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INQUIRY

INTO THE

Nature and Causes

OF THE

WEALTH OF NATIONS.

VOL. II.



INQUIRY

INTO THE

Nature and Causes

OF THE

WEALTH OF NATIONS.

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VOL. II.

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MDCCLXXVI.

The Reader is defired to correct with his Pen the two following ERRATA, which in this Second Volume affect the Sense.

Page 467, Line 6, counting from the Bottom; instead of immoveable, read moveable.

Page 488, Lines 3 and 4, counting from the Top; instead of three shillings a bushel, read three shillings and four-pence a bushel.

AN

N I R Y

INTO THE

NATURE AND CAUSES

OF THE

WEALTH OF NATIONS.

OOK IV.

Of Systems of political Oeconomy.

INTRODUCTION.

OLITICAL economy, confidered as a branch of the science of BOOK a statesman or legislator, proposes two distinct objects; first, IV. Introduction. to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide fuch a revenue or fubfistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue fufficient for the publick fervices. proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.

THE different progress of opulence in different ages and nations, has given occasion to two different systems of political economy, with regard to enriching the people. The one may be called the fystem of commerce, the other that of agriculture. I shall endeavour to explain both as fully and distinctly as I can, and shall begin with the system of commerce. It is the modern system, and is best understood in our own country and in our own times.

C H A P. I.

Of the Principle of the commercial, or mercantile System.

BOOK HAT wealth confifts in money, or in gold and filver, is a popular notion which naturally arises from the double function of money, as the instrument of commerce, and as the measure of value. In consequence of its being the instrument of commerce, when we have money we can more readily obtain whatever else we have occasion for, than by means of any other commodity. The great affair, we always find, is to get money. When that is obtained, there is no difficulty in making any fubfequent purchase. In consequence of its being the measure of value, we estimate that of all other commodities by the quantity of money which they will exchange for. We fay of a rich man that he is worth a great deal, and of a poor man that he is worth very little money. A frugal man, or a man eager to be rich, is faid to love money; and a careless, a generous, or a profuse man, is faid to be indifferent about it. To grow rich is to get money; and wealth and money, in short, are in common language confidered as in every respect synonymous.

> A RICH country, in the same manner as a rich man, is supposed to be a country abounding in money; and to heap up gold and filver in any country is supposed to be the readiest way to enrich it. For some time after the discovery of America, the first enquiry of the Spaniards, when they arrived upon any unknown coast, used to be, if there was any gold or silver to be found in the neighbourhood. By the information which they received, they judged whether it was worth while to make a fettlement there, or if the country was worth the conquering. Plano Carpino, a monk

fent ambassador from the king of France to one of the sons of CHAP. the famous Gengis Khan, fays that the Tartars used frequently to ask him if there was plenty of sheep and oxen in the kingdom of France. Their enquiry had the same object with that of the Spaniards. They wanted to know if the country was rich enough to be worth the conquering. Among the Tartars, as among all other nations of shepherds, who are generally ignorant of the use of money, cattle are the instruments of commerce and the measures of value. Wealth, therefore, according to them, confifted in cattle, as according to the Spaniards it confifted in gold and filver. Of the two, the Tartar notion, perhaps, was the nearest to the truth.

MR. Locke remarks a distinction between money and other moveable goods. All other moveable goods, he fays, are of 6) confumable a nature that the wealth which confifts in them cannot be much depended on, and a nation which abounds in them one year may, without any exportation, but merely by their own waste and extravagance, be in great want of them the next. Money, on the contrary, is a fleady friend, which, though it may travel about from hand to hand, yet, if it can be kept from going out of the country, is not very liable to be wasted and confumed. Gold and filver, therefore, are, according to him, the most solid and substantial part of the moveable wealth of a nation, and to multiply those metals ought, he thinks, upon that account. to be the great object of its political economy.

OTHERS admit that if a nation could be separated from all the world, it would be of no consequence how much, or how little money circulated in it. The confumable goods which were circulated by means of this money, would only be exchanged for a greater or a smaller number of pieces; but the real wealth or poverty

THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF

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BOOK poverty of the country, they allow, would depend altogether upon the abundance or fcarcity of those consumable goods. But it is otherwise, they think, with countries which have connections with foreign nations, and which are obliged to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant countries. This, they fay, cannot be done, but by fending abroad money to pay them with; and a nation cannot fend much money abroad, unless it has a good deal at home. Every fuch nation, therefore, must endeavour in time of peace to accumulate gold and filver, that, when occasion requires, it may have wherewithal to carry on foreign wars.

> In confequence of these popular notions, all the different nations. of Europe have studied, though to little purpose, every possible means of accumulating gold and filver in their respective countries. Spain and Portugal, the proprietors of the principal mines which fupply Europe with those metals, have either prohibited their exportation under the feverest penalties, or subjected it to a considerable The like prohibition feems antiently to have made a part of the policy of most other European nations. It is even to be found. where we should expect least of all to find it, in some old Scotch acts of parliament, which forbid under heavy penalties the carrying gold or filver forth of the kingdom. The like policy antiently took place both in France and England.

> WHEN those countries became commercial, the merchants found this prohibition, upon many occasions, extreamly inconvenient. They could frequently buy more advantageously with gold and filver than with any other commodity, the foreign goods which they wanted either to import into their own, or to carry to fome other foreign country. They remonstrated, therefore, against this prohibition as hurtful to trade.

They represented, first, that the exportation of gold and filver in order to purchase foreign goods, did not always diminish the quantity of those metals in the kingdom. That, on the contrary, it might frequently increase it; because if the consumption of foreign goods was not thereby increased in the country, those goods might be re-exported to foreign countries, and being there fold for a large profit, might bring back much more treasure than was originally sent out to purchase them. Mr. Mun compares this operation of foreign trade to the seed time and harvest of agriculture. "If we only behold," says he, "the actions of the husbandman in the seed time when he casteth away much good corn into the ground, we shall account him rather a madman than a husbandman. But when we consider his labours in the harvest, which is the end of his endeavours, we shall find the worth and plentiful increase of his actions."

THEY represented, secondly, that this prohibition could not hinder the exportation of gold and filver, which, on account of the smallness of their bulk in proportion to their value, could easily be fmuggled abroad. That this exportation could only be prevented by a proper attention to, what they called, the balance of trade. That when the country exported to a greater value than it imported. a balance became due to it from foreign nations, which was neceffarily paid to it in gold and filver, and thereby increased the quantity of those metals in the kingdom. But that when it imported to a greater value than it exported, a contrary balance became due to foreign nations, which was necessarily paid to them in the fame manner, and thereby diminished that quantity. That in this case to prohibit the exportation of those metals could not prevent it, but only, by making it more dangerous, render it more expensive. That the exchange was thereby turned more against the country which owed the balance, than it otherwise might have been; the merchant who purchased a bill upon the foreign country being obliged

BOOK obliged to pay the banker who fold it, not only for the natural risk, trouble and expence of fending the money thither, but for the extraordinary risk arising from the prohibition. But that the more the exchange was against any country, the more the balance of trade became necessarily against it; the money of that country becoming necessarily of so much less value, in comparison with that of the country to which the balance was due. That if the exchange between England and Holland, for example, was five per cent. against England, it would require a hundred and five ounces of filver in England to purchase a bill for a hundred ounces of filver in Holland: that a hundred and five ounces of filver in England, therefore, would be worth only a hundred ounces of filver in Holland, and would purchase only a proportionable quantity of Dutch goods: but that a hundred ounces of filver in Holland, on the contrary, would be worth a hundred and five ounces in England, and would purchase a proportionable quantity of English goods: That the English goods which were fold to Holland would be fold so much cheaper; and the Dutch goods which were fold to England, fo much dearer, by the difference of the exchange; that the one would draw fo much less Dutch money to England, and the other fo much more English money to Holland, as this difference amounted to: and that the balance of trade, therefore, would necessarily be so much more against England, and would require a greater balance of gold and filver to be exported to Holland.

> Those arguments were partly folid and partly fophistical. were folid fo far as they afferted that the exportation of gold and filver in trade might frequently be advantageous to the country. They were folid too in afferting that no prohibition could prevent their exportation, when private people found any advantage in exporting them. But they were fophistical in supposing, that either

to preferve or to augment the quantity of those metals required CHAP. more the attention of government, than to preserve or to augment the quantity of any other useful commodities, which the freedom of trade, without any fuch attention, never fails to fupply in the proper quantity. They were fophistical too, perhaps, in afferting that the high price of exchange necessarily increased, what they called, the unfavourable balance of trade, or occasioned the exportation of a greater quantity of gold and filver. That high price, indeed, was extremely disadvantageous to the merchants who had any money to pay in foreign countries. They paid fo much dearer for the bills which their bankers granted them upon those countries. But though the risk arising from the prohibition might occasion some extraordinary expence to the bankers, it would not necessarily carry any more money out of the country. expence would generally be all laid out in the country, in fauggling the money out of it, and could feldom occasion the exportation of a fingle fix-pence beyond the precise sum drawn for. The high price of exchange too would naturally dispose the merchants to endeavour to make their exports nearly balance their imports, in order that they might have this high exchange to pay upon as small a sum as possible. The high price of exchange, therefore, would tend, not to increase, but to diminish, what they called, the unfavourable balance of trade, and confequently the exportation of gold and filver.

Such as they were, however, those arguments convinced the people to whom they were addressed. They were addressed by merchants to parliaments, and to the councils of princes, to nobles and to country gentlemen; by those who were supposed to understand trade, to those who were conscious to themselves that they knew nothing about the matter. That foreign trade enriched the country, experience demonstrated to the nobles and country gentlemen,

BOOK gentlemen, as well as to the merchants; but how, or in what manner, none of them well knew. The merchants knew perfectly in what manner it enriched themselves. It was their business to know it. But to know in what manner it enriched the country, was no part of their business. This subject never came into their confideration, but when they had occasion to apply to their country for some change in the laws relating to foreign trade. It then became necessary to say something about the beneficial effects of foreign trade, and the manner in which those effects were obstructed by the laws as they then flood. To the judges who were to decide the business, it appeared a most satisfactory account of the matter, when they were told that foreign trade brought money into the country, but that the laws in question hindered it from bringing so much as it otherwise would do. Those arguments therefore produced the wished-for effect. The prohibition of exporting gold and filver was in France and England confined to the coin of those respective countries. The exportation of foreign coin and of bullion was made free. In Holland, and in fome other places, this liberty was extended even to the coin of the country. The attention of government was turned away from guarding against the exportation of gold and filver, to watch over the balance of trade, as the only cause which could occasion any augmentation or diminution of those metals. From one fruitless care it was turned away to another care much more intricate, much more embarrassing, and just equally fruitless. The title of Mun's book, England's Treasure in Foreign Trade, became a fundamental maxim in the political economy, not of England only, but of all other commercial countries. The inland or home trade, the most important of all, the trade in which an equal capital affords the greatest revenue and creates the greatest employment to the people of the country, was confidered as subsidiary only to foreign trade. It neither brought money into the country, it was faid, nor carried any out of it.

The

The country therefore could never become either richer or poorer by CHAP. means of it, except fo far as its prosperity or decay might indirectly influence the state of foreign trade.

A COUNTRY that has no mines of its own must undoubtedly draw its gold and filver from foreign countries, in the same manner as one that has no vineyards of its own must draw its wines. not feem necessary, however, that the attention of government should be more turned towards the one than towards the other object. A country that has wherewithal to buy wine, will always get the wine which it has occasion for; and a country that has wherewithal to buy gold and filver, will never be in want of those metals. are to be bought for a certain price like all other commodities, and as they are the price of all other commodities, so all other commodities are the price of those metals. We trust with perfect security that the freedom of trade, without any attention of government, will always supply us with the wine which we have occasion for: and we may trust with equal security that it will always supply us with all the gold and filver which we can afford to purchase or to employ, either in circulating our commodities or in other uses.

THE quantity of every commodity which human industry can either purchase or produce, naturally regulates itself in every country according to the effectual demand, or according to the demand of those who are willing to pay the whole rent, labour, and profits which must be paid in order to prepare and bring it to market. But no commodities regulate themselves more easily or more exactly according to this effectual demand than gold and silver; because on account of the small bulk and great value of those metals, no commodities can be more easily transported from one place to another, from the places where they are cheap, to those where they are dear, from the

BOOK IV. places where they exceed, to those where they fall short of this effectual demand. If there was in England, for example, an effectual demand for an additional quantity of gold, a packet-boat could bring from Lisbon, or from wherever else it was to be had, fifty tuns of gold, which could be coined into more than five millions of guineas. But if there was an effectual demand for grain to the same value, to import it would require, at five guineas a tun, a million of tuns of shipping, or a thousand ships of a thousand tuns each. The navy of England would not be sufficient.

WHEN the quantity of gold and filver imported into any country exceeds the effectual demand, no vigilance of government can prevent their exportation. All the fanguinary laws of Spain and Portugal are not able to keep their gold and filver at home. The continual importations from Peru and Brazil exceed the effectual demand of those countries, and fink the price of those metals there below that in the neighbouring countries. If, on the contrary, in any particular country their quantity fell short of the effectual demand, fo as to raise their price above that in the neighbouring countries, the government would have no occasion to take any pains to import them. If it was even to take pains to prevent their importation, it would not be able to effectuate it. metals, when the Spartans had got wherewithal to purchase them, broke through all the barriers which the laws of Lycurgus opposed to their entrance into Lacedemon. All the fanguinary laws of the customs, are not able to prevent the importation of the teas of the Dutch and Gottenburg East India companies; because fomewhat cheaper than those of the British company. A pound of tea, however, is about a hundred times the bulk of one of the highest prices, sixteen shillings, that is commonly paid for it in filver, and more than two thousand times the bulk of the fame

fame price in gold, and consequently just so many times more difficult to smuggle.

IT is partly owing to the easy transportation of gold and filver from the places where they abound to those where they are wanted, that the price of those metals does not fluctuate continually like that of the greater part of other commodities, which are hindered by their bulk from shifting their situation, when the market happens to be either over or understocked with them. The price of those metals, indeed, is not altogether exempted from variation, but the changes to which it is liable are generally flow, gradual, and uniform. In Europe, for example, it is supposed, without much foundation perhaps, that, during the course of the present and preceeding century, they have been constantly but gradually finking in their value, on account of the continual importations from the Spanish West Indies. But to make any sudden change in the price of gold and filver, fo as to raise or lower at once, sensibly and remarkably, the money price of all other commodities, requires fuch a revolution in commerce as that occasioned by the discovery of America.

If notwithstanding all this, gold and silver should at any time fall short in a country which has wherewithal to purchase them, there are more expedients for supplying their place, than that of almost any other commodity. If the materials of manufacture are wanted, industry must stop. If provisions are wanted, the people must starve. But if money is wanted, barter will supply its place, though with a good deal of inconveniency. Buying and selling upon credit, and the different dealers compensating their credits with one another, once a month or once a year, will supply it with less inconveniency. A well regulated paper money will supply it, not only without any inconveniency, but with very great

BOOK great advantages. Upon every account, therefore, the attention of government never was fo unnecessarily employed, as when directed to watch over the preservation or increase of the quantity of money in any country.

> No complaint, however, is more common than that of a scarcity of money. Money, like wine, must always be scarce with those who have neither wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it. Those who have either, will seldom be in want either of the money, or of the wine which they have occasion for. This complaint, however, of the scarcity of money, is not always confined to 1mprovident spendthrifts. It is sometimes general through a whole mercantile town, and the country in its neighbourhood. Overtrading is the common cause of it. Sober men, whose projects have been disproportioned to their capitals, are as likely to have neither wherewithal to buy money, nor credit to borrow it, as prodigals whose expence has been disproportioned to their revenue. Before their projects can be brought to bear, their stock is gone, and their credit with it. They run about everywhere to borrow money, and every body tells them that they have none to lend. Even fuch general complaints of the scarcity of money do not always prove that the usual number of gold and silver pieces are not circulating in the country, but that many people want those pieces who have nothing to give for them. When the profits of trade happen to be greater than ordinary, overtrading becomes a general error both among great and fmall dealers. They do not always fend more money abroad than usual, but they buy upon credit both at home and abroad, an unufual quantity of goods, which they fend to fome distant market, in hopes that the returns will come in before the demand for payment. The demand comes before the returns, and they have nothing at hand, with which they can either purchase money, or give solid security for borrowing. It is not any scarcity

fearcity of gold and filver, but the difficulty which fuch people find CHAP. in borrowing, and which their creditors find in getting payment, that occasions the general complaint of the scarcity of money.

IT would be too ridiculous to go about feriously to prove, that wealth does not consist in money, or in gold and silver; but in what money purchases, and is valuable only for purchasing. Money, no doubt, makes always a part of the national capital; but it has already been shown that it generally makes but a small part, and always the most unprofitable part of it.

IT is not because wealth consists more essentially in money than in goods, that the merchant finds it generally more easy to buy goods with money, than to buy money with goods; but because money is the known and established instrument of commerce, for which every thing is readily given in exchange, but which is not always with equal readiness to be got in exchange for every thing. The greater part of goods besides are more perishable than money, and he may frequently fustain a much greater loss by keeping them When his goods are upon hand too, he is more liable to fuch demands for money as he may not be able to answer, than when he has got their price in his coffers. Over and above all this. his profit arises more directly from felling than from buying, and he is upon all these accounts generally much more anxious to exchange his goods for money, than his money for goods. But though a particular merchant, with abundance of goods in his warehouse, may sometimes be ruined by not being able to fell them in time, a nation or country is not liable to the same accident. The whole capital of a merchant frequently confifts in perishable goods destined for purchasing money. But it is but a very fmall part of the annual produce of the land and labour of a country which can ever be destined for purchasing gold and filver from

The far greater part is circulated and BOOK from their neighbours. confumed among themselves; and even of the surplus which is fent abroad, the greater part is generally destined for the purchase of other foreign goods. Though gold and filver, therefore, could not be had in exchange for the goods destined to purchase them, the nation would not be ruined. It might, indeed, fuffer fome lofs and inconveniency, and be forced upon fome of those expedients which are necessary for supplying the place of money. The annual produce of its land and labour, however, would be the fame, or very nearly the fame, as usual, because the same, or very nearly the fame confumable capital would be employed in maintaining it. And though goods do not always draw money fo readily as money draws goods, in the long-run they draw it more necessarily than even it draws them. Goods can serve many other purposes besides purchasing money, but money can serve no other purpose besides purchasing goods. Money, therefore, necessarily runs after goods, but goods do not always or necessarily run after money. The man who buys, does not always mean to fell again, but frequently to use or to consume; whereas he who sells, always means to buy again. The one may frequently have done the whole, but the other can never have done more than the one-half of his business. It is not for its own sake that men desire money, but for the fake of what they can purchase with it.

Consumable commodities, it is faid, are foon destroyed; whereas gold and silver are of a more durable nature, and, were it not for this continual exportation, might be accumulated for ages together, to the incredible augmentation of the real wealth of the country. Nothing, therefore, it is pretended, can be more disadvantageous to any country, than the trade which consists in the exchange of such lasting for such perist able commodities. We do not, however, reckon that trade disadvantageous which consists

in the exchange of the hardware of England for the wines of CHAP. France; and yet hardware is a very durable commodity, and was it not for this continual exportation, might too be accumulated for ages together, to the incredible augmentation of the pots and pans of the country. But it readily occurs that the number of fuch utenfils is in every country necessarily limited by the use which there is for them; that it would be abfurd to have more pots and pans than were necessary for cooking the victuals usually confumed there; and that if the quantity of victuals were to increase, the number of pots and pans would readily increase along with it, a part of the increased quantity of victuals being employed in purchasing them, or in maintaining an additional number of workmen whose business it was to make them. It should as readily occur that the quantity of gold and filver is in every country limited by the use which there is for those metals; that their use consists in circulating commodities as coin, and in affording a species of houshold furniture as plate; that the quantity of coin in every country is regulated by the value of the commodities which are to be circulated by it: increase that value, and immediately a part of it will be fent abroad to purchase, wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of coin requifite for circulating them: that the quantity of plate is regulated by the number and wealth of those private families who chuse to indulge themselves in that fort of magnificence: increase the number and wealth of such families, and a part of this increased wealth will most probably be employed in purchasing, wherever it is to be found, an additional quantity of plate: that to attempt to increase the wealth of any country, either by introducing or by detaining in it an unnecessary quantity of gold and filver, is as absurd as it would be to attempt to increase the good cheer of private families, by obliging them to keep an unnecessary number of kitchen utensils. As the expence of purchasing those unnecessary utensils would diminish instead

BOOK instead of increasing either the quantity or goodness of the family provisions; fo the expence of purchasing an unnecessary quantity of gold and filver must, in every country, as necessarily diminish the wealth which feeds, cloaths and lodges, which maintains and employs the people. Gold and filver, whether in the shape of coin or of plate, are utenfils, it must be remembered, as much as the furniture of the kitchen. Increase the use for them, increase the confumable commodities which are to be circulated, managed and prepared by means of them, and you will infallibly increase the quantity; but if you attempt, by extraordinary means, to increace the quantity, you will as infallibly diminish the use and even the quantity too, which in those metals can never be greater than what the use requires. Were they ever to be accumulated beyond this quantity, their transportation is so easy, and the loss which attends their lying idle and unemployed fo great, that no law could prevent their being immediately fent out of the country.

> IT is not always necessary to accumulate gold and filver, in order to enable a country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies in distant countries. Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and filver, but with confumable goods. The nation which, from the annual produce of its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, labour and confumable stock, has wherewithal to purchase those consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign wars there.

> A NATION may purchase the pay and provisions of an army in a distant country three different ways; by sending abroad either, first, some part of its accumulated gold and filver; or, secondly, some part of the annual produce of its manufactures; or last of all, fome part of its annual rude produce.

THE gold and filver which can properly be confidered as accumulated or stored up in any country, may be distinguished into three parts; first, the circulating money; secondly, the plate of private families; and last of all, the money which may have been collected by many years parfimony, and laid up in the treasury of the prince.

IT can feldom happen that much can be spared from the circulating money of the country; because in that there can feldom be much redundancy. The value of goods annually bought and fold in any country requires a certain quantity of money to circulate and distribute them to their proper consumers, and can give employment to no more. The channel of circulation necessarily draws to itself a sum sufficient to fill it, and never admits any more. Something, however, is generally withdrawn from this channel in the case of foreign war. By the great number of people who are maintained abroad, fewer are maintained at home. Fewer goods are circulated there, and less money becomes necessary to circulate them. An extraordinary quantity of paper money, of fome fort or other too, fuch as exchequer notes, navy bills, and bank bills in England, is generally issued upon such occasions, and by fupplying the place of circulating gold and filver, gives an opportunity of fending a greater quantity of it abroad. All this, however, could afford but a poor resource for maintaining a foreign war, of great expence and feveral years duration.

THE melting down the plate of private families, has upon every occasion been found a still more infignificant one. The French. in the beginning of the last war, did not derive so much advantage from this expedient as to compensate the loss of the fashion.

THE accumulated treasures of the prince have, in former times, afforded a much greater and more lasting resource. In the present times, if you except the king of Prussia, to accumulate treasure feems to be no part of the policy of European princes.

THE

BOOK IV.

THE funds which maintained the foreign wars of the present century, the most expensive perhaps which history records, feem to have had little dependency upon the exportation either of the circulating money, or of the plate of private families, or of the treasure of the prince. The last French war cost Great Britain upwards of ninety millions, including not only the feventy-five millions of new debt that was contracted, but the additional two fhillings in the pound land tax, and what was annually borrowed of the finking fund. More than two-thirds of this expence was laid out in distant countries; in Germany, Portugal, America, in the ports of the Mediterranean, in the East and West Indies. The kings of England had no accumulated treasure. We never heard of any extraordinary quantity of plate being melted down. The circulating gold and filver of the country had not been supposed to exceed eighteen millions. Since the late recoinage of the gold, however, it is believed to have been a good deal under-rated. Let us suppose, therefore, according to the exaggerated computation of Mr. Horsely, that, gold and filver together, it amounted to thirty millions. Had the war been carried on, by means of our money, the whole of it must, even according to this computation, have been fent out and returned again at least twice, in a period of between fix and feven years. Should this be supposed, it would afford the most decisive argument to demonstrate how unnecessary it is for government to watch over the prefervation of money, fince upon this supposition the whole money of the country must have gone from it and returned to it again, two different times in fo fhort a period, without any body's knowing any thing of the matter. The channel of circulation, however, never appeared more empty than usual during any part of this period. Few people wanted money who had wherewithal to pay for it. The profits of foreign trade, indeed, were greater than usual during the whole war; but especially towards the end of it. This occasioned, what it always cccasions, a general overtrading in all the ports of Great Britain; and this again occasioned the usual complaint of the **fcarcity** fcarcity of money, which always follows overtrading. Many CHAP. people wanted it, who had neither wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it; and because the debtors found it difficult to borrow, the creditors found it difficult to get payment. Gold and filver, however, were generally to be had for their value, by those who had that value to give for them.

THE enormous expence of the late war, therefore, must have been chiefly defrayed, not by the exportation of gold and filver, but by that of British commodities of some kind or other. When the government, or those who acted under them, contracted with a merchant for a remittance to some foreign country, he would naturally endeavour to pay his foreign correspondent, upon whom he had granted a bill, by fending abroad rather commodities than gold and filver. If the commodities of Great Britain were not in demand in that country, he would endeavour to fend them to some other country, in which he could purchase a bill upon that country. The transportation of commodities, when properly fuited to the market, is always attended with a confiderable profit; whereas that of gold and filver is fcarce ever attended with any. When those metals are fent abroad in order to purchase foreign commodities, the merchant's profit arises, not from the purchase, but from the sale of the returns. But when they are fent abroad merely to pay a debt, he gets no returns, and confequently no profit. He naturally, therefore, exerts his invention to find out a way of paying his foreign debts, rather by the exportation of commodities than by that of gold and filver. The great quantity of British goods exported during the course of the late war, without bringing back any returns, is accordingly remarked by the author of The Present State of the Nation.

Besides the three forts of gold and filver above mentioned, there is in all great commercial countries a good deal of bullion alternately

BOOK nately imported and exported for the purposes of foreign trade. This bullion, as it circulates among different commercial countries in the fame manner as the national coin circulates in every particular country, may be considered as the money of the great mercantile republick. The national coin receives its movement and direction from the commodities circulated within the precincts of each particular country: the money of the mercantile republick, from those circulated between different countries. Both are employed in facilitating exchanges, the one between different individuals of the fame, the other between those of different nations. Part of this money of the great mercantile republick may have been, and probably was, employed in carrying on the late In time of a general war, it is natural to suppose that a movement and direction should be impressed upon it, different from what it usually follows in profound peace; that it should circulate more about the feat of the war, and be more employed in purchasing there, and in the neighbouring countries, the pay and provisions of the different armies. But whatever part of this money of the mercantile republick, Great Britain may have annually employed in this manner, it must have been annually purchased, either with British commodities, or with something else that had been purchased with them; which still brings us back to commodities, to the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, as the ultimate resources which enabled us to carry on the war. It is natural indeed to suppose, that so great an annual expence must have been defrayed from a great annual produce. The expence of 1761, for example, amounted to more than nineteen millions. accumulation could have supported so great an annual profusion. There is no annual produce even of gold and filver which could have supported it. The whole gold and filver annually imported into both Spain and Portugal, according to the best accounts, does not commonly much exceed fix millions sterling, which.

which, in some years, would scarce have paid sour months expense of the late war.

THE commodities most proper for being transported to distant countries, in order to purchase there, either the pay and provisions of an army, or some part of the money of the mercantile republick to be employed in purchasing them, seem to be the finer and more improved manufactures; fuch as contain a great value in a small bulk, and can, therefore, be exported to a great distance at little expence. A country whose industry produces a great annual furplus of fuch manufactures, which are usually exported to foreign countries, may carry on for many years a very expensive foreign war, without either exporting any confiderable quantity of gold and filver, or even having any fuch quantity to export. A considerable part of the annual furplus of its manufactures must, indeed, in this case be exported, without bringing back any returns. Some part of it, however, may still continue to bring back a return. The manufacturers, during the war, will have a double demand upon them, and be called upon, first, to work up goods to be fent abroad, for paying the bills drawn upon foreign countries for the pay and provisions of the army; and, secondly, to work up fuch as are necessary for purchasing the common returns that had usually been consumed in the country. In the midst of the most destructive foreign war, therefore, the greater part of manufactures may frequently flourish greatly; and, on the contrary, they may decline on the return of the peace. They may flourish amidst the ruin of their country, and begin to decay upon the return of its The different state of many different branches of the British manufactures during the late war, and for some time after the peace, may ferve as an illustration of what has been just now faid.

BOOK IV.

No foreign war of great expence or duration could conveniently be carried on by the exportation of the rude produce of the foil. The expence of fending fuch a quantity of it to a foreign country as might purchase the pay and provisions of an army, would be too great. Few countries too produce much more rude produce than what is sufficient for the sublistence of their own inhabitants. fend abroad any great quantity of it therefore, would be to fend abroad a part of the necessary subsistence of the people. It is otherwise with the exportation of manufactures. The maintenance of the people employed in them is kept at home, and only the furplus part of their work is exported. Mr. Hume frequently takes notice of the inability of the antient kings of England to carry on, without interruption, any foreign war of long duration. English, in those days, had nothing wherewithal to purchase the pay and provisions of their armies in foreign countries, but either the rude produce of the foil, of which no confiderable part could be spared from the home consumption, or a few manufactures of the coarfest kind, of which, as well as of the rude produce, the transportation was too expensive. This inability did not arise from the want of money, but of the finer and more improved manufactures. Buying and felling was transacted by means of money in England then, as well as now. The quantity of circulating money must have borne the same proportion to the number and value of purchases and sales usually transacted at that time, which it does to those transacted at present; or rather it must have borne a greater proportion, because there was then no paper, which now occupies a great part of the employment of gold and filver. Among nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known, the fovereign, upon extraordinary occasions, can feldom draw any confiderable aid from his fubjects, for reasons which shall be explained hereafter. It is in fuch countries, therefore, that he generally endeavours to accumulate a treasure, as the only resource against such emergencies. Independant of this necessity, he is in fuch

fuch a fituation naturally disposed to the parsimony requisite for CHAP. accumulation. In that simple state, the expence even of a sovereign is not directed by the vanity which delights in the gaudy finery of a court, but is employed in bounty to his tenants, and hofpitality to his retainers. But bounty and hospitality very feldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almost always does. Every Tartar chief, accordingly, has a treasure. The treasures of Mazepa, chief of the Cossacks in the Ukraine, the famous ally of Charles the XIIth, are faid to have been very great. The French kings of the Merovingian race had all treasures. When they divided their kingdom among their different children, they divided their treasure too. The Saxon princes, and the first kings after the conquest, seem likewise to have accumulated treasures. The first exploit of every new reign was commonly to seize the treasure of the preceeding king, as the most essential measure for fecuring the fuccession. The sovereigns of improved and commercial countries are not under the same necessity of accumulating treasures, because they can generally draw from their subjects extraordinary aids upon extraordinary occasions. They are likewise less disposed to do so. They naturally, perhaps necessarily, follow the mode of the times, and their expence comes to be regulated by the same extravagant vanity which directs that of all the other great proprietors in their dominions. The infignificant pageantry of their court becomes every day more brilliant, and the expence of it not only prevents accumulation, but frequently encroaches upon the funds destined for more necessary expences. What Dercyllidas said of the court of Persia, may be applied to that of several European princes, that he saw there much splendor but little strength, and many servants but few foldiers.

THE importation of gold and filver is not the principal, much less the fole benefit which a nation derives from its foreign trade. Between

BOOK Between whatever places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two distinct benefits from it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for it fomething else for which there is a demand. It gives a value to their fuperfluities, by exchanging them for fomething elfe, which may fatisfy a part of their wants, and increase their enjoyments. means of it, the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection. By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their labour may exceed the home confumption, it encourages them to improve its productive powers, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby increase the real revenue and wealth of the fociety. These great and important services foreign trade is continually occupied in performing, to all the different countries between which it is carried on. They all derive great benefit from it, though that in which the merchant resides generally derives the greatest, as he is generally more employed in supplying the wants, and carrying out the superfluities of his own, than of any other particular country. To import the gold and filver which may be wanted, into the countries which have no mines, is, no doubt, a part of the business of foreign commerce. It is, however, a most infignificant part of it. A country which carried on foreign trade merely upon this account, could scarce have occasion to freight a ship in a century.

> IT is not by the importation of gold and filver, that the difcovery of America has enriched Europe. By the abundance of the American mines, those metals have become cheaper. A service of plate can now be purchased for about a third part of the corn, or a third part of the labour, which it would have cost in the fifteenth

fifteenth century. With the same annual expence of labour and CHAP. commodities, Europe can annually purchase about three times the quantity of plate which it could have purchased at that time. But when a commodity comes to be fold for a third part of what had been its usual price, not only those who purchased it before can purchase three times their former quantity, but it is brought down to the level of a much greater number of purchafers; perhaps to more than ten, perhaps to more than twenty times the former number. So that there may be in Europe at present, not only more than three times, but more than twenty or thirty times the quantity of plate which would have been in it, even in its present state of improvement, had the discovery of the American mines never been made. So far Europe has, no doubt, gained a real conveniency, though furely a very trifling one. cheapness of gold and filver renders those metals rather less fit for the purposes of money than they were before. In order to make the same purchases, we must load ourselves with a greater quantity of them, and carry about a shilling in our pocket where a groat would have done before. It is difficult to fay which is most trifling, this inconveniency, or the opposite conveniency. Neither the one nor the other could have made any very effential change in the state of Europe. The discovery of America, however, certainly made a most essential one. By opening a new and inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe, it gave occasion to new divisions of labour and improvements of art, which, in the narrow circle of the antient commerce, could never have taken place for want of a market to take off the greater part of their produce. The productive powers of labour were improved, and its produce increased in all the different countries of Europe, and together with it the real revenue and wealth of the inhabitants. The commodities of Europe were almost all new to America, and many of those of America were new to Europe.

A new

BOOK A new fett of exchanges, therefore, began to take place which had never been thought of before, and which should naturally have proved as advantageous to the new, as it certainly did to the old continent. The favage injustice of the Europeans rendered an event, which ought to have been beneficial to all, ruinous and destructive to several of those unfortunate countries.

> THE discovery of a passage to the East Indies, by the Cape of Good Hope, which happened much about the fame time, opened, perhaps, a still more extensive range to foreign commerce than even that of America, notwithstanding the greater distance. There were but two nations in America, in any respect superior to savages, and these were destroyed almost as soon as discovered. rest were mere favages. But the empires of China, Indostan, Japan. as well as feveral others in the East Indies, without having richer mines of gold or filver, were in every other respect much richer. better cultivated, and more advanced in all arts and manufactures than either Mexico or Peru, even though we should credit, what plainly deserves no credit, the exaggerated accounts of the Spanish writers, concerning the antient state of those empires. But rich and civilized nations can always exchange to a much greater value with one another, than with favages and barbarians. Europe, however, has hitherto derived much less advantage from its commerce with the East Indies, than from that with America. Portuguese monopolised the East India trade to themselves for about a century, and it was only indirectly and through them, that the other nations of Europe could either fend out or receive any goods from that country. When the Dutch, in the beginning of the last century, began to encroach upon them, they vested their whole East India commerce in an exclusive company. The English, French, Swedes, and Danes, have all followed their example, fo that no great nation in Europe has ever yet had the benefit of a free

free commerce to the East Indies. No other reason need be assigned CHAP. why it has never been fo advantageous as the trade to America, which, between almost every nation of Europe and its own colonies, is free to all its subjects. The exclusive privileges of those East India companies, their great riches, the great favour and protection which these have procured them from their respective governments, have excited much envy against them. This envy has frequently represented their trade as altogether pernicious, on account of the great quantities of filver, which it every year exports from the countries from which it is carried on. The parties concerned have replied, that their trade, by this continual exportation of filver, might, indeed, tend to impoverish Europe in general, but not the particular country from which it was carried on; because, by the exportation of a part of the returns to other European countries, it annually brought home a much greater quantity of that metal than it carried out. Both the objection and the reply are founded in the popular notion which I have been just now examining. It is, therefore, unnecessary to say any thing further about either. By the annual exportation of filver to the East Indies, plate is probably fomewhat dearer in Europe than it otherwife might have been; and coined filver probably purchases a larger quantity both of labour and commodities. The former of these two effects is a very small loss, the latter a very small advantage; both too infignificant to deferve any part of the publick attention. The trade to the East Indies, by opening a market to the commodities of Europe, or, what comes nearly to the same thing, to the gold and filver which is purchased with those commodities, must necessarily tend to increase the annual production of European commodities, and consequently the real wealth and revenue of Europe. That it has hitherto increased them so little, is probably owing to the restraints which it every where labours under.

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BOOK IV.

I THOUGHT it necessary, though at the hazard of being tedious, to examine at full length this popular notion that wealth confifts in money, or in gold and filver. Money in common language, as I have already observed, frequently signifies wealth; and this ambiguity of expression has rendered this popular notion so familiar to us, that even they, who are convinced of its abfurdity, are very apt to forget their own principles, and in the course of their reasonings to take it for granted as a certain and undeniable truth. Some of the best English writers upon commerce set out with observing, that the wealth of a country consists, not in its gold and filver only, but in its lands, houses, and consumable goods of all different kinds. In the course of their reasonings, however, the lands, houses, and consumable goods feem to slip out of their memory, and the strain of their argument frequently supposes that all wealth consists in gold and silver, and that to multiply those metals is the great object of national industry and commerce.

THE two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in gold and silver, and that those metals could be brought into a country which had no mines only by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater value than it imported; it necessarily became the great object of political economy to diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods for home-consumption, and to increase as much as possible the exportation of the produce of domestick industry. Its two great engines for enriching the country, therefore, were restraints upon importation, and encouragements to exportation.

THE restraints upon importation were of two kinds.

FIRST, restraints upon the importation of such foreign goods for home-consumption as could be produced at home, from whatever country they were imported.

SECONDLY,

SECONDLY, restraints upon the importation of goods of almost CHAP. all kinds from those particular countries with which the balance of trade was supposed to be disadvantageous.

THOSE different restraints consisted sometimes in high duties, and sometimes in absolute prohibitions.

EXPORTATION was encouraged fometimes by drawbacks, sometimes by bounties, sometimes by advantageous treaties of commerce with foreign states, and sometimes by the establishment of colonies in distant countries.

DRAWBACKS were given upon two different occasions. When the home-manufactures were subject to any duty or excise, either the whole or a part of it was frequently drawn back upon their exportation; and when foreign goods liable to a duty were imported, in order to be exported again, either the whole or a part of this duty was sometimes given back upon such exportation.

BOUNTIES were given for the encouragement either of some beginning manufactures, or of such sorts of industry of other kinds as were supposed to deserve particular favour.

By advantageous treaties of commerce, particular privileges were procured in some foreign state for the goods and merchants of the country, beyond what were granted to those of other countries.

By the establishment of colonies in distant countries, not only particular privileges, but a monopoly was frequently procured

BOOK for the goods and merchants of the country which established them.

THE two forts of restraints upon importation above mentioned, together with these four encouragements to exportation, constitute the six principal means by which the commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and silver in any country by turning the balance of trade in its savour. I shall consider each of them in a particular chapter, and without taking much further notice of their supposed tendency to bring money into the country, I shall examine chiefly what are likely to be the effects of each of them upon the annual produce of its industry. According as they tend either to increase or diminish the value of this annual produce, they must evidently tend either to increase or diminish the real wealth and revenue of the country.

CHAP. II.

Of Restraints upon the Importation of Such Goods from Foreign Countries as can be produced at Home.

BY restraining either by high duties or by absolute prohibitions CHAP. II. be produced at home, the monopoly of the home-market is more or less secured to the domestick industry employed in producing Thus the prohibition of importing either live cattle or falt provisions from foreign countries secures to the graziers of Great Britain the monopoly of the home-market for butchersmeat. The high duties upon the importation of corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, give a like advantage to the growers of that commodity. The prohibition of the importation of foreign woollens is equally favourable to the woollen manufacturers. The filk manufacture, though altogether employed upon foreign materials, has lately obtained the fame advantage. The linen manufacture has not yet obtained it, but is making great strides towards it. Many other forts of manufacturers have, in the same manner, obtained in Great Britain. either altogether, or very nearly a monopoly against their countrymen.

THAT this monopoly of the home-market frequently gives great encouragement to that particular species of industry which enjoys it, and frequently turns towards that employment a greater share of both the labour and stock of the society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be doubted. But whether it tends either

BOOK to increase the general industry of the society, or to give it the most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, altogether so certain.

The general industry of the society never can exceed what the capital of the society can employ. As the number of workmen that can be kept in employment by any particular person must bear a certain proportion to his capital, so the number of those that can be continually employed by all the members of a great society must bear a certain proportion to the whole capital of that society, and never can exceed that proportion. No regulation of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society beyond what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction into which it might not otherwise have gone; and it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society than that into which it would have gone of its own accord.

Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the so-ciety, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.

FIRST, every individual endeavours to employ his capital as near home as he can, and confequently as much as he can in the support of domestick industry; provided always that he can thereby obtain the ordinary, or not a great deal less than the ordinary profits of stock.

Thus upon equal or nearly equal profits, every wholefale merchant naturally prefers the home-trade to the foreign trade of confumption,

confumption, and the foreign trade of confumption to the carrying CHAP. trade. In the home-trade his capital is never fo long out of his fight as it frequently is in the foreign trade of consumption. can know better the character and situation of the persons whom he trusts, and if he should happen to be deceived, he knows better the laws of the country from which he must seek redress. In the carrying trade, the capital of the merchant is, as it were, divided between two foreign countries, and no part of it is ever necessarily brought home, or placed under his own immediate view and command. The capital which an Amsterdam merchant employs in carrying corn from Konnigsberg to Lisbon, and fruit and wine from Lisbon to Konnigsberg, must generally be the one-half of it at Konnigsberg and the other half at Lisbon. No part of it need ever come to Amsterdam. The natural residence of such a merchant should either be at Konnigsberg or Lisbon, and it can only be some very particular circumstances which can make him prefer the residence of Amsterdam. The uneasiness, however, which he feels at being separated so far from his capital, generally determines him to bring part both of the Konnigsberg goods which he destines for the market of Lisbon, and of the Lisbon goods which he destines for that of Konnigsberg, to Amsterdam: and though this necessarily subjects him to a double charge of loading and unloading, as well as to the payment of some duties and customs, yet for the fake of having some part of his capital always under his own view and command, he willingly fubmits to this extraordinary charge; and it is in this manner that every country which has any confiderable share of the carrying trade, becomes always the emporium or general market for the goods of all the different countries whose trade it carries on. chant, in order to fave a fecond loading and unloading, endeavours always to fell in the home-market as much of the goods of all those different countries as he can, and thus, so far as he can, to

convert

BOOK convert his carrying trade into a foreign trade of confumption. A merchant, in the fame manner, who is engaged in the foreign trade of confumption, when he collects goods for foreign markets, will always be glad, upon equal or nearly equal profits, to fell as great a part of them at home as he can. He faves himself the risk and trouble of exportation, when so far as he can, he thus converts his foreign trade of consumption into a home-trade. Home is in this manner the center, if I may fay fo, round which the capitals of the inhabitants of every country are continually circulating, and towards which they are always tending, though by particular causes they may sometimes be driven off and repelled from it towards more distant employments. But a capital employed in the home-trade, it has already been shown, necessarily puts into motion a greater quantity of domestick industry, and gives revenue and employment to a greater number of the inhabitants of the country, than an equal capital employed in the foreign trade of confumption: and one employed in the foreign trade of confumption has the same advantage over an equal capital employed in the carrying trade. Upon equal, or only nearly equal profits, therefore, every individual naturally inclines to employ his capital in the manner in which it is likely to afford the greatest support to domestick industry, and to give revenue and employment to the greatest number of the people of his own country.

> SECONDLY, every individual who employs his capital in the support of domestick industry, necessarily endeavours so to direct that industry, that its produce may be of the greatest possible value.

> THE produce of industry is what it adds to the subject or materials upon which it is employed. In proportion as the value of this produce is great or fmall, fo will likewise be the profits of the employer. But it is only for the fake of profit that any man employs

ploys a capital in the support of industry; and he will always, there- CHAP. fore, endeavour to employ it in the support of that industry of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, or to exchange for the greatest quantity either of money or of other goods.

But the annual revenue of every fociety is always precifely equal to the exchangeable value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather is precisely the same thing with that exchangeable value. As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestick industry. and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the fociety as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry he intends only his own fecurity; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the fociety more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the publick good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in diffuading them from it.

WHAT is the species of domestick industry which his capital can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his local fituation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him.

BOOK The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could fafely be trufted, not only to no fingle person, but to no council or fenate whatever, and which would no where be fo dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and prefumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.

> To give the monopoly of the home-market to the produce of domestick industry, in any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful regulation. If the produce of domestick can be brought there as cheap as that of foreign industry, the regulation is evidently useless. If it cannot, it must generally be hurtful. It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy. The taylor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not attempt to make his own cloaths, but employs a taylor. The farmer attempts to make neither the one nor the other, but employs those different artificers. All of them find it for their interest to employ their whole industry in a way in which they have some advantage over their neighbours, and to purchase with a part of its produce, or what is the fame thing, with the price of a part of it, whatever else they have occasion for.

> WHAT is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can fupply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourfelves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have fome

fome advantage. The general industry of the country, being CHAP. always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished, no more than that of the above-mentioned artificers; but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the greatest advantage. It is certainly not employed to the greatest advantage, when it is thus directed towards an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make. The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished, when it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value than the commodity which it is directed to produce. According to the supposition, that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries cheaper than it can be made at home. It could, therefore, have been purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the fame thing, with a part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry employed by an equal capital, would have produced at home, had it been left to follow its natural course. The industry of the country, therefore, is thus turned away from a more, to a less advantageous employment, and the exchangeable value of its annual produce, instead of being increased, according to the intention of the lawgiver, must necesfarily be diminished by every such regulation.

By means of fuch regulations, indeed, a particular manufacture may fometimes be acquired fooner than it could have been otherwife, and after a certain time may be made at home as cheap or cheaper than in the foreign country. But though the industry of the fociety may be thus carried with advantage into a particular channel fooner than it could have been otherwife, it will by no means follow that the sum total either of its industry or of its revenue can ever be augmented by any such regulation. The industry of the society can augment only in proportion as its capital augments, and its capital can augment only in proportion to what can be gradually saved out of its revenue. But the immediate effect of

every

BOOK every fuch regulation is to diminish its revenue, and what diminishes its revenue, is certainly not very likely to augment its capital faster than it would have augmented of its own accord, had both capital and industry been left to find out their natural employments.

> THOUGH for want of fuch regulations the fociety should never acquire the proposed manufacture, it would not, upon that account, necessarily be the poorer in any one period of its duration. In every period of its duration its whole capital and industry might still have been employed, though upon different objects, in the manner that was most advantageous at the time. In every period its revenue might have been the greatest which its capital could afford, and both capital and revenue might have been augmenting with the greatest possible rapidity.

THE natural advantages which one country has over another in producing particular commodities are fometimes fo great, that it is acknowledged by all the world to be in vain to ftruggle with them, By means of glaffes, hotbeds, and hotwalls, very good grapes can be raifed in Scotland, and very good wine too can be made of them at about thirty times the expence for which at least equally good can be brought from foreign countries. Would it be a reasonable law to prohibit the importation of all foreign wines, merely to encourage the making of claret and burgundy in Scotland? But if there would be a manifest absurdity in turning towards any employment, thirty times more of the capital and industry of the country, than would be necessary to purchase from foreign countries an equal quantity of the commodities wanted, there must be an abfurdity, though not altogether fo glaring, yet exactly of the fame kind, in turning towards any fuch employment a thirtieth. or even a three hundredth part more of either. Whether the advantages which one country has over another, be natural or acquired,

quired, is in this respect of no consequence. As long as the one CHAP. country has those advantages, and the other wants them, it will always be more advantageous for the latter, rather to buy of the former than to make. It is an acquired advantage only, which one artificer has over his neighbour, who exercises another trade, and yet they both find it more advantageous to buy of one another, than to make what does not belong to their particular trades.

MERCHANTS and manufacturers are the people who derive the greatest advantage from this monopoly of the home market. The prohibition of the importation of foreign cattle, and of falt provisions, together with the high duties upon foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, are not near so advantageous to the graziers and farmers of Great Britain, as other regulations of the same kind are to its merchants and manufacturers. Manufactures, those of the finer kind especially, are more easily transported from one country to another than corn or cattle. It is in the fetching and carrying manufactures, accordingly, that foreign trade is chiefly employed. In manufactures, a very small advantage will enable foreigners to underfell our own workmen, even in the home market. It will require a very great one to enable them to do fo in the rude produce of the foil. the free importation of foreign manufactures was permitted, feveral of the home manufactures would probably fuffer, and some of of them, perhaps, go to ruin altogether, and a confiderable part of the stock and industry at present employed in them, would be forced to find out some other employment. But the freest importation of the rude produce of the foil could have no fuch effect upon the agriculture of the country.

If the importation of foreign cattle, for example, was made ever so free, so few could be imported, that the grazing trade of Great Britain BOOK Britain could be little affected by it. Live cattle are, perhaps, the only commodity of which the transportation is more expensive by fea than by land. By land they carry themselves to market. fea, not only the cattle, but their food and their water too must be carried at no fmall expence and inconveniency. The fhort fea between Ireland and Great Britain, indeed, renders the importation of Irish cattle more easy. But though the free importation of them, which was lately permitted only for a limited time, were rendered perpetual, it could have no confiderable effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great Britain. Those parts of Great Britain which border upon the Irish sea are all grazing countries. Irish cattle could never be imported for their use, but must be drove through those very extensive countries, at no small expence and inconveniency, before they could arrive at their proper market. cattle could not be drove fo far. Lean cattle, therefore, only could be imported, and fuch importation could interfere, not with the interest of the feeding or fattening countries, to which by reducing the price of lean cattle, it would rather be advantageous, but with that of the breeding countries only. The fmall number of Irish cattle imported since their importation was permitted, together with the good price at which lean cattle still continue to fell, feem to demonstrate that even the breeding countries of Great Britain are never likely to be much affected by the free importation of Irish cattle. The common people of Ireland, indeed, are faid to have fometimes opposed with violence the exportation of their cattle. But if the exporters had found any great advantage in continuing the trade, they could eafily, when the law was on their

FEEDING and fattening countries, besides, must always be highly improved, whereas breeding countries are generally uncultivated. The high price of lean cattle, by augmenting the value

side, have conquered this mobbish opposition.

of uncultivated land, is like a bounty against improvement. To CHAP. any country which was highly improved throughout, it would be more advantageous to import its lean cattle than to breed them. The province of Holland, accordingly, is said to follow this maxim at present. The mountains of Scotland, Wales, and Northumberland, indeed, are countries not capable of much improvement, and seem destined by nature to be the breeding countries of Great Britain. The freest importation of foreign cattle could have no other effect than to hinder those breeding countries from taking advantage of the increasing population and improvement of the rest of the kingdom, from raising their price to an exorbitant height, and from laying a real tax upon all the more improved and cultivated parts of the country.

The freest importation of salt provisions, in the same manner, could have as little effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great Britain as that of live cattle. Salt provisions are not only a very bulky commodity, but when compared with fresh meat, they are a commodity both of worse quality, and as they cost more labour and expence, of higher price. They could never, therefore, come into competition with the fresh meat, though they might with the salt provisions of the country. They might be used for victualling ships for distant voyages, and such like uses, but could never make any considerable part of the food of the people. The small quantity of salt provisions imported from Ireland since their importation was rendered free, is an experimental proof that our graziers have nothing to apprehend from it. It does not appear that the price of butcher's-meat has ever been sensibly affected by it.

EVEN the free importation of foreign corn could very little affect the interest of the farmers of Great Britain. Corn is a much more bulky commodity than butcher's-meat. A pound of wheat

BOOK IV.

wheat at a penny is as dear as a pound of butcher's-meat at fourpence. The small quantity of foreign corn imported even in times of the greatest scarcity, may satisfy our farmers that they can have nothing to fear from the freest importation. The average quantity imported, one year with another, amounts only, according to the very well informed author of the tracts upon the corn trade, to twenty-three thousand feven hundred and twenty-eight quarters of all forts of grain, and does not exceed the five hundredth and feventy-one part of the annual confumption. But as the bounty upon corn occasions a greater exportation in years of plenty. fo it must of consequence occasion a greater importation in years of scarcity, than would otherwise take place. By means of it, the plenty of one year does not compensate the scarcity of another, and as the average quantity exported is necessarily augmented by it, so must likewise, in the actual state of tillage, the average quantity imported. If there was no bounty, as less corn would be exported, fo it is probable that one year with another, less would be imported than at present. The corn merchants, the fetchers and carriers of corn, between Great Britain and foreign countries, would have much less employment, and might suffer confiderably; but the country gentlemen and farmers could fuffer very little. It is in the corn merchants accordingly, rather than in the country gentlemen and farmers, that I have observed the greatest anxiety for the renewal and continuation of the bounty.

Country gentlemen and farmers are, to their great honour, of all people, the least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly. The undertaker of a great manufactory is sometimes alarmed if another work of the same kind is established within twenty miles of him. The Dutch undertaker of the woollen manufacture at Abbeville, stipulated that no work of the same kind should be established within thirty leagues of that city. Farmers and country gentlemen

gentlemen, on the contrary, are generally disposed rather to promote CHAP. than to obstruct the cultivation and improvement of their neighbours farms and estates. They have no secrets, such as those of the greater part of manufacturers, but are generally rather fond of communicating to their neighbours, and of extending as far as possible any new practice which they have found to be advantageous. Pius Questus, says old Cato, stabilissimusque, minimeque invidiosus; minimeque male cogitantes sunt, qui in eo stadio occupati funt. Country gentleman and farmers, dispersed in different parts of the country, cannot fo eafily combine as merchants and manufacturers, who being collected into towns, and accustomed to that exclusive corporation spirit which prevails in them, naturally endeavour to obtain against all their countrymen, the fame exclusive privilege which they generally possess against the inhabitants of their respective towns. They accordingly seem to have been the original inventors of those restraints upon the importation of foreign goods, which fecure to them the monopoly of the home market. It was probably in imitation of them, and to put themselves upon a level with those, who, they found were disposed to oppress them, that the country gentlemen and farmers of Great Britain fo far forgot the generofity which is natural to their station, as to demand the exclusive privilege of fupplying their countrymen with corn and butcher's-meat. They did not perhaps take time to consider, how much less their interest could be affected by the freedom of trade, than that of the people whose example they followed.

To prohibit by a perpetual law the importation of foreign corn and cattle, is in reality to enact, that the population and industry of the country shall at no time exceed what the rude produce of its own foil can maintain.

THERE

BOOK IV.

THERE seem, however, to be two cases in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of domestick industry.

THE first is when some particular fort of industry is necessary for the desence of the country. The desence of Great Britain, for example, depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The act of navigation, therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in some cases, by absolute prohibitions, and in others by heavy burdens upon the shipping of foreign countries. The following are the principal dispositions of this act:

FIRST, all ships, of which the owners, masters, and three-fourths of the mariners are not British subjects, are prohibited, upon pain of forfeiting ship and cargo, from trading to the British settlements and plantations, or from being employed in the coasting trade of Great Britain.

SECONDLY, a great variety of the most bulky articles of importation can be brought into Great Britain only, either in such ships as are above described, or in ships of the country where those goods are produced, and of which the owners, masters, and three-fourths of the mariners are of that particular country; and when imported even in ships of this latter kind, they are subject to double aliens duty. If imported in ships of any other country, the penalty is forfeiture of ship and cargo. When this act was made, the Dutch were, what they still are, the great carriers of Europe, and by this regulation they were entirely excluded from being the carriers to Great Britain, or from importing to us the goods of any other European country.

THIRDLY,

THIRDLY, a great variety of the most bulky articles of im- CHAP. portation are prohibited from being imported, even in British ships, from any country but that in which they are produced; under pain of forfeiting ship and cargo. This regulation too was probably intended against the Dutch. Holland was then, as now, the great emporium for all European goods, and by this regulation, British ships were hindered from loading in Holland the goods of any other European country.

FOURTHLY, falt fish of all kinds, whale-fins, whale-bone, oil and blubber, not caught by and cured on board British vessels, when imported into Great Britain, are subjected to double aliens duty. The Dutch, as they are still the principal, were then the only fishers in Europe that attempted to supply foreign nations with fish. this regulation, a very heavy burden was laid upon their supplying Great Britain.

WHEN the act of navigation was made, though England and Holland were not actually at war, the most violent animosity fubfisted between the two nations. It had begun during the government of the long parliament which first framed this act. and it broke out foon after in the Dutch wars during that of the Protector and of Charles the IId. It is not impossible, therefore, that some of the regulations of this famous act may have proceeded from national animofity. They are as wife, however, as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom. National animosity at that particular time aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate wisdom would have recommended, the diminution of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the fecurity of England.

THE act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce. or to the growth of that opulence which can arise from it. interest

BOOK interest of a nation in its commercial relations to foreign nations is, like that of a merchant with regard to the different people with whom he deals, to buy as cheap and to fell as dear as possible. But it will be most likely to buy cheap, when by the most perfect freedom of trade it encourages all nations to bring to it the goods which it has occasion to purchase; and, for the same reason, it will be most likely to sell dear, when its markets are thus filled with the greatest number of buyers. The act of navigation, it is true, lays no burden upon foreign ships that come to export the produce of British industry. Even the antient aliens duty, which used to be paid upon all goods exported as well as imported, has, by feveral subsequent acts, been taken off from the greater part of the articles of exportation. But if foreigners, either by prohibitions or high duties, are hindered from coming to fell, they cannot always afford to come to buy; because coming without a cargo, they must lose the freight from their own country to Great Britain. By diminishing the number of feliers, therefore, we necessarily diminish that of buyers, and are thus likely not only to buy foreign goods dearer, but to fell our own cheaper, than if there was a more perfect freedom of trade. As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wifest of all the commercial regulations of England.

> THE second case, in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestick industry, is, when some tax is imposed at home upon the produce of the latter. In this case, it seems reasonable that an equal tax should be imposed upon the like produce of the former. would not give the monopoly of the home market to domestick industry, nor turn towards a particular employment a greater share of the stock and labour of the country, than what would naturally go to it. It would only hinder any part of what would naturally

go to it from being turned away by the tax, into a less natural CHAP. direction, and would leave the competition between foreign and domestick industry, after the tax, as nearly as possible upon the fame footing as before it. In Great Britain, when any fuch tax is laid upon the produce of domestick industry, it is usual at the fame time, in order to stop the clamorous complaints of our merchants and manufacturers, that they will be underfold at home, to lay a much heavier duty upon the importation of all foreign goods of the same kind.

This fecond limitation of the freedom of trade according to fome people should, upon some occasions, be extended much further than to the precise foreign commodities which could come into competition with those which had been taxed at home. When the necessaries of life have been taxed in any country, it becomes proper, they pretend, to tax not only the like necessaries of life imported from other countries, but all forts of foreign goods which can come into competition with any thing that is the produce of domestick industry. Subsistence, they say, becomes necessarily dearer in consequence of such taxes; and the price of labour must always rife with the price of the labourers subsistence. Every commodity, therefore, which is the produce of domestick industry, though not immediately taxed itself, becomes dearer in consequence of fuch taxes, because the labour which produces it becomes so. Such taxes, therefore, are really equivalent, they fay, to a tax upon every particular commodity produced at home. In order to put domestick upon the same footing with foreign industry, therefore, it becomes necessary, they think, to lay some duty upon every foreign commodity, equal to this enhancement of the price of the home commodities with which it can come into competition.

WHETHER

BOOK IV. WHETHER taxes upon the necessaries of life, such as those in Great Britain upon malt, beer, soap, salt, leather, candles, &c. necessarily raise the price of labour, and consequently that of all other commodities, I shall consider hereafter, when I come to treat of taxes. Supposing, however, in the mean time, that they have this effect, and they have it undoubtedly, this general enhancement of the price of all commodities, in consequence of that of labour, is a case which differs in the two following respects from that of a particular commodity, of which the price was enhanced by a particular tax immediately imposed upon it.

FIRST, it might always be known with great exactness how far the price of such a commodity could be enhanced by such a tax: but how far the general enhancement of the price of labour might affect that of every different commodity, about which labour was employed, could never be known with any tolerable exactness. It would be impossible, therefore, to proportion with any tolerable exactness the tax upon every foreign to this enhancement of the price of every home commodity.

SECONDLY, taxes upon the necessaries of life have nearly the same effect upon the circumstances of the people as a poor soil and a bad climate. Provisions are thereby rendered dearer in the same manner as if it required extraordinary labour and expence to raise them. As in the natural searcity arising from soil and climate, it would be absurd to direct the people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals and industry, so it is likewise in the artificial searcity arising from such taxes. To be left to accommodate, as well as they could, their industry to their situation, and to find out those employments in which, notwithstanding their unfavourable circumstances, they might have some advantage either in

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the home, or in the foreign market, is what in both cases, would CHAP. evidently be most for their advantage. To lay a new tax upon them, because they are already overburdened with taxes, and because they already pay too dear for the necessaries of life, to make them likewise pay too dear for the greater part of other commodities, is certainly a most absurd way of making amends.

Such taxes, when they have grown up to a certain height, are a curse equal to the barrenness of the earth and the inclemency of the heavens; and yet it is in the richest and most industrious countries that they have been most generally imposed. No other countries could support so great a disorder. As the strongest bodies only can live and enjoy health, under an unwholesome regimen; fo the nations only, that in every fort of industry have the greatest natural and acquired advantages, can subfift and prosper under such Holland is the country in Europe in which they abound most, and which from peculiar circumstances continues to prosper, not by means of them, as has been most absurdly supposed, but in spite of them.

As there are two cases in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of domestick industry; so there are two others in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation; in the one, how far it is proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods; and in the other, how far or in what manner it may be proper to restore that free importation after it has been for some time interrupted.

THE case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation how far it is proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods, is, when some foreign nation restrains by high duties or prohibitions the importation of some of our manufactures into their

BOOK their country. Revenge in this case naturally dictates retaliation, and that we should impose the like duties and prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures into ours. Nations, accordingly, feldom fail to retaliate in this manner. The French have been particularly forward to favour their own manufactures by restraining the importation of such foreign goods as could come into competition with them. In this confifted a great part of the policy of Mr. Colbert, who, notwithstanding his great abilities, feems in this case to have been imposed upon by the fophistry of merchants and manufacturers, who are always demanding a monopoly against their countrymen. It is at present the opinion of the most intelligent men in France that his operations of this kind have not been beneficial to his country. That minister by the tarif of 1667, imposed very high duties upon a great number of foreign manufactures. Upon his refufing to moderate them in favour of the Dutch, they in 1671 prohibited the importation of the wines, brandies, and manufactures of France. The war of 1672 feems to have been in part occasioned by this commercial dispute. The peace of Nimeguen put an end to it in 1678, by moderating some of those duties in favour of the Dutch, who in confequence took off their prohibition. It was about the same time that the French and English began mutually to oppress each other's industry, by the like duties and prohibitions, of which the French, however, feem to have fet the first example. The spirit of hoftility which has subsisted between the two nations ever since, has hitherto hindered them from being moderated on either fide. In 1607 the English prohibited the importation of bonelace, the manufacture of Flanders. The government of that country, at that time under the dominion of Spain, prohibited in return the importation of English woollens. In 1700, the prohibition of importing bonelace into England, was taken off upon condition that the importation of English woollens into Flanders should be put on the same footing as before.

THERE

THERE may be good policy in retaliations of this kind, when CHAP. there is a probability that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or prohibitions complained of. The recovery of a great foreign market will generally more than compensate the transitory inconveniency of paying dearer during a short time for some forts of goods. To judge whether fuch retaliations are likely to produce fuch an effect, does not, perhaps, belong fo much to the science of a legislator, whose deliberations ought to be governed by general principles which are always the fame, as to the skill of that infidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs. When there is no probability that any fuch repeal can be procured, it seems a bad method of compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people, to do another injury ourselves both to those classes and to almost all the other classes of them. When our neighbours prohibit some manufacture of ours, we generally prohibit, not only the same, for that alone would seldom affect them considerably, but some other manufacture of theirs. This may no doubt give encouragement to some particular class of workmen among ourselves, and by excluding some of their rivals, may enable them to raise their price in the home market. Those workmen, however, who fuffered by our neighbours prohibition will not be benefited by ours. On the contrary, they, and almost all the other classes of our citizens will thereby be obliged to pay dearer than before for certain goods. Every such law, therefore, imposes a real tax upon the whole country, not in favour of that particular class of workmen who were injured by our neighbours prohibition,

THE case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation how far or in what manner it is proper to restore the free importation of foreign goods, after it has been for some time interrupted,

but of some other class.

BOOK is, when particular manufactures, by means of high duties or prohibitions upon all foreign goods which can come into competition with them, have been so far extended as to employ a great multitude of hands. Humanity may in this case require that the freedom of trade should be restored only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of referve and circumspection. Were those high duties and prohibitions taken away all at once, cheaper foreign goods of the same kind might be poured so fast into the home market, as to deprive all at once many thousands of our people of their ordinary employment and means of fubfiftence. The diforder which this would occasion might no doubt be very considerable. It would in all probability, however, be much less than is commonly imagined, for the two following reasons:

> FIRST, all those manufactures, of which any part is commonly exported to other European countries without a bounty, could be very little affected by the freest importation of foreign goods. manufactures must be sold as cheap abroad as any other foreign goods of the same quality and kind, and consequently must be sold cheaper at home. They would still, therefore, keep possession of the home market, and though a capricious man of fashion might fometimes prefer foreign wares, merely because they were foreign, to cheaper and better goods of the same kind that were made at home, this folly could from the nature of things extend to fo few, that it could make no fensible impression upon the general employment of the people. But a great part of all the different branches of our woollen manufacture, of our tanned leather, and of our hardware, are annually exported to other European countries without any bounty, and these are the manufactures which employ the greatest number of hands. The filk, perhaps, is the manufacture which would fuffer the most by this freedom of trade, and after it the linen, though the latter much less than the former.

> > SECONDLY.

SECONDLY, though a great number of people should, by thus CHAP. restoring the freedom of trade, be thrown all at once out of their ordinary employment and common method of subsistence, it would by no means follow that they would thereby be deprived either of employment or fubfistence. By the reduction of the army and navy at the end of the late war more than a hundred thousand soldiers and feamen, a number equal to what is employed in the greatest manufactures, were all at once thrown out of their ordinary employment; but, though they no doubt fuffered fome inconveniency, they were not thereby deprived of all employment and subfistence. The greater part of the feamen, it is probable, gradually betook themselves to the merchants service as they could find occasion, and in the mean time both they and the foldiers were absorbed in the great mass of the people, and employed in a great variety of occupations. Not only no great convulsion, but no fensible diforder arose from so great a change in the situation of more than a hundred thousand men, all accustomed to the use of arms, and many of them to rapine and plunder. The number of vagrants was scarce anywhere sensibly increased by it, even the wages of labour were not reduced by it in any occupation, fo far as I have been able to learn, except in that of seamen in the merchant service. But if we compare together the habits of a foldier and of any fort of manufacturer, we shall find that those of the latter do not tend fo much to disqualify him from being employed in a new trade, as those of the former from being employed in any. manufacturer has always been accustomed to look for his subsistence from his labour only: the foldier to expect it from his pay. Application and industry have been familiar to the one; idleness and disfination to the other. But it is furely much easier to change the direction of industry from one fort of labour to another, than to turn idleness and diffipation to any. To the greater part of manufactures besides, it has already been observed, there are other collateral

BOOK collateral manufactures of fo fimilar a nature, that a workman can eafily transfer his industry from one of them to another. greater part of fuch workmen too are occasionally employed in country labour. The stock which employed them in a particular manufacture before, will still remain in the country to employ an equal number of people in some other way. The capital of the country remaining the fame, the demand for labour will likewife be the fame, or very nearly the fame, though it may be exerted in different places and for different occupations. Soldiers and feamen, indeed, when discharged from the kings service, are at liberty to exercise any trade, within any town or place of Great Britain or Ireland. Let the fame natural liberty of exercifing what species of industry they please be restored to all his majesty's subjects, in the fame manner as to foldiers and feamen; that is, break down the exclusive privileges of corporations, and repeal the statute of apprenticeship, both which are real encroachments upon natural liberty, and add to these the repeal of the law of settlements, so that a poor workman, when thrown out of employment either in one trade or in one place, may feek for it in another trade or in another place, without the fear either of a profecution or of a removal, and neither the publick nor the individuals will fuffer much more from the occasional disbanding some particular classes of manufacturers, than from that of foldiers. Our manufacturers have no doubt great merit with their country, but they cannot have more than those who defend it with their blood, nor deserve to be treated with more delicacy.

> To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopea should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the publick, but what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals irresustably oppose it. Were the officers

officers of the army to oppose with the same zeal and unanimity CHAP. any reduction in the number of forces, with which master manufacturers fet themselves against every law that is likely to increase the number of their rivals in the home market, were the former to animate their foldiers in the same manner as the latter enflame their workmen to attack with violence and outrage the propofers of any fuch regulation, to attempt to reduce the army would be as dangerous as it has now become to attempt to diminish in any respect the monopoly which our manufacturers have obtained This monopoly has fo much increased the number of some particular tribes of them, that, like an overgrown standing army, they have become formidable to the government, and upon many occasions intimidate the legislature. The member of parliament who supports every proposal for strengthening this monopoly, is fure to acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men whose numbers and wealth render them of great importance. he opposes them, on the contrary, and still more if he has authority enough to be able to thwart them, neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest publick services can protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insults, nor sometimes from real danger, arising from the infolent outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists.

The undertaker of a great manufacture who, by the home markets being suddenly laid open to the competition of foreigners, should be obliged to abandon his trade, would no doubt suffer very considerably. That part of his capital which had usually been employed in purchasing materials and in paying his workmen, might, without much difficulty, perhaps, find another employment. But that part of it which was fixed in workhouses, and in the instruments of trade, could scarce be disposed of without considerable

lofs.

BOOK loss. The equitable regard, therefore, to his interest requires that changes of this kind should never be introduced suddenly, but flowly, gradually, and after a very long warning. The legislature were it possible that its deliberations could be always directed, not by the clamorous importunity of partial interests, but by an extensive view of the general good, ought upon this very account perhaps, to be particularly careful neither to establish any new monopolies of this kind, nor to extend further those which are already established. Every such regulation introduces some degree of real disorder into the constitution of the state, which it will be difficult afterwards to cure without occasioning another diforder.

> How far it may be proper to impose taxes upon the importation of foreign goods, in order, not to prevent their importation, but to raise a revenue for government, I shall consider hereafter when I come to treat of taxes. Taxes imposed with a view to prevent, or even to diminish importation, are evidently as destructive of the revenue of the customs as of the freedom of trade.

CHAP. III.

Of the extraordinary Restraints upon the Importation of Goods of almost all Kinds, from those Countries with which the Balance is supposed to be disadvantageous.

To lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods CHAP. of almost all kinds, from those particular countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous, is the fecond expedient by which the commercial fystem proposes to increase the quantity of gold and filver. Thus in Great Britain higher duties are laid upon the wines of France than upon those of Portugal. German linen may be imported upon paying certain duties; but French linen is altogether prohibited. The principles which I have been examining, took their origin from private interest and the spirit of monopoly: those which I am going to examine from national prejudice and animofity. They are, accordingly, as might well be expected, still more unreasonable. They are so, even upon the principles of the commercial fystem.

FIRST, though it were certain that in the case of a free trade between France and England, for example, the balance would be in favour of France, it would by no means follow that fuch a trade would be disadvantageous to England, or that the general balance of its whole trade would thereby be turned more against it. If the wines of France are better and cheaper than those of Portugal, or its linens than those of Germany, it would be more advantageous for Great Britain to purchase both the wine and the foreign linen which it had occasion for of France, than of Portugal and Germany. Though the value of the annual importations from France would thereby be greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual importations would be diminished, in proportion as the French goods

BOOK goods of the fame quality were cheaper than those of the other two countries. This would be the case, even upon the supposition that the whole French goods imported were to be confumed in Great Britain.

> Bur, secondly, a great part of them might be re-exported to other countries, where, being fold with profit, they might bring back a return equal in value, perhaps, to the prime cost of the whole French goods imported. What has frequently been faid of the East India trade might possibly be true of the French; that though the greater part of East India goods were bought with gold and filver, the re-exportation of a part of them to other countries, brought back more gold and filver to that which carried on the trade than the prime cost of the whole amounted to. One of the most important branches of the Dutch trade, at present, consists in the carriage of French goods to other European countries. A great part even of the French wine drank in Great Britain is clandestinely imported from Holland and Zealand. If there was either a free trade between France and England, or if French goods could be imported upon paying only the same duties as those of other European nations, to be drawn back upon exportation, England might have some share of a trade which is found so advantageous to Holland.

> THIRDLY, and lastly, there is no certain criterion by which we can determine on which fide what is called the balance between any two countries lies, or which of them exports to the greatest value. National prejudice and animosity, prompted always by the private interest of particular traders, are the principles which generally direct our judgement upon all questions concerning it. two criterions, however, which have frequently been appealed to upon fuch occasions, the custom-house books and the course of exchange.

change. The custom-house books, I think, it is now generally ac- CHAP. knowledged, are a very uncertain criterion, on account of the inaccuracy of the valuation at which the greater part of goods are rated in them. The course of exchange, at least, as it has hitherto been estimated, is, perhaps, almost equally so.

WHEN the exchange between two places, fuch as London and Paris, is at par, it is faid to be a fign that the debts due from London to Paris are compensated by those due from Paris to London. On the contrary, when a premium is paid at London for a bill upon Paris, it is faid to be a fign that the debts due from London to Paris are not compensated by those due from Paris to London. but that a balance in money must be sent out from the latter place: for the risk, trouble, and expence of exporting which, the premium is both demanded and given. But the ordinary state of debt and credit between those two cities must necessarily be regulated, it is faid, by the ordinary course of their dealings with one another. When neither of them imports from the other to a greater amount than it exports to it, the debts and credits of each may compensate one another. But when one of them imports from the other to a greater value than it exports to it, the former necessarily becomes indebted to the latter in a greater fum than the latter becomes indebted to it: the debts and credits of each do not compensate one another, and money must be sent out from that place of which the debts over-balance the credits. The common course of exchange, therefore, being an indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between two places, must likewise be an indication of the ordinary course of their exports and imports, as these necessarily regulate that state.

But though this doctrine, of which some part is, perhaps, not a little doubtful, were supposed ever so certain, the manner in which the par of exchange has hitherto been computed, renders uncertain every conclusion that has ever yet been drawn from it.

WHEN

BOOK IV. When for a fum of money paid in England, containing, according to the standard of the English mint, a certain number of ounces of pure silver, you receive a bill for a sum of money to be paid in France, containing, according to the standard of the French mint, an equal number of ounces of pure silver, exchange is said to be at par between England and France. When you pay more, you are supposed to give a premium, and exchange is said to be against England, and in savour of France. When you pay less, you are supposed to get a premium, and exchange is said to be against France, and in savour of England.

But, first we cannot always judge of the value of the current money of different countries by the standards of their respective mints. In some it is more, in others it is less worn, clipt, and otherwise degenerated from that standard. But the value of the current coin of every country, compared with that of any other country, is in proportion, not to the quantity of pure filver which it ought to contain, but to that which it actually does contain. Before the reformation of the filver coin in king William's time, exchange between England and Holland, computed, in the usual manner, according to the standards of their respective mints, was five and twenty per cent. against England. But the value of the current coin of England, as we learn from Mr. Lowndes, was at that time rather more than five and twenty per cent. below its standard value. The real exchange, therefore, may even at that time have been in favour of England, notwithstanding the computed exchange was fo much against it; a smaller number of ounces of pure silver, actually paid in England, may have purchased a bill for a greater number of ounces of pure filver to be paid in Holland, and the man who was supposed to give, may in reality have got the premium. The French coin was, before the late reformation of the English gold coin, much less worn than the English, and was, perhaps, two or three

three per cent. nearer its standard. If the computed exchange CHAP. with France, therefore, was not more than two or three per cent against England, the real exchange might have been in its favour. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the exchange has been constantly in favour of England, and against France.

SECONDLY, in some countries, the expence of coinage is defrayed by the government, in others, it is defrayed by the private people who carry their bullion to the mint, and the government even derives fome revenue from the coinage. In England, it is defrayed by the government, and if you carry a pound weight of standard filver to the mint, you get back fixty-two shillings, containing a pound weight of the like standard filver. In France, a duty of eight per cent. is deducted for the coinage, which not only defrays the expence of it, but affords a small revenue to the government. England, as the coinage costs nothing, the current coin can never be much more valuable than the quantity of bullion which it actually In France, the workmanship as you pay for it, adds to the value, in the same manner as to that of wrought plate. fum of French money, therefore, containing a certain weight of pure filver, is more valuable than a Sum of English money containing an equal weight of pure filver, and must require more bullion, or other commodities to purchase it. Though the current coin of the two countries, therefore, were equally near the standards of their respective mints, a sum of English money could not well purchase a sum of French money, containing an equal number of ounces of pure filver, nor confequently a bill upon France for fuch a fum. If for fuch a bill no more additional money was paid than what was fufficient to compensate the expense of the French coinage, the real exchange might be at par between the two countries, their debts and credits might mutually compensate one another, while the computed exchange was confiderably in favour of France.

BOOK If less than this was paid, the real exchange might be in favour of England, while the computed was in favour of France.

THIRDLY, and lastly, in some places, as at Amsterdam, Hamburgh, Venice, &c. foreign bills of exchange are paid in what they call bank money; while in others, as at London, Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, &c. they are paid in the common currency of the country. What is called bank money is always of more value than the fame nominal fum of common currency. A thousand guilders in the bank of Amsterdam, for example, are of more value than a thousand guilders of Amsterdam currency. The difference between them is called the agio of the bank, which, at Amsterdam, is generally about five per cent. Supposing the current money of two countries equally near to the standard of their respective mints, and that the one pays foreign bills in this common currency, while the other pays them in bank money, it is evident that the computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in bank money, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in current money; for the same reason that the computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in better money, or in money nearer to its own standard, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in worse. The computed exchange, before the late reformation of the gold coin, was generally against London with Amsterdam, Hamburgh, Venice, and, I believe, with all other places which pay in what is called bank money. It will by no means follow, however, that the real exchange was against it. Since the reformation of the gold coin, it has been in favour of London even with those places. The computed exchange has generally been in favour of London with Lifbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, and, if you except France, I believe, with most other parts of Europe that pay in common currency; and it is not improbable that the real exchange was fo too.

Digression concerning Banks of Deposit, particularly concerning that of Amsterdam.

THE currency of a great state, such as France or England, generally consists almost entirely of its own coin. Should this currency, therefore, be at any time worn, clipt, or otherwise degraded below its standard value, the state by a reformation of its coin can effectually re-establish its currency. But the currency of a small state, such as Genoa or Hamburgh, can seldom consist altogether in its own coin, but must be made up, in a great measure, of the coins of all the neighbouring states with which its inhabitants have a continual intercourse. Such a state, therefore, by reforming its coin, will not always be able to reform its currency. If foreign bills of exchange are paid in this currency, the uncertain value of any sum, of what is in its own nature so uncertain, must render the exchange always very much against such a state, its currency being, in all foreign states, necessarily valued even below what it is worth.

In order to remedy the inconvenience to which this disadvantageous exchange must have subjected their merchants, such small states, when they began to attend to the interest of trade, have frequently enacted, that foreign bills of exchange of a certain value should be paid, not in common currency, but by an order upon, or by a transfer in the books of a certain bank, established upon the credit, and under the protection of the state; this bank being always obliged to pay, in good and true money, exactly according to the standard of the state. The banks of Venice, Genoa, Amsterdam, Hamburgh, and Nuremberg, seem to have been all originally established with this view, though some of them may have afterwards

CHAP.

BOOK wards been made subservient to other purposes. The money of fuch banks being better than the common currency of the country, necessarily bore an agio, which was greater or smaller, according as the currency was supposed to be more or less degraded below the standard of the state. The agio of the bank of Hamburgh, for example, which is faid to be commonly about fourteen per cent. is the supposed difference between the good standard money of the flate and the clipt, worn, and diminished currency poured into it from all the neighbouring states.

> Before 1600 the great quantity of elipt and worn foreign coin. which the extensive trade of Amsterdam brought from all parts of Europe, reduced the value of its currency about nine per cent. below that of good money fresh from the mint. Such money no fooner appeared than it was melted down or carried away, as it always is in fuch circumstances. The merchants, with plenty of currency, could not always find a fufficient quantity of good money to pay their bills of exchange; and the value of those bills, in spite of several regulations which were made to prevent it, became in a great measure uncertain.

> In order to remedy these inconveniencies, a bank was established in 1609 under the guarantee of the city. This bank received both foreign coin, and the light and worn coin of the country at its real intrinsic value in the good standard money of the country, deducting only fo much as was necessary for defraying the expence of coinage, and the other necessary expence of management. For the value which remained after this small deduction was made, it gave This credit was called bank money, which, a credit in its books. as it represented money exactly according to the standard of the mint, was always of the fame real value, and intrinsically worth more than current money. It was at the same time enacted, that

all bills drawn upon or negociated at Amsterdam of the value of CHAP. fix hundred gilders and upwards should be paid in bank money, which at once took away all uncertainty in the value of those bills. Every merchant, in consequence of this regulation, was obliged to keep an account with the bank in order to pay his foreign bills of exchange, which necessarily occasioned a certain demand for bank money.

BANK money, over and above both its intrinsic superiority to currency, and the additional value which this demand necessarily gives it, has likewise some other advantages. It is secure from fire, robbery, and other accidents; the city of Amsterdam is bound for it; it can be paid away by a simple transfer, without the trouble of counting, or the risk of transporting it from one place to another. In consequence of those different advantages, it feems from the beginning to have borne an agio, and it is generally believed that all the money originally deposited in the bank was allowed to remain there, nobody caring to demand payment of a debt which he could fell for a premium in the market. By demanding payment of the bank, the owner of a bank credit would lose this premium. As a shilling fresh from the mint will buy no more goods in the market than one of our common worn shillings, so the good and true money which might be brought from the coffers of the bank into those of a private person, being mixed and confounded with the common currency of the country, would be of no more value than that currency, from which it could no longer be readily distinguished. While it remained in the coffers of the bank, its superiority was known and ascertained. When it had come into those of a private person, its superiority could not well be afcertained without more trouble than perhaps the difference was worth. By being brought from the coffers of the bank, besides, it lost all the other advantages of bank money;

BOOK its fecurity, its easy and safe transferability, its use in paying foreign bills of exchange. Over and above all this, it could not be brought from those coffers, as it will appear by and by, without previously paying for the keeping.

> THOSE deposits of coin, or which the bank was bound to restore in coin, constituted the original capital of the bank, or the whole value of what was represented by what is called bank money. At present they are supposed to constitute but a very small part of it. In order to facilitate the trade in bullion, the bank has been for these many years in the practice of giving credit in its books upon deposits of gold and silver bullion. This credit is generally about five per cent. below the mint price of fuch bullion. The bank grants at the same time what is called a recipice or receipt, intitling the person who makes the deposit, or the bearer, to take out the bullion again at any time within fix months, upon re-transferring to the bank a quantity of bank money equal to that for which credit had been given in its books when the deposit was made, and upon paying one-fourth per cent. for the keeping. if the deposit was in filver; and one-half per cent. if it was in gold; but at the fame time declaring, that in default of fuch payment, and upon the expiration of this term, the deposit should belong to the bank at the price at which it had been received, or for which credit had been given in the transfer books. What is thus paid for the keeping of the deposit may be considered as a fort of warehouse rent; and why this warehouse rent should be so much dearer for gold than for filver, feveral different reasons have been affigned. The fineness of gold, it has been said, is more difficult to be afcertained than that of filver. Frauds are more eafily practifed, and occasion a greater loss in the more precious metal. Silver, besides, being the standard metal, the state, it has been faid,

faid, wishes to encourage more the making of deposits of filver CHAP. than of those of gold.

DEPOSITS of bullion are most commonly made when the price is somewhat lower than ordinary; and they are taken out again when it happens to rife. In Holland the market price of bullion is generally above the mint price, for the same reason that it was fo in England before the late reformation of the gold coin. The difference is faid to be commonly from about fix to fixteen stivers upon the mark, or eight ounces of filver of eleven parts fine. and one part alloy. The bank price, or the credit which the bank gives for deposits of such silver (when made in foreign coin, of which the fineness is well known and ascertained, such as Mexico dollars) is twenty-two gilders, the mark; the mint price is about twenty-three gilders; and the market price is from twenty-three gilders fix, to twenty-three gilders fixteen stivers, or from two to three per cent. above the mintprice.* The Proportions between the bank price, the mint price, and the market price of gold bullion, arenearly thesame. A person can generally fell his receipt for the difference between the mint price of bullion and the market price. A receipt for bullion is almost K 2 always

* The following are the prices at which the bank of Amsterdam at present (September, 1775) receives bullion and coin of different kinds.

SILVER.

Mexico dollars
French crowns
English filver coin

Mexico dollars new coin - 21 10

Ducatoons - - - - 3

Rix dollars - - - - 2 8

Bar filver containing $\frac{11}{12}$ fine filver 21 per mark, and in this proportion down to $\frac{1}{4}$ fine, on which 5 gilders are given.

Fine bars, 23 per mark.

GOLD

BOOK always worth fomething, and it very feldom happens, therefore, that any body suffers his receipt to expire, or allows his bullion to fall to the bank at the price at which it had been received, either by not taking it out before the end of the fix months, or by neglecting to pay the one-fourth or one-half per cent. in order to obtain a new receipt for another fix months. This, however. though it happens feldom, is faid to happen fometimes, and more frequently with regard to gold than with regard to filver, on account of the higher warehouse-rent which is paid for the keeping of the more precious metal.

> THE person who by making a deposit of bullion obtains both a bank credit and a receipt, pays his bills of exchange as they become due with his bank credit; and either fells or keeps his receipt according as he judges that the price of bullion is likely to rife or to fall. The receipt and the bank credit feldom keep long together, and there is no occasion that they should. The person who has a receipt, and who wants to take out bullion, finds always plenty of bank credits, or bank money to buy at the ordinary price; and the person who has bank money, and wants to take out bullion, finds receipts always in equal abundance.

> THE owners of bank credits and the holders of receipts constitute two different forts of creditors against the bank. holder of a receipt cannot draw out the bullion for which it is

granted.

GOLD. Portugal coin Guineas
Louis d'ors new

B- 310 per mark. Ditto old - - - 300 New ducats - - - 4 19 8 per ducat.

Bar or ingot gold is received in proportion to its fineness compared with the above foreign gold coin. Upon fine bars the bank gives 340 per mark. In general, however, fomething more is given upon coin of a known finencis, than upon gold and filver bars, of which the fineness cannot be ascertained but by a process of melting and affaying.

granted, without re-affigning to the bank a fum of bank money CHAP. equal to the price at which the bullion had been received. If he has no bank money of his own, he must purchase it of those who have it. The owner of bank money cannot draw out bullion without producing to the bank receipts for the quantity which he wants. If he has none of his own, he must buy them of those who have them. The holder of a receipt, when he purchases bank money, purchases the power of taking out a quantity of bullion, of which the mint price is five per cent. above the bank price. The agio of five per cent: therefore, which he commonly pays for it, is paid, not for an imaginary, but for a real value. The owner of bank money, when he purchases a receipt, purchases the power of taking out a quantity of bullion of which the market price is commonly from two to three per cent. above the mint price. The price which he pays for it, therefore, is paid likewise for a real value. The price of the receipt, and the price of the bank money, compound or make up between them the full value or price of the bullion.

UPON deposits of the coin current in the country, the bank grants receipts likewise as well as bank credits; but those receipts are frequently of no value, and will bring no price in the market. Upon ducatoons, for example, which in the currency pass for three gilders three stivers each, the bank gives a credit of three gilders only, or five per cent. below their current value. It grants a receipt likewise intitling the bearer to take out the number of ducatoons deposited at any time within six months, upon paying one-fourth per cent. for the keeping. This receipt will frequently bring no price in the market. Three gilders bank money generally fell in the market for three gilders three stivers, the full value of the decatoons if they were taken out of the bank; and before they can be taken out, one-fourth per cent. must be paid

BOOK paid for the keeping, which would be mere loss to the holder of the receipt. If the agio of the bank, however, should at any time fall to three per cent. fuch receipts might bring some price in the market, and might fell for one and three-fourths per cent. But the agio of the bank being now generally about five per cent. fuch receipts are frequently allowed to expire, or as they express it, to fall to the bank. The receipts which are given for deposits of gold ducats fall to it yet more frequently, because a higher warehouse-rent, or one-half per cent. must be paid for the keeping of them before they can be taken out again. The five per cent. which the bank gains, when deposits either of coin or bullion are allowed to fall to it, may be considered as the warehouse-rent for the perpetual keeping of fuch deposits.

> THE fum of bank money for which the receipts are expired must be very considerable. It must comprehend the whole original capital of the bank, which, it is generally supposed, has been allowed to remain there from the time it was first deposited, nobody caring either to renew his receipt or to take out his deposit, as, for the reasons already affigned, neither the one nor the other could be done without loss. But whatever may be the amount of this fum, the proportion which it bears to the whole mass of bank money is supposed to be very small. The bank of Amsterdam has for these many years past been the great warehouse of Europe for bullion, for which the receipts are very feldom allowed to expire, or, as they express it, to fall to the bank. The far greater part of the bank money, or of the credits upon the books of the bank, is supposed to have been created, for these many years past, by such deposits which the dealers in bullion are continually both making and withdrawing.

> No demand can be made upon the bank but by means of a recipice or receipt. The fmaller mass of bank money, for which the receipts are expired, is mixed and confounded with the much greater

greater mass for which they are still in force; so that, though there may be a considerable sum of bank money, for which there are no receipts, there is no specific sum or portion of it, which may not at any time be demanded by one. The bank cannot be debtor to two persons for the same thing; and the owner of bank money who has no receipt cannot demand payment of the bank till he buys one. In ordinary and quiet times, he can find no difficulty in getting one to buy at the market price, which generally corresponds with the price at which he can sell the coin or bullion it in titles him to take out of the bank.

IT might be otherwise during a public calamity; an invasion, for example, such as that of the French in 1672. The owners of bank money being then all eager to draw it out of the bank, in order to have it in their own keeping, the demand for receipts might raise their price to an exorbitant height. The holders of them might form extravagant expectations, and, instead of two or three per cent. demand half the bank money for which credit had been given upon the deposits that the receipts had respectively been granted for. The enemy, informed of the constitution of the bank, might even buy them up in order to prevent the carrying away of the treasure. In such emergencies, the bank, it is supposed, would break through its ordinary rule of making payment only to the holders of receipts. The holders of receipts, who had no bank money, must have received within two or three per cent, of the value of the deposit for which their respective receipts had been granted. The bank, therefore, it is faid, would in this case make no scruple of paying, either with money or bullion, the full value of what the owners of bank money who could get no receipts, were credited for in its books; paying at the same time two or three per cent. to such holders of receipts as had no bank money, that being the whole value which in this state of things could justly be supposed due to them.

EVEN

BOOK IV.

EVEN in ordinary and quiet times it is the interest of the holders of receipts to depress the agio, in order either to buy bank money (and consequently the bullion, which their receipts would then enable them to take out of the bank) fo much cheaper, or to fell their receipts to those who have bank money, and who want to take out bullion, fo much dearer; the price of a receipt being generally equal to the difference between the market price of bank money, and that of the coin or bullion for which the receipt had been granted. It is the interest of the owners of bank money, on the contrary, to raise the agio, in order either to fell their bank money fo much dearer, or to buy a receipt fo much cheaper. To prevent the stock jobbing tricks which those opposite interests might sometimes occasion, the bank has of late years come to the refolution to fell at all times bank money for currency, at five per cent. agio, and to buy it in again at four per cent. agio. In consequence of this resolution, the agio can never either rife above five, or fink below four per cent. and the proportion between the market price of bank and that of current moncy, is kept at all times very near to the proportion between their intrinsic values. Before this resolution was taken, the market price of bank money used sometimes to rise so high as nine per cent. agio, and fometimes to fink fo low as par, according as opposite interests happened to influence the market.

THE bank of Amsterdam professes to lend out no part of what is deposited with it, but, for every gilder for which it gives credit in its books, to keep in its repositories the value of a gilder either in money or bullion. That it keeps in its repositories all the money or bullion for which there are receipts in force, for which it is at all times liable to be called upon, and which, in reality, is continually going from it and returning to it again, cannot well be doubted. But whether it does so likewise with regard to that part

of its capital, for which the receipts are long ago expired, for which CHAP. in ordinary and quiet times it cannot be called upon, and which in reality is very likely to remain with it for ever, or as long as the States of the United Provinces subsist, may perhaps appear more uncertain. At Amsterdam, however, no point of faith is better established than that for every gilder, circulated as bank money, there is a correspondent gilder in gold or filver to be found in the treasure of the bank. The city is guarantee that it should be The bank is under the direction of the four reigning burgomasters, who are changed every year. Each new sett of burgomasters visits the treasure, compares it with the books, receives it upon oath, and delivers it over, with the same awful solemnity, to the fett which fucceeds it; and in that fober and religious country oaths are not yet difregarded. A rotation of this kind feems alone a fufficient fecurity against any practices which cannot be avowed. Amidst all the revolutions which faction has ever occasioned in the government of Amsterdam, the prevailing party has at no time accused their predecessors of insidelity in the administration of the bank. No accusation could have affected more deeply the reputation and fortune of the difgraced party, and if fuch an accusation could have been supported, we may be assured that it would have been brought. In 1672, when the French king was at Utrecht, the bank of Amsterdam paid so readily as left no doubt of the fidelity with which it had observed its engagements. Some of the pieces which were then brought from its repositories appeared to have been fcorched with the fire which happened in the town-house foon after the bank was established. Those pieces, therefore, must have lain there from that time.

What may be the amount of the treasure in the bank is a question which has long employed the speculations of the curious. Nothing but conjecture can be offered concerning it. It is generally reckoned that there are about two thousand people who keep accounts

BOOK accounts with the bank, and allowing them to have, one with another, the value of fifteen hundred pounds sterling lying upon their respective accounts, (a very large allowance) the whole quantity of bank money, and consequently of treasure in the bank, will amount to about three millions sterling, or, at eleven gilders the pound sterling, thirty-three millions of gilders; a great fum, and fufficient to carry on a very extensive circulation, but vastly below the extravagant ideas which some people have formed of this treasure.

> THE city of Amsterdam derives a considerable revenue from the bank. Besides what may be called the warehouse-rent above-mentioned, each person, upon first opening an account with the bank, pays a fee of ten gilders; and for every new account three gilders three flivers; for every transfer two flivers; and if the transfer is for less than three hundred gilders, six stivers, in order to discourage the multiplicity of small transactions. The person who neglects to balance his account twice in the year forfeits twenty-five gilders. The person who orders a transfer for more than is upon his account, is obliged to pay three per cent. for the fum overdrawn, and his order is fet aside into the bargain. The bank is supposed too to make a considerable profit by the sale of the foreign coin or bullion which fometimes falls to it by the expiring of receipts, and which is always kept till it can be fold with advantage. It makes a profit likewife by felling bank money at five per cent. agio, and buying it in at four. These different emoluments amount to a good deal more than what is necessary for paying the falaries of officers, and defraying the expence of management. What is paid for the keeping of bullion upon receipts, is alone fupposed to amount to a neat annual revenue of between one hundred and fifty thousand and two hundred thousand gilders. Public utility, however, and not revenue, was the original object of this institution. Its object was to relieve the merchants from the inconvenience of a disadvantageous exchange. The revenue which has ari-

CHAP.

fen from it was unforeseen, and may be considered as accidental. But it is now time to return from this long digression, into which I have been insensibly led in endeavouring to explain the reasons why the exchange between the countries which pay in what is called bank money, and those which pay in common currency, should generally appear to be in favour of the former, and against the latter. The former pay in a species of money of which the intrinsic value is always the same, and exactly agreeable to the standard of their respective mints; the latter in a species of money of which the intrinsic value is continually varying, and is almost always more or less below that standard. But though the computed exchange must generally be in favour of the former, the real exchange may frequently be in favour of the latter.

[End of the Digression concerning Banks of Deposit.]

Though the computed exchange between any two places were in every respect the same with the real, it would not always follow that what is called the balance of trade was in favour of that place which had the ordinary course of exchange in its favour. The ordinary course of exchange might, indeed, in this case, be a tolerable indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between them, and show which of the two countries usually had occasion to fend out money to the other. But the ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places is not always entirely regulated by the ordinary course of their dealings with one another, but is influenced by that of the dealings of both with many other countries. If it was usual, for example, for the merchants of England to pay the goods which they buy from Hamburgh, Dantzick, Riga, &c. by bills upon Holland, the ordinary state of debt and credit between England and Holland would not be entirely regulated by the ordinary course of the dealings of those two countrics with one another, but would be influenced by that of England with those other places. England might, in this case, be annually obliged to fend out money to Holland, though its annual exports

BOOK IV.

exports to that country exceeded the annual value of its imports from it, and though what is called the balance of trade was very much in favour of England.

HITHERTO I have been endeavouring to shew, even upon the principles of the commercial system, how unnecessary it is to lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous.

Nothing, however, can be more abfurd than this whole doctrine of the balance of trade, upon which, not only these restraints, but almost all the other regulations of commerce are founded. When two places trade with one another, this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither of them either loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side, that one of them loses, and the other gains in proportion to its declension from the exact equilibrium. Both suppositions are false. A trade which is forced by means of bounties and monopolies, may be, and commonly is disadvantageous to the country in whose favour it is meant to be established, as I shall endeavour to shew hereafter. But that trade which, without force or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on between any two places, is always advantageous, thought not always equally so, to both.

