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WORLD HISTORY

181S-1920

EDUARD FUETER

AUTHOR OF "HISTOIRE DE I/HISTORIOGRAPHIB MODERNS*'

TRANSLATED BY

SIDNEY BRADSHAW FAY

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN SMITH COLLEGE

NEW YORK

HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY

PRINTED IN THE USA. BY

TM« OUINN A BODEN COMPANY

RAHWAY. N J

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

A decade ago Professor Fueter attracted the attention of historical
scholars all over the world by his admirable Geschichte der neueren
Historic graphic (Munich, 1911). Its worth was quickly recognized
by its being translated into French in an enlarged edition with addi-
tional material from the hand of the author. The same keen in-
sight, excellent judgment, and great breadth of interest and reading
which characterized this History of Modern Historical Writing is also
seen in his Weltgeschichte der letzten hundert Jahre, 1815-1920
(Zurich, 1921). In two respects Professor Fueter is peculiarly well
equipped to write a History of the Modern World. Aside from his
scholarly historical training, as a Swiss he is able to look down from
his neutral heights upon the rest of Europe with singular detach-
ment and impartiality. Rarely have such heated questions as the
World War, the Irish question, or the American War of Secession
been treated with such succinctness, fairness and understanding.
The second advantage which Professor Fueter enjoys is the fact that
through various kinds of newspaper work he has come into direct con-
tact with the great problems of the day. The habit of seizing what
is vital rather than what is traditional is reflected in this book. He
has thrown overboard much that is usually found in histories of the
nineteenth century to make room for what he considers more im-
portant. Though one may, perhaps, not always completely agree
with his account, one can hardly fail to be interested and stimulated
by the originality and vigor with which he presents it.

Except for a very few slight corrections or modifications made
at the request of the author, the translation adheres, it is hoped, as
closely to the German edition as is consistent with readable English.
For convenience of reference the chapters are numbered consecutively
instead of by "Books" as in the original work.

S. B. F.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPTION OF WORLD HISTORY vii

BOOK I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS— THE POINT
OF DEPARTURE

A L THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS AS A PERIOD IN THE HIS-
TORY OF THE WORLD 3

II. THE GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE WORLD IN

1815 5

III. THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM 7

IV. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRENCH REVO-

LUTION ii

V. THE "PANIC OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION" . . 16

VI. HUMANITARIANISM 1 9

BOOK II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ALLIANCE AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY
TENDENCIES

VII. THE SOLIDARITY OF INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATISM 25
VIII. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATES IN

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA 29

IX. THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 36

X. THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY ... 44

XI. THE CONSERVATIVE INTERVENTION IN SPAIN . . 52
XII. THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM IN

FRANCE 57

XIII. BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM IN THE

OTHER STATES OF EUROPE RESULTING FROM THE
JULY REVOLUTION (BELGIUM AND POLAND) . . 69

XIV. THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND . . 82

iii

CONTENTS

BOOK III. FROM THE OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO

THE NEW

CHAPTER PAGE

XV. EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 103
XVI. THE FOUNDING OF A FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE IN

NORTH AFRICA 112

XVII. RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN ADVANCE IN CENTRAL

AND EASTERN ASIA . . . . . . . 129

XVIII. THE ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA AND THE COLONIAL

WARS WITH CHINA 140

XIX. THE FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF A NON-EUROPEAN

PEOPLE (JAPAN) 154

XX. THE OUTCOME OF AN ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION
IN EUROPE (THE HISTORY OF IRELAND IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY) 165

BOOK IV. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH

ESTATE, AND THE FORMATION OF NEW

NATIONAL STATES IN EUROPE

XXI. THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE . . .189
XXII. THE CRIMEAN WAR. RUSSIA AND THE EASTERN

QUESTION 212

XXIII. THE PANIC OVER SOCIALISM AFTER THE FEBRUARY

REVOLUTION ..... ... 223

XXIV. THE WAR OF SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES . 228
XXV. THE FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL NATIONAL STATE IN

ITALY 248

XXVI. GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE . . 261
XXVII. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA;

PRUSSIA'S CONQUEST OF GERMANY . . . .285

BOOK V. ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

XXVIII. NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
XXIX. THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY:
XXX. THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY:

TRALASIA

317

I. AFRICA . .325
II. ASIA AND Aus-

• 352

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

XXXI.

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY: III. THE ANGLO-
SAXON EMPIRES

XXXII. THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT AND THE ATTITUDE OF
GOVERNMENTS TOWARD IT

XXXIII. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA FOR

THE BALKANS

XXXIV. THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918

INDEX

PACK
361

381

403
423

475

WORLD HISTORY. 1815-1920

INTRODUCTION. THE CONCEPTION OF WORLD

HISTORY

WHAT has hitherto been called "universal history" or "world history"
(Weltgeschichte) has been nothing but a conglomeration. People
believed they were writing world history if they articulated together
in a formal fashion the events of various continents. Writers have
been satisfied with a mere juxtaposition of narratives, when in fact
they ought to have shown the interdependence of occurrences taking
place in widely separate localities.

The present work has an altogether different purpose. It will
attempt to survey the history of the last hundred years from a really
universal point of view. It will not aim at a schematic treatment of
different continents as of equal importance. A world history which
should devote the same attention to the chance happenings of a
tribe of African negroes and to the development of the British Em-
pire would be as unworthy of the name as a history of Italy in the
nineteenth century which treated in equal detail the Duchy of
Parma and the Kingdom of Sardinia. On the contrary, events shall
be so selected as to bring into the foreground those which have
universal significance; the criterion of importance shall be, not the
local, but the universal importance. Europe and the European
nations will indeed be given first place; but only those phenomena
shall be set forth in detail which have exercised a wide influence
beyond old Europe.

A brief exposition like the present is better adapted to this aim
than a detailed narrative. If one has to refrain from discussing many
interesting details it is all the easier to make clear the major lines
of development and the connecting threads in the history of lands
and peoples. The outline of the background will stand forth all
the more clearly if the number of decorative figures in the foreground
of the landscape is restricted to the most significant and essential ones.

The intelligent reader must console himself if a popular and con-
ventional anecdote, or a name dear to him, is either briefly men-
tioned or passed over entirely. For he will say to himself: What

2 INTRODUCTION

the present needs above all else is a grasp of history from the stand-
point of a world outlook and not a collection of anecdotes. Far too
long has the conventional historical instruction in the schools treated
the history of Europe as an isolated development. It is high time
this should cease. And also from practical reasons. A century and
a half ago, when the historians of the Aufklarung, or Age of Enlight-
enment, undertook for the first time to write real universal history,
their work was little more than a by-product of speculation in the
field of the philosophy of history. Now, in the twentieth century,
problems of world politics and world economics are no longer mere
academic questions. History must adapt itself to this new situation
if it is to be seriously considered as an introduction to political and
economic thought. This is particularly true of the period which is
to be treated in this book — for reasons which will be explained in
the next chapter.

BOOK I
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS— THE POINT OF DEPARTURE

CHAPTER I

THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS AS A PERIOD OF
WORLD HISTORY

IT has often been said, even by great philosophers, that history
simply repeats itself ; that, though to a superficial view much changes,
and though names and forms vary, nevertheless fundamentally the
same driving forces of history remain ever and immutably the same.

This view is mistaken. Naturally certain fundamental problems
are always recurring. Human nature has certain needs which must
always be satisfied in much the same way. The conflicts which
arise from individuals living together and from states existing side
by side show kindred traits from century to century. But so soon
as the observer raises himself above these identical phenomena of
a primitive nature, mighty are the differences which are revealed
from century to century and between one quarter of the globe and
another. Although the basic principles of human society may alter
but little, nevertheless the conditions under which these principles
act change greatly. A mere quantitative change in conditions may
have enormous consequences. Think, for instance, of the rapidity
of communication which we owe to steam. Theoretically, the modern
steamship and railway serve the same needs as the sailing-vessel and
the ox-cart of olden times; but the possibility of quicker communica-
tion with distant parts of the world has brought with it consequences
which would make it ridiculous to regard the difference between the
present and the past merely as a shortening of the time necessary
for the transportation of goods.

Now it is the aim of history to call attention to these changes
and shifting conditions, and to consider their consequences. No
period is so well adapted to this as the nineteenth century. For in
this century there took place one of those great changes which permit
us to differentiate one age sharply from another. This change was
the spread of European civilization, including European science and
knowledge as well as European colonization, over the whole earth.
Naturally, here also, one can cite analogies or at least similar phe-
nomena from earlier periods. For instance, there are close resem-
blances to the conquest of South America by Spain and Portugal

4 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

in the sixteenth century. But even if such events of an earlier
period seem essentially similar from a superficial point of view, there
remains, nevertheless, the great difference which results from the
far broader extent of the modern movement. No event of the past
century (1815-1920) has exercised so powerful an influence upon the
future of mankind — and not least on the European states them-
selves— as this Europeanization of the world. Compared with this,
how slight was the importance for their own age of European colonial
policy in previous centuries!

The plan of the present work will, therefore, place in the fore-
ground those events which are connected with this most important
development. It will seek first to describe the point of departure —
the world as it was in 1815 — and then the material and intellectual
conditions out of which resulted the conquest of the world by the
European nations and by European civilization.

CHAPTER II

THE GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE
WORLD IN 1815

TO-DAY the world is an economic unit. Economic disasters and great
revolutions which occur in one part of the world are quickly felt
everywhere else. A hundred years ago it was quite otherwise.

In 1815 the world was still divided into three parts. One of these
was virtually isolated from the other two; and these two traded with
one another regularly only in certain products.

The part which was virtually isolated and which, because of its
isolation, was not at all progressive, was the vast region of Eastern
Asia. Here Japan was completely inaccessible to foreigners, and
China had opened the door only a crack. Foreign ships were allowed
to touch at only one Chinese port (Canton). Even those foreign
traders who wanted to export Chinese tea were forbidden to make
regular settlements or to travel freely inland. Furthermore, even
this limited opportunity was exploited to only a small extent. The
direct trade of European nations (especially of the English) was
quite unimportant. And although China at that time was still
inferior to the European nations in the science of war, the Europeans
did not yet think of intervening with an armed hand for the benefit
of their traders.

The second division of the world from an economic point of view
consisted of Europe and those parts of America settled by Europeans.
The third area comprised the numerous remaining regions which
had come within the sphere of European colonial influence. In these
latter regions Europeans had secured for themselves privileges for
exploiting "colonial wares" which could not be produced in Europe
at all, or at least only under unfavorable conditions, because of the
climate. There was, as yet, no question of settlements to provide for
an overflow population (aside from the scattered penal settlements).
A surplus population did not yet exist in Europe in 1815. At that
time no European nation thought of reserving unoccupied regions
outside Europe as places of settlement; even in the case of England,
the country in which an excess peculation first began to appear, the
emigration prior to 1825 was altogether insignificant. Europe's

6 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

contact with the colonies was limited therefore to the regulation and
retention of trade; even if expeditions were made into the interior
for commercial purposes, these aimed only at the protection of the
commercial settlements on the coast.

Thus the colonial policy of the European nations in 1815 was in
theory still the same as during the three preceding centuries. But
the wars of the eighteenth century and of the Napoleonic Age had
brought a fundamental change in the relative strength of the various
nations. While in the earlier periods the various naval powers had
waged bitter strife for commercial advantages in the colonies, in.
1815 only one great sea power survived. To be sure, remnants of
the earlier conditions still existed in the shape of Dutch, French,
or Portuguese colonies. But the most dangerous rival of the British
colonial empire, the French dominion in Asia and America, had been
definitely destroyed and had fallen into the hands of the more
powerful competitor. And there was no likelihood that the situation
would soon change, because great sea power had been necessary
for the conquest of these overseas regions, whose products were so
much desired; and in 1815 England alone possessed such sea power.
The French navy was gone, the Spanish fleet decayed, and even the
Dutch shipping had sunk into insignificance. Any immediate re-
vival of the old rivalry on the sea was out of the question. The
only cases in which European nations might extend over new terri-
tories outside Europe were cases where there was a land connection,
or where sea communication offered only slight difficulties, as in
the expansion of Russia over Siberia and Central Asia, the creation
by France of a colonial empire in Algeria, or, to a certain extent,
the addition of new lands to the South and West by the United States.

England's dominant position was further strengthened by the fact
that, true to her policy for four centuries, she refrained from acquir-
ing territory on the continent of Europe. The nation which possessed
the only great sea power of the time could, if she desired, also con-
centrate her whole attention upon an overseas policy, because in
Europe she claimed no territory which bordered on a continental
military power.

CHAPTER III
THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Now it chanced that the only nation which possessed the necessary
sea power for extending European authority over the world was
also at the same time the nation which first developed the modern
industrial system and thereby inaugurated the period of great emi-
gration. In this its own citizens naturally had at first the greatest
share. Here we must glance back a little into the past.

In the course of the eighteenth century, the factors which gave
the impulse to the rise of the modern factory system, namely, the
substitution of power-driven machinery for manual labor and the
application of steam to industry, were in part the result of the new
scientific speculation which arose in Italy in the second half of the
sixteenth century. But, in the main, certain specific needs of the
time and the country led to the inventions which were to revolu-
tionize the industrial life of the whole world. Thanks to the un-
equaled quality of her wool and the wealth of her mines, England
had already secured a leading position in the textile and iron in-
dustries. This development modified the whole social structure
of the country. The lucrative extension of sheep-raising decreased
the number of agricultural laborers and furnished industry with an
unusually large amount of cheap labor. But at the beginning of
the eighteenth century one branch of industry was threatened with
destruction. The forests of England which had supplied the fuel
for smelting iron and making steel began to be exhausted. Unless
the metal industries were to migrate to Sweden or Russia, where for-
ests abounded, coal must be substituted for charcoal. To pump the
water from the coal mines, some mechanical contrivance was neces-
sary which could work more effectively than hand-pumps. This led
to the invention of the steam engine by James Watt. Soon the new
machine began to be applied to other purposes than pumping water
from coal mines. In the textile industries steam-driven machinery
was soon installed. A few decades later followed the two inventions
which placed the steam engine at the service of commerce — the
steamship and the railway. About the same time there occurred
also in America the invention of the cotton-gin, which placed at

8 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

the disposal of English industry a hitherto undreamt-of supply of
cotton, for which in turn new uses were discovered.

This introduction of manufacturing on a large scale, known in
England as the "Industrial Revolution/' taken all in all, was the
most important event of the nineteenth century. Thanks to the
new means of communication, commerce and industry were now for
the first time organized on a really world basis. Hitherto, European
trade with the overseas regions had been limited to the importation
of luxuries and raw materials which could not be produced in Eu-
rope; henceforth food supplies from other parts of the world could
be imported more cheaply by the industrialized European nations
than they could be raised at home. The industrialization of
a country, that is, the employment of propertyless workingmen in
factories at the expense of home agriculture and the multiplication
of factory employees far beyond what the soil at home would feed,
could now be carried on to an extent and with an intensity un-
dreamt-of in former times. Masses of men, who formerly would
either have starved or through recurrent under-nourishment have
been subject to epidemics and heavy mortality, could now not only
live, but even enjoy relative comfort with a lower mortality rate
than had ever been heard of before. The importation of food from
parts of the world outside Europe, made possible by the new means
of transportation, assured not only cheapness but also regularity of
supplies, so that local crop failures no longer resulted in famine.
Likewise, as there was no longer any geographical limitation upon the
exportation of manufactured goods, and as goods could be sold in
distant countries, there was nothing to prevent great expansion in
manufacturing. The Malthusian theory had declared that popula-
tion tended constantly to outrun food-supply, and that if the birth-
rate were not voluntarily checked, famine or war or some other dis-
aster must keep it within bounds. Now the Malthusian theory —
formulated under the influences of the first phases of the industrial
change in England — seemed contradicted.

This optimistic view, however, which perhaps reached its height
in the second half of the nineteenth century, lost sight of the fact
that the solution which it supposed it had found could hold good
only for a brief and unusually favorable period. It forgot that the
overseas regions could come to the aid of Europe's excess popula-
tion only so long as these regions themselves remained thinly popu-
lated. However, this is not the place to consider in detail the
question of overpopulation nor that of the social and political con-
sequences of the rise of an industrial proletariat; these can best be

THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM 9

treated later in the chapter on English History (ch. xiv). Here
it need only be pointed out that the new economic organization of
trade on a world basis was not merely a cause, but just as much a
consequence, of the increase of population which resulted from the
Industrial Revolution.

Manufacturing on a large scale, with the aid of steam-power,
made far less demands on the strength of the individual worker
than had the old manual labor. Children, women, and unskilled
workmen could be used to tend many machines just as well as grown
men and technically trained workers. Particularly in the first
period, prior to the legislation for the protection of children, factory
employees became self-supporting while still very young and could
begin to raise families. As wages varied arbitrarily and were rela-
tively high when times were good, workingmen became careless and
made no effort to limit the number of children, particularly as the
children did not have to divide up an inheritance but merely shared
in the opportunity to work. Only a few leaders warned the work-
ingmen to keep their families small in order to limit the number of
those competing for places to work. And since, in spite of the un-
hygienic conditions under which the working population for the
most part lived, a regular supply of imported food tended to reduce
mortality, the population of the industrial countries grew in num-
bers to an extent which has no parallel in earlier centuries.

It soon appeared that for an amelioration of the evils which arose
from this, particularly for the evil of unemployment in normal times,
there was but one remedy: emigration. If all the people who lived
exclusively by manual labor but were unable to find work at home
could move away to thinly settled or unoccupied regions, especially
outside Europe, the increase of population which was caused and
kept up by the Industrial Revolution could be borne without incon-
venience. This was at first the case. After 1815 great areas stood
open for settlement, particularly in North America, South Africa,
Australia and New Zealand, that is, in territories which were not
unsuited to white men. Furthermore, the economic situation was
such that this emigration of European labor not only relieved the
mother country from the burden of feeding those who departed,
but also positively contributed to the support of those who remained.
Distant lands, which could produce practically no necessaries of
life so long as they remained hunting-grounds in the hands of wild
native tribes, became in the hands of white settlers great granaries
from which the industrial masses of Europe could be fed, and to
which the manufactured products of European factories could be

io GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

sold. Apparently an equilibrium had been established. Thanks
to the new economic organization on a world basis, the enormously
increased population of the world could be fed, in fact better fed,
than was possible in previous centuries. But this was only a tem-
porary and provisional situation. Scarcely a hundred years had
passed before it became evident that the conditions on which the
economic equilibrium rested no longer existed; then came to an
end, one may say, the Age of the Industrial Revolution and the
Expansion of Europeans over the World.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION

THE Industrial Revolution which took place in England had as its
counterpart in much of the rest of Europe the revolution in prop-
erty rights and business relations which arose from the spread of
the French conception of legal equality. Here also we must glance
back into the past.

Up to the end of the eighteenth century, in nearly all the countries
of Europe (but less in England) institutions were in existence which
aimed to protect the privileged classes who possessed inherited
wealth from the competition of new elements struggling upwards
from the bottom of society. Almost everywhere the law took care
that the families which had secured possession of considerable prop-
erty (particularly landed property), or of a good government office
(one of the most fruitful sources of income in those days), should
be enabled to defend their property against competitors from the
lower social ranks, even when the latter were more capable and
energetic. Various legal privileges reserved a great part of the gov-
ernment offices for members of a definite social class. Various laws
took care that the property of the favored families could not be
divided, lest individual members of the family might be in danger
of being depressed into the ranks of the poor. In general, the legal
system worked in such a way that all the landed property of a family
passed to the eldest son and was kept together in his hands; the
younger sons and daughters were provided for by being given a place
in the army, the government, or the church. Usually, therefore,
the rank of officer in the army, the lucrative appointments in the
government, and the rich ecclesiastical endowments (in which ladies
also might share) were reserved for the "nobility," i. e., for the
wealthy class. In the city republics the rights of the ruling bourgeois
aristocracy were protected in the same way; the rest of the people,
whether rich or poor, were excluded from all important positions
and often even from the exercise of certain trades ; here also election
to most of the offices was restricted to the members of a few families,
who were thus assured of appointment to offices which they often

12 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

could not have won on a basis of ability and free competition. To
these privileges must be added that of exemption from taxation for
nobility, clergy, and the ruling bourgeois aristocracy, which like-
wise assured a mighty financial advantage to the favored few.

During the French Revolution this system of privileges was re-
placed by the principle of legal equality for all. All the limita-
tions which had reserved the numerous places of profit for in-
heritors of wealth disappeared. Now a commoner could be an army
officer, a poor man a justice, and even a very poor man a bishop.
Primogeniture was abolished; a law of inheritance was introduced
which gave younger and elder children an equal share, so that no
family's wealth was protected by the state from being divided up.
The privileges of the guilds were set aside, so that the exercise of
certain trades was no longer reserved for the benefit of a few fam-
ilies. Separate tribunals for the nobility, with their partiality for
the rich, were abolished. Many of the factors which made prefer-
ment according to social position possible simply disappeared. The
most important examples of this were the secularization of much of
the church property, such as the monasteries and other ecclesiastical
foundations which served no practical religious purpose, and the
cutting down of the revenues of those establishments which were
permitted to continue in existence, such as bishoprics. The income
of the ecclesiastical offices which survived was now so moderate
that even if they had been reserved as formerly for the children of
the nobility, they would not have sufficed for their support.

Friends and opponents of the French Revolution have too often
judged this system of equality from the standpoint of the city bour-
geoisie. In reality, however, its significance is far greater as regards
agricultural land in the country districts. Any one who wants to
judge the results of the French Revolution must begin with the
changes which took place in the condition of the peasants and in
the division of the soil.

The principle of equality of inheritance, for evident reasons, is
not nearly so important in the case of movable property as in that
of real estate. The joint management of a concern by brothers, the
provision of compensation for retiring members, the adaptation of
an organization to a greater or less number of participants, above
all, the expansion of business — these are all matters which are easier
to arrange in a commercial or industrial undertaking than in agri-
culture. In agriculture, particularly if a country is already so
thickly populated that it is difficult to enlarge an inherited estate
or buy new lands, serious consequences arise from laws compelling

CONSEQUENCES OF FRENCH REVOLUTION 13

the heirs to share the land equally or make an equivalent provision.
Even if some of the heirs withdraw from the land, the situation is
no better, since those who remain on the property are heavily bur-
dened financially by the compensation which they have to provide for
those who withdraw. Now if there happens to come a natural in-
crease in the population and a decrease in the death rate (as was
the case in the nineteenth century as a result of the new means of
communication, better hygiene, and long periods of peace), only
two alternatives are open to countries already thickly settled: either
a subdivision of the land into smaller parcels, with all the technical
difficulties in cultivation which this involves, or an artificial limita-
tion of the birth rate (provided, of course, that the law of equal in-
heritance is not modified). This is the dilemma, as is well known,
which the French saw clearly, and solved admirably, at least from
an economic point of view, by choosing the second alternative.

If a country avoids the evil consequences of legal equality by
such a restriction of population, and remains, so to speak, in the
first phase of the revolution, it secures a social structure whose
solidity is scarcely equaled by any other form of economic organ-
ization. The bulk of the population does not consist of homeless,
propertyless workingmen, nor of a crowd of day laborers whose
families live physically and mentally almost like cattle under a
few great landlords; it consists of a body of peasant proprietors
who are hardworking and thrifty, because out of their own experience
they know the value of property, and because they labor for them-
selves and their families and not for absentee landlords.

It has been necessary to examine a little more in detail the his-
torical significance of this idea of "equality," inasmuch as scarcely
any other historical event has been so much misrepresented as the
proclamation of this principle by the French Revolution. From
the outset, amateur philosophers of history have taken special de-
light in holding it up to reproach, repeating the platitude that Nature
herself knows no equality, and that men are never equally endowed
at birth. This is undoubtedly true; but, looked at closely, this very
fact is an argument, not against, but in favor of the abolition of
the pre-revolutionary class privileges. The advantages which the
members of the propertied class enjoyed before the Revolution did
not give free play to ability, but on the contrary acted as a shield
to the incompetent, who could not otherwise have withstood the
competition of talented rivals from the lower ranks of society. As
to "the rule of the fittest," whatever such an indefinite, theoretical
phrase may mean, certainly there was a closer approach to this

14 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Utopian conception under the legal equality introduced by the
French Revolution than under the earlier system of privileges for
certain families and classes. Historical events have also proved
that another theory, by which the privileged classes tried to justify
their position, is no longer tenable; namely, the theory that only
scions of the nobility possessed the necessary qualities to make
good military officers. The very wars of the French Revolution
proved this to be nothing but a legend. Every one knows that some
of the most successful French generals came from the lower ranks
of society; this was the time when it was said that every soldier,
even the humblest born, carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack.

Of course the principle of equality in inheritance is open to serious
criticism, and the historian would be the last person to assert that
there is nothing but good in it. Writers in England, that is, in the
country where primogeniture has been retained within certain limits
in combination with general freedom of testamentary disposition,
have with some justice called attention to the bad effects in France
of extreme subdivision of agricultural land. One might add also
that a class of independent large landlords can render to the state
valuable services which cannot be had easily in any other way.
But these are matters which have nothing to do with that favorable
recognition of talent which is supposed to have been destroyed by
the doctrine of equality. For the innovations of the French Revo-
lution had precisely the result that the man who was poor but tal-
ented henceforth need struggle only against the disadvantages due
to his poverty, but not against those due to the political and legal
privileges of the rich.

More justifiable is another theoretical objection. Little as the
historian can endorse in general talk about "the good old times,"
he must admit that some of the unrest in modern society is to be
traced back to this legal equality. When the propertied or ruling
classes were protected by all sorts of political privileges, they nat-
urally had less idea of the difficulty of the struggle for existence than
later. The rest of the population likewise, being excluded from the
enjoyment of sinecures, were more resigned to their fate than later;
realizing that they never could stand on an equal footing with their
mighty masters, they did not make the attempt. But in the case
of this objection also, in view of the great increase in population,
one cannot accept unreservedly the statement that legal equality
and freedom to exercise a trade have caused the boundless striving
for wealth of modern times with all its disturbing consequences.

In the history of the nineteenth century it is of fundamental im-

CONSEQUENCES OF FRENCH REVOLUTION 15

portance that these "Ideas of the French Revolution" coincided at
the outset with "liberal" or even republican forms of government.
In itself, the adoption of the kind of equality just described naturally
has no inherent connection with a free form of government. Writers
have often correctly pointed out that there can be more legal
equality under an autocracy than in an aristocratic republic. In
Europe before 1789 it was also true that the new ideas came nearer
to realization in monarchical than in republican states. "Enlightened
Despotism," which in a limited degree aimed at the same things as
the French Revolution later, bore its fruits primarily in monarchies.
Two events, however, made this no longer true henceforth. The
first was the establishment of the United States of America, which
for the first time proclaimed the complete equality of all the citizens
of the Union. The second was the fact that the monarchy in France
proved unable to carry through the reforms which it had inaugurated
and which were only completed under the First French Republic.
To be sure, a little later the introduction of the new ideas did not
depend on the continuance of liberal forms of government; as is
well known, the spread in Europe of the new French legal arrange-
ments, so far as it took place, was as much due to the campaigns
of Napoleon as to those of the Republic. But the first impression
remained the permanent one. It was two republics, the American
and the French, which first established legal equality; the example
of Napoleon could not be cited to the contrary, because the
Corsican Emperor was always regarded as an illegitimate upstart
by the representatives of the old political way of thinking.

CHAPTER V
THE "PANIC OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION"

THE reason that the same people who regarded Napoleon as an
illegitimate ruler were also the people who feared and hated the
republican revolutionary movement will become clear only if one
takes into consideration the intellectual as well as the material re-
sults of the French Revolution.

No event in European history ever caused such a change in the
political thought of the ruling classes as did the French Revolution.
In this respect even the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth
century was of less importance. It was the first time that conscious
conservatism became a ruling dogma.

To understand this, it is not enough to study merely the history
of the French Revolution itself. Much rather must one seek the
solution of the problem in the theory according to which the Revo-
lution was explained and in the consequences which were drawn
from the course of its progress.

Two ideas were particularly important. The first was the con-
nection which the adherents of the Old Regime thought they saw
between the Enlightened Despotism of the eighteenth century and
the political revolution. Because some French writers had brilliantly
set forth anti-ecclesiastical ideas about the Law of Nature, and be-
cause the reformers of French finance did not hesitate to confiscate
church property, the ruling classes thought that the real source of
revolutionary tendencies was to be sought in the writings of the
enlightened philosophers about religion.

The attitude of the ruling classes in church and state toward
education and culture therefore became radically altered. While
formerly they had welcomed the new intellectual ideas and more
than once defended them against the fanaticism of the middle class,
henceforth the contrary became the rule. Poets and essayists who in
the eighteenth century had been entertained at the courts of princes
and given important offices, were now at best merely tolerated and
everywhere regarded with suspicion. Henceforth, it was usually only
the fine arts which flourished in these states, for the fine arts did
not deal with the great problems of the age and showed a preference

THE "PANIC OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION" 17

for pre-revolutionary forms. Especially in countries where those in
control thought they ought to protect themselves against revolution-
ary attempts, the view prevailed that the state ought to restrict if
possible, or at least direct, intellectual movements. The split which
took place between the state and culture has continued in many
countries to the present day.

This governmental attitude in many states was given its special
character by the fact that the "age of innocence" had passed. Rulers
might still think it advisable from political motives to uphold the
church and religion, and block anti-ecclesiastical movements. But
the old naive faith, such as was still by no means uncommon among
rulers of the eighteenth century, could no longer be aroused. The
conviction that the wrath of heaven would smite the prince who
tolerated heretical beliefs in his territory, the belief in the existence
of witches who made compacts with the devil to injure their fellow-
men — all these and many other superstitions which had political
importance had disappeared forever. The most important teachings
of the Age of Enlightenment had gained much greater currency
even among people of strong religious faith than in the eighteenth
century ; at least the statesmen who advocated religion for the people
usually did so, not so much from conviction of the innate truth of
the church's dogmas, but because the maintenance of the Christian
religion seemed to be for the general good. As a famous English
statesman was leaving the House of Commons after a strong speech
in favor of the claims of the church, he remarked to a colleague:
"Well, after all, it's a curious thing that we have both been voting
for an extinct mythology."

Perhaps this decline in faith was not after ail a great difficulty.
Statesmen who urged a religion in which they no longer believed
might meet with few practical obstacles; but they could not always
hold logically to their policy. Since a training in the new natural
sciences was indispensable for industry and war, even conservative
statesmen had to approve their advancement. This contradiction
was obviated by allowing students of natural science a free hand so
long as they stuck closely to their subject, and by persecuting all
scholars who tried to draw from their science general conclusions
which were incompatible with church dogma.

The second idea which the representatives of the old order re-
garded as proved by the history of the French Revolution concerned
the attitude which the French monarchy had taken toward revolu-
tionary demands. The conservative governments were convinced
that it was only the monarch's excessive willingness to yield that

i8 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

was to blame when the movement went so far. Only by heading
off the danger at the outset could success be secured; if the reins
were once loosened there would be no stopping until there was a
complete upset. This was equivalent to a condemnation of a great
part of the work of the Enlightened Despots. Proposals for political
reform, which had been discussed calmly before the Revolution and
even initiated by royal ministers, were now regarded as unacceptable
because they might open the gate to revolution. Even harmless
notions now awakened a kind of panicky fear. The only salvation
lay in the principle of legitimacy and conservatism, that is, in con-
serving what existed simply because it existed. Better to preserve
what was incomplete than introduce what was new; for who knew
whether reform would stop with its first success — whether it would
not shove aside what had been treasured from the past?

Naturally this principle was not put completely into practice.
Aside from the fact that nearly all office holders had been brought
up on the teachings of Enlightened Despotism, the revolutionary
wars made it necessary to reorganize so many institutions, both
political and non-political, that serious breaches in the existing order
were unavoidable. But the principle was not without influence just
the same; especially in foreign policy (as will be shown in detail
in Book II) there was the very important conviction that govern-
ments owed it to their common interest to protect one another
against revolutionary conspiracies.

Like every panicky movement, this fear of revolution lasted only
a relatively short time in its extreme form. It reached its height
after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and during the following years.
The panicky feeling was also more sharply marked in those coun-
tries where none of the revolutionary demands had been accepted
than in those where few had been rejected; for instance, more
sharply in Austria than in England or America. On the other hand,
the fact must not be overlooked that the effects of these tendencies
were visible for a long time afterwards, in fact even up to the
present. Here is an intellectual influence which has stamped itself
on the whole period.

CHAPTER VI
HUMANITARIANISM

WHILE the political and religious tendencies of the Age of Enlighten-
ment were regarded with disfavor in governmental circles, as a
result of the French Revolution, another of its tendencies spread
almost without opposition. The humanitarian feeling, the compas-
sion for the suffering of human beings without regard to their race,
religion, or social condition, now became a political factor. The
attitude of wide groups of people on political questions, both foreign
and domestic, was determined by the expectation that the victory
of this or that party would advance the cause of humanity. Min-
istries were not free from this kind of influence; and even if they
did not embody it in practical legislation, they did not dare deny
the principle that the demands of mankind ought to be given con-
sideration.

Humanitarianism is generally regarded as a child of the eighteenth
century. This view is undoubtedly correct so far as its birth is
concerned. But its full strength did not develop until the nineteenth
century, when there came into power the men who had grown to
regard the novelties of the Age of Enlightenment as self-evident
truths. In the eighteenth century only a small minority had pro-
tested against the horrors of the criminal law, the gruesome execu-
tion of witches, slavery, and similar inhuman practices; it was only
by forceful measures that reforms in these matters could be effected.
But during and after the French Revolution these views came to
be shared by all cultivated persons in Europe. They gained greatly
in influence from the fact that they were taken up by religious
societies. Whereas in the eighteenth century, humanitarian doc-
trines had been chiefly preached by anti-ecclesiastical or at least
non-ecclesiastical groups, and had often been opposed in strictly
religious circles, now many religious groups, especially those out-
side the established church, adopted propaganda for humanitarian
laws and reforms as part of their platform. Sects which in the
eighteenth century were chiefly concerned with the salvation of
souls now turned with even greater zeal to the salvation of society

20 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

by prison reform and the abolition of slavery. Naturally the hu-
manitarian movement thereby became far stronger than at a time
when it was advocated only by a few aristocratic writers. It had
also rid itself of all revolutionary and anti-religious taint.

In this field of humanitarian reform, therefore, there was less
of a restoration of old conditions after 1815 than in any other field.
Conservative ministries might debate the re-introduction of primo-
geniture; but they no longer discussed the revival of torture and
the barbaric forms of the death penalty. Where barbaric penalties
were not actually abolished by law, they were no longer applied in
practice. Even humane forms of capital punishment came to be
regarded more and more as a terrible penalty which ought not to be
imposed except in extreme cases; for instance, in England, the death
penalty, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century was still
enforced for minor infractions of the law, was now reserved for only
the most serious crimes. Condemnation to corporal punishment
came now to be regarded as an evidence of a lower civilization, and
one of the reasons why Russia was felt to be a barbarous country
was the fact that she had done so much less than other countries
in the matter of humanitarian reform. In order to realize the tre-
mendous changes in attitude which had taken place one must not
forget that the worst excesses of Russian criminal law were really
humane in comparison with the horrors, for instance, which still
existed in French legal practice in the eighteenth century.

In many ways the new humanitarianism influenced practical pol-
itics. To it must be attributed some of the political hostility with
which Turkey was regarded in many countries. Its influence was
most successful in the abolition of slavery. In this matter the Age
of Enlightenment had taken the first step and asserted in the face
of ecclesiastical opposition the "natural rights of man." During the
French Revolution for the first time a European nation (France) for-
bade slavery in its colonies. Great Britain soon followed the example
of France; in 1807-8 the slave trade was abolished by Act of Parlia-
ment. The example of France and England was often followed in
the course of the nineteenth century, until finally it had been
imitated by all Christian countries. The movement toward the abo-
lition of slavery also affected the relations of European nations with
peoples of other races outside of Europe, as, for instance, in the well-
known case of Africa.

This struggle against slavery is a particularly characteristic evi-
dence of the power of humanitarianism, inasmuch as it was not at
all due to material motives in the ordinary meaning of the word.

HUMANITARIANISM

In fact, England's abolition of the slave trade was hurtful from the
point of view of British commerce; it was justifiable only on ideal-
istic grounds.

BOOK II

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE
AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY TENDENCIES

CHAPTER VII

THE SOLIDARITY OF INTERNATIONAL
CONSERVATISM

THE Great Powers which had led the struggle against Napoleon
had fought not only for an increase of territory, but also for a po-
litical principle. Although one of the Allies (Prussia) had been
somewhat permeated by French Revolutionary ideas, and another
(England) had already adopted many of them, the governments of
all the Allies were selfishly interested in many of the institutions
of the Old Regime, and the war against France was therefore re-
garded as a war for eradicating the international revolutionary
movement.

It was natural that the Alliance outlasted Napoleon's defeat and
banishment. In the first place, the revolutionary movement had
not been rooted out. In France itself, which for several decades
had been regarded as a hot-bed of subversive tendencies and upon
which an almost foreign dynasty had been imposed, the danger of a
new outbreak seemed constantly imminent; and each of the Allies
was aware that in such an event the consequences would not be lim-
ited to France alone. A second motive holding the Allies together
was their desire to keep their newly acquired territories. All the
Great Powers, except France, emerged from the Napoleonic Wars
with large increases of territory, acquired to a slight extent at the
expense of France, but mainly at that of little states, like the aris-
tocratic city republics and the bishoprics which were secularized.
The best way to preserve these acquisitions was for the coalition
which had conquered them to hold together to keep them. Finally,
the reorganization which took place at the Congress of Vienna, at
least so far as it concerned Europe, had created a balance of power
among the large states which was regarded as a guarantee of peace.
Now since none of the Great Powers had any inclination for another
great war after the Napoleonic upheaval, it was to the interest of
them all to conserve the existing balance which had been created
at the Congress of Vienna.

With this in view the four greater Allied Powers, Austria, Russia,
Prussia and Great Britain, signed a treaty on November 20, 1815,

26 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

"for the safety of their governments and for the general peace of
Europe," to prevent the possibility that " Revolutionary Principles
might again convulr.e France and endanger the peace of other coun-
tries." This had been preceded on September 26, 1815, by the Holy
Alliance, which was in keeping with the new religious and political
tendencies described above in chapter v; proposed by the Tsar,
and then signed by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia,
its mystical formulas aimed at the preservation of absolutism at
home.

It was characteristic of the new Alliance that it did not at first
include France, the feared home of revolutions. Only after a con-
siderable period of probation, and after the withdrawal of the army
of occupation which the Great Powers had left in France to secure
the execution of the treaty, was France at last, in 1818, admitted to
the league for the solidarity of conservatism. Great as was the de-
sire of the Allies to raise the prestige of the government which they
had restored in France, still greater was their feeling of anxiety lest
some new disturbance might burst forth from France.

It would, of course, be quite incorrect to assume that this prin-
ciple of the solidarity of conservatism always completely controlled
the foreign and domestic policy of the European nations. The old
aspirations and sources of agitation had not been suppressed. Even
in the six or seven years following the Congress of Vienna, that is,
in the period when the policy of international conservatism may
be said to have been at its height, there were at work among mem-
bers of the Alliance tendencies which were in contradiction with the
idea of joint action against the forces of revolution. But it would
be equally incorrect to deny that the conservative program of
those days exerted practical influence. The idea of a common fight
against the spirit of revolution acted as a gigantic brake on the
wheels of progress.

At this point, in order to avoid repetition later, a theoretical ob-
servation may be inserted parenthetically. — There is one conception
of history according to which all events may be traced back to
ideas; the past, as well as the present, is regarded as being a war
of great ideas; struggling groups, like nations or political parties,
merely embody general tendencies. Opposed to this first conception,
which might be called the idealogical conception of history, stands
another, commonly known as the "great man" or "hero" concep-
tion; this completely denies the effective influence of such ideas;
ideas are merely a bait which must be thrown to the stupid masses;
no statesman ever takes their big phrases seriously. A sensible

SOLIDARITY OF CONSERVATISM 27

observer will not admit that either of these extreme conceptions is
correct. Certainly the first in its strict sense is untenable. But
is a force without effect because opposing forces prevent it from
reaching its full development? Does not every joint action unite men
or groups, who may also be pursuing their own special aims, and is
not their common purpose a reality? Because selfish interests can
never be completely gotten rid of, can there be no self-sacrifice for
general aims?

This is the point of view from which one ought to judge the
attitude of the Conservative Powers after 1815. In the following
chapters it will be shown in detail that the feeling of conservative
solidarity was most effective in those countries where it harmonized
with the special interests of a definite nation or minority; and that
in other cases it made itself only partially felt. But this does not
mean it did not exert any influence as a distinct independent force.

The fact that conservatism could not triumph completely lay in
an uneven distribution of forces, and in a remarkable connection be-
tween this circumstance and the new policy of the Allied Powers.

One can understand that the "Panic of the French Revolution,"
mentioned above in chapter v, was more intense and lasted longer
in proportion as nations had rejected more completely the equali-
tarian and the constitutional doctrines of the Revolution. Similarly
the period of anxiety, caused by the paroxysms of the French Revo-
lution, was briefest in the United States of America, and longest
in the state which most completely embodied the Old Regime, namely,
in Austria. It was likewise quite normal that England should give
up sooner than the other Great Powers the idea that the first duty
of all states is to combat the peril of revolution. Although in Great
Britain, as will be pointed out later in chapter viii, an Old Regime
had to defend itself against a revolutionary attack at this time,
nevertheless the social reform movement there had little to do with
the movement on the Continent; for England had already accom-
plished in large part what the continental revolutionary party was
still striving after. Therefore the English were less inclined to sub-
ordinate their own national aims to the solidarity of international
conservatism, and the inclination evaporated more rapidly than in
the other countries. It was more than a mere accident that of all
the leading monarchs (aside from the Pope) the Prince Regent of
England was the only one who did not sign the Holy Alliance.

Now an important consequence of Great Britain's cool attitude
was the fact that the Conservative Alliance lost the use of the only
large navy in the world (see ch. ii). In every case where "rebels

28 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

against legitimacy" could be brought to reason only by the aid of
a large fleet, the decision whether this should be done depended
solely on Great Britain. Considering that the two cases of revolt
which were left unsettled by the Congress of Vienna, the Spanish-
American and the Greek, depended in last analysis upon sea power,
it is easy to see the practical importance of this independent policy
of Great Britain.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATES
IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA

THE most important of the revolutionary movements against which
the Conservative Alliance had to stand on the defensive was the
War of Independence of the Spanish-American colonies. The roots
of the trouble reached far back. The great example of the North
American Union — the unheard-of fact that a European colony should
wrench itself loose from its mother-country and establish itself suc-
cessfully as a democratic republic — naturally left a deeper impres-
sion in the New World than in Europe (although even here this
event was not without a strong influence on the peculiar course of
the French Revolution) . This was necessarily the case, both because
the Spanish colonies had been much worse treated by the mother-
country than the English ones, and because Spain, unlike England,
did not learn any lesson from the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies.
Both these points need a short explanation.

One must begin with economic and social facts. The Spanish-
American colonies, in 1776, were much more profitable to Spain
than were the English colonies to England.. Spain's revenues
were dependent on the possession and exploitation of her American
colonies in a way which had no parallel in England. Socially
also there was a sharp difference. The Spanish colonies con-
tained a large number of more or less independent natives who con-
tinued to exist as the lowest social group ; but in the wide areas of the
North American colonies the remnants of Indian tribes were negligi-
ble, and the negro slaves in the Southern states, being unfree, did not
count politically. Owing to these conditions, the government of the
Spanish colonies was not exercised by and for the whites settled there,
but by Spaniards and solely in the interests of the mother-country.
No Creoles, as white persons born in America were called, were ad-
mitted into the colonial government. Not the welfare of the colonists,
but the profit of the home government, was aimed at. In conflicts
between the Creoles and the natives, the Spanish administration took
a neutral stand, or was even inclined to protect the descendants of
original inhabitants against the claims of the successors of the Con-

30 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

quistadors. This attitude of the Spanish government was seen above
all in its commercial policy. The trade of the colonies was reserved
to Spanish merchants as a matter of principle; even Spanish liberals
did not want to abandon this commercial monopoly; it was indis-
pensable for the Spanish revenues.

Furthermore, the revolt of the English colonies in North America
brought no change in this Spanish colonial system. As is known and
will be pointed out later in the proper place, the revolt of the Thir-
teen Colonies made a great impression on the English government
and led to a complete change in British colonial policy. But in
Spain nothing of the kind took place. Although Spanish rulers
might well have said to themselves that the example of the United
States would certainly awaken similar aspirations in Central and
South America, and although it was to be expected that a rising in
the Spanish colonies would have at least the moral support of the
North American Union, Spain persisted in her traditional attitude.

At first Spain was strong enough to maintain control over her
colonies, but there soon came a moment which enabled the Creoles
to replace the administration of Spain by one of their own. The
Napoleonic Wars involved the Spanish (and Portuguese) colonies.

Two circumstances then favored the colonists' struggle for inde-
pendence. One was that the only nation which was in a position to
assist the insurgents was also the very nation which had the great-
est interest in the destruction of Spain's old commercial monopoly.
Although the English government never appears to have thought
of replacing the Spanish monopoly by one of its own, nevertheless
it was significant that, thanks to England's leading commercial po-
sition, it was the English who would profit most from the establish-
ment of freedom of trade in Central and South America. It abo
chanced favorably for England that her support of the South Ameri-
can movement for independence coincided with her general war
policy; England and the insurgent colonists had the same enemy;
Napoleon's elder brother, Joseph Bonaparte, had been set up as
King of Spain by England's French enemy.

The second circumstance which aided the colonists lay in these
conflicts in Spain itself. So long as the Spanish government was
waging a bitter and unsuccessful war in the Peninsula, it was in no
position to use force against the Creoles.

How necessary was the combination of both factors — British sea
power and Spanish-American natives — is proved by the events of
1806-07. The British attempted to secure a position for themselves
in the Spanish colonies by attacks on Buenos Aires and Montevideo;

ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATES 31

but these expeditions failed completely; they lacked support from
the side of the colonists.

Soon afterwards, however, the Creoles found a leader and an
opportunity enabling them to achieve complete independence, instead
of being simply transferred to the colonial empire of another nation.
The leader was a prominent representative of the old creole aristoc-
racy, Simon Bolivar of Caracas. Born in 1783, he now stood in the
full strength of his manhood. Having absorbed intellectual influ-
ences in Europe, and being impressed in the United States by their
great example, he resolved in 1809 to free the Spanish colonies. A
born hero of freedom, a logical idealist, absolutely unselfish, incom-
parably energetic, and ahead of his times, he believed it possible to
free and unite all the colonies immediately. Without hesitation he
also proclaimed the abolition of slavery. He was no great military
leader; but he understood how to gather around himself a group
of able men, and he never gave up hope even in the darkest hour.

The favorable moment for the colonies to break away came when
Napoleon compelled the Spanish King, Charles IV, to abdicate;
this left the colonies also without a ruler. For Joseph Bonaparte,
who had been set up by the French as the new king, was not recog-
nized anywhere in America ; and the legitimate successor, Ferdinand
VII, was not in a position to exercise authority. Therefore the
Creoles established committees, called juntas, "to protect the rights
of Ferdinand"; only gradually did they dare to proclaim complete
independence from Spain, the first instance being in 1811.

This outcome was in fact promoted by the attitude of the revolu-
tionary (anti- French) regency in Spain itself. One would have
thought that the liberal politicians who gathered in Cadiz to build
up a new Spain would not have adopted the selfish attitude of the
Old Regime. But they did. The regency answered various revolu-
tionary acts in Caracas with the severest reprisals and clung fast
to the old monopolistic system. This made the breach irreparable.

So long as the war continued in Europe the struggle in America
turned mostly in favor of the colonists. To be sure, there were
defeats and the easily understood preference of the original inhabi-
tants, or "Indians," for Spanish control continually provided the
royalist leaders with new soldiers. But Bolivar and his supporters
gained possession of most of the large provinces. Unless troops
from Spain intervened, the loss of the colonies by the mother country
was a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, it was probable
that if the revived Spanish government could send enough troops
to America the insurgents would be outmatched.

32 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

In this situation everything depended on Great Britain's attitude.
And it is an extraordinarily significant evidence of the importance
of the new conservative ideas that the English government at first
refrained from aiding the colonists. Every English self-interest
spoke in favor of intervention to secure the independence of the
colonies. England had everything to gain if the former Spanish
system of monopoly was replaced by freedom of trade with all
nations. But considerations of a general political nature prevented
England for a considerable time from favoring the revolutionists.
So at first no official support was given by England.

At the outset, therefore, Spain had a free hand. But this profited
her little. For what remained of the Spanish fleet sufficed only to
transport a few troops, and the Russian vessels which were placed
at her disposal in the interests of conservative solidarity proved
completely useless. So the revolutionists were able to spread their
conquests still further. Chili and Colombia were torn from the
royalists. Peru was the only region over which the Spaniards still
exercised control. This success of the colonists was partly the result
of British (unofficial) assistance. It was due to the English naval
hero, Lord Cochrane, who left the British service in 1818 to take
command of the newly created Chilian navy, that the Spanish flag
was driven completely from the Pacific Ocean. An extensive illegal
trade was carried on by British ships with American ports, a trade
which naturally furnished the colonists with munitions of war. But
five years passed before Great Britain openly took sides with the
insurgents. It was not until the "Panic of the French Revolution"
(see ch. v) was on the wane that England dared to prefer her own
interests above those of the Conservative Alliance. In 1817 England
might still seriously debate Spain's request to the Allies for aid
against the revolting American colonists and still adopt a passive at-
titude; but in 1822 at the Congress of Verona, she took a decisive
stand when the Conservative Allies wanted to adopt a common policy.
Here the British delegate declared that England felt compelled to
give a kind of partial recognition to the new governments, that she
had entered into negotiations with them, and that definite recogni-
tion must eventually follow this first step.

This attitude was strengthened the next year by what might be
called a declaration made jointly with the United States. The
United States, for reasons easily understood, had recognized the
independence of these free South American countries somewhat
earlier. This government did not need to have any regard for the
European Alliance, which it had never joined, and whose principles

ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATES 33

did not harmonize with its own political institutions; nor was it to
its interest to support the rule of a great European Power in the New
World. So it came about that in October, 1823, Canning, the Brit-
ish Foreign Minister, a typical representative of the younger genera-
tion in contrast to the earlier panicky conservatives, notified the
French ambassador of England's limited recognition of the new re-
publics; then, on December 2 of the same year, President Monroe
sent his famous message to Congress declaring that he would con-
sider any attempt on the part of European Powers to extend their
system to the Western Hemisphere, or to interfere in the domestic
affairs of American states, as dangerous to the peace and safety of
the United States. Two years later, in 1825, England formally
recognized the more important states.

This closed the door to every attempt by European Powers to
reduce the Spanish colonies to their old subjection; it also destroyed
the plans of the French to seek an equivalent in the Spanish colonies
for the colonial empire which they had lost in the eighteenth cen-
tury. A further fortunate circumstance in favor of the colonists
was the fact that the Spanish troops destined for America refused to
embark, partly because of their own grievances; the hole made in
Spanish revenues by the loss of the colonies had already begun to
derange the normal working of the Spanish administration (see be-
low, ch. xi).

The interval before recognition by England had not been left
unutilized by the Creoles. After conquering Ecuador, Bolivar suc-
ceeded in overthrowing the last bulwark of Spanish power by con-
quering Peru, taking definite possession in 1824. From there the
movement, which had hitherto been limited to South America, spread
also to Central and Spanish North America.

In Mexico, or New Spain as it was then called, the first revolts,
which took place at the same time as the risings in South America,
were the work of the aborigines, or Indians, and the Creoles there-
fore had at first taken the loyalist side. Not until the Indian re-
volts had been put down, did the Creoles rise. In 1821 one of their
generals, Iturbide, declared Mexico an independent Empire; next
year he made himself emperor. (His rule lasted only a year; how-
ever, it was followed, not by a restoration of Spanish authority, but
by an era of pronunciamentos.) This movement gave courage to
colonists in Central America; Guatemala deserted Spain in 1821,
the same year as Mexico.

In a similar way Brazil became independent. Here the commercial
conditions were the same. Portugal exploited her colonies and main-

34 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

tained a monopoly like Spain. Here also, aside from the interests
of the colonists themselves, it was the interests of British trade
which hindered the restoration of the old system. Brazil differed
in two respects from the Spanish republics: the new freedom of
commerce in 1808 was not introduced by a republican leader, but
by the Prince Regent (the later King John VI), who had fled from
Lisbon to America; and after the later definite separation from the
mother country in 1825-26, Brazil was established as a monarchy,
or rather an empire. Quite the same, however, was the part which
British sailors played. Lord Cochrane, who had commanded the
Chilian fleet, was put at the head of the Brazilian navy after the
declaration of independence in 1822. It was chiefly due to him,
and to many other British naval heroes who served under him, that
the military centers which held to Portugal were captured, and
that the Portuguese ships bringing aid were chased away.

The states of Central and South America found it difficult in their
new freedom to establish a firm political organization. As the Old
Regime had excluded colonists from the administration, they were
lacking in political experience. Almost the only people to manage
new affairs were the inhabitants of the towns, who were also the
people who benefited most by the abolition of the Spanish commer-
cial monopoly. The aborigines, who had rather lost than gained
by the revolt, remained indifferent toward these and the later revo-
lutions, except when they were sometimes drawn into feuds by ad-
venturers. Thus the conditions were altogether different from those
in North America at the time of the American Revolution; there
was also the enormous extent of the territory — the State of Colombia
alone was about as large as the original Thirteen Colonies — and
the total lack of means of communication. Under these circum-
stances Bolivar's dream of establishing a federation of the new in-
dependent states, which he attempted in a Pan-American congress
at Panama in 1824, proved premature; in fact, the newly constituted
states could not even preserve themselves from a further splitting
up. Other measures which he did accomplish by his idealism, like
abolition of slavery (in which he outstripped the action of the
United States, but had no success in Brazil) made such a sharp
break, however, with the past, that the emancipation of the slaves
often turned out to be nominal rather than real. The sudden cessa-
tion of all Spanish administration resulted in very unstable condi-
tions, and the lack of an effective public opinion led to many a
coup d'etat, so that for years rulers rose and fell with astonishing

ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT STATES 35

rapidity — except where thinly veiled military dictatorships were
established.

But after all one must not overlook the fact that much of this
political insecurity was merely symptomatic of a period of transi-
tion. It did not seriously disturb economic development, particularly
in the interior, nor did it affect the real significance in world history
of this South American struggle for independence. For the Euro-
pean nations the essential importance of this struggle lay in the
definite abolition, so far as America was concerned, of the old
monopolistic colonial system. European commerce, and later, as the
population in Europe increased rapidly, European expansion, found
here an open field in which merchants and settlers of various coun-
tries could thrive on equal terms. Also, though the emigrants who
settled there might be lost to the mother country, still they did not
swell the strength of any one of the great rival Powers of Europe.

CHAPTER IX
THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE

QUITE similar were the conditions in the Greek War of Independence.
Here also was a movement which some at least of the Great Powers
ought to have hailed with joy from the point of view of their for-
eign policy, yet which they refused to aid because of their regard
for the solidarity of international conservatism. The revolt of the
Greeks against the legitimate authority of the Turks was an event
which embodied two of the objectionable tendencies, the revolutionary
and the nationalistic; it was therefore in flat contradiction to the
principles of the Conservative Alliance. The only mitigating circum-
stance was the fact that Turkey, being a non-Christian state, could
not be regarded as a regular member of an alliance which liked to
lay so much stress on its religious character; though this circum-
stance, as we shall see, was not without its influence, nevertheless
at the outset it was subordinated to the policy of conservatism.

Russia, after pushing forward to the Black Sea under Catherine
II, naturally aimed to secure a free outlet to the Mediterranean.
Control over Constantinople and at least the Eastern part of the
Balkans became henceforth, along with expansion eastward, one
of the main aims of Russian foreign policy. To Russians a revolt
of their Greek co-religionists against Turkish authority was most
welcome. To weaken Turkey was to strengthen Russia. Further-
more, according to opinion at that time, an increase of Greek power
would assure the whole of the Balkans to Russia; for the Greek
Orthodox Church was still closely unified throughout the Balkans,
and the Greek element was everywhere dominant in it, no matter
to what nationality its communicants might belong. If a union
could once be established between Russia and the head of the Greek
Orthodox organization in Constantinople, it was thought the whole
Christian population of the Balkans would support Russian policy.

Even during the Napoleonic Wars one of the most important
topics in the negotiations between Alexander I and Napoleon had
been in regard to Russia's views as to Constantinople. But the
Congress of Vienna put an end for a time to such subversive schemes ;
it also showed the Greeks that they could not expect the Great

THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 37

Powers to take any initiative in expelling the Turks from Europe.
For if Alexander and Napoleon had been unable to agree as to the
disposal of the Turkish capital, there was little likelihood of arousing
a general crusade in Europe. Theoretical opposition to overthrowing
a legitimate ruler perhaps might have been overcome, but not the
divergent ambitions of the Great Powers. Austria, after completing
with Prussia the partition of Poland, had become more and more a
rival of Russia, and opposed every extension of Russian power in
the Balkans. England also was little inclined to tolerate Russian
expansion, particularly toward the Mediterranean. A Greek rising
would threaten the Mediterranean outpost which England had se-
cured by acquiring Corfu and the Ionian Isles during the Napoleonic
Wars. So the Greeks were left to win their independence by them-
selves.

The outlook for an unaided Greek attempt to overthrow Turkish
rule was not favorable, but still it was not desperate. It was a case
like that of the Dutch against the Spanish in the sixteenth century.
The Greeks were as powerless on land against the superior Turkish
army, as the Dutch against the Spanish infantry. But like the Dutch,
they enjoyed an invulnerable position on the sea. The Turkish
government had never raised its navy above mediocrity, and at the
beginning of the nineteenth century it was nothing to speak of.
Quite otherwise with the Greeks. Greek tradition was upheld even
more by the Greek sailors on the ^gean Islands than by the dwellers
on the Greek mainland itself. They made little more distinction
between honest trade and robbery on the seas than did their ances-
tors in the time of Odysseus; like the Greeks of old, also, these island
Greeks possessed a high degree of seafaring ability, love of liberty,
and indomitable energy. As they had never fallen so completely
under Turkish subjection, they now formed one of the strongest
supports in the War of Independence.

Those who like to generalize about the philosophy of history may
see here a specific instance illustrating a general principle: that
seafaring people and marines never allow themselves to be subjected
to the same kind of despotic treatment as may successfully be used
in dealing with land troops. Regular garrison drill, even in time of
peace, is impossible on the sea; nor can the individual be so com-
pletely treated as a mere machine as in the case of military forces
drilled on land. Therefore the naval service has always been re-
garded as having more of the spirit of freedom than the military,
and freedom-loving naval powers have always proved stronger than
absolutist governments. Even the reactionary philosophers of Greek

38 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

antiquity complained that the shipping trade had hastened "democ-
racy," using the word in its original sense; since that time few are
the despotic governments which have accomplished more than medi-
ocre results in naval matters. It is well known how many revolu-
tions have originated with sailors, and how the navy, in contrast
to the army, has always defended liberal movements.

Be this as it may, it is certain that the Greeks of the islands
formed the core of the opposition to Turkish rule; to them rather
than to the Greeks of the mainland is it due that the struggle for
independence held out successfully during the critical early years.

On land the situation proved most unfavorable for the Greeks.
For centuries, one may even say since the fourth century, B.C., the
Greek center of gravity lay, not in Hellas itself, but in Asia Minor.
It was essentially as a seafaring and commercial people that the
Greeks rose to power. After Athens lost her hegemony, the Greek
centers of wealth and often of intellectual activity were the great
commercial settlements which had arisen all around the shores of
the Mediterranean. Under Turkish rule, this situation had remained
unchanged. In fact, when Greek trade began to revive under Turk-
ish protection, after the destruction of Italian commerce at the
close of the Middle Ages, it was almost exclusively the "Levantines"
who enjoyed it. The rich and cultured Greek was no longer to be
found in what had been ancient Hellas, but in places like Smyrna,
Constantinople, Chios, and Samos; Hellas itself was largely occupied
by half-civilized and semi-independent bands known as Brigands,
Klephts, and Palikars.

To secure the independence of their country, the Greeks began
to form societies (Hetairiai). They hoped to receive substantial aid
from Christian peoples in spite of conservative rulers. For public
opinion was everywhere undoubtedly on the side of the Greeks,
both because of the enthusiasm for ancient Greek civilization and
because of the sentiment of the solidarity of Christendom; in fact,
many of the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna did not conceal
their personal sympathy for the Greek cause.

Among the European Powers, Russia particularly was regarded
as the natural ally of Greece. There were reasons for thinking that
Russia would lend official connivance and at least give as much
surreptitious support as the English had given to the Spanish Ameri-
cans in their wars of independence. And at first it seemed that this
would be the case. The Russian Black Sea port of Odessa was to
be the base for the Hetairia. This secret society for the liberation of
Greece was founded in October, 1815, by three Phanariots (Greeks

THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 39

of the rich "lighthouse" or Phanariot quarter in Constantinople).
Its leader was one of the Tsar's adjutants, a Greek aristocrat named
Alexander Ypsilanti. After their plans had ripened for six years,
so that the friends of freedom were ready for revolt, they planned
to make a combined attack on Turkey from the North and from
the South. Ypsilanti himself took command of the force which was
to march from the North through Moldavia (the northern part of
modern Rumania). On March 6, 1821, he crossed the Pruth and
occupied Bucharest.

Ypsilanti's undertaking, however, rested on two vain hopes. He
had counted on getting the Tsar's approval for what he had done.
But Alexander I, no matter how much he might personally sympa-
thize with the movement, declared himself opposed to secret con-
spirators, partly because of his regard for the solidarity of conserva-
tism and partly because of warnings from Austria. Ypsilanti's
second disappointment came from the Rumanians. He had sum-
moned this Christian population to rise against the Sultan, thinking
that religious motives would outweigh national feelings. He soon
learned, like so many others later, that this was a mistake. The
Rumanians had no intention of placing themselves under a Greek
leader. Serious quarrels soon broke out between Ypsilanti and the
Rumanian magnates. Under these circumstances the weak Greek
force was left without reinforcements, and was easily destroyed by
the Turks in June, 1821. Ypsilanti had to flee to Hungary where
he was arrested by the Austrians.

Much greater was the success of the attack from the South, which,
to be sure, had the support of the island Greeks. When Demetrius
Ypsilanti, Alexander's brother, landed in the Morea, as the ancient
Peloponnesus was now called, he was joined by the Palikars and
sailor folk of the neighboring islands. The whole Morea was quickly
cleared of the Turks, and a pitiless war was waged on Turkish ves-
sels in the Archipelago. The Sultan replied by one of those massacres
so often let loose afterwards upon his Christian subjects. In the
Phanariot quarter at Constantinople, as well as in other parts of
European Turkey, countless Greeks of note (particularly the ecclesi-
astics who were regarded as the leaders of the Greek nation) were
assassinated. Therefore, on January i, 1822, the Greeks declared
their independence and organized a regular government. This only
encouraged the Turks to further massacres. Particularly infamous
was their general slaughter of the whole population of the island of
Chios in 1822. In retaliation the Greeks drove all Turkish vessels
from the JEgean,

40 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

These massacres were a mistake on Turkey's part; for they almost
led to intervention by Russia. But again the conservative solidarity
of the Great Powers triumphed under Metternich's leadership. The
Tsar finally contented himself merely with breaking off diplomatic
relations with Turkey.

In the midst of their difficulties England came to the assistance
of the insurgents. Canning, the same minister who had stepped in
to help the cause of independence in South America, was now the
first representative of a Great Power to recognize the Greeks as
belligerents. Two reasons led him to do this. One was the strong
pressure of Philhellenism in England which was hard for the younger
generation to withstand. The other was the conviction that if the
Greeks received only Russian support, their emancipation from Tur-
key would not result in an independent Greek state, but simply in
an extension of the Russian territory. For Tsar Alexander had
made no concealment of the fact that he expected autonomous
Greece to be a Russian protectorate. An increase of Russia's power
in the Balkans was the last thing England wanted to see.

What this attitude of the greatest sea power of the time meant
was soon seen. As emphasized above, the Greeks had been able to
maintain themselves at first, since they were unconquerable at sea.
They were now in danger of losing this advantage. Upon Austria's
advice, the Sultan turned to his half-independent subject, Mehemet
Ali, the ruler of Egypt. He possessed what his suzerain in Constan-
tinople lacked — a fleet. It was not large, but it would suffice at
least for the transportation of troops to the Morea. In February,
1825, a strong Egyptian army under the command of Mehemet Ali's
adopted son, Ibrahim Pasha, landed in the south-west corner of the
Morea. The Greeks had nothing to match it. In vain they fought
most heroically; in vain they defended themselves for fifteen months
on the northern shore of the Gulf of Patras at Missolonghi, where
they had been joined by Lord Byron. In the summer of 1827 the
whole Greek mainland again had to submit to the Turks.

In spite of England's attitude, the situation would have been
desperate for the Greeks had not a change come in Russia. On
December i, 1825, a new Tsar and with him a new policy appeared
on the scene. Nicholas I was as autocratic as his elder brother,
Alexander I, indeed, even more so; but he was at the same time a
representative of the younger generation — he was born in 1796,
Alexander in 1777 — and so had not been brought up in circles which
felt such a panicky fear of all revolutionary movements. Some-
what like Canning, he pursued a national Russian, rather than a

THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 41

conservative Austrian, policy. After extorting from Turkey by the
Treaty of Akkerman (1826) the almost complete independence of
Serbia and a share of the suzerainty over Rumania, he decided next
year to intervene on behalf of Greece. He communicated with Eng-
land, and both Powers then demanded from the Sultan autonomy for
Greece.

Turkey, on the other hand, again appealed to arguments of the
Conservative Alliance. But her warning that the Great Powers were
undermining the principles of the Holy Alliance and legitimacy by
supporting the Greek insurgents, no longer had the same force as
a decade earlier. The protectors of Greece, on the contrary, suc-
ceeded in extending their alliance so as to include France. By the
Triple Alliance of July 6, 1827, England, Russia and France
pledged themselves to secure the independence of Greece.

At first the Turks would not yield. But the superior force of
the London coalition soon decided the conflict against them. The
Allies demanded of Ibrahim Pasha a promise to cease hostilities in
the Morea. Then, by accident, a naval engagement developed be-
tween the combined Anglo- Franco-Russian fleet and the Egyptian
ships at Navarino on the west coast of the Morea; and on October
20, 1827, the Egyptian fleet was totally destroyed.

This blow robbed Turkey of the only navy which she had left,
and yet provoked the Sultan to a declaration of war against the
Great Powers. As there were now no more naval engagements, only
French and Russian troops came into action; the French operated
in the Morea; the Russians advanced from the North through the
Balkans and on the East toward the Caucasus. As the reorganiza-
tion of the Turkish army, which was to bring it up toward a Euro-
pean standard, had only just begun, the Allies had an easy time,
except for some delays at sieges. The French conquered the whole
Morea and also compelled Ibrahim Pasha to evacuate the islands.
One Russian army pressed forward past Erzerum to the neighbor-
hood of Trebizond, while the other, for the first time in history,
crossed the Balkan Mountains and on August 14, 1829, entered
Adrianople without drawing a sword. The Sultan could do nothing
but make peace.

As the war had been won as much by the Great Powers as by the
Greeks themselves, the direct gains of the latter were not very
striking. Greece did not receive the islands on the coast of Asia
Minor, nor Crete, nor even the Greek territory in Thessaly, Epirus,
and the Ionian Islands. This was all the more grievous inasmuch
as the new state was deprived of the financial support of the wealth-

42 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

iest members of the Greek race at the very moment when it had
to pay the interest on the heavy debt which the war had imposed.
Considering the exceedingly difficult position in which the new and
incompletely established state was deliberately placed by the Great
Powers from its birth, one must regard as unjustified many of the
depreciatory judgments passed on it by the public opinion of Europe.
Rather will one be astonished at the progress which the restricted
country made in spite of the unfavorable circumstances of its birth.
Any comparison with the Greece of antiquity is wholly beside the
point. For what would the culture of classical Greece have been
without the Asiatic Greeks? And were not the true intellectual
descendants of the Athenian artizans and sailors to be found in
Constantinople and Smyrna rather than on the European mainland,
which in the early nineteenth century was largely inhabited by robber
bands? In addition to all this, the rivalry of the Great Powers
by no means left to the new state, to which they could not refuse
independence, an undisturbed development. The general Anglo-
Russian antagonism resulting from rivalry for influence in Greece
often sharpened Greek domestic political strife; while Greece en-
joyed no international authority by herself, it was of little advan-
tage to her that the Great Powers prevented jealous factions from
struggling for possession of the kingship by setting up in 1832 as
their monarch a foreigner — Prince Otto of Bavaria.

Nevertheless, regarded from the point of view of world history,
this elevation of Greece to independence (however little real inde-
pendence there was about it) was perhaps the most successful pro-
vision of the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. All the Christian terri-
tories which hitherto had been snatched from Turkey had either
been directly annexed by the victorious Great Powers, or constituted
merely as protected states. Even in the Treaty of Adrianople this
was what Russia did with her conquests; various districts south of
the Caucasus Mountains were incorporated into Russia; Serbia,
Wallachia and Moldavia were only given autonomy. In Greece, for
the first time, a new path was opened. A people freed from Turkish
rule was recognized as an independent state. Here was an example,
as may easily be understood, which fired all the other Balkan peoples
with the ambition to make complete independence the final goal of
their efforts. One may say: henceforth the small Balkan nations
shared with the Great Powers in the struggle for Constantinople.

The course of the War of Greek Independence gave rise to a cir-
cumstance which more than any other greatly prolonged this strug-
gle. A historian ought never to say that a thing is possible which

THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE 43

has never occurred, nor to posit the motives which have led to an
action. But he may venture the assertion that the Russians in 1829
would probably have had little military difficulty in taking posses-
sion of Constantinople. The Turkish army had proved itself so
little able to resist the Russians that it presumably could not have
withstood the last decisive blow. Now it appears that the Russian
government counted on Turkey's military weakness remaining per-
manent, and therefore regarded the establishment of a virtual pro-
tectorate over the Balkans as more desirable than an occupation of
the Turkish capital, since this would naturally have led to serious
diplomatic complications. Therefore, she stipulated for herself in
the Treaty of Adrianople the right of free navigation of the Black
Sea and passage through the Dardanelles, but abstained from de-
manding military guarantees. Count Nesselrode, who at that time
guided Russian foreign policy, declared that such an arrangement
better suited Russian interests than excessive conquests or the cre-
ation of independent states out of former Turkish territory.

If Russian ministers really thought this, they were certainly fun-
damentally mistaken. Already, in 1826, the Turkish Government
had begun systematically to reform its antiquated army. The Jani-
zary Corps, which had formerly won such great victories simply
because it was the only standing army, but which had long since
become out of date and undisciplined, was abolished (i.e., massacred).
From the two military powers who had steadily sided with Turkey
during the Greek War — Austria and Prussia — the Turkish author-
ities imported experts to train a new Turkish infantry. And this
reform did not simply remain on paper like pretty nearly every
other effort to modernize Turkey. After a few years the Ottoman
Government possessed an army which could cope with the well-
drilled and well-equipped armies of Europe. Thus the Greek War
of Independence started "the Balkan Question," and at the same
time considerably strengthened the Power which naturally would offer
the most determined resistance to the emancipation of the peoples
of the Balkans.

CHAPTER X
THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY

IN contrast to these two movements where the Principle of Conserva-
tism failed to prevail, stand two other movements in which the
Alliance of the Great Powers did succeed in enforcing their legit-
imist demands. It is certainly more than a mere accident that in
both these cases only military operations on land had to be em-
ployed against the offending states; no negative interference by
British sea power, therefore, took place.

The first of these interventions was directed against the liberal
movement in Italy.

In scarcely any other country at that time were conditions so
complex as in Italy, where the conflict between the existing situa-
tion and the Principles of the Revolution cannot be reduced to a
simple formula. The contradictory and often overlapping tendencies
must, therefore, be explained somewhat more in detail.

Nowhere outside France had the French revolutionary principles
of equality (see ch. iv) been so completely put into effect as in
the Italian states. Even before the Revolution in France, various
Italian governments had initiated social and political reforms ad-
vocated by Enlightenment, and, even where this had not been the
case, the French armies of occupation under Napoleon had assisted
the triumph of French laws. The Code Napoleon had been intro-
duced, the ecclesiastical foundations suppressed, and a modern sys-
tem of taxation put into effect with equal rights for all classes. In
1815, even in cases where there was a decisive wish to restore the
old feudal conditions, the financial changes had been too thorough-
going for their complete restoration. Moreover, it was not in the
interest of the monarchical governments to revive the old exemptions
from taxation and the other special prerogatives of noble families.
The only exception was the States of the Church whose ecclesiastical
government naturally involved preferential treatment of clergy; but
even here the economic basis of the Old Regime could not be com-
pletely restored.

In Italy, therefore, the struggle against existing conditions was
not directed, except in certain cases, against class privileges. The

THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY 45

aim of the revolutionists was rather to put an end to oppression in
the intellectual field which the Restoration of 1815 had established.

Certainly nowhere else was the contrast between the existing con-
ditions and those of the French occupation, or even of the preceding
period, so great as in Italy, in all matters connected with the
Church and theology. There were countries in which the belief
that political absolutism was bound up with the suppression of re-
ligious enlightenment (see ch. v) was as deeply rooted as in Italy;
but nowhere were governments so strongly influenced in their actions
by this belief as in the case of the great majority of the Italian
states and provinces of that time. Possibly, just because "enlight-
ened ideas" had spread so widely among the upper classes, the
political authorities were especially concerned to see to it that revo-
lutionary religious views were not made an opening wedge for liberal
agitation in the field of politics. This was also the only field in
which one can speak of a regular restoration — a restoration of
seventeenth rather than of eighteenth century conditions. Although
the reintroduction of primogeniture was scarcely considered, many
of the governments undertook a restoration of the monasteries, with-
out, however, being able to give them back their former rich pos-
sessions. Almost everywhere education was put under the control
of the clergy. The censorship of books was reintroduced. In Rome
even the Inquisition was set up again. Every independent intel-
lectual movement was regarded with distrust.

The opposition which arose to this regime, particularly in a part
of the city bourgeoisie, now connected itself in a peculiar way with
national and to some extent anti-papal tendencies.

The connection between the principles of liberty and nationality is
easy enough to understand. The only period in which Italy had nomi-
nally, at least, formed a single united national state (the Napoleonic
period) had been, at the same time, a period of religious freedom and
government by laymen instead of clergy ; even if Italians disregarded
this fact, they would have seen in the conditions after 1815 that there
existed a close inner connection between the two principles. For
the foreign state, which now controlled directly or indirectly the
Italian princes, and which alone afforded them the power to carry
through the principles of ecclesiastical restoration, was at the same
time the state which was most obstinately opposed to the idea of
Italian nationality. Austria, because of her own internal political
interests, was compelled more, than any other Great Power to fight
against the movement for political revolution. Austria, likewise, un-
less she wished to lose her Italian provinces (the "Lombardo-

46 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

Venetian Kingdom"), must set herself decisively against the Italian
national movement. Italians, therefore, who wanted to do away
with "priest rule" naturally also had to insist on the expulsion of
the Austrians and of the governments which were dependent on
Austria.

Still more complicated were the conditions in another connection.
What should be the attitude of the Italian national movement to-
ward the ruler of the Papal States? The Papacy, in its organiza-
tion at that time, was indeed the "enemy of all progress," — the
natural opponent of all efforts which aimed at modern government
by laymen instead of by priests, and, if possible, at constitutional
forms. But must this be always the case? Was it not conceivable
that a pope with modern views, who regarded himself as much an
Italian as an ecclesiastical ruler, might make concessions to the
political and social principles of the revolution so far as they did
not threaten theological dogma? And if this should happen, would
it not be a much better solution than a Utopian effort to bring
about Italian unity in opposition to the pope? Would not an
undertaking which was bound to meet with the opposition of all
faithful Catholics rest on an insecure basis, and necessarily involve
consequences of a serious moral nature?

It was quite natural that Italian patriots gave different answers
to these questions. Many of them, especially those whose feelings
were not satisfied with the ordinary program of Enlightenment,
inclined to admit the possibility of reforming the States of the
Church. This was all the more natural, inasmuch as this idea could
not be contradicted by the facts of experience. Such an attempt
had never been made; never had a pope ascended the throne of
St. Peter who could be regarded as holding modern ideas.

But although the problem did not present itself at that time so
sharply as half a century later, nevertheless it already existed, and
the historian can say of that period that a resolute champion of
intellectual freedom in Italy should not have hesitated to oppose
also the Temporal Power of the Papacy.

At any rate, all the currents of the Italian movement for liberty
concentrated in an attack on the Church and its privileges. Abso-
lutism itself was objectionable, primarily because it was inclined to
support or to protect the claims of the Church. This attitude of
the liberals was also strengthened by the fact that modern industry
had as yet found scarcely any entrance into Italy; even the great
factories which did exist were, for the most part, in the hands of
foreigners. Although the absolutistic governments were so patri-

THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY 47

archal and unsatisfactory, they nevertheless did not stand in sharp
contradiction with economic life, and they did not have to protect
themselves against a rich and powerful bourgeoisie.

This statement is true chiefly for the first decades after 1815.
The insurrections which took place at that time were due more to
the anxieties of the moment than to the assertion of principles.
The first revolutions are particularly interesting because they show
how insecure was the rule of native princes who could find support
neither from their nobility nor from their troops; and also because
it shows how a change in the situation could only be brought about
through a combined attack on the power of Austria.

Before further details are given, it may be recalled to memory
that the territories which made up the geographical expression of
Italy at that time fell into three groups. The first comprised the
provinces of Milan and Venetia, the so-called "Lombardo- Venetian
Kingdom," which was immediately under Austrian rule. The second
group was made up of the middle-sized and smaller states which
were ruled by relatives of the Austrian Emperor (Tuscany, Parma,
Modena) ; to these also must be added diminutive Lucca, ruled by
a Bourbon prince but united with Tuscany in 1847. Finally there
were the three relatively independent middle-sized states — Sardinia
(Piedmont, Savoy, and the Island of Sardinia), the States of the
Church, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Naples and Sicily).
Not only was Italy split up, but there was no single power in
the whole peninsula which could in any way stand up as a military
power against Austria; the Kingdom of Sardinia, which possessed
the strongest army, had purposely been given unfavorable frontiers
so that it could not undertake any successful attack upon the ter-
ritory of Milan.

It has been pointed out that in 1815 there did not exist anywhere
in Italy a powerful opposition party. The liberal bourgeoisie, to
be sure, rather disapproved the friendliness of the governments
toward the Church; but their opposition was not important. Much
more dangerous for the moment were the army officers. The period
of peace which followed the Napoleonic wars had naturally deprived
the growing numbers of this class of opportunities to advance; in
many states, also, preference had been given to officers of noble
birth, while those who had served under the Napoleonic princes had
been dismissed or neglected. The officers of the Napoleonic army
therefore leagued themselves with the liberal bourgeoisie. Since
there was neither parliamentary life nor freedom of the press their
joint efforts could take no other form than that of secret societies.

48 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

The most important of these was the "Carbonari" a society which
took its name from the "charcoal burners" of Calabria and spread
from Naples to the other Italian states. Since they had no legal
means of changing the absolutistic form of government, these so-
cieties naturally resorted to revolutionary weapons.

The first impulse to revolt came from events in Spain, of which
a more detailed account will be given in the next chapter. The suc-
cess of the Spanish generals who took to politics fired the zeal of
their Italian colleagues, particularly in the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies, which was closely connected with Spain. Scarcely had the
revolution in Spain triumphed with a single victory when the Nea-
politan army rose, demanding a constitution — in fact the very same
Spanish Constitution of 1812 which had just been put into force in
Spain. The king was powerless before the insurrection. The Spanish
Constitution was introduced (July 7, 1820), and sworn to by the
Neapolitan monarch. The Carbonari took the government in hand.
Even the Island of Sicily dared offer no resistance, although it
feared that the centralizing plans of the political reformers would
put an end to its own special privileges.

But these revolutionary successes stood in too strong contradic-
tion to the Conservative Principles of the Allied Powers for the new
regime in Naples to be permanent. The Congress of Troppau, one
of the international assemblages which was to fix the common policy
of the Allies, discussed the question whether it was not their duty
to restore order by military intervention. But in this case, also, the
Great Powers were not united. England on this occasion also was
opposed to interference; Russia and France proposed a middle
course. But the conditions in this Neapolitan case were much less
favorable for the revolutionists than those which have already been
described in the case of South America and Greece. The Power
which had the greatest selfish interest in upholding Conservative
Principles was also the Power which was most keenly interested in
defending the old conditions in Italy; it was also the Power which
was best situated to make a military intervention. The Austrian
government succeeded in calling attention to the fact that the
Spanish Constitution introduced in Naples contained ultra-liberal
principles which went even beyond the French constitution of that
day; and so Austria persuaded the two Western Powers (Great
Britain and France) to consent at least to action on her part. She
had a still greater success from the fact that the Tsar finally gave his
direct approval to the principle of intervention. It was at this time
that the three Eastern Powers (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) sub-

THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY 49

scribed a declaration which contemplated the application of force
against states which were guilty of illegal reforms. As a preliminary
step, the king of Naples and the other Italian princes as well, were
invited to present themselves at the Congress of the Great Powers
(which had removed to Laibach).

King Ferdinand of Naples accordingly came to Laibach and begged
the Congress to restore the Old Regime. His request was granted.
Austria received the mandate to carry out its execution, the decree
being signed by the ambassadors of the other Italian Powers with
the exception of the Pope.

This sealed the fate of the Neapolitan revolution. The revolu-
tionary troops offered practically no resistance to the fifty thousand
Austrian soldiers, and within a short time the whole kingdom was
occupied by Austrians (March 21, 1821). There followed not only
the abolition of the revolutionary constitution and the complete res-
toration of absolutism, but a systematic persecution of all the par-
ticipants in the revolt, as well as of the Carbonari in general ; count-
less persons were condemned to death, to the galleys, or to banish-
ment. The king created a new army; and in order that he might
not again be dependent on the favor of his officers, he signed in
1826 a military agreement with the Swiss for thirty years, taking
four Swiss regiments into his service.

Not very different was the outcome of the military revolt in
Piedmont.

In the Kingdom of Sardinia the government had proceeded more
energetically than anywhere else in Italy with the Restoration, or
to speak more correctly, with the reversal of the laicizing reforms
which had taken place during the period of French occupation. The
government did not hesitate at the most unreasonable acts: the
Botanical Garden in Turin was destroyed because it had been planted
by the French; the use of beautiful avenues was forbidden because
they had been constructed at Napoleon's command; and there were
many other measures of the same kind. In the army the older pre-
Napoleonic tactics were reintroduced ; officers who had served under
Napoleon were dismissed; and, in general, in appointments prefer-
ence was again given to persons of noble birth.

In one point, however, the opposition of the army officers in
Piedmont differed at the outset from that in Naples. In the rela-
tively large and richly endowed Kingdom of the Two Sicilies the
officers had contemplated at first only a reform of their own part of
Italy; but in the small and less fruitful Sardinian Kingdom, where
the nobility mostly lived in needy circumstances, the revolutionists

50 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

had from the outset looked forward to the extension of the rule of
Savoy over the whole of Italy. Their aspirations could be fulfilled
only if Savoyard officers and politicians had a greater field of ac-
tivity than was afforded to them by their own poor country. There
was also the further consideration that the Sardinian dynasty was
the only one of pure Italian descent and was therefore best fitted
to stand at the head of a national Italian state.

When; therefore, in the year 1821 (almost a year later than the
Neapolitan revolt), a military insurrection broke out at Alessandria
in the Kingdom of Sardinia, the rebels not only proclaimed the
Spanish Constitution like their brothers in the south, but they also
adopted the Italian colors (green, white and red), and proclaimed
the restoration of an Italian kingdom which should embrace the
whole nation. King and country should be freed from the Austrians,
and comrades in Naples protected from oppression.

The revolution in Piedmont, which had many adherents among
the students, was also successful at first, so far as Piedmont was
concerned. The king, Victor Emmanuel I, abdicated, appointed as
his successor his brother, Charles Felix, who was living at Modena,
and transferred the regency temporarily to a liberal-minded rela-
tive, the Prince of Carignano. But here, also, the Conservative
Alliance of the Great Powers interfered. The new king himself,
who was in no personal danger, called for help. His call did not
fall on deaf ears. Both Austria and Russia at once declared in
favor of military intervention. This sealed the fate of the revolu-
tion. The army of liberals which had attempted to strike eastward
was easily crushed by the Austrians at Novara, and there followed,
as in the case of Naples, a restoration with a systematic persecu-
tion of those guilty of revolt. In only one point did Austria fail
to secure her demands. France refused to have the guilty Prince
of Carignano, the presumptive heir to the throne after the childless
king, Charles Felix, excluded from his rights of succession, because
otherwise the Hapsburg Duke of Modena (a son-in-law of King
Victor Emmanuel I) would have become King of Sardinia; that is,
Piedmont also would have been subjected to Austrian authority.
However, Metternich knew how to bring it about that the guilty
prince was compelled to take part in the French expedition to Spain
(see the following chapter) in order to atone for his liberal princi-
ples; he was also forced to promise that he would never grant
his people a constitution.

In the parts of Italy directly dependent on Austria the isolated
revolutionary movements had no success at all, as in the case of the

THE CONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE AND ITALY 51

conspiracy of several young liberals in Milan in 1820 — famous be-
cause one of the prisoners, the young Piedmontese, Silvio Pellico,
described his sufferings in an Austrian fortress, the Spielberg, at
Briinn, in a book which breathed the noblest spirit of gentleness and
which soon became extraordinarily popular. In Modena a number
of notable people were arrested who had entered into relations with
the Neapolitan revolutionists.

In Italy the Conservative Alliance had triumphed completely in
its policy of intervention. On the other hand, it had become clear
to every one that a liberal reform in Italy could be accomplished
only by the expulsion of the Austrians and the princes dependent
on them.

CHAPTER XI
THE CONSERVATIVE INTERVENTION IN SPAIN

IN Italy, as has been pointed out, some of the principles of the
French Revolution had already been put into practice in the course
of the eighteenth century, and others had been introduced during
the period of French occupation, and could not be completely nulli-
fied. So the Restoration in Italy resulted less in a change in eco-
nomic conditions than in a revival of the power of the clergy, which
limited intellectual freedom on every hand. In Italy the Revolu-
tionary movement was primarily anti-clerical and nationalistic.
Quite different were the conditions in Spain.

In Spain French rule had lasted too short a time to introduce
legal equality, the secularization of church lands, and other reforms,
to the same extent as in Italy. Furthermore, less had been done
by the Old Regime in Spain than in the case of Italy to prepare
the way for change.

Even in Spain, however, the Enlightened Despotism of the
eighteenth century had made some attempts to improve the worst
conditions, that is, those which were most harmful from an eco-
nomic point of view. The system of primogeniture had been some-
what limited (primogeniture in Spain had previously been extended
to large classes which elsewhere in Europe would have been regarded
as belonging to the bourgeoisie ; it had also been considerably favored
by the contempt in which all manual labor was held — one of the
results of the period when Jews and Moors did all the manual work).
But the result of this eighteenth century reform had been very
slight. To be sure, many of the larger landed estates which had
been kept together by primogeniture had disappeared, and the very
large ones had been somewhat reduced in size; but in Andalusia,
the rich southern part of Spain and the source of Spanish wealth,
large landed estates still prevailed everywhere. The land-owners
were, practically without exception, absentee landlords. They had
their estates worked by poorly paid day laborers and were unable
to raise the capital necessary to improve the soil and the methods
pf cultivation, Good means of communication, especially canals

THE CONSERVATIVE INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 53

which are an absolute necessity where there are few good rivers,
technical education, model factories, — all these were lacking. In
addition to all this the government, following ancient Castilian tra-
dition, favored cattle-raising at the expense of agriculture, so that
the cultivation of the soil was faced with extraordinary difficulties.
The industries were altogether insignificant.

All these obstacles to the development of the natural resources
of the country became the more oppressive as the population grew.
In the second half of the eighteenth century the population appears
to have increased rapidly and the means of livelihood (such as
serving as mercenary soldiers or settling in America) were no longer
considerable. The revolt of the American colonies (see ch. viii)
brought the first decisive blow to the Old Regime. That destroyed
the very foundation of the government revenues. It struck the
government at the moment when it had to provide for extraordinary
expenditures. The revenues of the old system would indeed scarcely
have sufficed for the war against Napoleon ; and now the main source
of revenue, which had come from the possession of the American
colonies, was drying up. It is no wonder that the Spanish govern-
ment, in spite of its dislike of French institutions, seriously began
to ponder whether it should not lay taxes on the nobility and clergy.

But here a special difficulty arose from the attitude of the popu-
lation in the matter of religion.

Legal equality, or to put it more accurately, the abolition of
exemption from taxation, could not be carried through without dis-
turbing the privileges of the clergy. It was impossible to reform
the finances of the state unless the clergy gave up a part of their
possessions. For the enlightened politicians of the French Revolu-
tion this consideration had been no obstacle; but, while even in
France the secularization of church property had not been exactly
popular, in Spain any government which attacked the rights of the
Church would at least have to reckon on the passive resistance of
the population from the very outset. To put it differently: no reform
of the Spanish government could take place except in opposition to
the will of the mass of the people, particularly of the ignorant popu-
lation in the country. Persons who would help toward modernizing
conditions — the representatives of the city bourgeoisie and intellec-
tual classes — formed only a numerically small fraction of the people.
This unfortunate situation was offset only by the fact that the great
mass of those who had conservative ideas were neither organized
politically nor even, under normal conditions, interested in politics
at all. They let their opponents do as they wished, or at least could

54 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

not overthrow them unless aided by extraordinary circumstances.
So the battle was always fought out between merely small groups;
and the governing group at elections always won a majority.

Only in one respect did conditions in Spain resemble those in Italy.
The Napoleonic Wars had created a large body of officers who were
regarded with an unfriendly eye by the government, and who there-
fore joined the malcontents among the liberal civilians. This opposition
became chronic, because the government lacked the money adequately
to pay the troops. The kingdom was therefore constantly placed
before a dilemma : either the government followed its natural inclina-
tion and clung as tightly as possible to the Old Regime, in which
case it lacked money to meet the claims of the insurgent officers;
or, on the other hand, it sought to raise new revenues, in which case
it was forced to interfere with traditional arrangements. The result
was what might have been expected: one compromise followed
another; wide-reaching reforms were decreed which were nullified
by rebellion, or only partially enforced; there were ineffective hesi-
tating attempts at modernization instead of a real radical change.

One other point must be explained to show the difference between
Spain and the other countries. The national movement, which else-
where, as in Italy for instance, was closely connected with liberalism,
was in Spain generally favorable to conservative principles. Aside
from the fact that the dominant position of the Church seemed to
the Spaniard a national Spanish characteristic, which had been un-
justly abandoned by "Frenchifiers" in favor of modern "foreign"
institutions, the Old Regime seemed to represent national unity and
absolutistic centralization. Regionalism, that is, the possibility that
separate regions or provinces might introduce revolutionary reforms
which the central government could not approve, became therefore
in Spain a demand made by the Liberals rather than by their
"servile" opponents.

Spanish intellectuals had taken advantage of the absence of the
king and the anarchy of the Napoleonic Wars to put into effect an
ultra-liberal constitution — the Constitution of 1812, which had been
accepted by the Cortes at Cadiz. But this Constitution, which
abolished feudalism and the Inquisition, had been set aside at once
by the king, Ferdinand VII, after he returned from the exile in which
Napoleon had kept him. Even the Inquisition was reintroduced,
and liberal patriots were persecuted in the severest fashion. The
nobility, the clergy, and the masses of the people, however, remained
loyal to absolutism; but the soldiery and the officers who had once

THE CONSERVATIVE INTERVENTION IN SPAIN 55

supported the king against the French now began to go over to
the opposition.

The first of the insurrections which showed this union between
officers and liberals took place in 1820. The troops were assembled
in Cadiz for embarkation to America to suppress the revolting
colonies. But the soldiers were badly paid and discontented. A
young officer, named Riego, stirred them up to revolt, and at the
same time proclaimed the Constitution of 1812. This was the first
of the so-called "pronunciamentos" (a Spanish word which may be
translated by "proclamations"). It was the first time that revolting
officers had aimed not merely at satisfying personal claims, but at
bringing about a general political revolution.

The insurrection at once found a following in the two groups
which we have indicated as supporters of the reform movement in
Spain: the army and the intellectuals of several of the larger pro-
vincial towns, particularly in Aragon and Galicia; Corunna, Ferrol,
Saragossa, and Barcelona declared in favor of the Constitution, and
the troops which had been sent by the government against Riego
went over to the side of the insurgents. The king was as helpless
as his brother monarchs in Naples and Turin shortly afterwards.
He therefore yielded everything which was asked of him, declared
himself ready to accept the Constitution, and summoned the Cortes
(March 7, 1820). The Inquisition was abolished and the pro-
French liberals called back from exile.

The Conservative Alliance of the Great Powers was at first unable
to intervene. The Austrians first had to suppress the revolution in
Italy. There were also practical difficulties in the way of direct
military intervention in Spain. Yet the danger was great. Under
the pressure of Spanish example, Portugal also had introduced a
liberal constitution. The Spanish king sent a pressing call for help
to the Alliance and all his clergy rose up against the liberal innova-
tions. In Catalonia an "Apostolic Army" was formed, which ap-
pealed to the people to free the king from the hands of rebellious
unbelievers.

At this moment the Allies succeeded in winning the cooperation
of the French government, though not exactly of France herself; for
France herself had nothing to win through intervention in Spain,
and the majority of the French people were decidedly opposed to
supporting the Spanish priesthood. But the Bourbon dynasty was
allured by two advantages which might come from intervening in
Spain: it might rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the Conservative

56 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

Great Powers, who still distrusted France as the mother of revolu-
tions; and it might increase its military prestige, because if its inter-
vention was successful, it could point out that it had succeeded
where Napoleon had failed.

Accordingly, the French government proposed to the Conservative
Great Powers, at the Congress of Verona in October, 1822, that a
French expedition should be sent to Spain to overthrow the revo-
lutionary government there. The Congress naturally accepted the
proposal with alacrity.

The expedition was scarcely more than a military promenade.
Whereas Napoleon had had to fight against the fanaticism of the
masses and also against many liberal patriots, now the "Apostolic
Army" and a great part of the population stood on the side of the
French. The revolutionary government, which had been unable to
reform the political system during its brief period of control, and
which had at its disposal neither money nor troops, was unable to
organize any defense; without striking a blow, it left the capital in
company with the king and fled to Cadiz. Here occurred the only
real military event of the campaign. The revolutionists tried to
make a stand behind the fortifications of the city; but after a siege
of three months, when Fort Trocadero, which overlooked Cadiz, had
been taken by the French (August 31, 1823), there was no alterna-
tive but capitulation. The Old Regime was again restored.

There followed a bloody persecution of the insurgents just as in
Italy, only in a still more brutal fashion. Riego was hanged, and
many hundred others were beheaded or tortured.

The Holy Alliance had triumphed. But even in Spain the old
system could not be completely revived; the Inquisition, for instance,
was not restored (although "committees of faith" took its place).
Moreover, as has been already noted, the American colonies were
definitely lost during the unrest of these last years. This deprived
Spain of the means, not only of taking her place as a Great Power,
but also of carrying out effective economic reforms after the fashion
of the Enlightened Despots.

CHAPTER XH

THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM
IN FRANCE

NOWHERE is the expression "Restoration" so misleading as in the
case of France. Nowhere else was there so slight a revival of the
old system. It is no exaggeration to say that, with the exception of
the dynasty and some unimportant regulations, nothing was rein-
troduced which specially belonged to the Old Regime. To such an
extent was this the case that most of the conflicts during the Res-
toration period in France arose from the very fact that certain groups
wanted to impose on new France various institutions derived from
the old monarchy.

The innovations which distinguished the political and social struc-
ture of France in 1815 from France prior to 1789 fall into two groups.

The more important group comprises the changes which were the
result of the real Revolution. This includes, above all, the intro-
duction of equality in the division of inheritances, with a rigorous
insistence on the lawful portion which must be left to each heir ; the
abolition of primogeniture and of the large landed estates which went
with it; the secularization of the great Church property (there were
no longer any rich prelates; the Church was "democratized" finan-
cially and socially) ; and civil equality, that is, the abolition of
exemption from taxation and the setting aside of all the privileges
which had restricted to members of definite classes all admission to
the higher offices in the army and the government.

The second group of innovations dates chiefly from the time of
Napoleon. At the time of the Consulate there had been introduced
a strictly centralized system of administration which was in part
simply a continuation of the methods of the Old Regime; this cen-
tralization left scarcely any local self-government in existence and
gave to the possessor of supreme power an enormous influence in all
the details of local administration.

Both groups of innovations were taken over by the restored
Bourbon dynasty completely, the second group, in fact, with secret
approval. The significance of these arrangements will be evident

58 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

only if they are considered in connection with the social structure
of the France of that day.

The secularization of Church lands and the sale of the posses-
sions of the emigres had brought a considerable part of the former
large landed estates into the hands of free peasants, and thus greatly
favored the intensive cultivation of the soil. Now, for the first time,
the productivity of the land could be completely exploited. Although
Napoleon had stimulated the manufacture of articles of luxury and
export, still, manufacturing on a large scale had remained relatively
slight and could not be at all compared with the English factory
system. Tillage, viticulture, horticulture, the raising of olives and
sugar, — in fact agriculture was everywhere the rule, both on the
small farms and on the great estates. Growers of grain could count
on a minimum price for their products, thanks to an official sliding-
scale, which increased the tax on imported cereals when grain at
home was cheap; grain-growing, therefore, like manufacturing, in
addition to natural advantages, enjoyed the protection of the state.

The difference between France and England is seen particularly
in the fact that France still considerably surpassed her neighbor
beyond the Channel in the matter of population. In 1815, France
had about 28 million inhabitants, Great Britain about 18 million.
The United Kingdom was, therefore, not much more densely popu-
lated than France, but since many parts of Great Britain did not
enjoy the same richness and variety of products as France, and since
there was no opportunity for the development of a large body of
small peasant proprietors, the English economic system tended to-
ward manufacturing and the French toward an increase of the
peasantry. In fact, if contemporary evidence is not mistaken, owing
to the fact that the available land was still not completely exploited,
the French peasants were leaving a larger number of descendants
than in the last years of the Old Regime.

These conditions were largely reflected in the constitution pro-
claimed in June, 1814. The right to elect members to the Chamber
of Deputies became a privilege of the rich. To be an elector one
must pay at least three hundred francs in direct taxes; to be
eligible for election, a thousand francs; but there were no qualifica-
tions depending on birth or the exercise of a trade, and also no dis-
tinction was made between the new wealthy classes of the Revolu-
tionary and Napoleonic age and the nobility of the Old Regime. The
members of the Chamber of Peers, or Upper House, were, to be sure,
all appointed by the king, but he was not limited in any way in his
choice. The legislature therefore represented the wealthy classes,

CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN FRANCE 59

primarily the large landowners, but it also included many distin-
guished persons of the Napoleonic period who upheld the spirit of
the imperial system of administration. The executive power lay
wholly in the hands of the king.

This government would have run almost without friction, except
for certain obstacles in its way. First, there was the question of
the emigres. The members of the old nobility, who had lost their
property through leaving France during the Revolution, desired com-
pensation for their loyalty to the dynasty. But since every change
in property relations would have incurred the passionate opposition
of the whole nation, the mere suspicion that the monarchy favored
this desire would have been very dangerous to itself. The second
question was the religious one. In France a part of the royalists
were as convinced as the members of their class in other countries
that the only sure support of government by conservatives and nobles
lay in a strengthening of the influence of the Church ; this threatened
a sharp limitation of freedom of thought, which naturally drove the
intellectuals into the arms of the Opposition.

In view of this situation a great deal depended on the attitude of
the king. If he acted in unison with the great majority of property
owners and was careful to keep the constitution as it was, he could
be certain of the support of most of the influential elements in the
country. The great mass of the bourgeoisie and most officials were
on his side. On the other hand, if he did as the "Ultras," or extreme
royalists, wished, and carried out a real Restoration beyond the
terms of the constitution by a partial revival of the privileges of
large landowners and clergy, he would have met not only the oppo-
sition of the liberal bourgeoisie, but also of the small peasant
proprietors ; the latter were shut out from active political life, but they
did not want the new property relations in any way disturbed. The
proletariat was scarcely to be considered. The number of factory
employees was still small; furthermore, this class possessed neither
the training, the wealth, nor the ability to assert itself independ-
ently.

The internal conflict in France was further sharpened by the atti-
tude of the Foreign Powers.

France had to atone for the collapse of the Napoleonic system
by a partial loss of sovereignty. Not only was she compelled to give
up a considerable territory and to pay what was for those days a
large war indemnity (700,000,000 francs in five years), but she had
to permit the Great Powers to maintain an army of occupation of
150,000 men until this sum was paid. She was oppressed even more

60 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

severely in some respects by the political distrust with which she
was regarded abroad. As we have often said, France was looked
upon by the Conservative Powers as the real home of all revolu-
tionary tendencies and her political doings must be constantly super-
vised. Only after a considerable period of probation did the Allies
allow her to join their circle.

One would be altogether mistaken, however, in thinking that this
supervision meant that the Great Powers were ready to support
every action of the French king or every demand of the royalist
Ultras. Rather was the contrary the case. The Great Powers, and
particularly the leaders of Russian policy, realized that a restoration
of the Old Regime was impossible in France. They saw that some
concessions must be made to liberal demands and they contented
themselves with satisfying the principle of legitimacy by establishing
the old dynasty. They wished rather the stability of the new gov-
ernment than a reaction which would have caused new conflicts and
so strengthened the revolutionary movement. To be sure, the estab-
lishment in France of the Bourbon line, which had come to be re-
garded by Frenchmen as a foreign dynasty, was primarily their work
and they felt a joint responsibility for its defense. But for this very
reason they did not wish the French king to identify himself with
the plans of the Ultras.

On the contrary, France was expected to prove to the world that
legitimacy and constitutional freedom could go together. The French
constitution was extraordinarily liberal for those days, — so liberal,
in fact, that progressives had nothing to prefer to it except the Eng-
lish constitution, and even this was outmatched by the French so
far as the complete introduction of legal equality was concerned.
To be sure, political rights were limited to the wealthy classes,
the so-called "pays Ugal" ; but within these classes, which were
not barred to people from below, considerable rights were given
to the king's subjects. There existed, for example, the principle of
the freedom of the press ; in contrast to most of the European states,
there was no censorship for periodical publications, although the
compulsory preliminary deposit of a guaranty sum (cautionnement)
amounting to 200,000 francs for founding a new newspaper limited
the enjoyment of this right to the well-to-do classes. The army
was organized on a popular basis. According to the recruiting law
of 1818, the larger part of the army (200,000 men) was to be formed
by voluntary enlistment; the remainder (40,000 men) was to be
chosen by lot. This method of choosing by lot theoretically affected
all classes; but in as much as it was permitted to provide a substi-

CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN FRANCE 61

tute, the sons of the rich were practically exempted from military
service. On the other hand, there were no limitations upon advance-
ment within the army, and promotion was ordinarily secured by
rising through the lower ranks (in contrast to the Old Regime where
the higher positions had been simply handed over to the upper
classes).

It was a fortunate circumstance for the French monarchy that
the first king under the Restoration was thoroughly out of sympathy
with the aims of the extreme royalists. Louis XVIII, a younger
brother of the guillotined Louis XVI, possessed marked intellectual
ability, but he was, perhaps for this very reason, quite untouched
by the romantic movement of his age and was a true representative
of Enlightenment and its common sense. He had no intention of
risking his monarchy by a restoration of the lands of the Church
and the old nobility. In agreement with his leading minister,
Decazes, a statesman who had already served under Napoleon and
who was entrusted by the phlegmatic king with the practical direc-
tion of affairs, Louis XVIII did not struggle against the Revolution
during the first years, when the reaction against the Napoleonic age
was most pronounced among the rich classes; on the contrary, his
struggle was with the party of the extreme right which controlled
the Chamber of Deputies (the so-called Chambre Introuvable, "a
Chamber the like of which one would not find again," according to
the king's own expression). This was the time there arose the ex-
pression, "Plus royaliste que le roi" But on the whole, the king,
with the support of the moderate royalists or "doctrinaires" was suc-
cessful in his resistance to the Ultras. In vain did the Chamber of
Deputies give the government unlimited authority to prosecute those
who had been guilty of taking part in the "Hundred Days"; Decazes
made only a very limited use of this authority. Napoleon's Concordat
with the Pope remained in force, although strongly opposed by some
of the extreme royalists. The lands of the clergy were not restored.
The state kept control over education. The only concession to the
Ultras was the abolition of divorce.

It soon appeared that in all this the government was backed by
a majority not only of the country people, but also of the propertied
classes. The new Chamber of Deputies, elected in 1816, had a ma-
jority of "doctrinaires"

The Chamber was moderately royalist, but it was not "inde-
pendent," as the republican party of that day expressed it. So long
as no changes were made in property relations for the benefit of
the emigres there was nothing to hinder some concessions desired

62 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

by the large landowners. The most important measure of this kind
was the attempt to recreate a regular new nobility out of the class
of landowners both old and new. This took the approved form of
primogeniture. In connection with a Napoleonic decree of 1808 an
ordinance of 1817 ordered that no one could be appointed a member
of the Chamber of Peers, which contained both life members and
hereditary members, unless he had introduced primogeniture into
the whole or a part of his estate. To be a "duke" one must have
an estate with an income of 30,000 francs; ta be a "marquis" or a
"count," one of 20,000 francs; to be a "viscount" or a "baron,"
one of 10,000 francs. An exception was made in favor of the clerical
members of the Upper House. This attempt to create a new heredi-
tary nobility met with great approbation; up to the Revolution of
1830, primogeniture was introduced into no less than 440 landed
estates in France. On the other hand, the proposal of the Ultras in
the "Chambre Introuvable" that the electoral qualification be re-
duced to the payment of 50 francs in taxes was not passed; this
proposal rested on the idea that in elections the members of the old
nobility could count upon the votes of their peasants.

Public order was now so quickly restored that the allied troops
were able to leave France in the autumn of 1818. To be sure, the
Conservative Great Powers retained a distrust of France, and even
in 1818 did not fail to provide military measures against the possi-
bility of a new revolution. But at any rate their direct supervision
had now come to an end.

This peaceful development was soon broken by an unexpected
event. It was well known that the moderate attitude of the gov-
ernment depended on the person of Louis XVIII, and that the child-
less king's younger brother, the Count of Artois, was devoted to
romantic tendencies, and was the leader of the Ultras. The assas-
sination of a member of his family resulted in a change in this mod-
erate policy even before the change of rulers took place. On Febru-
ary 13, 1820, the Count's second son, the Duke of Berry, who was
thought to be the only person who would perpetuate the Bourbon
line, was murdered in front of the Opera House in Paris by one of
Napoleon's former soldiers. The murderer declared that he had
intended to extinguish the dynasty; but some months later a
posthumous son — the later Count of Chambord, or "Henry V" —
was born to the murdered duke. Although no connection could be
proved between the crime and the political activity of the mod-
erates, nevertheless the Ultras took advantage of the affair to declare
that their opponents, even including the minister Decazes himself.

CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN FRANCE 63

were at least morally responsible for the crime. Louis XVIII now
gave up his opposition to his brother's party. The extreme royalists
came into power. They used their power primarily in the spirit of
those religious and political tendencies which we have described
above in the chapter on the Panic of the French Revolution (see
ch. v). With the aid of the Jesuits the government tried to trans-
form the system of education. The censorship of the press was
introduced again. A new electoral law gave a "double vote" to the
large taxpayers (those who paid more than a thousand francs) who
were almost exclusively large landlords and mostly members of the
old nobility; in this way some 10,000 to 12,000 large landlords con-
trolled the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. So, in 1821, the
Ultras secured a majority, and the leading minister was no longer
Decazes but Villele, who had already distinguished himself in 1816
as a leader of the Ultras.

It was now possible for the government in 1823 to undertake that
punitive expedition against the revolution in Spain mentioned in the
preceding chapter.

With the accession of the Count of Artois, Louis XVIII's younger
brother, as Charles X, in 1824, the government was protected against
the possibility of any opposition from the side of the king. Its re-
actionary attitude now tended to unite all the parties of the left
(liberals and radicals) into a single group, so that liberal young men,
representatives of intellectual idealism, and a part of the bourgeoisie
joined together in opposition to the new reactionary policy of the
government. Nevertheless, this group formed only a small fraction
of the nation and did not incline to revolution by force. It rather
demanded merely the loyal application of the constitution. Its slogan
was "The Charter of 1814." Isolated revolutionary outbreaks in
1822, after the fashion of the Italian Carbonari, were neither suc-
cessful nor imitated by others. The ultra-royalist Chamber of 1824
also freed itself from political agitation by extending its own period
of office to seven years.

As soon as the new government sought to disturb the conditions
of legal equality established by the Revolution the liberal opposition
became stronger. In accordance with the new reactionary spirit, the
government passed a sacrilege law which, among other things, im-
posed the death penalty for burglary in a church. Next it was pro-
posed to realize the old desire of the Ultras that the imigr&s should
be given compensation. This was practically identical with the crea-
tion of a nobility unconditionally devoted to conservative principles.
The government converted the national debt from a five per-cent to

64 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

a three per-cent basis, and thus saved for the benefit of emigres
a capital sum reckoned at nearly a billion francs. French bond-
holders were thus indirectly taxed in order that the nobles who had
once fled from France might have the means of buying landed prop-
erty again. At the same time, also, equally for the benefit of the
class of large landowners, a measure was proposed for a further
limited kind of primogeniture, in addition to the law of 1817 which
established titles for the owners of large estates: landowners who
paid at least 300 francs in direct taxes were to be allowed to be-
queath a double portion of the inheritance to the eldest son. This
proposal, however, was rejected by the Chamber of Peers, in which
the officials of the Napoleonic Age retained a majority. The Cham-
ber of Peers also threw out a "Vandal Bill" imposing a crushing tax
on books and intended to put an end to the agitation of liberal
intellectuals.

So the new government was successful mainly only in its clerical
measures. The ecclesiastical Congregations increased rapidly and by
the law of mortmain acquired anew considerable property. Teachers
were placed under the control of bishops.

This attitude of the Government drove a part of even the prop-
ertied classes into opposition. The large manufacturers were dis-
contented because of the favors shown to the old nobility, and the
Gallicans and liberal bourgeoisie disapproved of the Government's
religious policy. In vain did the Government believe it could secure
a favorable turn of public opinion by military successes, therein
making the mistake which has frequently been made in French his-
tory. The elections to the Chamber of Deputies, which took place
soon after the victory at Navarino, resulted in a defeat for the Gov-
ernment. Under these circumstances it made little difference that
the Villele cabinet shortly before had tried, just previously in 1827,
to reduce the unmanageable Upper House to obedience by a creation
of new peers. No policy remained possible except concession to the
Liberals.

Accordingly, as soon as Villele had resigned, some real liberal
measures were undertaken. The seminaries for priests were placed
under the Universite, that is, under the state system of education.
In 1828 eight Jesuit colleges were suppressed (the Jesuits were par-
ticularly disliked by the Gallicans as being an "international re-
ligious Order").

The distrust which the Liberals felt toward the king, however, did
not disappear so quickly. They gave only lukewarm support to the
new ministry and it soon had to give way to a cabinet formed by

CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN FRANCE 65

Prince Jules de Polignac, one of the king's intimate friends, who was
even more devoted than he to mystical romantic ideas.

There arose at once the difficulty of trying to make this ministry
cooperate with the Liberal majority in the Chamber of Deputies.
This difficult problem, which is never completely soluble — how a
monarch shall exercise an independent right of appointing his min-
isters and at the same time respect the wishes of the majority in the
legislature — now had to be faced in France for the first time since
1814. The situation was complicated by the fact that the king's
personal policy was opposed not only by the majority in the legis-
lature, but also by the great majority of his subjects, so that in case
of a conflict with the Chamber public opinion would certainly be on
the side of the legislature. Moreover he could not count with cer-
tainty on the support of the army which, since the time of the Revo-
lution, did not represent any definite social class.

In spite of this, the monarch decided to venture on the struggle.
"I would rather saw wood than be a king like the King of Eng-
land," he said. The Opposition carried on a lively campaign in
favor of a change of government, and when the new elections in the
summer of 1830 gave them a still more considerable majority than
in the previous legislature, the king declared that it was his duty not
to yield "like Louis XVI, who by yielding had been overthrown."
On July 26, 1830, he published in the official Monitettr four
ordinances (decrees which were effective without the approval of the
legislature) : a new electoral law virtually restricted the franchise to
large landowners; freedom of the press was abolished; the Chamber
just elected was declared dissolved; and elections were ordered for
a new Chamber.

But the Opposition Party also now took up the struggle. The
fact that the Government had just succeeded in brilliant fashion in
dislodging the nest of pirates at Algiers (see below, ch. xvi), made
as little impression as the naval victory at Navarino three years
earlier. Scarcely had the ordinances appeared when several leaders
of the Intellectuals of the younger generation, led by the youthful
writer, Adolphe Thiers (who was to prove himself one of the greatest
French statesmen in the nineteenth century), issued a proclamation
in which they urged resistance to the government. They were soon
joined by other elements in the population — former Carbonari, re-
publican workmen, and students. Everywhere in Paris barricades
were thrown up. Here the die was cast. Although the barricades
afforded some defense, considering the relative inefficiency of the
cannon and the crookedness of the Paris streets, nevertheless they

66 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

could not have withstood a serious attack by trained troops. But
the army, which had no feeling of social solidarity with the ruling
class of old landlords and which was recruited from all classes, re-
fused to act, not completely but still in part. From the outset
individual regiments began to go over to the side of the people and
the loyal Swiss Guard was driven by the insurgents from the Louvre.
Soon, on July 29, 1830, there floated from the palace of the Tuileries
the Tricolor, the flag of the Revolution and the Napoleonic armies,
which had been replaced at the Restoration by the white banner
of the Bourbons. In the town hall of Paris a Provisional Government
was set up.

The insurrection had not been the work of the Extreme Left; the
Opposition derived its chief strength from the discontent of the
bourgeoisie and the industrial and commercial classes as well as
from the Intellectuals. What they objected to particularly was not
the Constitution of 1814, but the fact that the constitution had not
been loyally observed by the Ultras. The leaders of the revolution
therefore had no thought of a complete overturn, such as the intro-
duction of a democratic republic, but only of a "restoration of the
Charter," with guarantees to prevent its being abused either by
reactionaries or by radicals. The best way to do this seemed to be
to allow the monarchy to continue, but to place on the throne a
regent, who, though half legitimist, would be wholly free from legiti-
mist ecclesiastical influence. A suitable candidate existed in the
king's distant cousin, Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans. His father,
known as "Philip Equality," had already during the French Revo-
lution shown an inclination to new ideas and as a youth had even
fought in the Republican armies at Jemappes in 1792. In a mani-
festo signed by Thiers and Mignet, the Duke was proclaimed king
on July 30: "He will accept the Charter as we have always under-
stood it and wished it."

The Duke of Orleans assented at once on July 31. At first, how-
ever, he did not bear the title of King, only that of Lieutenant
General, because he wished to wait for his formal election by the
Chamber, as was necessary. The people quickly decided in his favor.
Since practically all the leaders supported him strongly there was
nothing for the little group of Republicans to do except to assent
also. The legitimist king, Charles X, also quickly perceived that his
cause was lost. He still tried to preserve appearances by abdicating
voluntarily and by appointing Louis Philippe as regent for his
grandson, the nine-year-old Duke of Bordeaux. But the Chamber
refused to countenance this subterfuge. After revising the consti-

CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM COLLAPSE IN FRANCE 67

tution as desired by the Liberal Opposition, it invested Louis Philippe
with the royal insignia on August 9. The new monarch, who had
already taken a solemn oath to the Charter, called himself "King
of the French" instead of "King of France," in order to avoid the
hated phraseology of the Old Regime. Shortly afterwards Charles X,
who had already fled to Rambouillet on August i, sailed from Cher-
bourg and left France forever on August 14.

Although the July Revolution did not result in changes which can
in any way be compared with those of the great Revolution of 1789,
nevertheless it marked as striking a break as possible away from
the conservative principles which were to have been guaranteed by
the Holy Alliance. Legitimacy had been rudely disregarded. Al-
though the new king was as much a Bourbon as the fallen monarch,
still he possessed no direct claim to the throne. More scandalous
was the fact that Louis Philippe did not at all owe his elevation to
the fact that he was a Bourbon, but to the will of the people and to
a revolution. In the amended Charter that part of the preamble
was suppressed which spoke of the Charter as "issued by the king";
the French people were now to be thought of as issuing the Charter
and as choosing a prince on the basis of it. France, naturally there-
fore, withdrew from the Conservative Alliance of the Great Powers.

In home policies there now took place all the changes which had
been long demanded by the liberal bourgeoisie. These measures fall
into two main groups.

The first group comprises all the regulations which aimed to set
aside the favors which had been shown to the large landlords of the
old nobility. The Chamber of Peers, to which a large number
of royalist landlords had been appointed as a result of the new
creations during the last years of the Restoration, now lost precisely
these elements because nearly half the members refused to take the
oath of allegiance to Louis Philippe ; also they were deprived of their
hereditary character. In 1835 tne creation of new landed estates,
based on primogeniture, was forbidden, so that the two Chambers
were no longer differentiated from one another by any class distinc-
tion; as a matter of fact, henceforth, it was the Chamber of Deputies
that enjoyed the whole legislative power. This also was freed more
completely from the influence of the old noble families. The elec-
toral qualification was reduced from 300 to 200 francs, and the age
qualification was reduced for voters from thirty to twenty-five years,
and for deputies from forty to thirty years. The significance of this
latter provision lies in the fact that it was the generation which had
lived through the Revolution which was devoted to reactionary ideas;

68 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

the admission of the younger generation to political life in itself
now strengthened the Liberal groups. Finally, the Royal Guards,
the only troops who were bound by a feeling of solidarity to defend
the monarch, were disbanded. Their place was taken by the Na-
tional Guard. To this belonged all taxpayers who could furnish their
own uniforms.

This last provision is extraordinarily characteristic; it sums up
in a word the whole essence of the July Monarchy. The mass of
the people, those who had no property or only the most necessary
means of subsistence, were still excluded from any participation in
political life just as before. But between the propertied bourgeoisie
and the really rich classes there was no longer any distinction. This
was seen in the membership of the new government. Here were to
be found only names of members of the well-to-do classes; the
proletarian masses were not represented.

The second group of measures resulting from the July Revolution
aimed to set aside all those provisions which had their origin in
religious-political romantic doctrines. By these measures the new
regime pleased both the Intellectuals and the Liberal bourgeoisie,
which had a horror of strengthening the economic power of the
church. In the revised constitution there no longer appeared the
phrase, "The Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the state."
The clergy lost its influence on the government. Freedom of the
press was proclaimed and freedom of instruction introduced.

So the classes of the population which had grown economically
strong as a result of the great Revolution now had political power
in their hands.

CHAPTER XIII

BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM IN THE

OTHER STATES OF EUROPE RESULTING

FROM THE JULY REVOLUTION

(BELGIUM AND POLAND)

SUCH a severe blow to legitimist principles naturally was not a mat-
ter of indifference to the members of the Conservative Alliance. The
first decisive act of the anti-revolutionary combination had been the
reestablishment in France of the lawful dynasty, and its chief aim
had ever been to watch over France to prevent revolution. Now its
efforts had failed in every respect. The legitimist king of France
had been put to flight. The Revolution had set up a new ruler and
France was no longer a member of the Alliance.

Even this was not all. Among the men who had led the Revolu-
tion of July, 1830, there were representatives of the old international
Republican propaganda, for whom the king at first, at least, had to
show some consideration. There was also the danger that the revo-
lutionary movement might spread into other states, particularly into
Italy (as Austria asserted). So when in August of this year the
Belgians revolted against the King of Holland, as will soon be ex-
plained, it seemed clear that the French July Revolution had created
a new source of revolution for all Europe.

But it was less easy to bring about intervention in France than
in Naples or Spain. It was impossible to make use of internal con-
flicts. The Conservative Great Powers would have had to run the
risk of a regular war, which none of them really wished, least of
all Austria, which was so weak financially. There was also the
further difficulty that Great Britain would, under no circumstances,
cooperate in intervention. The English government, which had long
since abandoned in practice the principles of the Holy Alliance, now
made little difficulty in coming to terms with the new regime in
France, and on September i, 1830, recognized it officially. Indeed,
it was even to be feared that England would directly oppose a legit-
imist punitive expedition against Louis Philippe, because military
complications would presumably be used by Russia to begin her
plan of conquest against Turkey, in direct opposition to British in-

70 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

terests. An equally important blow to possible intervention was
finally given by the new French king himself. Although Louis
Philippe had had to make some nominal concessions to the Republi-
can group, he made it perfectly clear from the outset that personally
he had no intention of spreading revolutionary principles beyond the
borders of France, after the fashion of the First French Republic.
Even within a fortnight after the triumph of the July Revolution,
in the middle of August, he officially informed the other European
governments that he had undertaken the task of securing the peace
of Europe against the horrible devastations of war. The ticklish
Belgian question, which might have provoked a conflict with Eng-
land, was at once arranged so that the possibility of a French inva-
sion and annexation of Belgium seemed out of the question. The
following years also showed clearly that of all the governments in
France, this government of the bourgeoisie was the least inclined
to warlike undertakings. In contrast to the Monarchy of the Resto-
ration, in contrast also to the Second Empire, the July Monarchy
never sought to overcome difficulties in home politics by a display of
military prestige abroad. In accordance with the economic charac-
ter of the new political system, the liberal bourgeois rulers were in-
clined to the same aims in both foreign and home politics: peace
and quiet for work and wealth.

This did not prevent the July Monarchy, however, from exercis-
ing a great moral influence in considerable parts of Europe, even
without the active participation of the responsible members of the
government. The victory which had been won in Paris over the
legitimist party and the absolutist tendencies of the monarchy, the
powerlessness of the Eastern Powers (Austria, Prussia and Russia)
in the face of this breach in the Conservative system — all this nat-
urally tended everywhere to arouse hope in the "party of movement"
that in other countries also the restored governments would be un-
able to withstand strong attack. The success of these insurrections
varied in proportion to the power which the representatives of the
Old Regime exercised. In Italy, so far as insurrections took place
at all, as in the States of the Church, in Parma, and in Modena, the
revolution collapsed anew through Austria's intervention. Twice
Austrian troops entered the States of the Church, where the inhabi-
tants, particularly those in the provinces lying at a distance from
Rome, had rebelled against the government of the Church and its
notoriously bad administration. The absolutist rule of the Church
was restored with slight changes, although the Great Powers had
sought some reforms, particularly in the matter of finance, In

BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 71

Parma and Modena also Austria restored the governments depend-
ent on herself. The hopes of the insurgents had turned toward
France, from whose new policy they thought they could expect sup-
port; but Louis Philippe, in accord with his whole political attitude,
refused all aid and contented himself with the formal occupation of
the papal town of Ancona (1832 to 1838). By this he wanted to
show that France, without interfering in general in Italian affairs,
did not regard Italy as the exclusive domain of the Austrian gov-
ernment.

More successful were the after effects of the July Revolution in
Switzerland. Here the privileges of the city bourgeoisie were almost
everywhere set aside. Also in several small and middle-sized states
in Germany, princes were compelled by the pressure of political
demonstrations to grant constitutions.

The two countries in which the July Revolution had the most de-
cisive effect, however, were Belgium and Poland. In both these
places its consequences were of great importance in world history.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands created by the Congress of
Vienna in 1815, from the standpoint of the European policy of the
Great Powers, was not without a purpose. The idea had been to
make the territory at the mouth of the Rhine and the Scheldt, which
had so often been a cause of discord, particularly between France
and England, into a single large state, which would not sink to the
position of a mere sphere of influence of one of the Great Powers.
Accordingly, the former Austrian (Belgian) provinces were united
with the former Dutch provinces into a single state. This king-
dom was then entrusted to a descendant of the Orange-Nassau fam-
ily which had given so many stadholders to the Dutch Republic.
But the new state included elements which were too heterogeneous
to permit a peaceful development. To be sure, the constitution had
provided a certain equality between Belgians and Dutch; the Cham-
ber of Deputies consisted of an equal number of members from the
Northern and Southern Provinces; but this really gave an advan-
tage to the Dutch, because their population numbered only two mil-
lion as against three million Belgians. Furthermore, the govern-
ment favored the Dutch at every turn. The Senate consisted in
large part of Hollanders. Most of the officials came from the Dutch
part of the kingdom. But above all, different economic interests
divided the two peoples who had been artificially united together.
Belgium, an industrial country, inclined toward a protective tariff;
Holland, an old commercial country, with equal insistence, favored
free trade, and succeeded in winning the king to its side,

72 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

Such a clash of interests has long existed in many united states
and yet not led to any split. But in the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands it struck particularly deeply into the consciousness of the
people because it was not counteracted by any common national
tradition, and also because in addition to the economic conflict,
which affected only the upper classes, there were sectarian dif-
ferences. Between Holland, which was mostly Protestant, and Bel-
gium, which was strictly Catholic, there could be no real feeling of
sympathy.

