

U. S. Dept. of State.

Affairs of Hungary, 1849-1850

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

IN RESPONSE TO A SENATE RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER
7, 1909, CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. A. DUDLEY MANN
(1849-1850), RELATING TO AFFAIRS IN HUNGARY, ALSO CER-
TAIN ADDITIONAL PAPERS TRANSMITTED BY SECRETARY
OF STATE ROBERT LANSING TO SENATOR HENRY CABOT
LODGE, ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1918, RELATING
TO THE SAME SUBJECT



18-26872

PRESENTED BY MR. LODGE
SEPTEMBER 28, 1918.—Ordered to be printed

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1918

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AFFAIRS OF HUNGARY, 1849-1850.

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FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

CORRESPONDENCE WITH A. DUDLEY MANN (1849-1850) IN RESPONSE TO SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 85, OF DECEMBER 7, 1909, RELATING TO AFFAIRS OF HUNGARY.

JANUARY 10, 1910.—Ordered to be printed.

JANUARY 20, 1910.—Ordered to be reprinted with corrections.

WASHINGTON, *March 28, 1850.*

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 22d instant, requesting the President of the United States to communicate to that body a copy of the instructions given to the agent of the United States who was employed to visit Hungary during the recent war between that country and Austria, and of the correspondence by and with such agent, so far as the publication of the same may be consistant with the public interest, I herewith transmit to the Senate a copy of the instruction to A. Dudley Mann, Esq., relating to Hungary, he having been appointed by me special agent to that country on the 18th day of June last, together with a copy of the correspondence with our late chargé d'affaires to Austria, referred to in those instructions, and of other papers disclosing the policy of this Government in reference to Hungary and her people. I also transmit, in compliance with the resolution of the Senate, but in a separate packet, a copy of the correspondence of Mr. Mann with the Department of State.

The latter I have caused to be marked "Executive," the information contained in it being such as will be found, on examination, most appropriately to belong to the Senate in the exercise of its executive functions. The publication of this correspondence of the agent sent by me to Hungary is a matter referred entirely to the judgment and discretion of the Senate.

It will be seen by the documents now transmitted that no minister or agent was accredited by the Government of Hungary to this Government at any period since I came into office, nor was any communication ever received by this Government from the minister of foreign affairs of Hungary, or of any other executive officer authorized to act in her behalf.

My purpose, as freely avowed in this correspondence, was to have acknowledged the independence of Hungary had she succeeded in establishing a government *de facto* on a basis sufficiently permanent in its character to have justified me in doing so, according to the usages and settled principles of this Government, and although she is now fallen, and many of her gallant patriots are in exile or in chains, I am free still to declare that had she been successful in the maintenance of such a government as we could have recognized we should have been the first to welcome her into the family of nations.

Z. TAYLOR.

Secretary Lansing to Senator Lodge.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 10, 1918.

Hon. H. C. LODGE,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR: It gives me pleasure to send to you herewith copies of the papers regarding Hungarian affairs requested in your letter to me of February 15 last. These papers are:

Confidential instruction from Mr. Clayton, Secretary of State, to A. Dudley Mann, special and confidential agent of the United States to Hungary, dated June 18, 1849.

Farewell address delivered by Kossuth to Hungary on August 15, 1849.

Dispatch No. 6 of August 28, 1849, from Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

Dispatch No. 10 of September 23, 1849, from Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

Dispatch No. 11 of September 24, 1849, from Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

Extract from dispatch No. 15 of November, 1849, from Mr. Mann.

Dispatch No. 16 of October 29, 1849, from Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

Communication from Mr. Mann to Secretary of State, dated November 1, 1849.

Dispatch No. 17 of November 8, 1849, from Mr. Mann.

Dispatch No. 20 of November 29, 1849, from Mr. Mann.

Dispatch No. 21 of December 13, 1849, from Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

I am, my dear Senator Lodge,

Sincerely, yours,

ROBERT LANSING.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Confidential.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 18, 1849.

A. DUDLEY MANN, Esq.

(Appointed special and confidential agent of the
United States to Hungary, now in Paris).

SIR: The President, reposing perfect confidence in your ability, integrity, and prudence, has selected you for an important trust; and hopes that you will accept the confidential appointment now offered and lose no time, after the receipt of this notice of his wishes, in proceeding to Hungary in the discharge of the duties committed to you by him.

It will be proper for you, in the first place, to repair to Vienna and to confer with Mr. Stiles upon the subject of your mission and upon the best method of accomplishing its object secretly and with dispatch. Mr. Stiles's intelligence and experience may be useful, and you may, if you think proper, avail yourself of his counsel and aid. The principal object the President has in view is to obtain minute and reliable information in regard to Hungary in connection with the affairs of adjoining countries, the probable issue of the present revolutionary movements, and the chances we may have of forming commercial arrangements with that power favorable to the United States.

The eventful scenes which convulse Europe have been watched from their commencement with close attention by the Government and people of the United States; and among them (as not the least interesting) the existing struggle between Austria and her ancient dependency, Hungary. In this desperate conflict Russia has chosen to assume an attitude of interference, and her immense preparations for invading and reducing the Hungarians to the iron rule of Austria, from which they * * * desire to be released, give so serious a character to the contest as to awaken the most painful solicitude in the minds of Americans. This anxiety is natural on our part and is by no means inconsistent with the well-known and long-established policy of noninterference in the domestic concerns of other nations which has ever animated and governed the councils and conduct of the American Government. If it shall appear that Hungary is able to maintain the independence she has declared we desire to be the very first to congratulate her and to hail with a hearty welcome her entrance into the family circle of nations. But the prospect, I fear, is a gloomy one at present. If you shall think so yourself, prudence will suggest to you the importance of suspending your operations, and circumstances may be such as to make it safer for you not to proceed to Hungary at all. Of this you are to judge.

The great changes that have already occurred, and the still greater which may be confidently expected to take place in European political systems are so intimately connected with probable revolutions in their commercial plans and prospects that it is impossible for us to look on as unconcerned spectators. We have important interests

at stake in the movements of Europe, and it is our duty to watch over those interests with a wise vigilance and to stand prepared to take advantage of every opening occasion which may be presented to secure or to improve friendly and useful relations with Governments likely to become instituted as well as with those that are already established. Peace and commerce are the noble aims of our happy land. The former, by God's blessing, we enjoy. Let us omit no exertions to secure the most liberal and beneficial extension of the latter. Hungary to us has been hitherto a comparatively unknown region. She may succeed in placing her independence upon an immovable basis and become classed among the important commercial nations of the world. Our best wishes attend her.

Since the revolution of March, 1848, Hungary has constituted herself into a power separate and independent of the Austrian Empire and has created a provisional government at the head of which Kossuth has been placed. The early efforts of this illustrious man to effect reforms and to ameliorate the condition of his countrymen, to redress grievances, to free the press from an intolerable censorship, to extend taxation to the privileged classes, to elevate from extreme wretchedness the yeomanry of his country, and to promote other great measures for the good of his fellow countrymen deserve and command our admiration. But a policy of immobility, backed by the bayonet, was successfully opposed to the stirring spirit of discontent and insurrection, and the national movement, which was sustained by the energy and public spirit of the Magyars, received no signal impulse until the expulsion of Metternich, an event which left them free to choose their own ministers and accelerated the course of reform and revolution. In vain, against the seemingly irresistible might of Austria, had Hungary appealed to Paris and to Frankfort.

At this critical moment an interesting application was indirectly made, on the part of Kossuth, to induce Mr. Stiles, our chargé d'affaires at Vienna, to undertake an intervention of the settlement of the differences between Hungary and the Imperial Government. The nature of this application and its results will be seen by you among the files of the legation at Vienna, which the chargé will open for your inspection, if you wish it, in reference to this particular matter, as well as in respect to all other questions of interest which concern Hungarian affairs and the objects of your proposed visit to that country.

The unfortunate result of the application alluded to plainly showed that the door of reconciliation was closed, and that all questions and issues were to be determined on the battle field. And, in the meantime, the sudden abdication of the late Emperor and the elevation of his successor have been followed by a train of events as striking as they were unexpected. The Hungarians at first sank beneath the stroke of the invader. The tables shortly became changed. And now the tide of invasion has been rolled back until it threatens to overwhelm the Austrian Empire, in which the nationality of Hungary had been so long merged.

To the contemplation of the American statesman, Hungary at this time offers the interesting spectacle of a great people rising superior to the enormous oppression which has so long weighed her down,

and she exhibits at the same time the determination and the power (we hope) to assert and maintain her separate and equal station among the powers of the earth. She is now described to us by those who profess to understand her position as the representative of republicanism and of liberal principles. Her geographical extent and situation and her population, productions, and mineral wealth constitute resources whose development would speedily follow her successful struggle for independence. In this case new commercial prospects would be unfolded, and the port of Fiume, in the Adriatic her only seaport, would become unlocked and opened to admit the navigation and staples of the United States.

The object of the President, as I have said, is to obtain information in regard to Hungary and her resources and prospects with a view to an early recognition of her independence and the formation of commercial relations with her. Your large experience in European affairs and the eminent ability which distinguishes your correspondence with this department inspire the President with great confidence in your opinions. And for that reason he feels no reluctance in leaving these delicate and important duties almost wholly to your own discretion and prudence. You will decide upon your own movements and places of destination, as well as upon the particular points of inquiry to which you will direct attention, upon the proper mode of approaching Mr. Kossuth and his confidential advisors, and upon the communications which you may deem it proper to make to them on the part of your Government. Future instructions to you will depend in a great degree upon the reports and representations which you may from time to time communicate to this department.

In the meanwhile I transmit herewith a sealed letter introducing you in your official character to the minister of foreign affairs of Hungary and an open copy of the same, which you will be at liberty to deliver or to withhold as under circumstances you may deem proper and expedient. Before you can reach Pesth or the seat of the provisional government of Hungary, wherever that may be, the whole scene may be changed, and it may even become improper for you to make any demonstration. In this case, and indeed in all other cases, you will be governed by your own good judgment and by circumstances. You may find it better and safer not to trust the communications you may desire to make to your Government to the insecurity of the public mail or to such modes of conveyance as may be within your reach, but to await your return to western Europe. If any advantage is offered by the use of the cipher, Mr. Stiles will furnish you with a copy of that which is in the legation at Vienna, and will explain it to you.

As the service to which you are assigned is important and may possibly be one of some peril, your compensation will be at the rate of \$10 a day, counting from the time of your receiving these instructions, provided you proceed upon the business of your mission within a week from that day; in addition to which your traveling and other necessary personal expenses during your absence and until your return to Paris will be allowed you. You will keep a strict account of your expenses actually incurred and take vouchers as usual in all

cases where they can be obtained. A letter of credit on Messrs. Baring Bros. & Co., bankers of the United States in London, requesting them to honor your drafts to an amount not exceeding \$1,000, is herewith inclosed, as an advance upon account.

Without intending to limit you, it is presumed that four or five months will be sufficient for effecting the objects in view and to enable you to gather and prepare the desired information. You may, perhaps, see fit to repair to Fiume in the course or toward the close of your journey. And if you should deem it advisable afterwards to visit Tuscany and other portions of Italy in pursuit of commercial objects and inquiries, future instructions on the subject may be sent to you upon an intimation from you to that effect to visit the grand duke, who, it is understood, would be well disposed to treat with us on terms highly advantageous, and to which terms we might subsequently commit the rest of the Italian States. If it be determined to instruct you to visit Italy for these objects, the term of your mission will be extended according to the necessity of the case, of which you will advise the department.

I have received and read with profit and with satisfaction the dispatch you did me the favor to address to me on the 10th ultimo, at my request, through Mr. Robertson; and I anticipate with pleasure further communications from you in relation to our commercial interests and the general condition of political affairs in Europe. Any suggestions from you in regard to the former will be most welcome and will receive my respectful and attentive consideration. After your mission to Hungary is closed and that to Italy, if this last shall be decided upon, it is possible that the President may desire to avail himself of your services in other quarters. At this moment the subject of the navigation laws of England, among others, engages my closest attention, and I hope to derive light from your own views in regard thereto as you may be pleased to present them to this department.

You will furnish the department with a copy of the new constitution, if any shall have been formed, of Hungary, and acquaint us with its operation, and whether any and what other nations shall have recognized the independence of Hungary, or intend to do so. Should the new Government prove to be in your opinion firm and stable, the President will cheerfully recommend to Congress at their next session the recognition of Hungary; and you might intimate, if you should see fit, that the President would in that event be gratified to receive a diplomatic agent from Hungary in the United States by or before the next meeting of Congress, and that he entertains no doubt whatever that in case her new Government should prove to be firm and stable her independence would be speedily recognized by that enlightened body.

I transmit herewith full powers for concluding a commercial convention, if it shall be practicable to form one, conformably with the foregoing instructions.

I am, sir, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN M. CLAYTON.

EXECUTIVE.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extracts.]

No. 1.]

PARIS, July 13, 1849.

SIR: My appointment, instructions, and the other documents transmitted therewith reached the legation of the United States in this city yesterday, having been forwarded through the post-office at London on the 11th.

I enter immediately upon the discharge of the delicate duties with which I have been so confidently intrusted, and with emotions of gratitude to the President and yourself which language can not adequately describe.

The realization of the favorable opinions entertained by the department of my capacity and disposition to be useful to my country shall be my unceasing care during the continuance of my mission.

I feel, indeed, more than ever confident that the highest of all national destinies awaits our Union when I perceive its affairs administered by statesmen acting in that sense of patriotism which has been manifested in the selection for public employment of myself—a citizen unknown to them personally and who was no applicant for office. My fitness for so important a position—a knowledge of which, as I am advised, was derived almost exclusively from my correspondence in the archives of the department—may have been overestimated; but the motive which influenced the choice was as pure as the noblest emanations of executive justice which proceeded from the heart of Washington.

I shall hasten to Vienna by the most expeditious conveyance, where I will determine upon my future movements. I shall be prepared to start in three or four days.

Gen. Lamoricière is about to leave here on a special mission to St. Petersburg. He was, as you are perhaps aware, until his recent election a modéré, but it is believed that he inclines more, at present, to Thiers and monarchie than to Cavaignac and la république des honnêtes gens. He will be met by the Emperor of Russia, who, after having declared Poland to be in a state of siege, returns to his capitol. It is feared that the restoration of the throne of France is seriously in contemplation; and it is supposed that negotiations are in progress for placing the crown upon the head of Louis Napoleon, with the assent of Orleanists and Legitimists, under the guaranty of the partitioning allies of 1772.

The question whether continental Europe shall be under Cossack or republican rule hereafter will, in all probability, be definitely decided on the plains or in the passes of Hungary. Should Kossuth fail in the consummation of his purpose, the yoke of despotism would doubtless become almost as galling to the governed in eastern, central, and western continental Europe as it is to those of the "colossal Empire" of the north. But little better than an actual state of siege would exist from the Black Sea to the British Channel and from the Mediterranean to the Baltic. The sword would enforce obedience to

law, and law would wrest the last cup of nourishment from the industrial pursuits for the sustenance of the sword. Apart from the sympathies, cherished by our generous institutions, which we entertain for the oppressed of all nations, European questions would then assume an American importance—commercially, if not politically—not known since the adoption of the Constitution.

