armed, 
21* 13. 

Derdas (? King of Elimeia), con- 
spiracy of, against Amyntas 
the Little, u b 4. 

Desire, insatiableness of human, 
5S a i, 63 b 22, 66 b 29, 67*41; 
found even in very young chil- 
dren, 34'' 22. 

Detectives, female, employed at 
Syracuse, I3 b 13. 


Devices, political, of oligarchies 
and democracies, 97 11 14-''^ ; 
their inutility, j h 40. 

Dexander, leader of a revolution 
at Mytilene, 4*9. 

Diagoras, an Eretrian, 6 a 36. 

Dicaea, the Pharsalian mare, 
62 a 24. 

Dicasteries, the Athenian, 74 a 4- 

Dictators: see Aesymnetes. 

Diodes, story of, and Philolaus, 
74 a 32- b 2. 

Dion, conspiracy of, against 
Dionysius, I2 a 4, 34, b l6. 

Dionysiac contests, 23 a 1. 

Dionysius the Elder, story of, and 
the Sicilian monopolist, 59 ; 
23-33 ! h' s request for guards, 
86 b 39 ; his rise to the tyranny, 
5 a 26, io b 3o; aided by Hip- 
parinus, 6 a 1 ; his marriage 
alliance with Locris, 7 a 39; 
his excessive taxation at Syra- 
cuse, I3 b 27. 

Dionysius the Younger, conspir- 
acy of Dion against, 12*4, 

35. b 9-i7- 
Diophantus, his plan for the 

management of the public 

slaves, 67 b i8. 
Directors of Education, 36 11 30, 

39 ; of Gymnastics, 23 a 1 . 
Discipline, good effects of, 7o a 

Dithyrambic poetry, suited to 
the Phrygian harmony, 42 b 7. 

Dockyards, often at a convenient 
distance from the city, 27 a 


Domination over others, not the 
true object of statesmanship, 
24 a 5-2 5 b 32, 33 a 3Q-34 a io. 

Dorian Mode, the : see Mode. 

Dowries made by Phaleas a 
means to the equalization of 
property, 66 b 2 ; large dowries 
customary at Sparta, 7o a 25. 

Draco, notorious for the severity 
of his legislation, 74 b 15. 

Drawing, a branch of education, 
37 b 25,38 a i7. 

Drinking, Plato's law about, 

74 b n- 

Drunkenness, law of Pittacus re- 
specting, 74 b 19. 

Dynasty, or Family Oligarchy : 
see Oligarchy. 

Earth-born men, the fable of 
the, 69 a 5. 

Eating, moderation in, encour- 
aged by the Cretan lawgiver, 
72 a 22. 

Eavesdroppers, employment of, 
by the tyrant Hiero, i3 h 14. 

Ecphantides (the ancient comic 
poet), 41* 36. 

Education, may be directed to 
a wrong end, 66 b 30-38 ; must 
have regard to the constitu- 
tion, 6o b 15, io a 1 2, 37 a 1 1-32 ; 
special, for the ruler, 77 a 16 
(cp. 32 b 42 ) ; confers a claim 
to pre-eminence in the state, 
83 a 24 (cp. 8i a 4,83 a 16-22, 93 1 ' 
40); excellence of the Spartan 
education, 94 1 ' 21, 37 a 31 {but 
cp. 38 b l 1-38); bad education of 
the rich. 95 b i6, io a 22; hostility 
of the tyrant to education, 1 3 b i ; 
education necessary to supple- 
ment habit, 32 b 10, 37* I : the 
special business of the legis- 
lator, 37 a 1 1 ; wrong notions 
of education prevalent in Hel- 
las, 33 b 5, 37*24, 38 b 32; the 
periods of education, 36 a 3-37 a 
7> 38 b 38~39 a io; necessity of 
a common system of education, 
37 a 2i (cp. 66 b 30, 94 b 2i); 
should education have an 
ethical or a practical aim ? 
37 a 33-38 b 8, 39" Ii-40 b i9; 
should it include music? 37 b 
23~38 b 8, 39 a 1 1-41 b 18 ; what 
instruments and harmonies are 
to be used ? ib. 41* I7~42 b 34 ; 
education not to be directed 
to a single end, 38'' 9 ; the 
proper place of gymnastics in 
education, 3S b 4-39 a lo; the 
education of mind and body 
not to be carried on together, 
39* 7 : writers upon musical 
education, 4o b 5, 4l b 27-36, 
42 a 3i, b 8, 23; education 
a kind of* rattle to older 
children, 40 b 3o; the three 
principles of education, 42'' 
33 : — Directors of Education, 

3° a 30, 39- 
Egypt ; physicians allowed to 

alter their treatment after the 

fourth day, 86 a 13 ; the pyra- 


mids, I3 b 2i; the division 
into Castes, 29 a 40- b 25 ; the 
Egyptians the most ancient 
of all people, b 32. 

Elder and younger, relation of, 
52 b 2o, 59 a 37— b 17 ; the elder 
to command, the younger to 
obey, 29 a 6-i7, 32 b 35- 

Eleven, the, at Athens, 22 a o. 

Elimeia, n b 13. 

Elis, narrowness of the oligar- 
chical government at, 6 a 16. 

Empire, unnecessary to the hap- 
piness of states, 24 b 5— 25 b 32, 

33 a 3°-34 a 10. 

End, the, the nature of each 
thing, 52 b 32 ; has no limit in 
the arts, 57 b 25 ; may agree or 
disagree with the means, 3i b 
29 ; contains an element of 
pleasure, 39 b 32. 

Enemies, will not walk on the 
same path, 95 b 24; may be 
united by a common danger, 
4 b 23. 

Entertainments (kwovpyiai) : see 
Public Services. 

Enthusiasm, created by music, 
40 a 10, 4l a 21 ; peculiarly the 
effect of the Phrygian har- 
mony, b 4 ; has a great power 
over certain persons, 42 a 4. 

Fphialtes, curtailed the privi- 
leges of the Areopagus, 74* 8. 

Ephors, the, a democratic ele- 
ment at Sparta, 65 b 39, 7o b 1 3- 
26,72*31, 94 b 3l ; their cor- 
ruption and licence, 7o b 6-35, 
72*41; greatness of their 
power, 7o b 13, I3 a 27; the 
mode of their election childish, 
7o b 27; have the right of 
calling the magistrates to 
account, 7l a 6; try suits re- 
specting contracts, 75 b 10 (cp. 
7o b 28, 73 a 20) ; established by 
Theopompus as a check on 
the royal power, 13* 26-33 ! 
correspond to the Cosmi in 
Crete, 72* 6, 28, 40 ; to the 
magistracy of 104 at Car- 
thage, b 34 ; Pausanias said to 
have tried to overthrow, l b 

Epidamnus, management of 
public slaves at, 67 b 18 ; gov- 
erned by a single archon, 

Sy a 7, i b 25 ; democratic revo- 
lution there, i b 2l ; its origin, 

4 a I3-. 

Epimenides, of Crete, used the 
name dfioKanoi for the members 
of a family, 52 b 14. 

Equality, how related to justice, 
8o a 7-8i a 10, 82 b i4-83 a 22, 
83 b 4o, 1*27, io ;i 30, 25 b 8, 32 b 
27 ; (the true kind) no longer 
desired in Hellenic states, 
96* 40 ; equality and liberty 
the aim of democracy, 9 1 b 3o, 1 a 
28, 8* u, 10*30, I7 b 3, 18*5; 
the desire of equality a cause 
of sedition, I a 28<- b 1 3, 2* 22-34, 
b io; when attained createscon- 
tentment, 7 a l8; equality either 
numerical or proportional, 
79 b 1 1-80* 6, l b 29-2* 8, 8*1 1- 
b 5 ; states must not be based 
on one kind alone, 2* 2 ; 
denied to the weak by the 
strong, i8 b 1. 

Equality of property, proposed by 
Phaleas, 66 a 39~67 b 19, 74 b 9. 

Equals in rank form a kind of 
democracy, 8* 16 ; legislation 
only for those who are equal, 

Eretria, owed its importance in 
early times to its cavalry 
force, 89 b 39; overthrow of 
the oligarchy of the ' knights ', 

Erythrae, overthrow of the Basi- 
lidaeat, 5 b i8. 

Ethiopia, offices given in, accord- 
ing to stature, 90 b 5. 

Eubulus (tyrant of Atarneus), 
story of, 67*31. 

Eunuch, the (Thrasydaeus), as- 
sassinated Evagorasof Cyprus, 
n b 5- 

Euripides, caused Decamnichus 

to be scourged, 1 i b 33 ; quoted, 

Iphig.inAulid. 1400, 52 b 8 ; 

fr. 891, 10*34; 
Bacchae, 381, 39* 19; 
Aeolus, fr. 16, 77*19; fr. 

Europe, the inhabitants of 
(northern), have more bravery 
than intelligence, 27 b 24 (cp. 

Euryphon, the father of Hippo- 
damus, 67 b 22. 


Eurytion, a revolutionary leader 

at Heraclea, 6*39. 
Euthycrates, a Phocian, 4 a 12. 
Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in 

Cyprus, murdered by the 

eunuch Nicocles, 1 l b 5. 
Evil ; the sense of good and evil 

characteristic of man, 53* 15. 
Evils, must be guarded against 

at their beginning, 3 b 17-3 1, 

7 b 32-39. 8 a 33. 

Example, power of, 73 a 39. 

Exchange, (1) according to 
nature (barter of necessaries), 
57* 6-30, 58 a 3 2 -40 ; (2) con- 
trary to nature (retail trade), 

56 b 4o-57 a i9, 57 a 4i- b 23, S& 

40, b 2I. 

Executive element, the, in the 
state, 98 a i,99 a 3-o b i2, 2i b 4- 
23* 10. 

Exoteric discussions, referred to, 
78 b 3i, 23*22. 

Experience, value of, 64 a 1 , 29'' 


Expiations for crime, could not 
be made if a community of 
women were established, 62 a 3 1. 

ILxposure of deformed children, 
justifiable, 35 b 19. 

Extravagance, the, of courts, 
causes discontent in the com- 
mon people, I4 b I. 

Extremes, danger of, 96 a 22- b 2, 
b 34-97 a I3>20 a 2-i7. 

Faction, frequency of, in Crete, 
72 b n-22; evil effects of, in 
Hellas, 96*22-36 ; a cause of 
revolution in oligarchies, 6 a 6; 
less common in democracies, 
96M3, 2 a 8, 7 a i6. 

Families, should the number of, 
equal the number of lots ? 
65'' 10. 

Families, large, encouraged at 
Sparta, 7o a 39. 

Family, the, the village a colony 
of, 52 b 16 (cp. 57 11 21) ; com- 
posed of three relations which 
are sanctioned by nature, 52 a 

26 foil., 3 b i-M, 59 a 37- b i7, 
6o b 1 3 ; governed by the elder 
or parent who is their king, 
52 b 20, 55 b 19, 59 b 10 ; differ- 
ent kinds of rule within the 

family, 59* 37- b i7 ; the family 
a part of the state, 6o b 13, 69 
b i4 ; the state more self- 
sufficient than the family, 
6l b 12. 

Family oligarchy : see Oligarchy. 

Family quarrels, a cause of revo- 
lutions, 3 b 37~4 a 17, 6 a 31. 

Father and child, relation of, 

53 b 5, 59 a 37- b i7- 
Fear, will make the bitterest 

enemies unite, 4 b 23 ; helps to 

keep the state together, 8 a 26. 

Female, the, by nature different 
from the slave except among 
barbarians, 52 b 1-9 ; subject 
by nature to the male, 54 b 13, 
59 a 39> 6o a 9 ; tendency of the 
female to produce offspring 
like the parents, 62 a 18 : — the 
union of male and female 
formed in obedience to a 
natural instinct, 52 a 28 ; the 
relation of male and female 
part of the household, 53 b 8, 
59 a 38. [See Woman.] 

Ferrymen, number of, at Tene- 
dos, 9i b 24. 

Finance, importance of, to the 
statesman, 59 a 33 ; the finan- 
ces of Sparta badly managed, 
7l b 10 ; suggestions for the 
regulation of state finances, 
8 b 3i-9 a 14, I9 b 33-2o b 17. 

Fishermen, number of, at Taren- 
tum and Byzantium, 9i b 23. 

Flatterers, influence of, with the 
tyrant, 92*21, I3 b 39. 

Flute, the, came into fashion at 
Athens and Lacedaemon after 
the Persian War, 4i a 28-36; 
story of Athene and the flute, 
b 2-8 ; not a fit instrument for 
freemen, a i8, 42 b 1. 

Flute-maker, the ruler compared 
to the, — the subject to the 
flute-player, 77 b 29. 

Flute-players, used as an illus- 
tration of the claims to super- 
iority in the state, 82 b 3i-83 a 3. 

Food, supplied by nature to all, 
56° i9- b 26, 58 s 35 ; one of the 
conditions of a state, 28 b 5. 

Force, generally associated with 
virtue, 55 a 13. 

Forests, Inspectors of, 2i b 30, 

3i b '5- 


Fortifications, necessary to the 
state, 3o b 32-3 i l iS. 

Fortune, the legislator ought not 
to trust to, 73''2i ; the con- 
troller of events, 3 1 '* 2 1 , 32 11 

Fountains, officers in charge of, 

2I b 26. 

Four Hundred, government of 
the, at Athens, 4 b 12, 5 b 27. 

Free, the, and the noble akin, 
83 a 33 (cp. 55 a 28-38). 

Freedom, supposed by Hellenes 
not to exist among barbarians, 
52 b 6, 55*28; is a reason 
why men claim authority in a 
state, 83 a i6, 33- b 8. [See 

Freeman, the, in his relation to 
theslave, 52 a 3o- b 9, 53 b 2i, 54 a 
1 7— 55 b 15; not always outward- 
lydistinguished by nature from 
him, 54 b 27 ; rule over free- 
men more noble than rule 
over slaves, a 25, 25* 28, 33 b 27 ; 
will never willingly submit to 
the tyrant, 95* 22, I4 a 2 ; has 
a natural right to rule, 6i b i, 
87*10-20; must not be 
ashamed to obey his lawful 
superiors, io a 12-36, 25* 27, 
32 b 12-41 (cp. 95 b i3); may 
have a certain knowledge of 
the arts, 37 b 15-21. 

Friends, have all things in 
common, 63*30 (cp. 29 b 4i). 

Friendship, weakened by com- 
munism, 62 b 3-24 ; the motive 
of society, b 7, 95 b 24 ; implies 
equality, 87 b 33 ; friendship 
among the citizens hated by 
the tyrant, 13*41; friendship 
at Sparta, 63* 35. 


Gela, tyranny of Cleander at, 

Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse, 2 b 32 ; 
duration of his tyranny, 15'' 
34 ; expulsion of his family, 
i2 b io, I5 b 38, 16*33. 

General, the, learns command 
by obedience, jj h 10 ; generals 
often became demagogues in 
ancient times, 5* 7-28 ; have 
often attacked their masters, 
12* 11 ; wise generals combine 

light-armed troops with caval- 
ry and heavy infantry, 2i a 16. 

Generalship, a rare quality, 9'' 5. 

Gentleness, associated with 
courage, 27 b 38-28* 16, 38 b 17. 

Gerusia : see Council of Elders. 

God, happy by reason of his 
own nature, 23 b 2i, 25 b 28; 
alone able to hold together 
the universe, 26* 32. 

Gods, the, supposed to be under 
a king because mankind 
originally were, 52 b 24, 59 b 12 ; 
their statues more beautiful 
than ordinary human forms, 

54 b 35- 
Gods, the, who preside over 

birth, 35 b 1 5 ; at whose festivals 

ribaldry is permitted, 36 b 16. 

Good, absolute and relative, 32* 

Good, the, the aim of the state, 
52*2, 6i b 9. 

Good and evil, the sense of, 
characteristic of man, 53* 15 ; 
made the test of freedom and 
slavery, 55*39- 

Goods, the three kinds of, 
23*21-38; external goods not 
to be preferred to virtue, 7i b 7, 
23*34- b 2i, 34 b 3; not the 
cause of happiness, 23 b 2i, 

Goodwill, identified by some 
with justice, 55* 17. 

Gorgias of Leontini, his defini- 
tion of virtue, 6o a 28 ; — of the 
citizen, 75 b 26. 

Gorgus, father of Psammetichus, 
tyrant of Corinth, I5 b 26. 

Government, the Constitutional, 
called in ancient times demo- 
cracy, 97 b 24 ; its rarity, 93* 
40 (cp. 96* 22) ; one of the 
true forms of government, 

79 a 37 (cp. 93 b 2 3) !. how dis- 
tinguished from aristocracy, 
oligarchy, and democracy, 

93 a 35-94 a 29, 98 a 35- b n> 7 a 
5-23, 17*2 (cp. 73 a 2-3o); 
composed of the heavy-armed 
soldiers, 65 b 28, 79 b 2, 88*12, 
97 b 23 ; the people to whom it 
is adapted, 88*12; suited to a 
large country population, 19* 
32 ; characterized by the 
alternation of rulers and ruled, 


52M4,$9 ,, 4.6i a 30- b 5,73 b i2, 
77 a 25,H 79 1V 8, 88*12, 32'' 
12-41 (cp. 55 h 16) ; by the 
combination of the vote and 
the lot in the election of 
the magistrates, o a 34- b l ; 
gives the affirmative power to 
the many, gS h 38 ; the mode 
in which it arises, 94 a 30- b 4i • 
causes of revolution to which 
it is subject, 3 a 1-6, 6 b 6-i6, 
7 a 5—33 ; means of its preser- 
vation, 8 a 35~ b io; more stable 
than aristocracy, 7 a 16. 

Government, forms of, how to 
be criticized, 69 a 29, 88 b 10- 
89 a 25; the legislator must 
know all, 89* 7 ; differ accord- 
ing to the character of the 
supreme authority, 78 b 10, 
83° 5, 97 b 39; are based on 
partial justice only, 8o a 7~25, 
8i a 8, 88 a 20, i a 25, i8 a 11-28; 
are all perversions of the 
perfect state, 93 b 25 ; may be 
divided into true forms and 
perversions, 75*38, 79 a i7- b io, 
88 a 32- b 2, 89 s 26- b 1 1 , 93 b 2 3 ; 
their successive changes in 
ancient times, 86 b 8-22, 97'' 
16-28 ; Plato's theory of 
change wrong, i6 a i- b 27 ; 
influence of increased popula- 
tion upon forms of govern- 
ment, 86 b 8-22, 93 a 1, 20 a 17 ; 
the worst forms the most 
precarious, b 39 ; common 
error that forms of govern- 
ment can be reduced to two — 
oligarchy and democracy, 
90*13-29; sense in which 
this is true, 91 b 7, i b 39 (cp. 
I7 a i7); the people adapted 
to each form of government, 
87 b 36-88 11 29 ; the magistrates 
suited to each, 99 b 3o-o a 8, 
22 b 12, 23 a 6 ; the judicial 
arrangements, 73 1 * 19, 75 b 8-l 7, 
i a io; the military force, 2i a 

Government, writers on, often 
unpractical, 88 b 35 ; have ex- 
tolled the Lacedaemonian 
constitution, b 4i, 33*' 12-21. 

Guardians of Children, 99 b l9, 
o a 4, 22 b 39; of the Citizens, 
68 a 22, 5 b 29 ; of the 

Law, 87*21, 98 b 29, 22 b 39, 
23 ;l 7 ; of Shrines, 22"' 25; of 
Women, 99 a 22, o a 4, 22'' 39. 

Guardians, the, in Plato's Re- 
public : see Plato. 

Guards, story of Dionysius' 
request for, 86 b 39; the guards 
of the tyrant mercenaries, of 
the king citizens, 85 a 24, ll a 7. 

Gymnastic, like other arts, has 
undergone improvement, 68 b 
35 ; includes various kinds of 
training, 88 b 15. 

Gymnastic exercises, forbidden 
to slaves in Crete, 64 a 21 ; dis- 
couraged in oligarchies among 
the poor, 97 a 29; one of the 
recognized branches of educa- 
tion, 37 b 23 ; carried to excess 
at Lacedaemon, 38 b 9~38; 
suggestions for their arrange- 
ment, 3i a 35 ; should be of a 
lighter kind for children, 38'' 
40 : —Directors of, 23 s1 1. 


Habit, bodily, the, to be required 
in the citizen, 35 b 5, 38 b 9-39 a 

Habit, the strength of law de- 
rived from, 69 s 20 ; one ele- 
ment of virtue, 32 a 38- b l 1, 34 b 
6; must go before reason in 
education, 38 b 4. 

Hanno, conspiracy of, at Carth- 
age, r 5. 

Happiness, independent of exter- 
nal goods, 23 b 21 , 32 a 25 ; the 
happiness of the whole de- 
pendent on the happiness of 
the parts, 5 5 b 9, 64^ 1 7, 29 11 23 ; 
happiness proportioned to 
virtue, 23 b 2i, 28 a 37, 28 b 35, 
29 a 22, 32 a 7 ; the perfect 
happiness of the divine nature, 
23" 21, 25 b 28; the happiness 
of men and states the same, 
24 a 5~25 b 32 ; the happiness 
of states not dependent on 
empire over others, 24'' 32- 
25 a 7; or on size, 26 a 8- b 7 ; 
happiness implies virtuous 
activity, 25* 16-34 ; is the 
worthy employment of leisure, 

37 b 33-38 a i3, 39 1 ' n-42. 
Harbours, should be separated 
from the city, 27 a 32. 


Harmodius, conspiracy of, and 
Aristogeiton, 11*37. 

Harp, the Lydian, one of the 
instruments to be rejected in 
musical education, 41*40. 

Hatred, more reasonable than 
anger, I2 b 32; may arise out 
of love, 28 s I-16. 

Health, an important considera- 
tion in choosing the site of a 
city, 30 a 38- b i7. 

Hearing, the, has more con- 
nexion with morals than any 
other sense, 4o a 28- b ia. 

Heiresses, number of, at Sparta, 
70* 24 ; legislation of Andro- 
damas respecting, 74 b 25 ; 
disputes concerning, a cause 
of revolutions, 4 a 4-13. 

Heliaea, court of, at Epidamnus, 

I b 23. 

Hellanocrates of Larissa, one 
of the conspirators against 
Archelaus, u" 17. 

Hellas, influence of the climate 
of, on the national character, 
27 b 20-38 ; natural superiority 
of Hellenes to Barbarians, 
52 b 7, 55*28, 85*19, 27 b 2Q; 
differences of the various Hel- 
lenic tribes, b 33 : — barbarous 
laws among the ancient Hel- 
lenes, 6S b 4i; the Hellenes 
formerly under royal rule, 
52 b 19, 86 b 8, 97 b 16 ; changes 
in government caused by the 
increase of population, 86 b 
8-22, 93* 1, 97° 22-28, 20*17; 
rise of the heavy-armed in 
importance, 97 b 22 ; effects of 
the Persian War upon Hellas, 
74 a I2, 4 a 2l, 41*30; growth 
of the Athenian empire in 
Hellas, 84" 40; division of 
Hellas between Athens and 
Lacedaemon, g6 a 32, 7 b 22: — 
smallness of the middle class 
in later Hellas, 95 b 21, 96 s 22- 
b 2 ; lack of great men, 13* 3 ; 
effects of the cultivation 
of rhetoric, 5 a 10 ; wrong 
notions of education, 95 b 16, 
33 b 5» 37 a 24, 39=— rage for 
flute-playing in Hellas after 
the Persian War, 4l a 28. 

Helots, difficulty of the Lacedae- 
monians in managing, 64 a 35, 

69*38, 72M9; their analogy 
with the Cretan Perioeci, 71" 
41, 72 b i9. 

Heniochi, the, in Pontus, said to 
be cannibals, 38 b 22. 

Hephaestus, the tripods of, 53 d 

Heptagon, the, a musical instru- 
ment, 4i a 41. 

Heraclea, in Pontus, had a large 
number of seamen, 27 b 14 ; 
democratical revolution there, 
5 b 36 : (? the same place) over- 
throw of the democracy, 4 b 3i ; 
introduction of a more popular 
government, 5 b 5 ; revolution 
at, arising out of the punish- 
ment of Eurytion for adultery, 

Heracleides of Aenos, one of the 
assassins of Cotys, n b 2i. 

Heracleitus, saying of, about 
anger, 15*30. 

Heracleodorus, a revolutionary 
leader at Oreus, 3* 19. 

Heracles, story of, and the Ar- 
gonauts, 84*23. 

Heraea (in Arcadia), revolution 
at, 3*15. 

Hesiod, quoted, Op. et Di., 25, 
I2 b 4 ; ib. 405, 52 b 10. 

Hestiaea (the later Oreus) in 
Euboea, democratic revo- 
lutions at, 3 a i8, b 33. 

Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, I2 b 
11; his employment of detec- 
tives and eavesdroppers, I3 b 
14 ; duration of his tyranny, 

I5 b 34- 
Hipparinus, aided Dionysius to 
gain the tyranny of Syracuse, 
Hippocrates, 'the great phy- 
sician,' 26* 15. 
Hippodamus, of Miletus, the 
planner of cities, 67 b 22, 30 b 
24 ; his character and appear- 
ance, 67 b 23; peculiarities of 
his constitution, b 30-68* 15; 
objections to it, 68* l6- b 3i. 
Homer, calls Zeus 'the father 
of Gods and men ', 59 b 13 : — 
//. ii. 204; 92*13 ; 
ib. 372 ; 87 b 14 ; 
»• 391-393; 85*10; 
"x. 63; 53*5; 


ib. 319 ; 67*1 ; 
ib. 648 ; 7S a 37 ; 
x. 224 ; 87 b 14; 
xvi. 59 ; 7S a 37 ; 
xviii. 376 ; 53 b 36; 
Otlyss. ix. 7 ; 38* 27 ; 
ib. 14 ; 52 b 22 ; 
xvii. 385 ; 38*26; 
— a passage is also cited, 38" 
24, which does not occur in 
our Homer. 

Homicide, one of Hippodamus's 
three divisions of laws, 6/ b 37 ; 
laws of Androdamas respect- 
ing, 74 b 23; suits concerning, 
tried at Sparta by the Elders, 
75 b io(cp. 7o b 39)- 

Honour, inequality in, a cause 
of revolutions, 67* 1,39, 2 a 24, 
b io, 3 b 3, 4 a 17-38, i6 b 2i; 
the remedy for this, 8 b 10, I5 a 
4-14 ; the citizen must share 
in the honours of the state, 
78 a 35 (cp. 8l a 28); honour 
less desired by men than 
wealth, 97 b 6, 8 b 34, iS b 16 
(cp. 2i a 4o). 

Honours, conferred in many 
states for military exploits, 24 b 

Horses, keeping of, a mark of 
great wealth in old times, 89'' 
35,97 b i8, 21*13. 

Household management, the art 
of, distinguished from the rule 
of a master, 52 a 7, 53 b l8, 78 b 
32-40; divided into three 
parts, 53 b i-l4, 59 a 37 ; how 
related to wealth-getting, 53*' 
i2,56 a 3-i4, b 4o,S7 b i7-58 a 38, 
includes the natural art of ac- 
quisition, 53 b 23, 56 b 26-57*41 , 
58" 19-38, b 9-2i ; has a limit, 
ib. 57 b 30, 58" 1 8 ; is more con- 
cerned with virtue than with 
wealth, 59 b 2o; the parts of 
men and women in, different, 
77 b 24; exists for the benefit 
of those under it, 78 b 32-40. 

Hunting, a species of war, 55 b 
38, 56 b 23, 24 b 39; the differ- 
ent branches of, 56 s 35. 

Husband and wife, relation of: 
see ' Male ' and ' Female '. 

Husbandmen, are sometimes 
hunters, 56 b 5 : would be 
better suited for Plato's' com- 


munism than the guardians, 
62 a 4o; make the best form 
of democracy, 92'' 25, g6 b 28, 
l8 b 9, I9 a 6-19 ; furnish good 
sailors, 27 b 11 ; should not be 
citizens, 29 a 25, 30* 25 ; should 
be excluded from the ' Free- 
men's Agora', 3i a 34. 
Husbandry, a part of the natural 
art of money-making, 56* 17, 
5S a 37, b i7. 


Iapygia, 29 b 2o:— Iapygians, 
the, defeat of the Tarentines 

by, 3 a 5. 

Iberians, the, a warlike nation, 

24 b 19. 
Imitations of our emotions, given 

by music, 39 b 42-4o b 13. 
Inactivity, not to be preferred 

to action, 25 a 31 (cp. 33 a 21 

- b 3). 
Indefinite office, he who shares 

in, a citizen, 75 a 31, b i3- 
India, the kings of, have a 

natural superiority to their 

subjects, 32 b 24. 
Inferior, the, exists for the sake 

of the superior, 33 a 2i. 
Inheritance, sale of an, forbidden, 

66 b 18 ; (at Sparta), 70 a 19 (cp. 

9 a 23); the division of an, 

may be a cause of revolution, 

3 b 33- 
Injustice, the sense of, peculiar 

to man, 53 a 1 5. 
Inspectors of Forests, 2i b 3o, 

3i b i5- 
Instincts, the, of animals, 54" 23, 

32 b 3- 

Instruments, best when made 
for one use, 52'' 1 ; may be 
either living or lifeless, 53" 27 ; 
are used either in production 
or in action, 54 a 1-17 ; are 
never unlimited in the arts, 
56** 34 ; the slave a living in- 
strument, 53 b 3o, 54 a i6. 

Instruments, musical, the, al- 
lowed to the freeman, 4l a 17- 
b 8. 

Intermarriage, rights of, 8o b 1 5, 

Invention, every, has been made 

many times over, 64 a 3, 29'' 25, 


Invention of tactics, 97'' 20 ;-— of 
siege machines, 31 * 1. 

Ionia, origin of tyrannies in, 
io b 28. 

Ionian Gulf, the, 90 b II, 29*20. 

Iphiades, a party leader at Aby- 
dos, 6*31. 

Istros, revolution at, 5 b 5. 

Italus, king of Oenotria, gave 
his name to Italy, 29'' 8 ; intro- 
duced common tables, b f6. 

Italy, antiquity of common tables 
in, 29 b 5-23 ; took its name 
from Italus, ''8. 


Jason, tyrant of Pherae, saying 
ascribed to, 77*24. 

Judges, not allowed to commu- 
nicate with each other, 68 b 8 ; 
should not hold office for life, 
7o b 38 ; necessary, even in 
the first beginnings of the 
state, 9i a 22; the various 
modes of appointing them, 
o b 38-l a io; provision for an 
equal division of opinion 
among judges, 18*38; those 
who inflict penalties to be 
different from those who see to 
their execution, 2i b 40-22 a 18. 

Judicial decisions, necessary to 
the existence of society, 22 a 6, 
32* 13 ; — element, the, in the 
state, 97 b 4i ; — functions, the 
citizen must share in, 75*26- 

b 2I. 

Justice, the sense of, peculiar to 
man, 53* 15 ; the bond of men 
in states, a 37, 83*20, 38 (cp. 
91*22); sometimes defined 
as goodwill, 55* 17 ; different 
in men and women, 59 b 28, 
60*20; in the ruler and the 
subject, 59 b 2i-6o tt 20, 77 b 16- 
30; consists in equality, 8o a 1 1, 
82 b i8, 83 b 4o, 32'' 27; cannot 
be the destruction of the state, 
81*19; cannot be united with 
the love of conquest, 24*35- 
25* 15 ; selfishness of the or- 
dinary notions of justice, i8 b 
x > 24^33; all claims to rule 
based upon partial and relative 
justice only, 8o a 7-34, 8i a 8, i* 
2S-36,9 a 36, I7 f, 3, 18*11-28. 


King, the, not the same with 
the statesman, 52*13; ought 
to be chosen for merit (as at 
Carthage), 71*21, 72 b 3 8 ; 
receives a special education, 
77*17; may be justified in 
putting down his rivals, 84'' 13, 
15*12; is the champion of the 
better classes against the 
people, io b 9; often supreme 
in religious matters, 85'' 16, 
22 b 29; should he have a 
military force ? 86 b 27-40 ; is 
guarded by the citizens, 85* 25, 

King, the true, or natural 
superior of the citizens, 84*3, 
b 22-34, S8 a 1 5-29, 25 b 10 ; un- 
known in later Hellas, 13*3. 
[See Royalty.] 

King, a, the Gods, why supposed 
to be under, 52 b 24, 59'' 12. 

Kings, the, of Crete (in ancient 
times), 72* 8 ; of Carthage, b 37~ 
73 a *3, 73 a 25-37; of Mace- 
donia, io b 39; of the Molos- 
sians, ib., 13*24; of Persia, 
39*34; of Sparta [see Lace- 
daemon] : — Kings, the an- 
cient, sometimes became ty- 
rants, io b i8. 

Knights, the, at Athens, 74* 20 ; 
at Eretria, 6*35. 

Labourers (unskilled), j8 l 13- 
22, 91*6, 17*25, 19*28, 21* 
6, 29*36, 37 b 21, 4i b i4, 42* 

Lacedaemon ; frequent wars of 
the Lacedaemonians with 
their neighbours, 69 b 3, 70* 2 ; 
their difficulties with the 
Helots, 69 a 38- b i2 (cp. 64* 
35); the Messenian Wars, 
70* 3, 6 b 38 ; the conspiracy 
of the Partheniae, 6 b 29;— of 
Pausanias, i b 20, 7*4, 33'' 34; 
—of Cinadon, 6 b 34 ;— of Ly- 
sander, i b 19, 6 b 33 ; the put- 
ting downof the tyrants, I2 b 7 ; 
the subject cities governed 
in the oligarchical interest by 
the Lacedaemonians, 96*32, 
7 b 23 : — friendship among 


the Lacedaemonians, 63* 35 ; 

agriculture forbidden to them, 
64*10; simplicity of life a- 
mong them, 65'' 40, 94'' 19-31 ; 
excellence of the Lacedae- 
monian education, h 2i, 37 a 3i 
(/Wcp. 24 b S, 34*40, 3S b 12) ; 
music not comprised in it, 
39 h 2; Lacedaemonian train- 
ing only advantageous while 
other nations did not train, 
38'' 24-38; rage for flute- 
playing at Lacedaemon after 
the Persian War, 41 11 33 ; error 
of the Lacedaemonians in 
thinking the objects of their 
desire preferable to the virtue 
which gained them, 7l h g, 34 b 
3 (cp. 23*36); spirit of dis- 
trust in the Lacedaemonian 
government, 7 i a 23 ; bad man- 
agement of the revenue, b lo ; 
frequency of corruption, 70 b 
10, 71*3, 72 a 4i; accumula- 
tion of property, 70*15-22, 
6 b 38, 7*36 (cp. i6 b 8) ; num- 
ber of heiresses, 70* 24 ; de- 
crease in population, 70* 29- 
h 6; encouragement of large 
families, b 1 ; expulsion of 
strangers, 72 b l7; strangers 
admitted to citizenship in 
ancient times, 70* 34 ; licence 
of the Lacedaemonian women, 
69 b 12-70*15 : — the Lacedae- 
monian constitution a com- 
bination of various forms of 
government, 65'* 32-66* I, 70'' 
23 ; — an aristocracy with an 
element of democracy, 93 b 16 
(cp. 7o b 16, 72*31); — re- 
garded by some as a demo- 
cracy, by others as an oli- 
garchy, 94 b 19-34; — often 
considered the next best to the 
idealstate,65 b 32,88 b 4i ; — its 
resemblance to the Cretan, 
7l b 22, 40-72*12, 72*^28 ; - 
to the Carthaginian, 72'' 25- 
73 a 4 ; the arrangement of the 
law courts at Lacedaemon, an 
aristocratical feature, 73* 19, 
75 ll 9; the attention of the 
legislator directed solely to 
war, 7i a 4i- b io, 24'' 8, 33'' 12- 
34* 10, 38 b 9~38 : — imperfec- 
tions of the Lacedaemonian 

monarchy, 7i a 20, /2 b 3S; 
limited powers of the kings, 
85*3, 13*25 ; their office an 
hereditary generalship, 7 i a 39, 
85*7-16, "26, 33-86" 4, 87 a 3 5 
origin of their power, io 1 ' 39 ; 
reason of its long continuance, 
I3 a 25 : — the Gerusia criti- 
cized, 70'' 35-7i a 18, 6 il 14 : - 
faults and merits of the Ephor- 
alty, 65 b 38, 7o b 6-35, 71*7, 
72 11 28,40, b 35 ; established by 
Theopompus as a check on 
the royal power, I3 a 26-33; 

— the officeof admiral, 7l a 37 ; 

— the common tables, why 
instituted, 63 b 4i, 6s b 41, 71* 
32, 94 b 27; not so well man- 
aged as in Crete, 71*28, 72 a 


Lametic Gulf, the, 29 1 * 13. 

Land, the, should be divided 
into two portions, 30*9 (but 
cp. 65'' 24): Hippodamus's 
division of, 67 1 ' 33, 68 a 40 ; - 
should it be cultivated by the 
owners ?,.63 a 8, 64 a 14, 6S a 34 - 
b 4, 28 b 24-29 a 2, 30*23-31; 
— at Sparta, had fallen into 
the hands of a few, 70* 16. 

Landowners, small, to be en- 
couraged, I9 a 6-I9. 

Larissa, the citizen-makers of, 
75 b 29; democratical revolu- 
tion at, 5 b 29 ; overthrow of 
the Aleuadae, 6 a 29. 

Law, at Aphytis, regulating the 
census of properties, I9 a l4; 
at Athens, providing for the 
maintenance of children of 
citizens slain in battle, 68* 10 ; 
at Cumae, about murder, 69* 
i; in Egypt, about physicians, 
86 a 13 ; at Epidamnus, about 
the employment of public 
slaves, 67 b 18 ; at Thebes, 
excluding from the govern- 
ment persons who had not 
given up business for ten years, 
78* 25, 2i a 28 :— forbidding in- 
habitants on the border lrom 
voting in a debate on war 
or peace, 30* 20 . -Laws, to 
limit the acquisition or sale 
of land, 66 b 14-24, 70* 19 ; 
against money-making in oli- 
garchies, l6 b 3 ; to promote 

T 2, 


peasant proprietorship, I9 a 6- 

Law, the, of Oxylus, 19* 12 :— 
Laws, the, of Androdamas, 
74 b 23 ; of Charondas, a 23-3i, 
b 5,97 a 23 ; of Draco, 74 b 15; of 
Lycurgus (see Lacedaemon); of 
Minos, 7i b 3i, 29 b 4 ; of Pha- 
leas, 66 a 39-67 b i9, 74 b 9? of 
Philolaus, 74 a 3i- b 5; of Pit- 
tacus, b i8 ; of Plato (see Plato) : 
of Solon, 66 b 17, 73 h 34"74 a 21, 
8l b 32 ; of Zaleucus, 74 a 22. 

Law, the, derives its force from 
habit, 69* 20 ; 'a surety of 
justice' (Lycophron), 8o b 10 ; 
may have a party character, 
8i a 36, 82 b 8; only exists for 
equals, 84° II, 87 a 18 ; must 
be supported by force in the 
ruler, 86 b 3i ; is a mean, 87 b 
4 ; is order, 26 a 29 ; is with- 
out passion, 86 a l8; the rule 
of, the rule of God, 87 a 28 (cp. 
53 a 29-39) ; — should the law 
or the monarch rule ? 86 a 7~ b 7, 
87 s i- b 36 ; — should the law 
ever be changed? 68 b 26-69 a 
27 (cp. 86 a 20-31, 87*27):— 
Laws, the, cannot provide for 
circumstances, 69 a 9, 82 b 4, 
86 a 9-35, 87 a 20- b 35; should 
be supreme, and the magis- 
trates only their interpreters, 
82 b 1, 87 a 25, b i5-3i» 92 a 32; 
are relative to the constitution, 
but distinct from it, 82 b lo, 
89 ft 13-20; must be obeyed and 
must be good, 92 a 32, 94 a 3. 
Law, the, or convention, by 
which prisoners of war be- 
come slaves, 55 a 5, 22. 
Law, guardians of, 87 a 2I, 98 b 

29, 22 b 39, 23*7. 
Law, unwritten, importance of, 

87% i9 b 4Q. 

Laws, the, of Hellenic cities gen- 
erally in a chaotic state, 24 b 5. 

Laws, the, of Plato : see Plato. 

Laws, division of, proposed by 
Hippodamus, 67 b 37. 

Law Courts, the, at Athens : — 
(i) The Areopagus (see Council 
of Areopagus) : — (ii) The Di- 
casteries ; their members paid, 
67 b 1, 74 a 8 ; formed the 
democratic element in the 

Athenian constitution, 73 b 41 : 
— (iii) The court of Phreatto, 

O b 29. 

Law Courts, the, oligarchical 
and democratical tricks with, 
94 a 37, 97 a 2i,36, 98 b i6; the 
rich should be encouraged to 
attend, even in democracies, 
20 a 27; used by the dema- 
gogues to ruin the rich, 2 b 22, 
4 b 20~5 a 7, 20 a 4. 

Law Courts, the possible varieties 
of, o b i3-i a i5. 

Lawgiver, Onomacritus said to 
have been the first, 74 a 25- 

Legislator, the, must have regard 
to the country' and the people, 
65 a l 8; must pay attention to the 
foreign relations of the state, 
67* 1 9-37, 25 a 1 2 ; must secure 
leisure for his citizens, 69* 34. 
73 a 32, b 7,28 b 33,29 a i8(cp.3i b 
73 b 21, 32 a 28-35; must regard 
the common good, 83 b 4o; 
ought not to want such a prin- 
ciple as ostracism, 84 b l7, 2 b 
19; must know all possible 
forms of states, 89* 7 ; and the 
causes of their preservation 
and destruction, g b 35, I9 b 37 ; 
must be able to reform as well 
as to create a state, 89 a 5 ; 
should favour the middle class, 
96 b 34 : must consider the 
deliberative, executive, and 
judicial elements in relation to 
the constitution of each state, 
97 b 37 ; must be modest in his 
designs, 65 a 17, 25 b 38; should 
not make conquest the aim of 
his state, 24 a 5-25* 15 ; must 
give all the citizens a share 
in the administration, 32 b 25 ; 
must have a care of education, 
b 15, 33 a i4, 34 b i6, 37 a n-2i; 
must not neglect physical edu- 
cation, 34 b 29. 
Legislators, the best, belonged 

to the middle class, 96"* 18. 
Leisure, the, of the citizens, the 
first object of the legislator, 
69 a 34, 73 a -32- b 7, 28 b 33, 29" 
18 (cp. 3i b i2); the citizen 
must know the right uses of, 

33 a 33-34 a io,37 b 23-38 b 8,39 a 
25 ; needed for virtue, 29° I. 


Leontini, tyranny of Panaetius 
at, io b 29, i6 H 36. 

Lesbos, subjection of, by the 
Athenians, S.i a 40. 

Leucas, changes introduced at, 
by the abolition of a law against 
the sale of a man's patrimony, 
66 b 22. 

Liberality, destroyed by commu- 
nism, 63 b 1 1 ; must be con- 
joined with temperance,65 a 33, 
26 b 3i. 

Liberty, supposed to be the 
characteristic feature of demo- 
cracy, 8o a s , 9 1 b 30-3 8 , 94 a 1 1 , 
i a 2S, 8 a 11,10*25-36, 17*40- 
b i7, iS a 5, l9 b 3o; must not 
be confused with licence, 
Io a 31 :— should be held out 
as a reward to slaves, 30 a 

32 - 
Libya, Upper, community of 

wives in, 62 a 20. 

Licence of the Spartan women, 

69 b i2-7o a 15 ; of slaves and 

women in democracies and 

tyrannies, I3 b 33, i9 b 28; must 

not be confused with liberty, 

io a 3i. 

Life, action, not production, 
54 a 7 ; pleasure of, 78 b 29 ; is 
the speculative or the practi- 
cal, better? 24 a 25-25 b 32 :— 
divided by the poets into 
periods of seven years, 35 b 32, 
36 b 40 : — simplicity of, at 
Sparta, 65 b 40, 94^19-31. 

Life, the, both of the citizens and 
the magistrates should be in 
harmony with the constitution, 
7o b 3l, 8 b 20. 

Life, the good, not desired by 
mankind in general, 57 b 40; 
the object of the existence of 
the state, 52 b 30, 8o a 31-81*4, 
91*17, 23 a 14, 25 a 7, 26 b 7, 
28 a 35 ; is it the same for states 
and for individuals? 23*14- 
25*15, 25 b 30. 

Limit, a, necessary in the arts, 
56 b 34, 57 b 27, 84 b 7, 26*37; 
in population, 65* 13, 39, 66 b 8, 
7o b 4, 26 a 8- b 7, 35 b 22 ; in the 
state, 76* 26, 25 b 33-26 b 32 ; in 
wealth, 56 b 31, 57 b 30, 65"* 28- 
38, 66'- 5-31. 

Live stock, the knowledge of, a 

part of the natural art of 
getting wealth, 58° 12-20. 
Lives, the different, of men and 
animals, 56* I9~ b 7, l8 b 9, I9 a 
Locri (in Italy), received laws 
from Zaleucus, 74 a 22 ; ruined 
by a marriage connexion with 
Dionysius, 7*38: Locrians, 
law among the, forbidding the 
sale of property, 66 b 19. 
Lot, use of the, characteristic of 
democracy, 73"* 18, 74 a 5, 94 b 7, 
I7 b 20, l8 a 2; modes in which 
it may be used in elections of 
magistrates, o a 19-'' 3. 
Love, would be weakened by 
communism, 62 b 7 ; influence 
of, among warlike races, 69 b 
27 ; may easily change into 
hatred, 28* 1. 

Love of boys, prevalent among 
warlike races, 69 b 26 ; encour- 
aged in Crete, 72*24. 

Love quarrels, a cause of revolu- 
tions, 3 b 21. 

Luxury of the Spartan women, 
69 b 2i; of the rich, in oligar- 
chies, 95 b 17, o a 7, 10*22. 

Lycophron, the Sophist, his con- 
ception of law, 8o b 10. 

Lyctus, in Crete, a colony of the 
Lacedaemonians, 71'' 28. 

Lycurgus, the author of the 
Lacedaemonian constitution, 
7 i b 25, 73 b 33 ; was the 
guardian of Charilaus, 7i b 25 ; 
his visit to Crete, ib. ; his 
failure to bring the women 
under his laws, 7o a 7 ; said by 
some to have been a disciple 
of Thales, 74 a 29 ; belonged 
to the middle class, 96 a 20. 

Lydian Mode, the : see Mode. 

Lydian Harp, the, 4i a 4C 

Lydian War, the, 9o' J 1 7. 

Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos, 5*41- 

Lysander, the conspiracy of, I 1 ' 
19, 6 b 33- 


Macedonia, origin of the royal 
power in, io b 39; ancient law 
in, that he who had not slain 
an enemy should wear a halter, 
2 4 b l5. " 


Magistrates, power of calling to 
account [see Account, pow^r 
of calling magistrates to] ; 
division of law-suits among 
the Lacedaemonian and 
Carthaginian magistrates, 72> & 
19, 75 b 8 (cp. 98* 7) ; election of 
magistrates by merit charac- 
teristic of aristocracy, 73* 18, 
26, 99 b 24;— for wealth, of 
oligarchy, 66 a 12, 73 a 25, 99 b 
25 ; choice by lot, of demo- 
cracy, 66 a 8, 74 a 5, i7 b 2o, 
i8 a 2; must be taken from 
those who carry arms, 68 a 2i, 
97 b l2; are very numerous in 
democracies, 73 b 12 ; ought to 
be only the guardians and 
interpreters of the law, 82 b 3, 
87 a 25, b 15-31, 92 a 32 ; cha- 
racter and powers of the 
magistrates in aristocracies, 
98 b 5, o a 4, 23 a 3 ; in constitu- 
tional governments, 98^ 5, 38; 
in democracies, a 14-33, 99 b 2c " 

-O a 5, I7 b I7-l8 a 10, 22 b I2, 

23 a 9; in oligarchies, 98 a 35- 
b 5,99 b 25-38, 23 a 8; the magis- 
trates peculiar toeach constitu- 
tion, 99 b 3o-o a 8, 22 b 12, 23* 
6 ; definition of the term 
'magistrate', 99*14-30; should 
he hold more than one office ? 
73 b 8, 99 :l 34— b 20, 2i b 8 ; the 
various modes of appointment, 
° a 9~ b S> 2 ° b ll ! popular elec- 
tion dangerous, 5 a 29, b 29 ; the 
magistrates should not be 
allowed to make money, 2 b 5, 
8 b 3i, 21*31 (cp. i6 a 39); 
undue power acquired by them 
a cause of revolution, 2 b I5, 
4 ft 17-38; greal authority of 
the ancient magistrates, 5" 15, 
Io b 20, i8 a 1 ; the magistrates 
may prevent revolutions by 
prudence, 8 a 27 ; manner in 
which they should act in 
oligarchies, 20 b 7-l6, 21*26- 
b 1 ; enumeration of the dif- 
ferent magistrates required by 
states, 2l b 4-23 a 10; the magis- 
trates must know the cha- 
racters of their fellow-citizens, 
26 b i4; must suppress ob- 
scenity, 36'' 14 : — Magistrates, 
certain, required by law to 

take their meals together, 1 7 b 

38, 3i a 25- 
Accountants,22 b n; Archon 

(the single, at Epidamnus and 
Opus), 87* 7, l b 25 ; Archons, 
22 b 29 ; Auditors, b 1 1 ; Con- 
trollers, ib. ; Corn Measurers, 
99 a 23 ; Councillors, b y], 22 b 
17, 23*9; (at Thurii), 7 b 14 ■; 
Uemiurgi (at Larissa), 75 1 ' 29; 
Directors of Education, 36* 32, 
40 ; of Gymnastics, 23 a i ; 
Eleven, the (at Athens), 22 a 
20; Fountains, .officers in 
charge of, 2i b 26; Guardians 
of Children, 99 b 19, o a 4, 22 b 
39; of the Citizens (at Larissa), 
5 b 29 ; of the Laws, 98 b 29, 22 b 

39, 23*8; of Shrines, 22 b 25 ; 
of Women, 99 a 22, o a 4, 22 b 
39; Harbour Masters, 2 l b 26, 
22 b 33 ; Inspectors of Forests, 
2 i b 3°) 3i b 15 *» Magis- 
tracy of the 104 at Carthage, 
72 b 34; ofthe5,73 a i3; of the 
100, a 14; Prytanis (at Mile- 
tus), 5*17; Prytanes, 22 b 29; 
Phylarchs (at Epidamnus), 
l b 22 ; Presidents, 2l b 39, 31° 
6; Receivers, 2i b 33; Re- 
corders, b 39, 3i b 6; Revenue 
Officers, o b 9; Sacred Recor- 
ders, 2 i b 39, 3 i b 6; Scrutineers, 
22 b il; Superintendents of 
Dionysiac Contests, 23 a 2 ; of 
Gymnastic Exercises, a 1 ; of 
Sacrifices, 22 b 24; of the Walls, 
2i b 26; Treasurers, b 33;— -of 
Sacred Revenues, 22 b 25 ; 
Wardens of the Agora, 99 b 1 7, 
o b u, 22 a i4, b 33, 3i b 9; of 
the City, 2i b 23, 22*13, b 33, 
3i b 10; of the Country, 2i b 30, 
22 b 33, 3i b l5- 

Magnesia (on the Maeander), 
possessed a great force of 
cavalry in ancient times, 89 b 

Magnesians, the, constantly at 

war with the Thessalians, 69 b 

Majority, the (in a state), diffi- 
culties about the power which 
should be possessed by, 8i a 1 1 
-82 b i3, 83 a 4o- b i3, 18 11 11 - b 5. 

Male and female, reason for 
the union of, 52* 28 ; the rela- 


tion of, part of the household, 

53 |J 5. 59" 37- 
Male, the, intended by nature to 

rule over the female, 54 1 ' 1 3, 

59 a 39- 

Malians, the, chose their magis- 
trates from those actually on 
military service, 97° 14. 

Man a political animal, 53 a 2, 
25-33, 78 b 19 ; has a natural 
wish for posterity, 52 a 28 ; 
alone has the faculty of speech, 
53 a 9 ;— the sense of good and 
evil, a 15 ; — the power of 
reason, 32 b 4; the worst of 
animals when not controlled 
by law and justice, 53 a 31 ; 
must allow reason to direct 
nature and habit, 32 a 38-° 1 1 ; 
should give the soul rule over 
the body, 54 a 3i- b 16 ; the 
plants and animals created for 
his sake, 56 a 20 : — Man, the 
virtue of the, different from 
that of the woman, 59 b 28, 6o a 
20-31, 77 b 20 : — Men are 
unlimited in their desires, 58 11 
1-14, 66 b 2o, 67 a 4i; arewicked 
by nature, 63 b 22 ; are more 
desirous of gain than of honour, 
97 b 6, 8 b 34, i8 b l6; are satis- 
fied with a moderate amount 
of virtue, 23 a 36 : — Men, the 
first, were ordinary, foolish 
people, 6c/ a 4. 

Mantinea, battle of, 4 a 26 ; 
government by representation 
at, i8 b 25. 

Marines, the, generally freemen 
in Hellenic cities, 27 b 9. 

Marriage, regulations respecting, 
34 b 29-36* 2 ; — the marriage 
relation 52 a 27, 53 1 ' 6, 59 a 37- 
b i7, 77^7. 

Marriages, quarrels about, often 
a cause of revolutions, 3 b 37~ 
4» 17,6*31. 

Massalia, revolution at, 5 b 4; 
persons of merit sometimes 
taken into the government, 

Master, the, in relation to the 
slave, S2 a 30- b i5, 53 b 4-23, 
59 a 37, 6o a 9, 33- b 7; has a 
common interest with the 
slave, 55 b 9, 7S b 3 2 > 33" 3 ; 
ought to train the slave in 

virtue, 6o b 3 ; — the science 
peculiar to, 53 b i8, 5 5 '' 20-39, 
6o b 4;— the rule of, 53 b 18, 
77 a 33, 33 a 3 ; wronglysupposed 
[by Plato] not to be different 
frompoliticalrule, 52 a 7, 53 b 18. 

Mean, importance of the, in 
stales, 95 a 25~96 b i2, 9 b i8; 
in education, 4i a 9, 42 b 34. 

Means, the, of the arts, not un- 
limited, 56 b 35, 57 b 27. 

Mechanic, the : see Artisan. 

Medes, the, 84 15 1 ; the Median 
kings not taught music, 39 a 35- 

Medicine, the art of, has no 
limit of its end, 57 b 25 ; aims 
at health, not money-making, 
58 a 10; its relation to house- 
hold management, a 27 ; has, 
like other - arts, undergone im- 
provement, 68 b 34. [See Phy- 

Megaclts, the leader of the 
attack on the Penthilidae at 
Mytilene, u b 27. 

Megara, 8o b 14 ; the government 
of, once confined to persons 
who had fought against the 
democracy, o a 1 7 ; the oligar- 
chical revolution, 2 b 3l, 4 b 35 ; 
rise of Theagenes to the 
tyranny, 5 a 24. 

Mercenaries, admitted to citizen- 
ship at Syracuse (B.C. 466), 
3 a 38 ; the tyrant's guard com- 
posed of, 8s a 26, 11*7. 

Merchant seamen, number of, 
at Aegina and Chios, 9i b 24 ; 
at Heraclea in Pontus, 27 b 14. 

Messenians, the, enmity of, to 
the Lacedaemonians, 69 1 ' 4, 
70 a 3. 

Messenian War, the (Second), 
6 b 38. 

Method, the, of investigation [<» 
i>(f)r]yr]iJ.evos rponos] pursued by 
Aristotle, 52 a 17, 5o a 2. 

Metics : see Aliens. 

Midas, the fable of, 57 b 16. 

Middle class, virtues of the, 95 a 
25-97*13; the middle class 
state the best, 95 b 25-96 a 2i, 
96 b 34, 8 b 30 ; smallness of the 
middle class in ancient states, 
97 b 26. 

Might and right, 55 1 1 3, 18 1 ' I, 

24 b 28. 


M iletus, the oil presses in, bought 
up by Thales, 59 a 13 ; great 
powers of the ancient magis- 
trates at, 5 a 17- 

Milk, given by nature as the 
food of young animals, 56 b 14, 
58* 36 ; the best food for 
children, 36 a 7. 

Mind, the, grows old as well as 
the body, 70 b 40 ; must not be 
educated at the same time as 
the body, 39* 7. 

Mining, an intermediate species 
of wealth-getting, 58 b 27. 

Minos, the Cretan law-giver, 
7l b 31 ; his laws retained by 
the Perioeci, ib. ; introduced 
the common tables into Crete, 
29 b 5, 22 ; his death at Cam- 
icus, 7i b 39- 

Mithridates (? Satrap of Pontus), 
conspiracy of, against Ariobar- 
zanes, I2 a 16. 

Mixo-Lydian Mode, the : see 

Mnaseas, a Phocian, 4 a 1 1. 

Mnason, a Phocian, 4*11. 

Moderation in eating, encour- 
aged at the Cretan common 
tables, 72 a 22 ; — in politics, 
necessary for the salvation of 
the state, 96 a 22- b 2, 9 b i8, 

20 a 2. 

Modes, the, sometimes divided 
into two principal forms, the 
Dorian and the Phrygian, 
90 a 20 ; their different effects 
and the use to be made of 
them in education, 40 a 4o- b i9, 
4i b i9-42 b 34. 

Mode in music, 54 a 33» 76 1 ' 8. 

Mode, the Dorian, 7° b 9> 9° a 23 ? 
produces a moderate and 
settled temper, 40 b 4, 42 a 29- 
b l7 : — the Lydian ; rejected 
by Plato in the Republic, 
a 32, b 23 ; suitable to children, 
b 32 : — the Mixo-Lydian ; has 
a sad and grave effect, 4o b 1 ; 
—the Phrygian, 76 b 9, 90 s 22 ; 
inspires enthusiasm, 4o b 4, 
42 b 1 ; should not have been 
retained by Plato, a 32- b i7- . 

Molossians, the, in Epirus, origin 
of the royal power among, 
io b 4o; good government of 
the Molossian kings, I3 a 24. 

Monarchy, arguments for and 

against, 85 b 33-88 a 32. 
Monarchy : see King, Royalty, 

ami Tyranny. 
Money, origin of, 57 a 34 * its 

conventional nature, b 10 ; 

ought not to be made from 

money, 58 b 4. 
Money-making, tales about, 58 b 

39"59 a 33- 

Monopolies, a common method 
of gaining wealth, 59*5-33. 

Morals, have a connexion with 
figures and colours, 40 a 31. 

Mortar-makers, 75 b 28. 

Multitude, the, their claim to the 
supreme power, 8i a li; are 
better collectively than the in- 
dividual, a 39-82 b i3, 83 a 4o, 
85 b 33-86 b 4o; should have 
power only to elect and control 
the magistrates, 8i b 25-34. 

Murder, expiations for, impos- 
sible if women are common, 
62 a 3i ; absurd law about, at 
Cumae, 69 a 1 ; cases of, tried 
at Sparta by the elders, 75 b 10 

(cp. 7o b 39)- 

Musaeus, quoted, 39 b 2i. 

Music, subject to a ruling prin- 
ciple, 54 a 33 ; better judged of 
by the many than by the 
individual, 8l b 7 ; useful (1) 
in education, 37 b 23~38 b 8, 39 a 
il-4o b 19, 4i b 38 ; (2) for the 
intellectual employment of 
leisure, 37 b 23~38 b 8, 39 b 4-15. 
4i b 4o; (3) with a view to 
purgation, 4l b 38-42 a 18 ;' has 
an effect upon morals, 39 a 
4l, b 42-40 b 25, 4i a 4, b 32-42 a 
28 ; not taught at Lacedae- 
mon, 39 b 2 ; naturally pleasant 
to men, 39 b 4. 20, 4o b 16, 4^ a 
15 ; produces enthusiasm, 4o a 
10, b 4, 42 a 4 ; allays the pas- 
sions, 4i a 23, 42 a 4-16; a rattle 
for children of a larger growth, 
40 b 30 ; cannot be judged ex- 
cept by a performer, b 35 {but 
cp. 39 a 42); must not be pur- 
sued to the point of professional 
excellence, 4i a 9, b 8 ; includes 
a higher and a lower kind, a l4, 
42 a 18 ; is composed of melody 
and rhythm, 40 a 19, 4i a I, 
b i9. 


Music, writers upon, 4o b 5, 41'' 

27-36, 42*31, b 8, 23. 
Musical Modes: see Mode. 
Musical Instruments, which may 

be used in education, 40 b 20- 

4l b i8. 
Myron, tyrant at Sicyon, l6 a 

Mytilene, dictatorshipof Pittacus 

at « 85*35; origin of the war 

with Athens, 4 a 4; slaughter 

of the Penthilidae, ii b 26. 


Nation, opposed to state, 61 a 28, 
76*29, 8 4 a 38, 85" 30, io b 35, 
26 b 4. 

Nature, implants in man a desire 
of posterity, 52*28 ; makes a 
distinction between the ruler 
and the ruled, a 30, 54*14-55 

a 3, 55 b 3> 59 a 37- b i7, b 33 5- : 
between the female and the 
slave, 52* 34 ; her designs 
must be sought in things which 
are uncorrupted, 54 a 36; does 
nothing in a niggardly fashion, 
52 b 1 ; creates nothing in vain, 
53*9, 56 b 20, 63*41 ; gives to 
man the social instinct, 53*7- 
39, 78 b i7-3o ; not always able 
to accomplish her intentions, 
54 b 27, 55 b 3; supplies food 
for all, 5<5 b 7-22, 58 a 35 ; has 
given all freemen a right to 
rule, 6i* 39, 87*10-20; fits 
the young to obey, the old to 
command, 29*13; permits 
proper relaxation, 37 b 30 ; her- 
self suggests the proper har- 
monies for each age, 42 b 22.; — 
forms one element in virtue, 
32*38- b n, 34 b 6; must be 
supplemented by art and 
education, 37* I. 

Naval force, the, which should 
be possessed by the state, 27 a 

Naxos, tyranny of Lygdamis at, 


Necessaries, the, of life, the 
object of the natural art of 
acquisition, 53*23, 57 a 6~34- 

Necessity the mother of inven- 
tion, 29*27. 

Nobility, among Barbarians only 
partially recognized by Hel- 
lenes, 55 a 32 ; confers a claim 
to superiority in the state, 8l a 
6. 83*33- b 8, 93 b 37; may be 
defined (1) as excellence of 
race, 83*37, i b 3; (2) as 
ancient wealth and virtue, 94* 
21 ; confused by mankind with 
wealth, 93 b 39, 94 a i7, 6 b 24; 
like virtue, is not often found, 
2 a I. 

Nobles, quarrels among, a cause 
of revolutions, 2* 10, 3 b 19, 5 b 
22, 8*31; form a democracy 
among themselves,* 16; should 
be humane to the subject 
classes, 97 b 7, 20 a 32- b 17. 

Notium ; quarrel between the 
Notiansand theColophonians, 
3 b io. 

Number, the, of the citizens must 
be considered by the legislator, 
26* 5 (cp. 65*13). 

Number, the, of Plato, l6 a 1-17. 


Oath, the, of the ancient kings 
was the stretching out of the 
sceptre, 85 b 12. 

Oaths, sworn in oligarchies, 
10* 7. 

Obedience, the necessary pre- 
liminary to command, 7J ] > 8, 

29 a 14, 33 a 2. 

Obligations, sometimes disa- 
vowed after a revolution, 
76* 10. 

Obscenity, must be forbidden 
among the citizens, 36 b 3-19 ; 
permitted at the festival of 
certain Gods, b 16. 

Odysseus, 38*28. 

Oenophyta, battle of, 2 b 29. 

Oenotrians, the (in Southern 
Italy), antiquity of common 
meals among, 29'' 8-22. 

Office, the ' indefinite ', in which 
all the citizens share, 75* 26- 
b 2l, 76*4. 

Office, lust of mankind for, 79* 
13 ; oligarchical tricks to keep 
the poor from, 97* 14-34 ; 
justice of the various claims 
to, 81* n-84 b 34 :— Offices, 


the, of the state, posts of 
honour, 8l a 31 ; their distribu- 
tion, 99 a 3-o b i2, 2i b 4-23 a io; 
their organization determines 
the character of each constitu- 
tion, 89* 15, CjO a 7; in small 
states must be combined, in 
large ones specialized, 73 b l2, 
99 a 34~ b 7, 2i b 8 ; in democra- 
cies restricted to six months' 
tenure, 8 a 15 (cp. I7 b 24); 
and rarely held more than 
once by the same person, 75 11 
2 3, I 7 b 23 ; should be divided 
into two classes, 9 a 27, 20 11 

Offices, sale of, and pluralism, 
at Carthage, 73 a 35, b & 

Oligarchy, the government of 
the few for their private 
interests, 78 b i2, 79 b 24;— or, 
more correctly, of the wealthy, 
b 7, 34-8o a 6, 9o H 3o- b 20, 9i b 9, 
1 a 3 1 , 17° 38 ; Plato wrong in 
thinking that an oligarchy can 
ever be called 'good', 89 b 5 ; 
oligarchy the perversion of 
aristocracy, 79 b 5, 86 b 15, 89* 
29 ; how distinguished from it, 
73 a 2-37, 92 b 2, 93 a 35- b 2i, 
b 33-94 a 25, 98 a 34- b 11, 7 a 5 ; 
popularly supposed, like aristo- 
cracy, to be a 'government of 
the best ', 93 b 40; analogous to 
tyranny in love of wealth, 1 i a 
9 ; has more forms than one, 
89 a 8, 91 b I5-30, 96 b 33, 97 b 
28 ; the forms enumerated, 

92 a 39- b i°» 93 a 12-34, 98 a 35~ 
b 5, 20 b i8-2i a 4; oligarchy 
less stable than democracy, 
96*13, 2" 8, 7 a 13; the shortest 
lived of all forms of govern- 
ments, excepting tyranny, I5 b 
11 (cp. 20 b 3o) ; the extreme 
form apt to pass into tyranny, 
96" 3, io b 22, i6 a 34 ; the causes 
of revolutions in oligarchies, 
3 b 3, 5 a 37-6 b 2i, i6 b 6-27; 
the means of their preserva- 
tion, 6 a 9, 8 a 3-10" 36, 21*3- 
b I ;— the Lacedaemonians the 
champions of oligarchy in 
Hellas, 96*32, 7.23'»— the 
people to whom oligarchy is 
suited, 89M7, 96 b 3i ; the 
military strength of oligarchy 

derived from cavalry and 
heavy infantry, 89^6, 97 1 ' 16, 
2i a 8 ; — oligarchical modes of 
appointing magistrates and 
judges, 66 a 8-i9, 98 a 34- b 5, 
o a 38, i a 12 ; magistracies 
peculiar to oligarchy, 98 b 26, 
99 b 30, 22 b 12, 23 11 8 ; — luxury 
of the women in oligarchies, 
o a 7 ; bad education of the 
children, 95 b 16, io a 22:— the 
oligarchs sometimes forbidden 
to engage in trade, i6 b 3; their 
tricks to keep the power in 
their own hands, 94* 37, 97 a 
14-34, 98 b l6; they ought 
rather to give the people a 
share in the government, b 26, 
2o b u, 2i a 26; they should 
not take oaths against the 
people, lo a 7 ; they should not 
be allowed to make money by 
office, 2 b 5, 8 b 31, 2l a 31. 

Olympic Games, the, injurious 
effects of the excessive train- 
ing for, 39 a 1. 

Olympus, melodies of, 40 s * 9. 

Onomacritus, the Locrian, sup- 
posed by some to have been 
the first legislator, 74 a 25. 

Onomarchus, a Phocian, 4 a J 2. 

Opici, the, or Ausones, 29 b 19. 

Opinion, true, the virtue of the 
subject, 77 b 28. 

Opus (in Locris), governed by a 
single magistrate, 87*8. 

Oratory, cultivation of, in later 
Hellas, 5 a i2. 

Order, good, in the state, pro- 
duced by the law, 26 a 29. 

Order, in the succession to office, 
72 b 4o; regulated by law, 

Oreus : see Hestiaea. 

Orthagoras, tyranny of, at 
Sicyon, I5 b 13. 

Ostracism, how far justifiable, 
84 a 3- b 34, 88*25, 2 b i8, 8 b 

x 9- 

Oviparous animals, 56" 13. 

Oxylus,king of Elis, law respect- 
ing mortgages attributed to, 
I9 a 12. 

Paches, capture of Mytilene by, 


Painters, combine their works 
from scattered elements, 
8i b l2; like other artists, 
observe a rule of proportion, 
S4 b 8; those who, like 
Polygnotus, express moral 
ideas, to be preferre 1, 40* 


Paintings, obscene, not to be al- 
lowed, 36 b 14. 

Panaetius, tyrant of Leontini, 
io b 29, 1 6 U 3 7. 

Parent, the, relation of, to the 
child, j2 a 2S, 53 b 7, 59 a 37~ b 17 \ 
provides food for the offspring, 

56 b io, 58*35- 
Partheniae, the (at Lacedae- 

mon), conspiracy of, 6 b 29. 
Passion, intended by nature to 

be controlled by reason, 54 b 5 ; 

present in the human soul 

from the first, 86 a 19, 33, 



I2 b 27, 

blinds men to 
_/, I5 a 2 9 ; the 

multitude freer from passion 

than the individual, 86 a 33. 
Patrimony, laws forbidding the 

sale of a, 66 b l8, 7o a 19 (cp. 

9 a 23). 
Patron, metics required to have 

a, 75M1. 
Pausanias, the assassin of Philip 

of Macedon, u b 2. 
Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, 

incorrectly called king, i b 2o, 

33 b 34 ; his conspiracy, i b 20, 

7 ;l 4, 33 h 34- 

Pauson, paintings of, 40 il 36. 

Payment of the democracy ; 
introduced at Athens by 
Pericles, 74" 8 ; bad effects of 
the practice, 67 b 1, 93" 5, 
1 7 b 31 ; how they may be 
counteracted, 20 a i7. 

Peace, the true object of war, 
33 a 35» 34 a 2-l6; the dangers 
of, a 26. 

Pediaci, the (or 'men of the 
plain '), at Athens, attacked 
by l'eisistratus, 5*24. 

Peisistratus, gained his tyranny 
by attacking the Pediaci, 
5 a 23 ; began as a demagogue, 
io b 3o; tried before the 
Areopagus, 1 5 b 21; twice 
driven from Athens, b 3o; — 
Peisistratidae, the, conspiracy 

of Harmodius and Aristo- 

geiton against, 1 1* 36, 1 2 b 31 ; 

built the temple of Olympian 

Zeus, I3 b 23; length of their 

tyranny, 15" 29. 
Peloponnesus, 71 1 ' 36, 76" 27 ; 

— Peloponnesian War, the : 

see War, Peloponnesian. 
Penestae, the, difficulties of the 

Thessalians with, 64 a 35, 

69 a 37. 
Pentacosio-medimni, the, in 

Solon's constitution, 74* 19. 
Penthilidae, the, at Mytilene, 

slaughter of, il b 27. 
Penthilus (? tyrant of Mytilene), 

assassination of, by Smerdis 

II b 29. 

Periander, tyrant of Ambracia, 
expelled by the people, 4 a 32, 

n a 39- 
Periander, tyrant of Corinth, 

story of, and Thrasybuhis, 

84 a 26, 1 l a 20 ; the great 

master of tyrannic arts, 13 11 

^7; duration of his tyranny, 

I5 b 2 5 . 

Pericles, curtailed the power of 
the Areopagus, and introduced 
the system of paying the 
dicasts, 74 a S. 

Perioeci (in Argos), admitted to 
citizenship 3 a 8:— (in Crete), 
better managed than in 
Sparta, 69 b 3, 72 b 18 ; corre- 
spond to the Helots, 72M, 
b i8; retain the laws of 
Minos, 7l b 3o; tribute paid 
by them, 72"* 18: — advan- 
tageous to have perioeci of 
foreign race as cultivators, 
29 a 26, 3o a 29, and as sailors, 
27 b u. 

Perjury, first made criminal by 
Charondas, 74'' 5. 

Permanence ot the state, only 
secured by the loyalty of all 
classes, 7o b 2i, 94 b 38, 96'' 15, 
8 a 5, 9 b 16, 2o b 26. 

Perrhaebians, the, hostile to the 
Thessalians, 69'' 6. 

Persia ;- growth of the Persian 
empire, 84 s 41; deposition of 
Astyages by Cyrus, lo b 38, 
12*12; tyrannical character 
of the Persian government, 
I3 U 38, b 9 5 military power 


held in esteem among the 
Persians, 24 b II ; the Persian 
kings not taught music, 39 a 34. 

Persian War, the : see War, 

Perversions, the, of the true 
forms of government, 75 b 1 , 

79 a l7- D lo, 
b ii, 93 b 23 

87 b 40, 89*26- 
all governments 
perversions of the perfect 
state, b 25 (cp. 73 a 2). 

Phalaris, of Agrigentum, mode 
in which he acquired his 
tyranny, io b 28. 

Phaleas of Chalcedon, the first 
to propose the equalization of 
property, 66 a 39, 74 15 9 ; criti- 
cisms of his constitution, 
66 a 39-67 b 19. 

Pharsalus, prudent administra- 
tion of the oligarchical govern- 
ment at, 6 a 10 ; — the Phar- 
salian mare called ' Honest', 
62 a 24. 

Pheidon, tyrant of Argos, io b 

Pheidon, of Corinth, wished 
population to be regulated, 
65 b i2. 

Phiditia, 71*27, 72 s 3, b 34. 

of Macedonia, 
by Pausanias, 

for the 

! ; — story 


Philip, King 
Il b 2. 

Philolaus, legislated 
Thebans, 74 a 31, b 
of Philolaus and 
a 32. 

Philosopher, the, may be al- 
lowed to discuss practical 
questions, 58 b 10; has no 
difficulty in acquiring wealth, 
59M7; must go below the 
surface of things, 79 b 12 ; his 
life as distinguished from 
that of the statesman, 24 a 
29 :- philosophers, the, not 
agreed about slavery, S5 a H ; 
the opinions of natural philo- 
sophers about marriage, 
35 a 39 i philosophers who 
have treated of musical edu- 
cation, 4o b 5, 4i b 27-36, 42 a 31, 
K 8, 23. 

Philosophy, especially necessary 
in the prosperous, 34 a 22- 

Philoxenus, attempted to com- 

pose a dithyramb in the 
Dorian mode, 42 b 9. 

Phocis ; the commencement of 
the Sacred War, 4 a 10. 

Phocylides, quoted (fragm. 12, 
Bergk), 95 b 33. 

Phoxus, tyrant of Chalcis, 4 a 29. 

Phreatto, court of, at Athens, 
o b 29. 

Phrygian Mode, the : see Mode. 

Phrynichus, played the dema- 
gogue in the government of 
the Four Hundred at Athens, 
5 b 27. 

Phylarchs, magistrates at Epi- 
damnus, l b 22. 

Physician, the, must be judged 
by the physician, 8i b 38-82 a 7 ; 
is healed by the physician, 
87 a 4i ; is not expected to 
persuade or coerce his 
patients, 24 b 29 ; must know 
both the end and the means 
of his art, 3i b 34 ; precepts of 
the physicians about marriage, 
35 a 39 ; law about physicians 
in Egypt, 86 a l3- 

Pictures, indecent, to be for- 
bidden, 36 b i4. 

Pillory, used as a punishment, 

6 b 2. 

Piraeus, laid out by Hippodam- 
us, 67 b 23 ; the inhabitants of, 
more democratic than other 
Athenians, 3 b .n. 

Pittacus, laws of, against 
drunkenness, 74 b i8; elected 
Aesymnetein Mytilene,85 a 35. 

Planning of cities, invented by 
Hippodamus, 67 b 22, 30 b 23. 

Plants, created for the sake of 
the animals, 56M5; sex (?) 
ascribed to, 52 a 2g. 

Plato, criticisms of; — forms of 
government differ in kind 
{Pol. 258 E foil.), 52 a 7, 
53 b 18, 55 b 1 7 ; the virtue of 
men and women not the same 
(Meno, 71-72), 6o a 20-31; 
slaves not always to be 
harshly treated (Laws, vi. 
777)i b 5 > disadvantages of 
community of wives and 
children, 6i a 4-64 b 25; of 
common property, 62 b yj- 
64'' 25,29 b 4i, the unity of the 
state may be carried too far, 


6i»i3- b 38, 62 b 3, 63 b 2Q; 
men and women ought not 
to have the same pursuits 
{Rep. v. 451 D), 64° 4 ; danger 
from the rulers being always 
the same, b 6-15 ; happiness 
should not be confined to one 
class {Rep. iv. 419), b 15 ; 
Plato has neglected the 
foreign relations of his state, 
65 s 20 ; amount of property 
allowed by him {Laws, v. 737 
D) insufficient, a 28 ; he should 
have limited population as 
well as property, a 38- b i6, 
66 b 5 ; he has not said how 
the rulers and subjects are 
related, 65 b 18 ; why should 
not property in land be in- 
creased to a certain extent ? 
b 2l ; difficulty of living in 
two houses {Laws, v. 745), 
b 24 ; the best state not made 
up of tyranny and democracy, 
66 a I ; the state of the Laws 
really a mixture of oligarchy 
and democracy, a 5-30 ; 
Plato's distinctions between 
good and bad constitutions 
(Pol. 302 E, 303 a), 89 b 5; 
his account of the classes 
necessary to a state {Rep. ii. 
369), 9i a 10-33 ; has not 
recognized the ' Polity ' in his 
enumeration of constitutions, 
93 b 1 ; his theory of revo- 
lutions {Rep. viii. 546), l6 a i 
- b 27 ; his error in saying 
that the guardians should be 
fierce to those whom they do 
not know {Rep. ii. 375),27 b 3S 
-28 a 16 : — that a valiant city 
needs no walls (Laws, vi. 77S), 
30'' 32 : — that the crying of 
children should be checked 
{Laws, vii. 792), 36° 34 ; his 
inconsistency in retaining the 
Phrygian mode {Rep. iii.399), 
42 a 32- b 17 : — the merits of 
Plato's writings, 6s a 10 ; he 
departs from ordinary practice 
more than other legislators, 
66 a 32 ; peculiarities suggest- 
ed by him, 74 b 9: — justice of 
his censure of the Lacedae- 
monian constitution {Laws, i. 
625, 630J, 7 1 '' 1 : — how far 

right in wishing that his city 
should not be near the sea, 
27 a 11— 31 : — speech of Aristo- 
phanes in the Symposium 
quoted, 62 b 11 :— criticism of 
the Republic, 6i a 4-64'' 25 ; 
of the Laws, 64 b 2o-66 a 30. 

Plays, the, of children, should 
be imitations of the occupa- 
tions of later life, 36 11 32. 

Pleasure, always sought by 
mankind, 58 a 3, 67* 5 ; denied 
by Plato to his guardians, 
64'' 15 ; is regarded differently 
by different persons, 38 a 7 ; 
the pleasure of living, 78 b 
29 ; relation of pleasure to 
happiness, 23 b I ; the natural 
pleasure given by music, 
39 b 20, 40 a 2, 14, b 16, 4l a 
14 : — Pleasures, the, which 
are unaccompanied by pain. 
67 a 8. 

Pluralism, at Carthage, 73 b 7. 

Poetry, better judged by the 
many than the individual, 
8i b 7. 

Poets, the, divide life into 
periods of seven years, 35 b 32, 
36 b 40 ; never represent Zeus 
as singing or playing, 39 b 6, 
employ the Phrygian harmony 
for dithyrambic poetry, 42 b 7 ; 
their descriptions of the Isles 
of the Blest, 34*31. 

Polity : see Government, the 

Polycrates, buildings of, at 
Samos, I3 b 24. 

Polygnotus, the painter, 4o a 

Poor, the, everywhere abound, 
79 b 37 ; covet the goods of the 
rich, 95 b 3o; their degraded 
state in Hellenic cities, b 5-25 : 
willing to fight if they are 
supported by the state, 97 b 1 1 ; 
equal to the rich in ideal 
democracies, l8 a 6; the 
surplus revenue distributed 
among them in the extreme 
democracy, 20 a 29 ; may cause 
a revolution if their num- 
bers increase, 2 b 33~3 a lo; 
begrudge the extravagance of 
courts, i4 a 4o; should be 
humanely treated, 67!' 8, 97 b 6; 


should be helped by the rich, 
2o a 32- > ' 16. 

Population, decline of, at Sparta, 
7o !l 29; importance of regu- 
lating, 6s a 38-''i6, 66 h 8, jo a 
29-'' 6, 35 b 2i; changes of 
government brought about by 
the natural increase of popu- 
lation in Hellas, 86 b 2o, 93 a I, 
97 b 22, 20 a 17, cf. 2i a i; a 
limit of population necessary 
to good government, 65M3, 
38, 66 b 8, 70^4, 26 a 5- b 7, 
,( 20, 27 a 15, 35 b 2i. 

Possession, a, may be called an 
instrument for maintaining 
life, 53 b 31 ; is an instrument 
of action, 54 a 2. 

Poverty, not the cause of the 
worst crimes, 66 b 38 ; always 
antagonistic to riches, 9l b 9; 
the parent of revolution and 
crime, 65 b 12 (but cp. i6 b 
14) ; one of the essential 
characteristics of democracy, 

Pre-eminency in virtue; the pre- 
eminently good man or family 
should be supreme, 83 b 2i, 
84 a 3- b 34, 88 a 15-29, i a 39 , 
25 b 10. 

Preservation, the general causes 
of, in states, 7 b 26-io a 38 ; the 
causes which affect monarch- 
ies, I3 a 18-33 ! tyrannies, a 34 
-l5 b io; democracies, I9 b 33 
-2o b 17, 2i a 1 ; oligarchies, a 3 
- b i. 

Presidents ; name given to 
certain magistrates, 2i b 39, 
3i b 6. 

Priests, are not political officers, 
99 a 17 ; necessary to the state, 
28 b u, 22; should be taken 
from the aged citizens who 
are past state service, 29 a 27 ; 
their duties, 22 b 18-29 ; re- 
quired to take their meals at 
common tables, 3i b 5. 

Prior and posterior ; the state 
prior to the family or the indi- 
vidual, 53 a 18; the whole prior, 
to the part, a 2o; true forms 
of government prior to per- 
versions, 75 b 1 ; the body 
prior in order of generation to 
the soul, 34 b ;o ; the irrational 

element prior to the rational, 
b 21. 

Prisoners of war, usually made 
slaves, 55 a 6, 23. 

Probuli, or senators, the head of 
the state in oligarchies, 98'' 29, 
99 b 31-38, 22 b 16, 23*7. 

Production, instruments of, 54 a 1. 

Property, a part of the house- 
hold, 53 b 23, 56 a 3; a con- 
dition but not a part of the 
state, 28 a 34 ; in the sense of 
food, provided by nature for 
all, 56 b 7,58 a 34 ;— the pleasure 
of property, 63 a 40 ; — Plato's 
limit of property unsatis- 
factory, 65 a 29; the limit 
should be such as to enable a 
man to live both temperately 
and liberally, a 32, 26'' 30 ;— 
inequality of property at 
Sparta, 7o a i5- b 6, 6 b 36, 
7 a 35, i6 b 8; — a great cause 
of revolutions, 66 a 37- b 2i. 

Property, community of; criti- 
cism of Plato's scheme, 62 b 
37-64 b 25 (see Plato); com- 
mon property opposed to 
human nature, 63 11 15, 64 a 1 ; 
exists in a modified degree 
among friends, 63" 29-37, 
30* 1 ; found to some extent 
at Sparta and Tarentum, 63** 
35, 20 b 9 ; would destroy the 
virtues of temperance and 
liberality, 63 b 5-14 ; would 
not produce the marvellous re- 
sults which Plato expects, 
b i5; — equalization of, pro- 
posed by Phaleas, 66 a 39-67'' 
x 9> 74 b 9> would not remedy 
the deeper evils of human 
nature, 66 b 28-67 a 17, 67 11 39. 

Property qualification, required 
in the holders of various offices, 
82 a 29, 9i b 39, 92 a 39, b 29, 93 s1 
14, i8 b 3o; ought not to be 
excessive, 97 b 2 ; in oligarchies 
should be fixed according 
to two standards, 20 b 22 ; 
changes in, a cause of revolu- 
tions, 3 a 12, 23, 6 b 6-i6, 7*27; 
the evil may be remedied by 
periodical revisions of the 
census, 8 a 35— 1| 6. 
Property taxes, in democracies, 
20 a 20, 


Proportion, importance of, 84'' 7, 
9°'' '3-97 a 13. i b 29-2 a 8, 2 b 33, 
7 :l 26' 8 b 10, 9 b 2I, 26*35. 

Prosperity o ten dangerous to 
men, 8 b 14, I2 b 2I, 34 a 2S. 

l'roverbs: 'Slave before slave, 
master before master', 55'' 29; 
• Friends have all in common', 
63 a 30 ; 'Well begun, half 
done', 3* 29; 'Nail knocks 
out nail', 14*5; 'No leisure 
for slaves', 34 a 20. 

Proxenus; Dexanderproxenusof 
Athens at Mytilene, 4 a 10. 

Prytanis, the chief magistrate at 
Miletus in ancient times, 5 a 17 ; 
— Prytanes, officers appointed 
for the performance of the 
public sacrifices, 22 1 ' 29. 

Psammetichus, son of Gor- 
gus, tyrant at Corinth, I5 h 

Public Services [XeiTovpyim], the 
rich should be excused from 
useless, 9 a i8, 2o b 4 (but cp. 

2I a 3l). 

Public works, erection of, a part 

of tyrannical policy, I3 b 2i ; 

should be undertaken by the 

notables in oligarchies, 2 i a 36 ; 

the labourers upon, sometimes 

public slaves, 67'' 16. 
Punishments, judicial, necessity 

of, 22*5, 32* 12. 
Purgation, produced by music, 

4i b 38-42 a i<;. 
Pyramids, the, of Egypt, I3 b 2I. 
Pytho, of Aenos, one of the 

murderers of Cotys, I I b 2C 


Quality and quantity in the 
state, 79 b u-8o a 6, 96'' 17-34, 

l b 29-2 a 8. 

Quarrels, often happen among 
fellow-travellers, 63 a i7;would 
be less frequent, if property 
were equalized, 67 11 37 ; when 
they occur among the nobles, 
a cauae of revolution, 3'' 19-37, 
8 a 31 ; quarrels about mar- 
riages .mother cause, 3 b 37-4* 
1 7 ; the constant quarrels 
between the demagogues and 
the rich, a great injury to the 
state, io rt 4 ; quarrels between 

the kings of Sparta encouraged 
by state policy, 71° 25. 


Rational principle, an element 
of virtue, 32 a 38- b i 1, 34'* 6 ; is 
the master artificer, 6o a 18 ; 
divided into two kinds, the 
speculative and the practical, 
33 a 24 ; is the end towards 
which nature strives, 34'' 14; 
intended by nature to control 
the passionate or irrational 
element in the soul, 54 b 5, 6o a 
4. 33 a 18, 34 b 14 ; is not found 
in the animals, 32'' 3 ; exists 
in slaves to a limited extent, 
54 b 22, 59 b 28; is not readily 
obeyed by those who have 
great advantages over others, 
95 b 5 ; may be overcome by 
passion, I2 b 28, I5 a 29; may 
be mistaken, 34 b 10. 

Rattle, the, of Archytas, 40 b 26. 

Reading, one of the customary 
branches of education, 37'' 23, 

Receivers, name given to certain 
revenue officers, 2i b 33. 

Recorders, 2i b 39. 

Reformation, the, of an old con- 
stitution, as difficult as the 
creation of a new one, 89 a 3. 

Registrars, 2l b 34. 

Registration of citizens, a pre- 
liminary to sitting in the as- 
sembly or the law-courts,97 a 24. 

Relations, the, of male and 
female, master and slave, 
parent and child, which com- 
pose the family and the state, 
52 a 24- b i5, 53 b 1-12, 59 a 37- 
'•17, 6o b 8. 

Relaxation, necessity of, 37 b 38, 
39 a i6, ''15; music a relaxa- 
tion worthy of freemen, 3S* 

Religion, matters of, used to be 
entrusted to the kings, 85*6 
(cp. 22 b 29 ; the tyrant should 
have a care of religion, I4 b 38 ; 
the expense of public worship 
should be borne by the state, 
30 11 8 :— the officers of religion, 

22 b l8-3t, 28 b 22, 29 a 27. 

Religious worship, one of the 
conditions of the state, 28'* 1 1. 


Representation, principle of, 
once existed in the govern- 
ment of Mantinea, i8 b 23. 

Republic, the, of Plato : see 

Residence in one spot does not 
make a citizen, 75 a 7 ; — or 
constitute a city, y6 a 19, 8o b 
13-35 (but cp. 6o b 40). 

Rest : see Leisure. 

Retail trade, not a natural mode 
of money-making, 57* 17, b io. ; 
arises out of the barter of 
necessary articles, a 4i- b 23. 

Revenue, officers of, 2i b 3i. 

Revenue, a certain amount of, 
one of the conditions of the 
state, 28 b 10:— Revenues, the, 
of the state should be publicly 
announced, 9 a 10 ; at Sparta, 
badly administered, 71'' 10. 

Revolutions, their objects, i a 19- 
2 a i5; their causes, 66 a 38, b 1 3, 
38, 2 a 1 6-4 b 1 8, 1 i a 22, 1 6 ,v 39- 
b 27; their occasions, 3 b 17— 
4 b 18, 7 a 4o; the preventives of 
them, 73 b 18, 7 a 16, b 26-io a 
38, I3 a i8-i5 b io, I9 b 6-2i a 4; 
revolutions, in democracies, 4 b 
I 9 _ 5 a 36 ; — in oligarchies, 5 a 
37-6 b 2l; — in constitutional 
governments, 6 b 1 1, 7 a 5 ; — in 
aristocracies, 6 b 22-7 b 25 ;— in 
monarchies, io a 39-i3 a 17 ; — 
in tyrannies, lo a 39~i5 b io; 
Plato's theory of revolutions, 
criticized, i6 a 1- b 27 ;— ques- 
tions raised after revolutions : 
citizens de iure and de facto, 
75 b 34-76 a 6; should old debts 
be paid ? ?6 a 10 ; — democratic 
measures taken byCleisthenes 
and others after a revolution, 
75 b 34~76 a 6, I9 b i9; revolutions 
may happen without an im- 
mediate change in the con- 
stitution, 92 b 11, i b 10. 

Revolutions at Abydos, 5 b 33, 6 a 
31 ; Aegina, a 4; Ambracia, 3 a 
23, 4 a 3i, n a 4o; Amphipolis, 
3 b 2, 6 a 2 ; Antissa, 3 a 34; 
Apollonia, a 36, 6 a 9; Argos, ! 
3 a 6; Athens, 4 b i2, 5 a 23, b 25; 
Byzantium, 3 a 33; Carthage, ; 
7 a 5, i6 a 34; Chalcis, 4 a 29, j 
1 6 a 3 1 ; Chios, 6 b 5 ; Clazo- j 
menae, 3 b 9; Cnidus, 5 b i2, j 

6 b 5 ; Colophon, 3 b 10 ; Corinth , 
6 a 23; Cos, 4 b 25; Cyme, 5 a i ; 
Cyrene,i9 b 18 ; Delphi, 3'' 37; 
Elis, 6 a i6; Epidamnus, i b 
2i,4 a i3; Eretria,6 a 35; Ery- 
thrae, 5 b 18 ; Heraea, 3M5 ; 
Heraclea, 4 b 3i, 5 b 5, 36, 6 a 
37; Hestiaea, 3 b 33 ; Istros, 
5 b 5 ; Lacedaemon (see Lace- 
daemon) ; Larissa, b 29, 6 a 29 ; 
Leontini, l6 a 36 ; Locri,7 a 38; 
Massalia,5 b 4; Megara, o a i7, 
2b 3ij 4 b 35> 5 a 24; Miletus, 
a i7; Naxos, a 4l ; Oreus, 3 a 
18 ; Rhegium, i6 a 38 ; Rhodes, 
2 b 23, 32, 4 b 27 ; Sicyon, i6 a 
30 ; Sybaris, 3* 29 ; Syra- 
cuse, 2 b 32, 3 a 38, b 2o, 5 a 26, 
6 a 1, i6 a 33 ; Tarentum, 3 a 3 ; 
Thebes, 2 b 29, 6 a 38; Thurii, 
3 a 3i, 7 a 27, b 6. 

Rhegium, tyranny of Anaxilaus 
at, i6 a 38 ; Androdamas of, 
74 b 23. 

Rhodes, 7i b 37 ; oligarchical re- 
volution at, 2 b 23, 32, 4 b 27. 

Rhythm, supplies imitations of 
the virtues and vices, 40 a i8; 
one of the elements of music, 
ib., 4i a i, b i9- 

Rich, the, one of the elements of 
the state, 9i a 33 ; everywhere 
few compared to the poor, 79 b 
2,7 ; often hindered by the 
cares of property from attend- 
ing to public business, 93° 7 
(but cp. 55 b 35); possess the 
external advantages of which 
the want occasions crime, 93 b 
38 (cp. 66 b 38); have too 
much power in so-called 
aiistocratical governments, 
97 a 9> 7 ai 9» their encroach- 
ments more dangerous to the 
state than those of the poor, 
97 a 1 1 ; constantly in anta- 
gonism to the poor, 95 b 2l, 
io a 4 ; should be protected 
against the demagogues, 9 a 
14, 20 a 6; should be relieved 
from useless state expenses, 9 11 
1 8, 20 b 4; should be generous to 
the poor, 97 b 7, 20 a 35 ; should 
be public-spirited and muni- 
ficent, 2i a 35 ; are often spoilt 
by indulgence in childhood, 
95 b 16, io a 22; can alone afford 


the expense of keeping horses, 

89 b 35- 
Riches and poverty, the opposing 
elements of the state, i b 39, 8 b 
28; riches more desired by men 
than honour, 97 b 6, 8 b 34, i8 b 
16; Solon wrong in thinking 
that ' no bound has been fixed 
to riches', 56 b 32. [See Wealth.] 
Riding, taught to the children of 

kings, 77 a l8. 
Roll of citizens, the, at Athens, 3 a 9. 
Royalty, the form of govern- 
ment in which one rules for 
the best, 79 a 33, lo b io; 
analogous to aristocracy, b 2, 
32 ; opposed to tyranny, 79 b 5, 
89 a 39, lo b 2 ; is it better than 
the rule of the law? 85 b 33- 
87 b 36; arose (1) from the 
government of families by the 
eldest, 52 b 19, 55 b 19, 59 b 10 ; 
(2) from services rendered by 
the first chiefs, 85" 6, 86 b io, 
Io b 9, 34; (3) from the weak- 
ness of the middle and lower 
classes, 97 b 25; once existed 
in Crete, 72 a 8; has various 
forms : (1) the Lacedaemon- 
ian (which is only a general- 
ship for life), 7i a 39, 85 s * 3, b 26, 
35-86 a 5, 87 s1 3 ; (2) the des- 
potic (among Barbarians), 85 ;l 
16, b 23, 95 a n ;. (3) the 
ancient Dictatorships, 85 a 3o, 
b 25, 95 a l2; (4) the mon- 
archies of the heroic age, 85 b 
3—23 ; (5) the absolute mon- 
archy, b 29, 87 a 8, 95 a 18,— the 
people to whom royalty is 
suited, 87 b 36-88 a 32 ; — causes 
of revolutions in monarchies, 
lo a 39-l3 a l7; means of 
their preservation, 13*18-33, 
royalty more often destroyed 
from within than from with- 
out, I2 b 38; true royalty un- 
known in later Hellas, 13"- 3, 
32 b 23. [See King.] 
Rule ; the various kinds of rule 
essentially different from each 
other, 52 a 7. 53 b i8, 54 b 2, 55" 
16, 59 a 37- b i7» 6o a 9, 78*30- 
40, 25 a 27, 33 a 3; the dis- 
tinction between the ruler 
and the ruled found through- 
out nature, 52 u 3o, 54 a 2i- b i6; 

the better the ruled, the better 
the rule, a 25, 15*4; the rule 
of freemen better than des- 
potic authority, 33 b 27; rule 
over others, not the highest 
object of the legislator, a 4i- 
34 a 10 ; rule must be learnt by 
obedience, 77 h 9, 29 a 13, 33 a 2. 

