Two treatises of government

\

I

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.
IN THE FORMER THE FALSE PRIN-
CIPLES AND FOUNDATION OF SIR
ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOL-
LOWERS ARE DETECTED AND

OVERTHROWN.
THE LATTER IS AN ESSAY CON-
CERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL
EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL

GOVERNMENT.

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
BY IOHN LOCKE

SALtTS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO

London Printed mdclxxxviiii
reprinted, the sixth time, by a. millar, h.
woodfall, i. whiston and b. white, i. ri-
vington, l. £>avis and c. reymers, r. bald-
win, hawes clarke and collinsj w. iohn-
ston, w. owen, i. richardson, s. crowder,

T. LONGMAN, B. LAW, C. RIVINGTON, fc

DILLY, R. WITHY, C. AND R. WARE, S. BAKER,

T. PAYNE, A. SHUCKBURGH, I. HINXMAN

MDCGLXIIII

CONTENTS OF BOOK I

Chap. I. The Introduction I

Chap. II. Of Paternal and Regal Power 5

Chap. III. Of Adam's Title to Sove-
reignty by Creation 1 6

Chap. IV. Of Adam's Title to Sove-
reignty by Donation Gen.i. 28. , 24

Chap. V. Of Adam's Title to Sove-
reignty by the Subjeclion of Eve 49

Chap. VI. Of Adam's Title to Sove-
reignty by Fatherhood $j

Chap. VII. Of Fatherhood and Property
confidered together as Fountains of So-
vereignty 85

Chap. VIII. Of the Conveyance of A-
dam's fovereign Monarchical Power 93

Chap. IX. Of Monarchy by Inheritance
from Adam 97

Chap. X. Of the Heir to Adam's Mo-
narchical Power 119

Chap. XI. Who Heir 122

CONTENTS OF BOOK It

Chap. I. The Introduction 193

Chap. It. Of the State of Nature 195

Chap. III. Of the State of War 206

Chap. IV. Of Slavery 212

Chap. V. Of Property 2i£

Chap. VI. Of Paternal Power 238

Chap. VII. Of Political or Civil Society 261
Chap. Vill. Of theBeginningof Political

Societies 279

Chap. IX. Of the Ends of Political So-
ciety and Government 305
Chap. X. Of the Forms of a Common-
wealth 310
Chap. XI. Of the Extent of the Legis-
lative Power 312
Chap. XII. Of the Legislative, Execu-
tive, and Federative Power of the
Common- wealth 324
Chap. XIII. Of the Subordination of the

Powers of the Common-wealth 328

Chap. XIV. Of Prerogative 339

Chap. XV. Of Paternal, Political, and

Defpotical Power, confidered together 348
Chap. XVI. Of Conquefl 353

Chap. XVJI. Of Ufurpation 372

Chap. XVIII. Of Tyranny 373

Chap. XIX. Of the DilTolution ef Go-
▼ernment 384

PREFACE

Reader, thou haft here the beginning and

end of a difcourfe concerning government; \4

what fate has otherwife difpofed of the

papers that mould have filled up the

middle, and were more than all the reft,

it is not worth while to tell thee. Thefe,

which remain, I hope are fufficient to efta-

blifti the throne of our great reftorer, our %

prefent King William ; to make good his

title, in the confent of the people^-avhich (J^

being the only one of all lawful governments,

he has more fully and clearly, than any

prince in Chriftendom ; and to juftify to the

world the people of England, whofe love of

their juft and natural rights, with their re-

folution to preferve them, faved the nation

when it was on the very brink of flavery and

ruin. If thefe papers have that evidence, I

flatter myfelf is to be found in them, there

will be no great mifs of thofe which are loft,

and my reader may be fatisfied without them :

for I imagine, I mall have neither the time,

nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill

up the wanting part of my anfwer, by tracing

Sir Robert again, through all the windings

and obfcurities, which are to be met with

in the feveral branches of his wonderful fy-

ftem. The king, and body of the nation,

have fince fo throughly confuted his Hypo-

thefts, that 1 fuppofe no body hereafter will

I have

V

have cither the confidence to appear againft
our common fafety, and be again an advocate
for flavery ; or the weaknefs to be deceived
with contradictions drefled up in a popular
flile, and well-turned periods : for if any one
will be at the pains, himfelf, in thofe parts,
which are here untouched, to ftrip Sir Ro-
bert's difcourfes of the flourifh of doubtful
expreffions, and endeavour to reduce his
words to direct, pofitive, intelligible propo-
rtions, and then compare them one with an-
other, he will quickly be fatisrled, there was
never fo much glib nonfenfe put together in
well-founding Englifh. V/If he think it not
worth while to examine his works all thro',
let him make an experiment in that part,
where he treats of ufurpation ; and let him
try, whether he can, with all his fkill, make
Sir Robert intelligible, and confident with
himfelf, or common fenfe. I mould not
fpeak fo plainly of a gentleman, long fince
paft anfwering, had not the pulpit, of late
years, publicly owned his doctrine, and made
it the current divinity of the times. It is
neceffary thofe men, who taking on them to
be teachers, have fo dangeroufly milled others,
mould be openly (hewed of what authority
this their Patriarch is, whom they have fo
blindly followed, that fo they may either
retract what upon fo ill grounds they have
vented, and cannot be maintained ; or elfe
juftify thofe principles which they preached
up for gofpel -, though they had no better an

author

author than an English eourtier : for I fhould
not have writ againfr. Sir Robert, or taken the
pains to mew his miftakes, inconfiftencies,
and want of (what he fo much boafts of, and
pretends wholly to build on) fcripture-proofs,
were there not men amongft us, who, by
crying up his books,4 and efpoufing his doc-
trine, fave me from the reproach of writing
againfr. a dead adverfary. They have been fo
zealous in this point, that, if I have done
him any wrong, I cannot hope they fhould
fpare me, I wifh, where they have done the
truth and the public wrong, they would be as
ready to redrefs it, and allow its juft weight to
this reflection, viz. that there cannot be done
a greater mifchief to prince and people, than
the propagating wrong notions concerning
government; that fo at laft all times might
not have reafon to complain of the Drum
Ecclefiaftic. If any one, concerned really for
truth, undertake the confutation of my Hy-
pothecs, I promife him either to recant my
miflake, upon fair conviction ; or to anfwer
his difficulties. But he muft remember two
things,

Firft, That cavilling here and there, at
fome exprerlion, or little incident of my dif-
courfe, is not an anfwer to my book.

Secondly, That I ihall not take railing for
arguments, nor think either of thefe worth
my notice, though I fhall always look on
myfelf as bound to give fatisfacton to any
pne, who mall appear to be confcientioufly

fcrupulous

fcrupulous in the point, and mall mew any
juft ground0 for his fcruples.

I have nothing more, but to advertife the
reader, that Oblervations (lands for Obferva-
tions on Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare
quotation of pages always means pages of his
Patriarchal Edition 1680. —k $JL*>*

OF GOVERNMENT

BOOK I

Chap. I. §. i . Slavery is fo vile and miferable
an eftate of man, and fo directly oppofite to
the generous temper and courage of our na-
tion ; that it is hardly to be conceived, that
an Englt/hman, much lefs a gentleman, mould ji/j/^
plead for it. And truly I mould have takeiyy '*
Sir Robert Fi/mers Patriarcba> as any other fal&
treatife, which would perfuade all men, that/
they are flaves, and ought to be fo, for fucfr.
another exercife of wit, as was his who writ
the encomium of Nero ; rather than for a
ferious difcourfe meant in.earneft, had not the
gravity of the title and epiftle, the picture in
the front of the book, and the applaufe that
followed it, required me to believe, that the

B author

V

2 Of Government.

author and publisher were both in earned.

I therefore took it into my hands with all the

expectation, and read it through with all the

attention due to a treatife that made fuch a

noife at its coming abroad, and cannot but

confefs my felf mightily furprifed/f that in a

book, which was to provide chains for all

mankind, I mould find nothing but a rope

of fand, ufeful perhaps to fuch, whofe fkill

and bullnefs it is to raife a duft, and would

blind the people, the better to miflead them ;*)

but in truth not of any force to draw thofe

into bondage, who have their eyes open, and

fo much fenfe about them, as to confider,

that chains are but an ill wearing, how much

care foever hath been taken to file and polifli

them.

§. 2. If any one think I take too much
liberty in fpeaking fo freely of a man, who
is the great champion of abfolute power, and
the idol of thofe who worfhip it ; I befeech
him to make this fmall allowance for once,
to one, who, even after the reading of Sir
Robert's book, cannot but think himfelf, as
the laws allow him, a freeman: and I know
no fault it is to do fo, unlefs any one better
billed in the fate of it, than I, mould have it
revealed to him, that this treatife, which has
lain dormant fo long, was, when it appeared
in the world, to carry, by ftrength of its
arguments, all liberty out of it ^ and that

from

Op Government. 3

from thenceforth our author's fhort model-
was to be the pattern in the mount, and the
perfect flandard of politics for the future.
His fyftem lies in a little compafs, it is no
more but this,

Tbat all government is abfolute monarchy.

And the ground he builds on, is this,

"That no man is born free.

§.3. In this lad age a generation of men
has fprung up amongft us, that would flatter
princes with an opinion, that they have a
divine right to abfolute power, let the laws
by which they are conftituted, and are to
govern, and the conditions under which they
enter upon their authority, be what they will,
and their engagements to obferve them never
fo well ratified by folemn oaths and promifes.
To make way for this doctrine, they have
denied mankind a right to natural freedom ;
whereby they have not only, as much as in
them lies, expofed all fubjects to the utmoft
mifery of tyranny and opprefTion, but have
alfo unfettled the titles, and fhaken the thrones
of princes : (for they too, by thefe mens
fyftem, except only one, are all born flaves,
and by divine right are fa bj efts to Adam's
right heir j) as if they had deHgned to make
war upon all government, and fubvert the
very foundations of human fbciety, to ferve
their prefent turn.

§. 4. However we muft believe them upon
their own bare words, when they tell us, we

B 2 are

4 Of Government.

are all born Haves, and we mud continue Co,
there is no remedy for it -, life and thraldom
we enter'd into together, and can never be
quit of the one, till we part with the other.
Scripture or reafon I am fure do not any where
fay fo, notwithstanding .the noife of divine
right, as if divine authority hath fubjected
us to the unlimited will of another. An
admirable ftate of mankind, and that which
they have not had wit enough to find out till
this latter age. For, however Sir Robert
Filmer feems to condemn the novelty of the
contrary opinion, Patr. p. 3. yet I believe it
will be hard for him to find any other age,
or country of the world, but this, which has
afferted monarchy to be jure divino. And
he confeffes, Patr. p. 4. That Heyward,
Blackwood, Barclay, and others, that have
bravely vindicated the right of kings in mojl
points, never thought of this, but with one
confent admitted the natural liberty and equality
of mankind.

§. 5. By whom this doctrine came at firfc
tobe broached, and brought in fafhion amongft
us, and what fad effects it gave rife to, I leave
to hiftorians to relate, or to the memory of
thofe, who were contemporaries with Sib-
thorp and Manwering, to recoiled:. My
bufinefs at prefent is only to confider what Sir
Robert Filmer, who is allowed to have carried
this argument farthefl, and is fuppofed to
have brought it to perfection, has faid in it;

for

Of Government. 5

for from him every one, who would be as
fafhionable as French was at court, has
learned, and runs away with this moit fyftem
of politics, viz. Men are not born free, a?id
therefore could never have the liberty to choofe
either governors, or forms of government.
Princes have their power abfolute, and by
divine right -, for flaves could never have a
right to compact or confent. Adam was an
abfolute monarch, and fo are all princes
ever lince.

CHAP. IX.

Of Paternal and Regal Power.

§. 6. QIR Robert Filmers great pofition is,
O that men are not naturally free. This
is the foundation on which his abfolute mo-
narchy {lands, and from which it erects itfelf
to an height, that its power is above every
power, caput inter nubila, fo high above all
earthly and human things, that thought can
fcarce reach it; that promifes and oaths,
which tye the infinite Deity, cannot confine
it. But if this foundation fails, all his fabric
falls with it, and governments muft be left
again to the old way of being made by con-
trivance, and the confent of men ^Avz-pwirlvn
xriais) making ufe of their reafon to unite
together into fociety. To prove this grand
pofition of his, he tells us, p. 12. Men
B 3 are

c Or Government.

are born in fubjeBion to ikeir parents, and
therefore cannot be free. And this autho-
rity of parents, he calls royal authority, p.
12, 14. Fatherly authority, right of father-
hood, p. 12, 20. One would have thought
he would, in the beginning of fuch a work
as this, on which was to depend the autho-
rity of princes, and the obedience of fub-
jedts, have told us exprefly, what that fa-
therly authority is, have defined it, though
not limited it, becaufe in fome other treatiles
of his he tells us, it is unlimited, and * un-
limitable ; he mould at leaft have given us
fuch an account of it, that we might have
had an entire notion of this fatherhood, or
fatherly authority, whenever it came in our
way in his writings : this I expected to have
found in the firft chapter of his Patriarcha.
But inflead thereof, having, 1. en paffant,
made his obeyfance to the arcana imperii,
p. 5. 2. made his compliment to the rights
and liberties of this, or any other nation,
p. 6. which he is going prefently to null and
deftroy ; and, 3. made his leg to thofe learned
men, who did not fee fo far into the matter
as himfelf, p. 7. he comes to fall on Bel-

larmine,

* In grants and gifts that have their original from God
or nature, as the power of the father hath, no inferior power
of man can limit, nor make any law of prefcription againft
:hem. Qbferwaticns, 158.

The fcripture teaches, that fupreme power was originally
the father, without any limitation, Ohftr^atiin:^ 215

Of Government. 7

larmine, p. 8. and, by a victory over him,
eftablifhes his fatherly authority beyond any
queftion. Bellarmine being routed by his
own confeffion, p. 1 1 . the day is clear got,
and there is no more need of any forces : for
having done that, I obferve not that he Hates
the queftion, or rallies up any arguments to
make good his opinion, but rather tells us
the ftory, as he thinks fit, of this ftrange
kind of domineering phantom, called the
fatherhood^ which whoever could catch,
prefently got empire, and unlimited abfolute
power. He allures us how this fatherhood
began in Adam, continued its courfe, and
kept the world in order all the time of the
patriarchs till the flood, got out of the ark
with Noah and his fons, made and fupported
all the kings of the earth till the captivity of
the Ifraelites in Egypt, and then the poor
fatherhood was under hatches, till God, by
giving the Ifraelites kings, re-efiablifloed the
ancient and prime right of the lineal fuccejjion
in pate?'nal government. This is his bulinefs
from p. 12. to 19. And then obviating an
objection, and clearing a difficulty or two
with one half reafon, p. 23. to confirm the
natural right of regal power, he ends the
firfr. chapter. I hope it is no injury to call an
half quotation an half reafon ; for God fays,
Honour thy father and mother ; but our author
contents himfelf with half, leaves out thy
B 4 mother

8 Of Government.

mother quite, as little ferviceable to his pur-
pofe. But of that more in another place.

§. 7. I do not think our author fo little
fkilled in the way of writing difcourfes of this
nature, nor fo carelefs of the point in hand,
that he by over-light commits the fault, that
he himfelf, in his Anarchy of a mixed Mo-
narchy, p. 239. objects to Mr. Hunt on in thefe
words : Where firjl 1 charge the author, that
he hath not given us any definition, or defcription
of monarchy in general ; for by the rules of me-
thod he fiould have firfl defined. And by the
like rule of method Sir Robert mould have told
us, what his fatherhood or fatherly authority
is, before he had told us, in whom it was to
be found, and talked fo much of it. But per-
haps Sir Robert found, that this fatherly au-
thority, this power of fathers, and of kings, for
he makes them both the fame, p. 24. would
make a very odd and frightful figure, and
very difagreeing with what either children
imagine of their parents, or fubjects of their
kings, if he fhould have given us the whole
draught together in that gigantic form, he
had painted it in his own fancy; and there-
fore, like a wary phyiician, when he would
have his patient fwallow fome harm or cor-
rcfive liquor, he mingles it with a large quan-
tity of that which may dilute it; that the
fcattered parts may go down with lefs feeling,
?.nd caufe lefs averfion.

§•8.

Of Government. 9

§. 8, Let us then endeavour to find what
account he gives us of this fatherly autho-
rity, as it lies fcattered in the feveral parts of
his writings. And firft, as it was vefted in
Adam, he lays, Not only Adam, but the fuc-
. ceeding patriarchs, had, by right of father-
hood, royal authority over their children, p. 12.
'This lordflnp which Adam by command had over
the iv hole world, and by right defending from
kirn the patriarchs did enjoy, was as large and
ample as the abfolute dominion of any monarch,
which hath been fince the creation , p. 13. Do-
minion of life and death, making war, and con-
cluding peace, p. 13. Adam and the patriarchs
had abfolute power of life and death, p. 35.
Kings, in the right of parents, fucceed to the
exercife of fupreme jurifdiclion, p. 19. As
kingly power is by the law of God, fo it hath
7io inferior law to limit it ; Adam was lord of
all, p. 40. The father of a family governs
by no other law, than by his own will, p. 78.
The fuperiority of princes is above laws, p. 79.
The unlimited jurifdicTion of kings is fo amply
defer i bed by Samuel, p. 80. Kings are above
the laws, p. 93. And to this purpofe fee a
great deal more which. our author delivers in
Bo dins, words : // is certain, that all laws,
privileges, and grants of princes, have no force,
but during their life ; if they be not ratified
by the expref confent, or by fufferance of the
prince following, efpecially privileges, Obser-
vations, p, 279. The reafon why laws have
4 been

io Of Government.

been alfo made by kings, was this ; when ki?igs
were either bujied with wars, or diflraclcd with
fublic cares, fo that every private man could
not have accefs to their pcrfons, to learn their
wills and pleafure, then were laws tf necejfity
invented, that Jo every particular fubjeel might
find his prince s pleafure decyphered unto him in
the tables of his laws, p. 92. In a monarchy,
the king mujl by necejfity be above the laws,
p. 100. A perfeel kingdom is that, wherein
the king rides all things according to his own
will, p. 100. Neither common nor flat ute laws
are, or can be, any diminution of that general
power, which kings have over their people by
right of fatherhood, p. 115. Adam whs the
father, king, and lord over his family j a fon,
a fubjeel, and a fervant or Jlave, were one
and the fame thing at firfl.' The father had
power to difpofe or fell his children or fervants -,
whence we find, that the firfl reckoning up of
goods in fcripture, the man fervant and the
maid-fervant, are numbred among the pojfefi
/ions and fubflance of the owner, as other goods
were, Obfervations, Pref. God alfo hath given
to the father a right or liberty, to alien his
power over his children to any other-, whence
we find the fale and gift of children to have
much bee?i in ufe in the beginning of the world,
when men had their fervants for a pofefjion
and an inheritance, as well as other goods;
whereupon we find the power of cajlrating and
making eunuchs much in ufe in old times, Obn

fervations,

Of Government. ii

fervations, p. 155. Law is nothing elfe but
the will of him that hath the power of the
fupreme father, Obfervations, p. 223. It was
God's ordinance that the fupremacy fhould be
unlimited in Adam, and as large as all the
ac~ls of his will; and as in him fo in all others
that have fupreme power , Obfervations, p.
245.

§.9.1 have been fain to trouble my reader
with thefe feveral quotations in our author's
own words, that in them might be feen his
own defcription of his fatherly authority, as
it lies fcattered up and down in his writings,
which he fuppofes was firft vefted in Adam,
and by right belongs to all princes ever fince.
This fatherly authority then, or right of
fatherhood, in our author's fenfe, is a divine
unalterable right of fovereignty, whereby a
father or a prince hath an abfolute, arbitrary,
unlimited, and unlimi^able power over the
Jives, liberties, and eftates of his children and
fubjecls; fo that he may take or alienate their
eftates, fell, caftrate, or ufe their perfons as
he pleafes, they being all his Haves, and he
lord or proprietor of every thing, and his
unbounded will their law.

§. io. Our author having placed fuch a
mighty power in Adamy and upon that fup-
pofition founded all government, and all power
of princes, it is reaibnable to expect, that he
fhould have proved this with arguments clear
and evident, fuitable to the weightinefs of
1 the

#

12 Of Government.

the caufe -, that fince men had nothing cKe
left them, they might in flavery have fuch
undeniable proofs of its neceffity, that their
confciences might be convinced, and oblige
them to iubmit peaceably to that abfolute
dominion, which their governors had a right
to exercife over them. Without this, what
good could our author do, or pretend to do, by
creeling fuch an unlimited power, but flatter
the natural vanity and ambition of men, too
?.pt of itfelf to grow and encreafe with the
porTerlion of any power ? and by perfuading
thofe, who, bv the confent of their fellow-
men, are advanced to great, but limited,
degrees of it, that by that part which is
given them, they have a right to all, that
was not fo ; and therefore may do what they
pleafe, becaufe they have authority to do
more than others, and fo tempt them to do
what is neither for their own, nor the good
of thofe under their care ; whereby great
mifchiefs cannot but follow.

§. 1 1. The fovereigntv of j$ifam, being that
on which, as a fure baric-, olir author builds
his mighty abfolute monarchy, I expecled,
that in his Patriarcha^ this his main fuppo-
iition would have been Droved, and eflablifhed
with all that evidence of arguments, that fuch
a fundamental tenet required ; and that this,
on which the great itrefs of the bufinefs
depends, would have been made out with
rcaibns lufmient to juftify the confidence

with

Of Government. 13

with which it was affumed. Bat in all that
treatife, I could find very little tending that
way ; the thing is there fo taken for granted,
without proof, that I could fcarce believe my-
felf, when, upon attentive reading that trea-
tife, I found there fo' mighty a ftructure
raifed upon the bare fuppofition of this
foundation : for it is fcarce credible, that
in a difcouife, where he pretends to confute
the erroneous principle of man's natural
freedom, he mould do it by a bare fuppo-
fition of Adams authority, without offering
any proof for that authority. Indeed he
confidently fays, that Adam had royal au-
thority, p. 12, and 13. Abfolute lordfiip and
dominion of life and death, p. 13. An uni-
verfal monarchy, p. 33. Abfolute power of
life and death, p. 35. He is very frequent-
in fuch affertions 5 but, what is flrange, in
all his whole Patriarcha I find not one pre-
tence of a reafon to eflablifh this his great
foundation of government; not any thing
that looks like an argument, but thefe words:
To cojifirm this natural right of regal power,
we find in the Decalogue, that the law which
enjoyns obedience to kings, is delivered in the
terms, Honour thy father, as if all power were
originally in the father. And why may I not
add as well, that in the Decalogue, the law
that enjoyns obedience to queens, is delivered
in the terms of Honour thy mother, as if all
power were originally in the mother ? The

argument,

14 © 1 Government.

argument, as Sir Robert puts it, will hold as
well for one as the other : but of this, more
in its due place.

§. 12. All that I take notice of here, is,
that this is all our author fays in this firft, or
any of the following chapters, to prove the
abfolute power of Adam, which is his great
principle : and yet, as if he had there fettled
it upon fure demonftration, he begins his
fecond chapter with thefe words, By con-
f erring thefe proofs and reafons, drawn from
the authority of the fcripture. Where thofe
proofs and reafons for Adams fovereignty are,
bating that of Honour thy father, above men-
tioned, I confefs, I cannot find -, unlefs what
he fays, p. 1 1 . In thefe words we have an
evident confejjton, viz. o/Bellarmine, that crea-
tion made man prince of his pojlerity, muft be
taken for proofs and reafons drawn from
fcripture, or for any fort of proof at all :
though from thence by a new way of in-
ference, in the words immediately following,
he concludes, the royal authority of Adam
fufficiently fettled in him.

§. 13. If he has in that chapter, or any
where in the whole treatife, given any other
proofs of Adam's royal authority, other than
by often repeating it, which, among fome
men, goes for argument, I defire any body
for him to fhew me the place and page, that
I may be convinced of my miftake, and ac-
knowledge my overfight. If no fuch argu-
ments

Of Government. 15

ments are to be found, I befeech thofe men,
who have fo much cried up this book, to
confider, whether they do not give the world
caufe to fufpect, that it is not the force of
reafon and argument, that makes them for
abfolute monarchy, but fome other by in-
tereft, and therefore are refoived to applaud
any author, that writes in favour of this doc-
trine, whether he fupport it with reafon or no.
But I hope they do not expect, that rational
and indifferent men fhouid be brought over to

o

their opinion, becaufe this their great doctor
of it, in a difcourfe made on purpofe, to fet
up the abfolute monarchical power of Adam,
in oppofition to the natural freedom of man-
kind, has faid fo little to prove it, from whence
it is rather naturally to be concluded, that
there is little to be faid.

§. 14. But that I might omit no care to
inform myfelf in our author's full {&n{e, I
confulted his Obfervations on Arijiotle, Hobbes,
&c. to fee whether in difputing with others
he made ufe of any arguments for this his
darling tenet of Adam's fovcreignty ; fince in
his treatife of the Natural Power of Kings, he
hath been fo fparing of them. In his Obfer-
vations on Mr. Hobbes 's Leviathan, 1 think he
has put, in fhort, all thofe arguments for it
together, which in his writings I find him
any where to make ufe of: his words are
thefe : If God created only Adam, and of a
piece of him made the woman, and if by gene-t

ration

1 6 Of Govern ;,i e n t.

ration from them two, as parts of them, all
mankind be propagated : if alfo God gave to
Adam not only the dominion over the woman
and the children that Jhoidd ifue from them,
but alfo over all the earth to fubdue it, and
over all the creatures on it, Jo that as long
as Adam lived, no man could claim or enjoy
any thing but by donation, afjignation or per-
inijjion from him, I wonder, 6cc. Obfervations,
165. Here we have the fum of all his
arguments, for Adam s fiver cignty* and againft
natural freedom, which I find up and down
in his other treatifes : and they are thefe fol-
lowing ; God's creation of Adam, the dominion
he gave him over Eve, and the dominion he
had as father over his children : all which I
fhall particularly confider.

C H A P. III.

Of Adam'* Title to Sovereignty by Creation.

§• I5- Q * R Robert, in his preface to his
O Obfervations on Arijlotles politics,
tells us, A natural freedom of mankind cannot
be fuppofed without the denial of the creation of
Adam: but how Adams being created, which
v/as nothing but his receiving a being im-
mediately from omnipotence and the hand
of God, gave A.dam a fovereignty over any
thing, I cannot fee, nor confequently under-
fland, how a fuppofition of natural freedom is

Of Government. 17

a denial of Adam\f creation, and would be
glad any body elfe (fince our author did not
vouchfafe us the favour) would make it out
for him : for I find no difficulty to fuppofe
the freedom of mankind, though I have always
believed the creation of Adam. He was
created, or began to exift, by God's imme-
diate power, without the intervention of
parents or the pre-exiitence of any of the
fame fpecies to beget him, when it pleafed
God he mould ; and fo did the lion, the
king of hearts, before him, by the fame
creating power of God : and if bare existence
by that power, and in that way, will give
dominion, without any more ado, our author,
by this argument, will make the lion have
as good a title to it, as he, and certainly the
antienter. No ! for Adam had his title by
the appointment of God, fays our author in
another place. Then bare creation gave him
not dominion, and one might have fuppofed
mankind free without the denying the creation
of Adam, fince it was God's appointment made
him monarch.

§. 16. But let us fee, how he puts his
creation and this appointment together. By
the appointment of God, fays Sir Robert, as foon
as Adam was created, he was monarch of the
world, though he had, ?to fubjecls -, for though
there could not be actual government till there
were fubjeBs, yet by the right of nature it was
due to Adam to be governor of his poflerity:

C though

i8 Of Government.

though not in aB, yet at leajl in habit, Adam
was a king from bis creation. I wilh he had
told us here, what he meant by God's ap-
f ointment : for whatfoever providence orders,
or the law of nature directs, or pofitive re-
velation declares, may be faid to be by God's
appointment : but Ifuppofe it cannot be meant
here in the firfl fenfe, /. e. by providence ;
becaufe that would be to fay no more, but
that as foon as Adam was created he was de
faclo monarch, becaufe by right of nature it
was due to Adam, to be governor of his po-
Jlerity. But he could not de facia be by
providence conftituted the governor of the
world, at a time when there was actually no
government, no fubjects to be governed,
which our author here confefTes. Monarch
of the world is alfo differently ufed by our
author ; for fometimes he means by it a
proprietor of all the world exclufive of the
reft of mankind, and thus he does in the
fame page of his preface before cited : Adam,
fays he, being commanded to multiply and people
the earth, a?id to fubdue it, and having dominion
given him over all creatures, was thereby the
monarch of the whole world-, none of his pojlerity
had any right to pojjefs any thing but by his
grant or permijjion, or by fuccejfion from him.
2. Let us underftand then by monarch pro-
prietor of the world, and by appointment God's
actual donation, and revealed poiitive grant
made to Adam, i. Gen. 28. as we fee Sir

Robert

Of Government. 19

Robert himfelf does in this parallel place,
and then his argument will ftand thus, by
the pofitive grant of God: as foon as Adam
was created, he was proprietor of the world*
becaufe by the right of nature it was due to
Adam to be governor of his poflerity. In which
way of arguing there are two manifefl falfe-
hoods. Firft, It is falfe, that God made that
grant to Adam, as foon as he was created, fince,
tho' it flands in the text immediately after his
creation, yet it is plain it could not be fpoken
to Adam, till after Eve was made and brought
to him : and how then could he be monarch
by appointment as foon as created, efpecially
fince he calls, if I miftake not, that which
God fays to Eve, iii. Gen. 16, the original
grant of government, which not being till
after the fall, when Adam was fomewhat,
at leaft in time, and very much diftant in
condition, from his creation, I cannot fee,
how our author can fay in this fenfe, that
by Gods appointment, as foon as Adam was
created, he was monarch of the world. Se-
condly, were it true that God's actual do-
nation appointed Adam monarch of the world
as foon as he was created, yet the reafon here
given for it would not prove it; but it would
always be a falfe inference, that God, by a
pofitive donation, appointed Adam monarch of
the world, becaufe by right of nature it was
due to Adam to be governor of his pojlerity :
for having given him the right of government
by nature, there was no need of a pofitive
C % docation ;

2o Of Government.

donation j at lead it will never be a proof of
fuch a donation.

§.17. On the other fide the matter will
not be much mended, if we underftand by
God's appointment the law of nature, (though
it be a pretty harfh expreffion for it in this
place) and by monarch of the world, fovereign
ruler of mankind : for then the fentence
under confederation muft run thus : By the
law of nature, as foon as Adam was created
he was governor of mankind, for by right of
nature it was due to Adam to be governor of
his po/ierity ; which amounts to this, he was
governor by right of nature, becaufe he was
governor by right of nature : but fuppofing
we mould grant, that a man is by nature
governor of his children, Adam could not
hereby be monarch as foon as created: for this
right of nature being founded in his being
their father, how Adam could have a natural
right to be governor, before he was a father,
when by being a father only he had that right,
is, methinks, hard to conceive, unlefs he will
have him to be a father before he was a fa-
ther, and to have a title before he had it.

§. 18. To this forefeen objection, our
author anfwers very logically, he was governor
in habit, and not in ab~i: a very pretty way
of being a governor without government, a
father without children, and a king without
fubjefts. And thu^s Sir Robert was an author
before he writ his book ; not in acl it is true,
but in habit ; for when be had once published

it,

Of Government. 21

it, it was due to him by the right of nature,
to be an author, as much as it was to Adam
to be governor of his children, when he had
begot them : and if to be fuch a monarch of
the world, an abfolute monarch in habit, but
not in ac~i, will ferve the turn, I mould not
much envy it to any of Sir Robert's friends,
that he thought fit gracioufly to beflow it
upon, though even this of ac~l and habit, if it
iignified any thing but our author's fkill in
diftinctions, be not to his purpofe in this
place. For the queftion is not here about
Adams actual exercife of government, but
actually having a title to be governor. Go-
vernment, fays our author, was due to Adam
by the right of nature : what is this right of
nature ? A right fathers have over their chil-
dren by begetting them; generatione jus acqui-
ritur parentibus in liberos, fays our author out
oiGrotius, Obfervations, 223. The right then
follows the begetting as arifing from it ; fo
that, according to this way of reafoning or
diftinguiming of our author, Adam, as foon as
he was created, had a title only in habit, a?id
not in act, which in plain Englijh is, he had
actually no title at all.

§.19. To fpeak lefs learnedly, and more
intelligibly, one may fay of Adam, he was
in a poffibility of being governor, fince it was
poffible he might beget children, and thereby
acquire that right of nature, be it what it
will, to govern them, that accrues from
C 3 thence ;

22 Of Government.

thence : but what connection has this with
Adams creation, to make him fay, that as
foon as he was created, he was monarch of the
world? for it may be as well faid of Noah,
that as foon as he was born, he was monarch
of the world, fince he was in pofhbility
(which in our author's fenfe is enough to
make a monarch, a monarch in habityJ to out-
live all mankind, but his own pofterity.
What fuch neceffary connection there is be-
twixt Adams creation and his right to govern-
ment, fo that a natural freedom of mankind
cannot be fuppofed without the denial of the
creation of Adam, I confefs for my part I
do not fee; nor how thofe words, by" the
appointment, &c. Obfervations, 254. how ever
explained, can be put together, to make any
tolerable fenfe, at leaft to eftabliih this po-
rtion, with which they end, viz. Adam was
a king from his creation > a king, fays our
author, not in atf, but in habit, i. e. actually
no king at all,

§. 20. 1 fear I have tired my reader's pa-
tience, by dwelling longer on this paffage,
than the weightinefs of any argument in it
feems to require : but I have unavoidably
been engaged in it by our author's way of
writing, who, hudling feveral fuppofitions
together, and that in doubtful and general
terms, makes fuch a rnedly and confufion,
that it is impoflible to fhew his miftakes,
without examining the feveral fenfes wherein

his

Of Government. 23

his words may be taken, and without feein
how, in any of thefe various meanings, they
will confifl together, and have any truth in
them : for in this prefent parTage before us,
how can any one argue againfl this pofition
of his, that Adam was a king from his crea-
tion, unlefs one examine, whether the words,
from his creation, be to be taken, as th^
may, for the time of the commencement of
his government, as the foregoing words im-
port, asfoon as be was created he wai monarch ;
or, for the caufe of it, as he fays, p. 11.
creation made man prince of his pojlerity ? how
farther can one judge of the truth of his
being thus king, till one has examined
whether king be to be taken, as the words
in the beginning of this parTage would per-
fuade, on fuppofition of his private domi-
nion, which was, by God's politive grant,
monarch of the world by appointment ; or king
on fuppofition of his fatherly power over his
ofF-fpring, which was by nature, due by the
right of nature-, whether, I fay, king be to
be taken in both, or one only of thefe two
fenfes, or in neither of them, but only this,
that creation made him prince, in a way
different from both the other ? For though
this arTertion, that Ada?n was king from lm
creation, be true in no fenfe, yet it flands
here as an evident conclufion drawn from the
preceding words, though in truth it be but
a bare affertion joined to other affertions of
the fame kind, which confidently put to-
C 4 gether

24 Of Government.

gether in words of undetermined and du-
bious meaning, look like a fort of arguing,
when there is indeed neither proof nor con-
nection : a way very familiar with our author:
of which having given the reader a tafte here,
I fhall, as much as the argument will permit
me, avoid touching on hereafter ; and mould
not have dnne it here, were it not to let the
world fee, how incoherences in matter, and
fuppofitions without proofs put handfomely
together in good words and a plaufible ftile,
are apt to pafs for ftrong reafon and good
fenfe, till they come to be looked into with
attention.

CHAP. IV.

Of Adams Title to Sovereignty by Donation^
Gen. i. 28.

§. 21.T TAV1NG at lail got frhrougk
the foregoing paiTage, where we
have been lb long detained, not by the force
of arguments and oppofition, but the in-
tricacy of the words, and the doubtfulnefs
of the meaning ; let us go on to his next
argument, for Adams fovereignty. Our au-
thor tells us in the words of Mr. Selden, that
Adam by donation from God, Gen. i. 28. was
made the general lord of all things, not without
fuch a private dominion to himjelf as without
.his grant did exclude his children. This deter-
mination of Mr. Selden, fays our author, is
3 confonant

Of Government. g j

confonant to the hijiory of the Bible, and na~
tural reafon, Obfervations, 2 it). And in his
Pref. to his Obfervations on Arijktle, he
fays thus, The jirfi government in the world
was monarchical in the father ofallfejh, Adam
being commanded to multiply and people the earth,
and to fubdue it, and having dominion given
him over all creatures, was' thereby the monarch
of the whole world ': none of his pojlerity had
dny right to poffefs any thing, but by his grant
or permijjion, or by fuccefjion from him : The
earth, faith the Pfalmift, hath he given to the
children of men, which jhew the title comes
from fatherhood.

§. 22. Before I examine this argument, and
the text oh which it is founded, it is necef-
fary to defire the reader to obferve, that our
author, according to his ufual method, begins
in one fenfe, and concludes in another ; he
begins here with Adam's propriety, or private
dominion, by donation ; and his conclusion is,
which Jhew the title comes from fatherhood.

§.23. But let us fee the argument. The
words of the text are thefe ; and God blejfed
them, and God faid unto them, be fruitful and
multiply, and replenijh the earth and fubdue it,
and have dominion over the fifo of the fea, and
over the fowl of the air, and over every living
thing that moveth upon the earth, i. Gen. 28.
from whence our author concludes, that
Adam, having here dominion given him over
all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the

whole

s6 Of Government.

'whole world: whereby mutt be meant, that
either this grant of God gave Adam property,
or as our author calls it, private dominion over
the earth, and all inferior or irrational crea-
tures, and fo confequently that he was thereby
monarchy or 2dly, that it gave him rule and
dominion over all earthly creatures whatlb-.
ever, and thereby over his children ; and fo
he was monarch : for, as Mr. Selden has pro-
perly worded it, Adam was made general lord
of all things, one may very clearly underftand
him, that he means nothing to be granted
to Adam here but property, and therefore he
fays not one word of Adam's monarchy. But
our author fays, Adam was hereby monarch of
the world, which, properly fpeaking, lignifies
fovereign ruler of all the men in the world $
and fo Adam, by this grant, mufl be con-
ftitutod fuch a ruler. If our author means
otherwife, he might with much clearnefs
have faid, that Adam was hereby proprietor of
the whole world. But he begs your pardon
in that point : clear diftincl: fpeaking not
ierving every where to his purpofe, you muH:
not expect it in him, as in Mr. Selden, or
ether fuch writers.

§. 24. In oppofition therefore to our au-
thor's doctrine, that Adam was monarch of the
k world, founded on this place, I mall
iliew,

I. That bv this grant, i. Gen. 28. God
gave no immediate power to Adam over men,

• over

Of Government. 27

over his children, over thofe of his own
ipecies ; and fo he was not made ruler, or
monarchy by this charter.

2. That by this grant God gave him not
private dominion over the inferior creatures,
but right in common with all mankind ; fo
neither was he monarchy upon the account
of the property here given him.

§. 25. 1. That this donation, i. Gen. 28.
gave Adam no power over men, will appear
if we confider the words of it : for fince
all pofitive grants convey no more than the
exprefs words they are made in will carry,
let us fee which of them here will comprehend
mankind, or Ada??is pofterity j and thofe,
I imagine, if any, mufh be thefe, every living
thing that maveth : the words in Hebrew are,
W2"IH rtfl i. e. Beftiam Reptantem, of which
words the icripture itfelf is the befl inter-
preter : God having created the fifhes and
fowls the t;th day, the beginning of the 6th,
he creates the irrational inhabitants of the
dry land, which, v. 24. are defcribed in
thefe words, let the earth bring forth the living
creature after his kind; cattle and creeping
things, and beajls of the earth, after his kind,
and, v. 2. and God made the beafls of the earth
after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and
every thi?ig that creepeth on the earth after his
kind : here, in the creation of the brute in-
habitants of the earth, he firfl fpeaks of them
all under one general name, of living crea-
tures, '

2$ Of Government.

iures, and then afterwards divides them into
three ranks, I . Cattle, or fuch creatures as
were or might be tame, and fo be the private
pofleffion of particular men ; 2. iW which,
ver. 24, and 25. in our Bible, is tranflated
beaits, and by the Septuagint (bw«, wild beafts,
and is the fame word, that here in our text,
Ver. 28. where we have this great charter to
Adam, is tranflated living things and is alfo
the fame word ufed, Gen. ix. 2. where this
<rrant is renewed to Noah, and there like wife
tranflated beaji. 3. The third rank were the
creeping animals, which ver. 24, and 25.
are comprised under the word, rTOTtn, the
fame that is ufed here, ver. 28. and is tranf-
lated moving, but in the former verfes creep-
ing, and by the Septuagint in all thefe places,
zpTrerd, or reptils ; from whence it appears,
that the words which we tranllate here in
God's donation, ver. 28. living creatures moving,
are the fame, which in the hiflory of the
creation, ver. 24, 25. lignify two ranks of
terreflrial creatures, viz. wild beajls and rep-
tils, and are fo underftood by the Septuagint.

§. 26. When God had made the irrational
animals of the world, divided into three kinds,
from the places of their habitation, viz.
fifes of the fea, fowls of the air, and living
creatures of the earth, and thefe again into
cattle, wild beafis, and reptils, he confiders
of making man, and the dominion he fhould
feavt over the terreflrial worlds ver. 26. and

then

Of Government. 29

then he reckons up the inhabitants of thefe
three kingdoms, but in the terreftrial leaves
out the fecond rank jrn or wild hearts: but
here, ver. 28. where he actually exercifes
this defign, and gives him this dominion, the
text mentions the ftjhes of the fea, and fowls
of the air, and the terreftrial creatures in the
words that fignify the wild beafts and reptils,
though tr an Hated living thing that movetb,
leaving out cattle. In both which places,
though the word that fignifies wild beajh be
omitted in one, and that which fignifies cattle
in the other, yet, fince God certainly exe-
cuted in one place, what he declares he de-
ligned in the other, we cannot but under-
stand the fame in both places, and have here
only an account, how the terreftrial irrational
animals, which were alreadv created and
reckoned up at their creation, in three di-
stinct ranks of cattle, wild beafts, and reptils,
were here, ver. 28. actually put under the
dominion of man, as they were defigned,
*oer. 26. nor do thefe words contain in them
the leaft appearance of any thing that can
be wrefted to fignify God's giving to one
man dominion over another, to Adam over
his pofterity.

§. 27. And this further appears from Gen.

ix. 2. where God renewing this charter to

Noah and his fons, he gives them dominion

over the fowls of the air, and the ft/ljes of the

fea, and the terrcftrial creatures, exprefTed by

30 Of Government.

PITT and tt*DTT wild hearts and reptils, the
fame words that in the text before us, i. Gen.
28. are tranflated every moving thing, that
vioveth on the earthy which bv no means can
comprehend man, the grant being made to
Noah and his fons, all the men then living,
and not to one part of men over another :
which is yet more evident from the very next
words, vcr. 3. where God gives every 1PtT\
every moving thing, the very words ufed,
ch. i. 28. to them for food. By all which
it is plain that God's donation to Adam,
ch. i. 28. and his defignation, ver. 26. and
his grant again to Noah and his fons, refer
to and contain in them neither more nor lefs
than the works of the creation the 5th day,
and the beginning of the 6th, as they are
fet down from the 20th to 26th ver. in-
clufively of the id; ch. and fo comprehend
all the fpecies of irrational animals of the
terraqueous globe, tho* all the words, whereby
they are exprelTed in the hiftory of their
Creation, are no where ufed in any of the
following grants, but fome of them omitted
in one, and fome in another. From whence
I think it is pad: all doubt, that man cannot
be comprehended in this grant, nor any do-
minion over thofe of his own fpecies be
conveyed to Adam. All the terreflrial ir-
rational creatures are enumerated at their
creation, ver. 25. under the names beafts of
the earth, cattle and creeping things j but man,

beiag

Of Government. 31

being not then created, was not contained
under any of thofe names j and therefore,
whether we underftand the Hebrew words
right or no, they cannot be fuppofed to
comprehend man, in the very fame hiftory,
and the very next verfes following, efpecially
iince that Hebrew word DOT which, if any
in this donation to Adam, ch. i. 28. muft
comprehend man, is fo plainly ufed in con-
tradi fUnction to him, as Gen. vi. 20. vii. 14,
21,23. Gen. viii. 17, 19. And if God made
all mankind Haves to Adcun and his heirs by
giving Adam dominion over every living thing
that moveth on the earth, ch. i. 28. as our
author would have it, methinks Sir Robert
mould have carried his monarchical power
one ftep higher, and fatisfied the world,
that princes might eat their fubje&s too,
fince God gave as full power to Noah and
his heirs, ch. ix. 2. to eat every living thing
that moveth, as he did to Adam to have » do-
minion over them, the Hebrew' words in both
places being the fame.

§.28. David, who might be fuppofed to
underftand the donation of God in this text,
and the right of kings too, as well as our
author in his comment on this place, as the
learned and judicious Ainfworth calls it, in the
8th Pfalm, rinds here nofuch charter of mo-
narchical power, his words are, Thou haft ??iade
him, i. e. man, the Son of man, a little lower
than the angels ; thou madcjl him to have dominion
ever the works of thy hands -, thou haft put all

things

32 Of Government.

things under his feet, all Jheep and oxen, and
the beajis of the field, and the fowls of the air,
and fifh of the fea, and whatfover paffeth thro*
the paths of the fea. In which words, if any
one can find out, that there is meant any
monarchical power of one man over another,
but only the dominion of the whole fpecies
of mankind, over the inferior fpecies of crea-
tures, he may, for aught I know, deferve to
be one of Sir Robert's monarchs in habit, for
the rarenefs of the difcovery. And by this
time, I hope it is evident, that he that gave
dominion over every living thing that moveth on^
the earth, gave Ada?n no monarchical power
over thofe of his own fpecies, which will
yet appear more fully in the next thing I am
to mew.

§. 29. 2. Whatever God gave by the words
of this grant, i. Gen. 28. it was not to Adam
in particular, exclufive of all other men :
whatever dominion he had thereby, it was not
a private dominion, but a dominion in common
with the reft of mankind. That this do-
nation was not made in particular to Adam,
appears evidently from the words of the text,
it being made to more than one; for it was
fpoken in the plural number, God bleiTed
them, and faid unto them, Have dominion.
God fays unto Adam and Eve, Have domi-
nion ; thereby, fays our author, Adam was
monarch of the world : but the grant being
to them, i. e. fpoke to Eve alfo, as many

interpreters

Of Government. 33

interpreters think with reafon, that thefe
words were not fpoken till Adam had his
wife, mutt not me thereby be lady, as well
as he lord of the world ? If it be faid, that
Eve was fubjecled to Adam, it feems fhe was
not fo fubjecled to him, as to hinder her do-
minion over the creatures, or property in them :
for fliall we fay that God ever made a joint
grant to two, and one only was to have the
benefit of it ?

§. 30. But perhaps it will be faid, Eve
was not made till afterward : grant it fo,
what advantage will our author get by it ?
The text will be only the more directly
againft him, and fhew that God, in this
donation, gave the world to mankind in
common, and not to Adam in particular.
The word them in the text muft include the
fpecies of man, for it is certain them can by
no means fignify Adam alone. In the 26th
Verfe, where God declares his intention to
give this dominion, it is plain he meant,
that he would make a fpecies of creatures,
that fhould have dominion over the other
fpecies of this terreftrial globe : the words are,
And God faid. Let us make man in our image,
after our likenefs, and let them have dominion
over thejifi, &c. 'They then were to have do-
minion. Who ? even thofe who were to
have the image of God, the individuals of
that fpecies of ?nan, that he was going to
make -, for that them mould fignify Adam.

D fingly,

34 Of Government.

fingly, exclufive of the reft that fhould be
in the world with him, is againft both fcrip-
ture and all reafon : and it cannot poffibly
be made fenfe, if man in the former part of
the vcrfe do not fignify the lame with them
in the latter •> only man there, as is ufual, is
taken for the fpecies, and them the individuals
of that fpecies : and we have a reafon in the
very text. God makes him in his own image,
after his own like?iefs; makes him an intel-
lectual creature, and fo capable of dominion:
for wherein foever elfe the image of God con-
firmed, the intellectual nature was certainly a
part of it, and belonged to the whole fpecies,
and enabled them to have dominion over the
inferior creatures ; and therefore David fays
in the 8 th Pfalm above cited, Thou hafi ??iade
him little lower than the angels, thou haft made
him to have dominion. It is not of Adam king
David fpeaks here, for verfe 4. it is plain, it
is of man, and the fon of man, of the fpecies
of mankind.

§.31. And that this grant fpoken to Adam
was made to him, and the whole fpecies of
man, is clear from our author's own proof out
of the Pfalmijl. The earth, faith the Pfalmift,
hath he given to the children of men -, which
feews the title comes from fatherhood. Thefe
are Sir Robert's words in the preface before
cited, and a ftrange inference it is he makes;
God hath given the earth to the children of
men, ergo the title comes from fatherhood. It is

pity

Of Government. 35

pity the propriety of the Hebrew tongue had not
ufed fathers of men, inflead of children of men y
to exprefs mankind : then indeed our author
might have had the countenance of the found
of the words, to have placed the title in the
fatherhood. But to conclude, that the father-
hood had the right to the earth, becaufe God
gave it to the children of men, is a way of
arguing peculiar to our author : and a man
mufl have a great mind to go contrary to the
found as well as fenfe of the words, before
he could light on it. But the fenfe is yet
harder, and more remote from our author's
purpofe : for as it ftands in his preface, it is
to prove Adams being monarch, and his
reafoning is thus, God gave the earth to the
children of men, ergo Adam was monarch of the
world. I defy any man to make a more
pleafant conclufion than this, which cannot
be excufed from the mod obvious abfurdity,
till it can be fhewn, that by children of 7neny
he who had no father, Adam alone is iig-
nified ; but whatever our author does, the
fcripture fpeaks not nonfenfe.

§. 32. To maintain tins property and private
dominion of Adam, our author labours in the
following page to deftroy the community
granted to Noah and his fons, in that parallel
place, ix. Gen. 1, 2, 3. and he endeavours to
do it two ways.

I. Sir Robert would perfuade us againfc
the exprefs words of the fcripture, that what

D 2 was

36 Of Government.

was here granted to Noah, was not granted
to his fons in common with him. His words
are, As for the general community between Noah
and his fons, which Mr. Selden will have to
be granted to them, ix. Gen. 2. the text doth not
warrant it. What warrant our author would
have, when the plain exprefs words of fcrip-
ture, not capable of another meaning, will
not fatisfy him, who pretends to build wholly
on fcripture, is not eafy to imagine. The text
fays, God blejfed Noah and his Jons, and faid
unto them, i. e. as our author would have it,
unto him : for, faith he, although the fons are
there mentioned with Noah in the blefjing, yet
it may beft be underfood, with a fubordination
cr benediction in fuccefjion, Obfervations, 211.
That indeed is beft, for our author to be un-
dei flood, which bed ferves to his purpofe -,
but that truly may beft be underfood by any
body elfe, which beft agrees with the plain
conftruction of the words, and arifes from
the obvious meaning of the place; and then
with fubordination and in fucceffon, will not
be bef underfood, in a grant of God, where
he himfelf put them not, nor mentions any
fuch limitation. But yet, cur author has
reafons, why it may bef be underfood fo. The
bleffng, fays he in the following words, might
truly be fulfilled, if the fons, either under or
- after their father, enjoyed a private dominion,
Obfervations, 211. which is to fay, that a
grant, whofe exprefs words give a joint title

i*

Of Government. 37

in prcfent (for the text fays, into your hands
they are deliyered) may befi be underjlood with
a fub ordination or in fiiccejjion ; becaufe it is
poffible, that \wfub ordination, or infuccejjion, it
may be enjoyed. Which is all one as to fay,
that a grant of any thing in prefent poffeffion
may bejl be underjlood of reveriion ; becaufe it
is poffible one may live to enjoy it in rever-
iion. If the grant be indeed to a father and
to his fons after him, who is fo kind as to
let his children enjoy it prefently in common
with him, one may truly fay, as to the event
one will be as good as the other; but it can
never be true, that what the exprefs words
grant in poffeffion, and in common, may befl
be underjlood, to be in reverfion. The fum
of all his reafoning amounts to this : God
did not give to the fons of Noah the world in
common with their father, becaufe it was
poffible they might enjoy it under, or after
him. A very good fort of argument again (I
an exprefs text of fcripture : but God mull:
not be believed, though he fpeaks ithimfelf,
when he fays he does any thing, which will
not confift with Sir Robert's hypothecs.

§. 33. For it is plain, however he would ex-
clude them, that part of this benediction, as he
would have it mfuccejjion, muft: needs be meant
to the fons, and not to Noah himfelf at all : Be
fruitful, and multiply, and replenijh the earth,
fays God, in this bleffing. This part of the
benediction, as appears by the fequel, con-
D 3 ccrned

38 Of Government.

cerned not Noah himfelf at all ; for we read
not of any children he had after the flood';
and in the following chapter, where his pof-
terity is reckoned up, there is no mention
of any; and fo this benediction in fuccejjion
was not to take place till 350 years after :
and to fave our author's imaginary monarchy*
the peopling of the world mud be deferred
350 years ; for this part of the benediction
cannot be underffood with fubordination, un-
lefs our author will fay, that they mufl afk
leave of their father Noah to lie with their
wives. But in this one point our author is
conftant to himfelf in all his difcourfes, he
takes great care there mould be monarchs in
the world, but very little that there mould be
people ; and indeed his way of government is
riot the way to people the world : for how much
abfolute monarchy helps to fulfil this great and
primary bleffing of God Almighty, Be fruit"
July and multiply, and repknijh the earth,
which contains in it the improvement too of
arts and fciences, and the conveniences of
life, may be feen in thofe large and rich coun-
tries which are happy under the Turkiffj go-
vernment, where are not now to be found
one third, nay in many, if not moft. parts
of them one thirtieth, perhaps I might fay not
one hundredth of the people, that were for-
merly, as will eafijy appear to any one, who
will compare the accounts we have of it at

this

Of Government. 39

this time, with antient hiftory. But this by

the by.

§.34. The other parts of this benediction,
or grant, are fo expreffed, that they muft
needs be underftood to belong equally to
them all ; as much to Noah's fons as to
Noah himfelf, and not to his fons with a
fubordination, or infuccejjion. The fear of you-,
and the dread of you, fays God, fhall be upon
every beafl, &c. Will any body but our au-
thor fay, that the creatures feared and flood
in awe of Noah only, and not of his fons
without his leave, or till after his death? And
the following words, into your hands they are
delivered, are they to be underftood as our
author fays, if your father pleafe, or they
fhall be delivered into your hands hereafter ?
If this be to argue from fcripture, I know
not what may not be proved by it ; and I
can fcarce fee how much this differs from
that ficlion and fanfe, or how much a fu-
rer foundation it will prove, than the opi-
nions of philofophers and poets, which our au-
thor fo much condemns in his preface.

§. 35. But our author goes on to prove,
that it may bejl be underftood with a fubordina-
tion, or a benediBion in fuccefjion ;for, favs he,
it is not probable that the private do?ninio7i which
God gave to Adam, and by his donation, qjjig-
nation, or ceffton to his children, was abroga-
ted, and a community of all things injlituted be-
tween Noah and his fons Noah was left

thefole heir of the world; why fiould it be thought
D 4 that

40 Of Government.

that God would difmherit him of his birth-right*
end make him of all men in the world the only
tenant in common with his children? Obfervations,

21 I.

§.36. The prejudices of our own ill-ground-
ed opinions, however by us called probable, can-
not authorife us to underftand fcripture con-
trary to the direct and plain meaning of the
words. I grant, it is not probable, that Adams
private dominion was here abrogated : becaufe
it is more than improbable, (for it will never
be proved) that ever Ada?n had any fuch pri-
vate dominion ; and fince parallel places of
fcripture are moil probable to make us know
how they may be bejl under food, there needs
but the comparing this bleffing here to Noah
and his fons after the flood, with that to Adam
after the creation, i. Gen. 28. to allure any
one that God gave Adam no fuch private do-
minion. It is probable, I confefs, that Noah
mould have the fame title, the fame property
and dominion after the flood, that Adam had
before it : but fince private dominion cannot
confift with the bleffing and grant God gave
to him and his fons in common, it is a fuffi-
cient reafon to conclude, that Adam had none,
efpecially fince in the donation made to him,
there are no words that exprefs it, or do in
the lead favour it ; and then let my reader
judge whether it may bejl be underjiood, when
in the one place there is not one word for it,
not to fay what has been above proved, that

the

Of Government. 41

the text itfelf proves the contrary ; and in
the other, the words and fenfe are directly
againfl it.

§. 37. But our author fays, Noah was the
file heir of the world 5 why jloould it be thought
that God would difinherit' him of his birth-right?
Heir, indeed, in England, fignifies the elded
fon,whois by the law of England to have all his
father's land j but where God ever appointed
any fuch heir of the world, our author would
have done well to have (hewed us ; and how
God dijinherited him of his birth-i'ight, or what
harm was done him if God gave his fons
a right to make ufe of a part of the earth for
the fupport of themfelves and families, when
the whole was not only more than Noah him-
felf, but infinitely more than they all could
make ufe of, and the poffeffions of one could
not at all prejudice, or, as to any ufe, (heigh-
ten that of the other.

§.38. Our author probably forefeeing he
might not be very fuccefsful in perfuading
people out of their fenfes, and, fay what
he could, men would be apt to believe
the plain words of fcripture, and think,
as they faw, that the grant was fpoken to
Noah and his fons jointly ; he endeavours
to infinuate, as if this grant to Noah con-
veyed no property, no dominion ; becaufe,
fubdumg the earth and dommion over the crea-
tures are therein omitted, nor the earth once na-
med. And therefore, fays he, there is a con-

fiderablt

4.2 ^ F Government.

fiderable difference between thefe two texts ; the
Jirfi bleffing gave Adam a dominion over the
earth and all creatures ; the latter allows Noah
liberty to ufe the living creatures for food : here
is no alteration or diminijlmig of his title to a
property of all things, but an enlargement only of
his commons, Gbfervations, 21 1. So that in
our author's fenfe, all that was faid here to Noah
and his fons, gave them no dominion, no pro-
perty, but only enlarged the commons -, their
commons, I mould fay, fince God fays, to you
are they given, though our author fays his -3
for as for Noah's fons, they, it feems, by Sir
Robert's appointment, during their father's
life-time, were to keep farting days.

§. 39. Any one but our author would be
mightily fufpe&ed to be blinded with pre-
judice, that in all this bleffing to Noah and
his fons, could fee nothing but only an en-
largement of commons : for as to dominion-,
which our author thinks omitted, the fear of
you, and the dread of you, fays God, flail be up-
on every beaft, which I fuppofe expreffes the
dominion, or fuperiority was deligned man over
the living creatures, as fully as may be ;
for in that fear and dread feems chiefly to
confift what was given to Adam over the in-
ferior animals ; who, as abfolute a monarch
as he was, could not make bold with a lark
or rabb,et to fatisfy his hunger, and had
the herbs but in common with the beafts,
as is plain from i Gen. 2, 9, and 30. In the

next

Of Government. 43

next place, it is manifefl: that in this bleff-
ing to Noah and his fons, property is not
only given in clear words, but in a larger ex-
tent than it was to Adam. Into your bands
they are given, fays God to Noah and his fonsj
vh'ch words, if they give not property,
nay, property in poffeflion, it will be hard
to find words that can ; fince there is not a
way to exprefs a man's being porTefTed of any
thing more natural, nor more certain, than
to fay, it is delivered into his hands. And ver.
3. to fhew, that they had then given them
the utmoft property man is capable of, which
is to have a right to deftroy any thing by
ufing it j Every moving thing that liveth, faith
God, Jhall be meat for you -, which was not al-
lowed to Adam in his charter. This our au-
thor calls, a liberty of ufing them for food, and
only an enlargement of commons, but no altera-
tion of property, Obfervations, 211. What other
property man can have in the creatures, but
the liberty of ufing them, is hard to be under-
flood : fo that if the firft bleffing, as our au-
thor fays, gave Adam dominion over the crea-
tures, and the bleffing to Noah and his fons,
gave them fuch a liberty to life them, as Adam
had not ; it muft needs give them fomething
that Adam with all his fovereignty wanted,
fomething that one would be apt to take for a
greater property ; for certainly he has no
abfolute dominion over even the brutal part
of the creatures ; and the property he has in,
3 them

44 O f Government.

them is very narrow and fcanty, who can-
not make that ufe of them, which is permit-
ted to another. Should any one who if, abfo-
lute lord of a country, have bidden our au-
thov fubdue the earth, and given him domi-
nion over the creatures in it, but not have
permitted him to have taken a kid or a lamb
out of the flock, to fatisfy his hunger, I
guefs, he would fcarce have thought him-
telf lord or proprietor of that land, or the
cattle on it ; but would have found the dif-
ference between having dominion, which a
fhepherd may have, and having full property
as an owner. So that, had it been his own
cafe, Sir Robert, I believe, would have thought
here was an alteration, nay, an enlarging of
property ; and that Noah and his children had
by this grant, not only property given them,
but fuch a property given them in the crea-
tures, as Adam had not : For however, in
refpect of one another, men may be allowed
to have propriety in their diftincl: portions of
the creatures ; yet in refpect of God the
maker of heaven and earth, who is fole lord
and proprietor of the whole world, man's
propriety in the creatures is nothing but that
liberty to ufe them, which God has permitted ;
and fo man's property may be altered and
enlarged, as we fee it was here, after the
flood, when other ufes of them are allowed,
which before were not. From all which I
fuppofe it is clear, that neither Adam, nor
2 Noah,

Of Government. 4$

Noah, had any private dominion, any property
in the creatures, exclufive of his pofterity,
as they mould fucceffively grow up into need
of them, and come to be able to make ufe
of them.

§.40. Thus we have.examined our author's
argument for Adam's monarchy, founded on
the bleffing pronounced, i.Gen. 28. Where-
in I think it is impomble for any fober rea-
der, to find any other but the fetting of
mankind above the other kinds of creatures,
in this habitable earth of ours. It is nothing
but the giving to man, the whole fpecies of
man, as the chief inhabitant, who is the
image of his Maker, the dominion over the
other creatures. This lies fo obvious in the
plain words, that any one, but our author,
would have thought it neceffary to have
fhewn, how thefe words, that feemed to fay
the quite contrary, gave Adam monarchical
abfolute power over other men, or the file
property in all the creatures ; and methinks
in a bulinefs of this moment, and that where-
on he builds all that follows, he mould have
done fomething more than barely cite words,
which apparently make againft him ; for I
confefs, I cannot fee any thing in them, tend-
ing to Adams monarchy, or private dominion,
but quite the contrary. And I the lefs de-
plore the dulnefs of my apprehenfi©n herein,
fince I find the apoftle feems to have as little
notion of any fuch private dominion of Adam

-as

46 Or Government.

as I, when he fays, God gives us all things
richly to enjoy, which he could not do, if
it were all given away already, to Monarch
Adam, and the monarchs his heirs and fuc-
ceffors. To conclude, this text is fo far
from proving Adam fole proprietor, that, on
the contrary, it is a confirmation of the ori-
ginal community of all things amongft the
Ions of men, which appearing from this do-
nation of God, as well as other places of
fcripture, the fovereignty of Adam, built up-
on his private dominion, muft fall, not having
any foundation to fupport it.

§. 41. But yet, if after all, any one will
needs have it fo, that by this donation of
God, Adam was made fole proprietor of the
whole earth, what will this be to his fove-
reignty ? and how will it appear, that pro-
priety in land gives a man power over the life
of another ? or how will the porTeffion even
of the whole earth, give any one a fovereign
arbitrary authority over the perfons of men ?
The moil fpecious thing to be faid, is, that he
that is proprietor of the whole world, may
deny all the reft of mankind food, and fo at
his pleafure ftarve them, if they will not
acknowledge his fovereignty, and obey his
will. If this were true, it would be a good
argument to prove, that there never was
any fuch property, that God never gave
any fuch private dominion ; iince it is more
reafonable to think, that God, who bid man-
kind

Of Government. 47

kind increafe and multiply, mould rather
himfelf give them all a right to make ufe of
the food and raiment, and other conveniences
of life, the materials whereof he had fo plen-
tifully provided for them ; than to make them
depend upon the will of a man for their fub-
fiftence, who mould have power to deftroy
them all when he pleafed, and who, being
no better than other men, was in fucceffion
likelier, by want and the dependence of a fcanty
fortune, to tie them to hard fervice, than by-
liberal allowance of the conveniences of life
to promote the great defign of God, increafe
and multiply : he that doubts this, let him
look into theabfolute monarchies of the world,
and fee what becomes of the conveniences of
life, and the multitudes of people.

