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Full text of "The yoga-system of Patañjali; or, The ancient Hindu doctrine of concentration of mind, embracing the mnemonic rules, called Yoga-sutras, of Patañjali, and the comment, called Yoga-bhashya"

rs. 









THE HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES 

VOLUME SEVENTEEN 



HARVARD ORIENTAL SERIES 

EDITED 
WITH THE COOPERATION OF VARIOUS SCHOLARS 

BY 

CHARLES ROCKWELL LANMAN 

PROFESSOR IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY, HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ASIATIC 

SOCIETY OF BENGAL, THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY (LONDON), AND THE 

DEUTSCHE MORGENLANDISCHE GESELLSCHAFT, ETC., CORRESPONDING 

MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND 

OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE (ACADEMIE DES INSCRIPTIONS 

ET BELLES-LETTRES) 

IDolume Seventeen 



CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 

Gbe 1barv>ar> TUntverstts press 

1914 



THE 

YOGA-SYSTEM OF PATANJALI 

r tbe ancient Ibinbu Doctrine of Concentration of flDtnfc 

EMBRACING 

THE MNEMONIC RULES, CALLED YOGA-SUTRAS, OF PATANJALI 

AND 

THE COMMENT, CALLED YOGA-BHASHYA, ATTRIBUTED TO VEDA-VYASA 

AND 

THE EXPLANATION, CALLED TATTVA-VAigARADI, OF VACHASPATI-MigRA 

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSKRIT 

BY 

JAMES HAUGHTON WOODS 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY 



V 



CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 

Gbe 1barvar> ^University press 

1914 



The volumes of this Series may be had, in America, by addressing Messrs. Ginn 
and Company, at New York or Chicago or San Francisco, or at the home-office, 
29 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. ; in England, by addressing Messrs. Ginn & Co., 
9 St. Martin's Street, Leicester Square, London, W.C. ; and in Continental Europe, 
by addressing Mr. Otto Harrassowitz, Leipzig. For the titles and descriptions and 
prices, see the List at the end of this volume. 




17. i- 57 



PRINTED FROM TYPE AT THE 

UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD, ENGLAND 

BY HOKACE HART, M.A. 

PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY 



First Edition, 750 Copies, October, 1914 



HVNC- LIBRVM 

IN MVLTIS ET LONGINQVIS TERRIS 

ELABORATVM ATQVE NVNC DENIQVE CONFECTVM 

SOCIIS- FIDELIBVS 

QVORVM MEMORIA LABOR ILLE FELICITER COMPENSATVR 

ALUS MAGISTRIS OMNIBVS SEMPER AMICIS 

D. 



Xlll 
XV 

xvii 

XX 

xxi 



CONTENTS 

Preface page 

1. Keasons for taking up the work ix 

2. Difficulties of comprehending the work ix 

3. Difficulties of style ix 

4. Translation of technical terms x 

5. Punctuation x 

6. Texts and manuscripts xi 

7. Acknowledgements xi 

' Introduction 

1. Authorship of the Yoga-sutras : The two Patanjalis .... xiii 

2. Tradition of their identity not earlier than tenth century . 

3. Comparison of philosophical concepts does not confirm the tradition 

4. Date of the Sutras (between a. d. 300 and 500) .... 

5. Date of the Bhasya (between a. d. 650 and 850) .... 

6. Date of Vacaspatimicra's Tattva-vaicaradi (about a. d. 800 to 850) 

Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras 

1. Book 1, Concentration (samadhi) xxiv 

2. Book 2, Means of attainment (sadhana) ...... xxv 

3. Book 3, Supernormal powers (vibhati) xxvii 

4. Book 4, Isolation (kaivalya) xxviii 

The Yoga-sutras translated without the Comment or the Explanation 
Being the Sutras translated in groups, with group-headings by translator xxx 



Translation of Patanjali's Yoga-sutras or Mnemonic Eules 
Together with the Comment or Yoga-bhasya, attributed to Veda-vyasa 
And Vacaspatimicra's Explanation or Tattva-vaicaradi 

1. Book 1, Concentration (samadhi) 1 

2. Book 2, Means of attainment (sadhana) 101 

3. Book 3, Supernormal powers (vibhuti) 201 

4. Book 4, Isolation (kaivalya) 297 

Appendixes 

1. Bibliography of works referred to in this volume .... 351 

2. Index of quotations in the Comment, in the order of citation . . 359 

3. Index of the same grouped according to their sources .... 361 

4. Index of quotations in the Tattva-vaicaradi, in the order of citation . 362 

5. Index of the same grouped according to their sources .... 364 

6. Quotations not yet traced to their sources ...... 365 

7. Index of words in the Yoga-sutras 366 



PREFACE 

1. Reasons for taking np the work. It is not without misgiving that one 
ventures to render into English the texts of an intricate system which 
have never, with the exception of the sutras, been translated in Europe 
or America. But the historical importance of those texts, as forming 
a bridge between the philosophy of ancient India and the fully developed 
Indian Buddhism and the religious thought of to-day in Eastern Asia, 
emboldens one to the attempt. For this system, together with the Nyaya 
and Vaicesika systems, when grafted upon the simple practical exhortations 
of primitive Buddhism, serves as an introduction to the logical and meta- 
physical masterpieces of the Mahayana. 

2. Difficulties of comprehending the work. Even after a dozen readings 
the import of some paragraphs is not quite clear, such for example as the 
first half of the Bhasya on iii. 14. Still more intractable are the single 
technical terms, even if the general significance of the word, superficially 
analysed, is clear. This irreducible residuum is unavoidable so long as 
one cannot feel at home in that type of emotional thinking which culmi- 
nates in a supersensuous object of aesthetic contemplation. 

3. Difficulties of style. The Bhasya and, still more, the Tattva-vaicaradi 
are masterpieces of the philosophical style. They are far from being a loosely 
collected body of glosses. Their excessively abbreviated and disconnected 
order of words is intentional. The Mimansa discussed first the meaning of 
words (paddrtha) ; then in a distinct section the meaning of the sentences 
(vdkydrtha) ; and finally and most fully the implication (bhdvartha) of the 
sentences as a whole. Wherever the sentence -form is lacking, I have intro- 
duced in brackets the words needed to make a declarative clause. Much 
more obscurity remains in the bhdvartha section of the Bhasya. For here 
many extraneous technical terms are surreptitiously introduced under the 
guise of exegesis. Thus polemic with an opponent whose name is suppressed 

D [h.o.s. 17] 



Preface [x 

creeps into the argument. The allusions are suggestive, but obviously 
elusive. The passage at iii. 14 might be quite simple if we had before 
us the text which it criticizes. 

4. Translation of technical terms. A system whose subtleties are not 
those of Western philosophers suffers disastrously when its characteristic 
concepts are compelled to masquerade under assumed names, fit enough for 
our linguistic habits, but threadbare even for us by reason of frequent 
transpositions. Each time that Purusa is rendered by the word " soul ", 
every psychologist and metaphysician is betrayed. No equivalent is found 
in our vocabulary. The rendering " Self " is less likely to cause misunder- 
standing. Similarly, and in accordance with the painstaking distinctions 
made at the end of ii. 5, it is most important to remember that the term 
a-vidya, although negative in form, stands for an idea which is not nega- 
tive, but positive. Bearing in mind the express instructions of the text, 
I have adopted " undifferentiated-consciousness " as the translation of avidya. 
Another word, which Professor Garbe discussed more than twenty years 
ago (in his translation of the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya, S. 70, Anm. 1), is 
guna. I prefer to translate this term by " aspect " rather than by " con- 
stituent ", because, in addition to the meanings " quality " and " substance ", 
it often seems to have the semantic value of " subordinate " as correlated to 
pradhdna. Three other words sattva and rajas and tamos seem untrans- 
latable, unless one is content with half -meaningless etymological parallels. 
In another case I have weakly consented to use " Elevation " as equivalent 
to prasamkhyana ; the original word denotes the culmination of a series 
of concentrations; the result is the merging of the Self in the object of 
contemplation. 

5. Punctuation. 1. Quotations from the Sutras are enclosed in single 
angular quotation-marks (< >). 2, Quotations from the Bhasya are enclosed 
in double angular quotation-marks (<K ). 3. Quotations from authorita- 
tive texts are enclosed in ordinary double quotation-marks (" "). 4. Objec- 
tions and questions by opponents, and quotations from unauthoritative texts, 
are enclosed in ordinary single quotation-marks (' '). Hyphens have been 
used to indicate the resolution of compound words. A half -parenthesis on 
its side is used to show that two vowels are printed in violation of the rules 
of euphonic combination (Lanman's Sanskrit Reader, p. 289). 



xi] Preface 

6. Texts and Manuscripts. The text of the sutras of the Yoga system, 
like that of the sutras of all the other five systems, except perhaps the 
Vaicesika, is well preserved; and there is an abundance of excellent 
printed editions. The most accessible and the most carefully elaborated 
of these books is the one published in the Anandacrama Series and edited 
by Kaclnatha Shastri Agace. Variants from twelve manuscripts, mostly 
southern, are printed at the foot of each page ; and Bhojadeva's Vrtti is 
appended ; also the text of the sutras by itself and an index thereto. Another 

y edition, in the Bombay Sanskrit Series, by Rajaram Shastri Bodas, is also an 
excellent piece of work. I have, however, made use of the edition by Svami 
Balarama (Calcutta, Samvat 1947, a.d. 1890; reprinted 1 in Benares a.d. 
1908) because it is based on northern manuscripts and because of the valuable 
notes in the editor's tippana. Of manuscripts, I have collated, with the kind 
permission of the Maharaja, during a charming week's visit at Jammu just 
below the glistening snows above the Pir Panjal, two of the oldest manu- 
scripts in the library of the Baghunath Temple. In Stein's Catalogue these 
are numbered 4375 and 4388 and the former is dated Samvat 1666. Two 
other manuscripts were lent me, one by the courtesy of the most learned 
Gafigadhara Shastri, the other the very carefully written Bikaner manuscript, 
sent to me by the generosity of the Bikaner government, which proved to 
be extremely valuable for disputed readings in the Tattva-vaicaradl. This 
latter manuscript seemed to be about a hundred and fifty years old and is 
described in Rajendralala Mitra's Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the 
Library of His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner (Calcutta, 1880) under 
the number 569. An old Sharada manuscript, which, by the kind mediation 
of Mukundaram Shastri of Shrinagar, was put into my hands, proved, 
upon critical examination, to have been so badly corrupted as, on the whole, 
not to be worth recording. 

7. Acknowledgements. At the end of one's task comes the compensation 
of looking back to old scenes, and to the friends and helpers who have 
watched the progress of the book. First of all I remember the delightful 

1 In the reprint, the pagination is unchanged, but the lines vary a little. Hence there 
are some small apparent inaccuracies in the references. The reprint may be had 
from Harrassowitz in Leipzig ; it is catalogued there as Patanjala-darqanasya 
yoga-tattva. 



\J 






l^Y^\t- 



Preface [xii 

visit on the island of Fohr, where, besides the long friendly walks upon 
the sands, I enjoyed the inestimable opportunity of reciting and reading the 
Yoga-sutras with Professor Deussen. The next winter, at Benares, Mr. Arthur 
Venis opened the doors of the Sanskrit College to me and with the utmost 
generosity smoothed my way through my first winter in India and initiated 
me into the methods of many controversial sutras. Since my return he has 
always been ready to assist, and I thank him for illuminating for me the 
perplexing debate on the sphota in iii. 17. Besides all this I am most 
grateful to him for an introduction to the lamented Shriman Mukunda 
Shastri Adkar, a scholar who has put the wealth of the ancient tradition 
and his own ripe scholarship at my disposal for many years. 
To many other scholars in Benares and in Kashmir and in Poona I wish 
to express my thanks, especially to Dr. Shripad Krishna Belvalkar and to 
Mr. V. V. Sovani. To Professor Arthur W. Ryder, of the University of 
California, I am also much indebted. Furthermore, my thanks are due to 
Colonel George A. Jacob of the Bombay Staff Corps for his courtesy in 
searching after quotations, and to Dr. Frederick W. Thomas of the India 
Office Library for similar favours too many to enumerate or to repay. 
My deepest insight into this system and into what little I know of the 
philosophy of India I owe to Professor Hermann Jacobi of Bonn. Each 
visit to the little city on the Rhine adds to my debt of gratitude to him 
and reveals to me the beauty of the scholar's life. 

On my return from each visit to India I laid the work in its several stages 
before Professor Lanman, my teacher in my student days and now my 
colleague. To him I owe the revision of the manuscript for the press 
and a comparison of most of the translation, either in manuscript or in 
proof, with the original. His rigorous criticism has detected many over- 
sights which strike a fresh pair of eyes more quickly than those of the 
author. For his ready and ungrudging help through many years of 
intimate friendship my hearty thanks. 



James Haughton Woods. 



Harvard University, 
July, 1914. 



INTRODUCTION 

1. Authorship of the Yoga-sutras. Identity of Pataiijali, author of 
the sutras, and of Pataiijali, author of the Mahabhasya, not yet proved. 

The opinion in India and in the West that the author of the Yoga-sutras 
is also the author of the great grammatical comment upon Panini has not 
been traced definitely any farther back than to the tenth century. The 
Yoga-bhasya (about a.d. 650 to 850) makes no statement as to the 
authorship of the Yoga-sutras, unless the benedictory verse at the be- 
ginning be regarded as valid proof that Patanjali wrote the sutras. Still 
less is there any statement in the Yoga-sutras about the author of the 
Mahabhasya. And conversely there is no reference in the Mahabhasya 
to the author of the Yoga-sutras. On the other hand, there is ground 
for believing that the author of the Comment on Yoga-sutra iii. 44 may 
have had the author of the Mahabhasya in mind when he quotes a certain 
formula and ascribes it to Patanjali. This is the only mention of Patanjali 
in the whole Comment. The formula is Ayutasiddha^avayava-bkeda^,anu- 
gatah samuho dravyam; and although it is ascribed to Patanjali (iti 
Patanjalih), it has not been found in the Mahabhasya. Nevertheless the 
Yoga-bhasya does here seem to contain an allusion, more or less direct, 
to the theory of the unity of the parts of concrete substances as set forth 
in the Mahabhasya. But the allusion is not direct enough to serve by 
itself as basis for the assertion that the Yoga-bhasya assumes the identity 
of the two PataSjalis. In other words, it does not justify us in assigning 
to the tradition of their identity a date as ancient as that of the Yoga- 
bhasya (eighth century). The allusion is, however, significant enough not 
to be lost out of mind, pending the search for other items of cumulative 
evidence looking in the same direction. 

2. Tradition of identity of two Patanjalis not earlier than tenth 
century. So far as I know, the oldest text implying that the Patanjali 
who wrote the sutras is the same as the Patanjali who wrote the Maha- 
bhasya, is stanza 5 of the introduction to Bhojadeva's comment on the 
Yoga-sutras, his Rajamartanda. This I would render as follows : 

Victory be to the luminous words of that illustrious sovereign, [Bhoja] 
Rana-rangamalla, who by creating his Grammar, by writing his comment 
on the Patanjalan [treatise, the Yoga-sutras], and by producing [a work] 
on medicine called Rajamrganka, has like Patanjali removed defilement 
from our speech and minds and bodies. 



Introduction [xiv 

Bhoja's Grammar, his comment called Rajamartanda, and his medical 
treatise are all extant. The stanza must mean that Patanjali and Bhoja 
both maintained a standard of correct speech, Patanjali by his Mahabhasya 
and Bhoja by his Grammar ; and that both made our minds clear of error, 
Patanjali by his Yoga-sutras and Bhoja by his comment upon them; 
and that both made our bodies clear of impurities, Patanjali by his medical 
treatise and Bhoja by his Rajamrganka. 

This certainly implies that the writer of this stanza identified Patanjali 
of the Yoga-sutras with Patanjali of the Mahabhasya. If the writer of 
the stanza of the introduction is the same as the Bhojadeva who wrote 
the Rajamartanda, we may note that he is called Ranarangamalla here, 
Maharajadhiraja in the colophon in Mitra's edition, and Lord of Dhara 
or Dharecvara in the colophon in the edition of Aga9e. There were a 
number of Bhojadevas; but whichever of them the author of the Raja- 
martanda may be, no one of them is earlier than the tenth century of 
our era. 

The tradition of the triple activity of Patanjali as a writer on Yoga and 
grammar and medicine is reinforced as follows : 

Yogena dttasya, padena vdcdm 

malam, carirasya tu vdidyakena 

yo 'pdkarot, tarn pravararh munindm 

Patanjalirh prdnjalir dnato 'smi. 

This is cited in Qivarama's commentary on the Vasavadatta (ed. Bibl. Ind., 

p. 239), which Auf recht assigns to the eighteenth century. The stanza 

occurs also in some MSS. just before the opening words of the Mahabhasya 

(Kielhorn's ed., vol. I, p. 503) that is, not under circumstances giving 

any clue to its date. We may add that an eighteenth-century work, 

the Patanjalicarita (v. 25, ed. of Kavyamala, vol. 51), vouches for Patanjali's 

authorship in the fields of Yoga and medicine in the following giti 

stanza : 

Sutrdni yogacdstre 

vdidyakacdstre ca vdrttikdni tatah 

krtvd Patanjalimunih 

pracdraydm dsa jagad idam trdtum. 

As to the precise medical work of which Patanjali was the author or 

with which he had to do, all three stanzas leave us uninformed. Not 

so the following stanza from the introduction to the commentary on 

Caraka, composed by Cakrapani, who (according to Jolly's book on 

Medicine in Biihler's Grundriss, p. 25) wrote about 1060 : 

Pdtanjala-Mahdbhdsya-Carakapratisamskrtdih 

mano-vdk-kdyadosdndm hantre 'hipataye namah. 



xv] Introduction 

This agrees in sense with the other stanzas, and in addition informs us 
that Patanjali's medical work consisted in a revision (pratisamskrta) of 
the great compendium of Caraka. 

Accordingly, the Bhoja-stanza appears to be the oldest external evidence 
thus far at hand for the tradition as to the identity of the two Patanjalis, 
and this tradition is not older than the tenth century, a thousand years 
and more after Patanjali the author of the Mahabhasya. 
3. The identification of the two Patanjalis not confirmed by a comparison 
of philosophical concepts. Inconsistent use of terminology and con- 
flicting definitions of concepts in the case of a single writer of two books 
are frequently explained by the fact that quite distinct subjects are dis- 
cussed in the different works. In other cases the subject under discussion 
is the same and such an explanation of the inconsistency does not hold. 
An instance of the latter is the discussion of the nature of substance 
[dravya) in the Yoga-system and in the Mahabhasya. In the commentary 
on Yoga-sutra iii. 44 we have the following definition, " A substance is a 
collection of which the different component parts do not exist separately 
(ayutasiddha^avayava-bheda^anugatah samuho dravyam iti Patan- 
jalih)" and the definition is attributed to Patanjali as being consistent with 
his sutras. This quotation is of the most technical kind and is in the 
same style as the Nyaya-sutras. A similar use of language, for instance, 
is found in Nyaya-sutra ii. 1. 32 (Vizianagaram edition, p. 798). On the 
other hand this phrase is not to be found in the Mahabhasya, which 
however does repeatedly analyse the concept of substance. And, what 
is more important, nothing so precise as the formula attributed (iii. 44) 
to Patanjali is found in the Yoga-sutras themselves. Yet substance is 
partially defined in Yoga-sutra iii. 14, " A substance (dharmiri) conforms 
itself to quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable external-aspects 
(dharma)." In this terminology dharmin and dharma of the Yoga-sutra 
are substitutions for dravya and guna of the Mahabhasya. In neither 
case is the description of substance discriminating. Yet such as it is, 
the difference is very slight. In the Mahabhasya it is substance, we 
are told, which makes the difference in weight between iron and cotton 
of the same bulk and dimension (Mahabhasya, Kielhorn's edition, vol. II, 
p. 366 19 ) ; and it is that which causes the difference between penetrability 
and impenetrability. Or again it is that which does not cease to be, even 
when a succession of properties appears within it (vol. II, p. 366 23 ). Of 
what kind then is this form of being (tattva) ? The answer is that when 
the various reds and other properties of a myrobalan fruit, for instance, 
successively appear within it, we have the right to call it a substance. 
In short a substance is a concretion of properties (guna-samdravo dravyam 



Introduction [xvi 

iti, Kielhorn, vol. II, p. 366 26 ) ; or, as it is put elsewhere, it is a collection 
of properties (guna-samuddya) such that the various states (bhdva) depend 
upon it (II. 200 14 ). This collection is loosely paraphrased as being a group 
(samgha) or mass (samuha, II. 35 6 6 ). 

In order, however, to make the comparison of the dharmin of the Yoga- 
sutras with the dravya of the Mahabhasya, we must assume that the 
interpretation of the Yoga-sutras, as given in the Comment, correctly 
represents the concept in the mind of the author of the sutras. There 
might well have been a series of redactions of the works of Patanjali, 
as of those of Caraka. The later interpretation, such as the formula in 
the Comment on iii. 44, might give us the original thought in more tech- 
nical form. If this be so, we find a great similarity in the discussion 
of the relation of whole and parts in the two works. In the Comment 
on the Yoga-sutra iii. 44 a collection (samuha) is of two kinds: 1. that in 
which the parts have lost their distinctness, for example, 'a tree', 'a herd', 
' a grove ' ; 2. that in which the parts are distinctly described, for example, 
' gods and human beings.' The second class has two subdivisions : 2 a . one 
in which the distinctness of parts is emphasized, for example, ' a grove of 
mangoes ' ; 2 b . one in which the distinctness is not emphasized, for 
example, ' a mango-grove.' From another point of view a group is two- 
fold: 1. a group whereof the parts can exist separately, for example } 
' a grove ', wherein the trees exist separately from the aggregate whole ; 
2. a group whereof the parts cannot exist separately, for example, ' a tree ' 
or ' an atom '. The question now arises, To which of these kinds of groups 
does a substance belong? A substance (dravya) is an aggregate of generic 
and particular qualities (sdmanya-vicesa-samuddya). This is the definition 
of substance from the point of view of its relation to its qualities. 
Furthermore, the substance is a group of the second subdivision of the 
second kind ; it is ' a collection of which the different parts do not exist 
separately '. This then is the resultant definition of substance according 
to the traditional interpretation of the Sutras. 

What now is the relation of whole and parts in the Mahabhasya, with 
especial reference to the substance and its qualities ? A collection (samu- 
ddya) is loosely paraphrased as being a group (samgha) or mass (samuha, 
Kielhorn, vol. II, p. 35 6 6 ). It is, etymologically at least, a concretion of 
properties (guna-samdrdva II. 366 2G ). It is a collection of parts; the 
characteristics of the parts determine the characteristics of the whole 
(III. 3 14 ; avayavdir arthavadbhih samuddyd apy arthavanto bhavanti 
1. 217 16 ; I. 30 26-27 ; avayave krtam lingam samuddyasya vicesakam bhavati 
I. 289 2f ; and I. 377 u ). All these cases would belong to the first subdivi- 
sion of the second kind of group, whereof the parts can exist separately. 



xvii] Introduction 

Yet a collection (samuddya) is not merely an assemblage of parts, but is 
a unity performing functions which the parts by themselves cannot 
perform, for example, the blanket, the rope, the chariot, as compared with 
the threads, the fibres, the chariot-parts, I. 220 16-23 . All these cases would 
belong to the second subdivision of the second kind of group, wherein 
the parts cannot exist separately (ayutasiddhdvayava). Such then are 
the different groups (samuddya). 

With regard to the substance (dravya), its relation to its qualities (guna) 
is analogous to the relation of the parts to the group, I. 220, vart. 11. 
Just as a collection (samuddya) is characterized by its parts (avayavdt- 
maka) III. 3 14 , so the substance (dravya) is characterized by its qualities 
(gundtmaka) or is a collection of qualities (gunasamuddya) II. 200 13 . 
This last formula is given tentatively as a not quite final conclusion ; yet 
the definition is not rejected. And elsewhere, I. 411 13 , II. 356 17 , II. 41 5 13 , 
and especially II. 366 14-26 , it is accepted as a working definition. Some 
qualities like sound, touch, colour, and taste belong to all substances ; they 
at least are present I. 246 ff , II. 198 5ff . Nothing, however, is said about 
a generic-form being required to constitute a substance (dravya). At the 
most it is true that when one asserts the reality of a species (dkrti) one 
does not deny the reality of the substance (dravya); and conversely. 
For each person who makes the assertion, the reality of both is asserted. 
Either the species or the substance may be dominant in anything, and 
the other subordinate. It is only a matter of the relative emphasis in 
the use of words. But the word substance is used for mass of particular 
qualities ; it is not a concretion of species and qualities, but is contrasted 
with species. Accordingly even if we admit that the formula ascribed 
to Patanjali in the Comment on iii. 13 is the correct rendering of the 
thought in the mind of Patanjali, the author of the Yoga-sutra, it is not 
true that Patanjali, the author of the Mahabhasya, when speaking of 
a substance (dravya) means what is contained in this formula. And 
there is nothing here to indicate that the tradition which identifies the 
two Patanjalis must be correct. 

4. Date of the Yoga-sutras between A.D. 300 and A.D. 500. If Patanjali, 
the author of the Mahabhasya, is not the author of the Yoga-sutras, when 
were they written? The polemic in the Yoga-sutras themselves against 
the nirdlambana school of Buddhists gives the answer. Very probably 
in the two Yoga-sutras iii. 14 and 15 and certainly in iv. 14 to 21 this 
school is attacked. The idealism of the Vijndna-vdda is attacked in iv. 15, 
16, and 17. We cannot, it is true, maintain that the Vijndna-vdda here 
attacked by the Sutra must be the idealism of Vasubandhu. But the 

C [h.o.s. 17] 



Introduction [xviii 

probability that the idealism is Vasubandhu's is great. And the earlier 
limit would then be the fourth century. There surely were idealists 
before him, just as there were pre-Patanjalan philosophers of yoga. Yet 
we have the great authority of Vacaspatimiera to support the obvious 
probability that the school of Vijndnavddins is here combated by 
Patanjali. He accepts the interpretation of the Comment which intro- 
duces a Vijndnavddinam Vdindcikam (p. 292 17 , Calc. ed.) as being 
intended by the author of the Sutra. It is true that the Sutra itself 
obviously does not make explicit references to this or any other school. 
Still the fact remains that the Sutra is attacking some idealist ; that the 
Comment explicitly states the idealist's position ; and that Vacaspatimiera 
identifies the idealist as being a Vijndnavddin. Elsewhere Vacaspatimiera 
contrasts this school with other Buddhist schools. And the possibility 
that he is referring to some Vijndna-vdda other than Vasubandhu's is 
remote. If this be so, it becomes clearer why Nagarjuna (a little before 
A.D. 200), the great expounder of the Qunya-vdda, does not, so far as 
we have discovered in the portion of the Mulamadhyamika-karikas thus 
far published (fasc. I-V), mention Patanjali. Yet from the Chinese transla- 
tions of Nagarjuna it is clear that he was familiar with the philosophical yoga. 
For example in the Chinese translation, 1 made in A. D. 472, of Nagarjuna's 
Upayakau^alyahrdaya-castra (Nanjio, No. 1257), eight schools of philo- 
sophers and logicians are enumerated: 1. Fire-worshippers, 2. Mlmansakas, 
3. Vaicesikas, 4. Sarhkhya, 5. Yoga, 6. Nirgranthas, 7. Monists, 8. Pluralists. 
There was then a philosophical school of Yoga about a.d. 200. 2 Patanjali 
was not unknown to Buddhist writers. But there is nothing to indicate 
that Nagarjuna is referring to Patanjali, the philosopher, who would then 
have preceded both nirdlambana schools. More probably, we may suppose, 
he refers to some one of the authorities on Yoga, such as Jaigisavya or 
Panca^kha who are quoted in the Yoga-bhasya. 

With regard to the later limit, a reference, if historically sound, would 
make it certain that Patanjali lived before a.d. 400. In the Mahavansa, 
chap. 37, vs. 167 (Tumour, p. 250 ; compare Dines Andersen, Pali Reader, 
I, p. 113, st. 3), we have the words 

Vihdram ekam dgamma rattith Pdtanjall-matam 
parivatteti. 

The verse refers to Buddhaghosa, who lived in the first half of the fifth 

1 I am indebted to the Rev. Kentoku Hori upon logical inferences and not upon 

of Tokyo for this reference. intuitive processes, as early as 300 B.C. 

2 Professor Jacobi has proved the existence (SB der konigl. preuss. Ak. derWiss., 

of a philosophical Yoga system, resting 13. Juli 191 1). 



xix] Introduction 

century. But unfortunately the Mahavansa proper, the work of Maha- 
nama, ends, according to the judgement of Professor Geiger, at chapter 37, 
verse 50, at which point also the tika stops. The quotation therefore belongs 
to the Culavansa. And if, as Professor Geiger concludes, the work of 
Mahanama is to be placed in the first quarter of the sixth century, the 
verse in question comes later, and probably later to such a degree that its 
value as evidence is almost nothing. If this be so, one can easily explain 
how it is that Buddhaghosa in the whole Visuddhimagga and in the 
Atthasalini makes no allusion to Patafijali. 

Much more conclusive is the fact that Umasvati in his Tattvarthadhigama- 
sutra ii. 52 refers to Yoga-sutra iii. 22. There can be little doubt of the 
reference since Umasvati's Bhasya repeats (Bib. Ind. ed. p. 53 13 and 65 3 ) 
two of the illustrations given in the Yoga-bhasya, of the fire set in the dry 
grass and of the cloth rolled up into a ball. Other references (Tattvartha- 
dhigama-sutra xii. 5 and 6 and ix. 44-46) are quite as likely allusions to 
ancient Jain formulae as to Patafijali. By how much Umasvati's date 
precedes that of his commentator, Siddhasena, cannot be said until the 
complete text of Siddhasena is published. The date for Siddhasena is set 
by Professor Jacobi (ZDMG. 60. 289, Leipzig, 1906, reprint p. 3, Eine Jaina- 
Dogmatik) at the middle or end of the sixth century. Umasvati precedes 
him ; and Patafijali the philosopher would not be later than a. d. 500 and 
might be much earlier. 

On the other hand I should guess that he is not much earlier. Because, for 
one reason, as Professor Stcherbatskoi reports, Dignaga (about A.D. 550 
or earlier) seems to know nothing of him. And secondly because it is 
improbable that the Yoga-bhasya was composed very much later. 
Other confirmatory evidence, somewhat later but more certain, would 
be the reference to Yoga-sutra i. 33 in Magha's Qicupalavadha iv. 55. 
Professor Hultzsch has kindly pointed out another reference at xiv. 62 of 
Magha's poem. In respect of the date of Magha, Professor Jacobi concluded 
(WZKM. vol. Ill, p. 121 ff.) that Magha lived about the middle of the sixth 
century. But Mr. Gaurishankar Ojha's discovery of the Vasantgadh inscrip- 
tion dated Vikrama 682 adds new and most convincing evidence. Professor 
Kielhorn (Gottinger Nachrichten, philol.-histor. Klasse, 1906, Heft 2, p. 146) 
is of the opinion that Magha, the grandson of a minister of the King Varma- 
lata, must be placed at about the second half of the seventh century. 
Still later, Gaudapada (about A.D. 700), in his comment on the Samkhya- 
Karika 23, quotes Yoga-sutra ii. 30 and 32 and names Patafijali as the 
author. 

The conclusion would be then that Patanjali's sutras were written at some 
time in the fourth or fifth century of our era. 



Introduction [xx 

5. Date of the Yoga-bhasya between A.D. 650 and A.D. 850. Of this 
the limits are easier to fix. Three pieces of evidence help us to determine 
the earliest limit. 

A. The Comment could not in any case be much earlier than a.d. 350. 
For (at the end of iii. 53 or 52) it quotes Varsaganya in the words 

murti-vyavadhi-jdti-bheddbhdvdn ndsti mulaprthaktvam iti Vdrsaganyah. 

And again (iv. 13) the Comment quotes from a cdstrdnucdsanam as follows : 

Gundndm paramam rupam na drstipatham rcchati 
yat tu drstipatham praptam tan mdyeva sutucchakam. 

Fortunately Vacaspatimicra offers us the information that this is an exposi- 
tion of the teaching of the Shasti-tantra. And furthermore, in the Bhamati 
on Vedanta-sutra ii. 1. 2. 3 (Nirnayasagara edition, 1904, p. 352, line 7 of 
the Bhamati), we are told that it is Varsaganya, the founder of the Yoga 
system, who said these words (ata eva yoga-cdstram vyutpddayitd aha sma 
Bhagavdn Vdrsaganyah " gundndm paramam . . ."). 

Thus the Comment contains two quotations from Varsaganya. There is 
little reason to doubt that Varsaganya was an older contemporary of 
Vasubandhu. Professor Takakusu 1 by a combination of dates centering 
about the Chinese translation of Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu estimated 
that Vasubandhu lived from about A.D. 420 till 500. Professor Sylvain 
LeVi (Asaiiga, vol. II, pp. 1 and 2) accepted the result of these discussions. 
But Professor Wogihara 2 had conjectured that the date of Vasubandhu 
must be set back. An elaborate confirmation of his suggestion is now 
offered by Monsieur Noel Peri, 3 who places the death of Vasubandhu 
at A.D. 350; and by Mr. B. Shiiwo, 4 who estimates that Vasubandhu's 
life was from A.D. 270 to 350. This is a return to the fourth century, 
the date for Vasubandhu which Biihler 5 favoured. Accordingly the Bhasya 
must in any case be later than A.D. 350. 

B. Another kind of evidence which helps us to determine yet more closely 
the earliest limit is the fact that the decimal system is used by way of 

1 Bulletin de PEcole Francaise d'Extreme- 4 "Doctor Takakusu and Monsieur Peri 

Orient, 1904, tome IV, pp. 48 and 56 ; on the date of Vasubandhu " in the 

and JRAS. Jan. 1905, pp. 16-18 of the Tetsugaku Zasshi, vol. 27, Nov.-Dec, 

reprint. 1912. I am indebted to Mr. K. Yabuki 

2 Asanga's Bodhisattvabhumi, Leipzig, for this. 

1908, p. 14. B "Die indischen Inschriften und das 

3 " A propos de la date de Vasubandhu " Alter der indischen Kunst-Poesie," in 

(Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Ex- Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserl. Akad. 

treme-Orient, tome XI, 1911, p. 339). der Wiss., Wien, 1890, p. 79 f. 



xxi] Introduction 

illustration in the Comment on iii. 13. The oldest epigraphic x instance 
of the use of the decimal system is in the Gurjara inscription of a.d. 595. 
With one obscure and doubtful exception, there is no literary evidence 
of the use of the decimal system before Varahamihira, who lived in the 
sixth century. If we consider this kind of evidence alone, it is improbable 
that the Comment precedes the year A. D. 500 ; it is probably later. 

C. There is evidence which determines that the earliest limit of the 
Comment is still later, as late as the seventh century. In the stanza 
iv. 55 of the Qicupalavadha by Magha (circa a.d. 650), not only Yoga- 
sutra i. 33 is referred to, but also the words of the avatdrana in the 
Comment. In the Comment the parikarma of the citta is enjoined. This 
is an uncommon term. Even if citta-parikamma might be found in 
Buddhist books, the fact that it here immediately precedes the quotation 
from sutra i. 33, makes it almost certain that such a mixture of termino- 
logy is impossible. In fact the stanza is full of specific yoga- terms in 
each line to such an extent that reference to any other system, much 
less to some heretical book, is quite excluded. The point is then that 
the words citta-parikarma together with the first word of the sutra 
have been wrought into the metre of the poem as one word. The poet, 
as we saw, probably lived in the second half of the seventh century. If 
this is trustworthy evidence, the Comment cannot be earlier than A.D. 650. 

D. The later limit is set by the date of Vacaspatimic,ra's Nyaya Index, 
A.D. 841 see below, page xxiii. 

Accordingly the date of the Bhasya would be somewhere between about 
A.D. 650 and about a.d. 850. 

6. Date of Vacaspatimicjra's Tattva-vaigaradl about A.D. 850. In the 

verse at the close of his Bhamati-nibandha, Vacaspatimicra gives the names 
of his works, seven in number : 

Yan Nydyakanikd-Tattvasamiksd-Tattvabindubhih I 
Yan Nyaya- Sdmkhya-Yogdndm, Veddntdndm nibandhandih ll 
Samacaisam mahat punyam, tat phalam puskalam maya I 
Samarpitam; athditena prlyatam Paramecvarah ll. 
The Nydya-vdrttilca-tdtparya-tlkd is on the Nyaya system ; the Tattva- 

1 See p. 78, of Biihler's Palaeographie, in " place-value " is utilized. Most of 

his Grundriss. In his Notes on Indian these he thinks are worthless as evi- 

Mathematics (Journal of the Asiatic dence for the introduction of the 
Society of Bengal, July 1907, vol. Ill, . decimal system. The same conclusion 

number 7, p. 482, note 5), Mr. G. R. is reached in a later article (JRAS. 

Kaye gives a list of epigraphical in- July 1910, p. 749). 
stances of the notation in which 



Introduction [xxii 

kdumudi is on the Samkhya system ; the Tattva-vaiqaradl is on the Yoga ; 
the NycLya-kanika, a gloss on the Vidhi-viveka, is on the Mimansa; the 
Tattva-bindu is on Bhatta's exposition of the Mimansa ; the Tattva-samiJcsd 
and the Bhamatl are both on the Vedanta. 

In the same verse at the end of the Bhamatl he speaks of himself as living 
under King Nrga : 

ta8min maMpe raahanlyaklrtavu Qriman-Nrge 'kdri maya nibandhah. 
Unfortunately there is (as Professor Liiders informs me) no epigraphical 
record of this king and we cannot say when or where he lived. Vacas- 
patimifjra was a native of Mithila, 1 the northern part of Tirhut, and the 
latter part of his name would indicate, as Fitz- Edward Hall has pointed 
out, that he was a native of Gangetic Hindustan. 

In the introduction to his edition of the Kusumanjali (Calcutta, 1864, p. x), 
Professor Cowell thinks that Vacaspatimicra lived in the tenth century. 
Barth (Bull, des Rel. de l'Inde, 1893, p. 271) would set him at the end of 
the eleventh or beginning of the twelfth century. Professor Macdonell 
(Hist, of Sansk. Lit., p. 393) places him soon after a.d. 1100. 
These judgements rest, more or less, upon the opinion that the Raja-varttika, 
quoted by Vacaspatimicra in his Samkhya-tattva-kaumudI on Karika 72, 
was composed by, or for, Bhoja Raja, called Ranaraiiga Malla, King of Dhara 
(1018-1060). This opinion accords with the assertion of Pandit Kacmatha 
Qastrl Astaputra of Benares College, who assured Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall that 
a manuscript of the Raja-varttika had been in his possession several years 
(Hall's edition of the Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya, 1856, p. 33). But the 
visible basis for this assertion that the Raja in question is Bhoja is not 
now at hand. 

Similarly, Professor Pathak in his article on Dharmaklrti and Shankara- 
carya (see Journal of the Bombay Branch RAS., vol. XXVIII, no. 48, 1891, 
p. 89, and also the table in the same Journal, p. 235, no. 49, note 74) is 
content to rest his conclusions as to the date of Vacaspatimicra upon the 
fact that QrlbharatI, the pupil of Bodharanya, in his edition of the Samkhya- 
tattva-kaumudI (Benares, Jainaprabhakara Press, 1889, p. 182), prints, in a 
note at the end, the word Bhoja before the word Raja-varttika. Thus it 
would appear that this varttika is by Bhojaraja and that Vacaspatimicra, 
who quotes it, must be later than Bhojaraja, that is, later than the tenth 
century. But we are not at all sure from other manuscript evidence 
that the word Bhoja should be read before the word Raja-varttika, and 
the date of this Raja-varttika is therefore undetermined. 

1 See the beginning of the Nyayasutro- prasad (^astri, Notices of Sanskrit MSS., 

ddharah by Vacaspatimicra Qrlvaca- Second Series, vol. II, p. 98). 

spatimi^rena Mithile$vara$urind (Hara- 



xxiii] Introduction 

By way of contrast we now have the direct statement of Vacaspatimicra 
that he finished his Nyayasuclnibandha in the year 898. For on the first 
page of this appendix to the Nyaya-varttika, as given in the edition of the 
Nyaya-varttika in the Bibliotheca Indica, 1907, he says that he is about to 
compose an index for the Nyaya-sutras 

Qrivdcaspatimicrena mayd sucl vidhdsyate. 
And in the colophon he says that he made the work for the delight of 
the intelligent in the year 898. 

Nydyasuclnibandho 'sdv akdri sudhiydm mude 
Qrivdcaspat imicrena vasv-an ka-vasu-vatsare. 

It remains to determine whether this year belongs to the era of Vikrama- 
ditya or of Qalivahana. In the introduction to his edition of Six Buddhist 
Nyaya Tracts (Bibl. Ind., 1910), Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasad Shastri 
gives the date as belonging to the second era, to Qaka 898. He says (p. iii) 
that the author of the Apohasiddhi " takes a good deal of pains in elaborately 
refuting the theory of Vacaspatimicra", and that he does " not quote or refute 
Udayana, whose date is Qaka 905 = A.D. 983". In his Notices of Sanskrit 
Manuscripts, second series, vol. II, p. xix, this distinguished scholar had 
come to the same conclusion with regard to the era to which this date of 
Vacaspatimigra should be assigned. This conclusion seemed doubtful to 
Mr. Nilmani Chakravarti, M.A., in his valuable Chronology of Indian 
Authors, a supplement to Miss Duff's Chronology of India (Journal of the 
Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. 3, 1907, p. 205). And one cannot refrain 
from thinking that the other era is presumably more likely for a Northern 
writer ; and that more especially a great difficulty is created if only seven 
years are supposed to separate Vacaspatimicra and Udayana. The difference 
between the two philosophers is of such a kind that one must assume a much 
longer interval between their writings. And furthermore, would it not be 
an extraordinary coincidence that the author of the Apohasiddhi should 
be so minutely familiar with the work of Vacaspatimi^a, and yet not 
have the dimmest sense of the existence of Udayana, the light of a new 
dawn in the world of Nyaya 1 ? Accordingly, the date of Vacaspati's 
Nyaya-index would appear to be Samvat 898 = A.D. 841 ; and the dates 
of his six other works, including the Tattva-vaic^radl, may be presumed 
to be not many years earlier or later. We are therefore safe in making 
the statement that the date of the Tattva-vaicaradI is not far from the 
middle of the ninth century, or approximately a. d. 850. 



ANALYTICAL SUMMAEY OF THE YOGA-SUTRAS 



BOOK FIRST CONCENTRATION 

1. Reasons for beginning the book ..... 

2. Characteristic mark of yoga is the restriction of fluctuations 

3. Intelligence in the state of restriction 

4. Intelligence in the state of emergence 

5. There are five fluctuations 

6. List of the five fluctuations 

7. The first fluctuation is the source of valid ideas 

8. The second fluctuation is misconception . 

9. The third fluctuation is predicate relation 

10. The fourth fluctuation is sleep . 

11. The fifth fluctuation is memory 

12. Two methods of restriction of the fluctuations 
18. The first method is practice 

14. The confirmation of practice 

15. The second method is passionlessness 

16. Characteristic mark of the highest passionlessness 

17. Result of these methods is conscious concentration of four kinds 

18. Characteristic mark of unconscious concentration 

19. A first way of approach to unconscious concentration 

20. A second way of approach to the same as used by yogins 

21. Gradations of methods and intensities 

22. Yet another way of approach .... 

23. Devotion to the Icvara is this way of approach 

24. Characteristic mark of the devotion to the Icvara 

25. The Icvara is unexcelled in his power of knowing 

26. The Icvara has no limit in time 

27. The symbolic expression of the Icvara 

28. Description of the devotion 

29. Two results of this concentration 

30. List of nine obstacles removed . 

31. Five accompaniments of the obstacles 

32. Prevention of these by calming the mind-stuff 



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xxv] 



Analytical Summary of the Yoga-siitras 



PAGE 

33. Four ways of calming the mind-stuff 71 

34. Breathings calm the mind-stuff . ....... 72 

35. Fixed attention steadies the mind ....... 72 

36. Fixed attention to processes of thought steadies the mind ... 74 

37. Attention to the mind-stuff of great yogins ..... 76 

38. Fixed attention to objects seen in sleep ...... 76 

39. Contemplations of the most desired object ..... 77 

40. Mastery of the mind-stuff the result of attentions .... 77 

41. Balanced state of the steady mind ....... 77 

42. Balanced state with regard to a coarse object ..... 80 

43. Balanced state with regard to a super-coarse object .... 82 

44. Balanced states with regard to subtile and super-subtile objects . 88 

45. Extent of the existence of subtile objects . . . . . . 91 

46. These balanced states are seeded concentrations .... 92 

47. Kesult of the super-subtile balanced state ...... 93 

48. Truth- bearing insight ......... 94 

49. Object of the truth-bearing insight ....... 94 

50. Latent impressions from this insight inhibit others .... 96 

51. Seedless concentration is the restriction of even these impressions . 98 



BOOK SECOND MEANS OF ATTAINMENT 



1. Yoga of action 

2. Besult of yoga of action 

3. The five hindrances ......... 

4. The root of the other hindrances is undifferentiated -consciousness 

5. Undifferentiated-consciousness is the first hindrance . 

6. Feeling-of-personality is the second hindrance 

7. Passion is the third hindrance . 

8. Hatred is the fourth hindrance 

9. Will-to-live is the fifth hindrance 

10. Bemedy for hindrances when subtile 

11. Remedy for fluctuations which result from hindrances 

12. Latent-deposit of karma the cause of hindrances 

13. Three kinds of fruition of karma ...... 

14. Results of fruition 

15. Pleasure to be rejected, inasmuch as it is intermingled with pain 

16. A. Future pain avoidable . ....... 

Q [h.o.s. 17] 



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Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras 



[xxvi 



17. B. Cause of future pain. Correlation of seer and seen 

18. Nature of an object for sight 

19. Subdivision of objects for sight 

20. Nature of seer .... 

21. Object for sight subordinate to seer 

22. Plurality of objects for sight . 

23. Nature of the correlation . 

24. Undifferentiated-consciousness the cause of the correlation 

25. C. The escape from pain is the isolation of the seer 

26. D. The method of escape is discriminative insight 

27. Seven forms of discriminative insight 

28. Means of attaining discrimination 

29. The eight aids to yoga 

30. i. The five abstentions 

31. Qualified abstentions 

32. ii. The five observances . 

33. Inhibition of obstacles to abstentions and observances 

34. Nature of perverse-considerations 

35. Consequences of abstention from injury . 

36. Consequences of abstention from lying 

37. Consequences of abstention from stealing . 

38. Consequences of abstention from incontinence 

39. Consequences of abstention from property 

40. Consequences of observance of cleanliness . 

41. Further consequences of cleanliness . 

42. Consequences of observance of contentment 

43. Consequences of observance of self-castigation 

44. Consequences of observance of study 

45. Consequences of observance of devotion to the Icvara 

46. iii. Nature of postures 

47. Ways to success in postures 

48. Consequences of postures . 

49. iv. Nature of restraint of the breath . 

50. Three kinds of restraint of the breath 

51. A fourth kind of restraint of the breath 

52. Consequences of restraint of the breath 

53. A further consequence is fixed attention 

54. v. Nature of fixed attention 

55. Consequences of fixed attention 



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xxvii] Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras 



BOOK THIRD SUPERNORMAL POWERS 



1. vi. Characteristic mark of fixed -attention . 

2. vii. Characteristic mark of contemplation . 

3. viii. Characteristic mark of concentration . 

4. The three last together are called constraint 

5. Consequences of mastery of constraint 

6. Three stages of constraint 

7. Last three aids more direct than first five . 

8. Even last three less direct than seedless concentration 

9. Characteristic mark of restricted mutations 

10. Peaceful flow of mind-stuff due to subliminal impressions 

11. Nature of mutations in concentration 

12. Characteristic mark of focused mutations . 

13. Mutations of external-aspect and time-form and intensity 

14. Characteristic mark of a substance .... 

15. Reason for the order of mutations .... 

16. Consequences of constraint upon the mutations 

17. Consequences of discriminating things from words and ideas 

18. Consequences of direct perception of subliminal impressions 

19. Consequences of direct perception of presented-ideas of another 

20. Object of such a presented-idea not perceived . 

21. Consequences of constraint upon the form of the body 

22. Consequences of constraint upon karma . 

23. Consequences of constraint upon acts of sympathy . 

24. Consequences of constraint upon powers . 

25. Consequences of constraint upon luminous processes . 

26. Consequences of constraint upon the sun . 

27. Consequences of constraint upon the moon 

28. Consequences of constraint upon the zenith 

29. Consequences of constraint upon the navel 

30. Consequences of constraint upon the throat 

31. Consequences of constraint upon the tortoise-tube 

32. Consequences of constraint upon the radiance in the head 

33. Consequences of constraint upon the vividness . 

34. Consequences of constraint upon the heart 

35. Consequences of constraint upon knowledge of the Self 

36. Consequences of direct perception of the Self . 

37. Supernormal powers obstructive to concentration 

38. Mind -stuff penetrates into the body of another . 

39. Consequences of constraint upon Udana . 



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Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras [xxviii 



40. Consequences of constraint upon Samaria ..... 

41. Consequences of constraint upon relation between the ear and air 

42. Consequences of constraint upon relation between body and air 

43. Dwindling of the obscuration of light 

44. Atomization and other supernormal powers 

45. Perfection of body .... 

46. Method of mastering the organs 

47. Consequences of mastering the organs 

48. Mastery over all matter 

49. Means of attaining Isolation 

50. Means of reducing opposition to Isolation 

51. Consequences of constraint upon moments and their sequence 

52. Object of discriminative perception . 

53. Characteristic mark of discriminative perception 

54. Consequences of the discrimination . 

55. Isolation is purity of the sattva and of the Self . 



PAGE 

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BOOK FOURTH ISOLATION 



1. Different causes of supernormal powers 

2. Reasons for mutations into another birth , 

3. No impulse given by karma .... 

4. Created mind-stuffs ...... 

5. Mind-stuff which gives the impulse . 

6. No latent-impressions in created mind-stuffs 

7. Varieties of karma ...... 

8. Latent impressions conform to karma 

9. Continuity of impressions 

10. Latent impressions from time without beginning 

11. Termination of impressions .... 

12. External-aspects in all three time-forms . 

13. External-aspects phenomenalized or subtile 

14. Activity of a thing due to a single mutation 

15. Things and mind-stuff on different levels . 

16. Things not dependent upon a single mind-stuff. 

17. Rejection of idealism ..... 

18. The Self undergoes no mutations 

19. Mind-stuff does not illumine itself . 

20. Fallacy in confusing thinking-substance and thing 

21. One mind-stuff not illumined by another . 



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xxix] Analytical Summary of the Yoga-sutras 



22. Intelligence aware of its own mind-stuff . 

23. Mind-stuff, when affected, capable of perceiving all objects 

24. Intelligence distinct from mind-stuff 

25. Change in the habits of the mind-stuff 

26. Change in the nature of the mind-stuff 

27. Disturbances in the discriminating mind 

28. Escape even from subliminal-impressions 

29. Means of attaining the Eain-cloud 

30. Consequences of the Eain-cloud 

31. Condition of mind-stuff in the Kain-cloud 

32. End of the sequences of mutations . 

33. Characteristic of a sequence 

34. Nature of Isolation .... 



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/ 



TRANSLATION OF THE YOGA-SUTBAS WITHOUT 
THE COMMENT OR THE EXPLANATION 

Being the Sutras translated in groups, together with 
group-headings added by the translator 

BOOK FIRST CONCENTRATION 

Goal of Concentration 

i. 1-4. Yoga is the concentration which restricts the fluctuations. Freed 

from them, the Self attains to self-expression. 

i. 1 Now the exposition of yoga [is to be made], i. 2 Yoga is the 
restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff, i. 3 Then the Seer [that is, 
the Self] abides in himself, i. 4 At other times it [the Self] takes the 
same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stuff]. 

Forms of the mind-stuff 

i. 5-11. The fluctuations are all exposed to attack from the hindrances 
and are five in number: 1. sources-of - valid-ideas ; 2. misconceptions; 
3. predicate-relations; 4. sleep; 5. memory. 

i. 5 The fluctuations are of five kinds and are hindered or unhindered, 
i. 6 Sources-of-valid-ideas and misconceptions and predicate-relations and 
sleep and memory, i. 7 Sources-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference 
and verbal-communication, i. 8 Misconception is an erroneous idea 
not based on that form [in respect of which the misconception is 
entertained], i. 9 The predicate-relation (vikalpa) is without any [corre- 
sponding perceptible] object and follows as a result of perception or 
of words, i. 10 Sleep is a fluctuation of [mind-stuff] supported by 
the cause of the [transient] negation [of the waking and the dreaming 
fluctuations], i. 11 Memory is not-adding-surreptitiously to a once 
experienced object. 

Methods of restricting fluctuations 

i. 12-16. An orientation of the whole life with reference to one idea; an 
emotional transformation corresponding to this focused state. 

i. 12 The restriction of them is by [means] of practice and passionless- 
ness. i. 13 Practice is [repeated] exertion to the end that [the mind- 



xxxi] Translation of the Yoga-sutras 

stuff] shall have permanence in this [restricted state], i. 14 But this 
[practice] becomes confirmed when it has been cultivated for a long time 
and uninterruptedly and with earnest attention, i. 15 Passionlessness 
is the consciousness of being master on the part of one who has rid 
himself of thirst for either seen or revealed objects, i. 16 This [passion- 
lessness] is highest when discernment of the Self results in thirstlessness 
for qualities [and not merely for objects]. 

Kinds of concentration 

i. 17-18. Four kinds of conscious concentration, and the concentration of 
subliminal-impressions alone. 

i. 17 [Concentration becomes] conscious [of its object] by assuming 
forms either of deliberation [upon coarse objects] or of reflection upon 
subtile objects or of joy or of the feeling-of-personality. i. 18 The other 
[concentration which is not conscious of objects] consists of subliminal- 
impressions only [after objects have merged], and follows upon that 
practice which effects the cessation [of fluctuations]. 

Degrees of approach to concentration 

i. 19-23. The worldly approach; the spiritual approach; the combina- 
tions of methods and intensities ; and the devotion to the highest Self. 

i. 19 [Concentration not conscious of objects] caused by worldly [means] 
is the one to which the discarnate attain and to which those [whose 
bodies] are resolved into primary-matter attain, i. 20 [Concentration 
not conscious of objects,] which follows upon belief [and] energy [and] 
mindfulness [and] concentration [and] insight, is that to which the 
others [the yogins] attain, i. 21 For the keenly intense, [concentration] 
is near. i. 22 Because [this keenness] is gentle or moderate or keen, 
there is a [concentration] superior even to this [near kind], i. 23 Or 
[concentration] is attained by devotion to the Icvara. 

Analysis of the highest Self 

i. 24-28. Unique quality of the highest Self; proof of His existence; His 

temporal priority ; His symbolical realization. 

i. 24 Untouched by hindrances or karmas or fruition or by latent-deposits, 
the Icvara is a special kind of Self. i. 25 In this [Icvara] the germ of 
the omniscient is at its utmost excellence, i. 26 Teacher of the Primal 
[Sages] also, forasmuch as [with Him] there is no limitation by time. 
i. 27 The word-expressing Him is the Mystic-syllable, i. 28 Kepetition 
of it and reflection upon its meaning [should be made]. 



Translation of the Yoga-sutras [xxxii 

Obstacles to the calming of the mind-stuff 

i. 29-34. The inner sense is exposed to distractions which may be over- 
come by focusing the mind ; by the cultivation of sentiments ; one may 
also practise breathings. 

i. 29 Thereafter comes the right-knowledge of him who thinks in an 
inverse way, and the removal of obstacles, i. 30 Sickness and languor 
and doubt and heedlessness and worldliness and erroneous perception and 
failure to attain any stage [of concentration] and instability in the state 
[when attained] these distractions of the mind-stuff are the obstacles. 
i. 31 Pain and despondency and unsteadiness of the body and inspiration 
and expiration are the accompaniments of the distractions, i. 32 To 
check them [let there be] practice upon a single entity, i. 33 By the 
cultivation of friendliness towards happiness, and compassion towards 
pain, and joy towards merit, and indifference towards demerit, i. 34 Or 
[the yogin attains the undisturbed calm of the mind-stuff] by expulsion 
and retention of breath. 

Attainment of Stability 
i. 35-39. Suitable objects for fixed-attention and contemplation. 

i. 35 Or [he gains stability when] a sense-activity arises connected with 
an object [and] bringing the central-organ into a relation of stability. 
i. 36 Or an undistressed [and] luminous [sense-activity when arisen 
brings the central-organ into a relation of stability], i. 37 Or the mind- 
stuff [reaches the stable state] by having as its object [a mind-stuff] freed 
from passion, i. 38 Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by 
having as the supporting-object a perception in dream or in sleep, i. 39 Or 
[the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by contemplation upon any such 
an object as is desired. 

Mastery and concentration 

i. 40-47. Classification of concentration with reference to different single 
objects or absence of objects, or to the mental act, or to a fusion of object 
and knower. 

i. 40 His mastery extends from the smallest atom to the greatest 
magnitude, i. 41 [The mind-stuff] from which, as from a precious gem, 
fluctuations have dwindled away, reaches the balanced-state, which, in 
the case of the knower or of the process-of-knowing or of the object- 
to-be-known, is in the state of resting upon [one] of these [three] and in 
the state of being tinged by [one] of these [three], i. 42 Of [these 
balanced-states] the state-balanced with deliberation is confused by 
reason of predicate-relations between words and intended-objects and 



;[xxxiii without the Comment or the Explanation 

ideas, i. 43 When the memory is quite purified, [that balanced- state] 
which is, as it were, empty of itself and which brightens [into conscious 
knowledge] as the intended-object and nothing more is super-delibera- 
tive, i. 44 By this same [balanced-state] the reflective and the super- 
reflective [balanced-states] are also explained, i. 45 The subtile object 
also terminates in unresoluble-primary-matter (alinga). i. 46 These 
same [balanced-states] are the seeded concentration, i. 47 When there 
is the clearness of the super-reflective [balanced-state, the yogin gains] 
internal undisturbed calm. 

Normative insight 

I. 48-51. After-effects of concentrated insight efface after-effects of con- 
centration upon objects. 

i. 48 In this [concentrated mind-stuff] the insight is truth-bearing, 
i. 49 Has another object than the insight resulting from things heard 
or from inferences, inasmuch as its intended-object is a particular, 
i. 50 The subliminal-impression produced by this [super-reflective 
balanced-state] is hostile to other subliminal -impressions, i. 51 When 
this [subliminal-impression] also is restricted, since all is restricted, [the 
yogin gains] seedless concentration. 



BOOK SECOND MEANS OF ATTAINMENT 
Devices for weakening hindrances 

ii. 1-11. Aids serviceable to the beginner who is on the path to con- 
centration. 

ii. 1 Self-castigation and study and devotion to the Icvara are the Yoga 
of action, ii. 2 For the cultivation of concentration and for the 
attenuation of the hindrances, ii. 3 Undifferentiated-consciousness 
(avidya) and the feeling-of-personality and passion and aversion and the 
will-to-live are the five hindrances, ii. 4 Undifferentiated-consciousness 
is the field for the others whether they be dormant or attenuated or 
intercepted or sustained, ii. 5 The recognition of the permanent, of 
the pure, of pleasure, and of a self in what is impermanent, impure, 
pain, and not-self is undifferentiated-consciousness {avidya). ii. 6 When 
the power of seeing and the power by which one sees have the 
appearance of being a single self, [this is] the feeling-of-personality. 
ii. 7 Passion is that which dwells upon pleasure, ii. 8 Aversion is that 
which dwells upon pain. ii. 9 The will-to-live sweeping on [by the 
force of] its own nature exists in this form even in the wise. ii. 10 
e [h.o.s. 17] 



Translation of the Yoga-sutras [xxxiv 

These [hindrances when they have become subtile] are to be escaped 
by the inverse-propagation, ii. 11 The fluctuations of these should be 
escaped by means of contemplation. 

Karma 

ii. 12-14. Origin of karma in hindrances; result of karma in state-of- 

existence, length of life, and pleasure or pain. 

ii. 12 The latent-deposit of karma has its root in the hindrances and may 
be felt in a birth seen or in a birth unseen, ii. 13 So long as the root 
exists, there will be fruition from it [that is] birth [and] length-of-life 
[and] kind-of-experience. ii. 14 These [fruitions] have joy or extreme 
anguish as results in accordance with the quality of their causes whether 
merit or demerit. 

All is pain 

ii. 15. Present and future and past correlations with objects result un- 
avoidably in pain. 

ii. 15 As being the pains which are mutations and anxieties and 
subliminal-impressions, and by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations 
of the aspects (guna), to the discriminating all is nothing but pain. 

There is an escape 

ii. 16. Only yogins are sensitive to future pain. This may be avoided in 
that it has not expressed itself in actual suffering. 

ii. 16 That which is to be escaped is pain yet to come. 

Cause of pain 

ii. 17-24. The Seer-sight relation implies 1. complexes of potential 
stresses between aspects (guna) and between sense-organs and elements, 
2. the power of the Seer who is undefiled by aspects, 3. the actual correla- 
tion until the purpose of the Seer, which is to differentiate consciousness, is 
completed. 

ii. 17 The correlation of the Seer and the object-of-sight is the cause 
of that which is to be escaped, ii. 18 With a disposition to brightness 
and to activity and to inertia, and with the elements and the organs 
as its essence, and with its purpose the experience and the liberation 
[of the Self], this is the object-of-sight. ii. 19 The particularized and 
the unparticularized [forms] and the resoluble only [into primary matter] 
and irresoluble-primary-matter are the divisions of the aspects (guna). 
ii. 20 The Seer who is nothing but [the power of seeing], although 
undefiled (piddha), looks upon the presented idea. ii. 21 The object- 
of-sight is only for the sake of it [the Self]. ii. 22 Though it has 



xxxv] without the Comment or the Explanation 

ceased [to be seen] in the case of one whose purpose is accomplished, 
it has not ceased to be, since it is common to others [besides himself], 
ii. 23 The reason for the apperception of what the power of the 
property and of what the power of the proprietor are, is correlation, 
ii. 24 The reason for this [correlation] is undifferentiated-consciousness 
{avidya). 

The escape 
ii. 25. Positive state of Isolation follows the ending of the correlation. 

ii. 25 Since this [non-sight] does not exist, there is no correlation. This 
is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer. 

Means of escape 
ii. 26-27. The act of discrimination leading up to the act of insight. 

ii. 26 The means of attaining escape is unwavering discriminative 
discernment, ii. 27 For him [there is] insight sevenfold and advancing 
in stages to the highest. 

Eight aids to yoga 

ii. 28-29. To purify the aspects and to intensify intuitive thinking there 

are five indirect aids and three direct aids. 

ii. 28 After the aids to yoga have been followed up, when the impurity 
has dwindled, there is an enlightenment of perception reaching up to the 
discriminative discernment, ii. 29 Abstentions and observances and 
postures and regulations-of-the-breath and withdrawal-of-the-senses and 
fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration. 

First indirect aid : i. Five abstentions 

ii. 30-31. The elements and degrees of morality in the form of prohibi- 
tions. 

ii. 30 Abstinence from injury and from falsehood and from theft and from 
incontinence and from acceptance of gifts are the abstentions, ii. 31 When 
they are unqualified by species or place or time or exigency and when 
[covering] all [these] classes there is the Great Course-of-conduct. 

Second indirect aid : ii. Five observances 
ii. 32. Advances in morality in the form of voluntary action. 

ii. 32 Cleanliness and contentment and self-castigation and study and 
devotion to the l9vara are the observances. 

Results of the abstentions and observances 
ii. 33-45. Persistent inhibitions of certain kinds reorganize an increase of 
activity of the opposite kind. 

ii. 33 If there be inhibition by perverse-considerations, there should be 



Translation of the Yoga-sutras [xxxvi 

cultivation of the opposites. ii. 34 Since perverse-considerations such, 
as injuries, whether done or caused to be done or approved, whether 
ensuing upon greed or anger or infatuation, whether mild or moderate 
or vehement, find their unending consequences in pain and lack of 
thinking, there should be the cultivation of their opposites. ii. 35 As 
soon as he is grounded in abstinence from injury, his presence begets 
a suspension of enmity, ii. 36 As soon as he is grounded in abstinence 
from falsehood, actions and consequences depend upon him. ii. 37 As 
soon as he is grounded in abstinence from theft, all jewels approach him. 
ii. 38 As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from incontinence, he 
acquires energy, ii. 39 As soon as he is established in abstinence from 
acceptance of gifts, a thorough illumination upon the conditions of birth, 
ii. 40 As a result of cleanliness there is disgust at one's own body and 
no intercourse with others, ii. 41 Purity of sattva and gentleness and 
singleness-of-intent and subjugation of the senses and fitness for the 
sight of the self. ii. 42 As a result of contentment there is an acquisition 
of superlative pleasure, ii. 43 Perfection in the body and in the organs 
after impurity has dwindled as a result of self-castigation. ii. 44 As 
a result of study there is communion with the chosen deity, ii. 45 
Perfection of concentration as a result of devotion to the Icvara. 

Third indirect aid: iii. Postures 
ii. 46-48. Bodily conditions favourable to concentration. 

ii. 46 Stable-and-easy posture, ii. 47 By relaxation of effort or by a 
[mental] state-of-balance with reference to Ananta. ii. 48 Thereafter 
he is unassailed by extremes. 

Fourth indirect aid: iv. Restraint of the breath 
ii. 49-52. Calming of affective states is favourable to concentration. 

ii. 49 When there is [stability of posture], the restraint of breath, a 
cutting off of the flow of inspiration and expiration, follows, ii. 50 [This 
is] external or internal or suppressed in fluctuation and is regulated by 
place and time and number and is protracted and subtile, ii. 51 The 
fourth [restraint of the breath] transcends the external and the internal 
object, ii. 52 As a result of this the covering of the light dwindles away. 

Fifth indirect aid : v. Withdrawal of the sense-organs 
ii. 53-55. The span of attention is confined to an inner object. 

ii. 53 For fixed-attentions also the central organ becomes fit. ii. 54 The 
withdrawal of the senses is as it were the imitation of the mind-stuff 
as it is in itself on the part of the organs by disjoining themselves from 
their object, ii. 55 As a result of this [withdrawal] there is a complete- 
mastery of the organs. 



xxxvii] without the Comment or the Explanation 

BOOK THIRD-SUPERNORMAL POWERS 
First direct aid: vi. Fixed-attention 
iii. 1. The knower focuses the process of knowing upon the object to be 
known. 

iii. 1 Binding the mind-stuff to a place is fixed-attention. 

Second direct aid : vii. Contemplation 
iii. 2. A two-term relation between the process of knowing and the object 
to be known. 

iii. 2 Focusedness of the presented idea upon that [place] is con- 
templation. 

Third direct aid : viii. Concentration 

iii. 3. A fusion of the knower and the process of knowing with the object 

to be known. 

iii. 3 This same [contemplation], shining forth [in consciousness] as the 
intended object and nothing more, and, as it were, emptied of itself, is 
concentration. 

Transition to seedless concentration 
iii. 4-10. The direct aids in combination result in insight and restricted 
subliminal-impressions and the calm flow of the mind-stuff. 

iii. 4 The three in one are constraint, iii. 5 As a result of mastering 
this constraint, there follows the shining forth of insight, iii. 6 Its 
application is by stages, iii. 7 The three are direct aids in comparison 
with the previous [five], iii. 8 Even these [three] are indirect aids 
to seedless [concentration], iii. 9 When there is a becoming invisible 
of the subliminal-impression of emergence and a becoming visible 
of the subliminal-impression of restriction, the mutation of restriction 
is inseparably connected with mind-stuff in its period of restriction, 
iii. 10 This [mind-stuff] flows peacefully by reason of the subliminal- 
impression. 

Mutations of substances 

iii. 11-15. In the focused state the concentration holds two time-forms 
within the span of attention. Mutations are in fixed orders of subliminal- 
impressions in the restricted state. 

iii. 11 The mutation of concentration is the dwindling of dispersiveness 
and the uprisal of singleness-of-intent belonging to the mind-stuff, 
iii. 12 Then again when the quiescent and the uprisen presented-ideas 
are similar [in respect of having a single object], the mind-stuff has 
a mutation single-in-intent, iii. 13 Thus with regard to elements and 
to organs, mutations of external-aspect and of time-variation and of 
intensity have been enumerated, iii. 14 A substance conforms itself to 
quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable external-aspects, iii. 15 The 
order of the sequence is the reason for the order of the mutations. 



Translation of the Yoga-sutras [xxxviii 

Application of constraints to different orders of mutations 

iii. 16-52. Given a single mutation of external-aspect or time-form or in- 
tensity, the whole sequence comes under control of the concentrated insight. 
iii. 16 As a result of constraint upon the three mutations [there follows] 
the knowledge of the past and the future, iii. 17 Word and intended- 
ohject and presented -idea are confused because they are erroneously 
identified with each other. By constraint upon the distinctions between 
them [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the cries of all living 
beings, iii. 18 As a result of direct perception of subliminal-impressions 
there is [intuitive] knowledge of previous births, iii. 19 [As a result of 
constraint] upon a presented-idea [there arises intuitive] knowledge of 
the mind-stuff of another, iii. 20 But [the intuitive knowledge of the 
mind-stuff of another] does not have that [idea] together with that upon 
which it depends [as its object], since that [upon which it depends] 
is not-in-the-field [of consciousness], iii. 21 As a result of constraint 
upon the [outer] form of the body, when its power to be known is 
stopped, then as a consequence of the disjunction of the light and of the 
eye there follows indiscernibility [of the yogin's body], iii. 22 Advancing 
and not-advancing is karma ; as a result of constraint upon this [two- 
fold karma] or from the signs of death [there arises an intuitive] 
knowledge of the latter end. iii. 23 [As a result of constraint] upon 
friendliness and other [sentiments there arise] powers [of friendliness], 
iii. 24 [As a result of constraint] upon powers [there arise] powers like 
those of an elephant, iii. 25 As a result of casting the light of 
a sense-activity [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the subtile 
and the concealed and the obscure, iii. 26 As a result of constraint 
upon the sun [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the cosmic-spaces, 
iii. 27 [As a result of constraint] upon the moon [there arises the 
intuitive] knowledge of the arrangement of the stars, iii. 28 [As a result 
of constraint] upon the pole-star [there arises the intuitive] knowledge 
of their movements, iii. 29 [As a result of constraint] upon the wheel 
of the navel [there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the arrangement 
of the body. iii. 30 [As a result of constraint] upon the well of the 
throat [there follows] the cessation of hunger and thirst, iii. 31 [As 
a result of constraint] upon the tortoise-tube [there follows] motionless- 
ness of the mind-stuff, iii. 32 [As a result of constraint] upon the 
radiance in the head [there follows] the sight of the Siddhas. iii. 33 Or 
as a result of vividness the yogin discerns all. iii. 34 [As a result of 
constraint] upon the heart [there arises] a consciousness of the mind-stuff, 
iii. 35 Experience is a presented-idea which fails to distinguish the sattva 
and the Self, which are absolutely uncommingled [in the presented-idea]. 
Since the sattva exists as object for another, the [intuitive] knowledge 
of the Self arises as the result of constraint upon that which exists for 



xxxix] without the Comment or the Explanation 

its own sake. iii. 36 As a result of this [constraint upon that which 
exists for its own sake], there arise vividness and the organ-of-[supernal]- 
hearing and the organ-of-[supernal]-touch and the organ-of-[supernal]- 
sight and the organ- of-[supernal] -taste and the organ-of-[supernalJ-smell. 
iii. 37 In concentration these [supernal activities] are obstacles ; in the 
emergent state they are perfections (siddhi). iii. 38 As a result of slacken- 
ing the causes of bondage and as a result of the knowledge of the procedure 
[of the mind-stuff], the mind-stuff penetrates into the body of another, 
iii. 39 As a result of mastering the Udana there is no adhesion to water 
or mud or thorns or similar objects, and [at death] the upward flight. 
iii. 40 As a result of mastering the Samana [there arises] a radiance, 
iii. 41 As a result of constraint upon the relation between the organ-of- 
hearing and the air, [there arises] the supernal-organ-of-hearing. iii. 42 
Either as a result of constraint upon the relation between the body and 
the air, or as a result of the balanced -state of lightness, such as that of 
cotton-fibre, there follows the passing through air. iii. 43 An outwardly 
unadjusted fluctuation is the Great Discarnate ; as a result of this the 
dwindling of the covering to the brightness, iii. 44 As a result of con- 
straint upon the coarse and the essential -attribute and the subtile and 
the inherence and purposiveness, there is a mastery of the elements, 
iii. 45 As a result of this, atomization and the other [perfections] come 
about, [there is] perfection of body ; and there is no obstruction by the 
properties of these [elements], iii. 46 Beauty and grace and power and 
compactness of the thunderbolt, [this is] perfection of body. iii. 47 As 
a result of constraint upon the process-of-knowing and the essential- 
attribute and the feeling-of-personality and the inherence and the 
purposiveness, [there follows] the subjugation of the organs, iii. 48 As 
a result of this [there follows] speed [great as that] of the central- organ, 
action of the instruments [of knowledge] disjunct [from the body], and 
the subjugation of the primary-cause, iii. 49 He who has only the full 
discernment into the difference between the sattva and the Self is one 
who has authority over all states-of-existence and is one who knows 
all. iii. 50 As a result of passionlessness even with regard to these 
[perfections] there follows, after the dwindling of the seeds of the 
defects, Isolation, iii. 51 In case of invitations from those-in-high- 
places, these should arouse no attachment or pride, for undesired 
consequences recur, iii. 52 As a result of constraint upon moments 
and their sequence [there arises the intuitive] knowledge proceeding from 
discrimination. 

Culmination of concentration 

iii. 53-55. The particular which is indiscernible in respect of class or 
term or point-in-space is intuitively discerned ; the widest span of objec- 
tivity is also discerned. This is the attainment of Isolation. 



Translation of the Yoga-sutras [xl 

iii. 53 As a result of this there arises the deeper-knowledge of two 
equivalent things which cannot be distinctly qualified in species or 
characteristic-mark or point-of-space. iii. 54 The [intuitive] knowledge 
proceeding from discrimination is a deliverer, has all things as its object, 
and has all times for its object, and is an [inclusive whole] without 
sequence, iii. 55 When the purity of the sattva and of the Self are equal 
there is Isolation. 

BOOK FOURTH ISOLATION 
Substances and subconsciousness 

iv. 1-13. Correspondence between imperceptible forms of substance and 

latent-impressions of concentrated states. 

iv. 1 Perfections proceed from birth or from drugs or from spells 
or from self-castigation or from concentration, iv. 2 The mutation into 
another birth is the result of the filling in of the evolving-cause. 
iv. 3 The efficient cause gives no impulse to the evolving-causes but 
[the mutation] follows when the barrier [to the evolving-cause] is cut, 
as happens with the peasant, iv. 4 Created mind-stuffs may result from 
the sense-of-personality and from this alone, iv. 5 While there is a 
variety of actions, the mind-stuff which impels the many is one. iv. 6 Of 
these [five perfections] that which proceeds from contemplation leaves 
no latent-deposit, iv. 7 The yogin's karma is neither-white-nor-black ; 
[the karma] of others is of three kinds, iv. 8 As a result of this 
there follows the manifestation of those subconscious-impressions only 
which correspond to the fruition of their [karma], iv. 9 There is 
an uninterrupted-causal-relation [of subconscious-impressions], although 
remote in species and point-of-space and moment-of-time, by reason of 
the correspondence between memory and subliminal-impressions, iv. 10 
Furthermore the [subconscious-impressions] have no beginning [that 
we can set in time], since desire is permanent, iv. 11 Since [sub- 
conscious-impressions] are associated with cause and motive and mental- 
substrate and stimulus, if these cease to be, then those [subconscious- 
impressions] cease to be. iv. 12 Past and future as such exist ; [therefore 
subconscious-impressions do not cease to be]. For the different time- 
forms belong to the external-aspects, iv. 13 These [external-aspects 
with the three time-forms] are phenomenalized [individuals] or subtile 
[generic-forms] and their essence is the aspects (guna). 

Polemic against Idealism 
iv. 14-23. Knowledge of the stream of consciousness is impossible unless 
it be a permanent order as contrasted with a succession of transient 
appearances. 

iv. 14 The that-ness of a thing is due to a singleness of mutation. 



xli] without the Comment or the Explanation 

iv. 15. Because, while the [physical] thing remains the same, the mind- 
stuffs are different, [therefore the two are upon] distinct levels-of-existence. 
iv. 16 And a thing is not dependent upon a single mind-stuff, [for then 
in certain cases] it could not be proved [by that mind-stuff], [and] then 
what would it be? iv. 17 A thing is known or not known by 
virtue of its affecting [or not affecting] the mind-stuff, iv. 18 Uninter- 
mittently the Master of that [mind-stuff] knows the fluctuations of 
mind-stuff [and thus] the Self undergoes-no-mutations. iv. 19 It does 
not illumine itself, since it is an object-for-sight. iv. 20 And there 
cannot be a cognition of both [thinking-substance and thing] at the 
same time. iv. 21 If [one mind-stuff] were the object-for-sight for 
another, there would be an infinite regress from one thinking-substance 
to another thinking-substance as well as confusion of memory, iv. 22 
The Intellect (citi) which unites not [with objects] is conscious of its own 
thinking-substance when [the mind-stuff] takes the form of that [thinking- 
substance by reflecting it], iv. 23 Mind-stuff affected by the Seer and by 
the object-for-sight [leads to the perception of] all intended-objects. 

Complete Self-realization of the Self 

iv. 24-34. All hindrances subside; all acts of the Self are spontaneous 
and free ; absence of limitations which thwart one who wishes to attain 
the ultimate ideal of his own nature. 

iv. 24 This [mind-stuff], although diversified by countless subconscious- 
impressions, exists for the sake of another, because its nature is to produce 
[things as] combinations, iv. 25 For him who sees the distinction, 
pondering upon his own states-of-being ceases, iv. 26 Then the mind- 
stuff is borne down to discrimination, onward towards Isolation, iv. 27 
In the intervals of this [mind-stuff] there are other presented-ideas [coming] 
from subliminal-impressions, iv. 28 The escape from these [subliminal- 
impressions] is described as being like [the escape from] the hindrances, 
iv. 29 For one who is not usurious even in respect of Elevation, there 
follows in every case as a result of discriminative discernment the 
concentration [called] Eain-cloud of [knowable] things, iv. 30 Then 
follows the cessation of the hindrances and of karma, iv. 31 Then, 
because of the endlessness of knowledge from which all obscuring 
defilements have passed away, what is yet to be known amounts to little, 
iv. 32 When as a result of this the aspects {gum) have fulfilled their 
purpose, they attain to the limit of the sequence of mutations, iv. 33 
The positive correlate to the moment, recognized as such at the final limit 
of the mutation, is a sequence, iv. 34 Isolation is the inverse generation 
of the aspects, no longer provided with a purpose by the Self, or it is 
the Energy of Intellect grounded in itself. 

I [h.o.s. 17] 



BOOK FIRST 
CONCENTRATION 



1 [h.o.s. 17| 



NOTICE TO THE READER 

Patanjali's Mnemonic Rules or Yoga-sutras are divided into four books as follows : 

Book 1. Concentration or Samadhi, with 51 rules or sutras, pages 1 to 100 

Book 2. Means of attainment or Sadhana, with 55 sutras, pages 101 to 200 

Book 3. Supernormal powers or Vibhuti, with 55 sutras, pages 201 to 296 

Book 4. Isolation or Kaivalya, with 34 sutras, pages 297 to 348. 

In all, there are 195 rules. Their extreme brevity is apparent when they are printed 
continuously, as at the end of the Ananda^crama edition, where the entire text of 
the rules occupies only between four and five pages. 

The Comment or Bhasya, usually after a brief introductory paragraph or phrase (called 
avatdrana), takes up the rules, one by one, and gives first the text and then the 
meaning thereof. 

Vacaspatimicra's Explanation is of course in the first instance an explanation of the 
Comment ; but since the Comment comprehends also the Rules, it is in fact an 
explanation of both Rules and Comment. In the body of this volume, the Explana- 
tion is not put all together by itself, but is made to keep pace with the Comment, 
rule by rule. 



Meaning of the Differences of Type 

The translation of the Rules is set in pica type of full-faced Clarendon style ; 

The translation of the Comment is set in pica type of Roman style ; 

The translation of the Explanation is set in long primer type of Roman style. 

Single angles (like these < >) indicate that the words which they enclose are taken from 

the particular Rule or Yoga-sutra under discussion. 
Double angles (like these < /) indicate that the words which they enclose are taken 

from the Comment or Yoga-bhasya. 
Double quotation marks (" ") indicate that the words which they enclose are taken from 

some authoritative text. 
Single quotation marks (' ') indicate that the words which they enclose are the objections 

or questions of an opponent, or are a quotation from some unauthoritative text. 
A half-parenthesis on its side () is used between two vowels to show that they are 

printed in violation of the rules of euphonic combination. 



BOOK FIEST 
CONCENTRATION 

May he, who, having abandoned his primal form, exercises his 
power to show kindness to the world in many ways he with the 
beautiful hood and many mouths, possessed of deadly poison and 
yet abolishing the mass of hindrances he the source of all know- 
ledge, and whose girdle of attendant snakes produces continual 
pleasure, may he, the divine Lord x of Serpents, protect you, with 
his white stainless body he, the giver of concentration (yoga), and 
himself concentrated in concentration. 
1. Now the exposition of yoga [is to be made]. 
The expression <now> indicates that a distinct topic 2 commences 
here. The authoritative book which expounds yoga is to be 
understood as commenced. [To give a provisional definition :] 
yoga is concentration ; but this is a quality of the mind-stuff (citta) 
which belongs to all the stages. The stages of the mind-stutf are 
these : the restless (ksipi&), the infatuated (m udha ), the distracted 
(viksijpta) , the single-in-intent (e hdgra) , and the restricted ( niruddha ). 
Of these [stages the first two have nothing to do with yoga and 
even] in the distracted state of the mind [its] concentration is [at 
times] overpowered by [opposite] distractions and [consequently] 
it cannot properly be called yoga. But that [state] which, when 
the mind is single-in-intent, fully illumines a distinct and real 
object and causes the hindrances (Jdega) to dwindle, slackens the 
bonds of karma, and sets before it U&T& goal the restriction [of all 

1 See Linga Purana, I., Ixiii. 22-37. application (atidega). The word atha 

2 There are six kinds of sutras according to may introduce a topic (adhikaravartha), 

the Mlmahsa : the definition (samjnd), or give the purport (prastdva^artha), or 

the key to interpretation (paribhdsd), state the subject-matter of the dis- 

the statement of a general rule (vidhi), cussion {drambha^artha). This is dis- 

the restrictive rule (niyama), an original cussed in Qloka-varttika i. 1. 22-24. 
statement (adhikdra), an analogical 



i. l ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [4 

fluctuations], is called the yoga in which there is consciousness of 
an object (samv rq jn dta) . This [conscious yoga], however, is 
accompanied byj deliberation [upon coarse objects], b^Preflection 
[upon subtile objects], by joy, by^the feeling-of -personality (asmita^^ 
This we shall set forth later. But when there is restriction of 
all the fluctuations (vrtjfy^of the mind-stuff], there is the con- 
centration in which there is no consciousness [of an object]. 

I prostrate myself before him who is the cause of the world's origination, before 
Vrsaketu, who although for him fruition and other results of karma proceeding 
from the hindrances have ceased is yet kindly [to the world he has made]. 
Prostrating myself before Patarijali the sage, I proceed to set forth a brief, clear, 
and significant explanation of the Comment by Vedavyasa. 
For here the Exalted Patarijali wishing to announce in brief the import of the 
book which he is about to begin that he may thus assist the procedure of men 
of understanding and that he may, more especially, make the hearer easily 
comprehend composed this sutra : 1. Now the exposition of yoga [is to be 
made]. Of this [sutra] the first portion, the word <now>, he [the author of 
the Comment] discusses in the phrase CThe expression <now> indicates that 
a distinct topic commences here.^ [The word <now> is used] as in [the sutra] 
" Now ' this is the Jyotis ". It does not imply that it is to be preceded [by condi- 
tions as in the first Brahma-sutra]. Now by the word <exposition> he means 
the authoritative book in the sense that it is that whereby a thing is expounded. 
Moreover the book may enter upon its activity when preceded not only by 
calm 2 and the other [five conditions required by the Brahma-sutra] ; but it 
must be preceded also by [Patanjali's] desire to announce [his] truth. [Calm], 
on the contrary, would follow when once there had been a desire to know and 
when the knowledge [had entered into action]. As it is written [BAU. iv. 4. 
23 or 28], " After that, calm and subdued and retired and resigned and concen- 
trated let him behold himself in the Self only." Although it would be possible 
[for the book to enter into action] immediately after advantage had been taken 
of such things as students' questions or performances of austerities or elixirs of 
life, [still these are] not mentioned. The reason for this is that these things 
would be of no use either to the student's knowledge or to [his] feeling inclined 
(pravrtti) [for it]. [What then would be advantageous? The book's authori- 
tativeness.] If the book be authoritative, then, even if there are no [questions 
or austerities or elixirs], the exposition of yoga is to be accepted ; but if not 
authoritative, then, even if [there be questions and all the other conditions, still] 

1 These words are from the Tandya-Mahabr. soma. See Caland and Henry : L'Agni- 

xix. 11.1 (Biblioth. Ind.). The jyotis stoma, I, p. 166. And compare Qastra 

is a chant by the udgatar in the Agni- Dipika (Benares edition), p. 230 20 . 

stoma directly after the filtering of the 2 See Vedanta Sara 4 and 14 and 17. 



5] Conditions required for a beginning [ i. 1 

the book is to be rejected. Thus it is [by insisting upon the authorita- 
tiveness of the book] that [Patahjali] refuses to say that [the book may begin] 
immediately after his understanding the truth and his desire to announce. But 
if it be agreed that [the word <now> indicates] that a distinct topic commences, 
then when once yoga has been mentioned as the topic of the book the student 
easily understands the announcement of the import of the book as a whole and 
is started into action. Now every one knows from Qruti and Smrti and the 
Epics and the Puranas that concentration is the cause of final-bliss [and that 
yoga is authoritative]. Some one might ask, ' If the word <now> indicates that 
a distinct topic commences in all those works to which it is attached, then, if 
this is so, would not such an announcement 1 as, "Now therefore the inquiry 
into Brahma [is to be made] " also be included ? ' To prevent this mistake [the 
commentator] uses the word here. [Again], some one cites the Yogiyajha- 
valkyasmrti, " Hiranyagarbha and no other of ancient days is he who gave 
utterance (valctd) to yoga" and asks how it can be said that Patahjali gives 
utterance to the authoritative book on yoga. In reply the author of the 
sutra says <the exposition): exposition in the sense of expounding something 
previously expounded. When then the word <now> signifies that here a dis- 
tinct topic commences, then the point of the statement is quite consistent. 
Accordingly he says, The authoritative work which expounds yoga ... as com- 
menced. Here an objector interrupts, ' The topic which is commenced here is 
not the authoritative work, but yoga in so far as it is taught.' In reply to 
which, he says ^Cis to be understood. True, we are beginning yoga in so far 
as it is taught. But the instrument which is to teach this [yoga] is the authori- 
tative work which deals with the same. Moreover the teacher's activity has to 
do more immediately with the instrument than with the thing he works upon. 
Accordingly, with emphasis upon the activity of the author (Jcartr), we are to 
understand that the authoritative work which deals with yoga is commenced. 
But the topic commenced is that yoga only which is limited in its activity by 
an authoritative work. This is the real point. And one must suppose that 
the hearing of the word <now>, which means that a distinct topic has com- 
menced, suggests like the sight of a water-jar 2 carried [on a girl's shoulder 
at early morning] another meaning, [namely,] it serves as an auspicious 
beginning. Doubt as to the actual thing [yoga] is occasioned by doubt as to 
the meaning of the word [yoga]. This [doubt] he removes by stating that 
[yoga in the phrase] <Kyoga is concentration^ is etymologically derived 
from the stem yuj-a [Dhatupatha iv. 68] in the sense of concentration and not 
from the stem yuj-i [vii. 7] in the sense of conjunction. 

Another objection is raised, ' The yoga which is to be described is a whole, and 
concentration is a part of it ; and a mere part is not the whole.' The reply is 

1 Brahma-sutra i. 1. 1. which one makes a circumambulation 

2 This is in the list of auspicious objects to (pradaksina), Visnu-snirti lxiii. 29. 



i. 1 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [6 

in the words But this. The word ca has the sense of but and distin- 
guishes the whole from the part. Which belongs to all the stages^ refers 
to the stages or states which are to be described : Madhumati [iii. 54], Madhu- 
pratlka [iii. 48], Vicoka [i. 36], Samskaracesa [iii. 9]. These belong to the 
mind-stuff. In all these [stages] is found that yoga the [more] special mark 
of which is the restriction of the mind-stuff. But concentration is a part 
[of this] and has not this as its special mark. And the words yoga is concen- 
tration are a statement for etymological purposes only, in so far as one is not 
dwelling upon the difference between the whole and the part. But [when he is 
referring to] the practical purpose of what he calls yoga,) [he says] it is the 
restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff: this is the stricter sense of the 
term. To those [Vaicesikas] who hold the view that fluctuations are sensations 
inherent in the soul and that therefore the restriction of them would also involve 
the soul (atmari) in which they inhere, to these in rebuttal he says, a quality 
of the mind-stuff .2> The term <mind-stuff> (citta) he uses as a partial expression 
for the inner-organ ' (antakkarana), the thinking-substance (buddhi). The point is 
that the Absolutely-eternal Energy of Intellect (citi-gakti), [since it is] immutable, 
cannot have sensations as its properties ; but the thinking-substance may have 
them. An objector says, This may be so. But if yoga belongs to all its 
stages, why then ! Sir, [since you concede that] the restless and the infatuated 
and the distracted states also are stages of mind-stuff, and [since] there would 
be among these states, reciprocally at least, also a restriction of fluctuations, 
then <yoga> would have to include these states also (tatrapi).' In replying to 
this difficulty he makes clear which stages are to be included and which not 
included [in yoga] by the words beginning with <the restless.) i. The restless 
incessantly thrown by force of rajas upon this or that object is excessively 
unstable ; ii. the infatuated because of a preponderance of tamas is filled with 
the fluctuation of sleep ; iii. the distracted differs from the restless in that, 
although prevailingly unstable, it is occasionally stable, this prevailing instability 
being either natural or generated by diseases and languor and other obstacles 
later [i. 30] to be described ; iv. the single-in-intent is the focused ; v. the 
restricted mind-stuff is that in which all the fluctuations are restricted and in 
which nothing remains but subliminal-impressions {saihskara). In spite of the 
fact that certain fluctuations of the restless and the infatuated, [the first two] of 
these [five stages], are restricted each by the others, still, since these two are 
not even indirectly causes of final bliss and since they contend against it, they 
are so far removed from [the possibility of] being called yoga that he has not 
expressly denied that these two are yoga. But in the case of the distracted 
[state], since occasionally it has stability when directed towards a real object, he 
denies that it can be yoga in the words <KOf these stages.^ When the mind is 
distracted, the concentration which is the occasional stability of the mind-stuff 

1 Compare Camkara Bhasya on ii. 4. 6 (Nirnayasagara edition, p. 71 1 11 ). 



7] States of mind- stuff jit for Yoga [ i. 1 

when directed to a real object, cannot properly be called yoga. Why [cannot 
this be called yoga]? Because it has come under the adverse influence of 
distraction, which is the opposite of this [yoga]. When fallen into the hands 
(antargata) of a troop of opponents, it is hard for a thing to be even what it is 
and it is still harder for it to produce effects. Just as any one can see that 
a seed which has fallen into the fire and stayed there three or four moments 
has not power, even if sown, of sprouting : this is the real meaning. If then 
concentration which has come under the adverse influence of distraction be not 
yoga, what then is yoga ? To this he makes answer, But that [state] which, 
when the mind is single-in-intent. By the word <Sreal (bhuta) he excludes 
[any] imaginary [object]. Since sleep, a fluctuation of mind-stuff, is also single- 
in-intent with regard to tamas, a real (bhuta) object, the peculiar (sva) [aspect of 
a substance x ] upon which it [sleep] depends (alambana), so he says <Kdistinct 
(sad) ; which means is clear (gobhana), in which the sattva [aspect] becomes evident 
in a very high degree. But that thing is not clear in which the tamas is in 
preponderance, inasmuch as it, [the tamas,] is the cause of hindrances. Now 
the perception of a thing either by verbal communication [dgama] or by inference 
may, we grant, be luminous (dyotanam bhavad api) ; still, in so far as it is 
mediately known, it does not destroy undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) 
which we directly experience. For in such [illusions as the sight of] two 
moons or a defective sense of orientation, [verbal communications or inferences] 
do not destroy undifferentiated-consciousness. Accordingly he uses the word 
<Kfully (pra), because it means luminous to the full extent (pra-karsam) and 
because it alludes to immediate perception [in the case of yoga]. The feeling- 
of-personality (asmita) and the other hindrances have their root in undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness (avidya). Furthermore, since knowledge (vidya) destroys 
undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) ; and since, when knowledge emerges, 
the hindrances [arising] from undifferentiated-consciousness and so on are 
destroyed, inasmuch as they are contrary the one to the other, and inasmuch 
as [then] the cause [of the hindrances] would be destroyed ; therefore he says 
and causes [the hindrances] to dwindle. 2> This, then, is the reason why 
[yoga] slackens the bonds which consist of karma. And in this passage by 
a figurative use of the cause for the effect he employs the word <karma, 
whereas subtile-influences (apurva) are intended. The word <Kslackens) means 
brings [them] down from their operation. For later [ii. 13] he says, " So long 
as the root exists, [there will be] fruition from it." And finally it Csets before 
it as a goal the restriction [of all fluctuations].^ Moreover since this [yoga] 
conscious of objects is four-fold, he employs the words [beginning] This 
[conscious yoga]. He describes [the yoga] not conscious of objects with the 
words all the fluctuations.^ [In other words,] we know (Mia) that sources-of- 
valid-ideas and other fluctuations (pramanadivrtti) made of rajas and tamas are 

1 'Aspect of a substance' is dharma (see iii. 13) or parinuma. 



i. 1 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [S 

restricted in [yoga] conscious [of objects] while fluctuations of sattva are retained ; 
but that in [yoga] not conscious [of an object] all fluctuations whatsoever are 
restricted. Therefore [the final result] is established (siddham) that ^belonging 
to all stages^ means occurring in all these [four] stages, MadhumatT and so 
on, which [four] are [all] included in these two stages [of the conscious and 
the unconscious yoga]. 



The intent of the following sutra is to state the distinguishing 
characteristic of this [yoga]. 

2. Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff. 
By the non-use of the word ' all ' [before <the fluctuations)], [the 
yoga which is] conscious [of objects] is also included under the 
denomination of yoga. Now mind-stuff has three aspects (guna), 
as appears from the fact that it has a disposition to vividness 
(prakhyd), to activity (pravrtti), and to inertia (sthiti). For the 
mind-stuff's [aspect] sattva, which is vividness, when commingled 
with rajas and tamas, acquires a fondness for supremacy and for 
objects-of-sense ; while the very same [constituent-aspect, sattva,] 
when pervaded with tamas, tends towards demerit and non- 
perception and passionateness and towards a failure of [its own 
rightful] supremacy ; [and] the very same \_sattva\ when the 
covering of error has dwindled away, illumined now in its 
totality (sarvatas), but faintly pervaded by rajas, tends towards 
merit and knowledge and passionlessness and [its own rightful] 
supremacy ; [and] the very same [sattva'], the stains of the last 
vestige of rajas once removed, grounded in itself and being 
nothing but the discernment (khydti) of the difference between the 
sattva and the Self (purusa), tends towards the Contemplation of 
the Rain-cloud of [knowable] Things. The designation given by 
contemplators (dhydyin) to this [kind of mind-stuff] is the highest 
Elevation (prasamkhydna). For the Energy of Intellect (citi-cakti) 
is immutable and does not unite [with objects] ; it has objects 
shown to it and is undefiled [by constituent-aspects] and is unending. 
Whereas this discriminate discernment (viveka-khydti), whose 
essence is sattva, is [therefore] contrary to this [Energy of Intellect 



9] Provisional definition of Yoga [ i. 2 

and is therefore to be rejected]. Hence the mind-stuff being 
disgusted with this [discriminative discernment] restricts even this 
Insight. When it has reached this state, [the mind-stuff], [after 
the restriction of the fluctuations,] passes over to subliminal 
impressions (samskdra). This is the [so-called] seedless concentra- 
tion. In this state nothing becomes an object of consciousness : 
such is concentration not conscious [of objects]. Accordingly the 
yoga [which we have defined as] the restriction of the fluctuations 
of the mind-stuff is two-fold. 

He introduces the second sutra with the words <Sthe distinguishing charac- 
teristic of this. The words <Kof this refer to the two kinds of yoga mentioned 
in the previous sutra. 2. Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind- 
stuff. Yoga is that particular state of mind-stuff in which sources-of -valid- 
ideas and the other fluctuations are restricted. The objection is made that 
this cannot be the distinguishing characteristic [of yoga] since yoga conscious 
[of objects] would be excluded. For in this [conscious yoga], [those] fluctua- 
tions of mind-stuff which have the sattva-nspect are not restricted. The reply is 
<by the non-use of the word ' all '.X> If yoga had been said to be the restric- 
tion of all the fluctuations of mind-stuff, [yoga] conscious [of objects] would 
not have been included. But [if the objection be made that this includes too 
much since there is restriction of sattva in the first three states, the reply is,] 
the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff which are hostile to the latent- 
deposit (agaya-paripanthin) of karma from the hindrances [i. e. the restriction, as 
thus qualified] includes this [yoga] also. [And this is so] because there is a 
restriction of those mind-stuffs fluctuations which have the rajas and tamas 
aspect in this [conscious yoga] also, and because this (tad) [hostility to the 
hindrances] is (bhavat) a part of that (tasya) [restriction]. But why is this 
mind-stuff, which is a single thing, in connexion with [its own] restless and 
other stages 1 And since some one might be in doubt why the fluctuations 
of mind-stuff which is in such [a three-fold] state should be restricted, he now 
makes clear first of all the reason for [the mind-stuff's] connexion with [these] 
states. Now mind-stuff [is in this threefold state] since the aspect sattva has a 
disposition to vividness [and] since the aspect rajas has a disposition to activity 
[and] since the aspect tamas has a disposition to inertia. The use of the word 
vividness is the use of a part for the whole (upalaJcsana). It alludes also to 
other kinds of sattva, to serenity and lightness and joy (priti) ; and Cactivity 
alludes to [the other] kinds of rajas, to pain and grief. Inertia is a property 
of the tamas-fluetuation and is opposed to activity. The use of the word 
inertia is a partial expression for heaviness and covering and dejection and 
similar states. What he means to say is this : the mind-stuff, although a single 
2 [h o.s. 17] 



i. 2 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [10 

thing, has, inasmuch as it is made up of three aspects and inasmuch as the 
aspects are not in equilibrium, a multitude of mutations (parinama) arising from 
a multitude of reciprocal antagonisms ; and thus may consistently have many 
states. He shows that the restless and other stages of the mind-stuff have 
according to circumstances a variety of subordinate states. For . . . which is 
vividness.^ Mind-stuffs sattva is sattva in its form as a mutation of mind- 
stuff; [and] this [mind-stuffs sattva] in its form as vividness is thus shown 
to be a preponderance of sattva in the mind-stuff. In this mind-stuff when 
rajas and tamas are somewhat less than the sattva, and when they two are equal 
each to the other, then (tadd) [that mind-stuff] is that thing thus described 
[in the Comment] which acquires a fondness for supremacy and for objects- 
of-sense, sound and so on. Although the mind-stuff under the predominance of 
sattva desires to meditate upon reality (tattva), still, when the reality is concealed 
by tamas, it thinks that such supremacies as atomization (animan) are the reality 
and desires to meditate upon them (tad). It meditates a moment, and then, 
caught by rajas, although obtaining no permanence [in its meditation] on them, 
it gains nothing except a fondness for these things. But its natural inclination 
towards sound and so on [the objects of sense] is quite well known. Accord- 
ingly in this way the mind-stuff is said to be distracted. While describing the 
restless mind-stuff, he alludes also to the infatuated : <Sthe very same . . . with 
tamas. s> Now when tamas suppresses rajas and extends itself, then, since rajas 
has become incapable of removing the tamas which covers the mind-stuff's sattva, 
the mind-stuff covered with tamas tends towards demerit and other [forms of 
ignorance]. Non-perception) is declared to be misconceived perception [i. 8], 
and also to be sleep-perception [i. 10] which is supported (dlambana) by a cause 
(pratyaya) of a [transient] negation. And from this [word] comes the sug- 
gestion (sucitd) of the infatuated state also. A ^failure of its [own rightful] 
supremacy^ is an obstruction to one's will in every direction. Thus it is that 
mind-stuff becomes pervaded with demerit and the other [forms of ignorance]. 
But when this same substance (sattva) of the mind-stuff comes to have its 
sa#ra[-quality] manifest [and] its cover of tamas removed [and] is accompanied 
by rajas, then it tends, as he says, towards merit and perception and passionless 
and [rightful] supremacy, as he says in the phrase ^dwindled away.^ That 
[substance of the mind-stuff] is referred to, the covering, that is, the tamas 
[-quality], that is, the infatuation of which has almost entirely (prakarsena) 
dwindled. For the same reason it is illumined in its totality2>: in substances- 
as-effects (viqesa) and substances-as-causes (avigesa) and in the linga and the 
lingin [see ii. 19] and the Self. Still it has not the capacity for merit and 
[rightful] supremacy since it lacks activity. With regard to this he says pervaded 
by rajas only. In other words when rajas is the active agent, merit and the 
rest do persist. Accordingly for the two middle classes of yogins, 1 the 

J See below, iii. 51, and cf. Kern's ' Lotus \ SBE. xxi. 387. 



1 1] Functions of the mind-stuff [ i. 2 

Madhubhtimika and the Prajnajyotis who have attained to concentration con- 
scious [of an object], the substance (sattva) of the mind-stuff is included. He 
now describes the state of the mind-stuff of the fourth class of contemplators, 
the Atikrantabhavaniya, with the words the same. Since the stain of the 
last vestige of rajas is removed, the mind-stuff is grounded in itself. Now the 
gold of the substance (sattva) of the thinking-substance (buddhi), when once the 
stain of the rajas and tamas is purified by the joining [of the upper and lower 
parts] of the crucible (puta-palca), which are practice and passionlessness, and 
when it has withdrawn [see ii. 54] the organs which are concerned with objects- 
of-sense, and is grounded in itself, has still a further function to perform 
(para Mrya), namely, the discriminative discernment [referring to the sattva 
and the Self], which performs its function in so far as its task (adhiJcara) is un- 
finished. With this in mind he says the mind-stuff. The mind-stuff which 
is nothing else than the discriminative discernment referring to the sattva and 
the Self tends towards the Contemplation [called] the Rain-cloud of [knowable] 
Things. The Eain-cloud of [knowable] Things will also be described [iv. 29]. 
He tells what is perfectly clear to yogins with regard to this [state] in the 
words, this ... is the highest.^ The mind-stuff which is nothing else than 
the discernment of the difference between the sattva and the Self and which 
lasts until the Rain-cloud of [knowable] Things, is designated by contemplators 
as the highest Elevation. And if one does not wish to make the distinction 
between the substance and its property, [this Elevation] may be regarded as 
having the same office as the mind-stuff [:the mind-stuff itself is the Eleva- 
tion.] In order to introduce the Concentration of Restriction as the ground for 
rejecting the discernment of the difference and as the ground for accepting the 
Energy of Intellect, he shows the excellence of the Energy of Intellect and the 
inferior value of the discriminative insight by the phrase the Energy of 
Intellects and the following words. Impurity has as its essence pleasure and 
pain and infatuation. For even pleasure and infatuation give pain to the man 
of discrimination [ii. 15] ; therefore, like pain, they too are to be escaped. 
Moreover exceptional beauty also comes to an end and so gives pain. Accord- 
ingly, that too the man of discrimination can only reject. Since this same 
impurity and this coming to an end do not occur in the Energy of Intellect 
[which is] the Self, it is said to be undefiled and unending. An objection is 
made, ' How can this (iyam) [Energy of Intellect] be free from defilement, if, in 
being aware of things which have as their essence pleasure and pain and infatua- 
tion, it assumes their form ? and how can it be unending if it accepts and rejects 
their forms ?' In reply it is said it has objects shown to it.S It [the Energy 
of Intellect] is that to which the various objects are shown. That [objection] 
would be sound, if, like the thinking-substance (buddhi), the Energy of Intellect 
assumed the form of objects ; but it is the thinking-substance only which, because 
it undergoes mutations (parinata sail) in the form of the objects, shows the 
object to the Energy of Intellect, which [latter however] does not take their 



i. 2 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [12 

form. And when this happens, the Self is then said to become aware [of 
the objects]. The objector asks, 'How can the Energy of Intellect unless 
it strike upon the thinking-substance which has taken the form of some object, 
know [that] object ? or, if it do strike upon [that] object, how is it that it does 
not undergo a change into the form of that [object] ? ' To this he replies <Kdoes 
not unite [with objects].^ Union is contagion ; not any of this is in Intellect : 
this is his meaning. If any one asks why there is no [union] of this [Intellect 
with objects], the reply is, it Cis immutable.^ Mutation, which has the three- 
fold character [see iii. 13] of external aspect (dharma) and time-variation 
(laJcsana) and intensity (avastM), does not appertain to the [Energy of] Intellect 
also (api) [as it does to the mind-stuff] in any such way that {yena), by passing 
into a mutation in the form of an action, the Energy of Intellect should mutate 
in correspondence with the thinking-substance. That it, [this Energy,] even 
if it does not unite [with objects], can [nevertheless] be conscious of objects, 
he will now show to be possible. This [much] is established, that the Energy 
of Thought is unsullied by [the aspects (guna)]. But it has been said that the 
discriminative discernment, since it has as its essence the substance of the 
thinking-substance is not unsullied. It is <K[therefore] contrary to this 
Energy of Intellect. And since even the discriminative discernment is to be 
rejected, then how can you make mention of the other fluctuations which 
abound in defects : this is the real meaning. Thence, [that is,] for this reason, 
the introduction of the Concentration of Eestriction is fitting. And so he says, 
CHence . . . with this.^ The meaning is that he restricts even the discrimina- 
tive discernment by the higher passionlessness which, surely, is nothing more 
than the complete calming of the perceptions. Now, what kind of a mind- 
stuff would that be that has all its fluctuations restricted ? In reply he says 
[When it has reached] this state.^ He speaks of that [mind-stuff] the state 
of which has restriction. He tells what restriction itself is : This is the 
[so-called] seedless. The latent-deposit (aqaya) of karma, which corresponds 
with the hindrances birth and length-of-life and kind-of-enjoyment [ii. 13], 
is the seed. That which is exempt from this is ^Cseedless.^ For this same 
[seedless concentration], he indicates the proper technical term which is current 
among yogins when he says In this state nothing.^ He sums up with the 
words the yoga [which we have defined as] the restriction of the fluctuations of 
the mind- stuff is two-fold. 



The mind being in this [unconscious] state, what will then be 
the condition of the Self? For it is the essence (dtman) [of the 
Self to receive] knowledge (bodha) [reflected upon it] by the 
thinking-substance (buddhi), [as this in its turn receives the 
impression of external objects, and in this case] there is a [total] 
absence of objects [in the thinking-substance]. 



13] Consummation of Yoga [ i. 3 

3. Then the Seer [that is, the Self,] abides in himself. 

At that time the Energy of Intellect is grounded in its own self, 
as [it is] when in the state of Isolation. But when the mind-stuff 
is in its emergent state, [the Energy of Intellect], although really 
the same, [does] not [seem] so. 

To introduce now the next sutra, he raises the question beginning The 
mind being in this [unconscious] state . . .? The question has the force of 
an objection: 'Now this Self, whose essence is [that it receives] the knowledge 
(bodha) [reflected upon it] by the thinking-substance which is mutated into 
the form of one [object] after another, is always undergoing an experience, 
[but there is] no [experience] when [the Self] is deprived of the knowledge 
from the thinking-substance. For the very nature of this Self is the know- 
ledge (bodha) thrown upon the thinking-substance precisely as shining is [the 
nature] of the sun. Moreover this [knowledge of the thinking-substance] 
does not occur in that kind of mind which consists of subliminal-impressions 
(samskara) only. And further a thing cannot exist without its own nature. 
If this is so, then why does not the Self know that thinking-substance also 
which consists of subliminal-impressions only?' To this he replies <there 
is a [total] absence of objects.^ The thinking-substance as such (buddhi-matra) 
is not the object of the Self, but (apt tu) only in so far as it fulfils the purposes 
of the Self [iv. 32]. Now the two purposes of the Self are discriminative 
insight and the enjoyment of objects ; and these do not exist in the restricted 
state [of the mind-stuff]. Thus the [total] absence of objects is established. 
The rebuttal is [also] given in the sutra: 3. Then the Seer [that is, the Self] 
abides in himself. The words <in himself> mean that the peaceful and the 
cruel and the infatuated nature falsely attributed [to the Self] has ceased. For 
the Self's Intelligence (caitanya) is himself (svarupa), [and is] not conditioned ; 
while the knowledge of the thinking-substance has the various forms peaceful 
and other. And so it is subject to conditions just as the crystal which is in its 
own nature absolutely transparently white [is subject to conditions] : the 
redness of the [crystal] is its condition of being near the China-rose. And 
when a condition ceases, there is no cessation of the thing conditioned ; since 
this would prove too much. This is the real point. And although [the Seer] 
in himself (svarupatah) cannot [actually] be divided, 1 still when-he [the author 
of the Comment] -supposes-a-predicate-relation (vikalpya) [between the drastr 
and his svarupa], the words <in himself) (svarupe) are put in the locative case. 
This same meaning is made clear by the author of the Comment when he says 
grounded in its own self. At that time means in the state of restriction 
[and] not in the state of emergence. [The objection is made,] ' This may be 
true. But if while in the state of emergence the Energy of Intellect is not 

* Literally, although the essential-attribute (svarupa) cannot be divided [from the Self]. 



i. 3 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [14 

grounded in itself and while in the state of restriction is grounded [in itself], 
then it would enter into mutation ; or else if in [the state of] emergence it 
[remains] grounded in itself, [then there would be] no difference between 
emergence and restriction.' In reply to this he says <KBut when the mind-stuff 
is in its emergent state.2> Never does the Energy of Intellect, [in that it is] 
absolutely eternal, deviate from itself. Accordingly, as [it is] in restriction, 
just so [is it] in emergence also. Assuredly, mother-of-pearl as such (svarupa) 
does not suffer increase or decrease of being, no matter whether the perception 
(jndna) which refers to it (gocara) be the source of a valid idea (pramana) or 
[the source of] a misconception. The observer however, although the thing 
is really the same, is under the illusion that it is not so (atathatvena). 
Compared with the concentration of restriction, even [the concentration that 
is] conscious [of an object] is nothing more than emergence. 