The Dutch government was also blameworthy in that it had too
little regard for these delicate conditions. It punished severely the
Belgian prelates who, in harmony with the feeling of their clergy,
had protested against the constitution. When the whole Belgian
Opposition, both Catholics and Liberals, united in a single group
(the "Union"), the king would make them no concessions, so that
the idea even arose of annexing Belgium to France.

Into this heated atmosphere now fell the news of the victorious
revolution in France. There, the work of the Congress of Vienna
had been overthrown; why should the same thing not be possible
in Belgium? Within a month of the revolution at Paris an insur-
rection broke out in Brussels on August 25, 1830, following the sing-
ing of Auber's revolutionary opera, "Masaniello." The population
rose and expelled the Dutch officials. An assembly of Belgian nota-
bles despatched delegates to the king at the Hague to present the
Belgian grievances. The Dutch government, however, had no inten-
tion of making concessions to the rebels, and decided to suppress
the insurrection with a bloody hand. The king's second son started
for Brussels with an army of ten thousand men, but his advance
was checked by the obstinate courage of the revolutionists; after
five days' fighting (September 21-26) he was forced to retreat. The
revolution had triumphed. On October 4 a Provisional Government
proclaimed Belgium an independent state, thus going beyond the
original demand for reforms to a complete separation. This procla-
mation was confirmed by a National Congress on November 18.
To indicate that the movement was not at bottom due to revolu-
tionary tendencies it was decided that Belgium should be a mon-
archy.

Theoretically, the situation here was the same as that in Naples
some years before. In both cases, in a small state, the government
established by the Great Powers had been overthrown by an unlaw-
ful rising of the people. In both cases, again, the question whether
the new government could maintain itself depended in last analysis

BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 73

upon the decision of the European concert, for it was clear that the
Belgian insurgents could not successfully defend themselves against
the united intervention of the Great Powers. In another connection,
to be sure, the situation in Belgium was quite different from that
in Naples in 1820. Not only could the Conservative Powers not
count upon the cooperation of one Great Power (France), but there
was even a danger that this Power might make common cause with
the insurgents, — might indeed even take advantage of the opportunity
to increase its own territory. A French party was already active
in Brussels and was agitating for a more or less veiled annexation
by France. In this difficult situation both the independence of Bel-
gium and the peace of Europe were saved by the diplomatic clever-
ness of the new French monarch. (He had at once recalled from en-
forced exile the experienced professional diplomatist, Prince Talley-
rand, and sent him as ambassador to the government whose attitude
was most important, namely to England.) The peace-loving bour-
geois government offered as compensation for Belgian independ-
ence the promise of its own complete disinterestedness. This plan
succeeded completely. So soon as the English government was con-
vinced that France did not intend to take advantage of the Belgian
revolution to advance to the mouth of the Scheldt, there was no
longer any danger that the British would depart from their policy
of non-intervention. In vain did the King of Holland call attention
to the treaties of 1814 and warn the Great Powers of their duty
to have a care for their observance. In vain were military prepara-
tions undertaken by Tsar Nicholas I (the only monarch who could
have despatched an army at once). On October 15 France and Eng-
land signed a convention to exclude any kind of interference by the
Great Powers except a peaceful one. Since Great Britain's inter-
vention could not be counted on, the other Powers were compelled
to abandon military measures against the Belgian revolutionists.
Within a short time Austria and Prussia gave their official approval
to a plan of leaving the solution of the Belgian question to a con-
ference of ambassadors in London.

The later agreements were, one may say, merely the logical conse-
quences of this first convention between the two Western Powers.
On December 20, 1830, the Conference declared Belgium to be an
independent state. Then, chiefly in order to prevent a possible in-
tervention by France, the newly-founded state was declared neutral,
and thus prevented from combining with a Great Power. When, in
spite of this, the Belgian Congress chose the Duke of Nemours, the
second son of Louis Philippe, the latter refused. Thereupon the

74 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

Belgians chose a German prince who was in no way connected by
blood with the French royal family, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (June

4, 1831).

As far as the Great Powers were concerned the Belgian question
was thus settled for the most part. But not for Holland. William
of Orange, the king, refused to recognize the decision of the London
Conference, and sought to reconquer Belgium by himself by force
of arms. He invaded Belgium and won considerable successes in
August, 1831, but the Western Powers did not thereby allow them-
selves to be shaken in their decision. France secured in London per-
mission to enforce the decision of the Conference by military meas-
ures. A French army which thereupon entered Belgium naturally
brought the Dutch advance to a standstill. Then, when the Dutch
government, notwithstanding considerable concessions which the
Powers were ready to make, still refused to give up Belgium and
evacuate Antwerp, England and France used force. A British fleet
blockaded the Dutch coast, and a French army besieged Antwerp
and forced it to surrender in a relatively short time in December,
1831. The passive resistance which Holland still maintained for
years (until 1838) against the decisions of the Conference was with-
out practical effect. Belgian independence and neutrality, solemnly
guaranteed in 1839 by the five Powers, France, Great Britain, Prus-
sia, Austria, and Russia, was already a reality in 1831 and remained
such.

The manner in which Belgium secured its separation from Holland,
and the fact that the new state was supported by the two liberal
western Powers, while the Conservative Powers (Prussia, Russia,
and Austria) assumed at first, at least, an unfriendly attitude, nat-
urally made contemporaries regard the dissolution of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, which the Congress of Vienna had established, as
a step forward in the triumphant progress of liberalism. However
close to the truth this was, it would nevertheless be a mistake to
estimate the historical importance of the Belgian revolution merely
from this point of view. For the whole of Europe it was of great
importance that the relatively strong Kingdom of the Netherlands
was destroyed and replaced by two weak small states. In the second
half of the nineteenth century, as disputes between the European
Powers were again decided more and more by wars and armaments,
it became clearer and clearer that this Belgian Revolution of 1830
had created between France and the new Prussian-German state a
kingdom which could exist only with the assistance of the Great
Powers. However, there was no actual infringement of the guaran-

BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 75

teed neutrality until 1914, when Germany opened war against
France by marching through Belgium.

The second important result of the July Revolution was the de-
struction of the state in which part of the Polish people had re-
ceived a half-independent political organization. In 1795, when
the old Polish Republic was totally effaced and the last bits of it
partitioned among the three neighboring Great Powers, the Polish
nation was destroyed as a factor in politics only in appearance but
not in reality. In no country, at that time, was the feeling of
nationality so strong as in Poland. It was fostered even by the
aristocratic character of the former "Republic." While in other
countries it was chiefly the middle class which supported nation-
alistic tendencies, in the hope that more liberal institutions would be
possible in a national state than in tiny despotisms, in Poland the
conditions were just reversed. Here the idea of a revival of inde-
pendence was identical with the restoration of the rule of the old
nobility. How could it have been otherwise in a country where there
was practically no middle class in existence (except the Jews), and
where the peasants, only recently emancipated from serfdom, lived
under primitive conditions? In Poland, national autonomy simply
meant that interference of foreign bureaucrats, who were independent
of the Polish nobility, would cease, and the native magnates would
again be given charge of the administration.

Nowhere, therefore, did the national movement rest on such strong
economic support as in Poland. In many other countries large land-
owners gladly took the side of the conservative anti-national move-
ment; in Poland, just the opposite was the case. Here all the land-
owners, that is, the whole wealth of the country, stood behind the
national cause. Any government which should follow the doctrines
of the Restoration and seek to favor the aristocratic elements would,
in Poland, simply strengthen its own enemies, that is to say, revo-
lution. In general, the governments which had annexed parts of Old
Poland recognized this danger; it is well known, for example, that
Prussia afforded greater advantages to the agricultural day-laborers
in her Polish districts than in the regions where the landlords were
of German nationality.

The one exceptional Polish region that existed after 1815 was
that part of original ancient Poland which formed the bulk of
the genuinely Polish territories added to Russia, the so-called
"Congress Poland," with the capital at Warsaw. Tsar Alexander I,
thanks to his education by the Swiss, La Harpe, was rather
more strongly inclined to liberal ideas than the rulers of Austria and

76 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

Prussia, and was also perhaps somewhat influenced by his friendly
relations with Polish aristocrats; he was the only one of the
three partitioning princes who had taken seriously the decree of the
Congress of Vienna by which the three Powers had held out to their
Polish subjects the expectation of "representative government and
national institutions." Alexander I, supplementing an arrangement
which Napoleon had made for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1807,
gave the Poles a regular constitution on November 27, 1815. By
this, "Congress Poland" acquired not only complete national au-
tonomy but also even parliamentary institutions, that is, more than
was enjoyed by the subjects of the three neighboring Great Powers.
At the same time Poland was connected with Russia merely by a
"personal union"; the Tsar ruled Poland only as a constitutional
king. The viceroy, his representative, and the imperial commissioner
were the only foreigners (Russians). All the other officials in civil
and military service must be Poles. Even the army had its own
special uniform. Polish was the only official language. The Roman
Catholic clergy in Poland retained their endowments and privileges.
Not only did the constitution provide for the establishment of a
legislature or Diet, which should meet every two years, with open
sessions; but a preponderant influence in both chambers was prac-
tically assured to the large landlords, because the right to vote and
to be elected was dependent on the payment of a high tax. It was
inconceivable that the Russian government would oppose the land-
owning nobility by any alliance with the peasant population. Still
stronger, if possible, was the preference given to the nobility in the
creation of judicial and administrative boards.

In spite of all this, the regime established in 1815 did not succeed
in becoming popular. From a material point of view there was an
undeniable prosperity during the fifteen years that Poland existed.
In Lodz there even began to be established large industries which
found a profitable market in the purely agrarian districts of Russia.
Possibly also the emancipation of the peasants, which had taken
place during the French period (1807) and which could not be un-
done, had a beneficial effect, although the peasants still remained
economically dependent upon the landlords as before; at any rate,
the population increased by more than a million and a half. The
deficit in government revenues disappeared, and the years 1820-
1825 even showed a surplus.

But the contrast between small "Congress Poland" and the great
Polish state of former times was so striking that the Polish nobles
of the new kingdom could not be content with what they had been

BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 77

given. They regarded their autonomous kingdom simply as a step-
ping-stone to the restoration of ancient Poland, and were particularly
anxious to win back at least a part of the districts which had for-
merly been annexed by Russia. To be sure, White Russia and the
Ukraine were out of the question; but there was the former Grand
Duchy of Lithuania lying to the north-east. For centuries, Lith-
uania had belonged to the Polish Republic. Although it was already
evident that the foreign peasant population there was opposed to
Polish nationalism, nevertheless the nobles of that region regarded
themselves absolutely as a part of the Polish aristocracy and were
regarded by their fellow nobles in Congress Poland as brothers in
exile. Polish magnates, like Prince Adam Czartoryski, long the
trusted friend of Tsar Alexander I, used their position in the Lith-
uanian educational district of Vilna to win the native population
for the Polish cause and so prepare for their later incorporation in
Poland.

Even before 1830, therefore, the Russian government had found
it necessary to restrict several of the liberties granted by the Con-
stitution of 1815. No actual conflict broke out until the July Revo-
lution in Paris roused enthusiastic hopes in Poland. As a result of
the French events, the Revolutionary party, mostly young men and
students, the so-called "Reds," got the upper hand over the aris-
tocratic clerical party of opposition (the " Whites") who did not
wish to overstep the bounds of legal opposition. The Polish army
summoned to service by Nicholas I against France and Belgium
now turned against Russian authority. As the whole administra-
tion was in Polish hands any local opposition was out of the ques-
tion. The government buildings in Warsaw were occupied by the
students of the Polish military school, and Constantine, the viceroy
and elder brother of the Tsar, left the country with his Russian
troops in December, 1830.

The "Whites" at first sought to bring about a compromise with
the Tsar in order to avoid war. But when St. Petersburg insisted
on absolute subjection they were swept away by the "Red" war party,
and the fiction was exploded that the revolution was directed merely
against the Tsar's representative and not against the Tsar himself.
The Polish Diet not only declared that the Romanov dynasty was
deposed, but also that Lithuania was indissolubly united with Po-
land (January, 1831).

Although the Poles had at their disposal considerable troops and
the support of the regular administrative machinery, and so were
much more favorably situated than, for example, the revolutionists

78 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

in Naples or Belgium, still it was clear that in their case also the
final decision lay in the hands of the Great Powers. The Polish
revolutionists, thanks to their stronger means of support, might be
able to maintain themselves for a longer time than insurgents else-
where; but, unless they were supported by the Great Powers, they
could not count on withstanding the overwhelming power of Russia
for more than a certain time. The new Polish government therefore
despatched official representatives to the Great Powers who had
guaranteed the decree of the Congress of Vienna. But though the
cause of Polish independence was very popular everywhere (even
outside France and England), there was small prospect of help com-
ing from outside. The French government believed it unwise either
to risk a war or to compromise itself by protecting an international
revolutionary movement, in spite of the very strong pressure of
public opinion; it therefore rejected the appeal of the Poles. Eng-
land, without the support of a Continental Power, was in no position
to act against the military forces of Russia; the British cabinet
therefore contented itself with the official (and formally correct)
reply that the Congress of Vienna had not guaranteed the Polish
constitution.

This meant that the war was already lost for the Poles in spite
of their heroic courage. Since their army had been the first to
mobilize, they did indeed secure some victories at first and occupied
some districts on the Lithuanian frontier. But as soon as the Rus-
sian army approached in an overwhelming majority — 120,000 men
against 45,000 — the Poles had to retreat to the Vistula. After five
bloody battles the Russian armies pressed on to Warsaw. The
Russian general offered the insurgents an amnesty and the restora-
tion of the constitution; but in spite of the advice of their military
experts the offer was rejected by the "Reds," who had compromised
themselves too far. The Russians thereupon bombarded the capital,
which soon capitulated in September, 1831. The remnants of the
Polish army now fled to foreign lands. Along with them went also
many members of the Polish nobility, who settled chiefly in France.

There now happened what the moderate "Whites" had feared
when they had opposed the extreme measures of the "Reds." The
independence of Poland was totally destroyed. An imperial ukase
decreed that henceforth Poland should be incorporated with Rus-
sia to form a single nation. The constitution was abolished, and
the administration put into the hands of a Russian governor and
Russian officials. The Russian language became obligatory for all
officials. The University of Warsaw was closed. A military die-

BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 79

tatorship was introduced, which was also intended to weaken in the
future the economic strength of the Polish magnates. Not only were
about three hundred emigres condemned to death, but their lands
were confiscated and divided among Russian generals of the Orthodox
Greek faith. Virtually nothing of old Poland was left except the
Church; and even here were not lacking all sorts of chicanery and
despotic interference. All other instruction was put completely un-
der the control of the Russian Minister of Education in 1839. How-
ever, Polish opposition was not broken by all these measures. The
Russian government did not succeed in destroying the economic
strength of the Polish nobility. Not even the feudal privileges of
the landlords were taken away. After the death of Nicholas I, in
1855, when the Russians allowed a somewhat looser rein, Polish
friends of freedom associated together in an Agricultural Society,
which, under cover of non-political activities, really pursued national
aims. There resulted another insurrection in 1863, which was fol-
lowed by a much severer reaction and by the total destruction of all
administrative institutions peculiar to Poland. Above all, the lands
of the Church were secularized in 1865 and the administration of the
Polish Catholic Church was placed under an ecclesiastical board in
St. Petersburg. At this time also the peasants were given the own-
ership of the land which they had been occupying and freed of all
servile obligations, so that the Polish nobles lost about half of their
existing income. Also Poles were forbidden to acquire land in
Poland.

Although these measures, whose decisive effect is still felt to the
present day, took place about a generation later, the whole develop-
ment was already foreshadowed in the years following 1830. It
became evident how fundamentally illusory were the hopes of
Poles that an autonomous position within the Russian Empire could
be used as a stepping-stone toward a restoration of national inde-
pendence. There remained only one suggestion of Polish indepen-
dence— the Republic of Cracow, created in 1815. But naturally
the hopes which the Kingdom of Poland had awakened could not
rest on this tiny free state. Furthermore, in 1836 Cracow was
occupied for a short time by the troops of the three protecting
Powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and then placed under Aus-
trian police supervision; finally, in 1846, it was completely incor-
porated in Austria.

So there was nothing left for the Polish patriots to do but look
around for help from some other direction. This is the point which
gives the Polish insurrections a wider importance in the history of

8o RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

the nineteenth century than that of mere incidents in the internal
development of Russia. After it had once been shown that the
Polish friends of independence had nothing to hope from Russia,
and that even the Russian revolutionary parties would not assist
them, and since Prussia was known to be uncompromisingly opposed
to all Polish aspirations, the only possible ally left was Austria.
There was the further fact that the Polish landlords had nowhere
kept such complete power over the agricultural population as in the
Austrian province of Galicia. The national spirit of the Poles in
Congress Poland remained as strong as ever, in spite of all the Rus-
sian measures of oppression; but, as a political factor, the only
Poles of primary importance were now the Galician magnates; and
since these exercised a considerable influence on Austrian policy,
owing to the political-social composition of the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy which will be explained later in detail, these conditions
contributed not a little toward sharpening the opposition between
Russia and the Danubian monarchy. To the old disputes which
related to the Balkans, there were now added elements of conflict
resulting from the nationalist and religious policy of the Galician
Polish nobility.

But in the early years contemporaries regarded the suppression
of the Polish Revolution merely as a defeat of Liberalism. The
contrast between Eastern and Western Europe became now more
sharply marked than ever. In Belgium not only had the work of
the Conservative Congress of Vienna been overthrown, but the newly
established kingdom had also been able to adopt a constitution which
even surpassed the French in the concessions which it made to liberal
demands. In order to vote it was sufficient to pay what, according
to the ideas of the time, was a very small tax (forty- two francs).
The constitution had expressly proclaimed the responsibility of min-
isters to the Chamber of Deputies, and this was interpreted to mean
that the cabinet must have the support of a majority in the Cham-
ber. Also, the Senate was not appointed by the King, but chosen
by the same electors as the Chamber. Freedom of the press, of
public meeting, of education, and of religion, was introduced. Even
the Church was wholly withdrawn from the supervision of the state
(without in general losing any of its privileges). The establishment
of the Belgian Kingdom was, from the standpoint of liberal doc-
trines, an even more complete victory than the setting up of Louis
Philippe's government.

In the East it was quite otherwise. Though Tsar Alexander I
during his liberal phase may have perhaps played with the idea

BREACHES IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM 81

of making Poland a model parliamentary state which might even
serve as an object lesson for the Russian Empire, and although he
also, by creating this kingdom, recognized the justice of the na-
tional Polish demands, all these plans were now proved to be Uto-
pian. It was not Poland which served as the model for Russia, but
Russian absolutistic institutions which were imposed on Poland.
The source from which some kind of free institutions might, have
spread in Eastern and Central Europe was destroyed.

It was thus that the fate of the Polish rising appeared to con-
temporaries, and this explains also why, at that time, and for a
long time afterwards, the sympathies of liberal circles, without re-
gard for the possible national aspirations of Poland, turned toward
the Poles and away from the Russians.

CHAPTER XIV
THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND

THE July Revolution, which made so many old institutions on the
Continent totter, was also not without its effect north of the English
Channel. There, also, it hastened a transformation in existing condi-
tions and gave reformers new zeal. But the Old Regime in England,
which was overthrown two years after the events in Paris, was so
absolutely different from the conservative systems of government on
the Continent that the bloodless English revolution of 1832 deserves
special treatment, even if the importance of the nation in which it
took place did not make such special treatment inevitable anyway.

"English freedom," which had been so often held up as a model
to the continental countries by French reformers in the eighteenth
century, in spite of many misconceptions about it by its admirers,
was no empty dream. The praises which they bestowed on it were
not usually regarded as exaggerated, because the writers who glori-
fied it wrote from the standpoint of the propertied bourgeoisie. The
demand for legal equality had been met as completely in England
as any representative of the middle class could wish. No English
law made any distinction between noble and commoner. No posi-
tion in the government, the army, or the Church, was reserved for
members of a special class. To be sure, in the case of landed prop-
erty there did exist the system of primogeniture, and peers had cer-
tain legal political privileges. But even these privileges did not ap-
pear oppressive, and the class which enjoyed them was not closed
against others, but was open to any new wealthy person. Although
socially also there were certain distinctions in favor of the "Old"
nobility, and although scions of distinguished families were given
preferences over sons of parvenus who had become rich in India, when
appointments were made to profitable positions in the government,
the army, or the Church, nevertheless there was no legal claim in
favor of younger sons of nobility; descendants of rich merchants
who had only recently risen in the world often secured the highest
appointments. There was besides no question about equality of
birth. Daughters of rich middle-class families could marry into the
circles of the large landowners without having to fear that their

COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 83

children would have a legal position inferior to that of the husbands.

Even in the matter of religion, where English legislation least
closely approached the ideals of the Revolution, there was no great
contrast between English practice and the ideals of Enlightenment, —
less at any rate than in almost any other European country in the
eighteenth century. Members of any other sect than the two Estab-
lished Churches were, to be sure, excluded from positions in the
government, in administration, and in public instruction; church
taxes had to be paid by every one, no matter to what religion he
belonged. But these were the only privileges enjoyed by members
of the Established Churches. No pressure was exercised by the state
upon Dissenters. England had been, and remained, the country of
"toleration" in the old technical sense of the word; and at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century practice went even further than
legislation, aside from the fact that government regulations were
sometimes vexatiously or maliciously enforced.

In business, manufacturing, and commerce the new revolutionary
doctrines also found less to attack than in other countries. To be
sure, the old guild regulations still existed, and also some privileged
trade corporations, but there was nowhere any trace of oppression.
For a long time, thanks partly to the complete pacification of the
country accomplished by the Tudors, the textile industry, the most
important industry of England next to the metal industries, had
grown up in the country districts, beyond the reach of guild regula-
tions; and, when the new factories sprang up with steam machinery
and therefore dependent on the coal mines, the new industrial cities
near these mines were completely free from the old restrictions. The
manufacturer who wanted to modernize his plant was restricted
neither by guild regulations nor by the patrician oligarchy in the
old town.

Although the English system offered little ground for attack from
the standpoint of the "French ideas," and although it had survived
unshaken during the storms of the revolutionary period, it was fall-
ing into sharper and sharper contradiction with the new economic
development of the country. There was, however, no class econom-
ically strong which was shut out from the government, as in many
states on the Continent, or which was subordinated legally to the
capitalists of the older sort. If one disregards the fact that certain
noble Catholic families and certain rich Dissenters were unable to
share in political life, one may say that Great Britain at that time
was a plutocracy with all the advantages of stability which goes with
such an organization. An opposition to the existing system by

84 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

propertied people was inconceivable; for almost every wealthy per-
son belonged to the favored classes himself. To be sure, there were
not lacking divisions within the capitalistic circles. The great land-
owning aristocracy, thanks to the old franchise system, still dom-
inated in politics over the representatives of the rising factories, and
the financial policy of the government was adapted more to the
needs of the growers of grain than of manufacturers, but nowhere
were real obstacles placed in the way of the new business activities.
On the other hand, the ever-increasing class of those without prop-
erty, particularly the factory workers, was treated as practically
almost without legal rights, and with severity. But before any ac-
count is given of this class, and of the economic structure of Eng-
land in general, attention must be called to two circumstances which
made possible the survival of so many old-fashioned institutions in
the British Isles.

The thing which most differentiated England politically at the
beginning of the nineteenth century from the continental' countries
was what has been misleadingly called "self-government," but which
might better be described as "government by local magnates and
an absence of independent government bureaucrats." As in the
Middle Ages, the exercise of countless activities which elsewhere
were in the hands of the state (police, collection of taxes, fixing of
wages, etc.) lay in the hands of the rich, particularly outside the
towns. They exercised this authority as a matter of honor, but also
naturally in the interests of their own class. As almost everywhere
else prior to the Revolution, the division of power between the
classes was the same in the army as in the civil service; that is, the
same propertied classes who as justices of the peace, for example,
ruled the agricultural day laborers and the factory workers in their
districts, were also those who secured the expensive places in the
army; and the same proletarians, from whom were recruited the
masses of workmen for the fields and the factories, also furnished the
rank and file of the armies. How was it possible that this situation
should have been able to survive in England in contrast to the Con-
tinent?

No historian can answer this question with a single phrase. Too
many factors combined to bring about this phenomenon for any
single explanation. But if the observer leaves aside all the less im-
portant influences, two reasons of prime importance may be noted.

One reason, which was particularly important after the personal
union of England and Scotland in 1603, lay in England's insular
position. The pressure for military centralization and for the crea-

COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 85

tion of a unified body of military officials did not exist in England,
so the creation of a bureaucracy was not necessary. No less im-
portant, perhaps, was the other reason. The main influence in mod-
ernizing administration, that is, in replacing unreliable feudal ad-
visers by dependable state officials, has, as is well known, always
been the financial need of the state, — particularly the necessity of
making the capital of the citizens quickly available for armaments
or for carrying on war. There was no greater obstacle for govern-
ments in this than survivals of the "feudal system": the privileges
in the matter of taxation enjoyed by the propertied classes and the
right of granting taxes enjoyed by the "estates," which were usually
identical with the propertied classes. Most of the "reforms" in
state administration have arisen from this financial need, and it is
well known that financial bankruptcy was the immediate occasion
of the French Revolution.

Now, England possessed a double advantage: on the one hand,
the revenues of the state could be largely increased without aban-
doning the old self-government; and, on the other hand, her insular
position made it safe for her not to create means for carrying on
war. Although there existed countless well-paid sinecures, and al-
though the state revenues were very loosely administered, England
was, nevertheless, the most powerful country financially of the time.
The soil was more productive of wealth than that of its rivals among
the Great Powers, although with the exception of Prussia it was
the smallest state in area and population. (Great Britain with Ire-
land had, at the time, 16,000,000 inhabitants; France, over 27,000,-
ooo ; Austria, about 23,000,000.) This financial strength depended
primarily on the economic prosperity of the British Isles and this
economic prosperity could be made available, because the same
classes who amassed wealth were also those who enjoyed political
power, who were most directly interested in having the state ma-
chine function properly, and who therefore, did not try to evade
taxation.

The Industrial Revolution (see ch. iii) now enormously accen-
tuated this situation, — the practical rule of the rich based on the
exploitation of the poor, who, ever since the rise of the domestic
textile industry in the second half of the sixteenth century, could
be forced to work and receive wages fixed by the state. The develop-
ment of industry on a large scale, the lengthening of the hours of
labor made possible through steam and water power, the smaller
need for physically powerful workers, and the resulting increased
employment of women and children in the factories — all these fac-

86 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

tors which have been sketched in that chapter — were taking place
in England about 1815. The gulf between "the poor" and "the
rich" was now enormously widened and the number of the "ex-
ploited" extraordinarily increased. In place of separate families
who worked scattered through the country, there now grew up whole
new cities. The wages of the workers were, in general, not much
smaller than formerly, but the living conditions were incomparably
worse. Huddled together in primitive, hastily constructed rows of
buildings, without care and without education, financially dependent
upon the will of the factory owner, who also often represented the
authority of the state — such was the life of the mass of population,
and the more manufactures increased the more agriculture decreased.

Were there any legal remedies for this? Did the much-praised
British constitution afford any possibility that parliamentary legis-
lation might interfere in the interests of humanity, at any rate for
the benefit of the unprotected women and children?

Whoever considers the franchise which at that time controlled
elections to Parliament can answer this question only in the negative.

The House of Commons, that is, the body which usually deter-
mined the make-up and the policy of the executive, was elected
mainly by the propertied classes. A majority (467 members) were
elected in boroughs where the candidates of the richest landlords
of the neighborhood or of the city patricians were almost always
chosen without a contest. Many places which had once had the
duty or the right of sending members to the House of Commons
either no longer existed or had sunk to a few miserable buildings,
owing to the extension of sheep-raising at the expense of agriculture.
In these "rotten boroughs" and "pocket boroughs," the election of
members of Parliament was in practice simply the unquestioned
property of the owner of the soil on which the place happened to be.
Even in the county elections, in which the small freeholders had a
share, the influence of the most powerful local magnate was, in most
cases, decisive. This lay partly in the fact that elections were public,
and the elector had to have his vote registered publicly. The only
really popular elections were those which took place in a few of the
great city electoral districts, particularly in the London district of
Westminster; because there pressure by landlords was impossible.

The prospect that the new class of factory employees could ever
get any considerable number of representatives of their own into the
House of Commons was therefore very slight. There remained only
three possibilities by which their demands and those of the philan-
thropists might secure a hearing,

COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 87

The first possibility was that the class of those who were discon-
tented and shut out from political activity should seek the support
of one of the two great parties in order by a combination of strength
to drive the opposition party from power. The conditions were not
unfavorable for such a combination. For a long time power had
shifted back and forth between two groups — the Tories and the
Whigs. The two rival parties did not differ from one another through
any difference in class interests; they both represented a group of
propertied citizens, but their adherents within the electorate were
not equally strong. The Whigs were originally a group of higher
nobles who were liberal-minded opponents of strong royal power,
since it tended to weaken their own strength. They were not exactly
loved by the great body of small land owners, who were strongly
conservative in religion and politics. These latter belonged, for the
most part, to the Tory party, and, thanks to the franchise system of
the time, formed a majority of the voters. This naturally had the
result that the Whigs gladly inclined toward reforms which would
increase the number of those likely to vote for the Whig party, as,
for example, the Dissenters in the towns. Indeed, the whole middle
class, the manufacturers and large merchants, were more favorably
inclined to the Whigs than to the Tories, because the Tories put
the interests of agriculture too much in the foreground. Since the
old franchise, which antedated the modern factory system, gave
privileges to the class of grain producers in the south of England,
instead of to the new group of manufacturers in the coal districts
in the west, it was reasonable to expect that the Whigs would favor
an extension of the suffrage beyond the classes who already enjoyed
it. And if a breach were once made in the old exclusive system,
workingmen might hope that their wishes would be given more
consideration than hitherto. There was the further fact that the
panicky fear of political innovations which seized England as a
result of the French Revolution had taken much less hold in the
enlightened circles of the Whigs than on the feelings of the Tories.

The second possibility lay in the fact that workingmen might com-
bine in organizations and attempt by extra-legal demonstrations and
revolutionary attacks to force from their opponents what they could
not secure by political means from Parliament as it was then con-
stituted. This method was tried along with the first, but combina-
tions of workingmen, as a result of their precarious financial posi-
tion, had so little power that the support of one of the two great
parties was absolutely indispensable.

A third possibility for the improvement of conditions lay in the

88 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

humanitarian movement, which was everywhere growing stronger
(see ch. vi). It was precisely in England that the movement was
most influential. This was not only due to the strength of religious
influences, which were changing, as a result of Enlightenment, more
and more into philanthropic channels; nor was it due only to the
misery, greater in England than elsewhere, because in no other
country did the Industrial Revolution dominate economic life to
nearly so great an extent; it was rather on the favorable economic
situation that the strength of these humanitarian tendencies in Eng-
land rested. Although the close of the Napoleonic Wars and the
new commercial policy of the Continental states disturbed inexperi-
enced manufacturers in many ways, and resulted in many periods
of industrial crisis after 1815, nevertheless the supremacy of British
industry was so well established that it could bear financially the
luxury, so to speak, of interference in the interests of humanity.
The best example of this is the prohibition of the slave-trade shortly
before the period of which we are speaking, an act which was bound
to injure exclusively British trade, but which was nevertheless passed
because the traffic in negroes was repugnant to the newly awakened
feeling concerning the rights of man.

At this point some general observations in regard to English
economic life may be inserted. At this time, and often afterwards,
the English were called a nation of shopkeepers, and their whole
policy was interpreted in the light of "commercial interests." Who-
ever talks in this way neither understands English policy nor knows
what a nation of shopkeepers is. The very thing that has made for
the strength of Great Britain has been that its people have not de-
voted themselves exclusively to commerce, as, for instance, the
Dutch or the Venetians were compelled to do. Certainly English
commerce is not insignificant, and in negotiations with foreign coun-
tries a regard for this branch of the nation's activity has certainly
played a considerable part. But this was partly due precisely to
the fact that British commerce, being relatively the weakest branch
of English economic activity, was most in need of state protection.
As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the nineteenth century and
for centuries earlier, the prosperity of the British Isles had rested
more on manufacturing than on commerce, and domestic policy was
more determined by care for the interests of growers of grain than
of merchants. The very fact that England was not restricted nar-
rowly to one branch of economic activity gave her policy a certain
grandeur and made it independent of disturbances in particular
branches of economic life,

COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 89

Much the same thing may be observed as to the condition of
internal politics. There, also, the position of the plutocracy was
so firmly established that no observer can deny to the system a cer-
tain trait of greatness. Freedom of discussion existed to an extent
which was unthinkable in any other country. So long as there was no
suspicion that revolution was advocated as a fundamental principle,
the government did not interfere by force in discussions. Intellectual
activity, particularly if it was in the interests of the upper classes,
was well paid and generally highly regarded. Even die "abuses"
of the old system were often favorable to talent. Gifted and am-
bitious young men without wealth who gladly put their abilities at
the service of a party found it easier even than in France to take
part in political life. How many a young man had reached the high-
est positions in the government by means of a "pocket borough,"
as the young Whig Macaulay rose to the dignity of cabinet minister
and civil governor of India ! It was also one of the ancient practices
of the British system that service of the state was by no means
always poorly paid. Men of talent but not of means were not
compelled to renounce a political career because a civilian salary was
insufficient to live on unless it were eked out by some side occupa-
tion or by forbidden methods of graft. The only name to designate
the old English system is "plutocracy." ( The word "aristocracy" I
shall avoid here and wherever possible; such a conception, which
was precise in ancient times, is no longer accurate, since it is ap-
plied to modern institutions which are only superficially analogous,
and since it is also applied to matters outside the field of politics.)
So England at that time may be called a plutocracy; but it would
be a mistake to conclude from this that money alone, and not intel-
lectual preeminence also, counted for something and brought results
in politics.

At the beginning of the period here treated, in the years imme-
diately following the Congress of Vienna, England was still under
the influence of the "Panic of the French Revolution" (see ch. v).
The idea of Conservatism as a fundamental principle, which was
caused by the reaction from the French Revolution, had already been
formulated in England; to this was now added the further fact that
the British Empire had been in almost unbroken bitter conflict with
the country where the new ideas originated. The revolutionary
movement also appeared even more dangerous than thirty years
before. The Industrial Revolution had become more widespread in
its consequences, and the commercial crises after 1815 had increased

go RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

.the misery and the discontent of the wage-earners. The neglect of
internal affairs, natural during the war, still continued; in fact, it
was greater, inasmuch as the upper classes no longer continued the
patriotic sacrifice which they had formerly been making (in the
shape of the payment of income taxes). The Tories had almost
uncontested power.

But now great changes were perceptible, both within the ruling
classes and in the new class of industrial workingmen. The Whigs
soon lost their fear of any change in the traditional system; they
even sought the help of the discontented to drive their opponents
from power ; and along with them many of the ruling classes desired
reforms from humanitarian motives. On the other hand, the work-
ingmen began to combine together by public demonstration and by
agitation in the press, in order to make Parliament yield to their
wishes.

It is not surprising that the Whigs succeeded sooner than the
workingmen; their efforts were less in conflict with the economic
interests of the ruling classes than were the workingmen's demands.
Accordingly, particularly in the years following 1820, when the
younger generation among the Tories had acquired greater influ-
ence, there was passed a whole series of reforms in accordance with
the French ideas of equality and of humanity. The extraordinarily
severe criminal laws were modified and brought nearer to Continental
ideals. The penalty for poaching or for stealing a purse was no
longer death. The tariff was lowered; above all things, the
importation of wheat was permitted when the price stood at sixty-
six (instead of eighty) shillings; that is, the profit which grain
growers had been extorting from consumers by high bread prices
was lowered. The exceptional laws against Protestant Dissenters,
such as their exclusion from all public office, were abolished in 1828.
In the following year Catholic Emancipation placed the Roman
Catholics also on a footing of legal equality.

Many of these innovations were due to the divisions within the
Tory party, which often gave the Whigs an opportunity to carry
through their plans. But there was still lacking the decisive act
which should open the way for radical reform. This did not take
place until the workingmen had been able to call attention to their
claims more effectively.

Immediately after the Treaty of Vienna there had begun a public
agitation against the existing regime. The agitators were made up
of workingmen thrown out of employment by the commercial crises.
They were led by a few writers of small circumstances who did not

COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 91

stand in with the plutocracy and who demanded a reform of the
existing system "from the roots upwards" — called therefore "Radi-
cals." They adopted "French ideas," particularly the idea of uni-
versal suffrage. The ablest journalist in this movement, a peasant's
son named Cobbett, reduced the price of his paper to what according
to the notions of the time was the extraordinarily low price of two-
pence, because he wanted "all the wage-earners and workers of Eng-
land" to be roused for the fight for electoral reform. (For reasons
which have been explained, this reform in England would mean a
change in the system of government.)

So in 1816 and the following years there were public meetings to
protest against the abuses and the misery of the workingmen. The
government at first adopted an absolutely unconciliatory attitude. It
refused to consider the demands of the demonstrators, and broke up
their meetings by military force. Parliament voted strict regulations
against "incendiary writings" and their authors.

But the agitation was not put down by such methods, and when,
in 1819, a new commercial crisis set in, the revolutionary agitation
began anew. This time it had its center in Manchester, that is, in
the heart of the new manufacturing district. It was characteristic
of the class character of the movement that it aimed particularly at
the abolition of the corn laws, as well as at the political measures
which have already been mentioned — universal suffrage, the secret
ballot, pay for members of Parliament, etc. Since there were prac-
tically no independent small peasant proprietors in England, the in-
terests of the consumers were practically identical with those of the
poor in the matter of the corn laws. Again the government used
troops and broke up a great meeting at Peterloo, near Manchester,
which aimed at strengthening the demands of the Radicals. New
and greater powers for the suppression of revolutionary agitation
were conferred upon those who exercised police jurisdiction, such as
the justices of the peace.

It was only gradually, and thanks to the influence of the younger
generation, that certain concessions were made. In 1825 Parliament
gave the workingmen at least a limited right of combination, although
combinations for certain purposes, such as the abolition of piece-
work, were still forbidden. Their first great success, however, was
the reform movement after 1830.

It was, indeed, not the July Revolution alone which led the Oppo-
sition to victory. To be sure, the fall of Charles X stirred the dis-
contented elements in England, no less than in other countries. In
various industrial centers there were formed political associations of

92 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

workingmen, and attempts were made to unite these hitherto scat-
tered organizations into one national trade-union in order to force a
minimum wage. But to this revival of agitation there were added
two new factors which alone enabled reform to succeed.

One of these was the industrial prosperity which was becoming
more and more apparent after the economic readjustment following
1815. The period of sharp alternations between overproduction
and unemployment had passed. The opportunity for marketing
goods was enormously extended by the use of the steam engine for
transportation on land. (In 1825 was opened the first railway for
the transportation of goods between Manchester and Liverpool.)
English industry could now bear without injury certain burdens and
limitations on the freedom with which capital had exploited labor.
But at the same time the misery increased, corresponding to the
increase in the number of people without the means of livelihood
who could be sent to work in the factories and compelled to serve
as apprentices. In 1827 it was estimated that almost two million
people received state aid. It was less and less possible to ignore the
demands of humanity.

The other factor which aided the Radicals came from one of the
great middle-class political parties. The Whigs were no longer
afraid of joining with the workingmen in order to overthrow the
Tories. Monster meetings could now be held undisturbed. There
were even threats of violence against manufacturers and opponents
of reform; there were even the rumblings of a general insurrection.
Under this pressure Parliament at last gave in and accepted the Whig
Reform Bill of 1832. This passed the House of Lords, where the
rich classes had a larger representation, by a small majority merely,
and even then only after the Whig ministry had threatened to force
the passage of the bill by the creation of new peers.

There can be no doubt that with the Reform Bill of 1832 the Old
Regime in England was definitely set aside. But it would be a de-
cided mistake to think that the bill replaced at once the old pluto-
cratic government by a constitution of a French revolutionary nature,
or that it erected a new government from top to bottom. The
Reform Bill worked out as one might have expected from the com-
position of the victorious coalition and the legal form in which the
change took place: it was a compromise and indeed a compromise
in which the stronger partner, that is, the Whigs, carried away the
lion's share of the booty. But this need not blind one to the
importance of the fact that a reform in the sacred British con-
stitution had been brought about owing to the demands of Radicals.

COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 93

The way was now open for further reform, even for the complete
adoption of the "French" system, and every reform in the fran-
chise, that is, in the composition of the highest political authority,
made the next reform easier. Furthermore, thanks to the bloodless
and legal character of the political change, no reactionary tendency
survived in active political life. Naturally there were not lacking
Tories who were as much opposed to the Reform Bill after 1832 as
before, but no practical politician could blink the fact that it would
be impossible to restore afterwards what could not be rescued at
that time from the attack of the Radicals. Never, therefore, has
any attempt been made to go back on the step taken in 1832. The
friends of reform had to encounter opponents who did not want to
go any further, but never those who made reactionary restoration
a part of their program. It is not necessary to explain more fully
how much easier this made the task of further political reform.

After these general observations, the most important innovations
of the Reform Bill and its consequences may be mentioned.

In the first place, the privileges of the large landowners were de-
cidedly curtailed. To be sure, polling in public remained, but the
polls were to be kept open for only two consecutive days. Above all
things, the little boroughs in which members had been nominated
exclusively by the landowners were now abolished. These "seats"
were now redistributed and given particularly to the great cities
which had arisen as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Further,
the franchise was no longer bound up with possession of the soil
(as had hitherto been generally the rule). Although persons who
were quite poor and those who had no home of their own did not
receive the vote, nevertheless householders who paid a rental of £10
annually were placed on the same footing in the boroughs as owners
of houses.

This meant not only a considerable increase in the number of
voters (one person in twenty-two instead of one in thirty-two), but
also the inclusion of new classes in the ranks of those who exercised
political power. The small bourgeoisie and the class of leaseholders
now shared in the election to the House of Commons. The cities in
the industrial regions of the north and west received parliamentary
representation. On the other hand, the majority of the workingmen
were still excluded from the franchise. In some towns whose popu-
lation, owing to economic changes, consisted only of workingmen,
the workingmen even lost a political advantage because such decay-
ing boroughs were now deprived of representation in Parliament.

But it would be a mistake to conclude that the Parliament elected

94 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

on this new basis was as opposed to reform in favor of the work-
mgmen as the old Parliament. An official investigation brought to
light such frightful conditions among the working classes that the
government stepped in and in 1833 through Lord Ashley's efforts
passed the First Factory Act. Since people still held the doctrine
that adults were in a position to look out for themselves, this Fac-
tory Act was aimed primarily at the protection of children, who had
hitherto been exploited in the most pitiless fashion. Children under
the age of ten could now be employed only eight hours a day, chil-
dren from thirteen to eighteen years of age only twelve hours at the
utmost. Night work for children was absolutely forbidden. To
watch over these regulations, factory inspectors were created — the
first invasion of the unlimited authority which manufacturers had
exercised. The so-called truck system was also forbidden, that is,
the abuse by which workingmen were paid in goods instead of in
cash.

Ten years later this quite inadequate law was followed by another.
In addition to children, women were now protected by the state, and
the employment of small children was forbidden altogether. The
mining law of 1842 put an end to the employment of women and
of children under ten years of age in the mines. (It had been dis-
covered that children only five years old were working twelve hours
a day in the mines along with convicts.) A law of 1844 forbade the
employment of children under nine years in the textile industries,
and at the same time introduced compulsory attendance at school.
A final step in this movement was the law of 1847, which established
everywhere a ten-hour day for women and children. This law was
all the more important because, owing to the character of the fac-
tory system, many adult male workers also now enjoyed the ten-
hour day.

Supplementary to these laws was the Poor Law of 1834, which
did away with the discretionary authority of the overseers of the
poor, and for the first time placed in power paid officials who were
independent of the local aristocracy. A central poor-law board was
established which was given compulsory powers against the local
magistrates. Similarly, care was taken for the improvement of sani-
tation and the maintenance of highways (which, in England, had
been left to private initiative, as England was a country which was
not open to military attack). The number of sinecures which had
been parcelled out among the propertied classes was considerably
reduced. In the towns the privileges of the "old families" were
abolished and all taxpayers enjoyed the same rights (1835). In the

COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 95

Established Church the bishop's pay was fixed at a definite sum
(still very high) and the surplus was put in a fund out of which the
hitherto badly paid parsons were to be supported.

All these measures, in accordance with the policy of the Whigs,
were compromises. Nothing was overturned anywhere except what
was necessary. Crying abuses were done away with, but nowhere
was there an attempt at systematic construction. This, in general,
gave satisfaction. There was compensation and advantage in that
over-hasty changes were avoided, although the workingmen found
themselves cheated in the outcome of the reform movement to which
they themselves had given the impulse. It has been pointed out
that the Parliament elected on the basis of the Reform Bill of 1832
was not wholly untrue to its program and passed a number of laws
for the protection of women and children. But practically nothing
had been done for the adult male workingmen, and the new fran-
chise gave them no more share in the government than the old.
The formation of a labor party or even of a strong radical group
in the House of Commons was still as unthinkable as before. The
workingmen had the feeling that they had been betrayed by the
Whigs and they returned to their old policy of demonstrations.
They also began to form purely class organizations. Under the
leadership of the cotton manufacturer and philanthropist, Robert
Owen, who for a long time had devoted himself to the cause of
social reform, there was founded in 1833 (the year after the Reform
Bill) the National Consolidated Trades Union. This aimed at "a
new moral world" and proclaimed the eight-hour day as part of its
program. Parliament was to be forced to give in by a general strike.

But the workingmen were still too poor to carry through such an
undertaking. Not only did the manufacturers unite together in an
opposing association the same year and agree to lock out all mem-
bers of the workingmen's association, but the government also de-
nounced Owen's association as an "unlawful conspiracy," and con-
demned several guilty persons to deportation. The government
proved itself stronger than the poorly-paid workingmen, who were
not able to carry through their strike. After only a year, the idea
of a general strike was dropped as hopeless in 1834.

The result was much the same when shortly afterwards the radical
party again began to act with the workingmen. This new phase of
the movement is distinguished ?.t bottom from the old only by the
fact that, thanks to the intellectuals, the demands of the working-
men were set forth in a precise program called The People's Charter.
This was the name given to the petition which was drawn up in 1838

96 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

and soon presented to Parliament. The Charter — whose advocates
were known as "Chartists" — true to the principles of radicalism,
laid the emphasis on demands of a political nature, that is, upon
changes in the composition of Parliament, because it was expected
that a Parliament elected by universal suffrage would at once fulfil
the wishes of the workingmen (an expectation which was natural in
England where there were practically no small peasants).

The agitation was now mainly carried on by the same methods
as prior to the Reform Bill, that is, primarily with the aid of mass
meetings, demonstrations, and occasionally revolutionary threats.
Just as in the earlier period, the strength of the movement rose
and fell; when trade was good, the agitation declined. In another
connection, on the other hand, times were changed: the new Lib-
eral government of the Whigs, which the Reform Bill had brought
into power, did not attempt any measures of suppression.

The success of the Chartists was, however, no greater. The peti-
tion for the introduction of universal suffrage, which was presented
to Parliament in 1839, was not even discussed by the House of
Commons. Threats of violence were ineffective, though some isolated
outbreaks did actually take place. The attempt at a general strike,
which was to force Parliament to accept the Charter, had no better
success (1842). A last effort of the Chartists in 1848, occasioned
by the February Revolution in France, was nipped in the bud,
partly with the aid of the bourgeoisie who came forward and volun-
teered as special constables.

Even before this, in 1845, the Trade Unions had separated from
the Chartists and adopted a new policy which for a long time con-
stituted the peculiarity of workingmen's conditions in England:
agreements with separate employers were reached by means of arbi-
tration or peaceful settlement; and, on the other hand, workingmen
abstained from regular political activity and merely sought protec-
tive legislation from Parliament. The success of this policy was so
great, that for more than a generation the revolutionary socialistic
movement came to an end in England. Naive observers, who
thought that they could draw a general conclusion simply from the
experience of one generation, believed that English workingmen had
some mysterious trait in their character which simply spoiled them
altogether for becoming socialists. As a matter of fact, this cessa-
tion of socialistic agitation was due to quite other reasons. Here
only the most important may be mentioned.

In the first place, the steady growth and prosperity of English
industry contributed essentially to an improvement in the condition

COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 97

of workingmen. The more the market was extended for giant fac-
tory production, as a result of technical inventions and increase of
purchasing power, due in part to the general increase in population
and the establishment of colonies of Europeans (in America), — the
more the market was extended in these ways, just so much more
could better wages be offered to English workingmen without any
misgivings lest the employer would really suffer in his profits. For-
eign competition did not exist at all until the last quarter of the
nineteenth century.

Thanks to the liberal provisions in the United States for poor
immigrants who wanted to work (see below, ch. xv), the English
workingman found on the other side of the ocean people of his own
language and stamp and was able to rise and become independent
without the economic system being in any way changed in his home
country. In the 1 830*3 there began to flow into the United States
a great stream of English immigrants, which drained out of Eng-
land precisely the elements which would have actively supported a
revolution.

Finally, it must not be overlooked that the English government,
after the system of conservatism had been broken in 1832, began to
take up perhaps a passive, but by no means a hostile, attitude to-
ward the workingmen. Parliament no longer laid obstacles in their
way. Furthermore it did not demand of them any direct sacrifice
for the state, such as universal military service. Therefore, so long
as economic conditions remained relatively favorable, there could
not develop any hatred against the system of government, which, as
will be pointed out later (in ch. xxxii), was even ready to make
further political concessions.

From the point of view of world history, perhaps this first phase
of the English workingmen's movement is of most importance from
the influence which it exercised upon the origin and form of in-
ternational social-democratic doctrines. As is known, Engels and
Marx drew their deductions primarily from the reports which were
made by English official commissions into the conditions of the fac-
tory employees. Now it was quite natural that the critics of the
capitalist factory system drew their examples mainly from English
conditions; for Great Britain was the only country which had been
fundamentally changed in character by the Industrial Revolution.
It was also quite natural that they generalized from certain English
phenomena, such as the fact that the Whigs as well as the Tories
were a plutocratic party; this seems to have given rise to the
Marxian phrase, "the reactionary mass." But more than this, certain

98 RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

specific English conditions were conceived of in a wholly incorrect
way, as if they prevailed everywhere. To mention only one mis-
conception: it was maintained that economic development in agri-
culture tended toward the creation of great landed estates, just as
it tended toward large scale production in manufacturing, a view
which from the outset was applicable only to England and which
involved a disregard of the question as to what attitude Socialism
was to take toward a system of small peasant proprietors. Another
example, perhaps, is the fact that the problems of military organi-
zation and of national defense find little place in the socialistic
theory; these were questions which in Great Britain were not live
questions, or, to put it more accurately, had no direct connection
with the demands of the English workingmen.

Finally, it may have helped to bridge over the gap between the
workingmen and the upper classes that the reform party at last
won a complete victory in the matter of the Corn Laws. Here,
in closing the chapter, therefore, an account of this must be given,
because it prepared the end of the economic Old Regime in England.
Although the tariff on imported grain had been somewhat lowered
(see p. 90), it was still in existence. The Corn Laws had two advan-
tages. One benefited a definite class, the owners of the soil, since
the tariff guaranteed the growers of grain a minimum profit. The
second advantage affected the nation as a whole: the fact that
domestic agriculture was protected seemed to make England inde-
pendent of imported grain in case of war. Both these arguments,
but especially the first, were, however, most strenuously combated
by a group of manufacturers. It was not permissible, they said, to
impose high bread prices on industry and particularly on the work-
ingmen, simply to give a good profit to Tory landlords; as for war,
there was no better way of preventing that than by general free
trade. How many international conflicts had arisen from disputes
about trade and tariffs! If only these restrictions upon international
commerce were abolished, they said, then wars in general would
become impossible; and then the last reason for the Corn Law
system would disappear.

As is evident, the free trade movement did not merely aim at the
abolition of the Corn Laws. It aimed at an establishment of a new
world order based on peace in general. It naturally had its center,
therefore, in Manchester, and the greater part of its advocates were
in the circles of large manufacturers and merchants, but not exclu-
sively so. With these classes were associated also numerous repre-

COLLAPSE OF OLD REGIME IN ENGLAND 99

sentatives of liberal, pacifistic ideas. By the side of the chief propa-
gandist in favor of free trade, the idealistically-minded cotton mer-
chant, Richard Cobden, there stood a typical representative of
radical doctrines, the Quaker, John Bright. It goes without saying
that the Anti-Corn-Law League gradually won the approval of the
workingmen, who were the very ones who suffered most directly from
the Corn Laws.

Many of the theories of Cobden and his companions may be un-
tenable as general propositions, but one can scarcely deny that they
were thoroughly in harmony with economic conditions in Great
Britain at that time. Now since the population of England had
enormously increased as a result of the Industrial Revolution, the
country had scarcely any other choice except to devote itself whole-
heartedly to modern industry. To maintain the Corn Laws was to
halt halfway; they made food dear without guaranteeing an adequate
domestic production of food. If all the restrictions on industry and
trade which had been imposed for the advantage of other classes
were abolished, then these two branches of economic activity, on
which the welfare of the British treasury finally rested, could flourish
to their full extent. In addition, there was the uncontested supe-
riority of English manufactured goods, which made competition of
foreign factories still impossible; the English manufacturer needed
no protective tariff for his products; likewise the English govern-
ment needed no tariff for revenue, since its other financial resources
were sufficiently productive. Finally there was the view, widely
prevalent at the time, that the period of great European wars had
gone by — that the period of peace, beginning in 1815, was the advent
of an age free from war.

Under these circumstances Cobden's agitation was sure of success
in the end. The Conservatives, that is the landlord party, sought at
first, to be sure, to break the attack of the free-traders by compro-
mises. In opposition to the rigid right wing of his party, the neo-
conservative minister, Peel, lowered the tariff on grain in 1842; later
he completely abolished the bounties on exports and reduced the
duties on imports. But the famine of 1845 showed that the British
Isles already had too great a population for even a limited system
of protection on grain. The domestic production was no longer suf-
ficient under any conditions.

In addition to this came a hitherto unknown potato rot in Ire-
land. Even if potatoes could have been used as a complete substi-
tute for wheat, there was no guarantee that they would suffice to
feed the population. Thousands died of hunger in Ireland at this

ioo RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE

time. After this calamity, it was impossible to delay longer the
final act: a majority of the Conservatives did indeed vote to retain
the Corn Laws, just as formerly; but a seceding minority was strong
enough, in combination with the Liberals, to secure a majority for
the cause of free trade in the House of Commons. The Corn Laws
were abolished in 1846.

The economic basis of the old Tory Party was thereby definitely
destroyed. The Liberal Party of large manufacturers and merchants
won the upper hand over the class of large landlords. To be sure,
landowners retained their social prestige, but agriculture in England
was no longer profitable. The possession of great estates became
more and more merely a social luxury for families who drew their
wealth from other sources. The military situation in the islands
became much more precarious. As population increased and agri-
culture declined, the ultimate decision in a war with one of the great
European Powers would now be determined exclusively by the ques-
tion whether the British navy could assure the importation of the
necessary food supply. By her lack of military preparation, Eng-
land was forced more and more to adopt a policy of peace in Europe,
and to avoid any European war.

But for the moment, the most important problem of English in-
ternal policy seemed to have been satisfactorily settled. Only one
trouble remained, which, instead of losing its bitterness, became
steadily more serious: the Irish question. For the sake of the clear-
ness of the narrative, no account of it is given here, but it will be
considered in a separate chapter below (ch. xx). Before this, it is
convenient to explain the results of the Industrial Revolution which
have been of most importance in world history: the settlement of
Europeans outside the old continent, and in this connection the
colonial policy of the European nations and its consequences during
the first half of the hundred-year period which we are considering.

BOOK III
FROM THE OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO THE NEW

CHAPTER XV
EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

IF the over-population of many European countries, which resulted
chiefly from the Industrial Revolution and which necessitated the
importation of food from abroad, found an outlet during the com-
mercial crises in the first decades of the nineteenth century (as has
been pointed out in the preceding chapter in connection with Eng-
land), this was primarily due to the fact that the United States of
America, with its still unsettled areas, offered the immigrant as ideal
a land as could be imagined.

The geographical conditions were as favorable as the political ones.

The mighty area commonly known as the Mississippi Valley,
which, during the first half of the nineteenth century and even down
to the i88o's, stood open for settlement, was endowed by Nature
with all the advantages which could attract settlers who were with-
out property, but able and industrious. Already Alexis de Tocque-
ville, the great French writer, in the book which he published in
1835, had recognized clearly the possibilities of westward expansion
for the population of the United States. He pictured the Mississippi
Valley as the most beautiful home which God had granted to man-
kind. Especially in the northern parts, that is, where slavery did
not exist, the climatic conditions were quite tolerable for Europeans,
although the ranges of temperature were sharper than in the cor-
responding latitudes in Europe. The main things, however, were the
exceeding richness of the soil, the climate which was favorable to
agricultural development, and the easy accessibility of the region,
thanks to the great rivers and the flatness of the land which made
the construction of railways very easy. No mention is here made
of the wealth of coal and iron, because these were scarcely consid-
ered by the immigrants.

Now in the year 1815 the western part of this vast region was
not settled at all, and even the part east of the Mississippi only to
a very slight extent. There stood at the disposal of European im-
migrants a region which seemed endlessly available, judging by the
rate at which population had grown hitherto. But the fact that this

103

io4 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

opportunity could be, and was, used so abundantly was due to the
political and social conditions no less than to the geographic.

Let us mention first the less important. One was the circumstance
that the immigrants, who in the first decades came chiefly from
Great Britain, found the same language, familiar customs, and
similar laws; and even those from the central part of Europe found
little that was strange in speech and custom. Then there was the
fact that complete religious freedom existed; the settler nowhere
needed to feel isolated because of his religious faith. But these
conditions, however important they might be, were less so than the
two decisive factors which first made the United States a regular
paradise for fugitives from the economic bonds of Europe.

One of these factors was of a political, the other of an economic,
nature.

The political factor consisted in the complete position of equality
which was accorded to a colonist after a relatively short residence.
He had a position of equality not only as compared with the natives
and the older settlers on the newly cleared land, but also with the
citizens of the United States in general.

It is necessary to digress a little to make the significance of this
fact clear.

Possessors of land which has to be cleared for agriculture have
naturally always tried to attract colonists by favorable conditions.
Since the soil yields a profit only if it is cultivated, and since no par-
ticular motive exists for the hard work of preparing it for agricul-
ture, this must be accomplished by offering rewards. Very often,
therefore, colonists have been endowed with extraordinary privi-
leges, even those who have been induced to settle by absolutist gov-
ernments.

But in all these cases there was one simple calculation at bottom.
Governments which forsook a part of the profit from newly-won
soil hoped to be richly compensated through the profit which would
come from bringing it into cultivation. But who would guarantee
that when the work was once accomplished the promises which had
had been made as an attraction would be lived up to? The privi-
leges which the ruler had given to colonists were exceptional, and
must in the course of time come to be regarded as anomalous. They
were also often of merely relative value; they might be preferable
to the heavy obligations put upon the ruler's other subjects, but still
not sufficient to secure real independence to the colonist.

Now the American system was absolutely different. The United
States was the first government in the world to abolish all legal

EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN UNITED STATES 105

distinctions among all (white) settlers, so that not even the fran-
chise was dependent upon property; this system of legal equality
was then simply extended to the colonized areas in the west. As
the Constitution of the United States recognized no distinction be-
tween old and new families, nor between landowners and merchants,
so there was also no superiority as between the original thirteen
colonies and the new states which were to be created. The so-called
Ohio or Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787, has been called one
of the most important laws of the United States (from the point of
world history it is perhaps even the most important). It provided
that every "territory" (colonial land which was given a provisional
status preparatory to full statehood), so soon as it had a definite
number of free inhabitants (60,000), should be incorporated into
the Union as a state on equal terms with the others. Thus the prin-
ciple was abandoned that the welfare of colonies ought to be subordi-
nated to that of the mother country; rather was the principle estab-
lished that colonies which are settled by a people are to be regarded
as an extension of the mother country and are to be put on an
equal footing with it in every respect.

To this wholly new principle was then added still another: that
the law of possession in the newly settled land should be on the
basis of small peasant proprietorship. From the outset (1785) Con-
gress decided that the land west of the Alleghanies should not be
held on a quit-rent or lease, but sold outright, free of obligations;
this provision, which theoretically would have permitted the growth
of large estates, was later (1820) made more democratic by lowering
the minimum price of the soil and reducing the minimum quantity
which should be sold to a single individual. The result was that any
man with only a hundred dollars could acquire a half quarter-section
(eighty acres) of public land, and even this purchase price, which
requires a small sum of hard cash in addition to what must be laid
out for buildings and stock, was soon declared no longer necessary.
Although the law provided that settlements should take place only
on surveyed land, that is, on the basis of a title derived from the
state, nevertheless, in the years 1830-1840, a preferential purchase
was accorded to the so-called "squatters," that is, persons who had
settled on United States lands without any kind of legal formality.
A man, therefore, who had cleared a piece of primeval forest could
not be dispossessed by a speculator when his work was finished
simply on the claim that the speculator had been the first to offer
the purchase price for the land to the government. A generation
later, the government went further, It has always been in accord-

io6 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

ance with liberal political conceptions in the United States that in-
dustry and ability on the part of settlers shall take precedence over
wealth, and the more democracy made its way the more the pur-
chase price of land was lowered. The influence of the plutocratic
South, however, steadily prevented taking the last step of giving the
land to the settlers without any charge at all. But when the War
of Secession took place between North and South, which will be
discussed in another connection (in ch. xxiv), consideration for the
plantation owners in the slave states was abandoned, and even this
principle was given recognition. Scarcely a year after war had been
declared, the so-called "Homestead Law" was passed in 1862. This
permitted every adult man who was a citizen of the United States,
or who expressed the intention of becoming one, to settle simply by
paying a small fee. The settler promised to cultivate the soil. If
he did this and cultivated his land uninterruptedly for five years,
he acquired without cost full possession of his "homestead."

The result of these laws was that the United States attracted into
the great Mississippi region not only a large number of industrious
farmers, but also a permanent stock of small proprietors who grew
up with the soil and who formed the strongest kind of a counter-
weight to proletarian influences from the manufacturing districts.
This development was also favored by the circumstance that because
of the enormous extent of vacant ground there were no agricultural
day laborers, such as are necessary for farming a large landed estate.
The elements in the population which in other countries would have
belonged to this class, in America received land of their own. The
extraordinary fertility of the soil demanded only a very small outlay
of capital at the beginning. The possibility of having complete con-
trol over the soil, which resulted from the laws of the Union being
extended over the whole territory, and especially from the lack of
laborers just mentioned, further brought it about that measures were
taken at the outset to provide for the marketing of the products.
The period of settlement on a large scale coincides with the intro-
duction of railways in the United States and the federal govern-
ment quickly paid much attention to this new invention. Enormous
areas of public land were provided with highways, canals, and above
all with railways. So, one may say, from the very outset, farmers
could reckon on a relatively developed transportation system, pro-
viding a market for their products. Similar, though perhaps with-
out such great consequences, were the arrangements which the gov-
ernment made for education. The federal government, in fact, in-

EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN UNITED STATES 107

sisted in the beginning that a relatively large part of the cleared
land should be reserved for the benefit of common and agricultural
schools. At first one, and later two, thirty-sixths of each "town-
ship" (each block of thirty-six square miles), into which the land
was surveyed, had to be reserved for educational purposes. If one
considers that the farmers settled almost exclusively on separate
farms, instead of being grouped in agricultural villages, and that
every small farmer working by himself felt personally responsible for
the economic development of his land, then one can easily appreciate
the significance of this care for systematic education.

The colonization of the North American continent was thus pre-
pared by the United States in the very best way possible; but the
fact that it took place with such unheard-of rapidity was, neverthe-
less, not due to the Americans themselves. In the first years of the
nineteenth century the westward movement beyond the Alleghanies
was already relatively strong. Both the farmers of New England
and the southern "poor whites" (white inhabitants in the Southern
states who had only a very few slaves or none at all) gladly sought
the fertile soil or the more favorable conditions of life in the Mis-
sissippi Valley. As far as numbers go, this migration was moderate;
it suffices to point out that in 1800 the United States had about
five million inhabitants. But so soon as the Industrial Revolution,
and also the period of peace after 1815, began to show results in an
increase of population, there set in an ever-increasing immigration
from Europe. Now began to be felt the full force of the circum-
stance that no other country offered settlers such favorable geo-
graphical, social, and political conditions as the United States. The
number of European immigrants, which in the decade 1821-1830
numbered 143,000 (scarcely more than in the preceding decade),
rose suddenly in the following ten years to almost 600,000. Still
more striking was the increase in the next decade, 1841-1850: during
this period 713,000 immigrants arrived. The same increasing ratio
is seen in the numbers who arrived year by year: 1842 was the first
year in which the immigrants numbered more than 100,000, but in
1847 rnore than 200,000 entered the United States.

It has already been explained why the United States did not ex-
perience any difficulties of the kind that most of the European coun-
tries faced. It was pointed out that, thanks to the complete legal
equality which was assured to the new settlers, there were no fun-
damental conflicts between them and those who had been already
long established; never could the immigrant have the feeling that

io8 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

his economic interests were sacrificed or subordinated to those of the
"mother country." But the complete political Americanization of
the immigrant population was favored by still other circumstances.
Some of these have been already mentioned, such as the fact that
they were provided with land of their own; the school system may
have helped to some extent, although it would appear that this in-
fluence has often been exaggerated. But there came the accidental
advantage to America that the first crowds of settlers were made up
of elements which could be fairly easily assimilated. The great
majority of the immigrants came naturally from the over-populated
countries of Europe in which the propertyless classes were blocked
either by the existence of large landed estates or by the fact that
the soil was already completely occupied. These were the condi-
tions which prevailed in the 1830*3 and '40*3, primarily in the
British Isles, and especially in Ireland. From 1829 to 1879 more
than half the immigrants (53 per cent) came from Great Britain and
Ireland, and during the first decades of this period the percentage
was a good deal larger still. The great majority of the new settlers
were therefore at least acquainted in speech and in thought with the
older colonists; they quickly felt at home. And though they did
not lose their love for their old home, still they thought of them-
selves primarily as Americans. The second great stream of immi-
grants which began to flow in the 1 850*8 from Germany (34 per
cent of the total immigration in the years 1820-1879) also proved
accessible to American influences. In speech and custom they dif-
fered from the Yankees more than the settlers from England, yet
on the other hand they were attracted still more strongly by certain
peculiarly American institutions. Not a few of them had left their
Fatherland precisely because they missed there the equality before
the law which they found in the United States; especially the numer-
ous immigrants from the eastern provinces of Prussia, who had wit-
nessed the failure of the Liberals to overthrow the power of the
Junker landlords, were extraordinarily impressed by the contrast,
and as a result were notably contented with the more favorable
conditions in America. The same is true of the immigrants from
Scandinavia, though their numbers were not large (three per cent);
with them the main motive was the fact that the infertile soil of
their mother country could not support a large number of inhab-
itants.

Still it would be a mistake to say that the origin of the immi-
grants was the dominating factor. It is not impossible that America
would have had the same good success with immigrants from other

EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN UNITED STATES 109

parts of Europe, for, aside from the beneficial laws, the enormous
extent of vacant soil and the general economic organization of the
United States were of prime importance. At the time of the great
immigration between 1830 and 1860 America was still predomi-
nantly an agricultural country; large scale manufacturing was as
yet inconsiderable. The immigrant therefore not only had an oppor-
tunity to acquire fertile land for almost nothing, but he was not
enticed away by the rival attractions afforded by industrial estab-
lishments. There had not yet grown up the great factories seeking
cheap foreign labor. It was therefore natural and dependent little,
if at all, upon the nationality of the immigrants, that in these early
decades they did not congregate in the great cities and manufac-
turing districts as they did later, but settled down on the soil as
free peasant proprietors. No impartial judge, therefore, can say
it is inconceivable, or even improbable, that in case the Italian
immigration had been as large in the years 1830-1860 as it was later
(in the years 1903-1906 when it formed 24 per cent of the total
immigration), these Italians would not have made just as good
farmers as the English, Irish, and Germans. One has only to think
of the Argentine Republic, where agricultural colonization has been
almost wholly in the hands of the Italians.

Be that as it may, it is a fact that the settlement of the Missis-
sippi region took place under circumstances which were extraor-
dinarily favorable to the United States, and that the rapid growth
of the Union as a Great Power is due primarily to the large immi-
gration from Europe. The North American Union of 1800, accord-
ing to European ideas, was only a small state, if judged by its
population of 5,306,000 (the later Belgium at this time had a popu-
lation of three million) ; but by the year 1850, that is, before the
immigration had passed the high point, the United States had already
outstripped states like Prussia and had caught up with Italy (which
indeed was only a geographical expression) ; and at the end of the
century she was larger than any of the European countries (without
their colonies), except Russia.

These are figures with which every one is familiar. But it has
been less generally observed what an important consequence this
rapid development had for the internal life of the European nations
during the nineteenth century. In connection with English condi-
tions it was pointed out above how the possibility of emigration to
America lessened the discontent due to economic crises. The same
is true of other countries. The United States was regarded as the
Promised Land which gladly received those who were discontented

i io FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

with their own country. It is naturally incapable of proof, but it
is very probable, that the relatively peaceful course which the in-
dustrialization of Europe took in the second half of the century is
in good part due to the safety valve which America afforded. To
this was added the fact that the agricultural development of America
made it essentially easier to provide food for the greatly over-
populated countries of Europe; that is, precisely because the immi-
gration from Europe led to the rapid colonization of the United
States, Europe had increased supplies of food placed at its disposal.
How favorable the conditions were for the new settlers is shown
by the fact that the number of those who were discontented or who
voluntarily went back to Europe was extraordinarily small. To be
sure, people who could not bear hard work and the other hardships
of primitive frontier life were winnowed out without mercy. It was
natural, also, that European intellectuals did not feel altogether com-
fortable in the midst of a population which was concentrating its
whole effort in developing the soil and which gave little opportunity
for urban culture in the European sense of the word. But if
a melancholy poet, like Lenau, gladly bade farewell to the uncon-
genial atmosphere of America, he was simply the exception who
proved the rule as to the great majority of the immigrants. This
American pioneer territory (in contrast not only to Europe, but also
to the older settled parts of America itself) was evidently of such
a character that only practical work was highly regarded and
achieved success. Because this is often overlooked in Europe, or
because these transition conditions have been identified with Ameri-
can life in general, people have been led into the mistake of denying
to the inhabitants of the New World any appreciation of spiritual
and intellectual values. In his excellent work on "The United States
of America," Paul Darmstadter rightly observes: "One can only
rightly understand American history in the nineteenth century if he
regards the opening up of the continent as the true task of the
American people at this period, a task which was so colossal that
the people had to concentrate all their strength upon its accom-
plishment."

There was only one obstacle to the free settlement of Europeans
at the beginning of the period of great immigration (1830-1860).
This was the slave system in the South. It has been already pointed
out that one of the most important laws favoring settlement on
homesteads could not be passed until after the secession of the
Southern States. The opposition between the North and the South,
however, was almost the only serious source of conflict which greatly

EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN UNITED STATES in

influenced the history of the United States in the first half of the
nineteenth century. But an account of this conflict and its suc-
cessful conclusion must be postponed until it can be considered in
connection with its significance for world history.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FOUNDING OF A FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE
IN NORTH AFRICA

Or a quite different kind, but equally sui generis and novel, was the
French colonial empire which was founded about the same time in
northern Africa. Brought about almost by chance, carried on origi-
nally not nearly so systematically by the government as the settle-
ment of the Mississippi Valley, pursued under much more difficult
conditions because the land was already occupied, — nevertheless the
French colonization in North Africa affords many analogies with
America. It stands in no less sharp contrast to the old colonial
policy and methods of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
centuries than does the American system of pioneer settlements.

The importance in world history of the French conquest of Algiers
and the neighboring lands may be considered under three heads:
the abolition of the danger from piracy in the Mediterranean; the
creation of a new French colonial empire in the place of the one
which had been almost totally destroyed in the eighteenth century;
and the extremely novel and on the whole successful attempt to
form out of natives and European settlers a new people, unified
economically and in part politically, which should not stand in the
relation of colonists to the mother country but which should be a
part of France itself. This last point will be considered in detail
later; the first two points, however, must be explained before the
regular narrative begins.

First, as to the question of the "Barbary Pirates."
Economically and politically, as is well known, the northern shores
of Africa belong much more to Europe than to Africa. Scarcely
anywhere else do the lands around an inland sea form such a definite
unity as in the case of the Mediterranean countries. The regions
of North Africa which are cut off by the Sahara Desert from the
main part of the continent are economically and geographically
connected exclusively with the countries of Southern Europe. For
centuries, therefore, there has been a close contact between Syria,
the Balkan Peninsula, Italy, Spain, and Africa from Egypt to
Morocco; even the split into two areas with different religious

FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 113

creeds resulting from the Mohammedan conquest was not able to
put an end to this close connection. Nevertheless it did help to
bring about an altogether one-sided kind of separate development.
It was natural that after a great Mohammedan empire grew up in
Asia Minor and Constantinople, the followers of Islam should join
it rather than the Christian nations of Southern Europe, with whom
they had formerly been in the closest touch. So it came about that,
at the beginning of the period which we are considering, all North
Africa, with the exception of Morocco (which, however, did not
belong to any European power), stood under the suzerainty of the
Sultan of Turkey.

This situation had extraordinarily serious consequences for the
Mediterranean countries of Europe. It was not merely that the
northern regions of Africa which were in part very fertile, such as
Algeria, were withheld from exploitation by Europeans, nor that the
harbors best adapted for trade with Northern Africa had been sub-
jected to foreign rule and arbitrary practices; but it was the fact
that the African shores, being beyond European control, created
conditions which were positively harmful to Southern Europe. From
the beginning of the sixteenth century, Mohammedan piratical
princes had established themselves not only in Algiers, but also in
Tunis and in other lairs along the coast. These pirates laid waste
the shores of Spain and Italy and continually endangered the safety
of commerce in the Mediterranean. No European traveller who
risked embarking in the Levant for Italy or France could be sure
that he would not spend the rest of his days in slavery in Algiers.
Everywhere along the shores watch-towers had had to be built to
warn the fisherfolk of Italy, Spain and France of the approach of
the African corsairs. To be sure, the danger was no longer so acute
as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but still there were
innumerable cases of robber attacks upon peaceful passenger and
merchant vessels. The reader need be only reminded of HebePs
well-known story, "The Clever Merchant" (Der Listige Kaufherr),
to be convinced that the fear of slavery in Algeria was not a mere
fantasy of the imagination on the part of sailors a hundred years
ago. Even Napoleon at Elba trembled at the thought of attacks
by corsairs.

Now how should this be remedied? Unquestionably the only
way to eradicate the evil was a permanent occupation of the places
on the coast. Mere demonstrations or bombardments (such, for
instance, as was made by the English against Algiers in 1816) were
useless. For how could the Dey of Algiers ever seriously assist in

ii4 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

the suppression of his country's chief industry? Supposing perma-
nent occupation was agreed upon, who should be given the task of
carrying it out? The country to which the Great Powers would
have preferred to give such a mandate, and which was in the best
geographical position to carry it out, namely Spain, was in no
position to do so. If Spain had been unable to conquer Algiers in
the sixteenth century (doubtless largely because the country was
deflected from its proper national aims by its connection with the
conglomeration of territories under the Hapsburgs), it was now still
less in a position to undertake any considerable military expedition
(see above, p. 53). Still more impotent were the little Italian states.
There remained, therefore, action only by some, or all, of the Great
Powers.

But here at first the obstacles loomed larger than the conviction
that something ought to be done. Joint intervention by the Great
Powers was first rendered impossible through Austria's opposition.
Prince Metternich was of the opinion, which was not without justice
from the point of view of his own country, that an attack on the
nominally Turkish territory of Algiers and Tunis would injure the
prestige of Turkey, and would, therefore, indirectly benefit the
Balkan policy of Austria's rival, Russia. England was interested
in the commerce of the Mediterranean only to a small extent, be-
cause, prior to the building of the Suez Canal, the sea-borne trade
with India went around the Cape of Good Hope. England, again,
like the other powers, was opposed to any increase of the generally
feared French state, and therefore refused its approval of any
possible French mandate. To all this was added the general neces-
sity for peace after the Napoleonic Wars and the desire to avoid
all actions which might disturb the balance of power among the
Great Powers which had been established with such difficulty. So
it came about that the problem of the Barbary Pirates was indeed
often discussed at the congresses of the European Powers, but armed
intervention, which was the only way of putting an end to the evil,
did not take place. Even the fact that the pirates sometimes ex-
tended their depredations to the North Sea brought no change in
the political situation. The European Powers contented themselves
with unheroic and awkward measures, like demands upon Turkey
and the exaction of damages, as a means of checking the seizures
made by the pirates.

Now, as to the other influence which the Algerian expedition had
on world history: the founding of a new French colonial empire.

France had once equaled, if not surpassed, Great Britain in im-

FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 115

portance as a colonial power. In North America, as well as in
India, considerable regions had once been under French control.
These settlements had by no means been without success. Since
France, being the country which was then the most densely popu-
lated of all the Great Powers, was in a position to send peasants
overseas, French Canada, at least, had enjoyed a prosperity which
in its way can be matched by little in the old colonial history. But
France was not strong enough in the eighteenth century to play
the part of a Great Power both on the continent and in the
colonies. Such a double policy was bound to fail on account of
the weakness of the navy which had determined French foreign
policy for a whole century and even under Napoleon. France had
to give way everywhere before her rival, England, who often
allied herself with France's enemies on the continent (as, for in-
stance, in the Seven Years' War). So one piece after another of
the French colonies was lost. Canada came under Great Britain;
in India the French retained only a few coast towns, which could
not serve as a base for the creation of a French colonial empire;
and the vast Louisiana Territory had to be sold by Napoleon to
the United States to prevent its falling into the possession of the
hated English enemy. Thus, in 1815, the French colonial posses-
sions had shrunk to small remnants on the north coast of South
America, in the West Indies, on the Senegal River, and in India.
What remained not only was of small importance in itself, but was
in no way capable of extension.

There seemed small prospect that France would ever again be
a colonial power on a great scale. In her foreign relations she was
limited in all military action by the distrust with which she was
regarded by the other European Powers. As far as over-population
was concerned, she had no need to acquire new territory for settle-
ment. The French Revolution, which had provided the peasants
with land and legal equality, had brought so much free soil under
intensive cultivation that, as has been already pointed out (p. 58),
the French peasants had even less fear than in the eighteenth cen-
tury of having too large families. And the advantage of colonial
possessions in providing raw materials for manufacturing, which was
so much emphasized later, was at this time scarcely mentioned.
France, little industrialized, would scarcely have allowed herself to
be moved in favor of colonial undertakings by such arguments.

So the only motives which remained were military prestige and
the desire to banish from the world the scandal of the Barbary
Pirates who were so hurtful to French commerce. As will be

ii6 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

pointed out, the Algerian expedition was actually undertaken merely
from these motives; any thought of colonization or even of a con-
quest of the whole area did not exist originally.

The Algerian undertaking is one of those historical events which
are greater than their originators could suspect. If any one had
asked an experienced historical and political thinker on New Year's
Day, 1831, which event in France during the past year appeared
to him the most important, he would certainly have answered, "The
July Revolution"; and on the basis of what he then knew he cer-
tainly could not have answered otherwise. The historian, who has
the advantage of looking back on what has happened since, will
probably come to a different opinion, and even if he were inclined
to attribute to the fall of Charles X an importance equal to that
of the conquest of the town of Algiers, he would scarcely dispute
that the latter has brought in its train historical consequences as
great as the former. The whole foreign policy of France in the last
fifty years, and with it the policy of the other European states, has
been turned into new paths by the fact that France again became
one of the great colonial powers. This was solely due to the expe-
dition against the North African pirates.

Before the consequences of this expedition are explained, the
course of the events themselves must be given. First, a few words
as to the internal conditions in Algeria and the nature of the
country.

In 1815, Algiers, as has been said, was nominally under the
Sultan of Turkey, but the connection with Constantinople had al-
ways been a loose one, and no change had occurred in this respect
hitherto. Economically Algeria was independent of Turkey. The
piracy upon which the ruling classes in Algeria lived was no part
of Turkish policy and in fact was often inconvenient to Turkey.
Practically, appointments in the government in Algiers were made
independently of Turkey to suit the Algerians themselves. The
main power was exercised by a kind of body of Janizaries, called
"Odschaks," whose leaders chose the Dey. The Sultan of Turkey
merely confirmed the choice. With the Odschaks the Christian
states were unable to come to any peaceful agreement, for they
simply lived by piracy. The Turkish Janizaries had often been
dangerous to the peace of Europe, because they were personally
interested in war; but in the case of the Odschaks, the situation
was much worse. Their very existence depended upon piracy. The
Turkish government of the time might contemplate annihilating the
Janizaries, (see above, p. 43 ); but the Dey of Algiers would have

FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 117

overthrown the very foundation of the Algerian system of govern-
ment, if he had attempted to curb the Odschaks. Under these cir-
cumstances it was also equally out of the question to attempt to
develop the natural wealth of the country. Yet an ordered govern-
ment and systematic cultivation of the soil afforded the attractive
prospect of great profits. About two-thirds of the strip of coast
lying north of the plateau region, an area about the size of South
Germany, is suited to intensive cultivation. Cereals, vegetables,
olives, and grapes grow abundantly. The plateau itself affords ex-
cellent pasture for cattle raising and even the grass in the waste
stretches to the South proved itself in later decades an excellent
material for making paper.

But all this wealth lay unavailable under the rule of the pirates.
Highways were lacking; above all things, irrigation systems were
lacking. Without these nothing could be done; for the great danger
which threatens the cultivation of the soil in Algeria is drouth.

Now, as to the history of the French conquest itself.

The first decision to undertake an expedition against Algiers is
to be found in the desire of the French government to make a dis-
play of military prestige in order to draw the attention of the public
away from domestic troubles. This was the same motive which led
to French participation in the Greek War of Independence (see
above, p. 64). The government of Charles X evidently believed,
as did so many other statesmen within and without France, that it
is possible to make people forget the errors of the government at
home by military successes — a view with which they can hardly be
reproached when one considers how often this mistake has been re-
peated since then. In no other lands have genuine liberals and in-
tellectuals been so little inclined to allow themselves to be deceived
as to the errors of internal policy by military glamour. The First
Napoleon was not popular in his day in France; Charles X was not
helped by his expedition to Algiers; and under the Third Napoleon
the intellectuals with few exceptions remained to the end in oppo-
sition. Be that as it may, the government of Charles X decided to
achieve an easy triumph for French arms in Africa, and at the same
time destroy the home of the pirates.

When this decision had once been reached in Paris, it was easy
to find a pretext for intervention. In the commercial relations be-
tween France and the Dey, friction had not been lacking. The
Algerian government demanded that the French should pay a higher
sum for the permission to fish for corals at La Calle, to the east
of Bona. It also demanded that two Jewish bankers, who had for-

ii8 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

merly delivered grain to the French Directory, should immediately
pay all that they owed. In the negotiations over this matter, an
unfortunate diplomatic incident occurred: on April 30, 1827, the
Dey of Algiers hit the French consul with the handle of his fly-
flapper. A more serious breach of diplomatic etiquette followed.
When, upon the request of the consul, some French ships appeared
in the bay of Algiers to demand apologies from the Dey, one of
the boats bearing the envoys was fired upon on August 3, 1829.
Paris at once answered by sending an expedition to Algiers.

The preparations for this expedition, which took place during the
last months of Charles X's reign (May to July, 1830), went forward
smoothly and rapidly. A large army was landed near the capital,
and before a month had passed Dey Hussein had to capitulate.
Algiers was occupied and the Dey himself was shipped away to Asia
Minor along with his harem, his ministers, and twenty-five hundred
Janizaries.

Then the question arose as to what should be done with this land
without a ruler. As has been indicated the French originally had
no idea of conquest and still less any intention of making Algeria
into a French colony. Although, even in the first years, some
people insisted that Algeria might become for France what India
was to Great Britain, still the government remained hostile to such
views. And even if it had wished to lend an ear to the plans of
conquest suggested by army officers, it would at first have been
frightened by the many obstacles which stood in the way of annex-
ing Algiers. So long as the July Monarchy was not firmly estab-
lished (see above, p. 70), the new regime could not afford to come
into conflict with the peacefully inclined public of France; nor
could it come to a breach with England, which, from the outset, very
strongly disapproved of this Algerian undertaking by its rival.
Nevertheless, events eventually proved themselves stronger than the
intentions of the government, and in the course of a few decades
Algeria was not only completely conquered by France, but was even
settled in part by Frenchmen. Military and economic motives had
worked together. The military motive had been decisive in the occu-
pation of the country, and the economic motive in carrying out the
settlement and the social reforms.

For the sake of clearness in the narrative these two movements
will be considered separately, although they mostly took place at
the same time. First, so much as is necessary in regard to the mili-
tary events.

The original and very beneficial idea had been to put an end to

FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 119

the piracy along the Algerian shores. This program was at first
closely followed. After capturing the town of Algiers, the French
did not press on into the interior, but contented themselves with
occupying a number of places on the coast, in order to get control
of all the little retreats from which the North African corsairs had
been accustomed to conduct their attacks in the Mediterranean.
But it soon appeared that this was only half the task. The French
quickly saw that the places which they occupied would have to
be regarded as unsafe unless they got control of the hinter-
land, or adjacent region in the interior. The Kabyle and Khroumir
tribes on the plateau had accustomed themselves to the presence of
the pirate kings who were of the same Mohammedan religion; but
they were unwilling to tolerate Christians in possession of their
coasts. The neighborhood of the coast towns was continually at-
tacked by tribes which undertook raids against the French from
the region of the plateau. Soon it was a question, not merely of
regular robber attacks such as had often taken place in the time of
the Dey, but of an organized resistance. The attack was made from
both sides: from the west Abd-el-Kader, the Emir of Mascara
(southwest of Oran) opened hostilities; from the east, Hadschi
Achmed, Bey of Constantine.

The most dangerous and important of these two enemies seemed,
at first, to be Hadschi Achmed, because he ruled over the rocky
fortress of Constantine, which was regarded as impregnable, and
also because he raised a claim to the coast town of Bona, which the
French had occupied. So at first the French followed the plan of
making concessions to Abd-el-Kader, in order to concentrate their
main attack with such moderate forces as they had upon suppressing
Hadschi Achmed.

But precisely this policy compelled the French gradually to throw
in larger forces. For the two leaders opposed to them were not to
be easily overcome ; and while in general it was not desirable to leave
them wholly alone, such a policy was still less to be thought of
after French prestige was at stake on account of defeats due to
underestimating the strength of the enemy. This was true of the
attack from the west as well as from the east.

Abd-el-Kader, Emir of Mascara, was the kind of military hero
that one only meets with in half-civilized regions and in novels.
A young man (about twenty-five years old), and a perfect type of
Arab, he united all the qualities which go to make up the ideal
military leader in the Orient: supple body, light complexion, broad
forehead and eagle nose. He was a bold horseman, at the same

120 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

time as holy and learned as he was warlike; a poet and a prophet who
knew how to interpret the Koran, and who, in spite of his youth,
had already made one pilgrimage to Mecca. Scarcely had he
ascended the throne on the death of his father, when he summoned
all true believers to a "Holy War," and opened hostilities in the
neighborhood of Oran.

The French government, which, as has been said, did not want to
undertake a regular war, tried at first to come to some friendly
agreement with the Emir. They did not suppose they need
fear him, because one of his attacks on a coast town shortly before
had failed. So, on February 26, 1834, General Desmichels signed
a treaty with Abd-el-Kader by which the Emir merely promised to
recognize French rule over three coast towns to the west, while the
French government recognized Abd-el-Kader as owner of "the whole
west," — that is, accorded him supreme power over various tribes
which had hitherto been independent. But the Arab hero did not
live up to the terms of the treaty. On the contrary, he extended his
robber attacks still further, and even dared to come in person close
to the city of Algiers. Becoming ever bolder, on June 28, 1835, he
risked an attack upon regular French troops, near Oran. In this
he was successful. The little French force was beaten and forced
to leave a number of their wounded in the hands of the enemy, who
maltreated them most cruelly. This catastrophe now stirred the
French government to more energetic action. A regular army was
despatched against the Emir's capital at Mascara. Abd-el-Kader
was naturally not able to face such an attack. His capital was
occupied and in part destroyed. Then the French troops retreated
at once to the coast, because for the present they wanted to wage
war only to the east.

There, as has been stated, Hadschi Achmed, Bey of Constantine,
who had formerly been under the Bey of Algiers, was now seeking
to establish an independent kingdom at Bona. Treacherous natives
hinted to the French that the Bey's capital could be easily
captured. The French commander-in-chief, General Clauzel, put
faith in these suggestions and with a small army (8-9,000 men)
undertook an advance against Constantine. But the hints of his
informers proved absolutely false. The city resisted in a way for
which the French were not at all prepared. Soon the French army
had to begin to retreat again to the coast. It was only with diffi-
culty that it succeeded in reaching the protecting walls of Bona.

This failure demanded more energetic intervention by the French,
if they did not want to risk endangering their occupation of the

FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 121

coast towns. Once more the French government signed what was
for them a very unfavorable treaty with Abd-el-Kader, in order to
have peace on the west. At the same time they dismissed Clauzel
and organized an army against Constantine which was equipped for
a regular siege. Naturally the Mohammedans could not resist such
a serious attack. Bravely as the Arabs defended themselves, Con-
stantine was captured after a few days of bombardment on October
13, 1837, and the rule of Hadschi Achmed came to an end.

The conquests in the eastern parts of Algeria were thus made
secure. But in the west the enemy still remained. Abd-el-Kader
proved himself an increasingly dangerous opponent. He had used
the interval of the attack against Constantine to create a small force
of soldiers drilled in the European fashion. As has happened so
often since then, he united with the kindred folk in Morocco further
west. In order to have a base and also a refuge from the French,
he had made an alliance with the Sultan of Morocco and become
the latter 's vassal. With the honored burnous which he received
from the Sultan, he was now ready to proclaim a Holy War in an
even grander style than before.

Abd-el-Kader used a real or alleged infringement of the Treaty
of 1837 as a pretext for declaring war on the French in 1839. Im-
mediately afterwards he made a sudden attack on the village of
Mazagran where a hundred or so French riflemen had intrenched
themselves. The attack failed, thanks to the heroic defense of the
French (February, 1840), but it made a great impression, and there
was everywhere the feeling that Abd-el-Kader could be rendered
harmless only by being systematically crushed. Now, for the first
time, the method of improvised separate actions was replaced by a
careful and well thought out plan. The whole military organization
and equipment was modified to suit the conditions of African war-
fare. The new aim was the continuous pursuit of the enemy into
all his retreats, — a steady offensive. For this purpose the creation
of new troops, Zouaves or Spahis, was necessary. For these even
natives were recruited. The uniform was made more convenient;
the little kepi took the place of the shako; the heavy buffalo-leather
belts disappeared; and in place of wagons, mules were used. The
French officers who had almost all now received a training in Al-
giers accustomed themselves to a kind of tactics different from what
was necessary in Europe. Since it was not intended to undertake
wide-reaching strategic operations against the fugitive Kabyles, it
mattered little that the intelligence service between the separate
corps was very poor, and that every officer went ahead in his own

122 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

district on his own hook, without bothering himself about the march-
ing routes of the others. In this way French generals lost the train-
ing in operating against an enemy who thought out his plans, as
proved fatal in the later wars of Europe, particularly in the War
of 1870. Finally, it may be noted that the new Governor, Bugeaud,
now had for the first time at his disposal a really large army (about
100,000 men).

With such preparations as these it was not difficult to overcome
the natives. Abd-el-Kader was quickly driven out of the region
south of Oran where lay his capital, Mascara. Soon the French
pressed forward to the high plateau. There, near Taguin, a small
body of troops under the Duke d'Aumale captured the Emir's whole
Smala (the tents and the entire military equipment). The most
important towns in the plateau, like Biskra, fell at once into the
hands of the victors. A small force even dared to push forward to
the Sahara Desert, so that the plateau could be regarded as having
been pierced from north to south.

Only one discordant note marred the success. The elusive Abd-
el-Kader had again escaped. He had fled into Morocco, a neigh-
boring state which was hardly friendly to the French. Algeria was
now troubled by invasions of Moroccan tribes. The Sultan refused
to expel Abd-el-Kader. Thereupon the French bombarded the two
most important ports in Morocco, Tangier and Mogador. At the
same time, General Bugeaud advanced by land. The large but un-
trained Moroccan army was easily destroyed at the river Isly, which
formed the boundary. The Sultan had to give in, although en-
couraged by the English who were afraid of having the French get
a foothold in Morocco. On September 10, 1844, the Moroccan gov-
ernment signed the treaty of Tangier, in which it promised to expel
Abd-el-Kader and to recognize French authority over all Algeria
within what had been the Turkish boundaries.

After he was thus cut off from any support from Morocco, Abd-
el-Kader 's fate was regarded as sealed. To be sure, thanks to his
superhuman cleverness, the brave chieftain succeeded for three years
in evading the French in the mountainous region to the south of his
former capital. He even inflicted some bloody attacks upon his
enemies. But his situation was hopeless. On December 23,
1847, he begged for mercy and surrendered. He was then interned
at Pau, in Southern France; later he moved to Damascus. Algeria
could now be regarded as wholly in the control of the French. What
followed was more in the nature of police than military measures.
In the 1850'? they succeeded in bringing even the tribes south of

FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 123

the plateau and north of the Sahara to recognize French rule. The
warlike Kabyles south of the city of Algiers were subdued by Mac-
Mahon in 1857. But these undertakings were of secondary impor-
tance in comparison with the work of colonization which then began,
and which will now be described.

In accordance with the program with which the French had un-
dertaken the expedition against Algiers, the colonization of the land
was undertaken very timidly at first. The conditions were far from
being so favorable as in America. On the one hand, Algeria was
already a settled country; on the other, it was out of the question
for the French to force the natives into a position of slavery or
serfdom, and make them work for the victors, as the Spanish had
once done in South America. The French, who had already for-
bidden the slave-trade and in 1848 had even abolished negro slavery
in Algiers, could not go back to this form of exploitation. A certain
difficulty also lay in the fact that France, not being over-populated,
would have to hold out relatively large advantages in order to attract
Frenchmen to settle in the region.

But it was equally certain that nothing but colonization with gen-
erous state support could transform Algeria into a valuable posses-
sion. It has already been pointed out that the natural resources of
Algeria could not be made available unless public works were under-
taken on a large scale. The mere occupation of the coast and the
establishment of a few trading establishments, even though provided
with privileges favoring French trade, would have brought in prac-
tically nothing; the cost would presumably have exceeded the finan-
cial returns. The country first had to be put in a condition to yield
up its products. And for this, besides settlement by European la-
borers, state support was necessary.

It was, however, a long time before the French government could
make up its mind to this. It was not in accord with Louis Philippe's
prudent parsimony to become involved in weary undertakings where
profits were uncertain. Adolphe Thiers was almost alone for a long
time in advocating expenditures on French colonization. After a
governor-generalship had been established in 1834, the Mole min-
istry finally adopted a compromise in 1838. They renounced the
idea of making all Algeria into a French colony at one time. Their
program was a gradual occupation, supported by the building of
towns and highways. They proclaimed: "France is going to revive
Roman Africa."

This program was undertaken at once and carried out systemati-
cally. Not only were highways laid down, but a great deal was

124 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

done in the way of irrigation and afforestation. It now became
possible to exploit the fertility of the soil. The more industrious part
of the population, which under the Deys had been scarcely more
than an object of exploitation by the state, was now given legal
security and could engage in commercial undertakings without being
disturbed. The native Jews who had always controlled the trade of
the country were raised to French citizenship and given an interest
in the rule of the foreigners.

Somewhat later colonization proper was taken up. The govern-
ment insisted that their efforts for the improvement of agriculture
should not benefit the native population merely. European settlers
ought to be attracted both to serve as a body of reliable dependents
and as centers for spreading European influence.

The undertaking did not seem easy. Neither was there as much
land available as in America at that time, nor was it to be expected
that a country which first had to be improved by public works
would be sought out by classes which were forced to emigrate, that
is, by those who had no property.

But the government knew how to overcome these difficulties. In
the matter of the land they were aided by circumstances. Through
the expulsion of the Dey the government had come into possession
of considerable land, altogether about as much as the former Grand
Duchy of Baden or the State of Connecticut ; these were lands which
had been formerly Turkish military colonies and also leased lands
in possession of Beys. In addition to these, there were added in the
following years numerous estates, confiscated because their own-
ers had participated in insurrections led by Abd-el-Kader and others ;
and many lands were taken which had no owner or heir.

These state domains were then rounded out through purchases
made in the ordinary commercial way or by expropriation, so that
they could serve as centers of colonization for the settlers. Settle-
ment then took place by villages as was necessary for safety. The
government saw to it that every village formed an independent eco-
nomic unit. There were not only peasants, but also artisans. The
size of the parcels of land which were given to the settlers varied
according to their occupation: an artisan received a smaller plot
than a tiller of the soil. The more important industries had to be
established in each village; black-smithing and carpentry were
obligatory occupations. In each village some common land was
reserved.

It was more difficult,. as has been said, to attract European settlers.
Here the government itself had to give assistance. And here also it

FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 125

accomplished its task to the fullest extent. At first the state took
over a considerable part of the initial expenditures. It was the
state that built streets in the new villages, saw to it that there was
drinking water where Nature did not provide it, and undertook the
erection of public buildings and schools. Indeed, it occasionally
went further and provided the necessary working capital to conces-
sion holders. During the first period (1841-1860), and again
later (1871-1883), the soil was placed at the disposal of the colonists
without charge. The settler merely undertook to cultivate the land,
plant trees and so forth, and settle there for a considerable time (five
or nine years). The system was therefore similar to that in America
where, however, the conditions in general were much more favorable.
As in America, up to 1870 non- French persons were also admitted — •
numbers of Germans, Italians and Spanish.

Nevertheless, all these efforts, at a time when America stood open
to immigrants without limit, would not have succeeded in attracting
a sufficient number of settlers to the Algerian soil unless other means
had come to the aid of the government. Among these were industrial
crises, like that of 1848, when some two thousand workingmen were
shipped away from Paris to Algiers. Fortunate, from this point of
view, was Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871;
numerous Alsatians preferred to emigrate to Africa rather than
fall under German rule. But the government found its most regular
and, so-to-speak, normal colonization material in the numerous sol-
diers who, during their long years of war against the natives, had
come to regard Algeria as a second home. Noteworthy is the fact
that the government took care that these soldiers, who were usu-
ally unmarried, should remain Frenchmen, and not become fathers
of a mixed race. In the i84o's (that is, at the time when Algeria
did not yet afford much attraction to civilians), soldiers who had
served out all but two years of their time were sent home for the
purpose of choosing and bringing back a French wife. They were
then relieved of the remainder of their military service and were
given a piece of land with the necessary means for its settlement. In-
deed, the government even became to some extent a matrimonial
agency. In Toulon there was opened a regular marriage market;
soldiers on leave who had been unable to find in their home town any
fair companion for life could go to the "Depot for Marriageable
Girls" which was established under the chaperonage of the best
women in this naval port; there each could choose a wife very
quickly. Since the African army did not afford a large enough
number of colonists, the French minister of war summoned dis-

126 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

banded soldiers who were living in France to go and settle in Algeria.

It is significant that the colonists were able to remain French-
men in the full sense of the word. Just as the frontiersmen in the
American Middle-West had just as full political rights as the citizens
in the older states in the East, so complete political equality was
established between Frenchmen who settled in Algeria and those of
the mother country. As far back as 1848 the Second Republic
divided the colony up into departments on the model of those in
France, and gave the colonists the right to elect deputies to the
French legislature. Three years later, in 1851, all tariff barriers be-
tween Algeria and France were removed. The colony, both polit-
ically and economically, was to be simply "an extension of France."
Although in the later years of the Second Empire (particularly
after 1860) there was a reaction against this liberal regime, the
colonists being deprived of their parliamentary franchise and the
natives given larger rights, this was merely a brief episode. After
1870 the Third Republic again gave the settlers their franchise.
Furthermore, the nationalistic Arab uprising which broke out as a
result of the French defeats in Europe, as well as from the change
in administrative principles and the favors shown to Jews, hac this
favorable result for colonization, that large areas of land became
available. The lands of the Kabyles who had taken part in the insur-
rection were confiscated, and their estates, which were among the
most fertile in Algeria, could be assigned to new colonists (for ex-
ample to the Alsatians who have just been mentioned in another
connection). The importance of this was seen clearly later when
available land began to be rare. The colonists even urged expro-
priating the lands of the native tribes, but the French government
was never willing to adopt such a measure, although the difficulty
of extending the land occupied by Europeans was essentially in-
creased by their refusal.

There was one defect, however, which all these regulations had
not been able to overcome: the relatively insufficient number of
French colonists. The measures of the French Government had re-
sulted in Algeria being gladly sought by settlers from other European
countries; but where was France to find the surplus of peasants
needed for Algeria? Being a country of frugal, small peasant pro-
prietors, who limited the number of their children in order to prevent
a partitioning of inherited land and property, France was not ordi-
narily in a position to afford settlers for Africa; and other immi-
grants than peasants could be made use of only exceptionally,
as, for instance, in the case of the factory employees sent out

FOUNDING OF FRENCH COLONIAL EMPIRE 127

from Paris in 1848, who had not turned out well. Thus the
European immigration was by no means insignificant, but it took
place almost wholly from countries where large landed estates pre-
vailed and where there was less prudence in the limitation of families
than in France; that is, chiefly from Spain, from which three-fifths
of the non- French immigrants came, and from southern Italy, which
sent two-fifths. The French "immigration" (i. e., new French set-
tlers) consisted almost exclusively of descendants of Frenchmen who
had already settled in Algiers. Now the law of 1889, that every one
born on French soil is a Frenchman, applied to Algeria also, accord-
ing to the principle of the legal equality of the two countries. And
although the sons of the immigrant Spaniards, (who settled mostly
in the western parts of the colony near Oran), and of the Italians
(chiefly in the east near Constantine) were thus made legally French-
men, nevertheless they did not lose their original national sympathies,
especially in the rivalry which arose between Italy and France over
the possession of colonial territory in Africa. And in view of Italy's
slight possession of territory available for settlement at that time,
this circumstance proved of considerable importance in foreign
politics.

So it is not easy to form a judgment as to the success of the
French colonial experiment in Algeria. From an economic point of
view the undertaking has certainly been a success. The export of
agricultural products of all sorts, which was very slight before the
expedition of 1830, has increased to an extent of which the French
may be proud. It is profitable chiefly to France, which has monop-
olized the shipping trade between Algiers and the mother country,
so that the growing prosperity of the colony has also been of ad-
vantage to the French merchant marine. The restoration of good
order in the interior, which involves a continuance of military rule
only in the south, and the building of highways and railways by
state support, has permitted the cultivation of regions in which agri-
culture had not been profitable since the days of the Romans. Piracy
has totally disappeared from the Mediterranean. But from the
political point of view, these are advantages which have benefited
the subjects of other states more than those of France. To be sure,
the law declares children of foreigners to be Frenchmen, and one
may perhaps see in this an advantageous artificial increase of the
French population. But these foreigners have come in such large
numbers that it has not been possible to assimilate them, and inter-
vention by foreign states is not absolutely out of the question for
all future time.

128 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

But aside from this problem, which is not at present acute, the
occupation of Algiers by the French has been of the very greatest
importance in its influence upon world history and upon the relation
of the European states to one another in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. France has come into a wholly new relation to the
other European states by becoming again a colonial power. If she
wished tc maintain the external and internal safety of her African
possessions, she was obliged to round out her colony, or at least to
strengthen it, by spheres of influence in the East and West, so that
she would neither have to fear an attack nor be subject to native
insurrections that would be supported by tribes of kindred race or
religion in Tunis or Morocco. French policy, therefore, came to be
opposed by all Powers which had a claim to either of these lands.
Indeed, any action looking toward the preservation of the inde-
pendence of Tunis or Morocco was regarded by France as dan-
gerous to French interests; for here independence meant the
possibility that the almost unceasing revolts and "Holy Wars" of
Arab tribes in Algeria would be secretly supported by their neigh-
bors. Details in regard to this must be reserved for treatment in
another connection (in ch. xxix). But here it may be pointed out
that the importance to France of controlling Tunis has for a long
time been a determining factor in French relations with Italy; and
the necessity of securing Morocco for the sake of Algeria has had a
powerful influence on her relations with Great Britain and later
with Germany.

The other results of the Algerian expedition can be touched upon
only very briefly. The technical military consequences of the colo-
nial wars have already been mentioned (see p. 121). A result of a
different kind is the influence which the successful occupation of
Algiers later had upon the conquest of the Sudan. There can be
no doubt that scarcely anything has contributed so much to the
new national spirit which gradually developed in France after the
catastrophe of 1870, and to the reawakening of a certain self-con-
fidence and optimism resulting from positive successes accomplished,
as the participation in the victorious undertakings which have so
extended the bounds of Algeria to the south. All these military
events would, however, have been unthinkable if it had not been
for the expedition of 1830.

CHAPTER XVII

RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN ADVANCE IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN ASIA

RUSSIA'S colonial activity in Asia, at least in the first decades of the
period we are treating, was of an altogether different kind. Here
the idea of settlement was decidedly subordinate; and many of
the conquered regions were in fact little suited to settlement. As
for the most important colonial territory, namely Siberia, the prepara-
tory work of conquest had already taken place in earlier centuries;
by the end of the eighteenth century the main part of the territory
was in the firm possession of the Tsars. Finally, Russia had even
less need than France perhaps to find free soil for an excess popu-
lation.

Nevertheless, the conquering expeditions which Russia undertook
about the middle of the nineteenth century and later to round out
and extend her Siberian possessions toward Central and Eastern
Asia must be considered from the point of view of world history
and of the extension of European rule throughout the world.
Through coming into conflict with hitherto independent Asiatic
empires, of which the greatest was China, the Russians not only
extended the territory where Europeans prevailed, but they also
gave a practical proof that the Asiatic empires under existing condi-
tions could not possibly offer a permanent resistance to the new
forces at the disposal of the European Powers. Asiatics were brought
to see that they could make a stand against their oppressors only
in case they appropriated as their own the technical improvements
which Europe had made. Otherwise, little states would disappear
altogether; and great ones, like China, would at least have to con-
sent to humiliating sacrifices. The expeditions of the Russians
have contributed to the "Awakening of the Far East" in the same
way, though perhaps less publicly, as the English attacks on China,
which will be spoken of in the next chapter.

The fact that Russia at that time had no need of free soil for
settlement was due to several reasons. The most important of these
was that the mother country, European Russia, still had room for
an increased population. The Russian empire was so thinly settled,

129

130 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

the cultivation of the soil was of so primitive a nature, and trans-
portation was developed to so slight an extent, that a denser popula-
tion would not have been harmful, but positively beneficial. A
greater number of agricultural laborers would have meant more
intensive cultivation of the soil, better means of transportation, and,
consequently, increased agricultural production, without the owners
of the soil having to pay individually any more for the support of
their laboring population. That this is true can be best illustrated
by the history of the system of large patrimonial estates in Russia.

One difference in development between Russia and Western and
Central Europe is seen in the Russian legislation and custom which
never accorded the right of primogeniture to the nobility. In Russia
feudalism always remained unknown, and so the old law of inheri-
tance was retained; noble estates (which meant simply all the es-
tates, since only nobles could hold land) were divided equally among
male descendants, without the eldest son, or any son, being given
a preference. When attempts were made to Europeanize Russia,
some Tsars, to be sure, attempted to acclimatize in Russia an exotic
growth like primogeniture. Peter the Great made a short-lived
attempt of this kind ; and, during the time of which we are speaking,
Nicholas I made a new effort to establish a land-owning aristocracy
on the West European model. A ukase issued in 1845 8ave every
noble the right to found one or more landed estates based on primo-
geniture. The Tsar had evidently observed that in Western Europe
large landed estates formed the strongest barrier against liberalism.
As war against liberalism was his life task, and as he wanted to
erect a similar dam in Russia against revolutionary floods for the
present and future, he planned the founding of large landed estates
with at least two thousand peasants and twelve thousand rubles
income. But his scheme had only small success. Russian traditions
proved too strong an obstacle. There was lacking the pressure of
military necessity, which in Western Europe had formerly given
rise to the institution of primogeniture — an institution foreign to
Roman, as well as to German, law. Only a few such estates were
founded, and there is no evidence that they in any way modified
the political development of Russia.

The full significance of this fruitless effort on the part of the
autocratic Tsar is seen only when one considers that in spite of it the
great estates in Russia have not been divided up into small parcels,
nor has the basis been shattered on which the existence of the Rus-
sian great seigneurs rests. While in Western and Central Europe
the free partition of estates led either to the destruction of large

RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN ADVANCE 131

landed estates or to the impoverishment of the nobility, this was not
the result in Russia. This was not due to any artificial attempt to
limit the birth rate. Infant mortality even among the leading families
in Russia was indeed greater than in other countries of Europe. But
even if what seems to be a large percentage of the children died
before becoming of age, Russia was far from reaching a "one-son
condition," which in other countries of Europe was generally the
only way to obviate a dividing up of the paternal inheritance. The
reason that large landed estates did not cease to exist lies
simply in the fact that there was an enormous extent of territory
available in Russia, and that the more intensive cultivation which
has been spoken of made it possible for a piece of the paternal in-
heritance to yield as much as all the family land had formerly pro-
duced. "In many parts of the empire," observes A. Leroy-Beaulieu,
"the produce of the soil for a long time increased so rapidly that
estates were often doubled or trebled in value in twenty or thirty
years, indeed, sometimes became even ten times as valuable. It
might happen that two or three sons who had divided a paternal
inheritance would each become as rich as his father had been when
he was at their age."

Clearly Russia had no need to seek out new colonial lands. Only
when these conditions are taken into consideration is another insti-
tution seen in its right light. One might be inclined to regard serf-
dom as an obstacle to Russian colonization. One is tempted to say
that the lack of excess agricultural labor is due to the fact that
Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century had no free
peasants ; that the mujik was bound to the soil and could scarcely get
permission to depart from his master's land, leaving it uncultivated,
and emigrate to Siberia. But such a way of looking at the matter
does not go to the bottom of the question at all. Even if Russia
had already been over-populated, one does not see why the landlord
should have refused to permit unemployed laborers to emigrate if
they paid some compensation in money. That this would have been
possible is shown by the fact that there were numerous serfs who
plied a trade in the country districts or in the towns instead of culti-
vating the soil to which they were bound by law. Indeed, it was a
common practice to have the obligatory work in the fields (three
days a week) replaced by an annual substitute payment in money,
the so-called Obrok. This practice was particularly common in the
less fertile regions; the peasant remained, to be sure, under the
authority of his master and could be called back to the fields at any
time; meanwhile, however, he devoted himself to some occupation

132 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

in the town. Why could not some similar arrangement have been
made for the benefit of the serfs who might have wanted to leave
Russia, if it had really been over-populated, and seek free soil in
Siberia?

Moreover, serfdom and the law forbidding any one to leave Russia
without a pass had not even at that time been completely effective
in preventing emigration to Siberia. Already forces similar to
those which had once encouraged the Puritans in their expedition
to New England were driving many peasants to seek out regions
beyond the Ural Mountains. Much of the oppression which
made life in Russia hard for the individual was unknown in
Siberia. Beyond the Ural Mountains there was no recruiting for
military service; there was no serfdom; above all, there was no
religious compulsion for the unorthodox, because the power of Rus-
sian governing boards was often merely nominal, owing to the great
distance. It has been asserted that in the case of many Russians
the desire to move out east to the land of freedom was so strong that
they committed a crime on purpose, in order to be exiled there. At
any rate, in 1850 and the following years, the voluntary emigration,
at least to the nearer districts, was not insignificant.

The great majority of the immigrants into Siberia, however, were
naturally made up of those who were condemned to exile. When one
speaks of them one thinks ordinarily of criminals (in part political
offenders) condemned to work in the Siberian mines or at other
hard labor. One often overlooks the fact that crime was often
punished by mere banishment, and that in this case deportation
was simply like compulsory settlement. Punishment under these
circumstances occasionally might almost be regarded as a favor,
and it was beneficial, at any rate, not only to the individual, but
to the state as a whole. In fact, a Russian author writing at the
time of Nicholas I, though not at all favorably inclined toward the
existing regime, had to admit: "Simple exile to Siberia does not
frighten people who have no occupation or property. Peasants
there receive land in abundance and the country is not everywhere
uninhabitable. The harsh treatment during and after transportation
alarms only more or less cultivated people," that is, the class which
scarcely came into consideration at all as regular colonists. Further-
more, the peasants who were banished to Siberia were treated as free,
and often possessed many privileges not enjoyed by people of their
class in European Russia; for three years, they were free of taxes;
and only after they had been settled for twenty years were they
liable to be recruited for military service.

RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN ADVANCE 133

However, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, the settle-
ments had been, on the whole, relatively small. By that time, a firm
basis had been laid in Siberia for a Russian peasant population, but,
for reasons which have been explained, no intensive colonization
had yet taken place. On the other hand, Russian political control
had been extended further and further in Siberia, so that the coun-
try came to have a greater value as a place for future settlements.
Through these great extensions of territory the Russian government
succeeded in connecting her Asiatic possessions much more closely
with the trading centers of the world than heretofore.

In this connection the conquest of the Amur region, which gave
Russia an excellent access to the Pacific Ocean, is especially note-
worthy. This extension of Russian territory took place under Count
Muraviev, who was governor general of Eastern Siberia after 1847.
Scarcely had he been appointed to his post when he proceeded sys-
tematically to secure the region by military means and also by the
acquisition of the Amur Province, which lay to the south and be-
longed to China. In 1850 he built the port of Nikolaievsk at the
mouth of the Amur. In the following years, he undertook a series
of expeditions into Chinese territory, and founded there various
towns which should serve as points of support for a Russian occu-
pation. The Chinese Empire, as will be explained in detail in an-
other connection, was too weak at the time to defend itself against
such usurpations. In 1858 the Chinese government had to sign the
Treaty of Aigun, in which the whole territory north of the Amur
was recognized as Russia's. For Russia this success was only the
first step in her advance to the Pacific Ocean. Two years later,
in 1860, the new acquisition of territory was extended by the Treaty
of Peking, which gave to the Tsar the whole Maritime Province
from the Amur down to the boundary of Korea. This extended
Russian territory so far to the south that the tip of it now lay oppo-
site Japan. Here, at this tip, the Russians constructed a new port,
Vladivostok, "The Conqueror of the East," both as a symbol and
as a point of departure for the further extension of Russian rule.
The fortress projected like a wedge into the sea to the south. This
expansion was enlarged further by the acquisition of the Island of
Sakhalin, which lay off the Amur territory and was acquired from
Japan by purchase or exchange in 1875.

How largely all these annexations had been brought about by the
desire to improve Russian transportation and commerce in Siberia
is clearly seen from the wording of the two treaties of Aigun and
Peking. The Russians were by no means content with the mere

134 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

acquisition of territory. They also secured for themselves wide com-
mercial privileges. The navigation of the large rivers of the region
was reserved for Russian and Chinese vessels so that the ships of
other nations were excluded. Russians acquired the right to travel
freely and trade throughout all China. They were freed from
tariff duties in Mongolia; caravans could come and go unhindered
between Kiakta in Siberia and Tien-Tsin in China. China had to
agree to the installation of a permanent Russian embassy in Peking,
which was to watch over the execution of these provisions. In Urga,
the most important city of Mongolia, a Russian consulate was es-
tablished.

Somewhat less successful were the Russian attempts to get control
of a new approach to Peking from the west. In the Upper Tarim
Valley in Turkestan there had arisen in the i86o's the independent
state of Kashgaria. This inclined to Russia, in order to have pro-
tection from China, from which it had separated itself; it was later,
however, again subjected to the Chinese (1877). North of this
the Kuldja territory, after likewise revolting from China (1865),
finally came completely under Russia (1871). China, however,
protested. The Russians felt compelled to hand back at least the
eastern part of their new acquisition (1881), but they retained the
western part as a new gate for entering China. This was the upper
Hi Valley, through which the hordes of Jenghiz Khan had begun
their march upon Europe in the Middle Ages.

From an economic point of view, the Russian conquests in Eastern
Siberia were the most important gains of territory that the Tsar
made in Asia. But as far as area is concerned they were overshad-
owed by the acquisitions in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Here,
by slow and sure advances, the whole, so to speak, of Turkestan
was conquered; that is, the whole region between European Russia
and Siberia on one side, and Persia and Afghanistan on the other.
Thus, with the exception of China, the only two independent states
left were Persia and Afghanistan, and these owed their independence
merely to the fact that the British as possessors of India were op-
posed to their absorption by the rival power of Russia.

The Russian wars in this region fall into two series of actions
independent of each other. The more romantic, but less important
in itself, was that in the west, which led to the complete subjection
of the whole Caucasus region. Even at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century Russia had attained a firm footing south of the
Caucasus Mountains and along the eastern shore of the Black Sea.
At that time the Tsar of Georgia had made the Tsar of St. Peters-

RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN ADVANCE 135

burg his heir. But the eastern part of the Caucasus region — Dagh-
estan, which lies north of the mountains along the Caspian Sea-
was still in the possession of mountain tribes who opposed Russian
rule because of their Mohammedan faith. If the Russians wanted to
overcome these mountain peoples, they saw that they had a task
somewhat similar to that of the French in Algeria, in gaining control
over the region of the high plateaus. Here, also, there was
a national hero who played the part of Abd-el-Kader. Schamyl,
the leader of the mountaineers of Daghestan, like the Algerian
prophet, was both a prophet and a warrior. He was full of devices
and for a long time could not be captured. It was decades before
the Russians destroyed his power. Apparently less efficient than the
French in Algeria, the Russian generals spent their efforts for almost
thirty years — from 1830 to 1859 — in vain attempts to get this bold
enemy into their power. Nearly two hundred thousand men had to
be sent against him, and still Schamyl always succeeded in escaping.
In 1839, the Russians thought they had captured him, when they
took the fortress of Akulscho in which he had been shut, but again
the leader escaped, and his sister, Fatima, cast herself into
the water to escape falling into the hands of the Russians. The
Russians even suffered some defeats. In 1842, the Russian army
under General Grabbe which tried to capture Schamyl's main fort
at Dargo was completely routed in the woods nearby. Dargo was
not taken until three years later (1845). Even then Schamyl did
not give up the game as lost, but entrenched himself on an inacces-
sible mountain height where he held out for fourteen years. It was
not until 1859 that some Russian volunteers scaled the plateau
where he was hidden, drew up after them their comrades by ropes
which were fastened to crevices in the rocks, and succeeded in sur-
rounding him. A desperate fight took place. Almost all of his fol-
lowers were slain. He himself took refuge in a cave. The Russian
general started a fire to smoke him out, and Schamyl surrendered.
He was treated in the same way as Abd-el-Kader: the Tsar saw
to it that he should have a peaceful old age at Kaluga, south of
Moscow, until his death on a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1871.

These conquests not only brought the Caucasus completely under
control, but enabled the Russians to make strategic use of the re-
gions already won to the south and east. Now, at last, the terri-
tories which had been ceded to the Russians either by native princes
or by the Sultans of Turkey, were open for military operations
(see above, p. 42). Russia's approach to Persia was unhindered,
and this empire was further reduced to the position of a vassal

i36 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

state. The Persians had previously felt the superior force of their
Russian neighbors. The wars which had broken out on account
of the transfer of Georgia to Russia had led to a series of defeats
for Persia, and finally to the treaty of Turcomanchai, by which
Persia had to cede the provinces of Erivan and Nakitschivan in the
Southern Caucasus. With the exception of the province of Kars,
which did not become Russian until 1878, all the territory between
the Black and Caspian Seas was now in Russian hands.

Still more wearisome and long drawn out were the wars which
established Russian rule over Turkestan. Here the first region to
be conquered was that between the Caspian Sea and the Sea of
Aral and the lands to the east of the Sea of Aral.

There existed conditions in this region which might be compared
with the piracy in North Africa. The vast Steppes between the Ural
region (Russian since the eighteenth century) and the kingdoms of
Khiva and Bokhara were mostly occupied by nomad peoples who
lived by capturing slaves. Every year they were accustomed to
ride westward into the Ural region, or even to the Volga, and seize
Russian subjects whom they carried away and sold in the slave
markets of Khiva or Bokhara. In much the same way the Turco-
mans of the Steppes to the south plundered the Persians. The only
way to get rid of this pest was to occupy the region where the
plundering nomads lived. The difficulties, however, were enormous,
and infinitely greater than in the case of the Barbary Pirates. Thou-
sands of kilometers of desert lay between Khiva and the nearest
Russian city of Orenburg. Not even the passable routes through
this wilderness were known. The native rulers used all their
power to prevent foreigners from getting access to them. The
merchants who dared to risk it were flayed alive or impaled. The
difficulty of advance in this region is best shown by the expedi-
tion which the governor of Orenburg made in 1839 with a particu-
larly well-equipped corps. Although he had paid especial regard to
the great extent of the steppes over which he was to press forward,
had collected an enormous number of camels (over ten thousand),
and had hired Kirghiz guides, the expedition was a total failure.
Almost all the camels, and a considerable part of the men, died of
cold, and in 1840 the army had to retreat before reaching its ob-
jective at Khiva.

The resources for overcoming this difficulty were not found until
about twenty years later. Russian generals in Siberia, who usually
went ahead on their own hook and bothered little about the new
Anglo-Russian agreement which made Iran and Turkestan a neutral

RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN ADVANCE 137

zone, now sought to attack the kingdom of Khiva from behind.
Having found that it was unattackable from the front, they went
around the steppes, east of the sea of Aral so as to attack from much
further east in the Syr-Darya (Jaxartes) region. They also aban-
doned all large expeditions and attempts to crush the enemy at a
blow, and went forward step by step. First they gained control over
the Kirghiz hordes in the regions bordering on Siberia. Then Gen-
eral Perovski founded on the border between Siberia and the Syr-
Darya region of Turkestan the fort which bears his name (1853).
This became a base from which to make further advances. The Rus-
sians were now in a region where they could get food and fodder
for their troops.

From this point the conquest of the land took place by regular
steps. British protests were ignored, or at most heeded only to the
extent that the Russian government dismissed disobedient generals
but retained the conquests of war. The first city to fall into the
power of the Russians was Holy City of Hasred, known to-day as
Turkestan. This resulted from expeditions in 1864 directed from
the north to the south and later also to the south west. In this and
the following years, Chimkent and Tashkent were captured. These
two successes, the second of which gave the largest city in Turkes-
tan to the Russians, were due to General Chernaiev, the "Lion," as
he was called by the Turcomans. He was the leader who disregarded
the command which his government, owing to English protests, had
sent him, and in spite of it occupied Tashkent, paying for his patri-
otic deed by the loss of his position. No change in Russian policy,
however, was brought about by this. General Romanowski, who
succeeded the dismissed "Lion," pushed south from Tashkent, after
repelling an attack by the Khan of Bokhara. In the following year,
1868, Samarkand fell into the hands of the Russians. So the Rus-
sians acquired the great city of the Zarashan region, formerly the
capital of Tamerlane, whose grave is still there. The "moral effect"
of this success was enormous. The Khan of Bokhara gave up
all further resistance. He recognized the Tsar as suzerain and de-
clared that he was ready to pay a large war contribution. On the
eastern side the Russians had now pressed forward from Turkestan
to the neighborhood of the Afghan frontier, that is, as far as was
possible without coming into direct conflict with British claims.
For at that time Russia admitted that Afghanistan lay outside her
sphere of influence.

Western Turkestan, including Khiva, was still independent. This
was precisely the region from which the plundering attacks of the

138 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

nomads were made. Then, as ever, it was impossible to come to
any terms with the Khan. He refused to deliver up either the
Russian or the Persian slaves. But Russia's new conquests now al-
lowed her at last to get the better of these trouble makers. A con-
centric attack was planned. Khiva was to be approached both from
the west and from the north-east. The forces coming from the west,
that is, from Orenburg and the Caspian Sea, did not even this time
reach their goal, but again suffered terrible losses in camels. On
the other hand, the contingent coming from the east, that is, from
the east of the Sea of Ural, pressed forward without great difficulty
to the capital at Khiva. The Khan had to give in to the Russian
demands. Thirty thousand captives were set free, the whole north-
ern territory of the Amu-Darya (Oxus) region was ceded to Russia,
and Russian merchants were promised freedom of trade. A Mo-
hammedan insurrection against these concessions was crushed by
the Russian army. So Khiva, as well as Bokhara, now became a
vassal state of Russia. The country retained only a few troops of
its own, and the command over these was given to Russian officers.
Henceforth, no one could enter either of these states without a Rus-
sian passport (1873).

