


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



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Map
 to elucidate the
ACCOUNT OF THE WAR
 IN
Spain & Portugal.

ACCOUNT
OF THE
WAR
IN
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL,
AND IN
THE SOUTH OF FRANCE,
FROM 1808, TO 1814, INCLUSIVE.

BY
JOHN T. JONES,
LIEUT. COLONEL, CORPS OF ROYAL ENGINEERS.

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PREFACE.

THE determination to submit this work to the public arose from the numerous memoirs on the war in the Peninsula, published by French officers, and the announcement of the speedy appearance of more laboured productions on the same subject, without any British officer stepping forward with a narrative of the actions of his countrymen.

It is constantly observed in the recital of the most ordinary events of life, that the details are made to appear materially different by the several actors; each indulging in animated description of the scenes in which he was personally engaged, and, through ignorance, either misrepresenting or passing over in silence the part borne by others. This unintentional deviation from equity applies with double force to the writings of belligerent nations, as, however pure the intentions of the authors, a variety

of incidents creditable to the hostile force must be imperfectly understood, or altogether unknown to them; and consequently it serves considerably to enhance the martial reputation of a people, that its own narratives should be implicitly received, even when drawn up with the utmost candour. It will therefore readily be conceived that such an advantage is carried to an undue extent in France, when, most of the writings which have appeared respecting the war in the Peninsula, are avowedly attempts to sustain the reputation of particular individuals, or to uphold the deeds of particular armies, and consequently written under the bias of personal as well as national feeling. Passing through such refracting mediums every action and circumstance is distorted. Severity of examination is, however, in some degree averted by the avowal of the motives which actuated the authors; and the knowledge that many of the chiefs, whom their writings were framed to eulogize, are already removed from the enjoyment of praise, and that the troops, whose merit they were intended to exalt, have been nearly exterminated, serves further to repress the exposure of their errors, and has hitherto gained uncontradicted currency for their statements.

Other writings, of a different description, on the same subject, appeared during the temporary reinstatement of the imperial rule, framed chiefly with a view to raise the confidence and reanimate the courage of the troops, by deceiving them into a belief that, though collectively unfortunate, they had ever been individually victorious. The exaggerations for this purpose are so gross and palpable as to carry their own detection, and their currency, it may be hoped, will be nearly as evanescent as the government they were intended to support.

A History of the War in Spain, originally published in England, is of a third description, and is more calculated to mislead than either of the former, as the author, without the apology of country or friends to support, has, under an ostentatious affectation of candour, well succeeded in giving a false colouring to all he relates; extraordinary boldness of assertion throughout being rendered plausible by reasoning founded on extreme ignorance of the localities, and of the details of his subject.

The tendency of these writings, however more or less vitiated the source from whence they flow, or however transient their duration, is unquestionably to shake that universally high opinion formed of the Portuguese and

British military from their success in the Peninsula; for what disinterested or impartial man, after reading of such gross blunders, such want of enterprize, such ignorance of the art of war as is imputed to them, and to their commander, on each separate occasion, does not feel his opinion of their merit diminished, and almost regret their general success over opponents represented as so much braver, and so much more skilful? Now, as local knowledge and personal observation are necessary to the detection of many of these delusions, is it not too probable, unless the future historian shall have it in his power to contrast the French statements with others of equal or similar authority, that they may, in a few years, be admitted as facts, and the details of a series of brilliant triumphs furnish laurels only to the vanquished? These considerations are submitted as an apology for a soldier's stepping out of his line to undertake a task for which he feels himself little qualified.

It is not intended by the foregoing observations to impute wilful misrepresentation to the French officers; prejudice and personal feeling too frequently blinding the judgment and perverting the understanding. This is strongly exemplified in the writings of our own countrymen respecting their allies, many of which

by actors in the scene, and penned at the moment, must be considered expressions of genuine feeling, as well as ocular testimony of passing events. A striking instance may be selected in the various accounts of the train of disasters which preceded the fall of a much esteemed officer at the commencement of the war. Every sufferer on that occasion taxed the natives with having been in some mode or other the authors of his misfortunes; and the numerous military friends of that respected chief, influenced by his desponding feelings, and desirous to exonerate his conduct and sustain his reputation, even went farther, representing the Spaniards not only as apathetic and cowardly, but as totally devoid of good will; and to such extent did national vanity warp the good sense of the people of England, that these aspersions were most implicitly received, and most loudly echoed, at the moment when the Gallicians were offering the noblest vindication of their character, by expelling, and nearly annihilating the intruders.

Even to this hour their statements have left an impression unfavourable to those mountaineers, notwithstanding time and more happy events have so far softened down personal and national feeling, that we inquire with astonish-

ment how such prejudices could have arisen, and on what ground it was expected that an unarmed peasantry should oppose the French at the moment when the finest troops they ever beheld, or, perhaps, ever were seen, which they regarded as invincible, and which they dignified with every vaunting appellation, deemed themselves incapable of defending their passes for a moment, and were seeking safety in hurried retreat to their ships.

The injustice of taxing the population of Galicia with cowardice and want of good will, was, however, paralleled by similar illiberality on their part towards the whole British army for the misfortunes of a single corps. At Corunna, nearly to the conclusion of the war, the inhabitants, (particularly the ladies,) when speaking of the British, after eulogizing their appearance, their deportment, their figure, their dress, invariably concluded by exclaiming, "What a pity such fine well-looking men should be afraid to fight!"

Prejudices are thus found on all sides, and the dissipation of them by exposure would lead to endless controversy; no attempt is therefore made in this work to analyse or refute the writings of others, the actions of the contending parties being simply narrated with-

out other object or colouring than the author's belief. This, however, on many points, is so much at variance with generally received opinions, that he shall esteem himself fortunate to escape suspicion of wilful misrepresentation; and he feels so strongly the probability that an impression of undue partiality towards the allied Portuguese and British army may lessen the value of his narrative, that he thinks it advisable to offer a few exculpatory observations on the following points:

1st. The little mention made of the exertions of the Spanish people subsequently to the first burst of popular feeling.

2d. The omission of the details of nearly all the battles fought by the Spaniards separately against the French.

3d. The little credit latterly assigned to the Guerrillas.

4th. The unvaried failure of success attributed to the efforts of the French against the British, and the reverse as attending the efforts of the British against the French.

Although the writer, from strict adherence to a belief founded on great opportunities of personal observation, totally denies the Spaniards the credit of those acts of hostility attributed to them by many others as arising from

an enthusiasm regardless of consequences, he is far from undervaluing an enmity always constant, always in activity, carried on with policy, and under great deception. It will, however, readily be perceived that a few scattered instances of the former would give more scope for detail than successive years of the latter conduct. As the blast of the tempest, or the raging of the whirlwind, though local in their action and transient in their duration, offer many descriptive particulars, whilst the general desolation produced by the silent progress of evils far more calamitous, can only be marked by a summary of their results—so it is with the opposition of the Spanish people to the French armies, infinitely more fatal in its effects than brilliant in its operation. The writer therefore considered it better to make this preliminary admission of the great benefit which accrued to the allied armies from the general good will of the inhabitants, than interrupt the military narrative by the introduction of the various instances of it within his knowledge, which, though highly creditable to individuals, had yet only a secondary influence on the event of the operation, and would prove of little interest to the reader.

The motive for omitting the details of most

of the actions fought by the Spanish armies, would be explained in the most satisfactory manner by an appeal to the French officers, many of whom have stated to the writer, that their greatest victories were nearly bloodless to themselves; various Spanish officers of distinction admit the fact; such is the testimony of several British officers who had opportunities of ascertaining the reality; and the writer has had ocular proof of the ease with which the French obtained more than one of their principal successes. A judgment formed on these data is the scale on which he rates the Spanish actions; he could not therefore conscientiously copy details or reports of a scientific combination of dispositions and tactics ending in such trifling results. The writer is far from wishing to depreciate their great merit collectively and individually; on the contrary, he finds much difficulty in checking the enthusiasm in their favour, which their steady perseverance and unshaken fortitude are so calculated to inspire; and he intended no disparagement to that deserving people by representing, that want of good officers, of organization, and of discipline, rendered their regular armies unfit to contend with the French. The Spaniards are naturally brave, hardy, and patient: their infantry, pre-

viously to its overthrow at the battle of Rocroy, though alloyed by an intermixture of various nations, was the admiration of Europe for its firm and steady courage; and their conduct on the heights of St. Marcial, when the beforementioned defects had been very partially remedied, proves that with due attention it may be rendered so again.

Sufficient has been said of the Guerrillas in the narrative for the reader to form his own judgment of their merits; lest, however, the writer should be supposed to rate them below his real opinion, he will state it in two lines:—whilst acting in small bodies, their efficiency, and the advantage drawn from them, could not be too highly valued; when united into large ones, they had all the inconveniences of regular armies without their good qualities.

The last point requires a more full examination, as strong suspicion of want of candour must naturally attach to the narrative of an officer of a rival nation, which, in seven active campaigns, denies one solitary triumph over his countrymen to those generals by whose tactics, and to those troops by whose prowess, every opponent had been previously overcome.

The talents of the French commanders are admitted to the fullest extent: they frequently

displayed the greatest ability, and the powerful armies entrusted to their charge were often manœuvred with peculiar skill; and so far is the writer from possessing any illiberality of feeling towards them, that he will venture an apology for their want of general success in the early periods of the war, by stating what he considers to have been the principal cause.

Trained in a school where every thing was effected by force of numbers, they were little fitted to appreciate that combination of prudence and boldness so happily blended in the conduct of their opponent: reasoning only on their own ideas of the value of men, they were constantly deceived by his unvarying steadiness in pursuing the object marked out for himself; never sacrificing his troops for the chance of converting a certain into a more brilliant result; but, whenever requisite, resorting to the boldest measures, and deeming no loss nor hazard too great to ensure success. Their own dispatches bear ample proof of their having been the dupes of the former conduct. The passage of the Douro in 1809; the siege of Rodrigo immediately after having relinquished the blockade; the still more arduous attack of Badajos; and the unexampled boldness of the march on Almaraz, are unquestion-

able examples of the latter; each deceiving the French commanders, and succeeding by a great, but well-judged temerity.

The strongest exemplification, however, is to be drawn from the action of Fuentes de Honor, fought to gain possession of Almeida soon after the conclusion of Marshal Massena's retreat out of Portugal. That officer, after spending five months near Lisbon, fruitlessly offering battle under the most disadvantageous circumstances, till his forces were completely disorganized and half wasted away, little expected that the moment his army was re-composed, reinforced, and again formidable, he should find his prudent competitor suddenly transformed into the boldest of adversaries, offering battle on most disadvantageous ground, and with retreat nearly impracticable. In the one case, the object in view was certain of being attained without risk; in the other, the prize could only be gained by hazarding all. This contrasted conduct offers the highest display of prudence, judgment, and boldness, forming so pure an example of the legitimate use of battles, as must have been incomprehensible to the French commanders of the revolution, and by such they were constantly foiled, and the superior force under their command rendered of no avail.

The merit of the French troops is also fully admitted. The soldiers, which originally composed the French armies in Spain, become veterans in a succession of victories, were certainly excellent, something superior to those composing the generality of armies: they displayed a degree of firmness from disciplined courage and individual confidence, which on many occasions excited the admiration of their opponents; the columns of attack at Talavera, at Albuera, and even in the Pyrenees, were apparently as firm, and as intrepid, as the renowned Grecian phalanx; and in their patient endurance of privations, particularly in Portugal, they evinced a steady attachment to their country, and to their chiefs, beyond the ordinary patriotism of modern soldiers. Nevertheless the most diligent research furnishes no instance of the French having, at the conclusion of any of their various attacks in the Peninsula, retained possession of any principal post, or prominent feature of ground, previously occupied by the British; nor, in their defensive actions, of their having maintained any post from which the British made an effort to dislodge them. On this simple and plain fact, so open to refutation if untrue, the writer rests his exculpation from unfairness, and, without further comment, submits it to the reader as

the standard on which to form his own opinion of the comparative merit of the troops of the two nations.

Unconscious of any particular bias or feeling, the writer has endeavoured, from his own observation, and the correspondence of officers of discernment and judgment, to draw up a faithful and impartial military account of the late war in Spain, Portugal, and in the South of France. As little as is consistent with clearness has been said on other subjects, and few opinions have been hazarded. No fact has been admitted without the strictest investigation: in consequence a variety of current anecdotes have been rejected which might have enlivened and embellished the narrative. Many errors, however, he fears, may have glided into the composition: some accidental omissions of minor occurrences he has himself discovered; all he claims credit for is general correctness and strict impartiality, that the reader who deems the work deficient in entertainment or information shall have no cause to complain of being imposed upon or misled; and that the historian may find an unvarnished tale on which safely to rely when handing down to posterity the events of the proudest æra in the military history of Great Britain.

Cambray, 19th July, 1817.

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ERRATA.

- Page 51, line 11, *for Minho read Tamboga.*
— 102, last line, *for the greater read or the greater.*
— 223, line 2, *for entered read entering.*
— 227, line 15, *for thirteenth read twelfth.*
— 341, line 9, *for Ortez read Orthes.*
Various places, *for Sir Lowrey Cole read Sir Lowry Cole.*

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ACCOUNT OF THE WAR
IN
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

CHAPTER I.

Events which preceded the War—French Armies admitted into Spain as friends—take military possession of Portugal—attempt the subjugation of the whole Peninsula—general opposition of the Spaniards—their success—the intruders concentrate behind the Ebro—a British Army expels the French from Portugal, and advances to the aid of the Spaniards—Buonaparte crosses the Pyrenees—disperses the Patriot Armies—advances against the British, who retire to Corunna, repulse their pursuers, and re-embark—French cross the Tagus—operations in Catalonia.—Being the period from October, 1807, to the end of January, 1809.

SPAIN, in the year 1795, withdrawing herself from the general confederacy against France, concluded a treaty of peace with that power, followed the succeeding summer by an intimate

alliance; from which time, during a period of twelve years, she deemed no sacrifices too great to enable her to fulfil the engagements she then contracted, and to merit the good will of her ally. In aid of a war against England, at variance with her vital interests, she saw, without a remonstrance, her fleets annihilated, her treasures drained, and her armies drafted to distant regions; and was on the point of suffering yet greater humiliations and losses in support of her fidelity, when, in 1807, the restless and unprincipled ambition of Napoleon Buonaparte induced him to meditate the deposition of the reigning family, and the substitution of his own, on the throne of Spain and the Indies.

Charles IV., the monarch then feebly swaying the sceptre of those kingdoms, naturally weak and indolent, had for many years left the direction of affairs to an unprincipled favourite, Manoel Godoy; who, educated in the lower ranks of society, and possessing no superior merit, had been raised to the highest authority in the state, through the criminal attachment of the Queen, and the blind partiality of the King. Created Prince of the Peace for concluding the treaty which rendered his country subservient to France, he hesitated at no step, however unworthy, to render it permanent; and his ascen-

dency in the royal councils daily increasing, he at length ruled despotically every department of the state, perverting each to the furtherance of his own views; the ill effects of which, too severely felt to be concealed, had brought the government into disrepute, and had lost Charles the respect and affection of his subjects.

This state of things, however favourable for, and warranting a domestic change, would not palliate in the eyes of the world the interference of a foreign power. With a view, therefore, to lessen the odium of dethroning an unoffending prince, and to facilitate its accomplishment, Buonaparte induced Charles in the autumn of the year to conclude a treaty with France; by which Portugal, the territory of a relation and ally, was to be divided into three principalities, to the exclusion of the Braganza family. One principality to be given in sovereignty to the Favourite on the conclusion of peace with England; but till that event the whole kingdom to be provisionally occupied by the troops of the two nations. The proposed measure being such a violation of honour and good faith, as to put the actors on a level, and afford the planner incalculable advantages in the prosecution of his intended perfidies; the aged monarch, in becom-

ing a party to the transaction, depriving himself of all appeal to the sympathy of Europe.*

This deviation from morality, as might be expected, was followed by a train of ill consequences to the weaker party. In fulfilment of the treaty, 25,000 French infantry and 3000 cavalry traversed Spain to take possession of Portugal, drawing with them the flower of the Spanish army as the stipulated contingent. Marshal Junot, their commander, held out deceitful assurances of friendship, proclaiming his sole object to be the emancipation of the government from the yoke of England, to enable it to assert its own independence. Either deceived by this language, or to remove all pretext for the further advance of the intruders, the Regent ordered the seizure of the effects of his English allies, and forbade the entry of their ships into his ports; only relaxing in acts of hostility towards them, when he found that no concession retarded the march of the French; that they had already entered Abrantes, and that they would soon appear before the capital. Then, alarmed for his personal liberty, he hastily embarked, and the British admiral, who blockaded the Ta-

* See Treaty in full, Appendix, A.

gus, consigning to oblivion the cessation of friendship so recently announced, not only permitted his free passage out of the river, but escorted him to his American dominions. The regular army of Portugal was equal in amount to the force of the invaders; and, aided by a numerous militia, would probably have annihilated them in their passage of the mountains of Beira, if encouraged thereto; but the Prince, not deeming it politic to be the first to unsheath the sword, endeavoured to the last moment to ward off the blow by negociation, and even on his departure commanded his subjects to receive his dethroners as friends.

The spirit of the people being from these causes compromised, all quietly submitted, and Lisbon, without a drop of blood being shed, passed, on the 1st December, 1807, under the dominion of France; as did Oporto a few days subsequently.

Buonaparte then demanded, that 40,000 of his troops should be admitted into Spain to support the armies in Portugal, and insure the completion of the treaty: to which Charles not only consented, but following up his bad faith towards his relation and ally, with positive treachery towards his own family and subjects did all in his power to facilitate their obtaining

the military command of the northern provinces of his kingdom; and his authority enabled the French commanders, by a combination of cunning, duplicity, and force, to seize the four principal fortresses within the Pyrenees; viz. St. Sebastian, Pamplona, Figueiras, and Barcelona. These were immediately strongly garrisoned, and, by a further perfidy, additional troops were introduced to form a disposable army of 70 or 75,000 men, which under the command of Marshal Murat, was concentrated round Vittoria, in readiness at the required moment to enter Madrid, and prepare the subjugation of the whole Peninsula.

Having thus derived all the advantages he could expect from the influence of his credulous ally, the next attempt of Buonaparte was to induce the emigration of the royal family. Charles, worked upon by the artifices and threats of various French agents, gave into the design, and made preparations for his departure to Mexico; but the strong disapprobation expressed by all ranks of his subjects, on discovering his intentions, obliged him to relinquish the undertaking, and disavow the intent. Other stratagems were then devised to alarm the King and inspire mistrust: rumours of plots against his authority were industriously circulated, and every species

of intrigue and dereliction of principle were used, to excite disunion in his court and family. Wishes of a matrimonial alliance on the part of Buonaparte had been secretly expressed to the Prince of Asturias, heir to the crown; which, when acceded to, and a written proposal made for one of the imperial nieces, it was treated with silent contempt; but now being revealed to Charles, and represented as an act of rebellion, the Prince, at the instigation of the Favourite, was imprisoned. Popular tumults followed at the royal residence, and various noblemen exerted themselves to stem the torrent of discord; on which Godoy, alarmed at the general disapprobation of his violence, endeavoured to retract, and released the Prince. This concession led to his own downfall, for the party opposed to his measures, strengthened by the support thus obtained, overpowered his influence, and threw him into a dungeon; then taking advantage of the general discontent of the nation, and of the absence of his counsellor, they drew from Charles the resignation of his crown, and on the 19th March, 1808, proclaimed the Prince of Asturias, King Ferdinand VII. Marshal Murat instantly availed himself of the pretext which the commotions at Aranjuez afforded, to advance with his army, and gain military possession of Madrid,

which he accomplished on the 23d March, holding equivocal language towards both parties, and declaring his movements dictated by a friendly desire to heal the divisions in the council, and give support to the lawful government.

It is unnecessary to inquire whether Charles's abdication was voluntary or forced: it is a question of internal regulation, which affects the different members of the state alone.—Ferdinand once acknowledged king by the nation, it is most clear that no foreign power had a shadow of right to interfere; and thenceforth, in viewing the contest between Buonaparte and the Spaniards, the errors and the weakness of the former reign should be forgotten, and the cause of the new sovereign judged on his own acts alone. So considered, it must be pronounced the most decidedly just that ever drew an appeal to the sword. Every other circumstance was unfavourable to Ferdinand, and fearful were the odds against which he had to contend: superior cunning was aided by superior force; and scenes of arrogance and perfidy were exhibited on the one side, only to be equalled by those of weakness and simplicity on the other. Of this one of the first occurrences of his reign affords a striking example.—Ferdinand having announced to his people that the change in the government

was effected with a design the more strictly to cement the alliance between the French and Spanish nations, Murat thereupon craftily expressed a desire to receive, as a mark of that increased friendship, the sword of Francis taken at Pavia, which the Spaniards preserved with the utmost veneration, fondly regarding it as a proud trophy of their former greatness. The Prince not only hastened to comply, but made a merit of the act, and sent the sword on the 5th of April with great pomp and ceremony to the French head-quarters: thus lowering his own dignity, and outraging the feelings of his people, at the moment when destruction could only be avoided by cherishing both.

Ferdinand, notwithstanding this too conciliatory conduct, was far from betraying the trust reposed in him, and his elevation to the throne totally deranged the plot carrying on for its subversion; even rendering necessary a fresh system of artifice and deception. Charles was persuaded by the French ambassador to protest against his own act of abdication as constrained, to appeal to Buonaparte for support, and to place himself under the protection of the French army. Murat at the same time urged Ferdinand, with an apparent warmth of regard, to submit his cause to the same arbitration; representing the emperor

of the French as attached to his interests, and actually on the road to Madrid, to pay a visit of compliment to his faithful ally. Menaces were at length used to give weight to his arguments, and the employment of force was to be apprehended; therefore, on the arrival of an envoy (General Savary) to announce Buonaparte's approach, and solemnly to assure Ferdinand of his intention to recognize him as King, the Prince, having arranged a council of government under the presidency of the Infant Don Antonio, proceeded to Burgos to meet his expected visitant. Not finding him in that city he went forward to Vittoria, from whence, after a few days' halt, he was prevailed upon, by the most barefaced falsehoods, and unblushing villany, to extend his journey to Bayonne.

The day of his arrival, that envoy—the man whose honour was pledged to the contrary— notified to Ferdinand the determination of Buonaparte never to recognize him as king, and that the Bourbon dynasty should thenceforth cease to reign in Spain. The Prince, in this extremity, evinced great firmness, and refused to submit; whereupon the abdicated monarch, and his consort, were brought to Bayonne, and on a stipulation for the release of the Favourite, warmly united in aiding the ruin of their son and the

downfal of their family. Ferdinand, a captive in a foreign country, stigmatised as illegitimate by his mother; vilified and threatened by his father, and without hope of escape, was at length compelled to restore the crown to Charles, who immediately, May 5th, made a cession of it to Buonaparte, and, to ensure the quiet transfer of his subjects, delegated the powers of Lieutenant of his Kingdom to Marshal Murat; commanding the Council of Government, the Captains-General of Provinces, and all minor authorities, implicitly to obey his orders.

The other members of the royal family subsequently acceding to the act of renunciation, Buonaparte, on the 5th of June, sanctioned by the approval of a mock assembly of the authorities of the state, consisting merely of a few grandees whom he had drawn together at Bayonne, conferred the crown on his brother Joseph; who two years previously had, by less unworthy means, displaced another branch of the Bourbons from the throne of Naples. The principal victims of his superior cunning then vanished from the scene: Charles was sent into banishment on an inadequate and ill-paid pension, and Ferdinand was closely confined in the Castle of Valency. Whilst a sentiment of pity is bestowed on the fate of the misguided father

and the credulous son, every one must rejoice that the traitor Godoy met with his full share of disappointment and humiliation,—the promised sceptre vanished from his grasp, and his enormous and ill-acquired wealth was confiscated in support of the cause he had endeavoured to betray.

The Spaniards, though ignorant of the extent of the meditated perfidy, were dissatisfied and alarmed at the departure of the royal family, indignant at the violent proceedings of the French commanders, and irritated at the growing insolence of the soldiery. Delivered over to oppression by the government, and deserted by the nobles, they felt themselves betrayed, and that personal exertion alone could bring them relief. These feelings, worked upon by a thousand sinister rumours, repeated and believed without examination, produced a general agitation, which threatened, on the slightest incident, to break into open insurrection.

The second of May produced an explosion at Madrid. Buonaparte, not considering his usurpation complete, whilst any member of the royal family remained without his grasp, ordered the Queen of Etruria, daughter of Charles IV. and her infant son, to be conveyed to France. At the moment of their departure from the palace,

the agitated feelings of those round the carriage induced them to impede its progress, and to insult the French officer in charge of the escort. Murat, to enforce his authority, ordered up a body of troops, to fire on and disperse the actors; which commands were too readily and successfully executed, and numbers were killed or maimed. A knowledge of this outrage spread in a moment all over Madrid, and the entire population poured into the streets, armed with whatever weapons they could find, to avenge their slaughtered countrymen. Murat, who considered the opportunity favourable to strike a lesson of awe, and by a terrible example to crush in the bud the rising spirit of the people, instantly brought up ten thousand troops, with artillery; and for two hours, whilst a pretext of resistance could be found, carried destruction through every quarter of the town; and the same evening executed, by sentence of a French commission, all the most obnoxious of the prisoners who had fallen into his power. Thus bled or perished fifteen hundred Spanish citizens, victims to an experiment of the effects of military coercion, in procuring the quiet submission of a nation to a change of rulers.

These severities effectually banished resistance from the capital; and the causes which gave

rise to them being misrepresented in various addresses to their countrymen by the council of government and by the priesthood, they produced no other sensation in the provinces, than silent and deadly hatred of allies, whose presence had occasioned such proceedings. A proclamation issued on the 20th May, formally to announce that Charles and Ferdinand had abdicated in favour of Buonaparte, first raised a suspicion that the subjugation of the Peninsula was the object of the passing scene; and when shortly afterwards two corps, under Dupont and Moncey, marched on Cadiz and Valencia, to secure the submission of those important places, the Spaniards fully perceived their danger. Then the views of Murat, in carrying to such an extreme the outrageous massacre of Madrid, became evident, and produced an universal abhorrence of its perpetrators. A burst of general indignation, and an enthusiastic spirit of resistance, spread throughout the whole Peninsula; each province flew to arms, established a local government, and without calculating its own strength or that of the intruders, boldly declared against the Usurper. Few excesses attended these spontaneous movements, except at Valencia, where the French residents were indiscriminately put to death; every where else

a spirit of moderation and order was upheld and encouraged by eloquent proclamations, inculcating the purest doctrines of liberty, whilst they cherished and matured the sudden blaze of active patriotism. The Junta of Seville took the lead in these proceedings; but the first communication made to England, was by deputies from the Asturias. So soon as they represented the feelings of the people, and their determination to resist to the utmost the aggressions of Buonaparte, friendship and alliance were established between the two nations, without discussion of terms; and arms, ammunition, and clothing supplied with a liberality only bounded by the wishes of the Patriots. On their part, considerable energy was manifested. The corps under Dupont, marching on Cadiz, had all its supplies withheld, and its progress was by every expedient retarded, whilst the regular troops in Andalusia were collecting at Seville, under Generals Castanos and Reding, to give it battle. Dupont succeeded in obtaining possession of Cordova on the 7th June, after a slight resistance, which he made a pretext for pillaging the town: then ascertaining the preparations made to oppose his further advance, he retired to Andujar, and fortified a position on the right of the Guadalquiver, intending to wait the arrival of

reinforcements from Madrid, to meet which he detached 6000 men under General Wedel, towards the Sierra Morena. Thus situated, he remained for sixteen days, constantly harassed by the Spaniards, who at last succeeded in depriving him of every supply. Dupont then fell back on Baylen, to rejoin Wedel's force; but Reding skilfully interposed his army, which rendering the situation of the French desperate, they attempted on the 21st July to carve their liberation with the sword. After some success, being repulsed at all points, with the loss of between 2 and 3000 of their numbers, the remainder entered into a treaty and surrendered prisoners of war. In the agreement was included the detachment under Wedel, on the more favourable condition of being sent to France; making the total number of captives 14,000.

Previously to this encouraging success, the populace of Cadiz, impatient at the temporizing conduct of Solano, the Governor, had risen and put him to death. General Morla, who succeeded to the command, organized with much promptitude a system of defence, and opening a fire on five French sail of the line and a frigate lying in the harbour, of which a British squadron precluded the escape, obliged them to surrender at discretion. Impartial truth requires it to be

added, that the Junta of Seville sullied the lustre of these brilliant achievements, by a breach of the capitulation granted to Wedel's corps at Baylen: on its arrival for embarkation at Cadiz, it was by their orders detained, and men and officers placed in close confinement, where a large proportion of them miserably perished.

Moncey's corps against Valencia totally failed in its object: it sat down before the town on the 28th June, and attempted to frighten the inhabitants into submission by a heavy fire of musketry and artillery; which failing in effect, and an army under General Caro making partial attacks on its rear, and cutting off all its communications, Moncey hastily retired on Madrid, sustaining some loss on his march.

In the north, fortune was less propitious to the Spaniards, and on the borders of Leon they received a severe check. Very early in the contest, by great exertions, an army of 30,000 men was formed from the levies of Gallicia, and those of the western provinces, the command of which was entrusted to General Cuesta, who consulting merely his own courage, and the ardour of his troops, imprudently hazarded the issue of a general action with a select French corps under Marshal Bessières, at Medina del Rio-Seco, on the 14th July. Some rapid cavalry manœuvres

threw the young Spanish troops into confusion, of which the infantry profited, to advance and gain a complete victory; one division alone, under General Blake, preserving a degree of order, and covering the retreat to Benevente. There the army was quickly re-organized, and Cuesta, not rendered more prudent by defeat, was again in march to court a similar or worse fate; when Joseph Buonaparte, alarmed at his movements, and at the great loss the French had already sustained, withdrew from Madrid on the 1st August, after ten days' residence, and fixed his court at Vittoria. At the same time, to prevent the destruction of his troops in detail, already reduced to 47,000 men, he caused them to retire into cantonments behind the Ebro; where, united in a body, they bade defiance to any attack in front, but had the mortification to find every extraneous exertion end in defeat and disgrace.

At Zaragossa, an unfortified town on the Ebro, of the utmost importance to the security of their new cantonments, a few ill-disciplined troops under General Palafox, enabled the citizens to make a most obstinate defence of sixty-three days. The French penetrated into the very heart of the city, when, to use the language of their own bulletin, "much obstinate fighting occurred, which lasted several days;

and after fourteen fortified convents, three-fourths of the city, the arsenal, and all the magazines were in their possession," they were obliged, on the 14th August, disgracefully to withdraw.

Gerona likewise opposed a successful resistance to their efforts. After bombarding the place for a fortnight, and being twice repulsed in attempts to carry an outwork by storm, General Duhesme was obliged to decamp, suffering severely from petty attacks, on his retreat to Barcelona, which place the Catalans immediately blockaded.

In other minor affairs, though not invariably successful, the Patriots displayed a similar degree of spirit and enterprize; and whilst they were thinning the ranks of the enemy, confidence spread over their own. In the exultation of the moment, the complete defeat which the army under Cuesta had sustained, from a very inferior French force, in the only general action yet fought, was glossed over as merely the effects of a superior cavalry acting in a level and open country against young troops. The ability of the new levies to contend with the French in the mountainous districts, was not the more doubted; and those most moderate in their expectations, confined their wishes to the intermixture of a greater proportion of old

soldiers. These were most opportunely supplied, by the courage and loyalty of the Marquis de la Romana, who, with 16,000 Spanish veterans, had been removed to the distant shores of the Baltic previously to the war, by the precautionary policy of Buonaparte. On being made acquainted by the British Admiral in those seas, with the events passing in his native country, he planned an attempt to liberate his army; and by stolen marches of unequalled length and celerity deceiving the vigilance of Bernadotte, the French commander, brought in safety nine thousand of his men to Nyborg, Langeland, &c. from whence transports conveyed them to St. Andero, where they landed on the 30th September.

Thus, the month of August closed on a succession of events, with one exception, encouraging to the hopes of the Patriots; and with such general good will, and such abundant materials, only a little arrangement seemed to be required to organize armies worthy of the cause, both in magnitude and zeal; and as no rumours were yet heard of reinforcements arriving to the French, every one confidently looked forward to the instalment of a supreme government, (arranged to meet at Madrid, and to be composed of two members from each of the seventeen provincial Juntas,) for the signal

of a general movement, which should in a moment annihilate the intruders.

In Portugal likewise, at this period, a spirit of resistance to the French had widely spread. The conduct of Junot was at first temperate, and the administration was carried on with the customary forms, till measures were completed for detaching the best of the native troops into France, disbanding the remainder, and disarming the population: then despising all opposition, Junot laid aside deceit, and in the name of his master declared on the 1st of February, 1808, that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign. So violent a change, abruptly announced to a nation blindly loyal, could not fail to produce considerable uneasiness and apprehension; and soon after, when, from the hostile movements in Spain, it became necessary to disarm the Spanish contingent, * and the force of the intruders was thereby diminished, the public discontent broke out into open resistance. Oporto first declared itself. The citizens, in the middle of June, overpowered the

* This measure was judiciously executed. The different battalions having been embarked on the Tagus under pretence of a military movement, were brought under the guns of the men of war, when resistance became vain, and they were without a struggle conveyed on board hulks which had been prepared for their reception.

garrison, and a body of armed peasantry repulsed with loss a French detachment which crossed the Douro to avenge their countrymen ; on which a general rising in the north followed, and a Provisional Government, in the name of the lawful sovereign, was established at Oporto, under the Presidency of the Bishop. Nearly at the same moment, the flame burst forth at the opposite extremity of the kingdom : in Algarve the royal standard was displayed, and the French expelled. Junot, alarmed at these symptoms of general discontent, and not having a force to keep in subjection the entire population, endeavoured to divide opinions, and gain time by conciliatory measures. Finding, however, that the Portugueze were no longer to be deceived by promises, and that partial risings were becoming general, he decreed, that whatsoever town or village should oppose the French troops, should be given up to pillage, the inhabitants put to the sword, and the houses levelled with the ground ; and further, that all individuals found with arms in their hands under any circumstances, should be instantly shot. These threats were enforced with a terrible severity at Leyria by General Margaron ; but the name immortalized as the most active agent of these atrocities, is that of Loison. The citizens of Evora and Guarda will ever

hold it in remembrance. At the former place the means of defence were organized by General Leite, with a body of Spanish troops, and consequently the resistance was regular warfare, rather than a popular commotion; notwithstanding which, Loison, on its capture on the 29th July, delivered it over to pillage, rather encouraging than repressing the atrocities of the soldiery. Those spared, still shudder whilst they relate the deliberate and sportive cruelty with which, for a whole day that unrestrained licentiousness prevailed, multitudes of women and children, but, above all, priests, were drawn from their places of refuge, and either ill-treated or destroyed. Creditable witnesses assert that several thousand individuals were killed or maimed during the massacre. At Guarda twelve hundred dead were numbered on the ground. Of the excesses at Atalaya, another scene of Loison's exploits, the particulars are unknown; as the inhabitants being few, it is understood that mercy was extended to none to perpetuate the incidents. Similar severities were practised at other places; excessive contributions were enforced with rigour, and inability to pay made the pretext for unlimited plunder. These and other vexations gave consistency to the popular movements; and whilst General Friere endeavoured to or-

ganize the insurrection in the north, a numerous undisciplined band, under the Count of Castro-marino, overran all Alemtejo. The country occupied by the French was consequently circumscribed on every side; but they retained possession of the fortresses of Almeida, Elvas and Peniche, and of various scattered posts, as Setubal, Palmela, Saint Julien, the Bugio, &c. Such was the situation of Portugal when the British came to her aid.

From the commencement of the insurrectionary movements, the liberation of Portugal had been considered by the English Cabinet as the primary step towards the independence of the Peninsula; and the Spanish authorities fully concurring in their opinion, a force of 9,000 men, which had been embarked at Cork for a distant service, under Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, was directed to proceed to the coast of Portugal, there to form a junction with 5,000 men afloat at Gibraltar, under Major-General Spencer; and then, at the judgment of Sir Arthur, to undertake such operations as should best tend to liberate the country. At the same time, arrangements were made for other corps, amounting to 18,000 men, to follow under Sir Harry Burrard and Sir John Moore, his senior officers: the whole to be commanded by Sir Hew Dalrymple, ordered for that purpose from Gibraltar.

The force from Cork disembarked in Mondego Bay on the 6th August, and was joined two days afterwards by the division under Sir Brent Spencer, making an army of 14,000 infantry and 200 cavalry; with which Sir Arthur Wellesley advanced towards Lisbon, on the 10th August. At Leyria, a body of 6000 Portuguese troops from Oporto joined, but could not be prevailed upon to make a forward movement with the British, unless supplied by them with daily rations, which was impracticable. Not shaken in his resolution by this discouraging circumstance, Sir Arthur continued his march unsupported by more than 1600 of the natives; and at Roliça, on the 17th, drove before him a corps of 3000 French under General Laborde. Immediately on quitting the village, the main road passes over a range of heights, the front of which commencing on the right of the road, and extending far to the left, is perfectly precipitous, a few narrow difficult tracks alone communicating over it. General Laborde halted on the summit of the ridge, looking down upon the British in the plain beneath. To dislodge him without the loss which would certainly attend an attack in front, General Ferguson, with 3000 men, was directed to turn his right, and a Portuguese corps of 1200 men was directed to penetrate to his rear by a wide movement on his left;

columns under Major-Generals Hill, Crauford, Nightingall, and Fane, being in the mean while assembled in the plain to rush up the passes as soon as he should be shaken. Either the march of the flanking corps occupied a longer time than was calculated, or the attack in front was made earlier than intended, as the passes were forced before the enemy discovered the danger which threatened his rear. The 9th and 29th regiments first formed upon the summit: General Laborde made three desperate but unsuccessful efforts to dislodge them, when the other troops coming up, he hastily retired on Torres Vedras, being unable, notwithstanding a superiority of cavalry, to carry off his artillery. From the very great strength of the ground, this success cost the victors nearly 400 in killed and wounded.

Sir Arthur did not pursue the retreating force on a road which would have led him distant from the sea; but moved to his right to open a communication with the fleet, and cover the landing of the expected reinforcements from England; and on the 20th occupied Vimiero, near to which 4000 men under Major-General Anstruther disembarked and united with his force.

Vimiero stands nearly at the bottom of a valley, at the eastern extremity of a considerable

height, which extends westward to the sea; and on the opposite side of the valley to the eastward, are other heights, over which passes the communication to Lourinha. In advance of the town is a plateau or table hill more elevated than the ground in its immediate front; but which is completely looked down upon from the heights on its right and left. The army having halted at Vimiero for one night only, and not expecting to be attacked, was disposed as most convenient to the troops. Six brigades occupied the height to the westward of the town; one battalion, with some light troops, were posted on the plateau; the cavalry and reserve artillery were in the valley, and on the hills to the eastward were merely piquets of observation.

At eight in the morning of the 21st, strong bodies of the enemy were observed moving on the road of Lourinha, shewing an evident intention of attacking the left of the British, to meet which the brigades of Generals Ferguson, Nightingall, Acland, and Bowes were successively moved across the valley, from the hill on the westward, to the hills on the eastward of Vimiero; the force on the plateau was augmented, and the remaining brigades were moved nearer to its support. Then in line of battle the right was near the sea, but screened from a

view of it by intervening heights; the centre was posted on the rising ground in front of the town, and the left on the hills to the eastward. The action commenced by the advance of a heavy close column against the centre: exposed to a destructive fire of artillery it steadily approached within a few paces of the 50th regiment formed in line, which received it with a volley, and instantly rushing to the charge threw it into the utmost confusion; whilst General Acland's brigade, which was in march from the right to the left, attacked it in flank; the cavalry completed its rout, and seven pieces of artillery remained in the valley. The attack on the Lourinha road was nearly simultaneous with that of the centre: the French advanced with imposing boldness, but were checked by the steadiness of General Ferguson's brigade, which was in first line, till the arrival of the other brigades; when after a sharp contest they were driven back with the loss of many men and six guns. Thus 21 pieces of artillery remained on the field, though the defeated force had a superiority of five times the number of cavalry: their loss in men was likewise very considerable. That of the British was under 700, in killed and wounded.

This was a grand effort made by Marshal Junot, with nearly all the disposable force he

could collect, about 12,000 infantry, and 1,200 cavalry. After the action he halted in the defiles of Torres Vedras, causing it to be proclaimed at Lisbon, that he had obtained the most splendid success, hoping by the deception, to calm the extreme agitation of the populace, and to repress open hostility, whilst he made an endeavour, by negociation, to extricate himself from the perilous situation in which his defeat had placed him.

Sir Harry Burrard landed during the action, but did not assume the command till the French were repulsed; then, as he judged that a forward movement would be productive of no results, from the great superiority of the enemy's cavalry, he decided that the troops should continue on the field. There Sir Hew Dalrymple found them the following morning on his landing; and a few hours subsequently a French officer presented himself at the outposts, commissioned by Junot to negociate with the victors, a convention for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army. Being admitted to treat, a suspension of hostilities was arranged, and a provisional agreement signed, in which it was stipulated that the French army should not, in any case, be considered as prisoners of war; that all the individuals composing it should be transported to France, with their arms and baggage.

and all their private property, from which nothing should be excepted. Emboldened by the concession of these favourable preliminaries, Junot temporised, and gained a week in debating the definitive articles. During this time, the expected reinforcements under Sir J. Moore were disembarked, increasing the British force to 32,000 men: yet with a good faith creditable to his country, Sir H. Dalrymple ratified the definitive convention on the stipulated basis; and in conformity thereto, 24,000 men, with their arms, baggage and artillery, were conveyed in transports to the ports between Rochefort and L'Orient, and unconditionally disembarked.*

The Generals, and the constituted authorities of Portugal, protested in the most solemn and forcible manner against the neglect of the interests of their countrymen, manifested by various articles of the treaty; and the indignation of the populace of Lisbon, at seeing their oppressors embark laden with the pillage of their churches, and carrying off in safety the fruits of their rapine and extortion, could only be repressed by the interposition of a British force.

* By a modification of the original agreement made at the instigation of Admiral Sir C. Cotton, eight Russian sail of the line were taken possession of to remain in England during the war; the crews enjoying the full benefit of the convention, and being sent to Russia. See Convention in full, Appendix B.

In England, as well as in Portugal, the Convention was generally deprecated; and the dissatisfaction felt by the government led to an investigation of its merits, by a court of general officers; from the proceedings of which, and the experience of subsequent campaigns, it may be inferred, that the interests of the Peninsula were consulted, by entering on a treaty for the liberation of Portugal; and that the convention of Cintra would have been highly advantageous to the Patriots' cause, had such conditions been imposed by the victors, as their advantageous position rendered equitable, and would doubtless have commanded.

To revert to the affairs of Spain. The enthusiastic movements of the people were not attended with those permanently great results which had been so sanguinely anticipated. Innumerable volunteers continued every where to enrol themselves, and each province completed a considerable army; but as the different Juntas appointed the officers, and tenaciously retained the command of their respective levies, no general system was followed; and the interests of a gallant and zealous people were sacrificed to petty jealousies, and the incompetency of local governors. The exertions of the commonalty merited a better fate, as the most moderate calculation will shew that in the short space of

four months, 170,000 combatants marched against the enemy; and when the number of recruits spread over the different provinces is taken into the account, it will be found that upwards of 200,000 individuals in that period voluntarily enrolled themselves; a force amply sufficient to have secured the independence of Spain, had it been rendered effective by proper equipments and organization. So different however was the case, that at no period were more than 50,000 men fully clothed and equipped, and when formed into armies they wanted every component part; having neither generals nor staff of experience, neither commissariat nor stores, surgeons nor medicines; being a mere body of infantry, with a disproportionately small artillery, and few cavalry; or rather, a collection of individuals urged forward by the best and most patriotic motives, but utterly incapable of acting together as a machine.

This ill-organized condition of the Spanish forces arose chiefly from the nation being necessitated to make a prodigious effort at a time when her military establishments were, from long continued neglect, and the previous subtle policy of France, reduced to the lowest state of degradation and nullity; giving no foundation on which to rear her overstrained exertions. It also partly arose from the too great ardour and

precipitancy of the Spaniards themselves. At the commencement of the war, the different provincial levies, when only half clothed and disciplined, were hurried forward by their respective generals, who were apprehensive of being too late to participate in the honour of expelling the enemy; and on approaching the scene of action, each finding himself unequal singly to commence the struggle, and objecting to combine for that purpose with a superior of another province, the whole became paralyzed. The officers, too confident and too uninstructed to perceive the advantage of withdrawing, and perfecting the drill and discipline of their men, permitted this invaluable opportunity for improvement to escape; and the different corps remained in perfect inaction for two months, exposed to the cold and rain on the summit of the mountains bordering on Arragon and Biscay, to which, from the deficiency of cavalry, they were obliged to ascend for security. As no money could be obtained to purchase supplies, nor any authority existed to enforce requisitions, neither magazines nor hospitals could be formed; and the young troops were fast wearing down with disease and hunger, and their constancy and their ardour undergoing a severe trial, previously to the hour of exertion. Thus passed away the

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latter end of August and the whole of September; at which period the Supreme Government was installed, and assumed the chief direction of affairs. The majority of the deputies were men of approved integrity, and some of them highly distinguished for talents and patriotism: they chose for their president the old Count Florida Blanca, whose rigid and unbending principles rendering him obnoxious to the favourite Godoy had caused him to reside, for some years previously, on his estate, an exile from the Court: much, therefore, was expected from the wisdom of their measures, as well as from the influence of their controlling authority. It was soon, however, discovered, that an assembly of thirty four persons was rather a deliberative than an executive power; and that the central Junta inherited all the defects of the provincial assemblies, without their local influence. Its authority being undefined, and its supremacy viewed with jealousy by the other Juntas, its rule was altogether too feeble for the crisis. Nor would it have been an easy matter to have established any government equal to the task of uniting and directing the efforts of the country to a speedy termination of the contest; as the very feelings and peculiarities of the people, which led them to brave the power of France,

were almost an insuperable bar to their readily overcoming it.

Every Spaniard, even the most enlightened, from a too exalted opinion of his own importance individually, and of the pre-eminent valour of his countrymen, regards all foreigners, particularly his enemies, with utter contempt. This self-sufficiency is aggravated by a blind confidence of success, arising from an habitual exaggeration in writing and speaking on the national interests, in which they all indulge. Inflated accounts bear with them the simplicity of truth; and by an incredible facility of belief, which pervades all classes, their hyperboles deceive each other, and even themselves. As they never, therefore, justly appreciate the danger which threatens them, all appeal to their apprehensions is vain; and they are equally intractable to persuasion or command. The Central Government, instead of repressing the general presumption, and attempting to shake the fallacious confidence of the people, rather encouraged both—itsself participating in the weakness of individuals, and by exaggerated statements of its force and means, deceiving its own commanders and its allies: thus, partly from inexperience, partly from national prejudices, dis-

appointing every hope which had been formed from its rule.

Unable to annul the improper appointments of officers made by the provincial Juntas, it endeavoured to palliate the evil of a variety of incompetent chiefs, by uniting several of them under the command of one superior. This arrangement, without producing a single amendment of organization or discipline, added to the general confidence; the new levies thus jumbled together being styled, and probably believed to be, powerful armies. Under that denomination they were, with a degree of temerity scarcely to be credited, pushed into contact with the French forces behind the Ebro, without mutual support, or the slightest common object in their movements, beyond an undigested idea which each commander possessed, of encompassing and making prisoners an enemy whose very outposts he was unable to drive back. Nor did these elevated hopes at all abate on ascertaining by a dispatch, intercepted early in October, from the Governor of Bayonne, (naming the different battalions, their numbers, and the days appointed for their passage through his garrison,) that 72,000 additional enemies would cross the Pyrenees before the middle of

November: it rather tended to urge forward the different generals, who, instead of falling back and concentrating their various armies, spread farther apart, and formed a yet greater arc, the more surely to encircle the superior numbers opposed to them. The levies of Galicia, Asturias, Las Montanas, &c. under General Blake, amounting to 40,000 men, advanced, subsequently to this knowledge, in front of Bilbao, and formed a separate army on the extreme left. Those of Andalusia, Castille, &c. 45,000 men, under General Castanos, crossed the Ebro near Tudela, and occupied a position in the centre, three days' march distant from Blake's; whilst 20,000 Arragonese under Palafox, yet lower down the river, closed the right. In second line, covering Madrid, but far too distant to support the advance, were other separated bodies of troops amounting to more than 30,000 men, denominated the armies of reserve and of Estremadura. The whole force of Catalonia, 18,000 or 20,000 men, was occupied to blockade Figueras and Barcelona; and the Marquis de la Romana not having arrived, his army was left in the rear at St. Andero. Such were the dispositions made to oppose the first great effort of the gathering storm.

To aid and give consistency to these patriotic,

though ill-regulated exertions of the Spaniards, the British government, immediately on the liberation of Portugal, directed a force to assemble under the command of Lieutenant General Sir John Moore, at Valladolid, to be composed of 20,000 men from the army at Lisbon, and of 13,000 men from England, to be disembarked at Corunna, under Sir David Baird. The latter arrived in Spain in the middle of October; but the force at Lisbon was not prepared to move till the end of the same month. The infantry marched on Salamanca, by the direct route through Portugal; but from an erroneous belief, that those roads were not practicable for artillery, that arm, with the cavalry and a guard of 3,000 infantry, were sent round by Badajos and the Escorial; an arrangement which added 150 miles to their march, and created a third division of force, considerably retarding the period when the army might take part in the impending struggle, which it was expected would be nearly balanced and obstinately contested.

The character of the war was as yet ill understood; the friends of the Spaniards overrating the importance of their military exertions, and the intruders in an equal degree undervaluing the national spirit which dictated them. France, previously to entering on the contest,

was rapidly attaining a military supremacy over the continent. The adjoining states had either been incorporated with her, or, under a nominal independence, served as her vassals. Those beyond the Rhine had been united into a confederation equally subservient to her rising greatness. The power of Prussia had been broken and enchained; that of Austria weakened, but not subdued; Russia was in strict friendship. Buonaparte, thus apparently all-powerful, despised what he considered a mere temporary commotion; but enraged at the loss and disgrace of his armies, and at the appearance of the English on the continent, he prepared to make a grand effort to re-instate Joseph. Having taken 80,000 troops of the confederation of the Rhine into his pay, called out a levy of 160,000 conscripts, and obtained, in a personal interview with the Emperor of Russia at Erfurt, the promise of strict neutrality in the event of the interference of Austria, he put columns in movement towards the Pyrenees from every quarter of his empire; and on the 30th October quitted Paris to place himself at their head, not doubting, by the destruction of the British, and by a most rapid termination of the war, to add to his personal fame, and retrieve the honour of his arms.

The campaign opened the moment the first

reinforcements entered Spain. The centre of Blake's army, which had advanced beyond Zornosa with the intention of penetrating to the rear of Vittoria, was briskly attacked on the 31st October, and after some resistance driven through Bilbao. The divisions on the flanks being too far distant to lend support, took no part in the combat, but separately retired. The French actively followed up their success, and in a succession of slight encounters at Guenas, Valmaseda, and Espinosa, rendered the *déroute* so complete, that on the 14th November, when the Marquis de la Romana traversed the district of Las Montanas to assume the command, he met with nothing but a confused, half-starved rabble, trusting to individual exertion for safety and support; and without even the semblance of a rear guard to check their pursuers. On reaching the almost inaccessible vallies near Renedo, where a supply of food could be obtained, the Marquis halted the fugitive mass for some days; and so far re-organized it, as to form a body of between 15 and 20,000 men, which he led in safety through the mountains of Asturias to the plentiful country round Leon,—deeming that an eligible situation to re-establish the discipline of the troops, and to cooperate with the British.

In these actions, the troops from the Baltic alone displayed firmness of conduct: injudiciously brought into action after the first discomfiture, at different periods and by single battalions, they bore the brunt of each affair, and a large proportion of those veterans were sacrificed. The new levies generally dispersed without waiting for the shock, and those who suffered bore a very small proportion to the number which escaped. The disorganization, however, was most complete; and without magazines, clothing, or money to refit the army, little could be hoped from its co-operation for many months. A single action at Tudela, on the 22d November, brought the armies of the right and centre into a similar or worse condition: being completely defeated, the fugitives of the former threw themselves into Zaragossa, there to prove, by one of the best defences on record, that want of discipline and experience, not want of courage, had led to their discomfiture; whilst those of the latter, less fortunate in a place of refuge, were driven into Valencia, far from the scene of action. The Catalans were in a moment dislodged from before Figueras, and the Estremaduran army, imprudently committed near Burgos, was annihilated without a struggle; nor did the strong pass of Somosierra afford a more happy field to the army of reserve—it was forced as

soon as attacked, and the defenders fled to the banks of the Tagus. At Talavera they rallied, and made an effort to return to the defence of the capital; but on their approach were a second time dispersed by a few cavalry. Shortly afterwards, to shift from themselves the odium of their little resistance and double flight, they accused their chief, St. Juan, of treason, sacrificed him without a trial, and suspended his body from a tree, in terrorem to other commanders.

Buonaparte lost not a moment to profit by the state of surprize and distrust into which this rapid succession of disasters had thrown the Spaniards: detaching Marshal Moncey to blockade Zaragossa, and leaving a corps under Marshal Soult on the borders of Leon, to observe the British, he rapidly advanced in person with 50,000 men, to complete his triumphs by the reduction of Madrid; and on the 2d of December his troops bivouacked within sight of its walls.

Fifteen days preceding this event, Sir John Moore arrived at Salamanca with the infantry from Portugal; where, from the division of his force before-mentioned, being placed as a centre between two extremities, neither of which he could approach without exposing the other, he remained, unwillingly, an inactive expectant of the course of events. On being made acquainted

with the result of the French movements, as the corps under Sir David Baird had not yet passed Astorga, he sent orders to that officer to retire on Corunna; and held his own infantry prepared to fall back on Lisbon, as soon as the junction of the cavalry and the artillery should be effected.

All attention was now fixed on Madrid as a last hope; and though the government had early retired from thence to Badajos, a long and determined resistance was expected, the extent of preparation for a defence by the populace being diligently proclaimed by the friends of the cause. These, in the language of enthusiasm, confidently predicted that the exertions of the citizens would even surpass those of the Arragonese; not sufficiently considering the different feeling which actuates an inhabitant of the chief town of a province and the inhabitant of the capital of an empire. The former, individually known, has personal importance to preserve, and local interests to cherish and maintain; whilst the latter, undistinguished in the multitude, considers himself merely a citizen of the state; and feels that neither his character nor his personal fame are more compromised by the conduct of the capital than those of all his fellow-subjects; besides, half the population of Madrid is composed of the wealthy and idle, and of those who are dependent on them, and such

are little able to stand fatigue, or tranquilly to face danger. These reflections seem, however, not to have escaped the government, as besides 6000 troops of the line, they introduced 10 or 15,000 peasants from the neighbouring villages; so that the embodied citizens formed little more than a moiety of the 50,000 armed men, whom they collected within the walls.

Buonaparte, instructed by experience, formed a right judgment of his opponents, and did not by a close investment force them to an obstinate resistance: on the contrary, leaving many of the communications with the country perfectly free, he collected the chief part of his force on the heights on one side of the city, where he erected formidable batteries, and from whence he carried on an attack against the Retiro, which partook too much of the scientific combination of regular warfare, for a populace successfully to oppose. The enceinte being little more than a mere garden wall was quickly breached, and the post being carried by storm, the defenders were put to the sword; after which the town became without any exterior defence on that side. Many of the peasants sought safety by an immediate return to their homes, and the most timid of the citizens, discouraged, and fearing a repetition of the dreadful second of May, opposed the

wishes of the more courageous to make a further resistance. Treachery was then every where suspected; frightful insubordination followed; and, to prevent a general massacre, a capitulation was concluded, which, on the 4th December, put the French into quiet possession of the capital.

