The works of the Right Reverend Father in God Joseph Butler : to which is prefixed a preface, giving some account of the character and writings of the author

•o-f^

THE, WORKS

OF THE

RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD^

JOSEPH BUTLER, p.C.L.. ^^^

LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM. -

. TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, ■

A PEEFACE, GIVING SOME ACCOUNT OF THE CHARACTER
AND WRITINGS OF THE AUTHOR.

BY SAMUEL HALIFAX, D. D.

LATE LOBD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTEE. -j

IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. L

OXFORD:
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS.
MDCCCLXXJV.

Hontron

Bx

, ryC/

V

. r ■■'

Y.|

HENRY FEOWDE

OXrOBD U]SriVERSITY PRESS WAREHOITSE

7 PATERNOSTER ROW

THE

ANALOGY OF RELIGION,

NATURAL AND llEVEALED,

TO THE

CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OP NATURE.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS.

I. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.
II. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

"^BY JOSEPH BUTLEE, D.C.L.

LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAil.

Ejus [Analogic] hsec vis est, ut id quod dubiutn est ad aliquid simile, de quo
uon quaeritur, referat ; ut incerta certis probet. Quintil. i. 6.

WITH A PREFACE,

GIVING SOME ACCODNT OF THE CHARACTER AND WRITINGS OF THE AUTHOR.

BY SAMUEL HALIFAX, D. D

LATE LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER.

^

OXFORD:

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS.
MDCCCLXXIV.

>7

TO
THE REVEREND

DR. THOMAS BALGUY,

ARCHDEACON AND PREBENDARY OF WINCHESTER, &c.

DEAR SIR,

I TRUST YOU will excuse the libertY I have taken
of prefixing your name to the following sheets ;
the latter part of which, I am confident, will not be
thought undeserving of your approbation ; and of
the former part you will commend the intention
at least, if not the execution. In vindicating the
character of Bishop Butler from the aspersions
thrown upon it since his death, I have but dis-
charged a common duty of humanity, Y'hich sur-
vivors owe to those who have deserved well of
mankind by their lives or writings, when they are
past the power of appearing in their own defence.
And if what I have added, by way of opening the
general design of the Works of this great Prelate, be
of use in exciting the younger class of Students in
our Universities to read, and so to read as to under-
stand, the Two Volumes prepared and published by
the Author himself; I flatter myself I shall have
done no inconsiderable service to ]\Ioralitv and Re-
ligion. Your time and studies have been long suc-
cessfully devoted to the support of the same great
cause: and in what you have lately given to the
world, both as an Author and an Editor, you have

VI

largely contributed to the defence of our common
Christianity, and of what was esteemed by One, who
w^as perfectly competent to judge, its best establish-
ment, the Church of England. In the present publi-
cation I consider myself as a fellow-labourer with
You in the same design, and tracing the path You
have trod before, but at great distance, and wutli
unequal paces. When, by His Majesty's goodness, I
w^as raised to that station of eminence in the Church,
to which You had been first named, and which, on
account of the infirmity of your health, You had
desired to decline ; it was honour enough for Me on
such an occasion to have been thought of next to
You : and I know of no better rule by which to
govern my conduct, so as not to discredit the Eoyal
Hand which conferred on me so signal and unmerited
a favour, than in cases of difficulty to put the ques-
tion to myself, How You would probably have acted
in the same situation. You see, Sir, I still look up
to You, as I have been wont, both as my Superior
and my Example. That I may long reap the benefit
of your advice and friendship; and that such a
measure of health and strength may be continued to
You, as may enable You to pass the evening of your
days with comfort, and enjoy the blessings of the
life you love ; is the cordial wish of,

Dear Sir,
Your veiy affectionate
and faithful Servant,

S. GLOUCESTEE.

Dartmouth Street, Westminster,
I2tli May, 1786.

PREFACE

BY

THE EDITOR.

" When I consider how light a matter very often subjects the best
established characters to the suspicions of posterity, posterity
often as malignant to virtue as the age that saw it was envious
of its glory ; and how ready a remote age is to catch at a low
i-evived slander, which the times that brought it forth saw
despised and forgotten almost in its birth ; I cannot but think
it a matter that deserves attention." — Letter to the Editor of the
Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism, &c. by Bishop Waebueton.
See his Woi'ks, vol. vii. p. 547.

THE Charge to the Clergy of tlie Diocese of Durham,
which is placed immediately after the Sermons, was
I printed and published in the year 1751, by the learned Pre-
late whose name it bears ; and, together with the Sermons
and Analogy of the same writer, both too well known to need
a more particular description^ completes the collection of his
Works. It has long been considered as a matter of curiosity,
on account of its scarceness ; and it is equally curious on
other accounts — its subject, and the calumny to which it
gave occasion, of representing the Aiithor as addicted to
siij^erstition, as inclined to Popery, and as dying in the com-
munion of the Church of Borne. The improved edition of the
Biograjihia Britannica, published under the care of Dr. Kip-
pis, having unavoidably brought this calumny again into
notice, it may not be unseasonable to offer a few reflections
in this place, by way of obviating any impressions that may
hence arise to the disadvantage of so great a character as

YUl PBEFACE

that of the late Bishop Butler : referring those, who desire a
more particular account of his life, to the third volume of
the same entertaining work, printed in 1784, art. Butler
(Joseph)*.

I. The principal design of the Bishop in his Charge is, to
exhort his Clergr to "do their part towards reviving a prac-
tical sense of reb'gion amongst the people c-ommitted to their
care;" and, as one way of effecting this, to "instruct them
in the Imj^ortance of External Eeliolon" or the usefulness
'of outward observances in promoting inward piety. Now,
from the compound nature of man, consisting of two parts,
the body and the mind, together with the influence which
these are found to have on one another, it follows, that the
religions regards of such a creature ought to be so framed,
as to be in some way properly accommodated to both. A re-
ligion which is purely spiritual, stripped of every thing that
may affect the senses, and considered only as a divine phi-
losophy of the mind, if it do not mount up into enthusiasm,
as has frequently been the case, often sinks, after a few short
fervors, into indifference : an abstracted invisible object, like
that which natural religion offers, ceases to move or interest
the heart ; and something further is wanting to bring it
nearer, and render it more present to our view, than merely
an intellectual contemplation. On the other hand, when, in
order to remedy this inconvenience, recourse is had to insti-
tuted forms and ritual injunctions, there is always danger
lest men be tempted to rest entirely on these, and persuade
themselves that a painful attention to such observances will
atone for the want of genuine pietj' and virtue. Yet surelv
there is a way of steering safely between these two extremes ;
of so consulting both the parts of our constitution, that the
bodv and the mind mav concur in renderino* our relicnous
services acceptable to God, and at the same time useful to
ourselves. And what way c-an this be, but precisely that
which is recommended in the Charge ; such a cultivation of
outward as well as inward religion, that from both mav
result, what is the point chiefly to be laboured, and at all
events to be secured, a correspondent temper and behaviour ;

• The account here alluded to is snbjoined to this preface.

BY THE EDITOR. IX

or, in other words, such an application of the forms of god-
liness, as may be subserWent in promoting the power and
spirit of it ? No man, who believes the Scriptures of the Old
and New Testament, and understands what he believes, but
must know, that external religion is as much enjoined, and
constitutes as real a part of revelation, as that which is inter-
nal. The many ceremonies in use among the Jews, in con-
sequence of a Divine command ; the baptism of water, as an
emblem of moral purity ; the eating and drinking of bread
and wine, as symbols and representations of the body and
blood of Christ, required of Christians, are proofs of this.
On comparing these two parts of religion together, one, it is
immediately seen, is of much greater importance than the
other ; and, whenever they happen to interfere, is always to
be preferred : but does it follow from hence, that therefore
that other is of little or no importance, and, in cases where
there is no competition, may entirelj* be neglected? Or rather
is not the legitimate conclusion directly the reverse, that no-
thing is to be looked upon as of little importance, which is
of any use at all in preserving upon our minds a sense of the
Divine authoritv, which recalls to our remembrance the obli-
gations we are under, and helps to keep us, as the Scripture
expresses it, "in the fear of the Lord all the day long*^?" If,
to adopt the instance mentioned in the Charge, the sight of
a church should remind a man of some sentiment of piety ;
if, from the view of a material building dedicated to the ser-
vice of God, he should be led to regard himself, his own
body, as a li\4ng "■ temple of the Holy Ghost^," and therefore
DO more than the other to be profaned or desecrated by any
thing that defileth or is impure ; could it be truly said of
such a one, that he was superstitious, or mistook the means
of religion for the end ? If, to use another, and what has
been thougrht a more obnoxious instance, taken from the
Bishop's practice, a cross, erected in a place of public wor-
ship'i, should cause us to reflect on Him who died on a cross
for our salvation, and on the necessity of our " own dying to
sin%" and of " crucifying the flesh with its affections and

^ Prov. xxiii. 17. "= t Cor. vi. 19.

^ See Note A, at the end of this preCvce. " Rom. vi. 11.

X

X PREFACE

lusts f;" would any worse consequences follow from such sen-
timents so excited, than if the same sentiments had been
excited by the view of a picture, of the crucifixion suppose,
such as is commonly placed, and with this very design, in
foreign churches, and indeed in many of our own ? Both the
instances here adduced, it is very possible, may be far from
being approved, even by those who are under the most sin-
cere convictions of the importance of true religion : and it is
easy to conceive how open to scorn and censure they must
be from others, who think they have a talent for ridicule,
and have accustomed themselves to regard all pretensions to
piety as hypocritical or superstitious. But " Wisdom is justi-
fied of her children s." Religion is what it is, " whether men
will hear, or whether they will forbear ^ ; " and whatever in
the smallest degree promotes its interests, and assists us in
performing its commands, whether that assistance be derived
from the medium of the body or the mind, ought to be esteemed
of great weight, and deserving of our most serious attention.

However, be the danger of superstition what it may, no
one was more sensible of that danger, or more in earnest in
maintaining, that external acts of themselves are nothing,
and that moral holiness, as distinguished from bodily observ-
ances of every kind, is that which constitutes the essence of
religion, than Bishop Butler. Not only the Charge itself,
the whole intention of which is plainly nothing more than to
N. enforce the necessity oi practical religion, the reality as well
as form, is a demonstration of this, but man}^ passages be-
sides to the same purpose, selected from his other writings.
Take the two following as specimens. In his Analogy he
observes thus: '^Though mankind have, in all ages, been
greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites,
by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts ; yet,
without making any comparison at all between them, and
consequently without determining which is to have the pre-
ference, the nature of the thing abundantly shews all notions
of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion : as they
are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scrip-
ture; and likewise to the most express particular dcclara-

' Gal. V. 24. P Matt. xi. 19. •' Ezek. ii. 5.

BY THE EDITOR. XI

tions of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, with-
out moral virtue i." And to the same purpose in his Sermon,
reached before the Society for the Propagation of the Gos-
pel, in Feb. 1738-9. " Indeed, amongst creatures naturally-
formed for religion, yet so much under the power of imagina-
tion as men are, superstition is an e\al, which can never be
out of sight. But even against this, true religion is a great
secui-ity, and the only one. True religion takes up that place
in the mind, which superstition would usurp, and so leaves
little room for it ; and likewise lays us under the strongest
obligations to oppose it. On the contrary, the danger of
superstition cannot but be increased by the prevalence of
irreligion ; and, by its general prevalence, the evil will be
unavoidable. For the common people, wanting a religion,
will of course take up with almost any superstition which is
thrown in their way : and in process of time, amidst the
infinite vicissitudes of the political world, the leaders of par-
ties will certainly be able to serve themselves of that super-
stition, whatever it be, which is getting groiuid ; and will
not fail to carry it to the utmost length their occasions re-
quire. The general nature of the thing shews this ; and his-
torv and fact confirm it. It is therefore wonderful, those
people who seem to think there is but one evil in life, that
of superstition, should not see that atheism and profaneness
must be the introduction of it ^."

He who can think and write in such a manner, can never
be said to mistake the nature of real religion : and he, who,
after such proofs to the contrary, can persist in asserting of
so discreet and learned a person, that he was addicted to
mperstit'ion^ must himself be much a stranger both to truth
and charit^^.

And here it may be worth our while to observe, that the
same excellent prelate, who by one set of men was suspected
of superstition, on account of his Charge, has by another been
represented as leaning to the bpposite extreme of enthusiasm,
on account of his two discourses On the Love of God. But
both opinions are equally without foundation. He was nei-
ther superstitious, nor an enthusiast : his mind was much too

' Analogy, part II. chap. i. '' Senu. xvi.

XU PREFACE

til strong", and his habits of thinking* and reasoning" much too
I Istrict and severe, to suffer liim to descend to the weaknesses
if either character. His piety was at once fervent and
ational. When impressed with a generous concern for the
declining" cause of religion, he laboured to revive its dying
interests ; nothing he judged would be more effectual to that
end, among creatures so much engaged with bodily things,
and so apt to be affected with whatever strongly solicits the
senses, as men are, than a religion of such a frame as should
in its exercise require the joint exertions of the body and the
mind. On the other hand, when penetrated with the dignity
and importance of '' the first and great commandment V
love to God, he set himself to inquire, what those movements
of the heart are, which are due to Him, the Author and Cause
of all things; he found, in the coolest way of consideration,
that God is the natural object of the same affections of grati-
tude, reverence, fear, desire of approbation, trust, and depend-
ence, the same affections in hincl^ though doubtless in a very
disproportionate degree, which any one would feel from con-
templating a perfect character in a creature, in which good-
ness, with wisdom and power, are supposed to be the pre-
dominant qualities, with the further circumstance, that this
creature was also his governor and friend. This subject is
manifestly a real one ; there is nothing in it fanciful or un-
reasonable : this way of being affected towards God is piety,
in the strictest sense : this is religion, considered as a habit
of mind ; a religion, suited to the nature and condition of
man '".
X II. From superstition to Fopery the transition is easy : no
wonder then, that, in the progress of detraction, the simple
imputation of the former of these, with which the attack on
the character of our Author was opened, should be followed
by the more aggravated imputation of the latter. Nothing,
I think, can fairly be gathered in support of such a suggestion
from the Charge, in which Popery is barely mentioned, and
occasionally only, and in a sentence or two ; yet even there,
it should be remarked, the Bishop takes care to describe the
peculiar observances required by it, " some as in themselves

1 Matt. xxii. 38. "> See Note B, at the end of this preface.

BY THE EDITOK. Xlll

wrong and superstitious^ and others of them as being- made
subservient to the pui-poses of superstition." With respect
to his other writings, any one at all conversant with them
needs not to be told, that the matters treated of both in his
Sermons and his Analogy did none of them directly lead him
to consider, and much less to combat, the opinions, whether
relating to faith or worship, which are peculiar to the Church
of Rome : it might therefore have happened, yet without any
just conclusion arising from thence, of being himself inclined
to favour those opinions, that he had never mentioned, so
much as incidentally, the subject of Popery at all. But
fortunately for the reputation of the Bishop, and to the
eternal disgrace of his calumniators, even this poor resource is
wanting to support their malevolence. In his Sermon at
St. Bride's before the Lord Mayor in 1 740, after having said
that " our laws and whole constitution go more upon suppo-
sition of an equality amongst mankind, than the constitution
and laws of other countries ; " he goes on to observe, that
" this plainly requires, that more particular regard should be
had to the education of the lower people here, than in places
where they are born slaves of power, and to be made slaves of
siqierstitlon'^ :" meaning evidently in this place, by the general
term superstition, the particular errors of the B,omanists.
This is something : but we have a still plainer indication what
his sentiments concerning Popery really were, from another
of his additional Sermons, I mean that before the House of
Lords on June the nth, 1747, the anniversary of his late
Majesty's accession. The passage alluded to is as follows ;
and my readers will not be displeased that I give it them at
length, " The value of our religious Establishment ought to
be very much heightened in our esteem, by considering what
jit is a security from ; I mean that great corruption of Christ-
lianity. Popery, which is ever hard at work to bring us again
'under its yoke. Whoever will consider the Popish claims, to
the disposal of the whole earth, as of Divine right, to dispense
with the most sacred engagements, the claims to supreme
absolute authority in religion ; in short, the general claims
which the Canonists express by the words plenitude of potoer

» Serm. xvii.

XIV PREFACE

— whoever, I say, will consider Popery as it is professed at
Rome, may see, that it is manifest, open usurjDation of all
\ human and Divine authority. But even in those Roman
Catholic countries where these monstrous claims are not ad-
mitted, and the civil power does, in many respects, restrain
the papal ; yet persecution is professed, as it is absolutely
enjoined by what is acknowledged to be their highest autho-
rity, a general council^ so called, with the Pope at the head of
it ; and is practised in all of them, I think without exception,
where it can be done safely. Thus they go on to substitute
force instead of argument; and external profession made by
force, instead of reasonable conviction. And thus corruptions
of the grossest sort have been in vogue, for many generations,
in many parts of Christendom ; and are so still, even where
Popery obtains in its least absurd form : and their antiquity
and wide extent are insisted upon as proofs of their truth ; a
kind of proof, which at best can only be presumptive, but
which loses all its little weight in proportion as the long and
large prevalence of such corruptions have been obtained by
force"." In another part of the same Sermon, where he is
again speaking of our ecclesiastical constitution, he reminds
his audience that it is to be valued, " not because it leaves us
at liberty to have as little religion as we please, without being
accountable to human judicatories ; but because it exhibits
to our view, and enforces upon our consciences, genuine
Christianity, free from the superstitions with which it is de-
filed in other countries ; which superstitions, he observes,
" naturally tend to abate its force." The date of this Sermon
should here be attended to. It was preached in June, 1 747 ;
that is, four years before the delivery and publieationoF th e
Charge, which was in the year 1751; and exactly five years
before the author died, which was in June, 1752. We have
then, in the passages now laid before the reader, a clear and
unequivocal proof, brought down to within a few years of
Bishop Butler's death, that Popery was held by him in the
utmost abhorrence, and that he regarded it in no other light,
than as t/ie great cornmtion of Christianity, and a manifest
ojaen usurjjation of all human and Divine authority. The argu-

» Serm. xx.

BY THE EDITOR. XV

ment is decisive ; nor will any thing- be of force to invalidate
it, unless from some after-act dm-ing the short remainder of
the Bishop's life, hesides that of delivering- and printing his
Charge, (which, after what 1 have said here, and in the notes
added to this Preface and to the Charge, I must have leave to
consider as affording no evidence at all of his inclination to
Papistical doctrines or ceremonies,) the contrary shall incon-
trovertibly appear.

III. One such after-act however has been alleged, which
would effectually demolish all that we have urged in behalf
of our Prelate, were it true, as is pretended, that he died in
the commmuon of the Church of Home. Had a story of this
sort been invented and propagated by Papists, the wonder
might have been less :

Hoc Tthacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridse.

But to the reproach of Protestantism^ the fabrication of this
calumny, for such we shall find it, originated from among
ourselves. It is pretty remarkable, that a circumstance so
extraordinary should never have been divulged till the year V
1767, fifteen years after the Bishop's decease. At that time *
Dr. Thomas Sefik«r was Archbishop of Canterbury; who of
all others was the most likely to know the truth or falsehood
of the fact asserted, having been educated with our Author in
his early youth, and having lived in a constant habit of
intimacy with him to the very time of his death. The
good Archbishop was not silent on this occasion : with a
virtuous indignation he stood forth to protect the posthumous^
character of his friend ; and in a public newspaper, under the
signature of Misojjseiides, called upon his accuser to support
what he had advanced, by whatever proofs he could. No
proof, however, nor any thing like a proof, appeared in re-
ply ; and every man of sense and candour at that time was
perfectly convinced the assertion was entirely groundless i'.
As a further confirmation of the rectitude of this judgment,
it may not be amiss to mention, there is yet in existence a
strong presumptive argument at least in its favour, drawn
from the testimony of those who attended our Author in the
sickness of which he died. The last days of this excellent

p See Note C, at the end of this preface.

\

XVI PREFACE

Prelate were passed at Bath ; Dr. Nathaiiael Forster, his
chaplain, being- continually with him ; and for one day, and
at the very end of his illness, Dr. Martin Benson alsOj the
then Bishop of Gloucester, who shortened his own life in his
pious haste to visit his dying- friend. Both these persons con-
stantly wrote letters to Dr. Seeker, then Bishop of Oxford,
containing accounts of Bishop Butler's declining health, and
of the symptoms and progress of his disorder, which, as was
conjectured, soon terminated in his death. These letters,
which are still preserved in the Lambeth library i, I have
read ; and not the slenderest argument can be collected from
them, in justification of the ridiculous slander we are here
considering. If at that awful season the Bishop was not
known to have expressed any opinion tending to shew his
dislike to Popery, neither was he known to have said any
thing, that could at all be construed in approhation of it :
and the natural presumption is, that whatever sentiments he
had formerly entertained concerning that corrupt system of
religion, he continued to entertain them to the last. The
truth is, neither the word nor the idea of Popery seems once
to have occurred either to the Bishop himself, or to those
who watched his parting moments : their thoughts were
otherwise engaged. His disorder had reduced him to such
debility, as to render him incapable of speaking much or long
on any subject : the few bright intervals that occurred were
passed in a state of the utmost tranquillity and composure ;
and in that composure he expired. " Mark the perfect man,
and behold the upright : for the end of that man is peacer."
'^ Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end
be like his M"

Out of pure respect for the virtues of a man, whom I had
never the happiness of knowing, or even of seeing, but from
whose writings I have received the greatest benefit and illu-
mination, and which I have reason to be thankful to Pro-
vidence for having early thrown in my way, I have adven-
tured, in what I have now offered to the public, to step forth
in his defence, and to vindicate his honest fiime from the
attacks of those, who, with the vain hope of bringing down

q See Note D, at the end of this preface. ■• Ps. xxxvii. 37. ^ Numb, .xxiii. 10.

BY THE EDITOK. XVll

superior characters to their own level, are for ever at work
in detracting" from their just praise. For the literary repu-
tation of Bishop Butler, it stands too hig-li in the opinion of
the world, to incur the danger of any diminution : but this
in truth is the least of his excellencies. He was more than a

i/ good writer, he was a good man ; and, what is an addition
/ even to this eulogy, he was a sincere Christian. His whole
study was directed to the knowledge and practice of sound
morality and true religion : these he adorned by his life, and
has recommended to future ages in his writings ; in which, if
my judgment be of auy avail, he has done essential service to
both, as much, perhaps, as any single person since the extra-
ordinary gifts of " the word of wisdom and the word of know-
ledge*-" have been withdrawn.

In what follows I propose to give a short account of the
Bishop's moral and rellyioHS si/stenis, as these are collected
from his works.

I. His way of treating the subject of morals is to be
gathered from the volume of his Sermons, and particularly
from the three first, and from the preface to that volume.

" There is," as our Author with singular sagacity has ob-
served, " a much more exact correspondence between the na-
tural and moral world, than we are apt to take notice of"."
The inward frame of man answers to his outward condition ;
the several propensities, passions, and affections, implanted in
our hearts by the Author of nature, are in a peculiar miinner
adapted to the circumstances of life in which he hath jilaced
us. This general observation, properly pursued, leads to
several important conclusions. The original internal consti-
tution of man, compared with his external condition, enables
us to discern what course of action and behaviour that con-
stitution leads to, what is our duty respecting that condition,
and furnishes us besides with the most powerful arguments to
the practice of it.

What the inward frame and constitution of man is, is a

' I Cor. xii. 8. " Serm. \i.

BUTLEK, ANALOGY. b

XVlll PIJEFACE

question of fact ; lo be determined, as other facts are, from ex-
iperienee, from our internal feelings and external senses, and
ifrom the testimony of others. Whether human nature, and
the circumstances in which it is placed, might not have been
ordered otherwise, is foreign to our inquiry, and none of our
concern: our province is, taking* both of these as they are, and
viewing the connexion between them, from that connexion to

1^ discover, if we can, what course of action is fitted to that na-

/ /ture and those circumstances. From contemplating the bodily
senses, and the organs or instruments adapted to them, we
learn that the eye was given to see with, the ear to hear with.
In like manner, from considering our inward perceptions and
the final causes of them, we collect that the feeling of shame,
for instance, was given to prevent the doing of things shame-
ful; compassion, to carry us to relieve others in distress; anger,
to resist sudden violence offered to ourselves. If, continuing
our inquiries in this way, it should at length appear, that the
nature, the whole nature, of man leads him to and is fitted for
that particular course of behaviour which we usually distin-

f I guish by the name of virtue, we are authorized to conclude,
that virtue is the law we are born under, that it was so in-
tended by the Author of our being; and we are bound by the
most intimate of all obligations, a regard to our own highest
interest and happiness, to conform to it in all situations and
\ events.

Human nature is not simple and uniform, but made up of
several parts; and we can have no just idea of it as a system
or constitution, unless we take into our view the respects and
relations which these parts have to each other. As the body
is not one member, but many; so our inward structure con-
sists of various instincts, appetites, and propensions. Thus
far there is no difference between human creatures and brutes.
But besides these common passions and affections, there is an-

-' other principle, peculiar to mankind, that of conscience, moral
sense, reflection, call it what you please, by which they are en-
abled to review their whole conduct, to approve of some ac-
tions in themselves, and to disapprove of others. That this
principle will of course have some influence on our behaviour,
at least at times, will hardly be disputed : but the particular

BY THE EDITOR. XIX

influence which it ought to have, the precise degree of power
in the reg-ulatiug- of our internal frame that is assigned it by
Him who placed it there, is a point of the utmost consequence
in itself, and on the determination of which the very hinge of
our Author's Moral System turns. If the faculty here spoken
of be, indeed, what it is asserted to be, in nature and kind sti-
^perior to every other passion and affection ; if it be given, not
merely that it may exert its force occasionally, or as our pre-
sent humour or fancy may dispose us, but that it may at all
times exercise an uncontrollable authority and government
over all the rest ; it will then follow, that, in order to com-
plete the idea of human nature, as a system, we must not
only take in each particular bias, propension, instinct, which
are seen to belong to it, but we must add besides the prin-
\J^ ciple of conscience, together with the subjection that is due
7 to it from all the other appetites and passions : just as the
idea of a civil constitution is formed, not barely from enu-
meratina" the several members and ranks of which it is com-
posed, but from these considered as acting in various degrees
of subordination to each other, and all under the direction of
the same supreme authority, whether that authority be vested
in one person or more.

The view here given of the internal constitution of man,
and of the supremacy of conscience, agreeably to the concep-
tions of Bishop Butler, enables us to comprehend the force of
that expression, common to him and the ancient moralists,
that virtue consists in foUoio'mg nature The meaning cannot
be, that' it consists in acting agreeably to that propensity of
our nature which happens to be the strongest -, or which pro-
pels us towards certain objects, without any regard to the
methods by which they are to be obtained : but the meaning
Q must be, that virtue consists in the due regulation and sub-
) jection of all the other appetites and affections to the superior
) faculty of conscience; from a conformity to which alone our
S actions are properly natural, or correspondent to the nature,
\ to the whole nature, of such an agent as man. From hence
too it appears, that the Author of our frame is by no means
indifferent to virtue and vice, or has left us at liberty to act
at random, as humour or appetite may prompt us ; but that

XX PREFACE

every man has the rule of right within him ; a rule attended
in the very notion of it with authority, and such as has the
force of a direction and a command from Him who made us
what we are, what course of behaviour is suited to our nature,
and which he expects that we should follow. This moral
faculty implies also a presentiment and apprehension, that the
judgment which passes on our actions, considered as of good
or ill-desei-t, will hereafter be confirmed by the unerring judg-
ment of God ; when virtue and happiness, \-ice and misery,
whose ideas are now so closely connected, shall be indisso-
y lubly united, and the Divine government be found to corre-
spond in the most exact proportion to the nature he has given
us. Lastly, this just prerogative or supremacy of conscience
it is, which Mr. Pope has described in his Universal Prayer,
though perhaps he may have expressed it rather too strongly,
where he says^

"WTiat conscience dictates to be done,
Or warns me not to do,
This teach me raore than hell to shun,
That more than heaven pursue."

The reader will observe, that this way of treating the sub-
ject of moralsj by an appeal to facts, does not at all interfere
with that other way, adopted by Dr. Samuel Clarke and
others, which begins with inquiring into the relations and Jit-
nesses of tilings, but rather illustrates and confirms it. That
there are essential differences in the qualities of human ac-
tions, established by nature, and that this natural difference
of things, prior to and independent of all will, creates a
natural fitness in the agent to act agreeably to it, seems as
little to be denied, as that there is the moral difference before
explained^ from which we approve and feel a pleasure in what
is right, and conceive a distaste to what is wrong. Still, how-
ever, when we are endeavouring to establish either this moral
or that natural difference, it ought never to be forgotten, or
rather it will require to be distinctly shewn, that both of these,
when traced up to their source, suppose an intelligent Author
of nature and moral Ruler of the world ; who originally ap-
pointed these differences, and by such an appointment has
signified his will that we should conform to them, as the only

BY THE EDITOR. Xxi

effectual method of securing our happiness on the whole uuder
his government^. And of this consideration our Prelate him-
self was not unmindful ; as may he collected from many ex-
pressions in different parts of his writings, and particularly
from the following passages in his eleventh Sermon. " It
may be allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue
and religion, that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all
our ideas the nearest and most important to us ; that they
will, nay, if you please, that they ought to prevail over those
of order, and beauty, and harmony, and proportion, if there
should ever he, as it is impossible there ever should be, any
inconsistence between them.'" And again, "Though virtue
or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and
pursuit of what is right and good, as such ; yet, when we sit
down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this
or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for
our happiness, or at least not contrary to it^."

Besides the general system of morality opened above, our
Author in his volume of Sermons has stated with accuracy
the difference between self-love and benevolence; in op-
position to those who, on the one hand, make the whole of
virtue to consist in benevolence =^, and to those who, on the
other, assert that every particular affection and action is
resolvable into self-love. In combating these opinions, he
has shewn, I tliink unanswerably, that there are the same
kind of indications in human nature, that we were made to
promote the happiness of others, as that we were made to
promote our own : that it is no just objection to this, that
we have dispositions to do evil to others as well as good ; for
we have also dispositions to do evil as well as good to ourselves,
to our own most important interests even in this life, for the
sake of gi-atifying a present passion : that the thing to be
lamented is, not that men have too great a regard to their
own real good, but that they have not enough : that benevo-
lence is not more at variance with or unfriendly to self-love,
than any other particular affection is : and that by consulting

^ See Note E, at tlie end of this preface. y Serm. xi.

'^ See the second dissertation " On the Nature of Virtue," at the end of the
Analogy.

XXll PREFACE

the happiuess of others a man is so far from lessening his own,
that the very endeavour to do so, though he should fail in the
accomplishment, is a source of the highest satisfaction and
peace of mind ». He has also, in passing, animadverted on the
philosopher of Malmesbury, who in his book " Of Human
Nature " has advanced, as discoveries in moral science, that
benevolence is only the love of power, and compassion the fear
of future calamity to ourselves. And this our Author has
done, not so much wdth the design of exposing the false
reasoning of Mr. Hobbes, but because on so perverse an
account of human nature he has raised a system, subversive
of all justice and honesty ^\
-^ II. The religious system of Bishop Butler is chiefly to be

collected from the treatise, entitled, " The Analogy of Reli-
gion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course
of Nature."

''All things are double one against another, and God hath
made nothing imperfect c," On this single observation of the

^^ Son of Sirach, the whole fabric of our Prelate's defence of
religion, in his Analogy, is raised. Instead of indulging to
idle speculations, how the world might possibly have been
better than it is ; or, forgetful of the difference between hy-
pothesis and fact, attempting to explain the Divine economy
with respect to intelligent creatures, from preconceived notions

/of his own ; he first inquires what the constitution of nature,
as made known to us in the way of experiment, actually is ;

i^ and from this, now seen and acknowledged, he endeavours to
form a judgment of that larger constitution, which religion

\ discovers to us. If the dispensation of Providence we are
now under, considered as inhabitants of this world, and having
a temporal interest to secure in it, be found, on examination,
to be analogous to, and of a piece with, that further dispensa-
tion, which relates to us as designed for another world, in
which we have an eternal interest, depending on our behaviour
here; if both may be traced up to the same general laws, and
appear to be carried on according to the same plan of admini-
stration ; the fair presumption is, that both proceed from one

» See Serm. i. and xi. and the preface to the volume of Sermons.
'' See the notes to Serm. i. and v. t Ecclus. xlii. 24.

BY THE EDITOR. XXlll

and the same Author. And if the principal parts objected to
in this latter dispensation be similar to and of the same hind
with what we certainly experience under the former ; the
o1)jections, being clearly inconclusive in one case, because con-
tradicted by plain fact, must, in all reason, be allowed to be
inconclusive also in the other.

This way of arguing- from what is acknowledged to what is
disputed, from things known to other things that resemble
them, from that part of the Divine establishment which is
exposed to our view to that more important one which lies
beyond it, is on all hands confessed to be just. By this me-
thod Sir Isaac Newton has unfolded the system of nature ;
by the same method Bishop Butler has explained the system
of grace ; and thus, to use the words of a writer, whom I
quote with pleasure, " has formed and concluded a happy
alliance between faith and philosophy '^"

And although the argument from analogy be allowed to be
imj^erfeqt, and by no means sufficient to solve all difficulties
respecting the government of God, and the designs of his
providence with regard to mankind; (a degree of knowledge,
which we are not furnished with faculties for attaining, at
least in the present state :) yet surely it is of importance to
learn from it, that the natural and moral world are intimately
connected, and parts of one stupendous whole or system ; and
that the chief objections which are brought against religion ) ^
may be urged with equal force against the constitution and / ^^
course of nature, where they are certainly false in fact. And [
this information we may derive from the work before us ; the
proper design of which, it may be of use to observe, is not to

prove the truth of religion, either natural or revealed, but to ^

confirm that proof, already known, by considerations from ^^__y
analogy.

After this account of the method of reasoning employed by
our Author, let us now advert to his manner of applying it,
first to the subject of Natural Religion, and secondly to that
of Revealed.

1. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a future
life ; and with this the treatise begins. Neither the reason
<i Mr. Mainwaring's Dissertation, prefixed to his volume of Sermons.

XXIV PREFACE

of the thing-, nor the analog-y of nature, according' to Bishop
Butler, give ground for imagining, that the unknown event,
death, will be our destruction. The states in which we have
formerly existed, in the womb and in infancy, are not more
different from each other than from that of mature age in
which we now exist : therefore, that we shall continue to
exist hereafter, in a state as different from the present as the
present is from those through which we have passed already,
is a presumption favoured by the analogy of nature. All
that we know from reason concerning death, is the effects it
has upon animal bodies : and the frequent instances among
men of the intellectual powers continuing in high health and
vigour, at the very time when a mortal disease is on the point
of putting an end to all the powers of sensation, induce us to
hope that it may have no effect at all on the human soul, not
even so much as to suspend the exercise of its faculties ;
though, if it have, the suspension of a power by no means
implies its extinction, as sleep or a swoon may convince us'^.
/> The probability of a future state once granted, an important
/ question arises. How best to secure our interest in that state.
We find from what passes daily before us, that the constitution
of nature admits of misery as well as happiness ; that both of
these are the consequences of our own actions ; and these
consequences we are enabled to foresee. Therefore, that our
happiness or misery in a future world may depend on our own
actions also, and that rewards or punishments hereafter ma}^
follow our good or ill behaviour here, is but an appointment
of the same sort with what we experience under the Divine
government, according to the regular course of nature f .
/- This supposition is confirmed from another circumstance,
^ / that the natural government of God, under which we now
live, is also moral ; in which rewards and punishments are
the consequences of actions, considered as virtuous and vicious.
Not that every man is rewarded or punished here in exact
proportion to his desert ; for the essential tendencies of virtue
and vice, to produce happiness and the contrary, are often
hindered from taking effect from accidental causes. However,
there are plainly the rudiments and beginnings of a righteous
« Part I. chap. i. f Chap. ii.

BY THE EDITOR, XXV

administration to be discerned in the constitution of nature :
from whence we are led to expect, that these accidental
hinderances will one day be removed, and the rule of distribu-
tive justice obtain completely in a more perfect stated.

The moral government of God, thus established, implies in
the notion of it some sort of trial, or a moral possibility of
acting- wrong as well as right, in those who are the subjects
of it. And the doctrine of religion, that the present life is in
fact a state of probation for a future one, is rendered credible,
from its being analogous throughout to the general conduct
of Providence towards us with respect to this world ; in which
prudence is necessary to secure our temporal interest, just as
we are taught that virtue is necessary to secure our eternal
interest ; and both are trusted to ourselves^.

But the present life is not merely a state of probation,
implying in it difficulties and danger; it is also a state of
discipline and improvement ; and that both in our temporal
and religious capacity. Thus childhood is a state of discipline
for youth ; youth for manhood ; and that for old age.
Strength of body, and maturity of understanding, are acquired
by degrees ; and neither of them without continual exercise
and attention on our part, not only in the beginning of life,
but through the whole course of it. So again with respect to
our religious concerns, the present world is fitted to be, and to
good men is in event, a state of discipline and improvement
for a future one. The several passions and propensions im-
planted in our hearts incline us, in a multitude of instances,
to forbidden pleasures : this inward infirmity is increased by
various snares and temptations, perpetually occurring from
without : hence arises the necessity of recollection and self-
government, of withstanding the calls of appetite, and form-
ing our minds to habits of piety and virtue ; habits, of which
we are capable, and which, to creatures in a state of moral
imperfection, and fallen from their original integrity, must
be of the greatest use, as an additional security, over and
above the principle of conscience, from the dangers to which
we are exposed '.

Nor is the credibility here given, by the analogy of nature,

B Chap. iii. h Chap. iv. ' Part I. chap. v.

XXVI PREFACE

to the general doctrine of religion, destroyed or weakened by
any notions concerning necessity. Of itself it is a mere word,
the sign of an abstract idea ; and as much requires an agent,
that is, a necessary agent, in order to effect any thing, as
freedom requires a free agent. Admitting it to be specula-
tively true, if considered as influencing practice, it is the same
as false : for it is matter of experience, that, with regard to
our present interest, and as inhabitants of this world, we are
treated as if we were free ; and therefore the analogy of na-
ture leads us to conclude, that, with regard to our future in-
terest, and as designed for another world, we shall be treated
as free also. Nor does the opinion of necessity, supposing it
possible, at all affect either the general proof of religion, or its
external evidence'^'.

Still objections may be made against the wisdom and
goodness of the Divine government, to which analogy, which
can only shew the truth or credibility of facts, affords no
answer. Yet even here analogy is of use, if it suggest that
the Divine government is a scheme or system, and not a
number of unconnected acts, and that this system is also
above our comprehension. Now the government of the na-
tural world appears to be a system of this kind ; with parts,
related to each other, and together composing a whole : in
which system, ends are brought about by the use of means,
many of which means, before experience, would have been
suspected to have had a quite contrary tendency ; which is
carried on by general laws, similar causes uniformly pro-
ducing similar effects : the utility of which general laws, and
the inconveniences which would probably arise from the oc-
casional or even secret suspension of tbem, we are in some
sort enabled to discern 1 ; but of the whole we are incompe-
tent judges, because of the small part which comes within
our view. Reasoning then from what we know, it is highly
credible, that the government of the moral world is a system
also, carried on by general laws, and in which ends are ac-
complished by the intervention of means ; and that both
constitutions, the natural and the moral, are so connected,

•< Chap. vi. 1 See a Treatise on Divine Benevolence, by Dr. Thomas

Balguy, part ii.

BY THE EDITOR. XXVll

as to form tog-ether but one scheme. But of this scheme, as
of that of the natural world taken alone, we are not qualified
to judge, on account of the mutual respect of the several
pai-ts to each other and to the whole, and our own incapacity
to survey the whole, or, with accuracy, any single part. All
objections therefore to the wisdom and goodness of the Divine
government may be founded merely on our ignorance"^ ; and
to such objections our ignorance is the proper, and a satis-
factory answer n.

2. The chief difficulties concerning Natural Religion being
now removed, our Author proceeds, in the next place, to that
which is Revealed ; and as an introduction to an inquiry into
the Credibility of Christianity, begins with the consideration
of its Importance.

The Importance of Christianity appears in two respects.
First, in its being a republication of Natural Religion, in its
native simplicity, with authority, and with circumstances of
advantage ; ascertaining, in many instances of moment, what
before was only probable, and particularly confirming the
doctrine of a futui-e state of rewards and punishments «.
Secondly, as revealing a new dispensation of Providence,
originating from the pure love and mercy of God, and
conducted by the mediation of his Son, and the guidance
of his Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind,
represented in a state of apostasy and ruin. This account
of Christianity being admitted to be just, and the distinct
offices of these three Divine persons being once discovered
to us, we are as much obliged in point of duty to acknow-
ledge the relations we stand in to the Son and Holy Ghost,
as our Mediator and Sanctifier, as we are obliged in point of
duty to acknowledge the relation we stand in to God the
Father ; although the two former of these relations be learnt
from Revelation only, and in the last we are instructed by
the light of nature ; the obligation in either case arising from
the offices themselves, and not at all depending on the manner
in which they are made known to usi'.

The presumption against Revelation in general are, that

™ See Note F, at the end of this prefiice. ° Part I. chap. vii.

o See Note G, at the end of this preface. p Part II. chap. i.

XXVm PEEFACE

i it is not discoverable by reason, that it is unlike to what is

z.

so discovered, and that it was introduced and supported by
3 miracles. But in a scheme so large as that of the universe,
unbounded in extent and everlasting in duration^ there must
of necessity be numberless circumstances which are beyond
the reach of our faculties to discern^ and which can only be
known by Divine illumination. And both in the natural and
moral government of the world, under which we live^ we find
many things unlike one to another, and therefore ought not
to wonder if the same unlikeness obtain between things visi-
ble and invisible ; although it be far from true, that revealed
religion is entirely unlike the constitution of nature_, as
analogy may teach us. Nor is there any thing incredible in
Revelation, considered as miraculous ; whether miracles be
supposed to have been performed at the beginning of the
world, or after a course of nature has been established. Not
at the heg'mning of the world ; for then there was either no
course of nature at all, or a power must have been exerted
totally different from what that course is at present : all men
and animals cannot have been born, as they are now; but a
pair of each sort must have been produced at first, in a way
altogether unlike to that in which they have been since pro-
duced ; unless we affirm, that men and animals have existed
from eternity in an endless succession : one miracle therefore
at least there must have been at the beginning of the world,
or at the time of man's creation. Not after the settlement of
a course of nature, on account of miracles being contrary to
that course, or, in other words, contrary to experience ; for,
in order to know whether miracles, worked in attestation of
a Divine religion, be contrary to experience or not, we ought
to be acquainted with other cases, similar or parallel to those,
in which miracles are alleged to have been wrought. But
where shall we find such similar or parallel cases ? The world
which we inhabit affords none : we know of no extra-
ordinary revelations from God to man, but those recorded in
the Old and New Testament ; all of which were established
by miracles : it cannot therefore be said, that miracles are
incredible, because contrary to experience, when all the ex-
perience we have is in favour of miracles, and on the side

BY THE EDITOK. XXIX

of relig-ion ^. Besides, in reasoning concerning miracles, they
ought not to be compared with common natural events, but
with uncommon appearances, such as comets, magnetism,
electi'icity ; which, to one acquainted only with the usual
phenomena of nature, and the common powers of matter,
must, before proof of their a<3tual existence, be thought
incredible ^

The presumptions against Revelation in general being
despatched, objections against the Christian Revelation in
particular, against the scheme of it, as distinguished from
objections against its evidence, are considered next. Now,
supposing a revelation to be really given, it is highly pro-
bable beforehand, that it must contain many things appearing
to us liable to objections. The acknowledged dispensation of
nature is very different from what we should have expected : ' *^
reasoning then from analogy, the revealed dispensation, it
is credible, would be also different. Nor are we in any
sort judges at what time, or in what degree, or manner, it is - /
fit or expedient for God to instruct us, in things confessedly
of the greatest use, either by natural reason, or by super-
natural information. Thus, arguing on speculation only, and
without experience, it would seem very unlikely that so im-
portant a remedy as that provided by Christianity, for the
recovery of mankind from a state of ruin, should have been
for so many ages withheld ; and, when at last vouchsafed,
should be imparted to so few; and, after it has been imparted,
should be attended with obscurity and doubt. And just so
we might have argued, before experience, concerning the
remedies provided in nature for bodily diseases, to which by
nature we are exposed : for many of these were unknown to
mankind for a number of ages ; are known but to few now ;
some important ones probably not discovered yet; and those
which are, neither certain in their application, nor universal
in their use : and the same mode of reasoning that would
lead us to expect they should have been so, would lead us to
expect that the necessity of them should have been super-
seded, by there being no diseases ; as the necessity of the
Christian scheme, it may be thought, might also have been
9 See Note H, at the end of this preface. ■■ Chap. ii.

XXX PREFACE

superseded, by preventing the fall of raau^ so that he should
not have stood in need of a Redeemer at all *,

As to objections against the wisdom and g-oodness of Chris-
tianity, the same answer may be applied to them as was to
>^the like objections against the constitution of nature. For
^ here alsOj Christianity is a scheme or economy, composed of

various parts, forming a whole ; in which scheme means are
used for the accomplishing of ends ; and which is conducted
by general laws, of all of which we know as little as we do of
the constitution of nature. And the seeming want of wisdom
or goodness in this system is to be ascribed to the same cause,
as the like appearances of defects in the natural system ;
our inability to discern the whole scheme, and our ignorance
of the relation of those parts which are discernible to others
beyond our view.

The objections against Christianity as a matter of fact, and
against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been obviated
together, the chief of them are now to be considered dis-
tinctly. One of these, which is levelled against the entire
system itself, is of this sort : the restoration of mankind,
represented in Scripture as the great design of the Gospel, is
described as requiring a long series of means and persons and
dispensations, before it can be brought to its completion ;
whereas the whole ought to have been effected at once. Now
every thing we see in the course of nature shews the folly of
this objection. For in the natural course of Providence, ends
are brought about by means, not operating immediately and
at once, but deliberately and in a way of progression ; one
thing being subservient to another, this to somewhat further.
The change of seasons, the ripening of fruits, the growth of
vegetable and animal bodies, are instances of this. And
therefore, that the same progressive method should be fol-
^ — " lowed in the dispensation of Christianity, as is observed in
the common dispensation of Providence, is a reasonable ex-
pectation, justified by the analogy of nature*.

Another circumstance objected to in the Christian scheme
is the appointment of a Mediator, and the sa^^ng of the
world through him. But the visible government of God

* Chap. iii. ' Chap. iv.

BY THE EDITOR. XXXi

being actually administered in this way, or by tlie mediation
and instrumentality of others, there can be no general pre-
sumption against an appointment of this kind, against his
invisible government being exercised in the same manner.
We have seen already, that with regard to ourselves this
visible government is carried on by rewards and punishments;
for happiness and misery are the consequences of our own
actions, considered as virtuous and vicious ; and these con-
sequences we are enabled to foresee. It might have been
imagined, before consulting experience, that after we had
rendered ourselves liable to misery by our own ill conduct,
sorrow for what was past, and behaving well for the future,
would, alone and of themselves, have exempted us from
deserved punishment, and restored us to the Divine favour.
But the fact is otherwise ; and real reformation is often found
to be of no avail, so as to secure the criminal from poverty,
sickness, infamy, and death, the never-failing attendants on
vice and extravagance, exceeding a certain degree. By the
course of nature then it appears, God does not always pardon ,
a sinner on his repentance. Yet there is provision made, '
even in nature, that the miseries, which men bring on
themselves by unlawful indulgences, may in many cases be
mitigated, and in some removed; partly by extraordinary
exertions of the offender himself, but more especially and
frequently by the intervention of others, who voluntarily, and
from motives of compassion, submit to labour and sorrow,
such as produce long and lasting inconveniences to them-
selves, as the means of rescuing another from the wretched
effects of former imprudences. Vicarious pimishment, there-
fore, or one person's sufferings contributing to the relief
of another, is a providential disposition in the economy of
nature": and it ought not to be matter of surprise, if by a
method analogous to this we be redeemed from sin and
misery, in the economy of grace. That mankind at present
are in a state of degradation, different from that in which
they were originally created, is the very ground of the
Christian revelation, as contained in the Scriptures. Whether
we acquiesce in the account, that our being placed in such a

" See Note I, at the end of this preface.

XXXll PREFACE

state is owing" to the crime of oui* first parents, or choose to
ascribe it to any other cause, it makes no difference as to
our condition : the vice and unhappiness of the world are
still there, notwithstanding- all our suppositions ; nor is it
Christianity that hath put us into this state. We learn also
from the same Scriptures, what experience and the use of
expiatory sacrifices from the most early times might have
taught us, that repentance alone is not sufficient to prevent
the fatal consequences of past transgressions : but that still
there is room for mercy, and that repentance shall be avail-
able, though not of itself, yet through the mediation of a
Divine person, the Messiah ; who, from the sublimest prin-
ciples of compassion, when we were dead in trespasses and
sins"^, sufiered and died, the innocent for the guilty, the just
for the unjust^, that we might have redemption through his
Hood, even the forgiveness of sins'-. In what way the death
of Christ was of that efficacy it is said to be, in procuring the
reconciliation of sinners, the Scriptures have not explained:
it is enough that the doctrine is revealed ; that it is not
contrary to any truths which reason and experience teach us ;
and that it accords in perfect harmony with the usual method
of the Divine conduct in the government of the world a.
t Again it hath been said, that if the Christian revelation
were true, it must have been universal, and could not have
been left upon doubtful evidence. But God, in his natural
providence, dispenses his gifts in great variety, not only
among creatures of the same species, but to the same indi-
viduals also at different times. Had the Christian revelation
been universal at first, yet, from the diversity of men's abili-
ties, both of mind and body, their various means of improve-
ment, and other external advantages, some persons must
soon have been in a situation, with respect to religious
knowledge, much superior to that of others, as much perhaps
as they are at present : and all men will be equitably dealt
with at last ; and to whom little is given, of him little will
be required. Then as to the evidence for religion being left
doubtful, difficulties of this sort, like difficulties in practice,
aff'ord scope and opportunity for a virtuous exercise of the
» Ephes. ii. i. y i Pet. iii. i8. ^ Coloss. i. 14. » Chap. v.

BY THE EDITOR. XXXUl

understanding-^ and dispose the mind to acquiesce and rest
satisfied with any evidence that is real. In the daily-
commerce of life^ men are oblig-ed to act upon g-reat uncer-
tainties, with regard to success in their temporal pursuits ;
and the case with regard to religion is parallel. However,
though religion be not intuitively true, the proofs of it which
we have are amply sufficient in reason to induce us to
embrace it; and dissatisfaction with those proofs may possibly
be men's own fault'\

Nothing remains but to attend to the positive evidence
there is for the truth of Christianity. Now^ besides its direct
and fundamental proofs, which are miracles and prophecies,
there are many collateral circumstances, which may be united
into one view, and all together may be considered as making
up one argument. In this way of treating the subject, the
revelation, whether real or otherwise, may be supposed to be
wholly historical : the general design of which appears to be,
to give an account of the condition of religion, and its pro-
fessors, with a concise narration of the political state of things,
as far as religion is affected by it, during a great length of
time, near six thousand years of which are already past. More
particularly it comprehends an account of God's entering
into covenant with one nation, the Jews, that he would be
their God, and that they should be his people ; of his often
interposing in their affairs ; giving them the promise, and
afterwards the possession, of a flourishing country; assuring
them of the greatest national prosperity, in case of their
obedience, and threatening the severest national punishment,
in case they forsook him, and joined in the idolatry of their
Pagan neighbours. It contains also a prediction of a par-
ticular person to appear in the fulness of time, in whom all
the promises of God to the Jews were to be fulfilled : and it
relates, that, at the time expected, a person did actually ap-
pear, assuming to be the Saviour foretold ; that he worked
various miracles among them, in confirmation of his Divine
authority ; and, as was foretold also, was rejected and put to
death by the very people who had long desired and waited for
his coming; but that his religion, in spite of all opposition,

b Chap. vi.

BUTLER, ANALOGY. C

XXXIV PREFACE

was established in the world by his disciples, invested
with supernatural powers for that purpose; of the fate and
fortunes of which relig-ion there is a prophetical description,
carried down to the end of time. Let any one now, after
reading- the above history, and not knowings whether the
whole were not a fiction, be supposed to ask, Wliether all
that is here related be true ? and instead of a direct answer,
let him be informed of the several acknowledg-ed facts, which
are found to correspond to it in real life; and then let him
compare the history and facts together, and observe the
astonishing- coincidence of both : such a joint review must
appear to him of very great weight, and to amount to evi-
dence somewhat more than human. And unless the whole
series, and every particular circumstance contained in it, can
be thought to have arisen from accident, the truth of Christ-
ianity is proved''.

The view here given of the moral and religious systems of
Bishop Butler, it will immediately be perceived, is chiefly
intended for younger students, especially for students in
Divinity ; to whom it is hoped it may be of use, so as to
encourage them to peruse, with proper diligence, the original
works of the Author himself. For it may be necessary to
observe, that neither of the volumes of this excellent Prelate
are addressed to those who read for amusement, or curiosity,
or to g-et rid of time. All subjects are not to be compre-
hended with the same ease ; and morality and religion, when

<= Chap. vii. To the Analogy are subjoined two Dissertations, both originally
inserted in the body of the work. One on Personal Identity, in which are con-
tained some strictures on Mr. Locke, who asserts that consciousness makes or
constitutes personal identity ; whereas, as our Author observes, consciousness
makes only personality, or is necessary to the idea of a person, i. e. a thinking
intelligent being, but presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal
identity; just as knowledge presupposes truth, but does not constitute it.
Consciousness of past actions does indeed sliew us the identity of ourselves, or
gives us a certain assurance that we are the same persons or living agents now,
which we were at the time to which our remembrance can look back : but still
we should be the same persons as we were, though this consciousness of what is
past were wanting, though all that had been done by us fomierly were for-
gotten ; unless it be true, that no person has existed a single moment beyond
what he can remember. The other Dissertation is On the Nature of Virtue,
which properly belongs to the moral system of our Author, already explained.'

BY THE EDITOK. XXXV

treated, as sciences, each accompanied with difficulties of its
own^ can neither of them be understood as they ought, without
a very peculiar attention. But morality and religion are not
merely to be studied as sciences, or as being speculatively
true ; they are to be regarded in another and higher light, as
the rule of life and manners, as containing authoritative direc-
tions by which to regulate our faith and practice. And in
this view, the infinite importance of them considered, it can
never be an indifferent matter whether they be received or
rejected. For both claim to be the voice of God ; and whether
they be so or not, cannot be known, till their claims be
impartially examined. If they indeed come from Him, we
are bound to conform to them at our peril : nor is it left
to our choice, whether we will submit to the obligations they
impose upon us or not ; for submit to them we must, in such
a sense, as to incur the punishments denounced by both
against wilful disobedience to their injunctions.

c 2

NOTES

TO THE

PEEFACE BY THE EDITOR.

Page ix. A.

Dr. Butler, when Bishop of Bristol, put up a cross, a plain
piece of marble inlaid, in the chapel of his episcopal house. This,
W'hicli was intended by the blameless Prelate merely as a sign or
memorial, that true Chiistians are to bear their cross, and not to
be ashamed of following a crucified Master, was considered as af-
fording a presumption that he was secretly inclined to Popish forms
and ceremonies, and had no great dislike to Popery itself. And, on
account of the offence it occasioned, both at the time and since, it
were to be wished, in prudence, it had not been done.

Page xii. B.

jMany of the sentiments, in these Two Discourses of Bishop
Butler, concerning the sovereign good of man ; the impossibility
of procuring it in the present life ; the unsatisfactoriness of earthly
enjoyments ; together with the somewhat beyond and above them
all, which once attained, there will rest nothing further to be wished
or hoped ; and which is then only to be expected, when we shall
have put off this mortal body, and our union with God shall be
complete; occur in Hookers Ecclesiastical Polity, book I. §. ii.

Page XV. C.

When the first edition of this Preface was published, I had in
vain endeavoured to procure a sight of the papers, in which Bishop
Butler was accused of having died a Papist, and Archbishop Seeker's
replies to them ; though I well remembered to have read both, when
they first appeared in the public prints. But a learned Professor
in the University of Oxford has furnished me with the whole con-
trovei'sy in its original form ; a bi-ief history of which it may not be
unacceptable to offer here to the curious reader.

XXXVlll XOTES TO THE PREFACE

The attack was opened in the year 1767, in an anonymous
pamphlet, entitled, " The Root of Protestant Errors examined ; " in
which the author asserted, that, " by an anecdote lately given him,
" that same Prelate" (who at the bottom of the page is called B — p
of D — m) " is said to have died in the communion of a Church, that
"makes much use of saints, saints' days, and all the trumpery of
" saint worship." When this remarkable fact, now first divulged,
came to be generally known, it occasioned, as might be expected,
no little alarm ; and intelligence of it was no sooner conveyed to
Archbishop Seeker, than in a short letter, signed Misopseudes, and
printed in the St. James's Chronicle of May 9, he called upon the
writer to produce his authority for publishing " so gross and scan-
" dalous a falsehood." To this challenge an immediate answer was
returned by the author of the pamphlet, who, now assuming the
name of PhileleutJio'os, informed Misopseudes, through the channel
of the same paper, that " such anecdote had been given him ; and
" that he was yet of opinion that there was nothing improbable in
" it, when it is considered that the same Prelate put up the Popish
" insignia of the cross in his chapel, when at Bristol ; and in his
" last Episcopal Charge has squinted very much towards that super-
"stition." Here we find the accusation not only repeated, but
supported by reasons, such as they are, of which it seemed necessary
that some notice should be taken : nor did the Archbishop conceive
it unbecoming his own dignity to stand up on this occasion, as the
vindicator of innocence against the calumniator of the helpless dead.
Accordingly, in a second letter in the same newspaper of May 23,
and subscribed Misopseudes as before ; after reciting from Bishop
Butler's Sermon before the Lords the veiy passage here printed in
the Preface, and observing, that, " there are, in the same Sermon,
"declarations as strong as can be made against temporal punishments
"for. heresy, schism, or even for idolatry;" his Grace expresses
himself thus: " Now he" (Bishop Butler) "was universally esteemed,
"throughout his life, a man of strict piet}' and honesty, as well as
" uncommon abilities. He gave all the proofs, public and private,
" which his station led him to give, and they were decisive and daily,
" of his continuing to the last a sincere member of the Church of
" England. Nor had ever any of his acquaintance, or most intimate
"friends, nor have they to this day, the least doubt of it." As to
putting up a cross in his chapel, the Archbishop frankly owns, that
for himself he wishes he had not ; and thinks that in so doing the
Bishop did amiss. But then he asks, " Can that be opposed, as any
" proof of Popery, to all the evidence on the other side ; or even to

BY THE EDITOR, XXXIX

*' the single evidence of tlie above mentioned Sermon 1 !Most of
"our churches have crosses upon them : are they therefore Popish
" churches ? The Lutherans have more than crosses in theirs ; are
" the Lutherans therefore Papists "i " And as to the Charge, no
Papist, his Grace remarks, would have spoken as Bishop Butler
there does, of the observances peculiar to Roman Catholics, some of
v>'hich he expressly censures as wrong and superstitious, and others,
as made subservient to the purposes of superstition, and, on these
accounts, abolished at the Reformation. After the publication of
this letter, Phileleutheros replied in a short defence of liis own con-
duct, but without producing any thing new in confirmation of what
he had advanced. And here the controversy, so far as the two
principals wei*e concerned, seems to have ended.

But the dispute was not suffered to die away quite so soon. For
in the same year, and in the same newspaper of July 21, another
letter appeared ; in which the author not only contended that the
cross in the Episcopal chapel at Bristol, and the Charge to the
Clergy of Durham in 1751, amount to full proof of a strong attach-
ment to the idolatrous communion of the Church of Rome, but,
with the reader's leave, he would fain account for the Bishop's "ten-
"dency this way." And this he attempted to do, " from the natural
" melancholy and gloominess of Dr. Butler's disposition ; from his
" great fondness for the lives of Romish saints, and their books of
" mystic piety ; from his drawing his notions of teaching men reli-
" gion, not from the New Testament, but from philosopliical and
" political opinions of his own ; and above all, from his transition
"from a strict Dissenter amongst the Presbyterians to a rigid
"Churchman, and his sudden and unexpected elevation to great
" wealth and dignity in the Church." The attack, thus renewed,
excited the Archbishop's attention a second time, and drew from
him a fresh answer, subscribed also Misopseudes, in the St. James's
Chronicle of August 4. In this letter, our excellent Metropolitan,
first of all obliquely hinting at the unfairness of sitting in judgment
on the character of a man who had been dead fifteen years ; and
then reminding his correspondent, that " full proof had been already
"published, that Bishop Butler abhorred Popeiy as a vile con-uption
"of Christianity, and that it might be proved, if needful, that he
"held the Pope to be Antichrist ;" (to which decisive testimonies of
undoubted aversion from the Romish Church, another is also added
in the Postscript, his taking, when promoted to the see of Durham,
for his domestic Chaplain, Dr. Nath. Foi-stcr, who had published,
not four years before, a Sermon, entitled, Popery destructive of the

xl NOTES TO THE PREFACE

Evidence of Christiauity ;) proceeds to observe, " that the natural
" melancholy of the Bishop's temper would rather have fixed him
"amongst his first friends, than prompted him to the change he
" made : that he read books of all sorts, as well as books of mystic
"piety, and knew how to pick the good that was in them out of
" the bad : that his opinions were exposed without reserve in bis
" Analogy and his Sermons, and if the doctrine of either be Popish
" or unscriptural, the learned world hath mistaken strangely in ad-
" miring both : that, instead of being a strict Dissenter, he never
" was a communicant in any Dissenting assembly ; on the contrary,
" that he went occasionally, from his early years, to the established
" worship, and became a constant conformist to it when he was
"barely of age, and entered himself, in 1714, of Oriel College:
" that his elevation to great dignity in the Church, far from being
" sudden and unexpected, was a gradual and natural rise, through a
" variety of preferments, and a period of thirty-two years : that, as
" Bishop of Durham, he had very little authority beyond his bre-
"thren, and, in ecclesiastical matters, had none beyond them; a
" larger income than most of them he had ; but this he employed,
"not, as was insinuated, in augmenting the pomp of worship in his
" cathedral, where indeed it is no greater than in others, but for the
"purposes of charity, and in the repairing of his houses." After
these remarks, the letter closes with the following words : " Upon
"the whole, few accusations, so entirely gi-oundless, have been so
" pertinaciously, I am unwilling to say maliciously, carried on, as the
" present : and surely it is high time for the authors and abettors of
" it, in mere common prudence, to shew some regard, if not to truth,
" at least to shame."

It only remains to be mentioned, that the above letters of Arch-
bishop Seeker had such an efi'ect on a writer, who signed himself
in the St. James's Chronicle of August 25, A Dissenting Minister,
that he declared it as liis opinion, that "the author of the pamjjhlet,
" called, ' The Root of Protestant Errors examined,' and his friends,
" were obliged in candour, in justice, and in honour, to retract their
" charge, unless they could establish it on much better grounds than
" had hitherto appeared :" and he expressed "his hopes that it would
" be understood that the Dissenters in general had no hand in the
"accusation, and that it had only been the act of two or thi-ee
" mistaken men." Another person also, " a foreigner by birth," as
he says of himself, Avho had been long an admirer of Bisliop Butler,
and had perused with great attention all that had been written on
both sides in the present controversy, confesses he had been " won-

BY THE EDITOR. xli

" derfully pleased with observing, with what candour and temper,
"as well as clearness and solidity, he was vindicated from the
" aspersions laid against him." All the adversaries of our Prelate,
however, had not the virtue or sense to be thus convinced ; some of
whom still continued, under the signatures of Old Martin, Latimer,
An Impartial Protestant, Paidinus, Misonothos, to repeat their con-
futed falsehoods in the public prints ; as if the curse of calumniators
had fallen upon them, and their memoiy, by being long a traitor
to truth, had taken at last a severe revenge, and compelled them
to credit their own lie. The first of these gentlemen. Old Martin,
who dates fi-om Newcastle, May 29, from the rancour and malignity
A\'ith which his letter abounds, and from the particular virulence he
discovers towards the chai'acters of Bishop Butler and his defendei-,
I conjecture to be no other than the very person who had already
figured in this dispute, so early as the year 1752 ; of whose work,
entitled, "A Serious Inquiry into the Use and Importance of
" External Eeligion," the reader will find some account in the notes
subjoined to the Bishop's Charge.

Page xvi. D.

The letters, with a sight of which I was indulged by the favour
of our present most worthy Metropolitan, are all, as I remember,
wrapped together under one cover; on the back of which is written,
in Archbishop Seeker's own hand, the following words, or words to
this efi"ect : " Presumptive Arguments that Bishop Butler did not
"die a Papist."

Page xxi. E.

"Far be it from me," says the excellent Dr. T. Balguya, "to
" dispute the reality of a moral principle in the human heart. I
"feel its existence ; I clearly discern its use and importance. But
" in no respect is it more important, than as it suggests the idea of
" a moral Governor. Let this idea be once effaced, and the prin-
" ciple of conscience will soon be found weak and ineffectual. Its
" influence on men's conduct has, indeed, been too nmch under-
" valued by some philosophical inquirers. But be that influence,
"while it lasts, more or less, it is not a steady and permanent prin-
" ciple of action. Unhappily we always have it in our power to lay
" it asleep. — Neglect alone will suppress and stifle it, and bring it
"almost into a state of stupefaction. Nor can anything, less than
" the terrors of religion, awaken our minds ft-om this dangerous
" and deadly sleep. It can never be a matter of indifference to a

» Discourse IX.

xlii NOTES TO THE PREFACE

" thinking man, whether he is to be happy or misei'able beyond the
" gi'ave."

Page xxvii. F.

TJte ignorance of man is a favourite doctrine with Bishop Butler.
It occurs in the Second Part of the Analogy ; it makes the subject
of his Fifteenth Sermon ; and we meet with it again in his Charge.
Whether sometimes it be not carried to a length which is excessive,
may admit of doubt.

Pacfe xxvii. G.

Admirable to this purpose are the words of Di*. T. Balguy, in

the Ninth of his Discourses, already referred to, p. xli. " The

" doctrine of a life to come, some persons will say, is a doctrine of

" natural religion ; and can never therefore be properly alleged to

" shew the impoi'tance of revelation. They judge perhaps from the

" frame of the world, that the present system is imperfect ; they

"see designs in it, not yet comphted ; and they think they have

" grounds for expecting another state, in which these designs shall

" be farther carried on, and bi'ought to a conclusion, worthy of

" infinite wisdom. I am not concerned to dispute i\\e justness of

" this reasoning ; nor do I wish to dispute it. But how far will it

"reach 1 Will it lead us to the Christian doctrine of a judgment to

"come? Will it give us the prospect of an eternity of happiness 1

" Nothing of all this. It shews us only, that death is not the end

" of our being ; that we are likely to pass hereafter into other

" systems, more favourable than the piesent to the great ends of

" God's providence, the virtue and the happiness of his intelligent

" creatures. But into what systems we are to be removed ; what

" new scenes are to be presented to us, either of pleasure or pain ;

"what new parts we shall have to act, and to what trials and

"temptations we may yet be exposed; on all these subjects we

" know just nothing. That our happiness for ever depends on our

" conduct here, is a most important proposition, which we learn only

" from revelationJ^

Page xxix. H.

" In the common affairs of life, comjnon exjjerience is sufficient
" to direct us. But will common experience serve to guide our
"judgment concerning the/a?Z and redemj)tion of mankind 1 From
" what we see every day, can we explain the commencement, or
" foretell the dissohition of the world ? To judge of events like
" these, we should be conversant in the history of other planets ;
" should be distinctly informed of God's various dispensations to all
"the different orders of rational beings. Instead then of grounding

BY THE EDITOR. xllii

" our religious opinions on what toe call experience, let us aj)])!)'
" to a more certain guide, let us hearken to the testimony of Goil
" himself. The credibility of human testimony, and the conduct of
" human agents, are subjects perfectly within the reach of our natu-
" ral faculties ; and we ought to desire no firmer foundation for
" our belief of religion, than for the judgments we form in the
" common affairs of life : whei-e we see a little plain testimony
" easily outweighs the most specious conjectures, and not seldom
"even strong probabilities." Dr. Balguy's Fourth Charge. See
also an excellent pamphlet, entitled, "Remarks on Mr. Hume's
" Essay on the Natural Histoi-y of Religion," §. 5 ; and the Sixth
of Dr. Powell's Discourses.

Page xxxi. I.

Dr. x\rthur Ashley Sykcs, from whose writings some good may
be collected out of a multitude of things of a contrary tendency, in
what he is pleased to call "The Scripture Doctrine of Redemption^',"
opposes what is here advanced by Bishop Butler ; quoting his words,
but without mentioning his name. If what is said above be not
thought a sufficient answer to the objections of this author, the
reader may do Avell to considt a Charge " On the Use and Abuse
" of Philosophy in the Study of Religion," by the late Dr. Powell ;
who seems to me to have had the observations of Dr. Sykes in his
view, where he is confuting the reasonings of certain philosophizing
Divines against the doctrine of the Atonement. Powell's Discourses,
Charge III. p. 342—348.

^ See the observations on t!ie texts cited in his first chapter, and also in
chapters the fifth and sixth.

The following Epitaph, said to be written by Dr. Natlianael Forster,
is inscribed on a flat marble stone, in the cathedral church of
Bristol, placed over the spot where the remains of Bishop Butler
are deposited ; and which, as it is now almost obliterated, it may
be worth while here to preserve.

H.S.

Reverendus admodum in Christo Pater

JOSEPHUS BUTLER, LL.D.

Hujusce primo Diceceseos
Deiude Dunelmensis Episcopus.

Qualis quantusque Vir erat

Sua libentissime agnovit setas :

Et si quid Prsesuli aut Scriptori ad famam valent

Mens altissima,

Ingenii perspicacis et subacti Vis,

Animusque plus, simplex, candidus, liberalis,

Mortui baud facile evanescet memoria.

Obiit Bathonise 16 Kalend. Julii,

A.D. 1752.

Annos natus 60.

THE LIFE OF DR. BUTLER.