How in that case [is it that the Energy of Intellect does not seem 
the same in the emergent state] ? [The answer is,] Since objects 1 
are shown to it. 

4. At other times it [the Self] takes the same form as the 
fluctuations [of mind-stuff]. 

In the emergent state [of the subliminal-impressions], the Self has 
fluctuations which are not distinguished from fluctuations of the 
mind-stuff; and so we have a sutra [of Pancacikha 2 ], " There is only 
one appearance [for both], that appearance is knowledge." The 
mind-stuff is like a magnet ; and, as an object suitable to be seen [by 
the Self as Witness], it gives its aid [to the Self] by the mere fact 
of being near it, and thus the relation between it and the Self is 
that between property (svam) and proprietor (svamin). Hence the 
reason why the Self experiences (bodha) the fluctuations of the 
mind-stuff is its beginning-less correlation [with the thinking-sub- 
stance]. 

To introduce the next sutra, he inquires How in that case ?2> If [the Energy 
of Intellect], though really the same, [does] not [seem to be] so, in what kind 
of a way in that case does it assume an appearance ? such is the meaning. 
He supplies the words Since objects are shown to it which give the reason, 
and [then] rehearses the sutra. 4. At other times it takes the same form as 
the fluctuations [of mind-stuff]. <At other times> means in the emergent 

1 Compare Visnu Pur. i. 14. 35. mente in Festgruss an Roth, Stuttgart, 

2 See Garbe : Pancacikha und seine Frag- 1893, p. 75. 



15] The Self correlated ivith its thinking-substance [ i. 4 

state ; <the fluctuations [of mind-stuff ]> are the tranquil and the cruel 
and the infatuated ; <Knot distinguished means not different. These [three] 
are those [fluctuations] which the Self has. <The same form:> in these 
words the word ' same ' is synonymous with ' one '. What he means to- say 
is this: when, by reason of nearness to each other, the difference between 
[the colour] of the China-rose and of the crystal [vase], or analogously, between 
the thinking-substance and the Self, does not come to consciousness (a-bheda- 
grahe), then the individual by wrongly attributing the fluctuations of the 
thinking-substance to the Self, recognizes [wrongly] that he is tranquil or 
pained or infatuated. Likewise, wrongly supposing that his face when reflected 
upon the dirty surface of a mirror is itself dirty, [the individual] bemoans 
himself at the thought that he is dirty. Although 1 the fluctuation of the 
thinking-substance, like the perception of sounds or other [perceptible] things, 
is also wrongly attributed to the Self, and although in so far as it is primary- 
substance it should be experienced as being unintelligent, nevertheless by 
transferring the quality of the Self to the thinking-substance, [the fluctuation 
of the thinking-substance] appears as if it were a fluctuation of the Self, as 
if it were an experience [of the Self]. And so although the Soul (atman) has 
no misconceptions, it seems to have misconceptions ; although not an ex- 
perience^ it seems to be an experiencer ; although it lacks the discriminative 
discernment, it seems to be provided with it, [and] it shines forth by the 
discriminative discernment. 2 And this will be set forth in detail in this [sutra] 
[iv. 22], "The intellect (citi) which unites not [with objects] is conscious of 
its own thinking-substance when [the mind-stuff] takes its form [by reflecting 
it] ; " and in this [iii. 35], " Experience is undistinguished from a presented- 
idea on the part of the sa^va-aspect and of the Self, each absolutely uncom- 
mingled [in the presented idea]." And this has been established in another 
system also [the Sarhkhya]. Accordingly with the words and so2> he intro- 
duces (aha) the sutra of Panca^kha the acarya, " There is only one appearance 
[for both], that appearance is knowledge." The question is raised, ' How 
is there one appearance ? considering that you say that the fluctuation of the 
thinking-substance occupied on the one hand with the different kinds of 
things, and occupied on the other hand with insight, and perceptible as 
being unintelligent in so far as it is primary-substance is appearance ; and 
[considering that you at the same time say that] the Self's intelligence (caitanya), 
which is different from this and which is the perception, is [also] appearance.' 

1 Literally : Although yet another Self- native discernment [that is, so long as 

wrong-attribution possesses a fluctua- there is no discriminative discernment : 

tion of the thinking-substance like the reading iva a vivekakhyfitydh]. Or: it 

perception of sounds and so on, and seems to be provided with it during 

although . . . the time of non-discriminative discern- 

2 Reading iva vivekakhydtyd. Or : it seems ment [reading iva a-vivekakhydtydm]. 

to be provided with it up to discrimi- 



i. 4 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [16 

To this he replies [in the words of Paflcacikha] <Kthat appearance is know- 
ledge.^ When he says <only one2>, he says it with reference to ordinary 
(laukika) knowledge, [which is] a fluctuation subject to origination and dissolu- 
tion. 1 But knowledge (khyati) is not intelligence (caitanya), [which latter is] 
the very nature of the Self. On the contrary that [i.e. intelligence] is concerned 
not with an ordinary perception (lokapratyaksa), but rather with verbal-com- 
munication and inference. Consequently after [the author of the Comment] 
has shown that undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) is the original cause 
[of making wrong attributions] in the emergent state, he suggests that this 
[consciousness] is the cause of the contact [of the Self with the thinking- 
substance], and also that the relation between property and proprietor is the 
cause of experience. He makes this [series of assertions] consistent by saying 
Cthe mind-stuff. Mind-stuff is the property of its proprietor, the Self: this 
is the connexion [of the statements]. The objection is made that that-by- 
which-one-is-intelligent (cetana), [namely,] the agent that is Master of the 
mind-stuff, accepts aid (upaMra) afforded by the mind-stuff, whereas it is 
impossible that he [the Master of the mind-stuff should accept] aid afforded 
by this [mind-stuff]. The reason for this is that there is no correlation [of 
the Self] with this [mind-stuff], since [the Self] cannot be aided [by it]. 
But on the other hand (ca) if it be the case (4ve) that there is a connexion 
with this [mind-stuff] or that aid is accepted from it, one would have 
to admit that [the Self] enters into mutation. In reply to this objection he 
says like a magnet ; and, as an object suitable to be seen [by the Self as 
Witness], it gives its aid [to the Self] by the mere fact of being near it. The 
mind-stuff is not in connexion with the Self, but is near it. [This] nearness, 
moreover, does not result from a correlation either spatially or temporally of 
the Self with it [the mind-stuff]. But the distinguishing characteristic [of this 
nearness] is [that the Self stands to the mind-stuff in a relation of] pre- 
established harmony (yogyata). Moreover the Self has the capacity for being 
the experiencer [while] the mind-stuff has the capacity for being experienced. 
Accordingly [mind-stuff] is described as an object suitable to be seen. In 
other words it is described as an object-for-experience when it enters into 
mutations which have the forms of various kinds of things (cabdadi). Although 
experience is a fluctuation in the form of sounds and of other [perceptible] 
things and is an external aspect (dharma : see iii. 13) of the mind -stuff, still 
it [experience] belongs to the Self, because the Self <takes the same form as 
the fluctuations :> [that is, because they result from the false supposition of 
an identity between mind-stuff and intelligence (caitanya) : this is what is 

1 The original, udaya-vyaya-dharmini, may Digha-nikaya, ii. 157, ed. PTS. But 

be a reminiscence of one of the most Vacaspati seems to understand it more 

famous of all Buddhist gathas, pregnantly here as ' subject to rising 

aniccct vata sankhara into and passing out of conscious- 

uppada-vaya-dhammino, nesa '. 



1 7] Five hinds of fluctuations [ i. 5 

meant. Therefore although there is no correlation with the mind-stuff, still 
it is established that the Self accepts aid afforded by it, and that it does not 
enter into mutation. A question is raised, ' The relation of property and 
proprietor is [we grant] the reason for experience and is subject to the condi- 
tions of undifferentiated-consciousness. But subject to what conditions is 
undifferentiated-consciousness? Not subject to conditions (as everybody admits) 
no effect is produced. As they say, "Is there any commencement of un- 
differentiated-consciousness for him [that is, man] as in the case of sleep and 
so on?"' While apparently summing up, he [in fact] removes this doubt 
with the words ^Hence the reason why . . . experiences the fluctuations of 
the mind-stuff. The reason for the [Selfs] awareness of the mind-stuffs 
fluctuations in the form of tranquil and cruel and infatuated forms is the 
[above-mentioned] correlation, which is without beginning since it is under 
the conditions of undifferentiated-consciousness which is without beginning. 
And the serial-order (santana) of undifferentiated-consciousness and of the 
subconscious-impressions (vasana) is, like the serial-order of seed and sprout, 
without beginning. 

Moreover these for there are many such found in the mind-stuff 
must be restricted. 

5. The fluctuations are of five kinds and are hindered or 
unhindered. 

The hindered (klistct) are those which are caused by the hindrances 
{kief a) [undifferentiated-consciousness, &c. : see ii. 3] and are the field 
for growth of the accumulation of the latent-deposits of karma ; 
the unhindered have discriminative discernment as their object and 
thus obstruct the task (adhikdra) of the aspects {guna). These are 
still unhindered even when they occur in the stream of the hindered. 
For even in the midst of the hindered [fluctuations] they are un- 
hindered ; while in the midst of the unhindered [they are] hindered. 
Corresponding subliminal-impressions are produced by nought else 
than [these] fluctuations, and fluctuations [are made] by subliminal- 
impressions. In this wise, the wheel of fluctuations and subliminal- 
impressions ceaselessly rolls 1 on [until the highest concentration is 
attained]. Operating in this wise, this mind-stuff, having finished 
its task, abides in its own likeness, or [rather] becomes resolved 
[into primary substance]. These, either hindered or unhindered, 
are the five-fold fluctuations. 

1 Compare iv. 11, p. 288 2 (Calc. ed.). 
3 [h.o.s. 17] 



i. 5 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [18 

Let this be granted. Still a man is qualified for that in which he has capacity. 
Furthermore the restriction of fluctuations is impossible unless one has an idea 
of the fluctuations. And yet no one even in a thousand years could count them. 
Numberless as they are, how [then] can they be restricted ? In reply to this 
difficulty he introduces the sutra whose purpose is to teach us their number and 
their nature with the words ^Moreover these for there are many such found 
in the mind-stuff must be restricted :) 5. The fluctuations are of five kinds 
and are hindered or unhindered. The fluctuations form a single whole. 
Of this [whole] there are five parts, and of them the first is the source- of-a- valid- 
idea. Accordingly, there is a fluctuation which has the parts of this [whole], 
[namely] five-fold, [that is] of five parts. And since these fluctuations are many, 
inasmuch as there are different mind-stuffs belonging to Chaitra and to Maitra 
and to other people, the use of the plural is consistent. What he wishes to say is 
this : Whether Chaitra or Maitra or any one else of all these without exception, 
the fluctuations are of exactly five kinds [and there are] no more [fluctuations]. 
And the word <Kmind-stuff, which has a collective sense (jatyabhipraya), is 
a singular, but is to be taken as [a plural,] mind-stuffs. He shows that there 
are differences of a subordinate kind which are serviceable in the pursuit [of 
yoga] in the words <hindered or unhindered.) By the help of the unhindered 
[fluctuations], the hindered should be restricted ; and the former, [should be 
restricted] by the higher passionlessness. He gives the explanation of this in 
the words <caused by the hindrances ;2> in other words the fluctuations have 
the feeling-of-personality and the other hindrances as their cause of action. 
Another interpretation would be that, for a person whose chief end is to fulfil 
the purposes of the Self, those fluctuations which consist of rajas and tamas act 
as hindrances in so far they cause hindrance. Hindrance is in the sense 
[Pan. v. 2. 127] of having something hindered [as its effect]. This [hindrance] 
belongs to those [fluctuations] and therefore they are called hindered. Since 
the action of those [hindered] fluctuations tends towards an increase of hindrance, 
it is they which are the field for growth of the accumulation of the latent- 
deposits of karma. For this observer [namely, the thinking-substance whose 
chief end is to fulfil the purposes of the Self] decides definitely (ava-saya) by 
sources-of-valid-ideas and in other ways what the [intended] object is and becomes 
attached to it or averse to it and [then] accumulates latent-deposits of karma. 
Thus, hindered fluctuations become the soil for the propagation of the accumu- 
lated merit and demerit. He explains the unhindered [fluctuations] by saying 
that they <Khave discriminative discernment as their object.^ When the sattva 
of the thinking-substance is cleansed of rajas and tamas and flows calmly 
onwards, the clearing of the insight {prajha) is the [discriminative] discernment. 
By [thus speaking of] that which has [discernment as its] object he partially 
describes that discrimination (viveJca), between sattva and the Self, which is the 
object of this [insight]. Accordingly, since [the unhindered] have as their 
object the discrimination of [the difference between] the sattva and the Self, for 



19] Mingling of fluctuations [ i. 6 

this very reason they obstruct the task of the aspects (guna). Now the aspects 
have the task to develop products. Since moreover this [development] lasts 
until the end of discriminative discernment, and since when the. aspects have 
accomplished their task (adhikara) [these unhindered fluctuations] restrict their 
authority (adhiJcdra), for this reason sources-of-valid-ideas and the other fluctua- 
tions are these unhindered ones. [The objection is made :] ' This may be true. 
But all living creatures have hindered fluctuations only, since there is nothing 
born that is free from desire. Furthermore, unhindered fluctuations cannot 
exist in the stream of hindered fluctuations. And even if those [unhindered 
fluctuations] could exist, they could not produce effects since they have fallen 
into the midst of obstructors. Tor this reason restriction of the hindered by 
the unhindered and of these latter by the higher passion lessn ess is nothing more 
than a wish.' In reply to that objection he says <Kin the stream of the hindered. 
Practice and passionlessness are produced by devoting oneself steadily to verbal 
communications and to inferences and to the instruction of teachers. <Kln the 
midst of the hindered [means] among [them]. That they occur there means 
that they are in themselves quite unhindered although they occur in the stream 
of the hindered. Surely a Brahman, although he reside at Calagrama which is 
crowded with hundreds of Kiratas, is not [on that account] a Kirata. This is an 
example of what is meant by [occurring] in the midst of the unhindered. And 
in so far as they are found among the hindered, the unhindered, without being 
suppressed by the hindered, do after all, as gradually their own subliminal- 
impressions come to fruition, suppress the hindered. ^Corresponding^ means 
that unhindered subliminal-impressions [are produced] by unhindered fluctua- 
tions. This is that wheel of fluctuations and subliminal-impressions which 
ceaselessly rolls on until the concentration of restriction [is attained]. Operating 
in this wise, the mind-stuff reaches the state of restriction and, coming [then] 
to consist of nothing but subliminal-impressions, abides in its own likeness 
(atmaJcalpena) : this is the superficial view. Or else and this is the stricter 
view it becomes resolved into primary substance. He joins together the 
meaning of sutras [5 and 6] by the word These. The word five-fold3> 
[literally, five times] is an expression of the sense merely ; but it is not a literal 
rendering of the force (vrtti) of the termination {gdbda), because it is not taught 
[by Panini, at v. 2. 42] that the termination taya (tayap) has the meaning of 
'kinds'. 



6. Sources-of-valid-ideas and misconceptions and predicate- 
relations and sleep and memory. 

These [five] he announces by their technical names. 6. Sources-of-valid-ideas 
and misconceptions and predicate-relations and sleep and memory, [The 
compound] is analysed according to the order of words in the enumeration [of 
the sutra]. The compound is a copulative (cdrthe dvamdvak, Panini ii. 2. 29) in 



i. 6 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [20 

the sense of mutual conjunction. Just as once more in the statement [ii. 5], 
" The recognition of the permanent, of the pure, of pleasure, and of a self in 
what is impermanent, impure, pain, and non-self, is undifferentiated-conscious- 
ness," such illusions as the loss of the sense of orientation or as the fire-brand 
[whirled about so as to be seen as a] circle, are not expressly excluded, so here 
also, even in the mentioning of the sources-of-valid-ideas and the rest, since doubt 
as to the real existence of other fluctuations would not [otherwise] be excluded, 
in order to exclude them [these others], the words ' of five kinds ' should be 
added. Thus it becomes clear that fluctuations are just so many and no more. 



7. Sources-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference and 
verbal-communication, i. Perception is that source-of- valid- 
ideas [which arises as a modification of the inner-organ] when the 
mind-stuff has been affected by some external thing through the 
channel of the sense-organs. This fluctuation is directly related to 
that [object], but, whereas the intended-object (artha) consists of a 
genus * and of a particular, it [the fluctuation] is chiefly concerned 
with the ascertainment of the particular [the genus being subordi- 
nate in perception to the particular]. The result [of perception] is 
an illumination by the Self (pduruseya) of a fluctuation which 
belongs to the mind-stuff, [an illumination which is] undistinguished 
(a-vipsta), [that is, one in which the Self does not distinguish itself 
from the thinking-substance], [as] we shall explain in detail hereafter 
[ii. 17] in the passage 2 beginning " Self is conscious-by- reflection of 
the thinking-substance." ii. Inference is [that] fluctuation [of the 
mind-stuff] which refers (-visayd) to that (tat-) relation (sambandha) 
which is present in things belonging to the same class as the subject- 
of-the-illation (anumeya) and absent from things belonging to 
classes different [from that of the subject-of-the-illation] ; and it is 
chiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the genus. Thus, for 
instance, the moon and stars possess motion, because, like [any man, 
for instance,] Chaitra, they get from one place to another ; and 
because [negatively] the Vindhya [mountain-range] does not get 
[from one place to another, it] does not possess motion, iii. A thing 
which has been seen or inferred by a trustworthy person is men- 

1 Compare ii. 14, p. 214 3 ; iii. 44, p. 257 2 (Calc ed.). 
2 Compare also i. 29 ; ii. 20 ; iv. 19. 



21] Sources of valid ideas [ i. 7 

tioned by word in order that his knowledge [thereof] may pass over 
to some other person. The fluctuation [in the mind-stuff] of the 
hearer which arises from that word and which relates to the object- 
intended by that [word] (tad-artha-visayd) is a verbal-communica- 
tion. That verbal-communication is said to waver, the utterer of 
which declares an incredible thing, not a thing which he himself has 
seen or inferred ; but if the original utterer has himself seen or 
inferred the thing, [then the verbal-communication] would be un- 
wavering. 

Among these [five], [of one, that is,] the fluctuation which is the source-of- valid- 
ideas, he gives (aha) [what may pass as the naturally expected] general dis- 
tinguishing characteristic (laJcsana), by analysing [that one into three and 
saying] : 7. The sourees-of-valid-ideas are perception and inference and 
verbal-communication. A valid-idea (prarnd) is an illumination of a thing 1 not 
already presented and is caused by the operation of the Self. The instrument for 
this is the source-of-the-valid-idea (pramdna). And the mention [of the sources-of- 
valid-ideas] analytically [is] for the purpose of definitely excluding either a less 
or a greater number. 

i. Of these [three] he gives first the distinguishing-characteristic of percep- 
tion, since it is the root of all the [other] sources-of- valid-ideas, in the words 
beginning ^Cof the sense-organs.^ By using the words intended-object2> 
he rejects [the doctrine of maya according to which the object is] a false 
attribution. With the words <Kdirectly related to that,^ in so far as [the 
fluctuation] has an external field-of-action, he renounces [the Buddhist doctrine 
which conceives] the field-of-action as having the form of mental-objects 
[literally, form of knowledge]. With the words ^affected by some external 
things he shows what the relation is between something to be externally 
known and [the object] in the form of a sensation which is found in the mind- 
stuff. With the words <Kthrough the channel of the sense-organs he tells the 
reason for the affect of this [external thing] upon the [mind-stuff which is] 
separated 2 [from it by the sense-organ in question]. The object is the genus and 
nothing more : thus some maintain. Particulars only : thus others. Members 
of yet other schools [say that the object is something that has] the genus and 
the particular as its properties. To reject these [points of view] he says that 
[the object] ^consists of a genus and of a particular. The object does 
not have these two as its properties ; but it consists of these two [by a relation 
of identity]. This will again be the topic of discussion in that passage [iii. 13] 
where it is said "since we do not maintain an absolute unity." With the words 

1 Literally, Of a that-ness not yet presented recognized as existent but of unknown 

to consciousness. That is, something quality. 

2 Vyavahita : compare Samkhya Karika 7. 



i. 7 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [22 

^Cchiefly concerned with the ascertainment of the particular^ he distinguishes 
that which relates to perception from that which relates to inference and to 
verbal-communication. In other words, although the genus itself does shine forth 
[into consciousness] in perception, still it is subordinated to the particular. This 
would also be a partial characterization of direct experience (saksatTtara). And so 
even the discriminative-discernment receives its characteristic mark. With the 
words The result [of perception] is an illumination by the Self of a fluctuation 
which belongs to the mind-stuff > he denies that there is any contradiction in 
the result. An objector asks how an illumination which is found in the Self 
can be the result of a fluctuation situated in the mind-stuff ? For surely when 
an axe ' is busy with a khadira-tree, it is not chopping on a palaca-tree. In reply 
[Vyasa] says ^undistinguished. S For the illumination whose seat is in the 
Self is not produced, but is the result when the intelligence (caitanya) is reflected 
in the mirror of the thinking-substance and assumes the form of that [thinking- 
substance] in so far as the fluctuation of the thinking-substance has the form of 
the object. And this [intelligence] in this [assumed] condition is undistinguished 
from the thinking-substance and has its being in the thinking-substance. More- 
over since the fluctuation has its being in the thinking-substance there is ground 
for the relation of the source-of-the-valid-idea to the result in the fact that [both] 
have the same locus [namely, in the thinking-substance]. And this he says 
we shall explain^ in the passage " Self is conscious-by-reflection." 
ii. After perception [and before verbal-communication], because [in the first 
place] verbal-communication depends upon inference, in so far as it obtains its 
validity 2 from a knowledge of the connective-power-of- words (sambandha) result- 
ing from an inference with regard to a cognition (buddhi) on the part of the 
hearer which [inference] is based on actions and so on, and [in the second place] 
because [in this sutra] the inferred is folio wed-in-enumeration by verbal-commu- 
nication, [therefore] he gives the characteristic marks of inference, before [he 
gives those of] verbal-communication, in the words subject-of-the-illation. 
A subject-of-illation is a subject (dharmin) distinguished by attributes (dharma) 
which we wish to know. Things belonging to the same class with it [the 
subject-of-illation], [are] objects similar to the genus which is an attribute of the 
major-term (sadhya), [that is, objects that are] similar instances {sapaksa). 
Which is presents in these [things belonging to the same class], with these 
words he excludes [both] contrariety s and lack of community as between an 
attribute of the middle-term (sddhana-dharma) [and the attributes of the major].' 
Things belonging to different classes are dissimilar instances, and they are other 
than the similar instances, [that is,] contrary to them and containing the nega- 
tion of them. ^Absents from these [things belonging to a different class]. 

1 See G. A. Jacob : A Handful of Popular 2 Samutihatayd : samarthyam grhndti, Bala- 
Maxims, part 1, 2nd edition, 1907, rama. 

p. 32. s See Athalye and Bod as, Tarka-samgraha, 

54, p. 306, and 53, p. 302. 



23] Perception and inference and verbal-commwiication [ i. 7 

Accordingly (tad) by this he rules out over-inclusive (sadharana) non-coextensive- 
ness (anaikantikatva). Things-are-brought-into-relation such is the use of the 
word <Krelation2>, a syllogistic-mark (linga). Thus describing the minor premiss 
(paJcsa-dharmatd) he avoids the fallacious-reasoning (asiddhata) [of the svarupa 
type 1 ]. <KRefers to that2> [means] having [necessary] con-nection with that, 
because of the etymology 2 of the word <Krefers (vi-saya) based on this [statement 
of Dhatu-patha, v. 2, that] "the root si means -nect." With the words the 
ascertainment of the genus he distinguishes [the object of an inference] from 
the object of a perception. Inference arises on condition that there be an aware- 
ness of a relation [between two terms]. In so far as, in the case of particulars, 
one does not apprehend relations, it is only the genus which, as affording an easy 
apprehension of relations, comes into the discussion. For this he gives an 
example in the passage beginning Thus, for instance. The word ca [after the 
word Vindhya] carries with it a reason. Because the Vindhya [range] has no 
motion, therefore it does not get [from one place to another]. Hence, as there is an 
absence of motion 3 (gati-nivrttdu), there is an absence of getting [from one place to 
another]. [And conversely,] because they do get from one place to another, the 
moon and stars, like Chaitra, do have motion. Thus [the point] is established. 
iii. Of the fluctuation which is a verbal-communication he gives the distinguish- 
ing characteristic in the words <Ka trustworthy persons [and so on]. Insight 
and compassionateness and dexterity-of-the-sense-organs combine into trust- 
worthiness. A man whose ways are governed by that is a trustworthy one. 
He is the one by whom the object is seen or inferred. Unless there be a heard 
word, there is no receiving [of the seen or inferred object on the part of another 
person], because, in so far as this [word] is rooted in something seen or inferred, 
it is only by these two that its meaning becomes complete. CHis knowledge 
[thereof] passing overX> [to some other person] means that in the mind-stuff of 
the hearer there arises [into consciousness] knowledge similar to knowledge 
found in the mind-stuff of the trustworthy person. To effect this [passing], 
a thing is mentioned [that is,] is made known, as a means to obtain what is 
good for the hearer and to avoid what is bad [for him]. The rest is easy. The 
verbal-communication <the utterer of which declares an incredible things for 
example, 'These identical ten pomegranates are going to be six cakes 4 ,' <Knot a 
thing which he himself has seen or inferred^ for example, ' A shrine let him 
worship who desireth heaven,' that verbal-communication wavers. 
An objector says, ' If that be so, then the verbal-communication even of such 
persons as Manu would waver, [and thus they would not be supreme authorities,] 
for even they [declared] things which they themselves had not seen or inferred.' 

1 See Athalye, p. 310. ' to stand still means not to move '. 

2 According to this, visaya ought to mean 4 This is an allusion to Patanjali's Maha- 

' dis-nection '. In fact it means ' sphere bhasya on i. 2. 45 (Kielhorn i. 217 13 ). 

of action ' from root vis ' act \ Cakes (apupa) are made with ghee : see 

3 See Dhatu-patha, i. 975, sthd gati-nivrttdu, Sayana on R V. x. 45. 9. 



i. 7 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [24 

In reply he says <Kbut if the original utterer. For in case of such persons (tatra), 
the original utterer was the Icvara, who had himself seen or inferred the things. 
For instance, it is said [at Manu ii. 7], " Whatever law has been ordained for any 
person by Manu, every such [law had been already] laid down in the Veda. 
That, surely, contains within itself all knowledge." This is the meaning. 



8. Misconception is an erroneous idea (jndna) not based on 
that form [in respect of which the misconception is enter- 
tained]. 

Why is it not a source-of-a- valid-idea ? Because it is inhibited by 
the source-of-a-valid-idea, for the reason that the source-of-a-valid- 
idea has as its object a positive fact. In such cases there is evidently 
an inhibition of the source-of-the-in valid-idea by the source-of-the- 
valid-idea, as for instance the [erroneous] visual-perception of two 
moons is inhibited by the actual (sad-visaya) visual-perception of 
one moon. This [fluctuation, namely, misconception] proves to be 
that [well-known] five-jointed undifferentiated-consciousness [the 
joints of which are enumerated at ii. 3 in the words] : " UndifFeren- 
tiated-consciousness and the feeling-of-personality and passion and 
hatred and the will-to-live are the hindrances." These same [are 
known] by peculiar technical x designations : Obscurity and Infatua- 
tion and Extreme Infatuation and Darkness and Blind-Darkness. 
These will be discussed in connexion with the subject of the defile- 
ments of the mind-stuff. 

8. Misconception is an erroneous idea not based on that form [in respect 
of which the misconception is entertained]. The word <Misconception> 
indicates the thing to be characterized ; the words <erroneous idea> and so on 
[give] the distinguishing characteristic. A form which appears [in conscious- 
ness] as an idea (jndna) is un-based on that form, [or, to put it as does the sutra,] 
<not based on that form>. As, [to give another example in which the negation 
applies to the action 2 and not to the object,] One who eats not the funeral-feast.' 
Accordingly doubt also would be included [in the definition of misconception]. 
But there is a distinction to this extent : in this case [the case of doubt] the failure 
to be based [on the true form] is overridden by a [clear] perception (jndna) ; but 
[in the other case], such as [the vision] of two moons, [the misconception is over- 

1 Compare Visnu Pur. i. 5. 5. rupa. Compare Patanjali : Maha- 

2 A case of prasajya-pratisedha. The nega- bhasya, Kielhorn's edition, i, p. 215, 

tion applies to pratisfha and not to last line; 221 u ; 319 12 ; 34P. 



25] Nature of misconception [ i. 8 

ridden] by the perception of the inhibition [of the one idea by the other idea]. 
An objector says, ' If this be granted, the predicate-relation (vikalpa), in that it 
is not based on the true form, would also upon consideration prove to be a mis- 
conception.' In reply to this he says 4Can erroneous perception.^ For these 
words describe an inhibition familiar in common experience to everybody. 1 Now 
this [inhibition] occurs in misconception ; but not in the predicate-relation, for- 
asmuch as the business-of-life [is done] by this [predicate-relation], and because, 
on the other hand, only the learned kind of persons when they might be engaged 
in reflection would have in this matter any idea of an inhibition. [The author 
of the Comment] puts forward the objection Why is it not a source-of-a-valid- 
idea ? The point is that a previous [perception] should not be inhibited by a 
later [perception] which has incurred contradiction ; on the contrary the later 
[perception should be inhibited] by just that previous [perception] which occurred 
first and has not incurred contradiction. He gives the rebuttal in the words 
<KBecause ... by the source-of-a-valid-idea.^ For this rule [of the Mimansa] applies 
(evam) when a later [perception] arises in dependence upon a previous. But in 
this present case two perceptions, each from its particular cause, in entire inde- 
pendence of each other, spring up. Accordingly the later [perception] does not 
attain to a rise [into consciousness] unless it has destroyed the earlier [perception] ; 
and in fact its rise [into consciousness] has its being in the removal of that 
[previous perception] by inhibition. But it is not true that the rise [into con- 
sciousness] of a previous [perception] has its being in an inhibition of the later, for 
the reason that, at that time [the time of the earlier perception], this [later per- 
ception] does not yet exist. Hence the fact that [one perception] has not incurred 
contradiction is the reason why [another perception] is to be inhibited ; and [hence 
also] the fact that [a perception] has incurred contradiction [is the reason] why it 
should act as inhibitor. Consequently it is established that the source-of -a- valid- 
idea, because its object is a positive fact, can inhibit the source-of-an-invalid-idea. 

An example is given in the words 4Cln such cases by the source-of-the- 

valid-idea. In order that it may be rejected, he shows the worthlessness of 
this [source-of-invalid-ideas, i.e., of undifferentiated-consciousness] in the words 
This . . . that . . five. So, undifferentiated-consciousness as a genus [exists] 
in five special-forms [literally, in five joints], namely, undifferentiated-conscious- 
ness, sense-of-personality, and so on. The mental-process (buddhi) which [recog- 
nizes : compare ii. 5] the self in eight forms which are not the self, that is, in 
the undeveloped [primary substance] and in the Great [thinking-substance] and 
in the substance of personality and in the five subtile-elements (tanmdtra), is 
undifferentiated-consciousness, the [so-called] Obscurity. Similarly the mental- 
process which [recognizes] welfare {(^reyas) in forms where no welfare is, in 
atomization (animan : technical, see iii. 45) and the rest of the eight supremacies 
of yogins, is eight-fold, the [so-called] Infatuation. [This is] worse than the pre- 

1 On the form sarvajanlna see Pan. iv. 4. 99, Siddhanta Kaumudi, 1651, or Whitney's 
Grammar, 1223 d. 



i. 8 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [26 

ceding. And this is called the sense-of-personality (asmitd). In this way, after 
one has obtained eight-fold supremacy by yoga and after becoming perfected 
(siddha), the resolution (atmika pratipattik) to enjoy the ten objects which are seen 
[in the world] (drsta-) and taught [in the qastra] (anuqravika : see i. 15) is [called] 
Extreme Infatuation ; this is desire. In case atomization and the other supre- 
macies do not come-into-play (an-utpattdu), because while working on in this way 
with this same intention he is impeded by something or other, [then, ] while he is 
bound down by this [impediment,] there arises, from the failure to enjoy the 
objects seen [in the world] and taught [in the $astra], anger towards the im- 
pediment. This is the so-called Darkness ; this is hatred. In like manner, if 
he have success with the [supernatural] qualities, atomization and so on, and if 
he dwell in thought close to the objects seen [in the world] and taught [in the 
qastra], [then] the fear that all this will perish at the end of the mundane period 
is the will-to-live, the [so-called] Blind-Darkness. It hath been said [Samkhya- 
karika 1 xlviii] "There are eight different kinds of Obscurity and of Infatua- 
tion. Extreme Infatuation is of ten kinds. Darkness is eighteen-fold ; likewise 
Blind-Darkness." 

9. The predicate-relation (vikalpa) is without any [corre- 
sponding perceptible] object and follows as a result of 
perceptions or of words. 

This [predicate-relation] does not amount to a source-of-valid-ideas, 
nor does it amount to a misconception. In spite of the fact that 
there is no [corresponding perceptible] object, [nevertheless,] because 
there is dependence upon the authority of perceptions or of words, 
something is evidently said [literally, there appears something- 
said (vyavahdra) which possesses a dependence]. Thus for instance, 
when it is said [by some philosophers] that The true nature of the 
Self is intelligence (cditanya) ', then in this case [of absence of per- 
ceptible object] we may well ask since the Self is itself nothing 
but intelligence what thing is in the attributive relation to what 
[other] thing? For (ca) 2 the expressive-force (vrtti) [of language] 
lies in the attributive-relation, as for instance ' Chaitra's cow '. 
[The eow is distinguished as being Chaitra's, who is something 
different from her.] Likewise [there is expressive-force when the 
subject and the predicate are identical, when for instance] the Self 
is said to be the unchanging [Absolute and thus is characterized] 
by the negation of some quality which is found in some [percep- 
1 Compare (the unedited) Civa-sutras ii. 13. J For ca meaning ' for', see p. 23 ls , above. 



27] Nature of predicate-relation [ i. 9 

tible] thing. 1 [Or when there is a connexion between a positive 
and a negative, when for instance] it is said, The arrow comes to a 
standstill [or] will come to a standstill [or] has come to a stand- 
still. The bare meaning of the verbal-root [sthd, ' stand still ' : com- 
pare page 23] is understood to be ' not to move '. [In this case also 
there is expressive-force in the attributive relation even in the 
absence of any factor or kdraka.'] So too [there is expressive- 
force] in the sentence ' The Self is something which has the property 
that it does not come into existence.' All that is meant is that there 
is an absence of the property of coming into existence ; not [any 
negative] property inherent in the Self. Therefore this property 
[which is a negation so far as perceptible objects are concerned] is 
predicated and as such it is something-that-is-thought (vyavahdra). 

9. The predicate -relation (viJcalpa) is without any [corresponding per- 
ceptible] object and follows as a result of perceptions or of words. 
The objection is made that, if the predicate-relation follows as a result of percep- 
tions or of words, then one would have to admit that it is included under [that] 
source-of- valid-ideas [which is termed] verbal-communication, or [on the other 
hand], if the predicate-relation has no [corresponding perceptible] object, it ought 
to be a misconception. In reply to this he says <SThis [predicate-relation] does 
not.)5> This is not included among sources-of-valid-ideas nor among misconcep- 
tions. "Why not ? Because he says <object. With the words In spite of the 
fact that there is no [corresponding perceptible] object,S> he denies that [the 
predicate-relation] is included among sources-of-valid-ideas. And with the words 
<Kbecause there is dependence upon the authority of perceptions or of words, 
[he denies] that it is included among misconceptions. "What he means to say 
is that a man in some cases falsely attributes diversity to things that are 
identical, and again in other cases identity to things that are diverse. There- 
fore since identity and diversity are non-existent as perceptible objects, the 
portrayal (dbhasa) of these two is a predicate-relation [and] not the source-of- 
a-valid-idea. Nor yet would it be a misconception, because it is not in contradic- 
tion with the fact that something is said. He gives an illustration which is well 
established in the systems (gastra) in the words Thus for instance.^ "What 
subject (vigesya) is in the attributive-relation (vyapadigyate), that is, is defined 
(vigesyate) by what [other] thing ? For when there is identity, there is no rela- 
tion of subject and predicate. Because [for instance] a cow cannot be defined 
as a cow ; but by something different [from herself J, by Chaitra. To this he 
replies by the phrase For the expressive-force [of language] lies in the 
attributive-relation. ) The relation between that to which the attribute is 
1 Literally ' possessing negated perceptible-objcct-qualitics '. 



i. 9 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [28 

to be applied and that which furnishes the attribute is the attributive- 
relation, that is to say, the relation-of-predicate-and-subject. In this [lies] the 
expressive-force (vrtti) of the sentence as for instance Chaitra's cow.S He 
adds another example found nowhere but in the books of the systems (cdstrlya), 
^Likewise [there is expressive-force]. S [A negated quality found in some per- 
ceptible thing would be, for instance,] motion, a quality belonging to some such 
[perceptible] thing as earth [and this quality as belonging to the Self] is negated. 
Who would that one [thus characterized] be ? The Self is said to be the 
unchanging [Absolute].^ Surely it cannot be urged in a Samkhya system that 
there is a certain quality in perceptible-objects called non-existence and that the 
Self could be defined by this. Sometimes there is found a reading ' Qualities of 
a perceptible thing are negated '. The meaning of this would be that negated 
[qualities] are those concomitant with negation ; qualities of [perceptible] objects 
cannot be concomitant with this [negation], because [in them] there cannot be 
a connexion between an existent and a non-existent. While on the other hand 
in this way [by the predicate-relation] there is distinct-knowledge. In the words 
<The arrow is coming to a standstills he gives an example from everyday life. 
Now just as when we say ' he cooks ' or ' he chops ', we mean that the accumu- 
lated moments of an action in serial order and characterized by a unity in the 
result are distinctly known, so it is also quite as truly a serial order to which he 
refers when he says comes to a standstill.^ When he says <Kwili come to 
a standstill, has come to a standstill,^ then some objector may say, 'If we 
grant [that the action of coming to a standstill is] like that of cooking, then 
the arrow could have as its attribute an action, namely, stopping still, 1 which 
is in a serial order and is over-and-above {bhinna) the arrow itself.' To this 
he replies, [that stopping still is not a series of actions, but that] The bare 
meaning 2 of the verbal-root is understood to be 'not to move'.S To begin 
with (tavat), not-to-move is a mental-structure (kalpita) ; then too (api) the exis- 
tence-in-positive-form (bMvarupatva) of this [non-moving (reading tasya api)] [is 
a mental-structure] ; [and] then too a serial order in this [existence-in-positive- 
form] [is again a mental-structure] if that's what you mean (iti), whew! what 
a string of mental-structures ! such is the intention [of the Comment.] [On 
the other hand,] a non-existent is conceived {gamyate) as in relation with all the 
Selves, [although not with perceptible-objects,] not only (ca) as if it were an 
existent, but also (ca) as if it were inherent (anugata) [provided it be] a mental- 
structure. 3 But a [non-existent is] not any kind of a property [existentially] 
distinct from the Self. By way of another illustration, he says, So too .... 

1 The words sthasyati, sthita and so forth of assertion, but no less also in terms 

explain the succession implied in the of negation, and both may be equally 

word tisihati. inherent in the concept of the Self, as 

9 Compare Patanjali : Mahabhasya on Pa- when we say ' Not coming into exie- 

nini i. 3. 2, vart. 11 (Kielhorn i. 258 18f )- tence is a property of the Self, or 

1 The Self (purum) can be defined in terms ' The Self is un-changing '. 



29] Nature of sleep [ i. 10 

the property that it does not come into existence.^ Many thinkers [of the 
Mimansa and Nyaya schools] have advanced the assertion that there is no 
fluctuation [called] predicate-relation other than the source-of-valid-ideas or the 
misconception. To enlighten them, is, as we may suppose, the purpose of this 
abundance of illustration. 



10. Sleep is a fluctuation [of mind-stuff] supported by the 
cause (pratyaya, that is tamas) of the [transient] negation 
[of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations]. 1 

And this [fluctuation] by [the operation of] connecting-memory 
becomes, upon awakening, a special kind of presented-idea 
(pratyaya). How is it that one can reflect : ' I have slept well, my 
mind is calm, it makes my understanding clear ; I have slept poorly, 
my mind is dull, it wanders unsteadfast ; I have slept in deep 
stupor, my limbs are heavy, my mind remains unrefreshed (kldnta) 
and languid and as it were stolen [from my grasp] ? ' [The answer 
is : ] the man [just after] awakening would of course not have this 
connecting-memory, had there not been [during sleep, some] experi- 
ence of [this form] of a cause (pratyaya, that is tamas) ; nor would 
he have the memories based upon it and corresponding with it [at 
the time of waking]. Therefore sleep is a particular kind of pre- 
sented-idea (pratyaya) ; and in concentration it also, like any other 
presented-idea, must be restricted. 

10. Sleep is a fluctuation [of mind-stuff] supported by the cause of the 
[transient] negation [of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations]. 1 
For, the word ' fluctuation ' given-in-the-topical [sutra i. 5] is made-the-subject-of- 
an-assertion [here]. Because, with regard to sources-of-valid -ideas and misconcep- 
tions and predicate-relations and memories being fluctuations, there is no disagree- 
ment among investigators, therefore this word is-made-the-subject-of-an-assertion 
(anudyate) [namely, that one of the fluctuations is sleep,] in order that this 
particular [fluctuation] may be mentioned. But as to whether sleep is a fluctua- 
tion or not, there is disagreement among investigators. Accordingly it must be 
expressly said that it is a fluctuation. And the fact that the matter-in-hand 
[namely, that one of the fluctuations is sleep] is made-the-subject 2 -of-an-assertion 
cannot serve as an express statement [to the effect that sleep is a fluctuation]. 

1 The point here is that sleep is a positive fore of sufficient importance to require 

experience and not, as some Vedantins, an explicit assertion. 

Udayana, for instance, would teach, the 2 Compare Jacobi : Anandavardhana's 
absence of a fluctuation. It is there- Dhvanyaloka, p. 23, note 1. 



i. 10 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [30 

Consequently the word fluctuation is used [here] again. That fluctuation is 
called sleep the object or support of which is a cause (pratyaya), that is, a cause 
(karana), the tamas which covers over the substance (sattva) of the thinking- 
substance, of the [transient] negation of the fluctuations of waking or of 
dreams. For the substance of the thinking-substance has three aspects ; and 
when tamas, the coverer of all the organs, preponderates over sattva and rajas 
and becomes manifest (avis), then, because there is no mutation of the thinking- 
substance into the form of an object, the Self, aware of a thinking-substance 
which consists of intensified tamas, is in deep sleep and inwardly conscious. 
Thus it is explained. 

[An objection :] why not consider sleep to be merely an absence of fluctuations, 
as in the case of restricted isolation (kdivalya)? He answers This. And 
this [fluctuation] by [the operation of] connecting-memory, that is, a remem- 
brance which can be made the basis of an argument (sopapattiJca), is a special 
kind of presented-idea. How [is the argument ? He replies] : When tamas is 
manifest in company with sattva, then the connecting-memory of a man just 
arisen from sleep is of such a kind that he reflects <Kl have slept well, my 
mind is calm, it makes my understanding clear ;S> clarifies it, in other words. 
But when tamas is manifest in company with rajas, then the connecting- 
memory is of such a kind that he reflects (aha) <Kl have slept poorly, in other 
words, my mind is dull and unfit for work. "Why? Since it wanders unstead- 
fast. [The author of the Comment] describes the connecting-memory, of a man 
[just] awakened, with reference to a sleep in which tamas, preponderating 
altogether over rajas and sattva, comes-quite-to-the-fore (samullase), in the words 
<l have slept in deep stupor, my limbs are heavy, my mind remains unrefreshed 
and languid and as it were stolen [from my grasp]. ^ In the words ... of 
course not have this . . ., he gives a negative instance of the middle-term 
(hetu), [that is, experience,] in order to show that the major-term (sadhya) [that is, 
memories] does not exist. Awakening means just after awakening. [Had 
there not been during sleep, some] experience of [this form] of a caused means 
[had there not been] an experience of the cause of the [transient] negation of the 
fluctuation. Based upon it2> is said with reference to the time of waking. An 
objection is made that sources-of-valid-ideas and other fluctuations have their 
locus in the emergent mind-stuff and must be restricted because they are enemies 
to concentration ; but that sleep, since it amounts to a fluctuation single-in- 
intent, is in no wise a foe to concentration. To this he replies with the words 
And in concentration.^ Sleep, to be sure, does amount to [a fluctuation] single- 
in-intent; but, because of its quality of tamas, it is a foe to concentration-with- 
seed and to seedless-[concentration], [that is, concentration without subliminal- 
impressions]. And therefore it also must be restricted : this is the meaning. 



31] 



Nature of Memo ry 



[-i.il 



11. Memory (smrti) is not-adding-surreptitiously (asampra- 
mosa) to a once experienced object. 

Does the mind-stuff remember the presented-idea or does it 
[remember] the object ? The presented-idea, if affected by the 
object-known (grdhya), shines-forth-in-consciousness (nirbhdsa) in a 
form x of both kinds, both of the object-known and of the process- 
of-knowing (grahana), and gives a start to the corresponding 
subliminal-impression. This subliminal-impression [of these two 
kinds changes into] its phenomenal [form 2 ] by the operation of 
the conditions-which-phenomenalize {vyanjaka) it (sva) [that is to 
say, the subliminal-impression], and brings forth [in its turn] 
a memory which [also] consists of the object known and of the 
process-of-knowing. With regard to these two (tatra), in the case 
of the idea (buddhi), the form of the process-of-knowing is predomi- 
nant ; and in the case of memory, the form of the object-known 
is predominant. The latter [that is, memory] is of two kinds, in 
that the-things-to-be-remembered are imagined (bhdvita) or not 
imagined. In a dream the-things-to-be-remembered are imagined, 
whereas in waking the-things-to-be-remembered are not imagined. 
All memories arise out of an experience either of sources-of-valid- 



1 The object as such is not directly per- 

ceived, but only its form (akara) as 
reproduced in the thinking-substance 
(buddhi-sattva), which in its turn reflects 
the image cast upon it by the Self. 

2 Literally, " possessing a manifestation of 

the manifester of itself." (1) The word 
sva denotes some mutation or time- 
form or intensity [iii. 13] yet to be 
phenomenalized. Anger or fear would 
serve as an example. (2) The word 
vyanjaka denotes the conditions which 
transform the unphenomenalized-form 
into a phenomenon. The approach of 
the tiger would be a concrete example. 
(3) The word anjana, that is prakagana 
or dvirbhdvaka, is the presented-idea of 
the tiger. The discussion is not with 
regard to things in themselves, but to 
their phenomenal forms. A phenome- 
nalized-form (yyakti) is in Vacaspati- 



micra's terminology equivalent to a 
fluctuation (vrtti). And this pheno- 
menalized-form is further conceived 
to be any change in a substance 
(dharmin) which realizes some purpose 
(arthakriydkdritva). When we so regard 
a substance that we see it doing any- 
thing which interests us, we call it 
a thing, in other words, a mutation 
(parinama) or a phenomenalized-form 
(vyakli). Consequently things do not 
arise and pass out of existence, as 
Buddhists would contend ; but our 
conscious experience temporarily iso- 
lates successive phenomenal aspects of 
permanent substances. In fine, all 
phenomena are latent or implicit in 
the substance and become fluctuating 
or explicit under certain determined 
conditions. 



i. 11 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [32 

ideas or of misconceptions or of predicate-relations or of sleep or of 
memory. And all these fluctuations have as their being pleasure 
and pain and infatuation ; and pleasure and pain and infatuation 
are to be explained among the hindrances [ii. 3-9] : " Desire is that 
which dwells upon pleasure " [ii. 7] ; " Aversion is that which dwells 
upon pain " [ii. 8] ; while undifferentiated-consciousness is the same 
as infatuation. All these fluctuations must be restricted. Because 
it is [only] upon their restriction that there ensues concentration 
whether conscious or not conscious [of objects]. 1 

11. Memory (smrti) is not-adding-surreptitiously (asampramosa) to a once 
experienced object. 

This not-adding-surreptitiously-to, which is the same as not stealing for, an 
object once experienced by means of sources-of-valid-ideas and other fluctuations is 
memory. For in the case of knowledge produced by nothing but a subliminal- 
impression, the object which appeared in that experience which was the cause 
of the subliminal-impression, is the own peculiar [object of that knowledge]. 
But the appropriation of any object in addition to that [own peculiar object] is 
a surreptitious addition, that is, a stealing [from other experiences]. Why [is 
there any stealing at all] ? Because there is similarity [between the subliminal- 
impression and other experiences]. Since this word <Ksurreptitious adding (sam- 
pra-mosa) is etymologically derived 2 from the root mus ' to steal '. What he 
means to say is this : all sources-of-valid-ideas and other fluctuations give access 
(adhi-gam), either by the generic or the special form, to a hitherto inaccessible 
object. But memory does not go beyond the limits of a previous experience. 
It corresponds with that [previous experience] or corresponds with less than that, 
but it does not correspond to [any experience] in addition to that. This fact 
distinguishes memory from other fluctuations. He puts forth for discussion the 
problem CDoes [the mind-stuff remember] the presented-idea? Because 
experience (anubhava) directs itself towards the object-known, [therefore] the 
subliminal-impression resulting from it {taj-ja), [that is, from experience,] since 
it has no [present] experience of its own, makes us remember only the object- 
known : this is one view of the case. [Another view is that the subliminal- 
impression makes us remember] only the experience [of knowing], for the reason 
that [subliminal-impressions] are derived solely from experience. After putting 
forth this problem, [the author of the Comment,] byway of bringing the two views 
into consistency, decides that remembrance must be of both kinds. In so 
far as it directs itself towards the object-known, [the subliminal-impression] 
is affected by the object-known. But, strictly speaking, it makes-to-shine- 
forth-in-consciousness, [that is,] it illumines, not only the object-known but also 

1 Compare the definition of memory as a tion ', at Philebus 34 A a-arrjpia alrrdfj- 

' keeping or maintenance of a sensa- a-tas. 8 Dhatu patha i. 707. 



33] Contrast between perception and memory [ i. n 

the process-of-knowing, that is, the form of both kinds, the nature of the two. 
This [subliminal-impression] is thus described as one which has the manifesta- 
tion (anjana) or form (dJcdra) of the manifester (vyahjaha) or cause (kdrana) of itself, 
in other words, which has the form of the cause of itself. [The subliminal- 
impression produces a memory corresponding to the cause of that impression, 
that is, to the experience (anubhava). ] Another interpretation would be that 
[this subliminal-impression is one] which has the manifestation (anjana) or the 
bringing-to-the-point-of-fruition (phaldbhimukhlkaratia) of the manifester (vyanjaka) 
or suggestive-stimulus (udbodhaJca). An objection is made : ' If, in so far as both 
refer to the cause [that is, to experience], there is a similarity between the idea 
(buddhi) and the remembi'ance, then what difference is there between them ? ' 
In reply to this he says <KWith regard to these two . . . the process-of-knowing. 2> 
i. [Perception :] the process-of-knowing (grahana) is an apprehending (upaddna). 
And there cannot be an apprehending of that which is [already] known. 
Accordingly an idea (buddhi) is said to be an illumination (bodhana) of that which 
has not been already got at (adhigata) by this [process-of-knowing]. This [idea] 
is that in which the configuration (dJcara) or form (rupa) of the process-of-knowing 
is the predominant or principal [element]. Though the relation between the 
idea and the process-of-knowing is one of identity, [still] l by predicating [the one 
of the other] the relation may be treated here as if it were that of principal and 
subordinate, ii. [Memory :] that whose predominant or primary [element] is the 
configuration of the object-known. This same predominance of the object-known 
in the configuration of the object-known lies in the fact that the object-intended 
(artha) has already been made the object of one of the other [four] fluctuations. 
Accordingly memory is declared to be concerned with objects which have 
already been made the object of one of the other fluctuations : this is precisely 
what is meant by not adding surreptitiously [to the once experienced object]. 
It might be urged that there is even in memory a surreptitious addition. For 
in a dream one's parents and others deceased who have been experienced in one 
time and place are brought [by memory] into relation with another time and 
place not previously experienced. The reply is The latter [that is, memoiy] 
is of two kinds : that [memory] by which imagined or mentally-constructed 
things are to be remembered ; [that memory by which] not imagined, that is, 
not mentally-constructed [or] real things [are to be remembered]. This [memory 
of imagined things] is not [really] memory, but is misconception ; because it 
agrees with the characteristic-mark [i. 8] of this [misconception]. But it is 
called memory in so far as it resembles memory, just as that which resembles 
a source-of-valid-ideas is called a source-of-valid-ideas. This is his point. But 
why is memory placed at the end [of i. 6] ? To this he replies A11 memories. 
Experience (anubhava) means getting to [an object]. Memory is a fluctuation 
preceded by a getting to [an object]. [Not until] after this [getting to an object] 

1 Literally, ' a relation of principal and subordinate is here (ayam) predicated.' 
5 [h.o.s. it] 



i. ll ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [34 

do memories associate themselves [with the subliminal-impression and with the 
experience]. The objection is made that a reasonable person should restrict 
those objects only which hinder 1 a man. Moreover the hindrances [affect him] 
thus ; but fluctuations do not. Why then should these [fluctuations] be 
restricted ? In reply he says And all these. [The rest is] easy. 



Now what means are there for the restriction of these [fluctuations] ? 
12. The restriction of them is by [means of] practice and 
passionlessness. 

The so-called river of mind-stuff, whose flow is in both directions, 
flows towards good and flows towards evil. Now when it is borne 
onward to Isolation [kdivalya], downward towards discrimination, 
then it is flowing unto good ; when it is borne onward to the 
whirl pool-of-existence, downward towards non-discrimination, then 
it is flowing unto evil. In these cases the stream towards objects 
is dammed by passionlessness, and the stream towards discrimina- 
tion has its flood-gate opened by practice in discriminatory know- 
ledge. Thus it appears that the restriction of the mind-stuff is 
dependent [for its accomplishment upon means] of both kinds, 
[practice and passionlessness]. 

With the word ^Cnow^ he asks what is the means for restriction. He gives 
the answer in the [following] sQtra : 12. The restriction of them is by [means 
of] practice and passionlessness. If the restriction is to be effected, then both 
[these] distinct activities, practice and passionlessness, must operate together, 
but not either one or the other separately. 2 Accordingly he says The river of 
mind-stuff.^ The words ^borne onward to> [connote] a continuous connexion ; 
^downward towards^ [suggest] depth or bottomlessness. 



13. Practice (abhydsa) is [repeated] exertion to the end that 

[the mind-stuff] shall have permanence in this [restricted 

state]. 

Permanence is the condition of the unfluctuating mind-stuff when 

it flows on in undisturbed calm. Practice is an effort (prayatna) 

with this end in view, a [consequent] energy, a persevering 

1 Read kli^nanti. with the distinction that there be [two] 

2 Literally, There is [ = must be] a piling-up- subordinate activities, but not an alter- 

together (samuccaya) [= simultaneous native [action], 

action] of practice and passionlessness, 



35] Restriction of fluctuations by practice [ i. 14 

struggle, the pursuit (anusthdna) of the course-of-action-requisite 
thereto with a desire of effectuating this [permanence]. 

Of these [two], he characterizes practice by telling what it is (svarupa) and 
what its purpose is, [and does so in the words] 13. Practice is [repeated] 
exertion to the end that [the mind-stuff] shall have permanence in this [re- 
stricted state]. This he discusses in the words of the . . mind-stuff. The word 
^unfluctuating^ means without fluctuations of rajas and tamas. Its flowing on 
in undisturbed calm is stainlessness, is the flowing on of the fluctuations of sattva ; 
it is singleness-of-intent ; it is permanence. It is with this end in view [that 
there is practice]. In the words <shall have permanence) there is [a pregnant 
use of] the locative case expressive of the reason [for the action] as in the phrase 
"He kills the leopard for the sake of the skin." He makes the word effort 
clear by a pair of synonyms a [consequent] energy, a persevering struggle.^ 
That this [effort] starts from a specific volition (iccM) he declares in the words 
with a desire of effectuating this. The word this refers to permanence. 
In the words the course-of-action-requisite thereto^ he describes the goal of the 
effort. The [eight] means-of-attaining [this] permanence are the [three] inner 
means (anga) and the [five] outer means, of which [eight] the first [two] are the 
abstentions and the observances [ii. 30 and 32]. The sense is that the functional- 
activity of the agent is occupied with the means [of the action], and not with 
the result. 

14. But this [practice] becomes confirmed when it has been 
cultivated for a long time and uninterruptedly and with 
earnest attention. 

[Practice,] when it has been cultivated for a long time, cultivated 
without interruption, and carried out with self-cast igation and 
with continence and with knowledge and with faith, in a word, 
with earnest attention, becomes confirmed. In other words it is 
not likely to have its object suddenly overpowered by an emergent 
subliminal-impression. 

An objection is made that practice is obstructed by emergent subliminal- 
impressions, which are the foes of practice [from time] without beginning. 
How does [practice] conduce to permanence? In reply he says, 14. But this 
[practice] becomes confirmed when it has been cultivated for a long time 
and uninterruptedly and with earnest attention. This same practice 
becomes a confirmed state only when (san) provided with [these] three qualifica- 
tions. And its goal, namely permanence, is not suddenly overrun by emergent 
subliminal-impressions. But if, even after having done practice of this kind, 
a man should fail to persevere, then in the course of time he might be overrun 
[reading abhibhuyeta]. Therefore one must not fail to persevere. 



i. 15 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [36 

15. Passionlessness is the consciousness of being master on 
the part of one who has rid himself of thirst for either seen 
or revealed objects. 

The mind-stuff (citta), if it be rid of thirst for objects that are 
seen, such as women, or food and drink, or power, if it be rid of 
thirst for the objects revealed [in the Vedas], such as the attain- 
ment of heaven or of the discarnate state or of resolution into 
primary matter, if, even when in contact with objects either super- 
normal or not, it be, by virtue of Elevation (prasamkhydna), aware 
of the inadequateness of objects, [then the mind-stuff] will have 
a consciousness of being master, [a consciousness] which is essen- 
tially the absence of immediate-experience 1 (abhoga) [and] has 
nothing to be rejected or received, [and that consciousness is] 
passionlessness. 

He describes passionlessness. 15. Passionlessness is the consciousness of 
being master on the part of one who has rid himself of thirst for either 
seen or revealed objects. He describes this riddance from thirst for seen 
objects whether animate or inanimate in the words beginning with women. 
Power) is sovereignty. Eevelation is Veda ; <Krevealed is that which is 
known from this [revelation], heaven for instance. Thirstlessness even for these 
things is specified in the words beginning <Kheaven. <KDiscarnate means 
without carnate body. The discarnate stated is the state of those who are 
resolved into their organs. But there are others deeming themselves to be 
nothing but primary-matter, persons who worship primary-matter, who are 
resolved into primary-matter, which of course has its task [still unfulfilled in 
so far as primary-matter is for them an object of desire] : the state of these 
is ^resolution into primary-matter. A man rids himself of a thirst which 
is directed to the attainment of this. Now one who is rid of thirst for a revealed 
object is said to be rid of a thirst which is directed to the attainment of 
heaven or the like. It might be objected : ' If passionlessness is riddance from 
thirst and nothing more, why ! then this [riddance from thirst] exists even if 
you don't get to your objects. And for that reason (iti) [that riddance from 
thirst] would [also] be passionlessness.' The reply to this is in the words ^super- 
normal or not. Passionlessness is not merely riddance from thirst. But it 
is [the consciousness of being master] on the part of the mind-stuff, and is 

1 This word anabhoga occurs in Asariga's in classical Sanskrit. The fact that it 

Mahayana-Sutralamkara (1907), p. 3 19 . occurs here is another indication of the 

In his translation (1911) on page 8, intimate relation between Patanjali and 

note 7, Sylvain Levi discusses this word the Mahayana. Haribhadra Suri uses 

and states that it apparently is lacking it at Yoga-bindu, vs. 91 and elsewhere. 



37] Restriction of fluctuations by passionlessness [ i. 16 

essentially the absence of immediate-experience of objects whether supernal or 
not, even when in contact with them. This same [consciousness] he makes 
more clear by saying [has nothing] to be rejected. The words <Khas nothing 
to be rejected or received^ mean free from flaw of attachment. This 'idea, 
[a state of] indifference, is the ^consciousness of being master. But whence 
comes this idea? In reply he says <Kby virtue of Elevation.^ Objects are 
encompassed by the three kinds of pain. That is their inadequateness. By 
meditation upon that, [results] a direct perception of it, [and that is] Elevation. 
By virtue of that. 1. The Consciousness of Endeavour (yatamana-samjna) ; 
2. The Consciousness of Discrimination ; 3. The Consciousness of a Single Sense ; 
4. The Consciousness of Being Master : these are the four consciousnesses, 
according to those who know the tradition. 1. Such things as desires are of 
course taints found in the mind-stuff. By these the senses (indriya) are turned 
each toward its particular object. So, in order that the senses may not turn 
toward this or that particular object, there is a beginning, an effort [made] 
to bring these taints to maturity [and thus to cast them off] : this is the Con- 
sciousness of Endeavour. 2. When this beginning is made, some taints have 
matured and others are maturing or are about to mature. In this [situation,] the 
ascertainment of the matured by [a process of] discriminating [them] from those 
about to mature is the Consciousness of Discrimination. 3. Inasmuch as the 
senses are [now] incapable of turning [toward objects], the matured [taints] per- 
sist in the central-organ 1 as a faint [barren] desire : the Consciousness of a Single 
Sense. 4. The faint [barren] desire also is destroyed and there is indifference 
to objects, whether supernal or not, even when they are close at hand : this idea 
(buddhi), higher than the other three [forms of consciousness], is the Conscious- 
ness of Being Master. And inasmuch as the [three] preceding ones have their 
purpose fulfilled by this same [fourth form of consciousness], therefore these are 
not separately mentioned. Thus all is quite cleared up. 



16. This [passionlessness] is highest when discernment of 
the Self results in thirstlessness for qualities [and not 
merely for objects]. 

[One yogin becomes] passionless on knowing the inadequateness of 
[all] objects, seen or revealed. Through practice in the vision of 
the Self, [another yogin,] because his thinking-substance is satiated 
with a perfect discrimination, resulting from the purity of this 
[vision], [between the qualities (guna) and the Self], [becomes] 

1 The central-organ (ntanas) is counted as the eleventh sense-organ and is the Single 
Sense here referred to. 



i. 16 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [38 

passionless with regard to [all] qualities whether perceptible or not- 
perceptible. Thus passionlessness is of two kinds. Of these [two], 
the latter is nothing but an undisturbed calm of perception 
[untouched by any objects whatsoever]. And at the rising of this 
[state, the yogin] on whom this insight has dawned, thus reflects 
within himself, ' That which was to be attained (prdpanlya) has 
been attained ; the hindrances which should have dwindled have 
dwindled ; the close-interlocked succession of existences-in-the- 
world, which so long as it is not cut asunder involves death 
after life and life after death, has been cut.' It is just this utter- 
most limit of knowledge that is passionlessness. For it is with 
this that Isolation, as they term it, is inseparably connected. 

After describing the lower passionlessness he tells of the higher: 16. This 
[passionlessness] is highest when discernment of the Self results in thirst- 
lessness for qualities [and not merely for objects]. Lower passionlessness 
serves as a cause of higher passionlessness. He points out the means to this 
[higher passionlessness] in the words ^passionless on seeing the inadequateness 
of [all] objects, whether seen or revealed. By this [statement] the lower 
passionlessness has been set forth. ^Practice in the vision of the Self is the 
practice in that vision of the Self who has become accessible through verbal- 
communications and inference and the instruction of teachers. [This practice] 
is a constantly reiterated performance through this. Purity of this vision 
is a focusedness upon sattva in so far as rajas and tamas have been rejected. 
Kesulting from this [purity] is that perfect discrimination between the qualities 
and the Self to the effect that the Self is pure and exists from time-without- 
beginning, whereas the qualities [in respect of which it is not contaminated] 
are the opposite of this by which [discrimination] the thinking-substance of 
the yogin is satiated (d-pyayita). It is to such a yogin that reference is made. Now 
these same words (anena) describe the concentration called the Eain-cloud of 
[knowable] Things [iv. 29]. A yogin of such a kind as this is altogether passion- 
less with regard to qualities (guna), whether their properties be developed or 
undeveloped, that is to say, even to the extent that he is passionless with regard 
to the discernment of the difference between sattva and the Self, [for to this 
discernment] qualities are essential. Thus that is, therefore, passionlessness 
is of two kinds. The first is when the substance (sattva) of the mind-stuff has 
[all] its tamas washed away by the excess of its sattva, and when the mind-stuff's 
sattva 1 is in contagion with a tiny stain of rajas. This [passionlessness,] 

1 This use of sattva is an intentional am- sattva (as a guna), which in the higher 

biguity. Sattva is not only the ' sub- stages of attainment preponderates in 

stance ' (of the mind-stuff), but is also the citta (Samkhya-sara, iii, near beg.). 



39] Undisturbed calm of the Self [ i. 16 

moreover, is common to those also whose wishes have been fulfilled (taustika). 1 
For they also have by virtue of the same [discrimination] been merged in 
primary matter. In this same sense it has been said [Sariikhya-karika 45] 
"From discrimination results resolution into primary-matter." Among these, 
that is, of these two [kinds of passionlessness] the latter is nothing but an 
undisturbed calm of perception. The use of the words ^nothing but indi- 
cates that this [passionlessness] is without any object. For it is the mind- 
stuffs substance (sattva) of precisely such a kind as this that is untouched by 
the stain of even a particle of rajas. This is the substrate for that [kind of 
passionlessness]. For this very reason it is called the undisturbed calm of 
perception. Because the substance (sattva) of the mind-stuff, although by nature 
undisturbed, [sometimes] experiences defilement from contact with rajas and 
tamas. But when all defilement by rajas and tamas is washed away by a 
stream of the undefiled water of passionlessness and practice, it [the substance 
of the mind-stuff] becomes absolutely undisturbedly calm and becomes so that 
nothing more is left of it than an undisturbed calm of perception. He shows its 
qualities so that we may be inclined to receive it. He says Cat the rising of 
this.^ The meaning is : When this [state] arises, then the yogin on whom this 
insight has dawned ; in other words, when there is this particular insight 
[that is, the undisturbed calm,] has present insight [that is, the Kain-cloud 
of knowable Things]. That which was to be founds that is, Isolation, has 
been found. In this sense he will say [iv. 30] " Even while living the wise man 
becomes liberated." The reason would be that what is nothing but subliminal- 
impression has its root [in undifferentiate d-consciousness] cut : this is the point. 
How is it that [Isolation] has been found ? Since all the hindrances which 
should have dwindled, undifferentiated-consciousness and the [four] others 
together with subconscious-impressions (vasana), have dwindled. It is urged as 
an objection that there is a mass of merit and of demerit ; there is the succession 
of existences-in-the-world, the unbroken sequence of birth and death for [all] 
living creatures. How then can there be Isolation ? In reply to this he says has 
been cut. That [succession] the joints of which show no connexion is close- 
interlocked. These sections of the whole (samuhin) multitude (samuha) of merits 
and demerits, which are the parts, are close-interlocked. For nothing alive is ever 
free from connexion with bondage to birth and death. This is that same suc- 
cession of existences-in-the-world. When hindrances dwindle, it is cut. To 
this same effect he will say [ii. 12] "The latent-deposit of karma has its root 
in the hindrances," [and ii. 13] " So long as the root exists there will be fruition 
from it." Some one might ask ' Without the full maturity of the Elevation 
(prasamkhyana) and the restriction of the Rain-cloud of [knowable Things], what 
is this undisturbed calm of perception ? ' To this he replies ^uttermost limit of 
knowledge.^ Higher passionlessness is only one kind of the Rain-cloud of 

1 Cp. Samkhya-karika 50. 



i. 16 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [40 

[knowable] Things ; nothing but that. To this same effect he will say [iv. 29] 
" For one who takes no interest even in Elevation there always follows, as a 
result of discriminative discernment, the concentration [called] the Eain-cloud 
of [knowable] Things," and [iv. 31] " Then, because of the endlessness of per- 
ception from which all defilements and coverings have passed away, the know- 
able amounts to little." For this reason Isolation is inseparably connected with 
it [and] is an essential characteristic (avinabhavin) of it. 



Now when the fluctuations of mind-stuff have been restricted by 
these two means, how are we to describe the [ensuing] concentra- 
tion conscious [of an object] ? 

17. [Concentration becomes] conscious [of its object] by 
assuming forms either of deliberation [upon coarse objects] 
or of reflection [upon subtile objects] or of joy or of the 
sense-of-personality. 

Deliberation (vitarka) is the mind-stuff's coarse direct-experience 
(abhoga) when directed to its supporting [object]. Reflection 
(vicdra) is the subtile [direct-experience]. Joy is happiness. The 
sense-of-personality is a feeling (samvid) which pertains to one self 
[wherein the Self and the personality are one]. Of these [four] the 
first, [that is, deliberation] which has [all] the four associated 
together is concentration deliberating [upon coarse objects]. The 
second, [that is, reflection,] which has deliberation subtracted [from 
it] is [concentration] reflecting [upon subtile objects]. The third, 
[that is, joy,] which has reflection subtracted from it, is [concentra- 
tion] with [the feeling] of joy. The fourth, [that is, the sense-of- 
personality,] which has this [joy] subtracted from it, is [concentra- 
tion] which is the sense-of-personality and nothing more. All 
these kinds of concentrations have an object upon which they rest. 
After having mentioned the means (updya), in order that he may state what- 
may-be-obtained-by-these-means {upeya) in all its variations, he asks Now . . . 
by these two means ? 17. [Concentration becomes] conscious [of its object] 
by assuming forms either of deliberation [upon coarse objects] or of 
reflection [upon subtile objects] or of joy or of the sense-of-personality. 
Since [concentration] not conscious [of an object] is preceded by [concentration] 
conscious [of an object], he describes first concentration [conscious] of an object. 
The generic-nature of [concentration] conscious [of an object] is to be learned 
from its association with the forms of delil eration and of reflection and of 



41] Concentration conscious of an object [ i. is 

joy and of the sense-of-personality as they are in themselves. He explains 
deliberation by the words <Sthe mind-stuff s. The direct-experience (dbhoga) [of 
an object] is an insight (prajna) with a direct-perception (saksdtJcdra) of the thing 
itself. And this is coarse because the object is coarse. Tor just as an archer, 
when he is a beginner, pierces first only a coarse, and afterwards a subtile 
target, so the yogin, when a beginner, has direct experience merely of some 
coarse object of contemplation made of the five [material] elements, [for 
example] four-armed [Vishnu], and afterwards a subtile [object]. Likewise the 
subtile direct-experience, when directed to its supporting [object], is a reflection 
upon an object which is either the unresoluble-primary-matter (alinga) or the 
resoluble-matter (linga) or the five tanmdtra which are the subtile elements, 
the causes of the coarse [elements]. Having thus described the object to be 
known, he describes the object which is the process-of-knowing with the word 
<5Cjoy. Happiness is the mind-stuffs direct-experience when directed towards 
a sense-organ as a coarse 1 supporting object. Sense-organs, as every one knows, 
arise from the personality-substance (ahamJcdra), in so far as they have a dispo- 
sition to illumine because of the predominance of the sattva [quality]. And 
because the sattva [gives] pleasure, these sense-organs also [give] pleasure. 
Thus direct-experience when directed to them is happiness. With the words 
a feeling which pertains to one self he tells of the concentration which has 
the knower as its object (grahitrvisaya). Organs-of-sense are produced out of the 
sense-of-personality. Consequently the sense-of-personality is their subtile form. 
Moreover this [sense-of-personality] together with the [Self as] known becomes 
the idea (buddM), that is, the feeling which pertains to one self. And because 
the knower becomes included in this [feeling], one may say that there is a 
[concentration] conscious of the knower as its object. He gives another subor- 
dinate difference between [these] four in the words <Kof these [four] the first. 
The effect adjusts itself to the cause, not the cause to the effect. Hence this 
coarse direct-experience becomes associated [by inherence] with coarse [objects] 
and with subtile [objects], with sense-organs and with the feeling-of-personality, 
which are four kinds of causes. Furthermore, the other [first three direct- 
experiences, inasmuch] as they have three or two or one cause, assume a triple 
or double or single form. The words <KA11 these distinguish [concentration 
conscious of an object] from [concentration] not conscious [of an object]. 



Now by what means is that concentration produced which is not 
conscious of any object 1 or what is its nature ? 
18. The other [concentration which is not conscious of 
objects] consists of subliminal - impressions only [after 

1 The word sthula is used here in the sense of product as contrasted with suksma in the 
sense of cause : cp. iii. 44. 
G [h.o.s. it] 



i. 18 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [42 

objects have merged], and follows upon that practice which 
effects the cessation [of fluctuations]. 

The concentration which is not conscious [of objects] is that 
restriction of the mind-stuff in which only subliminal-impressions 
are left and in which all fluctuations have come to rest. The 
higher passionlessness is a means for effecting this. For practice 
when directed towards any supporting-object is not capable of 
serving as an instrument to this [concentration not conscious of an 
object]. So the supporting-object [for this concentration] is [the 
Bain-cloud of knowable things] x which effects this cessation [of 
fluctuations] and has no [perceptible] object. For (ca) [in this 
concentration] there is no object-intended. Mind-stuff, when 
engaged in the practice of this [imperceptible object], seems as if 
it were itself non-existent and without any supporting-object. 
Thus [arises] that concentration [called] seedless, [without sensa- 
tional stimulus], which is not conscious of objects. 
To introduce [the topic of] [concentration] not conscious [of objects] which comes 
next in order, he asks <KNow ? 18. The other [concentration which is not 
conscious of objects] consists of subliminal-impressions only [after objects 
have merged], and follows upon that practice which effects the cessation 
[of fluctuations]. The first 2 clause [<follows upon> to <fluctuations>] relates 
to the means ; and the last two 2 words [from <the other> to <merged>] relate 
to the thing itself. The middle words [from <consists> to <only>] are dis- 
cussed in the words all fluctuations. ) He discusses the first 2 clause in the 
phrase The higher .... this. The cessation is the non-existence of fluctua- 
tions. That which effects this [passionlessness] is the cause [of it]. The 
practice of it is the repeated pursuit of this [cause], [The concentration] is 
that which follows upon this same pursuit. If it should be asked why lower 
passionlessness is not the cause of restriction, the reply is in the words <Swhen 
directed towards any supporting-object.^ A cause ought to be homogeneous 
with its effect, not heterogeneous. And, because it is directed towards a sup- 
porting-object, lower passionlessness is heterogeneous from its effect, which is 
concentration [not conscious of objects], [and] not directed towards a support- 
ing-object. This is the ground for the statement that it [restriction] arises 
from the undisturbed calm of perception which is not directed towards a sup- 
porting-object. For when all the defilements of rajas and tamas have fallen 
away from the sattva, it is the concentration of the Rain-cloud of [knowable] 

1 Literally, [the Rain-cloud] is-made-tbe- 2 The words first and two apply to the 
supporting-object. original, not to the translation. 



43] Concentration not conscious of an object [ i. 19 

things which is produced ; its activity continues quite transcendent to any 
object ; it has no end ; it beholds the taints in objects ; and because it alto- 
gether rejects all objects, it remains grounded in itself and so is not directed 
to any supporting-object ; [and thus] it may consistently be the cause of the 
concentration wherein subliminal-impressions only are left and which is not 
directed to any supporting-object because of the homogeneity [between the 
restriction and the concentration not conscious of objects] : this is his meaning. 
Coming to be directed to a supporting-object (alambana) is coming into depen- 
dence upon [an object] (agrayana). It <Kseems as if it were itself non-existent3> 
because it does not perform its functions as a fluctuation. It is Cseedless,; 
that is, not directed to any supporting-object. Another interpretation might 
be [that <KseedlessS>] is that from which the seed, namely, the latent-deposit of 
the karma from the hindrances, has passed away. 



This same concentration is, as every one knows, of two kinds. It 
is produced either by [spiritual] means [i. 20] or by worldly 
[means]. Of these two, that produced by [spiritual] means is the 
one to which yogins [who are on the way to Isolation] attain. 
19. [Concentration not conscious of objects] caused by 
worldly [means] is the one to which the discarnate attain 
and to which those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary- 
matter attain. The discarnate, that is, the gods, attain to the 
[concentration not conscious of objects which is] caused by worldly 
[means]. For in so far as their mind-stuff uses only their own 
subliminal-impressions they experience a quasi-state of Isolation, 
and [then] pass beyond [the period during which] the fruit corre- 
sponding to their own subliminal-impressions ripens [for their 
enjoyment]. [But at the end of this period they must return to 
the world.] Likewise those whose bodies are resolved into 
primary-matter experience a quasi-state of Isolation, during which 
the mind (cetas), with its task still undone, is resolved into 
primary-matter. But this lasts only till the mind-stuff, under the 
pressure of its [unfulfilled] task, returns [to the world]. 

In order to show what is to be accepted and what rejected he points out with 
the words <This same ... as every one knows3> a subsidiary distinction [to be 
found] in the concentration of restriction. The word ^Cthis means the con- 
centration of restriction ; it is <of two kinds. It is produced either by 
[spiritual] means [i. 20] or by worldly [means]. ) He refers to that concentra- 



i. 19 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [44 

tion of restriction produced [or] caused by faith and other [means] as will be 
described [i. 20]. The world ! (bhava) is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya). 
It is called the world because living beings are born [or] grow (bhavanti) in it. 
Those whose wishes have been fulfilled (tdudika), who have attained to passion- 
lessness, find the self (atman) in the not-self, either in the elements or the sense- 
organs, which are evolved-effects (viMra), or in evolving-causes (pralcrti), which 
are undeveloped [primary-matter], or in the personality-substance or in the five 
fine-substances (tanmatra). The [concentration] produced by worldly [means] 
is that concentration of restriction produced [or] caused by the world. Of these 
two [concentrations] that produced by [spiritual] means is for yogins who are on 
the way to liberation. By specially mentioning [the fact that spiritual means 
are for yogins], he denies that the other [means] have any relation with 
persons who are merely desirous of liberation [that is, who are not yogins]. 
To whom then do the worldly [means] appertain? He replies to this 
with the sutra. 19. [Concentration not conscious of objects] caused by 
worldly [means] is the one to which the discarnate attain and to which 
those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary-matter attain. In other 
words [this concentration] is attained by both the discarnate and by those 
[whose bodies] are resolved into primary-matter. This he discusses in the 
words The discarnate, that is, the gods.2> By serving one or the other 
of the organs or elements they have become identified with them. And 
inner-organs are permeated by subconscious-impressions from these [organs 
or elements]. After the body falls to pieces they are resolved into organs 
or into the elements. Their central-organs (manas) contain nothing left but 
subliminal-impressions. And they are stripped of the outer six-sheathed 
body. 2 [Thus they may be termed] discarnate. For in so far as their 
mind-stuff uses only their own subliminal-impressions, they experience a 
quasi-stsde of Isolation. Being discarnate they attain [to this]. And the 
similarity [of this state] with Isolation is in the absence of fluctuations. Its 
dissimilarity is in the presence of subliminal-impressions with their task [un- 
fulfilled]. In some [manuscripts] there is the reading 'by the enjoyment 
of nothing but subliminal -impressions '. The meaning of this would be ' that of 
which the enjoyment is nothing but subliminal-impressions'. The meaning 
is that there are no fluctuations of mind-stuff. When they have reached their 

1 Vijnana Bhiksu objects to this interpre- striction which is temporary and which 

tation and interprets the compound leads again to fluctuations is called 

(bhava-pratyaya) as that which has bhava-pratyaya ; that which follows 

birth (janma) as its cause. But he upon belief ($raddha) as the result 

seems to assume that the discussion is of higher passionlessness is upaya- 

in respect of the classification of two pratyaya. This latter is fit for persons 

kinds of unconscious concentration. aiming at liberation. The former is a 

Whereas it would appear that the pseudo-yoga and is to be rejected, 
classification is of the two kinds of 2 See Moksa-dharma, MBh. xii. 305. 5 f . = 

restriction of fluctuations. That re- 11332-3. 



45j Concentration not conscious of an object [ i. 20 

limit, they pass beyond or go beyond [the period during which] the fruit 
corresponding to the subliminal-impressions ripens. Yet once again they enter 
the round-of -rebirth. And so it has been declared in the Vayu[-purana], ' ' Ten 
periods of Manu the devotees of sense-organs remain here below ; a full hundred, 
the worshippers of elements. " ' Similarly those [whose bodies] have been resolved 
into primary-matter, in so far as they have become identified with one or the 
other of the five fine-substances or the personality -substance or the Great 
[thinking-substance] or the undeveloped [primary-matter] by serving [one or 
the other] of these, have their inner-organs permeated by subliminal- 
impressions from one or the other of these. After the body falls to pieces they 
are resolved into one or the other [of these] from the undeveloped [primary- 
matter] downwards. The words Cwith its task still undone3> mean that its 
purpose is unfulfilled. For that mind would have its purpose fulfilled, if it could 
also generate the discernment of the difference. The mind, however, which 
has not generated the discernment of the difference has not fulfilled its purpose 
and its task is still undone. Thus, as he says, they experience a quasi-state 
of Isolation, during which the mind (cetas), with its task still undone, is resolved 
into primary -matter. But this lasts only till the mind-stuff, under the pressure 
of its [unfulfilled] task, returns [to the world], Even after it has been reduced 
to a state of uniformity with primary-matter, it reaches the limit [of its time] 
and yet once again appears, that is, it becomes discriminated from this [primary- 
matter]. Precisely so after the rains are passed, a frog's 2 body, after having 
been reduced to an earthy state, when sprinkled with water from the cloud, 
experiences yet once again the state of being a frog's body. And in this same 
sense it has been said in the Vayu[-purana], "But those who-identify-them- 
selves-with-illusions-of-personality (abhimanika), remain a thousand [periods of 
Manu] ; those who identify themselves with the thinking-substance, ten 
thousand, and from them fevers [of desire] have passed away ; those who 
meditate upon undeveloped [primary -matter], remain for a full hundred thousand ; 
but after attaining to the Self, who is out of relation with qualities, there is no 
tale of time." 1 Thus inasmuch as this [state which is resolved into primary- 
matter] leads to a recurrence of births, its worthlessness (heyatva) has been 
established. 

20. [Concentration not conscious of objects,] which follows 
upon belief [and] energy [and] mindfulness [and] concen- 
tration [and] insight, 3 is that to which the others [the 
yogins] attain. 

1 Not yet traced in either edition. paBBa, Buddha says that he too, as well 

2 In the corresponding passages i. 27, as Alara Kalama, inculcates: Majjhima 

p. 64 27 ; ii. 17, p. 140 12 (Calc. ed.), we Nikaya, i. p. 164. Cf. 'The Balance 

find ' plant ' for ' frog '. of Powers,' Visuddhi Magga, book 4, 

s These five, saddha, viriya, sati, samadhi, p. Ill of 1st Rangoon ed. 



i. 20 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [46 

[That concentration not conscious of objects, which is] caused by 
[spiritual] means is that to which yogins attain. Belief is the 
mental approval [of concentration] ; for, like a good mother, 1 it 
protects the yogin. For him [thus] believing and setting dis- 
crimination [before him] as his goal there is the further (upa) 
attainment of energy. For him who has reached the further 
attainment of energy mindfulness is at hand. And when mindful- 
ness is at hand the mind-stuff is self-possessed and becomes concen- 
trated. When his mind-stuff has become concentrated he gains as 
his portion the discrimination of insight, by which he perceives 
things as they really are. Through the practice of these means 
and through passionlessness directed to this end there [finally] 
arises that concentration which is not conscious [of any object]. 
But for yogins he describes a series of means for the attainment of concentration. 
20. [Concentration not conscious of objects,] which follows upon belief 
[and] energy [and] mindfulness [and] concentration [and] insight, is that 
to which the others [the yogins] attain. It might be objected that those who 
reflect upon sense-organs might also be just the persons to have belief. To this 
he replies in the words ^Belief is the mental approval [of concentration]. 
This [approval], moreover, has as its object a reality which is quite accessible 
by verbal-communication or by inference or by the instruction of teachers. 
For it is this mental approval, [which is itself] an extreme delight [and] a great 
volition, [that is called] belief. Those who are under the illusion that the self 
is in such things as sense-organs, have not an extreme delight. Because it is 
a disapproval [of concentration which they feel] ; the reason [for this disapproval 
is that] it has its origin in downright infatuation. This is the meaning. 
Why does he speak of just this [particular] belief [in concentration not 
conscious of objects] ? He replies, for, like a good mother, it protects the 
yogin from calamities which follow upon a deviation from the way. This is 
a particular kind of volition and it generates an exertion directed towards the 
object desired. So he says For him [thus] believing. The exposition for 
the words for him is in the words ^setting discrimination [before him] as 
his goal. [For such a man] there is the further (upa) attainment of energy. 
Mindfulness is contemplation (dhyana). Self-possessed is undistracted. 
Becomes concentrated2> means having (yukta) the concentration of the [eight] 
aids to yoga. And by mentioning the concentration which is inseparably 
connected with the abstentions (yama) [ii. 30] and with the observances (niyama) 
[ii. 32], the abstentions and the observances and the other [six aids] are 
hinted at. 

1 Compare Metta Sutta in Sutta Nipata, i. 8 7 , p. 26, Fausboll's ed. 



47] Methods and intensities [ i. 21 

In this same way [concentration] conscious [of objects] arises for one who is 
endowed with all the aids to yoga. Therefore he says <3Cwhen his mind-stuff 
has become concentrated.^ Discrimination of insight, the exceptional quality 
[prdkarsa) [of mind-stuff], is attained. In the words through practice of these 
means he states that concentration not conscious [of an object] follows after 
conscious [concentration]. After reaching the stages in this same concentration, 
one after another, and as a result of passionlessness for the various objects, con- 
centration not conscious [of an object] arises. Now this is the occasion for 
Isolation. For the insight into the difference between the sattva and the Self 
is followed by restriction which causes the mind-stuff to cease from working at 
its task, since now, inasmuch as all its duties are done, its purpose is fulfilled. 



Now these yogins are of nine kinds, as being respectively followers 
of the gentle and the moderate and the vehement method ; that is 
to say, the follower of the gentle method, the follower of the 
moderate method, and the follower of the vehement method. 
Among these, the follower of the gentle method is also of three 
kinds : with gentle intensity, with moderate intensity, and with 
keen intensity. Likewise the follower of the moderate method [is 
found with the three intensities]. Likewise the follower of the 
vehement method [is found with the three intensities]. Now, among 
those who follow the vehement method, 
21. For the keenly intense, [concentration] is near. 
[For them] there is gaining of concentration and the result of 
concentration. 

Some one raises the objection that if belief and the other qualities are means 
for [attaining] yoga, then all [the yogins] without distinction would possess 
concentration and its results. Whereas it is observed that in some cases there 
is perfection (siddhi) ; in other cases the absence of perfection ; in some cases 
perfection after a delay ; in other cases perfection after still more delay ; [and] 
in other cases quickly. In reply to this objection he says Now these yogins 
are of nine kinds. Those are called [followers of gentle or moderate or 
vehement methods], in whose case, through the force of subliminal-impressions 
and the invisible-influences (adrda) of previous births, the methods, that is, 
belief and the other [means], become gentle or moderate or vehement. 
Clntensity) is passionlessness. And its gentle or moderate or vehement 
character is due to the force of previous subconscious-impressions and invisible- 
influences. Among these [yogins,] he describes those who are of such a kind 



i. 21 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [48 

that perfection is [for them] very quick, in the sutra 21. For the keenly 
intense, [concentration] is near. This is the statement of the sutra ; the 
comment completes the phrase. The result of concentration conscious [of an 
object] is [concentration] not conscious [of an object] ; and [the result] of this 
is Isolation. 

22. Because [this keenness] is gentle or moderate or keen, 
there is a [concentration] superior (vicesa) even to this 
[near kind]. 

In that there is a gently keen and a moderately keen and a 
vehemently keen, there is a superior even to this [concentration]. 
Because there is a superior to this [near kind], the attainment 
of concentration and the result of concentration is near to him 
who follows the vehement method and is of mildly keen intensity ; 
still more near to him who is of moderately keen intensity ; and 
most near to him who is of vehemently keen intensity. 

22. Because [this keenness] is gentle or moderate or keen, there is a 
[concentration] superior (vigesa) even to this [near kind]. This is explained 
by the Comment which is explained if you simply read it aloud. 



Is [the attainment] of concentration most near as a result of 
this last [method] only, or is there some other method also for 
its attainment, or not ? 

23. Or 1 [concentration] is attained by devotion to the 
Icvara. 

By devotion, 2 by a special kind of adoration, the Icvara inclines 
[to him] and favours him merely because of [this yogin's] profound- 
desire. Also as a result of the profound-desire for Him, the yogin 
becomes most near to the attainment of concentration and to 
[Isolation] the result [of concentration]. 

In order to bring forward another sutra he puts forth a topic for consideration 
in the words Is .... as a result of this last [method] only. The phrase 
or not is the remover of a doubt. 23. Or [concentration] is attained by 

1 As distinguishing from the conscious 2 Compare ii. 1, and see Bhag. Gfta xi. 55, 
concentration of i. 17, and from the and also SBE. xlviii, p. 284. 

not conscious or ' other ' of i. 18. 



49] Nature of the Igvara [ i. 24 

devotion to the Igvara. He discusses the words CBy devotion. By devotion 
[that is] by a special kind of adoration either mental or verbal or bodily. 
<KHe iuclines, that is, He is brought near [to him] and favours him. <KPro- 
found-desire is a wish for some thing yet to come, to the effect that this thing 
coveted by him may be his. By this means only and not by any other 
functional-activity. The rest is easy. 



But it is now asked who is this [being] that we have called the 

Icvara, as distinct from the primary-substance and the Self? 

24. Untouched by hindrances or karmas or fruition or by 

latent-deposits the Igvara is a special kind of Self. wv**"^ 

The <hindrances> are undifferentiated-consciousness and the - rest 

[ii. 3]. The <karmas> are good (kufala) or evil. The <fruition> is 

the consequences which these [evolve]. The <latent-deposits> 

(dpaya) are subconscious-impressions (vdsand) corresponding to 

these [fruitions]. These [hindrances and karmas and fruitions 

and latent-deposits], although they are found in the central-organ 

(manas), are attributed to the Self. For it is he that is said to be 

the experiencer of the results of these [in the central- organ]. Just 

as the victory or defeat which depends upon the combatants is 

attributed to [their] lord (svdmin). For, the Icvara is a special 

kind of Self who is untouched by this [kind of] experience. 

Then there are those who have obtained Isolation ; and those 

who are in Isolation (kevalin) are many. 1 Now these by severing 

the three instruments of bondage 2 have obtained Isolation ; and 

the Icvara's relation to this [Isolation] belongs neither to the past 

nor to the future, [but is eternal]. Thus it is not with Him as 

with the [ordinary] liberated [Self] that there has been expressly 

made known a terminus a quo of bondage (pilrvd bandhakoti). 

Nor is it with Him, as it is with one [whose body] is resolved into 

primary-matter, that there is a terminus ad quern, when bondage 



i 



According to Samkhya-sutra i. 91-92 the Tat. Kaum. xliv. The three vipdka are 

Icvara should be classed as one of jdti, dyus, and bhoga (ii. 13). These 

these. three are also the upasarga (Vacas- 

The three bandhana would be l.prakrti, pati-mifra,, i. 29, Calcutta edition, 

2. vikdra, 3. daksind. Compare Sam. p. 66 14 ). 



i. 24 ] Book I. Concentration or Samadhi [50 

might recur. But He is at all times whatsoever liberated and at 
all times whatsoever the Icvara. 

But it might be asked, ' That universally admitted eternal 
superiority (utharsa) of the Icvara which results from his assuming 
a sattva of perfect (prakrsta) quality has that any proof [to 
authorize it], or is it without proof? ' [The reply is, His] sacred- 
books (cdstra) are its proof. [But then] again [it may be asked], 
what proof have the sacred-books ? [The reply is] they have their 
proof in the perfect quality of [His] sattva. Inasmuch as both [the 
sacred-books and the superiority] reside in the Icvara's sattva, 
there is a never-beginning relation between the two. From these 
[sacred-books, therefore] this proves to be true that He is at all 
times whatsoever liberated and at all times whatsoever the Icvara. 
Now this His pre-eminence {aicvarya) is altogether without any- 
thing equal to it or excelling it. For, to begin with, it cannot be 
excelled by any other pre-eminence, because whatever might [seem] 
to excel it would itself prove to be that very [pre-eminence we are 
in quest of]. Therefore that is the Icvara wherein we reach this 
uttermost limit of pre-eminence. Nor again is there any pre-emi- 
nence equal to His. [Why not ?] Because when one thing is 
simultaneously desired by two equals, the one saying ' let this be 
new ' and the other saying ' let this be old ', if the one wins his 
way, the other fails in his wish and so becomes inferior. And two 
equals cannot obtain the same desired thing simultaneously, since 
that would be a contradiction of terms. Therefore [we maintain 
that,] in whomsoever there is a pre-eminence that is neither equalled 
nor excelled, he is the Icvara, and He is, as we said, a special kind 
of Self. 

He anticipates the objection that ' the universe (vigva) is pervaded by animate 
and inanimate [beings] only and by nothing else. Consequently if the Icvara be 
inanimate, then He is primary-substance {pradhana), since what is evolved from 
primary-substance also falls within primary-substance. And by this hypothesis 
he could not be made inclined since he is inanimate. Or on the other hand, 
if he be animate, still, since the Energy of Intellect is indifferent (audaslnya) 
and since in so far as it is not in the round-of-rebirths it has no feeling-of- 
personality or other [hindrance], how can the Energy of Intellect be inclined, 
[or] how can profound-desire [have anything to do with Energy of Intellect] ? ' 



51] The Igvara arid the other Selves [ i. 24 

In alluding to this he says <KBut now .... primary-substance. 2> He gives the 
reply to this objection in the following sutra. 24. Untouched by hindrances 
or karmas or fruition or by latent-deposits the Igvara is a special kind of 
Self. The <hindrances> are undifferentiated-consciousness and the rest^, for it 
is these that, by the stroke of various kinds of misery, hinder a man within the 
round-of-rebirth. Good (huqala) or evil are merit and demerit ; and by a 
figurative expression they are called karma, because they proceed from karma. 
<KFruition> is birth and length- of -life and the [kind of] experience [ii. 13]. 
^Corresponding to these : the subconscious-impressions corresponding to the 
fruitions. These subconscious-impressions are called latent-deposits because 
they lie in the ground of the mind-stuff. For, until [that particular] karma, 
[that is, some demerit], which precipitates (nirvartaJca) l the birth [of an individual] 
as a young elephant, makes manifest an impression (bhavana) [latent in his 
mind-stuff] which is characterized by a previously (prag) [existing] and potential 
kind of experience [proper to] a young elephant, for so long [that karma] is not 
capable of [producing] the experience proper to a young elephant. Therefore it 
proves to be true that the impression which produces the experience (anubhava) 
of being born as a young elephant corresponds to the fruition as a young elephant. 
It might be said : ' Such things as hindrances, inasmuch as they are properties 
of the thinking-substance, can by no means whatsoever touch the Self. Accord- 
ingly merely by mentioning the word <Self> the absence of any trace of these 
[hindrances] is established. Consequently what need is there of the words 
hindrances or karmas> and the rest?' In reply to this he says These. 
These [hindrances and karmas and fruitions and latent-impressions] although 
they reside in the central-organ (manas) are attributed to the Self who is in the 
round-of-rebirths. Why ? <KFor it is he that is said to be the experiencer of 
the results of these [in the central-organ]. That is to say, he is the thinker 
(cetayitr). Consequently the Icvara, because he is a Self, comes into relation 
with these. For this reason, [because these are only attributed to the Self], it is 
consistent to make a denial of this [relation]. This he does in the word <who.) 
For the Icvara is a special kind of Self who is untouched by this [kind] of 
experience, namely, that also found in the thinking-substance and common to 
the Selves in general. It is <a special kind> in that it is specialized [and] 
discriminated from [all] other Selves. Desirous of pointing out what is not 
to be included in the words <a special kind> he first raises a counter-objection 
(paricodana) and then rebuts it in the words CNow these . . . have obtained 
Isolation.^ 1. There is the bondage to primary-matter in the case of those 
[whose bodies] are resolved into primary-matter. 2. There is [the bondage] 
to evolved-matter in the case of the discarnate. 3. There is the bondage to 

1 This word is glossed in the Rahasyam mean an elephant which eats grass and 

by the word janaka. And the word twigs (katakasthap hastiti). 

'young elephant' karabha is said to 



i. 24 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [52 

sacrificial gifts in the case of those who partake in the experience of objects 
supernal or not supernal. These are those three well-known ^instruments of 
bondage. For, those whose central-organs are [subliminally] refined {samskrta) 
by impressions from primary-matter, attain to resolution into primary-matter 
only after the body has broken up. For the others [the liberated Selves] the 
terminus a quo is expressly made known ; accordingly the terminus ad quern 
alone is mentioned [as applying to those whose bodies are resolved into primary- 
matter, although the terminus a quo also applies to them]. But in this case 
[of the Icvara] both the terminus a quo and the later terminus are denied. 
Having stated the case in brief he now gives the details in the words <KBut He 
is at all times whatsoever liberated and He is at all times whatsoever the 
Icvara.^ He possesses pre-eminence in richness of knowledge and of action 
and of power. With reference to this he asks <That universally admitted . . . 
which.^ Perception and action are impossible in the case of the Energy of 
Intellect which does not enter into mutations. In case this be admitted and 
if it be said that therefore a substrate must be supposed to be made up of pure 
sattva without rajas and tamas, then the Icvara who is at all times whatsoever 
liberated cannot be in the relation of proprietor to his property towards an 
effulgence (utkarsa) of the sattva in a mind-stuff which depends upon undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness. In reply to this he says from his assuming a sattva 
of perfect (prakrsta) quality.2> In the case of the Icvara there does not exist 
as in the case of the ordinary man a relation, caused by undifferentiated-conscious- 
ness, of proprietor to his property, with the sattva of the mind-stuff. But [the 
relation is that] expressed by the resolve, ' By the teaching of knowledge and 
right-living (dharma) I will lift up beings, encompassed by the three anguishes, 
from the great sea of the state after death (pretya).' And this [knowledge and 
right-living] cannot be taught unless there be an abundance of excellence in the 
adequacy of [His] knowledge l and of [His] activity. And there cannot be this 
[abundance of excellence] unless a sattva be assumed which has been purified 
from stains by the removal of rajas and tamas. With this resolve the Exalted 
One reflects, and assumes a sattva of perfect quality. Although He is untouched 
by undifferentiated-consciousness, it appears as if He were under the illusion of 
identifying Himself with undifferentiated-consciousness and as if He were ignorant 
of the real nature of undifferentiated-consciousness. But He does not deal with 
undifferentiated-consciousness as if it were undifferentiated-consciousness as such. 
The actor who takes the role of Kama and represents the different kinds of 
behaviour [belonging to the character] is not of course confused [as to his real 
personal identity]. For he knows that this [role] is only a deliberately assumed 
form and not his [form] in reality. An objector might say, ' This may be so. 
It may be true that the Exalted One must assume sattva in order to uplift [the 
world]. On the other hand His desire to lift it up is based on His assumption of 

1 Compare Cvetacvat. Up. vi. 8. 



53] The Igvara and the worlds [ i. 24 

this [sattva] ; and inasmuch as this [desire] is also derived from primary-matter 
[the fallacy of] mutual interdependence results.' In reply to this he says 
^Eternal. This [objection] might be true, if this were the very first creation. 
But the succession of creations and contractions [of worlds] is from time-without- 
beginning. And when the period of the desire for contraction has come to a full 
end, then the Exalted One, while in the act of contemplating within Himself, 
' I must assume a sattva of perfect quality,' contracts the world. At that time 
the sattva of the Icvara's mind-stuff becomes subconsciously-impressed by the 
contemplation. And although the Icvara's mind-stuff be tending towards a 
homogeneity with primary-matter, still, when the period of the great mundane- 
dissolution has come to a full end, under the pressure of the subconscious- 
impression of the contemplation, it enters into a mutation of precisely the 
same kind as a state of sattva. In precisely the same way Chaitra contemplates 
' To-morrow I must get up just at day -break ' ; and then after having slept gets up 
at that very time because of the subliminal-impression resulting from his con- 
templation. Consequently since [the worlds] are from time-without-beginning, 
and in so far as the Icvara's contemplation and His assumption of the sattva are 
eternal, there is no [logical fallacy] of interdependence. Nor can it be urged l 
that the sattva of the Icvara's mind-stuff does not pass out [of the phenomenal 
state] into homogeneity with primary-matter. For that which [by reason of its 
subconscious-impression] never becomes homogeneous with primary-matter is not 
secondary-matter (pradhanika). And again it is not the Energy of Intellect, 
because it is non-perceptive (ajna). This being the meaning, one might assume 
another [kind of] thing which could not be proven by any source-of-valid-ideas. 
This too would be a quite groundless [assumption]. Because there is no other 
[kind of] thing distinct from primary -matter and the Self, has this kind of 
universally admitted and eternal superiority of the Icvara any proof [to authorize 
it, and] is it based on any source-of-valid-ideas, or is it without proof [and] not 
based on any source-of-valid-ideas ? The answer is in the phrase <JCsacred-books 
(rastra) are its proofs The sacred books are the Bevealed-Word (qruti) and the 
Tradition (smrti) and the Epics and Puranas. He brings forward an objection 
in the words <Kwhat proof have the sacred-books?^ For sacred books pre- 
suppose that there is inference and perception. And no one can perceive or 
infer the perfection of the l9vara's sattva. Again, there is no ground for saying 
that the sacred books have their source in a perception by the Icvara. For even 
if we imagine [Him saying that he perceives the sacred books], He would then 
be speaking to publish abroad His own pre-eminence. [This is inconceivable 
since no one could imagine that the Icvara would boast.] Such is the [objector's] 
meaning. In rebuttal he says <Kthey have their proof in the perfect quality of 
His sattva.J> This is what he intends [to say]. Incantations {mantra) and the 
Medical Vedas are composed by the Icvara. In these [two] cases their authori- 

1 Cp. Comment iii. 13. 



i. 24 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [54 

tativeness is granted by reason of their adequacy in action. [This adequacy] is 
undoubted because there is no failure to effect purposes. [The authoritativeness 
is granted. He shows that it is not based upon experimental evidence.] And 
in the case of the different herbs and of the particular combinations of one [herb] 
with another, and in the case of the incantations in so far as single syllables are 
connected or excluded, no one who uses only profane methods of proof, could, 
even in a thousand lives, make the connexions and exclusions. Furthermore 
there is no ground for asserting that connexions and exclusions [of the proper 
herbs or syllables] are a result of verbal-communication (dgama) and that verbal- 
communication is a result of these [connexions and exclusions] on the ground 
that the succession of these two [1. verbal-communication, 2. connexions and 
exclusions] forms a series from time- without-beginning. The reason for this is 
that the succession of these two is severed at the time of a great mundane 
dissolution. Neither [is there ground for saying that] there is no method of 
proving that there is this [great mundane dissolution]. For he will set forth in 
detail [iii. 13] that the world is an evolved-form of primary-substance and is 
identical [with it in substance]. There is evidently a heterogeneous mutation 
[e.g. curds] of the [original] homogeneous mutation [e.g. milk]. Analogously, 
milk or sugar-juice or similar substances assume various forms such as curds 
or treacle [and so forth]. And it is evident that the heterogeneous mutation 
presupposes the homogeneous mutation. So in the point at issue, the primary- 
substance can also have heterogeneous mutations by assuming such forms as the 
Great [thinking-substance] and the personality -substance ; occasionally also it can 
have a homogeneous mutation. And its homogeneous mutation is the state of 
equipoise [of the primary-substance]. This, moreover, is the great mundane 
dissolution. [There is therefore a great mundane dissolution.] [To revert to the 
argument that the authoritativeness of the sacred books is not experimentally 
to be found.] Accordingly, the Exalted One is first of all the composer of the 
Incantations and of the Medical Vedas. Hence it must be acknowledged that, in 
so far as the obscuration due to the stains of rajas and of tamos has been removed , 
the substance of [His] thinking-substance illumines everywhere. 
To resume the argument (tatha ca). Because He was aiming to give instruction 
in [worldly] happiness and in [eternal] bliss [incapable of test by experience here], 
the Vedas as a whole were composed by the Icvara and must also be supposed 
to have their source only in the perfect quality of His thinking-substance. And 
in the superiority of the substance (sattva) there is no possibility of error or deceit, 
which have their origin in rajas and tamas. This [then] is established that 
sacred books have their proof in the perfect quality of His sattva. [A further 
objection.] 4 This may be so. But then if the sacred books make known the 
perfection in so far as they are the effect of the perfection, there would be an 
inference from effect to cause 1 (^esavat). But that would not give us a verbal 

1 See Nyaya Bhasya xviii. 4. 



55] The Icvara and the Sacred Word [ i. 25 

communication (agama).' Eeplying to this he says ^Inasmuch as both. The 
sacred books do not make known a relation of cause and effect, but do make 
known the correspondence 1 from time without beginning between the word- 
expressing-a-meaning (vdcdka) and the thing-expressed (vacya). For the perfection 
has its existence in the substance of the Icvara's thinking-substance ; and the 
sacred books, in that they give expression to this [thinking-substance], also have 
their existence in it. In summing up he says CFrom these. From these 
sacred books, which give expression to the perfection of the substance of the 
Icvara's thinking-substance, this proves to be toue, [that is] is known, since the 
object (visaya) [the sacred books] is the distinguishing-characteristic of that-to- 
which-the-object-refers (visayin) [the Icvara], that He is at all times what- 
soever liberated and at all times whatsoever the Icvara. : Having thus dis- 
tinguished [Him] from any other Self, he distinguishes [Him] from any other 
Icvara also by saying Now this His.)S> He describes its being altogether without 
anything excelling it, in the words ^CFor to begin with. Why is this ? The 
reply is ^whatever . . . very. For what reason is this pre-eminence altogether 
free from everything that might excel it? He replies <KTherefore . . . that 
wherein.^ In other words, as applied to those who have not reached the 
uttermost limit, the term pre-eminence is [only] a figurative expression. He 
describes the state of freedom from anything equal to it by saying <Nor again 
. . . equal to His. Wish is unhindered volition ; by failure in this a man 
becomes inferior. Or if there be no inferiority, then it would be that both fail 
in their wishes. For no effect would occur, or if it did occur, the effect [of the 
two wishes] simultaneously would be perceived to have the logical mark 
(samalingita) of two contradictory qualities. Alluding to this he says And two. 
If however the intentions [of the two] are not contradictory and if the pre-eminent 
quality (tgvaratva) is attached to each, then what need of any others ? Because 
then [the intention] could be accomplished by a single pre-eminent (igand) alone. 
On the other hand, if [all] work together, no one would be the Icvara ; but there 
would be a parliament. Furthermore it is not fitting that those who are fit for 
uninterrupted pre-eminence [should rule] by turns. And besides this would be 
a more difficult supposition. Since this is evident, all is cleared up. 



Furthermore, 

25. In this [Icvara] the germ of the omniscient is at its 

utmost excellence. 

This our process-of-knowing (grahana) the supersensuous, whether 
in the past or future or present, whether separately or collec- 
tively, [this process,] whether it be small or great, is the germ 

1 This would constitute an agama. 



i. 25 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [56 

of the omniscient. He, verily, in whom this germ as it increases 
progressively reaches its utmost excellence is the omniscient. 
It is possible for the germ of the omniscient to reach this 
[uttermost] limit, for it admits of degrees of excellence, as in the 
case of any ascending scale. He in whom the limit of thinking 
is reached is the omniscient and He is a special kind of Self. 
[If you object that this argument would prove the omniscience of 
Buddha or of Jina, there would be this reply.] An inference ex- 
hausts (upahsaya) its force in bringing a general proposition to a 
conclusion, 1 but is powerless to prove a particular instance. There- 
fore the ascertainment of the [Omniscient] one's special name is 
[not a matter of inference, but is rather] to be sought out in the 
verbal-communication, [which excludes the supposed cases, since 
their tradition is false]. Although He is above all feelings of self- 
gratification, yet [to this Icvara] the gratification of living beings 
is a sufficient motive. He may be conceived as resolving, 'By 
instruction in knowledge and in right-living, at the dissolution 
of the mundane period and at the great dissolution, I will lift up 
human beings, who are whirled in the vortex of existence.' And 
likewise it hath been said, 2 " The First Knower, assuming a 
created mind-stuff through compassion, the Exalted, the Supreme 
Sage, unto Asuri who desired to know, declared this doctrine." 

After having mentioned the sacred books as a means of proving [His] power of 
action and of knowledge, he shows that inference is a means of proving [His] 
power of knowledge. This is stated in the words Furthermore.2> 25. In 
this [Icvara] the germ of the omniscient is at its utmost excellence. He 
discusses [the sutra] in the words <KThis our.^ In proportion to the degree to 
which the tamas which covers the sattva of the thinking-substance has been re- 
moved, this our process-of-knowing supersensuous things, past and future and 
present, which occur separately as well as collectively, [this] process may be 
qualified as being either small or great. This is the germ [or] cause of the omni- 
scient. Some one knows a very little of the past or of the other times, another 

1 Compare samanyenopasamharah, p. 100, p. 77. This fragment is also discussed 

line 4, Calcutta ed. of this work. by Fitz Edward Hall in his edition 

2 By Pahcacikha in the first fragment as of the Samkhya-Pravachana-Bhashya, 

collected by Garbe in his article on 1856, Preface pp. 10 and 17. See also 

Pahcacikha und seine Fragmente (in Garuda Purana i. 18. 