§. 42. But we know God hath not left one
man fo to the mercy of another, that he may
ftarve, him if he pleafe : God the Lord and
Father of all has given no one of his chil-
dren luch a property in his peculiar portion
of the things of this world, but that he has
given his needy brother a right to the fur-
plulage of his goods ; fo that it cannot juflly
be denied him, when his preffing wants call
for it : and therefore no man could ever
have a juft power over the life of another
by right of property in land or poiTeffions ;
fince it would always be a lin, in any man of
eftate, to let his brother perim for want of
affording him relief out of his plenty. As

juflict

48 Of Government.

juftice gives every man a title to the product
of his honeft induftry, and the fair acquis-
itions of his ancellors defcended to him -y
fo charity gives every man a title to fo much
out of another's plenty, as will keep him
from extreme want, where he has no means
to fubfift otherwife : and a man can no more
j ti illy make ufe of another's neceffity, to force
him to become his vaffal, by with-holding
that relief, God requires him to afford to the
wants of his brother, than he that has more
ftrength can feize upon a weaker, matter him
to his obedience, and with a dagger at his
throat offer him death or flavery.

§. 43. Should any one make fo perverfe an
ufe of God's bleffings poured on him with a
liberal hand ; mould any one be cruel and
uncharitable to that extremity, yet all this
would not prove that propriety in land, even
in this cafe, gave any authority over the per-
fons of men, but only that compact might j
fince the authority of the rich proprietor, and
the fubjecTtion of the needy beggar, began not
from the poffeffion of the Lord, but the con-
fent of the poor man, who preferred being
his fubject. to ftarving. And the man he thus
fubmits to, can pretend to no more power
over him, than he has confented to, upon corn-
pad:. Upon this ground a man's having his
flores filled in a time of fcarcity, having mo-
ney in his pocket, being in a velTel at fea,
being able to fwim, &c. may as well be

the

Of Government. 49

the foundation of rale and dominion, as being
poifefTor of all the land in the world ; any of
thefe being fufficient to enable me to fave a
man's life, who would perifh if fuch affi fiance
were denied himj and any thing, by this rule,
that may be an occafion of working upon
another's neceffity, to fave his life, or
any thing dear to him, at the rate of his
freedom, may be made a foundation of fove-
reignty, as well as property. From all which
it is clear, that though God fhould have given
Adam private dominion, yet that private domi-
nion could give him no fovereignty ; but we
have already fufficiently proved, that God
gave him no private dominion .

CHAP. V.

Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty by the Subjection
of Eve.

§. 44. t 1 ^HE next place of fcriptnre we
£_ rind our author builds his mo-
narchy of Adam on, is iii. Gen. 26. And thy
dejire Jhall be to thy hnjband, and he foall rule
over thee. Here ive have (fays he) the origi-
nal grant of government, from whence he con-
cludes, in the following part of the page,
Ob/trvations, 244. That the fupreme power is
fettled in the fatherhood, and limited to one kind
cf government, that is, to monarchy. For let
his premifes be what they will, this is al-
ways the conclusion ; let rule, in any text, be
but once named, and prefently abfolute mo-
E natqhy

50 Of Government.

narcby is by divine right eftablifhed. If any
one will but carefully read our author's own
reafoning from thefe words, Ohfervations, 244.
and conlider, among other things the line and
pojkrity of Adam, as he there brings them in,
he will find fome difficulty to make fenfe of
what he fays ; but we will allow this at pre-
fent to his peculiar way of writing, and con-
lider the force of the text in hand. The
words are the curfe of God upon the wo-
man, for having been the firft and forwardeft
in the difobedience ; and if we will confider
the occafion of what God fays here to our
firfl parents, that he was denouncing judg-
ment, and declaring his wrath againft them
both, for their difobedience, we cannot fup-
pofe that this was the time, wherein Gcd was
granting Adam prerogatives and privileges, in-
verting him with dignity and authority, eleva-
ting him to dominion and monarchy : for
though, as a helper in the temptation, Eve was
laid below him, and fo he had accidentally a
fuperiority over her, for her greater punifh-
. ment j yet he too had his (hare in the fail, as
. well as the fin, and was laid lower, as may be
feen in the following verfes ; and it would
be hard to imagine, that God, in the fame
breath, mould make him univerfal monarch
over all mankind, and a day-labourer for his
life ; turn him cut o$para£fe to till the ground,
vcr. i\. and at the fame time advance him
to a throne, and all the privileges and eafe of
abielute power.

§■ 45-

Of Government. 51

§.45. This was not a time, when Adam
could expect any favours, any grant of pri-
vileges, from his offended Maker. If thi;
be the original grant of government , as our au-
thor tells us, and Adam was now made mo-
narch, whatever Sir Robert would have him* it
is plain, God made him but a very poor mo-
narch, fuch an one, as our author himfelf
■would have counted it no great privilege to
be. God fets him to work for his living,
and feems rather to give him a fpade into his
hand, to fubdue the earth, than a fceptre to
rule over its inhabitants. In the fweat of thy
face thou fl: alt eat thy bread, fays God to him,
*ver. 19. This was unavoidable, may it per-
haps be anfwered, becaufe he was yet with-
out fubjects, and had nobody to work for
him 3 but afterwards, living as he did above
900 years, he might have people enough*
whom he might command, to work for him -,
no, fays God, not only whilft thou art with^
out other help, fave thy wife, but .as long
as thou liveft, (halt thou live by thy labour,
In the fweat of thy face, Jhalt thou eat thy
bread, till thou return unto the ground, for out
cf it ivaf thou taken, for dujl thou art, and unto
dujl Jhalt thou return, v. 19. It will perhaps
be anfwered again in favour of our author,
that thefe words are not fpoken perfonally
to Adam, but in him, as their reprefentative,
to all- mankind, this being a curfe upon man-
kind, becaufe cf the fall.

§. 46. God, I believe, fpeaks differently
from men, becaufe he fpeaks with more truth,

E 2 . more

52 Of Government.

more certaintv : but when he vouchfafes to
ipeak. to men, I do not think he fpeaks dif-
ferently from them, in crorTing the rules of
language in ule amongil them : this would
not be to condelcend to their capacities, when
he humbles himlelf to fpeak to them, but to
loie his defign in fpeaking what, thus fpoken,
they could not underfland. And yet thus
mull we think of God, if the interpretations
of fcripture, neceiTarv to maintain our au-
thor's doctrine, mull be received for good :
for by the ordinary rules of language, it
will be verv hard to underftand what God
favs, if what he fpeaks here, in the lingular
number, to Adam, muft be underflood to be
fpoken to all mankind, and what he fin
in the plural number, i. Gen. 26, and 28.
mufl be underflood of Adam alone, exclufive
of all others, and what he lavs to Noab and
his ion; jointly, mufl be underflood to be
meant to Noah alone, Gen. EX.

^7. Farther it is to be noted, that thefe
words here of iii. Gen. 16. which our author
calls tb lal grant of government , in

net fpoken to Adam, neither indeed was there
any grant in them made to Adam, but a
punifhment laid upon Eve: and if we will
take them as they were directed in particular
to her, or in her, as their reprefentative, to
all other women, thev will at mcll conce
the female fex only, and import no more,
but that fubjection they lhould ordinarily be

in

_• C_ i.

:■.-•.:- -. . '.:-.: :>-! :r.e:r :: ':. tzt : ~ '«
..:■; :: ::Li?t
:: the :::;_~ ::i~:t
or contract with her
;.e: ::;r~. .!. :..:". :
'-rir.z f:r*J- he; :iL:
if there could he :
v h:;h i: ill": = :ir:
her: for the who!

/;-*■;-_. ;:' :.r-< :: '.:'.::

I :':-•:. ~i-t :;t- i :.i:: r.i::t: :";: 2-;,
: i" . :_::_" : : .". i - 1 : : _ ~. z : _: 2

rnr.: :: n:is-:z 1:-'. rr.i". -■:'■ '■■ As..--. :j
rr.e.'r ■;-::::;. "-.:>. ■.-. = :: . : .

nor of him: neither will any one, I foppoiic,
:y :'/.-. ~z 7r::i-. ::.:.-: ::.-. .*tis.t: :n~. i; :
a law, to iobje&ed to the enrte ennrainnri in
thetB, that it is their duty sot to cadnwr
to avoid it . And wffl any one lay, that Ewe,
or any other woman, finned, it £he were
r:::::: :: :-ei •"■:;-_: _: zr.::t i.::'.::z'..ti ::.-.-
G:-j ::.:::::::• r.t: r.t:t -.-.:'- : :: zzi: i.zr.t:
.:' :_:: ::rt; :. _V_: . :- £ .: .:. ■ •: . :.:: :;. :.
r i:;. -::-;;' :~t.: :'_ r; t . : ? . :.ii :rtr. ':.
this text pot into a political fhhjnftino to
him ?• or that he thereby lboald hare had
- : •;---•.•.::.•.-." -;'..■: :•;: :. ;: '' !-:•: .: ;;.: ::V
::•:; :::. :~i: I :::. ;-.t £j:'~::!ry :: .:'
. :-: 1 ;r to men orcr their w;

54 Of Government.

only foretels what mould be the woman's
lot. how by his providence he would order
it fo, that (he mould be fubjec"t. to her huf-
band, as we fee that generally the laws of
mankind and cuftoms of nations have ordered
it fo -, and there is, I grant, a foundation in
nature for it.

§. 48. Thus when God fays of Jacob and
Efau, that the elder fhould ferve the younger,
xxv. Gen. 23. no body fuppofes that God
hereby made Jacob Efaus fovereign, but
foretold what fhould de facto come to pafs.

But if thefe words here fpoke to Bye muft
needs be underftood as a law to bind her and
all other women to fubjection, it can be no
other fubjection than what every wife owes
her hufband ; and then if this be the original
grant of government and the foundation of mo-
narchical power, there will be as many mo-
narchy as there are hufbands : if therefore
thefe words give any power to Adam, it can
be only a conjugal power, not political ; the
power that every hufband hath to order the
things of private concernment in his family,
as proprietor of the goods and land there,
and to have his will take place before that
of his wife in all things of their common
concernment ; but not a political power of
life and death over her, much lefs over any
body elfe.

§. 49. This I am fure : if our author will
have this text to be a grant, the original grant

Of Government. $$

of govermnent , political government, he ought
to have proved it by fome better arguments
than by barely faying, that thy dejire jhall be
unto thy hujband, was a law whereby Eve, and
all that JJjould come of her, were fub jedted to
the abfolute monarchical power of Ada?n and
his heirs. 'Thy defire jhall be to thy hujband,
is too doubtful an expreffion, of whofe figni-
fication interpreters are not agreed, to build
fo confidently on, and in a matter of fuch
moment, and fo great and general concern-
ment : but our author, according to his way
of writing, having once named the text,
concludes prefently without any more ado,
that the meaning is as he would have it.
Let the words rule and fubjecl be but found
in the text or margent, and it immediately
fignifies the duty of a fubjecl: to his prince ;
the relation is changed, and though God fays
hujband, Sir Robert will have it king ; Adam
has prefently abfolute monarchical power over
Eve, and not only over Eve, but all that
ftould come of her, though the fcripturc fays
not a word of it, nor our author a word to
prove it. But Adam mud for all that be an
abfolute monarch, and fo down to the end
of the chapter. And here I leave- my reader
to confider, whether my bare faying, without
offering any reafons to evince it, that this
text 9;ave not Adam that abfolute monarchical
power, our author fuppofes, be not as fuf-
ficient to deftroy that power, as his bare af-> ■
E 4 fertion

56 Of Government.

fcrtion is to eftablifh it, fince the text men-
tions neither prince nor people, fpeaks nothing
of abfolute or monarchical power, but the
fubje&ion of Eve to Adam, a wife to her
hufband. And he that would trace our au-
thor fo all through, would make a fhort and
fufficient anfwer to the greater!; part of the
grounds he proceeds on, and abundantly
confute them by barely denying ; it being a
fufficient anfwer to affertions without proof,
to deny them without giving a reafon. And
therefore mould I have faid nothing but
barely denied, that by this text the fupreme
power was fettled and founded by God hbifelf,
in the fatherhood, limited to monarchy, and that
to Adam'j- perfon and heirs, all which our
author notably concludes from thefe words,
as may be feen in the fame page, Obfrvaiions,
244. it had been a fufficient anfwer : mould
I have derired any fober man only to have
read the text, and confidered to whom, and
on what occafion it was fpoken, he would
no doubt have wondered how our author
found out monarchical abfolute power in it,
had he not had an exceeding good faculty
to find it himfelf, where he could not fhew
It others. And thus we have examined the
two places of fcripture, all that I remember
our author brings to prove Adam's fovereignty,
that fupremacy, which he fays, it was God's
ordinance Jhould be unlimited in Adam, and as
large as all the acis of his will, Observations,

254,

Of Government. 5.

254. viz. i. Gen. 28. and iii. Gen. 16. one
whereof fignifies only the fubjection of the
inferior ranks of creatures to mankind, and
the other the fubjection that is due from a
wife to her hulband, both far enough from
that which fubjects owe the governors of
political focieties.

CHAP. VI.

Of Adam\r Title to Sovereignty by Fatherhood.

§. 50. ' a ^HERE is one thing more, and
J[ then I think I have given you
all that our author brings for proof of Adam's
fovereignty, and that is a fuppofition of a
natural right of dominion over his children,
by being their father : and this title of fa-
therhood he is fo pkaicd with, that you will
find it brought in alrnoft in every page, par-
ticularly he fays, not only Adam, but the
fucceeding patriarchs had by right of fatherhood
royal authority over their children, p. j2. And
in the fame page, this fubjeclion of children
being the fountain of all regal authority, &c„
This being, as one would think by his fo
frequent mentioning it, the main bafis of all
his frame, we may well expect clear and
evident reafon for it, fince he lays it down as
a poiition neceffary to his purpofe, that every
man that is bom is fo far from being free, that by
his very birth he becomes a fubjeel of him that

begets.

5S Of Government.

begets him, Obfervations, 156. fo that Adam
being the only man created, and all ever
fmcc being begotten, no body has been born
free. If we afk how Adam comes by this
power over his children, he tells us here it is
"by begetting them : and fo again, Obfer-
vations, 223. this natural dominion of Adam,
fays he, may be proved out of Grotius himjclf,
hvho teacheth, that generatione jus acquiritur
parentikus in liberos. And indeed the acl of
begetting being that which makes a man a
father, his right of a father over his children
can naturally arife from nothing elic.

§.51. Grotius tells us not here how far
this jus in liberos, this power of parents over
their children extends -, but our author, al-
ways very clear in the point, allures us, it
is fupreme power, and like that of abfolute
monarchs over their Haves, abfolute power
of life and death. He that fhould demand
of him, how, or for what reafon it is, that
begetting a child gives the father fuch an
abfolute power over him, will find him an-
fwer nothing : we are to take his word for
this, as well as feveral other things; and by
that the laws of nature and the conftitutions
of government mull: Hand or fall. Had he
been an abfolute monarch, this way of talk-
ing might have fuited well enough ; pro
ratione voluntas might have been of force in
his mouth -, but in the way of proof or ar-
gument is very unbecoming, and will little

advantage

Of Government. 59

advantage his plea for abfolute monarchy.
Sir Robert has too much lefTened a fubjecYs
authority to leave himfelf the hopes of eila-
bliihing any thing by his bare faying it ; one
flave's opinion without proof is not of weight
enough to difpofe of the liberty and for-
tunes of all mankind. If all men are not,
as I think they are, naturally equal, I am
fure all flaves are; and then I may without
prefumption oppofe my {ingle opinion to his ;
and be confident that my faying, that begetting
of children makes them not jlaves to their fa-
thers, as certainly fets all mankind free, as
his affirming the contrary makes them all
flaves. But that this poiition, which is the,
foundation of all their doctrine, who would
have monarchy to be jure divino, may have
all fair play, let us hear what reafons others
give for it, fince our author offers none.

§. 52. The argument, I have heard others
make ufe of, to prove that fathers, by be-
getting them, come by an abfolute power
over their children, is this; that fathers have
a power over the lives of their children, becaufc
they give them life and being, which is the only
proof it is capable of: lince there can be no
reafon, why naturally one man mould have
any claim or pretence of right over that in
another, which was never his, which he be-
flowed not, but was received from the bounty
of another. 1. I anfwer, that every one who
gives another any thing, has not always

thereby

6o Of Cover n m ft n r.

thereby a right to take it away again. But*
2. They who fay the father gives life to his
children, are fo dazzled with the thoughts of
monarchy, that they do not, as they ought,
remember God, who is the author and giver
of life : it is in him alone we live, move, unci
have our being. Plow can he be thought to
give life to another, that knows not wherein
his own life confifls ? Philofophers are at a
lofs about it after their moil: diligent en-
quiries ; and anatomifts, after their whole
lives and fludies fpent in directions, and
diligent examining the bodies of men, con-
fefs their ignorance in the ftructure and ufe
of many parts of man's body, and in that
operation wherein life confifts in the whole.
And doth the rude plough-man, or the more
ignorant voluptuary, frame or fafhion fuch an
admirable engine as this is, and then put
life and fenfe into it ? Can any man fay, he
formed the parts that are neceffary to the
life of his child ? or can he fuppoie himfelf
to give the life, and yet not know what
fubjedfc is fit to receive it, nor what actions
or organs are neceffary for its reception or
prefervation ?

§.53. To give life to that which has yet
no being, is to frame and make a living
creature, fafhion the parts, and mould and
iuit them to their ufes, and having propor-
tioned and fitted them together, to put into
them a living foul. He that could do this,
1 might

Of Government. 6i

might indeed have fome pretence to deftroy
his own workmanfhip. But is there any one
fo bold, that dares thus far arrogate to him-
felf the incomprehensible works of the al-
mighty ? Who alone did at firfl, and con-
tinues ftill to make a living foul, he alone
can breathe in the breath of life. If any one
thinks himfelf an artift at this, let him num-
ber up the parts of his child's body which
he hath made, tell me their ufes and opera-
tions, and when the living and rational foul
began to inhabit this curious ftructure, when
leniQ began, and how this engine, which he
has framed, thinks and reafons : if he made
it, let him, when it is out of order, mend it,
at leaft tell wherein the defects lie. Shall kt
that made the eye not fee ? fays the Pfalmiil,
Pfalm xciv. 9. See thefe men's vanities! the
flruclure of that one part is fumcient to
convince us of an all-wife contriver, and he
has fo vifible a claim to us as his workman-
fhip, that one of the ordinary appellations
of God in fcripture is, God our Maker, and
the Lord our Maker. And therefore though
our author, for the magnifying his fatherhood,
be pleafed to fay, Obfervations, 159. That
even the power which God himfelf exercifeth over
mankind Is by right of fatherhood* yet this
iatherhood is fuch an one as utterly excludes
all pretence of title in earthly parents ; for
he is king, becaufe he is indeed maker of us

all,

62 Of Government.

all, which no parents can pretend to be of
their children.

§. 54. But had men (kill and power to
make their children, it is not Co (light a piece
of workmanfhip, that it can be imagined, they
could make them without deiigning it. What
father of a thoufand, when he begets a child,
thinks farther than the fatisfying his prefent
appetite? God in his infinite wifdom has
put flrong defires of copulation into the con-
stitution of men, thereby to continue the race
of mankind, which he doth moil commonly
without the intention, and often againff. the
confent and will of the begetter. And in-
deed thole who defire and defign children,
are but the occafions of their being, and
when they defign and wiih to beget them,
do little more towards their making, than
Deucalion and his wife in the fable did to-
wards the making of mankind, by throwing
pebbles over their heads.

§. $5. But grant that the parents made
their children, £ave them life and beins;, and
that hence there followed an abiblute power.
This would give xht father but a joint do-
minion with the mother over them : for
no bodv can denv but that the woman hath
an equal fhare, if net the greater, as nounm-
ing the child a long time in her own body
out of her own fubiiance : there it is fa-
mioned, and from her it receives the ma-
terials and principles of its eosft&ution : and

it

Of Government. 63

it is fo hard to imagine the rational foul
mould prefently inhabit the yet unformed
embrio, as foon as the father has done his
part in the act of generation, that if it muft
be fuppofed to derive any thing from the
parents, it muft certainly owe moft to the
mother. But be that as it will, the mother
cannot be denied an equal fhare in begetting
of the child, and fo the abfolute authority
of the father will not arife from hence. Our
author indeed is of another mind ; for he
fays, We know that God at the creation gave
the fovereignty to the man over the woman, as
being the nobler and principal agent in gene-
ration, Obfervations, 172. I remember not
this in my Bible; and when the place is
brought where God at the creation gave the
fovereignty to man over the woman, and
that for this reafon, becaufe he is the ?iobler
.and principal agent in generation, it will be
time enough to confider, and anfwer it. But
it is no new thing for our author to tell us his
own fancies for certain and divine truths, tho*
there be often a great deal of difference be-
tween his and divine revelations ; for God in
the fcripture fays, his father and his mother
that begot him.

§, 56. They who alledge the practice of

mankind, for expofmg or felling their children,

. as a proof of their power over them, are

with Sir Robert happy arguers ; and cannot

but recommend their opinion, by founding ,

it

64 Of Government.

it on the moft fhameful a&ion, and moft
unnatural murder, human nature is capable
of. The dens of lions and nurferies of
wolves know no fuch cruelty as this : thefe
favage inhabitants of the defert obey God
and nature in being tender and careful of
their orT-ipring: they will hunt, watch, fight,
and almoft ftarve for the prefervation of their
young; never part with them -, never forfake
them, till they are able to fhift for them-
felves. And is it the privilege of man alone
to act more contrary to nature than the
wild and moft untamed part of the creation ?
doth God forbid us under the feverefl pe-
nalty, that of death, to take away the life
of any man, a ftranger, and upon provo-
cation ? and does he permit us to deftroy
thofe, he has given us the charge and care
of; and by the dictates of nature and rea-
fon, as well as his revealed command, re-
quires us to preferve? He has in all the parts
of the creation taken a peculiar care to pro-
pagate and continue the feveral fpecies of
creatures, and makes the individuals act fo
flrongly to this end, that they fometimes
neglect their own private good for it, and
feem to forget that general rule, which na-
ture teaches all things, of felf-prefervation ; «
and the prefervation of their young, as
the ftrongeft principle in them, over-rules
the conftitution of their particular natures.
Thus we fee, when their young ftand in
need of it, the timorous become valiant,

tW

Of Government. 6$

the fierce and favage kind, and the ravenous
tender and liberal.

§. $j. But if the example of what hath
been done, be the rule of what ought to
be, hiftory would have furnifhed our author
with inftances of this abfolute fatherly power
in its height and perfection, and he might
have fhewed us in Peru, people that begot
children on purpofe to fatten and eat them.
The ftory is fo remarkable, that I cannot but
fet it down in the author's words. " In fome
" provinces, fays he, they were fo liquori(h
" after man's flefh, that they would not have
" the patience to flay till the breath was
" out of the body, but would fuck the blood
" as it ran from the wounds of the dying
" man ; they had public fhambles of man's
" flefh, and their madnefs herein was to
u that degree, that they fpared not their
" own children, which they had begot on
" Grangers taken in war : for they made
M their captives their miftrefTes, and choicely
" nourifhed the children they had by them,
" till about thirteen years old they butchered
'* and eat them \ and they ferved the mo-
" thers after the fame faihion, when they
<f grew pail child bearing, and ceafed- to
<f bring them any more roarers," Garcilaffb
de la Vega hijl. des Yncas de Peru, 1. i. c. 12.

§. 58. Thus far can the bufy mind of man

carry him to a brutality below the level of

hearts, when he quits his reaibn, which

F places

66 Of Government.

places him almoft equal to angels. Nor can
it be otherwife in a creature, whofe thoughts
are more than the fands, and wider than the
ocean, whe?e fancy and pafTion muft needs
run him into ftrange courfes, if reafon, which
is his only ftar and compafs, be not that he
fleers by. The imagination is always reft-
lefs, and fuggefts variety of thoughts, and the
will, reafon being laid afide, is ready for every
extravagant project ; and in this ftate, he
that goes fartheft out of the way, is thought
fitteft to lead, and is fure of moft followers :
and when fafhion hath once eftablifhed what
folly or craft began, cuftom makes it facred,
and it will be thought impudence, or mad-
nefs, to contradict or queftion it. He that
will impartially furvey the nations of the
world, will find fo much of their religions,
governments and manners, brought in and
continued amongft them by thefe means, that
he will have but little reverence for the prac-
tices which are in ufe and credit amongft
men ; and will have reafon to think, that
the woods and forefts, where the irrational
untaught inhabitants keep right by following
nature, are fitter to give us rules, than cities
and palaces, where thofe that call themfelves
civil and rational, go out of their way, by
the authority of example. If precedents are
fufficient to eftabliih a rule in this cafe, our
author might have found in holy writ chil-
dren facrinced by their parents, and this

amongft

Of Government. 67

amongft the people of God themielves : the
Pfalmijl tells us, Pfal. cvi. 38. They fed in-
nocent bloody even the blood of their fins and of
their daughters, whom they facrificed unto the idols
of Canaan. But God judged not of this by
our author's rule, nor allowed of the autho-
rity of practice againft his righteous law; but
as it follows there, the land was polluted with
blood ; therefore was the wrath of the Lord
kindled againjl his people, infomuch that he
abhorred his own inheritance. The killing of
their children, though it were fafhionable,
was charged on them as innocent blood, and
fo had in the account of God the guilt of
murder, as the offering them to idols had
the guilt of idolatry.

§.59. Be it then, as Sir Robert fays, that
anciently it was ufual for men to fell a?id
cafirate their children, Obfervations, 155. Let
it be, that they expofed them; add to it, if
you pleale, for this is ftill greater power, that
they begat them for their tables, to fat and
eat them : if this proves a right to do fo,
we may, by the fame argument, juftify adul-
tery, inceft and fodomy, for there are ex-
amples of thefe too, both ancient and mo-
dern ; fins, which I fuppofe have their prin-
cipal aggravation from this, that they crofs
the main intention of nature, which willeth
the increafe of mankind, and the conti-
nuation of the fpecies in the higheft per-
fection, and the diftinclion of families, with
F 2 the

68 Of Government.

the fecurity of the marriage bed, as neceflfary
thereunto.

§. 60. In confirmation of this natural au-
thority of the father, our author brings a
lame proof from the politive command of
God in fcripture : his words are, To confirm
the natural right of regal power, we find in
the Decalogue, that the law which enjoins obe-
dience to kings, is delivered in the terms, Honour
thy father, p. 23. Whereas ?nany confefs, that
government only in the abflracl, is the ordinance
of God, they are not able to prove any fuch
ordinance hi the fcripture, but only in the fa-
therly power ; and therefore we find the com-
mandment, that enjoins obedience to fuperiors,
given in the terms, Honour thy father ; Jo that
not only the power and right of government,
but the form of the power governing, and the
perfon having the power, are all the ordinances
of God. The firjl father had not only fimply
power, but power monarchical, as he was father
immediately from God, Obfervations, 254. To
the fame purpofe, the fame law is cited by
our author in fevera] other places, and juft
after the fame fafhion ; that is, and mother,
as apochryphal words, are always left out ; a
great argument of our author's ingenuity,
and the goodnefs of his caufe, which required
in its defender zeal to a degree of warmth,
able to warp the facred rule of the word of
God, to make it comply with his prefent
occalion , a way of proceeding not unufual

to

Of Government. 69

to thofe, who embrace not truths becaufe
reafon and revelation offer them, but efpoufe
tenets and parties for ends different from
truth, and then refolve at any rate to defend
them ; and fo do with the words and fenfe
of authors, they would fit to their purpofe,
juft as Procrufles did with his guefts, lop or
ftretch them, as may beffc fit them to the
fize of their notions : and they always prove
like thofe fo ferved, deformed, lame, and
ufelefs.

§. 61. For had our author fet down this
command without garbling, as God gave it,
and joined mother to father, every reader
would have feen, that it had made directly
againft him ; and that it was fo far from
eftablifhing the monarchical power of the fa-
ther, that it fet up the ?nother equal with
him, and enjoined nothing but what was due
in common, to both father and mother : for
that is the conftant tenor of the fcripture,
Honour thy father and thy mother, Exod. xx. He
that fmiteth his father or mother, fall furely
be put to death, xxi. 15. He that curfeth his
father or mother, fiall furely be put to death,
ver. ij. Repeated Lev. xx. 9. and by our
Saviour, Matth. xv. 4. Te Jljall fear every
man his mother and his father, Lev. xix. 3.
If a man have a rebellious fon, which will not
obey the voice of his father, or the voice of
his mother -, then fall his father and his mother
lay hold on him, and fay, This our fon is ftubr-
F 3 born

jo Of Government.

bom and rebellious, he will not obey our voice,
Deut. xxi. 1 8, 19, 20, 21. Curfed be be that
fettcth light by his father or his mother, xxviii. 16.
My fon, hear the injlruciions of thy father, and
forfake not the law of thy mother, are the
words of Solomon, a king who was not ig-
norant of what belonged to him as a father
or a king ; and yet he joins father and mo~
ther together, in all the inftructions he gives
children quite thro' his book of Proverbs.
Woe unto him, that fay eth unto his father, What
begettefl thou, or to the woman, What hajl thou
brought forth? Ifa. xi. ver. 10. In thee have
they Jet light by father or mother, Ezek. xxviii.
2. And it Jhall come topafs, that when anyJJ:all
yet prophefy, then his father and his mother
that begat him, jhall fay unto him, Thou fhalt
not live, and his father and his mother that
begat him, floall thrufl him through when he
prophe/ieth, Zech. xiii. 3. Here not the father
only, but the father and mother jointly, had
power in this cafe of life and death. Thus
ran the law of the Old Teftament, and in
the New they are likewife joined, in the
obedience of their children, Eph. vi. 1. The
rule is, Children, obey your parents ; and I do
not remember, that I any where read, Chil-
dren, obey your father, and no more : the fcrip-
ture joins mother too in that homage, which
is due from children; and had there been
tny text, where the honour or obedience of
children had been directed to the father alone,

it

Of Government. ji

it is not likely that our author, who pretends
to build all upon fcripture, would have omit-
ted it : nay, the fcripture makes the autho-
rity of father and mother, in refpect of thofe
they have begot, fo equal, that in fome
places it neglects even the priority of order,
which is thought due to the father, and the
mother is put firfl, as Lev. xix. 3. from which
fo conftantly joining father and mother to-
gether, as is found quite through the fcrip-
ture, we may conclude that the honour they
have a title to from their children, is one
common right belonging fo equally to them
both, that neither can claim it wholly, nei-
ther can be excluded.

§. 62. One would wonder then how our
author infers from the 5th commandment,
that all power was originally in the father ;
how he finds monarchical power of govern-
ment fettled and fixed by the commandment.
Honour thy father and thy mother. If all the
honour due by the commandment, be it what
it will, be the only right of the father, be-
caufe he, as our author fays, has thefovereignty
over the woman, as being the nobler and priii-
cipler agent in generation, why did God after-
wards all along join the mother with him, to
fhare in his honour ? can the father, by this
fovereignty of his, difcharge the child from
paying this honour to his mother I The fcrip-
ture gave no fuch licence to the Jews, and
yet there were often breaches wide enough ,
F 4 betwixt

yz Of Government.

betwixt hufoand and wife, even to divorce
and feparation : and, I think, no body will
fay a child may with-hold honour from his
mother, or, as the fcripture terms it, fet light
by her, though his father mould command
him to do fo ; no more than the mother
could difpenfe with him for neglecting to
honour his father : whereby it is plain, that
this command of God gives the father no
fovereignty, no fupremacy.

§.63. I agree with our author that the
title to this honour is veiled in the parents
by nature, and is a right which accrues to
them by their having begotten their chil-
dren, and God by many pofitive declarations
has confirmed it to them : I alio allow our
author's rule, that in grants and gifts, that
have their original from God a?id nature, as the
power of the father, (let me add and mother,
for whom God hath joined together, let no
man put afunder) no inferior power of men can
limit, nor make any law of prefcription againjl
them, Obfervations, 158. fo that the mother
having, by this law of God, a right to honour
from her children, which is not fubject to
the will of her hufband, we fee this abfolute
monarchical power of the jather can neither
be founded on it, nor confift with it ; and
he has a power very far from monarchical,
very far from that abfolutenefs our author
contends for, when another has over his fub-
jecfcs the fame power he hath, and by the

fame

Of Government. 73

fame title : and therefore he cannot forbear
faying himfelf that he cannot fee how any
mans children can be free from fubjeBion to
their parent s^ p. 12. which, in common fpeech,
I think, figniftes mother as well as father, or
if parents here lignifies only father, it is the
firft time I ever yet knew it to do fo, and
by fuch an ufe of words one may fay any
thing.

§. 64. By our author's doctrine, the fa-
ther having abfolute jurifdiction over his
children, has alfo the fame over their ilfue ;
and the confequence is good, were it true,
that the father had fuch a power : and yet I
afk our author whether the grandfather, by
his fovereignty, could difcharge the grand-
child from paying to his father the honour
due to him by the 5th commandment. If
the grandfather hath, by right of fatherhood,
fole fovereign power in him, and that obe-
dience which is due to the fupreme magi-
strate, be commanded in thefe words, Honour
thy father, it is certain the grandfather might
difpenfe with the grandfon's honouring his
father, which fince it is evident in common
fenfe he cannot, it follows from hence, that
Honour thy father and mother, cannot mean an
abfolute fubjeclion to a fovereign power, but
fomething elfe. The right therefore which
parents have by nature, and which is con-
firmed to them by the 5th commandment,
cannot be that political dominion, which our'

author

74 ^ F CjOVERNME N T.

author would derive from it: for that being
in every civil fociety Supreme fomewhere, can
difcharge any Subject from any political obe-
dience to any one of his fellow Subjects. But
what law of the magistrate can give a child
liberty, not to honour his father and mother?
It is an eternal law, annexed purely to the
relation of parents and children, and fo con-
tains nothing of the magistrate's power in it,
nor is Subjected to it.

§.65. Our author fays, God hath given
to a father a right or liberty to alien his pozver
over his children to any other, Obfervations,
155. I doubt whether he can alien wholly
the right of honour that is due from them :
but be that as it will, this I am fure, he
cannot alien, and retain the fame power. If
therefore the magistrate's fovereignty be, as
our author would have it, nothing hut the
authority of a fupr erne father, p. 23. it is
unavoidable, that if the magistrate hath all
this paternal right, as he muSt have it father-
hood be the fountain of all authority ; then
the fubjects, though fathers, can have no
power over their children, no right to ho-
nour from them : for it cannot be all in
another's hands, and a part remain with the
parents. So that, according to our author's
own doctrine, Honour thy J at her and mother
cannot poffibly be understood of political fub-
jection and obedience; Since the laws both
in the Old and New TeStament, that com-
manded

Of Government. 75

mancled children to honour and obey their
parents ; were given to fuch, whofe fathers
were under civil government, and fellow
fubjecls with them in political focieties ; and
to have bid them honour and obey their . pa-
rents, in our author's fenfe, had been to bid
them be fubjecls to thofe who had no title
to it; the right to obedience from fubjects,
being all veiled in another; and inftead of
teaching obedience, this had been to foment
fedition, by fetting up powers that were not.
If therefore this command, Honour thy fa~
ther and mother, concern political dominion,
it directly overthrows our author's monarchy;
iince it being to be paid by every child to
his father, even in fociety, every father muffc
neceifarily have political dominion, and there
will be as many fovereigns as there are fa-
thers : befides that the mother too hath her
title, which deftroys the fovereignty of one
fupreme monarch. But \£ Honour thy father
and mother mean fomething diftinct from
political power, as neceffarily it muft, it is
befides our author's buiinefs, and ferves
nothing to his purpofe.

§.66. The law that enjoins obedience to kings
is delivered, fays our author, in the terms,
Honour thy father, as if all power were ori-
ginally in the father, Obfervations, 254 : and
that law is alio delivered, fay I, in the terms,
Honour thy mother, as if all power were ori-
ginally in the mother. I appeal whether

the

y6 Of Government.

the argument be not as good on one fide as
the other, father and mother being joined
all along in the Old and New Teftament
where-ever honour or obedience is injoined
children. Again our author tells us, Obferr
vations, 254. that this command, Honour thy
father, gives the right to govern, and makes the
form, of government monarchical. To which I
aniwer, that if by Honour thy father be meant
obedience to the political power of the ma-
giftrate, it concerns not any duty we owe to
our natural fathers, who are fubjects ; be-
caufe they, by our author's doctrine, are
diverted of all that power, it being placed
wholly in the prince, and fo being equally
fubjedts and flaves with their children, can
have no right, by that title, to any fuch honour
or obedience, as contains in it political fub-
jeclion : if Honour thy father and mother
iignifies the duty we owe our natural parents,
as by our Saviour's interpretation, Matth. xv.
4. and all the other mentioned places, it is
plain it does, then it cannot concern poli-
tical obedience, but a duty that is owing to
peribns, who have no title to fovereignty,
nor any political authority as magiftrates
over fubjects. For the perfon of a private
father, and a title to obedience, due to the
iupreme magiftrate, are things inconfiftent -,
and therefore this command, which muft
neceffarily comprehend the peribns of our
natural fathers, muft. mean a duty we owe

1 them

Of Government. 77

them diilincT: from our obedience to the
magiftrate, and from which the moft abfolute
power of princes cannot abfolve us. What
this duty is, we (hall in its due place examine.
§. 67. And thus we have at laft got thro*
all, that in our author looks like an argument
for that abfolute unlimited /over eignty defcribed,
feci:. 8. which he fuppofes in Adam; fo that
mankind ever fince have been all born Jlaves,
without any title to freedom. But if crea-
tion, which gave nothing but a being, made
not Adam prince of his pojlerity : if Adam,
Gen. i. 28. was not conftituted lord of man-
kind, nor had a private dominion given him
exclufive of his children, but only a right
and power over the earth, and inferiour crea-
tures in common with the children of men ;
if alfo Gen. iii. 16. God gave not any poli*
tical power to Adam over his wife and chil-
dren, but only fubjected Eve to Adam, as a
punimment, or foretold the fubjection of the
weaker fex, in the ordering the common
concernments of their families, but gave not
thereby to Adam% as to the hufband, power
of life and death, which neceilarily belongs
to the magiftrate : if fathers by begetting
their children acquire no fuch power ove
them ; and if the command, Honour thy fa?
ther and mother^ give it not, but only en-
joins a duty owing to parents equally, whe-
ther fubjecls or not, and to the mother as
well as the father -, if all this be 10, as I ,

think,

j% Of Government.

think, by what has been faid, is very evi-
dent j then man has a natural freedom, not-
withftanding all our author confidently fays
to the contrary ; fince all that ihare in the
fame common nature, faculties and powers,
are in nature equal, and ought to partake in
the fame common rights and privileges, till
the manifefl appointment of God, who is
Lord over all, bleffed for ever, can be pro-
duced to fhew any particular perfon's fu-
premacy ; or a man's own confent fubjects
him to a fuperiour. This is fo plain, that
our author confeffes, that Sir John Hayward,
Blackwood and Barclay, the great vindicators of
the right of kings, could not deny it, but admit
ivith one confent the natural liberty and equality
of mankind, for a truth unquestionable. And
our author hath been fo far from producing
any thing, that may make good his great
poiition, that Adam was abfolute monarch, and
fo men are not naturally free, that even his
own proofs make againft him ; fo that, to
ufe his own way of arguing, the firji erroneous
-principle failing, the whole fabric of this vajl
engine of abfolute power and tyranny drops
down of it f If and there needs no more to
be faid in anfwer to all that he builds upon
fo falfe and frail a foundation.

§. 68. But to fave others the pains, were
there any need, he is not fparing himfelf to
fhew, by his own contradictions, the weak-
nefs of his own do&rine. Adams abfolute

and

Of Government. 79

and fole dominion is that, which he is every
where full of, and all along builds on, and
yet he tells us, p. 12. that as Adam was lord
of his children, fo his children under him had a
command and power over .their own children.
The unlimited and undivided fovereignty of
Adams fatherhood, by our author's computa-
tion, flood but a little while, only during
the firft generation, but as foon as he had
grand-children, Sir Robert could give but a
very ill account of it. Adam, as father of
his children, faith he, hath an abfolute, un-
limited royal power over them, and by virtue
thereof over thofe that they begot, and fo to all
generations ; and yet his children, viz. Cain
and Seth, have a paternal power over their
children at the fame time ; fo that they are
at the fame time abfolute lords, and yet vaffhls
and /laves ; Adam has all the authority, as
grand-father of the people, and they have a
part of it as fathers of a part of them : he
is abfolute over them and their pofteriry, by
having begotten them, and yet they are ab-
folute over their children bv the fame title.
No, fays our author, Adams children under
him had power over their own children, but
ft ill with fubordination to the jirft parent. A
good diftinclion that founds well, and it is
pity it iigniries nothing, nor can be reconciled
with our author's words. I readily grant,
that fuppofing Adams abfolute power over his
pofterity, any of his children might have
1 frona

8o Op Government.

from him a delegated, and fo a fubordinate
power over a part, or all the reft : but that
cannot be the power our author fpeaks of
here j it is not a power by grant and com-
miflion, but the natural paternal power he
fuppofes a father to have over his children.
For 1 . he fays, As Adam was lord of his
children, fo his children under him had a power
over their own children : they were then lords
over their own children after the fame man-
ner, and by the fame title, that Adam was,
i. e. by right of generation, by right of fa-
therhood. 2. It is plain he means the natural
power of fathers, becaufe he limits it to be
only over their own children ; a delegated
power has no fuch limitation, as only over
their own children, it might be over others,
as well as their own children. 3. If it were
a delegated power, it muff appear in fcrip-
ture ; but there is no ground in fcripture to
affirm, that Adam's children had any other
power over theirs, than what they naturally
had as fathers.

§. 69. But that he means here paternal
power, and no other, is paft doubt, from the
inference he makes in thefe words imme-
diately following, I fee not then how the chil-
dren of Adam, or of any man elfey can be free
from fubjeclion to their parents. Whereby it
appears that the power on one fide, and the
fubjeclion on the other, our author here fpeaks
of, is that natural power and fubjeclion be-
tween

Of Government. Si

tween parents and children : for that which
every man's children owed, could be no
other; and that our author always affirms to
be abfolute and unlimited. This natural power
of parents over their children, Adam had
over his pofteritv, fays our author ; and this
power of parents over their children, his chil-
dren had over theirs in his life-time, fays our
author alfo ; fo that Adam, by a natural right
of father, had an abfolute unlimited power
over all his pofterity, and at the fame time
his children had by the fame right abfolute
unlimited power over theirs. Here then are
two abfolute unlimited powers exifting to-
gether, which I would have any body re-
concile one to another, or to common fenfe.
For the faho he has put in of fubordination,
makes it more abfurd : to have one abfolute,
unlimited, nay unlimitable power in fubordi-
nation to another, is fo manifeft a contra-
diction, that nothing can be more. Adam
is abfolute prince with the ufilimited authority
of fatherhood over all his pofterity-, all his
pofterity are then abfolutely his fubje&s ; and,
as our author fays, his (laves, children, and
grand-children, are equally in this ftate of
fubjection and flavery; and yet, fays our
author, the children of Adam have paternal,
i. e. abfolute unlimited power over their own
children: Which in plain Engliflo is, they
are (laves and abfolute princes at the fame
time, and in the fame government ; and one

G part

82 Of Government.

part of the fubje&s have an abfolute unlimited
power over the other by the natural right
of parentage.

§. jo. If any one will fuppofe, in favour
of our author, that he here meant, that
parents, who are in fubjeclion themfelves to
the abfolute authority of their father, have
yet fome power over their children ; I confefs
he is fomething nearer the truth : but he
will not at all hereby help our author : for
he no where fpeaking of the paternal power,
but as an abfolute unlimited authority, can-
not be fuppofed to underftand any thing elfe
here, unlefs he himfelf had limited it, and
mewed how far it reached. And that he
means here paternal authority in that large
extent, is plain from the immediate follow-
ing words ; This fubjeclion of children being,
fays he, the foundation of all regal authority,
p. 12. the fubjeclion then that in the former
line, he fays, every mail is in to his parents,
and confequently what Adams grand-children
were in to their parents, was that which was
the fountain of all regal authority, i. e. ac-
cording to our author, abfolute unlimitable
authority. And thus Adams children had regal
authority over their children, whilft they
themfelves were fubjetts to their father, and
fell ow-fubj eels with their children. But let
him mean as he pleafes, it is plain he allows
Adam's children to have paternal power, p. 12.
as alfo all other fathers to have paternal 'power

over

Of Government. 8$

over their childre?i, Obfervations, 156. From
whence one of thefe two things will neceffarily
follow, that either Adam's children.- sven in
his life-time, had, and fo all other fathers
have, as he phrafes it, p. 12. by right of
fatherhood, royal authority over their children,
or elfe, that Adam, by right of fatherhood,
had not royal authority. For it cannot be but
that paternal power does, or does not, give
royal authority to them that have it : if it
does not, then Adam could not be fovereign
by this title, nor any body elfe ; and then
there is an end of all our author's politics at
Once : if it does give royal authority, then
every one that has paternal power has royal
authority, and then, by our author's patriarchal
government, there will be as many kings as
there are fathers.

§.71. And thus what a monarchy he hath
fet up, let him and his difciples confider.
Princes certainly will have great reafon to
thank him for thefe new politics, which fet
up as many abfolute kings in every country
as there are fathers of children. And yet
who can blame our author for it, it lying
unavoidably in the way of one difcourfing
upon our author's principles ? For having
placed an abfolute power in fathers by right of
begetting, he could not eafily refolve how
much of this power belonged to a fon over the
children he had begotten ; and fo it fell out ■
to be a very hard matter to give all the power,

G 2 as

84 Of Government.

as he does, to Adatn, and yet allow a part
in his life-time to his children, when they
were parents, and which he knew not well
how to deny them. This makes him fo
doubtful in his expreffions, and fb uncertain
where to place this abfolute natural power,
which he calls fatherhood* Sometimes Ada??;
alone has it all, as p. 13. Obfervations, 244,
245. & Pref.

Sometimes parents have it, which word
fcarce fignifies the father alone, p. i2, 19.
• Sometimes children during their fathers
life-time, as p. 12.

Sometimes fathers of fa?7?ilicsi as p. 78,
and 79.

Sometimes fathers indefinitely, Obferva-
tions, 155.

Sometimes the heir to Adam, Obfervations,

Sometimes the pofierity of Adam, 244, 246.

Sometimes pri?ne fathers, all fins or grand-
children of Noah, Obfervations, 244.

Sometimes the e/de/i parents, p. 12.

Sometimes all kings, p. 19.

Sometimes ail that have fupreme power,
Obfervations, 245.

Sometimes heirs to thofe firjl progenitors,
who were at frjl the natural pare??ts of the
whole people, p. 19.

Sometimes an elective king, p. 23.

Sometimes thofe, whether a few or a mul-
titude, that govern the com?no?i- wealth, p. 23.

Sometimes

Of Government. 8$

Sometimes he that can catch it, an ufurp-
er, p. 23. Obfervations, 155.

§.72. Thus-this new nothing, that is to carry
with it all power, authority, and government;
this fatherhood, which is to defign the perfon,
and eftablifh the throne of monarchs, whom
the people are to obey, may, according to Sir
Robert, come into any hands, any how, and
fo by his politics give to democracy royal
authority, and make an ufurper a lawful
prince. And if it will do all thefe fine feats,
much good do our author and all his follow-
ers with their omnipotent fatherhood, which
can ferve for nothing but to unfettle and de-
ftroy all the lawful governments in the world,
and to eftabliih in their room diforder, tyran-r
ny, and ufurpation.

CHAP. VII.

Of Fatherhood and Property conjidered together
as Fountains of Sovereignty.

%. y^. TN the foregoing chapters we have
X feen what Jdam's monarchy was,
in our author's opinion, and upon what
titles he founded it. The foundations which
he lays the chief ftrefs on, as thofefrom which
he thinks he may beft derive monarchical
power to future princes, are two, viz. Father-
G 3 hood

86 Of Government.

hood and property : and therefore the way he
propofes to remove the abfurdities and incon-
veniencies of the doclrine of natural freedom, is,
to maintain the natural and private dominion of
Adam, Obfervations, 222. Conformable here-
unto, he tells us, the grounds and principles of
government necefjarily depend upon the original of
property, Obfervations, 108. 'The fubjeflion of
children to their parents is the fountain of all regal.
authority ', p. 12. And all power on earth is ei-
ther derived or ufurpedjrom the fatherly power,
there being no other original to be found of
any power whaffocver, Obfervations, 158. I
will not fland here to examine how it can be
faid without a contradiction, that the firf
grounds and principles of gbverftmeni necefjarily
dcpendiipon the original of property ', and yet, that
there is no other original of any power whatfocver,
but that of the father : it being hard to under-
stand how there can be no other original but
fatherhood, and yet that the grounds and prin-
ciples of government depend upon the original
of property ; property and fatherhood being as
far different as lord of a manor and father
of children. Nor do I fee how they will ei-
ther of them agree with what our author iays,
Obfervations, 244.. of God's fentence againfl
Eve, Gen. iii. 16. That it is the original grant
cf government : fo that if that were the original,
government had not its original, by our author's
iv.vn confeiTion, either from property or fa-
therhood '3

Of Government. Sy

therhood ; and this text, which he brings as a
proof of Adam's power over Eve, neceflarily
contradicts what he fays of the fatherhood,
that it is the file fountain of all power : for if
Adam had any fuch regal power over Eve, as
our author contends for, it muft be by fome
other title than that of begetting.

§. 74. But I leave him to reconcile thefe
contradictions, as well as many others, which
may plentifully be found in him by any one,
who will but read him with a little attention 5
and mall come now to confider, how thefe
two originals of government, Adam's natural
and private dominion, will con lift, and ferve to
make out and eftablim the titles of fucceeding
monarchs, who, as oar author obliges them,
muft all derive their power from thefe foun-
tains. Let us then fuppofe Adam made, by
Gods donation, lord and fole proprietor of the
whole earth, in as large and ample a manner,
as Sir Robert could wifli ; let us fuppofe him
alfo, by right of fatherhood, abfolute ruler over
his children with an unlimited fupremacy; I
afk then, upon Adam's death what becomes of
both his natural and private dominion ? and I
doubt not it will be anfwered, that they de-
fcended to his next heir, as our author tells us
in fevr.ral places. But this way, it is plain,
cannot poffibly convey both his natural and
private dominion to the fame perfon : for
mould we allow, that all the property, all
the eftate of the father, ought to defcend to
G 4 the

88 Of Government.

the eldcft fori, (which will need fome proof
to eftabliih it) and To he has by that title
all the private dominion of the father, yet the
father's natural dominion, the paternal power
cannot defcend to him by inheritance : for
it being a right that accrues to a man only by
begetting, no man can have this natural do-r
minion over any one he does not beget ; un-
3efs it can be fuppofed, that a man can have
a right to any thing, without doing that upon
which that right is folely founded : for if a
father by begetting, and no other title, has na-
tural dominion over his children, he that does
not beget them cannot have this natural
dominion over them ; and therefore be it true
or falfe, that our author fays, Obfervations, 1 56.
That every man that is born, by his very birth
becomes afubjefl to him that begets him, this ne-
cefTariiy follows, viz. That a man by his birth
cannot become a fubjed: to his brother, who
did not beget him ; unlefs it can be fuppofed
that a man by the very fame title can come
to be under the natural and abfolute dominion
of two different men at once ; or it be fenfe
to fay, that a man by birth is under the na-
tural dominion of his father, only becaufe he
begat him, and a man by birth alio is under
the natural dominion of his eldeft brother,
though he did not beget him.

§. j 5. If then the private dominion of Adam,
i. e. his property in the creatures, defcend-
ed at his death all entirely to his eldeft fon,

his

Of Government. 89

his heir ; (for, if it did not, there is prefently
an end of all Sir Robert's monarchy) and his
natural dominion, the dominion a father has
over his children by begetting them, belonged
immediately, upon Adam's deceafe, equally
to all his fons who had children, by the
fame title their father had it, the fove-
reignty founded upon property, and the fo-
vereignty founded upon fatherhood, come
to be divided ; fince Cain, as heir, had
that of property alone ; Setb, and the other
fons, that o£ fatherhood equally with him. This
is the beft can be made of our author's
doctrine, and of the two titles of fovereignty
he fets up in Adam : one of them will either
{ignify nothing ; or, if they both mull ftand,
they can ferve only to confound the rights
of princes, and diforder government in his
pofterity : for by building upon two titles to
dominion, which cannot defcend together,
and which he allows may be feparated, (for
he yields that Adams children had their dijiincl
territories by right of private dominion, Ob-
fervations, 2 10. p. 40.) he makes it perpetually
a doubt upon his principles where the Sove-
reignty is, or to whom we owe our obe-
dience, {met fatherhood and property are di-
stinct titles, and began prefently upon Adam's
death to be in diftinct perfons. And which
then was to give way to the other ?

§.76. Let us take the account of it, as he
himfelf gives it us. He tells us out otGrotius,

That

90 Of Government.

That Adams children by donation) ajjignation,
erjbme kind of cefjicn before he was dead, had
their dijiincT: territories by right of private domi-
nion-, Abel had his flocks and paf hires for them ;
Oain had his fields for com, and the land of Nod,
-where he built him a city, Obfervations, 210.
Here it is obvious to demand, which ofthefe
two after Adams death was fovereign ? Cain,
fays our author, p. 19. By what title ? As
heir ; for heirs to progefiitors, who were natural
parents of their people, are not only lords of their
own children, but alfo of their brethren, fays
our author, p. 19. What was Cain heir to ?
Not the entire porTeffion?, not all that which
Adam had private dominion in ; for our author
allows that Abel, by a title derived from his
father, had bis dijlinfl territory for pafture
by right of private dominion. What then Abel
had by private dominion, was exempt from
Cains dominion : for he could not have
private dominion over that which was under
the private dominion of another ; and there-
fore his fovereignty over his brother is gone
wTith this private dominion, and fo there are
prefently two fovereigns, and his imaginary
title of fatherhood is out of doors, and Cain is
no prince over his brother : or elfe, if Cain
retain his fovereignty over Abel, notwithftand-
in<r his private dominion, it will follow, that
the firfl grounds and principles of gov eminent
have nothing to do with property, whatever
1 our

Of Government. 91

our author fays to the contrary. It is true,
Abel did not outlive his father Adam ; but that
makes nothing to the argument, which
will hold good againft Sir Robert in Abel's
iffue, or in Seth, or any of the poflerity of
Adam, not defcended from Cain.

§. 77. The fame inconvenience he runs in-
to about the three fons of Noah, who, as he
fays, p. 13. bad the whole world divided among ft
them by their father. I aik then, in which
of the three mail we find the eflablijhment of
regal power after Noah's death ? If in all three,
as our author there feems to fay ; then it will
follow, that regal power is founded in property
of land, and follows private dominion, and not
in paternal power, or natural dominion ; and Co
there is an end of paternal power as the foun-
tain of regal authority, and the fo-much-mag-
hihed fatherhood quite vani(hes. If the regal
power defcended to Sbem as eldeft, and heir
to his father, then Noah's divifwn of the world,
by lot to his fom, or his ten years jailing about
the Mediterranean to appoint each fon his part,
which our author tells of, p. 15. was labour
loft ; his divifion of the world to them, was
to ill, or to no purpofe : for his grant to
Cham and Japbet was little worth, if Sbem,
notwithflanding this grant, as foon as Noah
was dead, was to be lord over them. Or, if
this grant of private dominion to them, over
their affigned territories, were good, here were
fet up two diftind forts of power, not fubordi-

nate

92 Of G o v e r n m e n t.

nate one to the other, with all thofe inconve-
niences which he mutters up again It the power
of the people, Obfervations, 158. which I mall
let down in his own words, only changing
property for people. All power on earth is either
derived or ufurpedfrom the fatherly power, there
being no other original to be found of any power
whatfoever : for if there JJjould be granted two
forts of power, without any fubordination of one
to the other, they would be in perpetual firifc
which fiould be fupreme, for two fupremes can-
not agree : if the fatherly power be fupreme, then
the power grounded on private dominion mufi
be fubordinate, and depeiid on it ; and if the
power grounded on property be fupreme, then
the fatherly power muftfubinit to it, and camiot
be exercifed without the licence of the proprietors,
which muf quite dcflroy the frame and courfe of
nature. This is his own arguing againfr. two
diftinct independent powers, which I have
fet down in his own words., only putting
power rifing from property, for power of the
people ; and when he has anfwered what he
himfelf has urged here againfl two difrinct
powers, we (hall be better able to fee how,
with any tolerable fenfe, he can derive all re-
gal authority^/re/tf the natural and private do-
minion of Adam, from fatherhood and property
top-ether, which are diftinct titles, that do not
always meet in the fame perfon ; and it is
plain, by his own confefiion, prefently fer

parated

Of Government. 93

parated as Toon both as Adams and Noah's
death made way for fucceffion : though our
author frequently in his writings jumbles
them together, and omits not to make ufe of
either, where he thinks ijt will found bell: to
his purpofe. But the abfurdities of this will
more fully appear in the next chapter, where
we fhall examine the ways of conveyance of
the fovereignty of Adam, to princes that were
to reign after him.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Conveyance of Adam'j fovereign Mo-
narchical Power.

§. 78. O I R Robert, having not been very
O happy in any proof he brings for
the fovereignty of Adam, is not much more
fortunate in conveying it to future princes,
who, if his politics be true, muft all derive
their titles from that firft monarch. The
ways he has affigned, as they lie fcattered up
and down in his writings, 1 will fet down in
his own words : in his preface he tells us>
That Adam being monarch of the whole worlds
none of his pojlerity had any right to poffefs any
thing, but by his grant or pennijjion, or by
fucceffion from him. Here he makes two ways
of conveyance of any thing Adam ftood pof-
feffed of; and thofe are grants or fucceffion.
Again he fays, All kings either are, or are to

be

94 Of Govern men t.

be reputed, the next heirs to thofejirji progenitors,
who were at Jirji the natural parents of the
whole people, p. 19. There cannot be any mul-
titude of men whatsoever, but that in it, con-
fdered by it/elf, there is one man amongjl
them, that in nature hath a right to be the
king of all the rejl, as being the next heir to
Adam, Obfervations, 253. Here in thefe
places inheritance is the only way he allows
of conveying monarchical power to princes.
In other places he tells us, Obfervations,
255. All power on earth is either derived or
nfurped from the fatherly power, Obfervations,
158. AH kings that now are, or ever were, are
or were either fathers of their people, or heirs of
fuch fathers, or nfurpers of the right of fuch
fathers, Obfervations, 253. And here he
makes inheritance or ufurpation the only ways
whereby kings come by this original power :
but yet he tells us, This fatherly empire, as
it was of itfelf hereditary, fo it was alienable
by patent, and feizable by an ufurper, Obfer-
vations, 190. So then here inheritance, grant,
or ufurpation, will convey it. And lad of
all, which is moft admirable, he tells us,
p. ioo. It fills not which way kings come
by their power, whether by eleclion, donation,
fuccejjicn, or ly any other ?neans ; for it is fill
the manner of the governmerit byfupreme power,
that makes them properly kings, and not the
means of obtaining their crowns. Which I
think is a full aniwer to all his whole hypo-
thecs

Of Government. 95

thefis and difcourfe about Adams royal au-
thority, as the fountain from which all
princes were to derive theirs : and he might
have fpared the trouble of fpeaking fo much
as he does, up and down, of heirs and inheri-
tance, if to make any one properly a king,
needs no more but governing by fnpreme power,
and it matters not by what means he came
by it.

§.79. By this notable way, our author
may make Oliver as properly king, as any one
elfe he could think of: and had he had the
happinefs to live under Majfanellos govern-
ment, he could not by this his own rule have
forborn to have done homage to him, with
O king live for ever, fince the manner of his
government by fupreme power, made him
properly king, who was but the day before
properly a fifherman. And if Don Quixote
had taught his fquire to govern with fupreme
authority, our author no doubt could have
made a moft loyal fubject in Sancho Panchds
ijland ; and he muft needs have defer ved fome
preferment in fuch governments, fince I think*
he is the firfl: politician, who, pretending to
fettle government upon its true baiis, and to
eftablim the thrones of lawful princes, ever
told the world, That he was properly a king,
whofe t?ia?i?ier of government was by fupreme
power, by what means foever he obtained it ;
which in plain Englijh is to fay, that regal
and fupreme power is properly and truly his,

who '

96 Of Government.

who can by any means feize upon it ; and
if this be to be properly a king, I wonder
how he came to think of, or where he will
find, an u fur per.

§. 80. This is fo ftrange a doctrine, that
the furprife of it hath made me pafs by,
without their due reflection, the contra-
dictions he runs into, by making fometimes
inheritance alone, fometimes only grant or
inheritance, fometimes only inheritance or
•ufurpation, fometimes all thefe three, and at
laft election, or any other means, added to them,
the ways whereby Adam's royal authority, that
is, his right to fupreme rule, could be con-
veyed down to future kings and governors,
fo as to give them a title to the obedience
and fubjection of the people. But thefe con-
tradictions lie fo open, that the very reading
of our author's own words will difcover
them to any ordinary understanding ; and
though what I have quoted out of him (with
abundance more of the fame Strain and
coherence, which might be found in him)
might well excufe me from any farther
trouble in this argument, yet having pro-
pofed to mvfelf, to examine the main parts
of his doctrine, I (hall a little more parti-
cularly conilder how inheritance, grant, ufur-
pation or election, can any way make out
government in the world upon his principles;
or derive to any one a right of empire, from
this regal authority of Ada?::, had it been

never

Of Government. ay

never fo well proved, that he had been ab-
folute monarch, and lord of the whole
world.

C II A P. IX.

Of 'Monarchy \ by Inheritance from Adam*

§. 8 1. HP Hough it be never fo plain, that
there ought to be government
in the world, nay, mould all men be of our
author's mind, that divine appointment had
ordained it to be monarchical ; yet, fince men
cannot obey any thing, that cannot com-
mand ; and ideas of government in the
fancy, though never fo perfect, though never
fo right, cannot give laws, nor prefcribe
rules to the actions of men ; it would be of
no behoof for the fettling of order, and
eftablimment of government in its exercife
and ufe amongft men, unlefs there were a
way alfo taught how to know the perfcn, to
whom it belonged to have this power, and
exercife this dominion over others. It is in
vain then to talk of fubjeclion and obedience
without telling us whom we are to obey:
for were I never fo fully perfuaded that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the
world ; yet I am never the lefs at liberty
Hill, till it appears who is the perfon that
hath right to my obedience ; fince, if there
be no marks to know him by, and diftin-
guifTi him that hath right to rule from

H other

98 Of Government.'

other men, it may be myfelf, as well as
any other. And therefore, though fubmiffion
to government be every one's duty, yet fince
Chat fignifies nothing but fubmitting to the
direction and laws of fuch men as have
authority to command, it is not enough to
make a man a fubject, to convince him that
there is regal power in the world ; but there
mud. be ways of defigning, and knowing the
perfon to whom this regal power of right
belongs : and a man can never be obliged
in confcience to fubmit to any power, unlefs
he can be fatisfied who is the perfon who
has a right to exercife that power over him.
If this were not fo, there would be no di-
stinction between pirates and lawful princes;
he that has force is without any more ado to
be obeyed, and crowns and fcepters would
become the inheritance only of violence and
rapine. Men too might as often and as in-
nocently change their governors, as they do
their phyiicians, if the perfon cannot be
known who has a right to direct me, and
whofe prefcriptions I am bound to follow.
To fettle therefore men's confciences, under
an obligation to obedience, it is neceffary
that they know not only, that there is a
power fomewhere in the world, but the
perfon who by right is veiled with this power
over them.