By advantage or gain, I understand, not the increase of the quantity of gold and silver, but that of the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, or the increase of the annual revenue of its inhabitants.

If the balance be even, and if the trade between the two places confift altogether in the exchange of their native commodities, they will, upon most occasions, not only both gain, but they will gain equally, or very near equally: each will in this case afford a market for a part of the surplus produce of the other: each will replace

replace a capital which had been employed in raising this part of CHAP. the furplus produce of the other, and which had been distributed among, and given revenue and maintenance to a certain number of its inhabitants. Some part of the inhabitants of each therefore will indirectly derive their revenue and maintenance from the other. As the commodities exchanged too are supposed to be of equal value, fo the two capitals employed in the trade will, upon most occasions, be equal, or very nearly equal; and both being employed in raising the native commodities of the two countries, the revenue and maintenance which their distribution will afford to the inhabitants of each will be equal, or very nearly equal. This revenue and maintenance, thus mutually afforded, will be greater or smaller in proportion to the extent of their dealings. these should annually amount to an hundred thousand pounds, for example, or to a million on each fide, each of them would afford an annual revenue, in the one case, of an hundred thousand pounds, in the other, of a million, to the inhabitants of the other.

Ir their trade should be of such a nature that one of them exported to the other nothing but native commodities, while the returns of that other consisted altogether in foreign goods; the balance, in this case, would still be supposed even, commodities being paid for with commodities. They would, in this case too, both gain, but they would not gain equally; and the inhabitants of the country which exported nothing but native commodities would derive the greatest revenue from the trade. If England, for example, should import from France nothing but the native commodities of that country, and, not having such commodities of its own as were in demand there, should annually repay them by sending thither a large quantity of foreign goods, tobacco, we shall suppose, and East India goods; this trade, though it would give some revenue to the inhabitants of both countries, would give

more

BOOK more to those of France than to those of England. The whole French capital annually employed in it would annually be diffributed among the people of France. But that part of the English capital only which was employed in producing the English commodities with which those foreign goods were purchased, would be annually distributed among the people of England. The greater part of it would replace the capitals which had been employed in Virginia, Indostan, and China, and which had given revenue and maintenance to the inhabitants of those distant countries. If the capitals were equal, or nearly equal, therefore, this employment of the French capital would augment much more the revenue of the people of France, than that of the English capital would the revenue of the people of England. France would in this case carry on a direct foreign trade of confumption with England: whereas England would carry on a round-about trade of the fame kind with France. The different effects of a capital employed in the direct, and of one employed in the round-about foreign trade of confumption, have already been fully explained.

> THERE is not, probably, between any two countries, a trade which confifts altogether in the exchange either of native commodities on both sides, or of native commodities on one side and of foreign goods on the other. Almost all countries exchange with one another partly native and partly foreign goods. try, however, in whose cargoes there is the greatest proportion of native, and the least of foreign goods, will always be the principal gainer. If it was not with tobacco and East India goods, but with gold and filver, that England paid for the commodities annually imported from France, the balance, in this case, would be supposed uneven, commodities not being paid for with commodities, but with gold and filver. The trade, however, would, in this case, as in the foregoing, give some revenue to the inhabitants

of both countries, but more to those of France than to those of CHAP. England. It would give fome revenue to those of England. capital which had been employed in producing the English goods that purchased this gold and silver, the capital which had been distributed among, and given revenue to certain inhabitants of England, would thereby be replaced, and enabled to continue that employment. The whole capital of England would no more be diminished by this exportation of gold and silver, than by the exportation of an equal value of any other goods. On the contrary, it would, in most cases, be augmented. No goods are sent abroad but those for which the demand is supposed to be greater abroad than at home, and of which the returns confequently, it is expected, will be of more value at home than the commodities export-If the tobacco which, in England, is worth only a hundred thousand pounds, when sent to France will purchase wine which is, in England, worth a hundred and ten thousand pounds, the exchange will augment the capital of England by ten thousand pounds. If a hundred thousand pounds of English gold, in the fame manner, purchase French wine which, in England, is worth a hundred and ten thousand, this exchange will equally augment the capital of England by ten thousand pounds. As a merchant who has a hundred and ten thousand pounds worth of wine in his cellar, is a richer man than he who has only a hundred thousand pounds worth of tobacco in his warehouse, so is he likewise a richer man than he who has only a hundred thousand pounds worth of gold in his coffers. He can put into motion a greater quantity of industry, and give revenue, maintenance, and employment, to a greater number of people than either of the other two. But the capital of the country is equal to the capitals of all its different inhabitants, and the quantity of industry which can be annually maintained in it, is equal to what all those different capitals can maintain. Both the capital of the country, therefore, and

BOOK and the quantity of industry which can be annually maintained in it, must generally be augmented by this exchange. It would, indeed, be more advantageous for England that it could purchase the wines of France with its own hardware and broad-cloth, than with either the tobacco of Virginia, or the gold and filver of Brazil and Peru. A direct foreign trade of confumption is always more advantageous than a round-about one. But a round-about foreign trade of confumption which is carried on with gold and filver, does not feem to be less advantageous than any other equally roundabout one. Neither is a country which has no mines more likely to be exhausted of gold and filver by this annual exportation of those metals, than one which does not grow tobacco by the like annual exportation of that plant. As a country which has wherewithal to buy tobacco will never be long in want of it, fo neither will one be long in want of gold and filver which has wherewithal to purchase those metals.

> IT is a losing trade, it is faid, which a workman carries on with the alehouse; and the trade which a manufacturing nation would naturally carry on with a wine country, may be confidered as a trade of the same nature. I answer, that the trade with the alehouse is not necessarily a losing trade. In its own nature it is just as advantageous as any other, though, perhaps, fomewhat more liable to be abused. The employment of a brewer, and even that of a retailer of fermented liquors, are as necessary divisions of labour as any other. It will generally be more advantageous for a workman to buy of the brewer the quantity he has occasion for than to make it himself, and if he is a poor workman, it will generally be more advantageous for him to buy it by little and little of the retailer, than a large quantity of the brewer. He may no doubt buy too much of either, as he may of any other dealers in his neighbourhood, of the butcher, if he is a glutton, or of the draper, if he affects to be a beau among his companions. It is advan

advantageous to the great body of workmen notwithstanding, that CHAP. all these trades should be free, though this freedom may be abused 4 in all of them, and is more likely to be fo, perhaps, in some than in others. Though individuals, besides, may sometimes ruin their fortunes by an excessive consumption of fermented liquors, there feems to be no risk that a nation should do so. Though in every country there are many people who spend upon such liquors more than they can afford, there are always many more who fpend lefs. It deserves to be remarked too that, if we consult experience, the cheapness of wine seems to be a cause, not of drunkenness, but of fobriety. The inhabitants of the wine countries are in general the foberest people in Europe; witness the Spaniards, the Italians, and the inhabitants of the fouthern provinces of France. People are feldom guilty of excess in what is their daily fare. Nobody affects the character of liberality and good fellowship, by being profuse of a liquor which is as cheap as small beer. the contrary, in the countries which from either excessive heat or cold produce no grapes, and where wine confequently is dear and a rarity, drunkenness is a common vice, as among the northern nations, and all those who live between the tropicks, the negroes, for example, on the coast of Guinea. When a French regiment comes from some of the northern provinces of France, where wine is fomewhat dear, to be quartered in the fouthern, where it is very cheap, the foldiers, I have frequently heard it observed. are at first debauched by the cheapness and novelty of good wine; but after a few months refidence, the greater part of them become as fober as the rest of the inhabitants. Were the duties upon foreign wines, and the excises upon malt, beer, and ale, to be taken away all at once, it might, in the same manner, occasion in Great Britain a pretty general and temporary drunkenness among the middling and inferior ranks of people, which would probably be foon followed by a permanent and almost universal fobriety.

BOOK fobriety. At prefent drunkenness is by no means the vice of people of fashion, or of those who can easily afford the most expenfive liquors. A gentleman drunk with ale, has fcarce ever been feen among us. The restraints upon the wine trade in Great Britain besides, do not so much seem calculated to hinder the people from going, if I may fay fo, to the alehouse, as from going where they can buy the best and cheapest liquor. They favour the wine trade of Portugal, and discourage that of France. The Portuguese, it is said, indeed, are better customers for our manufactures than the French, and should therefore be encouraged in preference to them. As they give us their custom, it is pretended, we should give them our's. The sneaking arts of underling tradefinen are thus erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire: for it is the most underling tradefmen only who make it a rule to employ chiefly their own customers. A great trader purchases his goods always where they are cheapest and best, without regard to any little interest of this kind.

> By fuch maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to confider their gain as its own lofs. Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animofity. The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during the prefent and the preceeding century, been more fatal to the repose of Europe than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, I am afraid the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy. But the mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit of merchants and manufacturers,

facturers, who neither are, nor ought to be the rulers of man- CHAP. kind, though it cannot perhaps be corrected, may very eafily be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of any body but themselves.

THAT it was the spirit of monopoly which originally both invented and propagated this doctrine, cannot be doubted; and they who first taught it were by no means such fools as they who believed it. In every country it always is and must be the interest of the great body of the people to buy whatever they want of those who fell it cheapest. The proposition is so very manifest, that it feems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it ever have been called in question had not the interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers confounded the common fense of mankind. Their interest is, in this respect, directly opposite to that of the great body of the people. As it is the interest of the freemen of a corporation to hinder the rest of the inhabitants from employing any workmen but themselves, so it is the interest of the merchants and manufacturers of every country to fecure to themselves the monopoly of the home market. Hence in Great Britain and in most other European countries the extraordinary duties upon almost all goods imported by alien merchants. Hence the high duties and prohibitions upon all those foreign manufactures which can come into competition with our own. Hence too the extraordinary restraints upon the importation of almost all forts of goods from those countries with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous; that is, from those against whom national animosity happens to be most violently inflamed.

THE wealth of a neighbouring nation, however, though dangerous in war and politicks, is certainly advantageous in trade. In a **ftate**

BOOK state of hostility it may enable our enemies to maintain fleets and armies superior to our own; but in a state of peace and commerce it must likewise enable them to exchange with us to a greater value, and to afford a better market, either for the immediate produce of our own industry, or for whatever is purchased with that produce. As a rich man is likely to be a better customer to the industrious people in his neighbourhood, than a poor, so is likewise a rich nation. A rich man, indeed, who is himself a manufacturer, is a very dangerous neighbour to all those who deal in the fame way. All the rest of the neighbourhood, however, by far the greatest number, profit by the good market which his expence affords them. They even profit by his underfelling the poorer workmen who deal in the same way with him. The manufacturers of a rich nation, in the same manner, may no doubt be very dangerous rivals to those of their neighbours. This very competition, however, is advantageous to the great body of the people, who profit greatly besides by the good market which the great expence of fuch a nation affords them in every other way. Private people who want to make a fortune, never think of retiring to the remote and poor provinces of the country, but refort either to the capital or to some of the great commercial towns. They know, that where little wealth circulates there is little to be got, but that where a great deal is in motion, some share of it may fall to them. The fame maxims which would in this manner direct the common sense of one, or ten, or twenty individuals, should regulate the judgement of one, or ten, or twenty millions, and should make a whole nation regard the riches of its neighbours, as a probable cause and occasion for itself to acquire riches. A nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade is certainly most likely to do so when its neighbours are all rich, industrious, and commercial nations. A great nation surrounded on all fides by wandering favages and poor barbarians might, no CHAP. doubt, acquire riches by the cultivation of its own lands, and by its own interior commerce, but not by foreign trade. It feems to have been in this manner that the ancient Egyptians and the modern Chinese acquired their great wealth. The ancient Egyptians, it is faid, neglected foreign commerce, and the modern Chinese, it is known, hold it in the utmost contempt, and scarce deign to afford it the decent protection of the laws. The modern maxims of foreign commerce, by aiming at the impoverishment of all our neighbours, fo far as they are capable of producing their intended effect, tend to render that very commerce infigni-

ficant and contemptible.

THERE is no commercial country in Europe of which the approaching ruin has not frequently been foretold by the pretended doctors of this fystem, from an unfavourable balance of trade. After all the anxiety however which they have excited about this, after all the vain attempts of almost all trading nations to turn that balance in their own favour and against their neighbours, it does not appear that any one nation in Europe has been in any respect impoverished by this cause. Every town and country, on the contrary, in proportion as they have opened their ports to all nations; instead of being ruined by this free trade, as the principles of the commercial system would lead us to expect, have been enriched by it. Though there are in Europe, indeed, a few towns which in some respects deserve the name of free ports, there is no country which does fo. Holland, perhaps, approaches the nearest to this character of any, though still very remote from it; and Holland, it is acknowledged, not only derives 1ts whole wealth, but a great part of its necessary subsistence, from foreign trade.

THERE

BOOK IV.

THERE is another balance indeed, which has already been explained, very different from the balance of trade, and which, according as it happens to be either favourable or unfavourable, necessarily occasions the prosperity or decay of every nation. This is the balance of the annual produce and consumption. If the exchangeable value of the annual produce, it has already been observed, exceeds that of the annual consumption, the capital of the fociety must annually increase in proportion to this excess. The fociety in this case lives within its revenue, and what is annually faved out of its revenue, is naturally added to its capital, and employed fo as to increase still further the annual produce. If the exchangeable value of the annual produce, on the contrary, fall short of the annual consumption, the capital of the fociety must annually decay in proportion to this deficiency. The expence of the fociety in this cafe exceeds its revenue, and necessarily encroaches upon its capital. Its capital, therefore, must necessarily decay, and together with it, the exchangeable value of the annual produce of its industry.

This balance of produce and confumption is entirely different from, what is called, the balance of trade. It might take place in a nation which had no foreign trade, but which was entirely feparated from all the world. It may take place in the whole globe of the earth, of which the wealth, population, and improvement may be either gradually increasing or gradually decaying.

The balance of produce and confumption may be conftantly in favour of a nation, though what is called the balance of trade be generally against it. A nation may import to a greater value than it exports for half a century, perhaps, together; the gold and silver which comes into it during all this time may be all immediately sent out of it; its circulating coin may gradually decay, different

different forts of paper money being substituted in its place, and even the debts too which it contracts in the principal nations with whom it deals may be gradually increasing; and yet its real wealth, the exchangeable value of the annual produce of its lands and labour may, during the same period, have been increasing in a much greater proportion. The state of our North American colonies, and the trade which they carried on with Great Britain, before the commencement of the late disturbances, may serve as a proof that this is by no means an impossible supposition.

CHAP. IV.

Of Drawbacks.

TERCHANTS and manufacturers are not contented with the monopoly of the home market, but defire likewise the most extensive foreign sale for their goods. Their country has no jurisdiction in foreign nations, and therefore can seldom procure them any monopoly there. They are generally obliged therefore to content themselves with petitioning for certain encouragements to exportation.

OF these encouragements what are called Drawbacks seem to be the most reasonable. To allow the merchant to draw back upon exportation, either the whole or a part of whatever excise or inland duty is imposed upon domestick industry, can never occasion the exportation of a greater quantity of goods than what would have been exported had no duty been imposed. Such encouragements do not tend to turn towards any particular employment a greater share of the capital of the country, than what would go

BOOK to it of its own accord, but only to hinder the duty from driving away any part of that share to other employments. They tend not to overturn that balance which naturally establishes itself among all the various employments of the fociety; but to hinder it from being overturned by the duty. They tend not to destroy but to preferve, what it is in most cases advantageous to preferve, the natural division and distribution of labour in the fociety.

> THE fame thing may be faid of the drawacks upon the re-exportation of foreign goods imported; which in Great Britain generally amount to by much the largest part of the duty upon importation. Half the duties imposed by what is called the old subsidy, are drawn back univerfally, except upon goods exported to the British plantations; and frequently the whole, almost always a part of those imposed by later subsidies and imposts. Drawbacks were, perhaps, originally granted for the encouragement of the carrying trade, which, as the freight of the ships is frequently paid by foreigners in money, was supposed to be peculiarly fitted for bringing gold and filver into the country. But though the carrying trade certainly deserves no peculiar encouragement, though the motive of the institution was, perhaps, abundantly foolish, the institution itself seems reasonable enough. Such drawbacks cannot force into this trade a greater share of the capital of the country than what would have gone to it of its own accord, had there been no duties upon importation. They only prevent its being excluded altogether by those duties. The carrying trade, though it deserves no preference, ought not to be precluded, but to be left free like all other trades. It is a necessary resource for those capitals which cannot find employment either in the agriculture or in the manufactures of the country, either in its home trade or in its foreign trade of confumption.

THE revenue of the customs, instead of suffering, profits from CHAP. fuch drawbacks, by that part of the duty which is retained. If the whole duties had been retained, the foreign goods upon which they are paid, could feldom have been exported, nor confequently imported, for want of a market. therefore, of which a part is retained, would never have been paid.

THESE reasons seem sufficiently to justify drawbacks, and would justify them, though the whole duties, whether upon the produce of domestick industry, or upon foreign goods, were always drawn back upon exportation. The revenue of excife would in this case, indeed, suffer a little, and that of the customs a good deal more; but the natural balance of industry, the natural division and distribution of labour, which is always more or less disturbed by such duties, would be more nearly re-established by fuch a regulation.

THESE reasons, however, will justify drawbacks only upon exporting goods to those countries which are altogether foreign and independent, not to those in which our merchants and manufacturers enjoy a monopoly. A drawback, for example, upon the exportation of European goods to our American colonies, will not always occasion a greater exportation than what would have taken place without it. By means of the monopoly which our merchants and manufacturers enjoy there, the same quantity might frequently, perhaps, be fent thither, though the whole duties were retained. The drawback, therefore, may frequently be pure loss to the revenue of excise and customs, without altering the state of the trade, or rendering it in any respect more extenfive. How far fuch drawbacks can be justified, as a proper encouragement to the industry of our colonies, or how far it is advantageous

BOOK advantageous to the mother country, that they should be exempted from taxes which are paid by all the rest of their fellow subjects. will appear hereafter when I come to treat of colonies.

> DRAWBACKS however, it must always be understood, are useful only in those cases in which the goods for the exportation of which they are given, are really exported to some foreign country; and not clandestinely reimported into our own. That some drawbacks. particularly those upon tobacco, have frequently been abused in this manner, and have given occasion to many frauds equally hurtful both to the revenue and to the fair trader, is well known.

CHAP. V.

Of Bounties.

OUNTIES upon exportation are, in Great Britain, frequently petitioned for, and fometimes granted to the produce of particular branches of domestick industry. By means of them our merchants and manufacturers, it is pretended, will be enabled to fell their goods as cheap or cheaper than their rivals in the foreign market. A greater quantity, it is faid, will thus be exported, and the balance of trade confequently turned more in favour of our own country. We cannot give our workinen a monopoly in the foreign, as we have done in the home market. force foreigners to buy their goods, as we have done our own countrymen. The next best expedient, it has been thought, therefore, is to pay them for buying. It is in this manner that the mercantile fystem proposes to enrich the whole country, and to put money into all our pockets by means of the balance of trade.

BOUNTIES,

Bounties, it is allowed, ought to be given to those branches of CHAP. trade only which cannot be carried on without them. But every branch of trade in which the merchant can fell his goods for a price which replaces to him, with the ordinary profits of stock, the whole capital employed in preparing and fending them to market, can be carried on without a bounty. Every fuch branch is evidently upon a level with all the other branches of trade which are carried on without bounties, and cannot therefore require one more than they. Those trades only require bounties in which the merchant is obliged to fell his goods for a price which does not replace to him his capital, together with the ordinary profit; or in which he is obliged to fell them for less than it really costs him to fend them to market. The bounty is given in order to make up this loss, and to encourage him to continue, or perhaps to begin, a trade of which the expence is supposed to be greater than the returns, of which every operation eats up a part of the capital employed in it, and which is of fuch a nature, that, if all other trades resembled it, there would soon be no capital left in the country.

THE trades, it is to be observed, which are carried on by means of bounties, are the only ones which can be carried on between two nations for any confiderable time together, in such a manner as that one of them shall always and regularly lose, or fell its goods for less than it really costs to send them to market. But if the bounty did not repay to the merchant what he would otherwise lose upon the price of his goods, his own interest would soon oblige him to employ his stock in another way, or to find out a trade in which the price of the goods would replace to him, with the ordinary profit, the capital employed in fending them to market. The effect of bounties, like that of all the other expedients of the mercantile fystem, can only be to force the trade of a country into a channel

BOOK channel much less advantageous than that in which it would naturally run of its own accord.

THE ingenious and well informed author of the tracts upon the corn trade has shown very clearly, that since the bounty upon the exportation of corn was first established, the price of the corn exported, valued moderately enough, has exceeded that of the corn imported, valued very high, by a much greater fum than the amount of the whole bounties which have been paid during that This, he imagines, upon the true principles of the mercantile fystem, is a clear proof that this forced corn trade is beneficial to the nation; the value of the exportation exceeding that of the importation by a much greater fum than the whole extraordinary expence which the publick has been at in order to get it exported. He does not consider that this extraordinary expence, or the bounty, is the smallest part of the expense which the exportation of corn really costs the society. The capital which the farmer employed in raising it must likewise be taken into the account. Unless the price of the corn when sold in the foreign markets replaces, not only the bounty, but this capital, together with the ordinary profits of stock, the society is a loser by the difference, or the national stock is so much diminished. But the very reason for which it has been thought necessary to grant a bounty is the fupposed insufficiency of the price to do this.

THE average price of corn, it has been faid, has fallen confiderably fince the establishment of the bounty. That the average price of corn began to fall somewhat towards the end of the last century, and has continued to do so during the course of the sixty-four first years of the present, I have already endeavoured to show. But this event, supposing it to be as real as I believe it to be, must have happened in spite of the bounty, and cannot possibly have happened in consequence of it.

In years of plenty, it has already been observed, the bounty, by occasioning an extraordinary exportation, necessarily keeps up the price of corn in the home market above what it would naturally fall to. To do so was the avowed purpose of the institution. In years of scarcity, though the bounty is frequently suspended, yet the great exportation which it occasions in years of plenty, must frequently hinder more or less the plenty of one year from relieving the scarcity of another. Both in years of plenty, and in years of scarcity, therefore, the bounty necessarily tends to raise the money price of corn somewhat higher than it otherwise would be in the home market.

THAT, in the actual state of tillage, the bounty must necessarily have this tendency, will not, I apprehend, be disputed by any reafonable person. But it has been thought by many people, that by securing to the farmer a better price than he could otherwise expect in the actual state of tillage, it tends to encourage tillage; and that the consequent increase of corn may, in a long period of years, lower its price more than the bounty can raise it in the actual state which tillage may, at the end of that period, happen to be in.

I ANSWER, that this might be the case if the effect of the bounty was to raise the real price of corn, or to enable the farmer with an equal quantity of it to maintain a greater number of labourers in the same manner, whether liberal, moderate, or scanty, that other labourers are commonly maintained in his neighbourhood. But neither the bounty, it is evident, nor any other human institution, can have any such effect. It is not the real, but the nominal price of corn only, which can be at all affected by the bounty.

THE real effect of the bounty is not so much to raise the real value of corn, as to degrade the real value of silver; or to make an equal quantity of it exchange for a smaller quantity, not only of corn,

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corn, but of all other commodities: for the money price of corn regulates that of all other commodities.

IT regulates the money price of labour, which must always be such as to enable the labourer to purchase a quantity of corn sufficient to maintain him and his family either in the liberal, moderate, or scanty manner in which the advancing, stationary, or declining circumstances of the society oblige his employers to maintain him.

IT regulates the money price of all the other parts of the rude produce of land, which, in every period of improvement, must bear a certain proportion to that of corn, though this proportion is different in different periods. It regulates, for example, the money price of grass and hay, of butcher's meat, of horses, and the maintenance of horses, of land carriage consequently, or of the greater part of the inland commerce of the country.

By regulating the money price of all the other parts of the rude produce of land, it regulates that of the materials of all manufactures. By regulating the money price of labour, it regulates that of manufacturing art and industry. And by regulating both, it regulates that of the compleat manufacture. The money price of labour, and of every thing that is the produce either of land or labour, must necessarily either rise or fall in proportion to the money price of corn.

THOUGH in consequence of the bounty, therefore, the farmer should be enabled to sell his corn for four shillings the bushel instead of three and sixpence, and to pay his landlord a money rent proportionable to this rise in the money price of his produce; yet, if in consequence of this rise in the price of corn, four shillings will purchase no more goods of any other kind than three and six-

pence

pence would have done before, neither the circumstances of the CHAP. farmer, nor those of the landlord, will be in the smallest degree mended by this change. The farmer will not be able to cultivate better: the landlord will not be able to live better.

THAT degradation in the value of filver which is the effect of the fertility of the mines, and which operates equally, or very near equally, through the greater part of the commercial world, is a matter of very little consequence to any particular country. confequent rife of all money prices, though it does not make those who receive them really richer, does not make them really poorer. A fervice of plate becomes really cheaper, and every thing elfe remains precisely of the same real value as before.

Bur that degradation in the value of filver which, being the effect either of the peculiar situation, or of the political institutions of a particular country, takes place only in that country, is a matter of very great consequence, which, far from tending to make any body really richer, tends to make every body really poorer. The rife in the money price of all commodities, which is in this case peculiar to that country, tends to discourage more or less every fort of industry which is carried on within it, and to enable foreign nations, by furnishing almost all forts of goods for a smaller quantity of silver than its own workmen can afford to do, to underfell them, not only in the foreign, but even in the home market.

IT is the peculiar fituation of Spain and Portugal, as proprietors of the mines, to be the diffributors of gold and filver to all the other countries of Europe. Those metals ought naturally, therefore, to be somewhat cheaper in Spain and Portugal than in any other part of Europe. The difference, however, should be no

more

BOOK more than the amount of the freight and infurance; and, on account of the great value and small bulk of those metals, their freight is no great matter, and their infurance is the fame as that of any other goods of equal value. Spain and Portugal, therefore, could suffer very little from their peculiar situation, if they did not aggravate its disadvantages by their political institutions.

> Spain by taxing, and Portugal by prohibiting the exportation of gold and filver, load that exportation with the expence of fmuggling, and raise the value of those metals in other countries so much more above what it is in their own, by the whole amount of this expence. When you dam up a stream of water, as foon as the dam is full, as much water must run over the dam-head as if there was no dam at all. The prohibition of exportation cannot detain a greater quantity of gold and filver in Spain and Portugal than what they can afford to employ, than what the annual produce of their land and labour will allow them to employ, in coin, plate, gilding, and other ornaments of gold and filver. When they have got this quantity the dam is full, and the whole stream which flows in afterwards must run over. The annual exportation of gold and filver from Spain and Portugal accordingly is, by all accounts, notwithstanding these restraints, very near equal to the whole annual importation. As the water, however, must always be deeper behind the dam-head than before it, so the quantity of gold and filver which these restraints detain in Spain and Portugal must, in proportion to the annual produce of their land and labour, be greater that what is to be found in other countries. The higher and stronger the dam-head, the greater must be the difference in the depth of water behind and before it. The higher the tax, the higher the penalties with which the prohibition is guarded, the more vigilant and fevere the police which looks after the execution of the law, the greater must be the difference in the propor-

proportion of gold and filver to the annual produce of the land CHAP. and labour of Spain and Portugal, and to that of other countries. It is faid accordingly to be very confiderable, and that you frequently find there a profusion of plate in houses, where there is nothing else which would, in other countries, be thought suitable or correspondent to this fort of magnificence. The cheapness of gold and filver, or, what is the fame thing, the dearness of all commodities, which is the necessary effect of this redundancy of the precious metals, discourages both the agriculture and manufactures of Spain and Portugal, and enables foreign nations to supply them with many forts of rude, and with almost all forts of manufactured produce, for a smaller quantity of gold and silver than what they themselves can either raise or make them for at home. The tax and prohibition operate in two different ways. only lower very much the value of the precious metals in Spain and Portugal, but by detaining there a certain quantity of those metals which would otherwise flow over other countries, they keep up their value in those other countries somewhat above what it otherwise would be, and thereby give those countries a double advantage in their commerce with Spain and Portugal. Open the floodgates and there will presently be less water above, and more below, the dam-head, and it will foon come to a level in both places. Remove the tax and the prohibition, and as the quantity of gold and filver will diminish considerably in Spain and Portugal, so it will increase fomewhat in other countries, and the value of those metals, their proportion to the annual produce of land and labour, will foon come to a level, or very near to a level, in all. The loss which Spain and Portugal could fustain by this exportation of their gold and filver would be altogether nominal and imaginary. The nominal value of their goods, and of the annual produce of their land and labour would fall, and would be expressed or represented by a smaller quantity of silver than before; but their real value would

BOOK be the same as before, and would be sufficient to maintain, command, and employ, the fame quantity of labour. As the nominal value of their goods would fall, the real value of what remained of their gold and filver would rife, and a fmaller quantity of those metals would answer all the same purposes of commerce and circulation which had employed a greater quantity before. The gold and filver which would go abroad would not go abroad for nothing, but would bring back an equal value of goods of some kind or another. Those goods too would not be all matters of mere luxury and expence, to be confumed by idle people who produce nothing in return for their consumption. As the real wealth and revenue of idle people would not be augmented by this extraordinary exportation of gold and filver, fo neither would their confumption be much augmented by it. Those goods would, probably, the greater part of them, and certainly some part of them, confift in materials, tools, and provisions, for the employment and maintenance of industrious people, who would reproduce, with a profit, the full value of their confumption. A part of the dead stock of the society would thus be turned into active stock, and would put into motion a greater quantity of industry than had been employed before. The annual produce of their land and labour would immediately be augmented a little, and in a few years would, probably, be augmented a great deal; their industry being thus relieved from one of the most oppressive burdens which it at prefent labours under.

> THE bounty upon the exportation of corn necessarily operates exactly in the same way as this absurd policy of Spain and Portugal. Whatever be the actual state of tillage, it renders our corn fomewhat dearer in the home market than it otherwise would be in that state, and somewhat cheaper in the foreign; and as the average money price of corn regulates more or less that of

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all other commodities, it lowers the value of filver confiderably in the one, and tends to raife it a little in the other. It enables foreigners, the Dutch in particular, not only to eat our corn cheaper than they otherwife could do, but fometimes to eat it cheaper than even our own people can do upon the fame occafions; as we are affured by an excellent authority, that of Sir Mathew Decker. It hinders our own workmen from furnithing their goods for fo fmall a quantity of filver as they otherwife might do; and enables the Dutch to furnish their's for a fmailer. It tends to render our manufactures fomewhat dearer in every market, and their's fomewhat cheaper than they otherwife would be, and confequently to give their industry a double advantage over our own.

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The bounty, as it raises in the home market, not the real, but only the nominal price of our corn, as it augments, not the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can maintain and employ, but only the quantity of filver which it will exchange for, it discourages our manufactures without rendering the smallest real service either to our farmers or country gentlemen. It puts, indeed, a little more money into the pockets of both, and it will perhaps be somewhat difficult to persuade the greater part of them that this is not rendering them a very real service. But if this money sinks in its value, in the quantity of labour, provisions, and commodities of all different kinds which it is capable of purchasing, as much as it rises in its quantity, the service will be merely nominal and imaginary.

THERE is, perhaps, but one set of men in the whole commonwealth to whom the bounty either was or could be really serviceable. These were the corn merchants, the exporters and importers of corn. In years of plenty the bounty necessarily occasioned

BOOK IV. occasioned a greater exportation than would otherwise have taken place; and by hindering the plenty of one year from relieving the scarcity of another, it occasioned in years of scarcity a greater importation than would otherwise have been necessary. It increased the business of the corn merchant in both, and in years of scarcity it not only enabled him to import a greater quantity, but to sell it for a better price, and consequently with a greater profit than he could otherwise have made, if the plenty of one year had not been more or less hindered from relieving the scarcity of another. It is in this sett of men, accordingly, that I have observed the greatest zeal for the continuance or renewal of the bounty.

Our country gentlemen, when they imposed the high duties upon the importation of foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition, and when they established the bounty, seem to have imitated the conduct of our manufacturers. By the one institution, they secured to themselves the monopoly of the home market, and by the other they endeavoured to prevent that market from ever being overstocked with their commodity. By both they endeavoured to raise its real value, in the same manner as our manufacturers had, by the like institutions, raised the real value of many different forts of manufactured goods. They did not perhaps attend to the great and essential difference which nature has established between corn and almost every other fort of goods. When either by the monopoly of the home market, or by a bounty upon exportation, you enable our woollen or linen manufacturers to fell their goods for somewhat a better price than they otherwise could get for them, you raise, not only the nominal, but the real price of those goods. You render them equivalent to a greater quantity of labour and subsistence, you increase, not only the nominal, but the real profit, the real wealth and revenue

revenue of those manufacturers, and you enable them either to CHAP. live better themselves, or to employ a greater quantity of labour in those particular manufactures. You really encourage those manufactures, and direct towards them a greater quantity of the industry of the country, than what would probably go to them of its own accord. But when by the like institutions you raise the nominal or money price of corn, you do not raise its real value. You do not increase the real wealth, the real revenue either of our farmers or country gentlemen. You do not encourage the growth of corn, because you do not enable them to maintain and employ more labourers in raising it. The nature of things has stamped upon corn a real value which no human institution can alter. No bounty upon exportation, no monopoly of the home market can raise it. The freest competition cannot lower it. Through the world in general that value is equal to the quantity of labour which it can maintain, and in every particular place it is equal to the quantity of labour which it can maintain in the way, whether liberal, moderate, or fcanty, in which labour is commonly maintained in that place. Woollen or linen cloth are not the regulating commodities by which the real value of all other commodities must be finally measured and determined. Corn is. The real value of every other commodity is finally measured and determined by the proportion which its average money price bears to the average money price of corn. The real value of corn does not vary with those variations in its average money price, which fometimes occur from one century to It is the real value of filver which varies with them. another.

Bounties upon the exportation of any home-made commodity are liable, first, to that general objection which may be made to all the different expedients of the mercantile system; the objection of forcing some part of the industry of the country into a channel

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BOOK less advantageous than that in which it would run of its own accord: and, fecondly, to the particular objection of forcing it, not only into a channel that is less advantageous, but into one that is actually disadvantageous; the trade which cannot be carried on but by means of a bounty being necessarily a losing trade. The bounty upon the exportation of corn is liable to this further objection, that it can in no respect promote the raising of that particular commodity of which it was meant to encourage the production. When our country gentlemen, therefore, demanded the eftablishment of the bounty, though they acted in imitation of our merchants and manufacturers, they did not act with that compleat comprehension of their own interest which commonly directs the conduct of those two other orders of people. They loaded the publick revenue with a very confiderable expence; but they did not in any respect increase the real value of their own commodity. and by lowering fomewhat the real value of filver they discouraged in some degree the general industry of the country, and instead of advancing, retarded more or less the improvement of their own lands, which necessarily depends upon the general industry of the country.

> To encourage the production of any commodity, a bounty upon production, one should imagine, would have a more direct operation than one upon exportation. It has, however, been more rarely granted. The prejudices established by the commercial fystem have taught us to believe that national wealth arises more immediately from exportation than from production. has been more favoured accordingly, as the more immediate means of bringing money into the country. Bounties upon production, it has been faid too, have been found by experience more liable to frauds than those upon exportation. How far this is true, I know not. That bounties upon exportation have been abused to many fraudulent

fraudulent purposes, is very well known. But it is not the interest CHAP. of merchants and manufacturers, the great inventors of all these expedients, that the home market should be overstocked with their goods, an event which a bounty upon production might fometimes occasion. A bounty upon exportation, by enabling them to fend abroad the furplus part, and to keep up the price of what remains in the home market, effectually prevents this. Of all the expedients of the mercantile system, accordingly, it is the one of which they are the fondest. I have known the different undertakers of fome particular works agree privately among themselves to give a bounty out of their own pockets upon the exportation of a certain proportion of the goods which they dealt in. This expedient succeeded so well that it more than doubled the price of their goods in the home market, notwithstanding a very considerable increase in the produce. The operation of the bounty upon corn must have been wonderfully different, if it has lowered the money price of that commodity.

Something like a bounty upon production, however, has been granted upon fome particular occasions. The encouragements given to the white-herring and whale-fisheries may, perhaps, be considered as somewhat of this nature. They tend directly to render the goods cheaper in the home market than they otherwise would be in the actual state of production. In other respects their effects are the same as those of bounties upon exportation. By means of them a part of the capital of the country is employed in bringing goods to market, of which the price does not repay the cost, together with the ordinary profits of stock. But though the bounties to those fisheries do not contribute to the opulence of the nation, they may perhaps be defended as conducing to its defence, by augmenting the number of its failors and shipping. This may frequently be done by means of such bounties,



BOOK bounties, at a much smaller expence than by keeping up a great flanding navy, if I may use such an expression, in time of peace, in the same mauner as a standing army.

> Some other bounties may be vindicated perhaps upon the fame principle. It is of importance that the kingdom should depend as little as possible upon its neighbours for the manufactures necessary for its defence; and if these cannot otherwise be maintained at home, it is reasonable that all other branches of industry should be taxed in order to support them. The bounties upon the importation of naval stores from America, upon British made fail-cloth, and upon British made gunpowder, may perhaps all three be vindicated upon this principle. The first is a bounty upon the production of America, for the use of Great Britain. The two others are bounties upon exportation.

> WHAT is called a bounty is fometimes no more than a drawback, and consequently is not liable to the same objections as what is properly a bounty. The bounty, for example, upon refined fugar exported may be confidered as a drawback of the duties upon the brown and muscovado sugars, from which it is made. The bounty upon wrought filk exported, a drawback of the duties upon raw and thrown filk imported. The bounty upon gunpowder exported, a drawback of the duties upon brimstone and faltpetre imported. In the language of the customs those allowances only are called drawbacks, which are given upon goods exported in the fame form in which they are imported. When that form has been altered by manufacture of any kind, they are called bounties.

> PREMIUMS given by the publick to artists and manufacturers who excell in their particular occupations, are not liable to the same objections as bounties. By encouraging extraordinary dexterity

terity and ingenuity, they serve to keep up the emulation of the CHAP. workmen actually employed in those respective occupations, and are not considerable enough to turn towards any one of them a greater share of the capital of the country than what would go to it of its own accord. Their tendency is not to overturn the natural balance of employments, but to render the work which is done in each as perfect and compleat as possible. expence of premiums, befides, is very trifling; that of bounties very great. The bounty upon corn alone has fometimes cost the publick in one year, more than three hundred thousand pounds.

Bounties are fometimes called premiums, as drawbacks are fometimes called bounties. But we must in all cases attend to the nature of the thing, without paying any regard to the word.

I CANNOT conclude this chapter concerning bounties, without observing that the praises which have been bestowed upon the law which establishes the bounty upon the exportation of corn, and upon that system of regulations which is connected with it, are altogether unmerited. A particular examination of the nature of the corn trade, and of the principal British laws which relate to it, will sufficiently demonstrate the truth of this affertion. The great importance of this subject must justify the length of the digression.

THE trade of the corn merchant is composed of four different branches, which, though they may fometimes be all carried on by the same person, are in their own nature four separate and distinct trades. These are, first, the trade of the inland dealer; secondly, that of the merchant importer for home confumption; thirdly, that of the merchant exporter of home produce for foreign confumption; and, fourthly, that of the merchant carrier, or of the importer of corn in order to export it again.

I. THE

BOOK I. THE interest of the inland dealer, and that of the great body of the people, how opposite soever they may at first fight appear, are, even in years of the greatest scarcity, exactly the same. his interest to raise the price of his corn as high as the real scarcity of the feason requires, and it can never be his interest to raise it higher. By raifing the price he discourages the consumption, and puts every body more or less, but particularly the inferior ranks of people, upon thrift and good management. If, by raising it too high, he discourages the consumption so much that the supply of the feafon is likely to go beyond the confumption of the feafon, and to last for some time after the next crop begins to come in, he runs the hazard, not only of losing a considerable part of his corn by natural causes, but of being obliged to sell what remains of it for much less than what he might have had for it several months before. If by not raising the price high enough he discourages the confumption fo little, that the supply of the season is likely to fall fhort of the confumption of the feafon, he not only lofes a part of the profit which he might otherwise have made, but he exposes the people to suffer before the end of the season, instead of the hardships of a dearth, the dreadful horrors of a famine. It is the interest of the people that their daily, weekly, and monthly confumption, should be proportioned as exactly as possible to the supply of the feafon. The interest of the inland corn dealer is the fame. By fupplying them, as nearly as he can judge, in this proportion, he is likely to fell all his corn for the highest price, and with the greatest profit; and his knowledge of the state of the crop, and of his daily, weekly, and monthly fales, enable him to judge, with more or less accuracy, how far they really are supplied in this manner. Without intending the interest of the people, he is necessarily led, by a regard to his own interest, to treat them, even in years of scarcity, pretty much in the same manner as the prudent master of a vessel is sometimes obliged to treat his crew. When

he foresces that provisions are likely to run short, he puts them CHAP. upon short allowance. Though from excess of caution he should fometimes do this without any real necessity, yet all the inconveniencies which his crew can thereby fuffer are inconfiderable in comparison of the danger, misery, and ruin, to which they might fometimes be exposed by a less provident conduct. Though from excess of avarice, in the same manner, the inland corn merchang should fometimes raise the price of his corn somewhat higher than the scarcity of the season requires, yet all the inconveniencies which the people can fuffer from this conduct, which effectually fecures them from a famine in the end of the feafon, are inconsiderable in comparison of what they might have been exposed to by a more. liberal way of dealing in the beginning of it. The corn merchant himself is likely to suffer the most by this excess of avarice; not only from the indignation which it generally excites against him, but, though he should escape the effects of this indignation, from the quantity of corn which it necessarily leaves upon his hands in the end of the feafon, and which, if the next feafon happens to prove favourable, he must always fell for a much lower price than he might otherwise have had.

Were it possible, indeed, for one great company of merchants to posses themselves of the whole crop of an extensive country, it might, perhaps, be their interest to deal with it as the Dutch are said to do with the spiceries of the Molluccas, to destroy or throw away a considerable part of it, in order to keep up the price of the rest. But it is scarce possible, even by the violence of law, to establish such an extensive monopoly with regard to corn; and, whereever the law leaves the trade free, it is of all commodities the least liable to be engrossed or monopolised by the force of a few large capitals, which buy up the greater part of it. Not only its value far exceeds what the capitals of a few private men are capable of

BOOK purchasing, but, supposing they were capable of purchasing it, the manner in which it is produced renders this purchase altogether impracticable. As in every civilized country it is the commodity of which the annual confumption is the greatest, so a greater quantity of industry is annually employed in producing corn than in producing any other commodity. When it first comes from the ground too, it is necessarily divided among a greater number of owners than any other commodity; and these owners can never be collected into one place like a number of independent manufacturers, but are necessarily scattered through all the different corners of the country. These first owners either immediately supply the confumers in their own neighbourhood, or they supply other inland dealers who supply those consumers. The inland dealers in corn, therefore, including both the farmer and the baker, are necessiarily more numerous than the dealers in any other commodity, and their dispersed situation renders it altogether impossible for them to enter into any general combination. If in a year of fcarcity, therefore, any of them should find that he had a good deal more corn upon hand than, at the current price, he could hope to dispose of before the end of the feafon, he would never think of keeping up this price to his own loss, and to the fole benefit of his rivals and competitors, but would immediately lower it in order to get rid of his corn before the new crop began to come in. The fame motives, the same interests, which would thus regulate the conduct of any one dealer, would regulate that of every other, and oblige them all in general to fell their corn at the price which, according to the best of their judgement, was most suitable to the scarcity or plenty of the feafon.

> WHOEVER examines, with attention, the history of the dearths and famines which have afflicted any part of Europe, during either the course of the present or that of the two preceeding centuries,

of several of which we have pretty exact accounts, will find, I CHAP. believe, that a dearth never has arisen from any combination among the inland dealers in corn, nor from any other cause but a real scarcity, occasioned sometimes perhaps, and in some particular places, by the waste of war, but in by far the greatest number of cases, by the fault of the seasons; and that a famine has never arisen from any other cause but the violence of government attempting. by improper means, to remedy the inconveniencies of a dearth.

In an extensive corn country, between all the different parts of which there is a free commerce and communication, the scarcity occasioned by the most unfavourable seasons can never be so great as to produce a famine; and the scantiest crop, if managed with frugality and economy, will maintain, through the year, the fame number of people that are commonly fed in a more affluent manner by one of moderate plenty. The feasons most unfavourable to the crop are those of excessive drought or excessive rain. But, as corn grows equally upon high and low lands, upon grounds that are disposed to be too wet, and upon those that are disposed to be too dry, either the drought or the rain which is hurtful to one part of the country is favourable to another; and though both in the wet and in the dry feason the crop is a good deal less than in one more properly tempered, yet in both what is lost in one part of the country is in some measure compensated by what is gained in the other. In rice countries, where the crop not only requires a very moist foil, but where in a certain period of its growing it must be laid under water, the effects of a drought are much more difmal. Even in fuch countries, however, the drought is, perhaps, scarce ever so universal as necessarily to occasion a famine, if the government would allow a free trade. The drought in Bengal, a few years ago, might probably have occasioned a very great dearth. Some improper regulations, some injudicious restraints imposed by the

tributed, perhaps, to turn that dearth into a famine.

When the government, in order to remedy the inconveniencies of a dearth, orders all the dealers to fell their corn at what it supposes a reasonable price, it either hinders them from bringing it to market, which may sometimes produce a famine, even in the beginning of the season; or if they bring it thither, it enables the people, and thereby encourages them to consume it so fast, as must necessarily produce a famine before the end of the season. The unlimited, unrestrained freedom of the corn trade, as it is the only effectual preventative of the miseries of a famine, so it is the best palliative of the inconveniencies of a dearth; for the inconveniencies of a real scarcity cannot be remedied; they can only be palliated. No trade deserves more the full protection of the law, and no trade requires it so much; because no trade is so much exposed to popular odium.

In years of scarcity the inferior ranks of people impute their distress to the avarice of the corn merchant, who becomes the object of their hatred and indignation. Instead of making profit upon such occasions, therefore, he is often in danger of being utterly ruined, and of having his magazines plundered and destroyed by their violence. It is in years of scarcity, however, when prices are high, that the corn merchant expects to make his principal profit. He is generally in contract with some farmers to surnish him for a certain number of years with a certain quantity of corn at a certain price. This contract price is settled according to what is supposed to be the moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average price, which, before the late years of scarcity, was commonly about eight and twenty shillings for the quarter of wheat, and for that of other grain in proportion.

In years of scarcity, therefore, the corn merchant buys a great part of CHAP. his corn for the ordinary price, and fells it for a much higher. That this extraordinary profit, however, is no more than sufficient to put his trade upon a fair level with other trades, and to compenfate the many losses which he sustains upon other occasions, both from the perishable nature of the commodity itself, and from the frequent and unforeseen fluctuations of its price, seems evident enough, from this fingle circumstance, that great fortunes are as feldom made in this as in any other trade. The popular odium, however, which attends it in years of fearcity, the only years in which it can be very profitable, renders people of character and fortune averse to enter into it. It is abandoned to an inferior sett of dealers; and millers, bakers, mealmen and meal factors, together with a number of wretched hucksters, are almost the only middle people that, in the home market, come between the grower and the confumer.

THE ancient policy of Europe, instead of discountenancing this popular odium against a trade so beneficial to the publick, seems, on the contrary, to have authorifed and encouraged it.

By the 5th and 6th of Edward VI. cap. 14. it was enacted. That whoever should buy any corn or grain with intent to sell it again, should be reputed an unlawful engrosser, and should. for the first fault, suffer two months imprisonment, and forfeit the value of the corn; for the fecond, fuffer fix months imprisonment, and forfeit double the value; and for the third, be fet in the pillory, fuffer imprisonment during the king's pleasure, and forfeit all his goods and chattels. The antient policy of most other parts of Europe was no better than that of England.

BOOK IV. Our ancestors feem to have imagined that the people would buy their corn cheaper of the farmer than of the corn merchant, who, they were afraid, would require, over and above the price which he paid to the farmer, an exorbitant profit to himself. They endeavoured, therefore, to annihilate his trade altogether. They even endeavoured to hinder as much as possible any middle man of any kind from coming in between the grower and the confumer; and this was the meaning of the many restraints which they imposed upon the trade of those whom they called kidders or carriers of corn, a trade which nobody was allowed to exercise without a licence ascertaining his qualifications as a man of probity and fair dealing. The authority of three justices of the peace was, by the statute of Edward VI. necessary, in order to grant this licence. But even this restraint was afterwards thought infufficient, and by a statute of Elizabeth, the privilege of granting it was confined to the quarter-fessions.

The antient policy of Europe endeavoured in this manner to regulate agriculture, the great trade of the country, by maxims quite different from those which it established with regard to manufactures, the great trade of the towns. By leaving the farmer no other customers but either the consumer or his immediate factors, the kidders and carriers of corn, it endeavoured to force him to exercise the trade, not only of a farmer, but of a corn merchant or corn retailer. On the contrary, it in many cases prohibited the manufacturer from exercising the trade of a shop-keeper, or from selling his own goods by retail. It meant by the one law to promote the general interest of the country, or to render corn cheap, without, perhaps, its being well understood how this was to be done. By the other it meant to promote that of a particular order of men, the shopkeepers, who would be so much

much underfold by the manufacturer, it was supposed, that their CHAP. trade would be ruined if he was allowed to retail at all.

THE manufacturer, however, though he had been allowed to keep a shop, and to fell his own goods by retail, could not have underfold the common shopkeeper. Whatever part of his capital he might have placed in his shop, he must have withdrawn it from his manufacture. In order to carry on his business on a level with that of other people, as he must have had the profit of a manufacturer on the one part, fo he must have had that of a shopkeeper upon the other. Let us suppose, for example, that in the particular town where he lived, ten per cent. was the ordinary profit both of manufacturing and shopkeeping stock; he must in this case have charged upon every piece of his own goods which he fold in his shop, a profit of twenty per cent. When he carried them from his workhouse to his shop, he must have valued them at the price for which he could have fold them to a dealer or shopkeeper, who would have bought them by wholesale. If he valued them lower, he lost a part of the profit of his manufacturing capital. When again he fold them from his shop, unless he got the same price at which a shopkeeper would have fold them, he lost a part of the profit of his shopkeeping capital. Though he might appear, therefore, to make a double profit upon the same piece of goods, yet as these goods made successively a part of two distinct capitals, he made but a fingle profit upon the whole capital employed about them; and if he made less than this profit, he was a lofer, or did not employ his whole capital with the same advantage as the greater part of his neighbours.

WHAT the manufacturer was prohibited to do, the farmer was in some measure enjoined to do; to divide his capital between two different employments; to keep one part of it in his grana-

BOOK ries and stack yard, for supplying the occasional demands of the market; and to employ the other in the cultivation of his land. But as he could not afford to employ the latter for less than the ordinary profits of farming stock, so he could as little afford to employ the former for less than the ordinary profits of mercantile stock. Whether the stock which really carried on the business of the corn merchant belonged to the person who was called a farmer. or to the person who was called a corn merchant, an equal profit was in both cases requisite, in order to indemnify its owner for employing it in this manner; in order to put his business upon a level with other trades, and in order to hinder him from having an interest to change it as soon as possible for some other. The farmer, therefore, who was thus forced to exercise the trade of a corn merchant, could not afford to fell his corn cheaper than any other corn merchant would have been obliged to do in the case of a free competition.

> THE dealer who can employ his whole stock in one single branch of business, has an advantage of the same kind with the workman who can employ his whole labour in one fingle operation. As the latter acquires a dexterity which enables him, with the same two hands, to perform a much greater quantity of work; so the former acquires so easy and ready a method of transacting his business, of buying and disposing of his goods, that with the same capital he can transact a much greater quantity of business. As the one can commonly afford his work a good deal cheaper, so the other can commonly afford his goods somewhat cheaper than if his stock and attention were both employed about a greater variety of objects. The greater part of manufacturers could not afford to retail their own goods fo cheap as a vigilant and active shopkeeper, whose sole business it was to buy them by wholesale, and to retail them again. The greater part of farmers could still less afford to retail their own corn, or to supply the

the inhabitants of a town, at perhaps four or five miles distance CHAP. from the greater part of them, so cheap as a vigilant and active corn merchant, whose sole business it was to purchase corn by wholefale, to collect it into a great magazine, and to retail it again.

THE law which prohibited the manufacturer from exercifing the trade of a shopkeeper, endeavoured to force this division in the employment of stock to go on faster than it might otherwise have done. The law which obliged the farmer to exercise the trade of a corn merchant, endeavoured to hinder it from going on fo fast. Both laws were evident violations of natural liberty, and therefore unjust; and they were both too as impolitick as they were unjust. It is the interest of every society, that things of this kind should never either be forced or obstructed. The man who employs either his labour or his stock in a greater variety of ways than his fituation renders necessary, can never hurt his neighbour by underfelling him. He may hurt himself, and he generally does fo. Jack of all trades will never be rich, fays the proverb. But the law ought always to trust people with the care of their own interest, as in their local situations they must generally be able to judge better of it than the legislator can do. The law, however, which obliged the farmer to exercise the trade of a corn merchant, was by far the most pernicious of the two.

IT obstructed, not only that division in the employment of stock which is so advantageous to every society, but it obstructed likewise the improvement and cultivation of the land. By obliging the farmer to carry on two trades instead of one, it forced him to divide his capital into two parts, of which one only could be employed in cultivation. But if he had been at liberty to fell his whole crop to a corn merchant as fast as he could thresh it out,

BOOK his whole capital might have returned immediately to the land, and have been employed in buying more cattle, and hiring more fervants, in order to improve and cultivate it better. But by being obliged to fell his corn by retail, he was obliged to keep a great part of his capital in his granaries and stack yard through the year, and could not, therefore, cultivate fo well as with the fame capital he might otherwise have done. This law, therefore. necessarily obstructed the improvement of the land, and, instead of tending to render corn cheaper, must have tended to render it scarcer, and therefore dearer, than it would otherwise have been.

> AFTER the business of the farmer, that of the corn merchant is in reality the trade which, if properly protected and encouraged, would contribute the most to the raising of corn. would support the trade of the farmer in the same manner as the trade of the wholesale dealer supports that of the manufacturer.

> THE wholefale dealer, by affording a ready market to the manufacturer, by taking his goods off his hand as fast as he care make them, and by fometimes even advancing their price to him before he has made them, enables him to keep his whole capital, and sometimes even more than his whole capital, constantly employed in manufacturing, and consequently to manufacture a much greater quantity of goods than if he was obliged to difpose of them himself to the immediate consumers, or even to the retailers. As the capital of the wholesale merchant too is generally fufficient to replace that of many manufacturers, this intercourse between him and them interests the owner of a large capital to support the owners of a great number of small ones, and to assist them in those losses and misfortunes which might otherwise prove ruinous to them.

An intercourse of the same kind universally established between CHAP. the farmers and the corn merchants, would be attended with effects equally beneficial to the farmers. They would be enabled to keep their whole capitals, and even more than their whole capitals, constantly employed in cultivation. In case of any of those accidents, to which no trade is more liable than theirs, they would find in their ordinary customer, the wealthy corn merchant, a person who had both an interest to support them, and the ability to do it, and they would not, as at present, be entirely dependent upon the forbearance of their landlord, or the mercy of his steward. Were it possible, as perhaps it is not, to establish this intercourse universally, and all at once, were it posfible to turn all at once the whole farming stock of the kingdom to its proper business, the cultivation of land, withdrawing it from every other employment into which any part of it may be at present diverted, and were it possible, in order to support and affift upon occasion the operations of this great stock, to provide all at once another stock almost equally great, it is not perhaps very easy to imagine how great, how extensive, and how sudden would be the improvement which this change of circumstances would alone produce upon the whole face of the country.

THE statute of Edward VI. therefore, by prohibiting as much as poslible any middle man from coming in between the grower and the confumer, endeavoured to annihilate a trade of which the free exercise is not only the best palliative of the inconveniencies of a dearth, but the best preventative of that calamity: after the trade of the farmer, no trade contributing fo much to the growing of corn as that of the corn merchant.

THE rigour of this law was afterwards foftened by feveral subsequent statutes, which successively permitted the engrossing of corn when the price of wheat should not exceed twenty, twentyfour, thirty-two, and forty shillings the quarter. At last, by the

BOOK IV. r5th of Charles II. c. 7. the engrossing or buying of corn in order to sell it again, as long as the price of wheat did not exceed forty-eight shillings the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion, was declared lawful to all persons not being forestallers, that is, not selling again in the same market within three months. All the freedom which the trade of the inland corn dealer has ever yet enjoyed, was bestowed upon it by this statute. The statute of the twelsth of the present king, which repeals almost all the other antient laws against engrossers and forestallers, does not repeal the restrictions of this particular statute, which therefore still continue in force.

This statute, however, authorizes in some measure two very absurd popular prejudices.

First, it supposes that when the price of wheat has risen so high as forty-eight shillings the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion, corn is likely to be so engrossed as to hurt the people. But from what has been already said, it seems evident enough that corn can at no price be so engrossed by the inland dealers as to hurt the people; and forty-eight shillings the quarter besides, though it may be considered as a very high price, yet in years of scarcity it is a price which frequently takes place immediately after harvest, when scarce any part of the new crop can be sold off, and when it is impossible even for ignorance to suppose that any part of it can be so engrossed as to hurt the people.

SECONDLY, it supposes that there is a certain price at which corn is likely to be forestalled, that is, bought up in order to be sold again soon after in the same market, so as to hurt the people. But if a merchant ever buys up corn, either going to a particular market or in a particular market, in order to sell it again soon after in the same mar-

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CHAP.

ket, it must be because he judges that the market cannot be so liberally supplied through the whole season as upon that particular occafion, and that the price, therefore, must soon rise. If he judges wrong in this, and if the price does not rife, he not only loses the whole profit of the stock which he employs in this manner, but a part of the stock itself, by the expence and loss which necessarily attends the storing and keeping of corn. He hurts himself, therefore, much more effentially than he can hurt even the particular people whom he may hinder from supplying themselves upon that particular market day, because they may afterwards supply themselves just as cheap upon any other market day. If he judges right, instead of hurting the great body of the people, he renders them a most important service. By making them feel the inconveniencies of a dearth somewhat earlier than they otherwise might do, he prevents their feeling them afterwards fo feverely as they certainly would do, if the cheapness of price encouraged them to consume faster than fuited the real fcarcity of the feafon. When the fcarcity is real, the best thing that can be done for the people is to divide the inconveniencies of it as equally as possible through all the different months, and weeks, and days of the year. The interest of the corn merchant makes him study to do this as exactly as he can; and as no other person can have either the same interest, or the same knowledge, or the same abilities to do it so exactly as he, this most important operation of commerce ought to be trusted entirely to him; or, in other words, the corn trade, fo far at least as concerns the supply of the home market, ought to be left perfectly free.

THE popular fear of engrossing and forestalling may be compared to the popular terrors and suspicions of witchcraft. The unfortunate wretches accused of this latter crime were not more innocent of the misfortunes imputed to them, than those who have

BOOK IV. have been accused of the former. The law which put an end to all prosecutions against witchcrast, which put it out of any man's power to gratify his own malice by accusing his neighbour of that imaginary crime, seems effectually to have put an end to those sears and suspicions, by taking away the great cause which encouraged and supported them. The law which should restore entire freedom to the inland trade of corn, would probably prove as effectual to put an end to the popular sears of engrossing and forestalling.

THE 15th of Charles II. c. 7. however, with all its imperfections, has perhaps contributed more both to the plentiful supply of the home market, and to the increase of tillage, than any other law in the statute book. It is from this law that the inland corn trade has derived all the liberty and protection which it has ever yet enjoyed; and both the supply of the home market, and the interest of tillage, are much more effectually promoted by the inland, than either by the importation or exportation trade.

THE proportion of the average quantity of all forts of grain imported into Great Britain to that of all forts of grain confumed, it has been computed by the author of the tracts upon the corn trade, does not exceed that of one to five hundred and feventy. For supplying the home market, therefore, the importance of the inland trade must be to that of the importation trade as five hundred and seventy to one.

THE average quantity of all forts of grain exported from Great Britain does not, according to the same author, exceed the one and thirtieth part of the annual produce. For the encouragement of tillage, therefore, by providing a market for the home produce, the importance of the inland trade must be to that of the exportation trade as thirty to one.

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I HAVE no great faith in political arithmetick, and I mean not CHAP. to warrant the exactness of either of these computations. I mention them only in order to show of how much less consequence, in the opinion of the most judicious and experienced persons, the foreign trade of corn is than the home trade. The great cheapness of corn in the years immediately preceeding the establishment of the bounty, may perhaps, with reason, be ascribed in some measure to the operation of this statute of Charles II. which had been enacted about five and twenty years before, and which had therefore full time to produce its effect.

A VERY few words will sufficiently explain all that I have to say concerning the other three branches of the corn trade.

II. THE trade of the merchant importer of foreign corn for home confumption, evidently contributes to the immediate supply of the home market, and must so far be immediately beneficial to the great body of the people. It tends, indeed, to lower fomewhat the average money price of corn, but not to diminish its real value. or the quantity of labour which it is capable of maintaining. importation was at all times free, our farmers and country gentlemen would, probably, one year with another, get less money for their corn than they do at present, when importation is at most times in effect prohibited; but the money which they got would be of more value, would buy more goods of all other kinds, and would employ more labour. Their real wealth, their real revenue, therefore, would be the same as at present, though it might be expressed by a smaller quantity of silver; and they would neither be disabled nor discouraged from cultivating corn as much as they do at present. On the contrary, as the rise in the real value of filver, in confequence of lowering the money price of corn, lowers somewhat the money price of all other commodities, it gives the industry

BOOK industry of the country where it takes place some advantage in all foreign markets, and thereby tends to encourage and increase that industry. But the extent of the home market for corn must be in proportion to the general industry of the country where it grows, or to the number of those who produce something else, and therefore have fomething elfe, or what comes to the fame thing, the price of fomething elfe, to give in exchange for corn. But in every country the home market, as it is the nearest and most convenient, so is it likewise the greatest and most important market for corn. That rife in the real value of filver, therefore, which is that effect of lowering the average money price of corn, tends to enlarge the greatest and most important market for corn, and thereby to encourage, instead of discouraging, its growth.

> By the 22d of Charles II. c. 13. the importation of wheat, whenever the price in the home market did not exceed fifty-three shillings and four pence the quarter, was subjected to a duty of fixteen shillings the quarter; and to a duty of eight shillings whenever the price did not exceed four pounds. The former of these two prices has, for more than a century past, taken place only in times of very great scarcity; and the latter has, so far as I know, not taken place at all. Yet, till wheat had rifen above this latter price, it was by this statute subjected to a very high duty; and, till it had rifen above the former, to a duty which amounted to a prohibition. The importation of other forts of grain was restrained by duties proportionably high.

> THE diffress which, in years of scarcity, the strict execution of this statute might have brought upon the people, would probably have been very great. But, upon fuch occasions, its execution was generally suspended by temporary statutes, which permitted, for a limited time, the importation of foreign corn. The necessity of thefe

these temporary statutes sufficiently demonstrates the impropriety C I of this general one.

THESE restraints upon importation, though prior to the establishment of the bounty, were dictated by the same spirit, by the same principles, which afterwards enacted that regulation. How hurtful soever in themselves, these or some other restraints upon importation became necessary in consequence of that regulation. If, when wheat was either below forty-eight shillings the quarter, or not much above it, foreign corn could have been imported either duty free, or upon paying only a small duty, it might have been exported again, with the benefit of the bounty, to the great loss of the publick revenue, and to the intire perversion of the institution, of which the object was to extend the market for the home growth, not that for the growth of foreign countries.

III. THE trade of the merchant exporter of corn for foreign confumption, certainly does not contribute directly to the plentiful supply of the home market. It does so, however, indirectly. From whatever fource this fupply may be usually drawn, whether from home growth or from foreign importation, unless more corn is either usually grown, or usually imported into the country, than what is usually consumed in it, the supply of the home market can never be very plentiful. But, unless the surplus can, in all ordinary cases, be exported, the growers will be careful never to grow more, and the importers never to import more, than what the bare confumption of the home market requires. That market will very feldom be overstocked; but it will generally be understocked, the people, whose business it is to supply it, being generally afraid lest their goods should be left upon their hands. The prohibition of exportation limits the improvement and cultivation of the country to what the supply of its own inhabitants requires.

BOOK requires. The freedom of exportation enables it to extend its cultivation for the supply of foreign nations.

By the 12th of Charles II. c. 4. the exportation of corn was permitted whenever the price of wheat did not exceed forty shillings the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion. By the 15th of the same prince this liberty was extended till the price of wheat exceeded forty-eight shillings the quarter; and by the 22d, to all higher prices. A poundage, indeed, was to be paid to the king upon such exportation. But all grain was rated so low in the book of rates, that this poundage amounted only upon wheat to a shilling, upon oats to sour-pence, and upon all other grain to sixpence the quarter. By the 1st of William and Mary, the act which established the bounty, this small duty was virtually taken off whenever the price of wheat did not exceed forty-eight shillings the quarter; and by the 1sth and 12th of William III. c. 20. it was expressly taken off at all higher prices.

The trade of the merchant exporter was in this manner, not only encouraged by a bounty, but rendered much more free than that of the inland dealer. By the last of these statutes, corn could be engrossed at any price for exportation; but it could not be engrossed for inland sale, except when the price did not exceed forty-eight shillings the quarter. The interest of the inland dealer, however, it has already been shown, can never be opposite to that of the great body of the people. That of the merchant exporter may, and in fact sometimes is. If, while his own country labours under a dearth, a neighbouring country should be afflicted with a famine, it might be his interest to carry corn to the latter country in such quantities as might very much aggravate the calamities of the dearth. The plentiful supply of the home market was not the direct object of those statutes; but, under the pretence of encouraging

fible, and thereby to occasion, as much as possible, a constant dearth in the home market. By the discouragement of importation, the fupply of that market, even in times of great scarcity, was confined to the home growth; and by the encouragement of exportation, when the price was fo high as forty-eight shillings the quarter, that market was not, even in times of confiderable scarcity, allowed to enjoy the whole of that growth. The temporary laws, prohibiting for a limited time the exportation of corn, and

taking off for a limited time the duties upon its importation, expedients to which Great Britain has been obliged fo frequently to have recourse, sufficiently demonstrate the impropriety of her general fystem. Had that system been good, she would not so frequently

have been reduced to the necessity of departing from it.

raging agriculture, to raise the money price of corn as high as pos- CHAP.

WERE all nations to follow the liberal fystem of free exportation and free importation, the different states into which a great continent was divided would fo far resemble the different provinces of a great empire. As among the different provinces of a great empire the freedom of the inland trade appears, both from reason and experience, not only the best palliative of a dearth, but the most effectual preventative of a famine; so would the freedom of the exportation and importation trade be among the different states into which a great continent was divided. The larger the continent, the easier the communication through all the different parts of it, both by land and by water, the less would any one particular part of it ever be exposed to either of these calamities, the scarcity of any one country being more likely to be relieved by the plenty of some other. But very few countries have entirely adopted this liberal fystem. The freedom of the corn trade is almost every where more or less restrained, and, in many countries, is confined by fuch abfurd regulations, as frequently aggravate the unavoidable misfortune of a dearth into the dreadful calamity of a famine.

BOOK The demand of such countries for corn may frequently become for great and fo urgent, that a fmall state in their neighbourhood, which happened at the same time to be labouring under some degree of dearth, could not venture to supply them without exposing itself to the like dreadful calamity. The very bad policy of one country may thus render it in some measure dangerous and imprudent to establish what would otherwise be the best policy in another. The unlimited freedom of exportation, however, would be much less dangerous in great states, in which the growth being much greater, the supply could seldom be much affected by any quantity of corn that was likely to be exported. In a Swifs canton, or in some of the little states of Italy, it may, perhaps, sometimes be necessary to restrain the exportation of corn. In such great countries as France or England it scarce ever can. To hinder, besides, the farmer from sending his goods at all times to the best market, is evidently to facrifice the ordinary laws of justice to an idea of public utility, to a fort of reasons of state; an act of legiflative authority which ought to be exercised only, which can be pardoned only in cases of the most urgent necessity. The price at which the exportation of corn is prohibited, if it is ever to be prohibited, ought always to be a very high price.

> THE laws concerning corn may every where be compared to the laws concerning religion. The people feel themselves so much inte_ rested in what relates either to their subsistence in this life, or to their happiness in a life to come, that government must yield to their prejudices, and, in order to preserve the public tranquillity, establish that system which they approve of. It is upon this account, perhaps, that we so seldom find a reasonable system established with regard to either of those two capital objects.

> IV. THE trade of the merchant carrier, or of the importer of foreign corn, in order to export it again, contributes to the plentiful

plentiful supply of the home market. It is not indeed the direct CHAP. purpose of his trade to sell his corn there. But he will generally be willing to do fo, and even for a good deal less money than he might expect in a foreign market; because he saves in this manner the expence of loading and unloading, of freight and insurance. The inhabitants of the country which, by means of the carrying trade, becomes the magazine and storehouse for the supply of other countries, can very seldom be in want themfelves. Though the carrying trade might thus contribute to reduce the average money price of corn in the home market, it would not thereby lower its real value. It would only raise somewhat the real value of filver.

THE carrying trade was in effect prohibited in Great Britain upon all ordinary occasions, by the high duties upon the importation of foreign corn; and upon extraordinary occasions, when a fcarcity made it necessary to suspend those duties by temporary statutes, exportation was always prohibited. By this system of laws, therefore, the carrying trade was in effect prohibited upon all occasions.

THAT system of laws, therefore, which is connected with the establishment of the bounty, seems to deserve no part of the praise which has been bestowed upon it. The improvement and prosperity of Great Britain, which has been so often ascribed to those laws, may very easily be accounted for by other causes. That fecurity which the laws in Great Britain give to every man that he shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour, is alone sufficient to make any country flourish, notwithstanding these and twenty other absurd regulations of commerce; and this fecurity was perfected by the revolution, much about the same time that the bounty was established. The natural effort of every individual BOOK to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often incumbers its operations; though the effect of these obstructions is always more or less either to encroach upon its freedom, or to diminish its security. In Great Britain industry is perfectly secure; and though it is far from being perfectly free, it is as free or freer than in any other part of Europe.

Though the period of the greatest prosperity and improvement of Great Britain, has been posterior to that system of laws which is connected with the bounty, we must not upon that account impute it to those laws. It has been posterior likewise to the national debt. But the national debt has most assured not been the cause of it.

Though the system of laws which is connected with the bounty, has exactly the same tendency with the police of Spain and Portugal; to lower fomewhat the value of the precious metals in the country where it takes place; yet Great Britain is certainly one of the richest countries in Europe, while Spain and Portugal are perhaps among the most beggarly. This difference of situation, however, may easily be accounted for from two different causes. First, the tax in Spain, the prohibition in Portugal of exporting gold and filver, and the vigilant police which watches over the execution of those laws, must, in two very poor countries, which between them import annually upwards of fix millions sterling, operate, not only more directly, but much more forcibly in reducing the value of those metals there, than the corn laws can do in Great Britain. And, fecondly, this bad policy is not in those countries counter-balanced by the general liberty

liberty and fecurity of the people. Industry is there neither free CHAP. nor fecure, and the civil and ecclefiaftical governments of both Spain and Portugal, are fuch as would alone be fufficient to perpetuate their present state of poverty, even though their regulations of commerce were as wife as the greater part of them are abfurd and foolish.

THE 13th of the present king, c. 43. seems to have established a new system with regard to the corn laws, in many respects better than the ancient one, but in one respect perhaps not quite fo good.

By this statute the high duties upon importation for home consumption are taken off as soon as the price of wheat is so high as forty-eight shillings the quarter, and instead of them a fmall duty is imposed of only fixpence upon the quarter of wheat, and upon that of other grain in proportion. The home market is in this manner not fo totally excluded from foreign supplies as it was before.

By the same statute the old bounty of five shillings upon the quarter of wheat ceases when the price rises so high as fortyfour shillings, and upon that of other grain in proportion. The bounties too upon the coarfer forts of grain are reduced fomewhat lower than they were before, even at the prices at which they take place. If bounties are as improper as I have endeavoured to prove them to be, the fooner they cease and the lower they are, fo much the better.

THE same statute permits at all prices the importation of corn in order to be exported again, duty free; provided it is in the meantime lodged in the king's warehouse. This liberty indeed extends to no more than twenty-five of the different ports of BOOK IV.

Great Britain. They are, however, the principal ones, and there may not perhaps be warehouses proper for this purpose in the greater part of the others. Some provision is thus made for the establishment of the carrying trade.

So far this law feems evidently an improvement upon the antient fystem.

But by the same law exportation is prohibited as soon as the price of wheat rises to forty-sour shillings the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion. The price seems to be a good deal too low, and there seems to be an impropriety besides in stopping exportation altogether, at the very same price at which that bounty which was given in order to force it, is withdrawn. The bounty ought certainly either to have been withdrawn at a much lower price, or exportation ought to have been allowed at a much higher. So far, therefore, this law seems to be inferior to the ancient system.

CHAP. VI.

Of treaties of commerce.

WHEN a nation binds itself by treaty either to permit the entry of certain goods from one foreign country which it prohibits from all others, or to exempt the goods of one country from duties to which it subjects those of all others, the country, or at least the merchants and manufacturers of the country, whose commerce is so favoured, must necessarily derive great

great advantage from the treaty. Those merchants and manufac- CHAP. turers enjoy a fort of monopoly in the country which is fo indulgent to them. That country becomes a market both more extensive and more advantageous for their goods: more extensive, because the goods of other nations being either excluded or subjected to heavier duties, it takes off a greater quantity of theirs: more advantageous, because the merchants of the favoured country, enjoying a fort of monopoly there, will often fell their goods for a better price than if exposed to the free competition of all other nations.

Such treaties, however, though they may be advantageous to the merchants and manufacturers of the favoured, are necessarily disadvantageous to those of the favouring country. A monopoly is thus granted against them to a foreign nation; and they must frequently buy the foreign goods they have occasion for dearer than if the free competition of other nations was admitted. That part of its own produce with which such a nation purchases foreign goods, must consequently be sold cheaper, because when two things are exchanged for one another, the cheapness of the one is a necessary consequence, or rather is the same thing with the dearness of the other. The exchangeable value of its annual produce, therefore, is likely to be diminished by every such treaty. This diminution, however, can scarce amount to any positive loss, but only to a lessening of the gain which it might otherwise make. Though it fells its goods cheaper than it otherwise might do, it will not probably fell them for less than they cost; nor, as in the case of bounties, for a price which will not replace the capital employed in bringing them to market, together with the ordinary profits of stock. The trade could not go on long if it did. Even the favouring country, therefore, may still gain by the trade, though less than if there was a free competition.

BOOK IV. Some treaties of commerce, however, have been supposed advantageous upon principles very different from these; and a commercial country has sometimes granted a monopoly of this kind against itself to certain goods of a foreign nation, because it expected that in the whole commerce between them, it would annually sell more than it would buy, and that a balance in gold and silver would be annually returned to it. It is upon this principle that the treaty of commerce between England and Portugal, concluded in 1703 by Mr. Methuen, has been so much commended. The following is a literal translation of that treaty, which consists of three articles only.

ART. I.

His facred royal majesty of Portugal promises, both in his own name, and that of his successors, to admit, for ever hereafter, into Portugal, the woollen cloths, and the rest of the woollen manufactures of the British, as was accustomed, till they were prohibited by the law; nevertheless upon this condition:

ART. H.

THAT is to say, that her sacred royal majesty of Great Britain shall, in her own name, and that of her successors, be obliged for ever hereafter, to admit the wines of the growth of Portugal into Britain; so that at no time, whether there shall be peace or war between the kingdoms of Britain and France, any thing more shall be demanded for these wines by the name of custom or duty, or by whatsoever other title, directly or indirectly, whether they shall be imported into Great Britain in pipes or hogsheads, or other casks, than what shall be demanded for the like quantity or measure of French wine, deducting or abating a third-part of the custom or duty. But if at any time this deduction or abatement of customs, which is to be made as aforesaid, shall in

any manner be attempted and prejudiced, it shall be just and CHAP. lawful for his facred royal majesty of Portugal, again to prohibit the woollen cloths, and the rest of the British woollen manufactures.

ART. III.

THE most excellent lords the plenipotentiaries promise and take upon themselves, that their above-named masters shall ratify this treaty, and within the space of two months, the ratifications shall be exchanged.

By this treaty the crown of Portugal becomes bound to admit the English woollens upon the same footing as before the prohibition, that is, not to raise the duties which had been paid before that time. But it does not become bound to admit them upon any better terms than those of any other nation, of France or Holland, for example. The crown of Great Britain, on the contrary, becomes bound to admit the wines of Portugal, upon paying only two-thirds of the duty, which is paid for those of France, the wines most likely to come into competition with them. So far this treaty, therefore, is evidently advantageous to Portugal, and disadvantageous to Great Britain.

IT has been celebrated, however, as a master-piece of the commercial policy of England. Portugal receives annually from the Brazils a greater quantity of gold than can be employed in its domestick commerce, whether in the shape of coin or of plate. The furplus is too valuable to be allowed to lie idle and locked up in coffers, and as it can find no advantageous market at home, it must, notwithstanding any prohibition, be sent abroad and exchanged for fomething for which there is a more advantageous market at home. A large share of it comes annually to England, in return either for English goods, or for those of other European

BOOK European nations that receive their returns through England. Mr. Baretti was informed that the weekly packet-boat from Lisbon brings, one week with another, more than fifty thousand pounds in gold to England. The fum had probably been exaggerated. It would amount to more than two millions fix hundred thousand pounds a year, which is more than the Brazils are supposed to afford.

> Our merchants were some years ago out of humour with the crown of Portugal. Some privileges which had been granted them, not by treaty, but by the free grace of that crown. at the solicitation, indeed, it is probable, and in return for much greater favours, defence and protection, from the crown of Great Britain, had been either infringed or revoked. therefore, usually most interested in celebrating the Portugal trade, were then rather disposed to represent it as less advantageous than it had commonly been imagined. The far greater part. almost the whole, they pretended, of this annual importation of gold, was not on account of Great Britain, but of other European nations; the fruits and wines of Portugal annually imported into Great Britain nearly compensating the value of the British goods fent thither.

> LET us suppose, however, that the whole was on account of Great Britain, and that it amounted to a still greater sum than Mr. Baretti feems to imagine: this trade would not, upon that account, be more advantageous than any other in which for the same value sent out, we received an equal value of consumable goods in return.

> IT is but a very small part of this importation which, it can be supposed, is employed as an annual addition either to the plate or to the coin of the kingdom. The rest must all be sent abroad and exchanged

exchanged for confumable goods of some kind or other. But if CHAP. those consumable goods were purchased directly with the produce of VI. English industry, it would be more for the advantage of England than first to purchase with that produce the gold of Portugal, and afterwards to purchase with that gold those consumable goods. A direct foreign trade of confumption is always more advantageous than a round-about one; and to bring the same value of foreign goods to the home market, requires a much smaller capital in the one than in the other. If a smaller share of its industry, therefore, had been employed in producing goods fit for the Portugal market, and a greater in producing those fit for the other markets where those consumable goods for which there is a demand in Great Britain are to be had, it would have been more for the advantage of England. To procure both the gold, which it wants for its own use, and the consumable goods, would, in this way, employ a much smaller capital than at present. There would be a spare capital, therefore, to be employed for other purposes, in. exciting an additional quantity of industry, and in raising a greater annual produce.

Though Britain were entirely excluded from the Portugal trade, it could find very little difficulty in procuring all the annual supplies of gold which it wants, either for the purposes of plate, or of coin, or of foreign trade. Gold, like every other commodity, is always somewhere or another to be got for its value by those who have that value to give for it. The annual surplus of gold in Portugal, besides, would still be sent abroad, and, though not carried away by Great Britain, would be carried away by some other nation, which would be glad to sell it again for its price, in the same manner as Great Britain does at present. In buying gold of Portugal, indeed, we buy it at the first hand; whereas, in buying it of any other nation, except Spain, we should buy it at the second,

BOOK and might pay somewhat dearer. This difference, however, would surely be too infignificant to deserve the publick attention.

Almost all our gold, it is faid, comes from Portugal. With other nations the balance of trade is either against us, or not much in our favour. But we should remember, that the more gold we import from one country, the less we must necessarily import from all others. The effectual demand for gold, like that for every other commodity, is in every country limited to a certain quantity. If nine-tenths of this quantity are imported from one country, there remains a tenth only to be imported from all others. The more gold besides that is annually imported from some particular countries, over and above what is requisite for plate and for coin, the more must necessarily be exported to some others; and the more, that most insignificant object of modern policy, the balance of trade, appears to be in our favour with some particular countries, the more it must necessarily appear to be against us with many others.

It was upon this filly notion, however, that England could not subsist without the Portugal trade, that, towards the end of the late war, France and Spain, without pretending either offence or provocation, required the king of Portugal to exclude all British ships from his ports, and for the security of this exclusion, to receive into them French or Spanish garrisons. Had the king of Portugal submitted to those ignominious terms which his brother-in-law the king of Spain proposed to him, Britain would have been freed from a much greater inconveniency than the loss of the Portugal trade, the burden of supporting a very weak ally, so unprovided of every thing for his own defence, that the whole power of England, had it been directed to that single purpose, could scarce perhaps have defended him for another campaign.

campaign. The loss of the Portugal trade would, no doubt, have occasioned a considerable embarrassiment to the merchants at that time engaged in it, who might not, perhaps, have found out, for a year or two, any other equally advantageous method of employing their capitals; and in this would probably have consisted all the inconveniency which England could have suffered from this notable piece of commercial policy.

THE great annual importation of gold and filver is neither for the purpose of plate nor of coin, but of foreign trade. A roundabout foreign trade of confumption can be carried on more advantageously by means of these metals than of almost any other goods. As they are the universal instruments of commerce, they are more readily received in return for all commodities than any other goods; and on account of their small bulk and great value. it costs less to transport them backward and forwards from one place to another than almost any other fort of merchandize, and they lose less of their value by being so transported. Of all the commodities, therefore, which are bought in one foreign country, for no other purpose but to be fold or exchanged again for some other goods in another, there are none fo convenient as gold and filver. In facilitating all the different round-about foreign trades of confumption which are carried on in Great Britain, confifts the principal advantage of the Portugal trade; and though it is not a capital advantage, it is, no doubt, a confiderable one.

THAT any annual addition which, it can reasonably be supposed, is made either to the plate or to the coin of the kingdom, could require but a very small annual importation of gold and silver, seems evident enough; and, though we had no direct trade with Portugal, this small quantity could always, somewhere or another, be very easily got.

Though the goldsmiths trade be very considerable in Great Britain, the far greater part of the new plate which they annually stell,

BOOK fell, is made from other old plate melted down; fo that the addition annually made to the whole plate of the kingdom cannot be very great, and could require but a very small annual importation.

> IT is the same case with the coin. Nobody imagines, I believe. that even the greater part of the annual coinage, amounting, for ten years together before the late reformation of the gold coin, to upwards of eight hundred thousand pounds a year in gold, was an annual addition to the money before current in the kingdom. In a country where the expence of the coinage is defrayed by the government, the value of the coin, even when it contains its full standard weight of gold and filver, can-never be much greater than that of an equal quantity of those metals uncoined; because it requires only the trouble of going to the mint, and the delay perhaps of a few weeks, to procure for any quantity of uncoined gold and filver an equal quantity of those metals in coin. But, in every country, the greater part of the current coin is almost always more or less worn, or otherwise degenerated from its standard. In Great Britain it was, before the late reformation, a good deal fo, the gold being more than two per cent, and the filver more than eight per cent, below its standard weight. But if forty-four guineas and a half, containing their full standard weight, a pound weight of gold, could purchase very little more than a pound weight of uncoined gold, forty-four guineas and a half wanting a part of their weight could not purchase a pound weight, and something was to be added in order to make up the deficiency. The current price of gold bullion at market, therefore, instead of being the same with the mint price, or 461. 14s. 6d. was then about 471. 14s. and sometimes about fortyeight pounds. When the greater part of the coin, however, was in this degenerate condition, forty-four guineas and a half, fresh from the mint, would purchase no more goods in the market than any other ordinary guineas, because when they come into the coffers of the merchant, being confounded with other money, they could

CHAP.

could not afterwards be distinguished without more trouble than the difference was worth. Like other guineas they were worth no more than 461. 14s. 6d. If thrown into the melting pot, however, they produced, without any sensible loss, a pound weight of standard gold, which could be fold at any time for between 471. 14s. and 481. either in gold or silver, as fit for all the purposes of coin as that which had been melted down. There was an evident profit, therefore, in melting down new coined money, and it was done so instantaneously, that no precaution of government could prevent it. The operations of the mint were, upon this account, somewhat like the web of Penelope; the work that was done in the day was undone in the night. The mint was employed, not so much in making daily additions to the coin, as in replacing the very best part of it which was daily melted down.

WERE the private people, who carry their gold and filver to the mint, to pay themselves for the coinage, it would add to the value of those metals in the same manner as the fashion does to that of plate. Coined gold and filver would be more valuable than uncoined. The feignorage, if it was not exorbitant, would add to the bullion the whole value of the duty; because, the government having every where the exclusive privilege of coining, no coin can come to market cheaper than they think proper to afford it. If the duty was exorbitant indeed, that is, if it was very much above the real value of the labour and expence requisite for coinage, false coiners, both at home and abroad, might be encouraged, by the great difference between the value of bullion and that of coin, to pour in so great a quantity of counterfeit money as might reduce the value of the government money. In France, however, though the seignorage is eight per cent. no sensible inconveniency of this kind is found to arise from it. The dangers to which a false coiner is every where exposed, if he lives in the country of which he counterfeith

BOOK terfeits the coin, and to which his agents or correspondents are exposed if he lives in a foreign country, are by far too great to be incurred for the fake of a profit of fix or feven per cent.

> THE feignorage in France raises the value of the coin higher than in proportion to the quantity of pure gold which it contains. Thus by the edict of January, 1726, * the mint price of fine gold of twenty-four carats was fixed at feven hundred and forty livres, nine fous and one denier one-eleventh, the mark of eight Paris ounces. The gold coin of France, making an allowance for the remedy of the mint, contains twenty-one carats and three-fourths of fine gold, and two carats one-fourth of alloy. The mark of standard gold, therefore, is worth no more than about fix hundred and feventy-one livres ten deniers. But in France this mark of standard gold is coined into thirty Louis d'ors of twenty-four livres each, or into feven hundred and twenty livres. The coinage, therefore, increases the value of a mark of standard gold bullion. by the difference between fix hundred and feventy-one livres ten deniers and feven hundred and twenty livres; or by forty-eight livres, nineteen fous, and two deniers.

> A seignorage will, in many cases, take away altogether, and will, in all cases, diminish the profit of melting down the new coin. This profit always arises from the difference between the quantity of bullion which the common currency ought to contain, and that which it actually does contain. If this difference is less than the feignorage, there will be loss instead of profit. If it is equal to the feignorage, there will neither be profit nor lofs. If it is greater than the feignorage, there will indeed be some profit, but

^{*} See Dictionaire des Monnoies, tom. i. article Seigneurage, p. 489. par M. Abot de Bazinghen, Conseiller-Comissaire en la Cour des Monnoies à Paris.

less than if there was no seignorage. If, before the late reformation of the gold coin, for example, there had been a seignorage of five per cent. upon the coinage, there would have been a loss of three per cent. upon the melting down of the gold coin. If the seignorage had been two per cent. there would have been neither profit nor loss. If the seignorage had been one per cent. there would have been a profit, but of one per cent. only instead of two per cent. Wherever money is received by tale, therefore, and not by weight, a seignorage is the most effectual preventative of the melting down of the coin, and, for the same reason, of its exportation. It is the best and heaviest pieces that are commonly either melted down or exported; because it is upon such that the largest profits are made.

THE law for the encouragement of the coinage, by rendering it duty-free, was first enacted, during the reign of Charles II. for a limited time; and afterwards continued, by different prolongations, till 1769, when it was rendered perpetual. The bank of England, in order to replenish their coffers with money, are frequently obliged to carry bullion to the mint; and it was more for their interest, they probably imagined, that the coinage should be at the expence of the government, than at their own. It was, probably, out of complaifance to this great company that the government agreed to render this law perpetual. Should the custom of weighing gold, however, come to be difused, as it is very likely to be on account of its inconveniency; should the gold coin of England come to be received by tale, as it was before the late recoinage, this great company may, perhaps, find that they have upon this, as upon some other occasions, mistaken their own interest not a little.

Before the late re-coinage, when the gold currency of England was two per cent. below its standard weight, as there was

BOOK no feignorage, it was two per cent. below the value of that quantity of standard gold bullion which it ought to have contained. When this great company, therefore, bought gold bulhion in order to have it coined, they were obliged to pay for it two per cent. more than it was worth after the coinage. But if there had been a feignorage of two per cent. upon the coinage. the common gold currency, though two per cent. below its standard weight, would notwithstanding have been equal in value to the quantity of standard gold which it ought to have contained; the value of the fashion compensating in this case the diminution of the weight. They would indeed have had the feignorage to pay, which being two per cent. their loss upon the whole transaction would have been two per cent. exactly the same, but no greater than it actually was.

> Ir the feignorage had been five per cent. and the gold currency only two per cent. below its standard weight, the bank would in this case have gained three per cent, upon the price of the bullion; but as they would have had a feignorage of five per cent. to pay upon the coinage, their loss upon the whole transaction would, in the fame manner, have been exactly two per cent.

> If the feignorage had been only one per cent. and the gold currency two per cent. below its standard weight, the bank would in this case have lost only one per cent. upon the price of the bullion; but as they would likewise have had a seignorage of one per cent. to pay, their loss upon the whole transaction would have been exactly two per cent, in the fame manner as in all other cases.

> If there was a reasonable seignorage, while at the same time the coin contained its full standard weight, as it has done very nearly

nearly fince the late re-coinage, whatever the bank might lose by CHAP. the feignorage, they would gain upon the price of the bullion; and whatever they might gain upon the price of the bullion, they would lose by the seignorage. They would neither lose nor gain, therefore, upon the whole transaction, and they would in this, as in all the foregoing cases, be exactly in the same situation as if there was no feignorage.

WHEN the tax upon a commodity is so moderate as not to encourage fmuggling, the merchant, who deals in it, though he advances, does not properly pay the tax, as he gets it back in the price of the commodity. The tax is finally paid by the last purchaser or consumer. But money is a commodity with regard to which every man is a merchant. Nobody buys it but in order to fell it again; and with regard to it there is in ordinary cases no last purchaser or consimer When the tax upon coinage, therefore, is so moderate as not to encourage false coining, though every body advances the tax, nobody finally pays it; because every body gets it back in the advanced value of the coin.

A MODERATE seignorage, therefore, would not in any case augment the expence of the bank, or of any other private perfons who carry their bullion to the mint in order to be coined, and the want of a moderate seignorage does not in any case diminish it. Whether there is or is not a seignorage, if the currency contains its full standard weight, the coinage costs nothing to any body, and if it is short of that weight, the coinage must always cost the difference between the quantity of bullion which ought to be contained in it, and that which actually is contained in it.

THE government, therefore, when it defrays the expence of coinage, not only incurrs fome small expence, but loses some **fmall** BOOK fmall revenue which it might get by a proper duty; and neither the bank nor any other private persons are in the smallest degree benefited by this useless piece of public generosity.

THE directors of the bank, however, would probably be unwilling to agree to the imposition of a seignorage upon the authority of a speculation which promises them no gain, but only pretends to infure them from any lofs. In the present state of the gold coin, and as long as it continues to be received by weight, they certainly would gain nothing by fuch a change. But if the custom of weighing the gold coin should ever go into disuse, as it is very likely to do, and if the gold coin should ever fall into the same state of degradation in which it was before the late re-coinage, the gain, or more properly the favings of the bank, in confequence of the imposition of a seignorage, would probably be very consi-The bank of England is the only company which fends any confiderable quantity of bullion to the mint, and the burden of the annual coinage fails entirely or almost entirely upon If this annual coinage had nothing to do but to repair the unavoidable losses and necessary tear and wear of the coin, it could feldom exceed fifty thousand or at most a hundred thousand pounds. But when the coin is degraded below its standard weight, the annual coinage must, besides this, fill up the large vacuities which exportation and the melting pot are continually making in the current coin. It was upon this account that during the ten or twelve years immediately preceeding the late reformation of the gold coin, the annual coinage amounted at an average to more than eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds. But if there had been a feignorage of four or five per cent. upon the gold coin, it would probably, even in the state in which things then were, have put an effectual stop to the business both of exportation and of the melting pot. The bank, instead of losing every

every year about two and a half per cent. upon the bullion CHAP. which was to be coined into more than eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds, or incurring an annual loss of more than twenty one thousand two hundred and fifty pounds, would not probably have incurred the tenth part of that lofs.

THE revenue allotted by parliament for defraying the expence of the coinage is but fourteen thousand pounds a year, and the real expence which it costs the government, or the fees of the officers of the mint, do not upon ordinary occasions, I am affured, exceed the half of that sum. The saving of so very fmall a fum, or even the gaining of another which could not well be much larger, are objects too inconsiderable, it may be thought, to deserve the serious attention of government. the faving of eighteen or twenty thousand pounds a year in case of an event which is not improbable, which has frequently happened before, and which is very likely to happen again, is furely an object which well deserves the serious attention even of so great a company as the bank of England.

Some of the foregoing reasonings and observations might perhaps have been more properly placed in those chapters of the first book which treat of the origin and use of money, and of the difference between the real and the nominal price of commodities. But as the law for the encouragement of coinage derives its origin from those vulgar prejudices which have been introduced by the mercantile fystem; I judged it more proper to referve them for this chapter. Nothing could be more agreeable to the spirit of that system than a fort of bounty upon the production of money, the very thing which, it supposes, constitutes the wealth of every nation. It is one of its many admirable expedients for enriching the country.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. VII.

Of Colonies.

PART FIRST.

Of the motives for establishing new colonies.

THE interest which occasioned the first settlement of the different European colonies in America and the West Indies, was not altogether so plain and distinct as that which directed the establishment of those of antient Greece and Rome.

ALL the different states of antient Greece possessed, each of them, but a very fmall territory, and when the people in any one of them multiplied beyond what that territory could eafily maintain, a part of them were fent in quest of a new habitation in fome remote and distant part of the world; the warlike neighbours who furrounded them on all fides, rendering it difficult for any of them to enlarge very much its territory at home. colonies of the Dorians reforted chiefly to Italy and Sicily, which in the times preceeding the foundation of Rome, were inhabited by barbarous and uncivilized nations: those of the Ionians and Eolians, the two other great tribes of the Greeks, to Asia minor and the islands of the Egean sea, of which the inhabitants seem at that time to have been pretty much in the same state as those of Sicily and Italy. The mother city, though she considered the colony as a child, at all times entitled to great favour and affiftance, and owing in return much gratitude and respect, yet confidered it as an emancipated child over whom she pretended to claim no direct authority or jurisdiction. The colony settled its own form of government, enacted its own laws, elected its own magistrates, and made peace or war with its neighbours as an independant state which had no occasion to wait for the approbation

or consent of the mother city. Nothing can be more plain and CHAP. distinct than the interest which directed every such establishment.

ROME, like most of the other antient republicks, was originally founded upon an Agrarian law, which divided the publick territory in a certain proportion among the different citizens who composed the state. The course of human affairs, by marriage, by succesfion, and by alienation, necessarily deranged this original divifion, and frequently threw the lands, which had been allotted for the maintenance of many different families, into the possession of a fingle person. To remedy this disorder, for such it was supposed to be, a law was made, restricting the quantity of land which any citizen could possess to five hundred jugera, about three hundred and fifty English acres. This law, however, though we read of its having been executed upon one or two occasions, was either neglected or evaded, and the inequality of fortunes went on continually increasing. The greater part of the citizens had no land, and without it the manners and customs of those times rendered it difficult for a freeman to maintain his independancy. In the prefent times, though a poor man has no land of his own, if he has a little stock, he may either farm the lands of another, or he may carry on some little retail trade; and if he has no stock, he may find employment either as a country labourer, or as an artificer. But, among the antient Romans, the lands of the rich were all cultivated by flaves, who wrought under an overfeer, who was likewise a slave; so that a poor freeman had little chance of being employed either as a farmer or as a labourer. trades and manufactures too, even the retail trade, were carried on by the flaves of the rich for the benefit of their masters, whose wealth, authority and protection, made it difficult for a poor freeman to maintain the competition against them. The citizens, therefore, who had no land, had scarce any other means of subsist-

BOOK ence but the bounties of the candidates at the annual elections. The tribunes, when they had a mind to animate the people against the rich and the great, put them in mind of the antient division of lands, and represented that law which restricted this fort of private property as the fundamental law of the republick. The people became clamorous to get land, and the rich and the great, we may believe, were perfectly determined not to give them any part of theirs. To fatisfy them in some measure, therefore, they frequently proposed to send out a new colony. But conquering Rome was, even upon fuch occasions, under no necessity of turning out her citizens to feek their fortune, if one may fay fo, through the wide world, without knowing where they were to fettle. assigned them lands generally in the conquered provinces of Italy, where, being within the dominions of the republick, they could never form any independent state; but were at best but a fort of corporation, which, though it had the power of enacting bye-laws for its own government, was at all times fubject to the correction, jurisdiction, and legislative authority of the mother city. fending out a colony of this kind, not only gave some satisfaction to the people, but often established a fort of garrison too in a newly conquered province, of which the obedience might otherwife have been doubtful. A Roman colony, therefore, whether we consider the nature of the establishment itself, or the motives for making it, was altogether different from a Greek one. The words accordingly, which in the original languages denote those different establishments, have very different meanings. The latin word (Colonia) fignifies simply a plantation. The Greek word (amoinia) on the contrary, fignifies a feparation of dwelling, a departure from home, a going out of the house. But, though the Roman colonies were in many respects different from the Greek ones, the interest which prompted to establish them was equally plain and distinct. Both institutions derived their origin either from irrelistable necessity, or from clear and evident utility.