Festgruss an Roth, Stuttgart, 1893), 



57] The If vara as the limit of thinking [ i. 25 

much, another still more. Thus with regard to objects to be known there is a 
[relative] smallness or greatness of the knowing-process. He, verily, in whom 
this [germ] as it increases progressively has come to a stop because of its excel- 
lence, he is said to be the omniscient. In this wise only the object of proof is 
described ; now he gives the means of proof in the words <Slt is possible. In 
the words It is possible for the germ of the omniscient to reach this [utter- 
most] limits there is a statement of the major term. The limit is the reaching 
of the utmost excellence ; it is that state higher than which there is no excellence. 
Accordingly it should not be urged that this is establishing what is already 
established. For [this higher than which there is no excellence, is established] 
only so far as it is a terminal-point. [For,] the middle term (hetu), as he gives it, 
is <Kfor it admits of degrees of excellence. Whatever admits of degrees of excel- 
lence, all that is [capable of reaching] the utmost excellence. Similarly in the 
case of the kuvalaya berry and the amalaka fruit and the bilva fruit there is a size 
that admits of degrees. And in the soul (atman) [there is a magnitude which has 
reached its] utmost excellence. Thus he shows that there is a concomitance [of 
terms]. And when he says <Kas in the case of any ascending scale, 2> it is not 
relevant to object that there is a discrepancy in so far as the properties [of a 
substance], such as its magnitude, [form an ascending scale but do not reach 
utmost excellence]. For in the case of the whole, its magnitude does of course 
not excel the magnitude of the parts. But whatever magnitudes there are, each 
functioning by itself, from the smallest atom up to the final whole, may be so 
arranged that one may assert a progressive increase of magnitudes. But, because 
it is not finished as contrasted with the object to be thought, in so far as it 
has [successively] one or two or a multitude of objects, thinking may with reason 
be said to admit of degrees of excellence. Thus there is no discrepancy. He 
brings the discussion to a close in the words <SHe in whom the limits It 
might be objected that there are many authors of sacred books [tirthakara), 
Buddha and Arhata and Kapila the Sage and many others. Why, by this line 
of inference, may they not be counted as omniscient? In reply he says ^a 
general proposition.^ Whence then can we be informed of his particular 
qualities ? The reply is the [Omniscient] one's. The point is that the pseudo- 
sacred-words composed by Buddha or by the others are not a Sacred Word 
(agama). For they give instruction in the way of soullessness and of momentari- 
ness, both of which are contradicted by all sources-of-valid-ideas. The reason for 
this is that they are deceitful. A Sacred Word has as its distinguishing-charao- 
teristic the Kevealed-Word (gruti) and the Tradition (smrti) and the Epics and 
Puranas. The Sacred Word (a-gama) is that from which the [spiritual] means 
for [worldly] happiness and [final] bliss come to (d-gam) or strike upon the 
thinking-substance. From this [Sacred Word] comes information as to [the 
Icvara's] particular qualities, such as His name any particular name, for example 
Civa or the Icvara which are firmly established in the Eevealed Word and in 
the other books. Under the word ' such as ' (adi) are included the sexpartite 
8 [h.o.s. it] 



i. 25 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [58 

nature and the ten eternal principles, as described in the Vayu Purana [xii. 32], 1 
" Omniscience and Contentment and Limitless Knowledge and Freedom and 
Ever-unthwarted Energy and Infinite Energy these, the experts in the sacred 
ordinances tell us, are the six parts of the all-pervasive Mahecvara." Likewise 
M Knowledge and Passionlessness and Pre-eminence and Self-control and Truth 
and Patience and Perseverance and Creative Energy and Eight Knowledge of 
Self and Competency to Kule [the Universe] these ten eternal principles abide 
eternally in Carhkara." It is objected, ' This may be so. But inasmuch as the 
Exalted One, who is eternally free and who has attained to the utmost excellence 
of passionlessness, cannot cherish craving merely for his own self ; and inas- 
much as, if he be compassionate, he should create, to the end that every one 
should be intent upon happiness, for the reason that we cannot explain the pro- 
duction of a world of living beings in which pain predominates ; and inasmuch 
as, if he have no motive, we cannot explain his act [of creation] as being that of 
a being of understanding, therefore, even if he be endowed with the power of 
action, the world cannot be the result of his action.' In reply to this he Says 
Although He is above all feelings of self -gratification. The gratification of 
beings in whom is the breath of life is [for Him a sufficient] motive. Now it is 
clear that the mind-stuff ceases from the production of its [two kinds of] effects : 
the outer experience of the various kinds of things and [secondly] the discrimi- 
native discernment. Then it is that the Self enters into its Isolation. Accord- 
ingly as a means to motivate this [Isolation] the compassionate [Icvara] 
describes the discriminative discernment. Accordingly, although the Icvara 
with the help of merit and demerit makes living creatures feel pleasure and pain, 
for the reason that the mind- stuff has its task yet to fulfil, still he is not incom- 
passionate. He tells of the way by which he makes known the discriminative 
discernment as a [spiritual] means in the words By instruction in knowledge 
and in right-living. Both in knowledge and in right-living ; by instruction in 
both of these. By the combination of knowledge and of right-living as a result of 
reaching full maturity of discriminative discernment. <KAt the dissolution of the 
mundane period, that is, at the end of a Day of Brahma 2 , at which time the world 
with the exception of the Heaven of Truth (satya-ldka), vanishes. At the great 
dissolution, at which time there is the destruction of Brahma together with the 
Heaven of Truth. Whirled in the vortex of existence that is, 8 those merged 
in the [primary] cause ; and therefore partaking of the pain of that [cause] up to 
the time of death. The words ^dissolution of the mundane periods is an ex- 
pression of a part for the whole ; for at other times also [the Icvara may be con- 
ceived as] resolving I will lift up human beings. In other words human 
beings by attaining to Isolation are lifted up. It might be objected that this 

1 Anandacrama ed., p. 43 1_2 . not in the Bikaner MS. and may be 

2 See Visnu Purana vi. 3. a gloss. 
8 The words " that is . . . resolving " are 



59] The Ipvara unlimited by time [ i. 26 

instruction in knowledge and right-living by one whose motive is compassion is 
also well known to the followers of Kapila. In reply to this he says <KAnd likewise 
it hath been said. In this sense it hath been said by Pahca?ikha the Master 
(acarya). The First Knower is Kapila. The statement of Panca^kha the 
Master with regard to the First Knower applies to the First Teacher in the succes- 
sion [of teacher and disciple] to which he belonged ; and [this First Teacher] was 
the First Liberated. But it does not apply to the Supreme Teacher who is free 
from time-without-beginning. Of those who were the First Liberated and of those 
[other] knowers who were at other times liberated, Kapila is for us the First 
Knower [and the First] Liberated. And it is he that is the teacher, [but not from 
time without beginning]. For it is revealed that even Kapila attained to know- 
ledge, by the favour of Mahe9vara only, just as soon as he was born. He whom 
we call Kapila is accepted as being the [fifth] incarnation of Vishnu. [It might be 
objected that] Hiranyagarbha is the Self-existent [and thus he would be the First 
Knower]. [For] it is revealed in the Veda 1 [that he was the First-born and] that he 
also acquired Samkhya and Yoga. [The reply would be that] this same Icvara, 
the First Knower, the Self -existent 2 Vishnu [is] Kapila. " But [He is] the 
Ipvara of those descended from the Self-existent." This is the point. 



This same [^vara is] 

26. Teacher of the Primal [Sages] also, forasmuch as [with 

Him] there is no limitation by time. 

No-one-doubts-that the Primal Sages are limited by time ; [but] 
He to whom time does not apply, in so far as it might be a limiting 
object, is the Teacher even of the Primal Sages. As He is perfected 
(siddha) in that mode-of-existence (gati) which is perfection at the 
commencement of the present creation, so He is to be recognized 
[as being in this mode of perfection] at the beginning of past crea- 
tions also. 

He now states the distinction between the Icvara and such beings as Brahma by 
saying <SThis same [Icvara]. !2> These words This same [l9vara] form the 
transition to the sutra. 26. Teacher of the Primal [Sages] also, forasmuch 
as [with Him] there is no limitation by time. He explains the sutra in the 
words <SNo-one-doubts-that the Primal.^ Time, however, a period of a hundred 
years or some other period, does not apply, [that is] has no reference [to Him] in 

1 Qvet. Up. iii. 4, iv. 12, vi. 18. this passage the term ' First Knower' 
* If the reading be na sva, the meaning applies to Kapila and not to the Self- 
would be that although the Self- existent, 
existent is the First Knower, still in 



i. 26 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [60 

so far as it might be a limiting object, [that is] limiting motive. The mode-of- 
existence of perfection is the attainment of perfection. This is to be recognized 
as coming from the Sacred-Word. Such is the inner meaning. 



27. The word -expressing Him is the Mystic - syllable 

(pranava). 

The Icvara is the object-expressed by the mystic syllable. Is the 
expressiveness of this [Syllable] the work of [ordinary] usage (sarh- 
heta), or is it permanent [and self-manifesting] like [the relation of] 
the light to the lamp ? The relation of this thing-to-be-expressed 
to the expressive-word is fixed. But the usage [as determined] by 
the Icvara declares this its fixed meaning. Thus the [actual] rela- 
tion of father and son is permanent, but the verbal statement that 
that man is this man's father is suggested [to the mind] by usage. 
And the usage with regard to the relation between expressive-words 
and things-expressed is made by [the Icvara] to serve with a dis- 
tinct reference to the power of expression which they had in former 
creations also. The authoritative sages maintain that the relation 
between a word and an intended- object is eternal is so far as the 
consensus (sampratipatti) [of successive generations of speakers] 
is eternal. 

In this same series [of sutras] the Exalted Icvara has been made known. Now 
in order to make known the devotion [paid] to Him he tells of the word- 
expressive of Him. 27. The word-expressing Him is the Mystic -syllable 
(pranava). He begins the explanation with the words <. . . . the object-expressed. y> 
On this point he clears up [the topic] by setting forth for consideration the 
opinion of others. [This he begins] by asking Is the expressiveness.^ 
^Expressiveness^ is ability to give information. For to others J it seems as if 
the relation between word and intended-meaning is natural. [And] if this 
object-intended is to be recognized as having an essence of such a kind when 
it comes by usage from this word, then, whenever that [natural] relation does 
not exist, that [object-intended] will not be manifested even by hundreds of 
usages. For when a water-jar, which is capable of being made manifest by 
a lamp, is not [there], then even with thousands of lamps it cannot be made 
manifest. On the other hand, the word young-elephant (karabha), made by 

1 He refers to the Vaiyakaranas, such as, (Kielhorn's edition), vol. i, p. 6* f . 

for example, Patafijali in Mahabhasya 



61] Symbol of the Ipvara [ i. 28 

usage to denote an elephant (varana) evidently gives information with regard to 
an elephant. As a result of this, one might say that expressiveness is made by 
usage only. After reflection [as to whether the relation is accidental or eternal] 
he determines what the author's opinion is by saying is fixed. The import 
would be this. All words are capable of naming intended-objects of all kinds of 
forms. Thus the natural relation of them [i. e. of words] to intended-objects of all 
kinds of forms is most surely fixed. The usage, however, [as determined] by 
the Icvara is both a manifester [of this natural relation] and a limitation. And 
this [relation] has a word expressing it when the usage [as determined] by the 
Icvara [is followed] ; [but the relation suffers] corruption when the usage [as 
determined] by the Icvara is not [followed]. This is the distinction. It is this 
that he states in the phrase ^CBut the usage [as determined] by the Icvara.) He 
gives an example when he says <SThus.^ It is objected, ' A word is a product 
of the primary-cause ; at the time of the great dissolution it tends towards the 
primary causal state ; and its [expressive] power would also be resolved [into 
primary matter]. Then it would not be possible that the usage [as determined] 
by the Great Icvara (mahegvara) should revive the expressive power [of such 
a word] only as had been deprived of its expressive [power] after having been 
changed successively into [the different evolved forms of primary matter] begin- 
ning with the Great [thinking-substance]/ In reply to this he says Cin former 
creations.2> Although the word together with its expressive power passes into 
the primary causal state of equipoise, when it appears again it does appear 
endowed with the [expressive] power of that [word]. Similarly a plant [udbhijja], 
utterly reduced to an earthly condition after the rains have [ceased] to fall, 
[becomes as it was before] when sprinkled vigorously with the stream of water 
let fall from the clouds. Therefore the Exalted One makes the usage conform to 
the previous relation [of the word to the intended object]. Accordingly, in so 
far as the consensus [of previous creations, which is the same as] the series 
of similar modes-of-expression {vyavahara), is eternal, the authoritative sages 
(agamika) maintain * that this relation is not absolutely eternal. But their point 
is that it is impossible without the help of the Sacred Word to assert that the 
usage was exactly of the same kind in other creations also. 



Now, by the yogin who has recognized the power of the word to 
express the thing, 

28. Repetition of it and reflection upon its meaning [should 
be made]. 

The repetition of the Mystic Syllable, and reflection upon the 
Icvara who is signified by the Mystic Syllable. Then in the case 

1 See Patanjali, Mahabkasya (Kielhorn), vol. i, p. 6" and V 1 . 



i. 28 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [62 

of this yogin who thus repeats the Mystic Syllable and reflects 
upon its meaning, mind-stuff attains to singleness-of-intent. And 
so it hath been said, 1 

" Through study let him practise yoga ; 

Through yoga let him meditate on study. 
By perfectness in study and in yoga 
Supreme Soul shines forth clearly." 

Having designated the Mystic Syllable he tells of the contemplation. 28. Repe- 
tition of it and reflection upon its meaning [should be made]. He explains 
[the sutra] by saying Of the Mystic Syllable. Eeflection is an absorption in 
the mind again and again. What follows from this ? He replies by saying 
Cthe Mystic Syllable.^ He attains to singleness-of-intent [and his] mind-stuff 
comes to rest in the One Exalted. In illustration of this he introduces a stanza 
from Vyasa (vdiydsikl gatha) by saying And so.2> The Icvara then gratifies him 
by conferring upon him concentration and the fruit of concentration. 



What else comes to him ? 

29. Thereafter comes the right-knowledge of him who thinks 
in an inverse way, and the removal of obstacles. Whatever 
obstacles there be, disease and the rest, all these are removed by 
devotion to the Icvara, and [the yogin] comes to a sight of his own 
real self. He has the right knowledge which sees that as the 
Icvara is a Self and is undenled and undisturbed [by hindrances] 
and isolated and exempt from accidents, so he also is a Self 
conscious [by reflection] of its thinking-substance. 

What in addition comes to him? 29. Thereafter comes the right-knowledge 
of him who thinks in an inverse way, and the removal of obstacles. One 
is inverted who knows in an opposite way [to the ordinary person whose mind- 
stuff flows out and becomes modified by objects]. One who thinks in that way 
thinks inversely ; [in other words] the [ordinary] man [still] under the condi- 
tions of undifferentiated-consciousness (avidydvant). In such wise [the author] 
demarks [such a one] from the Icvara who is free from undifferentiated-con- 
sciousness (vidydvant), and who is endowed with eternal superiority of the sattva. 
Eight- knowledge comes to the kind of thinking which is under the conditions 
of undifferentiated-consciousness and which is inverted. A perception of himself 
as he is in his own self comes to him. <Obstacles> and <the removal) of them are 

1 Compare Visn. Pur. vi. 7. 33 f. ; Naradiya Pur. xlvii. 12-14. 



63] Results of meditation upon the Icvara [ i. 30 

to be described [ii. 32]. The words ^Whatever . . ,5> give the exposition of these 
[latter words]. The word <own [refers to hisj soul (atman), that is, his self. 
The word self (rupa) excludes all qualities attributed [to him] by undifferen- 
tiated -consciousness. One might well say that devotion to the Icvara has the 
Icvara as its object ; how then can it apparently give a direct perception, 
a thinking in the inverse way [upon one's own real self] ? For this would 
prove too much. In reply to this he says <Kas the Icvara. <KUndefiled :?> 
not subject to origination or dissolution in so far as He is absolutely unchanged. 
Undisturbed means free from hindrances. <Klsolated means beyond the 
scope of merit and demerit [and] consequently <Sexempt from accidents.^ <KAcci- 
dents are birth and length of life and kind of experience [ii. 13]. Since a 
homogeneity implies a certain degree of difference, he shows the difference 
between [Selves in general] and the Icvara by saying ^conscious [by reflec- 
tion] of its thinking-substance.^ In such wise the word <inverse> has been 
described. In the case of two objects which are totally irrelevant to each 
other, prolonged meditation on either one unfits one for a direct perception of 
the other. Whereas prolonged meditation upon one object proves to be of 
service for the direct perception of another similar to it. Similarly the 
study of one book proves to be of service for the acquisition of knowledge of 
another book similar to it. As for (tu) immediate-perception (pratyasatti), it is 
the cause of direct perception with regard to one's own self, but not with regard 
to another self. [Thus by meditating upon the Icvara, we learn about our own 
selves.] Thus the argument is cleared up. 



But what are these obstacles? Those which distract the mind- 
stuff. But what are these [that are distractive] and (vd) how many 
are they ? [He replies.] 

30. Sickness and languor and doubt and heedlessness and 
listlessness and worldliness (avirati) and erroneous perception 
and failure to attain any stage [of concentration] and insta- 
bility in the state [when attained] these distractions of the 
mind-stuff are the obstacles. 

There are nine obstacles, the distractions of the mind-stuff. These 
appear together with the fluctuations of the mind-stuff. And they 
are not found where the aforesaid fluctuations of mind-stuff are 
not. Sickness is a disorder in the humours [of the body] or in the 
secretions or in the organs. Languor is a lack of activity in the 
mind-stuff. Doubt is a kind of thinking which touches both alter- 
natives [of a dilemma], so that one thinks ' This might be so ; 
might not be so.' Heedlessness is a lack of reflection upon the 



i. 30 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [64 

means of attaining concentration. Listlessness is a lack of effort 
due to heaviness of body or of mind-stuff. Worldliness is greed of 
the mind-stuff; and its essence lies in addiction to objects of sense. 
Erroneous perception is the thinking of misconceptions. Failure 
to attain any stage is not attaining any stage of concentration. 
Instability in the state [when attained] is the failure of the mind- 
stuff to remain in the stage attained. If the concentrated stage 
of development had been reached, [the mind-stuff] would, of course, 
have remained in it. Thus it is that these distractions are called 
the nine blemishes of yoga [and] the nine foes of yoga [and] the 
obstacles of yoga. 

He asks a question by saying ^Cwhat.^ He gives the answer in general in 
the words ^Those which. With regard to their kinds and their number he 
asks <XBut what.) He gives the answer by the sutra beginning with the word 
30. Sickness. Obstacles are nine. These are fluctuations of mind-stuff and 
obstructive to yoga and opposed to yoga. Distractions of the mind-stuff are, of 
course, so-called because sickness and the other [obstacles] distract [or] divert 
the mind-stuff from yoga. He gives the reason for their being foes to yoga by 
saying <KThese . . . together with. First, in the case of doubt and of erroneous 
perception, they are foes to the restriction of fluctuations from the mere fact that 
they are fluctuations. And of those that are not fluctuations, such as sickness 
and the rest, these too are foes to it because they associate with fluctuations. 
He explains the things intended, by the words beginning with <KSickness.^ 
The humours (dhatu), wind and bile and phlegm, are so-called because they 
sustain (dharana) the body. A secretion is a special kind of mutation of nourish- 
ment eaten or drunk. The organs are the senses (indriya). A disorder in them 
is a state of defect or excess. A lack of activity is an incapacity for action. 
Doubt is a kind of thinking which touches both * alternatives [of a dilemma]. 
Although there is no difference between doubt and error (viparyasa) in so far as 
both do not remain in the proper form of that [in respect to which they are 
entertained], still, by emphasizing the subsidiary difference, that is, the touch- 
ing or not touching of the two alternatives [of the dilemma], the distinction in 
this case [of doubt] is made clear. A lack of reflection is a lack of action. This 
is about the same as saying that it is a lack of effort with regard to this thing. 
Heaviness of the body is the result of phlegm ; heaviness of the mind-stuff is the 
result of tamas. Greed is thirst. The stages of concentration are the Madhu- 
matl and the other [three]. If after reaching a given stage [the yogin] should 
deem himself sufficiently well off with only so much [progress], there would be 
a breach in the concentration ; and as a result of this there would be a retro- 

1 Compare Nyaya-sutra i. 1. 23. 



65] Varieties of distractions [ i. 32 

gression even from that stage. An effort should therefore be made in such 
a way that when [the yoginj has reached concentration, [the mind-stuff] should 
be stable there. 



31. Pain and despondency and unsteadiness of the body 
and inspiration and expiration are the accompaniments of 
the distractions. 

Pain proceeding from self [and] pain proceeding from living crea- 
tures and pain proceeding from the gods. Pain is that by which 
living beings are stricken down and for the destruction of which 
they struggle. Despondency is agitation of mind due to an 
impediment [to the fulfilment] of a desire. Unsteadiness of the body 
is that which makes it unsteady [and] makes it tremble. Inspira- 
tion is breathing which sips in the air which is outside. Expiration 
is that which makes abdominal x air flow outwards. These are the 
accompaniments of the distractions. These occur in one whose 
mind-stuff is distracted. These do not occur in one whose mind- 
stuff is concentrated. 

Not only the nine obstacles but also pain and the other accompaniments of these 
[obstacles] occur to this [yogin]. So [Vyasa] recites the sutra beginning with the 
word 31. Pain. Pain is that which is to be felt as unpleasant. [Pain] pro- 
ceeding from self is bodily by virtue of sickness, or mental by virtue of such 
things as passion. [Pain] proceeding from living creatures is such as is 
generated by tigers. [Pain] proceeding from the gods is such as is generated 
by the baleful influence of planets. And this pain, inasmuch as living beings 
in general would feel 2 it to be unpleasant, is to be rejected. Accordingly he 
says by which . . . stricken down. The breathing which without volitional 
action sips in the air which is outside [and] drinks it [or] makes it enter, this 
inspiration is opposed to emission (recaka), which is accessory to concentration. 
The breathing also, which without volitional action makes abdominal air flow 
outwards [and] expels it, this expiration 3 is opposed to inhalation (puraJea), 
which is an accessory to concentration. 



Furthermore these distractions, the foes of concentration, are to 

1 Only one MS. has kosthyam. Yet as Bala- should not take place when the ter- 

rama points out, the rule as given in mination yat is affixed to a stem signi- 

Panini v. 1. 6 (see Siddhanta Kaumudi, fying a member of the body, 

third Nirnaya Sagara edition, 1904, 2 See Tarka-samgraha, 67. 

p. 265 s ) would require that the vrddhi 3 Recaka and puraka are volitional (ii. 51). 



i. 32 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [66 

be restricted by the same l practice and passionlessness. Of these 
[two], in summing up, he describes the object to which the practice 
[applies]. 

32. To check them [let there be] practice upon a single entity. 
To check them let [the yogin] practise his mind-stuff by making it 
rest upon a single entity. But one whose mind-stuff is nothing 
more than an idea limited to one object after another, and is 
momentary (ksanika), of this [Buddhist] the mind-stuff as a whole 
is surely not single-in-intent and it is surely not distracted. But 
if this [mind-stuff when single-in-intent] is withdrawn from all 
[objects] and concentrated upon one [entity], then it may be said 
to be single -in-intent [and] hence not limited to one object after 
another. If, on the other hand, [in the opinion] of him who main- 
tains that the mind-stuff becomes single-in-intent as a stream of 
similar ideas, singleness-in-intent be a property of the mind-stuff 
[conceived] as a stream, then the mind-stuff [conceived as] a stream 
could not be a single thing, because [as he insists] it changes from 
moment to moment. If however [it be maintained 2 that] single- 
ness-of-intent is a property of an idea only in so far as it forms a 
part of the stream, then whether it consist in a stream of similar 
ideas or in a stream of dissimilar ideas it is all of it in nowise 
other than single-in-intent, inasmuch as it is limited to one object 
after another, and the fact that mind-stuff is distracted is unex- 
plained. Therefore it may be said that mind-stuff is a single thing 
[and] has many intended objects [and] is stable. 

Furthermore if ideas accidentally related and different in nature 
were produced by a single mind-stuff, then what a situation ! One 
idea would be the remembrancer of a thing seen by another idea ; 
and one idea would be later the experiencer of the latent- 
impression of karma accumulated by another idea. Even if this 
could in some way be harmonized 3 (samddhiya), it would surpass 
[in falsity] the maxim of the Cowdung 4 as a milky preparation. 

1 See i. 12. * See Colonel Jacob's Handful of Popular 

a As, for example, by Dharmakirti. Maxims, Part 1, 2nd ed., p. 25. Com- 

8 This same word also has the meaning of pare Sarvadarcana-samgraha (Ananda- 

4 concentrated '. crama ed.), p. 15 1 . 



67] One common substrate of ideas [ i. 32 

Moreover if the mind-stuff is to be [one idea after] another, then 
[the Buddhist who holds this opinion] denies the experience of his 
own self. How does the idea ' I ' in such expressions as ' I am 
touching what I have seen ' and ' I am seeing what I have touched ' 
inhere in one common (abheda) substrate-of-ideas, if all the ideas 
have nothing in common ? How could the idea ' I am this un- 
divided self which has a single idea [' I '] as its object and which 
persists in absolutely different mind-stuffs become hypostasized 
(acrayet) in one generic substrate-of-ideas ? The idea ' I am this 
undivided self is knowable in one's own experience. Moreover 
the authority of a perception is not overthrown by [that of] any 
other source-of-valid-ideas. Whereas any other source-of-valid- 
ideas comes into use only by virtue of a perception. Consequently 
the mind-stuff is one [and] has many objects and is stable. 
He introduces a sutra which summarizes the meaning which he has been stating. 
This he does by saying ^Furthermore these.2> Furthermore [that is] after the 
meaning which he has been stating. The connexion [of the sentences] is that 
he sums up by reciting this sutra. The reason why [the distractions] must be 
restricted is told in the words the foes of concentration. Although the words 
beginning ' By devotion to the Icvara ' [i. 23] refer to practice only, still in this 
case passionlessness must be deemed to be a co-operator with this [practice]. 
Accordingly he says <hy the same two.3> By the same two already character- 
ized, by practice and by passionlessness, [distractions are] to be restricted. The 
words of these^ [mean] of these two, namely, practice and passionlessness ; 
the words <the practice, that which is to be described next. 32. To check 
them [let there be] practice upon a single entity. A single entity, that is, the 
Icvara. For [He] is the subject-matter [of the discussion]. According to the 
Destructionists the mind-stuff as a whole is single-in-intent, [that is] is not in any 
degree whatsoever distracted. Consequently their teachings and their actions 
subservient to their teachings are meaningless, as he says in the words But one 
whose.S> [He refers to one] in whose opinion [the mind-stuff] is directed to 
one object after another whether to one [at a time] or to more than one [at a 
time]. Limited [in time], that is, present (samutparma) only so long as the 
intended-object is vivid (abhasa), [and] ending just there [and] not going else- 
where. ' Why not first take the foremost intended-object and afterwards take the 
next object?' In reply he says <and is momentary. Inasmuch as a moment 
is indivisible, it cannot have [within itself] the relation of before and after. In 
our system, however, since mind-stuff is not momentary ; and since it can be 
stable with regard to its object, whether this be one or many ; and since at each 
moment, in so far as one object is taken and another left, [mind-stuff can be] 



i. 32 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [68 

distracted. Consequently, by removing the mutations of distraction, singleness- 
of-intent may be imposed [upon the mind-stuff J. That the teaching and the doing 
of this is not futile, is stated in the words <SBut if. He sums up by saying <Xhence 
not. He sets up for refutation a Destructionist (vdinagika) by the words on 
the other hand . . . who.^ The meaning is that there shall be no attempt to 
impose singleness-of-intent upon a mind-stuff that is single and momentary. But 
in the case of a mind-stuff in serial order that is from time without beginning and 
that is not momentary, distraction will be removed and singleness-in-intent will 
be imposed. He takes up these two alternatives and shows the faults [of the one] 
by saying <Kof him.^ In his system, if singleness-of-intent is to be the property of 
the mind-stuff conceived as a stream or of a serial-order of mind-stuff, then the 
stream of mind-stuff is not a unit and is not persistent in the presented-ideas as 
they successively arise. Why [is this so] ? Because in your system whatever is 
at all is all of it momentary, and there is nothing not momentary : this is the 
point. He takes up the other alternative in the words If however. ) A pre- 
sented-idea which is a portion of [this whole] subjective (samvrta) stream might 
be real. For this reason the singleness-of-intent with reference to this presented- 
idea would be a property [belonging to a portion of the stream] [and] to be 
obtained by an effort. He shows the fault [in this alternative] by saying <Kall of 
it.^ Accordingly in so far as it has the form of real being, it is since it 
[must] be limited to one object after another [and] because it therefore arises 
during the vividness (abhdsa) of the object-intended by this {yat) [presented-idea] 
and because it is finished during this [moment of vividness] single-in-intent only. 
And thus the fact that mind-stuff is distracted remains unexplained. While it 
is to remove this [distraction] that singleness-in-intent is imposed. He sums 
up by saying Therefore. Hence also mind-stuff is one and has many objects 
and is stable as he explains by saying Furthermore if. For just as Chaitra 
cannot be he who remembers the book read by Maitra and just as Chaitra cannot 
be the enjoyer of the fruit of the latent-impressions of karma, heaped up by Maitra, 
with which he has had no connexion, whether meritorious or bad, so likewise 
something seen by one presented-idea cannot be remembered by another presented- 
idea ; nor can the fruit of a latent-deposit of karma heaped up by one presented-idea 
be experienced by another idea. [The Destructionist might reply that his doctrine 
of momentariness] does not prove too much, provided we add the qualification 
1 if there be a relation of cause and effect '. For in such cases as the funeral- 
sacrifice (qrdddha) and the vaipvanari sacrifice (isti) [at the birth of a son] we find 
that the fruition [of the sacrifice] passes [in the one case] to the father and 
mother and [in the other case] to the son, whereas none [of the three] is the 
actual agent 1 [in the sacrifice]. Or [again] in such cases 2 as that of the [bitter] 

1 In the frdddha the Bon sacrifices for the of the two sacrifices is found in the 

benefit of the father ; in the vaigvanari, Bhasya on Jaimini-sutra iv. 3. 38. 

the father for the son. For the latter 2 This seems to refer to Rumania's refuta- 

see Taittiriya Ar. ii. 6. A discussion tion of the Buddhists in Qlokavarttika, 



69] Permanence of the ego [ i. 32 

mango-seeds that have been nourished with sweet juices [we see] that the fruition 
by an indirect process must become sweet. [Thus the effort of one momentary- 
idea could find its result in another idea single-in-intent and indirectly related to it 
through a serial-order.] In reply to this he says Even if this could in some way 
be harmonized.^ The connexion of thought is this. What shall we say is the 
difference between ideas resident in one serial-order and different * ideas resident in 
another serial-order, so that when [something] has been experienced or 2 when 
[some] latent-impression of karma has been heaped up by an idea resident in one 
serial-order [another] idea belonging to the same serial-order should be the one to 
remember or to enjoy it and not an idea belonging to a different serial-order? For 
this that we call a serial-order is not such a [materially] real thing that it could 
[as such] distinguish the unit-in-the-serial-order (santanin) from [ideas] resident in 
other serial-orders. Furthermore an imaginary distinction cannot consistently 
exert activity. Surely the Brahman-boy cannot cook with fire that he imagines to 
be present. Moreover the relation of cause and effect is also nothing that is 
[materially] real [in this case of the two ideas, one of which appears in a series 
after the other has disappeared]. Because it is impossible that there should be in 
the present time a substrate for two things which are not co-existent, just as 
there cannot be [a substrate] for two things [separate in space] like the left 
horn and the other horn which do however coexist [in time]. For the past and 
the future cannot function as the present by being-partially-in-relation-and- 
partially-out-of- relation 3 (vyasanj) [since momentariness is by hypothesis assumed]. 
Consequently ideas are not under the limiting-conditions either of a serial- 
order or of a causal relation which is a part of their being ; [and], because they 
are real, they cannot, in so far as there are no reciprocal contacts, be dis- 
tinguished from other ideas whether resident in the same serial-order or in other 
serial-orders. This same line-of-reasoning is continued by an allusion to the 
cow-dung and the milk ; cow-dung is milk, because it is a product of the cow, 
like milk, which both sides admit [to be a product of the cow]. [The Buddhist 
argument] <Ssurpasses3> this [in falsity] because it is superior [in falsity] even to 
this [line-of-reasoning] in so far as it has the false appearance of being a line-of- 
reasoning. And this [system of ours] cannot be charged [with the fault of] 
destroying 4 what has been accomplished and accepting what has not been 
accomplished. For [we hold that] it is mind-stuff that is the agent of actions ; 

pp. 262 and 267 (Chowkambha ed.). and is not completely in any one. See 

CompareDela ValleePoussin'sLeBoud- Nyayakoca s.v. vyasanga and contrast 

dhisme,1902,page63,notesl77andl78. it with its opposite ekaparyaptatva. 

1 Reading bhinnapratyayanam with the 4 See Bhaskarodaya (Nirn. Sag. ed.), p. 49 3 . 

Bombay Sanskrit Series edition and The charge by the Buddhist is that the 

with the Bikaner MS. Yoga system assumes a common sub- 

2 This word is omitted by the two texts stance for the thinking-substance as 

just mentioned and ca is inserted causal agent and for the Self as ex- 

before karmaqayasya. periencer. Whereas the Yoga system 

3 That which is in several simultaneously itself denies such a common substrate. 



i. 32 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [70 

it is this [mind-stuff] that is connected with the pleasures and the pains 
generated by these actions. For the mind-stuff when changed [by receiving] the 
image (chaya) of the intelligence experiences pleasures and pains. Hence the 
supposition that experience in the Self is because of the assumption (graha) 
of an identity of the mind-stuff and the Self. Such is the very nature itself of 
these [mental pleasures and pains], which originate in dependence upon their 
own causes, 1 that they themselves remember and experience later the conse- 
quence, while others 2 do not [remember]. And the very-natures [of these 
mental pleasures and pains] ought not to be an injunction {niyoga) so that one 
says ' Let this be so ' or ' Let this not be so ', nor should it be a question 
(paryanuyoga) so that one asks ' Why is this not so ? ' To him who will not be 
satisfied with what has already been said he speaks with the words <Moreover 
. . . his own self.2> The idea ' I ' is bound up with the mind-stuff which is not 
distinguished [from the idea] and is the substrate of experiences and of memories 
of experiences that have qualities of originating and of ceasing, however varied 
they may be. How can [this idea] be attached to ideas that are absolutely 
distinguished from itself? It might be objected that inasmuch (a) as there is 
a distinction between the two causes 1. the process-of-knowing [in direct percep- 
tion] and 2. memory, and inasmuch (b) as there is a coherence (samsarga) of the 
two contradictory qualities of immediate-perceptibility and of mediate-percepti- 
bility the so-called recognition [that this was that] (pratyabhijnana) is not a 
single idea such that there could be a unity of the mind-stuff which contains these 
[contradictory] ideas. For this reason he says <in one's own experience.^ The 
objector might reply that ' 1. the distinction between the two causes and 2. the 
coherence between two contradictory causes have been mentioned as inhibiting 
this [one's own experience].' In reply to this he says ^Moreover ... of a per- 
ception . . . not.2> The totalities -of- causes (samagrt) do not remain distinct, 
on one condition only, that they are reduced-to-terms (anusara) of perception. 
And [that the totalities-of-causes do not remain distinct] is not contradicted by 
the fact that the qualities are immediate-perceptibility and mediate-perceptibility, 
this is shown to be consistent in the Nyayakanika. And the action of objects- 
intended by a [mind-stuff] that is not momentary is shown to be consistent in the 
Nyayakanika 3 and in the Brahmatattvasamiksa. Thus all is made clear. 



Of which [stable mind-stuff] this purification 4 is enjoined by the 
system. By what means is this ? 

1 Compare Qamkarabhasya ii. 2. 21 (Nirn. book called Vidhiviveka, the second is 

Sag. ed., 1904, p. 457, last line). a gloss on the Vedanta work called 

2 It is the agent himself that has the Brahma-siddhi. The first has been 

experience of the consequences. published in Benares by E. J. Lazarus, 

3 Both these books are in Vacaspatimicra's first in the Pandit (1907) and later as 

own list of his works which he gives a separate volume. 

at the close of the Bhamati-vyakhya ; * See pp. 80 4 and 84 10 (Calc. ed.). 

the first is a gloss on the Mimansa 



71] Friendliness, compassion, joy, indifference { i. 33 

33. By the cultivation of friendliness towards happiness 
and compassion towards pain and joy towards merit and 
indifference towards demerit [the yogin should attain] the 
undisturbed calm of the mind-stuff. 

Of these ! [four] he should cultivate friendliness towards all living 
beings that have reached the experience of happiness ; compas- 
sion towards those in pain ; joy towards those whose character 
is meritorious ; indifference towards those whose character is 
demeritorious. When he thus cultivates [friendliness and the rest] 
the white 2 quality [of karma] comes into being [within him]. 
And then the mind-stuff becomes calm ; and when calm it becomes 
single-in-intent and reaches the stable state. 

Because one whose central-organ is unpurified and full of such [feelings] as 
jealousy cannot successfully (sampatti) effect concentration and the means of 
concentration, he proceeds to set forth the means of [securing] undisturbed calm 
of the mind, which are hostile to such [feelings] as jealousy. This he does 
by saying 0f which [stable mind-stuff] this. In other words, of which 
stable mind-stuff this is the purification. The sutra begins with the words 
33 . . . friendliness and compassion and ends with the words undisturbed 
calm .... When towards those who are happy the mind-stuff 3 cultivates 
friendliness, that is, cordiality 4 , [then] the taint of envy ceases. When 
towards those who are in pain [the mind-stuff] cultivates compassion, that is, 
a desire to destroy pain in another as if it were his own, [then] the taint of a 
desire to injure others ceases from the mind. 3 When towards living- creatures 
whose disposition is meritorious the mind cultivates joy, 6 that is, gladness, 
[then] the taint of jealousy ceases. When towards those whose disposition is 
demeritorious, the mind cultivates indifference, that is, neutrality, [then] the 
taint of wrath ceases. And then, after the qualities (dharma) made of rajas and of 
tamas have ceased, the white quality made of sattva comes into being. One may 
say that he becomes endowed with a superiority of sattva. When there can- 
properly-be-said-to-be (paksa) a restriction of the fluctuations, his mind-stuff, 

1 These form the chapter on the Brahma B Medhatithi on Manu, in a characteristi- 

viharas in the Visuddhi-Magga. cally Schopenhaurian frame of mind, 

2 Compare the statements in iv. 7 on white informs us that friendliness is the 

and black karma ; and in ii. 13 on the absence of aversion (dvesdbhdva) and 

rise of white karma. not an attachment to one's friends. 

3 This construction is a good instance of For that would be bondage. Similarly 

dno koivov (kakaksi). joy is the cessation of grief but not 

4 This form (sauhardam) does not seem to positive gladness. Because that would 

accord with the examples given in be the result of passion. SeeBalarama's 

Siddhanta kaumudl on vi. 3. 52 (Nirn. notetp. 77(Calc.ed.). I have not traced 

Sag. ed., 1904, p. 207 2 ). the passage to Medhatithi-bhatta. 



i. 33 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [72 

because its true nature is undisturbed calm, becomes undisturbedly calm. And 
when undisturbedly calm, by means which are to be stated, 1 it becomes single- 
in-intent and gains the stable state. But if there be no cultivation of friendliness 
and the other [feelings] these means are not adequate for stability. 



34. Or [he gains stability] by expulsion and retention of 
breath. 

Expulsion is the ejection of the abdominal air through the aper- 
tures of the nose by a special kind of effort. Betention is restraint 
of the breath. <Or> by these two he should attain to a stability 
of the central-organ. 

He now states these means of [obtaining] stability. 
84. Or [he gains stability] by expulsion and retention of breath. 
The word <Or> signifies that there is a choice with regard to other means [now] 
to be stated, but not with regard to cultivation of friendliness and of the [other] 
feelings ; because [the alternatives now mentioned] are in addition to that 
[cultivation]. He explains the expulsion by saying Cof the abdominal.^ By 
a special kind of effort, described in books of Yoga, by means of which the 
abdominal wind is gradually emitted through the apertures of the nose. He 
explains retention by saying ^Eetention is restraint of the breath. It is the 
restraint of that portion of the abdominal wind that is emitted breath ; it is the 
keeping of it outside ; it is, on the other hand, not allowing it to enter suddenly. 
By these two, the expulsion and retention of wind, his body becomes light and 
his central organ gains the stable state. In this [sutra] we have to supply 
(akrs) the word ' stability ' from the phrase ' comes into a relation of stability ' 
found in the next sutra ; and this is to be connected with the words ' should 
attain ' as is understood from the context (artha). 



35. Or [he gains stability when] a sense-activity (pravrtti) 
arises connected with an object [and] bringing the central- 
organ into a relation of stability. 

The consciousness of supernormal (divya) odour in one who attends 
fixedly to the tip of his nose is sense-activity with odour [as object] ; 
on the tip of the tongue, the consciousness of supernormal taste ; on 
the palate, supernormal colour ; on the middle of the tongue, the 
consciousness of touch ; on the root of the tongue, the conscious- 
ness of sound. These sense-activities when arisen bring the mind- 
stuff into a relation of stability [and] dispel doubt and become a 
way of approach to concentrated insight. 2 Thus sense-activity 

1 Book ii. 1 ff. 2 Compare i. 20. 



73] Steadying the mind-stuff [ i. 35 

with regard to the moon or the sun or planets or gems or [the 
rays of] a lamp or similar objects, when it arises, should be 
regarded as being connected with an object. For although the 
true nature of things as they really are l becomes accessible by 
means of the various sciences and by inferences and by the 
instruction of masters, since these [means] are adequate to 
inform us of the things as they are, still, so long as any part 
whatsoever has not become consciously knowable by the appro- 
priate organ, the whole seems mediately-perceived. And the 
thinking-substance is not made to arise firmly with regard to 
such subtile intended-objects as Release. Therefore [if] only for 
the sake of reinforcing books and inferences and the instruction of 
masters, some one particular thing must necessarily be made an 
object of perception. Then after a portion of the intended-object 
as taught by these [three means] has been made the object of per- 
ception, the whole, even unto such an exceeding subtile object as 
Release, is thoroughly believed. For precisely this purpose the 
purification 2 of the mind- stuff is enjoined. If there are fluctua- 
tions unrestrained [as contrasted with this portion], then, when the 
Consciousness of being Master with regard to these has been pro- 
duced, [the mind-stuff] would be adequate to effect a perception of 
these various intended-objects. And this done, [the yogin] will 
without hindrance acquire belief [and] energy [and] mindfulness 
[and] concentration [i. 20]. 

He tells of another means for stability. 35. Or [he gains stability when] 
a sense-activity (pravrtti) arises connected with an object [and] bringing 
the central-organ into a relation of stability. He explains by saying in 
one who attends fixedly to the tip of his nose.2> In one performing fixed- 
attentions [and] contemplations [and] concentrations there arises, as a result 
of success in these, that direct-perception which is a supernormal consciousness 
of odours. Similarly [what is said] is applicable to the other sense-activities 
also. And this is to be believed on the strength of the authoritative- word 3 
and not from probable -reasonings (upapattitas). An objection, 'This may be 

1 This word yathabhuta is thought by Mrs. here is another proof of the intimate 

Rhys Davids to be ' specifically and connexion between the Yoga system of 

uniquely Gotamic '. (C. A. F. Rhys philosophy and Buddhism. 

Davids : Seeing Things as they Really 2 See also above, p. 70 end, or text, p. 77 1 

are, in Buddhism, vol. i, no. 3, p. 382, (Calc. ed.). 

March, 1904.) The fact that it occurs s Compare Maitri Up. vi. 20. 
10 [h.o.s. 17] 



i. 35 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samadhi [74 

so. But of what use is this kind of fluctuations which are of no service as 
regards Isolation?' In reply he says <These.2> These fluctuations, when 
once arisen, in a very short time bring the mind-stuff into a relation of 
stability with the object whether it be the Icvara or the discriminative 
discernment. Another objection, 'How could a fluctuation in relation to 
one object bring [the mind-stuff] into a relation of stability with another 
object?' In reply to this he says ^Cdispel doubt. It dispels [that is] it 
removes. Consequently [it becomes a way of approach] to concentrated 
insight.^ By the word <Thus he shows by analogy that other fluctuations 
also, which are taught in the revealed word, can be made objects. If it be 
objected, ' Whence can there be a doubt with regard to matters made known 
by the revealed word and by other [authorities],' he replies with the words 
<For although.^ For Yoga is based upon belief. And when a portion of 
the intended -objects taught is made the object of perception, contemplation 
and the other [states] which are based upon this [belief], follow for him 
without obstruction. 



36. Or an undistressed [and] luminous [sense-activity when 
arisen brings the central-organ into a relation of stability]. 

The words ' sense-activity when arisen brings the central-organ 
into a relation of stability ' are supplied from [sutra 35]. This is 
that consciousness of the thinking-substance which occurs when 
[the yogin] fixes his attention upon the Lotus of the Heart. For 
1. the sattva of the thinking-substance becomes resplendent and 
[all-pervasive] like the air (akdga). By skill in keeping [his central- 
organ] stable in this [Lotus], this sense-activity, because resplen- 
dent as the sun or the moon or planets or gems, becomes trans- 
formed in appearance. Thus 2. his mind-stuff comes to a state of 
balance with regard to the feeling-of-personality and becomes wave- 
less like the Great Sea [and] peaceful [and] infinite [and] the feel- 
ing-of-personality and nought beside. With regard to which it has 
I been said 1 " Pondering upon this self which is a mere atom, one is 
conscious in the same way as when one is conscious to the extent 
that one says ' I am '." This undistressed sense-activity is of two 
kinds : 1. in connexion with an object, and 2. the feeling-of-per- 
sonality and nought beside ; [and] is called luminous. By means 
of which the mind-stuff of the yogin gains the stable state. 

--] a Garbe (Festgruss an Roth, p. 78) from not however refer to a particular state 

this fragment infers a doctrine of the only of the self? 

atomic nature of the self. Might it 



75] Pondering upon the self [ i. 36 

36. Or an undistressed [and] luminous [sense-activity when arisen brings 
the central-organ into a relation of stability]. Without distress means 
freed from pain. Luminous means something having lumination. Luminous 
in the form of [casting] radiance ^Cupon the Lotus of the Hearts That lotus 
eight-petalled which is situated with head downwards between the abdomen 
and the thorax, he should turn, by the force of an emissive restraint of breath, 
head upwards and fix the mind-stuff attentively upon it. In the middle of 
this [lotus] is the circle of the sun [and] the letter A 1 [and] the locus of the 
waking-state. Above it is the circle of the moon [and] the letter U [and] 
the locus of sleep. Above this is the circle of fire [and] the letter M [and] 
the locus of deep-sleep. Above which is the highest, whose essence is the 
air [and] the prolonged nasal (brahma-nada) [and] the locus of the fourth 
[turlya] state [and] a half- measure. [All this] the knowers of Brahma relate. 
In this [Lotus], that is, in the pericarp [of the lotus], is the tube (nadi) of 
Brahma, with upturned face, and reaching to the circle of the sun and the 
other [circles]. And upward from this there extends the tube called Sushumna. 2 
This passes through the outer circles also beginning with that of the sun. 
Now this [tube] is the locus of the mind-stuff. And by fixing attention upon 
this [tube] the yogin acquires in addition the consciousness of mind-stuff. 
After showing the consistency [of his statement] he indicates what the appear- 
ance of the consciousness of the thinking-substance is by saying <SFor 1. the 
sattva of the thinking-substance. The words <Klike the air (akaga)y> describe 
its pervasive character. It takes various forms, it is transformed into the 
appearance [that is] into the form of the splendours of such [bodies] as the sun. 
And here thinking-substance (buddhi) is understood to be the central-organ 
(manas) and not the Great Principle (mdltat-tattva). Moreover, placed in the 
Sushumna and produced from the personality -substance which is itself evolved 3 
[from sattva], it has an abundance of sattva ; for this reason its luminosity is 
emphasized. Furthermore, in so far as it is concerned with various objects, 
its pervasiveness is also established. Having shown the state of balance 
(samdpatti) with regard to the central -organ, an effect of the feeling- of-per- 
sonality, he describes what the state-of-balance is in itself with regard to the 
feeling-of-personality by saying <Thus . . . comes to a state of balance. 
Peaceful [that is] that from which the waves of rajas and tamas have passed 
away. Infinite is all- pervading. The feeling-of-personality and nought 
besides is a form in which the splendours of various kinds do not reoccur. 
He makes his own opinion accord with another authoritative-work (agama) 
by saying With regard to which. "With regard to which this has been .. 7 .*il^V 
said by Paiicacikha. It is called an atom because it is hard of access [to ! 
knowledge]. The self has the personality-substance as its basis. Pondering 
[that is] reflecting [upon it], one knows in the same way as when one knows 
' I am '. An objector says, ' This may be true that the luminous [sense-activity] 
1 See Mand. Up. 9. 2 So MSS., not susumnd. 3 See Sam. Kar. xxv. 



i. 36 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [76 

assumes various forms of splendour, but how can the luminous [sense-activity] 
assume th8 form of the feeling-of-personality and nought beside?' In reply 
to this he says This ... is of two kinds. The point is that the sense-of- 
personality is itself, when cleansed from the defilement of rajas and tamas, 
lumination. He states also the consequences of the two-fold luminous [sense- 
activity] by saying <SiBj means of which. 



37. Or the mind-stuff [reaches the stable state] by having as 
its object [a mind-stuff] freed from passion. Or influenced by 
having as the supporting-object a mind-stuff freed from passion, 1 
the yogin's mind-stuff reaches tbe stable state. 

37. Or the mind-stuff [reaches the stable state] by having as its object 
[a mind-stuff] freed from passion. Those freed from passion are Krsnadvai- 
payana 2 and certain others. Mind-stuff is affected by having as the supporting- 
object the mind-stuff of these. 



38. Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by having as 
the supporting-object a perception in dream or in sleep. Or, 

assuming tbat form which has as its supporting-object either a 
perception in dream or in sleep, the yogin's mind-stuff reaches the 
stable state. 

38. Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by having as the support- 
ing-object a perception in dream or in sleep. For when in his dream he 
adores the Exalted Mahecvara's image which abides within a sequestered forest 
and seems as if it were sculptured out of the moon's orb ; [and] its members and 
limbs are soft as lotus stems ; it is made of precious moonstone-gems and 
festooned with garlands of exceeding fragrant jasmine and Malatl flowers ; 
it captivates the heart. When in the very [act of adoration] he awakens with 
mind in undisturbed calm ; then, reflecting upon that same [image] which had 
become the object supporting the perception in his dream, while his central- 
organ is identical in form with that [object], his mind-stuff reaches a stable 
state in that very [condition]. And sleep in this case is to be understood as 
having the quality of sattva. Of which sleep, when he wakes, he has the 
connecting-memory 'I slept well'. For in this sleep his central-organ has 
become single-in-intent. And to this extent only [that is, in a sleep tainted only 
in so far as it refers to some sattva aspect of a thing], the knowers of Brahma 

1 For an illuminatinginstance, see Hopkins, 2 SeeCamkaraBhasyaNirn.Sag.ed.p.732 10 . 
Yoga-technique (1901), Journal Am. Compare Telang, Journal of the Bombay 

Oriental Soc, vol. xxii, pt. 2, p. 356-7. Br. RAS., vol. xvi (1885), p. 196. 



77] Mastery of the mind-stuff [ i. 41 

tell us that the form of Brahma is in a state of deep sleep. Moreover, since 
perception severed from the object to be perceived cannot come within the 
range [of the sense-organs], he brings that object also which is to be perceived 
within the range [of the sense-organs]. 



39. Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by contem- 
plation upon any such an object as is desired. 

Let [the yogin] contemplate whatever object he desires. Having 

reached stability there, the mind-stuff reaches the stable state 

elsewhere also. 

39. Or [the mind-stuff reaches the stable state] by contemplation upon 
any such an object as is desired. Why say more ? Whatsoever [object] is 
desired, [let him contemplate] just that, whichsoever particular deity it be. 



40. His mastery extends from the smallest atom to the 
greatest magnitude. 

The mind-stuff entering into a subtile thing reaches a stable state 
which extends to the smallest atom ; entering a coarse thing it 
reaches a stable state which extends to the greatest magnitude. 
This freedom from obstruction of his, while advancing in this way 
to both of these kinds of limits, is complete mastery. So the yogin's 
mind-stuff filled full of mastery needs not again the purification 
perfected by practice. 

But how is the becoming one's self (atmibhava) to be understood as being 
a stable state ? In reply he says, 40. His mastery extends from the smallest 
atom to the greatest magnitude. He explains by saying into a subtile 
thing. Summarizing the meaning given above he tells the meaning of the 
word <mastery> by the words both of these kinds. He tells of the secondary 
results of mastery by saying So ... of mastery. 



Now when the mind has reached stability, what is the balanced- 
state (samdpatti) as such {svarupa) and (vd) as directed to an 
object ? This is told [in the sutra]. 

41. [The mind-stuff] from which, as from a precious gem, 
fluctuations have dwindled away, is, with reference either to 



i. 41 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [78 

the knower or to the process-of-knowing or to the object-to- 
be-known, in the state of resting upon [one] of these [three] 
and in the state of being tinged by [one] of these [three], and 
[thus] is in the balanced-state. 

The meaning of the words <from which .... fluctuations have 
dwindled away> refers [to the mind-stuff] of which the presented- 
ideas have come to rest. He takes as the example the words <as 
from a precious gem^ 1 Just as a crystal is tinged by the various 
colours of the different things next to which it lies and appears as 
having the form of the coloured (rupa) thing-next-to-which-it-lies 
(upagraya), so the mind-stuff is influenced by referring to the 
object-to-be-known and comes into a state-of-balance with the 
object- to-be-known and appears as having the form of the object-to- 
be-known as it is in itself. Influenced by a subtile element it comes 
into a state-of-balance with the subtile element and seems to be 
the subtile element itself. Likewise, influenced by referring to a 
coarse [element] it comes into a state-of-balance with a coarse form 
and seems to have a coarse form. Similarly, influenced by particu- 
lar things of the world it comes into a stafce-of-balance with the 
particular thing of the world and seems to have the form of the 
world. An analogous situation would be found to exist also with 
reference to the processes-of-knowing, [that is] in the organs of 
sense. Influenced by referring to a process-of-knowing it comes 
into a state-of-balance with the process-of-knowing and appears as 
having the form of the process-of-knowing as it is in itself. Simi- 
larly, influenced by referring to the Self as knower it comes into a 
state-of-balance with the Self as knower and appears as having the 
form of the Self as knower. Similarly, influenced by referring to 
a liberated Self it comes into a state-of-balance with the liberated 
Self and appears as having the form of the liberated Self. Thus it 
is that the mind, which is like a precious gem, in the state of rest- 
ing upon [one] of these, upon the knower or upon a process-of- 
knowing or upon the object-to-be-known [that is] upon the Self or 
a sense-organ or an element, [and which is] in a state of being 
tinged by [one of] these, [that is] while resting upon [one of] these, 

1 Compare Cakuntala, First prose speech after ii. 7 (Pischel, p. 125 1 '). 



79] Conscious balanced-states [ i. 41 

changes into their form this [mind] is said to be in the balanced- 
state. 

Thus the means for stability of the mind-stuff have been stated. The mastery 
of that mind-stuff which has reached stability has also been shown. Now 
a question is asked, 'When the mind has reached stability, what object has 
[concentration] conscious [of an object] and what is [concentration] itself?' 
This he asks by saying CNow.: Ref erring to this he introduces the next 
sQtra by saying CThis is told. He recites the sutra 41. [The mind-stuff] .... 
as from a precious gem .... the balanced-state. He explains this by the 
words ^dwindled away. The mind-stuff from which such fluctuations as 
sources-of-valid-ideas, when they are of rajas or of tamas, have dwindled away 
as a result of practice and of passionlessness. The explanation of this is 
Cof which the presented-ideas have come to rest.^ In this manner it is stated 
that the sattva of the mind-stuff, which is naturally pure, is not overpowered 
by the rajas and the tamas. He makes the example clear by saying <KJust as. 
<KThe thing next to which it lies is the limiting condition, such as the 
hibiscus flower. <Klnfluenced by means changed into its likeness. It 
appears as if marked by the form of the red or blue or other colour which is 
peculiar to the thing next to which it lies. He applies [the illustration] to the 
thing illustrated by saying <Xso .... the object-to-be-known. It is influenced 
by, [that is] it penetrates into, the object-to-be-known to which it refers. In 
this way he distinguishes the object-to-be-known from the knower and from the 
process-of-knowing. [The mind-stuff] covers over its own peculiar form as inner 
organ and comes into a state of balance with the object-to-be-known ; or it might 
be said that it seems to change into an objective state of being known. As 
a result of this it appears as having the form of the object-to-be-known as it is 
in itself. Influence (uparaga) comes only from an object-to-be-known. [This] 
he subdivides into subtile and into coarse [forms] by saying a subtile 
element.^ The particular things of the world are evidently those with an 
animate nature, for instance, cows ; and those with an inanimate nature, for 
instance, water-jars. In accordance with this it has been shown that there are 
two concentrations : that accompanied by deliberation [upon coarse objects] ; 
and that accompanied by reflection [upon subtile objects]. When he says 
CAn analogous situation .... also with reference to the processes-of-knowing, 
[that is] in the organs of sense he means that sense-organs are processes of 
knowing in that by them intended-objects are known. He makes the same 
clear by saying Preferring to a process of knowing. Since the process of 
knowing is itself that to which it refers, it is influenced, [that is] permeated, 
by this. It covers over its own peculiar form as inner organ and seems to be 
changed ' into a process of knowing, as if it were an outer organ. Having 
described in this way [the concentration] accompanied by joy, he tells of that 

1 The cosraological analogue is found in iii. 26, p. 240, last line (Calc. ed.). 



41-] 



Book I. Concentration or Samddhi 



[80 



accompanied by the feeling-of-personality by saying ^Similarly . . . the Self as 
knower. Because the Self as Knower is the locus of the feeling of personality : 
this is the point. Since there is no distinction between Selves, released Selves, 
like Quka 1 and Prahlada, as objects of concentration, must be included as being 
described by the words <KSimilarly . . . released. ) Coming to a close he explains 
the words <resting upon [one] of these [three] and in the state of being tinged 
by [one] of these three> by saying <KThus it is that. The mind-stuff's sattva 
freed from the defilement of the rajas and tamas [aspects], by virtue of the 
purification by contemplation, rests upon [that is] fixedly attends to one of 
these, either the knower or the process-of-knowing or the object-to-be-known. 
This state of being tinged by [one] of these [three], [that is] taking the form 
of [one] of them, is called the balanced-state, in other words, Yoga with the 
distinguishing-characteristic of being conscious [of an object]. And here the 
order of words in the sutra <knower or process-of-knowing or object-to-be- 
known) need not be heeded since it runs counter 2 to the order of objects- 
intended [as given in experience]. Similarly, in the Comment also, the clearing 
[of the statement with regard to the concentration upon] the subtile elements 
as being the first [in the order of statements] is not to be respected. Thus all 
becomes satisfactory. 



42. Of these 3 [balanced-states] the state-balanced with de- 
liberation is confused by reason of predicate-relations 
between words and intended-objects and ideas. 

For example, although the word 4 ' cow ' and the intended-object 
' cow ' and the idea ' cow ' are things distinct from each other, one 
finds that in the process-of-knowing they are undistinguished. 
When these are distinguished from each other, the properties of 
words are of one kind, the properties of objects-intended are of 
another kind, [and] the properties of thoughts are of another kind. 
Thus the levels-of-existence (pantha7i) are distinct. If now a 
yogin has come into a state of balance with one of these [objects in 



The Vedanta books place Cuka in the suc- 
cession between Vyasa and Gaudapada. 

See the discussion by Jacobi : the Dates 
of the Philosophical Sutras, JAOS., 
vol. xxxi (1911), p. 26. 

Rajendra Lala Mitra apparently omits 
this word from the sutra in his edition 
of Bhojaraja's Rajamartanda (1883). 

Compare Patanjali : Mahabbasya, vol. i, 



p. I 6 (Kielhorn'sedition),and the elabo- 
rate discussion in Vacaspatimicra's 
Tattvabindu in which he contrasts two 
different theories of the Vaiyakaranas 
(Bhartrhari in his Vakyapadiya and 
Vatsyayana) with three schools of 
Mimahsakas (1. followers of Upavarsa, 
such as Qaihkara, 2. Prabhakara, 3. 
Kumarila). 



81] Words, ideas, and things [ i. 42 

the predicate-relation], and if such an intended-object as ' cow ' 
strikes upon his concentrated insight, and if it comes to him 
permeated with predicate-relations between words and intended- 
objects and ideas, then that confused balanced-state is said to be 
<with deliberations 

The balanced-state in general has been described. By classification into sub- 
divisions there are four kinds of it : deliberative and super-deliberative, reflec- 
tive and super-reflective. Of these [four] he describes the state-balanced in 
deliberation [upon a coarse object] in the sutra beginning with the words 42. 
Of these and ending with the words balanced-state . . . <Of these) [that is] 
from among these balanced-states it is the state balanced in deliberation that is 
to be understood. Of what kind is this [balanced-state] ? Although in reality 
diverse, words and intended-objects and ideas have predicate-relations because the 
words and the other [two] are attributed the one to the other. And the predi- 
cate-relation represents the diversity that there is in one thing and the identity 
that there is in diverse things. Consequently [the balanced-state] is confused 
or mixed with predicate-relations between words and intended-objects and ideas. 
When he says ^CFor example . . . the word ' cow "2> it is evident that there is a 
predicate-relation which identifies the word with the intended- object and the 
idea, both of which have been appropriated by the [word] ' cow '. When he says 
the intended-object ' cow '2> it is evident that there is a predicate-relation 
which identifies the intended-object with the word and the idea, both of which 
have been appropriated by the [intended-object] ' cow '. When he says 4Cthe idea 
1 cow ' it is evident that there is a predicate-relation which identifies the idea 
with the word and the intended-object, both of which have been appropriated by 
the [idea] 'cow'. Thus in ordinary life it is evident that, although word and 
intended-object and idea are distinct, in the process of knowing they are not dis- 
tinguished. If in the process of knowing they are not distinguished, why then 
should there be any distinction ? In reply to this he says When these are dis- 
tinguished. When in accordance with methods of agreement and difference 
they are distinguished by experts, then 1. properties of words are of one kind 
[that is] a word which is nothing but a mutation of sound has such properties as 
high [pitch], 2. [properties] of an intended-object are of another kind [that is] such 
properties as insensibility and [definite] shape, 3. properties of an idea are of 
another kind [that is] illumination and no [definite] shape. Therefore the level 
(panthan) of their existences is distinct [that is] the way which leads to the various 
things themselves. When it is said that a yogin has come into a state of balance 
with one of these intended-objects, such as a cow, then the lower perception of the 
yogin has been described. The rest is easy. 



1 1 [h.o.s. 17] 



i. 43 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [82 

When however the memory is purified from [remembrances of] the 
conventional-use (samketa) of words and when the concentrated 
insight is free from predicate-relations [in the form] of ideas either 
of inferences or of something that has been heard, the intended 
object remains as it is in itself and nothing more, and is specifically 
characterized as having just that form which it has in itself and 
as nothing more. And this is the super-deliberative balanced- 
state. This is the higher perception. And this is the germ of 
inference and of anything that has been heard. From it inference 
and anything heard have their being. Moreover this knowledge 
(dargana) is not accompanied by an idea either of an inference or 
of anything that has been heard. Therefore the yogin's know- 
ledge derived from super-deliberative concentration is not con- 
fused by any other source of a valid idea. He illustrates the dis- 
tinguishing characteristic of the super-deliberative concentration 
by the sutra. 

43. When the memory is quite purified, [that balanced- 
state] which is, as it were, empty of itself and which 
brightens [into conscious knowledge] as the intended object 
and nothing more is super-deliberative. 
That insight which, when the memory is quite purified from pre- 
dicate-relations [in the form] of ideas either of inferences or of any- 
thing that has been heard, and from the conventional usage of 
words, is influenced by the thing in itself (svarupa) which is to be 
known ; and which, after as it were in its form of insight throwing 
off itself, the essence of which is a process of knowing, becomes 
the thing-intended (paddrtha) and nothing more ; [and becomes] 
as it were changed into the thing in itself which is to be known, 
this is the super-deliberative balanced-state. And as such it has 
[just] been explained. For to this [balanced-state] the world [so 
far as it is visible], whether [it be an animate object] such as a 
cow or whether [it be an inanimate object] such as a water-jar, is 
1. the formation of a single mental-act (buddhi), 2. its essence is 
an intended-object, 3. [and] its essence is that it is a special kind 
of conglomeration of atoms. And this particular kind of arrange- 
ment x [which constitutes the object] is an apparent-form (dharma) 
1 For this word samsthana see pp. 170 18 , 205 10 , 216 12 , 272 7 (Calc. ed.). 



83] The coarse object and nothing more [ i. 43 

common to the subtile elements [which compose it] and it is in- 
ferred [as being a whole] from its phenomenalized effects 1 ; it is 
self-dependent and presents itself by [changing] into its pheno- 
menal 2 form by the operation of the conditions-which-phenonlena- 
lize it (sva) ; and it disappears when another apparent-form arises 
in consciousness. This same apparent-form is called a whole 
(avayavin). And it is this that is one 3 and great or very small 
and tangible and that in which actions occur and impermanent. By 
this [kind of] wholes the business-of-life is carried on. But one to 
whom such a particular conglomeration is not [perceptibly] real 
since by an indefinite-first-impression 4 (avikalpa) a subtile cause 
is imperceptible for him, since there is no whole, nearly every- 
thing, in accordance with the statement that an erroneous idea is 
not based upon the form [i. 8] of that [in respect of which the idea 
is entertained], is reduced to erroneous ideas. And then what 
would be a complete idea, seeing that there are no objects to which 
it would refer? For whatever is perceived, all that is a bit 
influenced by its nature of being a whole-having-parts. Therefore 
a whole exists which becomes changed by receiving what is called 
sizes and the like. This is the object of the super-deliberative 
balanced-state. 

In order to show the connexion of the sutra he explains first super-deliberative 
[concentration] by saying When however.^ Purification is removal. For 
certainly inference and verbal-communication begin to function when occasioned 
by memories of the conventional use of words. And this conventional-usage has 
its essence in the false attribution to each other of the word and the intended 
object and the idea ' cow '. And as a result of this the two predicate-relations in 
the form of an idea either of an inference or of a verbal-communication arise. So 
when occasioned by one of these, concentrated insight still has deliberation 
[upon some coarse object]. But when the mind, in so far as it is absorbed in 
the intended object and nothing more and is zealous for the intended object and 
for nothing more, reaches by practice upon this [intended object] a state of 
inseparable fusion [with this object], [then] the memory of conventional-usages 

1 The atom carries within itself the minia- in Nyaya-sutra ii. 1. 36 and iv.2. 14 ff., 

ture of its effects. and also in Udayana's Atma-Tattva- 

2 The expression sva-vyanjaha-anjana also Viveka. 

occurs at pp. 37 3 , 112 2 , 207 6 , and 282 1 * All the MSS. including the Bikaner and 
(Calc. ed.). Gaiigadhara Shastri's MSS. omit this 

3 The relation of whole and part is discussed word. 



1.43- 



Book I. Concentration or Samddhi 



[84 



is thrown off. And when these are thrown off, predicate-relations in the form of 
an idea either of an inference or of anything heard, which two are rooted in 
memory, are thrown off. Then in the concentrated insight, freed from these 
predicate-relations, the intended object remains as it is in itself and nothing more ; 
and becomes accurately characterized as having just that form which it has in 
itself and as nothing more, and as not having any form of predicated-relation. 
This is the super-deliberative balanced-state. This is the higher perception of 
the yogin, since in it there is not even a trace of false attribution. An objec- 
tion might be raised, ' This may be so. But yogins, having known the that-ness 
of the intended object, make it consistent [with other knowledge] and teach it. 
And (va) how can this intended object be taught by verbal communication or be 
made consistent by inference which is intended for another, both of which cases 
not referring to that [object which is intended in the higher perception] ? 
Accordingly verbal-communication and inference [must] refer to that [higher 
object]. And since these two are predicate-relations, the higher perception is 
also nothing but a predicate-relation.' In reply to this he says And this . . . 
anything heard. For if this [knowledge], like that with deliberation, were 
accompanied by inference or by anything that had been heard, that is, if it had 
been tainted by either of these, then it would be confused. But it is only the 
germ of these two. For from it inference and anything that has been heard have 
their being. And it is not the rule that whatever is a cause of an effect has the 
same object as itself as its effect. For because the idea of smoke is the cause 
of the idea of fire, it does not therefore have this [fire] for its object. Con- 
sequently [the yogins] having known [the thatness of the intended object] by 
a perception free of predicate-relations l , teach it and make it consistent through 
the medium of predicate-relations. He sums up by saying ^Therefore, and 
shows the connexion with the sutra which is to be explained by using the 
word super-deliberative. The sutra begins with the words 43. When the 
memory is quite purified. The purification 2 is the removal of the memory 
which follows (tasmad) upon the predicate-relation which is nothing but the 
idea of the inference and of anything that has been heard and of the con- 
ventional-usage of words. When this occurs (tasydm). And in this case the 
purification from the memory of conventional-usages is the cause (hetu), and 
the purification from the memory of ideas, such as, of anything that has been 



1 A favourite verse to illustrate the gradual 

advance from the first dim impression 
to an assertion in distinct predicate 
form is Magha's verse in Cicupalavadha 
i.3. First a ball of light ; then a body; 
then a person is seen ; finally one says 
" It is Narada ! " as one beholds him 
falling from the sky. 

2 This purification seems to be a relaxation 



of attention which has been given 
to a too closely limited field. Our 
deepest convictions may speak to us 
in dissociative processes wherein any 
fixed succession of apperceptive acts 
has ceased. The purification lies in 
a distribution of attention so that it 
regards a whole and disregards the 
successive parts. 



85] Nature of the subtile object [ i. 43 

heard, is the effect (hetumant). And the word Cinference is to be understood 
as expressing the object * of the action [as expressing that which is inferred, and 
not that from which an inference is drawn] ; it is a word denoting the thing 
to be inferred. The word Cas it were (iva) in the clause as it were . . . 
itself^ (svam iva) is out of its right position and should be construed after 
the words rethrowing off. He rejects the theory 2 that there is [in this 
state] a diversity of objects by saying to this ... a single.^ It is 1. the for- 
mation of a single mental-act, in the sense that it forms 3 or brings forth a 
single mental-act. Consequently since it is [single], the atoms, in that they 
are many, are not the objects of the super-deliberative [balanced-state]. What 
he has wished to say is this : Assuming that they are fit [to be the object of 
the balanced-state], still, in that they are very subtile, and because they are collected 
into a manifold [each unit of which has its own subtile idea], they are not fit 
to be the object of a presented idea which brightens [into a conscious know- 
ledge] of the unity of the single intended-object which has magnitude [mahattva 
as contrasted with anu\. An objection, ' Granted that the atoms are real 4 exis- 
tences, then the [so-called] coarseness would be [only] a subjective {samvrta) 
property of that which shines clearly [in consciousness].' In reply to this 5 
he says 2. its essence is an intended object.^ The point is that when once 
a coarse object [as a whole] has been established in experience, it cannot, unless 
there be something inhibitory, be denied. To those [Vaicesika] who think that 
[animate things] like cows and [inanimate things] like water-jars are produced 6 
by binary and other atoms in gradations, he says 3. conglomeration of atoms. J> 
A conglomeration of atoms is a mutation in gross form and this [form of] 
mutation differentiates 7 it from other [coarse] mutations. That of which this 
[differentiated] mutation is the essence 8 , in other words, the-thing-itself(smmj?a), 
is that which is called [Ca conglomeration of atoms2>]. [Animate] things 
such as cows possess an [animate] seat-of-experience. 9 And such [inanimate] 
things as water-jars are [merely inanimate] objects [of this balanced-state]. And 
both of these same two kinds of objects are also seen (lokyate) ; and so [each] may 
be called the world (loka) [so far as it is visible to this balanced-state]. It might 
be objected that this [conglomeration, which is a gross form of mutation] might 

1 Pan. iii. 3. 113. B This would be the doctrine of the Yoga- 

2 The theory of the Sarvastivadin. See cara School. 

Sarvadarcanasamgraha (Anand. ed.), 8 See on the whole subject Jacobi's illumi- 
p. 7, 1. 9. nating article on the ' Atomic Theory ' 

3 This would be the theory of the Vaibha- in Hastings's Diet, of Religion and 

sika school, which asserts the percep- Ethics, and especially p. 201 a , line 10. 
tion of outer objects. See Sarvadar- 7 Compare Vaicesika-sutra vii. i. 9 and 
canasamgraha (Anand. ed.), p. 7 9 . (Jamkara on ii. 2. 12. 
* Compare Dharmakirti's Nyayabindutika 8 As contrasted with a special kind of con- 
Peterson's ed.), p. 16 26 , (Tscherbatskoi's glomeration (pracaya-vi$esa). 
ed. Bibl. Buddhica), p. 13 21 , also the 9 This seat-of-experience is, according to 
tippanl, p. 37. the Patanjala Rahasyam, the body. 



i. 43 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [86 

be either different from the subtile elements or not different [from them]. 1. If 
it be different from them, how can it be the [common] substrate of them and 
how can it be the form (akara) [which gives them oneness] ? For a water- 
jar is a different thing from a piece-of-cloth and cannot be the substrate [of 
the properties of the piece-of-cloth] nor can it be that which gives the form 
[of oneness] to this piece-of-cloth. 2. If, on the other hand, it [the object, so 
far as visible, which is a conglomeration of atoms] be not different [from its 
subtile elements], then it would be, like them, subtile and not common [to the 
whole group]. The point is this : any such thing as a water-jar is not absolutely 
different from the atoms, neither is it absolutely identical [with them]. In case 
it were different, as a horse and a cow are different, the relation [between 
them] of substance to its properties could not be consistently explained. In 
case it were identical, [so that the atoms were] like the substance, then this [sub- 
stance] could not be consistently explained. Consequently it is in some respects 
different and in some respects identical. And so it must be, if all is to be con- 
sistently explained. By putting the words ^subtile elements^ in the genitive 
case, he indicates that there is in some respects a difference ; and by the words 
^Cit is self-dependents, that there is an identity. [It is inferred] by its 
phenomenalized effects : phenomenalized in the sense that its [effect] is ex- 
perienced ; and phenomenalized in the sense that it [serves] the business-of-life. 
[And] it is proven by inference to any one who takes the opposite view. And 
in so far as it is identical with its cause, we may consistently say that it has the 
form of its cause. Accordingly he says ^Cby [changing] into its phenomenal form 
by the operation of the conditions-which-phenomenalize it.) ' Is this apparent- 
form (dharma), which is identical with it, permanent ? ' He gives a negative 
answer in the words when another apparent-form.^ Another apparent-form 
[that is,] as a potsherd [is another apparent-form of a water-jar broken in pieces]. 
That this whole has a form not-to-be-found {vyavrttam) in the atoms he shows by 
saying This same. For it has properties, which give it a specific-character, 
such as the holding of honey or of water, which actions are other than actions 
which could be accomplished by atoms. 1 [The whole is known] not only by 
[perceptual] experience, but also by the business-of-life since the conduct of men 
depends upon these [wholes]. This he states in the words and by this.S 
A [Buddhist] objection, ' This may be true. If there were nothing to contradict, 
experience might establish [by the help of inferences] that [the mutation in its 
gross form] is a whole-having-parts. But (ca) there is a contradiction. [For in 
the line of reasoning,] (a) All that exists is without parts, (/3) like thought 
(vijnana), and (y) such things as cows and water- jars exist, we have a natural 
[and valid] middle-term 2 [that is, existence]. [But the point is made that there 

1 The system insists that not even the 2 This is a term of the " Eastern school " of 
subtile (suksma) is perceptible to the Logicians, equivalent in their usage to 

avikalpita type of thinking. an unconditioned middle term, which 



87] Subtile object permanent and impermanent [ i. 43 

is no existence in coarse form.] For existence is subsumed (vyapta) under 
absence of contradictory qualities. 1 And connexion with contradictory qualities, 
which is contradictory with it [that is, existence], being found to exist in a 
thing-having-parts, excludes existence also, since in such a case something contrary 
to the subsumer [which is, absence of contradictory qualities] has been found. And 
so [to revert to the original point] there is in the whole a connexion with con- 
tradictory qualities, for example, belonging to that place and not belonging to 
that place, being covered and not being covered, being red and not red, moving 
and not moving. [Accordingly wholes in gross form do not exist.] ' In reply 
to this he says But one to whom. The intention [of what was first asserted] 
is this. [The whole in gross form is now said to be given in experience and to 
be an action realizing a purpose.] The existence which is given as the middle- 
term (hetu) must either be given by experience and be such as even a ploughman 2 
with dusty feet can understand, or it must be other than what is given by 
experience. Of these two the latter is not a middle-term since it is not given in 
experience, [that is, it must itself be established as existing in the middle-term]. 
But water-jars and such things have an existence given in experience, namely, 
activity realizing a purpose. [This form] is not other than its gross [form]. This 
[form given by experience and realizing a purpose] is the middle-term, [that is, 
existence], and by removing [the existence of] coarseness [as thus defined, this 
middle-term] destroys itself. In reply to this [the Buddhist] says, ' Existence 
is not [a permanent] coarseness, but is the negation of non-existence. And 
coarseness is negative non-coarseness. Moreover negativations differ according 
to the variations of the things negatived. So even when there is no coarseness, 
there is no destruction of existence.' [The reply to this would be :] By reason 
of variations in the negativations we may admit that there is a variation in the 
objects of the determination (avasaya). But would you, Sir, be good enough 
to say what the object is of the source-of-the-valid-idea which is not a first 
faint impression (vikalpa), and which is the necessary-condition (purvaJca) for 
the determinations ? For if you say that the atoms of colour which arise con- 
tinuously, and the minute that-ness of which is unknown, [are the object], 
the reply is, Very well. These are intermingled 3 with the atoms of odour and taste 
and touch and are [therefore] not continuous. Therefore if it be unaware of the 

would not be a hetvabhasa, but a valid 2 Compare Patanjali : Mahabhasya on i. 1. 

(sad) term. The later term would be 23 (Kielhorn i. 81 4 ). 

sad-anumana. See Nyaya-Koca, s. v. 3 One does not see merely the colour series. 

Such terminology points to the Eastern For this is intersected by the taste and 

country as the home of Vacaspati- smell and touch series. On the other 

inicra. Compare for this kind of logical hand the continuum of colour is not an 

language Dharmakhti's Nyaya-bindu- illusion as the Vedantin, Udayana for 

tika (Peterson's ed.), p. 104. example, would say (Atma-Tattva- 

1 See Nyaya-bindu-tlka ii. 2 (Peterson's ed.), Viveka, JIbananda's ed., Calc, 1873, 

p. 106 7 . p. 83 1 ). The Yoga system explains these 

series as the mutations of a substance. 



i. 43 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [88 

intermediate [atoms], this indefinite-first-impression, based upon the atoms, like 
the presented-idea of a forest as single and as dense [although it too is full of 
intermediate spaces,] would be false. Accordingly the indefinite-first-impressions 
proceeding from this [other first faint impression] are not even mediately in 
relation with a [perceptible] object. Thus how could one succeed in establishing 
that there are no parts in existences which are determined by these [indefinite-first- 
impressions] ? Therefore if one desires to hold to the validity of perceptions 
which are definite-later-impressions, the existence of that very coarseness which 
is being experienced by this [perception] must be admitted, [even] if one does 
not assent to that which is to be determined by [perception which is] definite- 
and-later-impression. To proceed : if existence inhibits this [kind of percep- 
tion], it would inhibit itself. That the atoms are exceedingly subtile and that 
they become the objects of experience through the medium of other kinds of 
atoms to acknowledge this is self-destructive. Having this in view he says 
One to whom this particular conglomeration which is not [perceptibly] real 
[is the object of a perception which is a definite-and-later-impression], one, that 
is, who says that the subtile atoms should therefore be objects of percep- 
tions which are definite-and-later-impressions to him he replies since by an 
indefinite-first-impression a subtile cause is imperceptible.^ For the reason that 
for him there is no whole, everything, according to the characterization given 
[i. 8] that " an erroneous idea is not based on that form [in respect of which it 
is entertained]," is reduced to erroneous idea, all that which rests upon coarse- 
ness and all that which rests upon the existence which is the locus of this 
[coarseness]. It might be objected that even so [and finally] knowledge is 
not erroneous in regard to one's self, because this does not appear as a whole 
having parts. In reply to this he says ^Nearly. The objector might reply 
' What even if it be so ? ' In reply to this he says And then. If such 
an idea as that of existence be erroneous, then such an idea, caused by existence 
or something of the kind as this that there are no wholes having parts, would 
also be erroneous. Because its object also, in so far as it is something to be 
determined, is certainly nothing coarse x [and this latter is] not concerned with 
definite-and-later-impressions. And this [object] does not exist. Such is the 
meaning of the argument. And if it be asked why there is no object, he 
replies with the word whatever. And the [apparent] contradiction must 
be removed in accordance with the explanation (upapatti) previously given 
based on identity in difference and on manifoldness in mutations. Then all 
would be satisfactory. 

44. By this same [balanced-state] the reflective and the 
super-reflective [balanced-states] are explained as having 
subtile objects. 

1 One suspects that the reading might be sthillam. 



89] The subtile object and nothing more [ i.44 

Of these [two], that is called the reflective (savicdra) balanced-state 
which refers to subtile elements the apparent forms of which have 
been manifested and which are characterized by an experience of 
place and time and cause. In this case also a subtile element 
capable of being apperceived by one idea and particularized by 
uprisen (udita) apparent-forms serves as that upon which the con- 
centrated insight rests. But that balanced-state which in all ways 
and by all means refers to such [subtile elements] as are free from 
characterization by apparent-forms whether quiescent (gdnta) or 
uprisen (udita) or indeterminable (avyapadegya) and which yet 
corresponds to all apparent-forms and is the essence of all apparent- 
forms is called super-reflective (nirvicdra). Since the subtile 
element is of this kind, it becomes, in this very form, that on which 
the concentrated insight rests and it influences the insight itself. 
When moreover the insight becomes, as it were, emptied of itself 
and becomes the intended object and nothing more, then it is 
called super-reflective. Of these [four] the deliberative and the 
super-deliberative have as object x something great ; while the 
reflective and the super-reflective have a subtile object. Thus by 
this same super-deliberative [balanced-state] the destruction of 
predicate-relations of both 2 kinds has been explained. 
44. By this same [balanced-state] the reflective and the super-reflective 
[balanced- states] are explained as having subtile objects. Those [whose 
apparent-forms have been manifested] are those by which the apparent-forms of 
such things as water- jars have been manifested, in other words, those that have 
included the apparent-forms of such things as water-jars. Place [for instance] 
above or below or at one side. Time [for instance] the present. Cause [for 
instance] the atom of earth is produced by the five fine elements among which 
the fine element of odour predominates. Likewise the atom of water [is pro- 
duced] from the four fine elements among which the fine element of taste pre- 
dominates. Likewise the atom of fire [is produced] from the three fine elements, 
excluding the fine element of odour and of taste, and among which the fine 
element of colour predominates. Likewise the atom of wind [is produced] 
from the [two] fine elements beginning with odour, and of which [two] the 

1 Vijfiana Bhiksu glosses mcihad-vastu with tive and the super-reflective ; and not, 

the words ' coarse ' (sthula) and ' modifi- as Vijfiana Bhiksu says, the reflective 

cation only ' (kevalavikrti). This is the and the super-reflective. This would 

use of the word in iii. 44. be a gross inconsistency. For the 

2 The two kinds must be the super-delibera- reflective kind has predicate relations. 

12 [h.o.b. it] 



i. 44 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [90 

fine element of touch predominates. Likewise [the atom] of air from the fine 
element sound alone. This is the cause in the case of the subtile elements. 
These [subtile elements] are experienced when they have a place and a time 
and a cause. An idea (buddhi) which is capable of being particularized does 
not follow unless it be particularized by [such] an experience. An objector 
might ask, ' What similarity is there between [the balanced-state] with delibera- 
tion and [that] with reflection ? ' In reply to this he says In this case also.2> 
For the atom of earth which consists of the conglomeration of the five fine 
elements may be apperceived by a single idea. Similarly the atom of water 
and the other atoms [too] which have as their essences four or three or two 
or one fine element may be apperceived by a single idea. ^Uprisen)^ means 
a present apparent-form ; [the element]' would be particularized by that. And 
finally with regard to this [uprisen apparent-form], it is pointed out that there 
is an interpenetration of the predicate-relations of verbal-communications and 
of inferences by the memory of the conventional-use [of words]. For when 
something coarse is the object of perception, the atoms do not appear. But 
[they do appear objectively] as the result of verbal-communications and of infer- 
ences. Thus it is consistent that this [balanced-state] should be confused. 
He describes the super-reflective [balanced -state] in the words CBut that 
which. In all ways means in all forms [of phenomenalization], such as blue 
and yellow. The termination 1 -tas [Pan. iv. 3. 13] in the word <6.sarvatas& is used 
[as equivalent] to all inflected case-endings. In other words it means by all 
means2> [that is] by experiences of place and of time and of cause. By this 
statement it is shown that the atoms as such are not particularized by time. 
Neither are they [particularized by time] mediately through apparent-forms 
which have their origin in these [atoms]. It is this that he describes in the 
word quiescent. CQuiescent are past. Uprisen are present. Inde- 
terminable^ are future apparent-forms. [Atoms] are not characterized by these. 
Not being characterized by apparent-forms, is it quite right to say that atoms 
are unrelated to them ? In reply to this he says ^correspond to all apparent- 
forms. With 2 which kind of a relation do these atoms correspond to 
apparent-forms? In reply to this he says Care the essence of all apparent- 
forms.^ In other words, the apparent-forms are different from the atoms in 
some respects and in other respects not different. But why has this balanced- 
state this kind of an object ? In reply to this he says CSince ... of this 
character. In other words, having an apperception of the that-ness of a per- 
ceptible object, it does not become active with regard to that which has not this 
that-ness. Having stated the object of this [balanced-state], he tells what it 
is itself by saying ^Moreover the insight. Bringing the [four] together, he 

1 The termination tasi is the same as tasil syam thinks that some words have been 

(Pan. v. 3. 7). lost at this point from the Tattva 

8 Raghavananda Yati in his PataBjala Raha- Vaicaradl of Vacaspati-inicra. 



91] The limit of subtile objects [ i. 45 

describes the object as being serviceable to distinguish what they are them- 
selves by saying 0f these. He sums up with the word Thus. 0f both 
kinds means both its own [super-deliberative] and also super-reflective forms. 



45. The subtile object likewise terminates in unresoluble- 
primary-matter (alinga). 

In the case of the earthen atom the fine element of odour, [which is 
the cause of the atom of earth,] is the subtile object of the [reflec- 
tive and super-reflective] balanced-states ; in the case of the watery- 
atom the fine element of taste [is the subtile object] ; in case of 
the fiery atom the fine element of colour ; in case of the windy 
atom the fine element of touch ; in case of the aerial atom the fine 
element of sound. The personality-substance which is the cause 
of these [elements is also the subtile object of this balanced-state]. 
Resoluble-primary-matter-as-such (lingamdtra) [which is the cause] 
of this [personality-substance] also is the subtile object [of the 
balanced-state]. Unresoluble-primary-matter [which is the cause] 
of this [resoluble-primary-matter-as-such] also is the subtile object 
[of the balanced-state]. And beyond the unresoluble-primary- 
matter there is nothing subtile. If the objection be raised that the 
Self is subtile, the reply is that this is true. The subtilty of the 
Self in relation to the resoluble-primary-matter [thinking-sub- 
stance] is, however, not that of the unresoluble-primary-matter to 
the resoluble-primary-matter. For the Self is not the material 
cause {anvayiii) of resoluble-primary-matter, but the instrumental 
cause (hetu). 

Accordingly it is explained that subtilty reaches its utmost degree 
in the primary-substance. 

Does the balanced-state, which has a thing-to-be-known as its object, end in the 
subtile element only ? No. But, 45. The subtile object likewise terminates 
in unresoluble-primary-matter (alinga). That state of the fine element of odour 
which is in relation to the earthen atom is the subtile object of the balanced- 
state. Similarly in the later cases also the connexion is to be made. The 
resoluble-primary-matter-as-such (linga-matra) is the Great Principle [that is, 
the thinking-substance (buddhi)]. For it goes to dissolution (laya) in the primary- 
substance. Unresoluble-primary-matter is primary-substance. For it does not 
dissolve into anything. This is the meaning. He says that subtilty terminates 



i. 45 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [92 

in unresoluble-primary-matter in the words And beyond the unresoluble- 
primary-matter there is nothing subtile.2> He raises a doubt by saying <lf 
the objection be raised.^ That is to say, the Self also is subtile not the unre- 
soluble primary-substance alone. He rebuts [this objection] by saying true. 
In other words, in so far as it is a material cause there is in the unresoluble- 
primary- substance subtilty, but not in the other [that is, the Self], In 
this case, since the purpose of the Self is the instrumental cause of the 
Great Principle and of the personality-substance and of the others, the Self is 
also, like unresoluble-primary-matter, a cause. Having in mind the question as 
to how subtilty, characterized in this way, is to be understood as regards the 
unresoluble, he asks <Showever. He gives the answer in the words not that 
of the resoluble-primary-matter. True, [the Self is] a cause, but not a material 
cause. For the Self is not, like the primary-substance, a cause of these [states], 
in so far as being the Great or the other [states] it enters into mutations. This 
is the meaning. He sums up in the words ^Accordingly it is explained that 
subtilty reaches its utmost degree in the primary-substance. 



46. These same [balanced-states] are the seeded concentra- 
tion. 

These four balanced-states have external [perceptible] things as 
their seed. Therefore the concentration is seeded. Of these four 
the deliberative and the super-deliberative refer to a coarse intended- 
object, the reflective and super-reflective to a subtile intended-object. 
Thus in four kinds, one after another, concentration has been 
enumerated. 

And in the four balanced-states the object of which is a thing-to-be-known he 
says that [concentration] conscious [of an object may occur]. 46. These same 
[balanced-states] are the seeded concentration. The word eva is out of place 
and should be understood after <seeded.> As a result of this, the four balanced- 
states, the object of which is the thing-to-be-known, are limited in so far as they 
are seeded. The seeded state, however, is not limited [to the thing-to-be-known], 
since, even in the case of the balanced-state the object of which is the knower 
or the process-of-knowing, it persists, not being negated by the distinction into 
predicate-relations and unpredicated-relations [with reference to the thing-to-be- 
known]. So with regard to the thing-to-be-known there are four balanced-states 
and four in respect of the knower and the process-of-knowing: thus there 
are eight ' of these [concentrations]. The Comment is explained by a [mere] 
reading. 

1 The Bikaner MS. and the Bombay San. Ser. text read siddhd in place of te. 



93] Internal undisturbed calm [ i. 47 

47. When there is the clearness of the super-reflective 
[balanced-state, the yogin gains] internal undisturbed calm. 

When freed from obscuration by impurity, the sattva of the think- 
ing-substance, the essence of which is light, has a pellucid steady 
flow not overwhelmed by the rajas and tamas. This is the clear- 
ness. When this clearness arises in the super-reflective balanced- 
state, then the yogin gains the internal undisturbed calm, [that is 
to say] the vision by the flash (sphuta) of insight which does not 
pass successively through the serial order [of the usual processes 
of experience] and which has as its intended-object the thing as it 
really is. And in this sense it has been said, 1 " As the man who 
has climbed the crag sees those upon the plain below (bhumistha), 
so the man of insight who has risen to the undisturbed calm of in- 
sight, himself escaped from pain, beholds all creatures in their pain." 
Of the four balanced-states which have as their object the thing-to-be-known, 
excellence belongs to the super-reflective [balanced-state]. [This] he describes in 
the sutra 47. When there is the clearness of the super-reflective [balanced- 
state, the yogin gains] internal undisturbed calm. He describes the meaning 
of the word <clearness> by [the words beginning with] ^impurity .^ Impurity 
is an accretion of rajas and tamas. And it is the defilement which has the 
distinguishing-characteristic of obscuration. [Clearness] is freed from this. 
The essence of which is lights means naturally light. For this reason the 
sattva of the thinking-substance is not overwhelmed. An objection is made, 
' This may be true. But if the balanced-state has as its object the thing-to-be- 
known, how could the undisturbed calm have itself as its object ? ' To this he 
replies with the words has as its intended-object the thing as it really is. In 
other words, it does not have the self as its object but as its substrate 2 (adhara). 
^CDoes not pass successively through the serial order means that it is simul- 
taneous. On this very point he cites the teaching of the Supreme Sage (para- 
marmh gathdm) with the words And in this sensed Seeing that he is above all 
by virtue of the perfection of his perceptive vision, 3 he knows that the creatures 
are Cin their pain, encompassed by the three kinds of pain. 



Compare MBh. xii. 17. 20 ; 151.11 ; Dham- and tempests, in the world below." 

mapada 28. Compare also Bacon's 2 This is explained in the Patanjala Raha- 

Essay on Truth, " No pleasure is com- syam thus, ' There is a doubt as to 

parable to the standing upon the there being a relation of cause and 

vantage-ground of truth (a hill not to effect in things which are in different 

be commanded and where the air is places (vyadhikaranatve karyakaranata 

always clear and serene) and to see nastlty a$ankyd).' > 

the errors and wanderings and mists 3 Compare p. 62 2 and Sutra ii. 15. 



i. 48 ] Book I. Concentration or Samddhi [94 

48. In this [calm] the insight is truth-bearing. 

In one whose mind-stuff is concentrated, the insight x which arises 
in this [calm] receives the technical name of <truth-bearing.> And 
this is a [term] whose meaning is intelligible of itself : [this insight] 
bears truth 2 and nothing else ; in it there is not even a trace of mis- 
conception. And in this sense it has been said, " By the Sacred Word 
[and] by inference and by eagerness for practice in contemplation, 
in three ways he promotes his insight and gains the highest yoga." 
With regard to this same point he gives the consensus of yogins by telling of the 
term current among yogins which itself expresses the intended-object. 48. In 
this [calm] the insight is truth-bearing. The Comment is easy. By the 
expression ^Sacred Word is meant the hearing (gravana) prescribed by the Vedas ; 
by the expression ^inference^ is meant consideration (manana). Contemplation 
is reflection. Practice in this is following it up one time after another. Eager- 
ness for this is close attention [to it]. So in this way absorption (nididhydsana) 
is described. 



But this [insight] 

49. Has an object other than the insight resulting from 
things heard or from inferences inasmuch as its intended- 
object is a particular. 

<A thing heard> is knowledge derived from verbal-communication. 
This deals with generic objects. For a particular cannot be con- 
noted by a verbal-communication. Why [not] ? Because a word 
does not have its conventional-usage established by the particular. 
Similarly inference deals with generic objects only. [For instance, 
compare i. 7], we say, where there is getting [to a place], there is 
motion ; and where there is no getting [to a place], there is no 
motion. And by an inference we get a conclusion in generic 
[terms only]. Therefore no particular can be the object of verbal- 
communication or of inference. And of this subtile and hidden 
and remote 3 thing there is no knowledge by ordinary percep- 
tion. Furthermore we cannot assert that this particular has no 
validity and does not exist. Therefore this particular as object, 
whether it belong to a subtile element or to the Self, is apper- 

1 See iii. 51. 2 Patanjala Rahasyam gives the gloss : atma-tattwm. 

3 Compare Samkh. Kar. vii. 



95] Normative insight [ i. 49 

ceptible by the concentrated insight only. Consequently this 
insight has an object other than [the object of] the insight result- 
ing from a thing heard or from inference, inasmuch as its intended- 
object is a particular. 

The objection is made, ' This may be true. But the super-reflective [balanced- 
state] which is produced by perfection of impressions whose objects ' refer to that 
which is known by verbal-communication or by inference can refer (gocarayet) 
only to the objects of verbal-communication and of inference. For surely a sub- 
liminal impression derived from the experience of one object is not able to pro- 
duce knowledge with regard to another. For that would be an unwarranted 
assumption. Therefore if the super-reflective [balanced -state] is truth-bearing, 
verbal communications and inferences must also be assumed to be this [that is, 
truth-bearing].' In reply to this he says 49. Has an object other than the 
insight resulting from things heard or from inferences inasmuch as its 
intended'Object is a particular. For the sattva of the thinking-substance is 
naturally bright ; although it has the power of seeing all intended-objects, it 
becomes obscured by tamas ; only when by rajas it is set-free-to-stream-forth, then 
only does it know [the object]. But when by practice and passionlessness the 
defilement of rajas and tamas is cast off and it shines forth spotlessly clear, then 
passing beyond the limits of all measures (mana) and of all things measurable 
{meya) and having endless brightness what then, pray, can there be that is not 
within its scope ? He explains [the sutra] in the words <A thing heard is know- 
ledge derived from verbal-communication. This deals with generic objects. 
Why? For a particular cannot be connoted by a verbal-communication.2> 
For what reason ? Because a word does not have its conventional usage estab- 
lished by a particular, since [the word] is an infinite and since it has a too-wide- 
pervasion {vydbMcara). For we do not perceive the relation of word and thing 
expressed in connexion with any particular instance of this [word]. And 
furthermore the sense of the sentence cannot be such a particular. Even in case 
of an inference which depends for its origin upon the knowledge of the relation 
between the syllogistic-mark {lingo) and the subject-of-the-proposition (lingin), the 
same procedure holds good, as he says ^Similarly inference.^ In the expression 
^where there is no getting to a placed the words where and there should 
by logical conversion be made to indicate the pervaded and the pervader. There- 
fore here by an inference we get a conclusion in generic [terms only]. He sums 
up with the word CTherefore.) It might be admitted that then we have 
ordinary perception irrespective of a knowledge of the relation [between the 
word and the thing-expressed] and that this [perception] does not deal with 
generic objects only. In reply to this he says, <And of this . . . no. It may 
not be admitted that ordinary perception depends upon a knowledge of the rela- 
tion [of word and thing-expressed] ; but it must be admitted that it depends upon 

1 The sequence is, first an anubhava, next a samskara, and then a smrti. 



i. 49 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [96 

the senses. And with this [higher insight] the senses have no pre-established 
harmony. This is the meaning. It is objected that if the individual is not 
within the scope of verbal-communications and inferences and perceptions, then 
it does not exist. For there is no source-of-valid-ideas for [it]. In reply to this 
he says ^Furthermore . . . not. For a source-of-valid-ideas is not [necessarily] 
a pervader nor a cause of the object-of-knowledge (prameya) to the extent that, if 
that [source-of-valid-ideas] should cease, the [object-of-knowledge] would cease to 
be. For surely, when the moon is a slender crescent (Jcaldvant), those who accept 
sources-of- valid-ideas do not doubt the real existence of the deer 1 which is situated 
in the other part [of the moon's surface not then visible]. CTherefore, for this 
reason it is apperceptible by the concentrated insight only. And here the 
atoms and the selves which are subjected to [this] discussion are endowed with a 
particularity peculiar to themselves, because, being substances, they are distinct 
from each other. Whatever things, being substances, are distinct from each 
other, these are endowed with particularity peculiar to themselves, like a cripple 
or a man with a shaven head. According to this inference, and to the verbal-com- 
munication which is devoted to teaching what the truth-bearing insight is, [the 
peculiar individuality of this insight has been defined]. Although the individual 
is described, still in the absence of such a description doubt might arise, because 
it has been obtained by a line-of-reasoning ; yet in so far as it is not far* or re- 
mote, this sattva is brought, with some difficulty, within the scope of verbal-com- 
munication or of inference. But they do not [make evident the existence of the 
particular] by as direct an experience as words of connexion, for instance, through 
their application of gender and number, [bring] the meaning of the word ' and ' 
[within the scope of verbal-communication or of inference]. Therefore it is 
established that [this insight] has an object other than the insights resulting from 
things heard or from inferences. 



When the yogin has gained concentrated insight, the subliminal- 
impression made by the insight is reproduced again and again. 
50. The subliminal-impression produced by this [super- 
reflective balanced-state] is hostile to other subliminal- 
impressions. 

The subliminal-impression arising from concentrated insight inhi- 
bits the latent-impression from the emergent subliminal-impres- 
sion. After emergent subliminal-impressions have been repressed, 

1 Compare Subhasitaratnabhandagaram which there results a generic idea 

(Nir. Sag. fourth ed.), p. 318, no. 162, (samdnyato bodhayatah) ; and of 're- 

b.v. ankath ke 'pi. See also Kuvalaya- mote ', that from which there results 

nanda Karika (Nir. Sag. ed.), p. 27 4 . no particular idea vifesato na bodh- 

* According to Patanjala Rahasyam the ayata iti. 
meaning of 'not far' is that from 



97] Inhibition of emergent subliminal-impressions [ i. 50 

the presented-ideas arising from them do not occur. When 
presented-ideas are restricted, concentration follows after. Then 
concentrated insight ; after that, subliminal-impressions made from 
insight ; thus latent-impressions from subliminal-impressions are 
reproduced again and again. Thus first comes insight and then 
[follow] subliminal-impressions. How is it that this excess of sub- 
liminal-impressions will not provide the mind-stuff with a task ? 
[The answer is :] these subliminal-impressions made by the insight 
do not provide the mind-stuff with a task since they cause the 
dwindling of the hindrances. For they cause the mind-stuff to 
cease from its work. For the movement of the mind-stuff termi- 
nates at [the time of] discernment (khydti). 

* Let this be granted. Let the [concentration] conscious [of an object] have a 
reality as its object by the practice of the aforesaid means. But this concentrated 
insight may be obstructed by beginningless emergent subliminal-impressions in 
so far as it is closely enveloped [by them], like minute flashes [of light] from a 
lamp in the eddy of a whirling wind.' To remove this doubt he introduces the 
next sutra with the words ^concentrated insight.^ He recites the sutra 50. 
The subliminal-impression produced by this [super-reflective balanced- 
state] is hostile to other subliminal-impressions. The word <this> refers to the 
super-reflective balanced-state. The word <other> describes the emergence. It 
is the nature of thoughts to incline 1 to intended-objects as they really are. 
This instability continues unsteady only so long as it does not reach the reality 
[literally, that-ness]. After reaching that and because it has taken a stable 
position there, [this] idea from the subliminal-impression does most certainly 
inhibit the series of ideas from subliminal-impressions which refer to what is 
not reality, even although [this series] is beginningless and rolls on as the wheel 2 
of the series of [fluctuations and] subliminal-impressions. And in this sense 
outsiders 3 also say, " There is no inhibition of the unviolated essence of a thing- 
as-it^really-is by contradictions even although these latter be from time without 
beginning. For it is the nature of the mind to incline to things as they are." 
The objector would say, ' This may be true. We may admit that, as a result of 
concentrated insight, there is a restriction of a subliminal-impression produced 
during the emergent state. Still there exists uninjured (avikala) an excess of 
subliminal-impressions which is produced by concentration and which causes the 
generation of the concentrated insight. So the fact that the mind-stuff has a 
task still remains.' With this in mind, he raises an objection, How is it that 

1 Compare Sarhkh. Tatt. Kau. lxiv. tion is found in Vacaspatimicra's Bha- 

2 Compare i. 5, p. 20 2 (Calc. ed.). mat! (Jiban. ed.), p. 60 37 . 

3 Either Jains or Buddhists. The quota- 

1 3 [h.o.s. 17] 



i. 50 ] Booh I. Concentration or Samddhi [98 

this, which he removes with the words these ... do not. For the work of 
the mind-stuff is of two kinds, the enjoyment of sounds and other [perceptible] 
things (gdbdddi) and discriminative discernment. With regard to these two 
[kinds of work], the mind-stuff, when it has latent-impressions of karma from 
the hindrances, proceeds to the enjoyment of sounds and other [perceptible] 
things ; but for the mind, all of whose latent-impressions of karma from the 
hindrances have been uprooted by subliminal-impressions arising in insight, and 
whose state is that its task is nearly ended, the only work that remains is dis- 
criminative discernment. Accordingly subliminal-impressions from concentra- 
tion are not the reasons why the mind-stuff has enjoyment as its task. On the 
contrary they are hostile to that. They cause the mind-stuff to cease from its 
work ; they make it incapable [of that work] which has the character of enjoy- 
ment. This is the meaning. Why ? CFor the movement of the mind-stuff 
terminates at [the time of] discernment. Since in order to enjoy, the mind-stuff 
moves until it experiences discriminative discernment. But when discrimina- 
tive discernment has come to pass, hindrances cease and it has no longer the 
task of enjoyment. Consequently the complete quiescence of the task of enjoy- 
ment is the purpose for which subliminal-impressions from insight exist. It is 
this that has been stated here. 



What further does he gain ? 

51. When this [subliminal-impression] also is restricted, 
since all is restricted, [the yogin gains] seedless concentra- 
tion. 

This [seedless concentration] is counter not only to concentrated 
insight but is opposed even to subliminal-impressions made in 
insight. Why? Because the subliminal-impression produced by 
restriction inhibits the subliminal-impressions produced by concen- 
tration. The existence of subliminal-impressions made by the 
mind-stuff in restriction may be inferred from the experience of the 
lapse of time during which there is stability (sthiti) of the restric- 
tion. Together with the subliminal-impressions which arise out 
of the emergent and restricted concentrations and which are con- 
ducive to Isolation, the mind-stuff resolves itself into its own per- 
manent primary-matter. Therefore these subliminal-impressions 
are counter to the mind-stuff's task and are not causes of its 
stability. Consequently, its task ended, together with the sub- 
liminal-impressions which are conducive to Isolation, the mind- 
stuff ceases [from its task]. When it ceases, the Self abides in 
himself and is therefore called pure and liberated. 



99] Attainment of Isolation [ i. 51 

He asks, What further ? What does he also gain ? [Since] the mind-stuff 
contains subliminal-impressions [produced] in insight, it has, as before, in 
so far as it is capable of generating a stream of insight, a task [to fulfil]. Thus 
to remove the task something else is also still required. This is the meaning. 
He gives the answer in the sutra 51. When this [subliminal-impression] also 
is restricted, since all is restricted, [the yogin gains] seedless concentration. 
The higher passionlessness, 1 which has as its distinguishing characteristic the 
undisturbed calm of perception, by an increase in subliminal-impressions restricts 
even those subliminal-impressions made by insight and not merely the insight 
[itself]. This is the meaning of the word even. Since the whole stream of 
subliminal-impressions as it rises [into consciousness] is restricted, [then,] in- 
asmuch as there is no cause, no effect can be produced. This same is seedless 
concentration. He explains [the sutra] in the words This [seedless concen- 
tration]. <KThis is seedless concentration arising out of higher passionless- 
ness, which is counter to concentrated insight, and which with the help of itself 
as cause 2 becomes not only counter to concentrated insight, but also contra- 
dictory to subliminal-impressions made by insight. It might be objected that, 
' A distinct-idea (vijnana) produced by passionlessness would, since a distinct-idea 
is real, inhibit what is insight and nothing more. But how does it inhibit a 
subliminal-impression which is different in kind from a distinct-idea? For 
evidently a man even when awake has a memory of the object seen in [his] 
dream. [Therefore subliminal-impressions are not inhibited].' With this in 
mind he asks, Why? He gives the answer in the words ^produced by 
restriction.^ Eestriction is that by which insight is restricted. It is the higher 
passionlessness. Produced from this it is [called] a subliminal-impression produced 
by restriction. Only by the subliminal-impression produced by the higher passion- 
lessness when it has been cultivated for a long time and uninterruptedly and 
with earnest attention, and not by a distinct-idea, are the subliminal-impressions 
of insight inhibited. This is the meaning. The objector continues, 'This 
may be so. But what is the source-of- valid-ideas for the existence of subliminal- 
impressions produced by restriction ? It might be either perceived directly, or 
inferred from memory, its effect. And when all the [mind-stuff's] fluctuations are 
restricted, the yogin has no perception nor yet memory, forasmuch as, in so far as 
he has destroyed all fluctuations whatsoever, it is impossible for him to produce 
a memory.' In reply to this he says, in restriction. The stability of the 
restriction is the restricted state of the mind-stuff. [The existence of subliminal- 
impressions is proved] by an experience of the lapse of time in [periods of J eight- 
and-forty minutes (muhurta) or half-a-watch or a whole watch, or a day and night 
and so forth. What he means to say is this : according to the degree of the perfec- 
tion in passionlessness and in practice, perfection of restriction is experienced by 
the yogin. And the moments of the higher passionlessness, in so far as they are 

1 Patanjala Rahasyam identifies this with dharma-megha. 

2 As explained in i. 18. 



i. 51] Book I. Concentration or Samadhi [100 

not related to each other in a fixed sequence, are not capable, in so far as they 
last for various periods of time, of producing the full excellence of restriction. 
So the point is that we must admit that there is a permanent accumulation of 
subliminal-impressions produced by the accumulations of the various moments of 
passionlessness. The objector says, ' Subliminal impressions from insight may 
perish, but why should the subliminal-impression from restriction perish with 
them ; or if it does not perish, [then the mind-stuff would still] have its task [to 
perform].' In reply to this he says, Cout of the emergent. [This is the 
analysis of the compound :] conscious [concentration] has {tasya) both emergence 
and the concentration of emergence which restricts this [emergence]. The sub- 
liminal-impressions arising out of these two are the subliminal -impressions which 
are conducive to Isolation. [And these are the same as] those produced by re- 
striction. The subliminal-impressions of emergent insight are resolved into 
mind-stuff. Thus the mind-stuff contains subliminal-impressions of emergent 
insight. But the subliminal-impression from restriction lies (aste) just uprisen 
in the mind-stuff. Although [this] subliminal-impression is [uprisen], the 
mind-stuff has no task [to fulfil]. For the mind-stuff has its task [to fulfil] 
when it is bringing to pass the two purposes of the Self, the experience of sounds 
and other [perceptible things] and the discriminative discernment. Such are the 
two purposes of the Self. But when nothing is left but subliminal-impressions 
[of restriction], now that the Self is not assimilated-by-reflection 1 (pratisam- 
vedm) to the thinking-substance, this is not one of the purposes of the Self. 
On the other hand, in the case of the discarnate and of those [whose bodies] are 
resolved-into-primary-matter, the mind-stuff, not only in so far as it is conducive 
to restriction, but also in so far as it is pervaded (vdsita) with hindrances, still 
has its task [to fulfil]. With this in mind he says Consequently. The rest 
is easy. 

The announcement (uddega) and the definition (nirdega) of Yoga, the characteristic- 
mark of the fluctuations which exist for the sake of this [Yoga], the means of 
Yoga and its subdivisions, [these] have been sketched in this Book. 



Of Patanjali's Yoga-treatise entitled Exposition of Samkhya 
(Sdmlchya-pravacana), the First Book, on Concentration. 