Ruler, the, ought to have moral 
virtue in perfection, 6o a 17 ; 
the virtue peculiar to him, 
77 b 25 ; must learn to govern 
by obedience, 77 b 9, 29 a i3, 
33 a 2 ; the rulers ought to re- 
main the same, 6i a 38, 32 b 22 ; 
dangers arising from this 
arrangement, 64*6-15, 32* 
23 ; the difficulty solved, if the 
elder rule, and the younger 
obey, 29 a 6, 32 b 35- 

Ruling class, a, not always 
humane, 97 b 9. 

Sacred recorders, 21 b 39, cf. 3 i b 6. 

Sailor, analogy of the, and the 
citizen, 76*20-35 ; number of 
sailors at Aegina, Athens, 
and Chios, 9l b 22; — at Hera- 
clea, 27 b 14. 

Salamis, victory of, 4 a 22. 

Sambuca, the, an ancient 
musical instrument, 4l b I. 

Samos, subjection of, by the 
Athenians, 84 a 39; buildings 
of Polycrates at, 13*24: — 
Samian colonists at Zancle, 

3 a 36. 

Sardanapalus, death of, I2 a l. 

Science, the, of the statesman, 
52 a 15, 58 a 22, 82 b 16, 88 b 22 ; 
—of the master, 53 b i8, 55* 
22, 31 ; — of the slave, *22- 
30; in all sciences the 
whole must be resolved into 
the parts; 52 a i8; every 
science capable of improve- 
ment, 68* 34 ; the philoso- 
phical student of science must 
not neglect any detail, 79" 12 ; 
all sciences aim at some good, 
82* 14 ;— the political science 
the highest of all sciences, *i 6 ; 
aims at the good of the state, 

>4 a ig ; the subjects which it 
includes, 88*2i-89 a 25. 



Scrutineers, 2 b n, 36. 

Scylax, quoted about the kings 
of India, 32 b 24. 

Scylletic Gulf, the, 2o, b 12. 

Scythians, the, 24 h 11-18. 

Sea, the, proximity of, good or 
evil? 27 a u- b i5. 

Sedition: see Revolutions. 

Self-sufficiency, the, of the state, 
the end and the best, 52 b 27, 
26 b 27, 28 b 16 ; would not be 
promoted by extreme unifica- 
tion, 6i b io. 

Selfishness, natural and un- 
natural, 63 a 4l. 

Senate : see Council of Elders. 

Senators : see Councillors. 

Senses : the objects of the, have 
not much resemblance to 
moral qualities, 40*28-38. 

Servant, the, a kind of instru- 
ment in the arts, 53 b 29 ; many 
servants often less efficient 
than a few, 6l b 36; the ser- 
vants who are employed in 
daily life, those with whom we 
most often disagree, 63* 19 ; 
children not to be left too 
much to servants, 36* 41. [See 

Sesostris, king of Egypt, first 
separated the people into 
castes, 29 b 4, 25. 

Seuthes, a Thracian, conspiracy 
of, against Amadocus, 12*14. 
Shepherds, lead the laziest life 
among men, 56*31; some- 
times combine brigandage 
with their other occupations, 
b 4 ; form the second best ma- 
terial of a democracy, i8 b n, 
19*19 ; excellent soldiers, a 22. 
Sicily, invadedbyMinos,7i b 39; 
the tyrannies in, mostly arose 
out of oligarchies, 16*35. 
Sicily, story of the man of, who 
bought up all the iron, 

59* 23. 
Sicyon, tyranny of Orthagoras 

and his descendants, 1 5 b 12, 

Siege machines, invention of, 

Sight, has a slight relation to 

moral qualities, 40*30. 
Simos, a party leader at Larissa, 


Simplicity of life at Sparta, 65 b 

40, 94 b 21-29. 
Siritis," a district of Southern 

Italy, 29*21. 
Sirrhas, war of, against Arche- 

laus, n b 12. 
Situation, the, suitable for the 

state, 26 b 26-27* 10, 

34- b 2i. 


Slave, the, does he exist by 
nature ? 54* i3-55 b 15 ; differ- 
ent from the female (except 
among barbarians). 52*34- 
b 9 ; how related to his master, 
* 3 o~ b io, 53 b 4, 54 a 8, 25^5 ; 
not always distinguished by 
nature from the freeman, 54 b 
32, 55 b 3; the relation between 
slave and master, when 
natural, does not exclude kind- 
ness, b l2 ; slave and master 
have a common interest, 52* 
34, 78 b 33 ; the slave must not 
be addressed in the language 
of command only [against 
Plato, Laws, vi. 777],. 6o b 5; 
place of the slave in the 
management of the family, 

53 b 23-54* 17, 54 b 25, 56* 2 5 
the slave an instrument taking 
precedence of other instru- 
ments, 53 b 32 ; liketheanimals, 
ministers to the needs of life, 
54 b 25 ; the science proper to 
him, 55 b 22-30; his share in 
virtue, 59 b 2i-6o b 7; — in 
reason, 54 b 22, 59 b 28 ; has 
not the deliberative faculty, 
60*12; is nearer to his master 
than the mechanic, *39 ; 
ought to be trained in virtue 
by him, b 3 ;— Slaves, how re- 
lated to artisans, *39, 67 b 15, 
77*37, 78*6 ; forbidden gym- 
nastic exercises in Crete,64*20 ; 
difficulty in managing them, 
64* 36, 69* 36- b i2, 30* 28 ; the 
different classes of slaves, 77* 
37 ; children of slaves only 
admitted to citizenship in 
extreme democracies, 78*3 2 > 
I9 b 6; slaves cannot form a 
state, 80*32; cannot be self- 
sufficient, 91*10; licence al- 
lowed to them in democracies 
and tyrannies, I3 b 35, i9 b 28 ; 
sometimes emancipated by 


tyrants to serve as a guard, 
I5 a 37 ; should be encouraged 
by the hope of freedom, 30*32; 
their company dangerous for 
children, 36 ll 4i. 

Slavery, is it according to 
nature? 54* 17— 55^ 15. 

Slavery ; — men should not think 
it slavery to live according to 
the constitution, io a 34. 

Slaves, the art of acquiring, a 
species of hunting or war, 55 b 

37, 33 b 38. 

Slaves, a school for, once 
existed at Syracuse, 55 b 23. 

Small matters, must not be neg- 
lected by the statesman, 3 a 20, 

b i7, 7 a 4°, b 32-39- 

Smerdis, the murderer of 
Penthilus at Mytilene, u b 29. 

Society, political, the highest of 
all communities, 52*5 ; exists, 
not for mere companionship, 
but for the sake of noble 
actions, 8o b 29-8i a 4; man 
designed by nature to take 
part in society, 52 b 30-53 a 39, 
78 b i9; benefit conferred on 
mankind by the establishment 
of society, 53 a 30; society can- 
not exist without judicial 
decisions and punishments, 
22*5, 32 a 12. 

Socrates, (6 SaKpdrrjs) 6i a 6, 
12, 16, b i9, 21, 62 b 6, 9, 63 b 
30, 64M2, 29, b 7, 24, 29, 37, 
65 a n, 9i a i2, i6 a 2, b 27, 42 a 

33 ; (SaKpdrrjs) 6o a 22, 42 b 23. 
Soldiers, according to Plato, 
should be taught to use both 
hands alike, 74 b l2; shep- 
herds make excellent soldiers, 
I9 a 22 ; relation of the differ- 
ent kinds of soldiers to the dif- 
ferent constitutions, 2i a 5-26 ; 
the soldier must have a good 
knowledge of the military art, 
31* 14 ; soldiers as necessaiy 
to the state as artisans or 
husbandmen [against Plato, 
Rep. ii. 369], 9i a 6-33> 26*21, 
28° 7, 29* 37 ; the soldiers 
should be taken from the 
youth, the councillors from 
the old, a 2-39, 32 b 35 ; should 
form a separate caste, as in 
Egypt? 2 9 a 3 8_b 5 ! position of 

the soldiers in the constitution 
of Hippodamus, 67 b 32, 68 a 

i7- b 4- 
Soldiers, heavy-armed, citizen- 
ship in constitutional govern- 
ments confined to the, 65 b 28, 
79 b 2, 88 a i2, 97 b 22; growth 
of their importance in 
Hellenic states, b i6-28; taken 
from the roll of citizens at 
Athens, 3 a 9 ; form (with 
cavalry) the natural military 
force of an oligarchy, 2i a 12- 
19; generally worsted by the 
light-armed in popular in- 
surrections, a i9; — the prin- 
cipal magistrates elected from 
those who are serving, or who 
have served, 68 a 21, 97 b 12. 
Soldiers, light-armed, always at- 
tached to democracy, 2i a 13 ; 
generally master the heavy- 
armed in popular insurrec- 
tions, a i9; the younger 
citizens in oligarchies should 
be trained in the exercises of 
light infantry, a 24. 
Solon, quoted, 56 b 32 ; like most 
legislators, a citizen of the 
middle classes, 96*19; had 
a law to prohibit unlimited 
acquisition of property, 66 b 
17 ; opposite opinions about 
his constitution, 73 b 35-74 a 2i 
(cp. 8i b 32). 
Sophism, the, upon the twofold 
meaning of the word ' all ', 61 b 
27 ;— that 'if the parts are 
little the whole is little', 7 b 36. 
Sophocles, quoted {Ajax, 293), 

6o a 30. 
Soul, the, rules by nature over 
the body, 54 a 3i- b 9 ; posterior 
to the body in order of 
generation, 34 b 20 ; more 
truly a part of an animal than 
the body, 91*24 ; the beauty 
of the soul less easily seen 
than that of the body, 54 b 38 ; 
the interests of soul and body 
thesame, 55 b 9; the irrational 
element in the soul subject to 
the rational, 54 b 5,6o a 4, 33 a 
18, 34 b 14 ; the divisions of 
the soul, 54 b 5, 60*4, 77*6, 
33* 16, 34 b 17 ; the soul never 
wholly free from passion, 86* 

U 2 


19; said to be or to possess 
tuning, 4o b 18. 

Sparta : see Lacedaemon. 

Spectators, are of two kinds, 42 a 
18 ; the vulgar sort deteri- 
orate the character of the 
performers, 4i b 14. 

Speculation, life of, opposed to 
that of action, 24 a 5-25 b 30, 
33 a i6-34 a 10. 

Speech, why given to man, 53 s 

Spies, employment of, by the 
tyrant, I3 b u. 

Spits, made to hold a lamp, 
99 b 10. 

State, the, is the highest of com- 
munities, 52 a 5 ; is based upon 
the relations of husband and 
wife, father and child, master 
and slave, ruler and subject, 
a 24~53 a 39, 6o b 13 ; formed of 
a union of villages, 52 b 27; 
exists for the sake of a good 
life, b 29, 8o a 3i-8i a 4, 9i a i7, 
23M4, 28 a 35;— not for the 
sake of alliance and security, 
8o a 34-81° 4 ; is distinguished 
from an alliance because it 
has an ethical aim, 6i a 24, 
8o b 1 ; — from a nation, because 
it is made up of different 
elements, 6i a 22; is not neces- 
sarily formed by a number of 
persons residing together, 76 :i 
19, 8o b 13-35 {but 6o b 40) ; is 
a work of nature, 52 b 30-53 a 
4 ; prior to the family or the 
individual, 53 a 18 :— composed 
of dissimilar parts or elements, 
6i a 22, 77 a 5-20, 89 b 27, 9o b 
23, 96 b 1 7-34, I b 29-2 a 8, 2 b 
34, 28 a 2i- b 23; the parts not 
to be identified with the con- 
ditions of the state, a 2i ; the 
parts and conditions enume- 
rated, 89 b 28-90 a 5, 9o b 39-9i b 
13, 28 b 5 ; — compared to the 
parts of animals, 90 b 25-39 : — 
the state depends for it s identity 
mainly on the sameness of 
the constitution, 76 a 6- b i5 ; 
must be able to defend it- 
self, 65 a 22, 67 a 19-37, 72 b i5, 
83 a 19, 9i a 6, 26 a 22, 34 a i9; 
should be self-sufficing, 52 b 27, 
6l b 12, 26 b 3, 27, 28 b 16 ; should 

not exceed a certain size, 65* 13, 
76 a 24-34, 25 b 33-26 b 32 ;— 
has the same virtue, and there- 
fore the same life and end, as 
the individual, 23 a l4-25 b 32, 
3I b 24-34 b i8; may, like an 
individual, be wanting in self- 
discipline, io a i8; must have 
the virtues of leisure, 34 a 13 ; 
can lead a life of virtuous 
activity isolated from others, 
24 b 4i, 25 b 16-30; is not made 
happier by conquest, 24 a 5- 
25 b 3 2 > 33 a 4l-34 a io; rests 
upon justice, 53 a 37, 32 b 27; 
must have a care of virtue, 
8o b 5, 32 a 3i (cp. 93 b i2); 
must be happy, not in regard 
to a portion of the citizens, 
but to them all, 64 b i7, 29 11 
23 ; is united by friendship 
among the citizens, 63 s * 30, 8o b 
38, 95 b 24, i3 b 5 ; must pay 
great regard to education, 
6o b i5,66 b 30, io a i2, 37 a 11- 
32 : — must not be left to 
fortune, 73 b 2i, 32 a 3i ; is not 
the growth of a day, 3 a 26 ; 
is preserved by the principle 
of compensation, 6l a 30- b 9; 
is sometimes left at the mercy 
of the army by the violence of 
faction, 6 a 26 ; its permanence 
can only be secured by the 
toleration of all elements, 70 b 
2i,94 b 38, 96 b i5, 8 a 3, 9 b 16, 
20 b 26 ; any state, however ill 
constituted, may last a few 
days, I9 b 35 : — the various 
claims to authority in the 
state, 8o a 7~3i, 8l a 11-39, 82 b 
i4-84 b 34, 94 a i9» 18*11-28; 
what share in the state may 
be allowed to the ordinary 
citizen? 8i b 21-31, 97 a 38- b 8, 
i8 b 27 (cp.74 a i5). 
State, the ideal, of Aristotle, 
would require (1) a defensible 
position, 26 b 39; (2) a mo- 
derate naval force, 27 a 4o- b i5 ; 
(3) courageous and intelligent 
citizens, b i9-28 a i6; (4) the. 
exclusion of mechanics and 
tradesmen from citizenship, 
28 b 24-29 a 26; (5) slaves and 
Perioeci to till the soil, 29" 25, 
b 38, 3° a 25 ; (6) common 


meals, 29 b 5-35, 30 a 3 ; (7) 
subdivision of the land into 
two parts, public and private, 
a 9 ; (8) [for the city] a central 
situation, 27* 1 , 30* 34 ; — near, 
but not upon, the sea, 27 a 1 1- 
40; a healthy site, 30 a 38; 
a good water supply, b 4 ; 
proper fortifications and walls, 
"17, 32-31* 18 ; an arrange- 
ment of houses and streets 
which will combine the ad- 
vantages of beauty and 
security, 30'' 21 ; an acropolis, 
for the temples, and a ' free- 
men's agora', 3i a 24~ b i; 
government buildings and a 
traders' agora, b l-I3- 

State, the best [absolutely], the 
inquirer into, must examine 
the best ideal and actual forms 
of government, 6o b 27 ; differs 
from the so-called aristo- 
cracies because the citizens 
are absolutely good, 84 11 1, 
93 b 3 {but cp. 76° 37); pre- 
supposes the best life, 23 a 14- 
24 a 4; in comparison with it, 
all existing governments may 
be called perversions, 93 b 25. 

State, the best [under ordinary 
circumstances], 88 b 24, 96 b 10 
(cp. 65 b 29). 

State, the best [for mankind in 
general], 88 b 33, 95 a 2 5- 

Statesman, the, is properly con- 
cerned with the natural art of 
acquisition only, 56 b 37, 58 a 
19 ; ought also to be ac- 
quainted with the art of 
money-making, 59 a 33 ; must 
be able to recognize evils at 
their commencement, 3 l) 26, 
8 a 33 ; must not despise small 
things, 3 a 2o, b 17, 7 a 4<>, b 32 ; 
must he have virtue, or is skill 
alone sufficient ? 9 a 33~ b 14 ; 
must know the 'real effect of 
political measures, b 35; will 
use fear as a means to bind 
the state together, 8 a 27 ; will 
not suppose that the greatness 
of the state depends merely 
on size, 26 a 8; the life of the 
statesman contrasted with the 
life of the philosopher, 24° 29. 

Statesman, the, the rule of, dif- 

ferent from other kinds of 

rule, 52 a 7, 53 b 18, 55 b 16. 
Stentor (proverbial use of the 

name), 26 b 7. 
Strangers, prohibition of, at 

Lacedaemon, 72 b i7. 
Subject, the, distinguished by 

nature from the ruler, 54 a 23. 
Suits at law, distributed amom; 

different magistrates, or tried 

by all, accordingly as the 

government is aristocracy or 

oligarchy, 73*19, 75 b 8-17 ; 

divided by Hippodamus into 

three classes, 67 b yj. 
Superintendents of Gymnastic 

and Dionysiac contests, 23 a 1. 
Sybaris, foundation of, 3 a 29 ; 

— expulsion of the Sybarite 

colonists from Thurii, a 3I. 
Symposium, the, of Plato : see 

Syracuse, the man of, who taught 
household duties, 55 b 24; — 

advice given to the Syracusans 
when Dionysius requested a 

guard, 86 b 40 ; — revolution 
in ancient times at Syracuse 
arising out of a love-quarrel, 
3 b 20 ; anarchy of the state 
before the tyranny of Gelo, 
2 b 32 ; duration of the tyranny 
of Hiero and Gelo, I5 b 34; 
employment of spies by Hiero, 
I3 b 13 ; expulsion of the family 
of Gelo and consequent demo- 
cratical revolution, 3 a 38, I2 b 
10, I5 b 38, i6 a 32, disturbances 
arising from the admission of 
mercenaries to citizenship, 3 a 
38; tyrants put down in many 
Sicilian cities by the Syra- 
cusans, I2 b 8; increased 
strength of the democracy at 
Syracuse after the victory over 
the Athenians, 4 a 27 ; rise of 
Dionysius to the tyranny, 5 a 
26, 6 a I, lo b 3o ; his excessive 
taxation, I3 b 26; attack of 
Dion on Dionysius the 
Younger, I2 a 4, 34, b 10-17. 

Tactics, unknown in ancient 

times, 97 b 20. 
Tarentum, colonized from Lace- 


daemon, 6 b 31 ; numbers of 
fishermen there, gi b 23 ; 
defeat of the Tarentines by 
the Iapygiansand consequent 
democratical revolution, 3 a 3 ; 
kindly spirit shown by the 
government, 2o b 9. 

Taxation, 7i b 13, I4 b 14, 20 b 3; 
oppressive, a part of tyrannical 
policy, I3 b 26; levied by the 
demagogues, in order to ruin 
the rich, 20 a 20. 

Telecles, of Miletus, constitution 
proposed by, 98 a 13. 

Temperance, different in men 
and women, 6o a 2i, 77 b 23; 
would be destroyed by com- 
munism, 63 b 8; must be 
united with liberality, 65 s 32, 
26 b 30, as necessary for the 
state as the individual, 34 a 19. 

Temple officers, 22 a 19. 

Temples, the (of the city), should 
be built upon the Acropolis, 
3i a 24; their arrangement in 
the country, b 17. 

Tenedos, number of ferrymen at, 
9i b 25. 

Thales, of Miletus, story about 
the way in which he once 
made a fortune, 59 a 6-2i : — 
[the Cretan poet] erroneously 
supposed to have been the 
companion of Onomacritus, 
74 a 28. 

Theagenes, tyrant of Megara, 

Thebes ; overthrow of the demo- 
cracy after Oenophyta, 2 b 29 ; 
punishment of Archias and 
consequent revolution, 6 a 38 ; 
the Theban invasion of 
Laconia, 69 b 37 ; — the legisla- 
tion of Philolaus, 74 a 32 ; law 
at Thebes excluding persons 
from the government who had 
not left business ten years, 78 a 
25, 2I a 28. 

Theodectes, quoted, 55 u 36. 

Theodorus, the actor, saying 
attributed to, 36 b 28. 

Theopompus, king of Sparta, es- 
tablished the Ephoralty, 1 3 a 26. 

Thera, one of the Sporades, 
ancient government of, 90 b 11. 

Thessaly ; difficulties of the 
Thessalianswith the Penestae, 

64 s 35, 69*37 ; ancient wars 
of the Thessalians with their 
neighbours, b 5 ; the ' Free- 
men 's Agora ' in Thessalian 
towns, 3I a 32. 

Thetes, the (in Solon's constitu- 
tion), 74 a 21. 

Thibron, a panegyrist of the 
Lacedaemonian government, 
33 b i8. 

Thirty, the government of, at 
Athens, 5 b 25. 

Thracians, the, a warlike nation, 
24 b 11. 

Thrasippus, tablet dedicated by 
him at Athens when choragus 
to Ecphantides, 41*36. 

Thrasybulus (brother of Hiero), 
tyrant of Syracuse for eleven 
months, I2 b n, I5 b 38. 

Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, 
Periander's advice to, 84 s * 27, 

II a 20. 

Thrasymachus, a revolutionary 
leader at Cyme, 5 a 1. 

Thurii, story of the foundation 
of, 3 a 29 ; democratical revolu- 
tion at, 7 a 27 ; subsequent (?) 
oligarchical revolution, b 6. 

Timophanes of Corinth, an in- 
stance of a general becoming 
a tyrant, 6 a 23. 

Timophanes, of Mytilene, 4*7. 

Trade : see Commerce. 

Traders, the employments of, 
devoid of moral excellence, I9 a 
26, 28 b 40 ; ought to be ex- 
cluded from citizenship, b 39; 
admitted to office at Thebes 
after they had retired from busi- 
ness ten years, 78 s 25, 2i a 28. 

Travellers, apt to quarrel about 
every trifle, 63* 17. 

Treasurers, 2i b 33; — of sacred 
revenues, 22 b 25. 

Treaties, conferring citizenship, 
75 a 10 ; of commerce, 8o a 38. 

Tribes, new, formed, after a 
revolution, 75 b 36, I9 b 2i. 

Trierarchs, at Rhodes, 4 b 29. 

Triopium, promontory near 
Cnidus, 7l b 36. 

Tripods, the, of Hephaestus, 53 b 

Troezen ; the Troezenians joint- 
founders with the Achaeans 
of Sybaris, 3 a 29 ; ancient 


oracle once given to them, 

35 a 20. 

Tyrannical arts, generally attri- 
buted to Periander or to the 
Persian kings, I3 a 37, b 9- 

Tyrannicide., esteemed honour- 
able in Hellas, I2 a 22. 

Tyranny, the government of the 
monarch who rules for his 
own interests, 79 b 6, 16, 95 a 
17, li a 2 ; akin to democracy, 
92* 17,11" 8, I2 b 4, 37, I3 b 38; 
hardly to be called a consti- 
tution, 93 b 29, 9S a 3 ; the per- 
version of royalty, 79 b 5, 87^39, 
89 s1 39, 92 a 1 8, b 8, 95 a 1 8 ; does 
not rest upon natural justice 
or expediency, 87 b 39; has 
all the vices both of democracy 
and oligarchy, n a io, I2 b 4, 
37; is unendurable to freemen, 
95 a 22 ; may arise either from 
extreme oligarchy or demo- 
cracy, 96° 2, 8 a 2i ; in Sicily 
often arose out of oligarchy, 
16*34; was common in 
ancient times, owing to the 
great powers of the magis- 
trates, 5 a 15, io b 2o; always 
a short-lived government, I5 b 
1 1 ; rarelybecomes hereditary, 
I2 b 2l; causes of revolution 
in tyrannies, io a 39-13* 16; 
means of their preservation, 
i3 a i8-i5 b io; governments 
into which tyranny may 
change, 16*29. 

Tyrant, the, is the natural enemy 
of the freeman, 95*22, 14*5; 
cuts off his rivals, 84 a 26- b 3, 
1 1* 20, 13*40; rules over in- 
voluntary subjects as the king 
over voluntary, 85*27; aims 
at pleasure, the ki ng at honour, 
11*4; is guarded by mer- 
cenaries, 85* 24, 11*7; some- 
times obliged to emancipate 
the slaves, 15*37; is much 
under the influence of flatter- 
ers, 92*21, I3 b 39 ; destroys 
the spirit and confidence of 
his subjects, I3 b 1, 14*5, 15; 
sends spies among them, I3 b 
11; incites them to quarrel, 
b i6; oppresses them by war 
and taxation, b i8 ; distrusts 
his friends, b 30 ; gives licence 

to slaves and women, b 33, 19'' 
28 ; loves the bad, I4 a I ; 
prefers foreigners to citizens, 
a lo ; is capable of any wicked- 
ness, a i3 ; is full of self-indul- 
gence and sensuality, b 29; 
may also preserve his tyranny 
by playing the 'father of his 
country', a 3i-i5 b 10; must be 
on his guard against assassins, 
especially against those who 
think that they have been 
insulted, 15*27; must con- 
ciliate the poor or the rich, 
whichever is the stronger, a 3i. 

Tyrants, the, of Hellenic cities 
put down by the Lacedae- 
monians, i2 b 7; of Sicily, by 
the Syracusans, b 8. 

Tyrants, most of the ancient, 
originally demagogues, 5*7, 
Io b i4; sometimesgreat magis- 
trates, or kings, 5* 15, lo b 20. 

Tyrrhenians, the, treaties of, 
with the Carthaginians, 8o a 

Tyrtaeus, the Lunomia of, cited, 
6 b 39- 


Unity, how far desirable in the 
state, 6i a io- b i5, 63 b 29-64" 

Useful, the, exists for the sake 
of the honourable, 33* 36. 

User, the, often a better judge 
than the artist, 82* 18. 

Usury, the most unnatural mode 
of money-making, 58 b 7, 25. 

Utility, too much regarded by 
Hellenic legislators, 33 b 9; is 
mot the sole aim of education, 
37 b 5, 38*38; is not sought 
after by men of noble 
mind, b 2. 


Valour, necessity of, in the state, 
65*22, 67*20, 83*19, 34* 
20 (cp. 91*19-33,26*22). [See 

Venality; at Sparta, 70 b 10, 
7 1* 3 ; at Carthage, 73* 35~ b 7 ; 
particularly dangerous in oli- 
garchies, 8 b 31. 

Vermiparous animals, the, 56 b 12. 

Village, the, a colony of the 


family, 52'' 16 ; the state a 
union of villages, b 27- 

Violence, often associated with 
virtue, 55 a 13. 

Virtue, the especial character- 
istic of aristocratical govern- 
ments, 73 a 26, 93 a 3S- b 2i, 7 a 
9; often allied to force, 55 a 13; 
more a concern of household 
management than wealth, 59'' 
20; depends upon the supre- 
macy of the rational principle 
in the soul, 33 s * 18 ; cannot be 
included under a general 
definition, 6o a 25; must be 
taught to the slave by his 
master, b 3 ; ought to be the 
aim and care of the state, 
8o b 5, 32 a 3i (cp. 93 b i2); 
gives a claim to superiority in 
the state, 8l a 4, 83 a 24; has 
many kinds, 79 b I ; cannot 
ruin those who possess, her, 
8i a 19 ; is a mean, 95* 37 ; 
how far required in the great 
officers of state, 9 a 33~ b 14 ; 
must be at least pretended by 
the tyrant, 15* 14, b 8; is re- 
garded as a secondary object 
by mankind, 23 a 36 : — cannot 
be separated from happiness, 
23*27, 24 a i2, 25 a i6, 28 a 37, 
b 35> 3 2a 7 j results from nature, 
habit, and reason, 32 a ^8- h II, 
34 b 6-28 ; is not a matter of 
chance, 32 a 3i ; how far con- 
sistent with the political life, 
24 a 5~25 b 32 ; should it be 
made the aim of education ? 
37 a 33~ b 23; consists in hating 
and loving and rejoicing 
aright, 40 a 1 5 : — should not 
(as is done by the Lacedae- 
monians) be supposed inferior 
to external goods, 7l b 9 (cp. 
2 3 a 36) ; nor be practised with 
a view to the single object of 
success in war, 7i a 4i, 24 b 5, 
33 b i2, 34 a 4o;— the virtue 
proper to the slave, the woman, 
the child, 59 b 21-32; of the 
ruler and the subject different, 
b 33-6o a 9, 77 a i3- b 3o; of 
the ruler, practical wisdom, 
of the subject, true opinion, 
b 25 ; of men and women not 
the same, 59 b 28, 6o a 20-31, 

77 b 20 ; less required in the 
artisan than the slave, 6o a 36 
(cp. 29 a i9); of the citizen 
relative to the constitution, 
76 b i6-77 a i3, 93 b 3, g a 3 6: 
of the good man absolute, 76" 
i6~77 a 13, 32 a 22; of the good 
citizen :— is it identical with 
that of the good man ? 76 b 16 

_ 77 b 

j u ) 

78 a 4 o, 

? a 32 


33 a 1 1 ; of the citizen in the 
perfect state, 76 b 35, 84* 1, 

93 b 3- 

Virtue, military, is found in the 
masses, 79'' 1 ; the social, is 
justice, 53 a 37, 83 s * 38. 

Virtues, the, of women and 
children important to the 
state, 6o b 16, 69 b i2; of the 
state and the individual the 
same, 23 b 33; of the military 
life, 7o a 5, 34* 25 ; of leisure, 
a T4. 

Viviparous animals, the, 56 b 13. 

Vote, election by, modes in 
which it can be employed, 
66 a 9, o a 9~ b 5. 


Walls, are not, as Plato supposes 
{Laws, vi. 778), unnecessary, 
30 b 32. 

Walls, officers appointed to take 
charge of the, 2i b 26, 22 a 35. 

War, a part of the art of acqui- 
sition when directed against 
wild beasts and against men 
who are intended by nature 
to be slaves, 55 b 37, 56 b 23, 
33 b 38 ; exists for the sake of 
peace, 33*35, 34 a 2-i6; a 
school of virtue, 7o a 5 ; a 
remedy against the dangers 
of prosperity, 34 a 25 ; constant 
war a part of tyrannical policy, 
I3 b 28; success in war the 
sole object of the Lacedaemo- 
nian and Cretan constitutions, 
7i a 4i- b io, 24 b 5, 33 b i2, 34 11 
40 ; progress in war : — in- 
vention of tactics, 97 b 20 ; — 
of siege machines, 31" 1 ; im- 
provement of fortifications, 
a l6. 

War, captives taken in, ought 
they to be made slaves ? 55 a 3 

-b a 


War, the Peloponnesian ; losses 
of the Athenian nobility, 3 a 10; 
battle of Oenophyta, 2 b 29 ; — 
capture of Mytilene, 4 a 4; — 
battle of Mantinea, "26; — 
the Sicilian expedition, a 27; 
— the Four Hundred at 

Athens, b 12, S 2 7 ', 


Thirty, b 26. 

War, the Persian, 3 a 5, b 33, 4 a 
21, 7 a 4; effect of, upon 
Athens, 74 a 13, 4 a 2i, 41* 30; 
— the Sacred, 4 a 12. 

Wardens of the Agora, 99 b 17, 
o b u, 22 a 14, b 33, 3i b 9; of 
the City, 2i b 23, 22 a 13, b 33, 
3l b Io; of the Country, 2 i b 30, 
22b 33. 3i b 1 5 ; of the Harbour, 

2I b 26. 

Warriors and Councillors, the 
two highest classes in the 
state, 91* 6- b 2, 29* 2-39. 

Water, good, as necessary as 
good air, 3o b 4~i7. 

Weak, the, always go to the wall, 
l8 b 4 . 

Wealth, the, of Midas, 57 b 16. 

Wealth, always antagonistic to 
poverty, 9i b 9; forms an ele- 
ment of the state, 67 a 28, 91 a 
33, 28 b 10, 22; includes many 
varieties, 56 u 16, S9 b 33; [the 
true kind] has a limit, 56 b 31, 
57 b 3°i popularly confused 
with coin, b 5, 35 ; not so 
much a concern of household 
management as virtue, 59 b 18 ; 
must be used with both tem- 
perance and liberality, 65* 32, 
26 b 30. 

Wealth, too highly valued at 
Sparta and Carthage, 69 b 23, 
7o a 14, 73 a 2i- b 7, 93 b 14 ; the 
chief characteristic of oli- 
garchy, 73 a 25, 79 b 39, 9° b i, 
91 b n,li a 10, I7 b 39 ; confers 
a claim to superiority in the 
state, 8o a 22-38, 83*16, 23- 
b 8; popularly associated with 
good birth and education, 93 b 
39) 94 a l 7> 6 b 24. [See Riches.] 

Wealth, the art of getting, how 
related to household manage- 
ment, 53 b i2, 56 a 1-19, b 40, 
57 b i7-58 b 4; the natural kind, 
56 a i5-57 a 4i, 58 a i9-40, b 9-2o; 
the unnatural, 56 b 40 foil., 58 11 

38- b 8, b 2I ; the intermediate, 
b 27 ; the unnatural pursues its 
end without limit, 5 7 b 23-40. 

Wealthy, the, have the external 
advantages of which the want 
tempts men to crime, 66 b 38, 
93 b 38 ; are apt to be spoiled 
by the luxury in which they 
are reared, 95'' 17, io a 22; 
form one of the classes neces- 
sary to the state, 91* 33, 28 b 
10, 22. [See Rich.] 

Whole, the, must be resolved 
into its parts, 52 a 17, 56 a 2 ; 
prior and therefore superior to 
the parts, 53 a 18-29, 88 a 26 ; 
the part belongs entirely to 
the whole, 54 a 9; every whole 
has a ruling element, a a8; 
the whole and the part have 
the same interest, 5 5 b 9 ; the 
virtue of the parts relative 
to the virtue of the whole, 6o b 
14; the happiness of the 
whole dependent on the hap- 
piness of the parts, 64 b i7, 
29 a 23 ; the sophism that ' if 
the parts are little the whole 
is little ', 7 b 36 ; the care of 
the part and the care of the 
whole inseparable, 37 a 29. 

Will, the, of the ruler, an unsafe 
guide, 7o b 29, 72 a 38, b 5, 86 a 
17, S7 a 20-32. 

Winds, the, sometimes said to be 
only two — north and south, 
90 a 13 ; the east wind the 
healthiest, 30 a 39; the north 
wind better than the south 
for the procreation of children, 

35 b i- 

Wine, not to be given to young 
children, 56 a 8 ; the age at 
which it may be drunk, b 22. 

Winter, the best season for 
marriage, 35 a 36. 

Wisdom, practical, the virtue of 
the ruler, 77 b 25. 

Wishing, found even in very 
young children, 34 b 22. 

Woman, the, has a different 
virtue to the man, 59 b 28-6o a 
31, 77 b 20; shares in the de- 
liberative faculty, 6o a 13. 

Women, should be trained with 
a view to the state, 6o b 15 (cp. 
69 b 12) ; cannot have the same 


pursuits as men, 64 b 4 ; said 
to have been common among 
certain Libyan tribes, 62 s 20 ; 
have great influence among 
warlike races, 6<3 b 24 ; caused 
great harm to Sparta by their 
disorder and licence, b 12-70* 
15; possessed two-fifths of the 
land in Laconia, 70 11 23 ; toe 
proud in oligarchies to be 
controlled, o a 7 ; have often 
ruined tyrannies by their 
insolence, I4 b 27; are allowed 
great licence in democracies 
and tyrannies, I3 b 33, I9 b 28 ; 
commonly cease to bear chil- 
dren after fifty, 35 a 9 ; should 
not marry too young, a il; 
impart their nature to their 
offspring, b i8: guardians of, 
99 a 22, o a 4, 22 b 39. 
Women and children, the com- 
munity of, proposed by Plato, 
6i a 4, 74 b 9; he has not ex- 
plained whether he would 
extend it to the dependent 
classes, 64* ll- b 4 ; — objec- 
tions of Aristotle: (1) unity 
would not be promoted, 6i b 
16 ; (2) there would be a 
general neglect of the children, 
b 32 ; (3) the parentage of the 
children could not be con- 
cealed, 62 a 14 ; (4) expiations 

would be impossible, a 31 ; (5) 
the concealment of relation- 
ship would lead to unnatural 
crimes, a 25-40, b 29 ; (6) 
affection would be weakened, 
a 40- b 24 ; (7) the transfer of 
children to another rank would 
be found impracticable, b 24 ; 
(8) the household would be 
neglected, 64*40. 


Xenelasia : see Strangers. 

Xerxes, King of Persia, con- 
spiracy of Artapanes against, 
n b 38- 

Zaleucus, the Locrian legislator, 
74 a 22 ; said to have been a 
disciple of Thales, a 29. 

Zancle, seizure of, by the 
Samians, 3 a 35. 

Zeugitae, the (in Solon's legisla- 
tion), 74 a 20. 

Zeus, 84 b 31 ; ' the father of 
gods and men,' 59 b 13 ; never 
represented by the poets as 
singing or playing, 39 b 8 : — 
Olympian, temple of (at 
Athens), built by the Peisi- 
stratidae, I3 b 23. 






Reprinted lithographically in Great Britain 


from sheets of the first edition 
1938, 1946, 1952 


The text used for this translation is that of F. Susemihl 
(Aris/otclis quae fcruutitr Occonomica, Leipzig, Teubner, 
1K87). Mr. \V. D.Ross has read through the translation 
both in manuscript and in proof and has made a number of 
valuable suggestions which have all been adopted. 

Of the two Books of Oeconomica which have come down to 
us in the Aristotelian Corpus neither can be regarded as the 
work of Aristotle himself. The First Book contains elements 
derived from Aristotle, but it also owes a good deal to the 
Oeconomicus of Xenophon. 1 It appears to be the work of a 
Peripatetic writer who was a pupil either of Aristotle himself 
or of a disciple of that philosopher. 2 The writer was clearly 
well acquainted with the writings of Aristotle and, though 
his doctrines are not purely Aristotelian, 15 he certainly wrote 
at a date before the Peripatetic school had become eclectic 
and coloured by Stoic influence in the second century u. C. 

The Second Book is evidently of a different character and 
the work of a different writer. It consists of an Introduc- 
tion, which divides Economics into four kinds, Royal, 
Satrapic, Political, and Personal — a division quite unknown 
to Aristotle — and then proceeds to relate a series of anec- 
dotes which have no logical connexion with the introduction 
and are mainly concerned with questionable methods of 
raising money. Several of those about whom the anecdotes 
arc related lived after the time of Aristotle. 4 and the style 
of the writer is certainly Hellenistic. That the author lived 
outside Greece proper is indicated by the, fact that his 
examples are mainly derived from Asia Minor, Syria, and 

Susemihl in his edition adds as a Third Book a treatise 

1 A list of parallels with Aristotle's Politics and Xenophon's Oeco- 
nomicus is given by Susemihl, op. at., pp. vi and vii. 

2 Possibly Eudemus, see Zeller, Aristotle and the Later Peripatetics 
(Engl. Trans.), vol. ii, p. 498. 

3 e. g. Economics is regarded as a separate science from Politics. 

4 See Susemihl. op. cit., pp. xi and xii. 


preserved only in Latin translations dealing with the position 
and duties of a wife in the household. The author of the 
original was certainly not Aristotle, but it has been con- 
jectured by Rose 1 that it is the treatise entitled No pot. 
dySpbs teal yafjLerfjs, which figures in the appendix of an 
anonymous index of Aristotelian works extracted from 
Hesychius Milesius. This treatise has not been translated 
for the present work. 

E. S. F. 
The University, Sheffield. 

June 20, 1 91 9. 

1 Aristoteles pscudepigr., p. 1 80 fT. 



Ch. 1. 

Ch. 2. 

Chs. 3, 4. 

Ch. 5. 

Economics and Politics. 

The subject-matter of Economics. 

The position of the wife in the household. 

The treatment of slaves. 

Ch. 6. The qualities of the Economist. 


Royal, Satrapic, Political, and Personal Economy, 
from history. 




I The sciences of politics and economics differ not only as 1343" 
widely as a household and a city (the subject-matter with 
which they severally deal), but also in the fact that the 
science of politics involves a number of rulers, whereas the 
sphere of economics is a monarchy. 

Now certain of the arts fall into sub-divisions, and it does 5 
not pertain to the same art to manufacture and to use the 
article manufactured, for instance, a lyre or pipes ; but the 
function of political science is both to constitute a city in 
the beginning and also when it has come into being to make 
a right use of it. It is clear, therefore, that it must be the 
function of economic science too both to found a household 
and also to make use of it. 

Now a city is an aggregate made up of households and land 10 
and property, possessing in itself the means to a happy life. 
This is clear from the fact that, if men cannot attain this 
end. the community is dissolved. Further, it is for this end 
that they associate together ; and that for the sake of which 
any particular thing exists and has come into being is its 
essence. It is evident, therefore, that economics is prior in 
origin to politics ; for its function is prior, since a household 15 
is part of a city. We must therefore examine economics 
and see what its function is. 

2 The component parts of a household are man and 
property. But since the nature of any given thing is most 
quickly seen by taking its smallest parts, this would apply 
.also to a household. So, according to Hesiod, it would be 20 
necessary that there should be 

First and foremost a house, then a wife 1 . . . , 

1 Works and Days, 405. 



for the former is the first condition of subsistence, the latter 
is the proper possession of all freemen. We should have, 
therefore, as a part of economics to make proper rules for 
the association of husband and wife ; and this involves 
providing what sort of a woman she ought to be. 

as In regard to property the first care is that which comes 
naturally. Now in the course of nature the art of agriculture 
is prior, and next come those arts which extract the products 
of the earth, mining and the like. Agriculture ranks first 
because of its justice; for it does not take anything away 
from men, either with their consent, as do retail trading 
and the mercenary arts, or against their will, as do the 

3° warlike arts. Further, agriculture is natural ; for by nature 
1343'' all derive their sustenance from their mother, and so men 
derive it from the earth. In addition to this it also conduces 
greatly to bravery ; for it does not make men's bodies 
unserviceable, as do the illiberal arts, but it renders them 
5 able to lead an open-air life and work hard ; furthermore it 
makes them adventurous against the foe, for husbandmen 
are the only citizens whose property lies outside the 

As regards the human part of the household, the first care 3 
is concerning a wife ; for a common life is above all things 
natural to the female and to the male. For we have else- 

10 where 1 laid down the principle that nature aims at producing 
many such forms of association, just as also it produces the 
various kinds of animals. But it is impossible for the female 
to accomplish this without the male or the male without 
the female, so that their common life has necessarily arisen. 
Now in the other animals this intercourse is not based on 
reason, but depends on the amount of natural instinct which 

15 they possess and is entirely for the purpose of procreation. 
But in the civilized and more intelligent animals the bond 
of unity is more perfect (for in them we see more mutual 
help and goodwill and co-operation), above all in the 
case of man, because the female and the male co-operate 

20 to ensure not merely existence but a good life. And the 

1 Cp. Eth. Nic. n62 a 16 ff. ; Pol. 1252° 26 ff. 

BOOK I. 2-4 I343 1 ' 

production of children is not only a way of serving nature 
but also of securing a real advantage ; for the trouble which 
parents bestow upon their helpless children when they are 
themselves vigorous is repaid to them in old age when they 
are helpless by their children, who are then in their full 
vigour. At the same time also nature thus periodically 
provides for the perpetuation of mankind as a species, since 25 
she cannot .do so individually. Thus the nature both of the 
man and of the woman has been preordained by the will of 
heaven to' live a common life. For they are distinguished 
in that the powers which they possess are not applicable to 
purposes in all cases identical, but in some respects their 
functions are opposed to one another though they all tend 
to the same end. For nature has made the one sex stronger, 3° 
the other weaker, that the latter through fear may be the 
more cautious, while the former by its courage is better i344 a 
able to ward off attacks ; and that the one may acquire 
possessions outside the house, the other preserve those 
within. In the performance of work, she made one sex able 
to lead a sedentary life and not strong enough to endure 
exposure, the other less adapted for quiet pursuits but well 5 
constituted for outdoor activities ; and in relation to offspring 
she has made both share in the procreation of children, but 
each render its peculiar service towards them, the woman by 
nurturing, the man by educating them. 

4 First, then, there are certain laws to be observed towards 
a wife, including the avoidance of doing her any wrong ; for 
thus a man is less likely himself to be wronged. This is 
inculcated by the general law, as the Pythagoreans say, 10 
that one least of all should injure a wife as being 'a 
suppliant and seated at the hearth '. 1 Now wrong in- 
flicted by a husband is the formation of connexions outside 
his own house. As regards sexual intercourse, a man 
ought not to accustom himself not to need it at all nor 
to be unable to rest when it is lacking,* but so as to be 

1 Reading in 1. 1 1 with Scaliger and Wilamowitz «</>' iarias f}fj.en}v. 
The Koiv6s vofim will then be that which forbids injury to suppliants, 
which, says the author, includes injury to a wife. (i0' iorias i]y^(viju 
can scarcely mean ' torn from the hearth '. 

2 Reading in 1. 14 with some MSS. unuvio*. 


«5 content with or without it. The saying of Hcsiod is a 
good one : 

A man should marry a maiden, that habits discreet he 
may teach her. 1 

For dissimilarity of habits tends more than anything to 
destroy affection. As regards adornment, husband and 
wife ought not to approach one another with false affecta- 
20 tion in their person any more than in their manners ; for if 
the society of husband and wife requires such embellishment, 
it is no better than play-acting on the tragic stage. 

Of possessions, that which is the best and the worthiest 5 
subject of economics comes first and is most essential — 
I mean, man. It is necessary therefore first to provide one- 

35 self with good slaves. Now slaves are of two kinds, the 
overseer and the worker. And since we see that methods 
of education produce a certain character in the young, it is 
necessary when one has procured slaves to bring up care- 
fully those to whom the higher duties are to be entrusted. 
The intercourse of a master with his slaves should be such 
as not either to allow them to be insolent or to irritate them. 

30 To the higher class of slaves he ought to give some share of 
honour, and to the workers abundance of nourishment. 
And since the drinking of wine makes even freemen inso- 
lent, and many nations even of freemen abstain therefrom 
(the Carthaginians, for instance, when they are on military 
service), it is clear that wine ought never to be given to 

35 slaves, or at any rate very seldom. Three things make up 
the life of a slave, work, punishment, and food. To give 
them food but no punishment and no work makes them 
I344 b insolent ; and that they should have work and punishment 
but no food is tyrannical and destroys their efficiency. It 
remains therefore to give them work and sufficient food ; for 
it is impossible to rule over slaves without offering rewards, 
and a slave's reward is his food. And just as all other men 
5 become worse when they get no advantage by being better 
and there are no rewards for virtue and punishments for 

1 Works and Days, 699. 

ROOK I. 4-6 1344' 

vice, so also is it with slaves. Therefore we must take 
careful notice and bestow or withhold everything, whether 
food or clothing or leisure or punishments, according to 
merit, in word and deed following the practice adopted by 
physicians in the matter of medicine, remembering at the 10 
same time that food is not medicine because it must be 
given continually. 