§. 82. How fuccefsful our author has
been in his attempts, to fet up a monarchical
cbfohte power in Adam, the reader may judge

by

Of Government. 99

by what has been already faid; but were that
abfolute monarchy as clear as our author would
deiire it, as I prefume it is the contrary, yet
it could be of no ufe to the government of
mankind now in the world, unlefs he alfo
make out thefe two things.

Fir ft, That this power of Adam was not to
end with him, but was upon his deceafe con-
veyed intire to fome other perfon, and fo on
to pofterity.

Secondlyy That the princes and rulers now
on earth are poffefled of this power of Adam,
by a right way of conveyance derived to
them.

§. 83. If the firf! of thefe fail, the power
of Adam, were it never fo great, never fo
certain, will lignify nothing to the prefent
government and focieties in the world ; but
we muft feek out fome other original of
power for the government of politys than
this of Adam, or elfe there will be none at
all in the world. If the latter fail, it will
deftroy the authority of the prefent gover-
nors, and abfolve the people from fubjeclion
to them, fince they, having no better a claim
than others to that power, which is alone the
fountain of all authority, can have no title
to rule over them.

§. 84. Our author, having fancied an ab-
folute fovereignty in Adam, mentions feveral
ways of its conveyance to princes, that were
to be his fuccefTors ; but that which he chiefly

H 2 infifts

ioo Of Government.

infifts on, is that of inheritance, which occurs
fo often in his feveral difcourfes; and I having
in the foregoing chapter quoted feveral of
thefe paffages, I mall not need here again
to repeat them. This fovereignty he erects,
as has been faid, upon a double foundation,
'viz. that of property ', and that of fatherhood.
One was the right he was fuppofed to have
in all creatures, a right to poffefs the earth
with the beafts, and other inferior ranks of
things in it, for his private ufe, exclufive of
all other men. The other was the right he
was fuppofed to have, to rule and govern
men, all the reft of mankind.

§.85. In both thefe rights, there being
fuppofed an exclufion of all other men, it
mull be upon fome reafon peculiar to Adam,
that they muft both be founded.

That of his property our author fuppofes
to arife from God's immediate donation, Gen.
i. 28. and that of fatherhood from the act of
begetting : now in all inheritance, if the heir
fucceed not to the reafon upon which his
father's right was founded, he cannot fucceed
to the right which followeth from it. For
example, Adam had a right of property in
the creatures upon the donation and grant of
God almighty, who was lord and proprietor
of them all; let this be fo as our author tells
us, yet upon his death his heir can have no
title to them, no fuch right of property in
them, unlefs the fame reafon, viz. God's

donation,

Of Government. ioi

donation, vetted a right in the heir too : for
if Adam could have had no property in, nor
ufe of the creatures, without this pofitive
donation from God, and this donation were
only perfonally to Ada?n, his heir could have
no right by it ; but upon his death it muft
revert to God, the lord and owner again ; for
pofitive grants give no title farther than the
exprefs words convey it, and by which only
it is held. And thus, if as our author him-
felf contends, that donation. Gen. i. 28. were
made only to Adam perfonally, his heir could
not fucceed to his property in the creatures ;
and if it were a donation to any but Adam,
let it be fhewn, that it was to his heir in
our author's fenfe, /. e. to one of his children,
exclufive of all the reft.

§. 86. But not to follow our author too
far out of the way, the plain of the cafe is
this. God having made man, and planted
in him, as in all other animals, a ltxong delire
of felf-prefervation ; and furnHhed the world
with things fit for food and raiment, and
other neceffaries of life, fubfervient to his
defign, that man mould live and abide for
fome time upon the face of the earth, and not
that fo curious and* wonderful a piece of
workmanfhip, by his own negligence, or
want of neceffaries, mould periih again, pre-
fently after a few moments continuance ;
God, 1 fay, having made man and the world
thus, fpoke to him, (that is) directed him

H 3 b7

102 Of Government.

by his fenfes and reafon, as he did the in-
ferior animals by their fenfe and inftinct,
which were ferviceable for his fubfiftence,
and given him as the means of his prefer-
nation. And therefore I doubt not, but be-
fore thefe words were pronounced, i. Gen.
28, 29. (if they mud be understood literally
to have been fpoken) and without any fuch
verbal donation, man had a right to an ufe of
the creatures, by the will and grant of God :
for the delire, ftrong defire of preferving his
life and being, having been planted in him
as a principle of adtion by God himfelf, rea-
fon, which was the voice of God in him, could
not but teach him and aflure him, that pur-
suing that natural inclination he had to
preferve his being, he followed the will of
his maker, and therefore had a right to make
ufe of thofe creatures, which by his reafon
or fenfes he could difcover would be fer-
viceable thereunto. And thus man's property
in the creatures was founded upon the right
he had to make ufe of thofe things that
were neceffary or ufeful to his being.

§. 87. This being the reafon and founda-
tion of Adam's property, gave the* fame title,
on the fame ground, to all his children, not
only after his death, but in his life-time : fo
that here was no privilege of his heir above
his other children, which could exclude them
from an equal right to the ufe of the inferior
creatures, for the comfortable prefervation

of

Of Government. 103

of their beings, which is all the property man
hath in them -, and fo Adam's, fovereignty
built on property, or, as our author calls it,
private dominion, comes to nothing. Every
man had a right to the creatures, by the
fame title Adam had, viz. by the right every
one had to take care of, and provide for their
fubfiftence : and thus men had a right in
common, Adam's children in common with
him. But if any one had began, and made
himfelf a property in any particular thing,
(which how he, or any one elfe, could do,
{hall be fhewn in another place) that thing,
that pofleffion, if he difpofed not otherwife
of it by his pofitive grant, defcended natu-
rally to his children, and they had a right to
fucceed to it, and poffefs it.

§. 88. It might reafonably be afked here,
how come children by this right of porTeffing,
before any other, the properties of their pa-
rents upon their deceafe ? for it being per-
fonally the parents, when they die, without
actually transferring their right to another,
why does it not return again to the common
flock of mankind ? It will perhaps be an-
fwered, 'that common confent hath difpofed
of it to their children. Common practice,
we fee indeed, does fo difpoie of it ; but we
cannot fay, that it is the common confent
of mankind ; for that hath never been afked,
nor actually given -, and if common tacit
confent hath eflablifhed it, it would make ■

H 4 but

j 04 Of Government.

but a pofitive, and not a natural right of
children to inherit the goods of their pa-
rents : but where the pra&ice is univerfal,
it is reafonable to think the caufe is natural.
The ground then I think to be this. The
firft and ilrongeft deiire God planted in men,
and wrought into the very principles of their
nature, being that of felf-prefervation, that
is the foundation of a right to the creatures
for the particular fupport and uie of each
individual perfon himlelf. But, next to this,
God planted in men a flrcng defire alfo of
propagating their kind, and continuing them-
felves in their polierity ; and this gives chil-
dren a title to fhare in the property of their
parents, and a right to inherit their pof-
feilions. Men are not proprietors of what
they have, meerly for themielves ; their chil-
dren have a title to part of it, and have their
kind of right joined with their parents, in
the pofTefTion which comes to be wholly
their's, when death, having put an end to
their parents ufe of it, hath taken them from
their pofTeffions , and this we call inheri-
tance : men being by a like obligation bound
to preferve what they have begotten, as to
preferve themfelves, their hTue come to have
a right in the goods they are pofTefTed of.
That children have fuch a right, is plain
from the laws of God ; and that men are
convinced that children have fuch a right,
is evident from the law of the land ; both

which

Of Government. 105

which laws require parents to provide for
their children.

§. 89. For children being by the courfe of
nature, born weak, and unable to provide for
themfelves, they have by the appointment of
God himfelf, who hath thus ordered the
courfe c.<n^hjre, a right to be nouriihed
and main tain^Jw their parents; nay, a right
not only to a bare fubfiftence, but to the
conveniencies and comforts of life, as far as
the conditions of their parents can afford it.
Hence it domes, that when their parents leave
the world, and fo the care due to their chil-
dren ceafes, the effects of it are to extend
as far as poffibly they can, and the pro-
vifions they have made in their life-time,
are underftood to be intended, as nature
requires they mould, for their children, whom,
after themfelves, they are bound to provide
for : though the dying parents, by exprefs
words, declare nothing about them, nature
appoints the defcent of their property to their
children, who thus come to have a title, and
natural right of inheritance to their fathers
goods, which the reft of mankind cannot
pretend to.

§. 90. Were it not for this right of being
nouriihed and maintained by their parents,
which God and nature has given to children,
and obliged parents to as a duty, it would
be reafonable, that the father mould inherit
the eltate of his fon, and be preferred in the

inheritance-

106 Of Government.

inheritance before his grand-child : for to the
grand-father there is due a long fcore of care
and expences laid out upon the breeding and
education of his fon, which one would think
in juftice ought to be paid. But that having
been done in obedience to the fame law,
whereby he received nourishment and edu-
cation from his own parents ; this fcore of
education, received from a man's, father, is
paid by taking care, and providing for his
own children ; is paid, I fay, as much as is
required of payment by alteration of pro-
perty, unlefs prefent necefiity of the parents
require a return of goods for their necefTary
fupport and fubfiftence : for we are not now
fpeaking of that reverence, acknowledgment,
refpedx and honour, that is always due from
children to their parents ; but of poiTeffions
and commodities of life valuable by money.
But though it be incumbent on parents to
bring up and provide for their children, yet
this debt to their children does not quite
cancel the fcore due to their parents ; but
only is made by nature preferable to it : for
the debt a man owes his father takes place,
and gives the father a right to inherit the
fon's goods, where, for want of ifTue, the
right of children doth not exclude that title.
And therefore a man having a right to be
maintained by his children, where he needs
it; and to enjoy alfo the comforts of life
from them, when the necefTary provifion due

to

Of Government. 107

to them and their children will afford it ; if
his fon die without iflue, the father has a
right in nature to poflefs his goods, and in-
herit his eftate, (whatever the municipal laws
of fome countries may abfurdly direct other-
wife;) and fo again his children and their iiTue
from him ; or, for want of fuch, his father and
his ilTue. But where no fuch are to be found,
i. e. no kindred, there we fee the poiTefiions
of a private man revert to the community,
and fo in politic focieties come into the
hands of the public magistrate ; but in the
ftate of nature become again perfectly com-
mon, no body having a right to inherit them :
nor can any one have a property in them,
otherwife than in other things common by
nature ; of which I mail fpeak in its due
place.

§.91. I have been the larger, in mewing
upon what ground children have a right to
fucceed to the poffeffion of their fathers
properties, not only becaufe by it, it will
appear, that if Adam had a property (a titular,
inrigniflcant, ufelefs property ; for it could be
no better, for he was bound to nourim and
maintain his children and pofterity out of
it) in the whole earth and its product, yet
all his children coming to have, by the law
of nature, and right of inheritance, a joint
title* and right of property in it after his
death, \t could convey no right of fovereignty
to any one of his pofterity over the reft : ,

fincc

108 Of Government.

fince every one having a right of inheritance
to his portion, they might enjoy their inhe-
ritance, or any part of it in common, or
mare it, or fome parts of it, by divifion, as it
heft liked them. But no one could pretend
to the whole inheritance, or any fovereignty
fuppofed to accompany it ; fince a right of
inheritance gave every one of the reft, as
well as any one, a title to fhare in the goods
of his father. Not only upon this account,
I fay, have I been fo particular in examining
the reafon of children's inheriting the pro-
perty of their fathers, but alio becaule it
will give us farther light in the inheritance
of rule and power, which in countries where
their particular municipal laws give the
whole poireflion of land entirely to the firii-
born, and defcent of power has gone fo to
men by this cuftom, fome have been apt to
be deceived into an opinion, that there was a
natural or divine right of primogeniture, to
both ejlate and power ; and that the inheri-
tance of both rule over men, and property in
things, fprang from the fame original, and
were to defcend by the fame rules.

§.92. Property, whofe original is from the
right a man has to ufe any of the inferior
creatures, for the fubfiftence and comfort of
his life, is for the benefit and fole advantage
of the proprietor, fo that he may even deftroy
the thing, that he has property in by his ufe
of it, where need requires : but government
5 being

Of Government. 109

being for the prefervation of every man's
right and property, by preferving him from
the violence or injury of others, is for the
good of the governed : for the magistrate's
iword being for a terror to -evil doers, and by
that terror to inforce men to obferve the
pofitive laws of the fociety, made confor-
mable to the laws of nature, for the public
good, i. e. the good of every particular
member of that fociety, as far as by common
rules it can be provided for -, the fword is
not given the magistrate for his own good
alone.

§. 93. Children therefore, as has been
fhewed, by the dependance they have on
their parents for fubfiftence, have a right of
inheritance to their fathers property, as that
which belongs to them for their proper good
and behoof, and therefore are fitly termed
goods, wherein the firu>born has not a fols
or peculiar right by any law of God and,
nature, the younger children having an equal
title with him, founded on that right they all
have to maintenance, fupport, and comfort
from their parents, and on nothing elfe.
But government being for the benefit of the
governed, and not the fole advantage of the
governors, (but only for their's with the reft,
as they make a part of that politic body,
each of whofe parts and members are taken
care of, and directed in its peculiar functions
for the good of the whole, by the laws of

fociety)

no Of Government.

fociety) cannot be inherited by the fame
title, that children have to the goods of their
father. The right a fon has to be maintained
and provided with the necefiaries and con-
veniences of life out of his father's flock, gives*
him a right to fucceed to his father's pro-
perty for his own good ; but this can give
him no right to fucceed alfo to the rule,
which his father had over other men. All
that a child has right to claim from his fa-
ther is nourifhment and education, and the
things nature furnifhesfor the fupport of life:
but he has no right to demand rule or domi-
nion from him: he can fubfift and receive
from him the portion of good things, and
advantages of education naturally due to him,
without e??ipire and dominion. That (if his
father hath any) was veiled in him, for the
good and behoof of others : and therefore
the fon cannot claim or inherit it by a title,
which is founded wholly on his own private
good and advantage.

§. 94. We muft know how the firft ruler,
from whom any one claims, came by his
authority, upon what ground any one has
empire, what his title is to it, before we
can know who has a right to fucceed him in
it, and inherit it from him : if the agree-
ment and confent of men firft gave a fcepter
into any one's hand, or put a crown on his
head, that alfo muft direct its defcent and
conveyance; for the fame authority, that

made

Of Government. hi

made the firft a lawful ruler, mud make the
fecond too, and fo give right of fucceffion :
in this cafe inheritance, or primogeniture, can
in its felf have no right, no pretence to it,
any farther than that confent, which efta-
blifhed the form of the government, hath fo
fettled the fucceffion. And thus we fee, the
fucceffion of crowns, in feveral countries, places
it on different heads, and he comes by right
of fucceffion to be a prince in one place,
who would be a fubject in another.

§. 95. If God, by his politive grant and re-
vealed declaration, firft. gave rule and dominion
to any man, he that will claim by that title,
muft have the fame pofitive grant of God
for his fucceffion : for if that has not direct-
ed the courfe of its defcent and conveyance
down to others, no body can fucceed to this
title of the firft ruler. Children have no right
of inheritance to this; and primogeniture can
lay no claim to it, unlefs God, the author of
this conftitution, hath fo ordained it. Thus
we fee, the pretentions of Saul's family, who
received his crown from the immediate ap-
pointment of God, ended with his reign ;
and David, by the fame title that Saul reign-
ed, viz. God's appointment, fucceeded in
his throne, to theexclufion of Jonathan, and
all pretentions of paternal inheritance : and
if Solomon had a right to fucceed his father, it
muft be by fome other title, than that of pri-
mogeniture. A cadet, or lifter's fon, muft

have

H2 Of Government.

have the preference in fucceffion, if he has
the fame title the firft lawful prince had :
and in dominion that has its foundation only
in the pofitive appointment of God himfelf,
Benjamin, the youngeft, muft have the inheri-
tance of the crown, if God fo direct, as well
as one of that tribe had the firft poffeffion.

§.96. If paternal right, the ad: of begetting,
eive a man rule and dominion, inheritance or
primogeniture can give no title : for he that
cannot fucceed to his father's title, which was
begetting, cannot fucceed to that power over
his brethren, which his father had by pater-
nal right over them. But of this I {hall
have occafion to fay more in another place.
This is plain in the mean time, that any go-
vernment, whether fuppofed to be at firft
founded in paternal right, confent of the people,
or the pofitive appoint7nent of God himfelf, which
can fuperfede either of the other, and fo begin
a new government upon a new foundation; I
fay, any government began upon either of
thefe, can by right of fucceffion come to thofe
only, who have the title of him they fuc-
ceed to : power founded on contracl can de-
fcend only to him, who has right by that
contract : power founded on begetting, he
only can have that begets ; and power found-
ed on the pofitive grant or donation of God,
he only can have by right of fucceffion, to
whom that grant directs it.

§•97-

Of Government* 113

• §. 97. From what I have faid, I think this is
cleaa* that a right to the uie of the creatures,
being founded originally in the right a man
has to fubiift and enjoy the conveniencies of
life ; and the natural right- children have to
inherit the goods of their parents, being found-
ed in the right they have to the fame fubfift-
ence and commodities of life, out of the flock
of their parents, who are therefore taught by-
natural love and tendernefs to provide for
them, as a part of themfelves ; and all this
being only for the good of the proprietor, or
heir ; it can be no reafon for children's inhe-
riting of rule and dominion* which has ano-
ther original and a different end. Nor can
primogeniture have any pretence to a right
of folely inheriting either property or power,
as we mall, in its due place, fee more fully.
It is enough to have mewed here, that Adams
property, or private dominion, could not convey
any fovereignty or rule to his heir, who not
having a right to inherit all his father's pof-
feffions, could not thereby come to have any
fovereignty over his brethren : and therefore,
if any fovereignty en account of his property
had been veiled in Adam, which in truth there
was not, yet it would have died with him.

§.98. As Adam's fovereignty, if, by vir-
tue of being proprietor of the world, he had
any authority over men, could not have been
inherited by any of his children over the reft,
becaufe they had the fame title to divide the
inheritance, and every one had a right to a

I portion

ii4 Of Government.

portion of his father's pofleffions ; fo nei-
ther could Adam's fovereignty by right of fa-
therhood, if any fuch he had, defcend to any
one of his children : for it being, in our au-
thor's account, a right acquired by begetting
to rule over thofe he had begotten, it was
not a power pofiible to be inherited, becaufe
the right being confequent to, and built on,
an act perfectly perfonal, made that power fo
too, and impoffible to be inherited : for
paternal power, being a natural right rifing
only from the relation of father and fon, is
as impcflible to be inherited as the relation
itfelf -, and a man may pretend as well to in-
herit the conjugal power the hufband, whofe
heir he is, had over his wife, as he can to
inherit the paternal power of a father over
his children : for the power of the hufband
being founded on contract, and the power
of the father on begetting, he may as well
inherit the power obtained by the conjugal
contract, which was only perfonal, as he
may the power obtained by begetting, which
could reach no farther than the perfonofthe
begetter, unlefs begetting can be a title to
power in him that does not beget.

§. 99. Which makes it a reafonable queflion
to afk, whether Adam, dying before Eve, his
heir, (fuppofe Cain or SethJ fhould have by
right of inheriting Adam's fatherhood, fovereign
power over Eve his mother : for Adam's father-
hood being nothing but a right he had to govern
his children, becaufe he begot them, he that

inherits

Of Government. 115

inherits Adam's fatherhood, inherits nothing,
even in our author's fenfe, but the right Adam
had to govern his children, becaufe he begot
them: fo that the monarchy of the heir would
not have taken in Eve; or if it did, it being
nothing but the. fatherhood of Adam defcended
by inheritance, the heir muft have right to
govern Eve, becaufe Adam begot her -, for
fatherhood is nothing elfe.

§. 100. Perhaps it will be faid with our
author, that a man can alien his power over
his child ; and what may be transferred by
compact, may be porTefTed by inheritance.
I anfwer, a father cannot alien the power he
has over his child : he may perhaps to fome
degrees forfeit it, but cannot transfer it ; and
if any other man acquire it, it is not by the
father's grant, but by fome act of his own.
For example, a father, unnaturally carelefs
of his child, fells or gives him to another
man ; and he again expofes him ; a third
man rinding him, breeds up, cherifhes, and
provides for him as his own : I think in this
cafe, no body will doubt, but that the great-
efl part of filial duty and fubjection was here
owing, and to be paid to this fofter-father ;
and if any thing could be demanded from
the child, by either of the other, it could be
only due to his natural father, who perhaps
might have forfeited his right to much of
that duty comprehended in the command, ,
Honour your parents, but could transfer none
of it to another. He that purchafed, and
I 2 neglected

u6 Of Government.

neglected the child, got by his purchafe and
grant of the father, no title to duty or ho-
nour from the child ; but only he acquired it,
who by his own authority, performing the
office and care of a father, to the forlorn and
periming infant, made himfelf, by paternal
care, a title to proportionable degrees of pater-
nal power. This will be more eafily admit-
ted upon confideration of the nature of pater-
nal power, for which I refer my reader to-
the lecond book.

§. 101. To return to the argument in
hand j this is evident, That paternal power
arifing only from begetting-, for in that our
author places it alone, can neither be tranf-
f erred nor inherited : and he that does not
beget, can no more have paternal power,
which arifes from thence, than he can have
a right to any thing, who performs not the
condition, to which only it is annexed. If
one mould afk, by what law has a father
power over his children ? it will be an-
fwered, no doubt, by the law of nature,
which gives fuch a power over them, to
him that begets them. If one mould afk
likewife, by what law does our author's
heir come by a right to inherit ? I think it
would be anfwered, by the law of nature too :
for I find not that. our author brings one
word of fcripture to prove the right of fuch
an heir he fpeaks of. Why then the law of
nature gives fathers paternal power over their
children, becaufe they did beget them; and

the

Of Government. 117

the fame law of nature gives the fame paternal
power to the heir over his brethren, who
did not beget them : whence it follows, that
either the father has not. his paternal power
by begetting, or eKe that the heir has it not
at all -, for it is hard to underftand how the
law of nature, which is the law of reafon,
can give the paternal power to the father over
his children, for the only reafon of begetting ;
and to the firfl-born over his brethren with-
out this only reafon, i. e. for no reafon at all :
and if the elded, by the law of nature, can
inherit this paternal power, without the only
reafon that gives a title to it, lb may the
youngeft as well as he, and a ftranger as
well as either ; for where there is no reafon
for any one, as there is not, but for him that
begets, all have an equal title. I am fure
our author offers no reafon ; and when any
body does, we {hall fee whether it will hold
or no.

§.102. In the mean time it is as good fenfe
to fay, that by the law of nature a man has
right to inherit the property of another, be-
caufe he is of kin to him, and is known to
be of his blood ; and therefore, by the fame
law of nature, an utter ftranger to his blood
has right to inherit his eftate ; as to fay that,
by the law of nature, he that begets them
has paternal power over his children, and
therefore, by the law of nature, the heir that
begets them not, has this paternal power
over them -, or fuppofing the law of the land

I 3 gave

1 1 8 Of Government.

gave abfolute power over their children, to
fuch only who nurfed them, and fed their
children themfelves, could any body pretend,
that this law gave any one, who did no fuch
thing, abfolute power over thofe, who were
not his children ?

§. 103. When therefore it can be mewed,
that conjugal power can belong to him that
is not an hufband, it will alio I believe be
■proved, that our author's paternal power, ac-
quired by begetting, may be inherited by a
fon -, and that a brother, as heir to his fa-
ther's power, may have paternal power over
his brethren, and by the fame rule conjugal
power too : but till then, I think we may
reft fatisfied, that the paternal power of Adam,
this fovereign authority of fatherhood, were
there any fuch, could not defcend to, nor be
inherited by, his next heir. Fatherly power, I
eafily grant our author, if it will do him any
good, can never be loft, becaufe it will be as
long in the world as there are fathers : but
none of them will have Adam's paternal power,
or derive their's from him ; but every one will
have his own, by the fame title Adam had
his, viz. by begetting, but not by inheritance,
or fucceffion, no more than hufbands have
their conjugal power by inheritance from
Adam. And thus we fee, as Ada?n had no
fuch property, no fuch paternal power, as gave
him fovereign jurifdiclion over mankind ; Co
likewife his fovereignty built upon either of
thefe titles, if he had any fuch, could not

have

Of Government. 119

have del ended to his heir, but muft have
ended with him. Adam therefore, as has
been proved, being neither monarch, nor
his imaginary monarchy hereditable, the
power which is now in the world, is not
that wiiich was Adam's, fince all that Adam
could have upon our author's grounds, either
of property or fatherhood, neceffariiy died
with him, and could not be conveyed to
pofterity by inheritance. In the next place
we will confider, whether Adam had any
fuch heir, to inherit his power, as our au-
thor talks of.

CHAP. X.

Of the Heir to Adam'i Monarchical Potter.

§. 104. /^UR author tells us, Obfer-
V^/ vations, 253. That it is a truth
undeniable, that there cannot be any multitude
of men whatfoever, either great or Jmall, tho
gathered together from the fever al corners and
r emote jl regions of the world, but that in the
fame multitude, confidered by its felf, there is
one man amongH them, that in nature hath a
right to be king of all the reft, as being the next
heir to Adam, and all the other fubje els to him .•
every man by nature is a king or a fubje 51.
And again, p. 20. i/'Adam him felf were fill
living, and now ready to die, it is certain that
there is one man, and but one in the world, who
is next heir. Let this multitude of men be, if

I 4 our

120 Of Government.

our author pleafes, all the princes upon the
earth, there will then be, by our author's
rule, one amongjl them, that in nature hath a
right to be king of all the reft, as being the
right heir to Adam ; an excellent way to
eflablifh the thrones of princes, and fettle
the obedience of their fubjecls, by fetting
up an hundred, or perhaps a thoufand titles
(if there be fo many princes in the world)
againfl any king now reigning, each as good,
upon our author's grounds, as his who wears
the crown. If this right of heir carry any
wreight with it, if it be the ordinance of God, as
our author feems to tells us, Obfcrvations, 244.
mufl: not all be fubject to it, from the higheft
to the loweft ? Can thofe who wear the name
of princes, without having the right of being
heirs to Adam, demand obedience from their
fubjecls by this title, and not be bound to
pay it by the fame lav/ ? Either governments
in the world are not to be claimed, and held
by this title of Adam's heir ; and then the
ftarting of it is to no purpofe, the being or not
being Adams heir fignilies nothing as to the
title of dominion : or if it really be, as our
author fays, the true title to government and
fovereignty, the firfr. thing to be done, is to
find out this true heir of Adam, feat him in
his throne, and then all the kings and princes
of the world ought to come and refign up
their crowns and fcepters to him, as things
that belong no more to them, than to any
of their fubjecls.

§• 105,

Of Government. 121

§. 105. For either this right in nature, of
Adams heir, to be king over all the race of
men, (for all together they make one mul-
titude) is a right not neceflary to the making
of a lawful king, and fo there may be lawful
kings without it, and then kings titles and
power depend not on it -, or elfe all the kings
in the world but one are not lawful kings,
and fo have no ri^ht to obedience : either
this title of heir to Adam is that whereby
kings hold their crowns, and have a right
to fubjedtion from their fubjecls, and then
one only can have it, and the reft being
fubjefts can require no obedience from other
men, who are but their fellow fubjects ; or
elfe it is not the title whereby kings rule,
and have a right to obedience from their
fubjects, and then kings are kings without
it, and this dream of the natural fovereignty
of Adanis heir is of no ufe to obedience and
government : for if kings have a right to
dominion, and the obedience of their fub-
jects, who are not, nor can poffibly be, heirs
to Adam, what ufe is there of fuch a title,
when we are obliged to obey without it ? If
kings, who are not heirs to Adam, have no
right to fovereignty, we are all free, till our
author, or any body for him, will mew us
Adams right heir. If there be but one heir
of Adam, there can be but one lawful king
in the world, and no body in confcience can -
be obliged to obedience till it be refolved

who

122 Of Government.

who that is ; for it may be any one, who is
not known to be of a younger houfe, and
all others have equal titles. If there be
more than one heir of Adam, every one is
his heir, and fo every one has regal power :
for if two Ions can be heirs together, then
all the fons are equally heirs, and fo all are
heirs, being all fons, or fons fons of Adam.
Betwixt thefe two the right of heir can-
not ifand ; for by it either but one only
man, or all men are kings. Take which
you pleafe, it diffolves the bonds of govern-
ment and obedience ; fince, if all men are
heirs, they can owe obedience to no body ;
if only one, no body can be obliged to pay
obedience to him, till he be known, and his
title made out.

CHAP. XI.
Who HEIR?

§. 1 06. t a ^ HE great queftion which in
all ages has diflurbed man-
kind, and brought on them the greatefl part
of thofe mifchiefs which have ruined cities,
depopulated countries, and difordered the
peace of the world, has been, not whether
there be power in the world, nor whence it
came, but who mould have it. The fettling
of this point being of no fmaller moment
than the fecurity of princes, and the peace

and

Of Government. 123

and welfare of their eftates and kingdoms, a
reformer of politics, one would think, fhould
lay this fure, and be very clear in it : for if
this remain difputable, all the reft will be to
very little purpofe ; and the ikill ufed in
dreffing up power with all the fplendor and
temptation abfolutenefs can add to it, without
mewing who has a right to have it, will
ferve only to give a greater edge to man's
natural ambition, which of its felf is but too
keen. What can this do but fet men on
the more eagerly to fcramble, and fo lay a
fure and lafting foundation of endlefs con-
tention and diforder, inftead of that peace
and tranquillity, which is the bufinefs of go-
vernment, and the end of human fociety ?

§. 107. This deiignation of the perfon our
author is more than ordinary obliged to take
care of, becaufe he, affirming that the af-
Jignment of civil power is by divine iftjiitution,
hath made the conveyance as well as the
power itfelf facred : fo that no coniideration,
no act or art of man, can divert it from that
perfon, to whom, by this divine right, it is
affigned ; no neceflity or contrivance can
fubftitute another perfon in his room : for
if the ajjignment of civil power be by divine
injlitution, and Adams heir be he to whom
it is thus affigned, as in the foregoing chapter
our author tells us, it would be as much fa-
crilege for any one to be king, who was not
Adam's heir, as it would have been amongfl
5 the

124 Of Government.

the Jews, for any one to have been priejl, who
had not been of Aaron 's pofterity : for not
only the priefthood in general being by divine in-
flitution, but the ajfignment of it to the fole line
and pofterity of Aaron, made it impoflible to
be enjoyed or exercifed by any one, but thofe
perfons who were the ofF-fpring of Aaron :
whofe fucceffion therefore was carefully ob-
ferved, and by that the perfons who had a
right to the priefthood certainly known.

§. 1 08. Let us fee then what care our
author has taken, to make us know who is
this heir, who by divine injlitution has a right
to be king over all men. The firft account of
him we meet with is, p. 12. in thefe words :
'This fubjeclion of children, being the fountain
of all regal authority, by the ordination of God
bimfelf', it follows, that civil power, not only in
general, is by divine injlitution, but even the
alignment of it, fpecif catty to the eldejl parents.
Matters of fuch coniequence as this is, mould
be in plain words, as little liable, as might
be, to doubt or equivocation ; and I think,
if language be capable of expreffing any thing
diftinctly and clearly, that of kindred, and
the feveral degrees of nearnefs of blood, is
one. It were therefore to be wifhed, that
our author had ufed a little more intelligible
expreflions here, that we might have better
known, who it is, to whom the alignment of
civil power is made by divine infiitution ; or at
leaft would have told us what he meant by

el def

Of Government. 125

eldejl parents : for I believe, if land had been
affigned or granted to him, and the eldejl
parents of his family, he would have thought
it had needed an interpreter ; and it would
fcarce have been known to whom next it
belonged.

§. 109. In propriety of fpeech, (and cer-
tainly propriety of fpeech is neceifary in a
difcourfe of this nature) eldejl parents iignifies
either the eldeft men and women that have
had children, or thofe who have longed: had
iffue ; and then our author's affertion will
be, that thofe fathers and mothers, who have
been longeft in the world, or longed: fruitful,
have by divine injiitution a right to civil power.
If there be any abfurdity in this, our author
mud anfwer for it : and if his meaning be
different from my explication, he is to be
blamed, that he would not fpeak it plainly.
This I am fure, parents cannot fignify heirs
male, nor eldejl parents an infant child : who
yet may fometimes be the true heir, if there
can be but one. And we are hereby flili as
much at a lofs, who civil power belongs to,
notwithstanding this ajjignment by divine in-
stitution, as if there had been no fuch ajjign-
ment at all, or our author had faid nothing
of it. This of eldejl parents leaving us more
in the dark, who by divine injiitution has a
right to civil power, than thofe who never
heard any thing at all of heir, or defcent, of
which our author is fo full. And though the

chief

126 Of Government.

chief matter of his writing be to teach obe-
dience to thofe, who have a right to it, which
he tells us is conveyed by defcent, yet who
thofe are, to whom this right bj defcent
belongs, he leaves, like the philofopners ftone
in politics, out of the reach of any one ta
difcover from his writings.

§. 1 10. This obfcurity cannot be imputed
to want of language in fo great a mailer of
ftyle as Sir Robert is, when he is reiblved
with himielf what he would fay : and there-
fore, I fear, finding how hard it would be to
fettle rules of defcent by divine inftitution,
and how little it would be to his purpofe, or
conduce to the clearing and eftablifhing the
titles of princes, if fuch rules of defcent were
fettled, he chofe rather to content himfelf
with doubtful and general terms, which
might make no ill found in mens ears, who
Were willing to be pleafed with them, rather
than offer any clear rules of defcent of this
fatherhood of Adam, by which men's con-
fciences might be fatisfied to whom it de-
fcended, and know the perfons who had a
right to regal power, and with it to their
obedience.

§. in. How elfe is it pofTible, that laying
fo much ftrefs, as he does, upon defcent, and
Adam's heir, next heir, true heir, he fhould
never tell us what heir means, nor the way
to know who the next or true heir is ? This,
I do not remember, he does any where ex-

preily

Of Government. 127

prefly handle ; but, where it comes in his
way, very warily and doubtfully touches ;
though it be fo neceflary, that without it all
difcourfes of government and obedience upon
his principles would be to no purpofe, and

fatherly power, never fo well made out, will
be of no ufe to any body. Hence he tells
us, Obfervations, 244. That not only the con-

Jlitution of power in general, but the limitation
of it to one kind, (i. e.) monarchy, and thi
determination of it to the individual perfon and
line of Adam, are all three ordinances of God ;
neither Eve nor her children coidd either limit
Adam's power, or join others with him ; and w
was given unto Adam was given in his perfon to
his pojierity. Here again our author informs
us, that the divine ordinance hath limited the
defcent of Adams monarchical power. To
whom ? To Adam's line and pojierity, fays our
author. A notable limitation, a limitation to
all mankind : for if our author can find any
one amongft mankind, that is not of the
line and pojierity of Adam, he may perhaps
tell him, who this next heir of Adam is :
but for us, I defpair how this limitation of
Adam's empire to his line and poflerity will
help us to find out one heir. This limitation
indeed of our author will fave thofe the
labour, who would look for him amongft
the race of brutes, if any fuch there were ;
but will very little contribute to the difcovery
of one next heir amongft men, though it make
a mort and eafy determination of the queftion

about

128 Of Government.

about the defcent of Adams regal power, by
telling us, that the line and pojlerity of Adam
is to have it, that is, in plain Engli/h, any
one may have it, fince there is no per-
fon living that hath not the title of being
of the line and pojlerity of Adam ; and while-
it keeps there, it keeps within our author's
limitation by God's ordinance. Indeed,
p. 19. he tells us, that Juch heirs are ?iot only
cords of their own children, but of their brethren ;
whereby, and by the words following, which
we mail coniider anon, he feems to infinuate,
that the eldefl fon is heir ; but he no where,
that I know, fays it in direct words, but by
the inftances of Cain and Jacob, that there
follow, we may allow this to be fo far his
opinion concerning heirs, that where there
are divers children, the eldefl fon has the right
to be heir. That primogeniture cannot give
any title to paternal power, we have already
fhewed. That a father may have a natural
right to fome kind of power over his chil-
dren, is eafily granted 3 but that an elder
brother has fo over his brethren, remains to
be proved : God or nature has not any where,
that I know, placed fuch jurifdiction in the
firft-born ; nor can reafon find any fuch na-
tural fuperiority amongft brethren. The
law of Mofes gave a double portion of the
goods and pofTerTions to the eldefl:; but we
find not any where that naturally, or by
God's injiitution, fuperiority or dominion be-
longed to him, and the inftances there brought

by

Of Government. 129

by our author are but ilender proofs of a
right to civil power and dominion in the
firft-born, and do rather (hew the contrary.

§. 112. His words are in the forecited
place : And therefore we find God told Cain of
his brother Abel ; his defire fhall be fubjecl unto
thee, and thou Jhalt rule over him. To which
I anfwer,

1 . Thefe words of God to Cain, are by
many interpreters, with great reafon, under-
stood in a quite different fenfe than what
our author ufes them in.

2. Whatever was meant by them, it could
not be, that Cain, as elder, had a natural
dominion over Abel; for the words are con-
ditional, If thou dojl well \ and fo perfonal to
Cain : and whatever was fignified by them,
did depend on his carriage, and not follow his
birth-right ; and therefore could by no
means be an eftabliihtnent of dominion in
the firit-born in general : for before this
Abel had his diflincl territories by right of
private dominion, as our author him/elf con-
ferTes, Objervations, 210. which he could not
have had to the prejudice of the heirs title,
if by divine injlituiion, Cain as heir were to
inherit all his father's dominion.

3. If this were intended by God as the
charter of primogeniture, and the grant of
dominion to elder brothers in general as fuch,
by right of inheritance, we might expect it -
fhould have included all his brethren : for

K we

J30 Of Government.'

we may well fuppofe, Adam, from whom the
world was to be peopled, had by this time,
that thefe were grown up to be men, more
fons than thefe two : whereas Abel himfelf is
not fo much as named -, and the words in
the original can fcarce, with any good con-
ftruction, be applied to him.

4. It is too much to build a doctrine of
fo mighty confequence upon fo doubtful and
obfcure a place of fcripture, which may be
well, nay better, underftood in a quite dif-
ferent fenfe, and fo can be but an ill proof,
being as doubtful as the thing to be proved
by it ; efpecially when there is nothing elfe
in fcripture or reafon to be found, that fa-
vours or fupports it.

§. 113. It follows, p. 19. Accordingly when
Jacob bought his brother s birth-right > Ifaac
blefj'ed him thus -, Be lord over thy brethren, and
let the fons of thy mother bow before thee.
Another inftance, I take it, brought by our
author to evince dominion due to birth-right,
and an admirable one it is : for it muft be
no ordinary way of reafoning in a man, that
is pleading for the natural power of kings,
and againfr. all compact, to bring for proof
of it, an example, where his own account of
it founds all the right upon compact, and
fettles empire in the younger brother, unlefs
buying and felling be no compact ; for he
tells us, when Jacob height his brother s birth-
right. But paging by that, let us confider

the

Of Government. 131

the hiftory itfelf, with what ufe our author
makes of it, and we fhall find thefe following
miftakes about it.

1 . That our author reports this, as if Ifaac
had given 'Jacob this bleffing, immediately
upon his purchafing the birth- right ; for he
fays, when Jacob bought, lfaac blejfed him -, which
is plainly otherwife in the fcripture : for it
appears, there was a diflance of time be-
tween, and if we will take the ftory in the
order it lies, it muft be no fmall diflance $
all Ifaac s fojourning in Gerar, and tranf-
a&ions with Abimelech, Gen. xxvi. coming
between ; Rebecca being then beautiful, and
confequently young ; but Ifaac, when he
bleffed Jacob, was old and decrepit : and
Efau alfo complains of Jacob, Gen. xxvii.
36. that two times he had fupplanted him ;
He took away my birth-right, fays he, and be-
hold now he hath taken away my blejjing -, words,
that I think fignify diflance of time and dif-
ference of action.

2. Another miflake of our author's is, that
he fuppofes Ifaac gave Jacob the bleffing, and
bid him be lord over his brethren, becaufe he
had the birth-right-, for our author brings
this example to prove, that he that has the
birth-right, has thereby a right to be lord
over his brethren. But it is alfo manifeft by
the text, that Ifaac had no confideration of
Jacob's having bought the birth-right ; for
when he bleffed him, he confidered him not

K 2 as

1^2 Of Government.

as Jacob, but took him for Efau. Nor did
Efau underftand any fuch conne&ion between
birth-right and the blejjing -, for he fays, He
hath fupplanted me thefe two times, he took away
my birth-right, and behold now he hath taken
away my bleffmg: whereas had the blejjing,
which was to be lord over his brethren, be-
longed to the birth-right, Efau could not
have complained of this fecond, as a cheat,
Jacob having got nothing but what Efau had
fold him, when he fold him his birth-right ;
fo that it is plain, dominion, if thefe words
fignify it, was not underftood to belong to
the birth-right.

§. 114. And that in thofe days of the
patriarchs, dominion was not underftood to
be the right of the heir, but only a greater
portion of goods, is plain from Gen. xxi. 10.
for Sarah, taking Ifaac to be heir, fays, Caft
out this bondwoman and her fon, for the fori
of this bondwoman fball not be heir with my
fon : whereby could be meant nothing, but
that he lhould not have a pretence to an
equal (hare of his father's eilate after his
death, but fhould have his portion prefently,
and be gone. Accordingly we read, Gen.
xxv. 5,6. That Abraham gave all that he had
unto Ifaac, but unto the Jons of the concubines
which Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts, and
put them away from Ifaac his fon, while he
yet lived. That is, Abraham having given
portions to all his other fons, and fent them

away,

Of Government. 133

away, that which he had referved, being the
greateft part of his fubftance, Ifaac as heir
pofTefTed after his death : but by being heir,
he had no right to be lord, over his brethren ;
for if he had, why fhould Sarah endeavour
to rob him of one of his fubjecls, or leiTen
the number of his JIaves, by deiiring to have
IJhmael fent away ?

§. 115. Thus, as under the law, the pri-
vilege of birth-right was nothing but a double
portion : fo we fee that before Mofes, in the
patriarchs time, from whence our author
pretends to take his model, there was no
knowledge, no thought, that birth-right o-ave
rule or empire, paternal or kingly authority,
to any one over his brethren. If this be net
plain enough in the ftory of Ifaac and Ijhnael,
he that will look into 1 Chron. v. 12. may
there read thefe words: Reuben was the fir ft-
born ; but for a/much as he defied his father 's
bed, his birth- right was given unto the fans of
Jofepb, the fon of Ifrael: and the genealogy is
not to be reckoned after the birth-right ; for
Judah prevailed above his brethren, a?id of him
came the chief ruler ; but the birth -right was
Jofepb's. What this birth-right was, Jacob
blemng Jofepb, Gen. xlviii. 22. telleth us in
thefe words, Moreover I have given thee one
portion above thy brethren, which I took out of
the hand of the Amorite, with my fword and
with my bow. Whereby it is not only plain,
that the birth-right was nothing but a double
K 3 portion,

134 Of Government.

portion j but the text in Chronicles is exprefs
againft our author's doctrine, and mews that
dominion was no part of the birth-right ;
for it tells us, thaxjofipb had the birth-right,
but Judah the dominion. One would think
our author were very fond of the very name
of birth-right, when he brings this inftance
of Jacob and Efau, to prove that dominion
belongs to the heir over his brethren.

§. 116. i. Becaufe it will be but an ill
example to prove, that dominion by God's
ordination belonged to the eldeft fon, be-
caufe Jacob the youngeft here had it, let
bim come by it how he would : for if it
prove any thing, it can only prove, againft
our author, that the afjigtiment of dominion to
the eldejl is not by divine infiitution, which
would then be unalterable : for if by the
law of God, or nature, abfolute power and
empire belongs to the eldeft fon and his
heirs, fo that they are fupreme monarchs,
and all the reft of their brethren flaves, our
author gives us reafon to doubt whether the
eldeft fon has a power to part with it, to the
prejudice of his pofterity, fince he tells us,
Objervations, 158. That in grants and gifts
that have their origi?ial from God or nature ,
no inferior power of man cati limit, or make any
law of prescription againjl them.

§. 117. 2. Becaufe this place, Gen. xxvii.

29. brought by our author, concerns not at

all the dominion of one brother over the

5 ©ther.

Of Government. 135

other, nor the fubjection of Efau to Jacob :
for it is plain in the hiftory, that Efau was
never fubjcct to Jacob, but lived apart in
mount Seir, where he founded a diftinct
people and government', and was himfelf
prince over them, as much as Jacob was in
his own family. This text, if confidered, can
never be understood of Efau himfelf, or the
perfonal dominion of Jacob over him : for
the words brethren and fons of thy mother,
could not be ufed literally by Ifaac, who
knew Jacob had only one brother -, and thefe
words are fo far from being true in a literal
fenfe, or eftablifhing any dominion in Jacob
over Efau, that in the /lory we find the quite
contrary, for Gen, xxxii. Jacob feveral times
calls Efau lord, and himfelf his fervant ; and
Gen. xxxiii. he bowed himfelf f even times to the
ground to Efau. Whether Efau then were a
fubject, and vaffal (nay, as our author tells us,
all fubjects are flaves) to Jacob, and Jacob
his fovereign prince by birth-right, I leave
the reader to judge; and to believe if he
can, that thefe words of Ifaac, Be lord over
thy brethren, and let thy mother s fons bow down
to thee, confirmed Jacob in a fovereignty over
Efau, upon the account of the birth-right
he had got from him.

§. 118. He that reads the flory of Jacob
and Efau, will find there was never any jurif-
diction or authority, that either of them had
over the other after their father's death : they

K 4 lived

i:6 Of Government.

lived with the friendfhip and equality of bre-
thren, neither lord, neither Jlave to his bro-
ther ; but independent each of other, were
both heads of their diftincl families, where
they received no laws from one another, but
lived feparately, and were the roots out of
which fprang two diftinc~t people under two
diftincl governments. This bleMing then of
Ifaac, whereon our author would build the
dominion of the elder brother, fignirles no
more, but what Rebecca had been told from
God, Gen. xxv. 23. Two nations are in thy
womb, and two mamier of people Jlja/l be fe-
parated from thy bowels, and the one people Jhall
be flronger than the other people, and the elder
Jhall Jerve the younger ; and fo Jacob bleffed
fndah, Gen, xlix. and gave him the fcepter
and dominion, from wThence our author mi^ht
nave argued as well, that jurifdiction and
dominion belongs to the third fon over
his brethren, as well as from this bleffing
of Ifaac, that it belonged to facob : both
thefe places contain only predictions of what
mould long after happen to their pofterities,
and not any declaration of the right of in-
heritance to dominion in either. And thus
we have our author's two great and only
arguments to prove, that heirs are lords over
their brethren.

1. Becaufe God tells Cain, Gen.iv. that
however fin might fet upon him, he ought
cr might be m after of it ; for the mod learned

interpreters

Of Government. 137

interpreters underftood the words of fin, and
not of Abel, and give fo ftrong reafons for
it, that nothing can convincingly be in-
ferred, from fo doubtful a text, to our au-
thor's purpofe.

2. Becaufe in this of Gen. xxvii. Ifaac
foretels that the Ifraelites, the pofterity of
'Jacob, mould have dominion over the Edc/n-
ites, the pofterity of Efau -, therefore fays
our author, heirs are lords of their brethren :
I leave any one to judge of the concluiion.

§. 119. And now we fee how our author
has provided for the defcending, and con-
veyance down of Adams monarchical power,
or paternal dominion to pofterity, by the
inheritance of his heir, fucceeding to all his
father's authority, and becoming upon his
death as much lord as his father was, not only
over his own children, but over his brethren,
and all defcended from his father, and fo
in infinitum. But yet who this heir is, he
does not once tell us ; and all the light we
have from him in this fo fundamental a point,
is only, that in his inftance of Jacob, by
ufing the word birth-right, as that which
pafled from Efau to Jacob, he leaves us to
guefs, that by heir, he means the eldeft fon ;
though I do not remember he any where
mentions exprefiy the title of the firft-born,
but all along keeps himfelf under the fhelter
of the indefinite term heir. But taking it to
be his meaning, that the eldeft fon is heir,

(for

138 Of Government.

(for if the eldeft be not, there will be no
pretence why the fons (hould not be all heirs
alike) and fo by right of primogeniture has
dominion over his brethren j this is but one
ftep towards the fettlement of fuccelTion, and
the difficulties remain frill as much as ever,
till he can (hew us who is meant by right
heir, in all thofe cafes which may happen
where the prefent poiTeiTor hath no fon. This
he iilently paries over, and perhaps wifely
too : for what can be wifer, aftqr one has
affirmed, that the perfon having that power,
as well as the power and form of government,
is the ordinance of God, and by divine injlitu-
tion, vid. Cbfervations, 254. p. 12. than to
be careful, not to itart any queflion con-
cerning the perfon, the refolution whereof
will certainly lead him into a confefllon, that
God and nature hath determined nothing
about him ? And if our author cannot fhew
who by right of nature, or a clear pofitive
law of God, has the next right to inherit the
dominion of this natural monarch he has
been at fuch pains about, when he died
without a fon, he might have fpared his
pains in all the reft, it being more neceflary
for the fettling men's confciences, and deter-
mining their fubjection and allegiance, to
mew them who by original right, fuperior
and antecedent to the will, or any act. of
men, hath a title to this paternal jur if diBion,
than it is to fhew that by nature there was

fuck

Of Government. 139

fuch a jurifdittion -, it being to no purpofe for
me to know there is fuch a paternal power,
which I ought, and am difpofed to obey,
unlefs, where there are many pretenders, I alfo
know the perfon that is rightfully invefled
and endowed with it.

§. 120. For the main matter in queftion
being concerning the duty of my obedience,
and the obligation of confcience I am un-
der to pay it to him that is of right my
lord and ruler, I muft know the perfon that
this right of paternal power refides in, and
fo impowers him to claim obedience from
me : for let it be true what he fays, p. 12.
That civil power not only in general is by divine
infitution, but even the alignment of it fpe-
daily to the eldejl parents ; and Observations,
254. 'That not only the power or right of go-
vernment, but the form of the power of go-
verning, and the perfon having that power, are
all the ordinance of God-, yet unlefs he fhew
us in all cafes who is this perfon, ordained by
God, who is this eldejl parent ; all his ab-
ftract notions of monarchical power will fig-
nify juft nothing, when they are to be re-
duced to practice, and men are confcientioufly
to pay their obedience : for paternal jurif-
dicfion being not the thing to be obeyed, be-
caufe it cannot command, but is only that
which gives one man a right which another
hath not, and if it come by inheritance,
another man cannot have, to command and

be

140 Of Government.

be obeyed ; it is ridiculous to fay, I pay obe-
dience to the -paternal power, when I obey
him, to whom paternal power gives no right
to my obedience : for he can have no divine
right to my obedience, who cannot mew his
divine right to the power of ruling over me,
as well as that by divine right there is fuch
a power in the world.

§. 121. And hence not being able to make
out any prince's title to government, as heir
to Adam, which therefore is* of no ufe, and
had been better let alone, he is fain to refolve
all into prefent porTeffion, and makes civil
obedience as due to an nfurper, as to a lawful
king ; and thereby the ufurpers title as good.
His words are, Obfervations, 253. and they
deferve to be remembered : If an ufurper dif-
poffefs the true heir, the fubjcBs obedience to
the fatherly power mufl go along, and wait upon
God's providence. But I mall leave his title
of ufurpers to be examined in its due place,
and defire my fober reader to confider what
thanks princes owe fuch politics as this, which
can fuppofe paternal power (/. e.) a 'light to
government in the hands of a Cade, or a
Cromwell-, and fo all obedience being due to
paternal power, the obedience of fubjects
will be due to them, by the fame right, and
upon as good grounds, as it is to lawful
princes; and yet this, as dangerous a doctrine
as it is, muH: neceffarily follow from making
all political power to be nothing elfe, but

Adam's

Of Government. 141

Adam's paternal power by right and divine
inflitution, defcending from him without be-
ing able to (hew to whom it defcended, or
who is heir to it.

§. 122. To fettle government in the world,
and to lay obligations to obedience on any
man's conference, it is as neceffary (fuppoiing
with our author that all power be nothing
but the being poffefled of Adam's fatherhood)
to fatisfy him, who has a right to this
power, this fatherhood, when the poiTeflbr
dies without fons to fucceed immediately to
it, as it was to tell him, that upon the
death of the father, the eldefl fon had a
right to it : for it is ftill to be remembered,
that the great queftion is, (and that which
our author would be thought to contend for,
if he did not fometimes forget it) what per-
fons have a right to be obeyed, and not
whether there be a power in the world, which
is to be called paternal, without knowing in
whom it refides : for fo it be a power, i. e.
right to govern, it matters not, whether it
be termed paternal or regal, natural or ac-
quired-, whether you call it fupreme father-
hood, or fupr -erne brotherhood, will be all one,
provided we know who has it.

§. 123. I go on then to a{k, whether in the

inheriting of this paternal power, this fupreme

fatherhood, the grandfon by a daughter hath

a right before a nephew by a brother ? Whe- -

ther the grandfon by the eldeft fon, being an

infant,

142 Op Government.

infant, before the younger fon, a man and
able ? Whether the daughter before the
uncle ? or any other man, defcended by a
male line ? Whether a grandfon by a younger
daughter, before a grand-daughter by an
elder daughter ? Whether the elder fon by
a concubine, before a younger fon by a wife ?
From whence alfo will arife many queflions
of legitimation, and what in nature is the
difference betwixt a wife and a concubine ?
for as to the municipal or pofitive laws of
men, they can fignify nothing here. It may
farther be afked, Whether the eldeft fon,
being a fool, (hall inherit this paternal power,
before the younger, a wife man ? and what
degree of folly it muft be that fhall ex-
clude him ? and who fhall be judge of it ?
Whether the fon of a fool, excluded for his
folly, before the fon of his wife brother who
reigned ? Who has the paternal power whilfl
the widow- queen is with child by the de-
ceafed king, and no body knows whether it
will be a fon or a daughter ? Which fhall be
heir of the two male-twins, who by the
diffection of the mother were laid open to
the world ? Whether a fifter by the half
blood, before a brother's daughter by the
whcle blood ?

§. 124. Thefe, and many more fuch doubts,
might be propofed about the titles of fuc-
ceflion, and the right of inheritance; and
that not as idle fpeculatidns, but fuch as in

hiitory

Of Government. 143

hiftory we mall find have concerned the
inheritance of crowns and kingdoms ; and
if our's want them, we need not go farther
for famous examples of . it, than the other
kingdom in this very ifland, which having
been fully related by the ingenious and learned
author of Patriarcha non Monarcha, I need fay
no more of. Till our author hath refolved
all the doubts that may arife ajpout the next
heir, and mewed that they are plainly deter-
mined by the law of nature, or the revealed
law of God, all his fuppoiitions of a mo-
narchicaly abfoliite, fnpreme, paternal power in
Adam, and the defcent of that power to his
heirs, would not be of the leaf! ufe to efta-
blifh the authority, or make out the title, of
any one prince now on earth; but would
rather unfettle and bring all into queflion :
for let our author tell us as long as he pleafes,
and let all men believe it too, that Adam had
a paternal, and thereby a monarchical power;
that this (the only power in the world) de-
Jcended to his heirs ; and that there is no other
power in the world but this : let this be all
as clear demonftration, as it is manifeft error,
yet if it be not paft doubt, to whom this
paternal power defcends, and whofe now it is,
no body can be under any obligation of obe-
dience, unlefs any one will fay, that I am
bound to pay obedience to paternal power in
a man who has no more paternal power than-
I myfelf -, which is all one as to fay, I obey
a man, becaufe he has a right to govern ;

and

144 O F Government.
and if I be afked, how I know he has a
right to govern, I mould anfwer, it cannot
be known, that he has any at all : for that
cannot be the reafon of my obedience, which
I know not to be fo ; much lefs can that be
a reafon of my obedience, which no body at
all can know to be fo.

§. 125. And therefore all this ado about
Adam s fatherhood, the greatnefs of its power,
and the necefiity of its fuppofal, helps no-
thing to eftabliih the power of thofe that
govern, or to determine the obedience of
iubjects who are to obey, if they cannot
tell whom they are to obey, or it cannot
be known who are to govern, and who to
obey. In the ftate the world is now, it is irre-
coverably ignorant, who is Adams heir. This
father 'hood, this monarchical power of Adam,
defcending to his heirs, would be of no more
life to the government of mankind, than it
would be to the quieting of mens confciences,
or fecuring their healths, if our author had
allured them, that Adam had a power to for-
give fins, or cure difeafes, which by divine
inftitution defcended to his heir, whilft this
heir is impoilible to be known. And (hould
not he do as rationally, who upon this af-
furance of our author went and confefTed his
fins, and expected a good abfolution ; or
took phylic with expectation of health, from
any one who had taken on himfelf the name
of prieft or phyfician, or thru ft himfelf into
thofe employments, faying, I acquiefce in
1 the

Of Government. 145

the abfolving power defcending from Adam,
or I mall be cured by the medicinal power
defcending from Adam j as he who fays, I
fubmit to and obey the paternal power de-
fcending from Adam, when it is confefTed all
thefe powers defcend only to his iingle heir,
and that heir is unknown ?

§. 126. It is true, the civil lawyers have
pretended to determine fome of thefe cafes
concerning the fucceffion of princes; but by
our author's principles, they have meddled in
a matter that belongs not to them : for if all
political power be derived only from Adam,
and be to defcend only to his fucceffive heirs,
by the ordinance of God and divine i72ft.it ut ion,
this is a right antecedent and paramount to all
government ; and therefore the poiitive laws
of men cannot determine that, which is itfelf
the foundation of all law and government, and
is to receive its rule only from the law of God
and nature. And that being filent in the
cafe, I am apt to think there is no fuch right
to be conveyed this way : I am fure it would
be to no purpofe if there were, and men would
be more at a lofs concerning government,
and obedience to governors, than if there
were no fuch right; lince by pofitive laws*
and compact, which divine infitution (if there
be any) (huts out, all thefe endlefs inextricable
doubts can be fafely provided againil : but it
can never be underftood, how a divine natu-
ral right, and that of fuch moment as is all
order and peace in the world, mould be con-

L veyed

146 Of Government.

veyed down to pofterity, without any plain
natural or divine rule concerning it. And
there would be an end of all civil govern-
ment, if the alignment of civil power were
by divine injiitution to the heir, and yet by that
divine injiitution the perfon of the heir could
not be known. This paternal regal power
being by divine right only his, it leaves no
room for human prudence, or confent, to
place it any where elfe ; for if only one man
hath a divine right to the obedience of man-
kind, no body can claim that obedience, but
he that can mew that right ; nor can men's
confeiences by any other pretence be obliged
to it. And thus this doctrine cuts up all go-
vernment by the roots.

§. 1 27. Thus we fee how our author, laying
it for a fure foundation, that the very perfon
that is to rule, is the ordinance of God, and
by divine injiitution, tells us at large, only that
this perfon is the heir, but who this heir is,
he leaves us to guefs ; and fo this divine injii-
tution, which afligns it to a perfon whom we
have no rule to know, is jufr. as good as an
affignment to no body at all. But whatever
our author does, divine injiitution makes no fuch
ridiculous alignments : nor can God be fup-
pofed to make it a facred law, that one cer-
tain perfon mould have a right to fomething,
and yet not give rules to mark out, and know
that perfon by, or give an heir a divine right
to power, and yet not point out who that
heir is. It is rather to be thought, that an

heir

OF Government. 147

heir had no fuch right by divine inftitution,
than that God mould give fuch a right to
the heir, but yet leave it doubtful and unde-
terminable who fuch heir is.

§. 128. If God had given the JandofCVz-
72aan to Abraham, and in general terms to fome
body after him, without naming his feed,
whereby it might be known who that fome-
body was, it would have been as good and
ufeful an alignment, to determine the right
to the land of Canaan, as it would be the
determining the right of crowns, to give
empire to Adam and his fucceffive heirs after
him, without telling who his heir is : for
the word heir, without a rule to know who
it is, fignifies no more than fome body, I
know not whom. God making it a divine
injiitution, that men mould not marry thofe
who were near of kin, thinks it not enough
to fay, None of you fiall approach to any that
is near of kin to him, to uncover their naked-
nefs ; but moreover, gives rules to know who
are thofe near of kin, forbidden by divine in-
jlitution -, or elfe that law would have been of
no ufe, it being to no purpofe to lay re-
ftraint, or give privileges to men, in fuch
general terms, as the particular perfon con-
cerned cannot be known by. But God not
having any where laid, the next heir mall
inherit all his father's eftate or dominion, we
are not to wonder, that he hath no where'
appointed who that heir mould be ; for never
having intended any fuch thing, never de-

L z ilgned

143 Of Government.

figned any heir in that fenfe, we cannot ex-
pect he fhould any where nominate, or ap-
point any perfon to it, as we might, had it
been other wife. And therefore in fcripture,
though the word heir occur, yet there is no
fuch thing as heir in our author's fenfe, one
that was by right of nature to inherit all that
his father had, exclufive of his brethren.
Hence Sarah fuppofes, that if Iflmiael ftaid in
the houfe, to mare in Abrahams eftate after
his death, this fon of a bond-woman might
be heir with Ifaac ; and therefore, fays fhe,
caft out this band-woman and her fon, for the
fon of this bond-woman jl:all not be heir with
my fon : but this cannot excufe our author,
who telling us there is, in every number of
men, one who is right and next heir to
Adam, ought to have told us what the laws
of defcent are : but he having been io
fparing to inftrucT: us by rules, how to know
who is heir, let us fee in the next place, what
his hiftory out of fcripture, on which he
pretends wholly to build his government,
^ives us in this neceflarv and fundamental
point.

§. 129. Our author, to make good the title
of his book, p. 1 ?. begins his hiftory of the
defcent of Adams regal power, p. 13. in
thefc words : This Icrdjhip which Adam by
command had over the whole world, and by
right defc ending from him, the patriarchs did
enjoy, was a large, &c. Flow does he prove
that the patriarchs by defcent did enjoy it ?

for

Of Government. 149

for dominion of life and death, fays he, we find
Judah the father pronounced fentence of death
againjl Thamar his daughter in law for playing
the harlot , p. 13. How does this prove that
Judah had abfolute and fovereign authority ?
be pronounced fentence of death. The pronoun-
cing of fentence of death is not a certain
mark of fovereignty, but ufually the office of
inferior magiftrates. The power of making
laws of life and death is indeed a mark of
fovereignty, but pronouncing the fentence
according to thofe laws may be done by
others, and therefore this will but ill prove
that he had fovereign authority: as if one
mould fay, Judge Jeff'eries pronounced fen-
tence of death in the late times, therefore
Judge Jeff'eries had fovereign authority. But
it will be faid, Judah did it not by com-
miflion from another, and therefore did it in
his own right. Who knows whether he had
any right at all ? Heat of paflion might carry
him to do that which he had no authority
to do. Judah had dominion of life and death :
how does that appear ? He exercifed it, he
pronounced fentence of death againjl Thamar :
our author thinks it is very good proof, that
becaufe he did it, therefore he had a right
to do it : he lay with her alfo : by the fame
way of proof, he had a right to do that
too. If the confequence be good from do-
ing to a right of doing, Abfalom too may
be reckoned amongft our author's fove-
L 3 reigns,

I co Of Govern m e n t.

reigns, for he pronounced fuch a fentcnce of
death againft his brother jimnon, and much
upon a like occafion, and had it executed
too, if that be Sufficient to prove a dominion
of life and death.

But allowing this all to be clear demon-
stration of fovereign power, who was it that
had this lordfhip by right defeending to him from
Adam, as large and ample as the abfoluteft do~
minion of any monarch f judah, fays our au-
thor, Judah a younger fon of Jacob, his
father and elder brethren living ; fo that if
our author's own proof be to be taken, a
younger brother may, in the life of his father
and elder brothers, by right of defcent, enjoy
Adam'i monarchical power j and if one fo
qualified may be monarch by defcent, why
may not every man ? if Judah, his father
and elder brother living, were one of Adam's
heirs, I know not who can be excluded from
this inheritance; all men by inheritance may
be monarchs as well as judah.