Dr. Joseph Butler^ a Prelate of the most disting-uished
character and abilities, was born at Wautao-e, in Berkshire,
in the year 1692. His father, Mr. Thomas Butler, who was a
substantial and reputable shopkeeper in that town, observing-
in his son Joseph'' an excellent g-enius and inclination for
learning-, determined to educate him for the ministry, among-
the Protestant Dissenters of the Presbyterian denomination.
For this purpose, after he had gone through a proper course
of grammatical literature, at the free grammar school of his
native place, under the care of the Rev. Mr. Philip Barton,
a clergyman of the Church of England, he was sent to a
Dissenting academy, then kept at Gloucester, but which was
soon afterwards removed to Tewkesbury. The principal tutor
of this academy was Mr. Jones, a man of uncommon abilities
and knowledge, who had the honour of training up several
scholars, who became of great eminence, both in the Esta-
blished Church and among the Dissenters. At Tewkesbury
Mr. Butler made an extraordinary progress in the study of
Divinity; of which he gave a remarkable proof, in the
letters addressed by him, while he resided at Tewkesbury, to
Dr. Samuel Clarke, laying before him the doubts that had
arisen in his mind, concerning the conclusiveness of some
arguments in the Doctor's demonstration of the being and
attributes of God. The first of these letters was dated the
4th of November, 1713; and the sagacity and depth of
thought displayed in it immediately excited Dr. Clarke's
particular notice. This condescension encouraged Mr. Butler
to address the Doctor again upon the same subject, which

* He wag the youngest of eight chiklreii.

xlvi THE LIFE OF

likewise was answered by him ; and the correspondence being
carried on in three other letters, the whole was annexed to
the celebrated treatise before mentioned, and the collection
has been retained in all the subsequent editions of that work.
The management of this correspondence was entrusted by
Mr. Butler to his friend and fellow-pupil, Mr. Seeker, who,
in order to conceal the affair, undertook to convey the letters
to the post-office at Gloucester, and to bring back Dr. Clarke's
answers. When Mr. Butler's name was discovered to the
Doctor, the candour, modesty, and good sense, with which
he had written, immediately procured him the friendship of
that eminent and excellent man. Our young student was
not, however, during his continuance at Tewkesbury, solely
employed in metaphysical speculations and inquiries. Another
subject of his serious consideration was, the propriety of
his becoming a Dissenting minister. Accordingly, he entered
into an examination of the principles of non-conformity;
the result of which was, such a dissatisfaction with them,
as determined him to conform to the Established Church.
This intention was, at first, disagreeable to his father, who
endeavoured to divert him from his purpose ; and, with that
view, called in the assistance of some eminent Presbyterian
Divines ; but finding his son's resolution to be fixed, he at
length suffered him to be removed to Oxford, where he was
admitted a commoner of Oriel College, on the 17th of March,
1714. At w^hat time he took Orders doth not appear, nor
who the Bishop was by whom he was ordained ; but it is
certain that he entered into the Church soon after his ad-
mission at Oxford, if it be true, as is asserted, that he
sometimes assisted Mr. Edward Talbot in the divine service, at
his living of Hendred, near Wantage. With this gentleman,
who was the second son of Dr. William Talbot, successively
Bishop of Oxford, Salisbury, and Durham, Mr. Butler formed
an intimate friendship at Oriel College; which friendship laid
the foundation of all his subsequent preferments, and procured
for him a very honourable situation when he was only twenty-
six years of age. For it was in 1718 that, at the recommend-
ation of Mr. Talbot, in conjunction with that of Dr. Clarke,
he was appointed by Sir Joseph Jekyll to be preacher at the

DR. BUTLEK. xlvii

Rolls. This was three years before he had taken any dc"-rce
at the University, where he did not go out Bachelor of Law
till the 10th of June 1721, which, however, was as soon as
that degree could suitably be conferred upon him. Mr. Butler
continued at the Rolls till 1726 ; in the beginning of which
year he published, in one volume octavo, " Fifteen Sermons
"preached at that Chapel." In the meanwhile, by the patron-
age of Dr. Talbot, Bishop of Durham, to whose notice he had
been recommended (together with Mr. Benson and Mr. Seeker)
by Mr. Edward Talbot, on his death-bed, our Author had Ixvn
presented first to the rectory of Haughton, near Darli no-ton,
and afterwards to that of Stanhope, in the same diocese. The
benefice of Haughton was given to him in 1722, and that of
Stanhope in 1725. At Haughton there was a necessity for
rebuilding a great part of the parsonage-house, and Mr. Butler
had neither money nor talents for that work. Mr. Seeker,
therefore, who had always the interest of his friends at heart,
and acquired a very considerable influence with Bishop Talbot,
persuaded that Prelate to give Mr. Butler, in exchange for
Haughton, the rectory of Stanhope, which was not only free
from any such incumbrance, but was likewise of much superior
value, being indeed one of the richest parsonages in England.
Whilst our Author continued preacher at the Rolls Chapel,
he divided his time between his duty in town and country ;
but when he quitted the Rolls, he resided, during seven years,
wholly at Stanhope, in the conscientious discharge of every
obligation appertaining to a good pai'ish pi-iest. This retire-
ment, however, was too solitary for his disposition, which had
in it a natural cast of gloominess. And though his recluse
hours were by no means lost, either to private improvement
or public utility, yet he felt at times, very painfully, the want
of that select society of friends to which he had been accus-
tomed, and which could inspire him with the greatest cheer-
fulness. Mr. Seeker, therefore, who knew this, was extremely
anxious to draw him out into a more active and conspicuous
scene, and omitted no opportunity of expressing this desire to
such as he thought capable of promoting it. Having himself
been appointed King's Chaplain in 1732, he took occasion, in
a conversation which he had the honour of holding with Queen

xlviii THE LIFE OF

Caroline, to mention to her his friend j\Ir. Butler. The Queen
said she thouo-ht he had been dead. Mr. Seeker assured her
he was not. Yet her ISIajesty afterwards asked Archbishop
Blackburn if he was not dead ; his answer was, "No, Madam ;
" but he is buried." Mr. Seeker continuing his purpose of
endeavouring- to bring his friend out of his retirement, found
means, upon Mr. Charles Talbot's being made Lord Chancellor,
to have JNIr. Butler recommended to him for his Chaplain.
His Lordship accepted, and sent for him ; and this promotion
calling him to Town, he took Oxford in his way, and was
admitted there to the degree of Doctor of Law, on the 8th of
December, 1733. The Lord Chancellor, who gave him also a
prebend in the Church of Rochester, had consented that he
should reside at his parish of Stanhope one half of the year.

Dr. Butler being thus brought back into the world, his
merits and his talents soon introduced him to particular notice,
and paved the way for his rising to those high dignities which
he afterwards enjoyed. In 1736 he was appointed Clerk of the
Closet to Queen Caroline; and, in the same year, he presented
to her Majesty a copy of his excellent Treatise, entitled, "The
"Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitu-
"tion and Course of Nature." His attendance upon his Royal
Mistress, by her especial command, was from seven to nine in
the evening every day : and though this particular relation to
that excellent and learned Queen was soon determined by her
death in 1737, yet he had been so effectually recommended
by her, as well as by the late Lord Chancellor Talbot, to his
Majesty's favour, that in the next year he was raised to the
highest order of the Church, by a nomination to the bishopric
of Bristol ; to which see he was consecrated on the 3rd of
December 1738. King George II, not being satisfied with
this proof of his regard to Dr. Butler, promoted him, in 1740,
to the Deanery of St. Paul's, London ; into which he was in-
stalled on the 24th of May in that year. Finding the demands
of this dignity to be incompatible with his parish duty at
Stanhope, he immediately resigned that rich benefice. Besides
our Prelate's unremitted attention to his peculiar obligations,
he was called upon to preach several discourses on public
occasions, which were afterwards separately printed, and have

DR. BUTLER. xHx

since been annexed to the latter editions of the Sermons at
the Rolls Chapel. In 1746, upon the death of Dr. Eg-erton,
Bishop of Hereford, Dr. Butler was made Clerk of the Closet
to the King ; and on the 16th of October, 1750, he received
another distinguished mark of his Majesty's favour, by being
translated to the see of Durham. This was on the 16th of
October in that year, upon the decease of Dr. Edward Chandler.
Our Prelate being thus appointed to preside over a diocese
with which he had long been connected, delivered his first,
and indeed his last Charge to his Clergy, at his primary
visitation in 1751. The principal object of it was " External
Religion." The Bishop having obsei-ved, with deep concern,
the great and growing neglect of serious piety in the kingdom,
insisted strongly on the usefulness of outward forms and in-
stitutions, in fixing and preserving a sense of devotion and
duty in the minds of men. In doing this, he was thought by
several persons to speak too favourably of Pagan and Popish
ceremonies, and to countenance, in a certain degree, the cause
of superstition. Under that apprehension, an able and spirited
writer, who was understood to be a Clergyman of the Church
of England, published, in 1752, a pamphlet, entitled, " A
serious Inquiry into the Use and Importance of External
Religion : occasioned by some Passages in the Right Rev. the
Lord Bishop of Durham's Charge to the Clergy of that Dio-
cese ; — Humbly addressed to his Lordship.^' Many persons,
however, and we believe the greater part of the Clergy of the
diocese, did not think our Prelate's Charge so exceptionable
as it appeared to this author. The Charge, being printed at
Durham, and having never been annexed to any of Dr. Butler's
other works, is now become extremely scarce ; and it is ob-
servable, that it is the only one of his publications which ever
produced him a direct literary antagonist.

By this promotion, our worthy Bishop was furnished with
ample means of exerting the virtue of charity ; a virtue which
eminently abounded in him, and the exercise of which was his
highest delight. But this gratification he did not long enjoy.
He had been but a short time seated in his new bishopric,
when his health began visibly to decline ; and having been
complimented, during his indisposition, upon account of his

BUTLER, ANALOGY. d

1 THE LIFE OF

great resignation to the Divine will, he is said to have ex-
pressed some regret, that he should be taken from the present
world so soon after he had been rendered capable of becoming
much more useful in it. In his last illness he was carried to
Bristol, to try the waters of that place ; but these proving in-
eflPectual, he removed to Bath, where, being past recovery, he
died on the I6th of Jime, 1752. His corpse was conveyed to
Bristol, and interred in the Cathedral there, where a monu-
ment, with an inscription, is erected to his memory.

On the greatness of Bishop Butler's character we need not
enlarge; for his profound knowledge, and the prodigious
strength of his mind, are amply displayed in his incomparable
writings. His piety was of the most serious and fervent,
and, perhaps, somewhat of the ascetic kind. His benevolence
was warm, generous, and diffusive. Whilst he was Bishop of
Bristol, he expended, in repairing and improving the episco-
pal palace, four thousand pounds, which is said to have been
more than the whole revenues of the bishopric amounted to
during his continuance in that see. Besides his private bene-
factions, he was a contributor to the infirmary at Bristol, and
a subscriber to three of the hospitals at London. He was
likewise a principal promoter, though not the first founder,
of the infirmary at Newcastle, in Northumberland. In sup-
porting the hospitality and dignity of the rich and powerful
diocese of Durham, he was desirous of imitating the spirit of
his patron, Bishop Talbot. In this spirit he set apart three
days every week for the reception and entertainment of the
principal gentry of the country. Nor were even the Clergy
who had the poorest benefices neglected by him. He not only
occasionally invited them to dine with him, but condescended
to visit them at their respective parishes. By his will he left
five hundred pounds to the Society for propagating the Gospel
in Foreign Parts, and some legacies to his friends and domes-
tics. His executor and residuary legatee was his Chaplain,
the Rev. Dr. Nathanael Foster, a divine of distinguished
literature. Bishop Butler was never married. Soon after his
decease, the following lines, by way of epitaph, were written
concerning him ; and were printed first, if we recollect aright,
in the London Mao-azine.

DR. BUTLEK.

Beneath this marble Butler lies entomb'd,
Who, with a soul inflam'd by love divine,

His life in presence of liis God consum'd.
Like the bright lamps before the holy shrine.

His aspect pleasing, mind with learning fraught :
His eloquence was like a chain of gold,
That the wild passions of mankind controU'd ;

Merit, wherever to be found, he sought.

Desire of transient riches he had none ;

These he, with bounteous hand, did well dispense ;
Bent to fulfil the ends of Providence;

His heart still fixed on an immortal crown.
His heart a mirror was, of purest kind,
"Where the bright image of his i\Iaker shin'd ;

Reflecting faithful to the throne above,

Th' iiTadiant glories of the Mjstic Dove.

.1 2

TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE

CHARLES, LOED TALBOT,

BARON OF HENSOL,
LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN,

THE FOLLOWING TREATISE

IS, WITH ALL RESPECT, INSCRIBED,

IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE HIGHEST OBLIGATIONS

TO
THE LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM,

AND TO HIMSELF,

BY HIS lordship's MOST DUTIFUL,

MOST DEVOTED,

AND MOST HUMBLE SERVANT,

JOSEPH BUTLER

THE

ANALOGY OF RELIGION,

NATURAL AND EEVEALED,

TO THE

CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

ADVERTISEMENT

PREFIXED TO THE FIRST EDITION.

TF the reader should meet here witli any thhig
-*- which he had not before attended to, it will not
be in the observations upon the constitution and
course of nature, these being all obvious ; but in
the application of them : in which, though there is
nothing but what appears to me of some real weight,
and therefore of great importance ; yet he will observe
several things, which will appear to him of very little,
if he can think things to be of little importance,
wliich are of any real weight at all, upon such a
subject as religion. However, the proper force of
the following Treatise lies in the whole general
analogy considered together.

It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted,
by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as
a subject of inquiry; but that it is, now at length,
discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they
treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed
point among all people of discernment ; and nothing
remained, but to set it up as a principal subject of
mii-th and ridicide, as it were by way of reprisals, for
its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the

u--

Iviii ADVERTISEMENT.

world. On the contraiy, thus much, at least, will be
here found, not taken for granted, but proved, that
any reasonable man, who will thoroughly consider
the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his
own being, that it is not, however, so clear a case,
that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, strong
evidence of its truth ; but it is certain no one can,
upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary.
And the practical consequence to be drawn from
this is not attended to by every one who is concerned
in it.

May, 1736.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION 1

PART I.
OF NATURAL RELIGION.

CHAP. I.
Of a Future Life 13

CHAP. II. A
Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punishments ;
and particularly of the latter 34

CHAP. IIL <
Of the Moral Government of God 47

CHAP. IV.
Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and
Danger 75

CHAP. V.
Of a State of Probation, as intended for moral Discipline and
Improvement 84

CHAP. VI.
Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Prac-
tice Ill

CHAP. YII.
Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Con-
stitution, imperfectly comprehended 1 29

CONCLUSION 142

Ix CONTENTS.

PART II.

OF KEVEALED RELIGION.

CHAP I.
Of the Importance of Christianity 151

CHAP. II.
Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, considered
as miraculous 171

CHAP. III.
Of our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected in a
Revelation ; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it
must contain Things appearing liable to Objections 179

CHAP. IV.

Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution im-
perfectly comprehended 196

CHAP. V.
Of the particular System of Christianity ; the Appointment
of a Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by
him 205

CHAP. VI.
Of the Want of Universality in Revelation : and of the sup-
posed Deficiency in the Proof of it 227

CHAP. VII.
Of the particular Evidence for Christianity 250

CHAP. VIII. >
Of the Objections which may be made against arguing fi'om
the Analogy of Nature to Religion 292

CONCLUSION X 306

DISSERTATION I.
Of Personal Identity 319

DISSERTATION II.
Of the Nature of Virtue 328

INTIIODUCTION.

Jl ROBABLE evidence is essentially distinguished
from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees ; *
and of all variety of them, from the^Tiighest moral
certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We can-
not indeed say a thing is probably true upon one
very slight presumption for it ; because, as there
may be probabilities on both sides of a question,
there may be some against it : and though there be
not, yet a slight presumption does not beget that
degree of conviction, which is implied in saying a
thing is probably true. But that the slightest pos-
sible presumption is of the nature of a probability, ap-
pears from hence ; that such low presumption, often
repeated, will amount even to ^oral certainty. Thus
a man's having observed the ebb and flow of the
tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though
the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again
to-morrow : but the observation of this event for so
many days, and months, and ages together, as it
has been observed by mankind, gives us a full as-
surance that it will.

That which chiefly constitutes Probability is ex-
pressed in the word Likely, i. e. like some truth % or
true event ; like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some
more or fewer of its circumstances. For when we

a Yerisiniile.

BUTLEB, ANALOGY. U

INTRODUCTION.

determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that
an event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind's
remarking in it a Hkeness to some other event, which
we have observed has come to pass. And this obser-
vation forms, in numberless daily instances, a pre-
sumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event
has or will come to pass ; according as the observa-
tion is, that the like event has sometimes, most com-
monly, or always so far as our observation reaches,
come to pass at like distances of time, or place, or
upon like occasions. Hence arises the belief, that a
child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the
stature and strenglh of a man ; that food will con-
tribute to the preservation of its life, and the want
of it for such a number of days be its certain
destruction. So likewise the rule and measure of
our hopes and fears concerning the success of our
pursuits ; our expectations that others will act so
and so in such circumstances; and our judgment
that such actions proceed from such princi^^les ; all
these rely upon our having observed the like to
what we hope, fear, expect, judge ; I say upon our
having observed the like, either with respect to
others or ourselves. And thus/whereas the prince ^
who had always lived in a warm climate, naturally
concluded in the way of analogy, that there was no
such thing as water's becoming hard, because he
had always observed it to be fluid and yielding :
we, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that
there is no presumption at all against this : that it
is supposable there may be frost in England any
given day in January next ; probable that there will
on some day of the month ; and that there is a
moral certainty, i. e. ground for an expectation vnih-
b The story is told by Mr. Locke in the chapter of Probability.

INTRODUCTION. 3

out any doubt of it, in some part or other of the
winter.

Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but
an imperfect kind of information ; and is to be con-
sidered as relative only to beings of limited capacities.
For nothing which is the possible object of know-
ledge, whether past, present, or future, can be pro-
bable to an infinite Intelligence ; since it cannot but
be discerned absolutely as it is in itself, certainly
true, or certainly false. But to Us, probability is
the veiy guide of life.

Trom these things it follows, that in questions of
difficulty, or such as are thought so, where more
satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen ;
if the result of examination be, that there appears
upon the whole, any the lowest presumption on one
side, and none on the other, or a greater presump-
tion on one side, though in the lowest degree
greater ; this determines the question, even in mat-
ters of speculation ; and in matters of practice, will
lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in
point of prudence and of interest, to act upon that
presumption or low probability, though it be so low
as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is
the truth. For surely a man is as really bound in
prudence, to do what upon the whole appears, ac-
cording to the best of his judgment, to be for his
happiness, as what he certainly knows to be so.
Nay further, in questions of great consequence, a
reasonable man will think it concerns him to remark
lower probabilities and presumptions than these ;
such as amount to no more than shewing one side
of a question to be as supposable and credible as
the other : nay, such as but amount to much less
even than this. For numberless instances might be

B 2

u^

4 INTRODUCTION.

mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life,
where a man would be thought, in a literal sense,
distracted, who would not act, and with great appli-
cation too, not only upon an even chance, but upon
much less, and where the probability or chance was
greatly against his succeeding c.

It is not my design to inquire further into the
nature, the foundation, and measm^e of probability;
or whence it proceeds that likeness should beget that
presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the
human mind is formed to receive from it, and which
it does necessarily produce in every one ; or to guard
against the errors, to which reasoning from analogy
is liable. This belongs to the subject of Logic;
and is a part of that subject which has not yet been
thoroughly considered. Indeed I shall not take upon
me to say, how far the extent, compass, and force, of
analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general heads
and rules ; and the whole be formed into a system.
But though so little in this way has been attempted
by those who have treated of our intellectual powers,
and the exercise of them ; this does not hinder but
that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured,
that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, to-
wards determining our judgment and our practice.
Nor does it in any wise cease to be of weight in those
cases, because persons, either given to dispute, or
who require things to be stated with greater exact-
ness than our faculties appear to admit of in prac-
tical matters, may find other cases in which it is
not easy to say, whether it be, or be not, of any
weight ; or instances of seeming analogies, which
are really of none. It is. enough to the present pur-
pose to observe, that this general way of arguing is

^ See chap. vi. part II.

\y

^

INTRODUCTION. 5

evidently natural, just, and conclusive. For there is
no man can make a question, but that the sim will
rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all,
in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square.

Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen ^
has with singular sagacity observed, that he ivlio
believes the Scripture to have ^proceeded from him
who is the Author of Nature, may well expect to
find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found
in the constitution of Nature. And in a like way of
reflexion it may be added, that he who denies the
Scripture to have been from God upon account of
these difliculties, may, for the very same reason,
deny the world to have been foiTQed by him. On
the other hand, if there be an analoofv or likeness
between that system of things and dispensation of
Providence, which Revelation informs us of, and
that system of things and dispensation of Providence,
which Experience together with Keason informs us
of, i. e. the known course of Nature ; this is a pre-
sumption, that they have both the same author and
cause ; at least so far as to answer objections against
the former's being from God, drawn from any thing
which is analogical or similar to what is in the
latter, which is acknowledged to be from him ; for
an Author of Nature is here supposed.

Forming our notions of the constitution and go-
vernment of the world upon reasoning, without
foundation for the principles which we assume,
whether from the attributes of God, or any thing
else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Des

^ Xpij fjxv TOi y( Tov ana^ napahf^niifvov rov KTiaavros tov Koafiov tivai
ravras ras ypa<^ai nfirdadai, on 6(tu rrtpi rfji mcrewr anavrq Toif ^rjrovcn
TOV iTfp\ avT^i Xo'yof, ravra Ka\ n(p\ to)v ypn<^(iiv. Philocal. p. 23. ed.

Cant.

/

V

6 IXTRODUCTIOX.

Cartes. Forming our notions upon reasoning from
principles which are certain, but applied to cases to
which we have no ground to apply them, (like those
who explain the structure of the human body, and
the nature of diseases and medicines from mere
mathematics without sufficient data,) is an error
much akin to the former : since what is assumed in
order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypo-
thesis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract
reasonings with the observation of facts, and argue
^ from such facts as are known, to others that are
~' like them ; from that part of the Divine government
over intelligent creatures which comes under our
view, to that larger and more general government
over them which is beyond it ; and from what is
present, to collect, what is likely, credible, or not
incredible, will be hereafter.

This method then of concluding and determining
being practical, and what, if we will act at all, we
cannot but act upon in the common pursuits of
life ; being evidently conclusive, in various degrees,
y proportionable to the degTee and exactness of the
whole analogy or Hkeness ; and having so great
authority for its introduction into the subject of
religion, even revealed religion ; my design is to
apply it to that subject in general, both natural
and revealed : taking for proved, that thei'e is an
intelligent Author of Nature, and natural Governor
of the world. For as there is no presumption against
this prior to the proof of it : so it has been often
proved with accumulated evidence ; from this argu-
ment of analogy and final causes ; from abstract
reasonings; from the most ancient tradition and
testimony ; and from the general consent of man-
kind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to

INTRODUCTION. 7

be denied by the generality of those who profess
themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of reliirion.

As there are some, who, instead of thus attendinor
to what is in fact the constitution of Nature, form
their notions of God's government upon hypothesis :
so there are others, who indulge themselves in vain
and idle speculations, how the world might possibly
have been framed otherwise than it is ; and upon
supposition that things might, in imagining that they
should, have been disposed and carried on after a
better model, than what appears in the present dis-
position and conduct of them. Suppose now a per-
son of such a turn of mind, to go on with his
reveries, till he had at length fixed upon some
particular plan of Nature, as appearing to him the
best. One shall scarce be thought guilty of de-
traction against human understanding, if one should
say, even beforehand, that the plan which this specu-
lative person would fix upon, though he were the
wisest of the sons of men, probably would not be
the vers- best, even accordinor to his own notions
of best ; whether he thought that to be so, which
afforded occasions and motives for the exercise of
the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the
gi-eatest happiness, or that these two were neces-
sarily connected, and run up into one and the same
plan. However, it may not be amiss once for all
to see, what would be the amount of these emenda-
tions and imaginary improvements upon the system
of nature, or how far they would mislead us. And
it seems there could be no stopping, till we came
to some such conclusions as these : that all creatiu-es
should at first be made as perfect and as happy
as they were capable of ever being : that nothing,
to be sure, of hazard or danger should be put upon

y

8 INTRODUCTION.

them to do ; some indolent persons would perhaps
think nothing at all : or certainly, that effectual care
should be taken, that they should, whether neces-
sarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always
do what was right and most conducive to happiness,
which would be thought easy for infinite power to
effect ; either by not giving them any principles
which would endanger their going wrong ; or by
laying the right motive of action in every instance
before their minds continually in so strong a manner,
as would never fail of inducing them to act conform-
ably to it : and that the whole method of govern-
ment by punishments should be rejected as absurd;
as an awkward roundabout method of carrying
things on ; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose,
for which it would be supposed creatures were made,
namely, happiness.

Now, without considering what is to be said in
particular to the several parts of this train of folly
and extravagance ; what has been above intimated,
is a full direct general answer to it, namely, that
I'we may see beforehand that we have not faculties
t for this kind of speculation. For though it be
admitted, that, from the first principles of our
nature, we unavoidably judge or determine some
ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable to
others, and that the ends now mentioned, or if they
run up into one, that this one is absolutely the best ;
and consequently that we must conclude the ultimate
end designed, in the constitution of Nature and
conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and hap-
piness possible : yet we are far from being able to
.judge what particular disposition of things would
be most friendly and assistant to virtue ; or what
means might be absolutely necessary to produce

INTRODUCTION. 9

the most happiness in a system of such extent as
our own world may be, taking in all that is past
and to come, though we should suppose it detached
from the whole of things. Indeed we are so far
from being able to judge of this, that we are not
judges what may be the necessary means of raising
and conducting one person to the highest perfection
and happiness of his nature. Nay, even in the little
affairs of the present life, we find men of different
educations and ranks are not competent judges of the
conduct of each other. Our whole nature leads us to
ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all
imperfection of him. And this will for ever be a
practical proof of his moral character, to such as
will consider what a practical proof is ; because it
is the voice of God speaking in us. And from hence
we conclude, that virtue must be the happiness, and
vice the misery, of every creature ; and that regu-
larity and order and right cannot but prevail finally
in a universe under his government. But we are
in no sort judges, what are the necessary means
of accomplishing this end.

Let us then, instead of that idle and not very
innocent employment of forming imaginary models
of a world, and schemes of governing it, turn our
thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct of
Nature with respect to intelligent creatures ; which
may be resolved into general laws or rules of ad-
ministration, in the same way as many of the laws
of Nature respecting inanimate matter may be col-
lected from experiments. And let us compare the
known constitution and course of things with what
is said to be the moral svstem of Nature ; the
acknowledged dispensations of Providence, or that
government which we find ourselves under, with

v/^

10 INTRODUCTION.

what religion teaches us to believe and expect ; and
see whether they are not analogous and of a piece.
And upon such a comparison it will, I think, be
found, that they are very much so : that both may
be traced up to the same general laws, and resolved
into the same principles of divine conduct.

The analogy here proposed to be considered is of
pretty large extent, and consists of several parts,
in some, more, in others, less, exact. In some few
.instances perhaps it may amount to a real practical
proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a con-
firmation of what is proved other ways. It will
undeniably shew, what too many want to have
shewn them, that the system of Religion, both
natural and revealed, considered only as a system,
and prior to the proof of it, is not a subject of
ridicule, unless that of nature be so too. And it
will afford an answer to almost all objections agamst
/-- the system both of natural and revealed Religion ;
though not perhaps an answer in so great a degree,
yet in a very considerable degree, an answer to the
u- objections against the evidence of it : for objections
against a proof, and objections against what is said
to be proved, the reader will observe are different
things.

Now the divine government of the world, implied
in the notion of religion in general and of Chris-
tianity, contains in it ; that mankind is appointed
to live in a future state ^ ; that there, every one shall
be rewarded or punished^ ; rewarded or punished
respectively for all that behaviour here, which we
comprehend under the words, virtuous or vicious,
morally good or evils: that our present life is a
probation, a state of trial ^^; and of discipline^ for

e Ch. i. f Cli. ii. g Cb. iii. 1' Ch. iv. i Cli. v.

INTRODUCTION. 11

that future one ; notwithstanding the objections,
which men may fancy they have, from notions of
Necessity, against there being any such moral plan
as this at all^ ; and whatever objections may appear
to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it
stands so imperfectly made known to its at present ^ :
that this world being in a state of apostasy and
wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense
both of theu' condition and duty being greatly
corrupted amongst men, this gave occasion for an
additional dispensation of Providence ; of the utmost
importance"^; proved by miracles'^; but containing
in it many things appearing to us strange, and not to
have been expected*^; a dispensation of Providence,
which is a scheme or system of things P ; carried
on by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah,
in order to the recovery of the workH; yet not
revealed to all men, nor proved with the strongest
possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed ;
but only to such a part of mankind, and with such
particular evidence, as the wisdom of God thought '^
fit^. The design then of the following Treatise will ^^
be to shew, that the several parts princij^ally ob-
jected against in this moral and Christian dispensa-
tion, including its scheme, its publication, and the
proof which God has afforded us of its truth ; that
the particular parts principally objected against in .
this whole" dispensation, are analogous to what is Ci/
experienced in the constitution and course of Nature^
or Providence ; that the chief objections themselves
which are alleged against the former, are no other
than what may be alleged with like justness against
the latter, where they are found in fact to be in-

^ Ch. vi. 1 Ch. vii. °i Part II. ch. i. « Ch. ii.

o Ch. iii. P Ch. iv. 'i Ch. v. r Ch. vi. vii.

12 INTRODUCTION.

conclusive ; and that this argument from analogy is
in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight
on the side of religion «, notwithstanding the ob-
jections which may seem to lie against it, and the
real ground which there may be for difference of
opinion, as to the particular degree of weight which
is to be laid upon it. This is a general account of
what may be looked for in the following Treatise.
And I shall begin it with that which is the founda-
tion of all our hopes and of all our fears ; all our
hopes and fears, which are of any consideration ;
I mean a Future Life.

s Ch. viii.

THE

ANALOGY OF RELIGION

TO THE

CONSTITUTION AND COUESE OF NATURE.

PART I.

OF NATUEAL EELIGION.

CHAP. I.

Of a future Ufe.

C1TEANGE difficulties have been raised hj some
^^ concerning personal identity, or the sameness of
living agents, implied in the notion of our existing
now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments;
which whoever thinks it worth while, may see con-
sidered in the first Dissertation at the end of this
Treatise. But without regard to any of them here,
let us consider what the analogy of nature, and the
several changes w^hich we have undergone, and those
which we know we may undergo without being
destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may,
or may not, have upon us ; and w^hether it be not
from thence probable, that we may survive this
change, and exist in a future state of life and per-
ception.

I. From our being bom into the present world
in the helpless imperfect state of infancy, and having
arrived from thence to mature age, w^e find it t<»

V

14 OF A FUTURE LIFE.

be a general law of nature in oiir own species, that
the same creatures, the same individuals, should exist
in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of
action, of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of
their being, greatly different from those appointed
them in another period of it. And in other creatures
the same law holds. For the difference of their
capacities and states of life at their birth (to go
no higher) and in maturity; the change of worms
into flies, and the vast enlargement of their loco-
motive powers by such change : and birds and insects
bursting the shell their habitation, and by this means
entering into a new world, furnished with new ac-
commodations for them, and finding a new sphere
of action assigned them ; these are instances of this
general law of nature. Thus all the various and
wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken
into consideration here. But the states of life in
which we ourselves existed formerly in the womb
and in our infancy, are almost as different from our
present in mature age, as it is possible to conceive
any two states or degrees of life can be. Therefore,
that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different
(suppose) from our present, as this is from our'
former, is but according to the analogy of nature ;
according to a natural order or appointment of the
very same kind, with what we have already ex-
perienced.

II. We know we are endued with capacities of
action, of happiness and misery : for we are conscious
of acting, of enjoying pleasure and suffering pain.
Now that we have these powers and capacities before
death, is a presumption that we shall retain them
through and after death; indeed a probability of it
abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 15

some positive reason to think that death is the
destruction of those Hving powers : because there is
in every case a probabihty, that all things will con-
tinue as we experience they are, in all respects,
except those in which we have some reason to think
they will be altered. This is that kind'^ of presump-
tion or probability from analogy, expressed in the
very word continuance, which seems our only natural
reason for beHeving the course of the world will
continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our
experience or knowledge of history can carry us back.
Nay it seems our only reason for believing, that any
one substance now existing will continue to exist a
moment longer ; the self-existent substance only ex-
cepted. Thus if men were ^sured that the unknown
event, death, was not the destruction of our faculties
of perception and of action, there would be no appre-
hension, that any other power or event, unconnected
with this of death, would destroy these faculties just
at the instant of each creature's death ; and therefore
no doubt but that they would remain after it : which
shews the high probability that our living powers
will continue after death, unless there be some ground
to think that death is their destruction^. For, if it

a I say kind of presumption or probability ; for I do not mean
to affirm that there is the same degree of conviction, that our living
powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances
will.

b Destruction of living powers is a manner of expression unavoid-
ably ambiguous; and may signify either tits destruction of a living
being, so as that tlie same living being shall be uncapable of ever
perceiving or acting again at all: or the destruction of those means
and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its
present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the
former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is
added. The loss of a mau's eye is a destruction of living powers in

16 OF A FUTURE LIFE.

would be in a manner certain that we should siu'vive
death, provided it were certain that death would not
be our destruction, it must be highly probable we
shall sur^^.ve it, if there be no ground to think death
will be our destruction.

Now though I think it must be acknowledged,
that prior to the natural and moral proofs of a
future life commonly insisted upon, there would
arise a general confused suspicion, that in the great
shock and alteration wliich we shall undergo by
death, we, i.e. our Kving powers, might be wholly
destroyed ; yet even prior to those proofs, there is
really no particular distinct ground or reason for
this apprehension at all, so far as I can find. If
there be, it must arise ej.ther from the reason of the
thing, or from the ayialogy of nature.

But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing ^
that death is the destruction of Hving agents, because
we know not at all what death is in itself; but only
[/ some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh,
skin, and bones. And these effects do in no wise
appear to imply the destruction of a living agent.
And besides, as we are greatly m the dark, upon
what the exercise of our living powers depends, so
we are whoUy ignorant what the powers themselves
depend upon ; the powers themselves as distin-
guished, not only from their actual exercise, but
also from the present capacity of exercismg them ;
and as opposed to their destruction : for sleep, or
however a s^A'oon, shews us, not only that these

the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction
of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no
more reason to think a being endued with living powers, ever loses
them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever
acquires them.

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 17

powers exist when tliey are not exercised, as the
passive power of motion does in inanimate matter ;
but shews also that they exist, when there is no
present capacity of exercising tliem : or that the
capacities of exercising them for the present, as well
as the actual exercise of them, may be suspended,
and yet the powers themselves remain undestroyed.
Since then we know not at all upon what the ex- \
istence of our living powers depends, this shews
further, there can no probability be collected from
the reason of the thing, that death will be their
destruction : because their existence may depend, ^
upon somewhat in no degree affected by death ;
upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of
terrors. So that there is nothing more certain, than
tluit the reason of the thing shews us no comiection I
between death, and the destruction of living agents.
Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole
analog [I of nature, to afford us even the slightest
presumption, that animals ever lose their living
powers ; much less, if it were possible, that they
lose them by death : for we have no faculties where-
with to trace any beyond or through it, so as to »,
see what becomes of them. This event removes
them from our view. It destroys the sensible proof, *-
which we had before their deatli, of their being
possessed of living powers, but does not appear to
afford the least reason to believe that they are, then,
or by that event, deprived of them.

And our knowing, that tliey were possessed of
these powers, up to the very period to which we
have faculties capable of tracing them, is itself a '
probability of their retaining them, beyond it. And
this is confirmed, and a sensible credibility is given
to it, by obserNTJig the very great and astonishing

BUTLEB, ANALOGY. C

t8 OF A FUTURE LIFE.

changes which we have experienced ; so great, that
our existence in another state of Hfe, of perception
and of action, will be but according to a method of
pro\adential conduct, the like to wliich has been
already exercised even with regard to ourselves ;
according to a course of nature, the like to which,
we have already gone through.

However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible,
how difficult it is to silence imagination enough to
make the voice of reason even distinctly heard in
this case ; as we are accustomed, from our youth
up, to indulge that forward delusive faculty, ever
obtruding beyond its sphere ; of some assistance
indeed to apprehension, but the author of all eiTor :
as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude con-
ceptions of things, taking for granted that we are
acquainted with, what indeed we are wholly ig-
*^ norant of ; it may be proper to consider the ima-
ginary presumptions, that death will be our de-
struction, arising from these kinds of early and
lasting prejudices ; and to shew how little they
can really amount to, even though we cannot wholly
divest ourselves of them. And,

I, All presumption of death's being the destruction
^ of living beings, must go upon supposition that they
' are. compounded ; and so, discerptible. But since
consciousness is a single and indivisible power, it
should seem that the subject in which it resides
must be so too. For were the motion of any par-
ticle of matter absolutely one and indivisible, so as
that it should imply a contradiction to suppose part
of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, i. e. part
of this matter to move, and part to be at rest ; then
its power of motion would be indivisible ; and so
also would the subject in which the power inheres.

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 19

namely, the particle of matter : for if this could be
divided into two, one part might be moved and
the other at rest, which is contrary to the suppo-
sition. In like manner it has been argued*^, and,
for any thing appearing to the contrary, justly, that
since the perception or consciousness, which we have
of our own existence, is indivisible, so as that it is
a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be
here and the other there ; the perceptive power, or
the power of consciousness, is indivisible too : and
consequently the subject in Avhich it resides ; i.e. the
conscious being. Now upon supposition that living
agent each man calls himself, is thus a single being,
which there is at least no more difficulty in con-
ceiving than in conceiving it to be a compound, and
of which there is the proof now mentioned ; it fol-
lows, that oiu' organized bodies are no more ourselves
or part of ourselves, than any other matter around
us. And it is as easy to conceive, how matter, which
is no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us
in the manner which our present bodies are ; as how
we can receive impressions from, and have power
over any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that
we may exist out of bodies, as in them ; that we
might have animated bodies of any other organs
and senses wholly different from these now given
us, and that we may hereafter animate these same
or new bodies variously modified and organized;
as to conceive how we can animate such bodies as
our present. And lastly, the dissolution of all these
several organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have
successively animated them, would have no more
conceivable tendency to destroy the living beings our-
selves, or deprive us of hving faculties, the faculties
<^ See Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.

V 2

X

20 OF A FUTURE LIFE.

of perception and of action, than the dissohition of any-
foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving
impressions from, and making use of for the common
occasions of Hfe.

II. The simpUcitj and absolute oneness of a living
agent cannot indeed, from the nature of the thing,
be properly proved by experimental observations.
But as these fall in with the supposition of its
unity, so they plainly lead us to conclude certainly,
that our gross organized bodies, with which we
perceive the objects of sense, and with which we
act, are no part of ourselves ; and therefore shew
us, that we have no reason to believe their destruc-
tion to be ours : even without determining whether
our living substances be material or immaterial.
For we see by experience, that men may lose their
limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest
part of these bodies, and yet remain the same living
agents. And persons can trace up the existence
of themselves to a time, when the bulk of their
bodies was extremely small, in comparison of what
it is in mature age : and we cannot but think, that
they might then have lost a considerable part of
that small body, and yet have remained the same
living agents ; as they may now lose great part of
their present body, and remain so. And it is cer-
tain, that the bodies of all animals are in a constant
flux, from that never-ceasing attrition, which there
is in every part of them. Now things of this kind
unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between these
living agents ourselves, and large quantities of mat-
ter, in which we are very nearly interested : since
these may be alienated, and actually are in a daily
course of succession, and changing their owners ;
whilst we are assured, that each living agent re-

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 21

mains one and the same permanent being *^. And
tliis general observation leads us on to the following
ones.

First, That we have no way of determining by
experience, what is the certain Imlk of the living
being each man calls himself: and yet, till it be
determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid
elementary particles of matter, which there is no
ground to think any natural power can dissolve,
there is no sort of reason to think death to be the
dissolution of it, of the living being, even though
it should not be absolutely indiscerptible.

Secondlv, From our being so nearly related to and
interested in certain systems of matter, suppose our
flesh and bones, and afterwards ceasing to be at
all related to them, the livinor acjents ourselves re-
maming all this while undestroyed notwithstanding
such ahenation ; and consequently these systems of
matter not being ourselves : it follows further, that
we have no ground to conclude any other, suppose
internal systems of matter, to be the living agents
ourselves ; because we can have no ground to con-
clude this, but from our relation to and interest in
such other svstems of matter : and therefore we can
liave no reason to conclude, what befalls those sys-
tems of matter at death, to be the destruction of
the living agents. We have already several times
over lost a great part or perhaps the whole of our
body, according to certain common established laws
of nature ; yet we remain the same living agents :
when we shall lose as great a part, or the whole,
by another common established law of nature, death ;
why may we not also remain the same ? That the
alienation has been gradual in one case, and in the

'1 St'c Difscrtatiuii I.

v^

22 OF A FUTURE LIFE.

other will be more at once, does not prove any-
thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed
through those many and great revolutions of matter,
so peculiarly appropriated to us ourselves ; why
should we imagine death will be so fatal to us ? Nor
can it be objected, that what is thus alienated or
lost, is no part of our original solid body, but only
adventitious matter ; because we may lose entire
limbs, which must have contained many soUd parts
and vessels of the original body : or if this be not
admitted, we have no proof, that any of these solid
parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though,
by the way, we are very nearly related to that ex-
traneous or adventitious matter, whilst it continues
united to and distending the several parts of our
solid body. But after all ; the relation a person
bears to those parts of his body, to which he is the
most nearly related ; what does it appear to amount
to but this, that the living agent, and those parts
of the body, mutually affect each other ? And the
same thing, the same thing in kind though not in
degree, may be said of all foreign matter, which
gives us ideas, and which we have any power over.
From these observations the whole ground of the
imagination is removed, that the dissolution of any
matter, is the destruction of a living agent, from the
interest he once had in such matter.

Thirdly, If we consider our body somewhat more
distinctly, as made up of organs and instruments of
perception and of motion, it will bring us to the
same conclusion. Thus the common optical experi-
ments shew, and even the observation how sight is
assisted by glasses shews, that we see with our eyes
in the same sense as we see with glasses. Nor is
there any reason to believe, that we see with them

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 23

in any other sense ; any other, I mean, which wonld
lead us to think the eye itself a percipient. The like
is to be said of hearing : and our feeling distant
solid matter by means of somewhat in onr hand,
seems an instance of the like kind, as to tlie subject
we are considering. All these are instances of foreign
matter, or such as is no part of our body, being in-
strumental in preparing objects for, and conveying
them to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar
or like to the manner in which our organs of sense
prepare and convey them. Both are in a like way
instruments of our receiving such ideas from external
objects, as the Author of nature appointed those ex-
ternal objects to be the occasions of exciting in us.
However, glasses are evidently instances of this;
namely of matter which is no part of our body, pre-
paring objects for and conveying them towards the
perceiving power, in like manner as our bodily
organs do. And if we see with our eyes only in the
same manner as we do with glasses, the like may
justly be concluded, from analogy, of all our other
senses. It is not intended, by any thing here said,
to affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of
})erception by any other of our senses, can be traced,
through all its steps, quite up to the living power
of seeing, or perceiving : l)ut that so far as it can
be traced by experimental observations, so far it ajD-
pears, that our organs of sense prepare and convey
on objects, in order to their being perceived, in like
manner as foreign matter does, without affording
any shadow of appearance, that they themselves per-
ceive. And that we have no reason to think our
organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances
of persons losing some of them, the living beings
themselves, their former occupiers, remaining unim-

24 OF A FUTURE LIFE.

paired. It is confirmed als6 by the experience of
dreams ; by which we find we are at present pos-
sessed of a latent, and, what would otherwise be, an
unimagined unknown power of perceiving sensible
objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our
external organs of sense as with them.

So also with regard to our power of moving, or
directing motion by will and choice : upon the de-
struction of a limb, this active power remains, as
it evidently seems, unlessened ; so as that the Hving
being, who has suffered this loss, would be capable
of moving as before, if it had another limb to move
with. It can walk by the help of an artificial leg ;
just as it can make use of a pole or a lever, to reach
towards itself and to move things, beyond the length
and the power of its natural arm : and this last it
does in the same manner as it reaches and moves,
with its natural arm, things nearer and of less
weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance
of our limbs being endued with a j)ower of moving
or directing themselves ; though they are adapted, like
the several parts of a machine, to be the instruments
of motion to each other ; and some parts of the same
limb, to be instruments of motion to other parts of it.

Thus a man determmes, that he will look at such
an object through a microscope ; or being lame sup-
pose, that he will walk to such a place with a staff
a week hence. His eyes and his feet no more de-
termme in these cases, than the microscope and
the staff. Nor is there any ground to think they
any more put the determination in practice ; or
that his eyes are the seers or his feet the movers,
in any other sense than as the microscope and the
staff are. Upon the whole then, our organs of
sense and our limbs are certainlv instruments, which

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 25

the living persons ourselves make use of to per- ]
ceive and move with : there is not any probability,
that they are any more ; nor consequently, that
we have anv other kind of relation to them, than
what we may have to any other foreign matter
formed into instruments of perception and motion,
suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any
other kind of relation, for I am not speaking of
the degree of it ;) nor consequently is there any
probability, that the alienation or dissolution of
these instruments is the destruction of the per- -
ceiving and moving agent.

And thus our finding, that the dissolution of
matter, in which living beings were most nearly
interested, is not their dissolution ; and that the
destruction of several of the organs and instruments
of perception and of motion belonging to them, is
not their destruction ; shews demonstratively, that
there is no ground to think that the dissolution of
any other matter, or destruction of any other organs
and instruments, will be the dissolution or destruc-
tion of living agents, from the like kind of relation.
And we have no reason to think we stand in any
other kind of relation to any thing which we find
dissolved by death.

But it is said these observations are equally ap-
plicable to brutes : and it is thought an insuperable
difficulty, that they should be immortal, and by con-
sequence capable of everlasting happiness. Now this
manner of expression is both invidious and weak :
but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty
at all, either in the way of natural or moral con-
sideration. For first, suppose the invidious thing,
designed in such a luanner of expression, were really
im}»lied, as it is not in the least, in the natural

26 OF A FUTURE LIFE.

immortality of brutes ; namely, that they must arrive
at great attainments, and become rational and moral
agents ; even this would be no difficulty : since we
know not what latent powers and capacities they
may be endued with. There was once, prior to
experience, as great presumption against human
creatures, as there is against the brute creatures,
arriving at that degree of understanding, which we
have in mature age. For we can trace up our own
existence to the same original with theirs. And we
find it to be a general law of nature, that creatures
endued with capacities of virtue and religion should
be placed in a condition of being, in which they are
altogether without the use of them, for a considerable
length of their duration ; as in infancy and child-
hood. And great part of the human species go out
of the present world, before they come to the exer-
cise of these capacities in any degree at all. But
then, secondly, the natural immortality of brutes does
not in the least imply, that they are endued with
any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature.
And the economy of the universe might require, that
there should be living creatures without any capa-
cities of this kind. And all difficulties as to the
manner how they are to be disposed of are so ap-
parently and wholly founded in our ignorance, that
Sw it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by any,
but such as are weak enough to think they are ac-
quainted with the whole system of things. There
is then absolutely nothing at all in this objection,
which is so rhetorically urged, against the greatest
\J part of the natural proofs or presumptions of the
immortality of human minds : I say the greatest
part ; for it is less applicable to the following ob-
servation, which is more peculiar to mankind :

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 27

III. That as it is evident our present powers and
capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not
depend upon our gross body in the manner in which
perception by our organs of sense does ; so they do
not appear to depend upon it at all in any such
manner, as to give ground to think, that the disso-
lution of this body will be the destruction of these
our present powers of reflection, as it will of our
powers of sensation ; or to give ground to conclude,
even that it will be so much as a suspension of the
former.

Human creatures exist at present in two states of
life and perception, greatly different from each other ;
each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its ow^n
peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of
our senses are affected or appetites gratified with the
objects of them, we may be said to exist or live in a
state of sensation. When none of our senses are
affected or appetites gratified, and yet we perceive,
and reason, and act ; we may be said to exist or live
in a state^ of reflection. Now it is by no means
certain, that any thing wliich is dissolved by death, is
any way necessary to the living being in this its state
of reflection, after ideas are gained. For, though,
from our present constitution and condition of being,
our external organs of sense are necessary for convey-
ing in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages, and
levers, and scaffolds are in architecture : yet when
these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflect-
ing in the most intense degree, and of enjoying
the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain,
by means of that reflection, without any assistance
from our senses ; and without any at all, which
"sve know of, from that body, wliich will be dissolved
by death. Tt does not appear then, tliat the rela-

28 OF A FUTURE LIFE.

tion of this gross body to the reflecting being, is,
in any degree, necessary to thinking ; to our intel-
lectual enjoyments or sufferings : nor, consequently,
that the dissolution or alienation of the former by
death, will be the destruction of those present
powers, which render us capable of this state of
reflection. Further, there are instances of mortal
diseases, which do not at all afiect our present
intellectual powers ; and this affords a presumption,
that those diseases will not destroy these present
powers. Indeed, from the observations made above ^,
it appears, that there is no presumjDtion, from their
mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution
of the body is the destruction of the living agent.
And by the same reasoning, it must appear too, that
there is no presumption, from their mutually affect-
ing each other, that the dissolution of the body is
the destruction of our present reflecting powers : but
instances of their not affecting each other, afford a
presumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal
diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers,
evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining
such diseases to be the destruction of them. Several
things indeed greatly affect all our living powers,
and at length suspend the exercise of them ; as for
instance drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound
sleep : and from hence we might have imagined it
would destroy them, till we found by experience
the weakness of this way of judging. But in the
diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as
this shadow of probability, to lead us to any such
conclusion, as to the reflecting powers which we
have at present. For in those diseases, persons the
moment before death appear to be in the liighest

e P. 21, 22.

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 29

vigour of life. They discover apprehension, memory,
reason, all entire ; with the utmost force of affection ;
sense of a character, of shame and honour ; and the
highest mental enjoyments and sulierings, even to
the last gasp : and these surely prove even greater
vigour of Hfe than bodily strength does. Now what
pretence is there for thinking, that a progressive
disease when arrived to such a degree, I mean that
degree which is mortal, will destroy those powers,
which were not impaired, which were not affected by
it, during its whole progress quite up to that degree 1
And if death by diseases of this kind is not the
destruction of our present reflecting powers, it will
scarce be thought that death by any other means is.

It is obvious that this general observation may be
carried on further : and there appears so little con-
nexion between our bodily powers of sensation, and
our present powers of reflection, that there is no
reason to conclude, that death, which destroys the
former, does so much as suspend the exercise of the
latter, or interrupt our continuing to exist in the
like state of reflection which we do now. For sus-
pension of reason, memory, and the affections which
they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor
is implied in oui' notion of it. And our daily ex-
periencing these powers to be exercised, without any
assistance, that we know of, from those bodies, which
will be dissolved by death ; and our finding often,
that the exercise of them is so lively to the last ;
these things afford a sensible apprehension, tliat
death may not perhaps be so much as a discon-
tinuance of the exercise of these powers, nor of the
enjoyments and sufferings which it implies^. So

f There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here
considered : Whether death be the destruction of living agents ; if

30 OF A FUTURE LIFE.

that our posthumous Hfe, whatever there may be in
it additional to our present, yet may not be entirely
beginning anew ; but going on. Death may, in
some sort, and in some respects, answer to our
birth ; which is not a suspension of the faculties
which we had before it, or a total change of the state
of life in which we existed when in the womb ; but
a continuation of both, with such and such great
alterations.

Nay, for ought we know of ourselves, of our pre-
sent life and of death ; death may immediately, in
the natural course of things, put us into a higher
and more enlarged state of life, as our biith does s ;
a state in which our capacities, and sphere of per-
ception and of action, may be much greater than at
present. For as our relation to our external organs
of sense, renders us capable of existing in our present
state of sensation ; so it may be the only natural
hinderance to our existing, immediately and of course,
in a higher state of reflection. The truth is, reason
does not at all shew us, in what state death naturally
leaves us. But were we sure, that it would suspend
all our perce]3tive and active powers ; yet the sus-

not, Whether it be the destruction of their present powers of reflec-
tion, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sen-
sation ; and if not, "Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance
of the exercise, of these present reflecting powers. Now, if there be
no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less
for the next, and less still for the first.

g This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans,

vofi'i^dv fieif yap 8r] tou ^iv iv6abf ^iov, wy av UKfifjv Kvofxevcov tivai' rov 8e
6uvaTov, ytvicnv ds tov ovTcoi (ilov, Koi rov fii8aifiova to'is <f)i\oixo(pT]aacn.
Lib. XV. p. 1039. ^^- -A-mst. 1707. To which opinion perhaps An-
toninus may allude in these words, is vvv ntpiufvus, woTe tp^pvov iK

TTis yaarpos ttjs yvvaiKos aov f^eXdj], ovtcos (Khf'}((crdat ttjv iLpav iv fj to
yj/vxiipi'W aov tov (Xvrpov tovtov fKTTtafiTai. Lib. ix. C. 3-

OF A FUTURE LIFE. 81

pension of a power and the destruction of it, are
effects so totally different in kind, as we experience
from sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise '
argue from one to the other ; or conclude even to
the lowest degree of probability, that the same kind
of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties,
though it be increased ever so much, will be sufficient
to destroy them.

These observations together may be sufficient to
shew, how little presumption there is, that death is
the destruction of human creatures. However, there
is the shadow of an analogy, which may lead us to
imagine it is ; the supposed Hkeness which is ob-
served between the decay of vegetables, and of living
cieatures. And this likeness is indeed sufficient to
afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of
the field, in their pictures of the frailty of our pre-
sent life. But in reason, the analogy is so far from
holding, that there appears no ground even for the
comparison, as to the present question ; because one
of the two subjects compared is wholly void of that,
which is the principal and chief thing in the other,
the power of perception and of action ; and which is
the only thing we are inquirmg about the continu-
ance of So that the destruction of a vegetable is an
event not similar or analogous to the destruction of
a living agent.

But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the de-
lusive custom of substituting imagination in the room
of experience, we would confine ourselves to what
we do know and imderstand : if we would arooie onlv
from that, and from that form our expectations ; it
Avould appear at first sight, that as no probability of
living beings ever ceasing to be so, can be concluded
froiii the reason of the thincj : so none can be ool-

32 OF A FUTURE LIFE.

lected from the analogy of Nature ; because we can-
not trace any living beings beyond death. But as
we are conscious that we are endued with capacities
of perception and of action, and are living persons ;
what we are to go upon is, that we shall continue so,
till we foresee some accident or event, which will
endanger those capacities, or be likely to destroy us :
which death does in no wise appear to be.

And thus, when we go out of this world, we may
pass into new scenes, and a new state of life and
action, just as naturally as we came into the present.
And this new state may naturally be a social one.
And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind,
may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed
general laws of wisdom, upon every one in proportion
to the degrees of his virtue. And though the advan-
tages of that future natural state should not be be-
stowed, as these of the present in some measure are,
by the will of the society; but entirely by his more
immediate action, upon whom the w^hole frame of
nature depends : yet this distribution may be just as
natural, as their being distributed here by the instru-
mentality of men. And indeed, though one were to
allow any confused undetermined sense, which people
please to put upon the word natural, it would be a
shortness of thought scarce credible, to imagine, that

\ no system or course of things can be so, but only
what we see at present ^ : especially whilst the pro-
bability of a future life, or the natural immortality of
the soul, is admitted upon the evidence of reason ;
because this is really both admitting and denying at
once, a state of being diiSerent from the present to be
natural. But the only distinct meaning of that word

-^ is, stated, fixed, or settled: since what is natural, as
•> See part II. chap. ii. and part II. chap, iv.

OP A FUTURE LIFE. 33

much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent
to render it so, i. e. to effect it continually, or at
stated times ; as what is supernatural or miracuLnis
does to effect it for once. And from hence it must
follow, that persons' notion of what is natural, will
be enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge
of the works of God, and the dispensations of his
Providence. Nor is there any absmxlity in sujipos-
ing, that there may be beings in the universe, whose
capacities, and knowledge, and views, may be so
extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation
may to them appear natural, i.e. analogous or con-
formable to God's dealings Avitli other parts of his
creation ; as natural as the visible known course of
things appears to us. For there seems scarce any
otlier possible sense to be put upon the word, but
that only in which it is here used ; similar, stated,
or uniforiii.

This credibility of a future life, which has been
here insisted upon, how Uttle soever it may satisfy
om' curiosity, seems to answer all the purposes of
religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof
would. Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one,
of a future life, would not be a proof of religion.
For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as recon-
cilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to
be accounted for by it, as that we are now alive,
is : and therefore nothinor can be more absurd than
to argue from that scheme, that there can be no
future state. But as religion implies a future state,
any presumption against such a state, is a presump-
tion against religion. And the foregoing obserwa-
tions remove all presumptions of that sort, and
prove, to a very considerable degree of probability,
one fundamental doctrine of religion ; which, if

BUTr.F.R. ANALOGY. U

34 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOB

believed, V70uld gTcatly open and dispose the mind
seriously to attend to the general evidence of the
whole.

CHAP. II.

Of the government of God hij rewards and punishments ; and
2)articidarly of the latter.

That which makes the question concerning a
future life to be of so great importance to us, is
our capacity of happiness and misery. And that
which makes the consideration of it to be of so great
importance to us, is the supposition of our happmess
and misery Hereafter, depending upon our actions
Here. Without this indeed, curiosity could not but
sometimes bring a subject, in which we may be so
highly interested, to our thoughts ; especially upon
the mortality of others, or the near prospect of our
own. But reasonable men would not take any further
thought about Hereafter, than what should happen
thus occasionally to rise in their minds, if it were
certain that our future interest no way depended
upon our present behaviour : whereas on the con-
trary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any
thing else, to tlunk it does ; then there is reason
also for the most active thought and solicitude, to
secure that interest ; to behave so as that we may
escape that misery, and obtain that happiness in
another life, which we not only suppose oiu-selves
capable of, but which we apprehend also is put in
our own power. And whether there be ground for
this last apprehension, certainly would deserve to be
most seriousl}^ considered, were there no other proof
of a future life and interest, than that presumptive
one, which the foregoing observations amount to.

BY T{K\VARD>i AND PUNISHMENTS. 35

Now in the present state, all which we enjoy, and
a great part of what we suffer, is ^;i<i in our own
power. For pleasure and pain are the consequences
of our actions : and we are endued by tlie Author of
our Nature ^^4th capacities of foreseeing these con-
sequences. We find by experience He does not so
much as preserve our lives, exclusively of our own
care and attention, to provide ourselves with, and
to make use of, that sustenance bv which he has
appointed our lives shall be preserved ; and without
which, he has appointed, they shall not be preserved
at all. And in general we foresee, that the external
things, which are the objects of our various passions,
can neither be obtained nor enjoyed, without exerting
ourselves in such and such manners : but by thus
exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects,
in which our natural good consists; or by this means
God gives us the possession and enjoyment of them.
1 know not, that we have any one kind or degree
of enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions.
And by prudence and care, we may, for the most
part, pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet : or,
on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned
passion, wilfidness, or even by negligence, make our-
selves as miserable as ever we please. And many do
please to make themselves extremely miserable, i. e.
to do what they know beforehand ^\■ill render them
so. They follow those ways, the fruit of which they
know, by instruction, example, experience, will be
disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely
death. This every one oljserves to be the general
course of things ; though it is to be allowed, we
cannot find by experience, that all our sufferings are
owmg to our own follies.

Why the Authoi- <>f Nature does not give his

I) 2

36 OF THE OOVEKNMENT OF GOD

creatures promiscuously such and such perceptions,
"without regard to their behaviour; why he does not
make them happy without the instrumentality of
their own actions, and prevent their bringing any
sufferings upon themselves ; is another matter. Per-
haps there may be some impossibilities in the nature
of things, which we are unacquainted with K Or less
happiness, it may be, would upon the whole be pro-
duced by such a method of conduct, than is by the
present. Or jDerhaps Divine goodness, with which,
if I mistake not, we make very free in our specu-
lations, may not be a bare single disposition to pro-
duce happiness ; but a disposition to make the good,
the faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an
infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased, with seeing
his creatures behave suitablv to the nature which
he has given them ; to the relations which he has
placed them in to each other; and to that, which
they stand in to himself: that relation to himself,
which, during their existence, is even necessary, and
which is the most important one of all : perhaps, I
say, an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased with
this moral piety of moral agents, in and for itself;
as well as upon account of its being essentially con-
ducive to the happiness of his creation. Or the
whole end, for which God made, and thus governs
T:he world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our
faculties : there may be somewhat in it as impossible
for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man
to have a conception of colours. But however this
be, it is certain matter of universal experience, that
the general method of Divine administration is, fore-i
warning us, or giving us capacities to foresee, witly
more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we,

> Part I. chap. vii.

BY KEWAKDS A^•D TUNISHMENTS. 37

shall have such enjoyments, if so and so, such suffer-
ings; and giving us those enjoyments, and making us
feel those sufierings, in consequence of our actions.

"But all this is to be ascribed to the general course
of nature." True. This is the very thing which I
am observing. It is to be ascribed to the general
course of nature : i. e. not surely to the words or
ideas, course of nature ; but to him who appointed it,
and put things into it : or to a course of o^^eration,
from its uniformity or constancy, called natural ^ ;
and which necessarily implies an operating agent.
For when men find themselves necessitated to confess
an Author of Nature, or that God is the natural
governor of the world ; they must not deny this
again, because his government is uniform ; they must
not deny that he does things at all, because he does
them constantly ; because the effects of liis acting are
permanent, whether his acting be so or not ; though
there is no reason to think it is not. In short, every
man, in eveiy thing he does, naturally acts upon the
forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or
obtaining good : and if the natural course of things
be the appointment of God, and our natural faculties
of knowledge and experience are given us by him ;
then the good and bad consequences wliich follow
our actions, are his appointment, and our foresight of
those consequences, is a warning given us by him,
how we are to act.

" Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying
every particular gratification of passion, intended to
put us upon gratifying ourselves in every such par-
ticular instance, and as a reward to us for so doing V
No certainly. Nor is it to be said, that our eyes
were naturally intended to give us the sight of each

"^ I' r-: 3.J-

38 UF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD

particular object, to which they do or can extend ;
objects which are destructive of them, or which, for
any other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes
from. Yet there is no doubt, but that our eyes were
intended for us to see with. So neither is there any
doubt, but that the foreseen pleasures and pains be-
longing to the passions, were intended, in general, to
induce mankind to act in such and such manners.

Now from this general observation, obvious to
every one, that God has given us to understand, he
has appointed satisfaction and delight to be the
consequence of our acting in one manner, and pain
and uneasiness of our acting in another, and of our
not acting at all ; and that we find the consequences,
which we were beforehand informed of, uniformly to
follow; we may learn, that we are at present actually [i
under his government in the strictest and most!
proper sense ; in such a sense, as that he rewards]
and punishes us for our actions. An Author oi
Nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction
^of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are thus
under his government : under his government, in the
same sense, as we are under the government of civil
magistrates. Because the annexing pleasure to some
actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or
forbear, and giving notice of this appointment before-
hand to those whom it concerns ; is the proper formal
notion of government. Whether the pleasure or pain
■which thus follows upon our behaviour, be owing to
the Author of Nature's acting upon us every moment
which M^e feel it ; or to his having at once contrived
. and executed his own part in the plan of the world ;
makes no alteration as to the matter before us. For
if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their
laws take place, without interposing at all, after they

BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 39

had passed them ; Avithout a trial, and the formalities
of an execution : if they were able to make their
laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute
them upon himself; we should be just in the same
sense under their government then, as we are now;
but in a much higher degree, and more perfect
manner. Vain is the ridicule with which, one fore-
sees, some persons will divert themselves, upon find-
ing lesser pains considered as instances of Divine
punishment. There is no possibility of answering
or evading the general thing here intended, without
denying all final causes. For final causes being ad-
mitted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned must
be admitted too as instances of them. And if they
are ; if God annexes delight to some actions, and
uneasiness to others, with an apparent design to
induce us to act so and so ; then he not only dis-
penses happiness and miseiy, but also rewards and
punishes actions. If, for example, the pain which
we feel, upon doing what tends to the destruction of
our bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to fire,
or upon wounding ourselves, be appointed by the
Author of Nature to present our doing what thus
tends to our destruction ; this is altogether as much
an instance of his punishing our actions, and conse-
quently of our being imder his government, as de-
claring by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so,
he would inflict such pain upon us, and inflicting it,
whether it be greater or less.

Thus we find, that the true notion or conception
of the Author of Nature, is that of a master or
governor, prior to the consideration of his moral
attributes. The fact of our case, which we find by
experience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or
government over us at present, by rewarding and

/

40 OP THE GOVERNMENT UF GOD

punishing us for our actions, in as strict and proper
a sense of these words, and even in the same sense,
as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and
punished by those who govern them.

And thus the whole analogy of Nature, the whole

present course of things, most fully shews, that there

is nothing incredible in the general doctrine of re-

>^ ligion, that God will reward and punish men for

' their actions hereafter: nothing incredible, I mean,
arising out of the notion of rewarding and pvuiishing.
For the whole course of nature is a present instance

^ of his exercising that government over us, which
implies in it rewarding and punishing.

BUT as Divine punishment is what men chiefly
object against, and are most unwilling to allow ; it
may be proper to mention some circumstances in
the natural course of punishments at present, which
are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning
a future state of punishment ; indeed so analogous,
that as they add a farther credibility to it, so they
cannot but raise a most serious apprehension of it
in those who will attend to them.

It has been now observed, that such and such
miseries naturallv follow such and such actions of
imprudence and wilfulness, as well as actions more
commonly and more distinctly considered as vicious ;
and that these consequences, when they may be
foreseen, are properly natural punishments annexed
to such actions. For the general thing here in-
sisted upon, is, not that we see a great deal of
misery in the world, but a great deal which men
bring upon themselves by their own behaviour,
which they might have foreseen and avoided. Now
the circumstances of these natural punishments, par-

BV PUNISHMENTS. A I

ticularly deserving our attention, are sucli as these ;
That oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in con-
sequence of, actions, which procure many present ad-
vantages, and are accompanied with much present
pleasure ; for instance, sickness and untimely death
is the consequence of intemperance, though accom-
panied with the highest mirth and jollity : That
these punishments are often nuich greater, than the
advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions, of
which they are the punishments or consequences:
That though we may imagine a constitution of
nature, in which these natural punishments, which
are in fact to follow, would follow, immediately
upon such actions being done, or very soon after ;
we find on the contrary in our world, that they
are often delayed a great while, sometimes even
till long after the actions occasioning them are for-
got; so that the constitution of nature is such, that
delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of pre-
sumption of final impunity : That after such delay,
these natural punishments or miseries often come,
not by degi'ees, but suddenly, with violence, and
at once ; however, the chief miserv often does : Tliat
as certainty of such distant misery following such
actions, is never afforded persons ; so perha])s during
the actions, they have seldom a distinct full ex-
pectation of its following' : and many times the case
is only thus, that they see in general, or may see,
the credibility, that intemperance, suppose, will bring
after it diseases ; civil crimes, civil punishments ;
when yet the real probal)ility often is, that they
shall escape ; but tilings notwithstanding take their
destined course, and the misery inevitably follows
at its appointed time in very many of these cases.

• See part II. elinii. vi.

•42 OF THE GOVEKNMENT OF GOD

Thus also though youth may be alleged as an excuse
for rashness and folly, as bemg naturally thought-
less, and not clearly foreseeing all the consequences
of being untractable and profligate ; this does not
hinder, but that these consequences follow, and are
grievously felt, throughout the whole course of ma-
ture life. Habits contracted even in that age, are
often utter ruin : and men's success in the world,
not only in the common sense of worldly success,
but their real happiness and misery, depends, in a
great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner
in which they pass their youth ] which consequences
they for the most part neglect to consider, and per-
haps seldom can properly be said to believe, before-
hand. It requires also to be mentioned, that in
numberless cases, the natural course of things affords
us opportunities for procuring advantages to our-
selves at certain times, which we cannot procure
when we will ; nor ever recall the opportunities, if
we have neglected them. Indeed the general course
of nature is an example of this. If, during the
opportunity of youth, persons are indocile and self-
willed ; they inevitably suffer in their future life,
for want of those acquirements, which they neglected
the natural season of attaininof. If the husbandman
lets his seedtime pass without sowing, the whole
year is lost to him beyond recovery. In like man-
ner, though after men have been guilty of folly
and extravagance up to a certain degree, it is often
in their power, for instance, to retrieve their affairs,
to recover their health and character ; at least in
good measure : yet real reformation is, in many
cases, of no avail at all towards preventing the
miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed
to folly and extravagance exceeding that degree.

BV I'UNISHMENTS. 4o

There is a certain bound to imprudence and mis-
behaviour, which being transgressed, there remains
no place for repentance in the natural course of
things. It is further very much to be remarked,
that neglects from inconsiderateness, want of atten-
tion"^, not looking about us to see what we have to
do, are often attended with consequences altogether
as dreadful, as any active misbehaviour, from the
most extravagant passion. And lastly, civil govern-
ment being natural, the punishments of it are so
too : and some of these punishments are capital :
as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure are
often mortal. So that many natural punishments
are final" to him, who incurs them, if considered

m Part II. chap, vi,

n The general consideration of a futui'e state of punishment, most
evidently belongs to the subject of Natural Religion. But if any of
these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiai'ly to this
doctrine, as tauglit in Scripture ; the reader is desired to observe,
that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future
punishment of tlie wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it,
in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture
does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of
mere Revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the
great distinction between the righteous and the wicked. sh:tll be
made at the end of this world; that each shall then receive according
to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should,
finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with
the wicked : but it could not be determined upon any [trinciples of
reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to
pa.ss through other states of life and being, before that distributive
justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches
us, that the next state of things after the present is ap])ointcd f<ir
the execution of this justice ; that it shall be no longer delayed ;
but the myslenj of God, the groat mystery of his suffering vice and
confusion to prevail, s^liall liven he, finished ; and he will Uike to him
his (jreat poxoer. ami vill relf/n,hy rendering to even- one according
to his works.

44 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD

only in liis temporal capacity : and seem inflicted
by natural appointment, either to remove the offender
out of the way of being further miscliievous ; or as
an example, though frequently a disregarded one,
to those who are left behind.

These things are not, what w^e call accidental, or
to be met with only now and then ; but they are
things of every day's experience : they proceed from
general laws, very general ones, by wdiich God
governs the world, in the natural course of his pro-
vidence. And they are so analogous to what ReH-
gion teaches us concerning the future punishment
of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that both
would naturally be expressed in the very same
words, and manner of description. In the book of
Proverbs^, for instance. Wisdom is introduced, as
frequenting the most public places of resort, and
as rejected when she offers herself as the natural
appointed guide of human life. How long, speaking
to those who are passing through it, how long, ye
simple ones, ivill ye love folly f and the scorners
delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge ?
Turn ye at my re^^roof: hehold, I will 2?our out
my spirit upon you, I tvill make known my ivords
unto you. But upon being neglected, Because I
have called, and ye refused ; I have stretched out
my hand, and no man regarded; hut ye have set
at 7iought all my counsel, and tvoidd none of my
reproof: I also ivill laugh at your calamity/ ; I ivill
mock when your fear cometh ; lohen your fear cometh
as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a
ivhirlivind ; luhen distress and anguish cometh upon
you. Then shall they call upon me, hut I loill not
answer ; they shall seek me early, hut they shall not

o Chap. i.