The only country which remained to be brought into subjection
was the strip of territory left between the Caspian Sea and Bokhara.
This task also was soon taken in hand by the Russians. There,
north of Persia, lived Turcomans, who gained a living in the same
way as the nomad tribes of Khiva. They were robber bands of
horsemen who hunted down Persian peasants and carried them
away as slaves. They had tried to protect themselves against hos-
tile attacks by building forts in their oases.

Ever since 1867 the Russians had tried to conquer the Turcomans,
and had succeeded to some extent in driving them back. Their
final strongholds, however, were not taken until General Skobelev
carried out a systematic campaign against them (1880). His ef-
forts culminated in the capture of the strongly fortified capital Gb'k-
tepe, where thirty-five thousand Turcomans had entrenched them-
selves. Skobelev wanted to go further and unite with Afghanistan
against British rule in India, but the English got ahead of him with
an expedition to Afghanistan (1880), and Skobelev died soon after-
wards.

After all these intervening areas had been occupied, Russians
finally approached Afghanistan. In 1884-5 they occupied the Merv
region and the Oasis of Pendjeh lying to the south of it. Both
territories lay east of Persia and within the Afghan zone. The

RUSSIA AND EUROPEAN ADVANCE 139

English government protested and it almost seemed as if war would
break out. But on this occasion, also, a peaceful solution was
found, as always, because England gave way on the main point: the
Russians retained their conquests.

In the eastern parts of Turkestan, in the region between
Bokhara and Chinese Turkestan, Russia and England agreed upon
a new Russian boundary. After long negotiations the Pamir terri-
tory finally fell to Russia in 1895, and could be staked out in such
a way that a relatively narrow strip of territory was left to the
Afghans between the Russian possessions and the region to the north
of India which became British at this time. This barren zone,
occupied by Mohammedan warrior tribes, was intended to be a bar-
rier to any great military operations either from the north or from
the south.

Thus, at the end of the nineteenth century, with the exception of
Persia and Afghanistan, no independent native kingdoms were left
in Central Asia. This vast part of the continent had been subjected
to two European Great Powers. Persia and Afghanistan retained
only a nominal independence, not because they were stronger than
Bokhara or Khiva, but simply because neither of the two European
rivals was willing to concede this booty to the other. China, too,
had suffered a considerable loss of territory to the north. The fate
of Asia, almost like that of Turkey, was being determined mainly by
the policy of these two European powers, though France finally
joined in with England and Russia.

Before any account is given of the consequences of this situation,
mention must be made of the European colonial policy which formed
both the supplement and the counterpiece to that of Russia in Siberia
and Central Asia: the establishment and extension of British power
in India.

CHAPTER XVIII

ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA AND COLONIAL WARS
WITH CHINA

WHILE the Russian expeditions in Siberia either led to settlement or
prepared the way for it later, British expansion in India was in
accordance with colonial policy in the old style. India was not
sought out as a place for settlement for an overflow population, nor
would such settlement have been conceivable. The land was not
vacant, and was hardly suitable as a permanent place of residence
for European families. Colonization here could take place only in
a purely commercial way. Europeans who settled in India aimed
to secure a monopoly of the export of Indian products and the im-
port of European manufactures in exchange. Altogether secon-
dary was any political idea in regard to population, that is, the idea
of caring for or improving a propertyless population which was pre-
vented from reaching economic prosperity at home. The number
of persons who could profit by this was not very large, nor could
one expect permanently to relieve the mother country from over-
population by a temporary emigration. Service in the British East
India Company afforded an excellent military and political training
and Great Britain owes many of her distinguished generals and
statesmen to the fact that India gave members of poor families a
much wider field of action than was possible at home. But India
could not be at all regarded as any place for settlement, such, for
instance, as Algeria.

The history of English colonization in India, both before and
after 1815, is in accord with these conditions. The British never
had any idea of a systematic conquest of the country. Their original
purpose, which was adhered to for a long time in principle, was
simply to obtain control of the coasts and the more important ports
of India in order to get the trade of the peninsula into their hands.
The fact that the possessions of the East India Company were ex-
tended widely into the interior from Bengal was simply due to the
circumstance that the coast places could only be regarded as safe
if the native warlike kingdoms were destroyed. A policy of con-
quest was at first prevented by the character of the British system

140

ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA 141

of control. India was not exactly a British possession, or to speak
more accurately, it was not exactly under English rule. It belonged,
so far as it did not consist of states which were nominally or act-
ually independent, to the East India Company. This was a trading
corporation which had, to be sure, some powers of government; it
maintained its own army and navy and officials, but it did not con-
stitute a state and it did not pursue national aims. The East India
Company, which up to 1813 had a monopoly of trade in Asia, was
naturally guided in its policy, not by the interests of England, but
by those of its stockholders. To shrewd calculating financiers noth-
ing appeared more expensive than warlike expeditions, which, even
if successful, resulted in only very moderate immediate gains.
However, every extension of territory also brought an increase in
the Company's revenues, for the Company usually took over the
rights of the deposed native princes and so acquired the latter's
land rents. Thus the Company had become a great landowning
corporation, and the revenue which it drew from its lands finally
exceeded the profits which came from its commerce. But it is easy
to see that a good part of the money that came in in this way had
to pay the costs of the military conquest of the land.

The East India Company, however, was not the only ruler in
India. Competition on the part of other European nations was in-
deed out of the question after the French attempt in the eighteenth
century to establish a colonial empire in India had definitely failed.
The French and the Portuguese possessed merely a few modest
places along the coast. But the more the East India Company
developed, the more the English government began to interfere by
appointing the Governors- General of India and by establishing a
Board of Control over the Company. This Board of Control was by
no means opposed to wide-reaching military operations. They re-
garded it as desirable to undertake wide conquests, although the
newly won territory might be a financial burden. In cases, for
instance, where this was the only method of protecting the life and
property of British subjects from the plundering raids of neighbor-
ing native tribes, the first Marquis of Hastings, who was Governor-
General of India in 1816, was given express permission to make
such conquests. So in the decades after 1815, before India became a
British vice-royalty, and even before the Company's charter had been
essentially limited by the state, the East India Company's policy
was no longer inspired purely by commercial motives. This change
is especially evident in two respects.

The first relates to the policy of territorial expansion. In 1815,

142 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

the possessions of the Company were very irregularly distributed
over India; though considerable in the northeast (Bengal) and in
the south (Madras and Ceylon), in the west they were limited to a
few coast towns. The important commercial city of Bombay had
no hinterland. Moreover, in the northwest was the largest native
state, the Mahratta Empire formed of Hindu warriors. This state
stretched also far to the east, and gave a point of support to robber
bands of Pindaris. These often attacked the British territory of
Madras in a fearful fashion. Just as in the case of Algiers or of
Khiva, there was no permanent remedy for this, unless the British
ceased to limit themselves to merely defensive measures against the
native plunderers. Here public safety and conquest coincided.

An occasion for such intervention was afforded by a particularly
brutal Pindari raid in 1816, which laid waste northern Madras.
The English opened war from the east and the west, and in scarcely
half a year (October, iSiy-March, 1818) the natives were subdued.
The Mahratta army was destroyed, many native princes were de-
posed, and others were compelled to recognize British suzerainty
which placed them under the control of a British "resident." Bom-
bay acquired a hinterland immediately dependent on the Company,
and all of India with the exception of the Punjab, that is the terri-
tory between China and Afghanistan, was brought under either the
direct or indirect rule of the East India Company.

The conquests in Burma took place somewhat later. Burmese
troops had attacked native princes who stood under British protec-
tion; thereupon the Governor-General, Lord Amherst, declared war
on Burma. After relatively protracted operations (1824-26), the
British army succeeded in compelling the King of Ava to cede his
whole Burmese coastal territory with the exception of the central
Pegu strip. British control was thus extended over India and
Burma up to the frontier of Siam.

The second respect in which a change of policy was evident is
seen in the humanitarian and educational activity of the Indian ad-
ministration. The East India Company as such had no interest
in improving the civilization of the native population or in intro-
ducing European institutions. On the contrary, it aimed to keep
Christian missionaries out in order to avoid unrest. The representa-
tives of the British Government, on the other hand, placed political
and social reforms in the foreground. They sought to apply the
new humanitarian ideas at least to the most objectionable Indian
customs, even where these customs rested on religious beliefs. As
early as 1802, Sir Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington, had

ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA 143

forbidden the practice of throwing children to the sharks or drown-
ing them in the Ganges. In 1829 the British went further still.
Cover nor- General Bentinck forbade widow burning. He expressly
declared that religious practices would be tolerated only so far as
they did not conflict with the fundamental demands of justice and
humanity. In 1832, the Cover nor- General declared illegal the slave
trade between the British districts, and finally, in 1843, slavery was
totally forbidden. In education, European methods began to be in-
troduced and a break was made in the traditional Oriental culture;
Persian was definitely abolished in 1837 as the language of the law
courts, and for it was substituted either English or one of the native
dialects.

All these tendencies, however, could not be fully developed so
long as the old charter of the East India Company, which had to
be periodically renewed, was still in force. The basis for more fun-
damental reforms was therefore not laid until the Reform Bill of
1832 had overthrown the conservative regime in the mother country
(see above, p. 93). It happened that in the next year (1833) the
charter had to be renewed. The new Liberal cabinet used this op-
portunity to give effect to most important demands for modern-
izing India. As almost always, what was old was not completely
swept away, but some compromise was found. Still, as a matter
of fact, the East India Company's new charter signified the end
of the Company's commercial policy, and virtually brought India
into the class of British crown colonies. Henceforth, the Company
was little more than a mere agent for the English government. The
administration of India had essentially passed over into the hands
of the British Government.

The first results of this new relationship were seen in the change
of policy adopted toward the territories in the north (Sindh, Punjab,
Beluchistan). The Board of Control in London looked further into
the future than the directors of the East India Company, and re-
garded it as necessary to get ahead of Russia. Instead of
being content with administering the territories already won, the
English government undertook to create a series of buffer states
to protect India against a Russian invasion. They inaugurated the
policy which was to determine almost exclusively their attitude
toward other powers for more than half a century. Henceforth, their
chief care was to make their Indian possessions safe against Russia ;
the main aim of British foreign policy, therefore, was to hinder
Russia from becoming too strong, not only in Asia, but also every-
where else.

144 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

In order to realize the full significance of this attitude, the reader
must keep in mind the forces on each side. England maintained in
Europe an army which was small in view of her international rela-
tions; and it was only her insular position and her superior fleet
which prevented this neglect of armament from bringing about her
downfall as a Great Power. In India this military weakness might
have much more serious consequences. England's army, which
was so small according to European notions, but which had won her
battles in India, might indeed suffice to keep the native princes in
order; but it was in no position to contend with a European military
power. Furthermore, English rule could not depend on her own
colonists for defense. India was not at all a settlement colony like
Algeria, and no active assistance was to be expected from the na-
tives, if English authority were once threatened. In fact, the nu-
merous native soldiers (Sepoys), out of which the British armies in
India were for the most part recruited (in 1857 &e proportion of
Sepoys to British troops in India was eight to one), could not be
regarded as thoroughly reliable. So if Russia, the greatest military
power of the time, should succeed in advancing against India, the
colony would simply have to be counted as lost. Neither was Great
Britain so organized that she could send out an army as strong as
Russia's, nor would her superiority at sea be of any advantage in
this case. So there was just one thing left to be done: to create
dependent states in the border territory between India and the
Russian possessions in Asia. These dependent states could bear the
first brunt of Russian attack, and make a Russian expedition to
India a more difficult affair. It became also part of England's
policy to weaken Russia in general, by means of international com-
binations, of which the alliance with France in the Crimean War is
the best known (see below, ch. xxii).

Under these circumstances, one can understand what a great im-
pression was made by Russia's systematic advance in Central and
Eastern Asia as described in the preceding chapter. As early as
the eighteenth century the East India Company had sought to es-
tablish close relations with Persia. Later Napoleon had thought
of attacking England by way of Persia. But now the Empire of
the Shah had fallen completely under Russian influence, and Persian
rulers were being instigated by Russian agents to undertake regular
attacks against India. Russia's first attempt was made against
Herat in Western Afghanistan. This stronghold lies in an oasis
and controls the caravan route from Turkestan to India, but could
not venture to make any independent resistance unaided; for the

ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA 145

little principality of Herat was one of the numerous divisions which
had survived after the splitting up of the empire of the Great Mogul,
and was so small in area that it could not think of venturing into
competition with Great Powers. But at this first attempt of Rus-
sia's it appeared that the opponents of her policy of expansion in
Central Asia could count on British help. The support which the
English gave to Herat was indeed quite insignificant, consisting only
of a single artillery officer in the service of the East India Company,
but this young man conducted the defense of the city so cleverly,
and understood so shrewdly how to inspire the garrison with unfail-
ing courage, that the Persian army, in spite of the Russian officers
who accompanied it, failed to take the city after a ten months'
siege (1838-39), and had to retreat. Herat thereupon was again
reestablished by the English as an independent state, that is, as a
buffer between Persia (which was regarded as already lost and
under Russian influence) and India (although a part of India which
was not British territory).

At the same time the Tsar undertook a similar step against the
larger and more important kingdom of Afghanistan. In 1837 tne
Russians had sent an agent to the Emir there and sought to prepare
the way for the same kind of underhand vassal relationship as in
Persia. The British in India replied to this by despatching an army
of six thousand men to Cabul in order to depose the Emir who was
friendly to Russia and to put in his place a pretender who was
devoted to themselves and who had fled to India under English pro-
tection (1839). The expedition was carried out without difficulty
so long as it was merely a question of fighting a way through the
country; the British army quickly seized the strongholds and occu-
pied Cabul. But the deposition of the preceding Emir resulted in a
general insurrection of the Afghans; they cut off communications
with India and destroyed almost to a man the British army in its
forced retreat (1842). This blow to British prestige was not left
unavenged. The very same year a large army was fitted out and
again occupied Cabul. But this time the British did not remain in
the city. They were satisfied when the preceding Emir, whom they
had released, declared himself to be their ally. So the much feared
preponderant influence of Russia over Afghanistan was destroyed,
for the moment at any rate.

This precarious success was not the only consequence of the
Afghan war. More important was the fact that by it the English
were driven to conquer the whole northern part of India, particu-
larly the Indus basin. Communications with Afghanistan were not

I46 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

regarded as secure so long as the intervening territory between it and
British India remained in foreign hands. In fact, it was not pos-
sible to control Russian intrigues unless the English became mas-
ters of the Punjab. Even during the Afghan war a British con-
tingent in the Sindh region, near the mouth of the Indus, had been
severely dealt with (1839).

Accordingly the Governors- General of India took the conquest of
these territories systematically in hand. The struggle was not easy.
The Punjab was, and is, occupied by the warlike Sikhs, who made
a most obstinate resistance to the English. The wars lasted for
seven years (1842-49); it was not until 1849 that the British could
proclaim the annexation of the Punjab. In 1856 there followed the
annexation of the Kingdom of Oudh on the upper Ganges in north-
eastern India; this included Lucknow, which was regarded, so to
speak, as the Brahmin Holy Land. All India was now in posses-
sion of the English. The districts which were directly dependent
upon the Governors- General formed a ring of territory around the
native princes who still exercised a nominal authority. And it
seemed likely that the directly dependent lands would be extended
still further, as the English claimed to inherit principalities for which
there was no legitimate heir, declaring them to be British pos-
sessions.

Similarly the British control over Burma was rounded out. There
the Kingdom of Pegu, which had once been left under a native
ruler, was annexed in 1852. In this way the whole of the territory
in India and Burma lying on both sides of the Bay of Bengal came
under British control.

But this capstone nearly brought the whole structure to the
ground. For a long time the proportion between the East India
Company's British troops and the native Sepoys had been a dan-
gerous one. As mentioned already, there were about eight Sepoys
to one British soldier. The self-confidence of the Sepoys had been
greatly increased during the recent wars. The British had made
important concessions to them; many of them who were recruited
from the fertile and densely populated territory of Oudh, which
had been recently annexed by the British, suddenly acquired in
their home territory an unusually privileged position. The unlucky
course of the first Afghan campaign had also not been forgotten
by the Sepoys. A wound to their religious sensibilities finally threw
the spark into the powder magazine. Unfortunately, the new wea-
pon introduced at this time into the Indian army, the so-called En-
field rifle, horrified both the Hindus and Mohammedans. The

ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA 147

cartridges that the soldiers had to bite off were greased with the fat
of the cow, which is sacred for the Hindus, and with lard from the
pig, which is abhorred by Mohammedans. So, in 1857, the year
after the annexation of Oudh, part of the Sepoys mutinied.

The revolt broke out in Delhi, northwest of Oudh. The Sepoys
refused to obey their European officers, slew a number of them, and
placed a successor to the Great Mogul on the throne. He soon
succeeded in capturing Cawnpur in Oudh; the English there were
mostly massacred. Rajah Nana Sahib, who had led the mutiny,
was able to begin the siege of Lucknow. The whole upper Ganges
region for the moment was lost to the British.

But the rebels remained isolated; the Sikhs and the Gurkhas
remained true to the British. This sealed the fate of the mutiny.
General Havelock was able to make the Punjab his base of opera-
tions. From there he quickly re-occupied Delhi, where the Great
Mogul committed suicide, and then captured Cawnpur. It was
somewhat longer before he was able to regain Lucknow in 1858;
but timely reinforcements had been sent into the besieged city. A
year later (1859) the whole mutiny could be regarded as suppressed.
The speed with which the Sepoy mutiny had been put down was no
more remarkable than the consequences which resulted from it. The
assassination of British subjects had made an enormous impression
in England. Public opinion ascribed the blame to the defective
military system and especially to the defective government of the
East India Company. The demand for a reform, that is for the
transfer of administration from the Company to the British Govern-
ment, could no longer be resisted. In 1858, the East India Com-
pany ceased to rule, the Governor- General became a Viceroy, and
the King of England undertook the immediate responsibility for
the government of India. A principle already contained in the
Company's charter of 1833 was also given increased emphasis:
natives, no matter of what race or religion, were to be admitted
so far as possible to official positions for which they were fitted.
At the same time all the rebels, except those who had been guilty
of murdering British subjects, received complete amnesty.

India was now given a special official in London, the Secretary of
State for India, whose duties were separated from those of the
Colonial Secretary. The expenditures for the country were consider-
ably increased. The Government established numerous schools for
the natives, undertook irrigation systems, and constructed a net-
work of railways throughout the country. Vast measures were
taken to prevent famine. The promise to admit natives into the

148 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

administration was fulfilled to the extent that at least subordinate
offices were given exclusively to natives; Indian notables were also
admitted into the elective city councils; the higher positions, how-
ever, which really controlled the administration, were reserved ex-
clusively for the British until very recently. But to secure appoint-
ment to these well-paid offices, persons had to pass a civil service
examination in London, which guaranteed the possession of definite
knowledge, especially in languages. In contrast with conditions
under the East India Company, care was taken that the appoint-
ment of high officials should not be made according to seniority; in
general, Anglo-Indian Civil Servants were not compelled to come up
through the lower grades of the service in India.

The effect of the Sepoy Mutiny is most clearly seen in the reform
of the military organization. After it had been shown how dangerous
an army was in which the native element predominated, the propor-
tion of European soldiers was materially increased. The artillery,
which was important and which could not be improvised by the
natives in case of a mutiny, was left wholly in the hands of Euro-
pean troops. In the infantry and the cavalry the proportion of
natives to Europeans was to be two to one in Bengal, and three to
one in Madras and Bombay. Only subordinate positions in the
army were open to natives. Ordinarily the standing army in India
was to consist of 80,000 British and 160,000 Sepoys. The success
of these changes has been complete; not only has there been no
further mutiny of native troops since 1857, but Indian regiments
which formerly used to refuse to fight in Burma, because they had a
superstitious horror of crossing the ocean, could now be used with-
out fear even on distant fields (such as Africa).

Two problems, however, still remained to be dealt with, both of
such a nature that a satisfactory solution was scarcely possible.
One concerned the economic structure of the country, the other the
population question.

The connection with England resulted in a strict division ot
labor. India, which had formerly been a flourishing textile manu-
facturing country according to Oriental notions, became reduced to
a country producing chiefly raw materials. Her muslin manu-
facture could not stand competition with English industries, and was
almost ruined. In its place, the cultivation of the soil was strongly
stimulated. The financial interests of the British government, which
drew one of its most important sources of revenue from the opium
monopoly along with the land tax and salt monopoly, tended to
coincide with those of the new railway systems, which, for instance.

ENGLISH POLICY IN INDIA 149

made advantageous the growing of wheat in the Punjab. The culti-
vation of tea in Assam rendered the English partially independent
of China for one of their favorite luxuries. But it became more and
more evident that the too dense population of India could not be
fed, and the excellent administration was not one of the least influ-
ences which tended to aggravate this evil. The complete pacification
of the country, the measures to prevent periodic famines, the ameli-
oration of the barbaric legal practices and religious customs, the
introduction of modern means of communication — all these had the
result that the population grew beyond measure, without being auto-
matically checked as formerly. Under these circumstances nothing
but India's manufactures could have remedied this evil to some ex-
tent; and in fact some efforts of this kind were undertaken, but they
were very moderate, and employed only a small part of the popula-
tion. And a great development of Indian textiles was scarcely
desirable from the point of view of the English export trade. Only
the emigration of numerous coolies to the African or West Indian
colonies succeeded in ameliorating a little the evils of Indian over-
population.

But this refuge did not apply to the upper classes, a circumstance
which was all the more serious because their position in the
Anglo-Indian state created a difficult problem — the second com-
plicated task which faced the British administration. The oppor-
tunity of acquiring European culture, which was liberally afforded
by the government, was creating in India a large "educated prole-
tariat," that was much more dangerous than the corresponding
groups in Europe; because, although in Europe the number of can-
didates who had passed an advanced examination, was greater than
the number of positions to be filled, in India the prospect of rising
to the highest positions in the civil service scarcely existed for the
natives at all. On the other hand, these intellectuals, like their
European brothers, had become virtually useless for any other prac-
tical economic activity, and so formed an evergrowing class of In-
dian declasses.

The opposition to British rule, which derived its strength chiefly
from these groups, also began to assume ever more dangerous forms
in another connection, directly as a result of this unlimited oppor-
tunity for acquiring a European education. The safety of British
rule had rested largely on the fact that hitherto there had been no
unified Indian national feeling. In fact, there could not be any,
so long as civilization in India rested on religion. The Hindu felt
himself further removed from the Mohammedan than from the Eng-

150 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

lishman, who usually did not disturb him in his religious practices.
The Sepoy Mutiny had been unable to spread, in good part owing
to the fact that the Sikhs would not support a revolt led by Nana
Sahib, whom they regarded as a Mohammedan. But now precisely
this contact with European civilization wakened new ideas among
the intellectuals. They were freed from the intellectual bondage of
their religious communities, so that Hindus and Mohammedans
found themselves standing on the common national foundation of
European ideas. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the im-
partial and absolutely honest justice administered by the English
was already regarded as a thorn in the flesh by the hitherto ruling
classes, because it protected the lower classes against the traditional
exploitation of the rich, it is easy to see that all the advantages which
British administration afforded, the natives gradually turned against
the benefactors, at least so far as concerned the "babus" or Indian
university graduates.

Thus was established the Indian Empire, which lasted for more
than half a century without any essential modifications. It was
merely a change in form when the name "colony" was dropped, and
India began to be thought of as a state united to Great Britain
through personal union. This was the purpose of the measure by
which the "Empire of India" was proclaimed in 1876, and the Queen
of England took the title "Empress of India." Since that time
King George V and Queen Mary have assumed the imperial dignity
formally, and in 1911 the city of Delhi was again raised to the
position of imperial capital. The King of England is likewise
the successor of the Great Mogul (who also had his capital at Delhi)
and no longer stands as the ruler of a subordinate people.

Much more important for the future than these external changes
is the fact that England by her control of India was led into a new
political policy in regard to Eastern Asia, and was provoked into
one of the most important events of the nineteenth century — the
Europeanizing of the Far East.

The partial transfer of political power from the East India Com-
pany to the British government in 1833 had influenced relations
with China. The Company had permission, as is well known, to
carry on trade in Canton — the sole Chinese port open to trade —
though only at definite times and under strictly regulated conditions.
Now in 1834, when the commercial agents of the Company were re-
placed in Canton by the official representatives of the British govern-
ment, and when the British envoy, Lord Napier, desired to be re-
ceived on equal terms by the governor of Canton, a conflict arose.

COLONIAL WARS IN CHINA 151

The Chinese government declared that they had provided only for
the admission of commercial agents, and the viceroy refused to enter
into any relations whatever with Napier. In 1834 the English repre-
sentative, who had no forces at hand, thereupon withdrew to the
neighboring Portuguese settlement of Macao.

In spite of this, the English government at first refrained from
forcible measures. To Lord Napier's complaints, it replied that it
wanted to restore commercial relations only by friendly means. Pos-
sibly this policy would have lasted a long time if the English cabinet
had not been compelled to regard the special wishes of the Indian
administration.

Since the end of the seventeenth century opium smoking had
developed in China. The new luxury had spread so rapidly and
caused such disastrous results that it was forbidden in 1729 except
for medical purposes and later, at the end of the eighteenth century,
forbidden altogether. This prohibitory legislation stood in direct
conflict with the interests of the East India Company, which
had a monopoly of the opium trade in India. Since it was impos-
sible to get the Chinese prohibition annulled, much smuggling went
on by way of Canton. The smuggling business increased more and
more, even after the political power was half transferred from the
East India Company to the British Government. Further induce-
ment to increasing the prohibited importation of opium into China
lay in the fact that in 1830 the cultivation of the poppy plant in
India was permitted to every one, which naturally materially in-
creased the supply of goods to be smuggled. Over this matter quar-
rels arose between the Chinese government and the British repre-
sentatives. The Chinese sought to destroy the smuggling by force,
that is, by confiscating the opium. The English government de-
manded compensation (1839). ^n order to give force to its demands
the London cabinet despatched a number of ships and troops to
China. As the Chinese still refused to give in, reinforcements were
sent out and a number of coast towns were occupied without great
difficulty. Finally, the British forces advanced up the Yang-tse
River as far as Nanking. The Chinese government perceived that
further opposition was hopeless, and in scarcely a week their dele-
gates signed with the British the Treaty of Nanking (1842).

The Treaty of Nanking marks the opening of political relations
between China and Europe. The Middle Kingdom, which shortly
before had only admitted the envoys of European Powers like de-
spised slaves, now had to concede to the English equality of treat-
ment and in many respects even superiority. After a supplementary

152 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

treaty of 1843, t*16 English received the exclusive right to punish
subjects of their own who committed crimes on Chinese soil. Eng-
land was assured the most-favored-nation treatment. In another
treaty it was stipulated that British goods should pay no higher
transit duties than those already in existence. These commercial
privileges were all the more important in that the Treaty of Nan-
king gave to the English full possession of the island of Hong- Kong
(at the entrance to Canton), and five other coast towns (including
Shanghai) were also opened to trade. In addition, China had to pay
a considerable war indemnity, to grant an amnesty to all Chinese
who had dealt with the British government, and to promise expressly
that Chinese officials would treat the British on a footing of equality.

This was the way in which the opium question was solved at first.
But it was more than fifteen years before the Chinese government
was ready to recognize officially the importation of opium; not
until 1858 did it agree to the collection of an import duty. But
since importation in the principal ports was practically controlled
by the English, the smuggling could not be stopped, and trade
statistics show that from 1845 the importation of opium steadily in-
creased. India, which marketed the greater part of its opium in
China, believed its profits secure; and nothing was left for the
Chinese to do except to plant the poppy themselves in a steadily
increasing quantity, unless they wanted to let the "foreign devils"
have all the profit.

The Opium War had still another result of enormous importance
for world history. Now for the first time there was established
direct and untrammeled trade between Europe and Asia. The Far
East was opened to exploitation by the trade and modern factory
production of European countries, backed by all the new means of
communication made possible by modern inventions. It was evident
that the old means of defense were inadequate to check this new
invasion. The giant state of China, which for centuries had never
had to fear attack from any of its neighbors, and which had felt
secure in its self-sufficiency, was now compelled by a relatively small
military force to open its doors to a trade that it recognized as hurt-
ful to itself. The despised foreigners, Russians and English, had
not only forced China to cede important territories, but had also
received the right to interfere in her internal financial policies. All
this had taken place without the sufferer having been guilty of any
barbaric act which could have given Europeans good grounds for
interference. In China there were neither robber bands nor pirates
rendering neighboring territories unsafe. The country desired nothing

COLONIAL WARS IN CHINA 153

but to be left in peace. Nevertheless, the invasion had taken place.
Europeans no longer permitted a market to be closed against them-
selves, and they had the military force to impose their will even on
their strongest opponent in Eastern Asia.

The reaction, to be sure, was not long in coming. Peoples whose
political organization was too different from that of Europe to per-
mit their inferiority in fighting strength to be quickly remedied, had
indeed little prospect of being able to avoid exploitation by Euro-
peans. On the other hand, the nations of Eastern Asia were too
advanced politically not to try to adapt their institutions success-
fully to those of Europe.

The first case of this kind will be explained in the following
chapter.

CHAPTER XIX

THE FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF A NON-
EUROPEAN PEOPLE (JAPAN)

THE Chinese Empire was so vast and its power was still so great,
in spite of the commercial concessions wrung from it by Europeans,
that the Treaty of Nanking and similar agreements which followed
with England and other European nations made no catastrophic im-
pression upon the organization of the state, and in fact passed almost
unnoticed by considerable parts of the Empire. There followed,
to be sure, a few small reforms in the nature of an adaptation to
European customs, but all such efforts left the structure of the Old
Regime untouched. It was quite otherwise with the little neighbor
for whom it was a question of life or death whether she could so
make herself over as to resist European armies.

Japan had sought to secure herself from interference by foreign
states in much the same way as China, or if possible, even more
strictly, so that she was shut off completely from foreign countries.
She was an example of an isolated state with a pure civilization of
its own. All commercial relations with foreign countries were for-
bidden; the only trade permitted was that along the coast. For-
eigners were admitted into only one harbor (Nagasaki). Even there
they could only land on an artificial island and had to submit to
humiliating ceremonies; and the only foreigners tolerated were the
Chinese and the Dutch, who were harmless both from a political
and military point of view.

Japan had no need to make any change, either within or without
the country, so long as no European Great Power became interested
in Eastern Asia. The only state which in earlier centuries might
have forced an opening of the country, namely China, desired no
commercial relations with foreigners; and it woud not have ac-
corded with the modern pacifistic policy of the Middle Kingdom
to use military force against a peaceful neighbor.

Even at the end of the eighteenth century a few far-sighted Japa-
nese had recognized that, owing to the extension of European ocean
commerce, danger was approaching from the fact that Japan's

FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF NON-EUROPEANS 155

military equipment was wholly inadequate judged by European
standards. Even at that time, a Japanese reformer arose who urged
that at least defense against foreign ships be modernized. He in-
sisted that the coasts ought to be fortified and the law forbidding
foreign trade be repealed. But his program was much too prema-
ture. The man who proposed these innovations was thrown into
prison and his efforts were ruined. Practically none of his sugges-
tions were carried out, except that some attention was given to the
defense of the coasts. Even the cruel treatment of foreign ships
was not given up, although Japanese might well have feared foreign
countries would use this as an argument for intervening. Even in
1825, the Japanese government ordered that every foreign ship
should be fired upon forthwith; it was not until 1842 (that is, after
the Opium War) that the law was modified so that an exception
should be made at least in favor of vessels in distress.

The first serious attack on this system was made when the Eng-
lish war against China ended with the defeat of a great power which
had hitherto been regarded as unconquerable. Reformers could
point to this as a warning which any one ought to understand. In a
petition to the Shogun, the highest authority in the country, they
declared that Japan would suffer the same fate as China unless she
changed her armament.

Important as these demands may have been in preparing public
opinion for the later revolution, the foreign warning was still not
sufficient to bring about a change. The Japanese first had to realize
in their own country what military weakness meant in the eyes of
the European Great Powers before their Ancien Regime could be
overthrown. To be sure, in some respects, their military system was
modernized; the government imported guns from the Netherlands,
and, in a very limited way, trained troops in the European fashion.
It also intended to continue these efforts. It listened attentively to
the warnings of the Dutch that it would be better to open the har-
bors voluntarily, while this was still possible, without waiting to be
forced to do so by the Europeans.

The decisive impulse which led Japan to abandon her isolation
policy came in the end from a nation which was not a European
power. Japan was too distant and too poor to have the European
Great Powers take such an interest in her as they did in China. It
was otherwise with the United States. The inhospitable attitude
of the Japanese government toward foreign vessels affected American
shipping particularly. It often happened that American whaling
ships were driven onto the Japanese coast. The greater proximity

1 56 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

made commercial relations more attractive than in the case of Eu-
rope. So it happened that in 1846 an American admiral desired
admission; when his request was refused, the government at Washing-
ton discussed sending an expedition against Japan.

Then in 1848, as a result of the war with Mexico, the United
States acquired California and the harbor of San Francisco. Her
interest in the opening of Japan became greater than ever. She
was no longer content with platonic requests. In 1853 Commodore
Perry appeared in the Bay of Yedo (now Tokio) with four warships
and requested the Mikado, the nominal ruler of Japan, to open his
harbors. At the same time he handed to the Japanese government
as a gift two hitherto unknown examples of modern science, — models
of the telegraph and the railway.

In this first visit Perry succeeded only in having his letter handed
to the Mikado, though this was contrary to Japanese law. The
means at his disposal did not permit him to go further. He there-
fore returned the following year (1854), but with twice as many
warships and four thousand soldiers on board. The Japanese, who
saw foreign steamers and guns for the first time, quickly perceived
that they must yield. They decided first to make concessions in
order to avoid a military conflict and thus gain time to reorganize
themselves. So Perry succeeded in having two harbors opened to
foreign trade, in having the tariff for American goods placed at a
very low rate, and in establishing an American consul who should
exercise jurisdiction over Americans.

Thus Japan had to make essentially the same concessions as
China; and these were made, not to the Americans alone, but to
all the other European nations, for the treaty with Perry in 1854
served as a model for numerous others. In the following years sim-
ilar treaties were made with Russia, Great Britain, Holland, and
France. Three harbors were finally opened to trade. The tariff
was declared applicable to all Europeans. The European Powers
received the right not only to establish consuls with their own juris-
diction, but also to be represented by ministers to the Shogun.

Japan seemed to have fallen into a position of greater dependence
than China. But the country had made these concessions, as has
been said, only in order to gain time to Europeanize her organization
undisturbed. Consequently, she set to work to adapt her military
system, which hitherto had been wholly neglected, to European
standards. This movement was essentially aided by the course of
the so-called Second Opium War in China (1858-60), which showed,
even more clearly than the First, the weakness of the East Asiatic

FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF NON-EUROPEANS 157

states compared with Europe, and also the serious consequences for
a state which did not adopt European methods.

The thing which gives the revolution in Japan world historic im-
portance was not merely the fact that her military institutions were
modernized, as also happened finally in China, but that the whole
social and political organization of the nation was revolutionized.
The main interest, therefore, does not lie in the less important tech-
nical innovations which Japan copied from Europe after 1854 (she
engaged military instructors from Holland, received a steamer from
the Dutch as a gift, and established an iron foundry), but in the
fundamental transformation of the constitution of the state. But
before this change is described, a brief account must be given of the
Ancien Regime in Japan.

The mountainous Japanese islands, where only fifteen per cent
of the soil is fit for cultivation, had always remained a relatively
poor country. Neither in industry nor in intellectual life had the
Japanese shown such an independent and wide development as the
Chinese. While the giant empire of China had always devoted
itself to the arts of peace, Japan had remained under the domination
of the warrior class. Although in other respects Chinese culture had
been slavishly copied (to such an extent that Japanese writers even
wrote their books in the Chinese language), in military matters
Japan had by no means modeled herself after her great neighbor.
Nominally, to be sure, the Japanese population was divided into the
same classes as the Chinese: there was the division into scholars,
peasants, artisans, and merchants; but in Japan "scholars" meant
the feudal nobility, the Samurai or warrior caste. There was no
merchant code of honor as in China; notions of honor were of a
feudal nature and were derived from loyalty to the overlord.

The most powerful of these feudal overlords, the Shogun, was
the actual ruler of the country. The nominal emperor, or Mikado,
lived a totally secluded shadow existence in Kioto; he was
carefully watched by the Shogun and was powerless against him
because he controlled only insignificant possessions. The Shogun in
Yedo (Tokio), on the other hand, was the richest man in the coun-
try. He did not rule exactly in cooperation with the other great
feudal lords (Daimios), but with the help of his own vassals.

All the power in general lay in the hands of this hereditary aris-
tocracy. The 268 Daimios, who had about 400,000 armed servants
(Samurai) in their pay, controlled all financial and political power.
But in spite of their military veneer their warlike spirit had de-
parted. The long years when Japan was threatened by no enemy

158 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

had allowed soldier virtues to decay. Knowing nothing of business
and brought up according to strict etiquette, the Daimios lived an
idle existence, whether on their country estates or at the court of
the Shogun. The Samurai were still equipped with armor and swords,
but modern weapons were scarcely known. There were not even
the beginnings of a navy.

Now if the Japanese wished to create a defensive system of a
European nature, their first task was to break the privileges of the
military caste. The most natural way to do this seemed to be to
restore the old empire by endowing the Mikado again with the
political power, as he had become merely an object of religious
veneration, and by playing him off against the Daimios.

The Europeans themselves aided the reformers in Japan. Since
the high Japanese officials, being feudal lords, were the most de-
cided opponents of every innovation, such as opening of the ports,
the Americans had at the very outset appealed to the Mikado,
and later British diplomats adopted the same policy. So it was the
Opposition Party itself which helped bring it about in 1867 that
power was restored to the new Mikado, Mutsu-Hito, who died
in 1912.

When Mutsu-Hito ascended the throne he turned out to be a
monarch who was ready to undertake the reforms advocated by the
Europeans and the Japanese and even by a part of the magnates
themselves. Old Japan was quickly transformed. In this same
year (1867) the last Shogun had to resign, and the next year the
Japanese government began to make voluntarily the concessions
which the Europeans shortly before had been wringing from them
by interfering in their affairs. Ports were opened, ambassadors were
admitted to direct intercourse with his Imperial Majesty, and the
royal residence was transferred to Yedo which was now named
Tokio; thus the Mikado henceforth lived at the former seat of the
Shoguns. In 1869 the Mikado took an oath to the constitution.

The most important change was the abolition of the old feudal
system. The execution of the treaties which had been made before
1868 had been rendered possible only by the fact that the Mikado
had allied himself with the foreigners against the conservative part
of the Japanese nobility; a permanent modernization of Japan could
only be brought about if the sworn adherents of the Old Regime
were rendered powerless forever. Accordingly, in the years 1871-75
the Mikado's enlightened despotism put a complete end to feudalism;
the nobles were either pensioned or bought off. The clans were
dissolved. Local government was handed over to prefects after

FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF NON-EUROPEANS 159

the French fashion. In imitation also of Napoleon I's government,
an advisory senate was established at the Mikado's side. The war-
rior caste of Samurai was completely abolished, and in its place
universal military service was introduced (1873). In the preceding
year (1872), as a necessary forerunner to it, compulsory education
was adopted. Banks and stock-companies were established like
those of Europe.

Going beyond these economic and political measures, the new
government even dared to deal with religion. In 1858 the Ameri-
cans had secured by treaty freedom of worship for their citizens.
Now Japan, of her own accord, went further and annulled all the
edicts which had been made against Christianity. Buddhism and
Shintoism were no longer to be regarded as religions of the state
(1880). Distinctly Christian institutions, like Sunday rest and the
Gregorian calendar, received official sanction. Foreigners of other
religions were called in considerable numbers as teachers in the
new state schools, particularly in the universities. English was
made obligatory as the language for students. The proposition was
even considered of introducing a simplified English as the language
of daily life.

The New Era was particularly manifest in the field of education.
The state overlooked no means by which the people could be made
quickly acquainted with European science and technical progress.
The system of education was put under state supervision. Four
universities and several technical schools were established, modeled
on those of Europe. Travelling fellowships were provided for
teachers who wanted to seek the fountains of knowledge in Europe.
In all this there was no question of slavish imitation, at least not
in the branches of knowledge which were not of a technical or
scientific nature. Thus, the religious instruction of European schools
was replaced by general ethics, and by courses in jurisprudence in
the secondary schools.

The speed with which this Asiatic people without, so to speak,
any preparation understood how to assimiliate all the inherited ac-
quisitions of European culture must ever remain one of the most
astonishing facts in world history. Scarcely had a decade passed
when Japan was able to use against another East Asiatic state the
very methods which the European countries had adopted only a
little while before against her. The Emperor of Korea, that is the
ruler of the peninsula which lies directly opposite Japan, was afraid
that his country might be contaminated by the example which
Mutsu-Hito had given; in 1873, therefore, he had broken ofi rela-

160 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

tions with the "renegades" in Tokio; and two years later a Japanese
warship was fired at from a fort on the Korean coast. Thereupon,
Japan immediately despatched a fleet and compelled the Emperor
to sign a treaty opening a number of Korean ports to foreign trade.
This was exactly a repetition of the step which the Americans had
taken in dealing with the Japanese in 1853.

The Japanese were no longer afraid to attack the mightier power
of China. In numbers they were much weaker than the Chinese, the
population of Japan being about one-tenth that of China. But this
disadvantage was more than equalized by the training which the Japa-
nese army and navy had received. While the Japanese forces had
been fundamentally modernized, the Chinese had left their armaments
on the old basis. To be sure, a number of European officers had
been employed in China after 1860 and some war vessels had been
built on European models, but the change was not so thorough-going
as in Japan, where every remnant of the old military conditions
disappeared, after the last resistance of the Samurai had been abso-
lutely crushed by the newly trained European troops. Even the
right of carrying two swords, which had formerly distinguished
Samurai from other people, was now taken away. Officers, to be sure,
were still appointed to a large extent from the nobility; but mem-
bership in a class was no longer sufficient; training in a technical
school was necessary. This training was put into the hands of foreign
experts, French in 1866, but German after 1885.

What could China oppose to this military equipment? Japan's
intervention in Korea was in a sense an invasion of Chinese rights,
because Korea, according to Chinese views, was under the suzerainty
of Peking. In 1876 Japan annexed the Liu-kiu islands lying south
of her. China protested strongly, but had to give in without striking
a blow.

A military conflict between the two countries was henceforth
inevitable. It would also decide whether Eastern Asia would be
permanently Europeanized or not. China clung to the hope of being
able to destroy her troublesome neighbor without having to Euro-
peanize her own military system. It seemed possible so to increase
China's naval forces as to secure an undisputed superiority over
Japan. If the Mikado could be taught a lesson in this way a reac-
tion was sure to follow in Japan. Japan was not a rich country;
the enormous military expenditures were a heavy burden for her
population, and if it should turn out that in spite of them the
Japanese army was not superior to the Chinese forces, the Japanese
reform movement was bound to collapse quickly.

FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF NON-EUROPEANS 161

Such was the reasoning of the Chinese statesmen whose intel-
lectual and political leader was Li-Hung-Chang. The Chinese
wished that the coming struggle for Korea should take place quickly,
and they made their preparations for it. But the Old Regime in
China, which was not adapted to war, least of all to a war against
modern European weapons, proved itself incapable of taking in
hand even the naval reforms demanded by Li-Hung-Chang. It was
not money and men that were lacking, but energy; and there was
no strong central government to guide the careless provincial gov-
ernors in a strict, uniform policy. China's natural superiority in
resources of all sorts could not be made available.

So it came about that the Japanese triumphed by land and by
sea in the war which broke out over Korea (1894-95). The im-
mediate occasion of the war came from the fact that the Japanese
sank a Chinese transport which was carrying troops to Korea.
When hostilities began the Chinese warships were larger and more
numerous than those of Japan, but the crews lacked European
training and the advantages of recent technical inventions. The
Japanese ships had greater speed, their officers had been trained by
British experts, and their crews had also been given excellent drill.
So the Japanese were able to win the war at sea before their land-
armies came into action, and to these the Chinese could then oppose
no equivalent force.

Without the Chinese navy being able to prevent it, the Japanese
landed troops in Korea and drove the Chinese out of the peninsula.
They were soon able to extend their operations further west toward
the Gulf of Pe-chili and Peking, and to advance into Manchuria,
where they captured the Chinese naval bases of Ta-lien-wan and
Port Arthur. Then they gained a firm footing on the opposite coast
in Shantung by storming Wei-hai-wei, which controls the entrance
to the Gulf of Pe-chili from the south as Port Arthur controls it from
the north. The entrance to Peking now stood open, and the Japa-
nese were already preparing to land another army in order to ad-
vance from Taku (the port of the Chinese capital) against the city
of Peking. There was nothing to stop them. All the Chinese war
vessels had either been destroyed or fallen into the hands of the
Japanese.

The Chinese government then saw that its cause was lost and
declared itself ready to make peace. On April 17, 1895, the Peace
of Shimonoseki was signed. This satisfied all the claims of the
Japanese. The independence of Korea was recognized; that is,
China abandoned her suzerain rights and handed the country over

162 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

to Japanese influence. The Liao-tung Peninsula, with Port Arthur
at its southern point, as well as Formosa and the Pescadores
Islands, were ceded to Japan. China paid a large war indemnity,
and as a pledge of payment left Wei-hai-wei in the hands of the
enemy. She also accorded Japan various commercial privileges.

It will be pointed out in another connection (see below, ch.
xxx ), how Japan was deprived by the European Powers of a con-
siderable part of the fruits of her victory. At this point we can
only make clear the importance which the Japanese success had
for world history. This importance was not affected by the fact
that a number of the European Powers checked Japan for the mo-
ment. The war had shown that an Eastern Asiatic country could
so completely appropriate European methods of conducting war as
to accomplish as great results as their teachers. It was evident that
China would soon follow Japan's example, and that the time was
coming to an end when European powers could regard Eastern Asia
as a booty to be divided up among themselves at will. The yellow
races themselves would soon have something to say, and, at any
rate, the European Powers would have to share their claims with
the new power of Japan. An English author rightly observed, "If
Li-Hung-Chang and his system had triumphed and if Mutsu-Hito
had been defeated in the war with China, one might have expected
that the Far East would have been partitioned among the European
and American Powers without delay."

All this was now avoided through the victories of Japan, and one
of the first causes of dispute between the Japanese and the Euro-
pean Powers was Japan's demand that the integrity of China be
respected. But the consequences of this dispute, which eventually
led to war between Japan and Russia, will be treated, as has been
said, in another connection. Here attention can be called only to
the consequences which Japan's progress had for Japan herself in
her relations with foreign powers.

About the same time as the war with China, Japan succeeded in
setting aside the treaties which she had been compelled to sign in her
time of weakness and which had restricted the Empire of the Rising
Sun to the position of a second-rate state. Japan was now able to
bring about a revision of her commercial treaties. She secured the
same freedom in fixing her tariff rates as European states. The low
import duties which had been established for the benefit of foreign
merchants were abolished. A final step in this direction was the
annulment of special consular jurisdiction for foreigners (1899)
Foreigners now had to seek justice in Japanese courts of law in the

FIRST EUROPEANIZATION OF NON-EUROPEANS 163

same way as in European countries; this was aided by the fact that
in 1898 a Japanese civil code was put into force, modeled after the
new German civil code; in 1880 a modern criminal code, drawn up
by a Frenchman, had also been adopted.

Finally, it meant a complete break with tradition that the Mikado
gave his country a constitution on the European model in 1889.
To be sure, a regular parliamentary system was not introduced.
The constitution was patterned after that of Prussia. Of the two
chambers, the House of Peers was composed of nobles appointed
by the Emperor for life. The House of Representatives was not
elected by universal suffrage; the franchise was dependent upon
the payment of a land tax of about seven dollars and a half. The
cabinet was not dependent for power upon a majority in the
House of Representatives. But if one considers that, according to
the notions of Old Japan, the Mikado was descended from the gods,
and that the government had formerly been exclusively in the hands
of irresponsible feudal princes, he will see that the revolution was
significant enough. A complete adoption of the system of parlia-
mentary government would also have been opposed to the social
structure of the country. The Japanese had, indeed, attempted to
introduce European manufacturing on a large scale. In 1872, when
the first railways were built, coal mines were opened and cotton
and silk mills established. But they had not resulted in developing
a well-to-do middle class as in Western Europe. The population of
the extraordinarily densely settled islands remained poor. The
great mass of the farmers gained a scanty living by rice culture, and
the military development of the country was chiefly noticeable in
the increase in the cost of living which it caused. So it was natural
that the descendants of the former warrior nobility, even after they
had lost their privileges, retained a privileged position. They were
the persons who were usually appointed as prefects and ministers,
and these representatives of the large landed estates often paid
little attention to the members of the House of Representatives.
Also the introduction of local self-government in 1899 turned out
chiefly to the advantage of the landlords. Similarly the officers in
the army and navy came in large part from the nobility. But this
did not alter the fundamentally important fact which resulted from
Europeanization, — the establishment of a strong central government
upon whose favor even the nobles were dependent.

After Japan had gone so far, it could be only a question of time
when China also would Europeanize herself. From the outset, one
might say, if this change could have been brought about with-

164 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

out endangering the unity of the enormous empire, the European
Powers would have found in the Middle Kingdom a still more dan-
gerous rival than in Japan, not only because of the vast extent of
the country, but also in view of the great efficiency of the people.
The Chinese had always given evidence of an intellectual ability
which was quite strikingly different from that of the Japanese. Now
if the inhabitants of the Land of the Rising Sun had been able
within such an astonishingly short time to prove pupils who were
beginning to surpass their teachers, — what were the Europeans soon
to expect from the Chinese?

CHAPTER XX

THE OUTCOME OF AN ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION

IN EUROPE. (THE HISTORY OF IRELAND

IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY)

THE history of Ireland, since 1815, is so closely connected with
the general population problems which determined the new colonial
policy in the nineteenth century, and has developed in so peculiar
a fashion, that it is best considered at this point; furthermore, the
older history of Ireland offers a remarkable contrast to modern
attempts at colonization. It is also desirable to explain the
development of Irish conditions apart from those of England.
Though events in Ireland are so often and so decisively interwoven
with English history, nevertheless neither can the history of Ireland
be rightly understood if it is given merely piecemeal in the narra-
tive of English events, nor can its fundamental importance for the
development of Great Britain be correctly seen.

For centuries, ever since England became a powerful state at
rivalry with France, it has been Ireland's fate to be held in a
dependent position by the neighboring stronger and richer kingdom
for strategic reasons, without the English Crown, however, being
able actually to subdue the whole country. It was vital to England
not to allow this close-lying island to fall under the control of
France or to be occupied by French troops ; yet any colonization by
English citizens, which was the only way of making the country
really a part of England, was out of the question. The Emerald
Isle, little suited to agriculture, and consisting almost wholly of
pasture lands, was at an early time sufficiently populated in view
of conditions existing there. There was no land vacant in such
a way that it could be occupied and divided among colonists.
The English government, therefore, contented itself, at first, with
merely occupying the little territory around Dublin, the so-called
"Pale," which at least might protect England against a direct
attack. Even this measure was satisfactory only from a military
point of view; the parts which had been settled by the Norman
nobles had been quickly Celticized under the influence of the
overwhelming native population. From the middle of the sixteenth

166 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

century the relations between the nominally subject Irish population
and the English Crown had grown much worse, as it had proved
impossible to extend the Protestant Reformation to the Celtic
parts of the island. This relation between British and Irish threat-
ened to become even more bitter, because it was anticipated that
the stricter rule of the Tudors would put an end to the liberty of
the Irish chieftains; to this was then added religious hatred, which
made the breach irrevocable. It was out of the question to think
of incorporating the Irish population into the English system of
government. If the English Crown wanted to make the island in-
disputably obedient, the only way to do it was to drive out the
natives by force, and to settle Scots and English in their place.
This accordingly was the method which was employed in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries by the Tudors and earlier Stuarts,
and with a special brutality by Cromwell. The Irish were driven
out of a considerable part of the island (especially in the east) ;
their land was given to English and Scots, mostly in the shape of
large landed estates.

But though this "settlement" was often carried through without
consideration for the Irish, it did not succeed in its purpose at all.
On the contrary, it created one difficulty more. At first it was
naturally impossible to destroy the native population altogether, or
even to drive it away completely from the regions which were as-
signed to British settlers. The bitterness between Anglo-Saxon set-
tlers and Irish natives continued just as before. Still further
complications were added. Ireland no longer formed a unit as
formerly. It was occupied by two populations who were sharply
divided by clashing religious creeds. Furthermore, the interests of
the Anglo-Saxon settlers were often not wholly identical with those
of the English in the mother country; so that here also groups were
often opposed, and even from the English point of view one claim
often demanded as much attention as another. Particularly com-
plicated were the conditions in 1800, — again under the fear of a
French invasion, — when Ireland was formally united with Great
Britain and the Dublin Parliament was dissolved; this gave Ire-
land's representatives a seat and voice in the English Parliament
itself.

It is well known with what bitter satire Swift exposed the misery
of the Irish people during the first half of the eighteenth century.
Since then, conditions had grown no better. The continuance of
peace, and still more the restoration of good order brought by the
English government with a cessation of the former clan feuds, had

OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 167

allowed the population to grow greatly, without any corresponding
increase in the means of livelihood. As Ireland was less well situated
than England, because it was little suited to agriculture, so it hap-
pened also that she could not make the same transition into a great
manufacturing state. Ireland possessed only a little inferior coal
and a scanty supply of wood, so that the considerable amounts of
iron could not be used. Manufactures had been allowed to develop
only to an extent that would not injure English manufacturing,
and Irish Catholics were often excluded from employment in fac-
tories. The Irish lacked also the capital to develop new industries.
In short, Ireland suffered all the disadvantages of the English
system of large landed estates; these disadvantages were further
sharpened by national and religious hatreds, by the smaller produc-
tivity of the soil (the population lived largely on potatoes and
milk), and by the absence of large industries, which in England and
Scotland saved from destruction the population which could no
longer be nourished from the soil.

The result was that a large emigration, or rather an internal migra-
tion, of labor took place earlier than in other countries. Even at
the beginning of the eighteenth century many poor Irish became
migratory laborers, going later to England for agricultural employ-
ment. Conditions in Ireland were so different from those in Eng-
land that at the Union in 1800 it was impossible simply to transfer
the English system to the neighboring island. Nevertheless, English
institutions remained in force, and, under the changed conditions,
were much more oppressive to the Irish Catholics than to their co-
religionists in England.

In England the Catholic Church was merely tolerated and tithes
had to be paid to the established Protestant Church by every indi-
vidual, no matter to what religion he belonged. But in England,
where Catholics formed only a small part of the population and
by no means the poorest part, this privilege of the Established Church
was of much less importance than in Ireland. Here the mass of the
natives, who were Catholic almost without exception, beside having to
support their own religion, to which the state contributed nothing, had
.also to pay taxes to support the foreign clergy of the Anglican
Church. Since 1832 tithes were no longer collected from the pas-
ture land, that is from the large estates in the hands of the English
landlords, whereas the tilled land, that is the farms of the poor peo-
ple, were left to bear the burden. Also the regulation by which all
public activity, such as sitting on juries and appointment to city
offices, was reserved for Protestants, naturally bore much harder in

1 68 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

Ireland than in England. From a purely political point of view.
on the other hand, the Irish Catholics were somewhat better off
than their religious brethren in England. The Irish parliament,
during the last years of its existence, had taken advantage of the
state of war with France to get a number of the exceptional laws
against Catholics annulled; the English government did not dare
to revive the old regime. Irish Catholics could vote for members
of the English House of Commons, but they could not be
elected to it. They might vote, but their representatives must be
Protestants, and the franchise was much lower than in England, so
low, in fact, that all peasants, so to speak, could vote. Also the num-
ber of representatives in the House of Commons assigned to Ireland
once for all in 1800 was not small; they numbered 100, whereas Scot-
land, for example, was represented by only 45 members. In 1800 and
afterwards, therefore, Ireland exercised a considerable influence in
the English Parliament.

One point peculiar to Irish economic life has not been mentioned :
the so-called "absenteeism" of the landlords. In England large
landed estates prevailed; but there the lord usually lived on his
estate. The Irish gentry, on the other hand, spent the larger part
of their existence in London or Dublin. They were, therefore, de-
pendent upon receiving rent from their estates, and neither had they
any personal contact with their tenants nor were they inclined to
forego a temporary profit from their estates in order to draw a
larger rent later. Rightly does M. J. Bonn observe, "If the Irish
landlord (that is, the landowner of English origin) had seriously
aimed at the improvement of agriculture, he ought to have lived
in the midst of his tenants. Either he ought to have cultivated his
estate on a large scale basis, employing and training the small
tenants as day laborers, or he ought to have been content to receive
his rents in the form of produce of the soil. In either case he would
have had to live primarily from the produce of his estate and he
would only have had to make small outlays in money. The cash
profits from his estate he would have paid out in the shape of wages
or used for improvements. If he preferred leasing his land, he
would have had to leave the cash profits from the leased land to
the leaseholders and content himself with payments in kind and
services. In this case the tenant could have saved capital and would
have had an inducement to more intensive agriculture."

In all this, be it observed, there was no clash of nationalities in
the modern sense of the word. In preceding centuries, to be sure,
the English government had attempted by force to supplant Irish

OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 169

customs and even the Irish language by that of England. But such
efforts had ceased long ago, because they had very little point.
To be sure, Gaelic had survived among a part of the population in
the purely Irish districts of the west; but a majority of the in-
habitants had learned English, and even adopted it to such an extent
that they had completely forgotten the Irish dialects. The com-
plaints of the Irish never rested on attacks against their language;
so far as Gaelic was still a living language, no obstacles were placed
in its way by the English government. Ireland's grievances were
wholly of a religious and social character.

So long as the laws against Roman Catholics were still in force
in England (see above, p. 90), Irish agitation was chiefly directed
to religious questions. Here their first leader was the Catholic
barrister O'Connell, who founded the Catholic League in 1823 and
sought the abolition of the laws against his Catholic brothers in
England. O'Connell was the first Catholic who was elected to the
House of Commons (1828), and it was apparently thanks to his
election that in the following year (1829) Catholic Emancipation
was passed in England.

This brought little advantage to Ireland, for, at the same time,
the electoral qualification, which was extraordinarily low according
to English conceptions, was increased in Ireland about five- fold, so
that the poor Irish peasants were now excluded from the franchise.
Thus the Irish farmers lost their former privilege, and since they
formed a much more numerous part of the population than the
farmers in England they were relatively worse off than the latter.

The Reform Bill of 1832 (see above, p. 92) made no direct
change in conditions in Ireland; it was of importance only in that
it broke the rigid conservatism of the Old Regime and so prepared
the way for reforms. The English workingman's movement scarcely
touched Ireland at all, since the country was so little industrialized ;
Irish Chartist leaders like O'Connell and O'Brien spent their energies
in England. In Ireland, as ever, the Church problem stood in the
forefront; here agitation could work freely, now that the Catholics
had been given political and legal equality. Daniel O'Connell, a
great orator and political organizer, to whom the Catholics owed in
good part the removal of the religious restrictions, understood how
to gather about himself all the aspirations of the Irish. He united
into a single party the mass of the Irish peasants who had hitherto
remained apart from political life; this party aimed at religious as
well as social reform, or rather at both at once, since disestablish-
ment of the Anglican Church in Ireland would at the same time

170 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

bring economic relief to the Catholic farmers. It was not O'Connell's
idea to replace the Protestant Church by a Catholic one; for he
wished to deprive the English government of all ecclesiastical influ-
ence. He merely wanted freedom and equality for the Irish Church,
that is, simply the abolition of all the privileges enjoyed by the
Anglicans. Previous to 1832 he had even dallied with the plan of
securing this by a return to the conditions before 1800. He founded
a league for home rule in Ireland, which should bring about a repeal
of the Act of Union made at the beginning of the century. But
after 1832 he cherished exclusively the aim of improving the con-
dition of the Irish Catholic population within the existing political
organization.

His most important demand was the abolition of the tithes, that
is, of the taxes for the support of the Protestant Church. In this
connection the Irish for the first time began to adopt the revolu-
tionary tactics of open opposition to the law, which have been so
often imitated since then. The Irish Catholics refused to pay the
tithes. A number of tithe proctors were murdered. Instead of
£104,000 only £12,000 were collected. In the face of this opposi-
tion the English ministry gave way. It would not, indeed, hear of
a complete abolition of the tithes; but, according to its usual prac-
tice, it sought to arrange a compromise. First, the number of
Anglican bishoprics in Ireland was decreased (from 22 to 12), and
the taxes for the maintenance of the church buildings were abolished,
which considerably reduced the payments which Irish Catholics had
to make. Later, payment of tithes was transferred from the tenants
to the landlords, that is, from the Irish to the English. At the
same time a poor-law with public support for the needy was intro-
duced. But the Irish regarded these concessions merely as partial.
Their agitation was helped by the fact that during their struggle
for the abolition of the tithes they had been able for the first time
to exercise a decisive influence on the parliamentary situation. By
his skill in organization, O'Connell had succeeded in forming such
a strong group about himself in the House of Commons that the
majority, and hence the decision as to which of the two English par-
ties should control, was dependent upon his will. O'Connell at that
time assured control to the Liberals by uniting with them against
the High Church Tories.

Just because the Irish question was apparently primarily a re-
ligious one, the Irish had little hope except from the Whigs, since
the Tories stood even more strongly in defense of the privileges of
the Anglican Church than for the maintenance of the landlord sys-

OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 171

tern. The conflict, therefore, became much more bitter when the
Conservatives again came to power in 1841. O'Connell returned to
his effort to secure the repeal of the Act of Union of 1800, and began
an agitation like that of the Chartists. Monster meetings were held
demanding autonomy for Ireland, that is, a restoration of the
Catholic government in the island.

This movement found extraordinarily favorable soil in the in-
creasing misery of the Irish people. Since 1800 the population of
Ireland had been continuing to increase without any corresponding
means for its support being afforded by the establishment of new
industries or by a more intensive cultivation of the soil. In 1825
the population of Ireland was 6,000,000; in 1836, 7,760,000; in
1841, 8,770,000; the average density of the population per square
mile in 1840 was 93; that is, it was almost as high as in England
(105), which had industries and was much more fertile; three times
as high as in Scotland (33), which, however, was largely hilly; and
higher than the average of the three countries put together (86);
it was also much higher than fertile France (62), or Germany
(61). The misery of the people grew in proportion to this increase
in their numbers. The soil was divided up into tiny parcels; the
farmers lived in miserable huts without windows, often along with
the cattle, and clothed only in rags; and they subsisted ordinarily
only on potatoes and water. In short, there was unquestionably
terrible suffering. The official commission of inquiry was the last
to deny these facts. The only question was how they should be
remedied.

The Irish naturally laid the blame on the landlords and par-
ticularly on the insecurity of their tenancy. How could one expect
the peasant to labor to improve his land if, at any moment, he might
be evicted by the landlord, and have to leave the soil he had been
cultivating without being paid any compensation for the improve-
ments which he had made? The tenant ought, at least, to be guar-
anteed against summary eviction without compensation for his im-
provements.

Justifiable as many of these demands were, one must not overlook
the fact that they were only one of the roots of the evil. This is
clear from all the reforms which have since taken place, which have
gone far beyond the first demands of the Irish. It was also clear
to contemporaries at that time. Lord Dufferin, one of the largest
landlords in Ireland, wrote in 1869, that the tenants of the exces-
sively divided soil would never be economically better off, even if
they were regarded as tenants for life. "The rents of Ireland are

172 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

comparatively low: to transfer, therefore, the power of exaction
created by competition from the landlord, against whose interest it
is to enforce it, and to hand it over to the tenant, who will never
fail to enforce it, would hardly be a change to the better. Yet you
will hear the same person who would vehemently denounce a land-
lord for insisting on a rack-rent, detail with complacency the enor-
mous sums of money which some one has obtained for his tenant-
right from a successor to his farm, whom he has skinned by the
process and left stranded for life on the barren acres. From the
foregoing considerations it is apparent that competition is an ir-
repressible force; if stifled in one direction, it will burst out in
another."

Thus the conditions were such that even if the Irish had secured
all their demands these alone would not have improved the situa-
tion. But they did not even secure all of these. To be sure,
O'Connell stirred up a great agitation; mass meetings, where a
quarter of a million people were supposed to have come together,
voted for the restoration of the Irish parliament (1843). But the
movement broke down when the government resorted to force.
O'Connell was declared by a Protestant jury guilty of an attempt
at conspiracy, and although the penalty was not imposed, his health
was impaired, and he withdrew from political life. The situation
in Ireland, however, demanded ever more insistently some remedy.
To all the existing suffering there was now added a new calamity.
The potato rot suddenly appeared in Europe. No country suffered
so much from it as Ireland, where the very means of existence
began to fail. Thousands died of hunger.

This was not one of the least reasons which determined the
English moderate Conservative prime minister, Peel, to abolish the
Corn Laws (see above, p. 99). Since one could no longer count on
potatoes, grain again became, as formerly, an indispensable food.
The English government went further still. By concessions of a
different kind it sought to win the Irish, or at least to undermine
the Irish movement. O'Connell's withdrawal from public life had
had dangerous results. The great leader had always made use of
legal methods and had worked hand in hand with the Catholic
clergy, which would give no support to revolutionary methods. But
now there had arisen a "Young Ireland" party which wanted to
abandon this policy. It was composed of young lovers of freedom
to whom religious ideas were foreign and who laid all their emphasis
on democratic social demands, as in the case of the victorious
February Revolution In Paris a little later in 1848 (see ch. xxi).

OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 173

They broke off, so far as they were concerned, all connections with
the clergy, and played with the idea of fighting for Ireland's in-
dependence with weapons in their hands, if need be.

The English government naturally sought the support of the
priests against this new movement. Peel did not disdain to break
with the system which had given state support only to the Protes-
tant Church; he granted from the English treasury to Maynooth
College, the seminary for Irish Catholic priests, the sum of £26,000
instead of only £900. He brought it about that in the future the
Roman Catholic Church in Ireland could also legally receive perma-
nent bequests. In addition to Dublin University, which was strictly
Protestant, there were founded three new colleges, which were
neutral in religion and therefore open to Catholics. But practically
nothing was done in regard to agrarian conditions. Peel had indeed
sent a commission of inquiry to Ireland, and brought in a bill which
was intended to guarantee to the peasants greater security of tenure
and compensation for improvements of the land; but the law was
thrown out in the House of Lords in 1848, thanks to the opposition
of the Irish landlords. Under these circumstances there was only
one remedy, — the remedy which had already been followed with
success in England and for which the way had been prepared so
excellently by legislation in the United States (see above, ch. xv),
namely emigration. The Irish began to leave their country in
great numbers, some going to England and Scotland, but many more
to America. Perhaps never since the world began have such
a vast number of people changed their homes at one time. In 1845,
the last year before the terrible famine which began in 1846 and
continued through 1847, ^e population of Ireland numbered about
8,300,000; it had fallen in 1851 to less than 6,600,000; that is, in
the course of six years it declined a million and a half, or more than
a fifth. The suffering was so great that many of the emigrants died
on shipboard, or soon after their arrival in America, from bodily
weakness.

Since then this movement has gone on almost unbroken. The
enormous figures of the first years were naturally never equaled
again; but still the emigration was always so considerable that the
population of Ireland has steadily declined ever since. In 1881 it
numbered only 5,100,000; in 1891, 4,700,000; and in 1901,
4,456,000. To be sure, this decline is not exclusively due to emi-
gration. Since the peasantry are somewhat better off and the civili-
zation of the people has improved, the earlier unlimited natural
increase has been limited even in Ireland. Taken absolutely the

174 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

number of emigrants has, perhaps, declined, but so also has the
birthrate.

This great shift in population has had consequences in the de-
velopment of the Irish question which are by no means limited to
social conditions in Ireland itself. In the first place, the unheard-
of rapidity with which the Mississippi Valley was settled was brought
about by nothing so much as the Irish immigration. Then the Irish
movement for independence acquired a support which it had never
known before: the large masses of Irish who settled in America
remained true to their former home. The Irish in America could
work up to prosperity quickly, and give aid to their countrymen
whom they had left in the Emerald Isle. In America revolutionary
plans could be laid without disturbance from the English govern-
ment; America cared nothing about these intrigues; in fact, many
Americans rather favored them, owing to their old grudges against
England, and the compact groups of Irish voters formed an impor-
tant political factor. Thus the Irish problem is closely connected
with the colonial history of the nineteenth century.

For the moment, this emigration did not relax essentially the
tension in political life in Ireland. The island was so frightfully
over-populated that the flight of masses in the years after 1846 re-
sulted in an economic improvement; similar famines have never
occurred since then. But the agrarian and social difficulties were
not removed for those who remained in Ireland. The English gov-
ernment attempted some further palliative measures. Only one of
their proposals, however, was carried through: the Encumbered
Estates Act of 1849, passed to facilitate the sale of properties which
were too heavily encumbered with mortgages. The tenants received
no guarantee against eviction; just as before, they could be driven
off the soil, and they then contented themselves with acts of
vengeance. On the other hand, "Young Ireland" made some regular
attempts at rebellion. In 1848, when revolution triumphed in
France, the Irish Nationalists sent the Provisional Government in
Paris a memorial asking for support. But the English government
answered this new attempt to ally with France by coercion laws; a
hundred and eighteen of the leaders were arrested. The armed
rebellion was suppressed and the leaders deported.

Though political agitation in Ireland was paralyzed for a time in
this way, it did not put an end to the Irish movement. The au-
thority of the English government did not extend to America; from
there a new nationalist society was organized in Ireland. Since open
opposition to the English government was impossible, it took the

OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 175

form of a secret society called the "Fenians," a name taken from
one of the old Irish legends. They continued the "Young Ireland"
policy, that is, they pursued revolutionary and republican aims, un-
supported by religion; they wanted to found an Irish republic by
means of armed rebellion. The leaders hoped to get the necessary
troops from Irish soldiers who had been in arms during the Civil
War in America, and also from Irishmen who had been in English
military service.

But these projects did not rest on any sound basis. To be sure,
the English government could not crush the heart of the revolu-
tionary party; though the secret printing press of the Fenian news-
paper in Ireland was confiscated and the leaders of the movement
arrested (1865), ^e organization still remained untouched in the
United States. But in spite of all their efforts the Fenians accom-
plished only some isolated and fruitless acts of violence. The reck-
less attempt to attack England by way of Canada failed, as was
to be expected; the Irish forces who invaded Canada from the
United States were driven back without much difficulty (1866). No
better success attended a number of Irish American soldiers who
landed in Ireland and attempted to rouse a general rebellion. In
England itself, the Fenians limited themselves to more or less fan-
tastic plots: one group attempted to seize the arsenal at Chester;
another blew up a prison in London to aid the flight of Fenians
imprisoned there (1867).

All these crimes, to be sure, had the result that public opinion in
England was again drawn to the Irish question. Those who had
thought that the emigration and the coercion measures of the last
decade had established quiet in Ireland were now convinced that
this was not so, and that no improvement in conditions could be
brought about except by reforms undertaken by the state. It was
the great Liberal minister, Gladstone, who undertook to translate
these convictions into law. Like his predecessors, he did not start
by making concessions to the republican Nationalists, but sought
to win the peasants and clergy.

First he abolished the hated privileges of the Anglican Church in
Ireland. The Church was disestablished; persons who did not
belong to it no longer had to pay tithes to it. Its enormous lands
were partly taken for other purposes; many of its domains were
assigned to the other churches, — to the Catholics and Presbyterians;
other domains were devoted to the support of hospitals and asylums.
The Anglican Church still remained very rich; but after 1871 it was
nothing but a private corporation.

176 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

In 1870 Gladstone passed the Irish Land Act for the benefit of
tenants: tenants were protected against arbitrary eviction, and so
enjoyed the same tenant-rights as the Protestants in Ulster;
henceforth landlords could not evict them, except by giving them
compensation for disturbance and for improvements made on the
land.

At the same time, a Peace Preservation Act was passed which
placed Ireland under exceptional laws; by this the English gov-
ernment hoped to hold revolutionary groups in check.

These measures were far from solving the Irish question; but at
any rate they brought quiet for some years. The Catholic clergy
was now satisfied. The failure of the last effort at rebellion had
shown that nothing was to be accomplished by opera-bouffe revo-
lutions. But before a decade had passed the movement flamed up
anew. Under existing conditions the Land Act of 1870 afforded
the tenants insufficient protection. So long as the amount of land
was so restricted and the number of peasants so large, it was im-
possible to prevent landlords from taking advantage of their stronger
position, so long as their right of possession remained untouched.
And the law had not dared to take this extreme step.

This last concession was at length forced from the English Parlia-
ment by the new tactics of the Irish opposition.

The Irish party at first refrained from revolutionary methods and
aims. They no longer worked for a rebellion, although they did
not object to criminal acts by individuals. They no longer de-
manded the establishment of an Irish republic, but merely Home
Rule for Ireland, with a parliament and an administration of their
own. This was to be secured, not by illegal means, but by a grant
from the English Parliament according to the forms of law.

The first difficulty which the Irish party met with lay in the
character of English parliamentary life. The influence and power
necessary to pass these unpopular measures was possessed only by
the two large parties which shared parliamentary power, but not
by the little Irish group which could never get a majority in the
House of Commons. Favorable party situations or sensational
events in Ireland might for a brief time bring about an alliance
between the Irish members and one of the ruling parties; but ordi-
narily the English Parliament could not only reject, but even ignore,
Irish grievances.

The man who determined to put an end to this was Charles
Stewart Parnell, who may be regarded, next to O'Connell, as the

OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 177

second great organizer of the Irish movement. By birth Parnell did
not belong really to the Irish. He was a Protestant landlord in the
Irish county of Witlow, and by position and religion belonged to
the Protestant English landlords. But in conviction he was wholly
on the side of the Irish, and he had grown up in a family which
nourished irreconcilable hatred against England. By using new
parliamentary tactics, he now planned to compel the English House
of Commons to discuss and fulfil Irish demands. He intended to
make it practically impossible to govern Ireland from England and
from the standpoint of the large English parties.

This result could not be reached in any normal fashion. The
Irish group in the House of Commons formed a hopelessly small
minority, and it was out of the question for him to think of chang-
ing the opinions of his opponents. But the liberal rules of proce-
dure in the English Parliament, which dated from a time when the
members (who were not professional politicians) had no great in-
terest in lengthening or shortening the sessions, made it possible
for a very few members to block parliamentary activity. There
was no means of restricting the length of time that a member
might speak; any member could propose an amendment to every
word of a proposed law; he could demand a vote on every amend-
ment; he could propose an adjournment after every vote; he could
demand to know whether a quorum was present, and so forth. If
there were present a number of members who were systematically
intent on "obstruction," the majority had no legal means of stop-
ping them.

Even the English parties had occasionally used this means, when
one of them was in the minority, in order to prevent the passage
of measures which were particularly objectionable. Now under
ParnelPs leadership the Irish adopted these tactics systematically.
They not only arranged among their members cooperation by which
one endless speech should follow another, but they obstructed the
activity of the English Parliament in general. They intended that
the English legislative machine should be absolutely prevented from
working until it listened to Ireland's grievances. In 1877 harmless
measures which had nothing to do with Ireland, such as a law in
regard to South Africa, were subjected, as we should say, to "sabo-
tage." There were sessions which lasted for more than forty-eight
hours. It has been reckoned that in one single session, one Irish
member spoke five hundred times and another three hundred and*
sixty-nine times. So great was the scandal that the House of

iy8 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

Commons finally authorized the presiding officer, or speaker, to
expel from the hall members who systematically attempted obstruc-
tion.

But success at first was on ParnelPs side. He had succeeded in
bringing the Irish question again to the forefront of public interest;
at the same time the Irish movement had again found a leader
around whom it could rally. Success came quickly. What was left
of the Fenians in Europe and America now joined Parnell. Parnell
made a great propagandist tour through the United States, was
received by Irish patriots there as the official representative of their
cause, and collected over $360,000.

At the same time Parnell joined with the party of the Irish
tenants. A former Fenian had founded the "Land League," which
aimed to protect tenants from eviction by the landlords. The aims
of the League were: (i) that no tenant should be evicted so long
as he paid his rent, (2) that he should be free to sell his tenant-
right, and (3) that the landlord should not be able to fix a higher
rent than was fair. These were the three aims which were known
as "the three F's": "fixity of tenure," "free sale," and "fair rent."
The Irish tenants were thus to be transformed into free peasant
proprietors, who would have full control over their land except that
they would have to pay the lord a definite but moderate rent.
Parnell advised the members of the League to force landlords to
make these concessions by passive resistance. If a tenant was
evicted, he was advised to stick on his ground just the same, and
leave the landlord to force him out with the aid of the police. He
was told that he could reckon on the support of the League. Fur-
thermore, members of the League showed their common interest with
evicted tenants by declaring that none of themselves would take
the place of the evicted tenant.

Such were the conditions in 1880 when the open parliamentary
struggle in regard to Home Rule began. The Liberals at that time
had again secured a majority in the House of Commons; that is,
the party was again in power which wanted to satisfy the Irish as
far as possible. In addition to former concessions the new ministry
was ready to give the Irish tenant financial support from the state
in economic transactions. The ministry brought in a law by which
henceforth a tenant who was evicted was to be compensated by the
state, the amount of compensation to be fixed by a special agrarian
commission. But the Irish opposition party, which had just indi-
cated its preference for extreme measures by choosing Parnell as its
president, declared that these concessions were inadequate; in fact,

OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 179

every improvement in the situation of the Irish tenants would weaken
the pressure for Home Rule. The party demanded the complete
abolition of landlordism and of large landed estates in Ireland, and
the granting of national independence. Following the revolutionary
tactics of Parnell, they did not hesitate to adopt against their oppo-
nents a regular system of terror. Not only were frequent attacks
made upon landlords, but there was invented the method which has
made famous throughout the world the name of the unhappy Cap-
tain Boycott. By this method the Land League broke off all com-
munications with their opponents: no Irishmen might speak with
a person who had been outlawed by the League; no workingman
or servant could take a position with him; no dealer would sell
him anything; in short the enemy was "boycotted," to use the
word which came into practice from the first victim against whom
it was applied in November, 1880.

By this means the Land League at first accomplished its purpose.
The condition of the Irish landlords became unbearable. It even
came about that a deputation of one hundred and five landlords
betook themselves to the English Lord-Lieutenant at Dublin and
begged him for protection, at the same time requesting him, how-
ever, to keep their names secret so that they might not be delivered
over to the vengeance of the members of the League.

But how could the British government give security of person
and property in the face of such an organization as Parnell's Land
League? The Liberal Ministry, indeed, did secure the passage of
a coercion law for Ireland; and Irish obstruction in the House of
Commons was gotten rid of by the adoption of new rules under
which a qualified majority could put an end to debate. Also,
several leaders of the Irish movement were arrested; but all
this availed nothing, since the Irish clung as closely to their radical
demands as before. Equally without avail were the efforts to im-
prove the economic condition of the tenants. In vain did the Glad-
stone ministry bring in a bill according to which the fixing of the
rent was no longer to lie in the hands of the landlords but in those
of a special impartial court which should fix rents for fifteen years.
In vain also did he advocate that the state should use government
money to help poor tenants buy land of their own. A "national
convention" of the Land League in 1881 declared, in spite of this,
that Ireland's only salvation lay in putting an end to "foreign rule"
by granting Home Rule.

The demands of the two parties now stood in such sharp oppo-
sition that no peaceful solution was possible. However much Glad-

i8o FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

stone wished to make concessions to the Irish, there were two points
on their program to which he would not consent: the tearing up of
the connection between England and Ireland, and an interference
with the rights of property. Even an attack on the leader of the
Irish had no success: the English government might indeed arrest
Parnell; but he gave out orders that no more rents were to be paid
so long as the British cabinet adopted terrorism; he declared that
military ppwer would be helpless before the passive resistance of
the whole people. So the situation was worse than before. Equally
without effect was the Government's declaration in 1881 that the
Land League was dissolved. Its activity continued under another
name, or the agitation was transferred to England where the law
did not apply.

The ministry soon realized this, and made a compromise with
the Irish leaders whom it had just arrested. The imprisoned men
were set free again and the ministry promised not to demand a full
payment of the rents which were in arrears.

For the moment, the situation seemed to be somewhat less critical.
But then a group of Irish extremists interfered. In spite of his
revolutionary aims, Parnell had always advocated a somewhat
statesmanlike moderation, and in general had refrained from attacks
on people's life. He knew that nothing would so stir up English
public opinion as crimes of this kind. But for this very reason he
was regarded by the hotheads of the party as not going far enough.
He was reproached with adopting a weak compromise policy by a
group of revolutionists who called themselves the "Invincibles" and
who held the traditions of the Fenians; Ireland, they said, must be
freed by armed revolution. When these politicians saw that
the situation was becoming somewhat more peaceful, they deter-
mined to make all reconciliation impossible by a crime.

On May 6, 1882, in broad daylight, they murdered in Phoenix
Park, Dublin, two distinguished persons, the Secretary for Ireland
and the Under- Secretary, who, even from the Irish standpoint, were
guilty of nothing except representing English rule in Ireland. The
English government could only answer this crime, which created
enormous excitement in England, by proclaiming martial law in
Ireland and by establishing courts which were not composed of
jurymen, that is, which were not subject to attempts at intimida-
tion by the local populace. But the Irish extremists thereupon ex-
tended their field of activity still further, making use of the fact
that they could organize secret societies undisturbed in the United
States. They undertook a terrorist campaign after the Russian

OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 181

fashion against the English government in England itself. Dynamite
was to be their chief weapon of destruction. There were explosions
in an office occupied by an English minister and in the Parliament
Buildings at London, but without fatalities, as it chanced.

One cannot say that these tactics were crowned with success.
Even if one assumes that these crimes made the English Liberals
more inclined to concessions to Ireland, the fact nevertheless re-
mains that the brutal violence of the Irish extremists roused an
irreconcilable opposition in England, which was horrified at the idea
of yielding to the movement. Gladstone's party of Liberals, indeed,
still stood on the side of the Irish, but it found it increasingly
difficult to meet the opposition within its own ranks.

For the moment, the Irish succeeded only in persuading the Con-
servatives, who were the party in power, to refrain from renewing
the coercion measures. The Liberals, on the other hand, promised
to give them as much independence as was compatible with the unity
of the British Empire. Since this did not satisfy the Home Rulers,
Parnell advised the voters to vote neither for the Liberals nor the
Conservatives. His advice was justified by the result in 1885, inas-
much as the Liberals, though they had a majority over the Con-
servatives in the new House of Commons, were reduced to a minority
if the Irish made a coalition with the Conservatives. Gladstone,
therefore, had to bargain with the Irish; being the leading English
minister, he adopted their demand for Home Rule, but this led to a
split in his own party. A section of the Liberals believed, probably
incorrectly, that establishment of Home Rule in Ireland would be
nothing more or less than the first step toward complete separation;
since they were unwilling to support this attack upon the "union"
of the two countries, they seceded and formed a special group within
the party known as the "Liberal Unionists." Among their leaders
was the man who later became so famous as colonial secretary,
Joseph Chamberlain, Member of Parliament for Birmingham.

The secession of this group became final when Gladstone laid
his Home Rule Bill before Parliament. The Liberal prime minister
intended to give the Irish complete Home Rule with a parliament
and executive of their own; only in matters which concerned both
countries was the decision of the English cabinet to be decisive.
This secession of the right wing of the Liberals was not the only
result of Gladstone's proposed Home Rule Bill. Public opinion in
England was very much opposed to his plan of separating Ireland
and England; and it was opposed also by the party of the English
settlers in Ireland. The Protestants in Ulster, which was largely

182 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

settled by English colonists, feared that they would be handed over
to a Catholic majority, and therefore joined together in protest and
founded an Anti-Home Rule League. They even began to arm and
declare that they would rather die with arms in their hands than
allow themselves to be ruled by an Irish Parliament. They called
themselves "Orangemen," in memory of William of Orange who
once had restored English rule in Ireland after driving out the
Stuart king, James II.

This united opposition compelled Gladstone to drop the Home
Rule Bill in 1886. A majority in the House of Commons voted
against it, and when the prime minister appealed to the people by
dissolving Parliament and calling for a new election, the result was
a disaster for the Liberal party. The Conservatives, who had
fought the election on the issue of the unity of the empire, won such
a majority that they were independent of any coalition between
Gladstonians and Home Rulers.

Naturally, the Home Rule plan was thus dead for the moment.
In Ireland open war broke out again between the landlords and the
tenants. The Government did, indeed, try to interfere in favor of
the farmers; but it was unwilling to touch property rights and so
the interference lacked practical effect. Little could be accomplished
merely by voluntary sales of land by landlords. The landlords were
not a little burdened by the extraordinarily high taxes for the sup-
port of the poor, which was one of the results of the over dense
population. "The landlord's position was tolerable only," writes
Bonn, "where he was able to pay taxes and interest without de-
pending on his rents, that is, on hard cash from his land." Toward
the end of the iSyo's, when improved communications shortened
transportation between Europe and the overseas countries, and when
the price of agricultural products began greatly to fall, the obliga-
tions of the landlords no longer permitted them either to reduce the
rents or to make improvements. To induce them to make financial
concessions to the tenants it was not enough to appeal to humanity,
or to their own interests, which they understood well enough; com-
pulsion had to be used; and since the Conservative government had
no idea of doing this, Parnell's party undertook to do it. In 1886 the
Land League compelled peasants to cease paying rents to landlords
who did not accept the rents fixed by the official land commission. On
the contrary, the tenants of every landlord were to form a company
to which they would pay the rents and which would then negotiate
in their name with the landlord. The English government declared
this plan illegal, but the Land League again replied with passive

OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 183

resistance: tenants who were evicted refused to leave their land;
landlords had to drive them out by using the police. In Ulster
there was even civil war on a small scale. Juries refused to con-
vict the leaders of the Irish movement. In the House of Commons
the Home Rulers, who were allied with Gladstone's followers, again
adopted obstruction, so that there finally had to be applied "guil-
lotine methods" of the American sort, which made it possible to fix
beforehand the date on which a debate should close.

In spite of this, the ministry proceeded in the direction of making
concessions. A land law was passed which was intended to trans-
form Irish tenants into peasant proprietors. But the conflict went
on just the same, so that the Government finally had to declare the
Land League a menace to the state and arrested its leaders as
common criminals.

At this moment, the crisis was relieved somewhat for a short time
owing to two new factors. One of these was the split which took
part among the Irish Nationalists; the other was the attitude of the
Catholic Church.

Since the days of "Young Ireland" and the Fenians, the Irish
opposition had not depended on religious support, although it had
drawn a good part of its strength from the antipathy with which
Irish Catholics regarded Protestant landlords. In spite of this the
clergy and the politicians had hitherto worked in harmony together.
Now a change came: the terrorist tactics of the Land League and
the use of dynamite in the Russian fashion were ways of fighting
which the Catholic Church could not officially tolerate. So in 1888
the Pope issued an encyclical condemning the Land League's so-
called "plan of campaign." This meant that henceforth the Irish
clergy had to refuse their support to Parnell's party. Furthermore,
Parnell was compromised personally in 1890 by being charged with
adultery; though this affair caused only small excitement in Ireland
itself, the scandal was all the greater among the Puritanically-
minded Liberals of England. The Scotch-English Dissenters, Pres-
byterians, Methodists, and Quakers, who formed the basis of the
old Liberal party which had remained true to Gladstone, declared
that they would break off all relations with the Irish Nationalists
if they kept this adulterer as their leader, and Gladstone himself
broke off openly with Parnell. The Irish party was thus embar-
rassed; some of the party, in order to keep up their connection with
Gladstone's followers, chose a new leader; but a minority remained
true to Parnell. The anti-Parnell majority was also supported by
the clergy who, as one may imagine, had never been much inclined

184 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

toward Parnell who was a Protestant. So the Irish party, which
had hitherto formed a solid organization, split into two groups which
were most bitterly hostile to one another: the anti-Parnellites, who
had the mass of the voters behind them and worked with relatively
peaceful means; and Parnell 's party, which no longer had to exer-
cise any restraint on itself and which included the extreme revolu-
tionary Nationalists. When Parnell died soon afterwards in 1891,
the party still remained split for a time.

Meanwhile political conditions in England brought it about that
the Liberals under Gladstone again came to office in 1892. This
time his party succeeded in securing in the House of Commons a
majority in favor of their leader's Home Rule bill, although it was
somewhat emasculated as compared with the earlier measure. It
was adopted there after a debate lasting eighty days. But it did
not became a law after all. The Upper House, in which the landlords
and the Anglican Church was much more strongly represented than
in the House of Commons, had been scarcely affected at all by the
change in feeling which had taken place in voters in Scotland
and Ireland. So the House of Lords rejected the bill by a large
majority of 419 to 40. Gladstone thereupon resigned. For the
moment his Irish policy could not be realized. The Liberals per-
ceived that they could not undertake radical reforms in Ireland until
they had revised the English constitution, — by putting an end to
the equality between the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament.

Still, this did not mean that in the meantime reform legislation
for Ireland was wholly neglected. Though the Conservatives were
unwilling to agree to Home Rule, they attempted to satisfy the Irish
people in another way. They adopted the old policy of the Liberals:
the Irish Nationalists were to be deterred from pursuing their effort
to break up the unity of the empire by improvements which were to
be made in the material welfare of the Irish population. How serious
the situation was is seen by the fact that the Conservatives, although
the party representing order, did not hesitate at serious interferences
with the rights of property. In 1903 the Conservative majority in the
English Parliament passed a new land act for Ireland. This aimed
at transferring from the landlords to the tenants within a reason-
able time all the salable land in Ireland. The state advanced money
at two and three-fourths per cent interest to the tenants to enable
them to buy the land. The sale was arranged by an official land
commission so that there was no possibility of the landlord's taking
advantage of the tenants. In contrast to England, where the gov-
ernment never interfered in the relations between landlord and tenant

OUTCOME OF ATTEMPT AT COLONIZATION 185

and where the laws favored the maintenance of large estates, the Irish
peasants were now given favorable treatment. The English govern-
ment supported their efforts to make themselves self-supporting by
placing at their disposal no less than £100,000,000 for the purchase
of land.

It would have been contrary to Irish policy for the Home Rulers
to cease agitation after this. Far from declaring themselves satisfied
by the Land Purchase Act, which they had supported, they regarded
this merely as a partial concession. Now, as before, they continued
to demand an Irish Parliament and a responsible Irish ministry.
But it was only after ten years of struggle and after the reform in
the House of Lords demanded by the Liberals (the limitation of
the House of Lords to a mere suspensive veto) that they were able
to carry through their purpose. In 1912 the Upper House was
deprived of its hitherto unlimited veto, and in 1914 the new Home
Rule Bill was adopted. Its bitterest opponents were now no longer
the Unionists and the Conservatives, but the Protestant English
settlers in Ulster. The Ulsterites adopted Irish methods and threat-
ened civil war. But the majority in the House of Commons, never-
theless, held fast to their plan, which, moreover, provided for a
transition period during which Ulster would not be subjected to an
Irish Home Rule government. This Home Rule Bill would have
gone into effect if the European war had not broken out in the
summer of 1914. This suspended the application of Home Rule,
and when the war was over circumstances had so changed that a
new law was regarded as necessary.

The Irish problem thus belongs to the many unsolved questions
which the last century has left for the future. Any settlement of
the conflict between the claims of England and the Irish Nationalists
which shall even be partially satisfactory seems more difficult than
ever. No matter how far one might make concessions, political
and social, to the Irish opposition, all these reforms could not get
rid of the fundamental economic difficulty due to a large popula-
tion settled upon an insufficient soil. To be sure, the great emigra-
tion has improved conditions essentially. There has been no repeti-
tion of the famine of the 1840*5, and the living conditions of the
Irish tenant have considerably improved. But this has made the
struggle even more dangerous for England: the stronger the Irish
Nationalists are economically, the better they are able to oppose
English rule. On the other hand, the plan of making Ireland into
a half sovereign state within the British Commonwealth of Nations
and of thus taking the first step toward setting aside the abnormal

i86 FROM OLD COLONIAL POLICY TO NEW

suzerainty of Great Britain over the overseas Dominions (see ch.
xxxi) is apparently bound to fail on account of the Ulster problem.
Because the English justly feel that there is no limit to the aims
and methods of Irish agitators, who allege that the British govern-
ment is responsible for things for which it is not to blame — for
these very reasons, the English hesitate to hand over men 01
their own race and religion to the spiteful rule of Irish Nationalists.
The Protestant Anglo-Saxon province of Ulster is the only one
which has hitherto managed to settle the land question satis-
factorily; and not one of the least reasons for this is the fact
that, in contrast to the purely Irish districts, it has been able to
develop large manufactures in modern fashion. Ought this region to
be allowed to fall under the control of a majority which is hostile
to it, and which, economically at least, is in a more primitive state
of civilization? The very fact that the Irish refuse to accept a
compromise which would withdraw Ulster from their control, and
insist instead upon ruling the whole island, is another fact which
makes the English government seriously hesitate. This attitude on
the part of the Irish seems to show that they have no intention of
allowing the Orangemen in Ulster to enjoy their special advantages.
Among the Irish now there is an extreme republican party, the so-
called Sinn Fein, which has triumphed over the Nationalists who
favored Home Rule.

Be that as it may, events during the World War showed that
Ireland must be regarded by the British Government as a land
which cannot be looked upon as forming a single permanent unit
with Great Britain, like Scotland. In England and Scotland, uni-
versal military service was introduced during the war, but not in
Ireland. This was not due to the fact that the Irish sympathized
with England's enemies. The attempt made by the Irish extremist,
Sir Roger Casement, to rouse a rebellion against England with Ger-
man help resulted, in 1916, in a merely insignificant local success.
And there were not lacking numerous Irish volunteers. But in the
English government there evidently prevailed the feeling that it
would not be safe to put Irish patriotism and self-sacrifice to too
severe a test. Though the Irish had no desire to exchange British
rule in favor of some vassal relation to Germany, still their inclina-
tion toward Great Britain was not so great that they could have
been compelled to fight for her. And it is not to be forgotten that
this system of universal military service was just as strange for
England as for Ireland. Here again was a case in which Ireland
was given privileged treatment.

BOOK IV

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE AND

THE FORMATION OF NEW NATIONAL STATES

IN EUROPE

CHAPTER XXI
THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE

THE July Monarchy (ch. xii) had satisfied all the wishes of the
French middle class by whom and for whom the Great Revolution
of 1789 had been made. Any restoration of the Ancien Regime,
with its privileges for inherited wealth and for the clergy, was hence-
forth forever out of the question. Practically unlimited freedom of
thought prevailed; neither schools nor writers were subjected to
ecclesiastical influence any longer. At the head of the administra-
tion stood statesmen who knew how to care skilfully for the welfare
of the bourgeoisie. In foreign politics, they avoided war and only
continued the struggle in Algiers because no other course was pos-
sible; and in internal affairs they devoted their careful attention to
the economic progress of the country. And this attention was richly
rewarded. Never before had France been able so completely to
develop her natural resources for creating wealth as during the reign
of Louis Philippe. Neither external nor internal obstacles any
longer stood in the way of unlimited economic activity. The inten-
sive cultivation of the fertile soil was assured by the mass of small
peasants whose number was correctly proportioned to what the soil
could produce. Manufacturing, protected against foreign competi-
tion by protective tariffs, could appropriate unchecked the results
of the "Industrial Revolution"; everything aided it: the excellent
technical training which was afforded by the state and was free from
all clerical control; and the systematic building of railways as a
result of the law of 1842. Guizot, who is rightly regarded as the
embodiment of this regime and who was at the head of the
Foreign Office, was only speaking the truth when he once assured
the Chamber of Deputies, "Let us not talk about our country having
to conquer territory, to wage great wars, to undertake bold deeds
of vengeance. If France is prosperous, if she remains free, rich,
peaceful, and wise, we need not complain if we exercise only a small
influence in the world abroad."

The bourgeoisie who had made the July Revolution were cer-
tainly thoroughly pleased with it. How indeed could they have
refused their approval to a government which, from their point of

189

i go STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

view, was regarded as an actual paradise, and which also satis-
fied all their old demands as to the form of government? The ideal
of the middle class had been reached: order, peace, quiet, the exclu-
sion of the Church from government, intellectual liberty, and the
possibility for every industrious and ambitious young man with some
property to rise in the world. The administration was in the hands
of honest, industrious, cultured men. Ministries were formed cor-
rectly according to the parliamentary system, and so the bourgeoisie
had an opportunity to share in politics.

But this government had three groups of opponents. The clergy
was opposed to this system which was built up on a Voltairean
basis. By the overthrow of Charles X they had lost the pre-
ponderant position which they had enjoyed before 1830. The so-
called "University of France," which centralized all instruction and
placed it under the supervision of the state, was retained by the July
Monarchy, but the clergy were excluded from it. Now, when the
clergy perceived that the cause of the Legitimists who followed the
older Bourbon line overthrown in 1830 was hopeless, they sought to
win back their former influence upon education through freedom of
instruction. Their newspapers no longer appealed to the throne.
They merely desired that clerical teachers should be given the same
permission to conduct schools as was given to teachers officially
approved by the state. To secure this, the clerical opposition began
a very vigorous campaign against the "University," accusing it of
systematically corrupting the youth. Then they turned their attack
against the government, which would not yield, but which instead
closed several Jesuit institutions in 1845. A large part of public
opinion was thus made hostile to Louis Philippe's government. To
be sure, the attacks of the clerical press made small impression upon
the bourgeoisie, who, for the most part, were followers of Voltaire,
like the king himself; and even when the government itself wanted
to make concessions, the Chamber of Deputies flatly opposed them.
On the other hand, these attacks by religious agitators left deep
traces outside the pays legal, that is, among the classes of the people
who were not represented in the Chamber of Deputies, especially
among the rural population.

The second group opposed to the government were the working-
men. The proletariat had no representation at all in the Chamber
of Deputies, and yet they stood in no less need of protection than
their fellow- workingmen in England. The exploitation of human
labor due to machinery aroused in France the sympathy of a much
smaller part of the population than in Great Britain. It was not

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 191

until 1815, much later therefore than in England, that the
iron and steel industries had begun really to develop in France and
much the same was true of the textile industries. It was not until
1840 that any reports were published in France concerning the
injuries to health resulting from the factory system. The main in-
dustry of France, now as before, was the growing of grain and the
making of wine. The happy results of the French Revolution were
clearest here. As the large landed estates had been broken up in
considerable parts of France, there grew up a class of small peasant
proprietors, who were able to acquire a high standard of living for
themselves and to produce more food for the industrial population
of the cities. The birth-rate declined somewhat, but so, also, did
the death-rate. The wheat harvest increased steadily from the Res-
toration to 1848; the same was true of barley, corn, potatoes, and
so forth; 1846 has been called a "famine year," but the harvest
yield of this year was larger than the annual average of the Resto-
ration era.

Although the factory system affected only a relatively small part
of the population, this did not make the condition of those who were
affected any better. Among the classes who had no legal means of
improving their condition there began to develop a bitter revolu-
tionary feeling. One ought to read the classic reports which Heinrich
Heine wrote from Paris at that time (1842) to the "Augsburger
Allgemeine Zeitung" — perhaps the cleverest newspaper correspond-
ence which has ever been written. "Everything is as quiet as a
winter's night after a new fall of snow. But in the silence you hear
continually dripping, dripping, the profits of the capitalist, as they
steadily increase. You can actually hear them piling up — the riches
of the rich. Sometimes there is the smothered sob of poverty, and
often, too, a scraping sound, like a knife being sharpened." And
in another passage Heine prophesies more in detail: "To-day, when
I visited some of the factories in the Faubourg Saint-Marceau and
discovered there what kind of reading matter was being spread
among the workingmen, who are the most powerful element among
the lower classes, I thought of Sancho's proverb, 'Tell me what you
have sown to-day, and I will predict to you what you will reap
to-morrow.' For here in the workshops I found several new edi-
tions of speeches by old Robespierre, Marat's pamphlets at two sous
a copy, Cabet's History of the Revolution, Cormenin's poisonous
little works, and Buonarroti's Babeuf's Doctrine and Conspiracy —
all writings which smell of blood. The songs which I heard them
singing seemed to have been composed in Hell and had a chorus

i92 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

of the wildest excitement. Really, people in our gentle walks of
life can form no idea of the demonic note which runs through these
songs. One must hear them with one's own ears, for example, in
those enormous workshops where the metals are worked and where
the half-naked, defiant figures keep time to their songs with the
mighty blows which their great iron hammers strike upon the ringing
anvil. . . . Sooner or later the harvest which will come from this
sowing in France threatens to be a republican outbreak."

This last observation is particularly important; for it points to
the circumstance which was to lead the social movement to success
— at least for a moment. If the French workingmen had stood
alone, they could hardly have accomplished anything but a fruitless
attempt at insurrection. It is probable that their agitation would
have aimed at less than the Chartist movement. They lacked
leaders and politicians who could have successfully expressed their
aspirations to the political authorities.

But leaders of this kind were now provided by the government
of Guizot through his neglect of the so-called capadtes — persons
of intellectual capacity but not of property.

So the third group of persons opposed to the government was
made up of the young intellectuals, the men who had carried on the
spiritual traditions of the Great Revolution, and who had never
become thoroughly reconciled to the July Revolution. They had
regarded the deposition of Charles X merely as a step forward.
Their republican ideals were not satisfied by the bourgeois mon-
archy of Louis Philippe, which put control into the hands of the
wealthy middle-class. At first the opposition of this group was
insignificant, because almost all of the intellectual leaders of the
younger generation who had prepared the way for the July Revo-
lution had been given office under the new government. But the
more the new regime became solidified, the greater became the gulf
between it and the republican idealists. The government devoted
its attention almost exclusively to material aims; it was not at all
inclined to endanger the prosperity of the country for the sake of
humanitarian reforms or idealistic motives. The administration be-
came more and more a closed caste. Since there was no longer any
strong opposition within the pays legal, and since the voters held to
the same materialistic aims as the ministry, the capadtes had no
means of taking part in political life. The government had no need
of the support of these able intellectuals and writers. Its only con-
cern was to retain its majority in the Chamber of Deputies; to do
this it had only to grant concessions to persons whose material in-

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 193

terests coincided with the government's policy, that is, to the wealthy
bourgeois. Many of the deputies themselves were also government
officials, financially dependent upon the government; others could
be won over by being given a share in public works and so forth.
Why should a government have bothered itself about groups who
possessed no political power under the existing franchise? Particu-
larly as this system was benefiting the country no less than the
ruling bourgeoisie? By 1840 the ministry had acquired a stability
hitherto unknown; the general well-being was improving, and there
prevailed, as Heine had once observed, "the greatest quiet." There
were not lacking some scandals, but the fact that guilty ministers
who had been making money by graft were strictly punished in the
courts showed that the government was not inclined to tolerate dis-
honest practices. In scarcely any other government have there been
so few cases of "corruption," using the word in the ordinary, though
not in a rigorously ethical, sense, as in that of the puritanical doc-
trinaire, Guizot.

But, as has been said, this system had nothing to offer to the
steadily increasing class of idealistically-minded intellectuals in
France. In fact, it seemed to them to be the very enemy of prog-
ress, if one regards the improvement of the condition of the Fourth
Estate as one of the tasks of the time. As had been the case in
England a little while before, the opposition was convinced that
what was needed most of all was a change in the franchise. They
believed that the government would only pay attention to the de-
mands of the workingmen when the property qualification for voting
had been done away with, and the wealthy middle-class thus de-
prived of its monopoly of seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

"Electoral and parliamentary reform" became the slogan of the
republican party. In 1843 a formal fusion took place between the
republicans and the socialists, when the leaders of both groups
founded a joint newspaper, "Reforme." Among its influential edi-
tors were both socialists, like Louis Blanc, and partisans of political
democracy, like Ledru-Rollin and Godefroy Cavaignac. Their pro-
gram had quite a socialistic tinge. It was drawn up by Louis Blanc
and contained such phrases as the following: "Formerly working-
men were slaves; now they are wage earners; they must be ele-
vated to the rank of partners (associes). It is the duty of the state
to bring about industrial reforms which will enable the workingmen
to reach this position. Citizens able to work have a right to work.
Only a democratic system of government can bring this about.
No government is democratic unless it rests on the sovereignty of

194 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

the people and universal suffrage, and gives realization to the for-
mula, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"

At first, therefore, this party of liberal opposition set up merely
political demands. They insisted that officials ought no longer to
be members of the Chamber of Deputies, that the franchise quali-
fication ought to be reduced to a hundred francs, and that the
capacites ought not to be restricted by any property qualification,
that is, that even intellectuals without property ought to be eligible
to the Chamber of Deputies.

But all these demands were met with an absolute refusal both by
the government and by the majority in the Chamber. Thereupon,
the opposition, following English example, determined to arrange
giant demonstrations on the part of people not represented in Par-
liament. A national petition, which set forth the reforms demanded
by the liberal socialistic group, was to be signed by thousands of
persons and presented to the government. In order to win support
for this there was organized in 1847 the so-called "banquet cam-
paign": banquets were held everywhere at which speakers for the
opposition (including also some moderate liberals) set forth the need
for a revision of the constitution and asked for signatures to the
petition. At these banquets purely political and socialistic desires
were intermingled, or rather the political reform was represented
as being the first step toward social reform. In July, 1847, at
one of these banquets in Paris, a health was drunk to the improve-
ment of the workingmen's condition. Other speakers glorified the
Great French Revolution in the way that Heine had already
noticed, and led cheers for the National Convention of 1793.

The government, however, declared that it would not allow itself
to be intimidated by this agitation outside Parliament. "The min-
istry will not yield one step," it was said in the Chamber in January,
1848. The authorities even went further. They determined to put
an end to the movement altogether, and forbade the "reform ban-
quet" which was to be held in Paris on February 22. This led to
the outbreak of revolution. At first there were only some harmless
demonstrations in which students and workingmen took part; but
soon, on February 23, 1848, barricades began to be thrown up in
the workingmen's districts in Paris. The government thereupon
called out the National Guard ; but this was hostile to Guizot's gov-
ernment and made demonstrations in favor of reform. Louis
Philippe then began to feel that his system was tottering. He forced
Guizot to resign and promised to form a new ministry favoring
reform (February 23).

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 195

The cause of reform seemed to be victorious and assured of a
further peaceful development. But on the evening of this same day
occurred an unfortunate incident. In the very heart of Paris, on
the Boulevard des Capucines, gunshots were exchanged between the
promenading masses of people and a number of troops who were
standing guard outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The troops
killed twenty-three of the crowd and wounded thirty others. Among
the dead were women and children. General rage seized the people.
They cheered for a republic, and on the next day all Paris was filled
with barricades. Louis Philippe now intended to make further con-
cessions than on the night before; he accepted a ministry composed
of men from the opposition in the Chamber, and promised a new
election. But these concessions came too late. The leaders of the
insurrection declared that he deserved the same fate as his prede-
cessor, Charles X. The King abdicated in favor of his grandson,
and fled from the Tuileries. The crowd thronged into the palace
and demolished the throne. The Chamber at first attempted to give
effect to the wish of the fallen monarch and proclaimed his grand-
son, the Count of Paris, as king. But the crowd pressed into the
Chamber, crying, "Down with the monarchy!" The republican
deputies used this opportunity to establish a provisional republican
government. This government then fused with one which had al-
ready been formed by republican politicians at the Hotel de Ville
in Paris. With the enthusiastic approval of the people of Paris,
the Republic was proclaimed on February 24, 1848.

As one sees, the February Revolution in Paris was exclusively
an urban socialistic movement. The country people who had indi-
rectly shared so much in the July Revolution and whose interests
would have been so severely injured by a reestablishment of the old
Restoration Monarchy and landlord nobility had neither taken part
in this revolution nor did they even regard it with any real sym-
pathy. In many respects their opinions were directly opposed to
those of the new men who had assumed power. This was particu-
larly true in the matter of religion: the revolutionary leaders were
hostile to the Church, believing at best in a kind of humanitarian
pantheism; but the French peasant of that day still clung closely to
his religion. So the new government, from the outset, did not har-
monize with the will of the majority of the people. It was com-
posed of representatives of tendencies which had triumphed in the
February Revolution. In it were leaders of the republican opposi-
tion under Louis Philippe, like Ledru-Rollin and Dupont de 1'Eure.
The socialistic movement was also represented by some socialist

196 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

republicans put forward at the Hotel de Ville, of whom the best
known was Louis Blanc.

At first, however, there was general enthusiasm in the country.
No class, except the higher bourgeoisie, had any real enthusiasm
for Louis Philippe's government. The clergy, as has been shown,
had no reason to grieve for the government which had fallen,
and the liberty-trees which were planted in the villages were blessed
by the priests. Furthermore, the new government had no intention
of replacing the former class-rule of the bourgeoisie by a new class-
rule in favor of the Fourth Estate. The members of the Provisional
Government were honest democrats and held fast to their ideals,
even when these seemed to benefit their opponents. They prob-
ably cradled themselves in illusions as to the political views of the
majority of Frenchmen; but even if they had known the real feeling
in France, they would not have renounced their convictions. They
therefore arranged at once for the election of a national constituent
assembly on the basis of universal suffrage, thus handing over the
sovereign parliamentary authority to the peasants and not to the
intellectuals and workingmen who had brought about the revolu-
tion. At the same time, unlimited freedom of the press and of public
meeting was introduced, and the ranks of the National Guard were
thrown open to all citizens, even to workingmen. The decrees of
the National Convention abolishing slavery in the French colonies
were renewed.

Thus the great mass of the citizens who had hitherto been excluded
from political life, and who, in good part, had insufficient education,
now acquired at one stroke a share in political and military power;
as E. Driault says, they now had "the ballot and the gun." News-
papers developed enormously (the stamp tax being abolished), and
were read by wide groups of people. Workingmen took part in
political debates and joined the National Guard by thousands, so
that its membership increased in a few weeks from fifty thousand
to two hundred thousand. But in accordance with the social struc-
ture of France, the citizens who were admitted to this new political
activity belonged much more to the peasant than to the proletarian
class.

From the government's point of view, this was all the more dan-
gerous, inasmuch as the socialistic ministers, who had had to be
included as a concession to radicalism, were not at all inclined to
leave the people time to become accustomed to the new conditions.
The socialistic demands which Louis Blanc set forth, such as "the
right to work," were to be realized at once. Although a majority

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 197

of the Provisional Government consisted of Republicans, who be-
lieved that political reforms were sufficient, and who held fast to
the tricolor, they were compelled, nevertheless, to make concessions
to their radical comrades ; the latter had hoisted the red flag and gave
the republican government the appearance of favoring a social revo-
lution. They supported a measure which appeared to meet a demand
formerly made by Louis Blanc, and organized National Workshops
(Ateliers Nationaux). They recognized the "right to work," — the
duty of the state to furnish employment to every citizen. They also
created a Labor Commission, led by two prominent socialist min-
isters. This commission heard delegates from various branches of
industry and economists of various views; it voted in favor of a
ten-hour day "in view of the fact that too much manual labor ruins
the health of the workingman and destroys the dignity of man by
preventing him from developing his intellectual possibilities." The
antagonism which existed within the Provisional Government came
to light more sharply in this incident than in any other. The re-
publicans wanted to use this occasion to prove the impracticability
of the socialist theories, and made only a pretense of accepting
Louis Blanc's demands. The Labor Commission was given no real
power, and the "National Workshops" were so organized by the
minister of commerce, Marie, that they were bound to be a fiasco.
Instead of giving work to the unemployed in workshops supported
by the state, and instead of taking into consideration the working-
man's particular aptitude, as Louis Blanc had desired, the republican
minister had about 100,000 laborers set to work digging in the
Champs de Mars in Paris. They were also given military organiza-
tion which made them more dangerous still. But the worst of it
was that this expensive experiment, in which the laborers cost much
and produced nothing, came at a period of economic depression.
The revolution had naturally caused a commercial crisis and the
income of the state had somewhat declined. Now, in addition to
the ordinary expenditures, there was added the outlay for the Na-
tional Workshops. The government was compelled to increase the
taxes by about one-half, adding an extra tax of forty-five centimes
for every franc paid in taxes. This aroused the first serious irrita-
tion among the peasants who had the feeling that they had to raise
money so that workingmen who produced nothing might receive pay.
So the popularity of the republic declined quickly, particularly
among the masses who had been recently admitted to the vote and
who were not yet trained for responsible participation in politics.
Soon other incidents took place which created an unfavorable im-

1 98 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

pression in the republic, because they seemed to show that the only
salvation against the socialist danger was the strong hand of a
military dictatorship.

The National Constituent Assembly which met on May 4 was
very far from being socialistic. As it represented the people who
had just expressed themselves through the new universal suffrage
it contained very few supporters of Louis Blanc: of its 900 mem-
bers, about 800 belonged to the republican party, and were opposed
to social revolution. In the Executive Committee, which was estab-
lished in place of the Provisional Government, not a single socialist
was given a seat; in it, beside Ledru-Rollin, Lamartine, Arago, and
other decided Republicans, there sat the Minister of Commerce,
Marie, who had tried to destroy the National Workshops by what
we should nowadays call "sabotage." But this attitude on the part
of the Executive Committee caused an open conflict. The work-
ingmen believed that they had been deceived, and attempted an
insurrection. On May 15 a great crowd pressed into the hall of
the Assembly, declared it dissolved, and proclaimed a purely so-
cialist government, of which Blanc and Blanqui were members. But
the insurrection failed. The National Guard dispersed it. Blanqui,
among others, was arrested, and Louis Blanc fled into exile. There-
upon the minister, Marie, ventured to declare the National Work-
shops abolished (June 21). But the labor movement was not
crushed by this. After Marie had rudely turned away a deputation
which came to protest against the closing of the National Work-
shops, a regular insurrection broke out. The methods of the Febru-
ary Revolution were used again, but this time only by members of
the Fourth Estate. In the eastern districts of Paris and in other
parts of the city occupied by the poor, barricades were thrown up.
A body of 70,000 workingmen united under the cry, "Liberty or
Death!" So great was the danger that the committee established
by the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, and all executive power
was placed in the hands of Cavaignac, the Minister of War. A mili-
tary dictatorship had to be established in order to suppress the
workingmen 's insurrection (June 24, 1848).

Naturally, there could be no doubt as to the outcome of the
struggle; the workingmen could not hold out against a regular mili-
tary attack. Nevertheless, great efforts were necessary before the
government troops were able to reconquer the parts of the city oc-
cupied by their opponents. The troops were able to advance only
step by step, and at the cost of heavy sacrifices. A number of
generals were killed. But on June 26 the entrance to the Saint

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 199

Antoine suburb, the real workingmen's quarter, was finally forced.
The rest of the workingmen's army, 11,000 men, surrendered to
the victor.

How severe the struggle had been is shown by the fact that after
the suppression of the insurrection, peaceful conditions were not
restored at once. It appeared necessary to leave the executive power
for the time being in General Cavaignac's hands, and in Paris the
state of siege was continued until the end of 1848. For newspapers
a cautionary deposit of money was again required; many failed
because they were unable to raise the large sum demanded. Who-
ever had taken part in the last revolt could be summarily deported;
about 4,000 persons were arrested and packed off to the colonies.
No amnesty was proclaimed for others not punished.

Henceforth, the Republic had to reckon with the unrestrained
hatred of the socialists, without being able to acquire the good will
of the conservative elements. For the majority of the population
did not think that the government had mastered the insurrection
quickly. They only remembered the unheard-of phenomenon of a
"red" revolt, and got the impression that nothing but a military
dictatorship could prevent a return of those terrible days.

The idealistic republicans also made the mistake of giving
into the hands of their numerous opponents the very weapons to
cause their own fall. On November 12, 1848, the National As-
sembly adopted the new constitution which gave the president an
altogether extraordinary amount of power. As in the United States,
the president was to be chosen for a four-year term and to appoint
his own cabinet. The executive power was therefore wholly inde-
pendent of the single chamber which was given legislative power.
True to the old republican program, the constitution also emphasized
the duty of the state to care for general education, for the establish-
ment of equality between workingmen and employers, and for the
provision of opportunities to work, so far as was possible.

So far, indeed, little objection could be made to the new constitu-
tion from a republican point of view. The fact that the president,
as in America, was made independent of the changing parties in
the legislature, might even be regarded as an advantage, since in this
way the executive would give the republic greater stability. But as
conditions then were, the election of the president ought, at least,
to have been in the hands of the legislature, the only body
which was thoroughly in favor of the republic. This was also the
view of distinguished parliamentary leaders. One of them, Jules
Grevy, even went so far as to wish to give the legislature not only

200 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

the right to elect, but also to recall, the president. But here again
the fatal voice of the poet, Lamartine, carried the day; just as he
had attempted to discredit Louis Philippe's government, by his
grotesque phrase, "France is bored" — as if it were the duty of those
in authority to entertain the people with theatrical phrases or with
useless warlike undertakings, — so now the poet again threw a new
phrase into the discussion which did not fail to produce a great
effect upon the republican idealists. After he had explained that it
was in accordance with the principles of democracy for the presi-
dent to be chosen directly by the people, he added, "God and the
people must decide. We must leave something to Providence." This
decided the matter. Not even the limiting clause was approved that
no member of a family which had formerly reigned in France could
be elected president. The Assembly decided, by 602 votes to 211,
that the president should be chosen on the same basis of universal
suffrage, on which it, itself, had been elected.

What this meant was soon evident. In addition to conditions
which gave the French president a wholly different position from
the American one — a centralized administration and a large army
at his unlimited disposal — there was added the peculiarity already
mentioned, that the masses of the people, who had hitherto been
excluded from the suffrage, were unable to make a choice among the
candidates on the basis of real political experience. They easily
voted, therefore, for a candidate who had done practically nothing
to deserve election, but who bore a familiar name. This was the
Bonapartist pretender, the nephew of Napoleon I ; named Louis after
his father, the former King of Holland, he had already attracted
general attention by his adventures during Louis Philippe's reign.

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, born in 1808, was by inheritance the
legitimate claimant to the Napoleonic imperial throne. Twice under
Louis Philippe he had attempted to make himself successor to his
famous uncle. Both times the undertaking had failed, under cir-
cumstances which were simply ridiculous, so ridiculous in fact, that
the imperial pretender was thought of as scarcely more than an
inexperienced dreamer. The first time, when he attempted to over-
throw the July Monarchy by a military insurrection in Strasburg,
he was easily arrested and shipped off to America (1836). Four
years later, when the pretender landed from England and tried
to seize Boulogne, he was again taken prisoner. He was condemned
by a court to life-long imprisonment. He spent six years under
arrest in the fortress of Ham until 1846, when he succeeded in
escaping to England disguised as a workman (the name of the stone-

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 201

mason, Badinguet, whose overalls he borrowed, clung to him as a
nickname long afterwards). Scarcely had the February Revolution
broken out in France when he returned to Paris and at once opened
an active political propaganda. His popularity grew rapidly. At
by-elections for the National Assembly in the summer of 1848 he
was elected in no less than five departments, including Corsica. He
had the great advantage that he had not compromised himself with
any party, and so had on his side all the opponents of the
new Republican government, who preferred an unknown person
to politicians who were disliked. Moreover, the hazy humanitarian
socialistic ideas which he had developed in his previous writings may
have won for him some of the socialists, who had not broken wholly
with the February Republic. So at the election on December 10,
1848, Louis Napoleon won an enormous majority in the popular
election. Those who voted for him included both the peasants and
the anxious bourgeois who saw in him the only savior from the
"reds," many workingmen who had learned to hate the republican
government, and also many republicans who disliked Cavaignac's
military dictatorship. General Cavaignac, who had triumphed over
the Paris workingmen in the fighting at the barricades in the July
Days, was the only other candidate who had any chance of success
against the Bonapartist prince. He received, in fact, nearly a mil-
lion and a half votes, while Ledru-Rollm got only 370,000, and
Lamartine only 18,000. But Cavaignac's vote was all the smaller
• hen one considers that Louis Napoleon was elected by no less than
nearly five and a half million votes.

On December 20, Louis Napoleon took the oath to the Constitu-
tion, and in doing so expressly condemned any attempt to change
the form of government by illegal methods. But he began at once
his policy of uniting all the conservative elements into a bloc which
should prepare the way to the throne for him as the preserver of
order. The panic of the socialist revolution had drawn together the
conservative groups which had hitherto been so hostile to one
another: many republicans even approached the standpoint of the
Orleanists who supported the July Monarchy; Legitimists who sup-
ported the older Bourbon line, clericals, and Orleanists, all faced by
the common danger which threatened property and religion, which
was regarded as the protector of property, now joined together in
a groat "Party of Order." The president at once declared himself
of the same mind. He even allowed a conflict to take place with
the republican majority in the Assembly. Quite characteristically
he first made concessions to the neo-conservative party in a religious

202 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

matter. Under the influence of the February Revolution in Paris,
reformers had risen in revolt in the Papal States and proclaimed a
Roman Republic. It would have been wholly in accord with the atti-
tude of the new, free-thinking, democratic government in France, if
French troops had supported this movement which could not suc-
ceed without aid from the outside, and the National Assembly passed
a vote in favor of such action. But the president paid no attention
to this vote. He knew that the "Party of Order" would never
pardon any weakening of the Pope's authority. He therefore sent
an army to Italy under General Oudinot, with orders to support,
not the Roman Republic, but the Pope; and he carried through his
purpose. In vain did republican leaders, Jules Grevy and Ledru-
Rollin, insist that the president ought to be impeached for disre-
garding the vote of the National Assembly. The Assembly did not
dare to go to such lengths, and Pope Pius IX was able to return to
Rome under the protection of French troops, and so restore at once
his old system of government in 1849.

Louis Napoleon took a still more decisive step when the new elec-
tions for the Legislative Assembly gave a majority to the groups
on which he was resting for support. The Constituent Assembly
had naturally been dissolved after it had accomplished its task of
making a constitution for the country. In 1849 the new elections for
the Legislative Assembly gave anti-republican tendencies full oppor-
tunity to express themselves. Under the panicky impression caused
by the socialist insurrection, for which the republicans were held
responsible, a complete change had taken place in the electorate. Of
the 750 deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly about 500 be-
longed to the "Party of Order"; barely a third of the deputies, there-
fore, represented the party which had had the majority in the Na-
tional Constituent Assembly.

Under these circumstances any opposition in the Legislative As-
sembly to the president's Roman policy had much less chance of
success than in the Constituent Assembly. In vain did Ledru-Rollin
again insist that the president ought to be impeached; in vain did
he appeal to Article V of the constitution, which expressly forbade
the use of French troops in the suppression of the liberty of another
people. His proposal was voted down. Two days later Ledru-Rollin
answered by stirring up a demonstration in one of the eastern suburbs
of Paris, but this disturbance, in which several hundred National
Guards and workingmen took part, was easily suppressed by the
military authorities, and only served as a legal pretext for breaking
up the republican organization. Ledru-Rollin had to flee to London ;

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 203

other leaders were arrested; the republican newspapers were sup-
pressed; and Paris was placed under martial law.

The way was now open for a new reactionary policy. In 1850 two
decisive laws were passed which marked not only a departure from
the ideals of 1848, but even a retrogression to the period before
1830.

Louis Philippe's government had differed from that which pre-
ceded it before 1830 largely in that it had withdrawn public education
wholly from the control of the Church (see above, p. 190). Laymen
who were essentially Voltairean in their way of thinking had been
given charge of public instruction. Although the bourgeoisie had
not experienced any new convictions of religious truth, they
now determined on political grounds to place the youth again under
the influence of the clergy. Their idea was that a strengthening
of religious influences was the only way to secure protection against
the socialist ideas in favor of social revolution. As M. Falloux said,
when introducing the new education law, "Lay teachers have made
the principles of social revolution popular in the most distant ham-
lets." It was therefore necessary, he said, "to rally around religion
in order to strengthen the foundations of society against those who
want to divide up property." The Legislative Assembly agreed with
him, and so in 1850 was passed the so-called "Falloux Law" which
again introduced clerical supervision over the schools. The "Uni-
versity" was divided into eighty-six departmental academies, at the
head of which were rectors who were elected from outside the "Uni-
versity" ; that is, they were chosen from ecclesiastical institutions and
were placed under the direction of the prefect and the bishop. The
higher schools (colleges) were supervised by an administrative
council which was usually presided over by the bishop. Teachers in
primary schools were placed under the local priest and had to teach
the Roman Catholic Catechism.

Another old wish of the clerical party was also satisfied, inasmuch
as instruction in all grades was now made "free," that is, open to
any one. The religious "congregations" were now able to enter into
unchecked competition with the public schools, and ecclesiastical
schools of every kind quickly sprang from the ground everywhere.
The bourgeoisie, who were anxious that the coming generation should
be protected from the dangerous doctrines threatening the system of
private property, could now not only send their children uncon-
cernedly to public schools; they could also send them to religious
educational institutions which devoted themselves directly to com-
batting the doctrines of social revolution.