§. 130. Touching war, ^ce fee that Abraham
commanded an army of 318 foldiers of his own
family, and Efau met his brother Jacob with
400 men at arms : for matter of peace, Abra-
ham made a league with Abimelech, &c.
p. 13. Is it not poffible for a man to have
318 men in his- family, without being
heir to Adam f A planter in the Weft Indies
has more, and might, if he pleafed, (who
doubts ?) mufter them up and lead them out

againft

Of Government. 151

againft the Indians, to feek reparation upon
any injury received from them ; and all this
without the abfolute dominion of a monarch,
dcfe ending to him from Adam. Would it not
be an admirable argument to prove, that all
power by God's inftitution defcended from
Adam by inheritance, and that the very per-
fon and power of this planter were the ordi-
nance of God, becaufe he had power in his
family over fervants, born in his houfe, and
bought with his money ? For this was juft
Abrahams cafe; thofe who were rich in the
patriarch's days, as in the Weft Indies now,
bought men and maid fervants, and by their
increafe, as well as purchafing of new, came
to have large and numerous families, which
though they made ufe of in war or peace,
<:an it be thought the power they had over
them was an inheritance defcended from
Adam, when it was the purchafe of their
money ? A man's riding in an expedition
againft an enemy, his horfe bought in a fair
would be as good a proof that the owner
enjoyed the lordjhip which Adam by command
bad over the whole world, by right dcfcending
to him, as Abrahams leading out the fervants
of his family is, that the patriarchs enjoyed
this lordfhip by defcent from Adam : fince
the title to the power, the mailer had in
both cafes, whether over Haves or horfes,
was only from his purchafe ; and the getting
a dominion over any thing by bargain and
L 4 money,

152 Of Government.

money, is anew way of proving one had it
by defcent and inheritance.

§. 131. But making war and peace are marks
of fivereignty. Let it be ib in politic fo-
cities : may not therefore a man in the V/efi
Indies, who hath with him fons of his own,
friends, or companions, foldiers under pay,
or flaves bought with money, or perhaps a
band made up of all thefe, make war and
peace, if there mould be occaiion, and ratify
the articles too with an oath, without being a
fovereign, an abfolute king over thofe who
went with him r He that law-, he cannot,
mull then allow many mailers of fhips, many
private planters, to be abfolute monarchs, for
as much as this they have done. War and
peace cannot be made for politic focieties,
but by the fupreme power of fuch focieties ;
becaufe war and ceace, vivins: a different
motion to the force of fuch a politic body,
none can make war or peace, but that which
has the direction of the force of the whole
body, and that in politic focieties is only
the fupreme power. In voluntary focieties
for the time, he that has fuch a power by
confent, may make war and peace, and ib
may a iingle man for himfeif, the ilate of
war not confifling in the number of parti-
fans, but the enmity of the parties, where
they have no fuperior to appeal to.

§. 132. The actual making of war or peace
is no proof of any other power, but only;

0?

Of Government. 153

oF difpofing thofe to exercife or ceafe ads of
enmity for whom he makes it; and this
power in many cafes any one may have
without any politic fupremacy : and therefore
the making of war or peace will not prove
that every one that does (0 is a politic ruler,
much lefs a kino; ; for then common-wealths
mud be kings too, for they do as certainly
make war and peace as monarchical govern-
ment.

§. 133. But granting this a mark of five-
relgnty in Abraham, is it a proof of the defcent
to him of Adams fovereignty over the whole
world ? If it be, it will furely be as good a
proof of the defcent of Adam'j- lordjliip to
others too. And then common-wealths, as
well as Abraham, will be heirs of Adam, for
they make 'war and peace, as well as he. If
you fay, that the lordjhip of Adam doth not
by right defcend to common-wealths, though
they make war and peace, the fame fay I of
Abraham, and then there is an end of your
argument : if you iland to your argument,
and fay thofe that do make war and peace, as
common-wealths do without doubt, do inherit
Adam'j- lordjhip, there is an end of your mo-
narchy, unlefs you will fay, that common-
wealths by defcent ev.jcying Adam'j /ord/hip are
monarchies -, and that indeed would be a new
way of making all the governments in the
"world monarchical.

1 54 Of Government.

§. 134. To give our author the honour of
this new invention, for I confefs it is not I
have firfi found it out by tracing his prin-
ciples, and fo charged it on him, it is fit my
readers know that (as abfurd as it may feem)
he teaches it himfelf, p. 23. where he in-
genuoufly fays, In all kingdoms and common*
wealths in the world, whether the prince be the
fupr erne father of the people, or but the true heir
to fuch a father, or come to the crow?: by u fur-
cation or eleciion, or whether feme few or a
7/iultitude govern the common-wealth ; yet fill
the authority that is in any one, or in many, or
in all thefe, is the only right, and natural au-
thority of a fupreme father ; which right of
fatherhood, he often tells us, is regal and royal
authority-, as particularly, p. 12. the page
immediately preceding this inftance of Abra-
ham. This regal authority, he fays, thofe
that govern common-wealths have ; and if
it be true, that regal and royal authority be
in thofe that govern common-wealths, it is
as true that common-wealths are governed
by kings; for if regal authority be in him
that governs, he that governs muft needs be
a king, and fo all common- wealths are no-
thing but down-right monarchies; and then
what need any more ado about the matter ?
The governments of the world are as they
mould be, there is nothing but monarchy in
it. This, without doubt, was the fureft way
our author could have found, to turn all

other

Of Government. 155

other governments, but monarchical, out of
the world.

§. 135. But all this fcarce proves Abra-
ham to have been a king, as heir to Adam.
If by inheritance he had been king, hot, who
was of the fame family, mull needs have been
his fubjecl, by that title, before the fervants
in his family ; but we fee they lived as friends
and equals, and when their herdfmen could
not agree, there was no pretence of jurif-
diction or fuperiority between them, but they
parted by confent, Gen. xiii. hence he is
called both by Abraham, and by the text,
Abraham s brother, the name of friendship
and equality, and not of jurifdiclion and
authority, though he were really but his ne-
phew. And if our author knows that Abra-
ham was Adam'b heir, and a king, it was
more, it feems, than Abraham himielf knew,
or his fervant whom he fent a wooing for his
fon -, for when he fets out the advantages* of
the match, xxiv. Gen, 35. thereby to pre-
vail with the young woman and her friends*
he fays, / am Abraham's fervant, and the lord
hath bkffed my majier greatly, and he is become
great ; and he hath given hint flocks and herds,
and filver and gold, and -men- fervants and maid-
fervants, and camels and aJJ'es ; a?id Sarah, my
majier s wife, bare a fon to my mafler when
Jhe was old, and unto him hath he given all he
hath. Can one think that a difcreet fervant,
that was thus particular to fet out his mailer's

greatnefs,

156 Of Government.

greatnefs, would have omitted the crown
Ifaac was to have, if he had known of any
iiich ? Can it he imagined he fhould have
neglected to have told them on fuch an 00
caiion as this, that Abraham was a king, a
name well known at that time, for he had
nine of them his neighbours, if he or his
mailer had thought any fuch thing, the
likelier! matter of all the reft, to make his
errand fuccefsful ?

§. 136. But this difcovery it feems v/as
referved for our author to make 2 or 3000
years after, and let him enjoy the credit of
it •, only he mould have taken care that fome
of Adam's land mould have defcended to this
his heir, as well as all Adams lordfhip : for
though this lordfhip which Abraham, (if we
may believe our author) as well as the other
patriarchs, by right defcending to him, did enjoy,
was as large and ample as the abfolnteji domi-
nion of any monarch which hath been fmce the
creation, yet his eftate, his territories, his
dominions were very narrow and fcanty, for
he had not the pofTeffion of a foot of land,
till he bought a field and a cave of the fons
of Heth to burv Sarah in.

§. 137. The inftance of Efau joined with
this of Abraham, to prove that the lordjhip
which Adam had over the whole world, by right
defcending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy,
is yet more pleafant than the former. EJau
met his brother Jacob with 400 men at arms ; he

1 therefore,

Of Government. 157

therefore was a king by right of heir to Adam.
Four hundred armed men then, however got
together, are enough to prove him that leads
them, to be a king and Adams heir. There
have been tories in Ireland, (whatever there
are in other countries) who would have
thanked our author for fo honourable an
opinion of them, efpecially if there had been
no body near with a better title of 500 armed
men, to question their royal authority of 400.
It is a fhame for men to trifle fo, to fay no
worfe of it, in fo ferious an argument. Here
Efau is brought as a proof that Adam's lord-
ihip, Adam's abfolute dominion, as large as thai
of any monarch, defended by right to the pa-
triarchs, and in this very chap. p. 19. Jacob
is brought as an inftance of one, that by
birth -right was lord over his brethren. So we
have here two brothers abfolute monarchs by
the fame title, and at the fame time heirs to
Adam ; the eldeft, heir to Adam, becaufe he
met his brother with 400 men ; and the
youngeft, heir to Adam by birth-right : Efau
enjoyed the lordfip which Adam bad over the
whole world by right defcending to him, in as
large and ample -manner, as the abjolutejl do-
minion of any monarch; and at the fame time,
"Jacob lord over him, by the right heirs have to
be lords over their brethren. Rifum teneatis f
I never, I confefs, met with any man of
parts fo dexterous as Sir Robert at this way
of arguing: but it was his misfortune to

light

1 58 Of Govern m e n t.

light upon an hypothecs, that could not bt
accommodated to the nature of things, and
human affairs ; his principles could not be
made to agree with that conftitution and
order, which God had fettled in the world,
and therefore mull needs often clafh with
common fenfe and experience.

§. 138. In the next fection, he tells us,
This patriarchal power continued not only till
the food, but after it, as the name patriarch
doth in part prove. The word patriarch doth
more than in part prove, that patriarchal
power continued in the world as long as there
were patriarchs, for it is necefiary that pa-
triarchal power mould be whilft there are
patriarchs ; as it is necefiary there mould be
paternal or conjpgdr power whilft there are
fathers or hufbands ; but this is but playing
with names. That which he would falla-
cioufly in fin u ate is the thing in queftion to be
proved, viz. that the lordfiip which Adam
had ever the world, the luppofed abfolute
univerfal dominion of Adam by right defend-
ing from him, the patriarchs did enjoy. If he
affirms fuch an abfolute monarchy continued
to the flood, in the world, I would be glad
to know what records he has it from ; for I
confefs I cannot find a word of it in my
Bible : if by patriarchal power he means any
thing elfe, it is nothing to the matter in hand.
And how the name patriarch in fome part
proves, that thofe, who are called by that

name,

Of Government. 159

name, had abfolute monarchical power, I
confefs, I do not fee, and therefore I think
needs no anfwer till the argument from it be
made out a little clearer.

§. 139. The three fons of Noah had the
world, Jays our author, divided amongjl them by
their father, for of them was the whole world
overfpread, p. 14. The world might be over-
fpread by the offspring of Noah's fons, though
he never divided the world amongft them -, for
the earth might be replenished without being
divided : fo that all our author's argument here
proves no fuch diviiion. However, I allow it
to him, and then afk, the world being di-
vided amongft them, which of the three was
Adams heir ? If Adam's lordfjip, Adam's mo-
narchy, by right defcended only to the eldeft,
then the other two could be but his fabjecis, his
/laves : if by right it defcended to all three
brothers, by the fame right, it will defcend
to all mankind; and then it will be impoffible
v/hat he fays, p. 19. that heirs are lords of
their brethren, mould be true ; but all bro-
thers, and confequently all men, will be equal
and independent, all heirs to Adams mo-
narchy, and confequently all monarchs too,
one as much as another. But it will be faid,
Noah their father divided the world amongft
them ; fo that our author will allow more to
Noah, than he will to God almighty, for
Objervations, 211. he thought it hard, that
God himfelf mould give the world to Noah'
and his fons, to the prejudice of Noah's birth -
Z right :

160 Of Government.

right : his words are, Noah was left fole heir
to the world : why fiould it be thought that God
would difmherit him of his birth- right, and make
him, of all ?nen in the world, the only tenant in
common with his children f and yet here he
thinks it fit that Noah mould disinherit Stem
of his birth-right, and divide the world be-
twixt him and his brethren ; fo that this birth-
right, when our author pleafes, mud, and
when he pleafes mufl not, be facred and in-
violable.

§. 140. If Noah did divide the world be-
tween his fons, and his afiignment of domi-
nions to them were good, there is an end of
divine inflitution ; all our author's difcourfe
of Adams heir, with whatfoever he builds
on it, is quite out of doors; the natural
power of kings falls to the ground; and then
the form of the power governing, and the perfon
having that power, will not be (as he fays they
are, Obfervations, 254.) the ordinance of God,
but they will be ordinances of man : for if
the right of the heir be the ordinance of
God, a divine right, no man, father or not
father, can alter it : if it be not a divine
right, it is only human, depending on the
will of man : and fo where human inflitution
gives it not, the firft-born has no right at all
above his brethren ; and men may put go-
vernment into what hands, and under what
form, they pleafe.

§. 141. He goes on, Mofi of the civile jl na-
tions of the earth labour to fetch their original

from

Of Government. 161

from fome of the fins, or nephews of Noah,
p. 14. How many do moft of the civileft
nations amount to ? and who are they ? I
fear the Chinefes, a very great and civil people,
as well as feveral other people of the Eafi,
IVeft, North and South, trouble not them-
felves much about this matter. All that
believe the Bible, which I believe are our
author's mof of the civileji nation nuft ne-
ceffarily derive themfelveo fro thi but

for the reft of the world, the) ink little
of his fons or nephews. But if the heralds
and antiquaries of all nations, for it is thefe
men generally that labour to find out the
originals of nations, or all the nations them-
felves, Jloould labour to fetch their original from
fome of the fins- or nephews of Noah, what
would this be to prove, that the lord/hip which
Adam had over the whole world, by right de-
fended to the patriarchs ? Whoever, nations,
or races of men, labour to fetch their original
from, may be concluded to be thought by
them, men of renown, famous to pofterity,
for the greatnefs of their virtues and actions;
but beyond thefe they look not, nor confider
who they were heirs to, but look on them as
fuch as raifed themfclves, by their own virtue,
to a degree that would give a luflre to thofe
who in future ages could pretend to derive
themfelves from them. But if it were Ogyges,
Hercules, Brama, Tamberlain, Pharamond ;
nay, if Jupiter and Saturn were the names,
M from

\6z Of Government.

from whence divers races of men, both an-
cient and modern, have laboured to derive
their original ; will that prove, that thofe
men enjoyed the lordfhip of Adam, by right
defcending to them ? If not, this is but a
flouri/h of our author's to miflead his reader,
that in itfelf figniiies nothing.

§. 142. To as much purpofe is what he
tells us, p. 15. concerning this divifion of
the world, That fane fay it was by Lot, and
others that Noah failed round the Mediter-
ranean in ten years, and divided the world into
Afia, Afric and Europe, portions for his
three fons. America then, it feems, was left
to be his that could catch it. Why our au-
thor takes fuch pains to prove the divifion of
the world by Noah to his fons, and will not
leave out an imagination, though no better
than a dream, that he can find any where to
favour it, is hard to guefs, fince fuch a di-
vifion, if it prove any thing, mull necelfarily
take away the title of Adams heir -, unlefs
three brothers can all together be heirs of
Adam ; and therefore the following words,
Howfoever the manner of this divifion be un-
certain, yet it is mojl certain the divifion itfelf
was by families from Noah and his children,
over which the parents were heads and princes,
p. 15. if allowed him to be true, and of
any force to prove, that all the power in the
world is nothing but the lordfhip of Adam\f
defcending by right, they will only prove, that

the

Of Government. 163

the fathers of the children are all heirs to
this lordfhip of Adam : for if in thofe days
Cham and Japbet, and other parents, befides
the eldeft ion, were heads and princes over
their families, and had a right to divide the
earth by families, what hinders younger bro-
thers, being fathers of families, from having
the fame right ? If Cha?n and Japhet were
princes by right defcending to them, not-
withstanding any title of heir in their elder!
brother, younger brothers by the fame right
defcending to them are princes now ; and fo
all our author's natural power of kings will
reach no farther than their own children, and
no kingdom, by this natural right, can be
bigger than a family : for either this lord-
Jhip of Adam over the whole world, by right
defcends only to the eldeft fon, and then there
can be but one heir, as our author fays, p. 19.
or elfe, it by right defcends to all the fons
equally, and then every father of a family
will have it, as well as the three fons of
Noah : take which you will, it deftroys the
prefent governments and kingdoms, that are
now in the world, fince whoever has this
natural power of a king, by right defcending
to him, muft have it, either as our author
tells us Cam had it, and be lord over his
brethren, and fo be alone king of the whole
world -, or elfe, as he tells us here, Shem,
Cham and Japbet had ity three brothers, and
fo be only prince of his own family, and all

M 2 families

164 Of Government.

families independent one of another : all the
world mud be only one empire by the right
of the next heir, or elfe every family be a
didincl: government of itfelf, by the lordjlrip
of Adam'i defcending to parents of families.
And to this only tend all the proofs he here
^ives us of the defcent of Adam's lordfhip :
for continuing his ftory of this defcent, he
fays,

§. 143. In the difperfion of 'Babel, we mujl

certainly find the efiablifoment of royal power,

throughout the kingdoms of the world, p. 14.

If you muft find it, pray do, and you will

help us to a new piece of hiflory : but you

mull mew it us before we mail be bound to

believe, that regal power was eftablifhed in

the world upon your principles : for, that

regal power was eftablifhed in the kingdoms

of the world, I think no body will difpute ;

but that there mould be kingdoms in the

world, whofe feveral kings enjoyed their

crowns, by right defcending to them from Adam,

that we think not only apocryphal, but alfo

utterly impoffible. If our author has no

better foundation for his monarchy than a

fuppofition of what was done at the difperfion

fA Babel, the monarchy he erects thereon,

whofe top is to reach to heaven to unite

mankind, will ferve only to divide and fcatter

them as that tower did -, and, inftead of efta-

blifning civil government and order in the

world, will produce nothing but confufion.

§. 144.

Of Government. 16$

§. 144. For he tells us, the nations they
were divided into, were diftinSt families, which
had fathers for rulers over them ; whereby it
appears, that even in the confufion, God was
careful to preferve the fatherly authority, by
dijlributing the diverfty of languages according
to the diverfty of families, p. 14. It would
have been a hard matter for any one but our
author to have found out to plainly, in the
text he here brings, that all the nations in
that difperfion were governed by fathers, and
that God was careful to preferve the fatherly
authority. The words of the text are ; Thefe
are the fons of Shem after their families, after
their tongues in their lands, after their nations. %
and the fame thing is faid of Cham and
jfaphet, after an enumeration of their po-
fterities ; in all which there is not one word
faid of their governors, or forms of govern-
ment; of fathers, or fatherly authority. But
our author, who is very quick lighted to fpv
out fatherhood, where no body elfe could fee
any the leafl glimpfes of it, tells us pofitivelv
their rulers were fathers, and God was careful
to preferve the fatherly authority ; and why ?
Becaufe thofe of the fame family {poke the
fame language, and fo of necefiity in the
divifion kept together. Juft as if one mould
argue thus : Hanibal in his army, confining
of divers nations, kept thofe of the fame
language together ; therefore fathers were
captains of each band, and Hanibal was careful

M 3 of

i66 Of Government.

of the fatherly authority: or in peopling of
Carolina* the Englifi, French, Scotch and
Welch that are there, plant themfelves toge-
ther, and by them the country is divided in
their lands after their tongues, after their fa-
milies, after their nations ; therefore care was
taken of the fatherly authority : or becaufe,
in many parts of America, every little tribe
was a diftincl: people, with a different lan-
guage, one mould infer, that therefore God
was careful to preferve the fatherly authority y
or that therefore their rulers enjoyed Adam'i
lordfcip by right defending to them, though
we know not who were their governors, nor
what their form of government, but only
that they were divided into little independent
focieties, fpeaking different languages,

§. 145. The fcripture fays not a word of

their rulers or forms of government, but only

gives an account, how mankind came to be

divided into diffcindt languages and nations ;

and therefore it is not to argue from the

authority of fcripture, to tell us pofitively,

fathers were their rulers, when the fcripture

fays no fuch thing ; but to fet up fancies of

one's own brain, when we confidently aver

matter of fact, where records are utterly

filent. Upon a like ground, /. e. none at all,

he fays, That they were not confufed multitudes

without heads and governors, and at liberty

to choofe what governors or governments they

f leafed,

§. 146,

Of Government. 167

§. 146. For I demand, when mankind were
all yet of one language, all congregated in
the plain of Shinar, were they then all under
one monarch, who enjoyed the lord/hip of Adam
by right defc ending to him ?• If they were not,
there were then no thoughts, it is plain, of
Adam's heir, no right to government known
then upon that title ; no care taken, by God
or man, of Adams fatherly authority* If
when mankind were but one people, dwelt
all together, and were of one language, and
were upon building a city together ; and
when it was plain, they could not but know
the right heir, for Shem lived till Ifaac's time,
a long while after the divifion at Babel-, if
then, I fay, they were not under the mo-
narchical government of Adam's fatherhood,
by right defcending to the heir, it is plain
there was no regard had to the fatherhood,
no monarchy acknowledged due to Adam's
heir, no empire of Shenis in Afa, and con-^
fequently no fuch divifion of the world by
Noah, as our author has talked of. As far
as we can conclude any thing from fcripture
in this matter, it feems from this place, that
if they had any government, it was rather a
common-wealth than an abfolute monarchy :
for the fcripture tells us, Gen. xi. 'They faid:
it was not a prince commanded the building
of this city and tower, it was not by the
command of one monarch, but by the con-
sultation of many, a free people ; let us build
M 4 us

1 68 Of Government.

us :fy : they builc it for themfelves as
i not as Haves for their lord and

mater: ib we be not feathered abroad; having
a cil x "• and fixed habitations to fettle

or." - families* This was the con-

fu! . 3 and defign of a people, that were
at li ivij to part afunder, but defired to keep
in one body, and could not have been either
neceflarv or likelv in men tied together under
the government of one monarch, who if they
had been, as our author tells us, all JIaves
under the abfolute dominion of a monarch,
needed not have taken fuch care to hinder
themfelves from wandering out of the reach
of his dominion. I demand whether this
be not plainer in fcripture than any thing
of Adam's heir or fatherly authority f

§. 147. But if being, as God fays, Gen.
xi. 6. one people, they had one ruler, one
king by natural right, abfolute and fupreme
over them, what care had God to preferve the
paternal authority of the fupreme fatherhood, if on
a fudden he fuffer 72 (for fo many our author
talks of) difinfl nations to be erected out of
it, under diftinct. governors, and at once to
withdraw themfelves from the obedience of
their fovereign ? This is to intitle God's care
how, and to what we pleafe. Can it be fenfe
to fay, that God was careful to preferve the
fatherly authority in thofe who had it not ?
for if thefe were fubjects under a fupreme
prince, what authority had they ? Was it an

inftance

Of Government. 169

inftance of God's care to preferve the fa-
therly authority, when he took away the true
fupreme fatherhood of the natural monarch ?
Can it be reafon to fay, that God, for the
prefervation of fatherly authority, lets feveral
new governments with their governors ftart
up, ""who could not all have fatherly autho-
rity ? And is it not as much reafon to fay,
that God is careful to deflroy fatherly autho-
rity, when he fuffers one, who is in porTcffion
of it, to have his government torn in pieces,
and fhared by feveral of his fubjecls ? Would
it not be an argument juft like this, for mo-
narchical government, to fay, when any mo-
narchy was mattered to pieces, and divided
amongft revolted fubjecls, that God was care-
ful to preferve monarchical power, by rending
a fettled empire into a multitude of little
governments ? If any one will fay, that what
happens in providence to be preferved, God
is careful to preferve as a thing therefore to
be efteemed by men as necefTary or ufefal, it
is a peculiar propriety of fpeech, which every
one will not think fit to imitate : but this I am
fure is impoflible to be either proper, or true
fpeaking, that Shem, for example, (for he was
then alive,) mould have fatherly authority, or
fovereignty by right of fatherhood, over that
one people at Babel, and that the next mo-
ment, Shem yet living, 72 others mould have
fatherly authority, or fovereignty by right of
fatherhood, over the fame people, divided

into

170 Of Government.

into fo many diftinct governments : either
thefe 72 fathers actually were rulers, juft
before the confufion, and then they were not
one people, but that God himfelf fays they
were ; or elfe they were a common-wealth,
and then where was monarchy ? or elfe thefe
72 fathers had fatherly authority, but knew it
not. Strange ! that fatherly authority mould
be the only original of government amongft
men, and yet all mankind not know it -, and
ftranger yet, that the confufion of tongues
fhould reveal it to them all of a fudden, that
in an inftant thefe 72 fhould know that they
had fatherly power, and all others know that
they were to obey it in them, and every one
know that particular jatherly authority to
which he was a fubject. He that can think
this arguing from fcripture, may from thence
make out what model of an Eutopia will
beft fuit with his fancy or intereft ; and this
fatherhood, thus difpofed of, will juftify both
a prince who claims an univerfal monarchy,
and his fubjedts, who, being fathers of fa-
milies, mall quit all fubje&ion to him, and
canton his empire into lefs governments for
themfelves ; for it will always remain a doubt
in which of thefe the fatherly authority re-
fided, till our author refolves us, whether
Stem, who was then alive, or thefe 72 new
princes, beginning fo many new empires in
his dominions, and over his fubjects, had
right to govern, fince our author tells us,

that

Of Government. 171

that both one and the other had fatherly,
which is fupreme authority, and are brought
in by him as inftances of thofe who did
enjoy the lordfiips of Adam by right defending
to them , which was as large and ample as the
abfoluteft dominion of any monarch. This at
leait is unavoidable, that if God was careful to
preferve the fatherly authority, in the 72 new-
er ebled nations, it necerTarily follows, that he
was as careful to deflroy all pretences ot
Adams heir ; fince he took care, and there-
fore did preferve the fatherly authority in fo
many, at leafl 71, that could not poffibly be
Adams, heirs, when the right heir (if God
had ever ordained any fuch inheritance) could
not but be known, Shem then living, and they
being all one people.

§. 148. Nimrod is his next inftance of
enjoying this patriarchal power, p. 16. but
I know not for what reafon our author feems
a little unkind to him, and fays, that he
againjl right enlarged his empire, by feizing
violently on the rights of other lords of families.
Thefe lords of families here were called fa-
thers of families, in his account of the dif-
perlion at Babel : but it matters not how
they were called, fo we know who they are ;
for this fatherly authority muil be in them,
either as heirs to Adam, and fo there could
not be 72, nor above one at once; or elfe
as natural parents over their children, and fo
every father will have paternal authority over

his

172 Of Government.

his children by the fame right, and in as
large extent as thofe 72 had, and fo be in-
dependent princes over their own offspring.
Taking his lords of families in this later
fenfe, (as it is hard to give thofe words any
other fenfe in this place) he gives us a very
pretty account of the original of monarchy,
in thefe following words, p. 16. And in this
fenfe he may be faid to be the author andjoimder
of monarchy, viz. As againft, right feizing
violently on the rights of fathers over their
children ; which paternal authority, if it be
in them, by right of nature, (for elfe how
could thofe 72 corne by it ?) no body can
take from them without their own confents ;
and then I defire our author and his friends
to conlider, how far this will concern other
princes, and whether it will not, according
to his conclufion of that paragraph, refolve
all regal power of thofe, whofe dominions
extend beyond their families, either into
tyranny and ufurpation, or election and con-
fent of fathers of families, which will differ
very little from confent of the people.

§. 149. All his inftances, in the next
fet~liony p. 17. of the 12 dukes of Edom, the
nine kings in a little corner of Afia in Abra-
hams days, the 3 1 kings in Canaan deftroyed
by Jofjua, and the care he takes to prove
that thefe were all fovereign princes, and that
every town in thofe days had a king, are fo
many direct proofs againft him, that it was
5 not

Of Government. 173

not the lordflnp of Adam by right defc ending
to them, that made kings : for if they had
held their royalties by that title, either there
muft have been but one fovereign over them
all, or elfe every father of a family had
been as good a prince, and had as good
a claim to royalty, as thefe : for if all
the fons of Efau had each of them, the
younger as well as the elder!:, the right of
fatherhood, and fo were fovereign princes after
their fathers death, the fame right had their
,fons after them, and fo on to all pofterity ;
which will limit all the natural power of
fatherhood, only to be over the iffue of their
own bodies, and their defcendents; which
power of fatherhood dies with the head of
each family, and makes way for the like power
of fatherhood to take place in each of his
fons over their refpective pofterities : whereby
the power of fatherhood will be preferved
indeed, and is intelligible, but will not be
at all to our author's purpofe. None of the
inftanees he brings are proofs of any power
they had, as heirs of Adams paternal autho^
rity by the title of his fatherhood defcending
to them ; no, nor of any power they had by
virtue of their own : for Adam's fatherhood
being over all mankind, it could defcend but
to one at once, and from him to his right
heir only, and fo there could by that title
be but one king in the world at a time :
and by right of fatherhood, not defcending'
from Adam, it muft be only as they them-

felves

1 74 O F Government

felves were fathers, and fo could be over none
but their own posterity. So that if thofe 12
dukes of Edom ; if Abraham and the nine kings
his neighbours 5 if Jacob and E/2z#, and the
31 kings in Canaan, the 72 kings mutilated
by Adonibefeck, the 32 kings that came to
Benhadad, the 70 kings of Greece making
war at Troy, were, as our author contends,
all of them fovereign princes ; it is evident
that kings derived their power from fome
other original than fatherhood, fincc fome of
thefe had power over mure than their own
posterity ; and it is demonstration, they could
not be all heirs to Adam : for I challenge any
man to make any pretence to power by right
of fatherhood, either intelligible or poflible in
any one, other wife, than either as Adam's
heir, or as progenitor over his own depend-
ents, naturally fprung from him. And if
our author could mew that any one of thefe
princes, of which he gives us here fo large a
catalogue, had his authority by either of thefe
titles, I think I might yield him the caufe ;
though it is manifeft they are all impertinent,
and directly contrary to what he brings them
to prove, viz. That the lordfiip which Adam
had over the world by right defcended to the
patriarchs.

§. 150. Having told us, p. 16, That the
patriarchal government continued in Abraham,
Ifaac, and Jacob, until the Egyptian bondage,
p. 17. he tells us, By maaifejl footfieps we
may trace this paternal government unto the
3 Ifraelites

Of Government. 17$

Ifraelites coming into Egypt, 'where the exercife
of fupreme patriarchal government was inter-
mitted, becaufe they were in JubjeSlion to a
fironger prince. What thefe footfteps are of
paternal government, in our author's fenfe,
i. e. of abfolute monarchical power defcending
from Adam, and exercifed by right of fa-
therhood, we have feen, that is for 2290 years
no footfteps at all ; fince in all that time he
cannot produce any one example of any per-
fon who claimed or exercifed regal authority
by right of fatherhood; or mew any one who
being a king was Adams heir : all that his
proofs amount to, is only this, that there
were fathers, patriarchs and kings, in that
age of the world; but that the fathers and
patriarchs had any abfolute arbitrary power,
or by what titles thofe kings had their's, and
of what extent it was, the fcripture is wholly
filent; it is manifeft by right of fatherhood
they neither did, nor could claim any title
to dominion and empire.

§. 151. To fay, that the exercife of fupreme
patriarchal government was intermitted, becaufe
they were in fubjeclion to a fironger prince, proves
nothing but what I before fufpetted, viz.
That patriarchal jurifdiclion or government is a
fallacious expreftion, and does not in our au-
thor fignify (what he would yet iniinuate by
it) paternal and regal power, fuch an abfolute
fovereignty as he fuppofes was in Adam.

§. 152.

176 Of Government.

§. 152. For how can he fay that patriarchal
jurifdiclion was intermitted in Egypt, where
there was a king, under whofe regal go-
vernment the Ifraelites were, if patriarchal
were abfolnte mo?2archical jurifdiclion ? And if
it were not, but fomething elfe, why does
he make fuch ado about a power not in quef-
tion, and nothing to the purpofe ? The exer-
cife of patriarchal jurifdiclion, if patriarchal
be regal, was not intermitted whilft the Is-
raelites were in Egypt. It is true, the exer-
cife of regal power was not then in the hands
of any of the promifed feed of Abraham, nor
before neither that I know ; but what is
that to the intermirlion of regal authority, as
defcending from Adam, unlefs our author will
have it, that this chofen line of Abraham had
the right of inheritance to Adams lordmip ?
and then to what purpofe are his inftances of
the 72 rulers, in whom the fatherly authority
waspreferved in the confufion ^.t Babel? Why
does he bring the 12 princes fons of Ifmael-,
and the dukes of Edom, and join them with
Abraham, Ifaac, and Jacob, as examples of the
exercife of true patriarchal government, if the
exercife of patriarchal jurifdiclion were inter-
mitted in the world, whenever the heirs of
Jacob had not fupreme power ? I fear, fu-
preme patriarchal jurifdiclion was not only in-
termitted, but from the time of the Egyptian
bondage quite loft in the world, fince it will

be

Of Government. 177

be hard to find, from that time downwards,
any one who exercifed it as an inheritance
descending to him from the patriarchs Abra-
ham, Ifaac, and "Jacob. I imagined monar-
chical government would have ferved his
turn in the hands of Pharaoh, or any body.
But one cannot eafily difcover in all places
what his difcourfe tends to, as particularly in
this place it is not obvious to guefs what he
drives at, when he fays, the exercife of fu-
preme patriarchal ' jurifdiBion in Egypt, or how
this ferves to make out the defcent of Adam's
lordfhip to the patriarchs, or any body elfe.

§. 153. For I thought he had been giving
us out of fcripture, proofs and examples of
monarchical government, founded on pater-
nal authority, defcending from Adam ; and
not an hiftory of the Jews : amongft whom
yet we find no kings, till many years after
they were a people : and when kings were
their rulers, there is not the leaft mention or
room for a pretence that they were heirs to
Adam, or kings by paternal authority. I ex-
pected, talking fo much as he does of fcrip-
ture, that he would have produced thence a
feries of monarchs, whofe titles were clear
to Adam s fathei'hood, and who, as heirs to
him, owned and exercifed paternal juris-
diction over their fubjects, and that this was
the true patriarchical government; whereas
he neither proves, that the patriarchs were
kings j nor that either kings or patriarchs

N were

178 Of Government.

were heirs to Adam, or fo much as pretended
to it : and one may as well prove, that the
patriarchs were all abfolute monarchs j that the
power both of patriarchs and kings was only
paternal ; and that this power defcended to
them from Adam : I fay all thefe proportions
may be as well proved by a confufed account
of a multitude of little kings in the Weft-
Indies, out of Ferdinando Soto, or any of our
late hiftories of the Northern America, or by
our author's 70 kings of Greece, out of Ho-
mer, as by any thing he brings out of fcrip-
ture, in that multitude of kings he has
reckoned up.

§. 154. And methinks he fhould have let
Homer and his wars of Troy alone, iince hi&
great zeal to truth or monarchy carried him
to fuch a pitch of tranfport againft philofo-
phers and poets, that he tells us in his pre-
face, that there are too many in thefe days, who
fleaje themfehes in running after the opinions
of.philofophers and poets, to find out fuch an
original of government, as might pro??iife them
fame title to liberty, to the great fcandal of
Chri/lianity, and bringing in of at h elfin. And
yet thefe heathens, philofopher Ariftotle, and
poet Homer, are not rejected by our zealous
Christian politician, whenever they offer any
thing that feems to ferve his turn ; whether
to the great fcandal ^Chriftianity and bringing
in of atheifm, let him look. This I cannot
but obferve, in authors who it is vifible write

not

Of Government. 179

not for truth, how ready zeal for interest and
party is to entitle Chrijlianity to their de-
iigns, and to charge atheifm on thofe who
will not without examining fubmit to their
doctrines, and blindly fwallow their non-
fenfe.

But to return to his fcripture hiftory, our
author farther tells us, p. 18. that after the
return of the Ifraelites out ^bondage, God, out
of a fpecial care of them, chofe iVTofes and
Jofhua fuccejjively to govern as princes in the
place and Jiead of the fupreme fathers. If it
be true, that they returned out of bondage, it
mull be into a ftate of freedom, and mufl
imply, that both before and after this bonclage
they were free, unlefs our author will fay,
that changing of mailers is returning out of
bondage ; or that a ilave returns out of bondage,
when he is removed from one gaily to ano-
ther. If then they returned out of bondage,
it is plain that in thofe days, whatever our
author in his preface fays to the contrary,
there were difference between 2.fon, zfubjecl,
and a Jlave ; and that neither the patriarchs
before, nor their rulers after this Egyptian
bondage, numbered their fons or fubjecls amongfi
their pofefpons, and difpofed of them with as
abfolute a dominion, as they did their other
goods.

§. 155. This is evident in Jacob, to whom
Reuben offered his two fons as pledges ; and
Judah was at laft furety for Benjami?i$ fafe

N 2 return

1S0 Of Government.

return out of Egypt: which all had been
vain, fuperfluous, and but a fort of mockery,
if facob had had the fame power over every-
one of his family, as he had over his ox or
his afs, as an owner over his fubfiance ; and
the offers that Reuben or jfudab made had
been fuch a fecurity for returning of Benja-
min, as if a man mould take two lambs out
of his lord's flock, and offer one as fecurity,
that he will fafely reftore the other.

§. 156. When they were out of this bon-
dage, what then ? God out of a fpecial care of
them, the Ifraelites. It is well that once in his
book he will allow God to have any care of
the people ; for in other places he fpeaks of
mankind, as if God had no care of any part
of them, but only of their monarch s, and
that the reft: of the people, the focieties of
men, were made as fo many herds of cattle,
only for the fervice, ufe, and pleafure of their
princes.

§. 157. Chofe Mofes and Jofhua fuccejjively
to govern as princes ; a fhrewd argument our
author has found out to prove God's care of
the fatherly authority, and Adams heirs, that
here, as an expreffion of his care of his own
people, he choofes thofe for princes over
them, that had not the lead: pretence to either.
The perfons chofen were, Mofes of the tribe
of Levi, and fofoua of the tribe of Ephraim,
neither of which had any title of fatherhood.
But fays our author, they were in the place

and

Of Government. i$i

and flead of the fupreme fathers. If God
had any where as plainly declared his choice
of fuch fathers to be rulers, as he did
of Mofes and JoJJjua, we might believe
Mofes and fofiua were in their place and
Jiead: but that being the queftion in debate,
till that be better proved, Mofes being chofen
by God to be ruler of his people, will no
more prove that government belonged to
Adams heir, or to the fatherhood, than God's
choofing Aaron of the tribe of Levi to be
prieft, will prove that the priefthood belonged
to Adam's heir, or the prime fathers ; fince
God would choofe Aaron to be prieft, and
Mofes ruler in Ifrael, though neither of thofe
offices were fettled on Adam's heir, or the
fatherhood.

§. 158. Our author goes on, and after them
likewife for a time he r a fed up judges, to defend
his people in time of peril, p. 18. This proves
fatherly authority to be the original of go-
vernment, and that it defcended from Adam
to his heirs* juft as well as what went be-
fore : only here our author feems to confefs,
that thefe judges, who were all the governors
they then had, were only men of valour,
whom they made their generals to defend
them in time of peril; and cannot God
raife up fuch men, unlefs fatherhood have a
title to government ?

But fays our author, when God gave the Is-
raelites kings, he re-eflabliflded the ancient and

N 3 prime

182 Of Government.

prime right of lineal fuccejjion to paternal go-
vernment, p. 1 8.

§. 1 60. How did God re-eftablijh it ? by
a law, a pofitive command ? We find no fuch
thing. Our author means then, that when
God gave them a king, in giving them a
king, he r:-ejlablijl:ed the right, &c. To re-
eflablifh de Jaclo the right of lineal fucceffion
to paternal government, is to put a man in
poffeffion of that government which his
fathers did enjoy, and he by lineal fucceffion
had a right to : for, firft, if it were another
government than what his anceflors had, it
was not fucceeding to an ancient right, but
beginning a new one : for if a prince mould
give a man, belides his antient patrimony,
which for ibme ages his family had been
diffeized of, an additional eflate, never before
in the poffeffion of his anceflors, he could
not be faidto re-ejlablifo the right of lineal fuc-
ceffion to any more than what had been
formerly enjoyed by his anceflors. If there-
fore the power the kings of Ifrael had, were
any thing more than Ifaac or Jacob had, it
was net the re-efiablifing in them the right
of fucceffion to a power, but giving them a
new power, however you pleafe to call it,
paternal or not : and whether Ifaac and Jacob
had the fame power that the kings of Ifrael
had, I delire any one, by what has been above
iaid, to confider 3 and I do not think they

will

Of Government. 183

will find, that either Abraham, Ifaac, or
"Jacob, had any regal power at all.

§. 161. Next, there can be no re-eftablijh-
merit of the prime and ancient right of lineal
fiicceffion to any thing, unlefs he, that is put
in pofieffion of it, has the right to fucceed,
and be the true and next heir to him he
fucceeds to. Can that be a re-eftablifhment,
which begins in a new family ? or that the
re-eft abUJJjment of an ancient right of lineal fuc-
cefion, when a crown is given to one, who
has no right of fiicceffion to it, and who, if
the lineal fucceffion had gone on, had been
out of all poffibility of pretence to it ? Saul,
the firft king God gave the Ifraelites, was
of the tribe of Benjamin. Was the ancient and
prime right of lineal fuccejjion re-ejlablijhed in
him ? The next was David, the youngeil fon
of Jefje, of the pofterity of Judah, Jacob's
third fon. Was the ancient and prime right
of lineal fuccejjion to paternal government re-
tftablified in him ? or in Solomon, his younger
fon and fuccefibr in the throne ? or in J ere-
boam over the ten tribes ? or in Athaliah, a
woman who reigned fix years an utter fixanger
to the royal blood ? If the ancient and prime
right of lineal fuccejjion to paternal government
were re-ejlablified in any of thefe or their
pofterity, the ancient and prime right oj' lineal
fuccejjion to paternal government belongs to
younger brothers as well as elder, and may
be re-eftabliihed in any man living ; for what-
N 4 ever

184 Of Government.

ever younger brothers, by ancient and prime
right of lineal Juccejjion, may have as well as
the elder, that every man living may have a
right to, by lineal fucceflion, and Sir Robert
as well as any other. And fo what a brave
right of lineal fucceflion, to his paternal or
regal government, our author has re-ejia-
blijhedj for the fecuring the rights and inhe-
ritance of crowns, where every one may have
it, let the world confider.

§. 162. But fays our author however, p. 19.
Whenjoever God made choice of any fpecial per Jon
to be king, he intended that the ijfue alfo fiould
have benefit thereof as being comprehended Juf-
ficiently in the perfon of the father, altho' the
father was only named in the grant. This yet
will apt help out fucceflion ; for if, as our
author fays, the benefit of the grant be in-
tended to the ijfue of the grantee, this will
not direct the fucceflion -, fince, if God give
any thing to a man and his ijfue in general,
the claim cannot be to any one of that ijfue
in particular ; every one that is of his race
will have an equal right. If it be faid, our
author meant heir, I believe our author was
as willing as any body to have ufed that
word, if it would have ferved his turn : but
Solomon, who fucceeded David in the throne,
being no more his heir than Jerobobam, who
fucceeded him in the government of the ten
tribes, was his iflue, our author had reafon
to avoid faying, That God intended it to

the

Of Government. 185

the heirs, when that would not hold in a
fucceffion, which our author could not ex-
cept againft ; and fo he has left his fuccetTion
as undetermined, as if he had faid nothing
about it : for if the regal- power be given by
God to a man and his iffue, as the land of
Canaan was to Abraham and his feed, mud
they not all have a title to it, all mare in it ?
And one may as well fay, that by God's grant
to Abraham and his feed, the land of Canaan
was to belong only to one of his feed ex-
clulive of all others, as by God's grant of
dominion to a man and his iffite, this domi-
nion was to belong in peculiar to one of his
ijfue exclufive of all others.

§. 163. But how will our author prove that
whenfoever God made choice of any fpecial
perfon to be a king, he intended that the (I
fuppofe he means his) ijfue aljo Jloould have
benefit thereof? has he fo foon forgot Mofes
and Jojhua, whom in this very fecJion, he
fays, God out of a jpecial care choje to govern
as princes, and the judges that God railed
up ? Had not thefe princes, having the au-
thority of the jupreme fatherhood, the fame
power that the kings had ; and being fpe-
cially chofen by God himfelf, mould not
their ijfue have the benefit of that choice, as
well as David's or Solomons ? If thefe had the
paternal authority put into their hands im-
mediately by God, why had not their ijfue
the benefit of this grant in a fucceffion to -

this

i£6 Of Government.

this power ? or if they had it as Adams heirs,
why did not their heirs enjoy it after them
by right defcending to them ? for they could
not be heirs to one another. Was the power
the fame, and from the fame original, in
Mofes, fofiua and the 'Judges, as it was in
David and the Kings j and was it inheritable
in one, and not in the other ? If it was not
paternal authority, then God's own people
were governed by thofe that had not -paternal
authority, and thofe governors did well
enough without it : if it were paternal au."
thority, and God chofe the perfons that were
to exercife it, our author's rule fails, that
whenfoever God makes choice ef any per/on to be
reme ruler (for I fuppofe the name king
has no fpell in it, it is not the title, but the
power makes the difference) he intends that
the ijjiie alfo Jhould have the benefit of it, fince
from their coming out of Egypt to David's
time, 400 years, the iffue was never fo fuf-
ficie'ntly comprehended in the per/on of the fa-
ther, as that any fon, after the death of his
father, fucceeded to the government amongft
all thofe judges that judged Ifrael. If, to
avoid this, it be faid, God always chofe the
perfon of the fucceffor, and fo, transferring
the fatherly authority to him, excluded his
iffue from fucceeding to it, that is manifeftly
not fo in the ftory of Jephtha, where he ar-
ticled with the people, and they made him
judge over them, as is plain, judg. 11.

§. 164.

Of Government. 187

§. 164. It is in vain then to fay, that when*
Jbever God choofes any fpecial ferfon to have the
exercife of paternal authority, (for if that be
not to be king, I deftre to know the dif-
ference between a king and one having the
exercife of paternal authority] he intends the
iffue alfo fiould have the benefit of it, fince we
find the authority, the judges had, ended
with them, and defcended not to their iffue ;
and if the judges had not paternal authority,
I fear it will trouble our author, or any of the
friends to his principles, to tell who. had then
the paternal authority, that is, the government
and fupreme power amongft. the Israelites $
and 1 fufpect they muft confefs that the
chofen people of God continued a people
feveral hundreds of years, without any know-
ledge or thought of this paternal authority,
or any appearance of monarchical govern-
ment at all.

§. 165. To be fatisfied of this, he need
but read the ftory of the Levite, and the war
thereupon with the Benjamites, in the three
laft chapters of Judges; and when he finds, that
the Levite appeals to the people for juftice
that it was the tribes and the congregation,
that debated, refolved, and directed all that
was done on that occafion j he muft con-
clude, either that God was not careful to pre-
ferve the fatherly authority amongft his own
chofen people ; or elfc that the fatherly au-
thority may be preferved, where there is no

monarchical

1 88 Of Government.

monarchical government : if the latter, then
it will follow, that though fatherly authority
be never fo well proved, yet it will not infer
a necefiity of monarchical government; if
the former, it will feem very ftrange and
improbable, that God fhould ordain fatherly
authority to be fo facred amongft the fons of
men, that there could be no power, or go-
vernment without it, and yet that amongft
his own people, even whilft he is providing
a government for them, and therein prefcribes
rules to the feveral flates and relations of
men, this great and fundamental one, this
mod material and necefTary of all the reft,
mould be concealed, and lie neglected for
400 years after.

§. 166. Before I leave this, I muft afk how
our author knows that whenfoever God makes
choice of any fpecial perfon to be king> he intends
that the iffue fhould have the benefit thereof?
Does God by the law of nature or revelation
fay fo ? By the fame law alfo he muft fay,
which of his iffue muft enjoy the crown in
fucceiTion, and fo point out the heir, or elfe
leave his iffue to divide or fcramble for the
government : both alike abfurd, and fuch as
will deftroy the benefit of fuch grant to the
iffue. When any fuch declaration of God's
intention is produced, it will be our duty to
believe God intends it fo ; but till that bs
done, our author muft fhew us fome better
warrant, before we fhall be obliged to re-
cede

Of Government. 189

ccive him as the authentic revealer of God's
intentions.

§. 167. The iffue, fays our author, is com-
prehended fufficieiitly in the perfon of the fa-
ther, although the father only was named in the
grant : and yet God, when he gave the land
of Canaan to Abraham, Gen. xiii. 15. thought
fit to put his feed into the grant too : fo the
priefthood was given to Aaron and his feed*,
and the crown God gave not only to David,
but his feed alfo : and however our author
affures us that God intends, that the if lie Jhould
have the benefit of it, when he choofes any perfon
to be king, yet we fee that the kingdom
which he gave to Saul, without mentioning
his feed after him, never came to any of his
iffue ; and why, when God chofe a perfon to
be king, he mould intend, that his iffue
fhould have the benefit of it, more than when
he chofe one to be judge in Ifrael, I would
fain know a reafon ; or why does a grant of
fatherly authority to a king more comprehend
the iffue, than when a like grant is made to
a judge ? Is paternal authority by right to
defcend to the iffue of one, and not of the
other ? There will need fome reafon to be
Ihewn of this difference, more than the
name, when the thing given is the fame fa-
therly authority, and the manner of giving it,
God's choice of the perfon, the fame too ;
for I fuppofe our author, when he fays, God

raifcd

1 90 Of Government.

raifed up judges, will by no means allow, they
were chofen by the people.

§. 1 68. But fince our author has Co con-
fidently aflured us of the care of God to pre-
ferve the fatherhood, and pretends to build
all he fays upon the authority of the fcrip-
ture, we may well expect that that people,
whofe law, constitution and hiflory is chiefly
contained in the fcripture, fhould furnifh him
with the cleared inftances of God's care of
preferving the fatherly authority, in that
people who it is agreed he had a mofl pecu-
liar care of. Let us fee then what flate this
paternal authority or government was in
among!! the fews, from their beginning to
be a people. It was omitted, by our author's
confefiion, from their coming into Egypt, till
their return out of that bondage, above 200
years : from thence till God gave the If-
raellies a king, about 400 years more, our
author gives but a very (lender account of it;
nor indeed all that time are there the leafl
footfleps of paternal or regal government
amongft them. But then fays our author,
God re-ejlablifoed the ancient and prime right
of lineal jtic cefjion to paternal government.

§. 169. What a lineal face effion to paternal
government was then eitablifhed, we have
already feen. I only now confider how long
this lafted, and that was to their captivity,
about 500 years : from thence to their de-
duction by the Romans, above 650 years
4 after,

Of Government. 191

after, the ancient and prime right of lineal
fuccefjion to paternal government was again
loft, and they continued a people in the pi'o-
mifed land without it. So that of 1750
years that they were God's peculiar people,
they had hereditary kingly government
amongft them not one third of the time ;
and of that time there is not the leaft footftep
of one moment of paternal government, nor
the re-eflablijhment of the ancient and prime
right of lineal fucce/jion to it, whether we
fuppofe it to be derived, as from its fountain,
from David, Saul, Abraham, or, which upon
our author's principles is the only true, from
Adam,

OF

OF CIVIL-GOVERNMENT

BOOK II k

Chap. I. §. i. It having been fhewn in the
foregoing difcourfe,

i. That Adam had not, either by natural
right of fatherhood, or by pofitive donation
from God, any fuch authority over his
children, or dominion over the world, as is
pretended :

2. That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no
right to it :

3. That if his heirs had, there being no
law of nature nor pofitive law of God that
determines which is the right heir in all
cafes that may arife, the right of fucceffion,
and confequently of bearing rule, could not
have been certainly determined :

4. That if even that had been determined,
yet the knowledge of which is the elded line

O of-

194 Of Civil-Government.
of Adam's pofterity, being fo long fince utterly
loft, that in the races of mankind and fa-
milies of the world, there remains not to one
above another, the leaft pretence to be the
eldeft houfe, and to have the right of inhe-
ritance :

All thefe premifes having, as I think, been
clearly made out, it is impoflible that the
rulers now on earth mould make any be-
nefit, or derive any the lead: madow of au-
thority from that, which is held to be the
fountain of all power, Adams private dominion
and paternal jurifdiciion j fo that he that will
not give juft occafion to think that all go-
vernment in the world is the product only of
force and violence, and that men live together
by no other rules but that of beafts, where the
ftrongeft carries it, and fo lay a foundation
for perpetual diforder and mifchief, tumult,
fedition and rebellion, (things that the fol-
lowers of that hypothecs fo loudly cry out
again.lt) mull of neceffity find out another
rife of governwent, another original of poli-r
tical power, and another way of defigning
and knowing the perfons that have it, than
what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

§. 2. To this purpofe, I think it may not
be amifs, to fet down what I take to be poli-
tical power ; that the power of a magijlrate
over a fubject may be diftinguifhed from
that of a father over his children, a ?najier
over his fervant, a hnjband over his wife, and

a

Of Civil-Government. 195

a lord over his flave. All which diftindt
powers happening fometimes together in the
fame man, if he be confidered under thefe
different relations, it may help us to diiKn-
guifh thefe powers one from another, and
ihew the difference betwixt a ruler of a
common-wealth, a father of a family, and a
captain of a galley.

§.3. Political power, then, I take to be a
right of making laws with penalties of death,
and confequently all lefs penalties, for the
regulating and preferving of property, and of
employing the force of the community, in
the execution of fuch laws, and in the de-
fence of the common-wealth from foreign
injury ; and all this only for the public good.

CHAP. II.

Of the State of Nature.

§.4. r a ^ O underftand political power
right, and derive it from its
original, we muft confider, what flate all
men are naturally in, and that is, a fate of
perfect freedom to order their actions, and
difpofe of their poffeffions and perfons, as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law
of nature, without afking leave, or depending
upon the will of any other man.

A fate alfo of equality, wherein all the
power and jurifdicticn is reciprocal, no one ,
O 2 having

196 Of Civil-Government.

having more than another ; there being no-
thing more evident, than that creatures of
the fame fpecies and rank, promifcuoufly born
to all the fame advantages of nature, and
the ufe of the fame faculties, fhould alfo be
equal one amongft another without fubor-
dination or fubjeclion, unlefs the lord and
mafter of them all mould, by any manifeft
declaration of his will, fet one above another,
and confer on him, by an evident and clear
appointment, an undoubted right to dominion
and fovereignty.

§. 5. This equality of men by nature, the
judicious Hooker looks upon as fo evident in
itfelf, and beyond all queftion, that he makes
it the foundation of that obligation to mu-
tual love amongft men, on which he builds
the duties they owe one another, and from
whence he derives the great maxims of jujiice
and charity. His words are,

The like natural inducement hath brought
men to know that it is no lefs their duty, to
love others than themf elves; for feeing thofe
things which are equal, mujl needs all have one
wieafure ; if I cannot but wifi to receive good,
even as much at every mans hands, as any man
can wijh unto his own foul, how Jhould I look
to have any part of my defre herein fatisfed,
unlefs myfelf be careful to fatify the like defre,
which is undoubtedly i?i other men, being of one
and the fame nature ? To have any thing offered
them repugnant to this defre, mujl needs in all

refpecls

Of Civil-Government. 197

rejpecls grieve them as much as me -, fo that if
I do harm, I muji look to fuffer, there being
no reafon that others Jhould Jhew greater mea-
fure of love to me, than they have by me /hewed
unto them ; my defre therefore to be loved of
my equals in nature, as much as pofjible may
be, impofeth upon me a natural duty of bearing
to t hem-ward fully the like affeBion ; from
which relation of equality between ourfehes and
them that are as ourfehes, what feveral rules
and canons natural reafon hath drawn, for
direction of life, no man is ignorant ■*■ Bccl. Pol.
Lib. 1.

§. 6. But though this be a fate of liberty,

yet // is not a fate of licence : though man in

that ftate have an uncontroulable liberty to

difpofe of his perfon or porTeflions, yet he has

not liberty to deftroy himfelf, or fo much as

any creature in his porTeflion, but where

fome nobler ufe than its bare prefervation

calls for it. The fate of nature has a law of

nature to govern it, which obliges every one :

and reafon, which is that law, teaches all

mankind, who will but confult it, that being

all equal and independent, no one ought to

harm another in his life, health, liberty, or

pofleffions : for men being all the workman-

Ihip of one omnipotent, and infinitely wife

maker ; all the fervants of one fovereign

mafter, fent into the world by his order, and

about his bulinefs; they are his property,

whofe workmanfhip they are, made to laft

O 3 during;

198 Of Civil-Government.
during his, not one another's pleafure: and
being furnifhed with like faculties, maring all
in one community of nature, there cannot
be fuppofed any fuch jub ordination among us,
that may authorize us to deftroy one another,
as if we were made for one another's ufes, as
the inferior rafiks of creatures are for our's.
Every one, as he is bound to preferve himfelf,
and not to quit his flation wilfully, fo by the
like reafon, when his own preservation comes
not in competition, ought he, as much as he
can, to preferve the reft of mankind, and may
not, unleis it be to do juftice on an offender,
take away, or impair the life, or what tends
to the prefervation of the life, the liberty,
health, limb, or*gcods of another.

§. 7. And that all men may be restrained
from invading others rights, and from doing
hurt to one another, and the law of nature
be obferved, which willeth the peace and
prefervation of all mankind, the execution of
the law of nature is, in that ftate, put into
every man's hands, whereby every one has a
right to punifh the tranfgrefTors of that law
to fuch a degree, as may hinder its violation :
for the law of nature would, as all other laws
that concern men in this world, be in vain,
if there were no body that in the ftate of
nature had a power to execute that law, and
thereby preferve the innocent and reftrain
offenders. And if anyone in the ftate of na-
ture may punifh another for any evil he has
4 done,

Of Civil-Government. 199

done, every one may do fo : for m that Jlate
of p erf eft equality, where naturally there is
no fuperiority or jurifdiction of one over
another, what any may do in profecution of
that law, every one mull: needs have a right
to do.

§. 8. And thus, in the ilate of nature, one
man comes by a power over a?iother ; but yet
no abfolute or arbitrary power, to ufe a
criminal, when he has got him in his hands,
according to the paffionate heats, or boundlefs
extravagancy of his own will ; but only to
retribute to him, fo far as calm reafon and
confcience dictate, what is proportionate t©
his tranfgreffion, which is fo much as may
ferve for reparation and restraint : for thefe
two are the only reafons, why one man may
lawfully do harm to another, which is that
we call punifhrnent. In tranfgreffing the law
of nature, the offender declares himfelf to
live by another rule than that of reafon
and common equity, which is that meafure
God has fet to the actions of men, for their
mutual fecurity j and fo he becomes dan-
gerous to mankind, the tye, which is to
fecure them from injury and violence, being
flighted and broken by him. Which being
a trefpafs againfl: the whole fpecies, and the
peace and fafety of it, provided for by the
law of nature, every man Cipon this fcore,
by the right he hath to preferve mankind in
general, may reftrain, or where it is necef-

O 4 fary,'

200 Of Civil-Government.
fary, deftroy things noxious to them, and fo
rnay bring fuch evil on any one, who hath
tranfgreffed that law, as may make him re-
pent the doing of it, and thereby deter him,
and by his example others, from doing the
like mifchief. And in this cafe, and upon
this ground, every ?na?i hath a right to punifi
the offender, and be executioner of the law of
nature.

§. 9. I doubt not but this will feem a very
flrange doctrine to fome men : but before
they condemn it, I defire them to refolve
me, by what right any prince or ftate can
put to death, or punifh an alien, for any crime
he commits in their country. It is certain
their laws, by virtue of any fanclion they
receive from the promulgated will of the
legiflative, reach not a ftranger : they fpeak
not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to
hearken to them. The legiflative authority,
by which they are in force over the fubjec~ts
of that common-wealth, hath no power over
him. Thofe who have the fupreme power
of making laws in England, France or Holland,
are to an Indian, but like the reft of the
world, men without authority : and there-
fore, if by the law of nature every man
hath not a power to punifh offences againft
it, as he foberly judges the cafe to require,
I fee not how the magistrates of any com-
munity can funijh an alien of another coun-
try ; fince, in reference to him, they can have

no

Of Civil-Government. 201

no more power than what every man na-
turally may have over another.

§. 10. Beiides the crime which confifts in
violating the law, and varying from the right
rule of reafon, whereby a man fo far be-
comes degenerate, and declares himfelf to
quit the principles of human nature, and to be
a noxious creature, there is commonly injury
done to fome perfon or other, and fome other
man receives damage by his tranfgrerlion : in
which cafe he who hath received any damage,
has, befides the right of punifhment common
to him with other men, a particular right to
feek reparation from him that has done it :
and any other perfon, who finds it juft, may
alfo join with him that is injured, and afTifl
him in recovering from the offender fo much
as may make fatisfaction for the harm he has
fuffered.

§. ii. From thefe two dijlindi rights, the
one of ' punijhing the crime for reflraint, and
preventing the like offence, which right of
punifhing is in every body ; the other of
taking reparation, which belongs only to the
injured party, comes it to pafs that the ma-
giftrate, who by being magiftrate hath the
common right of punifhing put into his
hands, can often, where the public good
demands not the execution of the law, remit
the punifhment of criminal offences by his
own authority, but yet cannot remit the fa-
tisfaction due to any private man for the

damage

202 Of Civil-Government.

damage he has received. That, he who has
fuffered the damage has a right to demand
in his own name, and he alone can remit :
the damnified perfon has this power of ap-
propriating to himfelf the goods or fervicc
of the offender, by right of felf-prefervation,
as ev^ery man has a power to punifh the
crime, to prevent its being committed again,
by the right he has of preferring all mankind, and
doing all reafonable things he can in order
to that end : and thus it is, that every man,
in the ftate of nature, has a power to kill a
murderer, both to deter others from doing
the like injury, which no reparation can
compenfate, by the example of the punifh-
ment that attends it from every body, and
alfo to fecure men from the attempts of a
criminal, who having renounced reafon, the
common rule and meafure God hath given
to mankind, hath, by the unjuft violence and
Haughter he hath committed upon one, de-
clared war againft all mankind, and there-
fore may be deftroyed as a lion or a tyger,
one of thofe wild favage beafts, with whom
men can have no fociety nor fecurity : and
noon this is grounded that great law of na-
ture, Wbofo jheddetb mans blood, by man fhall
his blood be fed. And Cain was fo fully con-
vinced, that every one had a right to deilroy
fuch a criminal, that after the murder of
his brother, he cries out, Every one thatfndeth

me,

Of Civil-Government. 203

me, jhall fiay ?ne\ fo plain was it writ in the
hearts of all mankind.

§. 12. By the fame reafon may a man in
the Itate of nature punijh the leffer breaches
of that law. It will perhaps be demanded,
with death ? I anfwer, each tranfgreffion ma^'
be punijhed to that degree, and with fo m>Bch
feverity, as will fuffice to make it an ill
bargain to the offender, give him caufe to
repent, and terrify others from doing the
like. Every offence, that can be committed
in the ftate of nature, may in the ftate of
nature be alfo puniftied equally, and as far
forth as it may, in a common-wealth : for
though it would be befides my prefent pur-
pofe, to enter here into the particulars of the
law of nature, or its meafures of puntjhment ;
yet, it is certain there is fuch a law, and that
too, as intelligible and plain to a rational
creature, and a ftudier of that law, as the
pofitive laws of common- wealths ; nay, pof-
iibly plainer ; as much as reafon is eafier to
be understood, than the fancies and intricate
contrivances of men, following contrary and
hidden interests put into words ; for fo truly
are a great part of the municipal laws' of coun-
tries, which are only fo far right, as they are
founded on the law of nature, by which they
are to be regulated and interpreted.