Of the Explanation of the Comment on Patanjali's-Treatise, which Explanation 
is entitled Clarification of Entities (Tattva-Vaigaradi) and was composed by the 
Venerable Vacaspatimicra, the First Book, on Concentration, is finished. 



1 Compare pp. 22 1 ; 66 s ; 138 9 ; 152*; and 305 2 (Calcutta ed.). 



BOOK SECOND 
MEANS OF ATTAINMENT 



BOOK SECOND 
MEANS OF ATTAINMENT 

It has been stated what the yoga is of one whose mind is concen- 
trated. [This sutra] gives the start to the problem [which considers] 
how even one whose mind-stuff is emergent may be concentrated 
(yukta) in concentration (yoga). 

1. Self-castigation and study and devotion to the Icvara 
are the Yoga of action. 

Yoga is not perfected in him who is not self-castigated. Impurity 
which is variegated with subconscious-impressions (vdsand), from 
time without beginning, coming from the hindrances and from karma, 
and into which [the meshes of] the net of objects have [there- 
fore] found entrance, is not reduced (sambhedam dpadyate) except 
by <self-castigation.> This is the use 1 of self-castigation. And 
this [kind of self-castigation], not being inhibitory to the undis- 
turbed calm of the mind-stuff, is therefore deemed [by great sages] 
to be worthy of his (anena, the yogin s) earnest attention. <Recita- 
tion> is the repetition 2 of purifying formulae such as the Mystic 
Syllable (pranava) or the study of books on Liberation. <Devo- 
tion to the Icvara> is the offering 3 up of all actions to the Supreme 
Teacher or the renunciation of the fruit of [all] these [actions]. 
If it be objected that the First Book described yoga with its means [and] with 
its subordinate divisions [and] with its results, and that no reason remains 
why a Second Book should be begun, he replies in the words has been 
stated. For in the First Book practice and passionlessness were described 
as means to yoga. And since these two, for one whose [mind-stuff] is 
emergent, do not instantly come into being, he stands in need of the means 
taught in the Second Book in order to purify the sattva. For by these he 
quite purifies the sattva and performs the protective ordinances and daily 

1 Similarly i. 41, p. 85 B (Calc. ed.). 3 Contrast this with i. 23 and see also Linga 

See ii. 44 and compare Linga Pur. viii. 39. Pur. viii. 40. 



ill ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [104 

cultivates practice and passionlessness. The state of being concentrated is the 
state of being undistracted. How could even a man whose mind-stuff is 
emergent be, because concentrated (yuMa) by the means which are to be taught, 
a yogin? This is the meaning. From among those observances which are 
to be described, having made a selection [of some] as being rather more service- 
able to the beginner, the author of the sutras first of all teaches [what] the 
yoga of action [is]. 1. Self-castigation and study and devotion to the 
Icvara are the Yoga of action. Action which is itself yoga is the yoga of 
action since it is a means-of-effecting yoga. Therefore, in the Visnu Purana, 
in the dialogue between Khandikya and Kecidhvaja, starting with the passage, 1 
1 At first the yogin who is [just] beginning to apply himself is called a novice 
(yoga-yuj),' self-castigation and recitation and the like are set forth. With the 
words Cin him who is not self-castigated^ he shows by a negative instance 
that self-castigation is a means. By the words ^from time without beginning^ 
he shows that self-castigation has a subsidiary function which is serviceable 
as a means 2 [of attaining yoga]. Variegated by reason of the subconscious- 
impressions, from time without beginning, coming from hindrances and from 
karma, [and] therefore that in which [the meshes of] the net of objects have 
found entrance, that is, inserted themselves, impurity, which is the excess of 
rajas and tamas, is not thoroughly reduced without self-castigation. Keduction 
is the thorough thinning out of that which was closely woven. The objection is 
raised: 'Even if we have recourse to self-castigation, still in so far as it 
causes disorders of the humours it is hostile to yoga ; how then is it a means 
[to attain] this [yoga]?' In reply to this he says, And this 8 [kind]. 
Self-castigation should be performed only so long as it does not bring on 
a disorder 4 of the humours. This is the meaning. Such as the Mystic 
Syllable that is, such as, the Hymn to the Purusa [EV. x. 90] or the Kudra- 
mandala 6 or a Brahmana or the like from the Vedas, or the Brahma-parayana 6 
from the Puranas. Icvara, that is, the Supreme Teacher, the Exalted, to 
him. With regard to Whom this 7 hath been said, "Whatever I do, whether 
auspicious or inauspicious, whether intentionally or unintentionally, all that 
is committed unto Thee. Moved by Thee I do [it all]." Kenunciation of the 
fruit of [all] these [actions] is doing the actions without attachment to the 
fruit [thereof]. And with regard to this it hath been said, 8 "You are concerned 
with actions only and never with fruits. Do not be one whose motive is the 
fruit of actions. Nor let your attachment be to inaction." 



1 VP. vi. 7. 33. See also Naradiya Pur. xlvii. homamantras, Taittiriya-samhita iv. 5, 

* Literally, is serviceable by being a means, Vajasaneyi-samhita xvi, Kathaka xvii. 

updyatd^upayoginam. 6 Refers perhaps to Visnu Purana i. 15. 

8 As opposed, for instance, to VP. ii. 11. 7 Vijnana Bhiksu calls this smrti. 



Compare i. 30, p. 67* (Calc. ed.). 8 Bhagavad Gita ii. 47. 

This seems to refer to the (^atarudriya- 



105] Purposes of the yoga of action [ ii. 2 

Now this yoga of action is 

2. For the cultivation of concentration and for the attenua- 
tion of the hindrances. 

For when the yoga of action is given earnest attention, it cultivates 
concentration ; attenuates the hindrances to an extreme degree ; 
[and] will make the hindrances, when they are extremely attenuated, 
disqualified for propagation, like seeds burned by the fire of Eleva- 
tion (prasamkhydna). But the subtile insight, which is the dis- 
criminative discernment between the sattva and the Self, untouched 
by the hindrances because they are so much attenuated, with its 
task finished, will be ready for inverse-propagation x (pratiprasava). 
In order to mention the purpose of this [yoga of action] he introduces the 
sutra with the words For the. 2. For the cultivation 2 of concentration 
and for the attenuation of the hindrances. It is objected that if the yoga 
of action alone is able to attenuate the hindrances, then there is no need of 
Elevation. To this he replies with the words the extremely attenuated.^ 
The yoga of action operates only for the extreme attenuation, but not for the 
sterilization of the hindrances, but Elevation [operates] for the sterilization 
of those [hindrances]. The words like burned seeds indicate that the 
burned seeds of winter rice [and the hindrances] are of the same kind in so 
far as both are sterile. The objector says, ' This may be true. But if Elevation 
alone can disqualify the hindrances from propagation, then there is no need 
for their attenuation.' In reply to this he says, of these. For if the 
hindrances are not attenuated, the discriminative discernment between the 
sattva and the Self, submerged (grasta) by mighty foes, is incapable even of 
uprising, still less of sterilizing them. But when the hindrances are quite 
thinned out and impotent, [the discernment], although in opposition to them, 
does, with the aid of passionlessness and of practice, finally arise. And when 
the discernment which is nothing more than the [sense] of the difference 
between the sattva and the Self is finally arisen, it is un-touched by them, 
that is, not overwhelmed by them, for just so long as it is not touched 
[by them]. The subtile insights is so-called, because its object is subtile 
inasmuch as its object is beyond the range of the senses. CWill be ready 
for inverse-propagation, that is, for resolution. Why? Because its task 
is finished. [In other words,] that is said to be of this kind by which, acting 
as a cause, the task of giving starts to the effects of the aspects (guna) has 
been finished. 



1 Compare ii. 2, p. 107 8 ; ii. 10, p. 120 1 ; 2 Deussen's excellent rendering of this word 
ii. 27, p. 167* ; iii. 50, p. 265 2 ; iv. 34, is Verinnerlichung. 

p. 319 2 (Calc. ed.). 

14 [a.o.8. 17] 



ii. 3 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sadhana [106 

Now what are these x hindrances and (vd) how many are they ? 
3. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyd) and the feeling- 
of-personality and passion and aversion and the will-to- 
live are the five 2 hindrances. 

This means that the so-called hindrances are five misconceptions 
[i. 8]. These when flowing out make the authority (adhikdra) of 
the aspects (guna) more rigid ; make a mutation more stable ; swell 
the stream of effects and causes ; and, becoming interdependent 
upon one another for aid, bring forth the fruition of karma. 
He raises a question by saying Now and replies [to it] by the sutra 
upon ^Undifferentiated-consciousness.^ 3. Undifferentiated-consciousness 
(avidyd) and the feeling-of-personality and passion and aversion and the 
will-to-live are the five hindrances. He explains the word hindrances 
by the words Cfive misconceptions.^ Undifferentiated-consciousness, to begin 
with, is nothing but misconception. The feeling-of-personality and the others 
also have undifferentiated-consciousness as their material cause, [and] since 
they cannot exist without it, [they too] are misconceptions. And hence when 
undifferentiated-consciousness is destroyed, there would follow the destruction 
of them also. He mentions the reason why they should be destroyed, in that 
they are the cause of the round-of-rebirths. This he states in the word 
CThese. When flowing out [that is] moving* continuously forth, make 
the authority of the aspects more rigid,^ that is, more powerful ; [and] in 
consequence make a mutation [more] stable. For in successive forms as 
unphenomenalized [primary matter] and as the Great [thinking-substance] 
and as the personality-substance, they swell, that is, they intensify, the stream 
of cause and effect. He shows for what purpose they do all this in the words 
Cone another.^ The [three] fruitions of karma, distinguished [ii. 13] as 
being birth and length of life and kind of experience, have their purpose (artha) 
in the Self. That [purpose] those hindrances bring to pass, that is, accomplish. 
Do they accomplish this singly ? He says, ' No.' But upon one another for 
aid,^ that is, the hindrances [aided] by the karmas, and the karmas [aided] by 
the hindrances. 



4. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyd) is the field for 
the others whether they be dormant or attenuated or 
intercepted or sustained. 

Of these [five], undifferentiated-consciousness is the field [or] 
propagative soil. The others are feeling-of-personality and the rest 

1 Many MSS. omit te. 2 Many MSS. omit panca. 

8 Compare ii. 4, p. HO 8 ; iii. 13, p. 207*. 



107] Varieties of undifferentiated-consciousness [ ii. 4 

[of the five hindrances]. In four kinds of forms, the dormant and 
the attenuated and the intercepted and the sustained. 1. Of these 
[four], what is the dormant state ? It is the tendency [of the 
hindrances] which remain merely potential in the mind towards' the 
condition of seed. The awakening of that [dormant hindrance] is 
the coming face-to-face with the [particular] object [which makes 
that dormant hindrance manifest]. But for one who has [reached] 
Elevation (prasamkhydna), and whose hindrances have become 
burned seed, there is not that [awakening of the hindrances] even 
when he is brought face-to-face with the object [which manifests 
them]. For out of what can burned seed germinate ? For this 
reason the fortunate (kugala) man whose hindrances have dwindled 
away is said to be in his last * body (caramadeha). In him only 
the burned state of the seeds, the fifth stage of the hindrances [is 
found], and not in other [persons]. So although the hindrances 
are existent, the vitality (sdmarthya) of the seed is said to be 
already burned. Accordingly, even when the object is face-to-face, 
there is no awakening of these [hindrances]. Thus dormancy and 
the failure of the burned seed to propagate have been described. 
2. Attenuation is now described. The hindrances, when over- 
powered (upahata) by the cultivation of their opposites, 2 become 
attenuated. 3. When this is the case, [the other hindrances] inter- 
cept [the attenuated hindrances] repeatedly, and move forth actively 
again in this or that [unattenuated] form (atmana). In that case 3 
they are called intercepted. How is this % Since [for instance] 
when one is in love, no anger is felt, inasmuch as, when one is in 
love, anger does not actively move forth ; and love, when felt in 
one direction, is by no means unfelt towards another object. When 
Chaitra is known to be in love with one woman, it is not assumed 
that he is out of love for other women. Rather, his love finds its 
fluctuation fixed in this direction, in other directions its fluctuation 
is yet to come. For this [third fluctuation] is for the moment both 
dormant and attenuated and intercepted. 4. That fluctuation 
which is fixed upon an object is sustained (uddra). No one of all 

1 See VP. v. 10. 7 and Bh. Gita viii. 26. s When they form a succession oftanu and 

2 See ii. 33. atanu. 



ii. 4 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [108 

these [four] passes beyond the limits of the hindrances [and there- 
fore all four are to be rejected]. If this is so (tarhi), what is this 
hindrance that is intercepted [or] dormant [or] attenuated or 
sustained ? The answer-is-now-given (ucyate). It is exactly true 
[that all hindrances are forms of undifferentiated-consciousness]. 
But only when these [hindrances] are particularized, do they 
become intercepted and so on. For just as these stages cease 
when their opposites are cultivated, so they become manifest 
(abhivyaJcta) when [changed] into the phenomenal-form (anjana) 
by the operation of their phenomenalizing-conditions (yyanjaka). 
So all those hindrances without exception are varieties of 
undifferentiated-consciousness. Why is this ? Since it is un- 
differentiated-consciousness and nothing else that pervades 1 all 
[hindrances]. Whatever [perceptible] object is given a form by 
the undifferentiated-consciousness, it is that [object] which is per- 
meated 2 by the hindrances. Whenever there is a misconceived 
idea, they become apperceived ; and when undifferentiated-con- 
sciousness dwindles, they too dwindle away. 

He shows that hindrances are to be rejected in that they have their root in 
undifferentiated-consciousness. 4. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) is 
the field for the others whether they be dormant or attenuated or inter- 
cepted or sustained. When he asks <Kl. Of these [four], what is the dormant 
state ? his intention is to say that there is no proof for the real existence of 
hindrances, if they are not performing their peculiar purposeful activity. He 
tells the answer in the words in the mind. The hindrances may not indeed 
perform their purposeful activity, but in the case of the discarnate and of those 
[whose bodies] are resolved into primary matter, they assume the form of seed 
and exist merely potentially, as curds exist in milk. For other than discrimina- 
tive insight there is nothing to cause the sterility of these [hindrances]. Hence 
the discarnate and those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary matter, who 
have not obtained discriminate discernment, have their hindrances dormant, 
until such time as [these hindrances] reach the time of their limitation. But 
when they reach that, since the hindrances revert once more, they come face-to- 
face with the various objects [of sense]. Thus these [hindrances] are those of 
which the basis is merely potential. In this way their potential rising [into 
consciousness] is described. By the words tendency . . . towards the condition 

1 BalarSma says, ' Undifferentiated - con- 2 Balarama explains the word anugerate 
sciousnesB is inseparably -connected by saying ' become inherent in ' (ami- 

with hindrances ' (klegesv avidyanviya). gata bhavanti). 



109] Undifferentiated-consciousness the source of hindrances [ ii.4 

of seed their potentiality of action is indicated. To meet the question why, 
in the case even of one who has discriminative discernment, hindrances are not 
dormant, he says, for one who has [reached] Elevation.^ <ln his last body, 
in other words, in his case no other body will be produced with reference to 
which [this] body of his could be called prior. <KNot in other persons,^ in other 
words, not in the discarnate and similar cases. An objection is raised, ' Since 
there is no total destruction of any existing thing, what, we ask, becomes of the 
force of the magical powers of this kind of yoga? Are not the hindrances 
awakened when face-to-face with objects ? ' In reply to this, he says, existent. 
Although the hindrances are existent, still in their state as seeds they are burned 
by the fire of Elevation (prasamJihydna). This is the meaning. 2. The opposite 
of the hindrances is the yoga of action ; by the cultivation, by the following up, 
of this, the hindrances become overpowered, that is, attenuated. Or we may say 
that thinking-focused-to-a-point {sarhyag-jndna) is the opposite of undifferentiated- 
consciousness ; that the knowing of distinctions is [the opposite] of the feeling- 
of-personality ; that the detached attitude (madhyasthya) is [the opposite] of 
passion and aversion ; [and] that the cessation of the thought of continuance is 
[the opposite] of the will-to-live. 3. He describes the interception with the 
words ^CWhen this is the case. Either because overcome by any one of the 
hindrances which moves actively forth, or because resorting excessively to objects, 
they intercept repeatedly and move actively forth in one form or another, that 
is, come into appearance (avirbhavcmti), either as the result of using aphrodisiacs 
and the like or as the result of the weakness of [the other hindrances] which 
overcome it. By the repetition he signifies the reiteration of the interruption 
and of the moving actively forth. Thus the difference [of this] from the afore- 
said dormant [hindrance] has been described. When love moves actively forth, 
anger which is different in kind is overpowered ; or again love itself set upon 
one object overpowers, though like in kind, another love which is set upon 
a different object. This he states by the word love. The fluctuation which 
is yet to come is to be understood as having a three-fold course according to 
circumstances. With this in mind he says, For this. The pronoun [' this'] 
refers only to the hindrance from the fluctuation which is yet to come ; it does 
not refer to Chaitra's love, just because that [love] is intercepted. 4. He describes 
the sustained [hindrance] in the words upon an object.^ If some one 
suggests as an objection that the sustained [hindrance], since it hinders men, 
might be [properly] called a hindrance, but that the others do not hinder [and so 
can] by no means be called hindrances, he says in reply all these [four]. They 
do not pass beyond the limits of the hindrances, that is, beyond the limits of the 
thing expressed by the word hindrance, when they become changed into the 
sustained state. Therefore they too are to be rejected. This is the point. 
Presupposing the unity of the hindrances ! he raises an objection in the words 

1 Literally, Presupposing a unity in so far as the quality of being a hindrance goes. 



ii. 4 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana 



[110 



If this is so, what. He rebuts it by showing that although they are of the 
same kind in so far as they are hindrances, they are particular because of the 
different previously described states. This he does in the words The answer- 
is-now-given. It is true. The objector says, 1 ' This may be true. The 
hindrances may result from undifferentiated-consciousness ; still why should they 
cease when undifferentiated-consciousness ceases? For surely no one would 
suppose that a piece of cloth ceases to be, when the weaver ceases to be.' In 
reply to this he says <Kall these . . . without exception.^ The distinctions 2 are 
only apparently distinctions, that is to say, they do not exist separably from 
this [undifferentiated-consciousness]. He asks a question in the words <KWhy 
is this ? He gives the reply in the words all [hindrances]. This same 
point is made clear by the word whatever. Is given a form [that is] is 
falsely attributed. ^The rest is easy. 

' In the case of those who have been resolved into entities, the hindrances are 
dormant ; for yogins, attenuated ; and in case of those attached to objects, 
hindrances are intercepted or sustained.' This is the summarizing-stanza. 3 



At this point undifferentiated-consciousness itself is described. 
5. The recognition of the permanent, of the pure, of pleasure, 
and of a self in what is impermanent, impure, pain, and not- 
self is undifferentiated-consciousness. 

1. It is the recognition of the permanent 4 in an impermanent 
effect, for example, that the earth should be perpetual, that the 
sky with the moon and stars should be perpetual, that celestial 
beings are deathless. 2. Likewise in the impure and highly re- 
pulsive 5 body there has been the recognition of purity. And it 



Namely, in reply to the hedgings which 

in the Comment follow 4Clt is true)^. 
Compare Kav. Prak. Ullasa iii. and the 

verse quoted in the comment on Appa- 

yadiksita's Kuvalayanandakarika p. II 1 

(Nirnaya Sag. ed., 1903) : 

Gaganam gaganakaram 
sagardh sdgaropamah 

Bamaravanayor yuddhath 
ramaravanayor iva. 
Discussed in Patanjali's Mahabhasya 

(Kielhorn's ed.), p. 6". The application 

is only general here. 
The parallel between this and the dis- 



cussion in Aryadeva's Catuhcataka is 
very striking. The concept of avidya 
is fundamental in the Mahayana. Arya- 
deva is said to be the pupil of Nagar- 
juna ; consequently he wrote a couple 
of centuries before PataSjali. We are 
indebted for this important discovery 
to Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasad 
Shastri (Notes on the newly -found 
Manuscript Chatuhsatika by Aryadeva, 
Journal Asiatic Society of Bengal, New 
Series, vol. vii, no. 7, 1911, p. 431). 
8 Compare Maitrl Up. iii. 4. 



Ill] Four errors of undifferentiated-consciousness [ ii.5 

has been said, " Because of its [first] abode [and] because of its 
origin [and] because of its sustenance [and] because of its exuda- 
tions [and] because of its decease and because it needs [constant] 
cleaning, the learned recognize that the body is impure." Here 
the recognition of the pure in the impure is evident. If we say, 
This girl, beautiful as the sickle of the new moon, her limbs 
formed of honey and nectar, her eyes large as the petals of the 
blue lotus, seeming to refresh the living world with her coquettish 
glances, so that we think that she has issued forth from the moon,' 
then what could be the connexion of this [body] with that (kena) 
[to which it is compared] ? Just so 1 it is that there is a miscon- 
ceived idea of the pure in the impure. In this way, [by showing 
the recognition of the pure in the impure, one sees that there is] 
the [misconceived] idea of merit where there is only demerit and of 
the useful where there is only the useless. 3. Similarly [Patafijali] 
will describe 2 the recognition of pleasure in pain in the words, " By 
reason of the pains of mutations and of anguish and of subliminal- 
impressions and by reason of the opposition of fluctuations of the 
aspects (guna) to the discriminating all is nothing but pain." Un- 
differentiated-consciousness is the recognition that there is pleasure 
in this [pain]. 4. Likewise the recognition of a self in the not-self, 
either in external aids 3 whether animate or inanimate, or in the 
body as the seat of outer experience, or in the central-organ which 
aids the Self, this is the recognition of a self in the not-self. In 
this sense it has been said of this, " He who counts any existing 
thing, whether phenomenalized or unphenomenalized [primary 
matter], as himself; or who rejoices in the success of these (tasya) 
[things], deeming it his own success, or who grieves at the ill- 
success of these [things], deeming it his own ill-success, these (sa) 
are all unenlightened." It is this four-fold undifferentiated-con- 
sciousness which becomes the root of that unbroken-series (santdna) 
of hindrances and of latent-impressions of karma together with its 
fruition. And this undifferentiated-consciousness (a-vidyd), pre- 

1 Compare the tale in Henry Warren's s Balarama says ' Such as sons or cattle or 

Buddhism in Translations, p. 297. servants or beds or seats, which are 

2 See ii. 15. not the self. 



ii. 5 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [112 

cisely as in the case of a foe (a-rnitra) or of a trackless forest (<x- 
gospada), is to be conceived as a really existing object (vastusa- 
tattva). Just as a foe (amitra) is not a negative friend [and] not 
something amounting to a friend, but the opposite of this [friend], 
a rival, so too a trackless forest 1 (a-gospada) is not [a place] 
not-visited-by-cows (gospada-abhdva), nor again is it merely a 
[quantity of] land which has a cow's foot as its measure, but, on 
the contrary, it is nothing less than a definite place, a different 
thing, other than these two [and the opposite of a cow's footprint]. 
Precisely so, undifferentiated-consciousness is not a source-of- valid- 
ideas nor the negation of a source-of- valid-ideas, but another kind 
of thinking the reverse of knowledge. 

5. The recognition of the permanent, of the pure, of pleasure, and of a 
self in what is impermanent, impure, pain, and not-self is undifferentiated- 
consciousness. 1. The word <Seffect is a qualification which serves [to 
indicate] the impermanence. Some indeed, deeming the elements permanent and 
longing to attain to the form of these, pay devotion even to these. Thus deeming 
the moon and sun and stars and heavenly regions permanent, in order to attain 
these, they pay devotion to the Paths [that is, the Way of the Fathers and the 
Way of the Gods] which begin with the Smoke. Similarly deeming the celestial 
beings, that is, the gods, to be deathless, they drink soma in order to reach their 
condition. For it is written [EV. viii. 48. 3], "We have drunk the soma; we 
have become deathless." It is this recognition of the permanent in the imper- 
manent that is undifferentiated-consciousness. 2. ^Likewise in the impure and 
highly repulsive body when the sentence is only half-finished he recites a 
stanza (gatha) from Vyasa 2 to show the repulsiveness of the body. The words 
are Because of its [first] abode. The abode is the mother's womb polluted 
by such things as urine ; the seed is the mother's blood and the father's semen. 
The sustenance is formation into juices of the food eaten and drunk ; for by it 
the body is held together. Exudation is sweat. And death defiles the body of 
even a scholarly man. Inasmuch as a bath is required after his [dead body] is 
touched. An objector might say, 'If the body is impure, there is no use in 
cleansing it with earth and with water.' To this he replies because it needs 
[constant] cleaning. Although the body is naturally impure, purification must 
be applied [to it], just as women produce fragrance [by applyingj ointments 

1 This illustration occurs in Siddhanta 2. ' Measure ' pramane ; thus gospada- 

Kaumudi, 1060, on Pan. vi. 1. 145. matram = ksetram. 

The word has the two meanings given 2 PataSjali discusses the word Vdiyasikih 

in the Comment : 1. 'Not-visited ' in the first varttika on iv. 1. 97. 
(asevite) ; thus gospaddny = aranyani ; 



113] Undifferentiated-consciousness is something 'positive [ ii. 5 

to the body. He completes the half-finished statement by saying Here . . . 
in the impure. ) The meaning is that it is impure on the grounds stated 
before. He describes the recognition of purity [in the impure] by the words 
the new. CCoquettish is that which is playful as the result of an 
erotic-mood. What could be the connexion of the highly repulsive body, by 
a highly remote (mandatama) similarity, with such a thing as the sickle of the 
new moon ? tln this way,^ by showing the recognition of purity in the impure 
body of a woman. ^CWhere there is only demerits as in the case of murder 
(hinsa), there is [the discovery of] an idea of merit in things which liberate from 
the round-of-rebirths. Similarly in case of a thing that is useless, such as money, 
because of the amount of pains [required] for getting it and keeping it, it is 
explained that there is [a discovery of] the idea of the useful [in the useless]. 
All these in that they are abhorrent are impure. 3. ^Similarly ... in pain. 
Easy. 4. [Likewise ... in the not-self. Easy. It was Paiicacikha 1 who 
spoke of this in this way. The "phenomenalized" [primary-matter] is the ani- 
mate, such as sons or wives or cattle ; the " unphenomenalized " is the inanimate, 
such as beds or seats or food. ^These (so) are all unenlightened^ [that is] 
stupid. It is called four-fold (catuspada) because it has four parts (pada), four 
places [where it becomes phenomenalized]. It might be objected, ' There is 
also another kind of undifferentiated-consciousness which has as its object such 
[states] as loss 2 of the sense of orientation or as [the sight] of the firebrand [whirled 
about so as to be seen as a] circle. Undifferentiated-consciousness has [therefore] 
an indefinite number of parts. Why then say that it is four-fold ? ' In reply 
to this he says, <Kthe root ... of that. There may also be of course other 
undifferentiated-consciousnesses, but the undifferentiated-consciousness which is 
the seed of the round-of-rebirths has only four parts. 

An objector says, 'Undifferentiated-consciousness (a-vidya) might be a nega- 
tive determinative 3 compound (nah-samdsa). In which case, 1. the first member 
(a-) might be determinative (pradhana), as for example, without-flies (a-maksika) ; 
or 2. the final member might be determinative, as for example, not a-king's 
officer (a-rajapurusa) ; or 3. [the compound] might have a third thing as deter- 
minative, as for example, a flyless place (amaksika dega). This being the 
situation, if we suppose 1. that the first member is determinative, then un- 
differentiated consciousness (a-vidya) would be understood as a negation whereto 
an affirmative is expected 4 (prasajjya-pratisedha). And this [kind of a nega- 
tion] could not be the cause of such things as the hindrances. Or if we 

1 This is the fifth fragment according to * A negative connected with a verbal stem. 

Garbe : Festgruss an Roth, 1893, p. 78. See PataBjali : Mahabhasya (Kielhorn's 

See also Garbe's Introduction to his ed.)i. 215, last line; 221"; 319 12 ; 341 s ; 

translation of the Samkhya-Tattva- iii. 35, last line. See also the discussion 

Kaumudi, p. 7. in Apodeva: Mlmansa-nyaya-prakaca 

2 Compare i. 6, p. 21 5 (Calc. ed.). (1906), p. 109. There is also a chapter 

3 Pan. ii. 2. 6. on this in Vaiyakarana Bhusana. 

15 [h.o.8. it] 



/ 



i. 5 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [114 

suppose 2. that the final member is to be the determinative, then it is undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness that is to be particularized by the negation of something. 
And this [kind of] undifferentiated-consciousness would be destructive of such 
things as the hindrances and not the seed of them [because it would be 
a consciousness of the absence of something]. For it cannot be that the 
[member] subordinate (guna) to the determinative (pradhana) [member of the 
compound] should break down that determinate. Therefore in order to make 
sure that it does not break down the determinative, something irregular, [that is, 
the absence of something] must be supposed, on the other hand, to be found in 
the subordinate [member of the compound]. Accordingly, in order that un- 
differentiated-consciousness as such should not be broken down, another meaning 
must be given to the negative or [another] negative must be supplied. Or if we 
suppose, on the other hand, 3. that another thing be the determinative [to the 
compound], we should have to say that [undifferentiated-consciousness] is a state- 
of-mind (buddhi) in which knowledge (vidya) does not exist. And that could not 
be the seed of such things as the hindrances merely in so far as it is the absence 
of knowledge. For then a similar-state-of-things would also have to be admitted 
in the case of that [form of undifferentiated-consciousness] which is attained in 
the restriction when preceded by discriminative discernment, [since here too 
there is absence of knowledge]. Accordingly in all [these three] ways [it has 
been shown] that undifferentiated-consciousness is not the root of such things as 
the hindrances.' In reply to this he says, And this . . . has. A really 
existing objects is the state of existence of a real object, that is, really existing 
objectivity. So in this way [it is evident] that undifferentiated-consciousness is 
neither 1. a negation-whereto-an-affirmative-is-expected (prasajjya-pratisedha) ; 
nor again 2. nothing but [a defective kind of] knowledge ; nor even 3. is it 
a state-of-mind characterized as being the absence of this, [that is, knowledge] ; 
but 4. undifferentiated-consciousness is described as being misconceived thinking, 
the opposite of knowledge (vidya). For the relation of word and thing is 
determined by conforming to the [usage of the] world. And because [according 
to the usage] of the world even a [compound] whose final member is determina- 
tive and which is a negative compound and which suppresses (upamardalca) the 
thing to be described by the last word [of the compound] is now and then found 
in a sense contrary to this [final member as determinative] and [at the same 
time] suggested by this [final member], there is [therefore] in this case also 
an expressive-meaning (vrtti) in the sense of being contrary to this [knowledge]. 
He analyses the example Just as a foe (a-mitra) is not. [A foe] is not 
a negative friends nor again . . . amounting to a friend. Supply * at this 
point [in the text] ' Some other thing, but the approach of this, a rival.' 
So too a trackless forests is not a negative cow's 8 footprint, nor again is it 
merely a [quantity of] land which has a cow's foot as its measure ; but, on 

1 It would appear that Vacaspatimicra did J See the discussion s. v. gospadam in ^abda- 
not read the words kith tu .. . sapatnah. Kalpa-Druma. 



115] Mistake of the feeling-oj '-personality [ ii. 6 

the contrary, nothing less than a spacious place, the opposite [in extent] of a cow's 
foot and other than the two negative a-gospada [that is, 1. without footprints- 
of-the-cow, and 2. not-a-cow's footprint would form together the first negative 
cow's footprint ; and 3. land covered by a cow's footprint would form the second 
negative cow's footprint], in fact, a different thing [altogether, the trackless 
forest]. He applies this to the matter in hand which he is illustrating, with the 
words ^Precisely so. 

6. When the power of seeing and the power by which one 
sees have the appearance (iva) of being a single-self, [this is] 
the feeling-of-personality. 

The Self is the power of seeing ; the thinking-substance is the 
power by which one sees. The hindrance called the feeling-of- 
personality is a change by which these two appear to become 
a single essence (svarupa). When there is any kind of failure to 
distinguish him who has the power of the enjoyer from that which 
has the power of being enjoyed, which are as distinct as possible 
and as unconfused as possible, enjoyment is ready at hand. But 
when each has recovered its own essence, there is Isolation. How 
is it that [at that time there could be anything] that could be 
called enjoyment ? In this sense it has been said, 1 " He who 
should fail to see that the Self is other than the thinking-substance, 
distinct in nature and in character and in consciousness and in 
other respects, would make the mistake of putting his own 
thinking-substance in the place of that [Self]." 

Having said that undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) is the cause, he says that 
the feeling-of-personality is the effect, which [in its turn] is supreme (varisihd) 
over passion and the other [hindrances]. 6. When the power of seeing and 
the power by which one sees have the appearance of being a single-self, 
[this is] the feeling-of-personality. The seeing and that by which one sees are 
precisely the two powers of the two, the self and the not-self. That undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness (avidya) which is characterized as being the perception of 
a self in what is the not-self, and which has the appearance of being a single 
intended-object, but which, in the strict sense, is not a single self, this [avidya] 
is the feeling-of-personality. Instead of saying ' of seeing and of that by which 
one sees ', he uses the words <power of> in order to indicate the relation between 
them, that is, the capacity to be an enjoyer and to be objects to be enjoyed. 
He elaborates the sutra by saying The Self. It might be asked, ' Why, since 

1 This is the sixth fragment of Paficacikha according to Garbe. Compare Bh. Gita vi. 41. 



ii. 6 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [116 

they are perceived as identical, should they not he identical and why should [the 
appearance of] unity hinder the Self? ' In reply he says he who has the power 
of the enjoyer . . . that which has the power of being enjoyed.^ He who has 
the power of the enjoyer is the Self ; that which has the power of being enjoyed 
is the thinking-substance. These two are as distinct as possible. If it be asked, 
1 "Whence comes this distinction ? ' the reply is, 4Cas unconfused as possible.^ 
Immutability and other [qualities] are the properties of the Self ; mutability and 
other [qualities] are the properties of the thinking-substance. Thus there is no 
confusion. Thus by these words it is asserted that the identity, although 
presented-as-an-idea, is not in-the-strict-sense-real. The words ^failure to dis- 
tinguish^ state the fact that hindrances exist. After having given an affirmative 
[line of reasoning], he states a negative [line of reasoning] in the words <its own 
essence.^ The recovery is the discriminative discernment. That another also 
holds this same opinion he says in the words ln this sense it has been said^ 
byPaiicacikha that the thinking-substance. In nature^ means in its own 
self, which is, at all times whatsoever, pure [of aspects (gum)] ; in character^ 
means in its detachment ; 4Cin consciousness^ means in its intelligence 
(caitanya) ; whereas the thinking-subject is impure and not detached and inani- 
mate (jada). Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) is the mental state with 
regard to these two [to the effect that they are one] self. The mistake^ is a 
subliminal-impression generated by a previous undifferentiated-consciousness ; 
or else it is the tamas [quality], because undifferentiated-consciousness is tamas. 



7. Passion is that which dwells x upon pleasure. 

That greed [or] thirst [or] desire, on the part of one acquainted 
with pleasure, ensuing upon a recollection of pleasure, for either 
the pleasure or for the means of attaining it, is passion. 

When one feels the discrimination, such states as passion cease. So the feeling- 
of-personality brought to pass by undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) is the 
root (nidana) of such states as passion. Accordingly, directly after the feeling-of- 
personality he gives the distinguishing-characteristic of passion and of the rest 
[of the hindrances]. 7. Passion is that which dwells upon pleasure. Since 
memory [of pleasure] is impossible in the case of one unacquainted with pleasure, 
the text says ^acquainted with pleasure.^ Passion for a recollected pleasure 
ensues Cupon a recollection of pleasure.^ But while a pleasure is in experience 
there is no need of recollection. Since, however, the means for attaining 
pleasure are either remembered or perceived, the passion must ensue upon a 
recollection of pleasure. And even when the means of attaining pleasure are 

1 See the gloss sukham anu$ete visayikaroti (anukurvanti), p. 281" (Calc. ed.), and 

(Maniprabha). Compare i. 11, p. 38* the last words of the Bhasya on iv. 28 

(Calc. ed.). See also VScaspati's gloss with Balarama's note. 



117] Passion, aversion, will-to-live [ ii. 9 

perceived, it is only after remembering that one of this same kind is the source 
of pleasure that he infers that this one is a source of pleasure in so far as it is of 
the same kind. After this follows the desire. He explains the words <dwells 
upon> by the word That. 



8. Aversion 1 is that which dwells upon pain. 

That repulsion [or] wrath [or] anger, on the part of one acquainted 
with pain, ensuing upon a recollection of pain, for either the pain 
or for the means of attaining it, is aversion. 

8. Aversion is that which dwells upon pain. The words ^acquainted with 
pain are to be explained as [in the] previous [sutra]. He explains the words 
<d wells upon> by the word Cthat. Kepulsion in the sense that it repels. The 
same he elaborates by synonyms, [for instance,] <Kwrath. 



9. The will-to-live (abhinivega) sweeping on [by the force of] 
its own nature 2 exists in this form even in the wise. 

In all living beings this craving for one's self ceaselessly rises, 
1 May I not cease to live ! May I live 1 ' This craving for one's 
self does not arise except in one in whom the experience of death 
resides. And from [the existence] of this [hope] the experience of 
other births is made clear. And this is that well-known hindrance 
[called] the will-to-live. This [fear of death], inconceivable as a 
result of either perception or inference or verbal-communication, 
sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature, as a vision of extermi- 
nation, forces the inference that the pangs of death have already 
been experienced in previous births. And just as it is evident that 
this fear is to be found in the unspeakably stupid, so also even in 
the wise, who have some understanding of the prior limit [of 
human lives], [that is, the round-of-rebirths,] and of their final 

1 Professor Deussen quotes most appositely 2 See Ruyyaka : Alamkarasarvasva (Kavya- 

Spinoza, Ethica iii. 13, Scholion, Amor mala 35), p. 55 4 , interprets the word as 

nihil aliud est, quam laetitia concomi- meaning merely eo ipso or by its own 

tante idea causae externae ; et odium nature. Compare Ramananda Yati in 

nihil aliud, quam tristitia concomitant e Maniprabha (Benares Sanskrit Series), 

idea causae externae. 1903, p. 30 7 , vasana-asangah svarasah. 



ii. 9 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [118 

limit [that is, Isolation]. Why is this ? Because this subconscious- 
impression, the result of the fear of death, is alike in both fortunate 
and unfortunate. 

9. The will-to-live sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature exists in this 
form even in the wise. He discusses the meaning of the term will-to-live in the 
words all living beings.^ This craving for one's self is the longing for one's 
self expressed in the words May I not cease to live, that is, ' May I not become 
non-existent,' [and also expressed] in the words May I live (bhuyasam)^ [that is] 
' May I be alive (jivydsam).' The longing for one's self is not possible unless the 
living creature have had residing in himself an experience of death. It is he only 
that has this craving for himself, [that is] the will-to-live, the fear of death. In 
the course of the discussion (prasahgatas) he refers by the words, And from [the 
existence] of this to a heterodox-person (nastika) who denies that there is 
another birth. From the fact that the present body is being held together, it 
follows that there is an experience of a previous birth. In other words, a birth 
is a conjunction * [of the soul] with a body and sense-organs and feelings which 
are different from those of any previous [conjunction] and are characterized by 
the [definite location] in the collection. This [birth] is experienced [or] attained. 
And it is this [experience or attainment] that is made clear. How is this ? In 
reply he says And this is that well-known will-to-live. Breaking off the 
sentence in the middle he tells of its hindering character in the word hin- 
drance.^ This [will-to-live] is called a hindrance because it hinders, [that is] 
pains, living-creatures with unkindly actions and the like. He finishes what he 
had begun to say by the words ^sweeping on by its own nature.^ It has 
a disposition to sweep on by virtue of its own nature in the form of subconscious- 
impressions. But this disposition is not accidental. Even in the case of a worm 
just born [that is] full of pain and low in intelligence [this disposition] is not 
accidental. He tells the reason for this in the words Cas a result of perception.^ 
This fear of death, being inconceivable, that is, not acquired in this present 
(pratyudita) birth as a result of perception or inference or verbal-communication, 
it must be inferred that the pangs of death have been experienced in a previous 
birth. This is the point at issue. For even a child just born trembles at the 
sight of a murderous thing. And from this peculiar quivering [the child] infers 
the nearness {jpratyasatti) to himself of the experience of death and is found to be 
afraid of it. Thus we see that fear results from pain or from whatever leads to 
pain. Moreover in this birth he has not experienced or inferred or heard of death. 
So we gather that he has known only in a previous [birth] the pains [of death] or 
that which leads to the pain. And from this a memory of himself as he was in that 
condition persists. This moreover does not occur unless there be subliminal- 
impressions. Furthermore this subliminal-impression [cannot occur] without 
experience and the experience does not belong to this life. Therefore the only 

1 See Qamkara on Brahma-sutra ii. 2. 23 with Anandagiri's gloss. 



119] Removal of hindrances by contemplation [ ii. 10 

remaining alternative is [a subliminal-impression] from a pre-existent birth. 
Thus there was a connexion with a previous birth. The word <so (tatM)> 
requires a correlative just as. Thus by supplying the word just as 
from the sense of the sentence, he shows, in the words just as . . . this, how 
the meaning of the sentence would be. In the unspeakably stupids 
means in the most sluggish intelligences. He shows [what the kind of] learning 
is by saying some understanding of the prior and of the final limits [of human 
lives]. The limit is the end. Now the prior limit of man is the round-of- 
rebirths ; the latter is Isolation. He by whom this has been understood from 
things heard or from inferences is called [one who has understanding of the 
prior and of the final limits]. This well-known fear exists [and] has become 
established in the case of the worm and of the wise man. It might be objected 
that in the case of the unwise fear-of-death is conceivable, but not in the case of 
the wise man, since [in him] it has been eradicated by knowledge. Or else if the 
fear-of-death has not been eradicated, it would be eternally present. With this 
in view he asks Why is this ? The answer is ^Because . . . it is alike. 
He does not refer to the wise man who has conscious [concentration], but to him 
who discriminates upon the basis of things heard and of inference. This is 
the point. 



10. These [hindrances] [when they have become] subtile are 
to be escaped by the inverse-propagation. 1 

These five hindrances when they have become like burned seeds, 
after the mind which has predominated over the deeds oftheyogin 
is resolved [into primary matter], come with it to rest. 

Thus the hindrances have been characterized, and of those which should be 
escaped, four states, the dormant and the attenuated and the intercepted and the 
sustained, have been shown. But ' why is not the fifth state, which is subtile, 
mentioned by the author of the sutras, inasmuch as it is in the state of burned 
seed ? ' To this he replies, 10. These [hindrances] [when they have become] 
subtile are to be escaped by the inverse-propagation. It is that of course 
which is within the scope of the exertions of man which has been described ; 
but the subtile is not within the scope of a man's exertions that he might escape 
(hana) [it]. It may, however, be escaped <by the inverse-propagation) [that is] 
by a reduction of the mind-stuff, which is an effect and which is characterized by 
the feeling-of-personality, to the state of its own cause, [the thinking-substance]. 
He explains [the sutra] by the word <SThese. Easy. 



Compare ii. 2, p. 107 6 (Calc. ed.), and the passages given above, at p. 105. 



ii. 11 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or SoZdhana [120 

But of permanent hindrances consigned to the condition of seeds 
11. The fluctuations of these should be escaped by means of 
contemplation. 

Those fluctuations of the hindrances which are coarse, after having 
been attenuated by the yoga of action, should be escaped by the 
Elevated (prasamJchydna) contemplation until subtilized [and] 
made like burned seeds. And just as a spot of coarse matter upon 
pieces of cloth is first shaken off and afterwards the spot of fine 
matter is removed with an effort and by [some appropriate] means, 
so coarse fluctuations are those whose opposition to hindrances is 
very slight, but the subtile fluctuations are those whose opposition * 
is very great. 

1 Now when the hindrances have been attenuated by the yoga of action, by 
directing his exertions towards what, does a man accomplish the rejection 
[of these hindrances] ? ' In reply to this he says But of permanent hindrances 
consigned to the condition of seeds. By these words he distinguishes them 
from those that have been sterilized (vandhya). He recites the sutra. 11. The 
fluctuations of these should be escaped by means of contemplation. He 
discusses [the sutra] in the words of the hindrances.^ Now when attenuated 
by the yoga of action these also may be eradicated themselves and their 
effects by reducing them to the condition of [their own] causes. [This is 
the] inverse propagation. Thus the coarse fluctuations have been explained. 
When a man's exertion is [still] within the scope of the Elevation, [the author] 
states what the limit is in the words [beginning] until. He elaborates 
the expression Csubtilized by saying burned. On this same point he 
gives a simile in the words CAnd just as . . . upon pieces of cloth.^ With 
an effort, such as by washing it [and] by some means, such as an alkaline (ksara) 
mixture. The likeness between the simile and the thing to which it is com- 
pared lies merely in the fact that there is a coarseness and a subtilty, but not 
in the [fact that they are both] removable by an effort. For this [removal] 
is impossible in the case of hindrances which are to be escaped by the process 
of inverse propagation. Those whose opposition is very slight, which have 
been described, are such as have [slight] causes of destruction. Those whose 
opposition is very great are such as have [great] causes of destruction. And 
next below 2 the inverse propagation as a means of attaining the destruction 

1 Some MSS. read pratipakseti. If correct, minute by alkali. Hindrances which 

a case of double sandhi. Corrected in are sustained are attenuated by yoga 

the Benares revision of the Calcutta of action ; the attenuated are reduced 

edition. to burned seed by Elevation; the 

* Coarse stains are removed by shaking; burned Beed is destroyed by inverse 

minute stains by washing ; more propagation. 



121] Karma rooted in hindrances [ ii. 12 

of the hindrances would be the Elevation (prasamkhyana). In view of this 
inferiority the Elevation has been called very slight. 



12. The latent-deposit of karma has its root in the hindrances 
and may be felt in a birth seen or in a birth nnseen. 

In this case we have a latent-deposit of the karma of merit and of 
demerit propagated l from lust [or] from greed [or] from infatuation 
[or] from anger. And this may be felt either in a birth seen or 
may be felt in a birth not seen. Of these, that [latent-deposit of 
karma] which, in so far as there is keen intensity, proceeds from 
sacrificial formulae [and] from self-castigation [and] from con- 
centration, and which is perfected by worship of the Icvara [or] 
of a deity [or] of a sage or magnanimous 2 beings, has instantly 
its fruition as a latent-deposit of meritorious karma. Thus [for 
instance] when, in so far as the hindrance is keen, contempt is 
shown again and again to those who have sought protection in 
terror and in sickness and in wretchedness, or again to those 
magnanimous beings who castigate themselves, this [contempt] 
also has fruition 3 as a latent-impression of evil karma. Just as 
the youth Nandlcvara passed out of the human form and was 
transformed into a divinity, so also Nahusa, Prince of the Gods, 
passed out from his proper mutation and was transformed into the 
condition of a brute. 4 Among these [latent-deposits] there is, in 
the case of those who dwell in the underworlds, no latent-deposit 
of karma which might be felt in a birth seen [in this life] ; and in 
the case of those hindrances which have dwindled, there is no latent- 
deposit of karma which might be felt in a birth unseen [that is, in 
another life]. 

'This may be true. Hindrances [are hindrances] because they hinder [and 
because] they are the causes of birth and of length-of-life and of kind-of- 
experience ; and the latent impressions of karma are of this kind (tathd). But 
undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) and the other [hindrances do not hinder 

1 A better reading is prabhava. and Siddhanta Kaum. (Nir. Sag. ed.), 

2 If mahdnubhava were a title of respect, it 1904, p. 155 8 . 

would precede the other members of 3 See Liiiga Pux. viii. 43. 7-53. 
the compound according to Pan. ii. 2. 30 4 See MBh. v. 17. 
16 [h.o.b.it] 



ii. 12 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [122 

and are not such causes]. How then can undifferentiated-consciousness and 
the rest be called hindrances?' In reply to this he says 12. The latent- 
deposit of karma has its root in the hindrances and may be felt in 
a birth seen or in a birth unseen. That for whose production and causal 
activity a hindrance is the root, that [is the latent-deposit of karma]. What 
he means to say is this. The latent-deposit of karma which is the cause of 
birth and of length-of-life and of kind-of-experience has its root in undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness. So undifferentiated-consciousness and the rest are also 
the causes of them. He explains the sutra with the words In this case.^ 
That in which all Selves in the round-of-rebirths are latent (agerate) is 1 a 
latent-deposit (aqaya). The latent-deposits of karma are merit and demerit. 
Merit which is the cause of heaven and similar states occurs when, as a result 
of some desire, there is an inclination for a work which is desirable. Similarly 
there is demerit in such cases as when from avarice another is robbed of his 
money. Likewise there is nothing but demerit in such cases as when from 
infatuation the idea of merit directs itself to killing or something of the kind 
which is demerit. But there is no merit which comes from infatuation. 
Merit does, however, come from anger, as for instance, the case of Dhruva a 
from anger at the slight [put upon him] by his father [Uttanapada]. For as 
a result of the meritorious latent-deposits of karma which were performed 
in the desire to surpass his father, he obtained a position above the dwellers 
in regions of the sky. Demerit, however, due to anger and resulting in the 
murder of Brahmans is well enough known to every one. He describes the 
double character of this [latent-deposit] by saying And this may be felt in 
a birth seen.^ He describes this that may be felt in a birth seen by saying 
in so far as there is keen intensity.^ In their respective order he gives 
examples in the words Just as Nandi9vara. The dwellers in the under- 
worlds are those who make latent-deposits of karma as a result of which certain 
underworlds, such as the Cooking Pot, 3 are reached. These have no latent- 
deposits to be felt in a birth seen [in this life] For no human body nor any 
kind of mutation of it can endure such torment (vedana) as is to be endured 
by them and uninterruptedly for thousands of years. The rest is easy. 



13. So long as the root exists, there will be fruition from it 
[that is] birth [and] length-of-life [and] kind-of-experience. 

While the hindrances exist, the latent-deposit of karma starts the 
fruition, but not so the cut root of the hindrances. Just as the 

1 This sentence is omitted in the Bikaner s Manu xii. 76 ; Bhag. Pur. v. 25. 13 ; com- 

MS. It might well be a gloss. pare Jataka, vol. hi, p. 43, no. 314. 

8 VP. i. 11. 24 with the context. 



123] Tliree-fold fruition of karma [ ii. 13 

grains of rice, when encased within the chaff, as seeds in an un- 
burned condition, are fit for propagation, but neither the winnowed 
chaff nor seed in the burned condition is so [fit], similarly the 
latent-deposits of karma, when encased within hindrances, are pro- 
pagative of fruition, but neither the winnowed hindrances nor seed 
in the condition of having been burned by the Elevation (pra- 
samkhydna) [is propagative]. And this fruition is of three kinds, 
birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience. In regard to these 
[three,] this is under discussion, whether 1. one karma is the cause 
of one birth, or whether 2. one karma gives the impulse to more 
than one birth. There is a second discussion as to whether 

3. more than one karma projects more than one birth, or whether 

4. more than one karma projects one birth. Now it is not true 
1. that one karma is the cause of one birth. Why so ? Because 
if the karma remaining over, accumulated from time-without- 
beginning and innumerable, and [the karma] of the present, should 
not have in their results an order limited [in its time], discourage- 
ment would be inflicted upon everybody. And this is prohibited. 
Neither 2. is one karma the cause of more than one birth. Why 
is this ? Because if, while there were more than one karma, only 
one karma at a time were to be the cause of more than one birth, 
a lack of time for fruition would be inflicted upon the remaining 
karmas. And that too would be prohibited. Neither 3. is more 
than one karma the cause of more than one birth. Why is this % 
Since it is impossible that more than this one birth should occur 
simultaneously, it must be supposed that they occur successively. 
This, likewise, would involve the same difficulty as in the last [case]. 
The result is then 4. the diverse accumulation of latent-deposits of 
karma, whether of merit or of demerit, made between birth and the 
end of life, remains in a relation of subordinate [parts] and a dominant 
[part]. This is made manifest at the ending of life after growing 
compact by one single impulse (ekapraghattakena). After accom- 
plishing death, it assumes a rigid form and causes a single birth 
only. And this birth receives its length from that same karma. And 
again in that same length-of-life from that same karma it attains to 
its kind-of-experience. This latent-deposit of karma since it is the 



ii. 13 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [124 

source of the birth and the length -of- life and the kind-of-experience, 
is said to have a three-fold fruition. Consequently [this] latent- 
deposit of karma is said to have [its limit in] one existence. On the 
other hand [a latent-deposit of karma] which is to be felt in [this] 
seen birth is said, since it is the cause of the kind-of-enjoyment only, 
to originate a single [kind of] fruition [and not a single existence]. 
Or, when it is the source of the length-of-the-life and the kind-of- 
enjoyment, it is said to originate two fruitions, as for instance in the 
case of Nandicvara or of Nahusa. But this mind-stuff like a fish-net 
made in different shapes on all sides and having, from time without 
beginning, a form-fixed (sammurchita) by subconscious impressions, 
which are like knots, caused by the experience of the fruition of the 
karma from the hindrances, is spread abroad. Therefore these sub- 
conscious-impressions are said to be preceded by more than one 
existence. It is this particular latent-deposit of karma, however, 
which is said to have [its limit] in one existence. Those sub- 
liminal-impressions which produce memory 1 are said to be sub- 
conscious-impressions (vdsand) and these are said to subsist from 
time-without-beginning. But that latent-deposit of karma which 
has [its limit] in a single existence has both a fruition limited [in 
time] and a fruition which is without limit [of time]. Of these 
two [orders], the limitation [in time] (niyama), [in so far as it has 
its limit in one existence], belongs only to the fruition which is to 
be felt in a birth of [this] seen [life] and which is limited [in time] ; 
whereas the fruition which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and 
which is without limit [of time] does not [have the limit in time 
which has its limit in a single existence]. Why so ? Because 
that fruition which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which 
is without limit [of time] has three kinds of outcome 2 (gati) : 
Either 1. it is annihilated (ndga) when this [latter] fruition is 
finished and become unfruitful ; or 2. it is cast away (dvdpa-gamana) 
into the dominant karma ; or 3. it may continue for a long time, 
subjected to the dominant karma which has a fruition limited [in 
time]. Of these [three], 1. the annihilation of [the karma] which is 
finished and become unfruitful is like the annihilation in this present 
1 See iii. 18, p. 230 2 (Calc. ed.). J Consult Cabda-Kalpa-Druma, p. 846 tt . 



125] Three outcomes of karma [ ii. 13 

world of the dark karma when once the bright karma has dawned. 
With regard to which this has been said, " Verily indeed karmas 
should be known to be by twos and twos. A single mass made of 
merit destroys [the dark and the dark-bright] evil * [mass]. Wish 
thou then to do well-done deeds. Right here to thee the wise make 
karma known." 2. Casting away into the dominant karma : with 
reference to which it has been said 2 , " Should there be a very 
slight admixture of guilt in the sacrifice, it is either to be removed 
or to be overlooked. [Therefore this admixture is] not enough to 
remove the good-fortune [won by merit]. Why [not] ? Because 
in my case there is much other good-fortune. Where then this 
[admixture of guilt] is cast away [into the dominant karma], even 
in heaven it will make only a slight reduction [of merit]." 
3. When he said, ' it may continue for a long time subjected to 
the dominant karma which has a fruition limited [in time],' how 
was this ? [The answer is], because, in the case of the karma the 
fruition of which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is 
limited [in time], death is said to be the appropriate cause of the 
manifestation. Not so, however, in the case [of the karma] the 
fruition of which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is 
without limit [of time]. On the contrary, [in this latter case], 
karma the fruition of which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and 
which is not limited [in time], either is annihilated or is cast away 
or is quiescent (updslta) in subjection [to the dominant karma] for 
a long time until the appropriate manifesting-conditions of the 
cause of the karma bring it close to its fruition. But since of this 
very fruition [of karma] the place or the time or the cause is none 
of them determinable, therefore it is that the ways of karma are 
[known as] mysterious and not easily discernible. Moreover, since 
the general rule is not broken down, even if there be exceptions, 

1 The genitive is object of apahanti ac- 2 See the careful discussion of this fragment 

cording to the Varttika, which refers of Paiicacikha in Garbe's translation of 

to Panini ii. 3. 56. Vacaspatimicra the Sarhkhya Tattva Kaumudl, 1892, 

makes krsna-krsnagukle an accusative p. 538, note 2. Compare also Candilya- 

object of apahanti. In this case papa- sutra xc (1861) and Cowell's translation 

kasya would mean belonging to a sinful (1878), p. 96. 
man (see p 129 s2 below). 



ii. 13 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [126 

therefore the latent-deposit of karma having [its limit in] a single 
existence [must] be acknowledged. 

[The objector says,] 'Let this be granted. Since the latent-deposit of karma 
is based upon undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya), there may result, after the 
production of knowledge (vidya), a destruction of undifferentiated-consciousness, 
and so there might not be any subsequent latent- deposit of karma. Still the 
latent-deposits of karma, done previously and accumulated by the succession from 
time without beginning of innumerable births, being unsettled in their period 
of development, it would be impossible by realizing the effects to cause [these 
latent-deposits] to dwindle in so far as they might be experienced. Because of 
this it would be impossible to cut off the round-of-rebirths.' To this he 
replies with the sutra 13. So long as the root exists, there will be fruition 
from it [that is] birth [and] length-of-life [and] kind-of-experience. 
What he means to say is this. The result of the latent-deposit of karma is 
pleasure and pain, and, in so far as both birth and length-of-life have the 
same purpose [as the latent-deposit] and are the necessary consequence of it, 
[these two] are also propagated [by the latent deposit]. Moreover pleasure 
and pain are attached to passion and aversion. And the latter are the necessary 
conditions [for pleasure and pain], since pleasure and pain are not possible 
in the absence of these [that is, passion and aversion]. Furthermore it is 
impossible to say that that wherein a man is pleased or disgusted is not to 
him, as the case may be, either a pleasure or a pain. So this soil of the self 
sprinkled with the water of the hindrances becomes a field propagating the 
fruits of karma. Thus it is true that the hindrances co-operate with the latent- 
deposit of karma for producing also the after-effects of the fruits. So when the 
hindrances are quite cut off, [the latent-deposits] are deprived of this [aid] 
also. Therefore, although the latent-deposits are endless and their period 
of ripening is unsettled, still, when in their condition as seeds, they are burned 
by Elevation (prasamJchyana), they cannot be in a position to bear fruit. 
The sense expressed is made clear by the Comment in the words, While . . . 
exists With regard to this same point he gives a simile Just as . . . the 
chaff. Although they have their chaff, their condition as seed is burned 
by heat (sveda) and in other ways. He applies the simile to the point-to-be- 
illustrated by saying, similarly. If it be objected that the hindrances 
cannot be removed, because no [really] existing things are removed, he replies 
in the words, nor seed in the condition of having been burned by the 
Elevation.^ He shows the threefold character of the fruition in the words, 
And this. Fruition is that which is brought to fruition or brought to 
perfection by karmas. The first point-under-discussion [1. and 2.] deems the 
unity of karma to be fixed and considers whether births are one or more than one. 
The second [3. and 4.], however, deems the manifoldness to be fixed and considers 
whether births are one or more than one. Thus there are four alternatives 



127] Limits of time for fruition [ ii. 13 

(mkalpa). Of these he refutes the first with the words Now it is not true 
1. that one karma is the cause of one birth. He asks, Why so ? He gives 
the answer by saying, from time- without-beginning. If the karma accumu- 
lated by each birth, one after another, in time without beginning, and therefore 
innumerable, which remains over after the karma which has been made to 
dwindle in each life, one after another, has been deducted, the world would 
feel discouragement. And this is prohibited. What he means to say is this. 
Since the dwindling of karma is broken-by-intervals (virala), and since [karma] 
is produced in abundance, the latent-deposits pressing one against the other 
and springing up incessantly, in breathless haste, towards their own fruition, 
[for this reason] even a very clever man could not determine the order of 
the results. Thus discouragement as regards the following up of meritorious 
[acts] would be inflicted [upon everybody]. He rejects the second alternative 
in the words <KNeither 2. is one karma the cause of more than one birth.2> 
He asks, Why is this ?) He gives the answer by saying, <Kof more than 
one birth. If a single karma only belonging to (ahita) more than one birth 
is the cause of a fruition which characterizes more than one birth, then a lack 
of time would be inflicted upon the remaining karmas. And that too would 
be prohibited. Thus in so far as karma would be fruitless, there would be the 
likelihood that it would not be followed up. And if there would be discourage- 
ment on the ground that there is no order of fruition limited [in time] {niyaia), 
in case one karma is to be uprooted in one life, how much more there would 
be in case one karma must be uprooted during more than one life. For then, 
since there is no chance, [one would infer] that there would be no time [in the 
future] for the fruition of the present karma [and thus again discouragement 
would follow]. He refutes the third alternative with the words, ^Neither 
3. is more than one karma the cause of more than one birth. He gives the 
reason for this in the word, ^Cthis.^ Since for those who are not yogins it is 
impossible that more than this one birth should occur simultaneously, it must 
be supposed to occur successively. For if a thousand karmas could simultaneously 
generate a thousand births, there would be since a thousand karmas would 
have dwindled away time for the fruition of the remainder and an order of 
results limited [in time]. But there is no such simultaneity of births. Having 
thus rejected the three propositions, he accepts as the result of the process of 
elimination 4. the proposition which remains, to the effect that more than one 
karma is the cause of one birth, as he says in the words, The result is . . . 
birth. The compound ^Cbetween-birth-and-the-end-of-life means in the 
interval [that is] between the two, both birth and the end-of-life. [This 
accumulation is] diverse because it gives forth results diversified by pleasures and 
pains. That is dominant which will give its result with absolute intensity and 
immediately. Whereas that is subordinate which [gives its result] after a delay. 
The Cending-of-life is death. <Made manifesto by it means being brought 
into the presence of that which tends to produce its effects. By one single impulse 



ii. 13 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [128 

means simultaneously. Growing compact or rolled 1 together into one lump 
in relation to the effect to be produced [that is] the next birth, it produces one 
birth only and not more than one birth. And this birth is the human or some 
other state. <And this birth receives its length-of-life from that same karma^ 
[would mean that] its life is limited by various periods of time. And again 
in that same length-of-life from that same karma it attains to its kind-of- 
experience^ [would mean that] a direct experience of pleasure and of pain is 
attained. Thus this latent-deposit of karma since it is the source of the birth 
and of the length-of-life and of the kind-of-experience is said to have a threefold 
fruition. He sums up the main statement in the words, ^Consequently [this] 
latent-deposit of karma is said to have [its limit in] one existence.^ Having 
one existence is one existence. [This] compound is in accordance [with 
Panini's sutra ii. 1. 49] beginning with the words, "A temporal antecedent, 
eka, &c." The termination [-ika] is in the sense of possession (matvarthlya).* 
Thus the meaning [of the compound] is one who has one existence '. Else- 
where the reading is (aikabhavika). In this case the dhah termination [-ika] in the 
sense of ' existing in ' is added to the word ' one-existence '. Then the meaning 
would be that its existing is limited to one birth. Thus having announced 
his main statement, namely, that [this] karma which [has its limit] in one 
existence has a three-fold fruition, he now distinguishes the three different 
kinds of fruition which belong to the karma that is to be felt in [this] seen 
birth and that is a part of this-present-world (aihika). By the word seen^ 
he refers, of course, to Nandl?vara whose length-of-life in a human birth was 
cut off at eight years. [Here] was a particular kind of merit produced by 
a vehement method of keen intensity. This merit had two fruitions in that 
it was the source of the length-of-life and of the kind-of-experience. But in 
the case of Nahusa, since the length of his life had been determined by 
a karma which led him to the attainment of Indra's position, there was a 
particular kind of demerit, leading only to a kind-of-enjoyment, by reason 
of the contrary [karma] coming from his striking s Agastya with his heel. An 
objector asks, 'Have the subconscious-impressions from the hindrances, like 
a latent-deposit of karma, their [limit] in one existence? And [if] the sub- 
conscious-impressions of the experiences of the fruition of the karma are 
favourable to [the pointing out of] the kind-of-experience, then a human being 
reduced to the body of a beast would not experience (bhunjlta) what is proper 
to his species.' In reply to this he says the karma from the hindrances.^ 
Having a fixed form (sammurchita) means rolled together into one lump. He 
describes the subconscious-impression as such in order to distinguish it from 

1 Vijnana Bhiksu glosses the word sath- s This story is given in its setting by 

murchita by pravrddhavega (p. 106 8 ) Jacobi in his article on Agastya 

and by upacitam or pustatn (p. 107 2 (Hastings : Cycl. of Rel. and Ethics, I, 

Benares ed.). p. 181 a , line 10). 

* Panini v. 2. 115. 



129] Fruitions not limited in time [ ii. 13 

right-action (dharma) and from wrong-action by saying <subliminal-impres- 
sions which. " In order to state certain exceptions to the general proposition 
[that the latent-deposit of karma] has [its limit in] a single existence he 
prepares the ground by saying But that . . . which. By the word But 
he shows that there is a distinction from the subconscious-impressions. 
The limitation [in time] of having [a limit in] a single existence is that which 
belongs only to the fruition which is to be felt in a birth of [this] seen [life] 
and which has a limit [in time] ; whereas the fruition which is not to be 
felt in [this] seen [life] does not [have the limit in time which has its limit 
in a single existence]. Of what kind then is fruition which is not limited 
in time ? He asks the reason in the words <K Why so ? He tells the reason 
in the words Because that. First he gives one outcome (gati) in the words 
is finished ; the second, in the words ^dominant ; the third, in the words 
Chas a limit [in time.]) Of these three he analyses 1. the first by saying Of 
these [three] ... is finished. 2> Other than the karmas of the mendicant (sam- 
nyasin), which are neither bright nor dark, there are only three karmas, the 
dark and the bright-dark and the bright. Now in this world a latent-deposit 
of bright karma, to be obtained by self-castigation and by recitation and by 
other means, when once uprisen [in the mind,] is the annihilator of dark 
[karma] which has not yet given its fruit. And because there is no distinction 
[between the dark and the dark-bright] we must suppose [that it is the 
annihilator] of the many-coloured [that is, the dark-bright karma] by reason 
of the conjunction [of this last] with the dark part. With reference to the 
same the Exalted [Vyasa] cites the Sacred Word when he says, ^With regard 
to which this. Verily indeed karmas [should be known to be] by twos and 
twos,^ that is, the dark and the dark-bright. [These the mass made of merit] 
destroys. Such is the construction [of the sentence]. By repeating the word 
<SCtwos he indicates that there is a very great number. In reply to the 
question, 'Belonging to whom' he says, ^belonging to a sinful.^ In other 
words, belonging to a sinful man. What is it that destroys? To this he 
replies, <KA single mass made of merits Because a collection includes the 
units-of-the-collection (samuhin). Thus the bright latent-deposit of karma is 
described as the third. What he means to say is this. This bright latent- 
deposit of karma, which is to be obtained by methods which are free from 
injury to others, is of such a kind, we may say, that although it is single, it 
destroys dark and dark-bright latent-deposits of karma, which are absolutely 
opposed, even when they are in great numbers. The word <Xthen (tat)y> 
means therefore. The word Wish thou is middle because Vedic. The rest 
is easy. And so we see (atra) that the power in the uprising of the bright 
karma is so indescribably great that it alone makes the others cease to be. 
But one could not say that they cease because of the pain resulting from recita- 
tions and other [right actions]. For a wrong-action (adharma) does not have, as 
its opposite, pain in general, but only that particular kind of pain which is 

17 [h.O.8. It] 



ii. 13 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [130 

the effect of itself [that is, the wrong-action]. Now the pain resulting from 
recitations and other [right actions] is not their effect. [And if this pain resulting 
from recitations and other right actions] is supposed to be the effect of this 
[wrong-action], then it is needless to make [special] prescriptions of recitations 
and other right actions, because then these [recitations and right actions] could 
be produced (utpatti) merely by the help of those [wrong-actions]. And if [this 
wrong-action] should not produce (anutpalti) [the pain which results from 
recitations and other right actions], then the Cooking Pot [Hell] and other 
[pains] are [specially] prescribed, [because the wrong-action must result in 
something and] because, if [Hells and other pains] be not [specially] pre- 
scribed, these [Hells] would never be produced at all. 1 

Thus all is four-square. He analyses 2. the second outcome in the word 
^dominant.^ In the dominant karma, as for instance in the Jyotistoma and 
similar [sacrifices], that which is accessory (anga) [karma] to this, namely the 
killing of the animal, is cast away [into the dominant karma]. For there are 
two effects of killing and of the other [acts] : 1. since it is prescribed [by the 
tradition] in so far as it is accessory to the dominant [karma], it assists ; 
2. since killing is forbidden by the rule "Let no living being be killed", it 
is needless. We see then that [killing], because it is performed as accessory 
to the dominant [karma] and not as being the dominant, ought not immediately 
[drag] and independently of the dominant [karma] to generate its own fruition, 
a useless result, but that it remains rendering assistance to the dominant [karma], 
the fruition of which has already commenced. And while rendering assistance 
to the dominant karma it remains, with reference to its own effect, as seed 
only, and is cast away into the dominant karma. With reference to which 
it has been said by Paiicacikha. The slight admixture of the invisible- 
influence (apurva), which is the dominant [karma] resulting from the Jyotistoma 
and other [sacrifices], with the invisible-influence resulting from the killing of 
the animal and similar [acts] and producing what is not desired (anartha), [this 
admixture] may be removed. For, by doing a certain amount of penance 
it may be removed. Or should a man heedlessly not have gone through the 
penance, [the slight admixture of guilt] comes to fruition at the time of the 
fruition of the dominant karma. In spite of all this, whatever undesired result 
be generated by this [accessory invisible-influence] may be overlooked. For 
the fortunate (Jcugala), plunging deep into the great pool of the nectar of pleasure 
brought near by the gathering together of merit, overlook a slight spark of 

1 Since however Hells are produced without fore right-actions and the pain result- 
any special prescription (vidhdna), it ing from right-actions cannot be the 
follows as a general rule that the con- consequences of wrong-actions. Not 
sequences of wrong-actions require no being such a consequence, the pain 
special prescription. But in the case from right-action cannot annihilate 
of recitations and other right-actions wrong-action, 
there is the special prescription. There- 



131] Fruition limited in time [ ii. 14 

the fire of pain brought about by a very little evil. Hence [the slight ad- 
mixture] is not enough or adequate to remove or to cause to dwindle good- 
fortune or great merit. He asks Why [not] ? The answer is the 
good-fortune.^ For in the case of me, the meritorious, much other good-fortune 
exists, the fruition of dominant karma, beginning with the initiatory rites 
and ending with the donations. Where then this admixture is very slight, 
it will make even in heaven, the result of it, a slight commingling of pain, 
that is, a slight reduction from the heaven which, [although] its beginning is 
gained by mixed merit, is [in itself] quite untouched by pain. He analyses 
3. the third outcome in the words, ^limited [in time].^ The predominance 
here is conceived as being extremely powerful but not as having accessories. 
And it is powerful in so far as its fruition is without limit [of time], because 
there is no opportunity [for its fruition] at any one time. But in the case 
of [the dominant karma] the fruition of which is without limit [of time] there 
is a weakness, because there is an opportunity [for its fruition] at some other 
time. The continuance for a long time is only in the condition of seed, but 
not as [actively] helping the dominant [karma] because this latter is inde- 
pendent. It is objected, ' It has been stated that the latent-deposit of karma 
is by the ending-of-life made manifest at one point of time only. Whereas 
now you say that it continues a long time. How then is the latter 
[statement] not in opposition to the previous [statement]?' With this in 
mind he asks, Chow was this ? He answers in the words, not ... in [this] 
seen [life].^ The singular number denotes a class. He determines the 
outcome of that which is different from this by the words, On the contrary 
. . . not ... in [this] seen [life]. The rest is easy. 



14. These [fruitions] have joy or extreme anguish as results 
in accordance with the quality of their causes whether merit 
or demerit. 

<These> [that is] birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience. 
Those with merit as cause have pleasure as result ; those with 
demerit as cause have pain as result. And just as the nature of 
this pain is counteractive, so for the yogin, even at the moment of 
pleasure in an object, there is nothing but counteractive pain. 

It has been stated that karma is rooted in hindrances and that fruitions are 
rooted in karma. Now the question is, ' of what are the fruitions the root, since 
you say that these are to be renounced ? ' In reply to this he says, 14. These 
[fruitions] have joy or extreme anguish as results in accordance with the 



ii. 14 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [132 

quality of their causes whether merit or demerit. He explains the sutra in 
the words, <K<These> [that is] birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience. 
Although birth and length-of-life, since they precede joy and extreme anguish, 
do have the latter as their results, whereas the kind-of-experience follows the 
rise [in consciousness] of joy and extreme anguish and in fact has its essence in 
the [direct] experience (anubliava) of them, still in so far as being [directly] 
experienced is the same as a kind-of-experience {bhoga), we may suppose that 
[joy and extreme anguish] are results of the kind-of-experience only so far as they 
are the objects of the kind-of-experience. It is objected, ' The birth and length- 
of-life and kind-of-experience, which are the results of extreme anguish, are 
things to be rejected {fieya), since they are felt to be counteractive. But why 
should those [fruitions] which have merit as cause be renounced? they have 
pleasure as their result since they are felt to be co-active (anukula). Nor can 
their co-activity, which may be felt by every one, be gainsaid by even a thousand 
verbal communications and inferences. Moreover neither joy nor extreme 
anguish can exist without the other. For while joy is being received, extreme 
anguish, since it cannot be driven off, may also fall to one's lot, because the two 
have separate causes and because they have separate forms.' In reply to this he 
says, <SAnd just as . . . this. Although ordinary individuals, at the time when 
there is pleasure in objects, are not conscious of them as counteractive, still 
yogins are conscious of this [counteractiveness]. 



How can this be accounted for ? 

15. As being the pains which are mutations and anxieties 
and subliminal-impressions, and by reason of the opposition 1 
of the fluctuations of the aspects (guna), to the discriminat- 
ing all is nothing but pain. 

1. For every one this experience of pleasure is permeated with 
passion and is dependent upon animate and inanimate instruments. 
In this case we have a latent-deposit of karma arising from passion. 
Likewise also [a man] hates the instruments of pain and becomes 
infatuated [by the instruments of infatuation]. Thus there is also 
a latent-deposit made by aversion and by infatuation. And in 
this sense it has been said, "Enjoyment is impossible unless one 
has killed some living creature." Therefore there is also the 
latent-deposit of karma, effected by killing, belonging to the body. 
Thus it has been said, " Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) 

1 This sutra seems to have influenced Umasvati : Tattvarthadhigama-sutra vii. 6. 



133] Inevitability of pain [ ii. 15 

is pleasure in an object of sense 1 ." That which is the subsi- 
dence of the organs because of their satiation with enjoyments is 
pleasure ; after there has been a craving, the failure to subside 
is pain. And by the application of the organs to enjoyments 
one cannot make one's self free from thirst [for enjoyment]. 
Why is this? Since passions increase because-of (anu) applica- 
tion to enjoyments, and the skill of the organs also increases. 
Therefore application to the enjoyment of pleasure is not a way 
of approach [to freedom from thirst for objects]. Surely one 
aiming at pleasure and permeated by objects is sunk in the deep 
bog of pain, like the man who, while in fear of the scorpion's 
poison 2 is bitten by the poisonous snake. This is the so-called 
painfullness of mutation; it is counteractive; even in a condition of 
pleasure it hinders the yogin himself. 2. Now what is the pain- 
fulness of anxiousness ? Every one has the experience of anxious- 
ness ; it is permeated by aversion and is dependent upon animate 
and inanimate instruments. Here we have a latent-deposit of karma 
arising from aversion. And [a man] yearning for the instruments of 
pleasure, throbs in the body and in [the organs of] speech and in the 
central-organ (manas). Since it then aids or (ca) thwarts others 
by aiding them or by injuring them, it amasses right-actions and 
wrong-actions. This latent-deposit of karma is the result of greed 
and of infatuation. For this reason it is called the painfulness of 
anxiousness. 3. But what is the painfulness of subliminal- 
impressions ? There is a latent-deposit of subliminal-impressions 
of pleasure arising from the experience of pleasure ; and there 
is a latent -deposit of subliminal-impressions of pain arising from 
the experience of pain. Thus analogously (evam), while the 
fruition from the karmas is under experience, there is on the other 
hand an accumulation of a latent-deposit of karma. Thus this 
stream of pain from time-without-beginning, spreading wider and 
wider, agitates even the yogin because its essence is counteractive. 
Why is this ? It is because a wise man is like an eyeball. Just 

1 Perhaps an allusion to the phrase sukha- Maxims, 2nd ed., 1909, p. 76) points out 

Tchyatir avidya (ii. 5, Calc. ed. 114 1 ). that Vacaspati uses this nyaya again 

Colonel Jacob (Second Handful of Popular in the Tatparya^ika (1898), p. 53 1S . 



ii. 15 ] Booh II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [134 

as a fine thread of wool fallen upon the eyeball by its touch gives 
pain, but not so when it falls upon other parts of the body, so these 
pains [from subliminal-impressions] hinder the yogin only, who is 
like an eyeball, but not any other perceiver. But upon the other, 
[not a yogin], who casts off the pain received time after time 
which has been brought upon him by his own karma, and who 
receives the pain cast off time after time, and who is as it were 
permeated through and through from all sides with fluctuating 
mind-stuff complicated from time- without-beginning with its 
subconscious-impressions, and who under [the influence of] 
undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyd) conforms [himself] to the 
* I-substance ' and to the ' Of me-substance ' with regard to 
those very things which are to be rejected, upon him, born again 
and again, the triple anguishes from both kinds of causes, both 
inner and outer, sweep down. This being so, the yogin, having 
seen himself and the whole multitude of creatures borne away by 
this stream of pain from time-without-beginning, seeks refuge in 
the focused-insight (samyag-darpana), the cause of the dwindling 
of all pain. <And by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations 
of the aspects (guna), to the discriminating all is nothing but pain.> 
The aspects (guna) of the thinking-substance in the form of bright- 
ness and of activity and of inertia, having become interdependent 
by aid given each to the other, give rise to a presented-idea either 
tranquil or cruel or infatuated, [either one or the other] of just 
these three aspects. " And because the changes (vrtta) of the 
aspects (guna) are unstable, the mind-stuff is in rapid mutation." 
Thus we have been told. 1 " The [outer] forms [when developed to] 
a high degree and the [inner] fluctuations [when developed to] a 
high degree oppose each other ; but the generic forms co-operate 
with [these when developed to] a high degree." Thus since these 
aspects (guna) have presented-ideas of pleasure and of pain and of 
infatuation obtained by reliance of one [aspect] upon another, each 
(sarve) [of them] has the form of each of [the others]. But the 
distinction between them is due to their being either in a subordi- 
nate (guna) or in a dominant state. Therefore <to the discrimi- 

1 By Pancavikha. Compare iii. 9 and 13, pp. 199 s and 204* ; iv. 15, p. 298 1 (Calc. ed.). 



135] Medical analogues to the Four Noble Truths [ ii. 15 

nating all is nothing but pain.> So the seed out of which this 
huge aggregate of pain grows forth is undifferentiated-consciousness 
(avidyd). And the reason for the failure-of-growth (abhdva) in 
this \avidya\ is the focused-insight. Just as a system of medicine 
has four divisions, [on] Disease [and on] Cause of Disease [and on] 
Health [and on] Remedy, so this system also has four divisions, 
[on] the Round-of-Rebirth [and on] the Cause of the Round-of- 
Rebirth [and on] Release [and on] the Way to Release. Of these 
[four], the Round-of-Rebirth with its mass of pains is that which 
is to be escaped ; the conjunction of the primary-cause and of the 
Self is the cause of this which is to be escaped {hey a) ; the final 
destruction of the correlation is the escape (hdna) ; the means 
of escape is focused-insight. In this [focused-insight] he who 
escapes as he is in himself can neither be accepted nor rejected 
(hey a). For if there be a rejection (hdna), that would involve the 
doctrine of the extermination of him [who escapes]. And * if there 
be an acceptance [that would involve] the doctrine [that he has] 
a cause. And x by denying both [the rejection and the acceptance], 
we have the doctrine [that the Seer as he is in himself is] eternal. 
This is the focused-insight. 

In order to account for this he introduces the sutra after first asking the question, 
How can this be accounted for ? The sutra begins with the word 15. . . . 
mutation and ends with the word discriminating . . . [The compound in the 
sutra is analysed,] mutation and anxiety and subliminal-impression these 
themselves are the pains it is by these . . . He describes the painfulness of 
the pleasure in objects of sense in so far as mutations are painful by saying, 
For every one this. Pleasure is surely impossible unless it be permeated by 
passion. For one cannot possibly say that one finds no happiness in a thing 
and at the same time take pleasure in it. Moreover, since pleasure leads to 
action and action causes a latent-deposit of merit and demerit, there is also 
a latent-deposit of karma produced by passion, because a thing which does not 
exist cannot be produced. Under these circumstances (tadd), a man experiencing 
pleasure and feeling attachment to it, feels aversion towards the instruments of 
pain with an aversion that is in an intercepted state. Furthermore, being unable 
to prevent these [instruments of pain] he becomes infatuated. Thus there is 
also a latent-deposit of karma made by aversion and by infatuation. And there 
is nothing contradictory in making infatuation, whose other name is misconcep- 
tion, the cause of a latent-deposit of the karma of infatuation also. If it be asked, 

1 Omitted in most MSS. 



ii. 15 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [136 

How can a man in love feel aversion or infatuation, since, when he is in love, 
aversion and infatuation are not evidently existent, he replies, CAnd in this 
sense it has been said by us when explaining [ii. 4] hindrances with intercepted 
states. In this way merit and demerit have been shown as produced by sense- 
activities of speech and mind. Because a mental volition produced by passion, 
so that one wills, ' this must be done,' is also not to be distinguished from the 
verbal form [of the volition] in so far as it is equally desired. As they say, 
'A volition with desire does not go beyond intended-objects which can be 
expressed by words.' He also shows a latent-deposit of karma belonging to the 
body in the words, C n Impossible . . . unless one has killed ". Hence authors 
of the Law Books say [Manu iii. 68, Visnu lix. 19], " Five kinds-of-slaughter are 
open to the householder." The objector says, 'This maybe true. Yet it is not 
fitting that a yogin should reject pleasure in objects-of-sense which can be felt 
by anybody. For that would be running counter to experience.' In reply to this 
he says, it has been said, " Undifferentiated-consciousness {avidya) is pleasure 
in an object-of-sense "2> by [us when] showing [ii. 5] that undifferentiated- 
consciousness is characterized by four kinds of misconceived ideas. The ancient 
sages (vrddha) do not pay heed to anything merely at the first impression. 
There is of course, merely at the first impression (dpatatas), an experience which 
any one can feel of pleasure which follows even after eating food mixed with 
sweet poison ; but after a lapse of time there is no pleasure. And as such it has 
been shown by The Exalted [Icvara in the Grta xviii. 38], " After there has been 
contact of the sense-organs with objects, that pleasure which is at the beginning 
like nectar and in the course of time like poison is known to be full of rajas." 
He raises a doubt by saying, which . . . with enjoyments.^ The objector says, 
' We do not accede to the statement that pleasure is the joy in objects. On the 
contrary, when men are not satiated and when their minds are afflicted with 
yearnings for one object after another, it is the very thirst itself that is the 
great pain. And this [thirst] does not subside unless enjoyment follow. 
Furthermore the full subsidence of this [thirst] is not permeated with passion 
and similar [states of mind]. Thus it cannot be said that this subsidence has 
the painfulness of mutation.' This is the point. ^Because of their satiation^ 
means : Because the thirst [for enjoyment] has dwindled, there is a subsi- 
dence of the organs, in other words, there is no activity [of the organs] with 
regard to objects-of-sense. He makes this same clear by a negative instance 
in the words arising from a craving.)^ He rebuts an objection with the words 
And ... by the organs . . . not. The word ^because of (aw) is used in 
the sense of cause. It is true that the dwindling of thirst [for objects] is the 
flawless 1 pleasure. But application to enjoyment is not the cause of this 
[dwindling of thirst] ; but it is the cause of the thirst which is just the opposite 
of this [dwindling of thirst]. Just as they say, 2 "Lust by the enjoyment of 

1 Without the flaw of raga. Naradiya Purana xxxiii. 38; Linga 

2 See Manu ii. 94 ; Visnu Purana iv. 10. 9; Purana Ixvii. 17. 



137] Pain is past and present and future [ ii. 15 

lusts never subsides ; just as by the butter-oblation the flames flare up yet 
once again." The rest is without obscurity. 2. He asks a question with regard 
to the painfulness of anxiety in the words, Now what? The answer is 
^every one.2> As everybody knows what it is, he does not make a detailed 
statement of it as such. And the detailed statement is analogous to that of" the 
painfulness of mutation. 3. He asks about the painfulness of subliminal- 
impressions by saying vvhat?> He gives the answer in the words the 
experience of pleasure. For an experience of pleasure gives rise to a subliminal 
impression and this to a memory of pleasure ; and this to a passion ; and this to 
movements of the central-organ and of the body and of [the organ of] speech ; 
and this [gives rise] to merit and demerit ; from these [comes] the experience 
of fruition ; from this a subconscious-impression. Thus there is a beginningless 
[chain]. Here the connexion should be understood in this way. There is 
a memory of pleasure and of pain according to the variation in the degree of the 
subliminal-impressions of pleasure and of pain ; and from this comes passion 
and aversion ; from these two come karma ; from the karmas, fruition. Streaming 
on in this way the stream of pain hinders the yogin only, but not the other 
perceiver, [that is] any ordinary person, as he says in the words Thus this . . . 
from-time-without-beginning. But the triple anguishes sweep down upon the 
other. This is the construction [of the sentence]. In so far as the two 
anguishes, that from the gods and that from the elements, are [each] external, 
their unity is emphasized. Since it is a fluctuation in the mind-stuff, undifferen- 
tiated-consciousness (avidya) is said to be ^fluctuating mind-stuff.^ Under [the 
influence of] this, <Kwith regard to those very things which are to be rejected^ 
[that is] with regard to the thinking-substance and the organs and the body and 
so on [as the 'I',] and with regard to wife and children [as the 'of me'], <Khe 
conforms [himself] to the ' I-substance ' and to the 'Of-me-substance.' This 
being the case, there is no other refuge for him than the focused-insight. So 
he says CThis being so.2> This being so, he has mentioned the extrinsic 
(aupddhika) painfulness of the pleasure in objects as a result of mutation and 
of subliminal-impressions and of contact with anxiousness. He [now] indicates 
the intrinsic [painfulness] by saying <And by reason of the opposition of the 
aspects (guna).>^ He explains [this part of the sutra] by saying brightness. 
Brightness and activity and inertia are the forms, in so far as they are forms 
of the thinking-substance, which enter into mutation. The aspects {guna) are 
sattva and rajas and tamas [and they] are interdependent upon each other. They 
give rise to either 1. a tranquil (its essence is pleasure), or 2. a cruel (its 
essence is pain), or finally (eva) 3. an infatuated (its essence is dejection) 
presented-idea of [these] three aspects, although its form is an experience of 
pleasure. And not even this mutation of this [thinking-substance] having such 
a presented-idea as its form is fixed. Because of this he says C" And because 
the changes of the aspects (guna) are unstable, the mind-stuff is in rapid muta- 
tion." It is objected, ' [There is] one presented-idea ; how can it at one time 
18 [h.o.s. 17] 



ii. 15 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [138 

make known tranquillity and cruelty and infatuation, which are opposed to each 
other?' In reply to this he says, <"The [outer] forms [when developed to] 
a high degree and the [inner] fluctuations [when developed to] a high degree 
oppose each other. " The forms2> are the eight states 1 (bhava) beginning 
with right-action. The ^fluctuations^ are pleasure and so on. So in this case 
wrong-action, since it is in such a condition [of high development], is opposed by 
right-action when it is in process of fruition. Similarly with knowledge [and] 
with passionlessness [and] with power [as well as] with pleasure and so on their 
corresponding contraries are in opposition. But the generic 2 forms, which are 
not actively moving forth, since they do not oppose [those which are developed] 
to a high degree, co-operate with those which are actively moving forth. The 
objector says, ' We know [all] this. Yet how can pleasure in objects have an 
intrinsic painfulness ? ' In reply to this he says, Thus since these.^ Because 
the material cause [of both] is not different and because their essence is the 
material cause, there is also no difference in the material effects (upadeya). 
1 So then is this identity absolute ? If so, the difference [between the two terms] 
in the attributive relations of the thinking-substance would not be possible.' 
In reply to this he says, in a subordinate or in a dominant. In relation to 
the generic element (dtman) there is subordination ; in relation to the element 
[which is developed] to a high degree there is dominance. So both extrinsieally 
and intrinsically (svabhavatas) <to the discriminating all is nothing but pain.> 
Consequently by men of insight pain should be escaped (heya). And it cannot be 
escaped unless its cause (nidana) be escaped. Moreover it cannot be escaped 
unless its cause be thoroughly understood. So he shows what its radical cause 
is in the words, So ... of this. That seed out of which the aggregate of pain 
grows forth [or] arises. He shows the reason for the extermination of this 
growth in the words And ... in this. Now he shows that this system which 
has entered upon its activity for the sake of showing favour [i. 1] to all is similar 
to another system of the same kind by saying, Just as. [A system described 
as being of four divisions] is one of which there are the four divisions, that is, 
four compactly arranged parts. It is objected, ' Why is there not a contradiction 
when you said that pain is to be escaped and when you [now] describe the 
round-of-rebirth as something to be escaped ? ' In reply to this he says <SOf these 
[four], .... with its mass of pains. That, by doing which undifferentiated- 
consciousness (avidya) makes the round-of-rebirth, [that constitutes] its special 
form of activity which is the cause of the round -of-rebirths. This he describes 
in the words, of the primary cause and of the Self. He tells what liberation 
is in the words, of the correlation. He tells what the means of liberation 
are in the words, the means of escape. Some 3 there are who regard the 
extermination of him-who-escapes (hdtr) as he is in himself to be liberation. 

i Right-action, knowledge, passionlessness, 2 The unspecialized forms. See iii. 44. 
power, and their opposites. See * The Yogacara school of Buddhists. 
Samkhya Kar. xl. 



139] The Self may escape pain [ ii. 16 

In this sense they say, " Like the blowing-out (nirvana) of a lamp is the deliver- 
ance of this anguished 1 (tapin) [mind]." Others 2 again teach that, as a result 
of the extermination of the hindrances with their subconscious impressions, 
purified mental-states (vijnana) are produced ; and that this itself is liberation. 
In reply to these he says, In this [focused-insight]. In this case he first 
finds fault with the escape by saying, <KFor if there be an escape ... for him.) 
Since no rational man ever exerts himself to exterminate himself. It is objected, 
1 We see some persons, all of whose pleasures are uprooted by intense disease and 
who drag about their bodies, as it were, laden with pain, striving to exterminate 
themselves.' True, he says in reply, there are a few such. But not of this kind 
are men living in [the ordinary^round-of-rebirth. [For] their lot is to enjoy diverse 
and strange and celestial delights. Even those [others], however, are evidently 
desirous of liberation. Accordingly we should not concede that liberation is 
the extermination of him who escapes as he is in himself since that would 
involve what is not one of the aims of man. The objector says, ' Very well then, 
let us say that he who escapes as he is in himself is something that may be 
accepted.' In reply to this he says, And if there be an acceptance . . . the 
doctrine [that he has] a cause.2> For if there be an acceptance [of him], then, 
because he would be impermanent in so far as he is an effect, he might also fall 
even from [his] state of liberation. For liberation is deathlessness. And [we 
could] not [say] that an uninterrupted succession of purified mental-states is 
deathless. Because the uninterrupted series, over and above the members-of-the- 
series (samtanin), not being anything [perceptibly] real, does not exist ; and 
because the members-in-the-series are not permanent. Therefore we should 
strive to have such a theory as [would teach that the Self as he is in himself is] 
eternal. For this being so, liberation (apavarga) might be [one of] the aims of 
men. So he says, <And by denying both. Consequently, liberation is nothing 
but [the Seer] abiding in himself [i. 3], Precisely this is the right point of view. 



This same system is set forth in its four divisions. 
16. That which is to be escaped is pain yet to come. 
Pain past, that is, transferred beyond experience, cannot properly 
be called (pakse vartate) a thing to be escaped. And present pain in 
its own moment [of existence] has attained experience ; so it cannot 
at the next moment be so changed that it can be escaped. Conse- 
quently only that pain which is yet to come is that which hinders 
the yogin only, who is like an eye-ball, 3 but [this does] not [hinder] 
any other perceiver. Only this pain becomes so changed that it 
may be escaped. 

1 The Bikaner MS. reads cetasa iti. Tapin 2 The Madhyamika school of Buddhists, 
appears to be correct instead of tat/in. 3 Compare ii. 15, p. 134 (Calc. ed.). 



ii. 16 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [140 

This same system is set forth in its four divisions. 3> 16. That which is to be 
escaped is pain yet to come. The words yet to corned exclude the past and 
the present. He makes this consistent by saying pain past. If it be 
objected that present pain now in experience is not to be transferred beyond 
experience, he replies And present.^ Easy. 



Therefore the cause of this same thing that is described as some- 
thing to be escaped is once more specified. 

17. The correlation of the Seer and the object-of-sight is the 
cause of that which is to be escaped. 

The Seer is the Self conscious by reflection of the thinking- 
substance. Objects- of-sight are all external-aspects (dharma) 
which have struck upon the sattva of the thinking-substance. So 
this same object-of-sight giving its aid, like a magnet, 1 by the mere 
fact of being near, becomes, by reason of its being an object-of-sight, 
the property of the Self, its proprietor, whose nature is seeing. It 
becomes changed into an object upon which experience operates, 
in so far it has the nature of another. Having acquired [this new] 
being, although self-dependent, [it becomes] by serving one-not- 
itself, 2 dependent on one-not-itself. The correlation of these two, 
the power of seeing and the power by which one sees, is from time- 
without-beginning and is effected for [two] purposes. [This corre- 
lation is] the cause of that which is to be escaped, in other words, 
the cause of pain. And in this sense it has also been said, " By 
avoidance of the cause of correlation with this [thinking-substance] 
the antidote for pain would be absolute." Why [would this be so] ? 
Because we know the antidote to prevent the cause of pain. For 
example, we know that the liability-to-scratches inheres in the 
sole of the foot, the power to scratch inheres in the thorn, 
the prevention [of scratching] is either by not stepping with the 
foot upon the thorn or by stepping [upon it when the sole 
of the foot] is covered by a foot-protector. Whoever understands 
these three [scratch and cause and prevention] has begun the 
antidote therefor and is not exposed to the pain from scratches. 

1 Compare i. 4, p. 17 l ; ii. 18, p. 143 s ; iv. 17, 30Q 7 (Calc. ed.). 
3 Compare iv. 24. 



141] Cause of pain [ ii. 17 

Why [is this] ? Because of his power to apperceive the three-fold 
character [of the case]. And to resume the argument (atrdpi), the 
sattva, the castigated, comes under the ownership of rajas, the 
castigator. Why [so] ? Since it stands in a passive relation to 
the activity of the castigator. The act of castigation affects 
the sattva as a passive object, but does not affect the immutable 
and inactive Soul (ksetrajna). [Why inactive ?] Since it has 
objects shown to it. But if the sattva be under castigation, the 
Self, it appears, conforming itself to the form of this [sattva'] is 
itself castigated along with [the sattva]. 

That which is to be escaped has been described. Its cause (nidana) is [now] 
described 17. The correlation of the Seer and the object-of-sight is the cause 
of that which is to be escaped. He tells of the Seer himself in the words 
The Seer . . . conscious by reflection of the thinking-substance. The intelli- 
gence (citi) belonging to the Self (Pums), although it is detached, becomes con- 
scious by reflection of the thinking-substance, and this consists in the thinking- 
substance being imaged (chaya) [in the intelligence]. It is objected that ' even if 
this be so, [the Self] could see the thinking-substance only, but could not see 
the various things (qabdddi) which are absolutely shut off [from it] '. To this he 
replies, <3CObjects-of-sight . . . the (sattva) of the thinking-substance.^ When by 
the channel of the senses the thinking-substance enters into mutations having 
the forms of various things and when it is an object-of-sight, the various things, 
the external-aspects, are also objects-of-sight. It is objected, ' In so far as the 
thinking-substance has assumed the form of these [things], it may have the form 
of the various things. But if, in the case of the Self, his relation to the think- 
ing-substance be assumed, he would be mutable. Yet if there be no relation 
between them, how can the various things, although present in the (sattva) of 
the thinking-substance, be objects-of-sight? For surely an object-of-sight not 
in relation with the Seer cannot be called an object-of-sight.' To this he replies, 
this same object-of-sight. All this has been given in detail by us in Book First, 
where we showed [i. 7, p. 22] that the sattva of the thinking-substance, although not 
in combination with intelligence (cditanya), in so far as it is absolutely clear, still, 
in so far as it contains the image (bimba) of the intelligence, seems to come into 
a balanced state [with the intelligence] and [so] experiences the various things. 
Hence also the Seer, enjoying within himself the pleasures and other [experi- 
ences] offered by the sattva of the thinking-substance which has entered into 
mutation in the form of the various things, becomes the proprietor. And the 
sattva of the thinking-substance [having mutations] of such a kind becomes his 
property. So this same sattva of the thinking-substance, containing the forms 
of the various things, becomes the object-of-sight ; and being like a magnet, it 
becomes the property of the Self whose nature is seeing and who is the proprietor. 



ii. 17 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [142 

Why [is this] ? He says, <Kthe experience.^ Because [the sattva of the think- 
ing-substance] is changed into an object upon which experience operates. The 
experience is the enjoyment on the part of the Self ; the operation is the 
activity ; the object> is the condition of being enjoyed ; because it is ^changed 
into this, it becomes the property [of the Self]. The objection is made, ' How 
can the sattva of the thinking-substance, which is luminous in itself, be the 
object of an experience ? ' In reply to this he says, <Sin so far as it has the 
nature of another . For if the sattva of the thinking-substance were really like 
the intelligence (caitanya), it would be luminous in itself. But it has acquired 
[this new] being, it is property (sva), it is other than intelligence (caitanya), and 
inert in nature. Therefore it is the object of the experience on the part of this 
[intelligence]. It is objected, ' One thing is dependent upon another thing, when 
in some way or other it exerts itself for the sake of the other. Whereas the 
sattva of the thinking-substance does not in any way exert itself for the Self 
which is detached [from it]. And how can [the thinking-substance] be depen- 
dent on this [intelligence] ? And this being so, it cannot be an object upon 
which [the Self] operates.' In reply to this he says, ^although self-depen- 
dent. ^By serving the purpose of one-no t-itself, by serving the purpose of 
the Self, it becomes <Kdependent on one-not-itself, dependent upon the Self. 
The objector says, ' This relation between the power of seeing and the power by 
which one sees must be either natural or accidental. If it be natural, since the 
two terms of the relation are permanent, the relation is one that cannot be exter- 
minated ; and this being so, the round-of-rebirth would be permanent. But if it 
be accidental, then in so far as hindrances and karma and its subconscious-im- 
pressions are fluctuations of the inner-organ, the former exist only so long as 
the inner-organ exists, and if at the same time (ca) the inner-organ is to have 
these as its cause, there would be the fault of mutual interdependence ; and 
[you could not explain this fault away by bringing in a series without begin- 
ning,] because it is impossible that there should be anything from time-with- 
out-beginning at the beginning of the creation, for then the round-of-rebirth 
would not be produced at all. On which point it has been said, " Even in the 
opinion of those who think that the Self is not an agent, how can the aspects 
(guna) bring about the very first activity ? For then karma does not yet exist. 
Neither is there then an erroneous idea nor passion nor hatred nor similar 
[hindrances]. For all these are fluctuations of the central-organ and the central- 
organ has not been produced at that time."' This doubt he removes by the 
words, The correlation of these two, the power of seeing and the power by 
which one sees, is from time-without-beginning and is effected for [two] 
purposes. It is true that the relation is not natural, but accidental. But it is 
not to be supposed that it has a beginning. For in so far as it is the result of a 
cause (nimitta) which is from time-without-beginning, it itself is also from time- 
without-beginning. Furthermore the uninterrupted succession of hindrances 
and karma and subconscious-impressions of these is from time- without-beginning. 



143] 



Return to the state of equipoise 



[ ii. 17 



And although at the time of [each] reversal of creation [this succession] has 
been reduced to the state of equipoise (samya) in the primary cause, still at the 
beginning of a creation it becomes again as before, just as some kinds of plants 1 
(udbMjja), reduced at the end of the rains to a state of earth, when the rains 
[return], assume again their proper form. More than once this has been made 
known previously. In so far as it brings it to growth, undifferentiated conscious- 
ness is the cause of the correlation ; in so far as it is the reason for [its] stability, 
the purpose of the Self is the cause. For this [conjunction] is stable by virtue 
of this [purpose of the Self]. It is this that is stated in the words, ^effected for 
[two] purposes. 4CAnd in this sense it has also been said2> by Paiacacikha. 2 
By conjunction with this3> means by conjunction with the thinking-substance. 
This same is the cause of pain. By the avoidance of this [conjunction] this 
antidote for pain would be absolute. So what is implied is (arthdt) that pain 
results from a failure to avoid it. In connexion with this same point he states 
an extremely well-known simile in the words, For example. 2> CA foot-pro- 
tector^ is a sandal. An objector says, ' Let this be granted. But if it be said 
that correlation with the aspects (guna) is the cause of the castigation, then we 
must say that the aspects (guna) are castigators. And since the action of casti- 
gating does not remain within the agent, as is the case in such an [intransitive] act 
as being, we must expect some other thing to be castigated. And the Self is not 
the passive object of this [act] as being something to be castigated, for in so far as 
he is immutable, it is not fitting that he should be such as to [reap] the conse- 
quences which come from actions. Therefore we come to the result that the act 
of castigating, which is concomitant with the thing castigated, ceases when [the 
thing castigated] also ceases, just as there is absence of smoke when fire is lack- 
ing.' So he says, <KAnd to resume the argument .... the castigator.^ It is 
the aspects {guna) only that are in the relation of castigated and castigator. Of 
these [three], sattva, because it is soft like the sole of the foot, is the object to be 
castigated. Whereas rajas, inasmuch as it is keen, is the castigator. This is 
the point. He asks, Why [so] ? That is to say, why is sattva alone, and 
not the Self, the object to be castigated ? He gives the answer in the words, 
the sattva as a passive 3 object.3> 'Is not then the Self castigated at all? If 
so, let it be the inanimate sattva that receives the castigation. What does it 
matter to us ? ' In reply to this he says, Since it has objects shown to it. But 
if the sattva be under castigation, the Self, it appears, conforming itself to the 
form of this [sattva] is itself castigated along with [the sattva].^ The cause of its 
being castigated along with it is that objects are shown to it and this has been 
explained previously [i. 4]. 



1 The frog's body (manduka-deha) is used s l.kartar 

as the simile in i. 19, p. 51 10 (Calc. ed.). 2. kriya 

2 This is the seventh in Garbe's collection 3. karma 

of Paiicacikha's fragments, Festgruss 4. upaya 
an Roth, p. 79. 



kantaka rajas tapaka 

bheda abhibhava tapa 

padatala sattva tapya 

padatrana viveka parihara 



ii. 18 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [144 

He tells what the object-of-sight itself is. 

18. With a disposition to brightness and to activity and to 
inertia, and with the elements and the organs as its essence, 
and with its purpose the experience and the liberation [of 
the Self ], [this is] the object-of-sight. 

The sattva has the disposition to brightness ; the rajas has the 
disposition to activity ; the tamas has the disposition to inertia. 
These aspects (guna) with the [three] separate parts influencing 
each other, with external-aspects (dharma) in conjunction or in 
separation, with limitations Mn-extent (murti) brought about by 
basing them upon an interdependence of one upon another, 
with separate powers, although in subservience to each other, 
still unconfused, with conformations (anupdtin) according to 
various disparate and comparate powers, with their presence 
manifested at the time when they become dominant, with their 
existence, although subordinate to the dominant [aspects] yet from 
their functional-activity (vydpara) inferred as included in the 
dominant, with their faculties employed as effective for the 
purposes of the Self, with their aid given, like that of a magnet, 
from the mere fact of being near, following without any external 
cause after a fluctuation of any one of themselves these aspects 
(guna) are denoted by the word primary-cause. And this is called 
<the object-of-sight. > This same object-of-sight enters into muta- 
tion as elements and as organs, as elements such as earth and 
the others in coarse 2 and in subtile [form]. It enters likewise into 
mutation as organs such as the organ-of-hearing (<protra). But it 
is not without an impelling force. On the contrary, it acts only 
by accepting an impelling force. For the object-of-sight exists for 
the sake of the experience and the liberation of the Self. Of these 
[two], experience is the ascertainment of things with desirable 
qualities and of things with undesirable qualities so long 
as this [ascertainment] does not divide [the Self from the 
thinking-substance]. Liberation is the ascertainment 3 of the 

1 Compare iii. 44, p. 254 2 (Calc. ed.). of Balarama in notes 1 and 2 of p. 144 

8 This refers forward to the important and (Calc. ed.). 

peculiardefinitions of coarse and subtile 8 Compare drastuh svariipopalabdhih so 

in iii. 44. See the illuminating words 'pavargah, ii. 23, p. 157* (Calc. ed.). 



145] False obj edification of the Self [ ii.. 18 

enjoyer himself. Thus there is no other process-of-knowing 
in addition to these two. And in this sense it has been said, 1 
" But he who in the three aspects (guna) which are agents and in 
the Self which is not an agent, but which is of the same kind in 
some respects and. of a different kind in other respects, 'sees all 
the produced states presented to the fourth, the witness of their 
action he has no suspicion that there is another kind of know- 
ledge [the pure intelligence]." ' How is it that these two, experience 
and liberation, made by the thinking-substance and existing in the 
thinking-substance only, are attributed to the Self?' Just as 
a victory or a defeat on the part of actual fighters 2 is ascribed to 
their commander, for he as we know is the experiencer of the 
result, so bondage and release, existing in the thinking-substance 
only, are ascribed to the Self. For he as we know has the 
experience of the results of these. Bondage is of the thinking- 
substance only and is the failure to attain the purposes of the Self. 
Release is the termination of the purpose of the Self. Thus it is 
that processes-of-knowing and processes-of-retention and compre- 
hensions-of-particulars 3 (uha) and removals-of-faults (apoha) and 
real-knowledge and the will-to-live, [all] existing in the thinking- 
substance, are assumed to exist in the Self. For he as we know 
has the experience of the results of these. 

He explains the object-of-sight by the sutra beginning with the word 18. . . . 
brightness and ending with the words object-of-sight. Brightness is a 
portion of the sattva ; it is influenced by dejection which is a quality of tamas 
or by pain which is a quality of rajas. Similarly it must be understood in 
the case of the quality of rajas and the rest. It is this that is stated in the 
words Cwith the [three] separate parts influencing each other. With 
external-aspects (dharma) in conjunction or in separation^ with [or from] the 
Self. As it is written [Cvet. Up. iv. 5], " One male goat [i.e., the unborn soul] 
has pleasure in leaping upon the one female goat [i. e. primary matter] which is 

1 This is Garbe's eighth fragment of Paiica- of the Self, who never acts, who is 

cikha. It is introduced to support the different in nature from the gunas, and 

statement that experience consists in who merely witnesses their changes, 

determining the nature of the gunas He does not suspect the existence of 

which have been identified with the an intelligence which is an insight 

Self. Although the three gunas are discriminated from the gunas. 

active agents, the indiscriminating 2 Compare i. 24, p. 55 2 (Calc. ed.). 

man looks upon all things as the deeds s See Nyaya-sutra i. 1. 40. 
19 [h.o.s. 17] 



ii. 18 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [146 

red and white and black and which brings forth many offspring like herself ; 
while another male goat deserts her after having enjoyed her." Limitations-in- 
extent, such as earth, are those which have been brought about by basing them 
upon interdependence of one upon another. The objector says, ' This may be 
true. When a quiescent idea is to be produced by sattva, since rajas and tamas 
also, in so far as they are accessory to sattva, are the causes of this [idea], 
there is a power in them. If this be so (iti), and whenever rajas or tamas might 
be principal, then always a quiescent idea might arise, not a cruel nor an 
infatuated one, just as in the case when sattva was dominant.' In reply to this 
he says, Cwith separate powers, although in subservience to each other, still 
unconfused.^ Let it be granted, when a quiescent idea is to be produced, that 
rajas and tamas are in an accessory relation, still their powers are not com- 
mingled. For the fact that their powers are not commingled may be inferred 
from the fact that there is no commingling of effects. Whereas effects of the 
quiescent and cruel and infatuated forms are seen to move actively forth in so far 
as their form is uncommingled. Thus it is established that the powers are 
unconfused. The objector says, ' Suppose this be granted. If the powers are 
unconfused, then the aspects {guna) cannot be supposed to work harmoniously 
together. Evidently things whose powers are different never have effects that 
are produced by a harmonious working together. Threads, for instance, and 
lumps of earth and dry grasses do not work harmoniously together and produce 
a jar.' In reply to this he says, Cwith conformations according to various dis- 
parate and comparate powers.2> Although the power of serving as material 
cause is in [a thing which is] comparate [with its effect], and not elsewhere, 
and although the power of serving as co-operative [cause may be] in disparate 
things, still when it is a water-jar that is to be generated, it is not in the 
power of the dry grasses to serve even as co-operative [causes], and this being 
so, these [grasses] do not work harmoniously with threads. This is the point. 
[He analyses the compound.] Those are referred to whose character it is 
to conform to certain kinds of powers with regard to possible disparates and 
comparates. <KAt the time when they become dominant.^ When a super- 
normal body is to be generated, the sattva is dominant and the rajas and tamas 
are accessory. Similarly when a human body is to be generated, the rajas 
is dominant and the sattva and tamas accessory. Likewise when an animal 
body is to be generated, the tamas is dominant and the sattva and rajas 
are accessory. Thus these aspects {guna) have their presence manifested at 
the time when they become dominant. In other words, they contribute to 
the effect in proportion as they become reintensified. And the word 
dominanfc is to be taken as the abstract form of dominance ' (bhdvapradhdna). 

1 He wishes to exclude the other meaning this word has the sense of ' dominant ' 

of pradhana, that is, primary cause. and of ' primary cause '. See Pan. 