If Hungary, however, should sustain herself against the united imperial forces, the prestige of the Czar would be impaired to such a degree that Russia could no longer excite terror in other States, and the dismemberment of Austria and the reestablishment of Italian notionalality would speedily ensue.

What exciting, what sublime or appalling, spectacles may I not be permitted to witness on the banks of the Danube! I am distinctly to behold kindred spirits in the great cause of humanity and rational liberty triumphing over an unequal and unnatural enemy or their death struggle. My trust, however, is, and will continue to be to the last, that the sacred adage—the battle is not to the strong—may be literally verified in the instance of the indomitable Magyars; and I shall desire no joy of a more boundless nature during my pilgrimage through life than to be enabled to report to you that “Hungary has established her independence on a permanent foundation; that I saw the infant Hercules strangle the mighty serpent.”

I have the honor to be,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Hon. JOHN M. CLAYTON,
Secretary of State, Washington.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extracts.]

No. 2.]

BERLIN, *July 28, 1849.*

SIR: Shortly after my arrival at this metropolis on the 26th I concluded not to proceed on my journey to the east until to-night, in order, during the delay, to transmit to you such useful information as I might be enabled to obtain from authentic sources of the condition of affairs in Hungary.

I forward herewith a literal translation of the proclamation of the Austrian Gen. Haynau upon the occasion of his entering Pesth. The ferocious sentiments therein expressed are disgraceful to their author and to the allied powers. The threats uttered to the gentler sex can not fail to provoke the universal indignation of enlightened humanity. Christianity will weep that a spirit so fiendish should manifest itself in a nation professing to recognize the ruling principles of civilization.

The members of the provisional government of Hungary, after quitting Pesth, repaired to Szegedin on the lower Theiss. Kossuth, when last heard from, was at Peterwardein, where he will probably be joined by his ministers.

The effective force of the imperialists in Hungary is about 350,000 men. The army of the Czar in the north numbers 150,000 men, and 80,000 more are reported to be on their march across the Carpathians

to unite with it. The Austrian corps, too, are receiving additional strength from Bohemia and elsewhere. I shall, perhaps, not overestimate the number if I state that by the middle of August the troops of the Emperor will amount to 500,000. To meet this immense invasion Hungary had not, two weeks ago, more than 250,000 men in actual service. A new impulse, however, has just been given to the cause of liberty and independence. The powerful appeals of Kossuth to his countrymen have not been made in vain. All classes are at length awakened to a sense of their country's wrongs and are courageously hastening to the defense of the national banner. The brutal purposes avowed by Haynau have stimulated woman to depart from her natural sphere and arm for action. It is reported that thousands of females are marching side by side with their husbands, brothers, and sons to enter the army, desiring a glorious death rather than submit to ignominious servitude.

The autocrat, in espousing the hopeless cause of the youthful Emperor, reserved to himself the right of arranging the plan of warfare to be observed by the invading army. This plan, it is understood, was perfected by the advice and with the entire approval of the most eminent captains within the embraces of the two Empires. It was considered so complete, even in its minutest details, as to be easy of immediate execution. In conformity therewith the allied forces were formed into four grand corps d'armée, which were subsequently subdivided. These were to enter, as nearly as possible, the geographical divisions of Hungary, and to advance in such order as to cause them to arrive at the same time at the center. By this intended concentration of vastly superior strength the "insurgents" were to be surrounded and the "insurrection" stifled. But the eastern division has not yet succeeded in advancing in the direction of the west nor the western division in the direction of the east, while the space between the Prince Paskiewitch and the Ban Jellachich remains as wide as at the commencement of operations. The latter commander, in fact, has experienced severe disasters in battle and has written from Ruma, in Slavonia, to the Emperor of Austria to say that unless he speedily receives considerable reinforcements he would inevitably be cut into pieces. Lieut. Gen. Grotenhielm is said to be marching to his succor from Bistritz—the headquarters of the Russians in the east—and Haynau and Nugent from the north and west; but whether any of them will succeed in opening a way to him is considered quite doubtful.

The autocrat has unquestionably signally failed in the consummation of his original plan, and in the stupendous failure, as might have been expected, the tower of strength contained in his name has been weakened. That he entertains painful apprehensions of the result is generally believed. That he would gladly return to the neutral ground which he occupied on the 1st of March, with his dazzling prestige untarnished, is very certain. It would be idle in me to offer you predictions upon the final issue of the contest, so energetically and desperately prosecuted by one of the belligerents and so judiciously and patriotically resisted by the other. The strength, for an open field fight, is decidedly on the side of the imperialists, while skill and invincibleness are as certainly with the Magyars. Kossuth's plans, if I fully comprehended them, have been admirably conceived.

His sagacious mind distinctly perceived from the first that the only hope of saving his country from so formidable a foe was that of fortifying himself strongly in the extreme south. Accordingly his energies are now directed to this end. Peterwardein is located on the right bank of the Danube, nearly opposite the mouth of the Theiss, and within a few miles of the Turkish frontier. The fort there, one of the strongest in the military boundary, has withstood the repeated attacks of Jellachich. Its position is so commanding that it was a primary object with the imperialists to obtain possession of it. In its front, with the exception of the angle at the junction of the Danube and Theiss, the country for a considerable distance is marshy and after the yearly autumnal rains can not be penetrated by heavy troops. Paskiewitsch, at the last dates, was at Miskolez, a distance of about 225 miles from Peterwardein. The army of Gorgey is in the same region, while that of Dembinski is not very far off, but east of it. Neither of the Hungarian commanders are disposed to engage in battle with the main army of Russia, for they would risk too much by such a procedure. They employ themselves in endeavoring to intercept reinforcements and in preventing supplies for subsistence, occasionally giving indications that they are preparing for a conflict. In this manner Paskiewitsch is forced to suspend his movements to the south, while time is afforded to Kossuth to perfect his arrangements. If Gorgey should succeed with Dembinski in detaining Paskiewitsch in the north until the middle of September, this year's campaign would result most adversely to Russia and Austria, and hostilities would cease. The Hungarians would retire to the angle which I have mentioned, where, with ample stores, they could remain secure until May, while the Cossacks would be in but little better condition than the French were under Napoleon in Russia, were they to remain in the country. Under this view of the subject the destiny of Hungary will be determined at latest by the 1st of December.

The autocrat arrived on the 25th instant at Warsaw from St. Petersburg. He is fully sensible of the value of the stake for which he plays. If he lose, the retrogradation of his policy and his principles can not fail to be more rapid than was the rise of his Empire to its present colossal stature.

Mr. Bodisco, the Russian minister to the United States, is here and staying at the same hotel at which I took apartments. The autocrat, I am informed, has given orders to his representatives abroad to exercise the utmost vigilance with respect to the passports of Americans when presented for a visé. He denounces in the most vehement terms all republican institutions—attributing the extension of liberal principles in Europe, and justly, to American example and influence.

The accounts from Milan represent that the recommencement of hostilities by Austria against Piedmont is likely to occur immediately. Radetzki has made a categorical demand of the government of Piedmont for a compliance with the peace conditions which he proposed at the time of the armistice; and states that in the event of a refusal he is prepared to enforce them. It will be recollected that the money which was employed in fitting out the French expedition to Rome was appropriated by the constituent assembly expressly for the purpose of protecting, physically, Piedmont against unjust exactions should Austria be disposed to make them. Will France, now that

the contingency has happened which was provided for, have recourse to an armed intervention? I question it very much. There is not, in my opinion, a solitary idea fostered by the ministers of Louis Napoleon and the majority of the legislative assembly but that which has for its object the creation of an Emperor and the establishment of an Empire. If Hungary should be crushed I am quite confident that the restoration of monarchy would be attempted, and if successfully, the crown would be placed upon the head of the President of the Republic regardless of the solemn oath to his God to be true to the constitution!

I have not yet had sufficient leisure to call upon Mr. Hannegan, our minister, nor have I seen Mr. Bodisco.

I have the honor to be, faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

PROCLAMATION OF THE MASTER OF THE ORDINANCE HAYNAU.

To the inhabitants of Ofen and Pesth:

After a number of victories which the imperial royal arms, engaged in a just cause, have obtained over those of the traitors, we are again among you; Austria's old banners are again floating above your battlements. But a change has taken place in our feelings since we left you a short time ago. Actuated by your conduct toward us, we would have then reposed confidence in you, notwithstanding your former outrages, and would have considered you incapable of ever again arraying yourselves faithlessly against us as enemies. You have, with the exception of a few, bitterly deceived us, and we can therefore scarcely credit the assurances of your peaceful intentions. Although the greater majority of you are Germans by language and by habit, yet, led on by a rascally hero of words, you have participated in the chimerical project of forming a Hungarian Republic. A part of the blood of the noble Kentzi and of his brave companions in arms falls upon your heads. You helped to stir up the fanatic fire which consumed him in his loyalty toward his Emperor. You have persecuted your well-intentioned fellow-citizens, and many of them, together with soldiers of the Emperor who had fallen into your hands, you shamefully murdered.

I might avenge them by the destruction of yourselves and of your cities, but I conform to the magnanimity of my Emperor and master; hearken, however, to the voice of an old soldier, who has shown how he keeps his word. Death will be visited, without regard to condition or sex, without delay, and on the spot where the deed is committed. Upon every one: (1) Who attempts to assist the cause of the rebels by word or deed, or by wearing revolutionary emblems; (2) who dares to insult, by word or deed, one of my soldiers, or one of the soldiers of my brave allies; (3) who enters into treasonable connections with the enemies of the Crown, and who attempts to kindle the spark of rebellion by malignant reports; (4) who dares to secrete arms, as was unfortunately formerly the case, and does not deliver them during the space of time appointed by another proclamation of mine. But, on the other hand, I promise my protection to the well-intentioned citizen who freely exposes his honest way of

thinking, to the peaceful peasant and to their property, and our good Emperor and master will relieve the heavy burden which these times, so pregnant with important events, has imposed upon them.

HAYNAU.

PESTH, *July 19, 1849.*

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

No. 3.]

VIENNA, *August 8, 1849.*

HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

SIR: The opinions which I expressed in my No. 2, written at Berlin on the 28th, respecting the failure of the military plans of the Czar for speedily obliterating the nationality of Hungary, are now substantially confirmed. The Magyars have again been eminently victorious in the west, within 80 miles of this place—in the very region where the Imperialists considered themselves most secure.

When Gorgey performed the daring exploit of hewing with his sword a passage through the solid mass of invading troops in his march to the north, it was generally believed that but a small number of men were left behind him for the defense of Komorn. This impression, in the absence of any information on the subject, was the more reasonable, inasmuch as Komorn from its strength and location was easy of protection, while a large army would necessarily rapidly consume its supplies without accomplishing any valuable end. An attempt at the storming of this fortress, as desirable as was the possession of it, seems not to have been contemplated. It was to be reduced to capitulation by siege, and accordingly it was beleaguered as was confidently believed, by an adequate force for the prevention of communication between it and the adjacent country. But, when least expected, about 20,000 Magyars issued from it, attacked the besiegers, put those who were not left upon the field to flight, captured Raab, a large town in the vicinity, took possession of 1,000 oxen belonging to the enemy, and other articles of subsistence, together with arms, ammunition, etc. The result of this brilliant achievement, this masterly ruse de guerre, casts for the moment an indescribable gloom over the imperial cause. It is even apprehended, such is the existing terror inspired by the name of Gorgey, that a descent will be made upon Vienna. Komorn, I may remark, bears the appellation of "Virgin Fortress," from the circumstance of its never having surrendered. It is situated at the lower extremity of Great Schütt Island, about midway between Presburg and Pesth, and commands the Danube at that point. It is to the west what Peterwardein is to the south, and the acquisition of such vast supplies so late in the season places it, in all probability, beyond the conquest of the invaders during the year's campaign.

The Vienna journals, without an exception, have from the commencement understated the magnitude of the disasters experienced by the Imperialists and misrepresented the nature of operations generally in Hungary. None of the reports published over the signatures of imperial officers are full and explicit. The authors of them appear to have studiously endeavored, by ambiguous expressions, to veil

important facts from public vision. The Presse, in its leader of yesterday, speaks distinctly enough concerning the victory at Komorn. "The most disagreeable intelligence which we have yet received from Hungary," it remarks, "is contained in an extra of the 'Vienna Gazette' of yesterday evening, to the effect that a corps d'armée of the Magyars suddenly marched from Komorn, commenced operations in the open field, surprised Gonyö, and is said to have captured Raab, and to have driven our troops back upon Wesselburg. It appears that the garrison of Komorn was much stronger than Haynau supposed it to be * *. * It is difficult to comprehend how the commanding general of an army should have been so destitute of correct information with regard to the strength of his enemy, even if withdrawn from his immediate observation by the ramparts of a fortress, as was the case in this instance. * *. * With respect to the operations of the imperial Russian troops we think that more concentration and combination with the movements of our own were necessary in the interest of success. In our opinion, General Haynau should not have thought of hurrying off to assist the Ban in the south before he prevented Gorgey, cost what it might, from breaking through the ranks of the Russians or rather from crossing the numerous Russian corps stationed (echellonnés) here and there along the banks of the Theiss to the astonishment of the military world. Yes, the best plan was, perhaps, for General Field Marshal Paskiewitch to have undertaken the operations toward the south and for Haynau to have confined himself to the continuance of hostilities before Komorn, and to the protection of the metropolis. It was the duty of the latter to make propositions and offers to this effect. He had the power to do so through the ministry. A plan of cooperation well traced and carried out with energy by both parties might have prevented what has happened."

The sentiments and views thus expressed are doubtless those entertained by the Austrian Government as they assuredly are those of intelligent individuals in private circles. The Presse, it is true, is not the organ of the ministry, but, nevertheless, it would not, with the restraints upon its freedom, venture to give utterance to opinions upon such a delicate subject, at so momentous a period, which were not strictly in accordance with the opinions of the cabinet. If I am correct in this supposition, there is virtually a condemnation on the part of Austria of the plans under which the operations of the invading forces have been conducted, and the Czar is chargeable with the blunders which have been committed, as well as reproachable for the inefficiency of his 100,000 soldiers (under the command of Prince Paskiewitch), "to the astonishment of the military world" in interfering with the movements of Gorgey. It is more than insinuated that the ordinary fortunes of war, in view of the concentration of such an immense number of heavy and thoroughly disciplined troops in a comparatively small space, have had no hand in the repeated reverses of the invaders. It is even whispered that Nicholas is acting faithlessly with his engagements to Francis Joseph. That he has deluded him by false professions in order the more surely to effectuate the definitive and early dismemberment of his Empire. That his overt design is the extension of his embraces to the 16,000,000 inhabitants of the Slavic race within the confines of Austria. And that

this purpose could not be perfected if he were to succeed in winning back Hungary to the House of Hapsburg Lorraine.