§.13. To this flrange doctrine, viz. That
in the Ji ate of nature every one has the executive
power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it

will

204 ^F Civil-Government.
will be objected, that it is unreafonable for men
to be judges in their own cafes, that felf-lovc
will make men partial to themfelves and their
friends : and on the other fide, that ill na-
ture, paflion and revenge will carry them too
far in punifhing others ; and hence nothing
but confufion and diforder will follow, and
that therefore God hath certainly appointed
government to reftrain the partiality and
violence of men. I eafily grant, that civil
government is the proper remedy for the in-
conveniencies of the (late of nature, which
mull: certainly be great, where men may be
judges in their own cafe, fince it is eafy to
be imagined, that he who was fo unjuft as
to do his brother an injury, will fcarce be fo
juft as to condemn himfelf for it : but I (hall
defire thofe who make this objection, to re-
member, that abfolute monarch s are but men ;
and if government is to be the remedy of
thofe evils, which necefTarily follow from
men's being judges in their own cafes, and
the ftate of nature is therefore not to be
endured, I defire to know what kind of
government that is, and how much better
it is than the ftate of nature, where one man,
commanding a multitude, has the liberty to
be judge in his own cafe, and may do to all
his fubjects whatever he pleafes, without the
leaft liberty to any one to queftion or controul
thofe who execute his pleafure ? and in what-
foever he doth, whether led by reafon, miftake
or paffion, mud be fubmitted to? much better

it

OF Clt'l L-G OVERNMEN T. 20£

it is in the ftate of nature, wherein men are not
bound to fubmit to the unjuft will of ano-
ther : and if he that judges, judges amifs in
his own, or any other cafe, he is anfwerable
for it to the reft of mankind.

§. 14. It is often afked as a mighty ob-
jection, where are, or ever were there any
men in fuch a Jiate of nature f To which it
may fuffice as an anfwer at prefent, that
fince all princes and rulers of independent —
governments all through the world, are in a
ftate of nature, it is plain the world never
was, nor ever will be, without numbers of
men in that ftate. I have named all go-
vernors of independent communities, whether
they are, or are not, in league with others :
for it is not every compact that puts an end
to the ftate of nature between men, but only
this one of agreeing together mutually to
enter into one community, and make one
body politic ; other promifes, and compacts,
men may make one with another, and yet
ftili be in the ftate of nature. The promifes
.and bargains for truck, &c. between the two
men in the defert ifland, mentioned by Gar-
cilajfo de la Vega, in his hiftory of Peru ; or
between a Swifs and an Indian, in the woods,
of America, are binding to them, though
they are perfectly in a ftate of nature, in
reference to one another : for truth and
keeping of faith belongs to men, as men,
and not as members of fociety.

§• *5-

206 Of Civil-Government.

§. 15. To thofe that fay, there were never
any men in the flate of nature, I will not
only oppofe the authority of the judicious
Hooker, Keel. Pol. lib. \. feci. 10. where he
fays, 'The laws which have been hitherto men-'
tioned, i. e. the laws of nature, do bind rrien
abfolutely, even as they are 7nen, although they
have never any fettled fellow/hip, never any
folemn agreement amongjl them/elves what to do,
or not to do: but forafmuch as we are not
by ourfelves fufficie?it to furnijh ourfelves with
competent ftore of things, needful for fuch a
life as our nature doth defire, a life fit for the
dignity of man ; therefore to fupply thofe defects
and imperfections which are in us, as living
fingle and folely by ourfelves, we are fiaturally
induced to feek communio?i and fellowfhip with
others : this was the caufe of?nens uniting them-
f elves at firfl in politic focieties. But I more-
over affirm, that all men are naturally in
that flate, and remain fo, till by their own
confents they make themfelves members of
fome politic fociety -, and I doubt not in the
fequel of this difcourfe, to make it very clear.

CHAP. III.

Of the State of War,

§. 16. f"'g "^ H E flate of war is a ftate of

enmity and deflruBion : and

therefore declaring by word or adion, not

Of Civil-Government, 207

a paffionate and hafty, but a fedate fettled
defign upon another man's life, puts him in
a fiate of war with him againft whom he
has declared fuch an intention, and fo has
expofed his life to the other's power to be
taken away by him, or any one that joins
with him in his defence, and efpoufes his
quarrel; it being reafonable and juft, I mould
have a right to deflroy that which threatens
me with deftru&ion : for, by the fundamental
law of naturet man being to be prrferi).ed as
much as poffible, when all cannot be pre-
ferred, the fafety of the innocent is to be
preferred : and one may deflroy a man who
makes war upon him, or has difcovered an
enmity to his being, for the fame reafon that
he may kill a wolf or a lion ; becaufe fuch
men are not under the ties of the common-
law of reafon, have no other rule, but that
of force and violence, and fo may be treated
as beafts of prey, thofe dangerous and noxious
creatures, that will be fure to deflroy him
whenever he falls into their power.

§.17. And hence it is, that he who at-
tempts to get another man into his abfolute
power, does thereby put himfelf into a fiate
of war with him ; it being to be underftood
as a declaration of a defign upon his life :
for I have reafon to conclude, that he who
would get me into his power without my
confent, would ufe me as he pleafed when
he had got me there, and deflroy me too '

when

2o8 Of Civil-Government.
when he had a fancy to it ; for no body can
defire to have me in his abfolute power, unlefs
it be to compel me by force to that which
is againft the right of my freedom, i. e.
make me a flave. To be free from fuch
force is the only fecurky of my prefervation >
and reafon bids me look on him, as an enemy
to my prefervation, who would take away
that freedom which is the fence to it ; fo
that he who makes an attempt to enjlave me,
thereby puts himfelf into a ftate of war with
me. He that, in the ftate of nature, would
take away the freedom that belongs to any
one in that ftate, muft neceffarily be fuppofed
to have a defign to take away every thing
elfe, that freedom being the foundation of all
the reft ; as he that, in the ftate of fociety,
would take away the freedom belonging to
thofe of that fociety or common-wealth, muft
he fuppofed to defign to take away from
them every thing elfe, and fo be looked on
as in a ftate of war*

§. 1 8. This makes it lawful for a man to
kill a thief who has not in the leaft hurt
him, nor declared any defign upon his life,
any farther than, by the ufe of force, fo to
get him in his power, as to take away his
money, or what he pleafes, from him $ be-
caufe ufing force, where he has no right, to
get me into his power, let his pretence be
what it will, I have no reafon to fuppofe,
that he, who would take away my liberty > would

not,

Ar

Of Ci vil-Gove rn Me nt. 209

not, when he had me in his power, take
away every thing elfe. And therefore it is
lawful for me to treat him as one who has
put himfelf into a Jiate of war with me, /. e.
kill him if I can ; for to. that hazard does
he juftly expofe himfelf, whoever introduces
a ftate of war, and is aggreffor in it.

§. 19. And here we have the plain dif-
ference between the Jiate of nature a?id the
fiate of war, which however fome men have
confounded, are as far diftant, as a {late of
peace, good will, mutual affiftance and pre-
fervation, and a flate of enmity, malice,
violence and mutual deftruction, are one from
another. Men living together according to
reafon, without a common fuperior on earth,
with authority to judge between them, is
properly the fiate of nature. But force, or a
declared deiign of force, upon the perfon of
another, where there is no common fuperior
on earth to appeal to for relief, is the Jiate of
war : and it is the want of fuch an appeal
gives a man the right of war even againft an
aggrefjor, tho' he be in fociety and a fellow
fubjedt. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm,
but by appeal to the law, for having ftolen
all that I am worth, I may kill, when he fets
on me to rob me but of my horfe or coat ;
becaufe the law, which was made for my
prefervation, where it cannot interpofe to fe-
cure my life from prefent force, which, if
loft, is capable of no reparation, permits me
P my

210 Of Civil-Government.

my own defence, and the right of war, a
liberty to kill the aggreffor, becaufe the ag-
grefTor allows not time to appeal to our com-
mon judge, nor the decifion of the law, for
remedy in a cafe where the mifchief may
be irreparable. Want of a common judge
with authority, puts all men in a ftate of
nature : force without right, upon a man's
perfon, makes a flate of war, both where
there is, and is not, a common judge.

§. 20. But when the actual force is over,
the Jlate of war ceafes between thofe that
are in fociety, and are equally on both fides
fubjected to the fair determination of the
law '3 becaufe then there lies open the remedy
of appeal for the paft injury, and to prevent
future harm : but where no fuch appeal is,
as in the flate of nature, for want of pofitive
laws, and judges with authority to appeal to,
the flate of war once begun, continues, with
a right to the innocent party to deftroy the
other whenever he can, until the aggreffor
offers peace, and defires reconciliation on fuch
terms as may repair any wrongs he has al-
ready done, and Secure the innocent for the
future ; nay, where an appeal to the law, and
conftituted judges, lies open, but the remedy
is denied by a manifelt, perverting of juflice,
and a barefaced wrefdng of the laws to pro-
tect or indemnify the violence or injuries of
fome men, or party df men, there it is hard
to imagine any thing but a jlate of war:

for

Of Civil-Government. 211
for where-ever violence is ufed, and injury
done, though by hands appointed to admi-
nifter juftice, it is Hill violence and injury,
however coloured with the name, pretences,
or forms of law, the end whereof being to
protect and redrefs the innocent, by an un-
biased application of it, to all who are under
it ; where-ever that is not bona fide done,
war is made upon the fufferers, who ftaving
no appeal on earth to right them, they are
left to the only remedy in fuch cafes, an
appeal to heaven.

§.21. To avoid this Jlate of war (wherein
there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein
every the leaft difference is apt to end, where
there is no authority to decide between the
contenders) is one great reafon of men's putting
themfelves into fociety, and quitting the date
of nature : for where there is an authority,
a power on earth, from which relief can be
had by appeal, there the continuance of the
jlate of war is excluded, and the controverfy
is decided by that power. Had there been
any fuch court, any fuperior jurifdiclion on
earth, to determine the right between Jephtha
and the Ammojiites, they had never come to
a Jlate of war : but we fee he was forced to
appeal to heaven. The Lord- the Judge (fays
he) be judge this day between the children of
Ifrael and the children of Amnion, J^g- **•
27. and then profecuting, and relying on his
appeal, he leads out his army to battle : and
P 2 therefore

212 Of Civil-Government.

therefore in fuch controverfies, where the
queftion is put, who Jhall be judge ? It cannot
be meant, who (hall decide the controverfy;
every one knows what fephtha here tells us,
that the Lord the "Judge mall judge. Where
there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies
to God in heaven. That quefHon then can-
not mean, who mall judge, whether another
hath put himfelf in a jlate of war with me,
and whether I may, as fephtha did, appeal to
heaven in it ? of that I myfelf can only be
judge in my own'confcience, as I will an-
swer it, at the great day, to the fupreme judge
of all men.

CHAP. IV.
Of SLAVERY.

§.22. ' | ^ HE natural liberty of man is to
L be free from any fuperior power
on earth, and not to be under the will or
legiflative authority of man, but to have only
the law of nature for his rule. The liberty
of man, in fociety, is to be under no other
legiflative power, but that eftablimed, by
confent, in the common-wealth ; nor under
the dominion of any will, or reftraint of any
law, but what that legiflative mail enact,
according to the trufl: put in it. Freedom
then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us,
Obfervations, A. $$. a liberty for every one
4 t$

Of Civil-Government. 213

t@ do what be lifts, to live as be pleafes, and
not to be tied by any laws : but freedom of men
under government is, to have a ftanding rule
to live by, common to every one of that
fociety, and made by the legiflative power
erected in it ; a liberty to follow my own will
in all things, where the rule prefcribes not ;
and not to be fubjecl to the inconftant, un-
certain, unknown, arbitrary will of another
man : as freedom of nature is, to be under no
other restraint but the law of nature.

§. 23. This freedom from abfolute, arbi-
trary power, is fo neceffary to, and clofely
joined with a man's prefervation, that he
cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his
prefervation and life together : for a man,
not having the power of his own life, cannot,
by compact, or his own confent, en/lave bim-
felf to any one, nor put himfelf under the
abfolute, arbitrary power of another, to take
away his life, when he pleafes. No body can
give more power than he has himfelf -, and
he that cannot take away his own life, cannot
give another power over it. Indeed, having
by his fault forfeited his own life, by fome
acl: that deferves death j he, to whom he
has forfeited it, may (when he has him in
his power) delay to take it, and make ufe
of him to his own fervice, and he does him
no injury by it : for, whenever he finds the
hardmip of his flavery outweigh the value of
his life, it is in his power, by refilling the,

P 3 will

214 O F C I V I L -G O V E R N M E N T .

will of his mafter, to draw on himfelf the
death he defires.

§. 24. This is the perfect condition of
ftanjery, which is nothing elfe, but the ft ate
of war continued, between a lawful conqueror
and a captive : for, if once compact enter
between them, and make an agreement for a
limited power on the one fide, and obedience
on the other, the ft ate of war and ftavery
ceafes, as long as the compact endures : for,
as has been faid, no man can, by agreement,
pafs over to another that which he hath not
in himfelf, a power over his own life.

I confefs, we find among the Jews, as-
well as other nations, that men did fell
themfelves 3 but, it is plain, this was only
to drudgery, not to ftavery : for, it is evident,
the perfon fold was not under an abfolute,
arbitrary, defpotical power : for the mafter
could not have power to kill him, at any
time, whom, at a certain time, he was ob-
liged to let go free out of his fervicej and
the mafter of fuch a fervant was-fo far from
having an arbitrary power over his life, that
he could not, ^t pleafure, fo much as maim
him, but the lofs of an eye, or tooth, fet
him free, Exod. xxi.

/

CHAP.

Of Civil-Government. 215

CHAP. V.
Of PROPER? T.

§. 25. \ T THether we confider natural rea-
VV fon, which tells us, that men,
being once born, have a right to their pre-
fervation, and confequently to meat and
drink, and fuch other things as nature af-
fords for their fubflftence : or revelation*
which gives us an account of thofe grants
God made of the world to Adam, and to
Noah, and his fons, it is very clear, that
God, as king David fays, Pfal. cxv. 16. has
given the earth to the children of men ; given
it to mankind in common. But this being
fuppofed, it feems to fome a very great dif-
ficulty, how any one fhould ever come to
have a property in any thing : I will not con-
tent myfelf to anfwer, that if it be difficult
to make out property, upon a fuppofition that
God gave the world to Adamy and his po-
jfterity in common, it is impoffible that any
man, but one univerfal monarch, fhould have
any property upon a fuppofition, that God
gave the world to Ada?n, and his heirs in
fucceffion, excluiive of all the reft of his po-
fterity. But I (hall endeavour to (hew, how
men might come to have a property in feveral
parts of that which God gave to mankind in
common, and that without any exprefs com-
pact of all the commoners.

P4 §.26..

2"i6 Of Civil-Government.

§. 26. God, who hath given the world to
men in common, hath alfo given them reafon
to make ufe of it to the beft advantage of
life, and convenience. The earth, and all
that is therein, is given to men for the fup-
port and comfort of their being. And tho' ^
all the fruits it naturally produces, and fyeafts %/J
^QL~ it feeds, belong to mankind in common, as
) * they are produced by the fpontaneous hand
of nature ; and no body has originally a
private dominion, exclufive of the reft of
mankind, in any of them, as they are thus
in their natural ftate : yet being given for
the ufe of men, there muft of necemty be a
means to appropriate them fome way or other,
before they can be of any ufe, or at all be-
neficial to any particular man. The fruit,
or venifon, which nourimes the wild Indian,
who knows no inclofure, and is ftill a tenant
in common, muft be his, and fo his, i. e. a
part of him, that another can no longer
have anv ri^ht to it, before it can do him
any good for the fupport of his life.

§. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior
creatures, be common to all men, yet every
man has a property in his own perfon : this
no body has any right to but himfelf. The
labour of his body, and the work of his hands,
we may fay, are properly his. Whatfoever
then he removes out cf the ftate that nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed
his labour with, and joined to it fomething

that

Of Civil-Government. 217

that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property. It being by him removed from
the common ftate nature hath placed it in,
it hath by this labour fomething annexed to
it, that excludes the common right of other
I men : for this labour being the unqueftionable
property of the labourer, no man but he can
have a right to what that is once joined to,
at leaft where there is enough, and as good,
left in common for others.

§. 28. He that is nourifhed by the acorns
he picked up under an oak, or the apples he
gathered from the trees in the wood, has
certainly appropriated them to himfelf. No
body can deny but the nourifhrnent is his.
I afk then, when did they begin to be his ?
when he digefled ? or when he eat ? or when
he boiled ? or when he brought them home ?
or when he picked their, up ? and it is plain,
if the firft gathering made them not his,
nothing elfe could. That labour put a di-
ftinction between them and common : that
added fomething to them more than nature,
the common mother of all, had done ; and
fo they became his private right. And will
any one fay, he had no right to thofe acorns
or apples, he thus appropriated, becaufe he
had not the confent of all maikind to make
them his ? Was it a robbery tius to aflume
to himfelf what belonged to all in common ?
If fuch a confent as that was neceffary, man
had flarved, notwithstanding the plenty God

had

2i8 Of Civil-Government.

had given him. We fee in commons, which
remain fo by compact, that it is the taking
any part of what is common, and removing
it out of the flate nature leaves it in, which
begins the property j without which the com-
mon is of no ufe. And the taking of this
or that part, does not depend on the exprefs
confent of all the commoners. Thus the
grafs my horfe has bit ; the turfs my fervant
has cut ; and the ore I have digged in any
place, where I have a right to them in
common with others, become my property ,
without the aflignation or confent of any
body. The labour that was mine, removing
them out of that common flate they were
in, hath fixed my property in them.

§. 29. By making in explicit confent of
every commoner, neceffary to any one's ap-
propriating to himfelf any part of what is
given in common, children or fervants could
not cut the meat, which their father or
matter had provided for them in common,
without affigning to every one his peculiar
part. Though the water running in the
fountain be every one's, yet who can doubt,
but that in tbe pitcher is his only who
drew it out ? His labour hath taken it out
of the hands cf nature, where it was com-
mon, and belonged equally to all her chil-
dren, and hath thereby appropriated it to
himfelf.

§•3°-

Of Civil-Government. 219

§. 30. Thus this law of reafon makes the
deer that Indians who hath killed it ; it is
allowed to be his goods, who hath beft'owed
his labour upon it, though before it was the
common right of every one. And amongfl
thofe who are counted the civilized part of
mankind, who have made and multiplied
pofitive laws to determine property, this ori-
ginal law of nature, for the beginning of pro-
perty, in what was before common, itill takes
place j and by virtue thereof, what flm any
one catches in the ocean, that great and frill
remaining common of mankind ; or what
ambergrife any one takes up here, is by the
labour that removes it out of that common
itate nature left it in, made his property, who
takes that pains about it. And even amongir,
us, the hare that any one is hunting, is
thought his who purfues her during the chafe :
for being a bead that is ftill looked upon as
common, and no man's private pofleilion ;
whoever has employed fo much labour about
any of that kind, as to find and purfue her,
has thereby removed her from the ftate of
nature, wherein me was common, and hath
begun a property.

§.31. It will perhaps be objected to this,
that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits
of the earth, &c, makes a right to them,
then any one may ingrofs as much as he will-
To which I anfwer, Not fo. The fame law
of nature, that does by this means give us

property,

220 Of Civil-Government.

property, does alio bound that property too.
God has given us all things richly, r Tim. vi.
12. is the voice of reafon confirmed by in-
fpiration. But how far has he given it us ?
*to enjoy. As much as any one can make ufe
of to any advantage of life before it fpoils,
fo much he may by his labour fix a property
in : whatever is beyond this, is more than
his mare, and belongs to others. Nothing
was made by God for man to fpoil or de-
stroy. And thus, confidering the plenty of
natural provisions there was a long time in
the world, and the few fpenders ; and to how
frnall a part of that provision the induitry of
one man could extend itfelf, and ingrofs it
to the prejudice of others j efpecially keeping
within the bounds, fet by reafon, of what
might ferve for his ufe; there could be then
little room for quarrels or contentions about
property fo efcablifhed.

§. 32. But the chief matter of property be-
ing now not the fruits of the earth, and the
beafl:s that fubfift on it, but the earth itfelf -,
as that which takes in and carries with it all
the reft -, I think it is plain, that property in
that too is acquired as the former. As much
land as a man tills, plants, improves, culti-
vates, and can ufe the product of, fo much
is his property. He by his labour does, as it
were, inclofe it from the common. Nor will
it invalidate his right, to fay every body elfe
has aQ eaual title to it ; and therefore he

cannot

Of Civil-Government. 221
cannot appropriate, he cannot inclofe, with-
out the confent of all his fellow -commoners,
all mankind. God, when he gave the world
in common to all mankind, commanded man
alfo to labour, and the penury of his con-
dition required it of him. God and his rea-
fon commanded him to fubdue the earth,
i. e. improve it for the benefit of life, and
therein lay out fomething upon it that was
his own, his labour. He that in obedience
to this command of God, fubdued, tilled
and fowed any part of it, thereby annexed to
it fomething that was his property \ which
another had no title to, nor could without
injury take from him.

§.33. Nor was this appropriation of any
parcel of land, by improving it, any pre-
judice to any other man, fince there was
ftill enough, and as good left ; and more
than the yet unprovided could ufe. So that, in
effect, there was never the lefs left for others
becaufe of his inciofure ffer himfelf : for he
that leaves as much as another can make
ufe of, does as good as take nothing at all.
No body could think himfelf injured by the
drinking of another man, though he took a
good draught, who had a whole river of
the fame water left him to quench his
thirfl : and the cafe of land and water,
where there is enough of both, is perfectly
the fame.

§• 34-

222 Of Civil-Government.

§. 34. God gave the world to men in
common ; but fince he gave it them for their
benefit, and the greater! conveniencies of
life they were capable to draw from it, it
cannot be fuppcfed he meant it fhould al-
ways remain common and uncultivated. He
gave it to the ufe of the induftrious and ra-
tional, (and labour was to be his title to it;)
not to the fancy or covetoufnefs of the quar-
relfome and contentious. He that had as
good left for his improvement, as was already
taken up, needed not complain, ought not
to meddle with what was already improved
by another's labour : if he did, it is plain
he defired the benefit of another's pains,
which he had no right to, and not the ground
which God had given him in common with
others to labour on, and whereof there was
as good left, as that already pofTeiTed, and
more than he knew what to do with, or his
induflry could reach to.

§. 25- K is true, in land that is common in
"England^ or any other country, where there
is plenty of people under government, who
have money and commerce, no one can in-
clofe or appropriate any part, without t
confent of all his fellow-commoners ; becaufe
this is left common by compact, *'. e. by the
law of the land, which is not to be violated.
And though it be common, in refpecl of
feme men, it is not fo to all mankind; but
is the joint property of this country, or this

pariih -

Of Civil-Government. 223

parifb. Befides, the remainder, after fuch
inclofure, would not be as good to the reft
of the commoners, as the whole was when
they could all make ufe of the whole; v/hereas
in the beginning and firft peopling of the
great common of the world, it was quite
otherwife. The law man was under, was
rather for appropriating. God commanded,
and his wants forced him to labour. That
was his property which could not be taken
from him where-ever he had fixed it. And
hence fubduing or cultivating the earth, and
having dominion, we fee are joined together.
The one gave title to the other. So that
God, by commanding to fubdue, gave au-
thority fo far to appropriate : and the con-
dition of human life, which requires labour
and materials to work on, neceffarily intro-
duces private pofTeflions.

§. 36. The meajure of property nature has
well let by the extent of men's labour and the
conveniencies of life : no man's labour could
fubdue, or appropriate all ; nor could his
enjoyment confume more than a fmall part;
fo that it was impoflible for any man, this
way, to intrench upon the right of another,
or acquire to himfelf a property, to the pre-
judice of his neighbour, who would frill have
room for as good, and as large a porTeffion
(after the other had taken out his) as before
it was appropriated. This meafure did confine
every man's pojfeffion to a very moderate pro- >
5 portion,

224 Of Civil-Government.

portion, and fuch as he might appropriate
to himfelf, without injury to any body, in
the firft ages of the world, when men were
more in danger to be loft, by wandering from
their company, in the then vaft wildernefs
of the earth, than to be ftraitened for want
of room to plant in. And the fame meafure
may be allowed ftill without prejudice to any
body, as full as the world ieems : for fup-
pofing a man, or family, in the ftate they
were at firft peopling of the world by the
children of Adam, or Noah -, let him plant in
fome in-land, vacant places of America, we
fhall find that the pojfejjtons he could make
himfelf, upon the meajures we have given,
would not be very large, nor, even to this
day, prejudice the reft of mankind, or give
them reaibn to complain, or think them-
felves injured by this man's incroachment,
though the race of men have now fpread
themfelves to all the corners of the world,
and do infinitely exceed the fmall number
was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of
ground is of io little value, without labour,
that I have heard it affirmed, that in Spain
itfelf a man may be permitted to plough,
ibw and reap, without being difturbed, upon
land he has no other title to, but only his
making ufe of it. But, on the contrary, the
inhabitants think themfelves beholden to
him, who, by his induftry on neglecled, and
confequently wafte land, has increafed the

ftock

Of Cl VIL-GOVERNMENT. 22£

flock of corn, which they wanted. Bat be
this as it will, which I lay no ftrefs on ; this
I dare boldly affirm, that the fame rule of
propriety, {viz.) that every man mould have
as much as he could make-ufe of, would hold
frill in the world, without flraitening any
body; fince there is land enough in the
world to fuffice double the inhabitants, had
not the invention of money, and the tacit agree-
ment of men to put a value on it, introduced
(by confent) larger polTemons, and a right to
them ; which, how it has done, I (hail by
and by fhew more at large.

§. 37. This is certain, that in the begin-
ning, before the defire of having more than
man needed had altered the intrinfic value
of things, which depends only on their ufe-
fulnefs to the life of man ; or had agreed,
that a little piece of yellow metal, which would
keep without wafting or decay, mould be
worth a great piece of flefh, or a whole heap
of corn ; though men had a right to appro-
priate, by their labour, each one to himfelf,
as much of the things of nature, as he could
ufe : yet this could not be much, nor to the
prejudice of others, where the fame plenty
was flill left to thofe who would ufe the
fame induftry. To which let me add, that
he who appropriates land to himfelf by his
labour, does not lelTen, but increafe the com-
mon frock of mankind : for the provifions
ferving to the fupport of human life, pro-
Q^ duced

226 Of Civil-Government.

duced by one acre of inclofed and culti-
vated land, are (to fpeak much within com-
pafs) ten times more than thofe which are
yielded by an acre of land of an equal rich-
nefs lying wafte in common. And therefore
he that inclofes land, and has a greater plenty
of the conveniencies of life from ten acres,
than he could have from an hundred left to
nature, may truly be faid to give ninety
acres to mankind : for his labour now fup-
plies him with provifions out of ten acres,
which were but the product of an hundred
lying in common. I have here rated the
improved land very low, in making its pro-
duct but as ten to one, when it is much
nearer an hundred to one : for I afk, whether
in the wild woods and uncultivated wafte of
America, left to nature, without any improve-
ment, tillage or hufbandry, a thoufand acres
yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as
many conveniencies of life, as ten acres of
equally fertile land do in Devcnfljire, where
they are well cultivated ?

Before the appropriation of land, he who
gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed,
caught, or tamed, as many of the beafts, as
he could -, he that fo imployed his pains
about any of the fpontaneous products of
nature, as any way to alter them from the
ftate which nature put them in, by placing
any of his labour on them, did thereby ac-
quire a propriety in them : but if they perifhed,

in

Of CiviL'OovEKivMtNT, 227

in his poffeiiion, without their due ufe ; if
the fruits rotted, or the venifon putriiied,
before he could fpend it, he offended againfl
the common law of n;.:ure, and was liable
to be punimed ; he invaded his neighbour's
fhare, for he had no right, farther than his
z/fe called for any of them, and they might
ferve to afford him conveniencies of life.

§.38. The fame meafures governed the
pofjefjion of land too : whatfeever he tilled and
reaped, laid up and made ufe of, before it
fpoiled, that was his peculiar right ; what-
foever he enclofed, and could feed, and make
ufe of, the cattle and product was alfo his.
But if either the grafs of his inclofure rotted
on the ground, or the fruit of his planting
perifhed without gathering, and laying up,
this part of the earth, notwithftanding his
inclofure, was ftill to be looked on as wafte,
and might be the poffeffion of any other.
Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take
as much ground as he could till, and make
it his own land, and yet leave enough to
Abel's fheep to feed on ; a few acres would
ferve for both their poffefTions. But as fa-
milies increafed, and induftry inlarged their
flocks, their pojfej/ions inlarged with the need
of them -, but yet it was commonly without
any fixed property in the ground they made
ufe of, till they incorporated, fettled them-
felves together, and built cities ,• and then,
by confent, they came in time, to fet out '
Qj2 the

228 Of Civil-Government.

the bounds of their dijiincl territories, and agree
on limits between them and their neigh-
bours j and by laws within themfelves, fet-
tled the properties of thofe of the fame fo-
ciety : for we fee, that in that part of the
world which was firft inhabited, and there-
fore like to be beft peopled, even as low
down as Abraham's time, they wandered with
their flocks, and their herds, which was their
fubftance, freely up and down ; and this
Abraham did, in a country where he was a
Granger. "Whence it is plain, that at leaft
a great part of the land lay in common ; that
the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed
property in any more than they made ufe of.
But when there was not room enough in the
fame place, for their herds to feed together,
they by confent, as Abraham and Lot did,
Gen. xiii. 5. feparated and inlarged their
pafture, where it bell liked them. And for
the fame reafon Efau went from his father,
and his brother, and planted in mount Seir,
Gen. xxxvi. 6.

§. 39. And thus, without fuppofing any
private dominion, and property in Adam, over
all the world, exclufive of all other men,
which can no v/ay be proved, nor any one's
property be made out from it ; but fuppofing
the 'world given, as it was, to the children of
men in common, we fee how labour could make
men diftinct titles to feveral parcels of it, for

their

Of Civil-Government. 229

their private ufes ; wherein there could be no
doubt of right, no room for quarrel.

§. 40. Nor is it fo ftrange, as perhaps
before confideration it may appear, that the
property of labour mould be able to over-
balance the community of land : for it is
labour indeed that puts the difference of value
on every thing ; and let any one conlider what
the difference is between an acre of land
planted with tobacco or fugar, fown with
wheat or barley, and an acre of the fame
land lying in common, without any huf-
bandry upon it, and he will find, that the
improvement of labour makes the far greater
part of the value. I think it will be but a
very modeft computation to fay, that of the
produces of the earth ufeful to the life of
man nine tenths are the effects of labour : nay,
if we will rightly eftimate things as they come
to our ufe, and caft up the feveral expences
about them, what in them is purely owing
to nature, and what to labour, we (hall find,
that in moil of them ninety-nine hundredths
are wholly to be put on the account of
labour,

§. 41. There cannot be a clearer demon-
ftration of any thing, than feveral nations of the
Americans are of this, who are rich in land, and
poor in all the comforts of life ; whom nature
having furnifhed as liberally as any other people,
with the materials of plenty, z. e. a fruitful
foil, apt to produce in abundance, what might ,

0^,3 ' ferve

230 Of Civil-Government.
ferve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for
want of improving it by labour, have not one
hundredth part of the conveniencies we en-
joy : and a king of a large and fruitful ter-
ritory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worfe
than a day-labourer in England.

§. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us
but trace fome of the ordinary provilions of
life, through their feveral progrerTes, before
they come to our ufe, and fee how much
they receive of their value from human indujiry,.
Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily
ufe, and great plenty -, yet notwithftanding,
acorns, water and leaves, or fkins, muit be
our bread, drink and cioathing, did not la-
bour furnifh us with thefe more ufeful com-
modities : for whatever bread is more worth
than acorns, wine than water, and cloth or
flk, than leaves, fkins or mofs, that is wholly
owing to, labour and indujiry -, the one of
thefe being the food and raiment which
unafiifted nature furnifhes us with -, the other,
provilions which our induftry and pains pre-
pare for us, which how much they exceed
the other in value, when any one hath com*
p«ted, he will then fee how much labour
makes the far greatejl part of the value of
things we enjoy in this world : and the
ground which produces the materials, is
fcarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at moft,
but a very fmall part of it ; fo little, that
even amongft us, land that is left wholly to

nature^

Of Civil-Government. 231

nature, that hath no improvement of paftu-
rage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed
it is, wajie ; and we (hall find the benefit of
it amount to little more than nothing.

This mews how much numbers of men
are to be preferred to largehefs of dominions;
and that the increafe of lands, and the right
employing of them, is the great art of govern-
ment : and that prince, who (hail be fo wife
and godlike, as by eftabliihed laws of liberty
to fecure protection and encouragement to
the honeft induftry of mankind, againft the
oppreflion of power and narrownefs of party,
will quickly be too hard for his neighbours :
but this by the by. To return to the argu-
ment in hand,

§. 43. An acre of land, that bears here
twenty bumels of wheat, and another in
America, which, with the fame husbandry,
would do the like, are, without doubt, of
the fame natural intrinfic value : but yet the
benefit mankind receives from the one in a
year, is worth 5 /. and from the other
pofiibly not worth a penny, if all the profit
an Indian received from it were to be valued,
and fold here ; at lead, I may truly fay, not
one thoufandth. It is labour then which puts
the great efi part of value upon land, without
which it would fcarcely be worth any thing :
it is to that we owe the greatefl part of ail
its uieful products • for all that the draw,
bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more

Q^j. worth

232 Of Civil-Government.

worth than the product of an acre of as good
land, which lies wafte, is all the effect of
labour : for it is not barely the plough-man's
pains, the reaper's and threfher's toil, and
the baker's fweat, is to be counted into the
bread we eat ; the labour of thofe who broke
the oxen, who digged and wrought the iron
and ftones, who felled and framed the timber
employed about the plough, mill, oven, or
any other utenfils, which are a van: number,
requifite to this corn, from its being feed to
be fown to its being made bread, mult all be
charged on the account of labour, and re-
ceived as an effect of that : nature and the
earth furnifhed only the almoft worthlefs
materials, as in themfelves. It would be a
flrange catalogue of things ', that induftry pro-
'vided and made nfe of, about every loaf of bread,
before it came to our ufe, if we could trace
them ; iron, wood, leather, bark, timber,
ilone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs,
pitch, tar, malls, ropes, and all the materials
made ufe of in the fhip, that brought any of
the commodities made ufe of by any of the
workmen, to any part of the work ; all which
it would be almoft impofiible, at leaft too
long, to reckon up.

§. 44. From all which it is evident, that
though the things of nature are given in
common, yet man, by being mailer of him-
felf, and proprietor of his own perfon, and the
&c~lions or labour of it, had fill tn himfelf the

great

Of Civil-Government. 233

great foundation of property ; and that, which
made up the great part of what he applied
to the fupport or comfort of his being, when
invention and arts had improved the conve-
niences of life, was perfectly his own, and
did not belong in common to others.

§. 45. Thus labourt in the beginning, gave
a right of property, wherever any one was
pleafed to employ it upon what was com-
mon, which remained a long while the far
greater part, and is yet more than mankind
makes ufe of. Men, at firft, for the mod
part, contented themfelves with what un-
affifted nature offered to their neceilities :
and though afterwards, in fome parts of the
world, (where the increafe of people and
flock, with the ufe of mo?iey, had made land
fcarce, and fo of fome value) the feveral
communities fettled the bounds of their diftinct
territories, and by laws within themfelves
regulated the properties of the private men
of their fociety, and fo, by co?npat~l and
agreement, fettled the property which labour
and induftry began ; and the leagues that
have been made between feveral ftates and
kingdoms, either exprefly or tacitly difowning
all claim and right to the land in the others
porTeffion, have, by common confent, given up
their pretences to their natural common right,
which originally they had to thofe countries,
and fo have, by po/itive agreement, fettled a
property amongft themfelves, in diftinct; parts
and parcels of the earth ; yet there are rtill '

great '

234 Of Civil-Government.
great tracts of ground to be found, which
(the inhabitants thereof not having joined
with the red of mankind, in the confent of
the ufe of their common money) lie wafte,
and are more than the people who dwell
on it do, or can make ufe of, and fo ftill
lie in common j tho' this can fcarce happen
amongft that part of mankind that have
confented to the ufe of money.

§. 46. The greatell: part of things really
iifeful to the life of man, and fuch as the
neceffity of fubfifting made the firfl com-
moners of the world look after, as it doth
the Americans now, are generally things of
jhort duration ; fuch as, if they are not con-
fumed by ufe, will decay and perifh of them-
felves : gold, filver and diamonds, are things
that fancy or agreement hath put the value
on, more than real ufe, and the necelfary
fupport of life. Now of thofe good things
which nature hath provided in common,
every one had a right (as hath been faid) to as
much as he could ufe, and property in all that
he could erTecl: with his labour ; all that his
indujlry could extend to, to alter from the
ftate nature had put it in, was his. He that
gathered a hundred bufhels of acorns or ap-
ples, had thereby a property in them, they
were his goods as foon as gathered. He was
only to look, that he ufed them before they
fpoiled, elfe he took more than his fhare, and
robbed others. And indeed it was a foolilh
thing, as well as difhoneft, to hoard up more
l than

Of Civil-Government. 235
than he could make ufe of. If he gave away
a part to any body elfe, fo that it perifhed
not ufelefly in his poffefTion, thefe he alfo
made ufe of. And if he alfo bartered away
plums, that would have rotted in a week,
for nuts that would lafl good for his eating
a whole year, he did no injury ; he wailed
not the common flock ; deflroyed no part of
the portion of goods that belonged to others,
fo long as nothing perifhed ufelefly in his
hands. Again, if he would give his nuts
for a piece of metal, pleafed with its co-
lour; or exchange his fheep for fhells, or
wool for a fparkling pebble or a diamond, and
keep thofe by him all his life, he invaded
not the right of others, he might heap up
as much of thefe durable things as he pleafed;
the exceeding of the bounds cfh'is juft property
not lying in the largenefs of his poMeilion,
but the perifbing of any thing ufelefly in it.

§.47. And thus came in the ufe of mo?iey9
fome lafling thing that men might keep witn-
out fpoiling, and that by mutual confent men
would take in exchange for the truly ufefu!,
but perifhable fupports of life.

§.48. And as different degrees of induflry
were apt to give men pofTeffions in different
proportions, fo this invention of money gave
them the opportunity to continue and en-
large them : for fuppoiing an ifland, feparate
from all pofhble commerce with the reft of
the world, wherein there were but an hun-
dred families, but there were fheep, horfes

and

236 Of Civil-Government.

2nd cows, with other ufeful animals, whol-
fome fruits, and land enough for corn for a
hundred thoufand times as many, but no-
thing in the itland, either becaufe of its com-
monnefs, or perifhablenefs, fit to fupply the
place of money ; what reafon could any one
have there to enlarge his poiTeffions beyond
the ufe of his family, and a plentiful fupply
to its conjumption, either in what their own
induftry produced, or they could barter for
like perimable, ufeful commodities, with
others ? Where there is not fome thing, both
lafting and fcarce, and fo valuable to be
hoarded up, there men will be apt to enlarge
their pojj'ejjions of land, were it never fo rich,
never fo free for them to take : for I afk,
what would a man value ten thoufand, or an.
hundred thoufand acres of excellent land,
ready cultivated, and well flocked too with
cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of
America, where he had no hopes of com-
merce with other parts of the world, to draw
money to him by the fale of the product. ? It
would not be worth the inclofing, and we
fhould fee him give up again to the wild
common of nature, whatever was more than
would fupply the conveniencies of life to be
had there for him and his family.

^, 49. Thus in the beginning all the world
was America, and more fo than that is now ;
for no fuch thing as money was any where
known. Find out fomething that hath the

Of Civil-Government. 237

ufe and value of money amongft his neighbours,
you (hall fee the fame man will begin pre-
iently to enlarge his poffeflions.

§. 50. But lince gold and filver, being
little ufeful to the life of man in proportion
to food, raiment, and carriage, has its value
only from the confent of men, whereof
labour yet makes, in great part, the meafure, it
is plain, that men have agreed to a difpro-
portionate and unequal poffejjion of the earth,
they having, by a tacit and voluntary con-
fent, found out a way how a man may fairly
poflefs more land than he himfelf can ufe
the product of, by receiving in exchange for
the overplus gold and filver, which may
be hoarded up without injury to any one;
thefe metals not fpoiling or decaying in the
hands of the poffefTor. This partage of
things in an inequality of private poifeffions,
men have made practicable out of the bounds
of fociety, and without compact, only by put-
ting a value on gold and filver, and tacitly
agreeing in the ufe of money : for in go-
vernments, the laws regulate the right of
property, and the pofTeflion of land is deter-
mined by pofitive conftitutions.

§. 51. And thus, I think, it is very eafy
to conceive, without any difficulty, how labour
could at firfi begin a title of property in the
common things of nature, and how the fpend-
ing it upon our ufes bounded it. So that
there could then be no reafon of quarrelling

about

238 Of Civil-Government.
about title, nor any doubt about the large-
neis of poilcflion it gave. Right and con-
veniency went together -, for as a man had a
right to ali he could employ his labour upon,
ib he had no temptation to labour for more
than he could make ufe of. This left no room
for con troverfy about the title, nor for incroach-
ment on the right of others ; what portion a
man carved to himfelf, was eafily feen ; and
it was ufelefs, as well as difhoneft, to carve
himfelf too much, or take more than he
needed.

CHAP. VI.

Of Paternal Power.

§. 52. T T may perhaps be cenfured as an
JL impertinent criticifm, in a difcourfe
of this nature, to find fault with words and
names, that have obtained in the world :
and yet poffibly it may not be amifs to offer
new ones, when the old are apt to lead men
into miftakes, as this of paternal power pro-
bably has done, which feems fo to place the
power of parents over their children wholly
in the father, as if the mother had no (hare
in it ; whereas, if we confult reafon or reve-
lation, we fhall find, {he hath an equal title.
This may give one reafon to afk, whether
this might not be more properly called pa-
rental power ? for whatever obligation nature

arid

Of Civil-Government. 239
and the right of generation lays on children,
it mull certainly bind them equal to both
the concurrent caufes of it. And accordingly
. we fee the politive law of God every where
joins them together, without di{lin6tion>wheii
it commands the obedience of children, Ho-
nour thy father and thy mother, Excd. xx. 12.
Whofoever curfeth his father or his mother, Lev.
xx. 9. Te fiall fear every man his mother and
bis father, Lev. xix. 3. Children, obey your
parents, Sec. Eph. vi. 1. is the flile of the
Old and New Teftament.

§. 53. Had but this one thing been well
confidered, without looking any deeper into
the matter, it might perhaps have kept men.
from running into thofe grofs miftakes, they
have made, about this power of parents ;
which, however it might, without any great
harfhnefs, bear the name of abfolute domi-
nion, and regal authority, when under the
title of paternal power it feemed appropriated
to the father, would yet have founded but
oddly, and in the very name (hewn the ab-
furdity, if this fuppofed abfolute power over
children had been called parental; and thereby
have difcovered, that it belonged to the mo- Jj. ty
ther too : for it will but very ill ferve the
turn of thofe men, who contend fo much for
the abfolute power and authority of the father-
hood, as they call it, that the mother mould
have any mare in it ; and it would have but
ill fupported the monarchy they contend for,

when '

24^ Of Civil-Government.

when by the very name it appeared, that that
fundamental authority, from whence they
would derive their government of a fingle
per foil only, was not placed in one, but two
perfons jointly. But to let this of names
pafs.

§. 54. Though I have faid above, Chap. IL
'That all men by nature are equal, I cannot be
fuppofed to underfland all forts of equality :
age or virtue may give men a juft precedency :
excellency of parts and merit may place others
above the common level : birth may fubject
fome, and alliance or benefits others, to pay
an obfervance to thofe to whom nature, gra-
titude, or other refpec~ts, may have made it
due : and yet all this confifts with the equa-
lity, which all men are in, in refpect of
jurifdiction or dominion one over another ;
which was the equcHty I there fpoke of, as
proper to the bufinefs in hand, being that
equal right, that every man hath, to his natural
freedom, without being fubjec~ted to the will
or authority of any other man.

§. 55. Children, I confefs, are not born in
this full ftate of equality, though they are
born to it. Their parents have a fort of
rule and jurifdiclion over them, when they
come into the world, and for fome time
after ; but it is but a temporary one. The
bonds of this fubjeclion are like the fwaddling
clothes they art wrapt up in, and fupported
by, in the weaknefs of their infancy : age and

reafon

Of Civil-Government. 241

reafon as they grow up, loofen them, till at
length they drop quite off, and leave a man
at his own free difpofal.

§. 56. Adam was created a perfect man,
his body and mind in full poffeffion of their
ftrength and reafon, and fo was capable,
from the fir/l inffant of his being to provide
for his own fupport and prefervation, and
govern his actions according to the dictates
of the law of reafon which God had im-
planted in him. From him the world is
peopled with his defendants, who are all
born infants, weak and helplefs, without
knowledge or underftanding : but to fupply
the defects of this imperfect ftate, till the
improvement of growth and age hath removed
them, Adam and Eve, and after them all
parents were, by the law of nature, under an
obligation to preferve, ?iourifo, and educate the
children they had begotten ; not as their own
workmanfhip, but the workmanfhip of their
own maker, the Almighty, to whom they
were to be accountable for them.

§. 5j> The law, that was to govern Adam,
was the fame that was to govern all his
polterity, the law of reafon. But his off-
spring having another way of entrance into
the world, different from him, by 'tf natural
birth, that produced them ignorant and
without the ufe of reafon, they were not
prefently under that law ; for no body can
be under a law, which is not promulgated x

R t©

242 Of Civil-Government.

to him ; and this law being promulgated or
made known by reafon only, he that is not
come to the ufe of his reafon, cannot be faid
to be wider this law ; and Adams children,
being not prefently as foon as born under this
law of reafon, were not prefently free : for
law, in its true notion, is not fo much the
limitation as the direction of a free and in~
tellige?it agent to his proper intereft, and pre-
fcribes no farther than is for the general good
of thofe under that law : could they be hap-
pier without it, the law, as an ufelefs thing,
would of itfelf vanifh ; and that ill deferves
the name of confinement which hedges us
in only from bogs and precipices. 9o that,
however it may be miftaken, the e?id of law
is not to abolifh or reftrain, but to pnferve
and enlarge freedom : for in all the ftates of
created beings capable of laws, where there
is no law, there is no freedom : for liberty is, to
be free from reftrain t and violence from
others ; which cannot be, where there is no
law : but freedom is not, as we are told, a
liberty for every man to do what he lifts : (for
who could be free, when every other man's
humour might domineer over him ?) but a
liberty to difpofe, and order as he lifts, his
perfon, actions, pofieffions, and his whole
property, within the allowance of thofe laws
under which he is, and therein not to be
fubject to the arbitrary will of another, but
freely follow his own.

§•58-

Of Civil-Government. 243

§.58. The power, then, that parents have
over their children, arifes from that duty
which is incumbent on them, to take care
of their off-fpring, during the imperfect ftate
of childhood. To inform the mind, and
govern the actions of their yet ignorant non-
age, till reafon mail take its place, and eafe
them of that trouble, is what the children
want, and the parents are bound to : for God
having given man an underflanding to direct
his actions, has allowed him a freedom of
will, and liberty of acting, as properly be-
longing thereunto, within the bounds of that
law he is under. But whilft, he is in an
eftate, wherein he has not under/landing of
his own to direct his will, he is not to have
any will of his own to follow : he that im-
derjlands for him, mud will for him too; he
muft prefcribe to his will, and regulate his
actions; but when he comes to the eftate
that made his father a freeman, the fon is a
freejnan too.

§. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is
under, whether natural or civil. Is a man
under the law of nature ? What made him free
of that law ? what gave him a free difpofing
of his property, according to his own will,
within the compafs of that law ? I anfwer,
a ftate of maturity wherein he might be fup-
pofed capable to know that law, that {0 he
might keep his actions within the bounds of
it. When he has acquired that ftate, he is
R 2 prefumed

244 Op Civil-Government.

prefumed to know how far that law is to
be his guide, and how far he may make ufe
of his freedom, and fo comes to have it -3
till then, fome body elfe mud guide him,
who is prefumed to know how far the law
allows a liberty. If fuch a flate of reafon,
fuch an age of difcretion made him free ', the
fame mall make his fon free too. Is a man
under the law of England? What made him
free of that law ? that is, to have the liberty
to difpofe of his actions and polTeflions ac-
cording to his own will, within the permiflion
of that law ? A capacity of knowing that
law -y which is fuppofed by that law, at the
age of one and twenty years, and in fome
cafes fooner. If this made the father free,
it (hall make the fon free too. Till then we
fee the law allows the fon to have no will,
but he is to be guided by the will of his
father or guardian, who is to underfrand for
him. And if the father die, and fail to fub-
flitute a deputy in his truft ; if he hath not
provided a tutor, to govern his fon, during
his minority, during his want of undemand-
ing, the law takes care to do it ; fome other
mufl: govern him, and be a will to him, till
he hath attained to a Jiate of freedom, and
his undemanding be fit to take the govern-
ment of his will. But after that, the father
and fon are equally free as much as tutor
and pupil after nonage ; equally fubjects of
the fame law together, without any dominion

left

Of Civil-Government. 245
eft in the father over the life, liberty, or
eftate of his fori, whether they be only in
the ftate and under the law of nature, or
under the pofitive laws of an eftablifhed
government.

§. 60. But if, through defects that may
happen out of the ordinary courfe of nature*
any one comes not to fuch a degree of rea-
fon, wherein Jie might be fuppofed capable
of knowing the law, and fo living within
the rules of it, he is never capable of being a
free man, he is never let loofe to the difpofure
of his own will (becaufe he knows no bounds
to it, has not understanding, its proper guide)
but is continued under the tuition and go-
vernment of others, all the time his own
underftanding is uncapable of that charge.
And fo lunatics and ideots are never fet free
from the government of their parents ; chil-
dren, who are not as yet come unto thofe years
whereat they may have ; and innocents which
are excluded by a natural defect from ever
having; thirdly, madmen, which for the pre-
fent cannot poj/ibly have the ufe of right reafon
to guide tbemfelves, have for their guide, the
reafon that guideth other men which are tutors
over them, to feek and procure their good for
them, fays Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. feci. 7.
All which feems no more than that duty,
which God and nature has laid on man, as
well as other creatures, to preferve their ofF-
fpring, till they can be able to £hift for them-
R 3 felves,

246 Of Civil-Government.

felves, and will fcarce amount to an inftance
or proof of parents regal authority.

§. 6 1 . Thus we are born free, as we are
born rational ; not that we have actually the
exercife of either : age, that brings one, brings
with it the other too. And thus we fee how
natural freedom and fub) eel ion to parents may
confift together, and are both founded on the
fame principle. A child is free by his fa-
ther's title, by his father's understanding,
which is to govern him till he hath it of
his own. The freedom of a man at years of
difcretion, and the fubjeclion of a child to his
pareiits, whilft yet fhort of that age, are fo
confifcent, and fo diftinguimable, that the
moft blinded contenders for monarchy, by
right of fatherhood, cannot mifs this difference-,
the moll obflinate cannot but allow their
confiftency : for were their doctrine all true,
were the right heir of Adam now known,
and by that title fettled a monarch in his
throne, inverted with all the abfolute unli-
mited power Sir Robert Filmer talks of; if
he fhould die as foon as his heir were born,
muft not the child, notwithstanding he were
never fo free, never fo much fovereign, be
in fubje&ion to his mother and nurfe, to
tutors and governors, till age and education
brought him reafon and ability to govern
himielf and others ? 'The neceiiities of his
life, the health of his body, and the infor-
mation of his mind, would require him to be

directed

Of Civil-Government. 247

directed by the will of others, and not his
own ; and yet will any one think, that this
reftraint and fubjeclion were inconiiftent with,
or fpoiled him of that liberty or fovereignty
he had a right to, or gave away his empire
to thofe who had the -government of his
nonage ? This government over him only
prepared him the better and fooner for it.
If any body fhould afk me, when my fon is
of age to be free? I mall anfwer, jull when
his monarch is of age to govern. , But at
what time, fays the judicious Hooker, Eccl.
Pol. 1. i. feci. 6. a man may be /aid to have
attained fo far forth the ufe of reafon, as fuf-
ficeth to make him capable of thofe laws whereby
he is then bound to guide his actions : this is a
great deal ?nore eafy for fenfe to difcem, than
for any one by fkill and learning to determine.

§. 62. Common-wealths themfelves take
notice of, and allow, that there is a time when
men are to begin to ac~l like free men, and
therefore till that time require not oaths of
fealty, or allegiance, or other public owning
of, or fubmiffion to the government of their
countries.

§. 63. The freedom then of man, and li-
berty of acting according to his own will, is
grounded on his having reafon, which is able
to innruct him in that law he is to Severn
himfelf by, and make him know how far he
is left to the freedom of his own will. To
turn him loofe to an unreftrained liberty,

R 4 before

248 Of Civil-Government.

before he has reafon to guide him, is not the
allowing him the privilege of his nature to,
be free ; but to thruft him out amongft brutes,
and abandon him to a ftate as wretched, and
as much beneath that of a man, as their's.
This is that which puts the authority into
the parents hands to govern the minority of
their children. God hath made it their
bufmefs to employ this care on their ofF-
fpring, and hath placed in them fuitable
inclinations of tendernefs and concern to
temper this power, to apply it, as his wifdom
defigned it, to the children's good, as long as
they mould need to be under if.

§. 64. But what reafon can hence advance
this care of the parents due to their off-fpring
into an abfolute arbitrary dominion of the fa-
ther, whole power reaches no farther, than
by fuch a discipline, as he rinds mod: ef-
fectual, to give fuch ftrength and health to
their bodies, fuch vigour and rectitude to their
minds, as may heft fit his children to be moft
ufeful to themfelves and others; and, if it
be necefTary to his condition, to make them
work, when they are able, for their swn
fubfiitence. But in this power the mother
too has her mare with the father.

§. 65. Nay, this power lb little belongs to
the father by any peculiar right of nature,
but only as he is guardian of his children,
that when he quits his care of ihem, he lofes
his power over them, which goes along with

their

Of Civil-Government. 249

their nourishment and education, to which
it is inieparably annexed ; and it belongs as
much to the fofier-father of an expofed child,
as to the natural father of another. So little
power does the bare ac~l of begetting give a
man over his iflue ; if all his care ends there,
and this be all the title he hath to the name
and authority of a father. And what will
become of this paternal power in that part of
the world, where one woman hath more than
one hufband at a time ? or in thofe parts of
America, where, when the hulband and wife
part, which happens frequently, the children
are all left to the mother, follow her, and
are wholly under her care and proviiion ? If
the father die whilfl the children are young,
do they not naturally every where owe the
fame obedience to their mother, during their
minority, as to their father were he alive?
and will any one fay, that the mother hath
a legiflative power over her children ? that fhe
can make (binding rules, which mall be of
perpetual obligation, by which they ought to
regulate all the concerns of their property,
and bound their liberty all the courfe of their
lives ? or can me inforce the obfervation of
them with capital punimments ? for this is
the proper power of the magi/Irate, of which
the father hath not fo much as the Shadow.
His command over his children is but tem-
porary, and reaches not their life or pro-
perty : it is but a help to the weaknefs and

imperfection

250 Of Civil-Government.

imperfection of their nonage, a difeiplinc
neceflary to their education : and though a
father may difpofe of his own porTeffions as
he pleafes, when his children are out of
danger of perifhing for want, yet his power
extends not to the lives or goods, which
either their own induflry, or another's bounty
has made their's ; nor to their liberty neither,
when they are once arrived to the infranchife-
ment of the years of difcretion. The father s
empire then ceafes, and he can from thence
forwards no more difpofe of the liberty of his
fon, than that of any other man : and it muft
be far from an abiolute or perpetual jurif-
diction, from which a man may withdraw
himfelf, having licence from divine autho-
rity to leave father and mother, and cleave to
his wife.

§. 66. But though there be a time when
a child comes to be as free horn fubjeclion to
the will and command of his father, as the
father himfelf is free from fubjection to the
will of any body clfc, and they are each
under no other reftraint, but that which is
common to them both, whether it be the
law of nature, or municipal law of their coun-
try; yet this freedom exempts not a fon from
that honour which he ought, by the law of
God and nature, to pay his parents. God
having made the parents instruments in his
great defign of continuing the race of man-
kind, and the occafions of life to their chil-
dren -,

Of Civil-Government. 251

dren ; as he hath laid on them an obligation
to nourifh, preferve, and bring up their off-
spring ; lb he has laid on the children a per-
petual obligation of honouring their parents,
which containing in it an inward efteem and
reverence to be Shewn by all outward ex-
preiiions, ties up the child from any thing
that may ever injure or affront, difturb or
endanger, the happinefs or life of thole from
whom he received his ; and engages him in
all actions of defence, relief, afliftance and
comfort of thofe, by whofe means he entered
into being, and has been made capable of
any enjoyments of life : from this obligation
no flate, no freedom can abfolve children.
But this is very far from giving parents a
power of command over their children, or
an authority to make laws and difpofs as they
pleafe of their lives or liberties. It is one
thing to owe honour, rcfpect, gratitude and
affiftance ; another to require an abfolute
obedience and fubmiffion. The honour due
to parents, a monarch in his throne owes his
mother -, and yet this leffens not his autho-
rity, nor fubje&s him to her government.

§. 67. The fubjeclion of a minor places in
the father a temporary government, which
terminates with the minority of the child :
and the honour due from a child, places in the
parents a perpetual right to refpecl, reve-
rence, Support and compliance too, more or
lefs, as the father's care, con1, and kindnefs

in

252 Of Civil-Government.
in his education, has been more or lefs. This
ends not with minority, but holds in all parts
and conditions of a man's life. The want
of diftinguifhing thefe two powers, viz. that
which the father hath in the right of tuition,
during minority, and the right of honour all
his life, may perhaps have caufed a great
part of the miftakes about this matter : for
to fpeak properly of them, the firfh of thefe
is rather the privilege of children, and duty
of parents, than any prerogative of paternal
power. The nourifhment and education of
their children is a charge fo incumbent on
parents for their children's good, that nothing
can abfolve them from taking care of it : and
though the power of commanding and chajlijing
them go along with it, yet God hath woven
into the principles of human nature fuch a
tendernefs for their ofF-fpring, that there is
]ittl& fear that parents mould ufe their power
with too much rigour ; the excefs is feidom
on the fevere fide, the flrong byafs of nature
drawing the other way. And therefore God
almighty when he would exprefs his. gentle
dealing with the Ifraelites, he tells them,
that though he chaiiened them, he chajlened
them as a man chajiens his fin, Deut. viii. 5.
/. e. with tendernefs and affection, and kept
them under no feverer difcipline than what
was absolutely beft for them, and had been
lefs kindnefs to have Slackened. This is that
power to which children are commanded ahe*

dience,

Of Civil-Government.' 253
dience, that the pains and care of their pa-
rents may not be increafed, or ill rewarded.

§. 68. On the other fide, honour and fup-
port, all that which gratitude requires to re-
turn for the benefits received by and from
them, is the indifpenfible* duty of the child,
and the proper privilege of the parents. This
is intended for the parents advantage, as the
other is for the child's ; though education,
the parents duty, feems to have moft power,
becaufe the ignorance and infirmities of child-
hood ftand in need of reftraint and correction;
which is a vifible exercife of rule, and a kind
of dominion. And that duty which is com-
prehended in the word honour, requires lefs
obedience, though the obligation be ftronger
on grown, than younger children : for who
can think the command, Children obey your
parents, requires in a man, that has children
of his own, the fame fubmiffion to his father,
as it does in his yet young children to him ;
and that by this precept he were bound to
obey all his father's commands, if, out of a
conceit of authority, he mould have the m-
difcretion to treat him fr.il! as a boy ?

§. 69. The firft part then of paternal power*
or rather duty, which is education, belongs fo
to the father, that it terminates at a certain
feafon ; when the bufinefs of education is
over, it ceafes of itfelf, and is alfo alienable
before : for a man may put the tuition of
his fon in other hands; and he that has made

his .

254 Op Civil-Government.
his fon an apprentice to another, has difcharged
him, during that time, of a great part of his
obedience both to himfelf and to his mother.
But all the duty of honour ', the other part,
remains never the lefs entire to them ; no-
thing can cancel that : it is fo infeparable
from them both, that the father's authority
cannot difpofTefs the mother of this right,
nor can any man difcharge his fon from ho-
nouring her that bore him. But both thefe
are very far from a power to make laws,
and inforcing them with penalties, that may
reach eilate, liberty, limbs and life. The
power of commanding ends with nonage ;
and though, after that, honour and refpect,
fupport and defence, and whatfoever gra-
titude can oblige a man to, for the higher!
benefits he is naturally capable of, be always
due from a fon to his parents ; yet all this
puts no fcepter into the father's hand, no
fovereign power of commanding. He has
no dominion over his fon's property, or
actions ; nor any right, that his will mould
prefcribe to his fon's in all things ; however
it may become his fon in many things, not
very inconvenient to him and his family, to
pay a deference to it.

§.70. A man may owe honour and refpect
to an ancient, or wife man ; defence to his
child or friend ; relief and fupport to the
diftrelfed ; and gratitude to a benefactor, to
fuch a degree, that all he has, all he can do,

cannot

Of Civil-Government. 255

cannot fufficiently pay it : but all thefe give
no authority, no right to any one, of making
laws over him from whom they are owing*
And it is plain, all this is due not only to
the bare title of father ; not only becaufe,
as has been faid, it is owing to the mother
too; but becaufe thefe obligations to parents,
and the degrees of what is required of chil-
dren, mav be varied by the different care
and kindnefs, trouble and expence, which is
often employed upon one child more than
another.

§.71. This fhews the reafon how it comes
to pafs, that parents in Jocieties, where Vtliey
themfelves are fubjects, retain a power over
their children, and have as much right to
their fubjection, as thofe who are in the fiate
of nature. Which could not poffibly be, if
all political power were only paternal, and
that in truth they were one and the fame
thing : for then, all paternal power being in
the prince, the fubject could naturally have
none of it. But thefe two powers, political
and paternal, are fo perfectly diflinct and
feparate -, are built upon fo different foun-
dations, and given to fo different ends, that
every fubject that is a father, has as much
a paternal power over his children, as the
prince has over his': and every prince, that
has parents, owes them as much filial duty
and obedience, as the meaneft of his fubjects
do to their's; and can therefore contain not any

3 Part'

256 Of Civil-Government.

part or degree of that kind of dominion*
which a prince or magiftrate has over his
fubject.

§. 72. Though the obligation on the pa-
rents to bring up their children, and the ob-
ligation on children to honour their parents,
contain all the power on the one hand, and
fubmiffion on the other, which are proper to
this relation, yet there is another power ordi-
narily in the father, whereby he has a tie on
the obedience of his children ; which tho'
it be common to him with other men, yet
the occaiions of (hewing it, almoft constantly
happening to fathers in their private familiesi
and the.inftances of it elfewhere being rare,
and lefs taken notice of, it paffes in the world
for a part of paternal jurifditlion. And this
is the power men generally have to befiow
their ejiates on thofe who pleafe them beft ;
the pofTeffion of the father being the ex-
pectation and inheritance of the children,
ordinarily in certain proportions, according
to the law and cuftom of each country ; yet
it is commonly in the father's power to
beftow it with a more fparing or liberal
hand, according as the behaviour of this or
that child hath comported with his will and
humour.

§. 73. This is no fmall tie on the obe-
dience of children : and there being always
annexed to the enjoyment of land, a fub-
mitiion to the government of the country,

of

Of Civil-Government. 257
of which that land is a part ; it has been
commonly fuppofed, that a father could oblige
his pojierity to that government, of which he
himfelf was a fubjeet, and that his compact
held them ; whereas, it being only a necef-
fary condition annexed to the land, and the
inheritance of an eflate which is under that
government, reaches only thofe who will take
it on that condition, and fo is no natural tie
or engagement, but a voluntary fubmiflion :
for every mans children being by nature as
free as himfelf, or any of his anceflors ever
were, may, whilfl they are in that freedom,
choofe what fociety they will join themfelves
to, what common-wealth they will put
■ themfelves under. But if they will enjoy
the inheritance of their anceflors, they muft
take it on the fame terms their anceflors had
it, and fubmit to all the conditions annexed
to fuch a poffeflion. By this power indeed
fathers oblige their children to obedience to
themfelves, even when they are pafl minority,
and mofl commonly too fubjecl: them to this
or that political power : but neither of thefe
by any peculiar right of fatherhood, but by
the reward they have in their hands to in-
force and recompence fuch a compliance;
and is no more power than what a French
man has over an Englifo man, who by the
hopes of an eflate he will leave him, will
certainly have a flrong tie on his obedience :
and if, when it is left him, he will enjoy it,

S he

258 Of Civil-Government.

he muft certainly take it upon the conditions
annexed to the pofjejjion of land in that
country where it lies, whether it be France
or England.