Just as ' one and two ' have an iii. 4. 69. 
abstract and a particular sense, so also 



147] The aspects are foreign to the Self [ ii. 18 

Just as [in the phrase of Panini's sutra i. 4. 22,] " The dual and singular are 
used in case of two and one ", [the words two and one are] in this case to be 
understood as twoness and oneness ; in other cases [such as of measurable 
numbers], they are to be understood as two and as one. An objector says, 
1 At that time [of dominance], it is possible to say that the dominant exists in 
so far as it is in its intense form. But is there any source-of-valid-ideas [to 
prove] the real existence of its accessories which are not in the intense form ? ' 
In reply to this he says, ^although subordinate. Although not intensified, 
still, because they have no discrimination [to recognize that they are themselves 
inanimate], and [yet] because they do work harmoniously together, from the 
mere fact of their functional-activity in so far as there is co-operation, 
their existence is inferred as being included in the primary cause. The 
objector says, ' We may grant that the aspects {guna) have faculties and 
work harmoniously together, but why do they perform this [co-operation] ? 
For surely just because one says there is a faculty, one generates no 
[actual] effect on the ground that there may not be any cessation in the 
production of effects.' In reply to this he says, <Kem ployed as effective for 
the purposes of the Self. After this [purpose has been effected], when all 
the purposes of the Self have been ended, the aspects [afterwards] cease and 
produce no effects. This is what he means to say. If it be asked, ' How can 
a thing which does not aid the Self, use impelling force as being a purpose of the 
Self,' he replies <Kaid given merely by being near. It is objected that 'the 
impeller of the aspects is a cause characterized only as being merit and demerit ; 
but can [these aspects be made to produce effects] when impelled by the purpose 
of the Self ? ' In reply to this objection he says, <Swithout any external 
caused [He explains the phrase.] CThe rest [of the aspects], even with- 
out any external-cause {pratyaya)^ [or] efficient-cause (nimitta) such as merit, 
^following the fluctuation of any one of them, ^ either of sattva or of rajas or 
of tamas, as dominant and as being active towards the production of its own 
effect. In which sense he will say later [iv. 3], "The efficient-cause gives no 
impulse, but [the mutation] follows when the barrier to the evolving-causes 
is cut, just as in the case of the peasant." The construction of the sentence 
is, these aspects {guna) are denoted by the word primary-cause (jpradhana). 
According to its derivation [the word jpradhana] is that by which the universe 
is produced (jpradhiyate) or put forth. 1 This is said to be the object-of-sight. 
Having mentioned the nature of the aspects {guna) he describes the effect 
of this disposition in the words, this same.)) In order to establish the 
doctrine of the pre-existent effect {satkdryavada), he says that a thing enters 
into mutation as a form of that thing, whichever it may be, that is its essence. 
He makes clear that its essence is elements and organs by the words begin- 
ning, as an element.^ To the words, <with its purpose the experience and 

1 Compare ii. 23, p. 159 s (Calc. ed.). 



ii. 18 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [148 

the liberation^ which are a part of the sutra, he gives an introduction by 
saying not without an impelling- forced He elaborates the word <experience> 
by saying of these [two]. For pleasure and pain belong to the thinking- 
substance as such in so far as it has three aspects (guna). Because this thinking- 
substance enters into mutation as being of such a kind [as one that has three 
aspects]. There is said to be experience in so far as there is an ascertainment 
[of the things] as belonging to [these] qualities. 1 Accordingly he says, so 
long as undivided. And this has been made known by us more than once. 
He elaborates the word <liberation> by saying <Kof the enjoyer.^ Liberation 
is that by which one is liberated [literally, wrenched off]. He states that 
there is no other impelling- force [than these two] by saying in addition to 
these two.) And in this sense it has been said^ by Paiicacikha in the 
words " But he who ". An objection is raised, ' As matters of [perceptible] 
reality, experience and liberation are made by the thinking-substance. How 
are they attributed to the Self who is neither their cause nor their locus ? ' 
In reply to this he says, These two. And that the Self is enjoyer has 
been explained and will be stated later [iii. 34]. But in the strict sense it 
is as the text says, ^Bondage is of the thinking-substance only and is the 
failure to attain the purposes of the Self.) <KThus^ means in the way that 
experience and liberation are mentioned as being related to the Self. [So] 
processes of-knowing and the rest are also to be understood as being related 
to the Self. Of these, 4Cthe process-of-knowing is the thinking of the intended- 
object as it is in itself ; the process-of-retention is memory with regard to this 
[object] ; <3Ccomprehension-of -particulars (w7&a) is the maintaining (uhana) of the 
-. particulars belonging to a thing ; <Kremoval-of-faults (apoha)^> is the removal for 

statable reasons {ytikti) of particulars when falsely attributed ; it is by these two 
only, by comprehension-of-particulars and by removal-of-faults, that the given 
thing is determined, that is, that there is real knowledge ; and will-to-live is 
rejection or acceptation preceded by this determination of the reality. 



This sutra is begun with the intent of determining the various 

forms of the aspects (guna), the objects-of-sight. 

19. The particularized and the unparticularized [forms] and 

the resoluble only [into primary matter] and irresoluble 2 - 

primary-matter are the divisions of the aspects (guna). 

Of these [four], the elements air and wind and fire and water and 

earth are the particularized [forms] of the unparticularized fine 

The Varttika says istdnistagunah are three ' aspects ' to the common use of 

8ukhaduhkhdtmakdh. This illustrates the term as ' quality '. 

the closeness of the term guna as the 2 Compare i. 45. 



149] Successive developments of the aspects [ ii. 19 

elements (tanmdtra) sound and touch and colour and taste and 
smell. Similarly the organs of the thinking-substance are ear and 
skin and eye and tongue and nose, and the organs of action, voice 
and hands and feet and organ-of- excretion and organ-of-generation. 
And as the eleventh the central-organ which has all kinds of things 
as its intended object. These are the particularized [forms] of the 
unparticularized [personality-substance] which is characterized as 
having the feeling of personality. This is the sixteen-fold mutation 
of the aspects (guna). The unparticularized [forms] are six, 
namely, the fine element of sound and the fine element of touch 
and the fine element of colour and the fine element of taste and 
the fine element of smell. Thus, as we know, sound and the rest 
with one or two or three or four or five distinguishing-characteristics 
are five unparticularized [forms]. And the sixth is that of which 
we can only say that it is the feeling-of-personality. These are 
the six unparticularized forms of the Great thinking-substance of 
whose being we can only say that it exists. That which is prior to 
the unparticularized [forms] is that of which we can only say that 
it is resoluble [primary-matter], the Great Substance (mahat-tattva) . 
Remaining in this Great Being (dtman) of which all that we can 
say is that it exists, these [six] unparticularized [forms] experience 
the limit of development. And reversing the process of creation 
they remain in that same Great Being of which all that we can say 
is that it exists, and revert to that which has neither existence nor 
non-existence, from which both existence and non-existence have 
been removed, from which non-existence has been removed, to 
the unphenomenalized and unresoluble primary-cause. This [Great 
Being of which all that we can say is that it exists], is the [first] 
mutation of these aspects. And that [Being] which has neither 
existence nor non-existence is the mutation [of these aspects] which 
is unresoluble [primary cause]. So the purpose of the Self is not 
the reason for the unresoluble state. Since the fact that the Self 
has a purpose is not known (bhavati) at the beginning as the 
cause of the state unresoluble [into primary matter], therefore the 
fact that the Self has a purpose is not a cause l of this [state]. 

1 See i. 45, p. 96" (Calc. ed.). 



,hft 



ii. 19 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [150 

And since that state is not effected by the purpose of the Self, it is 
called permanent. But at the beginning of the three states that 
are particularized, the fact that the Self has a purpose is known 
to be the cause. And this purpose is known to act as purpose 
and as efficient cause. Hence this state is called impermanent. 
But the aspects, which conform themselves to all kinds of external- 
aspects (dharma), neither cease to be nor come into being, but 
appear as if they had the properties of coming into existence and 
of passing out of existence by reason of the [individual] phenome- 
nalized forms, past and yet to come, going and coming, inseparably 
connected with the aspects. As for example we say, ' Devadatta 
is poor '. Why ? ' Because his cows are dying.' Since his poverty 
is due to the dying of his cows and not to his loss of himself, the 
parallel (samddhi) [to the going and coming of the phenomenalized 
forms as affecting the aspects (guna)~\ applies (sama). That of 
which we can only say that it is resoluble [into primary matter] is 
next [in development] to that which is irresoluble [into primary 
matter]. Formed therein it becomes distinguished from it [as its 
effect], since the order [of the development of the mutations] is not 
transgressed. Likewise the six unparticularized [forms] formed in 
that of which we can only say that it is resoluble [into primary 
matter] become distinguished [from it]. Because the order of 
mutations is fixed. Similarly the elements and organs formed in 
these unparticularized [forms] become distinguished [from them], 
as has been already described. There is no other entity (tattva) 
beyond the particularized [forms]. So there is no mutation into 
any other entity beyond the particularized [forms]. But their 
mutation into external-aspect and time-variation and intensity are 
to be explained [iii. 13] later. 

This sutra is begun with the intent of determining the various forms of the 
aspects (guna), the objects-of-sight.^ The sutra begins with the words 19. The 
particularized and ends with the words divisions . . . He mentions the 
particularized [forms] which are the evolved-matter (vikara) of the unparticula- 
rized [forms] which [latter] are without the serene and cruel and infatuated 
characteristics [the evolved forms], but not the [forms] evolving ' other entities 
(tattva). He describes the [forms] belonging to these [entities] in the words, 
1 See the discussion by Vacaspati in Samkhya Tattva-Kaum. on Kar. iii. 



151] Mutations of primary substance real [ ii. 19 

0f these [four], . . . air. The order of explanatory-statement follows 
exactly the order of production. The organs of intelligence (buddhi) are particu- 
larized [forms] of the [personality-substance (atoihMra)] which is characterized as 
having the feeling-of-personality, and which has sattva as its dominant [aspect]. 
But the organs of action [are particularized forms of the personality-substance] 
which has rajas as its dominant [aspect]. Whereas the central-organ (manas), 
the essence of which is of both kinds, must be supposed to be the [particularized 
form of the personality-substance] which has both kinds [that is, rajas and 
sattva] as its dominant [aspects]. And [there is an inference] on this point, that 
the five fine elements have the thinking-substance as their cause, because they 
are unparticularized [forms], like the feeling-of-personality. Moreover, being an 
unparticularized form is [the same as] being the cause of evolved matter ; and 
both in the fine elements and in the feeling-of-personality there is nothing 
particularized. After grouping them together he enumerates the particularized 
[forms] in the words, This ... of the aspects. He numbers the unparticu- 
larized [forms] also with the word six. He groups them together and sums 
them up with the word namely.2> Now the prior is particularized by the 
subsequent. So smell itself [together with the subsequent four] has five 1 
characteristics ; taste itself [together with the subsequent three] has four 
characteristics ; colour itself [together with the subsequent two] has three 
characteristics ; touch itself [with the subsequent sound] has two characteristics ; 
sound has the characteristic of sound only. ' But of what are these six 
unparticularized [forms] the effect ?' In reply to this he says These .... of 
which we can only say that it exists. The existent (sat) is that which is 
capable of actions fulfilling a purpose ; having existence (satta) is the abstract 
form of this. The Great Substance is that which is made of this. In other 
words, whatever action fulfilling a purpose there be, whether its characteristic 
be enjoyment [of various things] from sound downwards, or whether its 
characteristic be the discernment of the difference between the sattva and the 
Self, it is all of it comprehended in the Great Thinking-substance. By saying 
of whose being^ he shows what it really is and denies that it is nothing at 
all (tuccha). This is equivalent to saying that this first mutation of primary 
matter is a real thing, and not an appearance (vivartta). That which is prior to 
these, [that is] distant in time as compared with the unparticularized [forms] 
which are near in time, is that of which we can only say that it is resoluble 
[primary-matter], the Great Substance (mahat-tattva). Eemaining in this Great 
Being of which all that we can say is that it exists, these six unparticularized 
[forms], since it is established that the effect pre-exists [in its cause], experi- 
ence [or] reach the limit of development. On the other hand, of these non- 
particularized which have particularized [forms] there are also the mutations of 
external-aspect (dharma) and of time- variation and of intensity. It is this that 
is the limit of development, that is, the limit of mutation of these particu- 
1 See Garbe : Samkhya Philosophic, p. 236, note 3. 



ii. 19 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [152 

larized [forms]. Having thus mentioned the order of growth he describes the 
order of dissolution in the words, ^reversing the process of creation.^ Ke- 
versing the process of creation [means] becoming resolved {praliyamana) 
[into primary-matter]. In other words particularized forms are resolved into 
their own form, that is, become non-particularized. And they remain [or] 
are dissolved (nillya) in that same Great Being of which all that we can say 
is that it exists. And then even with the Great [Being], these unpartieu- 
larized [forms] revert to unphenomenalized [primary-matter], called unre- 
soluble because in none (a) else are they resolved (ll). This same 
[unphenomenalized primary matter] is qualified by the words, ^which has 
neither existence nor non-existence.^ Existence is that which is capable of acts 
fulfilling a purpose of the Self. Non-existence is worthlessness (tucchata) as 
regards the purpose of the Self. That is so-described [as having neither 
existence nor non-existence] which is beyond-the-range of both existence and 
non-existence. What he means to say is this. The state when sattva and rajas 
and tamas are in equipoise is never of use in fulfilling a purpose of the Self. 
And so it is not existent. Neither does it have a worthless kind of existence like 
the sky-lotus. Therefore it is also not non-existent. The objector says, ' This 
may be so. Still in the unphenomenalized state there are the Great [Thinking- 
substance] and the other [entities] in so far as these are identical with this 
[unphenomenalized state]. For there is no utter annihilation of the existent, or if 
utterly annihilated it cannot be made to grow again. For because one cannot 
make the non-existent grow, the Great [Thinking-substance] and the other 
[entities] would really exist [in the unphenomenalized state] and therefore might 
function as acts fulfilling the purpose of the Self [and so the unphenomenalized 
state might be said to exist]. Then how could you say that it has no existence?' 
In reply to this he says, Cfrom which both existence and non-existence have 
been removed.^ [The non-existent] is a cause which [exists] beyond any 
existing effect. Although in the causal state the effect does exist as potential 
being (qaMyatmana), still in so far as it does not fulfil its peculiar purpose it is 
said to be non-existent. This cause does not however have an effect [worthless 
for the purpose of the Self] like a hare's horns. Accordingly he says from 
which non-existence has been removed.^ [A cause which exists] beyond an 
effect that is non-existent or worthless [with regard to the purpose of the Self]. 
For if that were so, the effect would not be produced from this [cause] any 
more than the sky-lotus [would be produced from this cause]. This is the point. 
He brings the [topic of the] reversal of creation which has been described to 
a close in the words, This ... of these. The word This points back to 
that which has been stated just prior to that which immediately precedes. The 
states beginning with that of which we can only say that it is resoluble [into 
primary matter], since they are effected by a purpose of the Self, are not 
permanent. Whereas the state which is unresoluble [into primary matter], since 
it is not effected by a purpose of the Self, is permanent. He gives the reason 



153] Order of development fixed [ ii. 19 

for this in the words, of the state unresoluble into primary matter. But why 
is the purpose of the Self not a reason ? In reply to this he says, not ... of 
the state unresoluble. /> By using the object (visaya) [the purpose of the Self] 
in place of that which contains the object (visayin) [the unresoluble state], -he 
partially describes the knowledge [in the Self of this state]. What he means to 
say is this. For this being so, it should be known that the purpose of the Self 
acts as a cause in the state unresoluble [into primary matter], provided the 
state unresoluble [into primary matter] could produce (nirvartayeta) the enjoy- 
ment of objects or the discernment of the difference between the sattva 
and the Self, [either of which is] a purpose of the Self. When however these 
two are produced, there can be no longer a state of equipoise. Therefore this 
[unresoluble state] is not known as a cause of the fact that the Self has a pur- 
pose. Thus the fact that the Self has a purpose is not the reason for this 
[unresoluble state]. He concludes with the words, that . . . not.^ The 
word iti is used in the sense of therefore. He describes the impermanent state 
in the words of the three. y> In other words, that of which we can only say 
that it is unresoluble, the unparticularized, and the particularized. Having 
shown what the divisions are, he tells what the aspects are in the words, ^But 
the aspects. He gives a simile in the words, Just as Devadatta. In case the 
increase or decrease of the cows, which are absolutely distinct from Devadatta, is 
the reason for Devadatta's increase or decrease, how much more [in the parallel 
case] of the growth or decline of the [individual] phenomalized [forms], which 
are not different in some respects and different in other respeets from the 
aspects (guna). An objector asks, ' Is then the order of production not fixed ? ' 
No. As he says in the words, that of which we can only say that it 
is resoluble. ) For surely the seeds of the Nyagrodha tree do not in a single 
day shoot forth the Nyagrodha tree, with its dense mass of green leaves, 
which has absorbed in its branches and twigs a multitude of the fierce 
rays of the sun ; but gradually, through contact with earth and water and 
warmth, they produce in succession sprout and leaves and stalks and stems and 
the rest. So here also an order 1 [of production] must be accepted in that it is 
established by reasoning and by verbal-communication. How are the elements 
and organs formed from unparticularized [forms] ? In reply to this he says, 
<&s has been already described^ [by us] when explaining the first part of this 
very sutra. And if it be asked why, in the case of the particularized [forms], 
there is no mutation into any other entity, he replies ^no . . . the par- 
ticularized [forms]. So is it true then that the particularized [forms] actually 
enter into no mutations ? And if that were so, would not one have to say that 
they are permanent ? In reply to this he says, <KBut their . 



1 For example, tbe Samkhya-sutra i. 62, and Samkhya-karika xxii. 
20 [h.o.s. n] 



ii. 20 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [154 

The object-of-sight has been explained. Now this sutra is intro- 
duced with the intent of determining what the Seer as such is. 
20. The Seer, who is nothing but [the power of J seeing, 
although undefiled (guddha), looks upon the presented-idea. 

<Who is nothing but [the power of] seeing> means who is nothing 
but the power of seeing untouched by any qualifications. This 
Self becomes conscious-by-reflection (pratisarhvedin) of the think- 
ing-substance. He is not homogeneous with the thinking-substance 
nor utterly heterogeneous. Why [do we say that the Self] is not 
even heterogeneous [to the thinking-substance] ? Because the 
thinking-substance is something that enters into mutations, 1 
inasmuch as an object is known or not known [according as the 
thinking-substance has or has not changed into the form of that 
thing]. And the fact that an [external] object, for instance, a cow 
or a water-jar, is sometimes known and sometimes not known, 
proves that the thinking-substance is something which enters into 
mutations. Whereas the fact that, in the case of the Self, its 
object is always known, proves that the Self does not enter into 
mutations. Why [do we say this] ? Because it surely is not 
possible for the thinking-substance to be an object to the Self, and 
at the same time be something now comprehended and something 
again not comprehended [by the Self]. Hence it is proved that 
the Self always knows its object. And from this it follows that 
the Self does not enter into mutations. Moreover the thinking- 
substance exists for the sake of another, since it acts by combining 2 
causes. Whereas the Self exists for its own sake. Thus [continuing 
the argument], the thinking-substance is a complex of the three 
aspects, because it determines 3 each thing (sarva-artha) [as 
consisting of one or another of the three aspects, that is, as 
pleasurable or as painful or as indifferent]. And since it consists 
of the three aspects (guna), it is inanimate. The Self, on the 
other hand, is that which later beholds the aspects [by being 
reflected in them]. Hence it is not homogeneous with [the 

J Compare ii. 15, p. 135"; ii. 18, p. 152 3 ; 2 Compare Mrcchakatika, act 10, verse 59 
iii. 35, p. 244 5 ; iv. 17, p. 301 1 ; iv. 22, and YS. iv. 24. 

p. 306* ; iv. 33, p. 316 (Calc. ed.). s The concept adhyavasaya is defined in the 

comments on Samkhya-karika xxiii. 



155] Presented-ideas instruments of the Self [ ii. 20 

thinking-substance]. ' [Very well] then, suppose the Self to be 
heterogeneous [to the thinking-substance].' [Still], it is not utterly 
heterogeneous. Why [do we say this]? Because though pure 1 
in itself, the Self beholds the presented-ideas, that is to say,' it 
beholds that [mutation of matter which the thinking-substance 
undergoes when it takes the form of an object, and] which is a 
presented-idea of thinking-substance (bduddha). Looking [thus] 
upon this [change in the thinking-substance] the Self seems to be it 
[the thinking-substance], although it really is not it [the thinking- 
substance]. And in this sense it has been said, 2 " For the power 
of the enjoyer enters not into mutation nor unites [with objects]. 
Seeming to unite with a thing in mutation [the thinking-substance], 
it conforms itself to the fluctuation [which that thinking-substance 
undergoes]. And it is commonly termed a fluctuation of the 
thinking-substance in so far as it resembles (anukdramdtratayd) 
a fluctuation of thinking-substance that has come under the 
influence (upagraha) of intelligence (cditanya)." 

The object-of-sight has been explained. Now this sutra is introduced with 
the intent of determining what the Seer as such is. 20. The Seer, who is 
nothing but [the power of] seeing, although undented {<;uddha\ looks 
upon the presented-idea. He explains [the sutra] by the words ^nothing 
but [the power of] seeing.^ The qualifications are the properties. Un- 
touched by these in this way shows the import of the words ^nothing but. 
An objector says, ' This may be true. If the power of seeing is without all 
qualifications, then [the various things] from sound downwards would not be 
known. For the object-of-sight cannot be something out of contact with the 
seeing.' In reply to this he says, This Self. The union (samJcranti) of the 
reflection of the Self with the mirror of the thinking-substance is itself the Self's 
consciousness by reflection in the thinking-substance. And so the [various 
things] from sound downwards become connected with the thinking-substance 
which has been changed into the likeness (chdya) of the power of sight. In 
other words, [they become] objects-of-sight. The objector says, ' This may be 
true. Still why is not the unity, even in the strict sense, of the thinking- 
substance and of the Self to be accepted ? What is the use of changing it into 
the likeness of this [Self] ? ' In reply to this he says, It is not homogeneous 
with the thinking-substance. ' In this case it would be difficult for it to 
change into the likeness [of the Seer].' In reply to this he says, Cnor 

1 That is to say, unspecialized. 

2 This is Pancajikha's ninth fragment. It is quoted again in iv. 22. 



ii. 20 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [156 

utterly heterogeneous.^ Of these [two], he rejects the homogeneity in the 
words, not even homogeneous.^ The reason [for this] he asks by saying 
Cwhy? For the heterogeneity he gives a reason which itself contains a 
reason, in the words, known or not known.3> Because the thinking-substance 
enters into mutations, it is heterogeneous. When, as we know, this [thinking- 
substance] changes into the form of [the various things from] sound down- 
wards, then the object, having the distinguishing characteristics of [the various 
things from] sound downwards, becomes known to this [thinking-substance] ; 
but when not so changed into the form of these [things], the object does not 
become known to it. And so only occasionally it assumes the forms of these 
[things] and enters into mutations. And the argument is [of this kind] : The 
thinking-substance enters into mutations ; since objects are [sometimes] known 
and [sometimes] not known by it ; just as the organ of hearing and other 
organs [are sometimes active and sometimes not]. And the Self proves to be 
of different properties to this, because the middle term [that is, always-known] 
is contrary to this, as he says, <Salways known.S> The objector says, ' This 
may be so. But if the Self always has its object known, then he could not 
be isolated.' With this in mind, he asks, Why [do we say this]? He 
gives the answer in the words, ^Because surely . . . not . . . for the thinking- 
substance.^ In the state of restriction the thinking-substance may exist and 
at the same time there may be no process of apperception [by the Self], 
Therefore in order to indicate the contradiction, it is said, ^Can object to the 
Self. So the first Cand) (buddhig ca) has an accumulative force and makes 
the thinking-substance an object; but the two remaining ands {visayac ca 
and 'grahita ca) are to make the contradiction clear. The argument, however, 
is this. The Self enters not into mutation ; because objects are always known 
to it in the conscious and emergent states 1 ; whatever enters into mutation 
does not always have its objects known ; just as the organ of hearing or other 
[organs]. This is a negative instance of the middle term [sada-jfiatavisayatvat]. 
He gives another [instance] of difference in properties in the words, ^Moreover 
. . . for the sake of another. ) For the thinking-substance, in so far as it fulfils 
the purpose of the Self by combining with hindrances and karma and sub- 
conscious-impressions and with objects and organs, is for the sake of another. 
The argument, moreover, is this : The thinking-substance is for the sake of 
another ; because it acts by combining causes 2 ; like a bed or a seat or an 
ointment. But the Self is not like that, as he says the Self exists for its own 
sake. Everything serves the purpose of the Self, but the Self serves no other. 
This is the point. He gives yet another [instance] of difference in properties in 
the words, Thus . . . each thing. The thinking-substance determines all 
things as being serene or cruel or infatuated when it mutates into their forms. 
And these [three] are mutations of the sattva and rajas and tamas aspects. Thus 

1 This excludes the state unconscious of objects. 

2 Compare Samkhya-karika xvii. 



157] All objects subordinate to Selves [ ii. 21 

it is established that the thinking-substance is a complex of the three aspects. 
And again the Self is not like that, as he says, The Self, on the other hand, 
later beholds the aspects.^ It beholds them in that it is reflected in them, but 
it does not become mutated into their form. He brings the discussion to a close 
with the word, Hence. [Very well] then, suppose . . . heterogeneous.^ 
[But] it is not utterly heterogeneous [to the thinking-substance]. Why [do we 
say this] ? Because though pure in itself, it looks upon the presented-ideas. 
And that this is so, is [also] stated in these [words i. 4], " At other times it takes 
the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stuff]." And in this sense it has 
been said by Panca9ikha <." For the power of the enjoyer enters not into muta- 
tion.") [The power,] in other words, the self (atman). And therefore it does 
not unite with the thinking-substance. ^CSeeming to unite with the thinking- 
substance which is in mutation, ^it conforms itself to the fluctuation^ which that 
thinking-substance [undergoes]. An objector asks, ' If it does not unite, how is 
it that it seems to unite, or how does it conform itself [to the thinking-substance] 
without [assuming] a fluctuation [of its own] ? ' To this he replies with the 
words, CAnd it. That thing has come under the influence of intelligence 
whose form has been affected (uparahta) [by intelligence]. What he means to 
say is this. Although the moon does not unite with the clear water, still it 
seems to unite [with it] in so far as its reflection unites [with the water]. 
Similarly in this case also, although the power of intellect (citi) does not unite 
[with the thinking-substance], still it seems to unite since its reflection has 
united [with itj. Thus the power of intellect, changed into the essence of the 
thinking-substance, conforms itself to the fluctuation which the thinking- 
substance undergoes. In this way the word beholding has been explained. 
It beholds it in the sense that it sees [itself] as resembling it. 



21. The being {atman) of the object-of-sight is only for the 
sake of it [the Self]. 

Since the object-of-sight is changed in so far as it becomes the 
object of the action of the Self who is so much (rupa) seeing (drgi), 
<the being {atman) of the object-of-sight,> that is to say, the object- 
of-sight itself {svarupa) exists only for the sake of the Self. But 
inasmuch as it is itself only so long as it has acquired its being as 
having the form of another, it is no [longer] seen by the Self when 
once it has accomplished the purpose of the Self, [of giving the 
Self] experience and liberation. So by escaping from itself it 
attains cessation ; but it does not utterly cease to be. 



ii. 21 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [158 

Having stated what the Seer and the object-of-sight are, he says that the object-of- 
sight serves the purpose of the Self. [And this purpose is] based upon the relation 
characterized as being that of proprietor and property. 21. The being (atman) 
of the object-of-sight is only for the sake of it [the Self]. He explains [the 
sutra] in the words, Cwho is so much (rupa) seeing (drgi).^ Since the object-of- 
sight has become the object-of- action (Jcarma-rupata), [that is] has been changed 
into the object-of-experience by the experiencer [that is] the Self who is so much 
seeing, therefore the being of the object-of-sight must be only for the sake of 
the Seer, but not for the sake of the object-of-sight. The objector asks, ' How 
can the being [atma in drgyatma] be for the sake of this [atma in taddtma] [that is, 
the Self] ? ' In reply to this he says, is itself. What he means to say is this : 
The object-of-experience is the object-of-sight as having pleasure or pain. And 
pleasure and pain being co-agents or counter-agents persist as such (tattvena) 
only for this purpose [of acting with or against the Self]. For the [various 
things] from sound downwards as objects-of-sense are co-agents or counter-agents 
[for the Self] only because they are identical [with pleasure and pain]. And it 
cannot be said that they exist to be co-active or to be counter-active to themselves. 
For that would be a contradiction of a fluctuation with itself. Therefore by 
a process of elimination it is the power of intellect (citi) only for which they are 
co-active or counter-active. Consequently the object-of-sight is for this [Self] 
and not for the object-of-sight [itself]. And therefore the <object-of-sight is 
only for the sake of it [the Self],> not for the sake of the object-of-sight. 
Because (yat) it is itself as long as the purpose of the Self continues. And when 
the purpose of the Self is complete it is also completed. Accordingly he says, 
CBut . . . it . . itself.^ But the object-of-sight itself is inert (jada), yet it has 
acquired its being [that is] it is experienced as having the form of another [that 
is] the form of the soul (atman) [that is] the intelligence (caitanya). When 
experience and liberation have been accomplished it is no [longer] seen by the 
Self. [This was] the kind-of-experience, 1 the perception (anubhava) of sound 
and the other [perceptible] things. Liberation is the perception (anubhava) of 
the difference between sattva and the Self. Both these two kinds [of things, 
experience and liberation,] belong to the Self only who, by reason of the fact 
that the likeness of the Self becomes changed by the inert thinking-substance, 
[does know them both]. And so when experience and liberation have been 
accomplished for the Self, [the subservience of] the object-of-sight to the purpose 
of the Self is finished. Hence it is said, ^Cwhen once it has accomplished the 
purpose of the Self. Meanwhile he raises an objection in the words, by 
escaping from itself. ) He rebuts [this] with the words, ^Cbut it does not 
utterly cease to be. 



1 Vijnana Bhiksu expands this definition is a fluctuation of the mind (sukhaduh. 

and emphasizes the fact that experience khatmakafabdadicrttih). 






159] One primary substance and many Selves [ ii. 22 

Why [does it not utterly cease to be] ? 

22. Though it has ceased [to be seen] in the case of one whose 
purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased to be, since it is 
common to others [besides himself]. 

Although the object-of-sight has ceased in so far as one Self whose 
purpose has been accomplished is concerned, it has not ceased to be, 
because it is common to others besides him. Although it has ceased 
so far as one fortunate man is concerned, [still] it has not ceased in 
the case of unfortunate men, since their purpose has not been ful- 
filled. So for these persons it becomes the object-of-the-action of 
seeing and receives its form of being as having the form of another. 
And therefore since the power of seeing and the power by which 
one sees are permanent, the conjunction [of the two] is said to be 
from time-without-beginning. And in this sense it has been said, 
" The substances being in correlation from time without beginning, 
the external-aspects in general are also in correlation from time 
without beginning." 

An objector says, ' If [the object-of-sight] is absolutely inapperceptible, how is it 
that it does not cease to be ? ' With this in mind he asks, Why [is this] ? 
In the sutra he tells the answer beginning with the words 22 . . . whose 
purpose is accomplished and ending with the words since it is common to 
others [besides himself]. A Self whose purpose has been accomplished is of 
such a kind. For him the object-of-sight although it has ceased [to be seen], 
has not ceased [to be]. Why ? Since it is common to all Selves fortunate or 
unfortunate. He explains [the sutra] in the words, <JCone whose purpose has 
been accomplished. Cessation is the absence of that by which one sees. But 
the object-of-sight has not ceased to be, since it is common to other Selves. 
Hence the nature (riipa) of the being (atman) who is higher than the object- 
of-sight is intelligence (caitanya). So (tena) here we have that [being] which is 
made known in the Sacred Word and the Sacred Tradition and in the Epics 
and Puranas, the unphenomenalized, the whole-without-parts, the one, the 
independent, all-pervasive, permanent, [and] capable of producing-all-effects. 
Although [the object-for-sight] is not seen by the fortunate man, since for him 
its effect has been accomplished, it is not, however, something not seen by the 
unfortunate man. For because colour is not seen by the blind man, it does not 
become non-existent, since it is seen by the man who has eyes. For the Self 
is not, like the primary cause, only one. Because its plurality is established * 
in so far as there is the orderly arrangement of births and deaths, pleasures and 

1 Compare Samkhya-sutra i. 149. 



ii. 22 ] Booh II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [160 

pains, later kind-of-experience and release and round-of-existence ; and because 
the passages of the Sacred Word which teach the unity [of the Self] and which 
contradict the other sources-of-valid-ideas, can somehow be made consis- 
tent, as partial statements, by supposing that there is no division * in place or in 
time ; and because the fact that primary matter is one and the Selves many 
is expressly taught by the Sacred Word 2 itself, " One male goat [the unborn 
Soul] has pleasure in leaping upon the one female goat [primary matter] which 
is red and white and black and which brings forth many offspring like herself, 
while another male goat deserts her after having enjoyed her." And the 
meaning of this same Sacred Word is said over again by this sutra. Although 
the object-for-sight has ceased [to be seen], still so far as another Self is 
concerned it has not ceased to be. Therefore, since the power of seeing and the 
power by which one sees are permanent, their correlation is said to be from 
time-without-beginning. He states that those who have the tradition s (dgamin) 
concur with this teaching, as he says, A.nd in this sense it has been said. 
Since the correlation of substances, in other words, of the aspects (gum), with 
the souls is from time without beginning, [so] in the case of the mere external 
aspects (guna), such as the Great [thinking-substance], there is a correlation 
from time without beginning. The correlation of the Great [Thinking-substance] 
and of the rest, one by one, although from time without beginning, is not 
permanent. Still it is permanent when we regard the Great [thinking- 
substance] and the rest as a whole, since [these external aspects] are common to 
the other Selves. Accordingly he says the external-aspects in general.^ The 
words in generals (matra) point out the comprehensive character [of the 
compound]. Hence what follows is this : Although the correlation of one 
Great thinking-substance has become changed so that it is past, still the 
correlation of one Self 4 with another Great [thinking-substance] is not past. 
So [the correlation is] said to be permanent. 



The intent of this sutra is to describe what the correlation itself is. 
23. The reason for the apperception of what the power of 
the property and of what the power of the proprietor are is 
correlation. 

The Self as proprietor becomes correlated for the purpose of sight 

1 The Patanjala Rahasyam says that the 2 Cvet. Up. iv. 5. 

unity of all souls is only figurative. s The attribution of this quotation to 

All Selves are permanent and all- Panca?ikha rests upon the authority 

pervasive. The unity is that of a of Vijnana Bhiksu. 

collection, like that of a forest or of an * Reading purusdntarena with the Bikaner 

army, in so far as no division is made MS. 

in time or in place. 



161] Explanations of non-sight of the Self [ ii. 23 

with the object-for-sight as property. That apperception of the 
object-for-sight which results from this correlation is experience. 
Whereas the apperception of what the Seer is, is liberation. Since 
the correlation lasts until sight is effected, sight is said to be the 
cause of discorrelation. Since sight and non-sight are opposite to 
each other, non-sight is said to be the instrumental cause of corre- 
lation. Sight in this [system] is not the cause of release ; but the 
absence of bondage results from the absence of non-sight. This is 
release. Where there is sight, non-sight, which is the cause of bond- 
age, ceases [to be felt]. Thus the perception which is sight is said 
to be the cause of isolation. And what is this so-called non-sight ? 
1. Is it the authority (adhikdra) of the aspects (guna) [over the 
Self] ? 2. Or is it the case that, when in [the equipoised state of] 
the primary-cause, the mind-stuff, by which the objects are shown 
to the proprietor in his capacity as Seer, fails to produce [effects], 
there is non-sight, 1 although the property, the object-for-sight, 
exists ? 3. Or is it that the aspects (guna) possess the intended- 
objects [in potential form] % 4. Or is undifferentiated-conscious- 
ness (avidyd), which, together with its own mind-stuff, has been 
restricted, the seed for the production of its peculiar mind-stuff ? 
5. Or is it the manifestation of subliminal-impressions in motion 
(gati) after the subliminal-impressions in equilibrium (sthiti) have 
dwindled away ? Of which [theory] this has been said, 2 " The 
primary cause if it existed, on the one hand, in equilibrium (sthiti) 
only, would be a non-primary cause, because it would not cause 
any evolved effect. Similarly, if on the other hand it existed in 
motion (gati) only, it would be a non-primary cause, because the 
evolved effects would be permanent. And since it does act 3 in 
both ways [equilibrium and motion] it is ordinarily termed primary 
substance ; not otherwise. Also with regard to other supposed 
causes the same reasoning [applies]." 6. According to some 
non-sight is nothing but the power by which one sees, as the 
Sacred Word says, " The primary cause acts with the intent of 
displaying itself." The Self capable of illuminating all illuminable 

1 Compare iv. 34. 

2 Udasina Balarama attributes this to Paiicacikha. 3 Reading v> tti. 
21 [h.o.s. n] 



ii. 23 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [162 

things does not, before the primary cause acts, see. [On the other 
hand], the object-for-sight capable of making all kinds of effects is 
not then [without the Self] seen. 7. According to others non- 
sight is a property of both kinds also. From this point of view, 
this sight, although independent of the object-for-sight, requires 
a presented-idea [that is, the reflection] of the Self; and so is a 
property of the object-for-sight. Similarly sight, although not 
independent of the Self, still requires a presented idea in the object- 
for-sight ; a,nd appears as if it were actually a property of the Self. 
8. Certain others assert that non-sight is only the perception [of 
things only] by sight. These are the alternatives found in the 
books on this [topic of the nature of non-sight]. These many alter- 
natives deal with a common subject-matter, the correlation of all 
the Selves with the aspects (guna). 

Thus the serving the purpose [of the Self] as the cause of correlation has been 
stated. And as incidental [to this] the cause of the permanence of the primary 
cause and the cause of the permanence of the correlation in general have been 
stated. With the intent to describe what correlation itself is, in other words, 
its special particular [nature], the sutra has come into being. 23. The 
reason for the apperception of what the power of the property and of 
what the power of the proprietor are is correlation. Because the object-for- 
sight is for his sake, therefore the Self, accepting the aid rendered by this 
[object], becomes its proprietor. And the object-for-sight becomes his property. 
And the correlation of these two which has had a merely potential arrangement 
is the reason for the apperception of what the two are in themselves. This 
same is made clear in the commentary in the words The Self. The Self 
as proprietor merely by [his] pre-established harmony becomes correlated with 
the object-for-sight as his property for the sake of sight. The rest is easy. An 
objector says, ' This may be true. Liberation may be said to be the apperception 
of what the Seer himself may be, [that is, it may be] that by which he is 
liberated. And moreover release is not the effect of means. Should this be 
so, it would cease being what could be rightly called release.' In reply to this 
he says, until sight is effected. Until sight is effected there is a correlation 
of a particular Self with a particular thinking-substance. Thus sight is said to 
be the cause of discorrelation. ' But how does correlation last until sight is 
effected ? ' In reply to this he says, non-sight. Non-sight, undifferentiated - 
consciousness (avidya), is said to be the instrumental cause of correlation. He 
makes clear the meaning of what he said before by saying, in this [system] . . . 
not. The objector says, ' Sight may quite remove non-sight, its opposite. But 
how can it remove bondage ? ' In reply to this he says, is sight. Kelease has 



163] The Self and the aspects [ ii. 23 

been stated [i. 3] to be the self's (atmari) abiding in his own form as dis- 
criminated from the thinking-substance and other [substances]. And the 
means for effecting this is not only sight, but the removal of non-sight. This 
is the meaning. In order to obtain a particular kind of non-sight as the 
special reason for the correlation he puts forth the following alternatives with 
respect to non-sight in the words, And what is this. 1. Assuming that 
[non-sight] is some positive thing (paryudasa) l [not sight] he asks, d. Is it the 
authority of the aspects (guna) [over the Self] ? Authority is the competency 
to initiate effects. For it is as the result of this that the correlation, which is the 
reason for the round-of -existence, is produced. 2. Assuming that [non-sight] is a 
negation where there is a possibility of an affirmation (prasajya-pratisedha), 7, he puts 
forth a second alternative with the word, 2. Or. [Non-sight] is the failure, by 
the mind-stuff which shows objects-of-sense [to the Self], to produce either the 
[various things] from sound downwards or the [discrimination of] the difference 
between sattva and the Self. It is this that is made clear by the words, the 
property.^ The object-for-sight is [both] the various things from sound down- 
wards and the difference between sattva and the Self. The primary cause is in 
motion only so long as it has not completed the two-fold sight. But when both 
kinds of sight have been accomplished, it desists [from being further in motion]. 

3. On the assumption that [non-sight] is some positive thing [not sight], he 
puts forth the third alternative, 3. Or is it that the aspects {guna) possess 
the intended-objects [in potential form] ?2> For if the doctrine of pre-existent 
causes (satMrya) is established, experience and liberation are also yet to come 
in so far as they are [at present] indeterminable. This is the meaning. 

4. Assuming that [non-sight] is some positive thing [not sight], he puts forth the 
fourth alternative and asks 4. Or is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) . . .?2> 
At the time of the reversal of creation, it is restricted together with its peculiar 
mind-stuff [that is to say] it is reduced to the state of equipoise in the primary 
cause, the seed for the production of its peculiar mind-stuff. To this extent (tena) 
a subconscious-impression of undifferentiated-consciousness is other than sight 
and is precisely what is called non-sight. 5. Assuming that [non-sight] is 
some positive thing [not sight], he puts forth the fifth alternative and asks, 
5. Is it. .. in equilibrium ? When the subliminal-impressions in equilibrium, 
[that is] existing in the primary cause, and flowing on in a succession of 
mutations in the equipoised [state of the primary cause], have dwindled away, 
there is a start given to evolved-effects (vikdra), such as the Great [thinking- 
substance] and the rest, this is motion {gati). The reason for this [start given] 
is a subliminal-impression of the primary cause, the subliminal-impression 
in motion. The manifestation of it is its readiness to produce effects. He says 
that another theory admits the real existence of subliminal-impressions of both 

1 Compare Patanjali : Mahabhasya (Kiel- 343 Bff ; iii. 35 6 ; and elsewhere. 

horn's ed.) i. 93 s ; 101 8 ; 167 9 ; 183 7 ; % Compare p. 24, note 2 ; and p. 113, note 4. 
216 1 : 319 13 ; 334< : 341 s ; ii. 338 5 ; 



ii. 23 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sadhana [164 

kinds in the words, Of which [theory] this has been said by those who deny 
the absoluteness of either one. Primary cause (pra-dhana) is that by which the 
totality of evolved effects is put forth (pra-dhiyate) or produced. 1 If this primary 
cause always remained in equilibrium and never in motion, then because it 
would not cause any evolved effect, it would not put forth anything, and would 
not be a primary cause {pra-dhana). Or if it always remained in motion 
and never in equilibrium, then he says, ^Similarly ... in motion.^ Else- 
where the reading is 'for the purpose of equilibrium, for the purpose of 
motion'; the dative is here purposive and we must supply (drastavyah) 'only' 
(eva) after it. If it did not act for the purpose of equilibrium, no evolved 
effect would ever cease to be. And this being so, if a thing {bhava) exists and 
does not cease to be, it could not rise [again]. Thus there would be a cessation 
of evolution of effects altogether. And there would likewise be nothing put 
forth in this case and [thus] it would be a non-primary cause. Therefore its 
activity must be of both kinds, in equilibrium and in motion, [and] it is 
ordinarily termed primary substance ; not otherwise,^ as when for instance 
the absoluteness [of either] might be assumed. This reasoning or argument 
applies not only to the primary cause, but also to other supposed causes, to 
the higher Brahman or to its illusion (maya) or to atoms or to other 
[causes]. For these also if they existed in equilibrium only, would not be 
causes, since they do not cause evolved effects ; and if existing in motion only, 
would not be causes, since the evolved effects would be permanent. 6. Assum- 
ing that [non-sight] is some positive thing [not sight], he puts forth a sixth 
alternative in the words, 4Cnothing but the power by which one sees.^ Just as 
in the vow of Prajapati [Manu iv. 37], " One should not look upon the rising 
sun," a mental resolution [in positive form] closely related to not looking is 
understood, so in this case also [of non-sight], when there is a negation of sight, 
a power closely related to it and based upon it is described. And this [power] 
in order to give birth to sight characterized by experience and so forth brings 
about the pre-established harmony of the Seer with the object-for-sight. On the 
same point he recites a [passage from] the Sacred Word, The primary cause. 
The objector says, 'This may be true. But the Sacred Word says that the 
primary cause acts with the intent of displaying itself ; yet it does not say that 
it acts as the result 2 of the power by which one sees.' In reply to this he says, 
capable of illuminating all illuminable things. Because before the primary 
substance acts, mere displaying of itself is not capacity as an impelling force for 
action. For there is no ground for this [activity] in the absence of capacity to 
act as impelling force. Therefore in accordance with the Sacred Word it is 
said that capacity is the impelling force for action. The sixth alternative 
is based upon the assumption that the power by which one sees is in the 
primary cause. 7. The seventh alternative makes this same power reside in 
both kinds [the primary cause and the Self], as he says, Non-sight ... of both 
1 Compare ii. 18, p. 144" (Calc. ed.). a Reading ^akteh, p. 160 fl (Calc. ed.). 



165] Correct theory of the correlation [ ii. 23 

kinds aiso.2> Some say that non-sight belongs to both kinds, both to the Self 
and to the object-for-sight and that it is a power [or] a property of sight. 
An objector says, ' This may be true. We may grant this with regard to the 
object-for-sight, because it is the repository of all powers ; but we could not 
grant it with regard to the Seer, because the power of perception does not 
reside (adhara) in him, for the reason that perception does not have the relation 
to him of part to whole (samavaya). Should that be so, he would be subject 
to mutation.' To this he replies, <KFrom this point of view, this. That non- 
sight might be included in the object-for-sight might be conceded, still, since the 
object-for-sight is unintelligent {jada), seeing, which is an effect of a power residing 
in this [object-for-sight], would also be unintelligent {jada). So sight cannot be 
thought as a property of this [object-for-sight], for an unintelligent [thing] 
has not illumination in itself. Hence sight becomes, [that is] is known as, 
a property of this [object-for-sight] only as based upon the presented-idea of 
the Seer, the self (atman), that is, upon a change into the likeness of the 
intelligence (caitanya). Because that which-has-to-do-with-the-object (visayin) 
[that is, the power of seeing] is partially expressed by the object [that is, the 
object-for-sight]. The objector says, Even so, this perception becomes a pro- 
perty of the object-for-sight, but not a property of the Self.' To this he replies, 
^Similarly ... of the Self. It is true that it is not independent of the Self, 
still it does appear to become a property of the Self as based upon the 
presented-idea [that is] the likeness of the intelligence (caitanya) in the sattva 
of the thinking-substance of the object-for-sight, but it is not actually a property 
of the Self. What he means to say is this. In so far as there is no difference 
between intelligence and the thinking-substance, the external-aspects (dharma) 
of the thinking-substance distinctly appear (caJcasati) as if they were external- 
aspects of intelligence, in so far as they receive the image of intelligence. 
8. He describes the eighth alternative in the words, non-sight is only the 
perception. Only perception of the [various things] from sound downwards 
is non-sight ; but not the perception of the difference between sattva and the 
Self. So some say. Just as the eye, although the source-of-a-valid-idea for 
colour, is not the source-of-a-valid-idea for taste and the other [sensations]. 
What follows is this : The perceptions of the [various things], of sounds and 
so on, have the forms of pleasure and other [forms] and imply the correlation 
of the Seer and the object-for-sight, in so far as it is necessary for the sake 
of their perfection. Having thus put forth alternatives, and in order to accept 
the fourth alternative, he points-out-the-flaws in the other [seven] alternatives 
mentioned in the Samkhya system, on the ground that they would lead to 
an absence of diversity in experience, since [non-sight according to the other 
theories] is common to all the Selves. So he says, These . . . are found in the 
books.^ 



ii. 24 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [166 



But when there is a. correlation of an individual consciousness with 
its own thinking-substance, 

24. The reason for this [correlation] is undifferentiated- 
consciousness (avidyd). 

In other words, [undifferentiated-consciousness] is a subconscious- 
impression (ydsand) from erroneous thinking. The thinking- 
substance pervaded (vdsita) by subconscious-impressions from 
erroneous thinking does not attain to the discernment of the Self, 
which is the goal of its actions, [and] returns again with its task 
yet unfulfilled. But that [thinking-substance] which terminates in 
the discernment of the Self attains the goal of its actions, and, its 
task done, and its non-sight repressed, does not, since the cause 
of its bondage no longer exists, return again. Some [heterodox] 
person ridicules this [teaching of Isolation] with the anecdote l of the 
impotent man,' He is told by his simple-minded wife," impotent, my 
wedded lord, my sister has a child ; for what reason have not I ? " 
He says to her, " When I am dead, I will beget thee a son." : 
Similarly, [the objector continues,] since this thinking [of the 
discernment], even while existing, does not make a repression of 
mind-stuff, what expectation is there that it will in the future 
make it cease to be % On this point one who is almost a master 
(dcdryadeclya) says, " Is release anything but the cessation of 
the thinking-substance ? When there is no cause of non-sight the 
thinking-substance ceases. And this non-sight which is the cause 
of bondage ceases when there is sight." Then release is nothing 
but the cessation of the thinking-substance. Why then is there 
this confusion of ideas of his 2 that is so much out of place ? 

In order to fix upon the fourth alternative he introduces the satra with the 
words, CBut when there is a correlation of an individual consciousness with 
its own thinking-substance.)^ Individual {praty-anc) in the sense that it turns 



1 See Jacob, Maxims, II. 28, 2 d ed. 

2 Two interpretations seem justified. 1. 

The whole passage to the end of the 
comment on this sutra would be the 
statement of the acdryadectya. And 
asya would refer to the nastika. 2. 
The last two sentences would be that 
of the author of the comment and asya 



would refer to the dcdryadeclya. The 
difference between these two would 
be that the latter teaches that release 
is only a cessation of mutations, where- 
as the comment teaches that release 
is resolution of the thinking-substance 
(buddher vilaya) into the primary 
cause. 



1G7] Ending of undifferentiated-consciousness [ ii. 24 

(ancati) [or] gets back (prati) [or] in the opposite direction (pratlpam). A 
special correlation of each single Self with each single thinking-substance is the 
reason for the diversity between [individuals]. He recites the sutra 24. The 
reason for this [correlation] is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya). 
An objector says, ' Undifferentiated-consciousness is erroneous thinking. And 
the reason for this is the correlation of the Self with its own thinking-substance, 
just [as correlation is the reason] for experience and for liberation. For unless 
correlated with a thinking-substance, undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) does 
not arise. How then is undifferentiated-consciousness the reason for a particular 
kind of correlation ? ' In reply to this he says, a subconscious-impression 
from erroneous thinking. From undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya), even 
when belonging to another creation and restricted together with its own mind- 
stuff, a subconscious-impression exists in the primary-cause. And the primary- 
cause pervaded with the subconscious-impression from this [undifferentiated-con- 
sciousness] sends forth the same kind of a thinking-substance for the sake of 
correlation with one Self or another. Similarly in successive previous creations. 
And since [the series] is from time without beginning, there is no flaw in 
the argument. For this very reason the Self at the time of [mundane] 
dissolution is not released, as he says, 4Cerroneous thinking. When [the 
thinking-substance] reaches the goal of its actions [that is] the discernment of 
the Self, then since there is no subconscious-impression from erroneous 
thinking, which is the cause of bondage, the thinking-substance does not return 
again, as he says, <But that.2> Some heterodox person makes fun of this 
teaching with regard to Isolation by [telling] the anecdote of the impotent man. 
He tells the anecdote of the impotent man by the words, <simple-minded. 
The word treason (artha)^ in the expression <Kfor what reasons signifies a 
ground, because a motive is also a ground. He draws the analogy with the 
anecdote of the impotent man in the words, <KSimilarly since this. 'This 
existing perception of the discernment of the difference between the 
aspects (guna) and the Self does not cause a repression of the mind-stuff; 
what expectation is there that the mind-stuff, when it together with its 
subliminal-impressions is restricted by virtue of the higher passionlessness, 
will cease to be ? The point is that a thing has an effect when it exists ; 
and not, when it does not exist.' With regard to this he gives a rebuttal 
by means of an opinion which partially [agrees], On this point one 
who is almost a master. One who is little short l of a master. A master, 
moreover, has his characteristic given in the declaration of the Vayu, 2 " One 
who not only collects (acinoti) the meaning of the books, but also makes the 
people steadfast in good conduct, and observes (acarate) good conduct himself, he 
is a master (deary a)." Kelease is nothing but the repression of the thinking- 
substance which has entered into mutations in the form of experience and of 

1 See Panini v. 3. 67. 

2 See Vayu Purana lxix. 2; and Litiga Purana x. 15-16. 



ii. 24 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [168 

discriminative discernment. But there is no repression of the thinking-substance 
as such. This [repression], moreover, takes place only after the [thinking- 
substance] is established in the discriminative discernment which lasts up to the 
Kain-cloud of [Knowable] Things (dharma-megha). Even though the thinking- 
substance abides as itself and nothing less, [still it does exist elsewhere]. 
He makes this clear by the words, <Snon-sight. There is a repression 
of the thinking-substance when there is no non -sight [which is] the cause 
of bondage. And this non-sight [which is] the cause of bondage ceases 
as a result of sight. But as for the repression of sight, [that] is to be 
effected by the higher passionlessness. The point is, although the thinking- 
substance abides in itself and nothing less, there is release. Having cleared up 
the opinion which partially [agrees], he states his own opinion in the words, 
^Then release is nothing but the cessation of the thinking-substance. An 
objector asks, ' Have you not already * said that, when seeing is repressed, there 
results soon after a repression of the mind-stuff itself. How then can [this 
repression] be the result of sight ? ' In reply to this he says, Why then is there 
this confusion of ideas of his that is so much out of place ? The meaning is 
this. If we were to admit 2 that sight is the direct cause of the repression of the 
mindstuff, then we should be subject to this rebuke. But we take our stand 
upon the view that discriminative sight reaches its limit of perfection when the 
mindstuff is repressed and when it is subservient to the abiding of the Self 
in his own form, according to its degree of perfection in the cultivation of 
restricted concentration. How then should we be subject to this rebuke ? 



The pain which is to be escaped and the cause of pain, the so-called 
correlation, together with their reasons, have been described. 
Next the higher escape (hdna) is to be described. 
25. Since this [non- sight] does not exist, there is no correla- 
tion. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer. 
Since this non-sight does not exist, there is no correlation of the 
thinking-substance and of the Self, in other words, a complete 
ending of bondage. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer, 
the unmixed state of the Self ; in other words, the state in which 
[the Self] is not again correlated with aspects (guna). Upon the 
repression of the cause of pain there follows the ending of pain, the 
escape. Then the Self is said to be grounded 3 in his own self. 

Having thus spoken of two divisions, with the intent to describe the third 
division, he introduces the antra with the words, The pain which is to be 

1 See p. 162 s (Calc. ed.). MS. and the Anandajrama ed. (96 ,7 j. 

2 Reading kurvlmahi, with the Bikaner 3 Compare i. 3. 



169] Means of attaining escape [ ii. 26 

escaped. 25. Since this [non-sight] does not exist, there is no correlation. 
This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer. He explains the sutra in the 
word, this. For even in the great mundane dissolution there is no correla- 
tion. For this reason he uses the word ^complete. The words ^Cthe 
ending of pain, the escaped show that this is a fulfilment of the purposes 
of the Self. The rest has nothing obscure. 



Now what is the means of attaining escape ? 
26. The means of attaining escape is unwavering discrimina- 
tive discernment. 

Discriminative discernment 1 of the presented-idea of the differ- 
ence between sattva and the Self. But this discernment wavers 
when erroneous perception is not repressed. When erroneous 
perception, reduced to the condition of burned seed, fails to repro- 
duce itself (vandhya-prasava) , then the flow of the present ed-ide as 
of discrimination belonging to the sattva, which is cleansed from 
rajas belonging to the hindrances, and which continues in the 
higher clearness [and] in the higher consciousness of being master 
becomes stainless. This unwavering discriminative discernment 
is the means (updya) of escape. After this, erroneous perception 
tends to become reduced to the condition of burned seed. And its 
failure to reproduce itself is the Path (mdrga) to Release, the 
way-of-approach (updya) to escape. 

Wishing to denominate the fourth division as having the distinguishing- 
characteristic of the means of escape, he introduces the sutra with the word 
Now. 26i The means of attaining escape is unwavering discrimina- 
tive discernment. Even by verbal communication and by inference there is 
discriminative discernment. This [kind of discriminative discernment] does 
not, however, repress emergence or the subliminal impressions from emer- 
gence, because these two latter follow a man who has both [the verbal- 
communication and the inference]. Accordingly in order to repress this 
[emergence] he says, unwavering. Wavering is erroneous perception ; 
[unwavering] is free from that. What he means to say is this. He obtains 
discrimination by perception derived from something heard ; and he makes 
this logically tenable (vyavasthapya) [by ideas] derived from reasonings. The 
discriminative discernment, which in concentration has reached the utmost 
perfection of cultivation for a long time, uninterruptedly, and with earnest 

1 Discussed in Samkhya Tattva Kaumudi on Kar. 51. 
22 [h.o.s. 17] 



ii. 26 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [170 

attention, [and which] has direct perception and has uprooted erroneous per- 
ceptions together with their subconscious impressions, [and which is thus] 
unwavering, this is the means of escape. The rest of the comment is easy. 



27. For him [there is] insight seven-fold and advancing in 
stages to the highest. 

The words <for him> refer 1 to him 2 in whom discernment is 
re-uprisen. The word <seven-fold> means that the insight of the 
discriminating [yogin], after the removal of the defilements from 
the covering of impurity, when no other kind of presented-idea is 
generated in the mind-stuff, has just seven forms, as follows. 
1. The thing to be escaped has been thought out ; nor need [the 
yogin] think it out again. 2. The reasons for the thing to be 
escaped have dwindled away ; nor need they dwindle away again. 

3. The escape is directly perceived 3 by the concentration of 
restriction ; [nor need anything beyond this be discovered], 

4. The means of escape in the form of discriminative discernment 
has been cultivated ; [nor need anything beyond this be culti- 
vated]. So this is the four-fold final release (vimulcti), belonging to 
insight, which may be effected. But the final release of the mind- 
stuff is three-fold [as follows]. 5. The authority of the thinking- 
substance is ended. 6. The aspects (guna), like rocks fallen from 
the top of the mountain peak, without support, of their own 
accord, incline towards dissolution and come with this [thinking- 
substance] to rest. And when these [aspects] are quite dissolved, 
they do not cause growth again, because there is no impelling- 
cause. 7. In this stage the Self has passed out of relation with 
the aspects (guna), and, enlightened by himself and nothing more, 

1 See Nyaya-Koca, s.v. pratyamnaya *5. sutra and that it says that <for him> 

' The Varttika insists that <f or him> is rather means chimin whom discernment is 

<for it,> and that it refers to the means re-uprisen.)^ This explanation is cor- 

of escape. It denies that the reference roborated by the use of the words 

is to the Self since there is no mention vivekino bhavati. 

of the Self in the previous sutra. Bala- s See i. 3 and compare iii. 16, p. 218 4 ; 

rama replies that the Comment ex- iii. 18-19, pp. 230 5 and 231 15 ; iii. 26, 

pressly wishes to avoid reference to p. 241* ; iii. 51, p. 266 4 ; and iii. 52, 

the means of escape in the previous p. 269 8 (Calc. ed.). 



171] Seven stages of insight [ ii. 27 

is stainless and isolated. The Self beholding this seven-fold insight 
advancing in stages to the highest is denominated fortunate 
(kugala). Even when there is also the inverted generation of the 
mind-stuff the Self is said to be released [and] fortunate, because 
he has passed beyond the aspects (guna). 

He describes the goal as such which belongs to discriminative discernment 
in the sutra 27. For him [there is] insight seven-fold and advancing in 
stages to the highest. He explains [the sutra] by saying <for him.> In 
whom discernment is re-uprisen, that is to say, theyogin in whom discernment 
is present. The word refer> means allude. One whose mind -stuff has 
reached the goal of discriminative discernment, since the defilement of impurity, 
which is the covering of mind-stuff, has been taken off, and because no other 
presented-idea arises, that is to say, no presented-idea belonging to emergence 
of tamas or of rajas, in him there is the insight of just the seven forms 
which belong to the discriminating. There are different discernments according 
to the different objects. The compound [advancing in stages to the highest] means 
those stages [or] states the end of which is perfection. Complete perfection 1 is 
that higher than which there is nothing. That insight [or] discriminative 
discernment [is advancing by stages] whose stages are advancing. These seven 
kinds of stages he takes up beginning with the word ^Cas follows.^ Of these 
[seven], from among the four stages which may be completed by a man's effort, 
he takes up the first with the words, Cl. The thing to be escaped has been 
thought out. Whatever is an effect of the primary- cause, all that is surely 
nothing but pain by reason of the pains due to mutations, to anxiety, and to 
subliminal impressions, and by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations, 
and is therefore to be escaped. This has been thought out. He shows what 
the advancement to the highest is in the words <Knor need he think it out 
again.^ 2. He describes the second in the words ^dwindled away. He 
tells what the advancement to the highest is by saying nor , . . again. 
3. He describes the third in the words ^directly perceived. 2> Even in the 
state conscious [of objects] I have discovered by perception the escape which 
I am to perfect in the concentration of restriction. We need to supply the 
words, 'nor need anything beyond this be discovered.' 4. He describes the 
fourth by saying cultivated. The cultivated is the perfected means of 
escape belonging to discriminative discernment. We need to supply the words, 
'nor need anything beyond this be cultivated.' This the four- fold final release 
[or] completion may be effected. And in so far as it may be effected, it is 
shown to be included within the efforts [of a man]. Elsewhere the reading 
is Tcaryavimuhti. This would be the final release of insight with respect to 
effects. He describes the final release 2 of the mind-stuff which is not to be 

1 This word (samprakarsa) does not occur elsewhere in the Comment nor elsewhere in 
Vacaspati's Explanation. 2 Compare SBE. xxi. p. 31 (Lotus). 



ii. 27 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [172 

accomplished by effort, but which is to be accomplished subsequent to that 
which is to be attained by effort by saying CBut the final release of the 
mind-stuff is three-fold.2> 5. He describes the first [of these last three] in the 
words 5. The authority 1 of the thinking-substance is ended. In other 
words, the two tasks (karya) of experience and liberation have been done. 
6. He describes the second [of these last three] in the words ^The aspects.)^ 
He shows what the advancement to the highest is in the words 4CAnd . . . they 
do not. 7. He describes the third [of these last three] in the words In this 
staged In this stage, even while alive, the Self is called fortunate [and] 
released, since [this] is his last body. Accordingly he says, this. He says 
that [the yogin] is not released in a figurative 2 sense [as merely being free 
from his last body] in the words, ^inverted generation.^ Even when his 
mind-stuff is resolved into the primary cause, he is said to be released and 
fortunate, 3 because he has passed beyond * the aspects {gum). 



When discriminative discernment is perfected there is the means 
of escape. And there is no perfection without the means [of 
attaining it]. So this [topic of the means] is begun. 

28. After the aids to yoga have been followed up, when the 
impurity has dwindled, there is an enlightenment of percep- 
tion reaching up to the discriminative discernment. 

The aids to yoga are the eight which are about to be enumerated. 
As the result of following them up there is a dwindling or cessation 
of the five-sectioned [ii. 3] misconception. Upon the dwindling of 
this follows the manifestation of focused thinking. And in pro- 
portion as the means [of attaining discriminative discernment are 
followed up], so the impurity is reduced to a state of attenuation. 
And in proportion as it dwindles, the enlightenment of perception 
also, in accordance with the degree of dwindling, increases. Now 
this same increase experiences a perfection reaching up to discrimi- 

1 Compare ii. 10, p. 120 2 ; ii. 24, p. 162 2 ; actions which are the cause [of bond- 

iii. 55, p. 274 6 . The phrase carita-artha age]. Because of this he is not 

occurs iii. 50, p. 265 Q (Calc. ed.). bound, (hetusu Jcarmasu phalasanga- 

* Compare aupacarikam aicvaryam i. 24, rahitatvan na baddho bhavatiti kuca- 

p. 59* (Calc. ed.) ; and for definition of lata.) This is the suggestion of the 

aupacarikam iii. 55, p. 274 s (Calc. ed.). Patanjala Rahasyam. For other in- 

See also for use of word iv. 10, p. 286 s . stances see i. 24, p. 54 7 ; ii. 9, p. 119' ; 

8 Fortunate because he is free from attach- iv. 30, p. 314 2 (Calc. ed.). 
ment to the consequences of his own 4 Compare Bh. Gita xiv. 20. 



173] The nine causes [ ii. 28 

native discernment [or] up to the perception [ii. 26] which dis- 
tinguishes between the aspects (guna) as such and the Self. The 
following up of the aids to yoga is the cause of discorrelation 
(viyoga) with impurity, just as an axe [is the cause of the disjunc- 
tion (viyoga) of a tree] which is to be cut [from its root]. Now 
[the eight aids] are the cause of attaining discriminative discern- 
ment, just as right-living (dharma) is [the cause of getting] to 
happiness ; in other ways it is not a cause. Furthermore how 
many of these causes, according to the system, are there ? Just 
nine, he ! says, as follows, " Cause is nine-fold, rise [into conscious- 
ness] and permanence and manifestation and modification and 
presentation and attainment and disjunction and transformation 
and sustentation." Of these [nine], 1. The cause of rise [into con- 
sciousness], [is for instance] the central-organ [as the cause] of 
a mental-process (vijndna) ; 2. the cause of permanence : [for 
instance] the fact that the Self has purposes [is the cause of the 
permanence] of the central-organ, just as food [is the cause of the 
permanence] of the body ; 3. the cause of manifestation [is for 
instance] the shining [of the Self upon a fluctuation as the cause of 
the manifestation] of colour, just as the perception of colour [which 
is in the fluctuation, is the cause which manifests the shining of the 
Self] ; 4. the cause of modification [is for instance] another object- 
of-sense [which modifies] the central-organ, just as fire [is a cause 
which modifies] food to be cooked; 5. the cause of presentation: 
[for instance] the thought of smoke [is the cause of the presenta- 
tion] of the thought of fire ; 6. the cause of attaining : [for 
instance] the following up of the aids to yoga [is the cause of 
attaining] discriminative discernment ; 7. the cause of disjunction 
[is for instance] the same [following up as the cause which disjoins 
the Self] from impurity ; 8. the cause of transformation is for 
instance the goldsmith [as the cause which transforms] the gold. 
Similarly if a single presented idea of a woman has the quality of 
infatuation, undifierentiated-consciousness (avidyd) [is the trans- 
forming cause] ; if it has the quality of painfulness, hatred [is the 
transforming cause] ; if it has the quality of pleasurability, passion 

1 Apparently this is a samgrahafloka. Vijiiana Bhiksu says kdrikoktani nava karanani. 



ii. 28 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [174 

[is the transforming cause] ; if it has the quality of the detached 
attitude, 1 the recognition of the reality [is the transforming cause] ; 
9. the cause of sustentation [is for instance] the body [as the cause 
which sustains] the sense-organs, and these [organs as the cause 
sustaining] this [body], [and again] the great elements [as the 
sustaining cause] of bodies, and these [elements] reciprocally of all 
[elements], since human and animal and supernormal bodies depend 
upon each other. So much then for the nine causes. And these 
so far as possible are also to be applied to other things. But as 
for the following up of the aids to yoga, it comes into play as cause 
in two ways only, [as the cause of disjunction and as the cause of 
attainment]. 

So much for the four divisions which have been described. Since discriminative 
discernment, the means of escape, which falls within these [four], cannot be 
perfected before [one follows up the means], as in the process of milking a cow : 
and since what is not perfected cannot be a means [to something else], he 
proceeds to describe the means for its perfection in the words, When . . . 
perfected. At this point the way by which the means-of-attainment, which 
are about to be mentioned, serve as a means for discriminative discernment 
is shown by the sutra which begins with the word 28. . . . yoga and ends 
with the word discernment. For the aids to yoga, according to circumstances, 
by seen or unseen 2 methods, cause the impurity to dwindle away. That 
misconception has five sections must be understood as a partial statement, 
since merit and demerit, in so far as they are causes of birth and of length- 
of-life and of kind-ofi-enjoyment, are also impure. The rest is easy. Since we 
find that causality is multiform, what kind of causality belongs to the following 
up of the aids to yoga ? In reply to this he says, <After the aids to yoga have 
been followed up>. Since it disjoins the sattva of the thinking-substance from 
impurity it is the cause of disjunction from impurity. He gives a simile in 
the words, just as an axe. An axe disjoins the tree to be cut from its 
root. The sattva of the thinking-substance, when disjoined from impurity, 
causes one to attain to discriminative discernment, Just as merit is [the cause 
of attaining] pleasure, so the following up of the aids to yoga is the cause of 
attaining discriminative discernment. And [it is a cause] in no other form. 
So he says, ^CNow . . . discriminative insight.^ Having heard the denial in the 
words in other ways . . . not, he asks, ^Furthermore how many of these ? 
The answer is, Just nine. He shows what these are by a memorial verse 
(karikd), as follows, "... rise [into consciousness ]." He gives an illustration 

1 Read the tale in H. C. Warren : Buddhism 2 A visible means would be f auca ; an in- 
in Translations, p. 298. visible means would be svadhyaya. 



175] Causes as aids to yoga [ ii. 28 

of this in the words, Of these [nine], 1. The cause of rise [into consciousness].^ 

1. The central organ is the cause of the origin of a mental process because it 
brings out a mental process from an indeterminable stage to the present stage. 

2. The cause of permanence [is for instance] the fact that the Self has purposes. 
The central organ rising [into consciousness] out of the feeling-of-personality 
lasts only so long as the two-fold purpose of the Self is not fully accomplished. 
When the two kinds of purposes of the Self are accomplished it passes out 
of permanence. Therefore the fact that the Self has purposes is the cause 
of the permanence of the central organ which has risen [into consciousness] 
out of its own cause. He gives a simile in the words, ^Cjust as food is of 
the body. 3. The efficient cause of perceptive thinking, the preparation 
{samskriya) of an object either of itself or by a sense-organ, is manifestation. 
The cause of this manifestation [is for instance] the shining [of the Self upon 
a fluctuation as the cause of the manifestation] of colour. 4. The cause of 
modification [is for instance] another object-of-sense [which modifies] the 
central organ. For just so Mrkandu, whose central organ had become con- 
centrated, heard the fifth 1 note ripening upon the lute, and lifted up his eyes 
and beheld the heavenly-nymph Umloca 2 in the perfection of beauty and 
loveliness, so that he lapsed from concentration, and his central organ became 
attached to her. He gives an instance bearing upon the same point in the words 
just as fire. For just as fire is the cause of the modification of a thing to be 
cooked, like rice, in such manner that a thing whose arrangement of parts was 
compressed becomes loosely conjoined in parts. 5. An object which is definitely 
existing is the cause of presentation [just as] the thought of smoke [is the cause 
of the presentation] of the idea of fire. What he means to say is this. The 
thought (jnana) is that which is thought ; and the thought of fire is fire and it is 
thought [that is, it is a descriptive compound]. 3 6. The cause of attainment. 
The natural action of effects belonging to causes which are independent is [what 
he means by] attainment. Occasionally there is an exception to this [action of 
the effects, which is the] non-attainment. Just so waters whose nature it is to 
flow down a slope (nimna) are held back by a dam. Similarly also in this case, 
the sattva of the thinking-substance, which is disposed to pleasure and bright- 
ness, is by its own nature the producer of pleasure and of discriminative dis- 
cernment. This is attainment. Sometimes this [attainment], because it is held 
back, by reason of demerit or of tamas, does not follow. When by reason of 
merit or of following up the aids to yoga this [holding- back] is removed, then 
as a reason merely of the nature of the fluctuations of the thinking-substance's 
sattva when not held back by this [demerit or tamas], and in so far as it [this sattva] 
is the producer of this [pleasure and discernment], [this sattva] attains [them], 

1 See Raghuvanca ix. 26 and 47 ; Karpura- 2 Compare MBh. i. 4821 = i. 123. 64. 

manjarl i. 16 3 (HOS. vol. 4, p. 228). 8 The compound is not a genitive depen- 
The seventh note of the lute resembles dent (sasthTtatpurusa), but rather a 

the cooing of the koil. descriptive (karmadharaya). 



ii. 28 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [176 

as 1 he will [iv. 3] say, "The efficient cause gives no impulse, but [the muta- 
tion] follows when the barrier to the evolving causes is cut, just as in the case 
of the peasant." Thus there is said to be a cause of attainment only with 
reference to the effect characterized as discriminative discernment. 7. In 
respect to anything subsidiary [to discriminative discernment] the same thing 
would be a cause of disjunction. So he says, <&7. the cause of disjunction.^ 
8. He describes the cause of transformation in the words the goldsmith . . . 
the gold.^ In so far as the emphasis is upon the difference with respect to the 
gold, which is both different and not different from the bracelets and ear-rings 
and anklets, and in so far as the emphasis is upon the absence of difference 
[in the gold], which is not different from the bracelets and other things, there 
is a cause which transforms [the gold] from the bracelet [into something else]. 
And the goldsmith, who made the bracelet, in so far as he transforms the gold, 
which is [now] identical with the ear-ring, becomes the cause of transforma- 
tion. Although fire [given as an example of 5. modification] is a cause of 
transformation with respect to the thing to be cooked, still since the difference 
between the substance 2 and the property, the rice-grains and the lump of rice, 
is not emphasized, therefore even though the properties come and go, still the 
substance persists. It is not possible therefore to say that [the fire] is a cause 
of transformation. For this reason it was said that the fire is a cause of 
modification. And accordingly there is no cross-division. Moreover it should 
not be supposed that the cause of transformation in the case of the substance 
is merely a difference in the arrangement of parts. For this would be incon- 
sistent with the words the goldsmith.^ Having made clear what the cause 
of outer transformation is, he illustrates the inner [cause] in the words 
^Similarly if a single.^ Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya),^ that is, such 
a thought as ' This girl is to be loved '. The very same presented idea of 
a woman becomes, in the case of Chaitra, in consequence of his complete 
infatuation, infatuated, that is to say, dejected. For he says to himself, ' Alas ! 
that jewel of a woman has come into the hands of that lucky Maitra, not into 
the hands of me, bereft (Mna) of luck.' Similarly the rival wives' hatred 
of her is the cause of the painfulness of the idea of [this] woman. And again 
the passion of her husband Maitra for her is [the cause] of the quality of 
pleasurability in this same idea of the woman. The recognition of the reality, 
that the body of the woman is a congeries of skin and flesh and fat and bones 
and marrow, and is impure because of its [first] abode s [and] because of its 
origin and the rest, becomes, in the case of the discriminating, the cause of the 
detached attitude [that is to say] passionlessness. 9. The cause of sustentation 
is that which sustains the body and organs. And in the case of the body 
it is the organs. For the five breaths, beginning with the vital air, are functions 

1 Compare ii. 18, p. 144" (Calc. ed.). 

9 Compare Patanjali : Mahabhasya, vol. I, p. 7 middle (Kielhorn's ed.). 

3 Compare ii. 5, p. 111 1 . 



177] Eight aids to yoga [ ii. 29 

of the organs in general. For if they were not, the body would fall. Similarly 
in the case of the parts of the body, the flesh and the other [parts], there is the 
reciprocal relation of sustained and sustainer. Likewise the great elements, 
that is, the earth and the other [elements] ; and these [elements] are in- the 
reciprocal relation [of sustained and sustainer] in the case of bodies dwelling 
in the worlds of human beings or of Varuna or of the Sun or of the Wind 
(gandhavaha) or of the Moon. Thus in the case of earth, which has the qualities 
(guna) of odour and taste and colour and touch and sound, there are five great 
elements standing in the reciprocal relation of sustained and sustainer ; in the 
case of water there are four ; in the case of fire three ; in the case of wind two. 
Furthermore animal and human and divine [bodies] stand in a relation of 
sustained and sustainer. Some one asks, How can this [reciprocal relation of 
sustained and sustainer] be so, if the bodies are not in the relation of holder 
and held ? ' He replies, Csince human . . . depend upon each other. For the 
human body is sustained by the use of the bodies of tame animals and of birds 
and of wild animals and of plants. Similarly bodies like the tigers [are 
sustained] by the use of the human bodies and those of tame and wild animals 
and of others. And again in the same way the body of the tame animal and of 
the bird and of the wild animal [is sustained] by the use of plants and similar 
things. Likewise the divine body [is sustained] by the use of sacrifices, of 
goats and deer and the flesh of grouse and ghee and baked-rice-cakes x and 
branches of mango (sahaMra) and handfuls-of-darbha grass (prastara), offered 
by human beings. In the same way the deity also sustains human beings and 
the rest by granting boons and showers. Thus the dependence is reciprocal. 
This is the meaning. The rest is easy. 



In this [sutra] the aids to yoga are determined. 

29. Abstentions and observances and postures and regula- 

tions-of-the-breath and withdrawal-of-the-senses and fixed 

attention and contemplation and concentration are the eight 

aids. 

The following up of these must be performed in succession. And 

what they are we shall describe. 

Now with the intent of excluding either a larger or a smaller number he 

determines what are the aids to yoga by saying In this [sutra] the aids to 

yoga are determined. The sutra begins with the word 29. Abstentions and 

ends with the word aids. Practice and passionlessness and belief and energy 

and the rest [i. 20], both by reason of their own selves and in so far as they 

are indispensable, are also properly to be included among these same. 

1 Their use is described in Apastamba- in (^atapatha-Brahmana i. 2. 2. 1 f. 

Yajna-Paribhasa-Sutra xcix and cxxix And again in Manu vi. 11 and vii. 21. 

(SBE., vol. xxx), and their preparation 
23 [h.o.b. n] 



ii. 30 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [178 

Of these [eight] 

30. Abstinence 1 from injury and from falsehood and from 
theft and from incontinence and from acceptance of gifts are 
the abstentions. 

Of these [five] abstinence from injury means the abstinence from 
malice towards all living creatures in every way and at all times. 
And the other abstentions and observances are rooted in it. In so 
far as their aim is the perfection of it, they are taught in order to 
teach it. And in this sense 2 it has been said, " Surely this same 
brahman in proportion as he desires to take upon himself many 
courses-of-action, 3 in this proportion refraining from heedlessly 
giving injury, fulfils [the abstention of] abstinence from injury in 
order to give it the full character of its spotlessness." Abstinence- 
from-falsehood (satya) means speech and mind such as correspond to 
the object-intended ; and speech and mind corresponding to what 
is seen or inferred or heard. 4 If speech is spoken in order that 
one's own knowledge may pass to some one else, it should not be 
deceitful or mistaken or barren of information ; [then it would be 
abstinence from falsehood]. It should be used for the service of 
all ; not for the ruin of creatures. And even when used thus, 
should it be only for the ruin of creatures, it would not be an 
abstinence from falsehood ; it would be nothing less than wrong. 
In so far as there would be a false kind of merit [and] a resemblance 
of merit, it would become the worst of evils. Therefore let [the 
yogin] consider [first] what is good 5 for all creatures and [then] 
speak with abstinence-from-falsehood. Theft 6 is the unauthorized 
(apdstrapurvaka) appropriation of things-of-value from another. 
While abstinence-from-theft, when free from coveting, is the refusal 
to do this. Continence is control of the hidden organ of genera- 
tion. Abstinence -from -acceptance -of- gifts is abstinence -from - 
appropriating objects, because one sees the disadvantages in acquir- 

1 This sutra and the following are quoted 5 The principle would seem to be that 

in Gaudapada's Bhasya on Samkhya- a speech which does not harm any one 

karika xxiii. and which does some good, although 

* Similar plans of life in Bhag. Pur. xi, untrue, must be regarded as true. See 

second half. Manu iv. 138 and viii. 138. 

* JAOS. Proceedings, xi. 229. 6 Compare Linga Purana viii. 15. 
4 Compare Linga Purana viii. 13. 



179] Five abstentions [ ii. 30 

ing them or keeping them or losing them or in being attached to 
them or in harming them. These then are the abstentions. 

Having announced the aids [to yoga] of which the first are the abstentions and 
the observances, he introduces a sutra which specifies the abstentions by saying 
of these [eight]. The sutra begins with the words 30. Abstinence from, 
injury and ends with the word abstentions. He describes the aid to yoga [called] 
abstinence from injury by saying, in every way.S He praises such abstinence- 
from-injury with the words, And the other. Eooted in it would mean 
that, even if these are performed without observing abstinence from injury, they 
are as if they had not been performed, since they are quite fruitless. This is 
the meaning. The following up of them has nothing as its aim but the perfec- 
tion of this [abstinence-from-killing]. ' If abstinence-from-killing has the others 
rooted in it, how can it be that they aim at the perfection of the abstinence- 
from-injury ? ' To this he replies, in order to teach it. ^Perfections [in other 
words] the rise into consciousness of a thought. An objector asks, ' This may be 
true. But if the others exist for the sake of knowing abstinence from injury, 
what need of them, since this thought comes from the other source?' In reply 
he says, Cits spotlessness.S If the others were not followed up, abstinence-from- 
injury would be defiled by falsehood and other [vices]. With reference to this 
same point he tells of a concurrent opinion of those-who-have-the-tradition 
(dgamika) in the words, And in this sense it has been said. Easy. He gives 
the distinguishing characteristic of abstinence-from-falsehood in the words, 
^speech and mind such as correspond to the object-intended.^ The word such 
(yathd) raises an expectation which is fulfilled by the words ^corresponding to 
what is seen. He brings this into connexion with the correlated word 
corresponding-to (tatha)^ in the expression ^speech and mind corresponding 
to.S> [This should be, ] whenever there is a desire to say [something]. [If spoken] 
otherwise [than as seen], it is not abstinence-from-falsehood. This is stated with 
an explanation in the words to some other person. In order that knowledge 
thereof may pass to some one else, speech is spoken [or] uttered to produce know- 
ledge similar to one's own knowledge. If it is not deceitful [or] the cause of 
deceit, [it is abstinence-from-falsehood]. Just as when Drona the Master [MBh. 
vii. chap. 190] asked Yudhisthira [the king] with regard to the death of his own 
son Acvatthaman, 'Venerable sir (ayusman), thou who art rich in truth, has 
Acvatthaman been slain ? ' And he having in mind the elephant who had 
the corresponding name said, 'It is true, Acvatthaman is slain.' This is an 
answer which does not make Yudhisthira's own knowledge pass to [the other 
person]. For his own knowledge derived from the sense-organ 1 had as its 
object the slaying of the elephant and this [knowledge] was not passed [to 
Drona]. But quite another knowledge, that of the slaying of the latter 's son, 
was formed [in Drona's mind]. Or mistaken^ means due to a mistake, either 

1 Reading indriya-janma with the Bikaner MS. and the Bombay and Poona editions. 



ii. 30 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [180 

at the time when one desires to say something, or at the time of determining 
what the object-to-be-perceived is. 4CBarren of information^ is barren as regards 
information, as for instance an outlandish tongue is barren of information to 
Aryans ; or it might be purposeless, as for instance speech the utterance of 
which is not meant to be uttered. For in this [latter case], although one's own 
knowledge does pass to the other person, still it is exactly the opposite of making 
[knowledge] pass [to another], because it was not purposed. 1 An abstinence- 
from-falsehood even when it has these distinguishing characteristics, if it results 
in injury to another, would be a false kind of abstinence-from-falsehood, but 
would not be abstinence-from-falsehood, as he says in the words, If it. For 
example, one who practises austerities in abstinence-from-falsehood, when asked 
by robbers which way the rich merchant had gone, told the way the rich merchant 
had gone. Clt should be used, that is, uttered. The rest is easy. Since an 
[explanatory] negative idea depends on that of the positive he explains the 
distinguishing characteristic of theft by saying, Theft is the unauthorized.^ 
Here the generic idea is characterized by a qualification. This is the meaning. 
Since verbal and bodily operations are preceded by mental operations, it is the 
operation of mind, because it is dominant, that is mentioned in the words, 
free from coveting.^ He tells what continence is in the word <hidden. 
For even if his organ of generation is held in control, still if he become attached 
at the sight of a woman or upon [hearing] her talk or upon touching her limbs 
which are the seats of Kandarpa, he has no continence. So to exclude this case 
he says, the hidden organ. Other organs also that are very ardent for this 
[woman] are to be watched. He tells what abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts 
is by saying, objects. He mentions the disadvantage due to attachment to 
these [objects] in the words [ii. 15], " Since passions increase because of applica- 
tion to enjoyments, and the skill of the organs also increases." The disadvantage 
which is characteristic of injury is also expressed by the words, 2 "Enjoyment is 
impossible unless one has harmed some living creatures." Although obtained with- 
out effort, objects if unauthorized have disadvantages when one acquires them, 
since the acquisition of such things is censured. And even authorized objects, 
when acquired, are evidently disadvantageous, in that they must be kept and so on. 
Therefore abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts is the refusal to appropriate them. 



Now as for these [five abstentions] 

31. When they are unqualified by species or place or time 
or exigency and when [covering] all [these] classes [under 
these circumstances exists] the Great Course-of-conduct. 

Of these [five], abstinence-from-injury is qualified in respect of 

species as follows, a catcher of fish does injury to fishes only and 

1 Mrcchak. (Nirn. Sag. edition), p. 238 8 . J Compare ii. 15, p. 132* (Calc. ed.). 



181] Five observances [ ii. 32 

to nothing else. The same is qualified in respect of place, as when 
one says, ' I will not slay in a holy place.' The same is qualified 
in respect of time, as when one says, ' I will not slay on the 
fourteenth day [of the lunar fortnight] nor on a day of good omen. 
The same, in the case of one who refrains from [these] three is 
qualified in respect of exigency, as when one says, ' For the sake of 
gods and brahmans and not otherwise I will slay.' Likewise also 
in the case of the warrior who says, ' In battle only [I will do] 
injury, and nowhere else.' Abstinence-from-injury and the other 
[abstinences] unqualified by these species or times or places or 
exigencies must be kept when [covering] no less than all [these] 
cases. <In all [these] classes> means with regard to all [these] 
objects. Without exceptions in no less than all [these] classes 
this is what is meant by speaking of the Great Course-of-conduct 1 
when [covering] all [these] stages. 

Now as for these. The sutra begins with the words 31 ... by species and 
ends with the words Great Course-of-conduct. <When [covering] all [these] 
classes> means of those which are found in all [these] stages which are charac- 
terized as being species and the other [three stages]. The words Abstinence- 
from-injury and the other [abstinences] mean that the definition [of the Great 
Course-of-conduct] must be asserted in the case of the other abstentions also. 
The Comment is easy. 



32. Cleanliness and contentment and self-castigation and 
study and devotion to the Icvara are the observances. 

Of these [five], cleanliness is produced by earth or by water or the 
like, and by the consumption and other [requirements] with regard 
to pure sacrificial food. This is outer. Inner [cleanliness] is the 
washing away of the blemishes of the mind-stuff. [To practise] con- 
tentment means not to covet more than the means at hand. Self- 
castigation is the bearing of extremes, hunger and thirst, cold and 
heat, standing and sitting, stock-stillness and formal stillness, 
and, according to usage, courses-of-conduct such as mortifications 
(krcchra) 2 and lunar fasts 3 and rigid penances. 4 Study is the 

1 Compare Manu xii. 1-6. 8 Manu vi. 20, &c. 

2 Manu xi. 106, &c. * Manu xi. 213, &c. 



ii. 32 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [182 

recital of books that treat of release or the repetition of the 
syllable of adoration (pranava). Devotion to the Icvara 1 is the 
offering up of all actions to the Supreme Teacher. " He who rests 
in himself, for whom the network of perverse-considerations 
(vitarha) has been destroyed, whether resting upon a bed or on 
a seat, or wandering upon a road, would behold the destruction of 
the seed of the round-of-rebirths, would be permanently released, 
would participate in deathless delights." With regard to which 
this has been said, [i. 29], " Thereafter comes the right knowledge 
of him who thinks in an inverse way, and the removal of 
obstacles." 

He expounds cleanliness and the other observances. The sutra begins with the 
word 32. Cleanliness and ends with the word observances. He explains [the 
sutra] by saying Ccleanliness.) The words Cor the likeS are meant to include 
cow-dung and such things. Pure sacrificial food is the barley [mixed with] 
cow's urine and the rest [eaten at the (Jra,va,nl festival]. There is a consumption 
and other [requirements] with regard to this [food]. The other require- 
mentsS are meant to cover regulation of the dimensions and of the number of 
these morsels. Instead of saying 'produced by the consumption and other 
requirements with regard to pure sacrificial food ' he says <Kand by the consump- 
tion and other [requirements] with regard to pure sacrificial food.S For in the 
effect the cause is supposed figuratively to exist. The ^stains of the mind- 
stuffs such as arrogance and pride and jealousy ; the removal of this is cleanli- 
ness of the central-organ. ^Contentments is the desire to take no more than is 
necessary for the general maintenance of life, because it follows the renunciation 2 
of what had been before one's own property. This is its distinction [from 
abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts]. Stock-stillness is the absence of any 
indication of one's intention even by signs ; ^Cformal stillness^ is merely refraining 
from speech. In the phrase for whom the network of perverse-considerations 
has been destroyed^ the words ^perverse-considerations^ will be [later ii. 33] 
described. And doubts and misconceptions should be added [as parts of the 
network]. To this extent his intention is said to be pure. These abstentions 
and observances are also described in the Vishnu Purana [vi. 7. 36-37], s " Wish- 
ing to reduce the mind to its proper state he should resort to abstinence from 
incontinence and from injury and from falsehood and from theft and from 
acceptance-of-gifts. A man whose self is curbed should practise study and 
cleanliness and contentment and self-castigation. He should also make his 
mind incline towards the higher Brahman. These abstentions together with 

1 Compare ii. 1, p. 106 s (Calc. ed.). * Illustrated in Chand. Up. i. 10. 1-11. 

See also Naradlya Purana xlvii. 12-14. 



183] Inhibition of abstentions and observances [ii. 34 

the observances are declared to be five each. They give a special result when 
they are approached with a desire [for some special thing], and in the case of 
persons free from all desires they yield final release." 



As for these abstentions and observances, 

33. If there be inhibition by perverse-considerations (vitarka), 

there should be cultivation of the opposites. 

Whenever [in the mind] of this brahman [practising the absten- 
tions and observances] injuries and similar [faults] arise as 
perverse-considerations, such as for instance, ' I will kill him who 
hurts me ; I will also lie ; I will also appropriate his money ; and 
I will commit adultery with his wife ; and I will also make myself 
master of his property.' Thus inhibited by the blazing fever of 
perverse-considerations, let him cultivate the opposites of these. 
Let him ponder, ' Baked upon the pitiless coals of the round-of- 
rebirths, I take my refuge in the rules (dharma) for yoga by 
giving protection 1 to every living creature. I myself after ridding 
myself of perverse-considerations am betaking myself to them once 
more, like a dog. As a dog to his vomit, even so I betake myself 
to that of which I had rid myself.' Other similar [inhibitions of 
perverse-considerations] should be applied in the other sutras also 
[upon the aids to yoga]. 

Since " good things 2 are full of difficulties ", he introduces a sutra whose object 
is to give advice which will prevent the possibility of exceptions to these [absten- 
tions and observances]. So he says, As for these abstentions and obser- 
vances^ The sutra, 33. If there be inhibition by perverse-considerations, 
there should be cultivation of the opposites. In the Comment upon perverse- 
considerations there is nothing at all that seems obscure. 



34. Since perverse-considerations such as injuries, whether 
done or caused to be done or approved, whether ensuing 
upon greed or anger or infatuation, whether mild or moderate 
or vehement, find their unending consequences in pain and 
in lack of thinking, there should be the cultivation of their 
opposites. 

1 This phrase occurs in Manu viii. 303. siddhayah, (^akuntala,, Act iii, near end; 

2 Compare aho vighnavatyah prarthitdrtha- and ^aXe7rd ra na\d Repub. 435 c, 497 D. 



ii. 34 ] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [184 

Of these [considerations], first of all, injury, since it is done or caused 
to be done or approved, is three-fold. Moreover, each of these 
is three-fold, in so far as there is greed [such as] desire for the 
meat or for the skin, or in so far as there is anger as when a man 
thinks he has been ' hurt by that man ', or in so far as there 
is infatuation as when a man thinks [that what he is doing] ' will 
be merit for me '. Again, since greed and anger and infatuation are 
three-fold as being mild and moderate and vehement, there are 
thus seven-and-twenty varieties of injuries. Yet again, since 
[these are] gentle and moderate and extreme [these are] three- 
fold as follows, gently mild and moderately mild and keenly mild ; 
similarly, gently moderate and moderately moderate and keenly 
moderate ; likewise, gently keen and moderately keen and vehe- 
mently keen. Thus injury is of one-and-eighty varieties. It is, 
however, innumerable because of the varieties due to specifications 
(niyama) and to options (vikalpa) and to aggregations (samuccaya), 
due to the fact that the varieties l of those-who-breathe-the-breath- 
of-life are innumerable. In the same manner [the classification] is 
to be applied to falsehood and to the other [crimes]. Now since 
these perverse considerations have endless consequences in pain 
and in lack of thinking, one should cultivate their opposites. [In 
other words], there is a cultivation of those things the endless 
consequences of which are pain and a lack of thinking. And to 
continue, he who commits an injury first of all reduces the strength 
of the victim, then causes him pain by falling upon him with 
a knife or something of the kind, [and] afterwards even deprives 
him of life. When once he has taken away [the victim's] strength, 
his own animate or inanimate aids 2 begin to have their strength 
dwindle away. As a result of causing pain, he himself experiences 
pain in hells and in [the bodies of] animals and of departed spirits 
and in other [forms]. As a result of uprooting [the victim] from 
life, he himself continues from moment to moment at the very 
point of departure from life. And even while wishing for death he 

1 RaghavanandainthePatanjala-Rahasyam with a change in the order of words, 

attributes this quotation to Paksila- by the Udyotakara in the Nyaya- 

svamin. It is found in Vatsyayana's Varttika (Bibl. Ind.p. 9 10 ). 

Bhasya (Vizian. ed. p. I 7 ) ; and quoted, 2 See Vacaspati on ii. 15, p. 114 5 (Calc. ed.). 



185] Varieties of injuries [ ii. 35 

pants laboriously since the fruition 1 of pain is to be felt in a 
fruition which has 2 a limit [in time]. Furthermore, even if [the 
effects of] injury could be somehow done away 3 by merit, even 
then, if he obtained happiness, it would be [on condition 
that] his length-of-life be short. In the same way, so far as 
possible, [the classification] is to be applied to lying and to the 
other [violations of the abstentions]. Thus pondering on that 
same [painful consequence] of perverse considerations, which is 
inevitable (anugata) and undesired, the yogin should not devote 
his central organ to perverse considerations. As a result of the 
cultivation of the opposites, the perverse considerations become 
things that may be escaped. 

With the intent to describe what the cultivation of the opposites is, he states 
the different natures and kinds and causes and properties and results of the con- 
trary-considerations, as well as the objects for the meditation on the opposites in 
the sutra which begins with the words 34. . . . perverse- considerations and ends 
with the words cultivation of their opposites. He explains [the sutra] with 
the words, COf these . . . injury.^ Because the varieties of those-who-breathe- 
the-breath-of-life are innumerable, specifications and options and aggregations 
are possible with regard to injuries and the other [crimes]. In this situation, 
because there is a preponderance of tamas, as a result of wrong living, a lack of 
thinking also arises characterized by the four kinds of misconception [ii. 5], So 
it is that these perverse-considerations also result in lack of thinking [as well as 
arise out of undifferentiated-consciousness]. Tor the cultivation of their oppo- 
sites is precisely [the thought of] the endless consequences in pain and in lack 
of thinking. By virtue of this there is a revulsion from these. This same culti- 
vation of the opposites he makes clear by the words, of the victim. The 
victim is some tame animal. Strength is the energy which is the cause of the 
functional activity of the body. [This] he first reduces by tying him to a sacri- 
ficial post. For in this way the animal loses his spirit. The rest is very clear. 



When [the perverse considerations] become for this [yogin] unsuit- 
able for generation, then the power caused by this fact becomes 
indicative of the yogin's perfection. For example, 

1 The word vipaka is omitted in the Bikaner 8 The better reading is avapagata. In this 

and the two Kashmir and several other case, the injury would not be inde- 

good MSS. pendent fruit since it would be cast 

* Compare the discussion in ii. 13, especially away as a portion of the sacrifice. 
p. 127 (Calc. ed.). 
24 [h.o.b. 17] 



ii. 35] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [186 

35. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from injury, his 
presence begets a suspension of enmity. 

[This] occurs on the part of all living creatures. 1 

The abstentions and observances have been described, and the escape from the 
exceptions to these, the perverse considerations, as a result of the cultivation of 
the opposites has been described. Now he makes clear the signs indicative of 
thorough knowledge of perfection in these various abstentions and observances 
which results from practice in these [latter]. By a thorough knowledge of 
which signs [the yogin] accomplishes what is to be done in each particular case 
and acts with reference to what is yet to be done, as he says, When ... for 
this [yogin]. 35. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from injury, 
his presence begets a suspension of enmity. Even [enemies] whose hostility 
is everlasting 2 like horse and buffalo, mouse and cat, snake and mongoos, in 
the presence of the Exalted [yogin] who is grounded in abstinence from injury, 
conform themselves to his mind-stuff and renounce altogether their hostility. 



36. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from falsehood, 
actions and consequences depend upon him. 

If [the yogin] says to a man (iti), ' Be 3 thou right-living,' the man 
becomes right-living. If he expresses the wish (iti) ' Attain thou 
heaven,' the man attains heaven. What he says (vak) comes true. 

35. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from falsehood, actions and 
consequences have their residence [in him]. Actions mean right-living and 
wrong-living ; and consequences of these are such things as heaven and hell. 
Dependence upon the sense that these same depend upon him. Having depen- 
dence upon him is the abstract state of this [dependence]. Since such a thing 
happens in the case of the Exalted One's speech, [the Comment] says that actions 
depend upon him by saying <Kright-living.^ He says that consequences depend 
upon him by saying ^Cheaven.^ Comes true signifies that it is not prevented. 



37. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from theft, all 
jewels approach him. 

From all directions jewels approach to be his. 

37. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from theft, all jewels approach 

him. Easily understood. 

1 Compare Raghuvanca ii. 55, xiii. 50, xiv. kaumudl. Compare also Bana's Ka- 

79 and Kirata iii. 2. dambaii p. 93 8 (Parab's ed.) and Cakun- 

* See Panini ii. 4. 9 with the illustrations tala (Nir. Sag. ed.) p. 23, two lines up. 

fromtheKa$ikavrttiandtheSiddhanta- 'Whitney: Grammar 924. 



187] Results of abstentions [ ii. 39 

38. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from incon- 
tinence, he acquires energy. 

By the acquisition of which the yogin increases [his] unhindered x 
qualities. And when he is perfected he is able to transfer [his] 
thinking to [his] pupils. 

38. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from incontinence, he acquires 
energy. Energy [that is] power. By the acquisition of which he increases 
[or] accumulates qualities, such as minuteness, which are unhindered [that is] 
which have not been hindered. And when perfected he is endowed with the 
eight perfections of which the first is [called] tara 2 and also by other names 
such as Seasoning (iiha). He is able to transfer his thinking which relates to 
the aids to yoga to his pupils [or] disciples. 



39. As soon as he is established in abstinence-from-accept- 
ance-of-gifts, a thorough illumination upon the conditions of 
birth 

Becomes his. Who was I ? How was I ? Or what [can] this 
birth be ? Or how [can] this [birth] be ? Or what shall we 
become ? Or how shall we become ? ' Such a desire to know his 
own condition in former and later and intermediate times becomes 
of itself fulfilled 3 for him. These when he is established in the 
abstentions are the perfections. 

39. As soon as he is established in ahstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts, a 
thorough illumination upon the conditions of birth. Birth is [coming into] 
relation with a body and with sense-organs and the rest which are particularized 
as belonging to some class [of beings]. There is a thorough illumination, a 
direct perception of the conditions [of birth] [or] of what kinds [of birth]. That 
is to say, a thorough knowledge of a quiescent or uprisen or indeterminable 
birth together with its form [of experience]. He desires to know the past in 
the words, <.' Who was I ? ' He desires to know the different details as to 
origin and persistence of this same [birth] in the words, ' How was I ? * He 
desires to know what the present birth itself is in the words, ' Or what ? ' 
Is the body made directly of elements, or is it nothing but an aggregation of 
elements, or is it other than these ? Here also the words ' Or how ' might be 
supplied. 4 Elsewhere this is the actual reading. He desires to know the future 
in the words, <C Or what shall we become ? ' Here again the words ' Or how ' 
are [to be] supplied. 4 Such ... for him. The former [time] is past time ; 

1 See Manu xii. 28. 2 Samkhya-karika li. 8 The Vart. says vigistd bhavati. 

4 In the text of Vacaspati kathath va apparently was lacking. 



ii. 39 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [188 

the later is future ; the intermediate is the present. The existence of the self 
in these is a relation with a body and the rest. There is a desire to know this 
and from desire comes knowledge according to the maxim, " He who desires 
anything, does that same thing." 



We will speak with regard to observances. 

40. As a result of cleanliness there is disgust at one's own 

body and no intercourse with others. 

As soon as there is disgust with his own body, he has begun 
cleanliness. Seeing the offensiveness of the body, 1 he is no longer 
attached to the body and becomes an ascetic (yati). Moreover 
there is no intercourse with others. Perceiving the true nature of 
the body, desirous of escaping 2 even his own body, even after 
he has washed it with earth and water and other [substances], not 
seeing any purity in the body, how could he have intercourse with 
the bodies of others absolutely unhallowed as they are ? 

40. As a result of cleanliness, there is disgust at one's own body and no 
intercourse with others. By this [sutra] it is told what is indicative of per- 
fection in outer cleanliness. 



Furthermore [as other results], 

41. Purity of sattva and gentleness and singleness-of-intent 

and subjugation of the senses and fitness for the sight of the 

self- 

The word ' arise ' completes the sentence. As a result of cleanli- 
ness there is purity of sattva ; therefrom [it acquires] gentleness ; 
from this [it acquires] singleness-of-intent ; therefrom [it acquires] 
subjugation of the senses ; and from this fitness for the sight of the 
self is acquired by the sattva of the thinking-substance. So to 
this [last] there is access, as a result of his being established in 
cleanliness. 

He tells what is indicative of inner perfection by saying ^Furthermore.^ 41. 
Purity of sattva and gentleness and singleness-of-intent and subjugation 
of the senses and fitness for the sight of the self. When the defilements of 

1 Compare ii. 5, p. 113 s (Calc. ed.). See Lifiga Pur. viii. 32-33. 



189] Results of observances [ ii. 43 

mind-stuff are washed away, the mind-stuff comes-forth-to-sight undefiled. And 
as a result of freedom from defilement there is gentleness [or] transparency of 
sattva. In the transparent [sattva] there is singleness-of-intent. Therefrom, 
by the subdual of the central-organ, there results the subdual of the sense- 
organs which are dependent on the central-organ. After that the sattva of the 
thinking-substance becomes fit for the sight of the self. 



42. As a result of contentment there is an acquisition of 
superlative pleasure. 

And in this sense it has been said, 1 "What constitutes the 
pleasure of love in this world and what the supreme pleasure of 
heaven are both not to be compared with the sixteenth part of the 
pleasure of dwindled craving (trsnd)." 

42. As a result of contentment there is an acquisition of superlative 
pleasure. Superlative is that beyond which nothing more excellent exists. As 
was said by Yayati 2 when he conferred youth upon his [father] Puru, " The 
wise man, casting entirely away that craving which is hard for the strong- 
willed to cast off and which even in the aged ages not, is filled quite full 
with pleasure and nothing else." This same he shows by the words beginning 
What constitutes the pleasure of love. 



43. Perfection in the body and in the organs after impurity- 
has dwindled as a result of self-castigation. 
Self-castigation in the very act of completing itself destroys the 
defilement from the covering of impurity. As a result of the 
removal of the defilement of the covering of this [impurity] there 
is perfection of the body, such as atomization [iii. 45] ; likewise per- 
fection of the organs, such as hearing and seeing at a distance [that 
is, telepathy]. 

He tells what is indicative of perfection of self-castigation. 43. Perfection 
in the body and in the organs after impurity has dwindled as a result 
of self-castigation. Whatever covering has the characteristics of impurity, has 
the qualities and so on which are effects of the tamas. Such as atomization^ 
would be greatness or lightness or getting [to any place]. Easy. 



1 MBh. Qantiparvan 174. 46 andVayuPur. * Visnu Pur. iv. 10. 12 and Vayu Pur. 

xciii. 101 and Linga Pur. lxvii. 23. xciii. 99 and Linga Pur. lxvii. 20. 

Compare Bhartrhari Vair. Qat. 49 and Compare also MBh. i. 89-91 = 3577 ff. 
Dhvanyaloka, p. 176 (Kavyamala ed.). 



ii. 44 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [190 

44. As a result of study there is communion with the chosen 
deity. 

Gods and sages and perfected men come within the range of vision 
of [the yogin] who has the disposition to study ; and are helpful 
to his work. 

He tells what is indicative of perfection in study. 44. As a result of study 
there is communion with the chosen deity. Easy. 



45. Perfection of concentration as a result of devotion to the 
Icvara. 

One whose whole nature is surrendered 1 to the Icvara has perfec- 
tion of concentration. By which [concentration] he knows as the 
thing really is (avitatham) all that he desires to know, in other 
places and in other bodies and in other times. Thereafter his 
insight sees into things as they are (yathabhiltam). 

45. Perfection of concentration ... of devotion to the Icvara. And it 
should not be urged that if, only as a result of devotion to the Icvara, concentra- 
tion conscious [of objects] has its perfection, there is no need of the seven [other] 
aids. Because these [seven] by subsidiary activity, both seen and unseen, are 
of service to the perfection of devotion to the Icvara, and at the same time 
to perfection of concentration conscious [of objects]. Just as by a separation 
of correlations 2 curds fulfil the purposes of the sacrifice and also fulfil the 
purposes of men. Thus if this is so, [one should not say] that fixed-attention 
and contemplation and concentration are not the immediate 8 aids [to yoga]. 
Because it is clear that these [three] {asya) are immediate aids, in so far as 
for the perfection of [concentration] conscious [of an object] these [three] 
have the same object as [concentration] conscious [of an object], whereas the 
other aids [which have the Icvara as object] have an object which is not this. 
For the devotion to the Icvara has also the Icvara as its object, and has 
not as its object that which is to be consciously known. Accordingly this is 
a mediate aid. Thus all is cleared up. The words sees into are intended 
to show the etymology of the word insight. 





1 See ii. 1. to a thing is the antaranga of it '. Thus 

8 See Jaimini Mimansa-sutra iv. 3. 5. 2. devotion to the Icvara is the last cause 

8 Balarama defines antaranga by the words of the effect (antarangasadhana) of 

1 whatever happens immediately next concentration conscious of an object. 



191] Varieties of postures [ ii. 46 

The abstentions and observances together with their perfections 
have been described. We have the following to say of the postures x 
and the other [aids to yoga]. In this [sutra, it is said] 
46. Stable-and-easy posture. 

For example, the lotus-posture and the hero-posture and the decent- 
posture and the mystic-diagram and the staff-posture and [the 
posture] with the rest and the bedstead, the seated curlew and the 
seated elephant and the seated camel, the even arrangement, the 
stable-and-easy also called, as-is-easiest and others of the same 
kind. 

He introduces the next sutra with the words The abstentions and observances 
have been described. We have the following to say of the postures and the 
other [aids to yoga]. In this [sutra, it is said] 46. Stable-and-easy posture. 
Stable means motionless. That posture which is easy, which brings ease is 
the one intended by the sutra. The word dsana means either that whereon 
a man sits [that is, a seat] or the manner in which he sits [that is, a posture]. 
The lotus-posture is well known. 2 A man settled down (sthitasya) rests one 
foot on the ground and the other is placed over the partially contracted knee, 
this is hero-posture. Bringing the soles of his feet near to each other 
close to the scrotum, he should make a hollow of his hands and place them 
over it in the shape of a tortoise, this is the decent-posture. Inserting 
the contracted left foot into the space between the right shin and thigh and 
inserting the contracted right foot into the space between the left 
shin and thigh, that is the mystic diagram. Sitting down with the great- 
toes placed together and with ankles placed together and stretching out upon 
the ground shins and thighs and feet placed together, let him practise the 
staff -posture. Because there is a use of the yogic table s (yoga-pat$aJca), this is 
[the posture] with the rest. Lying down with the arms stretched around the 
knees is the bedstead. The curlew and the other seats may be understood by 
actually seeing a curlew and the other animals seated. The two feet are 
contracted and pressed against each other at the heels and at the tips of 

1 Linga Pur. viii. 87-90. of this book, and there is a vast 

2 An illustration of this by a native hand number of fantastic and repellent 

is given in Richard Schmidt's Fakire additions. 

und Fakirthum, to face p. 12 ; hero- 8 Balarama says that this yogic table is 

posture faces p. 28 ; decent-posture a special kind of support for the arms 

faces p. 16, but diverges from this de- of a yogin who is about to practise 

scription in its details ; mystic-diagram concentration. It is made of wood 

faces p. 24. The order of the illustra- and is well known among uddsin by 

tions does not correspond to the order the name of ' changan '. 



ii. 46 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [192 

the feet, this is the even arrangement. That arrangement in which one 
finds entire (sidhyati) stability and ease, this is the posture that is stable-and- 
easy. This is the one from among these [postures] which is approved by the 
Exalted Author of the sutras. An elaboration of this is given in the words, 
as-is-easiest.^ 



47. By relaxation of effort or by a [mental] state-of-balance 
with reference to Ananta 

[A posture] results. With these words the sentence is com- 
pleted. When efforts cease the posture is completed, so that there 
is no agitation of the body. Or the mind-stuff comes into a 
balanced-state with reference to Ananta 1 and produces the 
posture. 

Having stated what the postures are, he tells what are the means of attaining 
them. 47. By relaxation of effort or by a [mental] state-of-balance with 
reference to Ananta. A natural effort sustaining the body is not the cause 
of this kind of posture which is to be taught as an aid to yoga. For if its 
cause were such, the preaching of it would be purposeless in that it could 
be naturally perfected. Therefore this natural effort does not accomplish this 
kind of posture which is to be taught and is contrary [to it]. For in so far 
as this [natural posture] is the cause of an arbitrarily chosen posture it is 
the destroyer of the specific kind of posture. Consequently a man, practising 
the specific posture as taught, should resort to an effort which consists in the 
relaxation of the natural effort. Otherwise the posture taught cannot be 
accomplished. Or . . . with Ananta,^ the Chief of Serpents, who upholds 
the globe of the earth upon his thousand very steadfast hoods, [with him] 
the mind-stuff comes into a balanced state and produces the posture. 