I give no indulgence to such notions as those which attribute the discomfiture of the imperial arms to the treachery of the autocrat. On the contrary, I am quite convinced that a more resolute, a more ferocious, a more positive life or death war never was waged than that waged by Russia against the Magyars, and I am not sufficiently charitable to cover the disgrace attendant upon the prosecution of it with the alleged perfidy of Nicholas. Were I disposed to take this view of the matter I should be deplorably wanting in justice to that more than Spartan people, whose prowess, whose skill, whose patriotism, and whose indomitable enery mause rational liberty in continental Europe to smile and to hope and despotism to frown and to despond.

That the aggrandizement of Sclavic territory and the subsequent practical establishment of Panslavism are important considerations with the Czar can scarcely be questioned. The Sclavic population in Austria perceive day by day additional beauties in the tenets of civilizaton, and, in fact, may be considered as making rapid advances in the line of intellectual progress. If the spirit which prompts inquiry for truth and light be not subdued, it will, imperceptibly, force its way to the more benighted Slaves in the very hear of Russia and endanger, if not undermine, the colossal throne. It is natural to presume that the autocrat is desirous of fortifying himself against the threatening peril, and that no alternative is left him but to endeavor to shut out the rays of knowledge proceeding from the more enlightened States which penetrate and expand the Sclavic mind.

But Nicholas in his unbridled ambition has aspirations, I fear, which stretch far beyond the frontiers of Austria and the taming of the Slaves to bondage. Were he influenced exclusively by a laudable observance of nature's first law, cruel as his system, his aggressions, however they might shock the senses, would not amount to flagrant outrages on humanity. Peter the Great, in order to stimulate his successors to a faithful execution of the principles of unlimited absolutism, and to deeds of rapacity upon feebler States, bequeathed them as a legacy the following words:

I found Russia a rivulet; I leave it a river. My successors will make it a great ocean, destined to fertilize Europe.

In the face of all that is transpiring on the Continent, there is something startling to a votary of liberty in this remarkable prophecy of a century and a half ago—realized as it has been in part by an augmentation of the "river" to an oceanlike magnitude. There are many melancholy evidences that the remainder of it is in the course of fulfillment. I shall not exaggerate when I state that at this moment millions of the friends of monarchical government in France, Germany, and elsewhere are advocating the Russian system, the interminable-siege system, the bayonet-ruling system; thus desiring the immediate fertilization of Europe by the creation of such an ocean as was contemplated by the first "Emperor of all the Russias." The Czar is encouraged to persevere, finding allies in powers and sympathies with people who, until recently, regarded him as their natural and unrelenting enemy. That the Government of France is

prepared to adopt his policy in its extreme rigor, in many respects, I have all along believed since the intervention at Rome. This is now pretty distinctly foreshadowed in a Vienna journal of to-day. It says:

It is a fact worthy of remark that Prince Schwartzberg arrived at Warsaw nearly simultaneously with Lamoreiere, minister of the French Republic. The first meeting of the representative of a State which forms the incarnate principle of revolution with a man who in his person concentrates the strict monarchical system must be a singular one. The French volcano is certainly nearly extinguished, and, from a report which has been circulating for some time in diplomatic circles, it is more than probable that the entente-cordiale which now exists between the cabinets of St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Paris may be the origin of a closer alliance. The most important interests of those powers are confined to Germany, the land of the songster, who, according to his song, "Was ist das Deutschen vaterland?" is in search of his country.

If the "closer alliance" be perfected, Germany will cease to exist even in name. A liberty stifling Prussia will be made more potent for evil by the absorption of the other and more generous States. This accomplished, France, Austria, and Prussia, as far as concerns the performance of a conspicuous part in the affairs of the world, will be as powerless as pilot boats in tow of a 120-gun ship.

All now depends on Hungary, and, notwithstanding her recent glorious victories, it is expecting almost too much—if too much can be expected (particularly after a recurrence to the history of our own struggles) of a magnanimous people resolved upon absolving their allegiance to an oppressive crown—to calculate on their overcoming the odds arrayed against them.

Peace has just been definitely ratified between Austria and Sardinia, and a considerable part of the army of Radetzky is to be forthwith transferred to Hungary, which will increase the chances in favor of the invaders. In three months, if the Magyars can hold out so long, the contest will assume an aspect adverse to their enemies. A second year's invading campaign could not, it is supposed, be undertaken. Neither the finances of Austria nor of Russia will admit of it; nor can either contract loans, if this year's operations terminate unsuccessfully. The currency of the former at present is 20 per cent below par, with a downward tendency. Under such circumstances, and with an overwhelming public debt that may possibly be dishonored, borrowing is out of the question. Moreover, if Hungary be not conquered before winter, Great Britain, and perhaps other powers, will recognize her; while the people of France and Germany will make such a demonstration of their sympathies as will upset the Governments of Paris, Berlin, etc., if they continue to look on the cause of the Magyars with indifference. Again, the Croats may desert the standard of their leader, of which there are indications. It is rumored that they have refused to accept the imperial constitution of the 4th of March, in conformity with a proclamation of the Ban. Bosnia, too, is represented to be in a state of intestine commotion, dissatisfied with the Pacha. This may operate to the advantage of the Magyars by strengthening their position back of Peterwadein.

Great Britain has a paramount interest, commercial and political, in the success of the Hungarian cause. She seems not to have awakened to a sense of it, however, until just before the adjournment of Parliament. It is believed that she is now endeavoring to nego-

tiate here and at Warsaw for a suspension of hostilities, and she may possibly be in communication informally with Kossuth. The Government mistook its policy in not opposing at the first the intervention of Russia, but I will recur to this subject in a future number.

The Hungarian Government had removed, as represented by the last accounts, to Grosswadein, a strong fortification on the left side of the Thies, not far from the center of the territory. Dembinski was there with an army of 50,000 men.

I have not yet examined the correspondence of the legation. Mr. Stiles started a few days before my arrival on a tour through Tyrol and Switzerland to Paris, and will not return before the 1st of September. I arrived on the 30th.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

THE FAREWELL OF LOUIS KOSSUTH TO HUNGARY, ORSOWA, AUGUST 15,
1849.

Beloved Motherland, farewell, farewell home of the Magyars! Farewell home of the sorrows! Nevermore shall I see the summits of thy mountains; nevermore shall I call Fatherland the country where from the breast of my mother I sucked the milk of justice and freedom. Wilst thou, dear Fatherland, forgive him who is condemned to wander far from thee because he fought for thy happiness? Wilst thou forgive me, who can no longer give the name of freedom except to that small square of thy soil upon which I am kneeling with my family and a few faithful children of great vanquished Hungary?

I gaze upon thee, dear Fatherland, and see thee overwhelmed with suffering, I turn my eyes to the future and see nothing but darkness; thy plains are bathed in red blood which ruthless destruction will soon have turned to black, as if bringing mourning for the victories which thy sons won over the sacreligious foe of thy hallowed soil.

How many are the grateful hearts which have raised their prayers to the throne of the Almighty! How many the tears that have flown to the abyss to evoke the city of hell itself! How much blood has been shed to prove that the Magyar loves his country and can die for it!

And yet, beloved Fatherland, thou art a slave. From the bowels of thy soil will be drawn the iron with which the shackle all that is holy and to aid all that is sacreligious.

Oh God! If thou lovest thy people, whom, after so many fights, thou allowedst to conquer under Arpad, our heroic forefather, I beseech thee, I implore thee, dost not humiliate them!

Thou seest, dear Fatherland, I address thee again in these words, in the abyss of my despair, on the last height of thy land. Forgive me, for many of thy sons have shed their blood for thee for my sake. That was because I stood as thy champion, because I protected thee when on thy brow they wrote in bloody letters "Lost." It is because I raised my voice when thou wert told, "Be a slave!" It is because I buckled on my sword and took in hand a bloody pen when

they dared to say, "Thou art no longer a nation in the land of the Magyars!"

Time hurried on; fate in the pages of thy history, wrote in yellow and black letters "Death!" It called upon the Colossus of the North to affix the seal; but the red-hot iron from the East will melt that seal.

Dost thou see, O Fatherland, for them who shed so much blood there is no compassion for on thy hills made of the bones of thy sons, tyranny is slicing its bread.

Dost thou see, O Fatherland, the ingrate that thou hast fattened on thy abundance, march against thee; he has marched against thee, the traitor to his Fatherland, to achieve thy utter destruction.

But, Oh beloved Fatherland! thou hast withstood all those, thou hast not cursed thy existence, for in thy breast, far above any sorrow, hope has built its nest.

Magyars! Do not turn from me for at this moment my tears are pouring out for you, and the land under my feet is still named Hungary.

Thou has succumbed, oh, most true of nations! Thou hast succumbed under thy own blows!

Thy grave was not dug by the iron of the enemy foe; thy patriotism was not awed by the guns of 14 nations lined up against thee. It was not the fifteenth nation crossing the Carpathians which compelled thee to lay down thy arms; no; thou wert betrayed, thou wert sold, O Fatherland! Thy death warrant was written, oh beloved Fatherland, by him whose patriotism I never dared to suspect.

In the flight of my boldest thoughts, I should have doubted the existence of God rather than believed he could ever betray his country! Thou wert betrayed by him in whose hands but a few days ago I placed the government of our great country, which he swore to defend until the last drop of his blood had been shed. He turned traitor to his country because the color of gold to him proved more attractive than that of blood spilt for the country. The ignoble metal was more valuable than his country and his God, who forsook him, as he himself forsook me for his allies from hell.

Magyars: dear compatriots, do not blame me for being compelled to cast my eye on that man and yielding my place to him. It had to be done, for he had won the confidence of the people; the army loved him, and he had attained the position of which I myself could have been proud. And yet, that man has belied the nation's confidence and returned hatred for the love of the army. Accursed be the breast which, when suckling him, did not wither.

I love thee, oh the truest of the nations of Europe, as I love liberty, for which you waged such a proud fight. The God of liberty will never vanish from your memory. May you be blest forever!

My principles were not those of Washington, and my deeds were not those of William Tell. My wish was for a free nation, free as men can only be made by God, and you are dead, dead as is the lily, to sprout next year handsomer blossoms; you are dead, because your winter has come; but it will not be as long a winter as that of thy associate, overwhelmed by the frozen atmosphere of Siberia. No! Fifteen nations have dug thy grave, the battalions of the sixteenth will come to save you.

Be true as you have been heretofore, conform to the holy word of the Bible; say the prayer for the dead, and only strike your national hymn when you hear the thunder of the liberating nation roll over your mountains.

Farewell dear compatriots. Let the thoughts of God and the angels of freedom be with you. Do not accuse me; you may be proud for the lions of Europe have arisen to defeat the rebels. I am going to show the civilized world what heroes you are and the cause of the heroic people will be protected by the freest of the free peoples.

Farewell, land stained with the blood of so many brave men; those stains must be preserved to bear witness to the nation that loves you.

Farewell, young King of the Hungarians! Do not forget that my nation is not for you, and God inspires me with the confidence that the day will come when you will see the proof of this on the very ruins of the walls of Buda.

May the Almighty bless you, my beloved nation! Believe, hope, and love!

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

No. 4]

VIENNA, August 17, 1849.

HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

SIR: A telegraphic dispatch just received from Haynau announces that Gorgey, with his army of 30,000 or 40,000 men, laid down his arms on the 13th instant at Vilagos, an interior town near Arad. No details are given nor will any probably be received here in an authentic form before to-morrow. It is understood, however, that the surrender was made to a Russian general.

Within the last week the Magyars experienced several reverses in engagements with Haynau, which, perhaps, counterbalanced the recent advantages obtained by them at Komorn. Should the intelligence respecting Gorgey be confirmed, hostilities can scarcely fail to terminate at an early day adversely to Hungarian independence.

A rumor originating either in the London Post or Augsburg Gazette is currently circulated here that the President of the United States had formally received a minister from the government of Kossuth. Fortunately, your note to Mr. L. B. Breisach, under date of June 25, as contained in the American newspapers, was received yesterday and will place the matter before the public in its true light. The uniform policy of our Government with respect to the recognition of foreign states, so succinctly explained in this note, can not fail to impress all concerned in the question of Hungary as eminently just and proper.

I transmit this by mail to our dispatch agent in London, and I trust it will arrive in time for the Liverpool steamer of the 25th.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

No. 5.]

VIENNA, August 24, 1849.

HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

SIR: The surrender of Gorgey, according to the report of Paskiewitsch to the Czar, was unconditional. Not a paragraph relative to this momentous occurrence has yet been published by order of the Austrian Government. Detailed official accounts, however, were received here this morning from Warsaw, where they appeared in the *Courier* of the 18th instant. The following is a translation of the report of Paskiewitsch:

Hungary lies at the feet of your imperial majesty!

The government of the insurgents in its act of dissolution transferred all power to Gorgey, who, unconditionally, surrendered to the Russian Army. The other insurgent commanders will undoubtedly follow his example. The officers sent by Gorgey to me to negotiate a capitulation appeared to be willing to proceed to them with commissioners from our army, or from that of Austria, to endeavor to occasion a discontinuance of hostilities.

I am most fortunate in being enabled to report to your imperial majesty that the only request made of me by Gorgey was for the enjoyment of the privilege of surrendering to your army.

I have made suitable arrangements for having the troops of Gorgey surrounded by the corps of Gen. Rüdiger, to which the disarming of it is confided.

With regard to the delivery of the prisoners, and the arrangements for the other insurgents who may lay down their arms, I will advise with the commander in chief of the Austrian Army. I have had Gorgey brought to my headquarters, where he shall remain until I receive further orders from your imperial majesty.

It seems to be pretty well authenticated that a Hungarian war council was held at Arad on the 11th of August, in which all the members of the Government participated. That at the commencement of its deliberations Gorgey expressed a belief that recent reverses left no alternative to the Magyars but an abandonment of the cause for which they were struggling. That Kossuth, giving utterance to opinions diametrically opposite, was overruled by a considerable majority, and bowing to the will of that majority, immediately, by public proclamation, notified his countrymen that his official life was terminated, inasmuch as Gorgey had been chosen dictator. And that the first use Gorgey made of the authority conferred upon him was to place Hungary "at the feet of his imperial majesty," the Emperor of all the Russias.

The remark of the *Presse*, made at the time the news from Vilagos was gazetted, that "We are at a loss which to admire most, the military or diplomatic skill of Gen. Paskiewitsch," has become quite proverbial. It receives additional point from the fact that Hungary, as reported by the prince, is prostrate before the Czar, and that the only condition required in the consummation of this deed was an exclusive surrender to the Russian Army.

Kossuth, it is stated, started the same day that he was divested of his authority to Orsova, in Turkey. Whether in future he is to play a great rôle in the management of the affairs of eastern Europe the Almighty in His wisdom must determine. Gorgey will assuredly be

placed in a high military position, either in the Russian or Austrian service, as it is admitted on all sides that his professional talents are of a very superior order. All will depend, as respects the arms which he is to bear hereafter, upon the partition or disposition, as a whole, of Hungary. Between Kossuth and Gorgey, in political sentiment, there was never any sympathy. The latter was an uncompromising monarchist, as is distinctly seen in recent developments. Under the mask of national independence he fought for individual glory, not for liberal government. Consequently he was the idol of Magyar nobility, and in the war council the nobility prevailed. Kossuth, after the capture of Pesth, lost all control over the movements of Gorgey and therefore suspected his loyalty, communicating his suspicions to Benn.