§. 74. To conclude then, tho' the father s
power of commanding extends no farther
than the minority of his children, and to a
degree only fit for the difcipline and go-
vernment of that age ; and tho' that honour
and refpecl, and all that which the Latins
called piety, which they indifpenfibly owe to
their parents all their life-time, and in all
eftates, with all that fupport and defence is
due to them, gives the father no power of
governing, /. e. making laws and enacting
penalties on his children ; though by all this
he has no dominion over the property or
actions of his fon : yet it is obvious to con-
ceive how eafy it was, in the firit ages of
the world, and in places flill, where the
thinnefs of people gives families leave to
feparate into unpoffefTed quarters, and they
have room to remove or plant themfelves in
yet vacant habitations, for the father of the
family to become the prince of * it ; he had .

been

* It is no improbable opinion therefore, which the arch-
philofopher was of, that the chief perfon in every houfhold
was always, as it were, a king : fo when numbers of houf-
holds joined themfelves in civil focieties together, kings
were the firft kind of governors amongfl them, which is
alfo, as it feemeth, the reafon why the name of fathers con-
tinued ftill in them, who, of fathers, were made rulers ; as

alfo

Op Civil-Government. 259

been a ruler from the beginning of the in-
fancy of his children : and fince without
fome government it would be hard for them
to live together, it was likelier!: it fhould, by
the exprefs or tacit confent of the children
when they were grown up,- be in the father,
where it feemed without any change barely
to continue ; when indeed nothing more was
required to it, than the permitting the father
to exercife alone, in his family, that executive
power of the law of nature, which every
free man naturally hath, and by that per-
miffion refigning up to him a monarchical
power, whilrr. they remained in it. But that
this was not by any paternal right, but only
by the confent of his children, is evident from
hence, that no body doubts, but if a ftranger,
whom chance or bufinefs had brought to his
family, had there killed any of his children,
or committed any other fact, he might con-
demn and put him to death, or otherwife
have punifhed him, as well as any of his
S 2 children ;

alfo the ancient cuftom of governors to do as Mdchizedec,
and being kings, to exercife the office of priefts, which
fathers did at the firft, grew perhaps by the fame occafion.
Howbeit, this is not the only kind of regiment that has been
received in the world. The inconveniences of one kind have
caufed fundry others to be devifed ; fo that in a word, all
public regiment, of what kind foever, feemeth evidently to
h.ve rifen from the deliberate advice, confultation and com-
pofition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful ;
there being no impoffibility in nature confidered by itfelf, but
that man might have lived without anv public regiment,
Hooker's Eccl. P. lib. i. fed. 10.

260 Of Civil-Government.

children ; which it was impoffible he mould
do by virtue of any paternal authority over
one who was not his child, but by virtue of
that executive power of the law of nature,
which, as a man, he had a right to : and
he alone could punifh him in his family,
where the refpecl: of his children had laid
by the exercife of fuch a power, to give way
to the dignity and authority they were willing
mould remain in him, above the reft of his
family.

§. 75. Thus it was eafy, and almoft na-
tural for children, by a tacit, and fcarce avoid-
able confent, to make way for the father 's
authority and government. They had been
accuftomed in their childhood to follow his
direction, and to refer their little differences
to him; and when they were men, who fitter
to rule them ? Their little properties, and lefs
covetoufnefs, feldom afforded greater con-
troverfies ; and when any mould arife, where
could they have a fitter umpire than he, by
whofe care they had every one been fuftained
and brought up, and who had a tendernefs
for them all ? It is no wonder that they
made no diftindtion betwixt minority and full
age j nor looked after one and twenty, or
any other age that might make them the free
difpofers of themfelves and fortunes, when
they could have no dcfire to be out of their
pupilage: the government they had been
under, during it, continued ftill to be more

their

Of Civil-Government. 261

their protection than reftraint; and they could
no where find a greater fecurity to their
peace, liberties, and fortunes, than in the
rule of a father.

§.76. Thus the natural fathers of families,
by an infenfible change, became the politic
monarchs of them too : and as they chanced
to live long, and leave able and worthy heirs,
for feveral fucceflions, or otherwife ; fo they
laid the foundations of hereditary, or elective
kingdoms, under feveral conftitutions and
mannors, according as chance, contrivance,
or occafions happened to mould them. But
if princes have their titles in their fathers
right, and it be a fufficient proof of the na-
tural right of fathers to political authority,
becaufe they commonly were thofe in whofe
hands we find, de facto, the exercife of go-
vernment : I fay, if this argument be good,
it will as flrongly prove, that all princes, nay
princes only, ought to be priefts, fince it is
as certain, that in the beginning, the father
cf the family was prieji, as that he was ruler
in his own houjhold.

CHAP. VII.

Of 'Political or Civil Society.

§■77* (~^ 0£* naving made man fuch a
\Jf creature, that in his own judg-
ment, it was not good for him to be alone,'

S 3 put

262 Of Civil-Government*.

put him under ftrong obligations of neceffity,
convenience, and inclination to drive him
into focicty, as well as fitted him with un-
derftanding and language to continue and
enjoy it. The firfl Jociety was between man
and wife, which gave beginning to that be-
tween parents and children -, to which, in
time, that between mailer and fervant came
to be added : and though all thefe might,
and commonly did meet together, and make
up but one family, wherein the matter or
miftrefs of it had ibme fort of rule proper to
a family -, each of thefe, or all together,
came fhort of political fociety, as we fhall fee,
if we conlider the different ends, ties, and
bounds of each of thefe.

§.78. Co7ijugal Jociety is made by a volun-
tary compact between man and woman -, and
tho' it confifl chiefly in fuch a communion
and right in one another's bodies as is necef-
fary to its chief end, procreation ; yet it
draws with it mutual fupport and afliftance,
and a communion of intereils too, as necef-
fary not only to unite their care and affection,
but alfo neceffary to their common off-fpring,
who have a right to be nourished, and main-
tained by them, till they are able to provide
for thernfelves.

§. 79. For the end of co?2Jim5lion, between
male and female, being not barely procreation,
but the continuation of the fpecies -, this con-
junction betwixt male and female ought to

laft,

Of Civil-Government. 263

laft, even after procreation, fo long as is
neceffary to the nourishment and fupport of
the young ones, who are to be fuflained by
thofe that got them, till they are able to
Shift and provide for themfelves. This rule,
which the infinite wife maker hath fet to
the works of his hands, we find the inferior
creatures Steadily obey. In thofe viviparous
animals which feed on grafs, the conjunction
between male and female lafts no longer than
the very a& of copulation ; becaufe the teat
of the dam being Sufficient to nourifh the
young, till it be able to feed on grafs, the male
only begets, but concerns not himfeif for the
female or young, to whole fuilenance he can
contribute nothing. But in beafts of prey
the conjunction lafts longer : becaufe the dam
not being able well to fubfift herfelf, and
nourim her numerous off-Spring by her own
prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more
dangerous way of living, than by feeding on
grafs, the afhftance of the male is neceifary
to the maintenance of their common family,
which cannot fublift till they are able to prey
for themfelves, but by the joint care of male
and female. The fame is to be obferved in
all birds, (except Some domeflic ones, where
plenty of food excufes the cock from feeding,
and taking care of the young brood) whole
young needing food in the neft, the cock and
hen continue mates, till the young are able

S 4 to

264 Of Civil-Government.

to ufe their wing, and provide for them-
felves.

§. 80. And herein I think lies the chief,
if not the only reafon, nvby the male and fe-
male in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction
than other creatures, viz. becaufe the female
is capable of conceiving, and de faclo is
commonly with child again, and brings forth
too a new birth, Ion? before the former is
out of a dependency for fupport on his pa-
rents help, and able to fliift for himfelf, and
has all the affiiiance is due to him from his
parents : whereby the father, who is bound
to take care for thofe he hath begot, is under
an obligation to continue in conjugal fociety
with the fame woman longer than other
creatures, whofe young being able to fubfift
of themfelves, before the time of procreation
returns again, the conjugal bond diiiblves of
itfelf, and they are at liberty, till Hymen at
his ufual anniverfary feafon fummons them
a^ain to chufe new mates. Wherein one
cannot but admire the wifdom of the great
Creator, who having given to man fore-
light, and an ability to lay up for the future,
as well as to fupply the prefent neceiTity,
hath made it neceflary, that fociety of man
and wife fhould be ?nore lajiing, than of male
and female amongft other creatures ; that fo
their induftry might be encouraged, and their
interefl better united, to make provifion and
lay up goods for their common iffue, which

uncertain

Of Civil-Government. 265

uncertain mixture, or eafy and frequent fo-
lutions of conjugal fociety would mightily
diiturb.

§. 81. But tho' thefe are ties upon man-
kind, which make the conjugal bonds more
firm and lafting in man,- than the other
fpecies of animals ; yet it would give one
realbn to enquire, why this compact, where
procreation and education are fecured, and
inheritance taken care for, may not be made
determinable, either by confent, or at a cer-
tain time, or upon certain conditions, as well
as any other voluntary compacts, there being
no neceffity in the nature of the thing, nor
to the ends of it, that it mould always be
for life ; I mean, to fnch as are under no
reftraint of any pontive law, which ordains all
fuch contracts to be perpetual.

§.82. But the hufband and wife, though
they have but one common concern, yet
having different under/landings, will un-
avoidably fometimes have different wills too ;
it therefore being necefiary that the laft de-
termination, i. e. the rule, mould be placed
fomewhere ; it naturally falls to the man's
mare, as the abler and the ftronger. But
this reaching but to the things of their com-
mon intereft and property, leaves the wife in
the full and free poifefTion of what by con-
tract is her peculiar right, and gives the huf-
band no more power over her life than me
has over his -} the power of the hufband being
4 fo

266 Of Civil-Government.

fo far from that of an abfolute monarch, that
the wife has in many cafes a liberty to fe-
parate from him, where natural right, or
their contract allows it j whether that contract
be made by themfelves in the ftate of nature,
or by the caftoms or laws of the country
they live in;, and the children upon fuch
feparation fall to the father or mother's lot,
as fuch contract does determine.

§.83. For all the ends of marriage being
to be obtained under politic government, as
well as in the ftate of nature, the civil ma-
giftrate doth not abridge the right or power of
either naturally neceflary to thofe ends, viz.
procreation and mutual fupport and affiftance
whilft they are together ; but only decides
any controverfy that may arife between, man
and wife about them. If it were other wife,
and that abfolute fovereignty and power of
life and death naturally belonged to the huf-
band, and were neceflary to the fociety between
man and wife, there could be no matrimony
in any of thofe countries where the hufband is
allowed no fuch abfolute authority. But the
ends of matrimony requiring no fuch power
in the hufband, the condition of conjugal
fociety put it not in him, it being not at all
neceffary to that ftate. Conjugal fociety could
fubfift and attain its ends without it j nay,
community of goods, and the power over
them, mutual affiftance and maintenance, and
other things belonging to conjugal fociety,

might

Of Civil-Government. 267
might be varied and regulated by that con-
tract which unites man and wife in that
fociety, as far as may conrift with procreation
and the bringing up of children till they
could fhift for themfelves; nothing being
neceffary to any fociety, that is not neceffary
to the ends for which it is made.

§.84. The fociety betwixt parents and chil-
dren, and the diftinct rights and powers be-
longing refpectively to them, I have treated
of fo largely, in the foregoing chapter, that
I (hall not here need to fay any thing of it.
And I think it is plain, that it is far different
from a politic fociety.

§. 85. Majier and fervant are names as
old as hiftory, but given to thofe of far dif-
ferent condition ; for a freeman makes himfelf
a fervant to another, by felling him, for a
certain time, the fervice he undertakes to
do, in exchange for wages he is to receive :
and though this commonly puts him into the
family of his mafter, and under the ordinary
difcipline thereof -, yet it gives the mafter but
a temporary power over him, and no greater
than what is contained in the contract be-
tween them. But there is another fort of
fervants, which by a peculiar name we call
Jlaves, who being captives taken in a juff.
war, are by the right of nature fu bjeded to
the abfolute dominion and arbitrary power
of their matters. Thefe men having, as I
fay, forfeited their lives, and with it their
5 liberties,

268 Of Civil-Government.

liberties, and loft their eftates ; and being in
the Jlate of Jlavery, not capable of any pro-
perty, cannot in that ftate be confidered as
any part of civil feciety -, the chief end whereof
is the prefervation of property.

§.86. Let us therefore con fid er a majler
of a family with all thefe fubordinate rela-
tions of wife, children, fervants, and Jlaves,
united under the domeftic rule of a family ;
which, what refemblance foever it may have
in its order, offices, and number too, with a
little common-wealth, yet is very far from
it, both in its conflitution, power and end :
or if it muft be thought a monarchy, and
the paterfamilias the abfolute monarch in it,
abfolute monarchy will have but a very
Shattered and fhort power, when it is plain,
by what has been faid before, that the majler
cf the family has a very diftincl: and differently
limited power, both as to time and extent,
over thofe feveral perfons that are in it ; for
excepting the Have (and the family is as
much a family, and his power as paterfamilias
as great, whether there be any llaves in his
family or no) he has no legifiative power of
life and death over any of them, and none
too but what a miftrefs of a family may have as
well as he. And he certainly can have no
abfolute power over the whole family, who has
but a very limited one over every individual
in it. But how a family, or any other fo-
ciety of men, differ from that which is pro-
perly

Of Civil-Government. 269

perly political fociety, we (hall befl fee, by
considering wherein political fociety itfelf
confifts.

§. 87. Man being born, as has been proved,
with a title to perfect freedom, and an un-
controlled enjoyment of all the rights and
privileges of the law of nature, equally with
any other man, or number of men in the
world, hath by nature a power, not only to
preferve his property, that is, his life, liberty
and eftate, againft the injuries and attempts
of other men; but to judge of, and puniffi
the breaches of that law in others, as he is
perfuaded the offence deferves, even with
death itfelf, in crimes where the heinoufnefs
of the fad, in his opinion, requires it. But
becaufe no political fociety can be, nor fubfift,,
without having in itfelf the power to pre-
ferve the property, and in order thereunto,
punifh the offences of all thofe of that fo-
ciety ; there, and there only is political fo-
ciety, where every one of the members hath
quitted this natural power, refigned it up
into the hands of the community in all cafes
that exclude him not from appealing for pro-
tection to the law eftabliihed by it. And
thus all private judgment of every particular
member being excluded, the community
comes to be umpire, by fettled {landing rules,
indifferent, and the fame to all parties ; and
by men having authority from the commu-
nity,

270 Of Civil-Government.
nity, for the execution of thofe rules, decides
all the differences that may happen between
any members of that fociety concerning any
matter of right ; and puniflies thofe offences
which any member hath committed againft
the fociety, with fuch penalties as the law
has eftablifhed : whereby it is eafy to difcern,
who are, and who are not, in political fociety
together. Thofe who are united into one
body, and have a common eftablifhed law
and judicature to appeal to, with authority
to decide controversies between them, and
punifh offenders, are in civil fociety one with
another : but thofe who have no fuch com-
mon people, I mean on earth, are ftill in
the ffate of nature, each being, where there
is no other, judge for himfelf, and execu-
tioner; which is, as I have before fhewed
it, the perfect fate of ?iature.

§. 88. And thus the common-wealth comes
fey a power to fet down what punimment
fhall belong to the feveral tranfgreffions which
they think worthy of it, committed amongfl:
the members of that fociety, (which is the
power of making laws) as well as it has the
power to puniih any injury done unto any of
its members, by any one that is not of it,
(which is the power of war and peace ;) and
all this for the prefervation of the property
of all the members of that fociety, as far as
is poffible. But though every man who has

entered

Of Civil-Government. 271

entered into civil fociety, and is become a
member of any common -wealth, has thereby
quitted his power to punifh offences, againft
the law of nature, in profecution of his own
private judgment, yet with the judgment of
©ffences, which he has given up to the legif-
lative in all cafes, where he can appeal to
the magiftrate, he has given a right to the
common- wealth to employ his force, for the
execution of the judgments of the common-
wealth, whenever he fhall be called to it;
which indeed are his own judgments, they
being made by himfelf, or his reprefentative.
And herein we have the original of the legis-
lative and executive power of civil fociety, which
is to judge by (landing laws, how far offences
are to be punifhed, when committed within
the common-wealth ; and alfo to determine,
by occafional judgments founded on the pre-
fent circumftances of the fact, how far in-
juries from without are to be vindicated; and
in both thefe to employ all the force of all
the members, when there fhall be need.

§. 89. Where-ever therefore any number
of men are fo united into one fociety, as to
quit every one his executive power of the
law of nature, and to refign it to the public,
there and there only is a political, or civil
fociety. And this is done, where-ever any
number of men, in the ftate of nature, enter
into fociety to make one people, one body

politic,

272 Of Civil-Government.

politic, under one fupreme government; or
elfe when any one joins himfelf to, and in-
corporates with any government already made :
for hereby he authorizes the fociety, or which
is all one, the legiflative thereof, to make
laws for him, as the public good of the
fociety mall require -, to the execution where-
of, his own affiftance (as to his own decrees)
is due. And this puts men out of a ftate of
nature into that of a common-wealth, by fetting
up a judge on earth, with authority to de-
termine all the controversies, and redrefs the
injuries that may happen to any member
of the common- weal th ; which judge is the |
■^legiflative, or magiflrates appointed by it.
And where-ever there are any number of
men, however affociated, that have no fuch
decifive power to appeal to, there they are
flill in the Jlate of ?iature.

§. 90. Hence it is evident, that abfolnte
monarchy, which by fome men is counted
the only government in the world, is indeed
inconfiftent ivith civil fociety, and fo can be
no form of civil-government at all : for the
end of chil fociety, being to avoid, and remedy
thofe inconveniencies of the Hate of nature,
which necelfarily follow from every man's
being judge in his own cafe, by fetting up
a known authority, to which every one of
that fociety may appeal upon any injury re-
ceived, or c'ontroverfy that may arife, and

which

Of Ci vil-Gover n Ment. 273

which every one of the * fociety ought to
obey ; where-ever any perfons are, who have
not fuch an authority to appeal to, for the
decifion of any difference between them,
there thofe perfons are itill in the Jlate of na-
ture $ and lb is every abfohit-e prince, in refpect
of thofe who are under his dominion.

§.91. For he being fuppofed to have all,
both legiilative and executive power in him-
felf alone, there is no judge to be found, no
appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly,
and indifferently, and with authority decide,
and from whofe decifion relief and redrefs
may be expected of any injury or incon-
viency, that may be fuifered from the prince,
or by his order : fo that fuch a man, however
in titled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you
pleafe, is as much in the fate of nature, with
all under his dominion, as he is with the reft
of mankind : for where-ever any two men
are, who have no {landing rule, and common
judge to appeal to on earth* for the de-
termination of controverfies of right be-
twixt them, there they are ftill in the fate

T of

* The public power of all fociety is above every foul
contained in the fame fociety ; and the principal ufe of that
power is, to give laws unto all hat are under it, which laws
in fuch cafes we muft obey, unlets there be reafon fhewed
A'hich may neceffarily inforce, that the law of reafon, ot
>f God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eal. Pol. L i.
\S. 16.

274 ®F Civil-Government.
of * nature, and under all the inconveniencies
of it, with only this woful difference to the
fubject, or rather flave of an abfolute prince :
that whereas, in the ordinary ftate of nature,
he has a liberty to judge of his right, and
according to the bell: of his power, to main-
tain it ; now, whenever his property is in-
vaded by the will and order of his monarch,
he has not only no appeal, as thofe in fociety
ought to have, but as if he were degraded
from the common ftate of rational creatures,
is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend!
his right ; and fo is expofed to all the mifery
and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from

one,

* To take away all fuch mutual grievances, injuries and
wrongs, i. e. fuch as attend men in the ftate of nature,
there was no way hut only by growing into compofition
and agreement amongft themfelves, by ordaining fome kind
of government public, and by yielding themfelves fubjedt
thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule
and govern, by them the peace, tranquillity and happv
.eftate of the reft might be procured. Men always knew
that where force and injury was offered, they might be de-
fenders of themfelves ; they knew that however men maj-
feek their own commodity, yet if this were done with in-
jury unto others, it was not to be fufFered, but by all men,
and all good means to be withitood. Finally, they knew
that no man might in reafon take upon him to determine
his own right, and according to his own determination pro-
ceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man i;
towards himfelf, and them whom he greatly affects, partial ;
and therefore that ftrifes and troubles would be endlefs.
■ except they gave' their common confent, all to be ordered bj
fome, whom they mould agree upon, without which confen!
there would be no reafon that one man fhould take upor
him to be lord or judge over another, Hooker's Eccl. Pol, I. i
fici. io.

Of Civil-Government. 275

one, who being in the unreftrained ftate of
nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and
armed with power.

§.92. For he that thinks abfolute power
purifies mens blood, and corrects the bafenefs
of human nature, need read but the hiftory
of this, or any other age, to be convinced of
the contrary. He that would have been in-
folent and injurious in the woods of America,
would not probably be much better in a
throne; where perhaps learning and religion
mall be found out to juftify all that he
mail do to his fubjects, and the fword pre-
fently filence all thofe that dare queftion it :
for what the protection of abfolute monarchy is,
what kind of fathers of their countries it
makes princes to be, and to what a degree
of happinefs and fecurity it carries civil fo-
ciety, where this fort of government is grown
to perfection, he that will look into the late
relation of Ceylon, may ealily fee.

§.93. In abfolute monarchies indeed, as well
as other governments of the world, the fub-
jects have an appeal to the law, and judges
to decide any controversies, and reflrain any
violence that may happen betwixt the Subjects
themfelves, one amongft another. This every
one thinks neceffary, and believes he deferves
to be thought a declared enemy to fociety and
mankind, who mould go about to take it
away. But whether this be from a true love
ef mankind and fociety, and fuch a charity as

T 2 we

276 Of Civil-Government.

we owe all one to another, there is reafon to
doubt : for this is no more than what every
man, who loves his own power, profit, or
greatnefs, may and naturally muft do, keep
thofe animals from hurting, or deftroying one
another, who labour and drudge only for his
pleafure and advantage ; and fo are taken care
of, not out of any love the matter has for
them, but love of himfelf, and the profit they
bring him : for if it be afked, what fecurity,
what fence is there, in fuch a ftate, againji the
violence and opprcjjion of this abfohite ruler ?
the very queftion can fcarce be borne. They
are ready to tell you, that it deferves death
only to afk after fafety. Betwixt fubjecl and
fubject, they will grant, there mufl be mea-
fures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace
and fecurity : but as for the ruler, he ought
to be abfolute, and is above all fuch circum-
ftances ; becaufe he has power to do more
hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it.
To afk how you may be guarded from harm,
or injury, on that fide where the ftrongeft hand
is to do it, is prefently the voice of faction and
rebellion : as if when men quitting the ftate
of nature entered into fociety, they agreed
that all of them but one, mould be under the
reftraint of laws, but that he mould ftill re-
tain all the liberty of the ftate of nature, in-
creafed with power, and made licentious by
impunity. This is to think, that men are fo
foolim, that they take care to avoid what mif-
3 chiefs

Of Civil-Government. 277

chiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes ;
but are content, nay, think it fafety, to be de-
voured by lions.

§. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to
amufe people's understandings, it hinders not
men from feeling ; and when they perceive,
that any man, in what ftation foever, is out of
the bounds of the civil fociety which they are
of, and that they have no appeal on earth
againft any harm, they may receive from him,
they are apt to think themfelves in the ftate of
nature, in refpect of him whom they find to
be fo ; and to take care, as foon as they can,
to have that fafety andfecurity in civil fociety r,
for which it was firft instituted, and for which
only they entered into it. And therefore,
though perhaps at firft, (as Shall be mewed
more at large hereafter in the following part
of this difcourfe) fome one good and excellent
man having got a pre-eminency amongfl the
reft, had this deference paid to his goodnefs
and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority,
that the chief rule, with arbitration of their
differences, by a tacit confent devolved into
his hands, without any other caution, but the
aiTurance they had of his uprightnefs and wif-
dom ; yet when time, giving authority, and
(as fome men would perfuade us) facrednefs of
cuftoms, which the negligent, and unfore-
feeing innocence of the firft ages began, had
brought in fuccerTors of another Stamp, the
people finding their properties not fecure under

T 3 the

278 Of Civil-Government.

the government, as then it was, (whereas
government has no other end but the prefer-
vation of * property) could never be fafe nor
at reit, nor think themfclves in civil fociety, till
the legiflature was placed in collective bodies
of men, call them fenate, parliament, or
■what you pleafe. By which means every
fingle perfon became fubject, equally with
other the meaneft men, to thole laws, which
he himfelf, as part .of the legiflative, had efla-
blifhed ; nor could any one, by his own au-
thority, avoid the force of the law, when once
made; nor by any pretence of fuperiority plead
exemption, thereby to licenfe his own, or the
mifcarriages of any of his dependents, -f No
man in civil fociety can be exempted front the laws
of it : for if any man may do what he thinks
fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for re-
drefs or fecurity againft any harm he mall do ;
I aik, whether he be not perfectly ftill in the

ftate

* At the firft, when feme certain kind of regiment was
once appointed, it may be that nothing was then farther
thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted
unto their wifdom and difcreticn, which were to rule,' till by
experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, fo
as the thing which they had deviled for a remedy, did indeed
but increafe the fore, which it mould have cured. They favv,
that to live by one Man's will, became the caufe cj all -mens mifery.
This conflrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men
might fee their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of
tranfgreffing them. Hooker's Eccl. Pel. 1. i. fed. 10.

f Civil law being the aft of the whole body politic, doth
therefore over-rule each feveral part of the fame body. Hooker3
ibid.

Of Civil-Government. 279

ftate of nature, and fo can be no part or mem-
ber of that civil fociety ; unlefs any one will
fay, the ftate of nature and civil fociety are
one and the fame thing, which I have never
yet found any one fo great a patron of anarchy
as to affirm.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Beginning of Political Societies,

§. 95. "]% /TEN being, as has been faid, by
J.VX nature, all free, equal, and in-
dependent, no one can be put out of this
eftate, and fubjected to the political power of
another, without his own confent. The only
way whereby any one diverts himfelf of his
natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil
fociety, is by agreeing with other men to join
and unite into a community, for their com-
fortable, fafe, and peaceable living one
amongft another, in a fecure enjoyment of
their properties, and a greater fecurity againft
any, that are not of it. This any number of
men may do, becaufe it injures not the free-
dom of the reft ; they are left as they were
in the liberty of the ftate of nature. When
any number of men have fo confented to make
one community or government, they are thereby
prefently incorporated, and make one body po-
litic, wherein the majority have a right to act
and conclude the reft.

T 4 §. 96.

iff*

280 Of Civil-Government.

§. 96. For when any number of men have,
by the confent of every individual, made a
community, they have thereby made that com-
munity one body, with a power to ad: as one
body, which is only by the will and determi-
nation of the majority : for that which acts
any community, being only the confent of
the individuals of it, and it being neceffary
to that which is one body to move one way ;
it is neceflary the body mould move that way
whither the greater force carries it, which is
the confent of the majority: or elfe it is im-
poffible it mould act or continue one body,
one community, which the content of every in-
dividual that united into it, agreed that it
fhould ; and fo every one is bound by that
confent to be concluded by the majority. And
therefore we fee, that in affemblies, im-
powered to act by pofitive laws, where no
number is fet by that pofitive law which im-
powers them, the acl of the majority paffes for
the act of the whole, and of courfe determines,
as having, by the law of nature and reafon, the
power of the whole.

§. 97. And thus every man, by confenting
with others to make one body politic under
one government, puts himfelf under an obli-
gation, to every one of that fociety, to fubmit
to the determination of the majority, and to
be concluded by it ; or elfe this original com-
fact, whereby he with others incorporates
into one fociety, would fignify nothing, and

be

Of Civil-Government. 281

be no compact, if he be left free, and under
no other ties than he was in before in the
ftate of nature. For'what appearance would
there be of any compact ? what new engage-
ment if he were no farther tied by any decrees
of the fociety, than he himfelf thought fit,
and did actually confent to ? This would be
frill as great a liberty, as he himfelf had be-
fore his compact, or any one elfe in the ftate
of nature hath, who may fubmit himfelf, and
confent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.

§.98. For if the confent of the majority mall
not, in reafon, be received as the aB of the
whole, and conclude every individual ; nothing
but the confent of every individual can make
any thing to be the act of the whole : but
fuch a confent is next to impoflible ever to be
had, if we confider the infirmities of health,
and avocations of buiinefs, which in a num-
ber, though much lefs than that of a com-
mon-wealth, will necefTarily keep many away
from the public alfembly. To which if we
add the variety of opinions, and contrariety
of interefts, which unavoidably happen in all
collections of men, the coming into fociety
upon fuch terms would be only like Cato's
coming into the theatre, only to go out again.
Such a conftitution as this would make the
mighty Leviathan of a fhorter duration, than
the feebleft creatures, and not let it outlaft
the day it was born in: which cannot be
fuppoicd, till we can think, that rational crea-
tures

282 Of Civil-Government.

tures fhould defire and conftitute focieties only
to be diffolved : for where the majority can-
not conclude the reft, there they cannot act
as one body, and confequently will be im-
mediately difTolved again.

§. 99. Whofoever therefore out of a ftate
of nature unite into a community, mull: be un-
derftood to give up all the power, neceflary
to the ends for which they unite into fociety,
to the majority of the community, unlefs they
exprelly agreed in any number greater than
the majority. And this is done by barely
agreeing to unite into one political fociety, which
is all the compac~l that is, or needs be, between
the individuals, that enter into, or make up
a common-wealth. And thus that, which be-
gins and actually conjiitutes any political fociety,
is nothing but the confent of any number of
freemen capable cf a majority to unite and
incorporate into fuch a fociety. And this is
that, and that only, which did, or could give
beginning to any lawful government in the
world.

§. 100. To this I find two objections made.

Firft, That there are no mjia?ices to be found
in fory, of a company of men independent, and
equal one amongfi another, that met together, and
in this way began and fet up a government.

Secondly, It is impofjible of right, that men
fiould do fo, becaufe all ?ne?i being bom under
government, they are iofubmit to that, and are
not at liberty to begin a new one.

%. 101.

Of Civil-Government. 283

§. 101. To the firft there is this to anfwer,
That it is not at' all to be wondered, that
bijlory gives us but a very little account of
men, that lived together in the fate of Jiature.
The inconveniences of that condition, and £/
the love and want of fociety, no fooner brought
any number of them together, but they pre-
fently united and incorporated, if they de-
figned to continue together. And if we may
not fuppofe men ever to have been in the Jlate
of nature, becaufe we hear not much of them
in fuch a ftate, we may as well fuppofe the
armies of Salmanajfer or Xerxes were never
children, becaufe we hear little of them, till
they were men, and imbodied in armies.
Government is every where antecedent to re-
cords, and letters feldom come in amongft a
people till a long continuation of civil fo-
ciety has, by other more neceffary arts, pro-
vided for their fafety, eafe, and plenty : and
then they begin to look after the hiftory of
their founders, and fearch into their original,
when they have outlived the memory of it :
for it is with common-wealths as with parti-
cular perfons, they are commonly ignorant of
their own births and infancies : and if they
know any thing of their original, they are be-
holden for it, to the accidental records that
others have kept of it. And thofe that we have,
of the beginning of any polities in the world,
excepting that of the Jews, where God him-
felf immediately interpofed, and which fa-
vours

^

284 Of Civil-Government.
vours not at all paternal dominion, are all
either plain inftances of fuch a beginning as
I have mentioned, or at leaft have manifeft
footfteps of it.

§. 102. He muft /hew a ftrange inclination
to deny evident matter of fact, when it agrees
not with his hypothecs, who will not allow,
that the beginning of Rome and Venice were
by the uniting together of feveral men free
and independent one of another, amongft
whom there was no natural fuperiority or
fubjeclion. And if Jofephus Acojlds word
may be taken, he tells us, that in many parts
of America there was no government at all.
'There are great and apparent conjectures, fays
he, that thefe men, fpeaki ng of thole of Peru,
for a long time had neither kings nor common-
wealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day
in Florida, the Cheriquanas, thofe of Bralil,
and many other nations, which have no certain
kings, but as occafion is offered, in peace or war,
they choofe their captains as they pleafe, 1. i.
c. 25. If it be faid, that every man there
was born fubjecl: to his father, or the head
of his family ; that the fubjection due from
a child to a father took not away his free-
dom of uniting into what political fociety he
thought fit, has been already proved. But
be that as it will, thefe men, it is evident,
were actually free ; and whatever fuperiority
ibme politicians now would place in any of
them, they themfelves claimed it not, but by

confent

Of Civil-Government. 285

confent were all equal, till by the fame con-
fent they fet rulers over themfelves. So that
their politic focieties all began from a voluntary
union, and the mutual agreement of men
freely a&ing in the choice of their governors,
and forms of government. •

§. 103. And I hope thofe who went away
from Sparta with Palantus, mentioned by
fujlin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have
been freemen independent one of another, and
to have fet up a government over themfelves,
by their own confent. Thus I have given
feveral examples, out of hiftory, of people free
and in the flat e of nature, that being met to-
gether incorporated and began a common-
wealth. And if the want of fuch inftances
be an argument to prove that government were
not, nor could not be fo begun, I fuppofe the
contenders for paternal empire were better
let it alone, than urge it againft natural li-
berty : for if they can give fo many inflances,
out of hiftory, of governments begun upon
paternal right, I think (though at bed an
argument from what has been, to what
mould of right be, has no great force) one
might, without any great danger, yield them
the caufe. But if I might advife them in the
cafe, they would do well not to fearch too
much into the original of governments, as thev
have begun de facJo, left they mould find, at
the foundation of moft of them, fomething

very

2&6 Op Civil-Government.
very little favourable to the defign they pro-
mote, and fuch a power as they contend for.

§. 104. But to conclude, reafon being plairi
on our fide, that men are naturally free, and
the examples of hiftory mewing, that the
governments of the world, that were begun
in peace, had their beginning laid on that
foundation, and were made by the confent of
the people; there can be little room for doubt,
either where the right is, or what has been
the opinion, or practice of mankind, about
the firfl erecting of governments.

§. 105. I will not deny, that if we look
back as far as hiflory will direct us, towards
the original of common-wealths, we mall ge-
nerally find them under the government and
adminiftration of one man. And I am alfo
apt to believe, that where a family was
numerous enough to fubfifl by itfelf, and
continued entire together, without mixing
with others," as it often happens, where there
is much land, and few people, the govern-
ment commonly began in the father : for
the father having, by the law of nature, the
fame power with every man elfe to punifli,
as he thought fit, any offences againft that
law, might thereby punifli his tranfgreffing
children, even when they were men, and
out of their pupilage ; and they were very
likely to fubmit to his punifhment, and all
join with him againft the offender, in their
turns, giving him thereby power to execute

his

Of Civil-Government. 2S7

his fentence againfb any tranfgreffion, and fo
in effect make him the law-maker, and go-
vernor over all that remained in conjunction
with his family. He was fitted: to be trufted ;
paternal affection fecured their property and
interefr. under his care ; and the cuftom of
obeying him, in their childhood, made it
eafier to fubmit to him, rather than to any
other. If therefore they mull: have one to
rule them, as government is hardly to be
avoided amongft men that live together -, who
fo likely to be the man as he that was their
common father ; unlefs negligence, cruelty,
or any other defect of mind or body made
him unfit for it ? But when either the father
died, and left his next heir, for want of
age, wifdom, courage, or any other quali-
ties, lefs fit for rule ; or where feveral fa-
milies met, and confented to continue to-
gether -, there, it is not to be doubted, but
they ufed their natural freedom, to fet up
him, whom they judged the ableft, and mofl
likely, to rule well over them. Conformable
hereunto we find the people of America, who
(living out of the reach of the conquering
fwords, and fpreading domination of the two
great empires of Peru and Mexico) enjoyed
their own natural freedom, though, ccctei~h
paribus* they commonly prefer the heir of
their deceafed king; yet if they find him
any way weak, or uncapable, they pafs him

bv>

288 Of Civil-Government.

by, and fet up the ftouteft and braveft man
for their ruler.

§. 1 06. Thus, though looking back as far
as records give us any account of peopling
the world, and the hiflory of nations, we
commonly find the government to be in one
hand ; yet it defiroys not that which I affirm,
viz. that the beginning of politic fociety depends
upon the confent of the individuals, to join
into, and make one fociety j who, when
they are thus incorporated, might fet up
what form of government they thought fit.
But this having given occafion to men to
miftake, and think, that by nature govern-
ment was monarchical, and belonged to the
father, it may not be amifs here to confider,
why people in the beginning generally pitched
upon this form, which though perhaps the
father's pre-eminency might, in the firfr. in-
fiitution of fome common-wealths, give a
rife to, and place in the beginning, the power
in one hand; yet it is plain that the reafon,
that continued the form of government in a
Jingle per/on, was not any regard, or refpect
to paternal authority ; fince all petty mo-
narchies, that is, almoit. all monarchies, near
their original, have been commonly, at lead:
upon occafion, elective.

§. 107. Firft. then, in the beginning of
things, the father's government of the child-
hood of thofe fprung from him, having ac-
cuftemed them to the rule of one man, and

taught

h

Of Civil-Government. 289

taught them that where it was exercifed with
care and fkill, with affection and love to thofe
under it, it was fufficient to procure and
preferve to men all the political happinefs
they fought for in fociety. It was no wonder
that they mould pitch upon, and naturally
run into that form of government, which from
their infancy they had been all accuftomed
to ; and which, by experience, they had
found both eafy and fafe. To which, if we
add, that monarchy being fimple, and mod
obvious to men, whom neither experience
had inftructed in forms of government, nor
the ambition or infolence of empire had
taught to beware of the encroachments of
prerogative, or the inconveniencies of ab-
felute power, which monarchy in fuccefiion
was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon
them j it was not at all ftrange, that they mould
not much trouble themfelves to think of
methods of retraining any exorbitances of
thofe to whom they had given the authority
over them, and of balancing the power of
government, by placing feveral parts of it in
different hands. They had neither felt the
oppreffion of tyrannical dominion, nor did
the faihion of the age, nor their poffeffions,
or way of living, (which afforded little matter
for covetoufnefs or ambition) give them any
reafon to apprehend or provide againft it ;
and therefore it is no wonder they put them-
felves into fuch a frame of government t as was

U not

290 Of Civil-Government.

not only, as I faid, moft obvious and fimpler
but alfo bed fuited to their prefent ftate and
condition; which flood more in need of de-
fence againft foreign invafions and injuries*
than of multiplicity of laws. The equality
of a fimple poor way of living, confining their
defires within the narrow bounds of each
man's fmall property, made few controverfies,
and fo no need of many laws to decide them,
or variety of officers to fuperintend the pro-
cefs, or look after the execution of juftice,
where there were but few trefpaffes, and few
offenders. Since then thofe, who liked one
another fo well as to join into fociety, cannot
but be Juppofed to have feme acquaintance
and friendfhip together, and fome truft one
in another -, they could not but have greater
apprehenfions of others, than of one another:
and therefore their firft. care and thought can-
not but be fuppofed to be, how to fecure
themfelves againit foreign force. It was na-
tural for them to put themfelves under a
frame of government which might beil ferve
to that end, and chuie the wiiefl and braved
man to condud them in their wars, and lead
them out againit their enemies, and in this
chiefly be their ruler.

§. 108. Thus we fee, that the kings of the
Indians in America, which is ftill a pattern
of the firft ages in Ajia and Europe, whilft
the inhabitants were too few for the country,
and want of people and money gave men no

temptation

Of Civil-Government. 291

temptation to enlarge their poffeffions of land,
or conteft for wider extent of ground, are
little more than generals of their armies -, and
though they command abfolutely in war, yet
at home and in time of peace they exercife
very little dominion, and have but a very
moderate fovereignty, the refolutions of peace
and war being ordinarily either in the people,
or in a council. Tho' the war itfelf, which
admits not of plurality of governors, naturally
devolves the command into the kings file
authority.

§. 109. And thus in Ifirael itfelf, the chief
hujinefs of their judges, and fir Jl kings, feems to
have been to be captains in war, and leaders
of their armies -, which (befides what is
lignified by going out and in before the people,
which was, to march forth to war, and home
again in the heads of their forces) appears
plainly in the dory of Jephtha. The Ammonites
making war upon Ifrael, the Gileadites in fear
fend to 'Jephtha, a baftard of their family
whom they had caft oft, and article with him,
if he will affift them againft the Ammonites,
to make him their ruler ; which they do in
thefe words, And the people made him head
and captain over them, Judg. xi. 1 1. which
was, as it feems, all one as to be judge. And
he judged Ij'rael, Judg. xii. 7. that is, was
their captain- general Jix years. So when Jo-
n upbraids the Shecbemites with the obli-
gation they had to Gideon, who had been

U 2 their

292 Of Ci vil-Go ver nm ent.

their judge and ruler, he tells them, He
fought for you, and adventured his life jar, and
delivered you out of the hands of Midi an, Judg.
ix. 17. Nothing mentioned of him, but
what he did as a general: and indeed that
is all is found in his hiflory, or in any of the
reft of the judges. And Abimelech parti-
cularly is called king, though at moft he was
but their general. And when, being weary
of the ill conduct of Samuel's fons, the chil-
dren of Ifrael defired a king, like all the
nations to judge them, and to go out before
them, and to fight their battles, 1 Sam. viii.
20. God granting their deiire, fays to Sa-
muel, I will fend thee a ?nan, and thou jhalt
anoint him to be captain ever my people Ifrael,
that he in ay Jave my people out of' the hands
of the Phiiifiines, ix. 16. As if the only
bufmefs of a king had been to lead out their
armies, and fight in their defence ; and ac-
cordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial
of oil upon him, declares to Saul, that the
Lord had anointed him to be captain over
his inheritance, x. 1. And therefore thofe,
who after Saul's being folemnly chofen and
ialuted king by the tribes at Mi/pah, were
unwilling to have him their king, made no
other objection but this, Hoiv jliall this man
five ns? v. 27. as if they mould have faid,
this man is unfit to be our king, not having
fkill and conduct' enough in war, to be able
to defend us. And when God refolved to

transfer

Of Civil-Government. 293

transfer the government to David, it is in
thefe words, But now thy kingdom fiall not
continue : the Lord hath fought him a man
after his own heart, and the Lord hath com~
manded him to be captain over his people, xiii.
14. As if the whole kingly authority were
nothing elfe but to be their general: and
therefore the tribes who had ftuck to Saul's
family, and oppofed David's reign, when they
came to Hebron with terms of fubmiflion to
him, they tell him, amongft other arguments
they had to fubmit to him as to their king,
that he was in effect their king in Saul's time,
and therefore they had no reafon but to re-
ceive him as their king now. Alfo (fay they)
in time pafi, when Saul was king over us, thou
waft he that leddefl out and broughtefl in Ifrael,
and the Lord f aid unto thee, Thou Jljalt feed my
people Ifrael, and thou Jhalt be a captain over
Ifrael.

§. no. Thus, whether a family by degrees
grew up into a common-wealth, and the fatherly
authority being continued on to the elder fon,
every one in his turn growing up under it,
tacitly fubmitted to it, and the eafinefs and
equality of it not offending any one, every one
acquiefced, till time feemed to have con-
firmed it, and fettled a right of fucceffion by
prefcription : or whether feveral families, or
the defendants of feveral families, whom
chance, neighbourhood, or bufinefs brought
together, uniting into focietyj the need of a
U 3 general,,

294 Op Civil-Government.

general, whofe conduct might defend them
againft their enemies in war, and the great
confidence the innocence and fincerity of that
poor but virtuous age, (fuch as are almofi: all
thofe which begin governments, that ever
come to laft in the world) gave men one of
another, made the firfl beginners of common-
wealths generally put the rule into one man's
hand, without any other exprefs limitation or
reftraint, but what the nature of the thing,
and the end of government required : which
ever of thofe it was that at firft put the rule
into the hands of a fingle perfon, certain it
is no body was intruded with it but for the
public good and fafety, and to thofe ends, in
the infancies of common-wealths, thofe who
had it commonly ufed it. And unlefs they
had done fo, young focieties could not have
fubfifted; without fuch nurfing fathers tender
and careful of the public weal, all govern-
ments would have funk under the weaknefs
and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince
and the people had foon periihed together.

§. in. But though the golden age (before
vain ambition, and amor feeler atus babendi,
evil concupifcence,had corrupted men's minds
into a miilake of true power and honour)
had more virtue, and confequently better
governors, as well as lefs vicious fubjects ;
and there was then no flretching prerogative
on the one fide, to opprefs the people ; nor
confequently on the other, any difpute about

privilege)

Of Civil- Government. 295
privileget toleflen or reftrain the power of the
magiftrate, and fo no conteft betwixt rulers
and people about governors or government :
yet, when ambition and luxury in future
ages * would retain and increafe the power,
without doing the bufinefs for which it was
given ; and aided by flattery, taught princes
to have diftincl: and feparate interefts from
their people, men found it neceffary to exa-p
mine more carefully the original and rights
cf government ; and to find out ways to re-
train the exorbitances, and prevent the abufes
of that power, which they having intruded
in another's hands only for their own good,
they found was made ufe of to hurt them.

§. 112. Thus we may fee how probable it
is, that people that were naturally free, and
by their own confent either fubmitted to the
government of their father, or united together
out of different families to make a govern-
ment, mould generally put the rule into one
m-aris hands, and chufe to be under the con-
U 4 duel:

* At firft, when fome certain kind of regiment was once
approved, it may be nothing was then farther thought upon
for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their
wifdom and difcretion which were to rule, till by experience
they found this for all parts very inconvenient, fo as the
thing which they had devifed for a remedy, did indeed but
increafe the fore which it fhould have cured. They faw,
that to live by one man's will, became the caufe of ail men's
mifery. This conftrained them to come unto laws wherein
all men might fee their duty before hand, and know the
penalties of tranfgreiling th§m. Hookers Sec), Pol. L i.
J tit. 10.

296 Of Civil-Government.

duct of a fingle per/on, without fo much as
by exprefs conditions limiting or regulating
his power, which they thought fafe enough
in his honefty and prudence ; though they
never dreamed of monarchy being Jure Di-
vino, which we never heard of among man-
kind, till it vsras revealed to us by the divinity
of this laft age ; nor ever allowed paternal
power to have a right to dominion, or to be
^*£$he foundation of all government. And thus
-rf^^SJiuch may fuffice to fhew, that as far as we
k ,have any light from hiftory, we have reafon
to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of
'x^Jt^'QQvernmfnt^ fere been laid in the confent of the
"' peopled 1 fay peaceful, becaufe I mail have
occafion in another place to fpeak of con-
: / . queft, which fome efteem a way of beginning
of governments.

'The other objection I find urged againfi the
■ 'beginning of polities, in the way I have men-
. iioned, is this, viz.
J^i >, §. 113. That all men being born under go-
'ry eminent, fome or other , it is impojjible any of
^ '*•***! them fhould ever be free, and at liberty to unite
'i£* t** ^°Se^Jer> and begin a new one, or ever be able
to ereel a lawful government.

If this argument be good; I afk, how
came fo many lawful monarchies into the
world ? for if any body, upon this fuppo-
fition, can fhew me any one man in any age
of the worldyr^ to begin a lawful monarchy,
I will be bound to fhew him ten other free

men

Of Civil-Government. 297

men at liberty, at the fame time to unite and
begin a new government under a regal, or
any other form ; it being demonflration, that
if any one, born under the dominion of ano-
ther, may be fo free as to have a right to
command others in a new .and diflincl: em-
pire, every one that is born under the dominion
of another may be fo free too, and may be-
come a ruler, or fubjecl:, of a diflincl feparate
government. And fo by this their own prin-
ciple, either all men, however born, are free,
or elfe there is but one lawful prince, one
lawful government in the world. And then
they have nothing to do, but barely to fhew
us which that is -, which when they have
done, I doubt not but all mankind will eafily
agree to pay obedience to him.

§. 114. Though it be a fufficient anfwer
to their objection, to fhew that it involves
them in the fame difficulties that it doth
thofe they ufe it againft ; yet I mall endea-
vour to difcover the weaknefs of this argu-
ment a little farther.

All men, fay they, are born under govern-
ment, and therefore they cannot be at liberty to
begin a new one. Every one is bor?i a fubjed't
to his father, or his prijtce, and is therefore
under the perpetual tie of fubjeclion and alle-
giance. It is plain mankind never owned nor
confidered any fuch natural fubjeBion that they
were born in, to one or to the other that tied

them,

298 Or Civil-Government.

them, without their own confents, to a fub-»
jeclion to them and their heirs.

§. 115. For there are no examples fo fre-
quent in hiftory, both facred and profane,
as thofe of men withdrawing themfelves, and
their obedience, from the jurifdiction they
were born under, and the family or com-
munity they were bred up in, and Jetting up
new governments in other places; from whence
fprang all that number of petty common-
wealths in the beginning of ages, and which
always multiplied, as long as there was room
enough, till the flronger, or more fortunate,
fwallowed the weaker ; and thofe great ones
again breaking to pieces, dilTolved into lefTer
dominions. All which are fo many tefti-
monies againfl paternal fovereignty, and
plainly prove, that it was not the natural
right of the father defcending to his heirs,
that made governments in the beginning,
fince it was impoffible, upon that ground,
there mould have been fo many little king-
doms ; all muil: have been but only one uni-
verfal monarchy, if men had not been at
liberty to feparate themfelves from their fa-
milies, and the government, be it what it
will, that was fet up in it, and go and make
diftinct common-wealths and other govern-
ments, as they thought fit.

§. 116. This has been the practice of the
world from its firft beginning to this day;
nor is it now any more hindrance to the

freedom

Of Civil-Government. 299

reedom of mankind, that they are born under
onjiituted and ancient polities, that have efta-
>li(hed laws, and fet forms of government,

Ihan if they were born in the woods, amongft
he unconfined inhabitants, that run loofe in
hem : for thofe, who would perfuade us,
hat by being born under any government, we
ire naturally fubjecls to it, and have no more
my title or pretence to the freedom of the
[late of nature, have no other reafon (bating
that of paternal power, which we have al-
ready anfwered) to produce for it, but only,
becaufe our fathers or progenitors paffed away
their natural liberty, and thereby bound up
themfelves and their pofterity to a perpetual
fubjection to the government, which they
themfelves fubmitted to. It is true, that
whatever engagements or promifes any one
has made for himfelf, he is under the obli-
gation of them, but cannot, by any compact
whatfoever, bind bis children or pqfteritv : for
his fon, when a man, being altogether as
free as the father, any a5i of the father can
no more give away the liberty of the fon, than
it can of any body elfe : he may indeed annex
fuch conditions to the land, he enjoyed as a
fubjecl: of any common-wealth, as may oblige
his fon to be of that community, if he will
enjoy thofe pofTerlions which were his fa-
ther's ; becaufe that eftate being his father's
property, he may difpofe, or fettle it, as he
pleafes.

§• »7-

•^oo Of Civil-Government.

§. 117. And this has generally given the
occafion to miftake in this matter ; becaufe
common-wealths not permitting any part of
their dominions to be difmembered, nor to
be enjoyed by any but thofe of their com-
munity, the fon cannot ordinarily enjoy the
poffeflions of his father, but under the fame
terms his father did, by becoming a member
of the fociety ; whereby he puts himfelf
prefently under the government he finds there
ellablifhed, as much as any other fubject of
that common-wealth. And thus the confent
of freemen, born under government, which only
makes them members of it, being given feparately
in their turns, as each comes to be of age,
and not in a multitude together ; people take
no notice of it, and thinking it not done at
all, or not neceiTary, conclude they are na-
turally fubjects as they are men.

§. 118. But, it is plain, governments them-
felves underftand it otherwife ; they claim
no power over the J on, becaufe of that they had
over the father ; nor look on children as being,
their fubjects, by their fathers being fo. If
a fubjeel: of England have a child, by an Englifl}
woman in France, whofe fubject is he ? Not
the king of England'?; for he muft have
leave to be admitted to the privileges of it :
nor the king of France's ; for how then has
his father a liberty to bring him away, and
breed him as he pleafes ? and who ever was
judged as a traytor or defcrter, if he left, or

warred

Of Civil-Government. 301

;varred againft a country, for being barely
23orn in it of parents that were aliens there ?
ft is plain then, by the practice of govern-
ments themfelves, as well as by the law of
right reafon, that a child is born a fubjedl of
w country or government. He is under his
father's tuition and authority, till he comes
to age of difcretion ; and then he is a free-
man, at liberty what government he will put
himfelf under, what body politic he will
unite himfelf to : for if an Englijhmans fon,
born in France, be at liberty, and may do
fo, it is evident there is no tie upon him by
his father's being a fubjecl: of this kingdom ;
nor is he bound up by any compact of his an-
cestors. And why then hath not his fon, by
the fame reafon, the fame liberty, though he
be born any where elfe ? Since the power
that a father hath naturally over his children,
is the fame, where-ever they be born, and
the ties of natural obligations, are not bounded
by the pofitive limits of kingdoms and com-
mon-wealths.

§. 119. Every man being, as has been
(hewed, naturally free, and nothing being
able to put him into fubjection to any earthly
power, but only his own confent ; it is to be
confidered, what fhall be underliood to be a
fufficient declaration of a man's confent, to make
him fubjecl to the laws of any government.
There is a common diftinction of an exprefs
and a tacit ccmfent, which will concern our

prefent

302 Of Civil-Government.
prefent cafe. No body doubts but an exprefs
confenty of any man entering into any fo-
ciety, makes him a perfect member of that
fociety, a fubject of that government. The
difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon
as a tacit confent, and how far it binds, i. c.
how far any one mall be looked on to have
con fen ted, and thereby fubmitted to any go-
vernment, where he has made no exprerlions
of it at all. And to this I fay, that every
man, that hath any polTeffions, or enjoyment,
of any part of the dominions of any govern-
ment, doth thereby give his tacit confent, and
is as far forth obliged to obedience to the
laws of that government, during fuch enjoy-
ment, as any one under it ; whether this his
poileilion be of land, to him and his heirs
for ever, or a lodging only for a week ; or
whether it be barely travelling freely on the
highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as
the very being of any one within the terri-
tories of that government.

§. 120. To underfland this the better, it is
fit to confider, that every man, when he at
firft incorporates himfelf into any common-
wealth, he, by his uniting himfelf thereunto,
annexed alio, and fubmits to the community,
thofe polTeffions, which he has, or fhall ac-
quire, that do not already belong to any
other government : for it would be a direct
contradiction, for any one to enter into fo-
ciety with others for the fecuring and re-
gelating

Of Civil-Government. 303

gulating of property ; and yet to fuppofe his
land, whofe property is to be regulated by
the laws of the fociety, mould be exempt
from the jurifdiction of that government, to
which he himfelf, the proprietor of the land,
is a fubject. By the fame act therefore,
whereby any one unites his perfoa, which
was before free, to any common-wealth ; by
the fame he unites his poffeflions, which were
before free, to it alfo ; and they become,
both of them, perfon and pofTeffion, fubject
to the government and dominion of that
common-wealth, as long as it hath a being.
Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by
inheritance, purchafe, permiffion, or other-
ways, enjoys any part of the land, fo annexed
to, and under the government of that com-
mon-wealth, muji take it with the condition it
is under ; that is, of fubmitting to the govern-
ment of the common-wealth, under whole juris-
diction it is, as far forth as any fubjecl of it.
§. 121. But fince the government has a
direct jurifdiction only over the laud, and
reaches the pofTerTor of it, (before he has
actually incorporated himfelf in the focietv)
only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that ; the
obligation any one is under, by virtue of fuch
enjoyment, to fubmit to the government, begins
and ends with the enjoyment ; lb that whenever
the owner, who has given nothing but fuch
a tacit confent to the government, will, by
3 donation,

304 Of Civil-Government.

donation, ialc, or otherwise, quit the faidt
poiTefiion, lie is at liberty to go and incor-
porate himfelf into any other common-
wealth; or to agree with others to begin a
new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the
world, they can find free and unpofTefTed :
whereas he, that has once, by actual agree-
ment, and any exprefs declaration, given his
confent to be of any common-wealth, is per-
petually and indifpentibly obliged to be, and
remain unalterably a fubject to it, and can
never be again in the liberty of the ftate of
nature ; unlefs, by any calamity, the govern-
ment he was under comes to be difTolved ;
or elfe by fome public act cuts him off from,
being any longer a member of it.

§. 122. But fubmitting to the laws of any
country, living quietly, and enjoying privi-
leges and protection under them, makes not
a man a member of that fociety : this is only
a local protection and homage due to and
from all thofe, who, not being in a flate of
war, come within the territories belonging
to any government, to all parts whereof the
force of its laws extends. But this no more
makes a man a member of that fociety > a per-
petual fubject of that common-wealth, than
it -would make a man a fubject to another, in
whofe family he found it convenient to abide
for fome time; though, whilft he continued
in it, he were obliged to comply with the
laws, and fubmit to the government he

found

Of Civil-Government. 305
found there. And thus we fee, that fo-
reigners, by living all their lives under another
government, and enjoying the privileges and
protection of it, though they are bound, even
in confcience, to fubmit to its admmiltration,
as far forth as any denifon ; yet do not thereby
come to be fubjcBs or members of that com-
mon-wealth. Nothing can make any man fo,
but his actually entering into it by pofitive
enlevement, and exprefs promife and compact.
This is that, which I think, concerning the
beginning of political focietjes, and that con-
fent -which makes any one a member of any
common- wealth.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Ends of Political Society and Govern-

ment.

% 127. J F man in the ftate of nature be
X fo free, as has been laid ; if he
be abfolute lord of his own perfori and pof-
leffions, equal to the greatcft, and fubjed to
no body, why will he part with his ircedom ?
why will he give up this empire, and iubject
Limfelf to the dominion and controul oi any
other power ? To which it is obvious to an-
fwer, that though in the ftate of nature he
hath fucha right, yet the enjoyment of it
is very uncertain, and conftantly exposed to
the invafion of others : for all being kings as

X much.

oo6 Of Civil-Government.

much as he, every man his equal, and the
greater part no ftricl: obfervers of equity and
juftice, the enjoyment of the property he has
in this ftate is very unfafe, very unfecure.
This makes him willing to quit a con-
dition, which, however free, is full of fears
and continual dangers : and it is not without
reafon, that he feeks out, and is willing to
join in fociety with others, who are already
united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties and eftates,
which I call by the general name, property.

§. 124. The great and chief end, therefore*
of men's uniting into common-wealths, and
putting themfelves under government, is the
■prefervation of their property. To which in
the ftate of nature there are many things
wanting.

Firji, There wants an eftablified, fettled,
known law, received and allowed by commoi
eonfent to be the ftandard of right and wron^
and the common meafure to decide all con-
troverts between them : for though the la^
of nature be plain and intelligible to all ra-
tional creatures ; yet men being biafTed by.
their intereft, as well as ignorant for want of
ftudy of it, are not apt to allow of it as a
law binding to them in the application of it
to their particular cafes.

§. 125. Secondly, In the ftate of nature

--there wants a known and indifferent judge, with

authority to determine all differences ac-

^ cording

Of Civil-Government. 307

cording to the eftablifhed law : for every one
in that ftate being both judge and executioner
of the law of nature, men being partial to
themfelves, paftion and revenge is very apt
to carry them too far, and with too much
heat, in their own cafes ; as well as negli-
gence, and unconcernednefs, to make them
too remifs in other men's.

§. 126. thirdly) In the ftate of nature there
often wants power to back and fupport the
fentence when right, and to give it due exe~
cution. They who by any injuftice offended,
will feldom fail, where they are able, by force
to make good their injuftice ; fuch reiiftance
many times makes the punifhment dangerous,
and frequently deftructive, to thofe who at-
tempt it.

§. 127. Thus mankind, notwithftanding
all the privileges of the ftate of nature, being
but in an ill condition, while they remain,
in it, are quickly driven into fociety. Hence
it comes to pals, that we feldom find any
number of men live any time together in this
ftate. The inconveniencics that they are
therein expofed to, by the irregular and un-
certain exercife of the power every man has
of punifhing the tranfgreffions of others,
make them take fanctuary under the efta-
blifhed laws of government, and therein
feek the prefervatio?i of their property. It is
this makes them fo willingly give up every
one his fingle power of punifhing, to be
X 2 cxercifed

308 Of Civil-Government*

exercifed by fuch alone, as fhall be ap-
pointed to it amongft them ; and by fuch
rules as the community, or thofe authorized
by them to that purpofe, mail agree on. And
in this we have the original right and rife of
both the legijlative and executive power, as well
as of the governments and focieties them-
felves.

§. 128. For in the ftate of nature, to omit
the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man
has two powers.

The firft is to do whatfoever he thinks fit
for the prefervation of himfelf, and others
within the permiffion of the law of nature :
by which law, common to them all, he and
all the reft of mankind are one community,
make up one fociety, diftinct from all other
creatures. And were it not for the corrup-
tion and vitioufnefs of degenerate men, there
would be no need of any other ; no neceffity
that men mould feparate from this great and
natural community, and by pontive agree-
ments combine into fmailer and divided
afTociations.

The other power a man has in the. ftate
of nature, is the power to puni/Ij the crimes
committed againft that law. Both thefe he
gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may
fo call it, or particular politic fociety, and in-
corporates into any common-wealth, feparate
from the reft of mankind.

§. 129.

Of Civil-Government. 309

§. 129. The firft power, viz. of doing what-
foever he thought for the prefervation of him-
felf and the reft of mankind, he gives up to
be regulated by laws made by the fociety,
fo far forth as the prefervation of himfelf,
and the reft of that fociety (hall require;
which laws of the fociety in many things
confine the liberty he had by the law of
nature.

§. I30. Secondly ', The power of punifiing he
wholly gives up, and engages his natural force,
(which he might before employ in the exe-
cution of the law of nature, by his own fingle
authority, as he thought fit) to affift the
executive power of the fociety, as the law
thereof mail require : for being now in a new
ftate, wherein he is to enjoy many conve-
niences, from the labour, affiftance, and fo-
ciety of others in the fame community, as
well as protection from its whole ftrength ;
he is to part alfo with as much of his natural
liberty, in providing for himfelf, as the good,
profperity, and fafety of the fociety mall re-
quire; which is not only neceflary, but juft,
fince the other members of the fociety do
the like.

§. 131. But though men, when they enter
into fociety, give up the equality, liberty,
and executive power they had in the ftate of
nature, into the hands of the fociety, to be
fo far difpofed of by the legiflative, as the
good of the fociety mall require ; yet it being
X 3 only

2 1 o Of Civil-Government.

only with an intention in every one the better
to preferve himfelf, his liberty and property ;
(for no rational creature can be fuppofed to
change his condition with an intention to be
worfe) the power of the fociety, or legi/lative
constituted by them, can never be fuppofed to
extend farther, than the common good-, but is
obliged to fecure every one's property, by
providing againft thofe three defects above
mentioned, that made the flate of nature fo
unfafe and uneafy. And fo whoever has the
legiilative or iupreme power of any common-
wealth, is bound to govern by eftablifhed
jlanding laws, promulgated and known to the
people, and not by extemporary decrees; by
indijfere?it and upright judges, who are to
decide controversies by thofe laws , and to
employ the force of the community at home,
only in the execution of fuch laws, or abroad
to prevent or redrefs foreign injuries, and
fecure the community from inroads and in-
vaiion. And all this to be directed to no
other end, but the peace, ffety, and public
good of the people.

CHAP. X.

Of the Forms of a Common-wealth.

§. 132. *Tp HE majority having, as has been
X /hewed, upon men's nrfi: uniting
into fociety, the whole power of the com-
munity

Of Civil-Government. 311

munity naturally in them, may employ all
that power in making laws for the commu-
nity from time to time, and executing thofe
laws by officers of their own appointing ;
and then the form of the government is a
perfect democracy : or elfe may put the power
of making laws into the hands of a few felect
men, and their heirs or fuccefTors ; and then
it is an oligarchy: or elfe into the hands of
one man, and then it is a monarchy : if to
him and his heirs, it is an hereditary mo-
narchy : if to him only for life, but upon
his death the power only of nominating a
fucceflbr to return to them ; an elective mo-
narchy. And fo accordingly of thefe the
community may make compounded and
mixed forms of government as they think
good. And if the legiflative power be at
rirft given by the majority to one or more
perfons only for their lives, or any limited
time, and then the fupreme power to revert
to them again ; when it is fo reverted, the
community may difpofe of it again anew
into what hands they pleafe, and fo conftitute
a new form of government : for the form of
government depending upon the placing the fu-
preme power, which is the legiflative, it being
impoffible to conceive that an inferior power
fhould prefcribe to a fuperior, or any but the
fupreme make laws, according as the power
of making laws is placed, fuch is the form
of the common-wealth.