General Morla, the late Governor of Cadiz, who had for some time previously presided over the military councils of Spain, negotiated the capitulation; and, as he subsequently preferred rank and safety under Joseph Buonaparte's government, to a fate similar to that of St. Juan and other unsuccessful commanders, which he had too much reason to dread from the violence of a disappointed, though not humiliated soldiery, a long course of active treachery has been laid to his charge. Unless, however, some strong proof of it can be adduced, his former conduct, and the little possibility of a protracted defence of the town after the first success of the enemy, ought to plead for his acquittal. His actions certainly fell far short of that unbending firmness the confidence reposed in him demanded, and his acceptance of service under the Usurper, admits of neither palliation nor excuse; and for such conduct the name of Morla, even without the addition of previous treason, must

go down to posterity as that of a base and unworthy Spaniard.

The loss of Madrid was too humiliating and disastrous intelligence to obtain credit amongst the Spaniards, and a most extraordinary deception relative to it spread all over the Peninsula.—The belief that the town continued to resist, after the fall of the Retiro was universal: from the members of the Junta to the peasant, every man repeated it,—so strong was this impression, that although a reinforcement of 35,000 troops was marching from France through Navarre, yet Sir John Moore, animated by the accounts of the enthusiasm said to be displayed, and anxious to second it, was induced to countermand the retreat of Sir D. Baird's force; and after the junction of his artillery and cavalry, was actually in movement on Valladolid, to threaten the communications of the French, as a diversion in favour of the heroic defenders of the capital: when, on the 14th December, an intercepted dispatch from the French headquarters, made known to him its surrender; the subsequent advance of a French corps to Talavera-de-la Reyna to threaten Lisbon; the belief of Buonaparte that the British were in full retreat, and an order given under that impression to Marshal Soult to advance from Saldanha

with 16,000 men, and drive the Spaniards into Galicia. By these dispositions the force under Soult being left without any immediate support there appeared a chance of annihilating it by a rapid and unexpected manœuvre. Sir John Moore, urged to attempt something by the clamours of the public, the remonstrances of the British envoy and the impatient spirit of his army, decided contrary to his own judgment, as recorded at the moment, to make the experiment. With that view he moved to his left, and formed a junction with Sir D. Baird, on the 21st December, at Toro, where he mustered 29,000 effective sabres or bayonets under his command. Having previously arranged with the Marquis de la Romana, to make a simultaneous movement on the enemy's right with 10,000 of the most efficient of the Spaniards, by crossing the Cea above Saldanha, Sir John on the 23d advanced with his whole force. Already had his cavalry come in contact with that of the French, and his main body was marching from Villada and Sahagun on Carrion, to the attack of the infantry, when undoubted information was received that Buonaparte had changed the whole arrangement of his force; that the corps from Talavera was in march on Salamanca; that 35,000 men, headed by himself, in person,

had moved on the 22d from the Escorial, on Benevente; and that Soult's corps, reinforced was directed to advance on Astorga through Leon; shewing a combined operation for surrounding the British, which it required the most judicious measures to counteract; and to retreat on Gallicia was instantly decided. With much good order and regularity the different divisions were passed over the Esla, and collected at Benevente on the 26th. After the halt of a day, the main body continued its retreat on Astorga; detaching a corps of 3000 men, without artillery, by the road of Orense. At the moment of evacuating Benevente, the cavalry under Lord Paget and General Stewart had a successful and brilliant rencounter with some squadrons of the Imperial Guard, which forded the Esla after the destruction of the bridge; and from the prisoners was ascertained, that the head-quarters of the corps from the Escorial had been fixed the preceding evening at a village only sixteen miles distant. The danger of being overpowered was consequently imminent, and, to prevent it, the most rapid marches became necessary to reach Villa-franca, fifty miles distant; where the road enters a stupendous defile, and winding through it for many miles, renders a superiority of cavalry unavailing to

an enemy, and places in comparative security the flanks of a retiring army.

These marches were performed in the most inclement weather, with such constancy and celerity, that abandoning the sick, and destroying a quantity of stores and ammunition, the rear of the army, on the 3d January, entered the defile without any loss inflicted by the sword. The close approach of several strong divisions of cavalry which the same day came up with the reserve at Cacabelos, and skirmished with it to the entrance of the defile, gave full proof that however great the exertions which had been required of the soldiers, they were not more than just sufficient to ensure their safety.

It was found, even at this early period of the retreat, that rapidity of movement and the want of regular supplies had shaken the discipline of the troops: stragglers had become numerous, and disgraceful scenes of drunkenness and plunder were exhibited at Villafranca; the town being literally sacked in the search after food. These excesses, however, might readily have been restrained, if a previous arrangement for the supply had been made; as the army yet preserved a considerable degree of discipline, and was under full controul: but when within the defiles, traversing mountains

covered with snow, nearly inaccessible from their natural steepness, and affording the most favourable points for checking the pursuit, the troops found their marches rather accelerated than slackened, they lost all spirit. Urged to the utmost of their strength, without any regular supply of food, plunder became general. The little thus obtained proving unequal to their wants, their indignation broke out into ill-usage of the inhabitants; who, alarmed for their personal safety, and totally unable to meet the demands of successive applicants, barricaded their doors, and fled to the mountains. Then, to obtain shelter, violence was of necessity permitted, and all subordination vanished. Frightful disorder followed, and spread with such rapidity as to threaten the speedy dissolution of the army. The reserve which closed the rear, the movements of which the General in Chief constantly directed in person, formed the most collected body, and accomplished the fifty-six miles between Villa-franca and Lugo, where it arrived on the evening of the 5th, in forty-eight hours. To make this exertion, a quantity of treasure, and many valuable stores which could not advance at the same rate, were abandoned; but even with these sacrifices, it was found impracticable to

retire beyond Lugo without some repose: a general halt was therefore made on the 6th, and, as an endeavour to restore some kind of organization to the army, the troops were put in position in front of the town, to offer battle to their pursuers. Never did any measure produce a more instantaneous change in the appearance and behaviour of men,—all became animated, all became regular; and the army, posted with skill and judgment with its right resting on the Minho, presented such a formidable aspect to the enemy that they hesitated to commence the attack.

Buonaparte was no longer following with an overwhelming force. On arriving at Astorga, finding that the British had escaped from his pursuit, he countermarched with half his army; Marshal Ney being left with 18,000 men, to keep Leon in subjection, the task of following the retiring force was confided to Marshal Soult, with 23,000 men only. That general, after a slight skirmish, in which the native valour of the British soldiery shone forth with its accustomed brightness, did not venture to harass them by any further movement. The two armies remained tranquil in their respective positions till the evening of the 8th; when, as a longer halt could lead to no good results, Sir John Moore having decided to quit Galicia,

the army was withdrawn to embark at Corunna. There were yet forty-five miles to march to that place, and it was notified in orders that "the soldiers must make an exertion to accomplish them; the rear-guard cannot stop, and those who fall behind must take their fate." A scene of misery and distress followed, too painful to detail. The troops, already jaded, many of them bare-foot, and half-famished, had to perform this long march over roads knee-deep in mud, and in face of torrents of rain driven by an impetuous wind. The columns put in retreat with much order, quickly began to lengthen, and before half the distance was accomplished, became a string of men, extending along leagues of road. The bridges could not be destroyed for want of implements, and no partial checks for a moment impeded the enemy's passage of the rivers: the pursuit was as uninterrupted as the retreat; during which, only one short halt in the rain gave an opportunity for stragglers to come up, and all who did not then join were passed by the rear-guard. At Betanzos, where, from the physical impossibility of urging farther forward any number of men in a body, the march came to a termination, so little like the organization of an army could be discerned, that to judge

from appearances, its destruction had been accomplished. Ultimately, however, that proved by no means the case, for the French, deceived by fires left for that purpose, did not commence the pursuit from Lugo till ten hours after the army drew off, and could not come up with the rear in sufficient force to secure the numbers abandoned to them. Hundreds found opportunity to creep to the villages on either side of the road, from whence, by the friendly aid of the inhabitants, they were conveyed in safety to Ferrol, or Portugal; and when most pressed, the stragglers, conscious of their strength, and become desperate, formed themselves into bodies, and checked their pursuers. Near the conclusion of the pursuit the French cavalry, from the difficulty of procuring subsistence, being unable to follow with the same constancy with which the British retired, made long halts to refresh, which enabled other considerable numbers who had been left to their fate to regain their divisions; and on organizing the army after its arrival at Corunna on the 11th, it was found to muster nearly 15,000 combatants. The light division detached by Orense reached Vigo without loss, not having been followed by the enemy; the total number of men, therefore, who sunk under the fatigue of the retreat did not exceed 6 or 7000. The

cavalry however were completely dismounted, nearly 5,000 horses of different descriptions having been destroyed: the stores and equipments of all kinds were lost, and to recompose the army and fit it for further hostilities, it became necessary that it should return to England.

Corunna, from its situation on the narrow neck of a promontory which widely extends into the ocean, and is defended by a strong citadel, presented a secure and favourable point for embarkation; and that operation would have been effected without any further molestation from the enemy, had transports been in readiness to receive the troops. Unluckily at the commencement of the retreat, when uncertain to what point it would ultimately be directed, they had been sent to Vigo; and as their return might by adverse winds be long delayed, orders were given to prepare against a siege, and working parties were employed to strengthen the defences of the short front by which alone the town can be approached. The inhabitants, men, women, and children, cheerfully aided in the task; nor did the precautionary measure of spiking all their cannon towards the sea, which must have convinced them of the intention to abandon the place on the arrival of the ships,

at all lessen their zeal or their fidelity: they continued their labours unabated, and the town was quickly in a state to defy, for any period, a force unprovided with heavy artillery.

The French were long in coming up, to which the passage of the river Burgo materially contributed; as the engineers, from its immediate vicinity to Corunna, had been able to obtain the necessary implements to accomplish the destruction of the bridge. It was the 14th before they were able to repair it, and pass over their artillery; which gave time to the British Commander to re-organize the army, and to place it in position on a range of heights covering the great road, about a mile and a half in advance of the town. The left was well appoyed on the high banks of the river Burgo, but the right had no natural advantages; it rested on the little village of Elvina, situated low down at the extremity of the range of hills on which the front of the army was formed. To counterbalance this defect of the right of the ground, the division of General Frazer was placed in echellon, on a favourable point about half a mile in rear of the right; and the reserve under Major-General Paget was formed immediately in rear of the centre of the line.

The transports having at length arrived, the greater part of the artillery and the cavalry

were sent on board, and it was arranged for the army to withdraw and embark on the evening of the 16th ; but on the morning of that day reinforcements to the enemy joined, which augmented their numbers to 20,000, and about two p. m. their whole line suddenly appeared under arms, and a strong column immediately attacked the village on the right. The contest was obstinate : Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird, who commanded the division, lost an arm ; shortly afterwards the General in Chief, Sir John Moore, fell mortally wounded, and the command devolved on Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope. These losses did not dispirit the troops : the resistance continued unabated, when a judicious movement of the reserve, under General Paget, not only repulsed the assailants, but drove them far back. The enemy then directed their efforts against the centre, and left, successively ; but being repulsed in each attack, and even driven beyond their original position, they desisted, and before dark all movements had ceased. The result of the day proved to the enemy and to the world, (at the small price of 800 in killed and wounded,) that in advance or in retreat, the firmness of British infantry remains equally unshaken : for in this action, fought at the conclusion of a retreat of unprecedented hardships, under every

disadvantage of position, nearly unsupported by artillery, and without cavalry, they easily repulsed superior numbers of an elated enemy well supported with both. After dark, the army was withdrawn with the utmost regularity, and embarked as had been arranged before the combat: the good faith of the Spaniards enabling the rear-guard to continue the defence of the town, even the sick and wounded were brought off the following day without molestation; and on the evening of the 17th the whole had bid adieu to the shores of Spain, and were steering for England with a favourable gale. Two days afterwards, when far distant, and the guns of the place could no longer be turned against their departing allies, the inhabitants of Corunna, left without means of resistance, made the best terms they could for themselves. The authorities of Ferrol, nearly similarly situated, shortly afterwards followed their example, in despite of the more patriotic feelings of the populace, who could with difficulty be brought to submit. In these places the French obtained an immense supply of artillery, ammunition, and stores of every description, and their dominion over Galicia seemed completely established.

In the South, the torrent of disaster ran equally unchecked by the efforts opposed to it, and only ceased to overwhelm, from having too

widely spread. The fugitives from most of the Spanish armies, dispersed at the opening of the campaign, after traversing four hundred miles of country, individually, or in small bodies, exposed to the most trying hardships, united behind the Tagus. There, they were formed into an army by General Galluzo, who made dispositions to dispute the passage of the river by posting corps to defend the different communications; but having failed in his endeavours to destroy the bridges, Sebastiani, with 10,000 or 12,000 French troops, under a demonstration of passing at Arzobispo, crossed over his main body at Almaraz on the 24th December, and attacked the Spanish divisions in detail. They were readily dispersed, and were pursued through Truxillo to Merida; and the whole of the south of Spain, to the very gates of Cadiz, would have been overrun by the French, had not the supporting columns been halted in their march, and turned to the north in pursuit of the British.

In Catalonia, the French force, at the commencement of the autumnal campaign, was increased to 30,000 men, under the command of General St. Cyr; who, as a first operation, invested Rosas early in November; but, from the obstinate resistance of the garrison, (to which a party of British seamen under Lord Cochrane materially contributed,) did not

obtain possession of it till the 6th December, when the defenders were driven behind their last intrenchment. General St. Cyr then raised the blockade of Barcelona ; and closed the year by defeating, on the Llobregat, the regular army of the province under General Reding.

If, at any period of the war, the affairs of the Peninsula might be considered to have been desperate, it was at the conclusion of this first campaign; the French having not only triumphed over all the armies brought against them, but having also created an impression amongst their opponents of being too powerful to be resisted. Nothing can more strongly mark the baneful effects of such feelings than the events in Galicia : Corunna and Ferrol, the only two fortresses which, during the whole war, surrendered without a regular attack, being those best covered by armies in the field, and best situated for being amply provided and garrisoned. They were moreover those which England had it most in her power to succour, and one of them contained objects of peculiar British interest,—a naval arsenal and a powerful squadron; yet those places fell to an army of 20,000 men, which could not command a battering gun or siege store within 400 miles, without an effort being made to preserve them.

Luckily, neither the British nor Spanish governments participated in these feelings of despondency. On the 14th January, at the very moment when all hope of success seemed to have vanished, the former, in a solemn treaty, pledged itself never to acknowledge any other king of Spain than Ferdinand, his heirs, or lawful successors; and the latter in return bound itself by the same act, never to cede to France any portion of the territories or possessions of Spain. In these generous and noble resolutions each party was supported by nearly the total of the two nations. In England, a feeling of honour, of sympathy, and of admiration, superseded all considerations of prudence; whilst with the Spaniards, their peculiar qualities came to their aid. Neither their constancy nor their confidence was shaken by their reverses; though nearly all their chiefs had proved themselves incapable; and though no one event to inspire hope had glimmered through a long train of disasters, their pride and their presumption remained unabated.

The Marquis de la Romana displayed the most ability. Succeeding to the command in the north, at the moment of the greatest disaster, he contrived to unite and preserve the wreck of different armies. Subsequently, on the advance

of the French to Gallicia, finding himself with a most unmanageable force in the fore-ground at Leon, with the mountains of Asturias in his rear, the passages over which were nearly if not entirely blocked up with snow, he extricated himself with address. Generously resigning the safe road of Corunna to the British, the Marquis ventured upon the bold measure of a lateral movement to Orense; succeeding in which, he preserved one army in the field. That, a half-starved disorganised band, with some fugitive corps in La Mancha and Estremadura, now formed the only remaining military force of Spain; whilst the number of the enemy spread over the country fell little short of 200,000 men.

CHAPTER II.

Affairs of Portugal—Oporto reduced by Marshal Soult—Spaniards defeated at Medellin and at Ciudad Real—the French expelled from Portugal by Sir Arthur Wellesley—exertions of the Spaniards—defence of Saragossa—recovery of Galicia—Guerrillas—the British advance into Spain—the French armies of the South concentrate to drive them back—are defeated in the attempt at Talavera—bring up the armies of the North to their assistance—the British retire unmolested to Badajos—the Spaniards defeated at Almonacid and Ocana—French cross the Sierra Morena—spread over Andalusia—fall of Gerona, Hostalrich, and Astorga.—Being the period from February, 1809, to May, 1810.

A FULL account of the disasters in the north of Spain did not reach Lisbon till the succeeding month; when it was coupled with the alarming intelligence that three French armies were assembling for the subjugation of Portugal. One under Marshal Soult in Galicia, a second under General Lapisse at Salamanca, and the third on the banks of the Tagus under Marshal Victor; in which near and vulnerable quarter the only force in the field was an assem-

blage of the fugitives of Galluzo's army, which General Cuesta was attempting to reorganize. Consternation and dismay followed: the garrison and stores were withdrawn from Almeida; the forts and batteries on the Tagus were dismantled, and the British troops concentrated for instant embarkation. Happily however for Portugal, the return of Buonaparte to France to prepare for a war in Germany, taking with him 15,000 of his best troops, checked the impetus given to the French arms, and allowed an interval for preparation, which was duly improved.

The Portugueze are a people peculiarly adapted for military exertion, the lower classes being universally hardy, patient, and docile; whilst those of education, holding in remembrance the heroic deeds of their ancestors, cherish strong feelings of military pride. These qualities, however, have not of late years been fully displayed; as the government, conscious of its own limited resources, and having a firm reliance on the friendship and power of England, has always in the hour of danger trusted to her for support: at this crisis, actuated by such feeling, it submitted entirely to her guidance. General Beresford, selected by the British ministry, was in February appointed Marshal, and Commander in Chief

of the Portugueze army: at the same time, British officers were nominated to the superior commissions of each battalion, by which measures a general system of discipline and subordination was quickly established, being the amendment most required to render the army formidable; a native Legion, previously organized by Sir Robert Wilson, having proved the natural good courage of the men, and their capability to oppose the French, when ably commanded. That officer, at a moment of the greatest panic, with a corps of only 2,500 natives, and a body of stragglers separated from Sir John Moore's army on its retreat, by a judicious and spirited conduct, in conjunction with the Spaniards, preserved Rodrigo and Almeida, and checked the enemy's force on that frontier. At the same time the Spaniards, by an unlooked for effort, obliged the French to recross the Tagus, when they destroyed the bridge at Almaraz, which materially added to the security of the south; as the roads leading from the other passages over the river are not considered practicable for artillery in winter. The Junta, from the seat of government at Seville, issued the most manly and encouraging proclamations, which drew forth the most liberal donations, and the most spirited exertions from

the southern provinces; and soon again a respectable army appeared in the field, under General Cuesta; a division of which, commanded by the Duke of Albuquerque, gained, in the middle of February, considerable advantages over Victor's force at Consuegra and Mora, on the borders of La Mancha, and for the moment checked its career. These exertions of the natives gave great animation to all; 20,000 of the Portugueze were taken into the pay of England, and the British force at Lisbon being augmented to 17,000 men, before a blow was struck, confidence had gradually returned.

The storm first approached from the north. As soon as the entire conquest of Gallicia was effected, and posts were established to keep the inhabitants in subjection, the command of the province was delegated to Marshal Ney with 17,000 men; and Soult, with 24,000, marched on Oporto, by Vigo and Tuy; in which latter places he left garrisons. Being repulsed in an attempt to cross the Minho near its mouth, he ascended the river to Orense, which unlooked-for movement had nearly been fatal to the Marquis de la Romana; who, driven by the extreme superiority of the enemy to the confines of the kingdom, and amongst a people with whom he had established little commu-

nication, was surprized near Monterey, and pursued with loss to Sanabria.

Soult entered Portugal by the road of Chaves, meeting with little opposition, as General Friere, to whom the defence of the country was confided, had arranged to retire with his inferior and ill-disciplined force to the mountains near Oporto; from whence he might effectually harass the enemy during the attack of the city: or should they fail of success, would probably annihilate them in their retreat. These prudent measures were first interrupted by a mutiny of the division under General Silveira, some battalions of which insisted on defending Chaves; and remaining in the town, were shut up, and obliged to surrender at discretion on the third day. Soult left a garrison in the place to maintain his communication with Galicia, and proceeded onward. The young troops under General Friere, even after so recent an example of the ill consequences of disobedience, impatiently demanded to give battle; which with difficulty he opposed, and led them to Braga: there, thousands of armed peasants flocked to his standard, and added to the clamour for immediate combat. Friere had still the firmness to resist, and was in the act of representing to some of the most enlightened the

advantages of protracting the contest, when the senseless multitude, unable to distinguish between prudence and treachery, suspected the latter in this advice, and rushing into the apartment, murdered him and the officers of his staff. They soon, however, paid dearly for their injustice and barbarity: continuing their insubordination and presumption, they insisted on a British officer, Baron Eben, assuming the command, and leading them against the enemy. Their new commander gratified their wishes, and committed them in battle at Carvalho da Este, where, after some creditable efforts of individual bravery, they were defeated, and the sabres of the enemy's cavalry took ample vengeance on them for the murder of their late chief. Soult then invested Oporto, which had been fortified with much labour; 200 pieces of artillery had been mounted on extensive detached works, and a garrison of 20,000 men was collected for their defence, and might have held them for some weeks, but the same insubordination and want of confidence existing in the city, which had ruined their army in the field, they were carried by assault on the 29th of March, after an ill-regulated defence of three days. The French soldiers on entering the town made an indiscriminate slaughter of the inha-

bitants, and delivered themselves up to every species of plunder and licentiousness ; but it is pleasing to add, that Marshal Soult, either from a wish to conciliate the inhabitants and preserve the resources of the city, or from right feeling, strenuously exerted himself, after twenty-four hours, to restore order, and saved much that would otherwise have been destroyed.

The day previous to the fall of Oporto, which laid open the northern provinces, the Spanish army under Cuesta was completely defeated near Medellin, by Marshal Victor, and driven to Almandralejo ; which left the southern frontier without protection. Having thrown a bridge over the Tagus at Almaraz, Victor crossed on the 19th March with 10,000 men, traversed the Guadiana at Merida, and attacked the Spaniards posted at Dom Benito and Mingabril on the 28th. The day was at first well contested : the French cavalry commenced the attack by boldly charging the Spanish line, which stood firm, and by a heavy fire forced the assailants back with great loss ; then immediately following up its success, by a vigorous and concentrated attack on the enemy's left wing, the French gave way, and were successfully pursued for two hours. The Spanish cavalry particularly distinguished itself by boldness in the pursuit ; but

when the French, having arrived at a favourable point, faced about, it shamefully turned, and flying past the infantry, infected them with a similar panic; and in a moment the whole army dispersed, throwing away their arms, and seeking safety in a disorderly flight. The French, enraged at the loss of 4,000 of their own number, and mortified at having been triumphed over by men chiefly out of uniform, at first shewed little mercy to the fugitives, 9,000 of whom were sabred or bayoneted before they relaxed in their vengeance; and then the submission of some thousand others was received. The preceding evening closed upon an equally tragic scene at Ciudad-Real, a few leagues distant, at the dispersion and slaughter of the army of La Mancha: Sebastiani attacked it on the 27th March, and though he states that it fled on the first charge without resistance, he boasts to have sabred 3,000 of the fugitives. These events spread terror to the very gates of Seville, and opened an easy road to Lisbon. Sir John Craddock, commanding in Portugal, immediately, as a precautionary measure, posted a corps of 7,000 men at Abrantes, and assembled the main body of the British at Leyria, and the Portugueze army at Thomar.

Thus situated were the affairs of Portugal,

when Sir Arthur Wellesley landed at Lisbon on the 22d of April, to assume the supreme command; an appointment which opened a new æra in the war, as it gave unity to the action of the forces of the two nations, at the very time the French were acting on an opposite system. Already were the ill-consequences of independent commanders visible in their movements; the three armies of Soult, Victor, and Lapisse, which, if directed by one supreme chief, would long ere this have triumphantly entered Lisbon; disunited, and fearing to be separately committed, were losing the precious moments for action in suspense or petty movements. Marshal Soult remained nearly a month at Oporto inactive, in the daily expectation of intelligence from his co-adjutors, without which he did not think it prudent to move forward; at length, impatient at the delay, he detached 6,000 men under General Loison to drive the Portugueze from behind the Tamega, where Silviera, after having recaptured Chaves and blocked up his rear, had taken post, to cut off his only remaining communication with Spain. After an obstinate resistance of some days, Loison succeeded in his object on the 29th of April, and established himself at Amarante. Equally hesitating were the movements of La-

pisse and Victor: whereas Sir Arthur, unfettered in his views, acted with decision; and on the tenth day after his landing, the British from Leyria, 16,000 in number, were in movement for the recovery of Oporto, by Coimbra and Aveiro; whilst 6,000 Portugueze, under Marshal Beresford, marched by Vizeu to cross the Douro at Lamego, and cut off the enemy's best line of retreat by Amarante; the corps at Abrantes remaining to hold Victor's force in check. On the 10th of May, the French advanced posts were met with on the Vouga, and on the following day 4,000 infantry and some cavalry were dislodged from the strong ground above Grijon, and pursued with success. The same evening all the enemy's force withdrew from the left of the Douro; the floating bridge was destroyed, and all the boats near Oporto were firmly secured on the right bank: so that on the 12th, Sir Arthur found himself separated from his antagonist by a rapid and broad river, having no means, with his army, to effect the passage. Without an immediate decision, Soult might either retire unmolested on Galicia, or attack Marshal Beresford with his whole force, and cross into Beira. To prevent this, Sir Arthur planned, and successfully executed, the boldest passage of a river on record. He

detached a body of troops under General Murray to Avintas, five miles up the river, where, if boats should not be found, a ford would admit of the troops crossing; and General Sherbrook, with the Guards, to the ordinary ferry at Villa-nova, below the city; whilst from the Serra convent, nearly opposite the town, he directed the passage in person. The river was at this spot nearly three hundred yards broad, and extremely rapid, with considerable heights on the right bank. By the aid of the inhabitants, two boats were brought over from the enemy's side, and in these, protected by the fire of a brigade of light guns, three companies of the Buffs were ferried across. Soult, either despising the effort, or believing it only a feint to draw his attention from the main object, did not oppose the landing, but gave time to Major-General Paget to ascend the bank, and place the troops in a formidable attitude in a ruined building, before he attacked them. He then brought up a considerable force, which was firmly resisted, and gained time for passing over several other battalions. General Paget was early wounded, and the command devolved on General Hill, who was warmly engaged contesting the post, when the troops under General Murray appeared in sight, marching on the

enemy's left flank. The Guards were then pushed across, and the French precipitately retired into the city. Soult now discovered that he had been out-manœuvred, and ordered the immediate retreat of his army; but the British were already in the town, and charging up the streets: the confusion and precipitancy with which the French fled were far greater than can be readily imagined, and their panic seemed to increase as they gained the open country. A single squadron of the 14th dragoons, under Major Hervey, charged and cut their passage through three battalions of infantry marching in a hollow road, and returned triumphantly by a similar boldness, bringing back many prisoners. Never was the deroute of an army more complete, when night put an end to the pursuit, and gave the enemy a few hours' respite. Soult, after marching some miles towards Amarante, having effected his junction with Loison, and learning from him the destruction of the bridge at that place by Marshal Beresford, quitted the high road for the mountain-track by Guimaraens, where he made the sacrifice of all his artillery and carriages of every description. Thus freed from incumbrances, the extreme difficulty and badness of the roads over which he marched favoured his flight, and

he gained the pass of Ruivaes, near Salamonde, before the troops detached by Marshal Beresford arrived to occupy it; or, from the nature of the pass, (a very narrow bridge without a parapet wall on either side, over a deep precipice,) he would have been obliged to surrender at discretion. Thus, by force of marching, the main body of the fugitives, in a most deplorable state, succeeded in repassing the frontier on the 18th May at Montalegre, where the pursuit closed; as a more important object in the South demanded the return of the army. Marshal Victor, having been joined by Lapisse's division from Salamanca, had forced the passage of the Tagus at Alcantara, after a resistance highly creditable to the Portugueze under Colonel Mayne; and now seriously threatened Lisbon. The British force reached the banks of the Tagus early in June, when Victor retired; and Sir Arthur, having thus a second time freed Portugal, turned his attention to aid the cause of Spain.

Before the further actions of the British are narrated, a few pages will be well bestowed to recount the heroic, but unconnected efforts of resistance made by the Spaniards themselves, of which the siege of Zaragossa stands foremost. Immediately after the repulse of the French in the preceding summer, Palafox directed the

execution of various defensive works ; which, thrown up in haste, and executed with greater zeal than judgment, gave more the appearance than the reality of additional strength to the place : yet in the defence of them, Palafox added much to his previously high fame,—this second defence being far more arduous than the former, as 36,000 men were employed in the attack, and such a provision of artillery and stores brought against the town, as rendered success certain. From the day succeeding the unfortunate action at Tudela, constant skirmishing and small affairs of posts took place, whilst the French were bringing up the supplies for the attack ; which having accomplished, the siege commenced on the 20th December, by the assault and capture of the outposts of the Torrero and Casa-blanca ; and by an attempt to lodge in the suburbs on the left of the Ebro, from which, after several hours' fighting, and a dreadful slaughter of the Spaniards, the French were ultimately repulsed. On the 10th January a violent bombardment began, and frequently three thousand shells were thrown into the devoted town in twenty-four hours. On the 26th, fifty-five pieces of heavy ordnance battered the newly-raised works of the enceinte, and quickly formed a practicable breach : the

French vigorously assaulted it the following morning, and after a desperate resistance gained the summit; where, however, they could not maintain themselves, as the citizens, from behind an interior retrenchment, kept up an incessant fire, and every moment sallied forth and fought hand to hand with the troops and workmen, endeavouring to form the lodgment. In these fierce encounters, women and priests were observed amongst the foremost and most courageous; and openly to contend with such enthusiasm was hopeless. The besiegers therefore confined themselves to the slow, but certain operation of the sap, and by its insidious advances, on the 6th penetrated into the principal street named the Corso, where the buildings are of great solidity: then the conflict assumed the greatest degree of obstinacy—each house became a citadel, and required to be separately attacked; mining was the art employed, and the courage of the unpractised Arragonese failed before the skill of their more experienced antagonists. They nevertheless made the most surprizing efforts; when forced from one room they renewed the combat in the next; and frequently, when driven inch by inch out of a building, Palafox, by a desperate and bold offensive movement, recovered it, and the enemy had the

same resistance a second time to overcome. But courage alone is of little avail against courage and science united: daily and hourly the French made some advance; and when exertion was most required, a pestilential disorder, arising from the number of the unburied slain, broke out amongst the defenders, causing far more havoc than the sword. At last the heroic Palafox himself sickened, and affairs became desperate. Still the constancy of these dauntless Spaniards remained unshaken; and a priest of the name of Ric, by his personal example and the enthusiasm he inspired, directed the defence of the few remaining streets with undiminished bravery; and at last on the 20th February, after 30,000 citizens had buried themselves under the ruins of their houses, he, by firmness of conduct, forced Marshal Lannes to promise good treatment to the survivors.

“The garrison, 15,000 in number, marched out, and laid down their arms, after a resistance of fifty-two days open trenches, twenty-three of which were a war of houses. The town, on entering it, presented a dreadful and melancholy spectacle: entire districts of it were demolished by repeated explosions, and presented merely a mass of ruins thickly spread over with mutilated limbs and carcasses; the few houses which fire

and the mine had spared, were riddled by shot and shells; their interiors were cut through with communications, the walls loop-holed, the doors and windows barricadoed, and the streets blocked up with numberless traverses. The dirt, corruption, and misery, attending the crowding together of more than 100,000 souls into a city calculated for only 40,000, with all the hardships attendant on a long siege, had generated a frightful epidemic, more relentless than the sword. In the midst of the ruins and bodies with which the streets were filled, were observed here and there crawling along, a few inhabitants, pale, emaciated, and cast down, who seemed on the point of following their dead comrades whom they had been unable to remove. From an enumeration made at the commencement, and at the termination of this extraordinary and terrible siege, it has been ascertained that in fifty-two days, fifty-four thousand individuals perished; being two-thirds of the military, and the half of the inhabitants or refugees. The loss of the besiegers did not exceed 3,000.”*

During the siege, the efforts of the Arragonese to interrupt it had been unceasing, and

* Relation du Siège de Sarragosse, par Monsieur Le Baron de Rogniat, Lieutenant-Général.

they broke their strength and exhausted their resources in repeated attempts to penetrate through the quarters of the formidable army which invested the place; being generally, in the operation, outmanœuvred by detachments on their flanks, which frequently surrounded them; and as, on such occasions, little mercy was shewn, their loss was excessive, and on the fall of the place they were so discouraged that Arragon had all the appearance of being perfectly tranquil. Fourteen thousand men only were left in the province under General Suchet; and the remainder of the besieging army, under Mortier, moved into Castille to support the operations against Portugal.

Joseph Buonaparte returned to Madrid at the end of January, in consequence of the success of the French armies; and under protection of their bayonets was immediately afterwards inaugurated as King of Spain. A few unworthy Spaniards of rank, principally relations or connections of the late minister, Godoy, lent his usurpation the sanction of their names, and were nominated to the chief offices of the state. But the determination of every other individual throughout the country, to resist the establishment of the new dynasty, was, if possible, more

firmly rooted than even previously to their misfortunes.

England continued with unbounded munificence to supply their wants, and was probably of far more value to Spain than she would have been, if forming a portion of her integral territory. Within twelve months from the commencement of the war, she sent over to the Spanish armies (besides £2,000,000 sterling) 150 pieces of field-artillery with 42,000 rounds of ammunition, 200,000 muskets, 61,000 swords, 79,000 pikes, $23\frac{1}{2}$ millions of ball-cartridges, 6,000,000 leaden balls, 15,000 barrels of gunpowder, 92,000 suits of clothing, 356,000 sets of accoutrements and pouches, 310,000 pairs of shoes, 37,000 pairs of boots, 40,000 tents, 250,000 yards of cloth, 10,000 sets of camp equipage, 118,000 yards of linen, 50,000 great coats, 50,000 canteens, 54,000 havresacks, with a variety of other stores, far too numerous to be recapitulated.

The Spanish government also acted most nobly, and displayed the utmost wisdom and firmness in the midst of the national misfortunes. Far from despairing of their country from the loss of the battle of Medellin, they emulated the conduct of the Roman Senate, when similarly circumstanced by the victories

of Hannibal, and noticing only the good conduct of the troops in the early part of the day, decreed the thanks of the nation to the brave army of Estremadura, and pointed it out to the other corps as an example worthy of imitation. Cuesta was raised by the decree to the rank of Captain-General: promotion was granted to all the officers whose conduct had merited his approbation, and a badge of distinction, with a gratuity of one month's pay, was accorded to each of the battalions engaged, and a pension was assigned to the widows and orphans of all who had fallen. This wise measure was attended with the best effects, and from the wreck of the defeated armies, 45,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry quickly re-assembled in Estremadura. The command of this force was entrusted to General Cuesta, who, with a just and necessary severity, punished with death many of the runaways at Medellin, and produced a degree of discipline and subordination, which promised to render the Spaniards formidable in the field.

In aid of so desirable a change, a numerous and most valuable auxiliary force had spontaneously arisen throughout the Peninsula.—When the French after their first successes were obliged to separate and spread over the country

in small bodies to subsist, and keep the inhabitants in subjection, various acts of oppression and injustice were the consequences; these were individually and partially resisted, and deadly strife followed on both sides. Such of the Spaniards as most distinguished themselves in this opposition, or who killed any of the intruders, were obliged to flee to the mountains to escape chastisement from the French dragoons, which were immediately detached from the nearest station for that purpose. Many of these fugitives were proscribed, but being often compelled by hunger or necessity to descend to their homes, or to the habitations of their friends, they frequently encountered parties of the French, which, if weaker than themselves, were always sacrificed to their just vengeance; but if stronger, the Spaniards fled, and such as were overtaken were invariably put to death. Thus by degrees bands of desperate men collected, and set an example of resistance, which, when by long continuance the exactions and oppressions of the intruders became intolerable, led to the formation of a general and extended system of the same nature of opposition. Hundreds of the most spirited of the young men in each district united themselves into bands, serving without pay, under leaders selected from

amongst themselves: these having a perfect knowledge of the country, and being undistinguished by an uniform, assembled or dispersed at pleasure; every where opposing small bodies of the French, cutting off their convoys, and interrupting their communications: but intangible to any superior force sent out to annihilate them. From engaging in this petty warfare only, they obtained the appellation of guerrillas, little war-makers or warriors; being the diminutive of guerra, war.

Gallicia, however, was the theatre on which the wonderful perseverance and constancy of the Spanish character most fully displayed itself. The half-naked, disorganized band, preserved by the Marquis de la Romana at the period of the retreat of the British, waiting the favourable moment, not only inflicted a severe vengeance on the intruders; but ultimately, being well seconded by the courage and zeal of the inhabitants, drove them with disgrace out of the province. As soon as Soult's corps entered Portugal, and Ney's alone remained, the Spaniards began to act. A force under Murillo, joined by a body of Portugueze, which crossed the Minho, invested Vigo, at the end of March, and, aided by a British frigate, quickly forced the garrison of 1300 men to surrender; and the

next day nearly annihilated under the walls a French battalion, which approached unconscious of its fall. Romana himself quitted Senabria the moment Soult was too far advanced into Portugal to return; and with the aid of a single field-piece obliged two battalions to surrender prisoners on the 17th April, who attempted to resist in the palace of the Duke of Alva at Villa Franca. He then crossed over to the Asturias, which province, from the imbecility of the local Junta, remained in a state of inaction, and on the 22d April, by virtue of his military authority, dissolved the government as unworthy to rule, and appointed another, composed of more active members.

Marshal Ney and the French commanders in Leon, on ascertaining this movement of Romana's, deemed the opportunity favourable to surround him, and crush his army in toto: with that hope they made a simultaneous and concerted advance on every point of the principality; and on the same day, the 18th May, three detachments entered Oviedo by different roads. The Marquis, on their approach, withdrew to Gijon, and embarked; and the French had the mortification to learn that he had also saved his troops from their pursuit. Feeling that in the Asturias, bounded on all sides by the sea,

or by the enemy's corps, his army would be useless to the general cause, and in the event of being attacked by superior numbers, would be without a retreat, he had, on intelligence of Ney's movements, countermarched it, by a mountainous track, into Gallicia, with orders to blockade Lugo. This measure was so unlooked for by the French, and the place was so ill-provided, that it was on the point of capitulating for want of provisions, when, on the 22d of May, the troops under Marshal Soult most unexpectedly made their appearance, and obliged the Spaniards to raise the blockade.

That army, on commencing its retreat out of Portugal, gave loose to a diabolical spirit of revenge, burning the villages, and hanging many of the peasantry; the knowledge of which, outstripping their march, caused all the inhabitants to fly on their approach. This general desertion considerably augmented the difficulties and privations they had to encounter, and on their arrival before Lugo they were so disorganized, so ill-clothed, without shoes, badly armed, and reduced to such general distress, that the French garrison would not, till some of the officers made themselves individually known, believe them to be other than a collection of Spaniards. Soult put his troops into the town to refresh,

and on the return of Ney from the Asturias, the two Marshals concerted a general movement of their armies, to sweep through the whole of Galicia, and put down all opposition in the province.

On the 2d June, Soult commenced the pursuit of Romana's force by Monforte, Ponteferrada and Viana, constantly seeing his rear guard depart as he entered each place, and constantly expecting to out-march him on the next day: but he was ever baffled by the superior activity of his opponent, and his more accurate knowledge of the country. The inhabitants materially contributed to Romana's evasion, acting in the most hostile manner towards the French, and rendering every assistance to the fugitives: at length Soult, after having been for three weeks baffled in all his attempts, relinquished the enterprize, and returned on the 24th June to Senabria; from whence he proceeded to Zamora, to refresh his troops, and be in a situation to co-operate with the other armies. Marshal Ney was even more unsuccessful than Soult: he marched with the principal part of his forces in the opposite direction on Vigo; but in attempting the passage of the Soto-mayor, at the bridge of Payo, he was repulsed by the Spaniards under Murillo, and obliged to retrace his

steps with considerable loss. The Spanish leaders and the peasantry then redoubled their exertions, and Ney, finding his troops totally discouraged from the nature of the war, evacuated Corunna and Ferrol on the 22d June, and retired out of the province.

These successes were clouded by a severe check on the side of Valencia; where a fine and well-appointed army had been assembled. The command was entrusted to General Blake, who confidently advanced with it to recover Zaragoza. Being repulsed in the attempt on the 15th June, and harassed on his retreat by General Suchet, he halted after two days' march on the heights of Santa Maria, and ventured the issue of a general action. The young and raw Valencians, without confidence in themselves, wavered at the approach of the French cavalry, and dispersed at the first charge: but, with a patriotism which no discouragement could subdue, they individually returned to their homes, and again enrolled themselves.

The Catalans, after the defeat of their army at the conclusion of the last year, having nothing to oppose to the French but their individual courage, every where exerted themselves so much, and displayed such spirit and enterprize, that St. Cyr confined his operations to the siege

of Gerona; the brave defenders of which, though deprived of all hope of relief, from the defeat of the Valencian army just narrated, continued to resist, with an obstinacy proportioned to the increased means the French used against them; who, instructed by their previous failure, conducted this attack with far greater vigour than the former.

Upon the whole, since the commencement of the year, the aspect of affairs had materially changed in favour of the Spaniards; and no more auspicious moment could present itself to measure their strength with the intruders; as Buonaparte, in the prosecution of a war with Austria, had just experienced a severe check at Wagram on the Danube, which would prevent his sending any support to his armies in Spain. The amount of the French force at this period within the Pyrenees was 155,000, of which number 40,000 were in Arragon and Catalonia, and 10,000 in various garrisons and posts to maintain the communications throughout the country, leaving about 105,000 as the force absolutely in the field: of these, 50,000 were in three corps, covering Madrid on the south; and the remainder, under Marshals Soult, Ney, and other commanders, were in Old Castile, and in the kingdom of Leon.

Sir Arthur Wellesley and General Cuesta, after canvassing various ideas, united in an operation for the recovery of Madrid, by which it was arranged that Cuesta's army, 30,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry, in conjunction with the British, 19,000 strong, should advance by the right of the Tagus, overthrowing every thing that should attempt to impede their march; whilst General Vanegas, with 14,000 Spaniards, should threaten Aranjuez, and endeavour to possess himself of Toledo. Detachments of Spanish troops were to be posted at Perales and Baños, to interrupt the communication through those passes between the French troops in the north and those about to be attacked: and the Portugueze army under Marshal Beresford was directed to aid the Spaniards in watching those important points. Further, the Lusitanian Legion under Sir Robert Wilson, reinforced to 5000 men, by some battalions of Spanish light troops, was destined to act independently on the flanks or in the rear of the enemy, should they assemble in numbers and offer resistance on the south of Madrid.

In pursuance of this plan, the British moved by Salvatierra and Placencia, and at Oropesa on the 20th July effected their junction with Cuesta's army, which had crossed the river at Almaraz and Arzobispo. On the 22d, the

united armies advanced, driving before them a French force of 25 or 30,000 men under Marshal Victor, which took up a position on the Alberche, and gave the opportunity to realize all the expectations which had dictated the plan of the campaign. Sir Arthur was prepared to commence the attack on the morning of the 23d; but Cuesta, on the most frivolous pretences, declined to act till the following day: the attack was in consequence deferred, and Victor, gaining intelligence that Sir Robert Wilson was at Escalona in his rear, fell back after dark, and effected a junction with 10,000 men under Sebastiani at Torrijas.

Want of provisions began now to be severely felt in the British army, and the halt of a day or two became absolutely necessary to enable it to subsist. General Cuesta, however, deeming his own force sufficient to pursue the corps which he had declined to attack, put his troops in movement; but at Torrijas he found Victor again advancing, and he only saved his army from destruction by a retreat behind the Alberche, where the English lent him support. The 27th, the French continued to advance, and Cuesta's army, strengthened by a body of British infantry, and cavalry, retired in good order to a field of action selected by Sir Arthur for the two armies.

The position was about two miles in length,

extending perpendicularly from the Tagus, on which the right rested in the town of Talavera, partially retrenched, and having an intersected and most difficult country in its front. The centre was more open: but the left terminated favourably on a bold and commanding height, overlooking a considerable valley, which separated the left of the position from a range of rocky mountains. To the Spaniards was allotted the right, considered nearly inattackable, and to the British the more accessible ground on the left. Sir Arthur formed his troops in two lines, posting the left extremity of the second line, under General Hill, on the commanding feature before-mentioned, which possessed a decided influence over the whole position. To secure the point of junction between the two armies, cover was thrown up for eight or ten guns on an elevated knoll, and a division of British infantry, with a strong force of cavalry of the two nations, were posted to support it. Early in the afternoon of the 27th, the enemy crossed the Alberche, driving back with some loss the troops under General M'Kenzie; and in the course of the evening, 47,000 men were assembled in front of the position of the allies. Joseph Buonaparte commanded in person, having under his orders Marshals Jourdan, Victor, Mor-

tier, and General Sebastiani. A reconnoissance took place under a heavy cannonade, and a partial attack was made on the right, to ascertain how it was occupied; and it may be presumed that the height on the left of the British, occupied by General Hill, was discovered to be the most important point of the position, as twice during the night bodies of infantry were pushed along the valley to gain possession of it. At the first attack, though made with three regiments only, it being unexpected, and the troops advancing with rapidity and boldness, the French succeeded in attaining the summit of the hill, and were forming thereon, when a general charge with the bayonet drove them down. The second attack, repeated at the interval of some hours, was made with a stronger force, but the troops being prepared to receive it, the assailants were more easily repulsed.

At six o'clock in the morning of the 28th, a heavy cannonade commenced on the whole British line, and two divisions of infantry boldly advanced along the valley to dislodge General Hill's force; but when ascending the height, they were rushed upon with the bayonet, and driven down with great slaughter. To provide against a recurrence of these attempts, strong bodies of British and Spanish cavalry were

placed in the valley, and a division of 3,000 Spanish troops was ordered to occupy the hills beyond it. In these, and other various arrangements for attack and defence, the time passed on both sides till eleven o'clock; when the French regularly cooked and ate their dinners, whilst the British and Spaniards, less abundantly provided, endeavoured to repose on the ground after their fatigues.

At two o'clock the work of destruction again commenced, and under a heavy cannonade the enemy's infantry, formed into solid masses, prepared to make a general attack on the British line; whilst a numerous cavalry paraded in their rear, to complete the victory by an overwhelming charge on whichever point should be first penetrated. In about an hour the whole were in movement. The French Commander, aware of the insufficiency of his previous attacks of the heights on the left, now directed against it several heavy columns of infantry, with cavalry, which marched along the valley, flanked by numerous light troops upon the hills beyond it. A most desperate charge was made against these formidable bodies by General Anson with the 23d Light Dragoons, and 1st Hussars K. G. L.: the former, unchecked by the fire of the infantry, passed between two columns of the

enemy, and upset a regiment of Chasseurs, when being surrounded, it was almost entirely destroyed; notwithstanding which, the enemy was so astonished by the boldness of the attempt, that the columns halted; and the division of Spaniards under General Bassecourt, detached for that purpose, holding the light troops in check, this imposing movement, which threatened the destruction of the army, produced no results whatever. Simultaneous with this attack was the advance of other columns on the right of the British line, at the work intended to connect the two armies, which Brigadier-General Alexander Campbell's brigade and two Spanish battalions successfully repelled with the bayonet, and drove the enemy far back in great confusion, to which the artillery under General Howarth materially contributed; as by accuracy of fire they continued the work of destruction long after the muskets of the infantry had ceased to have effect. The columns directed against the centre of the British deployed before they attempted to ascend the position, and then advanced in as steady and regular a manner as the ground over which they marched would admit, and appeared determined to maintain the reputation of Invincibility which they had acquired by their deeds in other wars; but Lieutenant-

General Sherbrooke, having fully prepared his men, received them with a volley of musketry, which staggered their resolution, and the whole division instantly rushing forward with the bayonet, the French were driven back with prodigious slaughter. The brigade of Guards, in the ardour of pursuit, advancing beyond the rest of the line, a reserve of the enemy attacked it in overwhelming force, and threatened to annihilate it; but covered by a battalion which Sir Arthur ordered up for its support, and by the cavalry under General Cotton, it was enabled to resume its place in the line. Thus discomfited at every point, and having nearly 10,000 men killed or wounded, the enemy retired across the Alberche, leaving twenty pieces of cannon in possession of the victors. The next day only two divisions were seen on the left of the river, and those on the night of the 31st, also withdrew. In this desperate combat, the British lost above 5,000 men, of which between 7 and 800 were killed. The Spaniards lost about 1,200. Two General officers, M'Kenzie and Langworth, fell; and three others were wounded.

The day after the action, General Craufurd joined with a troop of horse artillery, and 3,000 infantry; having, in his zeal to aid in the further discomfiture of the enemy, made

the extraordinary exertion of forty-eight miles in twenty-four hours: but the scarcity of provisions was so extreme, that the allied armies were incapable of following up their splendid victory, and remained immoveable at Talavera.

Joseph Buonaparte, immediately after the battle, sent pressing orders to Marshal Soult (who on the advance of the combined armies had assembled together 35,000 men in Leon) to make a movement to his assistance, on the flank of the allies, through the pass of Baños. That officer had anticipated these orders, and was already in march; the troops to defend the pass had not been able for a moment to oppose his numbers, and his entry into Placencia was notified at Talavera, on the 2d August. It was instantly arranged between the two commanders that the British army should march and attack the approaching force, whilst the Spaniards remained to watch the line of the Tagus, and protect the removal of the wounded: this latter seemed the easier part, as Joseph's discomfited army, dreading a forward movement of the allies, was endeavouring by the road of Escalona to form a junction with the forces from the north. The British marched on the morning of the 3d to Oropesa, and the same evening Sir Arthur received two couriers, the

one to acquaint him that Soult had pushed on to Naval-moral, cutting off the communication between Oropesa and the bridge at Almaraz; the other from General Cuesta, stating, that as the enemy appeared in force moving upon his flanks, he had decided to retire from Talavera, and unite the two armies. This movement, which he executed the same night, leaving 1500 of the wounded English in the town, rendered the situation of both armies highly critical; as a corps of 35,000 or 40,000 men (Soult's) interposed between them and their best line of retreat, whilst another army of equal amount was marching on their flank from Talavera. Should either of the enemy's corps temporize, a junction might be effected between them, and the allies have to engage with a far superior force, with only one road open in their rear, and without the possibility of bringing up supplies to profit by success. The only resource left was to cross the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo, which was effected by the two armies with all their artillery over a road scarcely practicable for carriages. The British marched to Deleytosa and Jarracejo, where Sir Arthur intended to have remained, as in that position his army would have covered all the country on the left of the Tagus; but finding the difficulties thrown in the way of his ob-

taining supplies insurmountable, and that even his just remonstrances were met with recrimination, or treated with disrespect, he fell back from thence on Badajos the beginning of September. General Cuesta moved off from Arzobispo on the 7th of August, leaving a strong rear guard to protect the bridge, and cover his retreat, which was the next day completely cut up by a division of French cavalry, which forded the river unobserved. On the arrival of the army at Deleytosa, General Cuesta resigned the command. That officer in his younger days had given proofs of talent and enterprize; but fifty-five years of honourable service had rendered him incapable of that bodily and mental exertion which the command of a large army requires, and had further soured a temper naturally uncomplying. With the most upright intentions, mistaking obstinacy for firmness, pettishness for dignity, and procrastination for prudence, the little success resulting from the campaign must in great measure be attributed to his unfitness for the post he filled.

Sir Robert Wilson, in the execution of his orders, previously to the action at Talavera, pushed on to Naval-Carnero, within twelve miles of Madrid; and, on being ordered to rejoin the main army, finding his junction impeded by

the intervention of the French, he entered a wood in their rear; where he remained during the combat. When by the unexpected movement of Cuesta from Talavera, he afterwards found himself in a similar manner cut off from the line of the Tagus, he moved rapidly to his right, crossed the Tietar, and, scrambling over the Sierra de Llana, gained the pass of Baños. He had scarcely arrived there on the 12th August, when the whole corps of Marshal Ney was discovered moving by the same road from Placentia, on its return to Leon. To continue his march in face of so superior an enemy was to risk the utter destruction of his force: Sir Robert therefore preferred to defend the pass. After a combat of nine hours, numbers prevailed against him; the French dislodged his troops, killing or making prisoners 700 or 800, and the remainder with difficulty escaped to Castello Branco.

General Vanegas was also very active throughout these operations. During the action at Talavera, he threw some howitzer-shells into Toledo, causing much inquietude to the French commanders for the safety of the garrison. On the approach of Joseph the following day, he moved to his right, and gained a decided advantage over a French corps at Aranjuez. Subsequently, acting under orders at variance with each

other, from the Supreme Junta, and from General Cuesta, and probably not fully acquainted with the events which followed the victory at Talavera, he attempted operations beyond his means. On the 10th August he advanced against a force more numerous than his own, posted at Almonacid, which completely defeated and dispersed his corps. With laudable perseverance the fugitives were collected, and united with the army lately Cuesta's, and being reorganized and re-equipped, they soon formed a respectable body of 50,000 men, including 6000 cavalry, the chief command of which was bestowed on General Ariezaga. With a blind and unreasonable presumption, beyond that of any of his predecessors, Ariezaga led his army to the conquest of Madrid. Finding at Toledo a French force of 30,000 men waiting his approach, prudence came to his aid, but too late; in attempting to retire over the plains near Ocana, Joseph Buonaparte, with the main body of his forces, came up with him on the 19th November, and defeated him with a loss, and dispersion of his troops, far greater than in any preceding action during the contest—15,000 men being either killed, wounded, or made prisoners.

At the period of this disastrous event it be-

came known that Buonaparte, having concluded the war in Germany highly to his own advantage, had directed the march of 40,000 men from France to reinforce his armies in Spain. The Spanish government, alarmed at this intelligence, and seeing the wretched state to which their own military establishments were reduced, used every argument to induce Lord Wellington (the title conferred on Sir Arthur Wellesley for his brilliant achievements at Talavera) to again move forward. Their representations were met with fairness, and offers of co-operation made on the most disinterested terms: being either to entrust the supreme command to Lord Wellington, or to enter into arrangements to render the united armies efficient. Every attempt, however, to prevail on the Spanish government to concede the first point was strenuously resisted as a degradation to the national character: even the rank and talents of Marquis Wellesley, sent as ambassador expressly for that purpose, failed to effect it; nor could his lordship induce any beneficial change in their military system, on which reliance could be placed. The chief attention of the Junta was thought to be directed to the preservation of its own power, and the members of it were charged with carrying their feelings on that

point to such culpable excess, as even in the distribution of their forces, to be more governed by local interests and jealousy of the different commanders, than by the pressure of the service. Such opinions could only be entertained with feelings of resentment by every disinterested Spaniard, which were more particularly evinced by the Marquis de la Romana, who having been long absent from Spain, was entirely free from party prejudices. Called from his army in Galicia to assist in the councils of the state at this crisis, and nominated one of a commission to take into consideration the future conduct of affairs, he availed himself of the occasion (October 4th) to publish a manifesto against the Junta. In this paper he questioned the legality of their rule, upbraided them with incapacity and imbecility, and demanded the formation of a Council of Regency, or a deputation of the realm, till the Cortes could be assembled; the speedy meeting of which, he declared to be of vital importance. Such a manifesto, circulated by a military commander, was nothing short of a declaration of rebellion; and it proves the extreme weakness of the government to have borne with it, unless the merit be due to them of unwillingness to interfere with perfect freedom of discussion—the great

er patriotism of overlooking personal censure, rather than commence a struggle which might be productive of general anarchy.

Romana was certainly actuated by conscientious motives, as being urged to enforce his arguments with the bayonet, he steadily refused, and leaving the Junta to form its own decisions, the result was a decree for assembling the Cortes, which procrastinated the period of their entering on business till the 1st of March following.