48. Thereafter he is unassailed by extremes. 

As a result of mastering the postures he is not overcome by the 
extremes, by cold and heat and by the other [extremes]. 
He tells what is indicative of complete mastery of postures by saying 48. There- 
after he is unassailed by extremes. The Comment explains itself by a mere 
reading. Posture is also described in the Vishnu Purana [vi. 7. 39], " Having 
assumed a posture so as to possess the excellences of the decent-posture and 
the other [postures]." 



1 Compare Bh. Glta x. 28. Ananta is Vasuki, the Lord of Serpents. See also MBh. 
i. 35. 5 ff. 



193] Varieties of restraint of breath [ ii. 50 

49. When there is this [stability of posture], the restraint of 
breath cutting off the flow of inspiration and expiration 
[follows]. 

After the mastery 1 of posture [follows the restraint of the 
breath]. Inspiration is the sipping in of the outer wind ; expira- 
tion is the expulsion of the abdominal wind. Restraint of the 
breath is the cutting off of the flow of these two, the absence of 
both kinds. 

After describing [postures], he shows that these precede restraint of the breath 
and tells the distinguishing characteristic of this [restraint of the breath]. 
49. When there is this [stability of posture], the restraint of breath cutting 
off the flow of inspiration and expiration [follows]. In the case of emission 
(recdka) and inhalation (purdka) and suspension (Jcumbhaka), the words the cut- 
ting off of the flow of inspiration and expiration^ give the general character- 
istic of restraint of the breath. To explain : when in inhalation the outer wind 
sipped in is held inside, there is a break in the flow of inspiration and expiration ; 
again when in emission the abdominal wind forced out is held outside, there is 
also a break in the flow of inspiration and expiration. Similarly in the case of 
suspension also. This same is said by the Comment in the words ^After the 
subjugation of posture.^ 



But this [restraint of breath] is, 

50. External or internal or suppressed in fluctuation and is 
regulated 2 in place and time and number and is protracted 
and subtile. 

It is external in case there is no flow [of breath] after expiration ; 
it is internal in case there is no flow [of breath] after inspiration ; 
it is the third [or] suppressed in fluctuation in case there is no 
[flow] of either kind [neither of expiration nor inspiration], as the 
result of a single effort [to suppress both], just as water dropped 
upon a very-hot stone shrivels up wherever it falls, so both at once 
cease to be. And each of these three is regulated in space ; [each] 
deals with a certain amount of space. [Each] is regulated in time ; 
in other words, defined by a limitation to a certain number of 
moments. [Each] is regulated in number ; the first rising up [of 
the vital current from the navel to the palate is measured] by so 

1 Many MSS. omit this word jay e and read saty asane. 

2 The Varttika says paridrsto nirntto niyamito. 
25 [h.o.s. 17] 



ii.50 ] Book II Means of Attainment or Sddhana [194 

many inspirations and expirations. In the same manner, the 
second rising up of the checked [vital current] is measured by so 
many inspirations and expirations. Likewise the third. Similarly 
it is gentle [in method] ; similarly it is moderate ; similarly it is 
keen. Thus it is regulated by number. So then, practised in 
these ways, [it becomes] protracted and subtile. 

He introduces the sutra which gives the characteristics of the three particular 
restraints of the breath by saying, CBut this. The sutra begins with the word 
60. External and ends with the word subtile. The words <Sin fluctuation^ 
are connected with each [of the three]. He refers to emission (recaka) when he 
says In case . . . expiration.^ He refers to inhalation (puraka) when he says 
Tn case . . . inspiration. He refers to suspension (kumbhaJca) when he says 
^Cthe third. ^ This same he makes clear when he says 4Cin case ... of either 
kind. When by only one effort of retention there results an absence of both 
inspiration and expiration, and when there is not, as before, an effort to prolong 
a long stream of efforts of emission ; but, on the other hand, just as water thrown 
upon a very-hot stone dries altogether and shrivels up wherever it falls, so this 
wind, whose nature it is to flow, when its action is restricted by a mighty effort 
of retention, becomes subtilized and remains in the body. [Suspension] does 
not inhale and so is not inhalation ; does not emit and so is not emission. The 
words <Sdeals with a certain amount of spaced means as measured by a span, [the 
space between the outstretched tips of the thumb and the forefinger], by a vitasti 
[from the extended thumb to the tip of the little finger], or by a hand. And 
it is inferred as being external [in so far as it causes] motion in a blade of grass 
or a piece of cotton in a windless spot. Similarly if internal, it begins at the 
sole of the foot and extends to the head. And it is inferred by [an internal] 
touch light as that of an ant [moving on the body]. A moment is one quarter 
of the time required for the act of winking. [The wind] is defined by the limi- 
tation of a certain number of these [moments]. An instant (matra) is the time 
limited by snapping thumb and forefinger after having three times rubbed one's 
own knee-pan with the hand. The first rising up (udghdta) measured by thirty- 
six such instants is called slow. The same [udghata] when doubled is moderate. 
The same tripled, called the third, is keen. This same restraint of the breath 
he describes as being regulated by number in the words by number. The 
time for snapping thumb and forefinger as described is equal to the time defined 
by the action of inhalation and exhalation of a man in good health. 1 The rising 
up 2 which has been made the object of the action of the first rising-up is con- 
quered [and] mastered [and] checked. It is intended [by these measures of 

1 The meaning of the word svastha might elaborated at length in most of the 

also be at ease ' or ' motionless '. later books of decadent yoga. Com- 

8 See Kurma Pur. ii. 11. This process is pare also Vayu Pur. v. 79-81. 



195] Fourth restraint of breath [ ii. 51 

instants to indicate] the time of a certain number of moments. [And this time 
is equal to] a certain number of inspirations and expirations. Thus there is a 
slight difference [between the two kinds of measures, between the matra and the 
inspirations and expirations]. This same [restraint of breath] when practised 
day by day, [increasing gradually] by a day [at a time] or by a fortnight or by 
a month becomes, in so far as it is made to cover an increasing number of places 
or of times, protracted. And in so far as it is reached by a concentration of the 
most extreme delicacy it is said to be subtile, but not in so far as it is weak. 



51. The fourth [restraint of the breath] transcends the ex- 
ternal and the internal object. 

The external object regulated in place and time and number is 
transcended ; the internal object regulated in the same way is 
transcended ; in both kinds of cases [restraint] is protracted and 
subtile. Following after these there is no flow of either kind. 
This is the fourth restraint of breath. Now the third restraint of 
breath is without regard to objects, has no flow [of breath], is 
begun once only, is regulated in place and time and number, and 
is protracted and subtile. But the fourth, 1 because, in consequence 
of its mastery of the stages in order, it has made out the objects 
of both expiration and inspiration, after transcending both [ex- 
ternal and internal objects], is without flow and is the <fourth> 
restraint of breath. This is the distinction. 

Thus the three particular restraints of breath have been characterized. The 
fourth he characterizes with the words 51. The fourth [restraint of the breath] 
transcends the external and the internal object. [The Comment] explains 
[the sutra] in the words place and time and number. Transcended means 
cast down because its form has been mastered by practice. It is also protracted 
and subtile. Similarly, ^Following after these means the restraint of breath 
which has external and internal objects and which follows after knowledge of 
place and time and number. The fourth does not, like the third, arise by a 
single effort and instantly. But while in practice and after having reached the 
various stages according as it succeeds in one stage after another it proceeds as 
he says in consequence of its mastery of the stages. It is objected, 'In the 
repressed fluctuation also there is no flow of either. What then is [its] dis- 
tinction from this [fourth]?' In reply he says, the third. The third does 
not follow after any regard paid to [objects] and is completed by a single effort. 



1 See Linga Pur. viii. 111. 



ii. 51 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [196 

But the fourth is preceded by the regard paid to objects and has to be completed 
by many efforts. This is the distinction. The object of these two, the inhala- 
tion and the emission, is not considered ; but this [object] is regarded in respect 
of place and time and number. This is the meaning. 

52. As a result of this the covering of the light dwindles 
away. 

In the case of the yogin who is practising restraints of breath, the 
karma capable of covering discriminative thinking dwindles away. 
What this is they tell in the words, " Having covered the sattva 
which is disposed to light with delusion (indrajala) made of infatu- 
ation, [undifferentiated-consciousness] assigns the same [obscured 
form] to deeds which are not to be done." Therefore by practising 
restraint of breath his karma which covers the light, together with 
its bondage to the round-of-rebirth, becomes powerless. And from 
moment to moment it dwindles away. And in this sense it has 
been said, " There is no self-castigation higher than restraint of 
breath ; from it comes purity from defilement and the clear shining 
of thought." 

He describes the subsidiary purpose [served by] restraint of breath. 52. As a 
result of this the covering of the light dwindles away. The covering is that by 
which the sattva of the thinking-substance is covered, in other words, hindrances 
and evil. He explains [the sutra] in the words ^restraints of breath. Thinking 
(jnana) is that by which anything is thought. It is the light of the sattva of the 
thinking-substance. Discriminative thinking is the thinking of discrimination. 
For this [hindrance], since it covers discriminative thinking, is called the coverer 
(avaraniya) according [to the sutra of Panini iii. 4. 68 which says that] bhavya 
and geya and pravacanlya and similar forms have been shown to be used as 
exceptional forms in the sense of agent, just as for instance the words Jcopaniya 
and ranjamya. So here also the affix of the future passive participle is used to 
denote the agent. The word <karma) connotes the merit which results from it 
and the hindrance which is the cause of it. On this same point he states that 
there is a concurrence of opinion with those who have the tradition (agamiri) 
in the words What this is they tell.^ Extreme infatuation is passion. 
Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) too, which is inseparable from it, is also 
to be understood by this word. A deed not to be done is wrong-living. An 
objector asks, 'If restraint of the breath causes evil to dwindle, what need is 
there of self-castigation?' In reply to this he says becomes powerless. 
It does not dwindle away entirely. Therefore to make it dwindle away altogether 
self-castigation is needed. On this point also he states that there is a concurrence 
of opinion with those who have the tradition (agamiri) by saying And in this 



197] Fixed attention and withdrawal of the senses [ ii. 54 

sense it has been said. Manu also [vi. 72] says, ' ' By restraints of breath one 
should burn up defects." And that restraint of breath is also an aid to yoga 
is also stated 1 by the Vishnu Purana [vi. 7. 40-1], "But restraint of breath 
which masters by practice the wind called breath is to be recognized as being 
seeded and as seedless. When the two winds, breath (prana) and out-breath 
(apana) have overcome each other, that is two-fold. The third is the result of 
a subdual of these two." 



Furthermore, 

53. For fixed attentions also the central organ becomes fit. 

Merely in consequence of practice in restraint of breath [the 
central organ becomes fit for fixed attentions] in accordance with 
the statement [i. 34], " Or [he gains stability] by expulsion and 
retention of breath." 

Furthermore, 53. For fixed attentions also the central organ becomes fit. 
For restraint of breath steadies the central organ and makes it fit for fixed 
attentions. 



Now what is the withdrawal of the senses ? 
54. The withdrawal of the senses is as it were the imitation 
of the mind-stuff itself on the part of the organs by dis- 
joining themselves from their objects. 

When there is no conjunction with their own objects, the organs 
in imitation of the mind-stuff, as it is in itself, become, as it were, 
restricted. When the mind-stuff is restricted, like the mind-stuff 
they become restricted ; and do not, like the subjugation of the 
senses, require any further aid. Just as when the king-bee 2 flies 
up, the bees fly up after him ; and when he settles down, they 
settle down after him. So when the mind-stuff is restricted, the 
organs are restricted. This then is the withdrawal of the senses. 
The [yogin] being refined in this way by means of abstentions and other 
[aids], begins, for the sake [of attaining] constraint, the withdrawal of the 
senses. In order to introduce the sutra giving its distinguishing characteristic 
he asks the question, Now ?) The sutra begins with the word 54. . . . them- 
selves and ends with the words withdrawal of the senses. The mind-stuff 
also is not in contact with the [various kinds of things], sounds and so forth, 

1 Compare Naradiya Pur. xlvii. 16-17. 

3 Compare Pra9na Up. ii. 4. Repeated below iii. 38. This is what we call queen-bee. 



ii. 54 ] Booh II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [198 

which bring about infatuation and attachment and anger. And because it is not 
in contact with them, the eye and the other organs are not in contact. This is 
what is called the imitation of the mind-stuff by the senses. Because, as the 
mind-stuff settles down upon an entity, the organs of this [mind-stuff] cannot be 
said to imitate the mind, since their object is always external, therefore he 
says in imitation ... as it were.^ [In the compound beginning] with the 
word their own (sva) he shows by the locative case [in the word abhave] that 
the reason why the mind-stuff is imitated is because of the property common [to 
the mind-stuff and to the organs], namely, the disjunction from their own objects 
of sense. He elaborates [the meaning of] the imitation by saying Cwhen the 
mind-stuff is restricted. The similarity is that the effort which causes the 
restriction of both is similar. Here he gives a simile * by saying ^CJust as when 
the king-bee. He applies [the simile] to the thing illustrated by saying So. 
On this point also [he quotes] a sentence from the Vishnu Purana 2 [vi. 7. 43], 
" A man skilled in yoga, having restrained the organs attached to [the various 
things], sound and so forth, should make them imitate the mind-stuff, in that 
he is intent upon the withdrawal of the senses." And the motive for this is 
shown in the same place [vi. 7. 44], " In the case of men who have become 
motionless, the result of that [withdrawal] is perfect mastery of the organs. A 
yogin with unmastered [organs] cannot accomplish yoga." 



55. As a result of this [withdrawal] there is complete mastery 
of the organs. 

There are some who think 1. that the mastery of the organs is 
a lack of desire for the various things sounds and so forth. 
Longing (vyasana) is attachment in the sense that it puts him 
a long way from (vy-asyati) a good. 2. [Others think that] unfor- 
bidden experience is legitimate. 3. Others, that there may be 
conjunction [of the organs] with the [various things] sounds and 
so forth as one desires. 4. Others think that there is a subjuga- 
tion of the senses when there is no passion or aversion after the 
thinking of the various things is without pleasure or pain. 5. Jaigi- 
savya thinks that it is refusal to perceive [the various things 
beginning with sound] as a result of the mind-stuff's singleness-of- 
intent. And as a result of this, when [the yogin's] mind-stuff is 
restricted, the organs are restricted, [and] there is not as in the 
case of the subjugation of the other organs, any further need of 



1 Compare iii. 38. 2 See also Naradlya Pur. Ixvii. 19-20. 



199] Complete mastery of the organs [ ii. 55 

means performed with effort. But this mastery which is this 
singleness-of-intent is the complete [mastery]. 



The satra is explanatory of this [mastery]. 55. As a result of this [with- 
drawal] there is complete mastery of the organs. An objector asks, 'Are 
there other and incomplete masteries in comparison with which this may be 
called complete ? ' Undoubtedly, [he says in reply]. He shows what these are 
in the words <the various things beginning with sounds He elaborates the 
same by saying Cdesire. Desire is passion, attachment. According to what 
derivation ? It is that which rejects him [or] throws him away from a good. 
When there is none of this, there is absence of desire, in other words, mastery. 
2. He describes yet another [incomplete] mastery in the words ^unforbidden.^ 
That devotion to things which is not forbidden by the Sacred Word and other 
[authorities], and the absence of sense activity with regard to those things which 
are forbidden by these. Such is legitimate because it does not depart from the 
law. 3. He describes yet another [incomplete] mastery in the words ^contact 
[of the senses] with the [various things] beginning with sounds Contact of 
the organs with the [various things], sounds and so forth, as one desires. The 
meaning is that with regard to matters of enjoyment he is independent and not 
dependent on enjoyment. 4. He describes yet another [incomplete] mastery in 
the words, no passion and no hatred.^ Some say that it is a thinking with- 
out pleasure or pain, of the [various things], sounds and so forth, by a detached 
observer. 5. He describes that mastery which is approved by the author of the 
sutras and is also approved by the Supreme Sage, as he says, as a result of the 
mind-stuffs singleness-of-intent. Jaiglsavya says that when the mind-stuff 
together with the organs is single-in-intent, there is no sense-activity with 
regard to [various things] beginning with sound. The [commentator] says that 
this is the complete mastery in the words, But . . . the complete.^ The word 
4Cbut distinguishes it from other masteries. For the other masteries, in so 
far as they are in contact with the poisonous snake ' (aglvisa) of objects-of-sense 
(visaya), do not escape the possibility of contact with the poison of the hindrances. 
For even a man who knows the lore of poisons and who is a perfect master of 
serpents does not take a serpent on his lap and quietly go to sleep. This 
mastery, on the other hand, from which all intermixture with objects has been 
removed, since [in it] there is no distrust, is called complete, as he says, not 
as in the case of the subjugation of the other organs.^ Although, in the case of 
consciousness of endeavour [ii. 15], when one organ is subdued there is still 
need of another effort to conquer the other organs, yet, when the mind-stuff is 
restricted, there is no such need of further exertion in order to restrict the 
other senses. This is the meaning. 



1 ' One in which poison is lying ' according to the Gana on Panini vi. 3. 109. 



ii. 55] Book II. Means of Attainment or Sddhana [200 

Here in this Book he has taught the yoga of action and the hindrances to karma 
and the fruitions of karma; the painfulness of these [karmas] and also the 
[four] divisions : a group of five subjects appertaining to yoga. 



Of Patanjali's [Yoga-treatise] the Second Book, entitled Specifi- 
cation of the Means of Attainment. 



Of the Explanation of the Comment on Patanjali's [Yoga-treatise], whose 
Explanation is entitled Clarification of the Entities (Tattva-Vaigaradi), and 
which was composed by the Venerable Vacaspatimicra, the Second Book, 
called Specification of the Means of Attainment, is finished. 



BOOK THIRD 
SUPERNORMAL POWERS 



26 [*<> ] 



BOOK THIRD 

SUPERNORMAL POWERS 

The five indirect aids [to yoga] have been described. Fixed 
attention l is [now] to be described. 
1. Binding the mind- stuff to a place is fixed-attention. 
Binding of the mind-stuff, only in so far as it is a fluctuation, to 
the navel or to the heart-lotus or to the light within the head or 
to the tip of the nose or to the tip of the tongue or to other 2 places 
of the same kind or to an external object, this is fixed-attention. 

The First and Second Books described Concentration and the means thereto. In 
the Third Book the supernormal powers are to be described which are reasons 
for propagation of belief and which are favourable to this [concentration and 
its means]. These supernormal powers are to be accomplished by constraints 
(samyama). And constraint is the combination of fixed-attention and of con- 
templation and of concentration. So inasmuch as these [three] are the means of 
accomplishing the supernormal powers, we have here a mention of these three, 
in order to make known the particular quality of each as being direct aids to 
yoga and as contrasted with the five which are indirect aids. And with 
regard to these [three], fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration 
are in the relation of cause to effect, and the serial order 8 [of causes and 
effects] is specified. Therefore this order is followed in the order of the state- 
ments. Accordingly, fixed-attention is the first to be characterized. So he says 
1. Binding the mind-stuff to a place is fixed-attention. He describes a 
place belonging to one's self by the words to the navel. By the words 
Mother places of the same kind we must understand the palate and so forth. 
The binding is a relation. He describes an external place by the words <or 
to an external. > And with an external object the mind-stuff as such cannot 
have a relation. So it is said, Conly in so far as it is a fluctuation,^ in other 
words, only so far as it is a perception. On this point also there is a Purana, 4 
" Having mastered his breath by restraint of breath and his organs by with- 

1 See also ii.29 and 53. I. 356 (Kielhorn's ed.) and frequently. 

2 Compare Maitri Upan. vi. 20 and Garuda 4 Vishnu Pur. vi. 7. 45 and Naradlya Pur. 

Pur. ccxxvi. 21. lxvii. 21. 

8 Compare Patanjali : Mahabhasya I. 225 8 ; 



ii. 1 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [204 

drawal of the senses, he should make a localization of the mind-stuff upon some 
auspicious support." Auspicious supports are external, Hiranyagarbha and 
Vasava and Prajapati and so forth. And this has also been said, 1 "The incarnate 
form of the Exalted One leaves one without desire for any [other] support. 
This should be understood to be fixed-attention, when the mind-stuff is fixed 
upon this form. And what this incarnate form of Hari, on which one should 
ponder, let that be heard by thee, Kuler of Men. Fixed-attention is not 
possible without something on which to fix it. His face is calm, his eye like the 
lovely lotus petal, his cheek is beautiful, the expanse of his broad forehead is 
resplendent [with the light of thought], the charming ornament of the ear-ring 
is placed under the lobes of his ears which are equal in size, his neck is [marked 
with three lines] like a shell of the sea, his great broad chest is marked with 
the Qrivatsa, his belly has a deep navel and broken folds, he has eight long 
arms or, as Vishnu, four arms, his thighs and legs are evenly placed, his excel- 
lent 2 lotus feet [are arranged] as a mystic diagram. He is like Brahma with a 
stainless yellow garment, and is adorned with a diadem and with charming 
armlets and bracelets ; he has Qarnga [Vishnu's bow] and the discus and the 
mace and the sword and the conch and the rosary upon him, Vishnu, let 
the yogin ponder ; and, lost in him, concentrate his own mind until, 
King, the fixed-attention becomes firmly fixed upon him only. While per- 
forming this or while doing, as he wills, some other action wherein his mind 
does not wander, he should then deem this [fixed-attention] to be perfected." 



2. Focusedness of the presented idea upon that place is 
contemplation. 

The focusedness of the presented idea upon the object to be 
contemplated 3 in that place, in other words, the stream [of presented 
ideas] of like quality unaffected by any other presented idea. 

He characterizes the contemplation which is to be effected by fixed-attention. 
2. Focusedness of the presented idea upon that place is contemplation. 
Focusedness is singleness-of-intent. The Comment is easy. On this point 
also there is a Purana, 4 "An uninterrupted succession of presented-ideas single- 
in-intent upon His form without desire for anything else, that, King, is 
contemplation. It is brought about by the first six aids [to yoga]." 



3. This same [contemplation], shining forth [in conscious- 
ness] as the intended object and nothing more, and, as it 
were, emptied of itself, is concentration. 

When the contemplation only shines forth [in consciousness] in the 

1 Vishnu Pur. vi. 7. 77-85 and Naradiya 8 See Garuda Pur. ccxxxv. 28. 29. 

Pur. lxvii. 54-62. * Vishnu Pur. vi. 7. 89.' 

2 Reading vara, not kara. 



205] Contemplation and concentration [ iii. 4 

form of the object-to-be-contemplated and [so] is, as it were, empty 
of itself, in so far as it becomes identical with the presented-idea 
as such, then, by fusing [itself] with the nature of the object-to- 
be-contemplated, it is said to be concentration. 

He gives the characteristic of concentration which is to be attained by concen- 
tration [in the sutra] 8. This same [contemplation] .... concentration. 
He explains [the sutra] in the words, the contemplation only. The words 
shines forth [in consciousness] in the form of the object-to-be-contem- 
plated signify that it shines forth in the form of the object-to-be-contemplated 
and not in the form of the contemplation. That is why he says, Cempty. 
An objector asks, ' If it be empty, how could the object-to-be-contemplated 
appear ? ' In reply he says, as it were. He gives the reason for the same 
in the words, by fusing [itself] with the nature of the object-to-be-con- 
templated. On this point also there is a Purana, 1 " The knowing of this 
same [Vishnu] as he is when free from two-termed-relations (Jcalpana) is a 
completion of the contemplation by the central-organ, this is termed con- 
centration." A two-termed-relation (kalpana) is a distinction between the 
contemplation and the object-to-be-contemplated. Concentration is free from 
this. This is the meaning. Kecidhvaja after having described to Khandikya 
the eight aids to yoga, sums them up by saying, 2 "The soul (Jcsetrajna) has 
the means. Thinking is the means. It is inanimate. "When [thinking] has 
completed its task of release, it has done what it had to do and ceases." 



These same three, fixed-attention and contemplation and con- 
centration, in one are constraint. 
4. The three in one are constraint. 

When having a single object the three means are called constraint. 
So the technical term [now laid down] in this system for these 
three is constraint. 

These three, fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration, are used in 
many places [as one]. It would be laboured to enunciate [each time] their 
respective technical terms. So for brevity's sake he introduces a sutra 
which [lays down] a technical term (paribhdsa-sutra) by saying These same. 
4. The three in one are constraint. He explains [the sutra] by saying When 
having a single object. He removes a doubt as to whether [these three] 
are the [naturally] expressed meaning [of the word constraint] by saying 
for these three. The system (tantra) is that authoritative-book (gastra) 
by which yoga is systematized or expounded. In this system means in 

1 Vishnu Pur. vi. 7. 90 and Naradlya Pur. lxvii. 67. 

2 Vishnu Pur. vi. 7. 92 and Naradlya Pur. lxvii. 69. 



iii. 4 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [206 

what belongs to this [system]. And the passages [where the word] constraint 
[is used] are such as [iii. 16], "As a result of constraint upon the three 
mutations." 



5. As a result of mastering this constraint, there follows 
the shining forth of insight. 

As a result of mastering this constraint there follows the shining 
forth of concentrated insight. 1 Just in proportion as constraint 
enters the stable state, in that proportion the concentrated insight 
becomes clear. 

He mentions the result of success in constraint, for which the means-of- 
attainment is practice, by saying, 5. As a result of mastering this con- 
straint, there follows the shining forth of insight. The shining forth of 
insight is due to the fact that it remains in the clear stream of [the yogin who 
is] not overcome by other ideas. The Comment is easy. 



6. Its application is by stages. 

The application 2 of it, that is, the constraint is to that stage which 
is next the stage already mastered. For by overleaping the next 
stage without having first mastered the lower stage, [the yogin] 
does not gain constraint in the highest 3 stages. If he did not 
[gain that constraint], how could he gain the shining forth of 
insight ? Again, the constraint of one who by the grace of the 
Icvara has gained a higher stage does not apply to such things as 
the mind-stuff's thinking 4 in other persons who are on the lower 
stages. Why is this ? Since the purpose of this has been obtained 
from elsewhere. Yoga is itself the only spiritual guide [which can 
show] that this stage is next to that stage. How is this ? Because 
it has been said to be thus, 

By yoga, yoga must be known, 
Yoga increaseth yoga's store. 

He who for yoga care hath shown 
In yoga rests for evermore. 

1 See also i. 35, p. 80 4 ; i. 42, p. 88 2 ; i. 44, 2 A good illustration is found in Bhag. 
p. 94 s ; i. 49-51, pp. 100 7 , 101 2 . 5 , 102 2 , Pur. ii. 2, in which Visnu is adored 

103 s ; iv. 23, p. 308 5 . In this system jam- from his feet up to his smile. 

jna is psychological rather than ethical. s Compare ii. 27. * See iii. 19. 



207] Stages of concentration [ iii. 7 

But when applied, in what cases can this constraint have these results ? In 
reply he says, 6. Its application is by stages. The author of the Comment 
particularizes [the meaning of the word] stage by saying, of it. Its appli- 
cation is to that state as yet unmastered which is next to the stage [already] 
mastered. When the reflective concentration, whose object is coarse, is 
mastered by constraint, the [next] application of constraint is to super-reflective 
concentration which has not yet been mastered. When this too is mastered, 
the application [of the restraint] is to deliberative [concentration]. Similarly, 
[when this is mastered], the application is to super-deliberative [concentration]. 
Hence in the Purana, 1 when the balanced-state the object of which is coarse is 
perfected, then there is later introduced that concentration the object of which is 
subtile, in that the various weapons and ornaments are removed : " Then the 
wise man should ponder upon the serene form of the Exalted One, without its 
conch-shell and mace and discus and Cariiga, but having its string of beads. 
When the fixed-attention has become stable upon this form, then he should keep 
in mind the form without the ornaments, especially the diadem and the armlets. 
The wise man should make the god to have only one limb and [should think] 
1 1 am he \ Then after that he should devote himself to thought of ' I '." But 
why after having mastered a lower stage does he master a higher stage? 
[And] why is there not a reverse process ? In reply to this he says, ^without 
having first subjugated the lower stage, [the yogin] does not. For a man pro- 
ceeding to the Ganges from Cilahrada does not reach the Ganges unless he first 
get to the Meghavana. ^Again of one who by the grace of the Icvara has gained 
a higher staged why does he say this ? Because the purpose of this, the 
success in the higher stage which comes next, has been obtained from elsewhere, 
that is, from the devotion to the Icvara. For when an act has its action finished, 
then a means-of-attaining, which does not produce anything in particular, falls 
outside the function of [what can be called] a means. The objector says, ' This 
may be true. It is known in a general way {agamatah) what the different 
subordinated stages are. But how is there a knowledge of which comes after 
the other ? ' In reply to this he says, this staged Yoga which has been 
previously mastered is the reason for proceeding to the thinking of the yoga 
which comes after. This passage is to be understood by supposing that a state 
is equivalent to [a yoga which] contains a state. 



7. The three are direct aids in comparison with the previous 

[five]. 

The same three, fixed-attention and contemplation and concentra- 
tion, are direct aids to conscious concentration in comparison with 
the previous means, the five 2 beginning with the abstentions. 

1 Vishnu Pur. vi. 7. 86-88 and Naradiya Pur. lxvii. 63-65. 
8 Reading yamddibhyah pancabhyah. 



iii. 7 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhiiti [208 

But why is constraint applied in various places, and not the other five aids 
to yoga, although all without distinction are aids to yoga ? In reply he says, 
7. The three are direct aids in comparison with the previous [five]. These 
three means-of-attainment, inasmuch as their object is the same as [the object of 
the yoga] to be accomplished, are direct aids. But abstentions and the other 
[four] are not so. They are therefore indirect aids. These three means-of- 
attainment are direct aids only with reference to [yoga] conscious [of objects], 
but not to [yoga] not conscious [of an object]. For since [yoga] not conscious 
[of an object] is seedless [and has no object], it does not have the same object as 
these [three]. And since after these have been restricted for a long time, [uncon- 
scious yoga] arises subsequent to the higher passionlessness consisting in the 
undisturbed calm of perception, another name of which is the higher limit of 
conscious [yoga]. So he says, CThe same three. 



8. Even these [three] are indirect aids to seedless [concen- 
tration]. 

Even these, the three direct means-of-attainment, are indirect aids to 
seedless yoga. Why is this ? Since this latter occurs even when 
these are absent. 

8. Even these [three] are indirect aids to seedless [concentration]. Hence 
that which determines the relation of direct aid to this is sameness of objects and 
not a mere sequence. For this [sequence] in so far as it might exist in the case of 
devotion to the Icvara, which is an indirect aid, would make the application [of 
direct aid] too wide (vydbhicara). If this is established, even this over-wideness 
of the characterization which would include mere sequence could not apply to this 
[constraint]. Therefore it is still less probable that [this] constraint would be a 
direct aid to [concentration] not conscious [of an object]. To show that this is 
so it is said, Since this latter occurs even when these are absent. 



Now since during the restricted moments of the mind-stuff the 
changes of the aspects (guna) are unstable, 1 of what sort at those 
times is the mutation of the mind-stuff? 

9. When there is a becoming invisible of the subliminal- 
impression of emergence 2 and a becoming visible of the 

1 This again is apparently a portion of the p. 135" ; iii. 13, p.204 8 ; iv. 15, p. 298'. 

fragment of Paiicacikha quoted in Compare for use of word vrtta in the 

ii. 15 (p. 135" of theCalcutta text), to sense of 'behaviour' ii. 33, p. 177" 

be placed before fragment 11 of Garbe. (Calc. ed.). 

The phrase is also found at ii. 15, a Reading abhibhavaj>rddurbhScdu. 



209] Alternation of emergence and restriction [ iii. 9 

subliminal-impression of restriction, the mutation of re- 
striction is inseparably connected with mind-stuff in its 
period of restriction. 

The subliminal-impressions of emergence are external-aspects 
(dharma) of mind-stuff; since they do not consist of presented- 
ideas they are not restricted when presented-ideas are restricted. 
The subliminal-impressions of restriction are also external-aspects of 
mind-stuff. <When these two [states of mind-stuff] become visible 
or become invisibles [that is when] the subliminal-impressions of 
emergence are withdrawing and the subliminal-impressions of re- 
striction are being brought into place. The period of restriction is 
inseparably connected with the mind-stuff. Accordingly the muta- 
tion of restriction is this periodic alteration of subliminal-impressions 
of a single mind-stuff, because then the mind-stuff has nothing but 
subliminal-impressions, as has been explained [i. 18] with reference 
to the concentration of restriction. 

With the intent to give information here about the three mutations which are to 
be made use of in the sQtra [iii. 16], "As a result of constraint upon the three 
mutations," he asks, incidentally to the topic of seedless [concentration], Now? 
In the case of emergence and of yoga conscious [of objects], since there is an ex- 
perience of an accumulation of various very clear mutations, there has been no 
introduction of the question. But in the case of restriction the mutation is not 
experienced. Furthermore it cannot be said that because it is not experienced 
it does not exist. For inasmuch as mind-stuff is made up of three aspects 
(guna), and since also the changes of the aspects are unstable, an absence of 
mutation even for a moment is impossible. The answer to the question is the 
sutra 9. . . . emergence .... mutation of restriction .... In comparison with 
concentration unconscious [of any object] conscious concentration is emergence. 
Kestriction is that which restricts. It is the undisturbed calm 1 of perception 
[and it is also] the higher passionlessness. There is a becoming visible and a 
becoming invisible of these two subliminal impressions of emergence and the 
subliminal impression of restriction, that is to say, the becoming invisible of the 
subliminal-impression of emergence and the becoming visible of the subliminal- 
impression of restriction. The mind-stuff which is the substance in the period 
of restriction, that is, on the occasion of restriction, is inseparably connected with 

1 This does not refer to samadhi in general, is an undisturbed succession of clarified 

but only to the concentrated insight samskara. See also i. 18, p. 47 6 ; ii. 27, 

(prajhu) described in i. 47-48, which p. 166 s (Calc. ed.) ; also i. 51 and the 

is without influence from objects and sutras iii. 9-15. 
27 [h.o.i. it] 



iii. 9 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhilti [210 

both of these states. For the mind-stuff as substance, whether in the conscious 
or unconscious state, does not differ in itself in so far as subliminal impres- 
sions become visible or become invisible [within it]. An objector says, ' Just as 
later hindrances based upon undifferentiated-consciousness (fividya) cease when 
undifferentiated-consciousness ceases, and consequently there is no need of further 
special effort to repress them, so the subliminal-impressions based upon ideas of 
emergence may cease at the very moment of the cessation of the emergence. And 
therefore for the repression of them there should be no need of the subliminal- 
impressions of restriction.' With this in view he says, <KThe subliminal -impres- 
sions of emergence.^ The cessation of a cause in general is not a reason for the 
cessation of the effect. So that even if the weaver cease to be, there need be no 
cessation of the cloth. But with the cessation of that cause which is constitutive 
of the nature of the effect, there is a cessation of the effect. Now the other 
hindrances have been said to consist of undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyd). 
So with the cessation of that undifferentiated-consciousness it is right that these 
[hindrances] should cease. But the subliminal-impressions whose essence is 
presented-ideas are not such. For even if the idea be restricted for a long time, 
we observe a connecting recollection at the present time. Therefore even if the 
presented-ideas are repressed (nivrtti), still an accumulation of subliminal-impres- 
sions of restriction must be resorted to in order to repress these [subliminal- 
impressions from presented-ideas]. This is the meaning. The rest is easy. 



10. This 1 [mind-stuff] flows peacefully by reason of the 
subliminal-impression. 

By reason of the subliminal-impression of restriction, the peaceful 
flow of the mind-stuff requires dexterity in the application of the 
subliminal-impressions of restriction. When these 2 subliminal- 
impressions become weak, the subliminal-impression which has 
external aspects of restriction is overwhelmed by the subliminal- 
impression which has external aspects of emergence. 

But if there be an overwhelming (abhibhava) of the emergent subliminal -impres- 
sions in all respects, of what sort is the mutation with a powerful subliminal- 
impression of restriction? In reply to this he says, 10. This [mind-stuff] 
flows peacefully by reason of the subliminal-impression. Calm flowing is a 
flowing of a succession of restrictions only undefiled by the subliminal impres- 
sions of emergence. Why is dexterity of subliminal impressions needed, but 
not ordinary subliminal-impressions ? In answer to this he says, When these 

1 The sutra is an instance of dharma- nirodha. If the variant nabhibhuyate 

parinama, as explained in the Com- be accepted, tat must refer, as Vaca- 

ment on iii. 13. spati points out, to vyutthana. 

a In the text as received, tat refers to 



211] Substantial and temporal singleness-of -intent [ iii. 12 

subliminal-impressions become weak.] The word these (tatty refers back to 
restriction. But those who have the reading ' are not overwhelmed ' would 
refer by the word ^these (tad-dty to emergence. 



11. The 1 mutation of concentration is the dwindling of 
dispersiveness and the uprisal of singleness-of-intent 
belonging to the mind- stuff. 

Dispersiveness 2 is an external-aspect of the mind-stuff. Single- 
ness-of-intent is an external-aspect of the mind-stuff. The 
dwindling of dispersiveness means that it disappears ; the uprisal 
of singleness-of-intent means that it becomes apparent. The 
mind-stuff is inseparably connected with both of these as the 
substance [in which they inhere]. This same mind-stuff being 
inseparably connected with these two external-aspects which 
belong to itself, the passing away [of the distributiveness] and 
the coming forth [of the singleness-of-intent], becomes concen- 
trated. This is the mutation of concentration. 

He shows what the state of the mind-stuff is in the mutation of concentration 
conscious [of objects]. 11. . . . dispersiveness .... mutation of concentration. 
Dispersiveness is distractedness. Being existent s it does not (san na) cease to 
be. Dwindling is disappearing. Because a non-existent does not arise [in con- 
sciousness], an uprisal is a becoming apparent. The mind-stuff which is insepar- 
ably connected with the passing away of dispersiveness and the coming forth 
of singleness-of-intent, which are its external-aspects the dispersiveness having 
the passing away and the singleness-of-intent having the coming forth this 
mind-stuff is concentrating itself, that is, is becoming qualified as having a 
concentration which is to be attained in successive steps. 



12. Then 4 again when the quiescent and the uprisen pre- 
sented ideas are similar 5 [in respect of having a single 
object], the mind-stuff has a mutation single-in-intent. 

The quiescent is a previous presented idea of one whose mind-stuff 
is concentrated ; the uprisen is a later presented-idea of the same 

1 The sutra is an instance of laksana- * According to the scheme of iii. 13 this 

parinama, as explained in iii. 13. would appear to be an instance of 

2 See iv. 23. avastha-parinnma. 

* If the reading be m na, the translation 5 The Maniprabha explains the word ' alike' 
would be simpler, 'It does not cease ifulya) by adding ekavisayatvena. 

to be.' 



v> 



iii. 12 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [212 

kind as this [previous presented-idea]. But the mind-stuff of 
concentration is likewise inseparably connected with both. This 
is so until the breaking down of the concentration. This same 
mutation of singleness-in-intent belongs to the mind-stuff in which 
it resides {dharminah). 

12. Then ... a mutation . . . Then again, that is, when the serial order of 
the states of concentration is completed, the quiescent and the uprisen [that is] 
the past and the present are similar-presented -ideas, that is, similar and presented- 
ideas. But the similarity is a result of the singleness-in -intent. The words 
of one whose mind-stuff is concentrated^ indicate that the concentration is 
completed. The words This is so) mean that it is single-in-intent. He tells 
what the limit of this is by saying Cuntil the breaking down of the concentra- 
tion [that is] until there is a falling [of the concentration]. 



13. Thus, with regard to elements and to organs, mutations 
of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity 
jf-r have been enumerated. 

<Thus 5 > by the already (iii. 9) described mutations of mind-stuff in 
jk*\ - external-aspect and in time- variation and in intensity. The muta- 

tion of external-aspect in elements and organs, the mutation of 
time- variation and the mutation of intensity are to be understood 
as having been described. Of these [three] the mutation of ex- 
ternal-aspect takes place in the substance and is the becoming 
invisible of the external aspect of emergence and the becoming 
visible of the external aspect of restriction. And the mutation 
of time-variation is the restriction having the three time- variations, 
[that is,] connected with the three time-forms (adhvan). This 
[restriction], one may say, puts aside the first time-form whose 
time-variation is yet to come, and passes into the present time- 
variation, without however passing out of its state as external- 
aspect. But in this [condition] it becomes manifest as being what 
it is. This is its second time-form. And it is not completely 
severed from past or from future time-variations. Likewise 
emergence has the three time- variations ; it is connected with the 
three time-forms. Having put aside the present time-variation it 
passes over into the past time-variation, without however passing 
out of its state as external-aspect. This is its third time-form. 



213] Three types of mutation [ iii. 13 

And it is not completely severed from the future and the present 
time-variations. In the same manner, emergence, completing itself 
again [as a phenomenalized form], having put aside the future time- 
variation, and not having passed out of its state as external-aspect, 
passes into the present time- variation. In which [time], since this 
[emergence] manifests itself as it is, it obtains its functional 
activity. This is the second time-form of this [emergence]. And 
it is not completely released from past and future time- variations. 
In the same way it continues, now restriction, now emergence. 
Similarly the mutation of intensity [is described]. In it, during 
the moments of restriction, the subliminal-impressions of restriction 
become powerful and the subliminal-impressions of emergence 
become weak. This then is the external-aspects' mutation of 
intensity. In these cases the substance has a mutation in its 
external-aspects ; the external-aspects have mutation in time-varia- 
tions ; and the time- variations also have mutation in intensities. 
Consequently the changes of the aspects (guna) do not remain, 
even for a moment, devoid of mutations of external-aspect and of 
time- variation and of intensity. For (ca) the changes of the aspects 
(guna) are unstable. 1 And we say [hereafter in this sutra] that it 
is of the very nature of the aspects to cause activity. Thus we 
have to understand the three-fold mutation [of external-aspect and 
of time-variation and of intensity] in the case of elements and 
organs, because there is the distinction between the substance and 
the external-aspects. But in the strict sense there is but a single 
mutation. For the external-aspect is nothing more than the sub- 
stance itself. Since it is merely an evolved form of the substance 
amplified in the form of an external-aspect. In such cases there 
is within the substance an alteration of the condition of the present 
external-aspect with regard to past and future and present time- 
forms. There is no alteration of the matter. Just as by dividing 
a plate of gold there is an alteration of its condition, in so far as it 
is altered ; [but] there is no alteration of the gold. An opponent 
objects as follows, 'A substance is nothing over and above the 

1 Once more this appears to be quoted from fragment 11 of Paiicacikha in its completer 
form. Compare above, p. 134, note, and p. 208, note. 



iii. 13 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhiiti [214 

external-aspects [which as properties depend upon it]. For [a sub- 
stance] cannot pass beyond its [own] previous existence. If, again, 
[substance] were a something present in all its external-aspects, but 
different from them, then it would come to be known 1 (viparivarteta) 
as a something itself absolutely unchanged, although connected 2 
with a series of changes [in the external-aspects].' But this, [he 
replies, involves] no weakness [in our position]. [And] why [not] ? 
Because we do not maintain an absolute 3 unity. [The fact is that 
all] this world passes out of the state of a phenomenalized 
[individual] form. 4 And this we say because [we are bound to] 
deny that [the world] is permanent [in the sense of not entering 
into mutations]. Again [the world of things] continues to exist 
even after it has passed out [of phenomenalized individual existence]. 
For [we are obliged] to deny its annihilation. On being refunded 
[into its primary cause by the dissolution of the coarse elements,] it 
[the world takes on] a subtile form. And by reason of this subtile 
form it becomes unapperceived. An external-aspect 5 in the 
mutation of time- variation exists really in [all three] time-forms. 
[It is said to be] past [that is] having the past time-variation, 
though not completely severed from future and present time- 
variations. [So too it is said to be] future [that is] having the 
future time- variation, though not completely severed from present 
and past time-variations. [So also it is said to be] present [that 
is] having a present time-variation, though not completely severed 
from past and future time-variations. Take the case of a man 
enamoured of one particular woman he has not thereby lost his 
sexual feeling for the rest of women-folk. Here the difficulty is 

1 Compare abhidhana-gakti-parivrtta iii. 17, Mahabhasya I. 180 s , 207 10 , 266 22 (Kiel- 

p. 223 1 (Calc. ed.). horn). 

2 The word viparivarteta implies a series * This vydkti is the condition of the thing 

of changes in some subordinate and when so changed as to be manifest to 

additional thing, or some added pro- our consciousness, that is, when we 

perty in the unchanged thing. Compare can observe the effects it brings about. 

parivartanam in Sarva-darcana-sarh- 6 In the Yoga system the dharma is real ; 

graha (Anandarama Sanskrit Series), in the Vedanta it is unreal (vivaria). 

page 8, line 8 from below. The dharma is constantly changing 

' This word is discussed in Patanjali : into another thing ; but involves the 

concept of permanence. . 



215] External-aspect, time-variation, intensity [ iii. 13 

brought forward by others ' that since all three time-variations are 
[thus said to be] connected with everything that is in the mutation 
of time- variation, it must follow (prdpnoti) that the time-forms are 
confounded.' We meet this objection thus (tasya parihdra). What 
is termed the common nature of things as external-aspects cannot 
be brought into existence [at our pleasure]. The common nature 
[as external aspect] exists [independently] and therefore in regard 
to it the distinctions of time-variations must be maintained. Thus 
it must not be said that the common nature of this or that thing 
exists only in the present time. Because if this were so, the mind- 
stuff could never become subject to passion [for a certain object]. 
For anger [against some other object being by supposition now 
present in the mind-stuff], desire would not move actively forth. 
Moreover it is not possible for the three time-variations to belong 
simultaneously to one and the same [individual] phenomenalized 
form. But what is possible is the presentation {bhdva) in successive 
times of its phenomenal x [form] by the operation of the conditions- 
which-phenomenalize (vyanjaka) it. Thus it has been said, 2 " The 
[outer] forms [when developed to] a high degree and the [inner] 
fluctuations [when developed to] a high degree oppose each other ; 
but the generic forms co-operate with [these when developed to] 
a high degree." Hence [time-variations] are not confounded. To 
take an example. When we say absolutely (eva) that passion for 
a certain thing has shown itself, [we do not mean] that at that 
time [passion] for another object is non-existent ; [but we mean 
that passion for another object] continues to be present [in the 
mind-stuff] though in a generic [unphenomenalized] form. Hence it 
[the passion] for that [other object] exists at that time (tada tatra 
tasya bhdva). A similar [explanation can be given] in the case of 
time-variation [also]. The three time-forms do not belong to the 
substance but to the external-aspects. These [external-aspects] 
have a time-variation or do not have a time-variation. And as 
entering into various intensities are known by different names 
[which imply] an alteration of intensity but not of matter. Thus 

1 Compare i. 11, p. 37 3 (Calc. ed.). 

2 Compare ii. 15, p. 136 1 (Calc. ed.) and the parallels given there. 



iii. 13 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [216 

the same stroke is termed one l in the unifc-place and ten in the 
ten's place and a hundred in the hundred's place. So too the same 
woman is called a mother and a daughter and a sister. Some 
persons have objected ' that in the case of a thing which mutates in 
intensity [the substance of the thing] must logically be held to be 
(prasanga) absolutely permanent. How is this ? On the ground 
that it is functional activity 2 of the thing which determines the 
[special] time-form of the thing. Thus a thing is said to be a future 
thing when it is not exerting its own activity, and a present thing 
when it is thus active, and a past thing when it has ceased from 
activity. Hence, say these persons, it follows that substance and 
external-aspect and time-variation and intensity are all absolutely 
permanent.' But that [alleged] weakness, [we say], does not exist 
[in our position] ; for we hold that although a substrate (gunin) is 
permanent, its aspects (guna) suffer a variety of antagonisms. 
Just as any arrangement of parts, (samsthdna) [which are coarse 
elements,] is only an external-aspect of the imperishable subtile 
elements, sound and the rest, and has a beginning and an end, so 
the resoluble [into primary matter] is only an external-aspect of 
the imperishable aspects (guna), the sattva and the others, and 
has a beginning and an end, and to it [and to the rest] the term 
evolved-form (vikdra) is applied. The following serves as an 
illustration. 1 . The substance clay passes from its external-aspect 
in the form of a round lump of clay into another external -aspect. 
And thus as an external-aspect enters into mutation in the 
form of a water-jar. 2. The water-jar-form putting aside its future 
time-variation assumes its present time-variation ; here is the 
mutation as time- variation. 3. The water-jar is every moment 
undergoing oldness and newness [in its parts] and thus passes 
through mutations of intensity. Thus the substance also has 
another external-aspect, which is, the intensity ; and the external- 

1 Contrary to Mr. G. R. Kaye's opinion the Mihira (born 505 near Ujjain) in his 

following passages show that the place- Pancasiddhantika (ed. Thibaut, 1889), 

system of decimals was known as early p. xxx. 

as thesixth century a.d. SeeAryabhata 2 The point is that the thing is neither 

(born 476 a.d.) in his Aryabhatiya produced nor destroyed, but is its 

(ed. Kern, 1874), p. x and S*> 6 ; Varaha activity. 



217] One ultimate type of mutation [ iii. 13 

aspect has also another time-variation, which is, the intensity. 
There is therefore only one [kind of a] mutation of matter, though 
variously described [by us]. The same explanation is applicable 
to other things 1 also. The mutations of external-aspect and of 
time- variation and of intensity [as here described] do not transcend 
the substance 2 as such. Hence there is only one kind of a muta- 
tion which includes all those varieties we have described. 3 What 
then is a mutation ? It is the rise of another external-aspect in 
a permanent matter after an earlier external-aspect has been 
repressed. 

As being relevant to the discussion and as being useful to further discussion 
he gives the divisions of the mutations of elements and of organs in the sutra 
13. Thus . . . enumerated. He explains [the sutra] by saying Thus. An 
objector asks, 'It is only the mind-stuff that has been described as being in 
mutation, not its various kinds, the mutation of external-aspect and of time- 
variation and of intensity. So how can this [that has been said] be extended 
by analogy 4 to these latter ? ' In reply to this he says, of emergence and of 
restriction. 2> Although the words external-aspect and time-variation and inten- 
sity have not been previously mentioned, it is not however true that the mutations 
of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity have not been described. 
This is the point in brief. To continue. The mutation of external-aspect has 
been described in the words of this sutra [iii. 9], "subliminal-impression 
of emergence . . . subliminal-impression of restriction." And in showing this 
mutation of external-aspect, he has at the same time indicated the mutation of 
time-variation, which has its locus in the external-aspect, as he says in the 
words, <the mutation of time-variation.^ A time-variation (laksana) is that 
by which a kind of time is characterized. For, characterized by this, a thing is 
distinguished from other things with other times connected with them. The 
expression, the restriction having three time-variations has its explanation 
in the words ^connected with the three time-forms. The word time-form 
is an expression for time. This [restriction], one may say, puts aside the first 
time-form whose time-variation is yet to come. Does it then go beyond its 
state as an external-aspect possessing a time-form? No, he says. ^Without 
however passing out of its state as external-aspect. That very mutation which 
was yet to come is now present ; but the restriction [which was yet to come] 

1 This would apply to the whole Koa-fios. upon the dharmin which remains un- 

8 The mutations do not differ from the changed amid change. 

substance, but are the conditions for * The words atidega, anudega, and adega are 

the self-identity of the substance. discussed in Patanjali's Mahabhasya 

3 For the reason that all change depends on i. 1. 56, vart. 1, p. 133 foot (Kiel- 
horn's ed.). 
28 [h-o.s. n] 



iii. 13 J Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [218 

does not [now] cease to be a restriction. This is the meaning. Now comes his 
explanation of the present in the words in which condition it becomes manifest 
as being what it is^ in other words, in its nature ! as producing certain effects 
peculiar to it. A manifestation^ is a moving actively forth. This is its 
second time-form as compared to its first time-form which was yet to come. 
An objector says, ' This may be so. But if one has reached the present after 
having put aside the future time-form, and after having put aside this [present] he 
is to reach the past, then Sir, there would be a creation and destruction of [these] 
time-forms. And this is not a desired result. For nothing is made to grow out 
of a non-existent, nor is an existent ever destroyed.' In reply to this he says 
^C And it is not.^ The meaning is that he is not disconnected from the future 
and the past time-forms, inasmuch as they persist in their generic form. Having 
shown that the future restriction has a present time-variation, he shows that the 
present emergence has a past, its third form, by saying, Cln the same way, 
emergence. So then is the restriction alone future, and is the emergence not 
[future] ? No. As he says, In the same manner, now emergence.^ So there 
is a re-existence as regards the generic form of emergence, but not as regards the 
[individual] phenomenalized form. For the past does not exist again. Manifesta- 
tion of itself, as it is, is the same as the fact that that which is able to produce 
effects becomes visible. This mutation of time-variation, as described, recurs again 
and again in things of this kind, as he says, Cln the same way . . now.^ He 
describes the mutation of intensity, which has only been pointed out by the 
mutation of external-aspect, by saying, ^Similarly, . . . intensity.^ In the case 
of external-aspects, the time-form of which is present, the intensity is equiva- 
lent to the presence or absence of power. And the mutation is the gradation of 
this [intensity] from moment to moment. He concludes this discussion by 
the words In these cases. He specifies the various mutations as having a 
variety of relations 2 in accordance 3 with the teaching of the system, as he says 
ln these cases the substance.^ Then is this mutation of the aspects (guna) 
occasional ? The reply is, No. As he says ^Consequently.^ But why is this 
mutation perpetual? In reply he says For (ca) . . . unstable.^ The word 
For (ca)^ is in the sense of cause. The Cchanges are the behaviour (pracara). 
Why is it just so ? In reply he says Cthat which constitutes the aspects (guna).^ 
Is said to be later in this same [sutra]. So this three-fold mutation of mind- 
stuff also is expounded by the author of the sutras with regard to elements and 
organs as he says Thus. This three-fold mutation is the result of the distinc- 
tion between substance and external-aspects ; it is based upon the distinction 
between the substance and the external-aspects. So we have (tatra) a mutation 

1 The thing is what it is (rdfie t) because is a thing in relation. 

the mutation is fulfilling a purpose. Eeferring to the Paiicacikha's calam ca 

This is the essence of any individual gunavrttam, which is not, however, 

form. here expressly attributed to him. Com- 

2 A sambandha is a relation ; a sambandhin pare p. 213, note 1. 



219] Substances and external-aspects contrasted [ iii. 13 

such as a cow or a water-jar as an external -aspect of the substances earth and 
Other elements. And the external-aspects have mutations of time-variation such 
as past and future and present. Again the cow or other [animal] changed into 
its present time- variation has mutations of intensity, such as childhood and boy- 
hood and youth and old age. And the water-jar or other [thing] has its mutation of 
intensity, such as newness or oldness. Similarly organs, which are substances, 
have external aspects, which are the seeing of blue or of other colours. The 
external aspect has the present and the other time-variations. The time-variation 
which has the seeing of a jewel or some other [thing] has a mutation of intensity, 
such as the clearness or lack of clearness [of the seeing]. This mutation, thus 
described, of elements and of organs, is to be understood as being based upon 
the distinction between the substance and its external-aspects and time-variations 
and intensities. But as referring to the lack of distinction between them, it is 
mentioned when he says ^But in the strict sense. /> The word but) differen- 
tiates this from the view that they are distinct. The absolute reality of this 
[mutation] is asserted, but [the absolute reality] of the other [three-fold] muta- 
tion is not denied. Why ? CFor the external-aspect is nothing more than the 
substance itself.^ An objector says, ' If the external-aspect is merely an evolved 
form of the substance, how then should the idea prevail in the world that there 
is no confusion in the case of these [three] mutations ? ' In reply to this he says, 
in the form of an external-aspect. The word external-aspect is here equiva- 
lent to external-aspect and to time- variation and to intensity. It is the substance 
that enters into evolved-forms through the medium of these. So the [evolved - 
form] is one and is also not confused with [another]. Because [the 
external-aspects] the medium of this [substance], although not distinct from the 
substance, are not confused with each other. An objector says, ' If the external- 
aspects are not distinct from the substance, and if the time-forms of the substance 
are distinct, then since the external-aspects are not different from the substance, 
the external-aspects would be like a substance.' To which he replies, In 
such cases ... of the . . . external-aspect.^ The state means a particular 
arrangement-of-parts. 1 Just as a plate of gold 2 or of some other substance 
may receive a particular name and [be called] a necklace or a svastika, [so] there 
is an alteration only as [concerns the form of the ornaments], but the matter 
gold does not become something not gold, because there is no absolute distinction 
[between the substance and the external-aspect]. This is the intention of what 
he is about to say. He brings forward a Buddhist, who holds the doctrine of 
the absolute unity [of substance and of external-aspect], by saying, An opponent 
objects as follows. ' For the necklace and other things thus coming into 
existence are external -aspects only and are real in the strict sense. But there is 
no such thing called "gold", some one thing present in many external-aspects [and 
yet different from them]. But if it be assumed that the matter persists even in 

1 Compare i. 43, p. 90 1 (Calc. ed.) and the parallels given there. 

2 See ii. 28, p. 170 2 (Calc. ed.). 



iii. 13 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [220 

the external-aspects which are ceasing to be, then [the matter], like the Power 
of Intellect (citi), would not enter into mutations, but would continue existing 
absolutely unchanged. The continued existence in another form means the 
throwing away of its own form as consisting of mutations and the exchange of 
this for another, the absolutely changeless. Just as the Power of Intellect (citi), 
although the aspects divide themselves into one alteration after another, does 
not relapse from its own self and remains absolutely unchanged, so likewise 
gold, &c, would remain absolutely unchanged, a proposition which you do not 
admit. So matter is something not different from its external-aspects.' This ob- 
jection he refutes by saying this, [he replies, involves] no weakness.^ Why? 
^Because we do not maintain an absolute unity. Had we to admit the absolute 
permanence of matter, as of the Power of Intellect l (citi), then we should have 
lain open to this taunt We, however, do not take our stand upon the doctrine 
of absolute permanence. On the contrary, we say that all these three worlds, 
and not merely matter, pass out of their phenomenalized individual forms, as pro- 
ducing effects fulfilling a purpose. Why ? CFor [we are bound to] deny that 
[the world] is permanent,^ on the ground of a source-of-valid-ideas. For if the 
water-jar were not to pass out of its [individual] phenomenalized form, then even 
though reduced to the condition of potsherds or of broken bits, it would be as 
before clearly apperceived as a water-jar and it would have to fulfil the purposes 
[of a water-jar]. [But this cannot be.] Consequently the three worlds are not 
permanent. ' Very well then, suppose that [the jar] does not exist permanently 
in so far as it is not apperceived and does not fulfil the purposes of a water-jar, 
because like the sky-lotus it is illusory (tuccha).' In reply to this he says, even 
after it has passed out.^ It is not absolutely illusory existence, so that it would 
be absolutely impermanent. Why? Because [we are obliged] to deny its 
annihilation, on the ground of a source-of-valid-ideas. To explain. Whatever is 
illusory existence, cannot be apperceived or produce effects, quite as in the case 
of the sky-lotus. Whereas these three worlds are from time to time apperceived 
and do produce effects, [and so are not absolutely illusory existences]. Similarly 
we should cite as illustrations proving existence (sattvahctu) (a) capacity for rising 
into consciousness, (b) materiality, (c) fitness for external-aspects and time-varia- 
tions and intensities and others, [which proofs] are wanting in the case of the 
sky-lotus or the man's horns, which are absolutely illusory existences. Similarly 
[the jar] is not absolutely permanent so that it would be absolutely permanent like 
the Power of Intellect (citi), but on the contrary it is [only] in some respects 
permanent. And thus it is established that it enters into mutations. So we 
must understand that, in the states of the lump of clay and of the following 
states, the effects such as the water-jar, which are yet to come, have an existence. 
The objector says, ' This may be true. But if an effect even after it has passed 
out [of individual phenomenalized existence] exists, why is it not apperceived ? 
The reply is, On being refunded.^ Refunded [that is] resolved into its own 

1 Reading citi$akter. 



221] Simultaneity of contrary qualities [ iii. 13 

cause. A subtile form [that is] one not capable of being seen. And hence 
there is no apperception of it. Having thus substantiated the mutation of 
externa] -aspect, he substantiates the mutation of time-variation also, in so far as 
they are inseparably connected with each other, by saying, !in the mutation of 
time-variation. The meaning is that each time-variation is inseparably con- 
nected with the two others. The objector says, ' When one time -variation is in 
connexion, other time-variations are not perceived. How then [are these] connected 
with the former ? ' In reply he says, Take the case of a man. For an absence 
of experience does not do away with that which is established by the source-of-a- 
valid-idea. For the very fact that this [time-variation] has been made to rise 
[in consciousness], is the source-of-the-valid-idea for the real existence of these 
[other time-variations], because a non-existent thing, such as a man's horns, 
cannot be made to rise in consciousness. He sets up the objection uttered by 
another when he says, CHere ... in the mutation of time-variation. ' If when 
an external-aspect is present, it is at the same time past and future, then all the 
three time-forms would be confounded. And if the time-forms are to be in 
successive times, then it would follow that the production of the non-existent 
[becomes possible].' He meets the objection with the words, We meet this 
objection thus. For the existence of external-aspects in the present only 
is established by experience. From this it follows that [external-aspects are] 
in relation to earlier and to later time. [Why does it follow?] Because of 
course a non-existent does not come into being, nor is an existent annihilated, 
as he says, ^Because if this were so, the mind-stuff could never. For the 
mind-stuff at a time following after anger, is experienced as having the external- 
aspect of passion. And if passion did not exist at the time of anger, in so far as 
[passion] was [at that time] future, how then could [passion] rise into conscious- 
ness ? And if it should not rise in consciousness, how could it be experienced ? 
[The objector continues,] ' Even if this be granted, why would there not still be 
confusion of time-forms ? ' The question is [contained in the phrase,] ^Moreover 
it is not possible.^ ' What (Mm) cause is there for not confounding [the time- 
forms] ? ' And (ca) is used in the sense of ' but '. The answer is given in the 
words, the three. The three time-variations cannot possibly exist simul- 
taneously. In what? In one fluctuation of mind-stuff. But in successive 
times it is possible for each one of the time-variations to exist in its phenomenal 
[form] by the operation of the conditions which phenomenalize it [the time- 
variation]. Since the discussion of the time- variations depends upon the things- 
which-have-time-variations, therefore the time-variations, in so far as they have 
the form of the things-which-have-time-variations, belong to [or have the same 
nature as (tad-vattd)] these, that is, the things-which-have-time-variations. 
On this same point he states his concurrence of opinion with Pancacikha 
the Master by saying it has been said. This has been explained 1 before. 
He brings the discussion to a close by the word Hence. The time-forms are 

1 ii. 15, p. 135" (Calc. ed.). 



iii. 13 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhilti [222 

not confounded in so far as external-aspects which are opposed to each other, for 
instance, those that have become visible and those that have become invisible, 
are refunded into [their own causes]. He gives an illustration in the words 4CTo 
take an example. y> Previously it was shown that anger must be thought to be 
in relation with passion. Now a passion referring to one object is shown to 
be in relation to a passion referring to another object. He takes up the subject 
referred to in the illustration by saying, CA similar [explanation] in the case of 
time-variation.^ An objector says, ' Even when it is assumed that [the mutations] 
are not absolutely distinct, the distinction may yet exist. So when the external- 
aspect or the time-variation or the intensity alters, the substance, in that it is not 
distinct from them, should also alter. And it is just this that we do not accept, 
because it is contrary to the experience that the [permanent] substance is in- 
separably connected [with its own states which are impermanent].' In reply to 
this he says, The three time-forms do not belong to the substance. ?> Because it 
is the external-aspects, which are distinct from it, that have the three time-forms. 
That it is the external-aspects which are connected with the three time-forms is 
made clear by the words, These [external -aspects ]. Have a time-variation^ 
means manifested [that is] present. CDo not have a time-variation^ means un- 
manifested [that is] future or past. Of these [two], those-that-have-a-time-varia- 
tion, when they attain to the various intensities, either to powerfulness or to 
weakness, are referred to as being different f from other intensities, but not from 
other matter. The word ^Cintensity^ is here used in the sense of external- 
aspect and of time- variation and of intensity. What he means to say is this : 
Now it is experience alone which determines the difference or the absence of 
difference between the substance and the external-aspects and the other [muta- 
tions]. Since the external -aspects and the rest are not absolutely identical with 
the substance, to the extent that the common nature of the external-aspect and 
of the other [mutations] should have the form of the substance. Nor is there 
absolute difference, to the extent that the common nature of external- aspects 
should be [as different as] horses and cows. Experience moreover although 
not establishing the fact that there is absolute [identity or difference], does 
show the substance as one 2 and as persisting in the external-aspects and other 
[mutations] which have the quality of coming into and of passing out of experience, 
and it does exclude the external-aspects from each other. [All] this is experienced 
by every one. So we conform ourselves to this experience. We are not at 
liberty to throw it away, and to dispose of the experiences of the external-aspects 
as we like. On this same point he gives an example from ordinary life in the 
words, Thus the same stroke.^ Just as the stroke, which in itself is precisely 
the same, in relation to the various positions is called a hundred and other 
names, so the substance, which in itself is precisely the same, is repeatedly 
given a name in accordance with the alteration of its external-aspect and its 

1 Reading anyatvena. 

2 Thus the bauddha theory p. 205 4 (Calc. ed.) is partially conceded. 



223] The Self does not pass through mutations [ iii. 13 

time-variation and its intensity. This is the meaning. To illustrate the matter 
he gives another simile in the words, CSo too the same woman.)) At this point 
he raises an objection, made by an opponent, by saying, intensity. When 
there is a mutation of intensity, [that is] a mutation of external-aspect and of 
time-variation and of intensity, one would be involved in a fault with regard to 
the absolute [permanence] of the substance and of the external-aspect and of the 
time-variation and of the intensity. He asks, <How ?^ [The objector] gives the 
answer in the words, On the ground that the functional-activity . . . the time- 
form.^ For we can see that the functional-activity of that which is future in its 
time-form as belonging to curds is present as belonging to milk, because [the 
functional activity of the future] is shut off by this [functional-activity of the 
present]. For this reason when the external-aspect which has the time-variation 
(laksana) of the curds, although existent in the milk, does not exert its own 
functional-activity, then the undertaking of the business [of the effects to be 
accomplished] by curdling and the other [changes], is called future. And it is 
called present when it is thus active ; and past when it has done the business 
of curdling and the other [changes] and stopped. To this extent then it 
must follow that the substance and the external-aspects and the time-variations 
and the intensities, although persisting in all three times, are absolutely [per- 
manent]. For permanence is existence at all times. And in [these] four cases, 
whether they exist at all times or do not exist [at all times], there is no produc- 
tion. 1 This much only is the time- variation (laksana) of the absolutely permanent. 
And in the case of the Power of Intellect (citi-gakti) also, which is absolutely 
permanent, there is no other special feature. This is the point. He meets the 
objection in the words But that [alleged] weakness does not exists There is 
no weakness there. Why ? Because although the substrate (gunin) is permanent, 
the aspects (guna) suffer antagonisms, 2 the one of [the aspects] being capable of 
being overcome and the others of overcoming. This is their variety. What he 
means to say is this : Although there is existence at all times in the case of all 
four, still, in so far as there is a variety in the antagonisms of the aspects {guna), 
in that the various evolved-forms of which this [variety] consists become visible 
or invisible, and in so far as they enter into mutations, there is no absolute 
[permanence]. Whereas in the case of the Power of Intellect (citi-gakti) there is 
no becoming visible or becoming invisible of evolved-forms which belong to itself. 
Thus [this] is absolutely permanent. As they say, 3 " The learned call that perma- 
nent the nature of which does not perish." That this variety of antagonisms is 
the cause of the variety of the evolved forms in the case of both the evolving- 
substance and the evolved-substance is shown by the words, CJust as. Just 

1 If it is to exist at all times, then, like the a This word vimarda occurs once only in the 
citigakti, it could not be produced. Or Bhasya. But Vacaspati uses it four 

if it is not to exist at any time, then, times besides this, i. 2, p. II 2 ; iii. 13, 

like the horns of a man, it could not pp. 209 15 , 210 2 > 8 (Calc. ed.). 

be produced. This is Balarama's gloss. 3 Compare MBh. xii. 318. 102 (= 11826). 



iii. 13 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhicti [224 

as the arrangement of parts, 1 as distinguished (laTcsana) hy heing a mutation of 
earth and of other [coarse elements], is itself merely an external aspect and has a 
beginning and an end, in that it becomes invisible, [so] ^soundand the rest,^ 
the subtile elements sound and touch and colour and taste and smell, are not 
perishable as compared with their own products, and do not, like them, become 
invisible. He shows how this is in the case of the evolving-matter by the 
words, ^Cso the resoluble.^ ^CTo it the term evolved-form {vikara) is applied.^ 
But the Power of Thought (citi-^aliti) is not subject to this kind of evolution of 
form. This is the point. Having thus taken up by way of illustration both 
the evolved-matter and the evolving-cause, which are well enough known to 
thinking persons, he takes up in the case of the evolved-matter only, which is 
well enough known to the popular [mindl, the variety of the antagonisms of the 
aspects (guna) which leads to variety in the mutations of external-aspect and of 
time-variation and of intensity, by saying, CThe following serves as an illustra- 
tion.^- There is no necessity that the mutation of intensity should belong to 
time-variations only. For all [three], external -aspect and time-variation and 
intensity, are expressed by the word ' intensity \ Therefore the one [kind of] 
mutation is intensity which is common to all. Accordingly he says, Thus the 
substance only. He gives the distinguishing-characteristic of the mutation 
which includes [all] by saying, in a permanent.^ The word 'external-aspect' 
is an expression for external-aspect and for time-variation and for intensity, in 
so far as it is that in which they inhere. 



Among these [mutations], 

14. A substance conforms itself to quiescent and uprisen 
and indeterminable external-aspects. 

An external aspect 2 is [to speak precisely] only a power of the 
substance as limited by its pre-established harmony 3 [with regard 
to effects]. And it is known as an actual existence, of which the 
existence is inferred by the kind of effect which it generates, as 

1 Vacaspati uses samsthana as the equiva- 8 The same entity, regarded from the side 

lent to sathnive$a iii. 26, p. 238 7 , and iv. of permanence, is a mutation {pari- 

13, p. 291 8 . It is applied only to collec- nama) ; from the side of change is an 

tions of mahabhuta ; and is sometimes external aspect. 

not different from external fovm (murti), s The word yogyata is used in the sutra 

iii. 53, p. 272 1 , and iii. 13, p. 210 8 ; or ii. 53. The word yogyatva is in the 

again, the parts of grains, iii. 13, sutra ii. 41 and in the Bhasya, p. 182 11 

p. 205 4 , iii. 15, p. 216 3 ; or the parts of (Calc. ed.). Vacaspati uses it five 

words, iii. 17, p. 222 12 ; or of the limbs times : ii. 6, p. 116 5 ; ii. 23, p. 157 ; 

of birds, ii. 46, p. 185 10 . See also ii. 28, ii. 32, p. 176 10 ; iii. 14, p. 21 1 10 ". 
p. 170", and iii. 26, p. 239 8 (Calc. ed.). 



225] The three states of substance [ iiL 14 

one or another [form] of the single [substance]. Of these [forms] 
that is called present, if it be that the external-aspect is passing 
through [the state] of its peculiar functional-activity. This is different 
from the other external-aspects both the quiescent and the indeter- 
minable [states]. But when it has rejoined its general [or latent] 
form, then how could that external-aspect be distinguished from 
any other, since it is then of the very nature of the substance itself? 
There are, as every one knows, three of these external-aspects 
within the substance, the quiescent and the uprisen and the indeter- 
minable. Of these the quiescent are those that have come to rest by 
finishing their functional-activity. The uprisen are those in active 
function ; and these [uprisen] are immediately-contiguous (sam- 
anantara) to the future time- variation. While the past come after 
the present. Why do not the present come after the past ? Because 
there is no relation of antecedent and consequent [between them]. 
The relation of antecedent and consequent in the case of the future 
and the present l is not the same as [this relation] in the case of the 
past 2 [and of the present]. Therefore there is [no later external- 
aspect] immediately contiguous to the past. Consequently the 
future only is immediately contiguous [as being antecedent] to the 
present. Now the indeterminable [external-aspects], what are 
they? Everything containing the essence of everything. Upon 
which it has been said, " That which in the various forms 3 of taste 
and other [subtile elements] contains the mutations of [the coarse 
elements of] water and of earth is found in plants ; likewise [that 
which is mutable] in plants is found in animals, and of animals in 
plants." In this sense, in so far as the common nature is not 
destroyed, we use the term ' everything contains the essence of 
everything.' Still, because of connexion with place and time and 
form 4 and cause, the external-aspects do not of course manifest 
themselves at the same time. 5 That which passes through a 

1 The Varttika says that this is pragabhava. crimination is made. The contrast 

2 In this case there is pragdhvansa. between the two is similar to the 

3 Compare Vacaspati's quotation iv. 13, Cartesian use of clear ' and ' distinct.' 

p. 291 6 from the Vayu Pur. ; and also 5 The Bikaner MS. and the text of Bodas 
Yogavasista, Utpattiprakarana 78. (Bom. Sanskrit Ser.), p. 134 3 , both read 

4 The word rupa is used for colour and form ; upabandhat. 

the word ukara for form when a dis- 
29 [h.o.s. n] 



iii. 14 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhilti [226 

succession of these external-aspects, whether manifested or unmani- 
fested, and which has as its essence the generic form and the 
particular, 1 and which is present- in -all-but-different-from-them 2 
(anvayin), that is a substance. But the [Yogacara] who holds 
that this world is nothing but external-aspects without [a sub- 
stance] present-in-all-but-different-from-them, for him there would 
be no experience. Why would this be so ? [The reply is,] how 
could one consciousness of a subject-of-experience (bhokrtvena) be 
held responsible for a deed done by another consciousness ? And 
there would also be no memory of this [consciousness]. For there is 
no such thing as recollection by one consciousness of something seen 
by another [consciousness]. And it is the substance permanently 
present-in-all-but-different-from-them which, upon the recognition 
of a thing is recognized as participating in the alteration of the 
external-aspect. Consequently it is not true that [this world] is 
nothing more than external-aspects without [a substance] present- 
in-all-but-different-from-them. 

He gives the distinguishing-characteristic of this substance to which the three- 
fold mutation belongs by the sutra. 14. Among these [mutations] a substance 
conforms itself to quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable external- 
aspects. A substance (dharmin) is a thing that has external-aspects (dharma). 
And because, unless one knows the external-aspects, one cannot know the 
substance, he makes known what the external-aspect is in the word pre- 
established-harmony. The substance^ means a material object such as clay. 
Only a power [that is] the power of producing the dust and the lump of 
clay and the water-jar. This is the external-aspect, 3 in so far as these are 
contained in this [substance] in an unphenomenalized state. This is the point. 
An objector says, ' In so far as these exist therein in an unphenomenalized state 
they may become visible from within it, but how can the capacity to fetch 
water [in the jar] and similar [purposeful acts], which could not have been got out 
of their cause [the clay], be obtained by them [that is, the finished products] ? ' 
In reply to this he says, as limited by its pre-established -harmony.S> The 
power to produce the water-jar is defined as being pre-established-harmony for 
things which fetch water. Hence the power to fetch water and the other 
[purposeful] acts are also obtained by the water-jars and other things from their 
own cause only. Thus [the capacity to fetch water] is not accidental [with 

1 Compare i. 7, p. 21 4 , and iii. 44, p. 257 2 2 See also i. 45, p. 96 4 ; iii. 13, p. 205 5 ; 
(Calc. ed.). iii. 44, p. 257 6 (Calc. ed.). 

3 Reading dharmah. 



227] Past and present and future [ iii. 14 

regard to the substance]. This is the point. There is another interpretation. 
One might be asked, ' What are substances? ' The reply is, of the substance 
as limited by its pre-established-harmony.^ One might be asked, ' What is 
an external-aspect ? ' The reply is, An external-aspect is only a power. 1 ^ 
The meaning is that an external-aspect is only a pre-established -harmony 
belonging to these [substances]. Hence it is proven that the thing which has 
this [external -aspect] is the substance. Thus it becomes clear. He describes 
the source-of-the-valid-idea [which proves] the real existence of these [external, 
aspects] in the words, And it ... is inferred by the kind of effect which it 
generates.^ Of the single substance in one or another form as dust or as a 
lump of clay or as a water-jar. This is the meaning. And it differs because 
there are evidently different effects. This is another way of putting it (iti 
yavat). It is observed [or] apperceived. With regard to these [external-aspects] 
he describes the difference between the lump of clay, which strikes upon [the 
thinking substance of] experience and is present, and the quiescent state of the 
clay as dust, and the indeterminable state of the clay as water-jar by saying <SOf 
these [forms] that is called present.^ If there be no difference, then the dust 
and the water-jar would have their functional-activity co-extensive with that of 
the lump of clay. This is the point. But in the case of the unphenomenalized 
lump of clay, the establishment of the difference, as stated above, is impossible. 
[This] he says in the words, But when. What [then] is this [difference] ? 
By establishment of what difference will there be a differentiation ? Having 
thus mentioned that there is [this] establishment of a difference between the 
external-aspects, he analyses this difference in the words, CThere are, as every 
one knows. The word uprisen means present. He now deduces the 
priority and the sequence of the time-forms in the words, CAnd these.^ A 
question is raised in the words, Why does not ? ' For what reason does not 
the present come after the past ? ' This is the meaning. The reason is, There 
is no relation of antecedent and consequent [between them].^ By speaking of 
the object [that is, absence of antecedence and consequence] he indicates that 
which contains as its object [the absence of antecedence and consequence], 
that is to say, the non-apperception [of this object]. He shows what this same 
non-apperception is, in so far as its properties are opposite to those of appercep- 
tion, in the words, in the case of the future and the present.^ He brings the 
discussion to a close with the word, Consequently. Consequently (tat) 
means for this reason. The future only is immediately contiguous as being 
antecedent to the present ; but the past is not. The present is immediately 
contiguous to the past as being antecedent to it ; but the indeterminable is not. 
Therefore it is established that the youngest of the time-forms is the past. An 
objector says, " This may be true. The uprisen and the past may be surmised 

1 Compare the passage at the end of the intensified. It is an external-aspect of 

Explanation of iii. 15, "Power also is the mind and it is inferred only by the 

a subtile state of effects that are experience of its coarse effects." 



iii. 14 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [228 

to be those external-aspects which are in experience and those which have been 
experienced. But external-states which are indeterminable cannot, in so far as 
they are indeterminable, be surmised." With this in mind he asks, Now . . . ?> 
What are the indeterminables ? In what things do we look 1 for them? To 
this the answer is in the words ^Everything containing the essence of every- 
thing. Upon which it has been said.3> This is made consistent in the words, 
< ... of water and of earth. For, in the case of water which contains [the 
subtile elements of] taste and colour and touch and sound, and in the case of 
earth which contains odour and taste and colour and touch and sound, various 
forms containing the mutations are observed as perceived in the taste and other 
[subtile elements] which are found in the root and fruit and blossoms and foliage 
and in the other parts of trees and creepers and shrubs. This cannot be a 
mutation of earth which is not of a similar essence, or of water which is not of a 
like kind. For, as it has already 2 been consistently stated, there can be no pro- 
duction of that which does not already exist. Similarly in the case of animals, 
human beings and beasts tame or wild, various tastes, &c, are observed coming 
from mutations of plants. For these [human beings and other animals] in eating 
the fruits [and leaves] and so on acquire a rich variety of forms, &c. In the same 
way, plants are observed to have a variety of forms coming from the mutations of 
animals. For it is known that pomegranates become as large as coco-nuts when 
sprinkled with blood. He brings the discussion to a close with the words, 
Cln this sensed Thus everything, earth and water and all, contains all tastes 
and other [subtile elements]. He gives the reason for this in the words, in so 
far as the common nature is not destroyed. Because, in so far it is 
recognized everywhere, that-which-is-asserted (jati) of the common nature of 
earth and of water is not destroyed. An objector says, ' If everything 
contains the essence of everything, then, Sir, since everything everywhere is 
always in every part close at hand, there would be a manifestation of all existences 
whatsoever at one and the same time. For an effect whose cause, lacking nothing, 
is close at hand, ought not long to delay.' With this in mind he says, with place 
and time.2> Although everything containing the essence of everything is a cause 
[of everything], still there has to be [a manifestation] 1. of that [particular] 
place which belongs to a [particular] effect [of this cause]. For instance, 
Kashmir is the place of the saffron-plant. Because although these [causes] 
exist in Pancala and other countries, there is no coming actively forth 3 [of the 
plant]. Accordingly there is no manifestation of the saffron-plant in a place 
such as Pancala. 2. Likewise during the hot season, since no rain moves 
actively forth, there is no manifestation of rice-plants. 3. Similarly a doe 
1 Reading samiksamahe. spati it is the equivalent of abhivyakti 

Compare ii. 19, p. 149 5 ; iii. 11, p. 201 2 ; and occurs ii. 4, p. Ill 2 ; iii. 13, p. 203 1 ; 

iii. 13, pp. 206", 207 2 ; and asato iii. 14, p. 214 2f . Balarama glosses the 

'nupajanandt, ii. 15, p. 132 r> . word vidyamanata avirbhava iti, p. 214, 

3 The word mmudacara occurs once only in note 3 (Calc. ed.). 

the Bhasya iii. 13, p. 207". In Vaca- 



229] Reason for the order of mutations [ iii. 15 

does not give birth to a human being, because in her the human form does not 
develop. 4. In the same way, a non-meritorious person does not experience 
anything like pleasure, because in him no meritorious cause moves actively 
forth. Therefore because of connexion [or] separation by place or time or 
form or cause, things [that is] forms of being do not manifest themselves x 
at the same time. Having thus given a classification to the external-aspects, 
he shows that the substance is present-in-all-but-different-from-them by saying, 
. . which ... of these . . . The generic-form is the substance as such ; the 
particular is the external-aspect. The meaning is that its essence is of both 
these kinds. Having thus shown that the substance which is established by 
experience is present-in-all-but-different-from-them, he reminds the Annihila- 
tionist (vdindgika), who does not assent to this and who assents to the theory 
of a momentary mind-stuff made of consciousness only, of the undesired 
contingency previously [i. 32] mentioned, and he does so in the words, But 
the [Yogacara].^ [Also in the words,] And . . . upon the recognition of a 
thing. For a thing observed by Devadatta is not recognized by Yajfiadatta. 
Accordingly it is he who experiences that also recognizes. 



15. The order of the sequence (krama) is the reason for the 
order of the mutations. 

If it be possible 2 that a single substance has only a single muta- 
tion, then the order of the sequence is the cause of the order of the 
mutation. One finds, for example, clay in the form of dust, clay 
in the form of a lump, clay in the form of a water-jar, clay in the 
form of potsherds [and] clay in the form of small bits. It is in this 
sense that there is a sequence. 1. Whenever one external-aspect is 
immediately-contiguous to another external-aspect, it is [then in] 
sequence with it. The lump of [clay] falls away and the water-jar 
comes into existence. It is in such cases that a sequence in the 
mutation of external-aspects occurs. 2. There is a sequence in the 
mutation of time-variations. By reason of there being a future [time- 
variation] of the water-jar, there is a sequence [to it in the] present 
[time- variation]. Likewise by reason of there being a present [time- 
variation] of the lump [of clay], there is a sequence [to it in the] ^ . 

1 Reading with Bikaner MS. atmanam. possible. The form would be used as 

2 Reading prasakte, which represents this equivalent to a verbal form in -ya 

system. But if the reading be pra- according to Pan. i. 4. 31 with Siddh. 

sakteh (Kashmir MS. and Gangadhara Kaum. (Nir. Sag., ed. 1904), p. 144, last 

Shastri's MS.), then the word would line, 
be used as indicating that this is not 



iii. 15 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [230 

past [time-variation]. There is no sequence for the past. Why is 
this ? When there is a relation of antecedent and sequent there 
is an immediate contiguity. But this relation does not occur in 
the case of the past. Consequently there is a sequence for two 
time-variations only. 3. There is none the less a sequence in the 
mutations of intensity, as when the oldness of a brand-new water- 
jar becomes evident first on its rim * (prdnte), and then manifesting 
itself in a sequence which conforms to the succession of moments, 
[finally] reaches a complete [individual] phenomenal [form]. This 
then is the third mutation and it is other than the external-aspect 
and the time- variation. These same sequences become what they are, 
so long as the distinction between the substance and the external- 
aspect holds. For the external-aspect as such also can become the 
substance in so far as another external-aspect is concerned. But 
since, strictly speaking, this same substance can be named external- 
aspect by virtue of attributing to it an identity with the substance, 
therefore this sequence shines forth in consciousness as a unit only. 
The external-aspects of the mind-stuff are of two kinds, those 
that are perceived and those that are unperceived. Of these 
two, the perceived have as their essence presented-ideas ; those 
that are unperceived have as their essence real-things (vastu) only. 
These latter are moreover just seven ; by inference the existence 
of [these external-aspects] as real things only is brought within 
reach. " Restriction 2 and right-living and subliminal-impressions 
and mutations and vitality and movement and power are external- 
aspects of mind-stuff excluded from sight." 

15. The order of the sequence (Jcrama) is the reason for the order of the 
mutations. [A question is stated for discussion.] ' Does one substance have only 
one mutation characterized (laksana) by external-aspect and time-variation (laksana) 
and intensity? Or does it have many mutations characterized by external- 
aspect and time- variation and intensity ? Of these two which seems plausible ? 
[The answer of the objector is,] because the substance is one, the mutation is 
only one. For from a cause, which as such is one, there ought not to be a diversity 
of effects, because that diversity would have to be the result of chance.' If this 
be taken so, the reply is given. As a result of the order of the sequence 

1 In making a jar the rim is moulded first. the author of the Comment. Compare 

2 This seems to be a mnemonic verse by iii. 18, p. 230 4 (Calc. cd.). 



231] Continuity of successive mutations [ iii. 15 

there is an order of the mutations. Both ordinary men and men of trained 
minds search out with their own eyes, in clay which is one, a sequential 
succession of mutating form of dust and lump and water-jar and potsherds and 
small bits. And the immediate succession between the dust and the lump is 
one thing ; and that between the lump and the water-jar is another ; and 
that between the water-jar and the potsherds is another ; and that between the 
potsherds and the small bits is another. Whatever is sequent with respect 
to the one is antecedent with respect to the other. This same difference of 
sequences, since it does not correspond to a single mutation, leads one to 
conclude that there are different mutations. Moreover the clay, although a 
single substance, undergoes a succession of mutations in sequences following 
the sequence of contact (samavadJidna) with various co-operating causes which 
fall one after another into the sequence, and does not leave it [the succession 
of mutations] to chance. And as in the case of the order of the mutation of 
the external-aspects, so the reason for the order of the mutation of time-variations 
and for the order of the mutation of intensities is of the same kind as the order 
of the sequence. All this is made luminous in the words of the Comment, a 
single substance.^ On the assumption that there is an identity between the 
sequence and that which is in the sequence, it is said that this is its sequence, in 
the words, <SThere is none the less a sequence in the mutations of intensity.2> 
For it is thus when rice-grains, carefully guarded in a granary by a miser, after 
very many years become reduced to atoms, in that the arrangement of the parts 
[of the grain] is likely to crumble even at a touch of the hand. Such a 
[condition] would not result so suddenly (akasmat) in the case of brand-new 
rice-grains. Therefore in the sequence of successive moments this fact [that they 
are reduced to atoms] is seen to characterize those [grains] which have gotten 
into the sequence of very large and less large and large and minute and more 
minute and very minute. This same order in the sequence does depend upon the 
distinction between the substance and the external-aspects, as he says, These 
same sequences.^ Extended from the evolved- effect and up to resoluble [primary 
matter] there is this contingent relation of substance and external-aspects. 
Even [coarse elements] such as earth are external-aspects as compared with 
subtile elements, as he says, <the external-aspect also.) Because unresoluble 
[primary matter] is, strictly speaking, the only substance, it is usual to 
attribute identity to it. By virtue of (taddvarena)y> [that is] by virtue of 
having a common locus the substance would itself be an external-aspect. For 
this very reason there would be only one mutation, that of the substance, since 
external-aspects and time-variations and intensities have entered into the sub- 
stance itself. If this is so, it is almost equivalent to saying that the substance 
is far-removed from being absolutely permanent. "While discussing the mutations 
of the external-aspects he also states the diversity in the kinds of external- 
aspects of the mind-stuff by saying <Kof the mind-stuff.^ Perceived means 
direct perceptions ; unperceived2> means indirect perceptions. Of these two, 



iii. 15 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuli [232 

those whose essence is presented-ideas are sources-of-valid-ideas and passions 
and the like. By the words real things only he refers to the non-illuminating 
character [of things]. An objector says, ' This may be so. But if unperceived, 
they surely do not exist.' In reply to this he says Cby inference.^ These 
[external aspects] are so described whose existence as real things only is brought 
within reach by inference. The word inference (anu-mana) means the proof (mana) 
which comes after (anu), and, as having the same nature, verbal-communication 
is also [included in the term]. He brings together in a memorial-verse the 
seven unperceived external-aspects by saying, ^Bestriction.^ 1. The restriction 
of fluctuations is the unconscious stage [i. 51] of the mind-stuff. We come 
to a knowledge of it by verbal-communication and by inference as being a 
state in which subliminal-impressions alone remain. 2. The word bright- 
living^ is meant to include merit and demerit. Elsewhere the reading is ' karma'. 
In this case also merit and demerit produced by this [right-living] would have to 
be understood. And these are known either by verbal-communication or by 
inference based upon a knowledge from an experience of pleasure or of pain. 
3. But ^subliminal-impression^ is inferred from memory. 4. Likewise, 
since the aspects (guna) are three, the changes of the aspects of the mind- 
stuff are unstable, and so <Xmutation) from moment to moment is inferred. 
5. Similarly <vitality which is a kind of effort to sustain the breath. And 
since it is not known [to the mind], this external -aspect is inferred from 
expiration and inspiration. 6. Likewise <movement2> of the mind (cetas) is 
activity, in accordance with its activity in connexion with the various senses 
and portions of the body, and this [activity] also is inferred from the 
connexion with it [that is, the mind]. 7. Similarly ^Cpower^ 1 also is a 
subtile state of effects that are intensified. It is an external-aspect of the 
mind and it is inferred only by experience of its coarse effects. 



From here on the field-of-operation for the constraint [reached] by 
the yogin who has acquired all the means for the attainment of 
the desired object is discussed. 

16. As a result of constraint upon the three mutations [there 
follows] the knowledge of the past and the future. 
Yogins acquire knowledge of the past and of the future as a result 
of constraint upon the mutations of external-aspects and of time- 
variations and of intensities. Fixed-attention and contemplation 
and concentration, three in one, has been called [iii. 4] constraint. 
By this [constraint] the three mutations directly experienced 

1 Compare ii. 14, p. 21 1 12 (Calc. ed.). 



233] Words and objects and ideas [ iii. 17 

produce knowledge of the past and of the future in these [three 
mutations]. 

From this point up to the end of the [third] Book the field-of -operation for the 
constraint and the supernormal powers indicative of the mastery over objects 
will be described. Here we have first discussed as the field-of-operation for 
constraint, for that yogin who has appropriated to himself all the aids to 
yoga, just those three mutations which have been described in detail. This 
is in the words, 16. As a result of constraint upon the three mutations 
there follows the knowledge of the past and of the future. An objector 
asks, Direct-experience occurs only where there is constraint. How then 
can constraint upon the three mutations directly-experience the past and the 
future ? ' In reply to this he says, <KBy this [constraint ]. When the three 
mutations are brought under direct-experience by this [constraint], those [time- 
variations] of the past and the future, inseparably-connected-with-the-muta- 
tions-yet-different-from-them, become the objects of [intuitive] knowledge. And 
the direct-experience of the three mutations itself has as its essence the direct- 
experience of the past and the future which are included in [the three 
mutations]. Thus there is no difference of objects in the two cases of the 
constraint and of the direct-experience. 



17. Word and intended-object and presented-idea are con- 
fused because they are erroneously identified with each 
other. By constraint upon the distinctions between them 
[there arises the intuitive] knowledge (jnana) of the cries of 
all living beings. 

With regard to these [three,] voice has its function [in uttering] 
only the [sounds of] syllables. And the organ-of-hearing has as its 
object only that [emission of air] which has been mutated into 
a sound [by a contact with the eight places of articulation belong- 
ing to the vocal organ]. But it is a mental-process (buddhi) that 
grasps the word [as significant sound] by seizing a the letter-sounds 
each in turn and binding them together [into one word]. Sounds- 
of-syllables (varna) do not naturally 2 aid each other, for they 

1 This same point is much more elaborately of the real jewel does not shine out clear 

discussed by Vacaspati in his Tattva- at the first sight, but shines out in its 

bindu (Benares, 1892), on page 10 at fullness in the final idea, the resultant 

the top, and also p. 3 9 . of several impressions, so the sounds 

a The question is whether the sounds one singly do make the prototype manifest, 
by one or collectively make the proto- but do not immediately make the pro- 
type (sphota) manifest. The reply seems totype in its perfection manifest, 
to be that just as the full knowledge 
30 [n.o.s. 17] 



iii. 17 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [234 

cannot coexist at the same time. Not having attained-to-the- 
unity-of a word and not having [conveyed a definite meaning], they 
become audible (avis) and they become inaudible (tiras). Hence it 
is said that individually [letter-sounds] lack the nature of a word. 
On the other hand the [sounds of the] syllables one by one may 
be said to have the essence of a word l as being filled (pracita) with 
the power to furnish expressions for everything through their asso- 
ciation with other [sounds of] syllables which also co-operate [in this 
result]. And so they seem to pass into a multiplicity 2 of [word]- 
forms. A preceding [sound of a syllable] is mentally determined 
by the following and the following by the preceding to become-a- 
distinct-and-separate word. Thus a group of [sounds of] syllables 
follows in a sequence [of utterance] and is assigned by conventional 
usage to a [single] intended-object (artha). Hence though com- 
petent to indicate a great-number-of-things (sarva), a certain 
number of these [sounds of syllables], whatever that number may 
be, makes [but the one] object clear [to consciousness]. For example, 
g-o-h indicate [only that] thing [known as ' cow '] with its dewlap 
and other specific features. Hence [also] the unity, which the 
mental-process makes known out of these [many sounds of 
syllables], determined as these are by conventional-usage by a 
single intended-object and seized and bound together into a fixed 
sequence of sounds, is the word. This unity [termed] a word is 
in every case the object of a single 3 mental-process and requires 
a single [distinct] effort [of the organs of articulation]. It is a 
thing not having parts, and not having a sequence 4 [of parts]. 
It does not consist of [sounds of] syllables. It is a thing of the 
mind, and is brought into its function by means of the presented- 
idea [which we retain] of the final syllable-sound [in a group of these 
sounds]. If a man wish to convey information to another, he must 
express himself by these same syllable-sounds to which the others 
must listen. This use of speech to which no beginning [can be 

1 Compare Tattva Bindu, p. 6 2 (Ben. ed.). 8 That is, a separate and distinct mental 

2 A universe of meanings attached to one process. 

word. The concept vai$varupyam is 4 Compare Patanjali Mahabh. (Kielhorn), 
approached by Vacaspatimicra in i. 6 18 ; i. 7 s ; i. 75 9 ; i. 112 24 ; ii. 123Sand 

Samk. Tatt. Kaum. on Karika xv. elsewhere. 



235] Doctrine of the word-prototype [ iii. 17 

assigned] permeates the thinking-substance of the ordinary man with 
subconscious-impressions [which come from the syllable-sounds]. 
Thus as a result of common understanding (sampratipatti) [the 
word] is thought to be something real in itself. It is owing to our 
knowing what this [word] means in accordance with conventional- 
usage that we attempt to divide it [into sounds of syllables]. Thus 
we say that the seizing-in-turn-and-binding-together of this or 
that number of [sounds of] syllables in some such kind [of fixed 
sequence] is a word expressive of a single intended-object. But 
conventional-usage is essentially [what has been handed down] by 
the memory [of man]. It is a kind of erroneous identification 
of the word and the thing signified. So that there is a confusion 
of the word with the intended-object, and of the intended-object 
with the word. Here we see how conventional usage is a 
kind of erroneous identification of each with the other based 
upon memory. Thus it is that these [three], the. word 'cow' and 
the intended-object cow ' and the presented-idea ' cow ', get con- 
fused, because erroneously identified with one another. But he 
who recognizes these three as quite distinct is the knower of all. 
Furthermore, every word has the power l to express a [complete] 
sentence. Thus when we utter the word ' tree ', we imply that it 
exists. For no intended-object of a word can lack existence. 
Similarly no action expressed [by a verb] is possible without the 
means-of-attaining [the action]. And so when we utter the word 
1 cook-s', certain relations which are later expressly mentioned 2 are 
supplied to specify the meaning [by excluding other relations]. 
Thus we mention the man Chaitra as the agent, 3 rice as the object, 4 
and fire as the means 5 of the action [expressed by the verb ' cook ']. 
We observe also that words are so constructed as to give the 
meaning of the sentence ; thus a ' Beader ' 6 is ' one who recites 
Vedas ' ; thus if we say ' lives ', we mean [that he] ' keeps the breath 
of life.' [And conversely] in this sentence there is a manifestation 

1 The vakya^akti is discussed in the Tattva 3 Pan. i. 4. 54 kurtr. 

Bindu, p. 16 (Benares ed.). 4 Pan. i. 4. 49 karma. 

2 In accordance with Patanjali Mahabhasya 5 Pan. i. 4. 42 harana. 

on i. 2. 45, vart. 4 ; Kielhorn, i. 218*. 6 Pan. v. 2. 84. 



iii. 17 J Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [236 

of the meaning of words. But to determine whether a particular 
word denotes an action [described by a verb] or some relation 
[therewith, we must withdraw it from the sentence] and analyse 
its formation by making distinctions. Without such an [analysis] 
many a word such as bhavati or agvah or ajdpayah 1 would remain 
ambiguous, because as regards its outer form it might be analysed 
either as a noun or as a verb {akhydta). There is a distinction 
between these words and intended-objects and presented-ideas. 
To illustrate this [distinction], ' The palace whitens ' ; here the 
action [of a verb] is meant. ' The white palace ' ; here a relation is 
meant, [that of the quality white with the action or process which 
produced it]. The word is in essence both an action [denoted 
by a verb] and a relation, and the termination [at the end of the 
word] conveys these meanings of [action and of relation]. But why 
is this so ? Because this [process of whitening] is identified with 
that, [its result, the quality white] ; so that in conventional-usage 
the presented-idea [of these objects seems to be] one and the same. 
But the white intended-object is that which becomes the thing 
upon which the word and the presented-idea depend. For this 
[intended-object] by reason of its own intensities passes-through- 
evolved-forms and does not correspond to the word nor to the mental- 
process [which are unchanging in themselves]. Similarly the word 
and similarly the presented-idea do not correspond the one with 
the other. The word [changes] in one way ; the intended-object 
in another way ; and the presented-idea in another way. Thus 
there is a distinction. And so it happens that by constraint upon 
this distinction a yogin attains [intuitive] knowledge of the cries 
of all creatures. 

Here is another field-of-operation for constraint stated in sutra 17. Word . . . 
knowledge ... In this [sutra] while his intention is to explain a word as an 
expression of meaning, he describes first of all the object of the functional- 
activity of the vocal-organ by saying In this [sntra]. The voice is the 
organ of voice ; it is that which phenomenalizes [the sounds of the] syllables 
and it has eight places of articulation. As is said [in the Qiksa 13], " There 
are eight places of articulation of the [sounds of the] syllables, the chest and the 
throat and the head and the root of the tongue and the teeth and the nose and 

1 Whitney: Grammar, 2nd cd., 1042, 1. 



237] Sounds and words [ iii. 17 

the lips and the palate." This vocal organ has its function only in [uttering the 
sounds of the] syllables as they are known to ordinary sense-perception, and not 
as expressive of meanings. He explains the object of the functional-activity of 
the organ of hearing in the words the organ-of-hearing.S> The organ-of-hearing, 
however, has that only as its object which is mutated in the form of a particular 
[sound of a] syllable, which has as its essence a particular mutation of an 
emission-of-air (udana) subjected-to-contact (abhigJiatin) with [the various places- 
of-articulation] belonging to the vocal organ. But its object is not a word- 
expressing-a-meaning. This is what he wishes-to-say (ity artha). He distinguishes 
the word-expressing-a-meaning from the [sounds of the] syllables as known to 
ordinary sense-perception, by saying <Kthe word [as significant sound]. But it 
is the mental-process that grasps the word as expressing-meaning by seizing the 
letter-sounds each in turn (anu) and binding them together [into one word]. 
Having grasped the letter-sounds (ndda) as [the sounds of] syllables (varna) one 
by one as they are known in sense-perception, it binds them in turn [that is] 
afterwards so that they are made to change into a unity and we can say g-o-h 
[that is to say] one word. By this [mental-process] the word is grasped. 
Although each of the preceding mental-processes [by stages] brings each word, 
[so long as it] has the form of the [sounds of] syllables, into consciousness, 
still the word [expressing meaning] does not clearly lie [before us]. But at the 
last mental-act (vijnana) it becomes clear. Thus it is said <Sa mental-process 
(buddhi) grasps the word [as significant sound] by seizing the letter-sounds each 
in turn and binding them together [into one word].^ To [the Mimahsaka] who 
maintains that the [sounds of the] syllables in themselves express a meaning, in 
that a word cannot be discerned as one because the [sounds] are heterogeneous, 
he replies the [sounds of the] syllables. Now these [sounds of the] syllables 
must either 1. each singly [pratyeka) arouse the idea (dhi) having a word expressing 
meaning as its content, like a row of pegs 1 upon which a bag-of-netted-cords is 
hung ; or 2. in combination (samliata) like the stones which when together hold 
the pot. Not, in any case, 1. the first alternative, because from the single [sound 
of a syllable] the sense-perception of the thing does not rise in consciousness ; 
or because if it did proceed from a single one, the second and the third need not 
have been uttered. For when an action is completed, a means-of-attaining [that 
action] which adds nothing new cannot be counted as (nyayatipata) a means-of- 
attaining. Therefore 2. the second [alternative] remains. For the stones in com- 
bination can hold up the pot, because they are there at the same time. But the 
[sounds of the] syllables cannot be simultaneous. Accordingly, since it cannot 
be that aid is reciprocally given and received, they cannot by being together 
arouse the idea of the meaning. These [sounds of syllables] not attaining by 
themselves to a single special word and therefore not conveying [the meaning], 
become now audible (avis) and now inaudible (tiras). Like the iron rods [of a 

1 This phrase in almost the same words occurs in Vacaspati's Tattva Bindu, p. 5 ,s . 



iii. 17 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [238 

tripod which co-operate to hold a vessel] they are not, as being each by itself, 
termed a word. If, however, the [sounds of the] syllables were to attain to a 
word as a unit by being [each by itself] identical with the word, then the defect 
mentioned before would not apply, as he says <KOn the other hand the [sounds of 
the] syllables one by one may be said to have the essence of a word.S> CBeing filled 
with the power to furnish expressions for everything^ [means] having an accumu- 
lation of a great number of powers to indicate [things]. For the letter ' g ' occurs 
in words like gau and gana and gaura and naga expressing various meanings such 
as, for instance, the common-nature-of-cows. Thus [this letter] has the power to 
express this or that [meaning]. Likewise the letter ' o ' occurs in words like 
somak and gocih in words denoting the Icvara as the object-intended. This is to be 
said mutatis mutandis with regard to all [the letters]. Furthermore the [sound of 
a] syllable such as ; g ' which co-operates 1 [in one set of cases], is the very same 
which is associated [and] connected with [the sound of] another syllable such as 
'o\ These [sounds of the] syllables which have been so described are a general 
condition (bhava) or state. Therefore they seem to pass into a multiplicity of forms 
[or] a plurality. But it does not actually pass into a plurality just because of 
[its own peculiar] state. The <Kpreceding) [sound of a] syllable, the letter g ' 
by association with the following letter ' o ' is thus distinguished from words like 
gana ; and the following letter ' o ' by association with the letter ' g ' is dis- 
tinguished from words like gocih and thus becomes determined in the mental- 
process which seizes each in turn and binds them together to become a distinct- 
and-separate word-expressive-of-the-meaning (mcaJca) of the common-nature-of- 
the-cow, [to become] the word-prototype of the word ' cow '. The connexion of 
ideas is this. [This happens in this way] because the presented-idea of the thing 
cannot be effected by successive [sounds of] syllables which do not occur [in a word] 
in a fixed sequence. Nor, when heaven or the highest sacrificial-merit (apurva) 
is to be brought to pass, is it proper to say that just as sacrifices such as the 
Agneya 2 co-operate (sahitya) by means of purifications (samsMra), so the [sounds 
of the] syllables [by means of subliminal-impressions (samsMra)] co-operate in the 
production of the mental-process of the thing. [It is not proper to say this,] because 
the argument breaks down when we apply the method of alternatives (viJcalpa). 
Surely this subliminal-impression (samsMra) produced by the experience of [the 
sounds of the] syllables is either the one which generates memory, or it is the 
other, which is called sacrificial-merit 3 (apurva) and is likened to the purification 
(samsMra) by the Agneya and similar [sacrifices]. Now first of all the second 

1 Discussed at length on p. 6" of the Tattva after the new moon. All six have the 

Bindu (Benares ed.). name of darqapurnamasayaga. 

2 Six sacrifices are performed in two groups, 3 Compare the discussion of the sphota as 

three without a break in the groups. analogous to the sacrifice in Castra 

Three on the first day after the full Dlpika i. 1. 5, p. 68 ; i. 2. 10, p. 127. 

moon, the Agneya, the Upancu, the See also Tattva Bindu, p. 6 10 . On the 

Agnistoma ; three yoga on the first day intermixture of apfuva see Cast. Dip. 

ii. 1. 5, p. 200. 



239] The sphota [ in. 17 

[of these alternatives] cannot [be admitted], because of the difficulties in the 
assumption. It must be assumed that this [purification] is the very same as 
that which follows (purva) sacrificial-merit. Whereas this [word-type] which is 
one cannot be produced by experiences of [sounds of] syllables in sequences. 
Since we should have to assume [the existence] of many subsidiary purifications 
(sathsMra) each of the same kind [as the others]. It is this that is the difficulty. 
Furthermore so long as we do not know that this purification serves as a cause 
to make the intended-object known, it cannot be accepted as serving to produce 
this [meaning]. For a relation which is not known to serve the purpose of pre- 
senting the intended-object, cannot be accepted as serving [that purpose]. And, 
as for the subliminal-impression which is inferred from the memory which is its 
result, it is restricted [i. 11] to that object, namely, the experience which was 
its cause. And it is therefore not in a position to arouse a subliminal-impres- 
sion which has something else, [namely, the presentation of the intended-object of 
that experience] as its object. For if this were so, any one having experienced 
any one object, would be able to know any [other] object. And it is not right to 
say that [sounds of] syllables which arise in the mirror of such a memory as takes 
its origin in the sum-total {pinda) of subliminal-impressions produced by the 
experience of each syllable singly can express meaning [because the sounds of 
the syllables] are recognized as belonging together. For that would involve-the- 
conclusion that the idea of the intended object could be produced indiscriminately 
(avigesena), whether the [sounds of the syllables] be experienced in a sequence or 
out of a sequence or in reversed sequence. And it cannot be that this knowledge 
from memory can bring before itself {gocarayitum) that succession of sounds of 
syllables which was active in the previous experience. Hence in so far as it is 
not possible from the [sounds of the] syllables to have the presentation of the 
intended-object, it must be supposed that there is an experience 1 of the word as 
being single which could give rise to [the presentation of the intended-object 2 ]. 
The same objection, moreover, does not apply with reference to the word. For 
the word is phenomenalized by [sounds of] syllables only when single and differ- 
ing according to the difference * in the effort [of articulation]. And inasmuch 
as the words are alike in so far as they are produced through the action of the 
like places [of articulation] by sounds which are the conditions-which-pheno- 
menalize the various words each unlike the other, [the sounds] do make a word 
similar [to other words]. This word [go] is similar to other words which have 
the g ' sound, but in other respects it is dissimilar, since their dissimilarities 
are different in so far as the various other [syllables] are associated [with this 
syllable]. Because of [this] peculiarity of this [word], although it is one, and 

1 So his position is this. The sphota is a 2 The word sva evidently refers to the 
subliminal-impression in the buddht. bracketed phrase. 

The buddht forms the intended-object s See Patanjali : Mahabhasya on i. 1. 9, 
under the influence of the sphota. vart. 2, vol. i, p. 61 ; also on viii. 4. 

48, vol. iii, p. 466(Kielhorn). 



iii. 17 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [240 

altogether a unit (anavayava), still the sounds-of-the-syllables make it appear as 
a collection (sdvayava) and not as a unit. Just as a face, although it is one, with 
a definite colour and dimension and look, is made to appear, by [reflection in] a 
gem 1 or a sword-blade or a mirror, to be more than one and as having more 
than one colour and dimension and look. But this is not so in the strict 
sense. Whereas the [sounds of the] syllables are parts of the partless word and 
are formed of the similarities and peculiarities. 