X 4 §• 133-

312 OF ClV'IL-GovERNMF.N'T.

§.133. "By- common-wealth, I mud be un-
derftood all along to mean, not a democracy,
or any form of government, but any inde-
pendent community, which the hatines lignilied
by the word ci-vitas, to which the word
which bed anfwers in our language, is com-
mon-wealth, and mod: properly cxprefies fuch
a fociety of men, which community or city
in E?2glijh does not ; for there may be fub-
ordinate communities in a government ; and
city amongft us has a quite different notion
from common-wealth : and therefore, to avoid
ambiguity, I crave leave to ufe the word
common-wealth in that fenfe, in wThich I find
it ufed by king "James the firji ; and I take
it to be its genuine fignincation ; which if
any body dillike, I content with him to
change it for a better.

CHAP. XL

Of the "Extent of the Legijlative Power,

§. 1 34. r~W~~s H E great end of men's entering
j| into fociety, being the enjoy-
ment of their properties in peace and fafety,
and the great inftrument and means of that
being the laws eitablimed in that fociety ; the
firfi and fundamental pojitrue law of all com-
mon- wealths is the ejiablifing of the legijlative
power ; as the firfl and fundamental natural

law,

Of Civil-Government. 313

law, which is to govern even the legiflative
itielf, is the prefervation of the fociety, and
(as far as will confiit with the public good)
of every perfon in it. This legiflative is not
only / be fupr em e power of the common-wealth,
but facred and unalterable in the hands where
the community hive once placed it; nor can
any edict of any body e\(e. in what form foever
conceived, or by what power foever backed,
have the force and obligation of a law, which
has not its fanblion from that legiflative which
the public has chofen and appointed : for
without this the law could not have that,
which is abfolutelv neceffary to its being a
law, * the confent of the fociety, over whom
no body can have a power to make laws, but
by their own confent, and by authority re-
ceived

* The lawful power of making laws to command whole
politic focieties of men, belonging fo properly unto the fame
intire focieties, that for any prinee or potentate of what kind
foever upon earth, to exercife the fame of himfelf, and not
by exprefs commiffion immediately and perfonally received
from God, or elfe by authority derived at the firft from their
confent, upon whofe perfons they i:ipofe laws, it is no better
than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public
approbation hath not made fo. Hooker 's Eccl. Pol. 1. i. feSi.
10. Of this point therefore we are to note, that fith men
naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole
politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our cor,-
fent, we could in fuch fort be at no man's commandment
living. And to be commanded we do confent, when that
fociety, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before con-
fented, without revoking the fame after by the like univerfal
agreement.

Laws therefore human, of what kind fo ever, are available
by confent. Ibid.

314 Of Civil-Government.

ceived from them ; and therefore all the
obedience, which by the moil folemn ties any
one can be obliged to pay, ultimately termi-
nates in this fupreme power, and is directed
by thofe laws which it enacts : nor can any
oaths to any foreign power whatfoever, or
any domeftic fubordinate power, difcharge
any member of the fociety from his obedience
to the kgijlative, acting purfuant to their truft j
nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to
the laws fo enacted, or farther than they do
allow ; it being ridiculous to imagine one
can be tied ultimately to obey any power in
the fociety, which is not the fupreme.

§. 135. Though the kgifiathe, whether
placed in one or more, whether it be always
in being, or only by intervals, though it be
the fupreme power in every common-wealth;
yet,

F;rf}, It is not, nor can poflibly be abfo-
lutely arbitrary over the iives and fortunes of
the people : for it being but the joint power
of every member of the fociety given up to
that perfon, or aiTembly, which is legiilator ;
it can be no more than thofe perfons had in
a Hate of nature before they entered into fo-
ciety, and gave up to the community : , for
no body can transfer to another more power
than he has in hlmfelf j and no body has an
abfolute arbitrary power over himfelf, or over
any other, to deftroy his own life, or take
away the life or property of another. A man,

a-:

Of Civil-Government. 315

as has been proved, cannot fubjec~t himfelf
to the arbitrary power of another; and having
in the flate of nature no arbitrary power over
the life, liberty, or porlefTion of another, but
only fo much as the law of nature gave him
for the prefervation of himfelf, and the reft
of mankind ; this is all he doth, or can
give up to the common-wealth, and by it
to the legijlative flower, fo that the legillative
can have no more than this. Their power,
in the utmoft bounds of it, is limited to the
public good of the fociety. It is a power,
that hath no other end but prefervation, and
therefore can never * have a right to deftro^,
enflave, or designedly to impoverifh the fub-
jecls. The obligations of the law of nature
ceafe not in fociety, but only in many cafes
are drawn clofer, and have by human laws

known

* Two foundations there are which bear up public fo-
cieties ; the one a natural inclination, whereby all men defire
fociahle life and fellowship ; the other an order, exprefly or
fecretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union
in living together : the latter is that which we call the law
of a common-weal, the very foul of a politic body, the
parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and fet
on work in fuch actions as the common good requireth.
Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment
amengft men, are never framed as they mould be, unlefs
prefuming the will of man to be inwardly obftinate, rebellious,
and averfe from sll obedience to the facred laws of his
nature ; in a word, unlefs prefuming man to be, in regard
of his depraved mind, little better than a wild beaft, they
do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, fo to frame his out-
ward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common
good, for which focieties are inftituted. Unlefs they do this,
they are not perfect. Hookers Eccl. PcL I, i. fefl. 10.

3 1 6 Of Civil- Government.

known penalties annexed to them, to inforce
their obiervation. Thus the law of nature
/lands as an eternal rule to all men, legif-
lators as v/ell as others. The rules that they
make for other men's actions, muft, as well
as their own and other men's actions, be
conformable to the law of nature, i. e. to
the will of God, of which that is a decla-
ration, and the fundamental law of nature being
the prefer-vation of mankind, no human fanclion
can be good, or valid againft it.

§. 136. Secondly i * The legijlative, or fu-
preme authority, cannot aiTume to its felf a
power to rule by extemporary arbitrary de-
crees, but is bound to difpenfe jujlice, and decide
the rights of the fubject by promulgated Jlanding
laws , and known authorized judges : for the
law of nature being unwritten, and fo no
where to be found but in the minds of men,
they who through paffion or intereft mail
mifcite, cr mifapply it, cannot fo eafily be
convinced of their miftake where there is no
eftablimed judge: and fo it ferves not, as it
ought, to determine the rights, and fence the

properties

* Human laws are meafures in refpeft of men whofe actions
they muft direct, howbeit iuch meafures they are as have alfo
their higher rules to be meafured by. which rules are two,
the law of God, and the law of nature ; fo that laws human
muft be made according to the general laws of nature, and
without contradiction to any pofitive law of {"capture, other-
wife they are ill made. Hacker's Eccl. Pol. I. iii. feSi. 9.

To conftrain men to any thing inconvenient doth feera
unreafonable. Ibid. L i. fed. 10.

Of Civil-Government. 317
properties of thofe that live under it, efpe-
cially where every one is judge, interpreter,
and executioner of it too, and that in his
own cafe : and he that has right on his fide,
having ordinarily but his own fingle ftrength,
hathi not force enough to defend himfelf from
injuries, or to punifh delinquents. To avoid
thefe inconveniencies, which diforder men's
properties in the ftate of nature, men unite
into focieties, that they may have the united
ftrength of the whole fociety to fecure and
defend their properties, and may have Jlanding
rules to bound it, by which every one may-
know what is his. To this end it is that
men give up all their natural power to the
fociety which they enter into, and the com-
munity put the legiflative power into fuch
hands as they think fit, with this truft, that
they (hall be governed by declared laws, or
elfe their peace, quiet, and property will
flill be at the fame uncertainty, as it was in
the ftate of nature.

§. 137. Abfolute arbitrary power, or go-
verning without fettled jlanding laws, can nei-
ther of them confift with the ends of fociety
and government, which men would not quit
the freedom of the ftate of nature for, and
tie themfelves up under, were it. not to pre-
ferve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and
by Jlated rules of right and property to fecure
their peace and quiet. It cannot be fuppofed
that they mould intend, had they a power

fo

3 iB Of Civil-Government.

fo to do, to give to any one, or more, an
abfoluiC arbitrary power over their perfons and
eitates, and put a force into the magistrate's
hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily
upon them. This were to put themfelves
into a worfe condition than the ftate of na-
ture, wherein they had a liberty to defend
their right againlr. the injuries of others,
and were upon equal terms offeree to main-
tain it, whether invaded by a fingle man,
or many in combination. Whereas by fup-
pofing they have given up themfelves to the
abfolute arbitrary power and will of a legif-
lator, they have difarmed themfelves, and
armed him, to make a prey of them when
he pleafes ; he being in a much worfe con-
dition, who is expofed to the arbitrary power
of one man, who has the command of
100,000, than he that is expofed to the arbi-
trary power of 100,000 fingle men ; no body
being fecure, that his will, who has fuch a
command, is better than that of other men,
though his force be 100,000 times ftronger.
And therefore, whatever form the common-
wealth is under, the ruling power ought to
govern by declared and received laws, and not
by extemporary dictates and undetermined
refolutions ; for then mankind will be in a
far worfe condition than in the ftate of
nature, if they mall have armed one, or a
few men with the joint power of a multitude,
to force them to obey at pleaiure the exor-
4 bitant

Of Civil-Government. 319

- bitant and unlimited decrees of their fudden
thoughts, or unreftrained, and till that mo-
ment unknown wills, without having any
meafures fet down which may guide and
juftify their actions : for all the power the
government has, being on-ly for the good of
the fociety, as it ought not to be arbitrary and
at pleafure, fo it ought to be exercifed by ejla-
blijhed and promulgated laws j that both the
people may know their duty, and be fafe and
fecure within the limits of the law ; and the
rulers too kept within their bounds, and not
be tempted, by the power they have in their
hands, to employ it to fuch purpofes, and
by fuch meafures, as they would not have
known, and own not willingly.

§. 138. thirdly ', The fupreme power cannot take
from any man any part of his property without
his own confent : for the prefervation of pro-
perty being the end of government, and that
for which men enter into fociety, it necellarily
fuppofes and requires, that the people mould
have property, without which they muft be
fuppofed to lofe that, by entering into fo-
ciety, which was the end for which they
entered into it ; too grofs an abfurdity for
any man to own. Men therefore in fociety
having property, they have fuch a right to
the goods, which by the law of the com-
munity are their's, that no body hath a right
to take their fubftance or any part of it from
them, without their own confent : without

this-

320 Of Civil-Government.

this they have no property at all ; for I have
truly no property in that, which another can
by right take from me, when he pleafes,
againit my confent. Hence it is a miftake to
think, that the fupreme or legi/lative power of
any common-wealth, can do what it will,
and difpofe of the eftates of the fubject arbi-
trarily, or take any part of them at pleafure.
This is not much to be feared in govern-
ments where the legi/lative conlifts, wholly or
in part, in affemblies which are variable,
whofe members, upon the difTolution of the ^
ailembly, are fubjects under the common
laws of their country, equally with the reft.
But in governments, where the legi/lative is in
one lading affembly always in being, or in
one man, as in abfolute monarchies, there
is danger ftill, that they will think them-
felves to have a diftindt intereft from the
reft of the community; and fo will be apt
to increafe their own riches and power, by
taking what they think fit from the people :
for a man's property is not at all fecure, tho'
there be good and equitable laws to fet the
bounds of it between him and his fellow
fubjects, if he who commands thofe fubjecls
have power to take from any private man,
what part he pleafes of his property, and ufe
and difpofe of it as he thinks good.

§. 139. But government, into whatfoever

hands it is put, being, as I have before mewed,

intruded w^th this condition, and for this

5 end,

Of Civil-Government. 321

md, that men might have and fecure their
properties; the prince, or fenate, however it
may have power to make Jaws, for the re-
gulating or property between the fubjects one
amongft another, yet can never have a power
to take to themfelves the whole, or any part
of the fubjects property, without their own
confent : for this would be in effect to leave
them no property at all. And to let us fee,
that even abfolute power, where it is necefTary,
is not arbitrary by being abfolute, but is ftill
limited by that reafon, and confined to thofe
ends, which required it in fome cafes to be
abfolute, we need look no farther than the
common practice of martial difcipline : for
the prefervation of the army, and in it of*
the whole common-wealth, requires an ab-
folute obedience to the command of every fu-
perior officer, and it is juftly death to difobey
or difpute the moft, dangerous or unreaibnable
of them ; but yet we fee, that neither the
fcrjeant, that could command a foldier to
march up to the mouth of a cannon, or ftand
in a breach, where he isalmoft fure to periffi,
can command that foldier to give him one
penny of his money ; nor the general, that
can condemn him to death for deferting his
port, or for not obeying the moft defperate
orders, can yet, with all his abfolute power of
life and death, difpofe of one farthing of that
foldier's ellate, or feize one jot of his goods ;
whom yet he can command any thing, and

Y hang

322 Of Civil-Government.
hang for the leaft difobedience ; becaufe fuch
a blind obedience is neceffary to that end,
for which the commander has his power, viz.
the prefervation of the reft ; but the difpofing
of his goods has nothing to do with it.

§. 140. It is true, governments cannot be
fupported without great charge, and it is fit
every one who enjoys his mare of the pro-
tection, mould pay out of his eftate his pro-
portion for the maintenance of it. But ftill
it muft be with his own confent, i. e. the
confent of the majority, giving it either by
themfelves, or their representatives chofen by
them : for if any one mail claim a power to
lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own
authority, and without fuch confent of the
people, he thereby invades the fundamental
law of property, and fubverts the end of go-
vernment : for what property have I in that,
which another may by right take, when he
pleafes, to himfelf ?

§. 141. Fourthly, The legifative cannot
transfer the power of making laws to any other
hands : for it being but a delegated power
from the people, they who have it cannot
pafs it over to others. The people alone can
appoint the form of the common-wealth,
which is by conftituting the legillative, and
appointing in whofe hands that (hall be. And
when the people have faid, We will fubmit to
rules, and be governed by laws made by fuch
men, and in fuch forms, no body elfe can

fay

Of Civil-Government. 323

fay other men mall make laws for them ; nor
can the people be bound by any laws, but
fuch as are enacted by thofe whom they have
chofen, and authorized to make laws for
them. The power of the legijlative, being
derived from the people by a pofitive volun-
tary grant and inftitution, can be no other
than what that pofitive grant conveyed, which
being only to make laws, and not to make
legislators, the legijlative can have no power
to transfer their authority of making laws,
and place it in other hands.

§. 142. Thefe are the bounds which the
trult, that is put in them by the fociety, and
the law of God and nature, have Jet to the
legijlative power of every common-wealth, in.
all forms of government.

Firft, They are to govern by promulgated
ejiabliped laws, not to be varied in particular
cafes, but to have one rule for rich and
poor, for the favourite at court, and the
country man at plough.

Secondly, Thefe laws alfo ought to be
defignedy^r no other end ultimately, but the
good oj the people.

Thirdly, They mud not raije taxes on the
property oj the people, without the conjent of the
people, given by themfelves, or their deputies.
And this properly concerns only fuch go-
vernments where the legijlative is always in
being, or at lead where the people have
not referved any part of the legiflative to
Y 2 deputies,

324 Of Civil-Government.
deputies, to be from time to time chofen by
ifrfthemfelves.

Fourthly, The legijlative neither muit nor
can transfer the power of making laws to any
body elfe, or piace it any where, but where
the people have.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Legijlative, Executive, and Federative
Power of the Common- wealth.

§. 143. ' g 'HE legiflative power is that,
4 which has a right to direft
hew the force of the common-wealth mail be
employed for preferving the community and
the members of it. But becaufe thofe laws
which are constantly to be executed, and
whofe force is always to continue, may be
made in a little time ; therefore there is no
need, that the legijlative mould be always in
being, not having always bufinefs to do.
And becaufe it may be too great a temptation
to human frailty, apt to grafp at power, for
the fame perfons, who have the power of
making laws, to have alfo in their hands the
power to execute them, whereby they may
exempt themfelves from obedience to the
laws they make, and fuit the law, both in
its making, and execution, to their own
private advantage, and thereby come to have
a diftincl: intereft from the reft of the com-
munity,

Of Civil-Government.' 325
• munity, contrary to the end of fociety and
government : therefore in well-ordered com-
mon-wealths, where the good of the whole
is lb confidered, as it ought, the legislative
power is put into the hands of divers perfons,
who duly affembled, have by themfelves, or
jointly with others, a power to make laws,
which when they have done, being feparated
again, they are themfelves fubject to the laws
they have made ; which is a new and near tie
upon them, to take care, that they make
them for the public good.

§. 144. But becaufe the laws, that are at
once, and in a fhort time made, have a con-
ftant and lafting force, and need a perpetual
execution, or an attendance thereunto ; there-
fore it is neceffary there mould be a power
always in being, which fhould fee to the
execution of the laws that are made, and.
remain in force. And thus the legijlative and
executive power come often to be feparated.

§. 145. There is another power in every
common-wealth, which one may call na-
tural, becaufe it is that which anfwers to the
power every man naturally had before he
entered into fociety : for though in a com-
mon-wealth the members of it are diftin<fb
perfons Hill in reference to one another, and
as fuch are governed by the laws of the fo-
ciety ; yet in reference to the reft of man-
kind, they make one body, which is, as every
member of it before was, liill in the ftate of
Y 3 nature

326 Of Civil-Government.

nature with the reft of mankind. Hence it
is, that the controverfies that happen between
any man of the fociety with thofe that are
out of it, are managed by the public ; and
an injury done to a member of their body,
engages the whole in the reparation of it.
So that under this consideration, the whole
community is one body in theftate of nature,
in refpect of all other ftates or perfons out of
its community.

§. 146. This therefore contains the power
of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and
all the tranfactions, with all perfons and com-
munities without the common-wealth, and
may be called federative, if any one pleafes.
So the thing be underftood, I am indifferent
as to the name.

§. 147. Thefe two powers, executive and
federative, though they be really diftinct in
themfelves, yet one comprehending the exe-
cution of the municipal laws of the fociety
within its felf, upon all that are parts of it ;
the other the management of the fecurity and
interejl of the public without, with all thofe
that it may receive benefit or damage from,
yet they are always almoft united. And
though this federative power in the well or
ill management of it be of great moment to
the common-wealth, yet it is much lefs ca-
pable to be directed by antecedent, {landing,
pofitive laws, than the executive ; and fo muft
neceffarily be left to the prudence and wifdom

of

Of Civil-Government. 327

of thofe, whofe hands it is in, to be managed
for the public good : for the laws that con-
cern fubjects one amongft another, being to
direct their actions, may well enough precede
them. But what is to be done in reference
to foreigners, depending, much upon their
actions, and the variation of defigns and
interefls, muft be left in great part to the
prudence of thofe, who have this power com-
mitted to them, to be managed by the befl
of their fkill, for the advantage of the com-
mon-wealth.

§. 148. Though, as I faid, the executive
and federative power of every community be
really diflinct in themfelves, yet they are
hardly to be feparated, and placed at the
fame time, in the hands of diflinct perfons ;
for both of them requiring the force of the
fociety for their exercife, it is almoft im-
practicable to place the force of the com-
mon-wealth in diflinct, and not fubordinate
hands ; or that the executive and federative
power mould be placed in perfons, that might
act feparately, whereby the force of the public
would be under different commands : which
would be apt fome time or other to caufe
diforder and ruin.

Y 4 CHAP.

328 Of Civil-Government.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Subordination of the Powers of the
Common - wealth .

§. 149. ' A ^Hough in a conftituted com-
JL mon-wealth, ilanding upon
its own bafis, and acting according to its own
nature, that is, acting for the prefervation of
the community, there can be but one fupreme
power, which is the legiflative, to which all
the reft are and mud be fubordinate, yet the
legiilative being only a fiduciary power to act
for certain ends, there remains frill in the
people a fupreme power to remove or alter the
legifiative, when they find the legislative act
contrary to the trull: repofed in them : for all
power given with trufi for the attaining an
end, being limited by that end, whenever
that end is manifestly neglected, or oppofed,
the trufi muft necefiarily be forfeited, and the
power devolve into the hands of thofe that
gave it, who may place it anew where they
mall think bell: for their fafety and fecurity.
And thus the community perpetually retains a
fupreme power of faving themfelves from the
attempts and defigns of any body, even of
their legiilators, whenever they mall be fo
foolifh, or fo wicked, as to lay and carry on
defigns againft the liberties and properties of
the fubjecl: : for no man or fociety of men,
having a power to deliver up their prefer-

vation.

Of Civil-Government. 329

nation, or confequently the means of it, to
the abfolute will and arbitrary dominion of
another ; when ever any one fhall go about
to bring them into fuch a flavifh condition,
they will always have a right to preferve,
what they have not a power to part with -9
and to rid tbemfelves of thofe, who invade
this fundamental, facred, and unalterable law
of felf-prefcrvation, for which they entered
into ibciety. And thus the community may
be faid in this refpecl to be always the Jupreme
power, but not as coniidered under any form
of government, becaufe this power of the
people can never take place till the govern-
ment be diflblved.

§, 150. In all cafes, whilft the government
fubfifts, the legijlative is the Jupreme power :
for what can give laws to another, mull; needs
be fuperior to him ; and fince the legiilative
is no otherwife legiilative of the fociety, but
by the right it has to make laws for all the
parts, and for every member of the fociety,
prefcribing rules to their actions, and giving
power of execution, where they are tranf-
greffed, the legijlative mufl needs be the fu-
preme, and all other powers, in any members
or parts, of the fociety, derived from and
fubordinate to it.

§. 151. In fome common- wealths, where
the legijlathe is not always in being, and the
executive is vetted in a fingle perfon, who has
alio a mare in the legiilative ; there that iingle

perfon

22° Of Civil-Government.
perfon in a very tolerable fenfe may alfo be
called fupreme : not that he has in himfelf all
the fupreme power, which is that of law-
making ; but becaufe he has in him the fu-
preme execution, from whom all inferior ma-
gistrates derive all their feveral fubordinate
powers, or at leafl the greateft part of them ;
having alfo no legiflative fuperior to him,
there being no law to be made without his
confent, which cannot be expected mould
ever fubject him to the other part of the
legiflative, he is properly enough in this fenfe
fupreme. But yet it is to be obferved, that
tho' oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken
to him, it is not to him as fupreme legiflator,
but as fupreme executor of the law, made by
a joint power of him with others ; allegiance
being nothing but an obedience according to
law, which when he violates, he has no right
to obedience, nor can claim it otherwife than
as the public perfon vefted with the power
of the law, and fo is to be confidered as the
image, phantom, or reprefentative of the
common-wealth, acted by the will of the
fociety, declared in its laws ; and thus he has
no will, no power, but that of the law. But
when he quits this reprefentation, this public
will, and acts by his own private will, he
degrades himfelf, and is but a fingle private
perfon without power, and without will, that
has any right to obedience ; the members

owing

Of Civil-Government. 331

owing no obedience but to the public will of
the fociety.

§. 152. The executive power, placed any-
where but in a perfon that has alfo a mare
in the legillative, is viiibly fubordinate and
accountable to it, and may be at pleafure
changed and difplaced ; fo that it is not the
fupreme executive power, that is exempt from
fubordi nation, but the fupreme executive power
veiled in one, who having a (hare in the
legillative, has no diftincl: fuperior legillative
to be fubordinate and accountable to, farther
than he himfelf lhall join and confent ; fo
that he is no more fubordinate than he himfelf
ihall think fit, which one may certainly con-
clude will be but very little. Of other mi-
nijierial and fubordinate powers in a common-
wealth, we need not fpeak, they being fo
multiplied with infinite variety, in the dif-
ferent cuftoms and conftitutions of diftincl:
common-wealths, that it is impoftible to give
a particular account of them all. Only thus
much, which is necelfary to our prefent pur-
pofe, we may take notice of concerning them,
that they have no manner of authority, any of
them, beyond what is by pofitive grant and
commifTion delegated to them, and are all
of them accountable to fome other power in
the common-wealth.

§. 153. It is not neceiTary, no, nor fo much
as convenient, that the legifative mould be
always in being ; but abfolutely necelfary that
3 the

332 Of Civil-Government.

the executive power mould, becaufe there is
not always need of new laws to be made, but
always need of execution of the laws that
are made. When the legi/Iative hath put the
execution of the laws, they make, into other
hands, they have a power ftill to refume it
out of thole hands, when they find caufe,
and to punifh for any mal-adminiftration
againft the laws. The fame holds alfo in
regard of the federative power, that and the
executive being both minijlerim 'and fubordinate
to the legi/Iative, which, as has been fhewed,
in a constituted common-wealth is the Su-
preme. The legiflative alfo in this cafe being
iuppofed to conlift of feveral perfons, (for if
it be a lingle perfon, it cannot but be always
in being, and fo will, as fupreme, naturally
have the fupreme executive power, together
with the legiflative) may ajfemble, and exercife
their legijlature, at the times that either their
original conftitution, or their own adjourn-
ment, appoints, or when they pleafe; if nei-
ther of thefe hath appointed any time, or
there be no other way preferibed to convoke
them : for the fupreme power being placed
in them by the people, it is always in them,
and they may exercife it when they pleafe,
unlefs by their original conftitution they are
limited to certain feafons, or by an act of
their fupreme power they have adjourned to
a certain time ; and when that time comes,
they have a right to afjembk and act again.

4 §-*154-

Of Civil-Government. 333

■§. 154. If the legijlathe, or any part of it,
be made up of reprefentatives chofen for that
time by the people, which afterwards return
into the ordinary ftate of fubjects, and have
no (hare in the legiilature but upon a new
choice, this power of chufing muft alfo be
exerciied by the people, either at certain ap-
pointed feafons, or elfe when they are fum-
moned to it ; and in this latter cafe, the
power of convoking the legillative is ordi-
narily placed in the executive, and has one
of thefe two limitations in refpect of time :
that either the original constitution requires
their aj]embling and acting at certain intervals,
and then the executive power does nothing
but minifterially ifTue directions for their
electing and affembling, according to due
forms ; or elfe it is left to his prudence to
call them by new elections, when the oc-
caiions or exigencies of the public require
the amendment of old, or making of new
laws, or the redrefs or prevention of any
inconveniencies, that lie on, or threaten the
people.

§. 155. It may be demanded here, What if
the executive power, being poffeffed of the
force of the common-wealth, mail make ufe
of that force to hinder the meeting and acting
of the legiflative, when the original confti-
tution, or the public exigencies require it ?
I fay, ufing force upon the people without
authority, and contrary to the truft put in

him

334 Of Civil-Government.
him that does fo, is a ftate of war with the
people, who have a right to reinjiate their
legijlative in the exercife of their power : for
having erected a legiflative, with an intent
they mould exercife the power of making
laws, either at certain fet times, or when
there is need of it, when they are hindered
by any force from what is fo neceflary to the
fociety, and wherein the fafety and prefer-
vation of the people confiils, the people have
a right to remove it by force. In all ftates
and conditions, the true remedy of force with-
out authority, is to oppofe force to it. The
ufe of force without authority, always puts
him that ufes it into a fate of war, as the
aggreflbr, and renders him liable to be treated
accordingly.

§. 156. The power of affembling and dif-
mijfmg the legijlative, placed in the executive,
gives not the executive a fuperiority over it,
but is a fiduciary trull: placed in him, for the
fafety of the people, in a cafe where the un-
certainty and variablenefs of human affairs
could not bear a Heady fixed rule : for it not
being poiTible, that the firft framers of the
government mould, by any forefight, be fo
much matters of future events, as to be able
to prefix fo jufr periods of return and du-
ration to the afjemblies of the legiflative^ in all
times to come, that might exactly anfwer all
the exigencies of the common-wealth ; the
bed remedy could be found for this defect,

was

Of Civil-Government. 335

was to truft this to the prudence of one who
was always to be prefent, and whofe bufinefs
it was to watch over the public good. Con-
stant freqimit meetings of the legifative, and
long continuations of their aflcmblies, without
necefTary occafion, could not but be burden-
fome to the people, and muft neceffarily in
time produce more dangerous inconveniencies,
and yet the quick turn of affairs might be
fometimes fuch as to need their prefent help:
any delay of their convening might endanger
the public; and fometimes too their bufinefs
•might be fo great, that the limited time of
their fitting might be too mort for their
work, and rob the public of that benefit which
could be had only from their mature deli-
beration. What then could be done in this
cafe to prevent the community from being
expofed fome time or other to eminent ha-
zard, on one fide or the other, by fixed in-
tervals and periods, fet to the meeting and
aBing of the legifative, but to intruft it to
the prudence of fome, who being prefent,
and acquainted with the ftate of public af-
fairs, might make ufe of this prerogative for
the public good ? and where elfe could this
be fo well placed as in his hands, who was
intrufted with the execution of the laws for
the fame end ? Thus fuppofing the regulation
of times for the afembling and fitting of the
legifative, not fettled by the original confti-
tution, it naturally fell into the hands of the

. executive,

336 Of Civil-GovernmExVT.
executive, not as an arbitrary power depend-
ing on his good pleafure, but with this truft
always to have it exercifed only for the public
weal, as the occurrences of times and change
of affairs might require. Whether fettled
periods of their convening, or a liberty left to
the prince for convoking the legiflativc, or
perhaps a mixture of both, hath the lean:
inconvenience attending it, it is not my
buiinefs here to inquire, but only to (hew,
that though the executive power may have
the prerogative of convoking and dijfolvtng fuch
conventions of the legijlative, yet it is not
thereby fuperior to it.

§. i$y. Things of this world are in fo
conftant a flux, that nothing remains long in
the fame ftate. Thus people, riches, trade,
power, change their ftations, flourishing
mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in
times neelecled defolate corners, whilil other
unfrequented places grow into populous coun-
tries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. But
things not always changing equally, and
private interefl often keeping up cuftoms and
privileges, when the reafons of them are
ceafed, it often comes to pafs, that in govern-
ments, where part of the legiflativc coniifts
of reprefentatives chofen by the people, that
in trad of time this reprefeniaticn becomes
very unequal and difproportionate to the rea-
fons it was at firft eftablilhed upon. To what
grofs abfurdities the following of cuftom,

when

Of Civil-Government. ^37
| when reafon has left it, may lead, we may
be fatisfied, when we fee the bare name of
! a town, of which there remains not fo much
as the ruins, where fcarce fo much houiing
as a iheepcote, or more inhabitants than a
fhepherd is to be found, fends as many re-
prefentatives to the grand affembly of law-
makers, as a whole county numerous in
people, and powerful in riches. This Gran-
gers Hand amazed at, and every one muff,
confefs needs a remedy; tho' mod think
it hard to find one, becaufe the conftitution
of the legiilative being the original and fu-
preme act of the fociety, antecedent to all
pofitive laws in it, and depending wholly on
the people, no inferior power can alter it.
And therefore the people, when the legijlative
is once conftituted, having, in fuch a govern-
ment as we have been fpeaking of, no power
to act as long as the government frands ; this
inconvenience is thought incapable of a re-
medy.

§ . 158. Salus populifiiprema lex, i s c e r t a i n 1 y
fo juft and fundamental a rule, that he, who
iincerely follows it, cannot dangeroufly err.
If therefore the executive, who has the
power of convoking the legiilative, obferving
rather the true proportion, than falliion of
reprefentation, regulates, not by old cuftom,
but true reafon, the number of members, in all
places that have a right to be diit.incl.ly re-
prefented, which no part of the people how-

Z ever

33B Of Civil-Government.

ever incorporated can pretend to, but in pro*
portion to the amftance which it affords to
the public, it cannot be judged to have fet
up a new legiilative, but to have reftored the
old and true one, and to have rectified the
diforders which fucceflion of time had in-
fenfibly, as well as inevitably introduced :
For it being the intereft as well as intention
of the people, to have a fair and equal repre-
fentative; whoever brings it neareft to that,
is an undoubted friend to, and eftablifher of
the government, and cannot mifs the confent
and approbation of the community; prero-
gative being nothing but a power, in the hands
of the prince, to provide for the public good,
in fuch cafes, which depending upon unfore-
feen and uncertain occurrences, certain and
unalterable laws could not fafely direct
whatfoever mall be done manifeftly for the
good of the people, and the eftabliming the
government upon its true foundations, is, and
always will be, juft prerogative. The power
of erecting new corporations, and therewith
new reprcfentatives, carries with it a fuppofi-
tion, that in time the meafures of reprefeiitation
might vary, and thofe places have a juft right
to be reprefented which before had none ; and
by the fame reafon, thofe ceafe to have a
right, and be too inconiiderable for fuch a
privilege, which before had it. 'Tis not a
change from the prefent ftate, which perhaps
corruption or decay has introduced, that makes

an

Of Civil-Government. 339

an inroad upon the government, but the ten-
dency of it to injure or opprefs the people,
and to fet up one part or party, with a diitinc-
tion from, and an unequal mbjection of the
reft. Whatfoever cannot but be acknow-
ledged to be of advantage to the fociety, and
people in general, upon juft and lafting mea-
fures, will always, when done, juftify itfelf ;
and whenever the people mall chufe their re~
prefentatives upon juft and undeniably equal
meafures, fuitable to the original frame of the
government, it cannot be doubted to be the
will and act of the fociety, whoever permitted
or caufed them fo to do.

CHAP. XIV.
Of PRERO G AH IV E.

§. 159. \irHERE the legiflative and
VV executive power are in diftindt
hands, (as they are in all moderated monar-
chies, and well-framed governments) there
the good of the fociety requires, that feveral
things ftiould be left to the difcretion of him
that has the executive power : for the legif-
lators not being able to forefee, and provide by
laws, for all that may be ufeful to the com-
munity, the executor of the laws, having the
power in his hands, has by the common law
of nature a right to make ufe of it for the good
of the fociety, in many cafes, where the mu-

Z 2 nicipal

340 Of Civil-Government.

nicipal law has given no direction, till the
legiflative can conveniently be affembled to
provide for it. Many things there are, which
the law can by no means provide for; and
thole muft neceffarily be left to the difcretion
of him that has the executive power in his
hands, to be ordered by him as the public
good and advantage mall require : nay, it is
fit that the laws themfelves mould in fome
cafes give way to the executive power, or
rather to this fundamental law of nature and
government, viz. That as much as may be,
all the members of the fociety are to be pre-
ferved : for fmce many accidents may happen,
wherein a ftxic~t. and rigid obfervation of the
laws may do harm ; (as not to pull down an
innocent man's houfe to ftop the fire, when the
next to it is burning) and a man may come
fomtimes within the reach of the law, which
makes no diftinction of perfons, by an action
that may deferve reward and pardon; 'tis fit the
ruler mould have a power, in many cafes, to
mitigate the feverity of the law, and pardon
fome offenders : for the end of government
being the prefervation of all y as much as may
be, even the guilty are to be fpared, where
it can prove no prejudice to the innocent.

§. 1 60. This power to act according to
difcretion, for the public good, without the
prefcription of the law, and fometimes even
againflit, is that which is called prerogative :
for fince in fome governments the Jaw-
making

Of Ci vi l»Go ver nment. 341

making power is not always in being, and is
ufiially too numerous, and fo too flow, for
the difpatch requifite to execution ; and be-
caufe alfo it is impoffible to forefee, and fo
by laws to provide for, all accidents and necef-
fities that may concern the public, or to
make fuch laws as will do no harm, if they
are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all
occafions, and upon all perfons that may come
in their way ; therefore there is a latitude
left to the executive power, to do many things
of choice which the laws do not prefcribe.

§. 161. This power, whilft. employed for
the benefit of the community, and fuitably to
the truft and ends of the government, is un-
doubted prerogative, and never is queftioned :
for the people are-very feldom or never fcru-
pulous or nice in the point ; they are far from
examining prerogative, whilft it is in any
tolerable degree employed for the ufe it was
meant, that is, for the good of the people,
and not manifeflly againil it : but if there
comes to be a quejtion between the executive
power and the people, about a thing claimed
as a prerogative -, the tendency of the excrcife
of fuch prerogative to the good or hurt of the
people, will eafily decide that queftion.

§. 162. It is eafy to conceive, that in the
infancy of governments, when common-
wealths differed little from families in number
of people, they differed from them too but
little in number of laws: and the governors,
Z 3 being

342 Of Civil-Government.

being as the fathers of them, watching over
them for their good, the government was
almofl all prerogative. A few eftablifhed laws
ferved the turn, and the difcretion and care of
the ruler fupplied the reft. But when miftake
or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make
life of this power for private ends of their
own, and not for the public good, the people
were fain by exprefs laws to get prerogative
determined in thofe points wherein they found
difadvantap-e from it: and thus declared limi-
tations of prerogative were by the people found
neceffary in cafes which they and their ance-
stors had left, in the utmoft latitude, to the
wifdom of thofe princes who made no other
but a right ufe of it, that is, for the good of
their people.

§. 163. And therefore' they have a very
wrong notion of government, who fay, that
the people have incroached upon the prerogative ',
when they have got any part of it to be de-
fined by poiitive laws : for in lb doing they
have not pulled from the prince any thing that
of right belonged to him, but only declared,
that that power which they indefinitely left in
his or his anceftors hands, to be exercifed for
their good, was not a thing which they in-
tended him when he ufed it otherwife : for
the end of government being the good of the
community, whatlbever alterations are made
in it, tending to that end, cannot be an in-
croachment upon any body, fince no body in

5 g°-

Of Civil-Government. 343

government can have a right tending to any
other end : and thofe only are incroachments
which prejudice or hinder the public good.
Thofe who fay otherwife, fpeak as if the
prince had a diftincl: and feparate intereft from
the good of the community, and was not
made for it ; the root and fource from which
fpring almoft all thofe evils and diforders
which happen in kingly governments. And
indeed, if that be fo, the people under his go-
vernment are not a fociety of rational crea-
tures, entered into a community for their
mutual good; they are not fuch as have fet
rulers over themfelves, to guard, and promote
that good; but are to be looked on as an herd
of inferior creatures under the dominion of a
matter, who keeps them and works them for
his own pleafure or profit. If men were fo
void of reafon, and brutifh, as to enter into
fociety upon fuch terms, prerogative might
indeed be, what fome men would have it,
an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to
the people.

§. 164. But fince a rational creature cannot
be fuppofed, when free, to put himfelf into
fubjection to another, for his own harm ;
(though, where he finds a good and wife ruler,
he may not perhaps think it either necefTary
or ufeful to fet precife bounds to his power
in all things) prerogative can be nothing but
the people's permitting their rulers to do feve-
ral things, of their own free choice, where

Z 4 the

344 Of Civil-Government.
the law was filent, and fometimes too againfl
the direct letter of the law, for the public
good j and their acquiefcing in it when fo
done: for as a good prince, who is mindful
of the trufl put into his hands, and careful of
the good of his people, cannot have too much
prerogative, that is, power to do good ; fo a
weak and ill prince, who would claim that
power which his predeceffors exercifed with-
out the direction of the law, as a prerogative
belonging to him by right of his office, which
he may exercife at his pleafure, to make or
promote an intereft diffinct from that of the
public, gives the people an occafion to claim
their right, and limit that power, which,
whilfl it was exercifed for their good, they
were content mould be tacitly allowed.

§.165. And therefore he that will look
into the hijlcry of "England, will find, that pre-
rogative was always largejl in the hands of
our wifeft and befl princes; becaufe the people,
obferving the whole tendency of their actions
to be the public good, contefled not what
was done without law to that end: or, if any
human frailty or mifiake (for princes are but
men, made as others) appeared in fome fmall
declinations from that end -, yet 'twas vifible,
the main of their conduct tended to nothing
but the care of the public. The people there-
fore, finding reafon to be fatisfied with thefe
princes, whenever they acted without, or con-
trary to the letter of the law, acquiefced in

what

Of Civil-Government. 345

what they did, and, without the leafl com-
plaint, let them inlarge their prerogative as
they pleafed, judging rightly, that they did
nothing herein to the prejudice of their laws,
fince they acled conformable to the foundation
and end of all laws, the public good.

§. 166. Such god-like princes indeed had
fome title to arbitrary power by that argu-
ment, that v/ould prove abfolute monarchy
the beft government, as that which God
himfelf governs the univerfeby; becaufefuch
kings partake of his wifdom and goodnefs.
Upon this is founded that faying, That the
reigns of good princes have been always moll:
dangerous to the liberties of their people : for
when their fucceffors, managing the govern-
ment with different thoughts, would draw
the actions of thofe good rulers into precedent,
and make them the ftandard of their prero-
gative, as if what had been done only for the
good of the people was a right in them to
doy for the harm of the people, if they fo
pleafed ; it has often occafioned conteft, and
fometimes public diforders, before the people
could recover their original right, and get
that to be declared not to be prerogative,
which truly was never fo ; fince it is im-
poffible that any body in the fociety mould
ever have a right to do the people harm ;
though it be very poffible, and reafonable,
that the people mould not go about to fet
any bounds to the prerogative of thofe kings,

or

346 Of Civil-Government.

or rulers, who themfelves tranfgrerTed not
the bounds of the public good : for prero-
gative is nothing but the power of doing public
good without a rule.

§. 167. The power of calling parliaments in
England, as to precife time, place, and du-
ration, is certainly a prerogative of the king,
but flill with this truft, that it mall be made
ufe of for the good of the nation, as the
exigencies of the times, and variety of oc-
casions, mall require : for it being impoflible
to forefee which mould always be the fitted
place for them to aifemble in, and what the
ben: feafon ; the choice of thefe was left with
the executive power, as might be moft fub-
fervient to the public good, and befl fuit the
ends of parliaments.

§. 168. The old queftion will be afked in
this matter of prerogative. But who foall be
judge when this power is made a right ufe of?
I anfwer : between an executive power in
being, with fuch a prerogative, and a legif-
lative that depends upon his will for their
convening, there can be no judge on earth ;
as there can be none between the legislative
and the people, mould either the executive,
or the legislative, when they have got the
power in their hands, defign, or go about
to enflave or deftroy them. The people have
no other remedy in this, as in all other cafes
where they have no judge on earth, but to
appeal to heaven : for the rulers, in fuch at-

tempts^

Of Civil-Government. 34.7

tempts, exercifing a power the people never
put into their hands, (who can never be fup-
pofed to confent that any body fhould rule
over them for their harm) do that which
they have not a right to do. And where
the body of the people, or any fingle man, is
deprived of their right, or is under the exer-
cife of a power without right, and have no
appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to
appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the
caufe of fufficient moment. And therefore,
though the people cannot be judge, fo as to
have, by the constitution of that fociety, any
fuperior power, to determine and give ef-
fective fen fence in the cafe j yet they have,
by a law antecedent and paramount to ail
pofitive laws of men, referved that ultimate
determination to themfelves which belongs
to all mankind, where there lies no appeal
on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have
juft caufe to make their appeal to heaven.
And this judgment they cannot part with, it
being out of a man's power fo to fubmit
himfelf to another, as to give him a liberty
to deftroy him ; God and nature never al-
lowing a man fo to abandon himfelf, as to
neglecl: his own prefervation : and fince he
cannot take away his own life, neither can
he give another powrer to take it. Nor let
any one think, this lays a perpetual foun-
dation for disorder -, for this operates not, till
the inconveniency is fo great, that the majority

feel

348 Of Civil-Government.
feel it, and are weary of it, and find a ne-
cefiity to have it amended. But this the
executive power, or wife princes, never need
come in the danger of: and it is the
thing, of all others, they have moft need to
avoid, as of all others the moft perilous.

CHAP. XV.

Of PatemaU Political, and Defpotical Power s
confidered together.

§. 169. ' I *HOUGH I have had occafion
to fpeak of thefe feparately be-
fore, yet the great miftakes of late about go-
vernment, having, as I fuppofe, arifen from
confounding thefe diftintt powers one with
another, it may not, perhaps, be amifs to.
confider them here together.

§. 170. Firft, then, Paternal or parental
power is nothing but that which parents have
over their children, to govern them for the
children's good, till they come to the ufe of
reafon, or a ftate of knowledge, wherein they
may be fuppofed capable to underfland that
rule, whether it be the law of nature, or the
municipal law of their country, they are to
govern themfelves by : capable, I fay, to
know it, as well as feveral others, who live
as freemen under that law. The affection
and tendernefs which God hath planted in
the breail of parents towards their children,

makes

Of Civil-Government. 349

makes it evident, that this is not intended to
be a fevere arbitrary government, but only for
the help, inftruction, and prefervation of their
offspring. But happen it as it will, there is,
as I have proved, no reafon why it mould be
thought to extend to life and death, at any
time, over their children, more than over any
body elfe; neither can there be any pretence
why this parental power mould keep the child,
when grown to a man, in fubjeclion to the
will of his parents, any farther than having
received life and education from his parents,
obliges him to refpecl, honour, gratitude,
amftance and fupport, all his life, to both fa-
ther and mother. And thus, 'tis true, the
paternal \% a natural government, but not at all
extending itfelf to the ends and jurifdi&ions of
that which is political. The power of the
father doth not reach at all to the property of
the child, which is only in his own difpofing.
§. 171. Secondly ', Political power is that
power, which every man having in the flate
of nature, has given up into the hands of the
fociety, and therein to the governors, whom
the fociety hath fet over itielf, with this ex-
prefs or tacit truft, that it (hall be employed
for their good, and the prefervation of their
property : now this power, which every man
has in the fate of nature, and which he parts
with to the fociety in all fuch cafes where
the fociety can iecure him, is to ufe fuch
means, for the preferving of his own pro-
4 perty,

350 Of Civil-Government.

perty, as he thinks good, and nature allows
him ; and to punifh the breach of the law of
nature in others, fo as (according to the befk
of his reafon) may moil conduce to the pre-
fervation of himfelf, and the reft of mankind.
So that the end a?id meafure of this power,
when in every man's hands in the ilate of
nature, being the prefervation of all of his
fociety, that is, all mankind in general, it
can have no other end or meafure, when in the
hands of the magiftrate, but to preferve the
members of that fociety in their lives, li-
berties, and poiTeffions; and fo cannot be an
abfolute, arbitrary power over their lives and
fortunes, which are as much as pofiible to
be preferved ', but a power to make laws, and
annex fuch penalties to them, as may tend to
the prefervation of the whole, by cutting oft
thofe parts, and thofe only, which are fo
corrupt, that they threaten the found and
healthy, without which no feverity is lawful.
And this power has its original only from com-
pact and agreement, and the mutual confent
of thofe who make up the community.

§. 172. Thirdly, Dejpotical power is an ab-
folute, arbitrary power one man has over
another, to take away his life, whenever he
pleafes. This is a power, which neither na-
ture gives, for it has made no fuch diftinction
between one man and another -, nor compact
can convey : for man not having fuch an ar-
bitrary power over his own life, cannot give
another man fuch a power over it 5 but it is

the

Of Civil-Government. 351

the effect only of forfeiture, which the ag-
grefTor makes of his own life, when he puts
himfelf into the ftate of war with another :
for having quitted reafon, which God hath
given to be the rule betwixt man and man,
and the common bond whereby human kind
is united into one fellowship and fociety; and
having renounced the way of peace which
that teaches, and made ufe of the force of
war, to compafs his unjuft ends upon ano-
ther, where he has no right ; and fo revolt-
ing from his own kind to that of beads, by
making force, which is their's, to be his rule of
right, he renders himfelf liable to be deftroyed
by the injured perfon, and the reft of man-
kind, that will join with him in the exe-
cution of juftice, as any other wild beaft, or
noxious brute, with whom mankind can have
neither fociety nor fecurity*. And thus cap-
tives, taken in a jufl and lawful war, and
fuch only, are fiib]e5i to a defpotical power,
which, as it ariies not from compact, fo nei-
ther is it capable of any, but is the ftate of
war continued : for what compact can be
made with a man that is not mailer of his
own life ? what condition can he perform ?
and if he be once allowed to be mafter of
his own life, the defpotical, arbitrary power
of his mafter ceafes. He that is mafter of
himfelf, and his own life, has a right too to
the means of preferving it ; fo that as foon as

compacl

* Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious
hrute that is dejirufti-ve to their being.

552 Of Civil-Government.

compact enters, favery cecfes, and he fo far
quits his abfolute power, and puts an end to
the ftate of war, who enters into conditions
with his captive.

§. 173. Nature gives the firft of thefe, viz*
paterjial power to parents for the benefit of
their children during their minority, to fupply
their want of ability, and understanding how
to manage their property. (By property I
mufl be underflood here, as in other places,
to mean that property which men have in
their perfons as well as goods.) Voluntary agree-
ment gives the fecond, viz. political power to
governors for the benefit of their fubjecls, to
fecure them in the pofiefiion and ufe of their
properties. And forfeiture gives the third
defpotical power to lords for their own benefit,
over thofe who are flripped of ail property.

§. 174. He, that fhall confider the diftinct
rife and extent, and the different ends of
thefe feverai powers, will plainly fee, that
paternal power comes as far fhort of that of
the magijlrate, as defpotical exceeds it ; and
that abfolute dominion, however placed, is fo
far from being one kind of civil fociety, that
it is as inconfiflent with it, as flavery is with
property. Paternal power is only where mi-
nority makes the child incapable to manage
his property ; political, where men have pro-
perty in their own diipofal ; and defpotical,
over fuch as have no property at all.

CHAP,

Of Civil-Government. %$%

CHAP. XVI.

Of C O N ^U E s r.

§■ J75' f 1 'Hough governments can ori^
ginally have no other rife than
that before mentioned, nor polities be founded
on any thing but the confent of the people-, yet
fuch have been the diforders ambition has
filled the world with, that in the noife of
war, which makes fo great a part of the
hiftory of mankind, this confent is little taken
notice of: and therefore many have miftaken
the force of arms for the confent of the
people, and reckon conqueil as one of the
originals of government. But concjuejl is as
far from fetting up any government, as de-
molifhing an houfe is from building a new
one in the place. Indeed, it often makes
way for a new frame of a common-wealth,
by deftroying the former -, but, without the
confent of the people, can never erect a
new one,

§. 176. That the dggreffor, who puts him*
felf into the ftate of war with another, and
unjujlly invades another man's right, can, by
fuch an unjuft war, never come to have a
right over the conquered, will be eafily agreed
by all men, who will not think, that robbers
and pyrates have a right of empire over
whomsoever they have force enough to ma-
iler; or that men are bound by promifes,
A a which

354 Of Civil-Government.
which unlawful force extorts from them.
Should a robber break into my houfe, and
with a dagger at my throat make me feal
deeds to convey my eftate to him, would
this give him any title ? Juft fuch a title, by
his fvvord, has an imjiijl co?jquero?", who forces
me into fubmiflion. The injury and the
crime is equal, whether committed by the
wearer of a crown, or fome petty villain.
The title of the offender, and the number
of his followers, make no difference in the
offence, unlets it be to aggravate it. The
only difference is, great robbers punifh little
ones, to keep them in their obedience j but
the great ones are rewarded with laurels and
triumphs, becaufe they are too big for the
weak hands of juffice in this world, and
have the power in their own poffeiTion, which
ihould punifh offenders. What is my re-
medy againft a robber, that fo broke into
my houfe ? Appeal to the law for juftice.
But perhaps juftice is denie'd, or I am crippled
and cannot ftir, robbed and have not the
means to do it. If God has taken away all
means of feeking remedy, there is nothing
left but patience. But my fon, when able,
may feek the relief of the law, which I am
denied : he or his fon may renew his appeal,
till he recover his right. But the conquered,
or their children, have no court, no- arbitrator
on earth to appeal to. Then they may ap-
peal* as Jephtha did, to heaven* and repeat

their

Of Civil-Government. 355

their appeal till they have recovered the native
right of their anceftors, which was, to have
fuch a legiflative over them, as the majority
mould approve, and freely acquiefce in. If it
be objected, This would caufe endlefs trouble ;
I anfwer, no more than jufKce does, where
lhe lies open to all that appeal to her. He
that troubles his neighbour without a caufe,
is punifhed for it by the juftice of the court
he appeals to : and he that appeals to heaven
miift be fure he has right on his fide ; and a
right too that is worth the trouble and cofl
of the appeal, as he will anfwer at a tribunal
that cannot be deceived, and will be fure to
retribute to every one according to the mif-
chiefs he hath created to his fellow fubjects;
that is, any part of mankind : from whence
it is plain, that he that conquers in an unjujl
Tar can thereby have no title to the fubjeftion
and obedience of the conquered.

§. 177. But fuppofing victory favours the
right fide, let us conlider a conqueror in a
lawful war, and fee what power he gets,
and over whom.

Firjl, It is plain he gets no power hy his
conquejl over thofe that conquered with him.
They that fought on his fide cannot fuffer by
the conqueft, but mufl at leaft be as much
freemen as they were before. And moft
commonly they ferve upon terms, and on
condition to (hare with their leader, and
enjoy a part of the fpoil, and other advantages
A a 2 that

356 Of Civil-Government.

that attend the conquering fword ; or at lead
have a part of the fubdued country beftowed
upon them. And the conquering people are
not, I hope, to be Jlcrves by conqneft, and wear
their laurels only to (hew they are Sacrifices
to their leaders triumph. They that found
abfolute monarchy upon the title of the
fword, make their heroes, who are the founders
of iuch monarchies, arrant Draw-ca?z- -firs , and
forget they had any officers and foldiers that
fought on their fide in the battles they won,
or aftifted them in the fubduing, or fhared
in poffefling, the countries they mattered.
We are told by fome, that the Englifh mo-
narchy is founded iri' the Norman conqueft,
and that our princes have thereby a title to
abfolute dominion : which if it were true,
(as by the hiftory it appears otherwife) and
that William had a right to make ..war on this
ifland; yet his dominion by conqueft could
reach no farther than to the Saxons and 'Bri-
tons, that were then inhabitants of this courM *
try. The Normans that came with him, and
helped to conquer, and all defcended from
them, are freemen, and no Subjects by con-
queft ; let that give what dominion it will.
And if I, or any body elfe, lhall claim free-
dom, as derived from them, it will be very
hard to prove the contrary : and it is plain,
the law, that has made no diftinction between
the one and the other, intends not there

mould

Of Civil-Government. 357

mould be any difference in their freedom or
privileges.

§. 178. But fuppofing, which feldom hap-
pens, that the conquerors and conquered
never incorporate into one people, under the
fame laws and freedom ; let us fee next
what power a lawful conqueror has over the
fubdued: and that I fay is purely defpotical.
He has an abfolute power over the lives of
thofe who by an unjuft war have forfeited
them j but not over the lives or fortunes of
thofe who engaged not in the war, nor over
the pofleffions even of thofe who were actually
engaged in it.

§. 179. Secondly, I fay then the conqueror
gets no power but only over thofe who have
actually atfifted, concurred, or confented to
that unjuft force that is ufed againft him :
for the people having given to their gover-
nors no power to do an unjuft thing, fuch as
is to make an unjuft war, (for they never
had fuch a power in themfelvcs) they ought
not to be charged as guilty of the violence
and unjuftice that is committed in an unjuft
war, any farther than they actually abet it ; no
more than they are to be thought guilty of any
violence or oppreffion their governors fhould
ufe upon the people themfelves, or any part
of their fellow fubjedts, they having im-
powered them no more to the one than to
the other. Conquerors, it is true, feldom
{rouble themfelves to make the diftin&ion,
A a 3 but

358 Of Civil-Government.

but they willingly permit the confufion of
war to fweep all together : but yet this alters
not the right ; for the conquerors power
over the lives of the conquered, being only
becaufe they have ufed force to do, or main-
tain an injuflice, he can have that power
only over thofe who have concurred in that
force ; all the reft are innocent ; and he has
jio more title over the people of that country,
who have done him no injury, and fo have
made no forfeiture of their lives, than he has
over any other, who, without any injuries or
provocations, have lived upon fair terms with
him.

§. 180. 'Thirdly, The power a conqueror gets

over thofe he overcomes in a juji war, is

-perfectly defpotical : he has an abfolute power

over the lives of thofe, who, by putting them-

felves in a ftate of war, have forfeited them;

but he has not thereby a right and title to

their pofTeffions. This I doubt not, but at

firft fight will feem a fcrange doctrine, it

being fo quite contrary to the practice of the

world ; there being nothing more familiar in

fpeaking of the dominion of countries, than

to fay fuch an one conquered it; as if

conqueft, without any more ado, conveyed

a right of poflefiion. But when we con-

fider, that the practice of the ftrong and

powerful, how univerfal foever it may be,

is feldom the rule of right, however it be

one part of the fubjection of the conquered,

not

Of Civil-Government. 359

not to argue againft the conditions cut out
to them by the conquering fword.

§. 181. Though in all war there be ufually
a complication of force and damage, and the
aggreflbr feldom fails to harm the eftate,
when he ufes force againft the perfons of
thofe he makes war upon ; yet it is the ufe
of force only that puts a man into the ftate of
war : for whether by force he begins the
injury, or elfe having quietly, and by fraud,
done the injury, he refufes to make repa-
ration, and by force maintains it, (which is
the fame thing, as at firft to have done it by
force) it is the unjuft ufe of force that makes
the war : for he that breaks open my houfe,
and violently turns me out of doors ; or
having peaceably got in, by force keeps me
out, does in effect the fame thing ; fuppoling
we are in fuch a ftate, that we have no com-
mon judge on earth, whom I may appeal to,
and to whom we are both obliged to fubmit :
for of fuch I am now fpeaking. It is the
unjuft ufe of force then, that puts a man into
the ftate of war with another j and thereby
he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of
his life : for quitting reafon, which is the
rule given between man and man, and ufing
force, the way of beafts, he becomes liable
to be deftroyed by him he ufes force againft,
as any favage ravenous beaft, that is dan-
gerous to his being.

A a 4 §. i§2.

360 Of Civil-Government.

§. 182. But becaufe the mi {carriages of

the father are no faults of the children, and
they may be rational and peaceable, not-
withstanding the brutifhnefs and injuftice of
the father ; the father, by his mifcarriages
and violence, can forfeit but his own life,
but involves not his children in his guilt or
deitruction. His sjoods, which nature, that
willeth the prefervation of all mankind as
much as is pofnble, hath made to belong to
the children to keep them from perifhing, do
fHll continue to belong to his children : for
fuppofing them not to have joined in the
war, either thro' infancy, abfence, or choice,
they have done nothing to forfeit them : nor
has the conqueror any right to take them away,
by the bare title of having fubdued him that
by force attempted his deftruction ; though
perhaps he may have fome right to them, to
repair the damages he has fuftained by the
war, and the defence of his own right ;
which how far it reaches to the poiTeffions.
of the conquered, we mall fee by and by.
So that he that by conquejl has a right over a
mans per/on to deitroy him if he pleafes, has
not thereby a right over his ejiate to pofTefs.
and enjoy it : for it is the brutal force the
aggrefTor has ufed, that gives his adverfary
a right to take away his life, and deftroy
him if he pleafes, as a noxious creature -, but
it is damage fuftained that alone gives him
litle to. another man's goods : for though t

may

Of Civil-Government. 361

may kill a thief that fets on me in the high-
way, yet I may not (which feems lefs) take
away his money, and let him go : this would
be robbery on my fide. His force, and the
ftate of war he put himfelf in, made him
forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his
goods. The right then of conqueji extends
only to the lives of thofe who joined in the
war, not to their ejlates, but only in order to
make reparation for the damages received,
and the charges of the war, and that too
with refervation of the right of the innocent
wife and children.

§. 183. Let the conqueror have as much
juftice on his lide, as could be fuppofed, he
has no right to feize more than the vanquished
could forfeit : his life is at the vi&or's mercy ;
and his fervice and goods he may appro-
priate, to make himfelf reparation ; but he
cannot take the goods of his wife and chil-
dren ; they too had a title to the goods he
enjoyed, and their fhares in the eftate he
poiTerTed : for example, I in the ftate of na-
ture (and all common-wealths are in the
ftate of nature one with another) have in-
jured another man, and refilling to give fatif-
faction, it comes to a ftate of war, wherein
my defending by force what I had gotten
unjuftly, makes me the aggrefTor. I am
conquered : my life, it is true, as forfeit, is
at mercy, but not my wife's and children's.
They made not the war, nor affifted in it.

I could

362 Of Civil-Government.

I could not forfeit their lives ; they were not
mine to forfeit. My wife had a mare in
my eftate ; that neither could I forfeit. And
my children alfo, being born of me, had a
right to be maintained out of my labour or
Jubilance. Here then is the cafe : the con-
queror has a title to reparation for damages
received, and the children have a title to
their father's eftate for their fubfiflence : for
as to the wife's fliare, whether her own la-
bour, or compact, gave her a title to it, it is
plain, her hufband could not forfeit what
was her's. What mult be done in the cafe ?
I anfwer ; the fundamental law of nature
being, that all, as much as may be, mould
be preferved, it follows, that if there be not
enough fully to fatisfy both, viz. for the
conqueror s loj/es, and children's maintenance,
he that hath, and to fpare, muft remit fome-
thing of his full iatisfaclion, and give way to
the preffing and preferable title of thole who
are in danger to perifh without it.

§. 184. But fuppofing the charge and da*
mages of' the war are to be made up to the
conqueror, to the utmofl farthing ; and that
the children of the vanquished, fpoiled of
all their father's goods, are to be left to ftarve
and perifh ; yet the fatisfying of what mail,
on this fcore, be due to the conqueror, will
fcarce give him a title to any country he fhall
conquer: for the damages of war can fcarce
amount to the value of any confiderable tract

of

■ •

Of Civil-Government. 363

of land, in any part of the world, where
all the land is poflefTed, and none lies wade.
And if I have not taken away the con-
queror's land, which, being vanquished, it is
impofTible I mould j fcarce any other fpoil I
have done him can amount to the value of
mine, fuppofing it equally cultivated, and of
an extent any way coming near what I had
over-run of his. The deftruction of a year's
product or two (for it feldom reaches four
or live) is the utmoft fpoil that ufually can
be done : for as to money, and fuch riches
and treafure taken away, thefe are none of
nature's goods, they have but a fantaftical
imaginary value : nature has put no fuch
upon them : they are of no more account
by her Standard, than the wampompeke of
the Americans to an European prince, or the
filver money of Europe would have been
formerly to an American. And five years
product is not worth the perpetual inheritance
of land, where all is porTeffed, and none re-
mains wade, to be taken up by him that is
diiieized : which will be eaiily granted, if
one do but take away the imaginary value
of money, the difproportion being more than
between five and five hundred ; though, at
the fame time, half a year's product is more
worth than the inheritance, where there being
more land than the inhabitants pofiefs and
make ufe of, any one has liberty to make
life of the wade : but there conquerors take

little

364 Of Civil-Government.
little care to poilefs themfelves of the lands of the
vanquijhed. No damage therefore, that men
in the ftate of nature (as all princes and go-
vernments are in reference to one another)
fuffer from one another, can give a conqueror
power to difpofTefs the poiterity of the van-
quished, and turn them out of that inhe-
ritance, which ought to be the pofTeiTion of
them and their defcendants to all generations.
The conqueror indeed will be apt to think
himfelf mafter : and it is the very condition
of the fubdued not to be able to difpute their
right. But if that be all, it gives no other
title than what bare force gives to the ftronger
over the weaker : and, by this reafon, he
that is ltrongefl will have a right to whatever
he pleafes to feize on.

§. 1 8 <^. Over thofe then that joined with
him in the war, and over thofe of the fubdued
country that oppofed him not, and the po-
iferity even of thofe that did, the conqueror,
even in a juft war, hath, by his conqueit, no
right of dominion : they are free from any
fubjec~tion to him, and if their former go-
vernment be difTolved, they are at liberty to
begin and erect another to themfelves.