The slave who is best suited for his work is the kind that 
is neither too cowardly nor too courageous. Slaves who 
have either of these characteristics are injurious to their 
owners ; those who arc too cowardly lack endurance, while 
the high-spirited are not easy to control. All ought to have 15 
a definite end in view ; for it is just and beneficial to offer 
slaves their freedom as a prize, for they are willing to work 
when a prize is set before them and a limit of time is 
defined. One ought to bind slaves to one's service by the 
pledges of wife and children, and not to have many persons 
of the same race in a household, as is the case in a city. 
One ought to provide sacrifices and pleasures more for the ao 
sake of slaves than for freemen ; for in the case of the 
former there are present more of the reasons why such 
things have been instituted. 

6 The economist ought to possess four qualities in relation 
to wealth. He ought to be able to acquire it, and to guard 
it ; otherwise there is no advantage in acquiring it, but it is 
a case of drawing water with a sieve, or the proverbial jar 25 
with a hole in it. Further, he ought to be able to order his 
possessions aright and make a proper use of them ; for it is 
for these purposes that we require wealth. The various 
kinds of property ought to be distinguished, and those which 
are productive ought to be more numerous than the unpro- 
ductive, and the sources of income ought to be so distributed 
that they may not run a risk with all their possessions at 
the same time. For the preservation of wealth it is best to 3° 
follow both the Persian and the Laconian methods. The Attic 
system of economy is also useful ; for they sell their produce 
and buy what they want, and thus there is not the need of 
a storehouse in the smaller establishments. The Persian 



system was that everything should be organized and that 

35 the master should superintend everything personally, as Dio 
said of Dionysius ; for no one looks after the property of 
others as well as he looks after his own, so that, as far as 
I 345 :l possible, a man ought to attend to everything himself. The 
sayings of the Persian and the Libyan may not come 
amiss ; the former of whom, when asked what was the best 
thing to fatten a horse, replied, ' His master's eye ', while 
the Libyan, when asked what was the best manure, answered, 
5 ' The landowner's foot-prints'. Some things should be 
attended to by the master, others by his wife, according to 
the sphere allotted to each in the economy of the house- 
hold. Inspections need only be made occasionally in small 
establishments, but should be frequent where overseers are 
employed. For perfect imitation is impossible unless a 
good example is set, especially when trust is delegated to 

io others ; for unless the master is careful, it is impossible for 
his overseers to be careful. And since it is good for the 
formation of character and useful in the interests of economy, 
masters ought to rise earlier than their slaves and retire to 
rest later, and a house should never be left unguarded any 

15 more than a city, and when anything needs doing it ought 
not to be left undone, whether it be day or night. There 
are occasions when l a master should rise while it is still 
night ; for this helps to make a man healthy and wealthy 
and wise. On small estates the Attic system of disposing 
of the produce 2 is a useful one ; but on large estates, where 

20 a distinction is made between yearly and monthly expendi- 
ture and likewise between the daily and the occasional use 
of household appliances, such matters must be entrusted to 
overseers. Furthermore, a periodical inspection should be 
made, in order to ascertain what is still existing and what 
is lacking. 

The house must be arranged both with a view to one's 

25 possessions a and for the health and well-being of its in- 
habitants. By possessions I mean the consideration of 

1 Reading in 1. 16 rori re as suggested by Sylburg. 
I Cp. 1344'' 31-3. 

3 KTrjuam is here used in a very wide sense since it includes not only 
produce of the land and clothing, but also slaves and even guests. 

BOOK I. 6 i345 a 

what is suitable for produce and clothing, and in the case of 
produce what is suitable for dry and what for moist produce, 
and amongst other possessions what is suitable for property 
whether animate or inanimate, for slaves and freemen, 
women and men, strangers and citizens. With a view to 30 
well-being and health, the house ought to be airy in 
summer and sunny in winter. This would be best secured 
if it faces north and is not as wide as it is long. In large 
establishments a man who is no use for other purposes 
seems to be usefully employed as a doorkeeper to safe- 35 
guard what is brought into and out of the house. For the I345 b 
ready use of household appliances the Laconian method 
is a good one ; for everything ought to have its own 
proper place and so be ready for use and not require to be 
searched for. 



7 He who intends to practise economy aright ought t<~> be I 
fully acquainted with the places in which his labour lies 
and to be naturally endowed with good parts and deliber- 

io ately industrious and upright ; for if he is lacking in any 
of these respects, he will make many mistakes in the 
business which he takes in hand. 

Now there are four kinds of economy, that of the king 
(Royal Economy), that of the provincial governor (Satrapic 
Economy), that of the city (Political Economy), and that 
of the individual (Personal Economy). This is a broad 
method of division; and we shall find that the other forms 
of economy fall within it. 

Of these the Royal is the most important and the 

15 simplest, the Political is the most varied and the easiest, 
the Personal the least important and the most varied. 1 
They must necessarily have most of their characteristics in 
common ; but it is the points which are peculiar to each 
kind that we must consider. Let us therefore examine 

30 Royal Economy first. It is universal in its scope, but has 
four special departments — the coinage, exports, imports, 
and expenditure. To take each of these separately : in 
regard to the coinage, 2 I mean the question as to what 
coin should be struck and when it should be of a high and 
when of a low value ; in the matter of exports and imports, 
what commodities it will be advantageous to receive from 

25 the satraps under the Royal rule 3 and dispose of and when; 
in regard to expenditure, what expenses ought to be cur- 
tailed and when, and whether one should pa}- what is 

1 This sentence is clearly corrupt. No mention is made of 17 oarpa- 
niKrj, and noiKi\aiTt'nT] cannot be applied both to 77 7roXmK»;and 17 IdiuTtKrj : 
it is probably right as applied to 17 iSiwtuo;, being equivalent to ni-co/xaXo? 
ini346 a 9. 

2 Reading as suggested by Bekker tuno-rov rrepi fxiv to vofxiafia in 1. 22. 

3 iv rjj ray;} in 1. 25 is probably corrupt. 

BOOK II. i i345 b 

expended in coin or in commodities which have an equiva- 
lent value. 

Let us next take Satrapic Economy. Here we find 
six kinds of revenue : from land, from the peculiar products 
of the district, from merchandise, from taxes, from cattle, 30 
and from all other sources. Of these the first and most im- 
portant is that which comes from land (which some call 
tax on land-produce, others tithe) ; next in importance is 
the revenue from peculiar products, from gold, or silver, 
or copper, or anything else which is found in a particular 35 
locality; thirdly comes that derived from merchandise; 
fourthly, the revenue from the cultivation of the soil and I34 6 " 1 
from market-dues; fifthly, that which comes from cattle, 
which is called tax on animal produce or tithe ; and sixthly, 
that which is derived from other sources, which is called 
the poll-tax or tax on handicraft. 

Thirdly, let us examine the economy of the city. 5 
Here the most, important source of revenue is from the 
peculiar products of the country, next comes that derived 
from merchandise and customs, 1 and lastly that which 
comes from the ordinary taxes. 

Fourthly and lastly, let us take Personal Economy. 
Here we find wide divergences, because economy is not 
necessarily always practised with one aim in view. It is 10 
the least important kind of economy, because the incomings 
and expenses are small. Here the main source of revenue 
is the land, next other kinds of property, 1 ' and thirdly in- 
vestments of money. 

Further, there is a consideration which is common to all 
branches of economy and which calls for the most careful 
attention, especially in personal economy, namely, that the 15 
expenditure must not exceed the income. 

Now that we have mentioned the divisions of the subject, 
we must next consider whether, if the satrapy or city with 
which we are dealing can produce all,' 5 or the most im- 
portant revenues which we have just distinguished, some 

1 % 7i-()oo-o8of 17 duo raiv hmyonyHdv is apparently equivalent to the 8iayo>- 
yiov (portorium) of Polyb. 26. 7. 7. 

* Reading with Spengel KTrjfiuruv in 1. 13. 

:i Reading with Schneider and Bekker annvra (<'i) in 1. 19. 


20 rather than others ] ought to be employed. Next we must 
consider which sources of revenue do not exist at all but 
can be introduced, or are at present small but can be 
augmented ; and which of the expenses at present incurred, 
and to what amount, can be entirely 2 dispensed with without 

25 doing any harm. 

We have now mentioned the various kinds of economy 
and their constituent parts. We have further made a col- 
lection of all the methods that we conceived to be worth 
mentioning, which men of former days have employed or 
cunningly devised in order to provide themselves with 

30 money. For we conceived that this information also might 
be useful ; for a man will be able to apply some of these 
instances to such business 3 as he himself takes in hand. 

Cypselus, the Corinthian, having vowed to Zeus that, if 2 
he made himself master of the city, he would dedicate to 
him all the property of the Corinthians, ordered them to 
i346 b draw up a list of their possessions. When they had done 
so, he took a tenth part from each citizen and told them to 
trade with the remainder. As each year came round, he 
did the same thing again, with the result that in ten years 
5 he had all that he had consecrated to the god, while the 
Corinthians had acquired other property. 

Lygdamis, the Naxian, having driven certain men 
into exile, when no one was willing to buy their possessions 
except at a low price, sold them to the exiles themselves. 
And offerings belonging to them which were lying 4 half 
10 finished in certain workshops he sold to the exiles and 
any one else who wished to buy them, allowing the name 
of the purchaser to be inscribed upon them. 

The Byzantines being in need of money sold the 
sacred enclosures belonging to the state. 5 Those which 

1 Reading as suggested by Susemihl (tovtois fxaXKov avra>v 77 imtlvots, 
q (Keivois pak\op q) Tourotr in 1. 20. 

2 Omitting rd in 1. 24 with the MSS. 

5 Reading in 1. 30 eon yap on (Richards) tovtuv ((papfioaet Tt? 
(Sylburg) 01? (Schneider) av avrot npayiJuiTeiit]Tai. 

* Reading with Keil anoKtipfva in 1. 10. 

6 The locus classicus on such enclosures is the speech of Lysias 7r«n 
tov ar/Kov, 

ROOK II. I, a i346 b 

were fertile they sold on lease, and those which were un- 
productive in perpetuity. They treated in the same way 15 
the enclosures which belonged to associations and clans and 
all which were situated on private estates ; for the owners of 
the rest of the property bought them at a high price. To 
the associations they sold other lands, viz. the public lands 
round the gymnasium, or the market-place, or the harbour, 
and the places where markets were held at which various 20 
commodities were sold, and they gave the rights over the 
sea-fisheries and the sale of salt, and the stands l where 
jugglers, and soothsayers, and druggists, and other such 
persons plied their trades ; but they ordered them to pay 
over a third of their profits. And they sold the right of 
changing money to a single bank, and no one else might 2 5 
either give money in exchange to any one, or receive it in 
exchange from any one, under penalty of forfeiting the 
money. And whereas there was a law amongst them that 
no one should have political rights who was not born of 
parents who were both citizens, being in want of money 
they passed a decree that a man who was sprung from 
a citizen on one side only should become a citizen if he 
paid down thirty minae. And as they were suffering from 
want of food and lack of money, they made the ships from 30 
the Black Sea put in ; but, as time went on, the merchants 
protested and so they paid them interest at ten per cent, 
and ordered those who purchased anything to pay the 
ten per cent, in addition to the price. And whereas 
certain resident aliens had lent money on mortgaged 1347* 
property, because these had not the right to hold property, 
they passed a decree that any one who wished could obtain 
a title to the property by paying a third of the loan to the 

Hippias, the Athenian, put up for sale the parts of the 
upper rooms which projected into the public streets, and 5 
the steps and fences in front of the houses, and the doors 
which opened outwards. The owners of the property there- 
fore bought them, and a large sum was thus collected. He 

1 Reading as suggested by Susemihl TotovTorpunuv (rows t6ttovs) in 
1. 22. 


also declared the coinage then current in Athens to be base, 
and fixing a price for it ordered it to be brought to him ; 
but when they met to consider the striking of a new type 

10 of coin, he gave them back the same money again. And 
if any one was about to equip a trireme or a division of 
cavalry or to provide a tragic chorus or incur expense on 
any other such state-service, he fixed a moderate fine and 
allowed him, if he liked, to pay this and be enrolled amongst 
those who had performed state services. He also ordered 
that a measure of barley, and another of wheat, and an 

15 obol should be brought to the priestess of Athena-on-the- 
Acropolis on behalf of any one who died, and that the 
same offering should be made by any one to whom a child 
was born. 

The Athenians who dwell in Potidaea, being in need 
of money to carry on war, ordered all the citizens to draw 

ao up a list of their property, each man enrolling not his whole 
property collectively in his own deme, but each piece of 
property separately in the place where it was situated, in 
order that the poor might give in an assessment ; any one 
who possessed no property was to assess his own person at 
two minae. On the basis of this assessment they contributed 
each in full to the state the amount enjoined. 

25 Sosipolis of Antissa, when the city was in want of 

money, since the citizens were wont to celebrate the feast 
of Dionysus with great splendour and every year went to 
great expense in providing, amongst other things, very costly 
victims, persuaded them, when the festival was near at hand, 
to vow to Dionysus that they would give double offerings 

30 the next year and collect and sell the dedications for the 
current year. Thus a substantial sum was collected for the 
needs of the moment. 

The people of Lampsacus, expecting a large fleet of 
triremes to come against them, ordered the dealers to sell 
a medimnus of barley-meal, of which the market price was 
four drachmae, at six drachmae, and a chous of oil, the price 
of which was three drachmae, at four drachmae and a half, 

35 and likewise wine and the other commodities. The in- 
i347 b dividual seller thus received the usual price, while the 

BOOK II. 2 i347 v 

city gained the surplus and so was well provided with 

The people of Heraclea, when they were sending forty 
ships against the tyrants on the Bosporus, not being well 
provided with money, bought up from the merchants all 5 
their corn and oil and wine and the rest of their stores, 
fixing a date in the future at which they were to make the 
payment. Now it suited the merchants better to sell their 
cargoes wholesale rather than retail. So the people of 
Heraclea. giving the soldiers two months' pay, took the 
provisions with them 1 on board merchant-vessels and put 10 
an official in charge of each of the ships. When they 
reached the enemies' territory, the soldiers bought up all 
the provisions from them. 2 Thus money was collected 
before the generals had to pay the soldiers again, and 
so the same money was distributed time after time until 15 
they returned home. 

When the Samians begged for money for their return 
home, the Lacedaemonians passed a decree that they would 
fast for one day, themselves and their households and their 
beasts of burden, and would give to the Samians the 
amount that each of them usually expended. 

The Chalcedonians, having a large number of foreign 20 
mercenaries in their city, owed them pay which they could 
not give them. They therefore proclaimed that if any 
citizen or resident alien had any right of seizure against any 
state or individual and wished to exercise it, they should 
give in their names. When many did so, they seized the 
ships which sailed into the Black Sea on a plausible pretext, 2 5 
and appointed a time at which they promised to give an 
account of their captures. When a large sum of money 
had been collected they dismissed the soldiers and submitted 
themselves to trial for their reprisals, and the state out of 
its revenues made restitution to those who had been 30 
unjustly plundered. 

1 Reading with Kirchhoff in 1. 9 Sibovres fit/ir/rou fxivdov napi]yov aaa 
t!jv dyofxif. With this reading we have an example of the common 
confusion of XX and \x. 

2 An early example of a Field Force Canteen. 


When the people of Cyzicus were at variance and 
the popular party had gained the upper hand and the 
wealthy citizens had been imprisoned, they passed a decree, 
since they owed money to their soldiers, that they would 
not put their prisoners to death, but would exact money 
from them and send them into exile. 

35 The Chians, who have a law that a public register of 

debts should be kept, being in want of money decreed that 
i348 a debtors should pay their debts to the state and that the 
state should disburse the interest from its revenues to the 
creditors until they should reach their former state of 
prosperity. 1 
5 Mausolus, tyrant of Caria, when the king of Persia 

sent and ordered him to pay his tribute, collected together 
the richest men in the country and told them that the king 
was demanding the tribute, but he himself could not provide 
it. And certain men, who had been suborned to do so, 
immediately promised to contribute and named the amount 
that each would give. Upon this the wealthier men, partly 

10 through shame and partly from fear, promised and actually 
contributed far larger sums. 

On another occasion when he was in need of money, he 
called together the Mylassians and told them that their 
city, which was his capital, was unfortified and that the 
king of Persia was marching against him. He therefore 
ordered the Mylassians each to contribute as much money 

15 as possible, saying that by what they paid now they 
would save the rest of their possessions. 2 When a large 
contribution had been made, he kept the money and told 
them that at the moment the god would not allow them to 
build the wall. 

Condalus, a governor under Mausolus, whenever 
during his passage through the country any one brought 

20 him a sheep or a pig or a calf, used to make a record of the 

1 The meaning seems to be that all debts were repaid to the state 
by private debtors instead of to their creditors, and the state then paid 
interest to the creditors, thus virtually raising a loan for itself. Many 
editors emend in 1. 3 to «oy av ko.1 to dpxalov fKiroplaao-u; ' until they 
could afford to pay up the capital '. 

2 Reading in 1. 15 ra \om' (&v) o-w'f«iv (Richards). 

BOOK II. 2 1348* 

donor and the date and order him to take it back home and 
keep it until he returned. When he thought that sufficient 
time had elapsed, he used to ask for the animal which was 
being kept for him, and reckoned up and demanded the 
produce-tax on it as well. And any trees which projected 
over or fell into the royal roads he used to sell as profits. 1 
And if any soldier died , he demanded 2 a drachma as a toll 35 
for the corpse passing the gates ; and so he not only 
received money from this source, but also the officers could 
not deceive him as to the date of the soldier's death. Also, 
noticing that the Lycians were fond of wearing their hair 
long, he pretended that a dispatch had come from the king 
of Persia ordering him to send hair to make false fringes 3° 
and that he was therefore commanded by Mausolus to cut 
off their hair. He therefore said that, if they would pay 
him a fixed poll-tax. he would send for hair to Greece. 
They gladly gave him what he asked, and a large sum of 
money was collected from a great number of them. 

Aristotle, the Rhodian, who was governor of Phocaea, 35 
was in want of money. Perceiving therefore that there 
were two parties amongst the Phocaeans, he made secret i348 b 
overtures to one party saying that the other faction was 
offering him money on condition that he would turn the 
scale in their favour, but that for his own part he would 
rather receive money from them and give the direction of 
affairs into their hands. When they heard this, those who 
were present immediately gave him the money, supplying 5 
him with all he asked for. He then went to the other party 
and showed them what he had received from their opponents ; 
whereupon they alsb professed their willingness to give him 
an equal sum. So he took the money from both parties 
and reconciled them one with another. Also, noticing that 
there was much litigation among the citizens and that there 10 
were grievances of long standing among them owing to war, 
he established a court of law and proclaimed that unless 
they submitted their cases to judgement within a period 3 

1 (iriKcipnias is here used in its wider sense of ' profits ' ; in 1. 23 it 
has the special sense of ' tax on animal produce ', as in 1346*2. 

2 Reading in 1. 26 8tunv\ioi> t^rporr* (Scaliger). 

3 Reading in I. 12 \povov (Richards). 

i 3 48 b OECONOMICA 

which he appointed, there would be no further settlement 
of their former claims. Then getting control of the deposits 
paid in a number of suits, and the cases which were subject 

15 to appeal with damages 1 , and receiving money from both 
parties by other means, he collected a large sum. 

The Clazomenians, when they were suffering from 
famine and were in want of money, decreed that private 
individuals who had any olive oil should lend it to the state, 
which would pay them interest. Now olives are abundant 

20 in this country. When the owners had lent them the oil, 
they hired ships and sent it to the marts from which their 
corn came, giving the value of the oil as a pledge. And 
when they owed pay to their soldiers to the amount of 
twenty talents and could not provide it, they paid the 
generals four talents a year as interest. But finding that 
they did not reduce the principal and that they were 

25 continually spending money to no purpose, they struck an 
iron coinage to represent a sum of twenty talents of silver, 
and then distributing it among the richest citizens in 
proportion to their wealth they received in exchange an 
equivalent sum in silver. Thus the individual citizens had 
money to disburse for their daily needs and the state was 

30 freed from debt. They then paid them interest out of their 
revenues and continually divided it up and distributed it in 
proper proportions, and called in the iron coinage. 

The Selybrians were once in need of money ; and so, 
as they had a law which forbade the export of corn to 
another state 2 which was suffering from famine, and they 

35 had a supply of last season's corn, they passed a decree that 

private persons should hand over their corn to the state at 

1349a a fixed price, each reserving a year's supply ; they then 

allowed any one who wished to export his supply, fixing 

a price which they thought would give them a profit. 

The people of Abydos, when their land was unfilled 

owing to political dissensions and the resident aliens were 

paying them nothing because they still owed them money, 

5 passed a decree that any one who was willing should lend 

1 Reading L$ iavrov for e(f>' tavruv in 1. 14. 

2 Reading with Keil (roh aWou} iv in 1. 34. 

BOOK IT. 2 i349 a 

money to the farmers in order that they might till the soil, 
providing that they should enjoy the first-fruits of the crop 
and that the others should have what remained. 

The Ephesians, being in need of money, made a law 
that their women should not wear gold ornaments, but 10 
should lend to the state what they already possessed ; and 
fixing the amount which was to be paid they allowed the 
name of any one who presented that sum to be inscribed 
as that of the dedicator on certain of the pillars in the 

Dionysius of Syracuse, wishing to collect money, 
called together an assembly and declared that Demeter had 15 
appeared to him and bade him bring the ornaments of the 
women to her temple. He had therefore, he said, done so 
with the ornaments of the women of his own household ; 
and he demanded that every one else should do the same, 
lest vengeance from the goddess should fall upon them. 
Any one who refused would, he said, be guilty of sacrilege. 
When all had brought what they possessed through fear of 30 
the goddess and dread of Dionysius, after dedicating the 
ornaments to the goddess he then appropriated them, saying 
that they were lent to him by her. And when some time 
had elapsed and the women began wearing ornaments again, 
he ordered that any woman who wished to wear jewellery of 
gold should dedicate a fixed sum in the temple. 

And when he was intending to build triremes, he knew 25 
that he would be in want of money. He therefore called 
together an assembly and said that a certain city was to be 
betrayed to him and that he needed money for this purpose. 
He therefore asked the citizens to contribute two staters 
each ; and they did so. He then let two or three days 
elapse, and pretending that he had failed in his attempt, after 
commending their generosity he gave every man his contri- 
bution back again. By this action he won the hearts of the 30 
citizens. And so they again contributed, thinking that they 
would receive their money back again ; but he took the 
money and kept it for building his ships. 

And when he was in need of money he struck a coinage 
of tin, and calling an assembly together he spoke at great 



35 length in favour of the money which had been coined ; and 
they, even .against their will, decreed that every one 1 should 
regard any of it that he accepted as silver and not as tin. 

On another occasion, being in want of money, he asked 
i349 b the citizens to give him contributions ; but they declared 
that they had nothing to give. Accordingly he brought out 
his own household goods and offered them for sale, as 
though compelled to do so by poverty. When the Syracusans 
bought them, he kept a record of what each had bought, 
5 and when they had paid the price, he ordered each of them 
to bring back the articles which he had bought. 

And when the citizens owing to the taxes could not keep 
cattle, he said that he had enough up to the present ; those 
therefore who kept cattle should now be free from a tax on 
them. But since many soon acquired a large number of 
cattle, thinking that they could keep them without paying 
io a tax on them, when he thought that a fitting moment had 
come he gave orders that they should assess their value and 
then imposed a tax. Accordingly the citizens, angry at 
having been deceived, slew their cattle and sold them. And 
when, to prevent this, he ordered them to kill only as many 
as were needed for daily use, they next devoted them for 
sacrifice to the gods. Dionysius then forbade them to 
sacrifice any female beast. 

On another occasion when he was in need of money, he 
15 ordered all families of orphans to enrol themselves; and 
when many 2 had done so, he enjoyed their property until 
each member of such families came of age. 

And after he had captured Rhegium he called an 
assembly of the inhabitants together and informed them 
that he would be quite justified in enslaving them, but under 
30 the circumstances he would let them go free if he received the 
amount which he had spent on the war and three minae a head 
from all of them. The Rhegians then brought to light the 
wealth which before had been hidden, and the poor borrowed 
from the richer citizens and from foreigners and provided 
35 the sum which he demanded. When he had received it 

1 Reading (kuo-tov (Richards) in 1. 35. 

2 Reading with Schneider noXXcbp for c'iXXwv in 1. 16. 

BOOK II. 2 i349 b 

from them he nevertheless sold them all as slaves, and seized 
all the treasures which had before been hidden and were 
now brought to light. 

Also having borrowed money from the citizens under 
promise of repayment, when they demanded it back he 
ordered them to bring him whatever money any of them 
possessed, threatening them with death as the penalty if 
they failed to do so. When the money had been brought, he 30 
issued it again after stamping it afresh so that each drachma 
had the value of two drachmae, and paid back the original 
debt and the money which they brought him on this 
occasion. 1 

And when he sailed against Tyrrhenia with a hundred 
ships he took much gold and silver and a considerable 
quantity of other ornaments of all kinds from the temple of 
Leucothea. And knowing that the sailors too were keeping 35 
many things for themselves, he made a proclamation that 
every one should bring him the half of what he had and i350 a 
might retain the other half; and he threatened with death 
any one who failed to deliver up the half. The sailors, 
supposing that if they gave up the half they would be 
allowed undisturbed possession of the rest, did so ; but 
Dionysius, when he had received it, ordered them to go 
back and bring him the other half. 5 

The Mendaeans used the proceeds of their harbour 
customs and their other dues for the administration of their 
city, but did not exact the taxes on land and houses ; but 
they kept a register of property-owners, and whenever they 
needed money, those who owed taxes paid them. They 10 
thus profited during the time which elapsed by having full 
use of the money without paying interest. 

When they were at war with the Olynthians and needed 
money, seeing that they had slaves they decreed that 
a female and a male slave should be left to each citizen and 
the rest sold, so that private individuals might lend money 1? 
to the state. 2 

Callistratus, when the harbour-dues in Macedonia 

1 Reading in 1. 32 as suggested by Susemihl (nn-eVicoKf tcni <" vw") 

- Reading <!>$• 1-17 woXfi for 177 noXa u>j in 1. 14. 


were usually sold at twenty talents, made them fetch double 
that price. For, noticing that the richer men always bought 
them because it was necessary that the sureties provided 

20 for the twenty talents should be possessed of one talent, he 
proclaimed that any one who liked could purchase them and 
that sureties should be provided for only a third or any 
other proportion which 1 he could persuade them each to 

Timotheus, the Athenian, when he was at war with 
the Olynthians, and in need of money, struck a bronze 

25 coinage and distributed it to the soldiers. When they pro- 
tested, he told. them that the merchants and retailers would 
all sell their goods on the same terms as before. He then 
told the merchants, if they received any bronze money, to 
use it again to buy the commodities sent in for sale from 
the country and anything which was brought in as plunder, 
and said that, if they brought him any bronze money which 
they had left over, they should receive silver for it. 

3° When he was making war in the neighbourhood of 
Corcyra and was in difficulties, and the soldiers were 
demanding their pay and refusing to obey him and 
threatening to go over 2 to the enemy, he called together 
an assembly and told them that no money could reach him 

35 owing to the stormy weather, for he had, he declared, such 
an abundance of supplies that he offered them as a free gift 
the three months' rations which they had already received. 
I350 b They, supposing that Timotheus would never have made 
such a valuable concession unless he really expected the 
money, kept silence about the pay ; and he meanwhile 
achieved the objects which he had in view. 

When he was besieging Samos he actually sold to the 
5 inhabitants the fruits and the produce of their lands, and 
so had abundance of money to pay his soldiers. And when 
there was a shortage of provisions in the camp owing to 
the arrival of newcomers, he forbade the sale of corn ready 
ground, and of any smaller measure than a medimnus, and 

10 of any liquid in a smaller quantity than a eta. Accord- 

1 Reading and' 6n6<roi> (av~) tKaarovs (Richards) in 1. 21. 

2 Reading anoTropivatafiai (Richards) in 1. 33. 

BOOK II. 2 1350'' 

ingly the commanders of divisions and companies bought 
up provisions wholesale and distributed them to the soldiers, 
while the newcomers brought their own provisions with them 
and, when they departed, sold anything that they had left. 
The result was that the soldiers had an abundance of 
provisions. 15 

Didales, the Persian, having soldiers under his com- 
mand, could supply their daily needs from the enemy's 
country, but having no money to give them, and being 
requested to pay them, when the time came at which it was 
due he devised the following plan. He called together an 
assembly and told them that he had no lack of money, but 20 
that it was in a certain place which he named. He there- 
fore moved his camp and started to march thither. Then 
when he was near the place, he went in advance to it and 
took from the temples there all the embossed silver plate 
which they contained. He then loaded his mules so that 
the silver plate was visible, and they looked as though they 
were carrying solid silver. The soldiers, when they saw it, 25 
thought that the loads were all solid silver and were en- 
couraged, thinking that they would receive their pay. But 
Didales told them that he must go to Amisus and have 
the silver minted. Now the journey to Amisus was one of 
many days and exposed to the weather. So all this time 
he made use of the army, merely giving them their rations. 

He kept in his personal service all the skilled artificers 3° 
in the army and the retailers who carried on traffic in any 
commodity; and no one else was permitted to do any of 
these things. 

Chabrias, the Athenian, advised Taus, king of Egypt, 
when he was starting on a warlike expedition and was in 
need of money, to say to the priests that owing to the 35 
expense some of the temples and the majority of the priests 
must be dispensed with. When the priests heard this, each I35 1 ' 1 
wishing to retain their own temple, they privately offered 
him 1 money. And when Taus had accepted money from 
all of them, Chabrias advised him to order them to expend 

1 Reading in 1. 2 I8ia (cp. I352 b 23) with Scaliger and Schneider for 
Idta, and uvtu> with Sylburg and Schneider for avrols. 


a tenth part of the amount which they formerly spent on 
5 their temple 1 and to lend the rest to him until the war 
against the king of Persia should come to an end. And he 
advised him to fix the necessary amount and demand a 
contribution from each household and likewise from each 
individual ; and that, when corn was sold, the buyer and 
the seller should give an obol for each artabe over and 

10 above the price ; and that he should demand the payment 
of a tenth part of the profits derived from shipping and 
manufactures and any other form of industry. And he 
advised him, when he was leaving the country on an ex- 
pedition, to order that any unminted silver or gold which 
any one possessed should be brought to him : and when 

15 most people brought it, he advised him to make use of it 
and to commend the lenders to the provincial governors so 
that they might repay them out of the taxes. 

Iphicrates, the Athenian, when Cotys had collected 
an army, provided him with money in the following way. 

20 He advised him to order the men under his command to 
sow land for him with three medimni of corn. The result 
of this was that a great quantity of corn was collected. 
Accordingly he brought it down to the markets and sold it, 
and thus gained an abundance of money. 

Cotys, the Thracian, tried to borrow money from the 

25 Peirinthians so that he might collect an army ; but the 
Peirinthians refused to give him any. He therefore begged 
them at any rate to grant him some men from among their 
citizens to act as a garrison for certain strongholds, in order 
that he might make full use of the soldiers who were at 
present on duty there. To this request they promptly 
acceded, thinking that they would thus obtain possession of 

30 these strongholds. But Cotys threw into prison those who 
were sent and ordered the Peirinthians to recover them by 
sending him the money which he wished to borrow from 

Mentor, the Rhodian, having arrested Hermeias and 
seized his estates, allowed the overseers whom Hermeias 

35 had appointed to retain their positions. But when they all 

1 Omitting k<u ds alrov in 1. 4 with r and Schneider. 

BOOK II. 2 i35i a 

felt secure and took steps to recover anything which had 
been hidden or deposited for safety elsewhere, he arrested 
them and deprived them of all they had. 

Memnon, the Rhodian, after making himself master 1351'' 
of Lampsacus, was in need of money. He therefore exacted 
a heavy tribute from the richest citizens, telling them that 
they could collect it from the rest of the citizens. But when 
the latter had contributed, he ordered them to lend him 5 
this sum as well, fixing a period x within which he would 
pay them back. 

On another occasion when he was in need of money, he 
demanded contributions from them, saying that they should 
be repaid out of the revenues. They therefore contributed, 
thinking that they would soon receive their money back. 
But when the time was at hand for the payment of the 
revenues, he told them that he needed these revenues as 10 
well, but would repay them later with interest. 

He also excused himself from paying the rations and 
wages of those who were serving under him for six days in 
the year, 2 declaring that on these days they had no watch to 
keep, no marching and no expenses, meaning the ' omitted ' 
days. :; As he was already giving the soldiers their rations 15 
on the second day o r the new month, he thus passed over 
three days in the first month and five by the following 
month, and so he gradually gained on them till he reached 
a total of thirty days. 4 

Charidemus of Orus, who held certain places in 
Aeolia, when Artabazus was marching against him needed 20 
money to pay his soldiers. At first, then, the citizens gave 

'. Reading with Kirchhoff x^wov for iv xpova) in 1. 5. 

2 Reading with Richards tov eviavrov in 1. 12. 

3 Memnon's argument seems to have been that of the twelve months 
in the year six were 'hollow' months, i.e. had only twenty-nine days, 
and that since thirty was the proper number of days in a month, he 
would be paying them for six days too much, if he gave them the same 
amount for a ' hollow ' as for a ' full ' month. 

4 The year consisting of twelve months of twenty-nine and thirty 
days alternately, in the first month he docked them of three days' pay 
(one day on the ground that it was a ' hollow ' month, and two days by 
paying them in advance on the second day for the rest of the month) ; 
in the second month, which was not a 'hollow' month, he deprived 
them of two days' pay by paying them in advance on the second day. 
They thus lost five days in each period of two months, i.e. a total of 
thirty days in the year. 

i 35 i h OECONOMICA 

him contributions, but afterwards they declared that they 
had nothing left to give. Charidemus then ordered the 
inhabitants of the place which he thought was richest to send 
away to another place any coin or other valuable treasure 
which they possessed, and he promised to give them an 

25 escort ; at the same time it was clear that he himself was 
also removing his valuables. When they had obeyed him, 
he led them a little way outside the city and, after ex- 
amining what they had, took all that he needed and sent 
them back again. He also made a proclamation in the 
cities over which he ruled that no one was to keep any 

30 arms in his house, the penalty for so doing being a fine 
which he specified. He then took no further action and 
paid no attention to the matter. The citizens, thinking that 
he had not meant the proclamation to be taken seriously, 
continued to keep the arms which they happened to 
possess. But Charidemus suddenly instituted a house to 
house search and exacted the fine from those in whose 

35 houses he found any arms. 

A certain Philoxenus, a Macedonian who was satrap 
of Caria, being in need of money, said that he intended to 
celebrate the Dionysia, and he nominated the richest of 
I352 a the Carians to defray the cost of the choruses and gave 
directions as to what they had to supply. But seeing that 
they were annoyed, he sent to them secretly and asked 
them what they were willing to give to be released from 
serving. They declared their readiness to give considerably 
5 more than they thought it would cost them, in order to be 
freed from the trouble and the neglect of their private 
affairs which it would entail. Philoxenus accepted what 
they offered and put others on the list, until he received 
from them what he wanted and what each could spare. 

Evaeses, the Syrian, being satrap of Egypt, dis- 
covering that the provincial governors were on the point of 

10 revolting from him, summoned them to the palace and 
hanged them all, and ordered that their relatives should be 
told that they were in prison. Their relatives therefore 
severally began to negotiate on their behalf and tried to 
buy the release of the captives. Evaeses made an agree- 

BOOK II. 2 1352* 

mcnt in each case and, after receiving the sums for which 15 
he had stipulated, restored them to their relatives— dead. 

Cleomenes, an Alexandrian who was satrap of Egypt, 
when there was a severe famine everywhere else while 
Egypt was less seriously affected, forbade the export of 
corn, and when the provincial governors declared that 
they would not be able to pay the tribute because corn 
could not be exported, he cancelled the prohibition, but 20 
put a heavy tax on the corn. The result was that, if he 
did not succeed in getting a large tax at the cost of a small 
exportation, at least 1 the provincial governors lost their 

As he was sailing through the district in which the 
crocodile is regarded as a deity, one of his slaves was 
carried off. He therefore summoned the priests and told 25 
them that since he had been injured without provocation he 
intended to take vengeance 2 on the crocodiles, and gave 
orders to hunt them. The priests, in order that their god 
might not be affronted, collected all the gold that they 
possessed and presented it to him, with the result that he 

When king Alexander commanded him to found a city 
near the Pharos and to establish there the mart which was 30 
formerly held at Canopus, he sailed to Canopus and told 
the priests and the owners of property there that he had 
come to transfer them. The priests and inhabitants collected 
and eave him a sum of monev to induce him to leave their 
mart undisturbed. This he accepted and for the moment 35 
left them alone, but afterwards, when he had the material 
for building ready, he sailed to Canopus and demanded 
an excessive amount of money from them, which he I352 1 ' 
said represented the difference to him between having 
the mart near the Pharos and at Canopus. And when they 
said that they would not be able to give him the money he 
made them move their city. 

And when he had sent some one to make a purchase and 
discovered that his messenger had got what he wanted 

1 Reading ye for r* (W. IX Ross) in I. 22. 

2 Reading with Keil aiwveurdai for apvveirOtu in 1. 25. 


5 cheaply but intended to charge him an excessive price, he 
told the friends of the purchaser that he had heard that he 
had made his purchases at an excessive price and therefore 
he should not pay any attention to him ; at the same time 
with assumed wrath he railed against his stupidity. When 
10 they heard this they told Cleomenes that he ought not to 
believe those who spoke against the messenger until he 
came himself and rendered his account. When the pur- 
chaser arrived they told him what Cleomenes had said ; 
and he, wishing to make a good impression on them and on 
Cleomenes, submitted the prices at which he had actually 
bought the goods. 

When corn was being sold in the country at ten drachmae, 
15 he summoned the dealers and asked them at what price 
they would do business with him. They named a lower 
price than that at which they were selling to the merchants. 
However, he ordered them x to hand over their corn at the 
same price as they were selling to every one else ; and fixing 
the price of corn at thirty-two drachmae he then sold it 
20 He also called the priests together and told them that 
the expenditure' 2 on the temples in the country was 
excessive ; consequently some of the temples and the 
majority of the priests must be abolished. The priests 
individually and collectively gave him the sacred treasures, 
thinking that he really intended to carry out his threat and 
because each wished that his own temple should be Un- 
as disturbed and himself continue to be priest. 

Antimenes, the Rhodian, being put by Alexander in 
charge of the roads a round Babylon, raised money in the 
following way. An ancient law existed in Babylonia that 
anything which was brought into the country should pay 
a duty of ten per cent., but no one ever enforced it. 
Antimenes, waiting till all the satraps and armies were 
30 expected and no small number of ambassadors and craft s- 

1 Reading with Bekker (icdvovs in 1. 17. 

2 Omitting AvanaXov with some MSS. in 1. 20. 

3 Tjfuodtos in 1. 26 is corrupt, but the right sense is given by the Latin 
version, which reads curatione ei data uiarum. 

BOOK II. 2 1352* 

men summoned from abroad, bringing others with them, 1 
and persons travelling on their own private affairs, and 
many gifts were being brought in, exacted the ten per cent, 
duty according to the existing law. 

On another occasion, when providing the slaves who were 
to serve in the army, he commanded that any owner who 
wished should register the value which he put upon them, 35 
and they were to pay eight drachmae a year ; if the slave 
ran away the owner was to receive the price which he had 
registered. 2 Many slaves being registered, he amassed a i353 a 
considerable sum of money. And whenever any slave ran 
away he ordered the satrap of the country :! in which the 
camp was situated to recover the runaway or else to pay 
the price to the owner. 

Ophelas, the Olynthian, having appointed a super- 5 
intendent over the province of Athribis, when the provincial 
governors of that district came to him and expressed their 
willingness to pay of their own accord a much larger sum 
and begged him to dismiss the superintendent whom he 
had just appointed, asked them if they would be able to 
pay what they promised ; when they answered in the 10 
affirmative he left the superintendent at his post and bade 
him exact the amount of tribute which they themselves 
had assessed. Thus he did not think it right either to 
degrade the official whom he had appointed or to impose 
a heavier tribute upon them than they themselves had fixed, 
but at the same time he himself received a far larger 
amount of money. 

Pythocles, the Athenian, recommended to the Athe- 15 
nians that the state should take the lead from the mines at 
Laurium out of private hands at the market price of two 
drachmae and that they should then themselves fix the 
price at six drachmae and so sell it. 

Chabrias, when crews had been enrolled for a hundred 
and twenty ships and Taus only needed sixty, ordered the 20 
crews of the sixty ships which remained behind to supply 

1 Omitting in 1. 31 roiis before ayoiras (Aldine), but the whole phrase 
/iXXouf Toi/s (iyovras is probably corrupt. 
1 An early example of insuring employees. 
3 Reading with Schneider rfjr (y»)s) in 1. 3. 


those who sailed with two months' provisions, or else to sail 
themselves. They, wishing to attend to their own affairs, 
complied with his demand. 

Antimenes ordered the satraps to keep the storehouses 

25 filled along the royal roads according to the custom of the 
country ; but whenever an army or any other body of men 
unaccompanied by the king passed along, he used to send 
one of his own men and sell the contents of the storehouses. 
^S' Cleomenes, when the first day of the month was 

approaching and he had to give his soldiers their rations, 
purposely put back into harbour, and when the new month 
was approaching he put out again and distributed the 
rations ; he then left an interval from the beginning of the 
5 month until the first day of the next month. The soldiers, 
therefore, because they had recently received their rations, 
kept quiet ; and Cleomenes by passing over a month 
deprived them of a month's pay in each year. 

Stabelbius, general of the Mysians, when he owed 
his soldiers pay, called the officers 1 together and told 

10 them that he had no need of private soldiers but only of 
officers, and that, when he did need soldiers, he gave each 
officer a sum of money and sent him out to collect 
mercenaries, and that he would rather give the officers the 
pay which ought to go to the soldiers. He therefore 
ordered them each to send away their own levies out of 
the country. The officers, thinking that it would be an 

15 opportunity to make money, dismissed the soldiers in 
accordance with his commands. But after a short interval 
he collected the officers together and told them that just as 
a flute player was no use without a chorus, so too officers 
were useless without private soldiers ; he therefore ordered 
them to leave the country. 

20 Dionysius, when he was making a round of the 

temples, whenever he saw a gold or silver table displayed, 
ordered that a libation should be poured out f to good luck ' 
and that the table should be carried off; and whenever he 
saw amongst the statues one which held out a wine cup, he 

1 Reading in 1. 8 MvaSfV xrrpciTtyybs (Scaliger) ttydXwv (Schneider) 

(JTpuTiwriUi fii(T0('n; (TvyKa\e<T(i? TOVS t)yiflov»S (Cameraiilis) (<f)T]cr(i>. 

BOOK II. 2 i353 l 

would say, ' I accept your pledge ', and order the statue to 
be carried away. And he used to strip the raiment of gold x 
and crowns of silver 2 from the statues, saying that he 25 
would give 3 them others lighter and more fragrant ; he then 
clad them with white garments and crowns of white violets. 

1 Omitting re between to. and ^puo-5 in 1. 24. 

2 Reading tovs arecpdvovs ( 1-01/9 dpyvpov?} (coni. Susemihl) in 1. 24. 

3 Reading fvcoSe'trrfp' &v Bovvai (Richards) in I. 26. 


43 a -53 b 
Abydos, 49*3. 
Acropolis, 47 ; ' i 5. 
Agriculture, prior among the arts, 

43 a 25 ; defined, 43" 28 ; a natural 

art, 43 :l 30 ; conducive to bravery, 

43 b 2ff. 
Alexander, 52*28, b 26. 
Alexandrian, 52" 16. 
Aliens, resident, at Abydos, 49 a 4; 

at Byzantium, 47* 1 ; at Chal- 

cedon, 47 b 22. 
Amisus, 5o b 27, 28. 
Antimenes, imposes 10 % duty on 

imports in Babylonia, 52^26; 

institutes insurance of slaves 

serving in the army, 52 b 33 ff. ; 

sells the contents of storehouses 

on the royal roads, 53*240". 
Antissa, 47* 25. 
Aristotle,the Rhodian, raises money 

from the rival parties at Phocaea, 

48* 35 ff. ; obtains control of the 

law-courts, 48 b 11. 
Artabazus, 5i b 20. 
Artabe, 51*9. 
Arts, the, their subdivisions, 43*5 ; 

the mercenary a's, 43*29; the 

warlike a's, 43* 30 ; the illiberal 

a's, 43 b 3- See also Agriculture, 

Athena, 47* 15. 
Athenian, 47*4, 8, 18, 50*23, b 3 3 , 

51*18, 53*15. 
Athribis, province of, 53*6. 
Attic system of economy, 44 b 3I, 


Babylon, 52 b 27. 

Banks, right to change money 
granted to a single b. at Byzan- 
tium, 46'' 24. 

Black Sea, ships from, forced to put 
in at Byzantium, 46 b 3i ; seized 
by Chalcedonians, 47 b 25. 

Bosporus, tyrants on the, 47 b 3. 

Byzantines, raise money by selling 
sacred enclosures and other pro- 
perty and rights, 46 b 13 ff. ; grant 
right of changing money to a 
single bank, 46 b 24 ; grant citi- 
zenship to those born of one 

I343 a -I353 b 

citizen-parent only, 46 b 27 ; force 
ships from Black Sea to put in, 
46 b 3i; allow resident-aliens to 
lend money on mortgages, 47* 1 

Callistratus, doubles the sum for 
which harbour-dues in Macedonia 
are sold, 50* i6ff. 

Canopus, 52* 30, 31. 

Caria, 48*4, 5i b 36. 

Carians, 52* I. 

Carthaginians, not allowed to drink 
wine during military service, 

44 a 33- 
Chabrias, his advice to Taus, king 
of Egypt, 5o b 33 ; his device for 
obtaining provisions for the fleet, 

Chalcedonians, pay their mer- 
cenaries by seizing passing ships 
from the Black Sea, 47 b 2off. 

Charidemus, obtains money by 
deceiving the Aeolians, 5 1 b 1 9 ff*. ; 
forbids the possession of arms, 
5i b 29ff. 

Chians, raise money by forcing 
debtors to pay the state and pay- 
ing interest to creditors, 47 b 35- 

C/ious, 47*35. 

Chorus, tragic, 47*1 1, 5i b 37- 

Citizenship, granted at Byzantium 
to those born of one citizen- 
parent only, 46 b 27. 

City, the, the subject-matter of 
Politics, 43*2, 7; definition of, 
43* 10; economy of (Political 
economy), 45 b 14, 46 b 5 ff. 

Clans, property owned by, 46 b 15. 

Clazomenians, raise money by 
commandeering oil and selling it 
abroad, 48^ 1 7 ff". ; establish an 
iron coinage, 48 b 24 ff. 

Cleomenes, places a tax on exported 
corn, 52 a i6ff. ; obtains money 
by threatening to hunt sacred 
crocodiles in Egypt, 52*230".; 
transfers the mart at Canopus to 
the Pharos, 52*29; his device 
for obtaining goods at a fair price, 
52 b 4ff. ; fixes the price of coin, 


52 b 14 ; obtains money by threat- 
ening to reduce the number of 
temples in Egypt, 52 b 2off. ; by 
a trick deprives his soldiers of a 
month's pay in the year, 53 1 ' I ff. 