BY PUNISHMENT?;. 45

find me. This passage, every one sees, is poetical,
and some parts of it are highly figurative ; but their
meaning is obvious. And the thing intended is
expressed more literally in the following words ;
For that they hated hnotcledge, and did not choose
the fear of the Lord : — therefore shall they eat of
the fruit of their oiun -way, and be fielld tuifh their
oivn devices. For the security of the simple shall
slay them, and the 'prosperity of fools shall destroy
them. And the whole passage is so equally ap-
plicable, to what we experience in the present world,
concerning the consequences of men s actions, and
to what Eeligion teaches us is to be expected in
another, that it may be questioned which of the
two was pi-incipally intended.

Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper ^
proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments,
nothing methinks can give one so sensible an ap-
prehension of the latter, or representation of it to
the mind; as observing, that after the many dis-
regarded checks, admonitions and warnings, which
people meet with in the ways of vice and folly and
extravagance ; warnings from their very nature ;
from the examples of others ; from the lesser in-
conveniences which they bring upon themselves ;
from the instructions of wise and virtuous men :
after these have been long despised, scorned, ridi-
culed : after the chief bad consequences, temporal
consequences, of their follies, have been delayed for
a great while ; at length they break in irresistibly,
like an armed force : repentance is too late to re-
lieve, and can serve only to aggravate, their distress :
the case is become desj^erate : and poverty and sick-
ness, remorse and anguish, infamy and death, the
effects of their own doings, overwhelm them, beyond

V

46 OF THK GOVERXMEXT OP GOD

possibility of remedy or escape. This is an account
of what is in fact the general constitution of nature, •

It is not in any sort meant, that according to what
appears at present of the natural course of things,
men are always uniformly punished in proportion t< •
their misbehaviour : but that there are very many
instances of misbeha\dour punished in the several
ways now mentioned, and very dreadful instances
too ; sufficient to shew what the laws of the universe
may admit ; and, if thoroughly considered, sufficient
fully to answer all objections against the credibility
of a Future state of punishments, from any imagina-
tions, that the frailty of our nature and external
temptations, almost annihilate the guilt of human
vices : as well as objections of another sort ; from
necessity ; from suppositions, that the will of an in-
finite Being cannot be contradicted ; or that he must
be incapable of offence and provocation^.

Eeflections of this kind are not without their
terrors to serious persons, the most free from en-
thusiasm, and of the greatest strength of mind ; but
it is fit things be stated and considered as they really
are. And there is, in the present age, a certain
fearlessness, with regard to what may be hereafter
under the government of God, which nothing but an
universally acknowledged demonstration on the side
of atheism can justify; and which makes it quite
necessary, that men be reminded, and if possible
made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for
being thus presumptuous, even upon the most scep-
tical principles. For, may it not be said of any
person upon his being born into the world, he may
behave so, as to be of no service to it, but by being
made an example of the woful effects of vice and

1 See chap. iv. and vi.

BY PUNISHMENTS, 4 7

folly % That he may, as any one may, if he Avill,
inciu' an infamous execution, from the liands of civil
justice ; or in some other course of extravagance
shorten his days ; or bring upon himself infamy and
diseases w^orse than death \ So that it had been
better for him, even with regard to the present
world, that he had never been born. And is there
any pretence of reason, for people to think them-
selves secure, and talk as if they had certain jjroof,
that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there
can be nothing analogous to this, with regard to a
future and more general interest, under the pro-
vidence and government of the same God %

CHAP. III.
Of the moral government of God.

As the manifold appearances of design and of final
cfiuses, in the constitution of the world, prove it to
be the work of an intelligent Mind ; so the particular
final causes of pleasure and pain distributed amongst
his creatures, prove that they are under his govern- i/
ment ; what may be called his natural government
of creatures endued vs'ith sense and reason. This,
however, implies somewhat more than seems usually
attended to, when we speak of God's natural govern-
ment of the world. It implies government of the
very same kind with that, which a master exercises
over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his sub-
jects. These latter instances of final causes, as really
prove an intelligent Governor of the world, in the
sense now mentioned, and before* distinctly treated

" Cliap. ii.

1

48 OF THE ilORAL

of; as any other instances of final causes prove an
intelligent Maker of it.

But this alone does not appear at first sight to
determine any thing certainly, concerning the moral
character of the Author of Nature, considered in this
relation of governor ; does not ascertain his govern-
ment to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous
judge of the world. Moral government consists, not
barely in rewarding and punishing men for their
actions, which the most tyrannical person may do :
but in rewarding tlie righteous, and punishing the
wicked ; in rendering to men according to their
actions, considered as good or evil. And the per-
fection of moral government consists in doing this,
with regard to all intelligent creatures, in an exact
proportion to their personal merits or demerits.

Some men seem to think the only character of the
Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute bene-
volence. This, considered as a principle of action
and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce
the greatest possible happiness, without regard to
persons' behaviour, otherwise than as such regard
would produce higher degrees of it. 7\.nd supposing
this to be the only character of God, veracity and
justice in him would be nothing but benevolence
conducted by wisdom. Now surely this ought not
to be asserted, unless it can be proved ; for we
should speak with cautious reverence upon such a
subject. And whether it can be proved or no, is not
the thing here to be inquired into ; but whether
in the constitution and conduct of the world, a
righteous government be not discernibly planned
out : which necessarily implies a righteous governor.
There may possibly be in the creation, beings, to
whom the Author of Nature manifests himself under

L^

GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 49

this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite
absolute benevolence ; for it is the most amiable,
supposing it not, as perhaps it is not, incomjDatible
with justice : but he manifests himself to us under
the character of a righteous governor. He may, con-
sistently with this, be simply and absolutely bene-
volent, in the sense now explained : but he is, for he
has given us a proof in the constitution and conduct
of the world that he is, a governor over servants, as
he rewards and punishes us for our actions. And in
the constitution and conduct of it, he may also have
given, besides the reason of the thing, and the natural
presages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations,
that his government is righteous or moral : clear
to such as think the nature of it deserving their
attention ; and yet not to every careless person, who
casts a transient reflection upon the subject^.

But it is particularly to be observed, that the
Divine government, which we experience ourselves
under in the present state, taken alone, is allowed not i^
to be the perfection of moral government. And yet
this by no means hinders, but that there may be
somewhat, be it more or less, truly moral in it. A
righteous government may plainly appear to be
carried on to some degree : enough to give us the
apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried on

^ The objections against Religion, from the evidence of it not
being univei^sal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be
urged against natural Religion, as well as against revealed. And
therefore the consicjeration of them belongs to the first part of this
Treatise, as well as tne second. But as these objections are chiefly
urged against revealed religion, I chose to consider them in the
second part. And the answer to them there, chap. vi. as urged
against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as
urged against the Religion of Nature ; to avoid repetition, the
reader is referred to that chapter.

BUTLER, ANALOGY. E

u-

J

\ the I

50 OF THE MORAL

to that degree of perfection which reUgion teaches us
it shall ; but which cannot appear, till much more, of
the Divine administration be seen, than can in the
present life. And the design of this chapter is to
inquire, how far this is the case : how far, over and
above the moral nature^ which God has given us,
and our natural notion .of him as righteous governor
of those his creatures, to whom he has given this
nature f^ ; I saj how far besides this, the principles
and beginnings of a moral government over the world
may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all
confusion and disorder of it.
Now one might mention here, what has been often
urged with great force, that in general, less uneasiness
and more satisfaction, are the natural consequences ^
of a virtuous than of a vicious course of life, in the
present state, as an instance of a moral government
established in nature ; an instance of it, collected
from experience and present matter of fact. But it
must be owned a thino; of difificultv to weio;h and
balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each amongst
themselves, and also against each other, so as to
make an estimate with any exactness, of the overplus
of happiness on the side of virtue. And it is not
impossible, that, amidst the infinite disorders of the
world, there may be exceptions to the happiness of
virtue ; even with regard to those persons, whose
course of life from their youth ujd has been blame-
less ; and more with regard to those, who have gone
on for some time in the ways of vice, and have after-
wards reformed. For suppose an instance of the
latter case ; a person with his passions inflamed, his
natural faculty of self-government impaired by habits

c Dissertation II. tl Chap. vi.

e See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, part II.

^

G0VE1?NMEXT OF GOD. 51

of indulgence, and with all his vices about him, like
so many harpies, craving for their accustomed gratifi-
cation : who can say how long it might be, before
such a person would find more satisfaction in the
reasonableness and present good consequences of
virtue, than difficulties and self-denial in the re-
straints of it ? Experience also shews, that men can,
to a great degree, get over their sense of shame, so
as that by professing themselves to be without prin-
ciple, and avowing even direct villainy, they can sup-
port themselves against the infamy of it. But as the
ill actions of any one will probably be more talked
of, and oftener thrown in his way, upon his reforma-
tion ; so the mfamy of them will be much more felt,
after the natural sense of virtue and of honour is
recovered. Uneasinesses of this kind ought indeed to
be put to the account of former ^^.ces : yet it will be
said, they are in part the consequences of reforma-
tion. Still I am far from allowing it doubtful,
whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice
in the present world. But if it were, yet the begin-
nings of a righteous administration may beyond all
question be found in nature, if we will attentively
inquire after them. And,

I. In wdiatever manner the notion of God's moral
government over the world might be treated, if it
did not appear, whether he were in a proper sense
our governor at all : yet when it is certain matter of
experience, that he does manifest himself to us
under the character of a governor, in the sense ex-
plained ^ ; it must deserve to be considered, whether
there be not reason to apprehend, that he may be a
righteous or moral governor. Since it appears to be
fact, that God does govern mankind by the method

f Chap. ii.
23

52 OF THE MORAL

of rewards and punishments, according to some
settled rules of distribution ; it is surely a question
to be asked, What presumption is there against his
finally rewarding and punishing them according to
this particular rule, namely, as they act reasonably or
unreasonably, virtuously or viciously ? since rendering
men happy or miserable by this rule, certainly falls
in, much more falls in, with our natural apprehen-
sions and sense of things, than doing so by any other
rule whatever : since rewarding and punishing actions
by any other rule, would appear much harder to be
accounted for, by minds formed as he has formed
ours. Be the evidence of religion then more or less
clear, the expectation which it raises in us, that the
righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and the
wicked miserable, cannot however possibly be con-
sidered as absurd or chimerical; because it is no more
than an expectation, that a method of government
already begun, shall be carried on, the method of
rewarding and punishing actions ; and shall be carried
on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears
, to us at first sight more natural than any other, the
rule which we call distributive justice. Nor,

11. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tran-
quillity, satisfaction, and external advantages, being
the natural consequences of prudent management of
ourselves, and our affairs ; and rashness, profligate
negligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them
many inconveniences and sufferings ; these afford in-
stances of a right constitution of nature : as the cor-
rection of children, for their own sakes, and by way
of example, when they run into danger or hurt them-
selves, is a part of right education. And thus, that
God governs the world by general fixed laws, that he
has endued us with capacities of reflecting upon this

GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 53

constitution of things, and foreseeing the good and
bad consequences of our behaviour ; plainly implies
some sort of moral government : since from such a l/
constitution of things it cannot but follow, that pru-
dence and imprudence, which are of the nature of
vii'tue and vice s, must be, as they are, respectively
rewarded and punished.

III. From the natural course of things, vicious ac-
tions are, to a great degree, actually punished as mis-
chievous to society; and besides punishment actually
inflicted upon this account, there is also the fear and
apprehension of it in those j)6rsons, whose crimes
have rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a
discovery; this state of fear being itself often a ^
very considerable punishment. The natural fear and
apprehension of it too, which restrains from such ^^
crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. It
is necessary to the very being of society, that vices
destructive of it, should be punished as being so ; the
vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty : which punish-
ment therefore is as natural as society; and so is an
instance of a kmd of moral government, naturally
established, and actually taking place. And, since
the certain natural course of things is the conduct
of Providence or the government of God, though
carried on by the instrumentality of men ; the ob-
servation here made amounts to this, that mankind
find themselves placed by him in such circumstances,
as that they are unavoidably accountable for their
behaviour, and are often punished, and sometimes
rewarded under his government, in the view of their
being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to society.
If it be objected that good actions, and such as
are beneficial to society, are often punished, as in

b' See Dissert. II.

y

54 OF THE ilOKAL

the case of persecution and in other cases ; and that
ill and mischievous actions are often rewarded : it
may be answered distinctly; first, that tliis is in no
sort necessary, and consequently not natural, in the
sense in w^hich it is necessary, and therefore natural,
that ill or mischievous actions should be punished :
and in the next place, that good actions are never
punished, considered as beneficial to society, nor ill
actions rewarded, under the view of their being hurt-
ful to it. So that it stands good, without any thmg
on the side of vice to be set over against it, that the
Author of Nature has as truly directed, that vicious
actions, considered as mischievous to society, should
be punished, and put mankind under a necessity of
thus punishing them ; as he has directed and neces-
sitated us to preserve our lives by food.

IV. In the natural course of things, virtue qs such
^ is actually rewarded, and vice as such punished :
which seems to afford an instance or example, not only
of government, but of moral government, begun and
established ; moral in the strictest sense ; though not
in that perfection of degree, which religion teaches us
to expect. In order to see this more clearly, we must
distinguish between actions themselves, and that
quality ascribed to them, which we call virtuous or
vicious. The gratification itself of every natural pas-
sion must be attended with delight : and acquisitions
of fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the means
or materials of enjoyment. An action then, by which
any natural passion is gratified or fortune acquired,
procures delight or advantage ; abstracted from all
consideration of the morality of such action. Con-
sequently, the pleasure or advantage in this case,
is gained by the action itself, not by the morality,
the virtuousness or viciousness of it ; though it be,

GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 55

perhaps, virtuous or vicious. Thus, to say such an
action or course of behaviour, procured such pleasure
or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience and
pain, is quite a different thing from saying, that
such good or bad effect was owing to the virtue or
vice of such action or behaviour. In one case, an
action abstracted from all moral consideration, pro-
duced its effect : in the other case, for it will
appear that there are such cases, the morality of
the action, the action under a moral consideration,
i.e. the virtuousness or viciousness of it, 2:)roduced
the effect. Now I say virtue as such, naturally pro-
cures considerable advantages to the virtuous, and
vice as such, naturally occasions great inconvenience
and even misery to the vicious, in very many in-
stances. The immediate effects of virtue and vice
upon the mind and temper, are to be mentioned
as instances of it. Vice as such is naturally attended
with some sort of uneasiness, and, not uncommonly,
with great disturbance and apprehension. That in-
ward feeling, which, respecting lesser matters, and
in familiar speech, we call being vexed with oneself,
and in matters of importance and in more serious
language, remorse ; is an uneasiness naturally arising
from an action of a man's own, reflected upon by
himself as wrong, unreasonable, faulty, i.e. vicious in
greater or less degrees : and this manifestly is a
different feeling from that uneasiness, which arises
from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is more
common, than to hear a man lamenting an accident

or event, and adding but however he has the

satisfaction that he cannot blame himself for it ; or
on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of being
sensible it was his own doing ? Thus also the dis-
turbance and fear, which often follow upon a man's

v-

56 OF THE MORAL

having done an injury, arise from a sense of his being
blameworthy; otherwise there would, in many cases,
be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear
resentment or shame. On the other hand, inward
security and peace, and a mind open to the several
gratifications of life, are the natural attendants of
innocence and virtue. To which must be added the
complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of heart,
which accompany the exercise, the real exercise, of
gratitude, friendship, benevolence.

And here, I think, ought to be mentioned, the
fears of future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a
better life, in those who fully believe, or have any
serious apprehension of religion : because these hopes
and fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to
the mind, and cannot be got rid of by great part
of the world, even by men who have thought most
thoroughly upon that subject of religion. And no
one can say, how considerable this uneasiness and
satisfaction may be, or what upon the whole it may
amount to.

In the next place comes in the consideration, that
all honest and good men are disposed to befriend
honest good men as such, and to discountenance the
vicious as such, and do so in some degree ; indeed in
a considerable degree : from which favour and dis-
V courao'ement cannot but arise considerable advant-
age and inconvenience. And though the generality
of the world have little regard to the morality of
their own actions, and may be supposed to have
less to that of others, when they themselves are
not concerned ; yet let any one be known to be a
man of virtue, some how or other he will be favoured,
and good offices will be done him, from regard to
his character, without remote views, occasionally, and

GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 57

in some low degree, I think, by the generality of
the world, as it happens to come in their way.
Public honours too and advantages are the natural
consequences, are sometimes at least the conse-
quences in fact, of virtuous actions ; of eminent
justice, fidelity, charity, love to our country, con-
sidered in the view of being virtuous. And some-
times even death itself, often infamy and external
inconveniences, are the pubUc consequences of vice
as vice. For instance, the sense which mankind
have of tyranny, injustice, oppression, additional to
the mere feeling or fear of misery, has doubtless been
instrumental in bringing about revolutions, w^hich
make a figiire even in the history of the world.
For it is plain, men resent injuries as implying
faultiness, and retaHate, not merely under the notion
of having received harm, but of having received
wrong ; and they have this resentment in behalf of
others, as well as of themselves. So likewise even
the generality are, in some degree, grateful and dis-
posed to return good ofiices, not merely because such
an one has been the occasion of good to them, but
under the view, that such good offices implied kind
intention and good desert in the doer. To all this
may be added two or three particular things, which
many persons will think frivolous ; but to me
nothing appears so, which at all comes in towards
determining a question of such importance, as,
whether there be, or be not, a moral institution of
government, in the strictest sense moral, visibly
established and begun in nature. The particular
things are these : That in domestic government, whicli/
is doubtless natural, children and others also arej
very generally punished for falsehood and injustice
and ill -behaviour, as such, and rewarded for the

58 OF THE MORAL

contrary ; which are instances where veracity, and
justice, and right behaviour as such, are naturally
enforced by rewards and punishments, whether more
or less considerable in degree : That, though civil
government be supposed to take cognizance of ac-
tions in no other view than as prejudicial to society,
w^ithout respect to the immorality of them; yet as
such actions are immoral, so the sense which men
have of the immorality of them, very greatl}' con-
tributes, in different ways, to bring offenders to
justice : and that entire absence of all crime and
guilt in the moral sense, when plainly appearing,
will almost of course procure, and circumstances of
aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the penal-
ties annexed to civil crimes, in many cases, though
by no means in all.

Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad
effects of virtue and vice upon men's own minds,
the course of the world does, in some measure, turn
upon the approbation and disapprobation of them
as such, in others. The sense of well and ill doing,
the presages of conscience, the love of good cha-
racters and dislike of bad ones, honour, shame, re-
sentment, gratitude ; all these, considered in them-
selves, and in their effects, do afford manifest real
instances of virtue as such naturally favoured, and
^ of vice as such discountenanced, more or less, in the
daily course of human life ; in every age, in every
relation, in every general circumstance of it. That
God has given us a moral nature '\ may most justly
be urged as a proof of our being under his moral
^ government : but that he has placed us in a con-
dition, which gives this nature, as one may speak,!
scope to operate, and in which it does unavoidably!

1' See Dissert, II.

GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 59

operate ; i. e. influence mankind to act, so as thus
to favour and reward virtue, and discountenance and
punish vice ; this is not the same, but a further,
additional proof of his moral government : for it is
an instance of it. The first is a proof, that he will
finally favour and support virtue efiectually : the
second is an example of his favouring and supporting
it at present, in some degree.

If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it
arises, that virtue as such is often rewarded, and
vice as such is pimished, and this rule never in-
verted : it will be found to proceed, in part, imme-
diatelv from the moral nature itself, which God has
given us ; and also in part, from his having given
us, together with this nature, so great a power over
each other's happiness and misery. For Jirst, it is
certain, that peace and delight, in some degree
and upon some occasions, is the necessary and pre-
sent effect of virtuous practice ; an eftect arising
immediately from that constitution of our nature.
We are so made, that well-doing as such gives us
satisfaction, at least, in some instances ; ill-doing
as such, in none. And secondly, from our moral
nature, joined with God's having put our happiness
and misery in many respects in each other's power,
it cannot but be, that vice as such, some kinds and
instances of it at least, will be infamous, and men
will be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable ;
and the villain will by no means be able always to
avoid feeling that infamy, any more than he will
be able to escape this further punishment, which
mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under
the notion of his deserving it. But there can
be nothing on the side of vice, to answer this ;
because there is nothing in the human mind con-

V

60 OF THE MORAL

tradictoiy, as the logicians speak, to virtue. For
virtue consists in a regard to what is right and rea-
sonable, as being so ; in a regard to veracity, justice,
charity, in themselves : and there is surely no such
thing, as a like natiu^al regard to falsehood, injustice,
cruelty. If it be thought, that there are instances
of an approbation of vice, as such, in itself, and for
its own sake, (though it does not appear to me,
that there is any such thing at all ; but supposing
there be,) it is evidently monstrous : as much so, as
the most acknowledged perversion of any passion
whatever. Such instances of perversion then being
left out, as merely imaginary, or, however, unnatural ;
it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and
from our condition, m the respects now described,
\ that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but be,
\ favoured as such by others, upon some occasions,
] and happy in itself, in some degree. For what is
here insisted upon, is not the degree in which virtue
/ and vice are thus distinguished, but only the thing
/ itself, that they are so in some degree ; though the
whole good and bad eflPect of virtue and vice as such,
is not inconsiderable in degree. But that they must
be thus distinguished m some degree, is in a manner
necessary : it is matter of fact of daily experience,
even in the greatest confusion of human affairs.

It is not pretended but that in the natural course
of things, happiness and misery appear to be dis-
tributed by other rules, than only the personal merit
and demerit of characters. They may sometimes be
" distributed by way of mere discipline. There may
be the wisest and best reasons, whv the world should
be governed by general laws, from whence such pro-
miscuous distribution perhaps must follow; and also
Avhy our happiness and misery should be put in each

GOVERNMENT OP GOD. Gl

other's power, in the degree which they are. And
these things, as in general they contribute to the
rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such : so
they often contribute also, not to the inversion of
this, which is impossible ; but to the rendering per-
sons prosperous, though wicked ; afflicted, though
righteous ; and, which is worse, to the reivarding
some actions, though vicious, and punishing other
■actions, though virtuous. But all this cannot drown
the voice of Nature in the conduct of Providence,
plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way of dis-
tinction from vice, and preference to it. For our
being so constituted as that virtue and vice are
thus naturally favoured and discountenanced, re-
warded and punished respectively as such, is an
intuitive proof of the intent of Nature, that it should
be so : otherwise the constitution of our mind, from
which it thus immediately and directly proceeds,
would be absurd. But it cannot be said, because
virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and vicious
actions rewarded, that Nature intended it. For,
though this great disorder is brought about, as all
actions are done, by means of some natural passion ;
yet this may he, as it undoubtedly is, brought about
by the perversion of such passion, imjDlanted in us
for other, and those very good purposes. And in-
deed these other and good purposes, even of every
passion, may be clearly seen.

We have then a declaration, m some degree of
present eifect, from Him who is supreme in Nature,
which side He is of, or what part He takes : a decla-
ration for virtue, and against vice. So far therefore
as a man is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to
equity and charity, and the right of the case, in
whatever he is concerned ; so far he is on the side of

62 OF THE MORAL

the Divine administration, and cooperates with it :
and from hence, to such a man, arises naturally a
secret satisfaction and sense of security, and implicit
hope of somewhat further. And,

V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tend-
encies of virtue, which, though not of jDresent effect,
yet are at present discernible in nature ; and so
afford an instance of somewhat moral in the essential
constitution of it. There is, in the nature of things,
a tendency in virtue and vice to produce the good
and bad effects now mentioned, in a greater degree
than they do in fact produce them. For instance ;
good and bad men would be much more rewarded
and punished as such, were it not, that justice is
often artificially eluded, that characters are not
known, and many, who would thus favour virtue
and discourage vice, are hindered from doing so by
accidental causes. These tendencies of virtue and
vice are obvious with regard to individuals. But it
may require more particularly to be considered, that
power in a society, by being under the direction of
virtue, naturally increases, and has a necessary tend-
ency to prevail over opposite power, not under the
direction of it; in Hke manner as power, by being
under the direction of reason, increases, and has a
\^ tendency to prevail over brute force. There are
several brute creatures of equal, and several of
superior strength, to that of men; and possibly the
sum of the whole strength of brutes may be greater
than that of mankind: but reason gives us the ad-
vantage and superiority over them ; and thus man is
the acknowledged governing animal upon the earth.
Nor is this superiority considered by any as acci-
dental ; but as what reason has a tendency, in the
nature of the thing, to obtain. And yet perhaps

GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 63

difficulties may be raised about the meaning, as well
as the truth, of the assertion, that virtue has the like ---
tendency.

To obviate these difficulties, let us see more dis-
tinctly, how the case stands with regard to reason ; ^
which is so readily acknowledged to have this advan-
tageous tendency. Suppose then two or three men,
of the best and most improved understandmg, in a
desolate open plain, attacked by ten times the num-
ber of beasts of prey ; would their reason secure them
the victory m this unequal combat ? Power then,
though joined with reason, and under its direction,
cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power,
though merely brutal, vinless the one bears some_--
proportion to the other. Again: put the imaginary
case, that rational and irrational creatures were of
like external shape and manner : it is certain, before
there were opportunities for the first to distinguish
each other, to separate from their adversaries, and to
form an union among themselves, they might be upon
a level, or in several respects upon great disadvan-
tage ; though united they might be vastly superior :
since union is of such efficacy, that ten men united,
might be able to accomplish, what ten thousand of
the same natural strength and understanding wholly
ununited, could not. In this case then, brute force
might more than maintain its ground against reason,
for want of union among the rational creatures. Or
suppose a number of men to land upon an island
inhabited only by wild beasts ; a number of men
who, by the regulations of civil government, the
inventions of art, and the experience of some years,
could they be preserved so long, would be really
sufficient to subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve
themselves in security from them: yet a conjuncture

64 OF THE MORAL

of accidents might give such advantage to the irra-
tional animals, as that they might at once overpower,
and even extirpate, the whole species of rational
ones. Length of time then, j)roper scope and oppor-
tunities, for reason to exert itself, may be absolutely
necessary to its prevailing over brute force. Further
still : there are many instances of brutes succeeding
in attempts, which they could not have undertaken,
had not their irrational nature rendered them incap-
able of foreseeing the danger of such attempts, or the
fur}^ of passion hindered their attending to it ; and
there are instances of reason and real prudence pre-
venting men's undertaking what, it hath appeared
afterwards, they might have succeeded in by a lucky
rashness. And in certain conjunctures, ignorance and
folly, weakness and discord, may have their advan-
tages. So that rational animals have not necessarily
the superiority over irrational ones : but, how im-
probable soever it may be, it is evidently possible,
that in some globes the latter may be superior. And
were the former wholly at variance and disunited,
by false self-interest and envy, by treachery and in-
justice, and consequent rage and malice against each
other, whilst the latter were firmly united among
themselves by instinct ; this might greatly contribute
to the introducing such an inverted order of things.

/ For every one would consider it as inverted : since
reason has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail
over brute force ; notwithstanding the possibility it
may not prevail, and the necessity, which there is,
of many concurring circumstances to render it pre-

\,^^valent.
. Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency
\ to procure superiority and additional power : whether
this power be considered as the means of security

GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 65

from opposite power, or of obtaining other advan-
tages. And it has this tendency, by rendering public
good, an object and end, to every member of the
society ; by putting every one upon consideration
and diligence, recollection and self-government, both
in order to see what is the most eifectual method,
and also in order to perform their proper part, for
obtaining and preserving it : by uniting a society
within itself, and so increasing its strength ; and,
which is particularly to be mentioned, uniting it by
means of veracity and justice. For as these last are
principal bonds of union, so benevolence or public
spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody
knows what.

And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible
dispensations of Providence, to be, in any sort, ana-
logous to what appears : or that both together make
up one uniform scheme, the two parts of which, the
part which we see, and that which is beyond our
observation, are analogous to each other : then, there
must be a like natural tendency in the derived
power, throughout the universe, under the direction
of virtue, to prevail in general over that, which is
not under its direction ; as there is in reason, de-
rived reason in the universe, to prevail over brute
force. But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue,
or that it may actually produce, what it has a ten-
dency to produce ; the like concurrences are neces-
sary, as are, to the prevalence of reason. There
must be some proportion, between the natural power
or force which is, and that which is not, under the
direction of virtue : there must be suflB.cient lenofth
of time ; for the complete success of virtue, as
of reason, cannot, from the nature of the thing,
be otherwise than gradual : there must be, as one

BUTLER, ANALOGY. P

66 OF THE MORAL

may speak, a fair field of tnal^^ stage large and
extensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities,
for the vii'tuous to join together, to exert themselves
against lawless force, and to reap the fruit of their
united labours. Now mdeed it is to be hoped, that
the disproportion between the good and bad, even
here on earth, is not so great, but that the former
have natural power sufficient to their prevailing to
a considerable degree, if circumstances would permit
this power to be united. For, much less, very much
less, power under the direction of virtue, would pre-
vail over much greater not under the direction of it.
However, good men over the face of the earth cannot
unite ; as for other reasons, so because thev cannot
be sufficiently ascertained of each other's characters.
And the known course of human things, the scene
we are now passing through, particularly the short-
ness of life, denies to virtue its full scope in several
other respects. The natural tendency which we have
be^n considering, though real, is hindered from being
carried into effect in the present state : but these
hinderances may be removed in a future one. Virtue,
to borrow the Christian alhisi6n7~is~miirtant here ;
and various untoward accidents contribute to its
being often overborne : but it may combat with
greater advantage hereafter, and prevail completely,
and enjoy its consequent rewards, in some future
states. Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, per-
haps despised and oppressed, here ; there may be
scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in every other
way adapted, to afford it a sufficient sphere of
action ; and a sufficient sphere for the natural con-
sequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be
naturally immortal, and tliis state be a progress
towards a future one, as childhood is towards

GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 67

mature age ; good men may naturally unite, not
only amongst themselves, but also with other orders
of virtuous creatures, in that future state. For
virtue, from the very nature of it, is a principle
and bond of union, in some degree, amongst all who
are endued with it, and known to each other ; so
as that by it, a good man cannot but recommend
himself to the favour and protection of all virtuous
beings, throughout the whole universe, who can be
acquainted with his character, and can any way
interpose in his behalf in any part of his duration.
And one might add, that suppose all this advan-
tageous tendency of virtue to become effect, amongst
one or more orders of creatures, in any distant scenes
and periods, and to be seen by any orders of vicious
creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God ;
this happy effect of virtue would have a tendency,
by way of example, and possibly in other ways, to
amend those of them, who are capable of amend-
ment, and being recovered to a just sense of virtue.
If our notions of the plan of Providence were en-
larged in any sort proportionable to w^hat late dis-
coveries have enlarged our views with respect to the
m.'iterial world ; representations of this kind would
not appear ab^rd or extravagant. However, they
are not to be taken as intended for a literal delinea-
tion of what is in fact the particular scheme of the
universe, which cannot be known without revela-
tion : for suppositions are not to be looked on as
true, because not incredible : but they are mentioned
to shew, that our finding virtue to be hindered from
procuring to itself such superiority and advantages,
is no objection against its having, in the essential
nature of the thing, a tendency to procure them.
And the suppositions now mentioned do plainly

F 2

68 OF THE MORAL

shew tills : for thej shew, that these hinderances are
so far from being necessary, that we ourselves can
easily conceive, how they may be removed in future
states, and full scope be granted to virtue. And all
these advantao'eous tendencies of it are to be con-

o

sidered as declarations of God in its favour. This
however is taking a pretty large compass : though
it is certain, that, as the material world appears to
be, in a manner, boundless and immense ; there must
be some scheme of Providence vast in proportion
to it.
/// But let us return to the earth our habitation ;
and we shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by
imaginmg an instance not so vast and remote :
by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon it,
perfectly virtuous, for a succession of many ages ;
to which, if you please, may be given a situation
advantageous for universal monarchy. In such a
state, there would be no such thing as faction : but
men of the greatest capacity would of course, all
along, have the chief direction of affairs willingly
yielded to them ; and they would share it among
themselves without envy. Each of these would have
the part assigned him, to which his genius was pecu-
liarly adapted : and others, who had not any dis-
tinguished genius, would be safe, and think them-
selves very happy, by being under the protection
and guidance of those who had. Public determina-
tions would really be the result of the united wisdom
of the community : and they would faithfully be
executed, by the united strength of it. Some would
in a higher way contribute, but all would in some
way contribute, to the pubhc prosperity : and in it,
each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And
as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be

GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 69

unknown o.mong themselves ; so they would be suf-
ficiently secured from it in their neighbours. For
cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in in-
justice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction and
intestine treachery; these on one hand would be found
mere childish folly and weakness, when set in oppo-
sition against wisdom, public spirit, union inviolable,
and fidelity on the other : allowing both a sufficient
length of years to try their force. Add the general
influence, which such a kingdom would have over
the face of the earth, by way of example parti-
cularly, and the reverence which would be paid it.
It would plainly be superior to all others, and the
world must gradually come under its empire ; not
by means of lawless violence ; but partly by what
must be allowed to be just conquest ; and partly by
other kingdoms submittmg themselves voluntarily
to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming its
protection, one after another, in successive exigencies.
The head of it Avould be an universal monarch, in
another sense than any mortal has yet been ; and
the eastern style would be literally applicable to
him, that all people, ncftions, and languages should
serve him. And though indeed our knowledge of
human nature, and the whole history of mankind,
shew the impossibility, without some mu'aculous in-
terposition, that a number of men, here on earth,
should unite in one society or government, in the
fear of God and universal practice of virtue ; and
that such a government should continue so united
for a succession of ages : yet admitting or supposing
this, the effect would be as now drawn out. And
thus, for instance, the wonderful power and pros-
perity promised to the Jewish nation in the Scrip-
ture, would be, in a great measure, the consequence

70 OF THE MORAL

of what is predicted of them ; that the people should
he all righteous, and inherit the land for ever^ ; were
we to understand the latter phrase of a long con-
tinuance only, sufficient to give things time to work.
The predictions of this kind, for there are many of
them, cannot come to pass, in the present known
course of nature ; but suppose them come to pass,
and then, the dominion and preemmence promised
must naturally follow, to a very considerable degree.

Consider now the general system of religion : that
^ the government of the world is uniform, and one, and
moral ; that virtue and right shall finally have the
advantage, and prevail over fraud and lawless force,
over the deceits, as well as the violence of wicked-
ness, under the conduct of one supreme governor :
and from the observations above made, it will appear,
that God has, by our reason, given us to see a peculiar
connexion in the several parts of this scheme, and a
tendency towards the completion of it, arising out of
the very nature of virtue : which tendency is to be
considered as somewhat moral in the essential consti-
tution of things. If any one should think all this to
be of little importance ; I desire him to consider,
what" he would think, if vice had, essentiallv and in
its nature, these advantageous tendencies ; or if virtue
had essentially the direct contrary ones.

But it may be objected, that, notwithstanding all
N these natural effects and these natural tendencies of
virtue ; yet things may be now going on throughout
the universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same
mixed way as here at present upon earth : ^^.rtue
sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed ; vice
sometimes punished, sometimes successful. The an-
swer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this

i Isai. Ix. 21.

GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 71

chapter, nor of this treatise, properly to prove Gods
perfect moral government over the world, or the
truth of Rehgion ; but to observe what there is in
the constitution and course of nature, to confirm the
proper proof of it, supposed to be known : and that
the weight of the foregoing observations to this pur-
pose may be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and
pain are indeed to a certain degree, say to a very
high degree, distributed amongst us without any ap-
parent regard to the merit or demerit of characters.
And were there nothing else concerning this matter
discernible in the constitution and course of natiure ;
there would be no ground from the constitution and
course of nature to hope or to fear, that men would
be rewarded or punished hereafter according to their
deserts : which, however, it is to be remarked, im-
plies, that even then there would be no ground from
appearances to think, that vice upon the whole would
have the advantage, rather than that virtue would.
And thus the proof of a future state of retribution
would rest upon the usual known arguments for it :
which are I think plainly unanswerable ; and would
be so, though there were no additional confirmation of
them from the things above insisted on. But these^
things are a very strong confirmation of them. For,
First, They shew, that the Author of Nature is not
indifferent to virtue and vice. They amount to a
declaration from him, determinate and not to be
evaded, in favour of one, and against the other ; such
a declaration, as there is nothing to be set over
against or answer, on the part of vice. So that were
a man, laying aside the proper proof of Religion, to
determine from the course of nature only, whether it
were most probable, that the righteous or the wicked
would have the advantage in a future life ; there can

72 OF THK MORAl-

be no doubt, but that be would determine the proba-

^ bility to be, tliat the former would. The course of

nature then, in the view of it now given, furnishes

• us with a real praetieal proof of the obligations of

Religion.

Secondly, When, conformably to what TJeligion
teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and
vice as such, so as that every one shall, upon the
whole, have his deserts ; this distributive justice will
not be a thing dilVerent in kind, but only in dcijrct',
from what we experience in his present government.
It will be that in vff'i'ct, toward which we now see a
U'.ndency. It will be no more than the comph'tion of
that moral government, the principles and beginning
of which have been shewn, beyond all dispute, dis-
cernible ill the present constitution and course of
natuiv. And from hence it follows.

Thirdly, That, as under the natural government of
God, our experience of those kinds and degrees of
happiness and misery, which we do experience at
present gives just ground to hope for, and to fear,
higher degrees and other kinds of both in a future
\ state, supposing a future state admitted : so under
his moral government, our experience, that virtue
and vice are, in the mannei"s above mentioned,
actually rewarded and punished at present, in a cer-
tain degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear,
^ that they may be rewarded and punished in an
liigher tlegree hereafter. It is acknowledged indeed
th;it this alone is not suihcient ground to think, that

Xthcy actucdhj ivill be rewarded and punished in a
liigher degree, rather than in a lower : l)ut then,
Lastly, There is sufHcient ground to think so, from
^the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For
U'hese tc^ndencies arc ess(>nti;d, and founded in the

GOYERNMENT OF GOD. 73

iinture of things : whereas the hinderances to their be-
coming effect are, in numberless cases, not necessary,
but artificial only. Now it may be much more
strongly argued, that these tendencies, as well as the
actual rewards and pmiishments, of virtue and vice,
which arise directly out of the natiu'e of things, will
remain hereafter, than that the accidental hinderances
of them vnl]. And if these hinderances do not re-
main ; those rewards and punishments cannot but be
carried on much farther towards the perfection of
moral government : i. e. the tendencies of virtue and
vice will become eliect : but when, or where, or in /
what particular way, cannot be known at all, but by
revelation.

Upon the whole : there is a kind of moral govern- ^
ment implied in God's natural government ^ : virtue
and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as bene-
ficial and mischievous to society ^ : and rewarded and
punished directly as virtue and vice"^ The notion
then of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious,
but natural : for it is suggested to our thoughts by -v
the constitution and course of nature : and the execu-
tion of this scheme is actually begun, in the instances
here mentioned. And these things are to be con-
sidered as a declaration of the Author of Nature, for
virtue, and against vice : they give a credibility to
the supposition of their being rewarded and punished
hereafter ; and also ground to hope and to fear, that
they may be rewarded and punished in higher degrees
than they are here. And as all this is confirmed, so
the argument for Religion, from the constitution and
course of nature, is earned on farther, by observing,
that there are natural tendencies, and, in innumer-
able cases, only artificial hinderances, to this moral

k P. 51. 1 P. 53. ni p. 54. , to.

74 OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

scheme's being carried on much farther towards per-
fection, than it is at present". The notion then of a
moral scheme of government, much more perfect than
what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion }
for it is suggested to our thoughts, by the essential
tendencies of virtue and vice. And these tendencies
are to be considered as intimations, as implicit pro-
mises and threatenings, from the Author of Nature,
of much greater rewards and punishments to follow
virtue and vice, than do at present. And indeed,
every 7iatural tendency, which is to continue, but
which is hmdered from becoming effect by only
accidental causes, affords a presumption, that such
tendency will, some time or other, become effect : a
presumption in degree proportionable to the length
of the duration, through which such tendency will
continue. And from these things together, arises a
real presumption, that the moral scheme of govern-
ment established in nature, shall be carried on much
farther towards perfection hereafter ; and, I thmk, a
presumption that it will be absolutely completed.
But from these things, joined with the moral nature
^ which God has given us, considered as given us by
hini, arises a practical proofs that it will be com-
pleted : a proof -from:- fact ; and therefore a distinct
one from that, which is deduced from the eternal
and unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of
actions.

n p. 62, &c.

o See tliis proof drawn out briefly, chap. vi.

OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 75

CHAP. IV.

Of a state of ])rohation, as mpli/ing trial, difficulties and

danger.

The general doctrine of Religion, that our ]>resent
life is a state of probation for a future one, comjire-
liends under it several particular things, distinct from
each other. But the first and most common meaning
of it seems to be, that our future interest is now
depending, and depending upon ourselves; that we -
have scope and opportunities here, for that good and
bad behaviour, which God will reward and pimish
hereafter ; together with temptations to one, as well
as inducements of reason to the other. And this is,
in great measure, the same with saying, that we are
under the moral government of God, and to give an ^
account of our actions to him. For the notion of
a future account and general righteous judgment,
implies some sort of temptations to what is wrong : \\
otherwise there would be no moral possibility of
doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimi-
nation. But there is this difference, that the word
'probation is more distinctly and j^articularly expres-
sive of allurements to wrong, or difficulties in adhering
uniformly to what is right, and of the danger of mis-
carrying by such temptations, than the words moral
government. A state of probation then, as thus par-
ticularly implying in it trial, difficulties and danger, "
may require to be considered distinctly by itself.

And as the moral government of God, which Be-
ligion teaches us, implies, that we are in a state of
trial with regard to a future world : so also his
natural government over us implies, that we are
in a state of trial, in the like sense, with regard
to the present world. Natural government by n-- I

76 OF A STATE OF TRIAL.

wards and punishments, as much implies natural
trial, as moral government does moral trial. The
natural government of God here meant* consists
in his annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain
to others, which are in our power to do or forbear,
and in giving us notice of such appointment before-
hand. This necessarily implies, that he has made
our happiness and misery, or our interest, to depend
in part upon ourselves. And so far as men have
temptations to any course of action which will pro-
bably occasion them greater temporal inconvenience
and uneasiness, than satisfaction; so far their tem-
poral interest is in danger from themselves, or they
are in a state of trial with respect to it. Now
people often blame others, and even themselves, for
their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And
we find many are greatly wanting to themselves,
and miss of that natural happiness, which they
might have obtained in the present life : perhaps
every one does in some degree. But many run
themselves into great inconvenience, and into ex-
treme distress and misery: not through incapacity of
knowing better, and doing better for themselves, which
would be nothing to the present purpose ; but through
their own fault. And these things necessarily imply
temptation, and danger of miscarrjdng, in a greater
or less degree, with respect to our worldly interest
or happiness. Every one too, without having Re-
ligion in his thoughts, speaks of the hazards which
young people run, upon their setting out in the
world : hazards from other causes, than merely their
ignorance, and unavoidable accidents. And some
courses of vice, at least, being contrary to men's
worldly interest or good ; temptations to these must

a Chap. ii.

OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 77

at the same time be temptations to forego our pre-
sent and our future interest. Thus in our natural
or temporal capacity, we are in a state of trial, i. e. \
of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our
moral and religious trial.

This will more distmctly appear to any one, who
thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider,
what it is which constitutes our trial in both capa-
cities, and to observe, how mankind behave under it.

And that which constitutes this our trial, in both
these capacities, must be somewhat either in our ex-
ternal circumstances or in our nature. For, on the
one hand, persons may be betrayed mto wrong be-
haviour upon surprise, or overcome upon any other
very singular and extraordinary external occasions ;
who would, otherwise, have preserved their character
of prudence and of virtue : in which cases, every one,
in speaking of the wrong behaviour of these persons,
would impute it to such particular external circum-
stances. And on the other hand, men who have
contracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or
have some particular passions in excess, will seek
opportunities, and, as it were, go out of their way,
to gratify themselves in these respects, at the ex-
pense of their wisdom and their virtue; led to it,
as every one would say, not by external temptations,
but by such habits and passions. And the account
of this last case is, that particular passions are no
more coincident with prudence, or that reasonable
self-love, the end of which is our worldly interest,
than they are with the principle of virtue and re-
ligion ; but often draw contrary ways to one, as
well as to the other : and so such i:>articular pas-
sions are as much temptations, to act imprudently
with regard to our worldly interest, aa to act

78 OF A STATE OF TRIAL.

viciously^. However, as when we say, men are misled
by external circumstances of temptation ; it cannot
but be understood, that there is somewhat witliin
themselves, to render those circumstances temptations,
or to render them susceptible of impressions from
them : so when we say, they are misled by pas-
sions ; it is always supposed, that there are occasions,
circumstances, and objects, exciting these passions,
and affording means for gratifying them. And there-
fore, temptations from within, and from mthout,
coincide, and mutually imply each other. Now the
several external objects of the appetites, passions,
and affections, being present to the senses, or offering
themselves to the mind, and so exciting emotions
suitable to their nature ; not only in cases where
they can be gratified consistently with innocence
and prudence, but also in cases where they cannot,
and yet can be gratified imprudently and viciously :
this as really puts them in danger of voluntarily
foregoing their present interest or good, as their
future ; and as really renders self-denial necessary
to secure one, as the other : i, e. we are in a like
state of trial with respect to both, by the very
same passions, excited by the very same means.
Thus mankind having a temporal interest depending
upon themselves, and a prudent course of behaviour
being necessary to secure it ; passions inordinately
excited, whether by means of example, or by any
other external circumstance, towards such objects,
at such times, or in such degrees, as that they
cannot be gratified consistently with worldly pru-
dence ; are temptations, dangerous, and too often
successful temptations, to forego a greater temporal

I' See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726, 2nd ed. p. 205, &c.
pref. p. 25, &c'. Serm. p. 21, &c.

OF A STATE OP TRIAL. 79

good for a less ; i. e. to forego what is, upon the
whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a pre-
sent gratification. This is a description of our state
of trial in our temporal capacity. Substitute now
the word future for temporal, and virtue for pru-
dence; and it will be just as proper a description
of our state of trial in our religious capacity ; so
analogous are they to each other.

If, from consideration of this our like state of trial
in both capacities, we go on to observe farther, how
mankind behave under it ; we shall find there are
some, who have so little sense of it, that they scarce
look beyond the passing day : they are so taken up
with present gratifications, as to have, in a manner,
no feehng of consequences, no regard to their future
ease or fortune in this Hfe ; any more than to their
happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded
and deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly
concerns, as much as in Eeligion. Others are, not
deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by
the like passions, against their better judgment, and
feeble resolutions too of acting better. And there
are men, and truly they are not a few, who shame-
lessly avow, not their interest, but their mere will
and pleasure, to be their law of life: and who, in
open defiance of every thing that is reasonable, wUl
go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing,
with no remorse and little fear, that it will be their
temporal ruin ; and some of them, under the appre-
hension of the consequences of wickedness in anotlier
state. And to speak in the most moderate way,
liuman creatures are not only continually liable to
go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they
often actually do so, with respect to their temporal
interests, as well as with respect to ReUgion.

80 OP A STATE OP TRIAL.

Tims our difficulties and dangers, or our trials, in
our temporal and our religious capacity, as they
proceed from the same causes, and have tlie same
effect upon men's behaviour, are evidently analogous,
and of the same kind.

It may be added, that as the difficulties and
dangers of miscarrying in our religious state of trial,
are greatly increased, and one is ready to think, in
a manner whoUy made, by the ill behaviour of
others ; by a wrong education, wrong in a moral
sense, sometimes j^ositively vicious ; by general bad
example ; by the dishonest artifices which are got
into business of all kinds ; and, in very many parts
of the world, by rehgion's being corrupted into
superstitions, which indulge men in their vices : so
in like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves
prudently in res23ect to our present interest, and our
danger of being led aside from pursuing it, are
greatly increased, by a foohsh education ; and, after
we come to mature age, by the extravagance and
carelessness of others, whom we have mtercourse
with ; and by mistaken notions, very generally pre-
valent, and taken up for common opmion, coucerniDg
temporal happiness, and wherein it consists. And
persons, by their own negligence and folly in their
temporal affiiirs, no less than by a course of vice,
bring themselves into new difficulties ; and, by habits
of indulgence, become less qualffied to go through
them : and one irregularity after another, embarrasses
things to such a degree, that they know not where-
about they are ; and often makes the path of conduct
so intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult to trace
it out ; difficult even to determine what is the pru-
dent or the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong
behaviour in one stage of life, youth ; wrong, I

OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 81

mean, considering ourselves only in our temporal
capacity, without taking in religion; this, in several
ways, increases the difficulties of right behaviour in
mature age ; i. e. puts us into a more disadvantageous
state of trial in our temporal capacity.

We are an inferior part of the creation of God.
There are natural appearances of our being in a state v^
of degradation^. And we certainly are in a condition
which does not seem, by any means, the most advan-
tageous we could imagine or desire, either in oiu' ^
natural or moral capacity, for securing either our
present or future interest. However, this condition,
low and careful and uncertain as it is, does not afford
any just ground of complaint. For, as men may
manage their temporal aifairs with prudence, and
so pass their days here on earth iu tolerable ease
and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care : so
likewise with regard to religion, there is no more
requii'ed than what they are well able to do, and
what they must be greatly wanting to themselves,
if they neglect. And for persons to have that put
upon them, which they are well able to go through,
and no more, we naturally consider as an equitable
thing ; supposing it done by proper authority. Nor
have we any more reason to complain of it, with
regard to the Author of Nature, than of his not
having given as other advantages, belonging to other
orders of creatures.

But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state '
of trial, which Religion teaches us we are in, is
rendered credible, by its being throughout uniform
and of a piece with the general conduct of Provi-
dence towards us, in all other respects within the
compass of our knowledge. Indeed if mankind, cou-

c Part II. chap. v.

BUTLEE, ANALOGY. O

82 OF A STATE OF TEIAL.

sidered in their natural capacity, as inhabitants of
this world only, found themselves, from their birth
to their death, in a settled state of security and
hapjDiness, without any solicitude or thought of their
own : or if they were in no danger of being brought
into inconveniences and distress, by carelessness,
or the folly of passion, tlirough bad example, the
treachery of others, or the deceitful appearances of
things : were this our natural condition, then it
might seem strange, and be some presumption against
the truth of Religion, that it represents our future
and more general interest, as not secure of course,
but as depending upon our behaviour, and requiring
recollection and self-government to obtain it. For
it might be alleged, " What you say is oiu: condition
in one respect, is not in any wise of a sort with what
we find, by experience, our condition is in another.
Our whole present interest is secured to our hands,
without any solicitude of ours ; and why should not
our future interest, if we have any such, be so too 1 "
But since, on the contrary, thought and considera-
tion, the voluntary denying ourselves many things
which we desire, and a course of behaviour, far from
being- always agreeable to us ; are absolutely neces-
sary to our acting even a common decent, and
common prudent part, so as to pass with any satis-
faction through the present world, and be received
upon any tolerable good terms in it : since this is the
case, all presumption against self-denial and atten-
tion being necessary to secure our higher interest,
is removed. Had we not experience, it might,
perhaps speciously, be urged, that it is improbable
any thing of hazard and danger should be put upon
us by an infinite Being ; when every thing wliich
is hazard and danger in our manner of conception.

OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 83

and will end in error, confusion, and misery, is now
already certain in his foreknowledcre. And indeed,
why any thing of hazard and danger should be put
upon such frail creatures as we are, may well be
thought a difficulty in speculation ; and cannot but
be so, till we know the whole, or, however, much ,
more of the case. But still the constitution of nature !
is as it is. Oiu* happiness and misery are trusted |
to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Some- I
what, and, in many circumstances, a great deal too,
is put upon us, either to do, or to suffer, as we
choose. And all the various miseries of life, which
people bring upon themselves by negligence and
folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are
instances of this : which miseries are beforehand just
as contingent and undetermined as tlieir conduct,
and left to be determined by it.

These observations are an answer to the objections
against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying
temptations, and real danger of miscarrying with \
regard to our general interest, under the moral
government of God : and they shew, that, if we
are at all to be considered in such a capacity, and
as having such an interest ; the general analogy
of Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves
in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to
this interest, by our neglecting to act the proper
part belonging to us in tliat capacity. For we have v,
a present interest, under the government of God,
which we experience here upon earth. And this
interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is /
it offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition ;
in such sort, as that we are in danger of missing
it, by means of temptations to neglect, or act contrary
to it; and without attention and self-denial, must

O 2

84 OF A STATE OF

and do miss of it. It is then perfectly credible, that
this may be our case, with respect to that chief and
final good, which Eeligion proposes to us.

CHAP. V.

Of a state of prohat'ion, as intended for moral discijiline and

improvement.

From the consideration of our being in a proba-
tion-state, of so much difiiculty and hazard, naturally
arises the question, how we came to be placed in
it % But such a general inquiry as this would" be
found involved in insuperable difficulties. For,
though some of these difficulties would be lessened
by observing, that all wickedness is voluntary, as
is implied in its very notion ; and that many of the
miseries of hfe have apparent good effects : yet, when
we consider other circumstances belongmg to both,
and what must be the consequence of the former
in a hfe to come ; it cannot but be acknowledged
plain folly and presiunption, to pretend to give an
account of the whole reasons of this matter : the
whole reasons of our being allotted a condition, out
of which so much wickedness and misery, so cir-
cumstanced, would m fact arise. Whether it be not
beyond our faculties, not only to find out, but even
to understand, the whole account of this ; or, though
we should be supposed capable of understanding it,
yet, whether it would be of service or prejudice to
us to be informed of it ; is impossible to say. But
as our present condition can in no wise be shewn
inconsistent with the perfect moral government of
God : so Religion teaches us we were placed in it,
\ that we might quahfy ourselves, by the practice of

MORAL DISCirLIXE. 85

virtue, for another state which is to follow it. And
this, thougli but a partial answer, a very partial^
one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned ; yet, is
a more satisfactory answer to another, which is of
real, and of the utmost importance to us to have
answered : the inquiry, What is our business here ?>^
The known end then, why we are placed in a state
of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our
improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite
qualification for a future state of security and
happiness.

Now the beginning of life, considered as an edu-
cation for mature age in the present world, appears
plainly, at first sight, analogous to tliis our trial for
a future one : the former being in our temporal
capacity, what the latter is in our religious capacity.
But some observations common to both of them, and
a more distinct consideration of each, will more dis-
tinctly shew the extent and force of the analogy
between them ; and the credibility, which arises
from hence, as well as from the nature of the tliinor,
that the present life w^as intended to be a state of j
discipline for a future one.

I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed
for a particular way of life ; to which, the nature,
the capacities, temper, and quahfications of each
species, are as necessary, as their external circum-
stances. Both come into the notion of such state,
or particular way of life, and are constituent parts
of it. Change a man's capacities or character to the
degree, in which it is conceivable they may be
changed ; and he would be altogether incapable of
a human course of Hfe, and human happiness ; as
incapable, as if, his nature continuing unchanged,
he were placed in a world, where he had no sphere

86 OF A STATE OF

of action, nor any objects to answer his appetites,
passions, and affections of any sort. One thing is
set over against another, as an ancient writer ex-
presses it. Our nature corresponds to oiu- external
condition. Without this correspondence, there would
be no possibility of any such thing as human life and
human happiness : which life and happiness are,
therefore, a result from our nature and condition
jointly : meaning by human life, not Hving in the
literal sense, but the whole complex notion commonly
understood by those words. So that, without deter-
mining what will be the employment and happiness,
the particular life, of good men hereafter ; there
must be some determinate capacities, some necessary
character and qualifications, without which persons
cannot but be utterly incapable of it : in like manner,
as there must be some, without which men would
be incapable of their present state of life. Now,

II. The constitution of human creatures, and in-
deed of all creatures which come under our notice,
is such, as that they are capable of naturally be-
coming qualified for states of fife, for which they
were once whoUy unqualified. In imagination we
may indeed conceive of creatures, as incapable of
having any of their faculties naturally enlarged, or
as being unable naturally to acquire any new quali-
fications : but the faculties of every species known
to us are made for enlargement ; for acquirements
of experience and habits. We find ourselves in par-
ticular endued with capacities, not only of perceiving
ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also
of storing up our ideas and knowledge by memory.
W^e are capable, not only of acting, and of having
different momentary impressions made upon us ; but
of getting a new facility in any kind of action, and

MORAL DISCIPLINE. 87

of settled alterations in our temper or character.
The power of the two last is the power of habits.
But neither the perception of ideas, nor knowledge
of any sort, are habits ; though absolutely necessary
to the forming of them. However, apprehension,
reason, memory, which are the capacities of ac-
quiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise.
Whether the word hahit is ap]>licable to all these
improvements, and in particiUar how far the powers
of memory and of habits may be powers of the same
nature, I shall not inquire. But that perceptions
come into our minds readily and of course, by means
of their having been there before, seems a thing of
the same sort., as readiness in any jiarticular kind
of action, proceeding from being accustomed to it.
And aptness to recollect practical observations of
service in our conduct, is plainly habit in many cases.
There are habits of perception, and habits of action.
An instance of the former, is our constant and even
involuntaiy readiness, in correcting the impressions
of our sight concerning magnitudes and distances,
80 as to substitute judgment in the room of sensa-
tion imperceptibly to ourselves. And it seems as
if all other associations of ideas not naturally con-
nected might be called passive habits ; as properly
as our readiness in understanding languages upon
sight, or hearing of words. And our readiness in
speaking and writing them is an instance of the
latter, of active habits. For distinctness, we may
consider habits, as belonging to the body, or the
mind : and the latter will be explained by the
former. Under the former are comprehended all
bodily activities or motions, whether graceful or ini-
becoming, which are owing to use : under the latter,
general habits of life and conduct ; such as those of

88 OF A STATE OF

obedience and submission to authority, or to any-
particular person ; those of veracity, justice, and
charity ; those of attention, industry, self-govern-
ment, envy, revenge. And habits of this latter kind
seem produced by repeated acts, as well as the
former. And in like manner as habits belonging
to the body are produced by external acts : so habits
of the mind are produced by the exertion of inward
practical principles, i.e. by carrying them into act,
or acting upon them ; the principles of obedience,
of veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those
habits be formed by any external course of action,
otherwise than as it proceeds from these principles :
because it is only these inward principles exerted,
which are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity, of
justice, and of charity. So likewise habits of atten-
tion, industry, self-government, are in the same
manner acquired by exercise ; and habits of envj
and revenge by indulgence, whether in outward act,
or in thought and intention, i. e. inward act : for
such intention is an act. Eesolutions also to do well
are properly acts. And endeavouring to enforce upon
our own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget
in Others that practical sense of it, which a man
reaUy has himself, is a virtuous act. All these,
therefore, may and will contribute towards forming
good habits. But going over the theory of virtue
in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine
pictures, of it ; this is so far from necessarily or
certainly conducing to form an habit of it, in him
who thus employs himself, that it may harden the
mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually
more insensible, i. e. form an habit of insensibility,
to all moral considerations. For, from our very
faculty of habits, passive impressions, by being

MOKAL DISCITLINE. 80

repeated, grow weaker. Tlioiiglits, by often passing
through tlie mind, are felt less sensibly : being ;ic-
customed to danger, begets intrepidity, i. e. lessens
feai' ; to distress, lessens the passion of pity; to in-
stances of others' mortality, lessens the sensible
apprehension of our own. And from these two ob-
servations together ; that practical habits are formed
and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive
impressions grow weaker by being i-epeated uj)on
us ; it must follow, that active habits may be gradu-
ally forming and strengthening, ))y a course of acting
upon such and such motives and excitements, whilst
these motives and excitements themselves are, bv
proportionable degrees, growing less sensiljle. i. e, :iie
continually less and less sensibly felt, even as tlie
active liabits strengthen. And experience confirms
this: f<»r active principles, at the very time that
they are less lively in perception than they were, are
found to be, some how, wrought more thoroughly
into the temper and character, and become more
effectual in influencing our ])ractice. The three
things just mentioned may afT<»rd instances of it.
Perception of danger is a natural excitement of pas-
sive fear, and active caution : and by being inured
to danger, habits of the latter .are gradually wTought.
at the same time that the former gradually lessens.
Perception of distress in others is a natural excite-
ment, passively to J>ity, and actively to relieve it :
but let a man set himself to attend to, inrpiire out,
and relieve distressed persons, and lie cannot but
grow less and less sensibly affected with the various
miseries of life, with which he must become ac-
quainted ; when yet, at the same time, benevolence,
considered not as a passion, but as a practical
principle of action, will strengthen : and whilst he

90 OF A STATE OF

passively compassionates the distressed less, he will
acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and
befriend them. So also at the same time that the
daily instances of men's dying around its give us
daily a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension
of our own mortality, such instances greatly con-
tribute to the strengthening a practical regard to it
in serious men ; i. e. to forming an habit of acting
with a constant view to it. And this seems again
further to shew, that passive impressions made upon
our minds by admonition, experience, example,
though they may have a remote efiScacy, and a very
great one, towards forming active habits, yet can
have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us
to such a course of action : and that it is not being
affected so and so, but acting, which forms those
habits : only it must be always remembered, that
real endeavours to enforce good impressions upon
ourselves are a species of virtuous action. Nor do
we know how far it is possible, in the nature of
things, that effects should be wrought in us at once,
equivalent to habits, i. e. what is wrought by use
and exercise. However, the thing insisted upon is,
not what may be possible, but what is in fact the
appointment of nature : which is, that active habits
are to be formed by exercise. Their progress may
be so gradual, as to be imperceptible of its steps:
it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which we
are capable of habits, throughout its several parts ;
and to trace it up to its original, so as to distinguish
it from all others in our mind: and it seems as if
contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. But the
thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield,
in some such manner as this, to use and exercise, is
matter of certain experience.

MORAL DISCIPLINE. 91

Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of
action, we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readi-
ness, and often pleasure, in it. The inclinations
which rendered us averse to it grow weaker : the
difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real
ones, lessen : the reasons for it offer themselves of
course to our thoughts upon all occasions : and
the least gUmpse of them is sufficient to make us
go on, in a course of action, to which we have been
accustomed. And practical principles appear to grow
stronger, absolutely in themselves, by exercise ; as
well as relatively, with regard to contrary principles;
which, by being accustomed to submit, do so habitu-
ally, and of course. And thus a new character, in
several respects, may be formed ; and many habi-
tudes of life, not given by nature, but which natiu-e
directs us to acquire.

III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should
never have had these capacities of impro\ang by
experience, acquired knowledge, and habits, had they
not been necessaiy, and intended to be made use of.
And accordingly we find them so necessary, and so
much intended, that without them we should be
utterly incapable of that, which was the end for
which we were made, considered in our temporal
capacity only : the employments and satisfactions of
our mature state of life.

Nature does in no wise quahfy us wholly, much
less at once, for this mature state of life. Even
matiu-ity of understanding, and bodily strength, are
not only arrived to gradually, but are also very
much owing to the continued exercise of our powers
of body and mind from infancy. But if we suppose
a person brought into the world with both these in
maturity, as far as this is conceivable ; he would

92 OP A STATE OF

plainly at first be as unqualified for tlie human life
of mature age, as an idiot. He would be in a man-
ner distracted, with astonishment, and apprehension,
and curiosity, and suspense : nor can one guess, how
long it would be, before he would be familiarized to
himself and the objects about him enough, even to
set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too,
whether the natural information of his sight and
hearing would be of any manner of use at all to him
in acting, before experience. And it seems, that men
would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and
disposed to exert themselves with an impetuosity,
which would render society insupportable, and the
living in it impracticable ; were it not for some
acquired moderation and self-government, some apti-
tude and readiness in restraining themselves, and
concealing their sense of things. What of every
thing of this kind which is learnt would render a
man as uncapable of society, as want of language
would ; or as his natural ignorance of any of the
particular employments of life would render him
uncapable of providing himself with the common
conveniences, or supplying the necessary wants of
it. In these respects, and probably in many more,
of which we have no particular notion, mankind is
left, by nature, an unformed, unfinished creature ;
utterly deficient and unqualified, before the acquire-
ment of knowledge, experience, and habits, for that
mature state of life, which was the end of his crea-
tion, considering him as related only to this world.

But then, as nature has endued us with a power
of supplying those deficiencies, by acquired know-
ledge, experience, and habits : so likewise we are
placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and
youth, fitted for it; fitted for our acquiring those

MORAL DISCIPLINE. 93

qualifications of all sorts, which we stand in need
of in mature age. Hence children, from their very
birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objects
about them, with the scene in which they are placed,
and to have a future part ; and learning somewhat
or other, necessary to the performance of it. The
subordinations, to which they are accustomed in
domestic Hfe, teach them self-government in common
behaviour abroad, and prepare them for subjection
and obedience to civil authority. What passes before
their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives them
experience, caution against treachery and deceit, to-
gether with numberless little rules of action and
conduct, which we could not live without ; and which
are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as to be
mistaken perhaps for instinct : though they are the
effect of long experience and exercise; as much so
as language, or knowledge in particular business, or
the qualifications and behaviour belonging to the
several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning
of our days is adapted to be, and is, a state of educa-
tion in the theory and practice of mature life. We
are much assisted in it by example, instruction, and
the care of others ; but a great deal is left to our-
selves to do. And of this, as part is done easily
and of course ; so part requu'es diligence and care,
the voluntary foregoing many things which we de-
sire, and setting ourselves to what we should have
no inclination to, but for the necessity or expedience
of it. For, that labour and industry, which the sta-
tion of so many absolutely requires, they would be
greatly unqualified for, in maturity; as those in
other stations would be, for any other sorts of
application ; if both were not accustomed to them
in their youth. And according as persons behave

94 OF A STATE OF

tliemselves, in the general education which all go
through, and in the particular ones adapted to par-
ticular employments ; their character is formed, and
made appear ; they recommend themselves more or
less ; and are capable of, and placed in, diiferent
stations in the society of mankind.

The former part of life then is to be considered as
an important opportunity, which nature puts into
our hands ; and which, when lost, is not to be re-
covered. And our being placed in a state of dis-
cipline throughout this life, for another world, is a
providential disposition of things, exactly of the
same kind, as our being placed in a state of disci-
pline during childhood, for mature age. Our con-
dition in both respects is uniform and of a piece,
and comprehended imder one and the same general
law of nature.

And if we were not able at all to discern, how
or in what way the present life could be our pre-
paration for another ; this would be no objection
against the credibility of its being so. For we do
not discern, how food and sleep contribute to the
growth of the body ; nor could have any thought
that they would, before we had experience. Nor do
children at all think, on the one hand, that the
sports and exercises, to which they are so much ad-
dicted, contribute to their health and growth ; nor,
on the other, of the necessity which there is for
their being restrained in them : nor are they capable
of understanding the use of many parts of discipline,
which nevertheless they must be made to go through,
in order to qualify them for the business of mature
age. Were we not able then to discover, in what
respects the present Hfe could form us for a future
one ; yet nothing would be more supposable than

MORAL DISCIPLINE. 95

that it might, in some respects or other, from the
general analogy of Providence. And this, for ought
I see, might reasonably be said, even though we
should not take in the consideration of God's moral
government over the world. But,

IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently,
that the character of virtue and piety is a necessary
qualiiication for the future state ; and then we may
distinctly see, how, and in what respects, the present
life may be a preparation for it : since we want, and
are capable of, improvement in that character, hy
jnoral and religious habits; and the p>resent life is
fit to he a state of discipline for such imp)rovement :
in| like manner as we have already observed, how,
and in what respects, infancy, childhood, and youth
are a necessary preparation, and a natural state of
discipline, for mature age.

Nothing which we at present see would lead us to
the thought of a solitary unactive state hereafter :
but, if we judge at all from the analogy of nature,
we must suppose, according to the Scripture account
of it, that it will be a community. And there is
no shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiving,
though there be no analogy for it, that this com-
munity will be, as the Scripture represents it, under
the more immediate, or, if such an expression may
be used, the more sensible government of God. Nor
is our ignorance, what will be the employments of
this happy community, nor our consequent igno-
rance, w^hat particular scope or occasion there will
be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity,
amongst the members of it w^ith regard to each
other ; any proof, that there will be no sphere of
exercise for those virtues. Much less, if that were
possible, is our ignorance any proof, that there \vill

i)6 OF A STATE OF

be no occasion for that frame of mind, or character,
which is formed by the daily practice of those par-
ticular virtues here, and which is a result from it.
This at least must be owned in general, that, as
the government established in the universe is moral,
the character of virtue and piety must, in some
way or other, be the condition of our happiness, or
the qualification for it.

Now from what is above observed, concerning our
natural power of habits, it is easy to see, that we
are capable of moral improvement by discipline.
And how greatly we ivant it, need not be proved
to any one who is acquainted with the great wicked-
ness of mankind ; or even with those imperfections,
which the best are conscious of. But it is not per-
haps distinctly attended to by every one, that the
occasion which human creatures have for discipline,
to improve in them this character of virtue and
piety, is to be traced up higher than to excess in
the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice. Man-
kind, and perhaps all finite creatures, from the very
constitution of their nature, before habits of virtue,
are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what
is right; and therefore stand in need of \T.rtuous
habits, for a security against this danger. For, to-
gether with the general principle of moral imder-
standing, we have in our inward frame various
affections towards particular external objects. These
affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the
government of the moral principle, as to the occasions
upon which they may be gratified ; as to the times,
degrees, and manner in which the objects of them
may be pursued ; but then the principle of virtue
can neither excite them, nor prevent their being
excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt.