204 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

The second law in favor of the new conservative tendency was the
electoral law of May 31, 1850. The "Falloux Law" of March 25
had indeed roused some fear among the people at large, and some
by-elections had indicated a slight strengthening of the republican
feeling. To prevent a revival of socialist opposition in the Legisla-
tive Assembly the electoral law was changed. The Legislative As-
sembly was not able, and perhaps did not wish, completely to do
away with universal suffrage; but it determined to exclude the work-
ingmen in good part from it. The new law declared that henceforth
in order to vote one must have resided three years in the same dis-
trict and have one's name inscribed on the list of taxpayers. These
were conditions which were easily met by the peasants, who were
regarded as a conservative element and were therefore gladly pro-
tected by the Legislative Assembly in their political privileges. The
workingmen, on the other hand, could only meet these conditions to
a slight extent, and so it came about that some three million citizens,
chiefly workingmen, were robbed of their share in choosing the leg-
islature. The formation of a socialist party in the legislature was
therefore out of the question. Perhaps even more important was the
fact that the French chamber had now shown that an extension of
the suffrage may not only work in the direction of conservatism, but
may even be a regular protecting wall against revolutionary tend-
encies.

But this "reactionary" electoral law contributed essentially to the
downfall of the legislature. The Republican and Socialist opposi-
tion feared the new regime would be nothing but a poor imitation
of the July Monarchy, or worse, because the rule of the bour-
geoisie would be strengthened by placing education in the control
of the clergy.

The president, who was aiming at personal power and also at more
or less hazy humanitarian ideals, made use of this discontent in the
Republican and Socialist groups to pose as the true friend of the
people in opposition to the Legislative Assembly. He proceeded sys-
tematically toward restoring the Empire by manipulating public
opinion and by subjecting the army and the administration to his
control. He got rid of the Orleanists whom he had at first had to
take into his cabinet out of regard for the feeling in the Legislative
Assembly. He removed generals from office who opposed the Bona-
partist propaganda in the army. He asked the Legislative Assembly
to repeal the new electoral law and introduce again complete uni-
versal suffrage; and when it rejected his request by a small majority
he declared, "When I wanted to do good by improving the condition

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 205

of the lower classes of the people, the Legislative Assembly refused
to cooperate with me."

The only problem which remained for him was whether it
would be possible to restore the monarchy in some legal way, that
is, whether pubHc opinion, which was favorable to Louis Napoleon,
could compel the Legislative Assembly to submit to his wishes. This
was what the president at first attempted. Two things especially
must be accomplished if he wanted to introduce personal govern-
ment again. He must be provided with sufficient revenues to main-
tain a court, and the clause in the constitution which declared the
president ineligible for reelection at the expiration of his four-year
term must be repealed. The president and his party attempted to
secure both these things in the legislature; but both were rejected,
though with relatively small majorities. The proposal for increasing
his "endowment" by 1,800,000 francs was refused by a vote of
386 to 294. The more important proposal, revising the constitution
so that the president could be reelected, secured on July 26, 1851,
an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly, but not the three-
fourths majority required by the constitution.

Besides this the president was faced by the further difficulty that
he had no legal means of appealing to the people against the legis-
lature. The constitution, like that of America on which it was
modeled, had created the executive and legislative powers co-equal
(an arrangement which has often brought a political deadlock in the
United States) ; it withheld from him the right to dissolve the
Assembly and order new elections. If he wanted to make himself
"democratic autocrat" there was nothing for him to do but use
force.

Accordingly, he soon used force. With the aid of the army and
the police, the president succeeded in carrying out smoothly the
coup d'etat of December 2, 1851. The chief leaders of the Repub-
lican and Orleanist parties, like Cavaignac and Thiers, were arrested
and thrown into prison, and the legislative hall was occupied by
soldiers. One of the president's natural brothers, named Morny, was
made minister of the interior, so that Louis Napoleon at once had
all the prefects in his control. The coup d'etat took place under
the guise of saving the republic. The president not only declared
in his proclamation that it was his intention to overthrow the men
who had already ruined two monarchies, to nullify their plots against
the republic, and to appeal from them to the only sovereign whom
he recognized, namely to "the people"; but he also placed before
this people for popular vote (plebiscite) the draft of a new con-

206 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

stitution which repealed several reactionary decisions of the Legis-
lative Assembly (particularly the limitation of universal suffrage),
and which also extended the president's term of office for ten years
more. But the Republicans naturally did not allow themselves to
be deceived by these words. Although deprived in good part of their
leaders, they organized themselves for resistance and appealed, ac-
cording to the constitution, to the supreme court (Haute-Cour) to
condemn the president's high treason. The court met, acknowledged
the apparent guilt of the offender and invited him to defend himself.
A "Committee of Resistance," consisting of men like Victor Hugo,
Hippolyte Carnot, and Jules Favre, posted up placards calling people
to rise in armed revolt against Louis Napoleon who had made him-
self an outlaw. The opposition succeeded in winning over several
hundred workingmen to their side. Once more the eastern suburbs
of Paris were torn up for barricades.

This defensive action against Louis Napoleon did not seem alto-
gether hopeless. Both in Paris and in the provinces the coup d'etat
met with lively disapproval and the first attack on the barricades
had relatively little success. If the president had been willing or
able to use no more means than stood at the disposal of Charles X
or Louis Philippe, his coup d'etat would probably have failed; but,
in contrast to the preceding monarchs, he had the army firmly in
his grasp and he was not afraid to make a thorough and, if need
be, brutal use of it. Louis Napoleon had the troops attack the
barricades and clear the Grands Boulevards with frightful fusillades.
Although there was no organized resistance here, the troops opened
a systematic fire on the crowds and neighboring houses, and
the streets were covered with the bodies of old men, women and
children. In the provinces the president went ahead in the same
way; after several local attempts at revolt, he placed thirty- two
departments under martial law and established military commis-
sions with discretionary power which were given authority to con-
demn all suspicious persons by a kind of court-martial.

"Suspicious persons" were not only those opponents of the new
regime who were suspected of armed opposition, but, in general,
all persons who favored by conviction a republican form of govern-
ment. So it came about, that although the opposition to the coup
d'etat was quite limited, no less than 100,000 persons were arrested;
1545 were exiled, or fled voluntarily, like Victor Hugo. About
10,000 were deported to Algiers and 239 to Cayenne. More than
5,000 were placed under official surveillance and about 3,000 in-
terned in France itself. The republican party, as such, was de-

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 2°7

stroyed; there were still some republicans, but they were unable to
act in common.

Thus Louis Napoleon appealed from the intellectual elite, who
had hitherto been in control, to the masses of the bourgeois, who
were worried about the safety of their property. Shortly after-
wards, as he had promised, the plebiscite was held (December 14,
1851). It showed that the president had not acted against the
wishes of the majority of the population: the new constitution was
approved by about seven and a half million votes to 650,000. But
the conflict between the intellectual, influential classes and the
coup d'etat government still continued, and doubtless contributed
eventually to the fall of the Second Empire. For no matter how
much the president, and later emperor, attempted to win public
opinion by military glory and by increasing the prestige of France
abroad, French intellectuals, who are probably less likely to be
blinded by military glamor than those of any other country, re-
mained steadily hostile to him. Even the French Academy adopted
a decidedly unfriendly attitude down to the end of the Second Em-
pire. The brutal treatment of innocent bystanders on December 4,
and the equally brutal procedure against the intellectual leaders of
France, was never pardoned by his opponents.

At first, Louis Napoleon was in full possession of power in both
foreign and domestic matters. What the constitution of 1848 had
denied to him was now granted by the new one of 1852, adopted by
the people upon his proposal. It differed primarily from the pre-
ceding one in that it sharply limited the powers of the legislative
body, which had formerly been coordinate with the president; and
at the same time it extended the authority of the president and also
(theoretically, at least) that of the people. The president, who
henceforth was to be elected for ten years, was made sole executive ;
he appointed all officials, signed all treaties, and had the right to
declare war and proclaim martial law. The Legislative Assembly,
which was reduced in membership by two-thirds, could only discuss
laws which were laid before it by the president, and so lost all power
of initiative. By its side there was established a Senate whose mem-
bers were appointed for life by the president; this body had the
task of preserving the constitution. The president was responsible
neither to this nor to the Legislative Assembly, but merely to the
people. This did not mean, however, that the electorate was given
a regular share in the government by anything like a referendum.
The share which the people had in politics was limited to the extent
that voters might vote "aye" or "no" in the so-called plebiscites

208 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

whenever the president laid any measure before them for decision,
such as the adoption of a new constitution, or the making of war
or peace. Elections to the Legislative Assembly were still to be by
universal suffrage; however, the president had the right to propose
official candidates and thus influence the elections very strongly.

After this first step, it was a mere formality for the president to
complete his imitation of the First Napoleon by assuming shortly
afterwards the imperial title, and by declaring the imperial dignity
hereditary in his family. After the first elections to the Legislative
Assembly, which took place under the system of official candidates,
had given him an overwhelming majority (the opposition got only
three seats), he sought to allay the fears that he would take up his
uncle's war policy by declaring in his Bordeaux speech, "L'Empire,
c'est la paix," — "The Empire means peace, my conquests must be
of an economic nature." After all this, the Senate decided to lay
before the French people a plebiscite as to whether the Empire
should be restored. This resulted in an enormous majority in favor
of the proposal (7,839,000 ayes to 253,000 noes). Accordingly, on
December 2, 1852, on the anniversary of the coup d'ttat, the new
Emperor took his seat in the Tuileries, the old palace of the kings.

The Emperor's peace pronouncement was more than a mere phrase.
Although he was drawn into military adventures more than once, for
reasons which will be explained in another connection, he by no
means forgot the peaceful economic activity which he had promised
in his Bordeaux speech to undertake. And in contrast to Louis
Philippe's government, he sought, as far as possible, to look out for
the interests not only of the upper bourgeoisie but also of the peas-
ants, the workingmen and other consumers. The Credit Fonder
was established; agricultural societies were multiplied; the construc-
tion of railways was greatly pushed; rivers were improved so that
the harvests should not be injured by floods; forests were planted;
and swamps were drained. All this was of advantage to the work-
ingmen, for all these extended undertakings needed a large supply
of labor. In addition to the activities mentioned, one of the most
important in this connection was the systematic rebuilding of the
capital, which was begun in 1854 under Baron Haussmann, the pre-
fect of the Seine. At one stroke Paris was transformed from an
old-fashioned city into a modern capital. The narrow, crooked
streets disappeared; great buildings were laid out with plenty of
space in front of them; and broad approaches led to the railway
stations. This was done not only in the interests of hygiene and to

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 209

give employment to workingmen, but also, in case of rebellion, to
make easier the movement of troops. The construction of countless
new railway lines, the establishment of better overseas trade-routes,
the consolidation of the French rule in Algiers (see p. 124), — all this
aided the development of industry under the new regime. Still the
Emperor by no means favored exclusively the interests of the great
manufacturers as the July Monarchy had done. How little this was
the case is shown especially clearly in the so-called free-trade treaty
which he signed with Great Britain on January 22, 1860, in which
one of the negotiators was the well-known free-trader, Cobden. By
this France renounced all her prohibitory regulations against foreign
imports. In their place were established import duties which were
not to be more than thirty per cent ad valorem. In return, France
received the right to export to England free of any duty various
products, chiefly agricultural, and English duties upon French wines
and spirits were lowered. This was an innovation which could only
have been brought about by the fact that the Chamber of Deputies
did not have to be consulted ; now, as before, protectionists controlled
the legislature, and numerous French manufacturers regarded the
treaty as a misfortune for the country; but the Emperor ignored the
legislature, and, as a matter of fact, the commercial treaty resulted
in the foreign trade of France increasing in ten years from three
to eight million francs.

But though this material prosperity naturally made a great im-
pression, the opposition of the intellectuals and the numerous ideal-
ists, as has already been indicated, was not overcome. Its spokes-
man, the Jownal des Debats, expressed their feelings when it de-
clared, "Man does not live by bread alone; and all is not for the
best in the world simply because the price of cattle and govern-
ment revenues are rising." These people could not forgive the Im-
perial Regime either its illegal origin or its suppression of all free
intellectual life. The government, always afraid of opposition, un-
dertook, in alliance with the church, a spy system of extraordinary
rigor. In the years before 1860 persons were arrested for expres-
sions which they had used even in private conversation. News-
papers could be summarily suppressed or suspended by government
authority. No new newspaper could be established except by the
express permission of the government. Teachers in the "Univer-
sity" might be dismissed at any time. The dangerous professor-
ships of history and philosophy were altogether abolished. All po-
litical agitation was rendered impossible. Newspapers were allowed

aio STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

to publish only the official reports of the sessions of the Chamber.
Electoral campaign meetings, and even the publication of party
platforms, were forbidden.

The government was quite aware that there was an unyielding
opposition in the country. So it was driven more and more to seek
the support of those forces which it regarded as the only sure sup-
port of its authority, namely the army, the clergy, and the commer-
cial circles who were glad to be free of having to bother with politics
and of the danger of socialistic uprisings. How correct the gov-
ernment was, was seen at once as soon as it modified its oppressive
system after 1860: Paris, the intellectual center of France, chose
exclusively opposition candidates in 1863.

The situation which developed at that time had an importance
which extended far beyond France itself. While the fact that a
military dictatorship appeared to be the only means of holding down
the socialist revolutionary movement exercised a great influence on
the political thought of all Europe, the new dynasty's close con-
nection with the army also led to a complete change in foreign policy.
Emperor Napoleon III (as he called himself, since he regarded the
Duke of Reichstadt, the great Napoleon's little son, who had never
actually ruled, as "Napoleon II,") believed it necessary to give
the army an opportunity to distinguish itself; and he also wished
to win, as far as possible, the support of public opinion in France
by a display of "prestige." The national policy of his predecessors
was replaced by a dynastic policy of his own. In place of the
pacific policy of the July Monarchy which had suited so excellently
the economic structure and geographical expansion of France, and,
in fact, France's position among the European states, there now fol-
lowed a period of military adventures and fruitless warlike activities.
Napoleon III did not begin wars of conquest; even from victorious
wars he scarcely expected any increase of French territory. Usually
he championed the aspirations of other nations, whose interests
either did not touch, or were even in direct conflict with, those of
France. He allowed himself to be influenced either by general sen-
timental considerations or by the hope of acquiring for France
(empty) diplomatic distinction, which would reconcile the hostile
elements in his country to the imperial regime.

One of the most important results of this changed attitude on
the part of the French government was a fundamental alteration in
the relations of the European states to one another. The period of
peace following the Congress of Vienna came to an end. In place
of small wars of limited extent (like that in Belgium), or of colonial

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 211

wars, conflicts between the Great Powers began again. The
most important of these struggles took place in Italy. But before
an account is given of them a resume must first be given of the
great war which marked the beginning of this new era, and also of
the Civil War in America, which made clearer than anything else
the change in the political views of Europe.

CHAPTER XXII

THE CRIMEAN WAR. RUSSIA AND THE EASTERN

QUESTION

NAPOLEON III quickly secured recognition from the other Great
Powers. Although a Bonapartist government in France was in direct
contradiction with the Treaties of 1815 and 1818, still the other
Great Powers made no serious opposition to the Second Empire. For
reasons to be described in the next chapter, they felt they had a
common interest with the conservative regime victorious in France;
they hailed with joy the establishment of a monarchy instead of
a republic on the Seine, especially a republic tinged with socialism.
But the legitimist principles, which had been advocated by the Con-
servative Alliance of the Eastern Powers since 1815, were not
to be shoved aside all at once. Napoleon III was indeed recog-
nized as a de facto ruler, but he was not treated on terms of equality.
When he wished to marry, all the princely families of Europe,
even including Bernadotte's Swedish dynasty, refused the hands of
their daughters, so in January, 1853, the French emperor married
Eugenie de Montijo, who came from an old and respectable but not
princely family in Spain.

Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, was the ruler who was most cool to
Napoleon III. He had always regarded himself as the peculiar de-
fender of legitimacy. Shortly before this he had reaffirmed his atti-
tude by destroying the revolutionary Hungarian republic (which was
scarcely to be justified from a purely Russian standpoint). Nicholas
now refused to address Napoleon as "Mon Frere," which is the usual
form in which legitimate princes address one another.

If Napoleon wanted to make himself count with the other
Powers, the best way to do it naturally seemed to be by a stroke
against Russia. Furthermore, the French emperor could at the same
time show his good will toward his clerical adherents in France, if
he was able to stand forth as the defender of Roman Catholicism
against the Russian schismatics. A struggle with Russia, particu-
larly a military one, was hardly in the interests of the French na-

212

THE CRIMEAN WAR 213

tion. France did not care if her new ruler was snubbed in inter-
national etiquette. But Napoleon was guided by dynastic interests,
as has already been pointed out, and if he held to these, war with
Russia was perhaps advisable.

Such an undertaking seemed particularly favorable, from a military
point of view as well as for reasons of prestige, if it could be carried
out in conjunction with some other Great Power. For evident rea-
sons England was the only possible ally. England was naturally
hostile to Russia, and had become increasingly so, as Russian and
English interests clashed more sharply in Asia (see ch. xvii).
The English court had fewer scruples to overcome, and the British
government had been the first to recognize the French Empire.
Finally, England was also in a position, being the only great naval
power of the age, to afford better support to the French land army
than any other country.

The Eastern Question, that is, the question which European Power
should secure control over Constantinople, had become essentially
less favorable to Russia since the end of the War of Greek Inde-
pendence. From her defeats at that time Turkey had learned her
lesson, and had been reorganizing her army according to European
models and under the direction of European instructors. The
"Straits Convention" of 1841 had declared the Bosphorus neutral
and closed it to all ships of war, particularly to those of Russia.
If Russia wanted to retain free exit into the Mediterranean in case
of war, she was compelled to make preparations to break through
by force; with this in mind, she had been building a mighty fortress
and naval port on the Crimean Peninsula at Sebastopol. There was
danger that Russia might possibly get ahead of Turkey with her
war preparations before the Sultan at Constantinople had organized
sufficient defenses to free him from his dependence on St. Petersburg.

Russia herself, during the last decades, had been using her vast
natural resources for greater and greater military preparations. Al-
though she did not look forward to conquests in Europe, and
although her soldiers were chiefly used in suppressing revolutions and
in preserving existing conditions, still Nicholas I devoted most of
his attention to military matters. While his elder brother, Alex-
ander, had toyed with liberal political ideas, his interests were exclu-
sively devoted to the creation of a strong army and navy. He felt
that the existence of his government, and indeed of conservative
legitimist principles in Europe in general, were bound up with Rus-
sia's strong military force.

It is not to be denied that he accomplished his purpose with

STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

astonishing success. The corruption and inefficiency of Russian
administration have become proverbial in Western Europe, but the
facts brand this view as wholly false in many respects. Certainly,
many of the stories are true, which have been told by Russians as
much as by others, of the bribery and inefficiency of Russian offi-
cials. But only a superficial moralist will lay great weight on these
stories. If one wants to regard the matter critically and historically,
one must first of all see whether these delinquencies, which natu-
rally took place, actually hindered the working of the Russian state
machinery, and rendered abortive the aims toward which Russian
policy was directed. On this point the only answer that can be
given is that they did not. Though a great deal of corruption took
place, and though state funds were often squandered by officials,
nevertheless the efficiency of the Russian army and of Russian
foreign policy scarcely suffered at all thereby. One simply has to
remember the account given above (in ch. xvii) of Russia's expan-
sion in Central Asia, and one will admit that it would be difficult
to find any other state which could have carried out these tasks
better.

The error of the current view largely rests on the fact that people
are accustomed to think of policy and administration as being de-
pendent on natural resources. But just as a business man who has
only a little capital must proceed quite differently from a firm which
has millions in reserve, so it is also in the life of nations. Russia
was in the position of a millionaire with an enormous income, who
does not need to worry if his agents line their own pockets to some
extent. In spite of corruption, Russian revenues were always suf-
ficient, and Russian finance was more solid than that of other states
less favored by Nature, which pursued foreign policies not in har-
mony with their weak economic basis.

Furthermore, in the Russian civil service there were by no means
lacking persons who may be compared in patriotic self-sacrifice, zeal
and intelligence with the bureaucrats of other countries. To be-sure,
it became evident, step by step, that the centralized military admin-
istrative system which had been artificially transplanted to Russia
from the West demanded for its successful action a much more ad-
vanced state of civilization and a less primitive economic system
than existed in Russia. The Russian Empire, made up almost
wholly of peasants, in which only a few cities were little more than
large villages, in which a great part of the peasants were serfs under
the practically unlimited power of landlords, and in which there
was lacking both a strong city middle-class as well as free peasant

THE CRIMEAN WAR 215

proprietors, — such a country did not sufficiently possess the ele-
ments necessary to keep the complicated state machine at St. Peters-
burg working satisfactorily in all its detailed administrative parts.
Too many of the officials in its service were lacking in the necessary
knowledge and desired honesty. But the system still gave honest
men opportunities for service in a much larger degree than
has generally been admitted, and what the Russian government ac-
complished, both at home and abroad, shows clearly that these
opportunities were largely made use of. To be sure, it was unfor-
tunate that the "Panic of the French Revolution," augmented by
the officers' revolt of 1825 (the so-called Decembrist Revolution)
which aimed at the introduction of a constitution, lasted longer in
Russia than any other states; and, as a result, capable officials,
who were naturally inclined to western liberalism, were persecuted
by the system of suspicion, and, as far as possible, pushed to one side.
But, on the other hand, the civil service was less a monopoly of the
nobility than in many of the other feudalistic states of Central
Europe. Since there did not exist in Russia proper, as has already
been pointed out, a system of large landed estates based on primo-
geniture, younger sons of the nobility were placed under no economic
necessity of being put into the civil or military service, even when
they were not fitted for it; it was otherwise, however, in the German
Baltic provinces of Russia, where estates were entailed; from this
region, therefore, there have come an unusually large number of
Russian higher officials. Naturally, also, the nobility were promi-
nent in the administration and in the army, because the necessary
economic and social qualifications were harder to find in the other
social classes in Russia. But the nobility were not really privileged
as such ; and aristocracy based on service everywhere dominated over
aristocracy based on birth. The nobility (that is, the landlords,
since only nobles could acquire land) were at the same time the in-
dustrial class in Russia. To be sure, Russia did not have the neces-
sary conditions for the introduction of modern industry. The rela-
tively thinly settled soil, with its enormous mineral deposits and
with the great stretches of land in the south so excellent for grain
growing, was at that time only prepared to produce raw materials,
and these formed the larger part of her exports. But the govern-
ment, by prohibitive measures against the importation of those
products which could be manufactured in Russia itself, had tried
since 1822 to develop native Russian industries; and since the
nobility had the right to establish factories on their own soil and
even to inscribe themselves among the "merchants of the first guild,"

216 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

they were able to engage in industrial as well as commercial under-
takings. Thus, modest home industries had been developed.

Although Nicholas I had taken so much care of the army, and
although during his reign the military element dominated the civil
administration, still he never thought of making war against his two
neighbors on the west. Austria and Prussia were both too valuable
as bulwarks of absolutism, he thought, for him to attack them; and
also, at that time and for a long time afterwards, there were no
grounds for war against them. It was part of his policy, too, to
keep his subjects as far as possible from any contact with the foreign
nations of Europe: to go abroad, in his day, one had to have the
Tsar's personal permission; an attempt to emigrate might be
punished by exile to Siberia; foreign books and newspapers were
admitted only with difficulty, and all foreigners were watched by the
police. Now a war with the states of the west would only have
increased this contact with European civilization, which he so much
feared. But after Nicholas I had suppressed the Hungarian revolu-
tion in 1849, and thereby made Austria indebted to him, he believed
the moment had come to put an end to the reorganization of the
Turkish defensive measures which were growing steadily more threat-
ening; the time had come to establish Russia's supremacy in the
Balkans.

The Tsar naturally expected that he would only have to deal
with one opponent, England. He therefore first sought to arrange
the matter in a friendly way. He proposed to England a partition
of the empire of the "Sick Man," as he called the Sultan: in the
Balkans a number of independent states would be created under
Russian protection; Great Britain would have Egypt and
Crete; and Constantinople would not be Russian territory exactly,
but only be occupied by Russia "provisionally." But the English
government was unwilling to give Russia access to the Mediterranean
and declined the proposal.

Parallel with these negotiations, conflicts had been taking place
in regard to the Holy Places in Palestine. Here the claims of the
Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox monks were opposed to one
another. Since the former were under the protection of France, the
French government also was involved. Russia sought to use this
opportunity to compel Turkey to yield to her the right to protect
all Greek Orthodox Christians throughout the Turkish empire. But
owing to the pressure of the British ambassador in Constantinople,
Turkey rejected this demand. Russia thereupon broke off diplo-
matic relations with Turkey in 1853.

THE CRIMEAN WAR 217

Both sides then tried the plan of making military demonstrations.
The Tsar occupied the Rumanian Principalities with an army, and
England and France sent their fleets through the Dardanelles ; since
this was contrary to the convention of 1841, Russia protested.
Great Britain replied that Russia had already broken the peace by
her occupation of Rumania. On November 4, 1853, Turkey de-
clared war on Russia. So far, it was not at all inevitable that these
events should result in a European war; it was conceivable that the
war might this time also have been merely a local one. But the
Great Powers which were hostile to Russia, particularly Napoleon
III, who at that time was trying to translate his dynastic policy of
prestige into action, did not want to let the opportunity pass of
putting an end once for all to the danger which threatened Constan-
tinople through Russia's possession of a navy in the Black Sea.
When the Russian fleet sailed out shortly after Turkey's declaration
of war, and annihilated the Turkish fleet at Sinope on November 30,
1853, the Powers believed the favorable occasion had come for in-
tervening on behalf of Turkey. A combined Anglo-French force
sailed into the Black Sea, and the Russian vessels were compelled
to withdraw to Sebastopol. The Tsar thereupon broke off relations
with the two Western Powers. The latter then demanded the evacua-
tion of the Rumanian Principalities. When the Tsar rejected this
demand also, they declared war on him (March 27, 1854).

Since Russia did not want war, there were no serious military
operations at first. In order to deprive his enemies of any pretext
for an attack, the Tsar even withdrew his Russian troops from the
Rumanian Principalities, and had them occupied by Austrian troops,
so that no land attack against them was possible. But the Allies
raised new demands, such as the neutralization of the Black Sea.
and therefore continued the war.

Naval operations, which alone were possible at first, took place in
both the Baltic and the Black Sea. Though the Anglo-French at-
tacks on the Aland Islands and on Kronstadt were of no great im-
portance, their expedition against the naval port of Sebastopol on
the Crimean Peninsula developed into an enormous undertaking.
Their purpose here was the total destruction of this stronghold, in
order to deprive Russia of her Black Sea base for attack against
Constantinople.

The operation proved much more difficult than any one had antici-
pated. Thanks to their naval superiority, the Allies were able to
land their troops smoothly on the Crimean Peninsula north of
Sebastopol (30,000 French, 20,000 English, and 7,000 Turks).

2i8 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

Shortly afterwards, by their victory on the Alma (September 20,
1854), they were able to fight their way from the landing point down
to the fortress of Sebastopol. But the battle had been such a costly
one for the victors, and Sebastopol appeared to be so well fortified,
that the Allies did not dare to try to take it by storm. Instead they
began a regular siege.

The Russians made splendid use of this delay. Defensive works
of enormous strength were built. The entrance to the bay on the
southern shore of which Sebastopol lies was .blocked by sinking
ships, so that the city could not be reached by the Allied naval
guns. The siege dragged along in an extraordinarily slow manner.
The besiegers were attacked by cholera which caused fearful losses
in their ranks. The Russians were able to bring up a'relieving army
which compelled the Allies to fight battles at Balaklava and Inker-
man, which further reduced their forces. It was only their control
at sea which saved the Allied troops from a catastrophe.

From the point of view of world history it is important to note
how the contingents of the various nations performed their military
tasks. Here, for the first time, it became evident that the English
administration was not equal to the demands of a campaign against
a great European Power. In courage and bravery the English troops
were in no way inferior to their French allies; but the English gov-
ernment lacked the training and centralized administration necessary
for affording proper support and sufficient provisions. Not only did
English regiments often have to be saved by the French on the field
of battle, but the frightful winter which the Allies unexpectedly had
to spend in the Crimea deprived the British of half their troops,
owing to the deficient transportation system. So great was the
scandal that it overthrew the British ministry. More important than
these temporary consequences, however, was the fact that the Con-
tinent now saw for the first time since 1815 how weak Great Britain
was from a military point of view.

The Allies therefore gladly accepted offers of reinforcements which
were made to them from various sides. The Austrian government's
plan of uniting with them against the Russians was not carried out,
to be sure, because it was opposed by Prussia, Russia's natural ally.
But Turkey placed a new army corps at their disposal, and the King
of Sardinia, under Cavour's energetic leadership (see below, ch.
xxv ), gladly seized the opportunity to take part in the war and so
place himself in a position of equality with the other two great
states of the west. The government at Turin undertook to send
15,000 Piedmontese troops to the Crimea, on January 26, 1855.

THE CRIMEAN WAR 219

With the aid of these and other reinforcements, the Allies finally
succeeded in taking Sebastopol. To be sure, it cost a series of mur-
derous attacks; but finally, on September 9, 1855, after several
frightful reverses, the fortress was taken; that is, the Russians
evacuated the city after destroying everything.

But the Russian army itself was not destroyed; in fact, in another
theater of war, in the Caucasus, the Russians even won an important
success in taking the fortified position of Kars on November 27,
1855. But the French concluded there was nothing more to be
gained. Napoleon had secured what he wanted: his prestige was
increased and Russian pride was humiliated. In vain did the Eng-
lish government desire to continue hostilities. But as the French
had little to gain from the expedition against the Crimea from the
outset, so now Napoleon had little to expect personally through a
continuation of the war. Therefore peace negotiations were opened.
On Russia's side the decision for peace was made easier by the death
of Nicholas I on March 2, 1855. He had been the irreconcilable
enemy of the French usurper; his son and successor, Alexander II,
was not hindered by any personal motives of prestige from adopting
a conciliatory attitude.

The Peace Congress, as was natural under the circumstances, met
at Paris in February, 1856. This was the first great international
assemblage since the Congress of Vienna. It was at the same time
an official sign that the era which began in 1815 had come to an
end. In addition to the old Great Powers, including France and
Turkey, the Kingdom of Sardinia also was admitted to a seat in the
Congress, in accordance with the purpose which Cavour had had
in sending Piedmontese troops to help in the Crimean War. The
terms reached on March 30, 1856, corresponded with the demands
which the Allies had made upon Russia before the attack on Sebas-
topol. The victors put into the treaty of peace provisions desired
by Great Britain which gave Turkey guarantees against Russian
attack. The Powers undertook to respect the integrity of the
Turkish Empire; the Black Sea was neutralized, so that no state
might have naval ship-yards or war-ships on it; the navigation of
the Danube was declared free and open to all nations, and placed
under the supervision of an international commission; and the two
Rumanian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were recog-
nized as autonomous.

This last provision was carried out in such a way, thanks chiefly
to Napoleon's influence, that the Rumanians were able to unite
into a single state in 1859, in spite of Turkey's opposition. Russia

220 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

lost her monopoly of protecting Greek Orthodox Rumanians, and
her path to Constantinople was now barred by a practically inde-
pendent state. Rumania no longer stood under the influence of
Russia, but was placed under the general Concert of Europe. This
was a situation which had many analogies with the establishment of
the Greek Kingdom in 1829 (p. 42).

But it would be a mistake to regard the Crimean War merely as
a phase in the development of the Eastern Question. Such a view
would be all the more incorrect, inasmuch as the limitation placed
on Russia at the Congress of Paris remained in force only so long
as the victors in the Crimean war, especially France, possessed the
power to stand behind the execution of the terms of the treaty. So
far as the Near East was concerned, the Crimean war only resulted
in postponing Russia's advance against Constantinople for two
decades, and in creating a united Rumania. Much more important
were the general results of the war.

One of the first and most important of these general results was
the putting an end to Great Britain as a military factor in European
politics. It had been shown that her great economic development
and her political evolution, which was so happy in general, had not
been accompanied by any corresponding growth in her military
strength; in fact, that many of the peculiarities of the British con-
stitution, like the absence of bureaucracy on the French model, made
Great Britain almost unable to compete in military matters with the
Continental Powers. This did not exactly mean a real endangering
of Great Britain's safety; although her position was not so favor-
able as at the beginning of the century, since the extraordinarily great
increase of her population made it possible to starve her out by a
blockade, nevertheless the English navy and merchant marine were
still so superior to those of the other European Powers, that any
naval attack upon her was regarded as out of the question. Also,
a state with such solid economic strength as England could never
be ignored. But the fact had been proved that England was in no
position to interfere effectively in wars on the mainland. The states-
men of the continent now realized that they could carry on their
wars without having to reckon on English intervention, particularly
so long as their operations were limited to land warfare.

The Crimean War also opened an era of great wars in Europe,
after a period of nearly thirty years of peace following the Congress
of Vienna. This was less due to the fact that "the ice was broken,"
as people said, than to the fact that Russia, which was the strongest
protector of conservatism, had lost a part of her military prestige

THE CRIMEAN WAR 221

through her campaign in the Crimea. The Russian Empire could
no longer be regarded as invincible; her warnings that the old order
must be upheld lost force.

Finally, on Russia herself the Crimean War exercised a powerful
influence. In her foreign relations, wholly contrary to her natural
interests, she was forced into a hostile attitude toward a state with
which she had no fundamental grounds for conflict, namely toward
France; and, as a result, she was drawn more closely than ever to
Prussia. Henceforth, Russia had a real interest in the downfall of
the French Empire, an event which alone could enable her to regain
her former position in the Black Sea.

No less important, at least for the moment, were the changes
which took place in Russia's internal condition as a result of her
defeat in the Crimea. Formerly, Russia's absolutist military
bureaucracy had often been credited with Russia's success in foreign
policy; but now this halo had disappeared. People dared openly
to blame the all-powerful bureaucrats, or "tchinovniks," for the
unhappy outcome of the war; their corruption and follies were held
to be responsible. The cry for reforms, particularly for a control
over the bureaucracy and a lessening of the censorship of the press,
became louder and louder; moreover, the so-called intelligentsia,
composed of nobles and students with academic training and chiefly
represented in St. Petersburg, even demanded the introduction of
liberal institutions like a constitution.

The new Tsar, Alexander II, was not disinclined to yield to these
wishes. He limited the censorship, and permitted people to journey
abroad. But his most important reform was the abolition of serf-
dom.

The liberals had long demanded that the Russian people, too,
should be raised to the rank of a real nation by being given per-
sonal liberty. Hitherto, nine-tenths of the cultivable land in Russia
had belonged to the vast domains which were in the possession of
the great nobility or the state. On these domains lived 47,000,000
serfs, who were bound to the soil and forced either to serve in the
household of their lord or to cultivate his soil (though some were
also allowed to become artisans or traders in the towns). The no-
bility were naturally opposed to putting an end to these conditions
which often actually differed from slavery only in name, and in
which the person of the serf was completely at the lord's disposal.
But the Tsar remained firm, and in the famous ukase of February 19,
1 86 1, he declared serfdom totally abolished. On the crown lands the
serfs were either made tenants on a long lease, or were raised to free

222 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

peasant proprietors who were to pay for their land over a long period
of time. The other domains were divided: one part remained in
the possession of the lord, and the other was handed over to the
peasants on condition that they pay a definite sum in compensation
over a period of years. The state advanced four-fifths of the capital
necessary for these payments.

The Russian peasant thus became not only personally free, but
also an owner of land. Great stretches of land, to be sure, were
not given to individual owners, but were handed over to the village
communities, the so-called mirs; but even these were later divided
up on the basis of individual private property. The great landed
estates of the earlier period did not, however, wholly disappear.
They were not done away with until the Bolshevist Revolution, but
alongside of them there now existed free peasant village communities.

Tsar Alexander was not content with this reform only. Although
he refused to introduce popular government even in the limited form
which was customary in Prussia, he nevertheless granted the right
of local self-government within definite limits to the great and small
land owners. Thus, he broke with the system of autocratic
bureaucracy. The mirs were placed under assemblies composed of
the heads of households; above them were the district and provin-
cial assemblies, known as zemstvos, composed of delegates of the
nobility (or great landlords), of the clergy, and of the mirs; besides
administrative functions these zemstvos also participated in the crea-
tion of the lower courts of law. They formed a preliminary train-
ing school for parliamentary life.

At the same time, more freedom was introduced into the univer-
sities. They were given richer endowments and the right to elect
their own professors. The number of students increased enormously.
Many teachers even held socialistic views.

Thus, though much of the ancient regime still survived in Russia,
nevertheless, as a result of the Crimean War, the country had defi-
nitely entered upon an era of liberal reforms.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE PANIC OVER SOCIALISM AFTER THE
FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

IN the last chapter an example was given of the way in which the
February Revolution and its consequences influenced European
politics. We have seen how it smoothed Napoleon's path to the
imperial throne, and thereby opened the era of great wars which did
not come to an end until 1870. One would only half understand
these events, however, if one did not also consider the enormous in-
tellectual consequences which resulted from the French events of
1848.

It almost seems to be an historical law that most men are willing
to learn lessons only from most recent history. Only what they
themselves, or possibly their fathers, have intensely experienced,
seems to avail them as a guide for their own future. Moreover,
it continually happens that two things are regarded as inseparably
connected with one another, simply because they chanced to have
happened at the same time. To this category belong two conclu-
sions which were drawn from the events of 1848 and 1849 by large
circles of hitherto liberally-minded persons. In the first place, all
"progressively-minded" bourgeois politicians, at least in countries
which were somewhat industrialized, were given a terrible fright by
observing that the Fourth Estate had dared to take part in gov-
ernment and even to put into practice some of their doctrines, which
had hitherto been laughed at as merely theoretical, like "the right
to work." The intrusion of such socialistic elements into govern-
ment office seemed to many to be inseparably connected with the
abolition of bourgeois customs, of order, and even of civilization in
general; so political measures which gave the Fourth Estate any
rights were now regarded with the very greatest suspicion, even if
they ought to have been approved from the standpoint of liberal
theory. This panicky fear was still further increased by observing
that the February Revolution had come into existence through a com-
bination of Republicans and Socialists: whoever mentioned republic
or even democracy was now regarded as advocating anarchy and
communism. Constitutional liberalism might still be the aim of all

223

224 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

honest citizens as heretofore; but if it could not defend itself against
the destructive attack of the "reds," then indeed absolutism, or even
a military dictatorship after the style of Napoleon, ought be chosen
as the lesser evil!

It is noteworthy that this fear of the Socialist Movement, which
amounted to a horror of all liberal reforms, had by no means its
strongest effect on the class which was most directly threatened,
namely the manufacturers. At least a great part of the intellectuals
were just as strongly affected; they were afraid of a rule by the
barbarian masses of the people, and they were also often trembling
for the security of their little middle-class incomes. Like Schopen-
hauer, they might be little satisfied with the attitude of the old con-
servative system; but did not this system, even with all its bigotry,
at least guarantee the preservation of good order? Even so honest
and idealistic a statesman as the English free-trader, Cobden, be-
lieved that the regime of Napoleon III, with all its defects, was still
better than "the anarchy of Utopians, Anarchists, and Babblers,"
which Napoleon had put an end to.

A few political thinkers, indeed, had sufficiently freed themselves
from fear to draw from the example of France another, and appar-
ently directly contradictory, lesson: a republic, according to them,
was indeed dangerous; but could not some of the radical demands
be turned to conservative uses? Had not the elections under the
Second French Republic and Napoleon's plebiscites shown that a re-
public, or even parliamentary government with monarchical forms,
might be best opposed through the adoption of apparently revolu-
tionary arrangements like universal suffrage? Was not the real
"people," they asked, often less revolutionary than middle-class
idealists?

This is not the place to examine these theories, which, as is known,
were chiefly represented by Disraeli and Bismarck. Here we can
only observe that this drawing of analogous conclusions can only
claim to hold good so far as the social conditions are the same as
those in France, that is, where the majority of the population is not
composed of factory operatives or agricultural day laborers, but of
peasants living on their own property. Only in such a case is an
appeal to the interests of private property likely to find a hearing
among the masses.

In this connection, however, it should be stated that in France
itself this "realistic" conception of the intellectuals had less in-
fluence on the ruling authorities than in other countries. On the
other hand, as far as literature is concerned, the abandonment of

THE PANIC OVER SOCIALISM 225

liberal notions was particularly notable in France. The new
"realism" in literature, which differed from its predecessors
in that it aimed to criticize and make fun of the exaggerations and
ideals of romanticism, has found its classic expression in a French
work of art — in Flaubert's Madame Bovary (1857); but nowhere
else, as already stated, did there persist such a strong opposition
to this "realistic" way of thinking.

In another respect, however, it was only in France that the in-
fluence of the February Revolution reached its fullest development.
This was the change in the attitude toward religion on the part of
the bourgeoisie, who had hitherto been liberal. The capitalist
middle-class now passed through the same kind of conversion of
spirit as did the nobility after the French Revolution of 1789. They
did not, indeed, revert to the old dogmas; but they thought it neces-
sary to renounce Voltaireanism, outwardly at least, because their ex-
pectation had not been fulfilled that the masses could be held in check
by religion, even when the upper classes were not true to it. To
be sure, no true religious conversion took place; but they gave up
their opposition to having the schools placed under the Church.

This new religious attitude differs chiefly from the somewhat
analogous situation after 1815 in two respects.

One of these respects was the new alliance between the Papacy
and most of the Catholic governments, the most important exception
naturally being the Kingdom of Sardinia (see below, ch. xxv).
After the Restoration in 1815 the state had undertaken to advance
the demands of religion ; but it had had no intention of renouncing its
own political rights in regard to the Church, or of giving the Catholic
Church, as an organization, any kind of direct political influence.
The conservative governments were favorably inclined toward re-
ligion; but they remained "Gallican" (in France) and "Josephist"
(in Austria). Now the Revolution of 1848 awakened in the gov-
ernments and the bourgeoisie the conviction that this policy did not
suffice. The struggle against religious unbelief, which threatened
property rights, must be carried on more systematically, they thought ;
they ought no longer to oppose the Pope's word of command nor
the cooperation of bodies independent of the state. To the Pope
and the bishops there was given almost complete freedom from state
control. The "Ultramontane" parties, which had often grown up in
opposition to the state ecclesiastical control, were now allowed un-
checked activity. This change in France has already been men-
tioned (p. 203), but it was much the same in the other great states,
In the Prussian Constitution of 1850 the government renounced its

226 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

right of supervision and control over the Catholic clergy, and even
handed over religious instruction in the primary schools to them. The
Austrian government went somewhat further in the Concordat of 1855,
which completed the measures begun in 1850 for putting an end to
"Josephism" (the subjection of the Catholic Church in the country
to state control). The Placet was abolished, and instead the clergy
was given the right to supervise the schools and the censorship of
books.

Pope Pius IX on his side showed his gratitude by pronouncing
liberal revolutionary theories to be erroneous and forbidden by the
Church. This attitude found its classic expression in the "Syllabus
of Modern Errors" which the Pope issued with his Encyclical of
December 8, 1864. This declared emphatically that society must be
built up again on the basis of legitimate order, now that Catholic
civilization had been weakened (note the sequence) by Lutheranism,
Jansenism, Voltaireanism, and Socialism. The "Syllabus" therefore
declared erroneous not only numerous liberal principles which related
directly to church matters like the right to freedom of worship, but
also many of the fundamental demands of liberalism in general.

Of still greater practical importance was the establishment of an
unlimited supreme power within the Catholic Church which took
place a little later. It had always been a matter of dispute whether
definitions of dogma could be made by the Pope alone, or whether
they had to be confirmed by the sanction of the Church, represented
in ecclesiastical assemblies or councils. This was also a dispute
between the authority of the national churches and that of the Pope:
since the bishops, who formed the overwhelming majority at
councils, were inevitably more or less dependent upon the state gov-
ernments, the exclusion of councils from control was equivalent to
putting an end to what was left of the influence exercised by gov-
ernments upon the central authority of the Catholic Church.

In this dispute the Pope won a complete victory. On December
8, 1854, he promulgated the dogma of the Immaculate Conception
of the Virgin Mary, without being authorized thereto by a council.
Having thus tested his authority, he issued in 1868 a call to a
Vatican Council at which was to be officially confirmed the new
dogma of "Papal Infallibility," that is, the doctrine that the Pope
alone, without the approval of the Church, possesses in the defini-
tion of matters of faith the same infallibility which Christ gave to
the Church. The council met on December 8, 1869. It was char-
acteristic that, in contrast to former times, no temporal ruler was
represented at it. From the beginning the Holy Father had at his

THE PANIC OVER SOCIALISM 227

disposal a majority of the votes, thanks to the presence of a great
number of Italian bishops and of bishops in partibus infidelium; the
opposition, composed chiefly of German, Austrian, and French
bishops, had altogether scarcely a seventh of the votes. The deci-
sive Constitutio de Ecclesia was voted on July 18, 1870, before the
occupation of Rome by Italian troops compelled the Pope to adjourn
the council indefinitely on October 20; this suspension of the as-
sembly is still officially in force.

Thus the Catholic Church, also, as a bulwark against the inter-
national socialist movement, had been able to strengthen itself as
an international organization superior to national governments; it
offered itself as an ally, indeed, to the conservative states, but it
was more independent of conservative governments than had hitherto
been the case.

CHAPTER XXIV
THE WAR OF SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES

NOTHING, perhaps, shows so clearly the change in public opinion
mentioned in the last chapter as the attitude assumed by the gov-
erning classes in Europe toward the war over slavery in North
America. If ever humanity made a demand which was endorsed not
only by all Liberals, but also by a great part of the Conservatives,
it was the demand for the abolition of slavery, at least in countries
occupied by whites. Governments which in other matters yielded to
revolutionary desires very unwillingly, in this question were willing
to make concessions. Not even the fact that the abolition of the
slave trade and of slavery involved considerable sacrifices prevented
England, for example, from completely emancipating the slaves on
the sugar plantations in the British West Indies in 1834. Every-
where it was regarded as a disgrace that slavery was still tolerated
in the United States of America, — the only great country in the
world occupied by whites, with the exception of large parts of
Brazil, where slavery still existed.

One would have supposed, accordingly, that when the war against
slavery broke out in America, it would have been greeted with joy
by public opinion in Europe, and especially in the two countries
which had taken the lead in suppressing slavery, namely in Great
Britain and France. It is astonishing that this was not the case,
and yet one can understand the reason. All those groups which
had been driven by the revolutions of 1848 into a panicky anxiety
about a republican form of government, took the side of the slave-
holders. They almost had the effect, by their attitude, of prolonging
the continuance of slavery in the United States.

From the time of the first settlements in America climatic con-
ditions had brought it about that the southern colonies had an alto-
gether different economic structure from those in the North. The
South was the region where tobacco, rice, and cotton were cultivated
on a large scale; it was the region where the planters used negro
labor exclusively. With the exception of certain outlying districts,
not only was slave labor prevalent, but the plantations were wide
in extent. There was lacking any considerable group of towns-

WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 229

people or peasants; in fact with a few exceptions, there were no
large cities in the South. Small proprietors were extraordinarily
few in number. The mass of the population as early as the
eighteenth century in the most southern colonies, was largely made
up of negro slaves, the slaves greatly outnumbering the whites.
Above the slaves stood an aristocracy of plantation owners, who
possessed wide estates, which they had cultivated by the blacks.

Even at that time, cultivation of wide estates had many advan-
tages, which were all the greater as the plantations were extended.
At the close of the eighteenth century this extension of large planta-
tions at the expense of smaller ones increased in an unexpected
fashion. After the mechanical inventions in England had developed
enormously the means of using cotton, an American, Eli Whitney,
invented in 1 793 the so-called cotton gin, a machine which facilitated
the separation of the seeds from the cotton wool. Slavery, which
was beginning to decline, now acquired an altogether new impor-
tance. Cotton production increased very rapidly: in 1791, before
the invention of the cotton gin, it amounted to two million pounds;
in 1 80 1, to forty million; and in 1826 to more than three hundred
and thirty million pounds. New land was continually being brought
under cultivation. Since the overseas slave traffic had been stopped
through England's efforts, there arose in parts of the southern states,
where the cultivation of cotton was not profitable on account of
climatic conditions, as in Virginia, an interest in slavery, because it
was possible to breed slaves there who could always be easily sold
in the Cotton States. All efforts for the emancipation of the slaves
were now hopeless, although before this there had been a strong
movement for the abolition of slavery even in some of the slave
states like Virginia.

The more slavery was extended in the south, the more firmly it
became established and the more evident became the contrast be-
tween the slave states and the free states in the North. In the
northern states, where the cultivation of cotton was impossible,
slavery was formally abolished at the beginning of the century
under the influence of the new humanitarian movement; the
descendants of slaves were given a position of legal equality. The
districts of the North and the South differed sharply in their eco-
nomic interests. This need not necessarily have led to an economic
conflict. In fact, the cotton industry in New England, just begin-
ning in a modest way, derived a direct advantage from cotton grow-
ing in the South. Still, economic differences did exist. The most
important of these related to the tariff question: the infant indus-

230 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

tries in the North wanted protective tariffs; but the South, interested
in the free export of its raw products, and still more in the free
importation of foreign manufactures, was naturally inclined toward
free trade. But these differences never centered on the question
whether slavery should be totally abolished; they merely had the
result of making the South anxious that control in the Union should
not fall into the hands of the protectionist North ; the North, on the
other hand, strove to secure control over Congress. Owing to the
Constitution of the United States this conflict was now sharpened
by the question of the admission of new states. The free states
were more thickly settled than those in the South and they also had
a larger representation in the House of Representatives; for in the
apportionment of representatives three whites were counted as equal
to five blacks. The only way in which the South could prevent itself
from being outvoted by the North was by its influence in the Senate
where each state was represented by two senators without regard to
the population of the state.

Since some northern senators who were indifferent in regard to
slavery usually associated themselves with the senators from the
South who were unanimously in favor of slavery, the South usually
had a majority in the Senate. Thanks to this majority it was able
to bring it about for a long time that it suffered no disadvantage
in the proportion between the slave and free states. In 1820, the
Southerners even succeeded in passing the Missouri Compromise,
which forbade slavery north of the line 36° 30', but admitted the
territory of Missouri to the Union as a slave state although it lay
north of this line.

This victory was all the more important for the South, quite aside
from the political considerations just mentioned, in view of the fact
that cotton growing demanded ever wider and wider territory. Cul-
tivation by slave labor in the South was exceedingly exhausting to
the soil, and fresh land was therefore continually necessary. The
desire for new soil was so great that it even led to the only war of
conquest which the Union fought before it was completely settled.
The northern part of Mexico, known as Texas, had been filling up
since the beginning of the nineteenth century with immigrants from
the United States, who were naturally chiefly from the South. In
1836 these Americans made use of internal troubles in Mexico
to separate from it and declare Texas an independent republic. This
independence, however, was merely a first step toward annexation
by the United States. This again sharpened the conflict in regard
to slavery, which meanwhile had been increasing: the northern states

WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 231

feared that the slave states would be strengthened. Finally, in 1845,
when the Democratic presidential candidate had been elected, after
expressly stating that he favored the annexation of Texas, Texas
was adopted into the Union as one of the states. But Mexico de-
clared that she had never recognized the independence of Texas and
that she regarded its annexation by the United States as an infringe-
ment of her territory. She therefore broke off diplomatic relations
with her larger neighbor to the north. Soon afterwards, in 1846,
an incident led to a formal declaration of war on the part of the
United States.

In view of the anarchy in Mexico, the outcome of the war was
a foregone conclusion. Although the Americans had to improvise
an army and commissariat in great part, and although they could
scarcely have been able to meet an army organized in the European
fashion, still their forces were infinitely superior to those of Mexico.
Furthermore, on this occasion also, they were able to use their navy,
and at once took possession of the important California territory.
On land, Mexico was attacked both from the north and from the
Gulf of Mexico; the main American army, under General Winfield
Scott, advanced from Vera Cruz to the Mexican capital and seized
it on September 14, 1847. The Mexican republic had to yield. On
February 2, 1848, it signed the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo, by
which it not only gave up Texas but also Northern California and
New Mexico.

In this way the United States acquired definitely not only Texas,
but also a firm foothold on the Pacific Ocean, since the Bay of San
Francisco was included in Northern California. This was all the
more important inasmuch as a little while before this, in 1846, they
had secured by a treaty with Great Britain the southern part of the
Oregon territory, which had hitherto been disputed between Great
Britain and the United States. The United States now stretched
in a broad belt from east to west, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
By a lucky chance, it also happened that as soon as California fell
from the hands of the indolent Mexicans into those of the Americans,
rich deposits of gold were discovered there on January 24, 1848, at
the Sacramento River. This discovery at once resulted in a sur-
prisingly quick development of this region.

While the South had apparently scored a success by the annexa-
tion of Texas, the real situation was changing more and more to her
disadvantage. It was of relatively small importance that California,
contrary to expectations, was not adapted to slave cultivation. The
discovery of gold had drawn a laboring population from all terri-

232 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

tories into the region, and this population naturally wanted to be
protected from the competition of slave labor; they at once drew up
in 1849 a draft constitution forbidding slavery. On the other hand,
it was of decisive importance that there was beginning to spread a
new and purely humanitarian agitation which was independent ot
the economic and political conflict between the North and the South,
and which was to put an end not only to the political power of the
South, but to the institution of slavery altogether.

About twenty years before this time there had arisen an apostle
in favor of the emancipation of the slaves, who can best be com-
pared with the old Puritan leaders. He was one of those per-
sonalities who perhaps embodied more clearly than any other that
change from religious to humanitarian motives which took place in the
nineteenth century. It was no mere chance that his birth, in 1805,
took place in the very center of American Puritanism, the State of
Massachusetts. This man was William Lloyd Garrison. Garrison, a
self-educated man, differed from other enthusiasts for freedom of that
time, whose ideas he shared in general, by the fact that he combined
with an enthusiastic desire to aid the Greeks a propaganda in favor
of social and ethical reforms which at that time had relatively few
advocates. From his youth, for instance, he had abstained from
alcohol, and he founded the first prohibition newspaper in the United
States. He was won over to the cause of emancipation of the slaves
by a Quaker, one of the sect that had long opposed slavery. With
this man he published an Abolitionist weekly in Baltimore. Quite
characteristically he at once began to advocate a radical solution of
the slavery question. His Quaker friend wanted to bring about
emancipation step by step, and thought of settling negroes outside
the United States. But Garrison demanded that the negroes should
be given immediately all the rights of free citizens. Slavery, he
said, was a sin in itself and with sin no compromise ought to be
made.

It is a sign of his courage that he began his activities in Balti-
more, Maryland, one of the main markets for the traffic in slaves.
In various ways he was made to suffer for his attacks on the slave-
holders. Soon he had to transfer his agitation to Boston, and there
he founded, in 1831, a newspaper known as the Liberator. Its
motto was, "Our country is the world — our countrymen are man-
kind," and its exclusive aim was the abolition of slavery. In the
following year, he founded at Boston The New England Anti-Slavery
Society, which in 1833 was enlarged into The American Anti-Slavery
Society.

WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 233

At first his agitation gathered only a small minority of the popu-
lation in the Puritan New England states. Opposed to him were
nearly all the business people and manufacturers; many good Ameri-
can patriots, who feared that a dissolution of the Union might result
from emphasizing the slavery question; and also many peaceful
Abolitionists who did not approve of Garrison's reckless policy and
radical proposals. But the uncompromising teacher was not fright-
ened by this nor by the attacks of mobs which once even set fire to
the Abolitionist meeting-place in Philadelphia in 1838 and also to
an orphan asylum for negro children. In spite of all the opposition,
his movement made great progress. Leading politicians at first were
scarcely moved by it, but aside from them the number of his ad-
herents steadily increased. This was shown by the mass of petitions
which were presented to Congress asking at least for the abolition
of slavery in the District of Columbia, which meant in Washington.
In 1836 the House of Representatives, by the so-called "gag rule,"
voted not to discuss such petitions at all any more. How far indi-
vidual Abolitionists were ready to go is best illustrated by the fact
that some of them from Massachusetts and Ohio even demanded the
dissolution of the Union. By 1840 the Anti-Slavery Society is sup-
posed to have numbered between 150,000 and 200,000 members.

On ground thus prepared there now arose the struggle over the
question of how slavery was to be treated in the districts acquired
from Mexico. Once more political leaders succeeded in avoiding an
open conflict by adopting a compromise. By the "Compromise of
1850" it was agreed that California should be admitted to the Union
as a free state, but that in the other territories in question the popu-
lation itself should be allowed to decide in regard to slavery. In
the city of Washington the slave trade was abolished, though not
slavery itself. On the other hand, a concession was made to the
South which soon proved a very dangerous gift. This was the sharp-
ening of the Fugitive Slave Law: federal officials were now bound
to pursue slaves who fled into states where slavery was forbidden;
in identifying the fugitives a summary procedure was adopted which
gave no adequate protection against arbitrary arrest. People in the
North who had hitherto been able to ignore slavery now had their
attention called to the fact that they were living in a slave-holding
community. The Abolitionists often opposed the execution of the
law by force. How greatly this Fugitive Slave Law aroused public
opinion in the northern states is evident from the fact that it gave
the impulse to the writing of the most powerful book against slavery
in America: Uncle Tom's Cabin, by Harriet Beecher Stowe, which

234 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

appeared in 1852, owes its origin directly to the story of the saving
of a fugitive slave.

Tension was drawn tighter by the so-called Dred Scott case.
Owing to the peculiarities of the Constitution of the United States
it had happened that the Supreme Court had never decided the
question whether the Missouri Compromise, excluding slavery from
definite territories by an Act of Congress, was constitutional or not.
A case now arose of a Missouri slave, named Dred Scott, who had
been taken into free territory and afterwards sold to a citizen of a
slave-holding state. The negro thereupon appealed to a federal court
and maintained that he had become a free citizen by reason of his
residence in a free state. But the Supreme Court finally rejected his
appeal on the ground that a slave cannot be a citizen of the United
States. The Court went further and expressed the opinion in 1857
that Congress had not even the right to forbid slavery in the terri-
tories at all, for slaves were to be regarded as property, the protection
of which was imposed on Congress by the Constitution. Thus, at a
stroke, all that had been won by the anti-slavery movement seemed
jeopardized. No further progress could be made except by an
amendment of the Constitution to which the southern states would
never voluntarily agree.

Gradually, therefore, the view gained ground more and more that
it was unavoidably necessary to use force to compel the South to
give up at least its efforts for extending slavery further. The exist-
ing political parties, to be sure, used all their power to prevent such
a solution. They wanted neither a breach in the Union nor a dis-
solution of the existing political organizations, which were by no
means divided along the lines of North and South. But acts of vio-
lence committed by Southerners to influence voting in their favor
in the new territories in the West — acts of violence which in some
places amounted to civil war — roused feeling everywhere to such an
extent, especially in the North, that the old party dictation lost its
power. In place of the Whigs, who wanted to smooth over the
slavery question by political compromises, there arose in the North
a new political party, the Republicans, who took an uncompromising
attitude at least on the question of slavery in the territories. At
first the Republicans were in a minority in the Union, but this was
due to the fact that they could not win at once all the states in the
North. The majority of the northern states, however, soon became
Republican, and thenceforth it was merely a question of time when
the control of the Union would be transferred to the hands of the
anti-slavery party, for the representatives of the free states had a

WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 235

majority both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate,
and as soon as the Republicans got control of both these bodies the
slaveholding party would be outvoted.

This was what soon threatened to happen. In the presidential
election of 1860, the Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln, won
all the free states with the exception of New Jersey, and received
therefore a majority of the electoral votes. Thus the President,
though not the majority in Congress, became Republican. The
Southerners now believed that they ought not to delay longer. There
was no place for them any longer within the Union. If they wanted
to protect slavery from abolition the only way to do so seemed to
be to found a new republic of their own. On December 20, 1860,
a convention called for this purpose in South Carolina was the first
to pronounce in favor of secession from the Union. Her example
was quickly followed by six other southern states. In February,
1 86 1, the seceding states formed a new political body, the Confed-
erate States of America. Its constitution in general was modeled
after that of the Constitution of the United States, but slavery was
expressly protected against interference by the central government
and the introduction of protective tariffs was forbidden.

Secession, as such, was still not a cause for war. The question
of whether the states of the Union did not have the right to leave,
just as freely as to join, the Union had never been decided. Aside
from this disputed but unsettled constitutional question, it was con-
trary to all American traditions to use force as a means of compul-
sion against an obstinate community. President Lincoln expressly
declared that the Union would not assail the South, but war broke
out nevertheless, because the Confederates seized by force a federal
fort claimed by the North. So it was the South which opened mili-
tary operations, April 12, 1861. The North, also, now believed that
they must delay no longer, and on April 15 the President issued his
call for seventy-five thousand state militia for the suppression of
rebellion. This act united the whole South; of the eight southern
states which had hitherto not joined in secession, four (Virginia, in
part) left the Union and joined the Confederacy. The capital of
the Confederacy was soon fixed at Richmond, Va. The president
was Jefferson Davis, former senator from Mississippi.

To understand the course of the war and the importance of a pos-
sible intervention from Europe it is necessary to make clear the
character of the forces on each side.

In latent power, the northern states were greatly superior to those
of the South, and it was therefore a mathematical certainty that the

236 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

North would win, unless they ended the war prematurely because of
some unfortunate defeats, or unless they were deprived of their
natural superiority by the interference of foreign powers. The North
had a much greater reserve in man-power, for the number of in-
habitants in the northern states was altogether much greater than
in the South (twenty- two million in the North as against nine million
in the South). Furthermore, the great mass of negroes in the South
could not be exactly regarded as proper material out of which to
make soldiers. Then, also, the North possessed a superiority in the
matter of machinery which amounted almost to a monopoly. In the
South every effort had been directed toward the production of raw
materials ; commerce and industry had been left wholly undeveloped ;
even the cotton was practically not manufactured at all. If grain
and meat had to be imported into the South from the North before
the war, one can imagine how it was in the case of manufactured
goods. The most important consequence of this was the fact that
the control of the sea from the outset belonged to the North. The
North possessed both the ships and also the means for building a
navy, and was, therefore, in a position from the beginning to blockade
the southern ports and prevent the profitable exportation of cotton
as well as the importation of European military supplies. At the
start, to be sure, some of the forts and arsenals in the southern
states, which had belonged to the Union, passed into the hands of
the Confederacy; this provided arms at first, but later these could
only be replaced with difficulty, because the South had no steel
industries.

Over against these disadvantages, however, the South had certain
advantages which at least enabled it to delay the triumph of the
North. Though the armies and steamers of the North were able to
advance more rapidly along railways and rivers owing to their
better technical equipment, the Confederates, on the other hand,
controlled a solid, well-rounded territory and had the "inner line";
their armies did not have to march such long distances, nor to
operate often in thinly-settled areas, as did the Northern armies.
Though the North could depend on much larger reserves of men,
the South had a much larger number of specially trained military
officers. Not only had the military academy at West Point usually
been more largely attended by Southerners, but the control over
slaves had, perhaps, afforded an excellent training school for military
command. The South was also especially favored by the chance that
its armies were placed under the command of General Robert E.
Lee, perhaps the ablest military leader in the nineteenth century,

WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 237

since the time of Napoleon. With chivalrous qualities and per-
sonally no friend to slavery Lee, however, was scarcely a typical
representative of the Southern planters. He did not come from the
more pronounced plantation region, like the cotton states of South
Carolina or Georgia, but from Virginia, where a true aristocratic
civilization had always been able to boast many more representa-
tives than the regular Southern states.

Thanks to these advantages, the South was actually able to de-
fend its lost cause for a long time; so long, in fact, that there arose
for the North the question of a premature abandonment of the war,
and for Europe the question of intervention. If people in the North
had generally hoped to overcome the South quickly, they were soon
disillusioned in the first years of the struggle. The North intended
to attack the southern states from three directions. The main
theater of war was to be northern Virginia; here a crushing advance
was to be made upon the enemy's capital at Richmond. The second
offensive was to be carried out along the Mississippi from the north
toward the south; if this succeeded the Confederates could not only
be driven back from the north and the west, but their whole terri-
tory lying west of the Mississippi would be cut off from their main
body. The third line of attack by the North was to be by way of
the sea and aimed mainly at blockading the Southern ports against
Europe. The first year of the war (1861) resulted unsuccessfully
for the northern armies, both in Virginia and on the Mississippi.
The defeat which the Union troops met at Bull Run in Virginia on
July 21, 1 86 1, was particularly disheartening. On the other hand,
the navy gave a good account of itself from the outset; it captured
two of the most important forts on the coasts of North and South
Carolina.

Everything now depended on the attitude which Europe would
assume toward the war. It had become apparent that the North, in
spite of all its energy, and its enormous superiority in supplies, could
not win the war until it had spent a long time in organizing a mili-
tary system; and meanwhile it was possible for foreign countries to
intervene effectively. This was what the southern states undoubt-
edly counted upon. Two motives for this were brought forward,
one financial and the other political. The financial or economic
motive lay in the fact that European factories, particularly in the two
countries which might have become allies of the Confederacy, namely
England and France, could not get along without Southern cotton.
The political motive lay in the fact that all the capitalists of Europe,
and also the opponents of democracy who were so numerous after

238 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

1848, had a feeling of common interest with the Southerners; they
wanted nothing better than the downfall of the Union and the crea-
tion of a free-trade slaveholding state.

These considerations were not so far from the point; but in the
end it fell out otherwise. The Confederates had not realized that a
deep odium attached to slavery after all, and that however much
their European sympathizers might close their eyes to the horrors
of the plantation system in America, an open support of the slave
states could only be undertaken with the approval of a solid public
opinion. This did not exist in England. Aside from the fact that
humanitarian arguments had not lost all their force, the British
workingmen felt that their interests were no less bound up with the
much-abused northern states than were those of the manufacturers
with the slaveholders; so the English workingmen were opposed to
any declaration in favor of the South. In vain did the friends of
the Confederacy try all methods of persuasion to convince the work-
ingmen of Lancashire, the center of the English textile industry, that
the workingmen would be no less injured than their employers if the
factories should have to be closed for lack of American cotton. The
suffering workingmen would not allow any decision in favor of
slavery to be wrung from them. As a result, the English Liberal
Government, and consequently the French also, were hindered from
any regular intervention in favor of the South.

But though no regular intervention took place, the attitude which
the European states took toward the North was neither one of
friendliness nor of strict neutrality. This showed itself in two re-
spects which had an influence for a long time. The first was the
systematic manipulation of public opinion in a way unfavorable to
the cause of the North. An effort was made to stamp out the idea
that the great American democracy had gone to war from idealistic
motives. Economic differences were given as the cause of the con-
flict: the war was represented as originating from the jealousy of
the plebeian masses in the North toward the aristocratic civilization
of the South. This conception prevailed for a long time, although it
was wholly contrary to the facts. Commercial and political differ-
ences did exist between the North and the South, particularly in the
matter of the protective tarift, as has been mentioned, but certainly
no one in the North would have ever gone to war because of these
differences, especially as they were usually decided in favor of the
North. Moreover the whole movement for emancipation in America
had not come mainly from people who could be regarded as economic

WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 239

rivals of the plantation owners; on the contrary, the politicians and
manufacturers of the North had tried, up to the last moment, to
prevent the outbreak of open war. Industry and capital in the North
enjoyed a great advantage from the one-sided production of the
South ; they had a splendid market for their raw materials and manu-
factures and they could buy their cotton at a lower price than would
ever have been possible if slavery had not existed. If they had been
really moved by economic motives, the northern states, ought, on the
contrary, to have championed the maintenance of slavery. In reality
it was indignation at the disregard of the rights of man and at the
all too frequent acts of cruelty which was the determining factor with
the North. Any one who reads the correspondence of intellectual
American leaders in those years, especially those from the New Eng-
land states, will always discover how deep was the feeling of shame
at this disgrace, unworthy of a free country, which gnawed at the
heart of humane individuals in the North. In general, the attitude
of the South also is not to be wholly explained on economic
grounds. Proud Southerners who were not attached to slavery by
any strong economic interests were often embittered by the numerous
exaggerations and the unjust generalizations of which the Abolitionist
agitators were guilty, and also by the Abolitionist habit of always at-
tributing to the worst motives various regulations which the South
regarded as indispensable disciplinary measures.

To the defenders of privilege in Europe, America had always been
a thorn in the flesh. Even at the time of the Congress of Vienna,
at an evening gathering at the house of the Austrian reactionary
writer, Gentz, horror had been expressed when an eye-witness told
of conditions in the United States — "of a free state whose develop-
ment affords the unbelievable, indeed frightful, example of a common
citizen exercising as much power and influence as we here in Europe
are accustomed to associate only with nobility and kings." And
now one was expected to admit that these Republicans would shed
their blood in an idealistic humanitarian cause!

A living contradiction to these notions was furnished by the Presi-
dent of the United States who held its fate in his hands during the
war and who embodied the typical qualities of the North as did Lee
those of the South. Abraham Lincoln, whose election to the presi-
dency had decided the South to secede, was born in the wilds of
Kentucky of "poor whites," as white persons who had no slaves
were called in the South. He grew up in needy circumstances in Illi-
nois, whither his father had moved. He was a regular self-made and

240 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

self-educated man; he had tried all sorts of trades before he settled
down as a lawyer, which he did primarily in order to devote himself
to politics. He was a man of altogether extraordinary gifts, possessed
an unerringly sound understanding of men, and was honesty itself.
In the case of no other statesman, perhaps, is personality reflected
so directly and so sympathetically in public speeches as in the case of
Lincoln. These masterpieces of good, popular eloquence show not
only a man who is self-reliant, sympathetic, and full of humor, but
one who is an honest thinker throughout. No sophistical phrases,
no attempts to win a cheap triumph by irrelevancies, mar these utter-
ances, in which modern eloquence has perhaps reached its highest
level. Lincoln's combination of popular sympathetic feeling with his
clear recognition of essentials, without allowing himself to be con-
fused by the details of a bookish education, constitute the greatness
of the man ; in a certain degree they formed the very basis on which
the persistence of the North rested in spite of defeats. Great will-
power and tenderness of feeling were blended harmoniously together
in Lincoln.

Along with this manipulation of public opinion, Europe attempted
also to give direct assistance to the Southern states. It has been
pointed out that the military inferiority of the South rested chiefly
on the weakness of the Confederacy on the sea. It was just here
that the English government now permitted aid to be given by its
own subjects. It permitted privateers to be built and armed in
England for the benefit of the Confederate States. These privateers
did great damage to the shipping of the North and rendered partly
ineffective the blockade of the Southern ports. From a legal point
of view this action was all the more objectionable since Great Britain
did not venture to recognize the Confederacy as an independent state,
although the question was once discussed in the House of Commons ;
moreover she was supporting a party which, from the point of view
of the North, must be regarded as one of rebellion. The case of
France was somewhat different. Napoleon III, in fact, held back
somewhat more than England. Nevertheless, he took advantage of
the division in the Union to disregard the Monroe Doctrine, and
landed French troops in Mexico where an empire under Archduke
Maximilian was set up. The French Emperor expressly declared
that he wanted to prevent an extension of the influence of the Union
over America.

But all these measures did not suffice to turn the outcome of the
war in favor of the South. The superiority of the North was much
too great to be seriously threatened by a few blockade runners.,

WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 241

Thanks to capable leadership, the South was able to prolong the
war, but it could not win it. So the fate of secession was sealed
slowly but surely.

As to the main outline of the course of the war: in the original
theater of operations along the Potomac in the east, between the two
capitals of Washington and Richmond, the Union troops could make
no progress against Lee, although the Confederate army, in view of
its numerical weakness, could likewise undertake no decisive advance
to occupy territory in the North. At sea the struggle was quickly
decided in favor of the North. Thus the real fighting was concen-
trated in the Mississippi valley. Here the Northern states had all
the advantage, owing to their better naval equipment, the Union
having more than seventy-five armored vessels. Excellent new in-
ventions, like the Monitor, which were afterwards imitated in the
armor-turreted ships of Europe, quickly made the North superior
to the Southern forces. Union troops attacked the Southern posi-
tions on the Mississippi from two directions. From the north, Gen-
eral Grant advanced, conquering Kentucky and Tennessee, and then
moving down the river in 1862 as far as Fort Vicksburg. At the
same time, the mouth of the Mississippi, with New Orleans, was
taken from the water side. Admiral Farragut compelled the city to
capitulate on April 25, and then pushed up the river to Port Hudson,
two hundred miles south of Vicksburg. The Southern states to the
west of the Mississippi were therefore cut off from the rest of the
Confederacy, except for the relatively small strip between the two
forts.

On the other hand, in the East, in spite of many bloody battles,
the situation remained essentially unchanged. It became clear that
the war, however good the prospects for the North might be, was
still likely to last a long time. In view of this, President Lincoln
undertook to induce the Southern states to give up the war by weak-
ening their morale. On September 22, 1862, he issued a proclama-
tion stating that all the slaves in the South would be declared free
in seceding states which did not return to their allegiance by Janu-
ary, 1863.

This ultimatum, however, had no direct success, though it was
of the greatest importance later on; since the Union in accord-
ance with it declared all slaves free on January i, 1863, and since
the war ended with the defeat of the Confederacy, it was impossible
to repudiate this act; for the moment, the proclamation also was of
importance in the Union's relationship with foreign countries. It
had now been officially stated that the war really meant securing

242 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

emancipation for the slaves, although its outbreak, strictly speaking,
had not had anything to do with the slavery question; the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation made it clear that the Northern states had really
taken arms to give freedom to the Southern blacks.

The year 1863 passed in much the same way as the preceding
year. Again the operations in the eastern theater of war remained
indecisive. Lee, who had pressed forward in a bold advance far
toward the North and threatened Philadelphia, was checked at
Gettysburg and forced to a retreat which was carried out in splendid
fashion. But the armies of the North were able to maintain them-
selves on the defensive, and during the winter took about the same
positions as the year before. On the Mississippi, on the other hand,
the North was able to extend its successes. After two months' siege,
Vicksburg, on the east bank of the Mississippi, finally fell into
General Grant's hands. With this fort the Confederates lost also
their best army in the west under General Pemberton; it had been
shut into Vicksburg by Grant and fell into his power on July 5,
1863. Immediately afterwards, on July 8, Port Hudson surrendered;
this had checked the advance of Northern troops from New Orleans,
but now Union troops controlled the whole Mississippi. The Con-
federacy had lost Texas, Arkansas, and the greater part of Louisiana ;
these territories were now outside the field of military operations;
henceforth, there was nothing but a guerilla warfare in the region
west of the Mississippi River.

Union forces were now able to attack the main army of the South
under Lee, not only from the north but also from the west and even
from the south. The year 1864 was taken up with the execution
of this grandly conceived plan. Grant, who had been appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Northern armies after his successes on
the Mississippi, reserved for himself the direct attack upon Lee.
His subordinate, Sherman, who commanded the army of the south-
west, or Tennessee army, was given the task of invading the Con-
federacy, marching from the Mississippi into the Confederate States
and attacking the enemy from behind. Sherman in a bold march
carried out his orders exactly as they had been given to him. While
in the North Grant was held in check by the superior strategy of
Lee and was able to make no progress in spite of bloody battles
and of a two-to-one superiority in numbers, Sherman on the other
hand, invaded Georgia on September 2, 1864, captured Atlanta, the
largest arsenal of the Confederates, and then pressed forward in a
southeasterly direction to the Atlantic Ocean, without concerning
himself about the Confederate army of the west. After a short siege,

WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 243

Sherman captured and occupied Savannah on December 20. This
meant that the greater part of the Southern states was lost to the
Confederacy. Lee was narrowed down to a small area and could
be attacked by Union forces from the north as well as from the
south. At the same time, the last armored ships of the Confed-
erates were destroyed, so that all hope of aid from overseas disap-
peared.

Nevertheless, the South was still unwilling to give in. It counted
on the war-weariness of the North. For in the North, also, the
extraordinarily bloody battles had demanded great sacrifices. It
was not only in the South that the last man had been summoned
for service, so that at the close ot the war every man between the
ages of seventeen and fifty was liable to service; the decision had
even been taken, though it was not carried out, of enrolling negroes
as soldiers; the North had also had to resort to conscription in
1863, and this measure had led to draft riots in several places. The
war debts of the North no less than in the South had risen to enor-
mous figures. In their convention in 1864, the Northern Democrats
declared that after four years of fruitless war an end ought to be
put to hostilities.

But the people of the Union would not give ear to such "de-
featist" sentiments. In November, 1864, after Lincoln had been
nominated for the presidency, he was elected by the voters in twenty-
two out of twenty-five states, although he had expressly stated that
he was in favor of continuing the war to a victorious end. The war
accordingly was continued and soon led, as was to be expected, to the
defeat of the South.

To be sure, Lee's strategic genius succeeded in postponing the
downfall for some months. Attacked at the same time by Grant
and by Sherman, he succeeded in escaping toward the west. But his
fate was sealed. The North cut off all the railways from him so
that, without being exactly defeated, he had to surrender on April 9,
1865. Shortly afterwards, Johnston, commanding the Confederate
army of the west, also surrendered. The conditions were very lib-
eral, considering that secession was regarded as rebellion. No pri-
vate property was confiscated, the officers and men of the Southern
states were released on their word of honor ; the president and vice-
president of the Confederacy, as well as some of the officials, were,
to be sure, imprisoned, but they were later released without a single
one of them being legally condemned. Even Lee, who had been
greeted at his surrender in chivalrous fashion by Grant, was left
wholly unmolested.

244 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

The results of the war may be chiefly considered from three points
of view. First as to the economic consequences.

As a result of the proclamation of September, 1862, slavery was
abolished in all the warring states of the South, without any com-
pensation for the owners. The same thing happened in most of the
other states, and finally Congress, by an amendment to the consti-
tution on January 31, 1865, provided that slavery was abolished
throughout the territory of the Union. The Southern planters had
already suffered extraordinarily as a result of the operations of war.
The fighting had been carried on almost exclusively in their terri-
tory; wide areas had been systematically laid waste; their exports
were cut off; and their war currency and war bonds were worthless.
Now, in addition, the plantation owners lost their human labor mate-
rial, and received no compensation. Many negroes made use of
their new freedom merely to roam around in laziness. A change for
the better seemed all the more impossible, as many landowners did not
have enough cash to pay negroes regularly.

But it soon became evident that the advantages coming from rich
harvests were not wholly impossible simply because of difficulties
due to lack of capital. Where people could not pay negroes in cash,
they gave them a parcel of land in return for a part of the raw
produce, and though the production of cotton declined in the first
years after the war, nevertheless, by 1870, it had again reached the
production of 1860, and since then has exceeded it. It was also now
possible for whites to maintain themselves as workingmen by the
side of the blacks in the South. Production was less one-sided.
Industries and mining grew up along with agriculture. The eco-
nomic catastrophe which it was predicted would follow the emanci-
pation of the slaves did not take place, although emancipation was
accomplished under the most unfavorable circumstances imaginable.

Much more complicated and more permanent in its consequences
was the question as to what was to be the relation between the
whites and the negroes who had been given legal equality. In the
regular Southern states the negroes were in a large majority, and if
the principle of equality before the law was strictly adhered to, this
meant that the government would fall into the hands of a mass of
negroes who had just emerged from slavery and were in no way
trained for the exercise of political rights. The southern whites
attempted to prevent this from happening by special laws. They
decided, for instance, that negroes should not be allowed to buy or
lease land, that every negro must be in service to a white, that
colored vagabonds should be set to forced labor, and so forth. These

WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 245

provisions, in addition to the excited feeling which naturally pre-
vailed in the North immediately after the war, caused bad blood and
Congress determined to interfere. The situation was extraordinarily
intensified by the unfortunate circumstance that President Lincoln,
when the war was scarcely over, was assassinated on April 14, 1865.
Lincoln would have possessed the. authority to convince the North
that certain concessions must be made to the South, but his suc-
cessor, the Vice-President, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, who had
been nominated as a concession to the Southerners loyal to the Union,
did not command the same general confidence.

Congress, therefore, in spite of a presidential veto, took up the
cause of the freed negroes and insisted that the former Confederate
states should not be admitted again with full privileges to member-
ship in the Union until they had agreed to the amendments of the
Constitution, which among other things forbade any limitation of
the franchise on the grounds of race. At the same time, the territory
of the Southern States was placed under the command of Union
military officials who were to see to it that the new elections were
carried out on the basis of the legal equality of all men, with the
exception of some whites who had compromised their rights by
fighting

These "reconstruction laws" were put into effect and brought it
about that all the Southern States finally accepted the amendments
to the Constitution, so that by January 30, 1871, all the states were
again represented in Congress. But this had not been accomplished
without all sorts of abuses occurring. In the South it caused especial
bitterness that disreputable politicians from the North, called
"carpet-baggers," exploited the political inexperience of the negroes
in order to get themselves elected to offices which permitted them to
line their own pockets with public monies. This unnatural govern-
ment could not be permanent. Officially, the South indeed could not
revert to its earlier policy of publicly excluding the negro. Likewise
Southerners could not think of reintroducing slavery in some dis-
guised form, as had been their intention at first; but though the
negro was free and remained free, he was again deprived of his legal
political rights. At first the Southern whites sought to do this by
means of secret societies of which the best known is the so-called
Ku Klux Klan. These organizations attempted to terrorize the
negroes in all sorts of ways and frighten them from exercising their
political rights. When Congress stepped in and even permitted the
federal troops to be used in suppressing the secret organizations,
the whites resorted to somewhat more harmless methods with which

246 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

they secured their ends a little more slowly but none the less surely.
Although in the minority, the whites succeeded by 1877 in winning
back their control over all the Southern States. They have retained
this domination uninterruptedly ever since.

This was all the easier for them because the more the war became
a thing of the past, the more the North became somewhat indifferent
toward the condition of the negroes in the South. In 1877 tm's
indifference was publicly manifested further by the withdrawal of
federal troops from the South. However, as has been said, any re-
turn to the slavery of former times was out of the question. But
the negro problem was not solved. Little as the negro in general
might care for the exercise of political rights, there remained the
contradiction between his official political rights and his actual treat-
ment, especially his treatment in social relations, quite aside from
the fact that the so-called "lynch law," tolerated by the govern-
ment, was used almost exclusively against negroes, and that those
who employed it were never brought to justice. Even economic im-
provement has not altogether helped the negro: for while the
domination of the whites is threatened by the lazy negro who has
no property, what they really fear is the businesslike negro with
property. White workingmen too do not like the competition of
negroes working for less wages. When negroes recently have
appeared in the North as competitors of the whites, violent scenes
have taken place, as bad as those in the South. If one considers also
that in the case of a war, which is very rare to be sure, the same duties
are demanded of the negroes as of the whites, without their being
given, however, quite the same rights, one must admit that the nine-
teenth century has left few problems so difficult to solve as the
question of the colored people in the United States.

As a political consequence of these conditions, it may be further
noted that the whites of the South belonged almost without excep-
tion to the Democratic Party, because it was the Republican Party
which carried out measures for the protection of the slaves. The
Democrats have thereby secured not only a firm hold on the "Solid
South," but their attitude of opposition to capitalism has been dis^
tinctly increased.

The third result of the happy outcome of the War of Secession is
seen in the changed attitude of the United States in foreign affairs.
States which believed that they could get some advantage from the
division of the Union had to content themselves with actually mak-
ing concessions to the American republic, which was really not weak-
ened by the war, but actually unexpectedly consolidated in its

WAR OF SECESSION IN UNITED STATES 247

power. Scarcely was the Civil War ended, when the United States
demanded of France the withdrawal of the French troops which had
been supporting Emperor Maximilian's rule in Mexico since 1864.
Napoleon III could do nothing but yield to this demand. In the
early part of 1867, he recalled the army under Bazaine, and the Aus-
trian Archduke whom he had set up was captured shortly afterwards
by the opposition party in Mexico and shot on June 19, 1867. The
Monroe Doctrine was again restored to vigor.

Negotiations with Great Britain lasted somewhat longer. The
United States demanded compensation for the losses which their trade
had suffered through the privateers which had been fitted out in
England, especially for the losses caused by the Alabama. England
finally consented to submit the question to arbitration. Arbitrators
sitting at Geneva awarded the United States as compensation the
sum of fifteen and a half million dollars, which was thereupon paid
by England — one of the first cases in which a conflict between great
nations has been settled by arbitration, and in this respect of per-
manent influence on the later relations between Great Britain and
the United States.

CHAPTER XXV

THE FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL NATIONAL STATE

IN ITALY

ANTI-LIBERALISM had suffered a decisive defeat in America. There
the attempt to found a republic based on a feudal system of agri-
culture had failed. The hated Union had not suffered shipwreck,
but had come out of the War of Secession strengthened and eco-
nomically more powerful than ever before. The complete defeat of
the South had put an end to the danger that the United States would
have to adopt armaments. America was lost to the cause of anti-
democratic militarism.

About the same time, liberalism was winning a decisive victory in
Italy. Here, indeed, it was not so much the representatives of an
aristocratic economic system who were beaten, as the defenders of
the view that the privileges of the Church ought to be protected for
the sake of preserving the existing order of things.

The reader will perhaps remember (see ch. x) the unhappy con-
dition in which Italy found herself in the first half of the nineteenth
century. The greater part of the peninsula was directly or indi-
rectly under foreign control, which also meant the control of those
opposed to intellectual liberty. In Central Italy there were the
States of the Church, which, owing to their inner organization, could
not be won over to liberal reforms, perhaps not even to well-ordered
government. There was no hope of a change for the better. The
Great Power which dominated over Italy was far too strong to be
overthrown by the Italians themselves.

Such was the situation in 1848. The revolutions which broke out
in Austria at that time, as a result of the February Revolution in
Paris, raised for a moment the hope that Hapsburg military su-
premacy had come to an end. When Metternich's government col-
lapsed in Vienna, the patriots in the Austrian parts of Italy revolted
everywhere; the people attacked the Austrian troops in Milan, and
compelled the Austrian governor, Radetzky, to withdraw from the
city. In Venice a republic was proclaimed with Daniel Manin at
the head as president. The King of Sardinia thought he ought to
make use of the opportunity; so he invaded Milan and pressed

FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 249

forward as far as the Mincio. He rejected French assistance; this
was the time when he used the well-known phrase, "I'ltalia fara
da se." Charles Albert, the king, even received support from the
King of Naples and the Pope, and succeeded in defeating Radetzky
and in driving him back as far as the Adige on May 29, 1848.

But this success was only momentary. Radetzy received rein-
forcements, the Pope and the King of Naples withdrew, and the
Austrian Field Marshal was able to inflict a crushing defeat on
the Piedmontese at Custozza, July 24. Milan was again occupied
by Austrian troops.

But in the following year, there was again a revival of the liberal
movement. The republican revolt in Hungary had triumphed, and
this seemed to give the Italian patriots new hope, but the Italian
princes would no longer cooperate. Ferdinand, King of the Two
Sicilies, suppressed with great bloodshed the revolt in Messina, and
was nicknamed "Re Bomba," because of the way he bombarded the
city. Pius IX fled before revolution, and in the place of the papal
government, there was set up a democratic republic, at the head of
which stood the ablest man among the Italian revolutionists, the
Genoese, Mazzini. On February 9, 1849, Garibaldi, the brave leader
of volunteer troops from Nice, was given command over the Roman
army. In Tuscany also the grand duke was driven out and a re-
public proclaimed. All this finally induced the King of Sardinia
to try his luck once more, and again he invaded the Milanese ter-
ritory, but was completely defeated by Radetzky at Novara. Charles
Albert therefore abdicated, and his son and successor, Victor Em-
manuel II, signed a treaty of peace with Austria, August 6, 1849.
In this he renounced Lombardy, and undertook to pay a large war
indemnity. There was one notable concession, however, which the
Austrians could not wring from him: he refused to annul the liberal
constitution which his father had granted the kingdom on February
8, 1848, although the Austrians intimated that they would give up
the demand for the indemnity if he would annul it. So Piedmont
retained her liberal institutions, the foundation on which Cavour
shortly afterwards was to build up his policy.

The old regime was now reestablished everywhere. The restora-
tion of the Pope's authority in Rome by French aid has already been
mentioned in another connection (p. 202). Sicily, and especially
Palermo, was again subjected completely to the authority of the
Neapolitan kings. Particularly important was the fact that Austria,
after overthrowing the Hungarian Republic with Russian help, was
now able to restore her predominant position in Northern and Cen-

250 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

tral Italy. Austrian troops brought back the former rulers into
Modena and Tuscany again. In Venice the republic was overthrown
after an heroic defense on August 29, 1849. The former conditions
seemed restored more permanently than ever.

In reality, these events had simply taught the Italian patriots
and lovers of liberty that nothing could be done against Austria's
power by the methods hitherto pursued. The man who above all
others saw this clearly was the Piedmontese minister of commerce,
Count Cavour, then forty years of age and perhaps the greatest
statesman of the nineteenth century. He perceived that the expul-
sion of the Austrians from Italy and the creation of an Italian na-
tional state must be brought about in a different way.

The methods which he adopted differed from those of his prede-
cessors chiefly in three respects. So far as possible, he created an
efficient army ; he broke off completely the alliance with the Church,
in order to make sure of the cooperation of all liberal elements; and
he no longer disdained to appeal to the support of a foreign Great
Power, even if he should have to purchase it by making territorial
sacrifices.

In order to accomplish his purposes, he began, in 1850, a thorough-
going transformation of the Sardinian state in the direction of lib-
eralism. At the very time when other states were making political
concessions to the Papacy (see p. 225), he had the Piedmontese gov-
ernment issue a law by which the legal privileges of the clergy were
abolished. He terminated the Concordat with the Holy See; and
henceforth pious gifts in mortmain had to receive the sanction of
the state. The archbishop of Turin, who protested against this law,
was imprisoned for a month in the citadel of Turin. In the Chamber
of Deputies the government put an end to the traditional alliance
with the clerical right, and secured the election to the presidency of
the Chamber of the leader of the left center, a decided liberal. This
was the beginning of the so-called Connubio, the alliance of the
Piedmontese government with the liberals, or, one might say, with
the anti-clericals, for, in Italy, liberalism had been determined
primarily by church politics; owing to the conquests of the French
under Napoleon I, and also to the reforms made by the Italians
themselves, equality before the law, at least outside the Papal States,
existed in a far higher degree in Italy than in other regions under
Austrian rule. "What the nobility is to Germany, the priest caste
is to Italy," an Italian remarked at the time to a German historian.
At any rate, the unification of Italy was only to be accomplished if
the patriots, were willing to put an end to the claims of the Papacy.

FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 251

This policy of Cavour also made his military reforms easier. For
it was not enough to reorganize the army according to the Prussian
model. He had also to provide an increase in the revenues of the
state, and this could only be brought about by interfering with the
privileges of the clergy. Cavour not only sought to stimulate
Genoese shipping by commercial treaties; he wanted also to impose
taxes on church lands and above all things to abolish the monasteries,
which had become useless. In spite of energetic papal protests, he
succeeded in doing this. Out of about 600 monasteries in the
kingdom, 334 were secularized. Cavour was able to force the
feudalistic senate to approve this measure only by threatening to
resign ( 1855) . The wdl-being of the country was now systematically
improved. Railways and canals were constructed. With the help of
his new financial resources, the fortresses were modernized, arsenals
were built, and the army was increased.

Along with these measures, Cavour proceeded to bring about the
third point in his new program, — the alliance with a foreign Great
Power. It happened that he could not have found a helper more to
his liking than the man ruling in France at the time. The French
people, to be sure, had not the slightest interest in supporting an
Italian national movement against Austria; there were no grounds
for hostility between France and Austria; nor was it an advantage
for France to build up a rival Great Power on the Mediterranean.
This was the thought which had guided Louis Philippe and Guizot,
and they had done nothing to aid the Italian cause. But Napoleon
III put dynastic above national considerations. Intervention in the
quarrel between Sardinia and Austria would give an opportunity
further to increase the military prestige of the Second Empire.
The Bonapartist family had a traditional fondness for Italy.
Napoleon I had shown an inclination to Italy which can not be
wholly explained on political grounds, and the same was true of his
nephew. From the first years of his government, he pursued a
policy of raising Italy to the rank of a Great Power. Later on, his
efforts may have been somewhat stimulated by the attempt which
an Italian conspirator, Orsini, made to kill him with a bomb in 1858.
Orsini wanted to take vengeance on Napoleon because he regarded
him as responsible for the failure of the Italian revolution of 1848;
he conjured the emperor to come to Italy's aid.

Napoleon yielded to the wishes of the Italian patriots, although
from the very beginning this placed him in a very embarrassing
position. Italian unity, as desired by the Italians, meant the aboli-
tion of the Papal States; and how could a prince who rested so

252 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

much for support on the Holy See as did Napoleon give his approval
to this? From the outset, he could only accept a part of the Italian
nationalist program: he could support Cavour's aggression only to
the extent that the Temporal Power of the Papacy was not jeopard-
ized. In other words, he was helping to enlarge a state with which
he must eventually come into a life and death struggle. He was
creating a force which might crush himself.

A fantastic ruler like Napoleon, who had at his disposal the
best armies of Europe, was exactly the right kind of a man to be
Cavour's accomplice. The Piedmontese statesman had at once recog-
nized that he must first do something to place Napoleon under obli-
gations to himself. This is the explanation of Sardinia's alliance
with France and England during the Crimean war, which has already
been mentioned in another connection (see page 218). By this
Cavour also established cordial relations with England, where public
opinion was more or less on the side of Italian liberals, particularly
on account of English disapproval of the misrule in the Papal States.

A regular offensive alliance between Sardinia and France against
Austria was concluded in 1858. Napoleon III, who was then under
the vivid impression made by Orsini's attempt on his life, invited
Cavour to a confidential interview at Plombieres, where all the de-
tails for an attack against Austria were agreed upon. Here, for the
first time, Napoleon attempted to reach a compromise between the
claims of Savoy and those of the Pope. It was agreed that Italy
should be "free from the Alps to the Adriatic"; the kingdom of
Victor Emmanuel II should be enlarged by depriving Austria of the
Lombardo- Venetian Kingdom and also by seizing a part of the Papal
States. A further extension of the Sardinian boundary toward the
south, with a complete abolition of the Papal States, was not antici-
pated. Prince Napoleon, a son of King Jerome of Westphalia and
a cousin of the Emperor's, was to marry a daughter of the King of
Sardinia, which he did in 1859.

Accordingly, in 1859, when the war actually broke out, Cavour
was not afraid, following his program, to ally with revolutionary
elements. Just as he had already maintained relations with
republican revolutionists like Garibaldi and with Hungarian
rebels, so now he had the newspapers of Turin openly urge Austrian
soldiers in Lombardy and Venetia to desert. When Austria, ex-
asperated by his continual provocations, opened hostilities, Napoleon
declared on May 3, 1859, that he would hasten to the aid of the
Italians. How decisive his support was is shown by the whole
course of the war. The French auxiliary army was not only numer-

FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 253

ically much stronger than the Piedmontese force (about twice as
strong), but it made possible the great battles (particularly that of
Magenta to the west of Milan on June 4), which freed the whole
of Lombardy as far as the Mincio. However, it should be mentioned
that, at the same time, Garibaldi on the north drove back the Aus-
trians toward Como.

The Austrians, who had withdrawn into the so-called "Quadrilat-
eral" formed by the fortresses of Peschiera, Verona, Mantua and
Legnago, and had received reinforcements there, took up a strongly
fortified position on the hills near Solferino south of Peschiera.
After a bitter struggle, the Franco-Sardinian army, which was nu-
merically somewhat weaker, succeeded on June 24, 1859, m driving
the Austrians back and in crossing the Mincio. King Victor Em-
manuel was already contemplating an attack upon Venetia.

But at this moment, the Emperor of the French withdrew from
the undertaking. He had an interview with Francis Joseph at Villa-
franca, where preliminaries of peace were drawn up. Whatever may
have been the motives which made him take this step — perhaps he
thought the costs of a campaign against an Austrian army which
defended itself so obstinately were out of proportion to the ad-
vantages which would accrue to France; perhaps he was afraid
that Piedmontese ambitions would go too far; possibly he was in-
spired with fear by Prussia's mobilization — at any rate, whatever
may have been his motives, he returned to Paris with his troops,
and this simply put an end to the campaign. The peace of Zurich,
which was signed shortly afterwards on November 10, 1859, handed
over to Sardinia Lombardy, but not Venetia.

At the same time, the alliance which Cavour had made with
Italian liberalism now bore fruit. Venetia, to be sure, under Aus-
trian protection, could not be attacked. But in the weaker Italian
principalities there took place everywhere national revolts which
led to their alliance with Sardinia. In Tuscany, Parma, and Modena,
the princes were driven out, and the papal officials in the Legations
(Bologna) fared no better. In harmony with the liberal principles
of the Sardinian government, Cavour did not directly annex these
liberated territories, but everywhere asked the people to vote as to
annexation to Sardinia. The plebiscites resulted in overwhelming
majorities in favor of annexation ; in Emilia, for instance, there were
426,000 ayes, to 756 noes. This procedure was also adopted when
Napoleon, who had not opposed this extension of Piedmont, de-
manded compensation for France. The treaty of Turin, of March 23,
1860, providing for the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, was

254 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

first laid before the populations in question for their approval, and
not carried out until the people had voted in favor of it, likewise
by an extraordinarily large majority. Accordingly, when Victor Em-
manuel opened the "National Parliament" at Turin on April 2, 1860,
no distinction was made between the deputies from the old and
the newly-acquired Sardinian provinces.

The next point to be attacked was Southern Italy, as Rome did
not at first come into consideration. Officially, indeed, Cavour
could not participate in any such undertaking. But he at least se-
cured it an unhampered execution. In the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies there still prevailed an unlimited absolutism, and the new
king, Francis II, who had succeeded his father, Ferdinand II, "King
Bomba," in 1859, held fast to his absolutism, in spite of Napoleon's
warning. Now that Sardinia had become the center not only of
an Italian national state, but also of liberalism represented by a
parliamentary anti-clerical organization, this was a dangerous pro-
ceeding on the part of Francis II. Representatives of autocracy
could no longer count on Austrian help, and patriots now had
before their eyes a definite aim, — union with Sardinia along the
same lines accomplished in North Central Italy. Revolutionary com-
mittees were formed everywhere, and in April, 1860, an insurrec-
tion broke out in Sicily.

This insurrection was quickly supported from the outside.
Cavour, as has been mentioned, did not dare to give the insurrec-
tion official aid, but he allowed an international expedition for the
liberation of Southern Italy to be organized directly under his
eyes. The old hero of liberty, Garibaldi, formed a volunteer force
in Genoa (on Sardinian soil), consisting mainly of Italians, but also
including revolutionists from other countries, Hungarians and espe-
cially Frenchmen, like Maxime du Camp and Alexander Dumas,
Pere. The whole expedition was like an international crusade
against absolutism. A red shirt was the symbol which was adopted
by "The Thousand" as they set out.

Without any interference from the Sardinian fleet, "The Thou-
sand" embarked from Genoa and landed in safety in Sicily. They
were received with enthusiasm by the population. They easily dis-
persed the royal garrison troops in Calatafimi and Milazzo; and soon
had the whole of Sicily in their hands with the exception of Mes-
sina. Upon representations from France, Cavour requested Gari-
baldi to stop at this point; but Garibaldi took no notice of the re-
quest, and crossed over to the mainland. He soon won the whole
Kingdom of Naples, "The Thousand" entered the capital on Sep-

FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 255

tember 7, 1860, without shedding blood, and the King shut himself
up with the remainder of his troops in Gaeta.

After the undertaking had resulted so successfully, Cavour be-
lieved that he ought not to hold back any longer. With a half-
authorization from Napoleon he sent the Piedmontese army from
the north to aid Garibaldi's troops. The Sardinian forces invaded
the States of the Church, defeated the papal army, and occupied
Ancona. Here another popular vote was taken, and here, also,
there was an overwhelming majority in favor of annexation to
Piedmont, the Marches voting 134,000 to 1200, and Umbria 97,000
to 380. Connections with Naples were now established by land
and King Victor Emmanuel II was able to ride into Naples in
triumph by Garibaldi's side (November 7, 1860). The operations
against Gaeta were carried out by the Sardinian troops in such a
way that Garibaldi and his volunteers were more and more pushed
into the background. Garibaldi himself was given no political posi-
tion, so that his feelings were hurt, and he retired to his rocky island
of Caprera. However, neither he nor the republicans made any
serious opposition to Victor Emmanuel's kingdom.

The capture of Gaeta and Messina was now merely a question of
time. Shortly afterwards, these two last supports of Bourbon rule
fell, and the royal family fled on a French ship into exile. Naples
and Sicily also voted practically unanimously for annexation to
Sardinia. Victor Emmanuel could now take the final step of pro-
claiming himself King of Italy. In the whole of the peninsula, Vene-
tia and the curtailed States of the Church were the only territories
which still remained beyond his authority. The establishment of
the Kingdom was completed in the month of May, 1861, by an act
of parliament. The Italian problem was now solved except for
the States of the Church and Venetia. At the time of his death, on
June 6, 1 86 1, shortly after the proclamation of the Italian Kingdom,
Cavour's aim in life had been largely attained.

Of the two territorial problems still to be solved, the Roman
one was the most complicated. It was evident that an Italian
national state without Rome would be a torso. On the other hand,
international religious reasons made it undesirable completely to
abolish the States of the Church. Furthermore, the Papacy was
unyielding in matters of domestic politics. Moderate Italian patri-
ots would have perhaps been satisfied if the Papacy had been will-
ing to join in a liberal alliance with the Italian Kingdom; but for
this it was necessary that the Pope should make his state as liberal
as the Italian Kingdom, and this was precisely what the Pope re-

256 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

fused to do. Although Napoleon advised the Holy Father to yield
to the demand for modern reforms, the Curia refused to enter into
any kind of a bargain. Pius IX declared expressly, "We can make
no concessions" ("Non possumus").

The French, however, did not withdraw their protecting hand
from the States of the Church, and at first the Italian government
did not dare to interfere. The task of freeing Rome again remained
to be done by the revolutionary party. Again Garibaldi collected
his army of volunteers. But the government did not give it
support. On the contrary, King Victor Emmanuel sent troops
against the liberal hero, who was advancing against Rome from
Calabria; the Sardinian troops met Garibaldi at Aspromonte, and
dispersed his little force (1862). The Papacy then went further
and emphasized its dogmatic opposition to liberalism in the so-called
"Syllabus" (see p. 226). After this a compromise was no longer
possible. For the moment the Italian government seemed to give
up its Roman ambition. It removed the capital to Florence, which
was intended to indicate that at present it did not intend to make
Rome the capital of Italy.

The Italian government could now devote all the greater energy
to the acquisition of Venetia. The attack which Prussia was about
to make upon Austria (see ch. vii) offered the most favorable op-
portunity for this. With Napoleon's assistance, Italy signed on
April 8, 1866, an offensive alliance with Prussia against Austria,
good for three months. In accordance with this, as soon as Prussia
opened hostilities, Italian troops entered Venetia, while Garibaldi
again sought to penetrate into the Tyrol with his volunteers. For-
tune, however, did not favor the Italians, who in this war lacked
French support. The army under La Marmora was checked and
completely defeated on June 24, 1866, at Custozza by the Aus-
trians under Archduke Albert. But the Austrians were unable to
take advantage of their victory. Shortly after Custozza they were
terribly defeated by the Prussians at Koniggratz, and the Austrian
troops had to be withdrawn from Venetia to defend Vienna against
the advancing Prussians. Italian troops occupied the territory
abandoned by Austria. They now hoped for more, and even wanted
to win back Trieste and the possessions in Istria which had formerly
belonged to Venice. But their fleet was crushed at Lissa by the
Austrian navy under Admiral Tegetthoff on July 20, 1866. In the
Peace of Prague of October 3, 1866, Italy was only given Venetia;
for form's sake Austria ceded the province to Napoleon who
then handed it over to Italy. This annexation was also confirmed

FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 257

by a plebiscite in which only 69 persons voted to remain under Aus-
tria, while 647,000 favored annexation to Italy.

So only the Roman question still remained unsettled. How
long would France be in a position to protect the curtailed States
of the Church from Italy's attack? The Pope himself possessed no
means for his own defense, and the Italian government had re-
mained throughout true to Cavour's program. It retained its con-
nection with the liberal revolutionary groups and refused to make
to the Church concessions in political matters which would have
injured the Italian national movement. In view of a conflict with
Prussia, Napoleon believed that he ought to rely for support more
than ever upon the clerical party in France, which was attacking
Italy in the bitterest fashion. Veuillot, its best-known representa-
tive writer, even demanded that Italy ought to be made again "a
geographical expression," as in the days of Metternich.

Napoleon, however, needed all his troops in France, and was
compelled to recall the French garrison from Rome. The Italian gov-
ernment also had made some objections to this French garrison.
Scarcely had Rome been deprived of French protection, when Gari-
baldi took advantage of the fact. Unchecked by the Italian govern-
ment, he collected a volunteer army of sixty thousand men, and in
1867 marched with it from Florence against Rome. But Napoleon
had no intention of letting matters take their course. He despatched
from Toulon two divisions which arrived at Rome just in time to
save the States of the Church from destruction. The Garibaldians
had just defeated the Papal army, when they were driven back in
turn by the murderous fire of the French artillery. Garibaldi had
to retreat to Florence. "Les chassepots out fait merveille," wrote
one of the French generals to Napoleon (November 3, 1867), a
phrase which the Italians remembered a long time against the
French.

This made it clear that Italy could never secure Rome so long
as the French were in a position to oppose the abolition of the
Pope's Temporal Power. Even the modifications in the French gov-
ernment in the direction of liberalism, which were then being con-
sidered, promised no change in the attitude of France toward the
Roman question; for the representatives of the tradition of the July
Monarchy, as was expressed at the time by their spokesman, Thiers,
were just as energetically opposed as the clerical party to Italy's an-
nexation of Rome, because they -were opposed to the growth of a
dangerous rival Great Power south of the Alps.

But Nemesis soon overtook this French policy; since France —

258 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

and even French liberals — had tried to prevent what was inevitable,
and what, from an Italian point of view, was necessary, France
found no support in Italy when the Franco-Prussian war broke out.
All the projects for an Austro-Italian alliance with France came to
nothing, because the French Emperor had not been willing to give
Rome to the Italians — a step which Austria herself would not have
opposed. The crushing defeat to the French at Sedan resulted in
French statesmen failing to secure what had been their chief aim
in Italy. The day after the battle, the French garrison was re-
called from Rome and this sealed the fate of the city. The Italian
government at once despatched an army under General Cadorna,
who occupied the new capital on September 21, 1870, while the
Pope withdrew into the Vatican. This annexation also was ratified
by the people by an overwhelming majority of 130,000 to 1500.

United Italy thus acquired her natural capital. The work of
unification could be regarded as complete, except for several dis-
tricts with an Italian population, like the Trentino, Trieste, and the
coast towns of Istria and the Adriatic, which remained under Aus-
trian rule because of Italy's lack of success in the war of 1866.
Liberal Italian patriots believed that they had all the greater claim
to this "Italia Irredenta," inasmuch as they appealed, not to the
right of conquest, but to the freely expressed wish of the popula-
tion. Here was a diplomatic difficulty which became evident as
soon as Italy wished to join Austria in opposition to France on
account of the North African question (see below, ch. xxix) ; it re-
vived again very actively when a new cause of difficulty arose be-
tween Italy and Austria-Hungary owing to their rival ambitions in
the Balkans.

During the following years, however, this difficulty was less im-
portant than two other questions. One of these was the religious-
political one. Pope Pius IX could not be forced to give up his at-
titude of persistent opposition on account of loss of his temporal
power. In vain did the Italian government offer him, in the so-
called "Law of Guarantees" in 1871, considerable financial and
political advantages, if he would actually recognize the Italian King-
dom. In vain did the "Law of Guarantees" allow the Pope to re-
main as a sovereign prince in the Vatican, and give him an unlimited
right in appointing Italian bishops and a civil list of three and
a quarter million francs. The Pope regarded the "invaders" as ex-
communicate, and declared that, being a "prisoner," he could not
leave the Vatican. He refused to recognize the Italian kingdom
and to accept the civil list offered to him. Pious Catholics were

FOUNDING OF A LIBERAL STATE IN ITALY 259

not allowed to recognize Italian rule in Rome as legal. Theoretically
at least, there was still a danger that the Papal States might be
restored; this was a project which Catholic politicians who opposed
the Italian government often played with after 1870. A part of
the voters refused to take part in Italian elections, because this had
been forbidden by the Pope in his encyclical, "Non Expedit" (to
have taken part in Italian elections would have been tantamount
tc an indirect recognition of the revolutionary kingdom). Other-
wise, religious-political relations were practically arranged in the
way the Italian government wished. The policy of secularizing
monastic and ecclesiastical property, which had been introduced
by Cavour, was now carried out in the Papal States, so that in the
years 1868 to 1873 the whole operation realized more than five hun-
dred million francs for the government. At the same time, the ap-
pointment of bishops by the Pope was tacitly recognized by the
government.

The government's greatest difficulty lay in the matter of finance.
To have kept up an army and navy of the size wished by Cavour
was far beyond the natural resources of the Sardinian government;
and the same was true of the new Italian Kingdom, if it wanted to
play the part of a Great Power along with the other members of the
European Concert. The natural resources of the country could only
be insufficiently exploited. The necessary means of communication
were lacking, and the soil was not properly divided, particularly in
the south. Another obstacle may have lain in the lack of education,
especially in the territories which had formerly belonged to the
Pope and to Naples. In many regions, particularly in the former
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, order had first to be restored by force
of arms, and plundering had to be stopped, before a well-regulated
administration could be set up. All this could be accomplished in
the course of time, and was, in fact, accomplished in good part.
But this did not increase the state revenues sufficiently to cover the
military expenditures. Furthermore, as a consequence of the German
victories in 1870, which resulted in the introduction of universal
military service in Italy, the cost of armaments was still further
increased. Manufacturing for export on a large scale could not be
created in a day. The modern factory system had only been intro-
duced to a slight extent in Italy, and the lack of coal also proved
a serious obstacle, preventing the Italians from devoting an energetic
attention to this source of wealth. Finally, it was difficult to bring
about many reforms, and particularly perhaps the most important,
such as the breaking-up of the great landed estates, because up to

26o STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

1882 the right to vote was dependent upon the payment of a land-
tax and this excluded the great mass of the peasant tenants from the
franchise. And the ministry had to pay heed to the majority in the
Chamber of Deputies.

Thus the new kingdom had to pass through a difficult period of
transition, whose social and political consequences are evident even
to the present day. How Italy sought to play the part of a
Great Power and a colonizing country, in spite of her difficulties,
will be explained in a later chapter.

CHAPTER XXVI
GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE

ABOUT the same time that Italy was changed from a "geographical
expression" to a unified military state and was beginning to play a
part in international politics, a similar change was taking place in
the north. There also national ambition resulted in the creation of
a new Great Power, which was destined to play a much greater part
in the history of the world than Italy. But just because the analogy
between Italy and Prussia is so striking, it is desirable to call atten-
tion to the great differences which existed between them, quite aside
from those which happened to result from differences in personality
of the leaders. We may leave out of consideration here the final
result and the steps by which unity was achieved, and merely com-
pare briefly the conditions at the outset.

At first sight conditions in Germany seemed to be more favor-
able in every respect than in Italy. In good part directly, and to a
greater extent indirectly, Italy was under the rule of a foreign Great
Power, and was without protection against interference by foreign
governments. Germany, to be sure, included three small territories
(Holstein, Hanover and Luxemburg) which were connected by per-
sonal union with foreign states; but the administration was nowhere
in the hands of foreigners, and it was wholly out of the question for
foreign Great Powers to interfere in German relations by force of
arms. This was prevented by the fact that Germany included two
of the most powerful great states of the period, which would have
opposed any intervention, whereas Italy was composed of a num-
ber of helpless little states which scarcely possessed the rudiments
of an army. Italy, moreover, was merely a geographical expres-
sion; the bond of nationality was of a purely intellectual nature.
German states, on the other hand, were held together in the "Ger-
man Confederation," which, loose as it was, still afforded a certain
unity as against foreign powers. The members of the Confedera-
tion promised mutual protection to one another, and were forbidden
to make any alliance directed against its safety. The people in the
states of the Confederation were assured certain, though limited,

261

262 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

rights throughout its whole territory, and there was a common politi-
cal tradition, which was wholly lacking in Italy. The German Con-
federation of 1815 was indeed in no wise the legal successor of the
old Holy Roman Empire, but there was a general feeling of con-
tinuity, which was evident in such superficial circumstances as the
fact that Austria, which in recent centuries had almost always pro-
vided the emperors in the old empire, now had the presidency in
the Confederation.

But this relatively powerful position which the Confederation en-
joyed through the inclusion of the two Great Powers was precisely
the thing which proved an obstacle to its further development. It
was natural that Austria and Prussia, only a part of whose territories
were included within the Confederation, should pursue an inde-
pendent policy and be more intensely interested in their own aims
than in the national aspirations of German patriots. They were, to
be sure, strong enough to nip in the bud any foreign attack on Ger-
many, but they were not inclined to subordinate their own particu-
lar interests to the general good of Germany as a whole; in fact,
they were not inclined to advance the development of the Con-
federation, unless this development was of particular benefit to their
own country. From the point of view of those German patriots
who wanted to raise Germany herself to the position of a Great
Power, in spite of the dual rivalry between Austria and Prussia, it
was not a problem simply of uniting the smaller states together as
in Italy, but rather of subjecting them to one or other of the two
Great Powers in Germany. Furthermore, the rivalry between the
two Great Powers must be ended either by the expulsion of one of
them from the Confederation, or by its reduction to the position
of a middle-sized state. To be sure, these alternatives were not
clearly seen by any one at the time; in fact, almost all of those
who wanted to bring about a closer union of the German states
hoped that a compromise might be found which would solve the
existing Austro-Prussian rivalry; but in reality conditions were such
that no compromise solution was possible.

In this connection it is noteworthy that German national aspira-
tions were particularly lively in the small states. Subjects of the
two Great Powers naturally prided themselves primarily on being
either Prussians or Austrians, and felt little need of supporting the
ardent aspirations toward the creation of a new Great Power in
Germany. But subjects of the little states were not content with
the limited activity afforded to them at home, nor with member-
ship in a Confederation which counted for little internationally in the

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 263

eyes of foreigners; they could not help feeling the impotency
of the German Confederation and were natural representatives of
the "imperial idea." In general these people at first formed only
small groups. At that time and long afterwards, there was only
one form of national feeling which held all classes in Germany to-
gether, and this was hatred toward France. Even where the desire
for a new state and for the abolition of local boundaries in favor
of a national unified state was weak or not developed at all, there
existed an extraordinarily strong hostility to France. And it was
very important later on that this feeling was not least strong among
people who politically might have been called friends of French
thought, namely among the liberals.

An intelligent view of German history up to 1870 can only be
acquired by observing, not the German Confederation as a whole
with all its weaknesses in organization, but the two Great Powers
who determined its direction and later development. The his-
torian must turn his chief attention to the Power whose history was
to decide the fate of Germany, namely to Prussia. Austria can best
be treated by itself except so far as it has to be considered as a foil
to Prussia. The other German states scarcely need be considered
at all.

In speaking of Prussia one must make another distinction. The
kingdom consisted at that time, as is well known, of two separated
parts: Prussia proper in the east (which for the sake of convenience
is usually called the "East Elbian territory"), and the newly-acquired
Rhineland in the west. Of these two it was the East Elbian terri-
tory which dominated both. This was the nucleus or original terri-
tory from which Prussia proper had developed. Whoever wants to
understand Prussian history, and recent German history in general,
must begin with this region.

had a wholly peculiar structure. Con-

siderable cities with trade and industry in the modern sense were
rare. Most of the towns consisted of settlements of a petty local
character, usually with a strong proportion of Jews. There jwas
lacking, therefore, a strong middle-class. This condition "was more
marked in the country districts. Here there prevailed exclusively
the system of large landed estates, though not everywhere in such
a pronounced form as in Ireland, for instance; but still the popula-
tion was sharply divided into two classes: baronial landlords
(Rittergutsbesitzer} and agricultural day-laborers, without there be-
ing any free peasantry between them. The landlords or "Junkers"
were the only economically strong element in the country, because

264 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

there were no large manufacturers. They exercised an almost un-
limited authority in the open country; and as there were few large
cities they met with almost no rival opposition.
/The Prussian system of large landed-estates, as is always the
case, existed only by reason of the fact that the State took care of cer-
tain members in each family of the nobility./ The relative infertility
of great stretches of the East Elbian territory made the nobles less
able than elsewhere to provide adequate support for younger sons
who did not take over the estate. So the State had to come to their
support and look out for sons who were excluded from the patri-
monial inheritance through primogeniture or the system of entails.
For the nobility, therefore, it was a question of their very existence
that their families should possess, if not a monopoly, at least a
privileged position in appointments to higher positions in the army
and civil service.

The noble families believed that they had all the better claim,
inasmuch as, owing to the conditions under which they lived, they
believed that they alone were fit to fill these positions. Accustomed
to see about themselves "common people," living in a primitive
way as uneducated agricultural day-laborers, they easily came to
the idea that the state was not only bound to assure their economic
existence, but that it could not get along without them in general,
particularly as regards military service. In this connection, it is not
impossible that this idea was still further strengthened by another
peculiarity of East Elbian agrarian conditions which has often been
cite with praise. /Observers who have investigated economic politi-
cal conditions from the point of view of morality have often em-
phasized the fact that the East Elbian landlord was much superior
to the English landlord in Ireland or the owners of great estates
in Spain, in that he lived and worked on his estate himself, and
did not merely spend the income from it in the city. / This is doubt-
less true; "absenteeism" was unusual in Prussia, although it may be
a question whether it was not economic necessity, resulting from the
relatively small productiveness of the estates, which made the
Junker remain in the country. But, from a political point of view,
this circumstance was not without danger. Landlords in other
countries who spent a part of their life in the larger cities came in
contact with new currents of thought, and came into immediate
touch with men of capacity among the upper bourgeoisie and "in-
telligentsia." But in Prussia the Junkers were too often acquainted
only with members of their own class and with the agricultural day-
laborers who were dependent upon them. Even their acquaintance

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 265

with foreign countries may have been limited by this life of
isolation.

However, this was not the chief peculiarity of the Prussian State.
In the eighteenth century Prussia was by no means the only state
in which large landed property was favored through the exemption
from taxation, through a monopolization of all the government
offices, and through the exclusion of burghers from the possession
of extensive agricultural lands. /What gave Prussia in the nine-
teenth century her peculiar structure was, in the first place, the dis-
proportion between her natural resources and her ambition to play
a role as a Great Power; and, in the second place, the extraordin-
arily interesting changes which took place in her institutions after
the catastrophe at Jena in i8o6./'

Let us take the first point. Practically all the conditions were
lacking which might enable Prussia to take a place as a military
Great Power alongside of the other European Powers. The land
was not naturally rich either in population or resources; nor did it
possess highly developed industries or a large merchant-marine, like
other small states, which might have made up for its territorial weak-
ness. If, in spite of this, Prussia was determined as far as possible
to stand up beside other states more favored by Nature, it was neces-
sary for her to strain her powers to the very utmost. The concen-
tration of all her efforts for the support of an army, severe thrift
to cover the cost of military expenditures out of proportion to the
natural resources of the country, the union of all authority at a
central point in order to make sure that none of the meager revenues
were lost, — all these conditions were indispensable if Prussia was to
play the role of a Great Power as she wished to do. It presupposed
also the creation of a bureaucracy dependent on the monarch, which
should take the place of the old feudal patriarchal administration
and bring about a uniform development of the revenues of the State
for the general good, that is for the army. Already in the eight-
eenth century, therefore, there had been formed by the side of the
privileged landlord class a new body of administrators directed by
the king or at least by a central authority; these administrators
could oppose the privileges of the nobility whenever the role of the
State as a Great Power demanded it.

But even with all these measures, Nature was scarcely to be over-
come. Some observers may become very enthusiastic over the fact
that here the marvel of creating a state in spite of all unfavorable
conditions was accomplished simply by human energy. But the
shrewder judge, applying political and economic tests, will not over-

266 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

look the dangers of an artificial creation of this kind. However
much the Prussian government accomplished, and however power-
ful the proud structure of the new State appeared externally, it
rested on a dangerously small foundation. The State had been
wholly fashioned with a view to war, and yet was economically
much too weak to carry on war during a long period on its own
resources. It will be recalled that Frederick the Great was able to
bring the Seven Years' War successfully to a close only because of
financial support from England and his alliance with British sea-
power in general; and even then the odds were often very seriously
against him. Still more notable, perhaps, is the very unusual finan-
cial burden which the Napoleonic Wars imposed on Prussia. In com-
parison with other great states like Austria, Prussia had taken part
only a relatively short time in the wars of this period. In the final
decisive conflict she had had only a subordinate economic and mili-
tary part, if one compares what she did, with what Great Britain
or Russia accomplished. She had also come out of the Napoleonic
Wars with an extraordinarily large increase of territory, having been
enlarged not only by a piece of former Poland, but also by a part
of Saxony and the Rhineland. Nevertheless, the kingdom was crip-
pled financially to such an extent that for several decades she had
to abandon her warlike ambitions. She could not even undertake
her natural aim of establishing a direct connection between the East
Elbian nucleus and the Rhineland by conquering the Kingdom of
Hanover and the Electorate of Hesse.

The second factor which created modern Prussia was the catas-
trophe at Jena. One must bear in mind the contrast between
Prussia's earlier powerful position and her later collapse, perhaps
without parallel in all history, to understand how this event exer-
cised an almost revolutionary influence. The fact that the Prussian
army was thrown back head over heels by Napoleon was not the
decisive thing. The Emperor of the French had inflicted crushing
defeats on other opponents often enough without causing such an
inner collapse. But besides the loss of military prestige, it had been
shown that the artificially created Prussian structure was no longer
able to offer any resistance when times had changed. At a single
blow, the creation of many decades collapsed in a panic as soon
as the halo of military invincibility disappeared. If Prussian patri-
ots wished to prevent the repetition of such a disaster there was
nothing left for them to do except to adopt some of the "French
ideas." To be sure, the old bases of government did not need to be
abandoned altogether; for unless Prussia made use of all her re-

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 267

sources, she could never compete with the other great states; but
the whole population, and not merely the nobility and bureaucracy,
must be drawn into the active service of the State; the towns and
the middle-class must be something more than mere tax-payers.
^Accordingly, after 1806, reform legislation, combining the old
and the new, was carried out in a way to evoke admiration. With
the aid of several non-Prussian statesmen, like Stein and Harden-
berg, whose interests were not bound up with those of the Prussian
landlords, there was adopted so much of the French Revolution
idea of equality as was possible without exactly destroying the
privileged position of the landlords. The king allowed the nobility
to keep their favored position in the army and administration, but
he put an end to their monopoly, so far as it still existed; but at
the same time he compelled them to help pay the increased costs j
of the State. /

The most important of these reforms was certainly that which
dealt with the army. The Prussian army of the eighteenth century
had not differed essentially from those of other countries. Officers
were appointed from families of the native nobility, while the sol-
diers consisted in good part of non-Prussian mercenaries, who were
often recruited by improper means. This army had been defeated
by French troops in which there were neither privileges due to birth
nor recruits who were not French. Chiefly under the influence of a
Hanoverian, Scharnhorst, this French system was now introduced
in Prussia, at least in principle. The monopolization of military
office by the nobility was done away with, to the extent that
henceforth positions of command were given to burghers, and even
(during the war against Napoleon) to Jews. /It was decided that
henceforth promotion should take place according to ability and
bravery. Recruiting outside Prussia was to cease. Instead, the
whole male population, including all nobles and townspeople who
had hitherto been exempt from military service, were now to be
given military training./ Beside the standing army, there was created
a "resgD^" consisting of all young men; this was an extension of
the Napoleonic system of conscription, but differed chiefly from it
in that, owing to the limited area of the Prussian state, all young
men were to be given military training. Humiliating military pun-
ishments in the army were abolished, because now members of the
upper classes were also to serve as common soldiers.

The system of universal military service, which was legally de-
creed on September 3, 1814, after it had already been introduced in
practice, might easily have had the dangerous consequence that the

268 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

Prussian army might become, as in France, an instrument of democ-
racy and have destroyed the controlling influence enjoyed by the
landlord nobility. But this possibility, at least in times of peace,
was prevented by favoring the appointment of nobles as officers in
such a way that they possessed a majority of the positions, especially
in the higher places of command. The common people, particularly
the descendants of argricultural laborers, remained practically pre-
vented from rising to be officers. In this way the Prussian govern-
ment, in spite of the relatively small number of its population (about
ten and a half million in 1815), succeeded in using the whole of
the male population, thus being able to create as strong an army
as more populous states. But, at the same time, it avoided the
danger which might have arisen from the introduction of legal
equality in the army.