The reports of Haynau and Paskiewitsch—the former to the Austrian and the latter to the Russian Emperor—relative to the victories of Vilagos, Arad, etc., have this moment made their appearance. I regret that I have not time before the last post for this steamer starts to furnish you with a translation of them. I send herewith the evening edition of the *Presse* containing them. It will be seen that Haynau claims for the Austrians the glory of hastening the war to a close.

The Augsburg Gazette and other papers contain a translation of your note¹ upon the subject of the recognition of Hungary.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extracts.]

No. 1.—Private.]

VIENNA, August 25, 1849.

HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

DEAR SIR: I fear that my despatches may fail to reach you, and I send this under cover to Mr. Bates, of the house of Baring Bros. & Co., to be forwarded to Washington.

I closed my No. 5 yesterday, having written the first at Paris, the second at Berlin, the third, fourth, and fifth at Vienna. The third was carried to London by the courier of the British legation here; the others were transmitted to the post office.

An official bulletin from Venice, published this afternoon, announces the unconditional surrender of that city yesterday.

Austria continues in a state of painful suspense with respect to the intentions of the Czar, now that "all Hungary lies at his feet." The pacification of the Magyars, at any cost, is strenuously urged upon the Government. But unmistakable indications are furnished that the door of pacification is closed now, if indeed, it have not been since the employment of Russian intervention became manifest.

If the Czar really desire Hungary, there is no obstacle to his taking possession of it immediately, for sustained as he would be by Gor-

¹ To Breisach.

gey's influence, there is no power in Europe "to harm him or make him afraid."

Nicholas, after entering the war arena, with his accustomed sagacity, was not long in discovering that Gorgey was a general not to be despised, and that there was more to be accomplished by seducing than by subduing him, were either possible. He had recourse to diplomacy, after finding that his plans for hemming in and stifling the "insurrection" failed, and with what success is readily explained in the request of the renowned Magyar warrior for permission to surrender to the Russian commander in chief. To suppose after what has occurred that the preliminaries for the surrender had not been arranged during the month that Paskiewitsch and Gorgey were loitering on the banks of the upper Theiss would be to suppose that imperial ambition was too chaste to achieve a primary object by strategic influence.

We shall probably know soon what disposition is to be made of Hungary. If the question be left to the decision of the Magyars, it will certainly go to Russia. In the event of a vehement opposition on the part of Austria to such a procedure, the Czar may propose as a compromise measure the erection of a throne and the crowning of his son-in-law, the Duke of Leuchtenberg, king with hereditary rights.

In the face of the important occurrences which are so rapidly transpiring in eastern Europe, I would suggest for your consideration whether it is not desirable to establish a legation at Athens. As the southern point of Europe, a capable representative could collect much valuable information for the Government there. At Berne, in Switzerland, we should also, in my opinion, have a legation. Its central position, with the institutions of the country, seem to me to require that we should be represented there. But I have not time to enlarge upon the subject, nor do I deem it necessary after bringing it to your notice.

I shall employ myself in preparing reports upon commercial matters until the return of Mr. Stiles, who has been written to to hasten to his post. It is, perhaps, nothing more than respectful that I should await his arrival; but it is necessary that he should be here before I set out for Paris, to arrange my passports, etc.

When I reach Paris I can write to you more freely than I am disposed to do in Austria.

If you still intend that I shall go to Tuscany, I would be much obliged if you would forward my instructions, etc., to the legation at Paris at your earliest convenience.

I beg to renew to you the assurance that I am prepared to serve the President, to the best of my abilities, in any position which he may designate.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Received September 23, 1849.]

No. 6.]

VIENNA, August 28, 1849.

SIR: I received upon my arrival at this place the National Intelligence, containing the correspondence in relation to the steamship

United States, which you did me the honor to transmit to me under cover to Mr. Stiles. My more immediate duties have so constantly employed me since then that I have had no leisure until now to state to you how cordially I approve of the action of the President relative to this vessel, and how entirely I coincide in the opinions and views which you have expressed upon the subject to the Baron Von Roune.

Witnessing at Munich the first successful popular demonstration of last year against the moral and political enormities of sovereigns, I looked forward from that moment for a salutary improvement in the condition of Continental Europe. In the severance of reigning royalty from its titled paramour by an outraged people I imagined that I beheld the handwriting on the wall for all rulers "by right Divine" who had been regardless of the rights and interests of their subjects in a flagrant degree. Nor was I much mistaken, for in two weeks afterwards the King of France was forced to abdicate and the public voice majestic obtained from crowned heads most of the concessions demanded in Germany, Austria, and Italy.

From my long and intimate knowledge of the wrongs of the Germans, and with their orderly and unimpassionate deportment under a sense of those wrongs, I esteemed them as a people deserving vastly more political freedom than they had hitherto been permitted to enjoy. Observing my duty as an American, I silently watched from day to day the public manifestations from their commencement—
anxious that they might eventuate in benign and durable results. I saw nothing irrational in the universal desire entertained for the reestablishment of a Germany. On the contrary, I viewed the sentiment as emanating from a lofty spirit of patriotism, having for its ulterior object the adoption of institutions and laws sufficiently liberal and just to secure contentment to the governed. The notion of overthrowing at once the numerous thrones I considered chimerical in the extreme, but I nevertheless believed that it was possible to adopt a system the operations of which would gradually impair the foundation of those thrones until they would necessarily fall. As it was clear that the Deutsch-Schleswig question—which had been agitated and discussed for the last two years—could never be adjusted as one of right, and as there had been no obligatory, or rather observed, European law since the partition of Poland, notwithstanding the Vienna treaty, I believed that the demand of the Schleswigers for admission into the embraces of the fatherland was neither illegitimate nor unreasonable. In the war which grew out of this question I am very free to confess that I wished for the success of the Germans, because I had an abhorrence to the principle of sacrificing the peace and property of provinces, irrespective of language or race and in opposition to their avowed will, for the preservation of mongrel kingdoms merely for the convenience of princes.

But while I entertained sentiments decidedly favorable to that which was understood to be the great German cause—union and subsequent liberty—I was not without occasional painful forebodings that my country would, in some way or other, be allured to render physical assistance against Denmark. I sojourned at Frankfort from the commencement of hostilities in Schleswig until near the end of June, during which I was almost daily approached by members of the assembly and others to ascertain my opinions as to the like-

lihood of making an arrangement with the United States, by which a part of their war marine could be employed to protect the Elbe and the Weser from blockade. I repelled all such advances by replying that my country had not only international obligations and statutable provisions to obey but the cherished principles and policy of its fathers and founders to observe; that however much its affections might be enlisted for struggling humanity it would never consent that its honor should be submitted to reproach for having violated a rigid neutrality adverse to a nation involved in war with which it was at peace. In order that the Government might be fully guarded against the danger of aiding indirectly the Germans, in my No. 19, written at Frankfort on the Main May 1, 1848, I remarked to the Secretary of State:

Baron von Rouné returns to the United States as minister of Prussia. Two or three days before his appointment was gazetted the *Bundesvevsammlung* (Germanic Diet) "*Resolved*, That the Prussian Government be requested in all future negotiations with Denmark to have a particular regard to the security of German commerce and navigation in the North and Baltic Seas, and, if possible, to enter into an arrangement with some naval power to protect them on the coast." Absurd as is such a notion as that expressed in the latter part of this proceeding, it seems to be understood here that in conformity with it the diplomat mentioned has been dispatched to Washington. With a knowledge of our policy with respect to foreign nations, recently forcibly reexpressed by the Executive that of "peace with all nations, entangling alliances with none," by the cabinet of Berlin, I am somewhat disinclined to give credit to the statement, as current as it is among well-informed persons.

Those of our countrymen who contend that the steamship *United States* was not purchased and armed expressly with a view to employment against the Danes are either egregiously deceived themselves or endeavor to practice upon the credulity of others. On my route hither I conversed with several intelligent German gentlemen of my acquaintance in relation to the matter, and while they were disposed to be clamorous against the action of our Government they unhesitatingly admitted that the object for which the purchase and equipment was made was no other than belligerent and in the instance of Denmark. I was also told that one of the secretaries of the pseudo Frankfort government had been informed through an official channel that the United States were prepared to furnish any number of officers required for the German naval service, and that Germany might make arrangements accordingly. The nonobservance of this promise was more complained of than the detention of the steamer. Now, anyone conversant with German affairs since the 1st of April, 1848, knows perfectly well that the creation of a German navy has been advocated exclusively with reference to the Danish question, and it is, therefore, the more astonishing that a functionary of the United States, at home or abroad, should have given an assurance that his country was willing to furnish its own officers to aid in bringing this navy into existence.

As far as the Government and people of the United States contemplated the purposes comprehended by the German constituent assembly, they could not fail to feel a lively solicitude that those purposes should be attained. But when they saw that constituent assembly warring against the power which called it into being engaged in the creation of a stupendous throne and in arranging an imperial

crown for the House of Hohenzollern, they surely could not regard it as a body entitled to their esteem or their respect.

Consequently, apart from the influencing considerations which led to the decision of the President in requiring bonds that the steamer *United States* should not be employed against a nation with which the States of Germany were at war and we at peace, the Germany of Frankfort creation gave unmistakable evidences, some time before its self-immolation, that it was utterly unworthy of the sympathies of people so free, upright, and magnanimous as those of America.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant.

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

No. 7.]

VIENNA, September 1, 1849.

HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

SIR: Gen. Haynau has proclaimed an amnesty to all noncommissioned officers and privates who have been employed in the Hungarian service. The troops surrendered by Gorgey have returned to their homes.

The fortresses of Komorn and Icterwordein have not yet capitulated. The commandant of the former is represented to be disposed to throw open its gates, but his officers resolutely resist his wishes. Russian generals are in daily communication with each fortress, and it is confidently believed that arrangements for their surrender will be concluded soon. When this shall occur the present war will have been terminated.

About 45,000 Magyars, including the army of Gorgey, have laid down their arms to the Russians. No voluntary surrenders, as far as I am advised, have been made to the Austrians. In every circle the questions continue to be asked with increased anxiety, "What does this mean? If nothing worse result, is the Czar to enjoy all the glory attendant upon the cessation of hostilities when the victories were all won by the arms of Francis Joseph?"

It is stated that the Vilagos prisoners who have just arrived at Pressburg concur in the belief that Gorgey was an arrant traitor. Kossuth seems to be entirely of the same opinion (if the letters published over his name can be relied upon as genuine), as I intimated to you in my No. 5. In writing to Count Bathyanzi he expresses himself unreservedly upon the subject—remarking that "the proposal and execution of Gorgey's plan," which he had foreseen and feared, "was treason against the fatherland and resulted in a deathblow to the Republic."

Radetzky is expected here to-day. His troops are not to occupy Venice on account of the prevalence of disease there and the distress consequent upon the lengthened bombardment. I may remark here that Mr. Sparks, our consul for that city, died of cholera a short time since.

A customs union is reported to be in contemplation between Austria and the Italian States, with a view to the adoption of a prohibitory system against the manufactures of foreign countries. If

perfected, its operations will be chiefly aimed at England, but they can not fail, unless great care be exercised by our Government, to affect injuriously American interests.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extracts.]

No. 2, private.]

VIENNA, September 2, 1849.

HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

DEAR SIR: This morning's post brings important intelligence, if true, from the east. It is to the effect that the great Russian Army under the command of Paskievitch is returning in forced marches to Poland. That Gorgey had been delivered to Austria, and immediately pardoned by the Emperor, with the understanding that he was to be confined for a time to the limits of Styria. That the officers of Gorgey will probably be set at liberty, after being submitted to trial by a court-martial. That Kossuth, Bem, Dembiński, Mazores, and 16 other Polish chiefs, together with many Hungarian deputies, had been captured at Calapat, on their route to Constantinople, by order of the imperial Turkish commander. That they had been removed to Widdin, where they were to be detained as prisoners until the decision of the Sublime Porte should be known respecting the disposition which might be made of them. That the Austrian authorities in Turkey allege that they have the Hungarian crown jewels, and that according to treaty stipulations they were under the Austrian jurisdiction.

I forwarded two dispatches to you yesterday by post, No. 6 and 7. I trust they will in due time reach their destination. The communication between here and London is not only direct, but expeditious; but I fear that the system of espionage in the post administration has not been entirely abandoned in Europe and that my dispatches may be delayed, if not detained.

It is important that I should convey you all the information at my disposal between this and the meeting of Congress, relative to European affairs. With this object steadily in view I imagine I shall anticipate your wishes by proceeding direct to Florence, instead of returning to Paris, when I quit Vienna. My reports to you will give me constant employment for several weeks, so that I can not afford to lose the time that would be required for a tour to the west of Europe.

If you shall decide upon the mission to Tuscany, or upon my employment elsewhere, you can forward instructions, etc., as I stated in my last, addressed to me under cover to the legation of the United States in Paris. There are opportunities presented daily at Paris for the conveyance of dispatches to Florence by Americans.

No tidings since yesterday from Komorn and Peterwerdein. Tomorrow the victories in Hungary and Italy are to be celebrated here. Redetzky, Haynau, and Gellachich are to be present on the occasion.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

No. 8.]

VIENNA, September 8, 1849.

HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

SIR: A commercial union, if not a close political alliance, is unquestionably in contemplation between Austria and the peninsular Italian States. This union, if it be perfected, will perhaps extend its embraces to Sardina, and also to Bavaria and Wurtemberg. In fact, the Austrian system, with many additional impost restrictions, and possibly a few slight modifications, will in all probability be adopted throughout Germany. Experience has furnished indubitable testimony to potentates that freedom in commerce and political liberty are inseparable companions—the latter closely and steadily following the lead of the former. It is, therefore, considered indispensable, in the endeavor made to Russianize the Continent, to confine importations from foreign states of generous sentiment to such raw materials as may be absolutely required by the manufacturing interest and to such articles of consumption as can not be dispensed with. As a preparatory measure to a system of virtual exclusiveness on the part of Austria, except to States which may coalesce with her, it is announced that a notification has already been given by the minister of commerce to the Venetian authorities that the “free port” privileges of Venice are to be immediately abrogated. That a similar policy will be decided upon with reference to Trieste can not be reasonably doubted. This of course will eventuate in some degree to a diminution of consumption of our staples other than cotton, and to the disadvantage of our navigation.

The young Emperor left here yesterday for Dresden for the twofold object, it is said, of settling the German question with the King of Prussia, who is to meet him there, and of contracting a matrimonial alliance with a daughter of the heir presumptive to the throne of Saxony. On the 15th he is to proceed to Cilli, to be present at the ceremonies of opening the railroad to Laibach, from whence he will continue his journey to Trieste, where he will be visited, according to letters received from Naples, Rome, and Florence, by the King of the two Sicilies, the Pope (or two of his cardinals), and the Crown Prince of Tuscany. Should this meeting take place it is almost certain that, among other matters, the preliminaries for the establishment of a customs union will be arranged.