MOEAL DISCIPLINE. 97

when the objects of them are present to the mind,
not only before all consideration, whether they can
be obtained by lawful means, but after it is found
-they cannot. For the natural objects of affection
continue so ; the necessaries, conveniences, and plea-
sures of life, remain naturally desirable ; though
they cannot be obtained innocently : nay, though
they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when
the objects of any affection whatever cannot be ob-
tained without unlawful means ; but may be obtained
by them : such affection, though its being excited,
and its continuino- some time in the mind, be as
innocent as it is natural and necessary ; yet cannot
but be conceived to have a tendency to incline per-
sons to venture upon such unlawful means : and there-
fore must be conceived as putting them in some
da.nger of it. Now what is the general security
against this danger, against their actually deviating
from right ? As the danger is, so also must the
security be, from within : from the practical principle
of virtue *. And the strengthening or improving

^ It may be thought, that sense of interest would as effectually
restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interest
is meant a speculative conviction or belief, that such and such indul-
gence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than
satisfaction; it is contrary to present experience to say, Ihat this
sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging
themselves. And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard
to what is upon the whole our happiness ; this is not only coincident
with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the
idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be
improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily
see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but
by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence :
especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which is the
end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men

BUTLER, ANALOGY, H

98 OF A STATE OF

this principle, considered as practical, or as a prin-
ciple of action, will lessen the danger, or increase
the security against it. And this moral principle
is capable of improvement, by proper discipline and
exercise : by recollecting the practical impressions
which example and experience have made upon us :
and, instead of following humour and mere incli-
nation, by continually attending to the equity and
right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, be
it in greater or less matters ; and accustoming our-
selves always to act upon it ; as being itself the just
and natural motive of action ; and as this moral
course of behaviour must necessarily, under Divine
government, be our final interest. Thus the prin-
ciple of viHue, improved into an hahit, of ivhich ini-
'provement we are thus capable, ivill plainly he, in
propo7'tion to the strength of it, a security against the
danger ivhich finite creatures are in, from the very
nature of propension, or particular affections. This
way of putting the matter, supposes particular affec-
tions to remain in a future state ; which it is scarce
possible to avoid supposing. And if they do ; we
clearly see, that acquired habits of virtue and self-
government may be necessary for the regulation of
them. However, though we were not distinctly to
take in this supposition, but to speak only in gene-
ral ; the thing really comes to the same. For habits
of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are improve-
ment in virtue : and improvement in virtue must
be advancement in happiness, if the government of
the universe be moral.

From these things we may observe, and it will

mistaken, wheu they affirm they are wholly governed by interested-
ness and self-love. And so little cause is there for moralists to dis-
claim this principle. See p. 77, 78.

MORAL DISCIPLINE, 99

farther sliew this our natural and original need of
being improved by discipline, how it comes to pass,
that creatures made upright fall ; and that those
who preserve their uprightness, by so doing, raise
themselves to a more secure state of virtue. To say
that the former is accounted for by the nature of
liberty, is to say no more than that an event's actually
happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of
its happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable
from the very nature of particular affections or pro-
j)ensions. For, suppose creatures intended for such
a particular state of life, for which such propensions
were necessary: suppose them endued with such
propensions, together with moral understanding, as
well including a practical sense of virtue, as a spe-
culative perception of it ; and that all these several
piinciples, both natural and moral, forming an in-
ward constitution of mind, were in the most exact
proportion possible ; i. e. in a proportion the most
exactly adapted to their intended state of life ; such
creatures would be made upright, or finitely perfect.
Now particular propensions, from their very nature,
must be felt, the objects of them being present ;
though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with
the allowance of the moral principle. But if they
can be gratified without its allowance, or by con-
tradicting it ; then they must be conceived to have
some tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some
tendency, to induce persons to such forbidden gra-
tification. This tendency, in some one particular
propension, may be increased, by the greater fre-
quency of occasions naturally excitmg it, than of
occasions exciting others. The least voluntary in-
dulgence in forbidden circumstances, though but in
thought, will increase this wrong tendenc}^ ; and

H 2

100 OF A STATE OF

may increase it further, till, peculiar conjunctures
perhaps conspiring, it becomes effect ; and danger
of deviating from right, ends in actual deviation from
it : a danger necessarily arising from the very nature
of propension ; and which therefore could not have
been prevented, though it might have been escaped,
or got innocently through. The case would be, as
if we were to suppose a straight path marked out
for a })erson, in which such a degree of attention
would keep him steady : but if he would not attend
in this degree, any one of a thousand objects, catch-
ing his eye, might lead him out of it. Now it is
impossible to say, how mueli even the first full overt
act of irregularity might disorder the inward con-
stitution ; unsettle the adjustments, and alter the
proportions, which formed it, and in which the
uprightness of its make consisted : but repetition
of irregularities would produce habits. And thus
the constitution would be spoiled ; and creatures
made upright, become corrupt and depraved in their
settled character, proportionably to their repeated
irregularities in occasional acts. But, on the con-
trary, these creatures might have improved and
raised themselves, to an higher and more secure
state of virtue, by the contrary behaviour : by
steadily following the moral principle, supposed to
be one part of their nature : and thus withstanding
that miavoidable danger of defection, which neces-
sarily arose from propension, the other part of it.
For, by thus preserving their integrity for some
time, their danger would lessen ; since propensions,
by being inured to submit, would do it more easily
and of course : and their security against this less-
ening danger would increase ; since the moral prin-
ciple would gain additional strength by exercise :

MORAL DISCIl'LINE. 101

both which things are implied in the notion of vir-
tuous habits. Thus then vicious indulgence is not
only criminal in itself, but also depraves the inward
constitution and character. And virtuous self-eo-
vernment is not only right in itself, but also im-
proves the inward constitution or character : and
may improve it to such a degree, that though we
should suppose it impossible, for particular affections
to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle ;
and consequently should allow, that such creatures
as have been above supposed, would for ever remain
defectible ; yet their danger of actually deviating
from right may be almost infinitely lessened, and
they fidly fortified against what remains of it ; if
that may be called danger, against which there is
an adequate effectual security. But still, this their
higher perfection may continue to consist in habits
of virtue formed in a state of discipline, and this
their more complete security remain to proceed from
them. And thus it is plainly conceivable, that crea-
tures without blemish, as they came out of the hands
of God, may be in danger of going wrong ; and so
may stand in need of the security of virtuous habits,
additional to the moral principle wrought into their
natures by him. That which is the ground of their
danger, or their want of security, may be considered
as a deficiency in tliem, to which virtuous habits
are the natural supply. And as they are naturally
capable of being raised and improved by discipline,
it may be a thing fit and requisite that they should
be placed in circumstances with an eye to it : in
circumstances pecidiarly fitted to be, to them, a state
of discipline for their improvement in virtue.

But how much more strongly must this hold with
respect to tiiose, who have con-upted their ijaturea,

102 OF A STATE OF

are fallen from tlieii' original rectitude, and whose
passions are become excessive by repeated violations
of their inward constitution ? Upright creatures
may want to be improved : depraved creatures want
to be renewed. Education and discipline, which
may be in all degrees and sorts of gentleness and of
severity, is expedient for those : but must be abso-
lutely necessary for these. For these, discipline of
the severer sort too, and in the higher degrees of it,
must be necessary, in order to wear out vicious
habits ; to recover their primitive strength of self-
government, which indulgence must have weakened ;
to repair, as well as raise into an habit, the moral
principle, in order to their arriving at a secure state
of virtuous happiness.

Now whoever will consider the thing, may clearly
see, that the present world is peculiarly Jit to be a
state of discipline for this purpose, to such as will set
themselves to mend and improve. For, the various
temptations with which we are surrounded ; our ex-
perience of the deceits of vv^ickedness ; having been
in many instances led wrong ourselves ; the great
viciousness of the world ; the infinite disorders con-
sequent upon it ; our being made acquainted with
pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it, or
from the sight of it in others ; these things, though
some of them may indeed produce wrong effects upon
our minds, yet when duly reflected upon, have, all of
them, a direct tendency to bring us to a settled
moderation and reasonableness of temper: the con-
trary both to thoughtless levity, and also to that
unrestrained self-will, and violent bent to follow
present inclination, which may be observed in un-
disciplined minds. Such experience, as the present
state affords, of the frailty of our nature ; of the

MOKAL DISCIPLINE. 103

boundless extravagance of iingoverned passion ; of
the power which an infinite Being has over us, by
the various capacities of misery wliich he has given
us ; in short, that kind and degree of experience,
which the present state affords us, that the consti-
tution of nature is such as to admit the possibiHty,
the danger, and the actual event, of creatures losing
their innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious
and wretched ; hath a tendency to give us a prac-
tical sense of things, very different from a mere
speculative knowledge, that we are liable to vice,
and capable of misery. And who knows, whether
the securitv of creatiures in the hio;hest and most
settled state of perfection, may not in part arise,
from their having had such a sense of things as
this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, in
some state of probation. And passing through the
present w^orld with that moral attention, which is
necessary to the acting a right part in it, may leave
everlasting impressions of this sort upon our minds.
But to be a little more distinct : allurements to
what is wTong ; difficulties in the discharge of our
duty; our not being able to act an uniform right
part without some thought and care ; and the oppor-
timities which we have, or imagine we have, of avoid-
ing what we dislike, or obtaining what we desire,
by unlawful means, when we either cannot do it at
all, or at least not so easily, by lawfid ones ; these
things, i.e. the snares and temptations of vice, are
what render the present world peculiarly fit to be
a state of discipline, to those who will preserve their
integrity: because they render being upon our guard,
resolution, and the denial of our passions, necessary in
order to that end. And the exercise of such particu-
lar recollection, intention of mind, and self-govern-

104 OF A STATE OF

merit, in the practice of virtue, has, from the make
of our nature, a peculiar tendency to form habits of
virtue ; as impljT-ng, not only a real, but also a more
continued, and a more intense exercise of the vir-
tuous principle ; or a more constant and a stronger
effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus suppose a
person to know himself to be in particular danger,
for some time, of doing any thing wrong, which yet
he fully resolves not to do : continued recollection,
and keeping upon his guard, in order to make good
his resolution, is a continued exerting of that act of
virtue in a high degree, which need have been, and
perhaps would have been, only instantaneous and
weak, had the temptation been so. It is indeed
ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essential to
virtue and piety: but it would have been nearer
the truth, though not strictly the truth itself, to have
said, that it is essential to discipline and improve-
ment. For though actions materially virtuous, which
have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable
to our particular inclinations, may possibly be done
only from these particular inclinations, and so may
not be any exercise of the principle of virtue, i.e. not
be virtuous actions at all ; yet, on the contrary, they
may be an exercise of that principle : and when they
are, they have a tendency to form and fix the habit
of virtue. But when the exercise of the virtuous
principle is more continued, oftener repeated, and
more intense ; as it must be in circumstances of
danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind and in
any degree ; this tendency is mcreased proportion-
ably, and a more confirmed habit is the consequence.
This undoubtedly holds to a certain length: but
how far it may hold, I know not. Neither our in-
tellectual powers nor our bodily strength can be

MORAL DISCIPLINE. 105

improved beyond such a degree : and both may be
over-wroiio'ht. Possibly there may be somewhat
analogous to this, with respect to the moral charac-
ter ; which is scarce worth considering. And I men-
tion it only, lest it should come into some persons'
thoughts, not as an exception to the foregoing obser-
vations, which perhaps it is ; but as a confutation of
them, which it is not. And there may be several
other exceptions. Observations of this kind cannot
be supposed to hold minutely, and in every case. It
is enough that they hold in general. And these
plainly hold so far, as that from them may be seen
distinctly, which is all that is intended by them,
that the present luorld is peculiarly Jit to he a state of
discipline, for our improvement in virtue and piety :
in the same sense as some sciences, by requiring and
engaging the attention, not to be sure of such per-
sons as will not, but of such as will, set themselves
to them ; are fit to form the mind to habits of at-
tention.

Indeed the present state is so far from proving,
in event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of
men, that, on the contrary, they seem to make it
a discipline of vice. And the viciousness of the
world is, in different ways, the great temptation,
which renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in
the degree it is, to good men. The whole end, and
the whole occasion, of mankind's being placed in
such a state as the present, is not pretended to be
accounted for. That which appears amidst the
general corruption is, that there are some persons,
w^ho, having within them the principle of amend-
ment and recovery, attend to and follow the notices
of virtue and religion, be tliey more clear or more
obscure, which are afforded them ; and that the

106 OF A STATE OF

present woild is, not only an exercise of virtue in
these persons, but an exercise of it in ways and
degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it : apt to im-
prove it, in some respects, even beyond what would
be, by the exercise of it required in a perfectly
virtuous society, or in a society of equally imperfect
virtue with themselves. But that the present world
does not actually become a state of moral discipline
to many, even to the generality, i. e. that they do
not improve or grow better in it, cannot be urged
as a proof, that it was not intended for moral dis-
cipline, by any who at all observe the analogy of
nature. For, of the numerous seeds of vegetables
and bodies of animals, which are adapted and put
in the way, to improve to such a point or state of
natural maturity and perfection, we do not see
perhaps that one in a milHon actually does. Far
the greatest part of them decay before they are
improved to it ; and appear to be absolutely de-
stroyed. Yet no one, who does not deny all final
causes, will deny, that those seeds and bodies, which
do attain to that point of maturity and perfection,
answer the end for which they were really designed
by nature ; and therefore that nature designed them
for such perfection. And I cannot forbear adding,
though it is not to the present purpose, that the
appeai^ance of such an amazing waste in nature, with
respect to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes,
is to us as unaccountable, as, what is much more
terrible, the present and future ruin of so many
moral agents by themselves, i. e. by vice.

Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it
may be objected, in another way ; that so far as a
course of behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds
from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline

MORAL DISCIPLINE. 107

and strengthening of self-love. But doing what God
commands, because he commands it, is obedience,
though it proceeds from hope or fear. And a course
of such obedience will form habits of it. And a
constant regard to veracity, justice, and charity, may
form distinct habits of these particular virtues ; and
will certainly form habits of self-government, and of
denjdng our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice,
or charity requires it. Nor is there any foundation
for this great nicety, with which some affect to
distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all
Religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity,
justice, and charity, regard to God's authority, and
to our own chief interest, are not only all three
coincident ; but each of them is, in itself, a just
and natural motive or principle of action. And he
who begins a good life from any one of them, and
perseveres in it, as he is already in some degree,
so he cannot fail of becomino; more and more, of
that character, which is correspondent to the consti-
tution of nature as moral ; and to the relation, which
God stands in to us as moral Governor of it : nor
consequently can he fail of obtaining that happi-
ness, w^hich this constitution and relation necessarily
suppose connected with that character.

These several observations, concerning the active
principle of virtue and obedience to God's commands,
are applicable to passive submission or resignation to
his will : which is another essential part of a right
character, connected with the former, and very much
in our power to form ourselves to. It may be
imagined, that nothing but afflictions can give occa-
sion for, or require this virtue ; that it can have
no respect to, nor be any way necessary to qualify
for, a state of perfect happiness : but it is not ex-

108 OF A STATE OF

perieiice which can make us think thus. Prosperity
itself, whilst any thing supposed desirable is not
ours, begets extravagant and unbounded thoughts.
Imao'Ination is altoofether as much a source of dis-
content, as any thing in our external condition. It
is indeed true, that there can be no scope for
patience, when sorrow shall be no more : but there
may be need of a temper of mind, which shall have
been formed by patience. For, though self-love, con-
sidered merely as an active principle leading us to
pursue our chief interest, cannot but be uniformly
coincident with the principle of obedience to God's
commands, our interest being rightly understood ;
because this obedience, and the pursuit of our own
chief interest, must be in every case one and the
same thing : yet it may be questioned, whether self-
love, considered merely as the desire of our own
interest or happiness, can, from its nature, be thus
absolutely and uniformly coincident with the will
of God; any more than particular affections can'':
coincident in such sort, as not to be liable to be
excited upon occasions and in degrees, impossible to
be gratified consistently with the constitution of
things, or the Divine appointments. So that habits
of resignation may, upon this account, be requisite
for all creatures : habits, I say ; which signify what
is formed by use. However, in general it is obvious
that both self-love and particular affections in human
creatures, considered only as passive feelings, distort
and rend the mind ; and therefore stand in need of
discipline. Now denial of those particular affections,
in a cours of active virtue and obedience to God's
will, has a tendency to moderate them ; and seems
also to have a tendency to habituate the mind, to

b p. 82.

MOKAL DISnPLIXE. 109

be easy and satisfied with that degree of hajipiuess
which is allotted us, i. e. to moderate self-love. But
the jDroper discipline for resignation is alltliction. For
a right behaviour under that trial ; recollecting our-
selves so as to consider it in the view, in which
Religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand
of God ; receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks
proper to permit, in his world and under his govern-
ment ; this will habituate the mind to a dutiful sub-
mission. And such submission, together with the
active principle of obedience, make up the temper
and character in us, which answei's to his sovereignty;
and which absolutely belongs to the condition of our
being, as dependent creatures. Nor can it be said,
that this is only breaking the mind to a submission
to mere power ; for mere power may be accidental
and precarious and usurped : but it is forming within
ourselves the temper of resignation to his rightful
authority, who is, by nature, supreme over all.

Upon the whole : such a character, and such quaH-
fications, are necessary for a mature state of life in
the present world, as nature alone does in no wise
bestow ; but has put it upon us, in great part, to
acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to
another, from childhood to mature age ; put it upon
us to acquire them, by giving us capacities of doing-
it, and by placing us, in the beginning of life, in a
condition fit for it. And this is a general analogy
to our condition in the present world, as in a state
of moral discipline for another. It is in vain then
to object against the credibility of the present life's
being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble
and the danger, unavoidably accompanying such dis-
cipline, might have been saved us, by our being made
at once the creatures and the characters, loliich we

110 OF A STATE OF

were to he. For we experience, that vAat we tvere
to he, was to be the effect of what ive ivould do : and
that the general conduct of nature is, not to save us
trouble or danger, but to make us capable of going-
through them, and to put it upon us to do so. Ac-
quirements of our own, experience and habits, are
the naturcd supply to our deficiencies, and security
against our dangers : since it is as plainly natural
to set ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the
external things, which we stand in need of. In par-
ticular, it is as plainly a general law of nature, that
we should, with regard to oiu- temjDoral interest, form
and cultivate practical principles within us, by atten-
tion, use, and discipline, as anything whatever is a
natural law ; chiefly in the beginning of life, but
also throughout the whole course of it. And the
alternative is left to our choice : either to improve
ourselves, and better our condition ; or, in defaidt of
such improvement, to remain deficient and wretched.
It is therefore perfectly credible, from the analogy of
nature, that the same may be our case, with respect
to the happiness of a future state, and the qualifica-
tions necessary for it.

There is a third thing, which may seem implied
in the present world's being a state of probation ;
that it is a theatre of action, for the manifestation of
persons' characters, with respect to a future one :
not to be sure to an all-knowing' Beinsf, but to his
creation or part of it. This may, perhaps, be only
a consequence of our being in a state of probation
in the other senses. However, it is not impossible,
that men's shewins: and makino- manifest what is
in their lieart, what their real character is, may
have respect to a future life, in ways and manners
which we are not acquainted with : particularly

MORAL DISCIPLINE. Ill

it may be a means, for the iViithor of Nature
does not appear to do any thing without means, of
their being disposed of suitably to their characters ;
and of its being known to the creation, by way of
example, that they are thus disposed of. But not to
enter upon any conjectural account of this ; one may
just mention, that the manifestation of persons' cha-
racters contributes very much, in various w^ays, to
the carrying on a great part of that general course
of nature, respecting mankind, which comes under
our observation at present. I shall only add, that
probation, in both these senses, as well as in that
treated of in the foregoing chapter, is imjolied in I
moral government ; since by persons' behaviour '
under it, their characters cannot but be manifested,
and, if they behave well, improved.

CHAP. VI.

Of the opinion of necessity/, considered as influencing practice.

Throughoitt the foregoing Treatise it appears,
that the condition of mankind, considered as inhabit-
ants of this world only, and under the government
of God which we experience, is greatly analogous to
our condition, as designed for another world, or
under that farther government, which Religion
teaches us. If therefore any assert, as a Fatalist
must, that the opinion of universal Necessity is re-
concilable with the former ; there immediately arises
a question in the way of analogy, whether he must
not also own it to be reconcilable with the latter,
i. e. with the system of Eeligion itself, and the proof
of it. The reader then will observe, that the ques-
tion now ])efore us is not absolute, Whether the

112 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,

opinion of Fate be reconcilable with Eeligion ; but
hypothetical, Whether, upon supposition of its being
reconcilable with the constitution of Nature, it be
not reconcilable with Religion also : or, what pre-
tence a Fatalist, not other persons, but a Fatalist,
has to conclude from his opinion, that there can be
no such thing as Eeligion. And as the puzzle and
obscurity, which must unavoidably arise from arguing
upon so absurd a supposition as that of universal
Necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen ; it will, I
hope, as easily be excused.

But since it has been all along taken for granted,
as a thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author
of Nature, or natural Governor of the world ; and
since an objection may be made against the proof of
this, from the opinion of universal Necessity, as it
may be supposed, that such Necessity will itself
account for the origin and preservation of all things :
it is requisite, that this objection be distinctly an-
swered ; or that it be shewn, that a Fatality, sup-
posed consistent with what we certainly experience,
does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author
and Governor of Nature ; before we proceed to con-
sider, whether it destroys the proof of a moral
Governor of it, or of our being in a state of Religion.

Now, when it is said by a Fatalist, that the whole
constitution of Nature, and the actions of men, that
every thing, and every mode and circumstance of
every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly
have been otherwise ; it is to be observed, that this
Necessity does not exclude deliberation, choice, pre-
ference, and acting from certain principles, and to
certain ends : because all this is matter of undoubted
experience, acknowledged by all, and what every
man may, every moment, be conscious of. And

AS INFLUENCIXG rRACTICE. 113

from hence it follows, that Necessity, alone and of
itself, is in no sort an account of the constitution of
Natiu^e, and how things came to he and to continue
as they are ; but only an account of this circum-
stance relating to their origin and continuance, that
they could not have been otherwise than they are
and have been. The assertion, that every thing is
by Necessity of Nature, is not an answer to the
question ; Whether the world came into being as
it is, by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, or
not : but to qiiite another question ; Whether it
came into being as it is, in that way and manner
which w^e call necessarily, or in that way and man-
ner which we call freely. For suppose farther, that
one who was a Fatalist, and one who kept to his
natural sense of things, and believed himself a Free
Agent, were disputing together, and vindicating their
respective opinions ; and they should happen to in-
stance in a house : they would agree that it was
built by an architect. Their difference concerning
Necessity and Freedom would occasion no difference
of judgment concerning this ; but only concerning
another matter ; whether the architect built it neces-
sarily or freely. Suppose then they should proceed
to inquire concerning the constitution of Nature :
in a lax way of speaking, one of them might say,
it was by Necessity ; and the other, by Freedom :
but if they had any meaning to then- words, as the
latter must mean a Free Agent, so the former must
at length be reduced to mean an Agent, wdiether he
would say one or more, acting by Necessity : for
abstract notions can do nothing. Indeed we ascribe
to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent.
For we find within ourselves the idea of infinitv,
i. e, immensity and eternity, impossible, even in

BUTLEK, ANALOGY. I

114 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,

imagmation, to be removed out of being. We seem
to discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot
but be, somewhat, external to oiu-selves, answering
this idea, or the archetype of it. And from hence
(for this abstract, as much as any other, implies a
concrete) we conclude, that there is^ and cannot but
be, an infinite and immense eternal Being existing,
prior to all design contributing to his existence, and
exclusive of it. And from the scantiness of language,
a manner of speaking has been introduced ; that
Necessitv is the foundation, the reason, the account
of the existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor
can it be at all intended, that every thing exists as
it does, by this kind of Necessity ; a Necessity ante-
cedent in nature to design : it cannot, I say, be
meant that every thing exists as it does, by this
kind of Necessit}*, upon several accounts ; and par-
ticularly because it is admitted, that design, in the
actions of men, contributes to manv alterations in
nature. For if any deny this, I shall not pretend
to reason with them.

From these things it follows ; first. That when a
Fatalist asserts, that every thing is by Necessity, he
must • mean, by an Agent acting necessarily ; he
must I say mean this, for I am very sensible he
would not choose to mean it : and secondly. That
the Necessity, by which such an Agent is supposed
to act, does not exclude intelligence and design. So
that, were the system of Fatahty admitted, it would
just as much account for the formation of the
world, as for the structure of an house, and no more.
Necessity as much requires and supposes a Necessary
Agent, as Freedom requires and supposes a Free
Agent, to be the former of the world. And the
appearances of design and oi final causes in the

AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. IIT)

constitution of nature as really prove this acting-
Agent to be an intelligent designer, or to act from
choice ; upon the scheme of Necessity, supposed pos-
sible, as upon that of Freedom.

It appearing thus, that the notion of Necessity
does not destroy the proof, that there is an intelli-
gent Author of Nature and natural Governor of the
world ; the present question, which the analogy be-
fore mentioned^ suggests, and wliich, I think, it will
answer, is this : Whether the opinion of Necessity,
supposed consistent with possibility, with the con-
stitution of the world, and the natural government
which we experience exercised over it, destroys all
reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a state
of Religion : or whether that opinion be reconcilable
with Religion ; with the system, and the proof of it.

Suppose then a Fatalist to educate any one, from
his youth ujd, in his own prmciples ; that the child
should reason upon them, and conclude, that since he
cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does, he
is not a subject of blame or commendation, nor can
deserve to be rewarded or punished : imagine him to
eradicate the very perceptions of blame and com-
mendation out of Ms mind, by means of this system ;
to form his temper and character and behaviour to
it ; and from it to j udge of the treatment he was
to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his coming
abroad into the world : as the Fatalist judges from
this system, what he is to expect from the Author
of Nature, and with reo;ard to a future state. I can-
not forbear stopping here to ask, whether any one
of common sense would think fit, that a child should
be put upon these speculations, and be left to apply
them to practice. And a man has little pretence to

a p. III.
I 2

116 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,

reason, who is not sensible, that we are all children in
speculations of this kind. However, the child would
doubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed
from the restraints of fear and shame, with which
his playfellows were fettered and embarrassed ; and
highly conceited in liis superior knowledge, so far
beyond his years. But conceit and vanity would be
the least bad part of the influence, which these prin-
ciples must have, when thus reasoned and acted
upon, during the course of his education. He must
either be allowed to go on, and be the plague of
all about him, and himself too, even to his own
destruction : or else correction must be continually
made use of, to supply the want of those natural
perceptions of blame and commendation, which we
have supposed to be removed ; and to give him a
practical impression, of what he had reasoned him-
self out of the belief of, that he was in fact an ac-
countable child, and to be punished for doing what
he was forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible,
but that the correction which he must meet with,
in the course of his education, must convince him,
that if the scheme he was instructed m were not
false ; yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it,
and somehow or other misapplied it to practice and
common life ; as what the Fatalist experiences of
the conduct of Providence at present, ought in all
reason to convince him, that this scheme is misap-
plied when applied to the subject of Religion i\
But supposing the child's temper could remain still
formed to the system, and his expectation of the
treatment he was to have in the world be regulated
by it ; so as to expect that no reasonable man would
blame or punish him, for any thing which he should

b P. 126.

AS INFLUENCING PKACTICE. 117

do, because he could not help doing it : upon this
supposition it is manifest he would, upon his coming
abroad into the world, be insupportable to society,
and the treatment which he would receive from it
would render it so to him ; and he could not fail
of doing somewhat, very soon, for which he would
be delivered over into the hands of civil justice.
And thus, in the end, he would be convinced of the
obligations he was under to his wise instructor. Or
suppose this scheme of Fatality, in any other way,
applied to practice, such practical application of it
will be found equally absurd ; equally fallacious in
a practical sense : for instance, that if a man be
destined to Hve such a time, he shall live to it,
though he take no care of his owti preservation ;
or if he be destined to die before that time, no care
can prevent it : therefore all care about preservmg
one's hfe is to be neglected : which is the fallacy
instanced in by the ancients. But now on the con-
trary, none of these practical absurdities can be
drawn, from reasonmg upon the supposition, that we
are free ; but all such reasoning with regard to the
common affairs of life is justified by experience.
And therefore, though it were admitted that this
opinion of Necessity were speculatively true ; yet,
with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so
far as our experience reaches ; that is, to the whole
of our present life. For, the constitution of the
present world, and the condition in which we are
actually placed, is, as if we were free. And it may
perhaps justly be concluded, that since the whole
process of action, through every step of it, suspense,
deHberation, inclining one way, determining, and at
last doing as we determine, is as if we were free,
therefore we are so. But the thing here insisted

118 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,

upon is, that under the present natural government
of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with,
as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether
we are or not. Were this opinion therefore of
Necessity admitted to be ever so true ; yet such
is in fact our condition and the natural course of
things, that whenever we apply it to life and prac-
tice, this application of it always misleads us, and
cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful manner,
TNT.th regard to our present interest. And how can
people think themselves so very secure then, that
the same application of the same opinion may not
mislead them also, in some analogous manner, w^ith
respect to a future, a more general, and more im-
portant interest ? For, Eeligion being a practical
subject ; and the analogy of nature shewing us, that
we have not faculties to apply this opinion, were
it a true one, to practical subjects ; whenever we
do apply it to the subject of Religion, and thence
conclude, that we are free from its obligations, it
is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon.
There will still remain just reason to think, whatever
appearances are, that we deceive ourselves ; in some-
what of a like manner, as when people fancy they
can draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of
infinity.

From these thiugs together, the attentive reader
will see it follows, that if upon supposition of Free-
dom the evidence of Eeligion be conclusive, it
remains so, upon supposition of Necessity, because
the notion of Necessity is not applicable to practical
subjects : i. e. with respect to them, is as if it were
not true. Nor does this contain any reflection upon
reason ; but only upon what is unreasonable. For
to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to prac-

AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 119

tical principles, which the Author of our Nature gave
us to act upon ; and to pretend to apply our reason
to subjects, with regard to which, our own short
views, and even our experience, will shew us, it
cannot he depended upon ; and such, at best, the
subject of Necessity must be ; this is vanity, conceit,
and unreasonableness.

But this is not all. For we find within ourselves
a will, and are conscious of a character. Now if this,
in us, be reconcilable with Fate, it is reconcilable with
it, in the Author of Nature. And besides, natural
government and final causes imply a character and a
vdll in the Governor and Designer^ ; a will concei'n-
ingthe creatures whom he governs. The Author of
Nature then being certainly by some character or
other, notwithstandmg Necessity; it is evident this
Necessity is as reconcilable with the particular cha-
racter of benevolence, veracity, and justice in him,
which attributes are the foundation of Kehgion, as
with any other character ; since we find this Necessity
no more hinders inen from being benevolent, than
cruel ; true, than faithless ; just, than unjust ; or if
the Fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. For it is
said indeed, that what, upon supposition of Freedom,
would be just punishment ; upon supposition of Ne-
cessity, becomes manifestly unjust : because it is
punishment inflicted for doing that which persons
could not avoid doing. As if the Necessity, which is
supposed to destroy the injustice of murder, for in-
stance, would not also destroy the injustice of
punishing it. However, as little to the purpose as

<= By ivill and character is meant that, which, in speaking of men,
we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words
temper, taste, dispositions, practical principles : that whole frame of
mind, from vjhence we act in one manner rather than another.

120 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,

this objection is in itself, it is very much to the
purpose to observe from it, how the notions of justice
and injustice remain, even whilst we endeavour to
suppose them removed ; how they force themselves
upon the mind, even whilst we are making supposi-
tions destructive of them : for there is not, perhaps,
a man in the world, but would be ready to make this
objection at first thought.

But though it is most evident, that universal
Necessity, if it be reconcilable with any thing, is
reconcilable with that character in the Author of
Nature, which is the foundation of Keligion ; " Yet,
does it not plainly destroy the proof, that he is of
that character, and consequently the proof of Re-
ligion?" By no means. For we find, that hapjDi-
ness and misery are not our fate, in any such sense
as not to be the consequences of our behavioiu' ; but
that they are the consequences of it <^. We find God
exercises the same kind of government over us, with
that, which a father exercises over his children, and
a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now, whatever
becomes of abstract questions concerning Liberty and
Necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity
and justice must be the natural rule and measure
of exercising this authority or government, to a
Being who can have no competitions or interfering
of interests, with his creatiures and his subjects.

But as the doctrine of Liberty, though we experi-
ence its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties,
which run up into the most abstruse of all specula-
tions ; and as the opinion of Necessity seems to be
the very basis, upon which infidelity grounds itself;
it may be of some use to offer a more particular proof
of the obligations of Religion, which may distinctly
be shewn not to be destroyed by this opinion.

^ Chap. ii.

AS INFLUENCING PllACTICE. 121

The proof from final causes of an intelligent Au-
thor of Natiu-e is not affected by the opinion of
Necessity ; supposing necessity .a thing possible in it-
self, and reconcilable with the constitution of thino-.so.
And it is a matter of fact, independent on this or any
other speculation, that he governs the world by the
method of rewards and punishments ^i and also that
he hath given us a moial faculty, by which we dis-
tinguish between actions, and approve some as vir-
tuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as
vicious and of ill desert ». Now this moral discern-
ment implies, in the notion of it, a rule of action, and
a rule of a very peculiar kind : for it carries in it
authority and a right of direction ; authority in such
a sense, as that we cannot depart from it without
beinof self-condemned^. And that the dictates of
this moral faculty, which are by nature a rule to us,
are moreover the laws of God, laws in a sense includ-
ing sanctions ; may be thus proved. Consciousness
of a rule or guide of action, in creatures who are
capable of considering it as given them by their
Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty,
but also a sense of security in following it, and of
danger in deviating from it. A direction of the Au-
thor of Nature, given to creatures capable of looking
upon it as such, is plainly a command from him : and
a command from him necessarily includes in it, at
least, an implicit promise in case of obedience, or
threatening in case of disobedience. But then the
sense or perception of good and ill deserts which is
contained in the moral discernment, renders the sanc-
tion expHcit, and makes it appear, as one may say
expressed. For since his method of government is to

e P. 112, &c. f Chap. ii. K Dissert. TI.

h Serm. II. at the Rolls. » Dissert. II.

122 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY

reward and punish actions, his having annexed to
some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and
to others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring,
upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and
his rewards be bestowed. For he must have given
us this discernment and sense of things, as a presenti-
ment of what is to be hereafter : that is, by way of
information beforehand, what we are finally to expect
in his world. There is then most evident ground to
think, that the government of God, upon the whole,
will be found to correspond to the nature which he
has given us : and that in the upshot and issue of
things, happiness and misery shall, in fact and event,
be made to follow virtue and vice respectively; as he
has already, in so pecuhar a manner, associated the
ideas of them in our minds. And from hence might
easily be deduced the obligations of religious wor-
ship, were it only to be considered as a means of pre-
serving upon our minds a sense of this moral govern-
ment of God, and securing our obedience to it : which
yet is an extremely imperfect view of that most im-
portant duty.

Now I say, no objection from Necessity can lie
against this general proof of religion. None against
the proposition reasoned upon, that we have such
a moral faculty and discernment ; because this is a
mere matter of fact, a thing of experience, that
human kind is thus constituted: none against the
conclusion ; because it is immediate and wholly
from this fact. For the conclusion, that God will
filially reward the righteous and punish the wicked,
is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit^

k However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God
is determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case ;
though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation,

AS INFLUENCING PEACTICE. 123

that he should; but from its appearing, that he has
to us, he ivill. And this he hath certainly told us,
in the promise and threatening, which it hath been
observed the notion of a command implies, and the
sense of good and ill desert which he has given us,
more distinctly expresses. And this reasoning from
fact is confirmed, and in some degree even verified,
by other facts ; by the natural tendencies of virtue
and of vice^ ; and by this, that God, in the natural
course of his providence, punishes vicious actions
as mischievous to society; and also vicious actions
as such in the strictest sense '^\ So that the general
proof of Eeligion is unanswerably real, even upon
the wild supposition which we are arguing upon.

It must likewise be observed farther, that natural
Religion hath, besides this, an external evidence ;
which the doctrine of Necessitv, if it could be true,
would not affect. For suppose a person, by the
observations and reasoning above, or by any other,
convinced of the truth of Religion ; that there is a
God, who made the world, who is the moral Governor

and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it
be intelligible to say, that it is fit and reasonable for every one to
consult his own happiness, then fitness of action, or the right and
reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it
seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of
action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all
from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior
in that end, to be the ground of the preference ; as to suppose him
to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing
somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth
not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to per-
ception, than abstract truth is ; or that it is any more improper, to
speak of the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in
the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus
founded.

1 P. 62, 63. m P. 53, &c.

124 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,

and Judge of mankind, and will upon the whole
deal with every one according to his works : I say,
suppose a person convinced of this by reason ; but
to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present
state of mankind : it would be natural for such an
one to be inquisitive, what was the history of this
system of doctrine ; at what time, and in what man-
ner, it came first into the world ; and whether it were
believed by any considerable part of it. And were
he upon inquiry to find, that a particular person,
in a late age, first of all proposed it, as a deduction
of reason, and that mankind were before wholly
ignorant of it ; then, though its evidence from reason
would remain, there would be no additional proba-
bility of its truth, from the account of its discovery.
But instead of this being the fact of the case, on
the contrarv, he would find, w^hat could not but
afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth :
First, That somewhat of this system, with more or
fewer additions and alterations, hath been professed
in all ages and countries, of which we have any cer-
tain information relating to this matter. Secondly,
That it is certain historical fact, so far as Ave can
trace things up, that this whole system of belief,
that there is one God, the Creator and moral Governor
of the world, and that mankind is in a state of
Religion, was received in the first ages. And Thirdly,
That as there is no hint or intimation in history,
that this system was first reasoned out ; so there is
express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient
as history, that it was taught first by revelation.
Now these things must be allowed to be of great
weight. The first of them, general consent, shews
this system to be conformable to tlie common sense
of mankind. The second, namely, that Religion was

AS IXFLUENCING PRACTICE. 125

believed in the first ages of the world, especially
as it does not appear that there were then any super-
stitious or false additions to it, cannot but be a
farther confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof
of this alternative : either that it came into the
world by revelation ; or that it is natural, obvious,
and forces itself upon the mind. The former of
these is the conclusion of learned men. And who-
ever will consider, how unapt for speculation rude
and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps from hence
alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the truth.
And as it is shewn in the Second Part" of this
Treatise, that there is nothing of such peculiar pre-
sumption against a revelation in the beginning of
the world, as there is supposed to be against subse-
quent ones . a sceptic could not, I think, give any
account, which would appear more probable even to
himself, of the early pretences to revelation ; than by
supposing some real original one, from whence they
were copied. And the third thing above mentioned,
that there is express historical or traditional evidence
as ancient as history, of the system of Eeligion being
taught mankind by revelation ; this must be ad-
mitted as some degree of real proof, that it was so
taught. For why should not the most ancient tra-
dition be admitted, as some additional proof of a
fact, against which there is no presumption 1 And
this proof is mentioned here, because it has its
weio;ht to shew, that Religion came into the world
by revelation, prior to all consideration of the proper
authority of any book supposed to contain it ; and
even prior to all consideration, whether the revela-
tion itself be uncorruptly handed down, and related,
or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the his-

n Chap. ii.

126 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,

torical account, which we have, of the origin of
Eehgion, taking in all circumstances, is a real con-
firmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion
of Necessity. And the external evidence, even of
natural Beligion, is by no means inconsiderable.

But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to
be recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion,
which are only general ; that as speculative reason
may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also
may our moral understanding be impaired and per-
verted, and the dictates of it not imjDartially attended
to. This indeed proves nothing against the reality
of our speculative or practical faculties of perception ;
against their being intended by nature, to inform us
in the theory of things, and instruct us how we are
to behave, and what we are to expect in consequence
of our behaviour. Yet our liableness, in the degree
we are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most
serious admonition to us to be upon our guard, with
respect to what is of such consequence, as our deter-
minations concerning virtue and religion ; and par-
ticularly not to take custom and fashion and slight
notions of honour, or imaginations of present ease,
use, and convenience to mankind, for the only moral
ruleo.

The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature
of the thing, and the history of Religion, amount,
when taken together, to a real practical proof of it,
not to be confuted : such a proof as, considering the
infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, would
be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence
the actions of men, who act upon thought and re-
flection ; if it were admitted that there is no proof
of the contrary. But it may be said : " There are

o Dissert. II.

AS INFLUEXCING PRACTICE. 127

many probabilities, which cannot indeed be confuted,
i. e. shewn to be no probabilities, and yet may be
overbalanced by greater probabilities on the other
side ; much more by demonstration. And there is
no occasion to object against particular arguments
alleged for an opinion, when the opinion itself may
be clearly shewn to be false, without meddling with
such arguments at all, but leaving them just as they
are P. Now the method of government by rewards
and punishments, and especially rewarding and pun-
ishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must
go upon supposition, that we are Free and not Neces-
sary Agents. And it is incredible, that the Author
of Nature should govern us upon a supposition as
true, which he knows to be false ; and therefore
absurd to think, he will reward or punish us for our
actions hereafter ; especially that he will do it under
the notion, that they are of good or ill desert." Here
then the matter is brought to a point. And the
answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded : that
the whole constitution and course of things, the whole
analogy of Providence, shews beyond possibility of
doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is
false ; wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of
freedom indeed clearly shews where : in supposing
ourselves Necessary, when in truth we are Free
Agents. But upon the supposition of Necessity, the
fallacy lies in taking for granted, that it is incredible
Necessary Agents should be rewarded and punished.
But that, some how or other, the conclusion now
mentioned is false, is most certain. For it is fact,
that God does govern even brute creatures by the
method of rewards and pimishments, in the natu-
ral course of things. And men are rewarded and

P Page I, 9.

128 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,

punished for their actions, punished for actions mis-
chievous to society as being so, punished for vicious
actions as such ; by the natural instrumentality of
each other, under the present conduct of Providence.
Nay even the affection of gratitude, and the passion
of resentment, and the rewards and punishments
following from them, which in general are to be con-
sidered as natural, i. e. from the Author of Nature ;
these rewards and punishraents, being naturally^
annexed to actions considered as implying good in-
tention and good desert, ill intention and ill desert ;
these natural rewards and punishments, I say, are as
much a contradiction to the conclusion above, and
shew its falsehood, as a more exact and complete
rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert as
such. So that if it be incredible, that Necessary
Agents should be thus rewarded and punished ; then,
men are not necessary but free ; since it is matter
of fact, that they are thus rewarded and punished.
But if, on the contrary, which is the supposition we
have been arguing upon, it be insisted, that men are
Necessary Agents ; then, there is nothing incredible
in the farther supposition of Necessary Agents being
thus. rewarded and punished: since we ourselves are
thus dealt with.

From the whole therefore it must follow, that a
Necessity supposed possible, and reconcilable with
the constitution of things, does in no sort prove that
the Author of Nature will not, nor destroy the proof
that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his
eternal government, render his creatures happy or
miserable, by some means or other, as they behave
well or ill. Or, to express this conclusion in words
conformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy
q Serm. YITItli, at the Eolls.

AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 129

of nature shews us, that the opmlon of Necessity,
considered as practical, is false. And if Necessity,
upon the supposition above mentioned, doth not
destroy the proof of natural Religion, it evidently
makes no alteration in the proof of revealed.

From these things likewise we may learn, in what
sense to understand that general assertion, that the
opinion of Necessity is essentially destructive of all
religion. First, in a practical sense ; that by this
notion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and en-
courage themselves in vice, and justify to others
their disregard to all religion. And secondly, in the
strictest sense ; that it is a contradiction to the
whole constitution of nature, and to what we may
every moment experience in ourselves, and so over-
tirrns every thing. But by no means is this assertion
to be understood, as if Necessity, supposing it could
possibly be reconciled with the constitution of things
and mth what we experience, were not also recon-
cilable with Religion : for upon this supposition, it
demonstrably is so.

CHAP. VII.

Of the government of God, considered as a scheme or constitution,
imperfectlij comprehended.

Though it be, as it cannot Init be, acknowledged,
that the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility
to the general doctrine of Religion, and to the several
particular things contained in it, considered as so
many matters of fact ; and likewise that it shews
this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions
of Necessity : yet still, objections may be insisted

BUTLER, ANALOGY. K

130 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,

upon, against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of
the Divine government implied in the notion of
Beligion, and against the method by which this go-
vernment is conducted ; to which objections analogy
can be no direct answer. For the credibility, or the
certain truth, of a matter of fact, does not imme-
diately prove any thing concerning the wisdom or
goodness of it : and analogy can do no more, imme-
diately or directly, than shew such and such things
to be true or credible, considered only as matters of
fact. But still, if, upon supposition of a moral con-
stitution of nature and a moral government over it,
analogy suggests and makes it credible, that this
government must be a scheme, system, or constitu-
tion of government, as distinguished from a number
of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and
goodness ; and likewise, that it must be a scheme,
so imperfectly comprehended, and of such a sort in
other respects, as to afford a direct general answer
to all objections against the justice and goodness
of it : then analogy is, remotely, of great service in
answering those objections ; both by suggesting the
answer, and shewing it to be a credible one.

Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the
case. For, first, Upon supposition that God exercises
a moral government over the world, the analogy
of his natural government suggests and makes it
credible, that his moral government must be a
scheme, quite beyond our comprehension : and this
affords a general answer to all objections against the
justice and goodness of it. And, secondly, A more
distinct observation of some particular things con-
tained in God's scheme of natural government, the
like things being supposed, by analogy, to be con-
tained in his moral government, will fartlier shew,

A SCHEME IXCOMPREHENSIBLE, 131

how little weight is to be laid upon these objec-
tions.

I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral
government over the world, the analogy of his na-
tural government suggests and makes it credible,
that his moral government must be a scheme, quite
beyond our comprehension ; and this affords a general
answer to all objections against the justice and good-
ness of it. It is most obvious, analosfv renders it
highly credible, that, upon supposition of a moral
government, it must be a scheme : for the world,
and the whole natural government of it, appears to
be so : to be a scheme, system, or constitution, whose
parts correspond to each other, and to a whole ; as
really as any work of art, or as any particular model
of a civil constitution and government. In this great
scheme of the natiu-al world, individuals have various
pecuHar relations to other individuals of their own
species. And whole species are, we find, variously
related to other species, upon this earth. Nor do
we know, how much farther these kinds of relations
may extend. And, as there is not any action or
natural event, which we are acquainted with, so
single and unconnected, as not to have a respect to
some other actions and events : so possibly each of
them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have
a remote, natural relation to other actions and events,
much beyond the compass of this present world.
There seems indeed nothing, from whence we can
so much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures,
actions, and events, throughout the whole of nature,
have relations to each other. But, as it is obvious,
that all events have future unknown consequences ;
so if we trace any, as far as we can go, into what
is connected with it, we shall find, that if such event

K 2

182 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,

were not connected with somewhat farther in nature
■unknown to us, somewhat both past and present,
such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor
can we give the whole account of any one thing
whatever ; of all its causes, ends, and necessary ad-
juncts ; those adjuncts, I mean, without wliich it
could not have been. Bv this most astonishing con-
nection, these reciprocal correspondencies and mutual
relations, every thing which we see in the course of
nature is actually brought about. And things seem-
ingly the most insignificant imaginable are per-
petually observed to be necessary conditions to other
things of the greatest importance : so that any one
thing whatever may, for ought we know to the
contrary, be a necessary condition to any other.
The natural world then, and natural government of
it, being such an incomprehensible scheme ; so in-
comprehensible, that a man must, really in the literal
sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of
his ignorance in it ; this immediately suggests, and
strongly shews the credibility, that the moral world
and government of it may be so too. Indeed the
natural and moral constitution and government of
the world are so connected, as to make up together
but one scheme : and it is highly probable, that
the first is formed and carried on merely in subser-
viency to the latter ; as the vegetable world is for
the animal, and organized bodies for minds. But
the thing intended here is, without inquiring how
far the admuiistration of the natural world is sub-
ordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the
credibility, that one should be analogous or similar
to the other: that therefore every act of Divine
justice and goodness may be supposed to look much
beyond itself, and its immediate object ; may have

A SCHEME INC0MPKEHEN81BLE. 133

some reference to other parts of God's moral ad-
ministration, and to a general moral plan ; and that
every circumstance of this his moral government
may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the
whole of it. Thus for example : the determined
length of time, and the degrees and ways, in which
vu-tue is to remain in a state of warfare and dis-
cipline, and in which wickedness is permitted to
have its progress ; the times appointed for the exe-
cution of justice; the appointed instruments of it ;
the kinds of rewards and punishments, and the man-
ners of their distribution ; all particular instances of
Divine justice and goodness, and every circumstance
of them, may have such respects to each other, as
to make up altogether a whole, connected and re-
lated in all its parts ; a scheme or system, which is
as properly one as the natural world is, and of the
like kind. And supposing this to be the case ; it
is most evident, that Ve are not competent judges
of this scheme, from the small parts of it which
come within our view in the present life : and there-
fore no objections against any of these parts can be
insisted upon by reasonable men.

This our ignorance, and the consequence here
drawn from it, are universally acknowledged upon
other occasions ; and though scarce denied, yet are
universally forgot, when persons come to argue
against Eeligion. And it is not perhaps easy, even
for the most reasonable men, always to bear in mind
the desfree of our iornorance, and make due allow-
ances for it. Upon these accounts, it may not be
useless to go on a little farther, in order to shew
more distinctly, how just un answer our ignorance
is, to objections against the scheme of Providence.
Suppose then a person boldly to assert, that the

134 THE GOYERNMEAT OF GOD,

tilings complained of, the origin and continuance
of evil, might easily have been prevented by re-
peated interpositions'"^; interpositions so guarded
and circumstanced, as would preclude all mischief
arising from them ; or, if this were imjDracticable,
that a scheme of government is itself an imperfection ;
since more good might have been produced, without
any scheme, system, or constitution at all, by con-
tinued single unrelated acts of distributive justice
and goodness ; because these would have occasioned
no irregularities. And farther than this, it is pre-
sumed, the objections will not be carried. Yet the
answer is obvious : that were these assertions true,
still the observations above, concerning our igno-
rance in the scheme of Divine government, and the
consequence drawn from it, would hold, in great
measure ; enough to vindicate Religion, against all
objections from the disorders of the present state.
Were these assertions true, yet the government of
the world might be just and good notwithstanding ;
for, at the most, they would infer nothing more than
that it might have been better. But indeed they
are mere arbitrary assertions ; no man being suffi-
ciently acquainted with the possibilities of things,
to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of
probability. For however possible what is asserted
may seem ; yet many instances may be alleged, in
things much less out of our reach, of suppositions
absolutely impossible, and reducible to the most
palpable self-contradictions, which, not every one
by any means would perceive to be such, nor per-
haps any one at first sight suspect. From these
things, it is easy to see distinctly, how our ignorance,
as it is the common, is really a satisfactory answer

a P. 138, 139.

A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 135

to all objections against the justice and goodness of
Providence. If a man, contemplating any one pro-
vidential dispensation, wliicli had no relation to any
others, should object, that he discerned in it a dis-
regard to justice, or a deficiency of goodness ; no-
thing would be less an answer to such objection,
than our ignorance in other parts of Providence, or
in the possibiUties of things, no way related to what
he was contemplating. But when we know not but
the parts objected against may be relative to other
parts unknown to us ; and when we are unacquainted
with what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable
in the case before us ; then our ignorance is a satis-
factory answer ; because, some unknown relation,
or some unknown impossibility, may render what
is objected against, just and good ; nay good in
the highest practicable degree.

11. And how little weight is to be laid upon such
objections, will farther appear, by a more distinct
observation of some particular things contained in
the natural government of God, the like to which
may be supposed, from analogy, to be contained in
his moral government.

First, As in the scheme of the natural world, no
ends appear to be accomplished without means ; so
we find that means very undesirable, often conduce
to bring about ends in such a measure desirable, as
greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the
means. And in cases where such means are con-
ducive to such ends, it is not reason, but experience,
which shews us, that they are thus conducive.
Experience also shews many means to be conducive
and necessary to accomplish ends, which means, be-
fore experience, we should have thouglit, would have
had even a contrary tendency. Now from these

136 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,

observations relating to tlie natural sclieme of the
world, the moral being supposed analogous to it,
arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery
in each other's power to the degree it is, and making
men liable to vice to the degree we are ; and in
general, that those things which are objected against
the moral scheme of Providence, may be, upon the
whole, friendly and assistant to virtue, and pro-
ductive of an overbalance of happiness : i. e. the
things objected against may be means, by which an
overbalance of good will, in the end, be found pro-
duced. And from the same observations, it appears
to be no presumption against this, that we do not,
if indeed we do not, see those means to have any
such tendency ; or that they seem to us to have a
contrary one. Thus those things, which we call
irregularities, may not be so at all : because they
may be means of accomplishing wise and good ends
more considerable. And it may be added, as above ^,
that they may also be the only means, by which
these wise and good ends are capable of being ac-
complished.

After these observations it may be proper to add,
in order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion
from any of them, , that though the constitution of
our nature, from whence we are capable of vice and
misery, may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to
the perfection and happiness of the world ; and
though the actual permission of evil may be bene-
ficial to it : (i. e. it would have been more mis-
chievous, not that a wicked person had himself ab-
stained from his own wickedness, but that any one
had forcibly prevented it, than that it was per-
mitted :) yet notwithstanding, it might have been

t' P. 135-

A SCHEME INCOMPKEIIENSIBLE. 137

much better for the world, if this very evil had never
been done. Nay it is most clearly conceivable, that
the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial
to the world, and }'et, that it would be infinitely
more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus,
in the wise and good constitution of the natural
world, there are disorders which bring their own
cures ; diseases, which are themselves remedies.
Many a man would have died, had it not been for
the gout or a fever ; yet it would be thought mad-
ness to assert, that sickness is a better or more per-
fect state than health ; though the like, with regard
to the moral world, has been asserted. But,

Secondly, The natural government of the world is
carried on by general laws. For this there may be
wise and good reasons : the wisest and best, for
ought we know to the contrary. And that there
are such reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by
the analogy of nature : by our being made to ex-
perience good ends to be accomplished, as indeed
all the good which we enjoy is accomplished, by
this means, that the laws, by which the world is
governed, are general. For we have scarce any kind
of enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or
other, instrumental in procuring ourselves, by acting
in a manner which we foresee likely to procure them :
now this foresight could not be at all, were not the
government of the world carried on by general laws.
And though, for ought we know to the contrary,
every single case may be, at length, found to have
been provided for even by these : yet to prevent
all irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by
the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible
in the nature of things ; as we see it is absolutely
impossible in civil government. But then we are

138 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,

ready to think, that, the constitution of natiu^e re-
maining as it is, and the course of things being per-
mitted to go on, in other respects, as it does, there
might be interpositions to prevent irregularities ;
though they could not have been prevented or reme-
died by any general lav^s. And there would in-
deed be reason to wish, which, by the way, is very
different from a right to claim, that all iiTegularities
were prevented or remedied by present interpositions,
if these interpositions would have no other effect
than this. But it is plain they would have some
visible and immediate bad effects : for instance, they
would encourage idleness and neghgence ; and they
would render doubtful the natural rule of life, which
is ascertained by this very thing, that the course of
the world is carried on by general laws. And far-
ther, it is certain they would have distant effects,
and very great ones too ; by means of the wonderful
connections before mentioned"^. So that we cannot
as much as guess, what would be the whole result
of the interpositions desired. It may be said, any
bad result might be prevented by farther inter-
positions, whenever there was occasion for them :
but this again is talking quite at random, and in
the dark^^. Upon the whole then, we see wise
reasons, why the course of the world should be car-
ried on by general laws, and good ends accomplished
by this means : and, for ought we know, there may
be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends ac-
complished by it. We have no ground to believe,
that all irregularities could be remedied as they
arise, or could have been precluded, by general laws.
We find that interpositions would produce evil, and
prevent good : and, for ought we know, they would

<= P. 131, &c. <i P. 134-

A SCHEME IXCOMPKEHENSIBLE. 139

produce greater evil than they would prevent ; and
prevent greater good than they would produce. And
if this be the case, then the not interposing is so
far from being a ground of complaint, that it is an
instance of goodness. This is intelligible and suf-
ficient : and going farther, seems beyond the utmost
reach of our faculties.

But it may be said, that ' after all, these sup-
posed impossibilities and relations are what we are
unacquainted with; and we must judge of Eeligion,
as of other things, by what we do know, and look
upon the rest as nothing : or however, that the
answers here given to what is objected against
Religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate
the proof of it; since their stress lies so very much
upon our ignorance.' But,

First, though total ignorance in any matter does
indeed equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof
concerning it, and objections against it ; yet partial
ignorance does not. For we may in any degree be
convinced, that a person is of such a character, and
consequently will presume such ends ; though we are
greatly ignorant, what is the proper way of acting,
in order the most effectually to obtain tliose ends :
and in this case, objections against liis manner of
acting, as seemingly not conducive to obtain them,
might be answered by our ignorance ; though the
proof that such ends were intended, might not at
all be invalidated by it. Thus, the proof of Beligion
is a proof of the moral character of God, and con-
sequently that his government is moral, and that
every one upon the whole shall receive according to
his deserts ; a proof that this is the designed end
of his government. But we are not competent
judges, what is the proper way of acting, in order

140 THE GOVERNMENT OP GOD,

tlie most effectually to accomplish this end^. There-
fore our ignorance is an answer to objections against
the conduct of Providence, in permitting irregulari-
ties, as seemino; contradictorv to this end. Now,
since it is so obvious, that our ignorance may be a
satisfactory answer to objections against a thing, and
yet not affect the proof of it ; till it can be shewn, it
is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates
the proof of Rehgion, as it does the objections
against it.

Secondly, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and
unknown relations, might justly be urged to invali-
date the proof of Eeligion, as well as to answer
objections against it : and that, in consequence of
this, the proof of it were doubtful. Yet still, let
the assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it
is undeniably true, that moral obligations would
remain certain, though it were not certain what
would, upon the whole, be the consequences of ob-
serving or violating them. For, these obligations
arise immediately and necessarily from the judg-
ment of our own mind, unless jDcrverted, which we
cannot violate without being self-condemned. And
they would be certain too, from considerations of
interest. For though it were doubtfid, what will be
the future consequences of virtue and vice ; yet it
is, however, credible, that they may have those con-
sequences, which Religion teaches us they will : and
this credibility is a certain ^ obligation in point of
prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to live
in the conscientious practice of all that is good.
But,

Thirdly, The answers above given to the (objections
against Religion cannot equally be made use of to
c p. 8, 9. 1' Page 3 ; and part II. chap. vi.

A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 141

invalidate the proof of it. For, upon supposition
that God exercises a moral government over the
world, analogy does most strongly lead us to con-
clude, that this moral government must be a scheme,
or constitution, beyond our comprehension. And a
thousand particular analogies shew us, that parts of
such a scheme, from their relation to other parts,
may conduce to accomplish ends, wliich we should
have thought they had no tendency at all to accom-
plish : nay ends, which, before experience, we should
have thought such parts were contradictory to, and
had a tendency to prevent. And therefore all these
analogies shew, that the way of arguing made use
of in objecting against Religion is delusive : because
they shew it is not at all incredible, that, could we
comprehend the whole, we should find the permission
of the disorders objected against to be consistent with
justice and goodness ; and even to be instances of
them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of
Religion, as it is to the objections against it » ; and
therefore cannot invalidate that proof, as it does
these objections.

Lastly, From the observation now made, it is easy
to see, that the answers above given to the objec-
tions against Providence, though, in a general way
of speaking, they may be said to be taken from our
ignorance ; yet are by no means taken merely from
that, but from somewhat which analogy shews us
concerning it. For analogy shews us positively,
that our ignorance in the possiljilities of things, and
the various relations in nature, renders us incom-
petent judges, and leads us to false conclusions, in
cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge
and to object. So that the things above insisted

s Serm. at the Piulls. p. 312, 2d eil.

142 CONCLUSION.

upon are not mere suppositions of unknown impos-
sibilities and relations : but they are suggested to
our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation
of serious men, and rendered credible too, bv the
analogy of nature. And therefore, to take these
things into the account, is to judge by experience
and what w^e do know : and it is not judging so,
to take no notice of them.

CONCLUSION.

The observations of the last chapter lead us to
consider this little scene of human Hfe, in w'hich
we are so busily engaged, as having a reference, of
sort or other, to a much larger plan of things.
Whether we are, any way, related to the more dis-
tant parts of the boundless universe, into which w^e
are brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evi-
dent, that the course of things, which comes within
our view, is connected with somewhat, past, present,
and future, beyond it^^ So that we are placed, as
one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not a fixt
but a progressive one, every way incomprehensible:
incomprehensible, in a manner equally, with respect
to what has been, what now is, and what shall be
hereafter. And this scheme cannot but contain in
it somewhat as wonderful, and as much beyond our
thought and conception i, as any thing in that of
Religion. For, will any man in his senses say, that
it is less difficult to conceive, how the world came
to be and to continue as it is, without, than with,
an intelligent Author and Governor of it % or, admit-
ting an intelligent Governor of it, that there is

1' P. 131, &e. i See part II. chop, ii.

CONCLUSION. 143

some other rule of government more natural, and
of easier conception, than that which we call moral 1
Indeed, without an intelligent Author and Governor
of Nature, no account at all can be given, how this
universe, or the part of it particularly in which we
are concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be
carried on, as it is : nor any, of its general end and
design, without a moral Governor of it. That there
is an intelligent Author of Nature, and natural
Governor of the world, is a principle gone upon
in the foregoing treatise, as proved, and generally
known and confessed to be proved. And the very
notion of an intelligent Author of Nature, proved
by particular final causes, implies a will and a
character k. Now, as our whole nature, the nature
which he has given us, leads us to conclude his will
and character to be moral, just, and good : so we can
scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be other-
wise. However, in consequence of this his will and
character, whatever it be, he formed the universe
as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does,
rather than in any other manner ; and has assigned
to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a lot
in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and
enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains
allotted them, without any reflection. But one would
think it impossible, that creatures endued witli rea-
son could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this ;
reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least,
whither we are going ; and what the mysterious
scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves,
will at length come out and produce : a scheme in
which it is certain we are highly interested, and
in which we may be interested even beyond concep-

k P. 119.

144 COXCLUSIOX.

tion. For many things prove it palpably absurd to
conclude, that we shall cease to be, at death. Par-
ticular analogies do most sensibly shew us, that
there is nothing to be thought strange, in oiu' being
to exist in another state of life. And that we are
now living beings, affords a strong probability that
we shall continue so ; unless there be some positive
ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to
think death will destroy us. Were a persuasion of
this kind ever so well grounded, there would, surely,
be little reason to take pleasure in it. But indeed
it can have no other ground, than some such im-
agination, as that of our gross bodies being our-
selves ; which is contrary to experience. Experience
too most clearly shews us the folly of concluding,
from the body and the living agent affecting each
other mutual Iv, that the dissolution of the former
is the destruction of the latter. And there are re-
markable instances of their not affecting each other,
which lead us to a contraiy conclusion. The suppo-
sition then, which in all reason we are to go upon,
is, that our living nature will continue after death.
And it is infinitely unreasonable to forai an institu-
tion of life, or to act, upon any other supposition.
Now all expectation of immortality, whether more
or less certain, opens an unbounded prospect to our
hopes and our fears : since we see the constitution of
nature is such, as to admit ofmisery, as well as to be
prodvictive of happiness, and experience ourselves to
partake of both in some degree ; and since we cannot
but know, what higher degrees of both we are capable
of. And there is no presumption against believing
farther, that our future interest depends u]3on our
present behaviour : for we see our present interest
doth ; and that the happiness and misery, which

CONCLUSION. 1 45

are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently
do not follow, till long after the actions are done, to
which they are respectively annexed. So that were
speculation to leave us uncertain, w^iether it were
likely, that the Author of Nature, in giving happi-
ness and misery to his creatures, hath regard to
their actions or not : yet, since we find by experience
that he hath such regard, the whole sense of things
which he has given us, plainly leads us, at once and
without any elaborate inquiries, to think, that it
may, indeed must, be to good actions chiefly that he
hath annexed happiness, and to bad actions misery;
or that he will,, upon the whole, reward those who do
well, and punish those who do evil. To confirm this
from the constitution of the world, it has been ob-
served, that some sort of moral government is neces-
sarily implied in that natural government of God,
which we experience ourselves under : that good and
bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded and
punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to
societv, but also as virtuous and vicious : and that
there is, in the very nature of the thing, a tendency
to their being rewarded and punished in a much
higher degree than they are at present. And though
this higher degree of distributive justice, which
nature thus points out and leads towards, is pre-
vented for a time from taking place ; it is by obsta-
cles, which the state of this world unhappily throws
in its way, and which therefore are in tlieir nature
temporary. Now, as these things in the natural
conduct of Providence are observable on the side
of virtue ; so there is nothing to be set against them
on the side of vice. A moral scheme of government
then is visibly estabhshed, and, in some degree, car-
ried into execution : and this, together with the

BUTLER, AXALOGY. L

146 co^'CLUSIO^^

essential tendencies of virtue and vice duly con-
sidered, naturally raise in us an apprehension, that it
will be earned on farther towards perfection in a
future state, and that every one shall there receive
according to his deserts. And if this be so, then
our future and general interest, under the moral
government of God, is appointed to depend upon
our behaviour; notwithstanding the difficulty, which
this may occasion, of securing it, and the danger of
losing it : just in the same manner as our temporal
interest, under liis natural government, is appointed
to depend upon oiu- behaviour ; notwithstanding the
like difficulty and danger. For, from our original
constitution, and that of the world which we inhabit,
we are naturally trusted with ourselves ; with our
own conduct and our own interest. And from
the same constitution of nature, especially joined
with that course of things which is owing to men,
we have temptations to be unfaithful in this trust ;
to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run our-
selves into misery and ruin. From these temptations
arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our
temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as
to miscarry in it. There is therefore nothing incredi-
ble in supposing there may be the like difficulty and
hazard with regard to that chief and final good, which
Religion lays before us. Indeed the whole account, how
it came to pass that we were placed in such a condition
as this, must be beyond our comprehension. But it
is in piirt accounted for by what Religion teaches us,
that the character of virtue and piety must be a
necessary qualification for a future state of security
and happiness, under the moral government of God ;
in like manner, as some certain qualifications or other
are necessary for every particular condition of life,

CONCLUSION. 147

imder his natural government : and that the present
state was intended to be a school of discipline, for
improving in ourselves that character. Now this
intention of nature is rendered higlily credible by
observing ; that we are plainly made for improve-
ment of all kinds : that it is a general appointment of
Providence, that we cultivate practical principles, and
form within ourselves habits of action, in order to
become fit for what we were whollv unfit for before :
that in particular, childhood and youth is naturally
appointed to be a state of discipline for mature
age : and that the present world is peculiarly fitted
for a state of moral discipline. And, whereas ob-
jections are urged against the whole notion of moral
government and a probation-state, from the opinion
of Necessity ; it has been shown, that God has given
us the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all ob-
jections against ReHgion, on this head, are vain and
delusive. He has also, in his natural government,
suggested an answer to all our shortsighted objec-
tions, against the equity and goodness of his moral
government ; and in general he has exemplified to us
the latter by the former.

These things, w^hich, it is to be remembered, are
matters of fact, ought, in all common sense, to
awaken mankind ; to induce them to consider in
earnest their condition, and what they have to do.
It is absurd, absurd to the degree of being ridiculous,
if the subject were not of so serious a kind, for men to
think themselves secure in a vicious fife ; or even in
that immoral thoughtlessness, which far the greatest
part of them are fallen into. And the credibility of
Religion, arising from experience and facts here con-
sidered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to engage them
to five in the general practice of all virtue and piety;

L 2

148 CONCLUSION.

under the serious apprehension, though it should be
mixed with some doubt ^, of a righteous administra-
tion estabhshed in nature, and a future judgment in
consequence of it : especially when we consider, how
very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can
be gained by vice ^ ; how unquestionably little, as
well as precarious, the pleasures and profits of it are
at the best ; and how soon they must be parted with
at the longest. For, in the deliberations of reason,
concerning what we are to pursue and what to avoid,
as temptations to any thing from mere passion are
supposed out of the case : so inducements to vice,
from cool expectations of pleasure and interest so
small and uncertain and short, are really so insigni-
ficant, as, in the view of reason, to be almost nothing
in themselves ; and in comparison with the import-
ance of Religion, they quite disappear and are lost.
Mere passion indeed may be alleged, though not as a
reason, yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of life.
And how sorry an excuse it is, will be manifest by
observing, that we are placed in a condition, in which
we are unavoidably inured to govern our passions, by
being necessitated to govern them : and to lay our-
selves- under the same kind of restraints, and as great
ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue and piety,
in the ordinary course of things, require. The plea
of ungovernable passion then, on the side of vice, is
the poorest of all things ; for it is no reason, and
but a poor excuse. But the proper motives to Re-
ligion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral
nature, from the presages of conscience, and our
natural apprehension of God under the character of
a righteous Governor and Judge; a nature and

1 Part II. ch. vi. ™ P. 50.

CONCLUSION. 149

conscience and apprehension given us by him ;
and from the confirmation of the dictates of reason,
by life and immortality hrought to light hy the
Gospel; and the ivrath of God revealed from
heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteous-
ness of men.

THE END OF THE FIRST PART.

THE

ANALOGY or RELIGION

TO THE

CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

PART II.

OF REVEALED RELIGION.

CHAP. I.

Of the imjjortance of Christianity.

C OME persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of
the"!igTit of natiu-e, avowedly reject all revelation
as, in its very notion, incredible, and what must be
fictitious. And indeed it is certain, no revelation
would have been given, had the light of nature been
sufficient in such a sense, as to render one not want-
ing and useless. But no man, in seriousness and
simplicity of mind, can possibly think it so, who
considers the state of ReUgion in the heathen world
before revelation, and its present state in those places
which have borrowed no light from it : particularly,
the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men, con-
cerning things of the utmost importance, as well
as the natural inattention and ignorance of mankind
in general. It is impossible to say, who would have
been able to have reasoned out that whole system,
which we call natural Religion, in its genuine sim-
pHcity, clear of superstition : but there is certainly

152 OF THE IMPORTANCE

no ground to affirm that the generahty could. If
they could, there is no sort of probability that they
would. Admitting there were, they would highly
want a standing admonition to remind them of it,
and inculcate it upon them. And farther still, were
they as much disposed to attend to Religion, as the
better sort of men are ; yet even upon this suppo-
sition, there would be various occasions for super-
natural instruction and assistance, and the greatest
advantages might be aflPorded by them. So that
to say revelation is a thing superfluous, what there
was no need of, and what can be of no service, is,
I think, to talt quite wildly and at random. Nor
would it be more extravagant to affirm, that man-
kind is so entirely at ease in the present state, and
life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction
to suppose our condition capable of being, in any
respect, better.

There are other persons, not to be ranked with
these, who seem to be getting into a way of neglect-
ing, and, as it were, overlooking revelation, as of
small importance, provided natural Keligion be kept
to. With little regard either to the evidence of the
former, or to the objections against it, and even upon
supposition of its truth ; " the only design of it,"
say they, " must be, to establish a belief of the moral
system of nature, and to enforce the practice of
natural piety and virtue. The belief and practice
of these things were, perhaps, much promoted by
the first j)nblication of Christianity : but whether
they are believed and practised, upon the evidence
and motives of nature or of revelation, is no great
matter'^." This way of considering revelation, though

* Invenis multos — propterea nolle fieri Christiauos, quia quasi
sufficiuut sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid

OF CHKISTIANITY. 153

it is not the same with the former, yet borders nearly
upon it, and very much, at length, runs up into it :
and requires to be particularly considered, with re-
gard to the persons who seem to be getting into this
way. The consideration of it will likewise farther
shew the extravagance of tlie former opinion, and
the truth of the observations in answer to it, just
mentioned. And an inquiry into the Importance of
Christianity, cannot be an improper introduction to
a treatise concenimg the credibihty of it.