Many analogies with this military innovation are seen in the
"Town^ Ordinance" of 1808. The previous exclusion of the middle-
class~Th the towns iroin me army and local administration had re-
duced the townspeople to complete passivity as regards the state,
a circumstance which contributed not a little to the collapse at
Jena. According to French principles, it would have been natural
to remedy this situation by giving the middle-class some share in
the government, or at least in administration, by creating some form
of representative government or at least advisory councils. But if
the government had gone as far as this it would have limited the
existing authority of the baronial landlords. The government, there-
fore, rejected such an innovation and limited its reform at first to
the towns, leaving the country districts, containing the great class
of agricultural laborers, wholly out of consideration. The burghers
in the towns were given a share in local government, but not in the
central government of the state. In the towns there was introduced
a uniform civil law, somewhat like the French equality before the
law. Citizens chose from their midst representatives who formed
a city council which in turn elected a magistrate as executive head.
All this, to be sure, was done under the supervision of the govern-
ment, which, for instance, had to confirm the election of the magis-
trate. But in spite of this the law certainly gave to the town coun-
cils greater authority than was the case under Napoleon's system
of prefects, particularly at first; in 1831 and 1853 the government
assumed a somewhat wider supervision. It was also thoroughly
characteristic that nothing like this was done for the country dis-
tricts; there the authority of the nobles was limited neither by
village nor district organizations ; for such an innovation would have

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 269

disturbed the very foundation of the Prussian system of govern-
ment.

On the other hand, it must also be added that, in spite of this,
the condition of the agricultural population was notably improved
by the reform legislation. To be sure, the reformers did not exactly
dare to abolish completely the system of entails, and primogeniture
continued; but at least they made it possible to put an end to an
entail. On the other hand, the feudal limitations on personal free-
dom were abolished in a thorough-going fashion. Serfdom was done
away with. Feudal dues disappeared, as in France; the separation
of classes into separate castes ceased; henceforth, in Prussia, as in
France or England, a burgher might acquire land in the country, and
a noble might take up a profession. To be sure, the nobility still
retained great privileges, which were all the more important, inas-
much as the landlords were so much more powerful economically than
the agricultural laborers. The Junkers still retained their baronial
courts and their control over the rural police just as before. Never-
theless, a considerable approach was made to the "revolutionary"
principle of legal equality, which appeared to have transformed Prus-
sia into a modern political structure, at least in comparison with the
other states of Eastern Europe. . >>

/Other measures aimed chiefly at increasing the revenues of the
state. The government even thought of putting an end to the ex-
emption of noble estates from taxation ; it at least brought it about
that taxes were more equitably distributed. All that was left of
large ecclesiastical estates was confiscated./ This secularization
brought in a great deal to the crown, particularly in Silesia. In
order to improve trade and the well-being of the middle-class, free-
dom in choosing occupations was introduced, after the manner in
France. Hardenberg even issued an edict which was intended to
be a first step in removing the economic subjection under which the
agricultural population suffered (1811); but this, like the similar
Russian decree for the emancipation of the serfs, remained ineffective.

What gave particular significance to this adoption of "French
ideas" was the fact that the government could make use of an ex-
traordinarily efficient civil service, owing to the traditions and so-
cial system of the country. Owing to political and economic condi-
tions, men who did not belong to the land-owning nobility and yet
who craved more than a mere shopkeeper's existence, entered the
Prussian government service gladly. A political career, as well as
influence through the press, was out of the question in Prussia; in
a state where neither parliament nor freedom of the press existed,

270 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

a field of activity was offered in government civil service. Further-
more, there was scarcely as yet any great industry or commerce to
act as a rival in attracting persons away from a career as govern-
ment officials. The wider activities in which the Prussian State was
engaging, in comparison with other German territories, and the
many new opportunities which resulted from the fact that the terri-
tory of the State had been more than doubled, — all this attracted
many gifted men from non-Prussian regions. Thus, the King of
Prussia acquired a staff of executive officials dependent upon him-
self whose interests were not bound up with that of any other exist-
ing class.

/This class of civil servants, as was natural in this age, and as
was also the case in the other German states, had been reared com-
pletely in the ideas of Enlightened Despotism. y From this they had
drawn their energy and their reckless conviction of the necessity of
creating a new state in accordance with the progressive tendencies
of the eighteenth century. But from it they had also drawn the
conviction that all initiative ought to come "from above"; and that
the common people, like minors unable to act in their own interest,
ought never to have an independent part in government and admin-
istration. To this people belonged, in their opinion, not only the
so-called "uneducated masses/' but also every one who had not
passed through the bureaucratic school and also the members of
the professional, industrial, and commercial classes.

Here was the point where the ideas of the nobility and the bureau-
cracy coincided. The interests of the two classes, in general, were
often opposed to one another. More than once did the tendency of
the bureaucracy to extend state authority and increase state revenues
bring them into conflict with the nobles, who were defending their
privileges. But both classes were agreed that no third power should
be allowed to rise by their side.

All this will only be completely clear if one considers also the
influence of religious conditions. The nucleus territory of East and
West Prussia, from which the Prussian kingdom had developed, was
Protestant, and this had two important consequences. One of these
was of a political nature. There never existed in Prussia any such
independent church organization as had always acted as a check
upon the omnipotence of the State in absolutistic Roman Catholic
countries/ The Protestant Church, like all other corporations in
Prussia, stood unconditionally subject to the authority of the State
and of the classes controlling the State, like the nobility in the rural
districts./ The educative value of institutions half independent of

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 271

the State — educative for rulers and ruled alike — did not exist; and
it is well known that not only was the Catholic Church always re-
garded in Prussia as a foreign body, but also that the ruling authori-
ties in Prussia have never shown so clearly their incapacity for deal-
ing with independent organizations as in their dealing with the
Roman Catholic Church.

For the moment, however, the other consequence was more im-
portant. The very fact that the direction of the Church was identi-
cal with that of the State resulted in a relatively greater intellectual
freedom. To be sure, Protestantism clung as closely as Catholicism
to unchanging creeds. But the Protestant State Church lacked the
power to enforce its creeds, because the statesmen who possessed
the authority were too strongly influenced by the ideas of Enlighten-
ment not to allow them free rein. /In theory, Prussia was naturally
no less imbued with reaction against the "Revolutionary Enlighten-
ment" than the other conservative states, but the liberally-minded
officials who had charge of education in Prussia, as in the other
Protestant parts of Germany, extended much more broadly the
bounds of what was permitted, than did statesmen who were under
Catholic influence. / Education, indeed, was strictly supervised, and
everything which smacked of revolution was systematically forbid-
den. But there was no such anxious exclusion of all new ideas as
was the case, for instance, in Catholic Austria. Although news-
papers and books were sharply supervised, the government at least
allowed the university authorities a relatively free contact with
new intellectual currents.

In order to make this clear a few words must be said about the
peculiar position of the German, and particularly the Protestant,
universities in the nineteenth century.

The role which the German universities had originally played did
not differ from that of universities in other countries, and they had
not enjoyed any greater freedom. But in the eighteenth century,
through the foundation of the University of Gottingen in 1737, a
complete change was brought about. The Electorate of Hanover
was at that time, as is well known, connected with England by a
personal union, and it was therefore possible to transplant to Ger-
man soil English liberal ideas. The most important of these was
academic freedom; books did not have to be approved by officials
before being printed. Furthermore, all religious and political pres-
sure was removed. As a result, the University of Gottingen soon
enjoyed an extraordinary prosperity, and in the second half of the
eighteenth century became in Germany the center of science and

272 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

learning. But the influence of the new university soon extended
far beyond the limits of Hanover. Competition compelled other
German governments to give their professors greater freedom. So
gradually the German universities were transformed into those in-
stitutions familiar in the nineteenth century as places for scientific
study. Though they were dependent upon the state, and more or
less strictly controlled, and though admission to the faculty was
strictly supervised by the state, nevertheless teachers were no longer
bound to a prescribed textbook, nor forced to subscribe to a definite
creed.

This relative freedom was all the more notable in that it formed
in general, in Germany, the only exception to government inter-
ference with intellectual life. Academic freedom was allowed, be-
cause natural resources could not be fully developed without
scientific knowledge, and also because the consequences of university
education did not penetrate down to the lower classes. It had in
fact come about that there was an almost complete separation be-
tween persons of academic training and the "common people," to
which almost the whole middle-class belonged. As there was no in-
dependent political writing and no large reading public interested
in political and economic questions as in England or France, it came
about that academic people primarily wrote merely for one another.
This enhanced, on one hand, the narrowness of their work, but, on
the other hand, gave them great freedom in expression. This was
one of the main reasons of the poor "isolated life" of a German, of
which Goethe once complained to Eckermann.

Being the only places where political discussion was relatively
free, the universities assumed an extraordinary position in the politi-
cal life of the time. In Austria the authorities were thoroughly con-
sistent in excluding from the universities everything that was new,
in degrading, for instance, so dangerous a subject as history to the
rank of a despised subordinate study, which indeed would be better
not taught at all. But the other governments did not dare, as has
been said, to go so far as this. It had, however, the result that "re-
actionary" measures of the time were chiefly directed against the
upper schools.

But before these measures are discussed, a few words must be
said about conditions in Austria. They illustrate the point that
Prussia can only be understood in contrast to Austria.

Although the principles of Enlightened Despotism had not re-
mained unknown in government circles in Austria, and although a
series of reforms had taken place in accordance with it in the

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 273

eighteenth century, nevertheless the Austrian state was in many re-
spects the precise opposite of Prussia. This was due mainly to her
greater internal strength. /A state of Austria's size, with nearly
double as many inhabitants as Prussia and with a correspondingly
larger area including some of the most fertile parts of Europe, —
such a state could adopt the role of a Great Power ''naturally," that
is, without extraordinary efforts and without a concentration of all
its powers upon the army and finance. Austria could suffer in mili-
tary and financial matters with an ease only equaled by France./
Neither the numerous defeats which her armies had suffered during
the Napoleonic Wars, nor the bankruptcy of 1814, could destroy
the country's moral credit or lead to such a catastrophe as that
which followed Jena in Prussia.

Austria, therefore, did not need to reform her system to such an
extent as Prussia. The "old regime" organization continued, with
all its clumsiness and petty detail. There was no regular cabinet
and no regular centralized administration. The privileges of the
nobility continued untouched. The nobles were exempted from
military service and from the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts.
They possessed a monopoly of authority on their estates and in the
high places of the government. The peasantry were not only sub-
ject to the jurisdictional authority of the landlords, but also had to
pay feudal dues. In the various political assemblies of estates
(Landstande) , which still existed, only the nobility were repre-
sented, along with a few of the towns at most; and the right of
assessing the taxes, which in Bohemia, for instance, belonged to
these assemblies, was used in such a way that the peasants had to
pay much higher taxes on their land than did the lords. Nothing
was done to stimulate the industrial activity of the middle-class.
Commerce lay almost exclusively in the hands of the Jews. Pro-
fessional life was not developed, because educational institutions
were lacking. Industry was able to maintain a miserable existence
merely owing to the brutal prohibitive tariffs against foreign manu-
factures, which, however, were ineffective, owing to the active smug-
gling which went on. To be sure, one must not overlook the fact
that there was here no need for free trade. The fertile country
did not need to depend upon revenues from export trade, and per-
haps the very fact that there was no manufacturing on a large
scale, and consequently no great excess population, brought it about
that Austria still preserved her old reputation as a land in which
living was cheap, abundant and good. It was due to these rela-
tively easy conditions of life that only a negative attention was

274 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

given to intellectual matters. Political discussions were harmful
only because they would mislead people into being discontented
with their pleasant enjoyment of life, and set them instead to think-
ing about their political rights. Every change in the old system
rightly seemed dangerous, because it would have disturbed the
happy economic adjustment, and would therefore eventually have
brought about more wide-reaching changes. Therefore the govern-
ment forbade all political discussion in general. The censorship
was exceedingly strict; even a book like "The Restoration of Con-
stitutional Law," by Ludwig von Haller, a romantic, conservative
patrician of Berne, could not be sold in Austria. To print a politi-
cal pamphlet in Austria was unthinkable. All societies, even harm-
less pleasure meetings of literary persons, were forbidden, because
they might have given occasion for political discussion. One could
only journey abroad by permission, so that personal contact with
foreign ideas was forbidden as far as possible. A very highly de-
veloped secret police even watched over opinions which were ex-
pressed in private life. The universities were managed in the old
fashion just like schools.

This exclusion of everything new was still further strengthened
by the Roman Catholic character of the State. In itself the Roman
Catholic Church was scarcely less dependent upon the State than
the Protestant Church in Prussia, but it has already been pointed
out above that the Catholic clergy were less inclined to make com-
promises with modern civilization than were the Protestants. The
schools were now completely under the clergy, and even the students
had to attend mass. Non-Catholics were merely tolerated and had
no access to public office.

But the burdensomeness of Austria's system of repression was
lessened, not only on account of the natural wealth of the country,
but also on account of the naturally peaceful character of her for-
eign policy. Essentially Austria was not organized on a pacifist
basis. The maintenance of an efficient army could not be neglected
(although it did not equal modern trained armies like those of
France and Prussia), because the system of primogeniture made it
necessary to provide for the younger sons of the nobility by giving
them places in the army. But here also the government's policy
was merely conservative. The state was already rounded out terri-
torially, and therefore not driven, like Prussia, by ambitions to
unite separated territories by conquest. In view of the opposition
which she faced, particularly in Italy, Austria could regard it as an
advantage if only she were able to protect from attack what she

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 275

already possessed. Any ambitions for territorial extension existed
at most only in connection with Turkish territory in the Balkans;
but even here Austria did not intend to interfere by force of arms.
Thus she could keep her army within relatively limited bounds,
avoid excessive military expenditures, and, in contrast to the4 purely
continental power of Prussia, develop a fleet which was by no means
inconsiderable. All this sufficed to preserve the external position
of the monarchy for almost half a century. On the other hand,
Austria refrained from all offensive wars and did not even inter-
fere in the Russo-Turkish struggles, though Prince Metternich, in
view of his conservative principles, would have liked to interfere
against the Greeks in their fight for independence.

After this discussion, one can see in what respects Prussia dif-
fered mainly from her later rival. I say from her later rival, for in
the generation after the Congress of Vienna, Prussia was not in a
position to take up a struggle with Austria for control in Germany.
To be sure, Prussia had laid the foundation of her military system;
but the consequences of the Napoleonic period in this state to which
Nature had been so niggardly were felt for several decades, so that
for the time being Prussia was forced to follow a policy of peace.
Nothing is more characteristic of this than the fact that universal
military service, which could produce in Prussia an army equal in
size to the armies of the other great states, was not fully carried
out for financial reasons. Although the population grew steadily,
the number of men who were summoned for military service re-
mained the same; in 1860, only 40,000 out of 65,000 liable to mili-
tary service actually served under the colors.

/And yet the thing which is characteristic about what has been I
called "Prussian militarism" is the fact that institutions and views, 1
which in other countries have been advocated merely by a single class \
or profession, have been in Prussia transferred to the whole people./
In itself there is little which is original in Prussian military con-
ceptions. A number of old military views are perhaps particularly
accentuated in it, and they are carried out more rigidly to their
logical consequences than in other armies. But one has only to
look at the quite similar rules of the Jesuit Order to see that the
Spanish officer of the sixteenth century had the same ideas as to the
necessity of discipline and "corpse-like obedience" as the Prussian
military officers of the nineteenth century. What was new and of
importance in Prussia was rather the fact that these principles now
became a part of the thought of a whole people. As every one was
a soldier, so it went without saying that every one had the feelings

276 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

of a soldier, and must obey like a soldier. Therefore an altogether
extraordinary attention was given to the education of the people.
For they furnished the men who would be in actual service for
what in those days was regarded as only a short period of time,
and yet who must be instilled forever with a definite military way
of thinking. /It was in this spirit that the press and higher educa-
tion fiaci to be influenced. It was in this spirit above all else that
the civil service was administered, in order that in his daily life
the subject should always learn to think in a military way/

This is not the place to consider what may be the evil conse-
quences of such a militarization of all public life, or, to speak more
accurately, to what extent the direction of all State activity toward
military aims and the subordination of all State work to military
purposes makes the representatives of the State unfit to fulfil non-
military tasks. Here it is merely possible to mention the fact. It
may also be pointed out how harmoniously this system fitted in
with all the other institutions in Prussia./ Universal military service
itself was indeed a consequence of the smallness of the state, and
of its determination, nevertheless, to rival the Great Powers; but
when once this disproportionately large military machine had been
created, it offered an excellent support to the nobility, and har-
monized wonderfully with other institutions which deprived citizens
of all initiative, including initiative in politics./

From the point of view of world history, the period of German
history between 1815 and 1848 offers little of importance. Impor-
tant events in foreign politics were rare. The conflicts of the two
great states (particularly Austria) with the middle-sized, and little,
states, — conflicts which related to the censorship of the press, the
supervision of the universities and student societies, and the intro-
duction of liberal constitutions, — these conflicts were without great
significance; and even if gains in a liberal direction had been made
in the smaller states, they would have been of little importance so
long as the two great German states remained conservative. Much
more important for the future were the changes which, at this
period, were gradually taking place in economic conditions.

The long period of peace, together with the improvements in the
means of communication which were beginning in Germany, re-
sulted in a large increase in the population, which at first was offset
by only a small emigration. This new situation gradually brought
about the development of manufacturing on a large scale. Begin-
ning with the i83o's, the mining and textile industries began to
increase slowly in Germany. Just as in England, there took place

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 277

a shift in the population from the wooded regions to the coal dis-
tricts; but, in comparison with England, the changes which took
place in these matters were indeed very modest; but still, as a
period of preparation, these years are very significant.

These changes also influenced politics. Whereas, in the earlier
period, the demand for the union of the German states into a new
empire had come chiefly from liberal youthful idealists, with ro-
mantic patriotic feelings and with a hatred toward France, now
practical arguments began to be used more and more, urging the
necessity of putting an end to the "small states system," which in-
terfered with commerce/ Henceforth, it was primarily an economic
demand which insisted on a uniform commercial policy and the
abolition of all internal obstacles to trade and all vexatious local
regulations.

Now it was decisive that of the two great states, without whose
cooperation such reforms could not be carried out, Prussia alone
showed herself favorable toward these new considerations.

This was evident to every one through her founding of the Tariff
Union (Zollverein). {*

The fact that Prussia favored these ideas for a uniform tariff
policy for all Germany rested in part, at any rate, on geographical
grounds. Unlike Austria, Prussia did not form a solid territory,
with what might be called a natural boundary. She consisted of
two separated areas, inclosed numerous non-Prussian territories
("enclaves"), and had a very inconvenient and extended boundary,
more than seven thousand kilometers long. Thus, Prussia had a
motive for simplification and also for uniting with the other states,
which was lacking in Austria.

^But besides this motive, there were others. Prussia was just as \ I/
much inclined toward innovations for the benefit of the State, as
Austria was conservative in the true sense of the word. It was easy
and in harmony with her ambitions for increasing the economic
power of the kingdom for Prussia to introduce a uniform, low tariff
in place of the sixty-seven tariff systems which existed in Prussia
in 1815. /Her commercial policy also differed from that of Austria •
in very important respects. As has been said, Austria adhered to
a prohibitive tariff system, and did not want economic relations to
be disturbed in any way by contact with the outside world. Prussia,
on the other hand, had no such scruples, and also possessed as yet
no factories which the government thought ought to be protected.
The tariff, therefore, which Prussia proposed was very simple, and,
for that period, quite low: a tariff of ten percent ad valorem for im-

278 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

ported goods in general, twenty percent for colonial products. The

tariff had the advantage that the collection of duties required only

/ a relatively small number of officials./ Furthermore, it was easy to

/ make tariff agreements with other countries, inasmuch as the Prus-
sian tariff system did not aim at the protection of special Prussian

1 industries, x

Soon after the adoption of the tariff in 1818, Prussian officials
began to try to secure the adhesion of other states in the German
Confederation. It was not difficult to win over the little central
German principalities, which formed complete or nearly complete
"enclaves," as the states totally surrounded by Prussian territory
were called. In these states, also, the cost of collecting duties had
been very high in proportion to the amount collected so long as they
insisted on having their own tariff system; but as Prussia offered to
share the income from tariff duties on a per capita basis, these
states gained very considerably by adopting the Prussian tariff sys-
tem. The first prince to join the Tariff Union was the Duke of
Schwarzburg-Sondershausen in 1819, and a number of other small
princes, who were in a similar position, followed his example. In
1828 it was possible to secure the first adhesion of a state in South
Germany, the Grand Duchy of Hesse (Hesse-Darmstadt.) This
was not accomplished without difficulties, and Prussia had to make
various concessions to secure the adhesion of Hesse, such as allowing
Hesse to have her own customs officials. But Prussia was glad to
make this "poor bargain," as it was called, because she hoped to win
other states by it, and this hope was fulfilled./ Meanwhile the
central German states, especially those which feared annexation by
Prussia, like Hanover, Brunswick, and Saxony, and also the South
German states (with the exception of Baden) had also made Zoll-
vereins of their own. But the tariff union which Prussia had so
cleverly made with the Grand Duchy of Hesse put an end for the
most part to these local or "particularistic" unions./ Thus, Electoral
Hesse (Hesse-Cassel) joined the Prussian Zollverein in 1831, giving
Prussia a direct connection with South Germany and causing the
central German Zollverein to collapse. In 1833 the Bavarian-Wiirt-
temberg Zollverein also broke down and these states joined the
Prussian union, which after 1834 was known as the "German Com-
mercial and Tariff Union." By 1841 there remained outside of the
Union only a few small states like the Hanseatic towns and the
states which were most afraid of Prussia like Hanover, Brunswick,
Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg. But in the years 1841-52 most of
these were also won over as Prussia agreed to adopt several lower

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 279

tariff schedules. / Hesitating governments were won over more
easily by the fact that the tariff agreements were not perpetual, but
were signed merely for a short period of years; it always, there-
fore, seemed possible to withdraw in case Prussia should use their
adhesion to the Tariff Union for political purposes. But the finan-
cial returns proved to be so favorable that the agreements were
always renewed, — in 1853 for a period of twelve years./

Austria, on the other hand, was wholly opposed to the idea. As
a result, about the middle of the nineteenth century, unity in eco-
nomic matters at least had been accomplished under Prussian
leadership in a large part of Germany, without Austria having any
part in it.

But before any account is given of the corresponding political and
military union, the events of 1848, which in many respects trans-
formed Prussia, must first be mentioned.

One preliminary observation must be made. The history of the
following years, especially the developments in Prussia, would be
incomprehensible if one were to conclude from what has been said
that the advocates of national unity were moved merely by economic
motives. On the contrary, it is significant that the very persons
who from class interests most emphasized the need of unifying Ger-
many's economic policy were also the persons who were insisting on
political liberty. The opposition of manufacturers and merchants
to landowners and the tendencies which they represented in Prussia
was strong; people wanted legal equality just as much as a mod-
ernization of economic life. But since the idea was current that
Prussia was no less willing to adopt the one than the other, these
persons generally took the side of Prussia, hoping indeed to secure
both aims together.

In Prussia itself the conflict within the wealthy classes was very
marked. Hostile to the old Prussian system, with its privileges for
the landowners and the bureaucracy, were the western provinces,
which were reproached by the eastern provinces and by the
government with being "democratic"; these were the provinces in
which French civil law was in force and in which the government
had to create an artificial nobility for definite electoral purposes.
The large towns also were everywhere hostile to the privileged posi-
tion of the nobility. Hostile, furthermore, were the industrial regions
in the east, like Silesia and Saxony. These groups all doubtless
supported the effort to establish the Zollverein, but they were no
less zealous in advocating liberal political reforms. The history of
the following years is chiefly filled with the conflict which the Prus-

a8o STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

sian government carried on against these groups but which resulted
in their ultimate victory.

The demand for liberal reforms, especially for the introduction of
a constitution and parliamentary government, reached back in Prus-
sia to a period before 184-8.

Although the King of Prussia had promised in 1815 to create a
representative legislature, and although the German Act of Con-
federation made obligatory "a constitution based on a system of
estates," Prussia had nothing of the kind until 1823, and even
then only "Provincial Estates" which were merely advisory and
representative of the old feudal division of the population into
classes. In these Provincial Estates, whose meetings were secret,
the Prussian nobility naturally had the majority, owing to the nature
of the Prussian State: the nobility had 278 representatives, the
burghers 182, and the peasants 124. Only tax-payers could vote,
only possessors of property could be elected, so that members of
the liberal professions, like physicians or lawyers, could only be
elected in case they also happened to be landowners. But this ar-
rangement proved unsatisfactory when the State had to turn to the
public to borrow money to satisfy its new financial needs. To be
sure, by 1828, the frugal government had managed to change the
deficit into a surplus; but the limited state revenues did not suffice
to finance great undertakings, like the building of railways, — which
on purely military grounds could not be neglected. Furthermore,
it had been expressly promised in 1820 that no new loans would be
made without the consent of the Estates, and in 1842 the "United
Committees" of the Provincial Estates had refused to assume the
responsibility for such a loan. Therefore a royal order of Febru-
ary 3, 1847, finally summoned, as a provisional measure, the "United
Diet," or united meeting of the Provincial Estates, which was to
have the right of granting new taxes. But the United Diet was no
more yielding than the United Committees. It demanded at least
that the assembly should meet periodically, and it refused to grant
the money for railway construction.

In the midst of this conflict arrived the news of the February
Revolution in Paris. This encouraged a part of the opposition in
Prussia to emphasize their demands more strongly. In the large
cities especially, in which agitation was active, but in which the
bourgeoisie proper took no part, the groups of revolutionists were
composed almost exclusively of young persons and of a few laboring
men. The country districts and the army were wholly unaffected;
in fact, the army officers, who had the greatest interest in conserv-

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 281

ing the existing order of things, were down-right opposed to the move-
ment, and the agricultural laborers in the East Elbian provinces were
much too dependent upon their lords and too passive politically to
make common cause with the liberals in the towns./frundamentallyj
it was less a struggle of liberals against monarchy than an opposi-j
tion of towns and manufacturers against large landlords and their
privileges. Since the latter were the stronger, the insurrection was.
destined to fail from the very start/The king, as weak intellectu-/
ally as physically, was indeed ready to make some concessions, and
on March 8, 1848, consented to periodic meetings of the Diet, almost
before a petition for this had been drawn up. In a proclamation on
March 18 he also promised a constitutional system for all Germany.
But at this point the military authorities interfered, and attacked the
burghers in Berlin, who replied by throwing up barricades in the
city. The king was unwilling to take sides unconditionally with the
army and ordered the troops to withdraw from the city. His brother,
the later Emperor William I, who was especially opposed by the
people as being the pronounced representative of the claims of the
officers, had to leave Prussia and flee to England.

For the moment revolution triumphed. The king had to promise
a constitution which included universal suffrage among other things.
But the "National Assembly" which soon met in Prussia was wholly
powerless from the outset. Opposed to it were all the solidly estab-
lished powers in the state: the army, the bureaucracy, and the king.
Its decisions had only a momentary validity. Though it was dom-
inated, not by radicals, but by moderate liberals, jurists, and pro-
fessors, and though it voted to abolish what was left of the authority
of the landlords and to place local administration everywhere under
elected boards in place of the Junkers, and though it demanded a re-
sponsible ministry, — still all this did not result in any permanent
change. After sitting for seven months the National Assembly was
dispersed by the military authorities. The king then issued a new
constitution of his own on December 5, 1848. The revolution had
thus triumphed to the extent that the Old Regime was changed at
least in certain forms, and a constitution was introduced. But as in
the case of the reform legislation after the battle of Jena, it was here
less a question of the complete adoption of liberal reforms than of
a mere adaptation of them, in which care was taken that the privi-
leges of the classes which had hitherto ruled should not be essen-
tially restricted.

New, indeed, was the creation of a parliamentary assembly and
the constitutional principle that the House of Representatives

282 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

(Abgeordnetenhaus) must give its approval for new taxes. But the
authority of the assembly did not go beyond this and all administra-
tion remained exclusively dependent upon the king as heretofore.
Furthermore, the king took care, so far as possible, to prevent any
effective parliamentary opposition to the privileged position of the
large landowners. He did not dare to abolish universal suffrage, but
he modified it in such a way that the rich, who in the eastern prov-
inces were the nobles, secured a preponderant influence: in 1849
he issued a new electoral law which divided the voters into three
classes according to the taxes they paid, in such a way that each
of the three classes paid one-third of the taxes. Each class chose
the same number of electors, so that the rich were far more strongly
represented than the poor. Moreover, voting was done in public,
the voter announcing his vote orally, before it was written
down. Voters who were financially dependent were therefore liable
to pressure from the government or from the nobles. Finally, in
1854, a House of Lords (Herrenhaus) was organized by the side of
the House of Representatives, and representation in it was given
almost exclusively to the nobility and the members of the royal
family; part of the members were hereditary, but the greater part
were appointed for life by the king, mainly from the ranks of the
nobility.

This constitution, which remained in force until 1918, is his-
torically of the greatest importance. It not only made possible in
the iSso's and later the carrying out of a number of "reactionary"
measures, but it also had the result that later, when Prussia united
the other states into the German Empire, the largest and most influ-
ential state possessed a parliament which was thoroughly plutocratic
in its organization, and so prevented any possibility of the empire's
changing in the direction of liberalism.

At this point it is possible to speak only of the immediate conse-
quences of Prussia's triumph over revolution. To be sure, all the
measures which had been passed during the revolutionary days, were
not wholly undone by the administration; but for the most part the
privileges of the nobility were restored. The system of entails was
immediately revived in 1852, the landlords were again given control
over police, and the attempts to reorganize the provincial admin-
istration were interrupted.

Much more important were two developments which took place
without the active interference of the State. One of these, which
related to the attitude of the ruling classes in Prussia toward the idea
of German unity, will be discussed in the next chapter in connection

GERMANY UNDER AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN RULE 283

with the history of the national movement. The other may be
touched upon here. This was the unusually large and sudden emigra-
tion which began to take place as a result of the disillusionment over
the failure to secure liberal reforms in the matter of political
equality, and which tended to preserve the East Elbian provinces
from the danger of revolution for a long time to come. It is not
possible, so far as I know, to prove directly by statistics that the
masses who left Germany at that time to seek political freedom and
a home of their own in the United States came mainly from the
eastern provinces of Prussia; however, it is not a question of the
absolute number of emigrants to America, but rather whether a
relatively larger percentage did not leave the somewhat thinly settled
eastern provinces of Prussia as compared with the other parts of
Germany. It is a fact that the density of population in the eastern
provinces of Prussia increased so slowly between 1840 and 1900,
although there was no artificial limitation of the birth-rate during
the earlier decades, that the density there in 1900 was less than that
in South Germany in 1840. In Mecklenburg, where the social and
political conditions are similar to Prussia, the figures are still more
unfavorable. Even if the actual number of emigrants from the
thickly-settled territories of South and Northwest Germany had
been the same as from the agricultural regions of the Northeast,
it is clear that the agricultural provinces of Eastern Prussia would
have suffered very much more severely on a percentage basis. It is
probably safe to assert that the same thing happened there in the
country districts as happened in English industry in the i83o's and
4o's: it was precisely the energetic and intelligent members of the
population who had no property who emigrated, because it was dif-
ficult for them to rise at home. The result was that the danger of
revolutionary movements was essentially diminished. Naturally, all
these "emigrants" did not go to America; many simply moved into
the towns, but the social and political consequences were the same.
There was no longer any danger of a rising of the agricultural pro-
letariat against the landlords. To appreciate correctly the emigra-
tion figures, it must also be observed that even the decidedly agrarian
provinces of Prussia were not wholly in the hands of large land-
lords. Cautiously as the State had undertaken measures to estab-
lish independent peasant proprietors, the measures had not been
wholly without effect, and so only a part of the agricultural popu-
lation was forced to emigrate to America or to the towns in order
to secure a wholly independent position for themselves.
It must also be borne in mind that when the emigration from Ger-

284 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

many to the United States suddenly assumed enormous proportions
in the i85o's, this was certainly in most cases not due to disillu-
sionment over the failure of political ideals, but rather to material
necessity and a feeling of hopelessness. In general, this was natu-
rally observable not only in the regions of large landed estates, but
also in other thickly settled districts, and perhaps even in the regions
which were becoming slightly industrialized. But it was in the East
Elbian provinces particularly, where there were no factories, that
the political influence of emigration was mainly felt.

At the same time a revolutionary change was taking place in the
Old Regime in Austria. The details of this must be left until
later; here only so much can be said as is necessary to make clear
the conflict with Prussia to be treated in the next chapter.

The March Revolution of 1848 which broke out in Vienna almost
at the same time as in Berlin also ended in failure. In Vienna too
the government and the army remained masters of the situation.
But no more than in Prussia was there simply a complete restoration
of the previous system. A number of reforms were permanent.
The feudal dues which had been abolished, the inequality in taxa-
tion, and the administration of the provinces by the nobility, were
not established again. The old patriarchal government gave way
to a stricter supervision by a central authority. The cabinet began
really to function and not simply to let things take their course and
avoid innovations. Austria approached, one may say, to the Prus-
sian system. Furthermore, the State needed economic changes: this
was the age of great railway construction. A new policy was also
adopted in regard to religious matters. Attention has already been
called above (see p. 226) to the Concordat of 1855, which meant an
official break with "JosepMsm>" — with the state church of the Met-
ternich period; Catholicism again became the state religion.
Similar measures, to be sure, had taken place in Prussia where, for
instance, the public schools were placed under the clergy and where
the court party and the Junkers sought to use religion as a support
in the struggle against liberalism. But, it must be repeated, such
efforts meant quite a different thing on Protestant soil from what
they did in Catholic countries. With numerous Protestant friends
which Prussia had among the nationalists in Germany, Austria's
alliance with the Roman Catholic Church was a much stronger in-
fluence than the Prussian monarch's union with Protestant orthodoxy,

CHAPTER XXVII

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA;
PRUSSIA'S CONQUEST OF GERMANY

THE decades after 1815 in Germany were characterized by the fact
that Prussia and Austria worked hand in hand. Not only was Prussia
prevented from taking an independent military course, owing to
various reasons which have been mentioned, but she also held back
because her government adhered to conservative legitimist doctrines
of which she regarded Austria, next to Russia, as the principal pro-
tector. Frederick William III, who died in 1840, once observed in
the Political Testament which he made in 1827 for his successor,
"Russia, Prussia, and Austria should never separate from one an-
other. Their cooperation is to be regarded as the keystone of the
great European alliance." After 1840 this attitude changed some-
what. To be sure, the new king remained true to legitimist prin-
ciples and rejected the possibility of any conflict with Austria. But
a younger generation of Prussian politicians and military officers had
no such scruples. They did not care if legitimacy was interfered
with so long as Prussia might in this way strengthen her position as
a Great Power. In a certain sense, therefore, they approached the
point of view of the liberals who wanted German unity. Like the
latter, they shared the view that Prussia with only sixteen million
inhabitants in 1848 could maintain her position as a Great Power
only in case she joined the other German states to herself, and
then she would be able to assume a still greater position in the
world. This naturally was the same thing as saying that Prussia
must take up the struggle with Austria; for it was out of the ques-
tion that the Austrian state would voluntarily consent to a reorgani-
zation of the German Confederation which should relegate her to
second place.

It was not until 1848 that the conflict between the two Powers
came sharply to the surface; then at least it became clear in the
"Greater Germany" (grossdeutch) plan for German unity with the
inclusion of Austria, and the "Smaller Germany" (kleindeutsch) plan
for unification under Prussia without Austria.

285

286 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

Such a struggle was one of the conditions of the new Prussian
policy. The other condition, and perhaps the more important one,
lay in the change which had taken place in international relations.

In any attack on Austria before 1848, for which Prussia by herself
was scarcely strong enough, Prussia could have counted only upon
Russia's support; for various reasons, therefore, such an attack would
have seemed a dangerous matter. But now Napoleon Ill's policy
had created for Austria a powerful new opponent, — in fact, two
opponents, if one considers the Kingdom of Sardinia which was
being reconstructed with Napoleon's assistance. This created an
international situation which after the middle of the century gave
a prospect of success to a Prussian war against Austria.

This last point has already been touched upon several times and
therefore needs no further consideration here. But the change in
Germany itself must be briefly considered.

As to general conditions — the large increase in population, the
beginnings of industrialism, and the development of transportation
— enough has already been said. It has also been pointed out how
all these changes seemed to render necessary the economic and po-
litical unity of Germany. But the events of the year 1848 showed
also that such a union could only take place with the approval of
the Great Powers, and that the question of the best form of bring-
ing it about reduced itself to the alternative as to which of the two
German Great Powers should take over the leadership of it.

When the February Revolution had triumphed in Paris and lib-
erals in Germany were daring to advance their demands more ener-
getically, something of a panic seized the German governments.
Although at bottom their authority, at least in the larger states,
was scarcely endangered, the princes felt paralyzed by the unusual
situation and made unheard-of concessions. The Frankfort Diet,
which represented the sovereigns of the German Confederation,
adopted the colors of the forbidden Bwschenschajten, the German
student societies, which stood for nationalism and liberalism.
It also sanctioned the demands of the liberals that a German par-
liament should be summoned to sit in place of the Frankfort Diet.
Accordingly, a National Assembly was elected on the basis of uni-
versal suffrage throughout all Germany, including even the parts
of Prussia which did not belong to the German Confederation. It
met at Frankfort and among its members were all the leaders of
the liberal opposition, many of whom were professors or writers; as
there had been no opportunity for real parliamentary life in Ger-
many, universities and pamphlets, though severely censored, had

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 287

afforded the only forums free for political discussion. About a third
of the Assembly could be regarded as republican.

After this National Assembly had established a provisional gov-
ernment with an "imperial administrator" in the person of the Aus-
trian Archduke John, it began to discuss "fundamental rights."
This action has often been criticized, but perhaps unjustly. It was
naturally an illusion, due probably to the political inexperience of
most of the members, that the Frankfort Parliament imagined that
it could pass anything more than paper decrees in opposition to a
firmly-established military state like Prussia, especially as the Par-
liament had not the slightest military force at its disposal. But if
they counted on exercising anything more than mere moral influ-
ence it was not so foolish to begin by setting forth the minimum
rights which should be enjoyed by every German in the federation.
If these decrees, which were intended to abolish all legal inequalities
and class privileges and establish the independence of the courts and
freedom of occupations and of the press, — if these decrees had really
been carried out, then the local particularistic opposition which was
especially strong in Germany against a unification of Germany by
Prussia would have been destroyed; the privileges of definite classes
which encouraged the nobles and officers in Prussia to maintain an
opposition against the national movement would no longer have
had any point. But the National Assembly in St. Paul's Church at
Frankfort had, as has been said, no military force at its disposal
to translate its decrees into acts. The Great Powers ignored its
decisions, and in September, 1848, the Assembly even had to be
protected by Prussian and Austrian troops against a little republican
insurrection.

More important for the later period was the fact that the question
of Austria's attitude to the unification of Germany was made clear
for the first time. Was it possible to include a country like Austria,
composed of many nationalities, in a single political organization
which should have a purely national character and whose members
should have equal rights? There was the greatest doubt as to this.
Austria, in fact, rejected a compromise proposal that she should join
the new federation merely with her purely German territory. So,
after a small majority (267 to 263) had decided on the establish-
ment of a hereditary empire, the King of Prussia was chosen Em-
peror on March 28, 1849, by 290 votes. But as this would mean
that Austria would have to come under the tutelage of her rival,
the Austrian government, on April 5, recalled her deputies from
the Frankfort Parliament.

288 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

On the other hand, Frederick William IV, the legitimist King of
Prussia, did not dare to accept the imperial crown which was offered
to him by a revolutionary Assembly. He declared that he could
make no decision without the voluntary approval of the other
crowned heads in Germany, and therefore rejected the proffered
crown on April 28.

The two Great Powers, after suppressing meanwhile a number of
republican revolts in Saxony, Baden and elsewhere, then sought to
bring about a closer form of confederation by way of negotiations
among the governments. But all proposals came to nothing owing
either to Prussia's or to Austria's opposition. So finally in 1850
the old Diet of the Confederation had to be recalled to Frankfort,
and Prussia had to give up her attempt to make a separate union
with the smaller states.

Austria was not altogether displeased with this situation: she de-
sired no enlargement of Germany, and she again controlled the presi-
dency in the Confederation. It was otherwise with Prussia. Her
backing-down before Austrian wishes was regarded as a humiliation.
People saw that Prussia's union of Germany could only take place
as a result of a triumphant struggle over Austria; so Prussia began
to make preparation for such a war.

At first, however, there was a brief pause in the conflict. So long
as Frederick William IV, with his romantic legitimist notions, di-
rected the government of Prussia, an immediate open struggle with
Austria was not to be thought of. Not only was it necessary to
make military preparations for the civil war in Germany, but the
foreign policy which had hitherto been pursued had to be abandoned.
Prussia's relations to other states must no longer be determined by
the principles of conservative solidarity. Alliances must be made
with revolutionary governments and even with revolutionary parties.
In short, to use a new word which was becoming current, the gov-
ernment must act according to the principles of Realpolitik, — a
policy of opportunism which aims by shrewd calculation of actual
forces to secure practical success in politics. This word, which has
often been misunderstood, can only be seen in its real meaning if it
is contrasted with the maxims of legitimist solidarity which were
represented at that time by the court party in Prussia.

So it was not until 1858 that Prussia could begin to realize her
purposes; in that year the king became completely insane and was
removed from the government, and later died in 1861. His place
was taken by his younger brother, William, a man who hitherto had
been exclusively interested in military matters; he had nothing of

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 289

his brother's political idealism and thought of himself only as a
Prussian. He also had the advantage that he had not been educated
as an heir to the throne and therefore understood thoroughly at least
one profession, namely the army. Though one could not expect
from him any comprehension of far-seeing plans, still there was no
fear that he would adopt any of the doctrinaire notions with which
his elder brother had blocked the aims of the war party and of the
"red reactionary," Bismarck. In general, in all matters where the
maintenance of his personal authority was concerned the new king
was as unyielding as his brother.

After the group which had opposed war with Austria as a matter
of principle had thus been deprived of its support, the Prussian
government proceeded as rapidly as possible with military prepara-
tions. It could only hope to beat Austria if its army was enlarged
and the number of its professional officers increased. Ever since
1820 the number of young men called annually to the colors had
remained the same and the number of regiments had not been in-
creased. This was no longer to be the case according to a proposal
which was laid before the Prussian legislature in 1860. The number
of annual recruits was to be increased by about one-half — from
40,000 to 63,000 — and the peace strength of the army was also to
be considerably increased. No more exemptions from military
service were to be allowed. On the other hand, men were to be
allowed to leave the Landwehr at the age of thirty-two instead of
forty, so that in case of war the first brunt of the fighting would fall
chiefly upon the younger men. To carry out this reform, its chief
advocate, Albert von Roon, was appointed minister of war on De-
cember 5, 1859.

The Prussian legislature was asked to assent to the army reform,
because it involved an increase of taxation of nine and a half million
talers. A part of the expense, however, was to be met by increasing
the land tax ; but this proposal displeased the landlords in the Upper
House as much as the great increase in the standing army — from
about 230,000 to 450,000 — displeased the liberals, who formed a
strong group in the House of Representatives. This opposition party
felt that the increase in the army could be accomplished at a mate-
rially lower expenditure if the term of service was again reduced to
two years instead of three, though the king regarded three years'
service as unconditionally necessary to instil an enduring soldierly
spirit into the men. The increase in the number of officers simply
meant that it was easier to make provision for the Junkers.

The opposition was so great that the government adopted a subter-

2go STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

fuge. It asked for a grant of nine million talers merely for one year
( 1 860-61), as a "temporary" military arrangement. In this form
the government's proposal was adopted almost unanimously. But
the government ignored from the outset the clause which declared
that the increase in the army was only temporary. It proceeded to
organize permanent regiments. It is noteworthy that in so doing
the government met with the approval of the large landowners and
was thus assured of support at least in the House of Lords. This
was shown clearly by the fact that the Upper House even accepted
in 1 86 1 the increase in the land tax to which it had hitherto been
steadily opposed.

But all this naturally did not put an end to the party conflict in
the legislature; it merely postponed it. This was all the more
serious for the government, as the parliamentary situation became
by no means more favorable after 1860; a "German Progressive
Party in Prussia" was formed in 1861 which aimed at a thorough-
going modernization of the Prussian state, including the abolition of
the privileges of the land-owners, the separation of church and state,
and the reform of the House of Lords. In 1862 this party had a
majority in the lower house and was supported not only by the
great cities and the industrial districts in the west, but also by those
in the east, like Silesia and Saxony. The lower house demanded
that the government lay before it a detailed budget, in order to pre-
vent the government from finding the money for the increase of the
army by roundabout methods, such as the paring down of other
items. Thereupon the legislature was dissolved. But the new elec-
tions of May, 1862, strengthened, instead of weakening, the Progres-
sive Party, and an open constitutional conflict was unavoidable.

To carry on this conflict, the government needed at its head a
man who would not hesitate to take upon himself the odium of defy-
ing the constitution and of championing the king's prerogative in
the chamber regardless of all else. Such a man was found in Bis-
marck, "a young conservative," who had hitherto been employed
chiefly in diplomatic positions, but who became the head of the
ministry in the fall of 1862. This was an official declaration of
war, so to speak, against the legislature; the "constitutional con-
flict" had begun.

The new minister-president was a typical representative of the
realpolitik which had been developing among the younger genera-
tion of Prussian conservatives. To be sure, like every considerable
personality, he was not merely an exponent of the prevailing views
of his class; but in all essentials he did not differ from the political

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 291

views of his fellow Junkers which have been described in another
connection. Like them, he believed that the people were incapable
of looking out for their political interests themselves; like them, he
had only a slight practical acquaintance with the political life of
Western Europe; he had never stayed in England and he had been
to France only on brief diplomatic missions; like them, also, in a
struggle with intellectual forces, he knew no appeal but to force; he
never knew rightly how to estimate the effect of compulsory state
measures against the Catholic Church or the Socialists. With mod-
ern economic problems he was never really acquainted, and later he
was never able to see the importance of modern colonial policy. On
the whole, he was not a creative statesman, if one means by this a
far-seeing political thinker who pushes aside all old forces in order
to make place for a new structure capable of further development.
He was more clever, more logical, more opportunist than the other
Junkers of his class; but in his way of thinking he did not essen-
tially differ from them.

It was, therefore, not surprising that Bismarck's appointment as
minister-president was greeted with a storm of disapproval by all
Liberals in Germany, and not the least by those who were friendly
to Prussia, and hoped for the development of a new liberalism in this
northern Power. This was all the more natural as no one could
foresee at that time Bismarck's real importance; even those who
regarded it as an illusion that it might be possible for "Prussia to
merge in Germany," — the illusion that the dominating classes in
Prussia would make any renunciation for the sake of national ideals
— and who were therefore inclined to see the only means for the
unification of Germany in a participation of Prussian Conservatives
in a war against Austria — even such persons could never have sus*
pected what skill and diplomacy was possessed by the new Prussian
minister-president. To be sure, Bismarck had already been active
for a considerable time in the diplomatic service; but of what he
had accomplished as ambassador naturally nothing was known to
the public. And it was in the field of diplomacy that Bismarck's
real strength or even genius lay. Provided with a clear knowledge
of foreign relations which was almost infallible where it dealt with
states which were politically akin to Prussia, like Russia and Aus-
tria, free from any exaggeration of his own power and the blind-
ness of thinking himself invincible, free also from all scruples and
especially from any fear of allying himself with revolutionary move-
ments abroad, Bismarck proved himself to be a born artist in the
management of foreign affairs. He had at his disposal all the means

292 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

provided by the old as well as the new diplomacy, where he was
much less afraid of pursuing untrodden paths than in matters of
domestic politics.

Bismarck, one may say, was so strongly imbued with the diplo-
matic way of looking at things, that he regarded the conflicts of
parties and social classes as struggles for power which could only
be solved by the use of force. Compromise and cooperation he
regarded as impossible: one single authority must be supreme. He
therefore rejected any attempt by way of compromise to persuade
the Prussian House of Representatives to give a provisional assent
to the military law, and instead resorted to the "gap theory." The
Prussian constitution, he said, had a gap in it, because it made no
provision for the case in which the crown and the legislature failed
to come to an agreement in regard to the budget, and yet the ma-
chinery of government could not be left at a standstill; this gap
must be filled out of the monarch's unlimited power ; the king, there-
fore, had the right to expend monies even without the approval of
the legislature. The conflict was thus narrowed down to the alter-
native whether the king or the legislature was to be the determining
factor in Prussia.

The "constitutional conflict" followed. The House of Repre-
sentatives refused, as before, to approve the government budget;
whereupon Bismarck had the financial estimates voted by the House
of Lords, and ignored the protests of the House of Representatives.

When the government no longer feared to set aside the constitu-
tion, it had won in the conflict, at least for the moment, because all
agencies of power, such as the army and the administrative system,
were in the hands of the government and enabled it to collect taxes
without consent of parliament. All these powers were now used to
the fullest extent. At elections the government set up official can-
didates; liberal-minded officials were forced to conform; liberty of
the press was virtually done away with; liberal town mayors who
had been elected were replaced by government commissioners; and
the presentation of petitions was punished by fines.

At the same time that Bismarck was thus rendering the Progres-
sives and popular majority ineffective in their opposition to the
increase of the army, he was also making systematic diplomatic
preparations for war against Austria. Such a war could only succeed
for Prussia if it were certain that none of the European Great Powers
would intervene. A war which would last a long time could scarcely
turn out to the advantage of Prussia, in view of the numerical infe-
riority of the Prussian reserves and the financial weakness of the

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 293

country. The only possibility of ending it quickly lay in Prussia's
having to deal with only a single Great Power, namely Austria. The
international situation was already as favorable as possible; and it
was taken advantage of by the Prussian minister-president with the
greatest skill. England, since the Crimean War, scarcely counted any
longer as a military Power; Bismarck was convinced, and moreover
had tested his conviction in a harmless case, that Great Britain was
unable to intervene with military force — that is, in the only way
which would be effective. Russia, likewise, had been driven back
by the Western Powers in the foolish dynastic war waged by Na-
poleon III and England in the Crimea; moreover, Bismarck had
earned the gratitude of the Tsar by emphasizing the common inter-
ests of Prussia and Russia in the war against Polish independence,
and had delivered over to the Russian authorities Polish rebels who
fled to Prussia in 1863 (see p. 79). Under these circumstances it
was the Emperor of the French who was the most dangerous pos-
sible opponent. The European balance of power which had existed
hitherto would be seriously disturbed to the disadvantage of other
Powers who remained in their old position, if one of the Great
Powers, like Prussia, should enlarge its territory; and it was to be
expected that Napoleon III would not consent to such an enlarge-
ment of Prussia unless he were promised compensations in favor
of France, somewhat similar to the arrangement with Italy in
1860 (see p. 253). The Prussian government, therefore, had to ap-
pear to be not opposed in theory, at any rate, to some such arrange-
ment for compensation, and had to give Napoleon III the impres-
sion that he could accomplish his aim without having to resort to
arms. Bismarck carried on this tantalizing game with France in a
masterly way; and he was supported in it by the unquestioned
superiority at that time of the Prussian army administration, so far
as concerned rapidity of mobilization. This made it extraordinarily
difficult, from a military technical point of view, for Napoleon to
intervene in a war between Prussia and Austria. Last among all
these preparatory measures was the alliance with Italy, for whose
support in war Bismarck held out the prospect of the acquisition
of Venetia.

The first steps toward the territorial enlargement of Prussia and
the triumph over Austria took place in 1863 in the first year after
the outbreak of the constitutional conflict in Prussia: Prussia made
an effort to acquire Schleswig-Holstein, which had hitherto been
connected with Denmark, or at least the important harbor of Kiel;
and also t.o test whether Great Britain would really dare to inter-

294 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

fere on the continent in behalf of the small Powers threatened by
Prussia.

The formal occasion which caused the Danish War of 1864 arose
from a complicated question in regard to rules of inheritance and
constitutional law which need not be described here. It is sufficient
to state that the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, like Hanover
formerly, had been under the rule of a foreign prince, the king of
Denmark, and that Holstein, but not Schleswig, had hitherto be-
longed to the German Confederation. When Christian IX came to
the throne of Denmark in 1863, a German prince, the Duke of
Augustenburg, proclaimed himself as duke of Schleswig-Holstein
under the name "Frederick VIII." The Frankfort Diet thereupon
let Holstein be occupied by Saxon troops. Prussia and Austria
also demanded that Schleswig be occupied and actually proceeded to
occupation in spite of a decree to the contrary by the Diet and in
spite of warnings from England. They knew that this would mean
war with Denmark, but they let war take place in 1864. The war
could only have turned out favorably for the much weaker forces of
Denmark in case the Great Powers — especially England, which had
promised her protection in a more or less binding way — should inter-
fere in her favor against the two powerful German states. This pos-
sibility was not wholly out of the question, inasmuch as Prussia, lack-
ing a navy, could not think of attacking Copenhagen or the Danish
Islands, but had to limit her military operations to the Danish penin-
sula. Thus Denmark possessed a nucleus of impregnable territory,
and could, if given assistance by the friendly Great Powers, prolong
the war. But she received no such support; Great Britain, in view
of her weak military organization, offered nothing but advice, which
naturally made no impression upon Bismarck. So, after the Prussian-
Austrian troops had quickly occupied the Danish peninsula, Den-
mark was soon compelled to make peace. The only fighting of great
importance was the attack on the Duppel trenches in Schleswig,
opposite the island of Alsen, on April 18, 1864. On October 30,
1864, Denmark ceded to Austria and Prussia her rights to the
duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg.

The future fate of the duchies was not in any way fixed formally
by this cession. Prussia, however, offered the prince of Augusten-
burg a choice merely between a half or a complete annexation of the
territory to Prussia, being willing to recognize him as ruler over
Schleswig-Holstein only in case he made Kiel into a Prussian naval
station, signed with Prussia a military and naval agreement, and
joined the Zollverein. The prince, in fact, almost accepted these

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 295

demands unconditionally, but Bismarck used certain arguments to
get rid of him and the decision in regard to the two duchies then lay
wholly in the hands of the two possessory powers which were in actual
occupation — Prussia and Austria.

As to these two Powers, Prussia naturally wished to annex the
duchies, but Austria opposed this. Austria, which could not annex
these territories directly to herself, wanted them erected into an in-
dependent state as a member of the German Confederation. After
a provisional division of the territories, by which Austria received
Holstein in the south and Prussia Schleswig in the north, a struggle
took place between the two populations in the duchies themselves,
inasmuch as each Power stirred up an agitation in its own interests.

War was in danger of breaking out. But Moltke, the chief of
the Prussian general staff, was of the correct opinion that Prussia,
by herself, was too weak to wage war with Austria and that an
alliance with Italy must first be sought. This accordingly was
arranged: on April 8, 1866, Bismarck signed with Italy an offensive
alliance against Austria to last three months ; by this Italy hoped
to acquire Venetia, and Prussia German lands of equal value. At
the same time, both states began to arm, which led in turn to
military preparations in Austria. The direct provocation to war
finally came from Prussia who occupied Holstein and thereby
broke her former provisional agreement with Austria. Austria there-
upon demanded the mobilization of the army of the Confederation,
and her demand was adopted by a small majority in the Diet.
Prussia thus found herself at war with Austria and with the German
Confederation on June 14, 1866.

However, not all the German states obeyed the vote of the Diet.
Especially in North Germany almost all the little states held back,
that is, they practically took Prussia's side and Prussia only had to
deal with a coalition between Austria and the middle-sized German
states.

The course of the war now showed for the first time what an
advantage the Prussian army possessed owing to its more speedy
mobilization and its more systematic preparation. It was able at
the outset to carry the war into the enemy's territory and to attack
Austria before she was really armed. In the war with the middle-
sized German states it was also of advantage to Prussia that she
carried on the war without regard for any one, while the states on
the other side entered unwillingly into a German "civil war." Such
a moral hesitation was also felt by a part of the population in
Prussia, but owing to the pressure of the military system it was

296 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

unable to make itself effective. With the exception of Saxony, the
middle-sized German states also refused to join their troops to those
of Austria. The result of all this was that not even the defeat of the
Italian army at Custozza could prevent the complete victory of the
Prussian forces.

The decisive battle took place against the army of Austrians and
Saxons. The Austrians were under the command of General
Benedek and took a strong position in northern Bohemia. There
they were attacked by the Prussians who had approached by three
different lines of march, were numerically stronger, and, thanks to
the needle gun, were better armed. After hard fighting, known as
the battle of Sadowa or Koniggratz, on July 3, 1866, the Austrians
were routed. Their defeat amounted to a catastrophe. The only
Austrian army able to fight was destroyed and the road to Vienna
lay open to the Prussians. Not only a military collapse but the fall
of the monarchy itself was threatened, since Bismarck had estab-
lished relations at the beginning of the war with the Hungarian
insurgents who had revolted against Austria in 1849, and since he
now invited the Czechs also to revolt from Vienna after he had
occupied their territory.

From the German Confederation Austria could expect no help,
because in Germany Prussia's advance had been equally successful.
The battle with the Hanoverians at Langensalza on June 27 had
turned out indeed to the advantage of the Hanoverians; but in view
of the numerical superiority of the Prussian forces, the Guelf army
had to capitulate soon afterwards, on June 29. After the battle of
Sadowa Prussian troops marched into Bavaria as far as Wurz-
burg and Nuremberg. Nassau was occupied, and also the Free City
of Frankfort, which had to pay a large war contribution of
25,000,000 gulden. The army of the Confederation was also de-
feated, and the Diet of the Confederation, which had moved to
Augsburg, was disbanded.

As a result Austria was ready to sign an early peace, and asked
the French emperor for his mediation. It was offered at once; but
Napoleon III, who was not in a position to support his intervention
and desires by force of arms, merely secured a success in a few
superficial formalities. On the whole, Bismarck succeeded in carry-
ing through completely all of his wishes, although not exactly those
desired by the war party and the king. Bismarck wished to make
it easy for Austria to sign peace quickly, so that the Great Powers,
France and Russia, would have no time to intervene. Preliminaries
of peace, therefore, were signed at Nikolsburg on July 26, before the

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 297

Prussian government was officially informed of the Russian proposal
to call a congress or of the French request for compensation.

In these preliminaries of peace with Austria, Prussia secured all
the demands for which she had been struggling against Austria since
1848. Austria withdrew from the German Confederation, which
was now dissolved, and gave her consent to the founding of a north-
ern and a southern federation; this meant that she handed Germany
over to Prussia's leadership. Austria also ceded to Prussia all her
claims to Schleswig-Holstein, and gave her assent to Prussia's an-
nexations in North Germany consisting of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel,
Nassau, Frankfort, and some slight districts of Hesse-Darmstadt and
Bavaria; but she succeeded in preserving from seizure the territory
of her only wholly loyal ally, namely Saxony. Austria herself lost
only Venetia, which was ceded to Italy. Furthermore, considerable
war contributions were levied upon the German states.

The final peace between Austria and Prussia, which was signed
soon afterwards at Prague, on August 23, 1866, virtually confirmed
these conditions without change. The demands for compensation
which Napoleon III had made in the meanwhile were not directly
refused by Bismarck but merely treated in a dilatory fashion and
then finally ignored; Napoleon III had wanted some compensation
in territories on the left bank of the Rhine or in Belgium. Bismarck
yielded to the French Emperor on only two points in the treaty,
both of which were polite but valueless gestures: one of these was
the article which assured an "international independent existence"
to the South German Confederation which was to be established;
the other promised that the northern districts of Schleswig should
be united with Denmark if they should express their wish to this
effect in a plebiscite.

The first provision was valueless because no South German Con-
federation was actually established; it could not take place because
Prussia had already in August, 1866, signed a secret "offensive and
defensive alliance" with the South German states; this was pub-
lished in 1867, and m case of war placed the full war strength
of the South German states at the disposal of Prussia and even
under the supreme command of the King of Prussia. This offensive
and defensive alliance between the South German princes and
Prussia meant that the South German states were put under Prus-
sian military leadership. The other valueless provision, which was
contained in Article V of the Peace of Prague and which promised
a popular vote in Schleswig, was never carried out; it was probably
regarded from the outset merely as decorative, judging by the fact

298 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

that the "northern districts" spoken of in the text were nowhere
in the treaty precisely denned geographically. Moreover, such a
plebiscite would have been in direct contrast to the procedure fol-
lowed by Prussia in annexing her other new territories: all her
annexations were made merely on the basis of the right of the
victor, and often in pronounced opposition to the wishes of the popu-
lation. In many of the newly-won territories this procedure of
Prussia's gave rise at once to a party of systematic opposition.

This was at first a matter of domestic German concern, but in
1871 it led to an international conflict which has been of extraor-
dinary importance up to the present. It is therefore necessary, at
this point, to add a few observations of a general nature in regard
to this controversy which has often been only half thought through.

The problem in fact is not so simple as the supporters of the
Prussian theory have often thought. It is beyond doubt that the
procedure which Prussia followed in annexing Hanover, Schleswig-
Holstein, and the other territories was in itself nothing new; it was
in accordance with principles which have been practiced by states
since the most ancient times, and in fact was applied without con-
cern by all the states in 1815. But historic parallels only carry
complete conviction when the comparison goes deeper than a con-
sideration of mere rough superficial points. The transfer of one
country to another by annexation meant something quite different
in the nineteenth century from what it had meant in former times, and
was in much sharper contradiction with general political conceptions
then than formerly.

Let us take the last point first. It is clear that in an age when
subjects are permitted to have a say in regard to the introduction
of the new taxes, new laws, and so forth, the idea of handing them
over to a foreign state without consulting them appears much more
objectionable than in earlier ages when the modern conception of
political rights was unknown. Furthermore, one might suppose that
the theory of plebiscites, thanks to its frequent application in Italy
and France, might have become a part of European constitutional
law. Whoever sinned against it was introducing again a procedure
which had come to be regarded as out of date.

But more important, perhaps, is another point. In former cen-
turies the transfer of one state to another had usually interfered very
little with the life of the individual. In many cases this change
has simply meant that the local authorities who had hitherto held
power were dismissed and their rights transferred to new officials.
Economic conditions and legal relationships remained unchanged.

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 299

What difference did it make to a peasant if a town incorporated the
territory of his feudal lord? The services and payments which he
had to make were in no way altered. It should be remembered
that usually there was not even freedom of trade between the dif-
ferent territories which were gradually brought together under a
common ruler; in most cases the old tariff laws remained in force
so that there was no change in the daily life of the individual. The
conditions which existed in Alsace before the French Revolution are
known to every one, but it is less well known that these conditions
were by no means at all exceptional.

But what a contrast this affords to the consequences which re-
sulted from annexations in the nineteenth century! Even here, in
various fields such as that of religion and law, it was possible for
the annexed provinces to keep a part of the old arrangements. But,
on the other hand, incorporation in a new territory meant for the
individual personal burdens and duties, which made it seem natural
that he ought to be asked t6 give his approval to this change as
well as to other important innovations. Among these one need be
reminded only of universal military service, which was at once put
into practice by Prussia in all her new territories. This had the
result that a population, which had perhaps been annexed against
its will, not only had to endure the new situation, but even had to
defend it with its own blood. Whatever one may believe in theory
as to plebiscites, it can scarcely be denied that there was something
altogether new in this application of the right of the victor and that,
though it can perhaps be defended on its own merits, it cannot be
justified by an appeal to the practices of earlier ages.

The undesirability of this return to the earlier method of making
annexations was increased by the fact that the state which was doing
it was not offering to its new subjects even a liberal parliamentary
form of government. The opposition of the Progressives in Prussia
had not only proved itself ineffective, but it had dealt a blow to
liberal principles for a long time to come in the judgment of the
public. The splendid military victories and the large conquests
which Prussia had won were made possible only by the fact that the
government had disregarded the constitution and ignored the right
of the legislature to approve the budget. It was not the House of
Representatives, but the members of the Junker party, who had been
proved to be right by the outcome of later events. This did not
mean, necessarily, that the old ideals of Liberalism needed to be
completely buried; it must still be the task of the Liberals, as before,
to strive for internal political reforms and reduce the administrative

300 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

authority of the large landowners in favor of the civilian bureaucracy,
but the Liberals must not carry their opposition to the point of
opposing the government's military demands or its leadership in
foreign affairs; such an opposition would be as useless as un-
patriotic.

There was the further consideration that, after the events of 1866,
friends of the unification of Germany were unable to accomplish
their purpose except by adhering unconditionally to Prussia and
Prussian policy. All plans for making a real federal state in Ger-
many, or for having "Prussia merge itself in Germany," had proved
abortive; all attempts at securing a reform of the German Confed-
eration in any peaceful manner had failed. The only solution pos-
sible was by force of arms and with the aid of the authorities who
dominated Prussia. Therefore even the capitalistic circles, who
were interested in national unification in economic matters but who
had hitherto opposed the preponderant influence of the large land-
owners, began to swing away from the Liberal Opposition and form
a new party known as the National Liberals — a group of voters who
on internal questions still held fast to their liberal principles but
who in foreign affairs unconditionally supported the government.
This party now acquired a majority in the House of Representatives
in Prussia. The Progressive Party, on the other hand, was now
largely deserted by the voters who naturally could only make their
influence felt so far as was possible under the plutocratic "three-
class system of voting."

An outward expression of this party change was seen on Sep-
tember 3, 1866, after the war with Austria and the German Con-
federation, when the Prussian House of Representatives formally
voted, by the large majority of 230 to 75, an indemnity for the dis-
regard of the constitution. This was the first time that the National
Liberals separated from the Progressives.

The vote was perhaps inevitable; but it had wide-reaching con-
sequences, both for Prussian politics and for German politics in
general, which its advocates perhaps did not expect. The fact that
the Liberals had abandoned their opposition to the military policy
of the government in a state which was completely founded on a
military basis and which had almost no need of a parliament except
to approve military expenditures meant that the Liberals had put
out of their hands the only weapon with which they could exercise
a pressure on the government. The king had expressly declared
that his procedure during the constitutional conflict had been an
unavoidable necessity and that in similar circumstances he would

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 301

again always act as he had done. If the Liberals approved this
conception of the constitution they condemned themselves henceforth
to impotency. This is naturally not the place to discuss the question
whether the absolutist system represented by the king, or whether
a parliamentary system, was more advantageous from the Prussian
standpoint. It is only necessary to make clear the point that from
this moment Liberalism was henceforth dead as a decisive factor in
Prussia and in Germany. The government might make use of it for
its own purposes when it wanted to make a breach in the privileges
of the nobility and the clergy in the interests of the government;
but Liberalism was never able again to develop an effective initia-
tive of its own. Likewise, a parliamentary career was no longer a
thing to be thought of. The bureaucracy, whose prerogatives and
privileges were protected by the government, formed a solid front;
even if a Liberal were admitted to the ministry he did not have the
power to carry out his wishes. Naturally, this then had the further
consequence that gifted young men, who in other countries went into
politics, in Prussia and later in Germany sought out other careers,
preferring to devote their lives to the growing commercial, indus-
trial, or banking opportunities rather than to the profession of
politics. This change did not come at once; even after 1866 the
illusion still prevailed for a while that in spite of all this the ideals
of the Liberals might find expression in internal politics — that there
would be a "freisinnige Verwaltung," a "liberal and open-minded
administration," as it was stated in the National Liberal party plat-
form; and the competition from the professions, just mentioned,
was not so strong at first. But the more this illusion vanished and
the greater the opportunities became in trade and manufacturing, the
more this development became accentuated.

After Prussia had destroyed all the middle-sized states in North
Germany which had opposed her in the War of 1866, nothing stood
in the way any longer of a union of the other states in a federation
dominated by Prussia. The new constitution for this was drawn up
in such a way that the Prussian system of government was trans-
ferred to all North Germany. The North German Federation of
1867 was essentially nothing more than an enlarged Prussia. Prussia
received the presidency in the Federation and appointed at will the
Federal Chancellor. The creation of a Federal Cabinet with a par-
liamentary system of government was expressly rejected. Prussia,
as Federal President, was given the military and diplomatic powers,
including the right to declare war; the king of Prussia was federal
commander-in-chief and appointed the ambassadors. The army was

302 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

placed completely under Prussia's authority. All laws had to receive
the approval of the king of Prussia. The Reichstag, as the federal
parliament was called, had merely the right, as in Prussia, to vote
the budget and new laws. Above it was the Federal Council
(Bundesrat) , in which the state governments were represented, but
in which Prussia possessed seventeen votes of a total of forty-three,
so that no change in the constitution was possible without her con-
sent, as a two-thirds majority was necessary. The only respect in
which the Federation differed from the Prussian system was that in
elections to the Reichstag universal suffrage was introduced. By
this Bismarck hoped to play off the masses of the people against the
opposition of the particularist conservative circles in the annexed
provinces, especially in Hanover, where the nobility supported the
"Guelfs." On the other hand, there arose at the outset a number
of "protesting" representatives in the Reichstag who protested on
principle against their districts being joined to Prussia. These
"Irreconcilables" were made up of Hanoverians, Danes, and Poles
(who after the dissolution of the German Confederation now for the
first time really belonged to Germany).

Beside military and diplomatic matters, the central government in
the main was given control only over such matters as had to do with
commerce and communications, i.e., with public utilities, whose di-
versity and decentralization had been most severely criticized by
those interested in industry and trade; thus, tariff, postal, and
coinage matters were dealt with by the federal government. In gen-
eral, on the other hand, existing political institutions, like the state
legislatures, were left in existence; however, the rights of the indi-
vidual states as opposed to those of the federal government were not
really defined, so that it was not impossible that the authority and
activity of the Federation might be extended later. The army
was organized on the Prussian model in every respect, and the
training of the troops was put in the hands of Prussian officers.
The flag adopted was based on the Prussian black-and-white flag
by adding to it a strip of red.

If ever the much-abused phrase "transition stage" is applicable,
it was applicable in this case: no one had any doubt that the North
German Federation was merely a provisional arrangement. Within
Germany its relation to the South German States was regulated only
in a very primitive form by the military treaties of 1866; outside
Germany the question of the compensation which France was to
receive on account of Prussia's enlargement was still undetermined.
The most natural solution appeared to be to settle both questions at

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 303

the same time by a war with France, which would both put an end
to the possibility of any cessions of territory to the French and also
lead to the complete adhesion of South Germany to the North German
Federation dominated by Prussia.

This appeared to be all the more necessary, because feeling in the
South had by no means been inclined to submit to Prussia. In the
"tariff parliament," which was made up of deputies from the South
sitting with members of the Reichstag and which had to adapt the
Zollverein to the new political conditions, a feeling of hostility to
Prussia had prevailed among the representatives of the South. In
Wurtemberg and Bavaria the antagonism to the Prussian military
system had been very marked, and there had even been a movement
for cutting down the army expenditures and for the introduction
of the Swiss militia system. In the North, also, there was no little
discontent with the new military burdens which had resulted in an
increase of the taxes hitherto unknown. Even the landlords began
to realize the disadvantages of great armaments. All these com-
plaints might be overcome by a victorious and profitable war.

On the other side, the French government was also interested in
war. Although Napoleon III was not at all a conqueror by nature
and the prospect of a few small extensions of French territory would
not under any circumstances be worth the cost of a war — although
France, therefore, had much less to expect from a successful military
struggle than had Prussia — nevertheless, to a system of government
which was so dependent upon prestige as was France at that time,
a war seemed necessary if she was to retain her preponderant posi-
tion among the European Powers, or even if she was to preserve
the European balance of power. This French feeling gained strength
from Austria's policy at that time. The Hapsburg Empire naturally
did not regard its expulsion from Germany as final; though it had
been compelled to yield in 1866 to a coalition of Prussia and Italy,
there was the possibility that an alliance with France, and possibly
with Italy also, might undo what had been done. But all these plans
could only succeed in case France kept her military equipment at
least on a par with that of Prussia; and Austria would not consent
to a regular alliance with France because Italy, owing to the French
support of papal rule in Rome, refused to ally with France.

Whatever one may think of this policy of the French, it was most
unpardonable from their own point of view that Napoleon Ill's gov-
ernment did not develop its military equipment in proportion to its
political ambitions. All French calculations were senseless unless
the French army could make a stand against that of Prussia. Now

304 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

in this matter the French military circles were under a complete illu-
sion. To be sure, the arguments showing a superiority of the French
army were not all incorrect. French generals possessed a practical
experience which could not be matched by their opponents; French
infantry which had been trained in actual war, was undoubtedly
superior to that of Germany in quality; and part of the French
artillery was more modern than that of Prussia. France could also
bring forward a navy to which her enemy had practically nothing to
oppose. On the other hand, the French military leaders had nothing
to equal the methodical, "scientific," preparation for war in Prussia.
The French system of mobilization, advance to the frontier, and
independent action of individual generals by "improvisation" was
not so scandalously bad as was often asserted afterwards; it was
simply the military system of the old school, and with it the French
had fought a series of brilliant victories, not only in their colonies,
where victory was to be expected, but also in the wars with the
Austrians in Italy. But against Prussian methods it was thoroughly
antiquated. The thing which was almost inconceivably careless was
that the French army administration, which had witnessed the events
of 1866, was blind to the innovations in the Prussian system of con-
ducting war. A Prussian field-marshal, Prince Frederick Charles,
who had taken a leading part in the war of 1866, had remarked in
regard to this campaign, "We have no battle generals. ... It is
our military organization, and not the genius or talent of any leader,
which has given us victory in 1864 and 1866." Even if one does
not regard this remark as literally true, it is, nevertheless, beyond
question that it was the "organization" which was chiefly responsible
for the victories in those years, because it was possible for Prussia,
by means of her quicker mobilization, to begin the attack before the
enemy was really prepared for war. It should have been the duty
of the French military experts to draw their conclusions from these
facts and to modernize the French military organization in the same
fashion, or else to have avoided altogether a war for which France
was inadequately prepared.

As is well known, the opposite happened. To what extent per-
sonal reasons, like the sickness of Napoleon III who took chief
command, were to blame for this is uncertain. But it is a fact that
only a few civilians, like Thiers, recognized, to some extent, how
little the French army was in a position to undertake war with
Prussia.

Again one must admire the diplomatic skill with which Bismarck

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 305

directed Prussian policy before the war. Prussia had a greater in-
terest in the war than France, and the desire for it was certainly as
strong in Berlin as in Paris. But Bismarck nevertheless understood
how to make public opinion think that France was really responsible
for the war. From a practical point of view this was of the greatest
importance. This would not only have a quieting effect on the other
Great Powers, who would have been inclined to regard Prussia as
the disturber of the peace of Europe in view of the recent wars;
but it would be also of decisive importance in securing the adhesion
of South Germany. To be sure, the South German states, under
any circumstances, were obligated by treaty to take part in the war.
But the carrying out of this obligation would be made considerably
easier if the war could be represented as an act of self-defense on
Germany's part. It was at this point that France made one of
her greatest blunders. Frenchmen were aware only that the popu-
lation in South Germany had a feeling of strong antagonism toward
Prussia ; they were blind to the fact that the feeling of hatred toward
France, which had been long nourished, was much stronger than the
antipathy toward Prussia, and that this feeling was bound to become
stronger the more Germany was regarded as the party which was
attacked.

The course of events was briefly as follows. After the negotiations
to compensate France for Prussia's enlargement had had no success,
there arose, in 1870, the incident of the Hohenzollern Candidacy.
A revolution had broken out in Spain in 1868, and the Spanish gov-
ernment thought of electing Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern as king.
Bismarck favored this plan for the advancement of one of the King
of Prussia's relatives. But in France objection was taken to this
"disturbance of the European balance of power," and France made
a threatening declaration. The candidacy of Prince Leopold was
thereupon withdrawn by the Prince's father. The incident seemed
closed, but the French government, in order to gain the prestige of
a diplomatic victory, went further and requested from King Wil-
liam I a definite promise that he would never in the future permit
the candidacy of a Hohenzollern prince for the throne of Spain.
The king refused to make this promise and declined to receive
again the French ambassador, Benedetti.

This matter would scarcely have had any further importance if
Bismarck had not immediately published it through the newspapers
to the whole world. This announcement of the affront which was
supposed to have been given to the French ambassador on July 13,

306 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

1870, at Ems, where the King of Prussia was staying for his health,
was calculated as a blow to the French policy of winning prestige,
without exactly provoking France to war.

The blow had the effect which Bismarck apparently had expected.
The French cabinet informed the legislature of the events at Ems
and of Prussia's official notification to the cabinets of Europe of
King William's refusal to Benedetti. The French Legislative As-
sembly and Senate were overwhelmingly in agreement with the
French ministry that no further attempt at conciliation ought to be
made, and voted the credits for the army and navy; in the small
minority who spoke against a declaration of war were Thiers and
Gambetta. As great, if not greater, was the enthusiasm for war in
Germany. Even in South Germany all opposition collapsed and
mobilization began everywhere. Finally, on July 19, 1870, the
French issued a declaration of war — but only against Prussia.

For the outcome of the war much the same factors were decisive
as in 1866. The German troops advanced according to a well-
prepared plan and were able to attack with their full strength before
the French could send more than a few regiments to the frontier.
From the outset, therefore, the French had to fight on the defensive
and await the enemy in their own territory. How much they suf-
fered from their antiquated methods, especially from their defective
intelligence department and the wholly inadequate connection be-
tween the different army corps, has already been suggested. It must
also not be forgotten that domestic politics complicated the situation.
Now was seen the tragic result of the fact that the Napoleonic
regime, although it had just been modified in the direction of lib-
eralism, still rested essentially on prestige. The government did not
dare to recall its troops in time from the frontier after it recognized
the superiority of Prussia's preparation. It was afraid that such
an admission of its own weakness would lead to the overthrow of
the dynasty; it thus lost the only opportunity which it might have
had to adapt its antiquated organization to some extent at least to
the enemy's advance in a way which might possibly have lengthened
the war and made foreign intervention possible.

So the war was decided in an unbelievably short time. After the
first skirmishes on August 2, the Germans attacked two French
armies on August 4-6 and drove them back, the Alsatian army, being
driven back to Chalons after battles at Weissenburg, Worth, and
Froschweiler, and the second army on the Rhine under Napoleon
being forced to retreat to Metz after the Germans had stormed the
heights of Spichern. As a result of this, within scarcely four days,

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 307

foreign countries regarded France's cause as lost; Italy, which had
hitherto been hesitating, signed a treaty with England in which both
states pledged themselves to neutrality; Great Britain had already
declared her own neutrality on July 19. Russia, from the begin-
ning, had adopted a benevolent attitude toward Germany and threat-
ened to intervene against Austria in case Austria should support
France. In Paris the Ollivier ministry, which had declared war, was
overthrown.

Less successful for the Germans were the later battles. The
bloodiest ones of the war, Borny on August 14, Mars-la-Tour on
August 17, and Gravelotte and St. Privat on August 18, may even
be regarded as defensive successes for the French. But from a
strategic point of view, victory remained with the Prussians. The
best French army under Bazaine was cut off from its line of retreat
to the west and had to retire into Metz, where it was shut in by the
Germans and rendered immobile. Napoleon III himself, however,
managed to escape in time to Verdun.

Out of the remnants of MacMahon's army, which had been driven
out of Alsace, together with auxiliary troops of inferior quality, the
French now formed a new army which was to relieve Bazaine from
the north. It was only very unwillingly that MacMahon under-
took the task, because he well knew how little was to be expected
from his improvised army; but the minister of war had warned him
that Napoleon's retreat to Paris would result in the outbreak of
revolution. So MacMahon began to advance. But his worst fears
were more than fulfilled. The Germans succeeded in shutting him
in at Sedan; in spite of furious attacks the French were unable to
free themselves. So on September 2, 1870, the French army, in-
cluding Napoleon III, had to surrender.

This practically decided the war. France no longer had any
trained army and only an inadequate equipment in artillery, and
therefore had to buy arms abroad — in England. France, however,
did not give her cause up for lost, and maintained a heroic resist-
ance. Her armies accomplished deeds which, in view of the un-
favorable conditions, can only be regarded as marvelous. But re-
garded from a military point of view, the continuation of the war
was hopeless from the outset.

In spite of the haste with which new armies had been created
and all men between the ages of twenty and forty-one recruited,
it was impossible for the French to make use of the rela-
tively favorable position in which they found themselves directly
after Sedan. The situation was more favorable for the French then

308 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

than later, inasmuch as a great part of the German troops were still
detained in front of the unconquered French fortresses. While two
German armies marched toward Paris after Sedan, the third German
army was occupied with the siege of Metz, and considerable German
contingents were also held in front of the other French fortresses
like Strasbourg. Strasbourg did not surrender till September 27;
and Bazaine, in Metz, did not capitulate until October 27, when
compelled by hunger. The new French armies, however, were not
able to begin operations until October, and even then, in the judg-
ment of competent French officers, their training had been inade-
quate. Their attacks, which lasted from October, 1870, to January,
1871, were therefore without success; an eastern army under
Bourbaki, which was to have advanced from the Free County of
Burgundy and cut off the communications of the Germans, was
forced, on February i, 1871, to retreat behind the Swiss frontier.
Paris, which had been bombarded since December 27, had to sur-
render on January 24, on account of lack of food, after all attempts
to relieve it had failed.

The hopelessness of the French situation made any active inter-
vention by foreign Powers impossible. After Napoleon had been
taken prisoner, a Republic was proclaimed in Paris and the other
cities, and a Government of National Defense was formed on Sep-
tember 4, 1870; its most important member was Gambetta, a leader
of the Liberal Opposition under Napoleon III. It had been hoped
that the proclamation of a Republic would result in a speedier peace ;
Prussian official proclamations had emphasized the fact that Ger-
many was not making war upon the French people but only upon
the Emperor, Napoleon. But the French insisted, as a condition of
peace, that they should not cede any territory. Bismarck, however,
demanded an extraordinarily large indemnity and the cession of
Alsace; these conditions, as well as the difficulty of provisioning
Paris which was being besieged, caused all the negotiations to fail;
not even an armistice was signed. The French, furthermore, re-
ceived no support from abroad, in spite of the fact that in many
countries sympathy which had at first been against France had
swung over to her side. Only volunteers, like Garibaldi who wished
to express his gratitude for French assistance in the Italian War of
Liberation, hastened to the aid of France; but all foreign govern-
ments kept out of the war which they regarded as hopeless. Russia
took advantage of the war to annul, on her own authority and as her
compensation for Prussia's increase in power, the limitations which
had been imposed upon her after the Crimean War: on October 31,

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 309

1870, she claimed again complete political liberty in the Black Sea
(see p. 219). So France was left to face victorious Germany un-
aided, and after her military efforts had proved unsuccessful she had
to accept virtually all the conditions which were imposed upon her
by the Prussian government; the only point in which she did not
have to yield was the giving up of Belfort.

Preliminaries of peace were signed at Versailles on February 26,

1871, and were identical, in the main, with the final treaty of peace
signed at Frankfort on May 10. The most important provisions
were the cession of all of Alsace and a part of Lorraine, the pay-
ment of five billion francs as a war indemnity, and the obligation
on the part of both France and Germany to give each other the
most-favored-nation treatment in tariff matters.

Before the importance of this treaty is analyzed more closely
mention must be made of the change which took place in the
character of one of the signatories. The war which all Germans
had waged together successfully side by side made it possible to
reach quickly the result at which weary negotiations had been aim-
ing shortly before: the South German states declared their adhesion
to Prussia's North German Federation. The extension of the Fed-
eration took place in the form of treaties with the individual states:
Wiirttemberg and Bavaria had to be allowed to retain considerable
rights, such as special military privileges, indirect taxes, and postal
and telegraph systems of their own. Shortly before the last and
relatively strongest South German state — Bavaria — expressed its
approval by legislative vote to these innovations, on January 21,
1871, an official proclamation had been made of the new name which
was to be given to the Federation: on January 18, in the Hall of
Mirrors at Versailles, the "German Empire" had been solemnly pro-
claimed in place of the North German Federation, and the king of
Prussia had been raised to "German Emperor." This meant that
the national unity of Germany could be regarded as accomplished,
and that she might claim the position of a Great Power which
people had come to think of as being connected with the former
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Otherwise, no essen-
tial changes were made in the Constitution of the North German
Federation; in spite of various concessions of a formal nature, all
the real prerogatives remained in the hands of the Prussian king
who was now German emperor. Equally important was the fact
that the constitutions of the individual states were left unchanged,
so that Prussia with its dominating influence retained as before its
House of Representatives chosen by "the three-class system," its

310 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

House of Lords, and its ministry which was independent of the
legislature; the result of this was to exclude any possibility of a
transformation of the imperial constitution in the direction of liber-
alism.

The treaty of peace itself was in its content not very different
from the treaties of 1866, but it had far wider consequences, because
it struck at international relations and involved a change not merely
in Germany, but in the whole continent of Europe. The question
of the self-determination of peoples was renewed in a new and a
very much sharper form than in 1866; while in 1866 Prussia had
annexed only territories which had already belonged to the German
Confederation and in which a part of the population, at least, favored
the new regime, in the case of Alsace-Lorraine an integral part of
a foreign country was annexed against the general wish of its in-
habitants and against the solemn protests of its official representa-
tives, both in the French National Assembly at Bordeaux and in
the Reichstag of Berlin. To be sure, Thiers, France's representa-
tive at the peace negotiations, had been able to secure a provision
by which individual Alsatians might "opt" or choose in favor of
France. But this provision of the peace treaty was interpreted
in such a way by the German administration in 1872 that every
Alsatian who "opted" for France had to leave the country; he was
thus made to choose simply between accepting German citizenship
and exile. Furthermore, in the case of the annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine, the annexed peoples were not joined to a country which
gave the citizens political rights similar to what they had already
possessed, as was done, for instance, for the Hanoverians who
became Prussian citizens; on the contrary, they became part of a
state which gave its members a much smaller share in the govern-
ment and administration than had been the case in France at any
time since the Revolution. The Alsatians, also, did not even acquire
the right of local autonomy which was enjoyed by the citizens of
the other states of the Empire, like Baden, but were made into an
"Imperial Territory" (Reichsland) and were mainly ruled from
Berlin by means of a governor-general. Finally, a considerable part
of the Imperial Territory did not even form part of Germany from
a nationalist point of view, inasmuch as the population spoke French
— but in practice this was the least important point. So it came
about, as calm statesmen outside Prussia had already foreseen in
1871, that an "Alsatian question" developed, which was not merely
a local dispute, but was an international conflict which was impor-
tant as a matter of principle; the Alsatian desire for liberty, or at

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 311

least for autonomy, coincided with the French desire for a restora-
tion of the old frontiers, and both together proclaimed to all the
world the contrast between the conception of the State which was
held in Germany and that which was held by the Western Powers.

In still another respect the Treaty of Frankfort had an impor-
tance which extended far beyond the special case which the treaty
dealt with. This was the provision in regard to the so-called war
indemnity; I say "so-called," because the five billion francs which
France had to pay to victorious Germany covered much more than
the mere costs of the war. By making this war indemnity an
unheard-of amount according to the conception of those days, Bis-
marck had intended so to weaken France that she would lose her
position as a Great Power; he wanted to make her "impotent to
make alliances." On the other hand, he intended that the war should
appear as a profitable affair for the German Empire, the German
states, and the German military leaders and statesmen who had
conducted the war. Only a part of the money was used to cover
the costs of the war. A considerable remainder was devoted to
building up the imperial navy, to the construction of a new
Reichstag building, to the postoffice administration, and so forth;
and also to large gifts, totaling fifteen million francs, to Bismarck,
Moltke, Roon, and the others. Thus, the poorer state had acquired
by war the means for developing its power and its transportation
system through the help given it by the enemy — a circumstance
which psychologically was of enormous importance in the estimation
in which war was held.

This side of the indemnity payment must be emphasized all the
more, because Bismarck was not at all successful in the political
calculation which we have just mentioned. It soon became clear
how superficial it is to judge the wealth of a country according to
unessential things like density of population, the balance of trade,
military success, and so forth. The natural wealth of the country,
the wise limitation in the increase of population, a general frugality
and industriousness, which result from the prevalence of small peasant
proprietors and from a relatively small proportion of industrial pro-
letarians in the whole population, a disinclination for speculation,
and a preference for safe investments, which is also a result of stable
population conditions — all these things made it possible for the
French to pay the five billions within an unbelievably short period,
namely, by September 5, 1873. The Germans, therefore, had to
evacuate the French territories, which they had occupied as a guar-
antee, much earlier than Bismarck really wished.

3i2 STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

In addition to these changes, which are directly connected with
the treaty of peace itself, the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War
also modified Europe fundamentally in other respects, only the most
important of which can be touched upon here.

In the first place, the Prussian system was so far adopted over
the whole continent that universal military service was introduced
everywhere. The burdens of militarism increased enormously:
armies grew to a size, which even aside from the increase of popu-
lation, would have been regarded as unthinkable at an earlier time;
the so-called peace strength was now often as large as what had been
the war strength formerly. The system of borrowing money for un-
productive purposes now became general for the first time. What
had formerly been regarded as exceptional in ordinary times and as
normal only in time of war now became the rule and a matter of
course: this was the borrowing of money for sterile military expendi-
tures which would have to be paid back by posterity, a practice
which was made inevitable by the enormously increased costs of
"an armed peace"; this also involved similar practices in other
branches of the budget. Furthermore, the number of citizens who
were withdrawn from economically productive work increased dis-
proportionately, for it was not possible any longer to fill up the
army ranks by improvisation. The bonds between the individual
and the State were drawn much closer; the State was compelled to
give a much more careful attention than formerly to the develop-
ment of the individual than had hitherto been the case anywhere
outside of Prussia. Language and school questions which had been
regarded as important only by small circles were now dealt with by
governments as matters of prime importance in which the State must
take a hand. The question of the language to be used for command
in the army, for example, had hitherto been merely an internal mili-
tary question in cases where there was a mixed population; now it
became a national problem. The heavy personal obligation which
universal military service laid upon every individual was in itself
a regular training in national exclusiveness ; whoever dedicated his
life in this way to his country believed that he had a right to lay
claim to special advantages from foreigners. A severe blow was
given to the idea of "world citizenship" (Weltburgertum), that is,
the enjoyment of a larger citizenship and freedom beyond the limits
of one's own state.

This increase of armies and this extension of military obligations
over the whole population, however, made people regard war much
more seriously than heretofore. For the individual, as for the state,

STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 313

the stakes of war became indescribably greater — for the individual
because wars were no longer fought by professional soldiers, and for
the state because the normal state revenues no longer sufficed to
cover even the military expenditures in time of peace, to say nothing
of their inadequacy for a long war. The Franco-Prussian War was
followed, therefore, by relatively longer periods of peace among the
Great European Powers. The only wars which took place were
colonial wars, or wars like the Russo-Turkish War and the Spanish-
American War, which could be conducted by Great Powers with a
part of their military resources and were not really vital struggles
for the very existence of the country. It was natural that the
country which had been able to avoid the introduction of universal
military service, owing to its insular position, was easily able to
concentrate all its resources upon colonial wars of this kind; and it
is also easy to understand why the British Empire, being behind the
other Great Powers in military matters, as a result of this trans-
formation in Europe in which it did not take part, was especially
interested in the maintenance of peace on the Continent and always
sought by peaceful means as far as possible to come to an under-
standing with Powers with whom its colonial aims came into conflict.
But just because a war between two or more European Great
Powers on the Continent could turn out favorably for the victor, only
in case the war was a short one, it was of the highest consequence
that the two wars to which Prussia owed her leading position in
Europe had come to an end so quickly and smoothly. People were
too often inclined to draw the conclusion from this that the same
thing would always happen in the future; people calculated, not
only upon certain victory, but also upon the possibility, which was
very unlikely, that a new war could be made to more than cover
its costs as was the case in 1870. It would lead us too far afield
to indicate in detail the false conclusions on which these calculations
rested. But two points may be mentioned. The first is that the
numerical advantage which Prussia had formerly derived from her
system of universal military service was now equalized to the extent
that other states placed their whole population under arms in
the same way. Furthermore, the art of rapid mobilization was
easily copied in other states to such a point that there could never
be in the first days of a war such unequal combats as took place
in 1866 and 1870. In the second place, the two wars just mentioned
were altogether exceptional in the fact that in both cases the party
which had naval superiority had not been able to make any use of
this superiority: Austria had not been able to counteract her defeat

3H STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FOURTH ESTATE

at Sadowa by her naval victory at Lissa; and the French navy had
not been able to make its superiority effective against Prussia, be-
cause the war had been practically decided in the first month; the
navy remained virtually intact. According to an old but by no
means praiseworthy habit, people were inclined to draw conclusions
from recent experiences alone, and to overlook former wars, like the
Napoleonic wars and the War of Secession in America, both of which
were decided in good part by the superiority which one side had
upon the sea.

Of the further consequences of the Franco-Prussian War, only
one more can be mentioned — the effect on the new position of
affairs in Eastern Europe.

Without attempting to decide whether it is true that Austria de-
sired the War of 1870, the historian may at least maintain with cer-
tainty that it was this German victory over France which first defi-
nitely destroyed all Austria's plans for winning back again in any
way her position within Germany. The two German Powers which
had been rivals now became allies. The result of this was that
Austria, which never contemplated an overseas colonial policy, now
directed her expansionist plans exclusively toward the East, — toward
the Balkans. Her conflict with Russia, which had already existed
for a long time in a mild form, now became acute, and dominated
the whole policy of Eastern Europe and in many respects also that
of Central Europe. From being a Conservative Power, Austria had
become an aggressive one; and, though the Franco-Prussian War
may have resulted in outwardly peaceful conditions for a few decades
in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe it had caused a condition of
latent war which ultimately resulted in a complete new grouping
of the European Powers.

BOOK V
ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

CHAPTER XXVIII
NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

FROM a theoretical point of view there was nothing new in the eco-
nomic conditions which were created in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century by the economic organization of industry on a world
basis; by this is meant not merely the exchange of goods between
nations, but above all things the dependence of the most important
European nations upon food and raw materials imported from over-
seas. These economic conditions merely brought to a logical close,
one may say, the development which had begun in England at the
close of the eighteenth century in connection with the Industrial
Revolution. But already the very extension of this movement had
given it an altogether changed significance. It also became involved
with other tendencies which still further changed its character. In
the following pages these changes will be briefly outlined.

The extraordinary increase in population, which in its modern pro-
portions occurred at first only in the industrial centers of Great Brit-
ain, now not only took place in similar proportions in other equally
industrialized countries; but in these the ratio of population to agri-
cultural land and to food-supply was relatively more serious, because
the existing population was greater to begin with. Population in-
creased to an extent unparalleled in the history of the world (with
the exception of countries whose population was increased by im-
migration). In Great Britain, in 1800, there were 16,200,000 per-
sons; in 1900, 41,600,000. The figures for the other countries in
1800 and in 1900 run as follows: Germany, 21 and 56.3 million;
Italy, 18.1 and 32.4; Austria-Hungary, 23.1 and 45.4; European
Russia, 38.8 and 111.3 million. The total population of Europe in
1800 has been estimated at 180 million; in 1910 it numbered 450
million; that is, in no years it had multiplied just two and a half
times.

These figures, however, can be rightly appreciated only when con-
sidered in connection with the enormous settlements of population
in regions outside Europe. The increase in Europe was not only
accompanied, it was in fact only made possible, by a great emigra-
tion into pretty nearly every corner of the world fit for habitation

317

3i8 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

by whites. It was this emigration which helped to swell the popula-
tion of the United States from 5.3 million in 1800 to 77.1 million
in 1900. The increase of population in Europe was in fact condi-
tioned upon this emigration, because it was only by the productivity
of the whites in these thinly settled regions outside Europe that
there could be supplied the food which Europe more and more
needed. Now toward the end of the nineteenth century came the
first symptom indicating that this temporary situation might pos-
sibly come to an end before long. In the United States not only
was the vacant land largely occupied, but the former surplus of
products, particularly of wheat, was needed to feed the population
at home. There were, to be sure, still great areas, particularly in
South America, in which the saturation point had not been reached.
And in other parts of the world, particularly in Australia and New
Zealand, the stationary character of the population assured for the
future a surplus product which stood at the disposal of Europe;
and technical inventions, like the refrigeration of meat> enabled food
to be transported even over so great a distance as that between Aus-
tralia and Europe. But in both these cases of South America and
Australia, the situation would remain as it was on!y so long as there
was no immigration from Europe. Therefore, although the Euro-
pean industrial countries, in return for the products of their fac-
tories, might be fed forever from regions outside Europe (and parts
of Russia), nevertheless they would no longer have an outlet for
excess population such as had existed for all Europe up to about
1890. In densely populated countries, therefore, the necessaries
of life became dearer, because they were scarcer in proportion to
the population; and at the same time the competition for foreign
markets, and also for colonies affording the necessary raw materials
for manufacturing, became more intense — became, to speak more
accurately, a veritable struggle for existence. It was no longer a
question of exporting manufactured goods simply for profit; indus-
trial states were compelled to export their products as a means of
securing food for their overgrown population.

Attention must be called to a circumstance which still further
aggravated this overpopulation. In addition to new factors, like
steam transportation, which enabled inland and partially barren
countries to increase their population beyond the natural limits,
there was now added modern hygiene. To be sure, no sharp dividing
line between the past and the present can be drawn in this matter.
Every one knows that important measures to protect life, like vac-
cination, antedate the nineteenth century. But in connection with

NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 319

the development of the natural sciences, which now for the first
time completely emancipated themselves from theology and which
were increasingly fostered by industrial employers because of their
practical value, and along with the humanitarianism which attributed
a new value to human life, there took place about the middle of the
nineteenth century many discoveries which furnished medicine,
surgery, and sanitation with new tools and resources. Like the
new sources of food-supply, all these factors tended to lower the
death-rate. For instance, there was Lister's antiseptic treatment,
Pasteur's researches in bacteriology, and the Semmelweiss treatment
for the prevention of puerperal fever. Everywhere it was recog-
nized to be the duty of the state to make use of these discoveries
in fulfilling its functions, one of the most important of which was
now regarded as the preservation of human life. Urban building
was nearly revolutionized; the most minute hygienic regulations
were laid down, affecting the planning and construction of private
houses and especially of hospitals. To realize the decrease in the
death-rate due to all these factors, one has only to look at the sta-
tistics of infant mortality a century or more ago. Formerly it was
not uncommon for two-thirds of the children to die young. Even at
the beginning of the nineteenth century the infant mortality in
Russia somewhat exceeded 27 per cent. But even this figure is
unusually favorable compared with earlier periods. And the coun-
tries which have made the most progress in this respect, like Scandi-
navia, Switzerland, England, and France, have succeeded in saving
about 90 per cent of the children under one year of age.

Never perhaps in history did people live so improvidently, so
carelessly as to the inevitable results of their behavior, as the indus-
trial peoples of Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century.
The undreamed-of progress in all technical matters so completely
overthrew former conceptions of what was possible that even the very
conditions of human physical existence seemed to have altered. To
be sure, not all peoples were of this opinion, nor did all need to be.
Nations which had a sense of responsibility toward posterity, or
which, being made up of peasant proprietors not dependent on the
state, counted their resources carefully, like the French, the North
Americans (particularly in the Eastern States), the Australians, and
the New Zealanders — all these nations had already taken thought
in the nineteenth century to secure comparative stability in their
population. Others, like the English or the Russians, still had so
much unoccupied land at their disposal, either in Europe or in the
colonies, that the necessity of limiting the "natural" increase of

320 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

population, now possible with all the modern inventions, was not
so evident. In the case of still other nations, a decrease in the birth-
rate was beginning to be noticed. But this decrease was insufficient
to counteract the decrease in the death-rate.

As a result of these various conditions, the luxuries of life became
cheaper, and modern comforts due to invention and technical
progress came within the reach of every one; but the ordinary
necessaries of life became dearer and more difficult to secure. Char-
acteristic of this situation is the fact that the problem of housing
and land became almost the greatest social problem. Though food
production could not possibly keep pace with the increase of popu-
lation, nevertheless, thanks to modern transportation, which was al-
ways improving, and to thinly settled areas overseas, this difficulty
could still be solved; international agreement within certain limits
was possible. But nothing like this was possible in the housing
problem; here the effects of overpopulation and modern hygiene
made themselves felt more keenly than in the food question. While
the state tended greatly to increase the cost of building by its
sanitary regulations, real estate became a monopoly in the hands of
a few private persons who, in view of great demand, were able to
raise prices to exorbitant rates.

These were the circumstances which lay at the basis of that
"unrest" which has been so often and not unjustly complained of.
They made more difficult the struggle for existence by the profes-
sional classes, often attributed by dilettante writers to a change in
intellectual conditions. In contrast with the past, this was now
felt by the middle classes, and even by a part of the well-to-do.
The situation was particularly hard for young people of ability
but little property. The relative increase in the number of elderly
people, due to hygienic discoveries for prolonging life, often blocked
the path of the young. Noteworthy in this connection is the great
lengthening — in contrast even with conditions at the beginning of
the nineteenth century — of the period of professional education,
without, however, any certainty of finding after it all a place which
would even pay the expenses of the years of training. The rise of
the well-equipped poor was thus made extraordinarily difficult. Any
one who was able to wait a long time for a place, and did not have
to begin to earn his living at an early age, had pretty nearly a mon-
opoly of the occupations which were regarded as socially desirable.
Naturally the rich have always had a better chance, and before the
French Revolution (see p. n f.) they were favored by many political
privileges. But whereas at that time the number of applicants for

NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 321

office did not exceed the number of positions vacant in at all the
same proportion as later, the outlook for a gifted and energetic man
was then somewhat greater than more recently. This circumstance,
more than perhaps any other, has recently created in wide circles
a gloomy feeling of hopelessness, which may have had no small im-
portance as a psychological foundation for the development of a
war spirit.

One circumstance has not yet been mentioned which has sharp-
ened the economic conflict between nations. This is the new strug-
gle for markets.

It has been pointed out above in another connection (see p. 96 f.)
that in England the problem arising from the Industrial Revolution
was never given a carefully considered solution. The dangers
which arose from the exploitation of the workers, from the depend-
ence on foreign food-supply, and from the social condition of the
laboring classes, were lessened, but never removed. What had been
accomplished was due mainly to favoring circumstances; emigration
was possible on a wide scale, and steam transportation made possible
the importation of an unlimited food-supply. Moreover, after the
first critical years were passed, the income from exported manu-
factures was so large and steady that workingmen could be safely
allowed tolerable living conditions and sometimes even an increase
in wages. At least as late as 1870 the English large-scale textile
and steel industries were practically without a rival; the artistically
superior products of France were supplementary rather than com-
petitive. Up to this time England and France had taken the lead
in industrial technique. They had made, or turned to practical
account, virtually all the discoveries of the first half of the nine-
teenth century. So England had come to be regarded proverbially
on the Continent as a satiated, somewhat indolent, rich nation.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this situation began
to change more and more for the worse. It would be misleading
to speak of the "decadence" of English manufacturing, or to assume
a falling off in English exports. The change consisted rather in
the fact that several great industries began to compete with
those of England in the markets of the world. This competition, as
•compared with that of the earlier period, was felt more in
the new articles of export rather than in the old English staple
products. The new industrial countries, in so far as they did not
enjoy the same favorable situation which England had formerly
had, were forced from the outset to deal with a competitor. At
first France retained her leading position in all articles in which

322 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

artistic taste and delicacy of manufacture played an important
part. Then America, having ceased to be a colonial country im-
porting manufactures and exporting raw materials, and having
become a country of great industries competing in world markets,
hit upon the important practice of "standardization" (the making
of goods according to a few but complete types) ; "standardized"
goods could be manufactured very cheaply because all the goods of
one type were uniform. Though this practice is best suited to
young countries with identical needs and a uniform social structure,
like the United States and analogous colonial territories such as Can-
ada or Australia, it can be successfully adopted for many articles
in differently situated countries. More worth considering at this
point is the rise of German manufacturing on a large scale, for it
was involved much more closely than the English or American with
political and military factors, was much more fostered by the State,
and therefore has exercised a deeper influence on the history of
Germany.

As late as the middle of the nineteenth century, there did not
exist a single large factory in Germany. As compared with Eng-
land, raw materials in Germany were very inadequately developed;
in 1850, Germany mined only seven hundred-weight of coal per
capita, England, forty-three; the figures for pig-iron were 30 pounds
for Germany, as compared with 160 for England. In 1859, Germany
produced 5,000 tons of steel, while what England merely exported
was double that amount. From 1859 onwards the increase of popu-
lation, as well as the patriotic movement (involving gun-making in
the metal industries), led to a more intensive activity. How this
had increased among the German states the need for economic
unity has been pointed out above (p. 277). This need had been sat-
isfied by the political changes in 1866 and 1871. Thus one obstacle
to industrial development was cleared away.

But this was not all. The new German Empire could not draw
upon rich natural resources any more than its predecessor, the Prus-
sian Kingdom, without disturbing its dominant position in foreign
politics. Now, as previously, though to a lesser degree, Germany's
economic resources did not harmonize with her powerful position
in international politics. To be sure, Germany as a whole was not
so niggardly provided by Nature as the old Prussian Kingdom; but
the economic foundation was, and remained, too small for the exces-
sive political superstructure, particularly as the population steadily
grew larger and larger. This difficulty was further sharpened by the
extraordinary devotion to military matters which Germany inherited

NEW ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 323

from Prussia. Too large a part of the population was withdrawn
from productive work for military and administrative duties in a
country which was not adapted by Nature to bear the cost of enor-
mous armaments. The two evils went together: the burden of exces-
sive armaments and the application of large resources to uneconomic
ends. Futhermore, owing to the prevalence in Prussia of large
landed estates no serious progress could be made with agricultural
reforms, such as the establishment of small farmers on the soil.

Now what was the attitude of the German government toward
these difficulties? A completely satisfactory solution was not pos-
sible; for human energy and cleverness could not wholly offset
Nature's niggardliness. But a strong will and skill can at least
ameliorate the consequences of unfavorable conditions. This task
was undertaken with great adroitness by the governing classes
of Germany. They used the military and political situation of their
country in such a way as to compensate to some extent their dis-
advantageous position. In the first place, as has often been asserted,
the fact that the whole population, including the civil service, was
accustomed to military discipline, made easier the organization of
large industries under single management, since employers and
laborers were already intellectually prepared for submission to one
central authority. More important than this assertion (the truth
of which it is difficult to prove) was the growth of a "learned pro-
letariat" to an extent unequaled in any other country; this was
created through the exclusion of the middle classes and the intel-
lectuals from political office and through military regulations which
put a premium on higher education (like the privilege of serving
only one year in the army for those who were able to pass an
educational test). This provided the cheap and easy supply of
scientifically and technically trained labor needed in industry. The
German economist, Sombart, was certainly correct when he wrote
in 1903: "The political backwardness in which the German nation
still finds itself is not one of the least influences which have deter-
mined the peculiar character of our people. We are still to-day
governed in a half absolutistic fashion. We, or at any rate, the
members of our middle class, still do not enjoy what exists in con-
stitutional countries, namely, the possibility of a political career.
But, so far as I can see, this has all the more favorable result for
our economic life. With us there is no large diversion of talent into
the field of politics, as in other countries. Neither the rich, nor what
is more important, the talented, men of the middle class are with-
drawn from economic life to devote themselves to politics. They

324 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

remain to place their abilities at the service of industry as directors,
engineers, chemists and so forth."

This explains the characteristic which distinguishes German large-
scale production from that of all its competitors: its systematic sup-
port from science, with the emphasis on "systematic" ; for this is the
word which best describes the essence of German experimental in-
vestigation in the service of industry and the State. For the most
part, the great discoveries of "happy genius," like submarines, ma-
chine-guns, aeroplanes, telephones, phonographs, wireless telegraphy
and so forth, have been made outside Germany (especially in France) .
But these discoveries have usually been more systematically devel-
oped in Germany than elsewhere. Germany was one of the Great
Powers where proper laboratories and financial support were pro-
vided by industrial plants and by the State.

This stimulation of manufacturing was a much more vital ques-
tion for the German Empire than for other states. What could pay
for the ever increasing cost of armaments, what could pay even
for the food of the ever increasing population (hailed with joy as
potential soldiers), if not the exported manufactures? A reduc-
tion in expenditure for the army was regarded as tantamount to an
abandonment by the Empire of the preponderance won in Europe
in 1870, and by the ruling classes of their preponderance in Germany.

As a matter of fact, German manufacturers succeeded by these
means in establishing themselves beside their competitors in the
markets of the world, and even in acquiring a monopoly in certain
products — especially in the chemical trades. From an earlier period
of inferiority German trade also had developed a kind of affable
adaptability which enabled manufacturers to meet more quickly
the wishes of their customers, than did their rivals. Equally im-
portant too, was the fact that the German government used the
army, whose costs had in good part been paid by exported manu-
factures, as a lever for securing valuable marketing opportunities
for these same German manufactures in the shape of favorable
commercial treaties and so forth. Thus was created an extraor-
dinarily effective system of mutual support. Its only defect lay in
the extreme uncertainty of the bases on which it rested, namely on
a continued expansion of German exports, and on the irresistibility
of German threats of war.

CHAPTER XXIX
THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I : AFRICA

THE economic factors sketched in the preceding chapter gave
a new value to the possession of colonial territory. Although about
the middle of the nineteenth century the view had prevailed, and
not least in countries like England which possessed most colonies,
that overseas possessions were nothing but a costly burden for the
mother country, now opinion went so far to the opposite extreme
as to assert that the control over regions outside Europe, suitable
for settlement and providing raw materials, was indispensable for
a great industrial country. It was regarded as a great advantage
for an over-populated country to be able to settle its citizens in a
territory where they would not have to break their political con-
nection with the land of their birth. It also seemed desirable to
possess overseas territories which were occupied by fellow country-
men to whom the products of home industries could be more readily
sold.

Another motive was the desire to secure raw materials for manu-
factures. Now that the industries of the Great Powers had entered
upon the competitive stage with each other, a wholly new importance
attached to the possibility of obtaining from one's own colonies,
perhaps at lower cost on account of state aid, the necessary ma-
terials which were to be worked up by manufacturing. An industry
which could draw its raw materials from politically dependent
colonies was believed to have an advantage over its rivals.

Though this new situation might be explained by the new policy
which England, for instance, adopted toward colonial possessions,
the attitude of all Europe toward colonial matters was further altered
by the fact that by 1870 two new Great Powers had arisen which
likewise wanted their share in the extension of European rule in
other continents.

Germany and Italy regarded themselves, not without reason, as
being at a disadvantage. At the period when the other nations
were gaining great colonial empires, they either did not exist or
were occupied with their own unification. Not only had sea-faring

325

326 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

nations like the Dutch and the English made extensive conquests,
but great colonial regions had been acquired by the French in Al-
geria and by the Russians in Central and Eastern Asia. Now Ger-
many and Italy, finding that they had been left far behind at the
start in the race for colonial territory, had to look about to see
whether they could build up colonial empires in regions which had
not been occupied by their more fortunate rivals.

Important in its consequences was the circumstance that, though
the earth had not yet been completely divided up as far as con-
cerned regions which produced raw materials, there was, on the
other hand, relatively little territory left which was adapted to
settlement by the white man. Nearly all this kind of territory
had been occupied by other nations, particularly by the English
and the French, and, in a different fashion, by the republics of
North and South America. Almost the only exceptions were the
strips of territory in North Africa, like Tunis and Morocco, and
some parts of Turkey in Asia. If the belated states wanted to
catch up with their rivals who were ahead in the colonial race, they
believed they could only do so by force ; that is, by war or by threats
of war. Since the British colonies were fairly well populated, the
two Powers who were seeking land for settlement purposes turned
their attention primarily in the direction of the French colonies.

It can scarcely be denied that, of these two states, it was Italy
which from the outset saw more clearly the goal in view and chose
its means more cleverly. To be sure, it may have partly been due
to her relatively weak military force that Italy steadily took care
to avoid coming into open conflict with any other Great Power. As
compared with Germany, Italy could point to a much larger emigra-
tion of valuable labor; she perhaps had even greater reason for
retaining the political bond between her emigrant sons and the
mother country, and she certainly adapted her foreign policy more
consistently to this end and never failed to see the importance of
colonial policy. The same cannot be said of Germany. Her colonial
acquisitions, to be sure, measured merely by their area, were more
important than those of Italy. Thanks to the military pressure
which she could exert, she could secure from other countries con-
cessions which Italy could not think of. But the effects on her for-
eign policy of this kind of pressure were not always well considered ;
Germany's foreign policy in Europe was not modified as it should
have been in view of her new colonial aims.

The responsibility for this lies largely with the statesman who at
that time ruled German policy autocratically; or, to speak more

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 327

correctly, it lies rather with the system which he represented — the
system which reserved to a single man and a single class a monopoly
in the management of foreign relations. While a younger generation,
particularly men in large business circles, favored the acquisition of
commercial colonies, Bismarck stuck to his old principle of opposing
"colonies on the French model"; such commercial plans, which were
so completely beyond his economic horizon and so contrary to his
purely Continental traditions as an Old Prussian squire, he regarded
only with hesitation and fundamental disinclination. As is most
clearly seen in the memoirs which he wrote at the end of his life,
he never had a real interest in the problems of naval and colonial
policy, nor indeed in the tasks of the future which were facing Ger-
many as a result of her growing population and industrialization.
Understanding at bottom only the kindred governments of Russia
and Austria, but not the more liberal parliamentary countries of the
West, he never realized what France and England owed to their
colonial system. To be sure, it was under him that Germany made
her first colonial acquisitions; but neither in domestic nor foreign
politics were the traditions of the Prussian system of government
suited to the new task.

For the sake of a better bird's-eye view of recent colonial history
the following narrative has been divided into three chapters — the
partition of Africa, the struggle for Asia and the islands of the
Pacific Ocean, and the rise of the British Empire in its modern
form, together with the development of the foreign policy of the
United States. In itself no one of these chapters deserves precedence
over the others; the reason for treating Africa first is simply that
it was in Africa that one can see most clearly the rivalry of the
European Powers.

The interior of Africa was virtually untouched by European rule
up to about the middle of the nineteenth century (1865). The
coastal regions, to be sure, were largely in the hands of the old
trading nations — Portuguese, Dutch, English and French. But in
only two places did European rule extend deep into the interior:
in the north in French Algeria, and in the south in English Cape
Colony with its Boer prolongation. These two colonial conquests
were not due to a special "African" policy, but served, at least
originally, the same commercial purposes as the occupation of the
coast districts. Cape Colony was important for England's commerce
with India; the conquest of Algiers was intended to put an end to
the nuisance of piracy in the Mediterranean. No one at that time

328 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

thought of any systematic exploration of the interior, or hinter-
land; and the rather few places in which white men could be set-
tled in large numbers had not yet attracted attention.

Even in the period immediately following, the old ideas prevailed
at first. The occupation of Egypt is in many respects the counter-
part of the acquisition of Cape Colony; less regard was paid to the
advantage which might come from the territory itself than to the
importance which the whole region had for the trade with India.

Egypt, after the time of the Napoleonic expedition, became a semi-
independent state. An Albanian officer, named Mehemet Ali, raised
himself to the position of an independent pasha, and organized an
army and navy of his own. With the aid of his new forces he
conquered the Egyptian Sudan, including Khartum, and proved so
much more powerful than the Sultan at Constantinople, that the
latter was only saved from destruction by the Powers of Europe.

Mehemet Ali was one of the first oriental princes who consciously
and systematically strove to introduce European (especially French)
civilization and technical knowledge into his country. Large irriga-
tion works were built by French engineers in order better to dis-
tribute the fruitful waters of the Nile. What was perhaps more
important, Mehemet Ali introduced new crops, particularly cotton,
and thereby gave his country an exceedingly valuable article of
export. But this all took place after the fashion of an oriental en-
lightened despotism. There was lacking the middle class which
guarantees continuity in economic life. The fellaheen remained
poorer and more oppressed than ever. As there was no limit to
the pasha's power of squandering money, the expenditures of the
court regularly exceeded the revenues, no matter how much the
latter might be increased.

The situation was somewhat better, to be sure, under Said, Me-
hemet Ali's son and third successor, who ruled from 1854 to 1863.
Said recognized the right of private ownership among his Egyptian
subjects though hitherto the Pasha had owned all the land. He
dismissed a part of the soldiery in order to reduce expenditures. He
sought much more definitely than his father to promote the pros-
perity of his country by economic measures. But even in his case
everything depended on him personally; and so he had to turn to
foreigners to aid him in carrying out his reforms.

From the outset the foreigners belonged chiefly to the two na-
tions which had the greatest interest in the development of North
Africa and the route to India, namely, France and England. An
English company built the first railroad from Alexandria to Cairo.

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 329

A French engineer, De Lesseps, founded, mainly with French cap-
ital, the company which planned to build the Suez Canal.

Although the Sultan at Constantinople, influenced by the English
against the French, had not given his approval, De Lesseps began
the long and difficult excavations in 1859. Said supported him
eagerly, put 25,000 fellaheen a month at his service, and gave him
the necessary lands for nothing. In his honor the newly constructed
city at the mouth of the Canal was named Port Said. When he
died, the new Pasha, Ismail, under English influence, put great dif-
ficulties in the way of the French, and even canceled the concessions
promised by his predecessor. The English government early declared
that for the defense of India it would be compelled to seize Egypt
in case the canal was built. But in spite of this, De Lesseps suc-
ceeded by untiring energy in continuing his undertaking, and in
1869 the canal was finished. It proved of great advantage mainly
to the French, Italian and Austrian ports in the Mediterranean,
which now took over a large part of the European trade with Asia
and Australia.

Said's thrifty administration was only an episode in Egyptian his-
tory. His successor, Ismail, (1863-1879) again acted as if the
riches of Egypt were inexhaustible. However, he used the resources
which the economic prosperity of the land put at his disposal to
give his country greater independence and to Europeanize it further
along the lines which Mehemet Ali had laid down. He bought from
the Sultan of Turkey the right to bear the title of Khedive, or sov-
ereign; to make commercial treaties of his own; to increase his
army at his pleasure; and to introduce primogeniture for the ruler's
family. His government took possession of rich lands in Upper
Egypt and ordered the introduction of sugar-cane and the erection
of sugar refineries. In Cairo arose a European Quarter. Many oc-
cidental officials (mostly Frenchmen) were appointed. The Capitu-
lation System, which gave special rights and privileges to Europeans,
was restricted. Mixed courts, that is, courts composed of Egyp-
tian natives and Europeans living in Egypt, were instituted for
trying Europeans.

But all these innovations were beyond the financial resources of
his country. In ten years the Egyptian debt increased eightfold —
from 250 million to two billion francs. Ismail's credit was ex-
hausted and he could borrow only at ruinous rates of interest. At
that time (1875) the Khedive decided he must sell the 200,000
shares in the Suez Canal Company which he happened to own.
Disraeli quickly seized the opportunity to buy the shares for Eng-

330 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

land and so secure a direct influence in the administrative board of
the canal company. This money also was quickly spent by Ismail,
and the next year he began to default in the payment of his obli-
gations.

Egypt was now placed under European guardianship. The Euro-
pean governments took up the cause of the creditors and established
an international commission which should see to it that out of the
revenues of the Egyptian government the first payments should be
the interest on the debt. The commission consisted at first, in 1876,
of a Frenchman, an Italian, and an Austrian, that is, of representa-
tives of the nations which had the largest share in the trade of the
Mediterranean; later, representatives of Great Britain (1877) and
of Germany and Russia (1885) were added. Furthermore, however,
the whole financial administration of Egypt was placed, in 1876,
under special control, in fact, under two Controllers-General, one
Frenchman and one Englishman. France, after her prestige had
been weakened by the Franco-Prussian War, found it necessary to
keep on good terms with England; though she had formerly enjoyed
a preponderant position in the Nile region, she now agreed to this
"Anglo-French Condominium."

The Controllers-General now virtually took the whole government
into their own hands. They quickly discovered that the alleged
Europeanization of the administration had not put an end to the
Khedive's former autocratic methods in finance, and that the peas-
ant population (the fellaheen) were still plundered in the old fashion.
They demanded, therefore, a fundamental reform — that the Khedive
be content with a "civil list," or fixed revenue for the expenses of
his court and administration. Ismail consented and in 1878 even
appointed two of the commissioners as his ministers. But a reform
of Egyptian administration was bound to meet with dangerous op-
position. Certain as it was that the fellaheen, who had been ex-
ploited for centuries, would profit by an impartial and economical
government, it was equally certain that a limitation upon the Khe-
dive's financial power would injure the pockets of Egyptian notables.
The military and civil officials who were dismissed as superfluous
roused the people to revolts against the government of the European
commissioners. Ismail used this unrest to pose as a defender of
Islam. He dismissed his European ministers in 1879 and formed
a purely Egyptian cabinet.

The Dual Control Powers then succeeded in having the Sultan
remove Ismail. His son and successor, Tewfik, thereupon reestab-
lished the Dual-Control boards. But this did not silence the agita-

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 331

tion of the Mohammedan notables against European interference.
The Egyptian party compelled the Khedive to appoint a new cabinet
in which their leader became minister of war. The army was en-
larged and purified of its pro-European elements, and the authority
of the Controllers-General was no longer heeded (1882).

A proposition for a joint Anglo-French intervention, mainly urged
by one of the most active and important Frenchmen of the time,
Gambetta, failed through the opposition of the cautious French
Chamber of Deputies which objected to all colonial wars. All that
took place at first was merely a naval demonstration at Alexandria
and an international conference at Constantinople. In Egypt itself,
however, actual attacks were made by natives on Christians and a
number of Europeans were massacred in Alexandria. In spite of
this the French government refused to join with the British in in-
tervening, and even recalled their ships. The British admiral there-
upon bombarded Alexandria and occupied it with marines (1882).

The latent conflict now broke into open war. The Egyptian
minister of war threatened to destroy the Suez Canal. At this the
English advanced to the canal (after the French Chamber had again
refused to join with them) and seized it. They also occupied Cairo.
The Egyptian army was destroyed; its leader, the minister of war,
Arabi Bey, was captured and banished to Ceylon.

Out of the British occupation now arose the Egyptian "provisional
arrangement" — which was to last for decades. The English did not
proceed to annex the territory. They did not even interfere with
Egyptian institutions. They merely replaced the only force which
could have offered opposition to Europeans, namely the Egyptian
army, by a military organization dependent on themselves. The
Egyptian army was reorganized under the leadership of a British
general, or "Sirdar," and a standing English force of five to six
thousand men, paid out of the Egyptian budget, was stationed
in the country. The joint Anglo-French control was now at an
end (1883).

This was the beginning of the Anglo-French tension which was to
last twenty years. Henceforth French diplomacy strove to compel
the rival British to leave the land which they had occupied provision-
ally. The efforts, however, were in vain. All that France could bring
about was a European conference which neutralized the Suez Canal,
so that, in case of war, it could not be closed. This tension was not
officially ended until the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. But before
this is described, it is necessary to look at the situation in North-West
Africa; because the Entente of 1904 depended as much upon what

332 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

had been taking place in the western, as in the eastern, part of
North Africa.

As France's desire for influence in Egypt was mainly a conse-
quence of her occupation of Algeria, so her new policy of extending
French occupation over the regions to the west, south and east of
Algeria was also a natural continuation of a series of events which
began in 1830. To the French in Algeria it was important that the
nearest powerful Mohammedan country, Egypt, should be in the
hands of a friendly or dependent state; it was still more important,
in fact absolutely indispensable for the safety of the colony, that the
immediate border territories should be thoroughly subjected. In
Egypt a compromise arrangement with one of the other Great
Powers was conceivable; but in Tunis and Morocco any kind of
condominium would vitally interfere with French colonial policy in
Africa.

The first question which arose was the annexation of the region
lying to the east of Algeria. The Bey of Tunis, who was nominally
subordinate to the Sultan of Turkey like the Bey of Algiers formerly,
was a less dangerous neighbor for Europeans than the former piratical
princes of Algeria. Not only was there no piracy at Tunis, but
Europeans were admitted with relative freedom. As compared with
Algiers formerly, Tunisia had a somewhat larger percentage of fixed,
non-nomadic inhabitants, peasants and merchants; in addition there
had come a considerable number of European settlers, chiefly from
Italy and Malta, but also a number of French capitalists. The for-
eigners lived under the Capitulations System and were under the
jurisdiction of their own consuls.

There were not lacking, however, grounds for intervention. The
Bey of Tunis, like the Khedive of Egypt, could not live within his
income. He was compelled to borrow considerable sums from Eu-
ropean capitalists, and only the pressure of a control by the Great
Powers could persuade him to pay the interest regularly. Further-
more, he either could not, or would not, prevent robber bands in
his country from making raids upon French Algeria; for this there
seemed to be no remedy except occupation by a European Power.

As to the raids, France was the only power directly interested;
but the French were also largely concerned in a solution of the finan-
cial question. So it was natural that the French should cast their
eyes toward Tunis. But a French conquest of the country was
directly opposed to the views of other Great Powers. Great Britain
had not been pleased when the French got a foothold in North
Africa (see above, p. 118), and now supported the Sultan's rights

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I : AFRICA 333

of sovereignty. Still more dangerous was Italy's opposition. If
Italy wanted to pursue a colonial policy at all, Tunis was naturally
her first objective. The land of the Beys had already attracted a
considerable number of Italian settlers. It stood right at the door
of the newly-created Italian Kingdom. And it offered much more
favorable economic opportunities than Tripoli, which lay further
to the east. Italy therefore insisted from the first that she at least
be treated on an equal footing with her two rivals. As in the sim-
ilar case of Egypt later (see p. 330), when an international commis-
sion for controlling the collection of the Tunisian revenues was es-
tablished, one Italian was given a place on the Council along with
a Frenchman and Englishman (1865-1870). But soon afterwards,
Italy's position grew less favorable. In 1878 Great Britain gave
up her untenable position in favor of France, and henceforth Italy
stood alone in opposition to her more powerful French rival. The
first result of this was that the Bey favored the less dangerous
Italian state at the expense of France; in railway concessions, for
example, he granted more to the Italians than to the French. But
this very circumstance drove the French to take the last step of
converting Tunis into a French protectorate.