A conference of the most distinguished captains and civilians in the Austrian service is to take place at Schonbrunn on the 11th instant under the presidency of the Emperor. Its ostensible object is stated to be the organization of Hungary. But a more important subject than even this, from occasional inklings during the present week, is likely to engage its deliberations. The army of Voivalberg, near the confines of Switzerland, 36,000 strong, with a reserve of 20,000 men, requires an experienced and successful commander just now. Haynau it is rumored, is anxious to quit Hungary. If the obliteration of Switzerland have been really resolved upon at Warsaw the duty of consummating the deed could not be confided to safer hands than to this general. One thing is very certain: If the auto-

erat is disposed to wipe out the existence of the Helvetian Republic he may do so, in my opinion, with entire impunity; for I consider him politically omnipotent on the Continent. Kingdoms and republics, for all practical uses, in the balance of power are merely his departments and crowned heads and presidents his prefects. The Czar, as will be seen from the following address to his army, claims all the honor of terminating the contest with the Magyars, and who will venture to dispute his right to do so?

CHILDREN: God has blessed your ardor, your manly courage, your unwearied perseverance in the midst of hardships. Children, you have done your duty and the insurrection has been stifled. There where the enemy dared to meet you, you vanquished him, and pursuing the fugitive step by step, you finally witnessed an occurrence without a parallel. The whole force of the enemy unconditionally laid down their arms before you and surrendered to our mercy. In the course of two months were captured by and surrendered to us 150 flags and standards and 400 pieces of artillery, with more than 80,000 rebels. Honor and glory for you. Honor and glory for your victorious leader. As ever, you have shown yourselves worthy of the name of the victorious army of all the Russias. I thank you collectively and individually. I am delighted with you. I am proud of you.

NICHOLAS.

SEPTEMBER 3.

But I will advert in a future number, when I can do so with less restraint than at present, to the Russian Empire and the causes of its increased greatness.

Komorn has not yet surrendered, nor had Peterwardein when last heard from.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Copy.]

No. 3.—Private.]

VIENNA, September 9, 1849.

Hon. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

DEAR SIR: I wrote to you yesterday. Although I am informed that my dispatches reach the agency of the United States in London regularly, when transmitted by post, I nevertheless do not consider it prudent to express myself as freely as is desirable in relation to Russian and Austrian affairs until I meet with a safe private conveyance. You can not fail to be anxious to know the cause of the sudden termination of the Hungarian war. I hope to put you in possession of much information on the subject as soon as I meet with one of our trusty countrymen going to London or Paris.

Gorgey arrived here last night accompanied by his wife and brother. He is proceeding to Gratz, where he is to reside for a time. We have no additional tidings from Kossuth and his party. If they should succeed in getting to Constantinople, I think it not unlikely that they would embark for the United States. I hope for the credit of Kossuth that he has not carried off the crown jewels of Hungary. If they were in his possession he should have delivered them to Gorgey when he laid down his power.

Vienna is filled almost to overflowing with Russians. It is decidedly the most important point at present in Europe. All eyes are turned to it, as they were four and thirty years ago, for a solution of the continental questions. The same motives prevail with the autocrat for the subversion of Switzerland as prevailed with him in 1846 for the subversion of Cracow. He is as powerful now for the one as he was then for the other. Whether this power will be exercised, as is contemplated, a few weeks will determine. If it shall, Russia will take care of Hungary, while Austria and Prussia march upon Switzerland. Nicholas remarked a few days since that he had now demonstrated to the world what his arms were capable of performing, and that democracy might profit by the example.

How salutary to our best interests—to our tranquillity and security—our established policy with respect to the concerns of foreign States. Without an honest observance of it, what unprofitable difficulties may we not have been involved in on account of one or another of the abortive revolutionary movements of Europe? Let us resolutely adhere to it (despite the demagogical influences to drive the Government to an abandonment of it) in all coming time. Let us never, as well-intentioned, peace-loving republicans, give any just cause of offense, whatever our sympathies for their oppressed subjects, to any power or state. Let us be pure in all our acts, influenced by reason instead of passion, and that unseen Arm which has protected us from infancy will continue to watch over and guide our destiny.

Mr. Stiles has not yet arrived, nor have any tidings, as I understand, been received from him at the legation.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

No. 9.]

VIENNA, *September 16, 1849.*

Hon. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

SIR: Peterwardein capitulated on the 6th instant to the Austrian Army. The official report of the occurrence demonstrates that this fort was excellently well provided for defensive operations. It contained 7,600 effective men, 300 pieces of artillery, and a large supply of ammunition and provisions.

The "virgin fortress," the last hold of Magyar resistance to the restoration of Austrian authority, resolutely refuses to surrender. The terms upon which it was disposed to capitulate were rejected by Haynau, under an impression that it would be forced by circumstances to surrender unconditionally. A majority of the officers in Komorn were formerly in the Austrian Army, and as they know that no mercy would be bestowed upon them as prisoners without a previous promise of pardon, they are prepared to sell their lives at the highest price.

It has been ascertained during the present week that there are upward of 25,000 troops in the inclosure of the walls of Komorn, and

that they are not only amply furnished with all necessary articles of food for a siege of a 12-month or more, but that they have 500 well-mounted guns, besides 8 batteries with 8 guns each, 50 heavy guns, and 1,400 Artillery horses. It is estimated by competent military men that in order to beleaguer Komorn successfully 75,000 troops will be constantly required. The fortress, with the numerous facilities now at the disposal of Haynau, could doubtless be reduced by bombardment, but such an idea seems not to be entertained. In fact, Komorn, from its position and strength, is too valuable in the future military government of Hungary, to say nothing of the consequent pecuniary cost and loss of soldiers to Austria, to admit of such a procedure, particularly as the war is now virtually ended. I incline therefore to believe that, as reluctant as the Government may be to do so, an amnesty will be granted to all the inmates of the fortress, in which event its gates will be thrown open.

Paskiewitsch, it seems, has interceded for the captive Magyar officers. In reply to him the Emperor remarks that while he acknowledges the obligations imposed by humanity, he has nevertheless grave duties to perform to his realm. Still Gorgey has been pardoned, from which circumstance it may be inferred that his subalterns, if submitted to a trial at all, will be discharged.

The Czar has published another manifesto, in the form of a circular to his representatives in foreign countries, which has probably been communicated to you, explanatory of his motive for intervention, and expressive of his determination, now that his purpose has been so signally accomplished, to abide by the settlement of 1815.

In consequence of the death of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael, the Autocrat left Warsaw a few days ago for St. Petersburg.

It is now officially announced that after the 21st instant the "free-port" privileges are to cease at Venice.

The letter of Louis Napoleon to Ney has created much surprise, wherever it has been read. As really intending to benefit the cause of liberal government I attach no value to the sentiments which he utters. I may be uncharitable, but I can not believe otherwise than that the President of France is influenced, exclusively, in all his acts by an inordinate solicitude to reestablish the Imperial Throne; and that the object of the recent publication was to bring his name more conspicuously before the European public. Rome is assuredly in a deplorable condition, but not more than must have been foreseen by the French Government when it decided upon the subversion of the Republic. The expedition of Oudinot was not only ill-advised, but ill-boding, and I fear ill-intentioned.

The conference of the prominent civil and military functionaries of Austria, which I alluded to in my last, is progressing with its duties. It is engaged, as is understood at present, with the organization of Hungary.

A vigilant eye should be kept, as I am sure it will by yourself, over our interests in this Empire. I intend to devote a dispatch to this subject soon.

Mr. Stiles has written to his secretary to say that he will return to his post about the 20th.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Received Oct. 14.]

No. 10.]

VIENNA, *September 23, 1849.*

SIR: It seems to be generally understood here that Austria has submitted to Prussia a plan of central government for the States embraced in the Germanic Confederation, and it is stated that Prussia, finding the Spreebund or constitution of the three Kings impracticable now that Austria is in a condition to assert her rights to the presidency of the old Germanic Diet, is not inclined to throw any obstacles of an insurmountable nature in the way of its adoption. This plan, though not communicated to the public, is perhaps foreshadowed in the outlines of the interim government as proposed by Austria, which are to the following effect:

1. As soon as the consent of the different German governments shall have been obtained for that purpose, "the vicar of the Empire" shall immediately vacate his office when the duties appertaining to it shall be exercised by the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia.

2. Austria and Prussia shall govern through a committee of four, two members chosen by each (Austria to have the presidency), and in case of a disagreement upon any national question Bavaria, Hanover, and Wurtemberg and Bavaria, Hanover and Saxony shall alternately act as umpire, from whose decision no appeal shall be taken. With this condition the committee shall conduct the affairs of the confederation, exclusively, and shall be responsible alone to the respective sovereigns to whom it owes allegiance.

3. The 1st of May, 1850, is the period designated for the termination of the interim government, provided a definitive government shall have been arranged prior to that time.

4. All the States of the confederacy shall assent to the provisions of the central constitution before their operations shall commence, or shall be obligatory upon either.

Should the interim government be established upon the principle thus proposed all the smaller reigning princes would be morally mediatized. Austria and Prussia, with all power secured to themselves, would not likely be disposed to part with any portion of it by provisions in the constitution of the definitive government.

It is currently rumored this morning, though not as yet officially announced, that Komorn has capitulated, and upon the same terms, in conformity with the advice of Radekty, as those accorded to Venice—an amnesty to all persons within its walls. Radekty assisted, from time to time, in the construction of Komorn, and is said to have frequently expressed a belief that it was so strong if properly defended as to bid defiance to the assaults of an enemy.

The Government of Austria, aided by the most experienced military men in the Empire, continues to occupy itself with the question of the organization of Hungary. It is as difficult an one of satisfactory adjustment as ever engaged the deliberations of a cabinet. In its settlement Austria will possibly be forced to change materially her commercial system in order to harmonize not only the interests but the nationalities which she embraces. Under good diplomacy I am encouraged to believe that we could make ourselves instrumental

in abolishing the Tobacco Regie. I have collected many facts which could be usefully employed by an able representative upon the subject.

I have concluded to return to Paris, for reasons which I shall explain to you after I arrive there, and I shall leave here between this and the 1st proximo. By that time I trust that there will be some one here to represent the country.

I perceive, according to an announcement in a Berlin paper, that Baron von Rouné has been superseded, and that Baron von Gevölt returns as resident Prussian minister to Washington.

The letter of Louis Napoleon to Ney no longer occasions remark, let alone anxiety. It notoriously means nothing, and accomplishes nothing, as concerns the bettering of the conditions of the Romans. The cardinals are more unmerciful than they were before its contents were communicated to them.

I shall not write to you again from this place. I shall complete my reports, which will employ me several days, after I quit Germany. I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Received Dec. 12, 1849.]

No. 11.]

VIENNA, September 24, 1849.

Sir: The treaty which I concluded with Hanover in 1846, of which nothing was known in the States of the Zollverein until it was proclaimed by King Ernest in March, 1847, was attacked with much vehemence by the press, in the advocacy of Prussian interests. I forward you, herewith, the translation of an article which appeared in the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung upon the subject on the 29th of March, 1847. A friend in Germany wrote to me at Washington shortly after the publication was made, informing me of its contents and of the name of the author, but I never saw the article itself until, after a diligent search, I found it at Berlin on my route hither. It was prepared by a celebrated diplomatist, who, as will be perceived, was well acquainted with the statutes of our country, and also professed to have a thorough knowledge of our countrymen. In order that the translation (by any imperfection) may do no injustice to the writer, I send, along with this, the printed copy in German.

In my dispatch, No. 7, I stated to Mr. Buchanan that: "In my opinion, it is imperative upon Congress to repeal the act of 1828 if not that also of 1824," and so much solicitude did I feel that this might be done, that I transmitted him the form of a bill, which I hurriedly drew up for the purpose, at Schwerin, in November, 1847. It is scarcely necessary to advance a single argument for the repeal of those laws, and for giving the requisite notice to Prussia for the abrogation of our treaty with her, in addition to the unanswerable ones which will be found in the article referred to. If properly explained in Congress, assuredly no member could vote against the measure and afterwards face his constituents. However widely we

may occasionally differ with respect to home questions, we are at least in our international policy, in so far as concerns a profitable augmentation of our trade intercourse, an united people. With all our good will to foreigners—our steadfast desire for the most amicable relations with every State—we are not so regardless of our interests as to afford, knowingly, pecuniary benefits to them to the injury of ourselves.

The Prussian functionary (I believe the writer then held a position subordinate to a cabinet minister at Berlin), not satisfied with the privileges which we had so generously bestowed upon the flag of his sovereign, was apparently quite indignant that Hanover should have made import and transit duty concessions in order to be permitted to engage in the triangular carrying with us. "We can not believe," said he, "that the President of the United States, who stands under the law, as well as every other American citizen, and whose only duty it is to execute the laws of the country (and consequently those acts of 1824 and 1828), would have refused to do so, and had he done so, Congress and the press, if properly influenced, would very soon have called him back to his duty." With respect to Oldenburg he observed, "We hope the report will not be confirmed that the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg also acceded to the treaty of June 10, 1846. This would be on the part of Oldenburg a much greater blunder than it was on the part of Hanover. Why should Oldenburg, which has obtained, by the proclamation of the President of the United States of September 10, 1830, all that was granted to Hanover in the treaty of June 10, make additional concessions?"

When I visited Mecklenberg in October, 1847—then in the enjoyment of the President's proclamation—to negotiate the declaration of accession, I was met by the minister of foreign affairs with the arguments thus furnished by the Prussian expounder of American law, not to grant "similar favors" to those granted by Hanover, and it was not until after I convinced himself and the reigning prince by palpable demonstrations in repeated interviews that the United States would find it to be their duty to repeal the act at an early date, from which the proclamation derived its authority, that I succeeded in the object of my mission to that government.

While the acts of 1824 and 1828 remain upon our code book, and certain treaties continue in force, it is not possible for us to negotiate stipulations securing concessions favorable to the most extended consumption of our products in foreign countries. Prussia may levy transit duties on our staples passing to a third nation behind her, and foster her producing interests by prohibitory import duties; Denmark may exact unjustifiable sound tolls from our ships and such cargoes as we export to the Baltic; Sweden may burden with impunity by taxes, import and excise the articles of our growth, produce, and manufacture, and yet we are compelled to submit to such injustice because our laws forbid a resort to measures of retaliation. "The privilege of the indirect carrying to the United States," confidently asserts the renowned Prussian diplomat, "was the less to be valued as the attempts made from time to time by the American shipowners to repeal the acts of Congress of 1824 and 1828—authorizing the reciprocity—had repeatedly failed, and as it is not at all probable that these laws will be in the least changed, particularly as

things now stand in the United States." In fact, no value whatever is placed upon our generous navigation policy from the circumstance of its being utterly unrestricted, making no discrimination between selfish and liberal States.