Now if God has given a revelation to mankind,
and commanded those things which are commanded
in Christianity; it is evident, at first sight, that it
cannot in any Avise be an indifferent matter, whether
we obey or disobey those commands : unless we are
certainly assured, that we laiow all the reasons for
them, and that all those reasons are now ceased,
with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves
in particular. And it is absolutely impossible we
can be assured of this. For our ignorance of these
reasons proves nothing in the case : since the whole
analogy of nature shews, what is indeed in itself
evident, that there may be infinite reasons for things,
with which we are not acquainted.

But the importance of Christianity will more dis-
tinctly apjiear, by considering it more distinctly:
first, as a republication, and external institution, of
natural or essential Religion, adapted to the present
circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote
natural piety and virtue : and secondly, as containing

mihi prsecepturus est Christus ] Ut bene vivani 1 Jam bene vivo.
Quid inilii laecessarius est Christus 1 Nullum bomicidium, nullum
furtum, nullam rapinam t'acio, res alieuas non concupisco, nullo
adulterio contaminor. Nam inveuiatur in vita mea aliquid quod
repreliendatur, et qui reprelienderit faciat Cbristianum. Auff. in
Psal. xxxi.

154 OF THE IMPORTANCE

an account of a dispensation of things not discover-
able by reason, in consequence of which, several
distinct precepts are enjoined us. For though natural
Rehgion is the foundation and principal part of
Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it.

I. Christianity is a republication of natural Eeli-
gion. It instructs mankind in the moral system of
the world : that it is the work of an infinitely per-
fect Being, and under his government ; that virtue
is his law; and that he will finally judge mankind
in righteousness, and render to all according to their
works, in a future state. And, which is very ma-
terial, it teaches natural Eeligion in its genuine
simplicity; free from those superstitions, with which
it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in
a manner lost.

Revelation is farther, an authoritative publication
of natural Religion, and so afibrds the evidence of
testimony for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles
and prophecies recorded in Scripture, were intended
to prove a particular dispensation of Providence,
the redemption of the world by the Messiah : but
this does not hinder, but that they may also prove
God's general providence over the world, as oiu^
moral Governor and Judge. And they evidently
do prove it ; because this character of the Author
of Nature, is necessarily connected with and implied
in that particular revealed dispensation of things :
it is likewise continually taught expressly, and in-
sisted upon, by those persons who wrought the
miracles and dehvered the prophecies. So that in-"
deed natural Religion seems as much proved by
the Scripture revelation, as it would have been, had
the design of revelation been nothing else than to
prove it.

OF CHRISTIANITY. 155

But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles
can prove natural Religion ; and notable objections
may be iirged against this proof of it, considered
as a matter of speculation : but considered as a
practical thing, there can be none. For suppose a
person to teach natui'al Eeligion to a nation, who
had hved in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it ;
and to declare he was commissioned by God so to
do : suppose him, in proof of Ms commission, to fore-
tell things future, which no human foresight could
have guessed at ; to divide the sea w4tli a word ;
feed gTeat multitudes with bread from heaven ; cure
all manner of diseases ; and raise the dead, even
himself, to life : would not this give additional, cre-
dibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what
that of a common man would have ; and be an au-
thoritative publication of the law of nature, i.e. a
new proof of it 1 It w^ ould be a practical one, of
the strongest kind, perhaps, which human creatiu-es
are capable of having given them, The Law of
Moses then, and the Gospel of Ckrist, are authori-
tative publications of the religion of nature ; they
afford a proof of God's general pro\ddence, as moral
Governor of the world, as w^ell as of his particular
dispensations of providence towards sinful creatures,
revealed in the Law and the Gospel. As they are
the only evidence of the latter, so they are an ad-
ditional evidence of the former.

To shew this further, let us suppose a man of
the greatest and most improved capacity, who had
never heard of revelation, convinced upon tlie whole,
notwithstanding the disorders of the world, that it
was under the direction and moral government
of an infinitely perfect Being ; but ready to ques-
tion, whether he were not got beyond the reach

156 OF THE IMPORTANCE

of Lis faculties : suppose him brought, by this sus-
picion, into great danger of being carried away by
the universal bad example of almost every one around
him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical
sense at least, of these things: and this, perhaps,
would be as advantageous a situation with regard to
Religion, as nature alone ever placed any man in.
What a confinnation now must it be to such a person,
all at once, to find, that this moral system of things
was revealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite
Bemg, whom he had from principles of reason be-
lieved in : and that the pubHshers of the revelation
proved their commission from him, by making it ap-
pear, that he had intrusted them with a power of
suspending and changing the general laws of nature.

Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a
thing of the utmost importance, that life and immor-
tality are eminently brought to light by the Gospel.
The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a
course of wickedness, and the eflScacy of repentance,
are not only confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught,
especially the last is, wnth a degree of light, to which
that of nature is but darkness.

Farther : As Christianity served these ends and
purposes, when it was first pubhshed, by the mira-
culous publication itself; so it was intended to serve
the same purposes in future ages, by means of the
settlement of a visible church : of a society, dis-
tinguished from common ones, and from the rest of
the world, by peculiar religious institutions ; by an
instituted method of instruction, and an instituted
form of external Religion. Miraculous powers were
given to the first preachers of Christianity, in order
to their introducing it into the world : a visible
church was established, in order to continue it, and

OF CHRISTIANITY. 157

carry it on successively tliroiighout all ages. Had
Moses and the Prophets, Christ and his Apostles,
only taught, and by miracles proved, Eeligion to
their contemporaries; the benefits of their instruc-
tions would have reached but to a small part of man-
kind. Christianity must have been, in a great de-
gree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To prevent
this, appears to have been one reason why a visible
church was instituted : to be, like a city upon a hill,
a standing memorial to the world of the duty which
we owe our Maker : to call men continually, both by
example and instruction, to attend to it, and, by the
form of Religion, ever before their eyes, remind them
of the reahty : to be the repository of the oracles of
God : to hold up the light of revelation in aid to
that of nature, and propagate it throughout all
generations to the end of the w^orld — the light of
revelation, considered here in no other view, than as
designed to enforce natural Religion. And in pro-
portion as Christianity is professed and taught in the
world, ReUgion, natural or essential Religion, is thus
distmctly and advantageously laid before mankind,
and brought again and again to their thoughts, as a
matter of infinite importance. A \T.sible church has
also a farther tendency to promote natural Religion,
as being an instituted method of education, originally
intended to be of more pecrdiar advantage to those
who would conform to it. For one end of the insti-
tution was, that by admonition and reproof, as well as
instruction ; by a general regular discipline, and
public exercises of Religion; the hochj of Christ, as
the Scripture speaks, should be edified; i. e. trained
up in piety and virtue for a higher and better state.
This settlement then appearing thus beneficial ; tend-
ing in the nature of the thing to answer, and in some

158 OF THE IMPORTANCE

degree actually answering, those ends ; it is to be
remembered, that the very notion of it implies posi-
tive institutions; for the visibility of the church con-
sists in them. Take away every thing of this kind,
and you lose the very notion itself. So that if the
things now mentioned are advantages, the reason
and importance of positive institutions in general is
most obvious ; since without them these advantages
coidd not be secured to the world. And it is mere
idle wantonness, to insist upon knowing the reasons,
why such particular ones were fixed upon rather than
others.

The benefit arismg from this supernatural assist-
ance, which Christianity affords to natural KeHgion,
is what some persons are very slow in apprehending.
And yet it is a thing distinct in itself, and a very
plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest
really say, that the bulk of mankind in the heathen
world were in as advantageous a situation with
regard to natural Religion, as they are now amongst
us : that it was laid before them, and enforced upon
them, in a manner as distinct, and as much tending
to influence then.- practice 1

The objections against all this, from the perversion
of Christianity, and from the supposition of its having
had but little good influence, however innocently they
may be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as
conclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead to
downright Atheism : because the manifestation of the
law of nature by reason, which, upon all principles of
Theism, must have been from God, has been per-
verted and rendered inefiectual in the same mamier.
It may indeed, I think, truly be said, that the good
effects of Christianity have not been small ; nor its
supposed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly

OF CHRISTIANITY. 159

speaking. Perhaps too the things themselves done
have been aggravated ; and if not, Christianity hath
been often only a pretence ; and the same evils in the
main would have been done upon some other pre-
tence. However, great and shocking as the corrup-
tions and abuses of it have really been, they cannot
be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon prin-
ciples of Theism. For one cannot proceed one step
in reasoning iipon natural Religion, any more than
upon ChrLstianity, without laying it down as a first
principle, that the dispensations of Providence are
not to be judged of by their perversions, but by their
genuine tendencies : not by Avhat they do actually
seem to effect, but by what they would effect, if man-
kind did theii' part ; that part which is justly put
and left upon them.' It is altogether as much the
language of one as of the other ; He that is unjust ^
let him he unjust still : and he that is holy, let him he
holy still ^. The light of reason does not, any more
than that of revelation, force men to submit to its
authority ; both admonish them of what they ought
to do and avoid, together with the consequences of
each; and after this, leave them at full liberty to
act just as they please, till the appointed time of
judgment. Ever)' moment's experience shews, that
this is God's general ride of government.

To return then : Christianity being a promulgation
of the law of nature; being moreover an authorita-
tive promidgation of it ; with new light, and other
circumstances of peculiar advantage, adapted to the
wants of mankind; these things fully shew its import-
ance. And it is to be observed farther, that as the
nature of the case requires, so all Christians are com-
manded to contribute, by their profession of Christi-

^ Rev. xxii. ii.

160 OF THE IMPORTANCE

anity, to preserve it in the world, and render it such
a promulgation and enforcement of Religion. For it
is the very scheme of the Gospel, that each Christian
should, in his degree, contribute towards continuing
and carrying it on : all by uniting in the public pro-
fession and external practice of Christianity ; some
by instructing, by having the oversight and taking
care of this religious community, the Church of God.
Now this farther shews the importance of Christi-
anity; and, which is what I chiefly intend, its im-
portance in a practical sense : or the high obligations
we are under, to take it into our most serious con-
sideration; and the danger there must necessarily be,
not only in treating it despitefully, which I am not
now speaking of, but in disregarding and neglecting
it. For this is neglecting to do what is expressly
enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the
world, and transmitting them down to future times.
And all this holds, even though the only thing to be
considered in Christianity were its subserviency to
natural Religion. But,

II. Christianity is to be considered in a further
view; as containing an account of a dispensation of
things, not at all discoverable by reason, in con-
sequence of which several distinct precepts are en-
joined us. Christianity is not only an external insti-
tution of natural Religion, and a new promulgation
of God's general providence, as righteous Governor
and Judge of the world; but it contains also a
revelation of a particular dispensation of Providence,
carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the recovery
and salvation of mankind, who are represented in
Scripture to be in a state of ruin. And in con-
sequence of this revelation being made, we are com-
manded to he haptized, not only in the name of the

OF CHRISTIANITY. 161

Father, but also, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost:
aud other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the
Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the im-
portance of these duties may be judged of, by ob-
serving that they arise, not from positive command
merely, but also from the offices, which appear, from
Scripture, to belong to those divine persons in the
Gospel dispensation ; or from the relations, which, we
are there informed, they stand in to us. By reason is
revealed the relation which God the Father stands in
to us. Hence arises the obHgation of duty which we
are under to him. In Scriptm:e are revealed the
relations which the Son and Holy Spii'it stand in to
us. "Hence arise the obligations of duty which we
are under to them. The truth of the case, as one
may speak, m each of these three respects being ad-
mitted: that God is the governor of the world, upon
the evidence of reason; that Christ is the mediator
between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide
and sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation : the
truth of the case, I say, in each of these respects
being admitted ; it is no more a question, why it
should be commanded, that we be baptized in the
name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that
we be baptized in the name of the Father. This
matter seems to require to be more fully stated*^.

Let it be remembered then, that Religion comes
under the twofold consideration of internal and ex-
ternal : for the latter is as real a part of Religion, of
true Religion, as the former. Now when Religion is
considered under the first notion, as an mward i)riii-
ciple, to be exerted in such and such inward acts of
the mind and heart ; the essence of natural Rehgion

c See the Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sacni-
ments, &c., aud CoUiber of revealed Religion, as there quoted.

BUTLER, ANALOGY. M

\^

162 OF THE IMPORTANCE

may be said to consist in religious regards to God the
Father Almighty : and the essence of revealed Keli-
gion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in
rehgious regards to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.
And the obligation we are under, of paying these
religious regards to each of these Divine persons
respectively, arises from the respective relations
which they each stand m to us. How these relations
are made known, whether by reason or revelation,
makes no alteration in the case : because the duties
arise out of the relations themselves, not out of the
manner in which we are informed of them. The Son
and Spirit have each his proper office in that great
dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the
world ; the one our mediator, the other our sanctifier.
Does not then the duty of religious regards to both
these Divine persons, as immediately arise, to the
view of reason, out of the verv nature of these offices
and relations ; as the inward good-will and kind
intention, which we ow^e to our fellow-creatures, arises
out of the common relations between us and them?
But it will be asked, " What are the inward rehgious
regards, appearing thus obviously due to the Son and
Holy Spirit ; as arising, not merely from command in
Scriptiire, but from the very natui'e of the revealed
relations, which they stand in to us 1 " I answer, the
religious regards of reverence, honour, love, trust,
gratitude, fear, hope. In what external manner this
inward worship is to be expressed, is a matter of
pure revealed command ; as perhaps the external
manner, in which God the Father is to be w^or-
shipped, may be more so, than we are ready to think :
but the worship, the internal worship itself, to the
Son and Hol}^ Ghost, is no fartlier matter of pure
revealed command, than as the relations they stand

OF CHRISTIANITY. 163

in to us are matter of pure revelation : for the rela-
tions being known, the obligations to such internal .
worship are obligations of reason, arising out of those \
relations themselves. In short, the history of the
Gospel as immediately shews us the reason of these
obligations, as it shews us the meaning of the words,
Son and Holy Ghost.

If this account of the Christian Eeligion be just ;
those persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little
consequence, provided natural religion be kept to,
plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is pecu-
liarly so called, as distinguished from natural Re-
ligion, has yet somewhat very important, even of a
moral nature. For the office of our Lord being made
known, and the relation he stands in to us, the obli-
gation of rehgious regards to him is plainly moral,
as much as charity to mankind is ; since this obliga-
tion arises, before external command, immediately
out of that his office and relation itself. Those
persons appear to forget, that revelation is to be
considered, as informing us of somewhat new, in
the state of mankind, and in the government of
the world : as acquainting us with some relations we
stand ill, which could not otherwise have been
known. And these relations being real, (though be-
fore revelation we could be under no obligations from
them, yet upon their being revealed,) there is no
reason to think, but that neglect of behaving suitably
to them will be attended with the same kind of con-
sequences under God's government, as neglecting to
behave suitably to any other relations made kno\vn
to us by reason. And ignorance, whether unavoid-
able or voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, will,
just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case
as in the other : the ignorance being supposed

M 2

164 OF THE IMPORTANCE

equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both
cases.

If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between
God and man, i.e. if Christianity be true ; if he be
indeed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God ; no one
can say, what may follow, not only the obstinate,
but the careless disregard to him, in those high re-
lations. Nay no one can say, what may follow such
disregard, even in the way of natural consequence •*.
For, as the natural consequences of vice in this life
are doubtless to be considered as judicial punish-
ments inflicted by God ; so likewise, for ought we
know, the judicial punishments of the future life
may be, in a Hke way or a like sense, the natural
consequence of vice^ : of men's violating or disregard-
ing the relations which God has placed them in here,
and made known to them.

Again : If mankind are corrupted and depraved in
their moral character, and so are unfit for that state,
which Christ is gone to prej)are for his disciples ;
and if the assistance of God's Spirit be necessary to
renew their nature, in the degree requisite to their
being qualified for that state ; all which is impHed
in the express, though figurative declaration. Except
a man he horn of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the
hingdom of God^ : supposing this, is it possible any
serious person can think it a slight matter, whether
or no he makes use of the means, expressly com-
manded by God, for obtaining this Divine assistance ?
especially since the whole analogy of nature shews,
that we are not to expect any benefits without
making use of the appointed means for obtaining or
enjoying them. Now reason shews us nothing, of
the particular immediate means of obtaining either \

^ P- 32, 33. *^ Chap. V. f John iii. 5.

OF CHIUSTIANITY. 165

1 temporal or spiritual benefits. This therefore we
must learn, either from experience or revelation.
And experience, the present case does not admit of.

The conclusion from all this evidently is, that,
Christianity being supposed either true or credible,
it_js_jinspeakable irreverence, and really the most
presumptuous rashness^ to treat it as a Hght matter.
It can never justly be esteemed of little consequence,
^ill it be positively supposed false. Nor do I know
a hio;her and more important obligation which we
are under, than that of examining most seriously
into the evidence of it, supposing its credibility ; and
of embracing it, upon supposition of its truth.

The two following deductions may be proper to
be added, in order to illustrate the foregoing ob-
servations, and to prevent their being mistaken.

First, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the
distinction between what is positive and what is
moral in Religion. Moral ^)>Tcej:)f5 are precepts, the
reasons of which we see : positive j9>*ec(?29^s are pre-
cepts, the reasons of which we do not see s. Moral
duties arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior
to external command. Positive duties do not arise
out of the nature of the case, but from external
command ; nor would tliey be duties at all, were
it not for such command, received from hi in whose
creatures and subjects we are. But the manner in
which the nature of the case, or the fact of the

?, This is the distinction between moi-al and positive precepts
considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have
somewhat of a moral nature, we may sec the reason of them, con-
sidered in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some
respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they are alike,
we discern the reasons of both ; so far as they are different, w^e
discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See
p. 156, &c.. and J 66.

166 OF THE IMPORTANCE

relation, is made known, this doth not denominate
any duty either positive or moral. That we be
baptized in the name of the Father, is as much a
positive duty, as that we be baptized in the name
of the Son ; because both arise equally from revealed
command ; though the relation which we stand
in to God the Father is made known to us by
reason ; the relation we stand in to Christ, by
revelation only. On the other hand, the dispensa-
tion of the Gospel admitted, gratitude as imme-
diately becomes due to Christ, from his being the
voluntary minister of this dispensation, as it is
due to God the Father, from his being the foun-
tain of all good ; though the first is made known
to us by revelation only, the second by reason.
Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness sake,
it may be worth mentioning, that positive institu-
tions come under a twofold consideration. They are
either institutions founded on natural Eeligion, as
Baptism in the name of the Father ; though this
has also a particular reference to the Gospel dis-
pensation, for it is in the name of God, as the
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ : or they are ex-
ternal institutions founded on revealed Eelioion :
as Baptism in the name of the Son and of the
Holy Ghost.

Secondly, From the distinction between what is
moral and what is positive in Beligion, appears the
ground of that peculiar reference, which the Scrip-
ture teaches us to be due to the former.

The reason of positive institutions in general is
very obvious ; though we should not see the reason,
why such particular ones are pitched upon rather
than others. Whoever therefore, instead of cavilling
at words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly

OF CHIUSTIANITV. 107

see, that positive institutions in general, as distin-
guished from this or that parti cuhir one, have the
nature of moral commands ; since the reasons of
them appear. Thus, for instance, the external wor-
ship of God is a moral duty, though no particular
mode of it be so. Care then is to be taken, when
a comparison is made between positive and moral
duties, that they be compared no farther than as
they are different ; no farther than as the former
are positive, or arise out of mere external command,
the reasons of which we are not acquainted with ;
and as the latter are moral, or arise out of the ap-
parent reason of the case, without such external
command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall
run into endless confusion.

Now this being premised, suppose two standing
precepts enjoined by the same authority; that, in
certain conjunctiures, it is impossible to obey both ;
that the former is moral, i. e. a precept of which we
see the reasons, and that they hold in the particular
case before us ; but that the latter is positive, i. e.
a precept of which we do not see the reasons : it
is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the
former; because there is an apparent reason for this
preference, and none against it. Farther, positive
institutions, I suppose all those which Chrislianity
enjoins, are means to a moral end : and the end must
be acknowledged more excellent than tlie means.
Nor is observance of these institutions any religious
obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as
it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to
be the strict logical way of stating and determining
this matter ; but will, peihaps, l)e fnuid less a})pli-
cable to practice, than may Ije thought at first
sight.

168 OF THE IMPORTANCE

And therefore, in a more practical, though more lax
way of consideration, and taking the words, moral
law and positive institutions, in the popular sense ; I
add, that the whole moral law is as much matter of
revealed command, as positive institutions are : for
the Scripture enjoins every moral virtue. In this
respect then they are both upon a level. But the
moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts ;
interwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain
intimation of the Author of it, which is to be pre-
ferred, when they interfere.

But there is not altogether so much necessity for
the determination of tliis question, as some persons
seem to think. Nor are we left to reason alone to
determine it. For, first, Though mankind have, in
all ages, been greatly prone to place their religion
in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for
obedience to moral precepts ; yet, without making any
comparison at all between them, and consequently
without determining which is to have the prefer-
ence, the nature of the thing abundantly shews all
notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of
true Religion : as they are, moreover, contrary to
the whole general tenor of Scripture; and likewise
to the most express particular declarations of it, that
nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral
virtue. Secondly, Upon the occasion of mentioning
together positive and moral duties, the Scripture
always puts the stress of Religion upon the latter,
and never upon the former : which, though no sort
of allowance to neglect the former, when they do not
interfere with the latter, yet is a plain intimation,
that when they do, the latter are to be preferred.
And farther, as mankind are for placing the stress
of their religion any where, rather than upon virtue ;

OF CHRISTIANITY. 1G9

lest both the reason of the thing, and the general
spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation
now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this
prevalent folly: our Lord himself, from whose com-
mand alone the obligation of positive institutions
arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison
between them and moral precepts ; when the Pha-
risees censured him, for eating with publicans and
sinners ; and also when they censured his disciples,
for plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath-day.
Upon this comparison, he has determmed expressly,
and in form, which shall have the preference when
they interfere. And by delivering his authoritative
determination in a proverbial manner of expression,
he has made it general : I will have mercy, and not
sacrifice ^. The propriety of the word py^^overbial is
not the thing insisted upon : though I think the
manner of speaking is to be called so. But that
the manner of speaking very remarkably renders the
determination general, is surely indisputable. For,
had it, in the latter case, been said only, that God
preferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sab-
bath ; even then, by parity of reason, most justly
might we have argued, that he preferred mercy
likewise, to the observance of other ritual institu-
tions ; and in general, moral duties, to positive
ones. And thus the determination would liave been
general ; though its being so were inferred and not
expressed. But as the passage really stands in the
Gospel, it is much stronger. For the sense and the
very literal words of our Lord's answer are as appli-
cable to any other instance of a comparison, between
positive and moral duties, as to this upon which
they were spoken. And if, in case of competition,

1' Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7.

170 OF THE IMPORTANCE

mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions, it
will scarce be thought, that justice is to give place
to them. It is remarkable too, that, as the words
are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are
introduced, on both the forementioned occasions,
with a declaration, that the Pharisees did not under-
stand the meaning of them. This, I say, is very
remarkable. For, since it is scarce possible, for the
most ignorant person, not to understand the literal
sense of the passage, in the Prophet ' ; and since
understanding the literal sense would not have pre-
vented their condemning the guiltless ^ ; it can hardly
be doubted, that the thing which our Lord really
intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees
had not learnt from it, as they might, wherein the
general spirit of Religion consists : that it consists
in moral piety and virtue, as distinguished from
forms, and ritual observances. However, it is certain
we may learn this from his Divine application of
the passage, in the Grospel.

But, as it is one of the pecuUar w^eaknesses of
human, nature, when, upon a comparison of two
things, one is found to be of greater importance
than the other, to consider this other as of scarce
any importance at all : it is highly necessary that we
remind ourselves, how great presumption it is, to
make light of any institutions of Divine appoint-
ment ; that our obiiofations to obev all God's com-
mands whatever are absolute and indispensable ; and
that commands merely positive, admitted to be from
him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them :
an obligation moral in the strictest and most proper
sense.

To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the
Rosea vi. k See Matth. xii. 7.

OF CHinSTIANlTV. 171

account now given of Christianity most strongly
shews and enforces upon us the obligation of search-
ing the Scriptures, in order to see, what the scheme
of revelation really is ; instead of determining before-
hand, from reason, what the scheme of it must heV.
Indeed if in revelation there be found any passages,
the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural
Eeligion ; we may most certainly conclude, such
seeming meaning not to be the real one. But it is
not any degree of a presumption against an inter-
pretation of Scriptiu-e, that such interpretation con-
tains a doctrine, wliich the light of nature cannot
discover ^ ; or a precept, which the law of nature
does not obhge to.

CHAP. II.

Of the supposed presumption agamst a revelation, considered

as miraculous.

Having shewn the importance of the Christian re-
velation, and the obligations which we are under
seriously to attend to it, upon supposition of its
truth, or its credibility: the next thing in order, is
to consider the supposed presumptions against reve-
lation in general; which shall be the subject of this
chapter : and the objections against the Christian in
particular ; which shall be the subject of some follow-
ing ones^. For it seems the most natural method,
to remove these prejudices against Christianity, be-
fore we proceed to the consideration of the positive
evidence for it, and the objections against that evi-
dence ^\

y See chap. iii. ^ P. 172, 173. « Ch. iii, iv, v, vi. '-• Ch. vii.

172 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION

It is, I think, commonlv supposed, that there is
some pecuUar presumption, from the analogy of
nature, against the Christian scheme of things ; at
least against miracles ; so as that stronger evidence
is necessary to prove the truth and reahty of them,
than would be sufficient to convince us of other
events, or matters of fact. Indeed the consideration
of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought
very insignificant, by many j)ersons. Yet, as it
belongs to the subject of this Treatise; so it may
tend to open the mind, and remove some prejudices:
however needless the consideration of it be, upon its
own account.

I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the
analogy of nature, against the general scheme of
Christianity, that God created and invisibly governs
the world by Jesus Christ ; and by him also will
hereafter judge it in righteousness, i. e. render to
every one according to his works ; and that good
men are under the secret influence of his Spirit.
Whether these things are, or are not, to be called
miraculous, is, perhaps, only a question about words ;
or however, is of no moment in the case. If the
analogy of nature raises any presumption against
this general scheme of Christianity, it must be, either
because it is not discoverable by reason or experi-
ence ; or else, because it is unlike that course of
nature, which is. But analogy raises no presumption
against the truth of this scheme, upon either of these
accounts.

First, There is no presumption, from analogy,
against the truth of it, upon account of its not being
discoverable by reason or experience. For suppose
one who never heard of revelation, of the most
improved understanding, and acquainted with our

AGAINST MIRACLES. 173

whole system of natural philosophy and natural
religion : such an one could not but be sensible,
that it was but a very small part of the natural
and moral system of the universe, which he was
acquainted with. He could not but be sensible, that
there must be innumerable things, in the dispensa-
tions of Providence past, in the invisible government
over the world at present carrying on, and in what is
to come ; of which he was wholly ignorant <', and
which could not be discovered without revelation.
Whether the scheme of nature be, in the strictest
sense, infinite or not ; it is evidently vast, even be-
yond all possible imagination. And doubtless that
part of it, which is opened to our view, is but as
a point, in comparison of the whole plan of Provi-
dence, reaching throughout eternity past and future ;
in comparison of what is even now going on in the
remote parts of the boundless universe ; nay in com-
parison of the whole scheme of this world. And
therefore, that things lie beyond the natural reach
of our faculties, is no sort of presumption against
the truth and reality of them: because it is certain,
there are innumerable things, in the constitution and
government of the universe, which are thus beyond
the natiu^al reach of our faculties. Secondly, Analogy
raises no presumption against any of the things con-
tained in this general doctrine of Scripture now
mentioned, upon account of their being unlike the
known course of nature. For there is no presump-
tion at all from analogy, that the irhole course of
things, or Divine government, naturally unknown to
us, and everi/ thing in it, is like to any thing in that
which is known ; and therefore no peculiar presump-
tion against any thing in the former, upon account

^ P. i3'-

174 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION

of its being unlike to any thing in the latter. And
in the constitution and natural government of the
world, as well as m the moral government of it, we
see things, in a great degree, unlike one another :
and therefore ought not to wonder at such unlike-
ness between things visible and invisible. However,
the scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely
unlike the scheme of nature; as will appear m the
following part of this Treatise.

The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a
Divine mission, has been stated with great exactness
by divines ; and is, I think, sufficiently understood
by every one. There are also invisible miracles, the
Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, being
secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a
mission ; but require themselves to be proved by
visible miracles. Revelation itself too is miraculous ;
and miracles are the proof of it ; and the supposed
presumption against these shall presently be con-
sidered. All which I have been observing here is,
that, whether we choose to call eveiy thing in the
dispensations of Providence, not discoverable without
revelation, nor like the known course of things,
miraculous ; and whether the general Christian dis-
pensation now mentioned is to be called so, or not ;
*the foregoing observations seem certainly to shew,
that there is no presumption agamst it from the
analogy of natiu-e.

II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against
some operations, which we should now caU miracu-
^ lous ; particularly none against a revelation at the
beginning of the world : nothing of such presumption
against it, as is supposed to be implied or expressed
in the word miraculous. For a miracle, in its very
\x notion, is relative to a course of nature ; and implies

AGAINST MIRACLES. 175

\ somewhat different from it, considered as being so.
Now, either there was no course of nature at the
time which we are speaking of; or if there were, we
are not acquainted what the course of nature is, upon
the first peopling of worlds. And therefore the ques-
tion, whether mankind had a revelation made to
them at that time, is to be considered, not as a ques-
tion concerning a miracle, but as a common question
of fact. And we have the like reason, be it more or
less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this
question, and concerning common matters of fact of
the same antiquity ; for instance, what part of the
earth was first peopled.

Or thus : When mankind was first placed in this
state, there was a power exerted, totally difterent
from the present course of natiu'e. Now, whether
this power, thus whoDy different from the present
course of natiure, for we cannot properly apply to it
the word miraculous; whether this power stopped
immediately after it had made man, or went on, and
exerted itself farther in giving him a revelation, is
a question of the same kind, as whether an ordinary
power exerted itself in such a particular degree and
manner, or not.

Or suppose the power exerted in the fonnation of
the world be considered as mii'aculous, or rather, be
called by that name ; the case vnR not be different :
since it must be acknowledged, that such a power
was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that
our Saviour spent some years in a coiurse of working
miracles : there is no more presumption, worth men-
tioning, against his having exerted this mii-aculous
power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain
degree less ; in one or two more instances, than in
one or two fewer ; in this, than in another manner.

176 OF THE SUPPOSED PEESUMPTION

It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar
presumption, from the analogy of nature, against
supposing a revelation, when man was first placed
upon the earth.

Add, that there does not appear the least inti-
mation in history or tradition, that Keligion was first
reasoned out : but the whole of history and tradition
makes for the other side, that it came into the world
by revelation. Indeed the state of Religion in the
first ages, of which we have any account, seems to
suppose and imply, that this was the original of it
amongst mankind. And these reflections together,
without taking in the peculiar authority of Scripture,
amount to real and a very material degree of evi-
dence, that there was a revelation at the beginning
of the world. Now this, as it is a confirmation of
natiural ReHgion, and therefore mentioned in the
former part of this Treatise '^ : so likewise it has a
tendency to remove any prejudices against a sub-
sequent revelation.

III. But still it may be objected, that there is
some peculiar presumption, from analogy, against
miracles ; particularly against revelation, after the
settlement and during the continuance of a course
of nature.

Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it
is to be observed in general, that before we can have
ground for raising what can, with any propriety, be
called an argument from analogy, for or against
revelation considered as somewhat miraculous, we
must be acquainted with a similar or parallel case.
But the history of some other world, seemingly in
like circumstances with our own, is no more than a
parallel case : and therefore nothing short of this can

d Page 123, &c.

AGAINST MIRACLES. 177

be SO. Yet, could we come at a presumptive proof,
for or against a revelation, from being informed,
whether such world had one, or not ; such a proof,
being drawn from one single instance only, must be
infinitely precarious. More particularly : First of
all ; There is a veiy strong presumption against
common speculative truths, and against the most
ordinary facts, before the proof of them ; which yet
is overcome by almost any proof. There is a pre-
sumption of millions to one, against the story of
Caesar, or of any other man. For suppose a number
of common facts so and so circumstanced, of which
one had no kind of proof, should happen to come
into one's thoughts ; every one would, without any
possible doubt, conclude them to be false. And the
like may be said of a single common fact. And from
hence it appears, that the question of importance,
as to the matter before us, is, concerning the de- .
gree of the peculiar presumption supposed against
miracles ; not whether there be any pecuhar pre-
sumption at all against them. For, if there be the
presimijDtion of millions to one, against the most
common facts ; what can a small presumption, ad-
ditional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar ?
It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only
material question is, whether there be any such pre-
sumption against miracles, as to render them in any
sort incredible. Secondlv, If we leave out. the con-
sideration of llehgiun, we are in such total darkness,
upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or circum-
stances, the present course of nature depends ; that
there does not appear any improbability for or
against supposing, that five or six thousand years
may have given scope for causes, occasions, reasons,
or circumstances, from whence miraculous inter})0-

BUTLER, ANALOGY. N

178 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION

sitions may have arisen. And from this, joined with
the foregoing observation, it will follow, that there
must be a presumption, beyond all comparison,
greater, against the particular common facts just
now instanced in, than against miracles in general;
before any evidence of either. But, thirdly. Take in
the consideration of Religion, or the moral system
of the world, and then we see distinct particular
reasons for miracles : to afford mankind instruction
additional to that of nature, and to attest the truth
of it. And this gives a real credibility to the sup-
position, that it might be part of the original plan
of thmgs, that there should be miraculous inter-
positions. Then, lastly, Miracles must not be com-
pared to common natural events ; or to events which,
though uncommon, are similar to what we daily ex-
perience : but to the extraordinary phenomena of
nature. And then the comparison will be between
the presumption against miracles, and the presump-
tion against such uncommon appearances, suppose,
as comets, and against there being any such powers
in nature as magnetism and electricity, so contrary
to the properties of other bodies not endued with
these powers. And before any one can determine,
whether there be any pecuhar presumption against
miracles, more than aa-ainst other extraordmarv
things ; he must consider, what, upon first hearing,
would be the presumption against the last-mentioned
appearances and powers, to a person acquainted only
with the daily, monthly, and annual course of nature
respecting this earth, and with those common powers
of matter which we every day see.

Upon all this I conclude ; that there certainly is
no such presumption against miracles, as to render
them in any wise incredible : that on the contrary,

AGAINST MIRACLES. 171)

our being able to discern reasons for them, gives a
positive credibility to the history of them, in cases
where those reasons hold : and that it is by no means
certain, that there is any peculiar presumption at all,
from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against
miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary
phenomena : though it is not worth while to perplex
the Reader with inquiries into the abstract nature
of evidence, in order to determine a question, which,
without such mquiries, we see "^ is of no importance.

CHAP. III.

Of our mcapacHy of judging, %ohat were to he expected in a reve-
lation ; and the credibility, from analogy, that it must contain
things appearing liable to objections.

Besides the objections against the evidence for
Christianity, many are alleged against the scheme of
it ; against the whole manner in which it is put and
left with the world ; as well as against several par-
ticidar relations in Scripture : objections drawn from
the deficiencies of revelation ; from things in it ap-
pearing to men foolishness^; from its containing
matters of offence, which have led, and it must have
been foreseen would lead, into strange enthusiasm
and superstition, and be made to serv^e the pur-
poses of tyranny and wickedness ; from its not being
universal ; and, which is a thing of the same kind
from its evidence not being so convincing and satis-
factory as it might have been : for this last is some-
times turned into a positive argument against its
truth ^*. It would be tedious, indeed impossible,

'■ P. 176. a I Cor. i. 28. b See chap. vi.

N 2

180 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION-

to enumerate the several particulars comprehended
under the objections here referred to ; they being so
various, according to the different fancies of men.
There are persons, who think it a strong objection
against the authority of Scripture, that it is not
composed by rules of art, agreed upon by critics, for
polite and correct writing. And the scorn is inex-
pressible, with which some of the prophetic parts of
Scripture are treated : partly through the rashness
of interpreters ; but very much also, on account of
the hieroglyphical and figurative language, in which
they are left us. Some of the principal things of
this sort shall be particularly considered in following
chapters. But my design at present is to observe
in general, with respect to this whole way of argu-
ing, that, upon supposition .. of a revelation, it is
highly credible beforehand, we should be incompetent^
judges of it to a great degree : and that it would
contain many tilings appearing to us liable to great
objections ; in case we judge of it otherwise, than
by the analogy of nature. And therefore, though
objections against the evidence of Christianity are
most seriously to be considered; yet objections against
Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous :
almost all objections against it, excepting those
which are alleged against the particular proofs of its
coming from God. I express myself with caution,
I should be mistaken to vilify reason ; which is
indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge
concerning any thing, even revelation itself: or be
misunderstood to assert, that a supposed revelation
cannot be proved false, from internal characters.
For, it may contain clear immoralities or contra-
dictions ; and either of these would prove it false.
Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing else

LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 181

can possibly render any supposed revelation incredi- /|
ble. Yet still the observation above is, I think, true
beyond doubt ; that objections against Christianity,
as_distin^uish^dj^ against its evidence,

are frivolous. To inake out this,"is the~geheral "de-
^sign of the present chapter. And with regard to the
whole of it, T cannot but particularly wish, that the
proofs might be attended to ; rather than the as-
sertions cavilled at, upon account of any unacceptable
consequences, wdiether real or supposed, which may
be drawn from them. For, after all, that which is
ti\ie, must be admitted, though it should shew us —
the shortness of Otii" facurtiesT and that we are in no
uise juHges "of" many things, of which we are apt to
think ourselves very competent ones. Nor will this
be any objection with reasonable men, at least upon
second thought it will not be any objection with such,
against the justness of the following observations :

As God governs the world, and instructs his
creatures, according to certain laws or rules, in the
kno^vn course of nature.; known by reason together
withjexperience : so the Scripture_iii form s_,us^q£ a
scheme of Divine providence, additional to this. It
relates, that God has, 15y~fevelatibn, instructed men
in things concerning his government, which they
could not otherwise liave known; and reminded
them of things, which they miglit otherwise know;
and attested the truth of the whole l)y mmicles.
Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation
of things are both from God, if they coincide with
each other, and together make up one scheme of
Providence; our being incompetent judges of one,
must^render it credible, that we may be incompetent
judges also of tlie other. Since, upon experience, the
acknowledged constitution and course of nature is

182 THE CREDIBILITY OF llEVELATION

found to be greatly different from what, before ex-
perience, would have been expected ; and such as,
men fancy, there lie great objections against : this
renders it beforehand highly credible, that they may
find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge
of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very
different from expectations formed beforehand ; and
liable, in appearance, to great objections : objections
against the scheme itself, and against the degrees and
manners of the miraculous interpositions, by wliich
it was attested and carried on. Thus suppose a
prince to govern his dominions in the wisest manner
possible, by common known laws ; and that upon
some exigencies he should suspend these laws ; and
govern, in several instances, in a different manner :
if one of his subjects were not a competent judge
beforehand, by what common rules the government
should or would be carried on ; it could not be
expected, that the same person would be a competent
judge, in w^hat exigencies, or in what manner, or to
what degree, those laws commonly observed would
be suspended or deviated from. If he were not a
judge of the wisdom of the ordinary administration,
there is no reason to think he would be a judge
of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought
he had objections against the former; doubtless, it
is highly supposable, he might think also, that he
had objections against the latter. And thus, as we
fall into infinite.Jollies and mistakes, whenever we
pretend, otherwise than from experience and analogy,
to judge of the. constitution and course of nature ; it
is evidently supposable beforehand, that we should
fall into as great, in pretending to judge, in like
manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there any
more ground to expect that this latter should appear

LIABLE TO OUJEtTJONS. 183

to US clear of objections, than that the former
should.

These observations, relatin<y to the whole of Chris-

!^ tianity, are ^plicable to inspiration in particular. As
we are in no sort judges beforehand, bjTwhat laws
or rules, in what degree, or by what means, it were

■ to have been expected, that God would naturally
instruct us ; so upon supposition of his affording us
light and instruction by revelation, additional to
what he has afforded us by reason and experience,
we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in'
what proportion, it w^ere to be expected, that this
supernatural light and instruction would be afforded
us. We know not beforehand, what degree or kind
of natural information, it were to be expected God
would afford men, each by his own reason and ex-
perience : nor how far he would enable and effectually
dispose them to communicate it, w^hatever it should
be, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it
would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful ; nor
whether it would be given with equal clearness and
conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon any
good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or
even the faculty itself, by which we are capable of
attaining it, reason, would be given us at once, or
gradually. In Hke manner, we are wholly ignorant,
what degree of new knowledge, it were to be ex-
pected, God woidd give mankind by revelation, upon
supposition of his affording one : or how tar, or in
what way, he would inter})ose miraculously, to
qualify them, to whom he should originally make
the revelation, for communicating the knowledge
given by it ; and to secure their doing it to the
age in which they should live ; and to secure its
being transmitted to posterity. We are equally igno-

184 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION

rant, whether the evidence of it would be certain,

(j or highly probable, or doubtful <^ : or whether all who

Ijr. should have any degree of instruction from it, and

\ »i/<A/^ny degree of evidence of its truth, would have the

d-* same : or whether the scheme would be revealed at

y

once, or unfolded gradually. Nay w^e are not in any

\j}^ \, sort able to judge, whether it were to have been
"'l ^\5^^ expected, that the revelation should have been com-
"^ V^ mitted to w^riting ; or left to be handed down, and
X^ consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at

, length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and

during such time as they are permitted, in the degree
they evidently are, to act as they will.

But it may be said, " that a revelation in some of
the above-mentioned circumstances, one, for instance,
which was not committed to writing, and thus
secured against danger of corruption, would not have
answered its purpose." I ask, what purpose ? I^^
would not have answered all the purposes, which it
has now answered, and in the same degree : but it
would have answered others, or the same in different
degrees. And which of these were the purposes of
God, and best fell in with his general government,
we could not at all have determined beforehand.

Now since it has been shewn, that we_have no

principles of reason, upon which to judge beforehand,

how it were to be expected revelation should have

been left, or what was most suitable to the Divine

plan of government, in any of the forementioned

\ respects ; it must be quite frivolous to object after-

\ wards as to any of them, against its being left in one

way, rather than another: for this would be to

^object against things, upon account of their being

different from expectations, which have been shewn

c See chap. vi.

LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 185

to be without reason. And thus we see, tliat the
only question concerning the truth of Christianity is,
whethefit be a real revelation ; not whether it be
attended with every circumstance whi^BT we should
have looked for : and concerning the authority of
Scripture, whether it be what iF'ctaims tojoejiiot
whether it be a book of such sort, and so promulged,
as weak men are apt to fancy a book containing a
Divine revelation should. And therefore, neither ob-
scurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various
readings, nor early disputes about the authors of
particular parts ; nor any other things of the like
kind, thougli they had been much more considerable
in degree than they are, could overthrow the autho-
rity of the Scripture : unless the Prophets, Apostles,
or our Lord, had promised, that the book containing
the Divine revelation should be secure from those
things. Nor indeed can any objections overthrow
such a kind of revelation as the Christian claims to
be, since there are no objections against the morality
of it*^^, but such as can shew, that there is no proof
of miracles wrought originally in attestation of it;
no appearance of any thing miraculous in its obtain-
ing in the world ; nor any of prophecy, that is, of
events foretold, which human sagacity could not
foresee. If it can be shewn, that^ the 2^roof alleged ,
for all these is absolutely none at all, then Is twela-
tiriii ovrrturned. But were^it allowed, that the proof
of any one or all of them is lower than is allowed ;
yet, whilst any proof of them remains, revelation
will stand upon much the same foot it docs at
present, as to all the purposes of life and practice,
and ought to have the like influence upon our be-
haviour.

'1 Page 193.

186 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION

From the foregoing observations too, it will follow,
and those who will thoroughly examine into revela-
tion will find it worth remarking ; that there are
several ways of argumg, which, though just with
regard to other writings, are not applicable to Scrip-
ture : at least not to the prophetic parts of it. We
cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot be the
sense or intent of such a passage of Scripture; for, if
it had, it would have been expressed more plainly,
or have been represented under a more apt figure
or hieroglyphic ; yet we may justly argue thus,
with respect to common books. And the reason of
this difference is very evident; that in Scripture we^
are not competent judges, as we are in common
books, how plainly it were to have been expected,
what is the true sense, should have been expressed,
or under how apt an image figured. The only ques-
tion is, what appearance there is, that this is the
sense ; and scarce at all, how much more deter-
minately or accurately it might have been expressed
or figured.

" But is it not self-evident, that internal improba-
bilities of all kinds weaken external probable proof 1 "
Doubtless. But to what practical purpose can this
"Realleged here, when it has been proved before®,
that real internal improbabilities, which rise even to
moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary
testimony ; and when it now has been made appear,
that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to
the matter we are here considering: as it will farther
appear from what follows.

For though from the observations above made it is
manifest, that we are not in any sort competent
judges, what supernatural instruction were to have

ePage 177.

LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 187

been expected; and though it is self-evident, that
the objections of an incompetent judgment must be
frivolous ; yet it may be proper to go one step
farther, and observe ; that if men will be regardless
of these things, and pretend to judge of the Scripture
by preconceived expectations; tlie analogy of nature
shews beforehand, not only that it is highly credible
tKeymay, but also probable that they will, imagine
they have strong objections against it, however really
unexceptionable : for so, prior to experience, they
would tEink they had, against the cii'cumstances,
and degrees, and the whole manner of that instruc-
tion, which is afforded by the ordinary course of
nature. Were the instruction which God affords to
briite creatures by instincts and mere propensions,
and to mankind by these together with reason,
matter of probable proof, and not of certain observa-
tion ; it would be rejected as incredible, in many
instances of it, only upon account of the means by
which this instruction is given, the seeming dispro-
portions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and
circumstances of it. For instance : would it not have
been thought highly improbable, that men should
have been so much more capable of discovering, even
to certainty, the general laws of matter, and the
magnitudes, paths, and revolutions of the heaA'enly
bodies; than the occasions and cures of distempers,
and many other things, m which human life seems
so much more nearly concerned, tlian in astronomy ?
How capricious and irregular a way of information,
would it be said, is that of invention, by means of
which nature instriicis us in ittatters of science,
and in many thiiig.^, upon which the affairs of the
world greatly depend: that a man should, by this
faculty, be made acquainted with a thing in an

188 THE CREDIBILITY OP' REVELATION

instant, when perhaps he is thinking of somewhat
else, which he has in vain been searching after, it
may be, for years. So hkewise the imperfections
attending the only method, by which nat'ire enables
and directs ns to communicate our thoughts to each
other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very
nature, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite
abase, even from negligence ; and so liable to it from
design, that every man can deceive and betray by
it. And, to mention but one instance more ; that
bmtes, without reason, should act, in many re-
spects, with a sagacity and foresight vastly greater
than what men have in those respects, would be
thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do act
with such superior foresight : whether it be their
own indeed, is another question. From these things,
it is highly credible beforehand, that upon supposi-
tion God should afford men some additional instruc-
tion by revelation, it would be with circumstances, in
manners, degrees, and respects, which we should be
apt to fancy we had great objections against the
credibility of. Nor are the objections against the
! Scripture, nor against Christianity in general, at all
more or greater, than the analogy of nature would
beforehand — not perhaps give ground to expect;
for this analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases,
to ground an expectation upon ; but no more nor
greater, than analogy would shew it, beforehand, to
be supposable and credible, that there might seem to
lie against revelation.

By applying these general observations to a parti-
cular objection, it will be more distinctly seen, how
they are applicable to others of the like kind : and
indeed to almost all objections against Christianity,
^as distinguished from objections against its evidence.

LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 189

It appears from Scripture, that, as it was not unusual
in the apostohc age, for persons, upon their conver-
sion to Christianity, to be endued with miraculous
gifts ; so, some of those persons exercised these gifts
in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner ; and
this is made an objection against their being really
miraculous. Now the foregoing observations quite
remove this objection, how considerable soever it
may appear at first sight. For, consider a person
endued w4th any of these gifts ; for instance, that of
tongues : it is to be supposed, that he had the same
power over this miraculous gift, as he would have
had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of studv
and use, as it ordinarily is ; or the same power over
it, as he had over any other natural endowment.
Consequently, he would use it in the same manner
he did any other ; either regularly, and upon proper
occasions only, or irregularly, and upon improper
ones : according to his sense of decency, and his
character of prudence. Where then is the objection'?
Why, if this miraculous power was indeed given to
the world to propagate Christianity, and attest the
truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected, that
other sort of persons should have been chosen to
be invested with it ; or that these should, at the
same time, have been endued with prudence ; or that
they should have been continually restrained and
directed in the exercise of it : i. e. that God should
have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different
manner, or higher degree. But, from the observa-
tions made above, it is undeniably evident, tliat we
are not judges in what degrees and manners it were
to have been expected he should miraculously inter-
pose ; upon supposition of his doing it in some
detrree and manner. Nor, in the natural course of

\

190 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION

Providence, are superior gifts of memory, eloquence,
knowledge, and other talents of great influence, con-
ferred only on persons of prudence and decency, or
such as are disposed to make the properest use of
them. Nor is the instiuction and admonition natu-
rally afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly
in our education, commonly given in a manner the
most suited to recommend it; but often with circum-
stances apt to prejudice us against such instruction.

One might go on to add, that there is a great
resemblance between the light of nature and of reve-
lation, in several other respects. Practical Christianity,
or that faith and behaviour which renders a man a
Christian, is a plain and obvious thing : like the
common rules of conduct, with respect to our ordi-
nary temporal affairs. The more distinct and par-
ticular knowledge of those things, the study of which
the Apostle calls going on unto 2^("*]f^ction^, and of
the prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of
natural and even civil knowledge, may require very
exact thought, and careful consideration. The hin-
derances too, of natural, and of supernatural light
and knowledge, have been of the same kind. And
as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not
yet understood; so, if it ever comes to be understood,
before the restitutio7i of all thitigsS, and wdthout
miraculous interpositions ; it must be in the same
way as natural knowledge is come at : by the con-
tinuance and progress of learning and of liberty;
and by particular persons attending to, comparing
and pursuing, intimations scattered up and down it,
which are overlooked and disregarded by the gene-
rality of the world. For this is the w^ay, in which
all improvements are _madH7~"by' thoughtful men's
^ Heb. vi. I. S Acts iii. 21.

LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 101

tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped, us by
nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our
minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a
book, which has been so long in the possession of
mankind, should contain many truths as yet undis-
covered. For, all the same phenomena, and the
same faculties of investigation, from which such great
discoveries in natural knowledge have been made in
the present and last age, were equally in the posses-*^
sion of mankind several thousand years before . And
possibly it might be intended, that events, as they
come to pass, should open and ascertain the meaning
of several parts of Scripture.

It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a
material respect : for that natural knowledge is of
little or no consequence. But I have been speaking
of the general instruction which nature does or does
not afford us. And besides, some parts of natural
knowledge, in the more common restrained sense of
the words, are of the greatest consequence to the
ease and convenience of life. But suppose the
analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect ; yet
it might be abundantly supplied, from the whole
constitution and course of nature : which shews, that
God does not dispense his gifts according to our
notions of the advantage and consequence they would
be of to us. And this in general, with his method of
dispensing knowledge in particular, would together
make out an analogy full to the point before us.

But it may be objected still farther and more
generally; "The Scripture represents the world as
in a state of ruin, and Chiistianity as an expedient
to recover it, to help in these respects where natui'e
fails : in particular, to supply the deficiencies of
natural light. Is it credible then, that so many ages

192 THE CEEDIBILITY OF REVELATION

should have been let pass, before a matter of such
a sort, of so great and so general importance, was
made known to mankind ; and then that it should
be made known to so small a part of them 1 Is
it conceivable, that this supply should be so very
deficient, should have the like obscuritv and doubt-
fulness, be liable to the like perversions, in short,
lie open to all the like objections, as the light of
nature itself ^M" Without determining how far this
in fact is so, I answer ; it is by no means incredible,
that it might be so, if the light of nature and of
revelation be from the same hand. Men are naturally
liable to diseases : for which God, in his good provi-
dence, has provided natural remedies i. But remedies
existing in nature have been unknown to mankind
for many ages : are known but to few now ; probably
many valuable ones are not known yet. Great has
been and is the obscurity and difficulty, in the nature
and application of them. Circumstances seem often
to make them very improper, where they are abso-
lutely necessary. It is after long labour and study,
and many unsuccessful endeavours, that they are
brought to be as useful as they are ; after high con-
tempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we
have ; and after disputes and doubts, which have
seemed to be endless. The best remedies too, when
unskilfully, much more if dishonestly a2323lied, may
produce new diseases ; and with the rightest applica-
tion the success of them is often doubtful. In many
cases they are not at all effectual : where they are, it
is often very slowly: and the application of them,
and the necessary regimen accompanying it, is, not
uncommonly, so disagreeable, that some will not sub-
mit to them; and satisfy themselves with the excuse,
'» Chap. vi. i See chap. v.

LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 193

that, if they would, it is not certain whether it would
be successful. And many persons, who labour under
diseases, for which there are known natural remedies,
are not so happy as to be always, if ever, in the way
of them. In a word, the remedies which nature has
provided for diseases are neither certain, perfect,
nor universal. And indeed the same principles of
arguing, which would lead us to conclude, that they
must be so, would lead us likewise to conclude, that
there could be no occasion for them ; i. e. that there
could be no diseases at all. And therefore our ex-
perience that there are diseases shews, that it is
credible beforehand, upon supposition nature has
provided remedies for them, that these remedies may
be, as by experience we find they are, not certain,
nor perfect, nor universal; because it shews, that the
principles upon which we should expect the contrary
are fallacious.

And now, what is the just consequence from all
these things 1 Not tFat reason is no judge of what
is offered to us ^tSoeing of Divine revelation. For
this would be to infer, that we are unable to judge of
any thing, because we are unable to judge of all
things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only
of the meaning, but also of the morality and the
evklence j?f revelation. First, It is the province ( »f
reason to judge of the lunmlity of the Scripture; i. o.
not whether it contains things different from what
we should have expected from a wise, just, and good
Being ; for ol jections from hence have been now
obviated : but whether it contains things plainly
contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness 471:6
what the light of nature teaches us of God. And I
know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture,
excepting such objections as are formed upon sup-

BUTLER, ANALOGY. O

t ^

:k^^.

194 THE CREDIBILITY OF REA^ELATION

positions, which would equally conclude, that the
constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom,
justice, or goodness ; which most certainly it is not.
Indeed there are some particular precepts in Scrip-
ture, given to particular persons, requiring actions,
which would be immoral and vicious, were it not for
such precepts. But it is easy to see, that all these
are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the
whole nature of the case and of the action ; and both
constitutes and shews that not to be unjust or
J^Kib^"' immoral, which, prior to the precept, must have
appeared and really have been so : which may
well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to
immutable morality. If it were commanded, to
cidtivate the principles and act from the spirit
of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command
would not alter the nature of the case or of the
action, in any of these instances. But it is quite
otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing
an external action : for instance, taking away the
property or life of any. For men have no right to
either life or property, but what arises solely from
the grant of God : when this grant is revoked, they
cease to have any right at all in either : and when
this revocation is made known, as surely it is
possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to
deprive them of either. And though a course of
external acts, which without command would be im-
moral, must make an immoral habit ; yet a few
detached commands have no such natural tendency.
I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scrijj-
ture prece})ts, which require, not vicious actions, but
actions which would have been vicious had it not
been for such precepts ; because they are sometimes
weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid

LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 195

vipon objections drawn from them. But to me there
seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what
arises from their being offences : i. e. from their being
liable to b>e perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked
designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes ;
and, perhaps, to mislead the weak and enthusiastic.
And objections from this head are not objections
against revelation; but against the whole notion of
religion, as a trial; and against the general constitu-
tion of nature. Secondly, Eeason is able to judge,
and must, of the evidence of revelation, and of the ^
objections urged against that evidence : which shall
be the subject of a following chapter k.

But the consequence of the foregoing observations
is, that the question upon which the truth of Chris-
tianity depends is scarce at all, ~\\liat6l)jecf ions there
are against its scheme, since there are none against
the mofality^ oTlt; but luhat objections there are
against its evidejicej or, ivhat proof there remains
of it, after due allowances made for the objections
against that proof: because it has been shewn, that
the objections agaimt Christianity^ as distinguished
from objections against its evidence, are frivolous.
For surely very little weight, if any at aU, is to lie
laid upon a way of arguing and objecting, which,
when applied to the general constitution of nature,
experience shews not to be conclusive : and such, I
think, is the whole way of objecting treated of
throughout this chapter. It is resolvable into prin-
ciples, and goes upon suppositions, whicli mislead us
to think, that the Author of Nature would not act,
as we experience he does ; or would act, in sucli
and such cases, as we experience he does not in like
cases. But the unreiusonableness of this way of ob-

•< Cliai). vii.
o 2

196 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME,

jecting will appear yet more evidently from hence,
that the chief things thus objected against are justi-
fied, as shall be farther shewn^ , by distinct, particu-
[lar, and full analogies, in the constitution and course
)f nature.

But it is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as
objections of the foregoing sort against revelation are,
yet, when a supposed revelation is more consistent
with itself, and has a more general and imiform
tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances
considered, could have been expected from enthu-
siasm and political views ; this is a presumptive
proof of its not proceeding from them, and so of
its truth : because we are competent judges, what
might have been expected from enthusiasm and
political views. >•''-

CHAP. IV.

Of Christianity/, considered as a scheme or constitution,
imperfectli/ conqirehended.

It hath been now shewn ''^, that the analogy of
nature renders it highly credible beforehand, that
supposing a revelation to be made, it must contain
many things very different from what we should
have expected, and such as aj^pear open to great ob-
jections : and that this observation, in good measure,
takes off the force of those objections, or rather
precludes them. But it may be alleged, that this is
a very partial answer to such objections, or a very
unsatisfactory way of obviating them : because it

z Chap. iv. latter part, and v, vi.
^ lu the foregoing chapter.

IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 197

doth not shew at all, that the things objected against
can be wise, just, and good ; much less, that it is
credible they are so. It will therefore be proper to
shew this distinctly; by applying to these objections
against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of Christi-
anity, the answer above^^ given to the like objections
against the constitution of Nature : before we con-
sider the particular analogies in the latter, to the
particular things objected against in the former.
Now that which affords a sufficient answer to objec-
tions against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of
the constitution of Nature, is its being a constitu-
tion, a system, or scheme, imperfectly comprehended;
a scheme in which means " are made use of to
complish ends ; and which is carried on by general
laws. For from these things it has been proved,
not only to be possible, but also to be credible,
that those things which are objected against may
be consistent with wisdom, justice, and goodness ;
nay, may be instances of them : and even that the
constitution and government of Nature may be per-
fect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity
then be a scheme, and of the like kind ; it is evident,
the like objections against it must admit of the like
answer. And,

I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our com-
prehension. The moral government of God is exer-
cised, by gradually conducting things so in the course
of his providence, that every one, at length and upon
the whole, shall receive according to his deserts ; and
neither fraud nor violence, but truth and riglit, shall
finally prevail. Christianity is ;i, particular scheme
under this general plan of Providence, and a part of
it, conducive to its completion, with regard to man-

^ Part I. ch. vii. to wliicli this all along refers.

198 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME,

kind : consisting itself also of various parts, and a
mysterious economy, which has been carrying on from
the time the world came into its present wretched
state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a
Divine person, the Messiah ; who is to gather together
ill one the children of God that are scattered abroad^,
and establish an everlasting kingdom, ivherein divell-
eth righteousness '^. And in order to it ; after various
manifestations of things, relating to this great and
general scheme of Providence, through a succession
of many ages : (for the Spirit of Christ which was
in the proi^hets, testified beforehand his sufferings,
and the glory that should follow : unto ivhoni it was
revealed, that not unto themselves, hut unto 2(s they
did minister the things which are 7ioiv re^^orted unto
us hy them that have preached the Gospel; lohich
things the angels desire to look into^ :) — after various
dispensations, looking forward, and preparatory, to
this final salvation: in the fulness of time, when in-
finite wisdom thought fit ; He, being in the form of
God, — made himself of no reputation, and took upon
him the form of a servant, and was made in the like-
ness of men: and being found in fashion as a man,
he humbled himself, and became obedient to death,
even the death of the cross: 'ivherefore God also hath
highly exalted him, and given him a name, lohich is
above every name: that at the name of Jesus every
knee should boio, of things in heaven, and things in
the earth, and things under the earth: and that every
tongue shotdd confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to
the glory of God the Father^. Parts likewise of tliis
economy are the miraculous mission of tlie Holy
Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given to good

c John xi. 52. d 2 Pet. iii. 13,

e I Pet. i. II, 12. f Phil. ii. 6-11.

IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 199

men : the invisible government, wliich Christ at pre-
sent exercises over his church : that wliich he himself
refeis to in these words; In my Fathers house are
man?/ mansi07is — I go to prepare a place for you ?^:
and his future return to judge the ivorlcl in right-
eousness, and completely reestablish the kingdom of
God. For the Father judgeth no man ; hut hath
committed all judgment unto the So7i: that all men
should honour the Son, even as they honour the
Father^^. All i^ower is given unto him in heaven
and in earths And he must reign, till he hath j^ut
all enemies tender his feet. Then cometh the end,
when he shall have delivei^ed up the kingdom to God,
even the Father; iclien lie shall have put doivn all
rule, and all authority and poiver. And ivhen all
things shall he suhdued unto him, then shall the Son
also himself he suhject unto him that piit all tilings
under him, that God may he all in all ^. Now little,
surely, need be said to shew, that this system, or
scheme of things, is but imperfectly comprehended
by us. The Scripture expressly asserts it to be so.
And indeed one cannot read a passage relating to
this great mystery of godliness^, but what inune-
diately runs up into something which shews us our
ignorance in it ; as every thing in nature shews us
our ignorance in the constitution of nature. And
whoever will seriously consider that part of tlie
Christian scheme, which is revealed in Scripture,
will find so much more unrevealed, as will convince
him, that, to all the purposes of judging and object-
ing, we know as little of it, as of the constitution
of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much ;ni

& John xiv. 2. •' .Toliii v. 22, 23. ' Matt, xwiii. 18.

^ I Cor. XV. 25-28. ' I Tii«. iii. 16.

200 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME

answer to our objections against the perfection of
one, as against the perfection of the other ^.

II. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispen-
sation, as much as in the natural scheme of things,
means are made use of to accompUsh ends. And
tlie observation of this furnishes us with the same
answer, to objections against the perfection of Chris-
tianity, as to objections of the Hke kind, against the
constitution of nature. It shews the credibihtv, that
the things objected against, how foolish^ soever they
appear to men, may be the very best means of ac-
comphshing the very best ends. And their appear-
ing foolishness is no presumption against this, in a
scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension o.

III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensa-
tion may have been, all along, carried on by general
laws P, no less than the com'se of nature, may require
to be more distinctly made out. Consider then^upon
what ground it is we say, that the whole common
course of nature Is carried on according to general
fore-ordained laws. We know indeed several of the
general laws of matter : and a great part of the
natural behaviour of living agents is reducible to
general laws. But we know in a manner nothing,
by what laws, storms and tempests, earthquakes,
famine, pestilence, become the instruments of de-
struction to mankind. And the laws, by which per-
sons born into the world at such a time and place are
of such capacities, geniuses, tempei's ; the laws, by
which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude
of cases ; and by which innumerable things happen,
of the greatest influence upon the affairs and state
of the world ; these laws are so wholly unknown to

^ P. 131, &c. " I Cor. i.

o p. 135, &c. P P. 137, 138.

IMPERFECTLY COMPKEIIENDED. 201

^is, that we caU the events, which come to pass by
them, accidental : thougli all reasonable men know
certainly, that there cannot, in reality, I)e any sucli
thing' as chance ; and conclude^ that the things wliicli
have this appearance are the result of general laws,
andr may be reduced into them. It is then but an
exc'Seding tittle way, and in but a very few respects,
that we can trace up the natural course of things
before us, to general laws. And it is only from
analogy, that we conclude the whole of it to be capa-
ble of being reduced into them : only from our see-
ing, that part is so. It is from our finding, that the
course of nature, in some respects and so far, goes
on by general laws, that we conclude this of the
rest. And if that be a just ground for such a con-
clusion, it LS a just ground also, if not to conchide,
yet to apprehend, to render it supposable and credi-
W^ which is sufficient for answering objections, that
God's miraculous interpositions may have been, aU
along^in like manner, by general laws of wisdom.
Thus, that miraculous powers should be exerted, at
such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees and
manners, and with regard to such j)ersons, rather
than others ; that the affairs of the world, lacing per-
mitted to go on in their natural course so far, sliould,
just at such a point, have a new direction given
them by miraculous interpositions ; that these inter-
positions should be exactly in such degrees and re-
spects only ; all this may have been by general
laws. These laws are unknown indeed to us: ])ut
no more unknown, than the laws from whence it is,
tliat some die as soon as they are born, and otliers
live to extreme old age ; tliat one man is so superior
to another in understanding ; with innumera])le more
things, which, as was before observed, we cannot

202 CHiilSTIANITY A SCHEME

reduce to any laws or rules at all, though it is taken
for granted, they are as much reducible to general
ones, as gravitation. Now, if the revealed dispen-
sations of Providence, and miraculous interpositions,
be by general laws, as well as God's ordinary govern-
ment in the course of nature, made known by reason
and experience ; there is no more reason to expect,
that every exigence, as it arises, should be provided
for by these general laws or miraculous interposi-
tions, than that every exigence in nature should, by
the general laws of nature : yet there might be
mse and good reasons, that miracidous interpositions
should be by general laws ; and that these laws
should not be broken in upon, or deviated from, by
other miracles.

Upon the whole then : the appearance of defi-
ciencies and irregularities in nature~is owing f 6" Its
being a scheme but in part made known, and of such,
a certain particular kind in other respects. Now we
see no more reason why the frame and course of
nature should be such a scheme, than why Chris-
tianity should. And that the former is such a
scheme, renders it credible, that the latter, upon
'supposition of its truth, may be so too. And as it
is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed
but in part, and a scheme in which means are made
use of to accomplish ends, like to that of nature :
so the credibility, that it may have been all along
carried on by general laws, no less than the course
of nature, has been distinctly proved. And from all
this it is beforehand credible that there might, I
tliink probable that there would, be the like ap-
pearance of deficiencies and irregularities in Cliris-
tianity, as in nature : i. e. that Christianity would
be liable to the like objections, as the frame of

IMrEllFECTLY COMPKEHENDED. 203

nature. And these objections are answered by these
observations concerning Christianity; as the Hke ob-
jections against the frame of nature are answered
by the like observations concerning the frame of
nature.

The objections against Christianity, considered as
a matter of fact*!, havmg, in general, been obviated
in the preceding chapter; and the same, considered
as made against the Tvdsdom and goodness of it,
having been obviated in this : the next thing, ac-
cording to the method proposed, is to shew, tliat
the ^principal objections, in particular, against Chris-
tianity, may be answered, by particular and full
analogies in nature. And as one of them is made
agamst the whole scheme of it together, as just now
described, I choose to consider it here, rather than
in a distinct chapter by itself The thing objected
against this scheme of the Gospel is, " that it seems
to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a
long series of intricate means, in order to accomplish
his ends, the recoveiy and salvation of the world :
in like sort as men, for want of understanding or
power, not being able to come at their ends directly,
are forced to go roundabout ways, and make use of
many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them."
Now every thing which we see shews the folly of
this, considered as an objection against the tnith
of Christianitv. For, accordinpf to our manner of
conception, God makes use of variety of means, what
we often think tedious ones, in the natural course
of providence, for the accomplishment of all his ends.
Indeed it is certain there is somewhat in this matter
quite beyond our comprehension : but the mystery

1 P. 129, &c.

204 CHIIISTIANITY A SCHEME,

is as great in nature as in Christianity. We know
what we ourselves aim at, as final ends : and what
courses we take, merely as means conducing to those
ends. But we are greatly ignorant how far things
are considered by the Author of Nature, under the
single notion of means and ends ; so as that it may
be said, this is merely an end, and that merely
means, in his regard. And whether there be not
some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of con-
ception, concerning this matter, somewhat contra-
dictory arising from our extremely imperfect ^n.ews
of things, it is impossible to say. However, thus
much is manifest, that the whole natural M'orld and
government of it is a scheme ot system ; not a fixed,
but a progressive one-;- a scheme, in which the opera-
tion of various means takes up a great length of
time, before the ends they tend to can be attained.
The change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits
of the earth, the very history of a flower, is an in-
stance of this : and so is human life. Thus vegetable
bodies, and those of animals, though possibly formed
at once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature state.
And thus rational ae;ents, who animate these latter
bodies, are naturally directed to form each his own
manners and character, by the gradual gaining of
knowledge and experience, and by a long course
of action. Our existence is not only successive, as
it must be of necessity ; but one state of our life and
being is ajDpointed by God, to be a preparation for
another ; and that, to be the means of attaining to
another succeeding one : infancy to childhood ; child-
hood to youth ; youth to mature age. Men are
impatient, and for precipitating things : but the
Author of Nature appears deliberate throughout his
operations; accomplishing his natural ends by slow

IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 205

successive steps. And there is a plan of things
beforehand laid out, which, from the nature of it,
requires various systems of means, as well as length
of time, in order to the carrying on its several parts
into execution. Thus, in the daily course of natural
providence, God operates in the very same manner
as in the dispensation of Christianity : making one
thing subservient to another ; this, to somewhat
farther ; and so on, through a progressive series of
means, which extend, both backward and forward,
beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of opera-
tion, every thing we see in the course of nature
is as much an instance, as any part of the Christian
dispensation.

CHAP. V.

Of the particular system of Christianity ; the a2)2m7itment of a
Mediator, and the redemption of the world hy him.

There is not, I think, any thing relating to
Christianity, which has been more objected against,
than the mediation of Christ, in some or other of
its parts. Yet, upon thorough consideration, there
seems nothing less justly liable to it. For,

I. The whole analogy of nature removes all ima-
gined presumption against the general notion of a
Mediator beticeen God and man\ For we find all
living creatures are brought into the world, and their
life in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of
others : and every satisfaction of it, some way <jr
other, is bestowed by the like means. So that tlie
visible government, which God exercises over the

>* I Tim. ii. 5.