Coinage, 45 b 22, 23; Hippias de- 
clares the Athenian c. debased 
and calls it in, then reissues it, 
47 a 8; of iron at Clazomene, 
48 1 ' 25 ; of tin at Syracuse, 
49 a 32 ff. ; debased at Syracuse, 
49 b 30 ff. ; of bronze issued for 
silver by Timotheus, 50 11 23 ff. 

Condalus, raises money by various 
devices, 48 a i8ff. 

Corcyra, 50" 30. 

Corinthian, 46 a 32, 33, b 5. 

Cotys, brings down the price of 
corn by employing troops for 
agriculture, 5 1 u 1 8 ff . ; obtains 
money by a trick from the Peirin- 
thians, 5i a 24ff. 

Crocodiles, sacred, in Egypt, 52 a 24. 

Cypselus, his deception of the 
Corinthians, 46 s 32 ff. 

Cyzicus, popular party at, pays the 
army by releasing wealthy citizens 
from prison on payment of a fine, 
47 b 3 iff. 

Demeter, 49 a i5. 

Didales, deceives his soldiers by 
showing them mule-loads of silver 
plate, 50 a i6ff. ; keeps artificers 
and retailers in his personal 
service, 50'' 30. 

Dion, 44 b 35. * 

Dionysia, 5 i b 37. 

Dionysius, of Syracuse, appropriates 
by a trick the jewellery of the 
Syracusans, 49 a i4ff. ; obtains 
money for the fleet by a trick, 
49 a 25ff. ; issues a tin coinage, 
49 a 32ff. ; obtains money by the 
trick of selling his own household 
goods, 49 a 36rf. ; obtains money 
by removing the tax on cattle and 
then reimposing it, 49 b 6 ; appro- 
priates the income of orphan 
minors, 49 b 1 4 ff. ; discovers by 
a trick the hidden treasures of 
the Rhegians, 49 b 1 7ff. ; debases 
the coinage, 49 b 3off. ; obtains 
by a trick the treasures taken by 
his sailors from the temple of 
Leucothea, 49 1 ' 33 ; appropriates 

offerings and decorations of 
statues, 53 b 20 ff. 
Druggists, 46 b 22. 

Economics, compared with Politics, 
43 a I ; its sphere is a monarchy, 
43 a 4; its subject-matter is the 
household, 43 a 2, 9; prior in 
origin to Politics, 43 s 15 ; includes 
rules for the association of hus- 
band and wife, 43 a 23. 

Economist, qualities of the, 44 b 22 ff., 
45 b 7ff. 

Economy, systems of, Attic, 44 b 31, 
45 a i8; Laconian, 44 b 3i, 45 b 2; 
Persian, 44 b 30, 34; four kinds 
of, Royal, Satrapic, Political, and 
Personal, 45 b 1 1 ff. 

Egypt, S2 a 9, 1 6, 17. 

Egyptian, 5o b 33. 

Enclosures, sacred, 46 b I3; be- 
longing to associations and clans, 
4 6 b i5. 

Ephesians, the, forbid the wearing 
of gold ornaments, 49 a 9. 

' Essence ' defined, 43 a 13. 

Evaeses, obtains money by a trick 
from the relatives of governors 
whom he had hanged, 52 a 9ff. 

Expenditure, must not exceed 
income, 46 s 16. 

Export, exports, 45 b 21, 24 ; of corn 
forbidden at Selybria, 48 b 33 ; this 
prohibition relaxed, 49 a 1 ; tax 
on corn exported from Egypt, 

Farmers, loans to, 49 a 5- 

Female, see Male and female, 

Husband and wife. 
Fisheries, 46 b 20. 
Food, of slaves, 44 a 31 ff. 
Freedom, as a reward of merit in 

slaves, 44 b 15. 

Harbour dues, in Macedonia, 5o a i6. 

Heraclea, the people of, pay their 
army by commandeering local 
supplies and selling them to the 
soldiers, 47 b 3 ff. 

Hermeias, 5i a 33, 35. 

Hesiod, {Works and Days, 405) 
43 a 20, (do., 699) 44*16. 

Hippias, exacts payment for build- 
ings,&c.,projecting into the streets 
of Athens, 4 7 a 4; declares coinage 
debased and calls it in, then 
reissues it, 47* 8 ; excuses from 


state services on payment of 
a line, 47*11; imposes a pay- 
ment in grain and money for 
persons burn and dying, 47* 14. 

Household, the, is the subject- 
matter of Economics, 43* 2, 9 ; 
its component parts, 43 11 18 ; the 
first condition of subsistence, 
43*22 ; disposition of, 45 a 24ff. 

Husband and wife, rules for their 
association a part of Economics, 
43 a 23 ; the common life natural, 
43 b 8ff., 26; the nature of their 
intercourse, 43 b 17 ff. ; their func- 
tions compared, 43 b 27 ff. 

Imports, 45 1 ' 21, 24; 10% duty on, 
in Babylonia, 52 b 27- 

Income, sources of, should be dis- 
tributed, 44 1 ' 27 ; must not be 
exceeded by expenditure, 46* 16. 
See also Revenue. 

Insurance of slaves serving in the 
army, 52 b 33ff. 

Intercourse, sexual, see Sexual in- 

Iphicrates, his advice to Cotys, 

Iron coinage at Clazomenae, 4S b 25. 

Jugglers, 44 b 2i. 

Lacedaemonians fast for a day and 
give the money thus saved to the 
Samians, 47 b 16. 

Laconian system of economy, 44 b 

3i, 45 b 2. 
Lampsacus, 5 i b 1, provisions at L. 

bought up by the state and sold 

at a profit, 47 b 32. 
Laurium, 53 a 1.6. 
Lead-mines at Laurium, 53*16. 
Leucothea, 49 b 34. 
Levy on property at Potidaea, 47* 

Libyan, 45*2,4. 
Loans, to farmers, 49 a 5. 
Lycians, the, wear their hair long, 

48*28; deceived by Condalus, 

Lygdamis, his trick for raising 

money, 46'' 7 ff. 

Macedonia, 50* 16. 
Macedonian, 5 i b 36. 
Male and female, necessary to one 
another, 43 b 1 1 ff. ; then inter- 

course among the animals and 
among men compared, 43* 13 ff. ; 
see also Husband and wife. 

Man, a component part of the 
household, 43* 18 ; the worthiest 
subject of Economics, 44* 23. 

Man and woman, see Husband and 
wife, Male and female. 

Marriage, of slaves, commended, 
44 b 17 ; see also Husband and 

Master, the, necessity for personal 
supervision by, 44 b 34 ; should 
rise early and retire late, 45* 13. 

Mausolus, 48*18,31 ; the trick by 
which he paid tribute due to the 
king of Persia, 48* 4 ; raises 
money by a trick from the Mylas- 
sians, 48* II. 

Medimnus, 47*33, 5o b 9, 51*21. 

Memnon, obtains money by a trick 
from the inhabitants of Lam- 
psacus, 5 i b 1 ff. ; by a trick avoids 
paying his soldiers for 30 days in 
the year, 5 1 b 1 1 ff. 

Mendaeans, only exact property-tax 
when required, 50*6 ; sell slaves 
to pay war expenses, 50* 1 1. 

Mentor, obtains the possessions of 
Hermeias by a trick, 5i a 33 ff. 

Mercenaries, 47 b 2o, 53 b II. 

Metreta, 5o b 10. 

Mines, at Laurium, 53* 16. 

Mining, the art of, 43*26. 

Monarchy, the sphere of Economics 
is a m., 43* 4. 

Money-changing, the right of, 46 b 

Mortgaged property, loans on, 47* 1 . 

Mylassians, 48* II, 14. 

Mysians, 53 b 8. 

Naxian, 46 b 7. 

Oil, commandeered by the state at 
Clazomenae and sold abroad, 


Olynthian, 50* 12,23, 53*5. 
Ophelas, his device for obtaining 

more money from the provincial 

governors, 53* 5 ff. 
Orus, 5i b i9- 

Peirinthians, 51*24, 25. 
Persia, the king of, 48*4. *3> 3°> 


Persian, 45 a 2, 50'' 16 ; P. system of 

economy, 44 b 30, 34. 
Personal Economy, 45M4; its 

scope, 46 s 8-16. 
Pharos, the (at Alexandria), 52 a 30. 
Philoxenus, obtains money by 

granting relief from state-services, 

5i b 36ff. 
Phocaea, rival parties at, deceived 

by Aristotle the Rhodian,48 a 35 ff. 
Political Economy, 45M4; its 

scope, 46 b 5 ff. 
Politics, compared with Economics, 

43 a l; its subject-matter is the 

city, 43 a 2, 7; Economics prior 

to P., 43 a i5- 
Poll-tax, 46*4, 48 a 32. 
Potidaea, the Athenians at, levy 

a tax on property, 47 a 18. 
Procreation, the sole object of 

sexual intercourse of animals, 43 b 

1 5 ; in man subserves nature and 

provides for the support of 

parents in old age, 43 b 2off. ; 

provides for the perpetuation of 

the species, 43 b 25. 
Property, a component part of the 

household, 43 a 18 ; levy on, at 

Potidaea, 47 a 18 ; tax on, at 

Mende, 5o a n. 
Punishment of slaves, 44 a 35. 
Pythagoreans, 44 a 10. 
Pythocles, advises the Athenians to 

fix the market-price of lead, 53 s 

15 ff. 

Revenue, various kinds of, 45 b 
29 ff. ; sources of, 46 a 21 ff. ; see 
also Income. 

Rhegians, 49 b 22. 

Rhegium, 49 b 17. 

Rhodian, 51*33, b i, 52 b 26. 

Roads, royal, 48* 24, 52 b 26, 53 a 24. 

1 Royal' Economy, 45P 15 ; its scope, 

45 b i9ff- 

Salt, right to sell, 46 b 2i. 

Samians, 47 b 16, 19. 

Samos, 5o b 4. 

Satrap, 45 b 25, 5i b 36, 52 a 9, 16, 

b 29, 53 a 3- 
'Satrapic' Economy, 45 b 13, 28; 

its scope, 45 b 29ff. 
Selybrians, raise money by relaxing 

prohibition on the export of corn, 

48 b 33ff- 

Sexual intercourse, in animals based 
on instinct, 43'' 13; rules for, in 
man, 44 a 13. 

Slaves, necessity for good s., 44 a 
25; their education and treat- 
ment, 44 a 26 ff. ; punishment of, 
44 a 35 ; food of, 44 a 3 iff. ; freedom 
to be offered as prize of merit, 
44 b 1 5 ; best type of, 44 b 1 1 ff. ; 
marriage among, 44 b 17 ; leisure 
and amusements of, 44 b 19 ; sold 
at Mende to pay expenses of war, 
50* 1 1 ; insurance of slaves serv- 
ing in the army, 52 b 33ff 

Soothsayers, 46'' 22. 

Sosipolis raises money by selling 
offerings to Dionysus, 47 a 25ff. 

Stabelbius, by a trick disbands his 
soldiers to whom he owes pay, 
53 b 8ff. 

State-services, Hippias excuses 
from, on payment of fine, 47 a 1 1 ; 
similar device used by Philo- 
menus, 5 i b 36 ff. 
. Storehouses on royal roads, 53 a 

Suppliants, reverence for, 44 a 1 1 . 

'Syracusans, 49 b 4- 

Syracuse, 49 a 14. 

Syrian, 52 s 9. 

Taos, king of Egypt, 53 a 20, ob- 
tains money from the priests by 
threatening that they will be dis- 
pensed with, and borrows other 
moneyfromthem,5o b 33ff. ; taxes 
corn, 5i a 8; taxes industry, 51* 
10 ; commandeers unminted gold 
and silver, 5i a 13. 

Taxes, various kinds of, 45 b 3off. ; 
on cattle at Syracuse, 49 b 6; on 
property at Mende, 50*11; on 
corn and industries in Egypt, 51* 
8 ff. See also Poll-tax. 

Thracian, 5i a 24. 

Timotheus, Issues bronze for silver 
coinage, 5o a 23 ff . ; by a trick 
avoids paying his soldiers, 50 s 
30 ff. ; sells their own produce to 
the besieged Samians, 50 b 4; 
allows provisions to be sold 
wholesale only, 50 b 7. 

Tithe, 45 b 33. 

Trading, retail, 43 11 29. 

Tribute, paid by Mausolus to the 
king of Persia, 48°* 4. 


Tyrants, on the Bosporus, 47 b 4 ; 

Mausolus t. of C aria, 48 a 5. 
Tyrrhenia, 49'' 33. 

Wealth, acquisition and preserva- 
tion of, 44 b 23 ff. 

Wife, the, in the household, 43 a 21, 
b 7, 45 a 6; the proper possession 
of all freemen, 43 a 22 ; laws to be 

observed towards, 44'* 8. See 
also Husband and wife. 
Wine, not to be given to slaves, 
44 a 3lff. ; not drunk by the 
Carthaginians on military service, 

44 a 33- 
Woman, see Male and female, 
Husband and wife, Wife. 

Zeus, 46*32. 




K.C.B., F.B.A. 



Reprinted lithographically in Great Britain 


from sheets of the first edition 
1938. 1946, 1952 


THIS translation of the treatise on the Constitution of 
Athens is a revision of a translation prepared by me, shortly- 
after the first appearance of the Greek text in 1891, for 
Messrs. Bell & Son. and is issued with their concurrence. 
It has been revised throughout, with a view both to improv- 
ing it in detail and to bringing it into conformity with the 
text as now established. In particular, the last six chapters, 
which have been reconstructed out of a large number of 
fragments and were first printed as a continuous text in 
the edition prepared by me for the Berlin Academy (1903), 
are now translated for the first time. 

The text taken as the basis is that printed in the Oxford 
series {Sciiptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxonicnsis), which 
will be published almost simultaneous!}'. It is almost iden- 
tical with that of the Berlin edition ; indeed the extent of 
variation between this and all recent editions — Thalheim 
(1909), Sandys (1912), Hude (1916) — is very slight, and in 
default of the appearance of another manuscript of the 
treatise, to set beside the British Museum papyrus, the 
text may be considered as definitely established within very- 
narrow limits. 

In translating it. I have endeavoured to follow the matter- 
of-fact, unadorned style of the original. In the notes I have 
confined myself to the indication of possible variations of 
text and the explanation of passages which appear obscure. 
I have not undertaken any examination of the credibility 
of the statements made, or of the historical value of the 

I have to thank Mr. W. D. Ross and Prof. J. A. Smith 
for suggestions on points of detail. 

F. G. K. 

Dec. 1, 1919 




1. Condemnation [of the Alcmeonidae]. Purification of the city by 


2. Oligarchical constitution of the country, and miserable economic 

condition of the populace. 

3. Summary of pre-Draconian constitution. Origin of the Archons ; 

duration of their office, and their official residences. Predomi- 
nant position of the Areopagus as guardian of the constitution. 

4. The constitution of Draco: the franchise given to those who 

could furnish a military equipment. Qualifications of Archons, 
Treasurers, Strategi, and Hipparchi. Council of 401. Classi- 
fication of the population on a property basis. Position of 
Areopagus maintained. 

5. Political strife, leading to appointment of Solon as mediator and 

Archon : his own description of his task. 

6. The Seisachtheia. 

7. The constitution of Solon. 

The property classes. 

8. Mode ot election of magistrates. Tribes, Trittyes, and Nau- 

craries. Council of 400. Council of Areopagus ; its powers 
of supervision. Penalty for indifference in times of civil 

9. Democratic features: (I) prohibition of loans secured on the 

debtor's person ; (2) general right to claim redress of wrong ; 
(3) the appeal to the jury-courts. 

10. Solon's reforms of the currency and the standards of weights and 


11. Popular opinion on Solon's reforms. 

12. Quotations from his poems to illustrate his own view of his policy. 

13. Continuance of political strife. Damasias's coup d'etat. The three 

political parties: (1) the Shore, (2) the Plain, (3) the Mountain. 

14. Usurpation of Pisistratus : his first expulsion and restoration. 

15- His second expulsion and final restoration. Disarmament of 

the people. 

16. Characteristics of his rule. 

17. His death and family. 



18. The rule of the Pisistratidae. Harmodius and Aristogeiton. 

19. Deterioration of the tyrants' administration. Attacks by exiles, 

headed by Alcmeonidae : many failures, and final success through 
the Delphic oracle and Spartan help. Expulsion of the Pisis- 

20. Cleisthenes : struggle with lsagoras, backed by the Spartans under 

Cleomenes. Final expulsion of Spartans, and triumph of the 

21. Reforms of Cleisthenes. Establishment of ten tribes: Council of 

500: division of population into denies, grouped in trittyes. 

22. The law of ostracism : its application, and growth of popular 

control of politics. Marathon : the mines of Maroneia and 
the building of a navy under Themistocles' inspiration ; 

23. Revival of Areopagus through its efficiency in Persian war : its 

good administration. Aristides and Themistocles. The Ionian 

24. Aristides and the League : the population of Athens supported by 

the revenues of the League. 

25. Fall of the Areopagus : Ephhltes and Themistocles. 

26. Increasing laxity of administration, due to political demagogism. 

Inefficiency of aristocratic leaders. Zeugitae made eligible for 
Archonship. Institution of local justices. Restriction of fran- 
chise to persons of citizen birth by both parents. 

27. Rise of Pericles. Outbreak of Peloponnesian War. Institution of 

pay for services in law-courts, leading eventually to public 
demoralization and corruption. 

28. Growth of demagogism after Pericles' death. Summary of party 

leaderships from time of Solon. Deterioration of popular leaders : 
Cleon, Cleophon, and progenies uitiosior. The best statesmen 
of these later times. Nicias. Thucydides. and Theramenes. 

29. Fall of the democracy. Constitution of the Four Hundred : stages 

in its establishment : 

(a) Committee of 30: recommend Constituent Assembly of 
Five Thousand. 

30. [b) The Five Thousand appoint 1 00 commissioners to draft 

constitution. These draw up (1) a constitution for the 
future, with Councils composed of men over 30, and 

31. (2) a scheme for immediate adoption, based on a Council 
of Four Hundred with full powers of administration. 

32. Rule of the Four Hundred : failure of negotiations with Sparta. 

33. Loss of Euboea ; fall of Four Hundred : the government entrusted 

to the Five Thousand, with good results. The Revolution led 
by Theramenes. 

34. The Five Thousand dispossessed : the popular Assembly resumes 

control. Battle of Arginusae. Spartan offer of peace rejected. 



Battle of Aegospotami : fall of Athens. The Thirty established 
in power by Lysander. 

35. Rule of the Thirty : rapid deterioration. 

36. Opposition of Theramenes: nominal Assembly of Three Thousand. 

37. Thrasybulus and the exiles at Phyle. Execution of Theramenes, 

and admission of Spartan garrison. 

38. Defeat and deposition of the Thirty. Council of Ten. Defection 

of the populace. Second Council of Ten, which restores peace. 

39. Terms of reconciliation: settlement of partisans of the Thirty at 


40. The restored democracy ; statesmanlike action of Archinus. End 

of the secession to Eleusis. 

41. Recapitulation of successive constitutions, from Ion to the restored 

democracy. Payment for attendance at the Assembly. 


42. Admission to the franchise : the training of the youths. 

43. The Council of Five Hundred : its Prytanes. The programme of 

the Assembly. 

44. President of the Prytanes : the Proedri. 

45. Criminal jurisdiction of the Council ; its limitation to prelimi- 

nary investigation. 
Examination of magistrates, similarly limited. 

46. Examination of naval programme, and inspection of public 


47. Co-operation with other magistrates : 

(a) The Treasurers. 

(6) The Poletae [Commissioners for Public Contracts]. 

48. (c) The Apodectae (Receivers-General]. 

(d) The Logistae [Auditors]. 

(e) The Euthuni [Examiners of Accounts]. 

49. (/") The Catalogeis [Commissioners of Enrolment]. Inspec- 

tion of cavalry horses. 
ig) The Military Treasurer. 
(//) Examination of paupers. 

50. Commissioners for Repairs of Temples. 
Astynomi [City Commissioners]. 

51. Agoranomi [Market Commissioners]. 

Metronomi [Commissioners of Weights and Measures]. 
Sitophylaces [Corn Commissioners!. 
Superintendents of the Mart. 

52. The Eleven [Gaol Commissioners]. 
Eisagogeis [Introducers of Cases]. 



53. The Forty [Local Justices]. 


54. Hodopoei [Commissioners of Roads]. 

Clerks of the Assembly. 

Hieropoei [Commissioners of Public Worship]. 

Commissioners of Festivals. 

Magistrates for Salamis and Piraeus. 

55. The Archons : formalities of their election. 

56. (a) The Archon : appointment of Choregi ; share in admini- 

stration of festivals ; suits which are heard before him. 

57. (6) The King : superintendence of the mysteries and Lenaea: 

trials for homicide. 

58. (c) The Polemarch : his religious functions and jurisdiction in 

actions respecting non-citizens. 

59. (d) The Thesmothetae : their legal functions. 

60. Athlothetae [Commissioners of Games] : the oil from the sacred 


61. Military officials: (a) Strategi, {b) Taxiarchs, (c) Hipparchs, 

(d) Phylarchs. 

62. Modes of election. 
Pay for various offices. 

63-69. Procedure in the law-courts. 

63. The apparatus. Qualifications for service as jurors. Tickets. 

64. Selection of jurors, and assignment to courts. 

65. Precautions against packing of juries. 

66. Allotment of presiding magistrates. 

Selection of controller of the clock and counters of votes. 

67. Allotment of time to the litigants. 

68. Size of juries. Form of ballot balls. Method of voting. 

69. Counting of votes. Payment of jurors. 


. . . [They ! were tried] by a court empanelled from among i 
the noble families, and sworn upon the sacrifices. The part of 
accuser was taken by Myron. They were found guilty of the 
sacrilege, and their bodies were cast out of their graves and 
their race banished for evermore. In view of this expiation 2 , 
Epimenides the Cretan performed a purification of the city. 

After this event there was contention for a long time 2 
between the upper classes and the populace. Not only was 2 
the constitution at this time oligarchical in every respect, 
but the poorer classes, men, women, and children, were the 
serfs of the rich. They were known as Pelatae and also 
as Hectemori, 3 because they cultivated the lands of the 
rich at the rent thus indicated. The whole country was 
in the hands of a few persons, and if the tenants failed 
to pay their rent they were liable to be haled into slavery, 
and their children with them. All loans were secured upon 
the debtor's person, a custom which prevailed until the 

1 The narrative opens with the trial of the Alcmeonidae for sacrilege. 
Cylon, a young noble, had attempted to seize despotic power by force; 
but his attempt failed, and his adherents fled to sanctuary, which they 
were only induced to leave under a safe conduct. This was violated 
by the archon Megacles, one of the great house of the Alcmeonidae, 
who caused them all to be put to death ; a sacrilege which was 
supposed to be the cause of the misfortunes which subsequently befell 
Athens, until the Alcmeonidae submitted themselves to trial. The 
date of Cylon's attempt to set himself up as tyrant is shown by this 
treatise to have been before the time of Draco ; and, as Cylon was an 
Olympic victor in 640 B.C., and was apparently still a young man at 
the time of his attempt, the latter (which took place in an Olympic year) 
may be assigned to 632 B.C. The expulsion of the Alcmeonidae did 
not take place till many years afterwards ; the visit of Epimenides 
probably took place about 596 B. C, shortly before the legislation 
of Solon. Aristotle is here carrying down the story of Cylon's 
attempt to its conclusion, and he subsequently goes back to the 
reforms of Draco. 

2 Or ' in addition ' ; but the order of the words is in favour of the 
other interpretation. 

3 i.e. those who paid a sixth portion. Some scholars, however, 
interpret it to mean tenants who received only a sixth part of the 
produce, and paid five-sixths to their landlords. 

MB. 20 


time of Solon, who was the first to appear as the champion 
3 of the people. But the hardest and bitterest part of the 
constitution in the eyes of the masses was their state of 
serfdom. Not but what the}' were also discontented with 
every other feature of their lot : for, to speak generally, they 
had no part nor share in anything. 

3 Now the ancient constitution, as it existed before the time 
of Draco, was organized as follows. The magistrates were 
elected according to qualifications of birth and wealth. At 
first they governed for life, but subsequently for terms 

a of ten years. 1 The first magistrates, both in date and in 
importance, were the King, the Polemarch, and the Archon. 
The earliest of these offices was that of the King, which 
existed from ancestral antiquity. To this was added, 
secondly, the office of Polemarch, on account of some of the 
kings proving feeble in war ; for it was on this account that 
Ion 2 was invited to accept the post on an occasion of press- 

3 ing need. The last of the three offices was that of the 
Archon, which most authorities state to have come into 
existence in the time of Medon. Others assign it to the 
time of Acastus, 3 and adduce as proof the fact that the nine 
Archons swear to execute their oaths ' as in the days of 
Acastus ', which seems to suggest that it was in his time 

1 The absolute monarchy appears to have ended with Codrus, whose 
traditional date is about 1066 B.C. With the accession of his son, 
Medon, a change was evidently made in the nature of the kingly 
power, which is described in the following sentences. The office of 
Polemarch was already in existence ; but at this date the third office, 
that of Archon, was created, and, according to Aristotle, the descendants 
of Codrus agreed to surrender the kingship, taking in exchange the 
archonship, to which the more important functions of the king had 
been transferred. This agrees with the tradition that the kingship was 
abolished after the death of Codrus, though in fact it did not absolutely 
cease to exist, but was reduced to. the second rank, retaining little 
except sacrificial functions. In 752 B.C. the term of the Archon was 
limited to ten years, the election being still confined to members of the 
royal house. After four Archons had ruled on these conditions, the 
office was thrown open to all the Eupatridae, or nobles ; and in 682 B.C. 
the board of nine annual Archons was substituted for the decennial 

2 Ion was said to have come to the assistance of his grandfather 
Erechtheus, when the latter was engaged in war with Eumolpus of 
Eleusis, and to have been made Polemarch, or commander-in-chief, of 
the Athenians. 

-i The successor of Medon, 


that the descendants of Codrus retired from the kingship in 
return for the prerogatives conferred upon the Archon. 
Whichever way it be, the difference in date is small ; but that 
it was the last of these magistracies to be created is shown 
by the fact that the Archon has no part in the ancestral sacri- 
fices, as the King and the Polemarch have, but exclusively 
in those of later origin. So it is only at a comparatively 
late date that the office of Archon has become of great 
importance, through the dignity conferred by these later 
additions. The Thesmothetae l were appointed many years 4 
afterwards, when these offices had already become annual, 
with the object that they might publicly record all legal 
decisions, and act as guardians of them with a view- 
to determining the issues between litigants. Accordingly 
their office, alone of those which have been mentioned, was 
never of more than annual duration. 

Such, then, is the relative chronological precedence of 5 
these orifices. At that time the nine Archons did not all 
live together. The King occupied the building now known 
as the Bucolium, near the Prytaneum, as may be seen from 
the fact that even to the present day the marriage of the 
King's wife to Dionysus 2 takes place there. The Archon 
lived in the Prytaneum, the Polemarch in the Epilyceum. 
The latter building was formerly called the Polemarcheum, 
but after Epilycus, during his term of office as Polemarch, 
had rebuilt it and fitted it up, it was called the Epilyceum. 
The Thesmothetae occupied the Thesmotheteum. In the 
time of Solon, however, they all came together into the 
Thesmotheteum. They had power to decide cases finally 
on their own authority, not, as now, merely to hold a pre- 
liminary hearing. Such then was the arrangement of the 
magistracies. The Council of Areopagus had as its constitu- 6 
tionally assigned duty the protection of the laws ; but in 
point of fact it administered the greater and most important 
part of the government of the state, and inflicted personal 
punishments and fines summarily upon all who misbehaved 

1 The six junior Archons. 

2 The wife of the King-archon every year went through the ceremony 
of marriage to the god Dionysus, at the feast of the Anthesteria. 


themselves. This was the natural consequence of the facts 
that the Archons were elected under qualifications of birth 
and wealth, and that the Areopagus was composed of those 
who had served as Archons; for which latter reason the 
membership of the Areopagus is the only office which has 
continued to be a life-magistracy to the present day. 

4 Such was, in outline, the first constitution, but not very 
long after the events above recorded, in the archonship 
of Aristaichmus, 1 Draco enacted his ordinances. Now 
his constitution had the following form. The franchise 
was given to all who could furnish themselves with a 

a military equipment. The nine Archons and the Treasurers 
were elected by this body from persons possessing an 
unencumbered property of not less than ten minas, the less 
important officials from those who could furnish themselves 
with a military equipment, and the generals [Strategi] and 
commanders of the cavalry [Hipparchi] from those who 
could show an unencumbered property of not less than 
a hundred minas, and had children born in lawful wedlock 
over ten years of age. These officers were required to hold 
to bail the Prytanes, the Strategi, and the Hipparchi of the 
preceding year until their accounts had been an lited. takino- 


four securities of the same class as that to which the Strategi 

3 and the Hipparchi belonged. There was also to be a 
Council, consisting of four hundred and one members, elected 
by lot from among those who possessed the franchise. Both 
for this and for the other magistracies 2 the lot was cast 
among those who were over thirty years of age ; and no 
one might hold office twice until every one else had had his 
turn, after which they were to cast the lot afresh. If any 
member of the Council failed to attend when there was a sit- 
ting of the Council or of the Assembly, he paid a fine, to the 
amount of three drachmas if he was a Pentacosiomedimnus, 3 

4 two if he was a Knight, and one if he was a Zeugites. The 

1 The name of this Archon is not otherwise known, but the tradi- 
tional date of Draco is 621 B. c. 

2 i. e. the other magistracies to which election was made by lot. This 
does not mean that all the magistrates were at this time elected by lot, 
which certainly was not the case. 

1 The meanings of these terms are explained in ch. 7, 4. 


Council of Areopagus was guardian of the laws, and kept 
watch over the magistrates to see that they executed their 
offices in accordance with the laws. Any person who felt 
himself wronged might lay an information before the Council 
of Areopagus, on declaring what law was broken by the 
wrong done to him. But, as has been said before, 1 loans 5 
were secured upon the persons of the debtors, and the land 
was in the hands of a few. 

Since such, then, was the organization of the constitu- 5 
tion, and the many were in slavery to the few, the people 
rose against the upper class. The strife was keen, and 2 
for a long time the two parties were ranged in hostile 
camps against one another, till at last, 2 by common consent, 
they appointed Solon to be mediator'and Archon, and com- 
mitted the whole constitution to his hands. The immediate 
occasion of his appointment was his poem, which begins 
with the words : 

I behold, and within my heart deep sadness has claimed 

its place, 
As I mark the oldest home of the ancientlonian race 
Slain by the sword. 3 

In this poem he fights and disputes on behalf of each 
party in turn against the other, and finally he advises them 
to come to terms and put an end to the quarrel existing 
between them. By birth and reputation Solon was one of 3 
the foremost men of the day, but in wealth and position he 
was of the middle class, as is generally agreed, and is, indeed, 
established by his own evidence in these poems, where he 
exhorts the wealthy not to be grasping. 

But ye who have store of good, who are sated and overflow, 
Restrain your swelling soul, and still it and keep it low : 
Let the heart that is great within you be trained a 

lowlier way ; 
Ye shall not have all at your will, and we will not for 

ever obey. 

1 Ch. 2, 2. 

- The traditional date for Solon's legislation is 594 B. C. 

8 A passage of considerable length, which evidently comes from the 
same poem, is quoted by Demosthenes (de Fals. Leg. ch. 255), but this 
beginning of it is not otherwise known, nor yet the four lines quoted 
just below. 


Indeed, he constantly fastens the blame of the conflict on 
the rich ; and accordingly at the beginning of the poem he 
says that he fears 'the love of wealth and an overweening 
mind ', evidently meaning that it was through these that the 
quarrel arose. 

6 As soon as he was at the head of affairs, Solon liberated 
the people once and for all, by prohibiting all loans on 
the security of the debtors person: and in addition he 
made laws by which he cancelled all debts, public and 
private. This measure is commonly called the Seisachtheia 
[= removal of burdens], since thereby the people had their 

a loads removed from them. In connexion with it some per- 
sons try to traduce the character of Solon. It so happened 
that, when he was about to enact the Seisachtheia, he com- 
municated his intention to some members of the upper class, 
whereupon, as the partisans of the popular party say, his 
friends stole a march on him ; while those who wish to attack 
his character maintain that he too had a share in the fraud 
himself. For these persons borrowed money and bought up 
a large amount of land, and so when, a short time afterwards, 
all debts were cancelled, they became wealthy; and this, 
they say, was the origin of the families which were afterwards 
looked on as having been wealthy from primeval times. 

3 However, the story of the popular party is by far the most 
probable. A man who was so moderate and public-spirited 
in all his other actions, that when it was within his power to 
put his fellow-citizens beneath his feet and establish himself 
as tyrant, he preferred instead to incur the hostility of both 
parties by placing his honour and the general welfare above 
his personal aggrandisement, is not likely to have consented 
to defile his hands by such a petty and palpable fraud. 

4 That he had this absolute power is, in the first place, indi- 
cated by the desperate condition of the country ; moreover, 
he mentions it himself repeatedly in his poems, and it is 
universally admitted. We are therefore bound to consider 
this accusation to be false. 

7 Next Solon drew up a constitution and enacted new 
laws ; and the ordinances of Draco ceased to be used, with 


the exception of those relating to murder. The laws were 
inscribed on the wooden stands, 1 and set up in the King's 
Porch, and all swore to obey them ; and the nine Archons 
made oath upon the stone, 2 declaring that they would dedi- 
cate a golden statue if they should transgress any of them. 
This is the origin of the oath to that effect which they take 
to the present day. Solon ratified his laws for a hundred 2 
years ; and the following was the fashion in which he organ- 
ized the constitution. He divided the population according 3 
to property into four classes, just as it had been divided 
before, namely, Pentacosiomedimni, Knights, Zeugitae, and 
Thetes. 3 The various magistracies, namely, the nine Archons, 
the Treasurers, the Commissioners for Public Contracts 
[Poletac], the Eleven, 4 and the Exchequer Clerks [Colacr£- 
tae], 6 he assigned to the Pentacosiomedimni, the Knights, and 
the Zeugitae, giving offices to each class in proportion to the 
value of their rateable property. To those who ranked 
among the Thetes he gave nothing but a place in the 
Assembly and in the juries. A man had to rank as 4 
a Pentacosiomedimnus if he made, from his own land, five 
hundred measures, whether liquid or solid. Those ranked 
as Knights who made three hundred measures, or, as some 
say, those who were able to maintain a horse. In support 
of the latter definition they adduce the name of the class, 
which may be supposed to be derived from this fact, and 
also some votive offerings of early times ; for in the Acropolis 
there is a votive offering, a statue of Diphilus, 6 bearing this 
inscription : 

1 i.e. the well-known pillars, which were formed by joining together 
four rectangular tablets made of wood. 

2 See ch. 55, 5. 

3 The name Pentacosiomedimnus means one who possesses 500 
measures, as explained in the text below ; that of Knight, or Horseman, 
implies ability to keep a horse; that of Zeugites, ability to keep a 
yoke of oxen ; while the Thetes were originally serfs attached to the soil. 

4 The superintendents of the state prison ; see ch. 52, 1. 

'' These officers, whose original function was said to have been to 
' collect the pieces after a sacrifice ', were the Treasury officials in early 
times, who received the taxes and handed them over to be kept by the 
Treasurers. In later times the Colacretac seem to have ceased to 
exist, and they are not mentioned in Aristotle's enumeration of the 
officials in his own day. 

"' Mr. A. S. Murray has pointed out that this must be a mistake. 


The son of Diphilus, Anthemion hight, 
Raised from the Thetes and become a Knight, 
Did to the gods this sculptured charger bring, 
For his promotion a thank-offering. 

And a horse stands in evidence beside the man, implying that 
this was what was meant by belonging to the rank of Knight. 
Atthe sametimeitseemsreasonable to suppose that this class, 
like the Pentacosiomedimni, was defined by the possession 
of an income of a certain number of measures. Those 
ranked as Zeugitae who made two hundred measures, liquid 
or solid ; and the rest ranked as Thetes, and were not eligible 
for any office. Hence it is that even at the present day, when 
a candidate for any office is asked to what class he belongs, 
no one would think of saying that he belonged to the Thetes. 

8 The elections to the various offices Solon enacted should 
be by lot, out of candidates selected by each of the tribes. 
Each tribe selected ten candidates for the nine archonships, 
and among these the lot was cast. Hence it is still the 
custom for each tribe to choose ten candidates by lot, and 
then the lot is again cast among these. A proof that Solon 
regulated the elections to office according to the property 
classes may be found in the law still in force with regard to 
the Treasurers, which enacts that they shall be chosen from 

a the Pentacosiomedimni. 1 Such was Solon's legislation with 
respect to the nine Archons ; whereas in early times the 
Council of Areopagus 2 summoned suitable persons according 
to its own judgement and appointed them for the year to the 

either of Aristotle, or, more probably, of the copyist. The statue set 
up by Anthemion must have been his own, not his father's, since the 
latter, as the inscription proves, could not properly have been repre- 
sented with a horse, as he was only a member of the Thetes. We 
should therefore read ' a statue of Anthemion, son of Diphilus '. 

1 That this qualification was, in Aristotle's own time, purely nominal 
appears from ch. 47, 1, where it is stated that the person on whom the 
lot falls holds the office, be he ever so poor. 

2 This statement is of great value, as nothing was previously known 
concerning the way in which the Archons and other magistrates were 
appointed previous to the time of Solon. The elections by the 
Areopagus, which may have begun as early as the first successors of 
Codrus, apparently lasted till the reforms of Draco, by which the 
franchise was conferred on all who could furnish a military equipment, 
and the magistrates were presumably thenceforward elected in the 
general Ecclesia or Assembly. 


several offices. There were four tribes, as before, and four 

tribe-kings. Each tribe was divided into three Trittyes 

[= Thirds], with twelve Naucraries 1 in each; and the 
Naucraries had officers of their own, called Naucrari, whose 
duty it was to superintend the current receipts and expendi- 
ture. Hence, among the laws of Solon now obsolete, it is 
repeatedly written that the Naucrari are to receive and to 
spend out of the Naucraric fund. So'on also appointed a 
Council of four hundred, a hundred from each tribe; but he 
assigned to the Council of the Areopagus the duty of super- 
intending the laws, acting as before as the guardian of the 
constitution in general. It kept watch over the affairs of the 
state in most of the more important matters, and corrected 
offenders, with full powers to inflict either fines or personal 
punishment. The money received in fines it brought up into 
the Acropolis, without assigning the reason for the mulct. 
It also tried those who conspired for the overthrow of the 
state, Solon having enacted a process of impeachment to deal 
with such offenders. Further, since he saw the state often 
engaged in internal disputes, while many of the citizens from 5 
sheer indifference accepted whatever might turn up, he made 
a law with express reference to such persons, enacting that 
any one who, in a time of civil factions, did not take up arms 
with either party, should lose his rights as a citizen and 
cease to have any part in the state. 

Such, then, was his legislation concerning the magistracies. 
There are three points in the constitution of Solon which ** 
appear to be its most democratic features : first and most 
important, the prohibition of loans on the security of the 
debtor's person ; secondly, the right of every person who 
so willed to claim redress on behalf of any one to whom 
wrong was being done ; thirdly, the institution of the 
appeal to the jury-courts ; and it is to this last, they say, 
that the masses have owed their strength most of all, since, 

1 It appears from ch. 21,5 that the Naucraries were local divisions, 
which, under the constitution of Cleisthenes, were replaced by the 
denies. The division of tribes into Trittyes and Naucraries existed 
before the time of Solon, as appears from Herodotus (v. 71), and they 
are only mentioned here as continuing under Solon's constitution, not 
as created by him. 



2 when the democracy is master of the voting-power, it is master 
of the constitution. Moreover, since the laws were not drawn 
up in simple and explicit terms (but like the one concerning 
inheritances and wards of state), disputes inevitably occurred, 
and the courts had to decide in every matter, whether public 
or private. Some persons in fact believe that Solon deliber- 
ately made the laws indefinite, in order that the final 
decision might be in the hands of the people. This, how- 
ever, is not probable, and the reason no doubt was that it 
is impossible to attain ideal perfection when framing a law 
in general terms ; for we must judge of his intentions, not 
from the actual results in the present day, but from the 
general tenor of the rest of his legislation. 

lo These seem to be the. democratic features of his laws ; 
but in addition, before the period of his legislation, he 
carried through his abolition of debts, and after it his increase 
in the standards of weights and measures, and of the currency. 
2 During his administration the measures were made larger 
than those of Pheidon, and the mina, which previously had 
a standard of seventy drachmas, was raised to the full 
hundred. 1 The standard coin in earlier times was the two- 
drachma piece. He also made weights corresponding with 
the coinage, sixty-three minas going to the talent ; and the 
odd three minas were distributed among the staters and the 
other values. 2 

II When he had completed his organization of the constitution 
in the manner that has been described, he found himself 
beset by people coming to him and harassing him concerning 
his laws, criticizing here and questioning there, till, as he 
wished neither to alter what he had decided on nor yet to 
be an object of ill will to every one by remaining in Athens, 

' This is a somewhat curious way of expressing the fact that Solon 
substituted the Euboic for the Aeginetan standard of coinage. Each 
mina had ioo drachmas in its own standard, but the weight of the 
Aeginetan mina was only equivalent to 70 Euboic drachmas. The 
object of the change was to encourage trade with the great commercial 
cities of Euboea and with Corinth. 

2 i.e. the talent was raised by one-twentieth ; it still consisted of 
sixty minas, but these were equal to sixty-three of the old minas, and 
the increase was distributed proportionately over the smaller values, 
such as the stater ( = four drachmas). 


he set off on a journey to Kgypt, with the combined objects 
of trade and travel, giving out that he should not return for 
ten years. He considered that there was no call for him 
to expound the laws personally, but that every one should 
obey them just as they were written. Moreover, his a 
position at this time was unpleasant. Many members 
of the upper class had been estranged from him on account 
of his abolition of debts, and both parties were alienated 
through their disappointment at the condition of things 
which he had created. The mass of the people had 
expected him to make a complete redistribution of all 
property, and the upper class hoped he would restore 
everything to its former position, or, at any rate, make but 
a small change. Solon, however, had resisted both classes. 
He might have made himself a despot by attaching himself 
to whichever party he chose, but he preferred, though at the 
cost of incurring the enmity of both, to be the saviour of his 
country and the ideal lawgiver. 

The truth of this view of Solon's policy is established 12 
alike by common consent, and by the mention he has 
himself made of the matter in his poems. Thus : 

I gave to the mass of the people such rank as befitted 

their need, 
I took not away their honour, and I granted naught to 

their greed ; 
While those who were rich in power, who in wealth were 

glorious and great, 
I bethought me that naught should befall them unworthy 

their splendour and state ; 
So I stood with my shield outstretched, and both were 

safe in its sight, 
And I would not that either should triumph, when the 

triumph was not with right. 

Again he declares how the mass of the people ought to be * 
treated : 

But thus will the people best the voice of their leaders 

When neither too slack is the rein, nor violence holdeth 

the sway ; 


For indulgence breedeth a child, the presumption that 
spurns control, 

When riches too great are poured upon men of un- 
balanced soul. 

3 And again elsewhere he speaks about the persons who 
wished to redistribute the land : 

So they came in search of plunder, and their cravings 

knew no bound, 
Every one among them deeming endless wealth would 

here be found, 
And that I with glozing smoothness hid a cruel mind within. 
Fondly then and vainly dreamt they ; now they raise an 

angry din, 
And they glare askance in anger, and the light within 

their eyes 
Burns with hostile flames upon me. Yet therein no 

justice lies. 
All I promised, fully wrought I with the gods at hand 

to cheer, 
Naught beyond in folly ventured. Never to my soul 

was dear 
With a tyrant's force to govern, nor to see the good and base 
Side by side in equal portion share the rich home of 

our race. 

4 Once more he speaks of the abolition of debts and of those 

who before were in servitude, but were released' owing to the 

Seisachtheia : 

Of all the aims for which I summoned forth 
The people, was there one I compassed not? 
Thou, when slow time brings justice in its train, 

mighty mother of the Olympian gods, 

Dark Earth, thou best canst witness, from whose breast 

1 swept the pillars 1 broadcast planted there, 

And made thee free, who hadst been slave of yore. 
And many a man whom fraud or law had sold 
Far from his god-built land, an outcast slave, 
I brought again to Athens ; yea, and some, 
Exiles from home through debt's oppressive load, 
Speaking no more the dear Athenian tongue, 
But wandering far and wide, I brought again ; 

1 These were the pillars set up on mortgaged lands, to record the 
fact of the encumbrance. 


And those that here in vilest slavery 

Crouched 'ncath a master's frown, I set them free. 

Thus might and right were yoked in harmony, 

Since by the force of law I won my ends 

And kept my promise. Equal laws I gave 

To evil and to good, with even hand 

Drawing straight justice for the lot of each. 

But had another held the goad as I, 

One in whose heart was guile and greediness, 

He had not kept the people back from strife. 

For had I granted, now what pleased the one, 

Then what their foes devised in counterpoise, 

Of many a man this state had been bereft. 

Therefore I showed my might on every side, 

Turning at bay like wolf among the hounds. 

And again he reviles both parties for their grumblings in the 5 
times that followed : 

Nay, if one must lay blame where blame is due, 
Wer't not for me, the people ne'er had set 
Their eyes upon these blessings e'en in dreams: — 
While greater men. the men of wealthier life, 
Should praise me and should court me as their friend. 

For had any other man, he says, received this exalted post, 

He had not kept the people back, nor ceased 
Till he had robbed the richness of the milk. 
But I stood forth a landmark in the midst, 
And barred the foes from battle. 

Such, then, were Solon's reasons for his departure from 13 
the country. After his retirement the city was still torn by- 
divisions. For four years, indeed, they lived in peace ; but 
in the fifth year after Solon's government they were unable 
to elect an Archon on account of their dissensions, and 
again four years lat^r they elected no Archon for the same 
reason. Subsequently, after a similar period had elapsed, 2 
Damasiaswas elected Archon j 1 and he governed for two years 
and two months, until he was forcibly expelled from his 
office. After this it was agreed, as a compromise, to elect 
ten Archons, five from the Eupatridae, three from the 

1 Probably in 582 B.C. ; but several varieties of calculation are 
possible, and some editors omit the words 'after a similar period had 
elapsed '. 


Agroeci, and two from the Demiurgi ; } and they ruled 
for the year following Damasias. It is clear from this 
that the Archon was at the time the magistrate who 
possessed the greatest power, since it is always in connexion 

3 with this office that conflicts are seen to arise. But 
altogether thev were in a continual state of internal disorder. 
Some found the cause and justification of their discontent 
in the abolition of debts, because thereby they had been 
reduced to poverty ; others were dissatisfied with the 
political constitution, because it had undergone a revolu- 
tionary change ; while with others the motive was found in 

4 personal rivalries among themselves. The parties at this 
time were three in number. First there was the party of 
the Shore, led by Megacles the son of Alcmeon, which was 
considered to aim at a moderate form of government ; then 
there were the men of the Plain, who desired an oligarchy 
and were led by Lycurgus ; and thirdly there were the men 
of the Highlands, at the head of whom was Pisistratus, who 

5 was looked on as an extreme democrat. This latter party 
was reinforced by those who had been deprived of the debts 
due to them, from motives of poverty, and by those who 
were not of pure descent, from motives of personal 
apprehension.- A proof of this is seen in the fact that after 
the tyranny was overthrown a revision was made of the 
citizen-roll, on the ground that many persons were partaking 
in the franchise without having a right to it. The names 
given to the respective parties were derived from the districts 
in which they held their lands. 