The Prussian functionary expressed astonishment that Hanover was so unmindful of her interests as not to notify the United States, as Oldenburg had done, of her readiness to admit their vessels, and the cargoes conveyed by them, into her ports without subjecting them to higher or other duties than were levied on her own, and thus secure the indirect carrying. It is strange that a German diplomat so well instructed in the commercial and indeed political affairs of other countries, as the writer of the article, should have been ignorant of the fact that Hanover was not in a condition—or at any rate did not manifest a disposition—to place the vessels of the United States, and their cargoes, without reference to the country from whence they came on an entire equality in her ports, with those of her own. The discriminating Brunshausen or Stade duties which she exacted, would not admit of such a procedure before the treaty of June 10, 1846, was concluded. In that treaty, Article I, it is stipulated that—

No higher or other toll shall be levied or collected at Brunshausen or Stade on the River Elbe upon the tonnage or cargoes of the vessels of the United States than are levied and collected upon the tonnage and cargoes of vessels of the Kingdom of Hanover, and the vessels of the United States shall be subjected to no charges, detention, or other inconvenience by the Hanoverian authorities, in passing the above-mentioned place, from which vessels of the Kingdom of Hanover are or shall be exempt.

In his immoderate desire to embrace the German coast States in the Zollverein—with a view to ulterior political power—Frederick William IV had not a more diligent or dutiful subject in his employment than the nobleman of diplomatic celebrity. The King of Hanover, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Oldenburg, and the Hanseatic Towns, resolutely resisted the many temptations presented to them to become members of this league, but Prussia continued to persevere until the Hanover treaty was proclaimed. This treaty precluded the possibility of the perfection of the commercial union of Germany, during its continuance, unless Prussia would consent to change her policy, because it committed Hanover to low import and merely nominal transit duties (through whatever ports or in whatever vessels the importations might be made) on our leading products. It was also stipulated that "no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the Kingdom of Hanover of any articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States and of their fisheries than are or shall be payable on the like articles, being the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign country or of its fisheries." Prussia and the Zollverein States in matters of commerce stand in the attitude of foreign countries, to Hanover, Oldenburg, and the Mecklenburg, and consequently our whole oil and tobacco must continue to be admitted, while the treaty is in force, into Hanover, etc., on as favorable terms as that produced in Prussia, Baden, etc. If the league had been completed the products of the States composing it at present, would have entered the coast States free while ours would have been subjected to the tariff of imports which operates adversely to an extended con-

sumption of one or more staples. And here I will take occasion to remark that, in my opinion, it is not in the interest of our country for our Government to release the States obligated by the treaty of June 10, 1846, even if they shall augment the duty on tobacco, as they gave notice of their intention to do, about the commencement of next year. "We sincerely wish," says the sagacious Prussian diplomat, "that the promised abolition of the import duty upon raw cotton and the stipulation not to increase the duty on tobacco may present no obstacles to the future realization of a system of commercial policy favoring direct trade with trans-Atlantic countries! If an augmentation of the duty on tobacco were contemplated the United States would scarcely make use of the right of abrogation reserved to them, in Article II of the new treaty, as it would still be in their interest to desire the continuance of the other concessions so easily obtained."

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,
Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

No. 12.]

VIENNA, September 27, 1849.

HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON,
Secretary of State, Washington.

SIR: The conquest is now complete. The Austrian flag is suspended over Komorn. There is no longer a Magyar arm raised against autocratic rule.

As late as the 21st of July the Hungarian Government entertained confident hopes of ultimate success. In the session of the Diet of that day at Szegedin, as appears from the proceedings just published, the minister of the interior made an elaborate exposition of the condition of the country, which was so satisfactory in its details as to elicit plaudits even from members whose previous dismay had contributed to cast a gloom over the future. Toward the close of his speech the minister remarked:

If our army shall continue to fight as bravely as heretofore; if its leaders have no other, or more unworthy, intention than the liberation of the fatherland; if we can employ advantageously the extraordinary power contained in the rising masses of the millions of our people; if the nation will patiently accustom itself to the hardships of war, in the same spirit of patriotism with which it appreciates the liberty for which it is battling, the time is not distant when we shall be enabled to announce that we have no more sacrifices to demand.

This occurred in the last session, of which any account is furnished at Avad, which resulted in the bestowal of a dictatorship upon Gorgey. Haynau shortly afterwards occupied Szegedin, from whence he continued a victorious march to Temesvar. A spirit of insubordination had steadily found its way into the camps of Bene and Dembenski. Many of the officers suddenly became disobedient, and the privates, with such an example, were disposed to be mutinous. Evidence of this was in possession of the Government prior to the disastrous conflicts at Szovog and Temesvar; and Kossuth made a powerful exertion to reestablish discipline and order. In a touching

address to the army he appealed to its patriotism and its pride, imploring it not to swerve from its duty, not to disobey a command, while an invading foot pressed Hungarian soil. Pointing to that mighty nation of self-governing men beyond the Atlantic, he observed:

And, remember still more, and press the matter to your heart, to what a judgment you expose us in that part of the distant world which is looking with so much admiration and solicitude upon our struggle for freedom and independence.

But, as was soon seen, disaffection had attained an incurable point. At Szovog and Temesvar, the Magyars, enjoying many advantages, were routed with an immense loss of men and arms. When this startling intelligence was communicated to the Diet, the timid *ci-devant* Magnates and the noblemen who were members of that body became so frightened that they thought of nothing but their own personal safety, and were prepared to abandon the cause of independence as forever hopeless.

Gorgey perceived that the hour for the consummation of his long-cherished purpose had now arrived, and hastening to Arad he entered the hall of the Diet exclaiming "*Finis Pannoniæ.*" A nobleman himself, he was the darling of the nobility: The most renowned of the Magyar captains, he wore a charmed name for the multitude. The words which he pronounced, therefore, fell with as much force upon his astounded hearers as though they had been uttered by a supernatural voice. In the presence of that which was announced upon the highest authority as a palpable reality, Kossuth's explanations and remonstrances were unheeded. By the duplicity of the monarchist the republican was superseded. In the traitor's triumph the patriot lost his country.

Gorgey, it is believed, had his emissaries at work for some time before his surrender, and the disaffection in the Division of Bem and Dembinski may be attributable to his management. He had a brother who held a civil appointment in the Austrian service, with whom, by the connivance of the authorities, he is supposed to have corresponded freely and frequently. It is quite certain that no want of fidelity was manifested in any quarter of the Hungarian camp until a sort of corps d'armée traveling companionship, of loitering movement, was observable in the region of the upper Theiss, in the commands of Gorgey and Paskiewitsch.

The Autocrat had notoriously failed in his original plan for crushing the Magyars at a blow. His army had accomplished absolutely nothing in facilitating hostilities to a favorable conclusion. It was checkmated at every turn that it attempted in offensive operations. The titled hero of Erivan and Warsaw was in a sad dilemma. His princely fame was submitted to a dangerous ordeal. To advance was perhaps to encounter defeat; to retreat, incur disgrace. The gaining of any additional glory in combat with the Magyars as repeated discomfitures had foreshadowed was, to say the least, uncertain. Why not secure by diplomacy that which might be lost in fight? Gorgey is comparatively young, of noble blood, an inflexible anti-republican, without a sentiment in common with the liberalists of Hungary. He holds the destinies of the Magyars in his hands, and if he choose can lay their country at the foot of the throne of all the Russias. What price too high to pay for such a consummation?

Thus doubtless inquired and thus reasoned the great European statesman and diplomatist. Did he mistake his man? Alas, for the welfare of civilized Europe, no.

What says Gorgey, as he approaches the Russian commander to consummate his guilt? Why, "I have but one request to make; I want to surrender my army to the army of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias." Casting his eye upon the column of serf soldiers, as he subsequently passed in front of it, he observed, "What could not be undertaken and executed with such troops?"

Gorgey admits that he desired the dictatorship for no other purpose than to enable him to terminate the war, and, accordingly, immediately after it was bestowed upon him, he addressed letters to the different Magyar commanders, ordering them to lay down their arms to the Russians. His letter to Klapka, the commandant of Komorn, has been exposed to the public eye, and it contains alone ample proof that he was a betrayer of his country. Of all the Magyar officers taken prisoners not one except himself has yet been pardoned. This naturally occasioned remarks in all circles: but his friends are more disposed to applaud the returning prodigal than to conceal the enormities of the impenitent traitor.

Haynau in one of his reports states that Gorgey was so completely hemmed in at Vilagos that he was forced to surrender. Gorgey says, in his letter to Klapka, if he had been attacked he could have retired to Transylvania, and, to use his own language, he solemnly declared that he would sooner annihilate his whole corps in a desperate battle against whatever superiority than to surrender his arms unconditionally to Austrian troops. Here is indubitable testimony, if others were wanting, that a formal agreement had been made with the Russian general.

From the time of his leaving Komorn, on the 13th of July, until his arrival at Arad, on the 11th of August, Gorgey had transmitted no report or other communication to the Government. In fact, after his first victories, he disregarded all instructions which were transmitted to him. This cast a gloom over the hopes of Kossuth when all else appeared bright. A distant allusion was made to the circumstance in the speech of the minister of the interior, from which I have quoted. Kossuth as far back as April penetrated the selfish and ambitious designs of Gorgey and was constantly desirous of superseding him in his command. Gorgey was aware that his loyalty was suspected, and with a fiendish revenge encouraged, by the example of his own acts, disobedience to the civil authorities and consequent rebellion in the military ranks. He knew how to value the strength which victory had imparted to his name, and he was utterly unscrupulous as to the manner of its employment. That he will live in story as the deliberate betrayer of his country to bondage when it was bleeding at every pore to be free is as certain as that upright states and communities have a paramount interest in reproaching deeds which tend to the abasement of the human character.

Hungary has been won by vile means, not by those grand exploits of prowess and skill which rightfully reflect credit on conquerors. But false glory is not always ephemeral or valueless. In the instance of the fall of the Magyars it will be turned to as useful account as though it were genuine. Before the departure of his army for Hungary, Nicholas proclaimed to his "children" that in fulfillment of the

mission of Russia they were "about to march to put down a rebellion" which threatened "the security of orderly European government." "Let us take care to discharge our duty. God bless you." In his next address to them he exultingly exclaims:

God has blessed your manly courage. * * * You have done your duty and the insurrection has been stifled. The whole force of the enemy unconditionally laid down its arms before you, and surrendered to our mercy. In the short space of two months you have captured 400 pieces of artillery and 150 flags, besides taking 80,000 prisoners. You have shown yourselves worthy of bearing the name of the victorious army of all the Russias. I thank you collectively and individually. I am delighted with you. I am proud of you.

The Russian serf soldier believes that the voice of the Emperor is the voice of God, and consequently his highest and constant aspirations are for praise similar to the above. The superstitious faith in the magnificent destinies of the colossal Empire, which animates the breast of every Slavie subject—to which the autocrat unceasingly administers—will take deeper and deeper root as the result of the campaign beyond the Carpathians, thus announced, becomes more and more known. Within the confines of Russia, at least, the glory claimed by the Czar will never be questioned.

The Russian soldier is not only sufficiently brave to fight hard, but he has a motive to do so, because every war in which he is engaged is a holy one with him. He has no respect for any other mortal than his great chief, merely obeying those who interpret to him his will. He is kept in such a state of ignorance as to be nothing better than a human machine, and hence, notwithstanding his good will, he has not the capacity to make himself efficient in a combat where expert maneuvering is indispensable to victory. Nor has Russia furnished, with the solitary exception of Suvaroff, a general who has deservedly earned a high reputation in the field. Paskiewitsch, for his achievements on the Theiss, is hereafter to be honored by the army by salutations identical with those extended to the Emperor. Military eyes have searched in vain for evidence of skill in the affairs of Erivon and Warsaw on the part of the renowned champion who was rewarded with two principedoms. They may search again, but with no better success, for the generalship which has secured him in the bankruptcy of titles fresh dignities.

In not formally expressing her disapproval of the policy avowed in the manifesto of Nicholas of 14th May last Great Britain either misconceived the nature of the obligations imposed upon her as the most liberal and enlightened of the European powers or was ignorant of the principles and interests involved in the issue. Had she proclaimed in emphatic language within 24 hours after this manifesto reached Downing street that she was prepared to visit an armed intervention by any power adverse to Hungary the Czar would scarcely have had the temerity to march his army across his frontiers. The deplorable omission of such duty changes completely the relations of power in European states. If the star of England's glory shall hereafter be seen descending, the faithful historian will not be at a loss to fix the date at which it touched its culminating point.

It will be recollected that the autocrat, in his manifesto of May 11, 1848, distinctly stated, in substance, that it was his intention to avoid all interference with the domestic concerns of European nations; that he should leave to each the right of choosing its own

form of government; that he should act upon the defensive, merely shielding his own subjects, as far as possible, from the contamination of democratic notions. Shocked at the revolutionary demonstrations which were extending their influence in the direction of his dominion, Nicholas was careful in having his pacific purposes not only generally understood on this side of the Atlantic, but also in the United States. The manifesto of 1848 was received with universal favor. It caused the anxious world to breathe easier by diminishing, at so portentous a period, the chances of war.

An eventful, reactionary year closed and Russia's mask was cast off. Prince Louis was President of France. Indications were abundant that the first legislative assembly of the Republic would be monarchical in the extreme. The sagacious autocrat had accurately surveyed the space between himself and the incumbent of the presidential chair. At the presentation of Maximilian Joseph Eugene August Napoleon, Duke of Leuchtenberg, at the court of St. Petersburg, upon the occasion of his marriage to the Great Duchess, Nicholas remarked:

The Bonapartes and Romanows are already related, because their country's glory has always been their highest aspiration.

It was desirable to strengthen the ties of relationship between the Bonapartes and Romanows and to augment "their glory." The abrogation of struggling infant republics presented a suitable pretext for the realization of these objects. The victorious expedition to Rome was quickly followed by the more eminently victorious expedition to Hungary.

Acting in concord, as the cabinet of the Elysée National practically was with the cabinet of St. Petersburg, from what nation, except Great Britain, had the autocrat anything to apprehend? From the soi-disant Germany which was brought into existence by the stipendiaries of tottering thrones? No! The Frankfort Government never had sufficient power, after its high-handed attempt to establish an imperial crown, to disperse a country-town meeting. From Prussia? No! Frederick William IV was as much interested in the subjugation of the Continent to military law as his illustrious brother-in-law of the north. It had perhaps been satisfactorily ascertained that even Great Britain would interpose no obstacles. Metternich had been in England a year, controlling one or more of the leading journals and imbuing the public mind with the "beauties of autocratic doctrines." It was represented that the Magyars were fighting for democracy in its most Utopian sense, and that in the event of the dismemberment of Austria, England would suffer severely by the loss of her old and valuable ally. The liberal party was made to believe that the Camarilla aimed solely at unity, regardless of an extension of imperial power. Lord Palmerston stated, in debate:

Austria herself has renounced arbitrary government, and has entered the ranks of constitutional States. The step which she has taken can not be reversed, though there is reason to hope that the change may be regulated by prudence and moderation. Her Government will itself set an example of improvement and reform; and it is scarcely possible that with a representative legislature she would allow her executive, even if it were so inclined, to impose upon other countries principles of government diametrically opposite to those which will be carried into practice in Austria herself.