Lord Wellington had every personal motive to render him desirous of moving forward, but political considerations forbade his doing so, without the most certain guarantee of efficient co-operation, the small body of men under his lordship's command being all England could supply. The impossibility of obtaining sufficient specie, on any terms, to carry on the contest on a grand scale in the Peninsula, where every thing was of an excessive price, and, being the property of allies, must be paid for in money, had caused the main effort of the war to be transferred, during the summer, to an enemy's country, abundant and cheap; and where the troops could be partly supplied from the produce of England. An enterprize in favour of Austria, then contending with Buonaparte on equal terms, was prepared on a scale worthy of the object and of the nation;

...

and at the end of July a superb army exceeding 40,000 men was unexpectedly placed in a situation to penetrate into the finest provinces of the French empire, the inhabitants of which were discontented, and totally without a regular force. Three weeks, however, having been consumed in the reduction of Flushing, and in subsequent arrangements, it was decided in a military council, that the favourable period for landing on the Continent had passed, and that nothing further could be undertaken. Previously to this resolve, the unhealthy season had set in with its accustomed virulence—hundreds daily sickened under its influence; and ultimately more than half of the troops either perished, or were rendered inefficient by lingering diseases, generated in the pestilential marshes of the islands of Zealand.

Should therefore a repetition of the circumstances experienced in the last combined movement again occur, and render the British force inefficient from privation, or cause it to be sacrificed in unequal combat with the enemy, that support to the Peninsula would be lost. At this time the intended conquest of Portugal, which relied entirely on the British commander for protection, and which submitted with cheerfulness to all his wishes, was haughtily announced; it therefore became more consonant with justice and sound policy to attempt her salvation by a

prudent preservation of the means, rather than to risk every thing on the uncertain and unequal chance of the event of active hostilities in the south. Actuated by these motives, Lord Wellington released his army from inactivity on the unhealthy banks of the Guadiana, where the mortality and sickness which prevailed were alarmingly great, and moved it to the more genial climate of Beira to give protection to the north of Portugal, which a recent defeat of the Spaniards had lain open to the incursions of the enemy, whose force in that quarter was daily augmenting.

The army of La Romana, under the Duke del Parque, on the march of Soult and Ney to Placentia, took possession of Salamanca, and on the return of the French, ascertaining their numbers to be small, engaged them at Tomames, on the 18th October, with such complete success as to force them to retire behind the Douro.

At the end of the following month, the reinforcements which entered from France enabled General Kellerman to assemble 15,000 men, with which he attacked the Duke del Parque near Alba de Tormes. The troops, who had on all previous occasions behaved with character, broke on the first charge of cavalry, and individually dispersed; not the smallest appearance of

a collected body remaining to demand a second effort. The serious ill effects to have been apprehended from this disaster were happily prevented by the opportune arrival of the British, who, at the end of December, entered into cantonments behind the Coa, and under their protection the fugitives again collected.

The intrusive King took advantage of his success at Ocana, and of the employment found for the British in Portugal, to extend his authority over the provinces of the south, and entrusted the execution to Marshal Soult with an army of 55,000 men. The Spaniards, who had fortified with much care and labour the whole range of the Sierra Morena, or chain of mountains which cover the entrance of Andulasia from the north, and had allotted 30,000 men under Ariezaga for their defence, felt no apprehensions for the event. They, however, had quickly cause to repent of their confidence: Soult made his attack on the 20th January, in several columns, and dislodged the defenders with little loss to himself. The centre of the French army penetrated by Andujar and Cordova, and appeared before Seville on the 29th. That place reposing in all the apathy of presuming ignorance, was unprepared for defence, and, after two days negotiation, opened its gates on the assurance

of favourable treatment. The victors took possession of magazines and supplies of incalculable value; also of a foundry and powder-manufactory uninjured, no preparation having been made to meet such a reverse. Indeed the passage of the Sierra Morena was effected so much more quickly than had been judged possible, that treachery or the extreme of cowardice was imputed to the troops defending the passes. It was generally supposed, that the inaccessible precipices and strong defences, behind which they were posted, would, like the walls of a town, more than compensate the inferiority of their discipline, and enable them to rival in obstinacy the defenders of Zaragoza and Gerona. A little consideration, however, will shew that their situation was far less favourable. Along an extensive mountainous district there are innumerable ascents practicable to infantry, and whilst a shew of large bodies is made on the fortified roads, the flanks are turned by other troops, the combat falls where least expected, and the advantage of situation ends generally with the assailants. From the instances recorded in the highly instructive narrative of Xenophon to the present example, such has invariably been the fate of inferior or ill disciplined troops attempting to defend a mountainous barrier against a manœuvring force, and a disinterested

judgment will acquit the Spaniards of greater misconduct on the Sierra Morena than elsewhere. The government, however, acted as if they believed the passage of the mountains impracticable, and left Cadiz so totally unprovided for defence, that it would have fallen into the power of the French equally with Cordova and Seville, had not the Duke of Albuquerque, on hearing of the investment of the latter place, acted from his own judgment. He immediately marched his division of 8000 men from Pedrosa de la Sierra on the right bank of the Guadalquivir, by Carmona and Lebrija, a distance of 250 miles, in nine days, and threw himself into the city on the 4th February, in time to close the gates against the invaders, who presented themselves for admittance the following morning. The Duke even, by a judicious and firm conduct, opposed their entry into the Island of Leon, on one extremity of which Cadiz is built; precluding all possibility of injury to the city by bombardment, except from a single point without the island on the eastern side of the harbour, occupied by fort Matagorda.

Every other occurrence after the passage of the Morena was favourable to the French. General Sebastiani, with a very superior force, came up with the main body of Ariezaga's army retreating on Grenada, on the 28th January dispersed it afresh, and the same day entered

the city. A feeble attempt at resistance in front of Malaga, on the 5th February, was attended with similar results. The French cavalry charged into the streets with the fugitives, and were for a moment checked by a fire from the houses: but resistance ceased on the arrival of the infantry, and the town, with its immense magazines, abundant artillery, and supplies of every description, fell to the conquerors without a stipulation in behalf of the inhabitants.

Gerona surrendered on the 10th December, after a memorable defence of six months, which places the name of the Governor Don Marian Alvarez on a level with that of Palafox; and some particulars of his heroic conduct deserve to be recorded. The town stands low, at the confluence of the Ona and Ter rivers, which cover and protect the northern side, and on the opposite quarter the approaches are commanded by a small square fort of 90 toises exterior side, situated on a height 550 yards from the place called Montjuic. In this petty work, Alvarez, not having all together 5000 men under his command, defied for three months the utmost efforts of General St. Cyr with 20,000 French. Sixty pieces of heavy ordnance fired against the fort incessantly for twenty-two days, which, besides effecting an enormous breach, levelled all the upper works. The enemy then offered terms,

which being rejected, they gave the assault, and were repulsed with loss. During the three succeeding days the besiegers' batteries thundered without intermission, and on the fourth morning they again tried the force of arms. Several heavy columns advanced to the breach and persisted in their attempts to ascend it with so much courage and obstinacy, that success was long balanced, and on their repulse, 1600 killed and wounded remained in the ditch. After this effort, the French, finding all open attacks useless, resorted to the sap and the mine, and one entire month passed in the dispute of a ravelin, which (after several attempts to form a lodgment in it had failed) remained, as if by tacit agreement, unoccupied by either party, and all personal conflict ceased. The fire of artillery and the mine however gradually levelled the walls and blew up the very interior of the place; when, there being no longer any thing worth disputing, the garrison withdrew on the 11th of August.

In the defence of the town the same heroism continued to be displayed. By a multiplicity of artillery, the weak enceinte was quickly beaten down to a frightful extent; and the garrison, exhausted by the great efforts it had made, and being nearly destitute of provisions, was reduced to the lowest extremity. At this

moment General Blake, by a demonstration of attacking the besiegers on one side of the town, induced them to concentrate their forces to oppose him; when 3000 men with a supply of provisions entered at the opposite part over the river, where the enemy's posts were left too weak to make any resistance. This successful manœuvre of the Catalans, and the little progress made in the attack, induced Buonaparte to recal General St. Cyr, and to bestow the command in Catalonia on Marshal Augereau. That officer, soon after his arrival, seeing the garrison apparently without the slightest means of resistance, ordered a general assault, which he persisted in with much firmness for some hours, till his troops would no longer exert themselves. The numbers lost on this occasion were so great, that he feared again to renew the attempt, but confining himself to a fire from his batteries, waited the effects of time, and of an epidemic sickness, which broke out amongst the defenders. In the meanwhile, working parties were incessantly employed to break up the roads, and to create obstacles to the approach of any relief; notwithstanding which, General O'Donnel on the side of Bispal deceived the vigilance of the guard, and threw in a partial supply, which enabled the garrison to subsist till the 10th December, when both provisions and ammunition

being exhausted, the wretched remains of the defenders were, in the eyes of the French, sufficiently formidable to be granted a capitulation, even after the breaches had remained ten weeks open.

The walls of Hostalrich fell shortly afterwards an ignoble conquest to the same officer. The siege commenced on the 20th January, and the place was contested with the greatest obstinacy till the 12th May following, when the brave garrison, having consumed their last day's food, sallied out to cut their way through the blockading corps. A large proportion nobly fell in the attempt; amongst others the heroic Don Juan de Estrada, the governor; but many hundreds restored themselves to liberty. About a month previously to this event, O'Donnel made a general movement of the Catalan troops and peasantry, to throw in supplies; attacking at the same moment four or five of the enemy's posts. The Miquelets were very successful, cutting off whole detachments; but the regular army being repulsed, the object of the enterprise failed: nevertheless the French lost 2 or 3000 men in these several encounters, which so irritated Buonaparte, that Augereau shared the fate of St. Cyr, and was replaced by Marshal Macdonald.

In the kingdom of Leon, the force of the

enemy gradually augmented from the commencement of the year, and enabled them to lay siege to Astorga, which, after a spirited defence costing the assailants many men, capitulated in the middle of April; so that since England had turned her energies to another theatre of war, (the Scheldt,) the French had been uniformly successful in every quarter of Spain.

The spring of 1810 may be considered to have been the second crisis in the affairs of the Peninsula, as by a succession of desultory and ill-planned enterprizes on the part of the Spaniards, all their armies had been annihilated; almost all their fortresses reduced or blockaded, and three fourths of the kingdom subdued. The most sanguine could not hope to see the natives alone successfully resist the French, and Buonaparte in alliance with Austria stood pledged to his people, and to the world, to conquer Portugal, and drive the British army into the sea. Unhappily his means to fulfil his promises appeared unlimited; whilst the English nation, desponding at the general ill success of the war, and dissatisfied with the waste of their military strength in the Scheldt, were inclined to withdraw from the contest. Public opinion thus balanced for some time, and the season for exertion passed

in suspense. Happily, at the end of March, a decision of the Great Council of the nation retained in power the supporters of active hostilities, and the manly resolution followed, of sharing, if we could not ward off the blow aimed at our ancient and confiding ally. The Portugueze subsidiary force was in consequence augmented to 30,000 men, and such few battalions as could be rendered effective from the effects of the Walcheren climate were sent out to reinforce the army; with the command of which, the honour and future reputation of England, the independence of Portugal, and the last hope of the Peninsula, were committed to the prudence and judgment of Lord Wellington.

CHAPTER III.

Buonaparte decides to make the conquest of Portugal—a French army under Marshal Massena captures Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida—fights unsuccessfully at Busaco—advances towards Lisbon—is checked by Lord Wellington—remains inactive for five months—retires out of Portugal—again moves forward to succour Almeida—is repulsed in the attempt at Fuentes de Honor—French garrison evacuate the place.—Being the period from June, 1810, to May, 1811.

To ensure the conquest of Portugal, and the expulsion of the British, the preparations were very considerable. Three corps commanded by Marshals Ney and Junot, and General Reynier, composing an army of 66,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry were united for that purpose near Salamanca; and Marshal Massena, heretofore considered the boldest and most fortunate of Buonaparte's lieutenants, was sent from France to direct the enterprize. To give yet further importance to the operation, a strong body of the imperial guard crossed the Pyrenees, and the remainder was held in readiness for the same destination, being a strong intimation that the Emperor himself intended to follow.

The army collected to oppose this threatened invasion did not exceed 48,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, the half of it composed of young Portugueze levies, yet untried in a general action, of which a very unfavourable judgment continued to be entertained, notwithstanding the numerous proofs of courage they had lately evinced in various slight encounters. To give them steadiness and confidence, the troops of the two nations were now brigaded together in the proportion of one Portugueze to two British battalions; and even beyond this support, the foresight of Lord Wellington had provided a further auxiliary to compensate their little experience. Anticipating the awful crisis now arrived, and resolved not to commit his army in action except under very favourable circumstances, he had, as far back as the previous October, caused a position covering Lisbon to be most strongly retrenched, with the intention, on the advance of the invading force, to retire upon it, and there decide the fate of the Peninsula. Abrantes and Peniche were at the same time ordered to be further strengthened, and various other points fortified in support of a protracted system of warfare. It is worthy of remark, to shew the secrecy observed upon these operations, that notwithstanding the

magnitude of the work, no account of its progress ever became public, and the invaders remained ignorant of the formidable nature of the barrier which had been raised against them, till they found the allied army arrayed on it, to stop their further advance.

Operations commenced on the 26th April by the investment of Ciudad Rodrigo with two corps; General Reynier being detached to the left of the Tagus for the greater facility of subsistence. On the 11th of June, the trenches were opened on the hill to the north of the city, called the Great Teson. General Hervasti, the governor, opposed a proper resistance to the attack, till the 10th July, when a practicable breach having been formed in the *fausse-braie*, and in the body of the place, the counterscarp blown in, and the troops assembled in the trenches for the assault, as no hope of being relieved was held out to him, he made an honourable capitulation; previously to which, the Spanish cavalry under the guerrilla chief Don Julian sallied out, cut their way through the French posts, and escaped into Portugal.

The allied army was at this period cantoned in three corps: the main body, 22,000 men, under the personal command of Lord Wellington, at Vizeu, Celorico, Guarda, &c. with the

light division 4000 men in advance of Almeida, which fortress was supplied for a siege, but garrisoned chiefly with militia: a corps of 13,000 men under Lieutenant-General Hill on the right of the frontier, to observe the force under Reynier; and the third, a body of 10,000 men in reserve under Major-General Leith, at Thomar.

On the 24th July the enemy crossed the frontier to invest Almeida; the light division under Brigadier-General Craufurd, attempting to retard the operation, became engaged with five or six times its number, and there being only a single bridge, by which to repass the Coa, its retreat became endangered; but through the steady discipline of the troops, the utmost efforts of the enemy to break them failed, and the division finally effected the passage, with the loss of only 30 killed, and 270 wounded, or made prisoners.

Ground was broken before Almeida on the 15th August. The first batteries opened on the 25th; and soon afterwards a large magazine, which contained nearly all the powder in the place, blew up, with a tremendous explosion, killing many men, and injuring the defences. A Portugueze officer of artillery treacherously communicated to the besiegers the exhausted

state of the ammunition, and they in consequence demanded the immediate surrender of the garrison. The governor, General Cox, after some negociation, finding the French aware of the reduced state of his means, capitulated on the following day—the regular troops to be prisoners of war; the militia to return to their homes.

In the middle of September, Marshal Massena, having been joined by the 2d corps, (which recrossed the Tagus at the Barca de Alconete, in the beginning of July, and had since occupied Zarzamayor, Penamacor, Monsanto, &c.) advanced from Almeida, against Lisbon, and Lord Wellington with the main body of the allies retired along the left bank of the Mondego. To form a just idea of the enemy's march, and of the manœuvres opposed to him, it is necessary to know the peculiarities of the country. Conceive a quadrangular tract of territory 100 miles long and 50 miles broad, bounded on the west by the sea, on the north and south by the nearly parallel rivers Mondego and Tagus, and the eastern part of it filled by an immense mass of mountains, impenetrable to an hostile army, when defended with moderate resolution, called the Serra de Estrella: these mountains closing on the Tagus in the south, but leaving a space with a good road along it between them and

the Mondego on the north. An enemy intending to arrive at the S. W. point of the figure (the situation of Lisbon) from without those mountains, must consequently either march down the space between the Estrella and the Mondego, or must cross one or other of the two rivers, and recross it at a point below the Serra,

Massena, by obliging each soldier to carry fifteen days' bread, was enabled to march his whole force from Celorico by one route, on the north of the Mondego, and avoid all the difficulties of the strong ravines of the Serra de Estrella, so numerous on the other bank. The road to Coimbra which he selected passes, at three leagues distance from the town, over a high steep mountain lying perpendicular to his line of march, called the Serra de Busaco; being a branch of the large range of mountains in the north, called the Serra de Caramula. The Serra de Busaco closes almost perpendicularly on the Mondego; and on the opposite bank of that river, a mountainous branch of the Serra de Estrella, called the Serra de Murcella, forms nearly a continuation of the line of Busaco, creating an obstacle on the southern bank, as great as the former on the northern. To penetrate by any tolerable road into Estremadura on the line selected, it was absolutely necessary for the invaders to pass

over one or other of these Serras. Lord Wellington, who had placed officers in the mountains to ascertain their force and the direction of their march, on being made acquainted with it, crossed the Mondego, and occupied Busaco with nearly his whole army, leaving on the left bank a force just sufficient to repel any reconnoissance which might be pushed across the river. Previously to the advance of the enemy, till it could be clearly ascertained by what routes he intended to enter Portugal, it was necessary to keep the corps under Lieutenant-General Hill to guard the line of the Tagus, and the division of Major-General Leith in reserve, to support him. By a well-regulated movement these corps (the former breaking up from Sobriera-formosa, on the 17th, passing through Villa de Rey, fording the Zezere at the Barca de Codes, and afterwards following the military road by Espinhal) joined the main body of the army on the position the 26th September, the day of the arrival of the French army in front of it: and thus, at the required moment, the whole of the allied forces were concentrated on the first favourable point which offered for opposing the untried Portuguese levies to the veterans of France.

The Serra of Busaco is 250 feet more elevated

than the ground in its front, with an ascent too difficult for cavalry to act; and as its height nearly precludes the use of artillery to the assailants, it forms an almost inattackable position when fully occupied: but as the ridge is eight miles in extent, a considerable army is required for that purpose. Massena, not aware of the junction of the corps under Generals Hill and Leith, calculated that the position was very weakly lined with men, and with that impression, early in the morning of the 27th, under cover of a cloud of light troops, pushed up two strong columns of attack without any immediate support. On gaining the summit, they had barely time to deploy before they were charged down the hill by the divisions of Generals Picton, Leith, and Craufurd, and in three quarters of an hour from the commencement of the attack, had rejoined their comrades in the plain below. A continued fire of light troops was maintained throughout the day, at the bottom, and along the face of the position; and great movements were observed amongst the enemy's troops, but no further serious attack was attempted: the experiment of the morning having cost the French 2,000 dead on the field, a general officer and 300 men prisoners, and from 5 to 6,000 wounded; whilst the allies had

only 200 killed and 1,000 wounded. The Portuguese troops which took part in the action behaved with spirit, and confidence was thenceforth placed on their exertions, which every subsequent event strengthened, and after some further trial they ranked nearly on an equality in arms with their insular brethren. This repulse had nearly been fatal to the progress of the invaders, for after it, no hope could remain of forcing the position in front: to cross the Mondego, and endeavour to force the Serra de Murcella, was equally hopeless; as the allies, from their greater proximity, could always occupy it first; and to remain was impossible, from the want of provisions. In this dilemma, Massena, on the 28th, after a variety of movements to conceal his intentions, made the hazardous attempt to turn the position, by a difficult road over the Serra de Caramula, about six miles to its left; marching in one column, he effected his purpose without opposition, as a division of Portuguese militia destined to dispute the passage of the mountains at Sardao, from a misapprehension of the movements of the enemy, made a considerable detour, and arrived too late.

The Busaco range being thus turned, Lord Wellington, steadily adhering to his original intentions, fell back through Coimbra, and as

the enemy advanced, leisurely retired before them.

Lisbon being situated at the extremity of a peninsula formed by the sea and the Tagus, it is apparent, that if an army be so posted as to extend across the neck of the Peninsula, no enemy can penetrate to that city without a direct attack in front of the army so formed. It was on this principle, that the lines covering Lisbon were planned by Lord Wellington. Nature drew the rude outline of a strong defensive position, and Art rendered it perfect. A tract of country of thirty miles, extending from the mouth of the Zizandra on the ocean, to Alhandra on the Tagus, was modelled into a field of battle; mountains were scarped perpendicularly, rivers dammed, and inundations formed; all roads favourable to the enemy were destroyed, and others made to facilitate the communications of the defenders; formidable works were erected to strengthen and support the weak points; whilst numerous cannon, planted on inaccessible posts, commanded the different approaches to them, and gave an equality of defence to the whole position. Nor was any labour or expedient omitted, to render it equally favourable for offensive movements. Such was the ground to which the army made its last retrograde move-

ment on the 8th October, and where, on the following morning, it was joined by 6,000 Spanish troops, under the Marquis de la Romana.

Marshal Massena, on entering Coimbra, finding no preparation made to dispute the passage of the Mondego, fully believed that the English intended to quit the country, and hastened the march of his army, to enhance its triumph by the attack of their rear-guard. To facilitate his movements, he left his sick and wounded with their attendants, to the number of 5,000, in Coimbra, which city was a few days afterwards forcibly entered by Colonel Trant with the Portuguese troops, on their return from Sardoal, and the whole of the French made prisoners. The militia, assisted by the organized peasantry of the country, likewise took possession successively of the different towns which the enemy quitted in their advance, and from the moment of passing the Mondego, the French army was deprived of all communication beyond the circuit of its cavalry-patroles. Massena nevertheless pushed forward in the full confidence of success, and his cavalry and advanced guard, on the afternoon of the 10th, drove the allies out of Sobral, from whence he first discovered the formidable works which covered his antagonists. To judge from the instant halt he made, and

the retrograde movement which followed as soon as it became dark, they struck him as much with dismay as astonishment, and three days elapsed before he again ventured to the same spot. He then made a strict reconnoissance of the right of the lines, and placed the three corps of his army separately in bivouac in front of it. On the main road to Lisbon, through Zibriera, where the works thrown up were fewer than on the other parts of the line, it being intended as a manœuvring position for the main body of the army; he pushed his piquets into contact with those of the allies. In adjusting their posts, a sharp skirmish took place, and every thing denoted a meditated attack. The allied troops were daily under arms an hour before day-light, and the General in Chief with them, in readiness to direct their operations: the weather was generally wet, and the duty irksome, yet all supported it with cheerfulness, in the full confidence of annihilating their opponents in the threatened attempt; but after a week had elapsed, expectation would no longer support itself, and the hope of an immediate triumph almost vanished.

Thus situated, the two armies remained for a month without any movement, during which time, officers with strong escorts were employed

by the enemy, to ascertain the nature and resources of the country in their rear, to form a plan of future operations: that arranged, on the night of the 14th November the French army broke up from its bivouac, and retired into cantonments in the district round Thomar. To secure these cantonments, its advance was intrenched in the strong position of Santarem, behind the Rio-mayor, and a post was made at Punhete in its rear, with a bridge across the Zezere; its left was naturally covered by the Tagus, and its right, which was open and exposed to the attacks of the irregulars, was protected by the cavalry. This movement arose from a conviction on the part of Massena, of the impossibility of effecting anything further with his present force; the difficulty of procuring provisions; and the approach of winter, which rendered cover indispensable to the health of the troops. It was probably his further object, to gain time, in a good defensive position, for bringing up such strong reinforcements as were required to enable him to attack the lines with a probability of success.

The allied army followed the movements of the retiring force; and when it halted at Santarem, made a demonstration of attacking that post, to ascertain if a final retreat was intended, or only a change of position. The enemy stand-

ing firm, the columns of attack were recalled, and the troops were placed in cantonments at Cartaxo, (Head-quarters,) Alcoentre, Azambuja, &c. in readiness to fall back on the lines, should the French be reinforced, or otherwise quietly to remain under cover during the winter, prepared to take advantage of the movements which want of subsistence must ultimately impose upon the enemy, the foresight of which had partly led to the adoption of this Fabian defence of Portugal. Lieutenant-General Hill's corps was, at the same time, in furtherance of these views, crossed over to the south of the Tagus, and cantoned at Barcos, Chamusca, &c. to prevent the enemy communicating with the Alemtejo, and drawing supplies from thence.

Previously to the French passing the frontier, a proclamation was issued by the Portuguese Government, commanding all persons to leave their homes on the approach of the enemy, and to destroy all articles of subsistence which could not be carried off. Terror produced obedience to the first part of the mandate; the men and the women, with their flocks and their herds, every where disappeared, and the country on their line of march became a frightful solitude; but as no measures were taken to enforce compliance with the latter part, the natural feelings

of mankind rendered it nugatory. Most individuals remained by their immovable property, till their personal safety required flight, when it became too late to think of any thing beyond avoiding pursuit. Those more provident, who early fled, too generally secreted their effects in the futile hope of their escaping observation, which being invariably discovered, served equally to defeat the object in view; and the inhabitants of whole districts far removed from the scene, deeming themselves secure, remained quiet, and being unexpectedly surrounded in the extensive excursions of the enemy's cavalry, had no opportunity to remove any thing. This was particularly the case in the fertile and abundant country to the eastward of Santarem, and it may be safely asserted that not one fiftieth part of the corn had been removed from thence; therefore, to subsist an army it was a most eligible situation. It also presented the inestimable advantage of a strong front, with security on the flanks and in the rear, to admit of the soldiers dispersing over the country to collect the supplies; which, from the absence of the inhabitants, was the daily practice after morning parade, and it had been ascertained that the allies were not in movement. Thus the cantonments to which the French retired united

many great advantages, and were in all respects favourable, whilst they retained the superiority, or even an equality of force to their opponents.

Marshal Massena sent an immediate representation to Paris of the situation of his army, and of the necessity of great reinforcements. Orders were in consequence issued for all the disposable French troops in the South to march towards the Alemtejo frontier, which operated as a considerable diversion in his favour, causing the Spaniards to separate from the army in his front. The ninth corps d'armée was at the same time placed under his command; two divisions of which, about 10 or 12,000 men, joined him in the end of December, and the remainder, under General Claparede, took post at Guarda on the frontier, to keep open the communication with Spain, and drive away the parties of irregulars from his rear; so that at the commencement of the year the situation of the French was greatly improved. Massena, however, did not undertake any great movement; but keeping the main body of his army obstinately stationary in its cantonments, only sent some predatory detachments to the north, which not being in strength were readily repulsed by the militia. That force, shortly after his change of position, became very daring, interrupting all his communications, and even defeating with loss, at

Os Cardigos, in the Serra de Estrella, on the 14th November, a considerable detachment bringing a convoy to his relief; and threatened, should time be allowed for them to acquire confidence and experience, to form an obstacle in his rear, which would render retreat precarious. An unequal combat, in which they were imprudently committed with the corps under Claparede, on the 30th December, at Trancosa, wherein they were defeated and driven with loss beyond the Douro, checked these rising expectations, and their after efforts were comparatively trivial.

The enemy's hopes of ultimate success in the operations against Lisbon, which could alone justify their long state of wasting inactivity, were founded on a calculation, that the army in the south of Spain would be able to form a junction with that in Portugal, previously to the country being exhausted. All Massena's movements were directed to that object; Punhete was carefully entrenched, to protect an establishment formed at the mouth of the Zezere for building boats and making cordage: Abrantes was reconnoitred, to ascertain if liable to be carried by a coup de main; and every other undertaking equally showed an anxiety to establish a communication across the Tagus.

The judicious counter-efforts of the allies, however, prevented the army on the northern bank effecting it of itself; and the resistance of Badajos delayed the advance of the troops from the south, till the middle of March. Before that period the resources of the country had been nearly consumed, and the French troops, much reduced in numbers, had become very sickly and dispirited. Massena could therefore no longer with safety temporize; but in the end of February commenced his arrangements to retire out of Portugal. This decision was most opportunely made, as Lord Wellington only awaited the arrival of a long announced reinforcement to commence offensive operations; when inclosed between rivers and mountains, it is not easy to discover how the French army could have escaped entire destruction.

On the 4th March a fleet anchored in the Tagus with 7000 troops on board, and the following night the French advanced corps withdrew from Santarem, to which place the allied head-quarters were immediately transferred. It would be difficult accurately to state the amount of the retiring force; but judging from the appearance it made on its march, the infantry might be calculated at rather more than 40,000; but stating it as high as 45,000, that arm alone

had sustained a loss of 27,000 men since it left Rodrigo.* Disgusting accumulations of dirt and filth, and remnants of the most unhealthy kinds of food observed in every town and village, with the wretched and squalid appearance of most of the prisoners, and the unprovided and neglected state of the hospitals, sufficiently testified the miserable condition to which the invaders were reduced; and accounts for so prodigious a mortality beyond that inflicted by the sword. The sufferings and losses of the French, however, were nothing in comparison with those their visitation inflicted on Portugal, and its inhabitants. Nearly 2000 square miles of country remained for five months with scarcely an inhabitant: every thing it contained was devoured by the enemy, or destroyed by the season. In the space immediately bounding the positions of the two armies, which was not permanently occupied by either, the harvest perished on the ground, and the fruit fell rotten from the trees: flocks of innumerable small birds, as if drawn to the spot by instinct, fattened unmolested on the ungathered grapes: and latterly, the very wolves, conscious of security, or rendered more daring by the absence of their accustomed prey, prowled about

* See Appendix C.

masters of the territory ; reluctantly giving way to the cavalry patrols which occasionally crossed their track.

It was a gratifying, though melancholy sight, to witness, on the advance of the French, the entire population of different provinces accompanying the marches of a retiring army ; quitting their homes and sacrificing all their immovable property for the general good—men, women, and children, alike terrified, hurrying onward, and not knowing when or where to repose. Fifty thousand of these fugitives found support and consolation in the hospitality and kindness of the citizens of Lisbon ; but an equal number, who fled to the left bank of the Tagus, long remained exposed to the weather ; and a large proportion miserably perished from hunger and disease, before relief could be administered. Hard as their lot, it was far more happy than that of the villagers in the rear, and on the skirts of the enemy's cantonments ; whose habitations, plundered of every thing, and occasionally occupied by detachments of French, afforded their owners no supplies, and only a precarious shelter. Many of these wretched creatures passed the whole season of winter exposed to its inclemencies in the neighbouring woods or mountains, subsisting merely on roots and herbs ; and on the advance of the

allies returned to their homes, their bodies emaciated from abstinence, and their intellects impaired by long continued apprehension: amongst them were girls of sixteen, who, become idiots, resembled in person women of fifty. Numbers of children of either sex, who had survived the severe trial, flocked to the road side as the army approached, to demand relief; appearing so thin, pale, and haggard, that many a hardened veteran was observed to turn from the sight with disgust, as he compassionately bestowed on them a portion of the biscuit intended as his next day's support.

The loss sustained by Portugal in this invasion may be in some degree imagined, when it is stated, that in very extensive districts neither a living animal, nor an article of subsistence, was to be found at the departure of the French; and that the description they applied to their line of march when advancing became latterly, with the exception of the running wine, applicable to all the country over which they spread. "The towns and villages deserted; the mills destroyed; the wine running in the gutters; the corn stacks burnt; even the very furniture broken: neither a horse, nor a mule, nor an ass, nor a cow—not even a goat to be seen."*

* Official Account from the *Moniteur*.

Massena retired through Estremadura by the same road he entered it. As a preliminary measure, and to gain time for the retreat of his sick and baggage, he united the different corps of his army at Pombal, with the apparent intention of maintaining his ground. On the 11th March, Lord Wellington brought up the allied army, and having in the course of the day succeeded in driving in all the enemy's advanced posts, made his dispositions for a general attack on the following morning; but during the night Massena, having previously set fire to the town, drew off. The next day the allies were opposed by a body of the enemy, so strongly posted at the end of a defile in front of Redinha, as to require the formation of the greater part of the army to dislodge it, which occupied many hours. The corps thus left as a rear-guard remained firm, till it found its safety compromised: then abandoning its position, it retired at a very quick rate, losing but few men, as, without attending to order, it rapidly fell back on its friends; whilst the leading divisions of the allies were obliged to follow with precaution, not knowing the moment when they might be opposed by the whole French army.

In this manner, Massena daily covered his retreat, with a corps of 10,000 infantry, and the

best of his cavalry, without any other incumbrances than a few light guns well horsed. This rear-guard was invariably posted on positions not to be attacked in front without a very severe loss, and which could only be turned by a march of many hours, rendering the troops incapable of further exertion. During the time thus gained, the sick and baggage, followed by the main body, were retiring, and, except on one or two occasions, had completed their day's march before the rear-guard was forced back upon them.

Lord Wellington was ever active in the pursuit; using every manœuvre that skill could dictate to oblige the speedy retirement of the covering force from its different positions. Necessity and policy, however, obliged him to be sparing of the lives of his men, and not to attack it in front; the near equality of numbers which existed in the lines having been destroyed by the retreat of the enemy. On that event it became necessary, in addition to the Spaniards previously sent, to detach 15,000 men for the protection of the southern frontier, and Massena on arriving in Spain would be joined by fresh troops. On one occasion, having quickly driven in the rear-guard of the enemy, on entering the defiles of Miranda de Coryo, when a direct attack

would have caused the abandonment of the greater part of their artillery and baggage, his Lordship is reported to have thus expressed himself—" I have now an opportunity to inflict a severe loss on the enemy; but not without the sacrifice of many of my own troops. I therefore prefer to continue the system of harassing them, and destroying their organization, keeping my own army entire, to fighting a battle, in which it might be so crippled, as not to have the ascendancy over the fresh troops to be encountered on the frontiers. Almeida and Badajos are to be retaken." On this principle Lord Wellington acted throughout, never allowing the enemy any respite, and literally drove them over the frontiers with scarcely any loss to the allies, in a state of sickness and misery, which ultimately destroyed more of them than any partial action could have done.

Massena intended to have thrown his army across the Mondego, by the bridge of Coimbra; but when he arrived at Condeixa, two leagues from it, on the 13th March, and found himself pressed by the close pursuit of the allies, without knowing the amount of the force in that city, he feared to attempt the passage of the river, and halted to ascertain the success of a reconnoissance he had pushed forward. To the

allies it was of the utmost importance he should not gain possession of the strong country beyond the Mondego ; a corps was therefore dispatched over the mountains to the eastward, as if to occupy the passes, and alarm him for that flank. This manœuvre had the desired effect, as Massena, fearing to have both communications closed on him, made a sudden and rapid move with his whole army into the road between the Serra de Estrella and the Mondego. On that line the direction of the rivers and of the ravines, constantly opposing an extended and difficult front to the pursuers, was particularly favourable to his mode of covering his retreat : he was nevertheless very closely pressed, so much so, that at the passage of the Ceira, to secure the safety of his main body, he was compelled to sacrifice a part of his rear-guard ; it remained to be attacked, in a less favourable position than it usually occupied, and was driven across the river with severe loss. He even destroyed much ammunition and many stores, and there was every prospect of obliging him to abandon his artillery and baggage, when on the 19th, the allies, having outmarched their supplies, were obliged to relax in the pursuit for some days ; during which time he made such progress as ultimately to succeed in retiring them across the Coa.

General Reynier halted till the 3d April with

his corps behind that river where it makes a considerable elbow near Sabugal; which confidence had nearly caused its capture. Lord Wellington directed the light division to cross the Coa at a ford two or three miles above the town, and manœuvre in his rear, whilst two divisions should attack him in front. The day was very rainy and obscure, and the light division did not make a sufficiently wide movement; but became engaged with the flank of the enemy before the divisions in front were far enough advanced to support it. A battalion of the rifle corps was first in action, which the cavalry charged, and would have completely cut up, had not Colonel Beckwith, who commanded it, with great promptitude availed himself of the defence afforded by a square stone inclosure, into which he threw his men, and repelled the efforts of Reynier's whole corps till the remainder of the division came to his aid. Then the combat became more equal, and was maintained with spirit on both sides, till the divisions in front made their appearance; on which Reynier, perceiving that he was nearly surrounded, instantly retired as fast as the individuals composing his force could move, leaving a howitzer and 340 men dead on the field; and losing, before he reached Alfaiates, about an equal number who were made prisoners.

This affair closed the pursuit on that road; but two days afterwards, the cavalry, with two troops of horse-artillery, fell unexpectedly on a brigade of French infantry at Junça, the commander of which displayed the greatest coolness and bravery: he formed his men into a square, which though galloped round by the cavalry, and apparently overwhelmed by the fire of the artillery, continued slowly to retire across the open country till it reached the Duas Casas; even carrying off a superior officer who was severely wounded, and whose sufferings caused a retardment of its march. Indeed, the retreat of the French army throughout was conducted with much ability, and from the motives which restrained the direct attacks of the pursuing force, its loss by the sword, or prisoners, did not probably exceed 5,000 men; that of the allies being under 650. Having thus freely bestowed the tribute of praise justly due to the French as soldiers, it is but proper to notice their conduct as men; and to state, as an eye-witness, that the unnecessary cruelties and wanton destruction which marked every step of their retreat, were such as to cast a shade over their character which no military glory can efface, and to stamp them rather as sanguinary and unprincipled banditti, than as the organized warriors of a civilized state.

On the 9th April, Head-quarters were fixed

at Villa-formosa: Almeida was the same day reconnoitred, and being found amply garrisoned, and beyond a coup-de-main, and there being neither battering artillery nor siege stores with the army for its reduction, it was blockaded, and the troops were posted in front to prevent any of the enemy's detachments communicating with it. The disorganized and wretched state of Massena's army rendering it improbable that any great movement should be immediately made for its relief, Lord Wellington took the opportunity of inaction to visit that part of his army acting on the Alemtejo frontier. His return however was demanded before the end of the month; as the most strenuous exertions having been made to refit and reorganize the French army on its arrival at Salamanca, and the remaining infantry of the ninth corps, with a strong body of cavalry, and some brigades of artillery of the Imperial Guard, being united with it, Massena again mustered 40,000 infantry and 5,000 good cavalry, under his command. With that force he crossed the frontier on the 2d May, escorting a large convoy of stores and provisions, to revictual Almeida; and Lord Wellington, whose army, about 36,000 men, was cantoned on the Azava, immediately concentrated it, to give battle and oppose the entry of the supplies.

Almeida is situated on the right of the Coa,

a considerable river, running in a northerly direction, the banks of which are steep and mountainous, having but few communications across them. The principal are by the bridge of Almeida; by the bridge of Castello-boim, seven miles above Almeida; by the ford of St. Roque, near Freneda, three miles higher up; beyond which none of any military importance occur till near Sabugal, thirty miles above Almeida. At Sabugal, there is a good stone bridge, and the high roads from Guarda and Castello-branco, into Spain, pass over it.

In front of the Coa, in nearly a parallel direction to it, runs a small river called the Duas Casas, the ground between the two rivers, though high, being in general open. The village of Fuentes de Honor, opposite to Freneda on the Coa, is built on the left bank of the Duas Casas, extending up the western side of the valley, which is at that point and below it a very strong feature; but above the village, the head of the valley gradually wears itself out, and its banks rise in easy slopes.

Almeida being on the enemy's side of the Coa, the allies, to oppose a force coming to its relief, were obliged to engage with that river in their rear. To ensure the object for which they were about to fight, their left was of neces-

sity posted so near to the blockaded fortress, as to prevent any communication with the garrison round that flank; and the bridge at Sabugal being the only spot at which, in case of disaster, the army could with convenience recross the river, it was highly desirable that the right should be sufficiently extended, to keep open the communication with it also. Thus the protection of two extreme distant points was to be provided for in the formation of the army, requiring a front much beyond what its numbers would properly cover.

Lord Wellington selected for his field of battle the high ground behind the *Duas Casas*, placing the divisions of Generals Spencer, Picton, and Houston, in rear of *Fuentes de Honor*, and strongly occupying that village with their light infantry. In the same line, on the left, but a little detached, were Generals Craufurd's and Campbell's divisions, opposite to the village of *Alameda*, where there is a bridge over the *Duas Casas*. Sir W. Erskine's division was posted on the extreme left, to guard the great road to *Almeida*, which crosses the river by a ford under *Fort Concepcion*; and a Portuguese brigade with a British battalion under General Pack closely invested the fortress. A body of Spaniards, commanded by Don Julian Sanchez, was placed in the village

of Nava de Aver, two miles beyond the right of the army, for the further security of that flank.

On the 3d May, the enemy took post on the opposite side of the valley of the Duas Casas, their left being in front of the village of Fuentes de Honor, and their right extending about two miles and a half to Alameda. At first they threatened to attack from the latter point; but in the afternoon, made a desperate effort to carry the village of Fuentes, the possession of which would have enabled them to pierce through the front of the allies. That post was consequently defended with the greatest obstinacy, and the assailants, after many vigorous efforts, gladly availed themselves of the night to desist from the contest, having experienced a heavy loss. Being thus foiled in the endeavour forcibly to break through the line opposed to him, Massena passed the whole of the following day in reconnoitring, which gave cause to suspect some manœuvre on the right. General Houston's division was in consequence moved to Poza-Velha on that flank, the weakest point of the front; the features of the valley of the Duas Casas being there nearly worn out, and the river being fordable. During the night of the 4th, Massena marched his troops bodily to their left;

forming Junot's corps and all his cavalry in front of General Houston's division. This manœuvre was followed by a corresponding movement on the part of the allies; General Craufurd's division and the cavalry were sent to the support of General Houston, and Generals Spencer and Picton's divisions were moved to their right.

Soon after day-light on the 5th, Junot's corps attacked General Houston's division, and carried the village of Poza Velha: in following up this success, the French cavalry, by superiority of numbers, drove that of the allies beyond the infantry; which stood firm, and by a well directed fire, checked the pursuit. The horse-artillery were conspicuous in aiding the infantry, and the enemy halted. The Spanish troops in Nava de Aver, thus separated from the line by the loss of Poza Velha, made a detour to the rear, to Freneda.

Lord Wellington now determined to give up his communication with the bridge at Sabugal, and to strengthen his position by concentrating his army: with that intent, Generals Craufurd's and Houston's divisions were retired from the right, and formed in a line extending from the Duas Casas, towards Freneda on the Coa, at right angles to their original formation; the cavalry being placed in reserve. The enemy

attempted unsuccessfully to break the troops whilst executing this change of position; but when formed on the new line, they did nothing further than keep up a fire of artillery, which was not attended with any great effect. On the original front they renewed their attempts to carry the village of Fuentes, which was obstinately defended, and after a long struggle the allies retained possession of all the upper part of it. This was the expiring effort of Marshal Massena's command: foiled in every attempt, he feared to hazard a fresh attack, and remained quiet till the 9th, in presence of his antagonist; who, more active, availed himself of the opportunity to entrench the whole extent of his new front, and to render his position most formidable on the side where, two days previously, it had been the weakest. Massena then seeing all chance vanish of renewing the combat with success, retired towards Salamanca, leaving Almeida to its fate, and immediately afterwards resigned the command of the army. In this struggle the allies lost 198 killed, 1028 wounded, and 294 made prisoners.

Lord Wellington made instant arrangements to secure the prize his victory had gained him, and being aware of the intention of the Governor of Almeida to evacuate the place,

took such measures to prevent the escape of the garrison, as seemed to preclude the possibility of it; but from a delay in the execution of his orders, they were rendered almost nugatory. General Brenier, on the evening of the 10th, at the moment when the explosion of a number of fougaces blew down the entire revetement of two fronts, sallied out with his whole garrison, surprized and bayoneted the nearest piquet of the investing corps, and marching across the country, avoiding the principal roads, arrived with little loss near Barba del Puerco; he there passed unobserved a body of troops posted to oppose him, but in crossing the Agueda, his rear was attacked by another detachment, and about 200 of his men were destroyed. Having passed the bridge, no further effort could be made against the fugitives, as a whole corps of the French army was in readiness to support them.

The victory at Fuentes, and the fall of Almeida, having ensured the safety of the north of Portugal, Lord Wellington detached General Picton's and Houston's divisions to the Alentejo to reinforce Marshal Beresford; and being informed on the 16th, that Marshal Soult was in movement in that quarter, his Lordship followed, leaving the troops in the north under the command of Sir B. Spencer.

CHAPTER IV.

Military operations on the Alemtejo frontier in furtherance of the conquest of Portugal—Marshal Soult takes Olivença, Badajos, and Campo-mayor—Marshal Beresford forces the French to recross the Guadiana—retakes Olivença, and besieges Badajos—Soult advances with an army to its relief—is defeated at Albuera—second siege of Badajos—French armies of the North and South unite for its relief—the Allies retire into Portugal.—Being the period from December, 1810, to June, 1811.

To aid in the conquest of Portugal, an army of 14,000 men was drafted from the French forces in the south of Spain, which under the command of Marshal Soult advanced, at the end of December, to reduce Badajos, and open a communication across the Tagus with Marshal Massena. Generals Balasteros and Mendizabal, who commanded the Spanish armies in Estremadura, being unequal to oppose it, retired on its approach; the former to Salvatierra, and the lower parts of the Guadiana; the latter into Portugal, unaccountably leaving in Olivença seven battalions and a brigade of field artillery, with scarcely any provisions. Soult blockaded the place on

the 11th January, and on the 22d famine induced its surrender at discretion.

Having taken steps to make Olivença a place of arms in support of his further operations, Soult detached Marshal Mortier on the 26th January to invest Badajos; which was the same day completely shut up on the left of the Guadiana by the infantry, and a partial interruption given to its communications with Portugal by the cavalry, which forded the river. Two days afterwards, the siege commenced, and on the 11th February the batteries opened. The same evening the Pardaleras crown-work was stormed by parties advancing from the trenches, and was carried with scarcely any opposition; but from the rockiness of the ground it was several days before the enemy could secure a lodgment in it.

At this period, a considerable Spanish force came to the assistance of the besieged. The moment it was known at Cartaxo that Soult was in movement, Lord Wellington arranged a plan of operations with Romana for the defence of the southern frontier; and pointed out a position behind the Gevora, having its right on Fort Christoval, as the best situation for the Spaniards to keep open the communication with Badajos, should that fortress be attacked. The

Spanish troops had already separated from the British, and the Marquis de la Romana had named the following day for his departure to join them, when on the 23d January he suddenly expired at Cartaxo from an ossification of the vessels of the heart, universally regretted by his countrymen and their allies. The command in consequence devolved on General Mendizabal, who followed the plan laid down, and on the 9th February opening a communication with the garrison, posted his army on the Christoval heights; in which situation he kept the besiegers in a constant state of alarm, and it became an object of the first importance to them to dislodge him. Unhappily he gave the opportunity, by moving his whole force to its left, out of the protection of Fort Christoval, on account of a few howitzer shells thrown into his camp from the opposite bank of the river. This being observed by Marshal Mortier, he established a flying bridge upon the Guadiana, above the town; and in the night of the 18th February, crossed over a detachment of 6,000 men from the besieging army, which forded the Gevora, and at daylight commenced the attack. The force opposed to them consisted of 9,000 Spanish infantry, and a brigade of Portuguese cavalry; the troops of both nations be-

haved ill, and deriving little advantage from position, were quickly routed. The cavalry ensured safety by an immediate flight; notwithstanding a noble example shewn them by their commanding and other officers, who were conspicuous in their endeavours to retain them. Don Carlos de Espana succeeded in retiring 500 of the infantry to Elvas, about 3000 escaped into Badajos, and the remainder were either killed or made prisoners.

Being thus relieved from the inquietude of the army in the field, Mortier invested the place all round, and used every exertion to press forward the siege. The French, after securing themselves in the Pardaleras, struck out a parallel to the right and left, and threw up enfilading batteries against the works of the town: the approaches were yet twenty yards distant from the salients of the covered-way, when it was accidentally discovered on the 28th February, by the bold advance of an officer, that it was not occupied in the night; in consequence, on the next evening, the crest of the glacis was crowned by the flying sap. On the night of the 8th, the counterscarp of the ditch of the ravelin was blown in, and the ravelin itself, being abandoned by the garrison, was gained without a struggle. On the 9th, the breaching battery

opened; and on the 10th, the Governor capitulated, although previously informed by a telegraphic communication, that Massena had commenced his retreat, and that he should be immediately relieved. The garrison, 9,000 in number, marched out on the following day, and laid down their arms to 13,000 French.

Mortier then invested Campo-mayor, a large frontier town of Portugal, which being partly dismantled, was left with only a piquet of 200 militia to keep guard over five pieces of artillery, standing on the ramparts; notwithstanding which, Major Tallaia, the Governor, an officer, from his profession, (the Engineers,) perfectly skilled in the art of defending places, made such an appearance of resistance, as induced the French to set down regularly before the town. They brought up a battering train, and went through the whole ceremony of erecting enfilading, mortar, and breaching batteries; and after five days continued firing effected a practicable breach, when the weak garrison became at their mercy: yet even then, the Governor stipulated for 24 hours delay for the chance of being relieved; which not occurring he marched out on the 23d March. Mortier instantly commenced preparations to evacuate the town, and to send his artillery and stores to Badajos; but he had not

time to effect their removal, before he was interrupted by the approach of a British force under Marshal Beresford.

It had been arranged that the corps on the south of the Tagus should march to the relief of Badajos the moment that Massena should break up from his cantonments; but when the enemy's troops were first in movement on the 5th March, and their intentions were not positively ascertained, a considerable detachment from it crossed the Tagus at Abrantes to attack the entrenchments and destroy the bridge at Punhete. General Stewart, who commanded, finding the French garrison withdrawn from thence previously to his arrival, crossed the Zezere, to endeavour to hasten the retreat of the enemy's main body, by threatening their flank. These manœuvres occupied some days, and the corps was not sufficiently strong to advance in the absence of the detachment; indeed the destruction of the Spanish army under Mendizabel rendered necessary that the force to act in the Alemtejo should be augmented, even beyond the numbers originally allotted for that service; and to increase its strength, the fourth division was ordered to join it. From these causes, and the difficulty of establishing a bridge for want of materials, it was not till the 17th

that Sir William Beresford was enabled to recross the Tagus at Tancos, and put his corps in motion: it consisted of the Honourable Wm. Stewart and Lowrey Cole's divisions, General Hamilton's Portugueze division, with the 13th Light Dragoons, some heavy cavalry, and two brigades of artillery. It marched by Ponte de Sor, Craço, and Portalegre to Campo-mayor, where it arrived on the 25th March. A large convoy was just moving off, consisting of artillery, ammunition-waggon, strings of loaded mules, &c. escorted by 800 or 900 cavalry, and three battalions of infantry. An immediate pursuit was ordered, and the allied cavalry quickly came up with the French. Some squadrons made a most brilliant charge, and cut their way through the escort; after which, galloping along the road, they obliged the guard of the convoy to throw down their arms, and obtained possession of many guns and waggons: but before the infantry could come up to secure the prizes thus gained, the drivers moved on, and nearly all the convoy effected its retreat to Badajos. The allies in this affair suffered severely, upwards of 150 being killed, wounded, or made prisoners; owing chiefly to the too great ardour of the dragoons which led them to pursue the enemy to the very walls of the town.

The French having thus withdrawn from the right of the Guadiana, it became a consideration how to pass that river in pursuit of them, and to blockade Badajos before it could be provisioned, or put into a state of defence; the only two bridges, those of Merida and Badajos, being in their possession, and the army not being accompanied by a pontoon train. The best ford was readily discovered to be that opposite Fort Juramenha, only practicable for cavalry; but under any circumstances it could not be considered a proper permanent communication for an army, as the Guadiana is subject to very sudden rises. A bridge on trestles was therefore put down; but the day it was finished, the river rose so much as to render it useless; in consequence, the army was on the 5th April ferried across in rafts, which occupied the whole of the two following days. Headquarters were then established at a small village on the left bank, which, by the surprize of a cavalry piquet, the enemy entered in the night; but were almost immediately driven out again by an infantry guard. During this delay, the French had filled in the trenches before Badajos, partly built up the breach, and removed their battering train; therefore on the approach of the allies, leaving a sufficient garrison in the place,

Mortier retired on Seville. He also left a detachment of 400 men in Olivença, a considerable town, fortified with nine regular fronts, standing in an open country, two leagues from Juramenha, and blocking up no communication. It would therefore be difficult to assign a specious reason for leaving so small a body of men as 400, in so large a place; a number totally inadequate to any purposes of protracted defence, and yet far too great to sacrifice without an object. The town was immediately invested, and being found properly secured on all sides, not to lose men unnecessarily by an assault, General Cole, with his division, was ordered to reduce it in form. The Marshal, in the meanwhile, with the main body of the army, advanced to prevent any further supplies being thrown into Badajos; and after a successful cavalry encounter with the enemy at Los Santos, took post at Zafra.

On the 15th, General Cole having established a breaching battery, and having placed field howitzers to enfilade and see in reverse the part intended to be laid open, sent a flag of truce, offering terms to the Governor if he would surrender in half an hour; to which no answer being returned, the batteries opened at the expiration of the period. The wall proved extremely bad, and a great effect was

soon produced, when the governor hoisted a white flag, and expressed his readiness to accept the conditions offered. General Cole now refused him any terms, insisted on an unconditional surrender, and ordered the artillery to resume their fire. In two hours more the breach became nearly practicable, and the governor, fearing an assault, gave up the town.

The garrison marched out prisoners, 370, officers and soldiers. So ill provided for defence was the place, that, with the exception of five Spanish field-pieces, all the other guns were without carriages; the commandant however had, with much ingenuity, contrived to mount them on cars of the country, after the investment.

The Marshal, on the fall of Olivença, directed his views to the re-capture of Badajos, and was taking the preliminary steps by securing the communications across the Guadiana, when Lord Wellington arrived from the army of the north, and the two commanders, under a strong escort, reconnoitred the place. They found the whole enceinte fortified with regular and well covered works, not to be reduced by any means of attack at their disposition; except at the point of junction of the Rivillas with the Guadiana, where a steep and commanding height, washed by those rivers, giving a strong natural defence,

the fortifications were confined to a simple wall, built on the crest of the hill; being the front of an old castle which domineers over the works of the town.

Further observing that all the interior of the castle could be seen from a small fort situated on the heights of Christoval, on the Portugueze side of the Guadiana, and that the back of the front defence of the castle might be enfiladed from thence: it became clear that should the fort be reduced, and heavy batteries erected within it, no body of men, exposed to their fire, could stand to dispute a breach in the wall which formed the sole defence of the castle. That wall, from its uncovered position, appeared liable to be battered down from a distance; and as when in possession of the castle, the resistance of the town must, under its commanding influence, cease, Badajos might by this mode of attack be captured in a fortnight.

The only apprehension was, that the river and the steep ascent of the height might prove insurmountable obstacles; but officers of engineers having in the night ascended to the very foot of the wall, and ascertained that in reality they presented no difficulties, the plan was adopted.

Lord Wellington being recalled to the north, by the movements of Massena for the relief of

Almeida, the conduct of the siege was left to Marshal Beresford. Two different descriptions of bridges, for the conveyance of artillery and stores, were completed over the Guadiana on the 23d April; and the following day was fixed for the investment of the place. The weather had apparently settled fine, and every thing promised well: but such is the uncertainty of military operations, and on such uncontrollable causes does success frequently depend, that from the fall of distant torrents, the river swelled perpendicularly in the night seven feet; before the bridges could be taken up they were carried away, and the materials composing them floated down the stream; so that on the 24th the army, far from being able to act offensively, had lost all its communications with Portugal.

In a few days, by great exertions, another bridge was prepared, and the place was invested. On the night of the 8th the siege commenced, and notwithstanding the rockiness of the ground, an incessant fire of artillery, and a vigorous sortie in which the garrison obtained some success, a battery to breach Christoval opened at daylight on the 11th. It was, however, quickly silenced, the young Portugueze gunners, who alone were employed, being too unpractised for such a service, and their guns also proving ex-

tremely bad; from these causes, in a few hours only one piece of artillery remained serviceable.