A new attack on the Algerian frontier by a mountain tribe of
Khroumirs furnished the pretext for intervention. The Bey refused
to help the French punish the robbers. Thereupon a French division
marched into Tunis and occupied the Khroumir territory. The Bey
appealed to Europe for help; but no Power (not even Italy) would,
or could, interfere. So, after his capital had been occupied by the
French, he had to sign the Treaty of Bardo, recognizing a French
protectorate.

As in the case of Algeria earlier, there occurred a revolt of the
Mohammedan tribes to the south of the new protectorate. But the
French easily suppressed it, and from this time (1881) remained in
undisturbed possession. The eastern frontier of Algeria was thus
definitely secured.

The development which then took place in Tunis has many anal-
ogies with that in Algeria, with the single exception that the rule of
the native prince — the Bey — continued as a matter of formality
(somewhat as in Egypt and partly as in India) . But the real govern-
ment lies in the hands of a French resident, and the real military
power is exercised by French troops stationed in the country. Eco-
nomic prosperity also has developed along the same lines as in Al-
geria; numerous roads and railways have been built by the French.
The budget, which under the Bey regularly closed with a deficit, now

334 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

shows just as regularly a surplus. But as far as the European popu-
lation is concerned the French are at the same disadvantage as in
Algiers. Tunis is much less suited than Algeria to the one kind of
French immigration which is most important, namely that of French
peasants. No subdivision of the soil has taken place. Furthermore,
the Italian settlers in Tunis are about three times as numerous as
the French, who are preponderant only in wealth; the Italians are
active as laborers and not as small proprietors.

Between France and Italy the annexation of Tunis caused an
estrangement which lasted nearly a generation. Italy now turned her
back completely on France. She joined with Germany and Austria,
which had been allied since 1879, in forming the "Triple Alliance"
(May 20, 1882). The Italian government was not able to secure
from Austria an express promise of support for Italian Mediter-
ranean projects. But in Rome there evidently existed the hope that
henceforth Italy could pursue her colonial aims in opposition to
France with more success. Significant in this connection also is the
fact that a special declaration was attached to the Triple Alliance
Treaty stating that under no circumstances could the treaty be re-
garded as directed against Englnd.

At the same time Italy began to increase her armaments, which
had not been possible after 1870 on account of her unsatisfactory
financial condition (see above, p. 259), and initiated on the Red Sea
a colonial policy of her own. The account of these events, however,
must be postponed; at this point it is more convenient to explain
the progress of the undertakings which have transformed the orig-
inally tiny colony of Algiers into the center of a mighty colonial
empire.

There were two tasks confronting the French government in Al-
geria. One, in general the more important, was the counterpart to
the subjection of Tunis; it was the occupation of Morocco, which,
as an independent neighboring state, was more dangerous to the
safety of the French colonists in Algeria than Tunis had been. But
as this could not be undertaken at once because of England's oppo-
sition, the French after 1880 devoted their energies to the other
task.

This was the further extension of the southern frontier of Al-
geria, already advanced into the Sahara Desert, so that it should
come into touch with the French settlement at the mouth of the
Senegal River on the West Coast of Africa. This work was under-
taken from both extremities. From the colony of Senegal, which
in 1815, like nearly all the other European possessions in Africa,

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I : AFRICA 335

had consisted merely of a narrow strip of coast, the French pressed
up the Senegal River into the interior until they finally reached the
Niger (1883). Everywhere military posts were established. Leaving
the Niger, they pushed on eastwards to Lake Chad (1898). They
had already captured Timbuctoo, the capital of the region (1894).
By 1898 the French had reached a point south of the Sahara lying
somewhat further east than Tunis. All of these conquests, however,
would have remained incomplete if a sure connection had not been
established with French Guinea. This also was brought about by
systematic advances and political agreements. After the Ivory Coast
hinterland had come in good part into French hands, the whole
Ivory Coast itself fell to France by a friendly arrangement with
England (1892), though hitherto the French had had nothing but
insignificant settlements there. A second connection with the Guinea
Coast was created by the fact that the negro military kingdom of
Dahomey, whose ruler had often maltreated French traders, was
destroyed and annexed by the French. The French Sudan Empire
now comprised a solid area of over two million square kilometers,
with free access to the sea in the south and west as well as in the
north.

Finally, thanks to the bravery of their explorers and the energy
of their generals, the French succeeded even in uniting their newly-
founded Congo colony with their possessions in the Sudan. Under
Major Marchand they pressed on, passing what was then the Ger-
man Kamerun territory, north-eastwards as far as Uganda (1896-
98); after a convention of 1899 England recognized their right to
expand over the Wady region; this was definitely brought under
subjection in 1901 and established a direct connection between the
Chad region and the whole Sudan.

This last advance, however, threatened again to sharpen the still
unrelieved tension over Egypt. The military expedition under
Marchand had in fact pushed eastwards to the White Nile and taken
possession of a little place called Fashoda. But the French and Eng-
lish governments both remained true to their policy of avoiding war,
and the affair was settled when the French ministry recalled Mar-
chand's detachment. France even went further, and, in a convention
which may be regarded as foreshadowing the later Entente, ex-
pressly renounced all her claims to the Upper Nile; that is, she
recognized indirectly British supremacy in Egypt.

In order to understand this, the story of the extension of British
power over the Egyptian Sudan may here be briefly told. Mehemet
All (see p. 328) had already planned the conquest of the Upper

336 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

Nile region, and under Ismail the conquest had been accomplished.
The whole Egyptian Sudan, up to the great lakes, was brought
under Egyptian administration. This innovation resulted in many
difficulties: Sudanese negroes were sometimes set over European
officials, and native slave-dealers were disquieted lest the Europeans
wanted to check their business. The discontent became much more
serious when in Egypt itself a Mohammedan party began to oppose
the supremacy of the Europeans (see above, p. 330). At the moment
when Arabi Bey was stirring up revolt against the English and the
French, there arose among the Sudanese a native who proclaimed
himself the "Mahdi" — Prophet or Messiah — who would win for
Islam supreme power throughout the world. The Mahdi formed a
religious brotherhood, whose members the English called "dervishes,"
organized an army, and overthrew the Egyptian administration in
the Sudan. An Egyptian army which was sent against him was
destroyed. General Gordon who came up from Cairo to suppress
the movement was besieged with his Egyptian garrison in Khartum.
After holding out for a year during 1884-85 the town was taken
and Gordon was murdered. In spite of this tragic occurrence,
which roused great indignation in England, Great Britain at that
time was so occupied with other cares that she did not at once at-
tempt to recover her position. Moreover, the British occupation of
the Nile region was still regarded by many in England as provisional ;
as such, it did not imply any duty to occupy the hinterland in the
Sudan.

Not until 1897, after Egypt had become more and more a real
British possession, did the English authorities seriously prepare a
campaign against the Mohammedan fanatics in the Upper Nile
region. With the aid of carefully-laid railways a much quicker ad-
vance could be made this time than in the case of the unfortunate
expedition led by Gordon. As soon as a considerable force of trained
troops with European firearms opposed the dervishes, their resistance
naturally collapsed. On September 2, 1898, the Sirdar of Egypt,
General Kitchener, captured Omdurman on the White Nile, the
stronghold of the Mahdi. Shortly afterwards the town of Khartum
fell into the hands of the Anglo-Egyptian troops. The "Calif" who
had succeeded the Mahdi fled into the desert, where after long wan-
derings with his chiefs he was finally slain by the English a year
later.

It happened that in Khartum General Kitchener received news
of Marchand's occupation of Fashoda. He therefore went over on a
little steamer and hoisted his Egyptian flag opposite the French

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I : AFRICA 337

tricolor. The way in which this incident was settled has already
been told. It may be added that the English, in order to obliterate
the memory of this painful incident, have wiped out the name
"Fashoda" from their maps, so that the village where the historic
meeting took place is now called "Kodok."

France did not have to wait long for compensation. For a long
time and for more insistent reasons than in the case of Tunis, France
had sought to secure control over Morocco. The south-eastern part
of this country was the starting-point for all the Mohammedan re-
volts which had caused unrest in Algeria. The French had already
taken advantage of the extension of their power in the Sudan to
establish some military posts in Southern Oran, in order to check
this danger, but her further efforts to subdue Morocco had always
failed on account of England's opposition. England had also often
sent arms to the Sherif, or Sultan, and had helped train Moroccan
troops. In English eyes, however, Morocco had lost much of its
value since the opening of the Suez Canal; and although the foreign
trade of Morocco was almost exclusively in English and French
hands, the English government preferred to make secure its com-
munications with India by getting firm hold of Egypt rather than
to prolong its conflict with France in Egypt and Morocco. Ac-
cordingly, in 1904, there took place the famous Convention or
"Entente" which definitely put an end to the differences between
England and France over their colonial policies in North Africa.
France agreed to cease demanding England's withdrawal from Egypt;
in return, England accorded France full freedom of action in Mo-
rocco. It was a fine example of the way peacefully-inclined Great
Powers can settle their disputes; the diplomatic battle was fought
out without the accompaniment of military threats, increased arma-
ments, and warlike demonstrations.

The events just narrated may be regarded in a certain sense as a
continuation of the old Hellenistic-Roman Mediterranean policy.
On the other hand, the policy of the European states toward Africa
which began about 1870 — the regular partition of Africa— was
something altogether new. It differed essentially from the old
policy in that it was not confined to the North African coast, which
after all is a part of Europe geographically, nor to the strips of
coast occupied by European traders; on the contrary it aimed at
the systematic control and exploitation by Europeans of the whole
interior of the Dark Continent. A natural result of this new move-
ment was the increase in the number of states participating in

338 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

African politics. Hitherto the occupation of African territory had
been confined either to states which were interested in Africa on
account of their own Mediterranean position — like France, and, to
a slight extent, Spain — or which sought points of support for their
trade with India and Eastern Asia — like Portugal, England and Hol-
land. But now the competition for territory in the Dark Continent
was taken up by states which were driven merely by the desire to
share in the plunder — like Germany and, indirectly, Belgium.

Italy's case was peculiar. Her interests rested primarily on her
position as a Mediterranean Power. Her late entrance into the race
for Africa was due solely to the fact that she had become unified
as a Great Power later than France; it was not due to any new
conception of the value of Africa. Italy's African policy accordingly
followed its own bent; it is not to be regarded as a part of the gen-
eral European action. Austria-Hungary also, in spite of her large
Mediterranean interests, took no part at all in the partition of
Africa, doubtless on account of her internal political situation; Aus-
trian expansion gravitated exclusively toward the Balkans.

The first impulse toward a European settlement of the African
question was a humanitarian one. The journeys into the interior
of Africa by explorers of different nations had disclosed the existence
of an extensive slave-trade. The exportation of negro slaves to
America, to be sure, had completely ceased since England put her
foot down; but the export to Asia was still flourishing. On the
east coast of Africa there were great slave depots in which traders,
mostly Arabs, bought their wares for further sale in Asia. One
of the main reasons the negro chiefs were in continual war with
one another was that their tribesmen were captured and sold. The
slave-trade had assumed such proportions that some European ob-
servers even feared that Africa would be depopulated. Without
considering whether such a thing was possible, this much can be
stated with certainty: the slave traffic as it was then carried on in
Africa entailed a disproportionately large loss of human life. Negroes
captured in war who were too weak or too old to be sold as slaves
were simply murdered; and many died of exhaustion as they were
being driven down to the coast to be sold.

Many philanthropic societies were founded in Europe to put an
end to this inhuman traffic. They wanted the European Powers to
intervene. But it soon became evident that nothing but a permanent
occupation by Europeans could accomplish anything. Of how little
avail were mere proclamations had just been shown in the case of
the Egyptian conquest of the Upper Nile during the years 1869-

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 339

1875: these were supposed to put an end to the slave- trade in the
Egyptian Sudan; in reality the traffic still continued under the
Khedive's administration.

At first a semi-official European arrangement was attempted.
Leopold II, King of the Belgians, along with De Lesseps, the con-
structor of the Suez Canal, and Cardinal Lavigerie, the Primate of
Africa, founded in 1876 the "International African Association."
Its aim was the exploration of Central Africa as well as the sup-
pression of the slave-trade there. It began its task with great
energy. It provided Henry M. Stanley, who had just explored the
Congo River, with means for establishing a series of military posts
in the Congo region. Various places in the neighborhood of Lake
Tanganyika were fortified as places of refuge from the slave dealers.
This barred the great slave route from the Zambesi in the South to
Khartum on the Upper Nile.

But national rivalries soon arose within the Association. The
nations which already owned colonies in the neighborhood (like
Great Britain, France, and Portugal) feared they would lose a
valuable hinterland. And at any rate they were not inclined to
concede a free access to the sea to the new Belgian colonial state,
as one might call it. Moreover Germany, which hitherto possessed
no colonies in Africa, laid claim to a part of the Dark Continent.
Bismarck knew how to bring it about that a European conference
should meet in Berlin in 1885, in which the Great Powers of Eu-
rope systematically laid down the principles and prepared the way
for the partition of Africa.

The Conference dissolved the International Association, but this
did not mean that Leopold's work was undone. The diplomatists
recognized that a Congo state, lying in the middle of the continent,
would furnish as good a buffer as the rival European countries
could wish. They therefore allowed Leopold's new creation to
exist under the name of "The Congo Free State." But its admin-
istration did not remain international. It was the personal property
of the King of the Belgians, but it had no connection with the Bel-
gian state (until later when Leopold II bequeathed it to Belgium).
The Congo Free State was also given an uninterrupted access to the
ocean, inasmuch as the navigation of the Congo and the Niger
was declared free to all nations — on the analogy of the Rhine and
Danube agreements. The new conquests in the French Congo
(see p. 335) were given international recognition, and equal trading
privileges in the whole Congo region were thus assured to all nations.

The Berlin Conference also laid down for the future some funda-

340 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

mental principles of a general nature: all the Powers agreed to sup-
press the slave-trade; henceforth, every annexation of African soil
must be officially notified to the Powers; and no annexations were
to be recognized unless accompanied by effective occupation.

Now began the era of great annexations. The prevailing motive
was no longer necessity or security, but the feeling that without
colonies a Great Power was incomplete, especially in the case of
the two Powers which had hitherto had no share in the colonization
of Africa. In 1884-5 Germany took possession of Togoland and
the Kameruns on the Gulf of Guinea, of the economically worth-
less South West Africa — where later some diamonds were discovered
— and of the more promising German East African Territory to the
east of the Belgian Congo. Bismarck's dismissal gave a new free-
dom to German colonial policy. As several of Germany's recent
acquisitions conflicted with British claims, Germany and England
signed an agreement in 1890 dividing between themselves the lands
of the Sultan of Zanzibar. England took the island of Zanzibar
and the Northern continental part which connected the Upper Nile
region directly with the Indian Ocean, and Germany received the
Southern part. As compensation for other claims, Germany also
received from England the island of Heligoland, thanks to which the
English had hitherto been able to control the entrance to the Elbe
at Hamburg. For England the treaty was unfavorable to the extent
that it destroyed for the present her purpose of establishing an un-
broken colonial Empire in Africa reaching from the Cape to Cairo.
To be sure, it was now possible to protect the Egyptian Sudan from
any threat of danger from Germany, just as it was protected against
a French advance; but between the English possessions in the Su-
dan and in South Africa, there was now shoved a barrier in the
shape of the German and Belgian colonies. In this respect England's
position in Africa was much less favorable than that of France.

France further extended her African possessions by conquering the
island of Madagascar. This also was a blow to British claims. The
English had often supported the native population in their resistance
to French efforts at annexation. In 1868, the English even suc-
ceeded in converting to Anglicanism Ranawalo II, Queen of the
Hovas, so that British influence had seemed assured.

However, the quarrels between the Hovas and the French colonists
on Reunion Island (or lie Bourbon) did not cease any more than
the conflicts with the French traders on Madagascar itself. After
bombarding the coast several times, the French received in 1885
the right to maintain a French resident with a military guard in the

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 341

capital, Tananarive, as well as to occupy a number of coast dis-
tricts. This veiled protectorate was the first step toward annexa-
tion. The Queen of the Hovas at the time, Ranawalo III, used
her liberty to maintain direct diplomatic relations not only with
Great Britain as before, but also with the United States. The
French therefore sent an ultimatum in 1894. French public opinion
had recently become much more favorable to colonial undertakings
and the Chamber of Deputies without difficulty granted money for
decisive action when the ultimatum was rejected. Under these cir-
cumstances, French success was certain. Although the 15,000 French
troops who were landed on the west coast of Madagascar suffered
terribly from fever, Tananarive was captured with almost no serious
opposition in 1895, and the Queen recognized the French protectorate.
But as she or her officials, in spite of this, tried to stir up rebellion
against the French, Madagascar was changed from a protectorate
into an out-and-out French colony. Here also slavery was abolished
as one of the results of European rule.

The check which the English had suffered through the creation
of German East Africa was all the more bitter in that shortly before
the conclusion of the Zanzibar Agreement they had begun a new
advance from South Africa which seemed to bring them considerably
nearer their goal of uniting Cape Town and Cairo. The Portuguese
had retained as remnants from the age of their bold voyages of
discovery two relatively large stretches of land on the east and west
coasts of Africa — Angola on the west, and Mozambique on the east.
Portugal now considered the possibility of uniting these two regions
into an unbroken whole by converting the Zambesi territory into a
Portuguese colony. Such a scheme would have completely cut off
Cape Colony from Northern Africa. The British therefore com-
pelled Portugal to abandon her plan. The weak little country had
to give its consent to the Convention of August 20, 1890, which
established the British in the Zambesi territory. Under the leader-
ship of Cecil Rhodes the new British territory was quickly brought
under English subjection and the warlike tribes of Matabeleland
were conquered by his companion, Dr. Jameson. The railway which
ran inland from Cape Town was at once extended almost to the
Zambesi; but its completion was prevented on the one hand by the
existence of German East Africa, and on the other by the opposi-
tion of the French, who refused their consent to the transfer of a
strip of land in the Belgian Congo west of Lake Tanganyika.

The disputes between the Great Powers were not completely set-

342 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

tied by these various agreements. Between Germany and Great Brit-
ain, to be sure, there were no longer any serious grounds of conflict,
but between Germany and France there developed an opposition
which in many respects was much more dangerous. Germany seemed
to oppose on principle France's efforts to round out her African
colonial empire and render it secure; in particular Germany opposed
the "Tunification" of Morocco after England in 1904 had withdrawn
her opposition. But before an account is given of these matters,
something must be said of Italian policy in Africa.

Italy's policy of conquest in Africa is peculiar in the respect that
it affords the only case in history in which a native African state
succeeded in successfully evading European control. The Empire
of Abyssinia (with only the apparent exception of the negro Re-
public of Liberia) was the only really independent state in Africa
at the close of this new colonial period. It owed its independence
not only to the jealousy of European states toward one another,
but also to its own real power.

The Christian Empire of Abyssinia for centuries had been torn
by internal feuds. The "Ras" — local rulers — were in almost con-
tinual strife with the "Negus" or supreme ruler, to whom they often
paid only nominal obedience. The country also was virtually un-
known to Europeans and these civil wars had attracted little atten-
tion in Europe. Only once had the English felt compelled to inter-
vene, when Negus Theodore II arrested and imprisoned an English
consul in 1862. Great Britain despatched an expedition and suc-
ceeded in winning the support of the Ras. The Negus was defeated
and in 1868 committed suicide in his fortress of Magdala, whereupon
the English withdrew their troops. They were content to have
restored British prestige. Moreover, they believed that the country
could only be conquered by a large number of troops and that the
cost would be more than it would be worth.

From the 'eighties onward it was not England but Italy which
had most to do with Abyssinia. In 1885 an Italian colony had been
established at Massowah on the Red Sea near the Abyssinian fron-
tier. This settlement was often troubled by the Negus John, and
some Italian troops were completely routed. Italy therefore entered
into close relations with Menelek, who was Ras of Shoa and a rival
claimant for the position of Negus. Through his support Italy
tried to secure a firm foothold in Abyssinia and an agreement was
signed in which Menelek, in return for recognition by Italy, was
supposed to recognize an Italian protectorate. By this Treaty of
Ucciali of May 22, 1889, Italy agreed to recognize Menelek as

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I : AFRICA 343

"King of Kings" or "Negus of Ethiopia"; Menelek on his side made
the concession that he would negotiate with European Powers only
through the mediation of Italy. He also gave commercial privileges,
and agreed to have coins stamped in Italy and to order munitions.
An Ethiopian coin was struck which bore the image of the King
of Italy and the inscription, "Italy protects Ethiopia." On October
n, 1889, Italy officially notified the other Powers that she had as-
sumed a protectorate over Abyssinia.

These arrangements were extended by a further Italian occupation
of African territory. Hitherto, the Italians had only taken a piece
of land on the Red Sea; now followed the occupation of territory in
East Africa on the Indian Ocean. In 1891 the Italians signed a
convention with England which separated their claims from the
British possessions in Somaliland. The whole hinterland as far as
the region of the Upper Nile was recognized as an Italian sphere of
influence. Italy seemed to have laid the foundation for a great
African colonial empire, and for a share in the struggle for the
possession of the Egyptian Sudan.

But the Italian statesman, Crispi, the chief promoter of these
colonial undertakings, had reckoned without his Ethiopian ally.
Menelek succeeded in getting his own sovereignty recognized by the
successor of Negus John. This restored the unity of Ethiopia, and
Menelek no longer needed to lean on the Italians. He had himself
solemnly crowned and sent a direct notification of the fact to all
the Powers. When Italy complained that this infringed the Treaty
of Ucciali, Menelek on May n, 1893, declared the treaty at an
end altogether. So war began.

The Italian attack was led by General Baratieri from Massowah
as a base. The Italians first had to deal with the Ras of Tigre,
Menelek's former rival. He was beaten in a series of brilliant en-
gagements and had to flee to Menelek in 1895. After his most
dangerous rival had thus been overthrown, Menelek took courage.
He summoned his people to a national war against the invaders,
and soon had under his banners some 150,000 men, so it was said,
against about 20,000 Italians. The result came quickly. One
Italian column was annihilated; another had to capitulate; and an
even worse fate overtook the main force under General Baratieri
himself. In spite of the enemy's overwhelming superiority in num-
bers, the Italian General was unwilling to leave Abyssinian territory
and prepared to fight at Adowa. The result was a catastrophe. One
Italian general was taken captive, two others were killed, the retreat
took on a panicky character, and about 4,000 Italians, together

344 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

with all the artillery, fell into the hands of the Negus on March
i, 1896.

The blow was so crushing that Baratieri was court-martialed, but
acquitted. Crispi had to resign. More important was the fact
that the Italians were unable to attempt any military recovery.
Although their army was reformed at Massowah they had to con-
sent to negotiate, and on October 26, 1896, signed the Peace of
Addis-Ababa, in which they officially abandoned the Treaty of
Ucciali. Italy had to recognize the absolute independence of
"Ethiopia," as Abyssinia was now called. Though the Italians re-
tained the colony of Massowah, they had to give up their dream
of an East African Colonial Empire which was to balance that of
France in the West. They therefore made their next colonial at-
tempt at a different point. But as this took place in connection with
the Morocco trouble the latter must first be explained.

Attention has been called to the fact that it was absolutely neces-
sary for France to exercise a control over the administration of
Morocco. So long as Mohammedan tribes from the Moroccan ter-
ritory could disturb Algeria, the security of the French colony was
always in danger. But hitherto French attempts to get control over
Morocco had always failed on account of England's opposition.
Now in 1904 the Entente with England seemed to open the way:
the only country which had opposed French supremacy in Morocco
recognized French rights there in return for the French recog-
nition of British claims in Egypt. But events at once showed that
France was rid of one rival only to raise up another in its place
which was more dangerous both from a military and a political
point of view. The German Empire raised belated objections to
the French aspirations and succeeded in strengthening the Sultan
of Morocco in his refusal of French demands. The Anglo-French
Convention was held by Germany to be not binding internationally
because it had not been officially notified to the other Powers (see
p. 340) ; and at least it ought to be recognized that all European
Powers should be accorded equal rights in Morocco. These views
were given striking publicity by the German Kaiser's visit to the
Moroccan port of Tangier on March 31, 1905. William II
declared on this occasion that the object of his visit was to make
it publicly known that he was determined to safeguard efficaciously
German interests in Morocco; and that he looked upon the Sultan
as an absolutely independent sovereign.

This amounted to an official proclamation by Germany that she
would absolutely oppose the establishment of a French protectorate

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 345

over Morocco. The opposition between the two countries showed
itself with an intensity hitherto unequaled in the history of the
partitioning of Africa. On the one side was France, which believed
that she must guard her great colonial possession from troublesome
interference from an independent Morocco or even from German
settlements in the country which, as was feared, would be only too
easily used at every opportunity to support rebellions against the
French. On the other side was the German Empire, which could
only maintain her military system and support her excessively swollen
population, now numbering sixty millions as against forty millions in
1870, with the aid of her steadily increasing exports; Germany,
therefore, believed that she must lay claim to every sort of territory
which was still available, in order to provide for her industries. The
opposition was still further intensified by the fact that France's
new enemy was no longer a state like Great Britain, which avoided
in principle any conflict with Great Powers on the Continent out
of regard for her own military weakness; on the contrary, France's
new enemy was the leading military state of the age, which never
hesitated to appeal to the sword by threatening the possibility of war.

The effect of this new turn in Moroccan affairs was enormous in
France. It was felt that the military inferiority from which France
had suffered in respect to her eastern neighbor since 1870 was now
to be exploited not only in European matters, but also in the colonial
affairs of North Africa from which Bismarck had always stood aloof.

So this interference on Germany's part produced an impression
which long outlasted the immediate episode. For the moment it
was not difficult to settle the question at issue, because France
gave way in all essential points to Germany's demands: Delcasse, the
French minister of foreign affairs, who had refused to abandon
France's privileges in Morocco as a matter of principle, had to re-
sign on June 6, 1905, because his colleagues in the Cabinet and the
Chamber of Deputies would not support him. France and Germany
then signed, on September 28, 1905, an agreement which provided
for the internationalization and independence of various branches of
the Moroccan administration. This agreement was then laid before
an international conference which met shortly afterward, from Jan-
uary to April, 1906, in the Spanish town of Algeciras opposite
Gibraltar. Here, also, the German view prevailed completely.
Moreover, the very fact that the Moroccan question was placed be-
fore an international assembly attended by the European Powers,
the United States, and Morocco, was in itself a success for German
diplomacy. France, who believed she had a right to claim a priv-

346

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

ileged position in Morocco because of her Entente settlement with
England in 1904, and because of earlier agreements with Morocco,
had to agree to a Franco-Spanish police force and a Moroccan bank
which were to be placed under international control, in spite of
France's overwhelming financial interests in the region; the chief
inspector of the police force was to be a Swiss. In all financial
matters, such as the granting of contracts for public works, no one
nation was to be given an advantage over others.

But this settlement soon proved unsatisfactory. The native popu-
lation committed various acts of violence against French subjects in
Morocco. Against these acts the international police force, which
was never really organized, was powerless. The French, therefore,
occupied the town of Ujda on the Algerian frontier, and in 1907 the
port of Casablanca was occupied by Spanish troops. At the same
time the French advised the establishment of Franco-Spanish pro-
tective military detachments in place of the police force, but this
proposal was rejected owing to the opposition of the German gov-
ernment.

The Moroccan conflict therefore remained still unsettled. The
opposition soon flamed up anew. Aside from the fact that France
and Germany could not agree upon the interpretation of the eco-
nomic clauses of the Algeciras agreement, the internal anarchy in
Morocco made French military intervention more necessary than
ever. The Sultan of Morocco, Muley Hand, was threatened by
native rebellious tribes who were also making attacks upon the
French. France therefore sent a military expedition to the Moroc-
can capital of Fez, and restored order there; as soon as this had
been accomplished, in May and June, 1911, the troops immediately
began their retreat. At the same time Spain occupied the port of
Larasch on the west coast, because of an earlier agreement.

Germany regarded this advance of the French as a breach of
the Algeciras Act, and replied to it by a military demonstration.
The gunboat Panther was sent to Agadir on the south-west coast
of Morocco on July i, 1911. This was intended as an official procla-
mation of German claims either to a part of Morocco, or to some
other piece of French colonial territory. After long negotiations,
during which England at first took a stand against Germany's ex-
cessive demands, an agreement was signed on November 4, 1911,
by which Germany declared she was ready to recognize French polit-
ical control over Morocco in return for the cession of considerable
French territories in the Congo region. By this agreement, France
acquired the right to occupy by military force all points in Morocco

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 347

which she deemed necessary for public safety, and also the right
to represent the Sultan in his foreign relations. This satisfied the
chief complaints of the French. On the other hand, it was agreed
that the French Protectorate over Morocco should not be used for
the economic advantage of France exclusively; in commercial mat-
ters, and in the granting of contracts for public works, no distinc-
tion was to be made between nations. The Congo territory which
France ceded to Germany amounted to 275,000 square kilometers.

Even this Moroccan arrangement, however, did not wholly clear
up the situation. France, on her side, possessed within her Protec-
torate only limited rights; even the foreign consular courts, for ex-
ample, remained in existence. On the other hand, it was to be
expected that Germany would insist by threats of war, if necessary,
that every extension of French authority should be paid for by
further cessions of French colonial territory. The time had now
come which has already been alluded to: Africa was so completely
divided between the European Powers that henceforth, if one country
attempted to extend its colonial possessions, it could only do so
at the expense of one of the other European Powers. In practice,
this situation found expression in the fact that the most powerful
military state threatened to rob its less powerful neighbor of a part
of its colonies: in Central Africa, especially, it was seeking to estab-
lish a connection between the German colonies in the East and West
and round them out toward the North. So there developed here
inflammable matter of the most dangerous kind — dangerous pri-
marily because it was due to economic causes and because Germany
at that time regarded her own continued economic expansion as ab-
solutely necessary if she was to retain longer the position of hege-
mony which she had hitherto enjoyed (see p. 324). How completely
Germany had planned for the acquisition of French colonial terri-
tory is seen in the fact that in the decisive days at the end of July,
1914, the German government expressly refused to give Great Brit-
ain any kind of a guarantee in favor of the integrity of the French
colonies in case of war; in other words, she announced at the outset
her purpose of annexing, in whole or in part, French colonial ter-
ritory after she had won the war.

A curious chain of circumstances now brought it about that one
of the Powers on which Germany had thought she could count was
no longer on her side, but on that of her enemy; and this was also
a result of colonial aspirations in Africa. After Italy's attack against
Abyssinia had failed so disastrously, the only region left to which
Italian colonial policy could turn was Turkish territory, a remnant

348 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

which still remained free from European control between French
Tunis and the virtually English possession of Egypt. The Italians
now aspired to the conquest of Tripoli. This was especially the
case in the fall of 1911, when the Franco-German negotiations over
Morocco made it clear that under no circumstances would Italy
be able to acquire anything in North West Africa. As early as 1901
and 1903, France and Italy had mutually guaranteed to each other
their interests in Morocco and Tripoli; was this, therefore, not the
right moment for Italy to foreclose her mortgage?

But how would such an undertaking harmonize with Italy's mem-
bership in the Triple Alliance, to say nothing of the possible re-
proaches which might be made to her on the score of the unattrac-
tiveness and barrenness of a region which, not without reason, had
hitherto been neglected by the Powers? Would Italy not have to
go over to the other coalition of Powers, if she wanted to take pos-
session of a Turkish province? Were not her two allies the most
determined protectors of the integrity of the Turkish Empire, which
they would not allow to be weakened on account of their opposition
to Russia?

Italy realized all this and had prepared herself for the situation
some time before by refusing to defend the interests of her official
allies during the Algeciras conference. It was quite logical that
Italy, who had originally joined the Triple Alliance mainly out of
regard for her African policy, should now join the other coalition,
after it had become clear that her African policy could be better
pursued in alliance with France and Russia than with Germany and
Austria. But in spite of this Italy at first preserved an intermediate
position. She deserted the principles of the Triple Alliance, but
since her partners declared t,hat they agreed to this under certain
reservations, she did not break with them.

It was under these curious circumstances that the Tripolitan War
took place. The main military operations were almost wholly lim-
ited to the region which Italy wanted to acquire. Any attacks on
Turkish territory in the Balkans, which would have struck Turkey
in her most vulnerable spot, — like the attack upon Prevesa in Epirus
which had been counted upon so much — had to be renounced or
broken off, because Austria-Hungary was unwilling under any cir-
cumstances to allow any change in the Balkan situation.

The official reason given as the cause of the war was that the
Turkish government in Tripoli, in spite of Italian complaints, had
continually put difficulties in the way of Italian settlers. An Italian
ultimatum therefore demanded permission to occupy the Tripolitan

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 349

territory. When this was refused, Italy declared war on September
29, 1911.

The Turks had not expected this step, and, thanks to the surprise
nature of the attack, the first phase of the Italian operations was
highly successful. Within fourteen days all five of the chief ports
in Tripolitania were occupied by Italian troops. Already the Italian
Chamber of Deputies began to discuss the cabinet proposal that the
newly-conquered land, which was now given the ancient designation
of "Libya," should be declared annexed to Italy. But the resistance
of the enemy was by no means broken. The hostility of the native
Mohammedan population to Christian rule found a stronger support
in Tripoli than in Algiers. The Turks succeeded in getting modern
guns to Tripoli, with which to arm the Arabs; they also despatched
a corps of officers under Enver Bey to organize a defensive war
against the invaders. The only thing that was lacking to them
was an adequate heavy artillery. In general, however, Turkish tac-
tics soon proved very dangerous, and it was not long before the
Italian government considerably increased its troops and burdened
its budget with very heavy military expenditures. The Turks did
succeed, at times, in restricting the Italians to the possession of
the five ports; and although the Italians succeeded in reconquering
some of the oases near the coast, all their further advances against
the desert tribes met with insuperable difficulties. After half a year
of fighting the war seemed likely to drag on endlessly. This at first
gave the advantage to the Turks, who had not been able to do much
except send munitions to the fighting forces.

Under these circumstances, it occurred to the Italians to bring
the war to an end in another region. If they could not attack the
Arab tribes in the Tripolitan deserts, why should not Turkey be
compelled to yield by attacks on her vulnerable points, especially
as the Italians were absolutely superior at sea? The Italians there-
fore attempted a number of such attacks: the bombardment of
several ports in the Red Sea, November, 1911, to January, 1912;
a naval demonstration against Beirut on February 24, 1912; and
attacks on the Dardanelles, in April and July, 1912. But here it
became very clear how greatly Italy was hampered by her member-
ship in the Triple Alliance. She had been denied any attack on
the Balkans, as has just been stated, because of the opposition of
her allies. Any effective attack upon Syria was not possible,
because here the interests of Italy came into conflict with those
of France and England, who had no reason to show any regard for
a member of the opposing coalition. So, of all Italy's efforts, the

350 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

only one of permanent consequence was her occupation of Rhodes
and the dozen neighboring islands known as the "Dodecanese";
these gave Italy an important mortgage in hand when it came to
peace negotiations.

The occupation of Rhodes was also the decisive step. The Tur-
kish government now perceived that a continuation of the war would
only result in further losses of territory, and declared that she was
ready for official peace negotiations in Lausanne; and as Turkey
was now threatened by the Balkan League and its first victories, she
consented to the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on October 18, 1912.
This satisfied Italy's claims for the most part. Not only was Italy's
conquest of Tripolitania virtually recognized by Turkey, but the
Italians were allowed to keep the islands in the JEgean until the
last Turkish officer had left Tripoli. The Sultan of Turkey retained
only his religious sovereignty over the ceded territories, a concession
which could only have serious consequences for Italy in case Turkey
was able to support her demands with military measures; so Italy
naturally came to be opposed to the maintenance of the Turkish
power in its existing extent.

In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, Italy did not judge
it wise to break with either of the two coalitions of allied Powers.
Scarcely was the Peace of Lusanne signed, when she gave her con-
sent on December 5, 1912, to a further renewal of the Triple Al-
liance. Her allies had to recognize expressly her sovereignty over
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Italy was thus free to join, according
to circumstances, whichever coalition promised her greater as-
sistance in her policy of expansion in the Mediterranean. On the
other hand, it was clear that the Triple Alliance could only be per-
manent in case Austria-Hungary held strictly to the agreement,
repeated in the new text of the Triple Alliance treaty, by which
Italy and Austria-Hungary were to act in common and upon a foot-
ing of equality in the Balkans. As Italy had been forced to submit
to painful limitations in her war with Turkey out of regard for
Austria's Balkan policy, she would hold fast to the Alliance only
so long as her Austrian partner refrained from independent action
in the Balkans. This was one of the main reasons why the Alliance
was denounced prematurely by Italy.

The African colonial policy of the European Great Powers — the
partition of Africa among themselves — had at first resulted in a
more or less easy division, but had then come to exercise a dominat-
ing influence upon the relation of the Powers to one another in
Europe, where opposing interests were becoming sharper and sharper.

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. I: AFRICA 351

It became increasingly difficult to satisfy new Powers with all that
they wanted, when the African territory had already been wholly
divided up, without seriously injuring old legal owners. Not in
vain had Africa been Europeanized ; it now became the battle-field
and the military objective of European armies.

CHAPTER XXX

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. II: ASIA AND
AUSTRALASIA

IN Asia the new character of European colonial policy was no less
evident than in Africa. In Asia also there was an increase in the
number of the Powers who were trying to acquire colonial posses-
sions. To those nations which had been seeking to maintain or
extend traditional interests were now added others which were pur-
suing a colonial policy simply for its own sake. And in Western
and Central Asia the result was much the same as in Africa: at the
end of the period there survived no really independent states, that
is, native states, which did not exist either by the grace or the jeal-
ousy of the Great Powers of Europe. Very different, on the con-
trary, was the case in Eastern Asia. Here took place on a great
scale what had happened in Africa only in the Abyssinian region: one
native state succeeded by its own power in triumphantly opposing
European pressure, and another, though defenseless at first, was at
least strong enough to proceed to Europeanize its resources and
political organization.

Of the territorial acquisitions made by European Powers which
did not take part in the partition of Asia in the first half of the nine-
teenth century, the most important were those of France.

French colonial policy in Eastern Asia in its beginnings reaches
back to the time of the Second Empire, when it was little more than
a matter of prestige. The "Emperor" of Annam put to death some
Christian missionaries in 1858 and refused to make amends. There-
upon Napoleon III despatched an expedition and the Asiatic prince
had to cede his southern provinces, including Saigon; these consti-
tuted French Cochin-China in 1862. This proceeding made such
an impression in the region that the neighboring King of Cambodia,
who felt threatened by the more powerful ruler of Siam, put him-
self under French protection; and in 1867 those of his provinces
which lay next to Cochin-China were cut off and annexed to the
French colony.

Cochin-China in itself was not of great value. And if the French
had hoped to acquire a part of the South China trade, the hope

352

II ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 353

vanished when the bold explorations of two French officers made
it certain that the Mekong River, which empties into the sea through
Cochin-China, was not navigable. They found that for the China
trade the only suitable river was the Red River, or Song-Ka, which
empties into the sea through Tongking, far to the north of Cochin-
China.

Here in Tongking began the really new colonial policy of France,
dictated by modern commercial motives. French merchants estab-
lished some settlements in Tongking and sought to exploit the new
trade route. But they found a cool reception among the officials
of Annam. An unfortunate incident occurred: French officers seized
fortified places near the mouth of the Song-Ka, and in doing so
were killed in 1873. The French government at the moment was
not inclined toward an aggressive colonial policy. It refrained from
reprisals and contented itself with the Treaty of Saigon of 1874,
by which the Emperor of Annam promised to open Tongking to
French trade and even recognized an indefinite kind of French
protectorate.

But in practice this treaty proved worthless. The ruler of Annam
could disregard his promises the more easily from the fact that
nominally he stood under Chinese suzerainty and was encouraged
more or less officially by China to oppose the foreigners, so that
the situation of the French merchants in Tongking was exceedingly
precarious. Trade on the Song-Ka was out of the question. In ad-
dition to all this, a French detachment, which had seized the fortress
of Hanoi on the Song-Ka in order to secure respect for the treaty,
was ambushed by bands known as "Black Flags," and annihilated
in 1883.

Thereupon the French Government decided to intervene in Tong-
king in earnest. A regular expedition was fitted out. From this
moment there was no longer any question of serious resistance either
by Annam or by China. The new Emperor of Annam signed the
Treaty of Hue by which he recognized a French protectorate. China
gave way soon afterwards, after her troops, along with the "Black
Flags," had been chased out of the Tongking territory; and on May
n, 1084, Li-Hung-Chang signed in his country's name the Treaty
of Tien-Tsin, by which the Chinese promised to recall the rest of
their troops from the fortified places in Tongking and to recognize
the French protectorate over both Tongking and Annam.

China's signature, however, as it seems, was only a sham. French
troops occupying the northern part of Tongking met with difficulties,
as Chinese troops blocked the way. Therefore the French decided

354 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

to strike a blow against China itself and secure guarantees that the
treaty would be observed. They began a campaign which was
splendidly conducted and lasted seven months during 1884-85. The
French army destroyed the Chinese arsenal of Fuchau, 32 kilometers
from the coast in Fukien Province, blockaded the island of Formosa
off the coast, and Dccupied the Pescadores Islands which lie between
Formosa and the mainland. Then the French decreed a rice-block-
ade against the Gulf of Pechili, i.e., against Peking; North China,
which was accustomed to import its rice supply from the southern
provinces by sea, was to be starved into submission. Two Chinese
cruisers which tried to break through the blockade were torpedoed.
At the same time an effort was made to clear the Chinese troops
completely out of Tongking.

Although in this last operation the Chinese won some considerable
successes — which led to the overthrow of the Ferry ministry which
had begun the war — the general military situation was such that
China had no alternative but to yield. A second time a treaty was
signed at Tien-Tsin on June 9, 1885, which not only confirmed the
treaty of the preceding year, but which also conceded to the French
freedom of trade in the southern provinces of China.

France thus acquired final control over Tongking and Annam.
But how little the French at that time realized the importance of
colonial possessions is shown by the fact that the credits asked by
the government for the occupation of Tongking in accordance with
the treaty were voted by the Chamber of Deputies only by the nar-
row majority of 274 to 270 (December, 1885).

But within a decade public opinion in France changed and un-
reservedly supported the extension and safeguarding of the colonies
in Eastern Asia. At first the various territories were consolidated
for technical administrative reasons; Annam, Cambodia, Tongking
and Cochin-China were united under "The General Government of
Indo-China." Then the connections between the different parts,
especially between Tongking in the north and Cambodia in the
south, were improved by bringing the whole course of the Mekong
under French control. The King of Siam, who held important posi-
tions on the river at two points, was compelled by the Treaty of
October 3, 1893, to cede the whole left bank to the French, and to
promise not to erect any fortifications within 25 kilometers of the
right or west bank. In 1896 the English, who by the occupation of
Burma had become neighbors of the French, recognized the rights
of the French on the Mekong where the river touched British terri-
tory. Finally, in 1907, some southern provinces occupied by Siam

II: ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 355

were annexed, so that French Indo-China formed a solid and well-
rounded economic whole. The independence of Siam — which lay
between English and French territory in somewhat the same way
as Afghanistan lay between British and Russian — was mutually
guaranteed by both Powers.

During the same period European nations were acquiring pos-
sessions in Oceanica, though they are of less importance in world
history. The islands of the Pacific in themselves were much easier
to conquer than the Asiatic territories; but because of their sub-
ordinate economic importance, at first at any rate, they had hardly
attracted the attention of the European Powers. In 1843 tne French
proclaimed a protectorate over Tahiti, and in 1853 they annexed
New Caledonia, to be a penal settlement like that of the original
English settlement in Australia. Later annexations in the Pacific
took place largely to satisfy the whites in Australia, who feared not
without reason that their peaceful existence would be threatened
if other Great Powers besides England made extensive conquests.
Therefore the Australians continually urged London to extend more
widely the area of British rule.

The new era of British annexations began in 1875 with England's
occupation of the Fiji Islands. The Australian province of Queens-
land also desired the annexation of New Guinea; but the British
Government at first declined. Only after Germany had annexed a
part of the island did the English step in; New Guinea was then
divided in 1886 between Germany, Holland and Great Britain. In
the following years, a systematic partitioning of the islands of the
Pacific took place, and the process has been going on in detail up
to the most recent times. Many groups of islands were split up
after the fashion of New Guinea — the Samoan Islands, for instance,
between Germany and the United States, and the New Hebrides
under a joint Anglo-French "control." Here in the Pacific the
same thing took place as in Africa, only on a smaller scale; the Eu-
ropeanization of the world was extended to Oceanica.

Of far greater importance was the first collision which took place
between one of the Great Powers of Europe and one of the European-
ized nations of Eastern Asia.

China's military weakness, which had been revealed in the Tong-
:ing war, was soon afterwards again made evident in her war with
[apan (see p. 161 f.). Japan's victory was so crushing that the Great
Bowers of Europe did not allow her to make full use of it: they

>t only compelled her to forego some of her conquests, but com-

356

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

pensated themselves at China's expense. Thus Russia secured from
China the right to lease Port Arthur and to extend the Trans-Siberian
Railway across Manchuria. France received similar concessions,
and also an important port in South China. Great Britain received
Wei-hai-wei opposite Port Arthur. Germany occupied Kiaochau in
the Shantung Peninsula. Italy alone had her demands refused.
Everywhere the foreigners began to construct railways for which
China had to grant concessions.

Then a national Chinese reaction against the "Foreign Devils"
began. This time the movement took place mainly, not in the South
as formerly, but in the northern provinces which had felt most
severely the political and commercial invasion of the European na-
tions. The members of the secret societies who wanted to fight the
Europeans were known as "Boxers," and they received underhand
support from the Chinese Government, especially after 1898, when
the Dowager Empress, Tsu-Hsi, seized the power from the young
Emperor Kwang-Su, who wanted to introduce reforms after the
Japanese fashion.

The Boxer movement broke out in the early summer of 1900.
Connections between Tien-Tsin and Peking were cut in June, many
Christians were murdered in Peking, and the European Legations
were besieged and partly destroyed. The German ambassador was
one of those killed. But the senseless revolt quickly collapsed. An
international army was sent up from Tien-Tsin arid relieved the Le-
gations without great difficulty, so that China had to renew the con-
cessions made to the European Powers and also pay a heavy in-
demnity.

The Europeans then took up the penetration of China with re-
doubled zeal. But it soon appeared that they had to reckon with
a new opponent who was more dangerous than China.

Of all the European nations Russia had the greatest interest in
getting a firm footing in Eastern Asia. As the population in Russia
rapidly increased, Siberia gained an undreamt-of importance as
colonial land. Russian peasants had migrated there in large num-
bers, and though they settled mostly in Western Siberia, it became
increasingly important to make sure of the East. Siberia must be
brought into close contact with the mother country and with the
trade of the world; care must be taken so that Russia's overwhelm-
ing military force could be available for use in the Far East against
China and Japan. These ideas found most definite expression in
the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was begun
in 1891 and completed ten years later. This mighty strategic

II : ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 357

undertaking, which connected Moscow with Port Arthur as well
as with Vladivostok, not only made it possible to forward large
masses of troops in brief time to the Chinese frontier, but also stimu-
lated to a large degree the immigration into Siberia. The products
of the Siberian mines and farms and the tea of China could now
be transported cheaply to the markets of Europe.

It was easy to carry on this policy which concentrated, so to
speak, all Russia's imperialistic tendencies on Eastern Asia, so long
as it touched China only, but the Russians went ahead with just as
little regard for the existing and future aspirations of the Japanese.
They tried to occupy the harbor of Masampo in Southern Korea,
and threatened to bring the Korean Peninsula under their influence.
They intended not only to deprive Japan of Korea (see p. 162), but
also to cut off, as far as possible, all connection between Japan
and China. With this in view they fortified strongly their naval
base at Port Arthur.

But Japan had no intention willingly to allow this to take place.
Now that she had Europeanized her military organization, she felt
equal in power to the great nations of Europe and she knew also
that henceforth her policy of expansion would not have the whole
European concert opposed to her. England, the old rival of Russian
policy in Asia, had signed an alliance with Japan in 1902 and this
had disrupted the harmony among the European Powers. The Tokio
government therefore demanded of Russia that she recognize the
independence both of Korea and Manchuria, that is, of the two ter-
ritories which the Russians were intending to treat as their sphere
of influence. Just like the European states, Japan also could insist
that her own excess population needed Korea, both as a place for
colonial settlement and as a market for Japanese manufactured
goods.

When the Russians merely gave evasive answers, Japan suddenly
opened war a few months later. On February 9, 1904, without
warning, she torpedoed at Port Arthur several of the best Russian
ships in the Pacific.

The war which began in this way lasted eighteen months and
resulted in one defeat after another for the Russians. As in the
case of the war with China earlier (see p. 161), Japan at once showed
herself unquestionably superior at sea. Again it was evident that
an absolutistic state was unable to accomplish naval results which
were worth much of anything (see p. 37). On April n, 1904, the
Russian flagship Petropavlovsk was torpedoed, and thereafter the
Japanese were in absolute control of the sea.

358 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

On land the Japanese quickly drove the Russians out of Korea
and forced them back into Manchuria beyond the Yalu River which
separates Manchuria and Korea. This was followed in September,
1904, by the Russian defeat at Liao-Yang. Port Arthur was then
shut in and, being without reinforcements, had to surrender on
January 2, 1905, after a siege of seven months. This set free more
Japanese troops for service in Manchuria, where the Japanese armies
were now able to concentrate and defeat the Russians in a fourteen
days' battle at the Mukden, which was followed by the siege of the
city of Mukden in March, 1905. The Japanese victories were in-
complete only to the extent that the Russian army was able to
withdraw in orderly fashion and take up new positions further north
from which the Japanese were unable to dislodge them.

In spite of this, the situation was most unfavorable to the Rus-
sians. They had lost altogether, or in large part, both the territories
for which they had risked war with Japan, and they had no hope of
reconquering them. They therefore decided to make one desperate
effort — to use the Baltic fleet which had been despatched around the
world to help the armies in Manchuria; but the effort was in vain.
The fleet was totally destroyed by the Japanese on May 30, 1905,
near Tsu-shima Island in the Straits of Korea.

Under these circumstances the Russians gladly accepted President
Roosevelt's offer of mediation. Negotiations were opened at Ports-
mouth in the United States and led to the signing of a treaty of
peace on September 5, 1905. By this treaty Russia had to give up
all her intentions against Japan. She resigned to her opponent the
protectorate over Korea and ceded Port Arthur and the southern
half of the Island of Sakhalin. Furthermore, she agreed to evacuate
Manchuria, which was to be given back to China and to be open to
the trade of all nations.

Aside from these territorial agreements the Peace of Portsmouth
marks a turning point in the history of the world. It was the first
time that a non-European Power had proved herself superior in
war to a European Great Power. It had been shown that the pupil
might be more powerful than his teacher. It had been proved that
European states, which had enjoyed a superiority due to the fact
that they had gotten a start in technical inventions, might be easily
overtaken by peoples of another race, and that the rule over the
world which Europeans had established in the nineteenth century
rested on a much more precarious basis than had hitherto been sup-
posed. In many regions the triumph of the Japanese acted as a
stimulus toward imitation of Europeans. It also strengthened

II : ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA 359

greatly the opposition to the tendency of Europeans to exploit non-
European peoples. In comparison with these results all other con-
sequences were quite subordinate, even such as the effects at home
which the defeat of the Russian armies had upon the constitutional
development of the Tsar's empire (see ch. xxxiii).

It was in China that the lessons to be drawn from the Russo-
Japanese war were most quickly turned to effect. The reactionary
nationalistic "Boxer" tendencies disappeared completely. The gov-
ernment itself now undertook to Europeanize China. It abolished
the old system of examinations for civil officials which rested on a
literary humanistic basis. Torture and penalties involving mutila-
tion of the body were done away with. Even private practices, like
the foot-binding of women of the upper class, were forbidden.
Obstacles were no longer placed in the way of building railroads
and establishing schools. Japanese teachers were engaged and
numerous Chinese were sent to Europe to complete their education.
As in the case of Japan, there followed at the same time a Euro-
peanization of the system of government, that is, a reform in a
liberal direction. In 1906 the government sent a commission to
Europe to study the various forms of political institutions, and
when this returned and made its report, the Dowager Empress, as
regent, announced the issue of a constitution for China.

But however progressive the Manchu dynasty professed to be in
appearance, it soon appeared that it was not able, or perhaps did
not desire, to carry out a real Europeanization of the country. A
situation in which a foreign warrior tribe ruled the country was only
tolerable so long as the Manchus were able to protect the empire
against outsiders. Now the Manchus had shown themselves unable
to prevent the intrusion of Europeans. Furthermore, it was in
direct contradiction with European political notions that the
supreme government should be conducted without any participation
by Chinese natives, especially as it was in the hands of a foreign
tribe which was of a lower civilization. It was not to be expected,
therefore, that under these circumstances the Manchus would hon-
estly assist in modernizing China when this would threaten at the
same time their own authority. In vain did the government urge
intermarriage between Manchus and Chinese — by which the ruling
race, as such, would have ceased to exist. In vain did it issue lib-
eral announcements. In 1908 the Dowager Empress and her son,
who was a minor, suddenly died within twenty-four hours of one
another and in 1912 the Manchu dynasty was definitely overthrown.
China became a republic with Yuan-shi-kai as Provisional President,

36o ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

This transformation of China into a republic was merely the last
step in a movement which had begun after the death of the Dowager
Empress. In 1909, as a preparation for a future parliamentary form
of government, provincial assemblies had been established. In 1910
a national assembly consisting chiefly of officials was called together,
which, in turn, demanded the immediate calling of a national Chinese
parliament. This demand was conceded in 1912, and in 1913 there
came together the first parliament, which confirmed the Provisional
President in his office. But this did not bring about any regular
functioning of the new political institutions, for the president's first
act was to exclude his opponents from parliament and to dissolve
the assembly. Since that time, China has been unable to emerge
from the revolutionary stage and yet the process of Europeanization
has not been undone. These results are closely connected with the
size and organization of the Chinese empire, which differs so much
from Japan. Japan is a relatively small territory with a unified
population; there it was merely a question of replacing the rule of
a caste by that of the old national imperial system; but the gigantic
area of the Chinese empire includes sharp contrasts. It had been
held together hitherto merely by the rule ot a foreign dynasty. As
soon as this was overthrown the question arose as to which part of
the empire could assume the leadership. At once rival struggles
broke out between the provinces, especially between those of the
North and the South. The wealth of China lies more in the southern
provinces, which lead in trade and industry, than in the region
around Peking, which had become the capital mainly for military
reasons. The South was therefore not at all inclined to subordi-
nate itself to the control of the North which could only justify its
claim by the fact that it possessed the capital. Out of this question
arose rebellion and one civil war after another, and this is essentially
the situation at the moment at which these lines are being written.

The future of the Middle Kingdom is not clear. At the present
moment, one can merely say that China's economic strength and
productivity have been scarcely weakened by all this political con-
fusion. The people of China have developed their economic life to
a high point which, in its way, can scarcely be matched, and they
have done this by their own initiative and without having to follow
the directions of a central government. Therefore disturbances in
the functioning of the central governmental machine have less serious
consequences than would be the case in other countries.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE NEW COLONIAL POLICY. Ill: THE ANGLO-
SAXON EMPIRES

THE most novel and modern colonial policy is that which has been
pursued during the last half century by the two Anglo-Saxon em-
pires, Great Britain and the United States. A wholly new type of
federal state has been created by the British. A commonwealth
which has wholly given up the old traditional forceful methods, it
scarcely deserves the name of a political state, and yet in the end
it has proven to be firmer than many another organization which
is held together by force of arms. It is the purpose of this chapter
briefly to describe this new phenomenon. The order followed will
be to give an account first of the growth of the British Empire, then
of the new world policy of the United States, and finally of the
relations which have been established between these two empires.

It must be expressly noted, especially as concerns the British
Empire, that naturally only the so-called self-governing colonies or
"Dominions" will be considered, that is, only the outlying colonies
which are overwhelmingly settled by white men. For reasons which
are evident, these are the only regions which can be regarded as
sharing in the new "imperial" policy. In this chapter, therefore, I
shall wholly leave out of account the colonies which are inhabited
mainly by non-Europeans; the essential facts in regard to these
have already been given in other connections (see ch. xviii for
India, and chs. xxix-xxx for observations in regard to the British
acquisitions in Central Africa and the Pacific).

Let us take first British colonial policy, that is, England's relation
to the settlements which have been made by white men outside
Europe.

The history of these relations is dominated by one single event:
the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies gave a warning which could not
be ignored by any English government. The demand of England
which led to the revolt was that the colonies should bear their part
of the military expenditures raised for the common interest. The
Americans, however, had opposed this with the claim that as free

36:

362

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

men they ought not to be called upon to pay taxes which had been
voted, not by themselves, but by the Parliament at London. With
the aid of the French this claim was triumphantly maintained and
led to the loss of what was at that time the most important colony
of white settlers.

This had the result that other colonies in an analogous position
were granted greater constitutional rights: in 1791, shortly after
the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies, Canada was given a constitution.
England renounced completely the earlier and, in itself, natural
principle that obligations and rights ought to correspond to one
another. Gradually she granted the colonies all the rights of self-
government, even the right of having commercial policies of their
own which might possibly be directed against the mother country;
but in spite of this she also assumed, as before, all the military
burdens, especially the burden of defense upon the sea.

This was an altogether peculiar relationship. The citizen of the
Dominions enjoyed all the advantages which come from belonging
to a Great Power; the British fleet and British power protected him
and his interests, but in return he himself did not have to assume
the slightest obligation. He did not even have to contribute to the
limited military taxes demanded of the inhabitants of the mother
country. He was privileged in every respect: not only was he free
from a financial burden, but he was spared all the difficult problems
which arise in a liberally governed state from the union of the mili-
tary and civil administrations.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that about the
middle of the nineteenth century, when the more advanced colonies
began to pursue a tariff policy of their own — Canada introduced a
protective tariff in 1859 — there developed in England, especially in
strongly Liberal circles, a strong movement in favor of complete
separation of the colonies. Since the colonies no longer adapted
themselves to the wishes of the mother country, and no longer had
regard for her interests — why should the connection which had
become merely formal be continued any longer? Why should Eng-
land assume duties and secure no services in return? Would not
the connection due to the community of speech, of customs, and of
political thought make itself just as strongly felt if the last remnants
of the earlier dependence were done away with, leaving the colonies
and the mother country to stand side by side as independent states
with equal rights?

This view, however, never prevailed, and events have proved that
it was not well grounded. It is precisely this virtually complete

Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 363

freedom, in fact this privileged position which England has given
her colonies, which has kept alive and untroubled the feeling of
attachment which emigrant children have toward the mother coun-
try. It is this which has taught them really to prize their membership
in the British Empire. And, since the mother country never used
compulsion, the Dominions, at least in large part, have ever been
ready in time of need to give voluntary assistance on a wide scale.
The correct treatment of colonies, the correct procedure in those
questions of imperial policy which affect the particular interests
of special regions in different and often contradictory ways, was and
remains a difficult matter for the English government. It has often
demanded almost superhuman political tact and an extraordinary
adaptability in making political compromises, but the positive ad-
vantage which has resulted to England, be it noted on the other
side, is the fact that any idea of an armed uprising (like that, for
instance, of the Thirteen Colonies) has never since been considered
in the British colonies. The mother country has been spared the
need of any kind of military preparations and burdens to prevent
uprisings, at least in the regions occupied by Anglo-Saxons.

The development of the Dominions themselves has been dependent
in the nineteenth century mainly on population conditions in Europe,
and in a lesser degree on economic events, such as the discovery of
gold in Australia, which have attracted to the colonies other persons
than those who have been driven there through the pressure of excess
population. This was of importance for the future; it increased
essentially the preponderance of an English element among the im-
migrants. It has been pointed out above that the European country
which prior to 1850 was chiefly compelled to send a part of its
population overseas was Great Britain, which by that time had
become an industrial country. The settlers who went out to South
Africa and Australia were of English descent; as a result not only
were new colonies, like New Zealand, prevailingly English from the
outset, so that immigrants from other nations were assimilated by
the dominant race, but also even colonies which originally were not
made up mainly of an English population, like the Dutch in the
Cape Colony, or the French in Canada, acquired a strongly English
stamp.

In the first half of the nineteenth century the European emigra-
tion to the English colonies was still so slight in comparison with
the stream of emigrants which flowed into the United States that
the Australian continent could still be used as a penal settlement.
Though an English immigration into South Africa began as early

364

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

as 1819, free colonists did not settle in Australia until 1828, nor in
New Zealand until the years 1839-41. The sending of convicts to
New South Wales was not limited until 1840, and did not cease
completely until 1851; in Van Diemen's Land it did not cease until
1853. As late as 1849 the territory of West Australia, which was
less favorably adapted to colonists, still asked for the sending out
of convicts.

Shortly after this, however, occurred an event which attracted
great numbers of free white settlers to Australia. In 1851 the first
gold was discovered and there began on a large scale that movement
to the fifth continent which, as far as a good part of its area is
concerned, is much less favorable for agriculture than Canada or
even New Zealand. The number of inhabitants in the colony of
Victoria rose from 77,000 in 1851 to 731,000 twenty years later.
It was not until 1870 that the number of immigrants sharply de-
clined. The country was then so thickly settled that it could not
easily absorb a large stream of people without property; as there
were no regular "poor" in Australia, such new immigrants would
have been a danger for the people already settled there. They would
have remained proletarians and would have tended to depress the
relatively high wages of the workingmen who had settled there
earlier. Furthermore, occupations like cattle and sheep raising,
which formed the main support of the Australians, need only a
relatively small population. If the population had become much
denser the Australians would have been less able to support them-
selves by their profitable exports, which had been made possible by
the invention of refrigeration for transporting meat and other food
products to Europe.

The workingmen especially therefore were strongly opposed to
immigration, and since 1873 nothing has been done to stimulate it.
For the growing population itself, care was particularly taken in
Australia that the large landed estates, so far as they had survived
from the time of the first settlements, should be divided up more
or less voluntarily. In the i86o's and *7o's, legislation in many of
the colonies had attempted to stimulate agriculture and the develop-
ment of small peasant proprietors; then in the 1890^ all the colonial
governments in Australia attacked directly large estates and made
possible the compulsory dividing-up of large lands. This was most
energetically done in New Zealand, where somewhat the same cli-
matic conditions exist as in England and where the country is there-
fore particularly well suited for the extension of agriculture. At
the beginning of the twentieth century four times as much land was

Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 365

cultivated as in 1870; sugar, wheat, and fruits could be exported in
considerable quantities. This prosperous development was power-
fully supported by the building of railways, largely undertaken by
the governments, which brought the interior into direct connection
with the ports of the country.

Though the country was large, the natural increase of popu-
lation was so limited that even modern France scarcely shows a
smaller increase in population. The Australians, and still more,
perhaps, the New Zealanders began to take care to preserve that
satisfactory condition of economic equilibrium which secures to
every one who wants to work an adequate livelihood, and which
also prevents both excessive wealth and wretched poverty. The
problem, indeed, was not simple in its solution. It is only in theory
that states exist in isolation, and only a Utopian can construct a
community which is rationally organized according to its own de-
sires. In practice, the higher the standard of living rises, the
greater is the danger that foreigners will come in who will work
for less and underbid the natives. In Australia and New Zealand
these dangerous foreigners were the neighboring East Asiatics and
particularly the intelligent and industrious Chinese. At first, so long
as there was a lack of labor supply, Chinese and Hindu coolies were
imported by the Australians themselves, but when whole masses of
Chinese began to enter the country after the first discoveries of
gold, the Australians began to adopt their first defensive measures:
ship owners who imported Chinese had to pay a special tax from
1855 to 1 86 1. This law, and others like it, were, however, not
prohibitive, and remained in force only so long as the gold fever
lasted. It was not until later, in the i88o's, that stricter measures
were adopted. The Chinese were then excluded from work in the
mines and from naturalization, and in 1888 had to pay a heavy
poll-tax. Later, from 1897 to 1899, tne example of the southern
states in the American Union was adopted in various Australian
states and in New Zealand: immigrants had to show an "evidence
of education" which in practice resulted in a complete exclusion of
"undesirables." What had formerly been merely the expression of
class interests, now became a national ideal. It was no longer merely
the workingmen who desired the exclusion of cheap labor; all the
rest of the population insisted on keeping the land pure of elements
which, on account of their foreign unassimilable character, might
easily be an obstacle to the democratic development of the country.
How strongly this feeling permeates all classes is best seen in the
fact that since 1905 the Australians have preferred the lesser evil

366

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

of attracting white settlers again. Though competition from whites
may be ever so unwelcome, it is still far less dangerous than that
of the Chinese!

Military considerations have also had an influence. Was it not
conceivable that some day China or some other Asiatic power would
no longer tolerate the exclusion of its children and would try to
compel the Australians by force to give up laws which were hostile
to Asiatics? Against an actual attack, the colonies were, for the
present, protected by British power, but even England was not al-
ways free in her attitude, and so Australia finally had to give a
welcome to new settlers who, as far as race interests were concerned,
would have a feeling of solidarity with the old colonists.

Under these circumstances, the connection with the mother coun-
try gained new importance, both positively and negatively; posi-
tively, in so far as protection by England assumed new importance;
and negatively in so far as the colonies wished to be in a position
to defend their own interests themselves, whenever their attitude
should happen to be in contradiction with the imperial policy di-
rected from London. England made no opposition to this. On the
contrary, the more the colonies developed their military resources,
which, however, were quite limited, the more the mother country
loosened her connection with them and did away with practically
everything which served as a reminder of her control over the mem-
bers of the Empire.

Thus, at present, there are no longer any "imperial troops" in the
Dominions. Even the execution of laws for the protection of na-
tives, which in a way have formed a natural prerogative of the
mother country, has been put into the hands of the colonial gov-
ernments. The possibility of appealing from colonial courts to a
supreme court in London has been partly put an end to, and partly
so limited that the right must be regarded as virtually obsolete.
Even in diplomatic relations the colonies have acquired a position
of equality and the right to make treaties. Since 1877 it has been
an established principle that the colonies may or may not, as suits
them, adopt commercial treaties which have been made by the Im-
perial Government; in 1900 this principle was extended to all inter-
national agreements. No control is even exercised by London to
ensure freedom of movement from one colony to another; the
Dominions are free in the management of their immigration ques-
tions, and Australia and Canada have the right to exclude a British
subject from entering their country merely on the grounds that he
appears to be "undesirable."

Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 367

In spite of this, or because of it, the British Empire has held
solidly together. The feeling of unity and the realization of the
advantages of political connection with Great Britain have been
strong enough to make up for the lack of a federal organization.
It was also a great advantage that not only were the language and
customs everywhere the same, but also the political institutions. If
one considers how greatly the unification of the German lands was
hindered by the variety of political ideals from Prussian East Elbian
territory to the South German states; or if one recalls what a great
obstacle to the continuance of the union resulted from the existence
of slavery in the southern states of America, then one can easily
judge what an advantage the British Dominions have enjoyed
through the fact that their political institutions have everywhere
rested upon the same modern democratic basis. No colony has ever
been compelled for the sake of unity to give up the liberal institu-
tions and forms which it loves. On the contrary, the connection
between the Dominions has resulted in reforms which have been
introduced in one colony being adopted soon in another. Even the
mother country herself, which, for reasons easy to understand, has
retained more traces than the Dominions of her pre-revolutionary
political organization, shows an increasing tendency, as time goes
on, to copy political innovations from her colonies. An example of
this is the spread of woman's suffrage. Women were first given
equal political rights with men in New Zealand in 1893; during the
following decade woman's suffrage spread through all the Australian
states and about fifteen years later, in 1918, it became law in Great
Britain likewise.

Gradually also the mother country ceased to oppose in any way
the union into a federal commonwealth of colonies which were geo-
graphically close together. From the standpoint of Machiavellian
doctrine it would have been quite natural to keep the individual
colonies as isolated politically as possible, in order to make it easier
to control them; and in Canada, at least, England originally pur-
sued this plan, although the separation into two provinces which
was made in 1791 aimed primarily at protecting the weaker Anglo-
Saxon population from being outvoted by the French. But whatever
may have been the attitude of the London government at first, here,
also, it later adopted a policy of trustfulness and liberty instead of
suspicious calculations. Canada was later united again in 1840; in
1867 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were added; and the whole
federation was given the name of "Dominion of Canada." Similarly
no obstacles were placed in the way of the Australian states when,

368 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

after long negotiations, they were united into a federal common-
wealth in 1900.

This policy of federal organization and liberty was even applied
in South Africa, where national differences and a war which had
scarcely ended might have made the experiment seem especially
dangerous.

In order rightly to understand this one must go back a little in
the narrative.

When the English acquired Cape Colony as the result of the Revo-
lutionary wars, she gained possession of a colony which was of great
importance in view of her connection with India, and one which was
at the same time largely settled by white men. But the population
was not of English nationality. It was almost exclusively composed
of planters of Dutch and French descent — Boers — who had forced
the native population into a condition of semi-slavery, and who had
taken the privileged position of a ruling race. The English occupa-
tion now disturbed these patriarchical conditions. The Boers deter-
mined therefore to escape from this new situation by emigrating,
and, since the territory north of Cape Colony was still vacant and
unclaimed by any European state, an emigration took place lasting
more than twenty years, without interference, at any rate, by any
European Powers. The first of these "Treks" or migrations took
place in 1836, and led to the establishment of the Orange State.
Other Boers later attempted to establish a colony in Natal; but
since their settlement approached the sea and might have been
dangerous to the ocean route to India they were soon pursued by
the British; as the Boers wanted to remain independent they pushed
further inland toward the northwest beyond the Vaal river and
founded the "Transvaal" State (1845-1852).

The founding of these states took place just at the time when
the Liberal movement in England which placed little value on
colonial possessions had reached its height; and furthermore, since
the Boers had settled exclusively in the interior of the country
where the British were not yet at all interested, the English
government had no objection to recognizing the two new states, the
Transvaal Republic in 1852 and the Orange Free State in 1854.

But this attitude of toleration came to an end when the new
colonial policy began to develop, when Africa began to be sys-
tematically partitioned, and when the interior of the Continent began
to be marked off into European spheres of influence. Even before
this the Boers had been interfered with in various ways. Diamonds
had been discovered in 1871 at Kimberley in the Orange Free State;

Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRE 369

these diamond fields had to be ceded by the Republic to the English
in return for some compensation. Then, in 1877, the Boers made
a new advance toward the Indian Ocean, but were driven back
by the war-like Kaffir tribes. The British government took advan-
tage of this opportunity to proclaim the annexation of the Transvaal
at Pretoria, the capital of the territory. At the same time, also, the
British took up the war with the Zulus, whom the Boers had not
been able to overcome, and after considerable efforts brought it to
an end. It was in the course of this undertaking that Napoleon
Ill's only son, who had enlisted with the English as a volunteer,
was killed by Zulu spears on June i, 1879.

Immediately after the annexation of the Transvaal a number of
the Boers had begun a new Trek northwards into the region of
Portuguese East Africa. But even those who remained behind were
unwilling to submit to British rule. Under their three leaders,
Pretorius, Joubert, and Kriiger, a revolt broke out, which, thanks
to a number of successful battles on the border of Natal, including
especially one at Majuba Hill on February 27, 1881, turned out
wholly in favor of the Boers. England had to give in and by the
treaty of August 3, 1881, recognized anew the independence of the
two Boer republics, though with a reservation as to British suze-
rainty. A new treaty of February 27, 1884, in return for certain
concessions of territory, limited Great Britain's authority still fur-
ther, so that the British merely had control over the foreign rela-
tions of the republics.

Perhaps this situation would have lasted a long time if the Boer
republics had not discovered an unexpected source of wealth. Not
long after the treaty of 1884 extraordinarily rich gold fields were
discovered in the so-called "Rand" south of Pretoria in the
Transvaal, whereupon hordes of people from every possible country
in Europe flocked to the spot. The new city of Johannesburg,
south of Pretoria, shot up out of the ground. There developed a
large colony of foreigners, or "Uitlanders" as they were called by
the Boers, whose interests were not at all in harmony with those
of the Boers. Being treated as foreigners more or less without rights,
and yet compelled to pay heavy taxes over the expenditure of which
they had no control, the Uitlanders finally united in the "Transvaal
National Union" in order to secure equality of political rights, and
especially representation in the "Raad" or legislature. At the end
of 1895 a regular revolt was planned in Johannesburg. Dr. Jameson,
the friend of Cecil Rhodes, who was president of the English Char-
tered Company, to which the Kimberley diamond fields belonged,

370 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

led a raid which was to aid the revolt in Johannesburg. But he
was taken prisoner near Krugersdorp, and the rising in Johannes-
burg itself was easily suppressed.

But this by no means put an end to the trouble; on the contrary,
it made it more acute. At first the British government more or less
officially supported the rebels, because it imposed a merely nominal
fine on Dr. Jameson who had been pardoned and handed over by
Kriiger, the President of the Transvaal. It also seemed as if the
conflict between the Boers and the British might be taken advan-
tage of by other Powers as an excuse for interference; the German
Emperor, William II, did indeed send an official congratulatory tele-
gram to President Kriiger after his victory over Jameson. All this
took place at the moment when the British government was feeling
disturbed at Russia's increase of power in Asia and was consequently
more inclined than ever to find a kind of compensation in Africa
by new acquisitions which would establish a closer connection be-
tween her possessions there.

England's interference consisted in supporting officially the inter-
ests of the Uitlanders. Negotiations took place, but reached no
satisfactory conclusion. The English High Commissioner demanded,
but without success, that Uitlanders should be given political rights
after five years' residence. Then the British began to move troops
to Cape Colony. The Boers thereupon despatched an ultimatum to
England, and when this remained unanswered, opened war on Oc-
tober u, 1899, by invading Natal and Cape Colony.

The Boers had opened hostilities before the British were at all
prepared, so that they won all the victories at the outset. After
invading Natal and Cape Colony, they laid siege to Ladysmith,
Mafeking and Kimberley, and inflicted numerous defeats on the
British. But the difference in power and resources was too great
for them really to win a complete victory; moreover, the Boer ele-
ment in Cape Colony remained thoroughly loyal.

However, it took much longer to suppress the Boers than had been
expected. Even after the arrival of the first reinforcements under
an experienced general, Redvers Buller, in November, 1899, when
the British forces were able to take the offensive, they again suffered
at first a series of very serious defeats. But this only had the effect
of rousing the British government and also the British colonies to
still greater efforts. Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener were sent
out to take command, and large bodies of troops were transported
to South Africa. It was also of decisive importance that the rivalry
between the European Powers, and also British naval superiority,

Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 371

made it impossible for any of the European countries to think of
intervening.

The new military offensive conducted by Lord Roberts quickly
resulted in one success after another: the besieged towns were re-
lieved; Cronje's Boer army near Paardeberg in the Orange Free
State was forced to surrender on February 28, 1900; and Bloem-
fontein, the capital, was occupied, as were also Johannesburg and
Pretoria in the Transvaal. The war could now be officially regarded
as ended. This was the idea which the British expressed by annex-
ing the Orange Free State in May, 1900, and the Transvaal Republic
in the following September.

But the Boers were still not willing to admit that they were
beaten. Aided by the vast extent and mountainous character of
their territory, they were able to prolong the war for two years
more. Their fighting force consisted only of a few thousand men;
but thanks to the skill of their generals, Botha, De Wet, and
Delarey, they always succeeded again and again in escaping from
the pursuit of the British. But this guerilla war was hopeless so
long as no European Power intervened, and there was less prospect
of this than ever. Furthermore, the English more and more adapted
their military measures to meet the peculiar conditions of warfare
in South Africa. They hemmed the Boers in by lines of block-
houses and brought their women and children together in concen-
tration camps. These measures and the desolation caused by the
war finally compelled the "bitter-enders" to give up their struggle
for freedom. They accepted the British conditions, and by the
Treaty of Pretoria of May 31, 1902, both Boer republics gave up
their claim to independence. The Boers promised henceforth to
be loyal British subjects.

On their side the British promised to grant the Boers extensive
political rights and to help them in the work of reconstruction on
their farms. This promise was completely lived up to, and it is
mainly thanks to this liberal policy toward an enemy who had
just been suppressed in a bloody war that the annexation of the Boer
states differs so sharply from other annexations which have resulted
from compulsion by force of arms. As early as 1906 the Transvaal
was given self-government; and the Orange Colony was accorded the
same privilege in 1907. Soon afterwards all the South African
colonies were united into a single federation — the Union of South
Africa of 1910, a state in which both races, British and Boers, were
guaranteed complete equality. Even in the matter of the capital,
both groups were given equal treatment: Cape Town remains the

372 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

legislative capital, where the Union Parliament has its sessions, while
Pretoria, with the administrative offices, is the capital of the execu-
tive government. So it was brought about that the former citizens
of the Boer republics enjoy the same political privileges in the new
community as the rest of the whites, and they take an equally active
part in the strictly parliamentary system of government as their
former enemies. Only the colored natives are in an inferior political
position. There are a great number of these and they constitute a
serious problem. It is their presence, primarily, which distinguishes
South Africa from Canada or Australia. But this problem cannot
be considered here, as it belongs less to history than to current
politics.

This solution, however, has naturally not wholly put an end to
the opposition between the two "races" of Boer and British, any
more than did the granting of political equality between the French
and the Anglo-Saxons in Canada. Nevertheless, one may say that
any idea of a violent restoration of their former autonomy has com-
pletely disappeared in the Boer states. Boers like Botha, who
fought most bitterly against the British in the years 1900-1902,
have more than once proved themselves thoroughly loyal citizens.

It only remains to take a brief look at Canada. So long as the
great mass of European immigrants could still be absorbed by the
United States, and as Australia and South Africa attracted chiefly
gold seekers, Canada possessed relatively little importance from the
point of view of the new colonial policy. It was not until the last
third of the nineteenth century that the situation changed. Then,
after the Missouri Valley had been settled, Canada realized that she
might become the heir of the United States and attract agricultural
colonists. Hitherto, it was almost exclusively Eastern Canada which
had been settled, and even there the population was relatively
sparse. Now the government systematically set to work to open up
the great territories in the West. It used the same methods that the
United States had employed, except that the government took a much
more active part. Thus Canada not only adopted the land acts of
the United States in 1872 (see p. 105 ff.), but gave state support to
railway construction, after private enterprise had proved insufficient.
This was all the more important as nothing but the construction
of a great railway line from east to west could overcome the dif-
ficulty resulting from the existence of an extensive, barren area north
of Lake Superior. But the construction of a railway made it pos-
sible to connect the old provinces in Eastern Canada with the new
settlement territory in the West, which was extraordinarily favor-

Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 373

able for raising wheat. These measures had a marked success. A
considerable number of farmers began to settle in the western states ;
quite characteristically not a few of them came from the United
States where vacant land was already becoming restricted. Here
also the Anglo-Saxon element prevailed, so that the assimilation of
the newcomers took place quite easily. In the East, on the other
hand, manufacturing on a large modern scale gradually developed.
Here the soil was no longer sufficient for supporting the growing
population and it was therefore easier for the factories to secure
labor, and the factories also found a good market in the growing
region in the West. This resulted in a decided protective tariff sys-
tem, so that Canada lays more stress on commercial independence
than do any of the other British colonies.

Everywhere we see that the more the Dominions developed,
the more they adopted an independent policy and defended their own
interests against those of the mother country. It has been already
pointed out that the English government put no obstacles in their
way. From a formal point of view, the connection between the
colonies and England was merely a very loose one and it seemed
all the more possible that ultimately a complete separation might
take place, as the population in the colonies at least did not feel
the need for reviving imperial unity. Nevertheless, the colonial
governments were not blind to the existence of common interests
whose protection the Dominions were not able to look out for merely
by action on their own part. The idea of creating a regular perma-
nent imperial government could not be discussed at once. But it
was possible, at least, to bring about voluntary meetings to talk over
general lines of policy. The most natural form of these appeared
to be a conference of all the colonial prime ministers. Such a con-
ference took place, for the first time, in London, in 1887. It was
at first scarcely more than an experiment and was for the purpose
merely of exchanging ideas. It was not immediately raised to the
position of a permanent institution. Seven years went by before the
next meeting took place in 1894; as a concession to Canada this
conference met in the Canadian capital at Ottawa. Soon these two
meetings led to a further step: the question of preferential tariffs
was discussed, and as a result the English Parliament removed the
legal limitations which had hitherto restricted the colonies in tariff
matters (see p. 366). At the third conference in 1902, which again
met in London, it was decided that this new institution should meet
regularly every four years. At the meeting in 1906 it adopted
officially the title "Imperial Conference."

374 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

These meetings at first had no executive power, but their discus-
sions nevertheless were of the greatest practical importance. It was
a matter of primary importance that the problem of imperial defense
was continually discussed. This attracted general attention to this
subject, and the Dominions became aware that the existing system
of voluntary military support which had been given by all the large
colonies in the South African War would not be adequate any more
in the long run. In 1902 the various Dominions declared that in
the future they would contribute annually a certain amount toward
the cost of the imperial navy. Some of them, like Canada and Aus-
tralia, even proceeded to the building of fleets of their own.

This development found its final expression in the World War.
Nothing was better suited to emphasize the community of interests
between the mother country and the Dominions than this war. The
military operations were extended over the whole world, including
the Seven Seas. Parts of the British Empire were open to attack
from the German colonies in South Africa or in the Pacific. More-
over, a victory of Germany's military power threatened to limit, if
not completely to destroy, the political freedom of the British
colonies. All these things showed most clearly how completely the
fate of the Dominions was bound up with that of the mother coun-
try. Although all the colonies did not introduce universal military
service after the fashion of Great Britain, nevertheless they all gave
great military support on their own initiative. Their representatives
were soon united in a regular "Imperial War Council," and in the
treaty of peace with Germany the Dominions (and also India)
figure, so to speak, as Powers on an equal footing with the mother
country. But even here, as a matter of form, everything is not so
simple: the Dominions are mentioned neither as members of a fed-
eral state nor as wholly independent states. But still their diplo-
matic independence has now been recognized in an international
document, and at the same time their feeling of inseparable connec-
tion with the mother country has been so greatly increased by their
common efforts and experiences that they will never oppose on prin-
ciple the creation of an imperial government. The Dominions are
also directly interested in imperial policy through the acquisition
of new colonial territories, and even if no external changes in the
relations between Great Britain and her Dominions should take
place, one can foresee that in the future the colonies will conduct
their negotiations more and more on the basis of friendly mutual
concessions even in economic matters.

Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES

375

The colonial policy of the United States is in many ways analo-
gous to that of Great Britain. Here also the government aimed at
avoiding the danger of creating dependent territories or regular sub-
ject lands. The inhabitants of the new territories were accorded
the same political rights as the citizens of the old states. In theory
this principle was never abandoned, but its execution has met with
considerable difficulties where it was a question of dealing with for-
eign races and especially with colored populations. These diffi-
culties, however, were recognized at the outset. This was the reason
the United States refrained so long from making any colonial acqui-
sitions. It was also the reason that President Cleveland, in 1893,
declined to annex the Hawaiian Islands.

But this traditional policy could no longer be maintained when
the economic structure of the United States had been changed as
a result of the westward movement to the Pacific Ocean. America
was no longer a land producing merely raw materials and food. She
had developed an export trade on a large scale and she was striving,
like her European competitors, for new markets, and also for points
of support for her commerce. At first it was natural for her to look
out at least for good order in neighboring territories where weak
and inefficient governments hindered the Americans from exploiting
the territory economically.

The West Indies, where Spain retained a remnant of her once
large colonial empire, was the region which most closely touched
American interests. In Cuba, the most important of these posses-
sions, American citizens had invested considerable capital, but were
deprived of their profits by the almost continual revolts waged by
Cuban patriots against Spanish authority. Nevertheless, the United
States at first refrained from all intervention. No change of attitude
was even brought about by the horrible measures of repression which
were adopted by the Spaniards and which roused a powerful public
opinion in the United States. But in 1897, when the anti-interven-
tion administration of the Democrats gave way to a Republican
administration under McKinley, America began to interfere in the
Cuban revolt which had then been going on for two years. The
Washington government demanded that Spain abandon the horrible
methods which it had adopted to suppress the rebellion. The
Spaniards yielded so far as to give the Cubans large autonomy, but
this did not put an end to the revolt. Then it happened, apparently
by accident, that the battleship Maine, which had been sent to
Havana to protect American interests, was sunk by an explosion. In
America the Spanish government was regarded as responsible for

376 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

this, and President McKinley demanded that Spain should at once
abandon hostilities against the Cubans who were fighting for free-
dom. Shortly after that, on April 19, 1898, Congress decided to
recognize the independence of the island and to demand the with-
drawal of the Spanish troops.

This decision was naturally equivalent to a declaration of war
against Spain. As one might expect from the superiority of the
American navy, the war resulted in a series of victories for the
United States. First, a Spanish fleet was destroyed in the Pacific
at Manila on May i, 1898. Then, on July 3, the main Spanish
fleet was defeated at Santiago in a battle in which only one American
lost his life. This decided the war, for though the American land
army was insignificant it was now impossible for the Spaniards to
send reinforcements to their colonies. So the Americans were able
without great difficulty to take Santiago in Cuba, to occupy the
Island of Porto Rico, and, on August 13, 1898, to seize Manila in
the Philippines with the assistance of the natives who were in
rebellion. On the preceding day an armistice was signed, as Spain
had been seeking peace ever since July. Peace was eventually signed
at Paris on December 10, 1898. Spain had to give up her claim to
Cuba and to cede to the United States Porto Rico, the Philippines,
and the Island of Guam, which lies in the Pacific to the east of the
Philippines. Spain made special opposition to ceding the Philip-
pines which had not been conquered at all, but the Americans settled
this matter by agreeing to make a consolation payment of twenty
million dollars to Spain for the Philippine Islands.

The new problem which faced the United States was how to
regulate the relation which the territories ceded by Spain should
have to the Union. Now for the first time the Americans had
acquired territories which did not lie on the continent and which
were inhabited by a population of a wholly different sort politically.
Should the system of political equality be applied to these colonies?

The answer given varied according to circumstances. As far as
Cuba was concerned a solemn promise had been made, and so from
the outset there could be no question of annexing this island. As
Congress had promised, Cuba was made an independent republic
and American troops left the island in 1902, as soon as the new state
had been established. However, the Cubans had to give certain
guarantees for the protection of American economic interests. The
United States retained, among other things, some naval stations, a
control over Cuban finance, and a right to intervene under certain
circumstances. The Cubans also were not to allow interference by

Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 377

any other Power. In 1906 when new disorders took place in the
island, American troops were landed and a citizen of the United
States was set up as governor-general. This occupation lasted until
1909. Thus, a semi-protectorate was established by the United
States in Cuba without Cuba being incorporated, however, into the
Union.

In Porto Rico, on the other hand, matters were regulated quite
according to British precedent — not the precedent of the Dominions,
but that of the crown colonies. The island was not treated as an
integral part of the American Union but as a dependent territory.
In 1900 a constitution was issued which gave the President of the
United States the right to appoint the executive officials and the
members of the upper house of the legislature.

Both these territorial acquisitions — to which might be added San
Domingo, over which the United States assumed a protectorate by
a treaty in 1905 — belonged within the natural sphere of American
expansion and did not meet with any regular opposition from the
peoples concerned. The acquisition of the Philippines, on the other
hand, meant a complete break in the traditional policy of the United
States. In this case annexation took place against the wish of the
population, and as to the manner in which it took place, it cor-
responded exactly with the new East Asiatic policy which the great
states of Europe were adopting. Like the Europeans, the Americans
possessed considerable commercial interests in the Far East, and
were all the more anxious to secure a point of support there as it
was at this very time that the European Powers were beginning
to partition China (see p. 356), though the Americans refused, on
principle, to make territorial acquisitions at China's expense. There-
fore, the Americans held fast to the Philippines, in spite of strong
opposition in America itself when it became clear that the native
population would first have to be suppressed by force ; to have given
up the islands would have practically meant handing them over to
Germany or Japan. America continued in this policy when Agui-
naldo, formerly the ally of the Americans, prolonged a rebellion
which had been stirred up in 1899 and which made it necessary,
finally, to send out an army of seventy thousand men. On the
other hand, the Americans never gave up their idea of educating
the Filipinos in course of time for self-government. In fact they
put this idea into practice with British rapidity: as early as 1907
a legislature was called together, made up of inhabitants who only
a little while before had been hostile. On August 29, 1916, the
United States gave the islands complete autonomy.

378 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

In the case of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, in 1898,
the United States went even further. This territory was incorpo-
rated into the Union at once in 1900, so that the Constitution of
the United States extends to the islands, and in matters of com-
merce they are in a position of equality with the states in the Union.
Small extensions of the American colonial possessions resulted from
the acquisition of Tutuila and other Samoan Islands in 1900, and
the island of St. Thomas in the West Indies which was purchased
from Denmark in 1916.

Much more important than these acquisitions, however, was the
completion of the Panama Canal. This event can best be discussed
in connection with the history of Anglo-American relations.

Scarcely any other circumstance is so instructive in the history
of the foreign policy of Anglo-Saxons as the relation between Great
Britain and the United States. Here, opposite one another, stood
two Great Powers between whom there was little political sympathy,
and America had never wholly forgotten the hostile attitude of the
governing classes in England during the War of Secession. Between
the two countries also lay many serious sources of irritation — the
rivalry of their navies, the competition with which American in-
dustry threatened that of England, and the danger that Canada
might some day be absorbed by her larger neighbor. But in spite
of all this, it appears that not only have none of these causes of
irritation led to war between these unmilitaristic states, but they
have not even applied military pressure like threats of war. Dif-
ferences may arise and sharp words may be exchanged, but it has
never been necessary to rattle the sword to make one of the parties
finally give way. The idea of a settlement by war disappeared so
completely, that the boundary of Canada, though the question of
fortifying it during the War of Secession was discussed in England,
has been finally left without any fortifications at all, just like the
boundary of an inland village.

However, it must be said that the credit for this peaceful develop-
ment belongs mainly to England which ultimately always gave way.
This was particularly noticeable in connection with the negotiations
in regard to the Panama Canal.

In 1850, at a time when the United States had scarcely gained
a foothold on the Pacific Ocean and had few colonies in the West,
she signed the so-called Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Britain.
By this both Powers undertook not to exercise any exclusive control
over a canal which should be built at Panama. They also guar-

Ill: THE ANGLO-SAXON EMPIRES 379

anteed the neutrality of the canal and forbade the establishment of
fortified positions in its neighborhood.

England, therefore, had a formal right to oppose a canal which
should be exclusively under American control. Nevertheless, the
more the United States began to be a World Power, the more the
feeling spread in America that the canal ought to be a purely
American undertaking. The question became acute when the French
Panama Company, which had been founded by De Lesseps, the great
engineer who built the Suez Canal, collapsed. The opportunity
seemed now to have come for America to take the matter wholly
in her own hands, and, in 1901, the United States did actually
succeed in persuading England to a new agreement, the "Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty," which gave the Americans absolute control over
the canal.

The United States accordingly made full use of the treaty without
interference from England, and even without the trouble with Co-
lombia involving British intervention. The Republic of Colombia,
which owned the canal territory, refused to cede the necessary strip
of land six miles wide, and take ten million dollars in payment for
it, because the Republic hoped to squeeze a higher sum out of the
United States. The Americans helped themselves by arranging a
wholly bloodless "revolution," somewhat in light-opera fashion, in
the Colombian province of Panama. As a result of this, Panama
declared herself to be an independent republic, and as such ceded
the canal strip to the United States in 1903. The work of digging
the canal was then undertaken by the American government with
great skill in organization. Thanks to the discovery, a little while
before, that malarial fever was caused by the Anopheles mosquito,
measures could be taken to prevent the great loss of life which this
had hitherto caused. The canal was completed in 1914, and offi-
cially opened in 1915.

Another incident was the Venezuelan affair. When the English
government came into conflict with Venezuela in regard to the
boundary of their colony in Guiana in 1895, the United States in-
sisted on diplomatic intervention, basing her claim on the Monroe
Doctrine. In this case, also, England gave way, in spite of the sud'
denness of the American demand, and submitted the point at issue
to arbitration. Even at that time the idea of a general treaty of
arbitration between the two countries was discussed, but President
Cleveland's plan came to nothing in 1897, on account of the oppo-
sition in the American Senate, in which the necessary two-thirds
majority could not be secured for the treaty. Nevertheless, the rela-

380 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

tions between England and the United States became steadily more
friendly. During the Spanish- American War, England observed a
benevolent neutrality, and in 1903 she gave her approval to a settle-
ment of the question of the boundary between Alaska and Canada
which was very favorable for the United States.

It has been out of events of this kind that the Anglo-Saxon world
has developed in a way which is in such marked contrast to the
system of armed peace prevailing on the Continent of Europe. The
more armaments and military threats increase and become serious
there, so much more marked is the peaceful or rather unmilitary
character of British and American foreign relations. More charac-
teristic than the arbitration treaties or even the regular substitution
of diplomatic or judicial decisions instead of war, has been the
absence in these two countries of all armaments which could
be used for offensive purposes; and also the absence of all military
preparedness which could result in a sudden attack, or easily lead
to a "preventive" war. Both Powers have armies which might be
regarded, one might say, as non-existent, both in comparison with
the armies of the other European Powers and in view of their own
latent resources. Both have only the kind of navies which can be
used solely for defense and not in cooperation with great armies.
Neither Power has universal military service, nor a militarized sys-
tem of education, nor pressure by militarists upon the civil authori-
ties. In both, this peaceful attitude toward other Powers coincides
with democratic political institutions. The idea has therefore grown
up that the government of the people itself acts as a guarantee
against a policy of aggression. On the basis of their practical expe-
rience both countries are convinced that every conflict can be settled
through the goodwill of the parties concerned, without having to
appeal to arms. Occasional warlike operations against smaller states
or semi-barbarous peoples have naturally not been avoidable, but
such wars have been conducted without disturbing the normal life
of the population and without demanding the whole powers of the
state. They naturally, therefore, are not at all to be compared with
the kind of wars between Great Powers which are feared in Europe.

However, people of insight in both states perceived that the Anglo-
Saxon world could retain its "unmilitaristic organization" only so
long as it did not run the danger of being attacked by one of the
great European Powers which was armed to the teeth. But these
people were not numerous, and their warnings were not heeded. It
was not until this danger became a very practical one that both
states roused themselves to save their political ideals for the future.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT AND THE ATTITUDE
OF GOVERNMENTS TOWARD IT

IN the first half of the nineteenth century measures for the protec-
tion of industrial workers, aside from those which were wholly un-
political and due merely to philanthropic motives, were a part of
the liberal movement of the time. They formed the left wing of
liberalism. In demanding universal suffrage, bourgeois idealists and
representatives of the working classes found themselves on common
ground (see p. 194) ; but about the middle of the century a change
began to take place. In the new policy pursued by workingmen the
idea began to be given up that it would ever be possible to restore
a harmony of interests between capital and labor merely by laws
for the protection of workingmen. The view was wholly rejected
that the misery of the working-classes could be prevented by hu-
manitarian measures. It was becoming more evident than ever that
the tendency of modern manufacturing on a large scale was to make
it impossible for workingmen to rise to the class of property-owners
or to gain a livelihood in a business of their own. Owing to this,
the conviction gained ground that here were two classes whose in-
terests could never be harmonized with one another. It was there-
fore the task of the workingmen to unite in organizations of their
own and to form a party based on class lines which should oppose
all the other "bourgeois" parties. They believed that in certain
questions they might, however, cooperate with other parties. Since
it was the aim of the "proletarian" or "communistic" movement to
get control over the state, it was quite in accordance with the in-
terests of the workingmen, they believed, to act in common with the
"left" (or radical) liberals, who were also aiming to secure uni-
versal suffrage; for since the proletarians formed the majority in a
country, this would bring about the overthrow of the rule of the
capitalists. In theory, however, the proletarians believed that they
ought to fight all other organizations than their own, as being "the
great reactionary mass."

This program was first formulated in 1847 in the Communist

381

382

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

Manifesto by a German, Karl Marx. One of the points in which it
differed most from the previous socialistic movements was that it
abandoned nationalistic limitations on the workingmen. As religious
zealots used to put the claims of their religious party above the in-
terests of their country, so these new socialists regarded the world
no longer as divided into national states but into economic classes,
and the victory of their class was more important than the future
of their country. "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" This is
the phrase which rings through the Communist Manifesto and sounds
clearly the international character of the new socialist movement.

Accordingly, an international organization was founded. In 1864
the International Workingmen's Association was established at Lon-
don. Though various splits in it occurred later, there always re-
mained a bond between the various Socialist-democratic or Col-
lectivist parties in different countries. But as a matter of fact, this
International Association never acquired great practical importance.
What Socialists have actually accomplished has been due almost
exclusively to the efforts of the party in separate countries.

At any rate, it is only the successes of the socialist movement
within the existing states which are of any historical importance.
Here, indeed, Socialism has had a tremendous influence. It is
scarcely saying too much to insist that the question of Socialism
and its demands has dominated the internal policy of the states in
Western and Central Europe during the last fifty years. At any
rate, it has influenced it more strongly than any other single thing.

But here it is impossible even to summarize the history of So-
cialism in all the great states of Europe. It is only possible to indi-
cate a few typical developments and at the same time consider the
course of events in the largest countries.

For one kind of development the course of events in France is
most noteworthy.

It will be recalled that one of the main factors which led to the
establishment of the Second Empire was the fear of Socialism. A
republican form of government and liberalism — especially liberalism
with an anti-clerical tinge — had become objects of suspicion to the
bourgeoisie as presaging a communistic subversion of society. To
them, absolutism supported by the church seemed to be the only
means of salvation against a social revolution (see p. 203). Now
when the military collapse of Bonapartism at Sedan again opened
the way for the establishment of a Republic on September 4, 1870,
the question arose as to how the classes interested in the existing
system of property rights would reconcile themselves to the bug-

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 383

bear of a Republic. Would a Republic be able to survive when large
groups of people were convinced that it meant the beginning of
anarchy and the rule of the proletarian masses?

Men of insight, like the great statesman, Adolphe Thiers, who
was now chosen "Chief of the Executive Power," recognized at once
that a Republic was the only form of government for the new France,
but that this Republic must give solid guarantees against any change
in property rights if it was to survive. The two phrases which
Thiers coined at that time characterized the situation perfectly:
"The Republic is the form of government which divides us least";
and, "The Republic can only survive if it is conservative."

But it was very difficult to make these views prevail. In the
National Assembly at Bordeaux, which had been elected for the pur-
pose of making peace with Germany, the so-called reactionaries, or
Monarchists of various kinds, had a majority over the Republicans
of 400 to 350. The Assembly refused to go on record in any way
as favoring on principle a republican form of government.

An event which took place a little while afterwards had a peculiar
influence in reviving more strongly than ever in France and else-
where the old panicky fear of radical republican and socialist tend-
encies.

The long siege of Paris had left the population of the capital
extraordinarily excited against the government. Revolutionary
idealists found fault with those in authority for not declaring a revo-
lutionary war as in former times and leading them against the
enemy. The irritation was still further increased by the reactionary
attitude of the National Assembly which, on March 20, 1871, had
moved from Bordeaux to Versailles, near Paris. People feared a
restoration of the monarchy.

Now it happened that the artillery of Paris had had to be moved
to the industrial quarter of Montmartre on the occasion of the
entrance of the German troops. There and in other suburbs of a
similar kind, like Belleville and La Villette, a central committee had
been formed from revolutionary groups in the National Guard (see
p. 196), which was like a revolutionary government. The legal gov-
ernment at Versailles therefore wanted to get the cannon out of this
dangerous neighborhood. But in doing this, trouble developed.
The revolutionists declared that the cannon were their property and
on March 18 they shot down the two officers who were to have
brought the guns away. Thereupon an insurrection broke out almost
everywhere in Paris and the government officials fled to Versailles.

The revolutionary government which was now established in Paris

384 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

was not exactly a socialist organization in the new sense of the word,
but a curious mixture of extreme Republican and idealistic Socialist
institutions. On the one hand, the governing body of ninety per-
sons, known as the "Commune" adopted the red flag as the sign
and symbol of their socialist demands. But on the other hand, they
favored a federated republican constitution and desired that every
commune should have autonomy.

From a military point of view the fate of the insurrection was
hopeless from the outset. The only prospect of success would have
been for the other communes to have followed the example of Paris.
But it was only in a very few industrial towns like Saint-Etienne,
Limoges, and Marseilles that "communes" were formed, and these
were very short lived. However, the Parisians succeeded in main-
taining themselves for an extraordinarily long period. At the begin-
ning they even undertook an offensive against Versailles. But as
soon as a regular army could be formed from the prisoners of war
who were released from Germany, MacMahon was given command,
the "Communards" were driven back on the defensive, and Paris
was besieged a second time. The siege lasted two months. On
May 31, 1871, after a week of street fighting, the legal government
again gained control of the capital.

Although this socialist civil war made an enormous impression
everywhere, the permanent influence which the Commune exerted
was connected with another circumstance. The conflict between the
government troops and the revolutionists was not conducted ac-
cording to the regular rules of war, because the Commune had not
been recognized as a belligerent. This resulted in frightful reprisals
being inflicted on the rebels. Captured Communard leaders were
shot down without trial. The Communards, on their side, when
they saw their cause was lost, took vengeance by setting fire to public
buildings like the Ministry of Finance, the Hotel de Ville, and
the Tuileries. Hostages whom they had in their hands, including
magistrates and higher clergy, were simply murdered.

These acts of rage and destruction, in which at least 6,500 persons
are officially said to have lost their lives, left such an impression as
has rarely resulted from any single event. All opponents of re-
publican ideals, including a large number of cultured people who
had trembled at the fate of the artistic monuments of Paris, be-
lieved shudderingly that they had personally experienced the proof
that a triumph of extreme republican tendencies would only result
in the destruction of civilization and subversion of society. The
Parisian Communards had expressly appealed to the example of the

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 385

French Revolution, and among other things they had again intro-
duced the republican calendar. Could there be any better argu-
ment for the conclusion that the poison of revolution would ulti-
mately lead to the general dissolution of society?

It was almost a wonder that the anti-republican movement did
not triumph in France. Nevertheless, the wonder actually took
place. To be sure, those who had taken part in the Commune were
very severely punished. No less than 7,500 guilty persons were
deported to New Caledonia. In 1873 the National Assembly also
brought about Thiers's resignation, and a ministry was chosen in
which the three monarchist parties were represented and which
adopted as its motto the restoration of "ordre moral" which had
been shattered by the radicals. But the restoration of the monarchy
failed, aside from personal reasons, owing to the religious question.
The Legitimists and Orleanists did indeed unite in 1873 by means
of the so-called "fusion"; they both agreed to support the repre-
sentative of the older Bourbon line, the Count of Chambord
("Henry V"), with the understanding that he should be succeeded
by the Orleanist grandson of Louis Philippe. But when the ques-
tion of the flag was discussed, a dispute arose. The pious Count
of Chambord declared that he would hold fast to the old white flag
handed down to him by his ancestors. The Orleanists, forming the
"right center," wanted to keep the tricolor; they were all the more
unwilling to give in on the question of the flag because the adoption
of the white flag would have generally been regarded as a sign of
the restoration of clerical rule. After the experiences of the Second
Empire, public opinion was by no means inclined to tolerate this
nor were the Intellectuals. Some regard, also, had to be paid to
the feeling in the country. Reactionary forces began to get the
upper hand in the administration. Republican officials were re-
moved and statues of Republicans disappeared from the town halls.
The clergy began to assume more and more influence. In 1875
they were allowed to undertake higher education and establish uni-
versities of their own. The more these reactionary and clerical tend-
encies showed themselves, the more public opinion in France shifted
toward the left. A thing that contributed greatly to this was Gam-
betta's agitation. During the war of 1870 he had proved himself
to be a great organizer. He had traveled over all of France, every-
where urging that the Republic must be a real Republic, that is, that
a new social class should be admitted to political control.

The result of all this was that in 1875 the National Assembly, on
a vote in regard to the title of the head of the government, decided

386

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

by a majority of one only in favor of a Republic. At the same time,
constitutional laws were passed, making the Republic as much like
the July Monarchy as possible. The president was to be elected
for a term of seven years and could be reflected; thus he might be
transformed into a constitutional king. In the election of senators,
small communes had the same rights as large ones, which gave an
advantage to the large landowners. But all this merely delayed the
victory of democracy; it could not permanently prevent it. In spite
of all these precautionary measures, the Chamber of Deputies,
elected by direct and universal suffrage, finally arrogated supreme
authority to itself. This gave the control of the state not to prop-
erty owners as heretofore, but to the masses of the people who had
been excluded by previous constitutions from a share in the gov-
ernment. It also gave France for the first time a really stable con-
stitution. The era of political revolutions now ceased. No economic
group any longer possessed an artifically preponderant position. No
interference with intellectual freedom could again be attempted. So
disappeared the main cause which had formerly led to revolutions
in France. The new regime has lasted down to the present moment
— much longer than any previous government since 1789.

The democratic theory on which the government is based was
again shown in 1877 when the reactionary President, in cooperation
with the reactionary Senate, dissolved the Chamber of Deputies.
This was the occasion when Gambetta gathered the Republican hosts
with the slogan, "Le clericalisme, voila Vennemi" The phrase
appealed to the small property owners and the peasants. The Re-
publican parties again carried the election. Their influence was so
strong that they also soon gained a majority in the Senate.

All the logical changes were now made which have been com-
prised in the idea of a Republican form of government ever since
the establishment of the United States (see p. 15). Freedom of
meeting was introduced. There was also unlimited freedom of the
press, and after 1881 no more preliminary deposits were demanded.
In 1882 it was decided to make attendance at school obligatory.
All the schools were "laicized," that is, were made non-sectarian, and
great attention was given to more advanced education for girls.
The granting of higher academic degrees was reserved to the State
and could no longer take place in ecclesiastical institutions. Thus
Napoleon Ill's decree of 1850, which gave the clergy control over
education, was completely undone.

Other measures aimed at decentralization and at the same time at
the political education of the people. The election of mayors of

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 387

communes, with the exception of Paris, was left to the communal
councils, the powers of the mayors themselves were enlarged, and
the sessions of the communal councils were made public. Repre-
sentation in the Senate was based on population and the small com-
munes lost their privileged position. A special concession was made
to the lower classes in 1884 by the law which made possible the
establishment of "syndicats," or trade unions, free from government
interference. This law was at once taken advantage of very widely.

Thus it became possible for even the Socialist Party, which wanted
to secure political power by means of democratic institutions, to
support the Republic and work in cooperation with it. Furthermore,
the Socialists were no longer excluded from taking part in the gov-
ernment by any special laws. As they naturally could never get
control in a country where small property owners and peasants
dominated, no obstacles were placed in their way to check their
political activity. One of their leaders (Millerand) was a member
of a "bourgeois" cabinet as early as 1899. The large group of
Socialists in the Chamber of Deputies, led by Jaures, formed a part
of the "government bloc." In 1906 a Socialist (Viviani) even be-
came minister of labor in Clemenceau's cabinet, and in 1909 another
socialist (Briand) actually became prime minister. It was not until
the development of Socialism of the Left or Syndicalism that cool-
ness developed between the Republican "bloc" and a part of the So-
cialists, namely those who wanted to abandon constitutional political
methods altogether. The rise of this Syndicalism may be dated from
the founding of the General Confederation of Labor about 1896.
But splits in the Socialist groups by no means resulted in the anti-
republican and anti-socialistic clerical "Right" securing a preponder-
ance again. The republic was so firmly established in France that
it no longer had to depend upon the support of the Socialists of
the Left.

It had become so strong that even the new nationalistic attacks
by the Right were wholly unsuccessful. In the years 1887-89 the
reactionary parties, aided by a popular general named Boulanger,
attempted to set up a militarist government by means of a coup
d'etat and by plebiscites after the fashion of Napoleon III. This
government was eventually to prepare the way for a war of revenge
against Germany, but France, which was becoming more and more
pacifist in its attitude, refused to support the parties favoring re-
venge. Boulanger 's followers were terribly defeated at the polls in
1889 and Boulanger himself, sentenced to deportation, fled to
Brussels where he committed suicide in 1891. Somewhat later the

388

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

Republican party gained a similar victory over the clerical-royalist
group which had been seeking to build up a kind of rival govern-
ment in the army. The form it took was the affair about a Jewish
artillery captain named Dreyfus. In 1894 he had been banished
for life to the Devil's Island in French Guiana because he was sup-
posed to have betrayed military secrets to Germany. Military offi-
cers like Colonel Picquart, who later in 1896 expressed belief in his
innocence, were subjected to military discipline. But the friends of
the condemned man did not let the matter rest. The most notable
Republican Socialist leaders like Clemenceau and Jaures, as well as
writers like Zola and Anatole France, insisted most energetically
that Dreyfus was innocent. Equally energetic in opposition to them
stood the army, the Church, and various royalist intellectuals like
Brunetiere and Lemaitre. The conflict was a very bitter one, but
it ultimately resulted in bringing the case before the Court of
Cassation. Though a new judgment was pronounced against
Dreyfus he was nevertheless pardoned by the President of the Re-
public. Later he was even restored to his position in the French
army with the rank of major. More important still was the fact
that the army was now reorganized from top to bottom and the
exclusive authority of the nationalistic General Staff was broken.
The supreme authority in the army henceforth was in the hands of
the civil authorities.

The Republic had emerged so successfully from this trial of
strength that it now even dealt a final blow to the political power
of the Church, and proceeded to bring about a separation of Church
and State.

The first assault was made on the great religious orders known
as the Congregations. Every association in France had to have an
authorization from the State. The Congregations in most cases had
not secured this. In spite of this, not only had they been tolerated,
but they had even kept a great part of education in France in their
hands, although this was contrary to Ferry's School Law (see p.
386), which had remained on paper. In 1901 the Law of Associa-
tions, so far as the matter of principle was concerned, now brought
a change. In general, freedom of association was introduced, but
religious communities were to be formed only by special permission,
and the members of the unauthorized religious orders were excluded
from giving instruction in the schools. Congregations like the
Assumptionists, who refused to obey this regulation, were expelled
from France.

Waldeck-Rousseau, who was prime minister when this law was

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 389

adopted, proceeded with great moderation in its execution. But it
was otherwise with his successor, Combes. He represented much
sharper anti-clerical ideas, perhaps just because he had originally
been trained for the priesthood in a Catholic seminary. He attacked
the educational institutions of the forbidden religious orders much
more vigorously, and finally, in 1904, excluded even the authorized
Congregations from public teaching. Soon the government went still
further and extended their war to the secular clergy. A dispute
with the papacy about the appointment of bishops finally led to the
breaking off of diplomatic relations between Paris and the Vatican.
Then, in 1905, the Concordat, which Napoleon I had signed in 1801,
was declared null, and the Church was wholly separated from the
State. The Republic declared that it would no longer support re-
ligious communities in the future. The property of such religious
associations, after it had been inventoried by the State, was to be
handed over to new associations atltuelles which were to be formed.
Similar regulations were to be applied to the Protestant and Jewish
churches.

Thus it was planned to establish a free church and a free state,
and these plans of the government were accepted by the Protestants
and the Jews. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, under Pope
Pius X, allowed an open conflict to develop. The Pope forbade the
clergy to found the associations cultuelles provided for by the law.
His aim was evidently to make the Church appear like a martyr
which had been robbed of everything and to rouse public opinion in
France which had hitherto been fairly indifferent. But the French
government, and especially Briand, who became minister of educa-
tion in the Clemenceau cabinet in 1906, parried this move with as
much skill as moderation. The law was carried out as gently as
possible, but still without losing sight of its real purpose.

Thus, the Third French Republic succeeded in carrying out this
part of its program unhindered, and thereby gave a splendid new
proof of its stability, and belied as groundless the fear that anarchy
was beginning. Its strength was also soon shown by the French
attitude in foreign politics. Ever since 1870 France had been with-
out a single friend or ally, as Bismarck had wished. France was
separated from England, and later from Italy also, by colonial rival-
ries; any connection with Russia ran counter to political ideals on
both sides. Russia also regarded the support of Republican France
as quite an inadequate substitute for the support which Bismarck's
government had given Russian policy against Austria in the Balkans.
But in the course of twenty years conditions had altered. The great

390 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

prosperity of France and the wise economic policy of her population
had given an incomparable importance to financial association with
a country which had become "the banker of Europe." France was
the only country in Europe which had not become excessively indus-
trialized and filled with a surplus population; stable political condi-
tions and the resulting policy of peace made it possible to exploit
the rich soil to an ever larger extent; the population, however, was
kept down to about the same numbers, so that France was not only
independent of foreign countries for its food supply, but it even had
food to export from its own abundance. The frugal and industrious
population conserved so carefully what they had gained that they
had more money to lend to foreign nations than other countries which
outwardly appeared to be more prosperous.

It was in 1888 that Russia was able to place her first loan in
Paris. Two years later, when Bismarck was compelled to resign
partly because he would not support Austria-Hungary at Russia's
expense in the Near East, the plan for a Franco-Russian alliance
took more definite form. The Russo-German "reinsurance treaty"
was not renewed; in its place an alliance was made between Russia
and France in 1891, and in the next year this was followed by a
military convention between the two countries. The Radical Social-
ist republic had associated itself on a footing of equality with one of
the three Powers which was regarded as the protector of absolutism.
In 1891, the French navy visited Kronstadt and the Tsar had to
listen to the Marseillaise with bared head. In 1893, the Russian fleet
returned this visit, and in 1896, the new Tsar, Nicholas II, personally
visited France, being the first crowned head to do so since 1870.
France had now acquired the guarantee which had hitherto been
lacking that Russia would come to her support in case of an attack
from Germany.

At the same time, the Third French Republic had been acquiring
a great colonial empire, unequaled by that of the Old Regime; in
spite of many superficial defects, which undoubtedly existed and
caused complaint, it was clear that no other country had so satis-
factory a position and future prospects as France thirty or forty
years after the creation of the Third Republic. One may also say
that at that time the French people had renounced all further political
ambitions. The idea of pacifism had penetrated the leaders of the
governing parties and the greater part of the state system of educa-
tion; many teachers even advocated anti-militarism openly. France
had reached the position of a people who wished only to be left

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 391

in peace by others without desiring anything from them. To be
sure, the reactionary parties, which were excluded from a share in
the government, still nourished nationalistic aims, but with the ex-
ception of a small group of Intellectuals their agitation fell on deaf
ears, and it was noteworthy that even a considerable number of
politicians who had formerly been in favor of a monarchy had
"rallied" to the Republic.

In England the course of events was less dramatic, but ended at
the same goal.

The Reform Act of 1832 (see p. 92 f.) had not increased the politi-
cal rights of the working class essentially, if at all. The working-
men's condition, however, had been fundamentally improved by the
State, and the possibility of emigration to America had provided the
proper balance between the supply of population and the possibility
of employment. But the workingmen had no real share in drawing
up the laws for their own protection, and therefore they began anew
an agitation for electoral reform and for a larger representation of
workingmen in the House of Commons. In 1866 they were again
agitating definitely for universal suffrage.

This time it was easier to overcome the opposition of Parliament
than in 1832, and a number of monster meetings sufficed to make
the House of Commons adopt the Reform Act of 1867. Even this,
however, did not do away with all the inequalities in the existing
distribution of seats; the large cities were still at a considerable
disadvantage; but since in the towns every man was given a vote
who paid £10 rent for lodgings yearly and had resided there for a
year, practically all workingmen were enfranchised. This increased
the English electorate by more than a million voters, the greater
part of whom belonged to the laboring class.

Supported by the strength of the radical party which developed
from this electoral reform, Gladstone's new Liberal ministry (1868-
74) now carried through a number of innovations which still further
limited the former plutocratic individualistic system. In 1870 educa-
tion was for the first time made compulsory and special taxes were
collected for the support of schools. In 1872 the secret ballot was
introduced, which at last freed the electors from pressure by the
rich. In 1871 trade unions were officially recognized. Finally, the
practice of purchasing offices in the army was abolished; when the
House of Lords rejected this democratic measure, Gladstone put an
end to the existing practice in 1871 by a simple ordinance resting
on the royal prerogative.

392 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

What a position the workingmen had thus acquired in political
life is best seen by the fact that henceforth both the old political
parties began to make efforts to secure their favor.

Hitherto, all reforms for the benefit of the industrial proletariat —
but not for the agricultural laborers for whom scarcely anything had
been done, — had been brought about by the Liberal Party, the old
Whigs. The Conservatives or Tories had always opposed them,
because an extension of the suffrage, which was the necessary condi-
tion for social legislation, meant also a limitation of the dominating
influence of the large landowners. Now they perceived that they
would finally be completely pushed to the wall if they persisted in
their old attitude of opposing the demands of the workingmen; or,
to be more correct, one of their leaders perceived this. This leader
was an "outsider" who, thanks to his foreign origin, was better able
to grasp the situation than men who had been brought up exclusively
amid Tory ideas. Disraeli, or as he was known after 1876, Lord
Beaconsfield, coming from a family of converted Jews, by his extra-
ordinary tenacity and intelligence had been able to overcome all
the difficulties which were at first placed in the way of his political
activity, and had become the intellectual leader of the Conservative
Party. He now formulated the program of the Tories by which
they defeated the Liberals in the election of 1874. He reproached
the Whigs with being no more than a clique of a few large families
who would never really champion the well-being of the masses. The
weakening of the authority of State and Church, aimed at by the
Liberals, was not, he said, in the interests of the people. But it was
to be the task of the Conservative Party, with the aid of State and
Church, to improve the working classes; the Conservatives, he said,
were fundamentally the true people's party.

These were ideas, as one sees, which strongly recalled those of
Napoleon III, and in fact were inspired by him, only that the adop-
tion of them did not rest on an illegal act like the coup d'etat. At
any rate, Disraeli succeeded in winning to his side the workingmen
who had been disillusioned by Gladstone's compromise legislation,
and the Conservatives now began for the first time to undertake
social and political reforms. As prime minister, Disraeli replaced
the law of 1871 by another which established complete equality be-
tween employers and employees, and allowed workingmen to use
"peaceful means" in carrying on a strike. Employment of children
under ten years in factories was wholly forbidden and all factories
employing women were limited to a ten-hour working day.
These concessions in turn stirred the Liberals to make greater

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 393

Concessions. First, they abandoned more completely than hitherto
the principle of non-interference by the state; one of their leaders,
Joseph Chamberlain, the radical mayor of Birmingham and formerly
a large employer of labor, municipalized a great number of public
utilities which had previously been in the hands of private persons;
the example which he set in the "Birmingham System" was imitated
in many other towns. Then the Liberals went further in the ex-
tension of the suffrage than Disraeli had proposed a few years before.
The Liberals now urged that even agricultural laborers, who were
relatively numerous in England on account of the large landed
estates, should be allowed to participate in electing the House of
Commons. The Reform Act of 1884-85 accordingly abolished all
inequalities between rural and urban districts by extending the bor-
ough franchise to the counties; henceforth, any one who rented
lodgings for which he paid £10 a year had the vote. At a single
stroke the electors jumped in number from 3,221,000 to 5,700,000;
it was mainly the rural districts and villages which benefited by this
act. The counties were divided into electoral districts of equal size
and many little boroughs lost their right of being represented. The
practical effect of the law was to give the vote to all industrial
workers and also to all the agricultural laborers who were better
off and who did not live with their employers.

Hand in hand with this reform went a change in English local
government. All extensions of the suffrage were merely half meas-
ures so long as local government remained in the hands of rural
magnates like the justices of the peace. Chamberlain, who joined
the Tories as a "Liberal Unionist," because he believed in maintaining
the union of England and Ireland (see p. 181), persuaded the Con-
servatives to adopt changes in local administration and give some
political influence to the non-propertied classes. Parliament under-
took to create new districts in the counties; in every county, local
administration, with the right to levy taxes, was given to a county
council elected for three years by all the tax-payers, so that after
1888 the justices of the peace retained only their judicial authority.
In 1894 town councils, elected by all the tax-payers, were also es-
tablished in the towns, so that the rule of the squires came to an
end. These town and county councils were also given extensive
powers, so that in many places regular "community socialism" was
introduced.

Since then Conservative ministries have merely resulted in post-
poning, but no longer in preventing, further changes in the demo-
cratic direction. The Tory Party has sought to distract the atten-

394 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

tion of the country from problems at home by "imperialistic under-
takings" like the Boer War; but such means have merely meant
at best a delay for a few years. In spite of them the Liberals have
succeeded in carrying out three important reforms.

The first of these reforms was in regard to the House of Lords.
Now that the House of Commons had come really to represent the
people and was no longer dominated by landlords and distinguished
families, the contrast between it and the House of Lords had been
becoming more and more marked. The House of Lords had become
a regular class body which by its ecclesiastical-aristocratic veto had
several times been able to defeat measures against landed property
passed by the House of Commons, as in the case of measures relating
to Ireland (see p. 184 f.). The Liberals therefore began to consider
whether the Upper House ought not to be either abolished or at least
fundamentally changed; "mend or end the House of Lords" was the
motto which had been adopted by the radicals since 1894.

The conflict again became acute in 1909 when the House of Lords
rejected the Liberal budget brought in by the Asquith ministry,
chiefly because the Lords would not consent to the tax on landed
property contained in the budget. In the new election which then
took place one of the campaign cries was, "Abolition of the Lords'
veto." The Liberals won the election, and their ministry brought
in resolutions wholly abolishing the right of veto by the House of
Lords in financial matters and in other matters making the veto
merely suspensive in its effect for two years. The House of Lords
at first took a rebellious attitude; but when threatened with a
creation of new peers it finally gave way and passed the resolution
by a small majority.

After the opposition of the Upper House had been broken in this
way other Liberal reforms could be undertaken. Among these, was
the disestablishment of the church in Wales, where the greater
part of the population belonged to sects, like the Methodist; this
measure was important as a matter of principle because, according
to the intention of the Liberals, it was to be the first step toward
a separation of church and state in England itself. Other measures
were the introduction of laws for insurance against old age, sickness,
and unemployment.

Thus the pillars of the half plutocratic regime established by the
compromise of 1832 had completely collapsed when the World War
broke out in 1914. Great Britain had already followed the example
of her colonies to such an extent that prior to the reform of the
House of Lords, some leaders of the Conservative-Unionist party

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 395

actually proposed that in cases of serious conflict between the Upper
and Lower Houses an appeal should be made to the people by way
of a referendum, after the American or Swiss fashion. And finally
when, in the course of the war, the last step was taken toward imi-
tating the democratic ideals already prevailing in the colonies and
equal political rights were granted to women, this step made prac-
tically no change in the relative position and power of the two great
political parties. The same is true as to the appointment of Socialist
leaders as members of the cabinet. The transformation of the Old
Regime had already gone so far that the Reform Act of 1832, per-
haps even that of 1867, must be regarded as having had more im-
portant consequences than the measures passed in the most recent
decades.

The most marked contrast to this method of adapting political
conditions to meet social demands is furnished by Prussia and Ger-
many, the main lines of whose policy are as characteristic for East-
ern Europe as are the methods of France and England for the West
and the South.

In Germany also the government had to deal with Socialism. Since
the middle of the nineteenth century and the first beginnings of
manufacturing on a large scale, German workingmen had begun to
form organizations, and the more Germany strove to overtake France
and especially England in the lead which they enjoyed, the greater
grew the membership in these organizations.

What attitude should the government adopt toward them? Evi-
dently no solution like that in France and England was possible.
Any participation of the Socialists in the government, whether of
the whole Empire or of the individual States, was impossible because
the citizens as such, i. e. the legislatures, were practically denied any
real share in the administration and government of the country.
Moreover, there was lacking any strong democratic party correspond-
ing to the radical groups in France and England — any party of ideal-
istic intellectuals and small bourgeois who were friendly toward the
common people and who would have favored equal political rights
for the Socialists simply on grounds of liberalism. The progressive
parties in Germany had become powerless for ever as a result of
the unfortunate outcome (for them) of the constitutional conflict in
Prussia, and the two parties which were regarded as supporters and
sharers in the government's policy represented principles which were
most sharply opposed to the demands of the Social Democrats: the
Conservatives representing landed estates and the authority of the

396 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

church, were as hostile to the Socialist program as were the Na-
tional Liberals, composed of the large manufacturers and imperialistic
intellectuals (see p. 299 ff.).

Any concessions in the form of granting political rights were there-
fore not to be thought of. The only way of softening the fury of
the Socialist attack was for the government to grant the working-
men certain material advantages and at the same time to interest
them in favor of the continued existence of the existing regime.

This is the program which was adopted, though not immediately
after the war of 1870. The first decade after the founding of the
Empire showed, to be sure, a steady growth in the Socialist Party;
but it was still so weak and small that it could at first be ignored.
In this transition period, therefore, there was a struggle of a dif-
ferent kind — a struggle between the State and the claims of the
Church.