206 THE APPOINTMENT OF

world, is by tlie instrumentality and mediation of
others. And how far his invisible government be
or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all
by reason. And the supposition, that part of it is
so, appears, to say the least, altogether as credible,
as the contrary. There is then no sort of objection,
from the light of nature, against the general notion
of a mediator between God and man, considered as
a doctrine of Christianity, or as an appointment in
this dispensation : since we find by experience, that
God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments
of good and evil to us ; the instruments of his justice
and his mercyy And the objection here referred to
is urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent,
and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our mediator;
but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a
mediator at all.

II. As we must suppose, that the world is under
the proper moral government of God, or in a state
of religion, before we can enter into consideration
of the revealed doctrine, concerning the redemption
of it by Christ; so that supposition is here to be
distinctly taken notice of Now the Divine moral
government which religion teaches us, implies, that
the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some
future state, by the righteous judgment of God.
That such consequent punishment shall take efiect
by his appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as
it is not in any sort to be supposed, that we are
made acquainted with all the ends or reasons, for
which it is fit future punishments should be mflicted,
or why God has appointed such and such consequent
misery should follow vice ; and as we are altogether
in the dark, how or in what manner it shall follow,
by what immediate occasions, or by the instrumeu-

A MEDIATOR AND EEDEEMER. 207

tality of what means; there is no absurdity in sup-
posing it may follow in a way analogous to that,
in which many miseries follow such and such courses
of action at present; poverty, sickness, infamy, un-
timely death by diseases, deatli from the hands of
civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing
future punishment may follow wickedness of course,
as we speak, or in the way of natural consequence

from God's original constitution of the world ; from

• • • i

the nature he has afiven us, and from the condition

in which he places us ; or in a like manner, as a
person rashly trilling upon a precipice, in the way
of natural consequence, falls down; in the way of
natural consequence, breaks liis limbs, suppose ; in
the way of natural consequence of tliis, without help,
perishes.

Some good men may perhaps be offended with
hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing, that
the future punishments of wickedness may be in the
way of natural consequence : as if tliis were taking
the execution of justice out of the hands of God, and
giving it to nature. But they should remember, that
when things come to pass according to the course
of nature, this does not hinder them from being his
doing, who is the God of nature : and tliat the Scrip-
ture ascribes those punishments to Divine justice,
which are known to be natural; and which must
be called so, when distinguished from sucli as are
miraculous. But after all, this supposition, or rather
this way of speaking, is here made use of only by
way of illustration of the subject before us. For
since it must be admitted, that the future punish- |
ment of wickedness is not a matter of arbitrary
appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; it
comes, for ouglit I see, to the same thing, wliether

208 THE APPOINTMENT OF

it is supposed to be inflicted in a way analogous to
that, in which the temporal punishments of vice and
folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though
there were a difference, it is allowable, in the present
case, to make this supposition, plainly not an in-
credible one ; that future punishment may follow
wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or ac-
cording to some general laws of government already
established in the universe.

III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we
may observe somewhat, much to the present purpose,
in the constitution of nature or appointments of Pro-
vidence : the provision which is made, that all the
bad natural consequences of men's actions should
not always actually follow; or that such bad con-
sequences, as, according to the settled course of
things, would inevitably have followed if not pre-
vented, should, in certain degrees, be prevented. We
are apt presumptuously to imagine, that the world
might have been so constituted, as that there would
not have been any such thing as misery or evil. On
the contrary we find the Author of Nature permits
V ,it : but then he has provided reliefs, and, in many
\, 'cases, perfect remedies for it, after some pains and
; Idifficulties ; reliefs and remedies even for that evil,
which is the fruit of our own misconduct; and
which, in the course of nature, would have continued,
and ended in our destruction, but for such remedies.
And this is an instance both of severity and in-
dulgence, in the constitution of nature. Thus all
the bad consequences, now mentioned, of a man's
trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And
though all were not, yet some of them might, by
proper interposition, if not rejected : by another's
coming to the rash man's relief, with his own laying

A MEDIATOR AXD KEDEEMER. 209

hold on that relief, in such sort as the case required.
Persons may do a great deal themselves towards pre-
venting the bad consequences of their follies : and
more may be done by themselves, together with the
assistance of others their fellow -creatures ; which
assistance Nature requires and prompts us to. This
is the general constitution of the world. Now sup-
pose it had been so constituted, that after such
actions were done, as were foreseen naturally to
draw after them misery to the doer, it should have
been no more in human power to have prevented
that naturally consequent misery, in any instance,
than it is, in all; no one can say, whether such a
more severe constitution of things might not yet
have been really good. But, that, on the contrary,
provision is made by nature, that we may and do,
to so great degree, prevent the bad natural effects
of our follies ; this may be called mercy or compas-s
sion in the original constitution of the world : com-,i
passion, as distinguished from goodness in general.*
And, the whole knowTi constitution and coiu'se of
things affording us instances of such compassion, it
would be according to the analogy of nature, to hope,
that, however ruinous the natural consequences of
vice might be, from the general laws of God's go-
vernment over the universe ; yet provision might be
made, possibly might have been originally made, for
preventing those ruinous consequences from inevit-
ably following : at least from following universally,
and in all cases.

Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this
made a question, or spoken of as in any degree
doubtful. The generality of mankind are so far
from having that a\\'ful sense of things, which the
present state of vice and misery and daikness seems

BUTLEK, ANALOGY. P

210 THE APPOINTMENT OF

to make but reasonable, that tliey have scarce any
apprehension or thought at all about this matter,
any way : and some serious persons may have spoken
unadvisedly concerning it. But let us observe, what
we experience to be, and what, from the very con-
stitution of nature, cannot but be, the consequences
of irregular and disorderly behaviour; even of such
rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as we scarce call vicious.
Now it is natural to apprehend, that the bad con-
sequences of irregularity will be greater, in propor-
tion as the irregularity is so. And there is no
comparison between these irregularities, and the
greater instances of vice, or a dissolute profligate
disregard to all religion; if there be any thing at all
in religion. For consider what it is for creatures,
moral agents, presumptuously to introduce that con-
fusion and misery into the kingdom of God, which
mankind have in fact introduced ; to blaspheme the
Sovereign Lord of all ; to contemn his authority; to
be injurious, to the degree they are, to theu' fellow-
creatures, the creatures of God. Add that the effects
of vice in the present world are often extreme misery,
irretrievable ruin, and even death: and upon putting
all this together, it will appear, that as no one can
say, in what degree fatal the unprevented conse-
quences of vice may be, according to the general
rule of divine government ; so it is by no means
intuitively certain how far these consequences could
possibly, in the nature of the thing, be prevented,
consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with
what is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature.
However, there would be large ground to hope, that
the universal government was not so severely strict,
but that there was room for pardon, or for having
those penal consequences prevented. Yet,

A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 211

IV. There seems no probability, that any tiling we
could do would alone and of itself prevent them :
prevent theii' following, or being inflicted. But one
would think, at least, it were impossible that the
contrarv should be thous-ht certain. For we are not
acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not
informed of all the reasons, which render it fit that
future punishments should be inflicted : and there-
fore cannot know, whether any thing we could do
would make such an alteration, as to render it fit
that they should be remitted. We do not knowl
what the whole natural or appointed consequences
of vice are ; nor in what way they would follow, if
not prevented : and therefore can in no sort say, 1
whether we could do any thing which would be suf- i
ficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus
manifest, let us recollect the analogy of Nature or
Providence. For, though this may be but a slight
ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in this
matter ; yet it is sufiScient to answer a mere arbi-
trary assertion, without any kind of evidence, urged
by way of objection against a doctrine, the proof
of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider
then : people ruin their fortunes by extravagance ;
they bring diseases upon themselves by excess ;
they incur the penalties of civil laws ; and surely
civil government is natural ; will sorrow for these (
follies past, and behaving well for the future, alone
and of itself prevent the natural consequences of
them 1 On the contrary, men's natural abilities of
helping themselves are often impaired : or if not, yet
they are forced to be beholden to the assistance of
others, upon several accounts, and in different ways ;
assistance which they would have had no occasion
for, had it not been for their misconduct ; but wliich,

P 2

212 THE APPOINTMENT OF

in the disadvantageous condition they have reduced
themselves to, is absolutely necessary to their re-
covery, and retrieving their affairs. Now since this
is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabi-
tants of this world, and as having a temporal interest
here, under the natural government of God, which
however has a great deal moral in it ; why is it not
supposable that this may be our case also, in our
more important capacity, as under his perfect moral
government, and having a more general and future
interest depending "? If we have misbehaved in this
higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnoxious to
the future punishment, which God has annexed to
vice : it is plainly credible, that behaving well for the
time to come may be — not useless, God forbid — but
wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that
punishment ; or to put us in the condition, which we
should have been in, had we preserved our innocence.
And though we ought to reason with all reverence
whenever we reason concerning the Divine conduct :
yet it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all
our notions of government, as well as to what is, in
fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose,
that doing well for the future should, in all cases,
prevent all the judicial bad consequences of having
done evil, or all the punishment annexed to dis-
obedience. And we have manifestly nothing from
whence to determine, in what degree, and in what
cases, reformation would prevent this punishment,
even supposing that it would in some. And though
the efficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent
what mankind had rendered themselves obnoxious
to, and recover what they had forfeited, is now
insisted upon, in opposition to Christianit}^ ; yet, by
the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over

A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 213

the heathen world, this notion, of repentance alone
being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be con-
trary to the Pfeneral sense of mankind.

Upon the whole then ; had the laws, the general
laws of God's government been permitted to operate,
without any interposition in our belialf, the future
punishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or
have any reason to think, must inevitably have fol-
lowed, notwithstanding any thing we could have
done to prevent it. Now,

V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call
it which you please, revelation comes in ; confirms
every doubting fear, which could enter into the
heart of man, concerning the future unprevented con-
sequence of wickedness; supposes the world to be
in a state of ruin ; (a supposition which seems the
very ground of the Christian dispensation, and whicli,
if not provable by reason, yet is in no wise contrary
to it ;) teaches us too, that the rules of Divine govern-
ment are such, as not to admit of pardon imme-
diately and directly upon repentance, or by the sole
efficacy of it : but then teaches at the same time,
what nature might justly have hoped, that the moral
government of the universe was not so rigid, but
that there was room for an interposition, to avert
the fatal consequences of vice ; which tlierefore, by
this means, does admit of pardon. Revelation
teaches us, that the unknown laws of God's more
general government, no less than the particular laws
by which we experience he governs us at present,
are compassionate^, as well as good in tlie more
general notion of goodness : and that he hath merci-
fully provided, that there should be an interposition
to prevent the destruction of human kind ; whatever

^ P. 208, <fcc.

214 THE APPOINTMENT OF

that destruction iinjDrevented would have been, God
so loved the world, that he gave his ofdy begotten So7i,
that ivhosoever believeth, not, to be sure, in a specu-
lative, but in a practical sense, that ivhosoever be-
lieveth 171 him, shoidd not perish ^ : gave his Son in
the same way of goodness to the world, as he affords
particular persons the friendly assistance of their
fellow creatures ; when, without it, their temporal
ruin would be the certain consequence of their fol-
lies: in the same way of goodness, I say; though
in a transcendent and infinitely higher degree. And
the Son of God loved us, and gave himself for us,
with a love, which he himself compares to that of
human friendship : though, in this case, all compari-
sons must fall infinitely short of the thing intended
to be illustrated by them. He interposed in such
a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent
that execution of justice upon sinners, which God
had appointed should otherwise have been executed
upon them : or in such a manner, as to prevent that
punishment from actually following, which, according
to the general laws of Divine government, must
have, followed the sins of the world, had it not been
for such interposition^.

c John iii. i6.

d It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even l)y the most cursory
reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing said
in this chapter, that none can have tlie benefit of the general redemp-
tion, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with
it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that several
questions, which have been brought into the subject before us, and
determined, are not in the least entered into here : questions which
have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal rashness
contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved the
world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the
general laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the

A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMIMJ. 215

If any tiling here said should appear, upon first
thought, inconsistent with Divine goodness; a second,
I am persuaded, will entirely remove that appearance.
For were we to suppose the constitution of things to
be such, as that the whole creation must have
perished, had it not been for somewhat, which God
had appointed should be, in order to prevent that
ruin : even this supposition would not be inconsist-
ent, in any degree, with the most absolutely perfect
goodness. But still it may be thought, that this whole
manner of treating the subject before us supposes
mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And
truly so it does. But it is not Christianity, Avhich
has put us into this state, Whoever will consider
the manifold miseries, and the extreme wickedness of
the world ; that the best have great wrongnesses
within themselves, which they complain of, and en-
deavour to amend ; but that the generality grow
more profligate and corrupt with age ; that heathen
moralists thought the present state to be a state of
punishment : and, what might be added, that the
earth our habitation has the appearances of being a
ruin : whoever, I say, will consider all these, and
some other obvious things, will think he lias little
reason to object against the Scripture account, that
mankind is in a state of degradation ; against this

world, wliat would have been the future condition of the better sort
of men ; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom,
Manasses in his prayer asserts, repentance was not appointed. The
meaning of the first of these questions is gi-eatly ambiguous : and
neither of them can properly be answered, without going upon that
infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the case.
And perhaps the very inquiiy, What would have followed, if God hwl
not done as he has, may have in it some very great impropriety ; and
ought not to be carried on any fui-ther, than is necessary to help our
)iartial and inadequate conceptions of things.

216 THE APPOINTMENT OF

being the fact : how difficult soever he may think
it to account for, or even to form a distinct con-
ception of the occasions and circumstances of it.
But that the crime of our first parents was the
occasion of our being placed in a more disadvan-
tageous condition, is a thing throughout and par-
ticularly analogous to what we see in the daily course
of natural Providence ; as the recovery of the world
by the interposition of Christ has been shewn to be
so in general.

VI. The particular manner in which Christ inter-
posed in the redemption of the world, or his office as
Mediator, in the largest sense, hetween God and man,
is thus represented to us in the Scripture. He is
the light of the luorld ® ; the revealer of the will of
God in the most eminent sense. He is a propitia-
tory sacrifice f ; the Lamb of God^: and, as he volun-
tarily offered himself up, he is styled our High
Priest^^. And, which seems of peculiar weight, he is
described beforehand in the Old Testament, under
the same characters of a priest, and an expiatory
victim i. And. whereas it is objected, that all this
is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of the
Mosaic Law, the Apostle on the contrary affirms,
that the Law was a shadow of good things to come,
and not the very image of the things^ : and that the
•priests that offer gifts according to the Laiv — serve
unto the exa^nple and shadoiv of heavenly things, as

^ John i. and viii. 12.

f Rom. iii. 25. and v. 1 1 ; i Cor, v. 7 ; Eph. v. 2 ; i John ii. 2 ;
Matth. xxvi. 28.

g John i. 29, 36, and throughout the Boole of Revelation.
^ Throughout the Ejjistle to the Hebrews,
i Isa. liii ; Dan. ix. 24 ; Psalm ex. 4.
1< Heb. X. I.

A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 217

Moses was admonislied of God, iclien lie was ahont
to make the tabernacle. For see, saith he, that thou
make all things according to the j^ctttern shewed to
thee in the mount ^ : i. e. the Levitical priestliood was
a shadow of the priesthood of Christ; in Uke manner
as the tabernacle made by Moses was according to
that shewed him in the mount. The priesthood of
Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were the
originals : of the former of which the Levitical
priesthood was a type; and of the latter tlie taber-
nacle made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of
this Epistle then plainly is, that the legal sacrifices
were allusions to the great and final atonement to
be made by the blood of Christ; and not that this
was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be
more express or determinate than the following
passage : It is not j^ossihle that the blood of hulls and
of goats should take away sin. Wherefore ivhen he
cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offer-
ing, i. e. of bulls and of goats, thou ivouldest not,
hut a body hast thou prepared me — Lo, I come to do
thy uill, 0 God — By which will we are sanctified,
through the offering of the hodg of Jesus Christ once
for all^^. And to add one passage more of tlie like
kind : Christ was once offered to hear the sins of
many ; and unto them that look for him shall lie
appear the second time, loithout sin ; i. e. without
bearing sin, as he did at his first coming, by being
an offering for it ; without having our iniquities
again laid upon him, without being any more a sin-
offering : — unto them that look for him shall he
appear the second time, loithout sin, unto salvation ".
Nor do the inspired writers at all confine themselves
to this manner of speaking concerning the satisfac-

1 Heb. viii. 4, 5. m Heb. x. 4, 5, 7. 9, 10. 'i Heb. ix. 28.

218 THE APPOINTMENT OF

tion of Christ ; but declare an efficacy in what he did
and suffered for us, additional to and beyond mere
instruction, example, and government, in great variety
of expression : That Jesus should die for that nation,
the Jews : and not for that nation only, hut that also,
plainly by the efficacy of his death, he shoidd gather
together in one the children of God that luere
scattered abroad '^ : thsit he suffered for sins, the just
for the unjust V: that he gave his life, himself, a
ransom^: that ive are bought, bought with a price ^ :
that he redeemed us with his blood; redeemed us
from the curse of the law, beiiig made a curse for
us^: that he is our advocate, intercessor, and p?'o-
pitiation^ : that he tvas made perfect, or consummate,
through sufferings : and being thus tnade perfect, he
became the author of salvation^: that God was in
Christ reconciling the ivorld to himself ; by the death
of his Son, by the cross ; not imputing their tres-
p>asses unto them^: and lastly, that through death he
destroyed him that had the j^oiver of death^. Christ
then having thus humbled himself and become
obedient to death, even the death of the cross ; God
also hath hiyhly exalted him, and given him a name,
ivhich is above every name : hath given all things
into his hands : hath committed all judgment unto
him ; that all men shoidd honour the Son, even as
they honour the Father^. For, worthy is the Lamb

o John xi. 51, 52. 1' I Pet. iii. 18.

q Matt. XX. 28 ; Mark x. 45; i Tim. ii. 6.
' 2 Pet. ii. i; Rev. xiv. -4; i Cor. vi. 20.
8 I Pet. i. 19; Rev. V. 9; Gal. iii. 13.
t Heb. vii. 25 ; i Jolm ii. i, 2.
" Heb. ii. 10. and v. 9.
w 2 Cor. v. 19; Rom. v. 10; Eph. ii. 16.

^ Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of
Job, xxxiii. 24. >' Phil, ii. 8, 9; John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23.

A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 219

that luas slain to receive iioiuer, and riches, and
luisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and
blessing. And every creature which is in heaven,
and on the earth — heard /, saying, Blessiiig, a7id
honour, and glory, and power, he unto him that
sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever
and ever"^.

These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend
and express tlie chief parts of Christ's office, as
Mediator between God and man, so far, I mean, as
the nature of this his office is revealed ; and it is
usually treated of by divines under three heads :

First, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet :
that Prophet that shoidd come into the ivorld^, to
declare the Divine will. He published anew the
law of nature, which men had corrupted; and the
very knowledge of which, to some degree, was lost
among them. He taught mankind, taught us au-
thoritatively, to live soberly, righteously, and godly
in this present world, in expectation of the future
judgment of God. He confirmed the truth of this
moral system of nature, and gave us additional
evidence of it ; the evidence of testimony^. He
distinctly revealed the manner, in which God would
be worshipped, the efficacy of repentance, and the
rewards and punishments of a future life. Thus he
was a prophet in a sense in which no other ever was.
To wliich is to be added, tliat he set us a perfect
example, that we should follow his stci^s.

Secondly, He has a kingdom ichich is not of this
world. He founded a Church, to be to mankind a
standing memorial of religion, and invitation to it;
which he promised to be with always even to the
end. He exercises an invisible government over it,

'- Rev. V. 12, 13. » Jolin vi. 14. b Page 154, kc.

220 THE APPOINTMENT OP

himself, and by his Spirit: over that part of it,
which is mihtant here on earth, a government of
discipHne, for the perfecting of the saints, for the
edifying his hodi/ : till ive all come in the unity
of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God,
unto a perfect man, unto the ^neasure of the stature
of the fulness of Christ^. Of this Church, all
persons scattered over the world, who live in
obedence to his laws, are members. For these he
is gone to jyrepare a place, and vnll come again to
receive them unto himself, that where he is, there
they may he also ; and reign with him for ever and
ever^: and likewise to take vengeance on them that
knoiv not God, and obey not his Gosp)el^.

Against these parts of Christ's office I find no
objections, but what are fully obviated in the begin-
ning of this chapter.

Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacri-
fice, and made atonement for the sins of the world;
which is mentioned last, in regard to what is objected
against it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded
the Jews, and obtained amongst most other nations,
from, tradition, whose original probably was revela-
tion. And they were continually repeated, both
occasionally, and at the returns of stated times : and
made up great part of the external religion of man-
kind. But notv once in the end of the ivorld Christ
appeared to put away si^i by the sacrifice of him-
self^. And this sacrifice was, in the highest degree
and with the most extensive influence, of that efficacy
for obtaining pardon of sin, which the heathens may
be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to have

<• Epli. iv. 12, 13. *1 John xiv. 2, 3; Rev. iii. 21. and xi. 15.
< 2 Thess. i. 8. t Heb. ix. 26.

A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMED. 221

been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in
some degree, and with regard to some persons.

How and in what particular way it had this effi-
cacy, there are not wanting persons who have en-
deavoured to explain : but I do not find that the
Scripture has explained it. We seem to be very
much in the dark concern ino- the manner in which
the ancients understood atonement to be made, i.e.
pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the
Scripture has, as surely it has, left this matter of
the satisfaction of Christ, mysterious, left somewhat
in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if
not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor
has any one reason to complain for want of farther
information, unless he can shew his claim to it.

Some have endeavoured to explain the efficacy of
what Christ has done and suffered for us, bevond
what the Scripture has authorized : others, probably
because they could not explain it, have been for
taking it away, and confining his office as Redeemer
of the world to his instruction, example, and govern-
ment of the church. Whereas the doctrine of the
Gospel appears to be, not only that he taught the
efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy
w^hich it is, by what he did and suffered for us :
that he obtained for'us the benefit of having our
repentance accepted unto eternal life : not only that
he revealed to sinners, that they were in a capacity
of salvation, and how they might obtain it ; but
moreover that he put them into this capacity of
salvation, by what he did and sufiered for them ;
put us into a capacity of escaping future punishment,
and obtaining future happiness. And it is our wisdom
thankfully to accept tlie Ijenefit, by performing the
conditions, upon which it is offered, on our part,

222 THE APPOINTMENT OF

without disputing liow it was procured on bis.
For,

VII. Since we neither know by what means
punishment in a future state would have followed
wickedness in this ; nor in what manner it would
have been inflicted, had it not been prevented ; nor
aU the reasons why its infliction would have been
needful ; nor the particular nature of that state of
happiness, which Christ is gone to prepare for his
disciples : and since we are ignorant how far any
thing which we could do, would, alone and of itself,
have been effectual to prevent that punishment, to
which we were obnoxious, and recover that hap-
piness, which we had forfeited ; it is most evident
we are not judges, antecedently to revelation, whether
a mediator was or was not necessary, to obtain those
ends : to prevent That future punishment, and bring
mankind to the final happiness of their nature. And
for the very same reasons, upon supposition of the
necessity of a mediator, we are no more judges, ante-
cedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his
ofiice, or the several parts of which it consists; of
what was fit and requisite to be assigned him, in
order to accomplish the ends of Divine providence in
the appointment. And from hence it follows, that
to object against the expediency or usefulness of par-
ticular things, revealed to have been done or suffered
by him, because we do not see how they were con-
ducive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing
is more common to be met with, than this absurdity.
But if it be acknowledged beforehand, that we are
not judges in the case, it is evident that no objection
can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against
any particular part of Christ's mediatorial office re-
vealed in Scripture, till it can be shewn positively

A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 223

not to be requisite or conducive to the ends pro-
posed to be accomplished ; or that it is in itself
unreasonable.

And there is one objection made against the satis-
faction of Christ, which looks to be of this positive
kind : that the doctrine of his being appointed to
suffer for the sins of the world, represents God as
being indifferent whether he punished the innocent
or the guilty. Now from the foregoing observations
we may see the extreme slightness of all such objec-
tions ; and (though it is most certain all who make
them do not see the consequence) that they conclude
altogether as much against God's whole original con-
stitution of nature, and the whole daily course of
Divine providence in the government of the world,
i. e. against the whole scheme of Theism and the
whole notion of Eeligion, as against Christianity.
For the world is a constitution or system, whose
parts have a mutual reference to each other: and
there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on,
called the course of nature, to the carrying on of
which God has appointed us, in various ways, to con-
tribute. And when, in the dailv course of natural
providence, it is appointed that innocent people
shoiiTd suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable
to the very same objection, as the instance we are
now considering. The infinitely greater importance
"of that appointment of Christianity, which is objected
against, does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly
is, an appointment of the very same kind, with what
the world affords us daily examples of Nay, if there
were any force at all in the objection, it would Ije
stronger, in one respect, against natural providence,
than against Christianity : because under the former
we are in many cases commanded, and even neces-

224 THE APPOINTMENT OF

\ sitated wlietlier we will or no, to suffer for the faults
1 of others ; whereas the sufferings of Christ were volun-
l tary. The world's being under the righteous govern-
ment of God does indeed imply, that finally and upon
the whole every one shall receive according to his
personal deserts : and the general doctrine of the
whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion
of the Divine government. But during the progress,
and, for ought we know, even in order to the com-
r pletion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments
j I may be fit, and absolutely necessary. Men by their
' follies run themselves into extreme distress ; into
difiiculties which would be absolutely fatal to them,
were it not for the interposition and assistance of
others. God commands by the law of nature, that
we afford them this assistance, in many cases ^^^here
we cannot do it without very great pains, and labour,
and sufferings to ourselves. And we see in what
variety of ways one person's sufferings contribute to
the relief of another : and how, or by what particular
means, this comes to pass, or follows, from the con-
stitution and laws of nature, which come under our
notice : and, being familiarized to it, men are not
shocked with it. So that the reason of their insisting
upon objections of the foregoing kind against the
satisfaction of Christ is, either that they do not
consider God's settled and uniform appointments as
his appointments at all; or else they forget that
vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of
every day's experience : and then, from their being
unacquainted with the more general laws of nature
or Divine government over the world, and not seeing
how the sufferings of Christ could contribute to tlie
redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical
will ; they conclude his sufferings could not contri-

A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 225

bute to it any other way. And yet, what has been
often alleged in justification of this doctrine, even
from the apparent natural tendency of this method
of our redemption ; its tendency to vindicate the
authority of God's laws, and deter his creatures from
sin ; this has never yet been answered, and is, I
think, plainly unanswerable : though I am fjxr from
thinking it an account of the whole of the case. But
without taking this into consideration, it abundantly
appears, from the observations above made, that this
objection is, not an objection against Christianity, but
against the whole general constitution of nature.
And if it were to be considered as an objection
against Christianity, or considering it as it is, an ob-
jection against the constitution of natiu-e ; it amounts
to no more in conclusion than this, that a Divine
appointment cannot be necessary or expedient, be-
cause the objectgr^jdoes not discern it to be so :
though lie must own that the nature of the case
is such, as renders him incapable of judging, whether
it be so or not ; or of seeing it to be necessary,
though it were so.

It is indeed a matter of great patience to reason-
able men, to find people arguing in this manner :
objectmg against the credibihty of such particular
things revealed m Scripture, that they do not see L''^^
the necessity or expediency of them. For though
it is highly right, and the most pious exercise of
our understanding, to inquire with due reverence
into the ends and reasons of God's dispensations :
yet when those reasons are concealed, to argue from
our~~Tglior9,nce7" that sucli dispensations cainiot be
from God, is'T^finitely absurd. The presumption
of this kind of objections seems almost lost in the
folly of them. And the folly of them is yet greater,

BUTLER, ANALOGY. Q

\

226 THE APPOINTMENT OF

when they are urged, as usually tliey are, against
things in Christianity analogous or like to those
natural dispensations of Providence, which are matter
.<of experience. Let reason be kept to : and if any
part of the Scripture account of the redemption of
the world by Christ can be shewn to be really con-
trary to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God,
be given up : but let not such poor creatures as we
go on objecting against an infinite scheme, that we
do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts,
and call this reasoning / and, which still farther
heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts
which we are not actively concerned in. For it may
be worth mentioning.

Lastly, That not only the reason of the thing, but
the whole analogy of nature, should teach us, not to
expect to have the like information concerning the
Divine conduct, as concerning our own duty. God
instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, but
experience which instructs us,) what good or bad
consequences will follow from our acting in such and
such manners : and by this he directs us, how we are
to behave ourselves. But, though we are sufiiciently
instructed for the common purposes of life : yet it is
but an almost infinitely small part of natural pro-
vidence, which we are at all let into. The case is
the same with regard to revelation. The doctrine
of a mediator between God and man, against Avhich
it is objected, that the expediency of some things
in it is not understood, relates only to what was
done on God's part in the appointment, and on the
mediator's in the execution of it. For what is re-
quired of us, in consequence of this gracious dispen-
sation, is another subject, in wliich none can complain
for want of information. The constitution of the

A JIEDIATOK AND HKDEEMER. 227

world, and God's natural government over it, is all
mystery, as much as the Christian dispensation. Yet
under the first he has given men all things pertain-
'ing to life; and under the other, all things pertaining
unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is
nothing hard to be accoimted for in any of the com-
mon precepts of Christianity : though if there were,
surely, a Divine command is abundantly sufficient to
lay us under the strongest obligations to obedience.
But the fact is, that the reasons of all the Christian
precepts are evident. Positive institutions are mani-
festly necessary to keep up and propagate religion
amongst mankind. And our duty to Christ, the ui-
ternal and external worship of him ; this part of the
religion of the Gospel manifestly arises out of what
he has done and suffered, his authority and dominion,
and the relation which he is revealed to stand in
to us^.

CHAP. VI.

Of the want of nniversality in rerelation : and of the supposed
deficiency in the proof of it.

It has been thought l)y some persons, that if the
evidence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself
turns into a positive argument against it : because
it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would
be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And the
objection against revelation from its not being uni-
versal is often insisted upon as of great weight.

K P. l6l, &c.
Q 2

228 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:

Now the weakness of these opinions may be
shewn, by observing the suppositions on which they
are founded : which are really such as these ; that
it cannot be thought God would have bestowed
any favour at all upon us, unless in the degree,
which, we think, he might, and which, we imagine,
would be most to our particular advantage ; and
also that it cannot be thought he would bestow
a favour upon any, unless he bestowed the same
upon all : suppositions, which we find contradicted,
not by a few instances in God's natural govern-
ment of the world, but by the general analogy of
nature together.

Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as
doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulness as a
positive argument against it, should be put upon
considering, what that evidence indeed is, which
they act upon with regard to their temporal inter-
ests. For, it is not only extremely difficult, but in
many cases absolutely impossible, to balance pleasure
and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to be
able to say on which side the overplus is. There
are the like difficulties and impossibilities in making
the due allowances for a change of temper and
taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill health : any of which
render men incapable of enjoying, after they have
obtained what they most eagerly desired. Num-
berless too are the accidents, besides that one of
untimely death, which may even probably disap-
point the best concerted schemes : and strong objec-
tions are often seen to lie against them, not to be
removed or answered, but which seem overbalanced
by reasons on the other side ; so as that the cer-
tain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by
every one, thought justly disregarded, upon account

SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 229

of the appearing greater advantages in case of suc-
cess, though there be but little probability of it.
Lastly, every one observes our liableness, if we be
not upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood
of men, and the false appearances of things : and
this danger must be greatly increased, if there be
a strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion,
to favour the deceit. Hence arises that great un-
certainty and doubtfulness of proof, wherein our
temporal interest really consists ; what are the most
probable means of attaining it ; and whether those
means will eventually be successfid. And number-
less instances there are, in the daily course of life,
in which all men think it reasonable to engage in
pursuits, though the probability is greatly agamst
succeeding ; and to make such provision for them-
selves, as it is supposable they may have occasion
for, though the plain acknowledged probability is,
that thev never shall. Then those who think the
objection against revelation, from its light not being
universal, to be of weight, should observe, that the
Author of Nature, in numberless instances, bestows
That upon some, which he does not upon others,
who seem equally to stand in need of it. Indeed
he appears to bestow all his gifts with the most
promiscuous variety among creatures of the same
species : health and strength, capacities of prudence
and of knowledge, means of improvement, riches,
and all external advantages. And as there are not
any two men found, of exactly Hke shape and fea-
tures ; so it is probable there are not any two, of
an exactly like constitution, temper and situation,
with regard to the goods and evils of life. Yet,
notwithstanding these uncertainties and varieties,
God does exercise a natural government over the

230 KEVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL :

world : and there is such a thing as a prudent and
imprudent institution of Hfe, with regard to our
health and our affairs, under that his natural
government.

As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation
have been universal ; and as they have been afforded
to a greater or less part of the world, at different
times ; so likewise, at different times, both revela-
tions have had different degrees of evidence. The
Jews who lived during the succession of prophets,
that is, from Moses till after the Captivity, had
higher evidence of the truth of religion, than those
had, who lived in the interval between the last-
mentioned period and the coming of Christ. And
the first Christians had higher evidence of the mira-
cles wrought in attestation of Christianity, than
what we have now. They had also a strong pre-
sumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of much
greater force, in way of argument, than many think,
of which we have very little remaining ; I mean
the presumptive proof of its truth, from the influ-
ence which it had upon the lives of the generality
of its. professors. And we, or future ages, may pos-
sibly have a proof of it, which they could not have,
from the conformity between the prophetic history,
and the state of the world and of Christianity. And
farther : if we were to suppose the evidence, which
some have of religion, to amount to little more than
seeing that it may be true ; but that they remain
in great doubts and uncertainties about both its
evidence and its nature, and great perplexities con-
cerning the rule of life : others to have a full con-
viction of the truth of religion, with a distinct
knowledge of their duty; and others severally to
have all the intermediate degrees of religious light

SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PIIOOF. 231

and evidence, which lie between these two — if we
put the case, that for the present, it was intended,
revelation should be no more than a small liuht.
in the midst of__a_ world greatly overspread, not-
withstanding it, with ignorance and darkness : that
certain glimmerings of this light should extend, and
be directed, to remote distances, in such a manner
as that those who really partook of it should not
discern from whence it originally came : that some
in a nearer situation to it should have its light
obscured, and, in diiferent ways and degrees, inter-
cepted : and that others should be placed within
its clearei' influence, and be much more enlivened,
cheered, and directed by it ; but yet that even to
these it should be no more than alkjht shining in
a dark, place: all this would be perfectly uniform,
and of a piece with the conduct of Providence, in
the distribution of its other blessings. If the fact
of the case really were, that some have received
no light at all from the Scripture ; as many ages
and countries in the heathen world : that others,
though they have, by means of it, had essential or
natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet
have never had the genuine Scripture-revelation,
with its real evidence, proposed to their considera-
tion ; and the ancient Persians and modern Maho-
metans may possibly be instances of peo[»]e in a
situation somewhat like to this : that others, though
they have had the Scripture laid before them as of
Divine revelation, yet have had it with the system and
evidence of Christianity so interpolated, the system
so corrupted, the evidence so blended with false
miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubt-
fulness and uncertainty about the whole ; which
may be the state of some thouglitful men, in most

232 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL :

of those nations who call themselves Christian : and
lastly, that others have had Christianity offered to
them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper
evidence, as persons in countries and churches of
civil and of Christian libertv; but however that
even these persons are left in great ignorance in
many respects, and have by no means light afforded
them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to
regulate their life, to teach them their duty, and
encourage them in the careful discharge of it : I
say, if we were to suppose this somewhat of a
general true account of the degrees of moral and
religious light and" evidence, which were intended
to be afforded mankind, and of what has actuallv
been and is their situation, in their moral and reli-
gious capacity; there would be nothing in all this
i ignorance, doubtfulness and uncertainty, in all these
I varieties, and supposed disadvantages of some in
comparison of others, respecting religion, but may be
paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural dis-
pensations of Providence at present, and considering
ourselves merely in our temporal capacity.

l^or is there any thing shocking in all this, or
which "would seem to bear hard upon the moral ad-
ministration in nature, if we would really keep in
mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably with :
instead of forgetting this, or explaining it away,
after it is acknowledged in words. All shadow of
injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in this
various economy of Providence, would be lost; if we
would keep in mind, that every merciful allowance
shall be made, and no more be required of any one,
^ than what might have been equitably expected of
/' him, from the circumstances in which he was placed ;
and not what might have been expected, had he

SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 233

been placed in other circumstances : i. e. in Scripture
language, that every man shall be accepted accord-
ing to ivhat he had, not according to ivhat he had
not^. This however doth not by any means imply,
that all persons' condition here is equally advan-
tageous with respect to futurity. And Providence's
designing to place some in greater darkness with
respect to religious knowledge, is no more a reason
why they should not endeavour to get out of that
darkness, and others to bring them out of it ; than
why ignorant and slow people in matters of other
knowledge should not endeavour to learn, or should
not be instructed.

It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same
wise and good principle, whatever it was, which dis-
posed the Author of nature to make different kinds
and orders of creatures, disposed him also to place
creatures of like kinds in different situations : and
that the same principle which disposed him to make
creatures of different moral capacities, disposed him
also to place creatures of like moral capacities in
different religious situations ; and even the same
creatures, in different periods of their being. And
the account or reason of this is also most probably
the account why the constitution of things is such,
as that creatures of moral natures or capacities, for
a considerable part of that duration in which they
are living agents, are not at all subjects of morality
and religion ; but grow up to be so, and grow up
to be so more and more, gradually from cliildhood
to mature age.

Wliat, in particular, is the account or reason of
these things we must be greatly in the dark, were it
only that we know so very little even of our own

a 2 Cor. viii. 12.

234 REVEIiATlON NOT UNIVERSAL:

case. Our present state may possibly be the con-
sequence of somewhat past, which we are wholly
ignorant of : as it has a reference to somewhat to
come, of which we know scarce any more than is
necessary for practice. A system or constitution, in
its notion, implies variety ; and so complicated an
one as this world, very great variety. So that
were revelation universal, yet, from men's different
capacities of understanding, from the different
lengths of their lives, their different educations anH
other external circumstances, and from their dif-
ference of temper and bodily constitution ; their
religious situations would be widely different, and
the disadvantage of some in comparison of others,
perhaps, altogether as much as at present. And
the true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or
such a part of mankind, are placed in this condi-
tion of ignorance, must be supposed also the true
account of our farther ignorance, in not knowing
the reasons why, or whence it is, that they are
placed in this condition. But the follownng practical
reflections may deserve the serious consideration of
those persons, who think the circumstances of man-
kind or their own, in the foremen tioned respects, a
ground of complaint.

First, The evidence of Religion not appearing ob-
vious, may constitute one particular part of some
men's trial in the religious sense : as it gives scope,
for a virtuous exercise or vicious neglect of their
understanding, in examining or not examining into
that evidence. There seems no possible reason to be
given, why we may not be in a state of moral
-probation, with regard to the exercise of our under-
standing upon the subject of religion, as we are with
regard to our behaviour in common affairs. The

SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 235

former is as much a thing within our ])ower and
choice as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid
down for certain, that the same character, the same
inward principle, which, after a man is convinced of
the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the
precepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced,
set him about an examination of it, upon its system
and evidence being offered to his thoughts: and that
in the latter state his examination would be with
an impartiahty, seriousness, and solicitude, propor-
tionable to what his obedience is in the former.
And as inattention, negligence, want of all serious
concern, about a matter of such a nature and such
importance, when oifered to men's consideration, is,
before a distinct conviction of its truth, as real im-
moral depra\dty and dissoluteness ; as neglect of
religious practice after such conviction : so active so-
licitude about it, and fair impartial consideration of
its evidence before such conviction, is as reallv an
exercise of a morally right temper ; as is religious
practice after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively
true, but a matter of deduction and inference ; that
a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every
one, but left to be, by some, collected with heedful
attention to premises ; this as much constitutes
I'eligious probation, as much affords sphere, scope,
opportunity, for right and wrong behaviour, as any
thing whatever does. And their manner of treating
this subject, when laid before them, shews what is
in their heart, and is an exertion of it.

Secondly, It appears to be a thing as evident,
though it is not so much attended to, that if, upon
consideration of religion, the evidence of it should
seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest sup-
posable degree ; even this doubtful evidence will,

236 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL :

however, put them into a general state of ^rohation in
the moral and religious sense. For, suppose a man
to be really in doubt, whether such a person had not
done him the greatest favour ; or, whether his whole
temporal interest did not depend upon that person :
no one, who had any sense of gratitude and of
prudence, could possibly consider himself in the same
situation, with regard to such person, as if he had
no such doubt. In truth, it isas just, to say, that
certainty and doubt are the same ; as to say, the
situations now mentioned would leave a man as
entirely at liberty in point of gratitude or prudence,
as he would be, were he certain he had received no
favour from such person, or that he no way depended
upon him. And thus, though the evidence of religion
which is afforded to some men should be little more
than that they are given to see the system of Chris-
tianity, or religion in general, to be supposable^ and
credible ; this ought in all reason to beget a serious
practical apprehension, that it may be true. And
even this will afford matter of exercise for religious
suspense and deliberation, for moral resolution and
self-government ; because the apprehension that re-
ligion may be true does as really lay men under
obligations, as a full conviction that it is true. It
gives occasion and motives to consider farther the
important subject ; to preserve attentively upon their
minds a general implicit sense that they may be under
Divine moral government, an awful solicitude about
religion, whether natural or revealed. Such appre-
hension ought to turn men's eyes to every degree
of new light which may be had, from whatever side
it comes ; and induce them to refrain, in the mean
time, from all immoralities, and live in the conscien-
tious practice of every common virtue. Especially

SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 237

are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from
all dissokite profaneness ; for this the very nature of
the case forbids ; and to treat with highest reverence
a matter, upon which their own whole interest and
being, and the fate of nature, depends. This behaviour,
and an active endeavour to maintain within themselves
this temper, is the business, the duty, and the wisdom
of those persons, who complain of the doubtfuhiess
of religion : is what they are under the most proper
obligations to. And such behaviour is an exertion
of, and has a tendency to improve in them, that
character, which the practice of all the several duties
of religion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an
exeition of, and has a tendency to improve in others:
others, I say, to whom God has afforded such con-
viction. Nay, considering the infinite importance of
religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may
"Be said in general that whoever will weigh the
matter thorouglily may see, there is not near so
much difference, as is commonly imagined, between
what ought in reason to be the rule of life, to those
persons who are fully convinced of its truth, and
to those who have only a serious doubting appre-
hension, that it may be true. Their hopes and fears
and obligations, will be m various degrees : but, as
the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the
same ; so the subject-matter of their obligations, what
they are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so
very unlike.

It is to be observed farther, that, from a character
of understanding, or a situation of influence in the
w^orld, some persons have it in their power to do
infinitely more harm or good, by setting an example
of profaneness and avowed disregard to all religion,
or, on the contrary, of a serious, though perhaps

\

238 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL :

doTibting, apprehension of its truth, and of a reverend
regard to it under this doubtfuhiess ; than they can
do, by acting well or ill m all the common inter-
courses amongst mankind. And consequently they
are most highly accountable for a behaviour, which,
they may easily foresee, is of such importance, and
in whicli there is most plainly a right and a wrong ;
even admitting the evidence of religion to be as
doubtful as is pretended.

The ground of these observations, and that which
renders them just and true, is, that doubting neces-
sarily implies some degree of evidence for that,"of
which we doubt. For no person would be in doubt
concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so
circumstanced, which should accidentallv come into
his thoughts, and of which he had no evidence at
all. And though in the case of an even chance, and
where consequently we were in doubt, we should in
common language say, that we had no evidence at all
for either side ; yet that situation of things, which
renders it an even chance and no more, that such an
event will happen, renders this case equivalent to
all others, where there is such evidence on both sides^
of a question^, as leaves the mind in doubt concern-
ing the truth. Indeed in all these cases, there is no
more evidence on one side than on the other ; but
there is (what is equivalent to) much more for either,
than for the truth of a number of facts, which come
into one's thoughts at random. And thus, in all
these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence,
lower degrees of evidence, as belief presupposes
higher, and certainty higher still. Any one, who
will a little attend to the nature of evidence, will
easily carry this observation on, and see, that between

b Introduction.

SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 239

no evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords
ground of doubt, there are as many intermediate
degrees, as there are, between that degree which is
the ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though
w^e have not faculties to distinguish these degrees of
evidence with any sort of exactness ; yet, in propor-
tion as they are discerned, they ought to influence
our practice. For it Is as real an imperfection in
the moral character, not to be influenced in practice
by a lower degree of evidence when discerned, as it
is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, in
all subjects which men consider, they discern the
lower as well as higher degrees of evidence, propor-
tionably to their capacity of understanding ; so, in
practical subjects, they are influenced in practice, by
the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportion-
ably to their fairness and honesty. And as, in pro-
portion to defects in the understanding, men are
unapt to see lower degrees of evidence, are in danger
of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, and
are easily imposed upon in such cases ; so, in propor-
tion to the corruption of the heart, they seem capable
of satisfying themselves with having no regard in
practice to evidence acknowledged real, if it be not
overbearing. From these things it must follow, that
doubting concerning religion implies such a degree of
evidence for it, as, joined with the consideration of
its importance, unquestionably lays men under tlie
obligations before mentioned, to have a dutiful regard
to it in all their behaviour.

Thirdlv, The difficulties in which the evidence of
religion is involved, which some complain of, is no
more a just ground of complaint, than the external
circumstances of temptation, which others are placed
in ; or than difliculties in the practice of it, after a

240 EEVELATION NOT UNIA^EESAL :

full conviction of its truth. Temptations render
our state a more improving state of discipline*^,
than it would be otherwise : as they give occasion
for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous prin-
ciple, which coniirms and strengthens it more, than
an easier or less attentive exercise of it could. Now
speculative difficulties are, in this respect, of the
very same nature with these external temptations.
For the evidence of rehgion not appearing obvious,
is to some persons a temptation to reject it, without
any consideration at all ; and therefore requires
such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle,
seriously to consider that evidence, as there would
be no occasion for, but for such temptation. And
the supposed doubtfidness of its evidence, after it
has been in some sort considered, affords opportunity
to an unfair mind of explaining away, and deceit-
fullv hiding; from itself, that evidence which it mio-ht
see; and also for men's encouraging themselves
in vice, from hopes of impunity, though they do
clearly see thus much at least, that these hojDcs are
uncertain : in like manner as the common tempta^
tion to many instances of folly, which end in tem-
poral infamy and ruin, is, the ground for hope of
not being detected, and of escaping with impunity;
i. e. the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that
such foolish behaviour will thus end in infamy and
ruin. On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in
the evidence of religion calls for a more careful and
attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly
yielding themselves up to the proper influence of
any real evidence, though doubtful ; and in practis-
ing conscientiously all virtue, though under some
uncertainty, whether the government in the universe

c Part I. chap. v.

SUPPOSED DEFICIEXCY IX ITS PROOF. 241

may not possibly be such, as that vice may escape
with impunity. And in general, temptation, mean-
ing by this word the lesser allurements to \\i()ng
and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well
as the greater ones; temptation, I say, as such and
of every kind and degree, as it calls forth some vir-
tuous efforts, additional to what would otherwise
have been wanting, cannot but be an additional
discipline and improvement of virtue, as well as
probation of it in the other senses of that word'*.
So that the very same account i^ tobe given, why
the evidence of religion should be left in such a
manner, as to require, in some, an attentive, solici-
tous, perhaps painful exercise of their understanding
about it; aswhj_others should be placed in such
circumstances, as that the practice of its common
duties, after a full conviction of the truth of it, should
require attention, solicitude, and pains : or, why ap-
pearing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford
matter of temptation to some ; as why external
difficulties and allurements should be permitted to
affi^rd matter of temptation to others. The same
account also is to be given, why some should be
exercised with temptations of both these kinds •
as why others should be exercised with the latter
in such very high degrees, as some have been, par-
ticularly as the primitive Christians were.

Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing,
that the speculative difficulties, in which the evi-
dence of religion is involved, may make even the
principal part of some peisons' trial. For as the
chief temptations of the generality of the world are
the ordinary motives to injustice or unrestrained
pleasure; or to live in the neglect of religion froni

^ Part I. oliiip. iv. and i». 109, i 10.]

BUTLER, AN^U>OGY. K

242 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:

that frame of mind, which renders many persons
almost without feeHng as to any thing distant, or
which is not the object of their senses : so there
are other persons without this shallowness of temper,
persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible
and future ; who not only see, but have a general
practical feeling, that what is to come will be
present, and that things are not less real for their
not being the objects of sense ; and who, from their
natural constitution of body and of temper, and from
their external condition, may have small tempta-
tions to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well,
in the common course of life. Now when these
latter persons have a distinct full conviction of the
truth of religion, without any possible doubts or
difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoidable,
unless they will do a constant violence to their own
minds ; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to
them, than it is to creatures in a state of perfection.
Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of
moral discipline and exercise in a higher degree,
than they would have by such an easy practice of
religion. Or it may be requisite, for reasons un-
known to us, that they should give some further
manifestation*^ what is their moral character, to the
creation of God, than such a practice of it would
be. Thus in the great variety of religious situations
in which men are placed, what constitutes, what
chiefly and peculiarly constitutes, the probation, in
all senses, of some persons, may be the difficulties in
which the evidence of rehgion is involved : and their
principal and distinguished trial may be, how they
will behave under and with respect to these difficul-
ties. Circumstances in men's situation, in their

^ P. 109, 1 10.

SUPPOSED DEFICIEXCV IN ITS PROOF. 243

temporal capacity, analogous in good measure to this
respecting religion, are to be observed. We find
some persons are placed in such a situation in the
world, as that their chief difficulty with regard to
conduct, is not the doing what is prudent when it
is known; for this, in numberless cases, is as easy
as the contrary: but to some the principal exercise
is, recollection and being iijDon their guard against
deceits, the deceits suppose of those about them ;
against false appearances of reason and prudence.
To persons in some situations, the principal exer-
cise with respect to conduct is, attention in order
to inform themselves what is proper, what is really
the reasonable and prudent part to act.

But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition,
that men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of reli-
gion is not owing to their neglects or prejudices ;
it must be added, on the other hand, in all common
reason, and as what the truth of the case plainly
requires should be added, that such dissatisfaction
possibly may be owing to those, possibly may be
men's own fault. For,

If there are any persons, who never set them-
selves heartily and in earnest to be informed in re-
ligion; if there are any, who secretly wish it may
not prove true ; and are less attentive to evidence
than to difficulties, and more to objections than to
what is said in answer to them : these persons will
scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing the
evidence of religion, though it were most certainly
true, and capable of being ever so fully proved. If
any accustom themselves to consider this subject
usually in the way of mirth and sport : if they
attend to forms and representations, and inadequate
maimers of expression, instead of the real tilings

K 2

244 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:

intended by them : (for signs often can be no more
than inadequately expressive of the things signi-
fied :) or if tliey substitute human errors in the
room of Divine truth ; why may not all, or any of
these things, hmder some men from seeing that
evidence, which really is seen by others ; as a like
turn of mind, with respect to matters of common
speculation and practice, does, we find by experience,
hinder them from attaining that knowledge and
right understanding, in matters of common specula-
tion and practice, which more fair and attentive
-minds attain to 1 And the effect will be the same,
whether their neglect of seriously considering the
evidence of religion, and their indirect behaviour
with regard to it, proceed from mere carelessness,
or from the grosser vices ; or whether it be owing
to this, that forms and figurative manners of ex-
pression, as wel] as errors, administer occasions of
ridicule, when the things intended, and the truth
itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous
turn so far as to lose all sense of conduct and pru-
dence in worldly affairs, and even, as it seems, to
impair their faculty of reason. And in general,
levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice, do hin-
der us from being rightly informed, with respect to
common things : and they may, in like manner, and
perhaps in some farther providential manner, with
respect to moral and religious subjects: may hinder
evidence from being laid before us, and from being
seen when it is. The Scripture ^ does declare, that\

f Dan. xii. lo. See also Is. xxix. 13, 14; Mattli. vi. 23. and
xi. 25. and xiii. 11, 12 ; John iii. 19. and v. 44 ; i Cor. ii. 14. and
2 Cor. iv. 4 ; 2 Tim. iii. 13 ; and that affectionate as well as authori-
tative admonition, so very many times inculcated, ffe that hath ears
to hear, let him hear. Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in

SLUTOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS TUOOF. 245

j every one shall 7iot understand. And it makes n<>
difference, by what providential conduct this comes
to pass : whether the evidence of Christianity was, ori-
ginally and with design, put and left sOjjs that those
who^are^ desirous, of evading moral obligations should
not see it; and that honest-minded persons should:
or, whether it comes to pass by any other means.

Farther : The general proof of natural religion and
of Christianity does, I tliiuk, lie level to common
men ; even those, the greatest part of whose time,
from childhood to old age, is taken up with providing
for themselves and their families the common con-
veniences, perhaps necessaries, of life : those, I mean,
of this rank, who ever think at all of asking after
proof, or attending to it. Common men, were they
as much in earnest about religion, as about their
temporal affairs, are cajmble of being convinced upon
real _evidence, that there is a God who governs the
world: and they feel themselves to be of a moral
nature, and accomitable creatures. And as Christi-
anity entirely falls in with this their natural sense of
things, so they are capable, not only of being per-
suaded, but of being made to see, that there is evi-
dence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and
many appearing completions of prophecy. But
though this proof is real and conclusive, yet it is
liable to objectTons and may be run up into difficul-
ties ; which, however, persons who are capabTe, 'not'
only of talking of, but of really seeing, are cap-
able also of seeing through : i. e. not of clearing up

these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to say,
that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have
been, for this very purpose : Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam laj>is
esset Lyclius ad quern hujenia sanahilia exiilorarentur. De Ver. R.
C. lib. ii. towards the end.

\

246 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:

and answering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity,
for of such knowledge we are not capable with re-
spect to any one thing in nature ; but capable of
seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficul-
ties, or destroyed by these objections. But then a
thorough examination into religion, with regard to
these objections, which cannot be the business of
every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and,
from the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as
well as time and attention ; to see, how the evidence
comes out, upon balancing one thing with another,
and what, upon the whole, is the amount of it.
Now if persons who have picked up these objec-
tions from others, and take for granted they are of
weight, upon the word of those from whom they
received them, or, by often retailing of them, come
to see, or fancy they see them to be of weight ; will
not prepare themselves for such an examination,
with a competent degree of knowledge ; or will not
give that time and attention to the subject, which,
from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such
information : in this case, they must remain in doubt-
fulness, ignorance, or error ; in the same way as they
must, with regard to common sciences, and matters
of common life, ^ they neglect the necessary means
of being informed in them.

But still perhaps it will be objected, that if a
prince or common master were to send directions to
a servant, he would take care, that they should
always bears the certain mark, who they came from,
and that their sense should be always plain : so as
that there should be no possible doubt, if he could
help it, concerning the authority or meaning of them.
Now the proper answer to all this kind of objecti(3ns
is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain

SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PltouF. 247

we cannot argue thus with respect to Him, who is
the governor of the world : and particularly that he
does not afford us such information, \\ith respect to
our temporal affairs and interests, as experience
abundantly shews. However, there is a full answer
to this objection, from the very nature of religion.
For, the reason why a prince would give his direc-
tions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely
desires such an external action should be done,
without concerning himself with the motive or
principle upon which it is done : i. e. he regards only
the external event, or the thing's being done ; and
not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the
action. Whereas the whole of morality and religion
consisting merely in action itself, there is no sort of
parallel between the cases. But if tlie prince be
supposed to regard only the action ; i. e. only to
desire to exercise, or in any sense prove, the under-
standing or loyalty of a servant ; he would not
always give his orders in such a plain manner. It
may be proper to add, that the will of God, respect-
_^ing morality and reUgion, may be considered either
as absolute, or as only conditional. If it be abso-
lute, it can only be thus, that we should act vir-
tuously in such given circumstances ; not that we
should be brouglit to act so, by his changing of our
circumstances. And if God's will be thus absolute,
then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest
sense, to do or to contradict his will ; which is a
most weighty consideration. Or his will may be
considered only as conditional, that if we act so and
so, we shall be rewarded ; if otherwise, jiunished : of
wliich conditional will of the Author of Nature,
the whole constitution of it affords most certain
instances.

248 REVELATION KOT UNIVEESAL:

Upon the whole : that we are in a state of religion
necessarily implies, that we are in a state of proba-
tion : and the credibility of our being; at all in such a
state being admitted, there seems no peculiar diffi-
culty in supposing our probation to be, just as it is,
in those respects which are above objected against.
There seems no pretence, from the reason of the
thing, to say, that the trial cannot equitably be any
thing, but whether persons will act suitably to
certain information, or such as admits no room for
doubt ; so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage,
but either from their not attending to wliat they
certainly know, or from overbearing passion hurry-
ing them on to act contrary to it. For, since igno-
rance and doubt afford scope for probation in all
senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty :
and since the two former are to be put to the same
account as difficulties in practice ; meD/sjnoral j)roba-
tion may also be, whether they will take due care to
inform themselves by impartial consideration andT"
afterwards whether they will act as the case requires,
upon the evidence which they have, however doubt-
ful. And this, we find by ex^e^nencef is frequently"
our probation ?', in our temporal capacity. For, the""
information which we want with regard to our
worldly interests is by no means always given us of
course, without any care of our own. And we are
greatly liable to self-deceit from inward secret pre-
judices, and also to the deceits of others. So that
to be able to judge what is the prudent part, often
requires much and difficult consideration. Then
after we have judged the very best we can, the
evidence upon which we must act, if we will live
and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very high

g P. 41, 239, 242, 243.

SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IX ITS PKOUF. 240

degree. And the constitution and course of the
world in fact is such, as that want of impartial
consideration what we have to' do, and venturing
upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful
what will be the consequence, are often naturally,
i. e. providentiaUv, altogether as fatal, as miscon-
duct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we
certainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing
passion.

Several of the observations here made may well
seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good
men. But if the persons for whose sake they are
made think so ; persons who object as above, and
throw off all regard to reHgion under pretence of
want of evidence ; I desire them to consider again,
whether their thinkmg so be owing to any thing
unintelligible in these observations, or to their o^\^l
not having such a sense of religion and serious I
solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism '
does in all reason require % It ought to be forced
upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature
and condition necessarily require us, in the daily
course of life, to act upon evidence much lower than ""
what is commonly called probable ; to Cg^im, not
only agauist what we fully believe will, but also
against what we think it supposable may, happen ;
and to engage in pursuits when the probability is
greatly against success, if it be crediljle, that possibly
we may succeed in them.

250 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

CHAP. VIL

Of the particular evidence for Christianity.

The presumptions against revelation, and objec-
tions against the general scheme of Cliristianity,
and particular things relating to it, being removed;
there remains to be considered, what positive evi-
dence we have for the truth of it : chiefly in order
to see, what the analogy of nature suggests with
regard to that evidence, and the objections against it:
or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain natural
rule of judgment and of action, in our temporal con-
cerns, in cases where we have the same kind of
evidence, and the same kind of objections against it,
that we have in the case before us.

Now in the evidence of Christianity there seem to
be several things of great weight, not reducible to
the head, either of miracles, or the completion of
prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words.
But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs :
and those other things, however considerable they
are, yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct
proofs, but always to be joined with them. Thus the
evidence of Christianity will be a long series of
things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning of
the world to the present time, of great variety and
compass, taking in both the direct, and also the col-
lateral, proofs ; and making up, all of them together,
one argument: the conviction arising fi'om which
kind of proof may be compared to what they call the
effect in architecture or other works of art ; a result
from a great number of things so and so disposed,
and taken into one view. I shall therefore, first,
make some observations relating to miracles, and the

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 251

appearing completions of prophecy ; ami consider
what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections
brought against this evidence. And, secondly, I
shall endeavour to give some account of tlie general
argument now mentioned, consisting both of the
direct and collateral evidence, considered as making
up one argument : this being the kind of proof, upon
which we determine most questions of dilficidty, con-
cerning common facts, alleged to have happened, or
seeming likely to happen ; especially questions relat-
ing to conduct.

First, I shall make some observations upon the
direct proof of Christianity from miracles and pro-
phecy, and upon the objections alleged against it.

I. Now the following observations relating to the
historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation
of Christianity, appear to be of great weight.

1. The Old Testament aifords us the same his-
torical evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the
prophets, as of the common civil history of Moses
and the kings of Israel ; or, as of the afifliirs of the
Jewish nation. And the Gospels and the Acts affurd
us the same historical evidence of the miracles of
Christ and the Apostles, as of the common matters
related in them. This indeed could not have been
affirmed by any reasonal)le man, if the authors of
these books, like many other historians, liad appeared
to make an entertaining manner of writing their
aim ; though they had interspersed miracles in their
works, at proper distances and upon proper occasions.
These might have animated a dull relation, amused
the reader, and engaged his attention. And the
same account would naturally have been given of
them, as of the speeches and descriptions of such
authors : the same account, in a manner, as is to be

252 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

given, why the poets make use of wonders and
prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous and
natural, in Scripture, are rehited in plain unadorned
narratives : and both of them appear, in all respects,
to stand upon the same foot of historical evidence.
Farther : some parts of Scripture, containing an ac-
count of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth
of Christianity, are quoted as genuine, from the age
in which they are said to be written, down to the
present : and no other parts of them, material in the
present question, are omitted to be quoted in such
manner, as to afford any sort of proof of their not
being genuine. And, as common history, when
called in question in any instance, may often be
greatly confirmed by cotemporary or subsequent
events more known and acknowledged ; and as the
common Scripture-history, like many others, is thus
confirmed ; so likewise is the miraculous history of
it, not only in particular instances, but in general.
For, the establishment of the Jewish and Christian
religions, which were events cotemporary with the
miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both,
or subsequent to them, these events are just what
we should have expected, upon supposition such
miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of
those religions. These miracles are a satisfactory
account of those events : of which no other satisfac-
tory account cau be given ; nor any account at all,
but what is imaginary merely, and invented. It is
to be ydded, that the most obvious, the most easy
and direct account of this history, how it came to
be written and to be received in the world, as a true
history, is, that it really is so : nor can any other
account of it be easy and direct. Now, though an
account, not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 253

indirect, may indeed be, and often is, the true ac-
count of a matter ; yet it cannot be acbnitted on the
authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, su])-
position, and possibility, when opposed to historical
evidence, j^rove nothing, but that historical evidence
is not demonstrative.

Now the just consequence from all this, I think,
is, that the Scripture-history in general is to be
admitted as an authentic genuine history, till some-
what positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it.
But no man will deny the consequence to be, that
it cannot be rejected, or thrown by as of no
authority, till it can be proved to be of none ;
even though the evidence now mentioned for its
authority were doubtful. This evidence may be
confronted by historical evidence on the other side,
if there be any : or general incredibiHty in the
things related, or inconsistence in the general turn
of the history, would prove it to be of no authority.
But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first
and general view, the appearance is, that it is an
authentic history ; it cannot be determined to be
fictitious without some proof that it is so. And
the following observations in support of tliese, and
coincident with them, will greatly confirm the his-
torical evidence for the truth of Christianity.

2. The Epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of
epistolary writing, and moreover from several of
them being written, not to particular persons, but
to churclies, carry in them evidences of their being
genuine, beyond what can be in a mere historical
narrative, left to the world at large. This evidence,
joined with that which they have in common with
the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave
so much as any particular pretence for denying

254 OF thp: particular evidence

their genuineness, considered as an ordinary matter
of fact, or of criticism : I say particular pretence, for
deny trig it ; because any single fact, of such a kind
and such antiquity, may have general doubts raised
concerning it, from the very nature of human affairs
and human testimony. There is also to be men-
tioned a distinct and particular evidence of the
genuineness of the Epistle chiefly referred to here,
the first to the Corinthians ; from the manner in
which it is quoted by Clemens Bomanus, in an
epistle of his own to that church*''. Now these
epistles afford a proof of Christianity, detached from
all others, which is, I think, a thing of weight ; and
also a proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself.
For,

In them the author declares, that he received
the Gospel in general, and the institution of the
Communion in particular, not from the rest of the
Apostles, or jointly together with them, but alone,
from Christ himself; whom he declares likewise,
conformably to the history in the Acts, that he saw
after his ascension^. So that the testimony of St.
Paul is to be considered, as detached from that of
the rest of the Apostles.

And he declares farther, that he was endued with
a power of working miracles, as what was publicly
known to those very people, speaks of frequent and
great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting
in those very churches, to which he was writing ;
which he was reproving for several irregularities ;
and where he had personal opposers : he mentions
these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner,
and without effort ; by way of reproof to those who

* Clem. Rom. Ep. i. c. 47.

^ Gal. i; 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c. ; i Cor. xv. 8.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 255

had them, for their indecent use of them ; and by
way of depreciating them, iii comparison of moral
virtues : in short he speaks to these churches, of
these miraculous powers, in tlie manner, any one
would speak to another of a thing, which was as
familiar and as much known in common to them
both, as any thing in the world ^. And this, as hath
been observed by several persons, is surely a very
considerable thing.

3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that
Christianity offered itself to the world, and de-
manded to be received, upon the allegation, i.e. as
unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence, of mira-
cles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in
such an age ; and that it was actually received by
great numbers in that very age, and upon the pro-
fessed belief of the reality of these miracles. And
Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old
Testament, seems distinguished by this from all
other rehgions. I mean, that this does not appear
to be the case with regard to any other : for surely
it will not be supposed to lie upon any person, to
prove by positive historical evidence, that it was
not. It does in no sort appear that Mahometanism
was first received in the world upon the foot of
supposed miracles ^^, i. e. public ones : for, as reve-
lation is itself miraculous, all pretence to it must
necessarily imply some pretence of miracles. And
it is a known fact, that it was immediately, at
the first, propagated by other means. And as par-
ticular institutions, whether in Paganism or Popery,
said to be confirmed bv miracles after those insti-

c Rom. XV. 19 ; i Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10 — 28, &c. and xiii. i, 2, 8, and
the whole xivth chapter; 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13 ; Gal. iii. 2, 5.
'^ See the Koran, c. xiii. and c. xvii.

256 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

tutions had obtained, are not to the purpose : so,
were there what might be called historical proof,
that any of them were introduced by a supposed
divine command, believed to be attested by miracles ;
these would not be in any wise parallel. For single
things of this sort are easy to be accounted for,
after parties are formed, and have power in their
hands ; and the leaders of them are in veneration
with the multitude ; and political interests are
blended with religious claims and religious distinc-
tions. But before any thing of this kind, for a few
pei'sons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once,
to bring over such great numbers to a new religion,
and get it to be received upon the particular evi-
dence of miracles ; this is quite another thing. And
I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary
that the fact now mentioned, taking in all the cir-
cumstances of it, is pecidiar to the Christian reli-
gion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that
Christianity obtained, i. e. was professed to be re-
ceived in the world, upon the belief of miracles,
inimediately in the age in which it is said those
miracles were wrought : or that this is what its
first converts would have alleged, as the reason for
their embracing it. Now certainly it is not to be
suf)posed, that such numbers of men, in the most
distant parts of the world, should forsake the re-
ligion of their country, in which they had been
educated ; separate themselves from their friends,
particularly in their festival shows and solemnities,
to which the common people are so greatly addicted,
and which were of a nature to engage them much
more, than any thing of that sort amongst us ; and
embrace a religion, which could not but expose
them to many inconveniences, and indeed must have

FOR CIllUSTIANITY. , 257

been a giving up the world in a great degree,
even from the very first, and before the empire en-
gaged in form against them : it cannot be supposed,
that such numbers should make so great, and, to
say the least, so inconvenient a change in their
whole institution of life, unless they were really con-
vinced of the truth of those miracles, upon the
knowledge or belief of which they professed to make
it. And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged,
that the generality of the first converts to Christi-
anity must have believed them : that as by be-
coming Christians they declared to the world, they
were satisfied of the truth of those miracles ; so this
declaration was to be credited. And this their testi-
mony is the same kind of evidence for those mira-
cles, as if they had put it in writing, and these
writings had come down to us. And it is real
evidence, because it is of facts, which they had capa-
city and full opportunity to inform themselves of.
It is also distinct from the direct or express historical
evidence, though it is of the same kind : and it
would be allowed to be distinct in all cases. For
were a fact expressly related by one or more ancient
historians, and disputed in after-ages ; that this fact
is acknowledged to have been believed by great
numbers of the age in which the historian says it
was done, woidd be allowed an additional proof of
such fact, quite distinct from the express testimony
of the historian. The credulity of mankind is ac-
knowledged : and the suspicions of mankind ought
to be acknowledged too ; and their backwardness
even to beheve, and greater still to practise, what
makes against their interest. And it must par-
ticularly be remembered, that education and preju-
dice and authority, were against Christianity, in

BUTLER, ANALOGY. S

258 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

the age I am speaking of. So that the immediate
conversion of such numbers is a real presumption
of somewhat more than human in this matter : I
say presumption, for it is not alleged as a proof
alone and by itself. Nor need any one of the things
mentioned in this chapter be considered as a proof
by itself : and yet all of them together may be one
of the strongest 6.

Upon the whole : as there is large historical evi-
dence, both direct and circumstantial, of miracles
wrought in attestation of Christianity, collected by
those who have writ upon the subject ; it lies upon
unbelievers to shew, why this evidence is not to be
credited. This way of speaking is, I think, just; and
what persons who write in defence of religion
naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter of such un-
speakable importance, the proper question is, not
whom it lies upon, according to the rules of argu-
ment, to maintain or confute objections : but whether
there really are any, against this evidence, sufficient,
in reason, to destroy the credit of it. However,
unbelievers seem to take upon them the part of
shewing that there are.

They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people,
in different ages and countries, expose themselves to
the same difficulties which the primitive Christians
did ; and are ready to give up their lives for the
most idle follies imaginable. But it is not very
clear, to what purpose this objection is brought. For
every one, surely, in every case, must distinguish
between opinions and facts. And though testimony
is no proof of enthusiastic ophiions, or of any
opinions at all ; yet it is allowed, in all other cases,
to be a proof of facts. And a person s laying down

^ Page 290, &c.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 259

liis life in attestation of facts or of opinions, is the
strongest proof of his beHeving them. And if the
Apostles and their cotemporaries did believe the
facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves
to sufferings and death; tliis their belief, or rather
knowledge, must be a proof of those facts : for they
were such as came under the observation of their
senses. And though it is not of equal weight, yet it
is of weight, that the martyrs of the next age, not-
withstanding they were not eyewitnesses of those
facts, as were the Apostles and their cotemporaries,
had, however, full opportunity to inform themselves,
whether they were true or not, and gave equal proof
of their believing them to be true.