THE

THE establishment of the European colonies in America and the West Indies arose from no necessity; and though the utility which has resulted from them has been very great, it is not altogether so clear and evident. It was not understood at their first establishment, and was not the motive either of that establishment or of the discoveries which gave occasion to it, and the nature, extent, and limits of that utility are not, perhaps, well understood at this day.

CHAP. VII.

THE Venetians, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, carried on a very advantageous commerce in spiceries, and other East India goods, which they distributed among the other nations of Europe. They purchased them in Egypt, at that time under the dominion of the Mammeluks, the enemies of the Turks, of whom the Venetians were the enemies; and this union of interest, assisted by the money of Venice, formed such a connection as gave the Venetians almost a monopoly of the trade.

The great profits of the Venetians tempted the avidity of the Portugueze. They had been endeavouring, during the course of the fifteenth century, to find out by sea a way to the countries from which the Moors brought them ivory and gold dust across the Defart. They discovered the Madeiras, the Canaries, the Azores, the Cape de Verd islands, the coast of Guinea, that of Congo, Angola, and Loango, and, finally, the Cape of Good Hope. They had long wished to share in the profitable traffic of the Venetians, and this last discovery opened to them a probable prospect of doing so. In 1497, Vasco de Gama sailed from the port of Lisbon with a sleet of four ships, and, after a navigation of eleven months, arrived upon the coast of Indostan, and thus compleated a course of discoveries which had been pursued with great steadiness, and with very little interruption, for near a century together.

SOME

BOOK IV.

Some years before this, while the expectations of Europe were in suspence about the projects of the Portugueze, of which the fuccess appeared yet to be doubtful, a Genoese pilot formed the vet more daring project of failing to the East Indies by the west. The fituation of those countries was at that time very imperfectly known in Europe. The few European travellers who had been there had magnified the distance; perhaps through simplicity and ignorance, what was really very great appearing almost infinite to those who could not measure it; or, perhaps, in order to increase fomewhat more the marvellous of their own adventures in visiting regions so immensely remote from Europe. The longer the way was by the East, Columbus very justly concluded, the shorter it would be by the West. He proposed, therefore, to take that way, as both the shortest and the surest, and he had the good fortune to convince Isabella of Castile of the probability of his project. He failed from the port of Palos in August 1492, near five years before the expedition of Vasco de Gama set out from Portugal, and, after a voyage of between two and three months, discovered first some of the small Bahama or Lucayan islands, and afterwards the great island of St. Domingo.

But the countries which Columbus discovered, either in this or in any of his subsequent voyages, had no resemblance to those which he had gone in quest of. Instead of the wealth, cultivation, and populousness of China and Indostan, he found, in St. Domingo, and in all the other parts of the new world which he ever visited, nothing but a country quite covered with wood, uncultivated, and inhabited only by some tribes of naked and miserable savages. He was not very willing, however, to believe that they were not the same with some of the countries described by Marco Polo, the first European who had visited, or at least had left behind him, any description of China or the East Indies; and a very slight

flight resemblance, such as that which he found between the name CHAP. of Cibao, a mountain in St. Domingo, and that of Cipango, mentioned by Marco Polo, was frequently sufficient to make him return to this favourite prepoffession, though contrary to the clearest evidence. In his letters to Ferdinand and Isabella he called the countries which he had discovered the Indies. He entertained no doubt but that they were the extremity of those which had been described by Marco Polo, and that they were not very distant from the Ganges, or from the countries which had been conquered by Alexander. Even when at last convinced that they were different, he still flat-

tered himself that those rich countries were at no great distance, and, in a subsequent voyage, accordingly, went in quest of them along the coast of Terra Firma, and towards the isthmus of Darien.

In consequence of this mistake of Columbus, the name of the Indies has stuck to those unfortunate countries ever fince; and when it was at last clearly discovered that the new were altogether different from the old Indies, the former were called the West in contradiffinction to the latter, which were called the East Indies.

IT was of importance to Columbus, however, that the countries which he had discovered, whatever they were, should be reprefented to the court of Spain as of very great confequence; and, in what constitutes the real riches of every country, the animal and vegetable productions of the foil, there was at that time nothing which could well justify such a representation of them.

THE Cori, fomething between a rat and a rabbit, and supposed by Mr. Buffon to be the same with the Aperea of Brazil, was the largest viviparous quadruped in St. Domingo. This species seems never to have been very numerous, and the dogs and cats of the Spaniards are faid to have long ago almost entirely extirpated it, as

BOOK well as some other tribes of a still smaller size. These, however, together with a pretty large lizard, called the Ivana or Iguana, constituted the principal part of the animal food which the land afforded.

> THE vegetable food of the inhabitants, though from their want of industry not very abundant, was not altogether so scanty. It confisted in Indian corn, yams, potatoes, bananes, &c. plants which were then altogether unknown in Europe, and which have never fince been very much esteemed in it, or supposed to yield a sustenance equal to what is drawn from the common forts of grain and pulse, which have been cultivated in this part of the world time out of mind.

> THE cotton plant indeed afforded the material of a very important manufacture, and was at that time to Europeans undoubtedly the mest valuable of all the vegetable productions of those islands. But though in the end of the fifteenth century the muslins and other cotton goods of the East Indies were much esteemed in every part of Europe, the cotton manufacture itself was not cultivated in any part of it. Even this production therefore, could not at that time appear in the eyes of Europeans to be of very great confequence.

> FINDING nothing either in the animals or vegetables of the newly discovered countries, which could justify a very advantageous representation of them, Columbus turned his view towards their minerals; and in the richness of the productions of this third kingdom, he flattered himself, he had found a full compensation for the infignificancy of those of the other two. The little bits of gold with which the inhabitants ornamented their drefs. and which, he was informed, they frequently found in the rivulets and torrents that fell from the mountains, were sufficient to fatisfy

> > 40

fatisfy him that those mountains abounded with the richest gold CHAP. mines. St. Domingo, therefore, was represented as a country abounding with gold, and, upon that account, (according to the prejudices not only of the present times, but of those times) an inexhaustible source of real wealth to the crown and kingdom of Spain. When Columbus, upon his return from his first voyage, was introduced with a fort of triumphal honours to the fovereigns of Castile and Arragon, the principal productions of the countries which he had discovered were carried in solemn procession before him. The only valuable part of them confifted in some little fillets, bracelets, and other ornaments of gold, and in some bales of cotton. The rest were mere objects of vulgar wonder and curiofity; fome reeds of an extraordinary fize, fome birds of a very beautiful plumage, and some stuffed skins of the huge alligator and manati; all of which were preceded by fix or feven of the wretched natives, whose singular colour and appearance added greatly to the novelty of the shew.

In consequence of the representations of Columbus, the council of Castile determined to take possession of countries of which the inhabitants were plainly incapable of defending themselves. The pious purpose of converting them to christianity fanctified the injustice of the project. But the hope of finding treasures of gold there, was the fole motive which prompted to undertake it; and to give this motive the greater weight, it was proposed by Columbus that the half of all the gold and filver that should be found there should belong to the crown. This propofal was approved of by the council.

As long as the whole or the far greater part of the gold, which the first adventurers imported into Europe, was got by so very eafy a method as the plundering of the defenceless natives, it was not perhaps very difficult to pay even this heavy tax. when

BOOK when the natives were once fairly stript of all that they had, which, in St. Domingo, and in all the other countries discovered by Columbus, was done compleatly in fix or eight years, and when in order to find more it had become necessary to dig for it in the mines, there was no longer any possibility of paying this tax. The rigorous exaction of it, accordingly, first occafioned, it is faid, the total abandoning of the mines of St. Domingo, which have never been wrought fince. It was foon reduced therefore to a third; then to a fifth; afterwards to a tenth, and at last to a twentieth part of the gross produce of the gold mines. The tax upon filver, indeed, still continues to be a fifth of the gross produce. But the first adventurers do not appear to have been much interested about silver. Nothing less precious than gold feemed worthy of their attention.

> ALL the other enterprizes of the Spaniards in the new world, fubsequent to those of Columbus, seem to have been prompted by the fame motive. It was the facred thirst of gold that carried Oieda, Nicuessa, and Vasco Nugnes de Balboa, to the isthmus of Darien, that carried Cortez to Mexico, and Almagro and Pizzarro to Chili and Peru. When those adventurers arrived upon any unknown coast, their first enquiry was always if there was any gold to be found there; and according to the information which they received concerning this particular, they determined either to quit the country, or to fettle in it.

> OF all those expensive and uncertain projects, however, which bring bankruptcy upon the greater part of the people who engage in them, there is none perhaps more perfectly ruinous than the fearch after new filver and gold mines. It is perhaps the most disadvantageous lottery in the world, or the one in which the gain of those who draw the prizes bears the least proportion to the loss of those who draw the blanks: for though the prizes

are few and the blanks many, the common price of a ticket is the whole fortune of a very rich man. Projects of mining, inflead of replacing the capital employed in them, together with the ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both capital and profit. They are the projects, therefore, to which of all others a prudent law-giver, who defired to increase the capital of his nation, would least chuse to give any extraordinary encouragement, or to turn towards them a greater share of that capital than what would go to them of its own accord. Such in reality is the absurd considence which almost all men have in their own good fortune, that wherever there is the least probability of success, too great a share of it is apt to go to them of its own accord.

But though the judgement of fober reason and experience concerning such projects has always been extreamly unfavourable, that of human avidity has commonly been quite otherwise. fame passion which has suggested to so many people the absurd idea of the philosopher's stone, has suggested to others the equally abfurd one of immense rich mines of gold and silver. They did not consider that the value of those metals has, in all ages and nations, arisen chiefly from their scarcity, and that their scarcity has arisen from the very small quantities of them which nature has any where deposited in one place, from the hard and intractable substances with which she has almost every where surrounded those small quantities, and consequently from the labour and expence which are every where necessary in order to penetrate to and get at them. They flattered themselves that veins of those metals might in many places be found as large and as abundant as those which are commonly found of lead, or copper, or tin, The dream of Sir Walter Raleigh concerning the golden city and country of Eldorado, may fatisfy us that even wife men

BOOK are not always exempt from fuch strange delusions. More than a hundred years after the death of that great man, the jefuit Gumila was still convinced of the reality of that wonderful country, and expressed with great warmth, and I dare to fay, with great fincerity, how happy he should be to carry the light of the gospel to a people who could fo well reward the pious labours of their missionary.

> In the countries first discovered by the Spaniards, no gold or filver mines are at present known which are supposed to be worth the working. The quantities of those metals which the first adventurers are faid to have found there, had probably been very much magnified, as well as the fertility of the mines which were wrought immediately after the first discovery. What those adventurers were reported to have found, however, was fufficient to enflame the avidity of all their countrymen. Every Spaniard who failed to America expected to find an Eldorado. Fortune too didupon this what she has done upon very few other occasions. realized in some measure the extravagant hopes of her votaries, and in the discovery and conquest of Mexico and Peru (of which the one happened about thirty, the other about forty years after the first expedition of Columbus) she presented them with something not very unlike that profusion of the precious metals which they fought for.

> A PROJECT of commerce to the East Indies, therefore, gave occasion to the first discovery of the West. A project of conquest gave occasion to all the establishments of the Spaniards in those newly discovered countries. The motive which excited them to this conquest was a project of gold and filver mines; and a course of accidents, which no human wisdom could foresee, rendered this project much more fuccessful than the undertakers had any reasonable grounds for expecting.

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THE first adventurers of all the other nations of Europe, who CHAP. attempted to make settlements in America, were animated by the like chimerical views; but they were not equally successful. It was more than a hundred years after the first settlement of the Brazils, before any filver, gold, or diamond mines were discovered there. In the English, French, Dutch and Danish colonies, none have ever yet been discovered; at least none that are at present supposed to be worth the working. The first English settlers in North America, however, offered a fifth of all the gold and filver which should be found there, to the king as a motive for granting them their patents. In the patents to Sir Walter Raleigh, to the London and Plymouth companies, to the council of Plymouth, &c. this fifth was accordingly referved to the crown. To the expectation of finding gold and filver mines, those first settlers too joined that of discovering a north west passage to the East Indies. They have hitherto been disappointed in both.

PART SECOND.

Causes of the prosperity of new colonies.

THE colony of a civilized nation which takes possession, either of a waste country, or of one so thinly inhabited, that the natives easily give place to the new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other human society.

The colonists carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and of other useful arts, superior to what can grow up of its own accord in the course of many centuries among savage and barbarous nations. They carry out with them too the habit of subordination, some notion of the regular government which takes place in their own country, of the system of laws which support it, and of a regular administration of justice; and they naturally establish something of the same kind in the new settlement. But among savage

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and barbarous nations, the natural progress of law and government is still slower than the natural progress of arts, after law and government have been so far established, as is necessary for their protection. Every colonist gets more land than he can possibly cultivate. He has no rent, and scarce any taxes to pay. No landlord shares with him in its produce, and the share of the sovereign is commonly but a trifle. He has every motive to render as great as possible a produce, which is thus to be almost entirely his own. But his land is commonly fo extensive, that with all his own induftry, and with all the induftry of other people whom he can get to employ, he can feldom make it produce the tenth part of what it is capable of producing. He is eager, therefore, to collect labourers from all quarters, and to reward them with the most liberal wages. But those liberal wages, joined to the plenty and cheapness of land, soon make those labourers leave him in order to become landlords themselves, and to reward, with equal liberality, other labourers, who foon leave them for the fame reason that they left their first master. The liberal reward of labour encourages marriage. The children during the tender years of infancy are well fed and properly taken care of, and when they are grown up, the value of their labour greatly over-pays their maintenance. When arrived at maturity, the high price of labour, and the low price of land, enable them to establish themselves in the same manner as their fathers did before them.

In other countries, rent and profit eat up wages, and the two superior orders of people oppress the inferior one. But in new colonies, the interest of the two superior orders obliges them to treat the inferior one with more generofity and humanity; at least, where that inferior one is not in a state of slavery. Waste lands, of the greatest natural fertility, are to be had for a trifle. The increase of revenue which the proprietor, who is always the undertaker, ex-

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pects from their improvement, constitutes his profit; which in these CHAP. circumstances is commonly very great. But this great profit cannot be made without employing the labour of other people in clearing and cultivating the land; and the disproportion between the great extent of the land and the small number of the people, which commonly takes place in new colonies, makes it difficult for him to get this labour. He does not, therefore, dispute about wages, but is willing to employ labour at any price. The high wages of labour encourage population. The cheapness and plenty of good land encourage improvement, and enable the proprietor to pay those high wages. In those wages consists almost the whole price of the land; and though they are high, confidered as the wages of labour, they are low, considered as the price of what is so very valuable. What encourages the progress of population and improvement, encourages that of real wealth and greatness.

THE progress of many of the antient Greek colonies towards wealth and greatness, seems accordingly to have been very rapid. In the course of a century or two, several of them appear to have rivalled and even to have furpaffed their mother cities. Syracuse and Aggrigentum in Sicily, Tarentum and Locri in Italy, Ephefus and Miletus in lesser Asia, appear by all accounts to have been, at least, equal to any of the cities of antient Greece. Though posterior in their establishment, yet all the arts of refinement, philofophy, poetry, and eloquence, feem to have been cultivated as early, and to have been improved as highly in them, as in any part of the mother country. The schools of the two oldest Greek philosophers, those of Thales and Pythagoras, were established, it is remarkable, not in antient Greece, but the one in an Afiatick, the other in an Italian colony. All those colonies had established themfelves in countries inhabited by favage and barbarous nations, who eafily gave place to the new fettlers. They had plenty of good land, and as they were altogether independent of the mother city, they were

BOOK were at liberty to manage their own affairs in the way that they judged was most suitable to their own interest.

The history of the Roman colonies is by no means so brilliant. Some of them indeed, such as Florence, have in the course of many ages, and after the fall of the mother city, grown up to be considerable states. But the progress of no one of them sever to have been very rapid. They were all established in conquered provinces, which in most cases had been fully inhabited before. The quantity of land assigned to each colonist was seldom very considerable, and as the colony was not independent, they were not always at liberty to manage their own affairs in the way that they judged was most suitable to their own interest.

In the plenty of good land, the European colonies established in America and the West-Indies resemble, and even greatly surpass those of antient Greece. In their dependency upon the mother state, they resemble those of antient Rome; but their great distance from Europe has in all of them alleviated more or less the effects of this dependency. Their fituation has placed them less in the view and less in the power of their mother country. In pursuing their interest their own way, their conduct has, upon many occasions, been over-looked, either because not known or not understood in Europe; and upon some occasions it has been fairly suffered and submitted to, because their distance rendered it difficult to restrain it. Even the violent and arbitrary government of Spain has, upon many occasions, been obliged to recall or soften the orders which had been given for the government of its colonies, for fear of a general infurrection. The progress of all the European colonies in wealth, population and improvement, has accordingly been very great.

THE crown of Spain, by its share of the gold and silver, derived CHAP. some revenue from its colonies, from the moment of their first establishment. It was a revenue too, of a nature to excite in human avidity the most extravagant expectations of still greater riches. The Spanish colonies, therefore, from the moment of their first establishment, attracted very much the attention of their mother country; while those of the other European nations were for a long time in a great measure neglected. The former did not, perhaps, thrive the better in consequence of this attention; nor the latter the worse in consequence of this neglect. In proportion to the extent of the country which they in some measure possess, the Spanish colonies are confidered as less populous and thriving than those of almost any other European nation. The progress even of the Spanish colonies, however, in population and improvement, has certainly been very rapid and very great. The city of Lima, founded fince the conquest, is represented by Ulloa, as containing fifty thousand inhabitants near thirty years ago. Quito, which had been but a miserable hamlet of Indians, is represented by the same author as in his time equally populous. Gemelli Carreri, a pretended traveller, it is faid, indeed, but who feems every where to have written upon extreme good information, represents the city of Mexico as containing a hundred thousand inhabitants; a number which, in spite of all the exaggerations of the Spanish writers, is, probably, more than five times greater than what it contained in the time of Montezuma. These numbers exceed greatly those of Boston, New York and Philadelphia, the three greatest cities of the English colonies. Before the conquest of the Spaniards there were no cattle fit for draught, either in Mexico or Peru. The lama was their only beast of burden, and its strength seems to have been a good deal inferior to that of a common ass. The plough was unknown among them. They were ignorant of the use of iron. They had no coined money, nor any established instrument of commerce of any kind. Their commerce was carried on by barter. A fort

BOOK of wooden spade was their principal instrument of agriculture. Sharp stones served them for knives and hatchets to cut with; fish bones and the hard finews of certain animals ferved them for needles to few with; and these seem to have been their principal instruments of trade. In this state of things, it seems impossible, that either of those empires could have been so much improved or so well cultivated as at present, when they are plentifully furnished with all forts of European cattle, and when the use of iron, of the plough, and of many of the arts of Europe, has been introduced among them. But the populousness of every country must be in proportion to the degree of its improvement and cultivation. In spite of the cruel destruction of the natives which followed the conquest, these two great empires are, probably, more populous now than they ever were before, and the people are furely very different; for we must acknowledge, I apprehend, that the Spanish creoles are in many respects superior to the antient Indians.

> AFTER the settlements of the Spaniards, that of the Portugueze in Brazil is the oldest of any European nation in America. But as for a long time after the first discovery, neither gold nor filver mines were found in it, and as it afforded, upon that account, little or no revenue to the crown, it was for a long time in a great measure neglected; and during this state of neglect, it grew up to be a great and powerful colony. While Portugal was under the dominion of Spain, Brazil was attacked by the Dutch, who got possession of feven of the fourteen provinces into which it is divided. expected foon to conquer the other feven, when Portugal recovered its independency by the elevation of the family of Braganza to the throne. The Dutch then, as enemies to the Spaniards, became friends to the Portugueze, who were likewise the enemies of the Spaniards. They agreed, therefore, to leave that part of Brazil, which they had not conquered, to the king of Portugal, who agreed to leave that part which they had conquered to them, as a matter

not worth disputing about with such good allies. But the Dutch government soon began to oppress the Portugueze colonists, who, instead of amusing themselves with complaints, took arms against their new masters, and by their own valour and resolution, with the connivance indeed, but without any avowed assistance from the mother country, drove them out of Brazil. The Dutch, therefore, finding it impossible to keep any part of the country to themselves, were contented that it should be entirely restored to the crown of Portugal. In this colony there are said to be more than six hundred thousand people, either Portugueze or descended from Portugueze, creoles, mulattoes, and a mixed race between Portugueze and Brazilians. No one colony in America is supposed to contain so great a number of people of European extraction.

Towards the end of the fifteenth, and during the greater part of the fixteenth century, Spain and Portugal were the two great naval powers upon the ocean; for though the commerce of Venice extended to every part of Europe, its fleets had scarce ever sailed beyond the Mediterranean. The Spaniards, in virtue of the first discovery, claimed all America as their own; and though they could not hinder so great a naval power as that of Portugal from setthing in Brazil, fuch was, at that time, the terror of their name, that the greater part of the other nations of Europe were afraid to establish themselves in any other part of that great continent. The French, who attempted to fettle in Florida, were all murdered by the Spaniards. But the declension of the naval power of this latter nation, in consequence of the defeat or miscarriage of, what they called their Invincible Armada, which happened towards the end of the fixteenth century, put it out of their power to obstruct any longer the settlements of the other European nations. In the course of the seventeenth century, therefore, the English, French, Dutch, Danes and Swedes, all the great nations who had any ports upon the ocean, attempted to make some settlements in the new world.

THE

BOOK IV.

THE Swedes established themselves in New Jersey; and the number of Swedish samilies still to be found there, sufficiently demonstrates, that this colony was very likely to prosper, had it been protected by the mother country. But being neglected by Sweden, it was soon swallowed up by the Dutch colony of New York, which again in 1674, sell under the dominion of the English.

THE small islands of St. Thomas and Santa Cruz are the only countries in the new world that have ever been possessed by the Danes. These little settlements too were under the government of an exclusive company, which had the sole right, both of purchasing the surplus produce of the colonists, and of supplying them with such goods of other countries as they wanted, and which, therefore, both in its purchases and sales, had not only the power of oppressing them, but the greatest temptation to do so. The government of an exclusive company of merchants is, perhaps, the worst of all governments for any country whatever. It was not, however, able to stop altogether the progress of these colonies, though it rendered it more slow and languid. The late king of Denmark dissolved this company, and since that time the prosperity of these colonies has been very great.

The Dutch settlements in the West, as well as those in the East Indies, were originally put under the government of an exclusive company. The progress of some of them, therefore, though it has been considerable, in comparison with that of almost any country that has been long peopled and established, has been languid and slow in comparison with that of the greater part of new colonies. The colony of Surinam, though very considerable, is still inferior to the greater part of the sugar colonies of the other European nations. The colony of Nova Belgia, now divided into the two provinces of New York and New Jersey, would probably have soon become considerable too, even though it had remained

mained under the government of the Dutch. The plenty and CHAP. cheapness of good land are such powerful causes of prosperity, that the very worst government is scarce capable of checking altogether the efficacy of their operation. The great distance too from the mother country would enable the colonists to evade more or less by fmuggling the monopoly which the company enjoyed against them. At present the company allows all Dutch ships to trade to Surinam upon paying two and a half per cent. upon the value of their cargo for a licence; and only referves to itself exclusively the direct trade from Africa to America, which confifts almost entirely in the flave This relaxation in the exclusive privileges of the company, is probably the principal cause of that degree of prosperity which that colony at present enjoys. Curaçoa and Eustatia, the two principal islands belonging to the Dutch, are free ports open to the ships of all nations; and this freedom, in the midst of better colonies whose ports are open to those of one nation only, has been the great cause of the prosperity of those two barren islands.

The French colony of Canada was, during the greater part of the last century, and some part of the present, under the government of an exclusive company. Under so unfavourable an administration its progress was necessarily very slow in comparison with that of other new colonies; but it became much more rapid when this company was dissolved after the fall of what is called the Mississippi scheme. When the English got possession of this country, they sound in it near double the number of inhabitants which father Charlevoix had assigned to it between twenty and thirty years before. That jesuit had travelled over the whole country, and had no inclination to represent it as less considerable than it really was.

THE French colony of St. Domingo was established by pirates and free-booters, who, for a long time, neither required the protection.

tection, nor acknowledged the authority of France; and when the race of banditti became so far citizens as to acknowledge this authority, it was for a long time necessary to exercise it with very great gentleness. During this period the population and improvement of this colony encreased very fast. Even the oppression of the exclusive company to which it was for some time subjected, with all the other colonies of France, though it no doubt retarded, had not been able to stop its progress altogether. The course of its prosperity returned as soon as it was relieved from that oppression. It is now the most important of the sugar colonies of the West Indies, and its produce is said to be greater than that of all the English sugar colonies put together. The other sugar colonies of France are in general all very thriving.

But there are no colonies of which the progress has been more rapid than that of the English in North America.

PLENTY of good land, and liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, seem to be the two great causes of the prosperity of all new colonies.

In the plenty of good land the English colonies of North America, though, no doubt, very abundantly provided, are, however, inferior to those of the Spaniards and Portugueze, and not superior to some of those possessed by the French before the late war. But the political institutions of the English colonies have been more favourable to the improvement and cultivation of this land, than those of any of the other three nations.

FIRST, the engrossing of uncultivated land, though it has by no means been prevented altogether, has been more restrained in the English colonies than in any other. The colony law which imposes

poses upon every proprietor the obligation of improving and culti- CHAP. vating, within a limited time, a certain proportion of his lands, and which, in case of failure, declares those neglected lands grantable to any other person; though it has not, perhaps, been very strictly executed, has, however, had some effect.

SECONDLY, in Pensylvania there is no right of primogeniture, and lands, like moveables, are divided equally among all the children of the family. In three of the provinces of New England the oldest has only a double share, as in the Mosaical law. Though in those provinces, therefore, too great a quantity of land should fometimes be engrossed by a particular individual, it is likely, in the course of a generation or two, to be sufficiently divided again. In the other English colonies, indeed, the right of primogeniture takes place, as in the law of England. But in all the English cojonies the tenure of their lands, which are all held by free focage, facilitates alienation, and the grantee of any extensive tract of land generally finds it for his interest to alienate, as fast as he can, the greater part of it, referving only a fmall quit-rent. In the Spanish and Portugueze colonies, what is called the right of Mayorazzo * takes place in the succession of all those great estates to which any title of honour is annexed. Such estates go all to one person, and are in effect entailed and unalienable. The French colonies, indeed, are subject to the custom of Paris, which, in the inheritance of land, is much more favourable to the younger children than the law of England. But, in the French colonies, if any part of an estate, held by the noble tenure of chivalry and homage, is alienated, it is, for a limited time, subject to the right of redemption, either by the heir of the superior or by the heir of the family; and all the largest estates of the country are held by fuch noble tenures, which necessarily embarrass alienation. But, in a new colony, a great uncultivated estate is likely to be much

BOOK more speedily divided by alienation than by succession. The engrossing, however, of uncultivated land, it has already been observed. is the greatest obstruction to its improvement and cultivation; and the labour that is employed in the improvement and cultivation of land, affords the greatest and most valuable produce to the society. Its produce, in this case, pays not only its own wages, and the profit of the stock which employs it, but the rent of the land too upon which it is employed. The labour of the English colonists, therefore, being more employed in the improvement and cultivation of land, is likely to afford a greater and more valuable produce than that of any of the other three nations, which, by the engrossing of land, is more or less diverted towards other employments.

> THIRDLY, the labour of the English colonists is not only likely to afford a greater and more valuable produce, but, in confequence of the moderation of their taxes, a greater proportion of this produce belongs to themselves, which they may store up and employ in putting into motion a still greater quantity of labour. The English colonists have never yet contributed any thing towards the defence of the mother country, or towards the support of its civil govern-They themselves, on the contrary, have hitherto been defended almost entirely at the expence of the mother country. But the expence of fleets and armies is out of all proportion greater than the necessary expence of civil government. The expence of their own civil government has always been very moderate. It has generally been confined to what was necessary for paying competent falaries to the governor, to the judges, and to some other officers of police, and for maintaining a few of the most useful publick works. The expence of the civil establishment of Massachusets Bay, before the commencement of the present disturbances, used to be but about 18,000l. a year. That of New Hampshire and Rhode

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Rhode Island 3,500l. each. That of Connecticut 4,000l. That CHAP. of New York and Penfilvania 4,500l. each. That of New Jersey 1,2001. That of Virginia and South Carolina 8,0001. each. The civil establishment of Nova Scotia and Georgia are partly supported by an annual grant of parliament. But Nova Scotia pays, befides, about 7,000l. a year towards the publick expences of the colony; and Georgia about 2,500l. a year. All the different civil establishments in North America, in short, exclusive of those of Maryland and North Carolina, of which no exact account has been got, did not, before the commencement of the present disturbances, cost the inhabitants above 64,700l. a year; an ever memorable example at how small an expence three millions of people may not only be governed, but well governed. The most important part of the expence of government, indeed, that of defence and protection, has conftantly fallen upon the mother country. The ceremonial too of the civil government in the colonies, upon the reception of a new governor, upon the opening of a new affembly, &c. though sufficiently decent, is not accompanied with any expensive pomp or parade. Their ecclesiastical government is conducted upon a plan equally frugal. Tithes are unknown among them; and their clergy, who are far from being numerous, are maintained either by moderate stipends, or by the voluntary contributions of the people. The power of Spain and Portugal, on the contrary, derives some support from the taxes levied upon their colonies. France, indeed, has never drawn any confiderable revenue from its colonies, the taxes which it levies upon them being generaily spent among them. But the colony government of all these three nations is conducted upon a much more expensive plan, and is accompanied with a much more expensive ceremonial. The sums fpent upon the reception of a new viceroy of Peru, for example, have frequently been enormous. Such ceremonials are not only real taxes paid by the rich colonists upon those particular occasions,

BOOK but they ferve to introduce among them the habit of vanity and expence upon all other occasions. They are not only very grievous occasional taxes, but they contribute to establish perpetual taxes of the fame kind still more grievous; the ruinous taxes of private luxury and extravagance. In the colonies of all those three nations too the ecclesiastical government is extremely oppressive. Tithes take place in all of them, and are levied with the utmost rigour in those of Spain and Portugal. All of them besides are oppressed with a numerous race of mendicant friars, whose beggary being not only licensed, but consecrated by religion, is a most grievous tax upon the poor people, who are most carefully taught that it is a duty to give, and a very great fin to refuse them their charity. Over and above all this the clergy are, in all of them, the greatest engrossers of land.

> FOURTHLY, in the disposal of their surplus produce, or of what is over and above their own confumption, the English colonies have been more favoured, and have been allowed a more extensive market than those of any other European nation. Every European nation has endeavoured more or less to monopolize to itself the commerce of its colonies, and, upon that account, has prohibited the ships of foreign nations from trading to them, and has prohibited them from importing European goods from any foreign nation. But the manner in which this monopoly has been exercifed in different nations has been very different.

> Some nations have given up the whole commerce of their colonies to an exclusive company, of whom the colonists were obliged to buy all such European goods as they wanted, and to whom they were obliged to fell the whole of their own furplus produce. was the interest of the company, therefore, not only to sell the former as dear, and to buy the latter as cheap as possible, but to buy

no more of the latter, even at this low price, than what they CHAP. could dispose of for a very high price in Europe. It was their interest, not only to degrade in all cases the value of the surplus produce of the colony, but in many cases to discourage and keep down the natural increase of its quantity. Of all the expedients that can well be contrived to stunt the natural growth of a new colony, that of an exclusive company is undoubtedly the most effectual. This, however, has been the policy of Holland, though their company in the course of the present century, has given up in many respects the exertion of their exclusive privilege. This too was the policy of Denmark till the reign of the late king. It has occasionally been the policy of France, and of late, fince 1755, after it had been abandoned by all other nations, on account of its absurdity, it has become the policy of Portugal with regard at least to two of the principal provinces of Brazil, Fernumbuco and Marannon.

OTHER nations, without establishing an exclusive company, have confined the whole commerce of their colonies to a particular port of the mother country, from whence no ship was allowed to fail, but either in a fleet and at a particular feafon, or, if fingle, in confequence of a particular licence, which in most cases was very well paid for. This policy opened, indeed, the trade of the colonies to all the natives of the mother country, provided they traded from the proper port, at the proper feafon and in the proper vessels. But as all the different merchants, who joined their stocks in order to fit out those licensed vessels, would find it for their interest to act in concert, the trade which was carried on in this manner would necessarily be conducted very nearly upon the same principles as that of an exclusive company, The profit of those merchants would be almost equally exorbitant and oppressive. The colonies would be ill supplied, and would

BOOK would be obliged both to buy very dear, and to fell very cheap. This, however, has always been the policy of Spain, and the price of all European goods, accordingly, is faid to be enormous in the Spanish West Indies. At Quito, we are told by Ulloa, a pound of iron fells for about four and fixpence, and a pound of steel for about fix and nine-pence sterling. But it is chiefly in order to purchase European goods, that the colonies part with their own produce. The more, therefore, they pay for the one, the less they really get for the other, and the dearness of the one is the fame thing with the cheapness of the other. The policy of Portugal is in this respect the same as that of Spain, with regard to all its colonies, except Fernambuco and Marannon, and with regard to these it has lately adopted a still worse.

> OTHER nations leave the trade of their colonies free to all their subjects who may carry it on from all the different ports of the mother country, and who have occasion for no other licence than the common dispatches of the customhouse. In this case the number and dispersed situation of the different traders renders it impossible for them to enter into any general combination, and their competition is sufficient to hinder them from making very exorbitant profits. Under fo liberal a policy the colonies are enabled both to fell their own produce and to buy the goods of Europe at a reasonable price. But since the dissolution of the Plymouth company, when our colonies were but in their infancy, this has always been the policy of England. It has generally too been that of France, and it has been uniformly fo fince the diffolution of what, in England, is commonly called their Missifippi company. The profits of the trade therefore which France and England carry on with their colonies, though no doubt fomewhat higher than if the competition was free to all other nations, are, however, by no means exorbitant; and the price of European goods accordingly is not extravagantly high in the greater part of the colonies of either of those nations.

In the exportation of their own furplus produce too it is only with regard to certain commodities that the colonies of Great Britain are confined to the market of the mother country. These commodities having been enumerated in the Act of navigation and in some other subsequent acts, have upon that account been called enumerated commodities. The rest are called non-enumerated; and may be exported directly to other countries, provided it is in British or Plantation ships of which the owners and three-fourths of the mariners are British subjects.

Among the non-enumerated commodities are some of the most important productions of America and the West Indies; grain of all forts, lumber, salt provisions, fish, sugar, and rum.

GRAIN is naturally the first and principal object of the culture of all new colonies. By allowing them a very extensive market for it, the law encourages them to extend this culture much beyond the consumption of a thinly inhabited country, and thus to provide beforehand an ample subsistence for a continually increasing population.

In a country quite covered with wood, where timber confequently is of little or no value, the expence of clearing the ground is the principal obstacle to improvement. By allowing the colonies a very extensive market for their lumber, the law endeavours to facilitate improvement by raising the price of a commodity which would otherwise be of little value, and thereby enabling them to make some profit of what would otherwise be meer expence.

In a country neither half peopled nor half cultivated, cattle naturally multiply beyond the confumption of the inhabitants, and are often upon that account of little or no value. But it is necessary,

BOOK necessary, it has already been shewn, that the price of cattle should bear a certain proportion to that of corn before the greater part of the lands of any country can be improved. By allowing to American cattle, in all shapes, dead and alive, a very extensive market, the law endeavours to raise the value of a commodity of which the high price is fo very effential to improvement. The good effects of this liberty, however, must be somewhat diminished by the 4th of George III. c. 15. which puts hides and skins among the enumerated commodities, and thereby tends to reduce the value of American cattle.

> To increase the shipping and naval power of Great Britain, by the extension of the fisheries of our colonies, is an object which the legislature seems to have had almost constantly in view. Those fisheries, upon this account, have had all the encouragement which freedom can give them, and they have flourished accordingly. The New-England fishery in particular was, before the late difturbances, one of the most important, perhaps, in the world. whale-fishery which, notwithstanding an extravagant bounty, is in Great Britain carried on to so little purpose, that in the opinion of many people (which I do not, however, pretend to warrant) the whole produce does not much exceed the value of the bounties which are annually paid for it, is in New England carried on without any bounty to a very great extent. Fish is one of the principal articles with which the North Americans trade to Spain, Portugal and the Mediterranean.

> Sugar was originally an enumerated commodity which could be exported only to Great Britain. But in 1731, upon a representation of the fugar planters, its exportation was permitted to all parts of the world. The restrictions, however, with which this liberty was granted, joined to the high price of fugar in Great Britain. have rendered it, in a great measure, ineffectual. Great Britain

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and her colonies, still continue to be almost the sole market for all CHAP. the fugar produced in the British plantations. Their consumption increases so fast that, though in consequence of the increasing improvement of Jamaica as well as of the ceded islands, the importation of fugar has increased very greatly within these twenty years, the exportation to foreign countries is faid to be not much greater than before.

Rum is a very important article in the trade which the Americans carry on to the coast of Africa, from which they bring back negroe flaves in return.

IF the whole surplus produce of America in grain of all forts. in falt provisions and in fish, had been put into the enumeration, and thereby forced into the market of Great Britain, it would have interfered too much with the produce of the industry of our own people. It was probably not fo much from any regard to the interest of America, as from a jealousy of this interference, that those important commodities have not only been kept out of the enumeration, but that the importation into Great Britain of all grain, except rice, and of falt provisions has, in the ordinary state of the law, been prohibited.

THE non-enumerated commodities could originally be exported to all parts of the world. Lumber and rice, having been once put into the enumeration, when they were afterwards taken out of it, were confined, as to the European market, to the countries that lie fouth of Cape Finisterre. By the 6th of George III. c. 52. all non-enumerated commodities were subjected to the like restriction. The parts of Europe which lie fouth of Cape Finisterre, are not manufacturing countries, and we were less jealous of the colony ships carrying home from them any manufactures which could interfere with our own.

BOOK IV.

THE enumerated commodities are of two forts: first, such as are either the peculiar produce of America, or as cannot be produced, or at least are not produced in the mother country. Of this kind are melasses, coffee, cacao-nuts, tobacco, pimento, ginger, whale-fins, raw filk, cotton-wool, beaver, and other peltry of America, indigo, fustick, and other dying woods: fecondly, such as are not the peculiar produce of America, but which are and may be produced in the mother country, though not in fuch quantities as to supply the greater part of her demand, which is principally supplied from foreign countries. Of this kind are all naval stores, masts, yards, and bowsprits, tar, pitch, and turpentine, pig and bar iron, copper ore, hides and skins, pot and pearl ashes. The largest importation of commodities of the first kind could not discourage the growth or interfere with the sale of any part of the produce of the mother country. By confining them to the home market, our merchants, it was expected, would not only be enabled to buy them cheaper in the plantations, and confequently to fell them with a better profit at home, but to establish between the plantations and foreign countries an advantageous carrying trade, of which Great Britain was necessarily to be the center or emporium, as the European country into which those commodities were first to be imported. The importation of commodities of the fecond kind might be fo managed too, it was supposed, as to interfere, not with the sale of those of the fame kind which were produced at home, but with that of those which were imported from foreign countries; because by means of proper duties, they might be rendered always fomewhat dearer than the former, and yet a good deal cheaper than the latter. By confining such commodities to the home market, therefore, it was proposed to discourage the produce, not of Great Britain, but of some foreign countries with which the balance of trade was believed to be unfavourable to Great Britain.

THE prohibition of exporting from the colonies, to any other CHAP. country but Great Britain, masts, yards, and bowsprits, tar, pitch, and turpentine, naturally tended to lower the price of timber in the colonies, and consequently to increase the expence of clearing their lands, the principal obstacle to their improvement. But about the beginning of the present century, in 1703, the pitch and tar company of Sweden endeavoured to raife the price of their commodities to Great Britain, by prohibiting their exportation, except in their own ships, at their own price, and in fuch quantities as they thought proper. In order to counteract this notable piece of mercantile policy, and to render herself as much as possible independent, not only of Sweden, but of all the other northern. powers, Great Britain gave a bounty upon the importation of naval stores from America, and the effect of this bounty was to raise the price of timber in America, much more than the confinement to the home market could lower it; and as both regulations were enacted at the same time, their joint effect was rather to encourage than to discourage the clearing of land in America.

Though pig and bar iron too have been put among the enumerated commodities, yet as, when imported from America, they are exempted from confiderable duties to which they are subject when imported from any other country, the one part of the regulation contributes more to encourage the erection of furnaces in America, than the other to discourage it. There is no manufacture which occasions so great a consumption of wood as a furnace, or which can contribute so much to the clearing of a country overgrown with it.

The tendency of some of these regulations to raise the value of timber in America, and, thereby, to facilitate the clearing of the land, was neither, perhaps, intended nor understood by the

BOOK the legislature. Though their beneficial effects, however, have been in this respect accidental, they have not upon that account been less real.

THE most perfect freedom of trade is permitted between the British colonies of America and the West Indies, both in the enumerated and in the non-enumerated commodities. Those colonies are now become so populous and thriving, that each of them finds in some of the others a great and extensive market for every part of its produce. All of them taken together, they make a great internal market for the produce of one another.

The liberality of England, however, towards the trade of her colonies has been confined chiefly to what concerns the market for their produce, either in its rude state, or in what may be called the very first stage of manufacture. The more advanced or more refined manufactures even of the colony produce, the merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain chuse to reserve to themselves, and have prevailed upon the legislature to prevent their establishment in the colonies, sometimes by high duties, and sometimes by absolute prohibitions.

While, for example, Muskovado sugars from the British plantations, pay upon importation only 6s. 4d. the hundred weight; white sugars pay 1l. 1s. 1d.; and refined, either double or single, in loaves 4l. 2s. 5d. 3d. When those high duties were imposed, Great Britain was the sole, and she still continues to be the principal market to which the sugars of the British colonies could be exported. They amounted, therefore, to a prohibition, at first of claying or refining sugar for any foreign market, and at present of claying or refining it for the market, which takes off, perhaps, more than nine-tenths of the whole produce. The manufacture of claying or refining sugar accord-

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ingly, though it has flourished in all the sugar colonies of France, has been little cultivated in any of those of England, except for the market of the colonies themselves. While Grenada was in the hands of the French, there was a refinery of sugar by claying, at least, upon almost every plantation. Since it fell into those of the English, almost all works of this kind have been given up, and there are at present, October 1773, I am assured, not above two or three remaining in the island. At present, however, by an indulgence of the custom-house, clayed or refined sugar, if reduced from loaves into powder, is commonly imported as Muskovado.

WHILE Great Britain encourages in America the manufactures of pig and bar iron, by exempting them from duties to which the like commodities are fubject when imported from any other country, the imposes an absolute prohibition upon the erection of steel furnaces and slit-mills in any of her American plantations. She will not suffer her colonists to work in those more refined manufactures even for their own consumption; but insists upon their purchasing of her merchants and manufacturers all goods of this kind which they have occasion for.

SHE prohibits the exportation from one province to another by water, and even the carriage by land upon horse-back or in a cart, of hats, of wools and woollen goods, of the produce of America; a regulation which effectually prevents the establishment of any manufacture of such commodities for distant sale, and confines the industry of her colonists in this way to such coarse and houshold manufactures, as a private family commonly makes for its own use, or for that of some of its neighbours in the same province.

To prohibit a great people, however, from making all that they can of every part of their own produce, or from employing their stock and

BOOK and industry in the way that they judge most advantageous to them. felves, is a manifest violation of the most facred rights of mankind. Unjust, however, as such prohibitions may be, they have not hitherto been very hurtful to the colonies. Land is still so cheap, and, consequently, labour so dear among them, that they can import from the mother country, almost all the more refined or more advanced manufactures cheaper than they could make them for themselves. Though they had not, therefore, been prohibited from establishing such manufactures, yet in their present state of improvement, a regard to their own interest would, probably, have prevented them from doing fo. In their present state of improvement, those prohibitions, perhaps, without cramping their industry, or restraining it from any employment to which it would have gone of its own accord, are only impertinent badges of flavery imposed upon them, without any sufficient reason, by the groundless jealousy of the merchants and manufacturers of the mother country. In a more advanced state they might be really oppressive and insupportable.

> GREAT Britain too, as she confines to her own market some of the most important productions of the colonies, so in compensation she gives to some of them an advantage in that market; sometimes by imposing higher duties upon the like productions when imported from other countries, and fometimes by giving bounties upon their importation from the colonies. In the first way she gives an advantage in the home market to the fugar, tobacco and iron of her own colonies, and in the fecond, to their raw filk, to their hemp and flax, to their indigo, to their naval stores, and to their building timber. This fecond way of encouraging the colony produce by bounties upon importation, is, so far as I have been able to learn, peculiar to Great Britain. The first is not. Portugal does not content herfelf with imposing higher duties upon the importation of tobacco

tobacco from any other country, but prohibits it under the leverest CHAP. penalties.

WITH regard to the importation of goods from Europe, England has likewise dealt more liberally with her colonies than any other nation.

GREAT Britain allows a part, almost always the half, generally a larger portion, and fometimes the whole of the duty which is paid upon the importation of foreign goods, to be drawn back upon their exportation to any foreign country. No independent foreign country, it was eafy to foresee, would receive them if they came to it loaded with the heavy duties to which almost all foreign goods are subjected on their importation into Great Britain. Unless, therefore, some part of those duties was drawn back upon exportation, there was an end of the carrying trade; a trade so much favoured by the mercantile system.

Our colonies, however, are by no means independent foreign countries; and Great Britain having assumed to herself the exclusive right of supplying them with all goods from Europe, might have forced them (in the same manner as other countries have done their colonies) to receive fuch goods, loaded with all the fame duties which they paid in the mother country. But, on the contrary, till 1763, the same drawbacks were paid upon the exportation of the greater part of foreign goods to our colonies as to any independent foreign country. In 1763, indeed, by the 4th of George IIId, c. 15. this indulgence was a good deal abated, and it was enacted, "That no part of the duty called the old fubfidy should be drawn " back for any goods of the growth, production, or manufacture " of Europe or the East Indies, which should be exported from "this kingdom to any British colony or plantation in America; " wines, white callicoes and muslins excepted." Before this law, many different forts of foreign goods might have been bought cheaper BOOK cheaper in the plantations than in the mother country; and fome may still.

Of the greater part of the regulations concerning the colony trade, the merchants who carry it on, it must be observed, have been the principal advisers. We must not wonder, therefore, if in the greater part of them, their interest has been more considered than either that of the colonies or that of the mother country. In their exclusive privilege of supplying the colonies with all the goods which they wanted from Europe, and of purchasing all fuch parts of their furplus produce as could not interfere with any of the trades which they themselves carried on at home, the interest of the colonies was sacrificed to the interest of those merchants. In allowing the fame drawbacks upon the re-exportation of the greater part of European and East India goods to the colonies, as upon their re-exportation to any independent country, the interest of the mother country was facrificed to it, even according to the mercantile ideas of that interest. It was for the interest of the merchants to pay as little as possible, for the foreign goods which they fent to the colonies, and, confequently, to get back as much as possible of the duties which they advanced upon their importation into Great Britain. They might thereby be enabled to fell in the colonies, either the fame quantity of goods with a greater profit, or a greater quantity with the same profit, and, consequently, to gain fomething either in the one way or the other. It was, likewife, for the interest of the colonies to get all such goods as cheap and in as great abundance as possible. But this might not always be for the interest of the mother country. She might frequently suffer both in her revenue, by giving back a great part of the duties which had been paid upon the importation of fuch goods; and in her manufactures, by being underfold in the colony market, in confequence of the easy terms upon which foreign manufactures could be carried thither by means of those drawbacks. The progress of the linen manufacture

manufacture of Great Britain, it is commonly faid, has been a good CHAP. deal retarded by the drawbacks upon the re-exportation of German linen to the American colonies.

But though the policy of Great Britain with regard to the trade of her colonies has been dictated by the same mercantile spirit as that of other nations, it has, however, upon the whole, been less illiberal and oppressive than that of any of them.

In every thing, except their foreign trade, the liberty of the English colonists to manage their own affairs their own way is compleat. It is in every respect equal to that of their fellow citizens at home, and is fecured in the same manner, by an assembly of the representatives of the people, who claim the fole right of impoling taxes for the fupport of the colony government. The authority of this affembly over-awes the executive power, and neither the meanest nor the most obnoxious colonist, as long as he obeys the law, has any thing to fear from the refentment either of the governour or of any other civil or military officer in the province. The colony affemblies, though, like the house of commons in England, they are not always a very equal representation of the people, yet as the executive power either has not the means to corrupt them, or, on account of the support which it receives from the mother country, is not under the necessity of doing so, they are perhaps in general more influenced by the inclinations of their constituents. The councils, which, in the colony legislatures, correfpond to the House of Lords in Great Britain, are not composed of an hereditary nobility. In some of the colonies, as in three of the governments of New England, those councils are not appointed by the king, but chosen by the representatives of the people. In none of the English colonies is there any hereditary nobility. In all of them, indeed, as in all other free countries, the descendant of an old colony family is more respected than an upstart

BOOK of equal merit and fortune: but he is only more respected, and he has no privileges by which he can be troublesome to his neighbours. Before the commencement of the present disturbances, the colony assemblies had not only the legislative, but a part of the executive power. In Connecticut and Rhode island, they elected the governor. In the other colonies they appointed the revenue officers who collected the taxes imposed by those respective assemblies, to whom those officers were immediately responsible. There is more equality, therefore, among the English colonists than among the inhabitants of the mother country. Their manners are more republican, and their governments, those of three of the provinces of New England in particular, have hitherto been more republican too.

> THE absolute governments of Spain, Portugal, and France, on the contrary, take place in their colonies; and the discretionary powers which fuch governments commonly delegate to all their inferior officers are, on account of the great distance, naturally exercifed there with more than ordinary violence. Under all absolute governments there is more liberty in the capital than in any other part of the country. The fovereign himself can never have either interest or inclination to pervert the order of justice, or to oppress the great body of the people. In the capital his prefence over-awes more or less all his inferior officers, who in the remoter provinces, from whence the complaints of the people are less likely to reach him, can exercise their tyranny with much more fafety. But the European colonies in America are more remote than the most distant provinces of the greatest empires which had ever been known before. The government of the English colonies is perhaps the only one which, fince the world began, could give perfect fecurity to the inhabitants of fo very distant a province. The administration of the French colonies, however, has always been conducted with more gentleness and moderation than that of the Spanish and Portugueze. This superiority of conduct

is suitable both to the character of the French nation, and to what CHAP. forms the character of every nation, the nature of their government, which though arbitrary and violent in comparison with that of Great Britain, is legal and free in comparison with those of Spain and Portugal.

IT is in the progress of the North American colonies, however, that the superiority of the English policy chiefly appears. progress of the sugar colonies of France has been at least equal, perhaps superior, to that of the greater part of those of England; and yet the sugar colonies of England enjoy a free government nearly of the same kind with that which takes place in her colonies of North America. But the fugar colonies of France are not difcouraged, like those of England, from refining their own fugar; and, what is of still greater importance, the genius of their government naturally introduces a better management of their negro flaves.

In all European colonies the culture of the fugar cane is carried on by negro flaves. The constitution of those who have been born in the temperate climate of Europe could not, it is supposed, support the labour of digging the ground under the burning sun of the West Indies; and the culture of the sugar cane, as it is managed at present, is all hand labour, though, in the opinion of many, the drill plough might be introduced into it with great advantage. But, as the profit and fuccess of the cultivation which is carried on by means of cattle, depend very much upon the good management of those cattle; so the profit and success of that which is carried on by flaves, must depend equally upon the good management of those slaves; and in the good management of their flaves the French planters, I think it is generally allowed, are superior to the English. The law, so far as it gives fome

BOOK some weak protection to the flave against the violence of his master, is likely to be better executed in a colony where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, than in one where it is altogether free. In every country where the unfortunate law of flavery is established. the magistrate, when he protects the slave, intermeddles in some measure in the management of the private property of the master; and, in a free country, where the master is perhaps either a member of the colony affembly, or an elector of fuch a member, he dare not do this but with the greatest caution and circumspection. The respect which he is obliged to pay to the master, renders it more difficult for him to protect the flave. But in a country where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, where it is usual for the magistrate to intermeddle even in the management of the private property of individuals, and to fend them, perhaps, a lettre de cachet if they do not manage it according to his liking, it is much easier for him to give some protection to the slave; and common humanity naturally disposes him to do fo. The protection of the magistrate renders the slave less contemptible in the eyes of his master, who is thereby induced to consider him with more regard, and to treat him with more gentleness. Gentle usage renders the flave not only more faithful, but more intelligent, and therefore, upon a double account, more useful. He approaches more to the condition of a free fervant, and may possess some degree of integrity and attachment to his master's interest, virtues which frequently belong to free fervants, but which never can belong to a flave, who is treated as flaves commonly are in countries where the master is perfectly free and secure.

> THAT the condition of a flave is better under an arbitrary than under a free government, is, I believe, supported by the history of all ages and nations. In the Roman history, the first time we read of the magistrate interposing to protect the slave from the violence

of his master, is under the emperors. When Vedius Pollio, in the presence of Augustus, ordered one of his slaves, who had committed a slight fault, to be cut into pieces and thrown into his sish pond in order to feed his fishes, the emperor commanded him, with indignation, to emancipate immediately, not only that slave, but all the others that belonged to him. Under the republick no magistrate could have had authority enough to protect the slave, much less to punish the master.

THE stock, it is to be observed, which has improved the fugar colonies of France, particularly the great colony of St. Domingo, has been raised almost entirely from the gradual improvement and cultivation of those colonies. It has been almost altogether the produce of the foil and industry of the colonists, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of that produce gradually accumulated by good management, and employed in raifing a still greater produce. But the stock which has improved and cultivated the fugar colonies of England has, a great part of it, been sent out from England, and has by no means been altogether the produce of the foil and industry of the colonists. The prosperity of the English sugar colonies has been, in a great measure, owing to the great riches of England, of which a part has overflowed, if one may fay fo, upon those colonies. But the prosperity of the sugar colonies of France has been entirely owing to the good conduct of the colonists, which must therefore have had some superiority over that of the English; and this superiority has been remarked in nothing so much as in the good management of their slaves.

Such have been the general outlines of the policy of the different European nations with regard to their colonies.

THE policy of Europe, therefore, has very little to boast of, either in the original establishment, or in the subsequent prosperity of the colonies of America.

FOLLY

BOOK IV. Folly and injustice feem to have been the principles which presided over and directed the first project of establishing those colonies; the folly of hunting after gold and silver mines, and the injustice of coveting the possession of a country whose harmless natives, far from having ever injured the people of Europe, had received the first adventurers with every mark of kindness and hospitality.

THE adventurers, indeed, who formed some of the later establishments, joined, to the chimerical project of finding gold and silver mines, other motives more reasonable and more laudable; but even these motives do very little honour to the policy of Europe.

THE English puritans, persecuted at home, fled for freedom to America, and established there the four governments of New England. The English catholicks, treated with equal injustice, established that of Maryland; the Quakers, that of Pensylvania. The Portugueze Jews, persecuted by the inquisition, stript of their fortunes, and banished to Brazil, introduced, by their example, some fort of order and industry among the transported felons and strumpets, by whom that colony was originally peopled, and taught them the culture of the sugar cane. Upon all these different occasions it was, not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and injustice of the European governments, which peopled and cultivated America.

In effectuating some of the most important of these establishments, the different governments of Europe had as little merit as in projecting them. The conquest of Mexico was the project, not of the council of Spain, but of a governor of Cuba; and it was effectuated by the spirit of the bold adventurer to whom it was entrusted,

entrusted, in spite of every thing which that governor, who soon CHAP. repented of having trusted such a person, could do to thwart it. The conquerors of Chili and Peru, and of almost all the other Spanish settlements upon the continent of America, carried out with them no other publick encouragement, but a general permission to make settlements and conquests in the name of the king of Spain. Those adventures were all at the private risk and expence of the adventurers. The government of Spain contributed scarce any thing to any of them. That of England contributed as little towards effectuating the establishment of some of its most important colonies in North America.

WHEN those establishments were effectuated, and had become so considerable as to attract the attention of the mother country, the first regulations which she made with regard to them had always in view to secure to herself the monopoly of their commerce; to confine their market, and to enlarge her own at their expence, and, consequently, rather to damp and discourage, than to quicken and forward the course of their prosperity. In the different ways in which this monopoly has been exercised, consists one of the most effential differences in the policy of the different European nations with regard to their colonies. The best of them all, that of England, is only fomewhat less illiberal and oppressive than that of any of the rest.

In what way, therefore, has the policy of Europe contributed either to the first establishment, or to the present grandeur of the colonies of America? In one way, and in one way only, it has contributed a good deal. Magna virûm Mater! It bred and formed the men who were capable of atchieving such great actions, and of laying the foundation of fo great an empire; and there is no other quarter of the world of which the policy is capable of forming,

BOOK or has ever actually and in fact formed fuch men. The colonies owe to the policy of Europe the education and great views of their active and enterprizing founders; and some of the greatest and most important of them, owe to it scarce any thing else.

PART THIRD.

Of the Advantages which Europe has derived from the Discovery of America, and from that of a Passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope.

CUCH are the advantages which the colonies of America have derived from the policy of Europe.

WHAT are those which Europe has derived from the discovery and colonization of America?

THOSE advantages may be divided, first, into the general advantages which Europe, confidered as one great country, has derived from those great events; and, secondly, into the particular advantages which each colonizing country has derived from the colonies which particularly belong to it, in consequence of the authority or dominion which it exercises over them.

THE general advantages which Europe, confidered as one great country, has derived from the discovery and colonization of America, confift, first, in the increase of its enjoyments; and, secondly, in the augmentation of its industry.

THE surplus produce of America, imported into Europe, furnishes the inhabitants of this great continent with a variety of commodities which they could not otherwise have possessed, some for conveniency and use, some for pleasure, and some for ornament, and thereby contributes to increase their enjoyments.

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The discovery and colonization of America, it will readily be allowed, have contributed to augment the industry, first, of all the countries which trade to it directly; such as Spain, Portugal, France, and England; and, secondly, of all those which, without trading to it directly, send, through the medium of other countries, goods to it of their own produce; such as Austrian Flanders, and some provinces of Germany, which, through the medium of the countries before mentioned, send to it a considerable quantity of linen and other goods. All such countries have evidently gained a more extensive market for their surplus produce, and must consequently have been encouraged to increase its quantity.

But, that those great events should likewise have contributed to encourage the industry of countries, such as Hungary and Poland, which may never, perhaps, have fent a fingle commodity of their own produce to America, is not, perhaps, altogether fo evident. That those events have done so, however, cannot be doubted. Some part of the produce of America is confumed in Hungary and Poland, and there is some demand there for the sugar, chocolate, and tobacco, of that new quarter of the world. But those commodities must be purchased with something which is either the produce of the industry of Hungary and Poland, or with something which had been purchased with some part of that produce. Those commodities of America are new values, new equivalents, introduced into Hungary and Poland, to be exchanged there for the furplus produce of those countries. By being carried thither they create a new and more extensive market for that furplus produce. raise its value, and thereby contribute to encourage its increase. Though no part of it may ever be carried to America, it may be carried to other countries which purchase it with a part of their share of the surplus produce of America; and it may find a market by means of the circulation of that trade which was originally put into motion by the furplus produce of America.

THOSE

BOOK IV.

THOSE great events may even have contributed to increase the enjoyments, and to augment the industry of countries which, not only never fent any commodities to America, but never received any from it. Even fuch countries may have received a greater abundance of other commodities from countries of which the furplus produce had been augmented by means of the American trade. This greater abundance, as it must necessarily have increased their enjoyments, so it must likewise have augmented their industry. A greater number of new equivalents of some kind or other must have been presented to them to be exchanged for the surplus produce of that industry. A more extensive market must have been created for that furplus produce, fo as to raife its value, and thereby encourage its increase. The mass of commodities annually thrown into the great circle of European commerce, and by its various revolutions annually distributed among all the different nations comprehended within it, must have been augmented by the whole furplus produce of America. A greater share of this greater mass, therefore, is likely to have fallen to each of those nations, to have increased their enjoyments, and augmented their industry.

THE exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to diminish, or, at least, to keep down below what they would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments and industry of all those nations in general, and of the American colonies in particular. It is a dead weight upon the action of one of the great springs which puts into motion a great part of the business of mankind. By rendering the colony produce dearer in all other countries it lessens its consumption, and thereby cramps the industry of the colonies, and both the enjoyments and the industry of all other countries, which both enjoy less when they pay more for what they enjoy, and produce less when they get less for what they produce. By rendering the produce of all other countries dearer in the colonies, it cramps,

the fame manner, the industry of all other countries, and both the enjoyments and the industry of the colonies. It is a clog which, for the supposed benefit of some particular countries, embarrasses the pleasures, and encumbers the industry of all other countries; but of the colonies more than of any other. It only excludes, as much as possible, all other countries from one particular market; but it confines, as much as possible, the colonies to one particular market: and the difference is very great between being excluded from one particular market, when all others are open, and being confined to one particular market, when all others are shut up. The surplus produce of the colonies, however, is the original source of all that increase of enjoyments and industry which Europe derives from the discovery and colonization of America; and the exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to render this source much less abundant than it otherwise would be.

THE particular advantages which each colonizing country derives from the colonies which particularly belong to it, are of two different kinds; first, those common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces subject to its dominion; and, secondly, those peculiar advantages which are supposed to result from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the European colonies of America.

THE common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces, subject to its dominion, consist, first, in the military force which they furnish for its defence; and, secondly, in the revenue which they furnish for the support of its civil government. The Roman colonies furnished occasionally both the one and the other. The Greek colonies, sometimes, furnished a military force; but seldom any revenue. They seldom acknowledged themselves subject to the dominion of the mother city. They were generally her allies in war, but very seldom her subjects in peace.

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THE European colonies of America have never yet furnished any military force for the defence of the mother country. Their military force has never yet been sufficient for their own defence; and in the different wars in which the mother countries have been engaged, the defence of their colonies has generally occasioned a very considerable distraction of the military force of those countries. In this respect, therefore, all the European colonies have, without exception, been a cause rather of weakness than of strength to their respective mother countries.

THE colonies of Spain and Portugal only have contributed any revenue towards the defence of the mother country, or the support of her civil government. The taxes which have been levied upon those of other European nations, upon those of England in particular, have seldom been equal to the expence laid out upon them in time of peace, and never sufficient to defray that which they occasioned in time of war. Such colonies, therefore, have been a source of expence and not of revenue to their respective mother countries.

THE advantages of such colonies to their respective mother countries, consist altogether in those peculiar advantages which are supposed to result from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the European colonies of America; and the exclusive trade, it is acknowledged, is the sole source of all those peculiar advantages.

In consequence of this exclusive trade, all that part of the furplus produce of the English colonies, for example, which consists in what are called enumerated commodities, can be sent to no other country but England. Other countries must afterwards buy it of her. It must be cheaper therefore in England than it can be in any other country, and must contribute more to increase

increase the enjoyments of England, than those of any other CHAP. country. It must likewise contribute more to encourage her induftry. For all those parts of her own furplus produce which England exchanges for those enumerated commodities, she must get a better price than any other country can get for the like parts of theirs when they exchange them for the same commodities. The manufactures of England, for example, will purchase a greater quantity of the fugar and tobacco of her own colonies, than the like manufactures of other countries can purchase of that sugar and tobacco. So far, therefore, as the manufactures of England and those of other countries are both to be exchanged for the sugar and tobacco of the English colonies, this superiority of price gives an encouragement to the former, beyond what the latter can in these circumstances enjoy. The exclusive trade of the colonies, therefore, as it diminishes, or, at least, keeps down below what they would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments and the industry of the countries which do not possess it; so it gives an evident advantage to the countries which do possess it over those other countries.

This advantage, however, will, perhaps, be found to be rather what may be called a relative than an absolute advantage; and to give a superiority to the country which enjoys it, rather by depressing the industry and produce of other countries, than by raising those of that particular country above what they would naturally rise to in the case of a free trade,

THE tobacco of Maryland and Virginia, for example, by means of the monopoly which England enjoys of it, certainly comes cheaper to England than it can do to France, to whom England commonly fells a confiderable part of it. But had France, and all other European countries been, at all times, allowed a free trade

BOOK to Maryland and Virginia, the tobacco of those colonies might, by this time, have come cheaper than it actually does, not only to all those other countries, but likewise to England. The produce of tobacco, in consequence of a market so much more extensive than any which it has hitherto enjoyed, might, and probably would, by this time, have been so much increased as to reduce the profits of a tobacco plantation to their natural level with those of a corn plantation, which, it is supposed, they are still somewhat above. price of tobacco might, and probably would, by this time, have fallen somewhat lower than it is at present. An equal quantity of the commodities either of England, or of those other countries, might have purchased in Maryland and Virginia a greater quantity of tobacco than it can do at present, and, consequently, have been fold there for so much a better price. So far as that weed, therefore, can, by its cheapness and abundance, increase the enjoyments or augment the industry either of England or of any other country, it would, probably, in the case of a free trade, have produced both these effects in somewhat a greater degree than it can do at present. England, indeed, would not in this case have had any advantage over other countries. She might have bought the tobacco of her colonies somewhat cheaper, and, consequently, have sold some of her own commodities somewhat dearer than she actually does. But fhe could neither have bought the one cheaper nor fold the other dearer than any other country might have done. She might, perhaps, have gained an absolute, but she would certainly have lost a relative advantage.

> In order, however, to obtain this relative advantage in the colony trade, in order to execute the invidious and malignant project of excluding as much as possible other nations from any share in it, England, there are very probable reasons for believing, has not only facrificed a part of the absolute advantage which she,

as well as every other nation, might have derived from that trade, CHAP. but has subjected herself both to an absolute and to a relative disadvantage in almost every other branch of trade.

WHEN, by the act of navigation, England assumed to herself the monopoly of the colony trade, the foreign capitals which had before been employed in it were necessarily withdrawn from it? The English capital, which had before carried on but a part of it, was now to carry on the whole. The capital which had before supplied the colonies with but a part of the goods which they wanted from Europe, was now all that was employed to supply them with the whole. But it could not fupply them with the whole, and the goods with which it did supply them were necessarily fold very dear. The capital which had before bought but a part of the furplus produce of the colonies, was now all that was employed to buy the But it could not buy the whole at any thing near the old price, and, therefore, whatever it did buy it necessarily bought very cheap. But in an employment of capital in which the merchant fold very dear and bought very cheap, the profit must have been very great, and much above the ordinary level of profit in other branches of trade. This superiority of profit in the colony trade, could not fail to draw from other branches of trade a part of the capital which had before been employed in them. But this revulsion of capital, as it must have gradually increased the competition of capitals in the colony trade, fo it must have gradually diminished that competition in all those other branches of trade; as it must have gradually lowered the profits of the one, so it must have gradually raised those of the other, till the profits of all came to a new level, different from and fomewhat higher than that at which they had been before.

This double effect, of drawing capital from all other trades, and of raising the rate of profit somewhat higher than it otherwise would liave

BOOK have been in all trades, was not only produced by this monopoly upon its first establishment, but has continued to be produced by it ever fince.

> FIRST, this monopoly has been continually drawing capital from all other trades to be employed in that of the colonies.

> THOUGH the wealth of Great Britain has increased very much fince the establishment of the act of navigation, it certainly has not increased in the same proportion as that of the colonies. But the foreign trade of every country naturally increases in proportion to its wealth, its furplus produce in proportion to its whole produce; and Great Britain having engroffed to herfelf almost the whole of what may be called the foreign trade of the colonies, and her capital not having increased in the same proportion as the extent of that trade, she could not carry it on without continually withdrawing from other branches of trade fome part of the capital which had before been employed in them, as well as with-holding from them a great deal more which would otherwise have gone to them. Since the establishment of the act of navigation, accordingly, the colony trade has been continually increasing, while many other branches of foreign trade, particularly of that to other parts of Europe, have been continually decaying. Our manufactures for foreign fale, instead of being suited, as before the act of navigation, to the neighbouring market of Europe, or to the more distant one of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean fea, have, the greater part of them, been accommodated to the still more distant one of the colonies, to the market in which they have the monopoly, rather than to that in which they have many competitors. The causes of decay in other branches of foreign trade, which, by Sir Matthew Decker and other writers, have been fought for in the excess and improper mode of taxation, in the high price of labour, in the increase

increase of luxury, &c. may all be found in the over-growth of CHAP. the colony trade. The mercantile capital of Great Britain, though very great, yet not being infinite; and though greatly increased fince the act of navigation, yet not being increased in the same proportion as the colony trade, that trade could not possibly be carried on without withdrawing some part of that capital from other branches of trade, nor consequently without some decay of those other branches.

ENGLAND, it must be observed, was a great trading country. her mercantile capital was very great and likely to become still greater and greater every day, not only before the act of navigation had established the monopoly of the colony trade, but before that trade was very confiderable. In the Dutch war, during the government of Cromwel, her navy was superior to that of Holland; and in that which broke out in the beginning of the reign of Charles II. it was at least equal, perhaps superior, to the united navies of France and Holland. Its superiority, perhaps, would scarce appear greater in the present times; at least if the Dutch navy was to bear the same proportion to the Dutch commerce now which it did then. But this great naval power could not, in either of those wars, be owing to the act of navigation. During the first of them the plan of that act had been but just formed; and though before the breaking out of the fecond it had been fully enacted by legal authority; yet no part of it could have had time to produce any confiderable effect, and least of all that part which established the exclusive trade to the colonies. Both the colonies and their trade were inconsiderable then in comparison of what they are now. The island of Jamaica was an unwholesome desart, little inhabited and less cultivated. York and New Jersey were in the possession of the Dutch: the half of St. Christopher's in that of the French. The island of Antigua,

BOOK Antigua, the two Carolinas, Pensylvania, Georgia, and Nova Scotia, were not planted. Virginia, Maryland, and New England were planted; and though they were very thriving colonies, yet there was not, perhaps, at that time either in Europe or America a fingle person who foresaw or even suspected the rapid progress which they have fince made in wealth, population and improvement. The island of Barbadoes, in short, was the only British colony of any consequence of which the condition at that time bore any refemblance to what it is at present. The trade of the colonies, of which England, even for some time after the act of navigation, enjoyed but a part (for the act of navigation was not very strictly executed till several years after it was enacted) could not at that time be the cause of the great trade of England, nor of the great naval power which was supported by that trade. The trade which at that time supported that great naval power was the trade of Europe, and of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea. But the share which Great Britain at prefent enjoys of that trade could not support any such great naval power. Had the growing trade of the colonies been left free to all nations, whatever share of it might have fallen to Great Britain, and a very confiderable share would probably have fallen to her, must have been all an addition to this great trade of which the was before in possession. In consequence of the monopoly, the increase of the colony trade has not so much occasioned an addition to the trade which Great Britain had before, as a total change in its direction.

> SECONDLY, this monopoly has necessarily contributed to keep up the rate of profit in all the different branches of British trade higher than it naturally would have been, had all nations been allowed a free trade to the British colonies.

THE monopoly of the colony trade, as it necessarily drew to- CHAP. wards that trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would have gone to it of its own accord; fo by the expulsion of all foreign capitals it necessarily reduced the whole quantity of capital employed in that trade below what it naturally would have been in the case of a free trade. But, by lessening the competition of capitals in that branch of trade, it necessarily raised the rate of the profit in that branch. By lessening too the competition of British capitals in all other branches of trade, it necessarily raised the rate of British profit in all those other branches. Whatever may have been, at any particular period, fince the establishment of the act of navigation, the state or extent of the mercantile capital of Great Britain, the monopoly of the colony trade must, during the continuance of that state, have raifed the ordinary rate of British profit higher than it otherwife would have been both in that and in all the other branches of

But whatever raises in any country the ordinary rate of profit higher than it otherwife would be, necessarily subjects that country both to an absolute and to a relative disadvantage in every branch of trade of which she has not the monopoly.

nopoly established by that act contributed to keep it up.

British trade. If, since the establishment of the act of navigation, the ordinary rate of British profit has fallen considerably, as it certainly has, it must have fallen still lower, had not the mo-

IT subjects her to an absolute disadvantage: because in such branches of trade her merchants cannot get this greater profit, without felling dearer than they otherwise would do both the goods of foreign countries which they import into their own, and the goods of their own country, which they export to foreign countries. Their own country must both buy dearer and fell dearer; must both buy less and fell less; must both enjoy less and produce less than she otherwise would do.

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It subjects her to a relative disadvantage; because in such branches of trade it sets other countries which are not subject to the same absolute disadvantage either more above her or less below her than they otherwise would be. It enables them both to enjoy more and to produce more in proportion to what she enjoys and produces. It renders their superiority greater or their inferiority less than it otherwise would be. By raising the price of her produce above what it otherwise would be, it enables the merchants of other countries to undersell her in foreign markets, and thereby to justle her out of almost all those branches of trade, of which she has not the monopoly.

Our merchants frequently complain of the high wages of British labour as the cause of their manufactures being undersold in foreign markets; but they are silent about the high profits of stock. They complain of the extravagant gain of other people; but they say nothing of their own. The high profits of British stock, however, may contribute towards raising the price of British manufactures in many cases as much, and in some perhaps more than the high wages of British labour.

It is in this manner that the capital of Great Britain, one may justly say, has partly been drawn and partly been driven from the greater part of the different branches of trade of which she has not the monopoly; from the trade of Europe in particular, and from that of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea.

It has partly been drawn from those branches of trade; by the attraction of superior profit in the colony trade in consequence of the continual increase of that trade, and of the continual insufficiency of the capital which had carried it on one year to carry it on the next.

IT has partly been driven from them; by the advantage which CHAP. the high rate of profit, established in Great Britain, gives to other countries, in all the different branches of trade of which Great Britain has not the monopoly.

As the monopoly of the colony trade has drawn from those other branches a part of the British capital which would otherwife have been employed in them, fo it has forced into them many foreign capitals which would never have gone to them, had they not been expelled from the colony trade. In those other branches of trade it has diminished the competition of British capitals, and thereby raised the rate of British profit higher than it otherwise would have been. On the contrary, it has increased the competition of foreign capitals, and thereby funk the rate of foreign profit lower than it otherwise would have been. Both in the one way and in the other it must evidently have subjected Great Britain to a relative disadvantage in all those other branches of trade.

THE colony trade, however, it may perhaps be faid, is more advantageous to Great Britain than any other; and the monopoly, by forcing into that trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would otherwise have gone to it, has turned that capital into an employment more advantageous to the country than any other which it could have found.

THE most advantageous employment of any capital to the country to which it belongs, is that which maintains there the greatest quantity of productive labour, and increases the most the annual produce of the land and labour of that country. But the quantity of productive labour which any capital employed in the foreign trade of confumption can maintain is exactly in proportion, it has been shewn in the second book, to the frequency of its returns. A capital of a thousand pounds,

BOOK pounds, for example, employed in a foreign trade of consumption, of which the returns are made regularly once in the year, can keep in constant employment in the country to which it belongs a quantity of productive labour equal to what a thoufand pounds can maintain there for a year. If the returns are made twice or thrice in the year it can keep in constant employment a quantity of productive labour equal to what two or three thousand pounds can maintain there for a year. A foreign trade of confumption carried on with a neighbouring country is upon this account in general more advantageous than one carried on with a distant country; and for the same reason a direct foreign trade of confumption, as it has likewife been shewn in the fecond book, is in general more advantageous than a roundabout one.

> But the monopoly of the colony trade, so far as it has operated upon the employment of the capital of Great Britain, has in all cases forced some part of it from a foreign trade of consumption carried on with a neighbouring country, to one carried on with a more distant country, and in many cases from a direct foreign trade of confumption to a round-about one.

> FIRST, the monopoly of the colony trade has in all cases forced some part of the capital of Great Britain from a foreign trade of confumption carried on with a neighbouring to one carried on with a more distant country.

> IT has, in all cases, forced some part of that capital from the trade with Europe, and with the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea, to that with the more distant regions of America and the West Indies, from which the returns are necessarily less frequent, not only on account of the greater distance, but on account

account of the peculiar circumstances of those countries. New CHAP. colonies, it has already been observed, are always understocked. Their capital is always much less than what they could employ with great profit and advantage in the improvement and cultivation of their land. They have a constant demand, therefore, for more capital than they have of their own; and, in order to supply the deficiency of their own, they endeavour to borrow as much as they can of the mother country, to whom they are, therefore, always in debt. The most common way in which the colonists contract this debt, is not by borrowing upon bond of the rich people of the mother country, though they fometimes do this too, but by running as much in arrear to their correspondents, who supply them with goods from Europe, as those correspondents will allow them. Their annual returns frequently do not amount to more than a third, and fometimes not to fo great a proportion of what they owe. The whole capital, therefore, which their correspondents advance to them is feldom returned to Britain in less than three, and fometimes not in less than four or five years. But a British capital of a thousand pounds, for example, which is returned to Great Britain only once in five years, can keep in constant employment only one-fifth part of the British industry which it could maintain if the whole was returned once in the year; and, instead of the quantity of industry which a thousand pounds could maintain for a year, can keep in constant employment the quantity only which two hundred pounds can maintain for a year. The planter, no doubt, by the high price which he pays for the goods from Europe, by the interest upon the bills which he grants at distant dates, and by the commission upon the renewal of those which he grants at near dates, makes up, and probably more than makes up, all the lofs which his correspondent can fustain by this delay. But, though he may make up the loss of his correspondent, he cannot make up that of Great Britain. In a trade of which the returns

BOOK are very distant, the profit of the merchant may be as great or greater than in one in which they are very frequent and near; but the advantage of the country in which he resides, the quantity of productive labour constantly maintained there, the annual produce of the land and labour must always be much less. That the returns of the trade to America, and still more those of that to the West Indies, are, in general, not only more distant, but more irregular, and more uncertain too, than those of the trade to any part of Europe, or even of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean fea, will readily be allowed, I imagine, by every body who has any experience of those different branches of trade.

> SECONDLY, the monopoly of the colony trade has, in many cases, forced some part of the capital of Great Britain from a direct foreign trade of confumption, into a round-about one.

> Among the enumerated commodities which can be fent to no other market but Great Britain, there are feveral of which the quantity exceeds very much the confumption of Great Britain, and of which a part, therefore, must be exported to other countries. But this cannot be done without forcing some part of the capital of Great Britain into a round-about foreign trade of confumption. Maryland and Virginia, for example, fend annually to Great Britain upwards of ninety-fix thousand hogsheads of tobacco, and the consumption of Great Britain is said not to exceed fourteen thousand. Upwards of eighty-two thousand hogsheads, therefore, must be exported to other countries, to France, to Holland, and to the countries which lie round the Baltick and Mediterranean feas. But, that part of the capital of Great Britain which brings those eighty-two thousand hogsheads to Great Britain, which re-exports them from thence to those other countries, and which brings back from those other countries to Great Britain either goods or money

in return, is employed in a round-about foreign trade of confump- CHAP. tion; and is necessarily forced into this employment in order to dispose of this great surplus. If we would compute in how many years the whole of this capital is likely to come back to Great Britain, we must add to the distance of the American returns that of the returns from those other countries. If, in the direct foreign trade of confumption which we carry on with America, the whole capital employed frequently does not come back in less than three or four years; the whole capital employed in this round-about one is not likely to come back in less than four or five. If the one can keep in constant employment but a third or a fourth part of the domestick industry which could be maintained by a capital returned once in the year, the other can keep in constant employment but a fourth or a fifth part of that industry. But, had not the colonies been confined to the market of Great Britain for the fale of their tobacco, very little more of it would probably have come to us than what was necessary for the home consumption. The goods which Great Britain purchases at present for her own consumption with the great furplus of tobacco which she exports to other countries, she would, in this case, probably have purchased with the immediate produce of her own industry, or with some part of her own manufactures. That produce, those manufactures, instead of being almost entirely fuited to one great market, as at present, would probably have been fitted to a great number of smaller markets. Instead of one great round-about foreign trade of consumption, Great Britain would probably have carried on a great number of small direct foreign trades of the same kind. On account of the frequency of the returns, a part, and, probably, but a small part; perhaps not above a third or a fourth, of the capital which at present carries on this great round-about trade, might have been sufficient to carry on all those small direct ones, might have kept in constant employment an equal quantity of British industry, and have

BOOK have equally supported the annual produce of the land and labour of Great Britain. All the purposes of this trade being, in this manner, answered by a much smaller capital, there would have been a large spare capital to apply to other purposes; to improve the lands, to increase the manufactures, and to extend the commerce of Great Britain; to come into competition at least with the other British capitals employed in all those different ways, to reduce the rate of profit in them all, and thereby to give to Great Britain, in all of them, a superiority over other countries still greater than what she at present possesses.

> THE monopoly of the colony trade too has forced fome part of the capital of Great Britain from all foreign trade of confumption to a carrying trade; and, consequently, from supporting more or less the industry of Great Britain, to be employed altogether in supporting partly that of the colonies, and partly that of some other countries.

> THE goods, for example, which are annually purchased with the great furplus of eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco annually re-exported from Great Britain, are not all confumed in Great Britain. Part of them, linen from Germany and Holland, for example, is returned to the colonies for their particular confumption. But, that part of the capital of Great Britain which buys the tobacco with which this linen is afterwards bought, is necesfarily withdrawn from supporting the industry of Great Britain, to be employed altogether in supporting partly that of the colonies, and partly that of the particular countries who pay for this tobacco with the produce of their own industry.

> THE monopoly of the colony trade besides, by forcing towards it a much greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what

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what would naturally have gone to it, feems to have broken alto- CHAP. gether that natural balance which would otherwise have taken place among all the different branches of British industry. The industry of Great Britain, instead of being accommodated to a great number of small markets, has been principally suited to one great market. Her commerce, instead of running in a great number of fmall channels, has been taught to run principally in one great channel. But the whole system of her industry and commerce has thereby been rendered less secure; the whole state of her body politick less healthful than it otherwise would have been. In her present condition, Great Britain resembles one of those unwholsome bodies in which some of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, are liable to many dangerous diforders scarce incident to those in which all the parts are more properly proportioned. A fmall stop in that great blood vessel, which has been artificially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and through which an unnatural proportion of the industry and commerce of the country has been forced to circulate, is very likely to bring on the most dangerous disorders upon the whole body politick. The expectation of a rupture with the colonies, accordingly, has struck the people of Great Britain with more terror than they ever felt for a Spanish armada or a French invasion. It was this terror, whether well or ill grounded, which rendered the repeal of the stamp act a popular measure, among the merchants at least. In the total exclusion from the colony market, was it to last only for a few years, the greater part of our merchants used to fancy that they foresaw an entire stop to their trade; the greater part of our master manufacturers, the entire ruin of their business; and the greater part of our workmen an end of their employment. A rupture with any of our neighbours upon the continent, though likely too to occasion some stop or interruption in the employments of some of all these different orders of people, is foreseen, however, without

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any fuch general emotion. The blood, of which the circulation is stopt in some of the smaller vessels, easily disgorges itself into the greater, without occasioning any dangerous disorder; but, when it is stopt in any of the greater vessels, convulsions, apoplexy, or death, are the immediate and unavoidable consequences. If but one of those overgrown manufactures, which, by means either of bounties, or of the monopoly of the home and colony markets, have been artificially raised up to an unnatural height, finds some small stop or interruption in its employment, it frequently occasions a mutiny and disorder alarming to government, and embarrassing even to the deliberations of the legislature. How great, therefore, would be the disorder and confusion, it was thought, which must necessarily be occasioned by a sudden and entire stop in the employment of so great a proportion of our principal manufacturers?

Some moderate and gradual relaxation of the laws which give to Great Britain the exclusive trade to the colonies, till it is rendered in a great measure free, feems to be the only expedient which can deliver her from this danger, which can enable her or even force her to withdraw fome part of her capital from this overgrown employment, and to turn it, though with less profit, towards other employments; and which, by gradually diminishing one branch of her industry and gradually increasing all the rest, can by degrees restore all the different branches of it to that natural, healthful and proper proportion which perfect liberty necessarily establishes, and which perfect liberty can alone preserve. To open the colony trade all at once to all nations, might not only occasion some transitory inconveniency, but a great permanent loss to the greater part of those whose industry or capital is at present engaged in it. fudden loss of the employment even of the ships which import the eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco, which are over and above

above the confumption of Great Britain, might alone be felt very CHAP. fenfibly. Such are the unfortunate effects of all the regulations of the mercantile fystem! They not only introduce very dangerous disorders into the state of the body politic, but disorders which it is often difficult to remedy, without occasioning for a time, at least, still greater disorders. In what manner, therefore, the colony trade ought gradually to be opened; what are the restraints which ought first, and what are those which ought last to be taken away; or in what manner the natural fystem of perfect liberty and justice ought gradually to be restored, we must leave to the wisdom of future statesmen and legislators to determine.

FIVE different events, unforeseen and unthought of, have very fortunately concurred to hinder Great Britain from feeling, fo fenfibly as it was generally expected she would, the total exclusion which has now taken place for more than a year (from the first of December, 1774) from a very important branch of the colony trade, that of the twelve affociated provinces of North America. First, those colonies in preparing themselves for their non-importation agreement, drained Great Britain compleatly of all the commodities which were fit for their market: fecondly, the extraordinary demand of the Spanish Flota has, this year, drained Germany and the north of many commodities, linen in particular, which used to come into competition, even in the British market, with the manufactures of Great Britain: thirdly, the peace between Ruffia and Turkey has occasioned an extraordinary demand from the Turkey market, which, during the diffress of the country, and while a Ruffian fleet was cruizing in the Archipelago, had been very poorly supplied: fourthly, the demand of the north of Europe for the manufactures of Great Britain, has been increasing from year to year for some time past: and, fifthly, the late partition and confequential pacification of Poland, by opening the mar-

BOOK ket of that great country, have this year added an extraordinary demand from thence to the increasing demand of the north. These events are all, except the fourth, in their nature transitory and accidental, and the exclusion from so important a branch of the colony trade, if unfortunately it should continue much longer, may still occasion some degree of distress. This distress, however, as it will come on gradually, will be felt much lefs feverely than if it had come on all at once; and, in the mean time, the industry and capital of the country may find a new employment and direction, fo as to prevent it from ever rifing to any confiderable height.

> THE monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, fo far as it has turned towards that trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would otherwife have gone to it, has in all cases turned it, from a foreign trade of consumption with a neighbouring, into one with a more distant country; in many cases, from a direct foreign trade of confumption, into a round-about one; and in some cases, from all foreign trade of consumption, into a carrying trade. It has in all cases, therefore, turned it, from a direction in which it would have maintained a greater quantity of productive labour, into one, in which it can maintain a much fmaller quantity. By fuiting, befides, to one particular market only fo great a part of the industry and commerce of Great Britain it has rendered the whole state of that industry and commerce more precarious and less secure, than if their produce had been accommodated to a greater variety of markets.

> WE must carefully distinguish between the effects of the colony trade and those of the monopoly of that trade. The former are always and necessarily beneficial; the latter always and necessarily hurtful. But the former are so beneficial, that the colony trade, though subject to a monopoly, and notwithstanding the hurtful effects of that monopoly,

monopoly, is still upon the whole beneficial, and greatly beneficial; though a good deal less so than it otherwise would be.

CHAP. VII.

THE effect of the colony trade in its natural and free state, is to open a great, though distant market for such parts of the produce of British industry as may exceed the demand of the markets nearer home, of those of Europe and of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea. In its natural and free state the colony trade. without drawing from those markets any part of the produce which had ever been fent to them, encourages Great Britain to increase the furplus continually, by continually prefenting new equivalents to be exchanged for it. In its natural and free state, the colony trade tends to increase the quantity of productive labour in Great Britain, but without altering in any respect the direction of that which had been employed there before. In the natural and free state of the colony trade, the competition of all other nations would hinder the rate of profit from rifing above the common level either in the new market, or in the new employment. The new market, without drawing any thing from the old one, would create, if one may fay fo, a new produce for its own fupply; and that new produce would constitute a new capital for carrying on the new employment which in the fame manner would draw nothing from the old one.

The monopoly of the colony trade, on the contrary, by excluding the competition of other nations, and thereby raising the rate of profit both in the new market and in the new employment, draws produce from the old market and capital from the old employment. To augment our share of the colony trade beyond what it otherwise would be, is the avowed purpose of the monopoly. If our share of that trade were to be no greater with, than it would have been without the monopoly, there could have been no reason for establishing the monopoly. But whatever forces into a branch of trade

BOOK IV.

trade of which the returns are flower and more distant than those of the greater part of other trades, a greater proportion of the capital of any country, than what of its own accord would go to that branch, necessarily renders the whole quantity of productive labour annually maintained there, the whole annual produce of the land and labour of that country less than they otherwise would be. It keeps down the revenue of the inhabitants of that country, below what it would naturally rise to, and thereby diminishes their power of accumulation. It not only hinders, at all times, their capital from maintaining so great a quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise maintain, but it hinders it from increasing so fast as it would otherwise increase, and consequently from maintaining a still greater quantity of productive labour.

THE natural good effects of the colony trade, however, more than counter-balance to Great Britain the bad effects of the monopoly, so that, monopoly and all together, that trade, even as it is carried on at present, is not only advantageous, but greatly advantageous. The new market and new employment which are opened by the colony trade, are of much greater extent than that portion of the old market and of the old employment which is lost by the monopoly. The new produce and the new capital which has been created, if one may say so, by the colony trade, maintain in Great Britain a greater quantity of productive labour, than what can have been thrown out of employment by the revulsion of capital from other trades of which the returns are more frequent. If the colony trade, however, even as it is carried on at present is advantageous to Great Britain, it is not by means of the monopoly, but in spite of the monopoly.

IT is rather for the manufactured than for the rude produce of Europe, that the colony trade opens a new market. Agriculture

ture is the proper business of all new colonies; a business which CHAP. the cheapness of land renders more advantageous than any VII. They abound, therefore, in the rude produce of land, and instead of importing it from other countries, they have generally a large furplus to export. In new colonies, agriculture, either draws hands from all other employments, or keeps them from going to any other employment. There are few hands to spare for the necessary, and none for the ornamental manufactures. The greater part of the manufactures of both kinds, they find it cheaper to purchase of other countries than to make for themselves. It is chiefly by encouraging the manufactures of Europe, that the colony trade indirectly encourages its agriculture. The manufacturers of Europe to whom that trade gives employment constitute a new market for the produce of the land; and the most advantageous of all markets, the home market, for the corn and cattle, for the bread and butcher's-meat of Europe, is thus greatly extended by means of the trade to America.

But that the monopoly of the trade of populous and thriving colonies is not alone sufficient to establish, or even to maintain manufactures in any country, the examples of Spain and Portugal sufficiently demonstrate. Spain and Portugal were manufacturing countries before they had any considerable colonies. Since they had the richest and most fertile in the world they have both ceased to be so.

In Spain and Portugal, the bad effects of the monopoly, aggravated by other causes, have entirely conquered the natural good effects of the colony trade. These causes seem to be, other monopolies of different kinds; the degradation of the value of gold and filver below what it is in most other countries; the exclusion from foreign markets by improper taxes upon exportation, and the narrowing

BOOK narrowing of the home market, by still more improper taxes upon the transportation of goods from one part of the country to another: but above all, that irregular and partial administration of justice, which often protects the rich and powerful debtor from the pursuit of his injured creditor, and which makes the industrious part of the nation afraid to prepare goods for the confumption of those haughty and great men, to whom they dare not refuse to sell upon credit, and from whom they are altogether uncertain of re-payment.

> In England, on the contrary, the natural good effects of the colony trade, affisted by other causes, have in a great measure conquered the bad effects of the monopoly. These causes seem to be, the general liberty of trade, which, notwithstanding some restraints is at least equal, perhaps superior, to what it is in any other country; the liberty of exporting, duty free, almost all forts of goods which are the produce of domestick industry, to almost any foreign country, and what, perhaps, is of still greater importance, the unbounded liberty of transporting them from any one part of our own country to any other, without being obliged to give any account to any publick office, without being liable to question or examination of any kind; but above all, that equal and impartial administration of justice which renders the rights of the meanest British subject respectable to the greatest, and which, by fecuring to every man the fruits of his own industry, gives the greatest and most effectual encouragement to every fort of industry.

> If the manufactures of Great Britain, however, have been advanced, as they certainly have, by the colony trade, it has not been by means of the monopoly of that trade, but in spite of The effect of the monopoly has been, not to the monopoly. augment the quantity, but to alter the quality and shape of a part of the manufactures of Great Britain, and to accommodate to a market.

market, from which the returns are flow and distant, what would CHAP. otherwise have been accommodated to one from which the returns are frequent and near. Its effect has confequently been to turn a part of the capital of Great Britain from an employment in which it would have maintained a greater quantity of manufacturing industry, to one in which it maintains a much fmaller, and thereby to diminish, instead of increasing, the whole quantity of manufacturing industry maintained in Great Britain.

THE monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, like all the other mean and malignant expedients of the mercantile system. depresses the industry of all other countries, but chiefly that of the colonies, without in the least increasing, but on the contrary diminishing that of the country in whose favour it is established.

THE monopoly hinders the capital of that country, whatever may at any particular time be the extent of that capital, from maintaining so great a quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise maintain, and from affording so great a revenue to the industrious inhabitants as it would otherwise afford. But as capital can be increased only by favings from revenue, the monopoly, by hindering it from affording so great a revenue as it would otherwise afford, necessarily hinders it from increasing so fast as it would otherwise increase, and consequently from maintaining a still greater quantity of productive labour, and affording a still greater revenue to the industrious inhabitants of that country. One great original fource of revenue, therefore, the wages of labour, the monopoly must necessarily have rendered at all times less abundant than it otherwise would have been.

BOOK

By raising the rate of mercantile profit, the monopoly discou rages the improvement of land. The profit of improvement depends upon the difference between what the land actually produces and what, by the application of a certain capital, it can be made to produce. If this difference affords a greater profit than what can be drawn from an equal capital in any mercantile employment, the improvement of land will draw capital from all mercantile employments. If the profit is less, mercantile employments will draw capital from the improvement of land. Whatever therefore raises the rate of mercantile profit, either lesiens the superiority or increases the inferiority of the profit of improvement; and in the one case hinders capital from going to improvement, and in the other draws capital from it. But by discouraging improvement, the monopoly necessarily retards the natural increase of another great original fource of revenue, the rent of land. By raifing the rate of profit too the monopoly necessarily keeps up the market rate of interest higher than it otherwise would be. But the price of land in proportion to the rent which it affords, the number of years purchase which is commonly paid for it. necessarily falls as the rate of interest rises, and rises as the rate of interest falls. The monopoly therefore hurts the interest of the landlord two different ways, by retarding the natural increase. first, of his rent, and fecondly, of the price which he would get for his land in proportion to the rent which it affords.

THE monopoly, indeed, raises the rate of mercantile profit, and thereby augments fomewhat the gain of our merchants. But as it obstructs the natural increase of capital, it tends rather to diminish than to increase the sum total of the revenue which the inhabitants of the country derive from the profits of stock; a fmall profit upon a great capital generally affording a greater revenue than a great profit upon a small one. The monopoly raises

raises the rate of profit, but it hinders the sum of profit from CHAP. vil.

ALL the original fources of revenue, the wages of labour, the rent of land, and the profits of stock, the monopoly renders much less abundant than they otherwise would be. To promote the little interest of one little order of men in one country, it hurts the interest of all other orders of men in that country, and of all men in all other countries.

Ir is folely by raifing the ordinary rate of profit that the monopoly either has proved or could prove advantageous to any one particular order of men. But besides all the bad effects to the country in general which have already been mentioned as neceffarily refulting from a high rate of profit; there is one more fatal, perhaps, than all these put together, but which, if we may judge from experience, is inseparably connected with it. The high rate of profit feems every where to destroy that parsimony which in other circumstances is natural to the character of the merchant. When profits are high, that fober virtue feems to be fuperfluous, and expensive luxury to suit better the affluence of his fituation. But the owners of the great mercantile capitals are necessarily the leaders and conductors of the whole industry of every nation, and their example has a much greater influence upon the manners of the whole industrious part of it than that of any other order of men. If his employer is attentive and parfimonious, the workman is very likely to be so too; but if the master is dissolute and disorderly, the servant who shapes his work according to the pattern which his mafter prescribes to him. will shape his life too according to the example which he fets him. Accumulation is thus prevented in the hands of all those who are naturally the most disposed to accumulate; and the funds destined

BOOK destined for the maintenance of productive labour receive no augmentation from the revenue of those who ought naturally to augment them the most. The capital of the country, instead of increasing, gradually dwindles away, and the quantity of productive labour maintained in it grows every day less and less. Have the exorbitant profits of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon augmented the capital of Spain and Portugal? Have they alleviated the poverty, have they promoted the industry of those two beggarly countries? Such has been the tone of mercantile expence in those two trading cities, that those exorbitant profits, far from augmenting the general capital of the country, feem scarce to have been fufficient to keep up the capitals upon which they were made. Foreign capitals are every day intruding themselves, if I may fay so, more and more into the trade of Cadiz and Lisbon. It is to expel those foreign capitals from a trade which their own capital grows every day more and more infufficient for carrying on, that the Spaniards and Portugueze endeavour every day to straiten more and more the galling bands of their abfurd monopoly. Compare the mercantile manners of Cadiz and Lisbon with those of Amsterdam, and you will be sensible how differently the conduct and character of merchants are affected by the high and by the low profits of stock. The merchants of London indeed have not yet generally become such magnificent lords as those of Cadiz and Lisbon; but neither are they in general such attentive and parsimonious burghers as those of Amsterdam. They are supposed, however, many of them, to be a good deal richer than the greater part of the former, and not quite fo rich as many of the latter. But the rate of their profit is commonly much lower than that of the former, and a good deal higher than that of the latter. Light come light go, fays the proverb; and the ordinary tone of expence feems every where to be regulated, not fo much according to the real ability of spending, as to the supposed facility of getting money to fpend.