Marshal Beresford ordered additional guns to be brought from Elvas, and was in the act of opening ground against the castle, when he received intelligence that Marshal Soult had arrived at Llerena, with a force to succour the place; in consequence, the siege was raised, and the stores and artillery removed on the night of the 14th, under protection of General Cole's division. At the moment the rear-guard drew off, the garrison made a sortie in force, by which a Portugueze light battalion suffered severely, making the total loss during the operation above 100 killed and 650 wounded.

The army marched to Valverde and united with corps of Spaniards under Generals Castanos, Blake, and Balasteros, drawn from Cadiz and other places; after which the whole took post, to give battle to the advancing force, and prevent any supplies being thrown into Badajos. To induce the Spaniards heartily to co-operate with the British and Portugueze in this measure, Lord Wellington some time before proposed that, whenever the troops of the three nations should act together, the officer having the superior rank should command; consequently Castanos, as such, might now have assumed the chief direc-

tion; but with a self-denial and moderation rarely to be met with, he ceded his right to Marshal Beresford, stating, that real strength and not nominal rank ought to give precedence, and that the Spaniards, as the weakest body, would on this occasion consider themselves merely as auxiliaries.

The position selected for the combined armies was behind the little river Albuera, where the roads leading from Seville to Olivença and Badajoz separate, after crossing the river by a bridge close to the village of Albuera. The Albuera runs into the Guadiana, and the village of the same name is on its left bank. The ground on the west side rises in gentle swells and easy slopes: on the summit of this rise, nearly parallel to the river, the army was formed; its left having the village of Albuera in front, and the banks of the river being a further defence. The right had no particular appui, the swellings of the ground succeeding each other so rapidly, that every extension to one knoll, rendered it desirable to prolong the line to the next: therefore, after drawing it out to the utmost, and placing the right on a commanding feature, ground still remained on that flank very favourable to the enemy. Above the point forming the right of the line, the Albuera is merely a rivulet. On the eastern side of the river, in

front of the left of the position, the country is perfectly flat and open for an extent of six or seven hundred yards; at that distance are gentle rises covered with thick woods, which, opposite to the right, wind round in a semicircular form, till they meet the Albuera stream, above that part of the ridge occupied by the allies. On the night of the 15th, Marshal Soult took post on the woody hills above described, with 20,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 40 pieces of cannon. Marshal Beresford to oppose him had two divisions of British and Portugueze; one division of Portugueze, and 14,000 Spanish troops, composing a body of 27,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 32 pieces of cannon.

The Spaniards were formed on the right in two lines; General Stewart's division was in the centre, and General Hamilton's Portugueze division on the left; General Cole's division, (which joined from Badajos as the action commenced,) and a Portugueze brigade, formed a second line, in rear of the centre; the village of Albuera was occupied by a brigade of light infantry under General Alten; and the cavalry, under General Lumley, were posted to cover the right flank of the Spaniards.

At eight o'clock on the morning of the 16th, a heavy French column marched out of the wood,

directing its course on the village of Albuera, as if to attack the left of the allies; but whilst all attention was directed to that column, which was only a feint, the main body of the enemy, under cover of the wood to the right, crossed the Albuera above the position, and began to ascend the heights on the right of the Spaniards, unopposed. As soon as the heads of the columns debouched from the wood, and this movement could be observed, Marshal Beresford profited by the little time yet remaining, to give the Spanish troops a new alignment fronting their original flank, and to throw back the right of his reserve the better to support them. The French, from the heights they had gained, being on nearly equal ground, directed their main effort against the Spaniards, who received the shock with firmness, and maintained their post till overpowered by numbers, when they were forced back, and the enemy began to deploy his columns on one of the most commanding points of the position. At the same time, the French cavalry threatened the rear of the allies by a wide movement round their right flank; and the column which first advanced made fresh demonstrations of forcing the left. The issue of the contest depended therefore on recovering the ground from which the Spaniards had been dri-

ven. General Stewart's division was ordered forward for that purpose: heavy rain with a thick mist at the moment obscured the combatants from each other, and when the leading brigade of the division was in the act of charging the enemy, some squadrons of Polish lancers, which in the mist had wheeled unperceived into their rear, fell unexpectedly on their right flank, and made all but the left battalion prisoners; also capturing the guns which supported the advance. The day now appeared lost: but Major-General the Honourable William Stewart with the remainder of his division, and Major-General the Honourable Lowrey Cole with part of his division, immediately moving forward in line, and charging the enemy before their formation was complete, drove them off the hill with prodigious slaughter, and fixed victory with the allies. Never was there a more severe trial of individual and collective bravery: Major-General Houghton and many distinguished officers fell whilst gallantly leading on their men, whole ranks of whom were observed after the combat extended on the ground, in the order in which they had fought; and fields far in the rear of the allies were strewed with the bodies of Polish lancers, who had penetrated singly beyond the contending parties. These desperadoes galloped about in all

directions, spearing many of the wounded men and their defenceless supporters: one of them even charged Marshal Beresford himself, who grappling with him, threw him from his horse; when the stroke of a sabre from an orderly dragoon finished the Pole's career.

The French officers made many efforts, but in vain, to rally their men, and induce them to renew the attack; they therefore retired them under protection of their superior cavalry, to the hills on the opposite side of the river, where they remained during the following day; keeping a division of infantry in the plain, and holding the bridge over the Albuera. On the night of the 17th, Soult commenced his retreat on Seville, having lost in the conflict, as appeared by an enumeration of the bodies left on the field, and by an intercepted return of the wounded carried off, fully 8,000 men. The British and Portugueze also suffered severely in this sanguinary contest, having 1,000 killed, 3,000 wounded, and 570 made prisoners; the Spaniards lost above 2,000 in killed and wounded. As soon as the retreat of the enemy was known on the morning of the 18th, the cavalry was detached in pursuit of them, and in a gallant affair at Usagre, made some prisoners. The same day, the infantry resumed its ground before

Badajos, and Marshal Beresford had the satisfaction to find that Soult had been unable to communicate with the garrison, and consequently, the object of his giving battle to the French at Albuera had been fully attained.

Lord Wellington at this period assumed the personal command in the Alemtejo, and shortly afterwards the divisions detached from the north after the battle of Fuentes de Honor, joined, and the allies obtained a decided superiority. It was, however, to be apprehended that the French army of Portugal, to the command of which Marshal Marmont had just succeeded, would speedily cross the Tagus, and give the advantage of numbers to the enemy. The meditated operation against Badajos must consequently be of a rapid nature, and officers having ascertained, by personal examination in the night, that no alteration had been made to the castle defences, it was decided to renew the former attack with a greater power of artillery, and every thing which Elvas could supply was drawn from thence.

On the 27th, General Houston's division invested the place on the right, and Generals Picton's and Hamilton's divisions on the left of the river. Two days afterwards ground was broken against Christoval; but it was with difficulty

cover could be obtained at the advanced batteries, as the garrison had scraped away the earth, and left the rock bare: moreover, being fully prepared, and in expectation of the event, they opened a fire of cannon and musketry the instant the party began to work, which continued without intermission throughout the night; however, by means of woolsacks and other auxiliaries the batteries were all completed on the 2d, and at day-light on the 3d, opened on both sides of the river. The fire was kept up with such success, that on the night of the 5th, the breach in Christoval, on being reconnoitred, was found practicable, and at midnight was assaulted. The advance of the storming party entered the ditch, and attempted to ascend the breach; when they discovered that between the period of dark and the time of their advance, the earth had been removed, and the lower seven feet of the wall was standing clear. Instead of retiring, which might have been effected with little loss, the spirit of the men led them to endeavour to force over the wall, in which impracticable attempt they persevered for above an hour, whilst the enemy from the top of the parapet showered down upon them shells, hand-grenades, stones, &c. killing and wounding half their numbers, when the residue retired.

During the two following days, the breach was widened, and being again rendered practicable was assaulted immediately that it became dark in order to prevent its being cleared. The party advanced with resolution; but the situation of the defenders was quite changed. At the last assault there were only 75 men in the fort; it was now fully manned, with ample reserves; and the French, elated by recent success, received the assailants with cheers and invitations to approach. - The commanding officer, and the engineer conducting the column, were early killed, the next in seniority were wounded, and the remainder endeavoured to force in as they could. The enemy threw into the ditch, as at the former attack, quantities of bags filled with powder, shells, hand-grénades, stones, &c. and there being no fire from the trenches to prevent it, they mounted on the top of the parapet, from whence they took a deadly aim, and two thirds of the assailants were killed or maimed before their situation could be reported, and orders sent for their recal. The wounded Portugueze and English, stretched in great numbers upon the glacis, prevented an immediate renewal of the fire from the besiegers' batteries, of which the

garrison took advantage completely to clear the foot of the breach.

Nothing but the failure of this attack could have saved Badajos; as the breach in the castle was quite practicable, and the besiegers only waited the fall of Christoval to give the assault. That enterprize was necessarily dependent on the expulsion of the enemy from the fort, as the artillery from thence sweeps along the foot of the castle wall, and over the ground in its front.

From the exhausted state of the country it had been found impracticable to bring up battering artillery from Lisbon, and the guns used were Portugueze, made of brass, which being unequal to bear the constant service required of them, were rapidly becoming unserviceable, and the shot provided for the siege were nearly expended. Considerable further supplies would therefore be required to render the breach in Christoval again in a state to be assaulted, and to maintain a constant fire on that in the castle to prevent its being cleared; and as during that delay the armies of Soult and Marmont, known to be in rapid march for the relief of the place, would have time to unite, Lord Wellington ordered the siege to be converted into a blockade. The last of the guns and stores

were removed on the night of the 12th without any molestation from the garrison, and the total loss of the besiegers during the operation did not exceed 118 killed and 367 wounded.

The Spaniards under Blake were detached along the right bank of the Guadiana to cross into the country of Niebla, and make an attempt to carry off some of the French posts which had been weakened by drafts to form the advancing army, whilst Lord Wellington took post in front of Albuera with his own forces, to cover the blockade. The allies in that situation held Soult's corps in check, till the near approach of Marmont rendered a retreat necessary, when they recrossed the Guadiana, and on the 19th the French relieved Badajos. The following day the corps from the north under Sir B. Spencer, having kept a parallel movement with the enemy in its front, united with the main body of the army, and it was decided to give the two Marshals battle, should they attempt to penetrate into Portugal. To engage with advantage, a favourable position was selected on the heights in rear of Campo-mayor, which was strengthened with works, and the troops were placed in bivouac in the woods on the banks of the Caya, in readiness to occupy it on the first movement of the enemy.

CHAPTER V.

Military events in the South of Spain—the French retrench their cantonments near Cadiz—a Spanish and British force manœuvre to destroy their works—gain a victory at Barrosa, and retire into the island of Leon—Guerrillas—activity of Balasteros—French unsuccessfully attack Tarifa—affairs of the Eastern Provinces—Marshal Suchet takes Tortosa, Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tarragona—defeats the Valencian army under Blake—captures Murviedro and Valencia.—Being the period from the Spring of 1810 to the Conclusion of 1811.

SOME months passed after the occupation of Seville and Grenada by the French, before they obtained quiet possession of the provinces of the south. In all the mountainous districts, particularly the Sierra Morena, and the Alpujarras, the guerrilla warfare was long directed against them with activity and success. Gibraltar supplied the Patriots with arms and ammunition, and became a depôt for their prisoners, and an occasional point of support to their operations: at the same time, a considera-

ble portion of the French army was prevented acting against them by the regular force in Cadiz, which it was employed to observe. The first efforts of Marshal Soult in that quarter were to confine the Spaniards to the island of Leon by the reduction of Fort Matagorda; which being a small work, injudiciously dismantled on the first alarm, was, soon after the enemy's artillery opened, rendered untenable. The garrison was brought off in boats on the 23d April with little loss under the fire of the besiegers' batteries.

The Island of Leon is of some extent, and, for the sake of illustration, may be called of a triangular form, two sides of it being washed either by the harbour or the ocean, and consequently secure from the attacks of a land force. The third side, about eight miles in extent, is merely separated from the continent by a channel from 80 to 150 yards in width called the San Pedro river. Over this channel, the only communication to the country connects with a causeway artificially formed through a broad and difficult marsh, which everywhere bounds the land frontier of the Island. At the apex of the triangle, or point farthest removed from the continent, a low, narrow tongue of land stretches out four miles into the ocean; at the extremity of which stands the town of Cadiz.

strongly fortified, and presenting to the attack of an enemy only one front of fortification which occupies the whole breadth of the isthmus. The Spaniards collected 15,000 troops for the defence of the Island, and an auxiliary force of 6,000 or 7,000 British and Portuguese soon came to their aid, under Sir Thomas Graham. That officer, with great labour and ability, constructed a line of defensive works behind the river San Pedro, occupying the Caraccas as an advanced post on the left, and extending to the ocean on the right. The French, on their side, spared no labour to secure their cantonments: they fortified with care Puerto Real, Puerto St. Maria, and Chiclana, forming intrenched camps in the intermediate spaces; but above all they strengthened the point of Trocadero, where they established batteries, which at long and uncertain ranges occasionally threw shells into the town.

The two parties thus mutually regarded each other with distrust. The French could not possibly undertake any offensive operations against a place so well secured: and the only enterprize of their opponents worthy of remark was sending a detachment of 2,500 Spaniards and British, under Lord Blayney, in the middle of October, to take by a coup-de-main the castle of Fran-

gerola, near Malaga; the possession of which post would have opened a point of communication with the neighbouring mountaineers who yet resisted the French, and it was expected would lead to the recovery of Malaga. The troops were disembarked in the Calle de Mora, twelve miles westward of the place, from whence the road proved very bad, and the march occupied many hours. On investing the castle it was found so much more strongly garrisoned than had been anticipated, that an escalade was not deemed advisable; and twenty-four hours passed away in the operation of putting in battery against it some artillery from the ships, which gave time for General Sebastiani to arrive for its relief with a superior force. A few minutes previously to his appearance on the flank of the investing corps, the garrison made a sortie in front. Lord Blayney, who mistook the approaching force for Spaniards, was at the first onset made prisoner, with many men; the remainder were driven to the sea-side, and indebted to the men of war's launches for escaping a watery grave.

The inactivity of the Spaniards at this period arose in a great measure from the want of a fixed government. The Central Junta finished its unfortunate rule in a popular tumult, which took

place at Seville on the approach of the French. The members separately fled to Cadiz, where three and twenty of them united on the 29th January, and attempted to resume their authority; but neither the Local Junta, the army, nor the populace, would obey their decrees; upon which, in a dignified address to their countrymen, they made a solemn resignation of their authority, appointing a Council of Regency of five persons to carry on the government till the Cortes should be assembled. On the dissolution of the Junta, the individuals who had composed it were treated as criminals: the most obnoxious to the ruling influence were imprisoned, and the remainder banished, without distinction of character or conduct.

From the acts of subsequent governments, in no respect more energetic than those of the Central Junta, the justice of such treatment may be questioned. The members suddenly called to the direction of affairs had no example to guide them, no routine to follow; but a disorganized machine to set in movement and regulate under the most complicated difficulties. This they stated in vindication of their conduct in different appeals to the nation; which, while drawn up with moderation and candour, appear in the original manly and dignified, and

cannot be read without sympathy. The following few passages are selected to shew the nature of their apologies.

“ When the government of the country was committed to our charge, our armies, half organized, were destitute of every thing. Our treasury was empty, and our resources distant and uncertain: before we had time to act, the despot of France poured through the Pyrenees the most formidable military force ever known; his veteran legions, better provided, and far the most numerous, surrounded our disjointed armies, and in a moment Spain lost half her defenders. The reorganization of those forces and the creation of other armies have absorbed all the resources since then at our command. Wherever our authority extended, there has perfect liberty and justice prevailed, and even throughout the provinces occupied by the enemy, we have endeavoured, through many secret channels, to keep alive the fire of patriotism. We have upheld the national honour in the most delicate negotiations; always manfully bearing up against adversity, ever trusting that we should overcome it by our constancy. It is true we have committed many errors, and we would, were it possible, redeem them with our blood;

but in the various difficulties which encompassed us, who could have always acted right? Can it with justice be imputed to us that one general possessed little prudence, and that another was deserted by fortune; that one army wanted courage, and another confidence? Much, O Spaniards! is to be attributed to your inexperience, and much to circumstances.”

It has already been observed that the Central Junta, from its composition, and from the previous habits of the members which composed it, was altogether unfit to direct the affairs of a nation. They however were Spaniards, who never distrust their own powers, and they clung to the chief authority long after the nation had discovered their inability to wield it. This weakness, with the procrastination general in their countrymen, was their grand fault; and on dispassionately regarding the acts of their administration, even at this short distance of time, more seem worthy of praise than of censure, and few indeed can be suspected of criminality.

Spain gained nothing by the change of rulers; the Regency being still more desirous to prolong the period of their rule than the Junta had been. So many trifling difficulties were permitted to have weight in regulating the forms of election of the deputies to the Cortes, that the summer passed

away without any decision; as would most probably succeeding seasons, had not the intrusive King stimulated them into activity by some movements, to realise a promise made the preceding April, to convoke a similar assembly at Madrid. The apprehension of a counter government caused all lesser considerations to vanish, and the meeting of the Cortes was finally arranged for the month of September.

No such procrastination injured the cause of the intruders; who, bred under a system where the most momentous changes daily occurred, never admitted discussions about forms or justice for an instant to thwart their views. Joseph Buonaparte, on his return to Madrid from the conquest of the southern provinces, affected to consider the subjugation of the country complete, and acted as the acknowledged sovereign of Spain. Besides the boon of convoking the Cortes before alluded to, he published flattering promises of increased prosperity in every department of the state from his paternal care: renovated naval strength, revived commerce, improved agriculture, and a thousand other blessings, were held out in dazzling perspective to his faithful subjects. In the meanwhile, the French commanders turned Joseph's pretensions to real account: they issued pro-

clamations affecting the whole population, enforcing requisitions of every kind, and amongst others, for all the best animals in the country, for the service of the French armies; commanding such as were not required for military purposes to be maimed or mutilated. One of the French generals, Soult, had even the audacity to proclaim,—“ There is no Spanish army except that of his Majesty King Joseph Napoleon; all bodies of men therefore which exist in the provinces, whatever may be their number, and whoever may be their commander, shall be treated as gangs of banditti: and all individuals of such gangs as shall be taken with arms in their hands, shall be immediately shot.” In the same proclamation, he had even the injustice to denounce the most severe punishment against the peaceable and unarmed inhabitants of the districts, wherever the crime of opposing the French troops by these armed parties should be committed. This decree having been carried into execution at various places, the Council of Regency, to counteract its effects, commanded reprisals of three Frenchmen for each Spaniard so executed, with a certain number for each house destroyed, or other outrage committed. The Guerrilla chiefs gave force to their orders; one of them in particular hung several Frenchmen

on the trees along the high road near Madrid, in retaliation for some of his own men who had been similarly executed; vowing to do the same by all superior officers who should fall into his power. On this resolution becoming known, most of the French generals, alarmed at the danger which threatened them individually, disavowed the decree, and these excesses happily ceased.

In September, the Cortes assembled at Cadiz, and commenced their deliberations. One of the earliest acts of their authority was to dissolve with ignominy the Council of Regency, and appoint another, of which General Blake was placed at the head. This change gave a little activity to the Spanish military, and in the spring of 1811, it was resolved to make an offensive movement to destroy the French works in front of the island of Leon. The enterprize seemed certain of success as Marshal Soult had ventured on the bold measure of detaching a considerable portion of his force to besiege Badajos, thereby reducing his troops in the lines to 10 or 12,000, whilst the army in the island mustered nearly 20,000. To remove all impediment to a well combined exertion, General Graham consented to act under the orders of the Spanish general La Pena.

It was arranged that the force to be employed should be conveyed in transports to Tarifa, from whence it should march on the flank of the French, and be joined by General Zayas, with the remnant of the garrison of Cadiz, by a bridge which he was directed to throw across the San Pedro channel, near its junction with the ocean. A heavy gale forced the transports into Algesiras bay, from whence there is no road practicable for artillery ; but by the prodigious exertions of the British sailors, the guns, being transhipped into launches, were towed against the wind and current to Tarifa, where between 4 and 5,000 British, and nearly 12,000 Spaniards, assembled, and on the 4th March, reached Vejer. There, in a conference between the two generals, it was planned that the Spaniards, leading the van, should march to Conil ; that the English, closing the rear, should unite with them at that town during the night ; and that after some repose, the allied force should attack the French on the following day, when General Zayas, with the troops remaining in the island, should sally out, and parties of seamen and marines from the squadrons be disembarked to destroy the batteries round the harbour. The Commander-in-Chief, on arriving at the agreed point, having ascertained that Zayas had succeeded in throwing a bridge

over the San Pedro river on the 2d, and had repulsed a bold attempt of the enemy to gain possession of it, ordered the advance of the Spanish division under General Lardizabal to attack the intervening French posts, and open the communication with the island. This primary object of the expedition was brilliantly executed. The enemy, after some resistance, was forced to retire to his right, and La Pena moved the main body of the Spaniards to the heights of Bermesa, where he took post, to secure the advantage he had gained, and cover the junction of the troops from the island.

These movements La Pena communicated to Sir Thomas Graham, and requested him immediately to advance to his support. The dispatch was received at Barrosa, at the conclusion of a march of sixteen hours' duration, when the troops were nearly exhausted with fatigue; Sir Thomas, nevertheless, instantly obeyed. The line of his march was little distant from the coast, and nearly parallel to it; and the country, as is usual, formed into ravines or ridges, ending on the ocean. The height of Barrosa is one of those ridges, four miles from the bridge thrown across the San Pedro river by Zayas, and the height of Bermesa is another, little more than a mile distant from the same point. The British, in the

execution of La Pena's orders, were moving from the height of Barrosa to that of Bermesa, through a plain thickly wooded, which lies between the two, when a French corps, marching in two divisions, was discovered on their right flank; one division being about to ascend the heights of Barrosa, from which the British had just descended, and where a rear-guard of two Spanish battalions still remained, and the other only a few hundred yards from the wood in which the British were marching.

The force thus in movement was commanded by Marshal Victor, who leaving only four thousand men to guard the works of his extensive cantonments before Cadiz, embracing more than thirty miles of country, was manœuvring against the British and Spaniards with the remainder of his army, about 7 or 8,000 men.

General Graham, aware that the enemy might attack him to the greatest advantage if he should continue his march; or, being able to move far more rapidly than his fatigued troops, might from the extremity of the Barrosa height descend to the sea beach, and gain the position of Bermesa before him, instantly decided to become the assailant. Under a heavy and well-directed fire of artillery, his corps countermarched, filed out of the wood, and formed into two divisions;

the right commanded by Brigadier-General Dilkes; the left, by Colonel Wheatley. Immediate skirmishing of the light troops took place, covered by which General Dilkes advanced to the attack of the French division which had now gained the summit of the Barrosa height; the Spanish troops having very properly descended, and being in march, by a wide movement, to unite with the British: the enemy firmly waited the shock; but the undaunted perseverance of the assailants prevailed, and they were driven from the hill with the loss of two pieces of artillery. At the same time, the left wing was equally successful: the French advanced against it under a heavy fire of musketry; but as soon as the whole of the troops could be formed clear of the wood, the division was put in movement to meet them: Three companies of the Guards, and the 87th regiment, were foremost in a charge which was eminently successful, and the eagle of the 8th light infantry and a howitzer remained in their possession. The fugitives were closely pursued across a valley, where a reserve attempted to make a stand; it was, however, quickly routed, and every endeavour of the main body to reform was rendered vain by the destructive fire of the artillery. At length, after a contest of an hour and a half, in which the French lost a third of

their numbers, they marched away completely beaten, leaving six pieces of cannon, and 500 prisoners, in the power of the victors; who on their side also suffered severely, having 1,200 killed and wounded.

Marshal Victor, after the action, concentrated at Xeres nearly all the force under his command, leaving only a small guard in some of the principal works; and himself set off for Seville, to endeavour to preserve that important place. But the solid advantages which should have accrued from this splendid victory were lost by one of those misunderstandings so constant in combined operations where neither of the commanders possess absolute authority. The main body of the Spaniards, though only three miles distant, had not been brought back to share in the combat; whether from its sudden and unlooked-for commencement, its rapid termination, the apprehension of losing the communication with Cadiz, or from less justifiable causes, cannot be stated. General Graham, however, felt that he ought no longer to repose confidence in a superior, acting under whose orders, the British division had been exposed to the hazard of destruction; and who, he conceived, had not displayed due activity in coming to his assistance in the struggle, wherein his own decision, and

the bravery of his troops alone, had caused the discomfiture of the enemy : he therefore withdrew from under La Pena's command, and retired with the British, a few hours after the battle, into the island of Leon.

La Pena remained for several days on the Bermesa heights, negotiating a further combined operation of the troops of the two nations, without which he declined to make any movement to gain possession of the enemy's works, although he had above 15,000 men under his command ; and the navy, by landing on various points of the harbour, destroying several batteries and a quantity of stores, clearly proved their weak and unguarded state. At length the French, encouraged by his inactivity, and having received a small reinforcement from Seville, made an offensive movement ; on which the Spaniards re-crossed into the island, the communication over the river was destroyed, and each party resumed its former attitude.

Marshal Soult afterwards, to banish the remembrance of Victor's defeat, and to gloss over his own inactivity before Cadiz, cast artillery of a peculiar construction, from which shells filled with lead ranged over great part of the town. The army in the island of Leon did not return the compliment, because the principal sufferers

from it would have been their countrymen or allies. Nevertheless, by a happy art the French possess, of giving importance to their military operations, their defensive position opposite the island of Leon has been magnified into a strict blockade and vigorous bombardment of the town; and by an undue regard for national fame, is most frequently called by the English the siege of Cadiz.*

* The piece of artillery lately mounted in St. James's Park, considered as a monument of national success, is highly gratifying to every Englishman's feelings: but those who wrote the inscription upon it, either not understanding the force of military terms, or under-rating the value of military character, have turned it into a monument of reproach, by making it a public memento that the French besieged Cadiz. Nothing could more disadvantageously contrast the difference of energy of the two nations than the fact, that a French force, seldom exceeding ten or fifteen thousand men, had entered the island of Leon and carried on the siege of Cadiz, at the time when we were exerting our utmost strength to prevent it. As they did no such thing, but on the contrary, entrenched their cantonments, and held a position, strictly speaking, more defensive than that of the army in the island, which maintained its piquets and advanced posts on the continent during the whole period in question,—it surely would have been no more than justice to ourselves, and no disparagement to our enemy, if the inscription had been rather to the following effect:—That the French intending to besiege Cadiz, were, by the powerful assistance of the English, prevented for two years from even

Whilst the chief force of the French was occupied in Portugal and Andalusia, and there remained in the interior of Spain only a few weak corps, the Guerrilla system took deep root, and in the course of 1811 attained its greatest perfection. Left to itself, the boldest and most enterprising of its members rose to command, and the mode of warfare best adapted to their force and habits was pursued. Each province boasted of a hero, in command of a formidable band—Old Castile, Don Julian Sanchez; Arragon, Longa; Navarre, Espoz y Mina; the Asturias, El Marquisito; the Guadalaxara mountains, Juan Martin the Empecinado; besides which, were El Medico, El Francisquito, El Manco, with innumerable others renowned under some distinguishing appellative, whose deeds spread a lustre over every part of the kingdom. These partizans separated, and collected at any assigned

setting a foot in the island of Leon; that alarmed for their own safety, they erected formidable lines of defence to secure their cantonments; that not daring to approach sufficiently near the town to make use of artillery of the ordinary range, they endeavoured to increase its powers by casting mortars of a different construction to those in general use; that when, by the victory of the Duke of Wellington at Salamanca, the French were forced to abandon their lines, these mortars fell into the hands of the Spaniards, who, in gratitude to the British, for preserving Cadiz from the dangers and horrors of a siege, presented this to the Prince Regent, &c. &c.

rendezvous, at the command of their respective chiefs; and being assured of the inviolable faith of their countrymen, would frequently remain concealed for days together at the very gates of a town occupied by the French, and carry off the object of their search the moment it appeared. Nothing was secure from their activity and address. Joseph Buonaparte himself feared to sleep absent from Madrid, even with the strongest guard; every station, every village occupied by the French, was more or less retrenched; and these precautions did not always ensure safety. Besides various small posts destroyed, the cunning Marquisito surprized, in August, a regular garrison in St. Ander; and shortly afterwards the daring Empecinado openly attacked and made prisoners three entire battalions in Calatayud. Even the fortified towns were no security beyond their walls. The patient and enterprizing Don Julian drove away the cattle from under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo, and remaining in ambush, made a prisoner of the governor, who sallied out to retake them. Thus acting independently, and in small bodies, they were a constant source of inquietude to the French armies, doubling their duty, and giving perpetual employment to whole brigades, in fruitless endeavours to annihilate them.

Though such a desultory mode of warfare could be productive of no great results, yet in the reduced condition of the Spanish regular force, it ought to have been most carefully cherished and encouraged. Unluckily, however, the reputation of some of the Guerrilla chiefs raised an unworthy jealousy in the government, which feared their becoming independent; and to retain an authority over them, they cunningly rewarded their exertions with military rank, thereby subjecting them to the generals of the regular army. Gaudy uniforms, a personal staff, and other useless appendages followed; with their titles, their feelings of importance rose, and they increased their force in a corresponding degree; composing their bands of artillery, infantry, and cavalry, they exchanged activity for weight, and became a bad species of regular force. The talents of Mina and Longa alone rose with the change: they headed armies of 6 or 8,000 men with distinguished ability, and favoured by the strong country of Arragon and Navarre, displayed manœuvres sometimes for months together, in baffling the pursuit of more numerous bodies of French, which would reflect credit on the most celebrated commanders. With these exceptions, the Guerrilla force withered under the inter-

ference of the government, and would probably have ceased to exist in a few campaigns, had the war been so long protracted.

In the autumn of 1811, General Ballasteros, by adopting a system of warfare similar to that of the Guerrillas, manœuvred in the south of Andalusia with much success against various French detachments; supported by Gibraltar and the strong country of Ronda, the inhabitants of which were ever in arms, he appeared so formidable, that Soult deemed it necessary to send a division of 8 or 10,000 men, under General Godinot, to overpower him. Ballasteros long avoided a general action by rapid marches: at last, on the 14th October, being driven to the very extremity of the Peninsula, he took refuge, and found security and support under the guns of the British fortress.

This prudent, yet spirited conduct, raised such hopes of further success, that a detachment of Spanish and British troops was sent from Cadiz to occupy Tarifa, in furtherance of Ballasteros' operations, and landed at the very time he reached Gibraltar. Godinot immediately turned his exertions to dislodge the new-comers: but the only road by which he could bring artillery against the town skirting the ocean, the navy, ever on the alert, anticipated his arrival at

the pass of La Pena, which they so completely raked with their broadsides, that the French relinquished the attempt, and retrograded. Ballasteros in his turn became the assailant, and twice gained considerable advantages over Godinot on his retreat, who, on reaching Seville, fearing to be reproached for want of success, put a period to his existence.

The French were too well aware how narrowly they had escaped destruction from the Barrosa manœuvre, to risk the probability of its recurrence, by leaving Tarifa in possession of the allies; and immediately prepared a great effort to dispossess them of it. That place could not be considered a fortified post, being merely surrounded by an uncovered wall, imperfectly flanked by small projections; but, as an island connected with it by a bridge, afforded a place of refuge for the inhabitants, and a secure point of re-embarkation for the garrison, when driven from the town, General Copons and Colonel Skerrett, commanding the troops of the two nations, decided to wait the attack; and in the meanwhile, by great and continued exertion, much improved the defences. General Laval, with 10,000 men, formed the investment on the 20th December; on the 25th broke ground; on the 29th his batteries opened;

and on the 31st a breach became practicable. At 8 a. m. the next morning, a column advanced openly to the assault from a distance of 250 yards: during its approach the defenders kept up a steady and well-directed fire from the ramparts with such effect, that the French broke before they reached the foot of the breach, and returned into their trenches. Discouraged by the steadiness of the garrison, Laval made no further effort to renew the assault; but resumed the fire from his batteries, which at the expiration of forty-eight hours rendered the opening in the wall alarmingly great. Colonel Skerrett made most skilful arrangements to counteract its effects by forming interior retrenchments; and showed such confidence, that the French, fearing a second repulse, retired on the night of the 4th, burying their artillery, of which the state of the roads precluded the removal.

In the military operations of the eastern provinces few cheering events are found to contrast with the triumphant career of General Suchet, to whom the chief command of the French forces in Arragon was confirmed as a reward for the defeat of the Valencian army at Sta. Maria. His activity and enterprize were from that moment conspicuous: he instantly

followed up his first success, by a bold attempt to intimidate Valencia into submission; hoping by an unexpected effort to communicate with Soult in Murcia, and subjugate the whole of the eastern provinces. He suddenly appeared before the town with 15,000 men on the 5th of March, and threatened the citizens with his utmost vengeance if they resisted. General Caro, who had at the commencement of the war frustrated a similar attempt of Moncey, commanded the garrison, which consisted chiefly of those very troops who had fled on the first attack at Sta. Maria; but now feeling confidence in their situation, their native courage fully displayed itself, and they obliged their former conqueror, after the parade of a week, precipitately to retrograde. Suchet then laid siege to Lerida, the resistance of which was much abridged by a bold and unexpected assault immediately after the trenches were opened. The castle held out for some days after the fall of the town, till the 14th May, when it capitulated. His next enterprize was against Mequinenza, a small work situated on a high rock at the junction of the Segre with the Ebro. The conduct of the governor sullied the martial reputation of the eastern provinces; as he capitulated on the 8th June, after five days

resistance so feebly conducted as to draw upon him the reproaches of the very captors.

Being now secure on the side of Arragon, Suchet commenced preparations for the siege of Tortosa, the possession of which would give him the command of the best passage of the Ebro, and interpose an insurmountable obstacle to any united efforts of the three provinces bounded by its course. As early as the month of July he moved his troops into the environs of the place, where he entrenched Mora and Xerta, making the one a tête-de-pont across the Ebro, and the other a dépôt for his artillery and stores; but from the activity of the Catalans, with whom he had many partial encounters, he did not feel himself strong enough to commence the siege till the close of the year. At that period large reinforcements entered Catalonia from France, and enabled Marshal Macdonald to post a corps at Perillo to cover the operation on that side. The place was then closely invested. On the 19th December the French established themselves on the heights in front of Fort Orleans, and on the following night broke ground on the plain between that fort and the river. The garrison attempted repeated sorties, which were invariably repulsed with loss; and on the seventh night the

covered way was crowned before the besiegers' batteries opened. The following afternoon a most daring sally was made to destroy the guns whilst bringing into the batteries. The Spaniards rushing out in strong bodies from Fort Orleans, descended into the plain; one detachment overturned the guard of the trenches, burnt many gabions, and filled in a portion of the sap; but the division to seize the artillery was held in check till fresh troops were brought into the trenches, when the whole were driven back, leaving 400 killed and wounded on the ground.

On the 1st of January, 1811, the seventeenth day of the siege, the counterscarp having been blown in, two good breaches being open, and the columns being ready for the assault, as Suchet refused to grant any terms, the governor surrendered at discretion. "The garrison marched out 7,500 men, having lost 1500 during the attack; the besieging force of 10,000 men lost only 400. So small a loss, and the short duration of the siege, arose from the scientific direction of the approaches, and the well-selected situation of the batteries; or in other words, to the proper application of the art of attacking places. Perhaps also, the bold and unlooked for measure of carrying the approaches along the banks of the Ebro, entirely neglecting the

works on the heights which overlook the plain, tended very much to produce these results. It may boldly be asserted that the attack of any other point would have required double the time, and have been far more bloody.”*

The fall of Tortosa was a deadly blow to the eastern provinces, as it was the chief point of communication between them, and the grand depôt of their military resources. Catalonia was in consequence of it deprived of all exterior aid, except such as might be disembarked on the coast; and to cut that off, General Suchet hastened to lay siege to Tarragona, their only remaining port. Nor did the recovery of Figueras by the Spaniards, which happened at this period, at all divert his resolution. That brilliant enterprize had its origin in the never-ceasing activity of the Catalan chiefs, who finding themselves unequal to face the enemy in the field, had for some time turned their endeavours to other means of annoyance. General Campoverde on the 19th March attempted, with a body of regular troops, to surprize Fort Montjuic at Barcelona; but his intentions having been discovered by the French, the assailants were re-

* Relation du Siège de Tortose, par M. le Baron Rogniat, Lieutenant-Général.

ceived on their approach with a well-directed fire, and repulsed with loss. Two Miquelet leaders, General Martinez and Colonel Rovira, directed the attempt on Figueras. Having established an intelligence with three Spaniards serving in the citadel, they were admitted with a body of men through a sally-port on the night of the 9th April, and the French garrison, nearly 1000 in number, were made prisoners. Martinez then turned the guns against the town, which was occupied by 700 other French troops, and obtained possession of it also. Unfortunately the arrangements to support this grand blow by ensuring a supply of provisions had not been fully combined: a strong garrison was thrown in under Martinez, which maintained a communication with the sea for a considerable time; nevertheless, when invested by a corps under General Baraguay d'Hilliers, the place contained food for little more than three months.

The investment of Tarragona was completed on the 4th May. The garrison was numerous, and being supported by a squadron of English men of war under Captain Codrington, which kept the port open for the admission of supplies and reinforcements, threatened to make a most obstinate defence. On the first movement of the enemy, the Catalan army under Campoverde,

encouraged by the recovery of Figueras, (the blockade of which occupied a large portion of the French,) assembled and promised to afford assistance. On the other hand, Suchet, who saw the brightest prospects dawn upon him should he speedily capture this last hold of the Catalans, and complete the conquest of the province, determined to second a vigorous attack with the utmost licence of military severity. The siege was in consequence obstinately contested; but as the works of Tarragona no longer exist, the details would be of little practical utility, and the leading features only will be narrated.

Fort Oliva, a detached work, was first attacked, and as soon as a breach was formed, it was assaulted on the night of the 29th May, and being carried, above one thousand of the garrison were bayoneted. The attack was then directed against the works of the lower town: on the 21st June, two breaches being practicable, they were stormed and no quarter given; above two thousand Spaniards were bayoneted. Suchet reported to his government that in this assault only 160 prisoners were made, saved by a miracle from the fury of the soldiers; and that 1553 bodies of those who fell had been collected to be burnt: and added, "I fear much, should

the garrison stand the assault behind their last defences, that I shall be forced to set a terrible example, and intimidate Catalonia and Spain for ever, by the destruction of an entire city."

His apprehensions were shortly afterwards realized. The attack of the works of the upper town, the only remaining defence of the Spaniards, was vigorously pushed forward, and batteries to form a breach were nearly completed, when a British force of 2000 men under Colonel Skerrett arrived in the bay from Cadiz. That officer, with his engineers, examined the front attacked, and the latter truly foretold that it would be speedily beaten down after the enemy's fire should commence. On this report, the Governor, Contreras, a brave and sensible man, feeling that to press his allies to land would be to sacrifice them with his garrison, recommended rather that the British should co-operate with the Catalan army under Campoverde, in an attack of the rear of the besieging force; when his garrison should sally out and cut their way through the guard of the trenches, by which means the regular troops, a fine body of men 7000 in number, would be preserved for future services. Colonel Skerrett immediately sailed in a man of war to arrange the operation with Campoverde, who having met with a

severe loss on the 3d May, in an attempt to relieve Figueras, had been unable alone to act against the French, and had taken post with his army at Vandrels, about twenty-five miles to the eastward. The two commanders arranged to make a combined attack; but before Campoverde could move forward, or Colonel Skerrett rejoin his troops in the bay, the fate of Tarragona had been decided. The French batteries opened at day-light on the 28th June, and by ten o'clock a practicable breach was formed: the besiegers then appeared perfectly quiet, firing only an occasional round or two; but when the heat of the day was a little past, they suddenly rushed to the assault. The defenders made but a slight resistance, and in a few minutes the French columns were in the streets, and immediately gave loose to every species of licentiousness. Some thousands of the citizens perished by individual atrocity; whilst a continued fire from the batteries swept away crowds of trembling fugitives, who fled to the sea side and sought refuge in the boats of the squadron. The British seamen gallantly rescued many within reach of the very sabres of the enemy's dragoons, who charged amongst the defenceless mass, cutting and slashing in every direction. In a word, it was a French army licensed to

pursue its own inclinations, and scenes such as are read with distrust in the ancient historians are attested, by some thousand witnesses yet alive, to have been acted here. General Suchet's own statement is as follows :

“ The rage of the soldiers was increased by the obstinacy of the garrison, who expected to be relieved, and who were prepared to sally out. The fifth assault made yesterday in the middle of the day to the inner works was followed by a frightful massacre, with little loss on our side. The terrible example, which I foresaw with regret in my last report to your Highness, has taken place, and will be long remembered in Spain. Four thousand men were killed in the streets: ten or twelve thousand attempted to save themselves by getting over the walls, a thousand of whom were sabred or drowned; we have made 10,000 prisoners, including 500 officers, and in the hospitals remain 1500 wounded, whose lives have been spared.”*

There is something so exceedingly revolting in the picture of these severities, that the mind cannot divest itself of feelings of abhorrence towards the individual who directed them; or otherwise, were the subject coolly and dispassionately considered, the censure would be equally

* *Moniteur.*

divided between the aggressor, and the commander of the suffering party. It is the paramount duty of a general to use every means in his power to bring his operations to a successful termination, and to preserve the lives of his own men; and there seems no other such effectual mode of preventing similarly obstinate defences to those of Gerona and Saragossa, as for the assailants to avail themselves of the power of retaliation which victory furnishes. It is no more than the custom of war justifies, and self-preservation demands. In a battle, if a division stand the charge, the successful party make no scruple to bayonet all those they overtake; and no reason can be assigned why troops fighting behind a wall should be differently treated, and have the privilege of destroying their opponents till the last moment, and when they can no longer do so with impunity, be greeted with friendship. Till a certain point of the attack it is perfectly safe to continue the defence; if the garrison persevere longer they do it at their own risk: it is optional with them. It was so at Tarragona; and the principle of putting to the sword after the assault of a breach all those found with arms in their hands seems so fully justified by right and policy, that General Suchet, on the abstract consideration of the subject, can-

not be censured for having done so. The peculiar nature of the contest, however, ought to have made him hesitate in its application to the Spaniards, a people merely defending their homes against an unprincipled aggression. The idea of so severely punishing an act of pure self-defence should have revolted his moral feelings, and those of his officers. Such not having been the case, and the ferocious acts of which they were guilty towards the unarmed inhabitants, equally with the garrison, having been publicly avowed, give rise to many reflections on the abasement of the moral character under a military despotism. In what country, enjoying a sufficient share of freedom for impartial discussion, would a man after such deeds be well received in society? or what government, having the voice of a free and enlightened public to control their acts, dare to confer rewards upon him? Yet in France, General Suchet was not only elevated to the rank of Marshal for the massacre at Tarragona, but his character, it is believed, rose in the estimation of most of his countrymen.

The next operation of this successful commander was to dislodge the Baron d'Erolles from Montserrat, which had been strongly fortified by him, and from whence he made incursions to the very gates of Barcelona. On the 24th

July the French made various attacks on each side of the mountain, and the Spaniards, not being in numbers sufficient to resist at all points, were quickly overcome, and Erolles himself with difficulty avoided being made prisoner.

This loss was followed by another yet more severe. On the 19th August, the brave Miquelets, headed by General Martinez, after having sustained a blockade of four months in Figueras, and consumed all their provisions, attempted to cut their way through the investing corps: but the French having blocked up the roads, cut ditches, and made thick abattis, with a variety of other obstacles, the Spaniards were checked in their efforts, and after a long conflict forced back with considerable loss. The following day the garrison capitulated, which event completed the conquest of the Principality; if the possession of all the chief towns and military posts can be so called, whilst the inhabitants universally refuse obedience. Catalonia is extremely mountainous, and only one great road passes through it, running parallel to the coast, and at many points skirting the ocean. On this road are nearly all the strong fortresses, the sieges of which have been narrated; and the French were accordingly in full possession of the communication. But the western side of

the Principality is Pelion upon Ossa ; mountain rising above mountain in rapid succession, to the summit of the Pyrenees, and presenting innumerable fastnesses yet uninjured by the labour of man. There, the provincial force under Erolles, Sarsfield, Rovira, Manso, &c. found places of refuge and retirement, from whence they made constant excursions across the road ; and, when the field army of the enemy was on any distant service, frequently for weeks together occupied an intermediate town, preventing the slightest communication between the different garrisons ; so that, literally, it required a division of troops to escort a messenger from the one to the other. Indeed at no period did the manly spirit of the Catalans, and the enterprize of their chiefs, shine more conspicuously, than immediately after the loss of their fortresses ; which may, in some measure, be attributed to the firm conduct of General Lacy, who, on succeeding to the command of the province in July, issued many consolatory and animating proclamations, tending to dissipate the alarm caused by the rapid progress of the intruders ; after which he directed various small enterprizes against them. Erolles, on the 1st September, convoyed and assisted by a British frigate, retook the islands of Las Medas, considered of

some importance as commanding the long-shore navigation by which Barcelona was chiefly supplied with provisions. Soon afterwards, when the French forces concentrated at Tortosa to prepare for further conquests, leaving a number of scattered posts to keep the principality in subjection, and to maintain the communication with Arragon by the road of Lerida, a regular system was acted upon for their reduction. On the night of the 4th October, the corps of Erolles surprized the town of Igualada, killing or making prisoners 200 men, who had not time to secure safety in the castle to which the remainder fled; and three days afterwards defeated with greater loss, a detachment coming to their relief. The castle was soon after evacuated by the French, as also Montserrat, and other posts in the vicinity of Barcelona. On the 10th, the same active chief forced 600 men to capitulate in Cervera, and on the 14th, nearly 400 in Belpuig. The French made a great effort to intercept Erolles, which he evaded by a rapid march into Languedoc: there he spread terror and dismay amongst the authorities; but committing no acts of reprisals against the inhabitants, contented himself with levying a moderate contribution, with which, and a number of cattle, he triumphantly regained his native mountains.

Buonaparte, after the events at Tarragona, fully appreciated the activity, talents, and (which was more prized by him) the inflexible disposition of his newly-created Marshal. To give full scope for the display of these qualities, he withdrew Macdonald from Catalonia, and sent Decaen, an officer of inferior rank, to command the province, under the orders of Suchet; who in September advanced with 25,000 men, to make the conquest of Valencia. Success depending much on celerity of movement, he endeavoured by a circuitous route to avoid the delay of reducing the castle of Oropesa, which commands the great road: his battering artillery however could not follow by the same track, and appearing before the citadel of Murviedro without other means of attack, he ventured a general escalade, in which he was repulsed with great loss. After this check he remained inactive till the 18th October, when his artillery arrived; and as, during the time thus lost, the Spaniards had assembled a force to relieve the garrison, he hastily threw up some distant batteries, from which he formed a breach, and, without further preparation, gave the assault. The approach proved narrow and difficult, and the columns were driven back with loss; as also on a second attempt. Suchet then went

regularly to work, and on the 24th had brought his operations nearly to a close, when the advance of General Blake with a considerable army caused the attack to be suspended, and the besieging force to be concentrated to oppose him. That officer, after separating from the allies on the Guadiana in June, 1811, having been repulsed in an attempt to assault the castle of Niebla, returned to Cadiz; from whence, at the end of July, he sailed with a body of troops to Almeria, and uniting with the army of Murcia, mustered 20,000 men under his command. Soult immediately moved all his disposable force in that direction; and on the 9th August, in a general action near Lorca, so completely dispersed the Spaniards, that not more than 8 or 9,000 men united at Lebrilla, to which place Blake retired his Head-quarters. The fugitives, however, by degrees collected, and various reinforcements were sent to their support; and on the invasion of Valencia the command of the army of that province was likewise conferred on General Blake, increasing his force to 30 or 35,000 men, being nearly all the veteran troops in Spain, including the corps which so gallantly fought at Albuera. The different divisions were commanded by distinguished officers, and the cavalry and horse-

artillery were of superior quality. With this force Blake boldly advanced to relieve Murviedro, and on the 25th October attacked the French army near Puzol. The Spanish troops fought with gallantry, and at first obtained some partial success; when, elated with the prospect of a victory, Blake ordered a wide movement to prevent the retreat of the French, of which Suchet took advantage to attack with a compact body the weakened centre of the Spaniards. He easily overpowered it, and the circumventing wings with difficulty escaped the fate they were preparing for their enemies; by force of marching, however, they effected their retreat with the fugitives from the centre, and the whole recrossed the Guadalaviar; on which Murviedro capitulated. Suchet, a few days afterwards, pushed his advanced posts into the suburbs of Valencia, on the left of the river; but the Spanish army having taken up a strong line on the opposite side, the preparations to force the passage could not be completed till the 25th December: he then crossed, after some opposition, near Quarte and Mislata, and also near the mouth of the river. A portion of the Spaniards retired towards Murcia; but the great body, with the Commander in Chief, shut themselves up in the lines which had been constructed to strengthen the town;

from whence, on the night of the 28th, they made a feeble and unsuccessful endeavour to escape.

On the 1st January, 1812, ground was broken before the advanced line; and on the 4th, when the approaches were yet at some distance, the Spanish army abandoned the defence of them, and retired into the town. A bombardment followed, and after three days' continuance, during which the trenches were regularly pushed forward, General Blake, wishing to spare the citizens the horrors of a storm, capitulated on the 9th January, delivering up prisoners of war 16,000 good troops.

Blake served in 1793, and 1794, with distinction at the head of a battalion, in which situation his regular habits and personal courage qualified him to shine. At the battle of Rio-Seco, he commanded a brigade which preserved the most order and covered the retreat: and at Albuera, gave further proof of bravery and good arrangement in the charge of a division. Placed, however, repeatedly in the command of armies, he afforded an impressive lesson, that courage and enterprize are of little value unless blended with prudence and judgment; a too presumptuous confidence having rendered his career almost invariably disastrous. The events which

closed his military life show how little experience had diminished that failing; as he voluntarily sought the unequal combat in which his army was defeated, and unnecessarily sacrificed the remnant of his force in an attempt to hold a town unfit for defence, and without the means of retreat.

Thus, through the over-confidence of their chief, ingloriously fell the flower of the Spanish military. Spain, left without a regular army, sunk for a season into a mere auxiliary, and the contest in the field devolved entirely on the Portugueze and British. How it was supported by them, the succeeding chapter will shew.

CHAPTER VI.

Lord Wellington plans the recapture of Ciudad Rodrigo—cantons his army on the Agueda to blockade it—the French forces to the north of the Tagus unite for its relief, and raise the blockade—preparations to enable the allied army to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo—movements of Sir R. Hill to divert the enemy's attention therefrom—surprizes a French corps at Arroyo de Molinas, and obliges Soult to concentrate his forces in the south—Lord Wellington unexpectedly invests Rodrigo—breaks ground before it—effects two breaches—carries them by storm—immediately moves to the attack of Badajos, with similar results.—Being the period from June, 1811, to May, 1812.

THE armies of Marshals Marmont and Soult, united on the Guadiana to relieve Badajos, in June, 1811, amounted to upwards of 70,000 men, of which 8,000 were cavalry; whilst the allied force opposed to them did not exceed 50,000 men, including 4,000 cavalry. It was therefore decidedly advantageous to the French to fight a general action; and from the defensive arrangements made by Lord Wellington to meet

it, such was hourly expected. Under this impression, every one deemed the moment arrived, when, on the 22d June, two very strong bodies of French cavalry advanced towards Elvas and Campo-mayor. They proved, however, to be only a reconnoissance: the one made prisoners a piquet of three officers and sixty men of a dragoon regiment recently arrived from England, which mistook them for Portugueze: the other, after manœuvring for several hours, endeavouring to ascertain the position and numbers of the allied army, retired without having gained any information whatever; the troops being purposely concealed behind the hills. After this the two armies remained quiet in presence of each other for more than a month; during which period the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo was planned, and the preparations for the attack of it were commenced, the battering-train and the siege stores being ordered from Lisbon up the Douro.

The war in the Peninsula was conducted on principles peculiar to itself, and the reasoning founded on the events of other campaigns will not apply to it. That a general, with an inferior army, at the very moment of a tacit acknowledgment of his opponent's superiority, by relinquishing the pursuit of a valuable prize nearly within his grasp, should form

the design of wresting from that same enemy a fortress, which from every feeling of honour and interest he was bound to preserve, seems an inconsistency ; but tracing the idea to its origin, weighing the reasonings upon it, and combining therewith the successful result of the enterprize agreeably with the hopes entertained, it will appear far otherwise, and to have been formed on an accurate knowledge of the strong and weak points of each army.

Portugal owes much to its poverty. The impossibility of subsisting a large army for a length of time on the resources of any limited portion of it, formed the pivot on which the military operations for its defence invariably turned. The French were at no time sufficiently masters of the country to establish magazines ; but subsisted on the daily contributions they levied, and never therefore could remain long united in a large body. The British and Portugueze, on the contrary, had their floating magazines on the Tagus, and on the Douro : every thing was drawn from their rear ; and provided the line of supply was not materially lengthened, so as to require a great increase to the number of animals which brought up the provisions, they could act as well in one part of the country as in another, and for any

length of time. The enemy, during the whole of 1811, possessed a great numerical superiority, and could alone have been prevented deriving some advantage therefrom, by every movement of the allies being conducted with a happy reference to the difference of the commissariat of the two armies.

The expectation of success in the meditated enterprize was founded on a further application of the same principles. Ciudad Rodrigo, standing 60 miles from the cantonments of the French army, and in a country decidedly hostile, could only be provisioned by convoys escorted from that distance: it was therefore apparent, that should the allies be cantoned in the villages around it, no supplies could be thrown into the place with a less escort than an army equal to successfully contend against them. The enemy must therefore either harass his troops by long and frequent marches, in drawing them from the distant provinces to collect that number, every time it should become necessary to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo, or he must abandon it. It was further arranged that the battering-train and siege stores should be brought forward to Villa de Ponte, only sixteen leagues in the rear, to admit of immediate siege being laid to the place, should the enemy em-

ploy any part of his troops on other services. The allies, therefore, whilst remaining quiet in healthy cantonments, would paralyse the whole of the French forces in the north; and as from their inferiority in numbers they could not possibly make any offensive movement, perhaps no other plan of operations could have been devised, by which Portugal would have been so securely covered, and so much assistance have been rendered to the general cause of the Peninsula.

In the execution of this project, so soon as Marmont's army was obliged to move from the south of the Tagus from the exhausted state of the country, the allied Head-quarters, keeping a parallel movement, were transferred to Portalegre, and on the 10th August to Fuente Guinaldo. The army was then (with the exception of a small corps under Lieutenant-General Hill, guarding the Alemtejo frontier) cantoned in the villages on the banks of the Agueda, near Rodrigo, where it remained quiet till the middle of the following month. About that time Ciudad Rodrigo began to be much distressed for provisions, and repeated accounts were received that a very large army was assembling at Salamanca, to escort a convoy to its relief: but as it is the constant practice of the French commanders to circulate false reports, and exaggerate the

amount of their forces, it would have been too credulous to rely on their statements of the advance of 60 or 70,000 men; and by a retreat allow them quietly to relieve Rodrigo with a force probably not exceeding half that number. Lord Wellington, therefore, caused a position in front of Guinaldo to be retrenched, as a point of support to enable him to keep out his advanced corps till the last moment, and by that means ascertain the real force of the enemy. The troops were concentrated in readiness to occupy the position; General Craufurd's division remaining on the right of the Agueda, to watch the passages over the Sierra de Gata, and General Picton's division being placed in advance on the heights of El Bodom; but both divisions being intended to fall back on Guinaldo, if threatened in force.

When Marmont's army recrossed the Tagus, and went into cantonments behind the Tormes, a force under General Dorsenne, called the Army of the North, advanced by Astorga to make the conquest of Gallicia. General Abadia, who commanded the undisciplined troops of that province, retired within the defile of Villa-franca, which Dorsenne, after a sharp affair, did not think it prudent to enter; but retrograded, and joined his forces with those of

Marmont to relieve Rodrigo. Their united armies advanced from Salamanca for that purpose in the middle of September; and on the 24th, under their protection, an immense convoy entered the place.