In Prussia as elsewhere the Revolution of 1848 had led to the
making of concessions to the Catholic Church. The Church, formerly
regarded with distrust, and gladly tormented by the all-powerful
State as the only surviving independent organization, had acquired
complete independence in 1850. The government prized the influence
of the Church which seemed to assure the education of the people
as obedient citizens, and had placed elementary education under
ecclesiastical control, just as was done in France at about the same
time. After 1870, however, the panicky fear of revolution disap-
peared. At the same time the opposition of the Catholics proved
to be more and more an obstacle to all efforts aiming at strengthening
the authority and power of the government. The Catholic political
party, known as the "Center," was neither a class party nor was it
nationalistic. Among its leaders were men like Windthorst, a "Guelf,"
who championed the interests of the Hanoverian provinces annexed
by Prussia, or men who defended the Catholic Poles from attempts
to Germanize them. The conflict became very acute through the
"Old Catholic" movement, which arose as a protest against the
Vatican Council (see p. 226 f.). The Roman Catholic bishops for-
bade the employment of Old Catholics in educational institutions
and refused to sanction marriages between Old Catholics.

The only way of dealing with this conflict was to place the State
in control of all school and civil religious matters. In cooperation
with the National Liberals, who always favored an extension of
state and imperial control in order to simplify professional life, the
Prussian- German government succeeded in carrying out a part at
least of its program, in spite of sharp opposition from the king and

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 397

the nobility who were interested in keeping up ecclesiastical control
over education. A complete laicization of the schools was not, in-
deed, carried out; even the Prussian law of education issued in 1906
included the principle of sectarian education, because the children
of dissenters and of non-sectarian parents were forced to go to sec-
tarian schools. But lay inspectors were put at the side of the eccle-
siastical school supervisors; civil marriage was introduced in Prussia
in 1874, and into the whole Empire in 1875; the Jesuits were for-
bidden to reside in Germany, and in 1872 diplomatic relations with
the Vatican were broken off.

Much less successful was the attempt to subject the Catholic
Church itself to the authority of the State. In the years 1873-75,
by the so-called "May Laws," the Prussian government attempted
to transform bishops and priests into mere state officials. The State
was to supervise the seminaries for priests; bishops and priests were
to be compelled to study at state universities; the independence of
the Church was abolished; and the monasteries were dissolved.

The Prussian government in all this policy stood on a very nar-
row basis for support. Not only did its measures of force, though
so often effective hitherto, prove unavailing against an organization
like the Catholic Church; but neither the sequestration of property
nor the threat of imprisonment which was held over the heads of
several bishops succeeded in reducing the Church to submission.
Furthermore, the Junkers, who were the real ruling group in Prussia,
gave the government only a half-hearted support; in the Prussian
House of Lords a strong opposition developed against the Kultttr-
kampj, or "War for the defense of modern civilization," as it was
called by a Liberal surgeon named Virchow. Bismarck had to pay
for the support of the National Liberals with concessions which
threatened to deal a severe blow to the power of the nobility in in-
ternal politics. In 1872, the reform of the administration which had
been promised since 1814 was carried out, and by a creation of new
peers laws were forced through the Upper House which deprived
the feudal nobility of their control of the courts and the police.

But this unnatural alliance between Bismarck and the National
Liberals soon went to pieces. It left, however, several permanent
results. A number of measures were carried through to secure uni-
formity in commercial and legal matters: the Empire was given a
uniform system of coinage adapted from the Prussian taler, an Im-
perial Bank, and a uniform legal procedure. But even at that
time, Bismarck opposed, on principle, all efforts of the National
Liberals to make the administration, including foreign and domestic

398

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

policy, dependent upon the representatives of the people in the
Reichstag.

The result was that the National Liberals, on their side, refused
their consent to proposals which might have narrowed still further
the already more or less limited share which the legislature had in
legislation. The National Liberals refused to consent to a number
of indirect taxes, such as a large increase in the tariff which was
intended at the same time as protection to German industry, simply
because this would have rendered the Reichstag's control over the
budget illusory. Bismarck therefore joined again with the Conserva-
tives and made an agreement with the Center which put an end to
the Kultttrkampf. In 1880, he had the Prussian Diet give the gov-
ernment power to dispense with the "May Laws," and nothing fur-
ther remained except a formal revocation of the decrees. In 1882
Bismarck went so far as to restore diplomatic relations with the
Vatican, but at the same time he ceased making any further reforms
in the Prussian administration.

The government's new power and its renewed alliance with the
parties of the Right now bore fruit in the conflict with the Social
Democrats. This conflict could not be carried on without giving
offense to the Liberals; and as the government had assured itself
again of support from the Catholic party, any successful opposition
on the part of the Left was out of the question. It was also fortunate
for the government that in May and June, 1878, two attempts on
the life of Emperor William I were made by Socialists who, how-
ever, were not acting in the name of the party. The Reichstag was
thereupon dissolved and under the impression made by these two
attempts the Liberals lost their majority at the new election.

The new Reichstag then adopted without delay, on October 21,
1878, the government measure directed against the dangerous aims
of the Social Democrats: all Socialistic societies, meetings, and pub-
lications were forbidden; the German governments were given the
right to declare the lesser state of siege, which made it possible for
them to expel at will all persons suspected of Socialism. The law
was very strictly administered: 1400 publications were suppressed,
900 persons were expelled from Germany, and 1500 thrown into
prison. Whatever was left of the Social Democratic organization,
which grew out of a union of Socialist Parties in 1875, had to conceal
itself under harmless names or meet in secret. The conventions of
the party had to be held abroad, mostly in Switzerland or Denmark.

But it was clear that methods like these could by no means put
an end to the Socialist movement. This was at once seen from the

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 399

fact that the number of persons who voted the Socialist ticket steadily
increased, in spite of the anti-Socialist law which remained in force
until 1890. Therefore the government turned to other measures.

The new program for combatting Socialism was first officially
announced in an imperial message in November, 1881, which prom-
ised to work for the "positive improvement of the well-being of the
workingmen." It was carried out during the years 1883 to 1889
by laws introducing compulsory insurance for workingmen against
sickness, accident, incapacity, and old age. By insurance against
old age, all workingmen and other insured classes, like maid servants
and shop clerks, were to receive an old age pension after completing
their seventieth year, even though they were not incapacitated;
this amounted, on the average, to 150 marks ($35) a year. A num-
ber of protective laws were also passed: in 1891 children were for-
bidden to work in factories until they had completed the compulsory
education, and for women a ten-hour work day was introduced.
Finally, after 1890, the anti-Socialist law was not renewed.

To this policy the German government held fast down to 1914.
The leading principle of the government was to make no kind of
political concessions, either to the Socialists or to the Liberal parties
of the Left, but, by promoting the economic prosperity of those
who were excluded from participation in politics, to interest them in
the autocratic system of government, and to divert their attention
from "impracticable" political demands.

It was easiest to carry out this program with the aid of the Na-
tional Liberals, which was the party of the large manufacturers.
Though the National Liberals might often have friction with the
government, because in cases where their interests did not harmonize
with those of the government, the government was more inclined to
listen to the wishes of the large landlords forming the Conservative
and Catholic parties than to the requests of the manufacturers,
nevertheless their well-being was looked out for so excellently in
general that they gave up the last remnants of their former opposi-
tion. How could they have been vexed with a regime which excluded
workingmen from all influence in the government; which appointed
to military and civil positions only persons who could not be re-
proached with any Socialistic or even really Liberal inclinations;
which was ready at any time to use force to prevent strikes by means
of an army which was well-disciplined and commanded by officers
drawn exclusively from Conservative circles; and which was able
to force favorable trade agreements with foreign countries by means
of its military preponderance?

400 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

Similarly, the intellectual classes were also won over without
great difficulty. The government, especially in Prussia, was very
strict in its selection of the persons admitted to its monopolistic in-
stitutions. No Social Democrat was permitted to occupy a pro-
fessorial chair. Only exceptionally was an investigator who had
made himself suspicious by expressing liberal sentiments appointed
to state educational institutions. A social and political writer like
Karl Biicher was "impossible" for Prussian universities, because he
had once been the editor of a progressive newspaper like the Frank-
furter Zeitung. On the other hand, to intellectuals who were not
rejected for political reasons, the government offered a pleasant and
in many respects a privileged position, with safety against disturb-
ance through violence or strikes. For military reasons, however,
the State could not neglect the sciences which had a technical appli-
cation, and it was especially concerned that all instruction which
was destined to mold future soldiers should be carried on by men
who were thoroughly in sympathy with the ruling authorities. Why
then, should German professors and scholars envy their French,
English and Italian colleagues the intellectual freedom which was
granted to them? In these countries members of all political parties
and even pronounced Socialists were given university positions.

In this way Germany became the El Dorado of capitalists and
unpolitical men of learning — the state to which the rich in other
countries, who were being pressed by the attack of the Socialist
movement, turned with longing as to their ideal — the land on the
existence of which depended the preservation of order in Europe.
This was the opinion not only of Germans themselves, but of foreign
scholars, who feared that the Socialist flood would bring about the
destruction of all culture and good manners which was associated
with good order in Europe.

These views, however, grew less frequent when it became evident
what the results of this system were for Germany itself and for the
rest of the world. This militarization of intellectual life, this strug-
gle of the almighty government machinery against all cultural
movements which threatened to weaken the ruling political and
military system, this impoverishment of all intellectual life with the
exception of the technical sciences — these were all things to which
foreign countries might be fairly indifferent. But it was a very seri-
ous matter to them that in foreign relations the German economic
system was becoming increasingly dependent upon a steady increase
of exports. It has already been pointed out (see p. 324) that the
large increase in population, which had been stimulated for military

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 401

reasons, was making Germany ever more and more dependent eco-
nomically upon foreign countries, as she herself was not a land richly
endowed by Nature. This fact, as well as the unusually large and
almost steadily increasing expenditures for military purposes, and
after 1897-98 for the navy also, created such a burden on living
conditions in Germany that it was to be feared that in time she might
cease to be able to compete in foreign markets — at any rate, when
it was no longer possible to force favorable commercial agreements
by military threats or to secure a monopoly in a number of products
by conquering the foreign regions which produced the raw materials.
From this point of view the German political and economic system
affected directly the interests and rights of other countries. From the
point of view of German internal politics, also, there was the fact
that, in case of a further burdening of living conditions with perhaps
a reduction in the opportunities for work, the discontent of the work-
ingmen might increase to such an extent that revolutionary move-
ments, hitherto very weak, could no longer be kept within bounds
by armed force.

As a matter of fact, the Social Democratic movement had by no
means been kept in check by the decrees issued for the protection
of workingmen, however much the government might boast of the
beneficial effects of this social legislation. In actual political life the
effect of this social legislation was scarcely noticeable. Even if leg-
islative bodies in Germany had enjoyed control over the executive,
the growth of the Socialist vote could not have made itself com-
pletely felt owing to the unfair arrangement of electoral districts
in the two legislative assemblies which were of most importance —
the Prussian Diet and the Imperial Reichstag. As a result of the
shift of population from the country to the city, the rural districts
had come to have an extraordinary advantage over the towns, where
most of the workingmen lived, so that the Social Democrats had not
nearly as many representatives as they deserved according to the
number of votes they cast. This was also true of the Reichstag
which was elected by universal suffrage and not by the "three-class
system" as in Prussia. Hitherto the government had succeeded in
preventing revolts of workingmen by material concessions as well
as by armed force, but it was a question how long material conces-
sions could still be made in view of the fact that the persecuted
party did not soften at all in its opposition on principle to the
Prussian- German system of government. In a state which owed
its origin more or less to war, and was completely prepared for war,
there was a strong desire to improve the situation by a new recourse

402 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

to arms, which, whether by conquests, or by a war indemnity im-
posed on the conquered countries, or above all things by economic
concessions forced from the conquered foe, would give German in-
dustry a trade monopoly in foreign countries and a safer market
capable of further extension.

In this different attitude toward Socialism lies the distinction
which separates the states in the West, South, and, in part, the
North of Europe from those in Central and Eastern Europe. Peo-
ple have often used the word "democracy" to express this distinction ;
but this word, which had a very precise meaning among the Greeks,
has been applied to wholly different modern conditions and used
to mean so many different things, that it is best not to use it at all.
In reality, the root of the difference lies in the fact that in the one
case all social classes have equal political rights and exercise an
influence on the government in proportion to their numbers, and
neither the church nor the military officers exercise a controlling
influence in politics. But in the other case, especially as in Germany,
Austria-Hungary, and Russia, there exists a government by officials
who are dependent on the government, — a government which refuses
to cooperate with Socialists and Liberals of the Left and conducts
its domestic and foreign policy in accordance with the wishes of
the allied large landowners and large manufacturers, — a government,
finally, in which the army and the church are given a preponderant
influence in public education. This is the line of cleavage. Not
only was public opinion so conscious of it that the alliance of France
with Russia was often regarded as something monstrous, but it has
also been of importance more than once in practical politics. Here
we can only mention the service which Imperial Germany did for
the Russian government in arresting Russian Socialists and Revolu-
tionists, although Germany's interests, after she chose to support
Austria in the Balkans, no longer coincided with those of Russia.
It was certainly a sound feeling on the part of Russian Liberals,
in contrast with the Tsar's pro-German court circle, that the close
connection of the Russian government with Germany, and German
influence in general, was regarded as the greatest obstacle to that
liberty which they longed for. Much as the two countries differed
in their economic organization and in the education of the masses,
there were too many analogies between the principles of government
in both for an affinity not to have grown up — an affinity, moreover,
which was particularly emphasized by the circles who controlled the
actual government in Prussia.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA
FOR THE BALKANS

AN "Eastern Question" had existed for a long time. As early as
the eighteenth century, Russia, which had never possessed an access
to the sea which was satisfactory in every respect, had attempted to
get possession of Constantinople as a surer means of connection with
the Mediterranean. For a long time Turkey's existence had de-
pended solely upon the jealousy of the Great Powers toward one
another.

But the struggle of the Great Powers against Russia's aspirations
had hitherto been rather a European than an Austrian affair. Austria
was too much absorbed with other cares — by her struggle to retain
possession of her Italian possessions, and later by her conflict with
Prussia for leadership in Germany — to be able to oppose armed re-
sistance to Russian ambition. The duty of holding the Russians
back from Constantinople had fallen to England in alliance with
France, and during the Crimean War these allies had been able to
put a halt to Russian efforts at expansion.

A change took place when the Wars of 1866 and 1870 revolu-
tionized international relations in Europe. Austria had now definitely
lost her position in Italy and Germany. If she wanted to seek com-
pensation and carry out a policy of conquest like a Great Power, the
only region left to her was the Balkan Peninsula, because she had
neither the inclination nor the ability to carry on a regular over-
seas colonial policy. So the Danubian Monarchy concentrated its
whole foreign policy upon the Balkans, either to conquer them di-
rectly, or to draw them within the sphere of Austrian influence.

But this meant a conflict with Russia. This conflict was not
only sharpened by the new political situation, but it was put on a
fundamentally new basis. While Austria had formerly been able to
rely upon the assistance of the Western Powers, she now had to
carry on the struggle all alone so far as these were concerned.
France, after 1870, no longer counted as a military Great Power;
and Great Britain, which had refused to build up land armaments
like those of the Continental countries, no longer formed a counter-

403

404

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

weight which could be effectively opposed to the Russian advance
toward the Mediterranean. There was only one power left which
could interfere, either to help or to hinder Austria: this was the
newly- founded German Empire; on its attitude depended primarily
whether the two rival Eastern Powers should come to war over the
Balkans or not.

So long as war could be avoided, the expedient was usually adopted
which had first been applied in the establishment of the Kingdom
of Greece: the territories seized from the Turks were not annexed
by any of the Great Powers, but were made into independent states.
As in the case of Greece this did not, indeed, solve the problem; it
merely postponed its solution. The conflict continued in such a
way that the two Great Powers struggled to secure a dominant in-
fluence over the new states, which had purposely been left small.

In this connection Austria found herself in many respects at a
disadvantage. Little as the Balkan States were inclined toward
Russia, they nevertheless stood closer to the Russians than to the
Austrians. This was due to their common religion, although the
influence of this has often been exaggerated. It was due also to
similarities of language; although many people in Austria-Hungary
spoke languages akin to those of the Balkan nations, these people
belonged to the oppressed nationalities in Austria-Hungary, and
hated their German and Magyar rulers, whereas the ruling classes
in Russia were believed to be ready to assist all Pan-Slavic aspira-
tions. Finally, the close relationship between the Balkan peoples
and Russia rested on social conditions; although this has often not
been realized, it has exercised such a strong influence that it must
be considered somewhat more in detail here.

With the exception of Rumania and, to some extent, of Albania,
where medieval feudal conditions with large landed estates have
survived, the class of feudal landlords is unknown. The whole popu-
lation of Bulgaria and Serbia — the two peoples who dominate in the
Balkans — consists of peasants, and there is neither a middle-class
nor large landed estates. In this respect, there is no analogy on
their part either with Russia or with Austria. But there is a dif-
ference: in Austria, especially in the Slavic and Rumanian districts,
the system of large landed estates is much more pronounced than
in Russia; and the peasants performing agricultural services, who
are at the mercy of their feudal landlords, are very often in subjec-
tion to representatives of foreign races, like Germans and Magyars.
In Austria, also, the feudal landlords are privileged in all sorts of
ways, as by the system of primogeniture; but in Russia nothing of

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 405

this kind exists. The prosperous development of the Balkan States,
therefore, might be a dangerous example for the Slavic nationalities
of Austria, but for Russia any such effect was scarcely conceivable.

In order to understand this, a summary sketch may here be given
of Austrian history in the nineteenth century.

Austria was one of the few European states which were not trans-
formed by the French Revolution. In contrast to Prussia, her in-
herited institutions proved capable of withstanding the attack of
French armies, so that the compromise between medieval absolutism
and enlightened despotism remained as it had been established in
the eighteenth century. The only new phenomenon was an anxiety,
formerly unknown, as to all new "revolutionary ideas," and this
anxiety led to defensive measures which were equaled at the time
only in Russia.

The government of Austria lay exclusively in the hands of a
bureaucracy which in large part was made up of Germans. Uncon-
trolled by any public responsibility and without any reasonable sys-
tem of organization, this bureaucracy did its work with unbelievable
slowness and arbitrariness. The budget of this rich country showed
regularly a deficit — which was kept secret. This regime was as much
in contradiction with the wishes of the Liberals as with the demands
of the gradually awakening national feeling on the part of the vari-
ous populations which had been united under the monarchy. The
Liberals as such lived mainly in cities in the German-speaking dis-
tricts; they wanted a reform of the constitution so that the abso-
lutism of the bureaucracy might be abolished. The nationalistic
opposition was most lively in the non- German districts among the
Hungarians, Czechs, Croats, and Poles. In these districts a revolu-
tionary opposition was also in favor of federalism in government, in
contrast to countries like Italy and Germany where the Liberals
desired a centralized national state.

From the outset the national movements in Austria differed ac-
cording to the social and political organization of the districts. The
Magyar movement, which rested on the old Hungarian constitution
with its privileges for the nobility, bore an exclusively feudal char-
acter; it represented the interests of the large landowners. The
same was true of the Polish movement in Austria, especially as con-
cerned Eastern Galicia; here the supporters of nationalism were
the feudal landlords. On the other hand, it was quite different in
the case of the Czechs and even of the Croats and Serbs: these
peoples, so far as they were conscious of their position at all, had
been awakened to it by the zealous propaganda of a number of in*

406 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

tellectuals; but nothing had been done for their education; here
nationalism was mainly represented by the masses of people, and
their struggles were directed both against the privileged position of
the German elements in the Monarchy and against the privileges
of the large landowners.

From this arose a curiously complicated situation, in which the
government found it much easier to deal with those nationalities
who at least did not want to interfere with the privileged aristocracy
in their enjoyment of all the higher positions in the military and civil
service, than with those nationalities who were also putting forward
democratic demands. It was also true that the German elements in
Austria, who might have sympathized with the Czechs and Croats
on liberal grounds — since in their own districts there were only a
few large landed estates — nevertheless opposed them most violently,
because otherwise they would have lost their own privileged position
in the government. Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Church,
as a large owner of land, gladly put herself on the side of the aris-
tocratic authorities.

This variety of criss-crossing influences, of which we have been
able to mention only the most important, made it easy for the Aus-
trian government to maintain itself by continually shifting its policy
and making bargains; for it possessed two forces which were wholly
dependent upon the government itself and whose very existence was
bound up with the survival of the monarchy — two forces which, by
their very nature, as in Prussia, were willing to make concessions
to the land-owning nobility: these two forces were the bureaucracy
and the army.

How the Austrian government had been able to master the revo-
lutionary movement by means of these two forces had been shown
for the first time in 1848.

When the February Revolution triumphed in Paris, the Austrian
government was panic-stricken. When the mob in Vienna, which
included many students, rose in insurrection, Prince Metternich,
who had hitherto been all-powerful and who was regarded as the
embodiment of absolutism, fell from power; the Emperor granted
freedom of the press, permitted the creation of a citizen-guard, and
on March 15, 1848, summoned a national assembly. New threats
even compelled the ministry to allow this assembly to be elected
on the basis of universal suffrage to act as a constitutional convention.

Since Austria, at that time and for long afterwards, still had no
large manufactures and was primarily an agricultural country, this
proclamation of universal suffrage meant the strengthening, not of

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 407

the workingmen, but of the peasants. Accordingly, more than a
quarter of the representatives elected to the national convention were
farmers. But universal suffrage had also resulted in strengthening
the Slavic populations, who made up altogether a numerical ma-
jority in the Monarchy; the majority in the convention belonged
to the Slavic nationalities. It was due to this fact that the consti-
tutional convention had primarily in mind the abolition of the feudal
obligations imposed on the agricultural population, like compulsory
labor services. This reform was adopted unanimously and was the
most important permanent result of the March Revolution in Vienna.

But in making this reform, the various nationalities by no means
forgot their own particular claims. The Czechs in Bohemia de-
manded that they should have a ministry of their own and that
their national language should be put on an equal footing with Ger-
man. The Hungarians went still further. They insisted on a
national government of their own with responsible ministers. The
leader of the Liberal Hungarian movement, Kossuth, went so far
in his idealism as to have the Hungarian Diet abolish feudal land-
lord rights and decree equality before the law, which meant putting
an end to the exemption from taxation and the monopolization of
positions in the government which had been enjoyed by the Magyar
nobles. At that time the Hungarians also took a similarly liberal
attitude toward the Croats, who formed a part of the Hungarian
Kingdom and who had formerly been subjected by the Magyars to
efforts at "Magyarization": the Croats were given a "ban," or gov-
ernor, appointed from their own people, Colonel Jellachich. It was
only toward the Serbian demand for autonomy that the Hungarians
took an attitude of downright refusal.

The Hapsburg rulers in Vienna had been compelled to yield every-
where at first; but when this panicky fear had passed, they went
back on their promises. With the help of the army they succeeded
in crushing the revolution and in restoring the absolutistic regime
under the form of a military dictatorship. In this they were sup-
ported by the Slavs, who were as hostile to the German populace
of Vienna and to the Magyars as was the Hapsburg court party
itself. The attack against the Hungarians was carried out by none
other than the new Ban of Croatia, Jellachich, and Vienna was re-
conquered for the Hapsburgs by an army from Bohemia and Croatia.

Then, after Emperor Ferdinand had been compelled to abdicate
and had been replaced by his nephew, the eighteen-year-old Francis
Joseph, the new ruler declared that he was not bound by any of
the promises made by his predecessor; he therefore annulled com-

4o8 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

pletely all the measures which the government had promised to the
various nationalities at the moment it was under revolutionary
pressure.

It was in Hungary that it proved most difficult to carry out this
restoration. The Magyars had created an army of their own which
had been able to drive the Austrians almost completely out of the
country. The Hungarian Diet had deposed the Hapsburg dynasty
and made Kossuth their governor. The Austrian government had
to call upon the Tsar for help; whereupon a Russian army forced
its way into Hungary and compelled the revolutionists to lay down
their arms. By 1849 the rule of the Hapsburgs was restored in
Hungary. Some Hungarian political leaders were put to death,
many were banished, and the old Hungarian constitution was de-
clared annulled.

The Old Regime was now restored in all the other parts of the
Hapsburg Monarchy. The constitution was formally revoked and
freedom of the press abolished. The administration was strictly
centralized and put almost wholly into the hands of Germans. And
a concordat was made with the Catholic Church as has been men-
tioned in another connection (see p. 226).

But this system proved too weak to stand, the moment the Mon-
archy ceased to derive strength from successes in foreign policy,
which alone could have justified such a restoration. In 1859, ten
years after the restoration, came the costly campaign in Italy (see
p. 2 53 ) . To this were added financial difficulties. Austria, with her
rich mineral and agricultural resources and in spite of her miserable
administrative system, had sufficient means to prolong her existence
in some way or other under ordinary circumstances ; but the revenues
were not sufficient to meet the costs of a disastrous war policy.
Bankers refused to loan money so long as the financial administra-
tion was conducted by an uncontrolled bureaucracy, and in 1860 the
government loan was not subscribed. The Emperor called an Im-
perial Council consisting of thirty-eight notables, almost exclusively
large landowners, to help him out of the difficulty. It was in this
"Enlarged Council" that the opposition of class interests mentioned
above first came clearly to light. The majority, consisting of large
landlords from Hungary, Bohemia, and Polish Galicia, wanted a
federal system of government, in which each of the nationalities
should be given local self-government with the power in the hands
of the local nobility; the Germans, on the other hand, wanted a
continuance of the strong central power at Vienna, which meant
prolonging their own control of the administration,

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 409

The Emperor decided at first in favor of the great landlords.
Since the Hungarians wished above everything else the restoration
of their old constitution, he also made shortly afterwards some con-
cessions to the German party, so that the result was a compromise,
in which each of the Austrian lands was given a local Diet, but at the
same time there was created a real imperial parliament or Reichsrat,
consisting of two houses. The Reichsrat of 1860 was composed
of a House of Representatives chosen by the members of the local
Diets, which gave an unusually large advantage to the Germans,
and of a House of Lords composed mainly of the heads of noble
families and ecclesiastical dignitaries.

These concessions to the Germans and to the urban districts were
regarded as so excessive by the great landlords and the non- German
populations that the new constitution never really came into opera-
tion. The Hungarians, who felt that both their class interests and
their national interests had equally suffered, were the first to ob-
ject and refuse to recognize the new constitution. They and the
Croats simply refused to elect deputies to the House of Represen-
tatives. The Czech and Polish representatives quickly withdrew
from the Chamber also, so that there remained merely the represen-
tatives of the Germans and of the very small nationalities. At the
same time the financial deficit of the state was steadily increasing.
The Emperor therefore resorted to his old plan and decided to give
way to the landlords and their desire for a federalist system; so the
constitution of 1860 was "suspended" — forever.

It was a natural result of these events that the Hapsburg mon-
archs should seek to make an agreement with the most dangerous
opponents of the idea of centralized government, namely with the
Hungarian magnates. The Hungarians, who at that time were led
by an 1848 Liberal named Deak, favored on principle a compromise.
But it was not until the Austrian military defeats in 1866 that the
Austrian Emperor was finally induced to go to the point of coming
to an agreement with the Magyars. The Austrian government, whose
foreign policy at that time was in the hands of a former Saxon
minister and enemy of Prussia, Count Beust, was naturally anxious
to preserve Austria from the danger of being attacked in the rear
by the Hungarians in case of a war of revenge against Prussia.
Austria therefore recognized Hungary as an autonomous state with
a ministry of its own, and signed the Ausgleich, or "Compromise"
of 1867.

Austria, which henceforth was known as "Austria-Hungary," now
consisted of two states which, besides the common monarch, had only

4io ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

three other things in common: foreign affairs, the army and navy,
and finance; so far as these three things had to be supported finan-
cially they were to be managed by three joint ministers. "Com-
mercial matters" were to be managed on the same general principles,
but not by joint ministers. The common debt was to be met by a
special agreement to be revised every ten years. Above the three
imperial ministers of foreign affairs, war, and finance, "Delegations"
were set up, consisting of sixty representatives from each of the two
halves of the Dual Monarchy; the two Delegations enjoyed equal
rights and took the place of the Reichsrat, which was done away
with. The old Hungarian constitution was restored.

By this Ausglekh the government and the Germans had relieved
themselves of pressure from the most powerful nation within the Em-
pire; henceforth, the Hungarians possessed no direct influence on
the administration of the Austrian half of the Monarchy known as
Cisleithania ; but they were now just as much interested in the es-
tablishment of a centralized, united, national administration for their
own territory as the Germans were for theirs. These two ruling
nationalities, Germans and Magyars, henceforth formed a natural
alliance against subject nationalities like the Slavs, Rumanians, and
Italians.

In Hungary the government remained in the hands of the large
landowners. The House of Magnates, or upper branch of the Diet,
was still composed as before of hereditary feudal landlords. The
franchise for the Chamber of Deputies was indeed made somewhat
democratic, and the nobility lost their right of appointing the judges,
but elections were by open instead of secret ballot, so that the voters
were subject to pressure from landlords. As far as appearances went,
a parliamentary system of government had been introduced. Tran-
sylvania was completely incorporated into Hungary; Croatia, on the
other hand, by a special "Compromise," kept its autonomous ad-
ministration.

The Ausglekh between Austria and Hungary also resulted in the
establishment of constitutional government in Austria itself. The
half of the Monarchy west of the river Leith was given by the con-
stitutional laws of 1867 a new parliament with responsible ministers
and the promise of legal equality for all persons. All citizens were
declared capable of holding office, religious toleration was estab-
lished, the law courts were withdrawn from administrative control,
and even some of the concessions made to the church in the Concordat
of 1855 were canceled. The different national groups were prom-
ised equal treatment in the schools. The system of electing the

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 411

Reichsrat by the Provincial Diets was at first retained; but in 1873
it was transferred directly to the electorate who, however, still voted
as formerly in four groups consisting of landowners, towns, cham-
bers of commerce, and rural districts. It was not until 1907 that
universal and equal suffrage was introduced.

But in spite of all these appearances, the real power remained
almost exclusively in the hands of the Emperor or of his court.
The Chamber of Deputies was split into so many groups, according
to social classes and nationalities, that no parliamentary government
majority could be formed. It was therefore possible for the court
to create a government coalition out of any groups which it wanted
to. Its procedure was something like this: the Emperor could al-
ways count on the votes of the landowners and their deputies whose
interests were the same as his own, just as was the case in Prussia;
with these votes his ministers combined the votes of those parties or
nationalities whose support was easiest to obtain for the government
measure of the moment; such a ministry held together only until
the court decided to adopt a new policy with the support of a new
combination of parties.

This system of continual compromise and endless bargaining both
with the different nationalities and with the different social groups
cannot be described here in detail; not only were the Germans, at
the outset, split into several groups which squabbled violently with
one another, but so also were the Czechs. It must suffice to state
that, of all the parties, the Czechs went furthest in their demands
for federalism in government; like the Hungarians, they desired to
restore their old kingdom and be united with Austria only in a
personal union, recognizing the same monarch.

The most important result of all these struggles, however, was
the fact that the direction of the foreign policy of the Dual Mon-
archy slipped more and more into the hands of the Hungarians.
Hungary did not recognize any equality among her different races,
even in form: one nationality alone — that of the Magyars — exer-
cised unlimited political authority; one social class, the nobility,
dominated the Diet; the aristocratic character of these Magyar rulers
drew them close to the Vienna court; how natural it was, therefore,
that this powerful, closely organized, Hungarian clique should im-
pose their authority on the Austrian half of the Monarchy, which
was split into so many parties and divided by so many tendencies!

This circumstance was also of decisive importance in Austria's
relations to the Balkans. So far as Austro-Hungarian policy toward
the Balkans was determined primarily by economic considerations,

412 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

the interests of the Hungarian landlords proved to be the deter-
mining factor.

After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 had relieved Russia of
taking France and England into account as far as her policy in the
Near East was concerned, the Christian populations of the Balkans,
especially in Herzegovina, who had already revolted several times
against Turkish oppression, began to have stronger hopes of help
from St. Petersburg. Russian consuls stirred up their religious and
racial brothers in Bulgaria and Serbia toward a war of independence.
The Serbian inhabitants of Herzegovina rose in rebellion against
the Turkish officials; they were supported by the Montenegrins,
and in 1875 the Serbs in Serbia, who were autonomous, declared
that they could not leave their Serbian brethren in the lurch. The
Great Powers thereupon compelled the Sultan to withdraw his troops
from Herzegovina. For this the Turks avenged themselves not only
by individual acts of violence like the murder of the French and
German consuls in Salonika in 1876, but also by frightful massacres
in Bulgaria, where some villages had taken up arms against Turkey.
Serbia thereupon declared war; but her army was too weak to
withstand the Turks, and it was only Russia's intervention which
forced the Turks to conclude an armistice with the beaten Serbs.
The other Great Powers also undertook diplomatic intervention;
but the Turks managed to evade all their warnings, though in such
a despicable manner that in 1876 the Europeans gave up the defense
of the Turkish regime as hopeless.

This meant that for the moment they would give Russia a free
hand, and in 1877 the Tsar declared war on Turkey. Two Russian
armies advanced against the Turks, the main army through Bulgaria
into the Balkans, and a smaller force against Armenia. But victory
was not so easy to win as in 1829. The training of Turks by
Prussian and Austrian officers had borne fruit, and though the Turk-
ish army was incapable of taking the offensive, nevertheless it under-
stood how to hold the enemy in check most obstinately by good de-
fensive positions. The Turks had made the town of Plevna into a
well entrenched camp, and it proved impossible to dislodge them
by storming the place. The Russians had to begin a regular siege
and seek help from the Rumanian army. In December, 1877, after
Plevna had been besieged nearly five months, the place was taken;
but the Turks by their defense had so revived the fame of theK
former heroic exploits in war that the effect of the defense of Plevna
had an influence for a long time afterwards. It was not until the

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 413

winter that the Russians were able to force the Balkan passes, and
in January, 1878, their troops filed past Adrianople.

On March 3, 1878, in order to save their capital at Constantinople,
the Turks quickly agreed to sign the treaty of San Stephano, in
which they gave up all claims to Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro,
raised Bulgaria to the position of a tributary state, and ceded a piece
of Armenia to Russia.

Although Russia, in comparison with her enormous achievements
during the war, which had cost more than a billion dollars, had re-
ceived only a small direct advantage from the war, nevertheless,
the other Powers stepped in to prevent her from getting too much
influence through the founding of a new Balkan state, consisting
of an enlarged Bulgaria. Austria mobilized her army and England
sent her fleet to Constantinople. Germany, also, stood on their
side. As Russia had neither the inclination nor perhaps the means
of engaging in war with a European Great Power, she yielded. She
consented to lay the treaty of San Stephano for revision before a
European Congress which met at Berlin in the summer of 1878.

The result of this Congress was that the concessions imposed on
Turkey were essentially cut down. Serbia and Montenegro, to be
sure, retained their independence, but the extension of territory as-
signed to them was reduced. The clause by which Rumania was
given the Dobrudscha in compensation for the much richer district
of Bessarabia, which was ceded to Russia, was retained; at the
same time, a clause was imposed on the Rumanians compelling them
to give legal equality to adherents of all religions in Rumania,
even including the Jews. The increase of territory which Russia
had demanded in Asia Minor was considerably cut down, but the
most important point was the way in which the newly-created state
of Bulgaria was cut to pieces: northern Bulgaria was permitted to
have a prince of its own choosing; southern Bulgaria, or "East
Roumelia," was merely placed under a Christian governor; and the
whole of Macedonia was restored to Turkish misrule. The other
European Great Powers received some direct compensations for the
extension of territory which Russia received in Asia Minor. Bosnia
and Herzegovina, where the insurrection against Turkish oppression
had first broken out, were not assigned to Serbia and Montenegro in
accordance with ethnographic principles, but were left by the Con-
gress under the nominal suzerainty of Turkey, and Austria was given
the right to occupy and administer them. Russia had purposely
never claimed them because she did not want to interfere in the
Austrian sphere of influence. Great Britain, which had promised

4H ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

in a secret treaty to defend Turkey's rights in Asia Minor, received
directly from Turkey the right to administer Cyprus in return for
the payment of tribute. Finally, at the request of the French,
Greece was enlarged by being given part of Thessaly.

These decisions of the Congress of Berlin not only regulated the
situation in the Balkans for the moment; they embodied in general
the Balkan program of the Great Powers. The Christian popula-
tions now knew that the Great Powers, and especially Austria, would
never consent to the creation of independent powerful states in the
Balkan Peninsula, and also that they would never take determined
steps against Turkey. Little was to be hoped for, even from Russia.
The Tsar had attempted to carve up European Turkey and to es-
tablish in its place independent Christian states; but the other Great
Powers had prevented him and he had been forced to give in. Only
by exploiting the rivalries among the Great Powers or by allying
among themselves would it henceforth be possible for the Balkan
states to liberate the other Christian districts and unite them with
the nations which had already been formed. Such an alliance seemed
more necessary than ever. Now that the Turks had realized how
their authority was threatened by the existence of Christian com-
munities in Turkey, their former toleration had often given way
to a system of the most terrible persecution and even extermination.
But there was no hope that the Great Powers would do anything
to prevent this. They had, indeed, imposed on the Sultan promises
meant to protect the Christian populations; but since they clung to
the principle that European Turkey must continue to exist, they did
not dare to adopt any kind of measures which would really compel
the Turks to respect the treaties. The frightful massacring of Ar-
menians, which began in 1894, went on undisturbed without the
Great Powers troubling themselves about it.

So the Balkan states took their fate in their own hands. First,
Bulgaria got possession of East Roumelia, which had been withheld
from her by the Congress of Berlin; this was done simply by a
military occupation of the country in 1885. This resulted in a war
between Bulgaria and Serbia, as the latter wanted to prevent the
expansion of her rival. But the Bulgarians were victorious, and
Serbia was only saved by Austria, which did not want to see any
Balkan state, even Bulgaria, become too strong. But this friend-
ship between Austria-Hungary and Serbia went to pieces when
Serbia began to be an economic competitor of Austria and Hungary.
In spite of many disorders at court after their emancipation, both
Serbia and Bulgaria developed great economic prosperity; the more

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 415

Europe became industrialized and its population increased, the
greater was the profit which accrued to these two peasant states.
It was just because of this that Serbia, at least, came into conflict
with Hungary, which exercised a determining influence on the foreign
policy of the Dual Monarchy. Since Serbia, in contrast to Bulgaria,
had no free access to the sea, she was compelled to export all her
hogs through Austria; but now this mode of export began to be
restricted as much as possible for the benefit of the Hungarian land-
lords, and there developed a regular tariff war between Serbia and
Austria-Hungary.

Similar advances of the Christian population at Turkey's expense
took place further south. The Island of Crete, which had been given
a constitution as far back as 1868, had been in almost continual
revolt against the Turkish governors, and in 1897 the Christians in
the island proclaimed their union with the Greeks on the main-
land. The Greeks of the mother country thereupon occupied the
island; but the Great Powers stepped in and took possession of the
city of Canea; at the same time, Turkey declared war upon Greece.
But the Greek army was not at all prepared for this and was put
to flight by the Turks near Larissa. Owing to intervention by the
Powers the war was brought to a speedy end. Greece lost a number
of important strategic points in Thessaly, and had to withdraw her
troops from Crete and pay a war indemnity of a million dollars ; her
finances were therefore placed under European control.

In spite of this, Crete was practically taken from Turkey. The
Great Powers compelled the Sultan to withdraw his troops from the
island and they set up, as governor-general, a son of the king of
Greece. Crete was made autonomous. But this was merely the first
step toward complete freedom. In 1904, there began an opposition
under the leadership of a native statesman, Venizelos. The Opposi-
tion, which wanted to go further than the Greek dynasty, began a
war against the cautious governor-general, who finally resigned his
post; the Opposition then announced again the union of Crete with
Greece.

Meanwhile, changes in the attitude of the Powers toward one
another had been taking place, which reacted powerfully on the
fate of the Balkan peoples.

The most important of these changes was the wholly different
attitude of Germany. In one respect Bismarck had never lost his
keenness of judgment; he had never over-estimated the real power
at Germany's disposal and had never allowed the economic pros-
perity of his country to go to his head. One may say that he never

416 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

forgot how wonderfully favorable the combinations were to which
he owed his quick victories in 1866 and 1870. He realized that
they were due to the fact that the other Great Powers not directly
interested had not interfered, and he shaped his policy accordingly.
Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in his policy toward the
Balkans. Although bound by an alliance with Austria, and al-
though he thoroughly favored his ally being drawn away by Balkan
interests from political activities in Central Europe, he nevertheless
always prevented matters from going so far as to allow this to cause
hostility between Germany and Russia. In 1881 he renewed the
old friendly understanding between Germany and Russia, and
steadily recognized that Russia no less than Austria had claims to
a part of the Balkans.

The new generation in Germany was typically represented by
Emperor William II, who ascended the throne in 1888 at the age of
twenty-nine. He did not recognize these facts as did Bismarck. In
1890 the aged chancellor was dismissed, partly as a result of the
young Emperor's shifting to a closer support of Austria in the Near
East, and the secret "re-insurance treaty" with Russia was not re-
newed. Two reasons for this more aggressive and pro- Austrian
attitude probably had a determining influence. One of these was
the new ruler's inability correctly to appreciate other peoples who
were not educated and ruled in the same military fashion as the
Germans; this resulted in the conviction that Germany had no
need to fear a coalition of other Great Powers, which had been Bis-
marck's nightmare. The second reason was New Germany's de-
termination to expand and her belief that a welcome field for ex-
ploitation was to be found in a Turkey dominated by Germany and
protected by German arms. This did not mean that Germany was
directly interested in conquest in the Balkans, as was her ally, but
it did mean that she was interested in the continued existence of the
Turkish Empire and in the weakening of the Balkan nations, so
that the policy of the two Central Powers was now virtually one and
the same. The German government accepted the risk of turning
Russia into a natural enemy by this policy; but she believed that
the identity of political ideals in Germany and Russia (see p. 402)
would suffice to prevent an actual outbreak of war; she believed
that the Tsar's dislike of "democracy" would prove stronger than
his anxiety to maintain Russia's position in foreign affairs.

The consequences of this new grouping of the Powers became
more evident after 1905, after the close of the Russo-Japanese War
(see p. 357 f.).

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 417

The defeats which Russia suffered in Eastern Asia in this war
seemed to have revealed a military weakness in the Tsar's empire
which no one had suspected hitherto. If Russia could not even
withstand a relatively small Power like Japan, which had only just
equipped herself with European weapons, how would she ever be
able to make war against a European Great Power? All Russia's
enemies now abandoned their reserved attitude and no longer hesi-
tated to make aggressive moves; even during the war, in 1904, the
British had pushed forward in Tibet as far as Lhassa. Within Rus-
sia itself it was impossible to hold down the Liberal Opposition any
longer. In August, 1905, the Tsar proclaimed the creation of a
parliament with advisory powers, known as the "Advisory Duma";
later, in October, 1905, the Duma was given "legislative power." At
the same time, freedom of the press, religious toleration, and so forth
were proclaimed. The Duma elections of the next year gave the
reformers an overwhelming majority. The strongest party in the
Duma were the Constitutional Democrats under Miliukov; they
were known as the "Cadets," from the Russian name of the letters
"C. D." which was the familiar abbreviation for "Constitutional
Democrats." The next strongest party was the Group of Toil,
representing the peasants; the Extreme Conservatives, on the other
hand, were scarcely represented at all. The Duma now demanded
control over the executive — more even than was allowed to legisla-
tive bodies in Germany. It was therefore dissolved and the govern-
ment finally succeeded in 1907, by means of a limited franchise, in
securing the election of a Third Duma, in which the Octobrist party,
consisting of Liberals of the Right, had a majority. But even so,
the Tsar had to give his consent to the establishment of parliamen-
tary government, and the way for reforms was now open. The
president of the cabinet, Stolypin, who had risen to power through
provincial administration, undertook to create free peasant pro-
prietors. In 1910, the peasants were given the right to divide and
take as their own the fields which they had been cultivating; the
community ownership represented by the mir was replaced by pri-
vate ownership in land. The government regarded it as all the
more important to create these new peasant proprietors as a kind
of conservative force for the future, because there had recently been
a threatening growth of Socialism. The Liberal reforms which had
been granted in 1905 had not satisfied the Extreme Left; numerous
socialistic revolts had broken out, and there had been strikes by
officials, all of which were only put down with bloodshed. Thus
the government sought at first to secure support principally from

4i8 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

large landowners and from Conservative-Liberal officials; but later
it intended to rest its power on a broader basis.

For the moment, however, in the eyes of her neighbors, Russia
seemed to be very seriously weakened by the disorders which accom-
panied the introduction of constitutional government. But her
neighbors overlooked the considerable solid reform in the army and
administration which was taking place to remedy the evils which
had been laid bare in the war with Japan; so there took place one
move after another against Russia's interests in the Balkans.

In 1908 a group who called themselves "Young Turks" and who
were opposed to the Sultan's regime took possession of Constanti-
nople. They declared that the anarchy in Macedonia, which had
already led to the appointment of foreign military officers — among
whom, however, there were no Germans — must necessarily lead to
a partitioning of Turkey, unless the tyrannical system which had
hitherto existed was done away with.

The Young Turk coup d'etat succeeded at first, and a Turkish
Parliament, elected on the basis of the liberal constitution of 1876,
came into being. But the only really practical effect of the revolt
of the Young Turks was that it revealed more clearly than ever to
the Powers the weakness of the Turkish government. The Powers
therefore did not delay in taking advantage of this: it was in July,
1908, that the Young Turks had come into power; in October,
Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria declared himself independent, taking
the title of Tsar, and Austria-Hungary annexed the provinces of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This was a serious blow, not only for Russia, but still more for
the Balkan peoples themselves, who now saw, for the first time, that
in place of Turkish rule they were not to have independence but
the domination of a foreign Great Power. The annexation of the
provinces struck most deeply at the claims of Serbia, who now had
to regard her Serbian brothers living in Bosnia as lost. But resist-
ance was out of the question. A little state like Serbia could not
possibly attack Austria-Hungary, and Russia refrained from all
warlike action because Germany declared that the interests of her
Austrian ally were her own.

It was doubtful, however, how long the two Central Powers could
maintain their control over the Balkans. They were steadily be-
coming more and more isolated. Italy, no less than Austria, believed
that she had claims to the eastern coast of the Adriatic, and her
war for the conquest of Tripoli had showed that her interests as a
member of the Triple Alliance could not be made to harmonize with

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 419

Austria's policy, which aimed at control over Salonica and the
Western Balkans. France was the ally of Russia, but not wholly on
Russia's side. England's support was uncertain. The situation be-
came most threatening when the Balkan states, whose development
was endangered by the pro-Turkish policy of Austria-Hungary and
Germany, finally united together under the pressure of common
necessity in an offensive alliance against Turkey in the spring of 1912.

It was regarded almost as a wonder that a coalition uniting
Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro, could take place. Ap-
parently its success was mainly due to the diplomatic skill of the
Greek statesman, Venizelos. It was still more of a wonder that the
Central Powers allowed this alliance, which was directed against
their policy in Turkey, to take its course at first. The explanation
lies in the fact that they greatly over-estimated Turkey's defensive
strength; after the Turkish successes in the Greco-Turkish War,
and after the training of Turkish troops by German officers, they
regarded Turkey's power of resistance as almost invincible. In
reality, things turned out exactly the other way. After the Balkan
Allies had declared war in October, 1912, Turkey's power collapsed
with a speed which was unheard of. The Greeks captured Salonica
and Janina in Epirus; the Serbs, after a victory at Kumanovo, oc-
cupied Uskiib and the whole of northern Macedonia; the Monte-
negrins, after a long siege, seized Scutari in Albania. More decisive
than anything, however, was the fact that the Bulgarians crushed the
Turkish armies at Kirk-Kilisse and Liile Burgas, so that the rem-
nants of the beaten enemy had to withdraw behind the Tchataldja
Lines, a few miles west of Constantinople. With the support of the
Serbs, the Bulgarians also succeeded in capturing the strongly forti-
fied city of Adrianople. The Turks had to recognize that they were
beaten. In the Treaty of London, May 30, 1913, they gave up all
their European territory with the exception of Constantinople and
the Dardanelles up to a line running from Enos on the /Egean to
Midia on the Black Sea; they also gave up Crete and the other
islands in the -^Egean Sea.

The Great Powers had not been able to prevent Turkey from
being despoiled in this fashion. But the Central Powers were at
least able to bring it about that the Balkan states, especially Serbia
and Montenegro, which were particularly disliked by Austria for
economic and political reasons, were not too much enlarged. Though
Serbia had entered the war largely in order to secure free access
to the sea and make herself politically and commercially independent
of Hungarian oppression, she was now forced to abandon the most

420 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

important part of her conquests. At the insistence of Austria and
Italy, the Great Powers created an independent principality of Al-
bania, which was placed under a German prince; Serbia lost the
coast region on the Adriatic which she had occupied, and received
merely the right to have a so-called corridor railway; Montenegro,
also, had to give up to the newly created Albanian principality the
town of Scutari which she had captured at such cost.

By their intervention the Central Powers accomplished even more
than this. Not only were Serbia and Montenegro deprived of a
good part of their booty, but as a result of their losses, the harmony
among the Balkan states which had only just been brought about,
went to pieces again. The plan for dividing the spoils which had
been arranged before the war could no longer be carried out, and
Serbia therefore demanded compensations elsewhere. Since Bul-
garia would not agree to this, the two victorious nations now went
to war with one another. But Bulgaria was not at all equal to
her enemies; Serbs beat Bulgarians in the Bregnalnitza valley, and
Greeks beat them on the Upper Struma. Bulgaria was so weakened
that Rumania, which had hitherto stood aloof because she did not
border directly on Turkish territory, stepped in, and without striking
a blow occupied northern Bulgaria. Even the Turks finally took
the offensive again and reconquered Adrianople.

The Peace of Bucharest, on August 10, 1913, confirmed these
military developments. Macedonia was divided between Serbia and
Bulgaria, the Greek boundary was pushed further eastward, and
Rumania received a considerable piece of land which had hitherto
belonged to Bulgaria. Furthermore, in the treaty of Constantinople,
in September, 1913, Bulgaria ceded Adrianople back to Turkey.

But this only settled the Balkan question for the moment. To
be sure, the territories which Turkey had given up were regarded
as definitely lost. But in other respects, the situation was nowhere
satisfactory. Bulgaria could not reconcile herself to the loss of
Macedonia and her own northern districts; and Serbia was, and
remained, very indignant at the way she had been forced back from
the Adriatic. But all this irritation was at first without practical
importance, since the Balkan states were so exhausted by the war
that none of them could think of appealing to arms again.

Quite different was the situation in Austria-Hungary. While the
difficulties and suffering of these recent wars forced the Balkan
states to remain at peace, this very weakness of theirs tempted the
neighboring Great Power to speedy interference. It had become
evident that Serbia could not be crushed by economic weapons; but

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BALKANS 421

now the situation was all the more favorable for a military attack.
Unless Austria-Hungary quickly interfered to nip Serbia's develop-
ment in the bud, there was danger that before long the Serbian king-
dom, which was considerably enlarged and was beginning to have
great economic prosperity, might became a dangerous neighbor in
view of the Serbian populations in various parts of the Dual Mon-
archy. The situation in Bosnia appeared especially dangerous: the
Austrian government had never been able to break up the system
of large landed estates which had survived from the time when the
Mohammedans were in control; the Serbs in Bosnia would there-
fore be looking over with longing eyes to the peasant state of Serbia
across the border.

Equally influential was still another consideration. All Austria's
acts of interference in the Balkans had met with nothing but empty
diplomatic opposition on the part of the Franco-Russian Dual Al-
liance. France and Russia, though friendly to Serbia and Monte-
negro, had always ended by leaving them in the lurch when Austria
had threatened military action. Great Britain had not put herself
completely on the side of Russia and France, even in her diplomacy.
Was it not natural to expect that, in case of a new intervention by
Austria, Russia and her French ally would remain just as inactive
as heretofore? Especially as Austria could again use the German
army as a threat, as when she annexed Bosnia.

So Austria decided to attack Serbia in order to reduce the coun-
try to impotency once and for all. At first she planned to act in
unison with Italy, but in August, 1913, the Italian government
refused to cooperate; so Austria could count only on Germany's
support.

The final occasion causing the attack was an act of violence all
the details of which have not yet been wholly cleared up satisfac-
torily. On June 28, 1914, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to
the Austrian throne, was murdered by a Bosnian student named
Princip at Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. What the murderer's
motives were is unknown; but it is certain that the attempt, which
was not the first on that day, was carefully prepared beforehand, and
that the Austrian police had taken wholly inadequate measures for
the protection of the Archduke.

This crime now became the pretext for Austrian measures which
aimed to bring about war with Serbia. A murder had taken place
which, if it remained unavenged, would ultimately be a danger to
all crowned heads; all hesitating persons in Austria were con-
vinced that thoroughgoing measures must be taken once and for all.

422 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

Any complicity on the part of the Serbian government in the crime
was not proved and was very unlikely; but it was not difficult so
to represent the affair that appearances, at least, seemed to be
against officials in Belgrade.

Accordingly, on July 23, three weeks after the assassination,
Austria took Serbia by surprise with an ultimatum. This was so
worded that Serbia could scarcely accept it. Nevertheless, the Ser-
bian government did agree to all Austria's hard conditions with the
exception of two points. But Austria wanted war, and therefore
the Austrian minister left Belgrade at once on July 25, in spite of
Serbia's conciliatory answer. Three days later, on July 28, 1914,
Austria-Hungary officially declared war on Serbia.

CHAPTER XXXIV
THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY and also her German ally had certainly expected
that the other Great Powers, including Russia, would again leave
Serbia in the lurch. They had reckoned that Russia, which had
never yet interfered on Serbia's behalf, would consent to see her
completely destroyed, and would not only abandon the domination
of the Balkans to her old rival without a blow, but would com-
pletely lose her position as a Great Power. Though the Balkan
states, in spite of the obstacles which the Great Powers had put in
the way of their development, had at least been able to maintain a
certain independence, owing to the antagonism between Austria and
Russia, Germany and Austria now calculated that the Balkan states
would henceforth be at the mercy of the expansionist policy of the
Central Powers; and they also calculated that Russia would submit
to all this and that they could ignore her protests, like those of
any small state.

But it turned out otherwise. Russia refused to allow Austria to
attack Serbia in this way — and the World War broke out.

Before an account is given of the details of the outbreak of the
war, it is necessary to make some general observations.

Whoever wants to study the origin of the war ought not to con-
tent himself, as is so often done, with a mere statement of the hostile
interests which existed. Disputes between the Great Powers are
taking place almost all the time, and there are continually rumors
of threatening war; but more is needed than all this to cause a
war actually to develop out of these sources of irritation in such a
way that no compromise can ultimately be found. The very history
of Europe since 1870 shows this clearly: no matter how often fric-
tion developed between the Great Powers between 1870 and 1914,
it never caused war to break out; it was even possible to settle
ticklish questions like the partition of Africa without the Great
Powers resorting to arms. Wars have assumed such giant propor-
tions since the introduction of universal military service, and the
economic life of the peoples of Europe since the development of

423

424 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

world commerce is so dependent upon the undisturbed functioning
of international communications, that no conflict seemed worth a
war. In the age of professional armies a war which aimed at the
conquest of some border district might seem worth while; and even
in recent years some of the colonial wars which were carried out
under similar conditions might be justified. But a war between the
giant armies of Europe meant a risk which ought to be contem-
plated only for the sake of a great stake.

One might regard as such a stake the preservation or the acqui-
sition of the military domination of Europe, i.e. "World Power"
(W eltherrschajt) . Just because all states, and especially those
which felt themselves weaker in military force, shrank from war, it
was of great practical importance to enjoy the prestige of military
invincibility. The state which, because of its earlier military
achievements and continued armaments, appeared to be sure of
victory in a future war, could reap the fruits of war without coming
to an actual conflict. Its opponents would simply surrender to its
essential demands.

This had been the position of Germany in Europe since 1870.
Relying on the successes of 1866 and 1870, on a military organiza-
tion which was being built up ever more powerfully and which was
organized to the last detail, and on a complete militarization of the
people through the schools and barracks; relying also on the fact
that Germany's more rapid mobilization seemed to make it possible
for her to put her enemy at a disadvantage at the outset, if not to
overwhelm him quickly, — relying on all this, Germany had been able
to support every demand she made by a threat of war, without
having to fear anything of the same kind herself (never, so far as
is known, has a threat of war been made against the German gov-
ernment). Heavy as were the financial burdens, which the steadily
increasing armaments imposed on Germany, they all seemed to be
worth while, even from an economic point of view; for a hint at
this military organization sufficed to secure from other countries
concessions of all sorts, not the least important of which related
to commercial and political matters.

It was therefore thoroughly natural that Germany opposed all
efforts at the limitation of armaments more consistently than any
other state. Why should she be willing to abandon means of exert-
ing pressure, when she had the feeling that she could compete with
other countries more richly endowed by Nature, thanks primarily
merely to her military organization and armaments?

So all the attempts to lessen the frightful and ever-increasing

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 425

burden of armaments in Europe and even to prepare the way for
a wide-reaching system of international arbitration failed, owing
to the opposition of the German government. When Russia invited
all the European states to a conference, to consider means for limit-
ing armaments, and the meeting took place at the Hague in 1899,
the real purpose of the conference could not be seriously touched,
because the German representatives declared at the outset that their
country did not find that armaments were a burden and that they
had no intention of limiting their military preparations in any way.
The result was that nothing but a half measure providing for the
establishment of a permanent court of arbitration at the Hague was
accomplished; but it was impossible to make resort to this court
compulsory in international disputes; and even this provision for a
court was achieved only after long opposition on the part of the
German delegates. Only a few states went so far in separate treaties
as to bind themselves to submit all disputes to the Hague court, and
among the number were not included any of the European military
Powers.

Not only had all the efforts to limit the burdens of war in time
of peace failed, but it had been made perfectly clear which state was
mainly to blame for this. Not only in purely pacifist circles, but in
all countries where military expenditures were interfering with social
progress, public opinion therefore began to turn more and more
against Germany, which even during the last third of the nineteenth
century had still enjoyed an increasing popularity as the preserver
of "order," protecting the capitalist regime from the threats of
Socialism. People began to feel more strongly than ever that the
internal policy of all the European Great Powers would be deter-
mined in last analysis by whether they could put an end to the
pressure for excessive armaments — excessive even as compared with
those of the middle of the nineteenth century — which was being im-
posed by the German military organization. Moreover, this pressure
was finally felt not merely on the Continent, but in Great Britain.
Germany was seeking to arm herself at sea as well as on land, and
the English proposals for limiting naval armaments were summarily
rejected in Berlin as had been the proposals which Russia had
made in 1899.

The burden of these armaments, the like of which the world had
never seen, began gradually to be ever more crushing. The bound-
less optimism which resulted from the scientific inventions of the
second half of the nineteenth century, now began to show its fruit.
It was becoming clear even to those who had hitherto closed their

426 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

eyes to the simplest facts of political economy that scientific prog-
ress had been able to transform things and arrangements which had
formerly been luxuries of the rich into cheap articles of comfort for
the poor; but it had not been possible, in like manner, to increase
the necessaries of life and raw materials needed by the overgrown
populations of Europe. Progress in the science of communication
had indeed been able to distribute the existing necessaries of life
quickly and cheaply, but it could not increase the production at a
rate proportionate to the increase in population. From these con-
ditions, there began to develop, about 1905, a steadily-increasing
rise in the cost of articles which were necessary for the support of
life and for use in industry; and this led to a gradual revolu-
tionizing of all economic relations, especially those concerning the
living conditions of the numerous class of persons dependent on a
fixed salary. The giant activities of government, commerce, and
industry had been built up on the basis of cheap labor, which now
threatened to be no longer available. As a result, there arose a kind
of nervousness which, together with the fact that the more ambitious
elements found it less easy than formerly to emigrate, led to a kind
of unrest and discontent, which regarded any change in the general
situation, even one involving war, as a happy deliverance. Herein
lies a psychological root of the war which was especially strong in
Germany and Austria-Hungary; it is significant that in a relatively
thinly settled and primarily agricultural country, like France, one
does not find this feeling; and in England, at any rate, it was still
easy to emigrate to the colonies.

Such was the situation when Austria-Hungary declared war on
Serbia. All now depended on whether it would be possible to make
Austria retreat from the step which she had taken, by giving her to
understand that Russia would not consent to the destruction of
Serbia. The way to do this was for England, which was the Power
least directly concerned in Balkan conflicts, to undertake the role
of mediator as quickly as possible and propose an international con-
ference for settling the Austro-Serbian dispute. England did this,
but her offer did not meet with a favorable response from the Cen-
tral Powers. Russia was then compelled to make it clear that she
was in earnest in her determination not to allow Serbia to be
crushed by Austria. Just as Austria-Hungary had formerly, during
the Balkan Wars, supported her demands on Serbia and Montenegro
by mobilizing on the Russian frontier, so Russia now ordered mobi-
lization on July 30; moreover, it was "general mobilization" which

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 427

she ordered, because she wanted to convince Germany as well as
Austria that she was fixed in her determination.

In Vienna the government took the hint. The authorities realized
that they had been careless in playing with fire, but that it was not
yet too late to prevent the outbreak of a general war; so the Austro-
Hungarian government made a semblance of accepting the English
proposal for a conference.

At this moment, when Vienna might, perhaps, have saved the situa-
tion, Germany stepped in. It is uncertain how far she may have
been influenced by the desire in any event to take advantage of her
own more rapid mobilization against the Russians. The historian
will be inclined to discover another motive of a more general sort.
He will call attention to the fact that an influential party in Ger-
many, consisting mainly of the great manufacturers, wanted the war
under any circumstances, and he will point out that at this time
German policy had reached a turning point. For the first time it
had been shown that the threat of the German sword no longer
sufficed to compel the other Great Powers to lay down their arms
without fighting. What had worked effectively in 1908, was no
longer effective. Even in France, where not long before a minister
who was not agreeable to the German government had been dis-
missed upon a demand from Berlin, the fear of Germany was no
longer so intense as formerly. Thus, one of the props not only of
German foreign policy, but of Germany's whole economic and po-
litical system, began to totter. If Germany wanted to recover the
position which had been such an advantage to her foreign policy
since 1870, the only thing to do was to make the other Great Powers
realize anew the superiority of German arms.

So, on August i, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia, and on
August 3, on France, because Germany also wanted to take advan-
tage of her more rapid mobilization against France as well as against
Russia. Since, according to the German constitution, the Kaiser
could declare war only in case German territory had already been
attacked, the German government invented, among other things, the
story of an attack by French aviators on Nuremberg. In reality,
the French army had been withdrawn ten kilometers from the fron-
tier in order to avoid even any appearance of provocation. Hence-
forth Germany took the lead in everything. The fact may also be
noted that although Austria-Hungary was the indirect instigator of
the war and was just as much threatened as Germany by Russia's
mobilization, Austria-Hungary at first refrained from all hostile acts

428 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

against the Tsar's empire and continued the pacific attitude which
she had appeared to adopt at the last minute; it was not until four
days after Germany had declared war on Russia that Austria did
likewise on August 5.

In Germany the declaration of war was hailed with immense re-
joicing and greeted with enthusiasm by all classes of the popula-
tion; in France, a feeling of sad desperation prevailed, modified at
most by the consideration that it would be better that the long-
feared blow should take place at once rather than that the people
should have to live constantly under the threat of an attack.

Germany had issued her declarations of war on the supposition
that the Central Powers would have to deal only with Russia and
with France. England, during recent years, had taken so little part
in disputes between the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance, and
had paid so little attention to the development of her land army,
that any intervention on her part was regarded as very improbable;
and, any way, even if it took place, it seemed that it could only be
of small importance from a military point of view. But the German
authorities here betrayed, for the first time, how biased and mis-
taken they were, owing to their purely militaristic habit of thought,
in judging the real power of other peoples, who were educated and
governed according to wholly different principles. In vain did Ger-
many's diplomatic representatives sound warnings. Those in charge
of her policy adhered to their conviction that a country which had
never assumed the burden of universal military service was too
"degenerate" to be able to interfere in a war of the Great Powers
on the Continent.

Now came one of the days in England's history which was to
decide her destiny. From a business point of view, much, perhaps
everything, was in favor of her keeping out of the war. Great wars
have always offered neutrals advantages in commerce; and, further-
more, after the war was over there was the prospect of great profits
for English industry. The burden of debts which would be imposed
on the warring nations would for a long time limit their power of
competition. England had already considered protecting herself
from the competition of other countries, especially of Germany and
of the United States, — a competition which was beginning to be felt
in some branches — by simply changing her commercial policy from
free trade to the system of protective tariffs and trade agreements
which were used everywhere on the Continent; now a war on the
Continent would make it unnecessary to adopt such protective
measures.

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 429

Such shortsighted considerations, however, were more than out-
weighed by imperative arguments in favor of taking part in the war.

The whole public and private life of England was based on the
non-existence of military pressure. What Englishmen prized as
their liberty had only been possible of development owing to the
fact that military considerations did not dominate either education
or government administration. The fact that the English govern-
ment interfered to a relatively slight degree in the life of the private
individual, rested, in last analysis, upon the fact that the citizen
was not regarded as a future recruit for the army. This circum-
stance, which must be regarded as anomalous in Europe, especially
since 1870, had only persisted as a result of a certain balance of
power which had developed and which made it seem unlikely that
an insular country, at any rate, would be subjected to immediate
military attack. Now if, as between the two Continental combina-
tions of Powers, victory should fall to the one which had concen-
trated all its strength on military armaments, England's advan-
tageous position would be gone forever. England also would then
have to limit her individual citizens in the liberties of which they
were so proud. And not only that. If ever the whole Continent
should once fall under the control of a single military power, it was
all over with England's independence of action in foreign politics,
and in fact with her position as a Great Power. If it had been pos-
sible even then, when face to face with an enemy armed to the
teeth, to undertake the military training of the whole Eng-
lish people, which had hitherto been steadily rejected, it would have
been too late. England would have been forced to obey the dictates
of an all-powerful enemy and would have sunk to the rank of a
helpless Second-rate Power.

There was also the further consideration, as seemed to be shown
by the events of the immediately preceding years, that Germany was
one of the Powers which could not be satisfied by concessions and
compromises. Great Britain had followed the same policy toward
Germany as toward other countries, such as the United States.
Everywhere she had tried to come to some sensible agreement on
disputed questions. She had never put the slightest obstacles in the
way of German commerce and German imports into England, not
even where these injured English domestic interests, or where her
rival could be charged with "dumping," that is, with underselling
abroad, by charging higher prices at home — a practice which the
English regarded as "unfair." Even as regards Germany's plans of
expansion in Turkey, Great Britain had been ready to make conces-

430 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

sions: when the war broke out an agreement was ready for final
signing which gave the Germans considerable concessions in Meso-
potamia. But now, in their diplomatic notes to England, the Ger-
mans seemed to want a part of the French colonies in Africa, or
perhaps the whole of the French colonial possessions, and so threat-
ened to upset by means of a European war the agreements which
had been reached with such difficulty for partitioning Africa (see
above, p. 339 ff.) ; they were also not willing to promise to respect the
neutrality of Belgium, which looked as if they wanted to get a foot-
hold on the Belgian coast. Under these circumstances, the English
government, however little they wanted to enter the war, had no
alternative but to come as quickly as possible to the help of the
weaker party on the Continent: on August 4, England declared war
on Germany.

This was a "statesmanlike" decision in the true sense of the word,
if one means by this a step which involves heavy burdens for the
moment in order to escape greater evils in the future. This was also
true in view of the attitude of the English people, which at first,
among the lower classes, was almost indifferent. It was really only
the intellectuals, who saw further than the masses, who were strongly
in favor of war. It was not until 1915, when German Zeppelin
airships began to bombard open towns in England, that the British
people awoke from their apathy and a real war spirit began to
develop.

England's entrance into the war now altered fundamentally the
whole military situation for the two Central Empires. The greatest
Sea Power of the age was now on the side of their enemies, and it
was possible to blockade Germany's coasts. This was all the easier
as the German navy from the outset did not, and could not, think
of meeting the superior British fleet in open battle; with the excep-
tion of scattered raids it remained in port and so left the sea to the
British from the beginning. The only exceptions were those German
warships which at the outbreak of the war were stationed too far
away to be called back in time; these, to be sure, began at once
a series of successful attacks on enemy ships and bombarded enemy
ports. One German fleet even won a victory over an inferior British
fleet on November i, 1914, at Coronel, off the coast of Chile. But
by the end of 1914, nearly all these German vessels had been
destroyed; the Emden, which had been operating in the Indian
Ocean, was destroyed by an Australian cruiser, at Cocos Islands,
southwest of Java; the fleet of Admiral von Spee, who had won the
victory at Coronel, was destroyed on December 8, at the Falkland

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 431

Islands; the Dresden, which was the only ship to escape, was finally
sunk on March 14, 1915, near the Island of Juan Fernandez off the
coast of Chile. The Goeben and the Breslau, which happened to
be in the Mediterranean, managed, to be sure, to escape to Con-
stantinople, where they had an influence on the political situation;
but their naval activity was limited to the Black Sea. Thus the
Entente was able to control completely communications at sea.
Though the Germans and Austrians managed to do great injury to
shipping through submarine attacks, still they were never able to
send their own ships out upon the ocean.

Less considerable, at first, was the assistance which Great Britain
was able to give on land. The little army of 150,000, which was the
only one that was ready, evinced in many respects the technical
superiority which belongs to professional soldiers. But it was
numerically too small to be able to interfere with decisive effect.
It was not until later, when the war began to drag out, thanks to
the French victory on the Marne, that England was able to come
to the aid of her allies with larger masses of troops.

But before these events are narrated, the attitude of the other
European Great Power toward the war must be considered.

It is uncertain whether the Central Powers ever reckoned on active
help from Italy in their war against Russia and France; it is cer-
tain, however, that Italy's cooperation was inconceivable. The
Italian people never shared the ideas of conservative solidarity and
absolutistic politics which united Germany and Austria ; furthermore,
any increase in Austria's strength was diametrically opposed to
Italy's dearest interests. Austria was the chief obstacle to those
Italian aspirations which aimed at reuniting all persons of Italian
nationality; Trieste and the Italian Trentino were still under Aus-
trian rule; moreover, it looked as if the Austrian government was
trying to favor the Slavic at the expense of the Italian populations
in the "Terra Irredenta" — in the Italian unredeemed territories.
Equally opposed to Italian interests was the policy of the Dual
Monarchy in the Balkans. By her single-handed attack against
Serbia, Austria had not only broken the terms of the Triple Alliance,
which had been renewed for six years on December 5, 1912, but she
was interfering directly with Italy's sphere of influence on the
eastern shore of the Adriatic. Accordingly, when Emperor Francis
Joseph asked Italy for aid, in accordance with the terms of the
Triple Alliance Treaty, the Italian government, on August 3, simply
declared its neutrality. This meant, from the very outset, that
the French military authorities were given a guarantee against any

432 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

fear of attack from the southeast; they could concentrate all their
strength against the German invasion.

Meanwhile, the Germans had already begun their attack upon
France. Their plan was simple. Since their main, though by no
means their only, superiority lay in their speedier mobilization, it
was necessary first to conquer France, which in all probability
would be able to prepare for war in a shorter time than Russia.
On the other hand, the French had protected their eastern frontier
by strong fortresses on which German attacks would probably have
wasted themselves without effect; in fact, this line of fortresses was
never broken, and the German attack on Nancy from August 22 to
September u, 1914, resulted in the first serious failure which the
German army met with. The French had not intended to infringe
Belgian neutrality, and therefore made only inadequate preparations
along this frontier. For these reasons, the German General Staff
ignored the neutrality of Belgium which they had only recently
promised to respect, and decided to circumvent the French fortifica-
tions and attack France through the neutral territory of Belgium.
While Luxemburg, which was also neutral, was being occupied, an
ultimatum was sent to Belgium, demanding that German troops
should be allowed to march through the country; when this was
rejected by the Belgians, who had regard for their honor and inde-
pendence, the Germans, on August 3, began to invade the land.

Trusting to their neutrality, which was guaranteed, the Belgians
were not prepared for war, and even if they had devoted all their
strength to military matters they would not have been able to stand
successfully against a great military state because of the smallness
of their country. But the patriotism of the people and their indig-
nation at being attacked by a country which had been regarded with
particular sympathy by the ruling classes in Belgium — the Catholic
party had a decided dislike for the policy which Combes was pur-
suing in France — resulted in making the advance of the German
troops much less easy than had been expected. Even though the
Belgian fortresses were not able to withstand the new Austrian and
German guns, it was impossible to break the heroic resistance of the
little nation which the Germans had despised. On August 5, Liege
was bombarded and fell two days later, though some of the forts
held out until August 15. Partly, perhaps, as a result of the indig-
nation which seized the German military authorities because of this
resistance, which was unexpected and most dangerous for their plan
of attack against France, there now took place a number of acts of
violence against the civilian population of Belgium which cannot

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 433

be passed over in silence, inasmuch as they were of decisive impor-
tance in the further development of the war, and especially upon
the participation of other states.

One of the tendencies in the nineteenth century which had been
most important and successful in practice was humanitarianism
(see ch. vi). From the middle of the century an attempt had been
made to extend the movement even to war; the Red Cross had been
founded, and wounded men, whether friend or foe, were to be treated
with equal care. Later, the movement was taken up again at the
Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Detailed regulations were
issued for the protection of the civilian population in time of war;
collective penalties were forbidden, as well as the employment of
cruel weapons. It had been hoped that European countries had
reached the point of conducting war in a more humane fashion than
had hitherto been the case, or than was still regarded as necessary
in dealing with half-savage peoples outside Europe. The conduct of
the German troops toward the Belgian, and later in many cases
toward the French, civilian population, now showed that this hope
was vain. Whole villages and parts of cities were leveled to the
ground, and the inhabitants were shot in groups. In justification
it was alleged that there had been some firing by jrancs-tireurs, or
irregular troops. But even if isolated cases of this kind may have
happened, these bloody and terrible collective penalties were con-
trary both to international agreements and to all feelings of hu-
manity, especially as it could never be proved that there had been
any organized attacks by irregular troops. In other countries it
made a very bad impression that these acts, which were regarded
as those of "barbarians," were not the acts of individuals such as
naturally can never be wholly avoided, but had to be regarded as a
result of the German militarist system. Episodes like the maltreat-
ment of soldiers in German barracks, or outrages like that at Saverne
in 1913, which had hitherto been matters of domestic German con-
cern, now came to be regarded as a danger to the whole world.
Even peoples — like many Italians or Americans — who had hitherto
looked with unconcealed approval upon the German militarist sys-
tem because of its "efficiency," now began to perceive what it might
mean for them if the principle that military necessity, or what any
individual officer regarded as such, was to prevail over all other
considerations; and what it meant, if military leaders were to be
made responsible for the successful carrying out of their commands,
but not for the terrible and prohibited methods which they adopted
in carrying them out. Whatever individuals may think of German

434 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

conduct in Belgium and Northern France at that time, the German
government had given a practical demonstration of their system
which had an important effect long afterwards and against which
propaganda later could do nothing.

The memory of these deeds was not allowed to die out because
similar acts were continually opening people's eyes to these prin-
ciples adopted by the German military authorities. Here we can
only mention the deportation of many Belgians and French, both
men and women, to compulsory labor in German factories; the use
of poison gases, which took place first on April 22, 1915, and of
flame throwers; the destruction of coal mines; the systematic cut-
ting down of fruit trees; the sinking of passenger ships; and many
other things of the same kind. All these measures roused indigna-
tion in neutral countries; this was all the more the case as many
of the acts were apparently not even justified by military necessity.
The destruction in Belgium and the occupied parts of France of
all the factories which had been able to compete steadily and suc-
cessfully with German manufactures because of the high quality of
their product, and the damaging of French mines which produced
the coal for French industry, apparently were only to be explained
on the supposition that the large German manufacturers, who had
not been one of the least influences toward war, and who to the
very last held to their program of the most extensive annexations,
wanted to use for their economic advantage that complete power
which the German military authorities claimed in the occupied dis-
tricts, even in regard to private property.

At first, however, everything depended on how events would turn
out on the French theater of war.

The French military authorities had not repeated the mistake
which in 1870 had led to the disaster at Sedan. In spite of the fact
that the German army had already begun an offensive, French
mobilization was completed quietly. Partly as a result of this situa-
tion, the French suffered from the disadvantage that all the fighting
which followed took place on their territory; but they were able
to oppose the enemy with an army which was ready to fight. Their
first attack, however, was based on a false conclusion. The French
General Staff had not only never thought of infringing Belgian neu-
trality themselves, but they had not expected that the enemy would
do so. They moved the main mass of their troops, therefore, toward
the eastern frontier, and attempted to take the offensive there, where
they supposed the main German force would be. Not only did this
undertaking meet with no success, the attack at Saarburg, on August

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 435

20, ending after two days' bloody fighting in the retreat of the
French, and the advance into Alsace also resulting in the forced
withdrawal of the French, who kept in their possession only a small
bit of territory around Thann in the southwest; but it also pre-
vented them from opposing any adequate forces to the German
armies which were marching in through Belgium. So on August
21-23, after the battle of Charleroi, the French and the English had
to begin their retreat from that point, and soon this retreat was
extended to the whole French and British front. The operation,
however, took place in an orderly fashion and the German success
was incomplete to the extent that they did not succeed in crushing
even one of the enemy armies as they had done in 1866 and 1870.
But the Anglo-French retreat began to be more and more rapid, and
it almost seemed as though it would not come to an end before the
mountainous territory in the South was reached. The French and
English troops were pressed back to the Marne, and the French
Government, thinking that Paris was in danger, transferred its seat
to Bordeaux on September 3. Then, on September 5, Joffre, the
French commander-in-chief, issued his famous order for a counter-
attack. The Germans had pressed forward too rapidly, without suf-
ficiently protecting their flanks ; in the east, as a result of their fruit-
less attacks on Nancy, their flanks were as much exposed as in the
west, where they had marched to the southeast, past the fortresses
of Paris; the Germans were now attacked by the French and the
English together — a great impression was made by the attack led
by General Gallieni, the military commander of Paris — and after
hard fighting were driven back with a speed which at points was
like a flight; this was the First Battle of the Marne, September
6-10, 1914. The Germans did not stop their retreat until they had
reached positions to the north of the Aisne, where they immediately
began, however, to adapt themselves with extraordinary promptness
to the new situation. While the operations hitherto had been a
"war of movement," like the wars of 1866 and 1870, the Germans
now resorted to a "war of positions," such as had prevailed in the
American War of Secession. The use of modern quick-firing guns,
and especially of machine guns, with which the Germans were at
first much better equipped than the Allies, had shown that fighting
in the open field resulted in a sacrifice of life which had hitherto
never been known; and since the Germans, even after their retreat,
could still dig themselves in on French soil, they began to establish
a series of trenches which, on the whole, fixed the front line on
the western theater of operations down to the close of the war.

436 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

The great surprise attack, on which the greatest hopes had been
placed, had failed: Paris was not captured; the French army was
not destroyed; the communications with England were not even
broken. However, it was still possible to accomplish this latter aim,
and the German military authorities now devoted themselves to this
task with the greatest energy. But before an account is given of
this, the other theaters of war must be considered.

It was of decisive importance that the Central Powers, or at any
rate Austria-Hungary, were much less successful. in the East than in
the West. The Russians had been enormously underestimated.
Germans who believed that they would have to do with a military
system which had suffered such severe blows in the Russo-Japanese
War now found themselves completely in error. Since then the
defects which had caused those defeats had been remedied by cease-
less activity. No fault was to be found with the Russian equip-
ment, and Russian mobilization took place rapidly and in thoroughly
good order. The people were united in spirit, so that the Tsar
even dared to impose upon his people during the period of the war
complete abstention from alcoholic beverages. The results of these
reforms were soon evident, especially in the battles with the Aus-
trian troops. To be sure, the Austrians succeeded in advancing
from Galicia into Poland and in defeating the Russians at Krasnik
on July 2 5 ; but when the Russians came on with their full strength
the Austrians suffered a disastrous defeat at Lemberg on Septem-
ber 2. Galicia was now in good part lost to Austria, and the Rus-
sians began to advance against Hungary and the passes in the Car-
pathian Mountains. They also won decisive victories in a second
battle in Galicia near Grodek on September 6-13, and in a second
battle at Krasnik. By September 22, they were able to begin the
bombardment of the Galician fortress of Przemysl.

More successful was the resistance which the Germans made in
the north. While the Austrians could not even defend themselves
against the Serbs, and in spite of three attacks were driven out of
the country each time, the Germans succeeded in beating back the
Russian attack with great victories. The Russians had begun their
attack on East Prussia on August 7, and by August 20, after suc-
cessful fights at Gumbinnen, had pressed forward as far as Konigs-
berg. The German Government, which had hitherto devoted its
main attention to the French theater of war, was compelled to think
about taking defensive measures in the East. In this situation it
turned to a leader who had hitherto not been prominent but who
was to prove himself just the man for the task of commanding

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 437

troops in East Prussia. This was the later commander-in-chief, who
at that time was known merely as General Hindenburg. The effects
of his appointment were soon seen. On August 26-29 the Russian
invading army was given a crushing defeat at Tannenberg and
another at the Masurian Lakes on September 6-12. The Russians
not only had to clear out of East Prussia, but the Germans were
able to prepare a counter-offensive against Russia — an undertaking,
however, which was brought to a standstill by a defeat on the
Niemen on September 28, and which finally ended with a German
defeat at Augustowo on September 29-October 4, so that the Rus-
sians were again able to invade East Prussia.

But in the main, the situation in East Prussia had been definitely
saved for the Germans, and for a short time they were even able to
relieve the Russian pressure on Austria by undertaking, on October
15-27, an advance against Warsaw — which, however, was not suc-
cessful.

The really decisive events, however, took place on the West Front.
At first the Germans had concentrated all their forces on the fight
with the French and British armies, and had given little attention
to any attempt to occupy the northern coast of France and Bel-
gium. Now that they had failed in their main aim, they attempted
at least to cut the communications between England and France.
If the coast perhaps as far as Calais were in their possession, they
believed, it would be possible to threaten England and to check
the reinforcements which England was sending to France. So they
began "the race for the sea," and the two front lines were extended
northward toward the shores of Flanders.

The real battle was fought out in Belgium. First the Germans
reached the sea on October 10, by taking Antwerp. From there
they pushed westward along the coast past Zeebriigge, Ostend, and
Ghent as far as the Yser. Here and around Ypres the decisive bat-
tles took place. The contest was very severe and the battles were
extraordinarily bloody. But victory finally fell to the united French,
Belgian/ and English armies, although not until the Belgians had
opened the dykes and flooded the country around the Yser. It was
not until November 21 that the battle which had begun on October
19 could be regarded as ended. Although the Allies were much
too weak to drive the Germans out of their positions on the Yser,
and although the Germans had thus conquered an important naval
base on the Belgian coast, which they kept in their hands till the
last months of the war, nevertheless, the greater success had been
on the side of the Allies. The German advance had failed to reach

438 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

Calais or even Dunkirk, and communications between France and
England could therefore be maintained as before. Finally, from the
point of view of morale, it was of considerable importance that
through the successful defense of the line of the Yser, a part at
least of Belgium did not fall into the hands of the enemy.

Even if one should say that from a purely military point of view
the outcome of the First Battle of Ypres was as successful for the
Allies as for the Central Powers, there remained the fact that even
a merely defensive success on the side of the Entente was equivalent
to a victory; because everything which served to prolong the war
was to their advantage and to the disadvantage of the Germans.

This is the place to sketch the general military situation as it
was at the close of 1914, and at the same time to mention certain
events which have not yet been touched upon.

No specialist could fail to see at that time that the Central
Powers had lost the war, not "lost" of course in the same sense as
it was lost in 1918, but lost in comparison with the expectations
with which it had been begun. It was conceivable that individual
military successes might still create a military situation which would
permit the Central Powers to conclude a treaty of peace without
very great territorial or economic losses, possibly even with some
small gains. But under no circumstances could the German war
aims of August, 1914, be attained. Germany would be lucky if she
won back even a part of her former position of power. Her mili-
tary prestige had suffered severely. Her ability to make military
threats, on which her economic expansion had in part rested, would
prove in the future slight. Not only had the fear of German mili-
tary power proved to be exaggerated, but the other Great Powers
now realized what they could accomplish by joint action, and they
realized also to what purposes the profits of German industry had
been applied. Great Britain, which had hitherto laid no obstacles
in the way of German trade, had learned her mistake and had
entered the ranks of her opponents. Germany had had to assume
enormous war costs which, even aside from the almost impossible
case that her enemies might have to pay an indemnity, would have
placed her industries, which were based on a low cost of living, at
a severe disadvantage in competition with neutrals. And how would
this weakened Germany, even in case of victory, have been able to
defend herself against an economic alliance of the conquered Powers?
Nothing but a speedy peace could avert the worst, which was other-
wise certainly to be expected, namely, the ruin of the German Em-
pire.

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 439

The basis for these statements lies partly in what has been said
above concerning the economic tasks of German foreign policy (see
p. 324), and partly on a consideration of the reasons which alone
had made Prussia's wars in the past economically profitable (see
p. 313 f.). In addition a few reasons may be added.

The most important reason for saying that a prolongation of the
war would necessarily be harmful to Germany lies in the fact that
this meant that the other states would have an opportunity to com-
plete their insufficient military armaments. Naturally, in Germany
and Austria, people were not really prepared for a war which would
last several years, but their armament was much more thorough-
going than anywhere else, and their munition industries and the
scientific laboratories connected with them were very much more
developed than in countries like England or Russia, for instance.
It was now possible for the Allies to make up for lost time, to
prepare themselves on their side, and to imitate the various inven-
tions with which the German military authorities had surprised
them. They could also make serviceable for war their wholly un-
trained reserves in man-power, as was particularly true in the case
of England.

The Entente Powers were also at an advantage in having at their
disposal almost unlimited amounts of all the raw materials neces-
sary for making munitions, while the Central Powers, aside from
war booty, could only count on a definite quantity which could
scarcely be much increased. This was due to the powerful effect
of the blockade.

It is disputed which side first began blockading measures. The
Germans say that the English took the initiative; but the English,
on the contrary, maintain that it was the Germans who, for instance,
began by laying mines in front of English harbors and by seizing
merchant ships. However that may be, it is a fact that the blockade
of the Central Powers at sea was the first to be carried out effec-
tively (with the exception of the Baltic), while the Entente coun-
tries, in spite of submarine attacks, never found themselves cut off
from their overseas communications. Furthermore, since the con-
ception of contraband of war came to be extraordinarily ex-
tended, the blockade was absolute, or at least became so in the
course of time, except as to wares imported from neutral territories
which bordered on the Central Empires; cotton, for instance, was
declared absolute contraband of war by England and France on
August 21, 1915.

This automatically put a limit to the expansion of German mili*

440 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

tary armaments. The shutting-off of the importation of foodstuffs
was without great practical importance, because the German troops
were always sufficiently nourished, and the necessary supplies to
feed them would grow again. On the other hand, the providing of
indispensable metals like copper, or of materials like rubber and
oil, was one of the most ticklish tasks for the German military
authorities.

Moreover, Germany's position outside of Europe could only grow
worse as time went on. A superficial observer might with some
reason maintain, that as far as France and Russia were concerned,
the year 1914 closed with the advantage on Germany's side; but
in the overseas territories the Allies had an advantage, in fact an
overwhelming advantage. A number of the German colonies in
Africa, like Togoland and Kamerun had been occupied at once,
and for the most part conquered. On September 24, 1914, New
Guinea had been captured by the Australians. The attempt which
the Germans in Southwest Africa made to bring about the. separa-
tion of South Africa from England by means of a Boer insurrection
failed, although a number of Boer leaders who had been famous in
the Transvaal wars joined the movement; but the mass of the
Boers did not follow them, and by December, 1914, all the rebels
had been captured and the insurrection was at an end. Even before
this, a counter-offensive had been begun in September. In order
to render impossible any renewal of an attempt at rebellion, the
South African government determined to seize the German colony
itself: Walfisch Bay was occupied on December 25, and Swakop-
mund on January 14, 1915; and on July 9, 1915, the last German
forces in the colony had to surrender.

More noteworthy, perhaps, was Japan's immediate realization that
the collapse of Germany's power outside Europe gave her an oppor-
tunity to come a step nearer her own aim of expelling European
influence from China. On August 15, 1914, the Empire of the
Rising Sun addressed an ultimatum to Germany demanding the
evacuation of Kiaochau. When this demand was refused, which
was natural, Japan declared war on August 23, and on the 27th
began the blockade by which she finally took possession of the Kiao-
chau territory on November 7, 1914. Japan also occupied the
Marshall Islands on October 7, 1914.

Of their colonies the Germans thus retained only German East
Africa, which, however, had been their most important overseas
possession; but it was merely a question of time as to when they
would lose even this. For although the German forces undertook a

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 441

series of successful expeditions, and although their opponents were
too much occupied with operations in Europe to despatch an ade-
quate number of troops at first, the conditions were nevertheless such
as would correct themselves in favor of the Entente in case the war
continued a long time.

To offset this increase in the number of enemies fighting against
her, Germany did succeed in winning one new ally. Turkey herself
had scarcely any grounds for entering the war. She still felt very
severely her defeats in the Balkan wars; and though of the two
coalitions, the one which had declared war against her hereditary
Russian enemy stood a little closer to her, nevertheless, her interests
were clearly in favor of pursuing a more or less honorable policy
of neutrality — her traditional method of playing off one group of
Powers against the other. But the German government needed the
active cooperation of Turkey in order to strike a blow at English
rule over the Suez Canal and over India; therefore, under pressure
of the German cruisers, Goeben and Breslau, which were anchored
off Constantinople, the Turkish cabinet had to decide in favor of
war. On October 29, 1914, the Turks opened hostilities by bom-
barding Russian ports on the Black Sea. Great Britain and France
were not slow in replying. On November 5, they declared them-
selves in a state of war with Turkey; the English government
annexed Cyprus and then, on December 17, proclaimed a British
protectorate over Egypt, thus putting an end to the last formal con-
nection between Turkey and the Nile region. The Khedive was
deposed and in his place, as a sign that Turkish sovereignty was
completely ended, a "sultan" of their own was placed over the
Egyptians. The English were now in a position to undertake sys-
tematic preparations against the threatened attack on the Suez
Canal.

Against the blockade, also, Germany attempted a counter-measure
by proclaiming officially, on February 18, 1915, that the territory
around the British Isles was blockaded by submarines. The sub-
marine was a weapon the use of which was difficult to harmonize
with existing law in regard to blockades. International law required
that the life of sailors on merchant ships be safeguarded when these
ships were declared to be good prizes for having cargoes of contra-
band of war on board; but submarines were not completely
equipped, and in many cases not equipped at all, to afford such pro-
tection to life; consequently, the British government threatened to
make reprisals against Germans who were taken prisoner from sub-
marines. Henceforth, also, lives, and not merely goods, on neutral

442 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

ships were in no less danger than those on ships that belonged to
the belligerents. But this new weapon, created as a substitute to
offset the weakness of the German navy, failed to accomplish its
purpose, as it neither produced famine in England nor led to a
repeal of the English blockade measures.

The other weapon which the Germans had and which, like
submarines, they began to use more and more intensively and sys-
tematically, was the working upon the public opinion of enemy coun-
tries with a view to compelling the governments to sign a premature
treaty of peace. This weapon also was employed as far as pos-
sible. At first the German government had devoted itself to a
persistent propaganda in neutral countries, the like of which was
not employed for a good while by her opponents; this propagandist
activity, which had originally been chiefly of an apologetic nature,
was now modified by an attempt to convince the enemy nations
that their side was the weaker and that they could never win a final
victory. And this "defeatist" weapon was not wholly without effect;
in Italy, at least, various Socialist groups were not proof against
arguments of this kind. But in general, German propaganda did
not have as much success as had been expected. Countries which
had all the trump cards in their hands were not going to be per-
suaded to be afraid of their own destruction; so the Germans did
not succeed in disturbing the clear insight of the Allies as to the
real strength of each side, even though various German military
successes might seem ever so serious to non-specialists.

In view of the small prospect that the general situation could
ever be any better for Germany through continuing the war, and
in view of the circumstance that some of the leading statesmen in
Germany were aware of this fact, the question naturally arises why
the German government did not conclude peace, even at a sacrifice.
The answer probably is to be found in the fact that such an out-
come, though it would have given the German people relatively
favorable conditions, would have meant the downfall of the hitherto
ruling authorities. An "unfavorable peace," meaning by this a peace
which definitely deprived Germany of the means of exerting military
pressure, to preserve which she had gone to war in 1914, would
have meant the overthrow of a government which had begun a use-
less war. Though hitherto the German people had put their trust
unconditionally in the authority of the Government, and had viewed
foreign policy only in the light in which they had been told to view
it, this was merely due to the effective influencing of public opinion

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 443

in the schools and newspapers. Since the days of Bismarck, and
especially since the time of the Constitutional Conflict in Prussia
(see p. 300), Germans had accustomed themselves to believe, on the
basis of their own practical experience, that it was best to put their
trust in the government, i.e., in the bureaucracy which was de-
pendent on large manufacturers and landlords, for a correct judg-
ment in regard to foreign policy and military matters. Had not
Germany conquered her enemies in war and attained her mighty eco-
nomic development simply because the autocratic government had
shown greater insight than the Opposition, which was made up of
misguided representatives of the people? Was it not their patriotic
duty for the future also to leave themselves in the hands of this
safe leadership?

This view, which more than anything else accounts for the im-
potency of legislative bodies in Germany, could last only as long
as the Empire prospered under this absolutistic leadership; as soon
as the system failed to produce satisfactory results, it would no
longer be able to defend itself from the attack of the masses, who
had hitherto been shut out from participation in government, and
especially from the Socialists. The only way of preventing this
was to trust, in spite of everything, to the hazardous chance of a
favorable outcome of the war by continuing it further, although
normally every new year made Germany's economic, and conse-
quently her military, position worse.

How true this was, was shown during the early months of the next
year, 1915. At that time the coalition of the Allied Powers acquired
a new ally. As early as the fall of 1914, Italy probably decided to
take part in the war; at any rate, that was the time when she began
wide-reaching preparations. But Italy entered the war, not merely
because she would otherwise have weakened her claims to the Italian
territories under Austrian control as well as to the Dalmatian coast
and Albania, but because a victory of the Central Powers would
have imposed still more frightful armaments on Italy and so have
ruined her completely. During the winter of 1914-15 negotiations
were carried on, and Austria was not opposed in principle to ceding
certain districts to Italy; but no agreement could be reached be-
cause Austria refused to hand over at once the districts under dis-
cussion. Italy would have had to remain neutral merely on the
assurance of promises, and this appeared impossible. Supported by
a strong popular movement, which was strengthened by the steadily
increasing spirit of nationalism and by the sympathies for the En-

444 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

tente aroused by horror at Germany's method of waging war, Italy
declared war on Austria-Hungary, though not on Germany, on May
23, 1915. Hostilities began within the next few days.

The war between Italy and Austria was a regular war of na-
tionalities, and, on Austria's side especially, it was waged with an
energy and passion beyond anything in the Russian and Serbian
theaters of war. Nevertheless, this was not the main reason that
the Italians, in spite of all their bravery, made such small progress.
Half a century before, in ceding Venetia (see p. 256), Austria had
kept all the important strategic points, and she now reaped the
benefits of this. During 1915 the Austrians were not in a position
to take the offensive against Italy; but on the defensive they were
practically invincible, and the small gains of territory made by the
Italians were won with wholly disproportionate sacrifices. So the
military situation, both on the Isonzo and the Trentino front, was
at first stationary. This was also true in 1915 on the Western
Front, although the French and the English gained a number of
important local improvements in their front lines.

Far greater were the changes which took place on the Eastern
Front.

Among the enemies of the Central Powers in 1915, Russia was
relatively the weakest. No country found it so difficult to overcome
her inferiority in the supply of rruritions or to develop her reserves
in man-power as did Russia at that time. The lack of machinery
and large factories, which were only slightly developed in Russia in
comparison with the immensity of the empire, and the dearth of
scientifically-trained mechanics, prevented Russia from undertaking
the giant production of war material as quickly as Germany or the
western countries. The inadequate railway system made it far more
difficult to transport troops and munitions than was possible with
the close net-work of railways in Germany. Germany had some-
what the same advantage over her enemies that the South had in the
American War of Secession: she controlled the "inner line," and
could move her troops more quickly than the enemy from one theater
of war to another.

It is not surprising under these circumstances that in 1915 the
Central Powers concentrated almost all their efforts at first on the
struggle with the Russian armies.

At the beginning of 1915 the Russians had made considerable
progress in Galicia. They had occupied the most important points
in the Carpathian Mountains, which enabled them to invade Hun-
gary, and on March 22, 1915, they forced the fortress of Przemysl

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 445

to capitulate. But they soon met with a reverse. The Germans
came to the help of the Austrians, and in May, thanks to their
enormous superiority in munitions and artillery, the armies of the
Central Powers were able to break through the strong Russian posi-
tions on the Dunajec. The Russians had to retreat eastward in
hasty marches, and give up not only a large part of Galicia, but
also the passes in the Carpathians. Soon afterwards, on June 3,
Przemysl was reconquered by the Germans, and on June 22, Lem-
berg also. It was not long before the Russians, who had hitherto
been conducting an offensive war, now had to defend their own ter-
ritory. The Central Powers opened a concentric attack from the
north and the south on Poland, and the Russians had to abandon
enormous areas. On August 5, Warsaw and the fortress of Ivan-
gorod fell into the hands of the Central Powers. This was followed
by the fall of fortresses further east, like Novo Georgievsk and
Grodno, on September 2. The German- Austrian advance lasted till
the end of September, and won for the Central Powers a territory
half as large as Germany itself.

This was a great military success, and yet it had failed in its
main purpose. The Russian army was neither destroyed nor even
demoralized. It had been able to retreat in good order, and by
continual and often successful counter-attacks, which however were
seldom sustained, it gave evidence that it had not lost its power of
fighting. The war on the Eastern Front was by no means ended,
and a change might take place at any moment. The Russians now
made several changes in command: on September 8, the Tsar per-
sonally took over the supreme command, with General Alexeiev as
chief-of-staff. However, the Germans were now in a position to
withdraw a considerable part of their troops from the Russian theater
of war and despatch them to Serbia.

The Austrians had hitherto been unable to get the slightest con-
trol over the Serbs. It was the Serbs, rather than the Austrians,
who had hitherto been assuming the offensive. Now a change took
place. The Central Powers now undertook a great concentric attack
upon Serbia, whose destruction had been Austria's original purpose
in going to war. In carrying out this operation Turkey's precarious
position was a great advantage to the Central Powers. An attack
upon Serbia could only be carried out easily in case Bulgaria, which
had come out of the Second Balkan War severely reduced in power,
joined in the movement. The Central Powers were now able to com-
pel the Sultan to make concessions to Bulgaria which were sufficient
to entice the cabinet at Sofia to join their coalition. On July 22,

446 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

1915, a preliminary agreement was signed in Constantinople, giving
Bulgaria Turkish territory which included the whole length of the
Dedeagatsch railway and uninterrupted communications with the
^Egean Sea. Thereupon, on September 19, the Bulgarian govern-
ment ordered general mobilization, and though the Bulgarian dec-
laration of war was dated October 14, the Bulgarian army began
to invade Serbia on October n, — at about the same time the Aus-
trians and Germans began their attack on the north.

This sealed Serbia's fate during the following months. A request
for help from Greece based on the Balkan Alliance (see p. 419) was
refused on October 12. The Allies, however, did not leave the little
country wholly in the lurch. On October 5, an Anglo-French expe-
ditionary force, under Generals Sarrail and Mahon had landed on
Greek territory at Salonica upon the invitation of the Greek prime
minister, Venizelos, though not upon that of the Greek government
as such. This expeditionary force pushed as far north as Nish, but
it came too late and was too weak to prevent Serbia's downfall.
The Germans and the Austrians, and still more the Bulgarians,
pressed forward so rapidly that by the middle of November more
than half of Serbia was in the enemy's hands. On November 25,
the Serbian government had to retire to Scutari in Albania, and
it was followed a few days later by the whole Serbian army. The
German government then, on November 28, declared the Balkan
campaign officially at an end, and their assertion was scarcely an
exaggeration. All Serbia was occupied by enemy troops. The rem-
nants of the Serbian army had been transported to Corfu, and the
Anglo-French expeditionary force was compelled to retreat to
Salonica. The occupation of Montenegro, also, was merely a ques-
tion matter of a few weeks: Cettinje was occupied by the Aus-
trians on January 13, 1916, and Scutari ten days later. Thanks to
Bulgaria's joining the Central Powers, safer communications with
Turkey were also now restored and continued until the fall of 1918.

But still the war in the Balkans could not be regarded as wholly
ended. The Allies established themselves in a strong position at
Salonica, which was regarded as impregnable owing to reinforce-
ments received by sea; and so not only was Greece kept from the
enemy's influence, but the communications between Berlin and Con-
stantinople were continually in danger of being threatened, depend-
ing on the changes in the general military situation which might
take place. At first, however, there was no immediate danger of this.

The Allies had perceived that the war might be materially short-
ened if they could succeed in getting Constantinople into their con-

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 447

trol. This would restore communications with Russia by way of
the Dardanelles and cut off the possibility of a Turkish attack
against Egypt. Accordingly, in the spring of 1915, a great Anglo-
French expedition was undertaken. First, while the troops were
on their way to the east, an attempt was made to force the Straits
by a naval attack; but on March 18 this failed completely, and
caused the loss of one French and two British warships. About
a month later, on April 25-26, the land attack began, but was
scarcely more successful. To be sure, the Allies succeeded in dis-
embarking their troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula; but the place
had been put into such a good state of defence by the enemy that
the landing parties, in spite of the bravery with which they fought
and the bloody losses which they sustained, were unable to make
any serious advance, and had to resort to the same system of sta-
tionary trench warfare as on the Western Front. Even the landing
of a second army on August 6 did not improve the situation. So,
at the close of 1915, the Allies were compelled to abandon the
expedition as hopeless. Between December 8 and January 8 their
troops evacuated the Gallipoli Peninsula without disturbance from
the Turks. Thenceforth, and until the end of the war, Constan-
tinople remained unthreatened by military operations, with the ex-
ception of attacks from airships.

Though the Turks at Gallipoli had given another evidence of their
tenacity in holding defensive positions, they could not win any
greater success on the offensive than during the Balkan Wars, in
spite of the fact that they were supported by German officers and
soldiers. Four times between February and August, 1915, they had
attempted to attack the Suez Canal; but each time their efforts
had collapsed miserably. Turkey's main purpose in entering the
war was thus definitely thwarted, and from 1915 onwards it was
not the British but the Turks who had to stand on the defensive
in Egypt and Arabia. In Mesopotamia, where the English had
begun operations at the end of 1914 by occupying Basra on
November 2 1, this was also true, although the Turks won a number
of considerable successes in their defensive action. The British
expeditionary force which had pushed up the Tigris toward Bagdad
was beaten on November 24, 1915, south of the ancient city of
Ctesiphon, and forced to retreat to Kut-el-Amara, owing, it seems,
mainly to the fact that the communications to the rear had not been
properly attended to. Here at Kut-el-Amara the British were shut
in by the Turks, and as reinforcements could not be sent in time
they were forced to surrender on April 29, 1916.

448 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

This Turkish success, however, was of only momentary impor-
tance. It simply taught the British that they could do nothing
against the Turks by mere raids and improvised attacks; and since
it was easy for them to rectify their mistake, there was no doubt
as to the ultimate outcome here also, if the war only lasted long
enough.

Thus the year 1915 had brought the Central Powers, with the
exception of the Russian and Serbian regions, merely defensive suc-
cesses. This was the period in which the Entente Powers made up
for the munitions which they lacked in 1914 and prepared the scien-
tific equipment for future achievements. The most important step
in this direction came at the end of the year on December 28, when
the British government decided to introduce universal military
service in England and Scotland — a decision which at first, on
February 10, affected merely unmarried men, but a few months
later, on May 25, was extended to married men also.

In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, it fell to Germany to
take the initiative in an attack on the Western Front. Germany
appears to have perceived at this time the dangers which lay in a
prolongation of the war. Although a successful military undertak-
ing could no longer break the superiority of the enemy, the Germans
at least wanted to try whether, by breaking through on the French
front, they might not cause among the peoples of the Entente coun-
tries an illusion of possible defeat. Before the English law for universal
military service had accomplished its purpose, the German army on
February 21, 1916, began a tremendous attack upon the fortress
of Verdun, one of the points in the row of fortresses which, from
the outset, they had been unable to take. They secured some initial
successes in this attack which was made with unexpected force; but
they could not capture either the city or the fortress, although they
continued their attacks with extraordinarily large losses until July i.
They were not even able to hold some of the outer forts which they
had conquered at first; some of these fell into the hands of the
French again during the summer, and the rest were won back by a
French counter-offensive in the fall, the operations ending on No-
vember 4, 1916. Before this counter-attack took place, the British
and French on their side began a great attempt on July i to break
through the German positions on the Somme. This also failed of
its purpose, though it cost very heavy losses. To be sure, the Ger-
mans were driven back a considerable distance, but their front was
not broken and the Allies did not even succeed in capturing

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 449

Bapaume or Peronnes, and their sacrifices were out of all propor-
tion to their gains.

The Battle of the Somme brought into action for the first time
new engines of warfare which were characteristic of the new inten-
sive attention which English and French scientists were giving to
inventions for military purposes. These were the new armored cars,
known as "tanks," invented by an Englishman, and modeled on
American motor tractors; they were equipped so as to overcome
all obstacles like trenches and barbed wire. Though containing
many defects at first, they soon proved extraordinarily useful, in
fact indispensable; and they were all the more serviceable to the
Entente, inasmuch as the armies of the Central Powers were not
able to oppose them with any equivalent force. In general, the
year 1916 marks a turning point, because the Allies began to out-
match the enemy in practically all the fields of military technique,
beside branches in which they had had more or less of an advantage,
as in the case of the French field artillery; they had now caught
up with, or even surpassed, the Germans everywhere, as for example,
in aviation, in which the Germans had originally shown technical
superiority In the same way, there had been an increase in the
production of munitions by the Allies.

The Austrian offensive in the southern Tyrol in May, 1916, had
turned out as unfortunately as the attack on Verdun. The Aus-
trians, to be sure, had at first won some initial successes; but soon
afterwards, on June 12, they had to retreat, and the little towns
of Asiago and Arsiero, which they had captured, were again occu-
pied by the Italians on June 25 and 27. The Italians were then
able, on their side, to undertake a successful offensive, and on
August 8 captured Gorizia, the first large town to fall into their
hands. Here also the year 1916 closed with a gain for the Allies,
although it was not a very large one.

More varying and more dramatic were the events which were
taking place on the Eastern Front. The first months of the year
went by fairly quietly, the most important achievements of the
Russians being some advances in the Caucasus and in Persia. But
on June 4 the new commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in the
south, General Brussilov, began a great offensive against the Aus-
trian positions in the Ukraine and in Bukovina. At first the
Russians were completely successful; they crushed the Austrians
near Luzsk, won victories on the Strypa, and on June 17 captured
Czernowitz. Almost the whole of Bukovina was conquered. But

450 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

while the southern offensive had developed so successfully, further
north, near Kovel and Baranowitschi, the Russians came upon Ger-
man troops which had been sent to help the Austrians and their
advance was brought to a standstill in the second half of June.
This reacted on the southern sector, so that there, also, the Rus-
sians were unable to make further progress; however, the campaign
closed with a decided balance in Russia's favor.

The Russians appeared to have won a still more important ad-
vantage by their offensive, inasmuch as Rumania, after long hesi-
tation, finally declared war on Austria on October 27, 1916. But
this step, which was due chiefly to the consideration that the
Wallachian Kingdom could only successfully lay claim to the Ru-
manians in Austria-Hungary in case she took part in overthrowing
the Dual Monarchy, soon turned out to be a source of embarrass-
ment to the Allies. Rumania was not at all prepared for a war
with the great military Powers, and after a few easy victories, due
to her surprise attack, she was quickly defeated. The combined
German, Austrian and Bulgarian forces speedily occupied all of
Wallachia, and between September, 1916, and January, 1917, drove
the remnants of the Rumanian army back into Moldavia, so that
the economically valuable part of Rumania, with its supplies of
grain and oil, fell into the hands of the Central Powers. So Ru-
mania's entrance into the war turned out most unexpectedly to the
advantage of the enemy.

The year 1916 is also noteworthy for the only important naval
battle which took place.

The German navy was unable to force the British fleet to fight,
because the latter held itself in reserve in a safe harbor. In spite
of this, the Germans attempted to weaken it by destroying smaller
British naval detachments wherever possible. An opportunity of
this kind seemed to have come on May 31, 1916. The German
High Seas Fleet happened upon a detachment of battle cruisers under
Admiral Beatty, near the Skagerrak, west of Jutland. The consid-
erably weaker British force held out successfully until the main
British fleet could come up; when this began to take part in the
battle, the Germans withdrew, and, thanks to darkness and fog,
suffered only relatively small losses.

Judged by its results, this naval battle was perhaps the greatest
victory of the whole war. Henceforth, the German High Seas Fleet
disappeared from the seas, and the memory of the superiority of the
British navy made such a lasting impression on the Germans who
took part in the battle that the desperate attempt at the very end

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 451

of the war to send the German fleet out again, which meant sending
it to certain destruction, is supposed to have given the signal for
the German Revolution of November 3, 1918.

At the close of the year 1916 the Central Powers regarded it as
necessary to revive the spirits of their own people and at the same
time to strengthen the "defeatist" movement among their enemies.
On December 12, 1916, the German chancellor made a peace offer
expressed in extremely indefinite terms and in a victorious tone.
The offer did not meet with the slightest success in the Entente coun-
tries ; at home in Germany it may, perhaps, have materially strength-
ened the "determination to hold out," especially after the Allies
made known their conditions; these, in general, were less severe
than those which the Central Powers were finally compelled to accept
in 1919. The Germans never made a specific statement of their
peace terms, although the President of the United States, who was
supposed to have offered mediation originally at Germany's request,
sought to secure such a statement from them in his note of Dec-
ember 1 8. The reason for this evidently lay in the fact that the
announcement of terms which could be discussed would have
destroyed the* illusions of the German people concerning the mili-
tary situation; furthermore, the formulation of "reasonable" terms,
meaning by this terms which accorded with the actual strength of
the two sides at the time, appears to have been made difficult by
the fact that the German government was dependent upon the great
manufacturers, who wanted annexations of territory. At any rate,
up to the end of the war, the German authorities never completely
renounced Belgium, although this was demanded by the Entente as
the first condition of peace.

The year 1917 also brought no essential changes of importance
on the Western Front, in spite of the enormous efforts made. The
most notable event was the German evacuation of their positions on
the Somme in March and April, in order to evade a new attack by
the French and the British. But the later Allied attacks in the
West made no essential improvement in the Allied front line, al-
though the French conquered a number of long contested positions
by the end of the year.

It was again in the East that the great change took place during
this year.

The partial success of Brussilov's offensive had left a feeling of
deep depression in Russia. The Liberals were disillusioned in their
hopes as to the political situation both at home and abroad. They
had expected that the war would free them from the "German

452 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

yoke" and from the autocracy which had propped itself up on the
dread with which Germany was regarded; but, up to this time, they
had not been freed of either the one or the other. The government
had not known how to conduct the war successfully, nor had it
undertaken political reforms such as the Liberals wished. In fact,
many people believed that the pro- German court party in Russia
did not want any real victory over Germany at all. The conflict
became acute when the government refused to make any conces-
sions to the Duma, which it had been forced to call together on
February 27, 1917. On March 3 popular insurrections took place
in Petrograd, and as the Tsarist government was unwilling to give
way and even declared the dissolution of the Duma on March n,
a regular revolt broke out. As the Petrograd garrison at once took
the side of the revolutionists, the Opposition had easy sailing.
Within twenty-four hours, on March 12, the Tsarist regime was
overthrown, the ministers were arrested, and a Workman's and
Soldier's Council, or Soviet, was established. On March 14 there
followed the establishment of a regular provisional government under
the presidency of Prince Lvov, who belonged to the progressive
party, and who represented democratic parliamentary views. On
the next day, March 15, the revolutionists succeeded in compelling
the Tsar, Nicholas II, to abdicate.

From the outset and even before the revolution, there had existed
within the Russian Opposition two tendencies which were sharply
opposed to one another: on the one side, a group of intellectuals,
democrats, and idealists; and, on the other, the representatives of
the masses, who had abandoned democratic ideals and adopted
Socialist-revolutionary theories. Owing to the great concessions
made to the Liberals, as well as to extraordinarily tolerant admin-
istration and legislation, the gulf between these two parties was at
first bridged. Capital punishment was abolished, military courts
were done away with, and all exiles were permitted to return. The
Finnish constitution was ratified and the Poles were promised com-
plete independence. All restrictive regulations against oppressed
nationalities and religions were revoked, and universal suffrage, in-
cluding woman's suffrage, was introduced. A wholly new Russia
was supposed to have arisen which would not only put an end to
the Tsarist police regime at home but would also conduct with holy
zeal a patriotic war abroad.

Before any further account of this Russian revolution is given,
it is necessary to note the consequences which the overthrow of
Tsardom had in foreign countries.

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 453

If one considers the feeling of political solidarity which had
hitherto bound together the three Eastern Empires it is easy to
understand what an impression was made everywhere by the dis-
appearance of one of these empires from the absolutistic circle. The
German government at once felt compelled to promise to grant to
its own subjects the demands which had long been made by the
Opposition for a reform of the Prussian "three-class system of vot-
ing" and for other similar modifications of the existing regime.
More important than these proclamations, which remained without
effect, was the influence which the Russian revolution had upon
the policy of the United States.

The United States was the first country to recognize the new
Russian Republic — on March 22. This had a symbolic importance.
The fall of Tsardom put an end to one great obstacle which had
hitherto stood in the way of America's eventually joining the Allies.
American democracy (one may perhaps argue) would never have
joined a coalition which included Tsarist Russia among its mem-
bers. But now this was all changed, and the way was open for
the possibility of an alliance, at the very moment when America
had to face the question whether it would enter the war or not.

The United States had always represented the view that a
blockade-war did not justify any belligerent in disregarding the
rules of humanity and international law in regard to neutrals.
America, which had put into practice so eagerly the idea of inter-
national arbitration, and had already brought about a peaceful union
of all the American states, was of the view, and not unjustly, that
all such pacifist agreements were worthless if they could be ignored
in time of war. And it accorded with their principles and their
practice to prevent, above all things, any infringements of the law
which endangered not only property but also human life. Therefore
the United States, as the most powerful neutral, had issued warn-
ings, even to the Entente Powers, against acting contrary to inter-
national agreements, such as the agreements in regard to sending of
mail matter; but she adopted a much sharper tone toward the
Powers which were guilty of inhuman acts against her own citizens.
Most important among these acts was the campaign against mer-
chant ships by German submarines, which often paid no heed to
the rules prescribed for the protection of passengers and crews, and
even sank ships without giving the passengers any warning. It
now happened that a case of this kind involved a considerable num-
ber of American citizens. On May 7, 1915, the great English
passenger ship Lusitania, which was going from New York to Eng*

454 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

land, was torpedoed off the Irish coast by a German submarine.
A hundred and twenty-four Americans lost their lives. This led
to a sharp exchange of notes between Washington and Berlin, May
15-31, 1915. Without reaching any definite result, it still appeared
that the German military authorities would henceforth pay some-
what more attention to the rights of neutrals on the seas. But the
discussion lasted further. It was also complicated by the fact that
the Entente had begun to arm a large number of merchant ships
against submarine attack, and Germany requested that she be al-
lowed to sink such vessels, at least, without warning. In the midst
of these discussions, in which public opinion in America was by
no means unanimous on one side or the other — for the old sharp
anti-English feeling still existed — a new incident occurred which
gave the dispute another aspect. On March 24, 1916, the French
unarmed passenger ship Sttssex, on which there were several Ameri-
cans, was torpedoed by a German submarine in the English Chan-
nel. The American government thereupon sent an energetic note
to Berlin; when it received a merely evasive answer in regard to
the Sussex, it despatched still another note which had almost the
character of an ultimatum. This time public opinion in America
was much more unanimous, and the note took a much more ener-
getic tone than the previous ones, little as the President and Con-
gress betrayed any desire to enter the war. The German govern-
ment now realized the seriousness of the situation and promised in
its note of May 4 not to sink without warning any more merchant
ships in the future.

This side-tracked the dispute for the moment, but did not really
settle it. Germany, for instance, emphasized at the end of her note
that she reserved full freedom of action for herself in case the United
States was not able to compel Great Britain also to observe the rules
of international law. President Wilson, on the other hand, in his last
answer, insisted that the promise of the German government could
not be made dependent on conditions of this kind.

Such was the situation, when the German government, in the fol-
lowing year, on January 31, 1917, issued an official statement to all
neutrals that henceforth it intended to conduct an unrestricted sub-
marine campaign against merchant ships. All merchant ships, even
though neutral, which were found in the war zone, which included
the seas around Great Britain, France, and Italy and the Eastern
Mediterranean, were to be torpedoed by German submarines without
warning.

This decision was a desperate attempt, by means of a famine

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 455

blockade, to bring to a successful end for the Germans the war
which they had not been able to win with their armies; above all
else, it was an attempt to compel England, which could not be
attacked by armies, to make a premature peace. The submarine
weapon was not wholly without prospects of success; but it was an
extraordinarily dangerous weapon, and its adoption was due to the
feeling prevailing at German Headquarters since 1915, that any
chances must be taken. On the basis of President Wilson's previous
notes, Germany had to reckon with the danger that the United
States also would now intervene in the war. Furthermore, a num-
ber of other neutral states, from which the Germans had hitherto
been able to import goods to make up for their deficiency in raw
materials and food, would suffer such economic injury that further
assistance from these sources would necessarily be limited. Finally,
the world's supply of means of transport and of wares of which the
Central Powers would be in the greatest need, .even in case of vic-
tory, would be seriously diminished by this submarine warfare; and
so the economic misery at the close of the war would be increased, a
misery from which an over-populated country like Germany would
necessarily suffer most severely.

But all these considerations were thrown to the winds. This was
partly due to the wholly false estimates made by the German Navy
Department, which again underestimated the enemy's power of re-
sistance and inventive cleverness in devising means to meet the
submarine danger.

America's answer was not slow in coming. It was on February
i, 1917, that the unrestricted submarine campaign was to begin;
on February 3 the United States broke off diplomatic relations with
Germany, and on the next day urged other neutral states to do
likewise. This did not yet amount to war, and the other neutral
states, so far as they followed America's request at all, were slow
in acting upon it; Brazil, for instance, did not break off diplomatic
relations with Germany until April 9. But the United States might
take the final step at any moment.

It was at this point that the Russian Revolution became an
influence in giving a decisive turn to events. Even as late as 1916
America had still been disinclined to take part in the war. Presi-
dent Wilson, who had formerly been a professor of political science
and was a typical idealist representing the idea of law in interna-
tional relations, was a member of the Democratic Party, which
included the pacifistic lesser bourgeoisie; he had been reflected in
November, 1916, partly because he had been regarded as being the

456 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

candidate of the peace party. From a financial point of view, every
argument was against entering the war; it was certain that the
American government would have to assume an enormous burden
of taxes, as the English and Italians had already done, in case it
waged a war for which it had made so little preparation; and these
taxes, which would not be compensated by any economic profits,
would appear all the more burdensome, because the United States,
from the very beginning, had renounced all conquests and even in-
demnities. The consideration which drove America to war, there-
fore, was similar to that in the case of England: it was a question
of securing for the future that development toward a peaceful rela-
tion among nations, for which America had already begun so suc-
cessfully to pave the way, — a relation which was not based upon
threats of war and armaments, universal military service, the build-
ing of fortresses and so forth, but which would relieve the United
States of the necessity of "militarizing" herself for defence against
a European Power. Germany's announcement of unrestricted sub-
marine warfare now seemed to show that here was a Power which
would disregard its promises to other states just as inconsiderately
as it overstepped humanitarian provisions in favor of neutrals in
case of military necessity; an indication of this had recently been
given by the German intrigues in Mexico against the United States.
In addition to these influences, as has been said, came the fact that
Russia had now become one of the free peoples; on April 5 the
Congress of the United States declared war on Germany.

America's entrance into the war could not exercise an influence
upon military events in Europe at once, except so far as the supply-
ing of American munitions to the Entente countries had to be lim-
ited. But from the outset it had an immense "moral" effect: new
reserves in man-power and money now stood at the disposal of the
Allies; a new power had joined them which could not, under any
circumstances, be forced to give in by a country like Germany, which
was lacking in sea power. The Americans also made it a matter
of honor, when they were once in the war, to carry it on as vigor-
ously as possible, and they improvised an army and navy with
enormous energy.

Their achievements were all the more significant inasmuch as the
unrestricted submarine campaign turned out to be a complete
failure. At first, to be sure, there was a considerable increase in the
number of ships sunk. Great Britain was also compelled to do what
the Central Powers had done long before — to limit the consumption
of food and finally on February 25, 1918, to adopt a system of

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 457

rationing it. But in England there was never any food shortage
which could be compared with the privation in Germany and Aus-
tria, though even this was without great effect on the armies of the
Central Powers. Furthermore, means of defense against submarines,
like depth bombs and the throwing of artificial smoke screens about
vessels, were discovered, which materially lessened their activity.
The submarines also proved totally ineffective against ships of war.
And of the numerous transports which brought the American troops
to Europe, not a single one was sunk; nor were the communica-
tions between England and France broken. As an offset to America's
entrance into the war, therefore, Germany had risked a venture
which proved worthless.

Furthermore, the "moral," and also the actual, support of the
United States came to the aid of the Allies at a moment when they
were more in need of this support than ever, if the war was not to
be indefinitely prolonged. The Russian situation had taken a very
different turn from that which the Liberal Opposition had expected.
At first, to be sure, events had moved in the main as the Intellectuals
had anticipated. They succeeded, on May 5, 1917, in getting a vote
of confidence for the Provisional Government from the Work-
men's and Soldiers' Councils; and when a Socialist, Kerensky, be-
came prime minister on July 22, it might have been hoped that the
Extreme Left would support the government thenceforth. The revo-
lutionists also managed, between July i and 13, to begin a great
offensive in Eastern Galicia, which promised much. But at this
moment the military power of Russia collapsed at home.

For a considerable time there had existed within the Russian
Social Democratic Party a radical left wing, known as the Bolsheviki
or Maximalists, who had abandoned the Marxian doctrine that the "1
proletariat nught_tp_ get coritflfl over thgj^atp fry pfiac^ui means.
The Bolsheviki represented the principle that nothing but a revo-
lution could bring the rule into the hands of the workingmen, and
also that the future state ought not to be organized on a democratic
basis, but that political rights should be reserved for the property-
less classes. The advocates of these views had been banished from
Russia under the Tsarist regime. The most notable among them
was a landowner's son named Ulianov, who came to be called Lenin,
apparently because of his residence in Siberia near the river Lena;
during almost the whole period of the war, Lenin had been living
in Switzerland, and latterly at Zurich. The Provisional Govern-
ment now opened to these exiles an opportunity to return to Russia ;
with the aid of the German government, which gladly put at the

458 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

disposal of the Russian revolutionists a "sealed" train for crossing
German territory, thus preventing them from coming into any con-
tact with the German population and especially with the German
Socialists, all these Bolshevist leaders succeeded in getting back to
Russia. Lenin himself arrived at Petrograd on April 16, 1917.
Scarcely had they reached Russia when they began an extraor-
dinarily active propaganda in favor of their ideals, not only among
the people of Russia itself, but in the armies, where the government
let them have a free hand.

The thing which was of decisive importance was that they were
able to appeal to the feelings of the peasants as well as of the in-
dustrial workingmen. To the peasants who would follow them they
held out the prospect not only of an end of military service, but
also of a division of the great landed estates, for which prepara-
tions had been made by the Tsarist government itself, but which
could only have been wholly accomplished after a considerable time.

It is no wonder that these enticing arguments found a hearing
among the masses who, through the prohibition of alcohol, had been
deprived of their most effective means of forgetting their present
misery through pleasant illusions, for a few hours at any rate.
The discipline in the Russian army collapsed. Many of the peas-
ants deserted their regiments and returned home. The Russian mili-
tary advance, which had begun so successfully, was changed on
July 2 1 into a retreat which resembled a flight. All attempts of the
government to stop the movement proved fruitless; neither the ap-
pointment of the minister of war, Kerensky, as prime minister, nor
the orders to arrest Lenin, Trotzky — whose real name was Bronstein
— and their companions, were able to accomplish anything. Even the
appeals of "the old guard" Socialist leaders, like Plechanov, remained
unheeded. The Provisional Government finally had no support ex-
cept from the troops in Petrograd, and on November 7, 1917, even
this force was overthrown by a coup d'etat of the Bolsheviki, who
made use of naval troops. Kerensky and the Provisional Govern-
ment disappeared; their place was taken by the "People's Com-
missaries," Lenin and Trotzky, representing the Bolsheviki. A
counter move by Kerensky on November 13 resulted in failure at
Tsarskoe Selo.

It is not possible at this point to discuss the Russian situation,
which has not yet reached the end of its development; the later
course of the Bolshevist movement in Russia must therefore be
passed over here. But the Petrograd coup d'etat affected the whole
military situation, and some account of this must now be given.