IT is thus that the fingle advantage which the monopoly procures to a fingle order of men is in many different ways hurtful to the general interest of the country.

To found a great empire for the fole purpose of raising up a people of customers, may at first fight appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation that is governed by shopkeepers. Such sovereigns, and such sovereigns only, are capable of fancying that they will find some advantage in employing the blood and treasure of their subjects. to found and to maintain fuch an empire. Say to a shopkeeper, Buy me a good estate, and I shall always buy my cloaths at your shop, even though I should pay somewhat dearer than what I can have them for at other shops; and you will not find him very forward to embrace your proposal. But should any other person buy you fuch an estate, the shopkeeper would be much obliged to your benefactor if he would enjoin you to buy all your cloaths at his shop. England purchased for some of her subjects, who found themfelves uneasy at home, a great estate in a distant country. The price indeed was very fmall, and instead of thirty years purchase, the ordinary price of land in the present times, it amounted to little more than the expence of the different equipments which made the first discovery, reconnoitered the coast, and took a fictitious possession of the country. The land was good and of great extent, and the cultivators having plenty of good ground to work upon, and being for some time at liberty to sell their produce where they pleased, became in the course of little more than thirty or forty years (between 1620 and 1660) fo numerous and thriving a people, that the shopkeepers and other traders of England wished to secure to themselves the monopoly of their custom. Without pretending, therefore, that they had paid any part, either of the original purchase money, or of the **fubsequent**

BOOK subsequent expence of improvement, they petitioned the parliament that the cultivators of America might for the future be confined to their shop; first, for buying all the goods which they wanted from Europe; and, fecondly, for felling all fuch parts of their own produce as those traders might find it convenient to buy. For they did not find it convenient to buy every part of Some parts of it imported into England might have interfered with some of the trades which they themselves carried on Those particular parts of it, therefore, they were willing that the colonists should sell where they could; the farther off the better; and upon that account proposed that their market should be confined to the countries south of Cape Finisterre. A clause in the famous act of navigation established this truly shopkeeper proposal into a law.

> THE maintenance of this monopoly has hitherto been the principal, or more properly perhaps the fole end and purpose of the dominion which Great Britain assumes over her colonies. In the exclusive trade, it is supposed, consists the great advantage of provinces, which have never yet afforded either revenue or military force for the support of the civil government, or the defence of the mother country. The monopoly is the principal badge of their dependency, and it is the fole fruit which has hitherto been gathered from that dependency. Whatever expence Great Britain has hitherto laid out in maintaining this dependency, has really been laid out in order to support this monopoly. The expence of the ordinary peace establishment of the colonies amounted, before the commencement of the present disturbances, to the pay of twenty regiments of foot; to the expence of the artillery, stores, and extraordinary provisions with which it is necessary to supply them; and to the expence of a very confiderable naval force which is constantly kept up in order to guard, from the smuggling vessels of other

other nations, the immense coast of North America, and that CHAP. of our West Indian islands. The whole expence of this peace establishment was a charge upon the revenue of Great Britain, and was, at the same time, the smallest part of what the dominion of the colonies has cost the mother country. If we would know the amount of the whole, we must add to the annual expence of this peace establishment the interest of the sums which, in consequence of her confidering her colonies as provinces subject to her dominion, Great Britain has upon different occasions laid out upon their defence. We must add to it, in particular, the whole expence of the late war, and a great part of that which preceded it. late war was altogether a colony quarrel, and the whole expence of it, in whatever part of the world it may have been laid out, whether in Germany or in the East Indies, ought justly to be stated to the account of the colonies. It amounted to more than ninety millions sterling, including not only the new debt which was contracted, but the two shillings in the pound additional land tax, and the fums which were every year borrowed from the finking fund. The Spanish war which began in 1739, was principally a colony quarrel. Its principal object was to prevent the fearch of the colony ships which carried on a contraband trade with the Spanish main. This whole expence is, in reality, a bounty which has been given in order to support a monopoly. The pretended purpose of it was to encourage the manufactures, and to encrease the commerce of Great Britain. But its real effect has been to raise the rate of mercantile profit, and to enable our merchants to turn into a branch of trade, of which the returns are more flow and distant than those of the greater part of other trades, a greater proportion of their capital than they otherwise would have done; two events which, if a bounty could have prevented, it might perhaps have been very well worth while to give fuch a bounty.

UNDER

BOOK IV.

UNDER the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies.

To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over her colonies, and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to enact their own laws, and to make peace and war as they might think proper, would be to propose such a measure as never was, and never will be adopted, by any nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province, how troublesome soever it might be to govern it, and how small foever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion to the expence which it occasioned. Such facrifices, though they might frequently be agreeable to the interest, are always mortifying to the pride of every nation, and what is perhaps of still greater consequence, they are always contrary to the private interest of the governing part of it, who would thereby be deprived of the difposal of many places of trust and profit, of many opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction, which the possession of the most turbulent, and, to the great body of the people, the most unprofitable province feldom fails to afford. The most visionary enthufiast would scarce be capable of proposing such a measure, with any ferious hopes at least of its ever being adopted. If it was adopted, however, Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual expence of the peace establishment of the colonies, but might fettle with them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually fecure to her a free trade, more advantageous to the great body of the people, though less so to the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present enjoys. By thus parting good friends, the natural affection of the colonies to the mother country, which, perhaps, our late diffensions have well nigh extinguished, would quickly revive. It might dispose them not only to respect,

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for whole centuries together, that treaty of commerce which they CHAP. had concluded with us at parting, but to favour us in war as well as in trade, and, instead of turbulent and factious subjects, to become our most faithful, affectionate, and generous allies; and the fame fort of parental affection on the one side, and filial respect on the other, might revive between Great Britain and her colonies, which used to subsist between those of ancient Greece and the mother city from which they descended.

In order to render any province advantageous to the empire to which it belongs, it ought to afford, in time of peace, a revenue to the publick sufficient not only for defraying the whole expence of its own peace establishment, but for contributing its proportion to the support of the general government of the empire. Every province necessarily contributes, more or less, to increase the expence of that general government. If any particular province, therefore, does not contribute its share towards defraying this expence, an unequal burden must be thrown upon some other part of the empire. The extraordinary revenue too which every province affords to the publick in time of war, ought, from parity of reason, to bear the same proportion to the extraordinary revenue of the whole empire which its ordinary revenue does in time of peace. That neither the ordinary nor extraordinary revenue which Great Britain derives from her colonies, bears this proportion to the whole revenue of the British empire, will readily be allowed. The monopoly, it has been supposed, indeed, by increasing the private revenue of the people of Great Britain, and thereby enabling them to pay greater taxes, compensates the deficiency of the publick revenue of the colonies. But this monopoly, I have endeavoured to show, though a very grievous tax upon the colonies, and though it may increase the revenue of a particular order of men in Great Britain, diminishes instead of increasing that of the great body of the people; and confequently diminishes instead of increasing the ability of the great body

BOOK body of the people to pay taxes. The men too whose revenue the monopoly increases, constitute a particular order which it is both absolutely impossible to tax beyond the proportion of other orders, and extremely impolitick even to attempt to tax beyond that proportion, as I shall endeavour to show in the following book. No particular resource, therefore, can be drawn from this particular order.

> THE colonies may be taxed either by their own affemblies or by the parliament of Great Britain.

> THAT the colony affemblies can ever be fo managed as to levy upon their constituents a publick revenue sufficient not only to maintain at all times their own civil and military establishment, but to pay their proper proportion of the expence of the general government of the British empire, seems not very probable. It was a long time before even the parliament of England, though placed immediately under the eye of the sovereign, could be brought under such a system of management, or could be rendered sufficiently liberal in their grants for supporting the civil and military establishments even of their own country. It was only by distributing among the particular members of parliament, a great part either of the offices, or of the disposal of the offices arising from this civil and military establishment, that such a system of management could be established even with regard to the parliament of England. But the distance of the colony assemblies from the eye of the sovereign, their number, their dispersed situation, and their various constitutions, would render it very difficult to manage them in the same manner, even though the fovereign had the same means of doing it; and those means are wanting. It would be absolutely impossible to distribute among all the leading members of all the colony affemblies fuch a share, either of the offices or of the disposal of the offices arising from

from the general government of the British empire, as to dispose them to give up their popularity at home and to tax their constituents for the support of that general government, of which almost the whole emoluments were to be divided among people who were strangers to them. The unavoidable ignorance of administration, besides, concerning the relative importance of the different members of those different assemblies, the offences which must frequently be given, the blunders which must constantly be committed in attempting to manage them in this manner, seem to render such a system of management altogether impracticable with regard to them.

THE colony affemblies, befides, cannot be supposed the proper judges of what is necessary for the defence and support of the whole The care of that defence and support is not intrusted to It is not their business, and they have no regular means of information concerning it. The affembly of a province, like the vestry of a parish, may judge very properly concerning the affairs of its own particular district; but can have no proper means of judging concerning those of the whole empire. It cannot even judge properly concerning the proportion which its own province bears to the whole empire; or concerning the relative degree of its wealth and importance, compared with the other provinces; because those other provinces are not under the inspection and super-intendancy of the assembly of a particular province. What is necessary for the defence and support of the whole empire, and in what proportion each part ought to contribute, can be judged of only by that affembly which inspects and super-intends the affairs of the whole empire.

It has been proposed, accordingly, that the colonies should be taxed by requisition, the parliament of Great Britain determining the sum which each colony ought to pay, and the provincial assembly assessing

and

BOOK and levying it in the way that suited best the circumstances of the province. What concerned the whole empire would in this way be determined by the affembly which inspects and super-intends the affairs of the whole empire; and the provincial affairs of each colony might still be regulated by its own assembly. Though the colonies should in this case have no representatives in the British parliament, yet, if we may judge by experience, there is no probability that the parliamentary requisition would be unreasonable. The parliament of England has not upon any occasion shown the smallest disposition to overburden those parts of the empire which are not represented in parliament. The islands of Guernsey and Jersey, without any means of refisting the authority of parliament, are more lightly taxed than any part of Great Britain. Parliament in attempting to exercise its supposed right, whether well or ill grounded, of taxing the colonies, has never hitherto demanded of them any thing which even approached to a just proportion to what was paid by their fellow subjects at home. If the contribution of the colonies, besides, was to rife or fall in proportion to the rife or fall of the land tax; parliament could not tax them without taxing at the same time its own constituents, and the colonies might in this case be considered as virtually represented in parliament.

> Examples are not wanting of empires in which all the different provinces are not taxed, if I may be allowed the expression, in one mass; but in which the sovereign regulates the sum which each province ought to pay, and in some provinces affesses and levies it as he thinks proper; while in others, he leaves it to be affeffed and levied as the respective states of each province shall determine. some provinces of France, the king not only imposes what taxes he thinks proper, but affesses and levies them in the way he thinks proper. From others he demands a certain fum, but leaves it to the states of each province to assess and levy that sum as they think proper.

proper. According to the scheme of taxing by requisition, the CHAP. parliament of Great Britain would stand nearly in the same situation towards the colony assemblies, as the king of France does towards the states of those provinces which still enjoy the privilege of having states of their own, the provinces of France which are supposed to be the best governed.

Bur though, according to this scheme, the colonies could have no just reason to fear that their share of the publick burdens should ever exceed the proper proportion to that of their fellow citizens at home; Great Britain might have just reason to fear that it never would amount to that proper proportion. The parliament of Great Britain has not for some time past had the same established authority in the colonies, which the French king has in those provinces of France, which still enjoy the privilege of having states of their own. The colony affemblies, if they were not very favourably disposed (and unless more skilfully managed than they ever have been hitherto, they are not very likely to be fo) might still find many pretences for evading or rejecting the most reasonable requisitions of parliament. A French war breaks out, we shall suppose; ten millions must immediately be raised in order to defend the feat of the empire. This fum must be borrowed upon the credit of some parliamentary fund mortgaged for paying the interest. Part of this fund parliament proposes to raise by a tax to be levied in Great Britain, and part of it by a requisition to all the different colony affemblies of America and the West Indies. Would people readily advance their money upon the credit of a fund, which partly depended upon the good humour of all those assemblies, far distant from the seat of the war, and fometimes, perhaps, thinking themselves not much concerned in the event of it? Upon such a fund no more money would probably be advanced than what the tax to be levied in Great Britain might be supposed to answer for. The whole burden of the debt contracted

BOOK contracted on account of the war would in this manner fall, as it always has done hitherto, upon Great Britain, upon a part of the empire and not upon the whole empire. Great Britain is, perhaps, fince the world began, the only state which, as it has extended its empire, has only increased its expence without once augmenting its resources. Other states have generally disburdened themselves upon their subject and subordinate provinces of the most considerable part of the expence of defending the empire. Great Britain has hitherto suffered her subject and subordinate provinces to disburden themselves upon her of almost this whole expence. In order to put Great Britain upon a footing of equality with her own colonies, which the law has hitherto supposed to be fubject and subordinate, it seems necessary, upon the scheme of taxing them by parliamentary requisition, that parliament should have fome means of rendering its requisitions immediately effectual in case the colony assemblies should attempt to evade or reject them; and what those means are, it is not very easy to conceive, and it has not yet been explained.

> SHOULD the parliament of Great Britain, at the same time, be ever fully established in the right of taxing the colonies, even independent of the confent of their own affemblies, the importance of those assemblies would from that moment be at an end, and with it that of all the leading men of British America. Men desire to have some share in the management of public affairs chiefly on account of the importance which it gives them. Upon the power which the greater part of the leading men, the natural aristocracy of every country, have of preserving or defending their respective importance, depends the stability and duration of every fystem of free government. In the attacks which those leading men are continually making upon the importance of one another, and in the defence of their own, confifts the whole play

of domestic faction and ambition. The leading men of America, CHAP. like those of all other countries, desire to preserve their own importance. They feel, or imagine that if their assemblies, which they are fond of calling parliaments, and of confidering as equal in authority to the parliament of Great Britain, should be so far degraded as to become the humble ministers and executive officers of that parliament, the greater part of their own importance would be at an end. They have rejected, therefore, the proposal of being taxed by parliamentary requisition, and like other ambitious and high spirited men, have rather chosen to draw the sword in defence of their own importance.

Towards the declension of the Roman republic, the allies of Rome, who had born the principal burden of defending the state and extending the empire, demanded to be admitted to all the privileges of Roman citizens. Upon being refused, the focial war broke out. During the course of that war Rome granted those privileges to the greater part of them, one by one, and in proportion as they detached themselves from the general confederacy. The parliament of Great Britain infifts upon taxing the colonies: and they refuse to be taxed by a parliament in which they are not represented. If to each colony, which should detach itself from the general confederacy, Great Britain should allow such a number of representatives as suited the proportion of what it contributed to the public revenue of the empire, in consequence of its being subjected to the same taxes, and in compensation admitted to the fame freedom of trade with its fellow subjects at home; the number of its representatives to be augmented as the proportion of its contribution might afterwards augment; a new method of acquiring importance, a new and more dazzling object of ambition would be presented to the leading men of each colony. Instead of piddling for the little prizes which are to be found in what

BOOK may be called the paltry raffle of colony faction; they might then hope, from the prefumption which men naturally have in their own ability and good fortune, to draw fome of the great prizes which fometimes come from the wheel of the great state lottery of British politics. Unless this or some other method is fallen upon, and there feems to be none more obvious than this, of preserving the importance and of gratifying the ambition of the leading men of America, it is not very probable that they will ever voluntarily submit to us; and we ought to consider that the blood which must be shed in forcing them to do so, is every drop of it, the blood either of those who are, or of those whom we wish to have for our fellow citizens. They are very weak who flatter themselves that, in the state to which things have come, our colonies will be easily conquered by force alone. The persons who now govern the refolutions of what they call their continental congress, feel in themselves at this moment a degree of importance which, perhaps, the greatest subjects in Europe scarce feel. From shopkeepers, tradesmen, and attornies, they are become statesmen and legislators, and are employed in contriving a new form of government for an extensive empire, which, they flatter themselves, will become, and which, indeed, seems very likely to become one of the greatest and most formidable that ever was in the world. Five hundred different people, perhaps, who in different ways act immediately under the continental congress; and five hundred thousand, perhaps, who act under those five hundred, all feel in the fame manner a proportionable rife in their own importance. Almost every individual of the governing party in America fills, at present, in his own fancy, a station fuperior, not only to what he had ever filled before, but to what he had ever expected to fill; and unless some new object of ambition is presented either to him or to his leaders, if he has the ordinary spirit of a man, he will die in defence of that station.

IT is a remark of the president Henaut that we now read with CHAP. pleasure the account of many little transactions of the Ligue, which when they happened were not perhaps confidered as very important pieces of news. But every man then, fays he, fancied himself of some importance; and the innumerable memoirs which have come down to us from those times, were, the greater part of them, written by people who took pleasure in recording and magnifying events in which, they flattered themselves, they had been considerable actors. How obstinately the city of Paris upon that occasion defended itself, what a dreadful famine it supported rather than submit to the best and afterwards the most beloved of all the French kings, is well known. The greater part of the citizens, or those who governed the greater part of them, fought in defence of their own importance, which they foresaw was to be at an end whenever the antient government should be re-established. Our colonies, unless they can be induced to consent to a union, are very likely to defend themselves against the best of all mother countries, as obstinately as the city of Paris did against one of the best of kings.

The idea of representation was unknown in antient times. When the people of one state were admitted to the right of citizenship in another, they had no other means of exercising that right but by coming in a body to vote and deliberate with the people of that other state. The admission of the greater part of the inhabitants of Italy to the privileges of Roman citizens, completely ruined the Roman republic. It was no longer possible to distinguish between who was and who was not a Roman citizen. No tribe could know its own members. A rabble of any kind could be introduced into the assemblies of the people, could drive out the real citizens, and decide upon the affairs of the republic as if they themselves had been such. But though America was to send

BOOK fend fifty or fixty new representatives to parliament, the doorkeeper of the house of commons could not find any great difficulty in distinguishing between who was and who was not a member. Though the Roman constitution, therefore, was necesfarily ruined by the union of Rome with the allied states of Italy, there is not the least probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the union of Great Britain with her colonies. That constitution, on the contrary, would be compleated by it, and feems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have representatives from every part of it. That this union, however, could be easily effectuated, or that difficulties and great difficulties might not occur in the execution, I do not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear infurmountable. principal perhaps arise, not from the nature of things, but from the prejudices and opinions of the people both on this and the other fide of the Atlantic.

> WE, on this side the water, are afraid lest the multitude of American representatives should over-turn the balance of the constitution, and increase too much either the influence of the crown on the one hand, or the force of the democracy on the other. But if the number of American representatives was to be in proportion to the produce of American taxation, the number of people to be managed would increase exactly in proportion to the means of managing them; and the means of managing, to the number of people to be managed. The monarchical and democratical parts of the constitution would, after the union, stand exactly in the same degree of relative force with regard to one another as they had done before.

THE people on the other fide of the water are afraid lest their CHAP. distance from the seat of government might expose them to many oppressions. But their representatives in parliament, of which the number ought from the first to be considerable, would easily be able to protect them from all oppression. The distance could not much weaken the dependency of the representative upon the constituent, and the former would still feel that he owed his feat in parliament and all the consequence which he derived from it to the good will of the latter. It would be the interest of the former, therefore, to cultivate that good-will by complaining with all the authority of a member of the legislature, of every outrage which any civil or military officer might be guilty of in those remote parts of the empire. The distance of America from the feat of government, besides, the nations of that country might flatter themselves, with some appearance of reason too, would not be of very long continuance. Such has hitherto been the rapid progress of that country in wealth, population and improvement, that in the course of little more than a century, perhaps, the produce of American might exceed that of British taxation. The feat of the empire would then naturally remove itself to that part of the empire which contributed most to the general defence and support of the whole.

THE discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind. Their confequences have already been very great: but, in the short period of between two and three centuries which has elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole extent of their consequences can have been seen. What benefits, or what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result from those great events no human wisdom can foresee. By uniting, in some measure, the most distant parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another's wants.

BOOK wants, to increase one another's enjoyments, and to encourage one another's industry, their general tendency would feem to be bene-To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies. all the commercial benefits which can have refulted from those events have been funk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned. These misfortunes, however, seem to have arisen rather from accident than from any thing in the nature of those events themselves. At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the fide of the Europeans, that they were enabled to commit with impunity every fort of injustice in those remote countries. Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker, and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injuffice of independent nations into some fort of respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this equality of force than that mutual communication of knowledge and of all forts of improvements which an extensive commerce from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries along with it.

> In the mean time one of the principal effects of those discoveries has been to raise the mercantile system to a degree of splendor and glory which it could never otherwise have attained to. It is the object of that fystem to enrich a great nation rather by trade and manufactures than by the improvement and cultivation of land, rather by the industry of the towns than by that of the country. But, in consequence of those discoveries, the commercial towns of Europe, instead of being the manufacturers and carriers for but a very small part of the world, (that part of Europe which is washed by the Atlantic ocean, and the countries which

lie round the Baltick and Mediterranean feas), have now become CHAP. the manufacturers for the numerous and thriving cultivators of America, and the carriers, and in some respects the manufacturers too, for almost all the different nations of Asia, Africa, and America. Two new worlds have been opened to their industry, each of them much greater and more extensive than the old one, and the market of one of them growing still greater and greater every day.

THE countries which possess the colonies of America, and which trade directly to the East Indies, enjoy, indeed, the whole shew and splendor of this great commerce. Other countries, however, notwithstanding all the invidious restraints by which it is meant to exclude them, frequently enjoy a greater share of the real benefit of it. The colonies of Spain and Portugal, for example, give more real encouragement to the industry of other countries than to that of Spain and Portugal. In the fingle article of linen alone the confumption of those colonies amounts, it is said, but I do not pretend to warrant the quantity, to more than three millions sterling a year. But this great confumption is almost entirely supplied by France, Flanders, Holland, and Germany. Portugal furnish but a small part of it. The capital which supplies the colonies with this great quantity of linen is annually distributed among, and furnishes a revenue to the inhabitants of those other countries. The profits of it only are spent in Spain and Portugal, where they help to support the sumptuous profusion of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon.

Even the regulations by which each nation endeavours to fecure to itself the exclusive trade of its own colonies, are frequently more hurtful to the countries in favour of which they are established than to those against which they are established. The uniust

BOOK amjust oppression of the industry of other countries falls back, if I may fay fo, upon the heads of the oppressors, and crushes their industry more than it does that of those other countries. By those regulations, for example, the merchant of Hamburgh must fend the linen which he destines for the American market to London. and he must bring back from thence the tobacco which he destines for the German market; because he can neither send the one directly to America, nor bring back the other directly from thence. By this restraint he is probably obliged to sell the one somewhat cheaper, and to buy the other somewhat dearer than he otherwise might have done; and his profits are probably fomewhat abridged by means of it. In this trade, however, between Hamburgh and London, he certainly receives the returns of his capital much more quickly than he could possibly have done in the direct trade to America, even though we should suppose, what is by no means the case, that the payments of America were as punctual as those of London. In the trade, therefore, to which those regulations confine the merchant of Hamburgh, his capital can keep in constant employment a much greater quantity of German industry than it possibly could have done in the trade from which he is excluded. Though the one employment, therefore, may to him perhaps be less profitable than the other, it cannot be less advantageous to his country. It is quite otherwise with the employment into which the monopoly naturally attracts, if I may fay fo, the capital of the London merchant. That employment may, perhaps, be more profitable to him than the greater part of other employments, but, on account of the flowness of the returns, it cannot be more advantageous to his country.

> AFTER all the unjust attempts, therefore, of every country in Europe to engross to itself the whole advantage of the trade of its own colonies, no country has yet been able to engross to itself any thing

thing but the expence of supporting in time of peace and of defending CHAP. in time of war the oppressive authority which it assumes over them. The inconveniencies resulting from the possession of its colonies, every country has engrossed to itself completely. The advantages refulting from their trade it has been obliged to share with many. other countries.

AT first fight, no doubt, the monopoly of the great commerce of America, naturally seems to be an acquisition of the highestvalue. To the undiscerning eye of giddy ambition, it naturally presents itself, amidst the confused scrambie of politicks and war, as a very dazzling object to fight for. The dazzling splendor of the object, however, the immense greatness of the commerce, is the very quality which renders the monopoly of it hurtful, or which makes one employment, in its own nature necessarily less advantageous to the country than the greater part of other employments, absorb a much greater proportion of the capital of the country than what would otherwise have gone to it.

THE mercantile stock of every country, it has been shewn in the fecond book, naturally feeks, if one may fay fo, the employment most advantageous to that country. If it is employed in the carrying trade, the country to which it belongs becomes the emporium of the goods of all the countries whose trade that stock carries on. the owner of that stock necessarily wishes to dispose of as great a part of those goods as he can at home. He thereby saves himself the trouble, risk and expence, of exportation, and he will upon that account be glad to fell them at home, not only for a much fmaller price, but with fomewhat a fmaller profit than he might expect to make by fending them abroad. He naturally, therefore, endeavours as much as he can to turn his carrying trade into a foreign trade of confumption. If his stock again is employed in a foreign trade of confumption, he will, for the same reason, be glad

BOOK to dispose of at home as great a part as he can of the home goods. which he collects in order to export to some foreign market, and he will thus endeavour as much as he can, to turn his foreign trade of confumption into a home trade. The mercantile stock of every country naturally courts in this manner the near, and shuns the distant employment; naturally courts the employment in which the returns are frequent, and shuns that in which they are distant and slow; naturally courts the employment in which it can maintain the greatest quantity of productive labour in the country to which it belongs, or in which its owner refides, and shuns that in which it can maintain there the smallest quantity. It anaturally courts the employment which in ordinary cases is most advantageous, and shuns that which in ordinary cases is least advantageous to that country.

> But if in any of those distant employments, which in ordinary cases are less advantageous to the country, the profit should happen to rife somewhat higher than what is sufficient to balance the natural preference which is given to nearer employments, this fuperiority of profit will draw stock from those nearer employments, till the profits of all return to their proper level. This superiority of profit, however, is a proof that in the actual circumstances of the society, those distant employments are somewhat understocked in proportion to other employments, and that the stock of the society is not distributed in the properest manner among all the different employments carried on in it. It is a proof that fomething is either bought cheaper or fold dearer than it ought to be, and that some particular class of citizens is more or less oppressed either by paying more or by getting less than what is suitable to that equality, which ought to take place, and which naturally does take place among all the different classes of them. Though the same capital never will maintain the same quantity of productive labour in a distant as in a near employment, yet a distant employment may be as necessary for the welfare of the fociety

fociety as a near one; the goods which the distant employment CHAP. deals in being necessary, perhaps, for carrying on many of the nearer employments. But if the profits of those who deal in such goods are above their proper level, those goods will be fold dearer than they ought to be, or fomewhat above their natural price, and all those engaged in the nearer employments will be more or less oppressed by this high price. Their interest, therefore, in this case requires that some stock should be withdrawn from those nearer employments, and turned towards that distant employment, in order to reduce its profits to their proper level, and the price of the goods which it deals in to their natural price. In this extraordinary case, the publick interest requires that some stock should be withdrawn from those employments which in ordinary cases are more advantageous, and turned towards one which in ordinary cases is less advantageous to the publick: and in this extraordinary case, the natural interests and inclinations of men coincide as exactly with the publick interest as in all other ordinary cases, and lead them to withdraw stock from the near, and to turn it towards the distant employment.

IT is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals naturally dispose them to turn their stock towards the employments which in ordinary cases are most advantageous to the society. if from this natural preference they should turn too much of it towards those employments, the fall of profit in them and the rife of it in all others immediately dispose them to alter this faulty distribution. Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private interests and passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock of every society, among all the different employments carried on in it, as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society.

BOOK IV. ALL the different regulations of the mercantile system, necessarily derange more or less this natural and most advantageous distribution of stock. But those which concern the trade to America and the East Indies derange it perhaps more than any other; because the trade to those two great continents absorbs a greater quantity of stock than any two other branches of trade. The regulations, however, by which this derangement is effected in those two different branches of trade are not altogether the same. Monopoly is the great engine of both; but it is a different fort of monopoly. Monopoly of one kind or another, indeed, seems to be the sole engine of the mercantile system.

In the trade to America every nation endeavours to engross as much as possible the whole market of its own colonies, by fairly excluding all other nations from any direct trade to them. During the greater part of the fixteenth century, the Portugueze endeavoured to manage the trade to the East Indies in the same manner, by claiming the sole right of failing in the Indian seas, on account of the merit of having first found out the road to them. The Dutch still continue to exclude all other European nations from any direct trade to their spice islands. Monopolies of this kind are evidently established against all other European nations, who are thereby not only excluded from a trade to which it might be convenient for them to turn some part of their stock, but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in somewhat dearer than if they could import them themselves directly from the countries which produce them.

But since the fall of the power of Portugal, no European nation has claimed the exclusive right of sailing in the Indian seas, of which the principal ports are now open to the ships of all European nations. Except in Portugal, however, and within these sew years in France,

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the trade to the East Indies has in every European country been CHAP. subjected to an exclusive company. Monopolies of this kind are properly established against the very nation which erects them. The greater part of that nation are thereby, not only excluded from a trade to which it might be convenient for them to turn some part of their stock, but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in, fomewhat dearer than if it was open and free to all Since the establishment of the English East their countrymen. India company, for example, the other inhabitants of England, over and above being excluded from the trade, must have paid in the price of the East India goods which they have confumed, not only for all the extraordinary profits which the company may have made upon those goods in consequence of their monopoly, but for all the extraordinary waste which the fraud and abuse, inseparable from the management of the affairs of fo great a company, must necessarily have occasioned. The absurdity of this second kind of monopoly, therefore, is much more manifest than that of the first.

BOTH these kinds of monopolies derange more or less the natural distribution of the stock of the society: but they do not always derange it in the fame way.

Monopolies of the first kind always attract to the particular trade in which they are established, a greater proportion of the stock of the fociety than what would go to that trade of its own accord.

Monopolies of the second kind may sometimes attract stock towards the particular trade in which they are established and fometimes repel it from that trade according to different circumstances. In poor countries they naturally attract towards that trade more stock than would otherwise go to it. In rich countries they

BOOK they naturally repel from it a good deal of stock which would otherwise go to it.

SUCH poor countries as Sweden and Denmark, for example, would probably have never fent a fingle ship to the East Indies, had not the trade been subjected to an exclusive company. The establishment of such a company necessarily encourages adventurers. Their monopoly secures them against all competitors in the home market, and they have the same chance for foreign markets with the traders of other nations. Their monopoly shows them the certainty of a great profit upon a considerable quantity of goods, and the chance of a considerable profit upon a great quantity. Without such extraordinary encouragement, the poor traders of such poor countries would probably never have thought of hazarding their small capitals in so very distant and uncertain an adventure as the trade to the East Indies must naturally have appeared to them.

Such a rich country as Holland, on the contrary, would probably, in the case of a free trade, send many more ships to the East Indies than it actually does. The limited stock of the Dutch East India company probably repels from that trade many great mercantile capitals which would otherwise go to it. The mercantile capital of Holland is fo great that it is, as it were, continually overflowing, fometimes into the public funds of foreign countries, fometimes into loans to private traders and adventurers of foreign countries, sometimes into the most round about foreign trades of confumption, and fometimes into the carrying trade. All near employments being completely filled up, all the capital which can be placed in them with any tollerable profit being already placed in them, the capital of Holland necessarily flows towards the most distant employments. The trade to the East Indies, if it was altogether free, would probably absorb the greater

greater part of this redundant capital. The East Indies offer a CHAP. market both for the manufactures of Europe and for the gold and filver as well as for several other productions of America, greater and more extensive than both Europe and America put together.

EVERY derangement of the natural distribution of stock is necesfarily hurtful to the fociety in which it takes place; whether it be by repelling from a particular trade the stock which would otherwife go to it, or by attracting towards a particular trade that which would not otherwise come to it. If without any exclusive company, the trade of Holland to the East Indies would be greater than it actually is, that country must suffer a considerable loss by part of its capital being excluded from the employment most convenient for that part. And in the same manner, if without an exclufive company, the trade of Sweden and Denmark to the East Indies would be less than it actually is, or, what perhaps is more probable, would not exist at all, those two countries must likewise suffer a confiderable loss by part of their capital being drawn into an employment which must be more or less unsuitable to their present circum-Better for them, perhaps, in their present circumstances to buy East India goods of other nations, even though they should pay somewhat dearer, than to turn so great a part of their small capital to fo very distant a trade, in which the returns are fo very flow, in which that capital can maintain fo fmall a quantity of productive labour at home, where productive labour is fo much wanted, where fo little is done, and where fo much is to do.

Though without an exclusive company, therefore, a particular country should not be able to carry on any direct trade to the East Indies, it will not from thence follow that fuch a company ought to be established there, but only that such a country ought not in these

BOOK these circumstances to trade directly to the East Indies. That such companies are not in general necessary for carrying on the East India trade, is fufficiently demonstrated by the experience of the Portugueze, who enjoyed almost the whole of it for more than a century together without any exclusive company.

> No private merchant, it has been faid, could well have capital fufficient to maintain factors and agents in the different ports of the East Indies, in order to provide goods for the ships which he might occasionally send thither; and yet, unless he was able do this, the difficulty of finding a cargo might frequently make his ships lose the season for returning, and the expence of so long a delay would not only eat up the whole profit of the adventure, but frequently occasion a very confiderable lofs. This argument, however, if it proved any thing at all, would prove that no one great branch of trade could be carried on without an exclusive company, which is contrary to the experience of all nations. There is no great branch of trade in which the capital of any one private merchant is sufficient for carrying on all the subordinate branches which must be carried on in order to carry on the principal branch. But when a nation is ripe for any great branch of trade, some merchants naturally turn their capitals towards the principal, and fome towards the fubordinate branches of it; and though all the different branches of it are in this manner carried on, yet it very feldom happens that they are all carried on by the capital of one private merchant. If a nation, therefore, is ripe for the East India trade, a certain portion of its capital will naturally divide itself among all the different branches of that trade. Some of its merchants will find it for their interest to reside in the East Indies, and to employ their capitals there in providing goods for the ships which are to be sent out by other merchants who reside in Europe. The settlements which

CHAP.

which different European nations have obtained in the East Indies, if they were taken from the exclusive companies to which they at present belong and put under the immediate protection of the sovereign, would render this residence both safe and easy, at least to the merchants of the particular nations to whom those settlements belong. If at any particular time that part of the capital of any country which of its own accord tended and inclined, if I may fay fo. towards the East India trade, was not sufficient for carrying on all those different branches of it, it would be a proof that at that particular time, that country was not ripe for that trade, and that it would do better to buy for some time, even at a higher price, from other European nations, the East India goods it had occasion for, than to import them itself directly from the East Indies. What it might lose by the high price of those goods could seldom be equal to the loss which it would sustain by the distraction of a large portion of its capital from other employments more necessary, or more useful, or more suitable to its circumstances and situation than a direct trade to the East Indies.

Though the Europeans possess many considerable settlements both upon the coast of Africa and in the East Indies, they have not yet established in either of those countries such numerous and thriving colonies as those in the islands and continent of America. Africa, however, as well as several of the countries comprehended under the general name of the East Indies, are inhabited by barbarous nations. But those nations were by no means so weak and defenceless as the miserable and helpless Americans; and in proportion to the natural fertility of the countries which they inhabited, they were besides much more populous. The most barbarous nations either of Africa or of the East Indies were shepherds; even the Hotentots were so. But the natives of every part of America, except Mexico and Peru, were only hunters; and the difference is

BOOK IV.

very great between the number of shepherds and that of hunters whom the same extent of equally fertile territory can maintain. Africa and the East Indies, therefore, it was more difficult to displace the natives, and to extend the European plantations over the greater part of the lands of the original inhabitants. The genius of exclusive companies, besides, is unfavourable, it has already been observed, to the growth of new colonies, and has probably been the principal cause of the little progress which they have made in the East Indies. The Portugueze carried on the trade both to Africa and the East Indies without any exclusive companies, and their fettlements at Congo, Angola, and Benguela on the coast of Africa, and at Goa in the East Indies, though much depressed by superstition and every fort of bad government, yet bear some faint resemblance to the colonies of America, and are partly inhabited by Portugueze who have been established there for several generations. The Dutch settlements at the Cape of Good Hope and at Batavia, are at present the most considerable colonies which the Europeans have established either in Africa or in the East Indies, and both those settlements are peculiarly fortunate in their fituation. The Cape of Good Hope was inhabited by a race of people almost as barbarous and quite as incapable of defending themselves as the natives of America. It is besides the half way-house, if one may say so, between Europe and the East Indies, at which almost every European ship makes some stay both in going and returning. The supplying of those ships with every fort of fresh provisions, with fruit and sometimes with wine, affords alone a very extensive market for the furplus produce of the colonists. What the Cape of Good Hope is between Europe and every part of the East Indies, Batavia is between the principal countries of the East Indies. It lies upon the most frequented road from Indostan to China and Japan, and is nearly about mid-way upon that road. Almost all the ships too that sail between Europe

Europe and China touch at Batavia; and it is, over and above all CHAP. this, the center and principal mart of what is called the country trade of the East Indies; not only of that part of it which is carried on by Europeans, but of that which is carried on by the native Indians, and veffels navigated by the inhabitants of China and Japan; of Tonquin, Malacca, Cochin-China and the island of Celebes. are frequently to be feen in its port. Such advantageous fituations have enabled those two colonies to furmount all the obstacles which the oppressive genius of an exclusive company may have occasionally opposed to their growth. They have enabled Batavia to surmount

the additional disadvantage of perhaps the most unwholesome

climate in the world.

THE English and Dutch companies, though they have established no considerable colonies, except the two above mentioned, have both made considerable conquests in the East Indies. But in the manner in which they both govern their new subjects, the natural genius of an exclusive company has shown itself most distinctly. spice islands the Dutch burn all the spiceries which a fertile season produces beyond what they expect to dispose of in Europe with such a profit as they think fufficient. In the islands where they have no fettlements, they give a premium to those who collect the young bloffoms and green leaves of the clove and nutmeg trees which naturally grow there, but which this barbarous policy has now, it is faid, almost completely extirpated. Even in the islands where they have fettlements they have very much reduced, it is faid, the number of those trees. If the produce even of their own islands was much greater than what fuited their market, the natives, they fuspect, might find means to convey some part of it to other nations; and the best way, they imagine, to secure their own monopoly, is to take care that no more shall grow than what they themselves carry to market. By different arts of oppression they have reduced the population of feveral of the Moluccas nearly to the number which

BOOK is fufficient to supply with fresh provisions and other necessaries of life their own infignificant garrifons, and fuch of their ships as occasionally come there for a cargo of spices. Under the government even of the Portugueze, however, those islands are faid to have been tolerably well inhabited. The English company have not yet had time to establish in Bengal so perfectly destructive a fystem. The plan of their government, however, has had exactly the same tendency. It has not been uncommon, I am well assured, for the chief, that is, the first clerk of a factory, to order a peasant to plough up a rich field of poppies, and fow it with rice or some other grain. The pretence was, to prevent a scarcity of provisions; but the real reason, to give the chief an opportunity of selling at a better price a large quantity of opium, which he happened then to have upon hand. Upon other occasions the order has been reversed; and a rich field of rice or other grain has been ploughed up in order to make room for a plantation of poppies; when the chief forefaw that extraordinary profit was likely to be made by opium. The fervants of the company have upon feveral occasions attempted to establish in their own favour the monopoly of some of the most important branches, not only of the foreign, but of the inland trade of the country. Had they been allowed to go on, it is imposfible that they should not at some time or another have attempted to restrain the production of the particular articles of which they had thus usurped the monopoly, not only to the quantity which they themselves could purchase, but to that which they could expect to fell with fuch a profit as they might think fufficient. In the course of a century or two, the policy of the English company would in this manner have probably proved as completely destructive as that of the Dutch.

> Nothing, however, can be more directly contrary to the real interest of those companies, considered as the sovereigns of the countries which they have conquered, than this destructive plan.

In almost all countries the revenue of the sovereign is drawn from CHAP. that of the people. The greater the revenue of the people, therefore, the greater the annual produce of their land and labour, the more they can afford to the fovereign. It is his interest, therefore, to increase as much as possible that annual produce. But if this is the interest of every sovereign, it is peculiarly so of one whose revenue, like that of the sovereign of Bengal, arises chiefly from a land-rent. That rent must necessarily be in proportion to the quantity and value of the produce, and both the one and the other must depend upon the extent of the market. The quantity will always be fuited with more or less exactness to the confumption of those who can afford to pay for it, and the price which they will pay will always be in proportion to the eagerness of their competition. It is the interest of such a sovereign, therefore, to open the most extensive market for the produce of his country, to allow the most perfect freedom of commerce, in order to increase as much as possible the number and the competition of buyers; and upon this account to abolish, not only all monopolies, but all restraints upon the transportation of the home produce from one part of the country to another, upon its exportation to foreign countries, or upon the importation of goods of any kind for which it can be exchanged. He is in this manner most likely to increase both the quantity and

But a company of merchants are, it seems, incapable of considering themselves as sovereigns, even after they have become such. Trade, or buying in order to sell again, they still consider as the principal business, and by a strange absurdity, regard the character of the sovereign as but an appendix to that of the merchant, as something which ought to be made subservient to it, or by means of which they may be enabled to buy cheaper in India and thereby to

value of that produce, and confequently of his own share of it,

or of his own revenue.

fell

BOOK IV. fell with a better profit in Europe. They endeavour for this purpose to keep out as much as possible all competitors from the market of the countries which are subject to their government, and consequently to reduce, at least, some part of the surplus produce of those countries to what is barely sufficient for supplying their own demand, or to what they can expect to sell in Europe with such a profit as they may think reasonable. Their mercantile habits draw them in this manner, almost necessarily, though perhaps insensibly, to prefer upon all ordinary occasions the little and transitory profit of the monopolist to the great and permanent revenue of the sovereign, and would gradually lead them to treat the countries subject to their government nearly as the Dutch treat the Moluccas.

But if the genius of fuch a government, even as to what concerns its direction in Europe, is in this manner effentially and perhaps incurably faulty, that of its administration in India is still more fo. That administration is necessarily composed of a council of merchants, a profession no doubt extremely respectable, but which in no country in the world carries along with it that fort of authority which naturally over-awes the people, and without force commands their willing obedience. Such a council can command obedience only by the military force with which they are accompanied, and their government is therefore necessarily military and despotical. Their proper business, however, is that of merchants. It is to fell, upon their masters account, the European goods configned to them, and to buy in return Indian goods for the European market. It is to fell the one as dear and to buy the other as cheap as possible, and confequently to exclude as much as possible all rivals from the particular market where they keep their shop. The genius of the administration, therefore, so far as concerns the trade of the company, is the same as that of the direction. It tends to make government subservient to the interest of monopoly, and confequently

consequently to stunt the natural growth of some parts at least of CHAP. the surplus produce of the country to what is barely sufficient for answering the demand of the company.

All the members of the administration, besides, trade more or less upon their own account, and it is in vain to prohibit them from doing fo. Nothing can be more completely foolish than to expect that the clerks of a great counting-house at ten thousand miles distance, and consequently almost quite out of fight, should, upon a fimple order from their masters, give up at once doing any fort of business upon their own account, abandon forever all hopes of making a fortune of which they have the means in their hands, and content themselves with the moderate salaries which those masters allow them, and which, moderate as they are, can feldom be augmented, being commonly as large as the real profits of the company trade can afford. In such circumstances, to prohibit the servants of the company from trading upon their own account, can have scarce any other effect than to enable the superior servants, under pretence of executing their masters order, to oppress such of the inferior ones as have had the misfortune to fall under their displeafure. The fervants naturally endeavour to establish the same monopoly in favour of their own private trade as of the publick trade of the company. If they are suffered to act as they could wish, they will establish this monopoly openly and directly, by fairly prohibiting all other people from trading in the articles in which they chuse to deal; and this perhaps is the best and least oppressive way of establishing it. But if by an order from Europe they are prohibited from doing this, they will, notwithstanding, endeavour to establish a monopoly of the fame kind, fecretly and indirectly, in a way that is much more destructive to the country. They will employ the whole authority of government, and pervert the administration of justice, in order to harrass and ruin those who interfere with them

BOOK in any branch of commerce which by means of agents, either concealed or at least not publickly avowed, they may chuse to carry But the private trade of the fervants will naturally extend to a much greater variety of articles than the publick trade of the company. The publick trade of the company extends no further than the trade with Europe, and comprehends a part only of the foreign trade of the country. But the private trade of the fervants may extend to all the different branches both of its inland and foreign trade. The monopoly of the company can tend only to stunt the natural growth of that part of the furplus produce which in the case of a free trade would be exported to Europe. That of the fervants tends to stunt the natural growth of every part of the produce in which they chuse to deal, of what is destined for home confumption, as well as of what is destined for exportation; and confequently to degrade the cultivation of the whole country, and to reduce the number of its inhabitants. It tends to reduce the quantity of every fort of produce, even that of the necessaries of life, whenever the fervants of the company chuse to deal in them, to what those servants can both afford to buy and expect to fell with fuch a profit as pleases them.

> From the nature of their situation too the servants must be more disposed to support with rigorous severity their own interest against that of the country which they govern, than their masters can be to support theirs. The country belongs to their masters, who cannot avoid having some regard for the interest of what belongs to them. But it does not belong to the fervants. The real interest of their masters, if they were capable of understanding it, is the same with that of the country, and it is from ignorance only and the meanness of mercantile prejudice that they ever oppress it. But the real interest of the servants is by no means the same with that of the country, and the most perfect information would not necessarily put

put an end to their oppressions. The regulations accordingly which CHAP. have been fent out from Europe, though they have been frequently weak, have commonly been well-meaning. More intelligence and perhaps less good-meaning has sometimes appeared in those established by the fervants in India. It is a very fingular government in which every member of the administration wishes to get out of the country, and consequently to have done with the government, as soon as he can, and to whose interest, the day after he has left it and carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent if the whole country was fwallowed up by an earthquake.

I MEAN not, however, by any thing which I have here faid, to throw any odious imputation upon the general character of the fervants of the East India company, and much less upon that of any particular It is the system of government, the situation in which they were placed, that I mean to censure; not the character of those who have acted in it. They acted as their situation naturally directed, and they who have clamoured the loudest against them would probably not have acted better themselves. In war and negociation, the councils of Madrass and Calcutta have upon several occasions conducted themselves with a resolution and decisive wisdom which would have done honour to the senate of Rome in the best days of that republick. The members of those councils, however, had been bred to professions very different from war and politicks. But their fituation alone, without education, experience, or even example, feems to have formed in them all at once the great qualities which it required, and to have inspired them both with abilities and virtues which they themselves could not well know that they possessed. If upon some occasions, therefore, it has animated them to actions of magnanimity which could not well have been expected from them; we should not wonder if upon others it has prompted them to exploits of somewhat a different nature.

BOOK IV. Such exclusive companies, therefore, are nuisances in every respect; always more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they are established, and destructive to those which have the missortune to fall under their government.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the agricultural Systems, or of those Systems of political Oeconomy which represent the Produce of Land as either the sole or the principal Source of the Revenue and Wealth of every Country.

THE agricultural fystems of political economy will not require fo long an explanation as that which I have thought it necessary to bestow upon the mercantile or commercial system.

THAT fystem which represents the produce of land as the sole source of the revenue and wealth of every country, has, so far as I know, never been adopted by any nation, and it at present exists only in the speculations of a few men of great learning and ingenuity in France. It would not, surely, be worth while to examine at great length the errors of a system which never has done, and probably never will do any harm in any part of the world. I shall endeavour to explain, however, as distinctly as I can, the great outlines of this very ingenious system.

MR. Colbert, the famous minister of Lewis XIVth, was a man of probity, of great industry and knowledge of detail; of great experience and acuteness in the examination of publick accounts, and of abilities, in short, every way fitted for introducing method

and

and good order into the collection and expenditure of the publick CHAP. revenue. That minister had unfortunately embraced all the prejudices of the mercantile system. That system, in its nature and effence a system of restraint and regulation, could scarce fail to be agreeable to a laborious and plodding man of business, who had been accustomed to regulate the different departments of publick offices, and to establish the necessary checks and controuls for confining each to its proper sphere. The industry and commerce of a great country he endeavoured to regulate upon the fame model as the departments of a publick office; and instead of allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice, he bestowed upon certain branches of industry extraordinary privileges, while he laid others under as extraordinary restraints. He was not only disposed, like other European ministers, to encourage more the industry of the towns than that of the country, but in order to support the industry of the towns, he was willing even to depress and keep down that of the country. In order to render provisions cheap to the inhabitants of the towns, and thereby to encourage manufactures and foreign commerce, he prohibited altogether the exportation of corn, and thus excluded the inhabitants of the country from every foreign market for by far the most important part of the produce of their industry. This prohibition, joined to the restraints imposed by the antient provincial laws of France upon the transportation of corn from one province to another, and to the arbitrary and degrading taxes which are levied upon the cultivators in almost all the provinces, discouraged and kept down the agriculture of that country very much below the state to which it would naturally have rifen in so very fertile a soil and so very happy a climate. This state of discouragement and depression was felt more or less in every different part of the country, and many different enquiries were fet on foot concerning the causes of it. One of those causes appeared

BOOK appeared to be the preference given, by the institutions of Mr. Colbert, to the industry of the towns above that of the country.

If the rod be bent too much one way, fays the proverb, in order to make it straight you must bend it as much the other. The French philosophers, who have proposed the system which represents agriculture as the sole source of the revenue and wealth of every country, seem to have adopted this proverbial maxim; and as in the plan of Mr. Colbert the industry of the towns was certainly over-valued in comparison with that of the country; so in their system it seems to be as certainly under-valued.

THE different orders of people who have ever been supposed to contribute in any respect towards the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, they divide into three classes. The first is the class of the proprietors of land. The second is the class of the cultivators, of farmers and country labourers, whom they honour with the peculiar appellation of the productive class. The third is the class of artificers, manufacturers and merchants, whom they endeavour to degrade by the humiliating appellation of the barren or unproductive class.

THE class of proprietors contributes to the annual produce by the expence which they may occasionally lay out upon the improvement of the land, upon the buildings, drains, enclosures and other ameliorations, which they may either make or maintain upon it, and by means of which the cultivators are enabled, with the same capital, to raise a greater produce, and consequently to pay a greater rent. This advanced rent may be considered as the interest or profit due to the proprietor upon the expence or capital which he thus employs in the improvement of his land. Such expences are in this system called ground expences (depenses foncieres).

THE

THE cultivators or farmers contribute to the annual produce CHAP. by what are in this fystem called the original and annual expences (depenses primitives et depenses annuelles) which they lay out upon the cultivation of the land. The original expences confift in the instruments of husbandry, in the stock of cattle, in the feed, and in the maintenance of the farmer's family, fervants and cattle, during at least a great part of the first year of his occupancy, or till he can receive fome return from the land. The annual expences confist in the feed, in the tear and wear of the instruments of husbandry, and in the annual maintenance of the farmer's servants and cattle, and of his family too, so far as any part of them can be confidered as fervants employed in cultivation. That part of the produce of the land which remains to him after paying the rent, ought to be fufficient, first, to replace to him within a reasonable time, at least during the term of his occupancy, the whole of his original expences, together with the ordinary profits of stock; and, secondly, to replace to him annually the whole of his annual expences, together likewife with the ordinary profits of stock. Those two forts of expences are two capitals which the farmer employs in cultivation; and unless they are regularly restored to him, together with a reasonable profit, he cannot carry on his employment upon a level with other employments; but, from a regard to his own interest, must desert it as soon as possible, and seek some other employment. That part of the produce of the land which is thus neceffary for enabling the farmer to continue his business, ought to be considered as a fund sacred to cultivation, which if the landlord violates, he necessarily degrades the produce of his own land, and in a few years not only disables the farmer from paying this racked rent, but from paying the reasonable rent which he might otherwise have got for his land. The rent which properly belongs to the landlord, is no more than the neat produce which remains after

BOOK after paying in the compleatest manner all the necessary expences which must be previously laid out in order to raise the gross, or the whole produce. It is because the labour of the cultivators, over and above paying compleatly all those necessary expences, affords a neat produce of this kind, that this class of people are in this fystem peculiarly distinguished by the honourable appellation of the productive class. Their original and annual expences are for the same reason called, in this system, productive expences, because, over and above replacing their own value, they occasion the annual reproduction of this neat produce.

> THE ground expences, as they are called, or what the landlord lays out upon the improvement of his land, are in this fystem too honoured with the appellation of productive expences. Till the whole of those expences, together with the ordinary profits of stock, have been compleatly repaid to him by the advanced rent which he gets from his land, that advanced rent ought to be regarded as facred and inviolable, both by the church and by the king; ought to be subject neither to tithe nor to taxation. If it is otherwise, by discouraging the improvement of land, the church discourages the future increase of her own tithes, and the king the future increase of his own taxes. As in a well ordered state of things, therefore, those ground expences, over and above reproducing in the compleatest manner their own value, occasion likewise after a certain time a reproduction of a neat produce, they are in this fystem considered as productive expences.

> THE ground expences of the landlord, however, together with the original and the annual expences of the farmer, are the only three forts of expences which in this system are considered as productive. All other expences and all other orders of people, even those who in the common apprehensions of men are regarded as the

the most productive, are in this account of things represented as altogether barren and unproductive.

CHAP.

ARTIFICERS and manufacturers, in particular, whose industry, in the common apprehensions of men, increases so much the value of the rude produce of land, are in this system represented as a class of people altogether barren and unproductive. Their labour, it is faid, replaces only the stock which employs them. together with its ordinary profits. That stock confists in the materials, tools, and wages, advanced to them by their employer: and is the fund destined for their employment and maintenance. Its profits are the fund destined for the maintenance of their employer. Their employer, as he advances to them the stock of materials, tools and wages necessary for their employment, so he advances to himself what is necessary for his own maintenance. and this maintenance he generally proportions to the profit which he expects to make by the price of their work. Unless its price repays to him the maintenance which he advances to himself, as well as the materials, tools and wages which he advances to his workmen, it evidently does not repay him the whole expence which he lays out upon it. The profits of manufacturing stock, therefore, are not, like the rent of land, a neat produce which remains after compleatly repaying the whole expence which must be laid out in order to obtain them. The stock of the farmer yields him a profit as well as that of the master manufacturer; and it yields a rent likewise to another person, which that of the master manufacturer does not. The expence, therefore, laid out in employing and maintaining artificers and manufacturers, does no more than continue, if one may fay fo, the existence of its own value, and does not produce any new value. It is therefore altogether a barren and unproductive expence. The expence, on the contrary, laid out in employing farmers and country labourers. BOOK labourers, over and above continuing the existence of its own value, produces a new value, the rent of the landlord. It is therefore a productive expence.

MERCANTILE stock is equally barren and unproductive with manufacturing stock. It only continues the existence of its own value, without producing any new value. Its profits are only the repayment of the maintenance which its employer advances to himself during the time that he employs it, or till he receives the returns of it. They are only the repayment of a part of the expence which must be laid out in employing it.

THE labour of artificers and manufacturers never adds any thing to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the land. It adds indeed greatly to the value of some particular parts of it. But the confumption which in the mean time it occasions of other parts, is precisely equal to the value which it adds to those parts; so that the value of the whole amount is not, at any one moment of time, in the least augmented by it. person who works the lace of a pair of fine ruffles, for example, will fometimes raise the value of perhaps a pennyworth of flax to thirty pounds sterling. But though at first sight he appears thereby to multiply the value of a part of the rude produce about seven thousand and two hundred times, he in reality adds nothing to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce. The working of that lace costs him perhaps two years labour. The thirty pounds which he gets for it when it is finished, is no more than the repayment of the fubfistence which he advances to himself during the two years that he is employed about it. The value which, by every day's, month's, or year's labour, he adds to the flax, does no more than replace the value of his own confumption during that day, month, or year. At no moment of time, therefore, does he add

any thing to the value of the whole annual amount of the rude CHAP. produce of the land: the portion of that produce which he is continually confuming, being always equal to the value which he is continually producing. The extream poverty of the greater part of the persons employed in this expensive, though trifling manufacture, may fatisfy us that the price of their work does not in ordinary cases exceed the value of their subsistence. is otherwise with the work of farmers and country labourers. The rent of the landlord is a value, which, in ordinary cases, it is continually producing, over and above replacing, in the most compleat manner, the whole confumption, the whole expence laid out upon the employment and maintenance both of the workmen and of their employer.

ARTIFICERS, manufacturers and merchants, can augment the revenue and wealth of their fociety, by parsimony only; or, as it is expressed in this system, by privation, that is, by depriving themselves of a part of the funds destined for their own subsistence. They annually reproduce nothing but those funds. Unless, therefore, they annually fave some part of them, unless they annually deprive themselves of the enjoyment of some part of them, the revenue and wealth of their fociety can never be in the smallest degree augmented by means of their industry. Farmers and country labourers, on the contrary, may enjoy compleatly the whole funds destined for their own subsistence, and yet augment at the same time the revenue and wealth of their fociety. Over and above the funds destined for their own subsistence, their industry annually affords a neat produce, of which the augmentation necessarily augments the revenue and wealth of their fociety. Nations, therefore, which, like France or England, confift in a great measure of proprietors and cultivators, can be enriched by industry and enjoyment. Nations, on the contrary, which, like Holland and Hamburgh; are composed chiefly of merchants, artificers and manufacturers, can grow rich only

BOOK only through parsimony and privation. As the interest of nations fo differently circumstanced is very different, so is likewise the common character of the people. In those of the former kind liberality, frankness, and good fellowship, naturally make a part of that common character. In the latter, narrowness, meanness, and a felfish disposition, averse to all social pleasure and enjoyment.

> THE unproductive class, that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, is maintained and employed altogether at the expence of the two other classes, of that of proprietors, and of that of cultivators. They furnish it both with the materials of its work and with the fund of its subsistence, with the corn and cattle which it confumes while it is employed about that work. The proprietors and cultivators finally pay both the wages of all the workmen of the unproductive class, and the profits of all their employers. Those workmen and their employers are properly the servants of the proprietors and cultivators. They are only fervants who work without doors, as menial fervants work within. Both the one and the other, however, are equally maintained at the expence of the fame masters. The labour of both is equally unproductive. It adds nothing to the value of the fum total of the rude produce of the land. Instead of increasing the value of that sum total, it is a charge and expence which must be paid out of it.

> THE unproductive class, however, is not only useful, but greatly useful to the other two classes. By means of the industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, the proprietors and cultivators can purchase both the foreign goods and the manufactured produce of their own country which they have occasion for, with the produce of a much smaller quantity of their own labour than what they would be obliged to employ if they were to attempt, in an aukward and unskilful manner, either to import the one or to

make

class, the cultivators are delivered from many cares which would otherwise distract their attention from the cultivation of land. The superiority of produce which, in consequence of this undivided attention, they are enabled to raise, is fully sufficient to pay the whole expence which the maintenance and employment of the unproductive class costs either the proprietors, or themselves. The industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, though in its own nature altogether unproductive, yet contributes in this manner indirectly to increase the produce of the land. It increases the productive powers of productive labour, by leaving it at liberty to confine itself to its proper employment, the cultivation of land; and the plough goes frequently the easier and the better by means of the labour of the man whose business is most remote from the plough.

IT can never be the interest of the proprietors and cultivators to restrain or to discourage in any respect the industry of merchants, artificers and manufacturers. The greater the liberty which this unproductive class enjoys, the greater will be the competition in all the different trades which compose it, and the cheaper will the other two classes be supplied both with foreign goods, and with the manufactured produce of their own country.

It can never be the interest of the unproductive class to oppress the other two classes. It is the surplus produce of the land, or what remains after deducting the maintenance, first, of the cultivators, and afterwards of the proprietors, that maintains and employs the unproductive class. The greater this surplus the greater must likewise be its maintenance and employment. The establishment of persect justice, of persect liberty, and of persect equality, is the BOOK very simple secret which most effectually secures the highest degree of prosperity to all the three classes.

THE merchants, artificers, and manufacturers of those mercantile states which, like Holland and Hamburgh, consist chiefly of this unproductive class, are in the same manner maintained and employed altogether at the expence of the proprietors and cultivators of land. The only difference is, that those proprietors and cultivators are, the greater part of them, placed at a most inconvenient distance from the merchants, artificers, and manufacturers whom they supply with the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence, are the inhabitants of other countries, and the subjects of other governments.

SUCH mercantile states, however, are not only useful, but greatly useful to the inhabitants of those other countries. They fill up, in some measure, a very important void, and supply the place of the merchants, artificers and manufacturers, whom the inhabitants of those countries ought to find at home, but whom, from some defect in their policy, they do not find at home.

IT can never be the interest of those landed nations, if I may call them so, to discourage or distress the industry of such mercantile states, by imposing high duties upon their trade, or upon the commodities which they furnish. Such duties, by rendering those commodities dearer, could serve only to sink the real value of the surplus produce of their own land, with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which those commodities are purchased. Such duties could serve only to discourage the increase of that surplus produce, and consequently the improvement and cultivation of their own land. The most effectual expedient, on the contrary, for raising the value of that surplus produce, for encouraging

encouraging its increase, and consequently the improvement and CHAP. cultivation of their own land, would be to allow the most perfect freedom to the trade of all fuch mercantile nations.

This perfect freedom of trade would even be the most effectual expedient for supplying them, in due time, with all the artificers, manufacturers and merchants, whom they wanted at home, and for filling up in the properest and most advantageous manner that very important void which they felt there,

THE continual increase of the furplus produce of their land. would, in due time, create a greater capital than what could be employed with the ordinary rate of profit in the improvement and cultivation of land; and the furplus part of it would naturally turn itself to the employment of artificers and manufacturers at home. But those artificers and manufacturers, finding at home, both the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence, might immediately, even with much less art and skill, be able to work as cheap as the like artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states, who had both to bring from a great distance. Even though, from want of art and skill, they might not for some time be able to work as cheap, yet, finding a market at home, they might be able to fell their work there as cheap as that of the artificers and manufacturers of fuch mercantile states, which could not be brought to that market but from fo great a distance; and as their art and skill improved, they would foon be able to fell it cheaper. artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states, therefore, would immediately be rivalled in the market of those landed nations, and foon after underfold and justled out of it altogether. cheapness of the manufactures of those landed nations, in consequence of the gradual improvements of art and skill, would, in due time, extend their fale beyond the home market, and carry them

BOOK them to many foreign markets, from which they would in the fame manner gradually justle out many of the manufactures of fuch mercantile nations.

This continual increase both of the rude and manufactured produce of those landed nations would in due time create a greater capital than could, with the ordinary rate of profit, be employed either in agriculture or in manufactures. The furplus of this capital would naturally turn itself to foreign trade, and be employed in exporting to foreign countries fuch parts of the rude and manufactured produce of its own country as exceeded the demand of the home market. In the exportation of the produce of their own country, the merchants of a landed nation would have an advantage of the same kind over those of mercantile nations, which its artificers and manufacturers had over the artificers and manufacturers of fuch nations; the advantage of finding at home that cargo, and those stores and provifions, which the others were obliged to feek for at a distance. With inferior art and skill in navigation, therefore, they would be able to fell that cargo as cheap in foreign markets as the merchants of fuch mercantile nations; and with equal art and skill they would be able to fell it cheaper. They would foon, therefore, rival those mercantile nations in this branch of their foreign trade, and in due time would justle them out of it altogether.

According to this liberal and generous fystem, therefore, the most advantageous method in which a landed nation can raise up artificers, manufacturers and merchants of its own, is to grant the most perfect freedom of trade to the artificers, manufacturers and merchants of all other nations. It thereby raises the value of the surplus produce of its own land, of which the continual increase gradually establishes a fund which in due time necessarily raises up all the artificers,

artificers, manufacturers and merchants whom it has occasion CHAP. for.

WHEN a landed nation, on the contrary, oppresses either by high duties or by prohibitions the trade of foreign nations, it necesfarily hurts its own interest in two different ways. First, by raising the price of all foreign goods and of all forts of manufactures, it necessarily finks the real value of the surplus produce of its own land, with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which it purchases those foreign goods and manufactures. Secondly, by giving a fort of monopoly of the home market to its own merchants, artificers and manufacturers, it raifes the rate of mercantile and manufacturing profit in proportion to that of agricultural profit, and confequently either draws from agriculture a part of the capital which had before been employed in it, or hinders from going to it a part of what would otherwise have gone to it. This policy, therefore, discourages agriculture in two different ways; first, by finking the real value of its produce, and thereby lowering the rate of its profit; and, fecondly, by raifing the rate of profit in all other employments. Agriculture is rendered less advantageous, and trade and manufactures more advantageous than they otherwife would be; and every man is tempted by his own interest to turn, as much as he can, both his capital and his industry from the former to the latter employments.

Though, by this oppressive policy, a landed nation should be able to raife up artificers, manufacturers and merchants, of its own, fomewhat fooner than it could do by the freedom of trade; a matter, however, which is not a little doubtful; yet it would raife them up, if one may fay fo, prematurely, and before it was perfectly ripe for them. By raifing up too hastily one species of industry, it would depress another more valuable species of industry. By raising

BOOK up too hastily a species of industry which only replaces the stock which employs it, together with the ordinary profit, it would depress a species of industry which, over and above replacing that stock with its profit, affords likewise a neat produce, a free rent to the landlord. It would depress productive labour, by encouraging too hastily that labour which is altogether barren and unproductive.

> In what manner, according to this system, the sum total of the annual produce of the land is distributed among the three classes abovementioned, and in what manner the labour of the unproductive class, does no more than replace the value of its own confumption, without increasing in any respect the value of that sum total, is represented by Mr. Quesnai, the very ingenious and profound author of this system, in some arithmetical formularies. The first of these formularies, which by way of eminence he peculiarly distinguishes by the name of the Oeconomical Table. represents the manner in which he supposes this distribution takes place, in a state of the most perfect liberty, and therefore of the highest prosperity; in a state where the annual produce is such as to afford the greatest possible neat produce, and where each class enjoys its proper share of the whole annual produce. Some subsequent formularies represent the manner in which, he supposes, this distribution is made in different states of restraint and regulation; in which. either the class of proprietors, or the barren and unproductive class. is more favoured than the class of cultivators, and in which either the one or the other encroaches more or less upon the share which ought properly to belong to this productive class. Every such encroachment, every violation of that natural distribution, which the most perfect liberty would establish, must, according to this system. necessarily degrade more or less from one year to another the value and fum total of the annual produce, and must necessarily occasion

a gradual declension in the real wealth and revenue of the society; CHAP. a declension of which the progress must be quicker or slower, according to the degree of this encroachment, according as that natural distribution, which the most perfect liberty would establish, is more or less violated. Those subsequent formularies represent the different degrees of declenfion, which, according to this system. correspond to the different degrees in which this natural distribution of things is violated.

Some speculative physicians seem to have imagined that the health of the human body could be preserved only by a certain precise regimen of diet and exercise, of which every the smallest violation necessarily occasioned some degree of disease or disorder proportioned to the degree of the violation. Experience, however, would feem to show that the human body frequently preserves, at least to all appearance, the most perfect state of health under a vast variety of different regimens; even under some which are generally believed to be very far from being perfectly wholesome. But the healthful state of the human body, it would seem, contains in itself some unknown principle of preservation, capable either of preventing or of correcting, in many respects, the bad effects even of a very faulty regimen. Mr. Quesnai, who was himself a physician, and a very speculative physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the fame kind concerning the political body, and to have imagined that it would thrive and prosper only under a certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect liberty and perfect justice. He seems not to have considered that in the political body, the natural effort which every man is continually making to better his own condition, is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and correcting in many respects the bad effects of a political oeconomy in some degree both partial and oppressive. Such a political oeconomy, though it no doubt retards more or lefs,

BOOK is not always capable of stopping altogether the natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity, and still less of making it go backwards. If a nation could not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which could ever have prospered. In the political body, however, the wisdom of nature has fortunately made ample provision for remedying many of the bad effects of the folly and injustice of man; in the same manner as it has done in the natural body for remedying those of his sloth and intemperance.

> THE capital error of this system, however, seems to lie in its representing the class of artificers, manufacturers and merchants, as altogether barren and unproductive. The following observations may serve to show the impropriety of this representation.

FIRST, this class, it is acknowledged, reproduces annually the value of its own annual confumption, and continues, at least, the existence of the stock or capital which maintains and employs it. But upon this account alone the denomination of barren or unproductive should seem to be very improperly applied to it. We should not call a marriage barren or unproductive, though it produced only a fon and a daughter, to replace the father and mother, and though it did not increase the number of the human species, but only continued it as it was before. Farmers and country labourers, indeed, over and above the stock which maintains and employs them, reproduce annually a neat produce, a free rent to the landlord. As a marriage which affords three children is certainly more productive than one which affords only two; fo the labour of farmers and country labourers is certainly more productive than that of merchants, artificers and manufacturers. The fupe-

rior

rior produce of the one class, however, does not render the other CHAP. barren or unproductive.

SECONDLY, it feems, upon this account, altogether improper to confider artificers, manufacturers and merchants, in the fame light as menial fervants. The labour of menial fervants does not continue the existence of the fund which maintains and employs them. Their maintenance and employment is altogether at the expence of their masters, and the work which they perform is not of a nature to repay that expence. That work confifts in fervices which perish generally in the very instant of their performance, and does not fix or realize itself in any vendible commodity which can replace the value of their wages and maintenance. The labour, on the contrary, of artificers, manufacturers and merchants, naturally does fix and realize itself in some such vendible commodity. It is upon this account that, in the chapter in which I treat of productive and unproductive labour, I have classed artificers, manufacturers and merchants, among the productive labourers, and menial fervants among the barren or unproductive.

THIRDLY, it feems, upon every supposition, improper to say, that the labour of artificers, manufacturers and merchants, does not increase the real revenue of the society. Though we should suppose, for example, as it feems to be supposed in this system, that the value of the daily, monthly, and yearly confumption of this class was exactly equal to that of its daily, monthly, and yearly production, yet it would not from thence follow that its labour added nothing to the real revenue, to the real value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the fociety. An artificer, for example, who in the first fix months after harvest, executes ten pounds worth of work, though he should in the same time consume ten pounds worth of corn and other necessaries, yet really adds the value of ten pounds to the annual

BOOK annual produce of the land and labour of the fociety. While he - has been confuming a half yearly revenue of ten pounds worth of corn and other necessaries, he has produced an equal value of work capable of purchasing, either to himself or to some other person, an equal half yearly revenue. The value, therefore, of what has been confumed and produced during these fix months is equal, not to ten, but to twenty pounds. It is possible, indeed, that no more than ten pounds worth of this value, may ever have existed at any one moment of time. But if the ten pounds worth of corn and other necessaries, which were confumed by the artificer, had been confumed by a foldier or by a menial fervant, the value of that part of the annual produce which existed at the end of the six months. would have been ten pounds less than it actually is in consequence of the labour of the artificer. Though the value of what the artificer produces, therefore, should not at any one moment of time be supposed greater than the value he consumes, yet at every moment of time the actually existing value of goods in the market is, in consequence of what he produces, greater than it otherwise would be.

> WHEN the patrons of this system affert that the consumption of artificers, manufacturers and merchants, is equal to the value of what they produce, they probably mean no more than that their revenue, or the fund destined for their consumption, is equal to it. But if they had expressed themselves more accurately, and only afferted that the revenue of this class was equal to the value of what they produced, it might readily have occurred to the reader that what would naturally be faved out of this revenue, must necessarily increase more or less the real wealth of the society. In order, therefore, to make out something like an argument, it was necessary that they should express themselves as they have done; and this argument, even supposing things actually were as it seems to presume them to be, turns out to be a very inconclusive one.

> > FOURTHLY.

FOURTHLY, farmers and country labourers can no more augment, without parfimony, the real revenue, the annual produce of the land and labour of their fociety, than artificers, manufacturers and merchants. The annual produce of the land and labour of any fociety can be augmented only in two ways; either, first, by some improvement in the productive powers of the useful labour actually maintained within it; or, secondly, by some increase in the quantity of that labour.

The improvement in the productive powers of useful labour depend, first, upon the improvement in the ability of the workman; and, secondly, upon that of the machinery with which he works. But the labour of artificers and manufacturers, as it is capable of being more subdivided, and the labour of each workman reduced to a greater simplicity of operation than that of farmers and country labourers, so it is likewise capable of both these forts of improvement in a much higher degree. * In this respect, therefore, the class of cultivators can have no fort of advantage over that of artificers and manufacturers.

The increase in the quantity of useful labour actually employed within any society, must depend altogether upon the increase of the capital which employs it; and the increase of that capital again must be exactly equal to the amount of the savings from the revenue either of the particular persons who manage and direct the employment of that capital, or of some other persons who lend it to them. If merchants, artificers and manufacturers are, as this system seems to suppose, naturally more inclined to parsimony and saving than proprietors and cultivators, they are, so far, more likely to aug-

BOOK ment the quantity of useful labour employed within their society, and consequently to increase its real revenue, the annual produce of its land and labour.

FIFTHLY and lastly, though the revenue of the inhabitants of every country was supposed to confist altogether, as this system seems to suppose, in the quantity of subsistence which their industry could procure to them; yet, even upon this supposition, the revenue of a trading and manufacturing country must, other things being equal, always be much greater than that of one without trade or manufactures. By means of trade and manufactures, a greater quantity of subsistence can be annually imported into a particular country than what its own lands, in the actual state of their cultivation, could afford. The inhabitants of a town, though they frequently possess no lands of their own, yet draw to themselves by their industry such a quantity of the rude produce of the lands of other people as supplies them, not only with the materials of their work, but with the fund of their subsistence. What a town always is with regard to the country in its neighbourhood, one independent state or country may frequently be with regard to other independent states or countries. It is thus that Holland draws a great part of its subsistence from other countries; live cattle from Holstein and Jutland, and corn from almost all the different countries of Europe. A small quantity of manufactured produce purchases a great quantity of rude produce. A trading and manufacturing country, therefore, naturally purchases with a small part of its manufactured produce a great part of the rude produce of other countries; while, on the contrary, a country without trade and manufactures is generally obliged to purchase, at the expence of a great part of its rude produce, a very small part of the manufactured produce of other countries. The one exports what can subsist and accommodate but a very few, and imports the subsistence and accommodation of a great number. The other exports the accommodation

and subsistence of a great number, and imports that of a very few CHAP. only. The inhabitants of the one must always enjoy a much greater quantity of fublistence than what their own lands, in the actual state of their cultivation, could afford. The inhabitants of the other must always enjoy a much smaller quantity.

This fystem, however, with all its imperfections is, perhaps the nearest approximation to the truth that has yet been published upon the subject of political oeconomy, and is upon that account well worth the consideration of every man who wishes to examine with attention the principles of that very important science. Though in representing the labour which is employed upon land as the only productive labour, the notions which it inculcates are perhaps too narrow and confined; yet in representing the wealth of nations as confisting, not in the unconfumable riches of money, but in the confumable goods annually reproduced by the labour of the fociety; and in representing perfect liberty as the only effectual expedient for rendering this annual reproduction the greatest possible, its doctrine feems to be in every respect as just as it is generous and liberal. followers are very numerous; and as men are fond of paradoxes, and of appearing to understand what surpasses the comprehension of ordinary people, the paradox which it maintains, concerning the unproductive nature of manufacturing labour, has not perhaps contributed a little to increase the number of its admirers. They have for some years past made a pretty considerable sect, distinguished in the French republick of letters by the name of, The Oeconomists. Their works have certainly been of some service to their country; not only by bringing into general discussion, many subjects which had never been well examined before, but by influencing in some measure the publick administration in favour of agriculture. has been in consequence of their representations, accordingly, that the agriculture of France has been delivered from feveral of the oppref-

BOOK oppressions which it before laboured under. The term during which fuch a leafe can be granted, as will be valid against every future purchaser or proprietor of the land, has been prolonged from nine to twenty-seven years. The antient provincial restraints upon the transportation of corn from one province of the kingdom to another, have been entirely taken away, and the liberty of exporting it to all foreign countries, has been established as the common law of the kingdom in all ordinary cases. This sect, in their works, which are very numerous, and which treat not only of what is properly called Political Oeconomy, or of the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, but of every other branch of the system of civil government, all follow implicitly, and without any fensible variation, the doctrine of Mr. Quesnai. There is upon this account little variety in the greater part of their works. most distinct and best connected account of this doctrine is to be found in a little book written by Mr. Mercier de la Riviere, sometime Intendant of Martinico, intitled, The natural and effential Order of Political Societies. The admiration of this whole feet for their master, who was himself a man of the greatest modesty and simplicity, is not inferior to that of any of the antient philosophers for the founders of their respective systems. There have been. fince the world began, fays a very diligent and respectable author. the Marquis de Mirabeau, three great inventions which have principally given stability to political focieties, independent of many other inventions which have enriched and adorned them. is the invention of writing, which alone gives human nature the power of transmitting without alteration, its laws, its contracts, its annals, and its discoveries. The second, is the invention of money. which binds together all the relations between civilized focieties. The third, is the Oeconomical Table, the refult of the other two, which completes them both by perfecting their object; the great discovery of our age, but of which our posterity will reap the benefit.

As the political oeconomy of the nations of modern Europe, CHAP. has been more favourable to manufactures and foreign trade, the industry of the towns, than to agriculture, the industry of the country; fo that of other nations has followed a different plan, and has been more favourable to agriculture than to manufactures and foreign trade.

THE policy of China favours agriculture more than all other employments. In China, the condition of a labourer is faid to be as much superior to that of an artificer; as in most parts of Europe, that of an artificer is to that of a labourer. China, the great ambition of every man is to get possession of fome little bit of land, either in property or in lease; and leases are there faid to be granted upon very moderate terms, and to be fufficiently secured to the lessees. The Chinese have little respect for foreign trade. Your beggarly commerce! was the language in which the Mandarins of Pekin used to talk to Mr. Langlet, the Russian envoy, concerning it. Except with Japan, the Chinese carry on themselves and in their own bottoms little or no foreign trade; and it is only into one or two ports of their kingdom that they even admit the ships of foreign nations. Foreign trade, therefore, is, in China, every way confined within a much narrower circle than that to which it would naturally extend itself, if more freedom was allowed to it, either in their own ships, or in those of foreign nations.

MANUFACTURES, as in a small bulk they frequently contain a great value, and can upon that account be transported at less expence from one country to another than most forts of rude produce, are in almost all countries the principal support of foreign trade. In countries besides less extensive and less favourably circumstanced for interior commerce than China, they generally require the support of foreign trade. Without an extensive foreign market,

they

BOOK they could not well flourish either in countries so moderately extenfive as to afford but a narrow home market; or in countries where the communication between one province and another was fo difficult as to render it impossible for the goods of any particular place to enjoy the whole of that home market which the country could afford. The perfection of manufacturing industry, it must be remembered, depends altogether upon the division of labour; and the degree to which the division of labour can be introduced into any manufacture, is necessarily regulated, it has already been shown, by the extent of the market. But the great extent of the empire of China, the vast multitude of its inhabitants, the variety of climate, and consequently of productions in its different provinces, and the easy communication by means of water carriage between the greater part of them, render the home market of that country of fo great extent, as to be alone sufficient to support very great manufactures, and to admit of very considerable subdivisions of labour. The home market of China is perhaps in extent not much inferior to the market of all the different countries of Europe put together. A more extensive foreign trade, however, which to this great home market added the foreign market of all the rest of the world; especially if any considerable part of this trade was carried on in Chinese ships; could scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of China and to improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing industry. By a more extensive navigation, the Chinese would naturally learn the art of using and constructing themselves all the different machines made use of in other countries, as well as all the other improvements of art and industry which are practifed in all the different parts of the world. Upon their present plan they have little opportunity of improving themselves by the example of any other nation; except that of the Japanese.

THE policy of antient Egypt too and that of the Gentoo govern- CHAP. ment of Indostan seem to have favoured agriculture more than all other employments.

BOTH in antient Egypt and in Indostan, the whole body of the people was divided into different casts or tribes, each of which was confined, from father to son, to a particular employment or class of employments. The son of a priest was necessarily a priest; the son of a soldier, a soldier; the son of a labourer, a labourer; the son of a weaver, a weaver; the son of a taylor, a taylor; &c. In both countries, the cast of the priests held the highest rank, and that of the soldiers the next; and in both countries, the cast of the same sand labourers was superior to the casts of merchants and manufacturers.

The government of both countries was particularly attentive to the interest of agriculture. The works constructed by the antient sovereigns of Egypt for the proper distribution of the waters of the Nile were famous in antiquity; and the ruined remains of some of them are still the admiration of travellers. Those of the same kind which were constructed by the antient sovereigns of Indostan, for the proper distribution of the waters of the Ganges as well as of many other rivers, though they have been less celebrated, seem to have been equally great. Both countries accordingly, though subject occasionally to dearths, have been famous for their great fertility. Though both were extreamly populous, yet in years of moderate plenty they were both able to export great quantities of grain to their neighbours.

THE antient Egyptians had a superstitious aversion to the sea; and as the Gentoo religion does not permit its followers to light a fire, nor consequently to dress any victuals upon the water, it in effect

BOOK effect prohibits them from all distant sea voyages. Both the Egyptians and Indians must have depended almost altogether upon the navigation of other nations for the exportation of their furplus produce; and this dependency, as it must have confined the market, so it must have discouraged the increase of this surplus produce. It must have discouraged too the increase of the manufactured produce more than that of the rude produce. Manufactures require a much more extensive market than the most important parts of the rude produce of the land. A fingle shoemaker will make more than three hundred pairs of shoes in the year; and his own family will not perhaps wear out fix pairs. Unless therefore he has the custom of at least fifty such families as his own, he cannot dispose of the whole produce of his own labour. The most numerous class of artificers will feldom, in a large country, make more than one in fifty or one in a hundred of the whole number of families contained in it. But in fuch large countries as France and England, the number of people employed in agriculture has by fome authors been computed at a half, by others at a third, and by no author that I know of, at less than a fifth of the whole inhabitants of the country. as the produce of the agriculture of both France and England is, the far greater part of it, confumed at home, each person employed in it must, according to these computations, require little more than the custom of one, two, or at most four such families as his own, in order to dispose of the whole produce of his own labour. ture, therefore, can support itself under the discouragement of a confined market, much better than manufactures. In both antient Egypt and Indostan, indeed, the confinement of the foreign market was in some measure compensated by the conveniency of many inland navigations, which opened in the most advantageous manner the whole extent of the home market to every part of the produce of every different district of those countries. great extent of Indostan too rendered the home market of that country

country very great, and fufficient to support a great variety of manu- CHAP. factures. But the small extent of antient Egypt, which was never equal to England, must at all times have rendered the home market of that country too narrow for supporting any great variety of manufactures. Bengal, accordingly, the province of Indostan which commonly exports the greatest quantity of rice, has always been more remarkable for the exportation of a great variety of manufactures, than for that of its grain. Antient Egypt, on the contrary, though it exported some manufactures, fine linen in particular, as well as some other goods, was always most distinguished for its great exportation of grain. It was long the granary of the Roman empire.

THE fovereigns of China, of ancient Egypt, and of the different kingdoms into which Indostan has at different times been divided, have always derived the whole, or by far the most considerable part, of their revenue from fome fort of land-tax or land-rent. This landtax or land-rent, like the tithe in Europe, confisted in a certain proportion, a fifth, it is faid, of the produce of the land, which was either delivered in kind or paid in money, according to a certain valuation, and which therefore varied from year to year according to all the variations of the produce. It was natural, therefore, that the fovereigns of those countries should be particularly attentive to the interests of agriculture, upon the prosperity or declension of which immediately depended the yearly increase or diminution of their own revenue.

THE policy of the antient republicks of Greece, and that of Rome, though it honoured agriculture more than manufactures or foreign trade, yet feems rather to have discouraged the latter employments, than to have given any direct or intentional encouragement to the former. In several of the antient states of Greece, foreign trade was prohibited altogether; and in feveral others the employments

BOOK ments of artificers and manufacturers were considered as hurtful to the strength and agility of the human body, as rendering it incapable of those habits which their military and gymnastic exercises endeavoured to form in it, and as thereby disqualifying it more or less from undergoing the fatigues and encountering the dangers of war. Such occupations were confidered as fit only for flaves, and the free citizens of the state were prohibited from exercising them. Even in those states where no such prohibition took place, as in Rome and Athens, the great body of the people were in effect excluded from all the trades which are now commonly exercised by the lower fort of the inhabitants of towns. Such trades were at Athens and Rome all occupied by the flaves of the rich, who exercised them for the benefit of their masters, whose wealth, power and protection, made it almost impossible for a poor freeman to find a market for his work when it came into competition with that of the flaves of the rich. Slaves, however, are very feldom inventive; and all the most important improvements, either in machinery, or in that arrangement and distribution of work which facilitate and abridge labour, have been the discoveries of freemen. Should a slave propose any improvement of this kind, his mafter would be very apt to consider the proposal as the suggestion of laziness, and of a desire to save his own labour at the master's expence. The poor slave, instead of reward, would probably meet with much abuse, perhaps with some punishment. In the manufactures carried on by flaves, therefore, more labour must generally have been employed to execute the same quantity of work than in those carried on by freemen. The work of the former must, upon that account, generally have been dearer than that of the latter. The Hungarian mines, it is remarked by Mr. Montesquieu, though not more rich, have always been wrought with less expence, and therefore with more prosit, than the Turkish mines in their neighbourhood. The Turkish mines are wrought by flaves; and the arms of those flaves are the only machines which the Turks have ever thought of employing. The Hungarian mines

mines are wrought by freemen, who employ a good deal of machinery, CHAP. by which they facilitate and abridge their own labour. From the very little that is known about the price of manufactures in the times of the Greeks and Romans, it would appear that those of the finer fort were excessively dear. Silk fold for its weight in gold. was not, indeed, in those times a European manufacture; and as it was all brought from the East Indies, the distance of the carriage may in some measure account for the greatness of the price. price, however, which a lady, it is faid, would fometimes pay for a piece of very fine linen feems to have been equally extravagant; and as linen was always either a European, or, at farthest, an Egyptian manufacture, this high price can be accounted for only by the great expence of the labour which must have been employed about it, and the expence of this labour again could arise from nothing but the aukwardness of the machinery which it made use of. The price of fine woollens too, though not quite fo extravagant, feems however to have been much above that of the present times. Some cloths, we are told by Pliny, dyed in a particular manner, cost a hundred denarii, or three pounds fix shillings and eight pence, the pound weight. Others dyed in another manner cost a thousand denarii the pound weight, or thirty-three pounds fix shillings and eight pence. The Roman pound, it must be remembered, contained only twelve of our averdupois ounces. This high price, indeed, feems to have been principally owing to the dye. But had not the cloths themselves been much dearer than any which are made in the present times, so very expensive a dye would not probably have been bestowed upon them. The disproportion would have been too great between the value of the accesfory and that of the principal. The price mentioned by the same author of some Triclinaria, a fort of woollen pillows or cushions made use of to lean upon as they reclined upon their couches at

table, passes all credibility; some of them being said to have cost more than thirty thousand, others more than three hundred thou-

fand

BOOK fand pounds. This high price too is not faid to have arisen from the dye. In the dress of the people of fashion of both sexes, there feems to have been much less variety, it is observed by Doctor Arbuthnot, in antient than in modern times; and the very little variety which we find in that of the antient statues confirms his observation. He infers from this, that their dress must upon the whole have been cheaper than ours: but the conclusion does not feem to follow. When the expence of fashionable dress is very great, the variety must be very small. But when, by the improvements in the productive powers of manufacturing art and industry, the expence of any one dress comes to be very moderate, the variety will naturally be very great. The rich, not being able to diffinguish themselves by the expence of any one dress, will naturally endeavour to do fo by the multitude and variety of their dreffes.

> THE greatest and most important branch of the commerce of every nation, it has already been observed, is that which is carried on between the inhabitants of the town and those of the country. The inhabitants of the town draw from the country the rude produce which constitutes both the materials of their work and the fund of their subfistence; and they pay for this rude produce by fending back to the country a certain portion of it manufactured and prepared for immediate use. The trade which is carried on between those two different sets of people consists ultimately in a certain quantity of rude produce exchanged for a certain quantity of manufactured produce. The dearer the latter, therefore, the cheaper the former; and whatever tends in any country to raise the price of manufactured produce, tends to lower that of the rude produce of the land, and thereby to discourage agriculture. The smaller the quantity of manufactured produce which any given quantity of rude produce, or, what comes to the same thing, which the price of any given quantity of rude produce is capable of purchasing, the smaller the real value of that given quantity

quantity of rude produce; the fmaller the encouragement which CHAP. either the landlord has to increase its quantity by improving, or the farmer by cultivating the land. Whatever, besides, tends to diminish in any country the number of artificers and manufacturers, tends to diminish the home market, the most important of all markets, for the rude produce of the land, and thereby still further to discourage agriculture.

THOSE systems, therefore, which preferring agriculture to all other employments, in order to promote it impose restraints upon manufactures and foreign trade, act contrary to the very end which they propose, and indirectly discourage that very species of industry which they mean to promote. They are fo far, perhaps, more inconfistent than even the mercantile system. That system, by encouraging manufactures and foreign trade more than agriculture, turns a certain portion of the capital of the fociety from supporting a more advantageous, to support a less advantageous species of industry. But still it really and in the end encourages that species of industry which it means to promote. Those agricultural fystems, on the contrary, really and in the end discourage their own favourite species of industry.

IT is thus that every fystem which endeavours, either, by extraordinary encouragements, to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the capital of the society than what would naturally go to it; or, by extraordinary restraints, to force from a particular species of industry some share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it; is in reality subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote. It retards, instead of accelerating, the progress of the society towards real wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value of the annual produce of its land and labour.

3

BOOK

ALL systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to purfue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other man or order of men. The fovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of super-intending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the fociety. According to the fystem of natural liberty, the fovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent focieties; fecondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain publick works and certain publick institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great fociety.

THE proper performance of those several duties of the sovereign nccessarily supposes a certain expence; and this expence again necessarily requires a certain revenue to support it. In the following book, therefore, I shall endeavour to explain; first, what are the necessary expences of the sovereign or common-wealth; and which

of those expences ought to be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole fociety; and which of them, by that of some particular part only, or of some particular members of the society: secondly, what are the different methods in which the whole society may be made to contribute towards defraying the expences incumbent on the whole society, and what are the principal advantages and inconveniences of each of those methods: and, thirdly, what are the reasons and causes which have induced almost all modern governments to mortgage some part of this revenue, or to contract debts, and what have been the effects of those debts upon the real wealth, the annual produce of the land and labour of the society. The following book, therefore, will naturally be divided into three chapters.

CHAP.



BOOK

Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

CHAP. I.

Of the Expences of the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

PART FIRST.

Of the Expence of Defence.

HE first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society CHAP. from the violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force. But the expence both of preparing this military force in time of peace, and of employing it in time of war, is very different in the different states of society, in the different periods of improvement.

Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society. fuch as we find it among the native tribes of North America, every man is a warrior as well as a hunter. When he goes to war, either to defend his fociety, or to revenge the injuries which have been done to it by other focieties, he maintains himself by his own labour in the same manner as when he lives at home. His society, for in this state of things there is properly neither fovereign nor commonwealth, is at no fort of expence, either to prepare him for the field, or to maintain him while he is in it.

AMONG

B O O K

Among nations of shepherds, a more advanced state of society, fuch as we find it among the Tartars and Arabs, every man is, in the fame manner, a warrior. Such nations have commonly no fixed habitation, but live either in tents or in a fort of covered waggons which are eafily transported from place to place. The whole tribe or nation changes its fituation according to the different feasons of the year, as well as according to other accidents. its herds and flocks have confumed the forage of one part of the country, it removes to another, and from that to a third. dry feason, it comes down to the banks of the rivers; in the wet feafon it retires to the upper country. When such a nation goes to war, the warriors will not trust their herds and flocks to the feeble defence of their old men, their women and children; and their old men, their women and children, will not be left behind without defence and without subsistence. The whole nation, besides, being accustomed to a wandering life, even in time of peace, eafily takes the field in time of war.. Whether it marches as an army, or moves about as a company of herdsmen, the way of life is nearly the same, though the object proposed by it is very different. They all go to war together, therefore, and every one does as well as he can. Among the Tartars, even the women have been frequently known to engage in battle. If they conquer, whatever belongs to the hostile tribe is the recompence of the victory. But if they are vanquished, all is lost, and not only their herds and flocks, but their women and children become the booty of the conqueror. Even the greater part of those who survive the action are obliged to submit to him for the fake of immediate subsistence. The rest are commonly dissipated and dispersed in the defart.

THE ordinary life, the ordinary exercises of a Tartar or Arab, prepare him sufficiently for war. Running, wrestling, cudgel-playing, throwing the javeling, drawing the bow, &c. are the common pastimes

pastimes of thole who live in the open air, and are all of them the CHAP. images of war. When a Tartar or Arab actually goes to war, he is maintained by his own herds and flocks which he carries with him, in the same manner as in peace. His chief or sovereign, for those nations have all chiefs or sovereigns, is at no fort of expence in preparing him for the field; and when he is in it, the chance of plunder is the only pay which he either expects or requires.

An army of hunters can feldom exceed two or three hundred men. The precarious subsistence which the chace affords could feldom allow a greater number to keep together for any confiderable time. An army of shepherds, on the contrary, may sometimes amount to two or three hundred thousand. As long as nothing stops their progress, as long as they can go on from one district, of which they have confumed the forage, to another which is yet entire; there feems to be scarce any limit to the number who can march on together. A nation of hunters can never be formidable to the civilized nations in their neighbourhood. A nation of shepherds may. Nothing can be more contemptible than an Indian war in North America. Nothing, on the contrary, can be more dreadful than a Tartar invasion has frequently been in Asia. The judgement of Thucidides, that both Europe and Asia could not refift the Scythians united, has been verified by the experience of all ages. The inhabitants of the extensive, but defenceless plains of Scythia or Tartary, have been frequently united under the dominion of the chief of some conquering horde or clan; and the havock and devastation of Asia have always signalized their union. The inhabitants of the inhospitable desarts of Arabia, the other great nation of shepherds, have never been united but once; under Mahomet and his immediate fuccesfors. Their union, which was more the effect of religious enthusiasm than of conquest, was fignalized in the same manner. If the hunting nations of America fhould

BOOK should ever become shepherds, their neighbourhood would be much more dangerous to the European colonies than it is at present.

In a yet more advanced state of society, among those nations of husbandmen who have little foreign commerce and no other manufactures but those coarse and houshold ones which almost every private family prepares for its own use, every man, in the same manner, either is a warrior or eafily becomes fuch. They who live by agriculture generally pass the whole day in the open air, exposed to all the inclemencies of the feafons. The hardiness of their ordinary life prepares them for the fatigues of war, to some of which their necessary occupations bear a good deal of analogy. The necessary occupation of a ditcher prepares him to work in the trenches, and to fortify a camp as well as to enclose a field. ordinary pastimes of such husbandmen are the same as those of shepherds, and are in the same manner the images of war. But as husbandmen have less leisure than shepherds, they are not so frequently employed in those pastimes. They are soldiers, but soldiers not quite so much masters of their exercise. Such as they are, however, it feldom costs the sovereign or commonwealth any expence to prepare them for the field.

AGRICULTURE, even in its rudest and sowest state, supposes a settlement; some fort of fixed habitation which cannot be abandoned without great loss. When a nation of mere husbandmen, therefore, goes to war, the whole people cannot take the field together. The old men, the women and children, at least must remain at home to take care of the habitation. All the men of the military age, however, may take the field, and in small nations of this kind have frequently done so. In every nation the men of the military age are supposed to amount to about a fourth or fifth part of the whole body of the people. If the campaign too should begin after seed time.

time and end before harvest, both the husbandman and his prin- CHAP. cipal labourers can be spared from the farm without much loss. He trusts that the work which must be done in the meantime can be well enough executed by the old men, the women and the children. He is not unwilling, therefore, to ferve without pay during so short a campaign, and it frequently costs the sovereign or commonwealth as little to maintain him in the field as to prepare him for it. The citizens of all the different states of antient Greece feem to have ferved in this manner till after the fecond Persian war: and the people of Peloponesus till after the Peloponesian war. The Peloponesians, Thucidides observes, generally left the field in the fummer and returned home to reap the harvest. The Roman people under their kings and during the first ages of the republick ferved in the same manner. It was not till the siege of Veii, that they who staid at home began to contribute something towards maintaining those who went to war. In the European monarchies which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, both before and for some time after the establishment of what is properly called the feudal law, the great lords with all their immediate dependents used to serve the crown at their own expence. In the field, in the fame manner as at home, they maintained themselves by their own revenue, and not by any stipend or pay which they received from the king upon that particular occasion.

In a more advanced state of society, two different causes contribute to render it altogether impossible that they who take the field should maintain themselves at their own expense. Those two causes are, the progress of manufactures, and the improvement in the art of war.

Though a husbandman should be employed in an expedition, provided it begins after seed time and ends before harvest, the interruption

BOOK ruption of his business will not always occasion any considerable diminution of his revenue. Without the intervention of his labour. nature does herfelf the greater part of the work which remains to be done. But the moment that an artificer, a fmith, a carpenter, or a weaver, for example, quits his workhouse, the sole fource of his revenue is completely dried up. Nature does nothing for him, he does all for himself. When he takes the field, therefore, in defence of the publick, as he has no revenue to maintain himself, he must necessarily be maintained by the publick. a country of which a great part of the inhabitants are artificers and manufacturers, a great part of the people who go to war must be drawn from those classes, and must therefore be maintained by the publick as long as they are employed in its fervice.