Therefore the mental-process (buddhi) of this [word], in the case of a particular 
word, supports itself upon the word-prototype (sphota) which is undivided and 
partless, although it seems to be divided and seems to have parts. Therefore 
a part, the letter *g', of one particular word-prototype, the word 'go' cannot 
cause that [namely, the partless prototype] of which it [the ' g '] is part to come 
forth, because of the similarity of this word-prototype with that of words like 
gaura. Therefore when made special-and-distinct by the letter ' o ', it is able to 
cause that of which it is a part, [namely the word -prototype ' go ',] to come forth. 
Similarly the part which is the letter ' o ' is also not able, because of its similarity 
with words like qocih,to cause that of which it is a part, namely the word-prototype 
' go ', to come forth. So when made special-and-distinct by the letter ' g ', it is 
able to cause [its own prototype] to come forth. And although [these two ' g ' 
and *o'] do not naturally belong together, still through [their] subliminal- 
impressions they do belong together. And thus it is consistent to have the 
relation of qualified and qualifier between them. Nor can it be said that the 
two subliminal-impressions have each a different object, since the experiences 
whose objects were the two parts, and also the two subliminal-impressions 
which result from the experiences, have one word as their object. The word 
moreover is not distinctly (avyaMa) experienced when only part of it is experienced. 
Whereas it is perceived distinctly by the idea which seizes the [sounds of the] 
syllables in turn and binds them together, [the idea] which is produced by the 
subliminal-impressions which arise from the experience of the parts. This is 
the difference. And we find that the first indistinct experience does produce 
a distinct experience by arousing subliminal-impressions in a sequence [of 
degrees of distinctness], just as the presented-idea that the tree when seen from a 
distance is green 2 (harita), although indistinct, leads to the distinct presented-idea 
of the tree. But this kind [of an idea] is impossible in an experience wherein 
the [sounds of the] syllables should represent intended-objects. For surely one 
cannot say that the [sounds of the] syllables do each singly give rise to an indistinct 
presented-idea of the intended-object, and ultimately to a distinct idea. For 
distinctness and indistinctness are restricted to cases of perceptive thinking. 
But [in this case] the presentation of the intended-object is to be aroused by the 

1 The illustration and discussion are given passage in the Tattva Bindu [p. 5 s ] by 

more fully in the Tattva Bindu, p. 6 s . the same* author seems preferable to 

8 This reading given in the analogous the reading of ' elephant ' (hasti). 



241] Word-prototype and syllables [ iii. 17 

syllables, and is not a perception. So if this [unperceived presentation of the 
intended-object] is produced by the [sounds of the] syllables, it would be 
produced quite clear (sphuta) or it would not be produced at all. But it could 
not be unclear. Whereas for the word-prototype you have to assume a clear 
or an unclear form in that there is a perception of it made distinct by sounds. 
So the case is not analogous [in that the word cannot be perceived unless the 
sounds be distinct, whereas the sounds can be distinctly perceived]. Thus 
the [sounds of the] syllables combined in the mental-process which seizes them 
in turn and binds them together, and which has its origin in the organ-of-hearing, 
in this, together with the subliminal-impressions generated by experience of 
the [sounds of the] syllables, one by one, become the word-prototype of a single 
word. If there should be an alteration of the sequence, [then], in so far as there 
might not be any special-and-distinct effort [of the organ-of-voice], giving heed 
to the fixed order, 1 which would set in operation the special-and-distinct 
effort that alone can make this [word-prototype] manifest, it would follow that 
there would be no manifestation of it at all. In so far as the [sounds of 
the] syllables conform to [this] sequence and are determined by being the 
conventional-usage for an intended-object they display as their object a word 
as-it-is-usually-understood as having parts and as having its determination by 
conventional-usage only. ^Whatever that number might be means two or 
three, three or four, five or six. Though competent to indicate a great number 
of things, a certain number of these [sounds of] syllables makes but the one 
intended-object clear [to consciousness, for example] g-o-h [makes clear to 
consciousness only the one object known as 'cow'] having its dewlap [and 
other specific features]. It might then be said that the [sounds of the] 
syllables only, in so far as they accord with conventional-usage, have ex- 
pressive power, and accordingly there is no so-called word which is a unit. 
In reply to this he says, Hence ... of these.2> Into a fixed sequence of 
sounds)^ means a sequence caused by sounds. <Seized and bound together^ 
are those in whose case the sequence of sounds is of that kind. Which the 
mental-process makes known^ in the sense that it is made known or becomes 
clear by reason of the mental-process. It has been said, in harmony with the 
view of persons of not very fine insight, that the 'g' and 'o' and 'h' are 
determined by conventional -usage [as denoting the thing termed 'cow']. And 
this is so because, in so far as the ' g ' and the other [sounds of syllables] are 
parts of this [word], they are identical with it and so express its meaning. 
But we are of opinion, that, as any one can see, it is a unity that is called a word 
which expresses a meaning. This he makes clear by saying This unity. 
The connexion [of ideas] is that this unity [termed] a word is by an ordinary 
mental-process believed [to be made of sounds of syllables]. Why should it be 
a unit? In reply to this he says ^object of a single mental-process. It is 

1 Precisely as there is a fixed sequence without break of the several sacrifices. 

31 [h.o.s. 17] 



iii. 17 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhicti [242 

a unit since it is the object of that mental-process which is a unit in form so 
that one says ' g-o-h ' [that is] one word. He shows what it is that makes this 
distinct by saying ^requires a single [distinct] effort.^ The effort [of articulation] 
which makes the word r-a-s-a distinct is different in character from that which 
makes the word s-a-r-a distinct (vyanjaka). This [effort] moreover is determined 
by the result in the form of the manifestation of the word s-a-r-a in that ' it 
begins [differently] ; it has a definite succession [of sounds] ; and this is the single 
[and distinct effort]. This it was which was required. lt is a thing without 
parts2> because in reality it has no parts. These we only assume because of 
certain similarities and dissimilarities. Hence also it is <Kwithout a sequence 
of parts2> because there it has no definite succession. An objector says, 'The 
[sounds of the] syllables have a definite succession, and they are parts of this 
[word]. How then can the word be without parts, and without a sequence of 
parts ? ' In reply to this he says It does not consist of [sounds of] syllables.^ 
For it does not have the [sounds of the] syllables as its parts. On the contrary 
the word itself, because of certain similarities and dissimilarities, is generally 
assumed to have the form of this or that [sound] and [so] appears in what is 
not its real form. For the faces as reflected in a jewel or a sword-blade or 
a mirror are not parts of the real face. <Slt is a thing of the mind made known 
by the mental-process which seizes in turn and binds together [the sounds of 
the syllables]. It is brought before [us]2> [or] made an object by the operation 
{vyapard) of the presented-idea of the final [sound of the] syllable, [by the 
operation, that is, of] the subliminal-impression [of the final syllable] together 
with the subliminal-impressions generated by the experience of [sounds of] the pre- 
vious syllables. For it has already (adhastat) been explained that the experience 
of the syllables and of the subliminal-impressions arising from them are the 
object of the word. The objector says, ' This may be so. But if the word-as- 
such (pada-tattva) has no parts or sequence or [sounds of] syllables, why is it not 
generally assumed to be of such a kind ? For a bead of crystal, when overlaid 
with a coating of red-dye, does not, when that coating is removed, cease to be 
perceived as transparent and white. Therefore the [sounds of the] syllables are 
real [parts of the word].' In reply to this he says <Kto another. If a man wish 
to convey information he must express himself by, he must utter, the very 
[sounds of the] syllables to which the hearers must listen. This use of speech, 
to which no beginning [can be assigned], depends upon words consisting of 
distinct syllables. And the subconscious-impression produced by it has also no 
beginning. The mental-process of the ordinary man (loka) is permeated [and] 
pervaded (vasita) by this [subconscious-impression] and has to do with a word 
constructed of separate [sounds of] syllables. Thus as a result of usage, by the 
consensus of the elders, this word is thought of as something real in itself, 
as having reality in the strict sense. What he means to say is this : There is 
a certain thing, the limiting-condition, which is in correlation with the thing- 
1 Does upakramatas mean ' which is under consideration ' ? 



243] The real word [ iii. 17 

to-be-exposed-to-limiting-conditions (upadheya) and which is sometimes in 
correlation and sometimes out of correlation with it. Such a thing is red-dye. 
Now when this is out of correlation, the crystal shines forth in its natural trans- 
parent and white form. And it is quite proper [that the crystal should then 
shine forth]. But the presented-idea of the word, because it is not brought into 
[consciousness] (anutpada) by anything other than the particular sound brought 
about by the particular effort [of articulation], and in so far as this [presented- 
idea] is always turbid with flaws of dissimilarity, can generate the presented- 
idea [of the word] only as being in essence [sounds of] syllables. So how can 
there be the ordinaiy knowledge of a word when divested of its limiting 
conditions? As they 1 say, " Sounds because in themselves alike bring about 
false notions ; that which makes these [sounds] apperceived is the cause of this 
false notion. And for those whose knowledge of words is made known by the 
means [which produce it, that is, the sounds of the syllables] there is an 
inevitable false notion. This results in an overthrow (badha) of [all] knowledge 
and would cause an unfailing confusion of [all dealings] in the world." 
Because the essence of a word shines out turbid with separate [sounds of] syllables, 
for this reason persons of not very fine insight, deeming the syllables themselves 
to be the word, use conventionally these very [sounds of] syllables, which have 
taken certain forms, with certain intended-objects, as he says of this.2> This 
word, although by nature (ajanatas) a unity, is separated on the basis of the know- 
ledge of the conventional-usage [of this word] to suit the purposes of persons 
whose insight is not very fine, as if its essence were separate [sounds of] syllables. 
He describes this separation of the word into [sounds of] syllables by saying 
Cthis or that number. Of this or that number [that is] neither more nor less. 
Cln some such kind2> means a particular continuous sequence. <KThe seizing in 
turn and binding together^ means under the influence of a single mental-process. 
[This is] a word expressive of a single intended-object, such as a cow. The 
objector says, 'If conventional-usage is such a word expressive of a single 
intended-object only, then, Sir, there would be an erroneous identification of 
word and intended-object.' In reply to this he says <KBut conventional-usage. 
^Essentially . . . memory^ is that which in itself is memory. For conventional- 
usage, merely because you can say that it prevails {lerta), is not sufficient to define 
the intended-object ; but it must also be remembered. What he means to say 
is this. In a conventional-usage which makes no difference a difference is 
somehow imagined. [And therefore] the genitive case is used [to denote the 
distinction between the word and the thing]. When one who knows the 

1 Professor Ganganath Jha has found a Consequently they are not from any 

reference to these same verses in the Mlmansa work. Possibly they may be 

Nyayaratnakara, a commentary on the found in the unpublished portions of 

Clokavarttika (Chaukhambha Sans. the Vakyapadlya. I have not found 

Series, p. 880). Herein we find them them in the printed fascicles, 
referred to as v&iffdkaran&ir uhtam. 



iii. 17 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [244 

distinction between these [three] performs constraint upon this [distinction] 
he becomes the knower of all, has an [intuitive] knowledge of the cries 
of all living beings. Thus having analysed that unit, the word, which is 
without parts, although the parts are assumed to be in the [sounds of the] 
syllables, he says, with the intent to analyse the sentence, which has an 
imaginary division into parts, but which is a unit and has no parts Further- 
more, eveiy word has the power to express a [complete] sentence.^ The 
connexion [of ideas] is this. A word is used to convey information to another. 
And the other should have precisely that information conveyed to him which 
the words are intended to convey. And these [words] are also capable of giving 
that same information which deals with acceptance or [rejection (Mna) or 
indifference (upeksa)]. And they do not deal (tadgocara) with the meaning (artha) 
of the word only, but with the meaning of the sentence. So all words must 
subserve the meaning of the sentence. And accordingly the meaning of the 
sentence is that of these [words] also. And it is for this reason that whenever 
a word is used alone, it is always associated with another word, and the sense 
follows from that word, but not from the [first] word used alone. Why? 
Because by itself (tanmatrasya) it has no capacity. Thus it is the sentence that 
in all cases expresses the words ; but the words do not. However, as forming 
parts of this [that is, the sentence], the words also have expressive power with 
respect to the sense of the sentence, just as with respect to the word the [sounds 
of the] syllables as constituting it have also expressive power. Thus then just 
as each single [sound of a] syllable embraces the power to express all intended- 
objects of words, so also each single word embraces the power to express the 
meaning of all sentences. This is what is expressed by the words <3CFurthermore, 
every word has the power to express a [complete] sentence. Thus when we 
utter the word 'tree ', we imply that it exists. The meaning is that the word 
' tree ' in conjunction with the implied word is ' leads to the meaning of the 
sentence. Therefore as forming part of the sentence, the word ' tree ' produces 
that meaning (tatra vartate). But if it be asked why the word * is ' is implied, 
the reply is No intended-object can lack existence.^ For the means for 
denning the meanings of words is popular-usage 1 (loJca). And this popular- 
usage combines the meaning of the word as it is alone with the meaning ' is ' 
and in all such cases makes the meaning of a sentence. This same [popular- 
usage] is the meaning of a word which cannot lack existence. Hence those 2 
who know the functions of words have [this] agreement-of-usage (vyavahara), 
"Wherever there is no other verb, 'is' in the sense of being should be used." 
Having stated that a nominal-base s never lacks its action [expressed by a verb], 
he shows that any particular verb is never without a relation by saying And so 

1 Compare Patanjali Mahabhasya i. 2. 1, bhasya on v. 2. 94. 

vart. 2 (Kielhorn's ed., vol. i, p. 217). s Discussed in Patanjali Mahabhasya on 
7 See also for comparison Patanjali Maha- i. 2. 45. 



245] The unity of the word [ iii. 17 

when we utter.^ For when we utter the word ' cook-s ', all relations which are 
suitable for association with it are implied. For this reason there is an express 
statement of the special relations of this [verb], and the purpose [of this statement] 
is to exclude other [relations]. Thus the meaning of the sentence consists in 
nothing but the specializing [of the relations]. Similarly although out of all 
relations, a word is found to stand for the meaning of the sentence ; and the 
sentence is still more potential in the words. So he says We observe.^ But 
this does not mean that words like Eeader, which are complete in themselves, 
can present a meaning so long as they are not combined with words like ' is '. 
So even in the case of this word [Eeader, as complete in itself], the meaning is to 
be assumed only in so far as it forms part of a sentence. This is the point. [An 
objector] says, ' This may be true. But if the words by themselves have the 
expressive power of the sentence, then there is no further need of the sentence, 
since its meaning can be ascertained from them.' In reply to this he says 
<[And conversely] in this sentence.^ It has been said already that if there be 
a desire on the part of the speaker to convey information, the meaning of [his] 
words is not understood from the words alone, so long as these words are not 
brought into combination with other words. So then supposing the words 
to be separated from the sentence, a part of it, the relation or the verb, is to be 
explained by analysing [and] enumerating these [words], by allotting the shares 
to this word, the bases (pratyaya) and so on. ' But why is so much trouble taken 
to go through this account [of the analysis of words] ? ' In reply to this he says 
^Without such [an analysis]. Because of the similarity of noun and verb in 
such cases 1 as, 'A water-jar is {bhavati) there' and '0 Lady (bhavati), give an 
alms ' and ' While Your Honour (bhavati) is standing ' 2 ; or similarly in such cases 
as ' Thou didst go 8 (agvas) ' and ' The horse (agvas) walks ' ; or similarly in such 
cases as ' Goat's milk (aja-payas) drink thou ' and ' Thou didst conquer (ajdpayas) the 
foes,' because there is a likeness [in the form] of the verb and of the noun, it 
is ambiguous whether the words might be analysed as nouns or as verbs. And 
when there is no such accounting [for the form of the word, and because] when 
withdrawn [from the sentence] it cannot be known [whether it is a noun or 
a verb], how can it be analysed as a noun or as a verb ? 4 Therefore the words 
should be withdrawn from the sentence and analysed. But by a mere accounting 
[for the form of the word] there is not strictly speaking a distinction of the 
words [from the intended-objects and the presented-ideas]. Having thus treated 
the [different] kinds of words etymologically, he has the intention of telling 
that [in reality] there is no confusion between words and intended-objects and 

1 It would appear that Vacaspatimicra is greater elaboration in another work 

referring to Cloka-varttika iv. 191. by Vacaspatimicra called Tattvabindu 

2 Or possibly, 'Something is standing upon (Benares, reprinted from the Pandit, 

Your Honour (bhavati).' 1893). This particular passage occurs 

3 Or ' swell ', from root fvi or futf, on p. 15 of that text. 

4 This whole subject is discussed with much 



iii. 17 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [246 

presented-ideas which had got into confusion as a result of conventional-usage 
[which erroneously identifies one with the other], and proceeds to say There is 
a distinction between these words and intended-objects and presented-ideas.^ 
To illustrate this [distinction]. ' The palace whitens ' ; here [the word *] 
means the action [of a verb].S For here it is quite clear that this action 
1 grows white ', which is of a kind yet to be completed and which takes place 
by a succession [of acts], is different from the action 'white', which is of the 
completed kind. And even in those cases where both the word and the in- 
tended-object are of a completed kind, there also the word is different from the 
intended-object, as he says <K' The white palace ' ; here a relation is meant.S 
Here 2 there is no case-ending expressing relation because this is expressed [by 
the nominative case according to Panini ii. 3. 1]. He makes the distinction 
between the intended-object [and the word] by saying, in essence both an action 
[denoted by a verb] and a relation . . . the intended-object of which.S The 
meaning is that the intended-object of both these words is in essence an action 
[denoted by a verb] and it is in essence a relation. He makes the distinction 
between the presented-idea [and the word] by saying 4Cand the presented-idea.S 
The word <Kand3> shows that the words [the intended -object of which is this [the 
action and relation]^ are to be supplied. The word CthisS is to be understood 
(sambadliyate) as in subordination to another word [in a possessive compound]. It 
is so-described as being that of which the intended-object is in essence an action 
[denoted by a verb] and a relation because they are understood as alike. An 
objector asks ' Since words and intended-objects and presented-ideas are confused, 
how can there be any distinction between them ? ' With this in mind he asks 
But why is this so?) He gives the answer by saying ^Because this [process] 
is identified with that, [its result, the quality white]. J The presented-idea 
which identifies them is limited by conventional-usage [which erroneously 
identifies them with each other]. But this presented-idea has no basis in 
fact. The word conventional-usage is in the locative case. This shows that 
conventional-usage is the cause [of the presented-idea which fails to distinguish 
the act of whitening and the quality white]. He states what the real fact is 
in the words But the white intended-object is that which. Intensity such 
as newness or oldness. ^Corresponds [that is] be confused. Thus by the yogin's 
constraint upon the distinctions [he knows] the cries of all living beings, tame 
and wild animals, creeping things, birds and the rest, even the unphenomenalized 
speech among them and the intended-objects [denoted by these cries] and 
the presented-ideas of them. So in this case constraint performed upon the 
presented-ideas of the things-expressed by the utterances of human beings is 
performed upon these [objects and words] also, since they are comparate. Thus 

1 Vacaspatimicra seems to have read $abdah belonging to Gangadhara Shastrl. 

in his text of the Comment. And this 2 Compare the phrase cveto '$vo in Tattva 
reading is also in the excellent MS. Bindu, p. 16 12 . 



247] Jaiglsavya and Avatya [ iii. 18 

it is established that the yogin has [intuitive] knowledge of these cries and of 
the objects intended by them and of the present ed-idea of them. 



18. As a result of direct-perception of subliminal impressions 
there is [intuitive] knowledge of previous births. 

Those subliminal-impressions are of course of two kinds. 1. The 
causes of memory and of the hindrances in the form of subconscious 
impressions ; 2. the causes of fruition in the form of right-living 
and wrong-living. These subliminal-impressions formed in previous 
births are, like mutation and movement and restriction and power 
and vitality and right-living, unperceived external-aspects of mind- 
stuff [iii. 15]. Constraint upon these is sufficient for direct-perception 
of subliminal-impressions. Moreover there is no direct experience of 
these, unless there be experience of place and time and cause. It is 
thus, therefore, as a result of [intuitive] knowledge of subliminal- 
impressions that the knowledge of previous births arises [in the 
mind] of the yogin. Precisely as in other cases there is also, as 
a result of the direct-perception of subliminal-impressions, a con- 
sciousness (sarhvedana) of the births of others. On this point this 
tale is handed down. " To the Exalted Jaiglsavya, who as a result 
of direct-perception of subliminal-impressions beheld the sequence of 
his birth-mutations in ten great creative-periods, the knowledge born 
of discrimination became visible. Then to him spake the Exalted 
Avatya who had assumed a [coarse] body [for the purposes of this 
speech]. 'In ten great creative-periods, forasmuch as the sattva 
of [thy] thinking-substance is unsuppressed [by rajas and tamas] in 
consequence of spotlessness, thou beholdest the pain caused by 
birth in hells and in the bodies of brutes ; coming into existence 
over and over again among gods and human beings, which hast 
thou apperceived to be more, pleasure or pain ? ' Jaiglsavya x 
spake to the Exalted Avatya. ' In ten great creative-periods, 
forasmuch as the sattva of [my] thinking-substance is unsuppressed 
[by rajas and tamas] in consequence of spotlessness, I behold the 

1 See also ii. 55, p. 192 7 , and Acvaghosa's Mondschein d. Sankhya-Wahrheit, 

Buddhacarita xii. Compare Garbe : p. 35 ; and Garbe: Aniraddha, p. vii. 



iii. 18 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhiiti [248 

pain caused by birth in hells and in the bodies of brutes ; coming 
into existence over and over again among gods and human beings 
this I trow. Whatever [pleasure] I have passed through, all 1 this is 
nothing but pain.' The Exalted Avatya spake thus. ' Are Your 
Worship's mastery 2 over the primary-cause and the pleasure of 
bliss ineffable, are these also to be counted as pain ? ' The Exalted 
Jaigisavya spake : 'This can be called the pleasure of bliss ineffable 
only in comparison 3 with pleasure from objects of sense ; but it is 
nothing but pain in comparison with Isolation. Because this [bliss 
ineffable] is an external-aspect of the sattva of the thinking- 
substance and [so] has the three aspects (guna), and because a pre- 
sented-idea of anything having the three aspects is counted as 
something to be thrown aside, the thread of desire [in the bliss 
ineffable] is of the nature of pain. But by the removal of the 
anguish of the pain of desire, this pleasure [of bliss ineffable] is 
undisturbed-calm, 4 uninhibited, favourable in the eyes of all.' " 

18. As a result of direct-perception of subliminal-impressions there is 
[intuitive] knowledge of previous births. 

For the subliminal-impressions which are produced by knowledge are the causes 
of memory, whereas the subliminal-impressions produced by undifferentiated- 
consciousness are the causes of the hindrances which begin with undifferentiated - 
consciousness. As to the causes of fruition. Fruition is [ii. 13] birth and 
length-of-life and kind-of-enjoyment. The causes of it are the kinds of right- 
living and wrong-living. The subliminal-impressions put together in previous 
births are completed by their own peculiar causes. Just as a curry {vyanjana) is put 
together (samsJcrta) [by combining many undistinguished things] so it follows that it 
has been made. Mutation and movement and restriction and power and vitality 
are external-aspects of the mind-stuff. Likewise, the unperceived [subliminal-im- 
pressions] are external-aspects of the mind-stuff. Constraint upon these together 
with their attachments [of place and time and cause], whether they are some- 
thing heard or inferred, is adequate to bring to pass direct perception of both 
kinds of subliminal impressions. And if it be asked how there can be direct per- 
ception of previous births, even if it be possible to have direct perception of these 
[subliminal-impressions in place, time and cause] through constraint, he replies 
Moreover there is no ... of place. Cause is the previous body, the organs 
and the rest. Direct-perception of subliminal-impressions, with their adjuncts, 3 

1 Compare ii. 15. * See iv. 29, p. 313 5 (Calc. ed.). 

2 See Aniruddha on Samkhya-sutra v. 82. 6 Balarama mentions as instances of at- 

3 Compare Aniruddha on Samkhya-sutra tachments, mother and father or birth 

p. 3\ or country or city or time. 



249] Specimens of intuitive knowledge [ iii. 20 

necessarily involves the direct-perception of such things as births. This 
is the meaning. The constraint with respect to one's own subliminal- 
impressions he extends by analogy to those of others also in the words ^Precisely 
as in other cases also.^ With this in view he introduces as an aid to faith the 
dialogue between Jaiglsavya and Avatya, who had passed through the experience, 
by saying On this point this tale is handed down. A great creative-period is 
a great mundane cycle. By the words who had assumed a [coarse] body the 
perfection of a created body 1 is described. Spotless is brilliant ; that from which 
the stains of rajas and tamas have been removed. Mastery over the primary 
cause means power. By having this [power] and by creating movements in the 
primary-cause he gives to any one that kind of perfection of body or of organs 
which he wishes to confer upon him ; and further having created his own bodies 
and organs by thousands he roves through air and sky and earth at will. Bliss 
(santosa) is the dwindling of desire and the external-aspect of undisturbed calm 
belonging to the sattva of the thinking-substance. 



19. [As a result of constraint] npon a presented-idea [there 
arises intuitive] knowledge of the mind-stuff of another. 

As a result of constraint upon a presented-idea, in consequence of 
the direct-perception of the presented-idea, there arises the [in- 
tuitive] knowledge of the mind-stuff of another. 

19. [As a result of constraint] upon a presented-idea [there arises intuitive] 
knowledge of the mind-stuff of another. 

As a result of direct-perception of the presented-idea, [that is] of mind-stuff 
in general of another. 

20. 2 But [the intuitive knowledge of the presented-idea of 
another] does not have that [idea] together with that upon 
which it depends [as its object], since that upon which it 
depends is not-in-the-fleld [of consciousness]. 

The yogin knows that the presented-idea is affected. But he does 
not know that it is affected in dependence upon [this or] that 
[object]. When the presented-idea of another [person] is in de- 
pendence upon something, this [object] does not become something 
upon which the mind-stuff of the yogin depends. But it is the 
other's presented-idea only upon which the yogin's mind-stuff 
comes to depend. 

1 For the word nirmdna see Garbe : and consequently the numbering of 

Festgruss an Roth, p. 78 4 . the remaining siitras of the third part 

2 This sutra is omitted by Vijiiana Bhiksu of Yoga-varttika is at fault. 

32 [h.o.s. 17] *, ,\ k S Jj . 

ld^&.j*'Vi>.-tfti*j 



iii. 20 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [250 

Just as the direct-perception of subliminal-impressions implies the direct-percep- 
tion of previous births and of the adjuncts to these, so the direct-perception of 
another's mind-stuff might imply the direct-perception of that upon which that 
[mind-stuff] depends. To this conclusion (prapta) he says 20. But [the intuitive 
knowledge of the presented-idea of another] does not have that [idea] 
together with that upon which it depends [as its object], since that upon 
which it depends is not-in-the-field [of consciousness]. That constraint 
[ii. 19] has for its object the subliminal-impressions with their adjuncts l ; but 
this has as its object the other's mind-stuff and nothing more. This is what he 
means to say. 

21. As a result of constraint upon the [outer] form of the 
body, when its power to be known is stopped, then as a con- 
sequence of the disjunction of the light and of the eye there 
follows indiscernibility [of the yogin's body]. 

As a result of constraint upon the form of the body, [the yogin] 
inhibits that [imperceptible] power by which [the coarse and 
external] is known. When its power to be known is stopped, as 
a consequence of the disjunction of the light [that is, of the other 
person, the observer] and of the eye [that is, the organ], in- 
discernibility of the yogin is produced. In this way it must be 
understood that indiscernibility to sound and to other objects of 
sense has also been described. 

21. . . . body . . . indiscernibility. 

A body has its essence in the five [coarse elements]. And as having form it 
comes under the eye. For as having form the body and the colour of the body 
pass through the experience of being the object-of-the-action of the process-of- 
knowing by the eye. Thus when the yogin performs a special kind of con- 
straint upon the [external] form, then the power of being known, which belongs 
to the colour and which is the source of the direct-perception of a body having 
form, is stopped. Therefore when the power to be known is stopped, the yogin 
becomes indiscernible. In other words, the body of the yogin does not become 
the object of the thinking [coming from] the eye. The meaning is that when 
this is done, indiscernibility is the cause. In this way. When as a result 
of constraint upon sound or touch or taste or smell with reference to the body 
the power of these [four objects of sense] to be known is stopped, and when there 
is no connexion between the light [that is, of the other person, the observer] and 
the [other's] organ-of-hearing or of touch or of taste or of smell, then [the yogin] 
becomes indiscernible to these [organs]. Such, mutatis mutandis, is the mean- 
ing of the sutra. 

1 These Balarama has defined in his note (5) on p. 230 (Calc. ed.). 



251] Fast and slow development of karma [ iii. 22 

22. Advancing and not-advancing is karma; as a result of 
constraint upon this [two-fold karma] or from the signs of 
death [there arises an intuitive] knowledge of the latter end. 

Karma having its fruition in length-of-life is of two kinds, the 
advancing 1 and the not-advancing. Of the two, 1. just as a wet 
cloth spread-out dries in a shorter time, so is advancing karma ; 
2. and just as the same [cloth] rolled into a ball becomes dry 
a long time after, so is not-advancing [karma]. 1. Advancing 
karma is also like fire set in dry 2 grass, which spreads on all sides 
with the breeze, and burns in the briefest time. 2. And just as 
the same fire, put bit by bit into a pile of grass, burns a long time 
after, so is not-advancing [karma]. This is the karma having [its 
limit in] a single existence and causing the length-of-life, of two 
kinds, the advancing and the not-advancing. As a result of 
constraint upon this there is [intuitive] knowledge of the latter 
end, of the decease. <0r from the signs of death [there arises an 
intuitive] knowledge of the latter end.> A sign-of-death 3 is of 
three kinds, that pertaining to self and that pertaining to [other] 
creatures and that pertaining to divine beings. Of these [three], 
a sign-of-death 1. pertaining to one's self [would occur when] one 
with stopped 2 ears does not hear the sound [of the vital spirits] 
within one's own body ; or when one with closed eyes does not see 
the inner light. Likewise 2. a sign pertaining to other creatures 
[would occur when] one sees the Men of Yama, [or] when one sees 
unexpectedly the Fathers, the Departed. Similarly 3. [a sign] 
pertaining to divine beings [would occur when] one sees heaven or 
the Siddhas unexpectedly, or when everything is reversed. By 
this [sign] also he perceives that the latter end is near at hand. 

22. Advancing . . . or . . . And karma having its fruition in length-of-life 
is of two kinds, the advancing and the not- advancing. Now that karma which 
has [its limit] in a single existence and which is the source of birth and of 
length-of-life and of kind-of- enjoyment has a fruition in length -of-life. 1. And 
this is ready to afford the kind-of-enjoyment without the delay of even a very 



1 This word occurs here only in the Bhasya s Compare Markandeya Pur. xl. 1 ff. 

and in Vacaspati. Lihga Pur. xci. 1-36. 

2 Umiisvati's Tattvadhigama-sutra ii. 52. Mahabharata xii. 317 18 ff. 



iii. 22 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhitti [252 

short time. It has afforded much of the kind-of-enjoyment and only a little of 
its fruit remains. Its functional -activity continues only because it is impossible 
for it to have its fruition suddenly in one body ; therefore it delays. This is 
advancing [karma]. The advance is the functional-activity ; the [karma] is con- 
nected with this [functional-activity]. 2. The same karma, when it affords little 
fruit and requires time for this, and when, engaged in affording fruit, its functional- 
activity is intermittent and slow, is not-advancing. This same is made clear in 
two similes with the words Of these 1. just as. On the same point for greater 
clearness he gives another simile in the words 2. Or just as fire. The final- 
end is the great mundane-dissolution. As compared with this, death is the latter 
end. As a result of constraint upon the right-living and wrong-living in that 
karma, [there follows intuitive] knowledge of the latter end. And as a result 
of this the yogin, knowing his own karma which is advancing, and having 
created many bodies for himself, experiences suddenly the fruit [of karma] and 
dies when he wills. Incidentally [the author] says Or [the intuitive knowledge 
of the latter end] is the result of the signs-of-death.^ Signs- of-death (arista) are 
things which terrify such as the enemy (ari). The indications of death are of 
three kinds. Or when everything is reversed^ [that is] even when there is no 
jugglery, villages and cities he deems to be heaven, and the world of only human 
beings to be a world of divine beings. 



23. [As a result of constraint] upon friendliness and other 
[sentiments there arises] powers [of friendliness]. 
Friendliness l and compassion and joy are the three sentiments. 
As to these [three], by feeling friendliness for living beings who 
are in happiness he discovers the power of friendliness ; by feeling 
compassion for those in pain he discovers the power of compassion ; 
by feeling joy for those who are disposed to merit he discovers the 
power of joy. As a result of the sentiments there arises the con- 
straint which is concentration, and from it there arise powers of 
unfailing energy. Indifference, however, for those disposed to evil 
is not one [of these practised] sentiments. And therefore there is 
no concentration upon it. For this reason, since it is impossible 
to perform constraint upon it, there is no power resulting from 
indifference. 

23. [As a result of constraint] upon friendliness and other [sentiments 
there arise] powers [of friendliness]. 

By constraint upon friendliness and other [sentiments] he gains powers of 
friendliness and other powers. Of these three as a result of the sentiment 

1 See i. 33. 



253] Cultivation of sentiments [ iii. 25 

of friendliness there arises [in him] that kind of power by which he makes 
everybody happy. As a result of this he is kindly to all. Similarly through 
the power resulting from compassion he delivers living beings from pain and 
from the causes of pain. Likewise through the power of joy he imparts the 
detached-attitude to everybody. He states what will be of assistance in what 
will be said, namely, that sentiments cause concentration, as he says ^CAs a result 
of the sentiments there arises the constraint which is concentration.^ Although 
constraint is the three, fixed -attention and contemplation and concentration and 
not concentration alone, still since constraint follows as an effect after concentra- 
tion, and since concentration is the dominant of the three, concentration is 
figuratively used for constraint. Some manuscripts read ' The sentiments are 
concentration.' In this case we must suppose that the sentiments and concentra- 
tion, as being parts of the whole which is constraint, serve as causes of the 
constraint. Energy is exertion. By its means a man who has the powers of 
friendliness, &c, towards persons in happiness, &c, becomes unfailing in his 
exertion when things are to be done for others. Indifference is the detached 
attitude. In this case there is no sentiment. Nor is there anything that might 
arise [out of it] as in the case of those who are in happiness. 



24. [As a result of constraint] upon powers [there arise] 
powers like those of an elephant. 

As a result of constraint upon the power of an elephant one has 
the power of an elephant. As a result of constraint upon the 
power of Vainateya [the Garuda bird] one has the power of 
Vainateya. As a result of constraint upon the power of the wind 
one has the power of the wind. And so forth in the same way. 

24. [As a result of constraint] upon powers [there arise] powers like those 
of an elephant. He gains the power of that upon which [he exercises] 
constraint. 

25. As a result of casting the light of a sense-activity [there 
arises the intuitive] knowledge of the subtile and the con- 
cealed and the obscure. 

The yogin by casting the light of that sense-activity of the central 
organ which is called luminous [i. 36] upon an object whether 
subtile 1 or concealed or obscure has access to that object. 
25. . . . Sense-activity . . . intuitive knowledge. Casting [his mind] with 
constraint upon a subtile or concealed or obscure intended-object he has access 
to that intended-object. 

1 Compare Samkhya-karika vii. 



iii. 26 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [254 

26. As a result of constraint upon the sun [there arises the 
intuitive] knowledge of the cosmic-spaces (bhuvana). 
The enumeration of these [cosmic-spaces] : there are seven worlds. 
Among them, 1. starting from the Avici [nadir] and extending up 
to the summit of Meru is the Earth-world (bhu-loka) ; 2. beginning 
from the summit of Meru and going as far as the Pole-star 
(dhruva), the world of Intermediate Space diversified by planets 
and asterisms and stars. Beyond that is the five-fold Heaven- 
world (svar-loka) : 3. the world of Mahendra, the third world ; 
4. the Mahar world of Prajapati, the fourth world ; the three-fold 
world of Brahma, that is, 5. the Jana-w T orld and 6. the Tapas- 
world and 7. the Satya- world. 1 

" The world-of-Brahma in its three stages, 
Below it the world-of-Prajapati, the Great [world], 
And [below it] Mahendra's [world] : [these five] are called 

Heaven (svar). 
In the sky [of Intermediate-Space] are the stars ; on earth, 
the creatures." 
Thus saith the Summary-Stanza. 2 Rising in a series above Avici 
there are six regions (bhumi) of the Great-Hell (mahd-naraka), sup- 
ported [respectively] by solid-matter, by water, by fire, by wind, 
by air, and by darkness, namely, the Mahakala, the Ambarisa, the 
Baurava, the Maharaurava, the Kalasutra, and the Andhatamisra, 
wherein living creatures, having been allotted a long and grievous 
length-of-life, feeling the misery incurred as the result of their 
own karma, are born. Next, the seven lower-worlds (pdtdla), with 
the names Mahatala, Basatala, Atala, Sutala, Vitala, Talatala, and 
Patala, and as the eighth this earth 3 with its seven lands (dvlpa), 
and in the midst of it, the golden King of Mountains, Sumeru. 
Its peaks on the four sides are made of gems of silver, of lapis 



Svar 



( (7. Satya 2 Compare VP. ii. 4. 97. 

Brahma J 6. Tapas s For a very valuable collection of parallel 
J 5. Jana material in the Epic see Hopkins : 

4. Mahar Prajapatya Mythological Aspects, JAOS, 1910. 



3. Mahendra 
2. Antariksa 
1. Bhu 



255] Intuitive knoivledge of cosmic spaces [ iii. 26 

lazuli, of crystal, and of gold. By reason [of the reflection] of 
the brilliant colour of the lapis lazuli, the southern quarter 
of the sky is the deep blue of the petal of the blue-lotus ; the 
eastern is white ; the western is translucent ; the northern is like 
the golden amaranth. And on its southern slope is the Eose- Apple 
tree, from which this land is called the Land of the Rose- Apple. 
As the sun moves forward, day and night, 1 as it were fast bound to 
him, 1 revolve 2 [about Sumeru]. North of this [Sumeru] are three 
mountains, blue-and-white-peaked, two thousand yojanas in extent. 
Between these, three zones (varsa), nine thousand yojanas each, 
called 1. Ramanaka, 2. Hiranmaya, and 3. the Northern 3 Kurus. 
On the south, the [mountains] of Nisadha, of the Goldhorn, and 
of the Snow-crags, two thousand yojanas in extent. Between 
these, three zones of nine thousand [yojanas] each, called 4. the 
Harivarsha, 5. Kimpurusa, 6. Bharata. On the East of Sumeru, 
[the countries of] 7. Bhadracva, bounded by the Malyavat 
[mountains] ; on the West, [the countries of] 8. Ketumala, bounded 
by the Gandhamadana [mountains]. In the middle, the zone of 
9. Ilavrta. This same [Land of the Rose- Apple], a hundred 
thousand yojanas in extent, stretches in each direction from 
Sumeru for half this distance. Now the Land of the Rose- Apple, 
a hundred thousand yojanas in extent, is encompassed by a girdle- 
shaped sea of salt the double thereof. And then [there are] the 
lands of Qaka,Kuca, Kraunca, Qalmala, Magadha, andPuskara, each 
double the preceding, fringed with marvellous hills, and the Seven 
Seas, [flat] like a pile of mustard seeds, with their waters of Sugar- 
cane-juice, of Spirits, of Butter, of Curds, of Cream, of Milk, and of 
Treacle. [These lands] encompassed by the Seven Seas and girdle- 
shaped and encircled by the Lokaloka Mountains [are] estimated 
at five hundred millions of yojanas [in extent]. This whole well- 
founded configuration stretches out in the midmost part of the 
[World] Egg. And the Egg is a minute fragment of the primary- 
cause, like a firefly in the sky. 1. Here, in the lower world, in 

1 Siddhanta KaumudI on v. 4. 77 (Nir. Sag. vi. 7. 1 ff. and discussed by Jacobi in 

ed., 1904, p. 203 8 ). the article on the Abode of the Blest 

2 Just so Raghuvanca vii. 24. (Hastings : Cyclopaedia of Rel. and 
s Described in Ram. iv. 43 and Maha Bh. Ethics, II. 698 a ). 



iii. 26 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [256 

the sea, in these mountains, groups of gods have their abode, 
Asuras, Gandharvas, Kinnaras, Kimpurusas, Yaksas, Baksasas, 
Bhutas, Pretas, Picacas, Apasmarakas, Apsarases, Brahmaraksasas, 
Kusmandas, Vinayakas. In all the lands meritorious gods and 
human beings [have their abode]. Sumeru is the pleasure-ground 
of the thirty-[three] [gods]. In it are the pleasure-grounds, Micra- 
vana, Nandana, Caitraratha, and Sumanasa. Sudharma is the gods' 
assembly-hall. Sudarcana is their castle. Vaijayanta is their palace. 
2. The planets and asterisms and stars, fastened to the pole-star, 
have their courses regulated by the steady impulsion of the wind, 
and arranged at different points above 2 Sumeru move round about 
it. 3. They who dwell in [the world of] Mahendra are six groups 
of gods, the Thirty-three, the Agnisvattas, the Yamyas, the Tusitas, 
the Aparinirmita-vaca-vartins, and the Parinirmita-vaca-vartins. 
All [these] fulfil their desires and are endowed with atomization and 
the other powers. They live for a mundane period ; they are goodly 
to behold and they delight in love. Their bodies are not caused 
[by parents]. Their retinue is made of incomparable and not 
prudish Apsarases. 4. In the Great world of Prajapati there is 
a five-fold group of gods, the Kumudas, the Rbhus, the Pratar- 
danas, the Afijanabhas, and the Pracitabhas. These have the 
mastery over the great elements ; their food is contemplation ; 
their lives are for a thousand mundane periods. 5. In the first of 
the worlds-of-Brahma, in the Jana 3 world, there is a four-fold 
group of gods, the Brahmapurohitas, the Brahmakayikas, the 
Brahmamahakayikas, and the Amaras. These have the mastery 
over the elements and the organs. 6. In the second [of the 
worlds-of-Brahma], in the Tapas-world, there is a three-fold group 
of gods, the Abhasvaras, 4 the Mahabhasvaras, and the Satyama- 
habhasvaras. These have the mastery over the elements and the 

1 They are driven by the wind, as cows are 2 Compare Visn. Pur. ii. 12 and Umasvati 
driven by the ploughman in a circle Tattvadhig. Sut. iv. 14. 

around the threshing-post. Fastened 3 Vijnana Bhiksu reads Janar. 

by wind-ropes to the pole-star, accord- * Reading abhas. The name indicates 
ing to Maitri Up. i. 4. For the astro- that they are self-luminous. An in- 

nomy see Surya Siddhanta ii. 1 ; for the structive article upon them by Pro- 

simile, see Cakuntala vii. 6, and G. A. fessor Jacobi is found in Hastings : 

Grierson : Behar Peasant Life, 889, Cycl. of Rel. and Ethics, I. 202 a . 

with the illustration. 



257] Seven worlds of Brahma [ iii. 26 

organs and evolving-matter. Each lives twice as long as the 
previous [group] ; their food is contemplation ; their lives are 
chaste (urdhvaretas). Upwards there is no impediment to their 
thinking and in regions below there is no object obscure to their 
thought. 7. In the third [world] of Brahma, in the Satya-world, 
there are four groups of gods, the Acyutas, the Quddhanivasas, the 
Satyabhas, and the Samjnasamjnins. By them no laying down 
foundations for a dwelling is made ; they are grounded in them- 
selves and placed one above the other ; they have the mastery over 
the primary cause and live as long as there are creations. Of 
these [four] the Acyutas delight in deliberative contemplation ; 
the Quddhanivasas delight in reflective contemplation ; the Satya- 
bhas delight in contemplation where there is nothing but joy; 
and the Samjnasamjnins delight in contemplation where there is 
the feeling of personality and nothing more. These also remain in 
the three worlds. 1 These seven worlds are all without exceptions 
worlds of the Brahman. But the discarnate and those [whose 
bodies] are resolved into primary matter exist in the state of 
release and are not placed in the worlds. By performing constraint 
upon the door of the sun 2 the yogin should directly perceive [all] 
this. Then also upon other [objects than upon the sun]. Thus to 
this extent he should practise, until all this is seen. 

26. As a result of constraint upon the sun [there arises the intuitive] 
knowledge of the cosmic-spaces (bhuvana). 

Up to the pole-star from the summit of Meru in this world. Thus in this way 
from here up to the end of the Summary-Stanza (samgraha-gloJca) the seven worlds 8 
are briefly described. He describes them in detail in the words CAmong them . . . 
above Avlci. The word solid-matter means earth. [The word] region 
means a place [but not a hell]. These great hells must be understood to be 
accompanied by several lesser hells. These same are brought together under 
other names in the words, <KMahakala.) As the sun moves forward, day and 
night, revolve [about Sumeru], as it were fast bound to him. The meaning is 
that night is in that part of it which the sun leaves ; and day is in that part which 
the sun shines upon. He gives the extent of the whole Land of the Kose-Apple 

1 In the World-Egg. They are not released. s On this whole subject see Jacobi's article 

2 This seems to be the entrance to the on the Abode of the Blest in Hastings : 

world of Brahma. Compare Maitri Up. Cyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, 

vi. 30 (sduram dvaram) and Mundaka vol. II, p. 698*. 

Up. i. 2. 11 and Chandog. Up. v. 10. 2. 
33 [h.o.s. it] 



iii. 26 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [258 

in the words <KThis same [Land of the Rose- Apple], a hundred thousand yojanas.^ 
What kind of a hundred thousand yojanas ? In reply he says <Klt stretches out 
in each direction from Sumeru for half this distance. For halft would be 
fifty thousand yojanas. It stretches out [amounts to] is comprehended, in- 
asmuch as Sumeru occupies the middle of it. The Seven Seas, each like piles 
of mustard seeds, are each double [the preceding]. This is the connexion [of 
the sentence]. Just as a pile of mustard-seed is not heaped like a pile of rice- 
grains, nor quite [flat] like the earth, so are those seas. This is the meaning. 
Islands are fringed with marvellous hills, so that one could say that they seem 
to have fringes of marvellous hills. All this circuit of the earth, encompassed 
by garlands of lands and forests and mountains and cities and oceans, and 
encircled by the Lokaloka Mountains, extends, is comprehended, in the midst of 
the Egg of Brahma. This well-founded configuration^ means that it is that 
whose arrangement [is well-founded]. He now tells who they are that dwell 
there in the words Here, in the lower-world. He describes the arrangement 
of Sumeru in the words, ^Sumeru is Thus having described the Earth- 
world specifically, he describes specifically the world of Intermediate Space with 
the words The planets. The CimpulsionX> is the functional activity. He shows 
the Heaven-world in the words They who dwell [in the world of] Mahendra.^ 
3. <G roups of gods are kinds of gods. He also describes the perfection of the 
form of the six groups of gods by saying A11 [these] fulfil their desires.3> All 
objects yield to them even at nothing more than a desire. ^Goodly to beholds 
[that is] to be worshipped. They delight in love [that is] are fond of sexual 
pleasure. Their bodies are not caused by parents, [but] quite without cause, 
without union of parents, they obtain a supernal body from atoms thoroughly 
purified x by peculiar merit. 4. He describes the Mahar-world in the words, <ln 
the Great. These have the mastery over the great elements. Whatever they 
like the great elements confer upon them. And the great elements remain in 
this or that arrangement as they desire. ^Their food is contemplation^ means 
that they are sated with contemplation" merely and are nourished [thereby]. 5. He 
describes the Jana- world with the words <Sln the firsts In accordance with the 
order of the worlds as described they have the mastery over the elements and 
the organs. ) Earth and the other elements, and the organ-of-hearing and 
the other organs are employed just as they choose to employ them. 6. He 
describes, in accordance with the order already described, the second [world] of 
Brahma in the words In the second.^ These have the mastery over the 
elements and the organs and evolving-matter.2> Evolving-matter (prakrti) is the 
five fine elements. Over these they have the masteiy . For at their wish the subtile 

1 This is an allusion to the story of Dadhlci, Indra took his body and made it into 

whose body was the very essence of a thunderbolt (vi. 10. 12). The 

knowledge and of courses of austerities thunderbolt becomes energized with 

(Bhag. Pur. vi. 9. 51-54). While ab- the sage's austerities (Dadhtces tapasa 

sorbed in yoga he was unaware that tejitah vi. 11.20). 



259] Cosmical and physical correspondences [ iii. 26 

elements actually enter into mutations in the form of bodies. So say those who 
have the tradition. CTwice as long as the previous.2> The Mahabhasvaras have 
double as long a life as the Abhasvaras ; and the Satyamahabhasvaras have 
double as long a life as these latter. Upwards.) Upwards in the Satya-world 
there is no impediment to their thinking. But from Avici right up to- the 
Tapas-world they discern all subtile and concealed or other things. This is the 
meaning. 7. He describes the third world of Brahma in the words In the 
third. y> They are so described by whom the laying down of a dwelling or 
house has not been made. Just because they have nothing to hold them, they 
are grounded in themselves. They are such as are grounded in their own bodies. 
They have the mastery over the primary cause ; at their wish the sattva and 
rajas and tamas come into activity. They live as long as the creation,2> as 
it is handed down in the Sacred Word, 1 "All these having perfected their 
souls, together 2 with Brahma enter, when the reversal-of-creation (pratisamcara) 
is reached at the end of the highest [world], into the highest state." Having 
thus stated the common qualities of these four groups of gods, he describes 
their special qualities by taking them up in detail with the words, Of these 
[four]. The gods called Acyuta take delight in contemplation upon coarse 
objects. With this they are satisfied. The gods called Quddhanivasa take 
delight in contemplation upon subtile objects. With this they are satisfied. 
The gods called Satyabhas take delight in contemplation upon the organs 3 as 
objects. With this they are satisfied. The gods called Samjnasamjhins take 
delight in contemplation upon the feeling of personality and nothing more. 
With this they are satisfied. All these have recourse to concentration conscious 
[of objects]. And if it be asked why there is no mention here, among [these] 
worlds, of those who have given themselves to concentration not conscious [of 
an object], those namely who are discarnate and those [whose bodies] are resolved 
into primary matter, the reply is <SBut the discarnate and those [whose bodies] 
are resolved into primary matter.2> For those whose thinking-substance is in 
fluctuation, and to whom objects are shown, carry on worldly affairs and remain 
in the world. But the discarnate 4 and those [whose bodies] are resolved into 
primary matter, although they have a task to perform, do not so remain. 
This is the meaning. All this, with the exception of the Satya-world and as 
far [down] as to Avici, is directly perceptible to the yogin. Upon the door 
of the sun means upon the tube called Susumna. And inasmuch as, even 
with such an extent [of constraint], direct perception of [all] this does not 
occur, he says Then. Then also upon other [objects], that is, also upon 
objects other than the Susumna taught by the professor of yoga, until all this 
world is seen. For the sattva of the thinking-substance is by its own nature 
capable of illumining the whole [world]. But when covered by the defilement 

1 Contrast with Vayu Purana ci. 85. anenanandanugatam i. 41 of Vacaspati's 

2 Compare Bh. Gita viii. 16. comment, p. 86 8 (Calc. ed.). 
8 Compare bahihkaranam ivopannam iti, tad * See i. 19. 



iii. 26 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [260 

of tamas it illumines only that portion which is laid bare by rajas. It illumines 
the cosmic space laid bare by the constraint upon the door of the sun. But 
this does not apply similarly in other cases also. Since constraint upon this 
[cosmic space] has power to lay only so much bare. Thus all is cleared up. 



27. [As a result of constraint] upon the moon [there arises 
the intuitive] knowledge of the arrangement of the stars. 

By performing constraint upon the moon he would discern the 
arrangement of the stars. 



28. [As a result of constraint] upon the pole-star [there arises 
the intuitive] knowledge of their movements. 

Then by performing constraint upon the pole-star he would know 
the movements of the stars. By constraint upon heavenly cars, 
[for example, the chariot of the sun], he would discern them. 



29. [As a result of constraint] upon the wheel of the navel 
[there arises the intuitive] knowledge of the arrangement of 
the body. 

By performing constraint upon the wheel ' of the navel he would 
discern the arrangement of the body. The humours are three, 
wind and bile and phlegm. The [corporeal] elements 2 (dhatu) 
are seven, skin and blood and flesh and sinew and bone and 
marrow and semen. Here (esa) the mention is such that the pre- 
ceding element is in each case exterior to that next preceding. 



30. [As a result of constraint] upon the well of the throat 
[there follows] the cessation of hunger and of thirst. 

Below the tongue there is a cord ; below that is the throat ; below 
that the well. As a result of concentration upon that, hunger and 
thirst do not torment. 



1 Compare H. Walter: Hathayogapradi- 8 Compare i. 30, p. 67 4 (Calc. ed.). By 
pika, pp. xiii-xiv. adding pmna and atman the list is in- 

creased to nine. 



261] Specimens of applied power [ iii. 33 

31. [As a result of constraint] upon the tortoise-tube [there 
follows] motionlessness [of the mind-stuff]. 

Below the well there is, within the chest, a tube in shape like 
a tortoise. By performing constraint upon this, the yogin gains 
a motionless state like that of a serpent or of a guana. 1 

Whenever the yogin desires to know one thing or another, he should perform 
constraint upon that. Thus constraint which leads to the cessation of hunger 
and of thirst, and which leads to motionlessness, is taught by the words of the 
Sutra and is explained by the Comment with an explanation which is a [mere 
matter of] reading. So it is not explained [here]. 



32. [As a result of constraint] upon the radiance in the head 
[there follows] the sight of the Siddhas. 

Within an aperture in the skull there is a resplendent radiance. 2 
As a result of constraint upon this [radiance there follows] the 
sight of the Siddhas roving in the spaces between the sky 3 and 
the earth. 

32. [As a result of constraint] upon the radiance in the head [there 
follows] the sight of the Siddhas. 

The words <in the head) imply the tube (nadi) called Susumna, constraint 
upon) that, he means. 



33. Or as a result of vividness (prdtibha) [the yogin discerns] 
all. 

The so-called vividness is the deliverer 4 (tdraha). This is the 
preliminary form of the [intuitive] knowledge derived from 
discrimination. Just as the light at dawn [precedes] the sun. 
In this other way (tena vd) the yogin knows all 5 at the rise of the 
vivid [intuitive] knowledge. 

33. Or as a result of vividness (prdtiblia) [the yogin discerns] all. 
Vivid-light [that is] self-cogitation (uha). This develops into vividness. For in 
the case of one who practises a constraint which leads to the Elevation (prasam- 

1 These two animals exemplify the rigidity, 2 Compare Mahanarayana Up. xi. 10-12. 

and not as VijSana Bhiksu says, the * Pan. iv. 2. 32. 

convoluted state of the mind-stuff. * See iii. 54. 

The word godha is mentioned in Cowell 6 See J. H. Leuba : Hallucinations of Light 
and Gough's translation of the Sarva- (Revue Philosophique, vol. 54, 1902, 

darcanasamgraha, p. 238. p. 447). And compare iii. 40. 



iii. 33 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [262 

Myana), there results, when he attains perfection therein, an [intuitive] know- 
ledge due to that self-asserting which is the preliminary indication (linga) of 
the dawning of the Elevation. In this way the yogin discerns all. And this 
[intuitive] knowledge, since it serves to bring the Elevation near, delivers from 
the round-of-rebirth and so is called the ' deliverer '. 



34. [As a result of constraint] upon the heart [there arises] 
a consciousness of the mind-stuff. 

In this citadel of Brahma * is the house [of the mind-stuff], a tiny 
lotus [of the heart] [there arises] a discernment of that. As 
a result of constraint upon this [there arises] a consciousness of 
the mind-stuff. 

34. [As a result of constraint] upon the heart [there arises] a conscious- 
ness of the mind-stuff. 

The word heart is explained in the words, in the citadel of Brahma.^ 
Because it is great (brhat) the self is Brahma. His citadel, [that is] retreat. 
For with reference to this [citadel] he knows this, that it is his property. The 
cave is a den. That same lotus with downward head is the dwelling of the central- 
organ. He gives the reason for this consciousness of the mind-stuff by saying 
a discernment of that.^ By constraint upon this he discerns the mind-stuff 
with its own peculiar fluctuations. 



35. Experience is a presented-idea which fails to distinguish 
the sattva and the Self, which are absolutely uncommingled 
[in the presented-idea]. Since the sattva exists as object for 
another, the [intuitive] knowledge of the Self arises as the 
result of constraint upon that which exists for its own sake. 
The sattva of the thinking-substance, with its disposition to 
brightness, by mastering the rajas and tamas which are equally 
dependent upon the sattva, enters into a mutation as a result of 
the presented-idea of the difference between the sattva and the 
Self. Therefore the Self, of which we can only say that it is 
Intellect (citi), which is other [than the aspects (guna)"], and which 
is undefiled (cuddha) [by objects], is absolutely contrary in quality 
even to the sattva which is mutable. Experience is a presented- 
idea which fails to distinguish these two which are absolutely 

1 Chand. Up. viii. 1. 1. 



263] The Self distinct but unseparated [ iii. 35 

uncommingled. Because the Self has objects shown to it. This 
[same] presented-idea of experience is an object for sight, since 
the sattva exists for the sake of another. But as a result of 
constraint upon that presented-idea, which is distinguished from 
this [sattva], which is Intellect and nothing more, and which is 
other [than the aspects (guna)~\, and which belongs to the Self, 
[as a result of this,] that insight whose object is the Self arises. 
The Self is not seen by that presented-idea of the Self whose 
essence is the sattva of the thinking-substance. It is the Self 
which sees the presented-idea which depends upon its own self. 
For in this sense it has 1 been said, " Wherewith, pray, could 
one discern the Discerner ? " 

35. . . . Sattva . . . [intuitive] knowledge. When, by reason of its being 
altogether overwhelmed by rajas and tamas, even the thinking-substance, bright 
in form and exceedingly clear though it is, can in its mutation as a discriminative 
discernment, be absolutely distinguished from intelligence, how much more so 
then the rajas and tamas, which are inert (Jada) by nature ! With this in 
mind the author of the Sutras uses the words, <the sattva and the Self.> 
Taking up this same point the author of the Comment also says The sattva 
of the thinking-substance, with its disposition to brightness.^ Not merely one 
whose disposition is to brightness, but one which has entered into a mutation 
in the form of discriminative discernment. Inasmuch as it is altogether 
undefiled [by objects] and bright, it is absolutely similar to intelligence 
[caitanya). So there is a commingling, as he implies in the words equal. 
^Dependent upon sattva^ means a relation without which it cannot exist. 
The rajas and tamas which are equally dependent upon the sattva are so-called 
[in the Comment]. Mastered means overwhelmed. He states that there is 
no commingling in the words <KTherefore . . . even. The word ca is here in 
the sense of ' even '. [Contrary in quality] not merely to the rajas and tamas 
[but even to the sattva]. This is the meaning. The word mutable indicates 
the quality contrary to the Self who is immutable. A presented idea which 
fails to distinguish, because the thinking-substance, which is serene and cruel 
and infatuated, takes the image of the intelligence (caitanya). And so the 
serene and other forms are falsely attributed to the intelligence, just as the 
trembling of the clear water which reflects the moon is falsely attributed to 
the moon. He gives the reason for the experience in the words ^Because the 
Self has objects shown to it. This has been explained more than once. 2 If 
it be objected that the sattva of the thinking-substance might be different from 

1 Brhad-Aran. Up. ii. 4. 14 and iv. 5. 15. a For example, i. 4, p. 16 ; ii. 17, p. 141 ; 

and also iv. 22, p. 306 (Calc. ed.). 



iii. 35 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [264 

the Self, but that experience could not be different from the Self, he replies This 
[same]. This [same] presented-idea of experience is a presented-idea of a kind of 
experience belonging to the sattva. Hence as something for the sake of another 
experience is an object-for-sight. For the sattva is for the sake of another in that it 
is a combination of parts. And because experience is an external-aspect of this 
[saftfla], it would also be for the sake of another. Furthermore, that other for 
whose sake it is, would be the experiencer. His is the experience. Or [another 
explanation]. For experience (bhoga) is passing-through {anubhava) pleasure or 
pain which are felt to be coactive or counteractive. And this [experience] 
cannot be coactive or counteractive to itself. Because a fluctuation cannot be 
opposed to itself. Therefore experience must be for the sake of something that 
is to be made coactive or counteractive. This experiencer is the self. Experience 
is an object-for-sight to him. But . . . that presented-idea, which is distinguished 
from this which is for the sake of another. These words [from the Comment] 
are explained by supplying the other words in the ablative case ' for the sake of 
another '. An objector says, ' This may be true. But if the insight has the 
Self for its object, then whew ! Sir ! the Self becomes the object-for-insight 
by the insight ! There would surely be other insights, one after the other, and 
we should fall into an infinite regress ! ' In reply to this he says The Self 
is not .... by that presented-idea of the Self. The connexion-of-ideas is 
this. The Intellect (citi) illumines that which is inert (jacja), and that which 
is inert does not [illumine] the intellect. The idea presented to the Self has 
as its essence that which is not intelligent. How can this [presented-idea] 
illumine a being whose essence is intelligence? On the other hand, how 
can [the Self], whose essence is intelligence and whose brightness does not 
depend upon another, be properly said to illumine that which is inert ? When 
he says whose essence is the sattva of the thinking-substance he describes 
the inertness in so far as there is identity with the non-intelligent form. [We 
say that the sattva of the thinking-substance] depends upon the Self to the 
extent that it depends on the image of the Self as entered into the sattva of 
the thinking-substance, in the same sense that a person depends upon [his] 
face reflected in a mirror [if he wish to see himself]. [And the sattva is said 
to depend upon the Self.] But not [as the objector said], because the sattva 
of the thinking-substance illumines the Self. It is the sattva of the thinking- 
substance which reflects the Self united with this presented-idea, and which 
depends upon the Intelligence (caitanya) which has been mirrored (chayapanna) 
in it [as the intelligence] of the Self. Thus it exists for the sake of the Self. 
On this same point he quotes the Sacred Word by saying For in this sense 
it has been said by the Icvara " the Discerner." The meaning is that [He 
is discerned] by no one. 



265] Hyperaesthetic sensations [ iii. 37 

36. As a result of this [constraint upon that which exists 
for its own sake], there arise vividness and the organ-of- 
[supernal]-hearing * and the organ-of-[supernal] -feeling and 
the organ-of-[supernal]-sight and the organ-of-[supernal]- 
taste and the organ-of-[supernal]-smell. 

As a result of vividness, there arises an [intuitive] knowledge of 
the subtile or concealed or remote, whether past or future. As 
a result of the organ-of-[supernal]-hearing, one hears supernal 
sounds ; as a result of the organ-of-[supernal]-feeling, one has 
access to supernal touch ; as a result of the organ-of-[supernal]- 
sight, one has the consciousness 2 of supernal colour ; as a result of 
the organ-of-[supernal]- taste, one has a consciousness of supernal 
flavour ; as a result of the organ-of-[supernal] smell, 3 one has an 
[intuitive] knowledge 4 of supernal fragrance. These unceasingly 
arise. 

This restraint, moreover, upon that which exists for its own sake continues until 
the primary cause has fulfilled its peculiar task (kdrya), the [intuitive] knowledge 
of the Self. He describes all the supernormal powers which [the yogin] receives 
before that [intuitive knowledge comes]. 36. As a result of this . . . there 
arise ... So then it has been asserted that the central-organ and the organ of 
hearing and of feeling and of sight and of taste and of smell, which have been 
helped by the external-aspects which arise from yoga, are in each single case in 
direct causal relation with the supernal sounds and so forth and with the [in- 
tuitive] knowledge of vividness (pratibha). The five organs, of hearing and so 
on, which apperceive supernal sounds and so forth have technical names such as 
the organ-of-[supernal]-hearing and the rest. The Comment is easy. 



37. In concentration these [supernal activities] are obstacles ; 
in the emergent state they are perfections (siddhi). 
These, the vividness and so forth, arising in the yogin whose 
mind-stuff is concentrated, are obstacles, in that they go counter 
to the sight which belongs to this [concentrated mind-stuff]. 

1 This word yamna is from the causative relation to the object. 

stem. The ManiprabhS (p. 64 ai , Ben. 8 Compare Hopkins, Yoga-technique, JAOS. 

ed.) explains it as being ' the organs of (1901), vol. 22, p. 344 20 . 

knowing supernal sounds and so on ' * The word vijiidna is loosely used. It 

(divyandth <;dbda . . . ddinarh gruhakani). seems to indicate whatever comes to 

9 A samvid is a perception with little direct consciousness. 



34 [ 



H.O.S. 17 



iii. 37 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [266 

[But] arising [in the yogin] whose mind-stuff is emergent, they 
are perfections. 

Occasionally a man, after beginning constraint upon the self as object, acquires 
those perfections which are subsidiary to this, and thinks because of the power 
(prabhava) of these [perfections] that he has effected his purpose, and so might 
cease the constraint. So [the author] says, 37. In concentration these 
[supernal activities] are obstacles ; in the emergent state they are perfec- 
tions (siddhi). For a man whose mind-stuff is emergent thinks highly of these 
perfections, just as a man born in misery considers even a small bit of wealth 
a pile of wealth. But a yogin whose mind-stuff is concentrated must avoid 
these [perfections] even when brought near to him. One who longs for the 
final goal of life, the absolute assuagement of the three-fold anguish, how could 
he have any affection for those perfections which go counter to [the attainment] 
of that [goal] ? This is the meaning both of the Sutra and of the Comment. 



38. As a result of slackening the causes of bondage and as 
a result of the consciousness of the procedure [of the mind- 
stuff], the mind-stuff penetrates into the body of another. 

By virtue of the latent-deposit of karma in the body, the central- 
organ which is changeable and unstable becomes established. This 
is bondage. By virtue of concentration there is a slackening of 
this karma which is the cause of bondage. And the consciousness 
of the procedure [of the mind-stuff] comes only from concentration. 
As a result of the dwindling of the bondage of karma, and as 
a result of the consciousness of the procedure of his mind-stuff, 
the yogin by withdrawing mind-stuff from his own body deposits 
it in other bodies. The organs also fly after [ii. 54] the mind- 
stuff thus deposited. Just * as, for instance, when the king-bee 
flies up, the bees fly up after him, so the organs follow after the 
mind-stuff in its penetration into the body of another. 

After thus stating that power, in the form of [intuitive] knowledge extending 
as far as to the sight of the Self, is the result of constraint, he gives, as another 
result of constraint, power in the form of action. 38. . . . The causes of bond- 
age . . . penetration. When he says By virtue of concentration^ this means 
under 1. the power of the constraint whose object is the causes of bondage. The 
word ^concentration^ is used [instead of 'constraint,'] because it is pre- 
dominant [in constraint]. A procedure is that by which something proceeds into 

1 Compare Pracna Up. ii. 4. 



267] Externalizing of mind-stuff [ iii. 39 

another thing. It means the tubes (nadi) [that is] the paths for the coming and 
going of mind-stuff. As a result 2. of constraint upon this passage there is a con- 
sciousness of it. And as a result of this [as well as of 1. the constraint upon 
the causes of bondage], since the causes of bondage are slackened, it [the mind- 
stuff] is not held back by this [yogin]. Although the mind-stuff is not held back 
as it soars into the upward path, it cannot without impediment pass forth from 
his body nor enter into the other's body. Therefore the passage for this must 
also be known. The organs moreover follow the mind-stuff and settle down in 
their respective places in the other's body. 



39. As a result of subjugating the Uddna, there is no adhesion 
to water or mud or thorns or similar objects, and [at death] 
the upward flight. 

The fluctuation of the whole complex of organs which is dis- 
tinguished by having the different vital-forces (prdna) is vitality. 1 
Its activity is five-fold. Prdna has its course through the mouth 
and nose and its fluctuation extends as far as the heart. And 
Samdna, since it distributes equally, has its fluctuation from the 
navel. Apdna, since it leads down, has its fluctuation as far as 
the sole of the foot. Uddna, since it leads up, has its fluctuation 
as far as the head. Vydna is pervading. Among these Prdna is 
predominant. As a result of subjugating the Uddna there is no 
adhesion to water or mud or thorns or similar objects ; and at the 
time of decease there is the upward flight. This [upward flight] 
he attains by mastery [of the Uddna], 

89. Udana . . . and . . . the upward flight. The fluctuation of the whole 
complex of organs is life. The words ^distinguished by having the different 
vital-forces (prana)^ refer to that [fluctuation] of which the different vital-forces 
are the distinction. The organs have two kinds [of fluctuations], an inner and 
an outer. The outer is distinguished by the external-sense (dlocana) of colour 
and similar sensations. The inner is life. For this is a special kind of effort 
and it leads to the different activities of the winds (maruta) which the body 
comprehends. This effort is common to all the organs. As they say 2 " The 
fluctuations common to the [inner] organs are the five winds (vayu), vital-airs 
and so on." Because they are the distinguishing-characteristic of this [life]. 

1 Defined as a struggle for life by Vaca- 15,p.217 8 . It is mentioned in the list 

spati jwanam prdna-dhdrana-prayatna- iii. 18, p. 230 4 (Calc. ed.). 

Ihedo 'samviditaf cittasya dharmah iii. 3 Samkhya-karika 29. 



iii. 39 1 Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [268 

The action [or] function of this effort is of five kinds. 1. Prana extends from 
the tip of the nose to the heart. 2. Samana is one which evenly distributes as 
required in different places the various juices which are mutations of food eaten 
and drunk. And its locality extends from the heart and to the navel. 3. Apana 
is that which leads to the carrying off of urine, faeces, foetus, &c. And its 
activity (vrtti) is from the navel and to the sole of the foot. 4. Udana is so-called 
because it lfads up [that is] leads upwards such things as secretions. And its 
activity is from the tip of the nose and to the head. 5. Yyana is one that 
pervades [the whole body]. Of these thus described Prana is predominant, since 
the Sacred Word 1 declares that when that goes forth all goes forth, "Following 
the Prana when it goes forth, all the vital-forces (prana) go forth." Having thus 
explained the differences between the vital-forces (prana) with respect to activity 
and locality, he leads up to the meaning of the sQtra with the words As a result 
of subjugating the Udana.^ When constraint has been performed upon the 
Udana, [then] as a result of its subjugation, [the yogin] is not held back by 
water or similar objects. And at the time of decease his upward flight is by the 
path 2 which commences with the flame. As a result of this [constraint] he 
attains by mastery to this upward flight. These supernormal powers that result 
from constraint upon the vital-forces beginning with Prana, if there be success in 
it, should be understood according to the differences in the subjugations of 
activities and of localities [in the body]. 



40. As a result of subjugating the Samana [there arises] a 
radiance. 

The yogin who has subjugated the Samana by causing a pulsation 
of the flames, becomes radiant. 3 

40. ... the Samana ... a radiance. There is a pulsation, a flaming forth 
of the flame in the body. 

41. As a result of constraint upon the relation between the 
organ-of-hearing, and the air (akaga), [there arises] the 
supernal organ-of-hearing. 4 

For all organs-of- hearing the air is the [physical] basis, and for all 
sounds. In which sense it has been said "All 6 those whose 

1 Compare Brhad Ar. Up. iv. 4. 3. eluding the qdrada MS. instead of 

8 This is the devayana. See Brhad Ar. Up. ekadega-frutitvam. One is tempted to 

vi. 1. 3 and 18 and Chand. Up. iv. 15. surmise that there might be another 

5-6 ; Chand. Up. v. 10. 1. reading tulya-de$ya or tulya-deglya in- 

8 Compare prabhd bhdskarasya (iii. 13, stead of tulyadega, with a meaning 

p. 243 6 , Calc. ed.). similar to Vacaspati's gloss jatlya. This 

* iii. 51, p. 267 a (Calc. ed.). is Pancacikha's twelfth fragment 

8 Reading eka$rutitvam with six MSS. in- according to Garbe. 



269] Supernormal audition [ iii. 41 

processes-of-hearing (gravana) are in the same place have the same 
kind-of-hearing (eka-grutitvam)" 1 And this [fact that the air is the 
locus of sounds] is declared to be the [first] characteristic mark of 
air. And the second is that it is not covered 2 [by anything more 
extensive]. Thus because a thing which is not-limited-in-extent 
(amurta) is evidently not covered [by anything], it is also 
recognized that air is [all] pervasive. From the perception of 
sounds it is inferred that the organ-of-hearing exists. For in the 
case of a deaf man and of a man not deaf, the one perceives sound 
and the other not. Hence it is the organ-of-hearing only which is 
the field of operation for sound. For the yogin who has performed 
constraint upon the relation between the organ-of-hearing and the 
air, the supernal 3 ear begins. 

It has already been stated [iii. 36, p. 246 1-3 Calc. ed.] that as a result of 
constraint upon that which exists for its own sake [this would be the mukhya], 
there remains a subsidiary [perfection], the organ-of-[supernal]-hearing and other 
[organs]. Now the organ-of-[supernal]-hearing and other [organs] result from 
the constraint which has the organ-of-[supernal]-hearing and other [organs] as 
its sole purpose. 41. . . . Organ-of-hearing . . . organ-of-hearing. He 
says that the object of the constraint is the relation between organ-of-hearing 
and the air in the relation of the contained to the container, in the words 
^CFor all.^ All organs-of-hearing, although made of the personality-substance, 
have the air which is [contained in] the hollow-space of the auditory canal as 
its [physical] basis. The organ-of-hearing has its seat (dyatana) there. For if we 
assist or injure this [auditory canal], we find that the organ-of-hearing has 
been assisted or injured. [Air is] also [the physical basis] for sounds which are 
causes co-operating with the organ-of-hearing. When a sound is to be heard 
as coming from an earthen or other substance, the organ-of-hearing, which is 
in the hollow of the auditory canal, presupposes that there is a special 
sound residing in the air 4 (nabhas) which is its own [that is, the organ's] 
substance. [That this is so is] clear (drstam) [from analogy]. Thus when, 
for instance, one wishes to have an external sense (dlocana) of smell, which 
is contained in this case in earth, by means of the organ-of-smell which is 
a co-operating [non-material] cause for those things which have smell and 
[taste] as their [specific] qualities, [we find similarly that the sense of smell 

1 The Yogavarttika, p. 237 u , also suggests sists in a kind of hyperaesthetic per- 

this reading. ception of minute sounds, &c, which 

a The word andvaranam in the sense of are like subtile elements {divyatvam 

navriyate anena. In the Varttika it is tanmdtmdirupasuksmafabdddigrdhakat- 

said to be ' free space ' (avakdfd). vam). 

3 Balarama says that the supernality con- * That is to say the dkd$a. 



iii. 41 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhiiti [270 

requires such a special kind of smell in so far as it is contained in the earthen 
thing which contains it]. And it has already been said that the organs of smell 
and of taste and of touch and of sight and of hearing, although made of the 
personality-substance, do have the elements as their locus. For if we assist 
or injure the elements, we find that we have assisted or injured the organ-of- 
smell or some other of the organs. This same organ-of-hearing, which is 
made of the personality-substance, moreover resembles a piece of iron in 
that it is attracted by a magnet-like sound, in the mouth, produced by the 
mouth of the speaker, and, by a succession of its own functions {vrtti), has the 
external sense of the word which has come to the mouth of the speaker. Hence 
there are sense-presentations of sounds functioning at different points of space. 
[And this sense-presentation], common to all living-beings, cannot in the 
absence of inhibition, be counted as an invalid-source-of-ideas. And in this 
sense there is an utterance by Paficacikha, "All those whose-processes-of -hearing 
(gravana) are in the same place have the same kind-of-hearing." Those persons 
whose processes-of-hearing are in the same place are those persons, like Chaitra, 
whose organs-of-h earing are of that kind. The meaning is that the processes- 
of-hearing of all are in the air (akaga). The air, moreover, the locus of the 
organs-of-hearing, because it is produced from the fine-element (tanmatra), 
whose [specific] quality is sound, has sound as its specific quality. 1 By which 
sound as a co-operating [non-material] cause it grasps the sounds from earthen 
and other substances. Therefore there is for all one species of hearing (gruti) 
with regard to sound. This is the meaning. Thus then it has been shown 
that air is the locus of the organ-of-hearing and that it has sounds as its 
[specific] quality. And this fact that there is one kind of hearing (eJcagrutitvam) 
is the [first] characteristic mark of air. For this one kind of hearing is that 
condition which phenomenalizes sound. This very thing which is its substrate 
(agraya) is the thing expressed by the word air. For in the absence of such 
a hearing there is no [individual] phenomenal sound [belonging to earthen 
and other substances]. Moreover such a hearing cannot be a quality (guna) 
of the various [coarse substances] such as earth, because, if it be such, these cannot 
be both the thing-to-be-phenomenalized and the conditions-which-phenomenalize. 
And the [second] characteristic mark of air is that it is not covered 
[by anything more extensive]. If there were no air, the things not-limited- 
in-extent would be pressed together and could not be separated even by 
needles. And so as a result everything would be covered by everything. 
And it cannot be said that the not being covered [by anything] is merely 
because things-not-limited-in-extent are not present. For this negation implies 
a positive entity [for example, a thing-limited-in-extent]. And if this positive 
entity do not exist, there can be no negation of it. Nor can it be said that the 

1 Compare Vaicesika-siitra vii. 1. 22 to- p. 61, 11. 19-21 (Vizian. ed.). See also 

gether with the words of C, ridhara, Tarka-sariigraha, 14. 



271] Levitation [ iii. 42 

Energy of Intellect (citirahti) could be the substrate for this 1 [free space not 
covered by anything]. For being immutable it cannot have [spatial] properties 
that precisely determine. And again it cannot be said that space (dig) and time 
are substances (dravya) over and above earth and the other [coarse elements]. 
Consequently that particular mutation [which is not covered by anything more 
extensive] belongs to air only. Thus all is cleared up. When it is proved that 
the fact that nothing covers it is a characteristic mark of air, so that wherever 
there is anything that has nothing covering it, there always air is, then [all-] 
pervasiveness is also proved, as he says <KThus because a thing which is not- 
limited-in-extent.2> He gives the source-of-the-valid-idea to prove the real exist- 
ence of the organ-of-hearing by saying From the perception of sounds.^ For 
[every] action is to be effected by an instrument, just as the action of chopping 
or the bike is to be effected by the axe or something similar. So in this case also 
the act of perceiving sound must be accomplished by an instrument. And that 
which is the instrument is the organ-of-hearing. Now if it be asked why may 
not the eye or some other organ be the instrument of this [act], he replies in 
the case of a deaf man and of a man not deaf. This is determined by positive 
and negative arguments. And this is only an elliptical statement. For mutatis 
mutandis we must say that as a result of constraint upon the relation between 
the organ-of-touch and wind (vdta), between organ-of-sight and radiance, between 
the organ-of-taste and water, and between the organ-of-smell and earth, supernal 
touch and other [supernal sensations] would also arise. 



42. Either as the result of constraint upon the relation 
between the body and the air (akapa), or (ca) as the result of the 
balanced-state of lightness, such as that of the cotton-fibre, 
there follows the passing through air. 

Wherever there is a body there is air, because it [air] gives space 
to the body. The relation [of the body] with this [air] is that of 
obtaining [pervasion]. By performing constraint upon this relation 
the yogin subjugates the relation with this [air]. And gaining 
the balanced-state of lightness such as that of the cotton-fibre, 
even to [that of] atoms [of cotton-fibre], he becomes light himself. 
And by reason of this lightness he walks with both feet upon 
water. Next after this, however, he walks upon nothing more 
than a spider's thread, and then upon sunbeams. Thereafter he 
courses through the air at will. 

1 Reading (with Poona text) tad-afrayd. 



iii. 42 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [272 

42. . . . body .... passing through. By performing constraint upon the 
relation between the body and the air, or upon something light such as a cotton- 
fibre, [that is] by gaining the balanced-state [that is] the state of the mind which 
rests in the [thing] and in which it is tinged [i. 41] by it. He describes the 
sequence of the perfections by the words, upon water. 



43. An outwardly un-adjusted fluctuation is the Great Dis- 
carnate ; as a result of this the dwindling of the covering to 
the brightness. 

The fluctuation assumed by the central-organ outside the body is 
the fixed-attention (dhdrand) called Discarnate. If it is only an 
outer ' fluctuation of the central-organ which abides in the body, it 
is called adjusted (kalpita). But if it is an outer fluctuation of the 
central-organ, which is itself externalized, in that it [the fluctuation] 
disregards the body, it is of course called unadjusted. [The yogins] 
by means of the adjusted one among these two accomplish the 
unadjusted Great Discarnate, by means of which yogins enter 
the bodies of others. And as a result of this fixed-attention, the 
covering of the sattva of the thinking-substance, whose essence 
is brightness, which has the three-fold fruition from the hindrances 
and the karma, and whose root is rajas and tamas, dwindles away. 

He describes yet another constraint which leads to the penetration of 
another's body and which leads to the dwindling of the hindrances and 
karma and fruitions. 43. An outwardly .... dwindling. The discarnate he 
describes in the words The fluctuation assumed. In order to show the means 
to the Great Discarnate state which is unadjusted he first describes the discarnate 
in the words Clf it is. The words only a fluctuation^ mean thinking only in 
an imaginary way. He describes the Great Discarnate in the words But if it 
is. He shows that the adjusted and the unadjusted have the relation of means 
to end by saying among these two. Is it that one merely enters another's 
body as a result of this? Not so, he says in the words And as a result 
of this.) ^CAs a result of this fixed attention^ means when the Great Discarnate 
activity of the central-organ has been perfected. It has its three-fold fruition, 
from the hindrances and from karma, in birth and length-of-life and kind-of- 

The outer adjustment would be in part outwardly unadjusted state there is 

a voluntary act. Compare the ex- a renunciation of the self and of the 

planation in the Maniprabha me mano sense of individuality as limited by 

bahir astv ita kalpanayd. But in the a body dehe 'hambhavatyagah. 



273] Constraint upon five kinds of being [ iii. 44 

experience [ii. 13]. And it is this that has its root in rajas and tamas. Since 
from mere sattva when freed from rajas and tamas there arises discriminative 
discernment only. Thus the three-fold fruition in so far as it is rooted in rajas 
and tamas, and because its essence is in them, obscures the sattva of the 
thinking-substance. And as soon as these have dwindled away, the mind-stuff 
of the yogin freed from its covering [by them] roves and discerns at will. 



44. As a result of constraint upon the coarse (sihula) and the 
essential-attribute (svarupa) and the subtile [suJcsma) and the 
inherence (anvaya) and the purposiveness (arthavattva), there 
is a subjugation of the elements. 

In this [system] i. the [five elements] beginning with earth [which 
in essence are a generic form and a particular] have [as particulars] 
sounds and other perceptible things ; [these] particulars, together 
with their properties (dharma), shape and the rest [which are to 
be described], are technically called <coarse.> This is the first 
form of the elements. ii. The second form is its generic-form. 
For example, limitation-in-extent (milrti) is the [generic-form] of 
earth ; liquidity, of water ; heat, of fire ; wind [is] mobile, for air 
goes everywhere. This second form is technically called <essential- 
attributo This generic-form has sounds and other [concrete 
perceptible things] as its particulars. And in this sense it has 
been l said, " All these [perceptible things] that are inseparably 
connected with one genus praedicabile are distinguished only by 
their properties." In this system a substance (dravya) is an aggre- 
gate 2 (samuddya) of the generic-form and of the particular. For 
a collection (samuha) is of two kinds, 1. that in which [the names 
of] its different component parts have disappeared, as for instance, 
a body, a tree, a herd, a forest 3 ; and 2. that collection in which 
the different component parts are specified [each] by a term, as for 
instance ' of both kinds, gods-and-human-beings.' 4 One part of the 
collection is gods and the second part is human beings. Only by 
means of these two is it termed a collection. Furthermore, either 

1 Vijnana Bhiksu says purvacarya-samvadam aha. 

8 Compare Patanjali Mahabhasya I. 217 10 ; I. 289 2ff ; I. 377 llff ; III. 3 uff (Kielhorn). 
8 Compare Tattva Bindu (Ben. ed.), p. II 16 . 
* Compare Catapathabrahmana ii. 2. 2. 
35 [h.o.s. 17] 



iii. 44 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [274 

the distinction or the identity may be emphasized. We may say 
' a grove of mango-trees ' [or] ' gathering of Brahmans ' or we may 
say 'a mango-grove' [or] 'a Brahman-gathering.' Again the 
[collection] is two-fold, 1. that of which the parts exist separately ; 
and 2. that of which the parts do not exist separately. 1 A grove 
[or] a gathering is a collection from which the parts are separable. 
A body or a tree or an atom is a whole 2 (samghdta) of which the 
parts are not separable. Patafijali says that a substance is a 
collection the diiferent component parts of which do not exist 
separately. Thus it has been explained what the essential- 
attribute is. iii. Now what is the subtile form, [of these elements] ? 
[The answer is] it is subtile-substance, the cause of the elements. 
Of [any] one of these [elements] an atom is one part. Its essence 
is the generic-form and the particular and it is an aggregate 
consisting of different parts which cannot exist separately. 
Similarly with all the tanmdtras. This is the third [form]. iv. 
Now the fourth form of the elements. The aspects with dis- 
positions to discernment and to activity and to inertia and 
conforming to the nature of [their] effects are described by the 
word inherence. v. Now the fifth form of these [elements] is 
purposiveness. The having of experience and of release as their 
purpose is inherent in the aspects (guna). And the aspects are 
[inseparably connected] with the elements and the products of the 
elements. Thus all has a purpose. By constraint upon these five 
elements of the present time in their five forms, the sight of the 
essential-attribute of this or that form and the subjugation of it 
come about. [The yogin] by mastering the five essential-attributes 
of the elements, masters the elements, [and] as a result of their 
subjugation, the evolving-causes of the [coarse] elements follow the 
commands of his will just as the cows follow their own calves. 
44. . . . coarse . . . subjugation .... [The compound is to be analysed as] 
the coarse and the essential-attribute and the subtile and the inherence and 
the purposiveness. As a result of constraint upon these, the coarse and the 
essential-attribute and the subtile and the inherence and the purposiveness, there 

1 Compare Nyaya-sutra ii. 1. 32. 

2 Compare PataSjali Mahabhasya I. 30 M ; I. 31 9 ; 1.32*; I. 169 18ff ; III. 324 12 (Kielhorn). 



275] Concretions and universals [ iii. 44 

is a subjugation of them. i. He describes the coarse 1 by saying In this 
[system].2> The sounds and touches and colours and tastes and smells, belonging 
[respectively] to the earthen and watery and fiery and windy and airy [classes or 
elements], have correspondingly the particulars, such as the first (sadja) or the 
third notes, or heat or cold, or blue or yellow, or astringent or sweet, or fragrant 
or other [particular instances]. For because these are different from each other 
in name and form and use they are the particulars. Of these particulars there are 
five in earth, four (counting out smell) are in water, three (counting out smell 
and taste) are in fire, two (counting out smell and taste and colour) are in wind 
(nabhasvant), sound alone is in the air. Particulars such as these, together with 
their properties (dharma), form and the rest, are technically called <coarse> in 
[this] system. 1. And in this [system], to begin with, the properties belonging 
to the earthen [element] are " Shape, weight, roughness, resistance, and stability ; 
sustenance {vrtti), divisibility, endurance, meagreness, hardness, and usefulness 
to all." 2. The properties of water, "Liquidity, subtilty, brilliance, whiteness, 
sinuosity (mardava), weight, coolness, protectiveness, purification, cohesion are the 
qualities of water." 3. The fiery properties, " Tending-upwards, purifier, burner, 
cooker, without weight, resplendent, destructive, yielding strength, this is fire 
having characteristics different from the two previous [elements]." 4. The 
windy properties, ' ' Horizontal movement, purification, felling, impulsion, power, 
changeability, casting no shadow, aridity, these are the various properties of 
wind." 5. The airy properties, "Pervasiveness, interpenetration, unobstructive- 
ness are enumerated as three properties of air distinct in character from the 
previous properties." These are those properties, the shape and the following ; 
[the particulars were said to be] together with these. And shape is a particular 
instance of generic nature, such as cow-ness. ii. He describes the second form 
[of the elements] by saying The second form is its generic-form.2> Limitation- 
in-extent means natural 2 density. Liquidity is [the generic-form of] water and 
it is the effective cause of cleanliness (mrja) and plumpness and vigour. Heat 
is [the generic-form of] fire (vahni), since everywhere [heat], whether it be 
abdominal or solar or earthly, is inherent in fire (tejas). All this moreover 
is intended to show the identity of property and substance. Wind is motor. 
So he says " By the movement of grass and because it makes the body wander, 
motivity is inferred to be the generic-form of wind which goes everywhere. 
Going-everywhere is air, since it is clear that we apperceive sounds in all 
directions. For it has been previously [iii. 41] explained that one apperceives 
earthen and other sounds by means of the sound which is a [specific] quality 
of air the substance-in-which the organ-of-hearing inheres. This is what is 
1 Compare Bhagavata Pur. xi. 24. 16. but the solidity of snow is not natural, 

'Whatever is natural (samsiddhika) is in that it is due to cause. On the other 

distinct from the thing itself (svalhava) hand solidity is a natural property of 

and yet is not generated by a cause ghee ; whereas liquidity is not, in that 

outside the substance. For example, it is an effect of something outside 

liquidity is a natural property of water ; the substance. 



iii. 44 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [276 

described by the word essential-attribute. One such generic-form such as 
limitation-in-extent has the particular sounds and other perceptible things, 
such as the first note, such as heat, such as whiteness, such as astringency, such 
as fragrance, these constituting the particular instances of the generic- forms such 
as limitation-in-extent. That is to say, the generic-forms, 1 such as the limitations- 
in-extent, such as [the shapes of] lemons or bread-fruit or myrobolans, are also 
distinguished from each other by differences in taste and so on. So that these 
tastes and other qualities are particulars of these [generic-forms]. And in this 
sense it has been said, " All that are inseparably connected with one genus 
praedicabUe ") would refer to each of [the elements] such as earth. [Each of 
these] is inseparably connected with some one genus praedicabUe, limitation- 
in-extent, for example, or liquidity. [These that are thus inseparably connected] 
are distinguished only by their properties, 2 such for example as the first note. 
Thus the generic-form such as limitation-in-extent has been described, and 
the particulars such as the sounds have been described. And to those 3 who 
assert that substance (dravya) is a substrate (agraya) for the generic-form and for 
the particular [to them] he says, of the generic-form. In this system 
substance is an aggregate (samudaya) of the generic-form and of the particular. 
Those who take the point of view that substance is a substrate of these [two] 
even they cannot deny that both are experienced as an aggregate. For if this 
experience be denied, the two cannot have a container-(adMra)-which-underlies 
them. Therefore let us suppose that this [aggregate] is itself the substance. 
But we do not apperceive any substance underlying them different from both 
and from the aggregate of the two [which might be supposed to contain-them- 
by-underlying them], just as the mountain-peak is a distinct thing and other 
than the stones or the aggregate of stones, and underlies them. Thus we say 
that substance is a collection [and not anything underlying]. From this point 
of view, to prevent the [error that substance is any kind of a collection and] 
to reach the position that substance is a special kind of collection, he describes 
various kinds of collections in the words, For ... of two kinds. Since this 
is so, substance is not any kind of a collection. ^COf two kinds^ is a thing 
which exists in two ways. a. One of these kinds is given in the words has 
disappeared.^ These are so-called in whose case the difference between the 
parts has disappeared. One which has parts in whose case the differences 
have disappeared is of this kind. What he means to say is this. The idea 
of the collection raised by words like body, tree, herd, or forest does not bring 
into consciousness the difference between the several parts, since the words are 
not used to express this [difference]. So the collective [sense] only is brought 
to mind. There are four cases given as illustrations: 1. the case in which 
the parts can exist separately, 2. the case in which they cannot exist separately, 
8. an animate thing, 4. an inanimate thing. That parts can exist separately or 

1 Reading sdmdnydny apt. 2 This would be equivalent to the particular (vi^esa). 

* The Vaiceijikas. 



277] Kinds of units [ iii. 44 

cannot exist separately will be stated later. b. The second of the two kinds 
is described in the words, <&. that collection in which the different component 
parts are specified [each] by a term, as for instance ' of both kinds, gods-and- 
human-beings.'^ Now by the expression gods-and-human-beings the two parts 
of the collection which are expressed by the words Cof both kinds2> have been 
specified as being separate. An objection is raised, 'the expression of both 
kinds does not bring the difference between the parts of that [collection] 
into consciousness. How then can we say that the [collection] in which the 
different component parts have been described has received [names]?' The 
reply is in the words of these two. And it is because of these very parts that 
the term collection can be imposed. By the words of both kinds which 
describe a thing as having two parts, the idea of the collection is expressed, 
since a sentence cannot but express the object-intended by the sentence. 
This is the point. Once more he describes a difference in qualities by saying 
Furthermore. Both the identity and the distinction are emphasized. He 
describes the emphasis laid upon the difference in the words, C'a grove of 
mango-trees' [or] 'a gathering of Brahmans.' Because the genitive case 
is prescribed l to express a distinction, as for instance, ' a cow belonging to 
the Gargas.' He describes the emphasis laid upon the identity in the words 2 
'a mango-grove' [or] 'a Brahman-gathering.' [The compound is to be 
analysed thus,] the mango-trees which themselves make up the grove. 
Inasmuch as he wishes to emphasize the identity between the collection and 
its parts, [the words] refer to the same subject. This is the meaning. He states 
another kind of collection by saying Again [the collection] is two-fold. 
A collection of which the parts exist separately, is one the parts of which 
have an independent existence, apart, with intervals between ; for when the 
word 'herd' or 'grove' is spoken, the trees and the cows which are the 
parts of these [collections are thought to] have intervals between them. 
A tree, a cow, or an atom is a collection of which the parts do not exist 
separately, since neither the generic-form and the particular, which are the 
parts of these, have intervals between them, nor do the dewlap and the 
other [characteristic parts] of the cow have intervals between them. From 
among these same collections he selects that collection which constitutes 
a substance (dravya), saying ^cannot be separated.^ Having thus inciden- 
tally explained what a substance is, he sums up the topic in hand in the words 
Thus it has been explained what the essential-attribute is. iii. With the intent 
to state the third form he asks Now ??> He gives the answer in the words 
from which these [coarse elements] are made. Of [any one of] these [coarse 
elements]^ one part, a single mutation, is an atom. The generic-form is the 
limitation-in-extent or the like. The sounds and other [perceptible things] 
are the particulars. [The atom] has its essence in these [two parts]. A collection 
corresponds to such instances [of things] as are in part a generic-form, and in 
1 Panini ii. 3. 50. 2 According to Pan. viii. 4. 5 the n should be changed to n. 



iii. 44 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [278 

part a particular, wherein these parts cannot separately exist and yet have no 
intervals between them. And just as the atom is a subtile (suJcsma) form, so all 
the fine elements (tanmatra) are a subtile form. He brings this to a close in the 
words CThis is.2> <Kiv. Now the fourth form of the elements. The aspects with 
dispositions to discernment and to activity and to inertia and conforming to the 
nature of [their] effects^ means those whose disposition it is to be inseparably 
connected with (anu-gantum), that is, to conform to (anu-pat) the nature of [their] 
effects. Hence they are described by the term inherence (anv-aya). <v. Now 
the fifth form of these [elements] is purposiveness.^ He elaborates the word 
purposiveness by saying ^experienced An objector asks ' Even if it be granted 
that the aspects have a purpose, how can you still say that their effects are 
purposive ? ' In reply to this he says !the aspects. Products of the elements 
are such things as cows or water-jars. Having thus described the object of the 
constraint, he describes the constraint itself and its results in the words [upon 
these. The evolving- causes of the [coarse] elements^ are the elements 
themselves. 



45. As a result of this, atomization (animan) and the other 
[perfections] come about ; [there is] perfection of body ; and 
there is no obstruction by the properties of these [elements]. 

As to these 1 [eight perfections], 1. atomization occurs in case [the 
yogin] becomes atomic ; 2. levitation occurs in case [the yogin] 
becomes light ; 3. magnification (mahiman) occurs in case [the 
yogin] becomes magnified ; 4. extension (prdpti) occurs in case 
[the yogin] touches the moon with a mere finger's tip ; 5. efficacy, 
the non-obstruction of desire, occurs in case [the yogin] dives 
into the earth underground [and] emerges again, as if in water ; 
6. mastery (vapitva) occurs in case [the yogin] masters elements and 
products of elements and is not mastered by others ; 7. sovereignty 
occurs in case [the yogin] is sovereign over the production, ab- 
sorption, and arrangement of these [elements and products] ; 
8. the capacity of determining things according to desire (yatra- 
Jcdmdvasdyitva) is the capacity to will actual facts so that the 
elements which are the evolving-causes remain as he wills. And 
although having power, he does not cause reversal of things. Why 
not ? Because at the will of another [the Icvara], who determines 
things according to desire, and who from the beginning is perfected, 
the elements have been so willed. These are the eight powers. 
1 See VacaBpati in Samkh. Tat. Kaum. on Ear. xxiii. 



279] Eight magic powers [ iii. 45 

Perfection of body is described later. And its external-aspects are 
not obstructed. Earth with its limitation-in-extent [its essential- 
attribute] does not restrict the action of the body and [organs] 
of the yogin. For he penetrates even the rock. The water, liquid 
as it is, wets him not. The fire, hot as it is, burns him not. The 
wind, motor as it is, budges him not. And even in the air, whose 
essence is that nothing is covered [by it], his body is covered. 
Nay more, not even the Siddhas may behold him. 
When the elements follow the commands of his will, what perfection is 
attained by the yogin ? In reply he says 45. As a result of this . . . and . . . 
no obstruction. From the mastery resulting from constraint upon the a. coarse 
[elements], four perfections follow, as he says <KAs to these. 1. Atomization 
[that is] although great he becomes small. 2. Levitation [that is] although great, 
he becomes light and stays in the air like the tuft of a reed. 3. Magnification 
[that is] although small he becomes in dimension an elephant or a mountain 
or a town. 4. Extension [that is] all things become close at hand for the 
yogin. For instance, even while standing on the earth he touches the moon 
with the tip of his finger. He describes the perfection resulting from the 
subjugation by constraint of b. the essential-attribute in the words 5. efficacy, 
the non-obstruction of desire. His own form is not obstructed by the 
limitations-in-extent and other essential-attributes of the elements. He dives 
underground and emerges again as if in water, c. He now gives the perfection 
resulting from the subjugation by constraint of a subtile object by saying 
6. mastery.^ The elements are earth and the other [coarse elements]. The 
products-of-the-elements are such things as cows and water-jars. He becomes 
master of them, independent with regard to them, and not mastered by them. 
Since there is a mastery of the atoms of earth and of the other [coarse elements], 
and of the subtile elements which are the causes of these [elements and 
products], there follows a mastery of the effects of these. Therefore those 
particular elements or products of elements when put into a certain state remain 
in that state, d. He now gives the perfection which results from subjugation by 
constraint upon inherence (anvaya) as its object by saying <s7. sovereignty.^ 
Having subjugated the radical cause of these elements and products-of-elements, 
he becomes sovereign both over their growth [or] production, and over their 
decay [or] destruction, and over their arrangement or proper arrangement, e. He 
now describes the perfection which is the result of constraint upon purposive- 
ness by saying <H8. Fulfilment of whatever is desired is the volition which 
becomes effective.^ Whenever a yogin who has been successful with regard 
to the purposiveness of the aspects wishes anything to serve a particular 
purpose, that thing serves him for that purpose. Making others eat poison, 1 

1 Cf. Raghuvanca viii. 46, srag iyam yadi, &c. ; the stanza is missing in some ed.'s. 



iii. 45 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [280 

he wills that it have the effect of nectar and makes them live. An objector 
says ' This may be so. But why does he not make an interchange of things 
also, just as he makes a reversal of powers, so that he might make the moon 
into the sun, or make Kuhu into Sinlvali ? ' The reply is And although having 
the power, he does not. For assuredly these whose desires are fulfilled do 
not venture to transgress the order of the Exalted Highest Icvara. But the 
powers (gaJcti) of things are not limited in their nature, in so far as they 
differ in species and place and time and intensity. So it is proper that these 
[powers] should follow the commands of this [yogin]. These are the eight 
powers (aigvarya). With regard to the words <and there is no obstruction 
by the properties of these [elements].) By the very mentioning that atomiza- 
tion and the other [perfections] come about, it is clear that there is no 
obstruction by the properties of these [elements]. But this is mentioned 
again to make known the fruitions resulting from the constraints upon all 
the objects mentioned in this sutra. And the same holds good with reference 
to perfections of body. The rest is easy. 



46. Beauty and grace and power and the compactedness of 
the thunderbolt, [this is] perfection of body. 

The perfect body is handsome and alluring and unexcelled in 
power and compact as the thunderbolt. 

He describes the perfection of the body. 46. Beauty . . . perfection .... 
A compactness as of the thunderbolt. Of such a kind that the arrangement 
of the parts is firm and solid. 



47. As a result of constraint upon the process-of-knowing 
and the essential-attribute and the feeling-of-personality and 
the inherence and the purposiveness, [there follows] the 
subjugation of the organs. 

The object-to-be-known is the sounds and other [perceptible objects] 
whose essence is both the generic-form and the particular. 1. The 
process-of-knowing is a fluctuation of the organs with reference to 
these [objects]. And this [process] has not the character (dJcdra) 
of being a process-of-knowing their generic-form only. How, if the 
object as a particular were not seen by the organ, could it be 
determined by the central-organ ? 2. But the essential-attribute 

1 The self-luminous nature of cognition is Siddhanta Muktavall (1898), pp. 131- 

set forth with most subtle discrimina- 134. 

tion by Mr. A. Venis in his note on the 



281] Five subjugations of organs [ iii. 47 

is a collection, inherent in the different parts which cannot exist 
separately, [a collection] of the generic form [for example, the 
audibility] and of the particular [for example, the sounds and so 
forth], [a collection] which belongs to the sattva of the thinking- 
substance whose essence is brightness. The organ is [itself such] 
a substance. 3. The third form of these [organs] is the perso- 
nality-substance with the feeling-of-personality (asmitd) as its 
distinguishing-characteristic. Organs are particulars of this 
generic-form. 4. The fourth form is the aspects (guna) whose 
essence is determination 1 (vyavasaya) and whose disposition is 
to brightness and to activity and to inertia. Of which [aspects] 
the organs together with the personality-substance are a mutation. 
5. The fifth form inseparably connected with the aspects is the 
purposiveness 2 of the Self. Constraint is performed upon one 
after another of these five forms of the organs. As a result of 
the subjugation of the five forms of accomplishing the subjugation 
in each several one of them, there comes about for the yogin the 
subjugation of the organs. 

After the yogin has subjugated the elements his means for subjugating the organs is 
described. 47. Process-of-knowing . . . subjugation. As a result of constraint 
upon these, the process-of-knowing and the essential attribute and the feeling- 
of-personality and the inherence and the purposiveness. The process-of-know- 
ing is an act-of-perception {grhiti). And this [process], for its description, 
requires the object-to-be-known. So he describes the object-to-be-known by 
saying whose essence is both the generic-form and the particular. Having 
described the object-to-be-known, he describes the process-of-knowing in the 
words Cwith reference to these. ^ The fluctuation is about the same as 
an external-sense-process (alocana), an act-of-mutating into the form of an 
object. In reply to those who say that the fluctuation of an organ has as its object 
only the generic-form he says CAnd this has not. It is a process-of-knowing 
because [something] is known. And the process-of-knowing has not 3 for 
its object the generic-form only. For the central-organ, which depends upon 
the external organs, acts upon the external [and not upon the generic-form]. 
Otherwise we should have to admit that there are, for example, no blind or dumb 
persons. So then if the organ were not to have a particular as its object, then 

1 In accordance with Sarhkhya-karaka xxiii 2 Compare ii. 23, p. 158 4 (Calc. ed.) ; also 

it is clear that this term denotes the Samkhya-karika xv and Samkhya-sutra 

gunas in so far as they function as i. 129. 

thinking-substance (buddhi). 3 Reading na sdmdnyamdtragocaram. 

36 JH.O.B. n] 



iii. 47 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [282 

that particular would not be externally-sensed by that [organ]. How then could 
particulars be determined by the central-organ ? Therefore the perception of the 
organs has for its object both the generic-form and the particular. This then is 
the process-of -knowing which is the first form of the organs. 2. He describes the 
second form in the words CBut the essential-attribute. For the personality- 
substance out of a portion of its own sattva generated the organs. Hence that 
generic-form of the organs which belongs to all of them, and those particular 
features which are limited to some such object as colour, both of these two kinds 
also have brightness as their essence. 3. By saying CThe third form of these 
[organs ] he refers to the personality-substance as the cause of the organs. So 
wherever there are organs, there this [personality -substance] must be. Thus since 
it is common to all the organs, it is the generic-form of the organs. This is the 
meaning. 4. He speaks of The fourth form because the aspects (guna) have a 
double form, one whose essence is a determination, and another whose essence is 
to be the object of the determination. Of these [two forms], with reference to the 
fact that its essence is an object of determination [and] that it is an object of 
knowledge, the five fine elements and the elements and the products of the ele- 
ments form themselves ; but with reference to the fact that its essence is a determi- 
nation and that it has the form of a process-of -knowing, the organs together with 
the personality-substance [form themselves]. This is the meaning. The rest is easy. 



48. As a result of this [there follows] speed [great as that] of 
the central-organ, action of the instruments of [knowledge] 
disjunct [from the body], and the subjugation of the primary- 
cause. 

Speed of the mind means that the body acquires motion com- 
parable [to that] of the mind. Action of the instruments 1 of 
knowledge disjunct [from the body] is the acquisition by the 
discarnate organs of the fluctuation required for the place and 
time and object desired. Subjugation of the primary cause is the 
mastery over all evolving causes and evolved effects. These three 
perfections are called Honey-Faced (rnadhupratika). And they 
are acquired as the result of the subjugation in five forms of 
instruments [of perception]. 

He describes the perfections which result from the subjugation, in five kinds, 
of the organs. 48. As a result of this .... and the subjugation. The fact that 
the organs are instruments [of perception] even for the discarnate is described 
as being the action of the instruments [of perception] disjunct [from the body]. 

1 Compare amkara on Brabma-sutra ii. 1. 31. 



283] Subjugation of the primary cause [ iii. 49 

The place is Kashmir or some other [place]. The time is the past or some 
other [time]. The object is subtile or other. As a result of the subjugation of 
the organ and of the inherence, [there follows] mastery of all evolving-causes 
and evolved-effects, a subjugation of the primary cause. These perfections are 
called Honey- Faced by those persons who are expert in the yoga system. An 
objector says 'This may be true. By subjugation of the organs, the organs 
together with their objects may be mastered. But what is gained [by 
subjugation] of the primary cause and the other causes of these [organs] ? ' In 
reply to this he says And they. The instruments [of perception] are the 
organs. The five forms are [the five] processes-of-knowing [iii. 47]. [The 
result follows] from the subjugation of these. What he means to say is this : 
These perfections are not- a result of a subjugation of organs in general but 
of the five forms [of the processes-of-knowing]. And included in these [five] 
is the primary-cause and the rest. 

49. He who has only the full discernment into the difference 
between the sattva and the Self is one who has authority- 
over all states-of-existence and is one who knows all. 

He who is grounded in only the full discernment into the difference 
between the sattva and the Self, and who is in the higher con- 
sciousness * of being master in the higher clearness, and who has 
the sattva of his thinking-substance cleansed from the defilement 
of rajas and tamas is one who has authority over all states-of- 
existence. The aspects (guna) which are the essence of all things, 
which have both the determinations and the objects-of-determina- 
tions as their essence, present themselves as being the essence of 
the object-for-sight in its totality to their Owner, the Soul 
(ksetrajna). This is the meaning. Being <one who knows alb 
refers to the [intuitive] knowledge, produced by discrimination 
and rising instantaneously [into consciousness], of the aspects 
(guna) which are the essence of all, whether they be [iii. 14] 
quiescent or uprisen or indeterminable. This is the meaning. It 
is this perfection that is termed [i. 36] the ' undistressed,' by 
attaining to which the yogin who knows all, whose hindrances and 
bondages have dwindled, takes his recreation as having mastery. 
These same constraints, Which whether mediately or immediately lead to powers 
in the form of knowledge and of activity, are for the sake of the discernment 
into the difference between the sattva and the Self by way of the confidence 
1 See also i. 15, pp. 41 s and 42 3 ; i. 35, p. 81 4 ; i. 40, p. 84. 9 ; ii. 26, p. 164 11 (Calc. ed.). 



iii. 49 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [284 

produced by grasping the perfections in turn and binding them together. 
The supernormal powers subsidiary to this [discernment] are shown [in the 
sutra]. 49. Sattva . . . and. There is clearness in so far as the defilement 
by rajas and tamas has been washed away. As a result of this there is the 
higher consciousness of being master. It was inevitable that the sattva of the 
mind-stuff should be overwhelmed by the rajas and tamas. But when the 
latter subside, it is this [sattva] that is to be mastered by the yogin its master. 
When it is mastered, the yogin who is grounded in only the full discernment 
of the difference between the sattva and the Self, is one who has authority over 
all states-of-existence. This same he explains by the words ^essence of all 
things.^ ^Boththe determination and the object-of-determination mean both 
the inert {jada) and bright kind. In this way the power of action has been 
described. He describes the power of knowledge in the words one who 
knows alL> With the intent to create passionlessness with regard even to 
this two-fold perfection he gives the technical name current among yogins 
in the words that is termed the *undistressed.' One whose karmas, 
both hindrances [ii. 3] and bonds [i. 24], have dwindled away. He is of 
that kind. 

50. As a result of passionlessness even with regard to these 
[perfections] there follows, after the dwindling of the seeds 
of the defects, Isolation. 

When, after the dwindling of hindrances and of karma, [intuitive 
knowledge] comes to him thus, ' This presented-idea of discrimina- 
tion is an external-aspect of the sattva. And sattva is to be 
reckoned with those things that are to be escaped. The Self 
moreover is immutable, undefiled (puddha) [by the aspects], and 
other than the sattva/ when he is thus unaffected [by the 
aspects], those seeds of the hindrances which, like burned x seeds of 
rice, are incapable of generation, go together with the central-organ 
to their rest, and when, these being resolved into the primary 
cause, the Self does not again have the experience of the three 
pains (tdpa), then these aspects, in that they are manifested in 
the central-organ as being karma and hindrances and fruitions, 
have fulfilled 2 their purpose, and invert-the-process-of-generation. 
Then there is the absolute absence of correlation of the Self with 

1 Compare suksmtkrta dagdha-bija-kalpa dagdha-kle^a-bija ii. 4, 13, pp. 109 s and 

ii. 2, 10, 11, pp. 107 4 and 120 2 . 7 ; dagdha- 124 1 and iii. 55, p. 273 9 (Calc. ed.). 

bijanam apraroha ii. 4, p. 110* ; dagdha- a Compare carita-adhikara ii. 10, p. 120'; 

bijabhava ii. 4, 26, pp. 110\ 165 s , and ii. 24, p. 162 2 ; ii. 27, p. 166 5 ; iii. 55, 

iii. 50, p. 264 8 and iv. 28, p. 312 7 ; 274 8 . 



285] The gods allure yogins [ iii. 51 

the aspects, [which is] Isolation. Then the Self is nought else 
than the Energy of Intellect (citi) grounded in itself. 

With the intent to show that constraint upon the discriminative discernment 
is the purpose of the Self, whereas other constraints result in what is a pseudo- 
purpose of the Self, he describes the result of discriminative discernment- by 
means of the gain in the higher passionlessness. 50. As a result of passion- 
lessness even with regard to these . . . Isolation. When after the dwindling 
of hindrances and karmas the yogin has [intuitive] knowledge thus, of what 
sort is this [knowledge] ? In reply he says <K' This presented-idea of discrimi- 
nation is an external -aspect of the sattva.'^ The rest has been explained in 
various places and is accordingly easy. 



51. In case of invitations from those-in-high-places, these 
should arouse no attachment or pride, for undesired con- 
sequences recur. 