On the morning of the 25th, thirty squadrons of cavalry, and a body of infantry, with artillery, crossed the Agueda as a reconnoissance. The infantry made a demonstration of forcing the advanced position of El Bodom on its right, whilst the cavalry by a detour ascended the heights on its left, and advancing rapidly towards Guinaldo, rendered precarious the retreat of the troops opposed to the infantry; but the officer in command judiciously extricated them by crossing to the right of the Agueda, and recrossing the river at a ford higher up. On the left, the only force at first to oppose the enemy's formidable cavalry were two British and one Portugueze battalion, with three squadrons of dragoons, and four Portugueze guns. Such however was the discipline and confidence of this handful of men, that they maintained their ground a considerable time, and when ordered to fall back, on account of the approach of the enemy's infantry, formed into two squares; which though charged repeatedly on three sides, constantly repulsed the cavalry, and alternately

covering each other, effected their retreat in good order on the support ordered up. The divisions of Generals Picton and Cole, with some cavalry, were then placed on the position, and the enemy halted in front of it; the following day General Craufurd's division took their ground on the same alignment.

The position in front of Guinaldo was on a high ridge nearly three miles in width; the right appuying on the Agueda, and the left falling abruptly into a spacious plain, extending to the frontiers of Portugal. It was therefore necessary to post a strong body of troops in the plain to prevent the enemy from manœuvring in rear of the position; and a division was occupied to counteract any movement they might make to cross the Agueda higher up than Guinaldo, and to make face against the pass of Perales, where the French were in force; so that only three divisions could be given for the front. In the course of the 26th, 35,000 infantry, including twenty-two battalions of the Imperial Guard, and a numerous cavalry, assembled a few hundred yards in front of the position; and at dusk the head of another very large column appeared in sight, which, when joined, would have augmented the numbers of the enemy to 60,000 infantry, and 5000 cavalry;

in consequence, as soon as it became dark, the army was put in retreat.

On the 27th two columns of the French followed; and in the afternoon of that day, there were some sharp affairs, in which Lieutenant-General Cole's division twice lost and twice retook the village of Aldea de Ponte; ultimately retaining possession of it. At night the whole army, according to a preconcerted plan, fell back to a position selected on a chord of the arc formed by the river Coa near Sabugal, the left being at Rendo, and on the 28th offered battle to the enemy; but they having effected their object of revictualling Rodrigo, declined the challenge, and returned to Salamanca. The allies were then put into cantonments rather more retired than those they previously occupied, Head-quarters being established at Freneda. The casualties of all descriptions attending these movements a little exceeded 200.

The French by this great effort having placed Ciudad Rodrigo in a secure state from famine for a considerable time, no hope of speedily reducing it remained, except by a regular siege. To have the power of commencing such an operation at the first favourable moment, it was necessary that the battering-train and siege stores should be close to the frontier; with that view,

large parties of the troops, immediately on entered their new cantonments, were employed to restore the works of Almeida, and render that fortress a secure place for their reception. Other considerable preparations were likewise to be made before the siege could be undertaken at an advanced season of the year. Rodrigo stands on the Spanish side of the Agueda, a river subject to very rapid rises; ten feet in two days not being an uncommon rise; and the Douro, which receives it, frequently swelling twenty-five feet in the same period. The main ford and the permanent bridge are within musketry of the walls, and all the other passages over the river are either deep or of difficult access, and none of them are to be depended upon in winter; therefore to ensure crossing at the required moment, a bridge of sufficient dimensions to bear the weight of heavy artillery was to be prepared.

The exhausted state of the country presented a further difficulty. The two armies in their late manœuvres had consumed all the forage near the frontier; and on the approach of winter the little remaining herbage would disappear, and render it necessary to convey greater supplies to a more advanced point, at the moment when all the carriage of the country would be

pressed for the service of the siege; the battering train alone requiring five thousand oxen for its removal. To overcome this difficulty, Lord Wellington, in opposition to the generally received opinion of its impracticability, undertook to render the upper Douro navigable above the mouth of the Tua; the point where it had hitherto ceased to be navigated. Officers of engineers were employed on the duty; and in a few months the commissariat boats reached the mouth of the Agueda, forty miles higher than they had previously ascended, which saved a far greater distance of land carriage, and the consequent employment of a multitude of animals.

To divert the enemy's attention from these proceedings, the corps in the south under General Hill made several movements. That officer, on the 28th October, surprized, at Arroyo de Molinas, a detachment of Soult's army under General Girard, which was patrolling the country to levy contributions. General Hill marched from Portalegre on the 23d October by Albuquerque and Malpartida: on the 27th, when within a moderate march of Arroyo de Molinas, ascertaining that the French intended to pass the night in that town, he halted his troops early at some distance from it; feeling assured that they

would send out patroles on the side of Portugal, as being most open to attack. In the middle of the night, when not likely to be discovered, silently breaking up from his bivouac, he made a flank movement close to the road, by which the French intended to march in the morning, where, not apprehending danger, they kept only the ordinary guards. In that position he waited the approach of day, when he marched directly on the rear of the town with such celerity that the cavalry piquets were rushed upon before they had time to mount; and the French main body, though in the act of filing out, had so little intimation of danger, that they were surrounded before their formation was effected, and to seek safety they individually dispersed. Many of them were killed, 1500 were made prisoners, and three pieces of cannon were taken, with the loss to the allies of only seven killed and sixty-four wounded: General Girard with a few men escaped, and crossed the Guadiana at Merida. General Hill's corps after this success resumed its former cantonments, till the end of December, when it again advanced to Almandralejo; near which place it gained some advantage over a detachment of the enemy; and afterwards by demonstrations of further movements induced Soult to concentrate his forces in the south.

In December Marshal Marmont detached three divisions of infantry to the assistance of Suchet before Valencia, and spread the remainder of his troops over extensive cantonments: this appeared to present the favourable moment to attack Rodrigo, and it was eagerly seized. The different divisions prepared fascines and gabions in their respective villages, and on the 6th January, 1812, the bridge was fixed at Salices, and every thing was in readiness to commence the siege; but a heavy fall of snow having covered the ground, and the weather continuing extremely inclement, it was not till the 8th that the army moved. The light division under General Craufurd singly crossed the Agueda and formed the investment, the other divisions remaining under the nearest cover in readiness to support the attacking force, and to take their turn of duty in the trenches. The same evening a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne stormed and carried an advanced redoubt situated on the great Teson at the precise spot selected for the commencement of the attack, 500 yards from the walls. The following day the first parallel was established, and the batteries traced out. On the 14th the enemy made a vigorous sortie, and succeeded in filling in a part of the sap before they were repulsed.

The same afternoon the batteries opened, and at night the fortified convent of S. Francisco, which flanked the left of the approaches, was successfully escaladed by the 40th regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt. The second parallel was then completed, and some returns of the sap opened to blow in the counterscarp; but the strong indications of an immediate advance of the enemy to relieve the place induced Lord Wellington to decide upon giving the assault as soon as the breaches should be judged practicable, without the delay of that operation. In consequence such was the exertion made to push forward the attack, that two good breaches were completed on the thirteenth day, notwithstanding the garrison fired above 11,000 large shells, and nearly an equal number of shot, without a single round being fired against the defences in return. General Picton's division was directed to assault the larger, and General Craufurd's division the lesser; whilst the demonstration of an escalade to divert the attention of the garrison was directed to be made on the opposite side of the place by a body of Portuguese under General Pack. At 9 a. m. the leading brigade of each division most cheerfully moved forward, preceded by parties of sappers carrying some hundred bags filled with hay which

they threw into the ditch, to lessen its depth. Major-General M'Kinnon's brigade first descended opposite the great breach; at which moment hundreds of shells and various combustibles which had been arranged along the foot of the rubbish prematurely exploded, and exhausted themselves before the troops arrived within the sphere of their action. The men gallantly ascended the breach against an equally gallant resistance, and it was not till after a sharp struggle that the bayonets of the assailants prevailed and gained them a footing on the summit of the rampart. There behind an interior retrenchment, the garrison redoubled their defensive efforts, but nothing could long resist the ardour of the attacking columns, and the French gave way, at the very moment that the lesser breach was forced; then being attacked on both flanks, they took refuge in the town, where they were pursued from house to house, till all the survivors were made prisoners. The besiegers suffered less in numbers than might have been expected from such a bold enterprize, having only six officers and 140 men killed, and 60 officers and 500 men wounded; but they sustained an irreparable loss in two highly distinguished general officers, Craufurd and M'Kinnon. The former early fell whilst bringing up

his division; the latter, with many brave men, at the moment of success, by an explosion in the ditch of the retrenchment of the breach.

Seventy-eight officers and 1700 men prisoners, 109 pieces of mounted ordnance, a battering train complete of 44 pieces, an immense quantity of shot, shells, and musket ball cartridges, with a well filled armoury, and an amply supplied arsenal were the fruits of this success.

The capture of Ciudad Rodrigo deserves to rank with the proudest deeds of the British army; it being probably the only well authenticated instance of a retrenched breach, fully manned and prepared for defence, being carried by an effort of cool and deliberate courage against a brave and skilful enemy. There were no auxiliary attacks to detract from the splendour of the assault, or to cloak over the humiliation of defeat; a second inclosure of a height beyond the powers of escalade leaving the garrison at full liberty to employ their utmost efforts in defence of the breaches. The combat was therefore a fair trial of courage between the contending parties, and the result is too gratifying to admit of a sentence of exultation. Indeed, throughout all the details of the siege, every branch of the army gave proofs of zeal and devotion. The infantry, in addition to the

valour displayed in the assault, were patient and indefatigable in the works of the attack, which were pushed forward by the engineers with activity and judgment, and the breaches were most ably formed by the accurate fire of the artillery.

The fact of the capture of a fortress in face of a superior army the chief object of which was its preservation, sufficiently marks the brilliancy of the enterprize: but it will appear more striking when the season of the year is considered, (the depth of winter,) with the obstacle to secrecy and dispatch, which the passage of the Agueda formed. The construction of a bridge, and fixing it over that river, gave such strong intimations of an offensive movement being in contemplation, as should have induced the enemy to prepare to succour the place. Notwithstanding this advantage the celerity of the movements to form the siege so outstripped Marmont's expectations, that he had not collected his army at Salamanca till some days after its conclusion, and the breaches had been rendered nearly defensible. When it is considered that the officers thus out-manœuvred are represented to have shown the utmost judgment and knowledge on all occasions in other countries, and to be perfect masters of their art, the events of

this offensive movement must be admitted to bear proof equally of the superior foresight and promptitude of the Commander of the allies, as of the superior gallantry of his troops.

This successful attack was followed by the yet more daring attempt to play a similar game in the south, and reduce Badajos. The alarm which had been created amongst the French Marshals by the unexpected blow which had so recently fallen on one of them, added extremely to the difficulty of the meditated enterprize; Soult having it in his power readily to assemble 35,000 men, and Marmont being able to join him with a still greater number. All therefore depended on secrecy and activity. Accordingly, the battering-train and the engineers' stores were embarked in large vessels at Lisbon for a fictitious destination, and being transhipped at sea into smaller craft were conveyed to Alcacer do Sal; whence carriage of the country could, without creating suspicion, be collected to transport them to the banks of the Guadiana. Fascines and gabions for the attack were prepared at Elvas, as if intended for the works of that fortress; and every other arrangement was made under similar precautions to ensure secrecy.

So soon as the breaches at Rodrigo were thoroughly defensible, and the place was in some

degree provisioned, it was given over to the Spaniards, and the army was put in movement. One division of infantry, covered by a few cavalry posts, remained on the Agueda to create an alarm in that quarter; whilst, by a rapid movement, the main body crossed the Tagus on a bridge of boats laid down at Villa Velha, and directed its march on Elvas. On the 16th March all the preparations for the siege of Badajoz being complete, a pontoon bridge was thrown over the Guadiana, and the light, 3d, and 4th divisions, under Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard, Generals Picton and Colville, crossed and invested the town; the remainder of the army under Generals Graham and Hill being pushed forward to oppose Marshal Soult, who, instructed by the fate of Rodrigo, had begun to concentrate his forces the moment he heard of Lord Wellington's approach. On reconnoitring it was found that the place had been materially strengthened since the attack of the preceding summer; many of the scarps having been heightened, the detached works secured by good enclosures at their gorges, and a considerable portion of the enceinte having been covered by an inundation of the Rivillas. The garrison was ample and select, and commanded by General Philippon, whose two former suc-

cessful defences had inspired all around him with confidence. To reduce such a fortress by a regular attack, had the necessary means existed, would have required more time than sufficient to bring an army to its relief—Lord Wellington, therefore, decided by a bold effort to make himself master of a detached fort called the Picurina, from the site of which the scarp wall of one front could be sufficiently seen across the inundation to be beaten down, and having from thence effected a breach, to trust to the obscurity of evening to cover the march of the assaulting columns along the interior edge of the water.

The evening of the 17th proved very stormy, and ground was broken within 160 yards of Fort Picurina undiscovered by the enemy. On the 19th the garrison made a bold sortie, killing and wounding about 150 of the besiegers, before they were repulsed: their cavalry was particularly daring, galloping round the flanks of the trenches, and into the depôts far in the rear. This sortie, however, was more brilliant than useful to the besieged, as the trenches were not sufficiently advanced to be materially injured, and it expended above 300 of their numbers. The defence had a far more powerful auxiliary in the weather, which was so exceedingly tem-

pestuous, and the rain fell in such torrents, as to threaten the failure of the operation. The pontoon bridge over the Guadiana was carried away by the rise of the river: the current became too rapid for the flying bridges to be worked, and the passage of the supplies of every description was suspended. The works of the siege were also much impeded by it; the trenches on the low ground being constantly full of water, and the earth becoming so saturated with wet as to lose its consistency, and not to retain any shape. Happily on the 24th the weather settled fine, and the besiegers completed their first batteries, which the following day opened on the Picurina fort, to beat down the palisades and injure the defences. The same evening, Major-General Kempt commanding in the trenches, that work was assaulted: two parties advanced from the flanks of the parallel to the rear of the fort; and whilst the attention of the garrison was directed to repulse their efforts to force in at the gorge, a third party successfully escaladed the front. The defenders shewed much firmness, continuing to resist even when mixed with the assailants; many of them were of course bayoneted, the remainder, above 200, were made prisoners. About the time the fort was carried, the alarm-bell rang in the town, many rockets were

thrown up, and a random fire of musketry and cannon was opened from every part of the ramparts; the garrison evidently apprehending a general assault. At the same time, the beating of drums created the alarm of a sortie in the trenches, and the guard commenced a heavy firing: this caused a still heavier firing from the town, which increased that from the besiegers, and it was past midnight before quiet was restored. The second parallel was then formed in advance of the fort: enfilading and breaching batteries were erected in it, and after seven days firing three extensive breaches having become practicable, the assault was ordered on the evening of the 6th of April. To aid this measure, the counterscarp being yet entire, and the garrison appearing to have made every preparation for an obstinate defence, Major-General Picton with his division was directed by a simultaneous movement to escalate the exposed wall of the castle, described in the account of the former siege; and Major-General Leith with his division the rampart at the other extremity of the town.

Two divisions, headed by Colonel Barnard and General Colville, marched to the assault of the breaches about ten o'clock, accompanied by parties of sappers carrying ladders, crow-bars,

bags filled with grass, and other useful auxiliaries. They were discovered on reaching the glacis, and instantly a heavy fire opened on them; nevertheless the men leaped into the covered way at the points where the palisades had been purposely destroyed by the batteries; the ladders were quickly fixed down the counterscarp, and the two divisions descended into the ditch. These operations broke their formation, which could not be restored in the confined space wherein they found themselves inclosed. The enemy had the whole front doubly manned, and the summit of the breaches crowned with *chevaux de frise*: confident in their situation, and well provided with every means of annoyance, they kept up an unremitting and destructive fire on the assailants, who made many gallant but unconnected efforts to force the breaches; various officers even leading parties of their men to grapple with the spears fixed on the crest, but unfortunately never in sufficient strength to remove them. Such and other equally praiseworthy attempts were persevered in for two hours, when the majority of the officers having been disabled, and success appearing hopeless, the two divisions were withdrawn, to be reorganised for fresh efforts as soon as day should dawn.

General Picton met with a similarly determined resistance from the garrison of the castle, and lost many men; but persevering with firmness and decision in bringing forward fresh assailants, as fast as the preceding fell, he at length established a footing on the top of the wall: then the defenders, being few in number, became alarmed; other points were quickly forced, and the allies became masters of the post.

General Leith in like manner, by perseverance and gallantry, forced in under similar circumstances at the point allotted to his division. General Walker's brigade immediately swept round the ramparts, and falling unexpectedly on the troops posted for the defence of the breaches, readily dispersed them. Other battalions were then introduced up the breaches, and the garrison being overpowered, were made prisoners. The governor and staff, with a few men, took refuge in Fort Christoval on the opposite side of the river, till the tumult had subsided, when they sent their submission, augmenting the number of captives to nearly 4000. The besiegers lost 59 officers and 744 men killed, and had 258 officers and 2,600 men wounded.

This was, upon the whole, a most daring enterprise. The exertions of British troops are, however, sometimes quite extraordinary, and when

a few years shall have swept away the eye-witnesses, their achievements in these memorable assaults will scarcely obtain credit. Even their very failures on this evening, when fully considered, will be found to add lustre to their character. Probably never since the discovery of gunpowder were men more seriously exposed to its action, than those assembled in the ditch to assault the breaches. Many thousand shells and hand-grenades, numerous bags filled with powder, every kind of burning composition and destructive missile had been prepared, and placed behind the parapet of the whole front. These, under an incessant roll of musketry, were hurled into the ditch without intermission for upwards of two hours; giving to its surface an appearance of vomiting fire, and producing sudden flashes of light more vivid than the day. Description, however, conveys but a faint idea of the imposing nature of such mode of defence—The doors of success were certainly thrown open; but they were so vigilantly guarded, the approach to them so strewn with difficulties, and the scene altogether so appalling, that instead of its being a disparagement to the troops to have failed in forcing through them, is it not rather a subject for pride and exultation that they had firmness to persevere in the attempt till re-

called? Nor did the great loss they sustained from the well-prepared efforts of their antagonists render them vindictive; on gaining the ascendancy, not a single Frenchman implored mercy in vain. Scenes of plunder and drunkenness, such as are inseparable from an assault, prevailed to a great extent; but strong measures being immediately adopted, order was restored the succeeding day. In touching thus lightly on the excesses of the British, in comparison with the stronger mention made of the conduct of the French on similar occasions, be it remembered, that whilst the latter sports with life, and indulges every base passion, the former is seldom cruel; his chief object is the discovery of liquor, and generally speaking, his utmost personal outrage a blow.

Intelligence of the fall of Badajos was communicated to Marshal Soult when only two marches distant, by some cavalry which escaped from Christoval, and he had the mortification to find that even his natural activity, increased by the misfortunes of his coadjutor, had been unequal to match that of the British commander. The day previous to the assault, the covering army had fallen back on the besieging force, and arrangements had been made to fight a general action; but the capture of the place ren-

dering such a sacrifice of men unnecessary, the whole of the troops beyond the numbers required for the defence of the town were passed over the Guadiana. This measure depriving Soult of all chance of covering his disgrace by a brilliant affair, he retrograded on Seville; which place a Spanish force, sent to take advantage of his absence, held in a state of blockade. The allied cavalry under General Le Marchant closely followed his march, and gained some advantage over his rear-guard at Llerena.

The next day Lord Wellington received intelligence that Marshal Marmont was committing great depredations within the frontier of Beira, and immediately marched with the bulk of his army to oppose him. Marmont flattered himself by the recovery of Rodrigo and Almeida in the absence of his antagonist, to obliterate the triumph he had gained over him: calculating that of the great force which Soult had under his command in the south of Spain, sufficient numbers might be assembled successfully to engage the covering army, and cause the siege to be raised, he judged it better to make an irruption into Portugal, than to cross the Tagus as at the last attack. So soon, therefore, as Lord Wellington was completely engaged in the siege, he advanced from Salamanca with a considerable

force, and leaving one division to blockade Rodrigo, known to be indifferently supplied with provisions, invested Almeida with the remainder. After a reconnoissance, he pushed his riflemen to the very glacis, making a demonstration of an immediate assault of the works as yet imperfectly repaired, and only garrisoned by militia; but the good arrangements and firm conduct of Colonel Le Mesurier, the governor, induced him to desist, and leaving that fortress in his rear, he marched to Castellobranco, threatening to destroy the bridge of boats across the Tagus at Villa-Velha. A body of militia, which attempted to impede his progress, was severely handled; but on the approach of Lord Wellington, Marmont hastily retired out of Portugal, having derived neither honour nor advantage from his enterprize.

Head-quarters were then established at Fuente Guinaldo, and the army was put into cantonments between the Agueda and the Coa. In the meanwhile, under protection of a corps commanded by Sir Thomas Graham, the works of Badajos were repaired, and the place put into a state of defence.

It is gratifying to be able to state that at the period of the re-capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, Buonaparte stood on the pinnacle of

fame and power : his empire stretched from the Elbe to the Pyrenees, and from the shores of the northern to those of the Adriatic sea ; whilst throughout all continental Europe his military supremacy was admitted and feared. As proof of the latter assertion, it need only be recalled to memory that the various arbitrary decrees which, in the arrogance of uncontrolled authority, he, from time to time, issued, to cramp and confine the industry of the world, were obeyed without an hostile movement. The powerful and the weak equally yielded them a full though reluctant compliance. Even Russia, doubly secured against his interference by her immense extent and distant situation, deemed it prudent to submit ; till at length the prosperity of her empire being threatened by a longer adhesion, she endeavoured, by friendly representations, to obtain an exemption. These failing in effect, the discussion had, at this time, assumed the character of angry remonstrance, the usual precursor of war : but as a long series of overbearing conduct and insulting replies had failed to drive her into open resistance, it cannot be doubted that it depended on Buonaparte, by conciliatory and friendly attention, to preserve her as an ally. No external interference, or the apprehension of it, therefore, existed, to divert

his attention from the affairs of Spain; and the impartial historian, of whatever country he may be, is bound to record, that those brilliant triumphs over the French armies were obtained by the Portugueze and British, when Buonaparte was in amity with all the rest of the world, and his military empire in the zenith of its strength and glory.

CHAPTER VII.

Offensive Movements of the Allies into Spain—The Post of Communication over the Tagus at Almaraz between the French Armies on the North and South of that River, destroyed—Lord Wellington advances against the Army of Marmont on the North Bank—Captures his Works on the Tormes—Manœuvres on the Douro—Defeats him in a General Action near Salamanca—Drives the fugitives beyond Valladolid—Gains Possession of Madrid—General View of Affairs—Lord Wellington lays Siege to the Castle of Burgos—The Armies of Soult and Joseph unite for its Relief—The Siege raised, and the Allies retire behind the Agueda.—Being the period from May 1812, to the conclusion of that year.

THE French forces within the Pyrenees, in May, 1812, exceeded 170,000, chiefly veteran troops under distinguished officers. Soult commanded 58,000 in Andalusia, Marmont 55,000 in Leon, Souham 10,000 (the army of the north) in Old Castile, Suchet 40,000 in Arragon and the eastern provinces, and Jourdan could dispose of 15,000 men, called the Army of the

Centre, for the security of the intrusive King and the quiet of the capital. These might be re-inforced to any extent. On the other hand, the capitulation of Valencia had deprived Spain of nearly all the experienced troops formed in her numerous unsuccessful efforts; and the government, embroiled with its American subjects, and without a revenue at home, wanted money to equip other armies, even had the natives been forward to second them; whereas, fatigued with a war of unremitting want of success, which seemed interminable, they had fallen into a state of sullen quiet. Even the Guerrilla system was declining in its general influence: acting in corps which, at this period, attacked whole brigades of the French, it had ceased to be the insidious enemy every where to be apprehended, and further had thrown off its shield of intangibility; such unmanageable bodies hourly incurring the risk of being forced to regular combat, for which they were altogether unfitted either by organization or discipline. This increased strength of the bands was also attended with another serious evil.—Guerrillas, equally with other troops, require to be fed and clothed, and their chiefs had no funds to purchase supplies beyond the occasional booty taken from the French. Whilst acting in small bodies this was usually found

ample, or, if otherwise, the deficiency was voluntarily made up by the towns and villages. The captures of the permanently large bodies, however, not augmenting proportionably to their increased numbers, the liberality of the population could no longer meet their demands, and supplies could only be obtained by forced requisitions. These, even when *bonâ fide* required, caused a sentiment of irritation, which was raised to exasperation by the conduct of some of the bands, whose rapacity even excited distrust of the motives of their union. Thus perpetual and uncertain demands, falling on the citizens from all quarters for the maintenance of the Guerrillas, were fast generating a total separation of feeling and interest between those warriors and their countrymen.* Little therefore remained to Spain beyond undiminished hatred of the in-

* The writer was the first English officer who, on the occupation of Madrid in August, 1812, communicated between Lord Wellington's army and the force at Alicante. The inhabitants of the district through which he passed, never having seen an English uniform, crowded round him by hundreds wherever he stopped to refresh, and supposing him a person of importance, charged him with petitions of every nature to Lord Wellington. He, however, remarked, that the most pointed request of the authorities and respectable people of many of the principal towns and villages was, that parties of English cavalry should be sent to scour the country, and put

truders, a half-organised army in Galicia, and a few seasoned troops trained by Ballasteros in irregular warfare.

The allied Portugueze and British army from long service had attained great perfection, and their Commander, unwilling to allow the quiet of the Spaniards to sink into apathy, decided further to pursue the offensive. The brilliant operations narrated in the last chapter had opened a road into Spain either to the north or to the south, and had deprived the French of all power of temporary annoyance to Portugal in the absence of her protectors. The numbers of the allied force were far too limited to admit the hope of expelling from the peninsula so formidable an enemy as the French by any immediate effort; but to lay the foundation of ultimate freedom, by liberating the southern provinces, where the best spirit prevailed, and which would offer a rich and extensive country wherein the Spaniards might renew their exertions, seemed practicable. With this view, Lord Wellington decided to act on the Douro, as the most likely means of speedily attaining his object; the consequences to be expected from a victory

down the Guerrillas; whose demands they represented as being more vexatious than those of the French.

in the South, being to draw the enemy's chief force to the very point to be liberated.

Marshal Marmont, who commanded in the kingdom of Leon, could bring into the field, including a division detached on a plundering excursion into the Asturias, 50,000 men. Lord Wellington, after leaving a corps to observe the movements of Soult, could muster for offensive operations only 42,000; but as the Spanish army of Galicia, by threatening the northern parts of the province, would occupy a portion of the enemy to observe it, the force of the contending parties might be considered nearly matched. To prevent any check to a successful career by the junction of troops from the distant French armies, it was arranged that 10,000 British from Sicily, and 6,000 Spaniards organised in Majorca at the expense of England, should be disembarked on the eastern coast of Spain; and there uniting with a force which the Spaniards, with their usual perseverance and fortitude, were assembling under O'Donnell from the wreck of Blake's army, should raise Catalonia and Valencia in arms. This measure, it was presumed, would prevent Suchet detaching any portion of his forces, and keep stationary the Army of the Centre, by the sensation it would create in the capital and throughout La Mancha.

As a preliminary step it was expedient to render the communication between the armies on the north and south of the Tagus as difficult and tedious as possible, by the destruction of the bridge of boats at Almaraz, their shortest and best line of communication ; all the permanent bridges from Toledo downwards, having been destroyed by one or other of the belligerents in the course of the war, and the roads leading from them being scarcely practicable for carriages. Feeling the importance of this bridge to their mutual strength and security, the French commanders had surrounded it on both sides of the river with formidable enclosed works, having in the interior of them casemated and loop-holed towers. In the interval of preparation for the meditated offensive movement, Sir Rowland Hill was employed on this service. His corps broke up from Almandralejo on the 12th May, and marching by Jaraciejo reached, on the 18th, the Sierra, between four and five miles from Almaraz, on which the castle of Miravete stands. The French had put that post into a state of defence, and having connected it by a line of works with a fortified house on the opposite side of the main road, had raised a formidable barrier across the only communication by which artillery could be

brought from the south against the works of the bridge, considered inattackable with less powerful weapons. Sir Rowland judged otherwise; and finding that infantry could cross the Sierra by a tract leading through the village of Roman-gorda, left his artillery on the mountain, and at dark began to descend with a column of 2,000 men. The leading company arrived at dawn of day close to the principal fort, built upon a height a few hundred yards in advance of the tête-de-pont; but such were the difficulties of the road, that several hours passed away before the rear closed, during which time fortunately a deep ravine concealed the troops from the view of those within the work, and the first discovery they made of their danger, was on a desperate rush forward to the assault. Knowing, however, from a feint which had been made on the works of Miravete, that an enemy was in the neighbourhood, the garrison was on the alert, immediately opened a heavy fire, and resisted with vigour the efforts made to push up the scarp; but the moment the first men gained a footing on the parapet, their firmness forsook them; they took to flight, abandoning the tower and endeavouring to escape over the bridge through the tête-de-pont, which was entered with them. The officer commanding in the fort

on the opposite bank, immediately cut the bridge, and upwards of 250 of the fugitives were in consequence made prisoners. He even in his fright abandoned his post, and retired with his garrison to Talavera, for which conduct he was tried and most deservedly shot. The whole of this formidable post on both sides of the river thus fell to infantry alone, at the small loss of 53 killed and 147 wounded. The entire establishment, with the great depôt of stores it contained, was the same day destroyed, and the troops immediately retired.

Marmont and Soult, so soon as they became acquainted with the march of Sir R. Hill, put their respective forces in movement towards the Tagus: the former had the mortification, on reaching the banks of the river, to find his superb establishment in ruins, without even being able to command the means to draw off the garrison of Miravete, which remained completely isolated. Soult, after marching for some days, learning that Sir R. Hill had passed Truxillo, relinquished the attempt to intercept his return, and the allies regained, without molestation, their position in front of Badajos.

This grand object effected, Lord Wellington broke up from his cantonments on the Agueda, and crossed the Tormes on the 17th June, by

the fords above and below Salamanca. In that city the French had collected a considerable depôt of stores and ammunition; for the protection of which, and to command the passage of the river, they had constructed formidable works. On reconnoitring, they were found to consist of three well-covered forts of masonry, forming altogether a post of importance, only to be reduced by a regular attack. The division of Major-General Clinton was allotted for that service, and the remainder of the army took a position on the heights of St. Christoval, three miles in advance of the town, having its right on the Tormes near Cabrerizos and its left near Villares de la Reyna. On the second day after breaking ground, the artillery battered in breach, and the ammunition became exhausted before a practicable opening was formed; but as the parapets of one of the principal forts was much damaged, the palisades beaten down, and the defences otherwise injured, an attempt was made to carry it by escalade, which failed, with the loss of Major-General Bowes, and 120 men. On the 20th, Marmont, with a part of his army, approached the position of Christoval, and took up ground in its front, where he remained till the evening of the 23d, when judging that the allies were in too great strength to be forced to relinquish the

attack of the forts, he broke up, and manœuvred for some days on the Tormes above Salamanca, with the hope of drawing off the garrison. In this expectation he was disappointed, for on the arrival of fresh ammunition, one of the principal works was set on fire with hot shot, and the lesser breached. The troops were formed for the assault of the latter, when a white flag announced the intended submission of the garrison: at the same moment the flames in the other work increased rapidly, and the commandant likewise demanded to capitulate. Each, however, requiring three hours preliminary delay, their offers were treated as stratagems to gain time and get the flames under, and Lord Wellington limited them to five minutes to march out, promising them their baggage and effects. This message not being complied with, the batteries resumed their fire, under cover of which the storming parties advanced, and carried the lesser fort at the gorge: the enemy offering little resistance, the Portuguese light troops even penetrated into the principal fort, making the number of prisoners above 700. The works were immediately blown up; and the artillery and ammunition, with a great variety of stores and supplies, given to the Spaniards.

On ascertaining the capture of the forts, the

French army retired towards the Douro, closely followed by the allies, who on the 2d July came up with their rear-guard, and having driven it across the river with loss, took up ground on the left bank from La Seca to Pollos. Marmont concentrated his forces on the opposite side between Pollos and Tordesillas, to dispute the passage, which was an exceedingly difficult undertaking, the French having strongly fortified posts at Zamora and Toro, and having in some degree secured all the other bridges.--Between Valladolid and Portugal, the Douro runs through a flat extensive valley, varying in its width between the heights, which is however always considerable. The course of the river in its windings nearly throughout skirts the heights with its right bank; so much so, that from the Puente del Duero near Valladolid to Zamora, the only point favourable for passing in presence of an enemy from the left to the right bank, is at Castro Nuño, two leagues above Toro, where there is a good ford, a favourable bend in the river, and advantage of ground. The situation of the French was therefore exceedingly favourable, and they had been joined by the division from the Asturias, which had augmented their force to 47,000 men: little hope could therefore be entertained of any successful operation against

them whilst they remained concentrated behind the river.

It has already been remarked, that the subsistence of the French armies in Portugal, where they had only temporary possession, depended upon their commanding a sufficient tract of country to supply their wants. In Spain, the active hostility of the people produced the same consequences; as the French never formed any system of depôts or magazines, conceiving that they would cramp their movements and prevent their flying from point to point to defeat the constant attempts of the Spaniards to oppose their dominion.—Marmont therefore behind the Douro depended for support upon daily contributions; and to oblige him to separate his forces, or to make a decisive movement which would admit of bringing him to action under favourable circumstances, the Guerrillas were let loose upon his flanks and rear, to cut off his supplies, or render necessary large detachments for their collection. Pending the effects of this measure, bodies of the French army were observed daily to move to their right, and counter-movements were made by the allies; at length, on the 15th, a very large corps having moved down the river, Head-quarters were transferred from Rueda to La Nava del Rey, and a general movement of

the allied army to its left took place. On the 16th, two divisions of the enemy crossed over the bridge at Toro; in consequence the allies were moved that night to Fuente la Peña and Canizal on the Guareña; General Cole's and the light division occupying Castrejon on the Trabancos, two leagues to the right. The next day it was ascertained that the enemy had re-crossed the Douro at Toro in the night, destroying the bridge after them; and had by forced marches retraced their steps to Tordesillas, 25 miles above Toro. At that place the whole French army passed the river without opposition, and early on the morning of the 18th were on the Trabancos. Marmont, by this manœuvre, opened his communications with the Army of the Centre, which was in movement from Madrid to his support, and also endangered the safety of the two divisions on the right: but the cavalry being quickly moved up to cover their retreat, it was effected with trifling loss, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the enemy against them. So close was the pursuit, that the troops halting for a few minutes only, to refresh, on passing the Guareña, the enemy were enabled to open upon them fifteen or sixteen guns, under the fire of which they joined the army on the left bank of the valley. The main body of the French soon

afterwards came up, and the two hostile armies being collected in front of each other, Marshal Marmont, elated at the success of his manoeuvre, pushed a column across the valley to gain possession of an important ridge above Castrillos, at the junction of the Guareña, and another stream from Canizal; it was however in a moment repulsed by Lieutenant-General Cole's division, and the cavalry, which took from it a piece of artillery, and between 300 and 400 men. The loss of the allies during the day was 100 killed, 400 wounded, and 50 made prisoners. On the 19th, the enemy moved many troops to his left, but his intentions were parried by counter movements of the allies to the right. At daylight on the 20th, the whole French army was observed in full march to its left, and the allies were immediately put in motion to their right; but the hostile force was already too far advanced to be thus counteracted, and crossing the Guareña higher up, was enabled to extend along a range of heights on the flank of the allies, which was in consequence thrown back, and they marched in column along the bottom, in a parallel direction to the enemy to the heights of Cabeça Velhosa. The movements of this day were highly impressive—the two hostile armies marching in parallel lines, frequently within

half cannon-shot of each other, through a country open and with no impediment to meeting; every moment it might have been expected that some circumstance of ground or other accident would have brought on a general shock: a few occasional cannon-shot, however, alone interrupted the remarkable stillness of the scene. The next morning, the army retired to the position of St. Christoval, which it occupied during the attack of the forts. The same day the enemy crossed the Tormes by the fords near Alba and Huerta, marching by their left, to gain the road to Rodrigo. To counteract this intention, the allies in the evening made a corresponding flank movement, by the bridge and fords near Salamanca, and halted for the night on some heights on the left bank, which secured their communication.

Early on the morning of the 22^d July, the army took up the ground in position, placing its right near the remarkably bold rocky heights called the Arapiles, and its left on the Tormes; the enemy being immediately in front covered by a thick wood. About 8 A. M. a French column rapidly advanced from the wood, and seized the outer and most extensive of those strong points; upon which the allies as quickly as possible took possession of the other. Marshal Marmont col-

lected behind the Arapiles a large force, and having the greatest reliance in his skill as a tactician, commenced a series of manœuvres on a range of easy heights, about a thousand yards in front of his opponents. About 2 P. M. he extended rapidly to his left with great show, much fire from his artillery, and from numerous tirailleurs thrown out in his front, and on his flank. This was an attempt to turn the position of the allies; whereby, with a force little superior to their's, he acted on the circumference of an arc of one third greater extent than their line. Lord Wellington, who was eagerly watching for some false movement of his antagonist, lost not a moment to profit by this: he instantly decided to become the assailant, and made the following disposition of his army:—The 1st and light division, under Generals Campbell and Alten, to the left of the Arapiles heights, as the extreme left of the line—the divisions of Generals Cole and Leith, in two lines on the right of that point, with the divisions of Generals Clinton and Hope, and a body of Spaniards under Don Carlos de España, in column to support them. Major-General Pakenham's division, with a considerable body of cavalry, formed the extreme right. Whilst these movements were in progress, the enemy made many strenuous

but unsuccessful endeavours to possess themselves of the village of Arapiles, situated between the two armies, and occupied by a detachment of the Guards; but made no change in their general dispositions, probably deeming the motions of the allies merely precautionary efforts against their threatened flank manœuvres.

The moment the formation of the army was effected, the attack commenced from the right. Major-General Pakenham with his division, supported by several squadrons of cavalry under Major-General D'Urban, moved along a valley at a very quick rate, and crossed the extended left of the enemy, almost before they were aware of the attempt: General Cole's and Leith's divisions, supported by Generals Clinton's and Hope's, moved forward nearly at the same time, and attacked them in front, whilst a Portuguese brigade under Brigadier-General Pack, advanced against the bold height of the Arapiles. General Pakenham's division with the cavalry quickly overthrew the left of the French, and constantly bringing up their right, so as to outflank the points on which they attempted to stand, drove them for a considerable distance from one height to another, and made above 3,000 prisoners. Generals Cole and Leith like-

wise carried every thing before them, and were rapidly pursuing their success along the crest of the enemy's position, when they were momentarily checked by a body of troops advancing on their left flank, from the Arapiles height, which from its great strength the Portugueze had been unable to carry. Marshal Beresford, who was on the spot, changed the front of a brigade in reserve, which held in check the troops near the Arapiles till the arrival of General Clinton's division, when the French abandoned that important point, and the battle again became a series of triumphs. A charge of cavalry, made by Sir Stapleton Cotton, in which General Le Marchant fell, was eminently successful, and each successive height on which the enemy endeavoured to check the pursuit was immediately carried. The only appearance of equal resistance was for a short time on the French right, where the fugitives forced back from their left by the advance of General Pakenham, attempted to reform, under protection of the troops which had retired in good order from the Arapiles. An attack in front, made by General Clinton, cost many men; but on a flank movement of General Cole, they hastily retired, and the allied troops pursued them till night as quickly as they could march. Never was an army more completely routed:

besides the numbers dead and wounded, 7,000 prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, and two eagles remained on the field. The allies had nearly 5,000 killed and wounded: amongst the latter, five general officers, Beresford, Stapleton Cotton, Cole, Leith, and Alten.

Marshal Marmont and his second being disabled, the command of the French army devolved on General Clausel, who, as soon as it became dark, made a most rapid march towards Alba de Tormes. The 1st and light divisions were ordered to the ford of Huerta, in expectation that the Spaniards would continue to hold the castle of Alba, and that consequently the retreat of the enemy must be by Huerta; but the French having contrived to dislodge the Spaniards from the Castle, crossed the Tormes at that spot in the course of the night, and saved themselves from the further considerable loss which must inevitably have attended a rencontre with the two divisions, whilst fording the river in their disorganised state. The next morning the main body of the allies advanced to Alba, where the cavalry crossed, and shortly afterwards came up with the rear-guard of the fugitives. A brilliant charge was directed against them by General Bock, with a brigade of heavy dragoons of the German Legion, in which numbers were sabred,

and nine hundred made prisoners; many others, owing their safety to throwing away their arms, and scrambling over the enclosures. After this dispersion of their rear-guard, the enemy fell into the greatest disorder; but making exceedingly long marches, and being covered by a strong body of cavalry and horse artillery from the Army of the North, which joined them two days subsequently to the action, and the pursuit being much retarded by the increased distance to bring up the supplies, they passed the Douro without further serious loss.

Lord Wellington followed the fugitives to Valladolid, which he entered on the 30th, and finding that they continued in full retreat on Burgos, and that he had no chance of overtaking them, recrossed the Douro the next day, and established his Head-quarters at Cuellar, to organize preparations against the Army of the Centre, which, since the battle, had been manœuvring at no great distance from the allies, to favour the escape of the defeated force. On the 6th August, the army moved on Madrid by Segovia, leaving one division, and some weak battalions at Cuellar, to observe the line of the Douro. On the 11th, it crossed the mountains of Naval, Serrada, and Guadarrama, preceded by a small corps of heavy German and Portuguese

cavalry, which in the evening came up with the outposts of the Army of the Centre, commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, who had taken post in that strong country to watch the movements of the allies. A reconnoissance, made by Joseph, brought on a shock, in which a charge ordered by the Portugueze cavalry was not executed with spirit; they turned before they reached the enemy, and in their flight upset three guns of the horse artillery, which in consequence fell into the hands of their pursuers. The German cavalry, however, behaved with their usual gallantry, and prevented any further bad effects from the failure of the Portugueze. The enemy after this success retired, and the next day the allies entered Madrid, an event which, to judge from the little arrangement made to lessen its effects, seems to have been totally out of the contemplation of the French.

Joseph and his army precipitately abandoned the town by the road of Toledo on the approach of the allies, leaving a body of 1700 good troops shut up in the retrenchment of the Retiro. That post was immediately reconnoitred, and being found to consist of two enclosures, one requiring a small army for its defence, and the other so confined as not to afford space to endure a cannonade, Lord Wellington ordered the garrison

to be driven by force into the lesser work, and guns to be placed in battery to annihilate them when so confined. The preparations for commencing these operations being completed, the commandant, knowing the defects of his post, hastened to make his submission, and gave up 180 pieces of artillery, 20,000 stand of arms, a great quantity of ammunition, artillery carriages, clothing, and stores of all kinds.

Lord Wellington was now in a proud, but not enviable situation: he had defeated a powerful army and had driven the intrusive king from the capital; but the object of his advance was yet unattained, as Marshal Soult quietly remained in Andalusia, probably expecting that the other French armies amounting to more than 100,000 men, would be sufficient, without his assistance, to force back the 40,000 placed in the centre of them. The Cortes of Spain, far from directing all their energies to support and follow up the advantage gained over the intruders, seemed to be solely occupied in promulgating a new constitution, and to appreciate the success of the allies by the opportunity gained for its more extensive circulation.* The different Spanish commanders exerted themselves to the ex-

* Appendix D.

tent of their means. General Santocildes with the Gallician forces obliged a thousand men to surrender prisoners in Astorga, and the Empecinado captured 700 in Guadalaxara. Many of the principal Guerrilla chiefs hastened with their bands to Madrid, and those on the northern coast, encouraged by a squadron of men of war under Sir Home Popham, recovered Bilbao, and displayed more than their wonted activity. These efforts, so highly creditable to the individuals concerned, and to the national character, were however of little weight in the balance of strength.

Further, the promised co-operation on the eastern coast had entirely failed; the corps sent from Sicily not having exceeded 6,000 infantry of various nations, without cavalry. The time had passed for the employment of so small a force, the activity of Marshal Suchet having dispossessed the Spaniards of all means of immediate co-operation. Soon after the fall of Valencia, treachery put him in possession of Peniscola. The commandant afforded a solitary example of want of honour in a Castilian: he not only betrayed the confidence reposed in him by his countrymen; but publicly claiming credit for his baseness, endeavoured to augment his guilt by vaunting to the utmost the powers of

resistance of his garrison. Denia, though well provided, made but a slight resistance. There Suchet prudently bounded his immediate conquests, establishing his advanced posts on the commanding banks of the Xucar, which gave him a secure front towards Alicante, and left his army at liberty to punish and repress the slightest movement made to oppose his authority. Thenceforth seconding a good administration by a system of unrelenting severity, he established in a few months perfect submission and outward tranquillity throughout Valencia. The brave Catalans were preserved from similar quiet by the retaliatory measures of their chiefs;* nevertheless by entrenching various

* In direct violation of the capitulation made with Blake, which guaranteed pardon and oblivion for the previous political and military conduct of every individual in Valencia, Marshal Suchet officially reported to his government, only sixteen days subsequently, "that 1500 outrageous monks had been arrested and sent to France, and that the chiefs of the insurrection, inmates of the house of the English Consul, as well as the sicars of that wretch, had been executed on the public place." Suchet, the more quickly to establish obedience to his authority, gave up to pillage several towns or villages which were, for a short period after the fall of Valencia, the seat of declared resistance, and subsequently ordered to be treated as banditti and disturbers of the public peace, all Spaniards taken in acts of hostility against the French troops. These severities were found to have such effect in Valencia that the French

interior posts, and fortifying Blanes, Mataro, Mongat, with other places on the coast favourable for maritime communication, the French had in great measure bridled the inhabitants, and checked the descent of the organised troops from the mountains. General Maitland, on arriving with the forces from Sicily, had consequently a fortress to reduce before he could act, and the Catalan leaders were prepared to assist him with only 8,000 men; whilst they stated the enemy's disposable army in the province at 13,000; beyond which Suchet held concentrated near Valencia 14,000 infantry,

attempted to act on a similar system in Catalonia: the governor of Lerida even putting to death as robbers some soldiers of Erolles' corps who fell into his power. That resolute chief, on verifying the fact, kept parties on the watch till he made prisoners a small detachment of the garrison, from which he selected one individual by lot, and instantly executed the remainder in his presence. The fortunate prize drawer was then escorted to the gates of Lerida, and accorded life and liberty on condition of making known to his comrades the scene he had witnessed, and of delivering a letter to the governor which contained the positive determination of Erolles to treat in a similar manner every Frenchman, of whatever rank, he might capture, should a single Catalan be punished for opposing the French dominion. The sincerity of the threat was too clearly evinced by the action which accompanied it ever to be put to the test.—*Fact learnt in conversation with Erolles soon after its occurrence.*

with an excellent cavalry, having nothing to oppose his marching into Catalonia but the Spanish army under General O'Donnell unequal to contend with half his numbers. To land, and raise the province under these circumstances, would have been to commit the population without a rational prospect of success; therefore, on the intelligence that O'Donnell had been defeated with loss at Castalla on the 21st July, and had retired to Murcia, leaving Alicante open, General Maitland threw his corps into that fortress, and Joseph Buonaparte effected his junction with Suchet without interruption.

Strong armies thus radiated on Madrid from every quarter, and should Lord Wellington direct his further efforts to any other point than the north, would close upon him, without the liberation of any portion of the country: therefore steadily pursuing the leading feature of the campaign, his lordship directed the troops in the island of Leon to manœuvre against Soult's forces, whilst with four divisions he moved in person against Clausel, who with the army lately Marmont's, had advanced towards the Douro to bring off the French garrisons left in Zamora and Toro. The Spanish army of Galicia, consisting of

12,000 very indifferent troops, took part in the latter operation, and formed the left of the advancing force. Two weak divisions remained at Madrid, and the corps under Sir R. Hill took post on the Tagus to observe Soult's motions.

The enemy were driven from Valladolid on the 7th September, but no endeavour could provoke an action: they rapidly retired on every approach of the allies, destroying all the bridges, and never making a show of resistance till the 17th, when favourable ground, and the immediate vicinity of Burgos induced Clausel to remain in position, till the allied army was nearly formed for the attack. All his battalions could be distinctly numbered, and the force drawn out was calculated at 22,000: they did not however risk the shock, but quickly retired on the approach of the allies; forming a sad contrast to the imposing appearance and bold conduct they maintained prior to their defeat. They were the same day manœuvered out of Burgos, where the infantry of the Army of the North under General Souham, about 9,000 in number, effected their junction. That officer, who assumed the chief command, leaving a garrison in the castle, retired to Briviesca, where he halted in a strong position.

The castle of Burgos occupies an oblong conical hill, the lower part of which is surrounded by an uncovered scarp-wall of difficult access, and on the summit stands the ancient keep, converted into a modern casemated battery. Between these defences, the French had constructed two lines of field works thickly planted with cannon, encircling the hill, and they threw in nearly 3,000 men for their defence: thus forming of Burgos a strong post to cover their only remaining dépôt of ammunition and stores. It was an object of primary importance to deprive them of these supplies, and the castle garrisoned by Spaniards would prove a great support to the army in its manœuvres against the superior force with which it must ultimately contend. Accordingly, though there were only three heavy guns at command, five howitzers and a few hundred rounds of shot, the siege was decided and instantly commenced with vigour. The first evening a hornwork which covered the lower wall was assaulted; whilst two parties attacked it in front, Major the Hon. W. Cocks forced in at the rear: the garrison, which consisted of a strong battalion, made a spirited resistance, and being well seconded by the fire of the place, success cost the victors 400 in killed and wounded. Batteries were then erected,

under the fire of which the besiegers made an attempt by escalade to establish themselves on the space between the top of the outer wall, and the first line of field-works. The storming-party gallantly forced up the wall; but the immediate vicinity of the interior defences enabling the defenders to obtain constant reinforcements, the assailants, after many fruitless endeavours to establish themselves, were beaten down with considerable loss. An attempt followed to breach the wall with the three heavy guns, in which two of them were disabled by the more powerful artillery of the Castle: the sap and the mine were then brought into play, and when the first had been pushed so near to the place, that the garrison from the superior height of their defences plunged into it with all sorts of missiles thrown with the hand, rendering the work too destructive to be continued, a gallery was struck out and driven under the outer wall, where a mine was exploded on the night of the 29th September, which formed a breach. The opening was not at the moment deemed sufficiently large to be assaulted, and before day-light the garrison had placed such obstacles on its summit as rendered it impracticable. Another gallery was in consequence run under the wall, and in the afternoon of the 4th October exploded: its effects

produced an excellent breach, and the 24th regiment were in a few minutes lodged on its summit. The next afternoon the garrison sallied out and gained possession of the lodgment, which they destroyed before they could be repulsed. The two following days were spent in increasing the front of the lodgment, which by great perseverance was pushed within five toises of the enemy's line: the work however was very murderous, as only one piece of siege artillery remained serviceable, and the garrison from their extensive front overpowered the fire from the sap; besides having great dépôts of ammunition at their command, they rolled down a constant succession of shells, which lodging against the gabions destroyed them with those they were intended to protect, and the heavy rain which fell, retarded every exertion to repair the casualties. Under these circumstances, on the night of the 8th, the garrison made a desperate rush, overpowered the guard, and held possession of the trench long enough to destroy all the work on the level between the second line and the outer wall. It then became apparent that to push the sap on so restricted a front, without the assistance of artillery, was hopeless, and some ammunition having been received from St. Andero, the howitzers were put in battery to

injure the defences and make an opening in an exposed part of the second line. That effected, the assault was given on the 18th October; the assailants, after a severe struggle, carried the second line, and some of the German Legion even escaladed the third line, and complete success seemed to have crowned their efforts, when the garrison, seeing only small bodies opposed to them, rallied, charged the different parties and drove them out. This was the last vigorous effort of a siege of 30 days, wherein it is difficult to say which party deserved most praise, the assailants for their bold and courageous efforts, or the defenders for their perseverance and skilful arrangements. Each at the same moment had the good fortune to have its exertions duly appreciated: General du Breton and his garrison, as might be expected, found, in the applauses of their grateful countrymen, the reward justly due to their gallant defence; and the unsuccessful party, by a rare magnanimity in their chief, had the consolation of hearing their conduct praised, and their failure imputed to causes beyond their controul.*

* This siege failed entirely from want of the necessary means of attack with the besieging force. The same deficiency at the previous sieges, partly arising from a too limited means of transport, and partly from the non-exist-

During the progress of the attack, the hostile force at Briviesca had been considerably reinforced from France, and on the day of the assault manœuvred as if with the intention to fight a general action. In consequence, most of the besieging corps joined the covering army, but Sir Edward Paget having repulsed with loss the only serious attempt made by the French, they desisted, and it was expected the troops would have resumed their labours; a convoy of heavy artillery and ammunition being on the road from St. Ander, which would have ensured the fall of the castle in a few days, with little or no further loss to the besiegers. The period, however, had arrived when to provide for the security of the conquests to be retained was of far greater importance than the honour of a success, of which time had lessened the value. The object of the

ence of the requisite establishments in the British service, rendered them so costly in men. It is however but justice to the officers employed, to state that the attacks of the different fortresses in Spain, though irregular from the above cause, were pushed forward with a boldness, intrepidity, and dispatch beyond precedent, as admitted by friend and foe. The plan of the attack of Burgos had considerable professional merit as well as boldness, and, notwithstanding its failure, added much in the opinion of the army to the previously high reputation of Lt. Col. Burgoyne, the engineer in command.

campaign had already been fully attained, as Marshal Soult, finding the allies steadily pursuing the war in the north, had reluctantly evacuated the whole of the south of Spain, and joined his troops to the other armies to check their career. He destroyed his artillery and abandoned his works near Cadiz on the 25th August, and concentrated his forces at Grenada, where he remained till informed of the march on Burgos, when by the road of Caravaca he effected his junction with the army of the centre at Albacete on the 29th September.

Soult's movement on Grenada was rather precipitated by the success of a detachment sent from Cadiz against Seville under General Cruzmorgeon and Colonel Skerret. The troops landed in the Guadalquivir, and taking the route of St. Lucar unexpectedly appeared in the suburb Triana, on the right of the river, on the morning of the 27th August. The French garrison, which consisted of eight battalions, attempted to destroy the bridge, and gain time to effect their retreat; but the injury being trifling, the inhabitants, under the fire of the rear guard, threw planks across the opening, and the allies crossed in time to make 200 prisoners in the town. The same evening, the French troops from the vicinity of Cadiz, about 7,000 in num-

ber, approached Seville to take up their quarters ; but understanding the force in possession to be that of Sir R. Hill, they made a hasty movement to their right on Carmona. General Ballasteros, who had acquired considerable reputation for himself, and for the corps under his command, by unceasing activity throughout the campaign, hung upon the flank of the retiring force, and annoyed them with effect as far as Grenada ; when receiving instructions to act as one of the general mass, and obey the orders of Lord Wellington, he not only remonstrated, but, sacrificing the interests of his country to his personal feelings, ceased further to pursue the enemy. Had Ballasteros confined himself to a protestation, however forcible, it might have passed as the impulse of a high-spirited soldier, and patriot ; but his subsequent inactivity proved the contrary, and he justly forfeited, by his conduct on this occasion, the fruits of a most meritorious career : being deprived of his command, he was imprisoned at Ceuta, with scarcely a voice raised in his behalf.

Lord Wellington, receiving intelligence, on the 21st October, that Joseph and Soult's armies were in movement on Madrid, instantly raised the siege of Burgos, and by the unprecedented boldness of filing the whole army in the night

under the walls of the castle, and over the bridge of the Arlanzon closely enfiladed by its artillery, (which he accomplished with scarcely any loss,) gained a march on General Souham, who did not overtake him in force till late on the 23d. The French cavalry on that day attacked the rear-guard of the allies, consisting of two brigades of the same arm. Some Guerrilla troops stationed on their left flank instantly gave way, and the two brigades were obliged hastily to fall back; they, however, took an opportunity, after passing a broad deep ditch by a narrow bridge, to charge their pursuers when only part had filed over: the charge proved unsuccessful, and they were closely pursued back upon the infantry rear guard, composed of German light-troops under the command of Colonel Halkett, which remained steadily formed, received the enemy's cavalry with a volley and checked the pursuit. Head quarters were fixed for the night at Cordovilla.