> WHEN the art of war too has gradually grown up to be a very intricate and complicated science, when the event of war ceases to be determined, as in the first ages of society, by a fingle irregular skirmish or battle, but when the contest is generally spun out through several different campaigns, each of which lasts during the greater part of the year; it becomes univerfally necessary that the publick should maintain those who serve the publick in war, at least while they are employed in that service. Whatever in time of peace might be the ordinary occupation of those who go to war, so very tedious and expensive a service would otherwise be by far too heavy a burden apon them. After the fecond Persian war, accordingly, the armies of Athens feem to have been generally composed of mercenary troops; confisting indeed partly of citizens, but partly too of foreigners; and all of them equally hired and paid at the expence of the state. From the time of the seige of Veii the armies of Rome received pay for their fervice during the time which they remained in the field. Under the feudal governments the military fervice both of the great lords and of their immediate dependents

was, after a certain period, univerfally exchanged for a payment in CHAP. money, which was employed to maintain those who served in their stead.

The number of those who can go to war, in proportion to the whole number of the people, is necessarily much smaller in a civilized than in a rude state of society. In a civilized society, as the soldiers are maintained altogether by the labour of those who are not soldiers, the number of the former never can exceed what the latter can maintain, over and above maintaining in a manner suitable to their respective stations both themselves and the other officers of government, and law, whom they are obliged to maintain. In the little Agrarian states of antient Greece, a fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people considered themselves as soldiers, and would sometimes, it is said, take the field. Among the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed, that not more than one hundredth part of the inhabitants of any country can be employed as soldiers, without ruin to the country at whose expence they are employed.

The expence of preparing the army for the field seems not to have become considerable in any nation, till long after that of maintaining it in the field had devolved entirely upon the sovereign or commonwealth. In all the different republicks of antient Greece, to learn his military exercises was a necessary part of education imposed by the state upon every free citizen. In every city there seems to have been a publick field, in which, under the protection of the publick magistrate, the young people were taught their different exercises by different masters. In this very simple institution consisted the whole expence which any Grecian state seems ever to have been at in preparing its citizens for war. In antient Rome the exercises of the Campus Martius answered the

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BOOK same purpose with those of the Gymnasium in antient Greece. Under the feudal governments, the many publick ordinances that the citizens of every district should practife archery as well as several other military exercises, were intended for promoting the same purpose, but do not seem to have promoted it so well. Either from want of interest in the officers entrusted with the execution of those ordinances, or from fome other cause, they appear to have been univerfally neglected; and in the progress of all those governments, military exercises seem to have gone gradually into disuse among the great body of the people.

> In the republicks of antient Greece and Rome, during the whole period of their existence, and under the feudal governments for a considerable time after their first establishment, the trade of a foldier was not a separate distinct trade which constituted the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens. Every subject of the state, whatever might be the ordinary trade or occupation by which he gained his livelihood, confidered himself upon all ordinary occasions as fit likewise to exercise the trade of a soldier, and upon many extraordinary occasions as bound to exercise it.

> THE art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, fo in the progress of improvement it necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them. The state of the mechanical, as well as of some other arts with which it is necessarily connected, determines the degree of perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any particular time. But in order to carry it to this degree of perfection, it is necessary that it should become the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens, and the divifion of labour is as necessary for the improvement of this as of every other art. Into other arts the division of labour is naturally introduced by the prudence of individuals, who find that they promote

promote their private interest better by confining themselves to a CHAP. particular trade, than by exercifing a great number. But it is the wisdom of the state only which can render the trade of a soldier a particular trade separate and distinct from all others. A private citizen who, in time of profound peace and without any particular encouragement from the publick, should spend the greater part of his time in military exercises, might, no doubt, both improve himfelf very much in them, and amuse himself very well; but he certainly would not promote his own interest. It is the wisdom of the state only which can render it for his interest to give up the greater part of his time to this peculiar occupation: and states have not always had this wisdom, even when their circumstances had become fuch that the preservation of their existence required that they should have it.

A SHEPHERD has a great deal of leifure; a husbandman, in the rude state of husbandry, has some; an artificer or manufacturer has The first may, without any loss, employ a great deal of his time in martial exercises; the second may employ some part of it; but the last cannot employ a fingle hour in them without fome loss, and his attention to his own interest naturally leads him to neglect them altogether. Those improvements in husbandry too, which the progress of arts and manufactures necessarily introduces, leave the husbandman as little leisure as the artificer. tary exercises come to be as much neglected by the inhabitants of the country as by those of the town, and the great body of the people becomes altogether unwarlike. That wealth, at the same time, which always follows the improvements of agriculture and manufactures, and which in reality is no more than the accumulated produce of those improvements, provokes the invasion of all their neighbours. An industrious, and upon that account, a wealthy nation, is of all nations the most likely to be attacked; and unless the state takes

BOOK takes fome new measures for the publick defence, the natural habits of the people render them altogether incapable of defending themselves.

In these circumstances there seem to be but two methods by which the state can make any tolerable provision for the publick defence.

IT may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in spite of the whole bent of the interest, genius and inclinations of the people, enforce the practice of military exercises, and oblige either all the citizens of the military age, or a certain number of them, to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they may happen to carry on.

OR, fecondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in the constant practice of military exercises, it may render the trade of a soldier a particular trade, separate and distinct from all others.

If the state has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its military force is said to consist in a militia; if to the second, it is said to consist in a standing army. The practice of military exercises is the sole or principal occupation of the soldiers of a standing army, and the maintenance or pay which the state affords them is the principal and ordinary sund of their subsistence. The practice of military exercises is only the occasional occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they derive the principal and ordinary sund of their subsistence from some other occupation. In a militia, the character of the labourer, artissicer or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier: in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates over every other character; and in this distinction seems to consist

the effential difference between those two different species of military force.

MILITIAS have been of several different kinds. In some countries the citizens destined for defending the state, seem to have been exercised only, without being, if I may say so, regimented; that is, without being divided into separate and distinct bodies of troops, each of which performed its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers. In the republicks of antient Greece and Rome each citizen, as long as he remained at home, feems to have practifed his exercises either separately and independently, or with such of his equals as he liked best; and not to have been attached to any particular body of troops till he was actually called upon to take the field. In other countries, the militia has not only been exercifed, but regimented. In England, in Switzerland, and, I believe, in every other country of modern Europe, where any imperfect military force of this kind has been established, every militia-man is, even in time of peace, attached to a particular body of troops, which performs its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers.

Before the invention of fire-arms, that army was superior in which the soldiers had, each individually, the greatest skill and dexterity in the use of their arms. Strength and agility of body were of the highest consequence, and commonly determined the fate of battles. But this skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, could be acquired only in the same manner as fencing is acquired at present, by practising, not in great bodies, but each man separately, in a particular school under a particular master, or with his own particular equals and companions. Since the invention of fire-arms, strength and agility of body, or even extraordinary dexterity and skill in the use of arms, though they are far from being of no consequence, are, however, of less consequence. The nature of the weapon, though

BOOK it by no means puts the awkward upon a level with the skilful, puts im more nearly fo than he ever was before. All the dexterity and skill, it is supposed, which are necessary for using it, can be well enough acquired by practifing in great bodies.

> REGULARITY, order, and prompt obedience to command, are qualities which, in modern armies, are of more importance towards determining the fate of battles than the dexterity and skill of the foldiers in the use of their arms. But the noise of fire-arms, the fmoke, and the invisible death to which every man feels himself every moment exposed, as soon as he comes within cannon-shot, and frequently a long time before the battle can be well faid to be engaged, must render it very difficult to maintain any considerable degree of this regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even in the beginning of a modern battle. In an antient battle there was no noise but what arose from the human voice; there was no smoke, there was no invisible cause of wounds or death. man, till fome mortal weapon actually did approach him, faw clearly that no fuch weapon was near him. In these circumstances, and among troops who had some confidence in their own skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, it must have been a good deal less difficult to preserve some degree of regularity and order, not only in the beginning, but through the whole progress of an antient battle, and till one of the two armies was fairly defeated. But the habits of regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, can be acquired only by troops which are exercised in great bodies.

> A MILITIA, however, in whatever manner it may be either disciplined or exercised, must always be much inferior to a well disciplined and well exercised standing army.

> THE foldiers, who are exercised only once a week or once a month, can never be so expert in the use of their arms, as those who

who are exercised every day or every other day; and though this CHAP. circumstance may not be of so much consequence in modern, as it was in antient times; yet the acknowledged superiority of the Prusfian troops, owing, it is faid, very much to their fuperior expertness in their exercise, may satisfy us that it is, even at this day, of very confiderable confequence.

THE foldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once a week or once a month, and who are at all other times at liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, without being in any respect accountable to him, can never be under the same awe in his presence, can never have the same disposition to ready obedience, with those whose whole life and conduct are every day directed by him, and who every day even rife and go to bed, or at least retire to their quarters, according to his orders. In what is called discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a militia must always be still more inferior to a standing army, than it may sometimes be in what is called the manual exercise, or in the management and use of its arms. But in modern war the habit of ready and instant obedience is of much greater consequence than a considerable superiority in the management of arms.

THOSE militias which, like the Tartar or Arab militia, go to war under the same chieftains whom they are accustomed to obey in peace, are by far the best. In respect for their officers, in the habit of ready obedience, they approach nearest to standing armies. The highland militia, when it ferved under its own chieftains, had fome advantage of the same kind. As the highlanders, however, were not wandering, but stationary shepherds, as they had all a fixed habitation, and were not, in peaceable times, accustomed to follow their chieftain from place to place; so in time of war they were less willing to follow him to any confiderable distance, or to continue for any long time in the field. When they had acquired any booty they

BOOK they were eager to return home, and his authority was feldom fufficient to detain them. In point of obedience they were always much inferior to what is reported of the Tartars and Arabs. the highlanders too, from their stationary life, spend less of their time in the open air, they were always less accustomed to military exercises, and were less expert in the use of their arms than the

Tartars and Arabs are faid to be.

A MILITIA of any kind, it must be observed, however, which has ferved for feveral successive campaigns in the field, becomes in every respect a standing army. The soldiers are every day exercised in the use of their arms, and, being constantly under the command of their officers, are habituated to the same prompt obedience which takes place in standing armies. What they were before they took the field, is of little importance. They necessarily become in every respect a standing army, after they have passed a few campaigns in it. Should the war in America drag out through another campaign, the American militia may become in every respect a match for that standing army, of which, in the last war, the valour appeared at least not inferior to that of the hardiest veterans of France and Spain.

This distinction being well understood, the history of all ages. it will be found, bears testimony to the irresistible superiority which a well regulated standing army has over every fort of militia.

ONE of the first standing armies of which we have any distinct account, in any well authenticated history, is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Theffalians, and some of the Greek cities in the neighbourhood of Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which in the beginning were probably militia, to the exact discipline of a standing army. When he was at peace, which he was very feldom, and never for any

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long time together, he was careful not to disband that army. It CHAP. vanquished and subdued, after a long and violent struggle indeed, the galant and well exercised militias of the principal republicks of antient Greece; and afterwards, with very little struggle, the essential of the Greek republicks and of the great Persian empire. The fall of the Greek republicks and of the Persian empire, was the effect of the irresistable superiority which a standing army has over every fort of militia. It is the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which history has preserved any distinct or circumstantial account.

THE fall of Carthage, and the confequent elevation of Rome, is the fecond. All the varieties in the fortune of those two famous republicks may very well be accounted for from the same cause.

From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war, the armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under three great generals, who fucceeded one another in the command; Amilcar, his fon in law Afdrubal, and his fon Annibal; first in chastising their own rebellious slaves, afterwards in fubduing the revolted nations of Africa, and, lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army which Annibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those different wars, have been gradually formed to the exact discipline of a standing army. The Romans in the mean time, though they had not been altogether at peace, yet they had not, during this period, been engaged in any war of very great consequence; and their military discipline, it is generally said, was a good deal relaxed. The Roman armies which Annibal encountered at Trebia, Thrasymenus, and Cannæ, were militia opposed to a standing army. This circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than any other to determine the fate of those battles.

THE

BOOK V. THE standing army which Annibal left behind him in Spain, had the like superiority over the militia which the Romans sent to oppose it, and in a few years, under the command of his brother, the younger Asdrubal, expelled them almost entirely from that country.

Annibal was ill supplied from home. The Roman militia, being continually in the field, became in the progress of the war a well disciplined and well exercised standing army; and the superiority of Annibal grew every day less and less. Asdrubal judged it necessary to lead the whole, or almost the whole of the standing army which he commanded in Spain, to the assistance of his brother in Italy. In his march he is said to have been misled by his guides; and in a country which he did not know, was surprized and attacked by another standing army, in every respect equal or superior to his own, and was entirely deseated.

WHEN Afdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to oppose him but a militia inferior to his own. He conquered and subdued that militia, and, in the course of the war, his own militia necessarily became a well disciplined and well exercised standing army. That standing army was afterwards carried to Africa, where it found nothing but a militia to oppose it. In order to defend Carthage it became necessary to recall the standing army of Annibal. The disheartened and frequently defeated African militia joined it, and, at the battle of Zama, composed the greater part of the troops of Annibal. The event of that day determined the fate of the two rival republicks.

FROM the end of the second Carthaginian war till the fall of the Roman republick, the armies of Rome were in every respect standing armies. The standing army of Macedon made some resultance

refistance to their arms. In the height of their grandeur it cost CHAP. them two great wars, and three great battles, to fubdue that little kingdom; of which the conquest would probably have been still more difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its last king. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient world, of Greece, of Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble refistance to the standing armies of Rome. The militias of some barbarous nations defended themselves much better. The Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from the countries north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, were the most formidable enemies which the Romans had to encounter after the fecond Carthaginian The Parthian and German militias too were always respectable, and, upon feveral occasions, gained very considerable advantages over the Roman armies. In general, however, and when the Roman armies were well commanded, they appear to have been very much superior; and if the Romans did not pursue the final conquest either of Parthia or Germany, it was probably because they judged that it was not worth while to add those two barbarous countries to an empire which was already too large. The antient Parthians appear to have been a nation of Scythian or Tartar extraction, and to have always retained a good deal of the manners of their ancestors. The ancient Germans were, like the Scythians or Tartars, a nation of wandering shepherds, who went to war under the fame chiefs whom they were accustomed to follow in peace. Their militia was exactly of the fame kind with that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom too they were probably descended.

Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the Roman armies. Its extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those causes. In the days of their grandeur, when no enemy appeared capable of opposing them, their heavy armour was laid aside as unnecessarily

BOOK unnecessarily burdensome, their laborious exercises were neglected as unnecessarily toilsome. Under the Roman emperors besides, the standing armies of Rome, those particularly which guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to their masters, against whom they used frequently to set up their own generals. In order to render them less formidable, according to fome authors, Dioclesian, according to others, Constantine, first withdrew them from the frontier, where they had always before been encamped in great bodies, generally of two or three legions each, and dispersed them in small bodies through the different provincial towns, from whence they were scarce ever removed, but when it became necessary to repel an invasion. Small bodies of foldiers quartered in trading and manufacturing towns, and feldom removed from those quarters, became themselves tradesmen, artificers, and manufacturers. The civil came to predominate over the military character; and the standing armies of Rome gradually degenerated into a corrupt, neglected, and undifciplined militia, incapable of refifting the attack of the German and Scythian militias, which foon afterwards invaded the western empire. It was only by hiring the militia of some of those nations, to oppose to that of others, that the emperors were for some time able to defend themselves. The fall of the western empire is the third great revolution in the affairs of mankind, of which antient history has preferved any distinct or circumstantial account. was brought about by the irrefistable superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation; which the militia of a nation of shepherds has over that of a nation of husbandmen, artificers, and manufacturers. The victories which have been gained by militias have generally been, not over standing armies, but over other militias in exercise and discipline inferior to themselves. Such were the victories which the Greek militia gained over that of the Persian empire; and such too were those which in

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in later times the Swiss militia gained over that of the Austrians CHAP. and Burgundians.

THE military force of the German and Scythian nations who established themselves upon the ruins of the western empire, continued for some time to be of the same kind in their new settlements as it had been in their original country. It was a militia of shepherds and husbandmen, which, in time of war, took the field under the command of the same chieftains whom it was accustomed to obey in peace. It was, therefore, tolerably well exercised, and tolerably well disciplined. As arts and industry advanced, however, the authority of the chieftains gradually decayed, and the great body of the people had less time to spare for military exercises. Both the discipline and the exercise of the feudal militia, therefore, went gradually to ruin, and standing armies were gradually introduced to supply the place of it. When the expedient of a standing army, befides, had once been adopted by one civilized nation, it became necessary that all its neighbours should follow the example. They foon found that their fafety depended upon their doing fo. and that their own militia was altogether incapable of refisting the attack of fuch an army.

THE foldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen an enemy, yet have frequently appeared to possess all the courage of veteran troops, and the very moment that they took the field to have been sit to face the hardiest and most experienced veterans. In 1756, when the Russian army marched into Poland, the valour of the Russian soldiers did not appear inferior to that of the Prussians, at that time supposed to be the hardiest and most experienced veterans in Europe. The Russian empire, however, had enjoyed a profound peace for near twenty years before, and could at that time have very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy. When

BOOK the Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed a profound peace for about eight and twenty years. The valour of her foldiers, however, far from being corrupted by that long peace, was never more distinguished than in the attempt upon Carthagena, the first unfortunate exploit of that unfortunate war. In a long peace the generals, perhaps, may fometimes forget their skill; but, where a well regulated standing army has been kept up, the soldiers feem never to forget their valour.

> WHEN a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at all times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to be in its neighbourhood. The frequent conquests of all the civilized countries in Asia by the Tartars, sufficiently demonstrate the natural superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation. A well regulated standing army is superior to every militia. Such an army, as it can best be maintained by an opulent and civilized nation, so it can alone defend such a nation against the invasion of a poor and barbarous neighbour. It is only by means of a standing army, therefore, that the civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even preserved for any considerable time.

> As it is only by means of a well regulated flanding army that a civilized country can be defended, so it is only by means of it that a barbarous country can be fuddenly and tolerably civilized. A standing army establishes, with an irresistible force, the law of the fovereign through the remotest provinces of the empire, and maintains fome degree of regular government in countries which could not otherwise admit of any. Whoever examines, with attention, the improvements which Peter the Great introduced into the Ruffian empire, will find that they almost all resolve themselves into the establishment of a well regulated standing army. It is the instru-

> > ment

ment which executes and maintains all his other regulations. That CHAP. degree of order and internal peace which that empire has ever fince enjoyed, is altogether owing to the influence of that army.

MEN of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army as dangerous to liberty. It certainly is fo wherever the interest of the general and that of the principal officers are not necessarily connected with the support of the constitution of the The standing army of Cesar destroyed the Roman republick. The standing army of Cromwell turned the long parliament out of doors. But where the fovereign is himfelf the general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers of the army; where the military force is placed under the command of those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, because they have themselves the greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty. On the contrary, it may in some cases be favourable to liberty. The fecurity which it gives to the fovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome jealousy which in some modern republicks feems to watch over the minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen. Where the fecurity of the magistrate, though supported by the principal people of the country, is endangered by every popular discontent; where a small tumult is capable of bringing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole authority of government must be employed to suppress and punish every murmur and complaint against it. To a sovereign, on the contrary, who feels himself supported, not only by the natural aristocracy of the country, but by a well regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious remonstrances can give little disturbance. He can fafely pardon or neglect them, and his consciousness of his own superiority naturally disposes him to do

BOOK To. That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness can be tolerated only in countries where the fovereign is fecured by a well regulated standing army. It is in such countries only that the publick fafety does not require that the fovereign should be trusted with any discretionary power for suppressing even the impertinent wantonness of this licentious liberty.

> THE first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the fociety from the violence and injustice of other independent focieties, grows gradually more and more expensive as the fociety advances in civilization. The military force of the fociety, which originally cost the sovereign no expence either in time of peace or in time of war, must, in the progress of improvement, first be maintained by him in time of war, and afterwards even in time of peace.

> THE great change introduced into the art of war by the invention of fire arms, has enhanced still further both the expence of exercifing and disciplining any particular number of foldiers in time of peace, and that of employing them in time of war. Both their arms and their ammunition are become more expensive. A musquet is a more expensive machine than a javelin or a bow and arrows; a cannon or a mortar, than a balista or a catapulta. The powder which is spent in a modern review is lost irrecoverably, and occasions a very considerable expence. The javelins and arrows which were thrown or shot in an antient one, could eafily be picked up again, and were besides of very little value. The cannon and the mortar are, not only much dearer, but much heavier machines than the balista or catapulta, and require a greater expence not only to prepare them for the field, but to carry them to it. As the superiority of the modern artillery too over that of the antients is very great; it has become much more difficult,

difficult, and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a rown so as to resist even for a few weeks the attack of that supetior artillery. In modern times many different causes contribute to render the defence of the society more expensive. The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of improvement have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great revolution in the art of war, to which a mere accident, the invention of gunpowder, seems to have given occasion.

In modern war the great expence of fire-arms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best afford that expence; and consequently to an opulent and civilized over a poor and barbarous nation. In antient times the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times the poor and barbarous find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized. The invention of fire-arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable both to the permanency and to the extension of civilization.

PART II.

Of the Expence of Justica.

THE second duty of the sovereign, that of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice, requires too very different degrees of expence in the different periods of society.

Among nations of hunters, as there is scarce any property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour; so there is seldom any established magistrate or any regular administration of justice. Men who have no property can injure one another

BOOK another only in their perfons or reputations. But when one man kills, wounds, beats, or defames another, though he to whom the injury is done suffers, he who does it receives no benefit. It is otherwise with the injuries to property. The benefit of the person who does the injury is often equal to the loss of him who suffers it. Envy, malice, or resentment, are the only passions which can prompt one man to injure another in his person or reputation. But the greater part of men are not very frequently under the influence of those passions; and the very worst men are so only occasionally. As their gratification too, how agreeable soever it may be to certain characters, is not attended with any real or permanent advantage, it is in the greater part of men commonly restrained by prudential considerations. Men may live together in fociety with some tolerable degree of security, though there is no civil magistrate to protect them from the injustice of those passions. But avarice and ambition in the rich, in the poor the hatred of labour and the love of present ease and enjoyment, are the passions which prompt to invade property, passions much more steady in their operation, and much more universal in their influence. Wherever there is great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy to invade his possessions. It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many fuccessive generations, can sleep a single night in fecurity. He is at all times furrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never appeale, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually held up to chastise it. The acquifition

fition of valuable or extensive property, therefore, necessarily CHAP. requires the establishment of civil government. Where there is no property, or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour, civil government is not fo necessary.

CIVIL government supposes a certain subordination. But as the necessity of civil government gradually grows up with the acquisition of valuable property, so the principal causes which naturally introduce subordination gradually grow up with the growth of that valuable property.

THE causes or circumstances which naturally introduce subordination, or which naturally, and antecedent to any civil institution, give some men some superiority over the greater part of their brethren, seem to be four in number.

THE first of those causes or circumstances is the superiority of personal qualifications, of strength, beauty, and agility of body of wisdom, and virtue, of prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation of mind. The qualifications of the body, unless supported by those of the mind, can give little authority in any period of fociety. He is a very strong man who by mere strength of body can force two weak ones to obey him. The qualifications of the mind can alone give very great authority. are, however, invisible qualities; always disputable, and generally disputed. No society, whether barbarous or civilized, has ever found it convenient to fettle the rules of precedency, of rank and fubordination, according to those invisible qualities; but according to fomething that is more plain and palpable.

THE fecond of those causes or circumstances is the superiority of age. An old man, provided his age is not fo far advanced as to give suspicion of dotage, is every where more respected than a young

BOOK young man of equal rank, fortune, and abilities. Among nations of hunters, such as the native tribes of North America, age is the fole foundation of rank and precedency. Among them, father is the appellation of a superior; brother, of an equal; and son, In the most opulent and civilized nations, age of an inferior. regulates rank among those who are in every other respect equal, and among whom therefore there is nothing else to regulate it. Among brothers and among fifters, the eldest always take place; and in the fuccession of the paternal estate every thing which cannot be divided, but must go entire to one person, such as a title of honour, is in most cases given to the eldest. Age is a plain and palpable quality which admits of no dispute.

> THE third of those causes or circumstances is the superiority of The authority of riches, however, though great in every age of fociety, is perhaps greatest in the rudest age of fociety which admits of any confiderable inequality of fortune. A Tartar chief, the increase of whose herds and flocks is sufficient to maintain a thousand men, cannot well employ that increase in any other way than in maintaining a thousand men. The rude state of his fociety does not afford him any manufactured produce, any trinkets or baubles of any kind, for which he can exchange that part of his rude produce which is over and above his own con-The thousand men whom he thus maintains, depending entirely upon him for their fubfistence, must both obey his orders in war, and submit to his jurisdiction in peace. He is necessarily both their general and their judge, and his chieftainship is the necessary effect of the superiority of his fortune. In an opulent and civilized fociety, a man may possess a much greater fortune, and yet not be able to command a dozen of people. Though the produce of his estate may be sufficient to maintain. and may perhaps actually maintain, more than a thousand people.

yet as those people pay for every thing which they get from him, CHAP. as he gives scarce any thing to any body but in exchange for an equivalent, there is scarce any body who considers himself as entirely dependent upon him, and his authority extends only over a few menial servants. The authority of fortune, however, is very great even in an opulent and civilized fociety. That it is much greater than that either of age or of personal qualities, has been the constant complaint of every period of society which admitted of any considerable inequality of fortune. The first period of lociety, that of hunters, admits of no fuch inequality. Univerfal poverty establishes there universal equality, and the superiority either of age or of personal qualities are the feeble, but the sole foundations of authority and subordination. There is therefore little or no authority or fubordination in this period of fociety. The second period of society, that of shepherds, admits of very great inequalities of fortune, and there is no period in which the superiority of fortune gives so great authority to those who possess it. There is no period accordingly in which authority and subordination are more perfectly established. The authority of an Arabian scherif is very great; that of a Tartar khan altogether despotical.

THE fourth of those causes or circumstances is the superiority of birth. Superiority of birth supposes an antient superiority of fortune in the family of the person who claims it. All families are equally antient; and the ancestors of the prince, though they may be better known, cannot well be more numerous than those of the beggar. Antiquity of family means every where the antiquity either of wealth, or of that greatness which is commonly either founded upon wealth or accompanied with it. Upstart greatness is every where less respected than antient greatness. The hatred of usurpers, the love for the family of an antient monarch,

BOOK are in a great measure founded upon the contempt which men naturally have for the former, and upon their veneration for the latter. As a military officer submits without reluctance to the authority of a superior by whom he has always been commanded, but cannot bear that his inferior should be set over his head; so men easily submit to a family to whom they and their ancestors have always submitted, but are fired with indignation when another family, in whom they had never acknowledged any fuch fuperiority, assumes a dominion over them.

> THE distinction of birth, being subsequent to the inequality of fortune, can have no place in nations of hunters, among whom all men, being equal in fortune, must likewise be very nearly equal in birth. The fon of a wife and brave man may, indeed, even among them, be somewhat more respected than a man of equal merit who has the misfortune to be the fon of a fool or a coward. The difference, however, will not be very great; and there never was, I believe, a great family in the world whose illustration was intirely derived from the inheritance of wisdom and virtue.

> THE distinction of birth not only may, but always does take place among nations of shepherds. Such nations are always strangers to every fort of luxury, and great wealth can scarce ever be diffipated among them by improvident profusion. There are no nations accordingly who abound more in families revered and honoured on account of their descent from a long race of great and illustrious ancestors; because there are no nations among whom wealth is likely to continue longer in the fame families.

> BIRTH and fortune are evidently the two circumstances which principally fet one man above another. They are the two great fources

CHAP.

of personal distinction, and are therefore the principal causes which naturally establish authority and subordination among men. Among nations of shepherds both those causes operate with their full force. The great shepherd or herdsman, respected on account of his great wealth, and of the great number of those who depend upon him for subsistence, and revered on account of the nobleness of his birth, and of the immemorial antiquity of his illustrious family, has a natural authority over all the inferior shepherds or herdsmen of his horde or clan. He can command the united force of a greater number of people than any of them. His military power is greater than that of any of them. In time of war they are all of them naturally disposed to muster themselves under his banner, rather than under that of any other person, and his birth and fortune thus naturally procure to him fome fort of executive power. By commanding too the united force of a greater number of people than any of them, he is best able to compel any one of them who may have injured another to compensate the wrong. He is the person. therefore, to whom all those who are too weak to defend themselves naturally look up for protection. It is to him that they naturally complain of the injuries which they imagine have been done to them, and his interpolition in fuch cases is more easily submitted to. even by the person complained of, than that of any other person would be. His birth and fortune thus naturally procure him fome

It is in the age of shepherds, in the second period of society, that the inequality of fortune first begins to take place, and introduces among men a degree of authority and subordination which could not possibly exist before. It thereby introduces some degree of that civil government which is indispensably necessary for its own preservation: and it seems to do this naturally, and even independent of the consideration of that necessity. The consideration of that necessity

fort of judicial authority.

EOOK necessity comes no doubt afterwards to contribute very much to maintain and secure that authority and subordination. The rich, in particular, are necessarily interested to support that order of things which can alone secure them in the possession of their own advantages. Men of inferior wealth combine to defend those of superior wealth in the possession of their property, in order that men of superior wealth may combine to defend them in the possession of theirs. All the inferior shepherds and herdsmen feel that the security of their own herds and flocks depends upon the security of those of the great shepherd or herdsman; that the maintenance of their lesser authority depends upon that of his greater authority, and that upon their fubordination to him depends his power of keeping their inferiors in subordination to them. They constitute a fort of little nobility, who feel themselves interested to defend the property and to support the authority of their own little fovereign, in order that he may be able to defend their property and to support their authority. Civil government, fo far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all.

> THE judicial authority of fuch a fovereign, however, far from being a cause of expence, was for a long time a source of revenue The persons who applied to him for justice were always willing to pay for it, and a prefent never failed to accompany a petition. After the authority of the fovereign too was thoroughly established, the person sound guilty, over and above the satisfaction which he was obliged to make to the party, was likewife forced to pay an amercement to the fovereign. He had given trouble, he had disturbed, he had broke the peace of his lord the king, and for those offences an amercement was thought due. In the Tartar govern-

> > ments

ments of Asia, in the governments of Europe which were CHAP. founded by the German and Scythian nations who overturned the Roman empire, the administration of justice was a considerable fource of revenue both to the fovereign and to all the leffer chiefs or lords who exercifed under him any particular jurisdiction, either over fome particular tribe or clan, or over fome particular territory or district. Originally both the sovereign and the inferior chiefs used to exercise this jurisdiction in their own persons. Afterwards they univerfally found it convenient to delegate it to fome fubstitute, bailiff, or judge. This substitute, however, was still obliged to account to his principal or constituent for the profits of the jurisdiction. Whoever reads the instructions * which were given to the judges of the circuit in the time of Henry II. will see clearly that those judges were a fort of itinerant factors, sent round the country for the purpose of levying certain branches of the king's revenue. In those days the administration of justice not only afforded a certain revenue to the fovereign, but to procure this revenue feems to have been one of the principal advantages which he proposed to obtain by the administration of justice.

This scheme of making the administration of justice subservient to the purposes of revenue, could scarce fail to be productive of several very groß abuses. The person who applied for justice with a large prefent in his hand was likely to get fomething more than justice; while he who applied for it with a small one was likely to get something less. Justice too might frequently be delayed, in order that this prefent might be repeated. The amercement, besides, of the person complained of, might frequently suggest a very strong reason for finding him in the wrong, even when he had not really been fo. That fuch abuses were far from being uncommon, the antient history of every country in Europe bears witness.

^{*} They are to be found in Tyrrell's H.ftory of England.

BOOK V.

WHEN the fovereign or chief exercised his judicial authority in his own person, how much soever he might abuse it, it must have been scarce possible to get any redress; because there could seldom be any body powerful enough to call him to account. When he exercised it by a bailiff, indeed, redress might sometimes be had. If it was for his own benefit only that the bailiff had been guilty of any act of injustice, the fovereign himself might not always be unwilling to punish him. or to oblige him to repair the wrong. But if it was for the benefit of his fovereign, if it was in order to make court to the person who appointed him and who might prefer him, that he had committed any act of oppression, redress would upon most occasions be as impossible as if the sovereign had committed it himself. In all barbarous governments, accordingly, in all those antient governments of Europe in particular, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, the administration of justice appears for a long time to have been extremely corrupt; far from being quite equal and impartial even under the best monarchs, and altogether profligate under the worst.

Among nations of shepherds, where the sovereign or chief is only the greatest shepherd or herdsman of the horde or clan, he is maintained in the same manner as any of his vassals or subjects, by the increase of his own herds or slocks. Among those nations of husbandmen who are but just come out of the shepherd state, and who are not much advanced beyond that state; such as the Greek tribes appear to have been about the time of the Trojan war, and our German and Scythian ancestors when they first settled upon the ruins of the western empire; the sovereign or chief is in the same manner only the greatest landlord of the country, and is maintained, in the same manner as any other landlord, by a revenue derived from his own private estate, or from what in modern Europe was called the demesse of the crown. His subjects upon ordinary occasions contribute nothing to

his

his support, except when they stand in need of the interposition of CHAP. his authority in order to protect them from the oppression of some of their fellow subjects. The presents which they make him upon fuch occasions constitute the whole ordinary revenue, the whole of the emoluments which, except perhaps upon some very extraordinary emergencies, he derives from his dominion over them. When Agamemnon, in Homer, offers to Achilles for his friendthip the fovereignty of feven Greek cities, the fole advantage which he mentions as likely to be derived from it was, that the people would honour him with presents. As long as such presents, as long as the emoluments of justice, or what may be called the fees of court, constituted in this manner the whole ordinary revenue which the fovereign derived from his fovereignty, it could not well be expected, it could not even decently be proposed that he should give them up altogether. It might, and it frequently was proposed, that he should regulate and ascertain them. after they had been so regulated and ascertained, how to hinder a person who was all-powerful from extending them beyond those regulations, was still very difficult, not to say impossible. During the continuance of this state of things, therefore, the corruption of justice, naturally resulting from the arbitrary and uncertain nature of those presents, scarce admitted of any effectual remedy.

Bur when from different causes, chiefly from the continually increasing expence of defending the nation against the invasion of other nations, the private estate of the sovereign had become altogether insufficient for defraying the expence of the sovereignty; and when it had become necessary that the people should, for their own fecurity, contribute towards this expence by taxes of different kinds, it feems to have been very commonly stipulated that no present for the administration of justice should, under any pretence, be accepted either by the fovereign, or by his bailiffs and fub-

stitutes.

BOOK stitutes, the judges. Those presents, it seems to have been supposed, could more easily be abolished altogether, than effectually regulated and ascertained. Fixed salaries were appointed to the judges, which were supposed to compensate to them the loss of whatever might have been their share of the antient emoluments of justice; as the taxes more than compensated to the sovereign the loss of his. Justice was then said to be administered gratis.

> JUSTICE, however, never was in reality administered gratis in any country. Lawyers and attornies, at least, must always be paid by the parties; and, if they were not, they would perform their duty still worse than they actually perform it. The fees annually paid to lawyers and attornies amount, in every court, to a much greater fum than the salaries of the judges. The circumstance of those falaries being paid by the crown, can no where much diminish the necessary expence of a law-fuit. But it was not so much to diminish the expence, as to prevent the corruption of justice, that the judges were prohibited from receiving any present or fee from the parties.

> THE office of judge is in itself so very honourable, that men are willing to accept of it, though accompanied with very small emoluments. The inferior office of justice of peace, though attended with a good deal of trouble, and in most cases with no emoluments at all, is an object of ambition to the greater part of our country gentlemen. The salaries of all the different judges, high and low, together with the whole expense of the administration and execution of justice, even where it is not managed with very good œconomy, makes, in any civilized country, but a very inconfiderable part of the whole expence of government.

> THE whole expence of justice too might easily be defrayed by the fees of court; and, without exposing the administration of justice

to any real hazard of corruption, the public revenue might thus CHAP. be entirely discharged from a certain, though, perhaps, but a small incumbrance. It is difficult to regulate the fees of court effectually, where a person so powerful as the sovereign is to share in them, and to derive any considerable part of his revenue from them. It is very easy, where the judge is the principal person who can reap any benefit from them. The law can very eafily oblige the judge to respect the regulation, though it might not always be able to make the fovereign respect it. Where the fees of court are precifely regulated and afcertained, where they are paid all at once, at a certain period of every process, into the hands of a cashier or receiver, to be by him distributed in certain known proportions among the different judges after the process is decided, and not till it is decided, there feems to be no more danger of corruption than where fuch fees are prohibited altogether. fees, without occasioning any considerable increase in the expence of a law-fuit, might be rendered fully fufficient for defraying the whole expence of justice. By not being paid to the judges till the process was determined, they might be some incitement to the diligence of the court in examining and deciding it. In courts which confifted of a confiderable number of judges, by proportioning the share of each judge to the number of hours and days which he had employed in examining the process, either in the court or in a committee by order of the court, those fees might give some encouragement to the diligence of each particular judge. Public fervices are never better performed than when their reward comes only in confequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them. In the different parliaments of France, the fees of court (called Epices and vacations) constitute the far greater part of the emoluments of the judges. After all deductions are made, the neat falary paid by the crown to a counfellor or judge in the parliament of Toulouse, in rank and dignity the fecond

BOOK fecond parliament of the kingdom, amounts only to a hundred and fifty livres, about fix pounds eleven shillings sterling a year. About feven years ago that fum was in the fame place the ordinary yearly wages of a common footman. The distribution of those Epices too is according to the diligence of the judges. A diligent judge gains a comfortable, though moderate revenue by his office: An idle one gets little more than his falary. Those parliaments are perhaps, in many respects, not very convenient courts of justice; but they have never been accused; they seem never even to have been fuspected of corruption.

> THE fees of court feem originally to have been the principal fupport of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to take cognizance of many fuits which were not originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. The court of king's bench, instituted for the trial of criminal causes only, took cognizance of civil fuits; the plaintiff pretending that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some trespass or misdemeanor. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying of the king's revenue, and for enforcing the payment of fuch debts only as were due to the king, took cognizance of all other contract debts; the plaintiff alledging that he could not pay the king, because the defendant would not pay him. In consequence of such fictions it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon the parties before what court they would chuse to have their cause tried; and each court endeavoured, by fuperior dispatch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. The present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps, originally in a great measure formed by this emulation which antiently took place between their respective judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual

effectual remedy, which the law would admit, for every fort of CHAP. injustice. Originally the courts of law gave damages only for breach of contract. The court of chancery, as a court of conscience, first took upon it to enforce the specific performance of agreements. When the breach of contract confifted in the nonpayment of money, the damage fustained could be compensated in no other way than by ordering payment, which was equivalent to a specific performance of the agreement. In such cases, therefore, the remedy of the courts of law was sufficient. It was not fo in others. When the tenant fued his lord for having unjustly outed him of his leafe, the damages which he recovered were by no means equivalent to the possession of the land. Such causes. therefore, for some time, went all to the court of chancery, to the no finall loss of the courts of law. It was to draw back such causes to themselves that the courts of law are said to have invented the artificial and fictitious writ of ejectment, the most effectual remedy for an unjust outer or dispossession of land.

A STAMP-DUTY upon the law proceedings of each particular court, to be levied by that court, and applied towards the maintenance of the judges and other officers belonging to it, might, in the fame manner, afford a revenue sufficient for defraying the expence of the administration of justice, without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society. The judges indeed might, in this case, be under the temptation of multiplying unnecessarily the proceedings upon every cause, in order to increase, as much as possible, the produce of such a stamp-duty. It has been the custom in modern Europe to regulate, upon most occasions, the payment of the attornies and clerks of court according to the number of pages which they had occasion to write; the court, however, requiring that each page should contain so many lines, and each line so many words. In order to increase their payment,

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BOOK the attornies and clerks have contrived to multiply words beyond all necessity, to the corruption of the law language of, I believe, every court of justice in Europe. A like temptation might perhaps occasion a like corruption in the form of law proceedings.

Bur whether the administration of justice be so contrived as to defray its own expence, or whether the judges be maintained by fixed falaries paid to them from fome other fund, it does not feem necessary that the person or persons entrusted with the executive power should be charged with the management of that fund, or with the payment of those salaries. That fund might arise from the rent of landed eftates, the management of each estate being entrused to the particular court which was to be maintained by it. That fund might arise even from the interest of a sum of money, the lending out of which might, in the fame manner, be entrusted to the court which was to be maintained by it. A part, though indeed but a small part, of the salary of the judges of the court of session in Scotland, arises from the interest of a sum of money. The necessary instability of such a fund seems, however, to render it an improper one for the maintenance of an institution which ought to last forever.

THE separation of the judicial from the executive power seems originally to have arisen from the increasing business of the society, in consequence of its increasing improvement. The administration of justice became so laborious and so complicated a duty as to require the undivided attention of the persons to whom it was entrusted. The person entrusted with the executive power not having leisure to attend to the decision of private causes himself, a deputy was appointed to decide them in his stead. In the progress of the Roman greatness, the conful was too much occupied with the political affairs of the state to attend to the administration of justice.

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A prætor, therefore, was appointed to administer it in his stead. CHAP. In the progress of the European monarchies which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, the fovereigns and the great lords came universally to consider the administration of justice as an office both too laborious and too ignoble for them to execute in their own persons. They universally, therefore, discharged themselves of it by appointing a deputy, bailiff, or judge.

WHEN the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible that justice should not frequently be facrificed to, what is vulgarly called, politics. The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may, even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to facrifice to those interests the rights of a private man. But upon the impartial administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the fense which he has of his own fecurity. In order to make every individual feel himself perfectly fecure in the possession of every right which belongs to him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible independent of that power. The judge should not be liable to be removed from his office according to the caprice of that power, The regular payment of his falary should not depend upon the goodwill, or even upon the good acconomy of that power.

PART III.

Of the Expence of publick Works and publick Institutions.

THE third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and maintaining those publick institutions and those publick works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great fociety, are, however, of fuch a nature

BOOK nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of individuals should erect or maintain. The performance of this duty requires too very different degrees of expence in the different periods of fociety.

> AFTER the publick institutions and publick works necessary for the defence of the fociety, and for the administration of justice, both of which have already been mentioned, the other works and institutions of this kind are chiefly those for facilitating the commerce of the fociety, and those for promoting the instruction of the people. The institutions for instruction are of two kinds; those for the education of the youth, and those for the instruction of people of all ages. The consideration of the manner in which the expence of those different forts of publick work and institutions may be most properly defrayed, will divide this third part of the present chapter into three different articles.

ARTICLE I.

Of the publick Works and Institutions for facilitating the Commerce of the Society.

THAT the erection and maintenance of the publick works which facilitate the commerce of any country, fuch as good roads, bridges, navigable canals, harbours, &c. must require very different degrees of expence in the different periods of fociety, is evident without any proof. The expence of making and maintaining the publick roads of any country must evidently increase with the annual produce of the land and labour of that country, or with the quantity and weight of the goods which it becomes necessary to fetch and carry upon those roads. The strength of a bridge must be suited to the number and weight of the carriages which are likely to pass over it. The depth and the supply of water for a navigable canal must be proportioned to the number and tunnage of the lighters which are likely to carry goods

goods upon it; the extent of a harbour to the number of the ship- CHAP. ping which are likely to take shelter in it.

IT does not feem necessary that the expence of those publick works should be defrayed from that publick revenue, as it is commonly called, of which the collection and application is in most countries assigned to the executive power. The greater part of such publick works may easily be so managed as to afford a particular revenue sufficient for defraying their own expence, without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society.

A HIGHWAY, a bridge, a navigable canal, for example, may in most cases be both made and maintained by a small toll upon the carriages which make use of them: a harbour, by a moderate port duty upon the tunnage of the shipping which load or unload in it. The coinage, another institution for facilitating commerce, in many countries, not only defrays its own expence, but affords a small revenue or seignorage to the sovereign. The post office, another institution for the same purpose, over and above defraying its own expence, affords in almost all countries a very considerable revenue to the sovereign.

When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge and the lighters which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to their weight or their tunnage, they pay for the maintenance of those publick works exactly in proportion to the tear and wear which they occasion of them. It seems scarce possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such works. This tax or toll too, though it is advanced by the carrier, is finally paid by the consumer, to whom it must always be charged in the price of the goods. As the expence of carriage, however, is very much reduced by means of such publick works, the goods, notwithstanding the toll, come cheaper

BOOK to the confumer than they could otherwise have done; their price not being so much raised by the toll, as it is lowered by the cheapness of the carriage. The person who finally pays this tax, therefore, gains, by the application, more than he loses by the payment of it. His payment is exactly in proportion to his gain. It is in reality no more than a part of that gain which he is obliged to give up in order to get the rest. It seems impossible to imagine a more equitable method of raising a tax.

> WHEN the toll upon carriages of luxury, upon coaches, postchaifes, &c. is made fomewhat higher in proportion to their weight, than upon carriages of necessary use, such as carts, waggons, &c. the indolence and vanity of the rich is made to contribute in a very easy manner to the relief of the poor, by rendering cheaper the transportation of heavy goods to all the different parts of the country.

> WHEN high roads, bridges, canals, &c. are in this manner made and supported by the commerce which is carried on by means of them, they can be made only where that commerce requires them, and confequently where it is proper to make them. expence too, their grandeur and magnificence must be suited to what that commerce can afford to pay. They must be made confequently as it is proper to make them. A magnificent high road cannot be made through a defart country where there is little or no commerce, or merely because it happens to lead to the country villa of the intendant of the province, or to that of some great lord to whom the intendant finds it convenient to make his court. great bridge cannot be thrown over a river at a place where nobody passes, or merely to embellish the view from the windows of a neighbouring palace: things which fometimes happen in countries where works of this kind are carried on by any other revenue than that which they themselves are capable of affording.

In feveral different parts of Europe the toll or lock-duty upon a CHAP. canal is the property of private persons, whose private interest obliges them to keep up the canal. If it is not kept in tolerable order, the navigation necessarily ceases altogether, and along with it the whole profit which they can make by the tolls. If those tolls were put under the management of commissioners, who had themfelves no interest in them, they might be less attentive to the maintenance of the works which produced them. The canal of Languedoc cost the king of France and the province upwards of thirteen millions of livres, which (at twenty-eight livres the mark of filver, the value of French money in the end of the last century) amounted to upwards of nine hundred thousand pounds sterling. When that great work was finished, the most likely method, it was found, of keeping it in constant repair was to make a present of the tolls to Riquet the engineer, who planned and conducted the work. Those tolls constitute at present a very large estate to the different branches of the family of that gentleman, who have therefore a great interest to keep the work in constant repair. But had those tolls been put under the management of commissioners who had no such interest, they might perhaps have been diffipated in ornamental and unneceffary expences, while the most essential parts of the work were allowed to go to ruin.

THE tolls for the maintenance of a high road, cannot with any fafety be made the property of private persons. A high road, though entirely neglected, does not become altogether impassable, though a canal does. The proprietors of the tolls upon a high road, therefore, might neglect altogether the repair of the road, and yet continue to levy very nearly the same tolls. It is proper, therefore, that the tolls for the maintenance of such a work should be put under the management of commissioners or trustees.

BOOK In Great Britain, the abuses which the trustees have committed in the management of those tolls, have in many cases been very justly complained of. At many turnpikes, it has been faid, the money levied is more than double of what is necessary for executing in the compleatest manner the work which is often executed in a very flovenly manner, and fometimes not executed at all. The fystem of repairing the high roads by tolls of this kind. it must be observed, is not of very long standing. We should not wonder, therefore, if it has not yet been brought to that degree of perfection of which it feems to be capable. If mean and improper persons are frequently appointed trustees; and if proper courts of inspection and account have not yet been established for controuling their conduct, and for reducing the tolls to what is barely sufficient for executing the work to be done by them; the recency of the institution both accounts and apologizes for those defects, of which, by the wisdom of parliament, the greater part may in due time be gradually remedied.

> THE money levied at the different turnpikes in Great Britain is supposed to exceed so much what is necessary for repairing the roads, that the favings, which with proper oeconomy might be made from it, have been considered, even by some ministers, as a very great refource which might at fome time or another be applied to the exigencies of the state. Government, it has been faid, by taking the management of the turnpikes into its own hands, and by employing the foldiers, who would work for a very fmall addition to their pay, could keep the roads in good order at a much less expence than it can be done by trustees who have no other workmen to employ, but fuch as derive their whole subsistence from their wages. A great revenue, half a million perhaps, it has been pretended, might in this manner be gained without laying any new burden upon the people; and the turnpike

pike roads might be made to contribute to the general expence of CHAP. the state, in the same manner as the post-office does at present.

THAT a considerable revenue might be gained in this manner, I have no doubt, though probably not near so much, as the projectors of this plan have supposed. The plan itself, however, seems liable to several very important objections.

FIRST, if the tolls which are levied at the turnpikes should ever be considered as one of the resources for supplying the exigencies of the state, they would certainly be augmented as those exigencies were supposed to require. According to the policy of Great Britain, therefore, they would probably be augmented very fast. The facility with which a great revenue could be drawn from them, would probably encourage administration to recur very frequently to this resource. Though it may perhaps be more than doubtful whether half a million could by any oeconomy be faved out of the present tolls, it can scarce be doubted but that a million might be faved out of them if they were doubled, and perhaps two millions if they were tripled. This great revenue too might be levied without the appointment of a fingle new officer to collect and receive it. But the turnpike tolls being continually augmented in this manner, instead of facilitating the inland commerce of the country, as at prefent, would foon become a very great encumbrance upon it. The expence of transporting all heavy goods from one part of the country to another would foon be fo much increased, the market for all such goods confequently would foon be fo much narrowed, that their production would be in a great measure discouraged, and the most important branches of the domestic industry of the country annihilated altogether.

SECONDLY,

BOOK V. th

SECONBLY, a tax upon carriages in proportion to their weight, though a very equal tax when applied to the fole purpose of repairing the roads, is a very unequal one, when applied to any other purpose, or to supply the common exigencies of the state. When it is applied to the fole purpose above mentioned, each carriage is supposed to pay exactly for the tear and wear which that carriage occasions of the roads. But when it is applied to any other purpose, each carriage is supposed to pay for more than that tear and wear, and contributes to the supply of some other exigency of the state. But as the turnpike toll raises the price of goods in proportion to their weight, and not to their value, it is chiefly paid by the confumers of coarse and bulky, not by those of precious and light commodities. Whatever exigency of the state therefore this tax might be intended to supply, that exigency would be chiefly supplied at the expence of the poor, not of the rich; at the expence of those who are least able to supply it. not of those who are most able.

THIRDLY, if government should at any time neglect the reparation of the high roads, it would be still more difficult than it is at present to compel the proper application of any part of the turnpike tolls. A large revenue might thus be levied upon the people, without any part of it being applied to the only purpose to which a revenue levied in this manner ought ever to be applied. If the meanness and poverty of the trustees of turnpike roads render it sometimes difficult at present to oblige them to repair their wrong; their wealth and greatness would render it ten times more so in the case which is here supposed.

In France the funds destined for the reparation of the high roads are under the immediate direction of the executive power. Those funds consist partly in the six days labour which the country people are in most parts of Europe obliged to give to the reparation

ration of the highways; and partly in fuch a portion of the ge- CHAP. neral revenue of the state as the king chuses to spare from his other expences.

By the antient law of France, as well as by that of most other parts of Europe, the fix days labour was under the direction of a local or provincial magistracy, which had no immediate dependency upon the king's council. But by the present practice both the fix days labour, and whatever other fund the king may chuse to affign for the reparation of the high roads in any particular province or generality, are entirely under the management of the intendant; an officer who is appointed and removed by the king's council, who receives his orders from it, and is in constant correspondence with it. In the progress of despotism the authority of the executive power gradually absorbs that of every other power in the state, and assumes to itself the management of every branch of revenue which is destined for any public purpose. In France, however, the great post roads, the roads which make the communication between the principal towns of the kingdom, are in general kept in good order; and in fome provinces are even a good deal superior to the greater part of the turnpike roads of England. But what we call the cross roads, that is, the far greater part of the roads in the country, are entirely neglected, and are in many places absolutely impassable for any heavy carriage. In some places it is even dangerous to travel on horseback, and mules are the only conveyance which can fafely be trusted. The proud minister of an ostentatious court may frequently take pleasure in executing a work of splendor and magnificence, such as a great highway which is frequently feen by the principal nobility, whose applauses, not only flatter his vanity, but even contribute to support his interest at court. But to execute a great number of little works, in which nothing that can be done can make any great appearance, or excite the fmallest degree of admiration in any traveller, and which

BOOK which, in short, have nothing to recommend them but their extreme utility, is a business which appears in every respect too mean and paultry to merit the attention of fo great a magistrate. Under fuch an administration, therefore, such works are almost always entirely neglected.

> In China, and in feveral other governments of Asia, the executive power charges itself both with the reparation of the high roads, and with the maintenance of the navigable canals. In the instructions which are given to the governor of each province, those objects, it is said, are constantly recommended to him, and the judgement which the court forms of his conduct is very much regulated by the attention which he appears to have paid to this part of his instructions. This branch of public police accordingly is faid to be very much attended to in all those countries, but particularly in China, where the high roads, and still more the navigable canals, it is pretended, exceed very much every thing of the fame kind which is known in Europe. The accounts of those works, however, which have been transmitted to Europe, have generally been drawn up by weak and wondering travellers, frequently by stupid and lying missionaries. If they had been examined by more intelligent eyes, and if the accounts of them had been reported by more faithful witnesses, they would not perhaps appear to be fo wonderful. The account which Bernier gives of some works of this kind in Indostan, falls very much fhort of what had been reported of them by other travellers more disposed to the marvellous than he was. It may too perhaps be in those countries as it is in France, where the great roads, the great communications which are likely to be the fubjects of conversation at the court and in the capital, are attended to, and all the rest neglected. In China, besides, in Indostan, and in several other governments of Asia, the revenue of the sovereign arises almost altogether from a land-tax or land-rent, which rises or falls

with the rife or fall of the annual produce of the land. The great CHAP. interest of the sovereign, therefore, his revenue, is in such countries necessarily and immediately connected with the cultivation of the land, with the greatness of its produce, and with the value of its produce. But in order to render that produce both as great and as valuable as possible, it is necessary to procure to it as extensive a market as possible, and consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, and the least expensive communication between all the different parts of the country, which can be done only by means of the best roads and the best navigable canals. But the revenue of the fovereign does not in any part of Europe arise chiefly from a land-tax or land-rent. In all the great kingdoms of Europe, perhaps the greater part of it may ultimately depend upon the produce of the land: But that dependency is neither so immediate, nor fo evident. In Europe, therefore, the fovereign does not feel himself so directly called upon to promote the increase, both in quantity and value, of the produce of the land, or, by maintaining good roads and canals, to provide the most extensive market for that produce. Though it should be true, therefore, what I apprehend is not a little doubtful, that in some parts of Asia this department of the public police is very properly managed by the executive power, there is not the least probability that, during the present state of things, it could be tolerably managed by that power in any part of Europe.

EVEN those public works which are of such a nature that they cannot afford any revenue for maintaining themselves, but of which the conveniency is nearly confined to fome particular place or district, are always better maintained by a local or provincial revenue under the management of a local or provincial administration, than by the general revenue of the state, of which the executive power must always have the management. Were the

ffreets

BOOK streets of London to be lighted and paved at the expence of the treasury, is there any probability that they would be so well lighted and paved as they are at present, or even at so small an expence? The expence besides, instead of being raised by a local tax upon the inhabitants of each particular street, parish, or district in London, would, in this case, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the state, and would consequently be raised by a tax upon all the inhabitants of the kingdom, of whom the greater part derive no fort of benefit from the lighting and paving of the streets of London.

> THE abuses which sometimes creep into the local and provincial administration of a local and provincial revenue, how enormous foever they may appear, are in reality, however, almost always very trifling in comparison of those which commonly take place in the administration and expenditure of the revenue of a great empire. They are, besides, much more easily corrected. Under the local or provincial administration of the justices of the peace in Great Britain, the fix days labour which the country people are obliged to give to the reparation of the highways, is not always perhaps very judiciously applied, but it is scarce ever exacted with any circumstance of cruelty or oppression. In France, under the administration of the intendants, the application is not always more judicious, and the exaction is frequently the most cruel and oppressive. Such Corvees, as they are called, make one of the principal instruments of tyranny by which the intendant chastises any parish or communauté which has had the misfortune to fall under his difpleasure.

ARTICLE II.

Of the Expence of the Institutions for the Education of the Youth.

THE institutions for the education of the youth may in the same manner furnish a revenue sufficient for defraying their own expence.

expence. The fee or honorary which the scholar pays to the master CHAP. naturally constitutes a revenue of this kind.

EVEN where the reward of the master does not arise altogether from this natural revenue, it still is not necessary that it should be derived from that general revenue of the fociety of which the collection and application is in most countries assigned to the executive power. Through the greater part of Europe accordingly the endowment of schools and colleges makes either no charge upon that general revenue, or but a very small one. It every where arises chiefly from some local or provincial revenue, from the rent of some landed estate, or from the interest of some sum of money allotted and put under the management of trustees for this particular purpose, sometimes by the sovereign himself, and sometimes by some private donor.

HAVE those public endowments contributed in general to promote the end of their institution? Have they contributed to encourage the diligence, and to improve the abilities of the teachers? Have they directed the course of education towards objects more useful, both to the individual and to the public, than those to which it would naturally have gone of its own accord? It should not feem very difficult to give at least a probable answer to each of those questions.

In every profession the exertion of the greater part of those who exercise it is always in proportion to the necessity they are under of making that exertion. This necessity is greatest with those to whom the emoluments of their profession are the only source from which they expect their fortune, or even their ordinary revenue and subfistence. In order to acquire this fortune, or even to get this subfistence, they must, in the course of the year, execute a certain quantity

BOOK quantity of work of a known value; and, where the competition is free, the rivalship of competitors, who are all endeavouring to justle one another out of employment, obliges every man to endeavour to execute his work with a certain degree of exactness. greatness of the objects which are to be acquired by success in some particular professions may, no doubt, sometimes animate the exertion of a few men of extraordinary spirit and ambition. Great objects, however, are evidently not necessary in order to occasion the greatest exertions. Rivalship and emulation render excellency. even in mean professions, an object of ambition, and frequently occasion the very greatest exertions. Great objects, on the contrary, alone and unsupported by the necessity of application, have feldom been fufficient to occasion any considerable exertion. In England, fuccess in the profession of the law leads to some very great objects of ambition; and yet how few men, born to eafy fortunes, have ever in this country been eminent in that profession!

> THE endowments of schools and colleges have necessarily diminished more or less the necessity of application in the teachers. Their sublistence, so far as it arises from their salaries, is evidently derived from a fund altogether independent of their fuccess and reputation in their particular professions.

> In some universities the falary makes but a part, and frequently but a small part of the emoluments of the teacher, of which the greater part arises from the honoraries or fees of his pupils. necessity of application, though always more or less diminished, is not in this case entirely taken away. Reputation in his profession is still of some importance to him, and he still has some dependency upon the affection, gratitude, and favourable report of those who have attended upon his instructions, and these favourable fenti-

ments

ments he is likely to gain in no way so well as by deserving them, that is, by the abilities and diligence with which he discharges every part of his duty.

CHAP.

In other universities the teacher is prohibited from receiving any honorary or fee from his pupils, and his salary constitutes the whole of the revenue which he derives from his office. His interest is, in this case, set as directly in opposition to his duty as it is possible to set it. It is the interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can; and if his emoluments are to be precisely the same whether he does, or does not perform some very laborious duty, it is certainly his interest, at least as interest is vulgarly understood, either to neglect it altogether, or, if he is subject to some authority which will not suffer him to do this, to perform it in as careless and slovenly a manner as that authority will permit. If he is naturally active and a lover of labour, it is his interest to employ that activity in any way, from which he can derive some advantage, rather than in the performance of his duty, from which he can derive none.

If the authority to which he is subject resides in the body corporate, the college, or university, of which he himself is a member, and in which the greater part of the other members are, like himself, persons who either are or ought to be teachers, they are likely to make a common cause, to be all very indulgent to one another, and every man to consent that his neighbour may neglect his duty, provided he himself is allowed to neglect his own. In the university of Oxford, the greater part of the public professors have, for these many years, given up altogether even the pretence of teaching,

If the authority to which he is subject resides, not so much in the body corporate of which he is a member, as in some other extra-

BOOK neous persons, in the bishop of the diocese, for example; in the governor of the province; or, perhaps, in some minister of state, it is not indeed in this case very likely that he will be suffered to neglect his duty altogether. All that fuch fuperiors, however, can force him to do is to attend upon his pupils a certain number of hours, that is, to give a certain number of lectures in the week or in the year. What those lectures shall be, must still depend upon the diligence of the teacher; and that diligence is likely to be proportioned to the motives which he has for exerting it. An extraneous jurisdiction of this kind, besides, is liable to be exercised both ignorantly and capriciously. In its nature it is arbitrary and diferetionary, and the perfons who exercise it, neither attending upon the lectures of the teacher themselves, nor perhaps understanding the sciences which it is his business to teach, are seldom capable of exercifing it with judgement. From the insolence of office too they are frequently indifferent how they exercise it, and are very apt to censure or deprive him of his office wantonly, and without any just cause. The person subject to such jurisdiction is necessarily degraded by it, and, instead of being one of the most respectable, is rendered one of the meanest and most contemptible persons in the society. It is by powerful protection only that he can effectually guard himfelf against the bad usage to which he is at all times exposed; and this protection he is most likely to gain, not by ability or diligence in his profession, but by obsequiousness to the will of his superiors, and by being ready, at all times, to facrifice to that will the rights, the interest, and the honour of the body corporate of which he is a member. Whoever has attended for any considerable time to the administration of a French university, must have had occasion to remark the effects which naturally refult from an arbitrary and extraneous jurisdiction of this kind.

> WHATEVER forces a certain number of students to any college or university, independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers, tends

tends more or less to diminish the necessity of that merit or CHAP. reputation.

THE privileges of graduates in arts, in law, in physic, and divinity, when they can be obtained only by residing a certain number of years in certain universities, necessarily force a certain number of students to such universities independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers. The privileges of graduates are a fort of statutes of apprenticeship, which have contributed to the improvement of education, just as other statutes of apprenticeship have to that of arts and manufactures.

THE charitable foundations of scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, &c. necessarily attach a certain number of students to certain colleges, independent altogether of the merit of those particular colleges. Were the students upon such charitable foundations left free to chuse what college they liked best, such liberty might perhaps contribute to excite some emulation among different colleges. A regulation, on the contrary, which prohibited even the independent members of every particular college from leaving it, and going to any other, without leave first asked and obtained of that which they meant to abandon, would tend very much to extinguish that emulation.

IF in each college the tutor or teacher who was to instruct each student in all arts and sciences, should not be voluntarily chosen by the student, but appointed by the head of the college; and if in case of neglect, inability, or bad usage, the student should not be allowed to change him for another without leave first asked and obtained; such a regulation would not only tend very much to extinguish all emulation among the different tutors of the



BOOK fame college, but to diminish very much in all of them the necessity of diligence and of attention to their respective pupils. Such teachers, though very well paid by their students, might be as much disposed to neglect them as those who are not paid by them at all, or who have no other recompence but their falary.

> Ir the teacher happens to be a man of fense, it must be an unpleasant thing to him to be conscious, while he is lecturing his students, that he is either speaking or reading nonsense, or what is very little better than nonsense. It must too be unpleasant to him to observe that the greater part of his students desert his lectures: or perhaps attend upon them with plain enough marks of neglect, contempt and derision. If he is obliged, therefore, to give a certain number of lectures, these motives alone, without any other interest, might dispose him to take some pains to give tolerably good ones. Several different expedients, however, may be fallen upon which will effectually blunt the edge of all those incitements to diligence. The teacher, instead of explaining to his pupils himself, the science in which he proposes to instruct them, may read fome book upon it; and if this book is written in a foreign and dead language, by interpreting it to them into their own; or, what would give him still less trouble, by making them interpret it to him, and by now and then making an occasional remark upon it, he may flatter himself that he is giving a lecture. The slightest degree of knowledge and application will enable him to do this without exposing himself to contempt or derision, or saying any thing that is really foolish, absurd, or ridiculous. The discipline of the college at the fame time may enable him to force all his pupils to the most regular attendance upon this sham-lecture, and to maintain the most decent and respectful behaviour during the whole time of the performance.

THE discipline of colleges and universities is in general contrived CHAP. not for the benefit of the students, but for the interest, or more properly speaking, for the ease of the masters. Its object is in all cases to maintain the authority of the master, and whether he neglects or performs his duty, to oblige the students in all cases to behave to him as if he performed it with the greatest diligence and ability. It feems to prefume perfect wisdom and virtue in the one order, and the greatest weakness and folly in the other. Where the masters, however, really perform their duty, there are no examples, I believe, that the greater part of the students ever neglect theirs. No discipline is ever requisite to force attendance upon lectures which are really worth the attending, as is well known where-ever any fuch lectures are given. Force and restraint may no doubt be in some degree requisite in order to oblige children or very young boys to attend to those parts of education which it is thought necessary for them to acquire during that early period of life; but after twelve or thirteen years of age, provided the master does his duty, force or restraint can scarce ever be necessary to carry on any part of education. Such is the generofity of the greater part of young men, that, so far from being disposed to neglect or despise the instructions of their master, provided he shows some serious intention of being of use to them, they are generally inclined to pardon a great deal of incorrectness in the performance of his duty, and fometimes even to conceal from the publick a good deal of gross negligence.

THOSE parts of education, it is to be observed, for the teaching of which there are no publick institutions, are generally the best taught. When a young man goes to a fencing or a dancing school, he does not indeed always learn to fence or to dance very well; but he feldom fails of learning to fence or to dance. The good effects of the riding school are not commonly so evident. The expence of a riding

BOOK riding school is so great, that in most places it is a publick institution. The three most essential parts of literary education, to read, write, and account, it still continues to be more common to acquire in private than in publick schools; and it very seldom happens that any body fails of acquiring them to the degree in which it is necesfary to acquire them.

> In England the publick schools are much less corrupted than the universities. In the schools the youth are taught, or at least may be taught, Greek and Latin, that is, every thing which the masters pretend to teach, or which, it is expected, they should teach. In the universities the youth neither are taught, nor always can find any proper means of being taught, the sciences which it is the business of those incorporated bodies to teach. The reward of the schoolmaster in most cases depends principally, in some cases almost entirely, upon the fees or honoraries of his scholars. Schools have no exclusive privileges. In order to obtain the honours of graduation, it is not necessary that a person should bring a certificate of his having studied a certain number of years at a publick school. If upon examination he appears to understand what is taught there, no questions are asked about the place where he learnt it.

> THE parts of education which are commonly taught in universities, it may perhaps be faid, are not very well taught. But had it not been for those institutions they would not have been commonly taught at all, and both the individual and the public would have suffered a good deal from the want of those important parts of education.

> THE present universities of Europe were originally, the greater part of them, ecclesiastical corporations; instituted for the education of churchmen. They were founded by the authority of the

pope,

pope, and were fo entirely under his immediate protection, that CHAP. their members, whether masters or students, had all of them what was then called the benefit of clergy, that is, were exempted from the civil jurisdiction of the countries in which their respective universities were situated, and were amenable only to the ecclefiastical tribunals. What was taught in the greater part of those universities was, suitable to the end of their institution, either theology, or fomething that was merely preparatory to theology.

When christianity was first established by law, a corrupted latin had become the common language of all the western parts of Europe. The fervice of the church accordingly, and the translation of the Bible, which was read in churches, were both in that corrupted latin, that is, in the common language of the country. After the irruption of the barbarous nations who overturned the Roman empire, latin gradually ceased to be the language of any part of Europe. But the reverence of the people naturally preferves the established forms and ceremonies of religion, long after the circumstances which first introduced and rendered them reafonable are no more. Though latin, therefore, was no longer understood any where by the great body of the people, the whole fervice of the church still continued to be performed in that language. Two different languages were thus established in Europe. in the same manner as in antient Egypt; a language of the priests, and a language of the people; a facred and a profane; a learned and an unlearned language. But it was necessary that the priess should understand something of that sacred and learned language in which they were to officiate; and the study of the latin language therefore made from the beginning an effential part of university education.

IT was not so with that either of the Greek or of the Hebrew language. The infallible decrees of the church had pronounced

BOOK the latin translation of the Bible, commonly called the Latin Vulgate, to have been equally dictated by divine inspiration, and therefore of equal authority with the Greek and Hebrew originals. The knowledge of those two languages, therefore, not being indispensibly requisite to a churchman, the study of them did not for a long time make a necessary part of the common course of university education. There are some Spanish universities, I am assured, in which the study of the Greek language has never yet made any part of that course. The first reformers found the Greek text of the new testament and even the Hebrew text of the old more favourable to their opinions than the vulgate translation. which, as might naturally be supposed, had been gradually accommodated to support the doctrines of the catholic church. They fet themselves therefore to expose the many errors of that translation, which the Roman catholic clergy were thus put under the necessity of defending or explaining. But this could not well be done without some knowledge of the original languages, of which the study was therefore gradually introduced into the greater part of universities; both of those which embraced and of those which rejected the doctrines of the reformation. The Greek language was connected with every part of that classical learning, which, though at first principally cultivated by catholics and Italians, happened to come into fashion much about the same time that the doctrines of the reformation were fet on foot. In the greater part of universities therefore that language was taught previous to the study of philosophy, and as soon as the student had made fome progress in the latin. The Hebrew language having no connection with classical learning, and, except the holy scriptures, being the language of not a fingle book in any efteem, the study of it did not commonly commence till after that of philofophy, and when the student had entered upon the study of theology.

ORIGINALLY

ORIGINALLY the first rudiments both of the Greek and Latin CHAP. languages were taught in universities, and they still continue to be so in some universities. In others it is expected that the student should have previously acquired at least the rudiments of one or both of those languages, of which the study continues to make every where a very confiderable part of university education.

THE antient Greek philosophy was divided into three great branches; physics, or natural philosophy; ethics, or moral philofophy; and logic. This general division seems perfectly agreeable to the nature of things.

THE great phenomena of nature, the revolution of the heavenly bodies, eclipses, comets, thunder, lightning, and other extraordinary meteors, the generation, the life, growth, and diffolution of plants and animals, are objects which, as they naturally excite the wonder, so they necessarily call forth the curiosity of mankind to enquire into their causes. Superstition first attempted to fatisfy this curiofity by referring all those wonderful appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. Philosophy afterwards endeavoured to account for them, from more familiar causes, or from fuch as mankind were better acquainted with, than the agency of the gods. As those great phenomena are the first objects of human curiofity, fo the science which pretends to explain them must naturally have been the first branch of philofophy that was cultivated. The first philosophers accordingly of whom history has preserved any account, appear to have been natural philosophers.

In every age and country of the world men must have attended to the characters, defigns, and actions of one another, and many reputable rules and maxims for the conduct of human life, must have been laid down and approved of by common confent. As foon

BOOK foon as writing came into fashion, wise men, or those who fancied themselves such, would naturally endeavour to increase the number of those established and respected maxims, and to express their own sense of what was either proper or improper conduct, sometimes in the more artificial form of apologues, like what are called the fables of Æsop; and sometimes in the more simple one of apophthegms, or wife fayings, like the Proverbs of Solomon, the verses of Theognis and Phocyllides, and some part of the works of Hesiod. They might continue in this manner for a long time merely to multiply the number of those maxims of prudence and morality, without even attempting to arrange them in any very distinct or methodical order, much less to connect them together by one or more general principles, from which they were all deducible like effects from their natural The beauty of a fystematical arrangement of different observations connected by a few common principles, was first seen in the rude essays of those antient times towards a system of natural philosophy. Something of the same kind was afterwards attempted The maxims of common life were arranged in some in morals. methodical order, and connected together by a few common principles, in the same manner as they had attempted to arrange and connect the phenomena of nature. The science which pretends to investigate and explain those connecting principles, is what is properly called moral philosophy.

> DIFFERENT authors gave different fystems both of natural and moral philosophy. But the arguments by which they supported those different systems, far from being always demonstrations, were frequently at best but very slender probabilities, and sometimes mere fophisms, which had no other foundation but the inaccuracy and ambiguity of common language. Speculative systems have in all ages of the world been adopted for reasons too frivolous to have determined the judgement of any man of common fense, in

> > a matter

a matter of the smallest pecuniary interest. Gross sophistry has CHAP. fcarce ever had any influence upon the opinions of mankind, except in matters of philosophy and speculation; and in these it has frequently had the greatest. The patrons of each system of natural and moral philosophy naturally endeavoured to expose the weakness of the arguments adduced to support the systems which were opposite to their own. In examining those arguments, they were necessarily led to consider the difference between a probable and a demonstrative argument, between a fallacious and a conclusive one; and Logic, or the science of the general principles of good and bad reasoning, necessarily arose out of the observations which a scrutiny of this kind gave occasion to. Though in its origin posterior both to physics and to ethics, it was commonly taught, not indeed in all, but in the greater part of the antient schools of philosophy, previously to either of those sciences. student, it seems to have been thought, ought to understand well the difference between good and bad reasoning, before he was led to reason upon subjects of so great importance.

This antient division of philosophy into three parts was in the greater part of the universities of Europe, changed for another into five.

In the antient philosophy, whatever was taught concerning the nature either of the human mind or of the Deity, made a part of the system of physics. Those beings, in whatever their essence might be supposed to consist, were parts of the great system of the universe, and parts too productive of the most important essence. Whatever human reason could either conclude or conjecture concerning them made, as it were, two chapters, though no doubt two very important ones, of the science which pretended to give an account of the origin and revolutions of the great system

BOOK of the universe. But in the universities of Europe, where philofophy was taught only as fubservient to theology, it was natural to dwell longer upon those two chapters than upon any other of the science. Those two chapters were gradually more and more extended, and were divided into many inferior chapters, till at last the doctrine of spirits, of which so little can be known, came to take up as much room in the system of philosophy as the doctrine of bodies, of which fo much can be known. The doctrines concerning those two subjects were considered as making two distinct sciences. What was called Metaphyfics or Pneumatics was fet in opposition to Physics, and was cultivated not only as the more sublime, but, for the purposes of a particular profession, as the more useful science of the two. The proper subject of experiment and observation, a subject in which a careful attention is capable of making fo many useful discoveries, was almost entirely neglected. The subject in which, after a few very simple and almost obvious truths, the most careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and uncertainty, and can confequently produce nothing but fubtleties and fophisms, was greatly cultivated.

> WHEN those two sciences had thus been set in opposition to one another, the comparison between them naturally gave birth to a third, to what was called Ontology, or the science which treated of the qualities and attributes which were common to both the subjects of the other two sciences. But if subtleties and sophisms composed the greater part of the Metaphysics or Pneumatics of the schools, they composed the whole of this cobweb science of Ontology, which was likewise sometimes called Metaphysics.

> WHEREIN consisted the happiness and perfection of a man, confidered not only as an individual, but as the member of a family, of a state, and of the great society of mankind, was the object

object which the antient moral philosophy proposed to investigate. CHAP. In that philosophy the duties of human life were treated of as subfervient to the happiness and perfection of human life. But when moral, as well as natural philosophy, came to be taught only as subservient to theology, the duties of human life were treated of as chiefly subservient to the happiness of a life to come. In the antient philosophy the perfection of virtue was represented as necesfarily productive, to the person who possessed it, of the most perfect happiness in this life. In the modern philosophy it was frequently represented as generally, or rather as almost always inconfistent with any degree of happiness in this life; and heaven was to be earned only by penance and mortification, by the austerities and abasement of a monk; not by the liberal, generous, and spirited conduct of a man. Casuistry and an ascetic morality made up in most cases the greater part of the moral philosophy of the schools. By far the most important of all the different branches of philosophy, became in this manner by far the most corrupted.

Such, therefore, was the common course of philosophical education in the greater part of the universities of Europe. Logic was taught first: Ontology came in the second place: Pneumatology, comprehending the doctrine concerning the nature of the human foul and of the Deity, in the third: In the fourth followed a debased system of Moral philosophy, which was considered as immediately connected with the doctrines of Pneumatology, with the immortality of the human foul, and with the rewards and punishments which, from the justice of the Deity, were to be expected in a life to come: A short and superficial system of Phyfics usually concluded the course.

THE alterations which the universities of Europe thus introduced into the antient course of philosophy, were all meant for the education

BOOK education of ecclefiastics, and to render it a more proper introducion to the study of theology. But the additional quantity of subtlety and fophistry; the casuistry and the ascetic morality which those alterations introduced into it, certainly did not render it more proper for the education of gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely either to improve the understanding, or to mend the heart.

> This course of philosophy is what still continues to be taught in the greater part of the universities of Europe; with more or less diligence, according as the constitution of each particular university happens to render diligence more or less necessary to the teachers. In fome of the richest and best endowed universities the tutors content themselves with teaching a few unconnected shreds and parcels of this corrupted course; and even these they commonly teach very negligently and superficially.

> THE improvements which, in modern times, have been made in feveral different branches of philosophy, have not, the greater part of them, been made in universities; though some no doubt have. The greater part of universities have not even been very forward to adopt those improvements after they were made; and several of those learned societies have chosen to remain for a long time the fanctuaries in which exploded fystems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection, after they had been hunted out of every other corner of the world. In general, the richest and best endowed universities have been the slowest in adopting those improvements, and the most averse to permit any considerable change in the established plan of education. Those improvements were more easily introduced into some of the poorer universities, in which the teachers, depending upon their reputation for the greater part of their fubfistence, were obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions of the world.

But though the publick schools and universities of Europe were originally intended only for the education of a particular profession, that of churchmen; and though they were not always very diligent in instructing their pupils even in the sciences which were supposed necessary for that profession, yet they gradually drew to themselves the education of almost all other people, particularly of almost all gentlemen and men of fortune. No better method, it seems, could be fallen upon of spending, with any advantage, the long interval between infancy and that period of life at which men begin to apply in good earnest to the real business of the world, the business which is to employ them during the remainder of their days. The greater part of what is taught in schools and universities, however, does not seem to be the most proper preparation for that business.

In England, it becomes every day more and more the custom to fend young people to travel in foreign countries immediately upon their leaving school, and without fending them to any university. Our young people, it is faid, generally return home much improved by their travels. A young man who goes abroad at feventeen or eighteen, and returns home at one and twenty, returns three or four years older than he was when he went abroad; and at that age it is very difficult not to improve a good deal in three or four years. In the course of his travels he generally acquires some knowledge of one or two foreign languages; a knowledge, however, which is feldom fufficient to enable him either to speak or write them with propriety. In other respects he commonly returns home more conceited, more unprincipled, more diffipated, and more incapable of any ferious application either to study or to business, than he could well have become in fo short a time had he lived at home. ling fo very young, by spending in the most frivolous dissipation the most precious years of his life, at a distance from the inspec-

tion

BOOK tion and controul of his parents and relations, every useful habit which the earlier parts of his education might have had some tendency to form in him, instead of being rivetted and confirmed, is almost necessarily either weakened or effaced. Nothing but the discredit into which the universities are allowing themselves to fall, could ever have brought into repute so very absurd a practice as that of travelling at this early period of life. By sending his son abroad, a father delivers himself, at least for some time, from so disagreeable an object as that of a son unemployed, neglected, and going to ruin before his eyes.

SUCH have been the effects of some of the modern institutions for education.

DIFFERENT plans and different institutions for education seem to have taken place in other ages and nations.

In the republics of antient Greece, every free citizen was instructed, under the direction of the public magistrate, in gymnastic exercises and in music. By gymnastic exercises it was intended to harden his body, to sharpen his courage, and to prepare him for the fatigues and dangers of war; and as the Greek militia was, by all accounts, one of the best that ever was in the world, this part of their public education must have answered completely the purpose for which it was intended. By the other part, music, it was proposed, at least by the philosophers and historians who have given us an account of those institutions, to humanize the mind, to soften the temper, and to dispose it for performing all the social and moral duties both of public and private life.

In antient Rome the exercises of the Campus Martius answered the same purpose as those of the Gymnazium in antient Greece, and

and they feem to have answered it equally well. But among the CHAP. Romans there was nothing which corresponded to the musical education of the Greeks. The morals of the Romans, however, both in private and public life, feem to have been not only equal, but, upon the whole, a good deal superior to those of the Greeks. That they were superior in private life we have the express testimony of Polybius and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus; two authors well acquainted with both nations; and the whole tenor of the Greek and Roman history bears witness to the superiority of the public morals of the Romans. The good temper and moderation of contending factions feems to be the most essential circumstance in the public morals of a free people. But the factions of the Greeks were almost always violent and sanguinary; whereas, till the time of the Gracchi, no blood had ever been shed in any Roman faction; and from the time of the Gracchi the Roman republic may be confidered as in reality dissolved. Notwithstanding, therefore, the very respectable authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius, and notwithstanding the very ingenious reasons by which Mr. Montesquieu endeavours to support that authority, it feems probable that the mufical education of the Greeks had no great effect in mending their morals, fince, without any fuch education, those of the Romans were upon the whole superior. The respect of those antient fages for the institutions of their ancestors had probably disposed them to find much political wisdom in what was, perhaps, merely an antient custom, continued without interruption from the earliest period of those societies to the times in which they had arrived at a confiderable degree of refinement. Music and dancing are the great amusements of almost all barbarous nations, and the great accomplishments which are supposed to fit any man for entertaining his fociety. It is fo at this day among the negroes on the coast of Africa. It was so among the antient Celtes, among the antient Scandinavians, and, as we may learn from Homer, among

BOOK the antient Greeks in the times preceding the Trojan war. When the Greek tribes had formed themselves into little republics, it was natural that the study of those accomplishments should for a long time make a part of the public and common education of the people.

THE masters who instructed the young people either in music or inmilitary exercises, do not seem to have been paid, or even appointed by the state, either in Rome, or even in Athens, the Greek republic of whose laws and customs we are the best informed. The state required that every free citizen should fit himself for defending it in war, and should, upon that account, learn his military exercises. But it left him to learn them of such masters as he could find, and it seems to have advanced nothing for this purpose but a public field or place of exercise, in which he should practise and perform them.

In the early ages both of the Greek and Roman republics, the other parts of education feem to have confifted in learning to read, write, and account, according to the arithmetic of the times. These accomplishments the richer citizens seem frequently to have acquired at home by the assistance of some domestic pedagogue, who was generally either a slave or a freed-man; and the poorer citizens in the schools of such masters as made a trade of teaching for hire. Such parts of education, however, were abandoned altogether to the care of the parents or guardians of each individual. It does not appear that the state ever assumed any inspection or direction of them. By a law of Solon, indeed, the children were acquitted from maintaining in their old age those parents who had neglected to instruct them in some profitable trade or business.

In the progress of refinement, when philosophy and rhetoric came into fashion, the better fort of people used to send their children

dren to the schools of philosophers and rhetoricians, in order to be CHAP. instructed in those fashionable sciences. But those schools were not fupported by the public. They were for a long time barely tolerated by it. The demand for philosophy and rhetoric was for a long time fo small, that the first professed teachers of either could not find constant employment in any one city, but were obliged to travel about from place to place. In this manner lived Zeno of Elea, Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and many others. the demand increased, the schools both of philosophy and rhetoric became stationary; first in Athens, and afterwards in several other The state however seems never to have encouraged them further than by affigning to some of them a particular place to teach in, which was fometimes done too by private donors. The state seems to have assigned the Academy to Plato, the Lyceum to Aristotle, and the Portico to Zeno of Citta the founder of the But Epicurus bequeathed his gardens to his own school. Till about the time of Marcus Antoninus however, no teacher appears to have had any falary from the public, or to have had any other emoluments, but what arose from the honoraries or fees of his scholars. The bounty which that philosophical emperor, as we learn from Lucian, bestowed upon the teachers of philosophy, probably lasted no longer than his own life. There was nothing equivalent to the privileges of graduation, and to have attended any of those schools was not necessary, in order to be permitted to practise any particular trade or profession. If the opinion of their own utility could not draw scholars to them, the law neither forced any body to go to them, nor rewarded any body for having gone to them. The teachers had no jurisdiction over their pupils, nor any other authority besides that natural authority which superior virtue and abilities never fail to procure from young people towards those who are entrusted with any part of their education.

BOOK V.

AT Rome, the study of the civil law made a part of the education, not of the greater part of the citizens, but of some particular families. The young people however, who wished to acquire knowledge in the law, had no public school to go to, and had no other method of studying it than by frequenting the company of fuch of their relations and friends, as were supposed to understand it. It is perhaps worth while to remark, that though the laws of the twelve tables were many of them copied from those of some antient Greek republics, yet law never feems to have grown up to be a science in any republic of antient Greece. In Rome it became a science very early, and gave a considerable degree of illustration to those citizens who had the reputation of understanding it. In the republics of antient Greece, particularly in Athens, the ordinary courts of justice consisted of numerous and therefore disorderly bodies of people, who frequently decided almost at random, or as clamour, faction, and party spirit happened to determine. The ignominy of an unjust decision, when it was to be divided among five hundred, a thousand, or fifteen hundred people, (for some of their courts were so very numerous) could not fall very heavy upon any individual. At Rome, on the contrary, the principal courts of justice confisted either of a fingle judge, or of a fmall number of judges, whose characters, especially as they deliberated always in public, could not fail to be very much affected by any rash or unjust decision. In doubtful cases, such courts, from their anxiety to avoid blame, would naturally endeavour to shelter themselves under the example or precedent of the judges who had fat before them either in the fame or in some other court. This attention to practice and precedent necessarily formed the Roman law into that regular and orderly fystem in which it has been delivered down to us; and the like attention has had the like effects upon the laws of every other country where such attention has taken place. The supeziority of character in the Romans over that of the Greeks, fo much

much remarked by Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was probably more owing to the better constitution of their courts of justice, than to any of the circumstances to which those authors ascribe it. The Romans are said to have been particularly distinguished for their superior respect to an oath. But the people who were accustomed to make oath only before some diligent and well informed court of justice, would naturally be much more attentive to what they swore, than they who were accustomed to do the same thing before mobbish and disorderly assemblies.

THE abilities both civil and military of the Greeks and Romans will readily be allowed to have been at least equal to those of any Our prejudice is perhaps rather to over-rate modern nation. them. But except in what related to military exercises, the state feems to have been at no pains to form those great abilities: for I cannot be induced to believe that the musical education of the Greeks could be of much consequence in forming them. Masters, however, had been found, it feems, for instructing the better fort of people among those nations in every art and science in which the circumstances of their society rendered it necessary or convenient for them to be instructed. The demand for such instruction produced, what it always produces, the talent for giving it; and the emulation which an unrestrained competition never fails to excite, appears to have brought that talent to a very high degree of perfection. In the attention which the antient philosophers excited, in the empire which they acquired over the opinions and principles of their auditors, in the faculty which they possessed of giving a certain tone and character to the conduct and conversation of those auditors; they appear to have been much superior to any modern teachers. In modern times, the diligence of public teachers is more or less corrupted by the circumstances, which render them more or less independent of their success and reputation in their particular professions. Their falaries too put the private teacher, who would pretend to come into competition with them.

BOOK them, in the same state with a merchant who attempts to trade without a bounty, in competition with those who trade with a confiderable one. If he fells his goods at nearly the fame price, he cannot have the same profit, and poverty and beggary at least, if not bankruptcy and ruin, will infallibly be his lot. If he attempts to fell them much dearer, he is likely to have so few customers that his circumstances will not be much mended. The privileges of graduation, besides, are in many countries necessary, or at least extremely convenient to most men of learned professions, that is, to the far greater part of those who have occasion for a learned education. But those privileges can be obtained only by attending the lectures of the public teachers. The most careful attendance upon the ablest instructions of any private teacher, cannot always give any title to demand them. It is from these different causes that the private teacher of any of the sciences which are commonly taught in universities, is in modern times generally confidered as in the very lowest order of men of letters. A man of real abilities can scarce find out a more humiliating or a more unprofitable employment to turn them to. The endowments of schools and colleges have in this manner not only corrupted the diligence of public teachers, but have rendered it almost impossible to have any good private ones.

> WERE there no public inftitutions for education, no system, no science would be taught for which there was not some demand; or which the circumstances of the times did not render it, either necessary, or convenient, or at least fashionable to learn. A private teacher could never find his account in teaching either an exploded and antiquated fystem of a science acknowleged to be useful, or a science universally believed to be a mere useless and pedantic heap of sophistry and nonsense. fystems, such sciences, can subsist no where but in those incorporated focieties for education whose prosperity and revenue are in a great measure independent of their reputation, and alto--gether

gether independent of their industry. Were there no public insti- CHAP. tutions for education, a gentleman, after going through with application and abilities the most complete course of education, which the circumstances of the times were supposed to afford, could not come into the world completely ignorant of every thing which is the common subject of conversation among gentlemen and men of the world.

THERE are no public institutions for the education of women. and there is accordingly nothing useless, absurd, or fantastical in the common course of their education. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it necessary or useful for them to learn; and they are taught nothing else. Every part of their education tends evidently to fome useful purpose; either to improve the natural attractions of their person, or to form their mind to referve, to modesty, to chastity, and to oeconomy: to render them both likely to become the mistresses of a family, and to behave properly when they have become fuch. In every part of her life a woman feels fome conveniency or advantage from every It feldom happens that a man in any part of her education. part of his life derives any conveniency or advantage from some of the most laborious and troublesome parts of his education.

OUGHT the public, therefore, to give no attention, it may be asked, to the education of the people? Or if it ought to give any. what are the different parts of education which it ought to attend to in the different orders of the people? and in what manner ought it to attend to them?

In some cases the state of the society necessarily places the greater part of individuals in such situations as naturally form in them, without any attention of government, almost all the abilities and virtues which that state requires, or perhaps can admit

BOOK of. In other cases the state of the society does not place the greater part of individuals in fuch fituations, and fome attention of government is necessary in order to prevent the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the great body of the people.

> In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a very few fimple operations; frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the fame, or very nearly the fame, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender fentiment, and confequently of forming any just judgement concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests of his country, he is altogether incapable of judging; and unless very particular pains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war. The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes him regard with abhorrence the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life of a foldier. It corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigour and perseverance in any other employment than that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade feems in this manner to be acquired at the expence of his intellectual, focial,

focial, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilized CHAP. fociety this is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to prevent it.

IT is otherwise in the barbarous societies, as they are commonly called, of hunters, of shepherds, and even of husbandmen in that rude state of husbandry which precedes the improvement of manufactures, and the extension of foreign commerce. In such focieties the varied occupations of every man oblige every man to exert his capacity, and to invent expedients for removing difficulties which are continually occurring. Invention is kept alive, and the minds of men are not suffered to fall into that drowsy stupidity which in a civilized fociety fecms to benumb the understanding of almost all the inferior ranks of people. In those barbarous focieties, as they are called, every man, it has already been observed, is a warrior. Every man too is in some measure a statesman, and can form a tolerable judgement concerning the interest of the society, and the conduct of those who govern it. How far their chiefs are good judges in peace, or good leaders in war, is obvious to the observation of almost every single man among them. In such a society indeed, no man can well acquire that improved and refined understanding which a few men sometimes possess in a more civilized state. Though in a rude society there is a good deal of variety in the occupations of every individual. there is not a great deal in those of the whole society. Every man does, or is capable of doing, almost every thing which any other man does or is capable of doing. Every man has a confiderable degree of knowledge, ingenuity and invention; but scarce any man has a great degree. The degree, however, which is commonly possessed, is generally sufficient for conducting the whole simple business of the society. In a civilized state, on the contrary, though there is little variety in the occupations of the greater

BOOK greater part of individuals, there is an almost infinite variety in those of the whole society. These varied occupations present an almost infinite variety of objects to the contemplation of those few who, being attached to no particular occupation themselves, have leisure and inclination to examine the occupations of other people. The contemplation of so great a variety of objects necessarily exercifes their minds in endless comparisons and combinations, and renders their understandings in an extraordinary degree both acute and comprehensive. Unless those few, however, happen to be placed in some very particular situations, their great abilities, though honourable to themselves, may contribute very little to the good government or happiness of their society. Notwithstanding the great abilities of those few, all the nobler parts of the human character may be in a great measure obliterated and extinguished in the great body of the people.

> THE education of the common people requires, perhaps, in a civilized and commercial fociety, the attention of the public more than that of people of some rank and fortune. People of some rank and fortune are generally eighteen or nineteen years of age before they enter upon that particular business, profession, or trade, by which they propose to distinguish themselves in the world. They have before that full time to acquire, or at least to fit themselves for afterwards acquiring, every accomplishment which can recommend them to the public esteem, or render them worthy of it. Their parents or guardians are generally fufficiently anxious that they should be fo accomplished, and are in most cases willing enough to lay out the expence which is necessary for that purpose. If they are not always properly educated, it is feldom from the want of expence laid out upon their education; but from the improper application of that expence. It is feldom from the want of masters; but from the negligence and incapacity of the mafters who are to be had, and from

from the difficulty, or rather from the impossibility which there is CHAP. in the present state of things of finding any better. The employments too in which people of fome rank or fortune spend the greater part of their lives are not, like those of the common people. fimple and uniform. They are almost all of them extremely complicated, and fuch as exercise the head more than the hands. understandings of those who are engaged in such employments can feldom grow torpid from want of exercise. The employments of people of some rank and fortune, besides, are seldom such as harrafs them from morning to night. They generally have a good deal of leifure, during which they may perfect themselves in every branch either of useful or ornamental knowledge of which they may have laid the foundation, or for which they may have acquired fome taste in the earlier part of life.

IT is otherwise with the common people. They have little time to spare for education. Their parents can scarce afford to maintain them even in infancy. As foon as they are able to work, they must apply to some trade by which they can earn their subsistence. That trade too is generally fo simple and uniform as to give little exercise to the understanding, while at the same time their labour is both so constant and so severe, that it leaves them little leisure and less inclination to apply to, or even to think of any thing else.

Bur though the common people cannot in any civilized fociety be so well instructed as people of some rank and fortune, the most effential parts of education, however, to read, write, and account, can be acquired at so early a period of life, that the greater part even of those who are to be bred to the lowest occupations, have time to acquire them before they can be employed in those occupations. For a very small expence the public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the

BOOK the people, the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education.

THE public can facilitate this acquisition by establishing in every parish or district a little school, where children may be taught for a reward fo moderate, that even a common labourer may afford it; the master being partly, but not wholly paid by the public; because if he was wholly, or even principally paid by it, he would foon learn to neglect his business. In Scotland the establishment of fuch parish schools has taught almost the whole common people to read, and a very great proportion of them to write and account. In England the establishment of charity schools has had an effect of the same kind, though not so universally, because the establishment is not so universal. If in those little schools the books by which the children are taught to read were a little more instructive than they commonly are; and if, instead of the little smattering of Latin, which the children of the common people are fometimes taught there, and which can scarce ever be of any use to them, they were instructed in the elementary parts of geometry and mechanics, the literary education of this rank of people would perhaps be as complete as it is capable of being. There is scarce a common trade which does not afford fome opportunities of applying to it the principles of geometry and mechanics, and which would not therefore gradually exercise and improve the common people in those principles, the necessary introduction to the most fublime as well as to the most useful sciences.

THE public can encourage the acquisition of those most essential parts of education by giving small premiums, and little badges of distinction, to the children of the common people who excel in them.

THE public can impose upon almost the whole body of the people the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education, by obliging every man to undergo an examination or probation in them before

before he can obtain the freedom in any corporation, or be allowed CHAP. to fet up any trade either in a village or town corporate.

IT was in this manner, by facilitating the acquisition of their military and gymnastic exercises, by encouraging it, and even by imposing upon the whole body of the people the necessity of learning those exercises, that the Greek and Roman republics maintained the martial spirit of their respective citizens. They facilitated the acquisition of those exercises by appointing a certain place for learning and practifing them, and by granting to certain masters the privilege of teaching in that place. Those masters do not appear to have had either falaries or exclusive privileges of any kind. Their reward confifted altogether in what they got from their scholars; and a citizen who had learnt his exercises in the public Gymnasia, had no fort of legal advantage over one who had learnt them privately, provided the latter had learnt them equally well. republics encouraged the acquisition of those exercises by bestowing little premiums and badges of distinction upon those who excelled in them. To have gained a prize in the Olympic, Isthmian or Nemæan games, gave illustration not only to the person who gained it, but to his whole family and kindred. The obligation which every citizen was under to serve a certain number of years, if called upon, in the armies of the republic, sufficiently imposed the necessity of learning those exercises without which he could not be fit for that fervice.

THAT in the progress of improvement the practice of military exercises, unless government takes proper pains to support it, goes gradually to decay, and, together with it, the martial spirit of the great body of the people, the example of modern Europe sufficiently demonstrates. But the security of every society must always depend, more or less, upon the martial spirit of the great body of the people. In the present times, indeed, that martial spirit alone,

BOOK and unsupported by a well disciplined standing army, would not perhaps be sufficient for the defence and security of any society. But where every citizen had the spirit of a soldier, a smaller standing army would furely be requifite. That spirit besides would necesfarily diminish very much the dangers to liberty, whether real or imaginary, which are commonly apprehended from a standing army. As it would very much facilitate the operations of that army against a foreign invader, so it would obstruct them as much if unfortunately they should ever be directed against the constitution of the state.

> THE antient institutions of Greece and Rome seem to have been much more effectual for maintaining the martial spirit of the great body of the people than the establishment of what are called the militias of modern times. They were much more simple. When they were once established, they executed themselves, and it required little or no attention from government to maintain them in the most perfect vigour. Whereas to maintain even in tolerable execution the complex regulations of any modern militia, requires the continual and painful attention of government, without which they are constantly falling into total neglect and disuse. The influence besides of the antient institutions was much more universal. means of them the whole body of the people was completely instructed in the use of arms. Whereas it is but a very small part of them who can ever be so instructed by the regulations of any modern militia; except, perhaps, that of Switzerland. But a coward, a man incapable either of defending or of revenging himfelf, evidently wants one of the most effential parts of the character of a man. He is as much mutilated and deformed in his mind as another is in his body, who is either deprived of some of its most essential members, or has lost the use of those members. He is evidently the more wretched and miserable of the two; because happiness and misery,

mifery, which refide altogether in the mind, must necessarily depend more upon the healthful or unhealthful, the mutilated or entire state of the mind, than upon that of the body. Even though the martial spirit of the people were of no use towards the defence of the society, yet to prevent that fort of mental mutilation, deformity and wretchedness which cowardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading themselves through the great body of the people, would still deserve the most serious attention of government; in the same manner as it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and offensive disease, though neither mortal nor dangerous, from spreading itself among them; though perhaps no other public good might result from such attention besides the prevention of so great a public evil.