Now there are four kinds of yogins, 1 1. Prathama-JcalpiJca, 2. 
Madhubhumika, 3. Prajndjyotis, 4. Atihrdntabhdvanlya. Of these 
[four], 1. The first is the observant-of-practice (abhydsin) for whom 
light is just beginning. 2. The second has the truth-bearing 
insight [i. 48]. 3. The third is he who has subjugated the elements 
and the organs, and who has provided means for keeping all that 
has been cultivated [such as super-reflective states] and is yet to 
be cultivated [such as the undistressed perfection : see i. 36], and 
who has the means-of-attainment and so forth for what has been 
done and is yet to be done. 4. But the fourth, who has passed 
beyond that which may be cultivated, has as his sole aim the 
resolving (pratisarga) of the mind-stuff [into its primary cause]. 
His is the seven-fold [ii. 27] insight advancing in stages to the 
highest [concentration]. The purity of the sattva in that 
Brahman among these [four] who has directly experienced the 
[second] Honeyed (madhumati) Stage is observed by those-in- 
high-places, the gods. With their high-places they invite 2 him. 
1 Sir, will you sit here ? Will you rest here ? This pleasure might 
prove attractive. This maiden might prove attractive. This 
elixir checks old age and death. This chariot passes through air. 
Yonder are the Wishing Trees ; the Stream-of-heaven (manddkini) 
confers blessedness ; the sages are perfected ; the nymphs are 
1 Compare SBE. xxi, Kern, Saddharmapundarika, p. 387. a Invite, seek to attract. 



iii. 51 j Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [286 

incomparable and not prudish. Eyes and ears [will become] 
supernal ; the body like diamond. In consequence of your peculiar 
virtues, Venerable Sir, all these things have been won by you. 
Have entrance to this high-place which is unfading and ageless 
and deathless and dear to the gods.' Thus addressed let him 
ponder upon the defects of pleasure. ' Baked upon the horrible 
coals of the round-of-rebirths, and writhing 1 in the darkness 
of birth and of death, I have hardly found the lamp of yoga 
which makes an end to the obscurations of the hindrances. 
And of this [lamp] the lust-born gusts of sensual things are 
enemies. How then could it be that I who have seen its light 
could be led astray by these things of sense, a mere mirage, and 
make of myself fuel for that same fire of the round-of-rebirths 
as it flares up again ? Fare ye well ! Sensual things [deceitful] 
as dreams and to be craved by vile folk!' His purpose thus 
determined, let him cultivate concentration. Giving up attach- 
ment [for things of sense] let him not even take pride in thinking 
it is he that is thus urgently desired even by gods. Such a one, 
if in his pride he deem himself secure, will not feel as if he were 
one whom Death had gripped 2 by the hair. And so Heedlessness, 
on the lookout for his weak points and failures, and always 
carefully to be watched, will have found an opening and will arouse 
the hindrances. As a result of this undesired consequences recur. 
So then he who in this way does not become attached or take 
pride will attain permanently the purpose which he has cultivated 
within, and will find himself face to face with the purpose which 
he has yet to cultivate. 

Now obstructions to the yogin who has started to acquire Isolation are possible. 
So he gives instruction as to the cause which leads to their dispulsion [in the 
sutra]. 51. Those-in-high-places . . . undesired consequences recur. 
Those-in-high-places are those who, like the Great Indra, have high-places 
[in the Heaven-world]. The invitation is from them. No attachment to it 
or pride in it should be allowed to enter the mind, because <undesired conse- 
quences recur .> In order to ' select [from among the four classes] that 
yogin only whom the gods invite with offers of high-places, he mentions all 
possible kinds of yogins by saying four kinds of yogins. From among these 
[four] he describes the essential-attribute of the Prathama-kalpika by saying 

1 Writhing, or wandering. 

2 Compare the stanza ajaramaravat prajnah, &c, Hitopadeca, Introd., verse 3. 



287] Sensual temptations [ iii. 52 

0f these [four], 1. . . . the observant-of-practice. One for whom light is 
just beginning, but is not yet mastered, one whose [intuitive] knowledge has such 
an object as the mind-stuff of another. 2. He describes the second by saying 
truth-bearing insight.^ In whose case this has been said [i. 48] " In this 
[concentrated mind-stuff J the insight is truth-bearing." For he is one whose wish 
is to subjugate the elements and the organs. 3. He describes the third class 
by saying Che who has subjugated the elements and the organs. For by him 
the elements and the rest and the organs have been subjugated by constraint upon 
coarse elements and by constraint upon the process-of-knowing and the other [four 
constraints mentioned in iii. 47]. This same yogin is further described in the 
words <all that.^ He is one who has provided means for keeping all that has 
been cultivated, [that is] acquired, such as [intuitive] knowledge and so on of 
another's mind-stuff and so on, as a result of the subjugation of the elements 
and the organs. Consequently he does not lapse from them. One who has un- 
perfected means-of-attainment for what is yet to be cultivated, [that is] acquired, 
such as the undistressed [perfection], extending as far as to the higher passion- 
lessness. For human effort, only when it operates upon the instrument-of- 
acquisition, leads to the acquisition of the end. 4. He describes the fourth 
[kind of yogin] in the words <Kthe fourth.^ For this Exalted [yogin], released 
yet alive in the body, whose present body is his last, has as his sole aim the 
resolving of the mind-stuff [into its primary cause]. So from among all these 
yogins he determines that one to whom the invitation is directed by saying 
among these [four], the [second] Honeyed Staged As to the one in the 
Prathama-Jcalpika stage, there is not even a possibility of his receiving this [in- 
vitation] from the Great Indra and the other [gods]. The third also cannot be 
invited by them, since by mastery over the elements and the organs he has 
[already] obtained this [invitation]. And as to the fourth, because he has attained 
to the higher passionlessness, the possibility of an attachment is far-removed. 
Thus all that remains is the second, the truth-bearing insight. Thus, by elimi- 
nation, only the second, the [yogin]-of-truth-bearing-insight, [remains] as a proper 
recipient (visaya) of this invitation. ^Passes through air means roving through 
the air. CUnfading is imperishable. <Unaging) is always new. He describes 
the defect due to the arousal of pride in the words CSuch a one, if in his pride.^ 
One who in his pride counts himself secure will not feel the impermanence [of 
things] and will not reflect upon this. The other part is easy. 

52. As a result of constraint upon moments and their 
sequence [there arises the intuitive] knowledge proceeding 
from discrimination. 

Just as the atom is the minimal limit of matter, 1 so the moment is 

1 Similarly the moment (samaya) in the an endless succession of these moments. 

Jain system, equivalent to the ksana See Umasvati : Tattvarthadhigama- 

of the yoga, is a dravya. And time is sutra, iv. 15 and v. 38-39. 



iii. 52 ] Book III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [288 

the minimal limit of time. Or, the time taken by an atom in 
motion in order to leave one point and reach the next point is 
a moment. But the continuous flow of these [moments] is a 
sequence. Moments and the sequences of these [moments] cannot 
be combined into a [perceptually] real (vastu). Hours-of-eight-and- 
forty-minutes, days-of-thirty-such-hours and so on are combinations 
by a mental-process (buddhi). Thus time, being of this nature, does 
not correspond to anything [perceptually] real, but is a structure 
by a mental-process and follows as a result of perceptions or of 
words. [Thus] to the ordinary thinking of the emergent mind it 
might appear as if it were [perceptually] real. But the moment 
does come within the [real] objects 1 and rests 2 upon the sequence. 
Furthermore the sequence has its essence in an uninterrupted 
succession of moments. This [sequence] is called time by experts 
in time. So the yogins use the term. For two moments cannot 
occur simultaneously. Because it is impossible that there be a 
sequence between two things that occur simultaneously. When 
a later moment succeeds an earlier without interruption, there is 
a sequence. Thus in the present there is a single moment and 
there are no earlier or later moments. Therefore there is no 
combination of them. But those moments which are past and future 
are to be explained as inherent in the mutations. Accordingly the 
whole world passes through a mutation in any single moment. So 
all those external-aspects of the world are relative to this present 
moment. By constraint upon moments and their sequence both 
are directly perceived. And as a result of this, the [intuitive] 
knowledge proceeding from discrimination comes about. 

It has been stated in one place and another that as a result of constraint upon 
certain objects, knowledge of all follows. This [knowledge of all] is not a know- 
ledge of everything whatsoever without remainder. But it only emphasizes what 

1 A moment belongs to the real objects ; 2 Vacaspatimicra says the opposite. The 

butthereisnotime outside the sequence form avalambi is wrong and popular, 

of moments. Thus the theory of time See W. Kirfel, Beitrage zur Gesch. d. 

is midway between that of the Bud- Nominalkomposition, Bonn, 1908, 

dhists and the Vaicesika school ; and pp. 78-79. 
resembles the Jain doctrine (Umasvati 
v. 39). 



289] Reality of the time-sequence [ iii. 52 

kind of knowledge it is, just as in the expression ' Eaten with all the condi- 
ments.' For in this [expression] the sense is that [the meal] was eaten with 
as many kinds of condiments as were [served], but not all condiments whatsoever 
without remainder. For all that, the word ' all ' has in some cases the sense 
of 'without remainder,' in the sentence for instance, 'The glutton has eaten 
all the food that was brought to him.' For here it is understood as meaning 
'without remainder.' So now here he describes the constraint which leads 
to [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination and characterized as 
being a knowledge of everything without remainder. 52. Moments . . . 
[intuitive] knowledge. He describes the meaning of the word moment 
by means of an analogy and in the words Just as. When a clod of earth 
is being broken up, that bit of it wherein the gradations of smallness reach 
their minimal limit of smallness is the atom. So similarly the moment is 
the minimal limit of time. In other words it is a particle of time which 
has no prior and subsequent [within itself]. This same moment is illustrated 
in another way by the words Or, the time taken. The meaning is that 
[the atom] would traverse the distance measured by an atom. He now 
describes the meaning of the word sequence by saying <Kthe flow of these 
[moments]. The word 4Cthese refers to the moments. And the sequence 
which is of this kind is not [perceptually] real ; but it is abstractly [real]. 
Because, when so combined, it cannot possibly be thought of as perceptually 
real in the case of things which do not occur simultaneously. This has 
been said in the words ^Moments and the sequences of these. Since 
a sequence consists of moments which do not arise simultaneously, and since 
a combination of moments is not [perceptually] real, therefore also a combina- 
tion of moments and of their sequences is not [perceptually] real. Ordinary 
persons who have neither [natural] excellence of the thinking-substance nor 
that resulting from disputation, 1 whose emergent way of thinking is every 
moment new, and who deem such time a [perceptual] reality, are in error, 
So then, is the moment [as contrasted with time perceptually,] unreal ? Not 
so, as he says in the words But the moment. Does come within the 
[perceptually] real means that it is [perceptually] real. It is the basis 
(avalambana) for the sequence. It is the basis for it. It is supported by 
the sequence only in terms of predicate relations. This is the meaning. He 
gives the reason why the sequence should be the basis for the moment by 
saying Furthermore the sequence. He gives the reason for the [perceptual] 
unreality of the sequence in the words For . . . not. The word for (m) 
expresses the idea of reason. To him who might suppose that they occur 
simultaneously since they belong to different classes he says ^impossible 
between two things. Why is this impossible? To this he replies an 
earlier. He brings the discussion to a close in the word Thus. So then, 

1 Where one contends without reasons for contending. See Nyaya-sutra i. 2. 3 (= 44). 
37 [h.o.s. n] 



iii. 52 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [290 

are the earlier and later moments merely hare's horns? Not so, as he says 
in the words But .... which.^ The words ^inherent inO mean inseparably 
connected with the generic form. He sums up the discussion by saying 
^Accordingly.^ Since it is the present only which has the capacity to fulfil 
the purposes proper to itself. 



The particular that is the object of this [intuitive knowledge 
proceeding from discrimination] is brought 1 forward. 
53. As a result of this there arises the deeper-knowledge of 
two equivalent things which cannot be distinctly qualified 
in species or characteristic-mark or point-of-space. 
If two equivalent things resemble each other in point-of-space and 
in characteristic-mark, it is the difference in species which makes 
[us] distinguish between them, for instance, ' This is a cow ; that 
is a mare/ If the place and the species be equivalent, it is the 
characteristic-mark that makes [us] distinguish between them, for 
instance, 'This cow has black eyes; that cow is lucky.' 2 Since 
two myrobolan-fruits resemble each other in species and in charac- 
teristic-mark, it is the difference as to point-of-space that makes 
[us] distinguish between them, for instance, ' This one is in front ; 
this [other] is behind.' But when the myrobolan which was in front 
is put, while the attention of him who has the intuitive [knowledge] 
is elsewhere occupied, in the place of the one behind, then, if the 
places are equivalent so that one would think ' That is the one in 
front ; that is the one behind,' a right classification (pravibhdga) 
is impossible. Since the right view of things (tattva-jndna) must 
be free from doubt, it was said <As a result of this there arises the 
deeper-knowledge,> as a result [that is] of the [intuitive] know- 
ledge proceeding from discrimination. How is this 1 The point- 
of-space coincident with the myrobolan in front is distinct from 
the point-of-space coincident with the myrobolan behind. And 
the two myrobolans are distinct in that they pass through the 
incidents peculiar to their own points-of-space. But it is this 
passing through the incident belonging to another point-of-space 

1 See Qamkara on ii. 1. 37. 

2 The Rahasyam says that cows with white eyes are lucky. 



291] Intuitive knowledge of coincidences [ iii. 53 

that is the cause of the distinction between the two. This ex- 
ample illustrates how the supreme yogin has the presented-idea 
(pratyaya) of the difference between two atoms as a result of his 
direct experience of the point-of-space coincident with the atom 
in front, which atom is equivalent [to the other] in species and 
characteristic-mark and point-of-space. The reason for this is 
that the [only] distinction is between the coincidents [with the 
points-of-space] ; inasmuch as it is impossible that an atom 
which is behind can have the point-of-space of the one [in 
front], the passing of the atom behind through its own point-of- 
space is different [from the front atom's passing through its point- 
of-space]. Others [VdicesiJcas], however, describe [the same 
matter thus] : " These particulars (vicesa), which are ultimates, 
produce the idea of the difference." Even in this [opinion of 
theirs] the difference as to the point-of-space and as to the 
characteristic-mark and the difference as to limitation-in-extent 
and as to the intervening-space and as to species [might be a 
sufficient] cause of distinction. But it is the difference as to the 
incident that is accessible to the thinking-substance of the yogin 
only. Therefore it has been said, 1 " Since there is no difference 
as to limitation-in-extent or by reason of intervening-space or of 
species there is no distinction in the [primary] root [of things]." 
So says Varshaganya. 2 

Although the knowledge proceeding from discrimination is to be described 
later as having for its objects all things without remainder, still, since this 
knowledge is exceedingly subtile, the particular that is the object of it is first 
of all brought forward [in the words of the sutra]. 53. Species . . . deeper- 
knowledge. To ordinary persons a distinction in the species [intelligibilis] 
is the means-of-knowing the difference between things. [But when] the species 
[intelligibilis], the common-nature-of-the-cow, is equivalent, [and when] the 
place, in front or elsewhere, is equivalent, the- differentia (param) is the distinc- 
tion in the characteristic-marks of the black-eyed and of the lucky [cows]. 

1 Vijnanabhiksu interprets the passage as For there is no differentiating attribute 

referring to the teaching of the Vaice- over and above the differences in limi- 

ikas. He asserts that there is some- tation or similar differences. The 

thing such as limitation-in-extent which context alone can determine which 

distinguishes permanent substances ; interpretation is right, 
but that there is no such entity as 2 See Samkhya Tattva Kaumudi xlvii for 

a vi$esa the property of the substances. another quotation from Varshaganya. 



iii. 53 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [292 

In the case of two myrobolans, the common-nature-of-the-myrobolan, the species 
[intelligibilis] is equivalent ; the characteristic-mark, such as roundness, is 
equivalent. But the difference in point-of-space is the differentia. When, 
however, one wishes to test the yogin's knowledge, and, while the yogin 
who has the [intuitive] knowledge has his attention occupied elsewhere, puts 
the myrobolan which was in front behind, and removes or hides the one that 
was behind, then inasmuch as the places are equivalent so that one would 
think, ' That [myrobolan] is the one in front, and that is the one behind ' 
a right classification is impossible for an ordinary person, [however] wise, 
who is conversant with the three sources-of- valid-ideas [only]. Whereas the 
right-view-of-things must be free from doubt. And in the case of the yogin 
who has [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination there cannot 
be the possibility of doubt. So the author of the sutra says <As a result of 
this there arises the deeper-knowledge. > [The Comment] explains the words <As 
a result of this> by the words as a result [that is] of the [intuitive] knowledge 
proceeding from discrimination^ A question is asked 'How can [intuitive] 
knowledge proceeding from constraint upon moments and upon their sequences 
discriminate one myrobolan from another having an equivalent species and 
characteristic-mark and point-of-space?' This he asks by the words How 
is this? The reply is given in the words The point-of-space coincident 
with the myrobolan in fronts The point-of-space which characterizes the 
myrobolan in front is limited to one moment of the myrobolan in front. Or 
we may say that there is an incessant mutation [of the point-of-space as com- 
pared] with it [the moment]. And this is distinct from the incessant mutation 
of the myrobolan which is behind, distinct, that is, <Sfrom the point-of-space 
coincident with the myrobolan behind. Very well then, let there be a 
distinction as to points-of-space. How does this bear upon the distinction 
between the myrobolans themselves? The answer is in the words And 
the myrobolans are distinct in that they pass through the incidents peculiar 
to their own points-of-space. The coincidence with its own point-of-space is 
that digit of time belonging to the myrobolan which, with respect to its own 
point-of-space, is characterized by a kind of mutation in terms of nearness or 
furtherness. That is its incident peculiar to its point-of-space. Its ^passing 
through is either its getting [to a point-of-space] or it is knowledge. The two 
myrobolans are different in so far as there is this [passing through]. When the 
two myrobolans had a moment of the mutation in terms of nearness and further- 
ness, in so far as the two points-of-space are in front or behind, then [the yogin] 
performing-constraint (samyamiri) experiences the particularity of the incident 
of the mutation belonging to the two, in terms of nearness and furtherness 
with reference to another point-of-space. And he admits that they are quite 
different. Although at present [one of the myrobolans has such] a mutation 
that it is in the point-of-space of this [myrobolan], [still] up to the present it had 
the mutation with reference to a different point-of-space. So it is the moment 



293] Coincidence of the time and the space series [ iii. 53 

of the mutation of this point-of-space which distinguishes it [from the other 
point-of-space]. And this moment it is which is directly perceived by constraint. 
So it was this that was said But it is this passing through the moments 
belonging to another point-of-space that is the cause of the distinction between 
the two. With the help of this example and by dialogues 1 between laymen 
and experts and others one comes to believe that the distinction between even 
such kinds of atoms is accessible to the thinking-substance of the yogin, as he 
says This. ^Others [Vai9esikas], however, described [that is] set forth [this] . f ^ f> 
description by saying which. For the Vaicesikas say that there are ultimate 144 

particulars functioning in permanent substances. So they say. To explain. 
Yogins, [when they consider] liberated beings who are equivalent in respect of 
species and of point-of-space and of time and who are also free from [particular] 
specifications, have a [deeper] knowledge of each person as he really is as 
different from other persons. Therefore, they say, there is some ultimate 
particular. And if so, this same [distinction] is one that serves to distinguish 
permanent substances such as atoms. This he controverts in the words CEven 
in this opinion of theirs.^ Species and point-of-space and characteristic-mark 
have been illustrated. Limitation-in-extent is an arrangement-of-parts (sam- 
sthana). In which case [of limitation-of-extent], after a thing whose arrangement 
of parts is flawless has been removed and after another thing whose combination 
of parts is defective has been put in its place, while the observer meanwhile is 
elsewhere occupied, then there is a presented idea of the difference in so far 
as there is a difference in the arrangement of parts of this [thing]. Or 
limitation-in-extent might be body. There is a distinction, between the 
persons-in-the-rounds-of-rebirths, whose souls (atmari) are bound to this or 
that [body], and between those whose souls are liberated [from the round-of- 
rebirth], based on the different relations with the elements of one kind or 
another. So in all cases the presented- idea of the difference is established on 
other grounds [than the existence of ultimate particulars]. [Consequently] 
there is no [need of an] assumption 2 of ultimate particulars. Intervening- 
space 3 (vyavadhi) makes a difference between things, as in the case of the 
Lands 4 of Kuca and of Puskara, which are as such two points-of-space. 
Because differences in species and in point-of-space and in other respects are 
accessible by the ordinary thinking-substance, therefore it was said But the 
difference as to the incident is accessible to the yogin only. The word 
et?a limits the words difference as to the incident, but not the words 
accessible to the thinking-substance of the yogin. It follows then that the 
distinction between liberated souls with respect to their relations with their 

1 See Cloka-Varttika, p. 412 (Chaukambha dtma&nd sa ca samsthana vi$esah pp. 89* 

S. Ser.), for samvddapravrtti. and 90 l (Calc. ed.). 

* The Vaicesika doctrine is also rejected in s See also Vacaspati, p. 271". 

i. 43 in the phrases anu-pracaya-vigesa- * See iii. 26, p. 238 s (Calc. ed.). 



iii. 53 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [294 

bodies that have been * is also accessible to the yogin. But in the case of one 
who has not got the above-mentioned grounds for distinction, there is no 
division in the primary-cause. So the Master has thought. For this reason 
it was said [ii. 22] "Though it has ceased [to be seen] in the case of one whose 
purpose is fulfilled, it has not ceased to be, since it is common to others beside 
him." This is expressed in the words Climitation-in-extent and intervening- 
space. This statement is to be understood as partial and is to be extended 
to the different causes of difference already described [species, place, time, and 
so on]. The meaning is that in the primary-cause which is the root of the 
world there is no distinction, [that is] no difference. 



54. The [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimina- 
tion is a deliverer, has all things as its object, and has all 
times for its object and is [an inclusive whole] without 
sequence. 

The word <deliverer 2 (tdraha)> means that it arises out of its own 
vivid light without further suggestion. For it has all things for 
its object. This means that there is nothing that is not its object. 
It has all times for its object. This means that it has intuitive 
knowledge at all times of one whole (sarvam), past and future and 
present, with [the sum of] its states. 3 <[An inclusive whole] 
without sequence) means that it grasps one whole, striking upon 
[the thinking-substance] at one moment, with all its times. Such 
in its complete form is the [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from 
discrimination. Of this same the lamp of yoga is a part, beginning 
with the Honeyed 4 Stage until it reaches final perfection. 
Having thus shown a part of the object of [intuitive] knowledge proceeding 
from discrimination, he gives the distinguishing-characteristic of the [intuitive] 
knowledge itself which proceeds from discrimination. 54. Deliverer . . . 
[intuitive] knowledge. He points out [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from 
discrimination as the object of the statement ; the rest is the characteristic- 
mark. It is called the deliverer^ because it delivers from the ocean of the 
round-of-rebirths. He distinguishes this from the Vividness which was pre- 
viously [iii. 33] mentioned by saying has all times for its object. With 
[the sum of] its states means in all its subordinate particulars. Hence the 
[intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination is complete. For there 
is nothing, in any place or in any way or in any time, which is not in its 

1 The force of the suffix carena is explained a Defined by UmSsvati v. 43 as a group of 

in Pan. v. 3. 53. parinama. 

7 See iii. 33, p. 243". 4 iii. 51, p. 266* (Calc. ed.). 



295] % Isolation follows discrimination [ iii. 55 

sphere. Why speak of (astam) of other kinds of knowledge? For even 
[concentration] conscious [of objects] is a part of this [completed intuitive 
knowledge]. So then there is nothing more complete than this as he says 
<HOi this same the lamp of yoga is a part.^ The lamp of yoga is [concentration] 
conscious [of an object]. How does that begin and how end ? The reply 
is Cthe Honeyed. The truth-bearing insight [i. 48] is itself the honey, 
because it gives a flavour, as has ' been said [Comment on i. 47], " Having risen 
to the undisturbed calm of insight." Beginning with that which has this, with 
the Honeyed Stage, until it is finally perfected, [until] insight seven-fold in 
advancing stages [ii. 29] has reached the highest. Hence [intuitive] knowledge 
proceeding from discrimination becomes the Deliverer, since even a part of it, 
the lamp of yoga, is a deliverer. 



In either case, whether one has attained to [intuitive] knowledge 
proceeding from discrimination or has not attained to [intuitive] 
knowledge proceeding from discrimination, 'V'y^ '^/// 

55. When the purity of the sattva and of the Self are equal 
[there is] Isolation. 

When the sattva of the thinking-substance is freed from the 
defilement of the rajas and tamas, and when it has no task other 
than with the presented-idea of the difference of [the sattva] from 
the Self, and when the seeds of the hindrances within itself have 
been burned, then the sattva enters into a state of purity equal to 
that of the Self. When-this-is-so {tada), purity is the cessation of 
the experience which is falsely attributed to the Self. In this state / 
[of purity] Isolation follows for one-who-has-supremacy (igvara) or 
for one-who-has-not-supremacy, for one who partakes of the [intui- 
tive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination or for another. 
For if there be [intuitive] knowledge in the case of one whose 
hindrances have become burned seed, there is no further need 
of any [supernormal power]. As being the means of purifying 
the sattva, both the supremacy (aigvarya) proceeding from con- 
centration and the [intuitive] knowledge have been introduced- 
into-the-discussion. But strictly speaking the [intuitive] know- 
ledge represses not-sight (adargana). When this is repressed 
there are no more hindrances. Because there are no more hin- 
drances there is no fruition of karma. In this state the aspects, 

1 See above, p. 98 6 (Calc. ed.). 



iii. 55 ] Booh III. Supernormal Powers or Vibhuti [296 

their task done, do not again submit themselves as objects-for- 
sight to the Self. That is the Self s Isolation. Then the Self 
having its light within itself becomes undefiled and isolated. 
Of the Exposition of the Comment on the Patanjalan [Treatise], 
the Book on Supernormal Powers, the Third. 

Having thus described the [various] constraints together with their supernormal 
powers, all of which indirectly prepare the way for Isolation, with the intent to 
show that the [intuitive] knowledge of the difference between the sattva and the 
Self leads directly to Isolation, he here introduces the sutra by the words 
whether one has attained. Whether [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from 
discrimination has been attained or not, nevertheless the insight into the differ- 
ence between the sattva and the Self always brings Isolation to pass. This is the 
meaning. 55. When the purity of the sattva and of the Self are equal [there 
is] Isolation. [The last word] iti is meant to indicate the end of the sQtras 
[of this Book]. 1. The words one-who-has-supremacy refer to one who has 
the powers of action and of [intuitive] knowledge by reason of the constraints 
previously described. 2. The words or for one-who-has-not-supremacy refer to 
one who partakes of the [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination 
by reason of the constraint described [ii. 52] immediately before. 3. The words 
or for another^ refer to one in whom this [intuitive] knowledge has not risen 
[into consciousness]. In these cases there is no need at all for supernormal 
powers. Therefore he says For . . . no. And if it should be objected that 
there is no need of supernormal powers in connexion with Isolation, and that 
therefore instruction in them is useless, the reply is As being the means of 
purifying the sattva.^ The instrumental case is used to indicate such a kind 
of a mark [Pan. ii. 3. 21]. For the attainment of Isolation the supernormal 
powers are not absolutely useless, but they are not directly causes. This is the 
meaning. But it is the [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination 
that is the topic-under-discussion. And that which is a cause indirectly [the 
powers] is only figuratively a cause, not a principal cause. Strictly speaking, 
however, insight alone is the principal cause ; [and not the discrimination]. 
This is the meaning. By the words ^[intuitive] knowledge he means the 
Elevation. 

In this [Book] the indirect aids and the aids and the mutations have been 

treated at length, and the attainment of supernormal powers, and among these 

[powers] the [intuitive] knowledge proceeding from discrimination. 

Such is the stanza which summarizes the contents of [this] Book. 

Of the Explanation of the Comment on Patanjali's [Treatise, which Explanation 

is entitled] the Clarification of the Entities, composed by the Venerable Vaca- 

spatimicra, the Third Book, on Supernormal Powers, is finished. 



BOOK FOURTH 
ISOLATION 



G8 [ho . it] 



BOOK FOURTH 

ISOLATION 

1. Perfections proceed from birth or from drugs or from 
spells or from self-castigation or from concentration. 

1. The power of having another body is the perfection by birth. 

2. [Perfection] by drugs is by an elixir-of-life * [got] in the mansions 
of the demons, and by the like. 3. By spells, such as the acquisi- 
tion of [the power of] passing through space and atomization [iii. 
45]. 4. [Perfection] by self-castigation is the perfection 2 of the 
will, the faculty of taking on any form at will (kamarupin) [or] of 
going anywhere at will, and so on. 5. Perfections proceeding from 
concentration have been explained. 

Thus, in the First and Second and Third Books, concentration and the means of 
this [concentration] and the supernormal powers [produced] by it have been 
especially discussed. And other [matter] incidental 3 or suggested-by-the-course- 
of-the-discussion has been discussed. Now Isolation as resulting from this [con- 
centration] is to be expounded. And this Isolation cannot be expounded unless 
one have analysed the mind-stuff which is conducive to Isolation ; and the world 
beyond ; and the self which is to be in the world beyond and which is over and 
above the sum of mental-states (vijnana) and which is the enjoyer, by means of 
the mind-stuff which is its instrument, of the sounds and other [things] whose 
essence is pleasure, [pain,] and so on ; and the higher limit of Elevation (pra- 
samkhyana). So all these things are to be expounded in this Book, as also other 
matter incidental or suggested-by-the-course-of-the-discussion. Of these, with the 
intent first to determine-the-nature-of mind-stuff which is conducive to Isolation, 
in the case of persons whose mind-stuff is perfected, he states the five-fold per- 
fections by the words [of the sutra]. 1. Perfections proceed, from birth, or 
from drugs or from spells or from self-castigation or from concentration. 
He explains [the sQtra] by saying <Kl. The power of having another body. 
When karma, conducive to the enjoyment of heaven and performed by one of 

1 Treated at length in the Rasayana-tantra, s Such as the agglomeration of atoms or 

the seventh of the eight subdivisions the doctrine of momentariness. The 

of the Ayur-veda. distinctions between the fluctuations 

2 Equivalent to kdmavasayitva, the eighth would be " suggested by the course of 

siddhi, iii. 45, p. 259* (Calc. ed.). the discussion." 



iv. l ] Booh IV. Isolation or Kaivalya [300 

the human species, obtains its fruition from some cause or other, then a man, 
from the mere fact of being born into a certain group of gods, passes into another 
body, to the perfection which has atomization and other [supernormal powers]. 
2. He describes the perfection which proceeds from drugs. A human being 
when for some cause or other he reaches the mansions of the demons (asura), 
and when he makes use of elixirs-of-life brought to him by the lovely damsels 
of the demons, attains to agelessness and to deathlessness and to other perfec- 
tions. Or [this perfection may be had] by the use of an elixir-of-life in this 
very world. As for instance the sage Mandavya, 1 who dwelt on the Vindhyas 
and who made use of potions. 3. He describes the perfections by spells in the 
words <Kby spells.^ 4. He describes the perfection due to self-castigation in 
the words from self-castigation.^ He describes the perfection of the will in the 
words staking on any form at will.^ Whatever he desires, atomization for in- 
stance, precisely that he attains on the spot. In case he wishes to hear or think of 
anything, that very thing he hears and thinks. The words and so on include 
sight and the other senses. The perfections proceeding from concentration have 
been described [iii. 16-19, 21-36, 39-42, 51] in the previous (adtostana) Book. 



As to these [perfections], with regard to those bodies and organs 
which enter into the mutation of another birth, 
2. The mutation into another birth is the result of the filling- 
in of the evolving-cause. 

When the previous mutation has passed away, the rise of the 
subsequent mutation follows, since [this body and] these [organs] 
interpenetrate the new [arrangement] of parts. And the evolving- 
causes of the body and organs give aid to their own peculiar 
evolved-effects by filling-in in dependence upon such instrumental- 
causes 2 as merit. 

Now in the case of those four perfections the means for which are the drugs and 
the other [three] means, the same body and organs must enter into the mutation 
of another birth. But this mutation does not follow from material-causes in 
general. For the same quantity of material-causes cannot belong to him 
when he attains to a supernal or to a not-supernal state-of-existence which is 

1 See Markandeya Pur. xvi. 27 and Bhaga- The wife of this person, however, 

vata Pur. iii. 5. 20. Compare MahaBh. refused to let the sun rise. Accordingly 

1. 107-8. He keeps himself alive after even Mandavya Muni was obliged to 

robbers, who have entered his hermit- beat a retreat. 

age by mistake, have impaled him. He 2 Compare Vacaspati on iii. 18, p. 230*. 

was famous for curses, which were so See also i. 44, p. 94 1 and iv. 10, p. 283 7 

mighty as to blight even Yama. One (Calc. ed.). 
man was cursed to die before sunrise. 



301] Action of the final end [ iv. 3 

either more or less [than the present state]. For certainly a material cause 
which is to bring forth something not different is not sufficient to produce 
an effect of a different kind altogether. And so with a view to exclude the 
possibility of any accidental [difference between cause and effect] he supplies 
the following words, <KAs to these [perfections], with regard to those bodies and 
organs which enter into the mutation of another birth. And then recites the 
sutra 2. The mutation into another birth is the result of the fllling-in of 
the evolving- cause. 

When the body and organs, which have entered into the mutation of a human 
birth, enter into a birth as god or animal, the mutation is the result of the 
filling-in of the evolving-cause. Now the evolving-cause of the body is earth 
and other [coarse] elements, and the evolving-cause of the organs is the 
personality-substance. The interpenetration into the parts of these is the filling- 
in. From this filling-in there results [this mutation], as he says in the words 
CWhen the previous mutation.^ An objection might be made to the effect that 
if this aid is to follow from mere filling-in, why is it not eternally so? To 
which the reply would be <Ksuch ... as merits So we have explained ' how 
the same body can attain to the different stages of childhood and boyhood and 
young manhood and age and so on, or how a nyagrodha seed can become a 
nyagrodha tree, or how a particle of fire when placed on a pile of grass can 
envelop the region of the sky by the flaring forth of thousands of flames. 



3. The efficient cause gives no impulse to the evolving- 
causes ; but [the mutation] follows when the barrier [to the 
evolving-causes] is cut, as happens with the peasant. 

For an efficient cause such as merit gives no impulse to the 
evolving-causes (prakrti), since a cause is not set into activity by 
an effect. In that case, how is this ? [The answer is,] but in 
that case there is a cutting of the barrier, as happens with the 
peasant. Just as a peasant wishing to overflow 2 one meadow- 
plot, whether it be on the level or below or still lower, by filling- 
in with water from another meadow-plot, does not remove the 
waters with his hand, but cuts [the rim-of-turf which is] the barrier 
(dvarana) of them. And after this is cut, the water itself overflows 
the other meadow-plot. So similarly merit cuts demerit, the barrier 
(dvarana) of the evolving-causes ; and after this is cut, the evolving- 

1 By stating that a mutation, from the removed, we have the explanation. 

mahat down, follows whenever parti- 2 See Sir Walter Lawrence : The Vale of 
cles of the evolving-cause enter or are Kashmir, p. 327. 



iv. 3 ] Book IV. Isolation or Kdivalya [302 

causes themselves overflow each its own appropriate evolved-effect 
(viJcdra). Or again, just as the same peasant, after the same [rim- 
of-turf] is cut, cannot force the watery or earthen essences to inter- 
penetrate the roots of the different kinds of grain. In that case, 
what [can he do] ? He removes from among them the pulse or 
maize or red rice or what not. And when they are thus removed, 
the essences interpenetrate of themselves the roots of the grain. 
Similarly merit is an efficient cause in the sense that it follows 
upon nothing more than the mere cessation of demerit, by reason 
of the absolute opposition between purity and impurity. But 
merit is not the cause which sets the evolving-causes into activity. 
Of this Nandlcvara and others may be cited as examples. And 
conversely demerit inhibits merit ; and as a result of this there is 
a mutation of impurity. And of this Nahusa * [the king who was 
changed into] a serpent, and others may be cited as examples. 

The statement was that this filling-in is by the evolving-causes. With regard to 
this a doubt arises. ' Is the filling-in by the evolving-causes natural or is it due 
to merit ? Which seems plausible [to the objector] ? It seems plausible that even 
when the evolving-causes are there, the filling-in is accidental ; and since we are 
traditionally taught that merit [and demerit] are causes, [the filling-in] is due to 
these causes.' To this he replies [in the sutra]. 3. The efficient cause gives no 
impulse to the evolving-causes ; but [the mutation] follows when the 
barrier [to the evolving-causes] is cut, as happens with the peasant. 
True merit [and demerit] are efficient causes. But they are not impelling 
causes, since even these causes are the effects of the evolving-causes. And an 
effect does not impel a cause, forasmuch as this [effect], (in so far as its coming 
into existence is dependent upon this [cause]) is dependent on a cause, and 
[forasmuch as] the function of impelling belongs to what is independent. For 
surely when the potter is not there, the clay and the rod and wheel and the 
water and so on are not impelled by the jar which is to be produced or which has 
been produced. But they are impelled by a potter who is independent of them. 
Nor again can it even be supposed that it is the pui*pose of the Self that sets all 
in motion. But the Icvara [sets all in motion] as being the final-end of this 
[purpose of the Self]. For the purpose of the Self is described as setting all in 
motion only as being the final end 2 (uddega). While this purpose of the Self is 

1 By virtue of knowledge and asceticism a serpent (Bhag. Pur. vi. 13. 16 ; ix. 17. 

and the power of yoga, Nahusa was 1 ; and ix 18. 1). Compare in this 

equal to the task of ruling the Three book, ii. 12, p. 122 8 (Calc. ed.). 

Heavens. But he became blinded by a In the sense of being the object of desire, 

pride and was degraded to the state of See Nyaya-Koya under Uddefatvam, 1. 



303] Mind-stuff pervades many bodies [ iv. 5 

yet to be, it is right that the unphenomenalized matter should be the cause of 
the stability [of matter]. But it does not follow from this that merit [and 
demerit] are not efficient causes at all. Since it is quite consistent that they, 
like the peasant, should only remove obstructions. And in the case of the 
Icvara we must understand that his functional activity is limited to the removal 
of obstructions with a view to securing a basis for merit. All this, stated by the 
Comment, is clear upon a mere reading. 



But [if it be asked], while the yogin creates many bodies for 

himself, do these [bodies] then have a single central-organ, or 

have they several central-organs ? The answer is, 

4. Created mind-stuffs may result from the sense-of-per- 

sonality ' and from this alone. 

Assuming nothing more than the sense-of-personality as the cause 

of mind-stuff, [the yogin] makes created mind-stuffs. As a result 

of this, [the bodies] have [separate] mind-stuffs. 

Having disposed-of-the-subject of perfections as taking place by the filling-in of 
evolving-causes, he now raises the question as to the oneness or the manyness 
of the mind-stuff resident in the various bodies produced by the perfections, by 
saying But [if it be asked], while. 'If this is so, there would be many 
central-organs. And because the intention varies according to each mind-stuff 
of the [various] bodies, there would be no conformity to one intention and also 
there would be no readjustment [of memory], quite as in the case of distinct 
persons. Therefore [there is] only one mind-stuff, [which,] inasmuch as, like 
a lamp, it has a diffusive nature, pervades even many created bodies.' To this 
view he replies, 4. Created mind-stuffs may result from the sense-of- 
personality and. from this alone. Each body so long as it lives is evidently 
inseparably connected with an individual mind-stuff, such a body, for instance, 
as that of Chaitra or of Maitra. And the same holds good in the case of bodies 
[created by the yogin]. So it is established that each of these [bodies] has a 
separate central-organ of its own. With this in mind he says <from the sense- 
of-personality and from this alone.> 



5. While there is a variety of actions, the mind-stuff which 
impels the many is one. 

How can many mind-stuffs have their action provided with a 
purpose by a single mind-stuff ? [The answer is], the yogin makes 
a single mind-stuff which impels all the mind-stuffs. From this 
[mind-stuff] the variety of actions is obtained. 
1 Compare Samkhya-sutra vi. 64. 



iv. 5 ] Book IV. Isolation or Kdivalya [304 

As to the contention that, if there be many mind-stuffs, there cannot be con- 
formity to one intention [of this yogin who has many bodies], nor can there be 
a readjustment of memory, the reply is in the next sutra. 5. While there is 
a variety of actions, the mind-stuff which impels the many is one. This 
would be a weakness in the argument, if one mind-stuff which is to guide the 
central-organ resident in the various bodies were not to be created. But when 
such a [mind-stuff] is created, there is no weakness in the argument. And it 
should not be said that [the yogin] having one [mind-stuff] needs no separate 
central-organ proper to each body ; or that there is no need of the creation of 
a guide, because the yogin's own mind-stuff is the guide. Since what is estab- 
lished by proofs is not rightly-subject to command 1 or to question. On this 
point there is a Purana passage 2 " By virtue of his authoritative power the 
Icvara, though one, becomes many. Then being many he becomes one. And 
from him also proceed all these variations of the central-organ. The Yoglfvara 
makes the bodies one-fold or two-fold or three-fold or manifold and again un- 
makes them. "With some he may partake of objects, with others he may practise 
fierce austerities. All these again he may draw in, as the sun draws in the 
multitude of rays." With this same intention he says, many mind-stuffs.^ 



6. Of these [five perfections] that which proceeds from con- 
templation leaves no latent-deposit. 

The created 3 mind-stuff is of five kinds. For the perfections 
proceed from birth and from drugs and from spells and from self- 
castigation and from concentration. Of these five kinds only that 
mind-stuff which proceeds from contemplation leaves no latent- 
deposit. It alone has no latent-deposit which comes into action 
as a result of passion or similar [states]. It has accordingly no 
connexion with merit or evil, since the yogin's hindrances have 
dwindled away. For the others, however, there is a latent-deposit 
of karma. 

Now of these five [iv. 1] perfected mind-stuffs which have arisen thus he selects 
that mind-stuff which is conducive to release. 6. Of these [five perfections] 
that which proceeds from contemplation leaves no latent-deposit. Latent- 

1 Compare the use of these words by Vacas- found in Vayu Pur. vi. 22. All this 

pati on i. 32, p. 73" (Calc. ed. 1 ), p. 74 3 illustrates how various the readings 

(Calc. ed. 8 ). of the Vayu are and how much need 

* With some omissions this passage is found there is of a critical edition. 

in the Vayu Pur. lxvi. 143 and 152-3 8 Compare i. 25, p. 62 1 ; iv. 4, p.278 t0 ; and 

[in the Calcutta edition ii. 5. 139]. See the phrase buddhi-nirmanah iii. 52, 

also Kurma Pur. i. 4. 54-5. The phrase p. 268 9 (Calc. ed.). 
tasmac ca manaso bhedd jSyante is 



305] Karma of the yogin [ iv. 7 

deposits are things that lie latent, subconscious-impressions of karma and 
subconscious-impressions of hindrances. That mind-stuff in which these [sub- 
conscious-impressions] are not, is said to have no latent-deposit. In other 
words it is conducive to the liberation. Since it does not act with reference 
to passion or similar [states], it is therefore not connected with merit or evil. 
But why is there no activity generated by passion or similar [states]? The 
reply is in the words ^since the yogin's hindrances have dwindled away. 
With the intent to show that the central-organ, which is produced in contempla- 
tion, and in which there is no latent-deposit, is distinct from the others, he says 
that the others have latent-deposits, in the words <KFor the others, however.^ 



For 

7. The yogin's karma is neither- white-nor-black ; [the karma] 
of others is of three kinds. 

Karma as a class is, as every one knows, quadripartite (catuspdt), 
black and white-and-black and white and neither-white-nor-black. 
Of these [four], 1. the black is found in villains. 2. The white-and- 
black is attainable by outer means-of-attainment. The accumula- 
tion of the latent-deposit of karma in this [division] is by means 
of injury or of benefit to others. 3. The white belongs to those 
who castigate themselves and recite the sacred texts and practise 
contemplation. Because this kind of karma is confined to the 
central organ alone, it does not depend upon outer means and it 
does not grow as a result of injury to others. 4. The neither- 
white-nor-black x is found in the mendicant-saints (sannydsin), 
whose hindrances have dwindled away, and whose [actual] bodies 
are their last. Of these four, the yogin alone has the not-white 
karma, since he has renounced (sannydsdt) the fruition [even of 
good], and has not-black, since he will have nought of it. But the 
three kinds just mentioned are found in other living beings. 

On this same point also he introduces by the word For a sQtra which gives 
the reason. 7. The yogin's karma is neither-white-nor-black ; [the karma] 
of others is of three kinds. A division (pada) is a topic. [The karma as a 
class which is] contained in four divisions is in-four-divisions (catuspada). 
2. Whatever karma is attainable by outer means-of-attainment always contains 
some injury to others. For even in an action in which rice-grains 2 or some- 

1 See E. W. Hopkins : Great Epic of India (1901), p. 180. 

2 Compare Castra Dipika (Ben. ed., 1885), p. 3, first lines. 
39 [h.o.s. 17] 



iv. 7 ] Book IV. Isolation or Kdivalya [306 

thing similar are the xneans-of-attainment, one cannot say that there is no 
injury to others. Because one might possibly kill an ant while pounding [the 
grains]. And after all, by killing the seeds, one prevents the growth of stalks and 
so forth. On the other hand there is benefit in this action, in that the Brahmans 
and others receive their gifts. 3. The white belongs to those who castigate them- 
selves and recite sacred texts and practise contemplation, 1 to those who are not 
mendicant-saints. He gives the reason for the whiteness in the words ^Because 
this.^ 4. The neither-white-nor-black is found in the mendicant-saints. He refers 
to the mendicant-saints when he says <Khave dwindled away. Because persons 
who have renounced all karma, do not come into activity with reference to any 
karma which can be attained by outer means-of-attainment. And accordingly 
they have no latent-deposit of black karma. And because they have altogether 
offered up to the I$vara the fruition of the latent-deposit of karma, which is 
attainable by the following up of yoga, they have no latent-deposit of white 
karma. For that the fruit of which is indestructible, [that is, Isolation] is 
called white [karma]. The meaning is, one who has no fruit at all, 2 how 
can he have that, the fruit of which is indestructible ? Having thus described 
the four-fold kinds of karma, he determines which belongs to which by saying 
<0f these four . . . the not- white. 



8. As a result of this there follows the manifestation of those 
subconscious-impressions only which correspond to the 
fruition of their [karma]. 

<As a result of this> means of the three kinds of karma. The 
words <of those only which correspond to the fruition of their 
[karma]> means that those subconscious-impressions which cor- 
respond to the fruition of that karma which is comparate with 
them, dwell upon the fruition of karma. The manifestation of 
these only follows. For when karma of the gods is in fruition 
it is not the efficient cause for the manifestation of hellish or of 
brutish or of human subconscious-impressions. It does, however, 
make manifest those subconscious-impressions only which corre- 
spond to it. And the reasoning is the same with regard to 
hellish or brutish or human [subconscious-impressions]. 
Having discussed in detail the latent-deposit of karma, he tells what the outcome 
of the latent-deposit of the hindrances will be. 8. As a result of this there 
follows the manifestation of those subconscious-impressions only which 
correspond to the fruition of their [karma]. [The subconscious-impressions] 

1 Compare ii. 1 and notice that dhyana takes the place of Tpvarapranidhana. 
a If they have no white karma, how can they have the fruit of white karma ? 



307] Pre-natal tendencies [ iv. 9 

correspond to a particular fruition of karma, whether supernal or hellish birth 
or length-of-life or kind-of-experience, which belongs to a particular class, whether 
it be the class of merit or the class of demerit. These same [subconscious- 
impressions] are described in the words ^subconscious-impressions which . . . 
dwell upon the fruition of karma.^ They dwell 1 upon [or] imitate. For the 
subconscious-impressions which correspond to the fruition of supernal karma are 
generated by supernal enjoyments. Therefore subconscious-impressions corre- 
spond to their own fruition and are to be manifested by their own karma. This 
is the meaning of the Comment. 



9. There is an uninterrupted [causal] relation [of sub-con- 
scious-impressions], although remote in species and point-of- 
space and moment-of-time, by reason of the correspondence 
between memory and subliminal-impressions. 

Although a hundred species or a distance in points-of-space or a 
hundred mundane periods intervene, if there is a manifestation of 
the phenomenal [form] by the operation of the conditions-which- 
phenomenalize (vyanjaka) a, given thing (sva), namely, that from 
which the fruition [which results in a birth] as cat rises [into 
consciousness], and if again just that phenomenal [form] by the 
operation of the conditions- which-phenomenalize that given thing 
should arise [into consciousness], it would in an instant be pheno- 
menalized, in association with the subconscious-impressions, sub- 
liminally existent, of the fruition, [which results in the birth as] 
cat, and which had been experienced in former time. Why is 
this % Because, although those [subconscious-impressions] are re- 
mote, the karma [which produces] the same [result] becomes their 
manifester, [that is] efficient-cause; and so there is an uninterrupted 
[causal] relation. And wherefore is this ? The answer is <by reason 
of the correspondence between memory and subliminal-impressions.) 
Because subliminal-impressions are like experiences, and the latter 
correspond with the subconscious-impressions of karma, and 
because memory is like subconscious-impressions, [therefore] 
memory arises from subliminal-impressions, [although] species and 
points-of-space and moments-of-time intervene, and again, sub- 
liminal-impressions arise from memory. Thus it is that memory 

1 Compare ii. 7. 






iv. 9 ] Booh IV. Isolation or Kdivalya [308 

and subliminal-impressions are phenomenalized by virtue of the 
fact that the latent-deposit of karma assumes a fluctuation [of mind- 
stuff]. And consequently the uninterrupted-succession [of sub- 
conscious-impressions], although there be interventions, is proved 
from the fact that the relation of the determination to the 
determined is not cut through. 

An objector says, ' This may be true. But in the case of a man who immediately 
after his death passed into an existence as a cat, one would expect a manifesta- 
tion of human subconscious-impressions, in that these came immediately before. 
For it cannot be that one should not remember what was experienced on the day 
immediately preceding, but should remember what was experienced in the days 
before the intervention.' In reply to this he says, 9. There is an uninterrupted- 
causal] relation [of subconscious-impressions], although remote in species 
and point-of-space and moment-of-time, by reason of the correspondence 
between memory and subliminal-impressions. Although the subconscious 
impression of the cat pass through intervening births and so on, still there 
is an uninterrupted-succession of this subconscious-impression with respect to 
its fruit. For in consequence of the karma the fruition of which was [birth as] 
a cat, that particular subconscious-impression which corresponds to its fruition 
would become manifest, and the memory of that subconscious-impression would 
be produced, as he says Cthe rise [into consciousness] of the fruition [which 
results in a birth] as cat.X> The rise [into consciousness] means that from which 
something rises into consciousness, [that is] the latent-deposit of karma. The words, 
^Cand if again just that phenomenal [form] by the operation of the conditions- 
which-phenomenalize that given thing should rise [into consciousness]^ would 
mean that it would be manifested [that is] it would be brought near to the beginning 
of its fruition. This is the meaning. Subliminally existent^ means activities 
[of certain impressions]. ^Cln association with^ : it would be phenomenalized 
after having seized. The meaning is that if it is to be phenomenalized, it would 
be phenomenalized only after having seized the subliminal-impressions which 
correspond to its own fruition. Having explained that the result is in imme- 
diate succession with respect to the cause, he now explains the same with 
respect to the effect [memory] in the words And wherefore is this? . . . memory.^ 
There is similarity since both [memory and impression] correspond. This same 
thing he says by the word like. It is objected 'If the subliminal-impressions 
are of the nature of experience, then in that case, since experiences are tran- 
sitory, so also should the subliminal-impressions be transitory. How can 
they be capable of producing an experience capable of lasting a long time ? ' 
In reply to this he says And the latter correspond with the subconscious- 
impressions of karma. Just as the invisible-influence (apurva) [of the sacri- 
fice] is stable, although caused by momentary sacrifice (karma), so a subliminal- 



309] Priority of desire [ iv. 10 

impression is stable, although caused by momentary experience. Similarity 
is based upon some kind of difference. Otherwise if there were an identity in 
essence, similarity would be impossible. The rest is easy. 



10. Furthermore the * [subconscious-impressions] have no 
beginning [that we can set in time], since desire is per- 
manent. 

These subconscious-impressions, because of the permanence of 
desire, have no beginning. This well-known desire [ii. 9] for one's 
self, ' May I not cease to be ! May I be ! ' which is found in every 
one, is not self-caused. Why [not] ? [The answer is,] how could 
the fear of death, determined by the recollection of hatred and of 
pain, arise in an animal (jantu) just brought into life, in a condition 
wherein death has never been experienced ? Furthermore a self- 
caused thing does not need an efficient cause. It is for these 
reasons that this mind-stuff, commingled with subconscious- 
impressions which have no beginning, by the efficient-cause lays 
hold of certain subconscious-impressions, and presents itself for the 
experience of the Self. Others have come to the conclusion that, 
like [the light of] a lamp which is contracted l [if in] a jar and 
diffused [if in] a palace, the mind-stuff has such a form [as corre- 
sponds to] the dimension of the body. And thus [they say] there 
is an intermediate state and there is ground for the round-of-re- 
births. It is only this all-pervasive [mind-stuff's] fluctuation which 
contracts and expands. So the Master says. This [mind-stuff] 
furthermore requires such efficient-causes as right-living. And this 
efficient-cause is of two kinds, that which is external and that which 
has to do with self. The external requires the body and other 
means, such as praises and almsgiving and salutations. That which 
like belief, for instance, has to do with self is subject to the mind- 
stuff only. And in this sense it has been said " As for friendliness 
and such [exalted states-of-mind], they are the diversions of con- 
templative [yogins] ; they are in their essence unaided by outer 
means ; they bring right-living to perfection." Of these two, [the 
inner and the outer means], that of the central-organ is the stronger. 

1 Compare Sarhkhya Pravacana Bhasya (Garbe), i. 68 (HOS. 34 18 ), v. 69 (132 s *), v. 91 (133 7 ). 



iv. 10 ] Book IV. Isolation or Kdivalya [310 

How is this ? [The answer is, that intuitive] knowledge and 
passionlessness are unsurpassed by any other [force]. Who by 
bodily action and without the force of mind-stuff could empty 1 the 
Dandaka Forest [of people], or like Agastya 2 drink up the sea ? 

An objector says, 'This may be true. But subconscious-impressions sub- 
liminally-impressed in the previous or in a preceding birth might become 
phenomenalized, provided there be any source-of-valid-ideas [to prove] the 
existence of a previous or a preceding birth. But this is just what there is not. 
And it should not be said that the mere experience of joy or of grief in an animal 
just born is the source-of-the-valid-idea [to prove the existence of the previous 
birth]. For this may be explained by saying that it is self-caused like the 
contraction and expansion of the lotus.' In reply to this he says 10. Further- 
more these [subconscious-impressions] have no beginning [that we can 
set in time], since desire is permanent. The beginninglessness of these sub- 
conscious-impressions furthermore, not their mere uninterrupted [causal] relation 
is meant by the word ^Furthermore.^ This is because desire is permanent, 
since desire for one's self never loses its permanent character, for the reason that 
subconscious-impressions have no [assignable] beginning. And if it be objected 
that the permanent character of desire is unproven, inasmuch as it could be 
explained as being self-caused, the reply is CThis well-known desire. 
A heterodox person asks Why [not] ? The answer is an animal just 
brought into life) and therefore in a condition wherein death has not been 
experienced in this birth. In other words, he is one who has not experienced the 
condition which is death. How can there be in the child, fallen forward from its 
mother's lap and trembling in consequence, a fear of death due to the memory of 
pain associated with aversion, as is inferred from the peculiar quivering of the 
child as it clasps very tightly in its hand the thread s marked with the disk and 
other auspicious objects, which hang around its mother's neck ? And if again it 
is urged that this is self-caused, the reply is ^Furthermore not.) Furthermore 
a self-caused thing does not need [that is] take an efficient cause in order that it 
itself should come into existence. What he means to say is this. The tremor 
that is seen in the little child is grounded in fear. Because it is a tremor of 
a particular kind just like our own. And the fear of the child is based on 
the memory of pain and aversion because it is a fear like any one of our own 
fears. And so the fear which is characterized by an expectancy of something 
disagreeable to come does not arise from the mere memory of pain. But having 
inferred that the thing of which he is afraid is the cause of something disagreeable, 

1 Ucanas by his curse burned the land to Rel. and Ethics, vol. i, p. 180 b ). 

ashes and covered it with a shower of s Compare Bana : Kadambari, p. 152 14 (ed. 
dust (Ramayana vii. 81. 8-10). M. R. Kale) and p. 93 20 (ed. Peterson, 

2 See MabaBh. iii. 105 (Bomb.) and Jacobi's BSS.). 

article on Agastya (Hastings : Cycl. of 



311] Extent of the mind-stuff [ iv. 10 

[the child] now also is afraid of something disagreeable. So as a result of the 
memory of that kind of pain accompanied by aversion for that kind of cause of 
fear which has been previously experienced, when that kind of cause of fear is 
now experienced, he [the child] inferring that it would cause pain is afraid of it. 
And the child has not come to the conclusion at any other time in this birth 
that falling is the cause of pain. And he has not experienced that kind of pain. 
So that the only alternative that remains is an experience relating to previous 
births. All this can be logically formulated thus. The memory belonging to a 
child just born is based on a previous experience. Because it is a memory. Just 
like our own. Nor can it be said that the expansion and contraction of the 
lotus is self-caused. For what is self-caused cannot stand in need of another 
cause. Because if this were so, even the heat of fire would require another cause. 
Therefore what leads to the expansion of the lotus is merely an accidental cause, 
such as, for instance, contact with the rays of the early sun. And the cause of its 
closing is the subliminal-impression 1 which leads it to recover its original 
position. Similarly from laughter and other [physical acts] we must infer joy 
[and grief] in some previous life to be the causes [of the acts of the child]. 
So now let the topic rest. He brings the discussion to a close by saying lt is 
for these reasons. By the words ^efficient caused he means that karma has 
reached the time for its fruition. ^Laying hold o means manifestation. Inci- 
dentally, with the intent to do away with the diversity of opinions concerning 
the dimensions of the mind-stuff, he first of all describes the diversity in the 
words, <Ka water-jar ... a palace.^ [The Samkhya view.] 'Since we see works 
performed only when [the mind-stuff] functions within the limits of the body, 2 
there is no means-of-proving that mind-stuff exists outside the body. Nor is it of 
the dimension s of an atom. For then it would follow that at the time of eating 
and [handling] a long corn-cake,* the five-fold sensation by the organs simulta- 
neously could not be produced. And there is no means-of-proof for the assumption 
of a sequence 5 [of sensations when] not actually in experience. Furthermore 
one atomic central-organ cannot simultaneously 6 come in contact with organs 
located in several regions [of the body]. The only remaining alternative 
[for the Samkhya] is that the mind-stuff is of the dimension of the body. 
And in the body of an ant or of an elephant [as the case may be] it is liable 
to expansion or contraction, like a lamp placed in a [small] water-jar or in 

1 The word sarhskdra is defined in Tarka- corn and ghee or oil with spices and 

samgraha, 75. salt and is called in Marathi kodabo/e. 

* The Samkhya school holds the theory of On the plains it is made of sugar and 

madhyama-parimana (Silt, v. 69). wheat with almonds, sugar, and bits of 

3 This is directed against the argument in coco-nut in the middle and is boiled in 

Nyaya-sutra iii. 2. 62. ghee. In Hindi it is called karanji. 

This is a cake eaten at the Hindu New B Compare Nyaya-sutra iii. 2. 61. 

Year and on birthdays and on the feast 6 See Nyaya-sutra iii. 2. 59. 

of Dewali. In the west it is made of 



iv. 10 ] Booh TV. Isolation or Kaivalya [312 

a [large] palace.' [So it is that] others have come to the conclusion that 
the form [of the mind-stuff] is the dimension of the body itself ; it is that of 
which the dimension [is the body]. The [Sarhkhya] objector continues. ' If this 
[atomic theory] were true (evam), how can this [mind-stuff] come into relation 
with the womb (ksetra) or the seed ? For surely without something-in-which-it- 
resides (dqraya), this [mind-stuff] cannot from the dead body enter the blood and 
seed resident in the body of the mother and the father. Since [this mind-stuff] 
is dependent. For certainly when posts and such things do not move, their 
shadows do not move ; nor when the canvas is not moving does the picture 
which rests upon {aqraya) it move. And further according to this theory 
the round-of-rebirth would be impossible.' Therefore he says And thus [they 
say] there is an intermediate state and there is ground for the round-of- 
rebirths.^ The words CAnd thus mean when [the mind-stuff] is of the 
dimension of the body, there is, in order to get into another body, both the 
leaving of the first body and the getting into the other body, by means of 
a correlation, while on the way 1 (antara) with a migratory body. 2 For of course 
by this [correlation] he would pass 3 into another body as the Purana passage 4 
also says, u Yama by force drew forth a man the size of a thumb." This is what 
is meant by saying that there is an intermediate state and that consequently 
there would be ground for the round-of-rebirths.' Not tolerating this opinion, 
he gives his own by saying the fluctuation.^ It is only the all-pervasive 
mind-stuff's fluctuation which contracts and expands. So the Master, the Self- 
born, 5 set forth. His point [in rejecting the other theory] is this. If the 
mind-stuff without something-in-which-it-resides cannot get into a body, how 
does it [in the first place] find this something-in-which-it-resides in the 
migratory 6 body '? And if we imagine another body in this case, that would 
involve an infinite regress. Further, it is not possible that this migratory body 
be drawn forth from the body, since it is only when drawn forth that the 
mind-stuff can come into correlation with [the migratory body]. Therefore let 
there be 7 a subtile body from the moment of creation and up to the time of the 
great [mundane] dissolution. It would be limited in its function to the six- 
sheathed body, which would be the locus of the mind-stuffs. For so the mind- 
stuff could pass about in one body after another up to the Truth-world and 
down to Avici. And one could explain the drawing forth of this subtile 
body from the six-sheathed body. For in this case there is [no difficulty as 
to an] intermediate state of this [subtile body], because this [subtile body] 
is always necessarily there. Moreover there is no means-of-proof for the 
existence of this [subtile body] also, indeed it is not within the range of 

1 Adverbially, according to Panini ii. 3. 4. 6 The Varttika says that the Svayatnbhu is 

2 Compare Qarhkara on Vedanta-sutra hi. 1. Patafijali. 

1-6 and on iv. 2. 6-11. 6 This is of course the suksma-^arJra. Com- 

3 See Samkhya-sutra v. 103. pare Samkhya-sutra v. 103. 
* Compare MBh. iii. 16763. " So Cumkara on iii. 1. 1. 



313] No migratory body [ iv. 10 

ocular [demonstration]. Nor can the round of rebirths be the means-of-inference 
for this [subtile body]. For [this round-of-rebirths] can be explained quite as 
well by the theory of the Master. While (tn) as for the Tradition (dgama), it speaks 
of drawing out a man (purusa). And a man is neither mind-stuff nor subtile body, 
but the Energy of Intellect which unites not with objects. And since a drawing 
out of this [Energy of Intellect] is impossible, we must understand [the 
quotation] as being merely metaphorical. And so [the explanation of the 
metaphor is] that the meaning of the drawing out is only the non-existence 
of a fluctuation, belonging to both the Intellect and to the mind-stuff, with 
reference to this [object] or that. As to what has been said in the Smrti or in 
the Itihasa or in Puranas with regard to [the mind-stuff] just after death getting 
into the body of a Preta and that through the agency of commemorative-feasts 
(sapindlJcarana) 1 and so on [the mind-stuff] is liberated from this body 
all this we accede to. But what we cannot tolerate is that mind-stuff should 
be migratory. And there is no Tradition to support your theory. For the 
messengers of Yama carry him bound with fetters only as having a body [in 
general]. But it is not said that there is a migratory body. Hence since 
mind is an effect of the personality-substance ; and since the personality- 
substance like the sphere of the atmosphere pervades the three worlds, the 
central-organ is also all-pervasive. 2 An objector says, 'If this be so, the 
fluctuation of this [mind-stuff] would also be [all-]pervasive, and there would 
be a universal omniscience.' The reply to this is <Konly this .... fluctuation.^ 
The objector replies, ' This may be true. But how has this fluctuation, which 
depends on mind-stuff only, its contraction and expansion from time to time ? ' 
In reply to this he says This [mind-stuff] furthermore.^ And this mind- 
stuff for its fluctuation requires some such [efficient-cause] as right-living. 
He classifies [this efficient-cause] by saying And this efficient-cause. By 
the words <Ksuch . . . as we are to understand energy and wealth and the like. 
By the words like belief, for instanced we are to understand energy and 
mindfulness and such qualities [i. 20]. As to their being internal [means] he 
adduces the consensus of the Teachers by saying <KAnd in this sense it has been 
said. Diversion^ is functional activity. Perfection2> means whiteness. 
Of these two means among the inner and the outer. [Intuitive] knowledge 
and passionlessness mean the qualities engendered by them. By what quality 
of outer means-of-attainment are these [outer means] surpassed [or] over- 
whelmed? It is the qualities resulting from [intuitive] knowledge and 
passionlessness which overcome it, in that they remove it from the condition 

1 See Vishnu Pur. iii. 13. 29. a middle dimension (niadhyama-pari- 

2 The Mimansa holds the atman is per- mcina). The Van,-esika (viii. 1. 2) and 

manent and omnipresent (loka-Vart- the Nyaya conceive the iltman to he 

tika v. 18). The Samkhya-sutras (v. atomic. The Yoga teaches that mind- 

69-71) deny that the central-organ is stuff is all-persuasive ; its fluctuations, 

all-pervasive ; and assert that it is of however, expand and contract. 
40 [h.o.s.h] 



iv. 10 ] Book TV. Isolation or Kdivalya [314 

of seed. This is the meaning. On this point he gives a well-known illustration 
n the words <Kthe Dandaka Forest. 



11. Since [subconscious-impressions] are associated with, 
cause and motive and mental-substrate (dgraya) and stimulus, 
if these cease to be, then those [subconscious-impressions] 
cease to be. 

1. As to cause. From right-living results pleasure; from wrong- 
living, pain ; from pleasure, passion ; from pain, aversion ; and from 
this, struggle. Quivering in central-organ or in vocal -organ or 
in body with this [struggle], he either helps or injures another. 
From this again result right-living and wrong-living, pleasure and 
pain, passion and aversion. Thus revolves 1 the six-spoked wheel 2 
of the round-of-rebirths. And as it ceaselessly revolves, un- 
differentiated-consciousness (avidyd), the root of all the hindrances, 
is its motive-power. Such is cause. 2. But motive is that [human 
purpose] with reference to which any condition (yasya) such as 
right-living becomes operative [in the present]. For it is not the 
rise of anything new. 3. The central-organ, however, while its 
task is yet unfulfilled, is the mental-substrate of subconscious- 
impressions. For when the task of the central-organ is fulfilled, 
the subconscious-impressions, now without mental-substrate, are 
not able to persist. 4. When a thing confronted [with some 
object] phenomenalizes any subconscious-impression [in itself], then 
[that object] is the stimulus of that [subconscious-impression]. 
Thus all subconscious-impressions are associated with these causes 
and motives and mental-substrates and stimuli. If they cease 
to be, the subconscious-impressions cohering with them also 
cease to be. 

The question is raised, if these fluctuations of mind-stuff and the subconscious- 
impressions are without beginning, how can they be destroyed ? For surely 
the Energy of Intellect (citi) which is without beginning cannot be destroyed. 
In reply to this he says, 11. Since [subconscious-impressions] are asso- 
ciated with cause and motive and mental-substrate {aqraya) and stimulus, 

1 Compare i. 5, p. 20 2 (Calc. ed.). ham samsdracahram. Professor Jacobi 

* A six-spoked wheel occurs in the Rig- calls my attention to the passage in 

veda i. 164 12 , and in the Divyavadana Samaraicca Kaha p. 338 10 . 

p. 180 22 and 281 29 we find paHcaganda- 



315] The principles of individuation [ iv. 12 

if these cease to be, then those [subconscious-impressions] cease to be. 
Even a beginningless thing evidently perishes, for instance, the fact that a 
thing is yet to be (anagatatva). [This is prag-abhava.~\ So it is not [a proper] 
middle-term (sddhana) because it is too wide. As to the Energy of Intellect, 
on the other hand, since there is no cause which could make it perish, it does 
not perish. But the reason for this is not that it has no beginning. And it has 
been stated in the sutra that there is a cause which brings about the destruction 
of subconscious-impressions, although they are from time without beginning. 
Helping and injuring are partial expressions for the efficient- cause of right-living 
and wrong-living and so on. Under this expression the drinking of spirits and 
similar acts are also included. The motive-power (netri) is that which keeps 
[the wheel] moving (nayiM). He gives the reason for this in the words the 
Toot." Becoming operative is presentness ; but it does not mean that right- 
living as such is made to grow. Of this very point the reason is given in the 
words For it is not. That thing to which one is confronted would be such 
as contact with a maiden. So the meaning of the sutra is that where the more 
extensive is not, there the less extensive also is not. 



Since there is no production of that which is non-existent nor 
destruction of that which is existent, how will subconscious- 
impressions, by reason of their existence as things, cease to exist ? 
12. Past and future as such exist; [therefore subconscious- 
impressions do not cease to be]. For the different time- 
forms belong to the external-aspects. 

The future is that the phenomenalization of which is yet to come. 
The past is that the [individual] phenomenalized [form] of which 
has been experienced. The present is that which has entered into 
its functional activity. And this three-fold thing is the object for 
the [intuitive] knowledge [of the yogin]. And if they did not exist 
as such, this [intuitive] knowledge, not having any object, would not 
emerge x [in the mind-stuff]. Therefore past and future as such 
exist. Moreover if the result of the karma, either that which is 
conducive to experience or that which is conducive to liberation, 
when it is yet to emerge, were without-any-describable-existence, 
then the actions of the wise, directed towards this [or] for the 
purpose of this, would have no ground. And a cause is capable of 
making an already existent result present, but not of producing 2 

1 With udapatsyata (rare : Whitney, 941), p. 201 . For the word upajana seeii. 19, 

compare niramasyata, above 279 s . p. 150 7 ; iv. 2 and 11, pp. 276 8 and 288*. 

9 For the word upajanana compare iii. 11, For the verb see i. 33, p. 78 1 (Calc. ed.). 



iv. 12 ] Book IV. Isolation or Kdivalya [316 

something [altogether] new. The efficient cause when fully 
established gives aid to the particularized [form] of the effect, but 
it does not cause anything [quite] new to come into existence. A 
substance, moreover, consists of a number of external-aspects. 
And by variation of this [substance's] time-forms the external- 
aspects are in successive states. The past or the future does not, 
like the present, exist as a material thing, in that it has been 
changed into a particularized phenomenal form. How then is it ? 
The future has its peculiar existence as a thing yet to be pheno- 
menalized. The past has its peculiar existence as having an 
[individual] phenomenalized [form] already experienced. The 
[individual] phenomenalized [form] of the thing itself belongs to 
the present time-form only. This cannot be for the past and the 
future time-forms. And while one time-form is present, the two 
[other] time-forms are of course inherent in the substance. Hence 
the three time-forms do not come into a state-of-existence after 
having-been-in-a-state-of-non-existence. 

With the intent to introduce the next sutra he raises a doubt by saying 
there is no. The words of that which is non-existent^ have been intro- 
duced either incidentally or by way of illustration. 12. Past and future as 
such exist ; [therefore subconscious-impressions do not cease to be]. For 
the different time-forms belong to the external-aspects. There is no 
production of things non-existent, nor destruction of things existent. But 
emergence and remergence (udaya-vyayau) are nothing but a mutation of the 
different time-forms of external-aspects which are existent. This is the mean- 
ing of the sutra. ^Experienced^ is that by which one gets to the [individual] 
phenomenal [form]. The meaning is that at present its [individual] pheno- 
menal [form] is not. And so the external-aspect [is] existent in all three times, as 
he says And if.! For what is non-existent does not become an object of 
knowledge, because it is without-any-describable existence. For a mental act 
is nothing but a shining-forth of the object. And it cannot occur where there 
is no object. Whereas the mental-act of yogins has the three worlds for its 
object. The mental-act of such as we are also would not arise if there were 
no object. And this is [quite] consistent. Therefore the past and the future 
exist as connected-inseparably with their generic-forms. So the [intuitive] know- 
ledge of one who has experience of this kind is called the cause of the existence 
of the object. Because the future exists as something stateable, it also exists 
as an object, as he says in the words Moreover . . . conducive to experience. 
The wise is the clever man. And as to any acts to be performed, when 






317] Past and future exist [ iv. 13 

one thing is the cause of another, it can bring its particular function into play- 
only when the effect is [already] existing, for instance, the chapters of the 
Veda referring to the [cutting of] sacrificial-reeds (kanddlava). For certainly 
these cuttings of reeds do not bring into existence what is not existing. But 
they cause modifications 1 or they bring near a thing which is existing. 
Similarly the potter and the [efficient causes] lead to the present existence 
of a water-jar which already exists as he says an already existent.^ But if the 
past and future are to be supposed as being non-existent simply because they 
are not in the present, then, whew ! Sir ! the present also would be non- 
existent, because it is not in the past and future. But as to existence irrespective 
of its relation to time-form or to substance, it equally holds for all three, as he 
says A substance, moreover. The words are in successive states^ mean 
belonging to each state one by one. The expression as a material thing 
means in a substance which is a material thing. The termination -tas is used 
for all case-endings. If the past and the future are, only so far as they are past 
and future, then at the present they are not, because at this time they are not 
past or future, as he says And while one. He brings the discussion to 
a close in the words state-of-existence after having-been-in-a-state-of-non- 
existence.^ 



13. These [external-aspects with the three time-forms] are 
phenomenalized [individuals] or subtile [generic forms and] 
their essence is the aspects (guna). 

<These> are of course those external-aspects with the three time- 
forms : those which are [phenomenalized] are the present ; those 
which are subtile are the past and the future, the six 2 non-particulars. 
Since this whole world is nothing more than a particular colloca- 
tion of aspects (guna), it has in the strict sense the aspects as its 
essence. And in this sense the Exposition 3 of the System has said, 
"The aspects from their utmost height 

Come not within the range of sight. 
But all within the range of sight 

A phantom seems and empty quite." 

1 For the compound prdptivikdrdu see ing words ata eva yoga$astram vyutpa- 

Pan. ii. 2. 32. dayita-aha sma Bhagavdn Vdrsaganyah 

8 ii. 19, p. 147 7 (Calc. ed.). ''^wnnam(Nirnayasagara,firstedition, 

8 The quotation is attributed to Vdrsaganya p. 352). Compare Vijnana Bhiksu in 

by Vacaspatimicra in his Bhamati on his Vijnanamrta (Benares ed. 1901), 

Vedanta-sutra ii. 1. 2. 3 in the follow- p. 101. 



iv. 13] Book IV. Isolation or Kaivalya [318 

An objector says, 'This may be true. But this manifold amplification 
(prapanca) of the varied forms of the universe {vigva), having as its essence 
the kinds of mutation which are the states of the substance and its external- 
aspects, cannot properly come out of one primary substance. For from a cause 
which has no diversity, diversities of effect cannot come to pass.' In reply 
to this he says 13. These [external-aspects with the three time-forms] 
are phenomenalized [individuals] or subtile [generic forms and] their 
essence is the aspects {guna). These external-aspects with the three time- 
forms, both the phenomenalized and the subtile, have the aspects as their 
essence. For they have no other cause than the three-fold aspects. But as 
to their diversity, it follows from the diversity attending upon the beginningless 
subconscious-impressions from hindrances produced by these [aspects (guna)]. 
In which sense it has been said in the Vayu 1 Purana, "Because the primary 
cause has manifold forms, there is a marvellous mutation." Of the earth and 
the other phenomenalized [individuals], and of the eleven organs, which are 
present forms, there are past and future [forms], which are the six non- 
particularized [forms ; and these] arise according to their capacity. Making 
now a distinction between the permanent and the impermanent forms of the 
universe, he gives first its permanent form in the words this whole world. ^ 
This [that is] the visible [world]. A collocation means a mutation with 
a particular arrangement of parts. On this point there is a specific mention 
of the Shastitantra 2 text. It is like a phantom (mayo), but not quite a phantom. 
Empty quite means perishable. For just as a phantom in no time assumes 
different shapes, so those evolved-effects whose external-aspects become visible 
and invisible, change from moment to moment. Whereas primary-matter is 
permanent, and thus not homogeneous with a phantom, and is accordingly an 
ultimate reality. 



But if all things are aspects (guna), how is it that there is a 
single sound and a single organ [of sense] ? 
14. The that-ness of a thing is due to a singleness of muta- 
tion. 

When the aspects disposed to vividness and to activity and to 
inertia have as their essence processes-of-knowing, in so far as they 
are instruments [of perception], there is a single mutation, for 
instance, the organ-of-hearing. When their essence is objects-for- 

1 xlix. 182, Anandacrama ed., p. 153, and ' See Garbe : Mondschein der Samkhya 

liii. 20, Anandacrama ed., p. 175. See Wahrheit, p. Ill, note 3 ; and Garbe's 

also Samkhya Tattva Kaumudi xlii Translation of the Samkhya Pravacana 

[Garbe's translation, p. 86]. Bhasya, vi. 3, p. 147. 



319] Each thing a complex of relations [ iv. 14 

knowledge, in so far as they are sounds, there is a single mutation, 
a sound, an object of sense. The sounds and other [perceptible 
objects], belonging to the general class of limitation-in-extent, 1 
have a single mutation, an atom of earth, a part of a fine-substance 
(tanmdtra). And these [atoms] have a single mutation, the earth, 
a cow, a tree, a mountain, for examples. By adding [to each of] 
the other [coarse] elements [successively] liquidity and heat and 
motivity and the making of a space, a generic-form, the beginning 
of a single evolved-effect, would be formed. They who from the 
following point of view deny the existence of a thing as such by 
saying, ' There is no intended-object dissociated from a mental act, 
but percepts are dissociated from intended-objects and imagined 
as in dreams and similar states,' and they who say ' a thing is only 
a readjustment of percepts, like the objects of a dream, and not 
a thing in the full sense of the word,' these, when the thing is 
presented by its own authority as it is (tathd) [according as it is 
seen] to be there (idam), since they throw overboard the thing 
as such by an abstract (vikalpa) thinking without force of proof, . 
how in the very act of prattling it away can their own words be 
worthy of belief? 

It may be granted that the three-fold aspects {guna) have such a diversity of 
mutation. But whence comes a single mutation, so that one says 'This is 
earth' or 'This is water'? By raising this objection, since there is a con- 
tradiction between the three essences and the singleness, he introduces the 
sutra. 14. The that-ness of a thing is due to a singleness of mutation. 
We see a single mutation belonging to many, for instance, when a cow or 
a horse or a buffalo or an elephant is huddled together in a brackish 2 [land], 
each has a single mutation characterized by the common nature of salt. And 
[similarly] a wick and oil and fire form a lamp. In the same way the aspects 
{guna), though many, have a single mutation. As a result of this, each of the 
fine elements (tanmatra) and of the elements and of the products-of-the-elements 
has a that-ness, that is a singleness. [When their] essence is objects-for- 
knowledge, in so far as sattva is predominant, their essence is vividness. And 

1 Compare iii. 44, p. 254 2 (Calc. ed.). have the brackish flavour attaching to 

2 The Maniprabha says rumdsthale. And their bodies.' Colonel Jacob adduces 

the Patanjala Rahasyam says, ' If cows evidence to show that ruma is the 

and other animals are huddled together name of a particular salt-lake or mine 

in that brackish spot (rumdlavana- (Second Handful of Popular Maxims, 

bhilmi), then all of them together will 2nd edition, 1909, p. 69). 



[ v 14 ] Booh IV. Isolation or Kaivalya [320 

being subsidiary-products of the personality -substance they have a single 
mutation in the form of instruments [of perception], [for instance], the organ- 
of-hearing. In so far as the tamas of these same [aspects] is predominant, 
inasmuch as they are insensate (jada) and thus have objects-for-knowledge as 
their essence, there is a single mutation as being the fine element sound, 
an object of sense. By the words a sound he indicates the fine element 
sound ; by the words ^object of sensed he indicates that it is insensate. But 
the fine element cannot possibly be the object of the organ-of-hearing. The 
rest is easy. He now raises up a Destructionist (vainagika), who holds the 
Theory of Ideas (vijnanavadin), by saying ' There is no intended-object dis- 
sociated from a mental-act. ') ' For if there be elements and products of 
elements distinct from mental-acts, then we might suppose a productive cause 
of them such as the primary cause. But in the strict sense they are not anything 
different from ideas. How is it then that a primary cause is presupposed? 
And how is it that processes-of-knowing, the organs-of-sense, which are evolved- 
effects of the personality-substance, are presupposed ? To explain. Since an 
insensate intended-object cannot be vivid of itself, there is no intended- object 
dissociated from some mental-act. [Association is] coexistence [that is] a rela- 
tion. The absence of this is dissociation. The prefix vi- is used in the sense of 
absence. The meaning is that there is nothing unrelated to some idea ; [in other 
words] something which might properly be described as non-existing. On the 
other hand mental-acts do exist dissociated from intended-objects. For in so far 
as this mental-act is vivid in itself, it does not require an insensate intended- 
object in order to make a statement as to its own existence.' So then the 
holder of the Theory of Ideas {vijnanavadin) has indicated two requisites, 1. the 
fact 1 that it is perceived (vedyatva), and 2. the fact that it is apperceived 
along with something else (sahopalambha). 'These two points can further 
be brought out in a syllogism thus. Whatever is perceived by whatever 
process-of-perception, that [intended -object] is not distinct from that [process- 
of-perception]. Just as the soul in the case of knowledge. And the elements 
and the products-of-the-elements are perceived. So this apperception [of 
elements] is pervaded by the contrary proposition, [that is, it refutes the 
absence of distinction between the process and the object]. So the fact-that- 
it-is-perceived, which is less-extensive as compared with what-is-the-opposite 
of the distinction which- we-wish-to-deny, [as soon as this fact] is known, posits 
the absence-of-distinction, which is more extensive with regard to itself [the 
perception]. And when we see this, [the fact that they are seen as different], 
which is just the contrary of this, is denied. Accordingly, when any thing 
is invariably seen with another thing, then the one is not different from the 
other, just as the second moon which is always perceived with the [actual] 
moon. And it is the case that the object is always invariably perceived with 

1 Similar discussion by (paihkara on ii. 2. 28. See also Sarva-dar^ana-samgraha (Anand. 
ed.), pp. 9-10 and 13. 



321] Criticism of Buddhist idealism [ iv. 14 

the thought. Thus this perception contradicts the more extensive [term] ; the 
invariable relation contradicts the variable relation which is more extensive 
than the distinction, which we must deny. Eemoving thus the variable relation, 
it rejects the distinction, which is less extensive than this [relation]. 1 Let this 
be assumed. And if the intended-object is not different from the thouglit, 
then how is it that they seem to be different ?' In reply to this [the Vijiianavadin] 
says 'imagined. As the Destructionists 2 say "Because there is invariably 
an apperception of [the object] blue and of the percept of this [blue] at the 
same time, there is no difference [between them]. And the difference that 
may be seen between them results from illusions of mental-acts just as a pair 
of moons may be seen when there is one only without a second." [The 
Vijiianavadin] makes clear the imaginary [difference] in the words only a 
readjustment of percepts. ' [The author of the Comment] refutes this by 
saying these.! The construction of the sentence is, how can their own words 
be worthy of credence? CPresented means brought before them at the time 
of each perception. How [is it presented]? He replies Cas it is.^ In 
the different ways that [a thing] shines forth as being [the thing] that is 
pointed to as this and this, in that very way eo ipso (svayam) it is presented ; 
but not as being reduced to an object of a mental-act [or] as being a figment 
of the imagination. The words <Kby its own authority^ point out that the 
intended-object acts as cause with reference to the mental-act, because the 
intended-object has given rise to the mental-act by virtue of its own power 
as an object-for-knowledge. It is on account of this that the mental-act is the 
perceiver of the intended-object. Now how could a thing, which is of such 
a kind, [be thrown away] by reason of an [empty] abstract thinking having 
no force of proving? For since an [empty] conception is no means-of -proof, 
therefore what is based upon it and what is in essence that [empty abstraction] 
is no means-of-proof. In this way throwing overboard the thing as such, [that 
is] setting it afloat. An occasional reading is 'holding it under.' In this case 
too the meaning is the same. Prattling away this object in this way, [how] 
can their own words be worthy of belief ? This is what is intended. The two 
middle terms given, the invariable apperception at one time and the fact of 
being perceived, are non-conclusive. Because the negative statement is open to 
doubt. To explain. The coarseness and externality appear [in consciousness] 
in the case of elements and products of elements which [as you say] have the 
form of thought [only], but these two [qualities] are not possible in the case 
of thought [only]. To explain. Coarseness means pervading several points-of- 
space. Externality means related to separated points-of-space. And it is im- 
possible that a single mental-act should pervade several points-of-space and also 

1 If there is bheda, there is a-niyatasahopa- 2 Quoted Sarva Dare. Sarhg. p. 16 (Anandac. 
lambha ; but there is none of this ed.) and de la Valle'e Poussin's note in 

latter ; therefore there is no bheda. Le Bouddhisme (Museon, 1902), p. 34. 

41 [h.o.s. n] 



iv. 14 ] Booh IV. Isolation or Kdivalya [322 

[occupy] separated points- of-space. For it is impossible to have in a single thing 
the confusion of contrary qualities such as occupying this point-of-space and not 
occupying this point-of-space. Else if this were possible, one would have to 
admit that all three worlds are a single thing. If it be said that for this very 
reason we should admit that there is a difference in the mental-acts [as to 
coarseness and externality, in that there are as many thoughts as there are forms 
of the thing], then the reply would be, Then ! Sir ! in the case of the ideas 
which can grasp even the extremely subtile objects [finer than coarseness and 
externality], and which take no notice of each other's behaviour, and which are 
awake only to that [one atomic object] which comes within their range how 
could there be the appearance of coarseness ? And you cannot talk [of what 
is perceived by the later-distinct-impression (vikalpa) in language] which refers 
to the later-distinct-impression. Because there is no confusion of [the content of 
this impression with anything else], and [on the other hand] there is a clear 
appearance [of coarseness]. Nor can it be said that coarseness is externally 
sensed (alocitam) [by the first-indistinct-impression], and so the clearness of the 
knowledge (savikalpa) which follows this, and which is conditioned by this 
[avikalpa] could be explained. Further this later-distinct-impression is not, like 
the first-indistinct-impression, limited to its form (akara) and to nothing else. 
For since this [later-indistinct-impression] is not itself a coarse [thing], it 
cannot make the coarse [manifest] as its object. .Therefore if an idea is to 
be outer, since, as we have shown it, it cannot be coarse or outer, then these 
coarse and outer [impressions] may be counted, if you will, as altogether false. 
And you cannot say that such a false impression is just the same as a mental- 
act. For then you would have to admit that the mental-act is as empty as 
this [false impression]. So to resume the argument (tatha ca). In so far 
as the fact of being perceived is not less extensive than the absence of difference 
between [the idea and the object], how can the fact of its being perceived 
refute the fact of the difference ? And as to being invariably together. Just 
as in the case of the mental-act and of the coarseness, the one existent and 
the other non-existent, so likewise in the case of two existing things [the being 
perceived invariably together] may be explained on the ground of the nature 
of things or on the ground of some kind of an obstruction [in the thinking 
apparatus]. Accordingly those two fallacious middle terms [put forth by the 
opponent], because they are non-conclusive, only give rise to an [empty] 
abstraction (vikalpa), if there be no external [thing]. And the authority of 
a perception is not to be gainsaid by a mere [empty] abstraction. So the point 
was well taken when he said by an abstract (vikalpa) thinking without 
force of proofs By this [discussion we must understand that also the 
view which attempts to prove that objects] are ideas, urged as a ground that 
ideas have no external-basis, as illustrated by the ideas of a dream, is also 
overthrown. And the alternatives (vikalpa) regarding the object-of-the-illation 
have been offered-in-rebuttal by stating that the relation is that between whole 



323] Criticism of Buddhist idealism [ iv. 15 

and [part]. For details the Nyaya Kanika 1 is to be consulted. So there is 
no need of details here. 



Why is this incorrect ? 

15. Because, while the [physical] thing remains the same, the 
mind-stuffs are different, [therefore the two are upon] dis- 
tinct levels-of-existence. 

A single [physical] thing is the common [physical] basis for many 
mind-stuffs. It is not, of course, figured forth by a single mind- 
stuff, nor yet is it figured forth by many mind-stuffs. It is 
rather grounded in itself. Why is this ? Because, while the 
[physical] thing remains the same, the mind-stuffs are different. 
When the mind-stuff is in relation with right-conduct, the mind- 
stuff has thoughts of pleasure, the [physical] thing remaining the 
same. When in relation with wrong-living, from the same 
[physical thing] it has thoughts of pain. When in relation with 
undifferentiated-consciousness, from the same [physical thing] it has 
thoughts of infatuation. When in relation with complete insight, 
from the same thing it has thoughts of detachment. 2 If this is so, 
by whose mind-stuff would this thing be formed ? Nor would it be 
sound to say that one person's mind-stuff is affected when brought 
into relation with an object formed by the mind-stuff of another 
person. Consequently the [physical] thing and the thought distinct 
because of dissimilarity, in that the thing is the object-for-know- 
ledge and the thought is the process-of-knowing, [are upon] distinct 
levels-of-existence. There is not even a trace 3 of a blending of the 
two. But from the point-of-view of the Samkhya, since a thing has 
three aspects (guna) and since the changes of the aspects 4 are 
unstable, it comes into relation with the mind-stuffs [of men], 
dependent [for its existence in this case or the other] upon such 
determinants as right-living [or wrong living or undifferentiated 
consciousness or complete insight], it becomes the cause, in one form 

1 Reference is made to this work by Vacas- the Bhamati on Vedanta-sutra ii. 2. 

patimicra at i. 32, p. 75 1 (Calc. ed.), 25 (Nirnaya-sagara ed.), p. 462. 

and also in theTattva Bindu (Benares, a Compare ii. 28. 

1892), p. 23 12 . The Niralambanavada 8 Compare Pan. i. 2. 15. 

is discussed in the Qastra-dlpika, p. 32 ; * Compare ii. 15, p. 135"; iii. 9 and 13, 

in the Nyaya kanika, p. 261 ; and in pp. 199 3 and 204* (Calc. ed.). 



iv. 15 ] Booh IV. Isolation or Kaivalya [324 

or another, of presented-ideas, as they rise [into consciousness], 
corresponding [in quality] to the [determining] efficient-cause. 
So having in this manner, independently of the sutra, given the reason for 
setting up [the physical thing] as something over and above the mental-act, the 
author of the Comment introduces the reason as given in the sutra itself by the 
words Why is this ? 15. Because, while the [physical] thing remains the 
same, the mind-stuffs are different, [therefore the two are upon] distinct 
levels-of-existence. Whatever units are in the manifold these differ absolutely 
from the manifold. For instance, a single thought in Chaitra or in Maitra is 
distinct from the presented-ideas in Devadatta and in Vishnumitra, which are 
dissimilar. And since the intended-object is not different, even when the thoughts 
about it are manifold, it is other than the mental-acts. And further the iden- 
tity of the intended-object, although the thoughts of those who know it validly 
are different, is determined by the connexion of one [thought] with another [in 
memory]. For in the case of a single woman who is presented-to-the-minds of 
several persons, enamoured or ill-disposed or infatuated or detached, we see a 
reciprocal connexion so that one thinks ' She who is seen by you is seen by me 
also.' Consequently while the [physical] thing remains the same, because the 
mind-stuffs are different, because there is a difference of thoughts, [therefore] 
the two, the intended-object and the thought, [are upon] distinct levels-of-exist- 
ence [that is] [distinct] means of distinguishing the essential attributes. In 
the lover, a thought of pleasure with reference to the woman loved ; in rival 
mistresses, a thought of pain ; but in Chaitra who has not obtained her, a thought 
of infatuation, a depression. 'This may be so,' the objector says, ' but that 
intended-object with the distinguishing characteristic of being loved is figured 
forth by a mind-stuff of one person. And this same [intended-object] affects 
the mind-stuff of the others also. So [this mind-stuff] might be supposed to be 
common.' In reply to this he says nor would it be . . . another.^ For if that 
were so, when one person has the thought of blue, all would have the thought 
of blue. A further objection would be this ' Even according to the view which 
maintains the distinct existence of objects (arthavada), how can one and the 
same object be the cause of mental-acts differing according to the difference 
in pleasure and the other [experiences] ? For from a cause which is not differ- 
ent in its distinguishing characteristics there should be no difference in effects.' 
In reply to this he says from the point-of-view of the Samkhya.^ It is quite 
consistent to say that the same external thing which is a mutation of the three 
aspects (guna) has three forms. The objector says ' Even if it be so, then all 
without distinction would have a mental-act of pleasure and of pain and of 
infatuation.' In reply to this he says ^dependent [for its existence] upon such 
determinants as right-living. The sattva accompanied by the rajas and deter- 
mined by right-living produces the sensation of happiness. But this same sattva 
when determined by knowledge (vidya), after the rajas has been removed, gives 
rise to a sensation of detachment. And right-living and the other [experiences] 



325] One real object common to all Selves [ iv. 16 

are not all in all persons. Some of it is in some persons. So this arrangement 
[of pleasures and of pains] is quite consistent. 

There are some who say that a thing is coextensive with its 
thought, in so far as like pleasure and the other [experiences] 
it is experienced. In this way when they thus reject the quality 
of being common [to several mind-stuffs], they deny the existence 
of the thing in both its earlier and its later moments. 
16. And a thing is not dependent upon a single mind-stuff, 
[for then in certain cases] it could not be proved [by that 
mind-stuff], [and] then what would it be ? 
If a thing were dependent l upon a single mind-stuff, then if the 
mind-stuff be distracted or restricted, it itself would be un- 
touched by that mind-stuff. And not coming within the range 
of that [mind-stuff], and not being proved [by that mind-stuff], 
and unperceived in its nature by any one, would it then be at all? 2 
And how could it be produced again in relation to the mind-stuff? 
It would not possess those parts of it which are not apparent. So 
that if one says the back does not exist, neither could the belly be 
known. Consequently an intended-object is independent [of mind- 
stuff] and common to all the Selves. And again independent 
mind-stuffs function differently for each Self. As a result of 
a relation between these two [the intended-object and the mind- 
stuff] there follows an apperception, an experience of the Self. 
On this point there are some disputatious persons who say that the object is 
coexistential with the idea. Because it is the object of experience, like pleasure. 
What he means to say is this. The intended-object might be admitted to be 
distinct from knowledge, still since it is insensate {jada), it cannot be perceived 
in the absence of knowledge, but must be illumined by the knowledge. 
Accordingly [the object] is only at the time of the idea, and not at other times. 
Since there is no evidence that it exists at other times. This the author of the 
Comment confutes independently of the sutra in the words In this way when 
they. For a [physical] thing (vastu) is experienced by ordinary observers s as 
common to all mind-stuffs and as persisting 4 in the succession of various 
moments and as consisting of a mutation. Now if the thing is coexistential 
with the mental-act, then it would be of this sort [that its appearance and 

1 As the Vijnanavada maintains. 3 This would be the point of view of the 
* Compare de la Vallee Poussin : La Nega- Sarvastivadin. 

tion de l'Ame (Journal Asiatique, 9 e 4 Compare Nyaya-sutra i. 1. 40. 

serie, tome xx, 1902, pp. 248 and 254). 



iv. 16 ] Book IV. Isolation or Kdivalya [326 

disappearance would be coexistential with the appearance and disappearance of 
the idea]. If so, how can one act up to (anurodha) this objective-factor (idamanga) 
so that one shall not at the same time deny it ? This is the meaning. Or we 
may suppose that there is not a denial of this objective-factor. Let the intended- 
object be coexistential with the knowledge. To this also the reply is in the 
antra. 16. And a thing is not dependent upon a single mind-stuff, [for 
then in certain cases] it could not be proved [by that mind-stuff], [and] then 
what would it be P For the same mind-stuff which perceives a water-jar, when 
distracted by another substance such as a piece of cloth, does not remain upon 
the water-jar; or when the mind-stuff which has discrimination as its object, 
attains at that very time to restriction ; at these times, since there is no know- 
ledge of the water-jar or of the discrimination, the water-jar and the discrimina- 
tion, being dependent for their existence upon one particular knowledge only, 
would surely cease when this [knowledge] ceases. This he says in the words 
^dependent upon a single mind-stuff.^ The words how could it be mean that 
it could not be. How does it happen that the mind-stuff is in relation to this 
thing whether it be a water-jar or discrimination ? For the effects invariably 
are where the cause is, and invariably are not where the cause is not. Without 
regard to their own peculiar cause they cannot be produced by another cause. 
And if they are supposed to be causeless, then one would have to deny [such] an 
inconsistency as the accidental existence of them [the effects]. And there is no 
ground for saying that whatever causes the knowledge of the thing also causes 
the thing. For then it would follow that the taste and the sensific power and 
the digestion and so on would be the same whether one makes use of an actual 
sweetmeat or of a sweetmeat ' of hope. Therefore the point is well taken when 
he says And how could it be produced again in relation to the mind-stuff ? 
Furthermore the front part of anything is implied by the middle and hind part. 
But if the existence [of the thing] were to depend upon the knowledge, then 
the upper and middle parts would not exist, since this [idea of them] is not in 
experience. And accordingly since the pervader [the upper and middle parts] 
are not, the lower part, which is pervaded, would also not be. And thus if the 
whole object be absent, how could it be urged that the intended-object is coexis- 
tential with the knowledge, as he says It would not possess those parts.^ The 
words are not apparent^ mean are not perceived. He brings the discussion 
to a close by saying Consequently. The rest is easy. 



1 This is an allusion to the stanza in (^rihar- Sanskrit Series, fascicle I, p. 66.) This 

sa's Kbandanakhandakhadya stanza is given as aquotation in^rlhar- 

" Acdmodakatrptd ye, ye copdrjitamo- sa's work also. There is another book 

dakdh I of the same title on astronomy. See 

Rasaviryampdkddi tulyarh tesdm pra- also de la Valine Poussin, Le Boud- 

sajyate." dhisme (MustSon, 1902), p. 35, and 

(Lazarus and Co's edition, Medical Hall Hoernle's translation of the Sucruta, 

Press, Benares, p. 37; Chaukhamba p. 12. 



327] Objects now known now not known [ iv. 17 

17. A tiling is known or not known by virtue of its affecting 
[or not affecting] the mind-stuff. 

Object s-of-sense like magnets, bind to themselves the mind-stuff, 
as if it had qualities of iron, and affect it. The object whereby 
the mind-stuff is affected is known. But [the Self], who is other 
than this, is not known. The mind-stuff enters into mutations 
because the nature of the thing is now known l and now not 
known. 

This might 2 be conceded. ' But,' as the objector says, ' if the object is to be 
independent, in that it is insensate, it can never throw out light, or if it does 
throw out light, then its insensate character would vanish. And so (iti) it 
would cease also to be. For surely a thing cannot exist after casting off its 
own nature. Moreover it cannot be urged that throwing out light is a pro- 
perty of the intended-object which is really insensate by nature, and that this 
[property] is put into it by the organs. For if throwing out light were to be 
a property of the intended-object, it would be, like blueness, common to all 
persons. Thus if a single person knows the meaning of the [philosophical] 
systems, then all would be scholars and there would be no incompetent persons. 
Nor is it correct to say that a present external-aspect should exist in the past 
or in the future. Therefore that an intended-object exists independently as an 
object of apperception is nothing but a wish.' In reply to this he recites the 
sutra 17. A thing is known or not known by virtue of its affecting [or 
not affecting] the mind-stuff. 

Although the intended-object is by nature insensate, still by the channel of the 
organs it affects the mind-stuff. The Energy of Intellect {citirqdkti), whose 
reflection enters into the mirror of the mind-stuff which is in such a state [of 
being affected] as has been just described, enlivening (cetayamana) the mind-stuff 
which is affected by the intended-object, experiences the intended-object. But 
it does not impart to the object anything like visibility. Neither [is the 
Energy of Intellect] out of relation with the mind-stuff. For we have said 
that its reflection unites with the mind. And although both the mind-stuff, 
because it is omnipresent, and the organ which is made of the personality- sub- 
stance, are not in relation s with the object-of-sense, still that mind-stuff which 
has its fluctuation in any particular body is in relation with objects-of-sense. 
Thus it is that objects are said to be like a magnet. Since the mind-stuff is 
like the iron in its properties, the objects, having by the channel of the organs 
brought it into relation, affect it. And hence mind-stuff is capable of muta- 
tions, as he says Of the thing. 



1 ii. 20, p. 152 s (Calc). 2 The purpose of this sutra is to demolish idealism. 

8 Reading visaye nasti. 



iv. 18 ] Booh IV. Isolation or Kdivalya [328 

But as for [the Self] for whom this same mind-stuff is an object- 
of-sense 

18. Unintermittently the Master of that [mind-stuff] knows 
the fluctuations of mind-stuff [and thus] the Self undergoes- 
no-mutations. 

If, like the mind-stuff, the Master also, that is, the Self, should un- 
dergo mutation, then fluctuations of mind-stuff which are its objects 
would be, like objects-of-sense, the sounds and other [perceptible 
things], sometimes known and sometimes not known. The fact, 
however, that the central organ is unintermittently known by its 
Master, the Self, leads us to infer that [the Self] is an entity that 
undergoes-no-mutations. 

Thus then he has established the existence of the intended-object as distinct from 
mind-stuffs. Now with the intent of showing that the Self is distinct from 
these [mind-stuffs] whose nature is to enter into mutation, he asserts its [the 
Self's] immutability, the quality which differentiates it from these [mind-stuffs]. 
This he does by supplying some words and by reciting the sutra. CBut as for 
[the Self] for whom this same mind-stuff is an object-of-sense.) 19. Unin- 
termittently the Master of that [mind-stuff] knows the fluctuations of 
mind- stuff [and thus] the Self undergoes-no-mutations. The mind-stuff, 
whether it be restless or infatuated or distracted or in a state of focusedness, 
is always up to the time of restriction, experienced by the Self as in mutation. 
Why is this so ? Because the Self does not undergo mutation. If he entered 
into mutations, then the Self also, like the mind-stuffs, would sometimes know 
objects-of-sense and sometimes not. Whereas objects-of-sense are only known 
[and never unknown] to him. Therefore he does not undergo mutation. And 
as a result he is something distinct from things that are in mutation. The 
same he says in the words lf like the mind-stuff.^ It is the central-organ, 
when in fluctuation, that he unintermittently knows. Of this he is the Master 
[and] Owner, in other words, the Experiencer. Of this Master, the Self, [the 
above fact] leads us to infer the immutability. To explain : The point is that 
this Self which does not enter into mutation is distinct from the mind-stuff 
which enters into mutation. 



Should the doubt arise whether the mind-stuff like fire illumines 
itself and at the same time illumines objects 
19. It does not illumine itself, since it is an object-for-sight. 
Just as the organs-of-sense and the sounds and other perceptible 
[things] do not illumine themselves, since they are objects for sight, 



329] Things distinct from thoughts [ iv. 19 

so the central-organ is also to be represented. And accordingly, fire as 
an example could not apply to it. For fire does not throw light upon 
its own self which [before was something] without light. And here 
light is thrown [only] when there is a relation of the light-giver 
with something [which is yet] to be lighted. Furthermore such a 
relation [of a thing] does not occur with the thing itself. Besides, 
the meaning of the words <the mind-stuff illumines itself) is that 
it is not an object-for-knowledge for any one. Just as the words 
* Air is grounded in itself mean that it is not grounded in 
something else. For the reason that creatures are conscious-by- 
reflection of the processes of their own thinking-substances, when 
they say ' I am angry, I am afraid, I feel a passion for that person, 
I am angry with that person,' there is purposive action. This is 
impossible unless there be a knowledge of one's own thinking- 
substance. 

With the words ^Should the doubt arisen he sets up a Destructionist (vainagika) 
as an opponent, who argues as follows : ' All this may be so, provided mind-stuff 
be the object of the Self. But this it is not. On the contrary, this [mind- 
stuff] throws light upon itself [and] illumines the objects [and] originates 
in-dependence-upon previous mind-stuff. How then can the Self always have the 
objects perceived ? And still more how can it be distinct from the mind-stuff 
which enters-into-mutation ? ' 19. It does not illumine itself, since it is an 
object-for-sight. It might be so [self-illumining], providing mind-stuff had 
consciousness of itself. This, however, it does not have. It is, like the colour 
blue, [an object] capable of being included in experience in so far as it undergoes 
mutation. And whatever is capable of being included in experience cannot throw 
light upon itself. For it cannot be a fluctuation with regard to itself [and not 
to mind-stuff]. Since the same thing cannot be the act, the object of the act, 
and [one of] the relations * of the act. For the act of cooking is not cooked ; 
nor is the act of chopping chopped. On the other hand, the Self does not 
undergo mutation and is not an object of experience. Therefore with reference 
to him self-enlightenment is not inexplicable. For his self-enlightenment is 
nothing but an enlightenment 2 which is not dependent on any other ; and it is 
not his being an object of experience. Therefore because it is an object-for- 
sight, the mind-stuff which is the object of the seeing does not illumine in 
itself. The objects of the fluctuations of that mind-stuff only which has the 
reflections of the light of the self (atman) throw light. This is the point. An 
objector says, 'But don't you see that fire is an object-for-sight and yet has 

1 These relations are those expressed by the cases other than the nominative and 
possessive. 

2 Reading prakd^ata hy asya . . . nunulhavakarmatu. 

42 [h.o.s. 17] 



iv. 19 ] Book TV. Isolation or Kdivalya [330 

enlightenment in itself. It is not with a fire as it is with water-jars and so on, 
which may be made manifest by [the light of a] fire ; for a fire is not [made 
manifest] by another fire.' In reply to this he says <KAnd so, fire as an ex- 
ample^ Why ? For fire does not. The meaning is that fire does not 
require any other fire to throw light upon it, but has light thrown upon it by 
a mental-act. So it does not throw light upon itself. Thus [fire] is not an 
exception-to-general-principle [stated in the sutra]. This is the meaning. The 
word here in the expression And here light is thrown^ distinguishes [fire] 
from the light which is the nature of the Self, in other words, the light which 
is of an active kind. What he means to say is this : Wherever there is an 
action, it is in all cases seen to exist as related to an agent and to an instru- 
ment-of- action and to an object. Just as we see the act of cooking as related 
to Chaitra and to the fire and to the rice. Similarly throwing-light is an 
action. And this [action] too must be in the same [threefold] relation. Now 
a relation must be based upon a difference. It is impossible where there is no 
difference. This is the meaning. When it is said ^Besides, the meaning of 
the words <the mind-stuff illumines itself> is that it is not an object-for-know- 
ledge for any one,2> the objector grants, ' This may be so. But let it not be said 
that the mind-stuff is an object-for-knowledge. For when the process-of-know- 
ing, which is neither the cause nor the pervader [of the mind-stuff] is repressed, 
it does not follow that the mind-stuff must be repressed.' To this he replies, 
of their own thinking-substance. The ^thinking substance^ means the mind- 
stuff. 1 CMovements; mean functional-activities. <KBeings mean living beings. 
The different fluctuations of mind-stuff, anger or greed for instance, are, together 
with their basis the mind-stuff and with their objects, experienced by each in- 
dividual ; and refute that statement that the mind-stuff is not an object-for-know- 
ledge. He makes clear this same perception of the movements of one's own 
thinking-substance by the words <Hl am angry.^ 



20. And there cannot be a cognition of both [thinking- 
substance and thing] at the same time. 

And it is impossible in a single moment to cognize one's own 
form and another's as well. It is a supposition 2 of the Momen- 
tarists that whatever exists is both action and the means-related- 
to-an-action. 

20. And there cannot be a cognition of both [thinking-substance and 
thing] at the same time. He who says that mind-stuff illumines itself and 
illumines objects-of-sense cannot at least say that mind-stuff cognizes itself by 
the same functional-activity as that by which it cognizes objects. For a 

' That the buddhi is equivalent to citta; to manas; these are indications of a 

that in 1. 2, p. 6 1S , it is equivalent to wide divergence from the Samkhya. 

antahkaranam ; and that at the end of 2 Compare (^ariikara on ii. 2. 20. 
iv. 19 Vacaspati uses it as equivalent 



331] Criticism of Momentarists [ iv. 21 

functional-activity which has not a different distinguishing-characteristic is not 
adequate to producing a difference in effect. Therefore a difference in functional- 
activity has to be presupposed. In the opinion of the Destructionists there is no 
functional-activity over and above the various originations. And from the 
same act of origination which is without different distinguishing-character- 
istics, there cannot possibly come effects which have distinguishing-character- 
istics. For then this difference would be quite accidental. Neither [as in the 
last alternative] can it be urged that one and the same thing can have two 
originations. Therefore at one moment of time {samaya) the mind-stuff cannot 
determine the objects and also its own kind of thought ; [it cannot illumine 
itself]. The Comment states this in the words <KAnd it is impossible in a single 
moment.^ And in this sense it has been said ' by the Destructionists, " What- 
ever is the being of a thing that is itself the action and the means-related-to- 
action." Therefore this fact that mind-stuff is an object-for-sight, which is 
eternal, takes from it its character of illumining itself and points to a seer, and 
to the fact that the seer does-not-enter-into-mutations. 



If there be the opinion that a mind-stuff naturally 2 restricted is 
[yet] known by another mind-stuff immediately contiguous to it, 
[the answer is,] 

21. If [one mind-stuff] were the object-for-sight for another, 
there would be an infinite regress from on thinking- 
substance to another thinking-substance, as well as confusion 
of memory. 

If one mind-stuff were perceived by another mind-stuff, by whom 
would the thinking-substance of the thinking-substance be per- 
ceived? Because this would be perceived by still another, and 
that by yet one more, there would be an infinite regress. And 
there would be a <confusion of memory.> As many memories would 
obtain as there would be, on the part of the thinking-substances, 
experiences. And as a result of the confusion of these [memories] 
there would be no limit to the memory of one [thinking-substance]. 
Thus everything is put into disorder by the Destructionists' 
prattling away of the Self who is conscious by reflecting the 
thinking-substance. But those who assume that the experiencer 
as such [experiences] anywhere soever do not conform to the rules 
[of logic]. There are some who assume an existence as such, and 
that it is this existence which casts off those five divisions-of- 
existence (sJcandha) of theirs and puts others together again. But 

1 Compare Vacaspatimicra's Bhamati od ii. 2. 4. 20. (Nir. Sag. ed., p. 456, last line.) 

2 Compare ii. 9. 



iv. 21 ] Booh TV. Isolation or Kdivalya [332 

these are afraid of this very [existence]. Thus in the very act of 
saying, ' That I may feel the passionlessness of the Great Disgust 
for the divisions-