But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the
evidence of testimony even for facts, in matters re-
lating to religion : some seem to think it totally and
absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony upon
this subject. And indeed the powers of enthusiasm,
and of diseases too, which operate in a like manner,
are very wonderful, in particular instances. But if
great numbers of men, not appearing in any pe-
culiar degree weak, nor under any peculiar suspicion
of negligence, affirm that they saw and heard such
things plainly with their eyes and their ears, and
are admitted to be in earnest ; such testimony is
evidence of the strongest kind we can have, for any
matter of fact. Yet possibly it may l>e overcome,
strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus
attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an in-
stance where one thought it was so overcome, it
might be just to consider, how far such evidence
could be accounted for, by enthusiasm ; for it seems
as if no other imaginable account were to be given
of it. But till such incredibility be shewn, or con-

S 2

260 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

trary testimony produced, it cannot surely be ex-
pected, that so far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful
an account of such testimony, as that of enthusiasm
must be ; an account so strange, that the generality
of mankind can scarce be made to understand what
is meant by it: it cannot, I say, be expected, that
such account will be admitted of such evidence ;
when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account
of it, that people really saw and heard a thing not
incredible, which they affirm sincerely and with full
assurance, they did see and hear. Granting then
that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an absurd,
but a possible account of such testimony ; it is
manifest, that the very mention of it goes upon the
previous supposition that the things so attested are
incredible : and therefore need not be considered,
till they are shewn to be so. Much less need it be
considered, after the contrary has been proved. And
I think it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that
there is no incredibility in a revelation, in general ;
or in such an one as the Christian, in particular.
However ; as rehgion is supposed peculiarly liable to
enthusiasm, it may just be observed, that prejudices
almost without number, and without name, romance,
affectation, humour, a desire to engage attention, or
to surprise, the party-spirit, custom, little competi-
tions, unaccountable likings and disMkings ; these
influence men strongly in common matters. And
as these prejudices are often scarce known or re-
flected upon by the persons themselves who are in-
fluenced by them, they are to be considered as in-
fluences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human
testimony in common matters is naturally and justly
believed notwithstanding.

It is intimated farther, in a more refined way of

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 261

observation, that though it should be proved, that
the Apostles and first Christians could not, in some
respects, be deceived themselves, and, in other re-
spects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose
upon the world; yet it will not follow, that tlieir
general testimony is to be believed, though truly
handed down to us : because they might still in part,
i. e. in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in
part also designedly impose upon others ; which, it is
added, is a thing very credible, from that mixture of
real enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be met with in
the same characters. And, I must confess, I think
the matter of fact contained in this observation upon
mankind is not to be denied ; and that somewhat
very much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture
as a very common case, and most severely rej^roved.
But it were to have been expected, that persons
capable of applying tliis observation as applied in the
objection, might also frequently have met with the
like mixed character, in instances where religion was
quite out of the case. The thing plainly is, that
mankind are naturally endued with reason, or a
capacity of distinguishing between truth and false-
hood ; and as naturally they are endued with vera-
city, or a regard to truth in what they say : but from
many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and
biassed and deceived themselves, and capable of in-
tending to deceive others, in every different degree :
insomuch that, as we are all liable to be deceived by
prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon
thing, for persons, who, from their regard to truth,
would not invent a lie entirely without any founda-
tion at all, to propagate it with heightening cir-
cumstances, after it is once invented and set. agoing.
And others, though they would not propagate a lie,

262 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it
pass without contradiction. But, notwithstanding
all this, human testimony remains still a natural
ground of assent ; and this assent a natural principle
of action.

It is objected farther, that however it has hap-
pened, the fact is, that mankind have, in different
ages, been strangely deluded with pretences to mira-
cles and wonders. But it is by no means to be
admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all
more liable to be deceived by these pretences, than
by others.

It is added, that there is a very considerable de-
gree of historical evidence for miracles, which are,
on all hands, acknowledged to be fabulous. But
suppose there were even the like historical evidence
for these, to what there is for those alleged in proof
of Christianity, which yet is in no wise allowed,
but suppose this ; the consequence would not be,
that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted.
Nor is there a man in the world, who, in common
cases, would conclude thus. For what would such
a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence,
confuted by contrary evidence, or any way over-
balanced, destroys the credibility of other evidence,
neither confuted nor overbalanced % To argue, that
because there is, if there were, like evidence from
testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for
those in attestation of Christianity, therefore the
evidence in the latter case is not to be credited ;
this is the same as to argue, that if two men of
equally good reputation had given evidence in dif-
ferent cases no way connected, and one of them had
been convicted of perjury, this confuted the testi-
mony of the other.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 263

Upon the whole then, the general observation,
that human creatures are so liable to be deceived,
from enthusiasm in religion, and principles equiva-
lent to entliusiasm in common matters, and in both
from negligence ; and that they are so capable of
dishonestly endeavouring to deceive others ; this does
indeed weaken the evidence of testimony in all
cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these
things will appear, to different men, to weaken the
evidence of testimony in different degrees : in de-
grees proportionable to the observations they have
made, or the notions they have any way taken up,
concerning the weakness and negligence and dis-
honesty of mankind ; or concerning the powers of
enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But it
seems to me, that people do not know what they
say, who affirm these things to destroy the evidence
from testimony, which we have of the truth of
Christianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of
testimony in any case, but a proof or probability,
that persons are not competent judges of the facts
to which they give testimony; or that they are
actually under some indirect influence in giving it,
in such particular case. Till this be made out, the
natural laws of human actions require, that testi-
mony^e admitted. It can never loe sufficient to
overthrow clirect historical evidence, indolently to
say, that there are so many principles, from whence
men are liable to be deceived themselves, and dis-
posed to deceive others, especially in matters of
religion, that one knows not what to believe. And
it is surprising persons can help reflecting, that this
very manner of speaking supposes they are not satis-
fied that there is nothing in the evidence, of which
they speak thus ; or that they can avoid ol)serving,

264 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

if they do make this reflection, that it is, on such
a subject, a very material one ^.

And over against all these objections is to be set
the importance of Christianity, as what must have
engaged the attention of its first converts, so as to
have rendered them less liable to be deceived from
carelessness, than they would in common matters ;
and likewise the strong obligations to veracity, which
their religion laid them under : so that the first and
most obvious presumption is, that they could not
be deceived themselves, nor would deceive others.
And this presumption, in this degree, is peculiar to
the testimony we have been considering.

In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves,
and have an air of positiveness, which sometimes
is not veiy easy: yet they are necessary, and neces-
sary to be repeated ; in order to connect a discourse,
and distinctly to lay before the view of the reader,
what is proposed to be proved, and what is left
as proved. Now the conclusion from the foregoing
observations is, I think, beyond all doubt, this : that
\ unbelievers must be forced to admit the external
i evidence for Christianity, i.e. the proof of miracles
Svrought to attest it, to be of real weight and very-
considerable ; though they cannot allow it to be
sufficient, to convince them of the reality of those
miracles. And as they must, in all reason, admit
this ; so it seems to me, that upon consideration
they would, in fact, admit it ; those of them, I mean,
who know any thing at all of the matter :. in like
manner as persons, in many cases, own they see
strong evidence from testimony, for the truth of
things, which yet they cannot be convinced are
true : cases, suppose, where there is contrary testi-
f See the foregoing chapter.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 265

mony; or things which they think, whether with
or without reason, to be incredible. But there is
no testimony contrary to that which we have been ] \
considering : and it has been fully proved, that there
is no incredibility in Christianity in general, or in ' ,
any part of it.

II. As to the evidence for Christianity from pro-
phecy, I shall only make some few general observa-
tions, which are suggested by the Analogy of Nature ;
i.e. by the acknowledged natural rules of judging in
common matters, concerning evidence of a like kind
to this from prophecy.

1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part
of a prophecy does not, in any degree, invalidate the
proof of foresight, arising from the appearing com-
pletion of those other parts which are understood.
For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts,
which are not understood, were lost, or not written
at all, or written in an unknow^n tongue. Whether
this observation be commonly attended to or not, it
is so evident, that one can scarce bring oneself to
set down an instance in common matters to ex-
emplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in
cypher, and partly in plain words at length ; and
that in the part one understood, there appeared
mention of several known facts ; it would never
come into any man's thoughts to imagine, that if
he understood the whole, perhaps he might find,
that those facts were not in reality known by the
writer. Indeed, both in this example, and the thing
intended to be exemplified by it, our not understand-
ing the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or
a paragraph) might sometimes occasion a doubt,
whether one understood the literal meaning of such
a part : but this comes under another consideration.

266 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

For the same reason, though a man should be in-
capable, for want of learning, or opportunities of
inquiry, or from not having turned his studies this
way, even so much as to judge, whether particular
prophecies have been throughout completely ful-
filled ; yet he may see, in general, that they have
been fulfilled to such a degree, as, upon very good
ground, to be convinced of foresight more than
human in such prophecies, and of such events being
intended by them. For the same reason also, though,
by means of the deficiencies in civil history, and the
different accounts of historians, the most learned
should not be able to make out to satisfaction,
that such parts of the prophetic history have been
minutely and throughout fulfilled ; yet a very strong
proof of foresight may arise, from that general com-
pletion of them, which is made out : as much pioof
of foresight, perhaps, as the giver of prophecy intended
should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy.

2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to
such and such events, is itself a proof that it was
intended of them : as the rules, by which we natu-
rally judge and determine, in common cases parallel
to this, wdll shew. This observation I make in
answer to the common objection against the appli-
cation of the prophecies, that, considering each of
them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear,
that they were intended of those particular events,
to which they are applied by Christians ; and there-
fore it is to be supposed, that, if they meant any
thing, they v/ere intended of other events unknown
to us, and not of these at all.

Now there are two kinds of writing, wdiich bear a
great resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the
matter before us : the mythological, and the satirical,

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 267

where the satire is, to a certain degree, concealed.
And a man might be assured, that he understood
what an author intended by a fable or parable,
related without any application or moral, merely
from seeing it to be easily capable of such application,
and that such a moral might naturally be deduced
from it. And he might be fully assured, that such
persons and events were intended in a satirical
writing, merely fi'om its being applicable to them.
And, agreeably to the last observation, he might be
in a good measure satisfied of it, though he were not
enough informed in affairs, or in the story of such
persons, to understand half the satire. For, his satis-
faction, that he understood the meaning, the intended
meaning, of these writings, would be greater or less
in proportion as he saw the general turn of them
to be capable of such application ; and in proportion
to the number of particular things capable of it.
And thus, if a long series of prophecy is applicable
to the present state of the church, and to the
political situations of the kingdoms of the world,
some thousand years after these prophecies were
delivered, and a long series of prophecy delivered
before the coming of Christ is applicable to him ;
these tilings are in themselves a proof, that the pro-
phetic history was intended of him, and of those
events : in proportion as the general turn of it
is capable of such application, and to the luunber
and variety of particular prophecies capable of it.
And though, in all just way of consideration, the
appearing completion of prophecies is to be allowed
to be thus explanatory of, and to determine, their
meaning ; yet it is to be remembered farther, that
the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to a Messiah
before his coming, in much the same manner as

268 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

Christians do now: and that the primitive Christians
interpreted the prophecies respecting the state of the
church and of the world in the last ages, in the
sense which the event seems to confirm and verify.
And from these things it may be made appear :

3. That the shewing even to a high probability, if
that could be, that the prophets thought of some
other events, in such and such predictions, and not
those at all which Christians allege to be completions
of those predictions; or that such and such pro-
phecies are capable of being applied to other events
than those, to which Christians apply them — that
this would not confute or destroy the force of the
argument from prophecy, even with regard to those
very instances. For, observe how this matter really
is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author
of such a book, and was certainly assured, or satis-
fied to any degree, that one knew the whole of what
he intended in it ; one should be assured or satisfied
to such degree, that one knew the whole meaning
of that book : for the meaning of a book is nothing
but the meaning of the author. But if one knew a
person to have compiled a book out of memoirs,
which he received from another, of vastly superior
knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it were
a book full of great intricacies and difiiculties ; it
would in no wise follow, that one knew the whole
meaning of the book, from knowing the whole
meaning of the compiler : for the original memoirs,
i. e. the author of them, might have, and there would
be no degree of presumption, in many cases, against
supposing him to have, some farther meaning than
the compiler saw. To say then, that the ScrijDtures,
and the things contained in them, can have no
other or farther meaning than those persons thought

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 269

or had, who first recited or wrote them ; is evidently
saying, that those persons were the original, proper,
and sole authors of those books, i. e. that they are
not inspired: which is absurd, whilst the authority
of these books is under examination ; i. e. till you
have determined they are of no divine authority
at all. Till this be determined, it must in all reason
be supposed, not indeed that they have, for this
is taking for granted that they are inspired ; but
that they may have, some farther meaning than
what the compiler saw or understood. And, upon
this supposition, it is supposable also, that this
farther meaning may be fulfilled. Now events cor-
responding to prophecies, interpreted in a different
meaning from that, in which the prophets are sup-
posed to have understood them ; this affords, in a
manner, the same proof, that this different sense
was originally intended, as it would have afforded,
if the prophets had not understood their predictions
in the sense it is supposed they did : because there
is no presumption of their sense of them being the
whole sense of them. And it has been already
shewn, that the apparent completions of prophecy
must be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning.
So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy
has been fulfilled, in a natural or proper, i. e. in any
real, sense of the words of it. For such completion
is equally a proof of foresight more than human,
whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to
have understood it in a different sense. I say, sup-
posed : for, though I think it clear, that the prophets
did not understand the full meaning of their predic-
tions ; it is another question, how far they thought
they did, and in what sense they understood them.
Hence may be seen, to how Httle purpose those

270 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

persons busy themselves, who endeavour to prove,
that the prophetic history is applicable to events of
the age in which it was written, or of ages before
it. Indeed to have proved this, before there was
any appearance of a farther completion of it, might
have answered some purpose ; for it might have
prevented the expectation of any such farther com-
pletion. Thus could Porphyry have shewn, that
some principal parts of the book of Daniel, for in-
stance, the seventh verse of the seventh chapter,
which the Christians interpreted of the latter ages,
was applicable to events, which happened before or
about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes ; this might
have prevented them from expecting any farther
completion of it. And, unless there was then, as I
think there must have been, external evidence con-
cerning that book, more than is come down to us ;
such a discovery might have been a stumblingblock
in the way of Christianity itself: considering the
authority which our Savioiu' has given to the book
of Daniel, and how much the general scheme of
Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even
this discovery, had there been any suchs, would be
of very little weight with reasonable men now; if
this passage, thus applicable to events before the
age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable also to
events which succeeded the dissolution of the Koman
empire. I mention this, not at all as intending to

fe' It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this
way. For Jerom on the place says, Duas posteriores bestias — in
uno Macedonum regno po7iU. And as to the ten Kings; Decern
reyes enumerat, qui fuerunt scevissimi : ipsosque reges non unius
2)onit regni, verhi gratia, Macedonice, Syrice, Asice, et jEgypti ; sed
de diversis regnis unum efficit regum ordinem. And in this way
of interpretation anything may be made of any thing.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 271

insinuate, that the division of this empire into ten
parts, for it plainly was divided into about that
number, were, alone and by itself, of any moment
in verifying the prophetic history : but only as an
example of the thing I am speaking of. And thus
upon the whole, the matter of inquiry evidently
must be, as above put. Whether the prophecies are
applicable to Christ, and to the present state of the
world, and of the church; applicable in such a de-
gree, as to imply foresight : not whether they are
capable of any other application ; though I know
no pretence for saying the general turn of them is
capable of any other.

These observations are, I think, just; and the evi-
dence referred to in them real : though there may
be people who will not accept of such imperfect
information from Scripture. Some too have not
integrity and regard enough to truth, to attend to
evidence, which keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps
perplexity, and which is much of a different sort
from what they expected. And it plainly requires
a degree of modesty and fairness, beyond what every
one has, for a man to say, not to the world, but
to himself, that there is a real appearance of some-
what of great weight in this matter, though he is
not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it ;
but it shall have its influence upon him, in pro-
portion to its appearing reality and weight. It is
much more easy, and more falls in with the negli-
gence, presumption, and wilfulness of the generality,
to determine at once, with a decisive air. There is
nothing in it. The prejudices arising from that
absolute contempt and scorn, with which this evi-
dence is treated in the world, I do not mention.
For what indeed can be said to persons, who are

272 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

weak enough in their understandings to think this
any presumption against it ; or, if they do not, are
yet weak enough in their temper to be influenced
by such prejudices, upon such a subject?

I shall now, secondly, endeavour to give some ac-
count of the general argument for the truth of
Christianity, consisting both of the direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence, considered as making up one
argument. Indeed to state and examine this argu-
ment fully, would be a work much beyond the
compass of this whole treatise ; nor is so much as
a proper abridgement of it to be expected here.
Yet the present subject requires to have some brief
account of it given. For it is the kind of evidence,
upon which most questions of difficulty, in common
practice, are determined : evidence arising from
various coincidences, which support and confirm each
other, and in this manner prove, with more or less
certainty, the point under consideration. And I
choose to do it also : first, because it seems to be
of the greatest importance, and not duly attended
to by every one, that the proof of revelation is, not
some direct and express thmgs ~oliiyrbut a great
variety of circumstantial things also ; and that
though eaclFof "these direct and circumstantial things
is indeed to be considered separately, yet they are
afterwards to be joined together ; for that the pro-
per force of the evidence consists in the result of
those several things, considered in their respects to
each other, and united into one view: and in the
next place, because it seems to me, that the matters
of fact here set down, which are acknowledged by
unbelievers, must be acknowledged by them also to
contain together a degree of evidence of great weight,
if they could be brought to lay these several things

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 273

before themselves distinctly, and then with atten-
tion consider them together; instead of that cursor j
thought of them, to which we are familiarized. For
being familiarized to the cursory thought of things as
really liinders the weight of them from being seen,
as from having its due influence upon practice. (^

The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to
be inquired into, is this: That over and above our
reason and affections, which God has given us for
the information of our judgment and the conduct
of our lives, he has also, by external revelation,
given us an account of himself and his moral govern-
ment over the world, implying a future state of
rewards and punishments; i.e. hath revealed the
system of natural religion : for natural religion may
be externally'^ revealed by God, as the ignorant
may be taught it by mankind their fellow-creatures
— that God, I say, has given us the evidence of
revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascer-
tain this moral system; together with an account
of a particular dispensation of Providence, which
reason could no way have discovered, and a parti-
cular institution of religion founded on it, for the
recovery of mankind out of their present wretched
condition, and raising them to the perfection and
final happiness of their nature.

This revelation, whether real or supposed, may [
be considered as wholly historical. For prophecy is
nothing but the history of events before they come
to pass ; doctiines also are matters of fact ; and
precepts come under the same notion. And the
general design of Scripture, which contains in it this
revelation, thus considered as historical, may be said
to be, to give us an account of the world, in this

'• P. 153, &c.

BUTLER, ANALOGY. T

274 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

one single view, as God's world : by which it ap-
pears essentially distinguished from all other books,
so far as I have found, except such as are copied
from it. It begins with an account of God's creation
of the world, in order to ascertain, and distinguish
from all others, who is the object of our worship,
by what he has done : in order to ascertain, who he
is, concerning whose providence, commands, promises,
and threatenings, this sacred book, all along, treats;
the Maker and Proprietor of the world, he whose
creatures we are, the God of nature : in order like-
wise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations,
which are either imaghiary beings, i.e. no beings at
all ; or else part of that creation, the historical
relation of which is here given. And St. John, not
improbably, with an eye to this Mosaic account
of the creation, begins his Gospel with an account
of our Saviour's pre-existence, and that all things
were made by him; and without him was not any
thing made that ivas inade^ : agreeably to the doc-
trine of St. Paul, that God ci'eated all things by
Jesus Christ^. This being premised, the Scripture,
taken together, seems to profess to contain a kind of
an abridgment of the history of the world, in the
view just now mentioned : that is, a general account
of the condition of religion and its professors, during
the continuance of that apostasy from God, and state
of wickedness, which it every where supposes the
world to lie in. And this account of the state of
religion carries with it some brief account of the
political state of things, as religion is affected by
it. Eevelation indeed considers the common affiiirs
of this world, and what is going on in it, as a mere
scene of distraction ; and cannot be supposed to

i John i. 3, k Eph. iii. 9.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 275

concern itself with foretelling at what time Eome,
or Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should
be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and
dissoluteness, which all places equally aspire to be ;
cannot, 1 say, be supposed to give any account of
this wild scene for its own sake. But it seems to
contain some very general account of the chief
governments of the world, as the general state of
religion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them,
from the first transgression, and during the whole
interval of the world's continuing in its present state,
to a certain future period, spoken of both in the Old
and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great
variety of expression : 21ie times of the restitution
of all things^: when the mystery of God shall he
finished, as he hath declared to his servants the
prophets"* : when the God of heaven shall set up a
kingdom^ which shall never he destroyed: and the
kingdom shall not he left to other people^, as it is
represented to be during this apostasy, hut judgment
shall he given to the saints^, and they shall reign^ :
and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness
of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall he
given to the p)eople of the saints of the Most High 'i .

Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would
remark, how great a length of time the whole rela-
tion takes up, near six thousand years of which are
past ; and how great a variety of things it treats
of; the natural and moral system or history of the
world, including the time when it was fonned, all
contained in the very first book, and evidently written
in a rude and unlearned age ; and in subsequent
books, the various common and prophetic history,

1 Acts iii. 2 1. '" Rev. x. 7. " Dan. ii. 44. » Dan. vii. 22.
I' Rev. xxii. 5. i Dau. vii. 27.

T 2

276 OF thp: particular evidence

and the particular dispensation of Christianity. Now
all this together gives the largest scope for criticism;
and for confutation of what is capable of being con-
futed, either from reason, or from common history,
or from any inconsistence in its several parts; And
it is a thing which deserves, I think, to be men-
tioned, that whereas some imagine the supposed
doubtfulness of the evidence for revelation imphes
a positive argument that it is not true ; it appears,
on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that
it is true. For, could any common relation, of such
antiquity, extent, and variety, (for in these things
the stress of what I am now observing lies,) be
proposed to the examination of the world : that it
could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be
confuted, or shewn to have nothing in it, to the
satisfaction of reasonable men ; this would be thought
a strong presumptive proof of its truth. And indeed
it must be a proof of it, just in proportion to the
probabihty, that if it were false, it might be shewn
to be so : and this, I think, is scarce pretended to
be shewn, but upon principles and in ways of argu-
ing, which have been clearly obviated ^'. Nor does it
at all appear, that any set of men, who believe
natural religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity
has been thus confuted. But to proceed :

Together with the moral system of the world, the
Old Testament contains a chronological account of
the beginning of it, and from thence, an unbroken
genealogy of mankind for many ages before common
history begins ; and carried on as much farther as
to make up a continued thread of history of the
length of between three and four thousand years.
It contains an account of God's making a covenant with

f Chap, ii, iii, «fec.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 277

a particular nation, that they should be his people,
and he would be their God, in a peculiar sense ; of his
often interposing miraculously in their affairs; gi\nng
them the promise, and, long after, the possession, of
a particular country ; assuring them of the greatest
national prosperity in it, if they would worship him,
in opposition to the idols which the rest of the
world worshipped, and obey his commands ; and
threatening them with unexampled punishments, if
they disobeyed him, and fell into the general
idolatry: insomuch that this one nation should con-
tinue to be the observation and the wonder of all
the world. It declares particularly, that God would
scatter them among all people, from one end of the
earth unto the other: but that when they should return
unto the Lord their God, he woidd have conqxtssion
upon them, and gather them from all the nations,
vjhither he had scattered them: that Israel shoidd he
saved in the Lord, ivith an everlasting salvation; and
not he ashamed or confounded world without end.
And as some of these promises are conditional, others
are as absolute, as any thing can be expressed: that
the time should come, when the p)eop)le should he all
righteous, and inherit the land for ever: that though
God ivould make a full end of all nations whither he
had scattered them, yet ivould he not make a full end
of them: that he ivoidd hring again the captivity of
his people Israel, and plant them upon their land,
and they should he no more pulled up out of their
land: that the seed of Israel should not cease from
heing a nation for ever^. It foretells, that God would
raise them up a ] 'articular Person, in whom all his
promises should finally be fulfilled ; the Messiah,

~ Deut. xxviii. 64. xxx. 2, 3; Isa. xlv. 17. Ix. 21 ; Jer. xxx. 11.
xlvi. 28: Amos ix. 14. 15 ; Jer. xxxi. 36.

278 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

who should be, in an high and eminent sense, tlieir
anointed Prince and Saviour. This vvas foretold in
such a manner, as raised a general expectation of
such a person in the nation, as appears from the
New Testament, and is an acknowledged fact ; an
expectation of his coming at such a particular time
before any one appeared claiming to be that person,
and when there was no ground for such an expecta-
tion, but from the prophecies : which expectation,
therefore, must in all reason be presumed to be
explanatory of those prophecies, if there were any
doubt about their meaning. It seems moreover to
foretell, that this person should be rejected by that
nation, to whom he had been so long promised, and
though he was so much desired by them*. And it
expressly foretells, that he should be the Saviour of
the Gentiles ; and even that the completion of the
scheme, contained in this book, and then begun, and
in its progress, should be somewhat so great, that,
in comparison with it, the restoration of the Jews
alone would be but of small account ^^ It is a light
thing that thou shouldest he my servant to raise up
the tribes ofJacoh, and to restore the preserved of
Israel: I ivill also give thee for a light to the Gen-
tiles, that thou niaijest he my salvation unto the end
of the earth. And, In the last days, the mountain of
the Lords house shall he estahlished in the top of
the mountains, and shall he exalted ahove the hills;
ajid all nations shall flow into it — for out of Zion
shall go forth the law, and the loord of the Lord

t Is. vili. 14, 15. xlix. 5. ch. liii ; Mai. i. 10, 11. and cli. iii.

" Is. xlix. 6. ch. ii, cli. xi. ch. Ivi. 7 ; Mai. i. 11. To which must
be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New-
Testament, and very many in the Old ; which describe what shall
be the completion of the revealed plan of Providence.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 279

from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among the
nations — and the Lord alone shall he exalted in that
day, and the idols he shall utterly aholish. The
Scripture farther contains an account, that at the
time the Messiah was expected, a person rose up, in
this nation, claiming to be that Messiali, to be the
Person whom all the prophecies referred to, and in
whom they should centre : that he spent some years
in a continued course of miraculous works; and en-
dued his immediate disciples and followers with a
power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth
of that religion which he commissioned them to
publish : that, invested with this authority and power,
they made numerous converts in the remotest coun-
tries, and settled and established his religion in the
w^orld ; to the end of which the Scripture professes
to give a prophetic account of the state of this
religion amongst mankind.

Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of
historv, to have all this related to him out of the
Scripture. Or suppose such an one, having the
Scripture put into his hands, to remark these things
in it, not knowing but that the whole, even its
civil history, as well as the other parts of it, might
be, from beginning to end, an entire invention ; and
to ask. What truth was in it, and whether the re-
velation liere related was real, or a fiction % And,
instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at once,
to be told the following confessed facts ; and tlien
to unite them into one view.

Let him first be told, in how great a degree the
profession and establishment of natural religion, the
belief that there is one God to be worshijiped, tliat
virtue is his law, and that mankind shall be re-
warded and punished hereafter, as they obey and

280 OP THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

disobey it here ; in how very great a degree, I say,
the profession and estabhshment of this moral
system in the world is owing to the revelation,
whether real or supposed, contained in this book :
the establishment of this moral system, even in those
countries which do not acknowledge the proper
authority of the Scripture^. Let him be told also,
_^what number of nations do acknowledge its proper
authority. Let him then take in the consideration,
' of what importance religion is to mankind. And
upon these things he might, I think, truly observe,
that this supposed revelation's obtaining and being
received in the world, with all the circumstances and
effects of it, considered together as one event, is the
niost conspicuous and important event in the history
: \of mankind : that a book of this nature, and thus
promulged and recommended to our consideration,
demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to have its
N^ claims most seriously examined into : and that,
before such examination, to treat it with any kind
of scoffing and ridicule, is an offence against natural
piety. But it is to be remembered, that how much
soever the establishment of natural religion in the
world is owing to the Scripture-revelation, this
does not destroy the proof of religion from reason,
any more than the proof of Euclid's Elements is
destroyed, by a man's knowing or thinking, that he
should never have seen the truth of the several
propositions contained in it, nor had those proposi-
tions come into his thoughts, but for that mathe-
matician.

Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in
the next place, informed of the acknowledged anti-
quity of the first parts of this book ; and that its

" Page 231.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 281

chronology, its account of the time when the earth,
and the several parts of it, were first peopled witli
human creatures, is no way contradicted, but is really
confirmed, by the natural and civil history of the
world, collected from common historians, from the
state of the earth, and from the late invention of
arts and sciences. And as the Scripture contains
an unbroken thread of common and civil history,
from the creation to the captivity, for between three
and four thousand years ; let the person we are
speaking of be told, in the next place, that this ^
general history, as it is not contradicted, but is con- -
firmed by profane history as much as there would
be reason to expect, upon supposition of its truth ;
so there is nothing in the whole history itsdf, to
give any reasonable ground of suspicion of its not
being, in the general, a faithful and literally true
genealogy of men, and series of things, I speak
here only of the common Scripture-history, or of the
course of ordinary events related in it, as distin-
guished from miracles, and from the prophetic his-
tory. In all the Scripture-narrations of this kind,
following events arise out of foregoing ones, as in
all other histories. There appears nothing related
as done in any age, not conformable to the manners
of that age : nothing in the account of a succeed-
ing age, which, one would say, could not be true,
or was improbable, from the account of things in
the preceding one. There is nothing in the charac-
ters, which would raise a thought of their being-
feigned ; but all the internal marks imaginable of
their being real. It is to be added also, that mere
genealogies, bare narratives of the number of years,
whicli persons called by sucli and such names lived, do
nut carry the face of fiction ; perhaps do carry some

282 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

presumption of veracity : and all unadorned narratives,
which have nothing to surprise, may be thought to
carry somewhat of the like presumption too. And
the domestic and the political history is plainly-
credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which,
taken alone in the naked way they are told, may-
appear strange; especially to persons of other man-
ners, temper, education: but there are also incidents
of undoubted truth, in many or most persons' lives,
which, in the same circumstances, would appear to
the full as strange. There may be mistakes of
transcribers, there may be other real or seeming
mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted for:
but there are certainly no more things of this kind
in the Scripture, than what were to have been ex-
pected in books of such antiquity; and nothing, in
any wise, sufficient to discredit the general narrative.
Now, that a history, claiming to commence from the
creation, and extending in one continued series,
through so great a length of time, and variety of
events, should have such appearances of reality and
/> truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very re-

'"^^^ markable circumstance in its favour. And as all
this is applicable to the common history of the New
Testament, so there is a farther credibility, and a
very high one, given to it by profane authors :
many of these writing of the same time , and con-
firming the truth of customs and events, which
are incidentally as well as more purposely mentioned
in it. And this credibility of the common Scripture-
history gives some credibility to its miraculous his-
tory: especially as this is interwoven with the
common, so as that they imply each other, and both
together make up one relation.

Let it then be more particularly observed to this

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 283

person, that it is an acknowledged matter of fact,
which is indeed implied in the foregoing observation,
that there was such a nation as the Jews, of the
greatest antiquity, whose government and general
polity was founded on the law, here related to be
given them by Moses as from heaven : that natural
religion, though with rites additional yet no way
contrary to it, was their established religion, which
cannot be said of the Gentile world : and that their
very being as a nation, depended upon their acknow-
ledgment of one God, the God of the universe. For,
suppose in their captivity, in Babylon, they had gone
over to the religion of their conquerors, there would
have remained no bond of union, to keep them a
distinct people. And whilst they were under their
own kings, in their own country, a total apostasy
from God would have been the dissolution of their
whole government. They in such a sense nationally
acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of heaven
and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk
in idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, the peculiar
people of God. And this so remarkable an establish-
ment and preservation of natural religion amongst
them, seems to add some peculiar credilnlity to the
historical evidence for the miracles of Moses and the
Prophets : because these miracles are a full satisfac-
tory account of this event, which plainly wants to
be accounted for, and cannot otherwise.

Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of his-
tory, be acquainted farther, that one claiming to be
the Messiah, of Jewish extraction, rose up at the
time when this nation, from the prophecies above
mentioned, expected the Messiah : that lie was re-
jected, as it seemed to have been foretold he shoidd,
by the body of the people, under the direction of

n

284 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

their riders : that in the course of a very few years,
he was believed on and acknowledged as the pro-
mised Messiah, by great numbers among the Gentiles,
agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet not
upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles y,
of which miracles we also have strong historical
evidence, (by which I mean here no more than must
be acknowledged by unbelievers ; for let pious frauds
and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say
they destroy, our evidence of miracles wrought in
proof of Christianity 2;) that this religion approving
itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying its own
evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of its
system, and being no way contrary to reason in those
parts of it which require to be believed upon the
mere authority of its Author ; that this religion, I
say, gradually spread and supported itself for some
hundred years, not only without any assistance from
temporal power, but under constant discouragements,
and often the bitterest persecutions from it ; and
then became the religion of the world : that in the
mean time, the Jewish nation and government were
destroyed in a very remarkable maimer, and the
people carried away captive and dispersed through
the most distant countries ; in which state of dis-
persion they have remained fifteen hundred years :
and that they remain a numerous people, united
amongst themselves, and distinguished from the rest
of the world, as they were in the days of Moses,
by the profession of his law ; and every where looked
uj^on in a manner, which one scarce knows how dis-
tinctly to express, but in the words of the prophetic
account of it, given so many ages before it came to
pass; Thou shall become an astonishment, a proverb,

y r. 255, &c. '- P. 262, &c;.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 285

and a hyivord, among all nations whither the Lord
shall lead thee^.

The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews
remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and
the confirmation which this event appears to give
to the truth of revelation, may be thought to be
answered, by their religion's forbidding them inter-
marriages with those of any other, and prescribing
them a great many peculiarities in their food, by
which thev are debarred from the means of incor-
porating with the people in whose countries they
live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account of
that which it pretends to account for. Bat what
does it pretend to account for ? The correspondence
between this event and the prophecies ; or the coin-
cidence of both, with a long dispensation of Provi-
dence of a pecuhar nature, towards that people for-
merlv 1 No. It is only the event itself, which is
offered to be thus accounted for ; which single event,
taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence
and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared
miraculous : but that correspondence and coincidence
may be so, though the event itself be supposed not.
Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's being born at
Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy
and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous; the
series of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the
event, being admitted : though the event itself, his
birth at that place, appears to have been brought
about in a natural way ; of which, however, no one
can be certain.

And as several of these events seem, in some
degree expressly, to have verified the prophetic his-
tory already; so likewise they may be considered

a Deut. xxviii. 37.

286 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

farther, as having a peculiar aspect towards the full
completion of it ; as affording some presumption that
the whole of it shall, one time or other, be fulfilled.
Thus, that the Jews have been so wonderfully pre-

^ served in their long and wide dispersion ; which is
indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but
is now mentioned only as looking forward to some-
what yet to come : that natural religion came forth
from Judea, and spread, in the degree it has done
over the world, before lost in idolatry; which, to-
gether with some other things, have distinguished
that very place, in like manner as the people of it
are distinguished : that this great change of religion
over the earth was brought about under the pro-
fession and acknowledgment, that Jesus was the
promised Messiah : things of this kind naturally turn
the thoughts of serious men towards the full com-
pletion of the prophetic history, concerning the final
restoration of that people ; concerning the establish-
ment of the everlasting kingdom among them, the
kingdom of the Messiah ; and the future state of the
world, under this sacred government. Such circum-
stances and events, compared with these prophecies,
though no com23letions of them, yet would not, I
think, be spoken of as nothing in the argument, by a
person upon his first being informed of them. They

s^^ fall in with the prophetic history of things still
future, give it some additional credibihty, have the
appearance of being somewhat in order to the full
completion of it.

Indeed it requu'es a good degree of knowledge,
and great calmness and consideration, to be able to
judge thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of
Christianity, from that part of the prophetic history
which I'clates to the situation of the kingdoms of the

N

FOR CHEISTIANITY. 287

world, and to the state of the Church, from the
establishment of Christianity to the present time.
But it appears, from a general view of it, to be very
material. And those persons who have thoroughly
examined it, and some of them were men of the
coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable
to imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as
determinately conclusive.

Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history,
first to recollect the i:)assages above mentioned out of
Scripture, without knowing but that the whole was
a late fiction, then to be informed of the corre-
spondent facts now mentioned, and to unite them
all into one view ; that the profession and establish-
ment of natiural religion in the world, is greatly
owing, in different ways, to this book, and the
supposed revelation which it contains ; that it is
acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity; that
its chronology and common history are entirely
credible ; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of
whom it chiefly treats, appear to have been, in fact,
the people of God, in a distinguished sense ; tliat,
as tliere was a national expectation amongst them,
raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear
at such a time, so one at this time appeared claiming
to be that Messiah ; that he was rejected by tliis
nation, but received by the Gentiles, not upon the
evidence of prophecy, but of miracles ; that the
religion he taught supported itself under the greatest
difficulties, gained ground, and at length became
the religion of the world ; that in the mean time
the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, and the
nation dispersed over the face of the earth ; that
notwithstanding this, they have remained a distinct
numerous people for so many centuries, even to this

288 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

day; which not only appears to be the express com-
pletion of several prophecies concerning them, but
also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and easy
possibility that the promises made to them as a
nation may yet be fulfilled. And to these acknow-
ledged truths, let the person we have been supposing
add, as I think he ought, whether every one will
allow it or no, the obvious appearances which there
are, of the state of the world, in other resjDccts be-
sides what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian
Church, having so long answered, and still answering
to the prophetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts
set over against the things before mentioned out of
the Scripture, and seriously compared with them ;
the joint view of both together must, I think, appear
of very great weight to a considerate reasonable per-
son : of much greater indeed, upon having them first
laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so
familiarized to them, to conceive, without some
particular attention for that purpose.

All these things, and the several particulars con-
tained under them, require to be distinctly and most
thoroughly examined into ; that the weight of each
may "be judged of, upon such examination, and such
conclusion drawn as results from their united force.
But this has not been attempted here. I have gone
no farther than to shew, that the general imperfect
view of them now given, the confessed historical
"levidence for miracles, and the many obvious ap-
pearing completions of prophecy, together with the
collateral things^ here mentioned, and there are
several others of the like sort ; that all this together,

b All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible
to the head of certain miracles, or deterniinate completions of pro-
phecy. See pp. 250, 251.

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 289

which, being fact, must be acknowledged by iin-
behevei's, amounts to real evidence of somewhat
more than human in this matter : evidence much
more important, than careless men, who have been
accustomed only to transient and partial views of
it, can imagine ; and indeed abundantly sufficient '
to act u^^on. And these things, I apprehend, must
be acknowledged by unbehevers. For though they
may sav, that the historical evidence of miracles
w^rought in attestation of Christianity, is not suffi-
cient to convince them that such miracles were really r
wrought ; they cannot deny, that there is such his-
torical e^ddence, it being a known matter of fact
that there is. They may say, the conformity be-
tween the prophecies and events is by accident : but
there are many instances in which such conformity
itself cannot be denied. They may say, with regard
to such kind of collateral things as those above men-
tioned, that any odd accidental events, without
meaning, will have a meaning found in them by
a fanciful people : and that such as are fanciful in
any one certain way, will make out a thousand co-
incidences which seem to favour their peculiar follies.
Men, I say, may talk thus : but no one who is
serious, can possibly think these things to be nothing,
if he considers the importance of collateral things,
and even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of
probability, as distinguished, in nature, from the
evidence of demonstration. In many cases indeed
it seems to require the truest judgment, to deter-
mine with exactness the weight of circumstantial
evidence : but it is very often altogether as con-
vincing, as that which is the most express and
direct.

This general view of the evidence for Cliristianity,

BUTLER, ANALOGY. U

290 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE

considered as making one argument, may also serve
to recommend to serious persons, to set down every
thing which they think may be of any real w^eight
at all in proof of it, and particularly the many seem-
ing completions of prophecy : and they will find, that,
judging by the natural rules, by which we judge of
probable evidence in common matters, they amount
to a much higher degree of proof, upon such a joint
review, than could be supposed upon considering
them separately, at different times ; how strong
soever the proof might before appear to them, upon
such separate views of it. For probable proofs, by
being added, not only increase the evidence, but
midtiply it. Nor should I dissuade any one from
setting down, what he thought made for the contrary
side. But then it is to be remembered, not in order
to influence his judgment, but his practice, that a
mistake on one side may be, in its consequences,
much more dangerous, than a mistake on the other.
And what course is most safe, and what most dan-
gerous, is a consideration thought very material,
, when we deliberate, not concerning events, but con-
cerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To be in-
fluenced by this consideration in our judgment, to
believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed as much
prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other
prejudices, it operates contraiy ways, in different
men ; for some are inclined to believe what they
hope, and others what they fear. And it is manifest
unreasonableness to apply to men's passions in order
to gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning
conduct, there is nothing which reason more requires
to be taken into the account, than the importance
of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would be tlie
consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary man-

FOR CHRISTIANITY. 291

ner: still, that taking one side could be attended
with little or no bad consequence, and taking the
other might be attended with the greatest, must
appear, to unprejudiced reason, of the highest mo-
ment towards determinincr how we are to act. But
the truth of our religion, like the truth of common
matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence taken
together. And unless the whole series of things
which may be alleged in this argument, and every
particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed
to have been by accident ; (for here the stress of
the argument for Christianity lies ;) then is the truth
of it proved : in Hke manner, as if in any common
case, numerous events acknowledged, were to be
alleged in proof of any other event disputed ; the
truth of the disputed event would be j^roved, not
only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself
clearly imply it, but, though no one of them singly
did so, if the whole of the acknowledged events
taken together could not in reason be supposed to
have happened, unless the disputed one were true.

It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of
this evidence gives to those persons who attack
Christianity, especially in conversation. For it is
easy to shew, in a short and lively manner, that
such and such things are liable to objection, that
this and another thing is of little weight in itself;
but impossible to shew, in like manner, the united
force of the whole argument in one view.

However, lastly, as it has been made appear, that
there is no presumption against a revelation as mira-
culous; thatlhe general scheme of Christianity, and
the principal parts of it, are confoimabl to the
experienced constitution of things, and the whole
perfectly credible : so the account now given of the

U 2

292 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY

positive evidence for it, shews, that this evidence is
such, as, from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed,
though it should be lessened.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the ohject'wns tohich may he made against arguing from the
analogy of nature, to religion.

If every one would consider, with such attention

as they are bound, even in point of morality, to

consider, what they judge and give characters of;

the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good

measure at least, superseded. But since thi,s is not

to be expected ; for some we find do not concern

themselves to understand even what they write

against : since this treatise, in common with most

others, lies open to objections, which may appear

very material to thoughtful men at first sight; and,

besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections

of such as can judge without tliinking, and of such

as can censure without judging; it may not be amiss

to set down the chief of these objections which occur

to me, and consider them to their hands. And they

are such as these :

[ \ " That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in

\j revelation, by saying, that there are the same in

natural rehgion ; when what is wanting is to clear^

both of them of these their common, as well as other

their respective, difficulties : but that it is a strange

f , way mdeed of convincing men of the obligations of

\ I religion, to shew them, that they have as little_

reason_^for their worldly pursuits : and a strange

a

OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 203

way of vindicating the justice and goodness of tlie
Aiithor of nature, and of removing the objections
against both, to which the system of religion lies
open, to shew, that the like objections lie against
natural providence ; a way of answering objections
against rehgion, without so much as pretending to
make out, that the system of it, or the particular

things in it objected against, are reasonable

especially, perhaps some may be inattentive enough
to add, must this be thought strange, when it is
confessed that analogy is no answer to such objec-
tions : that when this sort of reasoning is can-ied
to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of,
it will yet leave the mind in a very imsatisfied state :
and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of man-
kind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to
forego their present interests and pleasures, from
regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence,"

Now, as plausible as this way of talking may
appear, that appearance will be found in a great
measure owing to half-views, which shew but part
of an object, yet shew that indistinctly, and to un-
determinate language. By these means weak men
are often deceived by others, and ludicrous men, by
themselves. And even those, who are serious and
considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, and
at once clearly see through the perj)lexities, in which
subjects themselves are involved ; and which are
heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words.
To this latter sort of persons, the following reply to
each part of this objection severally, may be of some
assistance ; as it may also tend a httle to stop and
silence others.

First, The thing wanted, i.e. what men require, is
to have all difficulties cleared. And this i^;, or, at

294 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY

least for any thing we know to the contrary, it may
be, the same, as requiring to comprehend the Divine
nature, and the whole plan of Providence from ever-
lasting to everlasting. But it hath always been
allowed to argue, from what is acknowledged, to
what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a
poor thing, to argue from natural religion to re-
vealed, in the manner found fault with, than it is
to argue in numberless other ways of probable de-
duction and inference, in matters of conduct, which
we are continually reduced to the necessity of doing.
Indeed the epithet ijoor may be applied, I fear, as
properly to great part or the whole of human life, as
it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is
it not a poor thing, for a physician to have so little
knowledge in the cure of diseases, as even the most
eminent have I to act upon conjecture and guess,
where the life of man is concerned ? Undoubtedly
it is : but not in comparison of having no skill at
aU in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly
in the dark.

Further : since it is as unreasonable, as it is
common, to urge objections against revelation, which
are of equal weight against natural religion ; and
those who do this, if they are not confused them-
selves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem,
that they are arguing only against revelation, or
particular doctrines of it, when in reality they are
arguing against moral providence ; it is a thing of
. consequence to shew, that such objections are as
j much levelled against natural religion as against
\ revealed. And objections, which are equally ap-
plicable to both, are properly speaking answered, by
its being shewn that they are so, provided the former
be admitted to be true. And, without taking in the

OF NATUllE TO RELIGION. 295

consideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is
plainly very material to observe, that as the things
objected against in natural religion are of the same
kind with what is certain matter of experience in the
course of providence, and in the information which
God affords us concerning our temporal interest
under his government ; so the objections against
the system of Christianity, and the evidence of it,
are of the very same kind with those which are
made against the system and evidence of natural
religion. However, the reader upon review may see,
that most of the analogies insisted upon, even in
the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily
require to have more taken for granted than is in the
former ; that there is an Author of nature, or natural
\ Governor of the world : and Christianity is vindi-
cated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but
chiefly from its analogy to the experienced constitu-
tion of nature.

Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and consists
in such a determinate course of Hfe, as being w^hat,
there is reason to think, is commanded by the Author
of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our happiness
under his government. Now if men can be con-
vinced, that they have the like reason to believe
this, as to believe, that taking care of their temporal
affairs will be to their advantage ; such conviction
cannot but be an argument to them for the practice
of religion. And if there be really any reason for
believing one of these, and endeavouring to preserve
life, and secure ourselves the necessaries and con-
veniences of it ; then there is reason also for believing
the other, and endeavouring to secure the interest
it proposes to us. And if the interest, which religion
proposes to us, be infinitely greater than our whole

>

296 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY

temporal interest; then there must be proportionably
greater reason for endeavourmg to secure one, than
the other ; since, by the supposition, the probabiHty
of our securing one is equal to the probability of our
securing the other. This seems plainly unanswer-
able ; and has a tendency to influence fair minds,
who consider what our condition really is, or upon
what evidence we are naturally appointed to act ;
and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon
which we live, and attend to and follow that practical
instruction, whatever it be, which is afforded us.

But the chief and proper force of the argument
referred to in the objection, lies in another place.
For, it is said that the proof of religion is involved
in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubt-
ful ; and that it cannot be supposed, that, if it were
true, it would be left upon doubtful evidence. Here
then, over and above the force of each particular
difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objections
taken together are turned into a positive argument
against the truth of religion; which argument would
stand thus : If rehgion were true, it would not be
left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree
in which it is : therefore that it is thus left, not
only renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens
its force, in proportion to the weight of such objec-
tions ; but also shews it to be false, or is a general
presumption of its being so. Now the observation,
that, from the natural constitution and course of
things, we must in our temporal concerns, almost
continually, and in matters of great consequence, act
upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evi-
dence of religion, is an answer to this argument ;
because it shews, that it is according to the conduct
and character of the Author of nature to appoint we

OF NATUllE TO RELIGION. 297

should act upon evidence like to that, which this
argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint
we should act upon : it is an instance, a general one
made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat
in his dealing with us, similar to what is said to
be incredible. And as the force of this answer lies
merely in the parallel, which there is between the
evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct ;
the answer is equally just and conclusive, whether
the pandlel be made out, by shewing the evidence of
the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter
to be lower.

Thirdly, The design of this treatise is not to vindi-
cate the character of God, but to shew the obligations
oTlnen : it is not to justify his providence, but to —
shew what belons^s to us to do. These are two sub-
jects, and ought not to be confounded. And though
they may at length run up into each other, yet ob-
servations may immediately tend to make out the
latter, which do not appear, by any immediate con-
nection, to the purpose of the former ; which is less
our concern, than many seem to think. For, first, .
it is not necessary we should justify the dispensa- '
tions of Providence against objections, any farther
than to shew, that the things objected against may,
for ought we know, be consistent with justice and
goodness. Suppose then, that there are things in
the system of this world, and plan of Providence
relatinof to it, which taken alone would be unjust :
yet it has been shewn unanswerably, that if we could
take in the reference, which these things may have
to other things present, past, and to come ; to the
whole scheme, which the things olyected against are
parts of; these very things might, for ought we
know, be found to be, not only consistent ^\ith

208 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY

justice, but instances of it. Indeed it lias been
shewn, by the analogy of what we see, not only
possible that this may be the case, but credible that
it is. And thus objections, drawn from such things,
are answered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as
religion makes its vindication necessary. Hence it
appears, secondly, that objections against the Divine
justice and goodness are not endeavoured to be re-
moved, by shewing that the like objections, allowed
to be really conclusive, lie against natural providence :
but those objections being supposed and shewn not
to be conclusive, the things objected against, con-
sidered as matters of fact, are farther shewn to be
credible, from their conformitv to the constitution
of nature ; for instance, that God will reward and
punish men for their actions hereafter, from the
observation, that he does reward and punish them
for their actions here. And tliis, I apprehend, is of
weight. And I add, thirdly, it would be of weight,
even though those objections were not answered.
For, there being the proof of religion above set
down ; and religion implying several facts ; for
instance again, the fact last mentioned, that God
will reward and punish men for their actions here-
after ; the observation, that his present method of
government is by rewards and punishments, shews
that future fact not to be incredible : whatever ob-
jections men may think they have against it, as
unjust or unmerciful, according to their notions of
justice and mercy; or as improbable from their belief
of necessity. I say, as impr^ohahle : for it is evident
no objection against it, as unjust, can be urged from
necessity ; since this notion as much destroys in-
justice, as it does justice. Then, fourthly. Though
objections against the reasonableness of the system

OF XATUKE TO IIELIGIOX. 201)

of religion cannot indeed be answered witliout enter-
ing into consideration of its reasonableness ; yet ob-
jections against the credibility or triitli of it may.
Because the system of it is reducible! into what is
properly niatteii:j)f.j6ici;- and the truth, the probable
truth, of facts may be shewn without consideration
o£_tEeir reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, thougli,
in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and
proper, yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of
the reasonableness of every precept enjoined us, and
of every particular dispensation of Providence, which
comes into the system of religion. Indeed the more
thoroughly a person of a right disposition is con-
vinced of the perfection of the Divine nature and
conduct, the farther he will advance towards that
perfection of rehgion, which St. John speaks of".
But the general obligations of religion are fully
made out, by proving the reasonableness of the
practice of it. And that the practice of religion is
reasonable, may be shewn, though no more could
be proved, than that the system of it may he so, for
ought we know to the contrary: and even without
entering into the distinct consideration of this. And
from hence, fifthly, it is easy to see, that though the
analogy of nature is not an immediate answer to
objections, against the wisdom, the justice, or good-
ness, of any doctrine or precept of religion : yet it
may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to
what is really intended by such objections ; whicli
is, to shew that the things objected against are
incredible.

Fourtlily, It is most readily acknowledged, that
the foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory ;
very far indeed from it: but so would any natural

* I John iv. 1 8.

300 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY

institution of life appear, if reduced into a system,
together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of
the case, men are divided in their opinions, whether
our pleasures overbalance our pains : and whether
it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world. And
were all such controversies settled, which perhaps, in
speculation, would be found involved in great diffi-
culties ; and were it determined upon the evidence
of reason, as nature has determined it to our hands,
that life is to be preserved : vet still, the rules which
God has been pleased to afford us, for escaping the
miseries of it, and obtaining its satisfactions, the
rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recover-
ing it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious,
but very far from being exact. Nor are we informed
by nature, in future contingencies and accidents, so
as to render it at all certain, what is the best method
of managing our affairs. What will be the success
of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of
the word Success, is highly doubtful. And what will
be the success of them in the proper sense of the
word; i.e. what happiness or enjoyment we shall
obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher degree.
Indeed the unsatisfactorv nature of the evidence, with
which we are obliged to take up, in the daily course
of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not
throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon
account of this doubtfulness. The evidence of religion
then being admitted real, those who object against it,
as not satisfactory, i. e. as not being what they wish
it, plainly forget the very condition of our being: for
satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such
a cieature as man. And, which is more material,
they forget also tlie very nature of rehgion. For,
religion presuj)p()ses, in all those who will embrace

OF NATURE TO KELIGIOX. 301

it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty ; which
it was~intended to try whether men have or not,
and to exercise in such as have it, in order to its
improvement. Religion presupposes this as mucli,
and in the same sense, as speaking to a man pre-
supposes he understands the language in which you
speak ; or as warning a man of any danger presup-
poses that he hath such a regard to himself, as that
he will endeavour to avoid it. And therefore the
question is not at all, Whether the evidence of re-
ligion be satisfactory ; but Whether it be, in reason,
sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue, which
it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is fully suffi-
cient for all those purposes of probation ; how far
soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the pur-
poses of curiosity, or any other : and indeed it
answers the purposes of the former in several re-
spects, which it would not do, if it were as over-
bearing as is rec^uired. One might add farther ; that
wdiether the motives or the evidence for any course
of action be satisfactory, meaning here, by that word
what satisfies a man, that such a course of action
will in event be for his good ; this need never be,
and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical
question in common matters. But the practical ques-
tion in all cases is, Whether the evidence for a course
of action be such, as, taking in all circumstances,
makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and
judge of conduct ^^ determine that course of action to,
be prudent. Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for
our interest or happiness, abmidantly determines an
action to be prudent : but evidence almost infinitely
lower than this, determines actions to be so too ;
even in the conduct of every day.

^ See Dissert. II.

302 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY

^ Fifthly, As to the objection concerning the in-
fluence wliich this argument, or any part of it, may,
or may not, be expected to have upon men ; I ob-
serve, as above, that religion being intended for a
trial and exercise of the morality of every person's
character, who is a subject of it ; and there being, as
I have shewn, such evidence for it, as is sufficient, in
reason, to influence men to embrace it : to object,
that it is not to be imagined mankind will be in-
fluenced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose

-^ of the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is
not to inquire, what sort of creatures mankind are ;
but what the light and knowledge, which is afforded
them, requires they should be : to shew how, in
reason, they ought to behave ; not how, in fact, they

/will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is
their own concern ; the personal concern of each man
in particular. And how little regard the generality
have to it, experience indeed does too fully shew.
But religion, considered as a probation, has had its
end upon all persons, to whom it has been proposed
with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their
practice : for by this means they have been put into
a state of probation ; let them behave as they will in
it. And thus, not only revelation, but reason also,
teaches us, that by the evidence of religion being
laid before men, the designs of Providence are carry-
ing on, not only with regard to those who will, but
likewise with regard to those who will not, be in-
fluenced by it. However, lastly, the objection here
referred to, allows the things insisted upon in this
treatise to be of some weight: and if so, it may
be hoped it will have some influence. And if there
be a probability that it will have any at all, there
is the same reason in kind, though not in degree.

OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 303

to lay it before men, as there would be, if it were
likely to have a greater influence.

And farther, I desire it mav be considered, with
respect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that
in this treatise I have argued upon the principles
of others ^, not my own : and have omitted what
I ihink true, and of the utmost importance, because
by others thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus
I have argued upon the principles of the Fatalists,
which I do not believe : and have omitted a thino;
of the utmost importance which I do beheve, the
moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all
will whatever; which I apprehend as certainly to
determine the Divine conduct, as speculative truth
and falsehood necessarily determine the Divine judg-
ment. Indeed the principle of liberty, and that of
moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind,
that moralists, the ancients as well as moderns, have
formed their language upon it. And probably it
may appear in mine : though I have endeavoured to
av^oid it ; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes
been obliged to express myself in a manner, which
will appear strange to such as do not observe the
reason for it : but the general argument here pursued
does not at all suppose or proceed upon these prin-
ciples. Now, these two abstract principles of liberty
and moral fitness being omitted, religion can be con-
sidered in no other view, than merely as a question
Q£_fact : and in this view it is here considerecT Tt
is obvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it,

c By arguing ttpon tJie principles of others, the reader will observe
is meant ; not proving any thing from those principles, but not-
vnthstanding them. Thus religion is proved, wot frovi the opinion
of necessity; which is absurd : but, notwithstanding or even though
that opinion were admitted to be true.

304 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY

are both historical. And even natural religion is,
properly, a matter of fact. For, that there is a
righteous Governor of the world, is so : and this
proposition contains the general system of natural
religion. But then, several abstract truths, and in
particular those two principles, are usually taken
into consideration in the proof of it : whereas it is
here treated of only as a matter of fact. To explain
this : that the three angles of a triangle are equal to
two right ones, is an abstract truth: but that they
appear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. And
this last must have been admitted, if any thing was,
by those ancient sceptics, who would not have ad-
mitted the former : but pretended to doubt. Whether
there were any such thing as truth, or Whether we
could certainly depend upon our faculties of under-
standing for the knowledge of it in any case. So
likewise, that there is, in the nature of things, an
original standard of right and wrong in actions,
independent upon all will, but which unalterably
determines the will of God, to exercise that moral
government over the world, which religion teaches,
i. e. finally and upon the whole to reward and punish
men respectively as they act right or wrong ; this
assertion contains an abstract truth, as well as matter
of fact. But suppose, in the present state, every
man, without exception, was rewarded and punished,
in exact proportion as he followed or transgressed
that sense of right and wrong, which God has im-
planted in the nature of every man : this would not
be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact.
And though this fact were acknowledged by every
one ; yet the very same difficulties might be raised
as are now, concerning the abstract questions of
liberty and monil fitness : and we should have a

OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 305

proof, even the certain one of experience, that the
government of the world was perfectly moral, without
taldng in the consideration of those questions : and
this proof would remain, in what way soever they
were determined. And thus, God having given man-
kind a moral faculty, the object of wliich is actions,
and which naturally approves some actions as right,
and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong,
and of ill desert ; that he will, finally and upon the
whole, reward the former and punish the latter, is
not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what
is as mere a fact, as his doing so at present would be.
This futui'e fact I have not indeed proved with the
force with which it might be proved, from the prin-
ciples of liberty and moral fitness ; but without them
have given a really conclusive practical proof of it,
which is greatly strengthened by the general analogy
of nature : a proof easily cavilled at, easily shewn not
to be demonstrative, for it is not offered as such ; but
impossible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. And
thus the obligations of religion are made out, exclu-
sively of the questions concerning liberty and moral
fitness ; which have been perplexed with difficulties
and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may.

Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what
is the force of this treatise. It will be, to such as
are convinced of religion upon the proof arising out
of the two last-mentioned principles, an additional
proof and a confirmation of it : to such as do not
admit those principles, an original proof of it^, and a
confirmation of that proof. Those who believe will
here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of objec-
tions, and the evidence of it in a pecuUar manner
strengthened : those wEo do not beheve will at least

'1 P. 1 20, &c.

BUTLER, ANALOGY. X

306 CONCLUSION.

be shewn the absurdity of all attempts to prove
Christianity false, the plain undoubted credibility of
it ; and, I hope, a good deal more.

And thus, though some perhaps may seriously
think, that analogy, as here urged, has too great
stress laid upon it ; and ridicule, unanswerable ridi-
cule, may be applied, to show the argument from it
in a disadvantageous light : yet there can be no
question, but that it is a real one. For religion, both
natural and revealed, imply in it numerous facts ;
analogy, being a confirmation of all facts to w^hich
it can be applied, as it is the only proof of most,
cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material
thing, and truly of weight on the side of rehgion,
both natural and revealed : and it ought to be par-
ticularly regarded by such as profess to follow nature,
and to be less satisfied wdth abstract reasonings.

CONCLUSION.

Whatever account may be given of the strange
inattention and disregard, in some ages and countries,
to a matter of such importance as Religion ; it would,
before experience, be incredible, that there should be
the like disregard in those, who have had the moral
system of the world laid before them, as it is by
Christianity, and often inculcated upon them : because
this moral system carries in it a good degree of
evidence for its truth, upon its being barely proposed
to our thoughts. There is no need of abstruse
reasonings and distinctions, to convince an unj^re-
judiced understanding, that there is a God who

CONCLUSION. 307

made and governs tlie world, and will judge it in
righteousness ; though they may be necessary to
answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are
raised: when the very meaning of those words,
which express most intelligibly the general doctrine
of religion, is pretended to be uncertain; and the
clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the
intricacies of speculation. But to an unprejudiced
mind ten thousand thousand instances of design
cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitively
manifest, that creatures ougEt to Hve under_a dutiful
sense of their Maker; and that justice and charity
must be his laws, to creatures whom he has made
social, and placed in society. Indeed the truth of
revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not self-
evident, but requires external proof, in order to its
being received. Yet inattention, among us, to re-
vealed religion, will be found to imply the same
dissolute immoral temper of mind, as inattention to
natural religion : because, when both are laid before
us, in the manner they are in Christian countries
of liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and
to embrace both upon supposition of their truth, are
obligations of the same natiu'e. For, revelation
claims to be the voice of God : and our obligation
to attend to his voice is surelv moral in all cases.
And as it is insisted, that its evidence is conclusive,
upon thorough consideration of it ; so it offers itself
to us with manifest obvious appearances of having
something more than human in it, and therefore in
all reason requires to have its claims most seriously
examined into. It is to be added, that though light
and knowled^-e, in what manner soever ai3brded us,
is equally fruui G<»(1 ; yet a miraculous revelation
has a pecuHar tendency, from the first principles of

X 2

308 CONCLUSION.

our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them
with reverence and awe : and this is a pecuhar
obhgation, to attend to what claims to be so with
such appearances of truth. It is therefore most
certain, that our obhgations to inquke seriously into
the evidence of Christianity, and, upon supposition
of its truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost im-
portance, and moral m the highest and most proper
sense. Let us then suppose, that the evidence of
religion m general, and of Christianity, has been
seriously inquired into, by all reasonable men among
us. Yet we find many professedly to reject both,
upon speculative principles of infidelity. And all of
them do not content themselves with a bare neglect
of religion, and enjoying their imagmary freedom
from its restraints. Some go much beyond this.
They deride God's moral government over the world.
They renounce his protection, and defy his justice.
They ridicule and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme
the Author of it ; and take all occasions to manifest
a scorn and contempt of revelation. This amounts
to an active setting themselves against religion ; to
what may be considered as a positive principle of
irreligion; which they cultivate within themselves,
and, whether they intend this effect or not, render
habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle.
And others, who are not chargeable with all this pro-
fligateness, yet are in avowed opposition to religion,
as if discovered to be groundless. Now admitting,
which is the supposition we go upon, that these
persons act upon what they think principles of
reason, and otherwise they are not to be argued
with; it is really inconceivable, that they should
imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it,
considered in itself, to be nothing at all : nor do they

CONCLUSIOX. 309

pretend this. They are far indeed from Laving a
just notion of its evidence : but they would not say
its evidence was nothing, if they thought the system
of it, with all its circumstances, were credible, like
other matters of science or histoiy. So that tlieir
manner of treating it must proceed, either from such
kind of objections against all religion, as have been
answered or obviated in the former part of this
treatise; or else from objections, and difficulties, sup-
posed more pecuUar to Christianity. Thus, they
entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a ^
revelation, and miraculous interpositions. They find
things in Scripture, whether in incidental passages,
or in the general scheme of it, which appear to
them unreasonable. They take for granted, that if
Christianity were true, the light of it must have
been more general, and the evidence of it more satis-
factory, or rather overbearing : that it must and
would have been, in some way, otherwise put and.
left, than it is. Now this is not imagining they see
the evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable ;
but quite another thing. It is being fortified against
the evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by
thinking they see the system of Christianity, or
somewhat which appears to them necessarily con-
nected with it, to be incredible or false ; fortified
against that evidence, which might, otherwise, make
great impression upon them. Or, lastly, if any of
these persons are, upon the whole, in doubt concern-
ing the truth of Christianity ; their behaviour seems
owing to their taking for granted, through strange
inattention, that such doubting is, in a manner, the
same thing, as being certain against it.

To these persons, and to this state of opinion con-
cerningTetigion, the~!ofegomg treatise is adaj'ted. \\

310 CONCLUSION.

For, all the general objections against the moral system
of nature having been obviated, it is shewn, that
there is not any peculiar presumption at all against
Christianity, either considered as not discoverable by

' reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered ; nor
any worth mentioning against it as miraculous, if
any at all ; none, certainly, which can render it in
the least incredible. It is shewn, that, upon supposi-
tion of a divine revelation, the analogy of nature
renders it beforehand highly credible, I think pro-
bable, that many things in it, must appear liable
to great objections; and that we must be incom-
petent judges of it, to a great degree. This observa-
tionfis, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very
utmost importance : but it is urged, as I hope it
will be understood, with great caution of not vilify-

V ing the faculty of reason, which is the candle of the
Lord ivithin us^; though jt can afford no light, where
rf'does not shine; nor judge, where it has no prin-
ciples to judge upon. The objections here spoken
of, being first answered in the view of objections
against Christianity as a matter of fact, are in the
next place considered as urged more immediately
against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the
Christian dispensation. And it is fully made out,
that they admit of exactly the like answer, in every
respect, to what the like objections against the con-
^stitution of nature admit of: that, as partial views
give the appearance of wrong to things, which, upon
farther consideration and knowledge of their rela-
tions to other things, are found just and good; so it
is perfectly credible, that the things objected against
the wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensa-
tion, may be rendered instances of wisdom and good-

^ Prov. XX. 27.

CONCLUSION. 311

ness, by their reference to other things beyond our
view : because Christianity is a scheme as much
above our comprehension, as that of nature ; and Hke
that, a scheme in which means are made use of to
accomphsh ends, and which, as is most credible, may
be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be
attended to, that this is not an answer taken merely
or chiefly from our ignorance ; but from somewhat
positive, which our observation shews us. Tor, to
like' objections, the like answer is experienced to be
just, in numberless parallel cases. The objections
against the Christian dispensation, and the ineth(jd by
which it is carried on, having been thus obviated,
in general and together; the chief of them are con-
sidered (listinctl)-, and the particular thmgs objected
to~aTe shewn credible, by their perfect analogy, each
apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be
fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored,
and infinite wisdom and power engages in accom-
plishing our recovery: it were to have been ex-
pected, it is said, that this should have been effected
at once; and not by such a long series of means, and
such a various economy of persons and things ; one
dispensation preparatory to another, this to a farther
one, and so on through an indefinite number of ages,
before the end of the scheme proposed can be com-
pletely accomplished ; a scheme conducted by infinite
wisdom, and executed by almighty power. But now,
on the contrary, our finding that every thing in the
constitution and course of nature is thus carried on,
shews such expectations concerning revelation to be
highly unreasonable; and is a satisfactory answer to
them, when urged as objections against the credi-
l>ility, that the great scheme of Providence in the
redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to

312 CONCLUSION.

be accomplished in this manner. As to the particular
method of our redemption, the appointment of a
Mediator between God and man : this has been shewn
to be most obviously analogous to the general con-
duct of nature, i. e. the Grod of nature, in appointing
others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we
experience in the daily course of providence. The
condition of this world, which the doctrine of our re-
demption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with
natural appearances, that heathen moralists infeiTed
it from those appearances : inferred, that human
natiu:"e was fallen from its original rectitude, and, in
consequence of this, degraded from its primitive
happiness. Or, however this opinion came into the
world, these appearances must have kept up the
tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. And as it
was the general opinion under the light of nature,
that repentance and reformation, alone and by itself,
was not sufficient to do away sin, and procure a full
remission of the penalties annexed to it ; and as
the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any
such conclusion ; so every day's experience shews us,
that reformation is not, in any sort, sufficient to
prevent the present disadvantages and miseriesT"
which, in the natural course of things, God has
annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there may
be ground to think, that the punishments, which, by
the general laws of Divine government, are annexed
to vice, may be prevented : that pro\'ision may have
been, even originally, made, that they should be
prevented by some means or other, though they
could not by reformation alone. For we have daily
instances of such mercy, in the general condnct^of
nature : compassion provided for misery^, medicines for

b Serm. at the Rolls, j^. io6.

CONCLUSION. 313

diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision
made, in the original constitution of the world, that
much of the natural bad consequences of our follies,
which 2^ersons themselves alone cannot prevent, may
be prevented by the assistance of others ; assistance,
which nature enables, and disposes, and apf)oints
them to afford. By a method of ofoodness analogous
to this, wdien the world lay in wickedness, and con-
sequently in ruin, God so loved tha.u'.oi'ldy.tJAat^he
gave his only-begotten Son to save it: and he being
made ^3(^/yc'c^ by suffering, become the author of
eternal salvation to all them that obey him^. Indeed
neither reason nor analogy would lead us to think, in
particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the
manner in which he did interpose, would be of that
efficacy for recovery of the world, which the Scripture
teaches us it was : but neither would reason nor
analogy lead us to think, that other particular means
would be of the efficacy, which exjDerience shews
they are, in numberless instances. And therefore,
as the case before us does not admit of experience:
so, that neither reason nor analogy can shew how, or
in what particular way, the interposition of Christ,
as revealed in ScrijDture, is of that efficacy, which it
is there represented to be ; this is no kind nor degree
of presumption. .against its being really of that effi-
cacy. Farther: the objections against Christianity,
from the light of it not being universal, nor its
evidence so strong as miglit possibly be given us,
have been answered by the general analogy of nature.
That God has made such variety of creatures, is
indeed an answer to the former: but that he dispenses
his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds,
amongst creatures of the same species, and even

f John iii. i6 ; Heb. v. 9.

314 CONCLUSION.

to the same individuals at different times ; is a more
obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from
being the method of Providence in other cases, to
afford us such overbearing evidence, as some require
in proof of Christianity ; that, on the contrary, the
evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to
act in common matters, throughout a very great part
of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting
the fact, that God has afforded to some no more than
doubtful evidence of religion; the same account may
be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations with
regard to practice. But as it is not impossible "^^
surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men's
own fault ; it deserves their most serious considera-
tion, whether it be not so. However, it is certain,
that doubting implies a degree of evidence for that
of which we doubt : and that this degree of evidence
as really lays us under obligations, as demonstrative
evidence.