THE fame thing may be faid of the gross ignorance and stupidity which, in a civilized fociety, feem fo frequently to benumb the understandings of all the inferior ranks of people. A man, without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man, is, if posfible, more contemptible than even a coward, and feems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential part of the character of human nature. Though the state was to derive no advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of people, it would still deserve its attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed. state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more they are instructed, the less liable they are to the delufions of enthufiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders. An instructed and intelligent people besides are always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themfelves each individually more respectable, and more likely to obtain the respect of their lawful superiors, and they are therefore more disposed to respect those superiors. They are more disposed to examine,

BOOK examine, and more capable of feeing through, the interested complaints of faction and fedition, and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of government. In free countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the favourable judgement which the people may form of its conduct, it must furely be of the highest importance that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or capricionfly concerning it.

ARTICLE III.

Of the Expence of the Institutions for the Instruction of People of all Ages.

THE institutions for the instruction of people of all ages are chiefly those for religious instruction. This is a species of instruction of which the object is not fo much to render the people good citizens in this world, as to prepare them for another and a better world in a life to come. The teachers of the doctrine which contains this instruction, in the same manner as other teachers, may either depend altogether for their subsistence upon the voluntary contributions of their hearers; or they may derive it from fome other fund to which the law of their country may entitle them; fuch as a landed estate, a tythe or land-tax, an established salary or stipend. Their exertion, their zeal and industry, are likely to be much greater in the former situation than in the latter. In this respect the teachers of new religions have always had a considerable advantage in attacking those antient and established systems of which the clergy, reposing themselves upon their benefices, had neglected to keep up the fervour of faith and devotion in the great body of the people; and having given themselves up to indolence. were become altogether incapable of making any vigorous exertion in defence even of their own establishment. The clergy of an established and well endowed religion frequently become men of learning and elegance, who possess all the virtues of gentlemen, or which

can recommend them to the esteem of gentlemen; but they are CHAP. apt gradually to lose the qualities, both good and bad, which gave them authority and influence with the inferior ranks of people, and which had perhaps been the original causes of the success and establishment of their religion. Such a clergy, when attacked by a fet of popular and bold, though perhaps stupid and ignorant enthusiasts, feel themselves as perfectly defenceless as the indolent, effeminate, and full-fed nations of the fouthern parts of Asia, when they were invaded by the active, hardy, and hungry Tartars of the North. Such a clergy, upon fuch an emergency, have commonly no other resource than to call upon the civil magistrate to persecute, destroy, or drive out their adversaries as disturbers of the public peace. It was thus that the Roman catholic clergy called upon the civil magistrate to persecute the protestants; and the church of England to perfecute the differents; and that in general every religious fect, when it has once enjoyed for a century or two the fecurity of a legal establishment, has found itself incapable of making any vigorous defence against any new sect which chose to attack its doctrine or discipline. Upon such occasions the advantage in point of learning and good writing may fometimes be on the side of the established church. But the arts of popularity, all the arts of gaining profelytes, are constantly on the side of its adversaries. In England those arts have been long neglected by the well-endowed clergy of the established church, and are at present chiefly culitvated by the differents and by the methodists. independent provisions, however, which in many places have been made for diffenting teachers, by means of voluntary subscriptions, of trust-rights, and other evasions of the law, seem very much to have abated the zeal and activity of those teachers. They have many of them become very learned, ingenious, and respectable men; but they have in general ceased to be very popular preachers. The methodists, without half the learning of the dissenters, are much more in vogue.

BOOK V.

In the church of Rome the industry and zeal of the inferior clergy is kept more alive by the powerful motive of felf-interest than perhaps in any established protestant church. The parochial clergy derive, many of them, a very confiderable part of their fubfistence from the voluntary oblations of the people; a source of revenue which confession gives them many opportunities of improving. The mendicant orders derive their whole subsistence from such oblations. It is with them, as with the huffars and light infantry of some armies, no plunder, no pay. The parochial clergy are like those teachers whose reward depends partly upon their falary, and partly upon the fees or honoraries which they get from their pupils, and these must always depend more or less upon their industry and reputation. The mendicant orders are like those teachers whose subsistence depends altogether upon their industry. They are obliged, therefore, to use every art which can animate the devotion of the common people. The establishment of the two great mendicant orders of St. Dominick and St. Francis, it is observed by Machiavel, revived, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the languishing faith and devotion of the catholic church. In Roman catholic countries the spirit of devotion is fupported altogether by the monks and by the poorer parochial clergy. The great dignitaries of the church, with all the accomplishments of gentlemen and men of the world, and sometimes with those of men of learning, are careful enough to maintain the necessary discipline over their inferiors, but seldom give themselves any trouble about the inftruction of the people.

"Most of the arts and professions in a state," says, by far the most illustrious philosopher and historian of the present age, "are of such a nature, that, while they promote the interests of the fociety, they are also useful or agreeable to some individuals; and in that case, the constant rule of the magistrate, except, "perhaps,

"perhaps, on the first introduction of any art, is, to leave the profession to itself, and trust its encouragement to the individuals who reap the benefit of it. The artizans finding their profits to rise by the favour of their customers, increase, as much as possible, their skill and industry; and as matters are not disturbed by any injudicious tampering, the commodity is always sure to be at all times nearly proportioned to the demand.

"But there are also some callings, which, though useful and even necessary in a state, bring no advantage or pleasure to any individual, and the supreme power is obliged to alter its conduct with regard to the retainers of those professions. It must give them publick encouragement in order to their subsistence; and it must provide against that negligence to which they will naturally be subject, either by annexing particular honours to the profession, by establishing a long subordination of ranks and a strict dependance, or by some other expedient. The persons employed in the sinances, sleets, and magistracy, are instances of this order of men."

"IT may naturally be thought, at first sight, that the ecclesiastics belong to the first class, and that their encouragement, as
well as that of lawyers and physicians, may safely be entrusted to
the liberality of individuals, who are attached to their doctrines,
and who find benefit or consolation from their spiritual ministry
and affistance. Their industry and vigilance will, no doubt, be
whetted by such an additional motive; and their skill in the
profession, as well as their address in governing the minds of the
people, must receive daily increase, from their increasing practice,
study, and attention.

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"But if we consider the matter more closely, we shall find, that " this interested diligence of the clergy is what every wife legislator " will study to prevent; because in every religion except the true. "it is highly pernicious, and it has even a natural tendency to " pervert the true, by infufing into it a ftrong mixture of fuper-"fition, folly, and delusion. Each ghostly practitioner, in order "to render himself more precious and facred in the eyes of his " retainers, will inspire them with the most violent abhorrence of " all other fects, and continually endeavour, by fome novelty, to " excite the languid devotion of his audience. No regard will be " paid to truth, morals, or decency in the doctrines inculcated. " Every tenet will be adopted that best suits the disorderly affections " of the human frame. Customers will be drawn to each conven-"ticle by new industry and address in practising on the passions "and credulity of the populace. And in the end, the civil " magistrate will find, that he has dearly paid for his pretended " frugality, in faving a fixed establishment for the priests; and "that in reality the most decent and advantageous compositions "which he can make with the spiritual guides, is to bribe their "indolence, by affigning stated salaries to their profession, and " rendering it superfluous for them to be farther active, than " merely to prevent their flock from straying in quest of new " pastures. And in this manner ecclesiastical establishments, though " commonly they arose at first from religious views, prove in the " end advantageous to the political interests of society."

But whatever may have been the good or bad effects of the independent provision of the clergy; it has, perhaps, been very seldom bestowed upon them from any view to those effects. Times of violent religious controversy have generally been times of equally violent political faction. Upon such occasions each political party has either found it, or imagined it, for its interest to league itself.

itself with some one or other of the contending religious sects. But CHAP. this could be done only by adopting, or at least by favouring, the tenets of that particular fect. The fect which had the good fortune to be leagued with the conquering party, necessarily shared in the victory of its ally, by whose favour and protection it was foon enabled in some degree to silence and subdue all its adversaries. Those adversaries had generally leagued themselves with the enemies of the conquering party, and were therefore the enemies of that party. The clergy of this particular fect having thus become complete masters of the field, and their influence and authority with the great body of the people being in its highest vigour, they were powerful enough to over-awe the chiefs and leaders of their own party, and to oblige the civil magistrate to respect their opinions and inclinations. Their first demand was generally, that he should filence and fubdue all their adversaries; and their second, that he should bestow an independent provision on themselves. As they had generally contributed a good deal to the victory, it feemed not unreasonable that they should have some share in the spoil. were weary besides of humouring the people, and of depending upon their caprice for a subsistence. In making this demand therefore they confulted their own ease and comfort, without troubling themselves about the effect which it might have in future times upon the influence and authority of their order. The civil magistrate, who could comply with this demand only by giving them fomething which he would have chosen much rather to take or to keep to himfelf, was feldom very forward to grant it. Necessity, however, always forced him to fubmit at last, though frequently not till after many delays, evafions, and affected excuses.

But if politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering party never adopted the tenets of one fect more than those of another, when it had gained the victory, it would probably

BOOK bly have dealt equally and impartially with all the different fects. and have allowed every man to chuse his own priest and his own religion as he thought proper. There would in this cafe, no doubt, have been a great multitude of religious fects. Almost every different congregation might probably have made a little feet by itself, or have entertained some peculiar tenets of its own. Each teacher would no doubt have felt himself under the necessity of making the utmost exertion, and of using every art both to preserve and to increase the number of his disciples. But as every other teacher would have felt himself under the same necessity; the success of no one teacher, or fect of teachers, could have been very great. The interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome only where there is either but one sect tolerated in the fociety, or where the whole of a large fociety is divided into two or three great fects; the teachers of each fect acting by concert, and under a regular discipline and subordination. But that zeal must be altogether innocent where the society is divided into two or three hundred, or perhaps into as many thousand small sects. of which no one could be confiderable enough to diffurb the publick tranquillity. The teachers of each fect, feeing themselves surrounded on all fides with more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and moderation which is fo feldom to be found among the teachers of those great sects, whose tenets being supported by the civil magistrate, are held in veneration by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and empires, and who therefore fee nothing round them but followers, disciples, and humble admirers. The teachers of each little fect, finding themselves almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every other fect, and the concessions which they would mutually find it both convenient and agreeable to make to one another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism,

THE WEALTH OF NATIONS.

fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to see CHAP. established; but such as positive law has perhaps never yet established, and probably never will establish in any country: because with regard to religion, positive law always has been, and probably always will be, more or less influenced by popular superstition and enthusiasm. This plan of ecclesiastical government, or more properly of no ecclesiastical government, was what the sect called independents, a fect no doubt of very wild enthuliasts, proposed to establish in England towards the end of the civil war. If it had been establithed, though of a very unphilosophical origin, it would probably by this time have been productive of the most philosophical good temper and moderation with regard to every fort of religious principle. It has been established in Pensylvania, where, though the quakers happen to be the most numerous sect, the law in reality favours no one fect more than another, and it is there faid to have been productive of this philosophical good temper and moderation.

But though this equality of treatment should not be productive of this good temper and moderation in all, or even in the greater part of the religious sects of a particular country; yet provided those sects were sufficiently numerous, and each of them consequently too small to disturb the publick tranquillity, the excessive zeal of each sect for its particular tenets, could not well be productive of any very hurtful effects, but, on the contrary, of several good ones: and if the government was perfectly decided both to let them all alone, and to oblige them all to let alone one another, there is little danger that they would not of their own accord subdivide themselves fast enough, so as soon to become sufficiently numerous.

In every civilized fociety, in every fociety where the distinction of ranks has once been completely established, there have been always

BOOK always two different schemes or systems of morality current at the fame time; of which the one may be called the strict or austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the loofe system. The former is generally admired and revered by the common people: The latter is commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are called people of fashion. The degree of disapprobation with which we ought to mark the vices of levity, the vices which are apt to arise from great prosperity, and from the excess of gaiety and good humour. feems to constitute the principal distinction between those two opposite schemes or systems. In the liberal or loose system, luxury. wanton and even diforderly mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to some degree of intemperance, the breach of chastity, at least in one of the two fexes, &c. provided they are not accompanied with gross indecency, and do not lead to falshood or injustice, are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence, and are eafily either excused or pardoned altogether. In the austere system, on the contrary, those excesses are regarded with the utmost abhorrence and detestation. The vices of levity are always ruinous to the common people, and a fingle week's thoughtlefness and diffipation is often fufficient to undo a poor workman for ever, and to drive him through despair upon committing the most enormous crimes. The wifer and better fort of the common people, therefore, have always the utmost abhorrence and detestation of such excesses, which their experience tells them are so immediately fatal to people of their condition. The diforder and extravagance of several years, on the contrary, will not always ruin a man of fashion, and people of that rank are very apt to consider the power of indulging in some degree of excess as one of the advantages of their fortune, and the liberty of doing fo without censure or reproach, as one of the privileges which belong to their station. In people of their own station, therefore, they regard fuch excesses with but a small degree of disapprobation, and cenfure them either very flightly or not at all.

ALMOST

Almost all religious fects have begun among the common people, from whom they have generally drawn their earlieft, as well as their most numerous proselytes. The austere system of morality has, accordingly, been adopted by those fects almost constantly, or with very few exceptions; for there have been some. It was the system by which they could best recommend themselves to that order of people to whom they first proposed their plan of reformation upon what had been before established. Many of them, perhaps the greater part of them, have even endeavoured to gain credit by resining upon this austere system, and by carrying it to some degree of folly and extravagance; and this excessive rigour has frequently recommended them more than any thing else to the respect and veneration of the common people.

A MAN of rank and fortune is by his station the distinguished member of a great fociety, who attend to every part of his conduct, and who thereby oblige him to attend to every part of it himself. His authority and consideration depend very much upon the respect which this society bears to him. He dare not do any thing which would difgrace or difcredit him in it, and he is obliged to a very strict observation of that species of morals, whether liberal or austere, which the general consent of this society prescribes to persons of his rank and fortune. A man of low condition, on the contrary, is far from being a distinguished member of any great fociety. While he remains in a country village his conduct may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it himself. In this situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is called a character to lofe. But as foon as he comes into a great city, he is funk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed and attended to by nobody, and he is therefore very likely to neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every fort of low profligacy and vice. He never emerges fo effectually from this obscurity, his conduct never excites so much

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BOOK the attention of any respectable society, as by his becoming the member of a small religious sect. He from that moment acquires a degree of consideration which he never had before. All his brother sectaries are, for the credit of the sect, interested to observe his conduct, and if he gives occasion to any scandal, if he deviates very much from those austere morals which they almost always require of one another, to punish him by what is always a very fevere punishment, even where no civil effects attend it, expulsion or excommunication from the sect. In little religious fects, accordingly, the morals of the common people have been almost always remarkably regular and orderly; generally much more fo than in the established church. morals of those little sects indeed have frequently been rather disagreeably rigorous and unfocial.

> THERE are two very easy and effectual remedies, however, by whose joint operation the state might, without violence, correct whatever was unfocial or difagreeably rigorous in the morals of all the little fects into which the country was divided.

> THE first of those remedies is the study of science and philofophy, which the state might render almost universal among all people of middling or more than middling rank and fortune; not by giving falaries to teachers in order to make them negligent and idle, but by instituting some sort of probation, even in the higher and more difficult sciences, to be undergone by every person before he was permitted to exercise any liberal profession. or before he could be received as a candidate for any honourable office of trust or profit. If the state imposed upon this order of men the necessity of learning, it would have no occasion to give itself any trouble about providing them with proper teachers. They would foon find better teachers for themselves than any whom the state could provide for them. Science is the

great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition; and CHAP. where all the superior ranks of people were secured from it, the inferior ranks could not be much exposed to it.

THE fecond of those remedies is the frequency and gaiety of public diversions. The state, by encouraging, that is by giving entire liberty to all those who for their own interest would attempt, without scandal or indecency, to amuse and divert the people by painting, poetry, music, dancing; by all forts of dramatic reprefentations and exhibitions, would eafily dislipate in the greater part of them that melancholy and gloomy humour which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and enthufiasm. Public diversions have always been the objects of dread and hatred, to all the fanatical promoters of those popular frenzies. The gaiety and good humour which those diversions inspire were altogether inconfistent with that temper of mind, which was fittest for their purpose, or which they could best work upon. Dramatic representations besides, frequently exposing their artifices to public ridicule, and fometimes even to public execration, were upon that account more than all other diversions the objects of their peculiar abhorrence.

In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one religion more than those of another, it would not be necessary that any of them should have any particular or immediate dependency upon the fovereign or executive power; or that he should have any thing to do either in appointing or in dismissing them from their offices. In such a situation he would have no occasion to give himself any concern about them, further than to keep the peace among them in the fame manner as among the rest of his subjects; that is, to hinder them from perfecuting, abusing, or oppressing one another. But it is quite otherwise in countries where there is an established or governing

BOOK governing religion. The fovereign can in this case never be fecure, unless he has the means of influencing in a considerable degree the greater part of the teachers of that religion.

> THE clergy of every established church constitute a great incorporation. They can act in concert, and pursue their interest upon one plan and with one spirit, as much as if they were under the direction of one man; and they are frequently too under fuch direction. Their interest as an incorporated body is never the same with that of the sovereign, and is sometimes directly opposite to Their great interest is to maintain their authority with the people; and this authority depends upon the supposed certainty and importance of the whole doctrine which they inculcate. and upon the supposed necessity of adopting every part of it with the most implicit faith, in order to avoid eternal misery. Should the fovereign have the imprudence to appear either to deride or doubt himself of the most trifling part of their doctrine, or from humanity attempt to protect those who did either the one or the other, the punctilious honour of a clergy who have no fort of dependency upon him, is immediately provoked to profcribe him as a profane person, and to employ all the terrors of religion in order to oblige the people to transfer their allegiance to fome more orthodox and obedient prince. Should he oppose any of their pretentions or usurpations, the danger is equally great. The princes who have dared in this manner to rebel against the church, over and above this crime of rebellion, have generally been charged too with the additional crime of herefy, notwithstanding their folemn protestations of their faith and humble submission to every tenet which she thought proper to prescribe to them. But the authority of religion is superior to every other authority. The fears which it suggests conquer all other fears. When the authorised teachers of religion propagate through the great body of the people

people doctrines subversive of the authority of the sovereign, it is CHAP. by violence only, or by the force of a standing army, that he can maintain his authority. Even a standing army cannot in this case give him any lasting security; because if the soldiers are not foreigners, which can feldom be the case, but drawn from the great body of the people, which must almost always be the case, they are likely to be foon corrupted by those very doctrines. The revolutions which the turbulence of the Greek clergy was continually occasioning at Constantinople as long as the eastern empire subsisted; the convulsions which, during the course of several centuries, the turbulence of the Roman clergy was continually occasioning in every part of Europe, sufficiently demonstrate how precarious and infecure must always be the situation of the sovereign who has no proper means of influencing the clergy of the established and governing religion of his country.

ARTICLES of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evident enough, are not within the proper department of a temporal fovereign, who, though he may be very well qualified for protecting, is feldom supposed to be so for instructing the people. With regard to fuch matters, therefore, his authority can feldom be fufficient to counterbalance the united authority of the clergy of the established church. The public tranquillity, however, and his own fecurity, may frequently depend upon the doctrines which they may think proper to propagate concerning fuch matters. As he can feldom directly oppose their decision, therefore, with proper weight and authority, it is necessary that he should be able to influence it; and he can influence it only by the fears and expectations which he may excite in the greater part of the individuals of the order. Those fears and expectations may consist in the fear of deprivation or other punishment, and in the expectation of further preferment.

BOOK V.

In all christian churches the benefices of the clergy are a fort of freeholds which they enjoy, not during pleasure, but during life, or good behaviour. If they held them by a more precarious tenure, and were liable to be turned out upon every flight difobligation either of the fovereign or of his ministers, it would perhaps be impossible for them to maintain their authority with the people, who would then confider them as mercenary dependants upon the court, in the fincerity of whose instructions they could no longer have any confidence. But should the sovereign attempt irregularly, and by violence to deprive any number of clergymen of their freeholds on account, perhaps, of their having propagated, with more than ordinary zeal, some factious or seditious doctrine, he would only render, by fuch perfecution, both them and their doctrine ten times more popular, and therefore ten times more troublesome and dangerous than they had been before. Fear is in almost all cases a wretched instrument of government, and ought in particular never to be employed against any order of men who have the fmallest pretensions to independency. To attempt to terrify them ferves only to irritate their bad humour, and to confirm them in an opposition which more gentle usage perhaps might easily induce them either to foften or to lay afide altogether. The violence which the French government usually employed in order to oblige all their parliaments or fovereign courts of justice to enregister any unpopular edict, very feldom fucceeded. The means commonly employed, however, the imprisonment of all the refractory members, one would think were forcible enough. The princes of the house of Steuart fometimes employed the like means in order to influence fome of the members of the parliament of England; and they generally found them equally intractable. The parliament of England is now managed in another manner; and a very small experiment which the duke of Choiseul made about twelve years ago upon the parliament of Paris, demonstrated sufficiently that all the parliaments

parliaments of France might have been managed still more easily CHAP. in the same manner. That experiment was not pursued. though management and perfuafion are always the caffest and the fafest instruments of government, as force and violence are the worst and the most dangerous, yet such, it seems, is the natural infolence of man, that he almost always disdains to use the good instrument, except when he cannot or dare not use the bad The French government could and durst use force, and therefore disdained to use management and persuasion. But there is no order of men, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all ages, upon whom it is fo dangerous, or rather fo perfectly ruinous, to employ force and violence, as upon the respected clergy of any established church. The rights, the privileges, the personal liberty of every individual ecclesiastic, who is upon good terms with his own order, are even in the most despotic governments more respected than those of any other person of nearly equal rank and fortune. It is so in every gradation of despotism, from that of the gentle and mild government of Paris, to that of the violent and furious government of Constantinople. But though this order of men can scarce ever be forced, they may be managed as easily as any other; and the fecurity of the fovereign, as well as of the public tranquillity, feems to depend very much upon the means which he has of managing them; and those means seem to consist altogether in the preferment which he has to bestow upon them.

In the antient constitution of the Roman catholic church, the bishop of each diocese was elected by the joint votes of the clergy and of the people of the episcopal city. The people did not long retain their right of election; and while they did retain it, they almost always acted under the influence of the clergy, who in such spiritual matters appeared to be their natural guides. The clergy, however, soon grew weary of the trouble of managing them, and sound

BOOK found it easier to elect their own bishops themselves. The abbot, in the same manner, was elected by the monks of the monastery, at least in the greater part of abbacies. All the inferior ecclesiastical benefices comprehended within the diocefe were collated by the bishop, who bestowed them upon such ecclesiastics as he thought proper. All church preferments were in this manner in the difposal of the church. The fovereign, though he might have some indirect influence in those elections, and though it was sometimes usual to ask both his consent to elect, and his approbation of the election, yet had no direct or fufficient means of managing the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman naturally led him to pay court, not so much to his sovereign, as to his own order, from which only he could expect preferment.

> THROUGH the greater part of Europe the Pope gradually drew to himself first the collation of almost all bishopricks and abbacies, or of what were called Consistorial benefices, and afterwards. by various machinations and pretences, of the greater part of inferior benefices comprehended within each diocese; little more being left to the bishop than what was barely necessary to give him a decent authority with his own clergy. By this arrangement the condition of the fovereign was still worse than it had been before. The clergy of all the different countries of Europe were thus formed into a fort of spiritual army, dispersed in different quarters indeed, but of which all the movements and operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon one uniform plan. The clergy of each particular country might be confidered as a particular detachment of that army, of which the operations could eafily be fupported and seconded by all the other detachments quartered in the different countries round about. Each detachment was not only independent of the fovereign of the country in which it was quartered, and by which it was maintained, but dependant upon a foreign

foreign fovereign, who could at any time turn its arms against the CHAP. sovereign of that particular country, and support them by the arms of all the other detachments.

Those arms were the most formidable that can well be imagined. In the antient state of Europe, before the establishment of arts and manufactures, the wealth of the clergy gave them the fame fort of influence over the common people, which that of the great barons gave them over their respective vassals, tenants, and retainers. In the great landed estates which the mistaken piety both of princes and private persons had bestowed upon the church, jurisdictions were established of the same kind with those of the great barons; and for the same reason. In those great landed estates, the clergy or their bailiffs could eafily keep the peace without the fupport or affistance either of the king or of any other person; and neither the king nor any other person could keep the peace there without the support and affistance of the clergy. The jurisdictions of the clergy, therefore, in their particular baronies or manors, were equally independent, and equally exclusive of the authority of the king's courts, as those of the great temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like those of the great barons, almost all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon their immediate lords, and therefore liable to be called out at pleasure, in order to fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might think proper to engage them. Over and above the rents of those estates, the clergy possessed, in the tythes, a very large portion of the rents of all the other estates in every kingdom of Europe. The revenues arising from both those species of rents were, the greater part of them, paid in kind, in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, &c. The quantity exceeded greatly what the clergy could themselves consume; and there were neither arts nor manufactures for the produce of which they could exchange the furplus. The clergy could derive advantage from this immense furplus.

BOOK furplus in no other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the like furplus of their revenues, in the most profuse hospitality, and in the most extensive charity. Both the hospitality and the charity of the antient clergy, accordingly, are faid to have been very great. They not only maintained almost the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen had frequently no other means of subsistence than by travelling about from monastery to monastery, under pretence of devotion, but in reality to enjoy the hospitality of the clergy. The retainers of some particular prelates were often as numerous as those of the greatest laylords; and the retainers of all the clergy taken together were, perhaps, more numerous than those of all the lay-lords. always much more union among the clergy than among the laylords. The former were under a regular discipline and subordination to the papal authority. The latter were under no regular difcipline or fubordination, but almost always equally jealous of one another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy, therefore, had both together been less numerous than those of the great lay-lords, and their tenants were probably much less numerous, yet their union would have rendered them more formidable. The hospitality and charity of the clergy too, not only gave them the command of a great temporal force, but increased yery much the weight of their spiritual weapons. Those virtues procured them the highest respect and veneration among all the inferior ranks of people, of whom many were constantly, and almost all occasionally, fed by them. Every thing belonging or related to fo popular an order, its possessions, its privileges, its doctrines, necessarily appeared facred in the eyes of the common people. and every violation of them, whether real or pretended, the highest act of facrilegious wickedness and profaneness. In this state of things, if the fovereign frequently found it difficult to refift the consederacy of a few of the great nobility, we cannot wonder that he fhould

should find it still more so to resist the united force of the clergy CHAP. of his own dominions supported by that of the clergy of all the neighbouring dominions. In such circumstances the wonder is, not that he was fometimes obliged to yield, but that he ever was able to relift.

THE privileges of the clergy in those antient times (which to us who live in the present times appear the most absurd) their total exemption from the fecular jurisdiction, for example, or what in England was called the benefit of clergy; were the natural or rather the necessary consequences of this state of things. How dangerous must it have been for the sovereign to attempt to punish a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his own order were disposed to protect him, and to represent either the proof as insufficient for convicting so holy a man, or the punishment as too severe to be inflicted upon one whose person had been rendered sacred by religion. The fovereign could, in fuch circumstances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts, who, for the honour of their own order, were interested to restrain, as much as possible, every member of it from committing enormous crimes, or even from giving occasion to such gross scandal as might disgust the minds of the people.

In the state in which things were through the greater part of Europe during the tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and for some time both before and after that period, the constitution of the church of Rome may be considered as the most formidable combination that ever was formed against the authority and fecurity of civil government, as well as against the liberty, reason and happiness of mankind, which can flourish only where civil government is able to protect them. In that constitution the groffest delusions of superstition were supported in such a manner by

the

BOOK the private interests of so great a number of people as put them out of all danger from any affault of human reason: because though human reason might perhaps have been able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, some of the delusions of superstition; it could never have dissolved the ties of private interest. constitution been attacked by no other enemies but the feeble efforts of human reason, it must have endured forever. But that immense and well built fabric, which all the wisdom and virtue of man could never have shaken, much less have over-turned, was by the natural course of things, first weakened, afterwards in part destroyed, and is now likely, in the course of a few centuries more, perhaps to crumble into ruins altogether.

> THE gradual improvements of arts, manufactures and commerce, the same causes which destroyed the power of the great barons, destroyed in the same manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the clergy. In the produce of arts, manufactures and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found fomething for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby discovered the means of spending their whole revenues upon their own persons, without giving any considerable share of them to other people. Their charity became gradually less extensive, their hospitality less liberal or less profuse. retainers became confequently less numerous, and by degrees dwindled away altogether. The clergy too, like the great barons, wished to get a better rent from their landed estates, in order to fpend it, in the fame manner, upon the gratification of their own private vanity and folly. But this increase of rent could be got only by granting leases to their tenants, who thereby became in a great measure independent of them. The ties of interest, which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this manner gradually broken and disfolved. They were even broken and diffolved

dissolved fooner than those which bound the same ranks of people CHAP. to the great barons: because the benefices of the church being, the greater part of them, much smaller than the estates of the great barons, the possessor of each benefice was much sooner able to fpend the whole of its revenue upon his own person. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the absolute command which they had once had over the great body of the people, was very much decayed. The power of the church was by that time very nearly reduced through the greater part of Europe to what arose from her spiritual authority; and even that spiritual authority was much weakened when it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy. The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order, as they had done before, as the comforters of their distress, and the relievers of their indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and difgusted by the vanity. luxury, and expence of the richer clergy, who appeared to fpend upon their own pleasures what had always before been regarded as the patrimony of the poor.

In this fituation of things, the fovereigns in the different states of Europe endeavoured to recover the influence which they had once had in the disposal of the great benefices of the church, by procuring to the deans and chapters of each diocese the restoration of their antient right of electing the bishop, and to the monks of each abbacy that of electing the abbot. The re-establishing of this antient order was the object of several statutes enacted in England during the course of the fourteenth century, and of the pragmatic sanction established in France in the sisteenth century. In order to render the election valid, it was necessary that the sovereign should both consent to it before-hand, and afterwards approve of the

BOOK the person elected; and though the election was still supposed to be free, he had, however, all the indirect means which his fituation necessarily afforded him of influencing the clergy in his own dominions. Other regulations of a fimilar tendency were established in other parts of Europe. But the power of the pope in the collation of the great benefices of the church feems, before the reformation. to have been no where so effectually and so universally restrained as in France and England. The Concordat afterwards, in the fixteenth century, gave to the kings of France the absolute right of presenting to all the great and confistorial benefices of the Gallican church.

> SINCE the establishment of the Pragmatic fanction and of the Concordat, the clergy of France have in general shown less respect to the decrees of the papal court than the clergy of any other catholic country. In all the disputes which their sovereign has had with the pope, they have almost constantly taken party with the former. This independency of the clergy of France upon the court of Rome, feems to be principally founded upon the Pragmatic fanction and the Concordat. In the earlier periods of the monarchy. the clergy of France appear to have been as much devoted to the pope as those of any other country. When Robert, the second Prince of the Capetian race, was most unjustly excommunicated by the court of Rome, his own fervants, it is faid, threw the victuals which came from his table to the dogs, and refused to taste any thing themselves which had been polluted by the contact of a person in his fituation. They were taught to do fo, it may very fafely be prefumed, by the clergy of his own dominions.

> THE claim of collating to the great benefices of the church, a claim in defence of which the court of Rome had frequently shaken and sometimes overturned the thrones of some of the greatest sovereigns

reigns in Christendom, was in this manner either restrained or CHAP. modified, or given up altogether, in many different parts of Europe, even before the time of the reformation. As the clergy had now less influence over the people, so the state had more influence over the clergy. The clergy therefore had both less power and less inclination to disturb the state.

THE authority of the church of Rome was in this state of declenfion when the disputes which gave birth to the reformation began in Germany, and foon spread themselves through every part of Europe. The new doctrines were every where received with a high degree of popular favour. They were propagated with all that enthusiastic zeal which commonly animates the spirit of party when it attacks established authority. The teachers of those doctrines, though perhaps in other respects not more learned than many of the divines who defended the established church, seem in general to have been better acquainted with ecclefiastical history, and with the origin and progress of that system of opinions upon which the authority of the church was established, and they had thereby some advantage in almost every dispute. The austerity of their manners gave them authority with the common people, who contrasted the strict regularity of their conduct with the disorderly lives of the greater part of their own clergy. They possessed too in a much higher degree than their adversaries, all the arts of popularity and of gaining profelytes, arts which the lofty and dignified fons of the church had long neglected, as being to them in a great measure useless. The reason of the new doctrines recommended them to some, their novelty to many; the hatred and contempt of the established clergy to a still greater number; but the zealous, passionate and fanatical, though frequently coarse and rustic eloquence with which they were almost every where inculcated, recommended them to by far the greatest number.

BOOK V.

THE success of the new doctrines was almost every where so great, that the princes who at that time happened to be on bad terms with the court of Rome, were by means of them eafily enabled, in their own dominions, to over-turn the church, which having lost the respect and veneration of the inferior ranks of people, could make scarce any resistance. The court of Rome had disobliged some of the smaller princes in the northern parts of Germany, whom it had probably confidered as too infignificant to be worth the managing. They univerfally, therefore, established the reformation in their own dominions. The tyranny of Christiern II. and of Troll archbishop of Upsal, enabled Gustavus Vasa to expel them both from Sweden. The pope favoured the tyrant and the archbishop, and Gustavus Vasa found no difficulty in establishing the reformation in Sweden. Christiern II. was afterwards deposed from the throne of Denmark, where his conduct had rendered him as odious as in Sweden. however, was still disposed to favour him, and Frederic of Holstein, who had mounted the throne in his stead, revenged himself by following the example of Gustavus Vasa. The magistrates of Berne and Zurich, who had no particular quarrel with the pope, established with great ease the reformation in their respective cantons, where just before some of the clergy had, by an imposture fomewhat groffer than ordinary, rendered the whole order both odious and contemptible.

In this critical fituation of its affairs the papal court was at fufficient pains to cultivate the friendship of the powerful sovereigns of France and Spain, of whom the latter was at that time emperor of Germany. With their affishance it was enabled, though not without great difficulty and much bloodshed, either to suppress altogether or to obstruct very much the progress of the reformation in their dominions. It was well enough inclined too to be complaisant to the king of England. But from the circum-

- stances

stances of the times it could not be so without giving offence to a still greater sovereign, Charles V. king of Spain and emperor of Germany. Henry VIII. accordingly, though he did not embrace himself the greater part of the doctrines of the reformation, was yet enabled, by the general prevalence of those doctrines, to suppress all the monasteries, and to abolish the authority of the church of Rome in his dominions. That he should go so far, though he went no surther, gave some satisfaction to the patrons of the reformation, who having got possession of the government in the reign of his son and successor, completed without any difficulty the work which Henry VIII. had begun.

In some countries, as in Scotland, where the government was weak, unpopular, and not very firmly established, the reformation was strong enough to overturn, not only the church, but the state likewise for attempting to support the church.

Among the followers of the reformation, dispersed in all the different countries of Europe, there was no general tribunal which, like that of the court of Rome, or an œcumenical council, could fettle all disputes among them, and with irrefistable authority prescribe to all of them the precise limits of orthodoxy. When the followers of the reformation in one country, therefore, happened to differ from their brethren in another, as they had no common judge to appeal to, the dispute could never be decided; and many fuch disputes arose among them. Those concerning the government of the church, and the right of conferring ecclefiastical benefices, were perhaps the most interesting to the peace and welfare of civil fociety. They gave birth accordingly to the two principal parties or fects among the followers of the reformation, the Lutheran and Calvinistic fects, the only sects among them, of which the doctrine and discipline have ever yet been established by law in any part of Europe.

BOOK

THE followers of Luther, together with what is called the v. church of England, preserved more or less of the episcopal government, established subordination among the clergy, gave the fovereign the disposal of all the bishopricks, and other consistorial benefices within his dominions, and thereby rendered him the real head of the church; and without depriving the bishop of the right of collating to the smaller benefices within his diocese, they, even to those benefices, not only admitted, but favoured the right of presentation both in the sovereign and in all other This system of church government was from the beginning favourable to peace and good order, and to fubmission to the civil sovereign. It has never accordingly been the occasion of any tumult or civil commotion in any country in which it has once been established. The church of England in particular has always valued herfelf, with great reason, upon the unexceptionable loyalty of her principles. Under fuch a government the clergy naturally endeavour to recommend themselves to the fovereign, to the court, and to the nobility and gentry of the country, by whose influence they chiefly expect to obtain preferment. They pay court to those patrons, sometimes, no doubt, by the vilest flattery and assentation, but frequently too by cultivating all those arts which best deserve, and which are therefore most likely to gain them the esteem of people of rank and fortune; by their knowledge in all the different branches of useful and ornamental learning, by the decent liberality of their manners, by the focial good humour of their conversation, and by their avowed contempt of those absurd and hypocritical austerities which fanatics inculcate and pretend to practife, in order to draw upon themselves the veneration, and upon the greater part of men of rank and fortune, who avow that they do not practife them, the abhorrence of the common people. Such a clergy, however, while they pay their court in this manner to the higher ranks of life, are very apt to neglect altogether the means of maintaining

their influence and authority with the lower. They are liftened CHAP. to, esteemed and respected by their superiors; but before their inferiors they are frequently incapable of defending, essectually and to the conviction of such hearers, their own sober and moderate doctrines against the most ignorant enthusiast who chuses to attack them.

The followers of Zuinglius, or more properly those of Calvin, on the contrary, bestowed upon the people of each parish, whenever the church became vacant, the right of electing their own pastor; and established at the same time the most perfect equality among the clergy. The former part of this institution, as long as it remained in vigour, seems to have been productive of nothing but disorder and confusion, and to have tended equally to corrupt the morals both of the clergy and of the people. The latter part seems never to have had any effects but what were perfectly agreeable.

As long as the people of each parish preserved the right of electing their own pastors, they acted almost always under the influence of the clergy, and generally of the most factious and fanatical of the order. The clergy, in order to preserve their influence in those popular elections, became, or affected to become many of them, fanatics themselves, encouraged fanaticism among the people, and gave the preference almost always to the most fanatical candidate. So small a matter as the appointment of a parish priest occasioned almost always a violent contest, not only in one parish, but in all the neighbouring parishes, who feldom failed to take party in the quarrel. When the parish happened to be fituated in a great city, it divided all the inhabitants into two parties; and when that city happened either to constitute itself a little republic, or to be the head and capital of a little republic, as is the case with many of the considerable cities in Switzerland and Holland, every paltry dispute of this kind, over and above exasperating

BOOK exasperating the animosity of all their other factions, threatened to leave behind it both a new schism in the church, and a new faction in the state. In those small republics, therefore, the magistrate very soon found it necessary, for the sake of preserving the public peace, to assume to himself the right of presenting to all vacant benefices. In Scotland, the most extensive country in which this presbyterian form of church government has ever been established, the rights of patronage were in effect abolished by the act which established presbytery in the beginning of the reign That act at least put it in the power of certain of William III. classes of people in each parish to purchase for a very small price the right of electing their own pastor. The constitution which this act established was allowed to subsist for about two and twenty years, but was abolished by the 10th of queen Ann, ch. 12. on account of the confusions and disorders which this more popular mode of election had almost every where occasioned. In so extensive a country as Scotland, however, a tumult in a remote parish was not so likely to give disturbance to government, as in a smaller state. The 10th of queen Ann restored the rights of patronage. But though in Scotland the law gives the benefice without any exception to the person presented by the patron; yet the church requires sometimes (for she has not in this respect been very uniform in her decisions) a certain concurrence of the people, before the will confer upon the presentee what is called the cure of fouls, or the ecclefiastical jurisdiction in the parish. sometimes at least, from an affected concern for the peace of the parish, delays the settlement till this concurrence can be procured. The private tampering of some of the neighbouring clergy, sometimes to procure, but more frequently to prevent this concurrence, and the popular arts which they cultivate in order to enable them upon fuch occasions to tamper more effectually, are perhaps the causes which principally keep up whatever remains of the old fanatical fpirit, either in the clergy or in the people of Scotland. THE

THE equality which the presbyterian form of church govern- CHAP. ment establishes among the clergy, consists, first, in the equality of authority or ecclefiastical jurisdiction; and, secondly, in the equality of benefice. In all presbyterian churches the equality of authority is perfect: that of benefice is not fo. The difference however, between one benefice and another, is feldom fo confiderable as commonly to tempt the possessor even of the small benefice to pay court to his patron, by the vile arts of flattery and affentation, in order to get a better. In all the presbyterian churches, where the rights of patronage are thoroughly established, it is by nobler and better arts that the established clergy in general endeavour to gain the favour of their superiors; by their learning, by the irreproachable regularity of their life, and by the faithful and diligent discharge of their duty. Their patrons even frequently complain of the independency of their spirit, which they are apt to construe into ingratitude for past favours, but which at worst perhaps is seldom any more than that indifference which naturally arises from the consciousness that no further favours of the kind are ever to be expected. There is fcarce perhaps to be found any where in Europe a more learned, decent, independent, and respectable set of men, than the greater part of the presbyterian clergy of Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland.

Where the church benefices are all nearly equal, none of them can be very great, and this mediocrity of benefice, though it may no doubt be carried too far, has, however, some very agreeable effects. Nothing but the most exemplary morals can give dignity to a man of small fortune. The vices of levity and vanity necessarily render him ridiculous, and are, besides, almost as ruinous to him as they are to the common people. In his own conduct, therefore, he is obliged to follow that system of morals which the common people respect the most. He gains their esteem

and

BOOK and affection by that plan of life which his own interest and situation would lead him to follow. The common people look upon him with that kindness with which we naturally regard one who approaches somewhat to our own condition, but who, we thinks ought to be in a higher. Their kindness naturally provokes his kindness. He becomes careful to instruct them, and attentive to affift and relieve them. He does not even despise the prejudices of people who are disposed to be so favourable to him, and never treats them with those contemptuous and arrogant airs which we fo often meet with in the proud dignitaries of opulent and wellendowed churches. The presbyterian clergy, accordingly, have more influence over the minds of the common people than perhaps the clergy of any other established church. It is accordingly in presbyterian countries only that we ever find the common people converted, without perfecution, completely, and almost to a man, to the established church.

> In countries where church benefices are the greater part of them very moderate, a chair in a university is generally a better establishment than a church benefice. The universities have, in this case, the picking and chusing of their members from all the churchmen of the country, who, in every country, constitute by far the most numerous class of men of letters. Where church benefices, on the contrary, are many of them very confiderable, the church naturally draws from the universities the greater part of their eminent men of letters; who generally find some patron who does himself honour by procuring them church preferment. In the former fituation we are likely to find the universities filled with the most eminent men of letters that are to be found in the country. In the latter we are likely to find few eminent men among them, and those few among the youngest members of the society, who are likely too to be drained away from it before they can have acquired experience

rience and knowledge enough to be of much use to it. It is ob- CHAP. served by Mr. de Voltaire that father Porrée, a jesuit of no great eminence in the republic of letters, was the only professor they had ever had in France whose works were worth the reading. In a country which has produced fo many eminent men of letters, it must appear fomewhat singular that scarce one of them should have been a professor in a university. The famous Gassendi was, in the beginning of his life, a professor in the university of Aix. Upon the first dawning of his genius it was represented to him that by going into the church he could eafily find a much more quiet and comfortable subsistence, as well as a better situation for pursuing his studies; and he immediately followed the advice. The observation of Mr. de Voltaire may be applied, I believe, not only to France, but to all other Roman catholic countries. We very rarely find, in any of them, an eminent man of letters who is a professor in a university, except, perhaps, in the professions of law and physic; professions from which the church is not so likely to draw them. After the church of Rome, that of England, is by far the richest and best endowed church in Christendom. In England, accordingly, the church is continually draining the universities of all their best and ablest members; and an old college tutor. who is known and distinguished in Europe as an eminent man of letters, is as rarely to be found there as in any Roman catholic country. In Geneva, on the contrary, in the protestant cantons of Switzerland, in the protestant countries of Germany, in Holland, in Scotland, in Sweden, and Denmark, the most eminent men of letters whom those countries have produced, have, not all indeed, but the far greater part of them, been professors in universities. In those countries the universities are continually draining the church of all its most eminent men of letters.

IT may, perhaps, be worth while to remark, that, if we except the poets, a few orators, and a few historians, the far greater part

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BOOK of the other eminent men of letters, both of Greece and Rome, appear to have been either public or private teachers; generally either of philosophy or of rhetoric. This remark will be found to hold true from the days of Lysias and Isocrates, of Plato and Aristotle, down to those of Plutarch and Epictetus, of Suetonius and Quintilian. Several of those whom we do not know with certainty to have been public teachers, appear to have been private tutors. Polybius, we know, was private tutor to Scipio Æmilianus. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, there are some probable reasons for believing, was fo to the children of Marcus and Quintus Cicero. To impose upon any man the necessity of teaching, year after year, any particular branch of science, seems, in reality, to be the most effectual method for rendering him completely master of it himfelf. By being obliged to go every year over the same ground, if he is good for any thing, he necessarily becomes, in a few years, well acquainted with every part of it: and if upon any particular point he should form too hasty an opinion one year, when he comes in the course of his lectures to re-consider the same subject the year thereafter, he is very likely to correct it. As to be a teacher of fcience is certainly the natural employment of a mere man of letters; fo is it likewise, perhaps, the education which is most likely to render him a man of folid learning and knowledge. The mediocrity of church benefices naturally tends to draw the greater part of men of letters, in the country where it takes place, to the employment in which they can be the most useful to the public, and, at the same time, to give them the best education, perhaps, they are capable of receiving. It tends to render their learning both as folid as possible, and as useful as possible.

> THE revenue of every established church, such parts of it excepted as may arise from particular lands or manors, is a branch, it ought to be observed, of the general revenue of the state, which

is thus diverted to a purpose very different from the defence of the CHAP. state. The tythe, for example, is a real land-tax, which puts it out of the power of the proprietors of land to contribute fo largely towards the defence of the state as they otherwise might be able to do. The rent of land, however, is, according to some, the sole fund, and, according to others, the principal fund, from which, in all great monarchies, the exigencies of the state must be ultimately supplied. The more of this fund that is given to the church, the less, it is evident, can be spared to the state. It may be laid down as a certain maxim, that, all other things being supposed equal, the richer the church, the poorer must necessarily be, either the sovereign on the one hand, or the people on the other; and, in all cases, the less able must the state be to defend itself. In several protestant countries, particularly in all the protestant cantons of Switzerland, the revenue which antiently belonged to the Roman catholic church, the tythes and church lands, has been found a fund fufficient not only to afford competent salaries to the established clergy, but to defray, with little or no addition, all the other expences of the state. The magistrates of the powerful canton of Berne, in particular, have accumulated out of the favings from this fund a very large fum, supposed to amount to several millions, part of which is deposited in a public treasure, and part is placed at interest in what are called the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe; chiefly in those of France and Great Britain. What may be the amount of the whole expence which the church, either of Berne, or of any other protestant canton, costs the state. I do not pretend to know. By a very exact account it appears, that, in 1755, the whole revenue of the clergy of the church of Scotland, including their glebe or church lands, and the rent of their manses or dwelling houses, estimated according to a reasonable valuation, amounted only to 68, 514l. 1s. 5d. 1. This very moderate revenue affords a decent subsistence to nine hundred and forty-

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BOOK four ministers. The whole expence of the church, including what is occasionally laid out for the building and reparation of churches, and of the manses of ministers, cannot well be supposed to exceed eighty or eighty-five thousand pounds a year. The most opulent church in Christendom does not maintain better the uniformity of faith, the fervour of devotion, the spirit of order, regularity, and austere morals in the great body of the people, than this very poorly endowed church of Scotland. All the good effects, both civil and religious, which an established church can be supposed to produce, are produced by it as completely as by any other. The greater part of the protestant churches of Switzerland, which in general are not better endowed than the church of Scotland, produce those effects in a still higher degree. In the greater part of the protestant cantons, there is not a fingle person to be found who does not profess himself to be of the established church. If he professes himself to be of any other, indeed, the law obliges him to leave the canton. But so severe, or rather indeed so oppresfive a law, could never have been executed in fuch free countries. had not the diligence of the clergy before-hand converted to the established church the whole body of the people, with the exception of, perhaps, a few individuals only. In some parts of Switzerland, accordingly, where, from the accidental union of a protestant and roman catholic country, the conversion has not been fo complete, both religions are not only tolerated, but established by law.

> THE proper performance of every fervice feems to require that its pay or recompence should be, as exactly as possible, proportioned to the nature of the service. If any service is very much under-paid, it is very apt to fuffer by the meanness and incapacity of the greater part of those who are employed in it. If it is very much over-paid, it is apt to fuffer, perhaps, still more by their negligence and idleness. A man of a large revenue, whatever may

to his profession, thinks he ought to live like other men of large revenues; and to spend a great part of his time in sessivity, in vanity, and in dissipation. But in a clergyman this train of life not only consumes the time which ought to be employed in the duties of his function, but in the eyes of the common people destroys almost entirely that sanctity of character which can alone enable him to perform those duties with proper weight and authority.

PART IV.

Of the Expence of Supporting the Dignity of the Sovereign.

OVER and above the expence necessary for enabling the sovereign to perform his several duties, a certain expence is requisite for the support of his dignity. This expence varies both with the different periods of improvement, and with the different forms of government.

In an opulent and improved society, where all the different orders of people are growing every day more expensive in their houses, in their furniture, in their tables, in their dress, and in their equipage; it cannot well be expected that the sovereign should alone hold out against the fashion. He naturally, therefore, or rather necessarily becomes more expensive in all those different articles too. His dignity even seems to require that he should become so.

As in point of dignity, a monarch is more raised above his subjects than the chief magistrate of any republic is ever supposed to be above his fellow citizens; so a greater expence is necessary for supporting that higher dignity. We naturally expect more splendor in the court of a king than in the mansion-house of a doge or burgo-master.

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BOOK V.

CONCLUSION.

THE expence of defending the fociety, and that of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, are both laid out for the general benefit of the whole society. It is reasonable, therefore, that they should be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society, all the different members contributing, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities.

THE expence of the administration of justice too may, no doubt. be considered as laid out for the benefit of the whole society. There is no impropriety, therefore, in its being defrayed by the general contribution of the whole fociety. The perfons, however, who give occasion to this expence are those, who, by their injustice in one way or another, make it necessary to seek redress or protection from the courts of justice. The persons again most immediately benefited by this expence, are those whom the courts of justice either restore to their rights or maintain in their rights. The expence of the administration of justice, therefore, may very properly be defrayed by the particular contribution of one or other or both of those two different sets of persons according as different occasions may require, that is, by the fees of court. It cannot be necessary to have recourse to the general contribution of the whole society. except for the conviction of those criminals who have not themfelves any estate or fund sufficient for paying those fees.

THOSE local or provincial expences of which the benefit is local or provincial (what is laid out, for example, upon the police of a particular town or district) ought to be defrayed by a local or provincial revenue, and ought to be no burden upon the general revenue of the society. It is unjust that the whole society should contribute towards an expence of which the benefit is confined to a part of the society.

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THE expence of maintaining good roads and communications CHAP. is, no doubt, beneficial to the whole fociety, and may, therefore, without any injustice, be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole fociety. This expence, however, is most immediately and directly beneficial to those who travel or carry goods from one place to another, and to those who consume such goods. The turnpike tolls in England, and the duties called peages in other countries, lay it altogether upon those two different setts of people, and thereby discharge the general revenue of the society from a very confiderable burden.

THE expence of the institutions for education and religious instruction, is likewise, no doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without injustice, be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole fociety. This expence, however, might perhaps with equal propriety, and even with fome advantage, be defrayed altogether by those who receive the immediate benefit of fuch education and inftruction, or by the voluntary contribution of those who think they have occasion for either the one or the other.

WHEN the institutions or public works which are beneficial to the whole fociety, either cannot be maintained altogether, or are not maintained altogether by the contribution of fuch particular members of the fociety as are most immediately benefited by them, the deficiency must in most cases be made up by the general contribution of the whole fociety. The general revenue of the fociety, over and above defraying the expence of defending the fociety and of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, must make up for the deficiency of many particular branches of revenue. The fources of this general or public revenue, I shall endeavour to explain in the following chapter.

BOOK V.

CHAP. II.

Of the Sources of the general or publick Revenue of the Society.

The revenue which must defray, not only the expence of defending the society and of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, but all the other necessary expences of government, for which the constitution of the state has not provided any particular revenue, may be drawn, either, first, from some fund which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and which is independent of the revenue of the people; or, secondly, from the revenue of the people.

PART I.

Of the Funds or Sources of Revenue which may peculiarly belong to the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

THE funds or fources of revenue which may peculiarly belong to the fovereign or commonwealth must consist either in stock or in land.

THE fovereign, like any other owner of stock, may derive a revenue from it, either by employing it himself, or by lending it. His revenue is in the one case, prosit; in the other, interest.

THE revenue of a Tartar or Arabian chief confists in profit. It arises principally from the milk and increase of his own herds and flocks, of which he himself super-intends the management, and is the principal shepherd or herdsman of his own horde or tribe. It is, however, in this earliest and rudest state of civil government only

only that profit has ever made the principal part of the public CHAP. revenue of a monarchical state.

SMALL republics have fometimes derived a confiderable revenue from the profit of mercantile projects. The republic of Hamburgh is faid to do fo from the profits of a public wine cellar and apothecaries shop *. The state cannot be very great of which the sovereign has leifure to carry on the trade of a wine merchant or apothecary. The profit of a public bank has been a fource of revenue to more considerable states. It has been so not only to Hamburgh, but to Venice and Amsterdam. A revenue of this kind has even by some people been thought not below the attention of so great an empire as that of Great Britain. Reckoning the ordinary dividend of the bank of England at five and a half per cent. and its capital at ten millions feven hundred and eighty thousand pounds, the neat annual profit, after paying the expence of management, must amount, it is faid, to five hundred and ninety-two thousand nine hundred pounds. Government, it is pretended, could borrow this capital at three per cent, interest, and by taking the management of the bank into its own hands, might make a clear profit of two hundred and fixty-nine thousand five hundred pounds a year. The orderly, vigilant and parfimonious administration of fuch aristocracies as those of Venice and Amsterdam, is extremely proper, it appears from experience, for the management of a mercantile project of this kind. But whether such a government as that of England; which, whatever may be its virtues, has never

^{*}See Memoires concernant les Droits & Impositions en Europe: tome 1. page 73. This work was compiled by the order of the court for the use of a commission employed for some years past in considering the proper means for reforming the sinances of France. The account of the French taxes, which takes up three volumes in quarto, may be regarded as perfectly authentic. That of those of other European nations was compiled from such informations as the French ministers at the different courts could procure. It is much shorter, and probably not quite so exact as that of the French taxes.

BOOK been famous for good occonomy, which in time of peace has generally conducted itself with the slothful and negligent profusion that is perhaps natural to monarchies; and in time of war has conflantly acted with all the thoughtless extravagance that democracies are apt to fall into; could be fafely trusted with the management of fuch a project must at least be a good deal more doubtful.

> THE post office is properly a mercantile project. The government advances the expence of establishing the different offices, and of buying or hiring the necessary horses or carriages, and is repaid with a large profit by the duties upon what is carried. It is perhaps the only mercantile project which has been fuccefsfully managed by, I believe, every fort of government. The capital to be advanced is not very confiderable. There is no mystery in the business. The returns are not only certain, but immediate.

> PRINCES, however, have frequently engaged in many other mercantile projects, and have been willing, like private persons, to mend their fortunes by becoming adventurers in the common branches of trade. They have fcarce ever fucceeded. fusion with which the affairs of princes are always managed, renders it almost impossible that they should. The agents of a prince regard the wealth of their master as inexhaustible; are careless at what price they buy; are careless at what price they fell; are careless at what expence they transport his goods from one place to another. Those agents frequently live with the profufion of princes, and fometimes too, in spite of that profusion, and by a proper method of making up their accounts, acquire the fortunes of princes. It was thus, as we are told by Machiavel, that the agents of Lorenzo of Medicis, not a prince of mean abilities, carried on his trade. The republic of Florence was feveral times obliged to pay the debt into which their extrava-

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gance had involved him. He found it convenient, accordingly, CHAP. to give up the business of merchant, the business to which his family had originally owed their fortune, and in the latter part of his life to employ both what remained of that fortune, and the revenue of the state of which he had the disposal, in projects and expences more suitable to his station.

No two characters feem more inconfiftent than those of trader If the trading spirit of the English East India and fovereign. company renders them very bad fovereigns; the spirit of fovereignty feems to have rendered them equally bad traders. While they were traders only, they managed their trade successfully, and were able to pay from their profits a moderate dividend to the proprietors of their stock. Since they became fovereigns, with a revenue which, it is faid, was originally more than three millions sterling, they have been obliged to beg the extraordinary affistance of government in order to avoid immediate bankruptcy. In their former situation, their servants in India considered themselves as the clerks of merchants: In their present situation, those servants confider themselves as the ministers of sovereigns.

A STATE may fometimes derive some part of its public revenue from the interest of money, as well as from the profits of stock. If it has amassed a treasure, it may lend a part of that treasure, either to foreign states, or to its own subjects.

THE canton of Berne derives a confiderable revenue by lending a part of its treasure to foreign states, that is, by placing it in the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe, chiefly in those of France and England. The security of this revenue must depend, first, upon the security of the funds in which it is placed, or upon the good faith of the government which has the management of them; and, fecondly, upon the certainty or probability

BOOK bability of the continuance of peace with the debtor nation. In the case of a war, the very first act of hostility, on the part of the debtor nation, might be the forfeiture of the funds of its creditor. This policy of lending money to foreign states is, fo far as I know, peculiar to the canton of Berne.

> THE city of Hamburgh * has established a fort of public pawnshop, which lends money to the subjects of the state upon pledges at fix per cent. interest. This pawn-shop or Lombard, as it is called, affords a revenue, it is pretended, to the state of a hundred and fifty thousand crowns, which, at four and sixpence the crown, amounts to 33,750 l. sterling.

> THE government of Penfylvania, without amassing any treafure, invented a method of lending, not money indeed, but what is equivalent to money, to its subjects. By advancing to private people, at interest, and upon land security to double the value. paper bills of credit to be redeemed fifteen years after their date, and in the mean time made transferable from hand to hand like bank notes, and declared by act of affembly to be a legal tender in all payments from one inhabitant of the province to another, it raised a moderate revenue, which went a considerable way towards defraying an annual expence of about 4500 l. the whole ordinary expence of that frugal and orderly government. The fuccess of an expedient of this kind must have depended upon three different circumstances; first, upon the demand for some other instrument of commerce, besides gold and filver money, or upon the demand for fuch a quantity of confumable stock as could not be had without fending abroad the greater part of their gold and filver money, in order to purchase it; fecondly, upon the good credit of the government which made use of this expedient; and, thirdly, upon the moderation with

^{*} See id. ibid.

which it was used, the whole value of the paper bills of credit CHAP. never exceeding that of the gold and silver money which would have been necessary for carrying on their circulation had there been no paper bills of credit. The same expedient was upon different occasions adopted by several other American colonies; but, from want of this moderation, it produced, in the greater part of them, much more disorder than conveniency.

THE unstable and perishable nature of stock and credit, however, render them unsit to be trusted to as the principal funds of that sure, steady, and permanent revenue, which can alone give security and dignity to government. The government of no great nation, that was advanced beyond the shepherd state, seems ever to have derived the greater part of its public revenue from such sources.

Land is a fund of a more stable and permanent nature; and the rent of public lands, accordingly, has been the principal source of the public revenue of many a great nation that was much advanced beyond the shepherd state. From the produce or rent of the public lands, the antient republics of Greece and Italy derived for a long time the greater part of that revenue which defrayed the necessary expences of the commonwealth. The rent of the crown lands constituted for a long time the greater part of the revenue of the antient sovereigns of Europe.

WAR and the preparation for war, are the two circumstances which in modern times occasion the greater part of the necessary expense of all great states. But in the antient republics of Greece and Italy every citizen was a soldier, who both served and prepared himself for service at his own expense. Neither of those two circumstances, therefore, could occasion any very considerable expense to the state. The rent of a very moderate landed

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BOOK estate might be fully sufficient for defraying all the other necessary expences of government.

In the antient monarchies of Europe, the manners and customs of the times fufficiently prepared the great body of the people for war; and when they took the field they were, by the condition of their feudal tenures, to be maintained either at their own expence, or at that of their immediate lords, without bringing any new charge upon the fovereign. The other expences of government were, the greater part of them, very moderate. The administration of justice, it has been shown, instead of being a cause of expence, was a source of revenue. The labour of the country people for three days before and for three days after harvest, was thought a fund sufficient for making and maintaining all the bridges, highways, and other public works which the commerce of the country was supposed to require. In those days the principal expence of the fovereign feems to have confifted in the maintenance of his own family and houshold. The officers of his houshold, accordingly, were then the great officers of state. The lord treasurer received his rents. The lord steward and lord chamberlain looked after the expence of his family. The care of his stables was committed to the lord constable and the lord marshal. His houses were all built in the form of castles, and seem to have been the principal fortresses which he possessed. The keepers of those houses or castles might be confidered as a fort of military governors. They feem to have been the only military officers whom it was necessary to maintain in time of peace. In these circumstances the rent of a great landed estate might, upon ordinary occasions, very well defray all the necessary expences of government.

In the present state of the greater part of the civilized monarchies of Europe, the rent of all the lands in the country, managed managed as they probably would be if they all belonged to one CHAP. proprietor, would fcarce perhaps amount to the ordinary revenue which they levy upon the people even in peaceable times. The ordinary revenue of Great Britain, for example, including not only what is necessary for defraying the current expence of the year, but for paying the interest of the public debts, and for finking a part of the capital of those debts, amounts to upwards of ten millions a year. But the land-tax, at four shillings in the pound, falls short of two millions a year. This land-tax, as it is called, however, is supposed to be one-fifth, not only of the rent of all the land, but of that of all the houses, and of the interest of all the capital stock of Great Britain, that part of it only excepted which is either lent to the public, or employed as farming stock in the cultivation of land. A very confiderable part of the produce of this tax arises from the rent of houses, and the interest of capital stock. The land-tax of the city of London, for example, at four shillings in the pound, amounts to 123,399 l. 6 s. 7 d. That of the city of Westminster, to 63,092 l. 1 s. 5 d. That of the palaces of Whitehall and St. James's, to 30,754 l. 6 s. 3 d. A certain proportion of the land-tax is in the same manner affested upon all the other cities and towns corporate in the kingdom. and arises almost altogether either from the rent of houses or from what is supposed to be the interest of trading and capital stock. According to the estimation, therefore, by which Great Britain is rated to the land-tax, the whole mass of revenue arising from the rent of all the lands, from that of all the houses, and from the interest of all the capital stock, that part of it only excepted which is either lent to the public or employed in the cultivation of land, does not exceed ten millions sterling a year, the ordinary revenue which government levies upon the people even in peaceable times. The estimation by which Great Britain is rated to the land-tax is, no doubt, taking the whole kingdom at an average, very much below the real value; though in feveral particular

BOOK ticular counties and districts it is faid to be nearly equal to that value. The rent of the lands alone, exclusive of that of houses, and of the interest of stock, has by many people been estimated at twenty millions, an estimation made in a great measure at random, and which, I apprehend, is as likely to be above as below the truth. But if the lands of Great Britain, in the present state of their cultivation, do not afford a rent of more than twenty millions a year, they could not well afford the half, most probably not the fourth part of that rent, if they all belonged to a fingle proprietor, and were put under the negligent, expensive, and oppreffive management of his factors and agents. The crown lands of Great Britain do not at present afford the fourth part of the rent which could probably be drawn from them if they were the property of private persons. If the crown lands were more extensive. it is probable they would be still worse managed.

> THE revenue which the great body of the people derives from land is in proportion, not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. The whole annual produce of the land of every country, if we except what is referved for feed, is either annually confumed by the great body of the people, or exchanged for fomething else that is confumed by them. Whatever keeps down the produce of the land below what it would otherwise rise to. keeps down the revenue of the great body of the people still more than it does that of the proprietors of land. The rent of land, that portion of the produce which belongs to the proprietors, is scarce any where in Great Britain supposed to be more than a third part of the whole produce. If the land, which in one state of cultivation affords a rent of ten millions sterling a year, would in another afford a rent of twenty millions; the rent being, in both cases, supposed a third part of the produce; the revenue of the proprietors would be less than it otherwise might be by ten millions a year only; but the revenue of the great body of the peo

ple would be less than it otherwise might be by thirty millions a CHAP. year, deducting only what would be necessary for seed. The population of the country would be less by the number of people which thirty millions a year, deducting always the feed, could maintain, according to the particular mode of living and expence which might take place in the different ranks of men among whom the remainder was distributed.

THOUGH there is not at present, in Europe, any civilized state of any kind which derives the greater part of its public revenue from the rent of lands which are the property of the state; yet, in all the great monarchies of Europe, there are still many large tracts of land which belong to the crown. They are generally forest; and fometimes forest where, after travelling several miles, you will scarce find a single tree; a mere waste and loss of country in respect both of produce and population. In every great monarchy of Europe the fale of the crown lands would produce a very large fum of money, which, if applied to the payment of the public debts, would deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which those lands have ever afforded to the crown. tries where lands, improved and cultivated very highly, and yielding at the time of fale as great a rent as can easily be got from them. commonly fell at thirty years purchase; the unimproved, uncultivated, and low-rented crown lands might well be expected to fell at forty, fifty, or fixty years purchase. The crown might immediately enjoy the revenue which this great price would redeem from mortgage. In the course of a few years it would probably enjoy another revenue. When the crown lands had become private property, they would, in the course of a few years, become wellimproved and well-cultivated. The increase of their produce would increase the population of the country, by augmenting the revenue and confumption of the people. But the revenue which the crown derives

BOOK derives from the duties of customs and excise, would necessarily increase with the revenue and consumption of the people.

THE revenue which, in any civilized monarchy, the crown derives from the crown lands, though it appears to cost nothing to individuals, in reality costs more to the society than perhaps any other equal revenue which the crown enjoys. It would, in all cases, be for the interest of the society to replace this revenue to the crown by some other equal revenue, and to divide the lands among the people, which could not well be done better, perhaps, than by exposing them to public sale.

LANDS, for the purposes of pleasure and magnificence, parks, gardens, public walks, &c. possessions which are every where considered as causes of expence, not as sources of revenue, seem to be the only lands which, in a great and civilized monarchy, ought to belong to the crown.

Public stock and public lands, therefore, the two sources of revenue which may peculiarly belong to the sovereign or commonwealth, being both improper and insufficient funds for destraying the necessary expence of any great and civilized state; it remains that this expence must, the greater part of it, be destrayed by taxes of one kind or another; the people contributing a part of their own private revenue in order to make up a public revenue to the sovereign or common-wealth.

PART II.

Of Taxes.

THE private revenue of individuals, it has been shewn in the first book of this inquiry, arises ultimately from three different sources; Rent, Profit, and Wages. Every tax must finally be paid from

from some one or other of those three different sorts of revenue, or from all of them indifferently. I shall endeavour to give the best account I can, first, of those taxes which, it is intended, should fall upon rent; secondly, of those which, it is intended, should fall upon profit; thirdly, of those which, it is intended, should fall upon wages; and, fourthly, of those which, it is intended, should fall indifferently upon all those three different sources of private revenue. The particular consideration of each of these four different forts of taxes will divide the second part of the present chapter into sour articles, three of which will require several other subdivisions. Many of those taxes, it will appear from the following review, are not finally paid from the fund or source of revenue upon which it was intended they should fall.

BEFORE I enter upon the examination of particular taxes, it is necessary to premise the four following maxims with regard to taxes in general.

I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expence of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expence of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate. In the observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. Every tax, it must be observed once for all, which falls finally upon one only of the three sorts of revenue above-mentioned is necessarily unequal, in so far as it does not affect the other two. In the following examination of different taxes I shall seldom take much further notice of this sort of inequality, but shall,

BOOK in most cases, confine my observations to that inequality which is occasioned by a particular tax falling unequally even upon that particular fort of private revenue which is affected by it.

II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself. The uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favours the corruption of an order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty.

III. EVERY tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the rent of land or of houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are usually paid, is levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay; or, when he is most likely to have wherewithal to pay. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very convenient for him. He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty too either to buy or not to buy as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconveniency from such taxes.

IV. Every tax ought to be fo contrived as both to take out CHAP. and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury, in the four following ways. First, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose falaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another additional tax upon the people. Secondly, it may obstruct the industry of the people, and discourage them from applying to certain branches of business which might give maintenance and employment to great multitudes. While it obliges the people to pay, it may thus diminish, or perhaps destroy some of the funds, which might enable them more easily to do fo. Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the employment of their capitals. An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to smuggling. But the penalties of fmuggling must rife in proportion to the temptation. The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates the temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it; and it commonly enhances the punishment too in proportion to the very circumstance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the crime*. Fourthly, by fubiecting the people to the frequent visits, and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecesfary trouble, vexation, and oppression; and though vexation is not, ffrictly fpeaking, expence, it is certainly equivalent to the expence at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. It is in some one or other of these four different ways that taxes are frequently fo much more burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the fovereign.

^{*} See Sketches of the History of Man, page 474. & seq.

BOOK V.

THE evident justice and utility of the foregoing maxims have recommended them more or less to the attention of all nations. All nations have endeavoured, to the best of their judgement, to render their taxes as equal, as certain, as convenient to the contributor, both in the time and in the mode of payment, and, in proportion to the revenue which they brought to the prince, as little burdensome to the people as they could contrive. The following short review of some of the principal taxes which have taken place in different ages and countries will show that the endeavours of all nations have not in this respect been equally successful.

ARTICLE I.

Taxes upon Rent. Taxes upon the Rent of Land.

A TAX upon the rent of land may either be imposed according to a certain canon, every district being valued at a certain rent, which valuation is not afterwards to be altered; or it may be imposed in such a manner as to vary with every variation in the real rent of the land, and to rise or fall with the improvement or declension of its cultivation.

A LAND tax which, like that of Great Britain, is imposed according to a certain invariable canon, though it should be equal at the time of its first establishment, necessarily becomes unequal in process of time according to the unequal degrees of improvement or neglect in the cultivation of the different parts of the country. In England, the valuation according to which the different counties and parishes were assessed to the land-tax by the 4th of William and Mary was very unequal even at its first establishment. This tax, therefore, so far offends against the first of the four maxims above-mentioned. It is perfectly agreeable to the other three. It is perfectly certain. The time of payment for the tax, being the same as that for the rent, is as convenient

convenient as it can be to the contributor. Though the landlord is in all cases the real contributor, the tax is commonly advanced by the tenant, to whom the landlord is obliged to allow it in the payment of the rent. This tax is levied by a much smaller number of officers than any other which affords nearly the same revenue. As the tax does not rise with the rise of the rent, the sovereign does not share in the profits of the landlord's improvements. The tax, therefore, does not discourage those improvements, nor keep down the produce of the land below what it would otherwise rise to. As it has no tendency to diminish the quantity, it can have none to raise the price of that produce. It does not obstruct the industry of the people. It subjects the landlord to no other inconveniency besides the unavoidable one of paying the tax.

THE advantage, however, which the landlord has derived from the invariable constancy of the valuation by which all the lands of Great Britain are rated to the land-tax, has been principally owing to some circumstances altogether extraneous to the nature of the tax.

part of the country, the rents of almost all the estates of Great Britain having, since the time when this valuation was first established, been continually rising, and scarce any of them having fallen. The landlords, therefore, have almost all gained the difference between the tax which they would have paid, according to the present rent of their estates, and that which they actually pay according to the ancient valuation. Had the state of the country been different, had rents been gradually falling in consequence of the declension of cultivation, the landlords would almost all have lost this difference. In the state of things which has happened to take place since the revolution, the constancy of the valuation has been advantageous to the landlord and hurtful to the sovereign. In a different state of things

BOOK it might have been advantageous to the fovereign and hurtful to the landlord.

As the tax is made payable in money, fo the valuation of the land is expressed in money. Since the establishment of this valuation the value of filver has been pretty uniform, and there has been no alteration in the standard of the coin either as to weight or fineness. Had filver risen considerably in its value, as it feems to have done in the course of the two centuries which preceded the discovery of the mines of America, the constancy of the valuation might have proved very oppressive to the landlord. Had filver fallen confiderably in its value, as it certainly did for about a century at least after the discovery of those mines, the same constancy of valuation would have reduced very much this branch of the revenue of the fovereign. Had any confiderable alteration been made in the standard of the money, either by finking the fame quantity of filver to a lower denomination, or by raifing it to a higher; had an ounce of filver, for example, instead of being coined into five shillings and twopence, been coined either into pieces which bore fo low a denomination as two shillings and feven-pence, or into pieces which bore so high a one as ten shillings and fourpence, it would in the one case have hurt the revenue of the proprietor, in the other that of the fovereign.

In circumstances, therefore, somewhat different from those which have actually taken place, this constancy of valuation might have been a very great inconveniency, either to the contributors, or to the commonwealth. In the course of ages such circumstances, however, must, at some time or other, happen. But though empires, like all the other works of men, have all hitherto proved mortal, yet every empire aims at immortality. Every constitution, therefore, which it is meant should be as permanent as the empire itself, ought to be convenient, not in certain circumstances only,

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but in all circumstances; or ought to be suited, not to those circum- CHAP. stances which are transitory, occasional, or accidental, but to those which are necessary and therefore always the same.

A TAX upon the rent of land which varies with every variation of the rent, or which rifes and falls according to the improvement or neglect of cultivation, is recommended by that fect of men of letters in France, who call themselves, the oeconomists, as the most equitable of all taxes. All taxes, they pretend, fall ultimately upon the rent of land, and ought therefore to be imposed equally upon the fund which must finally pay them. That all taxes ought to fall as equally as possible upon the fund which must finally pay them, is certainly true. But without entering into the difagreeable discussion of the metaphysical arguments by which they support their very ingenious theory, it will fufficiently appear from the following review, what are the taxes which fall finally upon the rent of the land, and what are those which fall finally upon some other fund.

In the Venetian territory all the arable lands which are given in lease to farmers are taxed at a tenth of the rent *. The leases are recorded in a public register which is kept by the officers of revenue in each province or district. When the proprietor cultivates his own lands, they are valued according to an equitable estimation and he is allowed a deduction of one-fifth of the tax, fo that for fuch lands he pays only eight instead of ten per cent. of the supposed rent.

A LAND-TAX of this kind is certainly more equal than the land-tax of England. It might not perhaps be altogether fo certain, and the affessment of the tax might frequently occasion a

^{*} Memoires concernant les Droits. p. 240, 241.

BOOK good deal more trouble to the landlord. It might too be a good deal more expensive in the levying.

Such a fystem of administration, however, might perhaps be contrived as would in a great measure both prevent this uncertainty and moderate this expence.

THE landlord and tenant, for example, might jointly be obliged to record their lease in a public register. Proper penalties might be enacted against concealing or misrepresenting any of the conditions; and if part of those penalties was to be paid to either of the two parties who informed against and convicted the other of such concealment or misrepresentation, it would effectually deter them from combining together in order to defraud the public revenue. All the conditions of the lease might be sufficiently known from such a record.

Some landlords, instead of raising the rent, take a sine for the renewal of the lease. This practice is in most cases the expedient of a spendthrist, who for a sum of ready money sells a suture revenue of much greater value. It is in most cases, therefore, hurtful to the landlord. It is frequently hurtful to the tenant, and it is always hurtful to the community. It frequently takes from the tenant so great a part of his capital, and thereby diminishes so much his ability to cultivate the land, that he finds it more difficult to pay a small rent than it would otherwise have been to pay a great one. Whatever diminishes his ability to cultivate, necessarily keeps down below what it would otherwise have been the most important part of the revenue of the community. By rendering the tax upon such sines a good deal heavier than upon the ordinary rent, this hurtful practice might be discouraged to the no small advantage

of all the different parties concerned, of the landlord, of the CHAP. tenant, of the fovereign, and of the whole community.

Some leases prescribe to the tenant a certain mode of cultivation, and a certain succession of crops during the whole continuance of the lease. This condition (which is generally the effect of the landlords conceit of his own superior knowledge, a conceit in most cases very ill founded) ought always to be considered as an additional rent; as a rent in service instead of a rent in money. In order to discourage the practice, which is generally a foolish one, this species of rent might be valued rather high, and consequently taxed somewhat higher than common money rents.

Some landlords, instead of a rent in money, require a rent in kind, in corn, cattle, poultry, wine, oil, &c. others again require a rent in service. Such rents are always more hurtful to the tenant than beneficial to the landlord. They either take more or keep more out of the pocket of the former than they put into that of the latter. In every country where they take place, the tenants are poor and beggarly, pretty much according to the degree in which they take place. By valuing, in the same manner, such rents rather high, and consequently taxing them somewhat higher than common money-rents, a practice which is hurtful to the whole community might perhaps be sufficiently discouraged.

WHEN the landlord chose to occupy himself a part of his own lands, the rent might be valued according to an equitable arbitration of the farmers and landlords in the neighbourhood, and a moderate abatement of the tax might be granted to him in the same manner as in the Venetian territory; provided the rent of the lands which he occupied did not exceed a certain sum. It is of importance that the landlord should be encouraged to cultivate a part of

BOOK his own land. His capital is generally greater than that of the tenant, and with less skill he can frequently raise a greater produce. The landlord can afford to try experiments, and is generally disposed to do so. His unsuccessful experiments occasion only a moderate loss to himself. His successful ones contribute to the improvement and better cultivation of the whole country. It might be of importance however, that the abatement of the tax should encourage him to cultivate to a certain extent only. the landlords should the greater part of them be tempted to farm the whole of their own lands, the country, (instead of sober and industrious tenants, who are bound by their own interest to cultivate as well as their capital and skill will allow them) would be filled with idle and profligate bailiffs, whose abusive management would foon degrade the cultivation and reduce the annual produce of the land, to the diminution, not only of the revenue of their masters, but of the most important part of that of the whole fociety.

> Such a system of administration might perhaps free a tax of this kind from any degree of uncertainty which could occasion either oppression or inconveniency to the contributor; and might at the same time serve to introduce into the common management of land, fuch a plan or policy as might contribute a good deal to the general improvement and good cultivation of the country.

> THE expence of levying a land-tax, which varied with every variation of the rent, would no doubt be fomewhat greater than that of levying one which was always rated according to a fixed valuation. Some additional expence would necessarily be incurred both by the different register offices which it would be proper to establish in the different districts of the country, and by the different valuations which might occasionally be made of

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the lands which the proprietor chose to occupy himself. The C expence of all this, however, might be very moderate, and much below what is incurred in the levying of many other taxes which afford a very inconsiderable revenue in comparison of what might easily be drawn from a tax of this kind.

THE discouragement which a variable land-tax of this kind might give to the improvement of land seems to be the most important objection which can be made to it. The landlord would certainly be less disposed to improve when the sovereign, who contributed nothing to the expence, was to share in the profit of the improvement. Even this objection might perhaps be obviated by allowing the landlord, before he began his improvement, to ascertain, in conjunction with the officers of revenue, the actual value of his lands according to the equitable arbitration of a certain number of landlords and farmers in the neighbourhood equally chosen by both parties; and by rating him according to this valuation for fuch a number of years, as might be fully fufficient for his complete indemnification. To draw the attention of the fovereign towards the improvement of the land, from a regard to the increase of his own revenue, is one of the principal advantages proposed by this species of land-tax. The term, therefore, allowed for the indemnification of the landlord ought not to be a great deal longer than what was necessary for that purpose; lest the remoteness of the interest should discourage too much this attention. It had better, however, be somewhat too long than in any respect too short. No encitement to the attention of the fovereign can ever counter-balance the smallest discouragement to that of the landlord. The attention of the fovereign can be at best but a very general and vague consideration of what is likely to contribute to the better cultivation of the greater part of his dominions. The attention of the landlord is a particular and minute confideration of what is likely to be the most advan-

BOOK tageous application of every inch of ground upon his estate. The principal attention of the fovereign ought to be to encourage, by every means in his power, the attention both of the landlord and of the farmer; by allowing both to pursue their own interest in their own way, and according to their own judgement; by giving to both the most perfect security that they shall enjoy the full recompence of their own industry; and by procuring to both the most extensive market for every part of their produce in consequence of establishing the easiest and fafest communications both by land and by water, through every part of his own dominions, as well as the most unbounded freedom of exportation to the dominions of all other princes.

> IF by such a system of administration a tax of this kind could be so managed as to give, not only no discouragement, but, on the contrary, some encouragement to the improvement of land, it does not appear likely to occasion any other inconveniency to the landlord, except always the unavoidable one of being obliged to pay the tax.

> In all the variations of the state of the society, in the improvement and in the declenfion of agriculture; in all the variations in the value of filver, and in all those in the standard of the coin, a tax of this kind would, of its own accord and without any attention of government, readily suit itself to the actual situation of things, and would be equally just and equitable in all those different changes. It would, therefore, be much more proper to be established as a perpetual and unalterable regulation, or as what is called a fundamental law of the common-wealth, than any tax which was always to be levied according to a certain valuation.

> Some states, instead of the simple and obvious expedient of a register of leases, have had recourse to the laborious and expensive

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one of an actual furvey and valuation of all the lands in the CHAP. country. They have suspected, probably, that the lessor and lesse, in order to defraud the public revenue, might combine to conceal the real terms of the leafe. Doomsday book seems to have been the refult of a very accurate survey of this kind.

In the antient dominions of the king of Prussia the land-tax is affeffed according to an actual furvey and valuation, which is reviewed and altered from time to time *. According to that valuation the lay proprietors pay from twenty to twenty-five per cent. of their revenue. Ecclesiastics from forty to forty-five per cent. The furvey and valuation of Silefia was made by order of the prefent king; it is faid with great accuracy. According to that valuation the lands belonging to the bishop of Breslaw are taxed at twenty-five per cent. of their rent. The other revenues of the ecclesiastics of both religions, at fifty per cent. The commanderies of the Teutonic order and of that of Malta, at forty per cent. Lands held by a noble tenure, at thirty-eight and one-third per cent. Lands held by a base tenure, at thirty-five and one-third per cent.

THE survey and valuation of Bohemia is said to have been the work of more than a hundred years. It was not perfected till after the peace of 1748, by the orders of the present empress queen +. The survey of the dutchy of Milan, which was begun in the time of Charles VI. was not perfected till after 1760. It is esteemed one of the most accurate that has ever been made. The furvey of Savoy and Piemont was executed under the orders of the late king of Sardinia 1.

^{*} Memoires concernant les Drois, &c. tome i. p.1:4, 115, 116, &c.

[#] ld. p. 83, 84. # 1d. p. 280, &c. also p. 237, &c. t) 316.

BOOK V. In the dominions of the king of Prussia the revenue of the church is taxed much higher than that of lay proprietors. The revenue of the church is, the greater part of it, a burden upon the rent of land. It seldom happens that any part of it is applied towards the improvement of land; or is so employed as to contribute in any respect towards increasing the revenue of the great body of the people. His Prussian majesty had probably, upon that account, thought it reasonable that it should contribute a good deal more towards relieving the exigencies of the state. In some countries the lands of the church are exempted from all taxes. In others they are taxed more lightly than other lands. In the dutchy of Milan, the lands which the church possessed before 1575, are rated to the tax at a third only of their value.

In Silefia lands held by a noble tenure are taxed three per cent. higher than those held by a base tenure. The honours and privileges of different kinds annexed to the former, his Prussian majesty had probably imagined, would sufficiently compensate to the proprietor a small aggravation of the tax; while at the same time the humiliating inferiority of the latter would be in some measure alleviated by being taxed somewhat more lightly. In other countries the system of taxation, instead of alleviating, aggravates this inequality. In the dominions of the king of Sardinia, and in those provinces of France which are subject to what is called the Real or predial taille, the tax falls altogether upon the lands held by a base tenure. Those held by a noble one are exempted.

A LAND-TAX affeffed according to a general furvey and valuation, how equal foever it may be at first, must, in the course of a very moderate period of time, become unequal. To prevent its becoming so would require the continual and painful attention of government to all the variations in the state and produce of every

every different farm in the country. The governments of Prussia, CHAP. of Bohemia, of Sardinia, and of the dutchy of Milan, actually exert an attention of this kind; an attention fo unfuitable to the nature of government, that it is not likely to be of long continuance, and which, if it is continued, will probably in the longrun occasion much more trouble and vexation than it can posfibly bring relief to the contributors.

In 1666, the generality of Montauban was affested to the Real or predial taille according, it is faid, to a very exact furvey and valuation *. By 1727, this affessment had become altogether unequal. In order to remedy this inconveniency, government has found no better expedient than to impose upon the whole generality an additional tax of a hundred and twenty thousand livres. This additional tax is rated upon all the different districts fubject to the taille according to the old affeffment. levied only upon those which in the actual-state of things are by that affessment under-taxed, and it is applied to the relief of those which by the same affessment are over-taxed. Two districts, for example, one of which ought in the actual state of things to be taxed at nine hundred, the other at eleven hundred livres. are by the old affessment both taxed at a thousand livres. Both these districts are by the additional tax rated at eleven hundred livres each. But this additional tax is levied only upon the district undercharged, and it is applied altogether to the relief of that over-charged, which confequently pays only nine hundred livres. The government neither gains nor loses by the additional tax, which is applied altogether to remedy the inequalities arifing from the old affeffment. The application is pretty much regulated according to the discretion of the intendant of the generality and must, therefore, be in a great measure arbitrary.

BOOK V.

Taxes which are proportioned, not to the Rent, but to the produce of Land.

TAXES upon the produce of land are in reality taxes upon the rent; and though they may be originally advanced by the farmer, are finally paid by the landlord. When a certain portion of the produce is to be paid away for a tax, the farmer computes, as well as he can, what the value of this portion is, one year with another, likely to amount to, and he makes a proportionable abatement in the rent which he agrees to pay to the landlord. There is no farmer who does not compute beforehand what the churchtythe, which is a land-tax of this kind, is, one year with another, likely to amount to.

THE tythe, and every other land-tax of this kind, under the appearance of perfect equality, are very unequal taxes; a certain portion of the produce being, in different fituations, equivalent to a very different portion of the rent. In some very rich lands the produce is fo great, that the one half of it is fully fufficient to replace to the farmer his capital employed in cultivation, together with the ordinary profits of farming stock in the neighbourhood. The other half, or, what comes to the fame thing, the value of the other half, he could afford to pay as rent to the landlord, if there was no tythe. But if a tenth of the produce is taken from him in the way of tythe, he must require an abatement of the fifth part of this rent, otherwise he cannot get back his capital with the ordinary profit. In this case the rent of the landlord, instead of amounting to a half, or five-tenths of the whole produce, will amount only to four-tenths of it. In poorer lands, on the contrary, the produce is fometimes fo small, and the expence of cultivation fo great, that it requires four-fifths of the whole produce to replace to the farmer his capital with the ordinary profit. In this case.

case, though there was no tythe, the rent of the landlord could amount to no more than one-fifth or two-tenths of the whole produce. But if the farmer pays one-tenth of the produce in the way of tythe, he must require an equal abatement of the rent of the landlord, which will thus be reduced to one-tenth only of the whole produce. Upon the rent of rich lands, the tythe may sometimes be a tax of no more than one-fifth part, or four shillings in the pound; whereas, upon that of poorer lands, it may sometimes be a tax of one-half, or of ten shillings in the pound.

The tythe, as it is frequently a very unequal tax upon the rent, fo it is always a great discouragement both to the improvements of the landlord and to the cultivation of the farmer. The one cannot venture to make the most important, which are generally the most expensive improvements; nor the other to raise the most valuable, which are generally too the most expensive crops; when the church, which lays out no part of the expense, is to share so very largely in the profit. The cultivation of madder was for a long time confined by the tythe to the United Provinces, which, being presbyterian countries, and upon that account exempted from this destructive tax, enjoyed a fort of monopoly of that useful dying drug against the rest of Europe. The late attempts to introduce the culture of this plant into England, have been made only in consequence of the statute which enacted that five shillings an acre should be received in lieu of all manner of tythe upon madder.

As through the greater part of Europe, the church, so in many different countries of Asia the state, is principally supported by a sand-tax, proportioned, not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. In China, the principal revenue of the sovereign consists in a tenth part of the produce of all the lands of the empire. This tenth part, however, is estimated so very moderately, that, in many provinces,

BOOK vinces, it is faid not to exceed a thirtieth part of the ordinary produce. The land-tax or land rent which used to be paid to the Mahometan government of Bengal, before that country fell into the hands of the English East India company, is faid to have amounted to about a fifth part of the produce. The land-tax of antient Egypt is faid likewise to have amounted to a fifth part.

> In Asia, this fort of land-tax is said to interest the sovereign in the improvement and cultivation of land. The fovereigns of China, those of Bengal while under the Mahometan government, and those of antient Egypt, are faid accordingly to have been extremely attentive to the making and maintaining of good roads and navigable canals, in order to increase, as much as possible. both the quantity and value of every part of the produce of the land, by procuring to every part of it the most extensive market which their own dominions could afford. The tythe of the church is divided into such small portions, that no one of its proprietors can have any interest of this kind. The parson of a parish could never find his account in making a road or canal to a distant part of the country, in order to extend the market for the produce of his own particular parish. Such taxes, when destined for the maintenance of the state, have some advantages which may serve in fome measure to balance their inconveniency. When destined for the maintenance of the church, they are attended with nothing but inconveniency.

> Taxes upon the produce of land may be levied, either in kind; or, according to a certain valuation, in money.

> THE parson of a parish, or a gentleman of small fortune who lives upon his estate, may fometimes, perhaps, find some advantage in receiving, the one his tythe, and the other his rent, in kind.

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The quantity to be collected, and the district within which it is to CHAP. be collected, are so small, that they both can oversee, with their own eyes, the collection and disposal of every part of what is due to them. A gentleman of great fortune, who lived in the capital, would be in danger of suffering much by the neglect, and more by the fraud of his factors and agents, if the rents of an estate in a distant province were to be paid to him in this manner. The loss of the fovereign, from the abuse and depredation of his tax-gatherers, would necessarily be much greater. The servants of the most careless private person are, perhaps, more under the eye of their master than those of the most careful prince; and a public revenue, which was paid in kind, would fuffer so much from the mismanagement of the collectors, that a very small part of what was levied upon the people would ever arrive at the treasury of the prince. Some part of the public revenue of China, however, is faid to be paid in this manner. The Mandarins and other taxgatherers will, no doubt, find their advantage in continuing the practice of a payment which is so much more liable to abuse than any payment in money.

A Tax upon the produce of land which is levied in money, may be levied either according to a valuation which varies with all the variations of the market price; or according to a fixed valuation, a bushel of wheat, for example, being always valued at one and the same money price, whatever may be the state of the market. The produce of a tax levied in the former way, will vary only according to the variations in the real produce of the land, according to the improvement or neglect of cultivation. The produce of a tax levied in the latter way will vary, not only according to the variations in the produce of the land, but according to both those in the value of the precious metals, and those in the quantity of those metals which is at different times contained in

coin

BOOK coin of the fame denomination. The produce of the former will always bear the fame proportion to the value of the real produce of the land. The produce of the latter may, at different times, bear very different proportions to that value.

> WHEN, instead either of a certain portion of the produce of land, or of the price of a certain portion, a certain fum of money is to be paid in full compensation for all tax or tythe; the tax becomes, in this case, exactly of the same nature with the land-tax of England. It neither rifes nor falls with the rent of the land. It neither encourages nor discourages improvement. The tythe in the greater part of those parishes which pay what is called a Modus in lieu of all other tythe, is a tax of this kind. During the Mahometan government of Bengal, instead of the payment in kind of a fifth part of the produce, a modus, and, it is faid, a very moderate onc, was established in the greater part of the districts or zemindaries of the country. Some of the fervants of the East India company, under pretence of restoring the public revenue to its proper value, have, in fome provinces, exchanged this modus for a payment in kind. Under their management this change is likely both to discourage cultivation, and to give new opportunities for abuse in the collection of the public revenue, which has fallen very much below what it was faid to have been when it first fell under the management of the company. The fervants of the company may, perhaps, have profited by this change, but at the expence, it is probable, both of their masters and of the country.

Taxes upon the Rent of Houses.

THE rent of a house may be distinguished into two parts, of which the one may very properly be called the Building rent; the other is commonly called the Ground rent.

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THE building rent is the interest or profit of the capital expended CHAP. in building the house. In order to put the trade of a builder upon a level with other trades, it is necessary that this rent should be sufficient, first, to pay him the same interest which he would have got for his capital if he had lent it upon good fecurity; and, fecondly, to keep the house in constant repair, or, what comes to the same thing, to replace, within a certain term of years, the capital which had been employed in building it. The building rent, or the ordinary profit of building, is, therefore, every where regulated by the ordinary interest of money. Where the market rate of interest is four per cent. the rent of a house which, over and above paying the ground rent, affords fix, or fix and a half per cent. upon the whole expence of building, may perhaps afford a fufficient profit to the builder. Where the market rate of interest is five per cent. it may perhaps require feven or feven and a half per cent. If, in proportion to the interest of money, the trade of the builder affords at any time a much greater profit than this, it will foon draw fo much capital from other trades as will reduce the profit to its proper level. If it affords at any time much less than this, other trades will foon draw fo much capital from it as will again raise that profit.

WHATEVER part of the whole rent of a house is over and above what is fufficient for affording this reasonable profit, naturally goes to the ground-rent; and where the owner of the ground and the owner of the building are two different persons, is, in most cases, completely paid to the former. This furplus rent is the price which the inhabitant of the house pays for some real or supposed advantage of the fituation. In country houses, at a distance from any great town, where there is plenty of ground to chuse upon, the ground rent is scarce any thing, or no more than what the ground which the house stands upon would pay if employed in agriculture.

BOOK agriculture. In country villas in the neighbourhood of some great town, it is fometimes a good deal higher; and the peculiar conveniency or beauty of fituation is there frequently very well paid for. Ground rents are generally highest in the capital, and in those particular parts of it where there happens to be the greatest demand for houses, whatever be the reason of that demand, whether for trade and business, for pleasure and society, or for mere vanity and fashion.

> A TAX upon house-rent, payable by the tenant and proportioned to the whole rent of each house, could not, for any considerable time at least, affect the building rent. If the builder did not get his reasonable profit, he would be obliged to quit the trade; which, by raifing the demand for building, would in a short time bring back his profit to its proper level with that of other trades. Neither would fuch a tax fall altogether upon the ground rent; but it would divide itself in such a manner as to fall, partly upon the inhabitant of the house, and partly upon the owner of the ground.

> LET us suppose, for example, that a particular person judges that he can afford for house-rent an expence of fixty pounds a year; and let us suppose too that a tax of four shillings in the pound, or of one-fifth, payable by the inhabitant, is laid upon house-rent. A house of sixty pounds rent will in this case cost him feventy-two pounds a year, which is twelve pounds more than he thinks he can afford. He will, therefore, content himself with a worse house, or a house of fifty pounds rent, which, with the additional ten pounds that he must pay for the tax, will make up the fum of fixty pounds a year, the expence which he judges he can afford; and in order to pay the tax he will give up a part of the additional conveniency which he might have had from a house of ten pounds a year more rent. He will give up, I fay, a part of this

this additional conveniency; for he will feldom be obliged to give CHAP. up the whole, but will, in consequence of the tax, get a better house for fifty pounds a year, than he could have got if there had been no tax. For as a tax of this kind, by taking away this particular competitor, must diminish the competition for houses of fixty pounds rent, so it must likewise diminish it for those of fifty pounds rent, and in the same manner for those of all other rents, except the lowest rent, for which it would for some time increase the competition. But the rents of every class of houses for which the competition was diminished, would necessarily be more or less reduced. As no part of this reduction, however, could, for any confiderable time at least, affect the building rent; the whole of it must in the long-run necessarily fall upon the ground-rent. The final payment of this tax, therefore, would fall, partly upon the inhabitant of the house, who, in order to pay his share, would be obliged to give up a part of his conveniency; and partly upon the owner of the ground, who, in order to pay his share, would be obliged to give up a part of his revenue. In what proportion this final payment would be divided between them, it is not perhaps very easy to ascertain. The division would probably be very different in different circumstances, and a tax of this kind might, according to those different circumstances, affect very unequally both the inhabitant of the house and the owner of the ground.

THE inequality with which a tax of this kind might fall upon the owners of different ground rents, would arise altogether from the accidental inequality of this division. But the inequality with which it might fall upon the inhabitants of different houses would arise, not only from this, but from another cause. The proportion of the expence of house-rent to the whole expence of living, is different in the different degrees of fortune. It is perhaps highest in the highest degree, and it diminishes gradually through the infe-

rior

BOOK rior degrees, fo as in general to be lowest in the lowest degree. The necessaries of life occasion the great expence of the poor. They find it difficult to get food, and the greater part of their little revenue is spent in getting it. The luxuries and vanities of life occasion the principal expence of the rich; and a magnificent house embellishes and sets off to the best advantage all the other luxuries and vanities which they possess. A tax upon house-rents, therefore, would in general fall heaviest upon the rich; and in this fort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be any thing very unreasonable. It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expence, not only in proportion to their revenue, but fomething more than in that proportion.