The evening of the 24th the whole army was behind the Carrion. The two bridges over that river at Palencia, those at Villa Muriel and Duenas, and the bridge over the Pisuerga at Tariejo, were ordered to be prepared for destruction, and exploded on the approach of the French. That at Villa Muriel was mined, and

successfully exploded under a fire of grape shot from the enemy. At Palencia the party posted to cover the operation was attacked, and being overpowered, the bridges in a perfect state were gained by the enemy. At Tariejo a report that the French had already crossed at that point delayed the commencement of the service, and they gained time to arrive before the mine was fully prepared; it was in consequence prematurely exploded, failed, and the cavalry immediately galloping over, made the party prisoners. The bridge at Duenas was fully destroyed. The enemy took advantage of some fords near Villa Muriel to push over the river a strong body of men, which, however, not being supported, were obliged speedily to recross.

26th October.—The army retired four leagues, and crossed the Pisuerga at Cabezon. The ground at and above Cabezon, on the left of the Pisuerga, is particularly bold and strong, steep heights in many parts abruptly terminating at the river: all the roads leading along its left bank are consequently very difficult and bad; and the high road from the north from that cause runs through the country to its right. At Cabezon it crosses the river by a stone bridge; that bridge was barricadoed and mined for destruction, and the army halted in its rear.

General Souham, having been detained by the ruined bridges of Duenas and Villa Muriel, did not approach till the evening, when he halted his whole army on the right of the Pisuerga, sending, however, frequent patrols, during the night, to the barricado on the bridge, to ascertain that the piquets had not been withdrawn. The next morning, to try the determination of the allies to maintain their ground, he brought up two brigades of artillery, and cannonaded the town: these being opposed by a superior fire he instantly desisted from further efforts in front; but made considerable detachments to his right through Cigales.

28th October.—In the morning a party of French attempted to pass the river at Simancas, but the bridge had been too effectually destroyed; in the evening they entered Tordesillas, where their arrival had been equally anticipated in the destruction of the bridge. During these movements to turn the flanks of the allies, a large force remained in a threatening attitude on the heights above Valladolid, from whence they occasionally cannonaded those passing along the high road.

29th October.—The army retired early from Cabezon, destroying the bridge, and that at Valladolid, and in the course of the day crossed

the Douro at Tudela, and at the Puente del Duero, the bridges at which places were blown up, as also that at Quintanilla, and subsequently those of Toro and Zamora. In the evening, the French passed over a body of men by swimming the river near Tordesillas, and unexpectedly attacking the guard left in a tower on the south end of the bridge, overcame it, and immediately began to restore the communication. In consequence the allied forces the next morning moved to their left and took up ground in front of the bridge, which they strengthened with batteries; in that position they remained till the 6th November, when the bridge at Toro as well as that at Tordesillas having been rendered passable, they fell back four leagues to Torrecilla de la Orden. The following day they continued their march, and on the 8th took up the position of St. Christoval in front of Salamanca which they had twice before occupied. Thus concluded a retreat exceeding one hundred and fifty miles, made in face of a superior enemy, with the deliberation of an ordinary march; in which, consequently, the troops suffered nothing from fatigue, and the casualties from the sword were under eight hundred and fifty. The casualties during the previous siege exceeded two thousand.

General Souham did not follow the retiring force beyond the Douro, but waited the approach of the armies of Joseph and Soult, which had some days previously passed through Madrid; Sir Rowland Hill's corps with the garrison of that town having leisurely retired by the pass of Guadarrama and Fontiveros on Alba. The same day the left of the allies reoccupied Christoval Sir R. Hill recrossed the Tormes, leaving a strong force in the town and castle to command the passage of the river.

On the 10th November the armies of Marshal Soult and General Souham, with Joseph Buonaparte's guard, composing a force of 80,000 infantry and 13,000 cavalry, united on the right of the Tormes: the allied army opposed to them not exceeding 48,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry.

The French directed their main efforts against the right of the allies, and made preparations to force the passage at Alba; but finding the town barricadoed, and the troops not to be shaken by a heavy cannonade, they relinquished the attempt, and on the 14th commenced the passage of the river, by the fords of Galisancho, higher up the stream. In the course of the following day the whole French army passed over to the left bank, and took post in a strong position near Mozarbes, from whence detachments of cavalry in-

tercepted the communication of the allies with Ciudad Rodrigo, leaving them only the alternatives, to attack, to starve, or to retire. The greater part of the troops being worn out with the fatigues of a campaign, in which the marching had been incessant from the first week in January, and being unfit to follow up any success they might gain, Lord Wellington preferred their restoration in quiet to the chance of glory by a barren victory, and on the 15th November broke up from Christoval, and commenced his retreat into Portugal. During the 16th, 17th, and 18th, the weather being extremely inclement, the roads excessively deep, and the supply of provisions irregular, the distress in the army was very great. A body of French cavalry, with light artillery, closely followed for the two first days of the retreat; but with little success, as the allies lost only 50 killed, 150 wounded, and 170 missing, after leaving the Tormes. On one occasion, however, the French cavalry, having penetrated the line of march between two divisions, made prisoner Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Paget, the second in command, who happened to be passing at the moment.

On the 18th Head-quarters entered Ciudad Rodrigo, and so soon afterwards as it could be

ascertained that the French armies had retired from the Tormes, the troops were put into extended winter cantonments, the left being retired to Lamego, and the right thrown sufficiently forward to hold the pass of Bejar.

This was the most important campaign of the whole war, as it decidedly changed the relative feelings and strength of the contending parties. Duly to appreciate its merit, it must be recollected that the military means of Spain were never before or subsequently at so low an ebb. The French forces, including those which entered during the summer, exceeded 190,000, and were formidable beyond their actual numbers from the confidence and skill acquired in twenty years of general success. They were moreover in possession of all the fortresses on the line of operations, and commanded by officers of the highest reputation. The amount of the British and Portugueze, including every reinforcement, fell short of 75,000, a portion of which, acting against the general mass, and in actual collision at various periods with 130,000 of the French, captured and retained possession of two of the fortresses, and liberated all the southern provinces of Spain; being incontrovertible proof of their possessing a superiority of tactic and combination as well as of prowess.

Difficulties nearly amounting to physical impossibilities were to be overcome before subsistence could be obtained for a greater superiority of numbers to oppose to the allies; whilst the assistance of the Spaniards could not but increase in value from their more extended territory. It has therefore only to be granted that man and nature should remain unchanged to feel assured that whatever might have been the fate of the rest of continental Europe, the subjugation of the Peninsula was no longer to be apprehended after the operations of 1812.

CHAPTER VIII.

Lord Wellington advances into Spain—turns the line of the Douro—manœuvres the French back on Vittoria—defeats them in a general action—drives them beyond the Pyrenees—blockades Pamplona and besieges St. Sebastian—the French make a great effort to relieve those places—are repulsed with loss—St. Sebastian carried by storm—Pamplona surrenders at discretion—Operations in the Eastern provinces.—Being the period from April, 1813, to the conclusion of the War in the Peninsula.

DURING the winter cantonments the most unremitting attention was paid to restore the discipline and organization of the army, preparatory to renewed exertion. Various changes were made in its equipments and accompaniments, tending equally to convenience and efficiency. Tents were provided to shelter the men in their bivouacs, and a pontoon train was fitted out for the passage of the rivers, and to enable the columns to act off the great road; the artillery carriages were renewed, and 1300 fresh horses added to their establishment. Strong reinforce-

ments, particularly of cavalry, joined from England, and the Portuguese battalions were completed. No hostile movement took place on either side, except an attempt made by the French to surprize the post at Bejar, the garrison of which, having timely notice of their approach, were on the alert, and in a moment repelled the assailants. The progress of these arrangements was therefore uninterrupted, and in the spring of 1813, the army formed a superb body of 65,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry.

The Cortes of Spain, enlightened by the events of the last campaign, and made sensible of the weakness of ranking national pride above the real interests of their country, conferred, in the month of December, the rank and authority of Generalissimo of the Spanish forces on Lord Wellington, who, in a personal conference with the administration at Cadiz, arranged that he should in the next campaign have the active co-operation of 50,000 Spanish troops. The principal divisions to be the army of Galicia under General Giron; a corps under General Freyre; and a force to be organized in Andalusia, as an army of reserve, under the Condé de Bispal.

Thus the united strength of the Peninsula was placed in hands capable of wielding it, at the moment when the resources of France were

greatly diminished, and her powerful empire shaken to its very centre. Buonaparte, soon after the opening of the last campaign, carried 400,000 men into the heart of Russia to enforce compliance with his system for regulating the commerce of the world: he pushed on with presumptuous confidence to Moscow, 300 leagues beyond the Vistula, without magazines, without an army of support, or even retaining possession of the country through which he passed, expecting to dictate peace as soon as lodged in the palace of the Czars; but the Russian generals, delivering up that ancient capital a prey to the flames, and refusing to enter into any communication with him, he found his expectations thwarted. Unable to carry the war further forward, and unwilling to confess his disappointment, he lingered so long in a state of inaction, that winter broke in upon his retreat, and the majority of his troops miserably perished by its inclemency, or threw themselves on the humanity of their pursuers to escape its effects; Napoleon himself, with a single attendant only, flying into Poland.

The more hardy Russians, braving the rigour of the season, did not relax in the pursuit on the liberation of their country; but crossing the frontier, and urging forward the force of the dif-

ferent nations through which they passed, gathered strength in their advance, and threatened France herself with invasion.

The line of the Elbe first served as a rallying point for the fugitives, who, on reserves drawn from every quarter of the empire, there checked the pursuit. The force thus collected, however, little exceeded 100,000 men, as Buonaparte, by an impolitic retention of various fortresses in the north of Germany, of little value in his plan of operations, deprived himself of the services of a body of veterans of nearly equal amount. The absolute authority, however, which he exercised over the persons of the French, enabled him to give a colour of judgment to this imprudent measure: by calling out the aged and the young, by anticipating the resources of the future, and disregarding all claims of exemption for past services, he made a convulsive exertion, which in the month of May fixed victory once more to his standards in the fields of Lutzen and Bauzen.

His policy with respect to Spain was of an equally grasping nature. Too obstinate to relinquish for a moment the nominal sovereignty of the country, he employed 140,000 good troops to maintain it; half of which number, concentrated for defensive war near the Pyrenees, would have been a more formidable body than

the whole, as spread over the Peninsula, and left, under every possible military disadvantage, exposed to the tactics and combined operations of the allies. The contention, by this arrangement, was, for the first time since the commencement of the war, brought to an equality; and, as the power of reinforcing the French armies and filling up their losses at pleasure had ceased, success against them might be pushed to the utmost; judging, therefore, from the events of the previous summer, every thing promised that the campaign of 1813 would end with the deliverance of the Peninsula.

Forty thousand of the French troops were in Catalonia and Valencia under Marshal Suchet; the remainder, under the immediate command of Joseph Buonaparte, having Marshal Jourdan as his Major General, were spread over Castille, Leon, and the northern provinces, for the facility of procuring subsistence, and to make face against the various Spanish corps, which, since the liberation of the south, had sprung up in all directions. They occupied Toledo and Madrid with their left, keeping a small corps in La Mancha; but every arrangement was subservient to guarding the line of the Douro, behind which river they had increased their defensive works, and anticipating an attack from the left bank

only, felt confident in the strength of their position.

Lord Wellington, having in this campaign no opponent on his right to take advantage of his wide movements, opposed the same tactics to the defences of the Douro, which in the last summer had liberated Andalusia, and decided to turn them by a flank movement through the province of *Tras os Montes*, which from its natural wildness, and the extreme badness of its roads, had hitherto been avoided in military operations. The large boats, which, by the improvements made to the navigation of the Douro, now constantly navigated to the mouth of the *Agueda*, afforded great facilities for this measure; a number of them being detained at different points, on various pretences, to convey the troops across, when the moment should arrive, without much previous preparation to excite suspicion of the intended movement.

In the middle of May the main body of the army, by this means, crossed the Douro at various points between *Lamego* and the frontier, directing its march on *Zamora*; whilst Lord Wellington in person, with two divisions of infantry, a corps of Spaniards, and some cavalry, advanced by the direct road to *Salamanca*. This double movement cloaked his views completely,

as the French, probably unacquainted with the improved navigation of the river, had no suspicion that the main force of the allies had been in a moment crossed over to their rear.

The officer who commanded in Salamanca having barricaded the bridge, and the principal communications through the town, allowed himself to be so long amused by demonstrations of a front attack, that detachments crossed the Tormes above and below the place, before he moved; in consequence he lost part of his artillery and many men, and nothing but the exceedingly brave and steady conduct of the remainder enabled them to reach the Douro.

The allied troops, marching on the north of that river, first met the enemy on the Esla; but, although the banks were steep and high, and the current rapid, no opposition was offered to the passage; on the contrary the French were so alarmed at the unexpected appearance of such a considerable force, that they abandoned Zamora and Toro, destroying the bridges. At the latter place the whole allied forces united on the right of the Douro, which effected the first object of the campaign.

Joseph Buonaparte, immediately on becoming acquainted with these movements, concentrated his troops on the main road to Burgos, along

which are to be found many fine defensive positions, and where some small depôts had been formed to enable the French troops to remain for their defence. That road was consequently their vantage ground, and Lord Wellington, to force them to abandon it, again manœuvred to his left, and marching on Palencia, approached so near the enemy's line of communication as to give them serious apprehensions for its preservation.

On the 12th a strong reconnoissance dislodged a French corps from the heights of Estapar, and threw them in confusion on Burgos, which a further demonstration to the left induced them to blow up with such precipitation that 3 or 400 men perished by the explosion.

The different divisions of the French army, after the destruction of Burgos, directed their march on Vittoria, while the allies, still moving to their left of the great road, crossed the Ebro, on the 15th June by the bridges of St. Martin and Fuente de Arenas, and on the 20th, after some skirmishing at St. Millan and Osma with French detachments, marching to join their main body, assembled on the little river Bayas, flanking the enemy's line of movement, and only separated by a bold range of heights of no great

extent from the plain of Vittoria, their point of concentration.

Lord Wellington the same evening, after a close reconnoissance, made arrangements for a general action, and on the morning of the 21st July moved his army, in three corps, over the heights which separated them from the enemy, the right commanded by Sir Rowland Hill, the centre by Sir Lowrey Cole and Lord Dalhousie, and the left by Sir Thomas Graham.

On attaining the summit, the position of the French could be distinctly traced: their centre extended along the left bank of the little river Zadorra, which runs in a southerly direction in front of Vittoria; their right was posted on some heights in front of the river above the village of Abechicho; their left being thrown far back, behind the river, to the village of Sabijana de Alva, having a small advanced corps strongly posted in the bold mountains of La Puebla, in its front, to support their centre, which would otherwise have presented a weak salient point. Thus they covered each of the three great roads which radiate on Vittoria; that from Logrono with their left; that from Madrid with their centre, and that from Bilbao with their right; the whole being a protection to the main road to Bayonne, which for some distance, after quitting

Vittoria, runs nearly parallel to the course of the Zadorra. Upon this road were observed immense convoys moving towards France, and the town was crowded with others waiting their turn to depart.

The strength of the two armies was nearly equal; as the French, forced by the necessity of seeking subsistence, and to keep at a distance the powerful Guerrilla bands of Mina and others, had 12,000 men under General Foy in the neighbourhood of Bilbao, and 15,000 men, under General Clausel, at Logrono; and the allies had been obliged to leave 7000 men to guard their line of supply.

The different corps of the allies marched directly from the summit of the heights to their points of attack. The right, under Sir Rowland Hill, became first engaged with the enemy's advance at La Puebla, and after a short resistance dislodged it from the mountains. Strong reinforcements, however, being immediately sent to its support, the contest was renewed, and continued for some time with much obstinacy; at length it ended to the advantage of the allies, who crossed the Zadorra in pursuit of the fugitives, attacking and gaining possession of the village of Sabijana de Alva, immediately in front of their left. This success depriving the centre

of the French of their chief support, Sir Lowrey Cole seized the favourable moment to cross the Zadorra by some foot bridges, which through neglect had not been destroyed, and vigorously attacked that part of their position; Lord Dalhousie speedily followed, and, joining in the combat, the defenders were driven back on Vittoria.

Sir Thomas Graham shortly afterwards drove the enemy's right from the heights above Abechucho; on which Joseph, seeing his communication with Bayonne nearly intercepted, marched a corps still farther to the right to occupy the villages of Gamarra Major and Menor on the Zadorra, where the high road nearly touches the banks of the river. The possession of these points enabled him to dispute the passage, and to cover the march of his convoys and the retreat of his army. Sir Thomas Graham therefore dispatched the Spaniards under Longa to drive them from the one, and General Oswald's division to drive them from the other, whilst, in person with the remainder of his corps, he attacked the village of Abechucho, also on the river. Gamarra Major was carried at the point of the bayonet by the determined advance of General Robinson's brigade, and Abechucho by a less exertion after it had been for some time can-

nonaded. The French, to recover the posts thus lost, collected a strong body of troops in rear of Gamarra Major, which, though it failed in several bold attempts to retake the village, was too powerful for a single division to advance and attack, and it prevented General Oswald immediately following up his first success; but as soon as the centre of the allies had penetrated to the town of Vittoria, the corps which thus held him in check, fearing to be taken in rear, retrograded. The division then crossed the Zadorra, and possessed themselves of the high road to Bayonne, forcing back on Vittoria the right, as well as the left and centre of the French; and the only road open for retreat was that leading to Pamplona.

The confusion amongst the different French corps, thus thrown back upon each other, was exceedingly great, and rapidly augmented with the pressure, till at length their army became an immense mob; the cavalry alone preserving some degree of order, and endeavouring to cover the retreat. The country was much intersected with ditches, and very unfavourable for artillery to gain the road. The allies made a most pressing advance, not allowing the enemy a moment's delay to overcome any obstruction, and 151 guns, and 415 caissons, with above 14,000

rounds of ammunition, and nearly two millions of musket cartridges, remained on the field; the enemy carrying off only one gun and one howitzer, the former of which was taken from them the following day.

Near Vittoria two thousand carriages of different descriptions were abandoned by the fugitives, containing money, valuables, and all the royal establishment. Joseph himself only escaped being a prisoner by quitting his vehicle, and mounting a horse at the moment that a squadron of British dragoons approached. So little anticipated was such a disaster, that the wives of the courtiers, and of the chief officers of state, were obliged to seek safety in personal exertion, and some hundreds of terrified women and children fled over the fields, and subsequently accompanied the march of the army on foot; amongst them were many Spaniards of high rank and previous affluence, who, exhausted with fatigue and hunger, crossed the frontier barefooted, and not possessing a single article of any value.

The number of killed and wounded and prisoners of the French, was not in proportion to their loss of artillery and accompaniments, probably little exceeding 10,000: nevertheless the panic was so great and general, that the troops

on reaching Pamplona, finding the gates closed, strenuously endeavoured to force over the walls, and only desisted from the attempt on being seriously opposed by a fire of both cannon and musketry. Nor were their chiefs altogether exempt from similar feeling: in a council of war it was decided to blow up the works and abandon Pamplona, as being insufficiently supplied. Joseph, however, feeling that the fortress would in some degree cover his retreat, commanded, as a last act of authority, that every thing should be taken by force from his neighbouring subjects. These commands rigorously executed, more than doubled the quantity of provisions, and prevented the execution of a resolve which would have completed the measure of their disgrace. A garrison being selected, the fugitive force, after a short halt on the glacis, hastened onward towards the Pyrenees in great disorder, their rear being still in sight of Pamplona, when the pursuit of the right and centre of the allies was checked by a fire from the walls.

The left of the allied army, under Sir Thomas Graham, marched from the field of action towards Bilbao, to intercept General Foy; but that officer, on ascertaining the complete defeat of Joseph, retired by the road of Bayonne. At Tolosa, he barricadoed the streets, and endea-

voured to make a stand. Sir Thomas Graham, however, quickly dislodged him: having brought up artillery, he forced open the gate, and charging into the town, gave the French no respite till he had driven them beyond the boundaries of Spain.

The corps under General Clausel marched on Vittoria the day after the action, unacquainted with the event: on arriving near the town, finding the allies in possession, without having the power to communicate with Joseph and receive his orders, Clausel countermarched on Logroño, where he halted for some days to obtain information of the movements of his chief. Three divisions marched on the 25th towards Tudela to intercept his return to France, whilst a force proceeded direct to attack him at Logroño. Clausel, to avoid the latter, moved on Tudela, where, he crossed the Ebro on the 27th; but somehow ascertaining that his retreat on that road was cut off, he recrossed the river the same evening, and marching rapidly on Zaragossa, gained the pass of Iaca far to the right, and entered France with little further loss than the sacrifice of his artillery.

The Condé de Bispal brought up the Spanish army of reserve a few days subsequently to the battle, and by means of a bombardment,

forced the little castle of Pancorva, with 700 men in it, to surrender: that post, situated on the top of a high inaccessible rock overhanging the great road from Madrid to Vittoria, where it passes through a ravine, entirely blocked up the main communication, which now became open. During these operations, Sir Rowland Hill continued to pursue the fugitives through the Pyrenees, driving them from every point they attempted to hold till he attained the summit of the pass of Maya, where he took post, concluding a series of brilliant triumphs from Portugal to the frontiers of France, achieved with a loss to the allies under 5000 in killed and wounded.

The fortresses of St. Sebastian and Pamplona being left to their fate, Lord Wellington decided to besiege the former, as nearest to the sea, where the means of attack could most readily be obtained, and the speedy reduction of which was most desirable for a point of communication with England, trusting to the more dilatory operation of famine to give him possession of the latter. To prevent the escape of the garrison, and to facilitate the blockade, strong works and various impediments were ordered to be thrown up on every side of Pamplona.

Sir Thomas Graham, with 10,000 men, was allotted for the siege of St. Sebastian. The town

town stands at the foot of a promontory washed by the sea, the approach being over a low sandy isthmus occupied by one front of a fortification, on the left flank of which, at six or seven hundred yards distant, are considerable sand-hills, which completely enfilade and take in reverse its front defences. From this point also the sea wall of the town is seen to the bottom, within the front works across the isthmus. To abridge the labours of the siege, and save time, it was decided to limit the operation to raising batteries on the sand-hills, from which to form a breach in the exposed wall, and so soon as practicable to storm it, trusting by quick movement of the assaulting columns to pass through the fire of the front line of works. Batteries were accordingly thrown up on the sand-hills; and on the 25th, two breaches being practicable, one thirty yards in front, the other ten, they were assaulted at the hour of low water.

The storming party, about 2000 men, being in readiness, a mine which had been formed under the glacis of the front line of works, was sprung as the signal to rush forward, the unexpected explosion of which created so much alarm amongst the defenders that the advance reached the breach with little loss: on attempting, however, to ascend it, so much fire was

brought upon them from the front, and from different flanks which had not been silenced, that in a short time five hundred were killed and wounded, and the remainder returned into the trenches.

The day the garrison obtained this triumph the enemy commenced a series of manœuvres against the right of the army. To retrieve the honour of the imperial arms Marshal Soult, considered the most able of the French commanders, returned early in July, from the army in Germany, to assume the command of the forces in the south as Lieutenant de l'Empereur. These, by desertion and other casualties, had been reduced to 80,000; nevertheless the new lieutenant proclaimed his intention of carrying the war beyond the Ebro; and, as proof of his expectations of success, used every exertion to bring forward fresh artillery, and to augment the strength of his cavalry, arms of little value for a struggle in the Pyrenees. His first enterprise was to relieve Pamplona: with that view, at the end of July, he assembled a convoy of provisions and stores at St. Jean Pied de Port, and concentrated the main body of his army in the environs of the town.

Of all the undertakings in war, the most hazardous is to defend the passes through a

range of mountains, as it obliges a separation of force to be made, which gives an enemy the choice of directing his principal strength against any particular corps, and to select the point most eligible for that purpose. Success of the assailants, at any single pass, compromises the safety of all the defensive corps, which are consequently less firm in proportion to the number of passes; and the resistance of the weakest becomes equally important to the safety of all as that of the strongest. The surest plan therefore is to concentrate in rear of the passes to be defended, leaving at them only posts of such strength as shall give warning of the points attacked in force, and allow time to make suitable dispositions for their support. In the Pyrenees, however, such an arrangement for defence is impracticable, as nature, acting on the great scale, has there so jumbled mountain along side of mountain, that all lateral communication is cut off, or is rendered too tedious to be of any advantage. The allies were therefore obliged to attempt the defence of the passes under the disadvantage of having two points to cover, sixty miles distant from each other, and two blockades at the same time to maintain.

To unite these four objects, the following were the dispositions made. The besieging force at

St. Sebastian, under Sir T. Graham, with its covering army (chiefly Spaniards) on the Bidassoa, formed the extreme left. A brigade of British infantry under General Byng, with a corps of Spaniards under Morillo in the pass of Roncesvalles, formed the extreme right, having as their support Sir Lowry Cole's division at Biscaret, in their immediate rear, and Sir Thomas Picton's division at Olaque. General Hon. William Stewart's division, with Silveira's Portuguese division under Sir R. Hill, were posted in the pass of Maya, about twenty miles on the left of Roncesvalles, having General Campbell's Portuguese brigade detached to Los Alduides. The light division under Baron C. Alten guarded the heights of St. Barbara, and Lord Dalhousie's division the Puerto de Echalar, intermediate points between the right and left; General Pack's division, the sixth, being in reserve at the interior pass of St. Estevan. The Condé de Bispal with 10,000 Spaniards was charged with the blockade of Pamplona.

Soult's arrangements were (see Plate II.) to attack, on the same day, in force, the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya, the roads from which diverge on Pamplona; thus acting against the extremities, every advance he should make would oblige the other defensive corps to fall back,

which would affect the resistance of his immediate opponent, and it would require only one advantage of combat or manœuvre, in a distance of thirty miles, to force one of the defensive corps from the road of Pamplona, on which his own forces would be certain to unite.

These manœuvres were commenced by the French on the 25th July, under the great advantage of Lord Wellington being at the opposite extremity of the line near St. Sebastian. Early on that morning the Count Erlon with 13,000 men made a judicious attack of the position of Maya, advancing against the right, where the ridges of the mountain branched off towards his camp. The force on the position was not sufficient to resist such formidable numbers, and the reserve, being posted at some distance to watch the passes of Aristacan, Ariete, and others, could not leave them totally unguarded, but was brought up by battalions as the pressure augmented; whereas the enemy's whole force acting compactly, each endeavour to check them proved too feeble, and the allies were forced back some miles, with the loss of 1600 in killed and wounded, to a strong piece of ground, where Sir R. Hill was enabled to concentrate all the troops under his command; on which the French desisted from further offensive movements.

Marshal Soult in person, with 35,000 men, directed the effort against Roncesvalles. General Byng, who commanded the advance of the allies in the pass, aware that a few miles to his right a road through Arbaicete turned his post, detached Morillo's corps as far to the right as consistent with mutual support, and placed his own brigade in a situation to cover the direct communication from St. Jean Pied de Port to that town. To effect the latter object, he was obliged to descend from the summit of the pass, which Marshal Soult observing, he slightly attacked Roncesvalles in front, whilst he marched a very considerable corps along the ridge of Arola to their left to cut off the retreat of those disputing the pass. The troops on the ridge, part of General Cole's division, being very inferior in numbers to the assailants, were beaten back with much loss, till strengthened by the Fuzileer brigade, which moved to their support, and enabled them to form on some very strong ground, which their pursuers did not think proper to attack.

Soult then directed his main effort against the front of General Byng's force, and drove it to the top of the mountain, which uncovered the road to Arbaicete. The same evening the Spanish regiments defending that town were successfully attacked and driven back on General

Cole's division, who having a superior force in his front and on his flank, with the chance of one also getting in his rear, retired, as soon as it became dark, to Lizoain, where the troops from Alduides joined him through Egue. In consequence of this retrograde movement, Sir R. Hill's corps fell back behind Irueta, where it took up an almost inattackable position.

General Picton with his division crossed over to Zubiri as soon as informed of Soult's movements, from whence, on the 26th, he moved forward to support the troops at Lizoain, of which, as senior officer, he assumed the command. At 2 P. M. the enemy's whole force advanced, when Sir T. Picton retired skirmishing to a strong bluff hill, which, with the ground on its right, he maintained in order of battle till dark, when he again fell back.

On the 27th, the two divisions resumed their march, men and officers dejected to think that a few hours would carry them beyond Pamplona, when a communication was received from Lord Wellington directing them to halt, as he had ordered up the Condé de Bispal to their support. Soon afterwards his lordship himself appeared, a sufficient presage of victory, and the troops took up their ground with full confidence of success.

Lord Wellington received information of the

enemy being in movement on the night of the 25th, and with his usual activity hastened to the scene of action, dictating, as he rode past the different corps, the movements proper to support the retiring force. Previously to their arrival, General Cole's division had formed on the high ridge between the rivers Arga and Lanz, and General Picton's division on the left bank of the former river, occupying also a strong ridge. The Spaniards were formed on the left of the two divisions, and the cavalry on the extreme right: thus the front extended across the two principal roads which, from Maya and Roncesvalles, radiate on Pamplona, in similar manner as has since been practised near Waterloo by the roads radiating on Brussels from Genappes and Nivelles. Orders had been sent to Sir R. Hill to retire behind the Lizasso, where he would be sufficiently near to support the position now occupied, and yet cover the road leading from Irantzun and Berisplano to Pamplona, into which Soult might throw himself by a wide movement to his right, or Count Erlon's force might enter direct.

Soult formed his army in a similar manner to that of the allies, on the ridge of a lofty mountain between the two roads, occupying Souraren as a detached post on his right, and on his left

placing one division on some bold heights beyond the road of Zubiri. The same evening he pushed forward a corps to take possession of a hill on the right of General Cole's division, occupied by one Spanish and one Portuguese battalion. These troops steadily resisted with the bayonet and drove the assailants back: an immediate reinforcement prevented any further effort of the enemy.

Early in the morning of the 28th, the sixth division under General Pakenham arrived, and were so disposed on the left of General Cole as to make face against the village of Souraren, where the enemy had collected in force. Scarcely had the troops taken up their ground when they were vigorously attacked from that point: the French steadily advanced; but after a little time the front fire, aided by that in flank from the troops on the position, caused such destruction amongst them that they retrograded.

Marshal Soult, on this failure, prepared for a general attack of the whole line. At 1 P. M. a strong column advanced up the hill on which the centre of the allies was formed, and attacked the left of General Cole's division, posted at a small chapel: a battalion which defended it was quickly dislodged; but on the approach of the Fuzileers to their support it returned to the

charge, and the enemy, in their turn, were driven back. They then directed their efforts against the hill on its right, where the 40th regiment, supported by a body of Spaniards, was in line; the latter instantly gave way, and the French gained the summit. Their triumph, however, was of short duration; the 40th with much steadiness gave them a volley, and rushing to the charge, drove them down again with great loss. Soult then covered his whole front with a cloud of tirailleurs, and under their fire attacked at the same time both flanks of General Cole's division: repulsed with great loss, three times he renewed the attempt, and at each suffered most severely. The only success he met with was on the left, where in the last attack he regained the chapel, and following up his advantage, established his columns on the position of the allies. The nearest battalions were ordered to drive them back, and never was more spirit shewn on any occasion; the 48th regiment charged literally to their front and to their flank, and with the bayonet dislodged the enemy from the chapel, which brilliant action closed the contest, as immediately afterwards General Pakenham's division moved forward and gave a decided superiority to the allies on that point.

On the 29th, the two armies remained quiet

in their respective positions. In the course of the day the allies were reinforced by Lord Dalhousie's division, which was posted near Marca-lain, assuring the communication of Sir R. Hill's corps with the main body, and firmly connecting the operations of the two defensive corps. This was a death-blow to Marshal Soult's system of manœuvres, and even placed him in an awkward dilemma should he attempt to retire without a further effort; as the allies were now become one army, having their left wing much nearer Lanz or St. Estevan, than the main body of their opponents.

Marshal Soult perceived the difficulty of his situation, and the same evening made disposition to extricate himself and attain his object of relieving Pamplona by a different manœuvre. The position occupied by the French between the Arga and Lanz was by nature so exceedingly strong, almost inaccessible, as to leave little apprehension of its being attacked when moderately guarded; Soult in consequence (having previously drawn in the division from the ground beyond the Zubiri road) marched the bulk of his army to his right, and at Ortix formed a junction with Count Erlon, preparatory to attacking the left of the allies. The resistance, however, which he had met with on the

right had so lessened his hopes of success, that he deemed it prudent, whilst his rear remained open, to send back his artillery to France.

The movement of so many troops to the mountains on the right of the Lanz leaving no doubt of the enemy's intentions, Lord Wellington, to prevent his right wing being detained inactive by an inferior force, (which would have given his antagonist nearly the same advantage as a separate attack of Sir R. Hill,) decided to make the corps in his front move, and with that intent, on the morning of the 30th, began to manœuvre on its flanks. Lord Dalhousie gallantly carried a height which supported their right, and Sir Thomas Picton turned their left from the high road through Roncesvalles by crossing over the heights from which the French division had been withdrawn, and General Pakenham drove them from the village of Ortix. These movements having shaken their confidence, an attack in front was made by Lieutenant General Cole's division, on which the enemy abandoned a position from its appearance impregnable, and they were pursued beyond Olaque to the rear of the troops opposed to Sir R. Hill, who had been warmly engaged throughout the day. Whilst his left flank was threatened by a wide movement of Count Erlon, a

strong force made many vigorous efforts to break his front. Sir R. Hill repulsed every attack, and maintained his position till Count Erlon was absolutely round his flank, when he leisurely retired to a range of heights near Eguarras and bade defiance to the enemy, who were unable to dislodge him.

On the night of the 31st, the main body of the French army made a creditable retreat through the pass of Dona Maria, where they left a strong corps in an excellent position. Nevertheless, Lord Dalhousie and Sir R. Hill, marching in parallel columns, simultaneously ascended the two flanks of the mountain, and quickly dislodged it; a brigade under General Barnes by a spirited attack literally driving more than double its numbers from one of the most difficult points. Lord Wellington at the same time marching through the pass of Vilate on Irueta, the line of the Bidassoa was completely turned, and the enemy lost many men in the further pursuit, as well as a considerable convoy of stores and provisions previously captured at Berueta, swelling their casualties to a number unusually great: those of the allies amounted to 6000. On the 1st of August the posts of the army were established in nearly the same situation as previously to the advance of the enemy.

On this success the siege of St. Sebastian, which since the failure of the assault had been converted into a blockade, was resumed. It was decided to renew the former attack with an increased power of artillery, and by batteries to be established on the isthmus to continue the breach round the angle of the land front. Eighty pieces of ordnance opened a direct fire on the 28th, and when the breaches appeared nearly in a state to be assaulted, a proportion was turned against the defences, which, in a few hours, nearly subdued the fire of the place. A little before noon on the 31st August, the columns advanced to the assault. The enemy on their approach exploded two mines on the flank of the front line of works, which blew down a wall under which the assailants were passing; luckily, however, the troops not being in very close order, few were buried, and they reached their point of attack with little loss. Many desperate efforts were made to carry the breach; but each time, on attaining the summit, a heavy and close fire from the entrenched ruins within destroyed all who attempted to remain, and those at the foot fell in great numbers from the flank fire. To supply these losses, fresh troops were sent forward with laudable perseverance as fast as they could be filed out of the trenches, and a

battalion of Portugueze gallantly forded the Urumea, in face of the enemy's works, the whole of which were strongly lined with men, who kept up an incessant fire of musquetry, particularly from a rampart more elevated than the spot where the breach had been formed. Sir Thomas Graham seeing this, trusted to the well-known accuracy of fire of the artillery to open upon that spot, over the heads of the assailants. This they did with much effect; nevertheless, two hours of continued exertion had fruitlessly passed away, and the troops were yet on the face of the breach, falling in great numbers, without being able to establish themselves on its summit, when a quantity of combustibles exploded within, which shook the firmness of the defenders—they began to waver, and the assailants to redouble their efforts to ascend. The most advanced works were successively abandoned by the garrison, and ultimately the retrenchment behind the breach. The troops immediately pushed up in great numbers, assisted each other over the ruins, and descended into the town; after which every attempt to check them behind various interior defences was in a moment overcome, and the garrison were driven into the castle.

Many valuable soldiers fell in this assault, but none more regretted than Lieutenant Colonel

Sir Richard Fletcher, Bart. the commanding engineer, an officer esteemed by the whole army for gallantry and professional talent: the former was advantageously displayed in conducting the attacks of Rodrigo and Badajos; the lines covering Lisbon bear honourable testimony to the latter.

The same day the French made a great effort to draw off the garrison by forcing through the covering army, the principal strength of which consisted of 8000 Spaniards posted on the heights of St. Marcial, on the left of the Bidasoa, covering the high road from Bayonne. The position occupied by the Spaniards was exceedingly strong, their front and left flank being covered by the river, and their right supported by the bold mountain of Haya.

During the 29th and 30th August the enemy assembled in force at Vera, in consequence of which General Inglis's brigade was ordered to the bridge of Lezaca, and General Ross's brigade took post on the left of the mountain of Haya, as an immediate support to the right of the Spaniards; and a Portugueze brigade occupied the right of the same mountain to prevent the left being turned. The first division under General Howard, in rear of Irun, formed a reserve to the left of the Spaniards, and Longa's

guerrillas, on the mountain of Haya, a reserve to their right. In the evening a large park of artillery and a pontoon train were clearly seen on the high road from Bayonne, and various large bodies of troops were observed in movement; but nothing hostile occurred. The night was exceedingly tempestuous; nevertheless at day-light on the 31st, it was perceived that a French division had crossed the Bidassoa by a ford in front of the left of the Spaniards, and that a second division was in the act of crossing at the same spot, whilst a third division, under protection of several batteries thrown up during the night, were constructing a bridge over the river about half a mile above the main road. At the same time 15 or 20,000 men were effecting the passage by the fords of Salim, to the right of the mountain of Haya. The two French divisions, as soon as formed, attacked the left of the Spaniards: despising their antagonists, they advanced with precipitate boldness; the hill they ascended was exceedingly steep, and the defenders firmly waited till the assailants had nearly attained the summit, when they charged them with the bayonet whilst in column, a movement so little expected that the French instantly broke, and were pursued to the bank of the river, which they recrossed in so much dis-

order, that many who mistook the direction of the ford were drowned.

A subsequent attempt made on the right by a French division, pushed across the Bidassoa to protect the construction of the bridge, was attended with a similar result; a considerable bend, however, in the river, covered with batteries, prevented the Spaniards following up their success, and interrupting the labours of the pontoons, who early in the afternoon completed the bridge. The French immediately passed over 15,000 men, and made a general attack on the heights of St. Marcial. At the moment of their advance Lord Wellington appeared in front of the line: the Spanish troops expressed their joy with loud and repeated vivas: encouraged by his lordship's presence, and deriving confidence from their previous success, they behaved most nobly: the French were repulsed at all points, and being pursued to the banks of the river, individually endeavoured to recross. Some discovered fords, to which they owed their safety; but many less fortunate in their researches being drowned, the eagerness with which the fugitives latterly pressed on the bridge became so great that it sunk from being overloaded, and most of those passing over at the moment perished.

Simultaneously with the attack of the Spaniards, the corps which crossed the river at Salim endeavoured to penetrate by a road to the right of the mountain of Haya, which leads to St. Sebastian through Oyarzun. The Portuguese were soon reinforced by General Inglis's brigade, which was relieved in the defence of the bridge of Lezaca by a similar force from the light division. The two brigades retired before the enemy, and, favoured by the great strength of the country, reached the ridge on which the Convent of St. Antonio stands, without serious loss; there the divisions of Sir L. Cole and Lord Dalhousie also assembled, as well as the Spaniards under Longa, and the enemy were unable to dislodge them. Being thus repulsed at all points, the French retired in the night, and the rains having rendered the fords impracticable, they were obliged to recross the Bidassoa by the bridge at Vera, exposed to the fire of part of the light division. This added to their previous loss, which cannot be estimated at less than 2000, in the course of the operation: amongst the number were two generals of division.

This action was of considerable importance; as, the position of St. Marcial being exceedingly strong, Lord Wellington trusted to the Spaniards alone to maintain it, giving them the opportu-

nity, like the Portugueze at Busaco, to imbibe confidence, and to lay the foundation of military character: thus, at the same moment, improving his own force, and causing incalculable harm to the French soldiers, who, beaten by the Spaniards they had been taught to despise, could not but feel a sense of growing inferiority.

On the 9th September, heavy batteries of mortars opened on the castle of St. Sebastian, which being too small to admit of cover being thrown up to lessen the effects of the shells, did not long resist. After enduring the bombardment for two hours, the garrison, reduced to 1300 effective, with 500 sick and wounded, surrendered prisoners of war. The casualties of the besiegers in the two attacks rather exceeded 3700.

The right of the allies, at Roncesvalles and Maya, held a most commanding situation, and threatened every moment to descend into France. Lord Wellington, on the surrender of St. Sebastian, determined to place his left in an equally menacing situation, by dispossessing the enemy of some strong ground they occupied as an advanced position on the right of the Bidassoa, the key of which was a high steep mountain, called La Rhune, situated in front of the passes of Vera and Echalar.

On the 7th October, two divisions under Sir Thomas Graham crossed the Bidassoa at low water, near its mouth. The Spanish army of Galicia under General Freyre crossed at the fords of St. Marcial, and the light division under Baron C. Alten with Longa's Spaniards attacked the entrenched pass of Vera, whilst General Giron with the army of Andalusia advanced against the entrenchments on La Rhune mountain.

Sir Thomas Graham and General Freyre both carried the enemy's works in gallant style. General Alten's attack of La Vera was peculiarly brilliant: the approach, which was narrow and of a continued ascent, was occupied by five strong redoubts domineering over each other; nevertheless the division advanced in column, and in that formation successively carried each work, the firmness of the defenders being probably shaken by the appearance of small parties of Spaniards detached to occupy various points on their flanks and in their rear. General Giron also carried the lower parts of La Rhune. The superior eminence however was nearly inaccessible, and after many fruitless efforts to ascend, the troops bivouacked below it. In the morning the defenders finding themselves left to their fate gave up the post after a feeble resistance, and the

Spaniards immediately pushing forward carried an entrenched line beyond the mountain, which was not obstinately disputed. The French commanders throughout the day evidently turned their chief attention to concentrate behind a fortified line along the Nivelle, a few miles in rear of La Rhune mountain, which apparently they had occupied merely as a temporary advanced position, as they even abandoned many intermediate works between it and the river on their being seriously menaced. Bridges of communication were speedily established over the Bidasoa, and works were thrown up to strengthen the ground gained on the French side, where the left of the army took post in an equally commanding attitude with the right.

On the 31st October the garrison of Pamplona surrendered prisoners, after a blockade of four months, which event concludes the war in the western parts of Spain;* and the operations in the eastern provinces alone remain to terminate the narrative.

The allied forces in Valencia were augmented during the winter of 1812 to 16,000, in nearly equal proportions of Spanish and British, and the

* See, Appendix E. some observations on the principal causes of this success.

chief command was transferred to Lieutenant General Sir J. Murray. During the same period a separate Spanish corps of 12,000 men, under General Elio, was organized in Murcia to act in conjunction with him. The two commanders early in March made a combined forward movement; General Elio on the left occupied Yecla, Villena, and the flat country in their vicinity, and Sir J. Murray on the right, the mountainous district of Castalla, having his advanced posts at Biar. In this position they remained till the beginning of April, when Suchet having put in motion against them a strong corps, General Elio decided to retire to a less open situation. Intending to march from Yecla early the next morning, he imprudently drew in his cavalry out-posts on the night of the 10th April, which gave the opportunity to General Harispe to enter the town by surprize. The Spaniards attempted to retire over the plain, which movement having been anticipated, the French cavalry waited their approach, and by repeated charges sabred or made prisoners nearly the whole number. A battalion of 1000 men newly clothed and appointed left in Villena, being separated by this success of the French from the right wing of the army, capitulated the following day.

On the 12th Marshal Suchet advanced by Vil-

lena, and after a contest of two hours at the pass of Biar, forced the defenders to fall back on Castalla with the loss of two mountain guns, on which the army took up the ground in position, the left on some strong rocky heights, the centre near the old Moorish castle from which the place takes its name, and the right thrown back behind a deep ravine. The enemy directed his efforts against the left, and a body of 4000 men steadily ascended the height; the ground over which they marched being rocky and uneven, their progress was consequently slow, and they covered their advance with numerous tirailleurs, between whom and the Spaniards under General Whittingham a continued firing was kept up for nearly an hour. The French, however, gradually ascended the slope till nearly in contact with the 27th regiment formed in line, which rushed forward and in a moment bayoneted them down. The Spaniards, encouraged by the example, joined in the charge, and the loss of the French was so considerable that they immediately commenced their retreat on St. Felipe, which they effected without further molestation.

Suchet, after this repulse, concentrated 15,000 infantry with a formidable cavalry in readiness to occupy the strong line of the Xucar, should the allies advance; but at the moment of their

success 2000 of the British were recalled to Sicily to enforce the acceptance of a free constitution, and each party remained quiet till the movements of the forces on the eastern coast were combined with the general operations of the campaign.

By instructions from Lord Wellington, Sir J. Murray was directed to land in Catalonia and possess himself of some maritime fortress which might enable him to co-operate with the Catalan chiefs. This junction of force, it was expected, would induce Marshal Suchet to abandon Valencia, and perhaps the lower Ebro, and also prevent him giving support to Joseph's army. Sir J. Murray was further directed, in the event of Suchet bringing up his troops in time to interrupt the capture of a maritime fortress, instantly to sail in the transports to Valencia and possess himself of the strong lines hitherto occupied by the enemy, which must necessarily be left in a very unguarded state. To aid these enterprises, a body of Spanish troops, brought forward from Murcia and Grenada under the Duke del Parque, were to threaten the line of the Xucar.

The army accordingly embarked at Alicante on the 31st May, and being favoured by the wind disembarked near Tarragona on the 3d

June, having made the passage in a much shorter time than troops could march by land. The main body immediately invested the place, and a brigade under Colonel Prevost attacked the post on the Col de Balaguer.

Fort Balaguer is a small square casemated work, standing on a bare rock 400 feet above the sea, from which its distance does not exceed a thousand yards; but the only communication open to the besiegers was by a circuitous route of a mile and a half over the face of the hills. Every supply, even water, was to be brought up by manual labour from the fleet, and the earth to construct the works of the attack, from the plain beneath, consequently the attack of this little fort presented many peculiar difficulties; nevertheless, on the night of the 5th, batteries were established within 100 yards, and by the skill and labour of the seamen artillery being dragged up the mountain, they opened on the following day. The practice from the mortars was excellent; every shell fell into the work, and after a few hours the governor capitulated.

The possession of Fort Balaguer effectually shut out Suchet from any immediate interference with the operations of the main body of the army; as the range of mountains at the extremity of which it is built, wind round in a semicir-

cular form, and encompass the plain on which Tarragona stands: a single passage, impracticable for carriages of any description about seven miles inland, forms the only communication over the ridge, between the great road which the fort commands, and the town of Mont-blanc, to reach which from Tortosa it is necessary to make nearly the detour of Mequinenza. The siege of Tarragona therefore commenced under the most favourable auspices. The strength of the fortifications had been considerably diminished by the French, who had dismantled or destroyed most of the exterior defences, and had left a garrison only sufficient for the interior line. This, however, not being fully known to the besiegers, many days were spent in cannonading a detached work, which it was not judged advisable to assault before the night of the 11th June.

Marshal Suchet with his wonted activity profited by the time thus afforded him: he arrived at Tortosa on the 9th, and, finding the direct communication impracticable from the loss of Fort Balaguer, marched the next day with a division of infantry without artillery by the mountain track before mentioned, leaving orders for the remainder of his army successively to follow, as they should arrive. At the same

time a corps from upper Catalonia assembled at Vendrels, rather more than a day's march to the eastward of Tarragona. On receiving information of the approach of these two hostile bodies, General Murray raised the siege and re-embarked the infantry on the 12th June, leaving nineteen pieces of artillery in the trenches, which he did not deem of sufficient value to risk an affair by waiting till night to effect their removal. The cavalry and field artillery marched to the Col de Balaguer as more favourable for their embarkation. Soon after their arrival a party of French cavalry from Tortosa skirmished with the out piquets, which induced Sir J. Murray to disembark infantry to cover the re-embarkation of the cavalry and artillery, and, successively, the whole army was relanded at the Col de Balaguer, where Lord W. Bentinck found it on the 17th June, on his arrival to assume the chief command. His lordship immediately blew up the fort, and re-embarked the troops for Alicante, to follow up Lord Wellington's instructions, and take advantage of the absence of Suchet's army from the line of the Xucar.

Sir J. Murray, for a deviation from his orders in not having pursued the same course, and for unnecessarily abandoning before Tarragona a considerable quantity of artillery and stores,

which he might have embarked in safety, was afterwards arraigned before a court martial. The latter part of the charge, alone, having been proved by circumstantial evidence, the court attributed it to an error in judgment.

Lord W. Bentinck advanced from Alicante and joined the Duke del Parque, to operate on the side of Valencia; but the splendid victory of Vittoria had rendered the retention of that province by the French impracticable. Suchet prudently abandoned Valencia on the 5th July; but, like his master on the Elbe, too confident of returning fortune, and too desirous to profit by it in the most rapid manner, threw away the means of commanding success by shutting up above twelve thousand troops in Denia, Murviedro, Peniscola, Tortosa, Lerida, Mequinenza, and other fortresses unnecessary to his immediate operations.

Lord W. Bentinck followed the retiring force into Catalonia; passing between Murviedro and the sea, and crossing the Ebro on flying bridges at Amposta, he invested Tarragona on the 30th July. Better informed of the strength of the place, that operation was vigorously performed: a brigade on the dawn of day advanced in line on the side of the Francoli, and obtained cover under some banks, 300 yards nearer the place

than the most advanced point occupied during the previous attack. Preparations were in progress to commence the siege, when Suchet, aware of its little power of resistance, made an effort to draw off the garrison: on his approach the allied troops took a position immediately in front of the town, to give battle, but in an affair of the outposts, the number of the French being ascertained to be considerable, the army on the night of the 16th August, retired to the Col de Balaguer. Suchet quickly dismantled Tarragona, and having made various breaches in its walls, again fell back behind the Llobregat, over which river he established a tête de pont at Moulins del Rey, as also various redoubts on its right bank.

The two armies remained inactive after this brush till the middle of September, when, it being understood that a large portion of the French had been withdrawn from Spain, the allied forces concentrated at Villa Franca. A corps of observation, composed of the 27th British regiment, three Spanish battalions, a battalion of Calabrians, and four mountain guns, under Colonel Adam, being placed on the main road at Ordal, about ten miles in their front, and equally distant from the enemy's posts on the Llobregat. The advanced corps reposed in posi-

tion at about one o'clock in the morning, when their piquets were rapidly pushed back, and in a few minutes they were attacked in force: the guns were on the road, and were ably fought for above an hour, during which the contest was firmly maintained along the whole front, when the attacking force pressing forward in overpowering numbers, their cavalry penetrated along the road to the rear of the position, upon which the defenders individually dispersed. The guns remained in the power of the French; but the greater number of the fugitives, favoured by the obscurity of night, eventually reached the main body. This rencontre has all the appearance of having been unlooked for by Marshal Suchet, whose whole army was advancing against the force at Villa Franca, probably ignorant of Ordal being occupied; or otherwise it can scarcely be supposed he would have confined himself to a front attack of a position completely open on both flanks.

On the approach of the French the following day, the allies retired over the plain of Villa Franca. Being rather closely followed, a halt made on a favourable spot for closing up the ranks, brought on an affair of cavalry, wherein the Brunswick Hussars overthrew a regiment of Cuirassiers, after which the French returned

to the Llobregat, and the allies continued their retreat to Tarragona.

On the 3d December Marshal Suchet made a general movement of his force to cover the pillage of the town of Martorelli, the inhabitants of which had the misfortune to incur his displeasure. This was the last offensive effort of the French in Catalonia, as, in the end of January, 1814, all their disposable troops quitted Spain to defend their own territory. Barcelona and Figueras, in which they left garrisons, were blockaded till, by a convention entered into with Lord Wellington at Toulouse, they were evacuated. Prior to that time Lerida and Mequinenza were recovered by stratagem. An aide-de-camp of Marshal Suchet having deserted, bringing with him the cypher in which the correspondence with the French garrisons left in Spain was carried on, advantage was taken of the occurrence by the Governor-General Copons to write in Suchet's name to the commandants of the different places yet occupied by the French, that a convention had been concluded between him and the Spaniards, by which their garrisons should march to Barcelona, giving up their respective places on the appearance of his aide-de-camp in company with a Spanish staff officer. The governors of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Mauzon, fell into the snare, not suspecting de-

ceit till they arrived at the strong mountain-pass of Martóral, where they found a British force in position which demanded the object of their march. On their reply, General Clinton denied all participation in the convention, and refused to admit them into Barcelona, which he was blockading and about to besiege; but left them at perfect liberty to proceed to any other point. Whilst hesitating what course to pursue in this dilemma, Copons closed upon their rear with a superior force, and, acquainting them with the stratagem, they capitulated with between 3 and 4000 men. The governor of Tortosa, more wary, or having, as he stated, received letters from Suchet only a few days previously, begged to postpone the delivery of the place till the arrival of the garrison of Murviedro, when he would march out and retire in company with them. The aide-de-camp, however, terrified at some strong symptoms of an inclination to hang him, which he observed whilst in Tortosa, declined to enter Murviedro, and those two fortresses were thus preserved by the prudence or superior discernment of an individual.

By the treaty of general peace the boundaries of Spain were extended to the limits occupied on the 1st January, 1792, and the Spaniards had the satisfaction to see their exertions against foreign tyranny crowned with complete success.

Not so, however, the attempts made to procure them domestic freedom. Before the conclusion of the war, when the ascendancy of the allies no longer admitted a hope of Joseph recovering his usurped possessions, Buonaparte, having bound Ferdinand VII., by treaty, to several acts favourable to France and hostile to England, released his majesty from captivity, and sent him across the frontier with the expectation of interrupting the unanimity so happily existing in Spain. This artifice was well parried by a decision of the Cortes, that no promises extorted from the king whilst under restraint should be binding on the nation. Their subsequent acts on this trying occasion were not marked by equal judgment. Without having ensured the means of commanding obedience they demanded of Ferdinand, on entering Catalonia, that he should swear, not only faithfully to observe and maintain the total change which, without his knowledge or concurrence, their predecessors had made in the fundamental laws of the state; but also various further restrictions they had placed on the royal authority since he had notified his release from captivity. The king was recommended to temporize under protection of the army and proceed to Valencia, where he fixed his court for some weeks. During that time it became evident beyond dispute, that the new

constitution, by its sweeping changes, had offended the prejudices and feelings of every class of society, and that nearly the total of the nation was hostile to its continuance. Emboldened by this knowledge, Ferdinand, on the 4th May, dissolved the ordinary Cortes then sitting, abrogated the acts of the late extraordinary Cortes, and resumed all the powers he had previously exercised, declaring guilty of high treason, and denouncing the punishment of death against whomsoever should oppose the execution of the decree. His majesty a few days subsequently entered Madrid, where he was received with tumultuous joy, the populace even vying with each other in endeavours to efface every public token of the exertions which had been made for their benefit. The Cortes thereupon, deeming resistance vain, quietly separated. The most distinguished of the patriotic members, as also the regents, were soon afterwards either banished, imprisoned, or condemned to degrading punishments; the liberty of the press was abolished; the Inquisition re-established; and the kingly government restored, without a single amelioration of the various encroachments which for some centuries it had gradually been making on the other branches of the constitution.