- The whole then of religion is throughout credible :
nor is there, I thmk, any thing relating to the re-
vealed dispensation of things, more different from
the experienced constitution and course of nature,
than some parts of the constitution of nature are
from other parts of it. And if so, the only question
which remains is, what positive evidence can be
alleged for the truth of Christianity. This too in
general has been considered, and the objections
against it estimated. Deduct, therefore, what is to
be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any
weight which may be thought to remain in these
objections, after what the analogy of nature has sug-
gested in answer to them: and then consider, what
are the practical consequences from all this, upon the

^ Page 243, &c.

x

CONCLUSION. 315

most sceptical principles one can argue upon : (for I
am writing to persons who entertain these prin- /
ciples:) and upon such consideration it will be
obvious, that immorality, as little excuse as it
admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons
who have been made acquainted with Christianity,
whether they believe it or not: because the moral
system of nature, or natural religion, which Christi- ^Jf^
anity lays before us, approves itself, almost intui- ^
tively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed.
In the next place, with regard to Christiai^ty, it will
be observed; that there is a middle between a full
satisfaction of the truth of it, and a satisfaction of
the contrary. The middle state of mind between
these two consists in a serious apprehension, that
it may be true, joined with doubt whether it be so.
And this, upon the best judgment I am able to
make, is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any ( y
sceptic can at all be supposed to go, who has had
true Christianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid
before him, and has in any tolerable measure con-
sidered them. For I would not be mistaken to
comprehend all who have ever heard of it : because
it seems evident, that in many countries called
Christian, neither Christianity, nor its evidence, are
fairly laid before men. And in places where both
are, there appear to be some, who have very little
attended to either, and who reject Christianity with
a scorn proportionate to their inattention; and yet
are by no means without understanding in other
matters. Now it has been shewn, that a serious
apprehension that Christianity may be true, lays
persons under the strictest obligations of a serious
regard to it, throughout the w^hole of their life : a
regard not the same exactly, but in many respects

316 CONCLUSION.

nearly the same, with what a full conviction of its
truth would lay them under. Lastly, it will apjDear,
that blasphemy and profaneness, I mean with regard
to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. For
there is no temptation to it, but from the wantonness
of vanity or mirth: and these, considering the infinite
importance of the subject, are no such temptations
as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a just
account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or
disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if
they had ^ demonstration of its falsehood ; there is
no reason to think they would alter their behaviour
to any purpose, though there were a demonstration
of its truth.

THE END OF THE SECOND PART.

TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS.

I. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.
II. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

ADVERTISEMENT.

In the first copy of these Papers, I had inserted the two
following- Dissertations into the chapters, Of a future Ife,
and, Of the moral govermnent of God; with which they are
closely connected. But as they do not directly fall under the
title of the foregoing Treatise, and would have kept the sub-
ject of it too long out of sight ; it seemed more proper to
place them by themselves.

DISSERTATION I.

OF PERSONAL IDENTIl'Y,

Whether we are to live in a futm-e state, as it is
the most important question which can possibly be
asked, so it is the most intelligible one which can
be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities
have been raised about the meaninof of that identitv,
or sameness of person, which is implied in the notion
of oui' living now and hereafter, or in any two
successive moments. And the solution of these
difficulties hath been stranger than the difficulties
themselves. For personal identity has been ex-
plained so by some, as to render the inquiry con-
cerning a future life of no consequence at all to us
the persons who are making it. And though few
men can be misled by such subtleties ; yet it may
be proper a little to consider them.

Now when it is asked, wherein personal identity
consists, the answer should be the same, as if it were
asked, wherein consists similitude, or equality; that
all attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet
there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea.
For as, upon two triangles being compared or viewed
together, there arises to the mind the idea of simili-
tude ; or upon twice two and four, the idea of
equality : so likewise, upon comparing the conscious-
nesses of one's self, or one's own existence, in any two
moments, there as immediately arises to the mind
the idea of personal identity. And as the two former

320 OP PERSONAL IDENTITY.

comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude
and equality; but also shew us, that two triangles
are alike, and twice two and four are equal : so the
latter comparison not only gives us the idea of per-
sonal identity, but also shews us the identity of
ourselves in those two moments ; the present, sup-
pose, and that immediately past ; or the present,
and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. Or
in other words, by reflecting upon that, which is
myself now, and that, which was myself twenty
years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and
the same self

But though consciousness of what is past does thus
ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to
say, that it makes personal identity, or is necessary
to our being the same persons, is to say, that a
person has not existed a single moment, nor done
one action, but what he can remember; indeed none
but what he reflects upon. And one should really
think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal
identity presupposes, and therefore camiot constitute,
personal identity ; any more than knowledge, in any
other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes.

This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen
from hence ; that to be endued with consciousness is
inseparable from the idea of a person, or intelligent
being. For, this might be expressed inaccurately
thus, that consciousness makes personality : and from
hence it might be concluded to make personal
identity. But though present consciousness of what
we at present do and feel is necessaiy to our being
the persons we now are ; yet present consciousness
of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our
being the same persons who performed those actions,
or had those feelings.

OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 321

The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in
the common acceptation of the word, does not appear
to have any relation to this of personal identity :
because the word same, when applied to them and
to person, is not only applied to different subjects,
but it is also used in different senses. For wdien a
man swears to the same tree, as having stood fifty
years in the same place, he means only the same as
to all the purposes of property and uses of common
life, and not that the tree has been all that time
the same in the strict philosophical sense of the word.
For he does not know, whether any one particle of
the present tree be the same with any one particle
of the tree which stood in the same place fifty years
ago. And if they have not one common particle of
matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper
philosophic sense of the word same : it being evidently
a contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part
of theu' substance, and no one of their properties is
the same : no part of their substance, by the sup-
position; no one of their properties, because it is
allowed, that the same property cannot be trans-
ferred from one substance to another. And there-
fore, when we say the identity or sameness of a
plant consists in a continuation of the same life,
communicated under the same organization, to a
number of particles of matter, whether the same
or not ; the word same, when applied to life and
to organization, cannot possibly be understood to
signify, what it signifies in this very sentence, when
applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense
then, the life and the organization and the plant are
justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the per-
petual change of the parts. But in a strict and
philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no

BUTLER, ANALOGY. Y

322 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

mode of being, no anything, can be the same with
that, with which it hath indeed nothing the same.
Now sameness is used in this latter sense, when
applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore,
cannot subsist with diversity of substance.

The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as
I think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in
these words. Whether it, i. e. the same self or person,
he the same identical substance ? And he has sug-
gested what is a much better answer to the question,
than that which he gives it in form. For he defines
Person, a thinhing intelligent being, &c., and personal
identity, the sameness of a rational heiyig^. The
question then is, whether the same rational being is
the same substance: which needs no answer, because
Being and Substance, in this place, stand for the
same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the
same person be the same substance, is said to be
this ; that the consciousness of our own existence, in
youth and in old age, or in any two joint successive
moments, is not the same individual action^, i. e.
not the same consciousness, but different successive
consciousnesses. Now it is strange that this should
have occasioned such perplexities. For it is surely
conceivable, that a person may have a caj)acity of
knowing some object or other to be the same now,
which it was when he contemplated it formerly : yet
in this case, where, by tlie supposition, the object is
perceived to be the same, the perception of it in
any two moments cannot be one and the same per-
ception. And thus though the successive conscious-
nesses, which we have of our own existence, are not
the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and
the same thing or object; of the same person, self,

'^ Locke's Works, vol. i. p. 146. ^ Locke, pp. 146, 147.

OF PERSONAL IDENTITV. 323

or living agent. The person, of whose existence the
consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or
a year ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but
one and the same person; and therefore is one and
the same.

Mr. Locke's observations upon this subject appear
hasty: and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied
with suppositions, which he has made relating to it''.
But some of those hasty observations have been
carried to a strange length by others ; whose notion,
when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts,
I think, to this^: "That Personality is not a per-
manent, but a transient thing : that it lives and dies,
begins and ends continually: that no one can any
more remain one and the same person two moments
together, than two successive moments can be one
and the same moment : that our substance is indeed
continually changing ; but whether this be so or not,
is, it seems, nothing to the purpose; since it is not
substance, but consciousness alone, which constitutes
personality : which consciousness, being successive,
cannot be the same in any two moments, nor con-
sequently the personality constituted by it." And
from hence it must follow, that it is a fallacy upon
ourselves, to charge our present selves with any
thing we did, or to imagine our present selves in-
terested in any thing which befell us yesterday; or
that oiu- present self will be interested in what will
befall us to-morrow : since our present self is not,
in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but
another like self or person coming in its room, and
mistaken for it ; to which another self will succeed

'^ Locke, p. 152.

d See an Answer to Dr. Clarke's Third Defence of liis Letter to
Mr. Dodwell, 2ud edit. pp. 44, 56, &c.

V 2

324 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

to-morrow. This, I say, must follow: for if the self
or person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not
the same, but only like persons ; the person of to-
day is really no more interested in what will befall
the person of to-morrow, than in what will befall any
other person. It may be thought, perhaps, that this
is not a just representation of the opinion we are
speaking of : because those who maintain it allow,
that a person is the same as far back as his remem-
brance reaches. And indeed they do use the words,
identity and same person. Nor will language per-
mit these words to be laid aside ; since if they were,
there must be I know not what ridiculous periphrasis
substituted in the room of them. But they cannot,
consistently with themselves, mean, that the person
is really the same. For it is self-evident, that the
personality cannot be really the same, if, as they
expressly assert, that in which it consists is not the
same. And as, consistently with themselves, they
cannot, so, I think it appears, they do not, mean,
that the person is really the same, but only that
he is so in a fictitious sense : in such a sense only
as they assert, for this they do assert, that any
number of persons whatever may be the same person.
The bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus
naked and open, seems the best confutation of it.
However, since great stress is said to be put upon
it, I add the following things.

First, This notion is absolutely contradictory to
that certain conviction, which necessarily and every
moment rises within us, when we turn our thoughts
upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past,
and look forward upon what is to come. All imagi-
nation of a daily change of that living agent which
each man calls himself, for another, or of any such

OF PERSOxVAL IDENTITY. 325

cliange tlirougliout our wliole present life, is entirely
borne down Ly our natural sense of things. Nor is
it possible for a person in liis wits to alter his con-
duct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a
suspicion, that, though he should live to-moiTow, he
should not, however, be the same person he is to-day.
And yet, if it be reasonable to act, with respect to
a future life, upon this notion, that personality is
transient ; it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect
to the present. Here then is a notion equally ap-
plicable to religion and to our temporal concerns ;
and every one sees and feels the inexpressible ab-
surdity of it in the latter case ; if, therefore, any can
take up with it in the former, this cannot proceed
from the reason of the thing, but must be owing
to an inward unfairness, and secret corruption of
heart.

Secondly, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or
quality, but a being only, which is capable of life and
action, of happiness and misery. Now all beings
confessedly continue the same, during the whole time
of their existence. Consider then a living being
now existing, and which has existed for any time
alive : this living being must have done and suffered
and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and
enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I say, and not
another,) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys,
what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All
these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings,
are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same
living being. And they are so, prior to all considera-
tion of its remembering or forgetting : since remem-
bering or forgetting can make no alteration in the
truth of past matter of fact. And supjiose this
being endued with limited powers of knowledge and

326 OF PERSONAL 1DE^^T1TY.

memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it
to have a. power of knowing itself to be the same
living being which it was some time ago, of remem-
bering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoyments,
and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know
or remember or forget anything else.

Thirdly, Every person is conscious, that he is now
the same person or self he was as far back as his
remembrance reaches : since when any one reflects
upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain
of the person who did that action, namely, himself,
the person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain
that the action was at all done. Nay, very often a
person's assurance of an action having been done, of
which he is absolutely assured, arises wholly from
the consciousness that he himself did it. And this
he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or the
property of some substance. If he, if person, be a
substance ; then consciousness that he is the same
person is consciousness that he is the same substance.
If the person, or he, be the property of a substance,
still consciousness that he is the same property is
as certain a proof that his substance remains the
same, as consciousness that he remains the same
substance would be : since the same property cannot
be transferred from one substance to another.

But though we are thus certain that we are the
same agents, living beings, or substances, now which
we were as far back as our remembrance reaches ;
yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly be
deceived in it 1 And this question may be asked at
the end of any demonstration whatever : because it
is a question concerning, the truth of perception by
memory. And he who can doubt, whether percep-
tion by memory can in this case be depended upon,

OF PERSOXAL IDENTITY. 327

may doubt also, whether perception by deduction
and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed
whether intuitive perception can. Here then we can
go no farther. For it is ridiculous to attempt to
prove the truth of those perceptions, whose trutli
we can no otherwise j^rove, than by other perceptions
of exactly the game kind with them, and which there
is just the same ground to suspect ; or to attempt
to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no
otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of
those very suspected faculties themselves.

DISSERTATION^ II.

OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

That which renders beings capable of moral
government, is their having a moral nature, and
moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute
creatures are impressed and actuated by various in-
stincts and propensions : so also are we. But addi-
tional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting
upon a,ctions and characters, and making them an
object to our thought: and on doing this, we
naturally and unavoidably approve some actions,
under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and
of good desert ; and disapprove others, as vicious
and of ill-desert. That we have this moral approv-
ing and disapproving^ faculty, is certain from our
experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in

^ This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus*, and is made use
of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral
faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, doKifxaa-riKfi
and dnoboKi^iaa-TiKq, upon a double account ; because, upon a survey
of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them
to be good or evil ; and also because it determines itself to be the
guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from all other facul-
ties, or natural principles of action : in the very same manner as
speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth
and falsehood ; and at the same time is attended with a cons^cious-
ness upon reflection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs
to it.

* Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. i.

OF THE NATURE OF VIKTUE. 329

each other. It appears from our exercising it un-
avoidably, in the approbation and disajiprobation
even of feigned characters: from tlie woids right
and ivrong, odious and cuniahle, base and ivortlii/,
with many others of Uke signification in all languages,
applied to actions and characters : from the many
written systems of morals which suppose it ; since
it cannot be imagined, that all these authors,
throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no
meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely
chimerical : from our natural sense of gratitude,
which implies a distinction between merely being
the instrument of good, and intending it : from the
like distinction, every one makes, between injury and
mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is pecuhar to man-
Idnd ; and between injury and just punisliment,
a distinction plainly natural, prior to the considera-
tion of human laws. It is manifest great part of
common language, and of common behaviour over
the world, is formed upon supposition of such a
moral faculty ; whether called conscience, moral
reason, moral sense, or Divine reason; whether con-
sidered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a
preception of the heart ; or, which seems the truth,
as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in tlie
general, what course of action this faculty, or prac-
tical discerning power within us, approves, and what
it disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed
wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt
there may be about paiticulars ; yet, in general, there
is in reality an universally acknowledged standard
of it. It is that, which all ages and all countries
have made profession of in public: it is that, which
every man you meet puts on the show of: it is
that, which the jjrimaiy and fundamental laws of all

330 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

civil constitutions over the face of the earth make it
their business and endeavour to enforce the practice
of upon mankind : namely, justice, veracity, and
regard to common good. It being manifest then, in
general, that ^ve have such a faculty or discernment
as this, it may be of use to remark some thmgs more
distinctly concerning it.

First, It ought to be observed, that the object of
this faculty is actions^, comprehending under that
name active or practical principles : those principles
from which men would act, if occasions and cu'cum-
stances gave them power ; and which, when fixed
and ha^bitual in any person, we call his character.
It does not appear, that brutes have the least reflex
sense of actions, as distinguished from events : or
that will and design, which constitute the very nature
of actions as such, are at all an object to their percep-
tion. But to ours they are : and they are the object,
and the only one, of the ajDproving and disapproving
faculty. Acting, conduct, behaviour, abstracted from
all regard to what is, in fact and event, the con-
sequence of it, is itself the natural object of the moral
discernment ; as speculative truth and falsehood is
of speculative reason. Intention of such and such
consequences, indeed, is always included ; for it is
part of the action itself: but though the intended
good or bad consequences do not follow, we have
exactly the same sense of the action as if they did.
In like manner we think well or ill of characters,
abstracted from all consideration of the good or the
evil, which persons of such characters have it actu-
ally in their power to do. We never, in the moral
way, applaud or blame either ourselves or otliers,

l> Ov8e f] aptTT] Koi KOKia — ev nelcrei, aKXa ivfpyfia, M. Anton, lib. ix.
1 6. Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6.

OF THE NATURE OF VIKTUE. 331

for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or for having
impressions made upon us which we consider as
altogether out of our power : but only for wliat we
do, or would have done, had it been in our power;
or for what we leave undone, which we might have
done, or would have left imdoiie, though we could
have done it.

Secondlv, Our sense or discernment of actions as
morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or discern-
ment of them as of good or ill desert. It may be
difficult to explain this perception, so as to answer
all the questions which may be asked concerning it :
but every one speaks of such and such actions as
deserving punishment ; and it is not, I suppose, pre-
tended, that they have absolutely no meaning at all
to the expression. Now the meaning plainly is not,
that we conceive it for the good of society, that the
doer of such actions should be made to suffer. For
if unhappily it were resolved, that a man, who, by
some innocent action, was infected wdth the plague,
should be left to perish, lest, by other people's com-
ing near him, the infection should spread ; no one
would say he deserved this treatment. Innocence
and ill-desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill-desert always
supposes guilt : and if one be not part of the other,
yet they are evidently and naturally connected in
our mind. The sight of a man in misery raises our
compassion towards him ; and, if this miseiy be in-
fficted on him by another, our indignation against
the author of it. But when we are informed, that
the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for his
treachery or cruelty; our compassion exceedingly
lessens, and in many instances our indignation wholly
subsides. Now what produces this effect is the con-
ception of that in the sufferer, which we call ill-

332 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

desert. Upon considering then, or viewing together,
our notion of vice and that of misery, there results
a third, that of ill-desert. And thus there is in
human creatures an association of the two ideas,
natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment.
If this association were merely artificial or accidental,
it were nothing : but being most unquestionably
natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead
of endeavouring to explain it away.

It may be observed farther, concerniDg our percep-
tion of good and of ill-desert, that the former is very
w^eak with respect to common instances of virtue.
One reason of which may be, that it does not appear
to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue pro-
ceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree
this principle is prevalent : since a very weak regard
to virtue may be sufficient to make men act well
in many common instances. And on the other hand,
our perception of ill-desert in vicious actions lessens,
in proportion to the temptations men are tliought to
have had to such vices. For, vice in human crea-
tures consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the
virtuous principle ; though a man be overcome, sup-
pose, by tortinres, it does not from thence appear to
what degree the virtuous principle was wanting.
All that appears is, that he had it not in such
a degree, as to prevail over the temptation : but
possibly he had it in a degree, which would
have rendered him proof against common tempta-
tions.

Thirdly, Our perception of vice and ill-desert arises
from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with
the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere
neglect of doing what we ought to do would, in many
cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest

OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 333

degree vicious. And tliis determination must arise
from such comparison, and be the result of it ; be-
cause such neglect would not be vicious in creatures
of other natures and capacities, as brutes. And it
is the same also with respect to positive vices, or
such as consist in doing what we ought not. For,
every one has a different sense of harm done by an
idiot, madman, or child, and by one of mature and
common understanding ; though the action of both,
including the intention, which is part of the action,
be the same : as it may be, since idiots and madmen,
as well as children, are capable not only of doing
mischief, but also of intending it. Now this differ-
ence must arise from somewhat discerned in the
nature of capacities or one, which renders the action
vicious ; and the want of which, in the other, renders
the same action innocent or less vicious : and tliis
plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected
upon or not, between the action and capacities of
the agent, previous -to our determining an action to
be vicious. And hence arises a proper application
of the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, dispropor-
tionate, unjit, to actions which our moral faculty
determines to be vicious.

Fourthly, It deserves to be considered, whether
men are more at Hberty, in point of morals, to
make themselves miserable without reason, than to
make other people so : or dissolutely to neglect
their own greater good, for the sake of a present
lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the good
of others, whom nature has committed to their care.
It should seem, that a due concern about our own
interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to
secure and promote it, which is, I tliink, very much
the meaning of the v^oy(\ prudence in our language;

334 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

it should seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary
behaviour faulty and blamable ; since, in the calmest
way of reflection, we approve of the first, and con-
demn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others.
This approbation and disapprobation are altogether
different from mere desire of our own, or of their
happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For
the object or occasion of this last kind of percep-
tion is satisfaction or uneasiness: whereas the ob-
ject of the first is active behaviour. In one case,
what our thoughts fix upon is our condition : in
the other, our conduct. It is true indeed, that nature
has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of
imprudence and folly, either in ourselves or others,
as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty: I suppose,
because that constant habitual sense of private in-
terest and good, which we always carry about with
us, renders such sensible disapprobation less neces-
sary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently
neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring
ourselves, than it is necessary and wanting to keep
us from injuring others, to whose good we cannot
have so strong and constant a regard : and also
because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring
its own punishment more immediately and constantly
than injurious behaviom', it less needs the additional
punishment, which would be inflicted upon it by
others, had they the same sensible indignation against
it, as against injustice and fraud and cruelty. Be-
sides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object
of compassion ; the unhappiness which people bring
upon themselves, though it be wilfully, excites in us
some pity for them : and this of course lessens our
displeasure against them. But still it is matter of
experience, that we are formed so as to reflect very

OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 335

severely upon the greater instances of imprudent
neglects and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and
others. In instances of this kind, men often say of
themselves with remorse, and of others witli some
indignation, that they deserved to suffer such cala-
mities, because they brought them upon themselves,
and would not take warning. Particularly when per-
sons come to poverty and distress by a long course
of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions,
though without falsehood or injustice ; we plainly
do not regard such people as ahke objects of com-
passion with those, who are brought into the same
condition by unavoidable accidents. From these
things it appears, that prudence is a species of virtue,
and folly of vice : meaning by folly, somewhat quite
different from mere incapacity; a thoughtless want
of that regard and attention to our own happiness,
which we had capacity for. And this the word pro-
perly includes ; and, as it seems, in its usual accep-
tation: for we scarce apply it to brute creatures.

However, if any person be disposed to dispute the
matter, I shall very williugly give him up the words
Virtue and Vice, as not applicable to prudence and
folly: but must beg leave to insist, that the faculty
within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of
prudent actions, and disapproves imprudent ones ; I
say prudent and imprudent actions as such, and con-
sidered distinctly from the happiness or miseiy whicli
they occasion. And, by the way, this observation
may help to determine what justness there is in that
objection against religion, that it teaches us to be
interested and selfish.

Fifthly, Without inquiring how far, and in what
sense, virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice
into the want of it; it may be proper to observe,

336 OP THE XATURE OF VIRTUE.

that benevolence, and the want of it, singly con-
sidered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice.
For if this were the case, in the review of one's own
character, or that of others, our moral understanding
and moral sense would be indifferent to every thing
but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and
the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we
should neither approve of benevolence to some persons
rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice and
falsehood upon any other account, than merely as an
ovei'balance of happiness was foreseen likely to be
produced by the first, and of misery by the second.
But now, on the contrary, suppose two men com-
petitors for any thing whatever, which would be of
equal advantage to each of them ; though nothing
indeed would be more impertinent, than for a
stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred
to the other ; yet such endeavour would be virtue, in
behalf of a friend or benefactor, abstracted from all
consideration of distant consequences : as that exam-
ples of gratitude, and the cidtivation of friendship,
would be of general good to the world. Again,
suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take
from another the fruit of his la,bour, with intent to
give it to a third, who, he thought, would have as
much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure
which the first possessor would have had in the
enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it ; sup-
pose also that no bad consequences would follow:
yet such an action would surely be vicious. Nay
farther, were treachery, violence and injustice, no
otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce
an overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any
ease a man could procure to himself as great ad-
vantage by an act of injustice, as the whole foreseen

OF THE NATURE OF VlIlTrE. 337

inconvenience, likely to be brought upon others by
it, would amount to; such a piece of injustice would
not be faulty or vicious at all : because it would be
no more than, in any other case, for a man to prefer
his own satisfaction to another's in equal degrees.
The fact then appears to be, that we are constituted
so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence,
injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some
preferably to others, abstracted from all considera-
tion, which conduct is likeliest to produce an over-
balance of happiness or misery. And therefore, were
the Author of uatin-e to propose nothing to himself
as an end but the production of happiness, were his
moral character merely that of benevolence ; yet ours
is not so. Upon that supposition indeed, the only
reason of his giving us the above-mentioned appro-
bation of benevolence to some persons rather than
others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked
violence, and injustice, must be, that he foresaw this
constitution of our nature would produce more happi-
ness, than forming us with a temper of mere general
benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution;
falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us, and
benevolence to some, preferably to others, virtue ;
abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance of
evil or good, which they may appear likely to produce.
Now if human creatures are endued with such a
moral nature as we have been explaming, or witli a
moral faculty, the natural object of which is actions :
moral government must consist in rendering them
happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing
them, as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the
moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, or
suggested and enforced by this moral faculty^; in

c Page 126.

BUTLEB, ANALOGY.

338 OF THE NATURE OF VIllTUE.

rewarding and punishing tliem upon account of their
so doing.

I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth obser-
vation, contradicted what any author designed to
assert. But some of great and distinguished merit
have, I think, expressed themselves in a manner,
which may occasion some danger, to careless readers,
of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly
aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at
promoting the happiness of mankind in the present
state; and the whole of vice, in doing what they
foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an
overbalance of unhappmess in it: than which mis-
takes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it
is certain, that some of the most shocking instances
of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of
persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not have
the appearance of being Hkely to produce an over-
balance of misery in the present state ; perhaps
sometimes may have the contrary appearance. For
this reflection might easily be carried on, but I

forbear The happiness of the world is the

concern of him, who is the Lord and the Proprietor
of it: nor do we know what we are about, when
we endeavour to promote the good of mankind in
any ways, but those which he has directed ; that is
indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and
justice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons
really endeavouring, in some sort, to do good
without regard to these. But the truth seems to
be, that such supposed endeavours proceed, almost
always, from ambition, the spirit of party, or
some indirect principle, concealed perhaps in great
measure from persons themselves. And though it
is our business and our duty to endeavour, witliin

OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 339

the bouDds of veracity and justice, to contribute to
the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness and
diversion of oiu: fellow-creatures : vet, from our short
views, it is greatly uncertain, whether this endeavour
will, in particular instances, produce an overbalance
of hajopmess upon the whole ; since so many and
distant things must come into the account. And
that which makes it our duty is, that there is some
appearance that it will, and no positive appearance
sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side ; and
also, that such benevolent endeavour is a cultivation
of that most excellent of all virtuous principles, the
active principle of benevolence.

However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to
be our rule of life ; it must be added, otherwise a
snare will be laid in the way of some plain men,
that the use of common forms of speech, generally
understood, cannot be falsehood ; and, in general, that
there can be no designed falsehood without designing
to deceive. It must likewise be observed, that in
numberless cases, a man mav be under the strictest
obligations to what he foresees will deceive, without
his intending it. For it is impossible not to foresee,
that the words and actions of men, in different ranks
and employments, and of different educations, will
perpetually be mistaken by each other : and it
cannot but be so, whilst they will judge Avith the
utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what they
are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent
judges of, even though they considered it with great
attention.

Z 2

INDEX

TO BISHOP BUTLETl'S ANALOGY,

Drawn up by Dr. Bentham, and revised and corrected by the Bishop himself.
Pi-inted from the original MS. now in the Bodleian Library.

Abstract notions, not to be applied
to practical subjects without fjreat
cautiousness, T15, 120.

Accidental, in what respects events
are so termed, 201.

Actions, to be distinguished from
the moral quality ascribed to
them, 54, 55.

Afflictions, how they produce the
habit of pious resignation, 109.

Analogical reasoning, what, 2, 4, 5.

how to be conducted, 5, 6.

• Origan's hint concerning it, 5.

how far intended to be here

applied to religion, 6.

Analogy, how it becomes the ground
of probability in diflferent degrees,
2.

arguments drawn from it im-
ply something similar and paral-
lel in the cases, 31, 32, 176.
may reasonably be admitted to

determine our judgments, 3.

— afford sufficient proof to in-
fluence our practice, 10.

— what it shows us concerning
our ignorance, 141.

its use with regard to objec-

tions against natural and revealed
religion, both as to their systems
and evidence, 10.
— how it assists us in judging of
revelation, 183.

Analogy, how it may be applied
to invalidate objections brought
against the wisdom and goodness
of the Divine government, 129,

how it obviates objections

against the credibility of future
punishments, 40.

between our state of trial, in

our temporal and religious ca-
pacity, 75, 76.

— between the misconduct of
mankind as to present and future
interests, 79, 80.

the miserable consequences of

men's neglecting moral improve-
ment illustrated from it, 105, 106.
— how it invalidates the j)lea
which is urged in favour of vice,
from passion, 147, 148.

what argument it suggests

that the ])rinciples of Fatalism,
if admitted to be true, do not
destroy the proof of God's moral
attributes, 118, 119.
— suggests arguments sufficient
to confute the Fatalist's plea for
irreligion, 117, 1 18.

between the moral system of

things as manifested by natural
reason and by revelation, 9, 10.
— between the light of nature
and revelation, 190.

342

INDEX TO

Analogy, how it obviates objections
drawn from our ignorance of the
manner or measure in which
knowledge supernatural is com-
municated to mankind, 187.

■ • as to the fitness of means to

their respective ends, 200.

affords no argument against

the general scheme of C^hristian-
ity, 172.

— affords no peculiar presump-
tion against the reality of mira-
cles, 174.

between the mysteriousness of

the scheme of Christianity, and
of God's natural government,
196, 197,

between the difficulty there is

in accounting for some parts of
God's ordinary Providence, and
some particulars of Christianity,
181, 182.

— the usefulness of arguing from
the analogy of nature to religion,
266, 295.

what is taken for granted in

this argument, 6.
— between what we see contained
in the natural government of
God, and what may be contained
in his moral, 135.

between what we at present

experience concerning happiness,
and what religion teaches us to
expect, 34, 35.

— affords no argument against
the certainty of a future life, 16,

how it confirms our appre-

hensions of future rewards and
punishments, 123, 124.

— between our state of probation,
as to temporal and future welfare,
78, 84, 85, 94, 109, no.

how it illustrates the Scrip-
tural doctrine of the fall, 202,
214.

— the Christian doctrine of a

Mediator and Redeemer, 205,213,
&c.

— how it obviates those objec-
tions against Christianity which
are drawn from its supposed want
of universality, 191, &c.

from its supposed want

of wisdom and justice, 196, 197.

how it obviates the objection

against the miraculousness of
spiritual gifts in the first Chris-

tians, drawn from their disorderly
use of them, 1S9.

Analogy, objections against the argu-
ment from analogy, drawn from
the supposed small degree of in-
fluence which it is likely to have
upon mankind, 302.

Attention, necessary when we con-
sider Christianity, 273.

Benevolence, divine, towards us, how
bmited, 48.

Body, our existence may be con-
sidered without it, 19.

Brachmans : see Death.

Brutes, whether capable of immor-
tality, and what kind, 25.

Chance, what is meant by it, 200.
Changes which things may undergo

without destruction, 13.
Characters, what it is that renders

some the object of approbation,

others of dislike, 330.
Christ, his prophetical office, 219.

regal and priestly, 219, 220.

the apparent tendency of his

sufferings justifies that method of

our redemption, 224, 225.

his satisfaction, see Mediator,

Redemption, Sacrifices.
— a summary of the Bible his-
tory, as respecting the Messiah,
276, &c.

upon what evidence his Divine

mission was acknowledged by the
Gentiles, 284.

Christianity .- see Revelation, Objec-
tions.

Christians, primitive, what argu-
ment their conversion and zeal
afford of the reality of Christ's
miracles, 258, 259.

Church, visible, the necessity of one
to promote religion and virtue,
156, &c.

Conscience, what proof it affords of
God's moral government, 49.

the dictates of it are to be

considered as the laws of God,
122.

makes us proper subjects of

moral government, 328.

regards chiefly, but not solely,

the intention of the agent, 332.

Consciousness does not make per-
sonal identity, but ascertains it
to ourselves, 320.

Contemplation, of itself, insufficient

BUTLERS ANALOGY.

343

to produce the habit of virtue,
88.

Conversation: see Objections.

Conviction [see Evidence], how it
may arise from analogy, 2.

Creature, upright, and finitely per-
fect ; the notion of such an one,
99.

Dangers of our miscarrying as to
our rehgious interests, whence
they chiefly arise, 79.

no impeachment* of God's

goodness, 81, 82.

Daniel; the book of D. had pro-
bably greater external evidence of
its authority formerly than what
is come down to us, 270.

Death, the opinion of the Brach-
mans concerning it, 30.

the proper notion of it, 14, &c.

— — our imaginations apt to mis-
lead us in considering it, 18.

not likely to destroy or sus-
pend our powers of perception,
27, &c.

our state after d. not discover-
able by reason, 31.

may be supposed to open our

way into a better state, 30, &c.

Definitions sometimes serve only to
perplex, 319.

Degradation : see Fall.

Difference of men's situations in
religious matters^, how to be
accounted for, 232, 233.

— — whether a supposed imiver-
sality of revelation would prevent
it, 233.

Different degrees of endence in
rehgious matters, consistent with
the justice of God's moral go-
vernment, 232.

Difficulties in religion; unreason-
able to expect to have them all
cleared, 293, 294.

■ as to the evidence of religion,

are analogous to those attending
the practice of it, 239, 240.

Discipline, necessary ° to our im-
provement in virtue, 96, 97.

Discipline, necessary ^ to our se-
curity against sin, 98.

the expediency of it to creatures,

whether supposed upright or de-
praved, 1 01.

how this world is peculiarly

fitted to be a state of discipline,

102.
Diseases of the body and mind; the

analogy observable between the

remedies which natural providence

has furnished us with for the

former, and those of revelation

for the latter, 192, 193.
Doubting [see Evidence'] ; some

evidence is implied wherever we

doubt, 238, 276.
Duties to other beings arise from

the relations in which they stand

to us, 162, 163.
Christian d., the reasons of

them evident, 227.

Education: see Youth.

End : see Means.

Enthusiasm; the conversion and
zeal of the first Christians not to
be accounted for by e., 259.

in what cases the pretence of

enthusiasm may be urged in op-
position to direct testimony, 259,
260.

religion not peculiarly liable

to e.y 260.

sometimes mixed with knavery,

261.

how injudiciously <?. is some-
times urged to discredit^ the evi-
dence of testimony in proof of
Christianity, 262.

Evidence; the different sorts of e.,
I, &c.

probable e., how distinguished

from demonstrative, i, 3.

probable e., relative to beings
of hmited capacity, 3.
— probable e., even in a low
degree, is a reasonable ground of
action, 3.

what great force probable e.

may receive from uniting several

» Credible from analogy that we are surrounded with these dangers, notwith-
standing any objections which may be alleged against it from the goodness of
Grod.— Butler.

'> Probably to be accounted for in the same manner as their different situa-
t ions in other respects. — Itntlcr.

<= Of great efficacy. — Butler. "> Of great efficacy. — Butler.

* Destroy or overthrow. — B idler.

344

INDEX TO

collateral things and circum-
stances into one view, 288, &c.

Evidence; the nature of that which
directs us with regard to oiu'
temporal interests, 228.

Evidence, though not sufficient to
exclude all doubt, affords rational
ground to influence our conduct,
3, 272, 273, 295.

Evidence of testimony; upon what
subjects it may be admitted as
proof, 259.

the circumstances which

strengthen this kind of e., 260.
whether it ma)' be invalidated.

and how, 259, 260, 262, 263.

— of t. of the first converts to
Christianity has several presump-
tions in favour of it, 264.

— of religion lies level to the
apprehensions of all men, — why
not attended to, 245, 246.

— is the same kind as that which

guides us in temporal matters,
297-301.

— whether Natural Religion has
any external e., and what, 123,124.
for Christianity represented,

p. ii. c. vii. partly direct or fun-
damental, 250, 272.

partly collateral, 286, 287.

not to be truly judged of

without careful consideration, 288.
— the supposed doubtfulness of
the e. of revelation is no argu-
ment against revelation, 227, 228.
of religion, though doubtful.

enforces the obligation to behave
religiously, 235-237.

why e. of religion has been left

doubtful, 240, 241.

about the authority and mean-

ing of divine commands, why it
may in some cases have been de-
signedly left doubtful, 246, 247,
&c.

Evil, though the ])ermission of it
may be beneficial, yet it might
have been better for the world if
this or that particular evil had
not been done, 136, 137, &c.

■ natural e., the remedies which

God has appointed for it, 208.

Existence, necessary, in what sense
attributed to God, 118.

Faculties, the human, why not given

us at our birth in their full matu-
rity, 91.

Fall of man, whether nature sug-
gests any appearances of it, 81.

does not aflford just matter of

complaint, 8r, 82.

how conceivable, 97, 99.

not to be accounted for solely

from the natui-e of liberty, 99.
— how accounted for by particu-
lar affections, 99, 100.

the Scriptural account of it

analogous f to what we see and
experience, 215.

our not being able to account

for it would not aflfect the cer-
tainty of the Christian dispensa-
tion, 215.

Falsehood, the several kinds of it,
261.

Fatalist, what is meant thereby, 112.

his argument against future

rewards and punishments retort-
ed, 127.

Fate, in what view considered in •
this treatise, 1 1 1 .

' if reconcilable with the present

constitution of things, is so with
rehgion, 112.
see Necessity.

Fear and Hope, proper motives to
religious obedience, 106.

Final Cause, the notion thereof does
not always imply that the end de-
signed is answered, 105, 106.

Fitness, whether, and in what sense,
it determines the will of God,
122, 123,303,304.

why the proof of religion from

moral fitness is here omitted,

303-
Folly of mankind as to present and

future interests, compared, 79, 80.

Future Life, the questions concern-
ing it here considered, 29 n. 43 h.

implied in the notion of reli-
gion, 33.

belief of it disposes the mmd

to attend to the evidence of reli-
gion, 33.
-the importance of it to us, and

of our considering it, 34, 142,
143

demonstrative proof of it not
necessary to answer the purposes
of religion, and to awaken our
serious consideration, 33, 34.

' And conformable. — Butler.

BUTLERS ANALOGY.

345

Future Life is represented both by
Reason and Scripture as a social
state, 95.

— — not to be conceived without
particular affections, 98.

this life a state of discipline

for it, 147.

the security of our virtue in it

may possibly be the effect of im-
pressions acquired in this life,
103.

the certainty of it deducible

from the imperfection of God's
moral government in the present

■ state of things, 49, 50.

the argument of it as drawn

from analogy, 13, &c. 144, &c.

the absurdity of arguing

against it upon principles of
Atheism, 33.

Future Judgment, the supposal of
one implies temptations, 76.

Future Punishments, the considera-
tion of them, whether it belongs
to Natural Religion, 43 n.

• the certainty of them imphed

in our natural sense of actions as
ill-deserving, 121.

may be presumed from God's

rewarding or punishing us for
our behaviour at present, 127,

the doctrine of religion con-

cerning them is rendered credi-
ble by what we experience con-
cerning the present distribution
of happiness and misery, 34, &c.
40, 44.

the end for which and the

manner in which they shall be
inflicted, not fully discovered, 206,
211.

objections against the credi-

bility of them obviated, 40, 41, 44.
Future Rewards, the certainty of
them is implied in our natural
sense of actions as well-deserving,
121.

General Laws; on what grounds
we say that the course of nature
is carried on by them, 200.

whether it be supposable that

the Christian dispensation is so
likewise, 200.

the use and application of this

supposition, 201, 202.

General Laws, the manifest wisdom
of carrying on the natural govern-
ment of the world by them, 137,
138.

God; the being of G. why taken
for granted in this treatise, 6.

' is necessarily existent, 113.

his will may be considered as

absolute or conditional, 247.

his will, how determined, 122 v.

■ his government, how exercised

over us at present, 39.

— his natural government over
mankind, what, and how proved,

47' 75j 76-

carried on by general

laws, 137, 138.

— whether natural pleasure and
pain may be considered as re-
wards and punishments from him,
38, 49, 128.

— his moral government, what,
and how proved, 47, 48, 53, 95,
143, 206.

-veracity and justice are the natu-

ral rule of God's government, 1 20.
the analogy between his natu-

ral and moral government, 130,
212.

his moral government not^er-

fectly executed in this present
state, 49.

■ the equitableness of it not yet
fully discernible by us, 72.

whether the present course of

nature, and the natural tenden-
cies of virtue and ^•ice, afford any
probability that it will be per-
fectly equitable hereafter, 71, 72.
his visible government over

the world is exercised by the me-
diation of others, 20,5, &c.
— not incredible that his invisi-
ble may be so likewise, 206.

we may be certain that his

government is moral, and yet be
ignorant how it is carried on, 135.
— bis goodness; whether or how
far the notion of it implies a dis-
position to confer hajjpiness, 36.
his goodness with regard to

the natural evils of life, 208.
— it is no objection to God's
goodness that he did not make
us perfect creatures all at oncee,
109, 1 10.

s The expectation that his goodness would have induced him to make us per-
fect creatures all at once, contraflicted by the analogy of what we experience.
— Butler.

346

INDEX TO

God; the series of God's providen-
tial dispensations is pror/ressive,
203.

his particular purposes not

knowable to us antecedently to
experience, 183, 184.

how God's moral government

accounts for our being placed in
a state of probation, 94.
— upon what suppositions the
objections against God's provi-
dence are usually founded, 133.
the dispensations of provi-

dence, how to be judged of, 159.
— how far we are concerned to
answer objections against God's
providence, 294, 297, 298.

objections against the Divine

government, how obviated by
analogy, 129, 130, &c.

— resignation to God's will is an
essential part of virtue, 107.

what temper of mind in us

corresponds to G.'s sovereignty,
T09.

the heinousnessh of disobey-

ing G.'s commands, 153, 210.

— whether disobedience i in any
case admits of an excuse, and
when, 143.

— the duties to God the Father,
whence their obligation arises,
i6i, &c.

those to God the Son and

Hall/ Ghost, 162, &c.

Good men J their security against
sin depends upon their improving
their virtuous habits, 98.

Good and evil, natural; the great
variety and seeming inequahty
of their distribution, 228, 229.

moral ; the notion of it implies

good desert, 331.

Goodness: see God.

Government, the formal notion of

it. 37-

natural and moral, 47, 48.

Guilt, the idea of it in our minds
always associated with that of ill-
desert, 331.

Habits, what, and how formed, 86,

87, &c.
how they differ from passive

impressions, 87-91.

Habits, the great consequence of
obtaining them in their proper
season, 92, 93.

virtuous and vicious, the man-
ner of their formation, 98, 100,
104.

of virtue necessary to all ra-
tional creatures, whether sup-
posed virtuous or depraved, 100,

lOI.

Happiness, wherein it consists, 85,
86.

and Misery, reflections upon

the means of their distribution at
present, 35.

present, mainly depends upon

our own behaviour, 35, 40, 44.

why it is not given to all pro-
miscuously, 36.

why not confined to merit, 60.

present, not to be secured

without great hazard and diffi-
culty, 82, 83.

how this is reconcilable with

the goodness of God"^, 82, 83.
Heathen world, the state of religion

in it, 151.
History, what account it gives of

the origin of religion, 176.
■ of the world, in what view it is

considered in Scripture, 273, 274.
see Scripture, Prophetic, Mi-

racles.

Hope and Fear, proper principles of
rehgious obedience, 106, 107.

Identity or sameness, the different
senses of the word, 304, 320.

in what sense applied to per-
sons, 306, 319, 322.

personal, not constituted by

consciousness, 320.

why by some thought to be

so, 320.
Jews, a summary of God's dealing

with them, 277.
their history as contained in

Scripture, confirmed by known

fact, 283.
not to be accounted for, but

upon supposition of the miracles
recorded in Scripture, 283, 284.
— the circumstances of their dis-
persion, and yet continuing a
distinct people, how they confirm
the truth of revelation, 285, 286.

1' Qy.— Butler. i Qy.— Butler.

^ Credible from hence, that this is the case too with regard to our future
hajipiness. — Butler.

BUTLERS ANALOGY.

347

Ignorance in matters of Religion,
owing frequently to men's negli-
gence and prejudices, 244.

in matters oi Revealed Religion,

no more excusable than of Natu-
ral, 163.

what experience may teach us

concerning our ignorance, 141.

• of the causes on what the

course of nature depends, 177.
— of the nature of our condition,
present and future ^ and of the
reasons why we are placed there-
in, 233.

of the manner and degrees in

which either natural or super-
natural knowledge would be con-
veyed to us, antecedently to ex-
perience, 183, 184.

• how this life is a preparation for

a better, should be no objection
against the credibility thereof, 94.
concerninar the scheme of the

na^MraZ world should teach us not
to wonder at the incomprehensi-
bleness of the moral, 132, 133.

objections drawn from our i.

sometimes very absurd, — when
more particularly so, 225, 226.
• in ivhat cases i. may serve for a

satisfactory answer to objections,
and when not, 134, 135, 139.

may be urged as a just answer

to objections against the scheme
of God's providence, 134, 135,
140, 141.

— may be a satisfactory answer
to objections against a thing, and
yet not affect the proof oi it, 140.
answers taken from our igno-

rance applied to objections against
providence •", in what sense they
may be called answers, 141.

Imagination, apt to mislead us, 18.

Improvement of the human faculties
in all respects is gradual, 90.

whether this circumstance

does not render them more use-
ful than if we had been born
with them in their full maturity,

91. 92.
Inspiration: in what manner or in
what degree it should be vouch-

safed to mankind not knowable
by human reason, 183.
Interest; sense of interest, what,
97, n.

in what respect it is, and

in what it is not, sutlicient to
restrain men from criminal self-
indulgence, 97, n.

in what sense it is always

coincident with virtue, 108.

Irregularities in nature, whence the
appearance of them arises, 202.

unreasonable to expect to have

them remedied by occasional in-
terpositions, 138.

Irreligion, its aggravated guilt be-
yond that of other vice, 212, 306.

more especially aggravated in

men of high rank and character,
2.^7.

not justifiable upon any pre-

tence of want of evidence in
religion, 235, 236.

Kingdom; idea of a k. perfectly

virtuous and happ}', 68.

see Political.

Knowledge, natural, the ordinary

methods of improving it, 190.

Liberty ; why the proof of religion
from thence is omitted in this
treatise, 303, 304.

the nature of it insufficient

to accovmt for the Fall, 99.
■the constitution of the present

world and our condition in it
imply that we are free, 117.

Life : see Future Life.

Living Powers, what, 15, n.

death not necessarily the de-
struction of them, 16, 17, 21.

why thought so, 17.

their not being exercised docs

not imply their non-existence,
16.

present life has reference to a

larger plan of things, not fully to

be comprehended by us, 142.
Locke, Mr., his notion of personal

identity examined, 322.
Locomotive powers, to what they

properly belong, 24.

* Natural and moral. — Butler.

™ Answers before given to objections against Providence, not taken from
our ignorance only, but from somewhat which analogy teaches us concerning
it. — Butler.

348

TXDEX TO

Mahometanism was not received in
the world upon the foot of
miracles, 255.

Man, how his nature differs from
that of brutes, and wherein it
agrees, 328.

Manifestation of persons' characters
in this life to other intelligent
creatures, what uses may be
served thereby, 1 1 1 .

this may be one use of tempta-
tions, 242.

Martyrs, primitive ; what argument
their sufferings afford of the
reality of Christ's miracles, 258.

Matter, our being affected thereby
does not prove it to make part of
our self, 21, 22.

Means and E7ul; speculative reason,
antecedently to experience, is a
very incompetent judge of either,
6, 8, 135, 141.

the distinction between them

not always rightly applied by us
to Divine actions, 204.

the making use of means for

the salvation of mankind not in-
consistent with the supposition of
wisdom in the contrivance", 203.
prescribed by Christianity, no

presumption against their wis-
dom, 200.

Mediator between God and man,
the notion of it agreeable to the
light of nature, 205, 312.

the appointment of a Mediator

considered, p. ii. ch. v.

the Christian doctrine of a

Mediator, in what respect mostly
objected to ; and the frivolousness
of such objections, 222, 226.
see Redemption.

Messiah : see Christ.

Miracle, a relative term, 174.

whether the power exerted at

the first formation of the world
should be so called, 174, 175.
whether the analogy of nature

affords any presumjition against
their reality, ])t. ii. ch. ii.
— with what phenomena of nature
they should be compared, in
order to judge v/hether there lies

any presumption against them.

Miracles, the consideration of reli-
gion carries with it distinct reasons
for them, 178.

the primary design of them,

154. 155-

whether they confirm natural

religion, and how, 155.

— peculiar to the Mosaic and
Christian religion, 255, 256.

— whether any others are well
attested by historical evidence <*,
262, 284, 285.

whether the supposition of

such attestation would discredit
the Scriptural miracles, 262, 284.
— related in Scripture, how
confirmed by contemporary and
subsequent facts, 238, 251, 252.

what observable as to the
manner in which they are related
in Scripture?, 250, 252, 253,

254-

recorded in Scripture, what

confirmation they receive from
the credibility of common historj'^,
281, 284.

— referred to in St. Paul's Epi-
stles, 254.

— what proof of their reality is
afforded by the conversion of the
first Christians, 256, 257.

Pagan or Popish, no j^aral-

lelismi between them and those
recorded in Scripture, 255.

invisible m., what may be

termed thus, 174.
Miraculous, in what respect many

events seemingly brought about

by natural means may justly be

esteemed to be miraculous, 285.
Misery : see Hapjnness.
Moral action, whether the nature of

it can be altered by virtue of a

command, 194.
Moral faculty : see Conscience.
Moral ohlic/ations, whence the force

of them arises, 140, 165, 167.
Moral precepts, see Positive.
Moral part of religion, why preferred

in Scripture to the positive, 167,

168.

" Conformable to the whole constitution and course of nature. — Butler.

" Like historical evidence of fal)ulous ones, to that there is for those which
are alleged in proof of Christianity, would not destroy tlie evidence of the
latter. — Jhitler. r Qy. — JhUler. ^ Parallel. — Butler.

BUTLERS ANALOGY.

349

Morality of actions depends chiefly,

but not solely, upon the intention

of the agent, 332.
■ depends [)artly upon the nature

and capacity of the agent, 333.
Mysteries, as great in nature as in

Christianity, 202.
Mysteriousness of the Christian

scheme affords no just objection

against it, 197.

Nature, light of n. insufficient, 151.

course of n. what, 5, 37, 207.

is progressive, 204.

with regard to intelligent

beings, is carried on by general

laws, 9, 137, 200.
• (as known by experience)

affords no presumption against any

of the Christian doctrines, 173.
our ignorance of the causes.

&c. on which the course of nature
depends, 177.

Natural, in what sense those events
may be termed natural which
proceed from God's immediate
interposition, 32, ^^.

see Government, Religion,

Knoivledye.

Necessary existence, how attributed
to God, 113, 1 14.

Necessity, as held by the Fatalist,
does not exclude deliberation and
choice, IT 2.

the supposition of n. will not

account for the origin and pre-
servation of all things, 112.

in what sense n. is said to l)e

the foundation of the existence of
God, 113.

existence of things by n. im-

plies some operating agent, i (4.

does not exclude an intelligent

agent, nor destroy the ground of
belief that we are in a state of
religion, 115.

nor the justice of punish-
ment for crimes, 119.

nor the proof of God's moral

character, 120, 147.
nor the proof of the obliga-
tions of religion, 119, 298, 299.
nor the external evidence of

religion, 126.

in what respect the opinion of

n. may be said to be destructive
of all religion, 129.

if made a principle of conduct

ence would soon convince us of

its absurdity, 1 15-1 18.
NefjUyence, no more excusable as

to matters of revealed religion

than of natural, 163.
is one source of dissatisfaction

about the evidence of religion,

243. 244-

Objections; the use of shewing that
the same objections lie against
natural religion which are com-
monly urged against revealed,
294, 295.

though not cleared up, do not

destroy the proof of religion, 245.

drawn from our ignorance,

when more particularly absurd,
222, 225.

what (pialifications are requisite

in order to then- due considera-
tion, 246.

against the argument from

analogy, drawn from the suj)pose(l
small degree of influence which it
is likely to have upon mankind,
considered, 302.

against the scheme of Provi-
dence are generally mere arbitrary
assertions, and receive a proper
answer from our ignorance, 133,

141-

against the dispensations of

Providence, how far we are con-
cerned to answer them, 297, 298.

drawn from the seeming irre-
gularities of the moral world, how
solved by comparing them with
what occurs in the natural world,

131. 134. 141, 142.

against the credibility of future

punishments obviated, 39, 46.
against the credibility of a

future life, drawn from our igno-
rance how this life is a preparation
for it, 94.

— against this world's being de-
signed for a state of moral im-
provement in virtue; drawn from
the frecjuent instances of men's
improving only in vice, 105, 160,
108, 109.

— whv the matter of the

in affairs of common life, experi-

Christian Revelation must be ex-
pected to appear liable to 0., 184,
185,177.

— against the reality of the
truths discovered by Christianity,
drawn from their appearing un-

350

INDEX TO

like the known course of nature,

ns- ^, . . .

Objections against Christianity,

drawn from the manner or degree
in which the hght of it is vouch-
safed, why frivolous, 184.

against Christianity, from its

supposed want of universahty,
191, 192.

• from its mysteriousness.

197.

against

the wisdom of it.

I9'7

drawn from the perversions of
Christianity, 158.

against Christianity itself, as

distinguished from those against
its evidence, why frivolous, 180.

against the Scriptural doctrine

of a Redeemer, 211, 226.

against Scripture, the com-
mon ones, their frivolousness,
184.

from its liableness to be

perverted, 195.

as to its not answering our

preconceived expectations, 187.

' what gives particular force to
objections against Christianity,
when offered in common conver-
sation, 291.

Obligations of duty, arising from
the bare supposableness or credi-
bility of religion, 237, 239.

Occasional interpositions to remedy
the supposed irregularities in the
government of the world, would
be attended* with manifest ill-
effects, 138.

Omissions, when vicious, 332.

Opinion : see Evidence.

Origen, his hint concerning analo-
gical reasoning, 5.

Passions, how they contribute to

make our present state a state of

trial, 77, 78.
are excited towards particular

objects whether we will or no,

96, 97.
such bare excitement not

criminal, 97.

— always dangerous, 99-101.

— how to be regulated, 100, 101.
how the fall of man may be

accounted for from thence, 99.
Passive Impressions differ from prac-
tical habits, 89, 90.

Passive Impressions are less sensi-
bly felt by being repeated, but
not less apt to influence our
practice, 89, 90.

St. Paul's Epistles, what particular
evidence we have of their ge-
nuineness, 253, 254.

what distinct proof of Chris-
tianity they afford, 254, 255.

Perception may be without external
objects, 22, 23.

our powers oip. different from

the senses, 23.

ridiculous to dispute the truth

of our p., 327.
Person, what, 320, 321.

sameness of p. prior to all

considerations of consciousness,

333.324-
Personality/, in what sense founded

in consciousness, 320.
Pleasure attending the gratification

of our passions, tohether, and how

far, intended to put us upon

gratifying them, 37.

the distribution of p). in the

world, in what sense it is reivard,

47-
Political state of kingdoms, in what

view taken notice of and foretold

in Scripture, 275.

Positive institutions implied in the

notion of a visible Church, 156,

157-
the great presumption of those

who shght them, 170.

Positive precepts, how they differ

from moral, 165.

whether founded in natural

religion, 166.

when and in what cases they

yield to moral, 168.

caution necessary when we

compare p. precepts with moral,
167.

Practical proof , what, 126.

Practice: by what evidence matters
of JO. are often determined, 294.

in matters of p. their import-
ance is always to be considered,
290.

Prejudices; several sorts oi p., 260.

occasion dissatisfaction about

the evidence of religion, 243.
the folly of being influenced

hy p. arising from contempt and
scorn, 271.
Present existence affords presump-
tion of continuance, where there

BUTLERS ANALOGY.

351

appears no reason to the con-
trary, 15.

Presumption : see Evidence.

Presumptuousness, the unjustifiable-
ness of it, 46.

Principles upon which we are apt
to reason antecedently to experi-
ence, generally prove fallacious,
194, 195, 196.

the several p. of virtue, how-
ever distinct from each other, are
coincident, 108.

Probability .- see Evidence.

Probation: see Trial.

a state of p., what is meant

by it, and how it differs from
moral government, 75.

Profaneness: see Irreligion.
Proof, practical, what is meant by

it, 126.
Prophecies recorded in Scripture,

the primary design of them, 154.
whether they confirm natural

religion, and how, 154.
concerning the Messiah, how

understood by the Jews before

the coming of Christ, 267.

the question concerning the

force of the argument arising
from jj. stated, 271.

whether their true meaning

is to be determined by their
apparent completion, 267.

the conformity between pro-

phecies and events not merely
accidental, 289.

though applicable to other

events, might nevertheless, in the
Divine intention, have had regard
to the Christian dispensation,
270, 271.

the force of the argument

from p. is best seen by taking
them in a long series, 266, 267.
the obscurity of one part of a

p. does not invalidate the proof
of foresight, arising from the ap-
parent completion of other intel-
ligible parts, 265.

the force of the argument

from p. not destroyed, though
we suppose the prophets not to
have understood the intended
meaning of their predictions,
269.

the qualifications requisite to

the state of the world, and of the
Christian church, 285, 288.

Prophets, not the sole authors of
what they wrote, 268, 269.

Providence : see God.

Prudence, whether it ever requires
us to act, and when, though there
is no probability of our succeed-
ing, 3-

the difficulty of obtaining p.,

243-

when a course of action may

be called prudent, 301.
Public spirit, the true notion of it,

65.
Punishment, its proper notion, 38,

39-
why natural ja. is in Scripture

ascribed to divine justice, 128.
p. of the innocent for the

guilty, whether and how far it

affects the doctrine of Christ's

satisfaction, 223, 224.

instances of vicarious p. in the

daily course of providence, 224.
— see Future Punishments

Reason, a very incompetent judge
of the conduciveness of means
to their respective ends, 135,
136.

or in what manner God

would instruct mankind, 183.

could not have discovered the

scheme of Christianity, 172.
how far r. can judge of reve-

take the force of the argument
arising {romp., 286, 287.
Prophetic History confirmed by

lation, and in what respect, 180,

193-

is an incompetent judge of the

matter of Divine revelation, 310.

this consideration affords no

presumption against revelation,
170, 310.

an account of the opposition

sometimes made to religion u]ion
su])posed principles of r., and the
folly of it, 308, 310.

Reasons of a divine command ceas-
ing, the obligation ceases, 153.

Reasonincj upon the course of
nature, without attending to
known facts, apt to be fallacious,
5. 8, 9.

upon the several possible

formations of the universe, why
ridiculous, 7, 8.

upon the principles of others,

what is meant by it, 303.

whether abstruse r. be ever

352

INDEX TO

necessary in matters of religion,
306.

Redemption ; the scriptural doctrine
of r. distinctly represented, 216.

how illustrated by what we

experience concerning the reme-
dies which God hath provided
against temporal evils, 208, 209.

further illustrated by analogy,

3"' 312-

— agreeable to our natural no-
tions, our hopes and our fears,
213.

the manner of its efficacy not

represented in Scripture, nor dis-
coverable by reason, 313, 314.
• why we are incompetent judges

of it, 222.
— the rashness of some persons
in determining questions concern-
ing it, 225, 226.

see Punishment, Mediator.

Reflection, our powers of r. do not
depend upon what is liable to a
dissolvition from death, 27, 28.

our powers of r. may be im-
proved by death, 30.

do not depend upon our bodily

powers, 29-31.

Relations, impossible for us to say
how far the r. (\i the several spe-
cies and individuals in the natural
world extend, 131.

between the several parts of

the Divine administration in the
moral world, 132, 133.

Religion, its general system, 70.

what is implied in the notion

of.r., 295, 296.

wherein the general spirit of

r, consists, 170.

— in what view considered
throughout this treatise, 303.

— is founded in the moral cha-

racter of God, 119.

— implies a future state, 33.

— implies our being in a state of
probation, 248,

the importance of being in-

fluenced by r., 148.
— the i)roper proof of r. and
motives to it, 148.

the force of its obligation is

not destroyed by the opinion of
necessity, 120.

— degrees of knowledge of r,
different among different men,
230, 231.

Religion J why its evidence has been
left at all doubtful, 238, 239.

such doubtfulness does not

destroy its obligation, 235, 236.

its importance, 126.

— an account of those who op-
pose it, as they suppose, on prin-
ciples of reason, 308, 309.

— the origin of r. according to
history and tradition, 176.

— the state of r. in the heathen
world, 151.

— distinguished into internal and
external, 161.

— natural r. what, 10, 11, 123.
is not the only object of

our moral regard, 162.

probably owes its rise and

establishment to revelation, 125,
152, 280.

whether it hath any external

proof, 123.

what proof it receives from

tradition, 124.

the great advantages which it

receives from Christianity, 153,
160.

what credibihty it receives

from the miracles recorded in
Scripture, 154, 155.

how promoted by the settle-
ment of a visible church, 156.

the obligations of natural r.,

as inculcated in Christian coun-
tries, lie obvious to all apprehen-
sions, 306, 307.

Religious knowledge, a general ac-
count of the different degrees of
it to be found among different
men, 230.

Remorse, what, 55.

Repentance, its insufficiency to ex-
piate guilt, argued from analogy,
211,312,313.

the general sense of mankind

upon this subject, 212.

its efficacy whence derived.

221.
Resignation to God's will, an essen-
tial part of virtue, 107, 108.

how the habit of it is pro-
duced, 108, 109.

Revelation necessary to explain the
scheme of the universe, 67.

to ascertain and supply the

defects of natural religion, 151.

the great usefulness of it with

respect to natural religion, 154,
163.

BUTLERS ANALOGY.

353

Revelation, supposed to have been
given at the beginning of the
world, in what sense miraculous,
174.

no pecuhar difficulty in sup-
posing a r. to have been made at
that time, 176.

the pretences of false r. imply

a true one, 125.

Revealed Religion (viz. Christian),
what is implied in the notion of
it, 10, II, 171.

the suppositions on which it

is grounded, 205, 206, 212, 213.

a short view of its scheme,

171, 197.

the extensiveness of it, 197.

the reasonableness and the

credibihty of its system are two
distinct considerations, 298, 299.

no presumption against it

from the analogy of nature, 171.

— upon what kind of proof it is
to be received, 307, 308.

— its evidence, part direct, part
collateral, 250, 251, 272.

— consists of various parts to be
united into one view, 288.

— briefly represented, 272, 287.
why left at all doubtful, 296,

300.

cannot be destroyed, 291, 292.
— how far tradition may be ad-
mitted in proof of it, 176.

how the question concerning

its truth ought to be stated, 183,
184, 195.

— may be considered as wholly
historical, 273.
• unreasonable to expect to have

all difficulties in it cleared, 294,

29o-

difficulties in it are parallel to

those which arise in the ordinary
administration of providence, 182.
— objections against the matter
of r. r., 179.

• admit of the same answers

as those alleged against the wise
constitution of nature, 197.

— the difference between its
scheme and the experienced
course of nature illustrated by
analogy, 314.

the mysteriousness of r. r., 197.

— its dispensation, whether car-
ried on by general laws, 200.

— how far to be judged of by
reason, 180, 193.

Revealed Religion, objections against
its want of universality consi-
dered, 191, 192.

against the wisdom and jus-
tice of it, 196, 197.

• against it as a matter of fact,

298, 299.

against it drawn from its

abuses and perversions, 158.

the duties of it strictly moral,

160, 161.

the practice of it may be

shewn to be reasonable, though
we cannot evince the reasonable-
ness of each precept, 299.

the rashness of treating it

with disregard, 165.
— the occasion of some men's
treating it with scorn, and the
sinfulness of so doing, 308, 316.
a brief account of its first

propagation and estabhshment,
255, 283, 284.

— what strength its evidence
receives from the conversion and
zeal of the first Christians, 259.
Jewish and Christian, the

degrees of their evidence different
at different times, 230.

Rewards and Punishments, accord-
ing to the natural constitution of
things, correspond to virtue and
vice, 145.

Ridicule, how it obstructs men's
seeing the evidence of religion,
244.

Sacrifices propitiatory, the general
prevalence of them shews the
sense of mankind about the
inefficacy of mere repentance, 212.

legal, their design, 216, 220.

the death of Christ a proper s.,

216, 220.

the manner of its efficacy not

explained in Scripture, and there-
fore unwarrantable in any man to
attempt explaining it, 221.

Scepticism, no justification of indif-
ference about religion, 248.

about the evidence of religion

implies a suspicion at least of its
being true, 263, 264.

Sceptics among us, their immorality
and irreligion utterly inexcusable,
315.316.

Scorn of religion, to what it is
owing, 308, 315, 316.

ScTJp^/re considered in an historical
view, 273.

A a

354

INDEX TO

Scripture ; the great antiquity of the
first parts of it, 280.

the genuineness of Scripture

history shewn by internal evi-
dence, 251.

the historical parts of it illus-

trated by correspondent facts, and

other histories, 279, 280.
■ a summary of the history of

the Old Testament as respecting

the Messiah, 278, 279.
■ the observable manner in

which the miraculous history is

related, 251, 252.
confirmed by contemporary

and subsequent facts, 252.
its not having been confuted

aflfords a presumption of its truth,

276.

its claim to a considerate

regard, 280.

how far reason is a proper

judge of the contents of it, 193.

its meaning not always to be

explained according to the com-
mon rules of criticism, 184, 185.
what are the ordinary methods

of coming at its true meaning,
190.

— difficulties of S. no argument
of its not coming from God, 5.

— the unreasonableness of ex-
pecting to have all difficulties in
it cleared, 293.

— probably contains several
truths as yet undiscovered, 191.

■ the common objections against

it are frivolous, 184.
— : some precepts of S. matter of

offence, why, 194.
— the folly of rejecting Scripture

because it does not answer our

preconceived expectations, 193.
some precepts of S. prescrib-

ing things seemingly unjust, how
to be considered, 193, 194.

the chronology and history of

the Old Testament confirmed by
other histories, 281.

the Jewish history in it con-

firmed by known fact, 283.

— the internal marks of its truth,
281, 282.

— not discredited by the seeming
strangeness of some incidents,
nor by sujjposed mistakes of tran-
scribers, 282.

■its common history gives credit

Scripture J not to be accounted for
without supposing the reality of
the miracles therein recorded,
283.

its prophetic history confirmed

by the state of the world and of the
Christian church, 285, 286.
the credibility of its full and

final completion, 286.
— what evidence it gives to
Christianity, and how to be con-
sidered, 286, 287.

see St. Paul's Epistles.

Self, indivisible, 18, 19, 20.

its sameness does not depend

upon the sameness of our body,

21, 22.
Self-denial, the use and necessity of

it, 82, 83, 93.

productive of resignation to

God's will, 108.

Self-love, whether this principle

wants to be improved, 98, 99.
Senses, what, 21, 22.

different from the perceiving

power, 22, 23.

■the dissolution of them imphes

not the dissolution of the agent
which perceives, 25.

Simplicity of a living agent, what
proof it admits of, 20.

Soul, its indivisibility, 18, 19.

Temptations are implied in the sup-
position of a future judgment, 75,
76.

their various sorts, 78, 103.

how they serve to improve our

virtue, 104, 105, 241.
-the supposition of them lessens

our perception of ill desert in

vicious actions, 332.
Testimony .■ see Evidence.
Treatise, this, the design of it, 10-12,

70,71,305,309.
to whom it is particularly ad-
dressed, 314, 315.
Trinity, whence our obligation of

duty to each Person in the T.

arises, 160, 161.
Trial, state of, what is implied in

the notion of it, 75, 76.
that we are in such a state,

145-147, 248.

how, in respect of our

understanding, 234.
as to our temporal interests.

75-77-

to the miraculous, 282.

80.

as to our religious concerns.

BUTLERS ANALOGY.

355

Trial, state of, as to our present
and future welfare compared, 77,

79-
the supposition of God's moral

government sufficiently accounts
for our being placed in a state of
t., 84, 95.

intended for our improvement

as a qualification for future hap-
piness, 85.

may be also intended for the

manifestation of our characters to
other inteUigent beings, no.

Vegetables, no arguing from their
decay to that of living creatures,

their identity, 321.

Veracity, our natural regard to it,

261.
Vice, what it chiefly consists in,

332-
does not consist merely in the

intention to produce unhappiness,

336, &c.
the manner in which the habit

of it is formed, 99, 100.
whether folly be a species of

it, 334- .

passion no excuse for it, 148.

temptations to v., various sorts,

103, 104.

the prosperity with which it

is sometimes attended, how re-
conciled with God's moral go-
vernment, 53, 54, 61.

the pleasures of it scarce worth

taking into account, 148.

the disadvantages naturally

attending it, 55, 210.

why not always punished, 145.

private, may be public bene-

fits, and yet, upon the whole, it

were more beneficial for the

world if men would refrain from

it, 136.
Viciousness of the world fits it to

be a state of trial to good men,

103.
Virtue, its general nature the same

universally and at all times, 329.
implies in it intention and

design, 330.

is relative to the capacity of

the agent, 332.
— does not consist merely in an
endeavour and intention to pro-
duce happiness, 335, 336.

Virtue corresponds to our notion of
good desert, 331.

common instances of it do

not raise in us any strong per-
ception of good desert, and why,

331-

whether prudence be a sort

of virtue, 333, 334.
— the habit of virtue not at-
tainable by mere contemplation,

88.

— its habit, how formed, 99, 100,
102, 103.

— its improvement progressive,

100, lOI.

— improved by temptation, 103,
241.

the advantages attending v. in
this world as to internal satisfac-
tion of mind, 56.
as to external advantages, 52,

56,57. 65.
its tendency to improve the

happiness of kingdoms, 68, 69.
often rewarded as such, but

never punished as such, 59.
why not always rewarded, 14,^5,

146.

— its hableness to afflictions,
how reconcilable with God's
moral government, 53, 54, 62.

— the restraints which it lays
men under are not to be thought
disadvantages, 50, 51.

— a qualification naturally re-
quisite to make us happy in a
future state, 95.

whether a true esteem of

moral v. be consistent with a

neglect of Revelation, 152, 153.
Understanding, our probation with

regard to it upon the subject of

religion, 234.
Universe, scheme of it knowable

only from Revelation, 67.
sjieculations about the several

possible formations of it and

schemes of its government, why

ridiculous, 8.
Universality, objections against

Christianity from its supposed

want of u., how answered, 191,

192, 227, 313, 314.

World, the present fitted to be a
state of discipline for moral im-
provement, 102, 103.

a theatre for the manifestation

356 INDEX TO butler's analogy.

of persons' characters to other what view to be considered, 273,

intelHgent creatures, IX o. 274.

World, the natural government of World, its period as spoken of in

it carried on by general laws, the Old and New Testament, 275.

137-
the natural w. intended to be Youth, the great importance of right

subordinate to the moral, 132. direction in that stage of hfe, 42,

its history in Scripture, in 86, 87, 91, 92.

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