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 459

The Bolshevist People's Commissaries, upon coming to power,
opened negotiations with the Central Powers in order to secure a
truce and negotiate a peace. They declared as their conditions: no
annexations, no indemnities, and the self-determination of peoples.
The Central Powers accepted these conditions, and, on December
15, a separate truce was signed at Brest-Litovsk between Soviet
Russia and the Central Empires. Shortly after that, on December
22, peace negotiations were opened.

The peace negotiations were extraordinarily slow, chiefly because
the German delegates did not hold to the conditions which they had
accepted, but had in view open and secret annexations of Russian
territory of enormous extent, without consulting the populations in
any way. As the Bolshevists had destroyed the Russian army,
they could no longer make any resistance to the enemy's demands;
and so finally, on February 24, 1918, they were compelled to accept
the German conditions, after Germany had already, on February 9,
concluded a separate peace with the Ukraine. The treaty of peace
itself was signed on March 3; but before this, as the truce had
already terminated, the Germans had again begun their advance,
and had occupied Kiev and Narva. The treaty of peace naturally
made Rumania's military position untenable; so this country also
had to sign a preliminary treaty on March 5, shortly after the con-
clusion of the treaty with Russia, and on May 7 consented to a
final peace treaty at Bucharest. This provided for considerable ces-
sions of territory to Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Central Powers in
general, and also converted Rumania into an economic vassal of
Germany by a petroleum monopoly and so forth. The only com-
pensation which Rumania received was that she was given a free
hand in Bessarabia, which had hitherto belonged to Russia.

It is easy to understand that this withdrawal of Russia from the
ranks of the Entente caused a deep depression among her former
allies — all the more so, as it was easy to see that the Central Powers
would now be able to throw against the Western Front all the mili-
tary forces which were set free by Russia's desertion. That no
"defeatist" collapse took place, in spite of this, is due to the fact,
aside from the general reasons already mentioned, that America's
help seemed to make up for the loss of the Russian armies. It was
also due to the manner in which the peace negotiations at Brest-
Litovsk had been carried on by the Germans and to the contents of
the treaties themselves, which destroyed every hope of reaching an
acceptable peace. The German government perhaps never made a
greater political mistake in the course of the whole war than it did

460 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

in imposing on Russia, in contradiction with the conditions at first
agreed upon, a treaty which involved such enormous sacrifices of
territory and such oppressive economic clauses as did the treaty of
Brest-Litovsk. The peoples in the Entente countries, even those
who held "defeatist" views, now perceived what they would have to
expect if they laid down their arms merely in return for general
promises ; from this moment onwards, the idea of a premature peace
was no longer discussed.

The harm which the Germans had done to themselves could never
be counteracted, no matter how great were their military efforts; the
Entente, which might suffer military reverses at some points, but
which could not be overcome, was now more invincible than ever.
However, it chanced that the great offensive which the German
General Staff undertook against the Anglo-French positions on the
Western Front with the aid of the troops withdrawn from Russia
failed. The Germans, to be sure, secured a number of very consid-
erable initial successes. They forced the English contingent in the
St. Quentin sector to give way, and for a moment, on March 21,
1918, and the following days, it seemed as if they were going to be
able to break the connection between the English and French
troops. The French, also, had to withdraw and give up Noyon
and other places. But this very disaster resulted in the accomplish-
ment of a reform which had long been necessary in the Allied armies,
but to which the English had hitherto been steadily opposed: the
Western Front was finally put under the command of a single per-
son; General Foch, who had distinguished himself in the Battle of
the Marne, and who had been commanding the French armies since
May 15, 1917, was now, on March 26, 1918, made commander-m-
chief of all the forces of the Allies in France. To be sure, this was
far from stopping the German advance; but it did hinder local
reverses from developing into a disaster along the whole front, such
as had almost been the case in March.

The German offensive lasted until the middle of July. It often
met with obstinate and even successful resistance; but in the end
the German attack almost always resulted in a gain of ground.
Many towns and positions which had come to be regarded as defi-
nitely in the possession of the Allies were reconquered by the
enemy. The Germans even succeeded for a second time in advanc-
ing to the Marne, and on July 15 in crossing it in several places.
But here the fortune of war changed. On July 18, the French and
the Americans undertook a great offensive between Chateau-Thierry
and Soissons, and drove the enemy systematically back. Not only

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 461

on the Marne, but also further north near Albert, the Germans
began a general retreat which lasted till August 4.

Guided by the sure hand of Marshal Foch, who had borne this
title since August 6, there now followed a systematic advance of
French, British and American troops, which drove the Germans out
of one position after another, in spite of their obstinate resistance.
By the beginning of September they had been driven back to the
line from which they had begun their offensive in March.

The Allies soon pressed forward still further. The American
troops, which, in view of the critical position in the spring of 1918,
had been transported to Europe in great numbers, made the first
attack since 1914 which turned out successfully against a strongly-
held front position: on September 12-13 they captured the salient of
St. Mihiel near Verdun.

The German army was not yet broken in organization. The sol-
diers still did their duty as conscientiously as ever, and the with-
drawal movements took place in a wholly orderly fashion. But it
may be surmised that the disastrous result of the last great offen-
sive, which they had hoped would end the war, aroused among the
troops a stronger and stronger conviction of the invincibility of the
Allies and consequently a certain discouragement. The lack in raw
materials for manufacturing munitions, at a time when their former
capture of booty had now been changed into severe losses in their
own guns, may also have led them to see the serious inferiority of
their own military leaders. Nevertheless, the Germans still had an
army which was able to threaten the Allies with a war of despera-
tion for a relatively long time.

Whoever thought this, however, had overlooked the fact that Ger-
many was only one link, though the strongest, in a coalition, and
that meanwhile this coalition had completely collapsed.

In order to understand this, it is necessary to go back a little in
the history of the other theaters of war.

The establishment of the Allied expeditionary corps in Salonica
(see p. 446) had turned out to be an excellent speculation. After
the Allies had interfered in Greece, they secured control of the
Greek fleet, and finally, on June n, 1917, compelled King Con-
stantine, who had been an out and out adherent of the pro-German
policy of neutrality, to leave the country along with the heir to the
throne. The Allies thus had at their disposal a territory in their rear
which they could trust, and which was now under the direction of the
friendly Venizelos, who had become prime minister again on June
26, 1917. Even before these events had taken place, the Allied

462 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

troops, in combination with the reorganized Serbian army, had made
an attack against the territory occupied by the Bulgarians; on No-
vember 1 8, 1916, this had resulted in the re-conquest of Monastir,
that is, of a little Serbian soil. They had also succeeded, on
February 18, 1917, in restoring connections with the Italian con-
tingents in Albania, so that Greece was completely cut off from the
Central Powers. Now, when the consequences of the severe defeat
of the Germans in the Second Battle of the Marne began to exercise
a greater influence on the spirits of Germany's allies, the Allied
armies in the Balkans were ready to take the offensive against
Bulgaria. On September 15, 1918, French, Serbian, English and
Greek troops began a combined attack on Bulgaria, which broke
the resistance of the enemy in a few days. The Bulgarians fell back
in disorderly flight and on September 25, ten days after the attack
had begun, they asked for an armistice — the first country in the
coalition of the Central Powers to take this step. Their request was
granted on September 30; and the agreement amounted to an un-
conditional surrender. The Bulgarian army had to lay down its
arms and deliver its prisoners without receiving a reciprocal right
in return; German and Austrian troops and diplomatic representa-
tives were also to be expelled from Bulgaria. Bulgaria thus disap-
peared from the ranks of the belligerents, and threw herself upon
the mercy of the victors, who thereby cut off the connection between
Turkey and the Central Powers. A short time afterwards, on Oc-
tober 4, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who had been responsible in
good part for the policy of his country, abdicated and handed over
the government to his son.

It was now only a question of time before Turkey would be com-
pelled to take the same step. Whereas she had not been able to
defend herself against the enemy, even with German help, now she
was completely lost, as communications with Berlin were no longer
open.

Thanks to their steady methodical work, the British had recov-
ered from their defeat in Mesopotamia and had conquered Palestine
from the Turks. In May, 1916, the English auxiliary corps which
had arrived too late to relieve Kut-el-Amara (see p. 447), began a
long, slow march up the Tigris. The Turks defended themselves
bravely, but were driven out of one position after another. The
British took Kut-el-Amara on February 24, 1917, entered Bagdad
on March n, Samarra on April 23, and Tekrit on November 5;
they also advanced toward the northeast to the frontiers of Persia.
The British expedition on the Euphrates was no less successful;

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 463

here, under the splendid leadership of General Maude, who was
commander-in-chief of the whole Mesopotamian expedition, they
won a decisive victory over the Turks at Ramadieh on September
28, 1917.

However, in the course of 1918, military operations in this region
began to drag. It was in Palestine that the decisive victory over
the Turkish forces was won.

The English first secured control over the desert lying between
Egypt and Palestine by defeating the Turks at Katia on the
Egyptian frontier on April 23, 1916, driving them out of the
region around El Arisch. On December 23, 1916, they captured a
strong Turkish position at Maghara on the Syrian frontier. Then
they began to build a railway across the desert reaching from the
Suez canal to Gaza in Palestine. The Turks had cleverly entrenched
themselves at Gaza and succeeded for some time in beating back
the attacks of the English in the spring of 1917; but General
Allenby, who was entrusted with the command in June, finally
overcame the resistance and captured Gaza for the British on No-
vember 7, 1917. From this point on, the British advance went
forward relatively quickly. Jaffa was captured on November 17,
Jerusalem on December 9, and Jericho on February 21, 1918. Later,
to be sure, the British met with some reverses, but on September
19, 1918, when they succeeded in bringing about a decisive engage-
ment, victory was wholly on their side. They broke through the
Turkish positions on the coast and were able to announce officially
that the Turkish armies were destroyed. Within a few days all
Palestine was in their hands. In this movement, the English had
been supported by forces placed at their disposal by the King of
the Hedjaz; this prince, without doubt as a result of an under-
standing with the British, had revolted against the Turks in June,
1916, founded a kingdom of his own at Mecca, and been recognized
for some time as an independent prince; similarly, in Mesopotamia
an independent Arabian kingdom had been proclaimed, free from
Turkey.

Under these circumstances, even if Bulgaria had not surrendered,
the Turks would have perhaps been compelled to make peace. At
any rate, scarcely a month later, on October 30, 1918, they also
threw themselves upon the mercy of the victorious Allies. They,
likewise, had to surrender all their fortresses, including the Bos-
phorus and the Dardanelles, which had been so long contested and
which had never fallen into an enemy's hands since the fall of the
Byzantine Empire. The Turks had to demobilize their army, hand

464 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

over their war vessels, place their railways under the control of the
Allies, break off all relations with the Central Powers, and expel
all Germans and Austrians from their territory.

Of Germany's three allies, there remained only Austria-Hungary;
but this empire also was near its end.

For a long time the Austrian government had seen more clearly
than the German that a continuation of the war would mean the
downfall of the old system of government, and had sought various
means to prevent this disaster, without, however, being able, up to
the last moment, to bring themselves to sacrifice Austrian territory
to Italy. Germany had always refused her approval, and due to
this as much as to the inadequacy of the Austrian proposals, all
negotiations with Italy had failed.

The fact that the Austrians were unwilling to make any conces-
sions to the Italians was in part owing to the fact that they re-
garded themselves as victors over Italy.

After various Italian attacks had failed of great success in the
course of 1917, the Austrians, supported by German auxiliary troops,
made a great counter-attack in October of this year. Favored, it
is said, by the "defeatist" and Socialist influences which prevailed
in some of the Italian divisions, the Austrians succeeded in a sur-
prisingly short time in breaking through the enemy positions at
Caporetto on October 24, and in pressing forward from here far
into Venetian territory. On October 28 they recaptured Gorizia, on
the 2 Qth occupied Udine, and on November 9 reached the Piave
river. On December 4-6 they also succeeded in advancing in the
neighborhood of Asiago.

Henceforth, the Austrians were mostly able to maintain them-
selves for several months in these conquests, and could thus, like the
Germans, carry on the war in the enemy's country. Various Italian
attacks only succeeded in unimportant front line gains. The Aus-
trians, however, were also just as unable to advance beyond the
front line which they had seized at their first onrush; a great Aus-
trian offensive from the Asiago plateau to the sea, which was
launched on June 15, 1918, had failed completely by June 25. The
Italians at this time had the support of French and British aux-
iliary troops.

This situation, when Austria's confidence in a successful outcome
had been broken by the defeats of the Germans in France, was a
good psychological moment for a new attack by the Allied Powers.
On October 24, therefore, the Allies began a great offensive against
the Austrian positions in the Trentino and on the middle Piave;

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 465

which led, on October 31, after a brave initial resistance of the Aus-
trians, to an Austrian retreat which was like a flight. The Aus-
trians abandoned their positions along the whole front. At the same
time, on November 3, the Italians captured the Austrian naval
forces at Trieste. Nothing remained for Austria to do except to sign
an armistice on November 3, which was equivalent to an uncon-
ditional surrender. She not only had to agree to demobilization,
but had to put all her railways at the free disposal of the
Allied Powers, who thus acquired the right to attack Germany by
way of Austria; all German troops had to be removed from Austria-
Hungary within fourteen days; and Austria had to renounce reci-
procity in regard to the delivery of prisoners and the raising of the
blockade.

While this was happening, the old Austrian government had ceased
to exist. On October 30, an independent Czecho-Slovak state had
been proclaimed at Prague; and on October 31, when the Serbs were
approaching Belgrade and threatening to invade Hungary, the Hun-
garians declared their independence and organized a Hungarian
republic. Soon after this a revolution occurred in Vienna, which
compelled Emperor Charles to abdicate on November 12, and trans-
formed German-Austria into a republic. Thus Austria fell apart
into its national constituent elements. Both the dynasty and the
former German-Magyar dual rule over the Slavic nationalities came
to an end.

So at last it was only the German armies which still stood in the
field, and even these were in a position in which they could only
be saved from disaster by a speedy armistice.

Immediately after the American success at St. Mihiel the German
government had sought to open peace negotiations, and on September
15, 1918, had offered peace conditions to Belgium. But the offer
was naturally rejected, and at the end of the month there began
a vast concentric attack upon the Germans from Ypres, Cambrai,
and the Argonne — a great simultaneous assault at many points on
the front, which prevented the Germans from making any further
use of their advantage of the "inner line" by shifting their more or
less inadequate reserves from one place to another. Under these
circumstances the Allied forces were able to press forward every-
where. On September 27, the English broke through the so-called
"Hindenburg Line" on the Cambrai front, capturing St. Quentin on
October i, Armentieres on October 3, Cambrai on the 9th, and Laon
on the 1 3th. The Allied offensive from the sea-coast could now be
taken up again and resulted in quick successes: Roulers was cap

466 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

tured on October 14, whereupon the Germans began to evacuate the
Belgian coasts north of the city as far east as Ostend; by October
19 the Belgians had occupied all the rest of the coast. They then
took Ghent, while British forces between the Scheldt and the Sambre
pressed forward in the direction of Valenciennes, so that the Ger-
man positions on the Scheldt were threatened. Ludendorff, Quar-
termaster General of the German army, who was generally regarded
as responsible for the German plans of campaign and especially for
the offensive of 1918, had to resign on October 26 — an admission
that his undertaking had failed.

Parallel with these last battles there had been going on for about
a month negotiations toward peace. Five days after Bulgaria's sur-
render, Germany had turned to the President of the United States
with a request for mediation, proposing as a basis President Wilson's
message to Congress of January 8, 1918, as well as his later similar
declarations. The President thereupon demanded, above all things,
that the Germans should put an end to their "illegal and inhuman
practices," like submarine warfare and the systematic devastation
and plundering of the territories which they were evacuating. He
also demanded a change in the German government, so that there
should no longer be any autocratic power which could arbitrarily
disturb the peace of the world. The German government there-
upon promised to give orders to the submarines not to torpedo pas-
senger ships in the future, and in Germany they promised to intro-
duce a parliamentary form of government. The President then laid
the German request for peace before the Allied Powers who replied
on November 6.

The Allied Governments had a difficult decision to make. The
battle on the Sambre, which had begun on November i, had cut the
last important communications between the German troops in the
Ardennes and those in Belgium; and this, together with the tre-
mendous advance of the French in the south, had made the posi-
tions of the Germans so untenable that they had no alternative but
to choose between a hasty retreat back over the German border or
the danger of being surrounded, — a disaster like Sedan only on a
wider scale. If the Allies, in spite of this, entered upon peace nego-
tiations, they would have to renounce the great final military
triumph which could be held up before the eyes of friend and foe
afterwards as the complete defeat of the German military power.

But, on the other hand, since the power of resistance of the Ger-
man armies had not yet been thoroughly broken, there was no deny-

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 467

ing that such a triumph would cost a great sacrifice in human life,
and that such a final act of glory, which was not absolutely neces-
sary, was not worth the blood which would have to be shed for it.
Furthermore, the "Fourteen Points" in President Wilson's message
to Congress of January 8, 1918, which had been accepted by Ger-
many, contained many demands which formed part of the program
of the Allies, like the handing back of Alsace-Lorraine to France,
and the creation of an independent Polish state which should include
all regions occupied by Poles even though they formed part of
Prussia. And even if all the Allies gave up wide-reaching demands
in order to abide by President Wilson's conditions, Germany would
suffer a very essential diminution of her territory, especially in the
east.

Accordingly, the Allies accepted the proposal transmitted by
America, however unpopular it was in many respects. They merely
made as reservations to the Fourteen Points two conditions: that the
demand for the freedom of the seas should not be accepted in the
sense understood by Germany; and that "the restoration of the
evacuated districts" -mentioned by the President should be under-
stood to mean that "Germany had to make compensation for all
damage done to the civil population of the Allies."

The Germans made no objection to these reservations, and on
November 7, 1918, requested an armistice. This was granted to
them on November n.

The armistice conditions, which reflected the actual military situa-
tion, were milder than those in the three armistices which had pre-
ceded. They were, to be sure, an agreement between a victor and
a defeated party, and contained numerous one-sided provisions to
Germany's disadvantage, such as the delivery of prisoners by one
party only, the maintenance of the blockade, the evacuation by Ger-
many of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine, which was
occupied by Allied troops. But no general demobilization of the
German army was insisted upon; of the war material, only a part
had to be handed over, except that all submarines were surrendered ;
of railway stock only so much was to be restored as had been carried
away by the Germans from the occupied territory. An unlimited
right of occupation, such as the Allies had insisted upon in dealing
with the other three defeated countries, was not required of Ger-
many. Naturally German East Africa, which was the only German
colony in which a remnant of German forces had been able to main-
tain itself, was to be evacuated, and the German government was

468 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

to withdraw all its troops from the territories which had formerly
belonged to Russia, and to annul the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and
Bucharest.

At the moment when this armistice was signed, the old German
government was no longer in existence. On November 3 the naval
troops in Kiel had given the signal for revolution, and within a
short time the movement had extended over all Germany. It was
directed not only against the Kaiser, but also against the federated
princes in the German Empire, who were rightly regarded as being
identified with the old system. On November 7 a republic was pro-
claimed in Bavaria; on the gth the Chancellor, Prince Max of
Baden, resigned and the revolutionists announced the abdication of
Emperor William II, who thereupon fled at once to Holland with
the Crown Prince. A Socialist party leader, who under the old
regime would not have been allowed to fill even the lowest position
in the civil service, now became German Chancellor on November 9.
Having reached this point we must halt. What has taken place
since can only be judged when it is known how events have turned
out. It only remains to note briefly the official conclusion of the
war through the treaties of peace.

Naturally, the treaty of peace with Germany was the most im-
portant.

The negotiations met with extraordinary difficulties. The coali-
tion of victors had swollen at the close to a host of about thirty
Countries and their claims collided with one another in many points.
The negotiations, therefore, after March 25, 1919, were carried on
merely by the heads of the four Great Powers, the "Council of
Four," representing Great Britain, France, the United States, and
Italy.

Much more serious and complicated was the question of dealing
with the economic misery into which the war had plunged Europe.

According to President Wilson's Fourteen Points there could be
no question of the victors treating Germany as Germany had treated
France in 1871 (see p. 311) — of demanding complete reparation for
the costs of war together with money gifts to the military
leaders and statesmen of the victorious countries. But even aside
from the Fourteen Points, such a demand could not have been car-
ried out. Germany, to be sure, had suffered much less through the
war than France, Belgium or Serbia; she had no devastated dis-
tricts, nor destroyed factories and mines. But Germany, which was
not rich by nature, had been severely injured in her export trade
by the war, and the finances of the Empire, in which the expendi-

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 469

tures even before the war had reached much too high a figure in
proportion to the real capital in the country, had been completely
ruined by war expenditures; moreover, in order to keep the popu-
lation in good spirits, the government had not dared to impose
appropriate new taxes, as had been done in England and Italy. The
population possessed barely enough money to pay even the current
expenses of the government, to say nothing of making any regular
payments on the war debts. On the other hand, the injured coun-
tries, like France, demanded that the defeated enemy should at
least make good the damages, which often could not be justified on
any military grounds; this was especially the case with France; the
economic advantage which she had enjoyed before the war owing
to her relatively thinly settled population had now been changed
into an economic disadvantage, inasmuch as a million French peas-
ants had fallen and the supply of labor was insufficient. There
were many other economic difficulties, which cannot be taken up
here, such as the lack of marine transportation facilities due to the
submarine warfare, and the abnormally low point to which exchange
in the defeated countries had fallen.

It was natural that under these circumstances the French should
desire compensation in the form of territory, aside from Alsace
which gladly returned to France. All her demands of this kind,
however, always failed on account of the opposition of her allies.
Instead, the conception of the word "restoration" was extended, and
there was placed on Germany the obligation of making yearly repara-
tion payments. It is possible that the settlement of the colonial
question was also regarded as a kind of compensation, in place of
the complete compensation which could not be made in cash. It
was in this matter that those who drew up the treaty of peace de-
parted furthest from President Wilson's program. In order to put
an end to conflicts for the possession of colonies, President Wilson
had desired an impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, having
regard at the same time for the interests of the natives; instead of
this the former German colonies were simply partitioned among the
allies, to be sure in the form of a mandate under the League of
Nations, so that the territories, at least in theory, were to be open
to all nations upon the same terms.

The second reason why the American program, deficient as it was
in many respects, was not completely carried out, lay in the effort
of France to create guarantees for herself against a new attack from
Germany. The experiences which France had had with the German
government before 1914. as well as her conviction that the German

470 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

mentality had not changed since the armistice, resulted in a partial
adoption only of measures which were to secure peaceful intercourse
among nations in the future. Disarmament, to be sure, was imposed
upon Germany, and other states carried through similar measures;
Great Britain, for instance, put an end to her universal military
service; France, on the other hand, which had only unwillingly
adopted the Prussian system of universal military service after 1870,
now clung fast to it in order to have protection against her neighbor.
On the other hand, as a result of American pressure, a League of
Nations was established along with the treaty of peace and as an
integral part of it; this was to take up again the old Russian plan
for a diminution of armaments and to provide for the application
of international means of compulsion against states which rejected
arbitration and proceeded directly to war. For the present, how-
ever, Germany was to be excluded from the League of Nations until
she had given evidence of a changed frame of mind.

In other respects the terms of the treaty of peace do not seriously
diverge from the Fourteen Points, and still less from the earlier
resolutions of the Entente Powers. There is one demand which
was fulfilled almost without exception — the demand that every na-
tionality should acquire its freedom. As applied to Germany, this
meant that not only should Poland acquire the parts which had
belonged formerly to Austria and Russia, as well as the part which
had been taken by Prussia, but also that the Danes in Northern
Schleswig, who had been denied the right of self-determination since
1866, should be allowed to decide to what state they should belong.
President Wilson's program also included the demand for a free
access to the sea for Poland; as the only seaport to be considered,
namely Dantzig, had no large Polish population, a compromise was
arranged by which the town was made into a free state by itself.
Regions where the composition of the population was a matter of
dispute acquired in general the right to vote on their future; thus
the Allies returned to the system of voting by plebiscites which had
been forgotten since 1866.

Hard as these conditions appeared to the Germans — hard mainly
because their concessions were rewarded with scarcely any counter
concessions — there was nothing for the totally defeated state to do
but to accept them. On June 28 the German delegates signed the
treaty in the Hall of Mirrors, at the Palace at Versailles, where the
German Empire had been proclaimed in 1870. Formal ratification
by the Allied Powers took place on January 10, 1920.

For Austria-Hungary the conditions were much severer. She had

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 471

made no stipulations in signing the armistice, and, furthermore, two
of the newly-created states into which the former Dual Monarchy
fell apart — Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia — were the friends of
the Allied Powers. Although in general the boundaries were drawn
in accordance with the lines of nationality, these pro-Ally states
received great concessions in the Treaty of Saint- Germain with
Austria, signed on September 10, 1919. Czecho-Slovakia, for in-
stance, was given the part of Bohemia occupied by Germans. It
was still less in accordance with the principle of nationality to
assign the German Tyrol to Italy, although strategic reasons could
be alleged for doing this. The German part of Austria, which was
now a republic, but which had formed the relatively poorest part
of the monarchy, was not only treated as the legal successor of Old
Austria, because of the predominance of German officials, but the
little state was also forbidden to join itself to Germany. By the
Treaty of the Trianon, of June 4, 1920, peace with Hungary was
worked out along the same lines. It is noteworthy, on the other
hand, that these treaties contain clauses for the protection of racial
minorities: the Powers have the right to prevent the forcible sup-
pression of linguistic groups.

By the Treaty of Neuilly, of November 27, 1919, Bulgaria came
out of the war materially reduced in size, and many districts in the
southern Balkans which were assigned to Serbia are probably pre-
dominantly Bulgarian by race.

Finally, by the Treaty of Sevres, of August 10, 1920, which has
not yet (1922) been ratified, Turkey was destroyed as a Great Power.
She was deprived of control over the Straits. The Sultan, to be
sure, was allowed to continue his residence in Constantinople, but
his military and political authority over the city was taken from
him. Great stretches of the Turkish Empire — Syria, the west coast
of Asia Minor, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia — were freed
from Turkish control, so that the Sultan retained only a modest
empire in the interior of Asia Minor. The expulsion of the Turks
from Europe, which had been the dream of Christianity for nearly
five hundred years, seemed to have been accomplished, and what-
ever may happen in the future to Constantinople, and however the
question of Russia's attitude to the new regime on the Bosphorus
may turn out, the Turkish Empire can never be revived again in its
old form.

It would need another whole volume if, at the close of this sketch,
one should try to give an account of the consequences which the
war has had for Europe and in fact for the whole world. Several

472 ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM

points have been touched upon in the account of the treaties of
peace, but aside from these there is so much more to be told that
no attempt shall here be made to tell it. Moreover, surmises as to
the future do not belong in a historical narrative; only the dilet-
tante and the amateur philosopher of history venture to make
prophecies. Attention, therefore, shall be called to only one point
which has not yet been mentioned, because it could find no place
in the narrative. It concerns the change in agrarian conditions.

That the war resulted in an extension of political rights is not
surprising; nor is it to be wondered at that the appeal for manual
labor, with the temporary shortage in labor supply, resulted in an
improvement in the condition of the workingmen and even in an
extension of political rights to women in many countries. The over-
throw of the three autocratic monarchies in Central and Eastern
Europe had the further natural result that political rights which had
hitherto been in large part a matter of privilege in Western and
Southern Europe were now extended over nearly the whole conti-
nent. But in addition to these changes — and as much in the lands
of the victors as in those of the defeated enemy — there now took
place a change, which has perhaps more deeply modified the struc-
ture of economic life than all the new constitutions and treaties of
peace. The war, and the continued crisis in transportation which
followed the war, have again suddenly recalled to people's minds,
hypnotized for a century by the Industrial Revolution, the funda-
mental importance of agriculture; and at the same time people
have begun to realize the eminent political importance of a system
of agriculture based on small peasant proprietors. Russia took the
first step by dividing up the large landed estates among the culti-
vators of the soil. Since then, one state after another has followed
her example, and even in Prussia, where the problem was perhaps
dealt with most timidly, the political privileges connected with large
landed estates have at least been abolished, and the way is open for
"internal colonization." But in other states, also, where no forcible
interference with private property has taken place, economic power
has shifted into a different set of hands. The large landowner in
England, who even before the war was scarcely able to manage his
estates in the old fashion, has now been compelled in very many
cases through the necessity of the age to sell his estate or allow it
to be divided up. In France, where small peasant proprietors have
strongly prevailed ever since the French Revolution, the new era
is indicated by the fact that the peasants have grown rich in con-
trast to the townspeople, and many estates whirh were formerly in

THE WORLD WAR, 1914-1918 473

the possession of the bourgeoisie have gone over into the hands of
the peasantry. Thus, in most countries, the rural districts have
acquired an economic preponderance over the towns. Though the
progress of science in the nineteenth century ruined agriculture in a
good many places, by making it possible to sell foodstuffs imported
from abroad at a lower price than domestic products, now it appears
that the reverse is about to happen — that agriculture is beginning
to act as a check on industry by setting too high a price on the
indispensable necessaries of life. Thus the problem which arose
from the Industrial Revolution more than a hundred years ago, as
to how to feed cheaply the masses of men necessary for manufac-
turing on a large scale, has now reached a new critical stage; while,
on the other hand, the struggle which the French Revolution began
against the privileges and domination of large landed property has
now for the first time reached a triumphant close in all Europe.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The reference readings cited in the following are selected with a view
to the needs of the student and the convenience of the instructor. The
bibliography is selective and does not claim to be in any sense exhaustive.
Works in foreign languages have purposely been omitted though a large
body of very valuable and in some cases indispensable material has thus
been barred.

The first two chapters require no reference reading because of their
purely introductory character. For the benefit of classes in which the
study of the Nineteenth Century is introduced by a brief survey of the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, a short list of titles on these eras
has been added.

The French Revolution

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History of Europe, I, pp. 414-26,
ch. 15. F. SCHEVILL, Political History of Modern Europe, pp. 343-83.
J. H. ROBINSON and C. A. BEARD, Development of Modern Europe, I,
chs. 9, 12, 13. H. M. STEPHENS, Revolutionary Europe, chs. 2-6. S.
MATTHEWS, The French Revolution to 1815 (1923 ed.). H. E. BOURNE,
Revolutionary Period in Europe, chs. 6-16. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY,

VIII, chs. 5-10, 12-16. L. MADELIN, The French Revolution. R. M.
JOHNSTON, French Revolution. E. LOWELL, Eve of the French Revolution.
F. A. OGG, Economic Development of Modern Europe, pp. 37-42, ch. 4.
J. H. ROSE, Revolutionary and Napoleonic Europe. C. D. HAZEN, French
Revolution and Napoleon, chs. 2-6.

Napoleonic Europe

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, I, ch. 16. F. SCHEVILL, Po-
litical History, pp. 383-418. H. E. BOURNE, Revolutionary Period, chs.
12-16. C. D. HAZEN, French Revolution, chs. 6-10. A. FOURNIER, Na-
poleon I. R. M. JOHNSTON, Napoleon. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY,

IX, chs. 5-7, 13, 17. H. FISHER, Napoleon. G. M. PRIEST, Germany Since
1740, ch. 7. F. SCHEVILL, Making of Modern Germany, Lect. III. A. L.
CROSS, England and Greater Britain, chs. 46-48. J. A. R. MARRIOTT, Re-
making of Modern Europe, chs. 7-11. J. C. ROPES, The First Napoleon.
E. REICH, Foundations of Modern Europe, chs. 4-7.

Chapter III. The New Economic System

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History of Modern Europe, II, ch.
18. C. D. HAZEN, Modern Europe, ch. 15. J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and
Contemporary Europe, ch. 3. C. A. OGG, Economic Development of
Modern Europe, chs. 3, 4, 7-12. H. G. PLUM and G. G. BENJAMIN,
Modern and Contemporary European Civilization, pp. 250-59. A. L. CROSS,

ii BIBLIOGRAPHY

England and Greater Britain, chs. 48-51, 53. G. SLATER, Making of Modern
England, ch. n. F. MARVIN, Century of Hope, chs. 5, 6. C. DAY,
History of Commerce, chs. 29, 35. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, X, chs.
23, 24; XI, ch. i. J. H. ROBINSON and C. A. BEARD, Development of
Modern Europe, II, ch. 18. W. J. ASHLEY, Economic Organization of
England, chs. 7, 8. J. A. HOBSON, Evolution of Modern Capitalism, chs.
I, 5, 16, 17. E. P. CHEYNEY, Industrial and Social History of England,
chs. 7, 8. A. JONES, Industrial Revolution, ch. 4. H. A. GIBBONS, Intro-
duction to World Politics, ch. 2. C. F. S. MASTERMAN, Condition of
England, ch. 7. F. A. OGG, Social Progress in Contemporary Europe, chs.
6-8, 15. A. TOYNBEE, Industrial Revolution. C. A. ELLWOOD, The Social
Problem. C. GIDE and E. REST, Economic Doctrines from the Time of
the Physiocrats. D. H. MACGREGOR, Evolution of Industry. J. A. R.
MARRIOTT, European Commonwealth, ch. 4.

Chapter IV. The Economic Consequences of the French Revolution

Chapter V. The Panic of the French Revolution

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, I, pp. 517-20, 573-76. J. S.
SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, pp. 1-17. F. MARVIN, Cen-
tury of Hope, ch. i. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, VIII, ch. 25, pp. 715-18,
729-31; IX, pp. 148-50, 160-61, 665-72. F. A. OGG, Economic Develop-
ment, chs. 5, 9. F. A. OGG, Social Progress, pp. 35-45, ch. 5, pp. 100-102.
F. A. KIRKPATRICK, Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century,
chs. i, 2, 8. R. M. JOHNSTON, French Revolution, ch. 7. E. REICH,
Foundations of Modern Europe, ch. 8. See also titles under chapter VII.

Chapter VI. Humanitarianism

A. L. CROSS, England and Greater Britian, pp. 903-06. F. MARVIN,
Century of Hope, ch. i. G. SLATER, Making of Modern England, ch. 4.
C. R. FAY, Life and Labour in the Nineteenth Century, ch. 4. F. A.
OGG, Social Progress in Contemporary Europe, chs. 15, 10. D. A. LECKY,
England in the Eighteenth Century, vol. VII, pp. 315-83. A. C. HALL,
Crime and Social Progress, ch. n. J. L. and B. HAMMOND, The Village
Labourer, chs. 9, 10. J. L. and B. HAMMOND, The Town Labourer, chs.
4, 5, 8-1 1. H. N. BRAILSFORD, Shelley, Godwin and Their Circle. C. A.
ELLWOOD, The Social Problem. E. A. JENKS, Short History of English
Law. R. A. WOODS, English Social Movements. T. MACKAY, Public
Relief of the Poor. M. B. SYNGE, Social Life in England, ch. 22.

Chapter VII. The Solidarity of International Conservatism

C. D. HAZEN, Modern Europe, ch. 14; Europe Since 1815, ch. i. J. S.
SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, ch. 2. C. H. HAYES,
Political and Social History, II, pp. 1-14, 41-44. F. MARVIN, Century of
Hope, ch. 2. J. H. ROBINSON and C. A. BEARD, Development of Modern
Europe, I, ch. 16, II, ch. 17. H. G. PLUM and G. G. BENJAMIN, Modern
and Contemporary European Civilizations, pp. 74-90. R. B. MOWAT,
European Diplomacy, 1815-1914, chs. 2-5. C. SEIGNOBOS, Political History
of Europe since 1814, chs. i, 25. J. R. M. MACDONALD, France, III, chs.
34-35. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, X, chs. i, 2, 13. E. R. TURNER,
Modern Europe, Pt. i, ch. 5. C. M. ANDREWS, Historical Development

BIBLIOGRAPHY m

of Modern Europe, I, ch. 3. W. A. PHILLIPS, Modern Europe, chs. 1-9.
W. MULLER, Political History of Recent Times, chs. 1-14. C. A. FYFFE,
History of Modern Europe, chs. 13-27. G. B. MALLESON, Prince Metter-
nich. SHAILER MATTHEWS, French Revolution, 1789-1815 (1923) ch. 25.
J. A. R. MARRIOTT, European Commonwealth, chs. 7, 15.

Chapter Fill. The Establishment of Independent States in Central and

South America

W. R. SHEPHERD, Latin America, pp. 69-80. M. A. S. HUME, Modern
Spain, ch. 5. C. H. HAYES, Political arid Social History, II, pp. 20-28.
J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, ch. 18. W. S. ROBERT-
SON, Rise of the Spanish American Republics, chs. i, 4, 6-8. W. S.
ROBERTSON, History of the Latin American Nations, ch. 6, CAMBRIDGE
MODERN HISTORY, X, chs. 8-10. F. J. TURNER, Rise of the New West
ch. 12. J. H. LATANE, Diplomatic Relations of the United States to
Spanish America, chs. 1-2. F. L. PAXON, Independence of the South
American Republics. B. MITRE, Emancipation of South America. B.
MOSES, South America on the Eve of American Emancipation. F. L.
PETRE, Simon Bolivar. W. F. REDDAWAY, Monroe Doctrine.

Chapter IX. The Independence of Greece

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, pp. 623-29. C. H.
HAYES, Political and Social History, pp. 47-50. F. SCHEVILL, History of
the Balkan Peninsula, chs. 19-21. W. MILLER, Ottoman Empire, chs.
4-6. R. B. MOWAT, European Diplomacy, 1815-1914, ch. 6. FORBES,
TOYNBEE and others, The Balkans, pp. 163-250. CAMBRIDGE MODERN
HISTORY, X, ch. 6. L. SERGEANT, Greece in the Nineteenth Century.
W. A. PHILLIPS, Greek War of Independence. P. F. MARTIN, Greece of
the Twentieth Century.

Chapter X. The Conservative Alliance and Italy

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, ch. 10. C. H. HAYES,

Political and Social History, II, pp. 44-46, 55-56. C. D. HAZEN, Europe

Since 1815, ch. 3. C. M. ANDREWS, Modern Europe, I, ch. 5. C.

SEIGNOBOS, Political History Since 1814, pp. 326-46. CAMBRIDGE MODERN

HISTORY, X, chs. 4, 5. BOLTON KING, History of Italian Unity. W. R.

THAYER, Dawn of Italian Independence. W. J. STILLMAN, Union of
Italy.

Chapter XL The Conservative Intervention in Spain

J, S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, ch. 18. M. A. S..
HUME, Spain, ch. 5. C. E. CHAPMAN, Spain, pp. 495-502. C. D. HAZEN,
Europe Since 1815, ch. 3. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, X, chs. 7-10. R. B.
MOWAT, European Diplomacy 1815-1914, ch. 8.

Chapter XII. The Collapse of the Conservative System in France

C. D. HAZEN, Modern Europe, ch. 17; Europe Since 1815, chs. 4, 6.
C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 14-20, 50-54. F. MARVIN,
Century of Hope, chs. 2, 3. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, X, chs. 2, 3,

iv BIBLIOGRAPHY

15. C. SEIGNOBOS, Political History Since 1814, ch. 5. J. S. SCHAPIRO,
Modern and Contemporary Europe, ch. 6. C. M. ANDREWS, Modern
Europe, I, chs. 4, 7. J. R. M. MACDONALD, France, III, chs. 34-36. G. L.
DICKINSON, Revolution and Reaction in Modern France. E. BOURGEOIS,
History of Modern France, chs. i, 3-6. J. R. HALL, Bourbon Restora-
tion.

Chapter XIII. Breaches in the Conservative System in the Other States
of Europe Resulting from the July Revolution (Belgium and Poland)

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, pp. 484-88. C. H.
HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 54-57. R. B. MOWAT, Euro-
pean Diplomacy 1815-1914, ch. 8. H. G. PLUM and G. G. BENJAMIN,
European Civilization, pp. 172-188. C. D. HAZEN, Europe Since 1815, chs.
5, 25. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, X, chs. 13, 14, 16; XI, ch. 23.
F. MARVIN, Century of Hope, ch. 2. P. J. BLOK, History of the People of
the Netherlands, Vol. V. G. BRANDES, Poland. W. R. MORFILL, Poland.
W. A. PHILLIPS, Poland, chs. 7, 8. N. HILL, Poland and the Polish
Question. J. A. R. MARRIOTT, European Commonwealth, chs. 9, 10.

Chapter XIV. Collapse of the Old Regime in England

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, chs. 4, 5. C. H.
HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 28-37, 100-116, 277-85. A. L.
CROSS, England and Greater Britian, chs. 46-49. C. D. HAZEN, Modern
Europe, ch. 16; Europe Since 1815, chs. 18, 19. F. MARVIN, Century of
Hope, chs. 2, 3, 8. J. A. R. MARRIOTT, England Since Waterloo, chs. 1-3.
C. SEIGNOBOS, Political History Since 1814, chs. 2, 3. J. H. ROBINSON and
C. A. BEARD, Development of Modern Europe, II, chs. 25, 26. J. H. ROSE,
Rise and Growth of Democracy in Britian, pp. 9-52. E. CHEYNEY, Short
History of England, ch. 19, pp. 645-60. G. B. ADAMS, Sketch of English
Constitutional History, chs. 10, n. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, X, chs.
18-20, 22; XI, ch. I. G. SLATER, Making of Modern England (1915), chs.
1-4. C. W. OMAN, England in the Nineteenth Century, chs. 1-4. C. R.
FAY, Life and Labour in the XIX Century, chs. 3-13. E. A. JENKS,
Short History of English Law. W. L. DAVIDSON, Political Thought in
England. E. C. CONNER, Common Lands and Inclosure. C. B. KENT,
English Radicals. G. S. VEITCH, Empire and Democracy, ch. 5. A. JONES,
Industrial Revolution, ch. 7. J. H. HARLEY, Syndicalism, ch. 2. E. JENKS,
Parliamentary England, chs. n, 12.

Chapter XV. European Settlement in the United States

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 600-14. H. GANNET,
Building of a Nation, pp. 51-77. P. L. HAWORTH, The United States in
Our Own Times, pp. 503-06. F. J. TURNER, The Frontier in American
History, chs. 9, 11-13. ?• F. HALL, Immigration, ch. I. F. MARVIN,
Century of Hope, ch. 11. W. H. WOODWARD, Short History of the Ex-
pansion of the British Empire. A. JOHNSON, Union and Democracy, ch.
14. F. J. TURNER, Rise of the West. A. B. FAUST, German Element in
the United States, I, 435-511. J. F. MAGUIRE, Irish in America, chs.
10, 24. S. BYRNE, Irish Emigration. R. B. ANDERSON, Norwegian
Immigration. A. W. TILBY, English People Overseas, vol. I; THE AMERI-
CAN COLONIES, vol. Ill ; BRITISH NORTH AMERICA. U. S. CENSUS BUREAU :
A Century of Population Growth. B. MEYER, History of Transportation
in the United States before i86a

BIBLIOGRAPHY v

Chapter XVI. The Founding of a French Colonial Empire in North

Africa

H. C. MORRIS, History of Colonization, I, chs. 14, 15. H. A. GIBBONS,
Introduction to World Politics, ch. 4. C. B. NORMAN, Colonial France.
H. H. JOHNSTON, Colonization of Africa by Alien Races. F. MARVIN,
Century of Hope, ch. n. J. S. KELTIE, Partition of Africa. J. A. R.
MARRIOTT, Europe and Beyond, ch. 5.

Chapter XVII. Russia and the European Advance in Central and

Eastern Asia

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II, ch. 25, pp. 586-92. C. D.
HAZEN, Europe Since 1815, ch. 29. J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Con-
temporary Europe, chs. 21, 22. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, X, ch. 17;
XI, ch. 9. H. A. GIBBONS, Introduction to World Politics, chs. 8, 9. J. H.
ROSE, Development of European Nations, II, chs. 2, 3, 9. F. H. SKRINE,
Expansion of Russia. G. F. WRIGHT, Asiatic Russia. A. KRAUSSE, Russia
in Asia. A. RAMBAUD, Expansion of Russia. G. DRAGE, Russian Affairs.
J. F. BADDELEY, Russian Conquest of the Caucasus. P. M. SYKES, History
of Persia. W. M. SHUSTER, Strangling of Persia. J. A. R. MARRIOTT,
Europe and Beyond, chs. 6, 9. F. A. KIRKPATRICK, Nineteenth Century,
ch. 12, 13.

Chapter XVIII. The English Policy in India and the Colonial Wars

with China

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, pp. 400-404. C. H.
HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 662-75. A. L. CROSS, England
and Greater Britian, ch. 41, pp. 966-74. H. A. GIBBONS, Introduction to
World Politics, chs. 5, n. C. HOLCOMBE, Real Chinese Question, chs. 7-9.
A. R. COLQUHOUN, China in Transformation, chs. 7-13. K. S. LATOURETTE,
Development of China, chs. 4, 5. C. F. LOVELL and C. E. PAYNE, Imperial
England, chs. 4, 5, u. M. TOWNSEND, Asia and Europe, pp. 1-120.
CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, XI, chs. 26, 28. F. MARVIN, Century of
Hope, ch. ii. R. MUIR, Making of British India. D. C. BOULGER, India
in the Nineteenth Century. McL. INNES, Sepoy Revolt. T. W. HOLDER-
NESS, Peoples and Problems of India. CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA.
V. A. SMITH, Oxford History of India.

Chapter XIX. The First Europeanization of a Non-European People

(Japan)

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 577-86. J. H.
SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, pp. 664-71. C. D. HAZEN,
Modern Europe, ch. 33. Cambridge Modern History, XI, ch. 28; XII,
chs. 17, 18. H. A. GIBBONS, Introduction to World Politics, chs. 10, n.
E. W. CLEMENT, Short History of Japan, ch. 9-16. E. H. DAVIS, Japan,
chs. 17-22. O. KAKUZO, Awakening of Japan. J. H. LANGFORD, Evolution
of New Japan. R. K. DOUGLAS, Europe in the Far East. P. S. REINSCH,
Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East. F. BRINKLEY and
BARON KIKUCHI, History of the Japanese People. L. HEARN, Japan, an
Interpretation. J. A. R. MARRIOTT, Europe and Beyond, ch. 9.

vi BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chapter XX. The Outcome of an Attempt at Colonization in Europe
(Ireland in the Nineteenth Century)

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 319-26. J. S.
SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, ch. 14. A. L. CROSS, Eng-
land and Greater Britain, pp. 510-12, 626-27, 841-4, 916-20, 932-3, 950-53,
991-5. Cambridge Modern History, X, ch. 20; XII, ch. 4. C. F. LOVELL
and C. E. PAYNE, Imperial England, ch. 13. G. S. VEITCH, Empire and
Democracy, chs. 6, 8. W. MORRIS, Ireland. G. SMITH, Irish History and
the Irish Question. A. S. GREEN, Irish Nationality. HORACE PLUNKETT,
Ireland in the New Century. L. PAUL-DUBOIS, Contemporary Ireland.
J. MORLEY, Gladstone. A. BALFOUR, Aspects of Home Rule. J. A. R.
MARRIOTT, European Commonwealth, ch. 10.

Chapter XXL The Social Revolution in France

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, pp. 97-110. C. H.
HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 116-23, 149-62, 175-180. H. G.
PLUM and G. G. BENJAMIN, European Civilization, pp. 197-207. R. B.
MOWAT, European Diplomacy 1815-1914, ch. 12. E. BOURGEOIS, Modern
France, chs. 9, 10. Cambridge Modern History, XI, chs. 2, 5, 10. C.
SEIGNOBOS, Political History, ch. 6. C. D. HAZEN, Modern Europe, ch. 19 ;
Europe Since 1815, chs. 9, 12. F. MARVIN, Century of Hope, ch. 4. J. R. M.
MACDONALD, History of France, III, chs. 37, 38. C. M. ANDREWS, Modern
Europe, I, ch. 8. J. A. R. MARRIOTT, Remaking of Modern Europe.
P. GEUDALLA, The Second Empire. J. A. R. MARRIOTT, French Revolution
of 1848 in Its Economic Aspects. H. A. FISHER, Bonapartism.

Chapter XXII. The Crimean War. Russia and the Eastern Question

F. SCHEVILL, History of the Balkan Peninsula, ch. 22. J. S. SCHAPIRO,
Modern and Contemporary Europe, ch. 27, pp. 505-14. G. P. GOOCH, His-
tory of Our Time, ch. 5. C. D. HAZEN, Europe Since 1815, chs. 28, 29.
C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 162-3, 498-503, 452-60.
C. M. ANDREWS, Modern Europe, II, ch. 2. H. G. PLUM and G. G. BEN-
JAMIN, European Civilization, Pt. 3, pp. 106-46. R. B. MOWAT, European
Diplomacy, 1815-1914, chs. 7, 10. J. H. ROSE, Modern European Nations,
Pt. I, chs. 7-1 1. W. MILLER, Ottoman Empire, ch. 10. G. S. VEITCH,
Empire and Democracy, ch. 4. C. SEIGNOBOS, Political History, chs 20, 26.
H. A. GIBBONS, Introduction to World Politics, ch. 8. A. L. CROSS, Eng-
land and Greater Britain, pp. 959-65. J. MAVOR, Economic History of
Russia, II, Bks. 4-7. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, XI, chs. 9, 22. F. H.
SKRINE, Expansion of Russia. G. DRAGE, Russian Affairs. J. A. R.
MARRIOTT, European Commonwealth, chs. 11-14.

Chapter XXIII. The Panic Over Socialism After the February

Revolution

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 211-230, 240-42, 406-12.
W. BARRY, Papacy and Modern Times, chs. 6, 7. V. GAYDA, Modern
Austria, chs. 25, 32-35. C. SEIGNOBOS, Political History, chs. 6, 7. CAM-
BRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, XI, ch. 10, pp. 130-140; ch. 25. J. S. SCHAPIRO,
Modern and Contemporary Europe, ch. 8. K. KAUTSKY, Social Democracy
and the Catholic Church. C. M. ANDREWS. Modern Europe, II, ch. i.
K, KAUTSKY, The Social Revolution.

BIBLIOGRAPHY vn

Chapter XXIV. The War of Secession in the United States

W. E. DODD, Expansion and Conflict. J. S. BASSETT, Short History of
the United States, chs. 23-29. W. WILSON, Division and Reunion, chs. 5-11.
H. W. ELSON, History of the United States, chs. 22-30. D. S. MUZZY, The
United States of America, I, chs. 8-10. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, XII,
ch. 2.

Chapter XXV. The Founding of a Liberal National State in Italy

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, ch. 10. C. H. HAYES,
Political and Social History, II, 163-75, 367-78. H. G. PLUM and G. G.
BENJAMIN, European Civilization, pp. 188-197. R. B. MOWAT, European
Diplomacy, 1815-1914, chs. n, 13-20. E. M. JAMISON and others, Italy,
Medieval and Modern, pp. 353-501. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, XI,
chs. 4, 14, 19 ; XII, ch. 8. C. SEIGNOBOS, Political History, pp. 346-74. C. D.
HAZEN, Modern Europe, chs. 20, 25; Europe Since 1815, chs. 10, 16.
C. M. ANDREWS, Modern Europe, I, ch. 5 ; II, ch. 3. G. P. GOOCH, History
of Our Time, ch. 3. F. MARVIN, Century of Hope, ch. 7. V. GAYDA, Mod-
ern Austria, Pt. I. J. H. ROSE, Nationality in Modern History. C. A.
FYFFE, History of Modern Europe. J. A. R. MARRIOTT, Remaking of
Modern Europe. W. R. THAYER, Life and Times of Cavour. MARTINENGO-
CESARESCO, Cavour. G. M. TREVELYAN, Garibaldi and the Making of
Italy. J. W. MARIO, Birth of Modern Italy. R. S. HOLLAND, Builders of
United Italy. R. M. JOHNSTON, The Roman Theocracy and the Republic.

B. KING, Italian Unity. P. ORSI, Cavour and the Making of Modern Italy,

Chapter XXVI. Germany Under Austro-Prussian Rule

]. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, ch. 7. F. SCKEVILL,
Making of Modern Germany, Lect. 4. C. H. HAYES, Political and Social
History, II, pp. 123-144. C. D. HAZEN, Modern Europe, ch. 18; Europe
Since 1815, chs. 2, 7, 8, 17. G. M. PRIEST, Germany Since 1740, chs. 8, 9.

C. SEIGNOBOS, Political History of Europe, chs. 12-14. C. M. ANDREWS,
Modern Europe, I, chs. 9, 10 ; II, chs. 5, 7. R. P. MAHAFFY, Francis Joseph
I» PP- J-36. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, X, chs. n, 12; XI, chs. 3, 6, 7,
15. E. F. HENDERSON, Short History of Germany, II, pp. 247-69, chs. 7, 8.
L. LEGER, History of Austro-Hungary, chs. 27-33. R. B. MOWAT, European
Diplomacy, 1815-1914, ch. 9. H. W. STEED, Hapsburg Monarchy. Remi-
niscences of Karl Schurz, vol. I.

Chapter XXVII. The Struggle Between Prussia and Austria; Prussia's
Conquest of Germany

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, chs. 9, 12, 16. C. H
HAYES, Political and Social History, II, 180-206, 426-35. F. SCHEVILL,
Making of Modern Germany, Lect. 5, 6, and appendices. C. D. HAZEN,
Modern Europe, chs. 21-23, 26; Europe Since 1815, chs. n, 13, 14. J. H.
ROBINSON and C. A. BEARD, Development of Modern Europe, II, pp. 109-
23, ch. 23. G. M. PRIEST, Germany Since 1740, chs. 9-12. H. G. PLUM
and G. G. BENJAMIN, European Civilization, pp. 147-171. R. B. MOWAT,
European Diplomacy, 1815-1914, chs. 21-23. C. SEIGNOBOS, Political History,
chs. 15, 16, 27. J. R. M. MACDONALD, France, III, chs. 39, 40. C. M.
ANDREWS, Modern Europe, II, chs. 6, 10. J. H. ROSE, Development of the
European Nations, I, chs. 1-4. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, XI, chs. 15,

vin BIBLIOGRAPHY

16, 21. E. F. HENDERSON, Short History of Germany, II, chs. 9, 10, n.
H. ONCKEN, Historical Rhine Policy of the French. V. GAYDA, Modern
Austria. J. W. HEADLAM, Bismarck and the Foundation of the German
Empire. P. GUEDALLA, The Second Empire. M. SMITH, Bismarck and
German Unity. J. H. ROSE, Nationality in Modern History.

Chapter XXVIII. New Economic Problems

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, pp. 650-57, 682-3.

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 547-58. C. F. G. MAS-
TERMAN, Condition of England. H. G. PLUM and G. G. BENJAMIN, Euro-
pean Civilization, pp. 216-25, 242-59. C. SEIGNOBOS, Europe Since 1814,
ch. 22. C. A. CONANT, United States in the Orient, chs. i, 3-5. W. H.
DAWSON, Evolution of Modern Germany, chs. i, 3, 4, 7, 15. D. H. MAC-
GREGOR, Evolution of Industry, ch. 4. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, XII,
chs. i, 20, 23. A. G. KELLER, Colonization. J. A. HOBSON, Imperialism.

D. S. JORDAN, Imperial Democracy. S. P. ORTH, The Imperial Impulse.

E. R. TURNER, Modern Europe, ch. 8. A. VIALLATE, Economic Imperialism
and International Relations During the Last Fifty Years. W. LIPPMANN,
Stakes of Diplomacy.

Chapter XXIX. The New Colonial Policy: I, Africa

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, pp. 675-81, 700-02.
C. D. HAZEN, Modern Europe, ch. 29; Europe Since 1815, ch. 23. H. A.
GIBBONS, New Map of Africa. H. A. GIBBONS, Introduction to World
Politics, chs. 15-17, 19. C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II,
614-37. H. C. MORRIS, Colonization, I, ch. 15. W. H. DAWSON, Evolution
of Modern Germany, chs. 17-19. G. P. GOOCH, History of Our Time,
ch. 8. J. H. ROSE, Modern European Nations, Pt. II, chs. 4-8. C. F.
LOVELL and C. E. PAYNE, Imperial England, chs. 8, 10, 12. CAMBRIDGE
MODERN HISTORY, XI, pp. 778-89; XII, ch. 15. C. LUCAS, Partition and
Colonization of Africa, chs. 5-6. H. E. EGERTON, British Colonial Policy
in the Twentieth Century, pp. 172-229. H. G. PLUM and G. G. BENJAMIN,
European Civilization, pp. 237-42. G. P. GOOCH, History of Modern Eu-
rope, 1878-1919, chs. 3, 8, lo, 14. E. D. MOREL, Africa and the Peace of
Europe. J. D. COLVIN, Cecil John Rhodes. H. H. JOHNSTON, Opening Up
of Africa. N. D. HARRIS, Intervention and Colonization in Africa.

Chapter XXX. The New Colonial Policy: II, Asia and Australasia

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 560-06. C. D. HAZEN,
Europe Since 1815, ch. 30; Modern Europe, ch. 32. J. S. SCHAPIRO, Mod-
ern and Contemporary Europe, pp. 671-4. G. P. GOOCH, History of Our
Time, ch. 7. J. H. ROSE, Modern European Nations, Pt. II, chs. 2, 3, 9.
H. E. EGERTON, British Colonial Policy, pp. 229-240. H. A. GIBBONS, In-
troduction to World Politics, chs. 9, n, 14. A. W. TILBY, English People
Overseas: Australasia, pp. 141-327, 333-400. E. F. HATCH, Far Eastern
Impressions, chs. 8, 9, 11-16. K. S. LATOURETTE, Development of China,
chs. 5-7. C. HOLCOMBE, The Real Chinese Question, chs. 9-11. F. H.
DAVIS, Japan, chs. 21, 22. C. F. LOVELL and C. E. PAYNE, Imperial Eng-
land, ch. 7. C. A. CONANT, United States in the Orient, chs. 2, 6, 7.
E. SINGLETON, China, pp. 82-100. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, XI, ch. 28,
pp. 789-801; XII, chs. 16, 17, 19. E. R. TURNER, Modern Europe, Pt. I.
ch. 12. R. K. DOUGLAS, Europe and the Far East. P. S. REINSCH, Intel-

BIBLIOGRAPHY ix

lectual and Political Currents in the Far East. K. K. KA WAR A MI, Japan in
World Politics. W. W. MCLAREN, Political History of Japan. H. A.
GILES, China and the Chinese. A. C. MAZUMDAR, Indian National Evolu-
tion.

Chapter XXXI. The New Colonial Policy: III, The Anglo-Saxon

Empires

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary Europe, pp. 407-23. C. H.
HAYES, Political and Social History, II, ch. 29. C. D. HAZEN, Modern
Europe, chs. 27, 28; Europe Since 1815, chs. 20-22. R. JEBB, The Britannic
Question, chs. 3-6. P. L. HAWORTH, United States in Our Own Times,
chs. 14-17. F. L. PAXON, The New Nation, chs. 16, 17. F. L. PAXON,
Recent History of the United States, pp. 210-13, chs. 24-26, 29, 35, 39, 43.
G. P. GOOCH, History of Our Time, ch. i. H. C. MORRIS, Colonization,
chs. 19-26. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, XI, chs. 12, 27; XII, chs. 16, 17.
H. A. GIBBONS, Introduction to World Politics, ch. 13. G. S. VEITCH,
Empire and Democracy, chs. 7, 9. H. G. PLUM and G. G. BENJAMIN,
European Civilization, pp. 225-37, 325-72. W. E. WEYL, American World
Policies, chs. 6-14. G. L. BEER, English Speaking Peoples, chs. 2, 3. F. A.
OGG, National Progress, chs. 13-17. S. G. INMAN, Problems in Pan-
Americanism, chs. 4-6, 8, 10; ch. 20, pp. 515-19. J. H. LATANE, Relations
of the United States to Spanish America. W. F. REDDAWAY, Monroe
Doctrine. A. B. HART, Monroe Doctrine. W. LIPPMAN, Stakes of Diplo-
macy. A. C. COOLIDGE, The United States as a World Power. J. H.
LATANE, From Isolation to Leadership. G. H. STUART, Latin America and
the United States.

Chapter XXXII. The Socialist Movement and the Attitude of
Governments Toward It

C. H. HAYES, Political and Social History, II, pp. 253-75, 277-307, 351-66.
F. MARVIN, Century of Hope, ch. 4. J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Con-
temporary Europe, ch. 24. J. R. ROSE, Modern European Nations, Pt. I,
chs. 6, ii. C. R. FAY, Life and Labour, chs. 5-7, 20. W. H. DAWSON,
Evolution of Modern Germany, chs. 7-9, 21. H. G. PLUM and G. G. BEN-
JAMIN, European Civilization, pp. 179-88, 197-208, 250-78. C. SEIGNOBOS,
Europe Since 1814, ch. 24. J. R. MACDONALD, Socialist Movement. F.
HOWE, Socialized Germany, chs. 6-14, 20-24. J- H. HARLEY, Syndicalism,
chs. 3-6. C. F. G. MASTERMAN, Condition of England, ch. 4. F. A. OGG,
Social Progress, chs. 17-19, 22. J. C. BRACQ, France Under the Republic.
F. SCHEVILL, Making of Modern Germany. F. K. KRUEGER, Government
and Politics of the German Empire. F. A. SIMPSON, Rise of Louis Napo-
leon. V. GAYDA, Modern Austria, chs. 25, 33-35.

Chapter XXXIII. The Struggle Between Austria and Russia for the

Balkans

C. D. HAZEN, Modern Europe, chs. 31, 35; Europe Since 1815, ch. 28.
F. SCHEVILL, Balkan Peninsula, chs. 22-32. C. H. HAYES, Political and
Social History, II, ch. 26. J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary
Europe, ch. 27. G. P. GOOCH, History of Our Time, ch. 5. R. B. MOWAT,
European Diplomacy, 1815-1914, chs. 24. 28. V. GAYDA, Modern Austria,
chs. 10-12. H. G. PLUM and G. G. BENJAMIN, European Civilization,
Pt. 3, pp. 294-311. G. P. GOOCH, Modern Europe, 1878-1919, chs. 4, 7, n

x BIBLIOGRAPHY

12, 15. H. A. GIBBONS, Introduction to World Politics, chs. 6, 7, 18, 20-23.
W. MILLER, Balkans, pp. 90-118, 215-48, 332-46. C. M. ANDREWS, Modern
Europe II, chs. 8, 13. C. SEIGNOBOS, Europe Since 1814, ch. 17. J. H.
ROSE, Modern European Nations, Pt. II, ch. n. CAMBRIDGE MODERN HIS-
TORY, XII, chs. 7, 14, N. FORBES, TOYNBEE, and others, Balkans, pp. 47-78,
119-62. W. MILLER, Ottoman Empire, chs. 16-19. E. DURHAM, Twenty
Years of Balkan Tangle. J. A. R. MARRIOTT, European Commonwealth,
chs. 11-14. J. A. R. MARRIOTT, Europe and Beyond, chs. 11, 12.

Chapter XXXIV. The World War, 1914-18

J. S. SCHAPIRO, Modern and Contemporary History, chs. 29, 30. C. H.
HAYES, Political and Social History, II, ch. 30. G. F. GOOCH, History of
Our Time, chs. 6, 10. G. P. GOOCH. Modern Europe, 1878-1919, chs. 16-19.
R. B. MOWAT, European Diplomacy, 1815-1914, chs. 25-29. CAMBRIDGE
MODERN HISTORY, XII, chs. 5-7, 12, 13. J. H. ROSE, Modern European
Nations, Pt II, chs. I, 10, n. F. SCHEVILL, Political History of Modern
Europe. F. SCHEVILL, Balkan Peninsula, ch. 32. F. MARVIN, Century of
Hope, ch 13. H. A. GIBBONS, Introduction to World Politics, chs. 23-49.
C. H. HAYES, Brief History of the War. R. S. BAKER, What Wilson Did
at Paris. A. P. SCOTT, Introduction to the Peace Treaties. J. M. KEYNES,
Economic Consequences of the Peace. F. BAUSMANN, Let France Ex-
plain. E. DURHAM, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle. E. D. MOREL, Ten
Years of Secret Diplomacy. F. NIELSON, How Diplomats Make War.
H. A. GIBBONS, New Map of Asia H. N. BRAILSFORD, War of Steel and Gold.
G. ALEXINSKY, Modern Russia. A. F. POLLARD, Short History of the
Great War. A. J. TOYNBEE, Nationality and the War. E. ANTONELLI,
Bolshevik Russia. F. Nrrn, Decadence of Europe.

INDEX

Abd-el-Kader, 119-124, 135.

Abolition, see Slavery.

Absenteeism, 52, 168, 264.

Abyssinia, 342-344, 347-

Addis-Ababa, Treaty of, 344.

Adowa, 343-

Adrianople, 41 f., 413, 4igi.

Adriatic Sea, 252, 420, 431.

^Egean Sea, 350, 419, 446.

Afghanistan, 134, i37-*39, 142, 144-
.147, 355-

Africa, 20, 112-128, 149, 325-351,
368-372, 423, 440; Abyssinia, 342-
344, 347; Algeria, 112-128, 189,
332-334, 337, 342, 344-347; Brit-
ish South Africa, 32;f., 368-
372; Congo, 339, 341, 347 J
Egypt, 112, 328-333, 335-341,
343, 441, 447 ; German colonies
and policy, 325-327, 339-35O, 374,
440, 467; Sudan, 128, 335-34O,
343; Tangier, 122, 344; Tunis,
128, 326, 332-335, 342, 348;
slavery in, 20, 123, 336, 338-
341, 368.

Agadir, 346.

Agriculture, 53, 58, I3of., 165-182,
356f., 364, 372f., 472f.; in Aus-
tria, 406 ; in England, 85-88, 98-
loo ; in France, 115, 208, 426; in
Prussia, 263-265, 283^; in
United States, 103-110; see also
Peasants.

Aguinaldo, 377.

Aigun, Treaty of, 133.

Akkerman, Treaty of, 41.

Akulscho, 135.

Alabama, privateer, 247.

Aland Islands, 217.

Alaska, 380.

Albania, 328, 404, 420, 443, 446, 462.

Albert, Battle of, 461.

Albert, Austrian Archduke, 256

Alexander I, Tsar, 26, 36, 40, 75-77,
80, 213.

Alexander II, Tsar, 219, 22if.

Alexandria, 328, 331.

Alexeiev, Russian General, 445.

Algeciras, 345-348.

Algiers, Algeria, 112-128, 189, 332-
334, 337, 342, 344-347-

Alleghany Mountains, 105, 107.

Allenby, English General, 463.

Alliance, Holy (1815), 261., 67, 69;
Conservative Alliance of the
Great Powers (1815), 25-80,
212, 285; Dual Alliance (1891),
390, 421, 428; Triple Alliance
(1882), 334, 348-350. 418, 428,
431 ; see also Treaties.

Alma, Battle of the, 218.

Alsace-Lorraine, 1251., 299, 306-310,
435, 467, 469.

Alsen Island, 294.

America, see United States, Canada,
Mexico, Brazil, Chile, etc.

Amherst, Lord, 142.

Amu-Darya (Oxus) River, 138.

Amur River, 133.

Ancona, 71, 255.

Anglican (Established) Church,
82f., 95, 167, 170, 175, 184, 340,
392, 394-

Anglo-Saxon, see England.

Angola, 341.

Annam, 352-354-

Annexations of territory: by con-
quest, 60, i65f., 23of., 296-299,

418-421, 451, 459f., 465, 467-471 ;

by plebiscite, 253-255, 257f., 297,
47i.

Antwerp, 74, 437.

Arabi Bey, 331, 336.

Arabia, Arabs, 119-128, 338, 349f-,
447, 463, 471.

Arago, French physicist, 198.

Aral, Sea of, 136, 138.

Arbitration, 247, 379ff., 425, 470.

Ardennes, 466.

Argonne, 465.

Aristocracy, see Landowners, No-
bility.

Arkansas, 242.

Armenia, 412-414, 471.

475

476

INDEX

Art, i6f., 224f., 322.

Asia, si., 129-164, 213-219, 327, 338,
352-360, 440, 447, 462f., 471.

Asia Minor, 38, 4if., 113, 413, 47^

Asiago, 449, 464.

Asquith, 394.

Athens, 38, 42.

Atlanta, 242.

Auber, French composer, 72.

Augsburg, 191, 296

Augustenburg, 294.

Augustowo, Battle of, 437.

Ausgleich, Compromise of, 1867,
409!

Australia. 9, 3i8f., 329, 355, 363-367,
372ff., 440.

Autocracy, see Conservatism, Liber-
alism, Parliaments.

Austria (Austria-Hungary), 25-27,
45 ff., 69ff., 225, 248-258, 284-
297, 304, 3i3f-> 402-412; Balkan
ambitions. 37ff., 43, 2i6f., 258,
338, 348-350, 4i4;47i ; political
and social conditions, 216, 225,
227, 272-279, 284, 317, 403-412,
47of. ; in World War, 422f.,
426f., 43 if., 436-440, 444-451,
459f., 464-47L

Babeuf, 191.

Baden, 278, 288, 310, 468.
Bagdad, 447, 462.
Balaklava, 218.

Balkans, Balkan question, 36, 40-
43, 80, 216, 258, 275, 338, 348-
350, 402-423, 426, 431, 441, 443,
445-450, 459-465, 47i.
Bapaume, 449.
Baranowitschi, 450.
Baratieri, Italian General, 343f.
Barbary Pirates, 112-118, 136.
Bardo, Treaty of, 333.
Barricades, 65, 194, 198, 206.
Basra, 447.
Battles (arranged chronologically) :

Jemmapes (1792), 66

Jena (1806), 265-268, 273, 281.

Navarino (1827), 41, 65

Dargo (1842-45), 135

Custozza (1848), 249; (1866) 256,

295

Novara (1849), 249
Sinope (1853), 217
Alma (1854), 218
Balaklava (1854), 218
Inkerman (1854)! 218

Battles (arranged chronologically) :
Sebastppol (1855), 218
Solferino (1859), 253
Bull Run (1861), 237
Vicksburg (1862-3), 24lf.
Gettysburg (1863), 242
Koniggratz, Sadowa (1866), 256,

296, 314

Lissa (1866), 256, 314
Langensalza (1866), 296
Weissenburg (1870), 306
Worth (1870), 306
Frpschweiler (1870), 306
Spichern (1870), 306
Borny, Mars-la-Tour, Gravelotte,

St. Privat (1870), 307
Sedan (1870), 307f., 382, 434, 466
Majuba Hill (1881), 369
Adowa (1896), 343f.
Manila Bay (1898), 376
Santiago (1898), 376
Liao-Yang (1904), 358
Port Arthur (1904-05), 358
Mukden (1905), 358
Tsushima (1905), 358
Coronel (1914), 430
Falkland Islands (1914), 43of.
Saarburg (1914), 434
Charleroi (1914), 435
Marne (1914), 435*. ; (1918),

46off.

Krasnik (1914), 436
Lemberg (1914), 436; (1915),

445

Grodek (1914), 436
Przemysl (1914), 436; (1915),

444f-

Gumbinnen (1914)^436
Tannenberg (1914), 437
Masurian Lakes (1914), 437
Augustowo (1914), 437
Ypres (1914), 437f- ; (1918), 465
Dunajec (1915), 445
Warsaw (1914-15), 437, 445
Gallipoli (1915), 447
Kut-el-Amara (1915-17), 447, 462
El-Arish (1916), 463
Maghara (1916), 463
Verdun (1916), 448f.
Somme (1916-17), 448f., 451
Asiago (1916-18), 449, 464
Gorizia (1916-17), 449, 464
Luzsk (1916), 449
Strypa (1916), 449
Czernowitz (1916), 449
Kovel (1916), 450
Jutland (1916), 4Sof,

INDEX

477

Battles (arranged chronologically) :

Caporetto (1917), 464

Piave (1917-18), 4641.

Ramadieh, Gaza, Jaffa, Jerusalem,
Jericho (1917-18), 463

St. Quentin (1918), 460, 465

Noyon (1918), 460

Chateau-Thierry (1918), 460

Soissons (1918), 460

Albert (1918), 461

St. Mihiel (1918), 461, 465

Argonne (1918), 465

Cambrai (1918), 465

Armentieres (1918), 465

Laon (1918), 465

Roulers (1918), 465

Sambre (1918), 466
Bavaria, 278, 296, 3O2f., 468.
Bazaine, 247, 307!.
Beatty, English Admiral, 450.
Beirut, 349.
Belfort, 309.
Belgium, 69-75, 80, 339!., 43O-435,

437*., 451, 465, 468.
Belgrade, 422.
Belleville, 383.

Benedek, Austrian General, 296.
Benedetti, French Ambassador, 3O5f.
Bengal, I4of., 148.
Bentinck, Lord, 143.
Berlin, 281, 339*-,
Bessarabia, 413, 459.
Beust, Austrian Minister, 409.
Birmingham, 181, 393.
Bismarck, 224, 289-297, 327, 339*.,

389*-, 397, 415.
Blanc Louis, 193, 196-198.
Blanqui, French Socialist, 198.
"Bloc," 200, 387.
Blockade, 236!., 354, 43of., 439-442,

4Soff., 465.
Boers, 327, 368-372.
Bohemia (Czechs), 296, 405-411,

465, 471.

Bokhara, 136!.

Bolivar, Simon, 30-33.

Bologna, 253.

Bolsheviki, 222, 457-460.

Bombay, 142, 148.

Bona, 117, H9f.

Bonaparte, Napoleon I, 25-27, 57,
117, 200, 250!., 389; "Napoleon
III," 211 ; Louis Napoleon, Na-
poleon III, 117, 126, 200-213,
223 f., 251-253, 256-258, 293, 296f.,
303-308, 352, 382, 389f; Joseph,
31 ; Prince Jerome, "Plon-Plon,"

252; Prince Imperial, only son
of Napoleon III. 369.

Bonn, M. J., quoted, 168.

Bordeaux, 208, 310, 435.

Borny, Battle of, 307.

Bosnia, 4ij, 418, 421 ; see also
Balkans.

Bosphorus, 282, 463, 471.

Boston, Mass., 232.

Botha, Louis, South African Prime
Minister, 371 f.

Boulanger, French Minister, 387.

Boulogne, 200.

Bourbaki, French General, 308.

Bourbons, 25-27, 28-66, 201, 385.

Bourgeoisie (Middle-class), 11-15,
45, 53*.; in France, 58-70, 180^-
211, 223-225, 381-391; in Eng-
land, 82-93, 391-395; in Ger-
many, 263-274, 279-284, 395-
402.

"Boxers" in China, 356, 359-

Boycott, 179.

Brazil, 33f., 228, 455-

Bregalnitza, 420.

Brest-Litovsk Treaties, 459*., 468.

Briand, French Minister, 387, 389.

Bright, John, 99.

Britain, British, see England.

Brunetiere, French literary critic,
388.

Brussels, 72.

Brussilov, Russian General, 449, 451.

Bucharest, 39, 420, 459, 468.

Buddhism, 159.

Buenos Aires, 30.

Bugeaud, French Marshal, 122.

Bukovina, 449.

Bulgaria, 404, 412-414, 418-420, 445*-,
450, 462f., 471-

Bull Run, Battle of, 237.

Buller, English General, 370.

Bundesrat, 302.

Buonarroti, French Radical, 191.

Bureaucracy, 84, 221 f., 265-273, 405-
410, 442 f.

Burma, 142, 146, 354.

Byron, Lord, 40.

Cabet, French author, 191.
Cadiz, 31, 54ff.

Cadorna, Italian General, 258.
Cairo, 328-332, 336, 341.
Calabria, 47, 256.
Calais, 437f.
Calatafimi, 254.
California, 156, 231, 233.

478

INDEX

Cambodia, 352-354.

Cambrai, 465.

Cameroons, see Kamerun.

Canada, 115, 175, 361-367, 372-374,

380.
Canals, 106, 251 ; Suez, 1 14, 329,

331, 337, 441, 447, 463; Panama,

378*.

Canea, 415.

Canning, George, 33, 40.
Canton, China, 5, 150-152.
C apatites, 192, 194.
Cape Colony, Capetown, 328, 341,

363, 368-374.

Capitalism, see Landowners, Manu-
facturing, Socialism.

"Capitulations," 329.

Caporetto, 464.

Caracas, 31.

Carbonari, 47ff., 63.

Carnot, Hippolyte, 206.

Carpathian Mountains, 436, 444f.

Carpetbaggers, 245.

Casablanca, 346.

Casement, Roger, 186.

Caspian Sea, 135-138.

Catholicism, see Church.

Caucasus, 41, I34ff., 219, 449.

Cavaignac, Godefroy, 193; Louis
Eugene, Minister of War, 198,
201, 205.

Cavour, 219, 249-255, 257, 259.

Cawnpur, 147,

Censorship, see Press.

Central Powers, see Germany, Aus-
tria-Hungary.

Cettinje, 446.

Ceylon, 142, 331.

Chamberlain, Joseph, 181, 393.

Chambord, Count of, "Henry V,"
62, 385-

Charleroi, 435.

Charles I of Austria (1916-18),
465.

Charles IV of Spain (1788-1808),
31.

Charles X of France (1824-1830),
63-66, 91, 116-118, 190, 192.

Charles Albert of Sardinia (1831-
1848), 249.

Chartists, 95f., 171, 192.

Chassepots, 257.

Chateau-Thierry, 460.

Cherbourg, 67.

Chernaiev, Russian General, 137.

Chile, 32, 34.

Chimkent, 137.

China, 5, 129, I33f., 150-157, 160-
164, 352-360, 440.

Chios, 38f.

Cholera, 218.

Christian, see Church.

Christian IX of Denmark, 294.

Church (Established) Anglican,
82f., 95, 167, 170, 175, 184, 340,
392, 3941 Dissenters, 83, 87, 90,
183 ; Orthodox Greek, 36, 212,
216; Protestant Lutheran, 2701".,
284; Roman Catholic, 83, 90,
167-173, 176, i82f., 212, 225-
227, 27of., 284, 386-389, 396-399,
406; Church lands and privi-
leges, n, 57-61, 1676*., 251, 259,
269, 406; influence on educa-
tion and politics, i6f., 45-55,
61-64, loo, 195, 203f., 209, 225-
227, 27of., 284, 386-389, 396-399.

Cisleithania (Austria), 410.

Classes of Society, see Church, No-
bility, Bourgeoisie, Working-
men.

Clauzel, French Marshal, 120.

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 378f.

Clemenceau, Georges, 387-389.

Cleveland, Grover, 375, 379.

Coal, 7, 83, 87, 103, 163, 167, 259,
322, 434.

Cobbett, William, 91.

Cobden, Richard, 99, 209, 224.

Cochin-China, 352-354.

Cochrane, Thomas, 32, 34.

Cocos Islands, 430.

Code Napoleon, 44.

Colombia, 32, 34, 379.

Colonies, colonial policy, 3f., 29-35,
314, 325-38o, 440, 469; American,
375-38o; Dutch (Boers) 327,
338, 355, 363, 368-372; English,
6, 140-155, 165-186, 3i8f., 325-
346, 356, 361-365, 378-380, 440;
French, 65, 112-128, 327-349,
352-355, 430; German, 325-327,
335, 339-342, 344-347, 43O, 44<>,
467, 469; Italian, 325f., 333f.,
338, 342-344, 347-350; Russian,
129-139; Spanish and Portu-
guese, 6, 29-35, 327, 339, 34i.

Columbia, District of (U.S.), 233.

Combes, French Minister, 389-432.

Commerce, sf., 30, 37, 88, 98-100,
133-157, 162, 236, 277-279, 317-
324, 428ff. ; see also Blockade,
Colonies, Tariff.

Communard, Commune, 384^

INDEX

479

Communist Manifesto, Communism,

381-383; see also Socialism.
Compromise, Missouri, of 1820, 231-
234; Great (1850), 233; or Aus-
gleich of 1867, 409-412.
Concordats with the Papacy, 61, 225,

250, 284, 389-
Conferences :
Algeciras (1906), 345-348.
Berlin (1884-85), 339f.
Hague (Peace; 1899), 425.
Hague (Peace; 1907), 433-
Paris (1919), 466ff.
Versailles (1919), 466ff.
See also Congresses, Treaties.
Congo, 339, 341, 347-
Congresses :
Berlin (1878), 413*.
Paris (1856), 219.
Verona (1822), 56.
Vienna (1815), 18, 25-28, 36, 7if.,

75, 80, 90, 212, 219, 239.
See also Conferences, Treaties.
Connubio, 250.

Conscription, see Military Service.
Conservatives, Conservatism : soli-
darity of, 25-100; in England,
82, 87, 90-92, 98-100, 170-173,
182-185; in France, 57ff., 223-
225, 383-391 ; in Prussia-Ger-
many, 263ff., 395-402; in Aus-
tria, 405-412; see also Land-
owners, Manufacturers, Primo-
geniture.
Constantine (Algeria), 119, 121,

127.

Constantine of Greece, 461.
Constantine Romanov, 77.
Constantinople, see Turkey.
Constitutions, constitutional govern-
ment, 27, 7iff-, 359f., 41.8, 452;
Austrian, 402-412; English, 84-
86, 1 66, 1841., 391-395; French,
58ff., 66ff., 192-208, 292, 300-
303, 309f -, 385*., 453 ; Japanese,
158-160, 163; Spanish, 54f.;
United States, 230, 235, 245f;
see also Liberalism, Suffrage.
Corfu, 37, 446.

Cormenin, French Radical, 191.
Corn Laws, 98-100.
Coronel, Naval Battle of, 430.
Cotton, 163, 228-230, 236-239, 244,

328, 439-
Cracow, 79.
Credit Fonder, 208.
Creoles, 2pff., 33.

Crete, 41, 216, 415, 419.

Crimean War, 212-222, 252, 293, 403.

Crispi, Italian Minister, 343f.

Cromwell, Oliver, 166.

Cronje, Boer General, 371.

Cuba, 375-377-

Custozza, Barttles of, 249, 256, 295.

Cyprus, 414, 441.

Cyrenaica (Tripoli), 348-351.

Czartoryski, Russian Minister, 77.

Czechs, 296, 405-411, 465, 47L

Czernowitz, 449.

Daghestan, 135.

Dahomey, 335.

Daimios, 206.

Dalmatia, 443.

Dardanelles, 43, 213, 217-219, 349,
446f., 463, 471.

Dargo, 135.

Darmstadter, German author,
quoted, no.

Davis, Jefferson, 235, 244.

Deak, Hungarian Statesman, 409.

Decazes, French Minister, 6if.

"Defeatism," 243, 442, 451, 459f.

Delarey, Boer General, 371.

Delcasse, French Minister, 345.

Democracy, I04ff., 192-207, 402, 452,
457f ., 472f . ; see also Liberalism,
Constitutions, Parliament.

Denmark, 293 f., 297, 302, 378.

DeWet, Boer General, 391.

Disraeli, 224, 329, 392.

Dissenters, 83, 87, 90, 183.

Dodecanese, 350.

Dominions of British Empire, 361-
374-

Dred Scott Case, 234.

Dreyfus, French Officer, 388.

Dual (Franco-Russian) Alliance,
390, 421, 428.

Dual Monarchy, see Austria-Hun-
gary.

Dublin, 165-168, I79f. ; University,
173.

Dufferin, Lord, quoted, 171 f.

Duma, 417, 457.

Dunajec, Battle of the, 445.

Dunkirk, 438.

Dutch, see Holland.

Economic Imperialism, 317-473; see
also Commerce, Manufacturing.

Ecuador, 33.

Education, I59f., 222, 391 ; state con-
trol over, 61, 209, 270-272, 276,

480

INDEX

312, 386-389, 396f., 400-402, 424;
clerical control over, i6f., 45-55,
61-64, 190, 195, 203*-, 209, 225-
227, 284, 386, 396.

Emden, 430.

Emigration, see population prob-
lems.

Engels, Socialist writer, 97.

England (Anglo-Saxon, Great Brit-
ain), agriculture, 85-88, 98-100;
colonial expansion, 6, 140-155,
165-186, 3i8f., 325-346, 356, 361-
375, 378-38o, 440; commerce, 30,
88, 98-100, 140-143, 147-153, 209,
428-430; Industrial Revolution,
7-9, 85-100; workingmen, 11-15,
84-90, 94-98, 238, 391-395 ; popu-
lation problem, 8sf., 97, 100, 140,
149, 317-322; sea power (navy),
7, 28, 32-34, 41. ioo, 314, 43of.,
439-442, 45off., 465, 467; non-
military character of, 84!., 94,
97, loo, 4O3f., 428-430; Parlia-
mentary Reform, 86-94, °6,
i84f., 391-395; World War,
428-431, 435-454, 456f-, 460-
472.

Enlightened Despotism, 2, 16, 19-21,
44ff., 53ff., 83, 88, 270-272.

Entails, see Primogeniture.

Entente (Anglo-French Agreement)
of 1904, 331, 335-337, 344-346,
430-471.

Epirus, 41, 348, 419.

"Equality," see French Revolution.

Eugenie, Empress, 212.

Factories, see Industrial Revolution,

Manufacturing, Workingmen.
Factory Acts, 94ff.
Falkland Islands, Battle of, 43of.
Falloux, French Minister, 2O3f.
Farragut, Admiral, 241.
Fashoda, 335-337-
Favre, Jules, 206.
February Revolution (1848), 96,

174, 194-106, 223, 225, 248f.,

280, 406.
Fellaheen (Egyptian peasants),

328-330.

Fenians, 175, 178, 183.
Ferdinand I of Austria (1835-48),

407.
Ferdinand VII of Spain (1807-

1833), 3i, 54-
Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies

(1830-59), 249, 254-

Ferdinand I of Bulgaria (1887-
1918), 418, 462.

Ferry, Jules, French Minister, 354,
386, 388.

Feudalism, see Landed Property.

Fiji Islands, 355.

Finland, 452.

Flanders, 437.

Flaubert, French author, 225.

Florence, 2561.

Foch, Ferdinand, 460.

Food-supply, .see Population prob-
lem.

Formosa, 162, 354.

Fourth Estate, 187-314; see also
Workingmen, Socialism.

France: Revolution of 1789, 11-18,
25-27, 53ff., 89-91, 93, 189, iSiff.,
225, 384f., 405; Napoleon I
(1799-1815), 25-27, 57, 117, 200,
25of., 389; Louis XVIII (1815-
24), 25-27, 58-63; Charles X
(1824-30), 63-66, 91, 116-118,
100, 192; Louis Philippe (1830-
48), 66-68, 123, i89f., 192-195,
200, 385; Second Republic
(1848-52), 197-207,223-225; Na-
poleon III, Second Empire
(1852-70), 200-213, 2231., 251-
253, 256-258, 293, 296 f., 303-308,
352, 382, 389f; Commune
(1871), 383-385; Third Republic
(1870- ), 353-355, 382-391; agri-
culture, 115, 208, 426; colonies,
65, 112-128, 327-347, 352-355,
430; manufactures, 58, 189,
1911. 319-321, 472f. ; peasants,
12-14, 58, 115, 472f. ; population
problems, 58, 125-127, 319, 469;
workingmen, 66, 68, 125-127,
100-199, 201-204, 209, 223ff., 381-
384.

France, Anatole, 388.

Francis II of the Two Sicilies
(1859-61), 2541.

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 421 f.

Francis Joseph, 253, 4O7ff., 431.

Fraternity, see French Revolution.

Frederick II, the Great (1740-86),
266.

Frederick William III (1797-1840),
26, 280, 285.

Frederick William IV (1840-61),
28off., 287!?.

Frederick Charles, Prussian Prince,
304-

INDEX

481

French Revolution of 1789, econo-
mic consequences, 11-15, 4?2f . ;
ideas of, 25, 53ff., 89-91, 93, 189,
191 f., 194; panic caused by, 16-
18, 225, 384f., 405; see also
February and July Revolutions.

Froschweiler, Battle of, 306.

Fugitive Slave Law, 233.

Fukien Province, China, 354.

"Gag-rule," 234.

Galicia (Polish), 80, 405, 408, 436,
444f., 457.

Gallicanism, 64, 225.

Gallieni, French General, 435.

Gallipoli, 447.

Gambetta, Leon, 306, 308, 331, 386.

Guarantees, Law of Papal, 258!.

Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 249, 252-257,
308.

Garrison, William Lloyd, 232f.

Gaza, 463.

Geneva Award, 247.

Genoa, 249, 251.

Gentz, German publicist, 139.

George V of England (1910- ), 150.

Georgia (U.S.), 237, 242f.

Georgia (Caucasus), 134-136.

Germany, 261-314, 395-402, 412-472;
Confederation of 1815 (1815-
1866), 261-263, 276-279, 285-297,
300 ; North German Federation
(1867-71), 297-303; German
Empire (1871-1918), 309-314,
322-327, 395-402, 468; Republi-
can Revolution (1918), 451, 468;
Kaiser William II, 416, 427, 468 ;
colonies and colonial policy,
325-327, 335, 339-342, 344-347,
430, 440, 467, 469; commerce,
276-279, 322-326, 397, 438; edu-
cation, 273f., 396f., 400; manu-
facturers and industrial develop-
ment, 276-279, 320-326, 399-402,
4i6f., 426-428, 438, 451 ; mili-
tarism, 311-314, 400-402, 424-
430, 432-435, 470; population,
317-324, 40of. ; unification of,
261-263, 276-279, 285-314, 397f.;
Socialism in, 291, 395-402, 425,
4/jsf., 468.

Gettysburg, Battle of, 242.

Ghent, 437, 466.

Gladstone, 175-184, 391.

Goeben, 441.

Gok-Tepe, 138.

Gold Discoveries, 231, 363-365, 369,

372.

Gordon, English General, 336.
Gorizia, 449, 464.
Gottingen University, 271 f.
Grabbe, Russian General, 135.
Grain, see Agriculture, Corn Laws.
Grant, General, 241-243.
Gravelotte, Battle of, 307.
Great Britain, see England.
Great Mogul, 145, 147, 150.
Greece, 28, 36-43, 213, 275, 404, 415,

4i9f., 446, 461 f.
Grodek, Battle of, 436.
Grodno, Fortress of, 445.
Guadaloupe Hidalgo, Treaty of, 231.
Guam, 376.
Guelf, 302, 396.
Guiana, 379, 388.
Guilds, 12, 83.
Guinea, 335, 340.
Guizot, French Minister, 189, 192-

194, 251.
Gurkhas, 147.

Hadschi-Achmed of Constantine,

ii9ff.

Hague, 72, 425, 433.
Haller, German historian, 274.
Ham, Fortress of, 200.
Hamburg, 340.
Hanover, 261, 266f., 271 f., 278, 294-

298,302,310.
Hanseatic Towns, 278.
Hardenberg, Prussian Minister, 267,

269.

Hastings, Marquis of, 141.
Haussmann, Baron, 208.
Havana, 375.

Havelpck, English General, 147.
Hawaiian Islands, 375, 378.
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 379.
Hebel, German writer, 113.
Hedjaz, 463.

Heine, German writer, 191-194.
"Henry V," Count of Chambord,

62, 385.

Heligoland, 340.
Herat, 145.

Herzegovina, 4i2f., 418,
Hesse-Cassel, 266, 278, 297.
Hesse-Darmstadt, 278, 297.
Hetairia, 38.

Hindenburg, German General, 437.
Hindenburg Line, 465.
Hindus, I42ff., 365^

482

INDEX

History, if., 3f., 26f., 37f., 211, 272,

423, 427, 472f.
Holland (Dutch), 6, 34, 37, 69, 71,

74, 88, I54-IS7, 327, 338, 355,363,

368-372.

Holstein, 293-299, 347.
"Holy Wars," I2of., 128.
Home Rule, Irish, 176-186.
Homestead Laws, io6f.
Hongkong, 152.
Hovas, 340.
Hue, Treaty of, 353.
Hugo, Victor, 206.
Humanitarianism, 19-21, 86-92, I42f.,

149, 195, 204f., 2o8f., 229, 232ff.,

319, 338-340, 38iff., 433f-, 453-

456.
Hygiene, 9, 13, 208, 318-320.

Ibrahim Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt,
4of.

Ideas of 1789, see French Revolu-
tion.

Immigration, see Population Prob-
lems.

Imperial Conferences, 373f.

Imperialism, economic, 315-373.

Indemnities, (1815) 59; (1866)
296; (1871) 309, 311; (1897)
415; (1918) 459J (1919) 468ff.

Industrial Revolution, 7-10, 84ff.,
167, 317-324, 415, 42iff., 472f.,
see also Manufacturing, Work-
ingmen.

Infallibility, Papal, 226f.

Inheritance, Law of, see Landed
Estates.

Intervention, 25-26, 30-56, 72ff.

Inkerman, Battle of, 218.

Inquisition, 45, 54, 56.

Intellectuals, 53, 64, no, 117, 149!,
192, 2o6ff., 221, 28off., 320-324,
400-402, 457; see also Liberals.

Intelligentsia, 221, 264.

Intervention, 25-26, 30-56, 72ff.

Inventions, industrial, 7ff., 318-324,
425f.; medical, 13, 208, 318-320,
379; military, 161, 241, 324,
434f., 449, 453-455, 457-

Ionian Islands, 37, 41.

Ireland, 85, 99f., lo8f., 165-186, 264,

393f-

Islam, see Mohammedanism.
Ismail Pasha, 3296?., 336.
Isonzo River, 444.
I stria, 256, 258, 443.
Italia Irredenta, 258.

Italy, 7, 38, 44-51, 248, 317; unifi-
cation of, 227, 248-258; since
1870, 389, 403, 408, 410, 418; in
World War, 43 if., 443f., 449.
464-468; colonies, 325f., 333f.,
338, 342-344, 347-350, 356.

Iturbide, 33.

Ivangorod, Fortress of, 445.

Ivory Coast, 335.

Jaffa, 463.

James II of England, 182.

Jameson, Dr. Leander Starr, 341,

Janina, 419.

Janizaries, 43, 116.

Jansenism, 226.

Japan, 5, 133, 154-164, 355-36o, 416-

418, 440.

Jaures, French Socialist, 387.
Jellachich, Croatian "Ban," 407.
Jemmapes, Battle of, 66.
Jena, Battle of, 265-268, 273, 281.
Jericho, 463.
Jerusalem, 463.
Jesuits, 63f., 190, 275, 397.
Jews, 124, 126, 263, 267, 273, 388f.,

392, 413.

Joffre, General, 435.
Johannesburg, 369^
John VI of Portugal, 34.
John, Archduke, Administrator, 287.
John, Negus of Abyssinia, 342.
Johnson, President Andrew, 245.
Johnston, Confederate General, 243.
oseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, 31.
fosephism, 225.
foubert, Boer General, 369.
[ournal des Debats, 209.
July Monarchy (Louis Philippe),

66-68, 123, 189-195, 200.
July Revolution (1830), 6sf., 116,

189, 192; effects of, 71-82, 9if.
Junkers (Prussian Squires), 289ff.,

299, 327.
Juntas, 31.
Jutland, Battle of, 45of.

Kabyle Tribesmen, 119, I2iff.

Kaffirs, 369.

Kamerun, 335, 340, 440.

Kars, 136, 219.

Kashgaria, 134.

Kentucky, 239, 241.

Kerensky, Russian Minister, 457f.

Khedive," 3296*.

Khiva, i36ff.

INDEX

483

Khroumirs, 119, 333.

Kiakta, 134.

Kiaochau, 356, 440.

Kiel, 293, 468.

Kiev, 459.

Kimberley, 368-370.

Kirghiz Tribes, i36f.

Kirk-Kilisse, Battle of, 419.

Kitchener, General, 336, 370.

Klephts, 38.

Kodok (Fashoda), 337.

Koniggratz (Sadowa), Battle of,

256, 296, 314-
Konigsberg, 436.
Korea, 133, 159-161, 357*-
Kossuth, Louis, 4O7f.
Kovel, Battle of, 45<>.
Krasnik, Battle of, 436.
Kronstadt, 219, 390.
Kruger, Paul, 369^
Kriigersdorp, 370.
Kwang-S , Chinese Regent, 356.
Ku Klux Klan, 245.
Kuldja, 134.
Kulturkampf, 397*-
Kumanovo, 219
Kut-el-Amara, battles of, 447, 462.

Labor Legislation, see Workingmen,
Legal Equality.

Ladysmith, Siege of, 370.

Laharpe, tutor of Alexander I, 75.

La Marmora, Italian General, 256.

Lamartine, French writer, 198, 2Oof.

Lancashire, 238.

Land League, Irish, 178-180, i82f.

Landed-Estates, Landowners, 11-14.
57-68, 75-77, ijoff., 157*-, 163,
184, 259f., 263-273, 280-284, 39i-
395, 399-402, 404-412, 472f.

Langensalza, Battle of, 296.

Lauenburg, 294.

Lausanne, Treaty of, 350.

League of Nations, 470.

Ledru-Rollin, French Radical, 201 ff.

Lee, Robert E., 236f., 239, 241-243.

Legal Equality, 11-15, 27, 44f., 53,
57ff., 82ff., I04ff., 127, 244ff.,
250, 26;ff., 279, 287, 369, 372,
395ff. ; see also Liberalism,
Serfdom, Suffrage.

Legislatures, Legislative control, see
Constitutions, Parliament.

Lemaitre, French writer, 388.

Lemberg, Battles of, 436, 445.

Lenau, German poet, no.

Lenin (Ulianov), Bolshevist leader,

457.
Leopold I of Belgium (1831-1865),

74.
Leopold II of Belgium (1865-1909),

339-

Leopold of Hohenzollern, 307!
Leroy-Beaulieu, French historian,

131-

Lesseps, Ferdinand, 329, 339, 379.

Liao-Yang, Battle of, 358.

Liberal Unionists, 181, 185, 394.

Liberals, Liberalism, in England, 87,
90-92, QSf., loo, 175, 177-185,
39iff. ; in France, 64-68, 117,
itigfi., 223-225, 38iff. ; in Prus-
sia-Germany, 2636% 395-402; in
Russia, 75ff., 452f., 457ff. ; in
Italy, 248-259; in Japan, is6f. ;
see also Constitutions, Parlia-
ments, Intellectuals, Legal
Equality.

Liberia, 342.

Liberty, idea of, see French Revolu-
tion.

Liege, 432.

Li-Hung-Chang, 162, 354.

Lincoln, Abraham, 235, 239-245.

Lisbon, 34.

Lissa, Battle of, 256, 314.

Lister, English surgeon, 319.

Liverpool, 92.

Lodz, 76.

Lombardy-Venetia, 45f., 249, 252.

London, 73, 86, 148, 181, 202, 373,
382, 419.

Lorraine, see Alsace-Lorraine.

Louis XVI (1774-1793), 61, 65.

Louis XVIII (1814-24), 25-27,58-63.

Louis Philippe (1830-48), 66-68, 123,
i89f., 192-195, 200, 385.

Louisiana, 115, 242.

Lucknow, Siege of, I46f.

Ludendorff, German General, 466.

Liile Burgas, Battle of, 419.

Lusitania, 453 f.

Lutherans, 27of., 284.

Luxemburg, 432.

Lvov, Russian Prince, 452.

Lynch Law, 246.

Macao, 151.

Macaulay, T, B., 89.

MacMahpn, French General and

President, 123, 307, 384.
McKinley, William, 375.
Macedonia, 413, 418-420.

484

INDEX

Madagascar, 34of.

Madras, 142, 148,

Madrid, 56.

Mafeking, 370.

Magyars, 4O4ff. ; see also Austria-
Hungary.

Mahdi, 336.

Mahon, English General, 446.

Mahrattas, 142.

Maine, Battleship, 375.

Majuba Hill, Battle of, 369.

Malaria, 379-

Malta, 332.

Malthus, English economist, 8.

Manchester, 91, 98.

Manchu Dynasty, 359.

Manufacturing. Industry, Manufac-
turers, 58, 83-100, 163, 189-192,
2o8ff., 236ff., 273f-, 276-279, 317-
326, 399-402, 4i6f., 426-428, 438,
451, 472; see also Industrial
Revolution, Workingmen.

Manchuria, 161, 356-358.

Manila, Battle of, 376.

Manin, Italian patriot, 248.

Marat, French revolutionist, 191.

March Revolution (1848), 281, 284,
4o6f.

Marchand, French officer, 335f.

Marie, French Minister.

Marne, Battles of the, 435 f-, 4°off.

Marshal Islands, 440.

Mars-la-Tour, Battle of, 307.

Marx, Karl, 97, 382, 457-

Mascara (Algeria), npf., 122.

Massachusetts, 232.

Massowah, 342f.

Masurian Lakes, Battles of, 437-

Matabeleland, 341.

Maude, Frederick S., General, 463.

Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico,
240, 247.

"May Laws," 397f.

Maynooth College, Ireland, 173.

Mazzini, Italian patriot, 249.

Mecca, 120, 463.

Mecklenburg, 278, 283.

Medicine, see Inventions.

Mediterranean Sea, 36-38, 1121., 119,
127, 216, 251, 327, 329ff., 350,
403ff., 431, 454-

Mehemet AH, 40, 329f., 335.

Mekong River, 353f.

Menelek of Abyssinia, 342-344.

Mesopotamia, 447, 462f., 471.

Messina, 249, 254.

Merv Oasis, 138.

Methodists, 183, 394.

Metternich, 40, 114, 248, 257, 275,
284.

Metz, Siege of, 3o6f.

Mexico, 33, 156, 230!, 233, 240,
247.

Middle-class, see Bourgeoisie.

Mignet, French historian, 66.

Mikado, 156-158, 163.

Milan, 47, 248f.

Militarism, military service, 311-314,
424-430; Prussia, 265-268, 275f.,
281, 289ff., 295f., 299-306, 311-
314; in Germany, 311-324, 400-
402, 424-430, 432-435, 470; in
France, 60, 186, 387*!, 470; in
Japan, I57f.; absence of milita-
rism in England and United
States, 186, 236-243, 248, 363,
366f., 378-380, 403f., 428-430,
470.

Miliukov, Russian Minister, 417.

Millerand, French Minister, 387.

Mincio, 249, 253.

Mir, Russian village community,
222, 417.

Mississippi River and Valley, 103,
io6f., 109, 174, 237, 24if.

Missolonghi, 40.

Missouri Compromise, 230, 234.

Mobilization, demobilization, 304,
424-427, 434, 465, 467.

Modena, 47, 71, 250, 253.

Mogador, 122.

Mohammedans, Islam, U3ff., I35ff.,
I46f., I49f«, 33iff-, 344, 349, 421 J
see also Arabia, Turkey.

Moldavia, 39, 42, 219, 450.

Mole, French Minister, 123.

Moltke, Hellmuth von, 295, 311,

Monasteries, see Church lands.

Monastir, 462.

Mongolia, 134.

Monitor, 241.

Monroe Doctrine, 33, 240, 247, 379.

Montenegro, 4i2f., 419-421, 426,
446.

Morea (Peloponnesus), 39-41-

Morny, French Minister, 205.

Morocco, H2f., 121 f., 128, 326, 334,
337, 342, 344-347-

Mortality, see Population.

Moscow, 357.

Mukden, Battle of, 358.

Muraview, 133.

INDEX

485

Mutsu-Hito, I58ff.

Nagasaki, 154.

Nanking, 152, 154.

Naples, 47-52, 69, 78, 249, 254f., 259.

Napoleon, see Bonaparte, France.

Narva, 459.

Nassau, 296f.

National Liberal Party in Germany,

3oof., 396-399.

Nationalities, National Movements,
36-51, 54, 69-81, 109, I2;f., 1491.,
165-186, 248-258, 262, 285-314,
356, 367, 382, 38;f., 404-411, 43i,
443, 450, 452.

Negroes, 241-246; see Slavery.
Negus, Emperor of Abyssinia, 342.
Nesselrode, Russian diplomat, 43.
Netherlands, see Holland.
New Caledonia, 355, 385. b38f.
New England, io7f., 229f., 232f.,
New Guinea, 355, 440.
New Jersey, 235.
New Mexico, 231.
New Orleans, 241 f.
New South Wales, 363.
New Zealand, 9, 3i8f., 363-367.
Nice, 249, 253f.

Nicholas I of Russia (1825-55), 40,
73, 77, 79, 130, 132, 2i2f., 216-
219.
Nicholas II (1894-1917), 390, 417,

445, 452.
Niger, 334, 339-
Nikolaievsk, 133.
Nikolsburg, peace preliminaries of,

296.

Nile River, 335f-, 339f-, 343-
Nish, 446.

Nobles, Nobility, Junkers, n-i5,
44ff., 58-64, 67, 75ff., 87, I3of.,
i58f., 195, 215, 22if., 225, 239,
263-272, 276, 279-284, 301 f., 397,
401-402; see also Landowners,
Primogeniture.
"Non expedit," 259.
"Non possumus," 256.
North America, 9, 29, 33, 115; see
also Canada, Mexico, United
States.

North German Federation, 297-303.
North Sea, 114, 454; see also

Blockade.

Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 105.
Nova Scotia, 367.
Novara, Battle of, 249.

Novo Georgievsk, Fortress of, 445.
Nuremberg, 296.

O'Brien, William Smith, 169.

O'Connell, Daniel, 169-172.

O tobrist Party, 417.

Odessa, 38.

Odschaks, 116.

Officers, officers' revolts, 47*?-, 55,

215, 267f., 399, 402; see also

Militarism.
Ohio, 105, 233.
Old Catholics, 396.
Oldenburg, 278.
Ollivier, French Minister, 307.
Omdurman, 336.
Opium, Opium Wars, 148, I5if.,

I55f.

Oran (Algeria), 119, 122, 127, 337.
Orange Free State, Orange Colony,

368f., 37i.

Orangemen (Ireland), 182, 186.
Oregon Territory, 301.
Orenburg, 136, 138.
Orleanists, 66, 201, 204, 386.
Orsini, 251.
Ottawa, 373-

Otto I of Greece (1832-62), 42.
Oudh, 146.

Oudinot, French General, 202.
Owen, Robert, 95.

Pacific Ocean, 32, 133, 231, 327, 355,
374f., 379-

Pale (Ireland), 165.

Palermo, 249.

Pamir, 139.

Panama, 34, 378f.

Papacy, Pope, 45ff., 202, 225-227,
248-259, 303, 389, 396f . ; see also
Church.

Paris, 62, 66, 82, 127, 172, 174, 191-
203, 208, 210, 219, 280, 286, 307f.,
376, 383f., 389, 406, 435.

Parliaments, Legislatures, Parlia-
mentary Reform : in Austria,
402-412; in England, 86-94, 166,
176-186, 391-395; in France,
58ff., 66ff., 192-208, 38sff.; in
Japan, 163 ; in Prussia-Germany,
280-292, 300-303, 3091. ; see also
Constitutions, Suffrage.

Parma, 47, 70, 253.

Parnell, Charles Stuart, 176-184.

Pasteur, Louis, 319.

486

INDEX

"Pays Legal" 60, 190, 192.
Peasants, 12-14, 58-64, 75, 79, 98, 105-

109, 131-133, 157, 167-183, 221-

222, 224, 263, 265, 268f., 283!.,

356f., 372f., 404, 417, 458, 469,

472f. ; see also Agriculture,

Landed Estates.
Peel, Sir Robert, 99, 172.
Pegu, 142, 146.
Peking, I33f., 161, 354, 360.
Pendjeh, 138.
Peronne, Battle of, 449.
Perovski, 137.

Persia, 134, 136, I38f., 144*-, 449-
Pescadores Islands, 162, 354.
Peterloo, 91.
Petrograd, St. Petersburg, 79, 215,

221, 452, 457-
Phanariots, 38f.
Philadelphia, 233, 242.
Philippines, 376f.
Piave, 464f.
Picquart, 388.

Piedmont, 2i8f., 249!., see also Italy.
Pindari raids, 142.
Pirates, 37, 65, 112-118, 136.
Pius IX (1846-78), 202, 226, 249ff.
Pius X (1903-14), 389-
Plebiscites, 205-208, 224, 253-255,

297f., 470.

Plechanov, Russian Socialist, 458.
Plevna, Siege of, 412.
Plombieres, 252.
Plutocracy, 83f., 89**., 97, 106, 282,

394; see also Landowners,

Manufacturers.
Pocket Boroughs, 86, 89.
Poland, 37, 7*, 75-8 1, 266, 293, 302,

396, 405, 4o8f., 436, 444f«, 452,

467, 470.

Polignac, French Minister, 65.
Population problems, food supply, 6,

8-14, 99-100, 107-109, 124-128,

I49f., i63f., 167, I73f«, 185, 283f.,

317-324, 363-366, 40off., 425f-,

469, 472f.

Port Arthur, i6if., 356-358.
Port Said, 329.
Porto Rico, 376f.
Portsmouth, Treaty of, 358.
Portugal, 3, 6, 30, 33f-, 55, 141,

327, 338f., 34i, 369.
Potatoes, opf., 167, I7if., 191.
Potomac River, 241.
Prague, 256, 297, 465.
Press, newspapers, freedom of,

60, 63, 65, 68, 80, ipof., 209,

269f., 276, 292, 386, 398, 400,
407f., 417.

"Prestige," 117, 210, 2i2f., 219,
242, 251, 303, 305f., 342, 438.

Pretoria, 369, 371.

Pretorius, Boer pioneer, 369.

Primogeniture, Entails, 11-15, 20,
45, 52, 329; in Austria, 275,
4O4f. ; in England, 82; in
France, 57, 62, 67; in Prussia,
264, 269, 282; in Russia, I3of.,

215, 404f..

Princip, Bosnian assassin, 421.

Privateers, 240, 247.

Privilege, system of, see Land-
owners, Manufacturers, Plutoc-
racy, Primogeniture.

Prohibition of alcohol, 232, 436,
458.

Proletariate, see Workingmen.

Pronunciamentos, 33, 55.

Progressives, see Liberals, Radicals.

Propaganda, "Defeatism," 243, 442,
45i, 459f.

Property rights, see Landowners,
Primogeniture.

Protestants (Anglicans, Dissenters,
Lutherans, Quakers), 82f., 87,
90, 95, 132, 167, 170, 175, i83f.,
193, 232, 27of., 284, 340, 392,
394-

Prussia, 25, 43, 70, 73-76, 79, 108, 163,

216, 218, 221 f., 225f., 253, 256,
261-314; East Elbian territory,
108, 263-265, 279, 281-285; ri-
valry with Austria, 261-263,
282-297, 403, 409, 439, 472 ; agri-
culture, 263-265, 283; army,
265-268, 275f., 289f., 295f., 299,
301-313; bureaucracy and no-
bility, 108, 263-272, 279-282,
29off., 30of., 472; see also Ger-
many.

Pruth River, 39.
Przemysl, Siege of, 436, 444f.
Punjab, I42f., 146-149.
Puritan, 132, 183, 193, 232.

Quakers, 99, 183, 232.

Radetzky, Austrian General, 249.

Radicals, Reds, 77f., 91 ff., 09, 199,
223f., 384, 394; see also Social-
ists.

Railways, 3, 7, 92, 103, 106, 127, 147,
156, 163, 189, 2o8f., 236, 243,

INDEX

487

251, 280, 284, 356f., 372, 444,
465, 467.

Raw materials, 7, 115, 117, 148, 215,
231, 236, 239, 3175., 325f., 375,
401, 426, 439, 455, 461 J coal, 7,
83, 87, 103, 163, 167, 259, 322,
434; cotton, 163, 228-230, 236-
239, 244, 328, 439; iron, 7, 103,
167, 322; wool, 7.

Realism, 224f.

Realpolitik, 288, 290.

"Reconstruction" in the South,
245f.

Red Cross, 433.

Reds, Radicals, 77f., 91 ff., 99, 199,
223f., 384; see also Socialists.

Reform Bills in England, 92!, 95!.,
143, 170, 39iff.

Religion, 16-18, 36, 59, 63f., 142!.,
I49f., 159, 2i7ff., 269, 271 f., 386,
404, 4i3f., 452 ; see also Church,
Mohammedans.

Republics, republicanism, n, 15, 29,
66, 71, 75, 175, 186, 192-207, 212,
223f., 228, 239, 249, 287, 308,
359, 382-391, 465, 468.

Reunion Island, 340.

Rhodes, Cecil, 341, 369.

Richmond, Va., 235, 237, 241.

Riego, Spanish General, 55f.

"Right to work," 193, 197, 223.

Rights, see Legal equality.

Roberts, Lord, 37of.

Robespierre, 191.

Romanovs, see Russia.

Romanticism, 6if., 68, 225, 277.

Rome, 45, 203, 225-227, 248-259, 284,
303, 389, 396ff. ; see also Church.

Roosevelt, Theodore, 358.

Roon, German Minister, 289, 311.

Rumania, 39, 41, 217, 219, 404, 410,
413, 420, 450, 459-

Russia, 6, 25, 75-81 ; Alex, nder I
(1801-25), 26, 36, 40, 75-77, 80,
213; Nicholas I (1825-55), 40,
73, 77, 79, 130, 132, 2i2f., 216-
219; Alexander II (1855-81),
219, 22if. ; Alexander III (1881-
94), 390; Nicholas II (1894-
1917), 390, 417, 445, 452;
Soviets, 452!., 457-460; absolu-
tism and liberalism, 75-81, I3off.,
2i2f., 216, 220-222, 402, 416-418,
451-453, 457*.; colonial expan-
sion, 129-139, 356-358; popula-
tion, 129-132, 317, 319; Balkan
ambitions, 36-43, 213-221, 314,

389f ., 402-405, 412-423 ; in World
War, 426-429, 436!., 439, 441,
444-^53, 457-460, 470-473.

Saarburg, Battle of, 434.

Sadowa (Koniggratz) Battle of,

256, 296, 314.
Said of Egypt, 328f.
Saigon, 352f.

Saint Germain, Treaty of, 471.
Saint Mihiel, Battle of, 461, 465.
St. Petersburg (Petrograd), 79,

215, 221, 452, 457-
Saint Quentin, Battles of, 460,

465.

Salonica, 412, 446, 461.
Sambre, Battle of the, 466.
Samoa, 355, 378.
Samurai, I57f., 160.
San Domingo, 377.
San Francisco, 156, 231,
San Stephano, Treaty of, 413.
Santiago, Battle of, 376.
Sardinia, Kingdom of, see Italy.
Sarrail, French General, 446.
Savannah, 243.
Savoy, 253.
Saxony, 266, 278f., 288, 294, 296,

409.

Scandinavians, 108, 319,
Schamyl, 135.
Scharnhorst, 267.
Scheldt River, 71, 73, 466.
Schleswig, 293-299.
Schopenhauer, 224.
Scott, General Winfield, 231.
Scutari, 420, 466.
Sea-Power, Navy, 7, 28, 32-34, 41,

loo, 236, 314, 354, 43of., 439-

442, 45off., 465, 467.
Sebastopol, Fortress of, 213, 217-

219.
Secession, War of, 106, 175, 235-246,

314, 378, 444.
Sedan, Battle of, 3O7f., 382, 434,

466.
Semmelweiss, Austrian physician,

319.

Senegal River, 334.
Serajevo, 422.
Serbia, 41 f., 4O5f., 407, 412-415, 418-

423, 426, 431, 444-446, 448, 462,

471.
Serfs, serfdom, 75f., 131 f., 214, 221 f.,

269.

Sevres, Treaty of, 471.
Shantung, 356.

INDEX

Sherman, General W. T., 242f.

Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 161.

Shogun, 155-158.

Siam, 354.

Siberia, 6, 129, 131-134, 136, 139,

356f., 457-
Sikhs, I46f., 150.
Silesia, 269, 279, 290.
Sinn-Fein, 186.
Sinope, Battle of, 217.
Skagerrak, Battle of, 45of.
Skobelev, Russian General, 138.
Slavery, 19-21, 88, 196, 221 ; in

America, 34, io6f., no, 228-245,

376; in Africa, 20, 23, 336, 338-

341, 368; in Asia, 136-138, 143-
Slovaks, 465, 471 ; see also Czechs.
Smyrna, 38, 42.
Socialism, Socialists, 971., 193-198,

201-204, 223f., 291, 381-402, 417,

425, 442f., 457-
Soissons, Battle of, 460.
Solferino, Battle of, 253.
Sombart, German economist, quoted,

323-

Somme, Battles of the, 448, 451.
Song-Ka River, 353.
South Africa, 9, 327*?., 368-372,

440.

South America, 29-35, 4°, 123, 318.
South Carolina, 235, 237.
South Germany, 278, 283, 3O2f.,

3<>5f., 309, 367-

Southwest Africa, 340, 440.

Soviet Government, 452, 457.

Spain, 6,28-35, 37f-, 52-56, 112-114,
127, 212, 305, 345f., 375f.

Spec, German Admiral, 430.

Spichern, Battle of, 430.

Squatters, 105.

"Standardization," 322.

Stanley, H. M., 339.

Steam Power, 3, 7ff., 83-85, 92, 157,
321 ; see also Industrial Revolu-
tion.

Stein, Prussian Minister, 267.

Stolypin, Russian Minister, 417.

Strasbourg, 200, 308.

Students, 194, 221 f., 406; see also
Universities.

Submarines, 324, 431, 439, 441 f., 453-
457, 466f., 469.

Suez Canal, 114, 329, 331, 337, 441,

447, 463-

Suffrage : in England, 86-94, 96, 143,
170, 391-395; in France, 58f.,
62f., 67, 190, 192, 194, 224, 386;

in Japan, 163; in Prussia, 280-
282, 309, 399, 453; elsewhere,
260, 381, 399, 4o6f., 411, 452.

Sussex, 454.

Switzerland, 66, 71, 308, 319, 346,
395, 398, 457-

"Syllabus," Papal, 226, 256.

Syndicalism, 387.

Syria, 112, 349, 463, 471.

Tahiti, 355-
Taku, 161.
Talleyrand, 73.
Tamerlane, 137.
Tananarive, 341.
Tanganyika, Lake, 339, 34L
Tangier, 122, 344.
"Tanks," 449.

Tannenberg, Battle of, 437.
Tariffs, tariff policy, 90, 126, 134,
156, 162, 189, 209, 229f., 235,
238, 273, 277-279, 302f., 309, 362,
415, 428.

Tarim Valley, 134.
Tegetthoff, Admiral, 266.
Tennessee, 241 f., 245.
Tewfik, Khedive of Egypt, 330.
Texas, 23of., 242.
Thibet, 417.
Thiers, Adolphe, 6sf., 123, 205, 257,

3051., 310, 383, 385.
Tien-Tsin, 134, 353 f., 356.
Tigris River, 447, 462.
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 103.
Togpland, 340, 440.
Tokio, 156, 158, 160.
Tongking, 353-355-
Tories, 87, 9O-93, 97-ico, 170, 392.
Toulon, 125, 257.
Transportation, see Commerce,

Railways.

Transvaal, 368-371, 440.
Treaties (arranged chronologically)

Vienna (1815), 25-28, 212

Akkerman (1826), 41

Adrianople (1829), 42f.

Turcomanchai (1828), 136

Nanking (1842), 151 f., 154

Guadaloupe Hidalgo (1848), 231

Clayton-Bulwer (1850), 378

Paris (1856), 219

Zurich (1859), 253

Anglo-French Commercial (1860),
209

Turin (1860), 253

Prusso-Italian (1866), 256, 295

INDEX

489

Treaties (arranged chronologically)

Prague (1866), 256, 297

Prusso-South German (1866),
297, 302, 305

Frankfort (1871), 309-312

Saigon (1874), 353

San Stephano (1878), 413

Berlin (1878), 4i3f.

Anglo-Boer (1881, 1884), 369

Triple Alliance (1882), 334, 348-
350, 418, 428, 431

Bardo (1883), 333

Hue (1883), 353

Reinsurance (1887), 390, 416

Ucciali (1889), 342ff.

Anglo-German (1890), 340

Anglo-Portuguese (1890), 341

Anglo-Italian (1891), 343

Franco-Russian (1891*?.), 390,
421, 428

Franco-Siamese (1893), 354

Shimonoseki (1895), i6if. .

Addis-Ababa (1896), 344

Paris (1898), 376

Hay-Pauncefote (1901), 379

Pretoria (1902), 371

Anglo-Japanese (1902), 357

Anglo-French Entente (1904),
337, 342, 344, 346

Algeciras (1905-06), 345*. , 348

Portsmouth (1905), 358

Franco-German Moroccan (1911),
346f.

Lausanne (1912), 350

Balkan Alliance (1912), 419, 446

London (1913), 4iQf-

Bucharest (1913), 420

Brest-Litovsk (1917-18), 459*-, 468

Bucharest (1918), 459, 468

Versailles (1919), 468ff.

Saint Germain (1919), 471

Neuilly (^919), 471

Trianon (1920), 471

Sevres (1920), 471

Arbitration treaties, 247, 379ff.,
425, 470

See also Conferences, Congresses.
"Treks," 368f.
Trentino, 258, 431, 444, 464.
Trianon (Versailles), Treaty of,

471-

Tricolor Flag, 66, 197, 385.
Trieste, 256, 258, 431, 464.
Tripolitania, 333, 348-35O, 418.
Trocadero, 56.
Trotzky (Bronstein), 458.
Tchinovniks, 221.

Tsushima, Battle of, 358.

Tudors, 83, 166.

Tuileries, 66, 195, 208, 384.

Tunis, ii3f., 128, 326, 332-335, 337,
342, 348.

Turcomanchai, Treaty of, 136.

Turcomans, 1368.

Turkestan, 134, 136-139, 144-

Turkey, Sultan, Constantinople, 36-
41, Cg, ii3f., 116, 124, 135, 139,
213, 216-219, 275, 313, 326, 328-
332, 348-350, 403, 412-416, 418-
420, 441, 445, 462-464, 47i.

Tuscany, 47, 2491-, 253.

Tyrol, 256, 449, 471.

Ucciali, Treaty of, 342ff.

Uganda, 335.

"Uitlanders," 369.

Ukraine, 77, 449, 459-

Ulster, 176, 181, i8sf.

Ultramontane Party, 225.

Ultra Royalists, 59, 61-63, 66.

Umbria, 255.

"Uncle Tom's Cabin," 233.

"Undesirables," 365*.

United States, 27, 29f., 103-111,
I56f., 228-247, 283, 318, 322, 376,
375-379, 435, 444, 451, 453-457,
46of., 466-470.

Universal military service, see Mili-
tarism.

Universities: Austrian, 274; French
(universite}, 64, 190, 203, 209;
German, 271 f., 368, 400; Irish,
173; Japanese, 159; Russian, 78,
222.

Ural Mountains, 132, 136.

Urga, 134.

Ueskiib, 419.

Van Diemen's Land, 364.

Vatican Council, 226f., 396.

Venetia, Venice, 88, 248, 252f., 255-
257, 273, 295, 297, 444-

Venezuela, 379.

Venizelos, 415, 419, 446", 461.

Verdun, Battles of, 448f.

Verona, 32, 253.

Versailles, 309, 383^, 468ff.

Veuillot, 257.

Vicksburg, 242.

Victor Emmanuel II of Italy (1849-

78), 249, 252-255.
Victoria (Australia), 364.
Victoria, Empress-Queen, 150.

490

INDEX

Vienna, 248, 284, 296, 406-408, 411,
465; Congress of, 18, 25-28, 36,
38, 71*-, 75, 80, 90, 212, 2191.,
239, 275.

Villafranca, Treaty of, 253.

Villele, French Minister, 63f.

Virchow, German surgeon, 397.

Virginia, 229, 236.

Vistula, 78.

Viticulture, wine, 58, 116, 191,
209.

Viviani, French Minister, 381.

Vladivostok, 133, 357.

Volga, 236.

Voltaireanism, 190, 203, 225f.

Wady region, 335.

Wallachia, 42, 219, 450; see also
Rumania.

Waldeck-Rousseau, French Minister,
388.

Wales, 394-

Walfisch Bay, 440.

Warsaw, 75*-, 78, 437, 445-

Washington, D. C, 233, 241.

Watt, James, 7.

Wei-hai-wei, 161, 356.

Wellesley, Arthur, Duke of Welling-
ton, 142.

West Indies, 115, 149* 228, 375,
378.

West Point, 236.

Whigs, 87, 89f., 92, 170, 392.

"Whites" (moderates, property-
owners), 77f.

White (Bourbon) Flag, 385.

White Russia, 77.

Widow burning, 143.

William I, King of Prussia (1861-
88), German Emperor, 281, 288,
305 f., 398.

William II, German Emperor (1888-
1918), 344, 370, 416, 427, 468.

William III of England (1689-

1702), 182.

.Vilson, President, 451, 454, 466-470.
Windthorst, 396.
Woman's suffrage, 367, 395, 452,

472.
Women in industry, 9, 85 f., 94, 392,

399, 472.
Wool, 7.
Workingmen, 11-15, 66, 68, 84-90, 94-

98, 125-127, 190-199, 201-204,

209, 223ff,, 238, 246, 28of., 32of.,

362f., 381-384, 391-396, 398-402,

457*.

"World Power," 424.
World War, 185, 347, 374, 394, 423-

472.

Worth, Battle of, 306.
Wiirtemberg, 278, 303, 309.
Wiirzburg, 296.

Yalu River, 358.

Yang-tse River, 151.

Yedo (Tokio), is6f.

"Young Ireland," 172, 174, 183.

Young Turks, 418.

Ypres, Battles of, 437f., 465.

Ypsilanti, 39.

Yser, Battle of, 437.

Yuan-shi-kai, 359.

Zambesi River, 339, 341.

Zanzibar, 34of.

Zarashan, 137.

Zemstvo, 222.

Zola, French novelist, 388.

Z ollver ein (Tariff Union), 277-270,

204, 303.
Zouaves, 121.
Zulus, 369.
Zurich, 253, 457.

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Fueter, Eduard

Vorld history, 1815-1920

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