Thus the ill-judged attempt of speculative

men, suddenly to raise a people to the enjoyment of unbounded freedom, lost the Spaniards the most favourable opportunity which ever presented itself to a nation to renovate and improve its institutions, affording sad proof that theoretical wisdom is little fitted to direct the affairs of the world. A free government, to be duly valued and inviolably maintained, must be a work of gradual improvement, arising from the increased knowledge and experience of those who live under it. Communities, equally with individuals, require training to habitual firmness and forbearance, qualities necessary in the highest degree to the preservation of rational freedom; such being the tendency of the different orders of men to encroach upon each other, that, without their constant and watchful exercise, a constitution, however perfect in its institutions, will infallibly sink into some description of despotism, or the still greater evil of a turbulent democracy. However much, therefore, we regret the acts of Ferdinand, and his compliance with the ungenerous councils to deny the slightest boon to a loyal and confiding people, whose fortunes had been so freely sacrificed, and whose blood had so copiously flowed in defence of his throne, we cannot but regard the failure of the efforts made in the cause of free-

dom to have been a natural consequence of the confined education and contracted ideas of the present race of Spaniards. This is the more lamentable, as the events in the narrative just concluded shew them to possess many great national virtues. Be it ever remembered that when betrayed into the power of Buonaparte, pride of independence led them to refuse submission to his fetters: the manly firmness of their character rendered vain the number of his forces; and their persevering fortitude gave opportunity for those combats which stripped his legions of their boasted invincibility, and stimulated continental Europe to those exertions which broke the tyranny of France, and probably saved the world from retrograding in civilization and refinement, under the oppressive influence of a powerful and widely spreading military despotism.

ACCOUNT OF THE WAR

IN THE

SOUTH OF FRANCE.

CHAPTER IX.

Military Position of Europe—Lord Wellington forces the Passage of the Nivelle—places the Right of his Army beyond the Nive—Marshal Soult successively attacks the Left and Right of the Allies—is repulsed at both points—the Army goes into Winter Cantonnements — again moves forward — the left blockades Bayonne—the right forces the Passage of the Gaves of Mauleon and Oleron—gains a Victory over Marshal Soult at Ortez—who subsequently manœuvres to his left—a Detachment of the Allies in consequence gains possession of Bordeaux—the remainder manœuvre against Soult in the direction of Toulouse—attack and carry his Entrenchment round that City—General Peace.—Being the period from November, 1813, to April, 1814.

DURING the summer and autumn of 1813, the military affairs of Europe underwent a complete change, and the French armies, heretofore so formidable, were beaten in every quarter. An armistice to negotiate a peace, under the mediation of Austria, followed the battles of Lutzen and Bauzen, in which the arrogant pretensions of Buonaparte proving that nothing less than the

dictatorship of Europe would satisfy his ambition, the Emperor Francis, whose alliance had been that of temporary convenience and family interest rather than of cordial attachment, joined his forces to those of Russia and Prussia to limit the French empire to the boundary of the Rhine. An outline of the military events which followed this decision may be traced in a few sentences.

Buonaparte had 250,000 men to support his pretensions ; the allies mustered a still greater number. The former made Dresden the pivot of his actions, stationing there his guard, his cavalry, and the élite of his troops, to the number of 70,000; the remainder of his force he divided into three armies, making face to Silesia in his front, towards Berlin on his left flank, and towards Bohemia on his right. Dresden, being thus a reserve and point of support to all his corps, and containing every thing he possessed in the shape of a *dépôt*, was entrenched. His left army had the further support of the fortress of Magdeburg, and several well-secured bridges over the Elbe; his right had no local advantages, and opposite to it the main force of the confederates assembled.

Early in August the Prussians seriously pressed the French troops in Silesia, which inducing Buonaparte to march his reserves to their

support, the allied main body, crossing the Elbe in Bohemia, attacked Dresden on the left of the river. Buonaparte, interrupted in his operations by intelligence of this movement, hastened back, and luckily arrived to succour the town at the moment the assailants were penetrating through its weak retrenchments. The confederated armies, foiled in this well-judged attempt, bivouacked in position from the river above to the river below the town, forming nearly a semi-circle on the left bank of seven miles in circumference. The communications along this extensive front being every where bad and tedious, and nearly impracticable in the centre, Buonaparte endeavoured, by a vigorous attack, separately to overwhelm one wing.

Having detached 30,000 men to cross the Elbe about fifteen miles above Dresden and take post in rear of the right flank of the confederates, he attacked them in front with his main body. In person he was successful, completely beating back those opposed to him; but not pressing the retiring force they proved too powerful for the corps detached to their rear, which, attempting to stop their retreat, was, after a short combat, made prisoners. A variety of minor affairs, generally successful, followed, with the French corps in Buonaparte's front and on his left flank;

nevertheless he remained obstinately stationary at Dresden, wearing away his troops with attempts to make head on each point, till at length the allies, having completed their arrangements, decided to unite their forces in his rear. Having drawn their separated armies together into two bodies, one marched from Prussia by the French left, the other from Bohemia by their right; and on the 15th October were within a few miles of effecting their junction at Leipzig, when Buonaparte interposed between them, having remained till the last moment at Dresden, and ultimately leaving there above 30,000 men. His little care of his troops, and his losses in battle, added to the number locked up in various garrisons, had reduced his forces to 170,000 combatants. He endeavoured with 25,000 men to check the march of the corps of the allies advancing from Prussia, whilst with the remainder of his army he attacked the other. This manœuvre, which had so frequently given him victory when tried on a great scale and by a wide movement, failed of effect when the two corps were within a few hours march of each other: the operations of his main body promised success; but his weak defensive corps being forced back on Leipzig, his only passage over the Elster, he ceased in his exertions, and finally retrograded to preserve his

communications. The main body of the allies pressed around him in overpowering numbers, and the Saxons quitted his ranks: retreat could not be attempted in day-light, from the numberless obstacles in his rear, and he had to contend for existence till night, when about two-thirds of his force filed through the town, the remainder surrendering prisoners the following morning on being attacked. The premature explosion of a bridge a few miles in rear of Leipzig caused a further loss of 15,000 of the fugitives. The defection of Bavaria, a corps of which nation attempted to intercept their retreat at Hanau, diminished them 10,000 more: the army shut up at Dresden surrendered prisoners of war; as did successively the various garrisons left in the north of Germany, and with difficulty Buonaparte collected some fifty thousand men on the banks of the Rhine, having in the short space of eighteen months sacrificed to his obstinacy above half a million of admiring warriors.

Thus the French armies on the eastern frontier were so completely annihilated, that little or nothing interposed between the allies and Paris: a considerable interval, however, elapsed (perhaps caused by political considerations) before they followed up their success, and the example of invasion, as well as of victory, was first to spring from the south.

Lord Wellington for that object, immediately on gaining possession of Pamplona, on the 1st November, concentrated his forces to their left; but heavy rains near the coast, and snow in the mountains, attended with exceedingly inclement weather, retarded any forward movement till the 10th November, when the whole* advanced to dislodge the French from a formidable line of works on the Nivelle, which, with great labour and expense, they had been preparing since the failure of their efforts in the Pyrenees.—(Plate 3.)

* The organization of the army was into three corps, as follows: the right, consisting of the second division, Honourable Sir W. Stewart; sixth division, Sir Henry Clinton; Sir J. Hamilton's Portuguese division; Morillo's Spanish division; and Colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry, under Sir Rowland Hill. The left, consisting of first division, Major-General Howard; fifth division, Major-General Oswald; Generals Wilson and Bradford's Independent Portuguese brigades; and Lord Aylmer's Independent British Brigade, under Sir John Hope. The centre divided into two bodies, the right of which, consisting of the third division, Major-General Hon. Charles Colville, in the absence of Sir Thomas Picton; fourth division, Lieutenant-General Hon. Sir L. Cole; seventh division, Mariscal del Campo Le Cor, in the absence of Lord Dalhousie, under Sir W. Beresford. The left formed of the light division under Baron C. Alten; the Spanish army of reserve under General Giron, and that of Don Manuel Freyre, supported by Baron Victor Alten's brigade of cavalry; altogether amounting to 85,000 men.

The position did not follow the windings of the river, but extended in nearly a direct line on either bank from the sea to Ainhoe on the left. The right was particularly strong, being covered by various advanced works, and by an interior line formed round the bridge on the main road to Bayonne, which was further supported by the town of St. Jean de Luz partially retrenched, the Nivelle not being fordable. The left ran in rear of the river along the heights of Ainhoe, which were occupied by five redoubts, and other works, extending on that flank to the lofty mountains in which the Nivelle rises, and terminating favourably at a fortified rock on the same range. This part of their position being considered by the French as the weakest, and offering the most favourable ground for attack, had been further strengthened by a line of works in front of Ainhoe, also appuying its left on the fortified rock before mentioned. In the centre, the Nivelle forms a very considerable interior bend, and their line was formed almost entirely on its left. The bridge at Ascain, and that a little below it, were covered by strong *têtes-de-pont*; and the space included in the bend of the river, from thence to the heights of Ainhoe, was studied with enclosed works and lines of entrenchments, of which the main defence was on a

range of heights behind Sare. That village was barricadoed, and the approach covered by two redoubts (a b), and by La Petite Rhune mountain, also retrenched, forming a strong advanced post in its front. The centre being the point where success would be most decisive, as the penetrating columns would separate the wings of the French army, and cause the immediate abandonment of St. Jean de Luz and the right of the line, Lord Wellington ordered it to be attacked simultaneously with the heights of Ainhoe, its immediate support on the left. The latter operation was entrusted to Sir Rowland Hill. Marshal Sir W. Beresford, with three divisions, was charged with the right of the centre attack. General Giron, with the Spanish army of reserve, was ordered to act on his immediate left, and Baron Alten's light division, with Longa's corps, against La Petite Rhune. General Freyre, with a body of Spaniards, was employed to threaten Ascain, and prevent the enemy detaching troops from thence to the support of those engaged. Sir John Hope had to perform the same service along the remainder of the French line to the sea.

The division of General Cole commenced the operations of the day: after the artillery had warmly cannonaded the principal redoubt in

front of Sare for a short time, the infantry advanced with ladders to the assault, and the skirmishers moved to its rear. The defenders, alarmed at these appearances, attempted to escape by leaping over the parapet, but rather too late, many being made prisoners in the ditch. The horse artillery directly galloped to some ground which took the other work in rear, and General Le Cor's division passed its flank, on which the garrison, even less resolute than their neighbours, secured safety by timely flight, and the divisions, instantly pushing forward, obtained possession of Sare without serious difficulty.

General Alten was equally successful against La Petite Rhune: having formed his division before day-light within 300 yards of the retrenchment, with which the face of the mountain was covered; as soon as day dawned the whole rushed to the attack with irresistible impetuosity, forcing line after line, till, approaching near the redoubts, the garrisons, fearing to stand the assault, abandoned them, and the troops, without further opposition, formed on the summit of the hill.

These preliminary attacks thus successfully executed, the whole moved forward against the retrenched range of heights in rear of Sare. The divisions of Generals Colville and Le Cor steadily

advanced up the hill covered by their respective light troops. On their approach the French abandoned their different lines of entrenchments, as also the enclosed works on their left (g h), being in an unfinished state. They even evacuated, without a struggle, a redoubt (f) capable of a good defence, and the two divisions formed in line on the crest of the position without other loss than that occasioned by accidental cannon shot. The defenders retired without order, and in great haste, down the reverse of the heights to the bridges over the Nivelle; one battalion alone, posted in rear of a strong work (e), preserving its formation, and making a show of resistance. On a similar force of Portugueze, however, moving forward, it retired, and the Portugueze, closely following for some distance, took up ground in rear of the garrison of the work which yet resisted (e), the attention of which was occupied by General Alten's division in its front. That officer moved forward at the appointed time from La Petite Rhune to the attack of the enemy's ground in his immediate front. The flanks of it were covered by impracticable ravines, and it could only be approached in front over a very narrow low neck exposed to the fire of two redoubts, and of trenches cut in the hill half way down the slope. Seeing, how-

ever, that shelter could be obtained under a bank on the opposite side, the 52d, headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne, crossed the ridge in single file, regardless of the fire from the defences: when collected under the bank the bugles sounded the advance, and the men ran up the slope with cheers, which had the effect of inducing the enemy to abandon his lines and the redoubt which supported them. The capture of one work (e) alone remained to complete their triumph, and the division were forming for the assault of it, when they were made acquainted with the success of Marshal Beresford's operations, which ensured its fall. The troops in consequence retired under cover from its fire, by which they had already lost above 200 men, and shortly afterwards the garrison, 560 in number; seeing all hope of retreat cut off, surrendered prisoners.

Sir Rowland Hill attacked the heights of Ainhoe in echellons of divisions, Sir H. Clinton's leading: nothing could exceed the firmness of their movements; they marched directly on the right of the five redoubts, fording the Nivelle, the banks of which were steep and difficult, and, scarcely firing a shot, attacked the enemy's troops posted in front of the work. These being quickly driven back with loss, the garrison,

astonished at the boldness of the assailants, ran out of the work on their near approach, which caused the troops on its left also to give way. The fugitives were closely pursued by Sir H. Clinton, who joined with the Portuguese division in the attack of the other redoubt, which the enemy scarcely attempted to defend. A work on a parallel ridge in the rear was carried by Sir W. Stewart's division, and the enemy was driven completely from his strong defences behind the river with a loss to the assailants of less than 500 men. Two divisions immediately marching on Espellete, caused the French to abandon their advanced line in front of Ainhoe, so soon as pressed by Morillo, and to make a circuitous retreat.

These movements firmly established the allies on the right of the upper part of the Nivelles; but further efforts were necessary to the complete success of the day, as the French troops, driven from the centre of their line, were concentrating on the heights above St. Pé, and making fresh arrangements of their artillery above Ascain. The army having the full command of the left bank of the river, and being in possession of the bridges, found no difficulty in crossing. Generals Colville and Le Cor's division passed without opposition at St. Pé, and,

dislodging the enemy from the points on which they were forming, established themselves in rear of the right of the enemy's line, the troops guarding which still remained in their works. The approach of night here terminated the operations of the day. Soult profited by the darkness, to withdraw the force on his right; the retreat of which, if executed in daylight, would have been exceedingly molested by Sir John Hope, and which the slightest retardment would have rendered precarious, the allied divisions at St. Pé being in a situation to interpose on the road between them and Bayonne. Early the following morning they moved forward with that intent, but heavy rain having rendered the cross roads nearly impracticable, and all the bridges on the main communication having been destroyed by the French, the march of the different columns was so much retarded that the retiring force gained Bayonne without further molestation.

Fifty pieces of cannon, fifteen hundred prisoners, with a quantity of ammunition and stores, enhanced the value of this triumph, which cost the victors little more than 500 killed and 2000 wounded. The position on the Nivelle had many great natural advantages: it was taken up with judgment, and neither labour nor expense had

been spared for three months to strengthen it to the utmost. Marshal Soult had fully 70,000 men for its defence, and he disputed every inch of the ground till dislodged, and no charge has been brought against him of serious error in his dispositions;* therefore, to account for such a

* An error of minor arrangement might possibly be pointed out in the plan he adopted of forming his lines between the works and the attacking force, by which means the fire of the redoubts was completely screened till after the repulse of his line, when the assailants following close, the garrisons generally gave way at the same time, and the support merely served to cover their retreat. The redoubts on the heights of Ainhoe were very respectable; and if the six or seven thousand men formed in front of them had been kept in reserve in their rear, leaving the fire of the work free, and had only acted against the allies when giving the assault, would not that operation have been rendered infinitely more difficult, or even hazardous?

Another secondary error might also be mentioned, which is the blind confidence felt by the French that the attack of Sir R. Hill would be directed along the ridge of mountains on their extreme left, which they carried to such a pitch, that whilst the columns were absolutely in march to the attack of the position of Ainhoe, they were observed to be detaching troops from thence to their left; and during the combat, so far from attending solely to the main point, and moving to the assistance of those engaged, the troops on the ridge amused themselves with driving the force under Mina up the pass of Maya: there they fell in with the baggage of a dragoon regiment which they plundered, and immediately returned with their booty; otherwise, had they followed a little farther,

line having been forced on two points at so small a loss, more seems necessary than that the attack should have been planned with judgment and executed with ability: upon the whole, it is probable that the statement of the French officers made at the period was correct, that ill success had lowered the spirit of their men, and that they fought on this occasion with less than their accustomed gallantry. The allied army certainly was never in finer order, or manœuvred better. The artillery under Colonel Dickson was conspicuously active, without any diminution of its usual destructive powers, which, as the country was unfavourable to its movement, shows to what a high degree arrangement and experience can unite those primary qualities in that arm.

Plate IV.—After this brilliant action, the allies went into cantonments between the Nivelle and the sea, till preparations should be organized for their further operations. The French at the same time concentrated in great numbers round Bayonne, only two miles in their immediate front; and as they might from thence make a sudden advance, a defensive line was appointed their capture was inevitable, as, notwithstanding their accidentally accelerated retreat, the troops detached for that purpose had nearly effected it.

for the different divisions, which they were employed to strengthen with works. It commenced at the sea on the left, in rear of Biaritz; from thence it passed over the main ridge of heights, crossing the Chaussée at a country-house belonging to the Mayor of that town; from thence it followed the right bank of a valley in front of Arcangues, falling on the Nive near a large chateau, called Garrat's House, the right being thrown back along the left of the Nive by Ustariz and Cambo.

Whilst the army occupied only this confined space in rear of the Nive, and the communication between Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port remained free, the French continued to have access to all the country on the right of the river, and were profiting by the opportunity to appropriate its resources to their own use, and to interrupt the foragers of the allies; therefore so soon as preparations were completed for crossing the Nive, it was decided to extend the cantonments of the army, and block up the front of the enemy, by driving back their advanced posts, and seizing some strong ground they occupied between the Nive and Adour. The army moved forward bodily on the 9th December. Sir J. Hope, with the left, met with little opposition, and closely reconnoitred

Bayonne. Sir R. Hill crossed the Nive by some fords at Cambo without resistance, as the French in his front hastily retired towards Bayonne to prevent General Clinton's division, which crossed by a bridge of boats at Ustariz, intercepting their retreat. The retiring force attempted to make a stand at Ville Franche; they were, however, quickly dislodged by the light infantry of the troops from Ustariz, when, darkness approaching, the operations of the day closed. The enemy in the night withdrew all his posts into Bayonne; and on the 10th Sir R. Hill's corps was established with its right on the Adour, its left on the height of Ville Franche above the Nive, and its centre across the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port, at the village of St. Pierre. Murillo's Spaniards were detached to Urcuray, and a brigade of cavalry to Hasparren, to observe a French division posted near St. Palais. Sir J. Hope resumed his former contentments in the course of the night, and the centre, under Marshal Beresford, withdrew to the left bank of the Nive, maintaining a communication with Sir R. Hill by a bridge of boats.

Bayonne is situated at the junction of the Nive with the Adour; the former not being fordable for several miles up its course; the lat-

ter being a very considerable river. The town, which is strongly fortified, contains secure bridges over both streams, and the French had added to its capacity by an entrenched camp nearly inattackable from natural obstacles, and sufficiently spacious to contain an army. The only two good roads through this corner of France, those from Paris to St. Jean de Luz and St. Jean Pied de Port, pass through the town: all the other roads are of the very worst description of cross country communication, and become quite impracticable in winter. Marshal Soult, at Bayonne, had consequently the advantage over the allies of holding the radii of excellent roads to the arc of their position, the communications along which were exceedingly bad, and intersected by a river; he had moreover all his communications assured from interruption, and all his movements supported by the fortress.

Soult lost not a moment in profiting by his advantageous position; judging that the principal strength of the allies would be on the right of the Nive, supporting Sir R. Hill's corps, he marched his main force from Bayonne early in the morning of the 10th, by the high road of St. Jean de Luz. The troops under Sir J. Hope, in position on the left of the allies, guarding that

road, were Major-General Hay's division, (the 5th,) and two Portugueze brigades, posted on a strong narrow ridge, and Baron Alten's light division likewise on a strong piece of ground at Arcangues, about two miles to their right; no defensive connection, however, existing between the two, except along a range of hills which projected too much to be occupied otherwise than by small posts. The position of each was strong in itself, the flanks being on difficult valleys, and so near to each other, that no enemy dare to penetrate between them. The French, without halting, attacked, and vigorously drove the light division into their entrenchments, establishing themselves on the connecting ridge between the two allied corps, and then immediately turned their main efforts against the left. The defenders, displayed a spirit worthy of their reputation, and, favoured by the ground, were immoveable: at one moment only was there any appearance of faltering; the enemy, after skirmishing for a considerable time, issued from a wood on the right of the high road, in such numbers as to drive back the advance on their support, which they likewise overpowered, and were rapidly following up their success, when a Portugueze battalion boldly moved forward on the road, and wheeled into the rear of the wood; the 9th British

regiment, which was formed on the extreme right, perceiving that the enemy had penetrated beyond their front, immediately faced about, and uniting in a charge to the rear, with the Portuguese, caused the pursuing column to retrograde with the loss of many killed and prisoners. The French, even after this severe check, firmly persisted in the combat, which only closed with the night; when the remainder of the left wing having been brought up from its cantonments, Major-General Howard's division relieved the fatigued troops on the field of action. At the same time Sir Lowry Cole and General Le Cor's division took post in a situation to support either of the defensive corps. Soult employed the night in making dispositions to force Baron Alten at Arcangues, moving many of his troops in that direction. Sir J. Hope seeing this, made a counter-movement on the 11th to be nearer to support General Alten, on which his opponent again changed his dispositions, and directed several columns against the left. Sir J. Hope lost not a moment in resuming his former ground; Soult, however, was in time to molest his rear in their march, and drove it back hastily; but made no attack after the troops had fully resumed their ground, which movement terminated the operations, though not the events of the day, as soon

after the firing ceased, three battalions of Nassau troops, informed of the liberation of their country from the sway of France, came over to the allies as the means of rejoining their prince. The next morning the French still occupied the ridge in force, and in the afternoon there was a sharp affair of outposts; but no serious movement took place on either side.

Marshal Soult, foiled in his endeavours to overwhelm the left of the army, profited by the position of Bayonne to move his whole force in the night of the 12th against the corps under Sir R. Hill, on the right of the Nive, the position of which he might have naturally expected would have been much weakened, by its supports being turned to resist his formidable and obstinate attacks of three days on the left. Such, however, was by no means the case: on the contrary, arrangements had been in progress from day-light in the morning to reinforce it with Sir H. Clinton's division; and Sir L. Cole's, with the greater part of the third division, were held in readiness to cross to the right of the Nive. Sir R. Hill had under his immediate command about 13,000 men: four brigades occupied the village of St. Pierre on the high road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port, Sir H. Clinton's division being a support in their rear:

two brigades were at Ville Franche, with one on some strong ground in its front, and a brigade at Vieux Moguere on the right. Soult advanced with 30,000 men, evidently directing one powerful effort against the centre: Sir R. Hill, in consequence, ordered all the troops from the flanks to the support of that point, except one battalion to guard Vieux Moguere. The French came on with great boldness and celerity, and in such superior numbers that they were fast dislodging the centre, when the troops from the flanks arrived, with a rare precision, to its assistance, and repulsed the advancing force. The battalion on the right being menaced, retired from Moguere to the heights in its rear, from whence, ascertaining the enemy to be in little force, it re-entered the village, making some prisoners. Soult's attention was entirely directed to the centre, which he repeatedly attacked: at last, finding his most strenuous endeavours fruitless, he began to draw off. To hasten his movements, General Byng's brigade advanced, and carried in superior style a hill on the French left, which covered their manœuvres, capturing two guns. The enemy after this abandoned all thoughts of further resistance, and hastily retired to some very strong ground near Bayonne, having their

left on the Adour; and Sir R. Hill's corps took up a parallel position.

These attacks of Marshal Soult were judiciously conceived, ably executed, and persevered in with firmness; nevertheless on both fields his most forcible efforts were repulsed by a small portion of the allied army—being incontestible proof of inferiority in his troops. The conscription, that powerful engine which, if duly applied, would have given endless vigour to the French armies, had, by its abuse, brought on their premature decay. Men being by its action the supply most readily attained, were on all occasions made the principal sacrifice. Buonaparte, besides his excessive losses in battle, threw them away by hundreds of thousands to save the incumbrance and expense of hospitals and magazines. His generals followed his example on a smaller scale, engaging incessantly, without care or thought, in useless affairs serving merely to bring their names into notice. Similar prodigality of life extended to the lowest officer. Still, however, men were forthcoming; each latter year saw half the number of the army replaced; but four times that period failed to render them veterans; and those legions so incessantly stimulated to exertion under the flattering address of heroes of Austerlitz, Friedland, and Jena, were

at this period composed of young and unwilling conscripts, trained in a school of misfortune and retreat.

The efforts last detailed must have been attended with excessive loss to the French, as the victors under their more favourable circumstances had above 1200 killed and wounded on the left, and nearly 2000 on the right. Soult considered the trial of strength decisive, and cantoning his army behind the Adour, thence forth turned all his exertions to complete the works round Bayonne, and to make various defensive arrangements to dispute the passage of the Pau, the best communications over which he assured by a strong tête-de-pont at Peyrehorade. For these objects he obtained a considerable period of quiet, as the winter had set in particularly wet and inclement. The Nive, the Adour, the Pau, the Gaves d'Oleron and Mauleon, with various other streams, had overflowed their banks, rendering the low grounds in their vicinity one continued marsh; the cross roads had become perfectly impracticable; the high roads, which were commanded by fortresses, could alone be used, and the allies were obliged to go into cantonments till a more genial season should admit of their pushing forward. The territory near the Pyrenees is exceedingly poor and ill cultivated, and carriage scarce; all the supplies for

the troops were in consequence drawn from the port of St. Jean de Luz, which, being situated in the innermost bite of the Bay of Biscay, was of dangerous approach, and many transports were stranded; nevertheless, except in the article of forage, the army was abundantly supplied. The inhabitants were peaceable: on the approach of the allies they had been encouraged to adopt a system of Guerrilla warfare; but the wholesome severity of sending prisoners of war to England those caught in acts of hostility, added to the unexpected generosity of paying for every thing, speedily changed their dispositions. Unlike the Spaniard, who, when he has driven his cattle to the mountains, can with ease transport all his remaining effects of value on the same mule with himself, the French cultivators are more or less proprietors, and have too much at stake to become desperate enemies, unless driven thereto by continued ill-treatment. Neither do they possess the same steady and elevated patriotic feelings as the Spaniards; indeed, the patriotism and attachment of the French to their rulers had been so weakened by the successive changes of the revolution, that when they found the sway of the allies the least oppressive, they lost sight of their duty in self-interest, and rather assisted than opposed the invaders. Under these circum-

stances, nothing of any interest occurred till the middle of February, when, the weather having become more favourable, Lord Wellington commenced a series of manœuvres to draw Soult's force from its advantageous position near Bayonne, and to carry the war into the heart of France. The first operation was to clear the right flank of the army, and assure its communications, by driving back the French troops from the vicinity of St. Palais. With that view Sir R. Hill, breaking up from Urcuray on the 14th, dislodged from Hellette a small force, which halted for the night on the hills above Meharin; but immediately fell back from thence the next morning on the advance of Murillo, and joined their main body near Garis.

The position of the enemy was very strong; but too much to their right of Garis to cover the road through that town, by which their retreat over the bridge at St. Palais might be cut off; it was consequently highly desirable to attack them; evening, however, was fast coming on, and only Sir W. Stewart's division, with Murillo's force, had arrived. Lord Wellington, therefore, not totally to lose the favourable opportunity which presented itself, having detached the Spaniards to occupy St. Palais, attacked them in front with Sir W. Stewart's division alone. The

troops gallantly carried the heights on the first effort, and firmly maintained them against many equally gallant efforts of the enemy to recover their ground. Night came on during the struggle, and several charges were made by the French after dark, which being invariably met with firmness, more men were bayoneted than is usual in such small affairs; at length the French finding their efforts ineffectual, and their loss considerable, retired and passed through St. Palais without molestation, the Spaniards not having reached the town.

The next day, the 16th, the retiring force was again found in position behind the Gave de Mauleon, with the apparent intention of waiting a general attack; but the artillery being advantageously placed, a battalion under their fire crossed the stream by a ford near Arrivete, and driving back the French posts from thence, the whole division instantly retired, and in the night passed the Gave d'Oleron, on which the right of the allies concentrated behind the Gave de Mauleon. The centre of the army made a corresponding movement on the 15th to the Bidouse river, Sir H. Clinton's and Baron Alten's light divisions remaining between the Nive and the Adour to watch the troops in Bayonne.

The advance of the left wing of the army, in-

tended to form the investment of Bayonne, was delayed till the 23d by the considerable preparation necessary to effect the passage of the Adour, an operation attended with peculiar difficulties. From the impracticability of transporting heavy apparatus across the country to the eastward, the bridge was of necessity most disadvantageously constructed below the town, where the river is 270 yards broad, and the tide and ripple so formidable as to preclude the use of any thing less than decked vessels of twenty or thirty tons burthen. These were to be collected and fitted out in the ports of Socoa and St. Jean de Luz, the navigation from whence was uncertain, and the entrance of the river at all times hazardous, and frequently impracticable; moreover the garrison, which exceeded 10,000 in number, were aided by a sloop of war and a flotilla of gun-boats.

Sir J. Hope moved to the left bank of the Adour about noon of the 23d with the ordinary pontoon train, and finding the garrison had only a small guard of observation on the other side, immediately rowed over fifty men, and, having stretched a hawser across, endeavoured by means of rafts to ferry over the remainder of his force. The rafts, however, could only work during slack tide, and in the evening one battalion of

Guards about 600 in number, and a few rockets only, had been passed to the right bank. A little before dark about double that force advanced towards them: the Guards, to receive the attack, were judiciously posted behind the sand hills, with artillery on the opposite bank flanking the ground in their front; their firmness, however, was not put to any severe trial, as a well directed discharge of rockets induced the French to halt, and after some hesitation they returned into the place. During the night the pontoons used as row boats were substituted for the rafts; fifteen men passed at each turn; and on the evening of the 24th the whole of General Howard's division, about 6000 men, with a few cavalry, were on the right bank.

So soon as security was thus obtained against the enemy, the navy conquered the difficulties of the navigation. British seamen under a British pendant shewed the way over the bar: the native crews of the remaining boats, kept in obedience by officers of engineers, with armed sappers, were constrained to follow, and the flotilla effected the passage with the loss of six of their number. The boats were immediately moored: the sappers worked incessantly, night and day, and by noon of the 26th a bridge was passable about two miles and a half below the town of

Bayonne, which for the remainder of the war served as the regular communication with the army from St. Jean de Luz and Spain, by the road of Dax, thus avoiding all the difficult and exhausted country along the foot of the Pyrenees. The same evening, after a sharp affair, the garrison was forced to withdraw into their defences, and Bayonne was blockaded on both sides of the Adour preparatory to forming the siege; in consequence the two divisions left to observe the place between the Nive and the Adour, joined the main body of the army.

On the 24th the right and centre of the allies made a general movement. Sir R. Hill's corps crossed the Gave d'Oleron without opposition by a ford near Villenave; Sir T. Picton's, the 3d, and Baron Alten's light division followed at the same spot, and Sir H. Clinton's division effected the passage between Montfort and Laas, also without opposition. The Spaniards at the same time shut up Navarreins, a place on the right of the line of operations sufficiently fortified to require battering artillery for its reduction, and Marshal Beresford confined the French on the left within their tête-de-pont at Peyrehorade.

Marshal Soult, on ascertaining these movements, leaving Bayonne to its own resources,

and having destroyed all the bridges over the Adour not protected by the fortress, concentrated his forces behind the Pau at Orthes. The allies on the 25th moved forward to dislodge him from thence. The left, under Marshal Beresford, crossed the river by a pontoon bridge below Peyrehorade, and marching through that town along the right bank united with the cavalry and with General Picton's division, which crossed by a ford below Berenx: during the night Sir H. Clinton and Baron Alten's divisions also effected the passage—Sir R. Hill remaining on the left bank on the high road to Sauveterre. The enemy were strongly posted, their left being supported by the town of Orthes and the river, from which their line extended along a chain of heights in the direction of Dax, the right terminating on a very commanding height, covered by the village of St. Boes in its front. The centre of the position from the retrocession of the hill was sheltered from attack by the flanks. A corps posted on an elevated mountain on the high road to Sault de Navailles, served as a reserve to the whole. The arrangements of the allies were that Sir L. Cole and General Walker's divisions, (the 7th,) with Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry under Marshal Beresford, should, by a wide movement,

attack the right, and Sir T. Picton and Sir H. Clinton, marching by the high road from Peyrehorade, should attack the left; Baron Alten's division remaining in reserve as a support to each. To render success certain and decisive, and to prevent the enemy retiring in the direction of Pau, Sir R. Hill was directed to cross the river at a ford about two miles above the town, and fall on the flank or rear of their position.

Marshal Beresford carried the village of St. Boes after an obstinate resistance, and then directed his efforts against two lines of the enemy formed on the heights above it, the only approach to which was along a narrow tongue of ground with a deep ravine on either side. The division of General Cole led the advance; the breadth of the ridge prevented more than two battalions deploying into line; fifteen pieces of French artillery played on them diagonally; the main line of their infantry opposed them in front; other strong bodies were formed in the ravines on their flanks, and after a long display of steady bravery in the troops the attempt was relinquished. To turn the height by its right would have required an exceedingly wide movement; Lord Wellington, therefore, preferred making a great effort against the left, and ordered the division in reserve to advance in support of Sir

T. Picton. These commands were boldly and successfully executed, and the allies gained the summit of the position. The enemy, whose dispositions for retreat were well planned, (being by echelons of divisions, each successively covering the other,) moved off in good order till they perceived that Sir R. Hill had effected the passage of the river, and was actually marching on a point in their rear, which would have cut off all retreat. Speed then became the order of the day; Soult precipitated the march of his divisions; Sir R. Hill pressed the advance of his; the French began to run, the allies ran also; the match was nearly even till the French completely broke, not a vestige of a column remaining: after this each party continued in a swinging trot for above three miles, during which the individuals gained the lead, and passed Sault de Navailles, where the pursuit closed. The different enclosures, the ditches, and every obstacle to flight were thickly strewn with killed and wounded, and nearly 2000 straggling fugitives, unhurt, with twelve pieces of cannon, were picked up by the infantry, which number was augmented by a charge of cavalry made near the conclusion of the chace; could that arm have sooner acted off the great road few of the French would have escaped, as they could have made no

attempt at formation to oppose the cavalry without the certainty of Sir R. Hill gaining their rear, as his march was parallel to theirs, and even with their flank. A similar effect would probably have followed the success of the original plan of attack, as the French right and centre would have been thrown back on their left, and their whole army forced to retire on the same road; and, as the communication from the right was difficult, probably at a much later period. Their loss under the actual circumstances may be calculated at 7000; that of the British and Portugueze is ascertained to have been under 2300 killed, wounded, and missing.

On the following day the centre of the allies crossed the Adour at St. Sever; the left marched to Mont de Marsan, where it made considerable captures of provisions and stores, and the right moved along the left bank of the river to dislodge two divisions of the enemy which remained at Aire. The French were found, near the latter place, strongly posted on a ridge of hills extending across the great road in front of the town, having their right on the Adour.

Sir W. Stewart's division attacked them along the road, seconded by General Le Costa's Portugueze brigade on his left. Both columns drove their opponents from the heights: the

Portugueze, however, were so broken by the resistance they encountered, that they could regain no formation, and a strong body of French, completely formed, were advancing to attack them in their disordered state, when a brigade, detached by Sir W. Stewart, arrived to their assistance, and, charging the approaching force, drove it completely down the height; nevertheless, before the French finally moved off, they made several further creditable, though unsuccessful efforts to regain their ground. The main body crossed the Adour, a small number only taking the direction of Pau, from whence they were driven a few days subsequently by General Fane with the cavalry.

Soult, by the manœuvre of Sir R. Hill's corps at Orthes, was forced to retire by the road of Bordeaux, and the allies directed the war near the coast, ensuring on their next success the fall of a town which would give them inexhaustible supplies and a fresh point of support and communication with England; besides separating their immediate opponents from the army of Suchet which, 10,000 in number, was in march from Catalonia to their assistance. Heavy rains, however, had so swelled the rivers, that many parts of the country were under water; and the French, having broken down

all the bridges in their retreat, a delay in the pursuit was the unavoidable consequence. Soult, who could not but perceive the advantage gained over him, endeavoured to counteract it, by moving on Agen on the 1st of March the moment he had reorganized his army. This step, leaving open the high road to Bordeaux, was not taken with impunity, and Lord Wellington drew a splendid advantage from the over confidence of his opponent. Having received assurances that the Bordelais were favourably inclined towards their former princes, and only prevented expressing their sentiments by the awe of a very small garrison, he detached Marshal Beresford with three divisions to drive out the military. This measure, however, was delayed till the 8th, as previously to making such further division of force, the Spaniards were brought up, and every other disposable body closed to the right. Marshal Beresford accomplished the object confided to him without resistance. On his approach towards the city the French troops withdrew to the right of the Garonne, and the authorities, with the entire population, came out to greet the allies, spontaneously mounting the Bourbon emblem, and destroying the badges of the existing government, without either pledge or

promise of protection, or even of a stipulation in their favour in the treaty of peace then negotiating with Buonaparte at Chatillon. That extraordinary man, after having been out-manceuvred, and completely beaten by the allies when in command of an enormous army on the Elbe, now that mutual assistance and combined exertion were no longer absolutely necessary to the ascendancy of his antagonists, and each was endeavouring to be the first to arrive at Paris, had the ability so to manœuvre a handful of men by incessant marching, as alternately to oppose each with a superior force, and to render himself so formidable as to obtain from confederated Europe the offer of peace on fair and honourable conditions. The full value or consequences of the popular movement at Bordeaux could not therefore be calculated. The French, generally speaking, were tired of the war; and in La Vendée real affection for the Bourbons, far from being extinguished, was but slightly smothered. A prince of that family was already in communication with them: another victory in the same quarter, and the flame might extend over all the western departments.

Marshal Soult showed by a proclamation he issued on the occasion, how deeply he felt the advantage gained by the Allies: he not only loaded

the British nation generally with opprobrium and abuse, but even in the anguish of his feelings descended to invectives against his watchful competitor. His actions which followed were more worthy of a military chief: he skilfully endeavoured to paralyse the progress of disaffection on the Lower Garonne by a rapid movement on the 13th to Conchez and Viella on the right flank, or rather rear, of the allies, driving in the pickets of Sir R. Hill's corps, and making the appearance of intending to attack with his whole force. Sir R. Hill in consequence concentrated his corps on a strong position, the left at Aire and the right at Garlin, having the little river Gros Lees in front, and the main road from Pau to Aire running parallel to his immediate rear, and Lord Wellington quickly moved two divisions to the right of the Adour to his support. It was not, however, Soult's intention to engage, and he took post with his whole army on a ridge of extremely strong ground on the right of the Gros Lees, extending from Progan to Mascarras, hoping that as 13,000 men were employed in the blockade of Bayonne, Lord Wellington would be under the necessity of recalling the force from Bordeaux to dislodge him. In this expectation he was disappointed, as by the precautions taken to

strengthen the main body of the Allies, it was sufficiently powerful alone to pursue the offensive. Lord Wellington, however, finding by this movement that the war was decidedly drawn to the eastward, recalled Marshal Beresford with two divisions, entrusting the preservation of Bordeaux to Lord Dalhousie with 5000 men.

On the 14th Soult remained inactive on his ground, but observing in the course of the day that the allies were collecting for the attack, he moved off at night in the direction of Lembege.

On the 15th the enemy's main body halted in position near Burosse, covered by a strong rear guard at Mascarras. On the approach of a single brigade of the allies, the whole retired upon Vic Bigorre, not firing a shot to maintain their ground in a country peculiarly defensible.

On the 18th the allied army followed, the right by Conchez, the centre by Castelman, and the left by Plaisance.

On the 19th the right moved on Vic Bigorre through Lembege, and the centre on the same place through Maubourget. The enemy were driven from Lembege after a slight skirmish; but at Vic two divisions made a determined stand, affording Sir T. Picton

an advantageous opportunity to display the bravery of the 3d division, which dislodged them in great style. In the evening Soult united his whole army on the right of the Adour; placing his left at Tarbes, and extending his right in the direction of Rabastens.

The 20th afforded a series of manœuvres highly creditable to both armies. Sir R. Hill's corps with Sir T. Picton's division moved from Vic upon Tarbes to attack Soult's position in front, whilst three divisions crossed the Adour near Vic, and marched on Rabastens to turn his right. These movements were exceedingly well combined. The right flank of the French was turned, and the front attack was about to commence, when Soult drew off. The troops elated, ascended the French position to continue the pursuit, and reap the fruits of their exertions, when, to their great mortification, they discovered a large portion of the French army formed on a parallel height of great strength across the road of Tournay, and the former occupiers of the position they had just gained, about 15,000 in number, ascending the same height to join their comrades. The new alignment was too strong to be attacked in front without a most severe loss, and to preserve the advantage gained by the flank movement it was necessary that

the corps at Rabastens should move still farther forward. So much time was required to communicate fresh arrangements, and for the additional march, that the day closed before any thing further could be attempted; and in the night, Soult, having previously sent off most of his incumbrances, retired by St. Gaudens on Toulouse, where he was assured of finding abundant supplies. In this light order he marched rapidly, and the bridge over the Garonne being at his command, he entered the city on the second day. The allies, on the contrary, were obliged to carry forward a pontoon train for the passage of the river, and most of the supplies necessary to their subsistence: heavy rains fell with little intermission during their march, and it was the 27th before they halted on the left of the Garonne opposite the city.

Lord Wellington ordered a bridge to be thrown across the river at Portet, a village immediately below the junction of the Ariège with the Garonne, intending to cross above the town, which would have obliged Soult either to abandon Toulouse, or to give up his junction with Suchet, who had not yet reached Carcassone, his march, like all Buonaparte's retrograde movements, having been too long delayed.

The current, owing to the late rain, was exceedingly rapid, and it was with much difficulty the sheer-line could be stretched across; that effected, the width proved to be 159 yards, being 26 yards more than the pontoons would cover, and consequently the attempt was abandoned.

On the 31st March, a favourable spot above the town, near Roques, was found not exceeding a practicable width, and the pontoons being laid down, Sir R. Hill's corps crossed and seized the bridge over the Ariege at Cintegabelle; but after persevering for some hours in attempts to advance, no road could be found from thence to Toulouse passable for an army, and the corps repassed the Garonne. Convinced of the impracticability of directing an attack from the upper side of the town, until finer weather should have hardened the roads, Lord Wellington turned his endeavours to effect the passage lower down the stream, and to attack Soult in front before he should be reinforced. Plate V. A favourable bend in the river being selected about half a league above Grenade, skirting the main road from that town to Toulouse, heavy flanking batteries were established, and the pontoons launched at day-break on the 4th April, though the whole French army was

within a short march. The current was rapid, and the river 127 yards wide; nevertheless in four hours from the commencement of the operation, the troops began to pass over the bridge. Three divisions of infantry, and some cavalry under Marshal Beresford, were already over, and General Friere's Spaniards with the light division were about to follow, when the river swelled so considerably, and the current became so rapid that the bridge would no longer hold together, and the flooring was of necessity removed. On the 5th the river continuing to swell, and the current to augment in force the centre pontoons were successively removed; and at length the whole was taken up, and Marshal Beresford with the three divisions remained on the right of the Adour, separated from the main-body of the army, and affording Soult an opportunity for an advantageous rencontre. The time for brilliant affairs, however, is not when fighting for existence; as besides the discouragement to enterprize attendant on conscious inferiority, a defensive army cannot spare men proportionate in any ordinary degree to the loss their efforts might be expected to inflict on their opponents. It was now with the French as with the Portuguese and British at the commencement of the war; nothing could be risked extraneous from

the main combat, and for that Soult was skilfully and diligently preparing at Toulouse, where he had nearly completed a superb position. That city presented many peculiar and great local advantages in furtherance of his labours, being surrounded by a defensible wall, three fourths of which is covered by the Canal Royal du midi, or by the Garonne, an impassable obstacle. Therefore to give that considerable portion of the circumference the strength of a moderate fortress, it was only necessary securely to cover the communications over the canal; and, being zealously aided by the labour of the inhabitants, he quickly effected this by fortifying various buildings, and constructing field-works of a stronger profile than usual. All direct approach to the remaining fourth of the enceinte not covered by the rivers, was interdicted by the state of the cross roads, being also flanked by a range of bold hills, which lie to the eastward of the town, just without the canal. The French had strongly occupied the summit of these heights with five redoubts, and had formed various lines of entrenchment in support of them, and to connect the flanks of the ground with the defences of the town. At the foot of the heights runs the river Ers, all the bridges over which out of fire of the works

were destroyed. Such was the advantageous situation in which Soult decided to try the fate of arms.

On the 8th, the current having subsided, the pontoons were again laid down, the Spanish army passed to the support of Marshal Beresford, and every thing was prepared for a general attack on the succeeding day. The distance, however, of the bridge from Sir R. Hill's corps, which remained on the left of the river opposite the main bridge of Toulouse, being deemed too considerable for proper communication during the intended operation, orders were given to move it the same night higher up the river to the vicinity of Ausonne. Some delay occurred in the operation, and the removal was effected too late to admit the passage of the light division in time to attack on the 9th; it was in consequence deferred till the morning of the 10th, when the division crossed, and the whole army moved towards the town.

The arrangements for the attack were, Sir R. Hill's corps to confine the enemy within his works on the left of the Garonne; Baron Alten's light and General Picton's division to make a show of attack, and prevent the enemy coming out by the road of Paris; whilst Freire's Spaniards and Sir Lowry Cole's and Sir Henry Clinton's

divisions under Sir W. Beresford should attack the intrenched heights; the cavalry keeping a look out above the town to prevent any movement of the French cavalry.

Sir L. Cole's and Sir H. Clinton's divisions being formed near the village of Mont-blanc, marched up the left bank of the Ers, along the foot of the heights, under a heavy cannonade till opposite their respective points of attack, when they changed their front, and steadily advancing up the hill, carried the right redoubt, and established themselves on the summit. The Spaniards formed in two lines in front of Croix d'Orade; they at first moved forward in good order, exposed to an exceedingly severe cannonade. The effects of this made them advance at too quick a rate; the stoutest and best runners greatly preceded their less active brethren, and before the first line arrived at a hollow road fifty yards from the enemy's entrenchments, it was completely broken. The reserve perceiving this fell into the opposite extreme, and moved forward so slowly as not to be near enough to lend support. The French vigorously advanced upon the Spaniards who had taken shelter under the bank, drove them down the hill, and would have seized the bridge over the Ers, isolating the two divisions on the right, had they not been checked

by a part of Baron Alten's light division. Sir T. Picton, who saw the great advantage to be gained by pushing across the canal, advanced against the work which defended the bridge on the left: when on the counterscarp the assailants discovered the formidable nature of its ditch, which rendered an assault impracticable, and brought them to a stand; a heavy fire of musketry from within the line was fast thinning their front, and a numerous artillery was playing on their flank; there was no shelter of any kind near at hand, and a speedy retreat alone saved them from annihilation.

Victory yet balanced: the enemy held his intrenchment and four of the redoubts, and an interval for arrangement was given him, whilst the Spaniards were reforming, and Sir W. Beresford was bringing up his artillery, which had been placed in battery in front of the village of Montblanc, to cannonade the works on the heights. Those objects accomplished, Sir H. Clinton advanced against one of the redoubts, which being incomplete, the enemy abandoned, but immediately afterwards employed an entire division to retake it. A British battalion placed in the interior fought most gallantly; but were nearly exhausted, when a brigade came to their assistance, which, charging the assailants, drove them down

the hill. The French immediately formed a still more powerful body behind the canal for a second attempt, on which the defenders of the work, having been reinforced, planted their colours on the parapet in proud defiance of the threatened effort.

French soldiers have naturally more intelligence than those of other nations, and their conduct is therefore more liable to be affected by their reason. In this case, seeing support at hand, and retreat assured, they fought with a courage worthy of their best days. The equal and unvarying firmness of their opponents, however, remained superior to the transient burst of heroism, and the most forcible efforts of the French failed to dislodge them from the work, though they surrounded it in such numbers that no one could shew his head above the parapet. At length, despairing of success against such cool resolution, they relinquished the attempt and retired behind the canal. The garrison of the remaining works, witness of this failure, and seeing Sir H. Clinton's division advancing from the right, and the Spaniards from the left, feared to risk the assault, and evacuated their posts, which accomplished the object of the attack, and the allies formed on the hills looking down on the city. As the operations of the day consisted en-

tirely in the attack of formidable retrenchments, the loss of the victors was very considerable, probably exceeding that of the vanquished, above 4500 Portugueze and British having been killed or wounded, and more than half that number of Spaniards.

At night every post of the French retired within their defensive line behind the canal. The allies had possession of the only bridge remaining over the Ers, and the debouché from that, over the Garonne, was too closely and too strongly guarded by Sir R. Hill to be forced; the place was consequently closed on three sides, and the victorious troops, which had driven the French from their formidable entrenchments, had but a step to surround the remainder; besides which, lines of works were commenced across all the communications from the city, and a famine within the walls must in a very short period have been the inevitable consequence. Thus, after a succession of masterly movements highly creditable to each chief, Soult was driven into a situation of inextricable difficulty. He had, however, at his disposal 35,000 troops, and desperation might have given a force to his expiring efforts, which would have occasioned a severe loss to the brave men who held him engaged; and as the conclusion of peace, though not officially

known, was too credibly reported to be doubted, the victor, desirous of avoiding an unnecessary effusion of blood, permitted the French army, without molestation, to file out of the town on the night of the 12th by the road of Carcassone, passing within cannon shot under the heights of Pugada, crowned by his troops, and bristling with his artillery.

How advantageously such forbearance contrasts with the conduct of the Governor of Bayonne, who, nearly similarly situated with respect to political intelligence, made, on the night of the 14th April, a general sortie against the blockading force, without any sufficient object, neither the stores nor the artillery having arrived, nor the works of the siege having commenced! The French directed their principal effort against the entrenched village of St. Etienne, the greater part of which fell to their powerful and rapid advance. Proper dispositions, however, having been previously arranged for the support of the post, the assailants were quickly driven back with great slaughter; but not without a loss to the blockading force of more than 800 in killed, wounded, and prisoners: amongst the latter was the commander of the corps, Lieut. General Sir John Hope, who, being early wounded, and his horse falling dead upon

him, could not be extricated before the enemy seized his person. Major-General Hay, a gallant veteran distinguished in most of the later triumphs of the war, fell in this useless attack.

On the 13th messengers arrived at Toulouse to announce the entry of the allies into Paris, the subsequent abdication of Buonaparte, and the restoration of the Bourbons. Suchet gave an immediate assent to the new order of things: Soult a more reluctant compliance. A convention for the suspension of hostilities, and for arranging a line of demarcation between the respective armies, followed on the 18th April,* soon after which the Portuguese and Spaniards recrossed the Pyrenees, and the British marched to Bordeaux to embark.

The French armies, deprived of their commanders, and without means of subsistence, speedily dissolved away: the young conscripts hastened to resume their peaceful labours, to which necessity soon after drove the dissipated and idle veteran; civil society once more asserted its equal rights, and the honourable exertions of England and the allies were rewarded by the attainment of every object for which they passed the boundaries of France. In reference

* See the Convention in full, Appendix F.

to the termination of the contest, which is the more immediate object of this work, it may be remarked that the page of history presents no stronger instance of full and complete retributive justice. A war of unprincipled aggression, begun by Buonaparte in acts of fraud and perfidy, and carried on by his soldiers with violence and rapine, causing the destruction of half a million of unoffending beings, ended with the complete triumph of those marked for its victims—the downfall of its author, and the humiliation and utter dispersion of his previously invincible legions.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX A.

No. I.

Secret Treaty between His Catholic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, by which the high contracting Parties stipulate whatever relates to the future condition of Portugal. Dated Fontainebleau, 27th October, 1807.

ART. 1.—The province of Entre Minho y Duero, with the city of Oporto, shall be given in full property and sovereignty to His Majesty the King of Etruria, under the title of King of Northern Lusitania.

ART. 2.—The kingdom of Alemtejo, and the kingdom of the Algarves, shall be given in full property and sovereignty to the Prince of the Peace, to be enjoyed under the title of Prince of the Algarves.

ART. 3.—The provinces of Beira, Tras os Montes, and Portuguese Estramadura shall remain as a deposit till a general peace, to be disposed of according to circumstances, as shall be arranged between the two high contracting parties.

ART. 4.—The kingdom of Northern Lusitania shall be

possessed by the hereditary descendants of His Majesty the King of Etruria, according to the laws of succession adopted by the reigning family of His Majesty the King of Spain.

ART. 5.—The principality of the Algarves shall be hereditary in the descendants of the Prince of the Peace, according to the laws of succession adopted by the reigning family of His Majesty the King of Spain.

ART. 6.—In default of legitimate descendants or heirs of the King of Northern Lusitania, or of the Prince of the Algarves, those countries shall be given as an investiture to His Majesty the King of Spain, on condition that they shall never be united under one head, nor attached to the crown of Spain.

ART. 7.—The kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of the Algarves also, acknowledge as protector His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain: and the sovereigns of those countries shall in no case make either peace or war without his consent.

ART. 8.—In case that the provinces of Beira, Tras os Montes, and Portugueze Estramadura, held under sequestration, should at a general peace be returned to the House of Braganza in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies which the English have conquered from the Spaniards and their allies, the new sovereign of these provinces shall have, with respect to His Majesty the King of Spain, the same obligation that the King of Northern Lusitania, and the Prince of the Algarves will be under, and shall possess them subject to the same conditions.

ART. 9.—His Majesty the King of Etruria cedes the full property and sovereignty of the kingdom of Etruria

to His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy.

ART. 10.—When the definitive occupation of the provinces of Portugal shall be effected, the respective princes who shall be put in possession shall jointly name commissioners to determine the proper limits.

ART. 11.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, becomes guarantee to His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, for the possession of his dominions on the continent of Europe south of the Pyrenees.

ART. 12.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, agrees to acknowledge His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain as Emperor of both Americas, at such time as may be convenient to his majesty to assume that title, which may either be at a general peace, or, at latest, within three years.

ART. 13.—It is understood between the two high contracting powers, that they will make an equal distribution of all the islands, colonies, and other ultramarine property of Portugal.

ART. 14.—The present treaty shall remain secret—shall be ratified—and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Madrid, at latest twenty days after being signed.

Done at Fontainebleau, 27th October, 1807.

(Signed)

DUROC,
IZQUIERDO.

No. II.

Secret Convention, signed at Fontainebleau, between His Majesty the King of Spain and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, by which the two high contracting Parties determine what relates to the occupation of Portugal.

ART. 1.—A body of imperial French troops, to the amount of 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, shall enter Spain and march directly to Lisbon, where they will be united to a corps of 8000 infantry, and 3000 Spanish cavalry, with thirty pieces of artillery.

ART. 2.—At the same time a division of Spanish troops, to the number of 10,000, shall take possession of the province of Entre Minho y Duero, and of the city of Oporto, and another division of 6000 Spanish troops shall take possession of the province of Alemtejo, and of the kingdom of the Algarves.

ART. 3.—The French troops shall be provisioned and maintained by Spain, and paid by France, during all the time of their progress through Spain.

ART. 4.—From the moment that the combined troops enter Portugal, the provinces of Beira, Tras os Montes, and Portugueze Estramadura, (which are to remain under sequestration,) shall be administered and governed by the commandant-general of the French troops, and the contributions which they shall impose shall be for the benefit of France. The provinces which will be formed from the kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of

Algarves, shall be administered and governed by the commandants-general of the Spanish division which shall enter them, and the contributions which shall be imposed shall be applied to the use of Spain.

ART. 5.—The central body shall be under the orders of the commander of the French troops, and to him shall be submitted the Spanish troops united to such central army. Notwithstanding, if the King of Spain, or the Prince of the Peace, shall unite themselves to such army, the commandant-general of the French troops, and the troops themselves, shall be under their orders.