> THE rent of houses, though it in some respects resembles the rent of land, is in one respect essentially different from it. The rent of land is paid for the use of a productive subject. The land which pays it produces it. The rent of houses is paid for the use of an unproductive subject. Neither the house nor the ground which it stands upon produce any thing. The person who pays the rent, therefore, must draw it from some other source of revenue, distinct from, and independent of, this subject. A tax upon the rent of houses, so far as it falls upon the inhabitants, must be drawn from the same source as the rent itself, and must be paid from their revenue, whether derived from the wages of labour, the profits of stock, or the rent of land. So far as it falls upon the inhabitants, it is one of those taxes which fall, not upon one only, but indifferently upon all the three different fources of revenue; and is in every respect of the same nature as a tax upon any other fort of confumable commodities. In general there is not, perhaps, any one article of expence or confumption by which the liberality or narrowness of a man's whole expence can be better judged of, than by his house-rent. A proportional tax upon this

this particular article of expence might, perhaps, produce a more CHAP. confiderable revenue than any which has hitherto been drawn from it in any part of Europe. If the tax indeed was very high, the greater part of people would endeavour to evade it as much as they could, by contenting themselves with smaller houses, and by turning the greater part of their expence into some other channel.

THE rent of houses might easily be ascertained with sufficient accuracy, by a policy of the fame kind with that which would be necessary for ascertaining the ordinary rent of land. Houses not inhabited ought to pay no tax. A tax upon them would fall altogether upon the proprietor, who would thus be taxed for a subject which afforded him neither conveniency nor revenue. Houses inhabited by the proprietor ought to be rated, not according to the expence which they might have cost in building, but according to the rent which an equitable arbitration might judge them likely to bring, if leased to a tenant. If rated according to the expence which they may have cost in building, a tax of three or four shillings in the pound, joined with other taxes, would ruin almost all the rich and great families of this, and, I believe, of every other civilized country. Whoever will examine, with attention, the different town and country houses of some of the richest and greatest families in this country, will find that, at the rate of only fix and a half, or feven per cent. upon the original expence of building, their house-rent is nearly equal to the whole neat rent of their estates. It is the accumulated expence of several successive generations, laid out upon objects of great beauty and magnificence, indeed; but, in proportion to what they cost, of very small exchangeable value.

GROUND-RENTS are a still more proper subject of taxation. than the rent of houses. A tax upon ground-rents would not. raise.



BOOK raise the rents of houses. It would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a monopolist, and exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use of his ground. More or less can be got for it according as the competitors happen to be richer or poorer, or can afford to gratify their fancy for a particular fpot of ground at a greater or fmaller expence. In every country the greatest number of rich competitors is in the capital, and it is there accordingly that the highest ground-rents are always to be found. As the wealth of those competitors would in no respect be increased by a tax upon ground-rents, they would not probably be disposed to pay more for the use of the ground. Whether the tax was to be advanced by the inhabitant or by the owner of the ground, would be of little importance. The more the inhabitant was obliged to pay for the tax, the less he would incline to pay for the ground; fo that the final payment of the tax would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent. The groundrents of uninhabited houses ought to pay no tax.

> Both ground-rents and the ordinary rent of land are a species of revenue which the owner, in many cases, enjoys without any care or attention of his own. Though a part of this revenue should be taken from him in order to defray the expences of the state, no discouragement will thereby be given to any fort of industry. The annual produce of the land and labour of the fociety, the real wealth and revenue of the great body of the people, might be the same after such a tax as before. Ground-rents, and the ordinary rent of land, are therefore, perhaps, the species of revenue which can best bear to have a peculiar tax imposed upon them.

> GROUND-RENTS seem, in this respect, a more proper subject of peculiar taxation than even the ordinary rent of land. The ordinary rent of land is, in many cases, owing partly at least to the attention

attention and good management of the landlord. A very heavy tax might discourage too much this attention and good management. Ground-rents, so far as they exceed the ordinary rent of land, are altogether owing to the good government of the sovereign, which, by protecting the industry either of the whole people, or of the inhabitants of some particular place, enables them to pay so much more than its real value for the ground which they build their houses upon; or to make to its owner so much more than compensation for the loss which he might sustain by this use of it. Nothing can be more reasonable than that a fund which owes its existence to the good government of the state, should be taxed peculiarly, or should contribute something more than the greater part of other funds towards the support of that government.

Though, in many different countries of Europe, taxes have been imposed upon the rent of houses, I do not know of any in which ground-rents have been considered as a separate subject of taxation. The contrivers of taxes have, probably, found some difficulty in ascertaining what part of the rent ought to be considered as ground-rent, and what part ought to be considered as building rent. It should not, however, seem very difficult to distinguish those two parts of the rent from one another.

In Great Britain the rent of houses is supposed to be taxed in the same proportion as the rent of land, by what is called the annual land tax. The valuation, according to which each different parish and district is assessed to this tax, is always the same. It was originally extremely unequal, and it still continues to be so. Through the greater part of the kingdom this tax falls still more lightly upon the rent of houses than upon that of land. In some few districts only, which were originally rated high, and in which the

rents

BOOK rents of houses have fallen considerably, the land tax of three or four shillings in the pound, is said to amount to an equal proportion of the real rent of the houses. Untenanted houses, though by law subject to the tax, are, in most districts, exempted from it by the favour of the affesfors; and this exemption fometimes occasions fome little variation in the rate of particular houses, though that of the district is always the same.

> In the province of Holland * every house is taxed at two and a half per cent, of its value, without any regard either to the rent which it actually pays, or to the circumstance of its being tenanted or untenanted. There feems to be a hardship in obliging the proprietor to pay a tax for an untenanted house, from which he can derive no revenue; especially so very heavy a tax. In Holland, where the market rate of interest does not exceed three per cent. two and a half per cent. upon the whole value of the house, must, in most cases, amount to more than a third of the building-rent, perhaps of the whole rent. The valuation, indeed, according to which the houses are rated, though very unequal, is faid to be always below the real value. When a house is rebuilt, improved, or enlarged, there is a new valuation, and the tax is rated accordingly.

> THE contrivers of the feveral taxes which in England have, at different times, been imposed upon houses, seem to have imagined that there was fome great difficulty in afcertaining, with tolerable exactness, what was the real rent of every house. They have regulated their taxes, therefore, according to fome more obvious circumstance, such as they had probably imagined would, in most cases, bear some proportion to the rent.

> THE first tax of this kind was hearth-money; or a tax of two stillings upon every hearth. In order to ascertain how many hearths

^{*} Memoires con c ernant les Droits, &c. p. 223.

hearths were in the house, it was necessary that the tax-gatherer CHAP. should enter every room in it. This odious visit rendered the tax odious. Soon after the revolution, therefore, it was abolished as a badge of flavery.

The next tax of this kind was, a tax of two shillings upon every dwelling house inhabited. A house with ten windows to pay four shillings more. A house with twenty windows and upwards to pay eight shillings. This tax was afterwards so far altered, that houses with twenty windows, and with less than thirty, were ordered to pay ten shillings, and those with thirty windows and upwards to pay twenty shillings. The number of windows can, in most cases, be counted from the outside, and, in all cases, without entering every room in the house. The visit of the tax-gatherer, therefore, was less offensive in this tax than in the hearth-money.

This tax was afterwards repealed, and in the room of it was established the window tax, which has undergone too several alterations and augmentations. The window tax, as it stands at present, (January, 1775) over and above the duty of three shillings upon every house in England, and of one shilling upon every house in Scotland, lays a duty upon every window, which, in England, augments gradually from two-pence, the lowest rate, upon houses with not more than seven windows; to two shillings, the highest rate, upon houses with twenty-sive windows and upwards.

THE principal objection to all such taxes is their inequality, an inequality of the worst kind, as they must frequently fall much heavier upon the poor than upon the rich. A house of ten pounds rent in a country town may sometimes have more windows than a house of five hundred pounds rent in London; and though the inhabitant of the former is likely to be a much poorer man than that of the latter, yet so far as his contribution is regulated by the window

BOOK window-tax, he must contribute more to the support of the Ifate. Such taxes are, therefore, directly contrary to the first of the four maxims above mentioned. They do not feem to offend much against any of the other three.

> THE natural tendency of the window-tax, and of all other taxes upon houses, is to lower rents. The more a man pays for the tax, the less, it is evident, he can afford to pay for the rent. Since the imposition of the window-tax, however, the rents of houses have upon the whole risen, more or less, in almost every town and village of Great Britain with which I am acquainted. Such has been almost every where the increase of the demand for houses, that it has raised the rents more than the window-tax could fink them; one of the many proofs of the great profperity of the country, and of the increasing revenue of its inhabitants. Had it not been for the tax, rents would probably have risen still higher.

ARTICLE II.

Taxes upon Profit, or upon the Revenue arifing from Stock.

THE revenue or profit arising from stock naturally divides itself into two parts; that which pays the interest, and which belongs to the owner of the stock; and that surplus part which is over and above what is necessary for paying the interest.

This latter part of profit is evidently a fubject not taxable directly. It is the compensation, and in most cases it is no more than a very moderate compensation, for the risk and trouble of employing the stock. The employer must have this compenfation, otherwise he cannot, consistently with his own interest, continue the employment. If he was taxed directly, therefore, in proportion to the whole profit, he would be obliged either to

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raise the rate of his profit, or to charge the tax upon the interest CHAP. of money; that is, to pay less interest. If he raised the rate of his profit in proportion to the tax, the whole tax, though it might be advanced by him, would be finally paid by one or other of two different fets of people, according to the different ways in which he might employ the flock of which he had the management. If he employed it as a farming stock in the cultivation of land, he could raise the rate of his profit only by retaining a greater portion, or, what comes to the fame thing, the price of a greater portion of the produce of the land; and as this could be done only by a reduction of rent, the final payment of the tax would fall upon the landlord. If he employed it as a mercantile or manufacturing stock, he could raise the rate of his profit only by raifing the price of his goods; in which case the final payment of the tax would fall altogether upon the confumers of those goods. If he did not raise the rate of his profit, he would be obliged to charge the whole tax upon that part of it which was allotted for the interest of money. He could afford less interest for whatever stock he borrowed, and the whole weight of the tax would in this case fall ultimately upon the interest of money. So far as he could not relieve himself from the tax in the one way, he would be obliged to relieve himself in the other.

THE interest of money seems at first sight a subject equally capable of being taxed directly as the rent of land. Like the rent of land it is a neat produce which remains after completely compensating the whole risk and trouble of employing the stock. As a tax upon the rent of land cannot raise rents; because the neat produce which remains after replacing the stock of the farmer, together with his reasonable profit, cannot be greater after the tax than before it: so, for the same reason, a tax upon

BOOK the interest of money could not raise the rate of interest; the quantity of stock or money in the country, like the quantity of land, being supposed to remain the same after the tax as before it. The ordinary rate of profit, it has been shewn in the first book. is every where regulated by the quantity of stock to be employed in proportion to the quantity of the employment, or of the business which must be done by it. But the quantity of the employment, or of the business to be done by stock, could neither be increased nor diminished by any tax upon the interest of money. If the quantity of the stock to be employed, therefore, was neither increased nor diminished by it, the ordinary rate of profit would necessarily remain the same. But the portion of this profit necessary for compensating the risk and trouble of the employer, would likewise remain the same; that risk and trouble being in no respect altered. The residue, therefore, that portion which belongs to the owner of the stock, and which pays the interest of money, would necessarily remain the same too. At

> THERE are, however, two different circumstances which render the interest of money a much less proper subject of direct taxation than the rent of land.

> first sight, therefore, the interest of money seems to be a sub-

ject as fit to be taxed directly as the rent of land.

First, the quantity and value of the land which any man possesses can never be a secret, and can always be ascertained with great exactness. But the whole amount of the capital stock which he possesses is almost always a fecret, and can scarce ever be ascertained with tolerable exactness. It is liable, besides, to almost continual variations. A year feldom passes away, frequently not a month, fometimes scarce a fingle day, in which it does not rise or fall more or less. An inquisition into every man's private circumstances, and an inquisition which, in order to accommodate

accommodate the tax to them, watched over all the fluctuations CHAP. of his fortune, would be a fource of fuch continual and endless vexation as no people could support.

SECONDLY, land is a subject which cannot be removed; whereas stock easily may. The proprietor of land is necessarily a citizen of the particular country in which his estate lies. The proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country. He would be apt to abandon the country in which he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition, in order to be affeffed to a burdensome tax, and would remove his stock to some other country where he could either carry on his business or enjoy his fortune more at his ease. By removing his stock he would put an end to all the industry which it had maintained in the country which he left. Stock cultivates land: stock employs labour. A tax which tended to drive away stock from any particular country, would fo far tend to dry up every source of revenue, both to the sovereign and to the society. Not only the profits of stock, but the rent of land and the wages of labour, would necessarily be more or less diminished by its removal.

THE nations, accordingly, who have attempted to tax the revenue arising from stock, instead of any severe inquisition of this kind, have been obliged to content themselves with some very loofe, and therefore more or lefs arbitrary estimation. The extreme inequality and uncertainty of a tax affeffed in this manner, can be compensated only by its extreme moderation, in confequence of which every man finds himself rated so very much below his real revenue, that he gives himself little disturbance though his neighbour should be rated somewhat lower.

By what is called the land-tax in England, it was intended that stock should be taxed in the same proportion as land. When BOOK When the tax upon land was at four shillings in the pound, or at one-fifth of the supposed rent, it was intended that stock should be taxed at one-fifth of the supposed interest. When the present annual land-tax was first imposed, the legal rate of interest was fix per cent. Every hundred pounds stock, accordingly, was supposed to be taxed at twenty-four shillings, the fifth part of fix pounds. Since the legal rate of interest has been reduced to five per cent. every hundred pounds stock is supposed to be taxed at twenty shillings only. The sum to be raised, by what is called the land-tax, was divided between the country and the principal towns. The greater part of it was laid upon the country; and of what was laid upon the towns, the greater part was affelled upon the houses. What remained to be affelled upon the stock or trade of the towns (for the stock upon the land was not meant to be taxed) was very much below the real value of that stock or trade. Whatever inequalities, therefore, there might be in the original affessment, gave little disturbance. Every parish and district still continues to be rated for its land. its houses, and its stock, according to the original affessment; and the almost universal prosperity of the country, which in most places has raifed very much the value of all these, has rendered those inequalities of still less importance now. The rate too upon each district continuing always the same, the uncertainty of this tax, fo far as it might be affeffed upon the stock of any individual, has been very much diminished, as well as rendered of much less consequence. If the greater part of the lands of England are not rated to the land-tax at half their actual value, the greater part of the stock of England is perhaps scarce rated at the fiftieth part of its actual value. In some towns the whole land-tax is affeffed upon houses; as in Westminster, where stock and trade are free. It is otherwise in London.

In all countries a fevere inquifition into the circumstances of CHAP. private persons has been carefully avoided.

AT Hamburgh * every inhabitant is obliged to pay to the state, one-fourth per cent. of all that he possesses; and as the wealth of the people of Hamburgh consists principally in stock, this tax may be considered as a tax upon stock. Every man affesses himself, and, in the presence of the magistrate, puts annually into the public coffer a certain sum of money, which he declares upon oath to be one-fourth per cent. of all that he possesses, but without declaring what it amounts to, or being liable to any examination upon that subject. This tax is generally supposed to be paid with great sidelity. In a small republic, where the people have entire considence in their magistrates, are convinced of the necessity of the tax for the support of the state, and believe that it will be faithfully applied to that purpose, such conscientious and voluntary payment may sometimes be expected. It is not peculiar to the people of Hamburgh.

The canton of Underwold in Switzerland is frequently ravaged by storms and inundations, and is thereby exposed to extraordinary expences. Upon such occasions the people assemble, and every one is said to declare with the greatest frankness what he is worth, in order to be taxed accordingly. At Zurich the law orders that in cases of necessity every one should be taxed in proportion to his revenue; the amount of which he is obliged to declare upon oath. They have no suspicion, it is said, that any of their fellow citizens will deceive them. At Basil the principal revenue of the state arises from a small custom upon goods exported. All the citizens make oath that they will pay every three months all the taxes imposed by the law. All merchants and even all inn-keepers are trusted with keeping themselves the

^{*} Memoires concernant les Droits, tome i. p. 74.

BOOK account of the goods which they fell either within or without the territory. At the end of every three months they send this account to the treasurer, with the amount of the tax computed at the bottom of it. It is not suspected that the revenue suffers by this confidence *

> To oblige every citizen to declare publickly upon oath the amount of his fortune, must not, it seems, in those Swiss cantons. be reckoned a hardship. At Hamburgh it would be reckoned the greatest. Merchants engaged in the hazardous projects of trade, all tremble at the thoughts of being obliged at all times to expose the real state of their circumstances. The ruin of their credit and the miscarriage of their projects, they foresee, would too often be the consequence. A sober and parsimonious people, who are strangers to all fuch projects, do not feel that they have occasion for any fuch concealment.

> In Holland, foon after the exaltation of the late prince of Orange to the stadtholdership, a tax of two per cent. or the fiftieth penny, as it was called, was imposed upon the whole substance of every citizen. Every citizen affessed himself and paid his tax in the fame manner as at Hamburgh; and it was in general supposed to have been paid with great fidelity. The people had at that time the greatest affection for their new government, which they had just established by a general insurrection. The tax was to be paid but once; in order to relieve the state in a particular exigency. It was, indeed, too heavy to be permanent. In a country where the market rate of interest seldom exceeds three per cent. a tax of two per cent. amounts to thirteen shillings and fourpence in the pound upon the highest neat revenue which is commonly drawn from stock. It is a tax

^{*} Id. tome i. p. 163, 166, 171.

which very few people could pay without encroaching more or lefs CHAP. upon their capitals. In a particular exigency the people may, from great public zeal, make a great effort, and give up even a part of their capital in order to relieve the state. But it is impossible that they should continue to do so for any considerable time; and if they did, the tax would foon ruin them fo completely as to render them altogether incapable of supporting the state.

THE taxupon stock imposed by the land-tax bill in England, tho' it is proportioned to the capital, is not intended to diminish or take away any part of that capital. It is meant only to be a tax upon the interest of money proportioned to that upon the rent of land; so that when the latter is at four shillings in the pound, the former may be at four shillings in the pound too. The tax at Hamburgh, and the still more moderate taxes of Underwold and Zurich, are meant, in the same manner, to be taxes, not upon the capital, but upon the interest or neat revenue of stock. That of Holland was meant to be a tax upon the capital.

Taxes upon the Profit of particular Employments.

IN some countries extraordinary taxes are imposed upon the profits of stock; sometimes when employed in particular branches of trade, and sometimes when employed in agriculture.

Or the former kind are in England the tax upon hawkers and pedlars, that upon hackney coaches and chairs, and that which the keepers of ale-houses pay for a licence to retail ale and spirituous liquors. During the late war, another tax of the same kind was proposed upon shops. The war having been undertaken, it was faid, in defence of the trade of the country, the merchants,

who

BOOK who were to profit by it, ought to contribute towards the support of it.

A TAX, however, upon the profits of flock employed in any particular branch of trade, can never fall finally upon the dealers (who must in all ordinary cases have their reasonable profit, and, where the competition is free, can seldom have more than that profit) but always upon the consumers, who must be obliged to pay in the price of the goods the tax which the dealer advances; and generally with some over-charge.

A TAX of this kind, when it is proportioned to the trade of the dealer, is finally paid by the confumer, and occasions no oppression to the dealer. When it is not so proportioned, but is the same upon all dealers, though in this case too it is finally paid by the confumer, yet it favours the great, and occasions some oppression to the fmall dealer. The tax of five shillings a week upon every hackney coach, and that of ten shillings a year upon every hackney chair, so far as it is advanced by the different keepers of such coaches and chairs, is exactly enough proportioned to the extent of their respective dealings. It neither favours the great, nor oppresses the fmaller dealer. The tax of twenty shillings a year for a licence to fell ale; of forty shillings for a licence to fell spirituous liquors; and of forty shillings more for a licence to sell wine, being the same upon all retailers, must necessarily give some advantage to the great, and occasion some oppression to the small dealers. The former must find it more easy to get back the tax in the price of their goods than the latter. The moderation of the tax, however, renders this inequality of less importance, and it may to many people appear not improper to give fome discouragement to the multiplication of little ale-houses. The tax upon shops, it was intended, should be the fame upon all shops. It could not well have been otherwise. It would

would have been impossible to proportion with tolerable exactness CHAP. the tax upon a shop to the extent of the trade carried on in it? without fuch an inquisition, as would have been altogether insupportable in a free country. If the tax had been confiderable, it would have oppressed the small, and forced almost the whole retail trade into the hands of the great dealers. The competition of the former being taken away, the latter would have enjoyed a monopoly of the trade; and like all other monopolists would soon have combined to raife their profits much beyond what was necessary for the payment of the tax. The final payment, instead of falling upon the shopkeeper, would have fallen upon the consumer, with a considerable over-charge to the profit of the shopkeeper. For these reasons, the project of a tax upon shops was laid aside, and in the room of it was substituted the subsidy 1759.

WHAT in France is called the personal taille is, perhaps, the most important tax upon the profits of stock employed in agriculture that is levied in any part of Europe.

In the diforderly state of Europe during the prevalence of the feudal government, the fovereign was obliged to content himfelf with taxing those who were too weak to refuse to pay taxes. The great lords, though willing to affift him upon particular emergencies, refused to subject themselves to any constant tax, and he was not strong enough to force them. The occupiers of land, all over Europe, were the greater part of them originally bond-men. Through the greater part of Europe they were gradually emancipated. Some of them acquired the property of landed estates which they held by some base or ignoble tenure, sometimes under the king, and fometimes under fome other great lord, like the antient copy-holders of England. Others, without acquiring the property, obtained leafes for terms of years of the lands which they occu-

pied

BOOK pied under their lord, and thus became less dependent upon him. The great lords feem to have beheld the degree of prosperity and independency which this inferior order of men had thus come to enjoy, with malignant and contemptuous indignation, and willingly confented that the fovereign should tax them. In some countries this tax was confined to the lands which were held in property by an ignoble tenure; and, in this case, the taille was said to be real. The land-tax established by the late king of Sardinia, and the taille in the provinces of Languedoc, Provence, Dauphiné, and Brittany; in the generality of Montauban, and in the elections of Agen and Condom, as well as in some other districts of France. are taxes upon lands held in property by an ignoble tenure. In other countries the tax was laid upon the supposed profits of all those who held in farm or lease lands belonging to other people, whatever might be the tenure by which the proprietor held them; and in this case the taille was said to be personal. In the greater part of those provinces of France, which are called the Countries of Elections, the taille is of this kind. The real taille, as it is imposed only upon a part of the lands of the country, is necessarily an unequal, but it is not always an arbitrary tax, though it is fo upon some occasions. The personal taille, as it is intended to be proportioned to the profits of a certain class of people, which can only be gueffed at, is necessarily both arbitrary and unequal.

> In France the personal taille at present, (1775,) annually imposed upon the twenty generalities, called the Countries of Elections, amounts to 40, 107,230 livres, 16 fous *. The proportion in which this fum is affessed upon those different provinces, varies from year to year, according to the reports which are made to the king's council concerning the goodness or badness of the crop, as well as other circumstances which may either increase or diminish their respective

Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tome ii. p. 17.

respective abilities to pay. Each generality is divided into a cer- CHAP. tain number of elections, and the proportion in which the fum imposed upon the whole generality is divided among those different elections, varies likewise from year to year, according to the reports made to the council concerning their respective abilities. impossible that the council, with the best intentions, can ever proportion with tolerable exactness, either of those two affessments to the real abilities of the province or district upon which they are respectively laid. Ignorance and misinformation must always, more or less, mislead the most upright council. The proportion which each parish ought to support of what is affested upon the whole election, and that which each individual ought to support of what is affeffed upon his particular parish, are both in the same manner varied, from year to year, according as circumstances are supposed to require. These circumstances are judged of, in the one case, by the officers of the election; in the other by those of the parish; and both the one and the other are, more or lefs, under the direction and influence of the intendant. Not only ignorance and mifinformation, but friendship, party animosity, and private resentment, are faid frequently to mislead such assessors. No man subiect to fuch a tax, it is evident, can ever be certain, before he is affessed, of what he is to pay. He cannot even be certain after he is affeffed. If any person has been taxed who ought to have been exempted; or if any person has been taxed beyond his proportion, though both must pay in the mean time, yet if they complain and make good their complaints, the whole parish is reimposed next year in order to reimburse them. If any of the contributors become bankrupt or infolvent, the collector is obliged to advance his tax, and the whole parish is reimposed next year in order to reimburse the collector, If the collector himself should become bankrupt, the parish which elects him must answer for his conduct to the receivergeneral of the election. But, as it might be troublesome for the receiver

BOOK receiver to profecute the whole parish, he takes at his choice five or fix of the richest contributors, and obliges them to make good what had been lost by the infolvency of the collector. The parish is afterwards reimposed in order to reimburse those five or six. Such reimpositions are always over and above the taille of the particular year in which they are laid on.

> WHEN a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock in a particular branch of trade, the traders are all careful to bring no more goods to market than what they can fell at a price sufficient to reimburs, them for advancing the tax. Some of them withdraw a part of their stocks from the trade, and the market is more sparingly supplied than before. The price of the goods rifes, and the final payment of the tax falls upon the confumer. But when a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock employed in agriculture, it is not the interest of the farmers to withdraw any part of their stock from that employment. Each farmer occupies a certain quantity of land, for which he pays rent. For the proper cultivation of this land a certain quantity of stock is necessary; and by withdrawing any part of this necessary quantity, the farmer is not likely to be more able to pay either the rent or the tax. In order to pay the tax, it can never be his interest to diminish the quantity of his produce, nor confequently to supply the market more sparingly than before. The tax, therefore, will never enable him to raise the price of his produce, nor to reimburse himself by throwing the final payment upon the confumer. The farmer, however, must have his reasonable profit as well as every other dealer, otherwise he must give up the trade. After the imposition of a tax of this kind, he can get this reasonable profit only by paying less rent to the landlord. The more he is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the less he can afford to pay in the way of rent. A tax of this kind imposed during the currency of a leafe may, no doubt, diffress or ruin the farmer.

farmer. Upon the renewal of the lease it must always fall upon CHAP. the landlord.

In the countries where the personal taille takes place, the farmer is commonly affeffed in proportion to the stock which he appears to employ in cultivation. He is, upon this account, frequently afraid to have a good team of horses or oxen, but endeavours to cultivate with the meanest and most wretched instruments of husbandry that he can. Such is his diffrust in the justice of his assessment fors, that he counterfeits poverty, and wishes to appear scarce able to pay any thing for fear of being obliged to pay too much. miserable policy he does not, perhaps, always consult his own interest in the most effectual manner; and he probably loses more by the diminution of his produce than he faves by that of his tax. Though, in consequence of this wretched cultivation the market is, no doubt, somewhat worse supplied; yet the small rise of price which this may occasion, as it is not likely even to indemnify the farmer for the diminution of his produce, it is still less likely to enable him to pay more rent to the landlord. The public, the farmer, the landlord, all fuffer more or less by this degraded cultivation. That the personal taille tends, in many different ways, to discourage cultivation, and consequently to dry up the principal fource of the wealth of every great country, I have already had occasion to observe in the third book of this inquiry.

What are called poll-taxes in the fouthern provinces of North America, and in the West India islands, annual taxes of so much a head upon every negro, are properly taxes upon the profits of a certain species of stock employed in agriculture. As the planters are, the greater part of them, both farmers and landlords, the final payment of the tax falls upon them in their quality of landlords without any retribution.

TAXES

BOOK V.

TAXES of so much a head upon the bondmen employed in culvivation, feem antiently to have been common all over Europe. There subsists at present a tax of this kind in the empire of Russia. It is probably upon this account that poll-taxes of all kinds have often been represented as badges of flavery. Every tax, however, is to the person who pays it a badge, not of slavery, but of liberty. It denotes that he is subject to government, indeed, but that, as he has some property, he cannot himself be the property of a master. A poll-tax upon flaves is altogether different from a poll-tax upon freemen. The latter is paid by the persons upon whom it is imposed; the former by a different set of persons. The latter is either altogether arbitrary or altogether unequal, and in most cases is both the one and the other; the former, though in some respects unequal, different flaves being of different values, is in no respect arbitrary. Every master who knows the number of his own slaves, knows exactly what he has to pay. Those different taxes, however, being called by the same name, have been considered as of the same nature.

Taxes upon the profits of stock in particular employments can never affect the interest of money. Nobody will lend his money for less interest to those who exercise the taxed, than to those who exercise the untaxed employments. Taxes upon the revenue arising from stock in all employments, where the government attempts to levy them with any degree of exactness, will, in many cases, fall upon the interest of money. The Vingtieme or twentieth-penny in France, is a tax of the same kind with what is called the land-tax in England, and is assessed, in the same manner, upon the revenue arising from land, houses, and stock. So far as it affects stock, it is assessed than that part of the land-tax of England which is imposed upon the same fund. It, in many cases, falls altogether upon the inte-

rest

rest of money. Money is frequently sunk in France upon what are called Contracts for the constitution of a rent, that is, perpetual annuities redeemable at any time by the debtor upon repayment of the sum originally advanced, but of which this redemption is not exigible by the creditor except in particular cases. The vingtieme seems not to have raised the rate of those annuities, though it is exactly levied upon them all.

Appendix to Articles I. and II.

Taxes upon the capital Value of Land, Houses, and Stock.

WHILE property remains in the possession of the same person, whatever permanent taxes may have been imposed upon it, they have never been intended to diminish or take away any part of its capital value, but only some part of the revenue arising from it. But when property changes hands, when it is transmitted either from the dead to the living, or from the living to the living, such taxes have frequently been imposed upon it as necessarily take away some part of its capital value.

The transference of all forts of property from the dead to the living, and that of immoveable property, of land and houses, from the living to the living, are transactions which are in their nature either public and notorious, or such as cannot be long concealed. Such transactions, therefore, may be taxed directly. The transference of stock or moveable property from the living to the living by the lending of money, is frequently a secret transaction, and may always be made so. It cannot easily, therefore, be taxed directly. It has been taxed indirectly in two different ways; first, by requiring that the deed, containing the obligation to repay, should be written upon paper or parchment, which had paid a certain

BOOK certain stamp-duty, otherwise not to be valid; secondly, by requiring, under the like penalty of invalidity, that it should be recorded either in a public or fecret register, and by imposing certain duties upon fuch registration. Stamp-duties and duties of registration have frequently been imposed likewise upon the deeds transferring property of all kinds from the dead to the living, and upon those transferring immoveable property from the living to the living, transactions which might easily have been taxed directly.

> THE Vicesima Hereditatum, the twentieth penny of inheritances. imposed by Augustus upon the antient Romans, was a tax upon the transference of property from the dead to the living. Cassius+, the author who writes concerning it the least indistinctly. fays, that it was imposed upon all fuccessions, legacies and donations, in case of death, except upon those to the nearest relations, and to the poor.

> OF the same kind is the Dutch tax upon successions *. Collateral fuccessions are taxed, according to the degree of relation, from five to thirty per cent. upon the whole value of the fuccession. Testamentary donations or legacies to collaterals, are subject to the like duties. Those from husband to wife, or from wife to husband, to the fiftieth penny. The Luctuofa Hereditas, the mournful fuccession of ascendents to descendents, to the twentieth penny only. Direct successions, or those of descendents to ascendents. pay no tax. The death of a father, to fuch of his children as live in the same house with him, is seldom attended with any increase. and frequently with a confiderable diminution of revenue; by the loss of his industry, of his office, or of some life-rent estate, of which he may have been in possession. That tax would be cruel and oppressive which aggravated their loss by taking from them any part

⁺ Lib. 55. See also Burman de Vect galibus pop. Rom. cap. xi. and Bouchaud de l' impôt du vingtieme fur les fuccessions.

^{*} Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. i. p. 225.

of his fuccession. It may, however, sometimes be otherwise with those children who, in the language of the Roman law, are said to be emancipated; in that of the Scotch law, to be foris-familiated; that is, who have received their portion, have got families of their own, and are supported by sunds separate and independent of those of their father. Whatever part of his succession might come to such children, would be a real addition to their fortune, and might, therefore, perhaps, without more inconveniency than what attends all duties of this kind, be liable to some tax.

THE casualties of the seudal law were taxes upon the transference of land, both from the dead to the living, and from the living to the living. In antient times they constituted in every part of Europe one of the principal branches of the revenue of the crown.

THE heir of every immediate vassal of the crown paid a certain duty, generally a year's rent, upon receiving the investiture of the estate. If the heir was a minor, the whole rents of the estate, during the continuance of the minority, devolved to the superior without any other charge, besides the maintenance of the minor, and the payment of the widow's dower, when there happened to be a dowager, upon the land. When the minor came to be of age, another tax, called Relief, was still due to the superior, which generally amounted likewise to a year's rent. A long minority, which in the present times so frequently disburdens a great estate of all its incumbrances, and restores the family to their antient splendor, could in those times have no such effect. The waste, and not the disincumbrance of the estate, was the common effect of a long minority.

By the feudal law the vassal could not alienate without the confent of his superior, who generally extorted a fine or composition for granting it. This fine, which was at first arbitrary, came in many countries to be regulated at a certain portion

BOOK of the price of the land. In some countries, where the greater part of the other feudal customs have gone into disuse, this tax upon the alienation of land still continues to make a considerable branch of the revenue of the fovereign. In the canton of Berne it is so high as a fixth part of the price of all noble fiefs; and a tenth part of that of all ignoble ones *. In the canton of Lucerne the tax upon the fale of lands is not universal, and takes place only in certain districts. But if any person sells his land, in order to remove out of the territory, he pays ten per cent. upon the whole price of the fale +. Taxes of the same kind upon the fale either of all lands, or of lands held by certain tenures, take place in many other countries, and make a more or less considerable branch of the revenue of the sovereign.

> Such transactions may be taxed indirectly by means either of stamp-duties, or of duties upon registration; and those duties either may or may not be proportioned to the value of the subject which is transferred.

> In Great Britain the stamp-duties are higher or lower, not so much according to the value of the property transferred, (an eighteen penny or half crown stamp being sufficient upon a bond for the largest sum of money) as according to the nature of the deed. The highest do not exceed fix pounds upon every sheet of paper, or skin of parchment; and these high duties fall chiefly upon grants from the crown, and upon certain law proceedings; without any regard to the value of the subject. There are in Great Britain no duties on the registration of deeds or writings, except the fees of the officers, who keep the register; and these are feldom more than a reasonable recompence for their labour. The crown derives no revenue from them.

[•] Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. i. p. 154. + Id. p. 157.

CHAP.

In Holland * there are both stamp-duties and duties upon registration; which in some cases are, and in some are not proportioned to the value of the property transferred. All testaments must be written upon stampt-paper, of which the price is proportioned to the property disposed of, so that there are stamps which cost from threepence, or three stivers a sheet, to three hundred florins, equal to about twenty-seven pound ten shillings of our money. If the stamp is of an inferior price to what the testator ought to have made use of, his fuccession is confiscated. This is over and above all their other taxes on succession. Except bills of exchange, and fome other mercantile bills, all other deeds, bonds and contracts, are subject to a stamp-duty. This duty, however, does not rise in proportion to the value of the fubject. All fales of land and of houses, and all mortgages upon either, must be registered, and, upon registration, pay a duty to the state of two and a half per cent. upon the amount of the price or the mortgage. duty is extended to the fale of all ships and vessels of more than two tons burthen, whether decked or undecked. These, it seems, are considered as a fort of houses upon the water. The sale of moveables, when it is ordered by a court of justice, is subject to the like duty of two and a half per cent.

IN France there are both stamp-duties and duties upon registration. The former are considered as a branch of the aides or excise, and in the provinces where those duties take place, are levied by the excise officers. The latter are considered as a branch of the domaine of the crown, and are levied by a different set of officers.

THOSE modes of taxation, by stamp-duties and by duties upon registration, are of very modern invention. In the course of little more than a century, however, stamp-duties have, in Europe, become almost universal, and duties upon registration

^{*} Id. tom. i. p. 223, 224, 225.

BOOK extremely common. There is no art which one government fooner learns of another than that of draining money from the pockets of the people.

> Taxes upon the transference of property from the dead to the living, fall finally as well as immediately upon the person to whom the property is transferred. Taxes upon the fale of land fall altogether upon the feller. The feller is almost always under the necessity of felling, and must, therefore, take such a price as he can get. The buyer is scarce ever under the necessity of buying, and will, therefore, give only fuch a price as he likes. He considers what the land will cost him in tax and price together. The more he is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the less he will be disposed to give in the way of price. Such taxes, therefore, fall almost always upon a necessitous person, and must, therefore, be frequently very cruel and oppressive. Taxes upon the fale of new-built houses, where the building is fold without the ground, fall generally upon the buyer, because the builder must generally have his profit; otherwise he must give up the trade. If he advances the tax, therefore, the buyer must generally repay it to him. Taxes upon the fale of old houses, for the fame reason as those upon the sale of land, fall generally upon the feller; whom in most cases either conveniency or necessity obliges to fell. The number of new built houses that are annually brought to market, is more or less regulated by the demand. Unless the demand is such as to afford the builder his profit, after paying all expences, he will build no more houses. The number of old houses which happen at any time to come to market is regulated by accidents of which the greater part have no relation to the demand. Two or three great bankruptcies in a mercantile town, will bring many houses to fale, which must be fold for what can be got for them. Taxes upon the fale of groundrents fall altogether upon the feller; for the same reason as those upon

upon the fale of land. Stamp duties, and duties upon the regiftration of bonds and contracts for borrowed money, fall altogether upon the borrower, and, in fact, are always paid by him.

Duties of the same kind upon law proceedings fall upon the
suitors. They reduce to both the capital value of the subject in
dispute. The more it costs to acquire any property, the less must
be the value of it when acquired.

ALL taxes upon the transference of property of every kind, so far as they diminish the capital value of that property, tend to diminish the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour. They are all more or less unthristy taxes that increase the revenue of the sovereign, which seldom maintains any but unproductive labourers, at the expence of the capital of the people which maintains none but productive.

Such taxes, even when they are proportioned to the value of the property transferred, are still unequal; the frequency of transference not being always equal in property of equal value. When they are not proportioned to this value, which is the case with the greater part of the stamp-duties, and duties of registration, they are still more so. They are in no respect arbitrary, but are or may be in all cases perfectly clear and certain. Though they sometimes fall upon the person who is not very able to pay; the time of payment is in most cases sufficiently convenient for him. When the payment becomes due, he must in most cases have the money to pay. They are levied at very little expence, and in general subject the contributors to no other inconveniency besides always the unavoidable one of paying the tax.

IN France the stamp-duties are not much complained of. Those of registration, which they call the Contrôle, are. They give occasion, it is pretended, to much extortion in the officers of the farmers

BOOK farmers general who collect the tax, which is in a great measure arbitrary and uncertain. In the greater part of the libels which have been written against the present system of finances in France, the abuses of the contrôle make a principal article. Uncertainty. however, does not feem to be necessarily inherent in the nature of fuch taxes. If the popular complaints are well founded, the abuse must arise, not so much from the nature of the tax, as from the want of precision and distinctness in the words of the edicts or laws which impose it.

> THE registration of mortgages, and in general of all rights upon immoveable property, as it gives great fecurity both to creditors and purchasers, is extremely advantageous to the public. That of the greater part of deeds of other kinds is frequently inconvenient and even dangerous to individuals, without any advantage to the public. All registers which, it is acknowledged, ought to be kept fecret, ought certainly never to exist The credit of individuals ought certainly never to depend upon fo very flender a fecurity as the probity and religion of the inferior officers of revenue. But where the fees of registration have been made a fource of revenue to the fovereign, register offices have commonly been multiplied without end, both for the deeds which ought to be registered, and for those which ought not. In France there are several different forts of secret registers. This abuse though not perhaps a necessary, it must be acknowledged, is a very natural effect of fuch taxes.

> Such stamp-duties as those in England upon cards and dice, upon news-papers and periodical pamphlets, &c. are properly taxes upon consumption; the final payment falls upon the persons who use or consume such commodities. Such stamp-duties as those upon licences to retail ale, wine and spirituous liquors, though intended perhaps to fall upon the profits of the retailers, are likewife

likewise finally paid by the consumers of those liquors. Such CHAP. taxes, though called by the fame name, and levied by the fame officers and in the same manner with the stamp-duties above mentioned upon the transference of property, are however of a quite different nature, and fall upon quite different funds.

ARTICLE III.

Taxes upon the Wages of Labour.

THE wages of the inferior classes of workmen, I have endeavoured to show in the first book, are every where necessarily regulated by two different circumstances; the demand for labour, and the ordinary or average price of provisions. The demand for labour, according as it happens to be either increasing, stationary, or declining; or to require an increasing, stationary, or declining population, regulates the fubfiftence of the labourer, and determines in what degree it shall be, either liberal, moderate, or scanty. The ordinary or average price of provisions determines the quantity of money which must be paid to the workman in order to enable him, one year with another, to purchase this liberal, moderate, or feanty subsistence. While the demand for labour and the price of provisions, therefore, remain the same, a direct tax upon the wages of labour can have no other effect than to raise them somewhat higher than the tax. Let us suppose, for example, that in a particular place the demand for labour and the price of provifions were fuch as to render ten shillings a week the ordinary wages of labour; and that a tax of one-fifth, or four shillings in the pound, was imposed upon wages. If the demand for labour and the price of provisions remained the same, it would still be necessary that the labourer should in that place earn such a subsistence as could be bought only for ten shillings a week, or that after paying

BOOK paying the tax he should have ten shillings a week free wages. But in order to leave him such free wages after paying such a tax, the price of labour must in that place soon rise, not to twelve shillings a week only, but to twelve and fixpence; that is, in order to enable him to pay a tax of one-fifth, his wages must necessarily foon rife, not one-fifth part only, but one-fourth. Whatever was the proportion of the tax, the wages of labour must in all cases rise, not only in that proportion, but in a higher proportion. If the tax, for example, was one-tenth, the wages of labour must necessarily soon rise, not one-tenth part only, but one-eighth.

> A DIRECT tax upon the wages of labour, therefore, though the labourer might perhaps pay it out of his hand, could not properly be said to be even advanced by him; at least if the demand for labour and the average price of provisions remained the same after the tax as before it. In all fuch cases, not only the tax, but fomething more than the tax, would in reality be advanced by the person who immediately employed him. The final payment would in different cases fall upon different persons. which such a tax might occasion in the wages of manufacturing labour would be advanced by the master manufacturer, who would both be entitled and obliged to charge it, with a profit, upon the price of his goods. The final payment of this rife of wages therefore, together with the additional profit of the master manufacturer, would fall upon the confumer. The rife which fuch a tax might occasion in the wages of country labour would be advanced by the farmer, who in order to maintain the same number of labourers as before would be obliged to employ a greater capital. In order to get back this greater capital, together with the ordinary profits of stock, it would be necessary that he should retain a larger portion, or what comes to the fame thing, the price of a larger portion, of the produce of the land, and consequently that he fhould

should pay less rent to the landlord. The final payment of this CHAP. rife of wages, therefore, would in this case fall upon the landlord, together with the additional profit of the farmer who had advanced it. In all cases a direct tax upon the wages of labour must, in the long run, occasion both a greater reduction in the rent of land, and a greater rife in the price of manufactured goods, than would have followed from the proper affeliment of a fum equal to the produce of the tax, partly upon the rent of land, and partly upon confumable commodities.

IF direct taxes upon the wages of labour have not always occafioned a proportionable rife in those wages, it is because they have generally occasioned a considerable fall in the demand for labour. The declenfion of industry, the decrease of employment for the poor, the diminution of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, have generally been the effects of fuch taxes. In consequence of them, however, the price of labour must always be higher than it otherwise would have been in the actual state of the demand: and this enhancement of price, together with the profit of those who advance it, must always be finally paid by the landlords and confumers.

A TAX upon the wages of country labour does not raise the price of the rude produce of land; for the same reason that a tax upon the farmers profit does not raise that price.

ABSURD and destructive as such taxes are, however, they take place in many countries. In France that part of the taille which is charged upon the industry of workmen and day-labourers in country villages, is properly a tax of this kind. Their wages are computed according to the common rate of the district in which they reside, and that they may be as little liable as possible to any over-charge, their yearly gains are estimated at no more than two hundred

BOOK hundred working days in the year *. The tax of each individual is varied from year to year according to different circumstances, of which the collector or the commissary, whom the intendant appoints to affift him, are the judges. In Bohemia, in confequence of the alteration in the fystem of finances which was begun in 1748, a very heavy tax is imposed upon the industry of artificers. They are divided into four classes. The highest class pay a hundred florins a year; which, at two and twenty-pence halfpenny a florin, amounts to ol. 7 s. 6 d. The fecond class are taxed at seventy: the third at fifty; and the fourth, comprehending artificers in villages and the lowest class of those in towns, at twenty-five florins +.

> THE recompence of ingenious artists and of men of liberal professions, I have endeavoured to show in the first book, necessarily keeps a certain proportion to the emoluments of inferior trades. tax upon this recompence, therefore, could have no other effect than to raise it somewhat higher than in proportion to the tax. If it did not rise in this manner, the ingenious arts and the liberal professions, being no longer upon a level with other trades, would be fo much deferted that they would foon return to that level.

> THE emoluments of offices are not, like those of trades and professions, regulated by the free competition of the market, and do not, therefore, always bear a just proportion to what the nature of the employment requires. They are, perhaps in most countries, higher than it requires; the persons who have the administration of government being generally disposed to reward both themselves and their immediate dependents rather more than enough. The emoluments of offices, therefore, can in most cases very well

Id. tom. ii. p. 108.

bear to be taxed. The perfons, besides, who enjoy public offices, especially the more lucrative, are in all countries the objects of general envy; and a tax upon their emoluments, even though it should be somewhat higher than upon any other sort of revenue, is always a very popular tax. In England, for example, when by the land-tax every other sort of revenue was supposed to be assessed at four shillings in the pound, it was very popular to lay a real tax of sive shillings in the pound upon the salaries of offices which exceeded a hundred pounds a year; those of the judges and a few others less obnoxious to envy excepted. There are in England no other direct taxes upon the wages of labour.

CHAP.

ARTICLE IV.

Taxes which, it is intended, should fall indifferently upon everydifferent Species of Revenue.

THE taxes which, it is intended, should fall indifferently upon every different species of revenue, are capitation taxes, and taxes upon consumable commodities. These must be paid indifferently from whatever revenue the contributors may posses; from the rent of their land, from the profits of their stock, or from the wages of their labour.

Capitation Taxes.

CAPITATION taxes, if it is attempted to proportion them to the fortune or revenue of each contributor, become altogether arbitrary. The state of a man's fortune varies from day to day, and without an inquisition more intolerable than any tax, and renewed at least once every year, can only be guessed at. His assessment, therefore, must in most cases depend upon the good or bad humour of his assessment, and must, therefore, be altogether arbitrary and uncertain.

CARITATION

BOOK V. CAPITATION taxes, if they are proportioned, not to the supposed fortune, but to the rank of each contributor, become altogether unequal; the degrees of fortune being frequently unequal in the same degree of rank.

Such taxes, therefore, if it is attempted to render them equal, become altogether arbitrary and uncertain; and if it is attempted to render them certain and not arbitrary, became altogether unequal. Let the tax be light or heavy, uncertainty is always a great grievance. In a light tax a confiderable degree of inequality may be supported; in a heavy one it is altogether intolerable.

In the different poll-taxes which took place in England, during the reign of William III. the contributors were, the greater part of them, affeffed according to the degree of their rank; as dukes, marquisses, earls, viscounts, barons, esquires, gentlemen, the eldest and youngest sons of peers, &c. All shopkeepers and tradesmen worth more than three hundred pounds, that is, the better fort of them, were subject to the same affessment; how great soever might be the difference in their fortunes. Their rank was more considered than their fortune. Several of those who in the first poll-tax were rated according to their supposed fortune, were afterwards rated according to their rank. Sergeants, attornies, and proctors at law, who in the first poll-tax were assessed at three shillings in the pound of their supposed income, were afterwards affeffed as gentlemen. In the affeffment of a tax, which was not very heavy, a confiderable degree of inequality had been found less insupportable than any degree of uncertainty.

In the capitation which has been levied in France without any interruption fince the beginning of the prefent century, the highest orders of people are rated according to their rank by an invariable tariff:

tarif; the lower orders of people, according to what is supposed to be their fortune, by an assessment which varies from year to year. The officers of the king's court, the judges and other officers in the superior courts of justice, the officers of the troops, &c. are assessment as a self-selfed in the first manner. The inferior ranks of people in the provinces are assessment as a self-selfed in the second. In France the great easily submit to a considerable degree of inequality in a tax which, so far as it affects them, is not a very heavy one; but could not brook the arbitrary assessment of an intendant. The inferior ranks of people must, in that country, suffer patiently the usage which their superiors think proper to give them.

In England the different poll-taxes never produced the fum which had been expected from them, or which, it was supposed, they might have produced, had they been exactly levied. France the capitation always produces the fum expected from it. The mild government of England, when it affeffed the different ranks of people to the poll-tax, contented itself with what that affeffment happened to produce; and required no compensation for the loss which the state might sustain either by those who could not pay, or by those who would not pay, (for there were many fuch), and who, by the indulgent execution of the law, were not forced to pay. The more severe government of France assesses upon each generality a certain fum, which the intendant must find as he can. If any province complains of being affelfed too high, it may, in the affeffment of next year, obtain an abatement proportioned to the over-charge of the year before: But it must pay in the meantime. The intendant, in order to be fure of finding the fum assessed upon his generality, was impowered to assess it in a larger fum, that the failure or inability of some of the contributors might be compensated by the over-charge of the rest; and till 1765, the fixation of this furplus affessment, was left altogether

BOOK to his discretion. In that year indeed the council assumed this power to itself. In the capitation of the provinces, it is observed by the perfectly-well informed author of the Memoirs upon the impositions in France, the portion which falls upon the nobility, and upon those whose privileges exempt them from the taille, is the least considerable. The largest falls upon those subject to the taille, who are affessed to the capitation at so much a pound of what they pay to that other tax.

> CAPITATION taxes, so far as they are levied upon the lower ranks of people, are direct taxes upon the wages of labour, and are attended with all the inconveniencies of fuch taxes.

> CAPITATION taxes are levied at little expence; and, where they are rigorously exacted, afford a very fure revenue to the state. It is upon this account that in countries where the ease, comfort, and security of the inferior ranks of people are little attended to, capitation taxes are very common. It is in general, however, but a small part of the public revenue, which, in a great empire, has ever been drawn from such taxes; and the greatest sum which they have ever afforded, might always have been found in some other way much more convenient to the people.

Taxes upon consumable Commodities.

THE impossibility of taxing the people, in proportion to their revenue, by any capitation, feems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes upon confumable commodities. The state not knowing how to tax directly and proportionably the revenue of its subjects, endeavours to tax it indirectly by taxing their expence, which, it is supposed, will in most cases be nearly in proportion to their revenue.

revenue. Their expence is taxed by taxing the confumable commodities upon which it is laid out.

Consumable commodities are either necessaries or luxuries.

By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensibly necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people. even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, ftrictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that difgraceful degree of poverty, which, it is prefumed, no body can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them. In Scotland, custom has rendered them a necessary of life to the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of women, who may, without any discredit, walk about bare-footed. In France, they are necessaries neither to men nor to women; the lowest rank of both sexes appearing there publicly, without any discredit, sometimes in wooden slioes, and sometimes bare-footed. Under necessaries. therefore, I comprehend, not only those things which nature, but those things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people. All other things, I call luxuries; without meaning by this appellation, to throw the smallest degree of reproach upon the temperate use of them. Beer and ale, for example, in Great Britain, and wine, even in the wine countries, I call luxuries. A man of any rank may, without

BOOK any reproach, abstain totally from tasting such liquors. Nature does not render them necessary for the support of life; and custom no where renders it indecent to live without them.

> As the wages of labour are every where regulated partly by the demand for it, and partly by the average price of the necessary articles of subsistence; whatever raises this average price must neceffarily raife those wages, so that the labourer may still be able to purchase that quantity of those necessary articles which the state of the demand for labour, whether increasing, stationary, or declining, requires that he should have +. A tax upon those articles necessarily raises their price somewhat higher than the amount of the tax, because the dealer, who advances the tax. must generally get it back with a profit. Such a tax must, therefore, occasion a rise in the wages of labour proportionable to this rise of price.

> IT is thus that a tax upon the necessaries of life, operates exactly in the same manner as a direct tax upon the wages of labour. The labourer, though he may pay it out of his hand; cannot, for any confiderable time at least, be properly said even to advance it. It must always in the long-run be advanced to him by his immediate employer in the advanced rate of his wages. His employer, if he is a manufacturer, will charge upon the price of his goods this rife of wages, together with a profit; fo that the final payment of the tax, together with this over-charge, will fall upon the consumer. If his employer is a farmer, the final payment, together with a like over-charge, will fall upon the rent of the. landlord.

> IT is otherwise with taxes upon what I call luxuries; even upon those of the poor. The rise in the price of the taxed commodities,

> > + See Book I. Cap. 8.

fons,

will not necessarily occasion any rise in the wages of labour. A CHAP. tax upon tobacco, for example, though a luxury of the poor as well as of the rich, will not raise wages. Though it is taxed in England at three times, and in France at fifteen times its original price, those high duties feem to have no effect upon the wages of labour. The same thing may be said of the taxes upon tea and fugar; which in England and Holland have become luxuries of the lowest ranks of people; and of those upon chocolate, which in Spain is faid to have become fo. The different taxes which in Great Britain have in the course of the present century been imposed upon spirituous liquors, are not supposed to have had any effect upon the wages of labour. The rife in the price of porter, occasioned by an additional tax of three shillings upon the barrel of ftrong beer, has not raifed the wages of common labour in London. These were about eighteen-pence and twenty-pence a day before the tax, and they are not more now.

The high price of fuch commodities does not necessarily diminish the ability of the inferior ranks of people to bring up families. Upon the sober and industrious poor, taxes upon such commodities act as sumptuary laws, and dispose them either to moderate, or to refrain altogether from the use of superfluities which they can no longer easily afford. Their ability to bring up families, in consequence of this forced frugality, instead of being diminished, is frequently, perhaps, increased by the tax. It is the sober and industrious poor who generally bring up the most numerous families, and who principally supply the demand for useful labour. All the poor indeed are not sober and industrious, and the dissolute and disorderly might continue to induse themselves in the use of such commodities after this rise of price in the same manner as before; without regarding the distress which this indulgence might bring upon their families. Such disorderly per-

BOOK fons, however, feldom rear up numerous families; their children generally perishing from neglect, mismanagement, and the scantiness or unwholesomeness of their food. If by the strength of their constitution they survive the hardships to which the bad conduct of their parents exposes them; yet the example of that bad conduct commonly corrupts their morals; fo that, instead of being useful to fociety by their industry, they become public nuisances by their vices and disorders. Though the advanced price of the luxuries of the poor, therefore, might increase somewhat the diftress of such disorderly families, and thereby diminish somewhat their ability to bring up children; it would not probably diminish much the useful population of the country.

> Any rise in the average price of necessaries, unless it is compenfated by a proportionable rife in the wages of labour, must necessarily diminish more or less the ability of the poor to bring up numerous families, and consequently to supply the demand for useful labour; whatever may be the state of that demand, whether increasing, stationary, or declining; or such as requires an increafing, stationary, or declining, population.

> Taxes upon luxuries have no tendency to raise the price of any other commodities except that of the commodities taxed. Taxes upon necessaries, by raising the wages of labour, necessarily tend to raise the price of all manufactures, and consequently to diminish the extent of their sale and consumption. Taxes upon luxuries are finally paid by the confumers of the commodities taxed, without any retribution. They fall indifferently upon every species of revenue, the wages of labour, the profits of stock, and the rent of land. Taxes upon necessaries, fo far as they affect the labouring poor, are finally paid, partly by landlords in the diminished rent of their lands, and partly by rich confumers, whether landlords.

fandlords or others, in the advanced price of manufactured goods; CHAP. and always with a confiderable over-charge. The advanced price of fuch manufactures as are real necessaries of life, and are destined for the confumption of the poor, of coarse woollens, for example, must be compensated to the poor by a farther advancement of their wages. The middling and superior ranks of people, if they understood their own interest, ought always to oppose all taxes upon the necessaries of life, as well as all direct taxes upon the wages of The final payment of both the one and the other falls altogether upon themselves, and always with a considerable over-They fall heaviest upon the landlords, who always pay in a double capacity; in that of landlords, by the reduction of their rent; and in that of rich consumers, by the increase of their expence. The observation of Sir Mathew Decker, that certain taxes are in the price of certain goods sometimes repeated and accumulated four or five times, is perfectly just with regard to taxes upon the necessaries of life. In the price of leather, for example, you must pay, not only for the tax upon the leather of your own shoes, but for a part of that upon those of the shoe-maker and the tanner. You must pay too for the tax upon the salt, upon the soap, and upon the candles which those workmen consume while employed in your fervice, and for the tax upon the leather, which the faltmaker, the foap-maker, and the candle-maker confume while employed in their fervice.

In Great Britain, the principal taxes upon the necessaries of life are those upon the four commodities just now mentioned, salt, leather, foap, and candles.

SALT is a very antient and a very universal subject of taxation. It was taxed among the Romans, and it is so at present in, I believe, every part of Europe. The quantity annually confumed by

any

BOOK any individual is fo fmall, and may be purchased so gradually, that nobody, it feems to have been thought, could feel very fenfibly even a pretty heavy tax upon it. It is in England taxed at three fhillings a buthel; about three times the original price of the commodity. In some other countries the tax is still higher. Leather is a real necessary of life. The use of linen renders soap such. countries where the winter nights are long, candles are a necessary instrument of trade. Leather and soap are in Great Britain taxed at three halfpence a pound; candles at a penny; taxes which, upon the original price of leather may amount to about eight or ten per cent; upon that of foap to about twenty or five and twenty per cent; and upon that of candles to about fourteen or fifteen per cent; taxes which, though lighter than that upon falt, are still very heavy. As all those four commodities are real necessaries of life, fuch heavy taxes upon them must increase somewhat the expence of the fober and industrious poor, and must consequently raise more or less the wages of their labour.

> In a country where the winters are fo cold as in Great Britain, fuel is, during that feafon, in the strictest sense of the word, a necessary of life, not only for the purpose of dressing victuals, but for the comfortable sublistence of many different forts of workmen who work within doors; and coals are the cheapest of all fuel. The price of fuel has so important an influence upon that of labour, that all over Great Britain manufactures have confined themselves principally to the coal countries; other parts of the country, on account of the high price of this necessary article, not being able to work fo cheap. In some manufactures, besides, coal is a neceffary instrument of trade; as in those of glass, iron, and all other metals. If a bounty could in any case be reasonable, it might perhaps be so upon the transportation of coals from those parts of the country in which they abound, to those in which they are wanted.

> > But

But the legislature, instead of a bounty, has imposed a tax of three CHAP. shillings and three-pence a ton upon coal carried coastways; which upon most forts of coal is more than fixty per cent. of the original price at the coal-pit. Coals carried either by land or by inland navigation pay no duty. Where they are naturally cheap, they are confumed duty free: Where they are naturally dear, they are loaded with a heavy duty.

Such taxes, though they raise the price of subsistence, and confequently the wages of labour, yet they afford a confiderable revenue to government, which it might not be easy to find in any other way. There may, therefore, be good reasons for continuing them. The bounty upon the exportation of corn, so far as it tends in the actual state of tillage to raise the price of that necessary article, produces all the like bad effects; and instead of affording any revenue, frequently occasions a very great expence to government. The high duties upon the importation of foreign corn, which in years of moderate plenty amount to a prohibition; and the absolute prohibition of the importation either of live cattle or of falt provisions, which takes place in the ordinary state of the law, and which on account of the scarcity is at present suspended for a limited time with regard to Ireland and the British plantations, have all the bad effects of taxes upon the necessaries of life, and produce no revenue to government. Nothing feems necessary for the repeal of fuch regulations, but to convince the public of the futility of that system in consequence of which they have been established.

Taxes upon the necessaries of life are much higher in many other countries than in Great Britain. Duties upon flour and meal when ground at the mill, and upon bread when baked at the oven, take place in many countries. In Holland the money price of the bread confumed in towns is supposed to be doubled by means of fuch

BOOK fuch taxes. In lieu of a part of them, the people who live in the country pay every year so much a head, according to the sort of bread they are supposed to consume. Those who consume wheaten bread, pay three gilders fifteen stivers; about fix shillings and nine-pence halfpenny. These, and some other taxes of the same kind, by raising the price of labour, are faid to have ruined the greater part of the manufactures of Holland*. Similar taxes, though not quite so heavy, take place in the Milanese, in the states of Genoa, in the dutchy of Modena, in the dutchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, and in the ecclesiastical state. A French author + of some note has proposed to reform the finances of his country, by substituting in the room of the greater part of other taxes this most ruinous of all taxes. There is nothing so absurd. fays Cicero, which has not fometimes been afferted by fome philosophers.

> Taxes upon butchers meat are still more common than those upon bread. It may indeed be doubted whether butchers meat is any where a necessary of life. Grain and other vegetables, with the help of milk, cheefe, and butter, or oil where butter is not to be had, it is known from experience, can, without any butchers meat, afford the most plentiful, the most wholesome, the most nourishing, and the most invigorating diet. Decency no where requires that any man should eat butchers meat, as it in most places requires that he should wear a linen shirt or a pair of leather shoes.

> Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be taxed in two different ways. The confumer may either pay an annual fum on account of his using or consuming goods of a certain kind; or the goods may be taxed while they remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they are delivered to the confumer. The confumable goods which last a considerable time before they are confumed altogether, are most properly taxed in the one way.

Those

^{*} Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. p. 210, 211. + Le reformateur.

Those of which the consumption is either immediate or more speedy, CHAP. The coach-tax and plate-tax are examples of the in the other. former method of imposing: The greater part of the other duties of excise and customs, of the latter.

A coach may, with good management, last ten or twelve years. It might be taxed, once for all, before it comes out of the hands of the coach-maker. But it is certainly more convenient for the buyer to pay four pounds a year for the privilege of keeping a coach, than to pay all at once forty or forty-eight pounds additional price to the coach-maker; or a fum equivalent to what the tax is likely to cost him during the time he uses the same coach. A service of plate, in the fame manner, may last more than a century. It is certainly easier for the consumer to pay five shillings a year for every hundred ounces of plate, near one per cent. of the value, than to redeem this long annuity at five and twenty or thirty years purchase, which would enhance the price at least five and twenty or thirty per cent. The different taxes which affect houses are certainly more conveniently paid by moderate annual payments, than by a heavy tax of equal value upon the first building or sale of the house.

IT was the well known propofal of Sir Mathew Decker that all commodities, even those of which the consumption is either immediate or very speedy, should be taxed in this manner; the dealer advancing nothing, but the confumer paying a certain annual fum for the licence to confume certain goods. The object of his scheme was to promote all the different branches of foreign trade, particularly the carrying trade, by taking away all duties upon importation and exportation, and thereby enabling the merchant to employ his whole capital and credit in the purchase of goods and the freight of ships, no part of either being diverted towards the advancing

BOOK advancing of taxes. The project, however, of taxing, in this manner, goods of immediate or speedy consumption, seems liable to the four following very important objections. First, the tax would be more unequal, or not fo well proportioned to the expence and confumption of the different contributors, as in the way in which it is commonly imposed. The taxes upon ale, wine, and spirituous liquors, which are advanced by the dealers, are finally paid by the different confumers exactly in proportion to their respective consumption. But if the tax was to be paid by purchasing a licence to drink those liquors, the sober would, in proportion to his confumption, be taxed much more heavily than the drunken consumer. A family which exercised great hospitality would be taxed much more lightly than one which entertained fewer guests. Secondly, this mode of taxation, by paying for an annual, half-yearly. or quarterly licence to confume certain goods, would diminish very much one of the principal conveniencies of taxes upon goods of speedy consumption; the piece-meal payment. In the price of three-pence halfpenny, which is at present paid for a pot of porter, the different taxes upon malt, hops, and beer, together with the extraordinary profit which the brewer charges for having advanced them, may perhaps amount to about three halfpence. If a workman can conveniently spare those three halfpence, he buys a pot of porter. If he cannot, he contents himself with a pint, and, as a penny faved is a penny got, he thus gains a farthing by his temperance. He pays the tax piece-meal, as he can afford to pay it, and when he can afford to pay it; and every act of payment is perfectly voluntary, and what he can avoid if he chuses to do so. Thirdly, such taxes would operate less as sumptuary laws. When the licence was once purchased, whether the purchaser drunk much or drunk little, his tax would be the same. Fourthly, if a workman was to pay all at once, by yearly, half-yearly, or quarterly payments, a tax equal to what he at present pays, with little or no inconveniency, upon all the different pots and pints of porter which he drinks in any such period of time, the sum might frequently distress him very much. This mode of taxation, therefore, it seems evident, could never, without the most grievous oppression, produce a revenue nearly equal to what is derived from the present mode without any oppression. In several countries, however, commodities of an immediate or very speedy consumption are taxed in this manner. In Holland, people pay so much a head for a licence to drink tea. I have already mentioned a tax upon bread, which, so far as it is consumed in farmhouses and country villages, is there levied in the same manner.

The duties of excise are imposed chiefly upon goods of home produce destined for home consumption. They are imposed only upon a few sorts of goods of the most general use. There can never be any doubt either concerning the goods which are subject to those duties, or concerning the particular duty which each species of goods is subject to. They fall almost altogether upon what I call luxuries, excepting always the four duties abovementioned, upon salt, soap, leather, candles, and, perhaps, that upon green glass.

The duties of customs are much more antient than those of excise. They seem to have been called customs, as denoting customary payments which had been in use from time immemorial. They appear to have been originally considered as taxes upon the profits of merchants. During the barbarous times of seudal anarchy, merchants, like all the other inhabitants of burghs, were considered as little better than emancipated bondmen, whose persons were despised, and whose gains were envied. The great nobility, who had consented that the king should tallage the profits of their own tenants, were not unwilling that he should tallage likewise those of an order of men whom it was much less their interest to protect.

BOOK protect. In those ignorant times it was not understood that the profits of merchants are a subject not taxable directly; or that the final payment of all fuch taxes must fall, with a considerable overcharge, upon the confumers.

> THE gains of alien merchants were looked upon more unfavourably than those of English merchants. It was natural, therefore, that those of the former should be taxed more heavily than those of the latter. This distinction between the duties upon aliens and those upon English merchants, which was begun from ignorance, has been continued from the spirit of monopoly, or in order to give our own merchants an advantage both in the home and in the foreign market.

> WITH this distinction the antient duties of customs were imposed equally upon all forts of goods, necessaries as well as luxuries, goods exported as well as goods imported. Why should the dealers in one fort of goods, it seems to have been thought, be more favoured than those in another? or why should the merchant exporter be more favoured than the merchant importer?

> THE antient customs were divided into three branches. The first, and perhaps the most antient of all those duties, was that upon wool and leather. It feems to have been chiefly or altogether an exportation duty. When the woollen manufacture came to be established in England, lest the king should lose any part of his customs upon wool by the exportation of woollen cloths, a like duty was imposed upon them. The other two branches were, first, a duty upon wine, which being imposed at so much a ton, was called a tonnage; and, fecondly, a duty upon all other goods, which being imposed at so much a pound of their supposed value, was called a poundage. In the forty-seventh year of Edward III. a duty

a duty of fix-pence in the pound was imposed upon all goods CHAP. exported and imported, except wools, wool-fells, leather, and wines, which were subject to particular duties. In the fourteenth of Richard II. this duty was raised to one shilling in the pound; but, three years afterwards, it was again reduced to fix-pence. It was raised to eight-pence in the second year of Henry IV.; and in the fourth year of the same prince, to one shilling. From this time to the ninth year of William III. this duty continued at one shilling in the pound. The duties of tonnage and poundage were generally granted to the king by one and the same act of parliament, and were called the Subfidy of Tonnage and Poundage. The fubfidy of poundage having continued for so long a time at one shilling in the pound, or at five per cent.; a fubfidy came, in the language of the customs, to denote a general duty of this kind of five per cent. This fubfidy, which is now called the Old Subfidy, still continues to be levied according to the book of rates established in the twelfth of Charles II. The method of ascertaining, by a book of rates, the value of goods subject to this duty, is faid to be older than the time of James I. The new subsidy imposed by the ninth and tenth of William III., was an additional five per cent. upon the greater part of goods. The one-third and the two-third fubfidy made up between them another five per cent. of which they were proportionable parts. The subsidy of 1747 made a fourth five per cent. upon the greater part of goods; and that of 1759, a fifth upon some particular forts of goods. Besides those sive subsidies, a great variety of other duties have occasionally been imposed upon particular forts of goods, in order sometimes to relieve the exigencies of the state, and sometimes to regulate the trade of the country, according to the principles of the mercantile fystem.

THAT fystem has come gradually more and more into fashion. The old subsidy was imposed indifferently upon exportation as well

BOOK as importation. The four subsequent subsidies, as well as the other duties which have fince been occasionally imposed upon particular forts of goods, have, with a few exceptions, been laid altogether upon importation. The greater part of the antient duties which had been imposed upon the exportation of the goods of home produce and manufacture, have either been lightened or taken away altogether. In most cases they have been taken away. Bounties have even been given upon the exportation of some of them. Drawbacks too, sometimes of the whole, and, in most cases, of a part of the duties which are paid upon the importation of foreign goods, have been granted upon their exportation. Only half the duties imposed by the old subsidy upon importation are drawn back upon exportation: but the whole of those imposed by the later subsidies and other imposts are, upon the greater part of goods, drawn back in the same manner. This growing favour of exportation, and discouragement of importation, have suffered only a few exceptions, which chiefly concern the materials of some manufactures. our merchants and manufacturers are willing should come as cheap as possible to themselves, and as dear as possible to their rivals and competitors in other countries. Foreign materials are, upon this account, fometimes allowed to be imported duty free; Spanish wool, for example, flax, and raw linen yarn. The exportation of the materials of home produce, and of those which are the peculiar produce of our colonies, has fometimes been prohibited, and fometimes subjected to higher duties. The exportation of English wool has been prohibited. That of beaver skins, of beaver wool, and of gum Senega, has been subjected to higher duties; Great Britain, by the conquest of Canada and Senegal, having got almost the monopoly of those commodities.

> THAT the mercantile system has not been very favourable to the revenue of the great body of the people, to the annual produce

duce of the land and labour of the country, I have endeavoured CHAP. to shew in the fourth book of this inquiry. It seems not to have been more favourable to the revenue of the fovereign; fo far at least as that revenue depends upon the duties of customs.

In confequence of that fystem, the importation of several sorts of goods has been prohibited altogether. This prohibition has in some cases entirely prevented, and in others very much diminished the importation of those commodities, by reducing the importers to the necessity of smuggling. It has entirely prevented the importation of foreign woollens; and it has very much diminished that of foreign silks and velvets. In both cases it has entirely annihilated the revenue of customs which might have been levied upon fuch importation.

THE high duties which have been imposed upon the importation of many different forts of foreign goods, in order to difcourage their consumption in Great Britain, have in many cases ferved only to encourage fmuggling; and in all cases have reduced the revenue of the customs below what more moderate duties would have afforded. The faying of Dr. Swift, that in the arithmetic of the customs two and two, instead of making four, make sometimes only one, holds perfectly true with regard to fuch heavy duties, which never could have been imposed had not the mercantile fystem taught us in many cases to employ taxation as an instrument, not of revenue, but of monopoly.

THE bounties which are fometimes given upon the exportation of home produce and manufactures, and the drawbacks which are paid upon the re-exportation of the greater part of foreign goods, have given occasion to many frauds, and to a species of smuggling more destructive of the public revenue than

BOOK any other. In order to obtain the bounty or drawback, the goods, it is well known, are fometimes shipped and fent to sea; but foon afterwards clandestinely re-landed in some other part of the country. The defalcation of the revenue of customs occafioned by bounties and drawbacks, of which a great part are obtained fraudulently, is very great. The gross produce of the customs in the year which ended on the 5th of January, 1755. amounted to 5,068,000l. The bounties which were paid out of this revenue, though in that year there was no bounty upon corn, amounted to 167,800 l. The drawbacks which were paid upon debentures and certificates to 2,156,800 l. Bounties and drawbacks together amounted to 2,324,600 l. In consequence of these deductions the revenue of the customs amounted only to 2,743,4001.: from which deducting 287,9001. for the expence of management in falaries and other incidents, the neat revenue of the customs for that year comes out to be 2,455,5001. expence of management amounts, in this manner, to between five and fix per cent. upon the gross revenue of the customs, and to fomething more than ten per cent. upon what remains of that revenue, after deducting what is paid away in bounties and drawbacks.

> HEAVY duties being imposed upon almost all goods imported, our merchant importers fmuggle as much, and make entry of as little as they can. Our merchant exporters, on the contrary, make entry of more than they export; fometimes out of vanity. and to pass for great dealers in goods which pay no duty; and fometimes to gain a bounty or a drawback. Our exports, in consequence of these different frauds, appear upon the customhouse books greatly to overbalance our imports; to the unspeakable comfort of those politicians who measure the national profperity by what they call the balance of trade.

ALL goods imported, unless particularly exempted, and such CHAP. exemptions are not very numerous, are liable to fome duties of customs. If any goods are imported not mentioned in the book of rates, they are taxed at 4 s. 9 d. of for every twenty shillings value, according to the oath of the importer, that is, nearly at five subsidies, or five poundage duties. The book of rates is extremely comprehensive, and enumerates a great variety of articles, many of them little used, and therefore not well known. It is upon this account frequently uncertain under what article a particular fort of goods ought to be classed, and consequently what duty they ought to pay. Mistakes with regard to this sometimes ruin the custom-house officer, and frequently occasion much trouble, expence and vexation to the importer. In point of perspicuity, precision and distinctness, therefore, the duties of customs are much inferior to those of excise.

In order that the greater part of the members of any society should contribute to the public revenue in proportion to their respective expence, it does not seem necessary that every single article of that expence should be taxed. The revenue which is levied by the duties of excise is supposed to fall as equally upon the contributors as that which is levied by the duties of customs; and the duties of excise are imposed upon a sew articles only of the most general use and consumption. It has been the opinion of many people that, by proper management, the duties of customs might likewise, without any loss to the public revenue, and with great advantage to foreign trade, be confined to a few articles only.

THE foreign articles of the most general use and consumption in Great Britain, seem at present to consist chiefly in foreign wines and brandies; in some of the productions of America and the West Indies, sugar, sum, tobacco, cacao-nuts, &c. and in

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BOOK some of those of the East Indies, tea, coffee, china-ware, spiceries of all kinds, feveral forts of piece goods, &c. These different articles afford perhaps at prefent the greater part of the revenue which is drawn from the duties of customs. The taxes which at present subsist upon foreign manufactures, if you except those upon the few contained in the foregoing enumeration, have the greater part of them been imposed for the purpose, not of revenue, but of monopoly, or to give our own merchants an advantage in the home market. By removing all prohibitions, and by subjecting all foreign manufactures to such moderate taxes as it was found from experience afforded upon each article the greatest revenue to the public, our own workmen might still have a confiderable advantage in the home market, and many articles, some of which at present afford no revenue to government. and others a very inconfiderable one, might afford a very great one.

> High taxes, fometimes by diminishing the consumption of the taxed commodities, and fometimes by encouraging fmuggling, frequently afford a smaller revenue to government than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes.

> WHEN the diminution of revenue is the effect of the diminute tion of consumption, there can be but one remedy, and that is the lowering of the tax.

> WHEN the diminution of revenue is the effect of the encouragement given to smuggling, it may perhaps be remedied in two ways; either by diminishing the temptation to fmuggle, or by increasing the difficulty of smuggling. The temptation to fmuggle can be diminished only by the lowering of the tax; and the difficulty of fmuggling can be increased only by establishing that system of administration which is most proper for preventing it.

THE

The excise laws, it appears, I believe, from experience, obstruct and embarrass the operations of the smuggler much more
effectually than those of the customs. By introducing into the
customs a system of administration as similar to that of the excise
as the nature of the different duties will admit, the difficulty of
smuggling might be very much increased. This alteration, it
has been supposed by many people, might very easily be brought
about.

THE importer of commodities liable to any duties of customs, it has been faid, might at his option be allowed either to carry them to his own private warehouse, or to lodge them in a warehouse provided either at his own expence or at that of the public, but under the key of the customhouse officer, and never to be opened but in his presence. If the merchant carried them to his own private warehouse, the duties to be immediately paid, and never afterwards to be drawn back; and that warehouse to be at all times subject to the visit and examination of the customhouse officer, in order to ascertain how far the quantity contained in it corresponded with that for which the duty had been paid. If he carried them to the public warehouse, no duty to be paid till they were taken out for home confumption. If taken out for exportation, to be duty-free; proper fecurity being always given that they should be so exported. The dealers in those particular commodities, either by wholefale or retail, to be at all times subject to the visit and examination of the customhouse officer; and to be obliged to justify by proper certificates the payment of the duty upon the whole quantity contained in their shops or warehouses. What are called the excise duties upon rum imported are at present levied in this manner, and the same system of administration might perhaps be extended to all duties upon goods imported; provided always, that those duties were, like the duties of excise, confined to a few sorts of goods of the most general

BOOK general use and consumption. If they were extended to almost all forts of goods, as at present, public warehouses of sufficient extent could not eafily be provided, and goods of a very delicate nature, or of which the preservation required much care and attention, could not fafely be trusted by the merchant in any warehouse but his own.

> IF by fuch a fystem of administration smuggling to any confiderable extent could be prevented even under pretty high duties, and if every duty was occasionally either heightened or lowered according as it was most likely, either the one way or the other, to afford the greatest revenue to the state; taxation being always employed as an instrument of revenue and never of monopoly; it feems not improbable that a revenue at least equal to the prefent neat revenue of the customs might be drawn from duties upon the importation of only a few forts of goods of the most general use and confumption; and that the duties of customs might thus be brought to the same degree of simplicity, certainty and precision, as those of excise. What the revenue at present loses by drawbacks upon the re-exportation of foreign goods which are afterwards re-landed and confumed at home, would under this fystem be faved altogether. If to this faving, which would alone be very confiderable, was added the abolition of all bounties upon the exportation of home-produce, in all cases in which those bounties were not in reality drawbacks of some duties of excise which had hefore been advanced; it cannot well be doubted but that the neat revenue of customs might after an alteration of this kind be fully equal to what it had ever been before.

> IF by such a change of system the public revenue suffered no loss; the trade and manufactures of the country would certainly gain a very confiderable advantage. The trade in the commodities

not taxed, by far the greatest number, would be perfectly free, CHAP. and might be carried on to and from all parts of the world with every possible advantage. Among those commodities would be comprehended all the necessaries of life, and all the materials of manufacture. So far as the free importation of the necessaries of life reduced their average money price in the home-market, it would reduce the money price of labour, but without reducing in any respect its real recompence. The value of money is in proportion to the quantity of the necessaries of life which it will purchase That of the necessaries of life is altogether independant of the quantity of money which can be had for them. The reduction in the money price of labour would necessarily be attended with a proportionable one in that of all home-manufactures, which would thereby gain fome advantage in all foreign markets. price of fome manufactures would be reduced in a still greater proportion by the free importation of the raw materials. If raw filk could be imported from China and Indostan duty-free, the filk manufacturers in England could greatly underfell those of both France and Italy. There would be no occasion to prohibit the importation of foreign filks and velvets. The cheapness of their goods would fecure to our own workmen, not only the possession of the home, but a very great command of the foreign market. Even the trade in the commodities taxed would be carried on with much more advantage than at present. If those commodities were delivered out of the public warehouse for foreign exportation, being in this case exempted from all taxes, the trade in them would be perfectly free. The carrying trade in all forts of goods would under this fystem enjoy every possible advantage. If those commodities were delivered out for home-confumption, the importer not being obliged to advance the tax till he had an opportunity of felling his goods either to some dealer, or to some confumer, he could always afford to fell them cheaper than if he had been

BOOK been obliged to advance it at the moment of importation. Under the same taxes, the foreign trade of consumption even in the taxed commodities, might in this manner be carried on with much more advantage than it can at present.

> IT was the object of the famous excise scheme of Sir Robert Walpole to establish, with regard to wine and tobacco, a system not very unlike that which is here proposed. But though the bill which was then brought into parliament, comprehended those two commodities only; it was generally supposed to be meant as an introduction to a more extensive scheme of the same kind. combined with the interest of smuggling merchants, raised so violent, though fo unjust, a clamour against that bill, that the minister thought proper to drop it; and from a dread of exciting a clamour of the fame kind, none of his fuccessors have dared to resume the project.

> THE duties upon foreign luxuries imported for home-confumption, though they fometimes fall upon the poor, fall principally upon people of middling or more than middling fortune. Such are, for example, the duties upon foreign wines, upon coffee, chocolate, tea, fugar, &c.

> THE duties upon the cheaper luxuries of home-produce destined for home-consumption, fall pretty equally upon people of all ranks in proportion to their respective expence. The poor pay the duties upon malt, hops, beer, and ale, upon their own confumption: The rich, both upon their own confumption and upon that of their fervants.

> THE whole confumption of the inferior ranks of people, or of those below the middling rank, it must be observed, is in every country

country much greater, not only in quantity, but in value, than CHAP. that of the middling and of those above the middling rank. whole expence of the inferior is much greater than that of the fuperior ranks. In the first place, almost the whole capital of every country is annually distributed among the inferior ranks of people as the wages of productive labour. Secondly, a great part of the revenue arifing both from the rent of land and from the profits of stock, is annually distributed among the same rank, in the wages and maintenance of menial fervants, and other unproductive labourers. Thirdly, some part of the profits of stock belongs to the fame rank, as a revenue arising from the employment of their small capitals. The amount of the profits annually made by small shopkeepers, tradesmen, and retailers of all kinds, is every where very confiderable, and makes a very confiderable portion of the annual produce. Fourthly, and lastly, some part even of the rent of land belongs to the same rank; a considerable part to those who are somewhat below the middling rank, and a small part even to the lowest rank; common labourers sometimes poffessing in property an acre or two of land. Though the expence of those inferior ranks of people, therefore, taking them individually, is very small, yet the whole mass of it, taking them collectively, amounts always to by much the largest portion of the whole expence of the fociety; what remains of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country for the confumption of the fuperior ranks being always much less, not only in quantity but in value. The taxes upon expence, therefore, which fall chiefly upon that of the superior ranks of people, upon the smaller portion of the annual produce, are likely to be much less productive than either those which fall indifferently upon the expence of all ranks, or even those which fall chiefly upon that of the inferior ranks; than either those which fall indifferently upon the whole annual produce, or those which fall chiefly upon the larger portion

BOOK tion of it. The excise upon the materials and manufacture of home-made fermented and spirituous liquors is accordingly, of all the different taxes upon expence, by far the most productive; and this branch of the excise falls very much, perhaps principally, upon the expence of the common people. In the year which ended on the 5th of July, 1775, the gross produce of this branch of the excise amounted to 3,314,223 l. 18 s. 103 d.

> IT must always be remembered, however, that it is the luxurious and not the necessary expence of the inferior ranks of people that ought ever to be taxed. The final payment of any tax upon their necessary expence would fall altogether upon the superior ranks of people; upon the fmaller portion of the annual produce, and not upon the greater. Such a tax must in all cases either raise the wages of labour, or lessen the demand for it. It could not raise the wages of labour, without throwing the final payment of the tax upon the superior ranks of people. It could not lessen the demand for labour, without lessening the annual produce of the land and labour of the country, the fund from which all taxes must be finally paid. Whatever might be the state to which a tax of this kind reduced the demand for labour, it must always raise wages higher than they otherwise would be in that state; and the final payment of this enhancement of wages must in all cases fall upon the fuperior ranks of people.

> FERMENTED liquors brewed and spirituous liquors distilled, not for fale, but for private use, are not in Great Britain liable to any duties of excise. This exemption, of which the object is not to expose private families to the odious visit and examination of the tax-gatherer, occasions the burden of those duties to fall frequently much lighter upon the rich than upon the poor. It is not, indeed, very common to distill for private use, though it is done

done fometimes. But in the country, many middling and almost CHAP. all rich and great families brew their own beer. Their strong beer, therefore, costs them eight shillings a barrel less than it costs the common brewer, who must have his profit upon the tax, as well as upon all the other expence which he advances. Such families, therefore, must drink their beer at least nine or ten shillings a barrel cheaper than any liquor of the same quality can be drunk by the common people, to whom it is every where more convenient to buy their beer, by little and little, from the brewery or the ale-house. Malt, in the same manner, that is made for the use of a private family, is not liable to the visit or examination of the tax-gatherer; but in this case the family must compound at feven shillings and fixpence a head for the tax. Seven shillings and fixpence are equal to the excise upon ten bushels of malt; a quantity fully equal to what all the different members of any fober family, men, women, and children, are at an average likely to confume. But in rich and great families, where country hospitality is much practifed, the malt liquors confumed by the members of the family make but a small part of the consumption of the house. Either on account of this composition, however, or for other reasons, it is not near so common to malt as to brew for private use. It is difficult to imagine any equitable reason why those who either brew or distill for private use, should not be

A GREATER revenue than what is at present drawn from all the heavy taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, might be raised, it has frequently been said, by a much lighter tax upon malt; the opportunities of defrauding the revenue being much greater in a brewery than in a malt-house; and those who brew for private use being exempted from all duties or composition for duties, which is not the case with those who malt for private use.

subject to a composition of the same kind.

BOOK V.

In the porter brewery of London, a quarter of malt is commonly brewed into more than two barrels and a half, fometimes into three bartels of porter. The different taxes upon malt amount to fix shillings a quarter; those upon strong beer and ale to eight shillings a barrel. In the porter brewery, therefore, the different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, amount to between twenty-fix and thirty shillings upon the produce of a quarter of malt. In the country brewery for common country fale, a quarter of malt is feldom brewed into less than two barrels of strong and one barrel of small beer; frequently into two barrels and a half of strong beer. The different taxes upon fmall beer amount to one shilling and four-pence a barrel. In the country brewery, therefore, the different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, seldom amount to less than twenty-three shillings and four-pence, frequently to twenty-fix thillings, upon the produce of a quarter of malt. Taking the whole kingdom at an average, therefore, the whole amount of the duties upon malt, beer, and ale, cannot be estimated at less than twenty-four or twenty-five shillings upon the produce of a quarter of malt. But by taking off all the different duties upon beer and ale, and by tripling the malt-tax, or by raising it from fix to eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt, a greater revenue, it is faid, might be raised by this fingle tax than what is at present drawn from all those heavier taxes.

1.	s.	d.	СНАР.
In 1772, the old malt tax produced - 722,023	11	H	<u>سمب</u>
The additional — 356,776	7	97	
In 1773, the old tax produced — 561,627	3	7=	
The additional — 278,650			
In 1774, the old tax produced — 624,614	17	5 3	
The additional — 310,745	2	8.	
In 1775, the old tax produced — 657,357			
The additional — 323,785	12	6 *	
4)3,835,580	12		
Average of these four years — 958,895	3	3	
In 1772, the country excise produced — 1,243,128	5	3	
The London brewery — 408,260	_	_	
In 1773, the country excise 1,245,808			
The London brewery — 405,406	-	-	
In 1774, the country excise — — 1,246,373	14	5=	
The London brewery — 320,601	18		
In 1775, the country excise — — 1,214,583	6	1	
The London brewery — 463,670	7	<u>x</u>	
4)6,547,832	19	2 r/4	
Average of these four years 1,636,958	4	9;	
To which adding the average malt tax, or 958,895		-	
The whole amount of those different taxes comes out to be	7	911	
But by tripling the malt tax, or by raising it			
from fix to eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt, that single tax would produce — — — 2,876,685	9	- 5	
A fum which exceeds the foregoing by _ 280,832	I	2 1 4	
	U	NDER	

BOOK V.

UNDER the old malt tax, indeed, is comprehended a tax of four shillings upon the hogshead of cyder, and another of ten shillings upon the barrel of mum. In 1774, the tax upon cyder produced only 3083 l. 6s. 8 d. It probably fell somewhat short of its usual amount; all the different taxes upon cyder having that year produced less than ordinary. The tax upon mum, though much heavier, is still less productive, on account of the finaller confumption of that liquor. But to balance whatever may be the ordinary amount of those two taxes; there is comprehended under what is called The country excise, first, the old excise of fix shillings and eight-pence upon the hogshead of cyder; secondly, a like tax of fix shillings and eight-pence upon the hogshead of verjuice; thirdly, another of eight shillings and nine-pence upon the hogshead of vinegar; and, lastly, a fourth tax of elevenpence upon the gallon of mead or metheglin: The produce of those different taxes will probably much more than counterbalance that of the duties imposed, by what is called The annual malt tax, upon cyder and mum.

Malt is confumed not only in the brewery of beer and ale, but in the manufacture of low wines and spirits. If the malt tax was to be raised to eighteen shillings upon the quarter, it might be necessary to make some abatement in the different excises which are imposed upon those particular sorts of low wines and spirits of which malt makes any part of the materials. In what are called Malt spirits, it makes commonly but a third part of the materials; the other two-thirds being either raw barley, or one-third barley and one-third wheat. In the distillery of malt spirits, both the opportunity, and the temptation to smuggle, are much greater than either in a brewery or in a malt-house; the opportunity, on account of the smaller bulk and greater value of the commodity; and the temptation, on account of the superior height

height of the duties, which amount to 2 s. 6 d. upon the gallon CHAP. of spirits. By increasing the duties upon malt, and reducing those upon the distillery, both the opportunities and the temptation to smuggle would be diminished, which might occasion a still further augmentation of revenue.

IT has for some time past been the policy of Great Britain to discourage the consumption of spirituous liquors, on account of their supposed tendency to ruin the health and to corrupt the morals of the common people. According to this policy, the abatement of the taxes upon the distillery ought not to be so great as to reduce in any respect the price of those liquors. Spirituous liquors might remain as dear as ever; while at the same time the wholesome and invigorating liquors of beer and ale might be confiderably reduced in their price. The people might thus be in part relieved from one of the burdens of which they at present complain the most; while at the same time the revenue might be confiderably augmented.

THE objections of Doctor Davenant to this alteration in the present system of excise duties, seem to be without foundation. Those objections are, that the tax, instead of dividing itself as at present pretty equally upon the profit of the maltster, upon that of the brewer, and upon that of the retailer, would, so far as it affected profit, fall altogether upon that of the maltster; that the maltster could not so easily get back the amount of the tax in the advanced price of his malt, as the brewer and retailer in the advanced price of their liquor; and that so heavy a tax upon malt might reduce the rent and profit of barley land.

No tax can ever reduce, for any considerable time, the rate of profit in any particular trade, which must always keep its level with

BOOK with other trades in the neighbourhood. The present duties upon malt, beer, and ale, do not affect the profits of the dealers in those commodities, who all get back the tax with an additional profit, in the enhanced price of their goods. A tax indeed may render the goods upon which it is imposed so dear as to diminish the confumption of them. But the confumption of malt is in malt liquors; and a tax of eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt could not well render those liquors dearer than the different taxes, amounting to twenty-four or twenty-five shillings, do at present. Those liquors, on the contrary, would probably become cheaper, and the confumption of them would be more likely to increase than to diminish.

> IT is not very easy to understand why it should be more difficult for the maltster to get back eighteen shillings in the advanced price of his malt, than it is at present for the brewer to get back twentyfour or twenty-five, fometimes thirty shillings, in that of his liquor. The maltster, indeed, instead of a tax of six shillings, would be obliged to advance one of eighteen shillings upon every quarter of malt. But the brewer is at present obliged to advance a tax of twenty-four or twenty-five, fometimes thirty shillings, upon every quarter of malt which he brews. It could not be more inconvenient for the maltsler to advance a lighter tax, than it is at present for the brewer to advance a heavier one. The maltster doth not always keep in his granaries a stock of malt which it will require a longer time to dispose of, than the stock of beer and ale which the brewer frequently keeps in his cellars. The former, therefore, may frequently get the returns of his money as foon as the latter. But whatever inconveniency might arise to the maltster from being obliged to advance a heavier tax, could eafily be remedied by granting him a few months longer credit than is at present commonly given to the brewer.

> > NOTHING

Nothing could reduce the rent and profit of barley land which CHAP. did not reduce the demand for barley. But a change of fystem which reduced the duties upon a quarter of malt brewed into beer and ale from twenty-four and twenty-five shillings to eighteen shillings, would be more likely to increase than diminish that demand. The rent and profit of barley land, besides, must always be nearly equal to those of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land. If they were less, some part of the barley land would foon be turned to fome other purpose; and if they were greater, more land would foon be turned to the raifing of barley. When the ordinary price of any particular produce of land is at what may be called a monopoly price, a tax upon it necessarily reduces the rent and profit of the land which grows it. A tax upon the produce of those precious vineyards, of which the wine falls so much short of the effectual demand, that its price is always above the natural proportion to that of the produce of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land, would necessarily reduce the rent and profit of those vineyards. The price of the wines, being already the highest that could be got for the quantity commonly fent to market, it could not be raifed higher without diminishing that quantity; and the quantity could not be diminished without still greater loss, because the lands could not be turned to any other equally valuable produce. The whole weight of the tax, therefore, would fall upon the rent and profit; properly upon the rent of the vineyard. When it has been proposed to lay any new tax upon fugar, our fugar planters have frequently complained that the whole weight of fuch taxes fell, not upon the confumer, but upon the producer; they never having been able to raife the price of their fugar after the tax higher than it was before. price had, it feems, before the tax been a monopoly price; and the argument adduced to show that sugar was an improper subject of taxation, demonstrated perhaps that it was a proper one; the gains of monopolists, whenever they can be come at, being cer-

tainly



BOOK tainly of all subjects the most proper. But the ordinary price of barley has never been a monopoly price; and the rent and profit of barley land have never been above their natural proportion to those of other equally fertile and equally well cultivated land. The different taxes which have been imposed upon malt, beer, and ale, have never lowered the price of barley, have never reduced the rent and profit of barley land. The price of malt to the brewer has constantly risen in proportion to the taxes imposed upon it; and those taxes, together with the different duties upon beer and ale, have constantly either raised the price. or what comes to the same thing, reduced the quality of those commodities to the confumer. The final payment of those taxes has fallen constantly upon the consumer, and not upon the producer.

> THE only people likely to fuffer by the change of system here proposed, are those who brew for their own private use. But the exemption which this superior rank of people at present enjoy from very heavy taxes which are paid by the poor labourer and artificer, is furely most unjust and unequal, and ought to be taken away, even though this change was never to take place. It has probably been the interest of this superior order of people, however, which has hitherto prevented a change of system that could not well fail both to increase the revenue and to relieve the people.

> Besides such duties as those of customs and excise above-mentioned, there are feveral others which affect the price of goods more unequally and more indirectly. Of this kind are the duties which in French are called Peages, which in old Saxon times were called duties of Passage, and which seem to have been originally established for the same purpose as our turnpike tolls or the tolls upon our canals and navigable rivers; for the maintenance of the road or of the navigation. Those duties, when applied to such purposes, are

most

most properly imposed according to the bulk or weight of the CHAP. goods. As they were originally local and provincial duties, applicable to local and provincial purposes, the administration of them was in most cases entrusted to the particular town, parish, or lordship, in which they were levied; such communities being in some way or other supposed to be accountable for the application. The fovereign, who is altogether unaccountable, has in many countries assumed to himself the administration of those duties; and though he has in most cases enhanced very much the duty, he has in many entirely neglected the application. If the turnpike tolls of Great Britain should ever become one of the resources of government, we may learn, by the example of many other nations, what would probably be the confequence. Such tolls are no doubt finally paid by the confumer; but the confumer is not taxed in proportion to his expence when he pays, not according to the value, but according to the bulk or weight of what he consumes. When such duties are imposed, not according to the bulk or weight, but according to the supposed value of the goods, they become properly

In fome small states duties similar to those passage duties are imposed upon goods carried across the territory, either by land or by water, from one foreign country to another. These are in some countries called transit-duties. Some of the little Italian states, which are situated upon the Po, and the rivers which run into it, derive some revenue from duties of this kind, which are paid altogether by foreigners, and which are perhaps the only duties that one state can impose upon the subjects of another without obstructing in any respect the industry or commerce of its own. The most important transit-duty in the world is that levied by the king of Denmark upon all merchant ships which pass through the Sound.

a fort of inland customs or excises, which obstruct very much the most important of all branches of commerce, the interior com-

merce of the country.

SUCH

BOOK V.

Such taxes upon luxuries as the greater part of the duties of customs and excise, though they fall indifferently upon every different species of revenue, and are paid finally, or without any retribution, by whoever confumes the commodities upon which they are imposed, yet they do not always fall equally or proportionably upon the revenue of every individual. As every man's humour regulates the degree of his confumption, every man contributes rather according to his humour than in proportion to his revenue; the profuse contribute more, the parsimonious less, than their proper proportion. During the minority of a man of great fortune, he contributes commonly very little by his confumption towards the support of that state from whose protection he derives a great revenue. Those who live in another country contribute nothing by their confumption towards the support of the government of that country in which is situated the source of their revenue. If in this latter country there should be no land-tax, nor any confiderable duty upon the transference either of moveable or of immoveable property, as is the case in Ireland, such absentees may derive a great revenue from the protection of a government to the support of which they do not contribute a fingle shilling. inequality is likely to be greatest in a country of which the government is in some respects subordinate and dependent upon that of some other. The people who possess the most extenfive property in the dependent, will in this case generally chuse to live in the governing country. Ireland is precifely in this fituation, and we cannot therefore wonder that the propofal of a tax upon absentees should be so very popular in that country. It might perhaps be a little difficult to ascertain either what fort, or what degree of absence should subject a man to be taxed as an absentee, or at what precise time the tax should either begin or end. If you except, however, this very peculiar fituation, any inequality in the contribution of individuals, which can arise from such taxes, is much

much more than compensated by the very circumstance which occafions that inequality; the circumstance that every man's contribution
is altogether voluntary; it being altogether in his power either to
consume or not to consume the commodity taxed. Where such
taxes, therefore, are properly assessed and upon proper commodities, they are paid with less grumbling than any other. When
they are advanced by the merchant or manufacturer, the consumer,
who finally pays them, soon comes to consound them with the price
of the commodities, and almost forgets that he pays any tax.