14 Pisistratus had the reputation of being an extreme 
democrat, and he also had distinguished himself greatly in 
the war with Megara. Taking advantage of this, he 
wounded himself, and by representing that his injuries had 
been inflicted on him by his political rivals, he persuaded 
the people, through a motion proposed by Aristion, to grant 
him a bodyguard. After he had got these ' club-bearers ', 

1 Eupatridae = the aristocrats, AgToeci = the country, or agricultural, 
party, Demiurgi = the handworkers, or labour party. 

2 Sc, lest their right to the franchise should be disputed, as it in fact 
was after the fall of the Pisistratidae. 


as they were called, he made an attack with them on the 

people and seized the Acropolis. This happened in the 

archonship of Corneas, thirty-one years after the legislation 

of Solon. It is related that, when Pisistratus asked for his 2 

bodyguard, Solon opposed the request, and declared that 

in so doing he proved himself wiser than half the people 

and braver than the rest, — wiser than those who did not see 

that Pisistratus designed to make himself tyrant, and 

braver than those who saw it and kept silence. But when 

all his words availed nothing he carried forth his armour 

and set it up in front of his house, saying that he had helped 

his country so far as lay in his power (he was already a very 

old man), and that he called on all others to do the same. 

Solon's exhortations,however, proved fruitless, and Pisistratus 3 

assumed the sovereignty. His administration was more 

like a constitutional government than the rule of a tyrant ; 

but before his power was firmly established, the adherents 

of Megacles and Lycurgus made a coalition and drove him 

out. This took place in the archonship of Hegesias, five 

years after the first establishment of his rule. Eleven years 4 

later l Megacles. being in difficulties in a party struggle, 

again opened negotiations with Pisistratus, proposing that 

the latter should marry his daughter ; and on these terms 

he brought him back to Athens, by a very primitive and 

simple-minded device. He first spread abroad a rumour 

that Athena was bringing back Pisistratus, and then, having 

found a woman of great stature and beauty, named Phye* 

1 There is some error in Aristotle's chronology of the life of 
Pisistratus. for while he states below that, of the thirty-three years 
between his first accession and his death, nineteen were spent in 
possession of the tyranny and fourteen in exile, in the actual enumera- 
tion of years he gives twenty-one years of exile and consequently only 
twelve of rule, of which only one can be assigned to his last period of 
government, which is always spoken of as the longest. It is therefore 
tolerably certain that one of the periods of exile is wrongly dated ; and 
as the ten years of the second exile are confirmed by Herodotus, it may 
be concluded that the eleven years here assigned to the first exile are 
wrong, and should be reduced to four. It should be noticed that in the 
Politics it is stated that Pisistratus was actually in power only seventeen 
years out of the thirty-three ; but this would reduce the duration of his 
third tenure of power lower than is at all probable, unless we suppose 
that the length of the two earlier terms is wrongly given here. For a 
statement of the various solutions offered by different commentators, see 
Sandys ad loc. 


(according to Herodotus, of the deme of Paeania, but as 
others say a Thracian flower-seller of the deme of Collytus), 
he dressed her in a garb resembling that of the goddess and 
brought her into the city with Pisistratus. The latter drove in 
on a chariot with the woman beside him, and the inhabitants 
of the city, struck with awe, received him with adoration. 

15 In this manner did his first return take place. He did 
not, however, hold his power long, for about six years after 
his return he was again expelled. He refused to treat the 
daughter of Megacles as his wife, and being afraid, in con- 
sequence, of a combination of the two opposing parties, he 

2 retired from the country. First he led a colony to a place 
called Rhaicelus, in the region of the Thermaic gulf; and 
thence he passed to the country in the neighbourhood of 
Mt. Pangaeus. Here he acquired wealth and hired mercen- 
aries; and not till ten years had elapsed did he return 
to Eretria and make an attempt to recover the government 
by force. In this he had the assistance of many allies, 
notably the Thebans and Lygdamis of Naxos, and also the 
Knights who held the supreme power in the constitution of 

3 Eretria. After his victory in the battle at Pallene he 
captured Athens, and when he had disarmed the people he 
at last had his tyranny securely established, and was able 

4 to take Naxos and set up Lygdamis as ruler there. He 
effected the disarmament of the people in the following 
manner. He ordered a parade in full armour in the Theseum, 
and began to make a speech to the people. He spoke for 
a short time, until the people called out that they could 
not hear him, whereupon he bade them come up to the 
entrance of the Acropolis, in order that his voice might 
be better heard. Then, while he continued to speak to them 
at great length, men whom he had appointed for the 
purpose collected the arms and locked them up in the 
chambers of the Theseum hard by, and came and made 

5 a signal to him that it was done. Pisistratus accordingly, 
when he had finished the rest of what he had to say, told 
the people also what had happened to their arms ; adding 
that they were not to be surprised or alarmed, but go home 


and attend to their private affairs, while he would himself 
for the future manage all the business of the state. 

Such was the origin and such the vicissitudes of the 16 
tyranny of Pisistratus. His administration was temperate, 2 
as has been said before, and more like constitutional 
government than a tyranny. Not only was he in every 
respect humane and mild and ready to forgive those who 
offended, but, in addition, he advanced money to the 
poorer people to help them in their labours, so that they 
might make their living by agriculture. In this he had two 3 
objects, first that they might not spend their time in the 
city but might be scattered over all the face of the country, 
and secondly that, being moderately well off and occupied 
with their own business, they might have neither the wish 
nor the time to attend to public affairs. At the same time 4 
his revenues were increased by the thorough cultivation of 
the country, since he imposed a tax of one tenth on all the 
produce. For the same reasons he instituted the local 5 
justices, 1 and often made expeditions in person into the 
country to inspect it and to settle disputes between indi- 
viduals, that they might not come into the city and neglect 
their farms. It was in one of these progresses that, as the *> 
story goes, Pisistratus had his adventure with the man 
of Hymettus, who was cultivating the spot afterwards 
known as ' Tax-free Farm '. He saw a man digging and 
working at a very stony piece of ground, and being surprised 
he sent his attendant to ask what he got out of this plot of 
land. 'Aches and pains', said the man; 'and that's what 
Pisistratus ought to have his tenth of '. The man spoke 
without knowing who his questioner was ; but Pisistratus 
was so pleased with his frank speech and his industry that 
he granted him exemption from all taxes. And so in 7 
matters in general he burdened the people as little as 
possible with his government, but always cultivated peace 
and kept them in all quietness. Hence the tyranny of 
Pisistratus was often spoken of proverbially as ' the age 
of gold ' ; for when his sons succeeded him the government 

1 See ch. 53, 1, where it is stated that their number was at first thirty, 
but was subsequently increased to forty. 



8 became much harsher. But most important of all in this 
respect was his popular and kindly disposition. In all 
things he was accustomed to observe the laws, without 
giving himself any exceptional privileges. Once he was 
summoned on a charge of homicide before the Areopagus, 
and he appeared in person to make his defence ; but the 
prosecutor was afraid to present himself and abandoned the 

9 case. For these reasons he held power long, and whenever 
he was expelled he regained his position easily. The 
majority alike of the upper class and of the people were in 
his favour ; the former he won by his social intercourse with 
them, the latter by the assistance which he gave to their 
private purses, and his nature fitted him to win the hearts 

10 of both. Moreover, the laws in reference to tyrants at that 
time in force at Athens were very mild, especially the one 
which applies more particularly to the establishment of 
a tyranny. The law ran as follows : ' These are the ancestral 
statutes of the Athenians ; if any persons shall make an 
attempt to establish a tyranny, or if any person shall join 
in setting up a tyranny, he shall lose his civic rights, both 
himself and his whole house.' 

17 Thus did Pisistratus grow old in the possession of power, 
and he died a natural death in the archonship of Philoneos, 1 
three and thirty years from the time at which he first 
established himself as tyrant, during nineteen of which he 

2 was in possession of power ; the rest he spent in exile. It 
is evident from this that the story is mere gossip which states 
that Pisistratus was the youthful favourite of Solon and 
commanded in the war against Megara for the recovery 
of Salami's. It will not harmonize with their respective ages, 
as any one may see who will reckon up the years of the life 

3 of each of them, and the dates at which they died. After 
the death of Pisistratus his sons took up the government, 
and conducted it on the same system. He had two sons by 
his first and legitimate 2 wife, Hippias and Hipparchus, and 
two by his Argive consort, Iophon and Hegesistratus, who 

1 527 B.C. 

2 Pisistratus's second wife was a foreigner, and therefore not legiti- 
mate according to strict Athenian law. 


was surnamed Thessalus. For Pisistratus took a wife from 4 
Argos, Timonassa, the daughter of a man of Argos, named 
Gorgllus ; she had previously been the wife of ArchTnus of 
Ambracia, one of the descendants of Cypselus. This was 
the origin of his friendship with the Argives, on account of 
which a thousand of them were brought over byHegesistratus 
and fought on his side in the battle at Pallene. Some 
authorities say that this marriage took place after his first 
expulsion from Athens, others while he was in possession 
of the government. 

Hippias and Hipparchus assumed the control of affairs on 18 
grounds alike of standing and of age ; but Hippias, as being 
also naturally of a statesmanlike and shrewd disposition, 
was really the head of the government. Hipparchus was 
youthful in disposition, amorous, and fond of literature (it 
was he who invited to Athens Anacreon, Simonides, and 
the other poets), while Thessalus was much junior in age, and 2 
was violent and headstrong in his behaviour. It was from 
his character that all the evils arose which befell the house. 1 
He became enamoured of Harmodius, and, since he failed 
to win his affection, he lost all restraint upon his passion, and 
in addition to other exhibitions of rage he finally prevented 
the sister of Harmodius from taking the part of a basket- 
bearer in the Panathenaic procession, alleging as his reason 
that Harmodius was a person of loose life. Thereupon, in a 
frenzy of wrath, Harmodius and Aristogeiton did their cele- 
brated deed, in conjunction with a number of confederates. 2 
But while they were lying in wait for Hippias in the Acropolis 3 
at the time of the Panathenaea (Hippias, at this moment, 
was awaiting the arrival of the procession, while Hipparchus 
was organizing its dispatch) they saw one of the persons 

1 This is a direct contradiction of the narrative of Thucydides(vi. 54), 
who makes Hipparchus responsible for the outrage which provoked the 
plot of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. It is impossible to say positively 
which is right. The exact details would be known to few, and the 
fact that it was Hipparchus who was killed (though Hippias, and not 
he, was the person aimed at) would cause men to believe that he was 
the person to blame. 

2 Thucydidc s states expressly (vi. 56) that the conspirators were few in 
number. Aristotle probably again intends to correct him, silently 
but pointedly. 


privy to the plot talking familiarly with him. Thinking 
that he was betraying them, and desiring to do something 
before they were arrested, they rushed down and made their 
attempt without waiting for the rest of their confederates. 
They succeeded in killing Hipparchus near the Leocoreum 
while he was engaged in arranging the procession, but ruined 

4 the design as a whole ; of the two leaders, Harmodius 
was killed on the spot by the guards, while Aristogeiton was 
arrested, and perished later after suffering long tortures. 
While under the torture he accused many persons who 
belonged by birth to the most distinguished families and 
were also personal friends of the tyrants. At first the 
government could find no clue to the conspiracy ; for the 
current story, 1 that Hippias made all who were taking part 
in the procession leave their arms, and then detected those 
who were carrying secret daggers, cannot be true, since at 
that time they did not bear arms in the processions, this being 
a custom instituted at a later period by the democracy. 

5 According to the story of the popular party, Aristogeiton 
accused the friends of the tyrants with the deliberate inten- 
tion that the latter might commit an impious act, and at the 
same time weaken themselves, by putting to death innocent 
men who were their own friends ; others say that he told no 

6 falsehood, but was betraying the actual accomplices. At 
last, when for all his efforts he could not obtain release by 
death, he promised to give further information against a 
number of other persons; and, having induced Hippias to 
give him his hand to confirm his word, as soon as he had 
hold of it he reviled him for giving his hand to the murderer 
of his brother, till Hippias, in a frenzy of rage, lost control of 
himself and snatched out his dagger and dispatched him. 

ig After this event the tyranny became much harsher. In 

consequence of his vengeance for his brother, and of the 

execution and banishment of a large number of persons, 

Hippias became a distrusted and an embittered man. 

2 About three years after the death of Hipparchus, finding his 

1 This is the version given by Thucydides (vi. 58), which Aristotle 
evidently again wishes to correct. 


position in the city insecure, he set about fortifying 
Munichia, with the intention of establishing himself there. 
While he was still engaged on this work, however, he was 
expelled by Cleomenes, king of Lacedaemon, in consequence 
of the Spartans being continually incited by oracles to 
overthrow the tyranny. These oracles were obtained in the 
following way. The Athenian exiles, headed by the 3 
Alcmeonidae, could not by their own power effect their 
return, but failed continually in their attempts. Among 
their other failures, they fortified a post in Attica, Lipsy- 
drium, above Mt. Parnes, and were there joined by some 
partisans from the city ; but they were besieged by the 
tyrants and reduced to surrender. After this disaster the 
following became a popular drinking song : 

Ah ! Lipsydrium, faithless friend ! 
Lo, what heroes to death didst send, 
Nobly born and great in deed ! 
Well did they prove themselves at need 
Of noble sires a noble seed. 

Having failed, then, in every other method, they took the 4 
contract for rebuilding the temple at Delphi, 1 thereby 
obtaining ample funds, which they employed to secure the 
help of the Lacedaemonians. All this time the Pythia kept 
continually enjoining on the Lacedaemonians who came to 
consult the oracle, that they must free Athens ; till finally 
she succeeded in impelling the Spartans to that step, 
although the house of Pisistratus was connected with them 
by ties of hospitality. The resolution of the Lacedaemon- 
ians was, however, at least equally due to the friendship 
which had been formed between the house of Pisistratus 
and Argos. Accordingly they first sent Anchimolus by sea 5 
at the head of an army ; but he was defeated and killed, 
through the arrival of Cineas of Thessaly to support the 
sons of Pisistratus with a force of a thousand horsemen. 
Then, being roused to anger by this disaster, they sent their 
king, Cleomenes, by land at .the head of a larger force ; and 
he, after defeating the Thessalian cavalry when they 

1 The temple at Delphi had been burnt, as is recorded by 
Herodotus (ii. 180). 


attempted to intercept his march into Attica, shut up 
Hippias within what was known as the Pelargic wall and 
blockaded him there with the assistance of the Athenians. 
6 While he was sitting down before the place, it so happened 
that the sons of the Pisistratidae were captured in an 
attempt to slip out ; upon which the tyrants capitulated on 
condition of the safety of their children, and surrendered 
the Acropolis to the Athenians, five days being first 
allowed them to remove their effects. This took place in 
the archonship of Harpactides, 1 after they had held the 
tyranny for about seventeen years since their father's death, 
or in all, including the period of their father's rule, for nine- 
and-forty years. 

20 After the overthrow of the tyranny, the rival leaders in 
the state were Isagoras son of Tisander, a partisan of the 
tyrants, and Cleisthenes, who belonged to the family of the 
Alcmeonidae. Cleisthenes, being beaten in the political 
clubs, called in the people by giving the franchise to the 

2 masses. Thereupon Isagoras, finding himself left inferior 
in power, invited Cleomenes, who was united to him 
by ties of hospitality, to return to Athens, and persuaded 
him to ' drive out the pollution ', 2 a plea derived from the 
fact that the Alcmeonidae were supposed to be under the 

3 curse of pollution. On this Cleisthenes retired from the 
county, and Cleomenes, entering Attica with a small force, 
expelled, as polluted, seven hundred Athenian families. 
Having effected this, he next attempted to dissolve the 
Council, and to set up Isagoras and three hundred of his 
partisans as the supreme power in the state. The Council, 
however, resisted, the populace flocked together, and Cleo- 
menes and Isagoras, with their adherents, took refuge in the 
Acropolis. Here the people sat down and besieged them 
for two days ; and on the third they agreed to let Cleomenes 
and all his followers depart, while they summoned Cleisthenes 

4 and the other exiles back to Athens. When the people had 

1 The Archon's name was not previously known, but the date is 
established independently as the year 511-10 B.C. (the Athenian 
official year beginning in July), apparently in the spring of 510 B.C. 

2 i. e. to expel the house of the Alcmeonidae, which was still supposed 
to be polluted by the sacrilege in the the affair of Cylon. 


thus obtained the command of affairs, Cleisthenes was their 
chief and popular leader. And this was natural ; for the 
Alcmeonidae were perhaps the chief cause of the expulsion 
of the tyrants, and for the greater part of their rule were 
at perpetual war with them. But even earlier than the 5 
attempts of the Alcmeonidae, one Cedon made an attack 
on the tyrants ; whence there came another popular drinking 
song, addressed to him : 

Pour a health yet again, boy, to Cedon ; forget not this 

duty to do, 
If a health is an honour befitting the name of a good 

man and true. 

The people, therefore, had good reason to place confidence 21 
in Cleisthenes. Accordingly, now that he was the popular 
leader, three years after the expulsion of the tyrants, in the 
archonship of Isagoras, 1 his first step was to distribute the 3 
whole population into ten tribes in place of the existing 
four, with the object of intermixing the members of the 
different tribes, and so securing that more persons might 
have a share in the franchise. 2 From this arose the saying 
' Do not look at the tribes ', addressed to those who wished 
to scrutinize the lists of the old families. 3 Next he made 3 
the Council to consist of five hundred members instead of 
four hundred, each tribe now contributing fifty, whereas 

1 508 b. c. 

2 It is not at first sight evident why a mere redistribution of the 
population into ten tribes instead of four should give more persons 
a share in the franchise. But the object of Cleisthenes was to break 
down the old family and tribal feelings on which political contests had 
hitherto been based. To do this, he established a new division into 
tribes, which corresponded to no existing subdivision of the old ones, 
and at the same time he introduced a large number of new citizens by 
the enfranchisement of emancipated slaves and resident aliens. 
There would have been endless difficulties in the way of introducing 
them into the old tribes, which were organized into clans and families 
on the old aristocratic basis ; but they were easily included in the new 
tribes, which had no such associations connected with them. 

s Apparently this means that since the tribes now bore no relation 
to the ancient families, it was useless to look at the lists of the tribes 
if any one wished to examine the rolls of the families. Hence the 
phrase seems to have become a proverbial one for making useless 
distinctions or refinements. The families (together with the larger 
units known as phratries or clans) were ancient divisions of the four old 
tribes, on the basis of kinship, and mainly for social and religious 


formerly each had sent a hundred. The reason why he did 
not organize the people into twelve tribes was that he might 
not have to use the existing division into trittyes ; for 
the four tribes had twelve trittyes, so that he would not 
have achieved his object of redistributing the population in 

4 fresh combinations. Further, he divided the country into 
thirty groups of demes, 1 ten from the districts about the 
city, ten from the coast, and ten from the interior. These 
he called trittyes ; and he assigned three of them by lot to 
each tribe, in such a way that each should have one portion 
in each of these three localities. All who lived in any 
given deme he declared fellow-demesmen, to the end that 
the new citizens might not be exposed by the habitual use 
of family names, but that men might be officially described 
by the names of their demes ; 2 and accordingly it is by the 
names of their demes that the Athenians speak of oneanother. 

5 He also instituted Demarchs, who had the same duties as 
the previously existing Naucrari, — the demes being made' 

*fo take the place of the naucraries. He gave names to the 
demes, some from the localities to which they belonged, 
some from the persons who founded them, since some of the 
areas no longer corresponded to localities possessing names. 

6 On the other hand he allowed every one to retain his family 
and clan and religious rites according to ancestral custom. 
The names given to the tribes were the ten which the 
Pythia appointed out of the hundred selected national 

22 By these reforms the constitution became much more 

1 The total number of demes, or parishes, is not given, but from 
Herodotus it appears to have been a hundred. It gradually increased 
with the growth of population, and in the third century B.C. there were 
176 demes. The demes composing each trittys appear to have been con- 
tiguous, but each trittys was separate from its two fellows, so that the 
party feeling of the tribe was spread over three local divisions, and the 
old feuds between the different districts of Attica became impossible. 

2 If the people continued to speak of one another by their family 
names as hitherto, newly enfranchised citizens, whose fathers had been 
slaves or aliens, would be markedly distinguished from the older 
citizens who belonged to ancient families ; but by making the name of 
the deme part of the necessary description of every citizen he broke 
down the family tradition ; moreover, it was easy for any man to 
establish his claim to citizenship by naming the deme to which he 
belonged, even though his father's name might be foreign or unfamiliar. 


democratic than that of Solon. The laws of Solon had 
been obliterated by disuse during the period of the tyranny, 
while Cleisthenes substituted new ones with the object of 
securing the goodwill of the masses. Among these was the 
law concerning ostracism. Four years 1 after the establish- i 
ment of this system, in the archonship of Hermocrcon, they 
first imposed upon the Council of Five Hundred the oath 
which they take to the present day. Next they began to 
elect the generals by tribes, one from each tribe, while the 
Polemarch was the commander of the whole army. Then, 3 
eleven years later, in the archonship of Phaenippus they 
won the battle of Marathon ; and two years after this 
victory, when the people had now gained self-confidence, 
they for the first time made use of the law of ostracism. 
This had originally been passed as a precaution against men in 
high office, because Pisistratus took advantage of his position 
as a popular leader and general to make himself tyrant ; and 4 
the first person ostracized was one of his relatives, Hipparchus 
son of Charmus, of the deme of Collytus, the very person 
on whose account especially Cleisthenes had enacted the law, 
as he wished to get rid of him. Hitherto, however, he had 
escaped ; for the Athenians, with the usual leniency of the 
democracy, allowed all the partisans of the tyrants, who had 
not joined in their evil deeds in the time of the troubles, to 
remain in the city ; and the chief and leader of these was 
Hipparchus. Then in the very next year, in the archonship 5 
of Telesinus, 2 they for the first time since the tyranny elected, 

1 This, if correct, would place this event in 504 B.C. But, in the 
first place, that year belongs to another Archon ; and secondly, it is 
inconsistent with the statement below, that the battle of Marathon 
occurred eleven years later. Marathon was fought in 490 B.C., there- 
fore the archonship of Hermocreon should be assigned to 501 B.C., 
for which year no name occurs in the extant lists of Archons. Whether 
the mistake in the present passage is due to the author or a copyist it 
is impossible to say. 

2 467 B.C. The date here given is valuable, because it had hitherto 
been a matter of doubt whether Callimachus, the polemarch at Mara- 
thon, on whose casting vote the fighting of that battle depended, was 
elected by lot or by open vote. The words of Herodotus (vi. 109), strictly 
interpreted, imply the former ; but it is repugnant to common sense to 
suppose that an officer holding so important a position was elected by 
lot, and it is now clear that, until three years after Marathon, the Ar- 
chons were still elected by direct vote, and, as stated above in this 


tribe by tribe, the nine Archons by lot out of the five 
hundred 1 candidates selected by the demes, all the earlier 
ones having been elected by vote ; 2 and in the same year 
Megacles son of Hippocrates, of the deme of Alopece, was 

6 ostracized. Thus for three years they continued to ostracize 
the friends of the tyrants, on whose account the law had 
been passed ; but in the following year they began to 
remove others as well, including any one who seemed to be 
more powerful than was expedient. The first person 
unconnected with the tyrants who was ostracized was 

7 Xanthippus son of Ariphron. Two years later, in the 
archonship of Nicodemus, 3 the mines of Maroneia were 
discovered, and the state made a profit of a hundred talents 
from the working of them. Some persons advised the 
people to make a distribution of the money among them- 
.selves, but this was prevented by Themistocles. He refused 
to say on what he proposed to spend the money, but he 
bade them lend it to the hundred richest men in Athens, 
one talent to each, and then, if the manner in which it was 
employed pleased the people, the expenditure should be 
charged to the state, but otherwise the state should receive 
the sum back from those to whom it was lent. On these 
terms he received the money and with it he had a hundred 
triremes built, each of the hundred individuals building one ; 
and it was with these ships that they fought the battle of 
Salamis against the barbarians. About this time Aristides 

S the son of Lysimachus was ostracized. Three years later, 
however, in the archonship of Hypsichides, 4 all the 

same chapter, the polemarch was the chief of the army, the ten 
generals (who subsequently became the chief military commanders) 
being his subordinates. 

1 It is probable that there is a mistake in this number. It appears 
from ch. 8, I that under the Solonian constitution the number of candi- 
dates nominated by each tribe was ten, and that the same was the 
number in the writer's own day ; and it is hardly likely that the 
higher number of fifty ever prevailed at an intermediate period. The 
Greek numerals for ioo and 500 are easily confused. 

2 This statement can only apply to the period after the expulsion of 
the tyrants and the reforms of Cleisthenes, since under the Solonian 
constitution (ch. 8, 1 ) the Archons were elected by lot out of forty candi- 
dates selected by the tribes. 

3 483 B. C 4 481 B. c. The name of this Archon is new. 


ostracized persons were recalled, on account of the advance 
of the army of Xerxes ; and it was laid down for the future 
that persons under sentence of ostracism must live between 
Geraestus and Scyllaeum, 1 on pain of losing their civic rights 

So far, then, had the city progressed by this time, growing 23 
gradually with the growth of the democracy ; but after the 
Persian wars the Council of Areopagus once more developed 
strength and assumed the control of the state. It did not 
acquire this supremacy by virtue of any formal decree, but 
because it had been the cause of the battle of Salamis being 
fought. When the generals were utterly at a loss how to 
meet the crisis and made proclamation that every one 
should see to his own safety, the Areopagus provided a 
donation of money, distributing eight drachmas to each 
member of the ships' crews, and so prevailed on them to go 
on board. On these grounds people bowed to its prestige ; 3 
and during this period Athens was well administered. At this 
time they devoted themselves to the prosecution of the war 
and were in high repute among the Greeks, so that the com- 
mand by sea was conferred upon them, in spite of the 
opposition of the Lacedaemonians. The leaders of the 3 
people during this period were Aristides, son of Lysimachus, 
and Themistocles, son of Neocles, of whom the latter 
appeared to devote himself to the conduct of war, while the 
former had the reputation of being a clever statesman and 
the most upright man of his time. Accordingly the one 
was usually employed as general, the other as political 
adviser. The rebuilding of the fortifications they conducted 4 
in combination, although they were political opponents ; but 
it was Aristides who, seizing the opportunity afforded by the 
discredit brought upon the Lacedaemonians by Pausanias, 
guided the public policy in the matter of the defection 

1 So the MS., but one of the grammarians, who probably drew from 
this passage, says that ostracized persons were compelled to live outside 
these boundaries ; and it is possible that the MS. reading here should 
be altered by the insertion of ^1} or the substitution of euros for wtos. 
Certainly in later times we find ostra< ized persons living beyond these 
limits ; and the balance of probability perhaps leans this way. Geraestus 
is at the extreme south of Euboea, and Scyllaeum at the extreme cast 
of Argolis. 


5 of the Ionian states from 1 the alliance with Sparta. It 
follows that it was he who made the first assessment of 
tribute from the various allied states, two years after the 
battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes ; 2 and 
it was he who took the oath of offensive and defensive 
alliance with the Ionians, on which occasion they cast the 
masses of iron into the sea. :j 

24 After this, seeing the state growing in confidence and 
much wealth accumulated, he advised the people to lay hold 
of the leadership of the league, and to quit the country dis- 
tricts and settle in the city. He pointed out to them that 
all would be able to gain a living there, some by service in 
the army, others in the garrisons, others by taking a part in 
public affairs ; and in this way they would secure the 

2 leadership. This advice was taken ; and when the people 
had assumed the supreme control they proceeded to treat 
their allies in a more imperious fashion, with the exception 
of the Chians, Lesbians, and Samians. These they main- 
tained to protect their empire, leaving their constitutions 
untouched, and allowing them to retain whatever dominion 

3 they then possessed. They also secured an ample mainten- 
ance for the mass of the population in the way which 
Aristides had pointed out to them. Out of the proceeds of 
the tributes and the taxes and the contributions of the allies 
more than twenty thousand persons were maintained. There 
were 6,000 jurymen, 1,600 bowmen, 1,200 Knights, 500 
members of the Council, 500 guards of the dockyards, 
besides fifty guards in the Acropolis. There were some 700 
magistrates at home, and some 700 4 abroad. Further, when 
they subsequently went to war, there were in addition 
2,500 heavy-armed troops, twenty guard-ships, 5 and other 

1 The MS. has 'and'; but the sense of the passage requires the 
alteration, since there is no indication of Athens having made an 
alliance with Sparta at this time. 

2 478 B.C. 

1 For this ceremony, as a sign of a determination which should last 
until the metal floated to the top of the sea, cf. Herodotus (i. 165) and 
Horace (Efiod, xvi. 25, 26). 

4 The number seems to be repeated by mistake on the part of the 

5 The normal crew of a trireme was 200 men. At that rate these 


ships which collected the tributes, with crews amounting 
to 2,000 men. selected by lot ; and besides these there were 
the persons maintained at the Piytaneum, and orphans, and 
gaolers, since all these were supported by the state. 

Such was the way in which the people earned their 25 
livelihood. The supremacy of the Areopagus lasted for 
about seventeen years after the Persian wars, although 
gradually declining. But as the strength of the masses 
increased, Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, a man with a 
reputation for incorruptibility and public virtue, who had 
become the leader of the people, made an attack upon that 
Council. First of all he ruined many of its members by 2 
bringing actions against them with reference to their ad- 
ministration. Then, in the archonship of Conon, 1 he 
stripped the Council of all the acquired prerogatives from 
which it derived its guardianship of the constitution, and 
assigned some of them to the Council of Five Hundred, and 
others to the Assembly and the law-courts. In this 3 
revolution he was assisted by Themistocles, 2 who was 
himself a member of the Areopagus, but was expecting to 
be tried before it on a charge of treasonable dealings with 
Persia. This made him anxious that it should be over- 
thrown, and accordingly he warned Ephialtes that the 
Council intended to arrest him, while at the same time he 
informed the Areopagites that he would reveal to them 

twenty guard-ships represent 4,000 men, and the 2,000 men mentioned 
in the next clause presumbly represent ten ships. 

1 462 B. C. 

2 This is one of the most striking of the new views of history brought 
to light by the reappearance of Aristotle's work. The current opinion 
(based mainly on Thucydides) is that Themistocles was ostracized 
about 471 B.C., that the charge of complicity with Pausanias in his 
intrigues with Persia was brought against him about 466 B.C., and 
that he reached Persia in his flight about 465 B.C., the year in which 
Artaxerxes succeeded Xerxes. It now appears (if the evidence of this 
work is to be accepted) that he was in Athens in 462 B.C., and his 
ostracism cannot, therefore, be placed earlier than 461 B.C., and his 
flight to Persia may have occurred in 460 B. c. This statement is 
irreconcilable with the narrative of Thucydides (i. 137) that in his 
flight he was nearly captured by the Athenian fleet then engaged in 
the siege of Naxos, which is generally assigned to the year 466 B.C. ; 
and most critics reject it. It is evident, however, that Thucydides' 
system of chronology for this period was not the only one current in 


certain persons who were conspiring to subvert the con- 
stitution. He then conducted the representatives delegated 
by the Council to the residence of Ephialtes, promising 
to show them the conspirators who assembled there, 
and proceeded to converse with them in an earnest manner. 
Ephialtes, seeing this, was seized with alarm and took 
4 refuge in suppliant guise at the altar. Every one was 
astounded at the occurrence, and presently, when the 
Council of Five Hundred met, Ephialtes and Themistocles 
together proceeded to denounce the Areopagus to them. 
This they repeated in similar fashion in the Assembly, 
until; they succeeded in depriving it of its power. Not 
long afterwards, however, Ephialtes was assassinated by 
Aristodtcus of Tanagra. In this way was the Council of 
Areopagus deprived of its guardianship of the state. 

26 After this revolution the administration of the state 
became more and more lax, in consequence of the eager 
rivalry of candidates for popular favour. During this 
period the moderate party, as it happened, had no real chief, 
their leader being Cimon son of Miltiades, who was a com- 
paratively young man 1 , and had been late in entering public 
life ; and at the same time the general populace suffered 
great losses by war. The soldiers for active service were 
selected at that time from the roll of citizens, and as the 
generals were men of no military experience, who owed 
their position solely to their family standing, it continually 
happened that some two or three thousand of the troops 
perished on an expedition ; and in this way the best men 
alike of the lower and the upper classes were exhausted. 
2 Consequently in most matters of administration less heed was 
paid to the laws than had formerly been the case. No 
alteration, however, was made in the method of election of 
the nine Archons, except that five years after the death 
of Ephialtes it was decided that the candidates to be sub- 
mitted to the lot for that office might be selected from 

1 This is inconsistent with the received chronology, and also with 
the words which immediately follow ; hence various conjectures (e. g. 
va>8p6v, ' sluggish ', for vfvrepov) have been proposed, none wholly 


the Zeugitae as well as from the higher classes. 1 The first 
Archon from that class was Mnesitheides. 2 Up to this 
time all the Archons had been taken from the Pentacosio- 
medimni and Knights, while the Zeugitae were confined to 
the ordinary magistracies, save where an evasion of the law 
was overlooked. Four years later, in the archonship of 3 
Lysicrates, 3 the thirty 'local justices', 4 as they were called, 
were re-established ; and two years afterwards, in the 
archonship of Antidotus, 5 in consequence of the great 4 
increase in the number of citizens, it was resolved, on the 
motion of Pericles, that no one should be admitted to the 
franchise who was not of citizen birth by both parents. 

After this Pericles came forward as popular leader, 27 
having first distinguished himself while still a young 
man by prosecuting Cimon on the audit of his official 
accounts as general. Under his auspices the constitution 
became still more democratic. He took away some of the 
privileges of the Areopagus, and, above all, he turned the 
policy of the slate in the direction of sea power, which 
caused the masses to acquire confidence in themselves and 
consequently to take the conduct of affairs more and more 
into their own hands. Moreover, forty-eight years after the 2 
battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Pythodorus, 6 the 
Peloponnesian war broke out, during which the populace 
was shut up in the city and became accustomed to gain its 
livelihood by military service, and so, partly voluntarily and 
partly involuntarily, determined to assume theadministration 
of the state itself. Pericles was also the first to institute 3 
pay for service in the law-courts, as a bid for popular favour 
to counterbalance the wealth of Cimon. The latter, having 

1 It is evident from ch. 7, 4 that the eligibility to the archonship was 
never, strictly speaking, extended beyond this, though in practice 
members of the lowest order, the Thetes, often held the office. 

2 The archonship of Mnesitheides was in 457 B. c. ; and as the death 
of Ephialtes was in 462 B.C., and it has just been stated that the 
alteration in the law was made five years later, it follows that a 
Zeugites was elected for the first year in which the members of that 
order were eligible. 

3 453 B.C. * See chapters 16, 5 and 53, 1. 6 451 B.C. 

6 432-1 B. C. ; and as the war broke out four months before the end 
of Pythodorus' year of office (Thuc. ii. 2), the actual date falls in 
the spring of 431 B. C. 


private possessions on a regal scale, not only performed the 
regular public services magnificently, but also maintained 
a large number of his fellow-demesmen. Any member of 
the deme of Laciadae could go every day to Cimon's house 
and there receive a reasonable provision ; while his estate 
was guarded by no fences, so that any one who liked might 

4 help himself to the fruit from it. Pericles' private property 
was quite unequal to this magnificence and accordingly he 
took the advice of Damonides of Oia (who was commonly 
supposed to be the person who prompted Pericles in most of 
his measures, and was therefore subsequently ostracized), 
which was that, as he was beaten in the matter of private 
possessions, he should make gifts to the people from their 
own property; and accordingly he instituted pay for the 
members of the juries. Some critics accuse him of thereby 
causing a deterioration in the character of the juries, since it 
was always the common people who put themselves for- 
ward for selection as jurors, rather than the men of better 

5 position. Moreover, bribery came into existence after this, 
the first person to introduce it being Anytus, after his com- 
mand at Pylos. 1 He was prosecuted by certain individuals 
on account of his loss of Pylos, but escaped by bribing the 

28 So long, however, as Pericles was leader of the people, 
things went tolerably well with the state ; but when he was 
dead there was a great change for the worse. Then for the 
first time did the people choose a leader who was of no 
reputation among men of good standing, whereas up to this 
time such men had always been found as leaders of the 
a democracy. The first leader of the people, 2 in the very 
beginning of things, was Solon, and the second was 

1 Pylos was recaptured by the Spartans, owing to the neglect of 
Anytus to relieve it, in 411 B. c. Anytus was one of the leaders of the 
moderate aristocratic party (ch. 34, 3), and one of the prosecutors 
of Socrates. 

2 It is evident that this designation ' leader of the people' became 
a sort of semi-official title. There is no sufficient evidence that there 
was ever a regular process of appointment to the post ; but there was 
always some recognized chief of the democratic party to whom 
the name was given. The leader of the aristocratic party does not 
seem to have had any equally well recognized designation. 


Pisistratus, both of them men of birth and position. After 
the overthrow of the tyrants there was Cleisthenes, 
a member of the house of the Alcmeonidae ; and he had 
no rival opposed to him after the expulsion of the party of 
Isagoras. After this Xanthippus was the leader of the 
people, and Miltiades of the upper class. Then came 
Themistocles and Aristides, 1 and after them Ephialtes as 
leader of the people, and Cimon son of Miltiades of the 
wealthier class. Pericles followed as leader of the people, and 
Thucydides, who was connected by marriage with Cimon, of 
the opposition. After the death of Pericles, Nicias, who sub- 3 
sequently fell in Sicily, appeared as leader of the aristocracy, 
and Cleon son of Cleaenetus of the people. The latter 
seems, more than any one else, to have been the cause 
of the corruption of the democracy by his wild undertakings ; 
and he was the first to use unseemly shouting and coarse 
abuse on the Bema,- and to harangue the people with his 
cloak girt up short about him, whereas all his predecessors 
had spoken decently and in order. These were succeeded 
by Theramenes son of Hagnon as leader of the one party, 
and the lyre-maker Cleophon of the people. It was 
Cleophon who first granted the two-obol donation for the 
theatrical performances, 3 and for some time it continued to 
be given ; but then Callicrates of Paeania ousted him by 
promising to add a third obol to the sum. Both of these 
persons were subsequently condemned to death ; for the 
people, even if they are deceived for a time, in the end 
generally come to detest those who have beguiled them into 
any unworthy action. After Cleophon the popular leader- 4 
ship was occupied successively by the men who chose to talk 
the biggest and pander the most to the tastes of the majority, 
with their eyes fixed only on the interests of the moment. 

1 Themistocles and Aristides were both of them leaders of the 
democracy, as is stated in ch. 23, 3. It is a mistake to regard Aristides 
as an aristocratic leader. 

2 The Bema was the platform or tribune from which orators spoke in 
the Athenian Assembly. 

3 Two obols was the price of a seat in the theatre ; and after the 
time of Cleophon (the date had hitherto been placed earlier, Plutarch 
appearing to assign the measure to Pericles) the necessary sum was 
provided, for all citizens who chose to apply for it, by the state. 


5 The best statesmen at Athens, after those of early times, 
seem to have been Nicias, Thucydides, and Theramenes. 
As to Nicias and Thucydides. nearly every one agrees that 
they were not merely men of birth and character, but also 
statesmen, and that they ruled the state with paternal care. 
On the merits of Theramenes opinion is divided, because it 
so happened that in his time public affairs were in a very 
stormy state. But those who give their opinion deliberately 
find him, not, as his critics falsely assert, overthrowing every 
kind of constitution, but supporting every kind so long as it 
did not transgress the laws ; thus showing that he was able, 
as every good citizen should be, to live under any form of 
constitution, while he refused to countenance illegality and 
was its constant enemy. 

29 So long as the fortune of the war continued even, the 
Athenians preserved the democracy ; but after the disaster 
in Sicily, when the Lacedaemonians had gained the upper 
hand through their alliance with the king of Persia, they 
were compelled to abolish the democracy and establish in 
its place the constitution of the Four Hundred. The speech 
recommending this course before the vote was made by 
Melobius, and the motion was proposed by Pythodorus of 
Anaphlystus ; but the real argument which persuaded the 
majority was the belief that the king of Persia was 
"more likely to form an alliance with them if the constitu- 
tion were on an oligarchical basis. The motion of Pytho- 
3 dorus was to the following effect. The popular Assembly 
was to elect twenty persons, over forty years of age, 
who, in conjunction with the existing ten members of the 
Committee of Public Safety. 1 after taking an oath that they 
would frame such measures as they thought best for the 
state, should then prepare proposals for the public safety. In 
addition, any other person might make proposals, so that 
of all the schemes before them the people might choose the 
3 best. Cleitophon concurred with the motion of Pythodorus, 
but moved that the committee should also investigate the 

1 This committee is probably the same as that which we know from 
Thucydides to have been appointed immediately after the news of the 
Sicilian disaster was received in Athens. 


ancient laws enacted by Cleisthenes when he created the 
democracy, in order that they might have these too before 
them and so be in a position to decide wisely ; his sugges- 
tion being that the constitution of Cleisthenes was not really 
democratic, but closely akin to that of Solon. When the 4 
committee was elected, their first proposal was that the 
Prytanes x should be compelled to put to the vote any motion 
that was offered on behalf of the public safety. Next they 
abolished all indictments for illegal proposals, all impeach- 
ments and public prosecutions, in order that every Athenian 
should be free to give his counsel on the situation, if he 
chose ; and they decreed that if any person imposed a fine 
on any other for his acts in this respect, or prosecuted him 
or summoned him before the courts, he should, on an informa- 
tion being laid against him, be summarily arrested and 
brought before the generals, who should deliver him to the 
Eleven 2 to be put to death. After these preliminary 5 
measures, they drew up the constitution in the following 
manner. The revenues of the state were not to be spent on 
any purpose except the war. All magistrates should serve 
without remuneration for the period of the war, except the 
nine Archons and the Prytanes for the time being, who 
should each receive three obols a day. The whole of the 
rest of the administration was to be committed, for the 
period of the war, to those Athenians who were most cap- 
able of serving the state personally or pecuniarily, to the 
number of not less than five thousand. This body was to 
have full powers, to the extent even of making treaties with 
whomsoever they willed; and ten representatives, over forty 
years of age, were to be elected from each tribe to draw up 
the list of the Five Thousand, after taking an oath on a full 
and perfect sacrifice. 

These were the recommendations of the committee; and 30 
when they had been ratified the Five Thousand :! elected 

1 See ch. 43, 4. 2 See ch. 52, 1. 

3 This mention of the Five Thousand appears to be in direct con- 
tradiction to the statement in ch. 32,3, that the Five Thousand were only 
nominally selected, which is also in accordance with the statement of 
Thucydides (viii. 93). There are two possible explanations : either all 


from their own number a hundred commissioners to draw 
up the constitution. They, on their appointment, drew up 

a and produced the following recommendations. There should 
be a Council, holding office for a year, consisting of men 
over thirty years of age, serving without pay. To this 
body should belong the Generals, the nine Archons, the 
Amphictyonic Registrar [Hieromnemon], 1 the Taxiarchs, 
the Hipparchs, the Phylarchs, 2 the commanders of garrisons, 
the Treasurers of Athena and the other gods, ten in number, 
the Hellenic Treasurers [Hellenotamiae], 3 the Treasurers 
of the other non-sacred moneys, to the number of twenty, 
the ten Commissioners of Sacrifices [Hieropoei], and the ten 
Superintendents of the mysteries. All these were to be 
appointed by the Council from a larger number of selected 
candidates, chosen from its members for the time being. 
The other offices were all to be filled by lot, and not from 
the members of the Council. The Hellenic Treasurers who 
actually administered the funds should not sit with the 

3 Council. 4 As regards the future, four Councils were to 
be created, of men of the age already mentioned, and one 
of these was to be chosen by lot to take office at once, while 
the others were to receive it in turn, in the order decided by 
the lot. For this purpose the hundred commissioners were 

persons possessing the necessary qualification of being able to furnish 
arms were temporarily called the Five Thousand until the list of that 
body could be properly drawn up (thus the so-called Five Thousand 
which took over the government after the fall of the Four Hundred 
actually included all persons able to furnish arms) ; or the Five 
Thousand nominated by the hundred persons mentioned at the end of 
the last chapter was only a provisional body, and a fresh nomination 
was to be made when the constitution had been finally drawn up. 

1 This is the title of one of the two members sent by each Amphic- 
tyonic state to the general councils. He served as secretary, while the 
other, the Pylagoras, was the actual representative of his state. 

2 For these military officers see ch. 6i, 3-6. 

3 These were the officers appointed to receive the contribution of the 
allied states of the Confederacy of Delos, or, as these states sub- 
sequently became, the subject-allies of the Athenian empire. After the 
loss of the empire by the result of the Poloponnesian war these officers 
were no longer required, and consequently ceased to exist. 

4 If this is not to be taken as directly contradicting the statement 
made just above, it must be supposed that the actual handling of the 
money was confined to a few of the Hellenotamiae (probably in 
rotation), the duties of the rest being to advise and superintend-. 


to distribute themselves and all the rest 1 as equally as 
possible into four parts, and cast lots for precedence, and 
the selected body should hold office for a year. They 2 were 4 
to administer that office as seemed to them best, both with 
reference to the safe custody and due expenditure of the 
finances, and generally with regard to all other matters to the 
best of their ability. If they desired to take a larger number 
of persons into counsel, each member might call in one assist- 
ant of his own choice, subject to the same qualification of age. 
The Council was to sit once every five days, unless there 
was any special need for more frequent sittings. The casting 
of the lot for the Council was to be held by the nine Archons ; 
votes on divisions were to be counted by five tellers chosen 
by lot from the members of the Council, and of these one 
was to be selected by lot every day to act as president. These 5 
five persons were to cast lots for precedence between the 
parties wishing to appear before the Council, giving the first 
place to sacred matters, the second to heralds, the third 
to embassies, and the fourth to all other subjects ; but 
matters concerning the war might be dealt with, on the 
motion of the generals, whenever there was need, without 
balloting. Any member of the Council who did not enter 6 
the Council-house at the time named should be fined 
a drachma for each day, unless he was away on leave of 
absence from the Council. 

Such was the constitution which they drew up for the 31 
time to come, but for the immediate present they devised 
the following scheme. There should be a Council of Four 
Hundred, as in theancient constitution," forty from each tribe, 
chosen out of candidates of more than thirty years of age, 
selected by the members of the tribes. This Council should 
appoint the magistrates and draw up the form of oath which 
they were to take ; and in all that concerned the laws, in the 

1 i.e., apparently, all the rest of the Five Thousand who were over 
thirty years of age. 

2 Mr. J. A. R. Munro {Classical Quarterly) proposes to transfer this 
sentence and the next, so as to make them precede the two previous 
sentences, and relate to the Hellenic Treasurers. This transposition 
would make the sense much clearer. 

1 i.e. as in the constitution of Solon 


examination of official accounts, and in other matters gener- 

2 ally, they might act according to their discretion. They 
must, however, observe the laws that might be enacted with 
reference to the constitution of the state, and had no power to 
alter them nor to pass others. The generals should be provi- 
sionally elected from the whole body of the Five Thousand, 
but so soon as the Council came into existence it was to hold 
an examination of military equipments, and thereon elect 
ten persons, together with a secretary, and the persons thus 
elected should hold office during the coming year with full 
powers, and should have the right, whenever they desired it, of 

3 joining in the deliberations of the Council. The Five Thou- 
sand 1 was also to elect a single Hipparch and ten Phylarchs; 
but for the future the Council was to elect these officers 
according to the regulations above laid down. No office, 
except those of member of the Council and of general, might 
be held more than once, either by the first occupants or by 
their successors. With reference to the future distribution 2 
of the Four Hundred into the four successive sections, the 
hundred commissioners must divide them whenever the time 
comes for the citizens to join in the Council along with the rest. 