In diplomacy the Czar is an overmatch for all the cabinets of Europe, particularly if he have Metternich as his instrument. The world may possibly yet be informed that the idea of the French expedition to Rome originated at St. Petersburg or Brighton, and that through St. Petersburg management Great Britain was, unsuspectingly, influenced to tacitly acquiesce in its purposes. If Great Britain declined from prudential motives to protest against French intervention, with what consistency could she protest against the contemplated Russian intervention? Moreover, by committing France, nominally a Republic, and placing her in the lead, Great Britain would not be disposed, in any event, to make a belligerent demonstration. Such reflections as these may have been indulged in by the prolific mind of the Czar. Lord Palmerston, awakening to the actual condition of things, after all the mischief had been done, proposed mediation to Prince Schwarzenberg. He received for answer that the Austrian Government would take the liberty of inquiring, in a short time, of Great Britain in what manner she intended to arrange the Canadian difficulties.

I can not be mistaken in the supposition that the autocrat and the French President have acted throughout understandingly with respect to continental questions. Gorgey surrendered on the 13th of August. Louis Napoleon's famous letter was written on the 18th of that month. The intelligence could not have been conveyed from Világos to Paris in five days, and yet it must have been known at the Elysée National on the 18th that Russia had accomplished her purpose in Hungary. It is not presumable, judging from antecedents, that the liberal opinions expressed to Ney would have been communicated to the public while a chance remained for the success of the Magyars. I risk nothing in stating that Louis Napoleon was authentically informed of the treasonable designs of Gorgey, as well as of the precise time at which they would be executed, when his epistle was prepared. He could afford to utter generous sentiments after having been instrumental in battling down liberty. The cardinals, from the day of their restoration, had been in the constant commission of deeds revolting to humanity. Why were they, then, not punished or rebuked at the outset? Because Russia had not finished her work, if, indeed, Louis Napoleon was averse to them, in reality.

The smaller States of Germany are now to be arranged. Whether they be divided between or taken altogether by Austria or by Prussia is of but little moment. The octroye constitution of the one is as objectionable as that of the other. In their operations the provisions of both may be expressed in a dozen words. They notoriously mean nothing more than that Francis Joseph and Frederick William, by the grace of Nicholas, are absolute, have mighty armies, and exact implicit obedience from their subjects. The military strength of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and the smaller German States is about 2,150,000 men, supported at an expense of at least \$100,000,000 annually. This immense army is to be increased (Russia having already given an order to that effect with respect to her own), and will hereafter be employed, as at present seems certain, in establishing and sustaining autocratic measures. If, therefore, Louis Napoleon shall succeed in reestablishing the imperial throne of France,

his "relation" will take care that the crown shall be placed on his head and kept there. The obliteration of Switzerland may be delayed until the constitution of the Republic is formally subverted. France will then overtly cooperate with the autocrat, as she has done all along under the administration of Louis Napoleon covertly. England, by her stupendous blunders, will cease to be heard upon the Continent, nor is it likely, with such odds against her, that she will attempt to make herself felt. How different might have been her position! Before Russia repaired to the rescue of Austria, Hungarian independence was almost as good as established.

The autocrat is said to have familiarly remarked to one of our representatives near his court: "Your government or mine." I imagine that this sentiment has latterly been so changed as not to embrace ourselves; for in his manifesto of the 29th ultimo he says:

Penetrated with gratitude to the bestower of all blessings, we exclaim in the fulness of our heart, God is with us. Hear it, ye people, and believe it, God is truly with us.

As the millenium of autocracy can not occur during the existence of republics, the Czar in his triumphs, will perhaps regard us as his natural enemy. This is the more probable as our country is the asylum for the thousands whom his system is driving from their homes. In 1823 France drew her sword in the service of the Holy Alliance, which aimed not only at perpetuating the then reigning dynasties but also entertained, for a time, the notion of regulating the balance of power upon the American Continent. She may do the same again, without returning it to its scabbard unstained, in the service of the autocrat who contemplates the creation of thrones and the prostration of republics in Europe, and the waging of an universal warfare against the principles of self-government. From Russia singly, America has nothing whatever to apprehend. A nation that has no navigation can have no mariners and, consequently, the navy of the autocrat must continue to be tied up in ordinary, and to rot for the want of hands to sail it. Neither Austria nor Prussia have any war marine deserving of mention; that of the former, according to an official statement before me, consisting of 3 frigates, 6 corvettes, 7 brigs, 3 steamers, and 50 gunboats; and the latter of 1 corvette, 3 steamers—the United States, Arcadia and Britannia—and a few small steamboats.

The steam navy of France is large, but it does not contain half a dozen first-rate ships. It might be efficient in coast service, for which it was mainly constructed, but it seems to be ill adapted for the prosecution of long voyages. The experiment made with the four vessels, employed two years ago in trade intercourse with New York, was singularly unsuccessful, on account of imperfection in construction and machinery.

With such facts before our eyes, if a coalition of the continental powers under the direction of the bold and energetic enemy of political freedom be formed, no uneasiness need be excited for our safety. If we are favored with peace and continued prosperity, in a few years we shall be found in the possession of a steam commercial marine which can be readily converted into war vessels larger than that of all the world beside. Our almost interminable seaboard, and its trade, our foreign navigation and commerce, under judicious

management, will insure this result. The destiny assigned us is as high above the destiny assigned the Cossack's chieftain as Divine light is above the regions of infernal darkness. May we never lose sight of our true duty by becoming anarchists, monarchists, disunionists, false philanthropists, socialists, or communists.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant.

A. DUDLEY MANN.

(Mailed at Bremen.)

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

No. 13.]

PARIS, October 8, 1849.

HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

SIR: I reached here yesterday. In my communications to you from Vienna I deemed it prudent to avoid any mention whatever of the nature of my mission. My dispatches were prepared with as much caution in this respect, freely as I expressed my opinions and views on other subjects, as though they were to be submitted to the examination of the Austrian authorities.

I now rejoice more than ever that the President bestowed upon me the appointment of confidential agent, not that I shall derive or am entitled to the least degree of fame for the manner in which I have discharged my duties, but because I have reason to flatter myself that I have been so fortunate as to commit no mistake or imprudence calculated to endanger the peace of our country. A more delicate or complicated mission, as I saw from the first, was never confided even to the most experienced and accomplished diplomatist. The smallest of the dangers attendant upon it, in the exasperated state of Austria and Russia, at the time of my repairing to Vienna and subsequently, were those personal to myself.

Our chargé was not at his post. He was represented by the tutor of his children—a comparatively young and inexperienced Austrian—who had no other authority from his chief than to verify passports. Nor had we a solitary consul in Austria during a great part of my stay in Vienna.

At Berlin, on my route, I took the precaution to have the parcel which I received from the department inclosed under the seal of the legation of the United States, without explaining, however, the nature of my duties to the legation of the United States at Vienna, and my son appointed bearer of dispatches. Fortunately I possessed an old passport, authenticated at the legation here more than two years ago, with the statement that I was charged by my Government with diplomatic functions, and I was thus enabled to cross the Austrian frontier without detention, or more than a mere formal examination of my baggage. Upon entering Vienna I proceeded, with my son, to the legation and deposited there all my official papers. It is proper for me to add that I requested the representative of Mr. Stiles to open the parcel in order that he might see that it contained nothing for Mr. S., which being done, it was resealed. I took occasion to remark that the documents related to Hungarian affairs and that it was of

the utmost importance that they should be kept entirely secure from mortal eye. The correspondence of our chargé with the department of state was afterwards offered to me for perusal, but under the circumstances I concluded to decline an examination of it.

Although the gentleman intrusted with the legation made rather a favorable impression upon me I, nevertheless, was not free from fears that he might be induced to betray his trust, particularly as his first duty was to his sovereign; but I had no alternative but to commit my papers to his care, inasmuch as they would be liable to seizure at any moment if they remained in my hands.

The Government of Hungary had become an itinerant one before my commission arrived. In its retreat from Pesth it was without a fixed destination, locating itself in the first instance temporarily at Szegedin. I consequently determined after getting to Vienna to be guilty of no such indiscretion, unbounded as was my desire for the success of the Magyars, as to engage in an attempt, which would inevitably prove abortive, to follow its uncertain movements. I conceived that my duties would be better discharged by standing still and watching minutely the effect of the events that were transpiring—prepared to act with efficiency at the first propitious moment—than by an imprudent risk or premature diplomatic intercourse with the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs to furnish Austria and Russia with a valid excuse for a quarrel, and perhaps *casus belli* with my country. It is my deliberate belief that during the uncertainty of the issue of the war, when the two autocratic powers were tormented by the sympathetic meetings and other demonstrations in England and the United States, Nicholas and Francis Joseph were anxious for a suitable pretext to terminate their amicable relations with us, such as would have been afforded them by a knowledge of the existence of my appointment, instructions, etc. The uniform policy of our Government in relation to nations struggling for freedom and independence, not unknown at St. Petersburg and Vienna, doubtless led the Czar and his youthful ally to contemplate the likelihood of such a mission as that with which I was charged, and to arrange their plans for preventing its execution accordingly. For what purpose was Mr. Bodisco stationed at Berlin and the Chevalier Hulsemann at Vienna while hostilities were pending? Evidently to prevent, if possible, our moral intervention in behalf of Hungary.

I was disposed to proceed direct from Vienna to Florence, and so informed you, but as soon as I ascertained that Mr. Stiles—whom I had been anxiously expecting for some time—would not resume his duties, and that the archives of the legation were to be left with Mr. Schwartz, I resolved to revisit Paris. After what I had heard from reliable sources, together with that which passed under my own eyes, concerning this functionary, I was quite unwilling to place such documents as mine in his possession, and I deemed it hazardous to bear them with me to Tuscany. Moreover, I was not sure that I would be permitted to reside in Florence, until I could hear from you, without satisfying the authorities that I was called there for an ostensible object.

Before closing my correspondence in connection with my mission I conceived it to be proper to lay before you, as explanatory of the

embarrassing position in which I was placed from the commencement, the preceding statements and remarks.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

No. 14.]

PARIS, *October 15, 1849.*

SIR: Before quitting Vienna I stated to you that the prospect was somewhat favorable for an early abandonment of the tobacco régime system in Austria. I now proceed to detail such information, in connection with the subject, as I suppose may be employed by the Government with advantage, in contributing to the accomplishment of an object so vastly important to our country's interests.

The Austrian Empire, it may be well for me to state at the commencement, contains at the present time, as nearly as can be correctly ascertained, 35,375,000 inhabitants, 15,000,000 of whom are embraced in Hungary (including Transylvania, Croatia, Dalmatia, the Military Boundary, and the Coast land); 4,675,000 in Galicia; 4,250,000 in Bohemia; 2,300,000 in Moravia and Silesia; 2,400,000 in the lower and upper archduchies of Austria proper; 1,000,000 in Styria; 900,000 in Tyrol and Voralberg; and 4,850,000 in Lombardy and Venice. This population is composed of 16,000,000 Slaves; 7,000,000 Germans; 4,700,000 Magyars; 5,000,000 Italians; 2,000,000 Wallachians; 500,000 Jews; 150,000 gypsies; 15,000 Armenians; 5,000 Greeks; and 5,000 French and Osmanians.

The annual average yield of tobacco in Austria is estimated at 79,000,000 pounds. The plant is not permitted to be grown elsewhere in the realm than in Hungary, Galicia, Tyrol, and Venice. In Hungary, alone, it is free from the surveillance of the régime; and there, peculiarly favored by climate and soil, it is the leading agricultural staple, the product amounting to 68,000,000 pounds annually, one-third of which is disposed of to the Austrian régime, another exported to foreign countries, and the other consumed at home. In Galicia the climate is too cold and otherwise unsuitable for enlarged or successful tobacco growing. The product, all of which is purchased by the régime, is about 9,000,000 pounds per annum. In Tyrol and Venice the régime is so exacting of the cultivator as to cause its officers to count every plant before the crop matures.

In the reorganization of the Empire—which from a destitution of homogeneous population has been miraculously preserved from dismemberment—it is a primary consideration, as I understand, with the Government to establish a system of commerce and revenue that will be uniform in its operations upon the different ci-devant kingdoms, archduchies, principalities, counties, etc. The want of such an one palpably contributed to increase the prejudices of one nationality against another, and to add to the just dissatisfaction of each with Metternich and the Camarvilla. The continuance of the tobacco régime presents insurmountable obstacles to the adoption of measures calculated to secure to the governed equality in taxation and privileges. To place Hungary under the régime is admitted to be

impossible, unless soldiers shall be quartered in the house of every planter. From his habitual freedom to the use of his pipe the Hungarian, from time immemorial, has regarded tobacco as indispensable to his existence: It is computed that male adults, in the aggregate, consume annually about $6\frac{1}{2}$ pounds each. The *régie* realizes a profit of 10 cents on every pound of smoking tobacco, and consequently, if its operations were extended to Hungary, each smoker would be subjected to a new annual tax—to say nothing of others—of 65 cents upon his tobacco, thus causing a drain of \$2,000,000 more, unless consumption should be diminished, than was required heretofore, for the sustenance of the monarchy. The value of an average tobacco crop in Hungary, before it is conveyed from the estates producing it, may be stated at about \$2,750,000. The industry engaged in the cultivation of the staple is as amply remunerated for its labor as that employed in any other agricultural avocation.

Austria realizes annually a revenue from the tobacco *régie* of \$7,500,000, less by one-half than is derived from a similar source in France and by two-thirds than Great Britain collects from import duties on tobacco. This sum she can not afford to lose in the present state of her finances, or she can not afford to lose in the present monopoly, inasmuch as it is excessively odious to the military. In the States of the Zollverein of Germany, which contain a population of about 28,000,000 and which produce more than three-fourths of the quantity of tobacco produced in all Austria, the receipt of customs upon unmanufactured tobacco, under a specific duty of \$3.35 per 100 pounds, amounted in 1846—the latest official report that I have seen—to \$1,776,774, and upon “manufactured or in rolls,” cigars, and snuff, under a duty ranging from \$7 to \$9.50 per 100 pounds, \$541,948. In most, if, indeed, not all, the provinces of Austria the fondness of the people for the pipe equals that of those in the embraces of the Zollverein, while their ability to enjoy it, if the price of tobacco were as moderate, is much greater. Therefore even under such a tariff in Austria as is in force in the Zollverein—supposing the cultivation to remain the same in Hungary, Galicia, Tyrol, and Venice (and it is not likely to be increased)—the Empire, with a population one-fifth larger than the States composing the Zollverein, might calculate with certainty upon raising a revenue of \$2,882,266 from the article. If to this be added the cost of maintaining the *régie* in its existing form, the actual loss to the treasury would perhaps not exceed \$3,000,000. The question that will naturally suggest itself to the Government of Austria in the event of a resolution for the discontinuance of the monopoly is, under what import duty on tobacco can the largest revenue be secured? This inquiry a well-informed chargé of the United States could, unobtrusively, assist in solving, and with singular benefit to his country, particularly in the deficiency of practical financiers and sound political economists at Vienna. The Zollverein tariff, as is admitted even by Prussian functionaries, is not the most favorable that could be adopted as relates to tobacco for revenue purposes, while it is notoriously unjust in its operations upon our product, as may be elucidated by a single statement:

A pound of Cuba tobacco, worth from \$1 to \$1.50 per pound, is submitted to no higher impost than a pound of Maryland, Ohio, Virginia, or Kentucky tobacco, the value of which is from 3 to 6

cents per pound. If we could influence Austria, by fair argument, to establish an *ad valorem* duty of 25 or at most 30 per cent, upon unmanufactured tobacco, I am quite confident that she would not only be benefited herself, in realizing the highest attainable custom-house revenue on the article, but that we should enjoy a vastly extended market in that Empire for our staple. The Hungarian tobacco, which is only suited to the pipe, does not compete successfully with ours in any of the European markets, and if it were protected by a 25 or 30 per cent *ad valorem* duty, the consumption of the yield of Maryland and Ohio would, notwithstanding, so universally popular is it with smokers, be upon an extended scale in Austria. It has, heretofore, been in general use in the free port of Trieste and the recent free port of Venice.