Such taxes are or may be perfectly certain, or may be affelfed fo as to leave no doubt concerning either what ought to be paid, or when it ought to be paid; concerning either the quantity or the time of payment. Whatever uncertainty there may fometimes be, either in the duties of customs in Great Britain, or in other duties of the same kind in other countries, it cannot arise from the na-

ture of those duties, but from the inaccurate or unskilful manner

in which the law that imposes them is expressed.

Taxes upon luxuries generally are, and always may be, paid piece-meal, or in proportion as the contributors have occasion to purchase the goods upon which they are imposed. In the time and mode of payment they are, or may be, of all taxes the most convenient. Upon the whole, such taxes, therefore, are, perhaps, as agreeable to the three first of the four general maxims concerning taxation, as any other. They offend in every respect against the fourth.

Such taxes, in proportion to what they bring into the public treafury of the state, always take out or keep out of the pockets of the people more than almost any other taxes. They seem to do this in all the four different ways in which it is possible to do it.

FIRST,

BOOK V.

First, the levying of fuch taxes, even when imposed in the most judicious manner, requires a great number of custom-house and excise officers, whose salaries and perquisites are a real tax upon the people, which brings nothing into the treasury of the state. This expence, however, it must be acknowledged, is more moderate in Great Britain than in most other countries. In the year which ended on the fifth of July, 1775, the gross produce of the different duties, under the management of the commissioners of excise in England, amounted to 5,479,6951. 7s. 10d. which was levied at an expence of little more than five and a half per cent. From this gross produce, however, there must be deducted what was paid away in bounties and drawbacks upon the exportation of exciseable goods, which will reduce the neat produce below five millions. The levying of the falt duty, an excise duty, but under a different management, is much more expensive. The neat revenue of the customs does not amount to two millions and a half, which is levied at an expence of more than ten per cent. in the falaries of officers, and other incidents. But the perquisites of customhouse officers are every where much greater than their salaries; at fome ports more than double or triple those salaries. If the salaries of officers, and other incidents, therefore, amount to more than ten per cent. upon the neat revenue of the customs; the whole expence of levying that revenue may amount, in falaries and perquisites together, to more than twenty or thirty per cent. officers of excise receive few or no perquisites; and the administration of that branch of the revenue, being of more recent establishment, is in general less corrupted than that of the customs, into which length of time has introduced and authorifed many abuses. By charging upon malt the whole revenue which is at present levied by the different duties upon malt and malt liquors, a faving, it is supposed, of more than fifty thousand pounds might be made in the annual expence of the excise. By confining the duties

duties of customs to a few forts of goods, and by levying those CHAP. duties according to the excise laws, a much greater saving might probably be made in the annual expence of the customs.

SECONDLY, fuch taxes necessarily occasion some obstruction or discouragement to certain branches of industry. As they always raise the price of the commodity taxed, they so far discourage its confumption, and confequently its production. If it is a commodity of home growth or manufacture, less labour comes to be employed in raising and producing it. If it is a foreign commodity of which the tax increases in this manner the price, the commodities of the same kind which are made at home may thereby, indeed, gain some advantage in the home market, and a greater quantity of domestic industry may thereby be turned towards preparing them. But though this rife of price in a foreign commodity may encourage domestic industry in one particular branch, it necessarily discourages that industry in almost every other. The dearer the Birmingham manufacturer buys his foreign wine, the cheaper he necessarily fells that part of his hardware with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which he buys it. That part of his hardware, therefore, becomes of less value to him, and he has less encouragement to work at it. The dearer the confumers in one country pay for the furplus produce of another, the cheaper they necessarily sell that part of their own surplus produce with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which they buy it. That part of their own furplus produce becomes of less value to them, and they have less encouragement no increase its quantity. All taxes upon confumable commodities, therefore, tend to reduce the quantity of productive labour below what it otherwise would be, either in preparing the commodities taxed, if they are home commodities; or in preparing those with which they are purchased, if they are foreign commodities. Such taxes too always



BOOK always alter, more or less, the natural direction of national induftry, and turn it into a channel always different from, and generally less advantageous than that in which it would have run of its own accord.

> THIRDLY, the hope of evading fuch taxes by fmuggling gives frequent occasion to forfeitures and other penalties, which entirely ruin the smuggler; a person who, though no doubt highly blameable for violating the laws of his country, is frequently incapable of violating those of natural justice, and would have been, in every respect, an excellent citizen, had not the laws of his country made that a crime which nature never meant to be fo. In those corrupted governments where there is at least a general suspicion of much unnecessary expence, and great misapplication of the public revenue, the laws which guard it are little respected. Not many people are scrupulous about smuggling when, without perjury, they can find any easy and safe opportunity of doing so. To pretend to have any scruple about buying smuggled goods, though a manifest encouragement to the violation of the revenue laws, and to the perjury which almost always attends it, would in most countries be regarded as one of those pedantic pieces of hypocrify which, instead of gaining credit with any body, serve only to expose the person who affects to practise them, to the suspicion of being a greater knave than most of his neighbours. By this indulgence of the public, the sinuggler is often encouraged to continue a trade which he is thus taught to consider as in some meafure innocent; and when the feverity of the revenue laws is ready to fall upon him, he is frequently disposed to defend with violence, what he has been accustomed to regard as his just property. From being at first, perhaps, rather imprudent than criminal, he at last too often becomes, one of the hardiest and most determined violaters of the laws of fociety. By the ruin of the fmug

gler, his capital, which had before been employed in maintaining CHAP. productive labour, is absorbed either in the revenue of the state or in that of the revenue-officer, and is employed in maintaining unproductive, to the diminution of the general capital of the fociety, and of the useful industry which it might otherwise have maintained.

FOURTHLY, fuch taxes, by subjecting at least the dealers in the taxed commodities to the frequent visits and odious examination of the tax gatherers, expose them sometimes, no doubt, to some degree of oppression, and always to much trouble and vexation; and though vexation, as has already been faid, is not strictly speaking expence, it is certainly equivalent to the expence at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. The laws of excise, though more effectual for the purpose for which they were instituted, are, in this respect, more vexatious than those of the customs. When a merchant has imported goods subject to certain duties of customs. when he has paid those duties, and lodged the goods in his warehouse, he is not in most cases liable to any further trouble or vexation from the custom-house officer. It is otherwise with goods subject to duties of excise. The dealers have no respite from the continual visits and examination of the excise officers. The duties of excise are, upon this account, more unpopular than those of the customs; and so are the officers who levy them. Those officers, it is pretended, though in general, perhaps, they do their duty fully as well as those of the customs; yet, as that duty obliges them to be frequently very troublesome to some of their neighbours, commonly contract a certain hardness of character which the others frequently have not. This observation, however, may very probably be the meer suggestion of fraudulent dealers, whose smuggling is either prevented or detected by their diligence.

THE inconveniencies, however, which are, perhaps, in some degree inseparable from taxes upon consumable commodities, fall as light

BOOK light upon the people of Great Britain as upon those of any other country of which the government is nearly as expensive. Our state is not perfect, and might be mended; but it is as good or better than that of most of our neighbours.

> In confequence of the notion that duties upon confumable goods were taxes upon the profits of merchants, those duties have, in fome countries, been repeated upon every successive sale of the goods. If the profits of the merchant importer or merchant manufacturer were taxed, equality seemed to require that those of all the middle buyers, who intervened between either of them and the consumer, should likewise be taxed. The famous Alcavala of Spain seems to have been established upon this principle. It was at first a tax of ten per cent. afterwards of fourteen per cent. and is at present of only fix per cent. upon the fale of every fort of property, whether moveable or immoveable; and it is repeated every time the property is fold. * The levying of this tax requires a multitude of revenue officers fufficient to guard the transportation of goods, not only from one province to another, but from one shop to another. It subjects not only the dealers in some forts of goods, but those in all forts, every farmer, every manufacturer, every merchant and shop-keeper, to the continual visits and examination of the tax gatherers. Through the greater part of a country in which a tax of this kind is established, nothing can be produced for distant fale. The produce of every part of the country must be proportioned to the confumption of the neighbourhood. It is to the Alcavala, accordingly, that Ustaritz imputes the ruin of the manufactures of Spain. He might have imputed to it likewise the declenfion of agriculture, it being imposed not only upon manufactures, but upon the rude produce of the land.

In the kingdom of Naples there is a fimilar tax of three per cent. upon the value of all contracts, and confequently upon that

^{*} Memoires concernant les Droits, &c. tom. i. p. 455.

of all contracts of sale. It is both lighter than the Spanish tax, CHAP. and the greater part of towns and parishes are allowed to pay a composition in lieu of it. They levy this composition in what manner they please, generally in a way that gives no interruption to the interior commerce of the place. The Neapolitan tax. therefore, is not near fo ruinous as the Spanish one.

THE uniform system of taxation, which, with a few exceptions of no great consequence, takes place in all the different parts of the united kingdom of Great Britain, leaves the interior commerce of the country, the inland and coasting trade, almost entirely free. The inland trade is almost perfectly free, and the greater part of goods may be carried from one end of the kingdom to the other, without requiring any permit or let-pass, without being subject to question, visit or examination from the revenue officers. There are a few exceptions, but they are such as can give no interruption to any important branch of the inland commerce of the country. Goods carried coastwife, indeed, require certificates or coastcockets. If you except coals, however, the rest are almost all duty-free. This freedom of interior commerce, the effect of the uniformity of the system of taxation, is perhaps one of the principal causes of the prosperity of Great Britain; every great country being necessarily the best and most extensive market for the greater part of the productions of its own industry. If the same freedom, in consequence of the same uniformity, could be extended to Ireland and the plantations, both the grandeur of the state and the prosperity of every part of the empire, would probably be still greater than at present.

In France, the different revenue laws which take place in the different provinces, require a multitude of revenue officers to furround, not only the frontiers of the kingdom, but those of almost each particular province, in order either to prevent the importation

BOOK importation of certain goods, or to subject it to the payment of certain duties, to the no small interruption of the interior commerce of the country. Some provinces are allowed to compound for the gabelle or falt-tax. Others are exempted from it altogether. Some provinces are exempted from the exclusive sale of tobacco, which the farmers-general enjoy through the greater part of the kingdom. The aides, which correspond to the excise in England, are very different in different provinces. Some provinces are exempted from them, and pay a composition or equivalent. In those in which they take place and are in farm, there are many local duties which do not extend beyond a particular town or district. The Traites, which correspond to our cuftoms, divide the kingdom into three great parts; first, the provinces subject to the tarif of 1664, which are called the provinces of the five great farms, and under which are comprehended Picardy, Normandy, and the greater part of the interior provinces of the kingdom; fecondly, the provinces subject to the tarif of 1667, which are called the provinces reckoned foreign, and under which are comprehended the greater part of the frontier provinces; and, thirdly, those provinces which are said to be treated as foreign, or which, because they are allowed a free commerce with foreign countries, are in their commerce with the other provinces of France subjected to the same duties as other foreign countries. These are Alface, the three bishopricks of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and the three cities of Dunkirk, Bayonne, and Marseilles. Both in the provinces of the five great farms, (called fo on account of an antient division of the duties of customs into five great branches, each of which was originally the subject of a particular farm, though they are now all united into one) and in those which are faid to be reckoned foreign, there are many local duties which do not extend beyond a particular town or district. There are some such even in the provinces

provinces which are faid to be treated as foreign, particularly in CHAP. the city of Marseilles. It is unnecessary to observe how much both the restraints upon the interior commerce of the country, and the number of the revenue officers must be multiplied, in order to guard the frontiers of those different provinces and districts, which are subject to such different systems of taxation.

OVER and above the general restraints arising from this complicated fystem of revenue laws, the commerce of wine, after corn perhaps the most important production of France, is in the greater part of the provinces subject to particular restraints arifing from the favour which has been shewn to the vineyards of particular provinces and districts, above those of others. The provinces most famous for their wines, it will be found, I believe, are those in which the trade in that article is subject to the fewest restraints of this kind. The extensive market which fuch provinces enjoy, encourages good management both in the cultivation of their vineyards, and in the subsequent preparation of their wines.

Such various and complicated revenue laws are not peculiar to France. The little dutchy of Milan is divided into fix provinces, in each of which there is a different fystem of taxation with regard to feveral different forts of consumable goods. still smaller territories of the duke of Parma are divided into three or four, each of which has, in the same manner, a system of its own. Under fuch abfurd management, nothing but the great fertility of the foil and happiness of the climate could preferve fuch countries from foon relapsing into the lowest state of poverty and barbarism.

Taxes upon consumable commodities may either be levied by an administration of which the officers are appointed by government.

BOOK ment, and are immediately accountable to government, of which the revenue must in this case vary from year to year, according to the occasional variations in the produce of the tax; or they may be lett in farm for a rent certain, the farmer being allowed to appoint his own officers, who, though obliged to levy the tax in the manner directed by the law, are under his immediate inspection. and are immediately accountable to him. The best and most frugal way of levying a tax can never be by farm. Over and above what is necessary for paying the stipulated rent, the salaries of the officers, and the whole expence of administration, the farmer must always draw from the produce of the tax a certain profit proportioned at least to the advance which he makes, to the risk which he runs, to the trouble which he is at. and to the knowledge and skill which it requires to manage so very complicated a concern. Government, by establishing an administration under their own immediate inspection of the same kind with that which the farmer establishes, might at least fave this profit which is almost always exorbitant. To farm any confiderable branch of the public revenue, requires either a great capital or a great credit; circumstances which would alone restrain the competition for fuch an undertaking to a very small number of people. Of the few who have this capital or credit, a still fmaller number have the necessary knowledge or experience; another circumstance which restrains the competition still further. The very few who are in condition to become competitors find it more for their interest to combine together; to become copartners instead of competitors, and when the farm is set up to auction to offer no rent, but what is much below the real value. In countries where the public revenues are in farm, the farmers are generally the most opulent people. Their wealth would alone excite the public indignation, and the vanity which almost always accompanies such upstart fortunes, the foolish oftentation with with which they commonly display that wealth, excites that indig- CHAP. nation still more.

THE farmers of the public revenue never find the laws too fevere, which punish any attempt to evade the payment of a tax. They have no bowels for the contributors, who are not their subjects, and whose universal bankruptcy, if it should happen the day after their farm is expired, would not much affect their interest. In the greatest exigencies of the state, when the anxiety of the fovereign for the exact payment of his revenue is necessarily the greatest, they seldom fail to complain that without laws more rigorous than those which actually take place, it will be impossible for them to pay even the usual rent. In those moments of public distress their demands cannot be disputed. The revenue laws, therefore, become gradually more and more fevere. The most fanguinary are always to be found in countries where the greater part of the public revenue is in farm. The mildest, in countries where it is levied under the immediate inspection of the sovereign. Even a bad sovereign feels more compassion for his people than can ever be expected from the farmers of his revenue. He knows that the permanent grandeur of his family depends upon the prosperity of his people, and he will never knowingly ruin that prosperity for the sake of any momentary interest of his own. It is otherwise with the farmers of his revenue, whose grandeur may frequently be the effect of the ruin, and not of the prosperity of his people.

A TAX is fometimes, not only farmed for a rent certain, but the farmer has, besides, the monopoly of the commodity taxed. In France, the taxes upon tobacco and falt are levied in this manner. In fuch cases the farmer, instead of one, levies two exorbitant profits upon the people; the profit of the farmer, and the still more exorbitant one of the monopolist. Tobacco being a luxury,

BOOK a luxury, every man is allowed to buy or not to buy as he chuses. But falt being a necessary, every man is obliged to buy of the farmer a certain quantity of it; because if he did not buy this quantity of the farmer, he would, it is prefumed, buy it of Iome fmuggler. The taxes upon both commodities are exorbitant. The temptation to fmuggle confequently is to many people irrefiftable, while at the same time the rigour of the law, and the vigilance of the farmer's officers, render the yielding to that temptation almost certainly ruinous. The smuggling of salt and tobacco fends every year feveral hundred people to the gallies, besides a very confiderable number whom it fends to the gibbet. Those taxes levied in this manner yield a very considerable revenue to government. In 1767, the farm of tobacco was lett for twentytwo millions five hundred and forty-one thousand two hundred and seventy-eight livres a year. That of salt, for thirty-fix millions four hundred and ninety-two thousand four hundred and four livres. The farm in both cases was to commence in 1768, and to last for fix years. Those who consider the blood of the people as nothing in comparison with the revenue of the prince, may perhaps approve of this method of levying taxes. Similar taxes and monopolies of falt and tobacco, have been established in many other countries; particularly in the Austrian and Prussian dominions, and in the greater part of the states of Italy.

> In France, the greater part of the actual revenue of the crown is derived from eight different fources; the taille, the capitation, the two vingtiemes, the gabelles, the aides, the traites, the domaine, and the farm of tobacco. The five last are, in the greater part of the provinces, under farm. The three first are every where levied by an administration under the immediate inspection and direction of government, and it is univerfally acknowledged that in proportion to what they take out of the pockets of the people, they bring more into the treasury of the prince than

the other five, of which the administration is much more wasteful CHAP. and expensive.

THE finances of France seem, in their present state, to admit of three very obvious reformations. First, by abolishing the taille and the capitation, and by increasing the number of vingtiemes, so as to produce an additional revenue equal to the amount of those other taxes, the revenue of the crown might be preserved; the expence of collection might be much diminished; the vexation of the inferior ranks of people, which the taille and capitation occafion, might be entirely prevented; and the fuperior ranks might not be more burdened than the greater part of them are at present. The vingtieme, I have already observed, is a tax very nearly of the fame kind with what is called the land-tax of England. The burden of the taille, it is acknowledged, falls finally upon the proprietors of land; and as the greater part of the capitation is affessed upon those who are subject to the taille at so much a pound of that other tax, the final payment of the greater part of it must likewise fall upon the same order of people. Though the number of the vingtiemes, therefore, was increased so as to produce an additional revenue equal to the amount of both those taxes, the superior ranks of people might not be more burdened than they are at present. Many individuals no doubt would; on account of the great inequalities with which the taille is commonly affessed upon the estates and tenants of different individuals. The interest and opposition of such favoured subjects are the obstacles most likely to prevent this or any other reformation of the fame kind. Secondly, by rendering the gabelle, the aides, the taxes upon tobacco, all their different customs and excises uniform in all the different parts of the kingdom, those taxes might be levied at much less expence, and the interior commerce of the kingdom might be rendered as free as that of England. Thirdly, and lastly.

BOOK by subjecting all those taxes to an administration under the immediate inspection and direction of government, the exorbitant profits of the farmers general might be added to the revenue of the state. The opposition arising from the private interest of individuals, is likely to be as effectual for preventing the two last as the first mentioned scheme of reformation.

> THE French system of taxation seems, in every respect, inferior to the British. In Great Britain ten millions sterling are annually levied upon less than eight millions of people, without its being possible to fay that any particular order is oppressed. From the collections of the abbè Expilly, and the observations of the author of the Essay upon the legislation and commerce of corn, it appears probable that France, including the provinces of Lorraine and Bar, contains about twenty-three or twenty-four millions of people; three times the number perhaps contained in great Britain. foil and climate of France are better than those of Great Britain. The country has been much longer in a state of improvement and cultivation, and is, upon that account, better stocked with all those things which it requires a long time to raife up and accumulate. fuch as great towns, and convenient and well-built houses, both in town and country. With these advantages it might be expected that in France a revenue of thirty millions might be levied for the support of the state, with as little inconveniency as a revenue of ten millions is in Great Britain. In 1765 and 1766, the whole revenue paid into the treasury of France, according to the best, though, I acknowledge, very imperfect accounts which I could get of it, usually run between 308 and 325 millions of livres; that is, it did not amount to fifteen millions sterling; not the half of what might have been expected, had the people contributed in the fame proportion to their numbers as the people of Great Britain. The people of France, however, it is generally acknowledged, are much more oppressed

oppressed by taxes than the people of Great Britain. France, how- CHAP. ever, is certainly the great empire in Europe which, after that of Great Britain, enjoys the mildest and most indulgent government.

In Holland the heavy taxes upon the necessaries of life have ruined, it is faid, their principal manufactures, and are likely to discourage gradually even their fisheries and their trade in ship building. The taxes upon the necessaries of life are inconsiderable in Great Britain, and no manufacture has hitherto been ruined by The British taxes which bear hardest on manufactures are fome duties upon the importation of raw materials, particularly upon that of raw filk. The revenue of the states general and of the different cities, however, is faid to amount to more than five millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling; and as the inhabitants of the United Provinces cannot well be supposed to amount to more than a third part of those of Great Britain, they must, in proportion to their number, be much more heavily taxed.

AFTER all the proper subjects of taxation have been exhausted. if the exigencies of the state still continue to require new taxes, they must be imposed upon improper ones. The taxes upon the necessaries of life, therefore, may be no impeachment of the wisdom of that republic, which, in order to acquire and to maintain its independency, has, in spite of its great frugality, been involved in fuch expensive wars as have obliged it to contract great debts. The fingular countries of Holland and Zealand, besides, require a confiderable expence even to preserve their existence, or to prevent their being swallowed up by the sea, which must have contributed to increase considerably the load of taxes in those two provinces. The republican form of government feems to be the principal fupport of the present grandeur of Holland. The owners of great capitals, the great mercantile families, have generally either fome direct

BOOK direct share, or some indirect influence in the administration of that government. For the fake of the respect and authority which they derive from this fituation, they are willing to live in a country where their capital, if they employ it themselves, will bring them less profit, and if they lend it to another, less interest; and where the very moderate revenue which they can draw from it will purchase less of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than in any The residence of such wealthy people neother part of Europe. ceffarily keeps alive, in spite of all disadvantages, a certain degree of industry in the country. Any public calamity which should destroy the republican form of government, which should throw the whole administration into the hands of nobles and of foldiers, which should annihilate altogether the importance of those wealthy merchants, would foon render it disagreeable to them to live in a country where they were no longer likely to be much respected. They would remove both their refidence and their capital to fome other country, and the industry and commerce of Holland would foon follow the capitals which supported them.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of publick Debts.

IN that rude state of society which precedes the extension of commerce and the improvement of manufactures, when those expensive luxuries which commerce and manufactures can alone introduce, are altogether unknown, the person who possesses a large revenue, I have endeavoured to show in the third book of this inquiry, can spend or enjoy that revenue in no other way than by maintaining nearly as many people as it can maintain. A large revenue may at all times be faid to confist in the command of a large quantity of the necessaries of life. In that rude state of things it is commonly paid in a large quantity of those necessaries, in the materials of plain food and coarse cloathing, in corn and cattle, in wool and raw hides. When neither commerce, nor manufactures furnish any thing for which the owner can exchange the greater part of those materials which are over and above his own consumption, he can do nothing with the furplus but feed and cloathe nearly as many people as it will feed and cloathe. A hospitality in which there is no luxury, and a liberality in which there is no oftentation. occasion, in this situation of things, the principal expences of the rich and the great. But these, I have likewise endeavoured to show in the same book, are expences by which people are not very apt to ruin themselves. There is not perhaps any selfish pleasure fo frivolous, of which the pursuit has not fometimes ruined even fensible men. A passion for cock-fighting has ruined many. Bu the instances, I believe, are not very numerous of people who have been ruined by a hospitality or liberality of this kind; though the hospitality of luxury and the liberality of oftentation have ruined many. Among our feudal ancestors, the long time during which estatea

BOOK estates used to continue in the same family sufficiently demonstrates the general disposition of people to live within their income. Though the ruftic hospitality constantly exercised by the great landholders may not to us in the present times seem consistent with that order which we are apt to confider as inseparably connected with good oeconomy, yet we must certainly allow them to have been at least so far frugal as not commonly to have spent their whole income. A part of their wool and raw hides they had generally an opportunity of felling for money. Some part of this money perhaps they fpent in purchasing the few objects of vanity and luxury with which the circumstances of the times could furnish them; but some part of it they seem commonly to have hoarded. They could not well indeed do any thing else but hoard whatever money they faved. To trade was difgraceful to a gentleman, and to lend money at interest, which at that time was considered as usury and prohibited by law, would have been still more so. In those times of violence and disorder, besides, it was convenient to have a hoard of money at hand, that in case they should be driven from their own home they might have fomething of known value to carry with them to some place of safety. The same violence which made it convenient to hoard, made it equally convenient to conceal the hoard. The frequency of treasure trove, or of treasure found of which no owner was known, fufficiently demonstrates the frequency in those times both of hoarding and of concealing the hoard. Treasure-trove was then considered as an important branch of the revenue of the fovereign. All the treasure-trove of the kingdom would scarce perhaps in the present times make an important branch of the revenue of a private gentleman of a good estate.

> THE fame disposition to fave and to hoard prevailed in the fovereign, as well as in the fubjects. Among nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known, the fovereign, it has already

already been observed in the fourth book, is in a situation which naturally disposes him to the parsimony requisite for accumulation.

In that situation the expence even of a sovereign cannot be directed by that vanity which delights in the gaudy sinery of a court. The ignorance of the times affords but sew of the trinkets in which that sinery consists. Standing armies are not then necessary, so that the expence even of a sovereign, like that of any other great lord, can be employed in scarce any thing but bounty to his tenants, and hospitality to his retainers. But bounty and hospitality very seldom lead to extravagance; though vanity almost always does. All the antient sovereigns of Europe accordingly, it has already been observed, had treasures. Every Tartar chief in the present times is said to have one.

In a commercial country abounding with every fort of expensive luxury, the fovereign, in the fame manner as almost all the great proprietors in his dominions, naturally spends a great part of his revenue in purchasing those luxuries. His own and the neighbouring countries supply him abundantly with all the costly trinkets which compose the splendid, but insignificant pageantry of a court. For the fake of an inferior pageantry of the fame kind, his nobles dismis their retainers, make their tenants independent, and become gradually themselves as infignificant as the greater part of the wealthy burghers in his dominions. The fame frivolous passions which influence their conduct influence his. How can it be supposed that he should be the only rich man in his dominions who is infensible to pleasures of this kind? If he does not, what he is very likely to do, spend upon those pleasures so great a part of his revenue as to debilitate very much the defensive power of the state, it cannot well be expected that he should not spend upon them all that part of it which is over and above what is necessary for supporting that defensive power. His ordinary expence be-

comes

BOOK comes equal to his ordinary revenue, and it is well if it does not frequently exceed it. The amassing of treasure can no longer be expected, and when extraordinary exigencies require extraordinary expences, he must necessarily call upon his subjects for an extraordinary aid. The present and the late king of Prussia are the only great princes of Europe who, fince the death of Henry IV. of France in 1610, are supposed to have amassed any considerable treasure. The parsimony which leads to accumulation has become almost as rare in republican as in monarchical governments. Italian republics, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, are all in debt. The canton of Berne is the fingle republic in Europe which has amassed any considerable treasure. The other Swiss republics have not. The tafte for fome fort of pageantry, for fplendid buildings, at least, and other publick ornaments, frequently prevails as much in the apparently fober fenate-house of a little republic as in the diffipated court of the greatest king.

> THE want of parsimony in time of peace, imposes the necessity of contracting debt in time of war. When war comes, there is no money in the treasury but what is necessary for carrying on the ordinary expence of the peace establishment. In war an establishment of three or four times that expence becomes necessary for the defence of the state, and consequently a revenue three or four times greater than the peace revenue. Supposing that the fovereign should have, what he scarce ever has, the immediate means of augmenting his revenue in proportion to the augmentation of his expence, yet still the produce of the taxes from which this increase of revenue must be drawn will not begin to come into the treasury till perhaps ten or twelve months after they are imposed. But the moment in which war begins, or rather the moment in which it appears likely to begin, the army must be augmented, the fleet must be fitted out, the garrisoned towns must be put into a posture of desence; that

that army, that fleet, those garrisoned towns must be furnished CHAP. with arms, ammunition and provisions. An immediate and great expence must be incurred in that moment of immediate danger, which will not wait for the gradual and flow returns of the new taxes. In this exigency government can have no other refource but in borrowing.

THE same commercial state of society which, by the operation of moral causes, brings government in this manner into the neceffity of borrowing, produces in the subjects both an ability and an inclination to lend. If it commonly brings along with it the necessity of borrowing, it likewise brings along with it the facility of doing fo.

A COUNTRY abounding with merchants and manufacturers. necessarily abounds with a fet of people through whose hands, not only their own capitals, but the capitals of all those who either lend them money, or trust them with goods, pass as frequently, or more frequently, than the revenue of a private man, who, without trade or business, lives upon his income, passes through his hands. The revenue of such a man can regularly pass through his hands only once in the year. But the whole amount of the capital and credit of a merchant who deals in a trade of which the returns are very quick, may fometimes pass through his hands two, three, or four times in a year. A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, therefore, necesfarily abounds with a fet of people who have it at all times in their power to advance, if they chuse to do so, a very large sum of money to government. Hence the ability in the subjects of a commercial state to lend.

COMMERCE and manufactures can feldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their

BOOK their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can feldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government. The fame confidence which disposes great merchants and manufacturers, upon ordinary occasions, to trust their property to the protection of a particular government; disposes them, upon extraordinary occasions, to trust that government with the use of their property. By lending money to government, they do not even for a moment diminish their ability to carry on their trade and manufactures. On the contrary, they commonly augment it. The necessities of the state render government upon most occasions willing to borrow upon terms extremely advantageous to the lender. The fecurity which it grants to the original creditor, is made transferable to any other creditor, and, from the universal confidence in the justice of the state, generally fells in the market for more than was originally paid for it. The merchant or monied man makes money by lending money to government, and instead of diminishing, increases his trading capital. He generally considers it as a favour, therefore, when the administration admits him to a share in the first subscription for a new loan. Hence the inclination or willingness in the subjects of a commercial state to lend.

> THE government of such a state is very apt to repose itself upon this ability and willingness of its subjects to lend it their money on extraordinary occasions. It foresees the facility of borrowing, and therefore dispenses itself from the duty of faving.

> In a rude state of fociety there are no great mercantile or manufacturing capitals. The individuals who hoard whatever money

money they can fave, and who conceal their hoard, do so from CHAP. a distrust of the justice of government, from a fear that if it was known that they had a hoard, and where that hoard was to be found, they would quickly be plundered. In such a state of things few people would be able, and nobody would be willing to lend their money to government on extraordinary exigencies. The sovereign feels that he must provide for such exigencies by saving, because he foresees the absolute impossibility of borrowing. This foresight increases still further his natural disposition to save.

THE progress of the enormous debts which at present oppress, and will in the long-run probably ruin all the great nations of Europe, has been pretty uniform. Nations, like private men, have generally begun to borrow upon what may be called personal credit, without assigning or mortgaging any particular fund for the payment of the debt; and when this resource has failed them, they have gone on to borrow upon assignments or mortgages of particular funds.

What is called the unfunded debt of Great Britain, is contracted in the former of those two ways. It consists partly in a debt which bears or is supposed to bear no interest, and which resembles the debts that a private man contracts upon account; and partly in a debt which bears interest, and which resembles what a private man contracts upon his bill or promissory note. The debts which are due either for extraordinary services, or for services either not provided for, or not paid at the time when they are performed; part of the extraordinaries of the army, navy, and ordnance, the arrears of subsidies to foreign princes, those of seamens wages, &c. usually constitute a debt of the first kind. Navy and exchequer bills, which are issued sometimes in payment of a part of such debts, and sometimes for other purposes, constitute

BOOK constitute a debt of the second kind; exchequer bills bearing interest from the day on which they are issued, and navy bills fix months after they are issued. The bank of England, either by voluntarily discounting those bills at their current value; or by agreeing with government for certain confiderations to circulate Exchequer bills, that is, to receive them at par, paying the interest which happens to be due upon them, keeps up their value and facilitates their circulation, and thereby frequently enables government to contract a very large debt of this kind. In France, where there is no bank, the state bills (billets d'etat) + have sometimes fold at fixty and feventy per cent. discount. During the great re-coinage in king William's time, when the bank of England thought proper to put a stop to its usual transactions, exchequer bills and tallies are faid to have fold from twenty-five to fixty per cent. discount; owing partly, no doubt, to the supposed instability of the new government established by the revolution, but partly too to the want of the support of the bank of England.

> WHEN this resource is exhausted, and it becomes necessary, in order to raife money, to affign or mortgage fome particular branch of the public revenue for the payment of the debt, government has upon different occasions done this in two different ways. Sometimes it has made this affignment or mortgage for a short period of time only, a year or a few years, for example; and fometimes for perpetuity. In the one case the fund was supposed sufficient to pay, within the limited time, both principal and interest of the money borrowed. In the other it was supposed sufficient to pay the interest only, or a perpetual annuity equivalent to the interest, government being at liberty to redeem at any time this annuity upon paying back the principal fum borrowed. When money was raifed in the one way, it was faid to be raifed by anticipation; when in the other, by perpetual funding, or, more flortly, by funding.

In Great Britain the annual land and malt taxes are regularly CHAP. anticipated every year, by virtue of a borrowing clause constantly inferted into the acts which impose them. The bank of England generally advances at an interest, which fince the revolution has varied from eight to three per cent. the fums for which those taxes are granted, and receives payment as their produce gradually comes in. If there is a deficiency, which there always is, it is provided for in the supplies of the ensuing year. The only confiderable branch of the public revenue which yet remains unmortgaged is thus regularly spent before it comes in. Like an unprovident spendthrift, whose pressing occasions will not allow him to wait for the regular payment of his revenue, the state is in the constant practice of borrowing of its own factors and agents, and of paying interest for the use of its own money.

In the reign of king William, and during a great part of that of queen Anne, before we had become so familiar as we are now with the practice of perpetual funding, the greater part of the new taxes were imposed but for a short period of time, (for four, five, fix, or feven years only) and a great part of the grants of every year confifted in loans upon anticipations of the produce of those taxes. The produce being frequently infufficient for paying within the limited term the principal and interest of the money borrowed, deficiencies arose, to make good which it became necessary to prolong the term.

In 1697, by the 8th of William III. c. 20. the deficiencies of feveral taxes were charged upon what was then called the first general mortgage or fund, confisting of a prolongation to the first of August, 1706, of several different taxes, which would have expired within a shorter term, and of which the produce was accumulated into one general fund. The deficiencies charged upon this prolonged term amounted to 5,160,459 l. 14s. 94d.

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In 1701 those duties with some others were still further prolonged for the like purposes till the first of August, 1710, and were called the second general mortgage or fund. The deficiencies charged upon it amounted to 2,055,999 l. 7 s. 11¹/₂ d.

In 1707, those duties were still further prolonged, as a fund for new loans, to the first of August, 1712, and were called the third general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was 983,2541. 118. 9¹/₄d.

In 1708, those duties were all (except the old subsidy of tonnage and poundage, of which one moiety only was made a part of this fund, and a duty upon the importation of Scotch linen, which had been taken off by the articles of union) still further continued, as a fund for new loans, to the first of August, 1714, and were called the fourth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was 925,1761. 9s. 2¹/₄d.

In 1709, those duties were all (except the old subsidy of tonnage and poundage, which was now lest out of this fund altogether) still further continued for the same purpose to the first of August, 1716, and were called the fifth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was 922,029 l. 6 s. od.

In 1710, those duties were again prolonged to the first of August, 1720, and were called the fixth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was 1,296,552 l. 9 s. 11 \frac{3}{4} d.

In 1711, the same duties (which at this time were thus subject to four different anticipations) together with several others were continued for ever, and made a fund for paying the interest of the capital of the South Sea company, which had that year advanced to government, for paying debts and making good desiciencies, the sum of 9,177,967 l. 15 s. 4 d. the greatest loan which at that time had ever been made.

BEFORE

BEFORE this period, the principal, fo far as I have been able to observe, the only taxes which in order to pay the interest of a debt had been imposed for perpetuity, were those for paying the interest of the money which had been advanced to government by the Bank and East India company, and of what it was expected would be advanced, but which was never advanced, by a projected land-bank. The bank fund at this time amounted to 3,375,027 l. 17s. 10½ d. for which was paid an annuity or interest of 206,501l. 13s. 5d. The East India fund amounted to 3,200,000l. for which was paid an annuity or interest of 160,000l.; the bank fund being at six per cent. the East India fund at sive per cent. interest.

In 1715, by the first of George I. c. 12. the different taxes which had been mortgaged for paying the bank annuity, together with several others which by this act were likewise rendered perpetual, were accumulated into one common fund called The Aggregate Fund, which was charged, not only with the payment of the bank annuity, but with several other annuities and burdens of different kinds. This fund was afterwards augmented by the third of George I. c. 8. and by the fifth of George I. c. 3. and the different duties which were then added to it were likewise rendered perpetual.

In 1717, by the third of George I. c. 7. several other taxes were rendered perpetual, and accumulated into another common fund, called The General Fund, for the payment of certain annuities, amounting in the whole to 724,8491. 6s. 10\frac{1}{3}d.

In consequence of those different acts, the greater part of the taxes which before had been anticipated only for a short term of years, were rendered perpetual as a fund for paying, not the capital, but the interest only, of the money which had been borrowed upon them by different successive anticipations.

HAD

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HAD money never been raifed but by anticipation, the course of a few years would have liberated the public revenue, without any other attention of government besides that of not overloading the fund by charging it with more debt than it could pay within the limited term, and of not anticipating a fecond time before the expiration of the first anticipation. But the greater part of European governments have been incapable of those attentions. They have frequently overloaded the fund even upon the first anticipation; and when this happened not to be the case, they have generally taken care to overload it by anticipating a fecond and a third time before the expiration of the first anticipation. The fund becoming in this manner altogether infufficient for paying both principal and interest of the money borrowed upon it, it became necessary to charge it with the interest only, or a perpetual annuity equal to the interest, and such unprovident anticipations necessarily gave birth to the more ruinous practice of perpetual funding. But though this practice necessarily puts off the liberation of the public revenue from a fixed period to one fo indefinite that it is not very likely ever to arrive; yet as a greater fum can in all cases be raised by this new practice than by the old one of anticipations, the former, when men have once become familiar with it, has in the great exigencies of the state been universally preferred to the latter. To relieve the present exigency is always the object which principally interests those immediately concerned in the administration of public affairs. The future liberation of the public revenue, they leave to the care of posterity.

During the reign of queen Anne, the market rate of interest had fallen from six to sive per cent. and in the twelsth year of her reign sive per cent. was declared to be the highest rate which could lawfully be taken for money borrowed upon private security. Soon after the greater part of the temporary taxes of Great Britain had been rendered perpetual, and distributed into the Aggregate, South Sea, and General Funds, the creditors of the public,

publick, like those of private persons, were induced to accept of CHAP. five per cent. for the interest of their money, which occasioned a faving of one per cent. upon the capital of the greater part of the debts which had been thus funded for perpetuity, or of one-fixth of the greater part of the annuities which were paid out of the three great funds above mentioned. This faving left a confiderable furplus in the produce of the different taxes which had been accumulated into those funds, over and above what was necessary for paying the annuities which were now charged upon them, and laid the foundation of what has fince been called the Sinking Fund. In 1717, it amounted to 323,434l. 7s. 71 d. In 1727, the interest of the greater part of the public debts was still further reduced to four per cent.; and in 1753 and 1757, to three and a half and three per cent.; which reductions still further augmented the finking fund.

A SINKING fund, though instituted for the payment of old, facilitates very much the contracting of new debts. It is a fubfidiary fund always at hand to be mortgaged in aid of any other doubtful fund, upon which money is proposed to be raised in any exigency of the state. Whether the finking fund of Great Britain has been more frequently applied to the one or to the other of those two purposes, will fufficiently appear by and by.

Besides those two methods of borrowing, by anticipations and by perpetual funding, there are two other methods, which hold a fort of middle place between them. These are, that of borrowing upon annuities for terms of years, and that of borrowing upon annuities for lives.

DURING the reigns of king William and queen Anne, large sums were frequently borrowed upon annuities for terms of years, which

BOOK were sometimes longer and sometimes shorter. In 1693, an act was passed for borrowing one million upon an annuity of fourteen per cent. or of 140,000l. a year for fixteen years. In 1691, an act was passed for borrowing a million upon annuities for lives, upon terms which in the present times would appear very advantageous. But the subscription was not filled up. In the following year the deficiency was made good by borrowing upon annuities for lives at fourteen per cent. or at little more than feven years purchase. In 1695, the persons who had purchased those annuities were allowed to exchange them for others of ninety-fix years. upon paying into the Exchequer fixty-three pounds in the hundred; that is, the difference between fourteen per cent. for life, and fourteen per cent. for ninety-fix years, was fold for fixty-three pounds, or for four and a half years purchase. Such was the fupposed instability of government, that even these terms procured few purchasers. In the reign of queen Anne, money was upon different occasions borrowed both upon annuities for lives, and upon annuities for terms of thirty-two, of eighty-nine, of ninetyeight, and of ninety-nine years. In 1719, the proprietors of the annuities for thirty-two years were induced to accept in lieu of them South-sea stock to the amount of eleven and a half years purchase of the annuities, together with an additional quantity of stock equal to the arrears which happened then to be due upon them. In 1720, the greater part of the other annuities for terms of years both long and short were subscribed into the same fund. The long annuities at that time amounted to 666,8211. 8s. 3. d. a year, On the 5th of January, 1775, the remainder of them, or what was not subscribed at that time, amounted only to 136,4521. 12s. 8d.

> During the two wars which begun in 1739, and in 1755, little money was borrowed either upon annuities for terms of years, or upon

upon those for lives. An annuity for ninety-eight or ninety-nine CHAP. years, however, is worth nearly as much money as a perpetuity, and should therefore, one might think, be a fund for borrowing nearly as much. But those who, in order to make family settlements, and to provide for remote futurity, buy into the public stocks, would not care to purchase into one of which the value was continually diminishing; and such people make a very considerable proportion both of the proprietors and purchasers of stock. An annuity for a long term of years therefore, though its intrinsic value may be very nearly the same with that of a perpetual annuity. will not find nearly the same number of purchasers. fcribers to a new loan, who mean generally to fell their subscription as foon as possible, prefer greatly a perpetual annuity redeemable by parliament, to an irredeemable annuity for a long term of years of only equal amount. The value of the former may be supposed always the same or very nearly the same, and it makes therefore a more convenient transferable stock than the latter.

During the two last mentioned wars, annuities either for terms of years or for lives were seldom granted but as premiums to the subscribers to a new loan, over and above the redcemable annuity or interest upon the credit of which the loan was supposed to be made. They were granted, not as the proper fund upon which the money was borrowed; but as an additional encouragement to the lender.

Annuities for lives have occasionally been granted in two different ways; either upon separate lives, or upon lots of lives, which in French are called Tontines, from the name of their inventor. When annuities are granted upon separate lives, the death of every individual annuitant disburthens the public revenue so far as it was affected by his annuity. When annuities are granted

BOOK granted upon tontines, the liberation of the public revenue does not commence till the death of all the annuitants comprehended in one lot, which may fometimes confift of twenty or thirty perfons, of whom the furvivors fucceed to the annuities of all those who die before them; the last survivor succeeding to the annuities of the whole lot. Upon the fame revenue more money can always be raifed by tontines than by annuities for separate lives. An annuity, with a right of furvivorship, is really worth more than an equal annuity for a separate life, and from the confidence which every man naturally has in his own good fortune, the principle upon which is founded the success of all lotteries, such an annuity generally fells for fomething more than it is worth. In countries where it is usual for government to raise money by granting annuities, tontines are upon this account generally preferred to annuities for separate lives. The expedient which will raise most money, is almost always preferred to that which is likely to bring about in the speediest manner the liberation of the public revenue.

> In France a much greater proportion of the public debts confifts in annuities for lives than in England. According to a memoir presented by the parliament of Bourdeaux to the king in 1764, the whole public debt of France is estimated at twentyfour hundred millions of livres; of which the capital for which annuities for lives had been granted, is supposed to amount to three hundred millions, the eighth-part of the whole public The annuities themselves are computed to amount to thirty millions a year, the fourth part of one hundred and twenty millions, the supposed interest of that whole debt. These estimations, I know very well, are not exact, but having been prefented by so very respectable a body as approximations to the truth, they may, I apprehend, be considered as such. It is not the different degrees of anxiety in the two governments of France and.

and England for the liberation of the public revenue, which occa- CHAP. fions this difference in their respective modes of borrowing. It arises altogether from the different views and interests of the lenders.

In England, the feat of government being in the greatest mercantile city in the world, the merchants are generally the people who advance money to government. By advancing it they do not mean to diminish, but, on the contrary, to increase their mercantile capitals; and unless they expected to fell with some profit their share in the subscription for a new loan, they never would subscribe. But if by advancing their money they were to purchase, instead of perpetual annuities, annuities for lives only, whether their own or those of other people, they would not always be so likely to sell them with a profit. Annuities upon their own lives they would always fell with lofs; because no man will give for an annuity upon the life of another, whose age and state of health are nearly the same with his own, the same price which he would give for one upon his own. An annuity upon the life of a third person, indeed, is, no doubt, of equal value to the buyer and the feller; but its real value begins to diminish from the moment it is granted, and continues to do so more and more as long as it subsists. It can never, therefore, make so convenient a transferable stock as a perpetual annuity, of which the real value may be supposed always the same, or very nearly the fame.

In France, the feat of government not being in a great mercantile city, merchants do not make fo great a proportion of the people who advance money to government. The people concerned in the finances, the farmers general, the receivers of the taxes which are not in farm, the court bankers, &c. make the greater part of those who advance their money in all public exigencies. Such people are commonly men of mean birth, but of great wealth, and frequently

BOOK quently of great pride. They are too proud to marry their equals, and women of quality disdain to marry them. They frequently resolve, therefore, to live bachelors, and having neither any families of their own, nor much regard for those of their relations, whom they are not always very fond of acknowledging, they defire only to live in splendor during their own time, and are not unwilling that their fortune should end with themselves. The number of rich people, besides, who are either averse to marry, or whose condition of life renders it either improper or inconvenient for them to do fo, is much greater in France than in England. fuch people, who have little or no care for posterity, nothing can be more convenient than to exchange their capital for a revenue, which is to last just as long as, and no longer than, they wish it to do.

> THE ordinary expence of the greater part of modern governments in time of peace being equal or nearly equal to their ordinary revenue, when war comes they are both unwilling and unable to increase their revenue in proportion to the increase of their expence. They are unwilling, for fear of offending the people, who, by fo great and fo sudden an increase of taxes, would soon be disgusted with the war; and they are unable, from not well knowing what taxes would be sufficient to produce the revenue wanted. The facility of borrowing delivers them from the embarrassment which this fear and inability would otherwise occasion. By means of borrowing they are enabled, with a very moderate increase of taxes, to raife, from year to year, money sufficient for carrying on the war, and by the practice of perpetual funding they are enabled, with the smallest possible increase of taxes, to raise annually the largest possible sum of money. In great empires the people who live in the capital, and in the provinces remote from the scene of action, feel, many of them, scarce any inconveniency from the

> > war;

war; but enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of reading in the news-papers the exploits of their own fleets and armies. To them this amusement compensates the small difference between the taxes which they pay on account of the war, and those which they had been accustomed to pay in time of peace. They are commonly dissatisfied with the return of peace, which puts an end to their amusement, and to a thousand visionary hopes of conquest, and national glory, from a longer continuance of the war.

THE return of peace, indeed, seldom relieves them from the greater part of the taxes imposed during the war. These are mortgaged for the interest of the debt contracted in order to carry it on. If, over and above paying the interest of this debt, and defraying the ordinary expence of government, the old revenue, together with the new taxes, produce some surplus revenue, it may perhaps be converted into a sinking fund for paying off the debt. But, in the first place, this sinking fund, even supposing it should be applied to no other purpose, is generally altogether inadequate for paying, in the course of any period during which it can reasonably be expected that peace should continue, the whole debt contracted during the war; and, in the second place, this fund is almost always applied to other purposes.

THE new taxes were imposed for the sole purpose of paying the interest of the money borrowed upon them. If they produce more, it is generally something which was neither intended nor expected, and is therefore seldom very considerable. Sinking funds have generally arisen, not so much from any surplus of the taxes which was over and above what was necessary for paying the interest or annuity originally charged upon them, as from a subsequent reduction of that interest. That of Holland in 1655, and that of the ecclesiastical state in 1685, were both formed in this manner. Hence the usual insufficiency of such funds.

DURING

BOOK V.

During the most profound peace, various events occur which require an extraordinary expence, and government finds it always more convenient to defray this expence by misapplying the finking fund than by imposing a new tax. Every new tax is immediately felt more or less by the people. It occasions always some murmur, and meets with fome opposition. The more taxes may have been multiplied, the higher they may have been raised upon every different subject of taxation; the more loudly the people complain of every new tax, the more difficult it becomes too either to find out new subjects of taxation, or to raise much higher the taxes already imposed upon the old. A momentary suspension of the payment of debt is not immediately felt by the people, and occafions neither murmur nor complaint. To borrow of the finking fund is always an obvious and eafy expedient for getting out of the present difficulty. The more the public debts may have been accumulated, the more necessary it may have become to study to reduce them, the more dangerous, the more ruinous it may be to misapply any part of the finking fund; the less likely is the public debt to be reduced to any confiderable degree, the more likely, the more certainly is the finking fund to be misapplied towards defraying all the extraordinary expences which occur in time of peace. When a nation is already overburdened with taxes, nothing but the necessities of a new war, nothing but either the animofity of national vengeance, or the anxiety for national fecurity, can induce the people to fubmit, with tolerable patience, to a new tax. Hence the usual misapplication of the finking fund.

In Great Britain, from the time that we had first recourse to the ruinous expedient of perpetual funding, the reduction of the public debt in time of peace, has never borne any proportion to its accumulation in time of war. It was in the war which began in 1688, and was concluded by the treaty of Ryswick in 1697, that the foundation of the present enormous debt of Great Britain was first laid.

On the 31st of December, 1697, the public debts of Great Britain, funded and unfunded, amounted to 21,515,742l. 13s. 8½d.

A great part of those debts had been contracted upon short anticipations, and some part upon annuities for lives; so that before the 31st of December, 1701, in less than four years, there had partly been paid off, and partly reverted to the public, the sum of 5,121,041 l. 12 s. 0¾d.; a greater reduction of the public debt than has ever since been brought about in so short a period of time. The remaining debt, therefore, amounted only to 16,394,701 l. 1s. 7¼d.

In the war which began in 1702, and which was concluded by the treaty of Utrecht, the public debts were still more accumulated. On the 31st of December, 1714, they amounted to 53,631,076l. 5 s. 6 ½ d. The subscription into the South Sea fund of the long and short annuities increased the capital of the public debts, so that on the 31st of December, 1722, it amounted to 55,282,978l. 1 s. 3 ½ d. The reduction of the debt began in 1723, and went on so slowly that, on the 31st of December, 1739, during seventeen years of profound peace, the whole sum paid off was no more than 8,328,354l. 17 s. 11½ d. the capital of the public debt at that time amounting to 46,954,623l. 3 s. $4\frac{7}{12}$ d.

The Spanish war, which began in 1739, and the French war which soon followed it, occasioned a further encrease of the debt, which, on the 31st of December, 1748, after the war had been concluded by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, amounted to 78,293,313 l. 1 s. $10\frac{3}{4}$ d. The most profound peace of seventeen years continuance had taken no more than 8,328,354 l. 17s. $11\frac{3}{12}$ d. from it. A war of less than nine years continuance added 31,338,689 l. 18 s. $6\frac{1}{6}$ d. to it *.

During the administration of Mr. Pelham, the interest of the public debt was reduced, or at least measures were taken for reduce-Vol. II. 4 B ing

^{*} See James Postlethwaite's history of the public revenue.

BOOK ing it, from four to three per cent.; the finking fund was increased, and some part of the public debt was paid off. In 1755, before the breaking out of the late war, the funded debt of Great Britain amounted to 72,289,673 l. On the 5th of January, 1763, at the conclusion of the peace, the funded debt amounted to 122,603,3361. 8 s. 2 d. The unfunded debt has been stated at 13,927,580 l. 2 s. 2 d. But the expence occasioned by the war did not end with the conclusion of the peace; so that though on the 5th of January, 1764, the funded debt was increased (partly by a new loan, and partly by funding a part of the unfunded debt) to 129,586,7801. 10 s. 13 d. there still remained (according to the very well informed author of the Considerations on the trade and finances of Great Britain) an unfunded debt, which was brought to account in that and the following year, of 9,975,017 l. 12 s. 215 d. In 1764, therefore, the public debt of Great Britain, funded and unfunded together, amounted, according to this author, to 139,561,8071. 2 s. 4 d. The annuities for lives too, which had been granted as premiums to the subscribers to the new loans in 1757, estimated at fourteen years purchase, were valued at 472,500 l.; and the annuities for long terms of years, granted as premiums likewise, in 1761 and 1762, estimated at 271 years purchase, were valued at 6,826,8751. During a peace of about feven years continuance, the prudent and truly patriot administration of Mr. Pelham, was not able to pay off an old debt of fix millions. During a war of nearly the same continuance, a new debt of more than feventy-five millions was contracted.

> On the 5th of January, 1775, the funded debt of Great Britain amounted to 124,996,0861. 1 s. 6 d. The unfunded, exclusive of a large civil list debt, to 4,150,236 l. 3 s. 117 d. Both together, to 129,146,3221. 5s. 6d. According to this account the whole debt paid off during eleven years profound peace amounted only to 10,415,474 l. 16 s. 97 d. Even this fmall

fmall reduction of debt, however, has not been all made from the favings out of the ordinary revenue of the state. Several extraneous sums, altogether independant of that ordinary revenue, have contributed towards it. Among these we may reckon an additional shilling in the pound land tax for three years; the two millions received from the East India company, as indemnification for their territorial acquisitions; and the one hundred and ten thousand pounds received from the bank for the renewal of their charter. To these must be added several other sums which, as they arose out of the late war, ought perhaps to be considered as deductions from the expences of it. The principal are,

		1.	s.	d.
The produce of French prizes	-	690,449	18	9
Composition for French prisoners		670,000	0	0
What has been received from the fal	e of the cede	ed } 95,500	0	0
	Total,	1,455,949	18	9

If we add to this fum the balance of the earl of Chatham's and Mr. Calcraft's accounts, and other army favings of the fame kind, together with what has been received from the bank, the East India company, and the additional shilling in the pound, land tax; the whole must be a good deal more than five millions. The debt, therefore, which since the peace has been paid out of the favings from the ordinary revenue of the state, has not, one year with another, amounted to half a million a year. The sinking fund has, no doubt, been considerably augmented since the peace, by the debt which has been paid off, by the reduction of the redeemable four per cents. to three per cents. and by the annuities for lives which have fallen in, and, if peace was to continue, a million

BOOK a million perhaps might now be annually spared out of it towards the discharge of the debt. Another million, accordingly, was paid in the course of last year; but, at the same time, a large civil list debt was left unpaid, and we are now involved in a new war which, in its progrefs, may prove as expensive as any of our former wars. The new debt which will probably be contracted before the end of the next campaign, may perhaps be nearly equal to all the old debt which has been paid off from the favings out of the ordinary revenue of the state. It would be altogether chimerical, therefore, to expect that the public debt should ever be completely discharged by any savings which are likely to be made from that ordinary revenue as it stands at prefent.

> THE public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe, particularly those of England, have by one author been reprefented as the accumulation of a great capital fuper-added to the other capital of the country, by means of which its trade is extended, its manufactures multiplied, and its lands cultivated and improved much beyond what they could have been by means of that other capital only. He does not confider that the capital which the first creditors of the public advanced to government, was, from the moment in which they advanced it, a certain portion of the annual produce turned away from ferving in the function of a capital, to serve in that of a revenue; from maintaining productive labourers to maintain unproductive ones, and to be spent and wasted, generally in the course of the year, without even the hope of any future reproduction. In return for the capital which they advanced they obtained, indeed, an annuity in the public funds in most cases of more than equal value. annuity, no doubt, replaced to them their capital, and enabled them to carry on their trade and business to the same or perhaps to a greater extent than before; that is, they were enabled either

to borrow of other people a new capital upon the credit of this CHAP. annuity, or by felling it to get from other people a new capital of their own, equal or superior to that which they had advanced to government. This new capital, however, which they in this manner either bought or borrowed of other people, must have existed in the country before, and must have been employed, as all capitals are, in maintaining productive labour. When it came into the hands of those who had advanced their money to government, though it was in some respects a new capital to them, it was not fo to the country; but was only a capital withdrawn from certain employments in order to be turned towards others. Though it replaced to them what they had advanced to government, it did not replace it to the country. Had they not advanced this capital to government, there would have been in the country two capitals, two portions of the annual produce, instead of one, employed in maintaining productive labour.

When for defraying the expence of government a revenue is raised within the year from the produce of free or unmortgaged taxes, a certain portion of the revenue of private people is only turned away from maintaining one species of unproductive labour, towards maintaining another. Some part of what they pay in those taxes might no doubt have been accumulated into capital, and consequently employed in maintaining productive labour; but the greater part would probably have been spent and consequently employed in maintaining unproductive labour. The public expence however, when defrayed in this manner, no doubt hinders more or less the further accumulation of new capital; but it does not necessarily occasion the destruction of any actually existing capital.

When the publick expence is defrayed by funding, it is defrayed by the annual destruction of some capital which had before existed

BOOK in the country; by the perversion of some portion of the annual produce which had before been destined for the maintenance of productive labour, towards that of unproductive labour. As in this case, however, the taxes are lighter than they would have been, had a revenue sufficient for defraying the same expence been raised within the year; the private revenue of individuals is necesfarily less burthened, and confequently their ability to fave and accumulate some part of that revenue into capital is a good deal less impaired. If the method of funding destroys more old capital, it at the same time hinders less the accumulation or acquisition of new capital, than that of defraying the public expence by a revenue raised within the year. Under the system of funding, the frugality and industry of private people can more easily repair the breaches which the waste and extravagance of government may occasionally make in the general capital of the fociety.

> IT is only during the continuance of war, however, that the fystem of funding has this advantage over the other system. Were the expence of war to be defrayed always by a revenue raifed within the year, the taxes from which that extraordinary revenue was drawn would last no longer than the war. The ability of private people to accumulate, though less during the war, would have been greater during the peace than under the system of funding. War would not necessarily have occasioned the destruction of any old capitals, and peace would have occasioned the accumulation of many more new. Wars would in general be more speedily concluded, and less wantonly undertaken. The people feeling, during the continuance of the war, the complete burden of it, would foon grow weary of it, and government, in order to humour them, would not be under the necessity of carrying it on longer than it was necessary to do fo. The foresight of the heavy and unavoidable burdens of war would hinder the people

people from wantonly calling for it when there was no real or CHAP. folid interest to fight for. The seasons during which the ability of private people to accumulate was fomewhat impaired, would occur more rarely, and be of shorter continuance. Those, on the contrary, during which that ability was in the highest vigour, would be of much longer duration than they can well be under the fystem of funding.

WHEN funding, besides, has made a certain progress, the multiplication of taxes which it brings along with it fometimes impairs as much the ability of private people to accumulate even in time of peace, as the other system would in time of war. The peace revenue of Great Britain amounts at present to more than ten millions a year. If free and unmortgaged, it might be fufficient, with proper management and without contracting a shilling of new debt, to carry on the most vigorous war. The private revenue of the inhabitants of Great Britain is at present as much encumbered in time of peace, their ability to accumulate is as much impaired as it would have been in the time of the most expensive war, had the pernicious system of funding never been adopted.

In the payment of the interest of the public debt, it has been faid, it is the right hand which pays the left. The money does not go out of the country. It is only a part of the revenue of one fet of the inhabitants which is transferred to another; and the nation is not a farthing the poorer. This apology is founded altogether in the fophistry of the mercantile system, and after the long examination which I have already bestowed upon that system, it may perhaps be unnecessary to say any thing further about it. It fupposes, besides, that the whole public debt is owing to the inhabitants of the country, which happens not to be true; the Dutch, as well as feveral other foreign nations, having a very confiderable

share.

B OOK share in our public funds. But though the whole debt were owing to the inhabitants of the country, it would not upon that account be less pernicious.

> LAND and capital stock are the two original sources of all revenue both private and public. Capital stock pays the wages of productive labour, whether employed in agriculture, manufactures, or commerce. The management of those two original sources of revenue belongs to two different fetts of people; the proprietors of land, and the owners or employers of capital stock.

> THE proprietor of land is interested for the sake of his own revenue to keep his estate in as good condition as he can, by building and repairing his tenants houses, by making and maintaining the necessary drains and enclosures, and all those other expensive improvements which it properly belongs to the landlord to make and maintain. But by different land-taxes the revenue of the landlord may be so much diminished; and by different duties upon the necessaries and conveniencies of life, that diminished revenue may be rendered of so little real value, that he may find himself altogether unable to make or maintain those expensive improvements. When the landlord, however, ceases to do his part, it is altogether impossible that the tenant should continue to do his. As the distress of the landlord increases, the agriculture of the country must necessarily decline.

> WHEN by different taxes upon the necessaries and conveniencies of life, the owners and employers of capital stock find, that whatever revenue they derive from it, will not, in a particular country, purchase the same quantity of those necessaries and conveniencies, which an equal revenue would in almost any other; they will be disposed to remove to some other. And when, in order to raise those

> > taxes,

taxes, all or the greater part of merchants and manufacturers, that CHAP. is, all or the greater part of the employers of great capitals, come to be continually exposed to the mortifying and vexatious vifits of the tax gatherers; this disposition to remove will soon be changed into an actual removal. 'The industry of the country will necesfarily fall with the removal of the capital which supported it, and the ruin of trade and manufactures will follow the declension of agriculture.

To transfer from the owners of those two great sources of revenue, land and capital stock, from the persons immediately interested in the good condition of every particular portion of land, and in the good management of every particular portion of capital stock, to another fett of persons, (the creditors of the public, who have no fuch particular interest) the greater part of the revenue arising from either, must, in the long-run, occasion both the neglect of land, and the waste or removal of capital stock. A creditor of the public has no doubt a general interest in the prosperity of the agriculture, manufactures, and commerce of the country; and confequently in the good condition of its lands, and in the good management of its capital stock. Should there be any general failure or declension in any of these things, the produce of the different taxes might no longer be fufficient to pay him the annuity or interest which is due to him. But a creditor of the public, confidered merely as fuch, has no interest in the good condition of any particular portion of land, or in the good management of any particular portion of capital stock. As a creditor of the public he has no knowledge of any such particular portion. He has no inspection of it. He can have no care about it. Its ruin may in most cases be unknown to him, and cannot directly affect him.

THE practice of funding has gradually enfeebled every state which has adopted it. The Italian republics seem to have begun it. Genoa

BOOK Genoa and Venice, the only two remaining which can pretend to an independent existence, have both been enfeebled by it. Spain feems to have learned the practice from the Italian republics, and (its taxes being probably less judicious than theirs) it has, in proportion to its natural strength, been still more enfeebled. The debts of Spain are of very old standing. It was deeply in debt before the end of the fixteenth century, about a hundred years before England owed a shilling. France, notwithstanding all its natural resources, languishes under an oppressive load of the same kind. The republic of the United Provinces is as much enfeebled by its debts as either Genoa or Venice. Is it likely that in Great Britain alone a practice, which has brought either weakness or defolation into every other country, should prove altogether innocent?

> THE system of taxation established in those different countries, it may be faid, is inferior to that of England. I believe it is fo. But it ought to be remembered, that when the wifest government has exhausted all the proper subjects of taxation, it must, in cases of urgent necessity, have recourse to improper ones. The wife republic of Holland has upon some occasions been obliged to have recourse to taxes as inconvenient as the greater part of those of Spain. Another war begun before any confiderable liberation of the publick revenue had been brought about, and growing in its progress as expensive as the last war, may, from irrefistable necessity, render the British system of taxation as oppressive as that of Holland, or even as that of Spain. To the honour of our present fystem of taxation, indeed, it has hitherto given so little embarraffment to industry, that, during the course even of the most expensive wars, the frugality and good conduct of individuals seems to have been able, by faving and accumulation, to repair all the breaches which the waste and extravagance of government had made

made in the general capital of the fociety. At the conclusion of CHAP. the late war, the most expensive that Great Britain ever waged, her agriculture was as flourishing, her manufacturers as numerous and as fully employed, and her commerce as extensive, as they had ever been before. The capital, therefore, which supported all those different branches of industry, must have been equal to what it had ever been before. Since the peace, agriculture has been still further improved, the rents of houses have risen in every town and village of the country, a proof of the increasing wealth and revenue of the people; and the annual amount of the greater part of the old taxes, of the principal branches of the excise and customs in particular, has been continually increasing, an equally clear proof of an increasing consumption, and consequently of an increafing produce, which could alone support that consumption. Great Britain seems to support with ease, a burden which, half a century ago, nobody believed her capable of supporting. Let us not, however, upon this account rashly conclude that she is capable of fupporting any burden; nor even be too confident that she could support, without great diffress, a burden a little greater than what has already been laid upon her.

WHEN national debts have once been accumulated to a certain degree, there is fearce, I believe, a fingle instance of their having been fairly and completely paid. The liberation of the public revenue, if it has ever been brought about at all, has always been brought about by a bankruptcy; sometimes by an avowed one, but always by a real one, though frequently by a pretended payment.

THE raising of the denomination of the coin has been the most usual expedient by which a real public bankruptcy has been disguissed under the appearance of a pretended payment. If a sixpence, Vol. II.

BOOK for example, should either by act of parliament or royal proclamation be raised to the denomination of a shilling, and twenty fixpences to that of a pound sterling; the person who under the old denomination had borrowed twenty skillings, or near four ounces of filver, would, under the new, pay with twenty fixpences, or with fomething less than two ounces. A national debt of about a hundred and twenty-eight millions, nearly the capital of the funded and unfunded debt of Great Britain, might in this manner be paid with about fixty-four millions of our present money. It would indeed be a pretended payment only, and the creditors of the public would really be defrauded of ten shillings in the pound of what was due to them. The calamity too would extend much further than to the creditors of the public, and those of every private person would suffer a proportionable loss; and this without any advantage, but in most cases with a great additional loss, to the creditors of the public. If the creditors of the public indeed were generally much in debt to other people, they might in some measure compensate their loss by paying their creditors in the same coin in which the public had paid them. But in most countries the creditors of the public are, the greater part of them, wealthy people, who stand more in the relation of creditors than in that of debtors towards the rest of their sellow citizens. A pretended payment of this kind, therefore, instead of alleviating, aggravates in most cases the loss of the creditors of the public; and without any advantage to the public extends the calamity to a great number of other innocent people. It occasions a general and most pernicious subversion of the fortunes of private people; enriching in most cases the idle and profuse debtor at the expence of the industrious and frugal creditor, and transporting a great part of the national capital, from the hands which were likely to encrease and improve it, to those which are likely to diffipate and destroy it. When it becomes necessary for a state to declare

laws

declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both least dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor. The honour of a state is surely very poorly provided for, when, in order to cover the disgrace of a real bankruptcy, it has recourse to a juggling trick of this kind, so easily seen through, and at the same time so extremely pernicious.

Almost all states, however, antient as well as modern, when reduced to this necessity, have, upon some occasions, played this very juggling trick. The Romans, at the end of the first punic war, reduced the As, the coin or denomination by which they computed the value of all their other coins, from containing twelve ounces of copper to contain only two ounces; that is, they raifed two ounces of copper to a denomination which had always before expressed the value of twelve ounces. The republic was, in this manner, enabled to pay the great debts which it had contracted with the fixth part of what it really owed. So fudden and fo great a bankruptcy, we should in the present times be apt to imagine, must have occafioned a very violent popular clamour. It does not appear to have occasioned any. The law which enacted it was, like all other laws relating to the coin, introduced and carried through the affembly of the people by a tribune, and was probably a very popular law. In Rome, as in all the other antient republics, the poor people were constantly in debt to the rich and the great, who, in order to fecure their votes at the annual elections, used to lend them money at exorbitant interest, which, being never paid, soon accumulated into a fum too great either for the debtor to pay, or for any body else to pay for him. The debtor, for fear of a very severe execution, was obliged, without any further gratuity, to vote for the candidate whom the creditor recommended. In spite of all the

BOOK laws against bribery and corruption, the bounty of the candidates, together with the occasional distributions of corn, which were ordered by the fenate, were the principal funds from which, during the later times of the Roman republic, the poorer citizens derived their subsistence. To deliver themselves from this subjection to their creditors, the poorer citizens were continually calling out either for an entire abolition of debts, or for what they called New Tables; that is, for a law which should entitle them to a complete acquittance, upon paying only a certain proportion of their accu-The law which reduced the coin of all denominamulated debts. tions to a fixth part of its former value, as it enabled them to pay their debts with a fixth part of what they really owed, was equivalent to the most advantageous new tables. In order to satisfy the people, the rich and the great were, upon feveral different occafions, obliged to confent to laws both for abolishing debts, and for introducing new tables; and they probably were induced to confent to this law, partly for the same reason, and partly that by liberating the public revenue, they might restore vigour to that government of which they themselves had the principal direction. operation of this kind would at once reduce a debt of a hundred and twenty-eight millions to twenty-one millions, three hundred and thirty-three thousand, three hundred and thirty-three pounds, fix shillings and eight-pence. In the course of the second punic war the As was still further reduced, first, from two ounces of copper to one ounce; and afterwards from one ounce to half an ounce; that is, to the twenty-fourth part of its original value. By combining the three Roman operations into one, a debt of a hundred and twenty-eight millions of our present money, might in this manner be reduced all at once to a debt of five millions, three hundred and thirty-three thousand, three hundred and thirty-three pounds, fix shillings and eight-pence. Even the enormous debt of Great Britain might in this manner foon be paid,

By means of such expedients the coin of, I believe, all nations CHAP. has been gradually reduced more and more below its original value, and the same nominal sum has been gradually brought to contain a fmaller and a fmaller quantity of filver.

NATIONS have fometimes, for the same purpose, adulterated the standard of their coin; that is, have mixed a greater quantity of. alloy in it. If in the pound weight of our filver coin, for example, instead of eighteen penny weight, according to the present standard, there was mixed eight ounces of alloy; a pound sterling, or twenty shillings of such coin, would be worth little more than fix shillings and eight-pence of our present money. The quantity of filver contained in fix shillings and eight-pence of our prefent money, would thus be raifed very nearly to the denomination of a pound sterling. The adulteration of the standard has exactly the same effect with what the French call an augmentation, or a direct raising of the denomination of the coin.

An augmentation, or a direct raising of the denomination of the coin, always is, and from its nature must be, an open and avowed operation. By means of it pieces of a smaller weight and bulk are called by the same name which had before been given to pieces of a greater weight and bulk. The adulteration of the standard, on the contrary, has generally been a concealed operation. By means of it pieces were issued from the mint of the same denominations. and, as nearly as could be contrived, of the fame weight, bulk. and appearance, with pieces which had been current before of much greater value. When king John of France *, in order to pay his debts, adulterated his coin, all the officers of his mint were fworn to fecrefy. Both operations are unjust. But a simple augmentation is an injustice of open violence; whereas an adulteration is an injustice of treacherous fraud. This latter operation, therefore, as

^{*} See du Cange Glossary, voce Moneta; the Benedictine edition.

BOOK foon as it has been discovered, and it could never be concealed very long, has always excited much greater indignation than the former. The coin, after any confiderable augmentation, has very feldom been brought back to its former weight; but after the greatest adulterations it has almost always been brought back to its former fineness. It has scarce ever happened that the fury and indignation of the people could otherwise be appealed.

> In the end of the reign of Henry VIII. and in the beginning of that of Edward VI. the English coin was not only raised in its denomination, but adulterated in its standard. The like frauds were practifed in Scotland during the minority of James VI. They have occasionally been practised in most other countries.

> THAT the public revenue of Great Britain can ever be completely liberated, or even that any confiderable progress can ever be made towards that liberation, while the furplus of that revenue, or what is over and above defraying the annual expence of the peace establishment, is so very small, it seems altogether in vain to expect. That liberation, it is evident, can never be brought about without either some very considerable augmentation of the public revenue, or some equally considerable reduction of the public expence.

> A MORE equal land-tax, a more equal tax upon the rent of houses, and such alterations in the present system of customs and excise as those which have been mentioned in the foregoing chapter, might, perhaps, without increasing the burden of the greater part of the people, but only distributing the weight of it more equally upon the whole, produce a confiderable augmentation of revenue. The most fanguine projector, however, could scarce flatter himself that any augmentation of this kind would be fuch as could give any reasonable hopes either of liberating the public revenue altogether,

gether, or even of making fuch progress towards that liberation in time of peace, as either to prevent or to compensate the further accumulation of the public debt in the next war.

By extending the British system of taxation to all the different provinces of the empire inhabited by people either of British or European extraction, a much greater augmentation of revenue might be expected. This, however, could scarce perhaps be done, consistently with the principles of the British constitution, without admitting into the British parliament, or if you will into the states general of the British Empire, a fair and equal representation of all those different provinces, that of each province bearing the same proportion to the produce of its taxes, as the representation of Great Britain might bear to the produce of the taxes levied upon Great Britain. The private interest of many powerful individuals, the confirmed prejudices of great bodies of people feem, indeed, at present, to oppose to so great a change such obstacles as it may be very difficult, perhaps altogether impossible, to furmount. Without, however, pretending to determine whether fuch a union be practicable or impracticable, it may not, perhaps, be improper, in a speculative work of this kind, to consider how far the British fystem of taxation might be applicable to all the different provinces of the empire; what revenue might be expected from it if fo applied, and in what manner a general union of this kind might be likely to affect the happiness and prosperity of the different provinces comprehended within it. Such a speculation can at worst be regarded but as a new Utopia, less amusing certainly, but not more useless and chimerical than the old one.

THE land-tax, the stamp duties, and the different duties of customs and excise, constitute the four principal branches of the British taxes.

IRELAND

BOOK V.

IRELAND is certainly as able, and our American and West Indian plantations more able to pay a land-tax than Great Britain. Where the landlord is subject neither to tithe nor poors rate, he must certainly be more able to pay such a tax, than where he is subject to both those other burdens. The tithe, where there is no modus, and where it is levied in kind, diminishes more what would otherwise be the rent of the landlord, than a landtax which really amounted to five shillings in the pound. Such a tithe will be found in most cases to amount to more than a fourth part of the real rent of the land, or of what remains after replacing compleatly the capital of the farmer, together with his reasonable profit. If all moduses and all impropriations were taken away, the complete church tithe of Great Britain and Ireland, could not well be estimated at less than fix or seven millions. If there was no tithe either in Great Britain or Ireland, the landlords could afford to pay fix or feven millions additional land-tax, without being more burdened than a very great part of them are at present. America pays no tithe, and could therefore very well afford to pay a land-tax. The lands in America and the West Indies, indeed, are in general not tenanted or leased out to farmers. They could not therefore be affeffed according to any rent-roll. But neither were the lands of Great Britain, in the 4th of William and Mary, affeffed according to any rentroll, but according to a very loofe and inaccurate estimation. The lands in America might be affeffed either in the same manner, or according to an equitable valuation in consequence of an accurate furvey, like that which was lately made in the Milanese, and in the dominions of Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia.

STAMP-DUTIES, it is evident, might be levied without any variation in all countries where the forms of law process, and the deeds by which property both real and personal is transferred, are the same or nearly the same.

THE

THE extension of the customhouse laws of Great Britain to CHAP. Ireland and the plantations, provided it was accompanied, as in justice it ought to be, with an extension of the freedom of trade, would be in the highest degree advantageous to both. All the invidious restraints which at present oppress the trade of Ireland, the distinction between the enumerated and non-enumerated commodities of America, would be entirely at an end. The countries north of Cape Finisterre would be as open to every part of the produce of America, as those south of that cape are to some parts of that produce at prefent. The trade between all the different parts of the British empire would, in consequence of this uniformity in the customhouse laws, be as free as the coasting trade of Great Britain is at present. The British empire would thus afford within itself an immense internal market for every part of the produce of all its different provinces. So great an extension of market would soon compensate both to Ireland and the plantations, all that they could fuffer from the increase of the duties of customs.

THE excise is the only part of the British system of taxation, which would require to be varied in any respect according as it was applied to the different provinces of the empire. It might be applied to Ireland without any variation; the produce and consumption of that kingdom being exactly of the same nature with those of Great Britain. In its application to America and the West Indies, of which the produce and consumption are so very different from those of Great Britain, some modification might be necessary, in the same manner as in its application to the cyder and beer counties of England.

A FERMENTED liquor, for example, which is called beer, but which, as it is made of melasses, bears very little resemblance to our beer, makes a considerable part of the common drink of the people in America. This liquor, as it can be kept only for a few days,

BOOK days, cannot, like our beer, be prepared and stored up for fale in great breweries; but every private family must brew it for their own use, in the same manner as they cook their victuals. But to subject every private family to the odious visits and examination of the tax gatherers, in the same manner as we subject the keepers of alehouses and the brewers for public sale, would be altogether inconfistent with liberty. If for the fake of equality it was thought necessary to lay a tax upon this liquor, it might be taxed by taxing the material of which it is made, either at the place of manufacture, or, if the circumstances of the trade rendered fuch an excise improper, by laying a duty upon its importation into the colony in which it was to be confumed. Befides the duty of one penny a gallon imposed by the British parliament upon the importation of melasses into America; there is a provincial tax of this kind upon their importation into Massachusets Bay, in ships belonging to any other colony, of eight-pence the hogshead; and another upon their importation, from the northern colonies, into South Carolina of five-pence the gallon. Or if neither of these methods was found convenient, each family might compound for its consumption of this liquor, either according to the number of persons of which it consisted, in the same manner as private families compound for the malt-tax in England; or according to the different ages and fexes of those persons, in the same manner as feveral different taxes are levied in Holland; or nearly as Sir Mathew Decker proposes that all taxes upon confumable commodities should be levied in England. This mode of taxation, it has already been observed, when applied to objects of a speedy confumption, is not a very convenient one. It might be adopted, however, in cases where no better could be done.

> Sugar, rum, and tobacco, are commodities which are no where necessaries of life, which are become objects of almost univerfal confumption, and which are therefore extreamly proper fubiects

jects of taxation. If a union with the colonies was to take place, CHAP. those commodities might be taxed either before they go out of the hands of the manufacturer or grower; or if this mode of taxation did not fuit the circumstances of those persons, they might be deposited in public warehouses both at the place of manufacture, and at all the different ports of the empire to which they might afterwards be transported, to remain there, under the joint custody of the owner and the revenue officer, till such time as they should be delivered out either to the consumer, to the merchant retailer for home confumption, or to the merchant exporter; the tax not to be advanced till fuch delivery. When delivered out for exportation, to go duty free; upon proper fecurity being given that they should really be exported out of the empire. These are perhaps the principal commodities with regard to which a union with the colonies might require some considerable change in the present system of British taxation.

What might be the amount of the revenue which this fystem of taxation extended to all the different provinces of the empire might produce, it must, no doubt, be altogether impossible to ascertain with tolerable exactness. By means of this system there is annually levied in Great Britain, upon less than eight millions of people, more than ten millions of revenue. Ireland contains more than two millions of people, and according to the accounts laid before the congress, the twelve affociated provinces of America contain more than three. Those accounts, however, may have been exaggerated, in order, perhaps, either to encourage their own people, or to intimidate those of this country, and we shall Suppose therefore that our North American and West Indian colonies taken together contain no more than three millions; or that the whole British empire, in Europe and America, contains no more than thirteen millions of inhabitants. If upon less than eight

BOOK eight millions of inhabitants this system of taxation raises a revenue of more than ten millions sterling; it ought upon thirteen millions of inhabitants to raise a revenue of more than sixteen millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling. From this revenue, supposing that this system could produce it, must be deducted, the revenue usually raised in Ireland and the plantations for defraying the expence of their respective civil governments. The expence of the civil and military establishment of Ireland, together with the interest of the public debt, amounts at a medium of the two years which ended March, 1775, to fomething less than seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year. By a very exact account of the revenue of the principal colonies of America and the West Indies, it amounted, before the commencement of the late diffurbances, to a hundred and fortyone thousand eight hundred pounds. In this account, however, the revenue of Maryland, of North Carolina, and of all our late acquisitions both upon the continent and in the islands, is omitted, which may perhaps make a difference of thirty or forty thousand pounds. For the fake of even numbers therefore, let us suppose that the revenue necessary for supporting the civil government of Ireland, and the plantations, may amount to a million. There would remain confequently a revenue of fifteen millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, to be applied towards defraying the general expence of the empire, and towards paying the public But if from the present revenue of Great Britain a million could in peaceable times be spared towards the payment of that debt, fix millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds could very well be spared from this improved revenue. This great finking fund too might be augmented every year by the interest of the debt which had been discharged the year before, and might in this manner increase so very rapidly, as to be sufficient in a few years to discharge the whole debt, and thus to restore compleatly the at present debilitated and languishing vigour of the empire.

In the meantime the people might be relieved from some of the most burdensome taxes; from those which are imposed either upon the necessaries of life, or upon the materials of manufacture. The labouring poor would thus be enabled to live better, to work cheaper, and to send their goods cheaper to market. The cheapness of their goods would increase the demand for them, and consequently for the labour of those who produced them. This increase in the demand for labour, would both increase the numbers and improve the circumstances of the labouring poor. Their consumption would increase, and together with it the revenue arising from all those articles of their consumption upon which the taxes might be allowed to remain.

THE revenue arising from this system of taxation, however, might not immediately increase in proportion to the number of people who were subjected to it. Great indulgence would for some time be due to those provinces of the empire which were thus subjected to burthens to which they had not before been accustomed, and even when the same taxes came to be levied every where as exactly as possible, they would not every where produce a revenue proportioned to the numbers of the people. In a poor country the confumption of the principal commodities subject to the duties of customs and excise is very small; and in a thinly inhabited country the opportunities of smuggling are very great. The confumption of malt liquors among the inferior ranks of people in Scotland is very small, and the excise upon malt, beer, and ale, produces less there than in England in proportion to the numbers of the people and the rate of the duties, which upon malt is different on account of a supposed difference of quality. In these particular branches of the excise there is not, I apprehend, much more fmuggling in the one country than in the other. The duties upon the distillery, and the greater part of the duties of customs,

BOOK in proportion to the numbers of people in the respective countries, produce less in Scotland than in England, not only on account of the smaller consumption of the taxed commodities, but of the much greater facility of fmuggling. In Ireland, the inferior ranks of people are still poorer than in Scotland, and many parts of the country are almost as thinly inhabited. In Ireland, therefore, the confumption of the taxed commodities might, in proportion to the number of the people, be still less than in Scotland, and the facility of smuggling nearly the same. In America and the West Indies the white people even of the lowest rank are in much better circumstances than those of the same rank in England, and their confumption of all the luxuries in which they usually indulge themselves is probably much greater. The blacks, indeed, who make the greater part of the inhabitants both of the fouthern colonies upon the continent and of the West Indian islands, as they are in a state of slavery, are, no doubt, in a worse condition than the poorest people either in Scotland or Ireland. We must not, however, upon that account, imagine that they are worse fed, or that their confumption of articles which might be subjected to moderate duties, is less than that even of the lower ranks of people in England. In order that they may work well, it is the interest of their master that they should be fed well and kept in good heart, in the fame manner as it is his interest that his working cattle should be fo. The blacks accordingly have almost every where their allowance of rum and of melasses or spruce beer, in the same manner as the white servants; and this allowance would not probably be withdrawn, though those articles should be subjected to moderate duties. The confumption of the taxed commodities, therefore, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, would probably be as great in America and the West Indies as in any part of the British empire. The opportunities of smuggling, indeed, would be much greater; America, in proportion to the extent

extent of the country, being much more thinly inhabited than CHAP. either Scotland or Ireland. If the revenue, however, which is at present raised by the different duties upon malt and malt liquors. was to be levied by a fingle duty upon malt, the opportunity of fmuggling in the most important branch of the excise would be almost entirely taken away: And if the duties of customs, instead of being imposed upon almost all the different articles of importation, were confined to a few of the most general use and confumption, and if the levying of those duties was subjected to the excise laws, the opportunity of smuggling, though not so entirely taken away, would be very much diminished. In consequence of those two, apparently, very simple and easy alterations, the duties of customs and excise might probably produce a revenue as great in proportion to the confumption of the most thinly inhabited province as they do at present in proportion to that of the most populous.

THE Americans, it has been faid, indeed, have no gold or filver money; the interior commerce of the country being carried on by a paper currency, and the gold and filver which occasionally come among them being all fent to Great Britain in return for the commodities which they receive from us. But without gold and filver, it is added, there is no possibility of paying taxes. We already get all the gold and filver which they have. How is it possible to draw from them what they have not?

THE present scarcity of gold and silver money in America is not the effect of the poverty of that country, or of the inability of the people there to purchase those metals. In a country where the wages of labour are fo much higher, and the price of provisions so much lower than in England, the greater part of the people must furely have wherewithal to purchase a greater quantity,

BOOK if it was either necessary or convenient for them to do so. The fearcity of those metals, therefore, must be the effect of choice, and not of necessity.

IT is for transacting either domestic or foreign business, that gold and silver money is either necessary or convenient.

THE domestic business of every country, it has been shewn in the fecond book of this inquiry, may, at least in peaceable times, be transacted by means of a paper currency, with nearly the same degree of conveniency as by gold and filver money. It is convenient for the Americans, who could always employ with profit in the improvement of their lands a greater stock than they can eafily get, to fave as much as possible the expence of fo costly an instrument of commerce as gold and filver, and rather to employ that part of their furplus produce which would be necessary for purchasing those metals, in purchasing the instruments of trade, the materials of cloathing, feveral parts of houshold furniture, and the iron-work necessary for building and extending their fettlements and plantations; in purchasing, not dead stock, but active and productive stock. The colony governments find it for their interest to supply people with such a quantity of papermoney as is fully fufficient and generally more than fufficient for transacting their domestic business. Some of those governments, that of Penfylvania particularly, derive a revenue from lending this paper-money to their fubjects at an interest of fo much per cent. Others, like that of Massachuset's Bay, advance upon extraordinary emergencies a paper-money of this kind for defraying the public expence, and afterwards, when it fuits the conveniency of the colony, redeem it at the depreciated value to which it gradually falls. In 1747 * that colony paid, in this manner, the greater part of its public debts, with the tenth part of the

^{*} See Hutchinson's History of Massachuset's Bay, Vol. II. Page 436. & seq.

the money for which its bills had been granted. It suits the conveniency of the planters to save the expence of employing gold and silver money in their domestic transactions; and it suits the conveniency of the colony governments to supply them with a medium, which, though attended with some very considerable disadvantages, enables them to save that expence. The redundancy of paper money necessarily banishes gold and silver from the domestic transactions of the colonies, for the same reason that it has banished those metals from the greater part of the domestic transactions of Scotland; and in both countries it is not the poverty, but the enterprising and projecting spirit of the people, their desire of employing all the stock which they can get as active and productive stock, which has occasioned this redundancy of paper money.

In the exterior commerce which the different colonies carry on with Great Britain, gold and filver are more or less employed, exactly in proportion as they are more or less necessary. Where those metals are not necessary, they seldom appear. Where they are necessary, they are generally found.

In the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies, the British goods are generally advanced to the colonists at a pretty long credit, and are afterwards paid for in tobacco, rated at a certain price. It is more convenient for the colonists to pay in tobacco than in gold and silver. It would be more convenient for any merchant to pay for the goods which his correspondents had sold to him in some other fort of goods which he might happen to deal in, than in money. Such a merchant would have no occasion to keep any part of his stock by him unemployed, and in ready money, for answering occasional demands. He could have, at all times, a larger quantity of goods in his shop or warehouse, and he could deal to a greater extent. But it seldom happens to be convenient



BOOK venient for all the correspondents of a merchant to receive payment for the goods which they fell to him, in goods of some other kind which he happens to deai in. The British merchants who trade to Virginia and Maryland happen to be a particular fett of correspondents, to whom it is more convenient to receive payment for the goods which they fell to those colonies in tobacco than in gold and filver. They expect to make a profit by the fale of the tobacco. They could make none by that of the gold and filver. Gold and filver, therefore, very feldom appear in the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies. Maryland and Virginia have as little occasion for those metals in their foreign as in their domestic commerce. They are faid, accordingly, to have less gold and filver money than any other colonies in Ame-They are reckoned, however, as thriving, and confequently as rich as any of their neighbours.

> In the northern colonies, Penfylvania, New York, New Jersey, the four governments of New England, &c. the value of their own produce which they export to Great Britain is not equal to that of the manufactures which they import for their own use, and for that of some of the other colonies to which they are the carriers. A balance, therefore, must be paid to the mother country in gold and filver, and this balance they generally find.

> In the fugar colonies the value of the produce annually exported to Great Britain is much greater than that of all the goods imported from thence. If the fugar and rum annually fent to the mother country were paid for in those colonies, Great Britain would be obliged to fend out every year a very large balance in money, and the trade to the West Indies would, by a certain species of politicians, be considered as extremely disadvantageous. But it so happens, that many of the principal proprietors of the fugar plantations reside in Great Britain. Their rents are remitted to them in fugar

fugar and rum, the produce of their estates. The sugar and rum CHAP. which the West India merchants purchase in those colonies upon their own account, are not equal in value to the goods which they annually fell there. A balance, therefore, must generally be paid to them in gold and filver, and this balance too is generally found.

THE difficulty and irregularity of payment from the different colonies to Great Britain, have not been at all in proportion to the greatness or smallness of the balances which were respectively due from them. Payments have in general been more regular from the northern than from the tobacco colonies, though the former have generally paid a pretty large balance in money, while the latter have paid either no balance, or a much smaller one. The difficulty of getting payment from our different sugar colonies has been greater or less in proportion, not so much to the extent of the balances respectively due from them, as to the quantity of uncultivated land which they contained; that is, to the greater or smaller temptation which the planters have been under of over-trading, or of undertaking the fettlement and plantation of greater quantities of waste land than suited the extent of their capitals. from the great island of Jamaica, where there is still much uncultivated land, have, upon this account, been in general more irregular and uncertain than those from the smaller islands of Barbadoes, Antigua, and St. Christophers, which have for these many years been completely cultivated, and have, upon that account, afforded less field for the speculations of the planter. The new acquisitions of Grenada, Tobago, St. Vincents, and Dominica, have opened a new field for speculations of this kind; and the returns from those islands have of late been as irregular and uncertain as those from the great island of Jamaica.

Ir is not, therefore, the poverty of the colonies which occasions, in the greater part of them, the present scarcity of gold and silver money.

BOOK money. Their great demand for active and productive stock makes it convenient for them to have as little dead stock as possible; and disposes them upon that account to content themfelves with a cheaper, though less commodious instrument of commerce than gold and filver. They are thereby enabled to convert the value of that gold and filver into the instruments of trade, into the materials of cloathing, into houshold furniture, and into the iron work necessary for building and extending their settlements and plantations. In those branches of business which cannot be transacted without gold and filver money, it appears that they can always find the necessary quantity of those metals; and if they frequently do not find it, their failure is generally the effect, not of their necessary poverty, but of their unnecessary and excesfive enterprize. It is not because they are poor that their payments are irregular and uncertain; but because they are too eager to become excessively rich. Though all that part of the produce of the colony taxes, which was over and above what was necessary for defraying the expence of their own civil and military establishments, were to be remitted to Great Britain in gold and filver, the colonies have abundantly wherewithal to purchase the requisite quantity of those metals. They would in this case be obliged, indeed, to exchange a part of their furplus produce, with which they now purchase active and productive stock, for dead stock. In transacting their domestic business they would be obliged to employ a coftly instead of a cheap instrument of commerce; and the expence of purchasing this costly instrument might damp somewhat the vivacity and ardour of their excessive enterprize in the improvement of land. It might not, however, be necessary to remit any part of the American revenue in gold and filver. It might be remitted in bills drawn upon and accepted by particular merchants or companies in Great Britain, to whom a part of the furplus produce of America had been configned, who would pay into the treasury the American revenue in money, after having themselves received the

the value of it in goods; and the whole business might frequently CHAP. be transacted without exporting a fingle ounce of gold and filver from America.

IT is not contrary to justice that both Ireland and America should contribute towards the discharge of the public debt That debt has been contracted in support of Great Britain. of the government established by the revolution, a government to which the protestants of Ireland owe, not only the whole authority which they at present enjoy in their own country, but every security which they possess for their liberty, their property, and their religion; a government to which several of the colonies of America owe their present charters, and consequently their present constitution, and to which all the colonies of America owe the liberty, fecurity, and property, which they have ever fince enjoyed. public debt has been contracted in the defence, not of Great Britain alone, but of all the different provinces of the empire; the immense debt contracted in the late war in particular, and a great part of that contracted in the war before, were both properly contracted in defence of America.

By a union with Great Britain, Ireland would gain, besides the freedom of trade, other advantages much more important, and which would much more than compensate any increase of taxes that might accompany that union. By the union with England, the middling and inferior ranks of people in Scotland gained a complete deliverance from the power of an aristocracy which had always before oppressed them. By a union with Great Britain the greater part of the people of all ranks in Ireland would gain an equally complete deliverance from a much more oppressive aristocracy; an aristocracy not founded, like that of Scotland, in the natural and respectable distinctions of birth and fortune; but in

the

BOOK the most odious of all distinctions, those of religious and political prejudices; distinctions which more than any other animate both the infolence of the oppressors and the hatred and indignation of the oppressed, and which commonly render the inhabitants of the same country more hostile to one another than those of different countries ever are. Without a union with Great Britain, the inhabitants of Ireland are not likely for many ages to consider themselves as one people.

> No oppressive aristocracy has ever prevailed in the colonies. Even they, however, would, in point of happiness and tranquillity, gain confiderably by a union with Great Britain. It would, at least, deliver them from those rancorous and virulent factions which are inseparable from small democracies, and which have so frequently divided the affections of their people, and disturbed the tranquillity of their governments, in their form fo nearly democratical. In the case of a total separation from Great Britain, which, unless prevented by a union of this kind, seems very likely to take place, those factions would be ten times more virulent than ever. Before the commencement of the present disturbances, the coercive power of the mother country had always been able to restrain those factions from breaking out into any thing worse than gross brutality and infult. If that coercive power was entirely taken away, they would probably foon break out into open violence and bloodshed. In all great countries which are united under one uniform government, the spirit of party commonly prevails less in the remote provinces, than in the center of the empire. The distance of those provinces from the capital, from the principal feat of the great scramble of faction and ambition, makes them enter less into the views of any of the contending parties, and renders them more indifferent and impartial spectators of the conduct of all. spirit of party prevails less in Scotland than in England.

In the case of a union it would probably prevail less in Ireland CHAP. than in Scotland, and the colonies would probably foon enjoy a degree of concord and unanimity at prefent unknown in any part of the British empire. Both Ireland and the colonies, indeed, would be subjected to heavier taxes than any which they at present pay. In consequence, however, of a diligent and faithful application of the public revenue towards the discharge of the national debt, the greater part of those taxes might not be of long continuance, and the public revenue of Great Britain might foon be reduced to what was necessary for maintaining a moderate peace establishment.

THE territorial acquisitions of the East India company, the undoubted right of the crown, that is, of the state and people of Great Britain, might be rendered another fource of revenue more abundant perhaps than all those already mentioned. Those countries are represented as more fertile, more extensive; and in proportion to their extent much richer and more populous than Great Britain. In order to draw a great revenue from them, it would not probably be necessary to introduce any new system of taxation into countries which are already sufficiently and more than sufficiently taxed. It might perhaps be more proper to lighten than to aggravate the burden of those unfortunate countries, and to endeavour to draw a revenue from them, not by imposing new taxes, but by preventing the embezzlement and misapplication of the greater part of those which they already pay.

IF it should be found impracticable for Great Britain to draw any confiderable augmentation of revenue from any of the refources above-mentioned; the only resource which can remain to her is a diminution of her expence. In the mode of collecting and in that of expending the public revenue; though in both there

BOOK there may be still room for improvement; Great Britain scems to be at least as occonomical as any of her neighbours. The military establishment which she maintains for her own defence in time of peace, is more moderate than that of any European state which can pretend to rival her either in wealth or in power. None of those articles, therefore, seem to admit of any considerable reduction of expence. The expence of the peace establishment of the colonies was, before the commencement of the prefent diffurbances, very confiderable, and is an expence which may, and if no revenue can be drawn from them, ought certhinly to be faved altogether. This constant expence in time of peace, though very great, is infignificant in comparison with what the defence of the colonies has cost us in time of war. The last war, which was undertaken altogether on account of the colonies, cost Great Britain, it has already been observed, upwards of ninety millions. The Spanish war of 1739 was principally undertaken on their account; in which, and in the French war that was the consequence of it, Great Britain spent upwards of forty millions, a great part of which ought justly to be charged to the colonies. In those two wars the colonies cost Great Britain much more than double the fum which the national debt amounted to before the commencement of the first of them. Had it not been for those wars that debt might, and probably would by this time have been compleatly paid; and had it not been for the colonies, the former of those wars might not, and the latter certainly would not have been undertaken. was because the colonies were supposed to be provinces of the British empire, that this expence was laid out upon them. But countries which contribute neither revenue nor military force towards the support of the empire, cannot be considered as provinces. They may perhaps be confidered as appendages, as a fort of splendid and showy equipage of the empire. But if the empire empire can no longer support the expence of keeping up this equi- CHAP. page, it ought certainly to lay it down; and if it cannot raise its revenue in proportion to its expence, it ought, at least, to accommodate its expence to its revenue. If the colonies, notwithstanding their refusal to submit to British taxes, are still to be confidered as provinces of the British empire, their defence in fome future war may cost Great Britain as great an expence as it ever has done in any former war. The rulers of Great Britain have for more than a century past amused the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only. It has hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an empire; not a gold mine, but the project of a gold mine; a project which has cost, which continues to cost, and which if purfued in the same way as it has been hitherto, is likely to cost immense expence, without being likely to bring any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony trade, it has been shewn, are, to the great body of the people, mere loss instead of profit. It is furely now time that our rulers should either realize this golden dream, in which they have been indulging themselves, perhaps, as well as the people; or, that they should awake from it themselves, and endeavour to awaken the people. If the project cannot be compleated, it ought to be given up. If any of the provinces of the British empire cannot be made to contribute towards the support of the whole empire, it is furely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expence of defending those provinces in time of war, and of fupporting any part of their civil or military establishments in time of peace, and endeavour to accommodate her future wews. and defigns to the real mediocrity of her circumstances.

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