32 The hundred commissioners appointed by the Five 
Thousand drew up the constitution as just stated ; and after 
it had been ratified by the people, under the presidency of 
Aristomachus, the existing Council, that of the year of 
Callias, 3 was dissolved before it had completed its term of 
office. It was dissolved on the fourteenth day of the month 

1 The subject is not expressed in the original, but as it is stated that 
in the future the Council was to elect these officers, it seems certain 
that the provisional arrangement was that the Five Thousand should 
elect them, as in the case of the generals, the Council not being 
yet properly constituted. 

* i.e. the distribution mentioned in the preceding chapter. Ap- 
parently the sense intended is that the division into the four sections 
should take place so soon as the remaining citizens from whom the four 
Councils were to'be drawn up (viz. the members of the Five Thousand 
over thirty years of age) had been associated with the Four Hundred 
who formed the provisional Council, i. e., practically, so soon a? the list 
of the qualified members of the Five Thousand was ready. 

3 Callias' year of office began in 412 B.C., and was now within two 
months of its end. The date of the entry of the Four Hundred into 
office is consequently in May, 411 B. C. 


Thargelion, and the Four Hundred 'entered into office on 
the twenty-first; whereas the regular Council, elected by 
lot, ought to have entered into office on the fourteenth of 
Scirophorion. 1 Thus was the oligarchy established, in the 2 
archonship of Callias, just about a hundred years after the 
expulsion of the tyrants. The chief promoters of the 
revolution were Pisander, Antiphon, and Theramenes, all of 
them men of good birth and with high reputations for 
ability and judgement. When, however, this constitution 3 
had been established, the Five Thousand were only 
nominally selected, and the Four Hundred, together with 
the ten officers on whom full powers had been conferred, 2 
occupied the Council-house and really administered the 
government. They began by sending ambassadors to the 
Lacedaemonians proposing a cessation of the war on the 
basis of the existing position ; but as the Lacedaemonians 
refused to listen to them unless they would also abandon 
the command of the sea, they broke off the negotiations. 

For about four months the constitution of the Four 33 
Hundred lasted, and Mnasilochus held office as Archon of 
their nomination for two months of the year of Theopompus, 
who was Archon for the remaining ten. On the loss of the 
naval battle of Eretria, however, and the revolt of the whole 
of Euboea except Oreum, the indignation of the people 
was greater than at any of the earlier disasters, since they 
drew far more supplies at this time from Euboea than from 
Attica itself. Accordingly they deposed the Four Hundred 
and committed the management of affairs to the Five 
Thousand, consisting of persons possessing a military 
equipment. At the same time they voted that pay should 
not be given for any public office. The persons chiefly a 
responsible for the revolution were Aristocrates and Thera- 
menes, who disapproved of the action of the Four Hundred 
in retaining the direction of affairs entirely in their own 
hands, and referring nothing to the Five Thousand. During 

1 Roughly equivalent to June, the last month of the official year 
at Athens. The ' regular Council ' means the Council which, in the 
ordinary course of things under the democracy, should have been 
elected by lot to succeed that belonging to the year of Callias. 

2 i. e. the ten Generals appointed as provided for in ch. 31. 2. 


this period the constitution of the state seems to have been 
admirable, since it was a time of war and the franchise was 
in the hands of those who possessed a military equipment. 1 

34 The people, however, in a very short time deprived the 

Five Thousand of their monopoly of the government. 2 

Then, six years after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, in 

the archonship of Callias of Angele, 3 the battle of Arginusae 

took place, of which the results were, first, that the ten 

generals who had gained the victory were all 4 condemned 

by a single decision, owing to the people being led astray by 

persons who aroused their indignation ; though, as a matter 

of fact, some of the generals had actually taken no part in 

the battle, and others were themselves picked up by other 

vessels. 5 Secondly, when the Lacedaemonians proposed to 

evacuate Decelea and make peace on the basis of the existing 

position, although some of the Athenians supported this 

proposal, the majority refused to listen to them. In this 

they were led astray by Cleophon, who appeared in the 

Assembly drunk and wearing his breastplate, and prevented 

peace being made, declaring that he would never accept 

peace unless the Lacedaemonians abandoned their claims 

3 on all the cities allied with them. 7 They mismanaged their 

' This is an echo of the commendation which Thucydides expresses 
at greater length (viii. 97). 

2 Probably after the battle of Cyzicus, in 410 B. c, when the fleet, 
which was democratic in its sympathies, returned to Athens. 

3 406 B. C. This was, however, five years after the overthrow of the 
oligarchy, not six, so that either Aristotle calculated from the beginning 
and not the end of the rule of the Four Hundred, or the numeral must 
be altered in the MS. 

4 This is probably inexact. Two of the generals, Conon and Leon, 
can hardly have been included in the accusation, as Conon was 
blockaded in Mytilene and Leon is never mentioned in connexion 
with either the battle or the trial. It is true that Aristotle says below 
that some of the condemned generals had not taken part in the battle, 
but if this had actually been the case, Xenophon could hardly 
have helped noticing it. Xenophon does expressly name the eight 
generals who were present at the battle, and states their positions 
in the Athenian line ; and, of these eight, six stood their trial and 
were executed, while the remaining two declined to return to Athens 
and were, no doubt, condemned in absence. 

5 And therefore were in no condition to be picking up the survivors 
on other disabled ships, for neglecting which they were condemned. 

* As a warlike demonstration, like a politician appearing in khaki. 
7 Cleophon retorted against the Lacedaemonians the ground on 
which they had refused to accept the Athenian overtures in 411 R. c. 


opportunity then, and in a very short time they learnt their 
mistake. The next year, in the archonship of Alexias, 
they suffered the disaster of Acgospotami, the consequence 
of which was that Lysander became master of the city, and 
set up the Thirty as its governors. He did so in the 
following manner. One of the terms of peace stipulated 3 
that the state should be governed according to ' the ancient 
constitution '. Accordingly the popular part)' tried to 
preserve the democracy, while that part of the upper class 
which belonged to the political clubs, 1 together with the 
exiles who had returned since the peace, aimed at an 
oligarchy, and those who were not members of any club, 
though in other respects they considered themselves as good 
as any other citizens, were anxious to restore the ancient 
constitution. The latter class included Archinus, Anytus, 
Cleitophon, Phormisius, and many others, but their most 
prominent leader was Theramenes. Lysander, however, 
threw his influence on the side of the oligarchical party, and 
the popular Assembly was compelled by sheer intimidation 
to pass a vote establishing the oligarchy. The motion to 
this effect was proposed by Dracontides of Aphidna. 

In this way were the Thirty established in power, in the 35 
archonship of Pythodorus. 2 As soon, however, as they 
were masters of the city, the)- ignored all the resolutions 
which had been passed relating to the organization of the 
constitution, 3 but after appointing a Council of Five 
Hundred and the other magistrates out of a thousand 
selected candidates, 4 and associating with themselves ten 
Archons in Piraeus, eleven superintendents of the prison, and 
three hundred ' Jash-bearers ' as attendants, with the help 
of these they kept the city under their own control. At 2 
first, indeed, they behaved with moderation towards the 
citizens and pretended to administer the state according to 
the ancient constitution. In pursuance of this policy they 

1 i.e. the extreme oligarchs. 2 The year 404-403 B.C. 

s The Thirty were appointed avowedly to draw up a scheme for the 
constitution, like the hundred commissioners mentioned in ch. 30. 

4 MS. 'out of candidates selected from the thousand ' ; but nothing is 
known about any such body. The other magistrates were probably 
included in the Council (cf. ch. 30, 2),. so that 500 names had to be 
chosen from 1000. 


took down from the hill of Areopagus the laws of Ephialtes 
and Archestratus relating to the Areopagite Council ; they 
also repealed such of the statutes of Solon as were obscure, 1 
and abolished the supreme power of the law-courts. In 
this they claimed to be restoring the constitution and 
freeing it from obscurities ; as, for instance, by making the 
testator free once for all to leave his property as he pleased, 
and abolishing the existing limitations in cases of insanity, 
old age, and undue female influence, in order that no 
opening might be left for professional accusers. 2 In other 

3 matters also their conduct was similar. At first, then, they 
acted on these lines, and they destroyed the professional 
accusers and those mischievous and evil-minded persons 
who, to the great detriment of the democracy, had attached 
themselves to it in order to curry favour with it. With all 
of this the city was much pleased, and thought that the 

4 Thirty were doing it with the best of motives. But so soon 
as they had got a firmer hold on the city, they spared no 
class of citizens, but put to death any persons who were 
eminent for wealth or birth or character. Herein they aimed 
at removing all whom they had reason to fear, while they 
also wished to lay hands on their possessions ; and in a 
short time they put to death not less than fifteen hundred 

36 Theramenes, however, seeing the city thus falling into 
ruin, was displeased with their proceedings, and counselled 
them to cease such unprincipled conduct and let the better 
classes have a share in the government. At first they resisted 
his advice, but when his proposals came to be known abroad, 
and the masses began to associate themselves with him, they 
were seized with alarm lest he should make himself the 

1 See ch. 9, 2. 

2 Solon's law allowed a man who had no legitimate children to 
leave his property as he chose, provided his will was made while 
he was of sound mind and subject to no undue influence. These 
provisions were reasonable enough in themselves, but a class of 
hangers-on of the law-courts had sprung up, who made a profession of 
challenging the legality of testamentary dispositions on these grounds, 
no doubt in the hope of extorting money. In order to put an end 
to this trade the Thirty abolished the qualifications in the law of Solon 
on which it was based. 


leader of the people and destroy their despotic power. Ac- 
cordingly the)' drew up a list of three thousand ^ citizens, to 
whom they announced that they would give a share in the 
constitution. Theramenes, however, criticized this scheme 3 
also, first on the ground that, while proposing to give all 
respectable citizens a share in the constitution, they were 
actually giving it only to three thousand persons, as though 
ail merit were confined within that number: and secondly 
because they were doing two inconsistent things, since they 
made the government rest on the basis of force, and yet 
made the governors inferior in strength to the governed. 
However, they took no notice of his criticisms, and for a 
long time put off the publication of the list of the Three 
Thousand and kept to themselves the names of those who 
had been placed upon it ; and every time they did decide to 
publish it they proceeded to strike out some of those who 
had been included in it, and insert others who had been 

Now when winter had set in, Thrasybulus and the exiles 37 
occupied Phyle, and the force which the Thirty led out to 
attack them met with a reverse. Thereupon the Thirty 
decided to disarm the bulk of the population and to get rid 
of Theramenes ; which they did in the following way. 
They introduced two laws into the Council, which they 
commanded it to pass ; the first of them gave the Thirty 
absolute power to put to death any citizen who was not 
included in the list of the Three Thousand, while the second 
disqualified all persons from participation in the franchise 
who should have assisted in the demolition of the fort of 
Eetioneia, 2 or have acted in any way against the Four 
Hundred who had organized the previous oligarchy. 
Theramenes had done both, and accordingly, when these 

1 The MS. says two thousand, but this must be a copyist's error, 
as the Three Thousand is mentioned immediately below, and that number 
is confirmed by the other authorities. 

2 The Four Hundred had begun to build this fort, which commanded 
the entrance to the Piraeus, in the later days of their rule ; but Thera- 
menes and others of the moderate party, suspecting that it was intended 
to enable the oligarchs to betray the port to the Spartans, incited the 
populace to destroy it. This was one of the most serious blows dealt 
to the power of the Four Hundred. 


laws were ratified, he became excluded from the franchise and 
a the Thirty had full power to put him to death. 1 Theramenes 
having been thus removed, they disarmed all the people 
except the Three Thousand, and in every respect showed a 
great advance in cruelty and crime. They also sent 
ambassadors to Lacedaemon to blacken the character of 
Theramenes and to ask for help ; and the Lacedaemonians, 
in answer to their appeal, sent Callibius as military governor 
with about seven hundred troops, who came and occupied 
the Acropolis. . 
38 These events were followed by the occupation of Munichia 
by the exiles from Phyle, and their victory over the Thirty 
and their partisans. After the fight the party of the city 
retreated, and next day they held a meeting in the market- 
place and deposed the Thirty, and elected ten citizens with 
full powers to bring the war to a termination. When, how- 
ever, the Ten had taken over the government they did 
nothing towards the object for which they were elected, but 
sent envoys to Lacedaemon to ask for help and to borrow 

2 money. Further, finding that the citizens who possessed the 
franchise were displeased at their proceedings, they were 
afraid lest they should be deposed, and consequently, in 
order to strike terror into them (in which design they suc- 
ceeded), they arrested Demaretus, one of the most eminent 
citizens, and put him to death. This gave them a firm hold 
on the government, and they also had the support of 
Callibius and his Peloponnesians, together with several of 
the Knights ; for some of the members of this class were 
the most zealous among the citizens to prevent the return 

3 of the exiles from Phyle. When, however, the party in 
Piraeus and Munichia began to gain the upper hand in the 
war, through the defection of the whole populace to them, 
the party in the city deposed the original Ten, and elected 
another Ten,^ consisting of men of the highest repute. Under 

1 This is quite different from Xenophon's dramatic account 
(ii. 3. 23-561 ot the totally illegal arrest and execution ol Theramenes. 

2 No other authority seems to distinguish between these two boards 
of Ten. Practically, the rule of the first is ignored, and only that of 
the second, which brought the war to a conclusion, is recognized; but 
the appointment of this board is assigned to the days immediately 
following the defeat of the Thirty, and it is not recognized that a con- 


their administration, and with their active and zealous 
co-operation, the treaty of reconciliation was made and the 
populace returned to the city. The most prominent 
members of this board were Rhinon of Paeania and Phayllus 
of Acherdus, who, even before the arrival of Pausanias, 
opened negotiations with the party in Piraeus, and after 
his arrival seconded his efforts to bring about the return of 
the exiles. For it was Pausanias, the king of the Lacedae- 4 
monians, who brought the peace and reconciliation to a 
fulfilment, in conjunction with the ten 1 commissioners of 
arbitration who arrived later from Lacedaemon, at his own 
earnest request. Rhinon and his colleagues received a vote 
of thanks for the goodwill shown by them to the people, 
and though they received their charge under an oligarchy 
and handed in their accounts under a democracy, no one, 
either of the party that had stayed in the city or of the exiles 
that had returned from the Piraeus, brought any complaint 
against them. On the contrary, Rhinon was immediately 
elected general on account of his conduct in this office. 

This reconciliation was effected in the archonship of 39 
Kucleides, 2 on the following terms. All persons who, having 
remained in the city during the troubles, were now anxious 
to leave it, were to be free to settle at Eleusis, retaining 
their civil rights and possessing full and independent powers 
of self-government, and with the free enjoyment of their own 
personal property. The temple at Eleusis should be com- 2 
mon ground for both parties, and should be under the 
superintendence of the Ceryces and the Eumolpidae, 3 ac- 
cording to primitive custom. The settlers at Eleusis should 
not be allowed to enter Athens, nor the people of Athens to 
enter Eleusis, except at the season of the mysteries, when 
both parties should be free from these restrictions. The 
secessionists should pay their share to the fund for the 

siderable time, apparently about six months, elapsed between this event 
and the restoration of the democracy. 

1 Xenophon says fifteen, and some editors alter the present text 

2 i. e. late in the summer of 403 B. c. 

3 Two ancient Athenian families, who from the earliest times had 
retained the duty of superintending the Eleusinian mysteries. See 
ch. 57, 1. 


common defence out of their revenues, just like all the 

3 other Athenians. If an)' of the seceding party wished to 
take a house in Eleusis, the people would help them 
to obtain the consent of the owner ; but if they could not 
come to terms, they should appoint three valuers on either 
side, and the owner should receive whatever price they 
should appoint. Of the inhabitants of Eleusis, those whom 
the secessionists wished to remain should be allowed to do 

4 so. The list of those who desired to secede should be made 
up within ten days after the taking of the oaths in the case 
of persons already in the country, and their actual departure 
should take place within twenty days ; persons at present 
out of the country should have the same terms allowed to 

5 them after their return. No one who settled at Eleusis 
should be capable of holding any office in Athens until he 
should again register himself on the roll as a resident in the 
city. Trials for homicide, including all cases in which one 
party had either killed or wounded another, should be 

6 conducted according to ancestral practice. 1 There should be 
a general amnesty concerning past events towards all persons 
except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, and the magistrates 
in Piraeus; and these too should be included if they should 
submit their accounts in the usual way. Such accounts 
should be given by the magistrates in Piraeus before a 
court of citizens rated in Piraeus, and by the magistrates in 
the city before a court of those rated in the city.'- On these 
terms those who wished to do so might secede. Each 
party was to repay separately the money which it had 
borrowed ior the war. 

40 When the reconciliation had taken place on these terms, 
those who had fought on the side of the Thirty felt con- 
siderable apprehensions, and a large number intended to 
secede. But as they put off entering their names till the last 
moment, as people willdo, Archinus,ol>serving theirnumbers, 
and being anxious to retain them as citizens, cut off the 
remaining days during which the list should have remained 

1 The reading of this passage is rather doubtful. 

2 The exact reading of this passage also is doubtful, but the general 
sense appears to be that here given (inserting *V t<u a<TT*i after iv toU). 


open ; and in this way many persons were compelled 
to remain, though they did so very unwillingly until they 
recovered confidence. This is one point in which Archinus 3 
appears to have acted in a most statesmanlike manner, and 
another was his subsequent prosecution of Thrasybulus on 
the charge of illegality, for a motion by which he proposed 
to confer the franchise on all who had taken part in the 
return from Piraeus, although some of them were notoriously 
slaves. And yet a third such action was when one of the 
returned exiles began to violate the amnesty, whereupon 
Archinus haled him to the Council and persuaded them 
to execute him without trial, telling them that now they 
would have to show whether they wished to preserve the 
democracy and abide by the oaths they had taken ; for 
if they let this man escape they would encourage others 
to imitate him, while if they executed him they would make 
an example for all to learn by. And this was exactly what 
happened ; for after this man had been put to death no 
one ever again broke the amnesty. On the contrary, the 3 
Athenians seem, both in public and in private, to have 
behaved in the most unprecedentedly admirable and public- 
spirited way with reference to the preceding troubles. 
Not only did they blot out all memory of former offences, 
but they even repaid to the Lacedaemonians out of the 
public purse the money which the Thirty had borrowed for 
the war, although the treaty required each party, the party 
of the city and the party of Piraeus, to pay its own debts 
separately. This they did because they thought it was 
a necessary first step in the direction of restoring harmony ; 
but in other states, so far from the democratic parties l 
making advances from their own possessions, they are rather 
in the habit of making a general redistribution of the land. 
A final reconciliation was made with the secessionists at 4 
Eleusis two years after the secession, in the archonship of 
Xenaenetus. 2 

This, however, took place at a later date : at the time of 41 

which we are speaking the people, having secured the control 

1 Or ' victorious democracies' (reading ol fir/pm K^aT^auvra). 
4 401 B.C. The date is not elsewhere definitely recorded. 


of the state, established the constitution which exists at the 
present day. Pythodorus was Archon at the time, but the 
democracy seems to have assumed the supreme power with 
perfect justice, since it had effected its own return by its 
* own exertions. 1 This was the eleventh change which had 
taken place in the constitution of Athens. The first 
modification of the primaeval condition of things was when 
Ion and his companions brought the people together into a 
community, for then the people was first divided into the 
four tribes, and the tribe-kings were created. Next, and 
first after this, having now some semblance of a con- 
stitution, 2 was that which took place in the reign of Theseus, 
consisting in a slight deviation from absolute monarchy. 
After this came the constitution formed under Draco, when 
the first code of laws was drawn up. The third was that 
which followed the civil war, in the time of Solon ; from 
this the democracy took its rise. The fourth was the 
tyranny of Pisistratus ; the fifth the constitution of Clei- 
sthenes, after the overthrow of the tyrants, of a more demo- 
cratic character than that of Solon. The sixth was that 
which followed on the Persian wars, when the Council 
of Areopagus had the direction of the state. The seventh, 
succeeding this, was the constitution which Aristides sketched 
out, and which Ephialtes brought to completion by over- 
throwing the Areopagite Council ; under this the nation, 
misled by the demagogues, made the most serious mistakes 
in the interest of its maritime empire. The eighth was the 
establishment of the Four Hundred, followed by the ninth, 
the restored democracy. The tenth was the tyranny of the 
Thirty and the Ten. The eleventh was that which followed 
the return from Phyle and Piraeus ; and this has continued 
from that day to this, with continual accretions of power to 
the masses. The democracy has made itself master of 

1 The text here is corrupt. There is no natural contrast between 
the fact that Pythodorus was Archon and the assumption of the control 
of the state by the democracy, since the Archon had for a long time 
been nothing more than a figure-head. Probably some words have 
dropped out. 

2 This is the first of the eleven changes to which Aristotle has just 
referred. The constitution of Ion is not reckoned in the enumeration, 
since it was the original establishment and not a change. 


everything and administers everything by its votes in the 
Assembly and by the law-courts, in which it holds the 
supreme power. Even the jurisdiction of the Council has 
passed into the hands of the people at large ; and this 
appears to be a judicious change, since small bodies are 
more open to corruption, whether by actual money or 
influence, than large ones. At first they refused to allow 3 
paj ment for attendance at the Assembly ; but the result 
was that people did not attend. Consequently, after the 
Prytanes had tried many devices in vain in order to induce 
the populace to come and ratify the votes, Agyrrhius, 1 in 
the first instance, made a provision of one obol a day, which 
Heracleides of Clazomenae, 1 ' nicknamed ' the king ', increased 
to two obols, and Agyrrhius again to three. 

The present state of the constitution is as follows. The 4 2 
franchise is open to all who are of citizen birth by both 
parents. They are enrolled among the demesmen at the age 
of eighteen. On the occasion of their enrolment the demesmen 
give their votes on oath, first whether the candidates appear 
to be of the age prescribed by the law (if not, they are 
dismissed back into the ranks of the boys), and secondly 
whether the candidate is free born and of such parentage 
as the laws require." Then if they decide that he is not 
a free man, he appeals to the law-courts, and the demesmen 
appoint five of their own number to act as accusers ; if the 
court decides that he has no right to be enrolled, he is sold 
by the state as a slave, but if he wins his case he has a right 
to be enrolled among the demesmen without further ques- 
tion. After this the Council examines those who have been 2 

1 A politician of no very great repute, who flourished at the end 
of the fifth century and in the early part of the fourth. It is clear 
from many allusions in the F.cclesiazusae of Aristophanes that the rate 
of pay had been raised to three obols shortly before the performance of 
that play in 392 B. C ; and the first establishment of payment for 
attendance at the Assembly cannot be placed many years before that 

2 Heracleides is only known otherwise by a mention in the Ion 
attributed to Plato, in which he is referred to as a foreigner who had 
held office at Athens. 

3 i. e. whether he is born of two citizen parents. 



enrolled, and if it comes to the conclusion that any of them 
is less than eighteen years of age, it fines the demesmen 
who enrolled him. When the youths [Ephebi] have passed 
this examination, their fathers meet by their tribes, and 
appoint on oath three of their fellow tribesmen, over forty 
years of age, who, in their opinion, are the best and most 
suitable persons to have charge of the youths ; and of these 
the Assembly elects one from each tribe as guardian, 
together with a director, chosen from the general body 

3 of Athenians, to control the while. Under the charge of 
these persons the youths first of all make the circuit of the 
temples ; then they proceed to Piraeus, and some of them 
garrison Munichia and some the south shore. 1 The As- 
sembly also elects two trainers, with subordinate instructors, 
who teach them to fight in heavy armour, to use the bow 
and javelin, and to discharge a catapult. The guardians 
receive from the state a drachma apiece for their keep, and 
the youths four obols apiece. Each guardian receives the 
allowance for all the members of his tribe and buys the 
necessary provisions for the common stock (they mess 
together by tribes), and generally superintends everything. 

4 In this way they spend the first year. The next year, after 
giving a public display of their military evolutions, on the 
occasion when the Assembly meets in the theatre, 1 ' they 
receive a shield and spear from the state ; after which they 

5 patrol the country and spend their time in the forts. For 
these two years they are on garrison duty, and wear the 
military cloak, and during this time they are exempt from 
all taxes. They also can neither bring an action at law. 
nor have one brought against them, in order that they 
may have no excuse for requiring leave of absence ; though 
exception is made in cases of actions concerning inheritances 
and wards of state, 3 or of any sacrificial ceremony connected 

1 'Aktj? = the southern side of Piraeus. 

- This was on the occasion of the great Dionysiac festival in each 
year, when the whole people was gathered together in the theatre, 
together with numbers of visitors from foreign countries. 

3 When a man died leaving a daughter, but no son, his estate, 
though not becoming her property, was attached to her, and the 
nearest of kin could claim her in marriage ; and the property went to 
the sons born of such marriage. If she was poor, the nearest of kin 


with the family. 1 When the two years have elapsed they 
thereupon take their position among the other citizens. 
Such is the manner of the enrolment of the citizens and the 43 
training of the youths. 

All the magistrates that are concerned with the ordinary 
routine of administration are elected by lot, except the 
Military Treasurer, the Commissioners of the Thcoric fund, 2 
and the Superintendent of Springs. 3 These are elected by 
vote, and hold office from one Panathcnaic festival to the 
next. 4 All military officers are also elected by vote. 

The Council of Five Hundred is elected by lot, fifty from a 
each tribe. Each tribe holds the office of Pry tanes in turn, the 
order being determined by lot; the first four serve for 
thirty-six days each, the last six for thirty-five, since the 
reckoning is by lunar years.' 1 The Prytanes for the time 3 
being, in the first place, mess together in the Tholus, and 
receive a sum of money from the state for their maintenance ; 
and, secondly, they convene the meetings of the Council 

was obliged either to marry her or to provide her with a dowry. If 
there were more daughters than one, the. estate seems to have been 
divided among them under similar conditions. These heiresses were 
under the special protection of the Archon I see ch. 56, 6, 7), and may 
therefore be described as wards of state. 

1 Only members of the older houses belonged to ' families ' in^the 
technical sense, these being one of the earliest subdivisions of the 
population of Attica, and having sacrificial observances connected 
with them. See ch. 21, 6, where it is said that Cleisthenes, though 
breaking up the old tribal organization and introducing new citizens, 
allowed the families and the sacrificial observances to remain according 
to the ancient system. 

2 This was the fund which provided the populace with the price of 
admission to the theatre (and, eventually, with something in addition) 
at the festivals. 

3 Athens was scantily supplied with fresh water, and consequently 
this officer was of some importance. 

4 The Panathenaic festival was at the end of the first month of the 
Attic year (July). The other magistrates probably came into office at 
the beginning of that month ; the Archons certainly did so. 

5 The ordinary Attic year was of 354 days, divided into twelve lunar 
months of thirty and twenty-nine days alternately. The efficiency was 
made up by inserting intercalaiy months, at first every alternate year, 
then three in eight years, and subsequently seven in nineteen. In an 
intercalary year the duration of the prytanies was thirty-nine and 
thirty-eight days, in place of thirty-six and thirty-five. 

■ The official residence of the Prytanes, supposed to represent the 
centre of the public lite of Athens. 


and the Assembly. The Council they convene every day, 
unless it is a holiday, the Assembly four times in each 
prytany. It is also their duty to draw up the programme 
of the business of the Council and to decide what subjects 
are to be dealt with on each particular day, and where the 

4 sitting is to be held. They also draw up the programme 
for the meetings of the Assembly. One of these in each 
prytany is called the 'sovereign' Assembly; in this the 
people have to ratify the continuance of the magistrates in 
office, if they are performing their duties properly, and 
to consider the supply of corn and the defence of the 
country. On this day, too, impeachments are introduced 
by those who wish to do so, the lists of property confiscated 
by the state are read, and also applications for inheritances 
and wards of state, 1 so that nothing may pass unclaimed 

5 without the cognizance of any person concerned. In the 
sixth prytany, in addition to the business already stated, 
the question is put to the vote whether it is desirable to hold 
a vote of ostracism or not ; and complaints against profes- 
sional accusers, whether Athenian or aliens domiciled in 
Athens, are received, to the number of not more than three 
of either class, together with cases in which an individual 
has made some promise to the people and has not performed 

6 it. Another Assembly in each prytany is assigned to the 
hearing of petitions, and at this meeting any one is free, 
on depositing the petitioner's olive-branch, to speak to the 
people concerning any matter, public or private. The two 
remaining meetings are devoted to all other subjects, and 
the laws require them to deal with three questions connected 
with religion, three connected with heralds and embassies, 
and three on secular subjects. Sometimes questions are 
brought forward without a preliminary vote of the Assembly 
to take them into consideration. 

Heralds and envoys appear first before the Prytanes, and 
the bearers of dispatches also deliver them to the same 

1 If there was no direct heir, the next of kin had to apply to the 
state, in the person of the Archon, to have his, claim recognized. The 
claims on wards of state have been mentioned in note 3 to ch. 42, 5. 


There is a single President of the Prytanes, elected by lot, 44 
who presides for a night and a day ; he may not hold the 
office for more than that time, nor may the same individual 
hold it twice. He keeps the keys of the sanctuaries in 
which the treasures and public records of the state are 
preserved, and also the public seal ; and he is bound to 
remain in the Tholus, together with one-third of the 
Prytanes, named by himself. Whenever the Prytanes 2 
convene a meeting of the Council or Assembly, he appoints 
by lot nine Proedri, one from each tribe except that which 
holds the office of Prytanes for the time being ; and out of 
these nine he similarly appoints one as President, and hands 
over the programme for the meeting to them. They take 3 
it and see to the preservation of order, put forward the 
various subjects which are to be considered, decide the 
results of the votings, and direct the proceedings generally. 1 
They also have power to dismiss the meeting. No one 
may act as President more than once in the year, but he 
may be a Proedrus once in each prytany. 

Elections to the offices of General and Hipparch and all 4 
other military commands are held in the Assembly, in such 
manner as the people decide ; they are held after the sixth 
prytany by the first board of Prytanes in whose term of 
office the omens are favourable. There has, however, to be 
a preliminary consideration by the Council in this case also. 2 

In former times the Council had full powers to inflict 45 
fines and imprisonment and death ; but 3 when it had con- 
signed Lysimachus ' to the executioner, and he was sitting 
in the immediate expectation of death, Eumelides of Alopece 
rescued him from its hands, 5 maintaining that no citizen 
ought to be put to death except on the decision of a court 

1 In the fifth century the Prytanes themselves acted as presidents 
at meetings of the Council and Assembly ; but in the fourth century 
the Proedri appear to have been instituted, as here described. 

2 As with all business submitted to the Assembly : see ch. 45, 4. 

3 The MS. has 'and', but is perhaps imperfect. 

1 Neither the story nor the person is otherwise known. He may 
have been one of the partisans of the Thirty fXen. Hell. ii. 4, 8). 
* Oi ' deprived it of its powers '. 


of law. 1 Accordingly a trial was held in a law-court, 
and Lysimaclius was acquitted, receiving henceforth the 
nickname of ' the man from the drum-head ' ; - and the 
people deprived the Council thenceforward of the power 
to inflict death or imprisonment or fine, passing a law 
that if the Council condemn any person for an offence 
or inflict a fine, the Thesmothetae shall bring the sentence 
or fine before the law-court, and the decision of the jurors 
shall be the final judgement in the matter. 

2 The Council passes judgement on nearly all magistrates, 
especially those who have the control of money ; its judge- 
ment, however, is not final, but is subject to an appeal to 
the law-courts. Private individuals, also, may lay an 
information against any magistrate they please for not 
obeying the laws, but here too there is an appeal to the 

3 law-courts if the Council declare the charge proved. The 
Council also examines those who are to be its members for 
the ensuing year, and likewise the nine Archons. 3 Formerly 
the Council had full power to reject candidates for office as 
unsuitable, but now they have an appeal to the law-courts. 

4 In all these matters, therefore, the Council has no final 
jurisdiction. It takes, however, preliminary cognizance of 
all matters brought before the Assembly, and the Assembly 
cannot vote on any question unless it has first been con- 
sidered by the Council and placed on the programme by the 
Prytanes ; since a person who carries a motion in the 
Assembly is liable to an action for illegal proposal on these 
grounds. 4 

46 The Council' also superintends the triremes that are 
already in existence, with their tackle and sheds, 5 and builds 
new triremes or quadrireines, 6 whichever the Assembly 

' It should be observed that throughout the treatise a 'law-court' 
(SiKcuTTi'ipiov) always means one of the large popular jury-courts, 
the constitutional importance of which is described in ch. 9. 

2 This, though verbally close to the original, is rather a paraphrase 
than a translation. The original apparently denotes that Lysimachus was 
about to be executed by the method of beating or bastinadoing to death. 

3 See ch. 55, 2. 

4 i. e. if this procedure has been omitted. 

5 i. e. the sheds in which the ships were laid up when in dock. 

6 Quadriremes were first built at Athens a few years before 330 B. C, 


votes, with tackle and sheds to match. The Assembly 
appoints master-builders for the ships by vote; and if they 
do not hand them over completed to the next Council, the 
old Council ' cannot receive the customary donation — that 
being normally given to it during its successor's term of 
office. For the building of the triremes it appoints ten 
commissioners, chosen from its own members. The Council -» 
also inspects all public buildings, and if it is of opinion that 
the state is being defrauded, it reports the culprit to the 
Assembly, and on condemnation 2 hands him over to the law- 

The Council also co-operates with the other magistrates 47 
in most of their duties. First there are the treasurers of 
Athena, 3 ten in number, elected by lot, one from each tribe. 
According to the law of Solon — which is still in force — they 
must be Pentacosiomedimni, but in point of fact the person 
on whom the lot falls holds the office even though he be 
quite a poor man. These officers take over charge of the 
statue of Athena, the figures of Victory, and all the other 
ornaments of the temple, together with the money, in the 
presence of the Council. Then there are the Commissioners - 
for Public Contracts [Poletaej, ten in number, one chosen 
by lot from each tribe, who farm out the public contracts. 
They lease the mines and taxes, in conjunction with the 
Military Treasurer and the Commissioners of the Theoric 
fund, in the presence of the Council, and grant, to the 
persons indicated by the vote of the Council, the mines 
which are let out by the state, including both the workable 

and in 325 B.C. they began to build quinqueremes. As the latter are 
not mentioned here, we seem to get a lower limit of date for the com- 
position (or revision) of the treatise. The upper limit is fixed by 
ch. 54, 7 as 329 B.C. 

1 Grammatically the subject of this sentence should be the master- 
builders, but the facts are stated in the speech of Demosthenes against 
Androtion in closely parallel language. 

2 According to the text of the MS. {KartiyvnviTd), the condemnation 
is by the Council ; but this has already been expressed before the 
reference to the Assembly (adiKflv dot;;/), and if condemnation by the 
Council sufficed for the case to be brought before the courts, the 
reference to the Assembly would be otiose. Hence the emendation 

s Each of the temples seems to have possessed a treasury, but that 
of the temple of Athena was far the most important. 


ones, which are let for three years, and those which arc 
let under special agreements for [ten?] years. 1 They 
also sell, in the presence of the Council, the property 
of those who have gone into exile from the court of the 
Areopagus, and of others whose goods have been confiscated, 
and the nine Archons ratify the contracts. They also 
hand over to the Council lists of the taxes which are farmed 

3 out for the year, entering on whitened tablets the name of 
the lessee and the amount paid. They make separate 
lists, first of those who have to pay their instalments in each 
prytany, on ten several tablets, next of those who pay thrice 
in the year, with a separate tablet for each instalment, and 
finally of those who pay in the ninth prytany. They also 
draw up a list of farms and dwellings which have been 
confiscated and sold by order of the courts ; for these 
too come within their province. In the case of dwellings 
the value must be paid up in five years, and in that of farms, 

4 in ten. The instalments are paid in the ninth prytany. 
Further, the King-archon brings before the Council the 
leases of the sacred enclosures written on whitened tablets. 
These too are leased for ten years, and the instalments are 
paid in the [ninth] prytany ; consequently it is in this 

5 prytany that the greatest amount of money is collected. 
The tablets containing the lists of the instalments are 
carried into the Council, and the public clerk takes charge 
of them. Whenever a payment of instalments is to be 
made he takes from the pigeon-holes 2 the precise list of the 
sums which are to be paid and struck off on that day, and 
delivers it to the Receivers-General. The rest are kept 
apart, in order that no sum may be struck off before it is paid. 

48 There are ten Receivers-General [Apodectae], elected by 
lot, one from each tribe. These officers receive the tablets, 
and strike off the instalments as they are paid, in the 
presence of the Council in the Council-chamber, and give 
the tablets back to the public clerk. If any one fails to pay 

1 This is the apparent reading of the passage, but the MS. is con- 
siderably damaged in this part. 

2 The exact meaning of the word here (following Sir. J. Sandys) trans- 
lated ' pigeon-holes ' is doubtful. 


his instalment, a note is made of it on the tablet ; and 
he is bound to pay double the amount of the deficiency, or, 
in default, to be imprisoned. The Council has full power 
by the laws to exact these payments and to inflict this 
imprisonment. They receive all the instalments, therefore, on -' 
one day, and portion the money out among the magistrates ; 
and on the next day they bring up the report of the 
apportionment, written on a wooden notice-board, and read 
it out in the Council-chamber, after which they ask publicly 
in the Council whether any one knows of any malpractice in 
reference to the apportionment, on the part of either a 
magistrate or a private individual, and if any one is charged 
with malpractice they take a vote on it. 

The Council also elects ten Auditors "[Logistae] by lot 3 
from its own members, to audit the accounts of the magis- 
trates for each pry tany. They also elect one Examiner of 4 
Accounts [Euthunus] by lot from each tribe, with two 
assessors [Paredri] for each examiner, whose duty it is to 
sit at the ordinary market hours, 1 each opposite the 
statue of the eponymous hero of his tribe ; and if any one 
wishes to prefer a charge, on either public or private 
grounds, against any magistrate who has passed his audit 
before the law-courts, within three days of his having so 
passed, he enters on a whitened tablet his own name and that 
of the magistrate prosecuted, together with the malpractice 
that is alleged against him. He also appends his claim for 
a penalty of such amount as seems to him fitting, and gives 
in the record to the Examiner. The latter takes it, and if 5 
after reading it he considers it proved he hands it over, if 
a private case, to the local justices who introduce cases 3 for 
the tribe concerned, while if it is a public case he enters it on 
the register of the Thesmothetae. Then, if the Thesmothetae 
accept it, they bring the accounts of this magistrate once 

1 Reading lalt ayopais, and accepting Wilamowitz's interpretation. 
The alternative translation, ' on the days of the tribal meetings ', is not 
satisfactory, since the complaints had to be lodged within three days. 

2 All cases had to be brought before the courts by some magistrate. 
Several instances in which one of the Archons, or the Thesmothetae 
collectively, or the Arbitrators, or some other magistrate, performed 
this function for specific classes of cases are mentioned in the following 



more before the law-court, and the decision of the jury 
stands as the final judgement. 

49 The Council also inspects the horses belonging to the 
state. If a man who has a good horse is found to keep it 
in bad condition, he is mulcted in his allowance of corn ; 
while those which cannot keep up or which shy and will 
not stand steady, it brands with a wheel on the jaw, and 
the horse so marked is disqualified for service. It also 
inspects those who appear to be fit for service as scouts, 
and any one whom it rejects, is deprived of his horse. It 
also examines the infantry who serve among the cavalry, 1 

a and any one whom it rejects ceases to receive his pay. The 
roll of the cavalry is drawn up by the Commissioners of 
Enrolment [Catalogeis], ten in number, elected by the 
Assembly by open vote. They hand over to the Hipparchs 
and Phylarchs the list of those whom they have enrolled, 
and these officers take it and bring it up before the Council, 
and there open the sealed tablet containing the names of 
the cavalry. 2 If any of those who have been on the roll 
previously make affidavit that they are physically incapable 
of cavalry service, they strike them out ; then they call up 
the persons newly enrolled, and if any one makes affidavit 
that he is either physically or pecuniarily incapable of 
cavalry service they dismiss him, but if no such affidavit is 
made the Council vote whether the individual in question 
is suitable for the purpose or not. If they vote in the 
affirmative his name is entered on the tablet ; if not, he is 
dismissed with the others. 

3 Formerly the Council used to decide on the plans for 
public buildings and the contract for making the robe of 
Athena ; 3 but now this work is done by a jury in the lavv- 

1 This means infantry who fought among the ranks of the cavalry. 
The Tr,><'8f>ofji<,i above are also a military body, meaning light cavalry 
who acted as advance guard or skirmishers. There was a special 
corps so named in the army of Alexander. 

■ i. e. the names of those already in the cavalry, before the new 

3 This was the robe which was carried in procession at the great 
Panathenaic festival. It was embroidered with mythological subjects, 
and was woven on each occasion by a number of girls, under the 
superintendence of two of superior family. 


courts appointed by lot, since the Council was considered 
to have shown favouritism in its decisions. The Council 
also shares with the Military Treasurer the superintendence 
of the manufacture of the images of Victory and the prizes 
at the Panathenaic festival. 

The Council also examines infirm paupers ; for there is a 4 
law which provides that persons possessing less than three 
minas, who are so crippled as to be unable to do any work, 
are, after examination by the Council, to receive two obols 
a day from the state for their support. A treasurer is 
appointed by lot to attend to thern. 

The Council also, speaking broadly, co-operates in most 5 
of the duties of all the other magistrates; and this ends the 
list of the functions of that body. 

There are ten Commissioners for Repairs of Temples, 50 
elected by lot, who receive a sum of thirty minas from the 
Receivers-General, and therewith carry out the most 
necessary repairs in the temples. 

There are also ten City Commissioners [Astyndmi], of 2 
whom five hold office in Piraeus and five in the city. Their 
duty is to see that female flute- and harp- and lute-players 
are not hired at more than two drachmas, and if more than 
one person is anxious to hire the same girl, they cast lots and 
hire her out to the person to whom the lot falls. They also 
provide that no collector of sewage shall shoot any of his 
sewage within ten stadia of the walls; they prevent people 
from blocking up the streets by building, or stretching 
barriers across them, or making drain-pipes in mid-air with 
a discharge into the street, or having doors 1 which open 
outwards ; they also remove the corpses of those who die in 
the streets, for which purpose they have a body of state 
slaves assigned to them. 

Market Commissioners [Agoranomi] are elected by lot. 51 
five for Piraeus, five for the city. Their statutory duty is 
to see that all articles offered for sale in the market are pure 
and unadulterated. 

Commissioners of Weights and Measures [MctronSmi] J 

1 Or possibly ' windows '. 


are elected by lot, five for the city, and five for Piraeus. 
They see that sellers use fair weights and measures. 

3 Formerly there were ten Corn Commissioners [Sitophy- 
lUces], elected by lot, five for Piraeus, and five for the city ; 
but now there are twenty for the city and fifteen for 
Piraeus. Their duties are, first, to see that the unprepared 
corn in the market is offered for sale at reasonable prices, 
and secondly, to see that the millers sell barley meal at a 
price proportionate to that of barley, and that the bakers 
sell their loaves at a price proportionate to that of wheat, 
and of such weight as the Commissioners may appoint ; for 
the law requires them to fix the standard weight. 

4 There are ten Superintendents of the Mart, elected by 
lot, whose duty is to superintend the Mart, and to compel 
merchants to bring up into the city two-thirds of the corn 
which is brought by sea to the Corn Mart. 

5 2 The Eleven also are appointed by lot to take care of the 
prisoners in the state gaol. Thieves, kidnappers, and pick- 
pockets are brought to them, and if they plead guilty they 
are executed, but if they deny the charge the Eleven bring 
the case before the law-courts ; if the prisoners are acquitted, 
they release them, but if not, they then execute them. They 
also bring up before the law-courts the list of farms and 
houses claimed as state-property; and if it is decided that 
they are so, they deliver them to the Commissioners for 
Public Contracts. The Eleven also bring up informations 
laid against magistrates alleged to be disqualified ; this 
function conies within their province, but some such cases 
are brought up by the Thesmothetae. 
3 There are also five Introducers of Cases [Eisagogeis], 
elected by lot, one for each pair of tribes, who bring up the 
' monthly ' cases ] to the law-courts. ' Monthly ' cases are 
these : refusal to pay up a dowry where a party is bound to do 
so, refusal to pay interest on money borrowed at 1 2 per cent. 2 , 

1 i.e. cases which have to be decided within a month, as being 
considered to be of a pressing nature. 

■ If the rate of interest was higher, the creditor could not make use 
of this procedure. 


or where a man desirous of setting up business in the 
market has borrowed from another man capital to start 
with; also cases of slander, cases arising out of friendly 
loans or partnerships, and cases concerned with slaves, cattle, 
and the office of trierarch, or with banks. These are brought 3 
up as ' monthly ' cases and are introduced by these officers ; 
but the Receivers-General perform the same function in 
cases for or against the farmers of taxes. Those in which 
the sum concerned is not more than ten drachmas they can 
decide summarily, but all above that amount they bring 
into the law-courts as ' monthly ' cases. 

The Forty ' are also elected by lot, four from each 53 
tribe, before whom suitors bring all other cases. Formerly 
they were thirty in number, and they went on circuit 
through the demes to hear causes; but after the oligarchy 
of the Thirty they were increased to forty. They have full a 
powers to decide cases in which the amount at issue does 
not exceed ten drachmas, but anything beyond that value 
they hand over to the Arbitrators. The Arbitrators take 
up the case, and, if they cannot bring the parties to an 
agreement, they give a decision. If their decision satisfies 
both parties, and they abide by it, the case is at an end ; 
but if either of the parties appeals to the law-courts, the 
Arbitrators enclose the evidence, the pleadings, and the laws 
quoted in the case in two urns, those of the plaintiff in the 
one, and those of the defendant in the other. These they 3 
seal up and, having attached to them the decision of the 
arbitrator, written out on a tablet, place them in the 
custody of the four justices whose function it is to introduce 
cases on behalf of the tribe of the defendant. These officers 
take them and bring up the case before the law-court, to a 
jury of two hundred and one members in cases up to the 
value of a thousand drachmas, or to one of four hundred 
and one in cases above that value. No laws or pleadings or 
evidence may be used except those which were adduced 

1 These are the officials elsewhere described as the local justices, 
who were instituted by Pisistratus (ch. 16, 5) and revived in 453 B.C. 
ich. 26, 3;. 


before the Arbitrator, and have been enclosed in the 

4 The Arbitrators are persons in the sixtieth year of their 
age ; this appears from the schedule of the Archons and the 
Eponymi. There are two classes of Eponymi, the ten who 
give their names to the tribes, and the forty-two of the years 
of service. 1 The youths, on being enrolled among the 
citizens, were formerly registered upon whitened tablets, and 
the names were appended of the Archon in whose year they 
were enrolled, and of the Eponymus who had been in course 
in the preceding year ; at the present day they are written on 
a bronze pillar, which stands in front of the Council-chamber, 
near the Eponymi of the tribes. Then the Forty take the 

5 last of the Eponymi of the years of service, and assign the 
arbitrations to the persons belonging to that year, casting 
lots to determine which arbitrations each shall undertake ; 
and every one is compelled to carry through the arbitrations 
which the lot assigns to him. The law enacts that any one 
who does not serve as Arbitrator when he has arrived at the 
necessary age shall lose his civil rights, unless he happens 
to be holding some other office during that year, or to be 
out of the country. These are the only persons who escape 

6 the duty. Any one who suffers injustice at the hands of the 
Arbitrator may appeal to the whole board of Arbitrators, 
and if they find the magistrate guilty, the law enacts that he 
shall lose his civil rights. The persons thus condemned 

7 have, however, in their turn an appeal. The Eponymi are 
also used in reference to military expeditions ; when the men 
of military age are despatched on service, a notice is put up 
stating that the men from such-and-such an Archon and 

1 These Eponymi are unknown except from this passage and 
quotations from it in the grammarians. It would appear that, just 
as the Eponymi of the tribes were the ten heroes who gave their names 
to the ten tribes, so a cycle of forty-two years was arranged, to each 
of which the name of a hero was assigned as its Eponymus. Then, 
as every Athenian was liable to military service for forty-two years (18 
to 59 inclusive), each man had to go through the complete cycle before 
he was free from liability to serve. During the last year ot his cycle, 
however, he was required to serve not as a soldier but as an Arbitrator ; 
and accordingly each year the Forty took the list of those who were 
commencing their last year of service, and assigned to them the duties 
which they were to undertake as arbitrators during the year. 