ART. 6.—A body of 40,000 French troops shall be collected at Bayonne, at latest on the 20th of November next, to be ready to pass through Spain for Portugal in case the English shall send forces, or threaten an attack upon that country. This additional body, however, shall not enter Spain until the two high contracting parties shall have agreed upon the measure.

ART. 7.—The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at the same time with those of the treaty of this day.

Done at Fontainebleau, 27th October, 1807.

[Translated from Cevalhos.]

APPENDIX B.

Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of Portugal by the French Army.

THE generals commanding in chief the British and French armies in Portugal, having determined to negotiate, and conclude a treaty, for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops, on the basis of the agreement entered into on the 22d instant for a suspension of hostilities, have appointed the undermentioned officers to negotiate the same in their names; viz. on the part of the general in chief of the British army, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, Quarter-Master-General; and on the part of the general in chief of the French army, Monsieur Kellerman, General of Division, to whom they have given authority to negotiate and conclude a convention to that effect, subject to their ratification respectively, and to that of the admiral commanding the British fleet at the entrance of the Tagus.

These two officers, after exchanging their full powers, have

agreed upon the Articles which follow.

ART. 1.—All the places and forts the kingdom of Portugal, occupied by the French troops, shall be delivered up to the British army in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present convention.

ART. 2.—The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage; they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and on their arrival in France they shall be at liberty to serve.

ART. 3.—The English government shall furnish (at its expense) the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France, between Rochefort and L'Orient inclusively.

* All other artillery, arms and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British army and navy in the state in which they may be at the period

ART. 4.—The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging to it, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun.*

ART. 5.—The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army;

of the ratification of the convention.

that is to say, its military chest, and the carriages attached to the field commissariat and field hospitals; or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same, on its account, as the commander in chief may judge it necessary to embark. In like manner all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.

ART. 6.—The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the generals, and other officers of all ranks. It is, however, fully understood, that the means of conveyance for horses, at the disposal of the British commanders, are very limited: some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon,* at all events every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.

* The number of horses to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed 600, and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed 200.

ART. 7.—In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the places, of the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the equipments of the army.†

† The first division shall embark within

ART. 8.—The garrison of Elvas

seven days from the date of the ratification, or sooner if possible.

and its forts, and of Peniché and Palmela, will be embarked at Lisbon; that of Almeida at Oporto or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.

ART. 9.—All the sick and wounded, who cannot be embarked with the troops, are entrusted to the British army; they are to be taken care of, whilst they remain in this country, at the expense of the British government, under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France when the final evacuation is effected. The English government will provide for their return to France, which shall take place by detachments of about 150 or 200 men at a time; a sufficient number of French medical officers shall be left behind to attend them.

ART. 10.—As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked it in the harbours specified, or in any other of the ports of France to which stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given them to return to England without

delay, and security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port.

ART. 11.—The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.

ART. 12.—The fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniché, and Palmela, shall be given up as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the mean time the general in chief of the British army will give notice of the present convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all further hostilities.* The occupation of Lisbon, and of the forts of St. Juliens and the Bugio, together with the other defences of the Tagus, shall take place on the embarkation of the second division of the French army; immediately on the exchange of the ratifications the British troops shall be put in possession of the forts of Cascaes, and the other forts to the right of St. Juliens.

* The forts of St. Juliens, the Bugio, and Cascaes, shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries, as far as the Lazaretto at Trafaria on one side, and fort

ART. 13.—The transports des-

St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the second division, as shall also the harbour, and all the armed vessels in it, of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition.

*From the date of the ratification of the present convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims, whatever, of the French government against subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops, in the month of December, 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled; and all

tined for the embarkation, and such ships of war as may be necessary towards that service, shall be immediately admitted into the Tagus.

ART. 14.—Commissaries shall be named on both sides to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.

ART. 15.—Should there arise any doubts as to the meaning of any article, it will be explained favourably to the French army.

ART. 16.*—From the date of the ratification of the present convention, by the commanders in chief by land and sea, all contributions, or requisitions, shall cease throughout Portugal on the part of the French army.

ART. 17.—All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected; their property of every kind, moveable and immoveable, shall be respected; and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army, or to remain in Portugal; in either case, their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty of retaining, or of disposing of it, and

sequestrations laid upon their property, moveable or immoveable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.

*It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement; only, however, in so far as regards leaving the port: and that none of the stipulations above-mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculations.

passing the produce of the sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose.*

ART. 18.—No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army; and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders; they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property, it not having been at their option to be obedient, or not, to the French government;—they are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the sixteenth Article.

ART. 19.—The Spanish troops detained on board ship in the port of Lisbon shall be given up to the general in chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain without being taken in battle, or in

consequence of military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of last May, and the days immediately following.

* Hostages of the rank of field officers shall be mutually furnished on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present convention. The officer of the British army shall be restored on the completion of those Articles which concern the army, and the officer of the navy, on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army.

ART. 20.—There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the present hostilities.

ART. 21.*—Hostages shall be mutually given for the guarantee of the present convention until its final completion.

ART. 22.—It shall be allowed to the general in chief of the French army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present convention; a vessel will be furnished by the British admiral to convey him to Bordeaux or Rochefort.

ART. 23.—The British admiral will be invited to accommodate his excellency the commander in chief, and the other principal officers of the French army, on board of ships of war.

Done and concluded at Lisbon, this 28th day of August, 1808.

(Signed)

GEORGE MURRAY,
Q. M. G.

(Signed)

Le Général de Division,
KELLERMAN.

*Additional Articles to the Convention of the 28th August,
1808.*

ART. 1.—The seventeenth Article having particularly in view the subjects of his Danish Majesty, Lieutenant Colonel Murray admits having been apprized of the same, and that he considers the stipulations of that Article to be applicable to them in their full extent.

ART. 2.—The individuals in the civil employment of the army, made prisoners either by the British troops, or by the Portuguese, in any part of Portugal, will be restored, as is customary, without exchange.

ART. 3.—The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines up to the day of embarkation; the garrisons up to the day of the evacuation of the fortresses. The remainder of the magazines shall be delivered over in the usual form to the British government, which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses of the army, from the above-mentioned periods till their arrival in France, under

the condition of being reimbursed by the French government for the excess of the expense beyond the estimate to be made by both parties of the value of the magazines delivered up to the British army.*

* The provisions on board the ships of war in possession of the French army, will be taken on account by the British government, in like manner with the magazines in the fortresses.

ART. 4.—The general commanding the British troops will take the necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the means of subsistence between the country and the capital.

ART. 5.—Should it be found necessary to employ Danish vessels, or those of any other nation, in carrying the French army, in aid of the British transports, they shall, in like manner with these latter, quit the ports of France immediately on the disembarkation being effected; they are not to be detained in France on any pretext; and they shall enjoy the same advantages stipulated for the English ships, of returning, unmolested, to a friendly port.

Done and concluded at Lisbon, this 28th day of August, 1808.

(Signed)

GEORGE MURRAY,
Q. M. G.

(Signed)

Le Général de Division,
KELLERMAN.

APPENDIX C.

THIS number is calculated upon a belief that the infantry of Massena's army, when it left *Ciudad Rodrigo*, was 62,000.

At the moment of the invasion of Portugal the French magnified the number of troops under Marshal Massena to 110,000: the successive writers of the present day, each emboldened by the diminution of his predecessor, have at length ventured to reduce his numbers to 45,000: for the sake of future historical writers, the following letter from General Eblé, commanding the artillery of the army, is inserted as the authority for the strength assigned to Massena's army in this publication, and a summary is made of the total of the French force which took part in his campaign:

“ Addressée à son Excellence le Duc de Feltre, Ministre de la Guerre, à Paris.

“ Armée de Portugal:

“ *Ciudad Rodrigo, le 19^e Juillet, 1810.*

“ Le Général de Division, Commandant en Chef l'Artillerie de l'Armée de Portugal, Eblé.

“ Monseigneur,

“ J'ai reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire, le 4 Juin dernier, et sur laquelle je la prie de me permettre de lui faire quelques réflexions.

“ Comme elle, je pense que le pays où doit agir l'armée de Portugal, s'oppose à ce que l'on traîne à sa suite une

grande quantité d'artillerie, et suis loin de demander que celle qui existe soit augmentée : mais je pense aussi, qu'elle doit toujours avoir sous la main, au moins, un double approvisionnement, dont un marchant avec les troupes, un demi en réserve à la suite de chaque corps, et l'autre moitié au parc général.

“ J'appuie mon opinion sur la difficulté de former des dépôts surs et assez rapprochés pour que l'on puisse, avec la célérité que les opérations peuvent commander, faire remplacer les munitions consommées ; parceque les moyens de transport du pays, qui ne consistent qu'en bœufs, ont disparu partout où l'armée a séjourné ou passé ; et que partout les villages sont restés déserts ; et il seroit impossible, avec le peu de chevaux existant, de renvoyer des voitures d'artillerie sur les derrières pour rapprocher les dépôts. J'ai néanmoins l'honneur d'observer à votre excellence, que le double approvisionnement que je demande, ne dispensera pas d'avoir une ligne de dépôts pour alimenter le parc général et fournir aux troupes, qui circulent dans le pays, &c. Ces dépôts demanderont un officier d'artillerie, des cannoniers, une garde non seulement pour servir l'artillerie, qui sert à défendre ces dépôts, mais encore pour confectionner des munitions, escorter des convois, &c. et déjà le nombre existant des uns et des autres est au-dessous de l'indispensable nécessaire.

“ La demande que je fais d'un double approvisionnement peut, au premier instant, paroître outrée à votre Excellence ; mais j'aime à croire que les raisons que je lui donne la convaincront du contraire, et la disposeront à ne pas trouver étrange que je demande un nombre de caissons, ou de chariots à munitions suffisant pour porter

quatre millions de cartouches ; et l'armée étant de plus de 62,000 hommes, le 2me corps compris, il n'y aura à sa suite qu'environ 60 cartouches par homme.

“ La consommation de ces munitions est vraiment incroyable : elle est occasionnée par l'inexpérience et la négligence du soldat, par l'insouciance des officiers, et par les nombreux détachemens qui marchent continuellement avec les convois de vivres et de munitions.

“ Le siège de Rodrigo a occasionné une consommation de plus de neuf cent mille cartouches d'infanterie, par le seul fait des tirailleurs ; attendu que les assiégés n'ont point fait de sortie.”

The infantry	- - -	62,000	}
Cavalry	- - -	6,000	
Artillery, sappers, and other auxiliaries	- - -	4,000	
Makes Massena's army to have been originally on leaving Rodrigo			}----- 72,000
9th corps d'armée, two divisions joined in front of the lines	- - -		} 10,000
Remaining infantry of that corps joined on the frontier, where it had been stationed to cover the communication with Portugal			} 8,000
Cavalry and artillery of the Imperial Guard in the battle of Fuentes de Honor	-		} 2,000
Soult's force directed against the Alemtejo			13,000
			<hr/> 105,000

The above are stated as the lowest probable numbers ; otherwise, paying strict attention to veracity, the number of the French forces which acted against Portugal in the winter of 1810 and 1811, might be reckoned at 110,000

men. During the campaign under consideration, the French were stronger in Spain than at any other period of the war, mustering nearly 250,000 men, including 35,000 cavalry.

The writer, feeling a disinclination to make his work a detailed register of the atrocities committed by the French armies, now that they are no longer formidable, confined himself to a general censure on their conduct whilst in Portugal. A work, intended as apologetical of Marshal Massena's campaign, having appeared since those pages were printed off, he cannot be suspected of wanton detraction by taking the opportunity of this Appendix to quote from it a friendly statement of their outrages.

“ Depuis l'affaire de Boussaco, l'armée ne vivait que de ses maraudes: tous les habitans fuyaient constamment notre approche; ils abandonnaient leurs demeures pour se réfugier au milieu des montagnes ou dans le cœur des forêts; ils emportaient toujours avec eux, leurs effets et leurs provisions de toute espèce; ils emmenaient aussi leurs bestiaux, et ils avaient grand soin, avant leur émigration, de cacher et d'enfouir dans les lieux les plus difficiles, tout ce qu'ils ne pouvaient enlever. Si notre marche rapide ou imprévue ne leur laissait point le temps de construire ou de creuser leurs cachettes, ils jetaient dans les puits, dans des mares ou dans les rivières, tout ce qui pouvait servir à alimenter notre armée ou être utile à sa conservation. Cette conduite, comme je l'ai déjà dit, leur avait été prescrite par les anglais; et le gouvernement de Lisbonne, entièrement dévoué à Wellington, avait prononcé peine de mort pour quiconque ne s'y conformerait pas strictement. Ce plan, fidèlement exé-

cuté, était efficace pour nous obliger à évacuer, au bout de quelque temps, les provinces où nous avions eu l'intention de nous fixer : à la vérité, il assurait aussi la dévastation et la ruine de ces mêmes contrées pendant nombre d'années ; mais les portugais, déterminés et vindicatifs, supportaient ces sacrifices avec plaisir, en songeant aux privations et aux besoins poignans qui devaient nous assaillir. Nous trouvions partout les moulins détruits, les huches cassées, les fours démolis ; et nous étions sans cesse dans la nécessité de fabriquer nous-mêmes, tous les ustensiles propres à la manutention.

“ Quelque riche et fertile que soit un pays, il est impossible qu'une armée étrangère puisse y subsister longtemps, lorsqu'elle est absolument privée de tout secours de la part des habitans. Les subsistances sont bientôt épuisées, si les indigènes ne renouvellent les productions du sol. Les convois par terre ne peuvent suffire à alimenter une armée, dans un pays lointain, lorsqu'elle est un peu considérable : cette observation s'applique, *à fortiori*, à l'armée de Portugal, qui se trouvait privée et éloignée de tout secours, et qui ne pouvait même recevoir de convois de munitions, pour remplacer celles qui avaient été consommées dans les combats.

“ On avait essayé d'envoyer aux vivres des détachemens en ordre, commandés par des officiers ; mais ces détachemens, contenus par la discipline militaire, ne rapportaient jamais rien ; tandis que les soldats qui s'échappaient furtivement des camps ou de leurs cantonnemens, et qui se réunissaient ensuite par groupes, revenaient toujours avec des mulets ou des ânes chargés de farine, de grain, de lard, de jambons, de légumes secs et d'outres de vin. Les corps étant chargés de pourvoir eux-mêmes à leur subsistance, on renonça au mode d'envoyer de gros dé-

tachemens aux vivres, et l'on fut forcé, malgré tous les inconvéniens, de tolérer les courses partielles dans l'intérieur des compagnies; toute autre manière de *s'avitailier* avait été reconnue infructueuse. Nos maraudeurs, allant à travers champs, se dérobaient facilement aux partis portugais qui harassaient sans cesse nos troupes le long des chemins, et qui nous faisaient toujours payer notre subsistance du sang de quelques-uns de nos camarades. Dans les commencemens, il n'y avait point d'égoïsme : les capitaines dont les soldats faisaient meilleure capture, partageaient avec les autres, et ceux-ci savaient reconnaître ce service à leur tour.

“ Le sixième corps qui occupait Tomar, Santa-Cruz, Ourem, etc., en seconde ligne, était beaucoup moins gêné pour les vivres que le reste de l'armée; les villages n'étaient point aussi dévastés que dans les environs de Santarem, et les soldats avaient moins de distance à parcourir pour trouver un pays neuf. Aussi, le sixième corps a-t-il fourni quelquefois des subsistances aux autres troupes, qui se trouvaient dans les positions les plus défavorables.

“ Nous avons dans toutes les compagnies, un ou plusieurs hommes d'un tact si fin qu'aucune cachette ne pouvait leur échapper : dans les maisons, ils les désignaient au premier moment; dans les champs, dans les bois, dans les rochers, ils les devinaient à cinquante pas au loin. On ne le croira peut-être pas, mais j'ai connu, en Portugal, des soldats dont le sens de l'odorat était si exquis, qu'ils découvraient les cachettes à l'odeur, à une distance assez forte pour surprendre étrangement tous les spectateurs. J'avais, dans ma compagnie, un certain *Tabaco*, qui aurait fait fortune en employant le prestige de

la baguette devinatoire; son talent n'était point de découvrir les sources, ni de dire où l'on avait caché de l'eau; mais il allait flairant, et sentait où l'on avait enfoui le vin: lorsqu'il passait à côté de quelque cachette de cette liqueur, on le voyait se mettre en arrêt, et il ne tombait jamais en défaut. Dans les circonstances où nous nous trouvions, l'instinct de ces soldats, plus adroits ou privilégiés, était devenu très-précieux pour leurs camarades: ils se mettaient à la tête des groupes de maraudeurs, et pourvoyaient leurs compagnies de tout ce qui était nécessaire à la vie et à l'entretien des troupes. Les officiers, de leur côté, avaient dirigé la construction des fours; ils nommèrent des boulangers, des bouchers; ils organisèrent des ateliers pour les tailleurs et pour les cordonniers; ils avaient désigné des meûniers qui mirent les anciens moulins en état; et même, dans les endroits où il n'y en avait jamais eu, les soldats avaient imaginé d'en construire qu'ils faisaient tourner à bras, ou bien qu'un âne seul, attelé à l'extrémité d'un levier, pouvait facilement faire aller. Les meules étaient fabriquées avec des tombes prises dans les églises, parce qu'on ne trouvait point ailleurs des pierres convenables. Ces moulins, une fois achevés, ressemblaient assez aux moulins à bras dont on se sert en Bretagne pour moudre le blé noir. Ainsi, notre armée, dépourvue de tout ce qui était indispensable à la vie, avait suppléé à tout: la nécessité est un habile maître.

“ Les maraudes, qui d'abord étaient assez heureuses, devinrent de jour en jour moins productives et plus pénibles. Le pays que l'armée occupait rapportait peu de froment; on fut bientôt réduit au pain de maïs, et même, n'en trouvant point suffisamment, plusieurs corps

étaient réduits à la moitié ou au tiers de la ration ; d'autres régimens ne vivaient que de viande et de légumes, encore n'en avaient-ils pas toujours en assez grande quantité.

“ Le vin qui abondait dans le pays, ayant été gaspillé par les soldats qui le trouvaient, ou consommé dans les camps avec une imprévoyante profusion, était aussi épuisé.

“ Nos maraudeurs avaient beau s'étendre jusqu'à quinze ou vingt lieues sur les derrières ou sur les flancs de l'armée, ils ne rapportaient plus que très-peu de chose : le produit des courses était quelquefois consommé par les pourvoyeurs avant leur rentrée dans les cantonnemens. Les compagnies étaient toujours dans une avide attente : dans leur anxiété, elles plaçaient des hommes aux aguets sur les chemins par où leurs détachemens devaient revenir. Si la tournée avait été heureuse, les soldats placés en vedettes revenaient en courant prévenir leurs camarades, et la joie du besoin satisfait brillait un instant sur tous les visages ; si la maraude avait été infructueuse, les figures s'allongeaient, et l'esprit restait sombre. C'est à cette époque, que la plupart des régimens commencèrent à ressentir vraiment toute espèce de besoins.

“ On trouvait encore quelques troupeaux cachés dans des lieux déserts et presque inaccessibles ; soit dans les endroits les plus sombres et les plus touffus des forêts, soit derrière des masses énormes de rochers, où l'homme n'avait peut-être jamais pénétré avant cette guerre ; ou enfin, au fond des précipices les plus affreux. Là aussi, étaient retirés des habitans que la crainte et la solitude avaient rendus à moitié sauvages : leur barbe longue, leurs cheveux épars, leurs traits noircis par la fumée des feux qu'ils n'osaient allumer que la nuit, peignaient toute l'insouciance du malheur.

“ Des personnes distinguées, des prêtres, que les mouvemens de nos colonnes avaient empêchés de se retirer vers Lisbonne, se trouvaient aussi réfugiés dans ces espèces d'antres, avec des familles de paysans. Dans ces crevasses de montagnes, où nul chemin ne conduisait, ces malheureux habitans se croyaient en sûreté à côté de leur fortune ; mais ces réduits farouches, qui devaient les défendre de la cupidité du soldat sans frein, aigri par les fatigues et le besoin, leur servaient quelquefois de tombeaux. Les femmes, les filles, trouvées dans ces lieux sauvages, étaient obligées d'assouvir les passions les plus effrénées pour éviter la mort : je le dis à regret, on en a vu même d'éborgnées par les tigres dont elles venaient de rassasier la brutalité ! Ceux qui commettaient ces abominations étaient quelques misérables qui, du rebut gangrené des grandes villes, avaient été introduits, par le sort, dans les rangs des braves. Ce sont ces êtres vils qui dans leurs courses, se trouvant dégagés de tout espèce de joug, s'abandonnaient aveuglément à leur férocité. Qu'on se garde bien de confondre ces brigands atroces avec nos vrais soldats. Les hommes les plus cruels sont presque toujours les plus lâches.

“ Dans la crise où notre armée se trouvait alors, les lois répressives, les réglemens de police et de discipline, étaient tombés en désuétude. On ne punissait guère que le subordonné qui manquait à son supérieur, encore montrait-on parfois une indulgence condamnable. Si l'on faisait un exemple d'un coupable pris en flagrant délit, la police refermait bientôt son œil indolent, et le vice reprenait son cours. Un état de choses si pernicieux aurait fini par corrompre tous nos soldats : car il faut des liens inflexibles pour contenir dans l'ordre les corps nombreux.

“ Dans les commencemens, les hommes de nos com-

pagnies ramenaient souvent avec eux, sans distinction de rang et de qualité, les jeunes et jolies femmes qu'ils surprénaient dans leurs courses vagabondes. Obligées de se couvrir des seuls effets que les soldats trouvaient, la jeune paysanne était quelquefois affublée du costume d'une comtesse, et la Dame portait à son tour les vêtements d'une simple villageoise. Cette disparate de l'habit et de la condition était une chose curieuse à observer.

“ Les captives montraient d'abord de la tristesse, mais elles s'habituèrent facilement à une situation qui, du moins, les garantissait des souffrances et des nombreux dangers qu'elles avaient courus dans leurs sauvages rochers: elles avaient leur protecteur qui les faisait respecter dans les cantonnemens, et, d'ordinaire, elles s'y attachaient fortement. Quelquefois aussi, elles s'élevaient de degré en degré jusqu'à devenir les compagnes des généraux: ces exemples n'étaient point rares.

“ Un jour, étant en correspondance à Quinta-de-Sardima, près de Leyria, un vieux brave de ma compagnie me ramena une jeune et jolie demoiselle avec sa mère d'un nom connu et respecté en Portugal: leurs vêtements salis, mais d'une riche étoffe, étaient en désordre; et leurs pleurs et leurs soupirs exprimaient la plus vive affliction. Mon estimable soldat venait de les arracher d'entre les mains d'un groupe de maraudeurs, au moment où les seuls obstacles de la nature défendaient encore la jeune fille de l'ignominie des traitemens qu'éprouvait sa mère. Les soins les plus respectueux, que je leur prodiguai pendant quelques jours, ne tarissant point leurs larmes, je pris sur moi de les faire conduire à plusieurs lieues, hors des avant-postes, par le digne voltigeur qui les avait déjà sauvées une fois.

“ Une circonstance bien particulière de cette guerre, et dont on n’a jamais parlé, est qu’on a porté le dérèglement jusqu’à vendre des femmes ! On en a aussi troqué pour des chevaux de main : j’ai vu une partie de cartes où l’on jouait une jeune fille contre un objet de luxe. Un employé aux vivres me sollicita moi-même, très-sérieusement, de lui céder en propriété, pour deux onces d’or, une des femmes réfugiées dans le petit village que je commandais.

“ On avait découvert tant de cachettes qu’il n’en restait plus ; ou du moins, celles qui existaient encore avaient été faites avec un tel soin, qu’il était presque impossible de les découvrir. Le tact que nos soldats avaient acquis par l’habitude se trouvait de plus en plus en défaut ; et les besoins augmentaient chaque jour d’une manière effrayante. Le mal-être était si grand qu’il rendait nos soldats insensibles et cruels : excités par la faim, ils essayèrent de torturer les habitans opiniâtres qu’ils pouvaient saisir à portée des villages abandonnés, afin de leur faire déclarer les cachettes qu’ils connaissaient encore : ce moyen, d’une barbarie inouïe, leur réussit, et l’armée entière vécut quelques temps d’aveux arrachés par la question. Des soldats qui, dans des circonstances antérieures, avaient montré des sentimens généreux, racontaient alors avec sang-froid ces abominations !

“ Si l’histoire parle un jour de ces atrocités, qu’elle n’omette pas de rapporter, qu’il ne restait à l’armée de Portugal, commandée par le prince d’Essling, que ce seul et dernier moyen pour ne pas succomber dans les angoisses du besoin.”—*Campagnes de l’Armée de Portugal, par Monsieur Guingret, Chef de Bataillon, &c.*

APPENDIX D.

THE constitution promulgated by the Cortes having been annulled, it is thought better not to clog the military narrative with any particulars respecting it; and only to throw together in this Appendix a few observations pointing out the slight basis on which it reposed, to account for the facility with which it was destroyed.

When the Extraordinary General Cortes was elected in 1810, the greater number of the provinces, being occupied by the French, could return no deputies, and a variety of unprecedented expedients were adopted to complete the regular number, besides a direct violation of ancient usage in admitting representatives from the American provinces. These irregularities ought to have made the Cortes entertain doubts of their own legality, and be exceedingly cautious how they introduced the required ameliorations in the government; instead of which, they commenced by the most violent changes in every institution of the state and church. This want of judgment may be traced to the composition of the assembly. The nomination as deputy being attended with no pecuniary advantage, and appearing to hold out no prospect of future benefit, was little courted by prudent or worldly men; whereas every aspiring or visionary patriot, fraught with the hope of regenerating his country, sought with avidity to be elected; and, unluckily, too great a proportion of members were returned whose ideas of perfection were drawn from the writings of Plato and Aristotle,

and whose highest ambition was to refine on the theoretic doctrines of their favourite authors. These members being the best educated, and some of them eloquent speakers, soon obtained an ascendancy: they fairly enough arrogated to themselves the title of *Liberales*, though they certainly little maintained it in branding with that of *Serviles* all who refused to support their views of giving unbounded freedom to the nation. In the sittings of the Cortes, whoever spoke contrary to their opinions, whether he uttered the sentiments of prejudice firmly rooted by long duration, the simple effusions of an honest heart, or the logic of a less cultivated understanding than their own, was branded as a servile; and not unfrequently, when argument failed, was silenced by the clamours of the populace in the galleries, who, flattered with the expectation of some unknown advantage, listened with impatience to all who opposed the meditated changes. Thus, only, arguments favourable to the views of the *liberales* being admitted, every objection to their schemes was overlooked, and with nine tenths of the nation totally unprepared for any change, they drew up a body of laws striking at almost every institution regarded with respect, and chalked out for the Spaniards, unconscious of its value, a higher degree of liberty than the most enlightened nation has yet been able to attain. From ignorance of human nature, or from too strong democratic notions, they absolutely courted the opposition of the upper classes by wanton changes, and a total disregard of their feelings and prejudices; so that the constitution, the fruits of their labour, whilst it abased the kingly power, degraded the nobles, robbed the church, and limited the authority of the military, promised only a distant benefit to the people

contingent on the success of the war, and consequently from its announcement was opposed by a host of powerful enemies without a single class of society feeling warmly interested in its preservation.

APPENDIX E.

By reference to dates, it will be seen that the French were driven beyond the boundaries of Spain, whilst Buonaparte was yet in strength to make face against the united armies of the remainder of Europe, and consequently the triumph of the Spaniards was not the effect of extraneous circumstances, though, without doubt, much accelerated by them.

It is to be desired that some competent person would delineate the causes which produced the salvation of Spain, and assign to each its due share of importance, that the world may profit by the extraordinary occurrence of a nation without a regular army having preserved its independence against the most formidable legions which ever threatened a state; and that it may be generally understood how far popular spirit is equal to protect itself; as also whether any new ideas on war ought to be entertained from the issue of this peculiar struggle. In the mean while the following cursory observations on the subject are submitted.

The most prominent features of the contest appear to have been, 1st. The exertion and unbending firmness of

the population. 2d. The Guerrilla warfare. 3d. The faults of the enemy. 4th. The allied British and Portuguese army. 5th. The shape and size of the country, its communications and thin population. Lastly, the great expense supported by England. Each of these shall be separately considered.

The unbending firmness manifested on all occasions by the Spaniards, added to occasional great exertion, contributed much to their independence; but however desirable to support the trite adage, that a nation determined to be free must become so, and of all similarly received opinions which tend to promote a spirit of patriotism and of freedom in the commonalty, it must be admitted that they appear falsified by every event of the struggle; these freemen having been invariably beaten by the organized bondsmen opposed to them, and the patriotic population, wherever the English army, or peculiar local circumstances did not operate in their favour, (as in Catalonia and Arragon,) having been held by them in a state of subjection. The unbending spirit and firmness of the people alone, would not therefore have expelled the intruders in any limited period. Time, it is probable, would have rendered their perseverance triumphant; but, unless aided by some extraneous cause, several generations would have first passed away, and the event is more a subject of speculation than of useful inquiry.

The second feature of the contest, the Guerrilla warfare, also contributed something to its successful result: the part it bore has, however, been much overrated, which a reference to the registers of their deeds, the Cadiz and Lisbon Gazettes of the period, will prove, the number of French therein claimed to have been killed or

captured by the Guerrillas falling little short of the total number which crossed the Pyrenees.

Without wishing to detract from those highly patriotic, meritorious, and useful bodies, it may be stated that their reputation owed much to the pen as well as to the sword. When acting with the British in France they showed less firmness than the regular corps of Spaniards, and the astonishment of the English officers was not a little excited at frequently witnessing the vaunted bands of Mina and Longa turn before inferior numbers of French troops. From this fact, and from there being in the interior of Spain no places of refuge of such strength as the Alpujarras and the mountains of Andalusia, from which the small moveable corps Marshal Soult had it in his power to employ, had nearly, if not entirely, dislodged them, it is not too much to presume, that so far from being of themselves able to save their country, had the intrusive government driven the British and Portuguese armies out of the Peninsula, and found itself strong enough to act against the Guerrillas, and to treat them as banditti, they would, in a few months, have dwindled into such.

3d. The faults of the enemy.—Of these the two most usually cited are having penetrated to the south, and spread over the distant provinces, before the north was pacified, or even fully subdued; and, secondly, having divided their forces into distinct armies. The first of these two alleged errors contributed much, during the protraction of the war, to shake their dominion; but the French also gained considerably by it in the first instance: had they filled up two or three campaigns in tranquillising the north, would not regular armies have been trained to oppose their invasion of the south? and is it altogether

certain they would, even in that time, have established their dominion against the inflexible firmness of the Spaniards? On the second point, it may be asked whether the entrusting each grand army to the care of its own chief was not a consequence of the attempt to subdue a nation of the size of Spain, rather than a fault, and whether such system must not invariably be pursued on every similar occasion? How can it ever be practicable for a central authority to controul the various movements of armies spread over many thousand square miles, and frequently with their communications interrupted for days together? An order of detail requires to be modified every moment, and can only be given by those on the spot. No authority, however little removed from the scene of action, would be competent thereto. A general plan of operations must necessarily emanate from a single source, and if (as ought to be the case) confined to ensure unity of object and action to the various parts of the machine, it could be better regulated at Paris than at Madrid. The principal error of the French seems rather to have been having no decided line of subordination between the different commanders when circumstances required the junction of their armies, and having a puppet king who could not, on any unforeseen emergency, enforce obedience to his commands; and it will be found most in temporary and unforeseen combined movements, that the separation of command was injurious to the French. None of those auxiliary causes, nor all of them united, would therefore have produced a decisive effect had there been no English nor Portugueze army present, and it follows to consider it *à priori*, as having been the principal agent in effecting the deliverance of the Penin-

sula; but making every allowance for the peculiar talents of the British chief, there is room for inquiry how 60,000 men, with few reinforcements, should, for years together, have been able successfully to oppose very superior numbers constantly reinforced at pleasure.—What were the causes which enabled it to do so?

The good will of the population is admitted to have been of great assistance,* but that would not have been long available without a large tract of country to manœuvre over; as had the army been obliged to fight whenever pressed, the most splendid success would in a

* It is extremely difficult to describe the nature of the assistance given by the Spaniards, as their hostility towards the intruders was carried on with policy, and under great deception: wherever the French arrived in force the inhabitants tranquilly received them, obeyed their orders with seeming alacrity, and at the same moment communicated them to the commanders of their own forces. The day prior to the battle of Salamanca, the same letter, in triplicate, from King Joseph to Marmont was brought to Lord Wellington by three separate couriers—one of whom had a written order to be paid four hundred dollars, by Marmont, on receipt of the dispatch; (these letters being in a character which could not be deciphered their contents proved of no advantage to the allies.) The day of the action at Vittoria, the Alcalde of Logroño, thirty-six miles distant, arrived on the field, his mule dropping under him with fatigue as he dismounted, to say that he had early that morning received Clausel's corps, and that whilst he had left his deputy to serve out the rations he had brought the return of their numbers. A thousand similar actions might be quoted to show the passive, though not less effectual nature of the assistance given by the population. The strongest proof, however, of general and disinterested good will is, that although no army ever had better intelligence, the whole amount of money paid on that head fell short of the sum given for intelligence at the capture of a single sugar island in the first years of the war.

few repetitions have been annihilation. To feel assured that extent of country had great influence, beyond the weakness it caused to the French armies by separation, we need only look at the consequences produced by the allies acting in one part of Spain or another. Sir John Moore, by drawing the war into the north, saved the south from immediate conquest, and Lord Wellington subsequently liberated those provinces by a similar manœuvre;—the victory of Vittoria freed Valencia, and the invasion of France, Catalonia. We likewise find the advantage of an extensive country confirmed by the conduct of many of the provinces: thus Galicia, stigmatised as the least warlike province in Spain, overpowered a considerable army by its extent and shape, which did not admit of any portion of the inhabitants being separated from the remainder: whereas the Asturias, bearing the reputation of the most warlike province, literally composed of one huge mountain, and from whence issued some of the most celebrated Guerrilla bands, never made any protracted resistance; the French always beat the organized troops on the first rencounter, and, there being no extent of country to disperse over, they never could recover: a chain of posts of forty miles drew a line from the frontier to the sea, and impeded all communication from east to west.

Spain, considered as a whole, is very nearly the shape of Galicia, and Portugal that of the Asturias; the British were, however, driven from the one into the other, and by parity of reasoning, as well as by a consideration of the circumstances which occurred, it is fair to presume they would never have recovered the ascendancy, had not the lines in front of Lisbon afforded a field of battle too de-

cidedly advantageous to leave the enemy any hope of wearing out the defenders by a succession of sanguinary combats.

The shutting up the army in the lines would in most countries, and under other circumstances, have been equivalent to its destruction; the space they covered, geographically considered, being a mere point, and affording no supplies: regarded, however, in a military view, with its rear open to the sea, it was of more value in the defence of Portugal than the occupation of the whole kingdom. The war was equally alive, the army was entire, secure, and daily increasing in strength and experience; the blockaders were, at the same time, from the difficulty of communication, wasting away, and the scanty supplies which could be drawn from the resources of the thin population around them ensured their ultimate retreat. The lines therefore drew much of their value from the peculiar character of the country, and still more from the last mentioned cause of success, as, without daily supplies of a magnitude only to have been furnished by the prodigious wealth of England, famine would more rapidly have acted upon the defenders than the blockaders, and would have dislodged them first—an event which would, in all probability, have concluded the efforts of the British forces in the cause: at any rate it must be admitted, that nothing but an expenditure unheard of before in the annals of war, could have enabled the British and Portuguese to follow up and continue their triumphs in such a poor and exhausted country. Innumerable persons were employed in the service of the commissariat, and provisions were purchased at any price, however exorbitant, till the utmost exertions of Britain failed in obtaining a

stiffness of specie.* Then the expedient of maintaining a line of supply from the sea was carried to such extent, that, in some cases, articles of food to be procured on the spot were brought from England at six times their local price. Even under this system the current year failed to clear its own expenses in the Peninsula: credit and confidence supplied the deficiency—promises of payment were accepted in lieu of money, and three millions of debt were contracted, which it required two years of peace to liquidate.

If, therefore, the reasoning offered to shew that no other sufficient means than the regular Portugueze and British army existed in Spain, to avert the dominion of France, be correct, the contest unhappily tends to confirm most of the received opinions respecting war—that regular armies alone are fit to contend with regular armies—that the most numerous legions will generally prevail—that the largest countries are those best adapted for defensive war; but, above all, that money is the main support of

* The expenses of the war never having exceeded a tithe of the revenue raised in Great Britain, the difficulty did not arise from want of money, but from the impossibility of converting the currency of the state into bullion. That commodity, like any other, rose in price from the demand exceeding the supply, and the exchange between England and Portugal became so unfavourable to the former, that at one period seventy-two pence were paid for each dollar, the current and standard value of which is only fifty-four pence. This had the effect of materially increasing the cost of every article paid for in the Peninsula, and consequently operated indirectly as a premium on supplies sent from England.

In 1812 there were 9000 hired mules employed in the transport of provisions and forage, besides 2000 cars with their cattle, the property of government.

hostilities—holding out no fresh hopes to the patriot, or to the minor state. It, however, leaves a forcible appeal to all citizens to submit to discipline in the hour of invasion, and a warning to all governments exposed to the aggression of a more powerful neighbour, to pay watchful attention to preserve the foundation of its military establishment.

The contest in Spain, however, considered under a more enlarged view, offers additional proof of what the history of mankind seems to inculcate—that dominion founded on mere military exertion can never stand still—that it must on every effort advance, or it instantly retrogrades; such is apparently a law of the universe, intended to prevent one man tyrannizing over the whole globe, and counteracting by the arrangements of his limited understanding, the infinite variety of institutions and governments required for general prosperity. To take an extreme case—suppose the subjugation of only one people remain to complete universal dominion; if they successfully resist, the conquerors of the remainder of the earth are stripped of their invincibility, and the greater the efforts they make, and the longer they persevere in them, so much the more apparent does it become. The hopes of the conquered, and the power of the oppressor, naturally rise and fall in inverse ratio—the whole become less submissive, and greater exertions are required to maintain the ascendancy. Opportunity or accident raises some other people into open resistance: the means of reconquering them are diminished; each successful revolt generates another; in a succession of years the struggle becomes general; and, ultimately, nations resume the natural boundaries of independence marked out by cli-

mate, soil, or other localities. Such, at least, may be clearly traced in the dissolution of one, if not of two, of the greatest military empires which ever flourished; and such threatens, ere long, to be further exemplified in the extinction of a tottering state not long since the terror of Christendom, as spreading both by fanaticism and the sword.

It must have been a perfect reliance on the effects of re-action, when advance should cease, which caused six months perseverance during the winter of 1810 and 1811, in employing all the disposable military strength of England, and spending millions of money to preserve a few square miles of territory free from the dominion of France, when, by means of the fleet, so much more advantageous a field of action could in a moment have been found.

The maintenance of that small spot deprived the French armies of their invincibility; and it was fair to reason thus—if the destruction of the most renowned military empires, even of those consolidated by a duration of successive centuries, has been by re-action from the point where advance ceased, what chance will the comparatively infantine exertions of France have of rising into maturity, if checked almost at their birth, and proved to be of no overpowering strength?

APPENDIX F.

FIELD Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, and the Marshals the Duke of Dalmatia, and the Duke of Albufera, being desirous of concluding a suspension of hostilities between the armies under their respective orders, and of agreeing upon a line of demarcation, have named the undermentioned officers for that purpose, viz. on the part of the Marquis of Wellington, Major General Sir George Murray, and Major General Don Luis Wimpffen; and on the part of the Duke of Dalmatia, and of the Duke of Albufera, the General of Division Count Gazin.

These officers, having exchanged their full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles:

ART. 1.—From the date of the present Convention there shall be a suspension of hostilities between the allied armies under the orders of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, and the armies of France under the orders of Marshal the Duke of Dalmatia, and of Marshal the Duke of Albufera.

ART. 2.—Hostilities shall not be recommenced on either part without a previous notice being given of five days.

ART. 3.—The limits of the department of the Haute Garonne, with the departments of Arriege Aude and Tarn, shall be the line of demarcation between the armies as far as the town of Buzet on the river Tarn. The line will then follow the course of the Tarn to its junction with

the Garrone, making a circuit, however, on the left bank of the Tarn, opposite Montauban, to the distance of three quarters of a league from the bridge of Montauban. From the mouth of the river Tarn, the line of demarcation will follow the right bank of the Garonne as far as the limits of the department of the Lot and Garonne, with the department of La Gironde. It will then pass by La Reole, Sauveterre, and Rauzan, to the Dordogne, and will follow the right bank of that river, and of the Gironde, to the sea. In the event, however, of a different line of demarcation having been already determined by Lieutenant General the Earl of Dalhousie, and General Decaen, the line fixed upon by those officers shall be adhered to.

ART. 4.—Hostilities shall cease also on both sides in regard to the places of Bayonne, St. Jean de Pied de Port, Navarreins, Blaye, and the Castle of Lourdes.

The governors of these places shall be allowed to provide for the daily subsistence of the garrisons in the adjacent country: the garrison of Bayonne, with a circuit of eight leagues from Bayonne, and the garrisons of the other places named, within a circuit of three leagues round each place.

Officers shall be sent to the garrisons of the above places to communicate to them the terms of the present convention.

ART. 5.—The town and forts of Santona shall be evacuated by the French troops, and made over to the Spanish Forces. The French garrison will remove with it all that properly belongs to it, together with such arms, artillery, and other military effects, as have not been the property originally of the Spanish government.

The Marquis of Wellington will determine whether the

French garrison of Santona shall return to France by land, or by sea; and in either case the passage of the garrison shall be secured, and it will be directed upon one of the places, or ports, most contiguous to the army of the Duke of Dalmatia.

The ships of war, or other vessels now in the harbour Santona, belonging to France, shall be allowed to proceed to Rochfort with passports for that purpose.

The Duke of Dalmatia, will send an officer to communicate to the French general commanding in Santona, the terms of the present convention, and cause them to be complied with.

ART. 6.—The fort of Venasque shall be made over as soon as possible to the Spanish troops, and the French garrison shall proceed, by the most direct route, to the head quarters of the French army. The garrison will remove with it the arms and ammunition which are originally French.

ART. 7.—The line of demarcation between the allied armies, and the army of Marshal Suchet, shall be the line of the frontier of Spain and France from the Mediterranean to the limits of the department of the Haute Garonne.

ART. 8.—The garrisons of all the places which are occupied by the troops of the army of the Duke of Albufera, shall be allowed to return without delay into France. These garrisons shall remove with them all that properly belongs to them, as also all the arms and artillery which are originally French.

The garrisons of Murviedro, and of Peniscola, shall join the garrison of Tortosa, and these troops will then proceed together by the great road, and enter France by

Perpignan. The day of the arrival of these garrisons at Gerona, the fortresses of Figueira, and of Rosas, shall be made over to the Spanish troops, and the French garrisons of these places shall proceed to Perpignan.

As soon as information is received of the French garrisons of Murviedro, Peniscola, and Tortosa, having passed the French frontier, the place and forts of Barcelona shall be made over to the Spanish troops, and the French garrisons shall march immediately for Perpignan. The Spanish authorities will provide for the necessary means of transport being supplied to the French garrisons on their march to the frontier.

The sick or wounded of any of the French garrisons, who are not in a state to move with the troops, shall remain and be cured in the hospitals where they are, and will be sent into France as soon as they have recovered.

ART. 9.—From the date of the ratification of the present convention, there shall not be removed from Peniscola, Murviedro, Tortosa, Barcelona, or any of the other places, any artillery, arms, ammunition, or any other military effects belonging to the Spanish government. And the provisions remaining at the evacuation of these places shall be made over to the Spanish authorities.

ART. 10.—The roads shall be free for the passage of couriers through the cantonments of both armies, provided they are furnished with regular passports.

ART. 11.—During the continuance of the present convention, deserters from either army shall be arrested, and shall be delivered up if demanded.

ART. 12.—The navigation of the Garonne shall be free from Toulouse to the sea, and all boats in the ser-

vice of either army, employed in the river, shall be allowed to pass unmolested.

ART. 13.—The cantonments of the troops shall be arranged so as to leave a space of two leagues at least between the quarters of the different armies.

ART. 14.—The movements of the troops, for the establishment of their cantonments, shall commence immediately after the ratification of the present convention.

The ratification is to take place within twenty-four hours for the army of the Duke of Dalmatia, and within forty-eight hours for the army of the Duke of Albufera.

Done in Triplicate at Toulouse, on the 18th of April, 1814.

(Signed)	(Signed)	(Signed)
G. MURRAY, M.G. & Q.M.G.	LUIS WIMPFEN, Gefe de E. M. G. de Campaña de los Ejercitos Españoles.	Le Lieut. General, de GAZAN.

Approuvé, Le M. Duc D'AL- BUFERA.	Confirmed, WELLINGTON.	Approuvé, M. Duc de DAL- MATIA.
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APPENDIX G.

THE writer is happy to have it in his power to give a particular detail of the manœuvre practised by the 50th regiment under Colonel Walker at Vimiero, (see page 28,) as it offers the first example of troops formed in line charging and breaking the heavy close column of the revolutionary school.

The 50th regiment, about 900 rank and file, were formed in line on the rising ground in front of Vimiero, supported by three guns under Lieutenant Colonel Robe, when a French column of 5,300 men in close order of half battalions, with seven pieces of artillery, approached their front. The fire of the British guns was very destructive, and shook the advancing force considerably, until, obtaining shelter from an inequality in the ground, they made a short pause to close up their ranks, and then again moved on till the guns could no longer be served. The 50th regiment had till that moment remained with ordered arms, when Colonel Walker, seeing the little chance of successfully resisting in line the heavy body approaching, made an attempt with the approbation of General Fane, to turn the flank of the column. Leaving the left wing of the regiment in line, forming a front nearly equal to that of the advancing force, the right wing was thrown into échellons of companies of about four paces to the left, and having advanced for a short distance in that order were commanded to form into line on the left company. Time, however, was wanting to complete this manœuvre: the rapidity of the enemy's march had brought them almost into contact with the regiment when only two companies of the right wing had formed into line, and a very hot though confused fire had already commenced from the flanks of the advancing column. An instant decision became necessary: the two companies in line bore precisely on the angle of the column: Colonel Walker ordered a volley and a charge. The angle was in a moment broken, and forced in on the centre; the drivers of three French guns a little advanced in front, alarmed at the firing in their rear, cut their

traces, and rushing back on their friends added to the confusion, which, on the three outer companies of the 50th taking part in the charge, became general, converting the column into an ungovernable mob bearing down the officers, and flying without resistance for nearly two miles, harassed by the 50th and a detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons. At that distance a reserve of French cavalry lent the broken mass support, and protected their further retreat.

The same principle acted on with some difference of detail produced similar results at Talavera, Albuera, &c. —viz. Charging in front and flank or rear a mass of men, the far greater number of whom are, from their formation, incapacitated from offensive or defensive action, and, consequently, peculiarly subject to panic and alarm, which, once created, neither the judgement of the officer nor the innate courage of the soldier can prevent the whole crowding back together.

The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that the attack in close heavy column was merely an expedient adopted at the commencement of the war, when the French troops were not sufficiently disciplined to advance steadily in line, nor their opponents sufficiently practised in field manœuvres to oppose weight by activity and decision, and that, as a tactical arrangement, it is utterly unworthy of the celebrity it has attained.

APPENDIX H.

*Miscellaneous Observations on the Text.**Page 4—line 5.*

JUNOT's advance entered Portugal from Alcantara on the 19th November, and marching by Castel Branco, Perdigao, Sobreira, Cortisada, and Abrantes, arrived at Santaram 28th November, Sacavern 29th, and Lisbon 30th.

The Prince Regent embarked on the 27th, but was detained in the Tagus, by adverse winds, till the 29th.

Page 7.

Ferdinand's offer for one of the imperial nieces is dated the 11th October, 1807. Buonaparte's answer the 16th April, 1808.

The cabal and arrests at Aranjuez took place between the 16th and 19th March.

The paper styled Charles's Protestation bore date the 21st March.

General Savary arrived at Madrid 7th April.

Buonaparte arrived at Bayonne the night of 14th April.

Ferdinand left Madrid 10th April—arrived at Bayonne 20th April.

Charles and the queen arrived 1st May.

Page 11—line 4.

Buonaparte even carried menaces so far as to say
" Prince, il faut opter entre la cession ou la mort."

Page 13—line 22.

Most Spaniards estimate the number at 10,000: few admit it to have been less than 5000, and the writer has never met with one who estimated it under 3000; a list, however, was made out by order of the perpetrators, and published under their authority, which stated the number of inhabitants, killed and wounded, not to exceed 200.

Page 23—line 25.

At the moment when the exportation of their wines was prohibited, and from the general stagnation of commerce, as well as the stoppage of the remittances from America, the country was unable to pay the ordinary taxes, a forced contribution of one hundred millions of francs was imposed. Subsequently, on finding every expedient unavailing to raise so large a sum, it was reduced to fifty millions.

Page 31—end of first paragraph.

It is true, that by a different line of conduct the French army might have been forced to surrender at discretion; its generals and its eagles might have been sent trophies to England, and Lisbon might have been unconditionally liberated. Almeida, Elvas, and St. Julien, would however long have resisted; the fleet would long have been interdicted the entry of the Tagus, and the army long retarded in its organization and equipment. Time would consequently have been sacrificed to render victory more brilliant, and solid advantages thrown away for splendour of triumph.

Page 51—line 17.

Soon after Napoleon's entry into Spain, Austria published a manifesto protesting against the treatment of the Spanish princes. Buonaparte, on his arrival at Benevente, believing the war in Spain terminated, hastened to meet the impending storm, and arrived at Paris on the 28th January, 1809.

Page 61.

Much of this Chapter is from personal observation, the writer having been sent to the Asturias, in a military capacity, in August, 1808; having witnessed the discomfiture of Blake's army at Zornosa, accompanied the Marquis de la Romana on his retreat to Renedo, and subsequently having done duty with the British from Astorga to Corunna.

Page 65—line 21.

This repulse was effected by the determined conduct of a serjeant of Portugueze artillery, who commanded a few gunners in a small tower: he refused to enter into any negociation, and, opening a fire, sunk the two first boats which attempted to cross.

Page 70—line 15.

It is understood that Marshal Soult at this period meditated the attempt to render himself independent, as Sovereign of Northern Lusitania, and that proclamations to such an effect were printed off, if not circulated. A French general officer told the writer, that an individual of Soult's staff, who was supposed to have been a principal agent in the affair, being recalled to Paris, Buonaparte

addressed him by name at a grand levee at the Tuileries. "Take care how you draw up proclamations—my empire is not yet sufficiently extended for my generals to become independent—one step further, and I would have caused you to have been shot."

Page 80—second paragraph.

Abstracted from returns laid before the House of Commons.

Page 87—second paragraph.

This action more generally takes its name from the town of Belchite, where the Spaniards offered the most resistance.

Page 90—last line.

The position was admirably well chosen, and the description given hardly conveys a just idea of its merit. A French officer far better described it, as a front of fortification, of which the town of Talavera, and the height occupied by General Hill were the two bastions.

Page 96—line 9.

Composed of his own forces from Portugal, Marshal Ney's corps from Galicia, and the troops which moved into Castille from Arragon on the surrender of Saragossa.

Page 105—line 27.

Monsieur Guingret states that the French army lost in this attack only nine men killed, including two officers.

Page 113—line 19.

It was at this period he married the Arch Duchess Maria Louise.

Page 118—line 6.

The division under Major General Leith was composed principally of militia.

Page 118.

A battalion of Swiss troops, which had been placed in garrison at Sanabria, capitulated to General Silveira in the beginning of August.

Page 132—line 1.

Numerous batteries were thrown up on the left bank of the river to command the mouth of the Zezere: piquets and posts of observation were pushed every night to the edge of the water, and a garrison was put into the castle of Tancos.

Page 133—line 21.

This was written from the recollection of vast tracts of maize standing uncut, and of entire fields strewn with corn. All the carriage of the country, and most of the efficient labourers had been in requisition for the completion of the lines, and the service of the army, during the latter part of the summer.

Page 136—line 5.

Seven thousand men marched along the foot of the Serra de Estrella by Espinhal, and joined the main body

at Miranda de Corvo. A division of the allies followed their march.

Page 189—line 18.

Many of the Guerrilla leaders were accompanied in the field by females, who, as is not unfrequent in camps, wore male attire. These, after a time, habituated to danger, became very daring, frequently fighting amongst the foremost, on which circumstance, most of the tales of the bands being commanded by Amazons, had their origin.

Page 227—line 15.

Ground was broken on the night of the 8th, and the assault took place on the evening of the 19th, so that in fact the siege only lasted eleven days.

Page 229—line 16.

The main scarp at Rodrigo every where on the eastern side of the place exceeds twenty-eight feet in height, and no ladder of that length was issued, on the evening of the assault, from the engineers' park. The Portugueze, under General Pack, spiritedly escaladed a lunette, situated in front of the fausse-braie, in which the guard was overpowered and bayoneted.

Page 241—line 18.

These movements, apparently so simple, were exceedingly complex in reference to the commissariat, the frontier of Beira not yielding subsistence for a squadron of dragoons. Previously to marching from the Agueda, it was necessary not only to establish magazines on the Guadiana, but also to leave such depôts in the north as

should enable the army to return to the succour of Almeida or Rodrigo. A depôt was in consequence established at Celorico, considered the point least removed from the frontier for safety, the grand magazines being placed on the right bank of the Douro. The event showed the judgment displayed in the arrangement, as on Marmont's approach to Celorico, the officer in charge of the depôt set it on fire, and the army drew all its supplies, and consequently owed its efficiency to the magazines placed beyond the Douro.

Page 278—line 2.

The complete success of this bold manœuvre offers many reflections on the futility of attempting to stop the march of troops by the fire of artillery in the night. In this instance the good order and silence with which the allied army filed under the walls of the castle was rendered of no avail to them by the conduct of a party of Guerrilla cavalry, who, unused to such coolness, put their horses to their speed, and made such a clatter, that the garrison took the alarm, and opened a fire from the artillery directed on the bridge; the first discharge was, as might have been expected, very effectual; but the gunners immediately afterwards lost the range and direction, and their fire only served to make the carriages file over the bridge with more speed than usual.

Page 284—line 21.

These numbers are given on the best authority, the writer, by an uncommon chance, having seen the return of the two armies. Some favourable opportunities for ascertaining the number of the French in Spain at diffe-

rent periods, led to the conclusion, that from 1809 to 1812 inclusive, the assigned amount was 200,000, and that it seldom varied 20,000 men, more or less.

Page 289—last paragraph.

A staff officer of rank, in the French service, stated to the writer, that in the winter of 1812 and 1813, about 10,000 men only were withdrawn from Spain, chiefly intended as non-commissioned officers to supply the vacancies occasioned by the losses in Russia: about half the number were drafted from Catalonia. Marshal Soult was recalled at the same time.

Page 298—line 27.

This and the following facts were ascertained from a French general officer, a principal actor in the scene.

Page 315—line 3.

Sir G. Collier, with a squadron of men of war, showed great perseverance and seamanship in maintaining a maritime blockade: the danger of the coast, and the immediate vicinity of the French ports, enabled the garrison, however, to have frequent communication, and even when shut up in the castle, they obtained some artillery.

Page 354—line 2.

It is not intended to imply that 7,000 men were actually on the Nivelle; but that such numbers were under the command of Marshal Soult.

Page 392—last paragraph.

The number of the French who perished in the same

period, would not probably be overrated at a similar amount. That of the Portugueze and British army was also very considerable; and it may safely be stated, that a million of persons perished in this attempt to extend and consolidate the rule of the Buonaparte family.

FINIS.

Sketched to about 4 Miles to an Inch.



(Sketch)
 (Explanatory of the Movements)
 in the
PYRENEES,
 between the 25th July & 2^d August 1813.



Attack
of the
FRENCH ENTRENCHED POSITION
on the
NIVELLE
10th November 1813.

Scale of Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5