§. 186. The conqueror, it is true, ufually,
by the force he has over them, compels
them, with a fword at their breafts, to ftoop
to his conditions, and fubmit to fuch a go-
vernment as he pleafes to afford them ; but
the enquiry is, what right he has to do i'o »

If

Of Civil-Government. 365

If it be faid, they fubmit by their own con-
fent, then this allows their own confent to be
neceff'ary to give the conqueror a title to rale
over them. It remains only to be confidered,
whether promifes extorted by force, without
right, can be thought confent, and bow far
they bind. To which I mall fay, they bind
not at all ; becaufe whatfoever another gets
from me by force, I ftill retain the right of,
and he is obliged prefently to reftore. He
that forces my horfe from me, ought pre-
fently to reftore him, and I have ftill a right
to retake him. By the fame reafon, he that
forced a promife from me, ought prefently to
reftore it, i. e. quit me of the obligation of
it; or I may refume it myfelf, i. e. chufe
whether I will perform it : for the law of
nature laying an obligation on me only by
the rules (lie prefcribes, cannot oblige me
by the violation of her rules : fuch is the ex-
torting any thing from me by force. Nor
does it at all alter the cafe to fay, I gave ??iy
promife, no more than it excufes the force,
and paffes the right, when I put my hand in
my pocket, and deliver my purfe myfelf to
a thief, who demands it with a piftol at my
breaft.

§. 187. From all which it follows, that
the government of a conqueror, impofed by force
on the fubdued, againft whom he had no
right of war, or who joined not in the war

againft

366 Op Civil-Government.

againft. him, where he had right, has no ohli~
gation upon them.

§. 188. But let us fuppofe, that all the
men of that community, being all members
of the fame body politic, may be taken to
have joined in that unjuft war wherein they
are fubdued, and fo their lives are at the
mercy of the conqueror.

§. 189. I fay, this concerns not their
children who are in their minority : for
fince a father hath not, in himfelf, a power
over the life or liberty of his child, no act
of his can poffibly forfeit it. So that the
children, whatever may have happened to the
fathers, are freemen, and the abiolute power
of the conqueror reaches no farther than the
perlbns of the men that were fubdued by
him, and dies with them : and mould he
govern them as flaves, fubjected to his ab-
iolute arbitrary power, he has no fucb right of
dominion over their children. He can have
no power over them but by their own con-
fen t, whatever he may drive them to fay or do ;
and he has no lawfull authority, whilil force,
and not choice, compels them to fubmif-
fion.

§. 1 90. Every man is born with a double
right : firfi, a right of freedom to his perfon,
which no other man has a power over, but the
free difpofal of it lies in himfelf. Secondly,
a right, before any other man, to inherit with
his brethren his father s goods.

§. 191.

Of Civil-Government. 367

§. 191. By the firft of thefe, a man Is na-
turally free from iubjeclion to any govern-
ment, tho' he be born in a place under its
jurifdiction; but if he difclaim the lawful
government of the country he was borruin,
he muft alfo quit the right that belonged to
him by the laws of it, and the porTeffions
there defcending to him from his anceflors,
if it were a government made by their con-
fers.

§. 192. By the fecond, the inhabitants of
any country, who are defcended, and derive
a title to their eflates from thofe who are
fubdued, and had a government forced upon
them againft their free confents, retain a
right to the pojfejjion of their ancejhrs, though
they confent not freely to the government,
whofe hard conditions were by force im-
pofed on the pofTefibrs of that country : for
the fir ft conqueror never having had a title to
the land of that country, the people who are
the defcendants of, or claim under thofe who
were forced to fubmit to the yoke of a go-
vernment by conftraint, have always a right
to make it off, and free themfelves from the
ufurpation or tyranny which the fword hath
brought in upon them, till their rulers put
them under fuch a frame of government as
they willingly and of choice confent to.
Who doubts but the Grecian chriflians, de-
fcendants of the ancient pofTefibrs of that
country, may juftly cafl off the Turki/h

yoke

36$ Of Civil-Government.

yoke, which they have fo long groaned under*
whenever they have an opportunity to do it?
For no government can have a right to
obedience from a people who have not freely
confented to it; which they can never be
fuppofed to do, till either they are put in a
full ftate of liberty to chufe their govern-
ment and governors, or at leaft till they
have fuch ftanding laws, to which they have
by themfelves or their reprefentatives given
their free confent, and alfo till they are
allowed their due property, which is fo to
be proprietors of what they have, that no
body can take away any part of it without
their own confent, without which, men
under any government are not in the ftate of
freemen, but are direct flaves under the force
of war.

§. 193. But granting that the conqueror in
a juft war has a right to the eftates, as well
as power over the perfons, of the conquered;
which, it is plain, he hath not: nothing of
abfolute power will follow from hence, in the
continuance of the government; becaufe the
defcendants of thefe being all freemen, if
he grants them eftates and pofTeffions to in-
habit his country, (without which it would
be worth nothing) whatfoever he grants
them, they have, fo far as it is granted, pro*
ferty in. The nature whereof is, that with-
out a maris own confent it cannot be taken from
bim*

§• 194-

Of Civil-Government. 369

§. 194. Their perfons are free by a native
right, and their properties, be they more or
lefs, are their own, and at their own difpofe,
and not at his; or elfe it is no property.
Suppofing the conqueror gives to one man
a thoufand acres, to him and his heirs for
ever i to another he lets a thoufand acres for
his life, under the rent of 50I. or 500I. per
a?m. has not the one of thefe a right to
his thoufand acres for ever, and the other,
during his life, paying the faid rent ? and
hath not the tenant for life a property in all
that he gets over and above his rent, by his
labour and induftry during the faid term,
fuppofing it be double the rent? Can any
one fay, the king, or conqueror, after his
grant, may by his power of conqueror take
away all, or part of the land from the heirs
of one, or from the other during his life,
he paying the rent ? or can he take away
from either the goods or money they have
got upon the faid land, at his pleafure ? If
he can, then all free and voluntary contrasts
ceafe, and are void in the world -, there needs
nothing to diffolve them at any time, but
power enough: and all the grants and pro-
mifes of men in power are but mockery and
collufion : for can there be any thing more
ridiculous than to fay, I give you and your's
this for ever, and that in the furefr. and" moil
folemn way of conveyance can be devifed j
and yet it is to be underftood, that I have
B b right,

370 Of Civil-Government.
right, if I pleafe, to take it away from you
again to morrow?

§.195. I will not difpute now whether
princes are exempt from the laws of their
country ; but this I am furc, they owe fub-
jection to the laws of God and nature. No
body, no power, can exempt them from the
obligations of that eternal law. Thofe are
fo great, and fo ftrong, in the cafe of pro-
mifes, that omnipotency itfelf can be tied by
them. Grants, promifes, and oaths, are
bonds that bold the Almighty : whatever fome
flatterers fay to princes of the world, who
all together, with ail their people joined to
them, are, in comparifon of the great God,
but as a drop of the bucket, or a dufl on
the balance, inconfiderable, nothing !

§. 196. The lliort of the cafe in conquefi
is this : the conqueror, if he have a jurl
caufe, has a defpotical right over the perfons
of all, that actually aided, and concurred in
the war againfr. him, and a right to make up
his damage and cod out of their labour and
eftates, fo he injure not the right of any
other. Over the reft of the people, if there
were any that confented not to the war, and
over the children of the captives themielves,
or the poffeflions of either, he has no power ;
and fo can have, by virtue of conquefi, no law-
ful title himfelf to dominion over them, or
derive it to his pofterity ; but is an aggreiTor,
if he attempts upon their properties, and

thereby

Of Civil-Government. 371

thereby puts himfelf in a ftate of war againft
them, and has no better a right of princi-
pality, he, nor any of his fuccefTors, than
Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here in
England-, or Spartacus* had he conquered
Italy, would have had ; which is to have
their yoke caft off, as foon as God mall give
thofe under their fubjedtion courage and
opportunity to do it. Thus, notwithftand-
ing whatever title the kings of Affyria had
over fudah, by the fword, God affifted He-
zekiah to throw off the dominion of that
conquering empire. And the lord was with
Hezekiah, and he prof per ed -, wherefore he went
forth, and he rebelled againjl the king of Af-
fyria, and ferved him not, 2 Kings xviii. 7.
Whence it is plain, that making off a power,
which force, and not right, hath fet over any
one, though it hath the name of rebellion,
yet is no offence before God, but is that
which he allows and countenances, though
even promiies and covenants, when obtained
by force, have intervened : for it is very
probable, to any one that reads the ftory
of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively, that the
Affyrians fubdued Ahaz, and depofed him,
and made Hezekiah king in his father's life-
time ; and that Hezekiah by agreement had
done him homage, and paid him tribute all
this time.

B b 2 CHAP.

^jz Of Civil-Government,

CHAP. XVII.
Of USURPATION.

§. 197. A S conqueft may be called a fo^
/\ reign ufurpation, fo ufurpation
is a kind of domeftic conqueft:, with this
difference, that an ufurper can never have
right on his fide, it being no ufurpation, but
where one is got into the poffefjion of what
another has right to. This, fo far as it is
vfurpation, is a change only of perfons, but
not of the forms and rules of the govern-
ment: for if the ufurper extend his power
beyond what of right belonged to the lawful
princes, or governors of the commonwealth,
it is tyranny added to nfurpatiori.

§.198. In all lawful governments, the
designation of the perfons, who are to bear
rule, is as natural and neceiTary a part as the
form of the government itfelf, and is that
which had its efcablimment originally from
the people 5 the anarchy being much alike,
to have no form of government at all ; or to
agree, that it ill all be monarchical, but to
appoint no way to delign the perfon that (hall
have the power, and be the monarch.
Hence all commonwealths, with the form
of government eitablifhed, have rules alio
of appointing thofe who are to have any
mare in the public authority, and fettled
methods pf conveying the right to them:

for

Of C i v i l-G o v e r n m e n t . 373

for the anarchy is much alike, to have no
form of government at all ; or to agree that
it mall be monarchical, but to appoint no
way to know or defign the peribn that (hall
have the power, and be the monarch.
Whoever gets into the exercife of any part
of the power, by other ways than what the
laws of the community have prefcribed, hath
no right to be obeyed, though the form of
die commonwealth be llill preferved ; fince
he is not the perfon the laws have appointed,
and confequently not the perfon the people
have confented to. Nor can fuch an nfurper,
or any deriving from him, ever have a title*
till the people are both at liberty to confenty
and have actually confented to allow, and
confirm in him the power he hath till then
ufuiped.

CHAP. XVIIL
of r T R A N N T.

%• x99- A $ ufurpation is the exercife of
£\. power, which another ha ill a
right to; fo tyranny is the exercife of power
beyond right , which no body can have a right
to. And this is making ufe of the power
any one has in his hands, not for the good
of thofe who are under it, but for his own
private feparate advantage. When the go-
vernor, however intitled, makes not the
law, but his will, the rule; and his corn-
B b 3 mands

374 Of Civil-Government.

mands and actions are not directed to the
prefervation of the properties of his people,
but the fatisfaction of his own ambition,
revenge, covetoufnefs, or any other irregular
paflion.

§. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth,
or reafon, becaufe it comes from the obfeure
hand of a fubjec~t, I hope the authority of
a king will make it pafs with him. King
'James the firfl, in his fpeech to the parlia-
ment, 1603, tells them thus, / will ever
prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole
commonwealth, in making of good laws and
confutations, to any particular and private ends
of mine ; thinking ever the wealth and weal
of the commonwealth to be my greatefi weal and
worldly felicity -y a point wherein a lawful king
doth direBly differ from a tyrant : for I do ac-
knowledge, that the fpecial and great ejl point of
difference that is betwee?i a rightful king and
an ufurping tyrant, is this, that whereas the
proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his king-
dom and people are only ordained for fatisfaclion
of his defres and unreafo?iable appetites, the
righteous and juft king doth by the contrary ac-
knowledge himfelf to be ordained for the pro-
curing of the wealth and property of his people.
And again, in his fpeech to the parliament,
1609, he hath thefe words, The king binds
himfelf by a double oath, to the obfervation of
the fundamental laws of his kingdom -, tacitly,
as by being a king, and Jo bound to protect as

well

Of Ci vil- Gove rnment. 27s
well the people, as the laws of bis kingdom ; and
expre/ly, by his oath at his coronation , fo as
every jujl king, in a fettled kingdom, is bound
to olferve that paclion 7nade to his people, by
his laws, in framing his government agreeable
thereunfo, according to that paclion which
God made with Noah after the deluge. Here-
ajter, feed-time and harvefl, and cold and heat,
and fummer and winter, and day and night,
jl:all not ccafe while the earth remaineth. And
therefore a king governing in a fettled kingdom,
leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a ty-
rant, as foon as he leaves off to ride according
to his laws. And a little after, Therefore all
kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will
be glad to bound themfelves within the limits of
their laws -, and they that perfuade them the
contrary, are vipers, and pejts both againft
them and the commonwealth. Thus that
learned king, who well underftood the
notion of things, makes the difference be-
twixt a king and a tyrant to confifl only in
this, that one makes the laws the bounds of
his power, and the good of the public, the
end of his government ; the other makes all
give way to his own will and appetite.

§. 201. It is a miflake, to think this fault
is proper only to monarchies ; other forms
of government are liable to it, as well as
that : for wherever the power, that is put
in any hands for the government of the
people, and the prefervaticn of their pro-
B b 4 perties,

\

376 Of Civil-Government.

perties, is applied to other ends, and made ufe
of to impoverifb, harafs, or fubdue them to
the arbitrary and irregular commands of thofe
that have it; there it prefently becomes
tyranny, whether thofe that thus ufe it are one
or many. Thus we read of the thirty tyrants
at Athens, as well as one at Syracufe -y and the
intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at
Rome was nothing better.

§. 202. Where- ever law ends, tyranny begins >
if the law be tranfgrefled to another's harm ;
and whofoever in authority exceeds the power
given him by the law, and makes ufe of the
force he has under his command, to com-
pafs that upon the fubjecl, which the law
allows not, ceafes in that to be a magiftrate ;
and, acting without authority, may be op-
poled, as any other man, who by force in-
vades the right of another. This is acknow-
ledged in fubordinate magiftrates. He that
hath authority to feize my perfon in the
ftreet. may be oppofed as a thief and a
robber, if he endeavours to break into my
houfe to execute a writ, notwithstanding
that I know he has fuch a warrant, and
fuch a legal authority, as will impower him
to arrefl me abroad. And why this mould
not hold in the highe(t, as well as in the
moft inferior magistrate, I would gladly
be informed. Is it reafonable, that the
eldeft brother, becaufe he has the greater!:
part of his father's eflate, fhould thereby

have

Of Civil-Government. XTJ
have a right to take away any of his younger
brothers portions ? or that a rich man, who
pofTerTed a whole country, mould from thence
have a right to feize, when he pleafed, the
cottage and garden of his poor neighbour ?
The being rightfully porTefled of great power
and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatell
part of the fons of Adam, is fo far from
being an excufe, much lefs a reafon, for
rapine and oppreffion, which the endamaging
another without authority is, that it is a great
aggravation of it : for the exceeding the
bounds of authority is no more a right in.
a great, than in a petty officer ; no more ju-
ftifiable in a king than a conftable ; but is fo
much the worfe in him, in that he has more
truft put in him, has already a much greater
fhare than the reft of his brethren, and is
fuppofed, from the advantages of his edu-
cation, employment, and counfellors, to be
more knowing in the mcaiures of right and

wrong.

§. 203. May the commands then of a prince
be oppofed? may he be reiifted as often as
any one (hall find himfelf aggrieved, and but
imagine he has not right done him ? This
will unhinge and overturn all polities, and,
inftead of government and order, leave no-
thing but anarchy and confufion.

§. 204. To this I anfwer, that force is to
be oppofed to nothing, but to unjuft and un-
lawful force -, whoever makes any oppofitioh

in

378 Of Civil-Government.
in any other cafe, draws on himfelf a jure,
condemnation both from God and man ; and
fo no fuch danger or confufion will follow,
as is often fuggeftcd : for,

§. 205. Firjly As, in fome countries, the
perfon of the prince by the law is facred ;
and fo, whatever he commands or does, his
perfon is frill free from all queflion or vio-
lence, not liable to force, or any judicial
cenfure or condemnation. But yet oppofition
may be made to the illegal acts of any in-
ferior officer, or other commiffioned by him;
unlefs he will, by actually putting himfelf into
a ftate of war with his people, diilblve the
government, and leave them to that defence
which belongs to every one in the flate of
nature : for of fuch things who can tell what
the end will be ? and a neighbour kingdom
has mewed the world an odd example. In all
other cafes thz facrednefs of the per/bn excepts
/. him from all inconveniencies> whereby he is
•iju,iecure, whilft the government ftands, from
all violence and harm whatfoever; than which
there cannot be a wifer constitution : for the
harm he can do in his own perfon not being
likely to happen often, nor to extend itfelf
far; nor being able by his- fingle frrength to
fubvert the laws, nor opprefs the body of
the people, mould any prince have fo much
weaknefs, and ill nature as to be willing to
do it, the inconveniency of fome particular
mifchiefs, that may happen fometimes, when

a

Of Civil-Government. 379

a heady prince comes to the throne, are well
recompenfed by the peace of the public,
and fecurity of the government, in the perfon
of the chief magiftrate, thus fet out of the
reach of danger : it being fafer for the body,
that fome few private men ihould be fome-
times in danger to furTer, than that the head
of the republic mould be eafily, and upon
flight occafions, expofed.

§. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, be-
longing only to the king's perfon, hinders
not, but they may be queftioned, oppofed,
and refitted, who ufe unjufl force, though
they pretend a commiffion from him, which
the law authorizes not ; as is plain in the
cafe of him that has the king's writ to arreft
a man, which is a full commiffion from the
king; and yet he that has it cannot break
open a man's houfe to do it, nor execute
this command of the king upon certain days,
nor in certain places, though this commiffion
have no fuch exception in it; but they are
the limitations of the law, which if any one
tranfgrefs, the king's commiffion excufes him
not : for the king's authority being given
him only by the law, he cannot impovver
any one to act againft the law, or juftify
him, by his commiffion, in fo doing; the
commiffion, or command of any magi fir ate, where
he has no authority, being as void and infig-
nificant, as that of any private man ; the
difference between the one and the other, '
4 being

\

380 Of Civil -Government.
being that the magistrate has fome authority
fo far, and to fuch ends, and the private
man has none at all : for it is not the com-
mijjion, but the authority, that gives the right
of a&ing ; and again/1 the laws there can be
no authority. But, notwithstanding fuch re-
finance, the king's perfon and authority are
flill both fecured, and fo no danger to go-
vernor or government.

§. 207. Thirdly, Suppofing a government
wherein the perfon of the chief magistrate is
not thus facred ; yet this doctrine of the law-
fulnefs of refijling all unlawful exercifes of
his power, will not upon every flight oc-
cafion in danger him, or imbroil the govern -
me?2t : for where the injured party may be
relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal
to the law, there can be no pretence for
force, which is only to be ufed where a man
is intercepted from appealing to the law :
for nothing is to be accounted hoftile force,
but where it leaves not the remedy of fuch
an appeal ; and it is fuch force alone, that
puts him that ufes it into a Jlate of war, and
makes it lawful to refift. him. A man with
a fword in his hand demands my purfe in the
high-way, when perhaps I have not twelve
pence in my pocket : this man I may law-
fully kill. To another I deliver 100 1. to
hold only whilft I alight, which he refufes
to reflore me, when I am got up again, but
draws his fword to defend the polleffion of it

by

Of Civil-Government. 381

by force, if I endeavour to retake it. The
mifchief this man does me is a hundred,
or pofiibly a thoufand times more than the
other perhaps intended me (whom Ikilledbe-
fore he really did me any); and yet I might
lawfully kill the one, and cannot fo much
as hurt the other lawfully. The reafon
whereof is plain j becaufe the one ufing
force, which threatened my life, I could not
have time to appeal to the law to fecure it ;
and when it was gone, it was too late to
appeal. The law could not reftore life to
my dead carcafs : the lofs was irreparable ;
which to prevent, the law of nature gave
me a right to dejiroy him, who had put him-
felf into a ftate of war with me, and threatened
my destruction. But in the other cafe, my
life not being in danger, I may have the
benefit of appealing to the law, and have re-
paration for my iool. that way.

§. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful adls
done by the magistrate be maintained (by
the power he has got), and the remedy which
is due by law, be by the fame power ob-
structed ; yet the right of reffiing, even in.
fuch manlier!: adts of tyranny, will not fud-
denly, or on flight occaflons, dijlurb the go-
vernmeni : for if it reach no farther than fome
private men's cafes, though they have a right
to defend themfelves, and to recover by force
what by unlawful force is taken from them ;
yet the right to do fo will not eafily engage

them

2$2 Of Civil-Government.
them in a con tell:, wherein they are fure to
perifh ; it being as impoffible for one, or a
few oppreffed men to dijhirb the government ,
where the body of the people do not think
themfelves concerned in it, as for a raving
mad-man, or heady mal-content to overturn
a well-fettled flate \ the people being as little
apt to follow the one, as the other.

§. 209. But if either thefe illegal acts have
extended to the majority of the people; or
if the mifchief and opprefTion has lighted only
on fome few, but in fuch cafes, as the pre-
cedent, and confequences feem to threaten
all ; and they are perfuaded in their con-
fciences, that their laws, and with them their
cflates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and
perhaps their religion too ; how they will be
hindered from refilling illegal force, ufed
againft them, I cannot tell. This is an //z-
convenience, I confefs, that attends all gtrccrn-
ments whatfoever, when the governors have
brought it to this pafs, to be generally fu-
fpected of their people ; the moll dangerous
fbte which they can poflibly put themfelves
in -y wherein they are the lefs to be pitied,
becaufe it is fo eafy to be avoided ; it being
as impoffible for a governor, if he really
means the good of his people, and the pre-
fervation of them, and their laws together,
not to make them fee ancf feel it, as it is for
the father of a family, not to let his children
fee he loves, and takes care of them.

§. 210.

Of Civil-Government. 383

§. 210. But if all the world fliull obferve
pretences of one kind, and actions of ano-
ther -, arts ufed to elude the law, and the
truii of prerogative (which is an arbitrary-
power in fome things left in the prince's hand
to do good, not harm to the people) employ-
ed contrary to the end for which it was
given : if the people fhall find the minifters
and fubordinate magiflrates chofen fuitable
to fuch ends, and favoured, or laid by, pro-
portionably as they promote or oppofe them :
if they fee feveral experiments made of arbi-
trary power, and that religion underhand
favoured, (tho' publicly proclaimed againft)
which is readieft to introduce it ; and the
operators in it fupported, as much as may'
be , and when that cannot be done, yet ap-
proved frill, and liked the better : if a long
train of aSlions Jheiv the councils all tending
that way ; how can a man any more hinder
himielf from being perfuaded in his own
mind> which way things are going; or from
cafling about how to fave himfelf, than he
could from believing the captain of the fhip
he was in, was carrying him, and the rell
of the company, to Algiers 9 when he found
him always fleering that courfe, though crofs
winds, leaks in his fhip, and want of men
and provifions did often force him to turn his
courfe another way for fome time, which he
fteadily returned to again, as foon as the
wind, weather, and other circumftances
would let him ?

CHAP.

384 Of Civil-Government.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Difjolntion of Government,

§• 211. TTE that will with any clearnefs
JL JL fpeak of the difjolntion of govern-
ment, ought in the firft place to diftinguifh
between the difjblution of the fociety -and the
dijfolution of the government. That which
makes the community, and brings men out
of the loofe ftate of nature, into one politic
fociety, is the agreement which every one has
with the reft to incorporate, and acl as one
bodv, and fo be one diftincl: common-wealth.
The ufual, and almoft only way whereby
this union is difjblved, is the inroad of foreign
force making a conqueft upon them : for in
that cafe, (not being able to maintain and
fupport themfelves, as one intire and "inde-
pendent body) the union belonging to that
body which confifted therein, muft necef-
farily ceafe, and fo every one return to the
ft ate he was in before, with a liberty to fhift
for himfelf, and provide for his own fafety,
as he thinks fit, in fome other fociety. When-
ever the fociety is difjblved, it is certain the
government of that fociety cannot remain.
Thus conquerors fwords often cut up go-
vernments by the roots, and mangle focieties
to pieces, fenarating the fubdued or fcattered
multitude from the protection of, and de-
pendence on, that fociety which ought to

have

Of Civil-Government, ? 8 <

have preferved them from violence. The
world is too well inftru&ed in, and too for-
ward to allow of, this way of diflblving of
governments, to need any more to be faid of
it; and there wants not much argument -to
prove, that where the fociety is dijjohed, trfe
government cannot remain; that being as
impoffible, as for the frame of an houie to
fubfiil when the materials of it are fcat-
tered and diffipated by a whirl-wind, or
jumbled into a confufed heap by an earth-
quake.

§. 212. Beficles this over- turning from
without, governments are difolved from within,

Fir ft t When the legijlative is altered. Civil
fociety being a flate of peace, amongft thofe
who are of it, from whom the ifate of war
is excluded by the umpirage, which they
have provided in their legi dative, for the
ending all differences that may arife amongfl
any of them, it is in their Icgijlaiive^ that the
members of a common-wealth are united,
and combined together into one coherent
living body. This is the foul that gives form,
life, and unity, to the common-wealth : from
hence the feveral members have their mutual
influence, fympathy, and connexion : and
therefore, when the kgijiative is broken, or
diffblved, diffolution and death follows : for
the e fence and anion of the fociety confiding in
having one will, the legiflative, when once
eilabli flied by the majority, has the declaring, '
and as it were keeping of that will. The

C c con-

^86 Of Civil-Government.

conflitution of the legijlative is the firft and
fundamental act of fociety, whereby pro-
vision is made for the continuation of their
union, under the direction of perfons, and
bonds of laws, made by perfons authorized
thereunto, by the confent and appointment
of the people, without which no one man,
or number of men, amongft: them, can have
authority of making laws that fhall be bind-
ing to the reft. When any one, or more,
fhall take upon them to make laws, whom
the people have not appointed fo to do,
they make laws without authority, which
the people are not therefore bound to obey ;
by which means they come again to be out
of fu ejection, and may conftitute to them-
felves a new kgi/!ative, as they think beft,
being in full liberty to refill the force of
thofe, who without authority would impofe
any thing upon them. Every one is at the
difpofure of his own will, when thofe who
had, by the delegation of the fociety, the
declaring of the public will, are excluded
from it, and others ufurp the place, who
have no fuch authority or delegation.

§. 213. This being ufually brought about
by fuch in the common-wealth who mifufe
the power they have ; it is hard to confider
it aright, and know at whofe door to lay it,
without knowing the form of government in
which it happens. Let us fuppofe then the
legiflative placed in the concurrence of three
diftmct perfons.

1. A

Of Civil-Government. 3 87

1. A Tingle hereditary perfon, having the
Conitant, fupreme, executive power, and with
it the power of convoking and dilTolving the
other two within certain periods of time.

2. An affembly of hereditary nobility.

3. An aflembly of reprefentatives chofen,
pro tempore, by the people. Such a form of
government fuppofed, it is evident,

§. 214. Fitjiy That when fuch a fingle
perfon, or prince, fets up his own arbitrary
will in place of the laws, which are the will
of the fociety, declared by the legiflative,
then the legijlative is changed : for that being
in effect the legislative, whofe rules and laws
are put in execution, and required to be
obeyed ; when other laws are fet up, and
other rules pretended, and inforced, than
what the legiflative, conftituted by the fo-
ciety, have enacted, it is plain that the le-
gijlative is changed. Whoever introduces new
laws, not being thereunto authorized by the
fundamental appointment of the fociety, or
fubverts the old, difowns and overturns the
power by which they were made, and fo
lets up a new legiflative.

§. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders
the legitlative from affembling in its due
time, or from acting freely, puriuant to thofe
ends for which it was conftituted, the legis-
lative is altered : for it is not a certain number
of men, no, nor their meeting, unlefs they
have alio freedom of debating, and leifure
C c 2 of

388 Of Civil-Government.

of perfecting, what is for the good of the
fociety, wherein the legiflative coniifts : when
thefe are taken away or altered, fo as to de-
prive the fociety of the due exercife of their
power, the legiflative is truly altered ; for it
is not names that conftitute governments,
but the ufe and exercife of thofe powers that
were intended to accompany them ; fo that
he, who takes away the freedom, or hinders
the acting of the legiflative in its due feafons,
in effect takes away the legiflative, and puts
an end to the government.

§. 216. 'Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary
power of the prince, the electors, or ways
of election, are altered, without the confent,
and contrary to the common intereft of the
people, there alfo the legiflative is altered : for,
if others than thofe whom the fociety hath
authorized thereunto, do chufe, or in another
way than what the fociety hath prefcribed,
thofe chofen are not the legiflative appointed
by the people.

§. 217. Fourthly, The delivery alfo of the
people into the fubjection of a foreign power,
either by the prince, or by the legiflative, is
certainly a change of the legiflative, and fo a
dijfolution of the government : for the end why
people entered into fociety being to be pre-
served one intire, free, independent fociety,
to be governed by its own laws ; this is loft,
whenever they are given up into the power
of another.

§. 218.

Of Civil-Gov^knment. 389

§.218. Why, in fuch a conftitution as this,
the diffolution of the government in thefe cafes
is to be imputed to the prince, is evident ;
becaufe he, having the force, treafure and
offices of the ftate to employ, and often per-
fuading himfelf, or being flattered by others,
that as fupreme magiflrate he is uncapable of
controul -, he alone is in a condition to make
great advances toward fuch changes, under
pretence of lawful authority, and has it in
his hands to terrify or fupprefs oppofers, as
factious, feditious, and enemies to the go-
vernment : whereas no other part of the
legiflative, or people, is capable by themfelves
to attempt any alteration of the legiflative,
without open and vifible rebellion, apt enough
to be taken notice of, which, when it pre-
vails, produces effects very little different
from foreign conquer!:. Befides, the prince
in fuch a form of government, having the
power of diffolving the other parts of the
legiflative, and thereby rendering them private
perfons, they can never in oppofition to him,
or without his concurrence, alter the legif-
lative by a law, his confent being neceffary
to give any of their decrees that fanction.
But yet, fo far as the other parts of the le-
giflative any way contribute to any attempt
upon the government, and do either pro-
mote, or not, what lies in them, hinder fuch
defigns, they are guilty, and partake in this,
C c 3 which

390 Of Civil-Government.

which is certainly the greatefl crime men can
be guilty of one towards another.

§.219. There is one way more whereby
fuch a government may be diffolved, and that
is, when he who. has the fupreme executive
power, neglects and abandons that charge,
fo that the laws already made can no longer
be put in execution. This is demonftratively
to reduce all to anarchy, and fo effectually to
dijfohe the government : for laws not being
made for themfelves, but to be, by their exe-
cution, the bonds of the fociety, to keep every
part of the body politic in its due place and
function -, when that totally ccafes, the go-
vernment vifibly ceafes, and the people be-
come a confuted multitude, without order
or connexion. Where there is no longer the
adminiitration of juftice, for the fecuring of
men's rights, nor any remaining power
within the community to direct the force, or
provide for the neceflities of the public,
there certainly is no government left. Where
the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as
if there were no laws ; and a government
without laws is, I fuppofe, a myftery in
politics, unconceivable to human capacity,
and inconfiftent with human fociety.

§. 220. In thefe and the like cafes, when
the government is dijfolved, the people are at
liberty to provide for themfelves, by erecting
a new legislative, differing from the other,
by the change of perfons, or form, or boths

as

Of Civil-Government. 391

as they mall find it mofl for their fafety and
good : for the fociety can never, by the fault
of another, lofe the native and original right
it has to preferve itfelf, which can only be
done by a fettled legiilative, and a fair and
impartial execution of the laws made by it.
But the ftate of mankind is not fo miferable
that they are not capable of ufing this re-
medy, till it be too late to look for any,
To tell people they may provide for the mf elves,
by erecting a new legiilative, when by op-
preffion, artifice, or being delivered over to a
foreign power, their old one is gone, is only
to tell them, they may expect relief when
it is too late, and the evil is pail: cure. This
is in effect no more than to bid them firffc
be Haves, and then to take care of their li-
berty; and when their chains are on, tell
them, they may act like freemen. This, if
barely fo, is rather mockery than relief; and
men can never be fecure from tyranny, if
there be no means to efcape it till they are
perfectly under it : and therefore it is, that
they have not only a right to get out of it,
but to prevent it.

§.221. There is therefore, fecondly, another
way whereby governments are diff'ohed, and
that is, when the legiflative, or the prince,
either of them, act contrary to their truft.

Firfty The legiflative ails againft the truft

repofed in them, when they endeavour to

invade the property of the fubject, and to

C c 4 make

392 Of Civil-Government.

rnake themfelves, or any part of the com-
munity, matters, or arbitrary difpofers of the
lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.

§. 222. The reafon why men enter into
fociety, is the prefervation of their property ;
and the end why they chufe and authorize a
legifiative, is, that there may be laws made,
and rules fet, as guards and fences to the
properties of all the members of the fociety,
to limit the power, and moderate the do-
minion, of every part and member of the fo-
ciety : for fince it can never be fuppofed to
be the will of the fociety, that the legifiative
ihould have a power to deftroy that which
every one defigns to fecure, by entering into
fociety, and for which the people fubmitted
themfelves to legiflators of their own making ;
whenever the kgijlators endeavour to take away,
and deftroy the property of the people, or to
reduce them to ilavery under arbitrary power,
they put themfelves into a Hate of war with
the people, who are thereupon abfolved from
any farther obedience, and are left to the
common refuge, which God hath provided
for all men, againfi force and violence.
Whensoever therefore the Legifiative. fha!l
tranfgrefs this fundamental rule of fociety ;
and either by ambition, fear, folly or cor-
ruption, endeavQ&F tQ gr.afp themfelves, or put
into the hands of any other, an abfclute power
over the lives, liberties, and eilates of the
people; by this breach of trull they Jo [/

the

Of Civil-Government. 393

the power the people had put into their
hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves
to the people, who have a right to refume
their original liberty, and, by the eftablifh-
ment of a new legislative^ (fuch as they fhall
think fit) provide for their own fafety and
fecarity, which is the end for which they are
in fociety. What I have faid here, concern-
ing the legiflative in general, holds true alfo
concerning the fupreme executor, who having
a double truft put in him, both to have a
part in the legiilative, and the fupreme exe-
cution of the lav/, acts againfl both, when
he goes about to fet up his own arbitrary-
will as the law of the fociety. He acJs alfo
contrary to his truft, when he either employs
the force, treafure, and offices of the fociety,
to corrupt the reprefentatives, and gain them
to his purpofes -, or openly pre-engages the
electors, and prefcribes to their choice, fuch,
whom he has, by follicitations, threats, pro-
mifes, or otherwife, v/on to his defigns ; and
employs them to bring in fuch, who have
promifed before-hand what to vote, and
what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates
and electors, and new-model the ways of
election, what is it but to cut up the go-
vernment by the roots, and poifon the very
fountain of public fecurity ? for the people
having referved to themfelves the choice of
their reprejentatives, as the fence to their
properties, could do it for no other end, but
4 that

394 Op Civil-Government.
that they might always be freely chofen, and
fo chofen, freely 'act, and advife, as the ne-
ceffity of the common-wealth, and the public
good fhould, upon examination, and mature
debate, be judged to require. This, thofe
who give their votes before they hear the
debate, and have weighed the reafons on all
fides, are not capable of doing. To prepare
fuch an aifembly as this, and endeavour to
fet up the declared abettors of his own will,
for the true reprefentatives of the people, and
the law-makers of the fociety, is certainly as
great a breach of truft, and as perfect a de-
claration of a defign to fubvert the govern-
ment, as is poflible to be met with. To
which, if one fhall add rewards and punish-
ments vilibly employed to the fame end, and
all the arts of perverted law made ufe of,
to take off and deftroy all that ftand in the
way of fuch a defign, and will not comply
and confent to betray the liberties of their
country, it will be paft doubt what is doing.
What power they ought to have in the fo-
ciety, who thus employ it contrary to the
trull went along with it in its firft inftitution,
Is eafy to determine ; and one cannot but
fee, that he, who has once attempted any
fuch thing as this, cannot any longer be
trufted.

§. 223. To this perhaps it will be faid,
that the people being ignorant, and always
difcontented, to lay the foundation of go-
vernment

Of Civil-Government. 395

vernment in the • unfteady opinion and un-
certain humour of the people, is to expofe it
to certain ruin ; and no government will be
able long to fubjiji, if the people may fet up
a new legiflative, whenever they take offence
at the old one. To this I anfvver, Quite the
contrary. People are not fo eafily got out
of their old forms, as fome are apt to fuggeft.
They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend
the acknowledged faults in the frame they
have been accultomed to. And if there be
any original defects, or adventitious ones in-
troduced by time, or corruption ; it is not an
eafy thing to get them changed, even when
all the world fees there is an opportunity for
it. This flownefs and averfion in the people
to quit their old constitutions, has, in the
many revolutions which have been feen in
this kingdom, in this and former ages, frill
kept us to, or, after fome interval of fruitlefs
attempts, ftill brought us back again to our
old legiilative of king, lords and commons :
and whatever provocations have made the
crown be taken from fome of our princes
heads, they never carried the people fo far as
to place it in another line.

§. 224. But it will be faid, this hypotbefis
lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. To
which I anfvver,

Firjl, No more than any ether hypotbefis :
for when the people- are made miferable, and
£nd themfelves expefed to the ill ufage of ar-
bitrary

396 Of Civil-Government.

bltrary power ■, cry up their governors, as much
as you will, for fons of Jupiter; let them be
facred and divine, defcended, or authorized
from heaven ; give them out for whom or
what you pleafe, the fame will happen. The
people generally ill treated, and contrary to
right, will be ready upon any occafion to
eafe themfelves of a burden that fits heavy
upon them. They will wifh, and feek for
the opportunity, which in the change, weak-
nefs and accidents of human affairs, feldom
delays long to offer itfelf. He muft have
lived but a little while in the world, who
has not feen examples of this in his time ;
and he muff have read very little, who cannot
produce examples of it in all forts of govern-
ments in the world.

§. 225. Secondly, I anfwer, fuch revolutions
happen not upon every little mifmanagement
in public affairs. Great mi/lakes in the ruling
part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and
all the flips of human frailty, will be born by
the people without mutiny or murmur. But
if a long train of abufes, prevarications and
artifices, all tending the fame way, make the
defign vifible to the people, and they cannot
but feel what they lie under, and fee whi-
ther they are going; it is not to be won-
dered, that they mould then rouze them-
felves, and endeavour to put the rule into
fuch hands which may fecure to them the
ends for which government was at firft erect-
ed j and without which, ancient names, and

ipecious

Of Civil-Government. 397

fpecious forms, are fo far from being better,
that thev are much worfe, than the ftate of
nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies
being all as great and as near, but the remedy-
farther off and more difficult.

§. 226. Thirdly, I anfwer, that this doflrine
of a power in the people of providing for
their fafety a-new, by a new legiflative, when
their legiflators have acted contrary to their
truft, by invading their property, is the befi
fence againfi rebellion, and the probableft means
to hinder it: for rebellion being an oppofition,
not to perfons, but authority, which is founded
only in the conflitutions and laws of the
government ; thofe, whoever they be, who by
force break through, and by force juftify
their violation of them, are truly and pro-
perly rebels : for when men, by entering into
fociety and civil-government, have excluded
force, and introduced laws for the prefer-
vation of property, peace, and unity amongft
themfelves, thofe who fet up force again in
oppofition to the laws, do rebellare, that is,
bring back again the ftate of war, and are
properly rebels : which they who are in
power, (by the pretence they have to autho-
rity, the temptation of force they have in
their hands, and the flattery of thofe about
them) being likelieft to do; the propereft way
to prevent the evil, is to (hew them the
danger and injuftice of it, who are under the
greater]; temptation to run into it.

§. 227.

398 Of Civil-Government^

§. 227. In both the fore-mentioned cafes*
when either the legislative is changed, or the
legiflators act contrary to the end for which
they were constituted ; thofe who are guilty
arc guilty of rebellion : for if any one by force
takes away the established legislative of any
fociety, and the laws by them made, pur-
fuant to their truSt, he thereby takes away
the umpirage, which every one had confented
to, for a peaceable decifion of all their con-
troverfies, and a bar to the State of war amongSl
them. They, who remove, or change the
legislative, take away this decisive power,
which no body can have, but by the appoint-
ment and confent of the people -, and fo de-
ftroying the authority which the people did,
and no body elfe can let up, and introducing a
power which the people hath not authorized,
they actually introduce a Jlate of wary which
is that of force without authority : and thus,
by removing the legislative established by the
fociety, (in whofe decisions the people ac-
quiefccd and united, as to that of their own
will) they untie the knot, and expofe the
people a-new to the fate of war. And it thole,
who by force take away the legislative, are
rebels, the legiflators themfelves, as has been
ihewn, can be no lefs eSteemed fo ; when
they, who were fet up for the protection,
and prefervation of the people, their liberties
and properties, Shall by force invade and
endeavour to take them away ; and fo they

putting

Of Civil-Government. 399

putting themfelves into a ftate of war with
thofe who made them the protectors and
guardians of their peace, are properly, and
with the greateft aggravation, rebel/antes, re-
bels.

§. 228. But if they, who fay it lays a foun-
dation for rebellion, mean that it may occafion
civil wars, or interline broils, to tell the people
they are abfolved from obedience when il-
legal attempts are made upon their liberties
or properties, and may oppofe the unlawful
violence of thofe who were their magiftrates,
when they invade their properties contrary
to the trull put in them ; and that therefore
this doctrine is not to be allowed, being fo
deftructive to the peace of the world : they
may as well fay, upon the fame ground, that
honeft men may not oppofe robbers or pirates,
becaufe this may occasion diforder or blood-
med. If any mifchicf come in fuch cafes, it
is not to be charged upon him who defends
his own right, but on him that invades his
neighbours. If the innocent honefl man
muft quietly quit all he has, for peace fake,
to him who will lay violent hands upon it,
I deiire it may be considered, what a kind of
peace there will be in the world, which con-
fifts only in violence and rapine ; and which
is to be maintained only for the benefit of
robbers and opprerTors. Who would not
think it an admirable peace betwixt the
mighty and the mean, when the lamb,

without

460 OF Civil-Government.

without refinance, yielded his throat to be
torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus % den
gives us a perfect pattern of fuch a peace,
and fuch a government, wherein Vlyffes and
his companions had nothing to do, but quictlv
to fuller themfelves to be devoured. And
no doubt Ulyffes, who was a prudent man,
preached up pajtve obedience, and exhorted
them to a quiet fubmiffion, by rep refen ting
to them of what concernment peace was to
mankind -, and by (hewing the inconveniences
might happen, if they mould offer to refifl
Polyphemus, who had now the power over
them.

§. 229. The end of government is the
good of mankind ; and which is bejl for
mankind, that the people mould be always
expofed to the boundlefs will of tyranny, or
that the rulers mould be fometimes liable to
be oppofed, when they grow exorbitant in
the ufe of their power, and employ it for
the deflruclion, and not the prefervation of
the properties of their people ?

§. 230. Nor let any one fay, that mifchief
can arife from hence, as often as it mail
pleafe a bufy head, or turbulent fpirit, to
defire the alteration of the government. It
is true, fuch men may ftir, whenever they
pleafe ; but it will be only to their own juft
ruin and perdition : for till the mifchief be
grown general, and the ill defigns of the
rulers become vifible, or their attempts fen-

fible

Of Civil-Government. 401

fible to the greater part, the people, who are
more difpofed to fuffer than right themfelves
by refinance, are not apt to fKr. The ex4-
amples of particular injuftice, or oppreffion
of here and there an unfortunate man, moves
them not. But if they univerfally have a
perfuafion, grounded upon manifeft evidence,
that deiigns are carrying on againft their li^-
berties, and the general courfe and tendency
of things cannot but give them ftrong fu-
ipicions of the evil intention of their go-
vernors, who is to be blamed for it ? Who
can help it, if they, who might avoid it,
bring themfelves into this fufpicion ? Are
the people to be blamed* if they have the
fenfe of rational creatures, and can think of
things no otherwife than as they find and
feel them ? And is it not rather their fault,
who put things intofuch a poftufe, that they
would not have them thought to be as they
are ? I grant, that the pride, ambition, and
turbulency of private men have fometimes
caufed great diforders in common-wealths,
and factions have been fatal to ftates and
kingdoms. But whether the mifchief hath
qftener begun in the peoples ivantonnefs, and a
delire to caft off the lawful authority of
their rulers, or in the rulers infoknce, and
endeavours to get and exercife an arbitrary
power over their people ; whether oppreffion,
or difobedience, gave the nrfl rife to the dif-
order, I leave it to impartial hiftory to de~
D d termine.

402 Of Civil-Government.

termine. This I am fure, whoever, either
ruler or fubject, by force goes about to in-
vade the rights of either prince or people,
and lays the foundation for overturning the
constitution and frame of any juji government,
is highly guilty of the greatest crime, I think,
a man is capable of, being to anfwer for all
thofe mifchiefs of blood, rapine, and def-
lation, which the breaking to pieces of go-
vernments bring on a country. And he who
does it, is juftly to be efteemed the common
enemy and pelt of mankind, and is to be
treated accordingly.

§. 231. Thzt Jubjefts ox foreigners, attempt-
ing by force on the properties of any people,
may be rejijied with force, is agreed on all
hands. But that magijlrates, doing the fame
thing, may be rejijied, hath of late been
denied : as if thole who had the greatefl: pri-
vileges and advantages by the law, had thereby
a power to break thofe laws, by which alone
they were fet in a better place than their
brethren : whereas their offence is thereby
the greater, both as being ungrateful for
the greater (hare they have by the law, and
breaking alfo that truit, which is put into
their hands by their brethren.

§. 232. Whofoever ufes force without right,
as every one does In fociety, who does it
without law, puts himfelf into a Jiate of war
with thofe againft whom he fo ufes it ; and
in that flate all former ties are cancelled, all

other

Of Civil-Government. 403
other rights ceafe, and every one has a right
to defend himfelf, and to refill the aggrejj'or*
This is To evident, that Barclay himfelf, that
great afTertor of the power and facrcdnefs of
kings, is forced to confefs, That it is lawful
for the people, in fome cafes, to refijl their
king ; and that too in a chapter, wherein he
pretends to mew, that the divine law muts
up the people from all manner of rebellion.
Whereby it is evident, even by his own
doctrine, that, fince they may in fome cafes
rejijl, all refitting of princes is not rebellion.
His words are thefe. Quod Jiquis dicat, Ergone
populus tyrannica crudelitati & furori jugulum
Jemper prcebebit? Ergone multitudo civitates fuas
fame * f err 0, &jiammd vajiari,feque, conjuges, £?
liberos fortunce ludibrio & tyranni libidini ex-
pom, inque omnia vita pericula omnefque ?niferias
& molejiias a rege deduci patientur f Num Wis,
quod otmii animantium generi eji a naturd tribu-
turn, denegari debet, ut fc. vim vi repel/ant,
ffeq; ab injuria tueantur ? Huic breviter re-
Jponjwn fit, Populo univerfo negari defenfwne?n,
qua juris naturalis eji, neque ultionem quce prater
Jiaturam eji adverfus regem concedi debere. £>ua-
propter Ji rex non in Jingulares tantu?n perfonas
aliquot privatum odium exerceat, fed corpus
etiam reipublica, cujus ipfe caput eji, i. e. totum
popidum, vel infgnem aliquam ejus partem im-
?nani & intolerandd javitid feu tyrannide di-
vexet ; populo, quidem hoc cafu rejijiendi ac
tuendi Je ab injuria pot eft as competit, fed tuendi-
D d 2 fi

AC4 Of Civil-Government.

je tanfum, non enim in principem invadendi : &
reftituendce injurice illatce, non recedendi a debitd
reverent id propter accept am injur iam. Pr&-
Jentem denique impetum propulfandi non vim
prceteritam ulcifcenti jus habet. Horum enim
alter um a naturd eft, ut vitam fcilicet corpufque
tucamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, tit
inferior de fuperiori fupplicium fumat. f^uod
ttaque popidus malum, antequam faBwn ft,
imp e dire pot eft, ?ie fiat, id pqftquam fatlum eft,
in regem author on fceleris vindicare non potejl :
popidus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus quif-
piarn habet : quod huic, vel ipfts adverfariis
judicibus, except o Buchanano, nullum nift in pa-
tientia remedium fupereft. Cum ille Ji into-
lerabilis tyr annus eft f modicum enim ferre om-
nino debet) refftere cum reverentid pojfit, Bar-
clay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 8.

In Englifi thus.

■ §.233- But if a?:y one fhould afk, Muft the
people then always lay themfelves open to the
cruelty and rage of tyranny ? Muft they fee
their cities pillaged, and laid in afies, their
wives and children expofed to the tyrant's luft
and fury, and themfelves and families reduced
by their king to ruin, and all the miferies of
id ant and oppreffion, and yet ft fill ? Mujl
men alone be debarred the co?nmon privilege of
oppofng force with force, which nature allows
Jo freely to all other creatures for their pre-

fervation

Op Civil-Government. 405

fervation from injury ? I anjwer : Self-defence
is a part of the law of nature ; nor can it be
denied the community, even againji the king
himfelf: but to revenge themfehes upon kirn,
muft by no means be allozOed them ; it being not
agreeable to that law. Wherefore if the king
ftjali Jhew an hatred, not only to feme particular
perfons, but fets himfelf againji the body of the
common- wealth, whereof he is the head, and
ft: all, with intolerable ill ufage, cruelly tyrannize
over the whole, or a conjiderable part of the
people, in this cafe the people have a right to
rejift and defend themfehes from injury : but
it muft be with this caution, that they only de-
fend themfehes, but do not attack their prince :
they may repair the damages received, but muft
not for any provocation exceed the bounds of
due reverence and refpedi. They may repulfe
the prefent attempt, but muft not revenge paji
violences : for it is natural for us to defend life
and limb, but that an inferior Jhould punijh a
fuperior, is againji nature. The rnij chief which
is dejigned them, the people may prevent before
it be done ; but when it is done, they muft not
revenge it o?i the king, though author of the
villany. This therefore is the privilege of the
people in general, above what any private per-
fen hath ; that particular men are allowed by
our adverfarics themfehes (Buchanan only ex-
cepted J to have no other remedy but patience ;
but the body of the people may with refpeft rejift
D d 3 intolerable

406 Of Civil-Government.

hi tolerable tyranny ; for when it is but mo-
derate* they ought to endure it.

§, 234. Thus far that great advocate of
monarchical power allows of refijlance.

§. 235. It is true, he has annexed two
limitations to it, to no purpofe :

Firji, He fays, it muft be with reverence.

Secondly, It muft be without retribution, or
punifhment ; and the reafon he gives is, be-
caufe an inferior cannot punijh a fuperior.

Firft, How to refijl force 'without jit -iking
again, or how to jlrike with reverence, will
need fome ikill to make intelligible. He
that {hall oppofe an afTault only with a fhield
to receive the blows, or in any more refpect-
ful pofture, without a fword in his hand, to
abate the confidence and force of the af-
failant, will quickly be at an end of his re-
fijlance, and will find fuch a defence ferve
only to draw on himfelf the worfe ufage.
This is as ridiculous a way of reffiing, as
fuvenal thought it of fighting ; ubi tu pulfas,
ego vapulo tantum. And the fuccefs of the
combat will be unavoidably the fame he there
defcribes it :

■ ' ' Libert as pauperis hac efi :
Pulfatus rogat, & pugnis concifus, adoraf,
Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.

Thig

Of Civil-Government. 407

This will always be the event of fuch an
imaginary refifiance, where men may not
ftrike again. He therefore who may refijl y
mufi be allowed to jlrike. . And then let our
author, or any body elfe, join a knock on the
head, or a cut on the face, with as much
reverence and refpecl; as he thinks fit. He that
can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for
aught I know, defire for his pains, a civil,
refpedrful cudgeling where-ever he can meet
with it.

Secondly, As to his fecond, An inferior
cannot punijh a fuperior ; that is true, gene-
rally fpeaking, whilfr, he is his fuperior. But
to refill force with force, being the fiat e of
war that levels the parties, cancels all former
relation of reverence, refpecl:, and fuperiority :
and then the odds that remains, is, that he,
who oppofes the unjuft aggreffor, has this
fuperiority over him, that he has a right, when
he prevails, to punifh the offender, both for
the breach of the peace, and all the evils that
followed upon it. Barclay therefore, in an-
other place, more coherently to himfelf, de-
nies it to be lawful to refijl a king in any
cafe. But he there affigns two cafes, where-
by a king may un-king himfelf. His words
are,

<%uid ergo, nulline cafus incidere pojfunt qui-
bus populo fefe erigere at que in regem impotentius
dominant em arma caper e & invader e jure fuo
fudque authoritate liceat ? Nulli certc quamdiu

D d 4 rex

408 Of Civil-Government.

rex manet. Semper enim ex divinis id ob/Iata
Regem honorificato ; & qui poteftati refiftit,
Dei ordinationi refiilit : non alias igitur i?i
eum populo potejlas eft qua?n ji id commit tat
propter quod ipfo jure rex ejfe de/iuat. Tunc
enim fe ipfe principatu exuit at que in privatis
conftituit liber : hoc modo populus & fuperior
efficitur, rev erf o ad eum fc. jure illo quod ante
regem inauguratum in interregno habuit. At
font paucorum generum commijfa ej if modi qua
hunc eff'eBum par hint. At ego cum plurima
animo perluftrem, duo tanturn invenio, duos, in-
quam, cafus quibus rex ipfo ftao ex rege non
regem fe facit & omni honor e & dignitaie re-
ga/i atque in fubditos poteftate "dejlituit ; quorum
etiam meminit Winzerus. Horum unus eft, Si
regnum difperdat, quemadmodum de NerGne fer-
tur, quod is nempe fenatum populumque Roma-
num, atque adeo arbem ipfam ferro ftammaque
vaftare, ac novas fibi fedes quarere decrevifjet.
Et de Caligula \ quod palam denunciarit fe neque
civ em neque principem fenatui amplius fore, in-
que animo babuerit interempto utriufque ordinis
eledlifjimo quoque Alexandriam commigrare, ac
ut populum uno iBu interimeret, unam ei cer-
vicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditatur
& molitur JerJa, omnem regnandi curam &
animum ilicd abjicit, ac proinde imperium in
fubditos ami t tit, ut dominus fervi pro dcrelifio
habit i dominium.

§. 236. Alter cafus eft, Si rex in alicujus
client el am ft contulit, ac regnum quod lib e rum

a majoribus.

Of Civil-Government. 409

a majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienee
ditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte
non ed mente id agit populo plane ut incommodet :
tamen quia quod pr&cipuym eft regime dignitatis
ami/it, ut jummus fcilicet in regno fecundum
Deum fit, & fo!o Deo inferior, atque populum
etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cujus li-
bertatem fartam & tec~lam confervare debuit, in
alter ins gentis ditionem & pot eft at em dedidit;
hdc velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut
nee quod ipfe in regno imperium habuit retineat,
nee in eum cui collatum voluit, juris qulcqua?n
transferat ; atque ita eo faSlo liberum jam &
fua poteftatis populum relinquit, cujus rei exem-
plum unum annales Scotici fuppeditant, Barclay
contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 16.

Which in Englifh runs thus.

§. 237. What then, can there no cafe happen

wherein the people may of right, and by their

own authority \ help themflves, take arms, and

fet upon their king, imperioujly domineering over

them ? None at all, wkilfi he remains a king.

Honour the kin^, and he that refifts the

power, refifls the ordinance of God ; are

divine oracles that will never permit it. The people

therefore can never come by a power over him,

unlefs he does fomething that makes him ceafe -

to be a king : for then he divefts himfelf of his

crown and dignity, and returns to the ft ate of

a private man, and the people become free and

fuperior,

4io Of Civil-Government.
fuperior, the power which they had in the in-
terregnum, before they crowned him king, de-
volving to them again. But there are but few
mi/carriages which bring the matter to this
ft ate. After confidering it well on all fides, I
can find but two. Two cafes there are, I fay,
whereby ■ a king, ipib facto, becomes no king,
and lofes all power and regal authority over his
people ; which are alfo taken notice of by Win-
zerus.

The firfi is, If he endeavour to overturn the
government, that is, if he have a purpofe and
defign to ruin the kingdom and common- wealth,
as it is recorded of Nero, that hi refolved to
cut off the fenate and people of Rome, lay the
city wafie with fire and fword, and then re-
move to fome other place. And of Caligula,
that he openly declared, that he would be no
longer a head to the people or fenate, and that
he had it in his thoughts to cut off the wortbiejl
men of both ranks, and then retire to A lex an-
\ dria : and he wijht that the people had but one
neck, that he tnight difpatch them all at a blow.

- Such defigns as thefe, when any king harbours

i A in his thoughts, and ferioufly promotes, he im~

7?iediately gives up all care and thought of the

Kcommon- wealth ; and cofifequently jorfeits the
power of governing his fubjecls, as a majler
does the dominion over his flaves whom be hath
abandoned.

§. 238. The other cafe is, When a king makes
bh>ijelf the dependent of another, and fubjecls his

kingdom

Of Civil-Government. 411

kingdom which his anceftors left him, and the
people put free into his hands, to the dominion
of another : for however perhaps it may not be
his intention to prejudice the people ; yet becaufe
he has hereby loft the principal part of regal
dignity ; viz. to be next and immediately under
God, fupreme in his kingdom ; and alfo becaufe
he betrayed or forced his people, whofe liberty
he ought to have carefully preferved, into the
power and dominion of a foreign nation. By
this, as it were, alienation of his kingdom, he
himfelf lofes the power he had in it before,
without transferring any the leaf right to thofe
on whom he would have bejlcwed it ; and Jo by
this ac~l fets the people free, and leaves them at
their own difpofal. One example of this is to
be found in the Scotch Annals.

§. 239. In thefe cafes Barclay, the great
champion of abfolute monarchy, is forced
to allow, that a king may be rejijled, and Xla
ceafes to be a king. That is, in fhort, not
to multiply cafes, in whatfoever .he has no
authority, there he is no king, and may be-—
refifled : for wherefoever the authority ceafes, / \s 4
the king ceafes too, and becomes like other fc£
men who have no authority. And thefe two
cafes he inftances in, differ little from thofc
above mentioned, to be deftructive to go-
vernments, only that he has omitted the
principle from which his doctrine flows; and
that is, the breach of truft, in not preferving
the form of government agreed on, and in
I not

412 Op Civil-Government.

not intending the end of government itfelf,
which is the public good and prefervation of
property. When a king has dethroned him-
felf, and put himfelf in a ftate of war with
his people, what mall hinder them from
profecuting him who is no king, as they
would any other man, who has put himfelf
into a ftate of war with them ; Barclay, and
thofe of his opinion, would do well to tell
us. This farther I defire may be taken no-
tice of out of Barclay, that he fays, The mif-
chief that is dejigned them, the people may pre-
vent before it be done : whereby he allows re-
fijlance when tyranny is but in defign. Such
dejigns as thefe (fays he) when any king har-
bours in his thoughts and ferioufly promotes , he
immediately gives up all care and thought of the
common- we alt h'y fo that, according to him, the
neglecl: of the public good is to be taken as
an evidence of fuch defign, or at leaft for a
fufficient caufe of refflance. And the reafon
of all, he gives in thefe words, Becaufe he
betrayed or forced his people, whofe liberty he
ought carefully to have preferved. W hat he adds,
into the power and dominion of a foreign nation,
iignifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture ly-r
ing in the lofs of their liberty, which he
ought to have preferved, and not in any di-
ftinclion of the perfons to whofe dominion
they were fubjecled. The peoples right is,
equally invaded, and their liberty loft, whe-
ther they are made Haves to any of their

own.

Of Civil-Government. 413

own, or a foreign nation ; and in this lies the
injury, and againft this only have they the
ri^ht of defence. And there are inftances
to be found in all countries, which mew, that
it is not the change of nations in the perfons
of their governors, but the change of go-
vernment, that gives the offence. Biljon, a
bifhop of our church, and a great flickler for
the power and prerogative of princes, does,
if I miftake not, in his treatife of Chrijiian
fubje&ion, acknowledge, that princes may for-
feit their power, and their title to the obe-
dience of their fubjects -, and if there needed
authority in a cafe where reafon is fo plain,
I could fend my reader to BraSion, Forte/cue,
and the author of the Mirrour, and others,
writers that cannot be fufpecled to be igno-
rant of our government, or enemies to it.
But I thought Hooker alone might be enough
to fatisfy thofe men, who relying on him
for their ecclefiartical polity, are by a ftrange
fate carried to deny thofe principles upon
which he builds it. Whether they arejherein
made the tools of cunninger workmen, to
pull down their own fabric, they were bed
look. This I am fure, their civil policy is
fo new, fo dangerous, and fo deftructive to
both rulers and people, that as former ages
never could bear the broaching of it ; fo it
may be hoped, thofe to come, redeemed from
the impofitions of thefe Egyptian under-tafk-
mailers, will abhor the memory of fuel) fer-

vile

414 Of Civil-Government.

vile flatterers, who, whilft it feemed to ferve
their turn, refolved all government into ab-
folute tyranny, and would have all men born
to, what their mean fouls fitted them for,
flavery.

§. 240. Here, it is like, the common que-
/Hon will be made, Who fiall be judge, whe-
ther the prince or legiflative act contrary to
their trull? This, perhaps, ill-affected and
factious men may fpread amongft. the people,
when the prince only makes ufe of his due
prerogative. To this I reply, The people
Jhall be judge ; for who fhall be judge whe-
ther his truftee or deputy acts well, and ac-
cording to the trull: repofed in him, but he
who deputes him, and muft, by having de-
puted him, have flill a power to difcard him,
when he fails in his truft ? If this be rea-
fonable in particular cafes of private men,
why mould it be otherwife in that of the
greater!: moment, where the welfare of mil-
lions is concerned, and alfo where the evil,
if not prevented, is greater, and the redrefs
very difficult, dear, and dangerous ?

§. 141. But farther, this queftion, (Who
Jhall be judge?) cannot mean, that there is
no judge at all: for where there is no ju-
dicature on earth, to decide controversies
amongft men, God in heaven is judge* He
alone, it is true, is judge of the right. But
every man is judge for himfelf, as in all other
cafes, fo in this, whether another hath put

himfelf

OF ClVIL-GoVERNMENt. 415

himfelf into a ftatc of war with him, and
whether he mould appeal to the Supreme
Judge, as yeptha did.

§. 242. If a controverfy arife betwixt a
prince and fome of the people, in a matter
where the law is filent, or doubtful, and the
thing be of great confequence, I mould think
the proper umpire, in fuch a cafe, mould be
the body of the people : for in cafes where
the prince hath a truft repofed in him, and
is difpenfed from the common ordinary rules
of the law ; there, if any men find them-
felves aggrieved, and think the prince ads
contrary to, or beyond that truft, who fo
proper to judge as the body of the people,
(who, at firft, lodged that trull in him) how
far they meant it mould extend ? But if the
prince, or whoever they be in the admini-
ftration, decline that way of determination,
the appeal then lies no where but to heaven ;
force between either perfons, who have no
known fuperior on earth, or which permits
no appeal to a judge on earth, being pro-
perly a ftate of war, wherein the appeal lies
only to heaven ; and in that ftate the injured
party muji judge for himfelf, when he will
think fit to make ufe of that appeal, and put
himfelf upon it.

§. 243. To conclude, The power that every
individual gave the fociety, when he entered
into it, can never revert to the individuals
again, as long as the fociety lafts, but will

always

4i 6 Of Civil-Government.

always remain in the community; becaufe
without this there can be no community, no
common-wealth, which is contrary to the
original agreement : fo alfo when the fociety
hath placed the legiflative in any affembly
of men, to continue in them and their fuc-
celTors, with direction and authority for pro-
viding fuch fucceffors, the legiflative can never
revert to the people whilft that government
lafts -, becaufe having provided a legiflative
with power to continue for ever, they have
given up their political power to the legif-
lative, and cannot refume it. But if they
have fet limits to the duration of their legif-
lative, and made this fupreme power in any
perfon, or affembly, only temporary ; or elfe,
when by the mifcarriages of thofe in autho-
rity, it is forfeited ; upon the forfeiture, or
at the determination of the time fet, it re-
verts to the fociety, and the people have a
right to a<5l as fupreme, and continue the
legiflative in themfelves; or erect a new form,
or under the old form place it in new hands,
as they think good.

F I N I S.

r^ A

' itih

> 1