Eponynms to such-and-such another Archon and Eponymus 
are to go on the expedition. 

The following magistrates also are elected by lot : Five 54 
Commissioners of Roads [Hodopoei], who, with an assigned 
body of public slaves, arc required to keep the roads in 
order: and ten Auditors, with ten assistants, to whom all 2 
persons who have held any office must give in their accounts. 
These are the only officers who audit the accounts of those 
who are subject to examination, 1 and who bring them 
up for examination before the law-courts. If they detect 
any magistrate in embezzlement, the jury condemn him 
for theft, and he is obliged to repay tenfold the sum he 
is declared to have misappropriated. If they charge a magis- 
trate with accepting bribes and the jury convict him, they 
fine him for corruption, and this sum too is repaid tenfold. 
Or if they convict him of unfair dealing, he is fined on that 
charge, and the sum assessed is paid without increase, if 
payment is made before the ninth prytany, but otherwise it 
is doubled. A tenfold fine is not doubled. 

The Clerk of the Prytany, as he is called, is also elected by 3 
lot. He has the charge of all public documents, and keeps the 
resolutions which are passed by the Assembly, and checks 
the transcripts of all other official papers and attends at the 
sessions of the Council. Formerly he was elected by open 
vote, and the most distinguished and trustworthy persons 
were elected to the post, as is known from the fact that the 
name of this officer is appended on the pillars recording 
treaties of alliance and grants of consulship 2 and citizenship. 
Now, however, he is elected by lot. There is, in addition, 4 
a Clerk of the Laws, elected by lot, who attends at the 
sessions of the Council ; and he too checks the transcript of 
all the laws. The Assembly also elects by open vote 5 
a clerk to read documents to it and to the Council ; but 
he has no other duty except that of reading aloud. 

1 Every person who had held any public office had to submit himself 
and his accounts to examination before a jury at the end of his term of 
office; on which occasion any citizen might impeach his conduct 
during his office. 

" i. e. of representation ol a foreign state. 


6 The Assembly also elects by lot the Commissioners of 
Public Worship [Hieropoei], known as the Commissioners 
for Sacrifices, who offer the sacrifices appointed by oracle, 
and, in conjunction with the sects, take the auspices whenever 

7 there is occasion. It also elects by lot ten others, known as 
Annual Commissioners, who offer certain sacrifices and 
administer all the quadrennial festivals except the Pan- 
athenaea. There are the following quadrennial festivals : 
first that of Delos (where there is also a sexennial festival), 
secondly the Brauronia, thirdly the Heracleia, fourthly the 
Eleusinia, and fifthly the Panathenaea ; and no two of these 
are celebrated in the same place. 1 To these the Hephaestia 
has now been added, in the archonship of Cephisophon. 2 

s An Archon is also elected by lot for Salamis, and a 
Demarch for Piraeus. These officers celebrate the Dionysia 
in these two places, and appoint Choregi. In Salamis, 
moreover, the name of the Archon is publicly recorded*. 

55 All the foregoing magistrates are elected by lot, and 
their powers are those which have been stated. To pass on 
to the nine Archons, as they are called, the manner of their 
appointment from the earliest times has been described 
already. At the present day six Thesmothetae are elected 
by lot, together with their clerk, and in addition to these an 
Archon, a King, and a Polemarch. One is elected from 
a each tribe. They are examined first of all by the Council 
of Five Hundred, with the exception of the clerk. The 
latter is examined only in the law-court, like other magis- 
trates (for all magistrates, whether elected by lot or by 
open vote, are examined before entering on their offices) ; 
but the nine Archons are examined both in the Council and 
again in the law-court. Formerly no one could hold the 
office if the Council rejected him, but now there is an 
appeal to the law-court, which is the final authority in the 
3 matter of the examination. When they are examined, they 

1 The reading is rather doubtful, and the meaning might be 'no two 
of them take place in the same year ' ; but with five festivals in four 
years, two of them must have fallen in the same year. 

2 This date (329 B. c.) gives us a limit of time after which this work 
must have been written, or (since the words have the air of a paren- 
thetical or later addition) at least revised. See note 5 on ch. 46, 1. 


arc asked, first. -Who is your father, and of what demo? 
who is your father's father ? who is your mother ? who is 
your mother's father, and of what deme ? ' Then the candi- 
date is asked whether he possesses an ancestral Apollo and 
a household Zeus, and where their sanctuaries are ; next if he 
possesses a family tomb, and where ; then if he treats his 
parents well, and pays his taxes, and has served on the 
required military expeditions. When the examiner has put 
these questions, he proceeds, ' Call the witnesses to these 
facts': and when the candidate has produced his witnesses, 4 
he next asks, ' Does any one wish to make any accusation 
against this man?' If an accuser appears, he gives the 
parties an opportunity of making their accusation and 
defence, and then puts it to the Council to pass the candi- 
date or not, and to the law-court to give the final vote. If 
no one wishes to make an accusation, he proceeds at once to 
the vote. Formerly a single individual gave the vote, but 
now all the members are obliged to vote on the candidates, 
so that if any unprincipled candidate has managed to get rid 
of his accusers, 1 it may still be possible for him to be 
disqualified before the law-court. When the examination 5 
has been thus completed, they proceed to the stone on which 
are the pieces of the victims, and on which the Arbitrators 
take oath before declaring their decisions, and witnesses 
swear to their testimony. On this stone the Archons stand, 
and swear to execute their office uprightly and according to 
the laws, and not to receive presents in respect of the per- 
formance of their duties, or, if they do, to dedicate a golden 
statue. When they have taken this oath they proceed to 
the Acropolis, and there they repeat it ; after this they enter 
upon their office. 

The Archon, the King, and the Polemarch have each two 56 
assessors, nominated by themselves. These officers are 

1 i.e. by inducing them not to press their charges. It appears that 
originally, if no accusation was brought before the Council, the exami- 
nation by the law-court was a mere tormality, a single member voting 
for the whole jury. But it was found that candidates sometimes 
escaped an accusation before the Council by ' squaring ' their accusers ; 
and to meet this the law-court was made to examine and vote 

C«5 20 


examined in the law-court before they begin to act. and 
give in accounts on each occasion of their acting. 
3 As soon as the Archon enters office, he begins by issuing 
a proclamation that whatever any one possessed before he 
entered into office, that he shall possess and hold until the 

3 end of his term. Next he assigns Choregi to the tragic 
poets, choosing three 1 of the richest persons out of the 
whole body of Athenians. Formerly he used also to assign 
five Choregi to the comic poets, but now the tribes provide 
the Choregi for them. Then he receives the Choregi 
who have been appointed by the tribes for the men's and 
boys' choruses 2 and the comic poets at the Dionysia, and 
for the men's and boys' choruses at the Thargelia (at 
the Dionysia there is a chorus for each tribe, but at the 
Thargelia one between two tribes, each tribe bearing its 
share in providing it); he transacts the exchanges of properties 
for them, 3 and reports any excuses that are tendered, if 
any one says that he has already borne this burden, or that 
he is exempt because he has borne a similar burden and 
the period of his exemption has not yet expired, or that he 
is not of the required age ; since the Choregus of a boys' 

4 chorus must be over forty years of age. He also appoints 
Choregi for the festival at Delos, and a chief of the mission 4 
for the thirty-oar boat which conveys the youths thither. 
He also superintends sacred processions, both that in honour 
of Asclepius, when the initiated keep house, and that of the 

1 Only three tragic poets might contend at the festivals, and it was 
the duty of the Archon to decide what poets should be admitted to the 
honour. In Comedy, as stated below, five competitors were allowed, 
but this number applies only to the fourth century, before which time 
the number was limited to three. The duty of the Choregus was to 
defray the expense of training, maintaining, and equipping the chorus 
required for a play or a dithyrambic contest. 

* These are dithyrambic choruses, which were quite unconnected 
with the dramatic representations, and in which the several tribes 
competed against one another. 

3 If any person considered that he had been unduly saddled with 
one of the burdens which rich men were called upon to bear for the 
state (such as the equipment of a chorus or a trireme), he might require 
any one on whom he thought the burden should rather have been laid 
either to undertake it, or else to submit to an exchange of properties. 

4 i.e. chiefs of the sacred deputation sent from Athens to the Delian 
festival. It is uncertain whether there was more than one such chief, 
and some editors read dpxtde&[pws]. 


great Dionysia--the latter in conjunction with the Superin- 
tendents of that festival. These officers, ten in number, 
were formerly elected by open vote in the Assembly, and 
used to provide for the expenses of the procession out of 
their private means ; but now one is elected by lot from 
each tribe, and the state contributes a hundred minas for the 
expenses. The Archon also superintends the procession 5 
at the Thargelia, and that in honour of Zeus the Saviour. 
He also manages the contests at the Dionysia and the 

These, then, are the festivals which he superintends. 
The suits and indictments which come before him, and () 
which he, after a preliminary inquiry, brings up before 
the law-courts, are as follows. Injury to parents (for 
bringing these actions the prosecutor cannot suffer any 
penalty); 1 injury to orphans (these actions lie against their 
guardians) ; injury to a ward of state (these lie against 
their guardians or their husbands) ; 2 injury to an orphan's 
estate (these too lie against the guardians) ; mental derange- 
ment, where a party charges another with destroying his 
own property through unsoundness of mind ; for appoint- 
ment of liquidators, where a party refuses to divide property 
in which others have a share ; for constituting a wardship ; 
for determining between rival claims to a wardship ; for 
granting inspection of property to which another party lays 
claim ; for appointing oneself as guardian ; and for deter- 
mining disputes as to inheritances and wards of state. The 7 
Archon also has the care of orphans and wards of state, 
and of women who, on the death of their husbands, declare 
themselves to be with child ; and he has power to inflict 
a fine on those who offend against the persons under his 
charge, or to bring the case before the law-courts. He also 
leases the houses of orphans and wards of state until they 
reach the age of fourteen, and takes mortgages on them ; 
and if the guardians fail to provide the necessary food for 

1 In most cases the prosecutor was subject to penalties if he failed to 
receive a fifth part of the votes of the jury. 

- The state still continued its protection of heiresses even after they 
were married. It scare only ceased when they had children capable 
of inheriting the property. 


the children under their charge, he exacts it from them. 
Such are the duties of the Archon. 

57 The King in the first place superintends the mysteries, in 
conjunction with the Superintendents of Mysteries. The 
latter are elected in the Assembly by open vote, two from 
the general body of Athenians, one from the Eumolpidae. 
and one from the Ceryces. Next, he superintends the 
Lenaean Dionysia. 1 which consists of a procession and a con- 
test. The procession is ordered by the King and the 
Superintendents in conjunction ; but the contest is managed 
by the King alone. He also manages all the contests of the 
torch-race ; and to speak broadly, he administers all the 

2 ancestral sacrifices Indictmentsfor impietycomc before him, 
or any disputes between parties concerning priestly rites ; 
and he also determines all controversies concerning sacred 
rites for the ancient families 2 and the priests, All actions for 
homicide come before him, and it is he that makes the 
proclamation requiring polluted persons to keep away from 

3 sacred ceremonies. Actions for homicide and wounding 
are heard, if the homicide or wounding be wilful, in the 
Areopagus ; so also in cases of killing by poison, and of 
arson. These are the only cases heard by that Council. 
Cases of unintentional homicide, or of intent to kill, or of 
killing a slave or a resident alien or a foreigner, are heard 
by the court of Palladium. When the homicide is acknow- 
ledged, but legal justification is pleaded, as when a man takes 
an adulterer in the act, or kills another by mistake in battle, 
or in an athletic contest, the prisoner is tried in the court of 
Delphinium. If a man who is in banishment for a homicide 
which admits of reconciliation 3 incurs a further charge of 
killing or wounding, he is tried in Phreatto, and he makes 

1 The lesser of the two chief festivals of Dionysus, held in January. 
Many of the plays which have come down to us were first performed 
at this festival, but it was not such a magnificent occasion as the great 
Dionysia, at which strangers from the rest of Greece were usually 
present in great numbers. 

2 See note 2 on ch. 20, 2. 

3 A person who committed an involuntary homicide had to give 
pecuniary satisfaction to the relatives of the deceased, and he was 
compelled to go into exile for a year unless they gave him leave to 
return earlier. 


his defence from a boat moored near the shore. All these 4 
cases, except those which are heard in the Areopagus, are 
tried by the Ephetae on whom the lot falls. 1 The King 
introduces them, and the hearing is held within sacred pre- 
cincts and in the open air. Whenever the King hears a case 
he takes off his crown. The person who is charged with 
homicide is at all other times excluded from the temples, 
nor is it even lawful for him to enter the market-place; but 
on the occasion of his trial he enters the temple and makes 
his defence. If the actual offender is unknown, the writ 
runs against ' the doer of the deed '. The King and the 
tribe-kings also hear the cases in which the guilt rests on 
inanimate objects and the lower animals. 2 

The Polemarch performs the sacrifices to Artemis the 58 
huntress and to Enyalius, and arranges the contest at 
the funeral of those who have fallen in war, and makes 
offerings to the memory of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. 
Only private actions come before him, namely those in which 3 
resident aliens, both ordinary and privileged, and agents of 
foreign states are concerned. It is his duty to receive these 
cases and divide them into ten groups, and assign to each 
tribe the group which comes to it by lot ; after which the 
magistrates who introduce cases for the tribe hand them 
over to the Arbitrators. The Polemarch, however, brings ?, 
up in person cases in which an alien is charged with deserting 
his patron or neglecting to provide himself with one, 3 and 
also of inheritances and wards of state where aliens are 
concerned ; and in fact, generally, whatever the Archon does 
for citizens, the Polemarch does for aliens. 

The Thesmothetae in the first place have the power of 59 

1 The Ephetae were a very ancient board of magistrates who used 
to hear these kinds of cases, but whether they are spoken of here is 
doubtful, as the word in the MS. is lost in a lacuna. It is, however, 
supplied from passages in Harpocration and other grammarians. 

- This is a relic of a very primitive custom, by which any object that 
had caused a man's death was put upon its trial. In later times it may 
have served the purpose of a coroner's inquest. Cases of this kind, and 
those in which the culprit was unknown, were tried in the court of the 
Prytaneum, and it is probable that the name occurred in the treatise, 
but has dropped out of the MS. 

3 Every alien resident in Athens was required to provide himself 
with a patron from among the citizens. 


prescribing on what days the law-courts are to sit. and next 
of assigning them to the several magistrates ; for the latter 
must follow the arrangement which the Thesmothetae assign. 
« Moreover they introduce impeachments before the Assembly, 
and bring up all votes for removal from office, challenges of 
a magistrate's conduct before the Assembly, indictments for 
illegal proposals, or for proposing a law which is contrary 
to the interests of the state, complaints against Proedri or 
their president for their conduct in office, and the accounts 

3 presented by the generals. All indictments also come 
before them in which a deposit has to be made by the 
prosecutor, namely, indictments for concealment of foreign 
origin, for corrupt evasion of foreign origin (when a man 
escapes the disqualification by bribery), for blackmailing 
accusations, bribery, false entry of another as a state debtor, 
false testimony to the service of a summons, conspiracy to 
enter a man as a state debtor, corrupt removal from the list 

4 of debtors, and adultery. They also bring up the examina- 
tions of all magistrates, 1 and the rejections by the demes 

5 and the condemnations by the Council. Moreover they 
bring up certain private suits in cases of merchandise and 
mines, or where a slave has slandered a free man. It is they 
also who cast lots to assign the courts to the various magis- 

r> trates, whether for private or public cases. They ratify 
commercial treaties, and bring up the cases which arise out 
of such treaties ; and they also bring up cases of perjury 

7 from the Areopagus. The casting of lots for the jurors is 
conducted by all the nine Archons, with the clerk to the 
Thesmothetae as the tenth, each performing the duty for his 
own tribe. Such are the duties of the nine Archons. 

6o There are also ten Commissioners of Games [ Athlothetae] , 
elected by lot, one from each tribe. These officers, after 
passing an examination, serve for four years ; and they 
manage the Panathenaic procession, the contest in music 
and that in gymnastic, and the horse-race ; they also provide 
the robe of Athena- and, in conjunction with the Council, 

1 i. e. the examination to which all magistrates were subjected before 
entering office. See ch. 55, 2. 

2 See note 3 on ch. 49, 3. 


the vases, 1 and they present the oil to the athletes. 
This oil is collected from the sacred olives. The Archori 2 
requisitions it from the owners of the farms on which 
the sacred olives grow, at the rate of three-quarters of a 
pint from each plant. Formerly the state used to sell the 
fruit itself, and if any one dug up or broke down one of the 
sacred olives, he was tried by the Council of Areopagus, 
and if he was condemned, the penalty was death. Since, 
however, the oil has been paid by the owner of the farm, the 
procedure has lapsed, though the law remains ; and the oil 
is a state charge upon the property instead of being taken 
from the individual plants.'- When, then, the Archon has :, 
collected the oil for his year of office, he hands it over to the 
Treasurers to preserve in the Acropolis, and he may not take 
his seat in the Areopagus until he has paid over to the 
Treasurers the full amount. The Treasurers keep it in the 
Acropolis until the Panathenaea, when they measure it out 
to the Commissioners of Games, and they again to the victo- 
rious competitors. The prizes for the victors in the musical 
contest consist of silver and gold, for the victors in manly 
vigour, of shields, and for the victors in the gymnastic con- 
test and the horse-race, of oil. 

All officers connected with military service are elected by 61 
open vote. In the first place, ten Generals [Strategi], who 
were formerly elected one from each tribe, but now are 
chosen from the whole mass of citizens. Their duties are 
assigned to them by open vote ; one is appointed to com- 
mand the heavy infantry, and leads them if they go out to 
war ; one to the defence of the country, who remains on the 
defensive, and fights if there is war within the borders of the 
country ; two to Piraeus, one of whom is assigned to 
Munichia. and one to the south shore, and these have charge 
of the defence of the Piraeus; and one to superintend the 

1 The vases given as prizes at the Panathenaea, of which a consider- 
able number still exist. 

2 The meaning is that the oil is now a fixed charge on the estate, so 
that the owner would be liable for the amount, whatever happened to 
the plants. 


symmories, 1 who nominates the trierarchs 2 and arranges 
exchanges of properties 3 for them, and brings up actions to 
decide on rival claims in connexion with them. The rest 
are dispatched to whatever business may be on hand at the 
2 moment. The appointment of these officers is submitted 
for confirmation in each prytany, when the question is put 
whether they are considered to be doing their duty. If any 
officer is rejected on this vote, he is tried in the law-court, 
and if he is found guilty the people decide what punishment 
or fine shall be inflicted on him ; but if he is acquitted he 
resumes his office. The Generals have full power, when on 
active service, to arrest any one for insubordination, or to 
cashier him publicly, or to inflict a fine ; the latter is, however, 

3 There are also ten Taxiarchs, one from each tribe, elected 
by open vote; and each commands his own tribesmenand 

4 appoints captains of companies [Lochagi]. There arealso two 
Hipparchs, elected by open vote from the whole mass of the 
citizens, who command the cavalry, each taking five tribes. . 
They have the same powers as the Generals have in respect 
of the infantry, and their appointments are also subject to 

5 confirmation. There are also ten Phylarchs, elected by open 
vote, one from each tribe, to command the cavalry, as the 

6 Taxiarchs do the infantry. There is also a Hipparch for 
Lemnos, elected by open vote, who has charge of the cavalry 

j in Lemnos. There is also a treasurer of the Paralus, and 
another of the Ammonias, similarly elected. 4 

62 Of the magistrates elected by lot, in former times some 

The companies into which the richer members of the community 
were formed (first in 377 h. c.) for the payment of the extraordinary 
charges in war-time. 

2 The trierarchs were the persons (chosen from the richest men in 
the community) who were required to undertake the equipment of 
a trireme at their own expense. Like the office of Choregus (ch. 56,3,4) 
it was a public duty performed by private individuals. 

3 See note 3 on ch. 56, 3. 

4 These are the two triremes, usually known as ' sacred ', which 
were used for special state services. According to the grammarians 
the two originally so employed were the Paralus and Salaminia ; e. g. 
it was the latter that was sent to fetch Alcibiades back from Sicily to 
stand his trial. The Ammonias appears to have taken the place of the 
Salaminia in the time of Alexander, when the Athenians sent sacrifices 
to the god Amnion in it. 


including the nine Archons, were elected out of the tribe as 
a whole, while others, namely those who are now elected in 
the Theseum, were apportioned among the demes ; but 
since the demes used to sell the elections, these magistrates 
too are now elected from the whole tribe, except the members 
of the Council and the guards of the dockyards, who are 
still left to the demes. 

Pay is received for the following services. First the ^ 
members of the Assembly receive a drachma for the ordinary 
meetings, and nine obols for the ' sovereign ' meeting. Then 
the jurors at the law-courts receive three obols; and the 
members of the Council five obols. The Prytanes receive 
an allowance of an obol for their maintenance. The nine 
Archons receive four obols apiece for maintenance, and also 
keep a herald and a flute-player; and the Archon for 
Salamis receives a drachma a day. The Commissioners for 
Games dine in the Prytaneum during the month of Heca- 
tombaeon in which the Panathenaic festival takes place,from 
the fourteenth day onwards. The Amphictyonic deputies 
to Delos receive a drachma a day from the exchequer 
of Delos. Also all magistrates sent to Samos, Scyros, 
Lemnos, or Imbros receive anallowance fortheir maintenance. 
The military offices may be held any number of times, but 3 
none of the others more than once, except the membership 
of the Council, which may be held twice. 

The juries for the law-courts are chosen by lot by the nine 63 
Archons, each for their own tribe, and by the clerk to the 
Thesmothetae for the tenth. There are ten entrances into j 
the courts, one for each tribe ; twenty rooms in which the 
lots are drawn, two for each tribe ; a hundred chests, ten for 
each tribe ; other chests, in which are placed the tickets of 
the jurors on whom the lot falls ; and two vases. Further, 
staves, equal in number to the jurors required, are placed by 
the side of each entrance ; and counters are put into one 
vase, equal in number to the staves. These are inscribed 
with letters of the alphabet beginning with the eleventh 
{lambda), equal in number to the courts which require to be 
filled. All persons above thirty years of age are qualified to 3 



serve as jurors, provided they are not debtors to the state 
and have not lost their civil rights. If any unqualified per- 
son serves as juror, an information is laid against him, and 
he is brought before the court ; and, if he is convicted, the 
jurors assess the punishment or fine which they consider him 
to deserve. If he is condemned to a money fine, he must 
be imprisoned until he has paid up both the original debt, 
on account of which the information was laid against him, 
and also the fine which the court has imposed upon him. 

4 Each juror has his ticket of box-wood, on which is inscribed 
his name, with the name of his father and his deme, and one 
of the letters of the alphabet up to kappa \ l for the jurors in 
their several tribes are divided into ten sections, with approxi- 

5 mately an equal number in each letter. When the Thesmo- 
thetes has decided by lot which letters are required to attend 
at the courts, the servant puts up above each court the letter 
which has been assigned to it by the lot. 

64 The ten chests above mentioned are placed in front of the 
entrance used by each tribe, and are inscribed with the 
letters of the alphabet from alpha to kappa. The jurors 
cast in their tickets, each into the chest on which is 
inscribed the letter which is on his ticket ; then the ser- 
vant shakes them all up, and the Archon draws one 

3 ticket from each chest. The individual so selected is called 
the Ticket-hanger [Empectes], and his function is to hang up 
the tickets out of his chest on the bar which bears the same 
letter as that on the chest. He is chosen by lot, lest, if the 
Ticket -hanger were always the same person, he might tamper 
with the results. There are five of these bars in each of the 

3 rooms assigned for the lot-drawing. Then the Archon casts 
in the dice and thereby chooses the jurors from each tribe, 
room by room. The dice are made of brass, coloured black or 
white ; and according to the number of jurors required, 
so many white dice are put in, one for each five tickets, while 

1 The tenth letter of the alphabet. Thus the whole body of jurors 
was divided into ten sections, indicated by the letters from alpha to 
kappa ; and the courts for which jurors were required were indicated 
by the requisite number of letters from lambda onwards. 


the remainder are black, in the same proportion. 1 As the 
Archon draws out the dice, the crier calls out the names 
of the individuals chosen. The Ticket-hanger is included 
among those selected. Each juror, as he is chosen and 4 
answers to his name, draws a counter from the vase, and 
holding it out with the letter uppermost shows it first to the 
presiding Archon ; and he, when he has seen it, throws the 
ticket of the juror into the chest on which is inscribed the 
letter which is on the counter, so that the juror must go into 
the court assigned to him by lot, and not into one chosen by 
himself, and that it may be impossible for any one to collect 
the jurors of his choice into any particular court. For this 5 
purpose chests are placed near the Archon, as many in 
number as there are courts to be filled that day, bearing the 
letters of the courts on which the lot has fallen. 

The juror thereupon, after showing his counter again to 65 
the attendant, passes through the barrier into the court. 
The attendant gives him a staff of the same colour as the 
court bearing the letter which is on his counter, so as to 
ensure his going into the court assigned to him by lot ; 
since, if he were to go into any other, he would be betrayed 
by the colour of his staff. Each court has a certain colour 3 
painted on the lintel of the entrance. Accordingly the 
juror, bearing his staff, enters the court which has the same 
colour as his staff, and the same letter as his counter. As 
he enters, he receives a voucher from the official to whom 
this duty has been assigned by lot. So with their counters 3 
and their staves the selected jurors take their seats in the 
court, having thus completed the process of admission. The 
unsuccessful candidates receive back their tickets from the 
Ticket-hangers. The public servants carry the chests from 4 
each tribe, one to each court, containing the names of the 
members of the tribe who are in that court, and hand them 

1 Thus the process of selection is as follows. The Ticket-hanger 
arranges all the tickets on a bar, which establishes their order. Then 
the Archon draws a die ; if it is white, the owners of the first five 
tickets on the bar serve on the jury, while if it is black they are 
rejected ; and so on through the whole number. The selected jurors 
are then assigned to the several courts in accordance with the lots 
drawn from the vases. 


over to the officials 1 assigned to the duty of giving back 
their tickets to the jurors in each court, so that these officials 
may call them up by name and pay them their fee. 

66 When all the courts are full, two ballot boxes are placed in 
the first court, and a number of brazen dice, bearing the 
colours of the several courts, and other dice inscribed with 
the names of the presiding magistrates. Then two of the 
Thesmothetae, selected by lot, severally throw the dice with 
the colours into one box, and those with the magistrates' 
names into the other. The magistrate whose name is first 
drawn is thereupon proclaimed by the crier as assigned for 
duty in the court which is first drawn, and the second in the 
second, and similarly with the rest. The object of this 
procedure is that no one may know which court he will 
have, but that each may take the court assigned to him 
by lot. 

2 When the jurors have come in, and have been assigned to 
their respective courts, the presiding magistrate in each 
court draws one ticket out of each chest (making ten in all, 
one out of each tribe), and throws them into another empty 
chest. He then draws out five of them, and assigns one 
to the superintendence of the water-clock, and the other 
four to the telling of the votes. This is to prevent any 
tampering beforehand with either the superintendent of the 
clock or the tellers of the votes, and to secure that there is 

.i no malpractice in these respects. The five who have not 
been selected for these duties receive from them a statement 
of the order in which the jurors shall receive their fees, and 
of the places where the several tribes shall respectively 
gather in the court for this purpose when their duties are 
completed ; the object being that the jurors may be broken 
up into small groups for the reception of their pay, and not 
all crowd together and impede one another. 

67 These preliminaries being concluded, the cases are called 
on. I fit is a day for private cases, the private litigants are 
called. Four cases are taken in each of the categories 

't> v 

1 The correct reading is perhaps 'the rive officials'. 


defined in the law, and the litigants swear to confine their 
speeches to the point at issue. If it is a day for public 
causes, the public litigants are called, and only one case 
is tried. Water-clocks are provided, having small supply- 3 
tubes, 1 into which the water is poured by which the 
length of the pleadings is regulated. Ten gallons 2 are 
allowed for a case in which an amount of more than five 
thousand drachmas is involved, and three for the second 
speech on each side. When the amount is between one and 
five thousand drachmas, seven gallons are allowed for the 
first speech and two for the second ; when it is less than one 
thousand, five and two. Six gallons are allowed for 
arbitrations between rival claimants, in which there is no 
second speech. The official chosen by lot to superintend the 3 
water-clock places his hand on the supply-tube whenever 
the clerk is about to read a resolution or law or affidavit or 
treaty. When, however, a case is conducted according to a 
set measurement of the day, he does not stop the supply, 
but each party receives an equal allowance of water. 3 The 4 
standard of measurement is the length of the days in the 

month Poseideon 4 The measured day is 5 

employed in cases when imprisonment, death, exile, loss of 
civil rights, or confiscation of goods is assigned as the penalty. 

Most of the courts consist of 500 members . . . ; and 68 
when it is necessary to bring public cases before a jury of 
1,000 members, two courts combine for the purpose, [while 
the most important cases of all are brought before] 1 ,500 
jurors, or three courts. The ballot balls are made of brass a 

1 Or, reading aiiXovs it (x" vaal Kul **povs, with Sandys, ' having 
supply-tubes and outlets ' ; but it is difficult to say that water is 
poured into an outlet. The water is poured in through the supply- 
tube, and trickles out through an opening at the bottom. When the 
aperture at the top is closed, the water ceases to run out. 

s The x°'s is really equivalent to about three-quarters of a gallon. 

3 In ordinary suits, fixed allowances of water (i. e. of time as measured 
by the water-clock) were given for each speech, and the time occupied 
in the reading of affidavits, &c, was not included in the allowances, so 
that the water-clock was stopped while they were read. In more 
important cases a certain portion of the day was allotted to either side, 
without allowance for the time occupied by reading documents. 

+ i. e. December to January, when the days are shortest. A mutilated 
passage follows. 


with stems running through the centre, half of them having 
the stem pierced and the other half solid. When the 
speeches are concluded, the officials assigned to the taking 
of the votes give each juror two ballot balls, one pierced 
and one solid. This is done in full view of the rival litigants, 
to secure that no one shall receive two pierced or two solid 
balls. Then the official designated for the purpose takes away 
the jurors' staves, in return for which each one as he records 
his vote receives a brass voucher marked with the numeral 3 
(because he gets three obols when he gives it up). This is 
to ensure that all shall vote ; since no one can get a voucher 

3 unless he votes. Two urns, one of brass and the other 
of wood, stand in the court, in distinct spots so that no one 
may surreptitiously insert ballot balls ; in these the jurors 
record their votes. The brazen urn is for effective votes, 1 
the wooden for unused votes ; and the brazen urn has a lid 
pierced so as to take only one ballot ball, in order that no 
one may put in two at a time. 

4 When the jurors are about to vote, the crier demands 
first whether the litigants enter a protest against any of the 
evidence ; for no protest can be received after the voting 
has begun. Then he proclaims again, ' The pierced ballot 
for the plaintiff, the solid for the defendant ' ; and the 
juror, taking his two ballot balls from the stand, with his 
hand closed over the stem so as not to show either the pierced 
or the solid ballot to the litigants, casts the one which is to 
count into the brazen urn, and the other into the wooden urn. 

5g When all the jurors have voted, the attendants take the 
urn containing the effective votes and discharge them on to 
a reckoning board having as many cavities as there are 
ballot balls, so that the effective votes, whether pierced 
or solid, may be plainly displayed and easily counted. 
Then the officials assigned to the taking of the votes tell 
them off on the board, the solid in one place and the pierced 
in another, and the crier announces the numbers of the 

1 i. e. those which record the juror's actual vote. Each juror receives 
two ballots, and uses one (pierced or solid according as he votes for 
the plaintiff or the defendant l to record his vote, and throws the other 


votes, the pierced ballots being for the prosecutor and the 
solid for the defendant. Whichever has the majority is vic- 
torious ; but if the votes are equal the verdict is for the 
defendant. Then, if damages have to be awarded, they 2 
vote again in the same way, first returning their pay- 
vouchers and receiving back their staves. Half a gallon 
of water is allowed to each party for the discussion of the 
damages. Finally, when all has been completed in accor- 
dance with the law, the jurors receive their pay in the order 
assigned by the lot. 


References are to chapters and sections. 

Acastus, 3, 3. 

Acherdus, deme of, ■$&, 3. 

Acropolis, 7, 4; 8,4; 14,1; 15,4; 18, 
3; 19,6; 20,3; 37,2; 55,5; 60,3. 

Acte" (south shore of Piraeus), 42, 
3; 61, 1. 

Aegospotami, battle of, 34, 2. 

Agoranomi (Market Commission- 
ers), 51, 1. 

Agroeci, 13, 2. 

Agyrrhius, 41, 3. 

Alcmeonidae, 1; 19,3; 20,2,4,5; 28,2. 

Alexias, archon, 34, 2. 

Aliens, jurisdiction of Polemarch 
over, 58, 3. 

Alopece, deme of, 22, 5 ; 45, 1. 

Ammonias, sacred trireme, 61, 7. 

Amphictyonic deputies, 62, 2. 

Anacreon, 18, I. 

Anaphlystus, deme of, 29, 1. 

Anchimolus, 19, 5. 

Angele, deme of, 34, 1. 

Anthemion, 7, 4. 

Antidotus, archon, 26, 4. 

Antiphon, 32, 2. 

Anytus, 27, 5 ; 34, 3. 

Aphidna, deme of, 34, 3. 

Apodectae (Receivers), 47, 5 ; 48, 

1, 2; 50; 52,3. 
Arbitrators, 53, 2-6 ; 58, 2 ; oath 

of. 55, 5- 

Archestratus, 35, 2. 

Archinus of Ambracia, 17, 4. 

Archinus, political leader, 34, 3 ; 40, 

Archon, the, 3, 2-3, 5 ; 60, 2, 3 ; 
constitutional importance of, 13, 
2 ; functions of, 56. 

Archon, for Salamis, 54, 8 ; 62, 2. 

Archons, the nine, 3 ; 4, 2 ; 7, 1, 3 ; 
8, 1,2; 29, 5 ; 30,2; 47, 2; 63, 
I ; 64 ; 66, 1 ; election of, 22, 
5; 26, 2; 55; examination of, 
45, 3 ; oath of, 55, 5 ; pay of, 62, 

2. See also King-Archon, Pole- 
march, Thesmothetae. 

Archons, in Piraeus, 35, 1. 
Archons, chronological sequence of, 


621 Aristaichmus, 4, 1. 

594 Solon, 5, 2. 

582 (?) Damasias, 13, 2. 

560 Corneas, 14, 1. 

555 Hegesias, 14, 3. 

528 Philoneos, 17, I. 

511 Harpactides, 19, 6. 

508 Isagoras, 21, 1. 

501 Hermocreon, 22, 2. 

490 Phaenippus, 22, 3. 

487 Telesiniis, 22, 5, 

483 Nicodemus, 22, 7. 

481 Hypsichides, 22, 8. 

478 Timosthenes, 23, 5. 

462 Conon, 25, 2. 

457 Mnesitheides, 26, 2. 

453 Lysicrates 26, 3. 

451 Antidotus, 26, 4. 

432 Pythodorus 27, 2. 

412 Callias 32, 1, 2. 

[411 Mnasilochus, 33, 1.] 

411 Theopompus, 33, I. 

406 Callias, 34, 1. 

405 Alexias, 34, 2. 

404 Pythodorus, 35, I ; 41, I. 

403 Eucleides, 39, 1. 

401 Xenaenetus, 40, 4. 

329 Cephisophon, 54, 7. 
Archons, ten, 13, 2. 
Areopagus, Council of, 3, 6 ; 4, 4 ; 

8, 2, 4; 16, 8 ; 23, 1 ; 25, 1-4; 

27, 1; 35. 2; 47, 2; 57, 3; 60, 

Arginusae, battle of, 34, 1, 
Argos, 17, 4; 19, 4. ' 
Aristaichmus, archon, 4, 1. 
Aristides, 22, 7 ; 23, 3-5 ; 24, 3 ; 

28, 2 ; 41, 2. 
Aristion, 14, 1. 

\ristocrates, 33, 2. 
Aristodicus, of Tanagra, 25, 4. 
Aristogeiton, 18, 2-6; 58, I. 
Aristomachus, 32, 1. 


Artemis, sacrifices to, 58, I. 
Asclepius, procession of, 56, 4. 
Assembly i^Ecclesia) 4, 3 ; 25, 2, 4 ; 

41, 2; 42, 4; 43, 3-6; 44,2,4; 

45,4 5 46, 1, 2; 49, 2; 54, 3, 5; 

pay for, 41, 2. 
Assessors, to Archons, 56, 1 ; to 

Euthuni, 48, 4. 
Astynomi, 50. 
Athena, 14, 4 ; robe of (peplus), 49, 

3 ; 60, 1 . 

statue of, 47, 1. 
Athens, constitutions of: 

Ion, 41, 2. 

Theseus, 3 ; 41,2. 

Draco, 4 ; 41,2. 

Solon, 5-12 ; 41, 2. 

Pisistratus, 14-16; 41, 2. 

Cleisthenes, 21 ; 41, 2. 

Areopagite, 23-25 ; 41, 2. 

Democracy, 26-28 ; 41, 2. 

Four Hundred, 29-33 ! 4 1 , 2. 

Democracy restored, 33, 1-34; 
39-41, 2. 

Thirty, 34, 3-38 ; 4 1, 2. 
Athens, empire of, 24. 
Athlothetae (Commissioners of 

Games), 60, I, 3 ; 62, 2. 
Auditors, 48, 3 ; 54, 2. 

Brauronia, festival of. 54, 7. 

Bribery, 27, 5. 

Bucolium, 3, 5. 

Buildings, public, 46, 2 ; 49, 3. 

Callias, archon (412-41 1 B. C), 32, 

Callias, archon (406-405 B. c.j, 34, 1. 

Callibius, 37, 2 ; 38, 2. 

Callicrates, 28, 3. 

Catalogeis (Commissioners of En- 
rolment), 49, 2. 

Cavalry, examination 01, 49, 1, 2. 

Cedon, 20, 5. 

Cephisophon, archon, 54, 7. 

Ceryces, 39, 2; 57, 1. 

Choregi, 54, 8 ; 56, 3, 4. 

Cimon, 26, 1 ; 27, 1, 3 ; 28, 2. 

Cineas, of Thessaly, 19, 5. 

City, Commissioners of, 50. 

Cleisthenes, 20, 1-22, 4; 28,2; 

29. 3; 4i. 2. 
Cleitophon, 29, 3 ; 34, 3. 
Cleomenes, 19, 2, 5 ; 20, 2, 3. 
Cleon, 28, 3. 
Cleophon, 28, 3; 34, 1. 

Clerk of the Council, 47, 5 ; 48, 1. 

— of the Laws, 54, 4. 

— of the Frytany, 54, 3. 

— Reading, 54, 5. 

— to Archons, 55, 1,2. 

— to Thesmothetae, 55, 1 ; 59, 7 ; 

63, I- 
Clocks, water, in law-courts, 67, 

Codrus, 3, 1, note; 3, 3. 
Coinage, Solon's reform of, 10. 
Colacretae, 7, 3. 
Collytus, deme of, 14, 4 ; 22, 4. 
Corneas, archon, 14, 1. 
Confederacy of Delos, 23, 5. 
Confiscated properties, 47, 2, 3 ; 

52, 1. 
Conon, archon, 25, 2. 
Contracts, Commissioners for, 47, 

2; 52, I. 
Corn, Commissioners, 51, 3. 
Council of 500, 21, 3 ; 22, 2 ; 25, 

2; 41, 2; 43, 2-49 5 55, 2-4; 

membership of, 62, 3 ; pay for, 

62, 2. 

— of 500 (under the Thirty), 35, I. 

— of 400, 8, 4; 31. 

— of 401, 4, 3. 

Councils under constitution of Four 

Hundred, 30. 
Cylon, 1, note. 

Damasias, archon, 13, 2. 

Damonides, 27, 4. 

Decelea, 34, 1. 

Delos, festival of, 54, 7 ; 56, 4 ; 

missions to, 62, 2. 
Delphi, oracle of, 19, 4 ; 21,6. 
Delphinium, court of, 57, 3. 
Demarchs, 21,5 

— for Piraeus, 54, 8. 
Demaretus, 38, 2. 

Demes, 20, 4-6 ; elections by, 62, 1 . 
Demes, names of: 

Anaphlystus, 29, 1. 

Angele, 34, 1. 

Aphidna, 34,3. 

Collytus, 14, 4 ; 22, 4. 

Laciadae, 27, 3. 

Oia, 27, 4. 

Paeania, 14, 4; 28, 3 ; 38, 3. 
Demiurgi, 13, 2. 
Dionysia, festival of, 56, 3-5. 

Superintendents of, 56. 4. 

— Lenaean, festival of, 57, 1. 

— in Salumis and Piraeus. 54, 8. 
I Diphilus. 7, 4. 


Draco, legislation of, 4 ; 7, 1 ; 41, 2. 
Dracontides, 34, 3. 

Eetioneia, fort of, 37, 1. 

Eisagogeis (Introducers of Cases), 
52, 2 ; 58, 2. 

Elections by lot, 43, 1, 2; 44, 1 ; 
47, 1, 2; 48, 1, 3, 4; 50; 51, 
1-4; 52, 1, 2; 53, 1 ; 54, 1-4, 
6-8; 55, 1 ; 56, 4; 60, 1 ; 62, 1. 

— by vote, 43, 1 ; 44, 4 ; 46, 1 ; 
49, 2; 54, 3, 5; 5 6 >4; 57, 1 ; 
61, 1,3-7- 

Eleusinia, festival of, 54, 7. 

Eleusis, 39, 1-4 ; 40, 4. 

Eleven, the (Police Commissioners), 

7,3; 29,4; 35, 1; 39, 5; 52, i- 
Empectes (Ticket-hanger}, 64, 2, 3 ; 

Enrolment, Commissioners of, 49, 

Enyalius, sacrifices to, 58, 1. 
Ephebi, examination of, 42, 1, 2; 

53,4; training, 42, 2-5. 
Ephetae, 57, 4. 
Ephialtes, 25 ; 28, 2 ; laws of, 35, 

2; 41, 2. 
Epilyceum, 3, 5. 
Epimenides, I. 
Eponymi (eponymous heroes 1, of 

tribes, 21, 5; 48,4; 53,4. 

— of years of service, 53, 4-7. 
Eretria, 15, 2 ; battle of, 33, 1. 
Euboea, 33, 1. 

Eucleides, archon, 39, 1. 

Eumelides, 45, 1. 

Eumolpidae, 39, 2; 57, 1. 

Eupatridae, 13, 2. 

Euthuni (Examiners of Accounts), 

Examination of Magistrates, 45, 2, 

3; 48, 4, 5; 55- 
Examiner of Accounts, 48, 4. 

Family deities, 55, 3. 
Festivals, Commissioners for, 54, 7. 
Festivals, quadriennial, 54, 7. 
Five Thousand, Assembly of, 29, 
5; 30, I ; 31,2, 3; 32, I, 3; 33, 

I ; 34, 1. 
Forty, the. See Justices, Local. 
Four Hundred, constitution of, 29- 

Four Hundred, Council of, 8, 4 ; 

21,3; 31, 1 ; 32, 1,3- 
Franchise, citizen, 4, 1 ; 7, 3, 4 ; 
21, 2 ; 26, 4; 42. 

Games, Commissioners of, 60, 1,3; 
62, 2. 

— prizes in, 60, 3. 
Geraestus, 22, 8. 
Gorgilus, 17, 4. 

Harmodius, 18, 2-4. 

— and Aristogeiton, memorial 
offerings to, 58, 1. 

Harpactides, archon, 19, 6. 
Hectemori, 2, 2. 
Hegesias, archon, 14, 3. 
Hegesistratus (Thessalus), 17, 3. 
Hellenotamiae, 30, 2. 
Hephaestia, festival of, 54, 7. 
Heracleia, festival of, 54, 7. 
Heracleides, of Clazomenae, 41,3. 
Hermocreon, archon, 22, 2. 
Hieromnemon, 30, 2. 
Hieropoei (Commissioners of Public 

Worship), 30, 2 ; 54, 6. 
Hipparchs, 4, 2 ; 30,- 2 ; 31, 3 ; 49, 

2 ; 61, 4 ; election of, 44, 4. 

— for Lemnos, 61, 6. 
Hipparchus,son of Charmus, 22, 4. 
Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, 17, 

Hippias, son of Pisistratus, 17, 3- 

x 9> 5- , . . 

Hodopoei (Commissioners of 

Roads), 54, I. 
Homicide, cases of, 57, 3, 4. 
Horses, state examination of, 49, 1,2. 
Hypsichides, archon, 22, 8. 

Imbros, magistrates for, 62, 2. 
Introducers of Cases, 52, 2 ; 58, 2. 
Ion, 3, 2; 41, 2. 
Iophon, 17, 3. 

Isagoras, son of Tisander, 20, 1-3 ; 
21, I ; 28, 2. 

Jurors, qualifications of, 63, 3. 
Justices, local, 16, 5 ; 26, 3 ; 48, 5 ; 

King-Archon, 3,2,3, 5; 47, 4; 55,1; 

56, 1 ; functions of, 57. 
Knights, 4.3; 7,3,4; 24, 3 ; 26, 2 ; 


Laciadae, deme of, 27, 3. 
Law-courts, appeal to, 42, 1 ; 45, 

1-3; 48, 4, 5; 49, 3 5 55, 2. 
- -jurisdiction of, 52, 2; 53, 2, 3; 
54, 2; 55, 2,4; 56, 6, 7; 61, 2. 
pay for service in, 27, 3. 


Law-courts, power of, 9, I ; 35, 2 ; 
41, 2. 

— procedure in, 63-69. 
Laws, Clerk of, 54, 4. 
Law-suits, categories of, 56, 6 ; $7, 

2-4: 58, 2; 59, 2, 3. 
Leaders of the people (rrpocrraT^s 

toi" brjfiov) 2, 2 ; 20, 4 ; 23, 3 ; 

25, I ; 28, 2, 3; 36, I. 
Lemnos, Hipparch for, 61, 6; 

magistrates for, 62, 2. 
Lenaea, festival of, 57, 1. 
Leocoreum, 18, 3. 
Lipsydrium, 19, 3. 
Lochagi, 61, 3. 

Logistae (Auditors), 48, 3 ; 54, 2. 
Lot. See Elections. 
Lycurgus, 13,4: 14, 3. 
Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos, 15, 2. 
Lysander, 34, 2, 3. 
Lysicrates, archon, 26, 3. 
Lysimachus, 45, 1. 

Magistrates, audit of accounts of, 

48, 4 5 54, 2. 

— examination of, 45, 2 ; 55 ; 59, 4. 
Marathon, battle of, 22, 3. 
Market, Commissioners of, 51, 1. 
Maroneia, mines of, 22, 7. 

Mart, Superinten