The contemplated financial and commercial system of Austria, if it shall be judiciously arranged, will, in all probability, be adopted, as far as it can be made applicable, in the Italian peninsula, Piedmont, and the German States. No one of the governments, in fact, which were convulsed by the revolutionary movement of last year seems to have determined definitely upon its financial and commercial policy yet. The King of Naples, the Pope, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany were represented, before I left Vienna, as anxiously awaiting a demonstration on the part of Austria, in order to shape their system in conformity therewith. It is not only important to Austria that all nationalities within her limits shall be speedily obliterated and her subjects in each division made to harmonize by like privileges, or like oppressions, extending over all, but it is also deemed necessary, in order to the establishment of durable order and its less difficult preservation, that the Italian and German subjects of Francis Joseph shall have no cause to complain that the subjects of Italian and German princes are under gentler or more just rule than themselves. In the consummation of this measure no ameliorations are designed for the governed, though slight pecuniary ones, in some instances, may result from it.

Under existing circumstances it is scarcely possible that an accredited agent to the Government of Tuscany could succeed in negotiating a treaty with that Grand Duchy to which the other States of the peninsula would accede, of an advantageous nature, but he could, perhaps, serve our interests as well by furnishing arguments to the Grand Duke, which, from his generous commercial sentiments, he might be disposed to employ, in reference to our tobacco interests, with Austria.

Our navigation, in its intercourse with Austria, is on as good a footing as we could reasonably desire. We carry about 38 times as much to Austrian ports as Austria carries to our ports, while Austria carries about 35,000 tons more per annum to British ports than Great Britain carries to Austrian ports. The commercial marine of Austria measures about 225,000 tons, numbers 6,000 vessels, and employs 27,000 seamen; 600 vessels, measuring 175,000 tons, are engaged in trade with foreign countries, chiefly with Turkey; 3,000, measuring 60,000 tons, engaged in the coasting trade, and 2,400 engaged in the home fisheries. The annual increase of tonnage in the first class of vessels is about 3,500 tons.

Austria imports from the United States 25,000,000 pounds cotton wool per annum, and from all other countries 16,000,000 pounds. She

has 190 cotton spinneries, with 1,130,000 spindles, which give active employment to 25,000 hands and produce annually 37,000,000 pounds twist. The duty on cotton wool is about 30 cents per 100 pounds; on twist, \$5.50.

Austria, as she now exists, can never consume largely of our products, except cotton, wool, and tobacco. Nor should we have gained anything, commercially, by the establishment of Hungarian independence. The produce of the soil of the United States and of Hungary is quite similar, with the exception of the cotton plant and the sugar cane. Hungary yields annually about 25,000,000 lower Austria metzen wheat; 20,000,000 rye; 30,000,000 oats; 23,000,000 barley; 17,000,000 Indian corn; 10,000 centurs rice; 27,000 eimers wine; 68,000,000 pounds tobacco. As before stated, 50,000,000 centurs hay, 350,000 centurs wool, a few thousand pounds silk, 11,000,000 cords (Austrian measure) wood. The mines yield 3,100 marks gold, 69,287 marks silver, 493 marks quicksilver, 39,017 centurs copper, 27,000 lead, 300 zinc, 425,000 iron, 9,000 antimony, 17,000 alum, 800,000 stone coal. When the last census was taken the number of horses was 1,000,000; of horned cattle, 4,260,000; of sheep, 17,000,000; hogs, 4,000,000. I know of no article that we could have sold to Hungary to advantage in its raw state, nor of any one that we could have bought from her. Most, if not all, of the manufactures that she would have required she could have procured elsewhere on better terms than in the United States. Her interest, as is seen, being essentially agricultural, without manufactories of any description deserving of mention, she might have been an invaluable commercial ally to England. I may add that Hungary proper contains not an inch of seaboard. Fiume (an insecure harbor), Bucari, and Porto Re are situated in Croatia; and Zara, Spalato, Ragusa, and Cattaro in Dalmatia. If the Magyars had been successful, even with Croatia and Dalmatia embraced in their natural bounds, we could not under the most favorable treaty stipulations have enjoyed an extended direct navigation with them nor a more profitable triangular one, proportionably, than we now enjoy with Austria.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

No. 15.]

PARIS, *October 25, 1849.*

Hon. JOHN M. CLAYTON,

Secretary of State, Washington.

SIR: The copy of the National Intelligencer containing the French correspondence, transmitted to me by the department, was received on the 18th instant.

I entirely concur in opinion with the President as to the necessity which existed for the prompt dismissal of the minister of France.¹

¹ M. Poussin. The Secretary of State declined to hold any further correspondence with him September 14, 1849. M. Poussin was replaced by M. Sain de Boislecomte, who presented credentials March 18, 1850.

This procedure was demanded by national self-respect; it was demanded as a salutary rebuke for palpable departures from diplomatic proprieties; it was demanded "to preclude opportunities which might be again abused" for manifesting intentional discourtesy to the Government of the United States.

Whatever the efforts to restore the accredited functionary of France to his former position, the President, in my opinion, should resolutely decline a renewal of official intercourse with him. Were we to make the slightest concessions to France in this instance, the representatives of imperious and presumptuous powers, and even those of puny States, might avail themselves of the precedent to wantonly address, on the most trivial occasions, offensive statements and remarks to our Government. While I am not a stickler for a rigid observance of diplomatic etiquette, I am, nevertheless, desirous that our own correspondence with foreign nations shall be characterized by temperate, courteous, and dignified language. Nothing was ever gained in negotiation by the employment of disrespectful or reproachful terms. The *suaviter in modo* is invariably more effective than the *fortiter in re*. This is the first and most important of all lessons for those who go abroad to represent their country; and our own public servants should learn it well, in order that we may not only increase our fame and our usefulness, but that we may also furnish no example hereafter, by inconsiderate indiscretions, to irascible and inexperienced diplomats residing near our Government.

The appointment of Mr. Rives, as I foresaw from the first, was an unfortunate one. To make any concession to the French Government for the purpose of securing his reception would be to commit a serious blunder. Mr. De Tocqueville has perhaps prior to this proposed to the President that before diplomatic relations can be regularly resumed between the two countries Mr. Poussin must be reestablished in his position or another minister accredited to France; that although Mr. P.'s notes to yourself contained objectionable expressions, yet they were not really more offensive than the terms used by Mr. R. in his correspondence with the minister of foreign affairs of France in 1830; and that if the former rendered himself obnoxious to the Government of the United States there is no reason, acting under similar considerations, why the latter should not be obnoxious to the Government of France. Thus the recognition of Mr. Rives would be consequent upon the rerecognition of Mr. Poussin. Does the President desire the reception of Mr. Rives upon conditions so adverse to the elevated principle upon which he now stands in the affair? Would he submit to a wrong after having nobly sustained himself in a right? I can not be mistaken, in the event of such an issue, as to the course he would adopt.

Even had the relations of the French minister with our Government continued perfectly harmonious Mr. Rives could neither have been a popular nor a successful minister here. This was indicated to me in a distinct manner in a conversation which I had with an intelligent country gentleman, in an adjoining department, as far back as May. He asked who, in the change of administration, would be the successor of Mr. Rush. I replied, Mr. Rives most probably. "Comment," inquired he, "l'homme qui nous a trompés et qui s'en est

vanté ensuite?" What, the man who deceived us and afterwards boasted of it?—alluding to the assertions contained in Mr. R.'s dispatch to Mr. Livingston of July 8, 1831. This dispatch, I may add, is at present the subject of conversation in all well-informed political circles.

It is proper for me to state, after having so frankly expressed my views upon so delicate a matter, that I never communicated with anyone touching the appointment of Mr. Rives except a devoted friend of yours at Washington, to whom I wrote in June, and I request him, by the steamer which conveys this, to place my note before you for perusal.

I understand that the French cabinet complains of the publication of the correspondence under the circumstances. This is natural enough, inasmuch as public men have rarely sufficient nerve to face their mistakes when clearly revealed to the world. The note of Mr. De Tocqueville to Mr. Rush is not calculated to win a reputation for the writer as a diplomatist. Of one thing you may be assured: The notion of a war with the United States is nowhere entertained among the French. The Government, whether it be nominally republican, or autocratic, will have quite enough to do to take care of itself for the next five years, if not the next five hundred, without seeking a *casus belli* with a nation so peaceably disposed and friendly as the United States.

Austria and Prussia have, conjointly, established a federal authority for Germany in conformity with the plan proposed by the former, an outline of which I furnished you in my number 10. The Archduke Alfred of Austria has been placed in command of the fortress of Mayence in virtue of this arrangement. The King of Hanover, standing upon his reserved rights, under the treaties of 1815, protests against any usurpation of power so dangerous to the sovereignty of his realm. Frederick William replies that, notwithstanding he considers that these treaties are still obligatory, the Germanic Diet, which they provided for, has lost its authority and it can not be reestablished.

Yesterday I casually met with Count Teleki, the late accredited minister of Hungary to France, for the first time. Claspings my hand between his he exclaimed: "I can not be mistaken in the supposition that there was one magnanimous nation prepared to acknowledge my dear country, as soon as circumstances would possibly admit." With a heart bleeding for the wrongs and sorrows of his compatriots I could reply in no other manner than by bowing affirmatively. From the day that my commission reached me I studiously avoided interviews with the Magyars, resolving that my first should be with their secretary of foreign affairs. In the first place, with all my sympathies inordinately excited for their cause, I feared that I might be misled by their plausible enthusiasm. In the second, if any calamity should befall me, in the prosecution of my duties, I was unwilling that it should be attributable in any degree—to the prejudice of my Government—to indiscreet intercourse with or inconsiderate zeal for the struggling patriots. * . *

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Received November.]

No. 16.]

PARIS, October 29, 1849.

SIR: Tidings have just been received by me from Vienna which I consider entitled to credit, that Austria had given instructions to her plenipotentiaries who were about to repair to Frankfort for the purpose of adjusting definitely the question of the authority of the Confederation, to consent to an abandonment of her Tobacco Regie if it should be ascertained that it interposed any obstacles to the establishment of a commercial union between that Empire and the States which constitute the Zollverein and the German coast States. My dispatches must have prepared you for this agreeable intelligence, from my statements on the subject both before and since my return to Paris. The contemplated measure is more important than any that has occurred on the Continent for a number of years, as relates to American interests, and I need not remark that we should leave no efforts untried to consummate and turn it to the most valuable account.

The Austrian Empire, Prussia, and the German States and the Italian States contain in the aggregate about 87,000,000 inhabitants. If a commercial union be formed under the auspices of Austria, extending over her Provinces and the sovereignties of Germany, the States of the Italian Peninsula—such is the influence which the Government of Francis Joseph exercises upon each—with perhaps Sardinia, will unite without unnecessary delay in a similar if not an identical system. By judicious management I think it likely that we may succeed in getting the import duty on tobacco established in all the States designated at 30 per cent ad valorem. The primary consideration in fixing the rate of customhouse import will be to realize the largest obtainable amount of revenue from the article; and I believe it is susceptible of demonstration that a tariff of 25 or at most 30 per cent will operate the most favorably for this object. With such a duty as the latter, even, we could safely calculate upon a consumption of our product of $1\frac{1}{2}$ pounds per annum, or 130,500,000 pounds—equal to 130,500 hogsheads. This would be within 5,262 hogsheads of the entire export of our staple in 1847.

Cotton wool, in all probability, would be permitted to enter the commercial union duty free; while the duty on twist, as a measure of protection for domestic industry, would be made to conform to the existing duty on the article in Austria. This would operate most injuriously to Great Britain. It would deprive the Manchester manufacturers, almost exclusively, of the lucrative markets which they at present enjoy for 75,000,000 pounds cotton yarn annually.

The transit duties and river tolls would, as a consequence of the commercial union, be abolished on all our products, from the North Sea to the Adriatic and from the Lake of Constance to the Baltic.

France could not long resist the influences which might be brought to bear upon her for the relinquishment of the tobacco monopoly, if Austria, Prussia, and the German States should unite in a commercial bond and establish a moderate tariff upon the article. The government in future, whatever its form, can have no security for a day's existence except that which is derivable from the army. The army,

therefore, must be favored whatever the cost. Now there is scarcely a soldier in its ranks who does not consider tobacco essential to his ordinary enjoyments, and who is not conscious that the price of it is unjustly clear. I risk nothing in stating that if a manifestation should proceed from the military against the *régie*—such as would likely transpire if autocratic nations should abandon the traffic in the staple and substitute a moderate duty—France would be compelled to yield to its demands.

While I am quite confident that there is not a government in Europe which is disposed to make any amelioration in its system of duties on our products, in a sense of reciprocity for our liberal tariff on its manufactures, I am, nevertheless, certain that we may furnish arguments to the advocates of commercial reforms which they may employ advantageously with their opponents, and consequently with benefit to our interests. The fact can not be concealed, that there is a wonderful degree of ignorance concerning financial and commercial subjects in continental Europe.

It may, possibly, be supposed, from the frequency with which I recur to the matter, that I attach an undeserved importance to an extension of the consumption of our early staple in Europe. To remove such an impression, if it exist, I need only state that the plant is grown in every State and Territory in the Union, that its production, as a staple, is confined to no section, that it matures as perfectly in the valleys of the Connecticut and Muskingum Rivers as in those of the James and Missouri, and that its cultivation, with remunerating prices, may be largely augmented and with profit to all other industrial pursuits.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

PARIS, November 1, 1848.

DEAR SIR: The Chambers of Tuscany are to convene on the 1st of January. Hence it is important, in the event of your having determined upon my mission to the Tuscan Government that I should reach Florence prior to that time.

Without being overconfident that the tobacco monopoly will be abandoned by Austria, I can not but regard the indications as highly encouraging that such a measure will be adopted. The opinions and views which, through my unknown instrumentality, were communicated to the public on the subject, during my sojourn in Vienna; were fortunately in reason, and engaged, as I understood, the serious consideration of the cabinet.

If the coast states of Germany consent to join Austria in a commercial league they will be disposed to insist on a low tobacco duty; and as far as we could do so prudently, we should endeavor to influence them to be resolute in their demands. I should like to be at Frankfort when the question is taken into consideration. This will not probably occur until toward the beginning of June. By that time I could complete the duties of the proposed mission to Tuscany, Greece, and Switzerland.

Much credit would be due to the administration, if through its agency it should succeed in abolishing the tobacco regie of Austria. Is it necessary that I should assure you of my willingness to work, incessantly, for the accomplishment of an object, promising so much immediate and prospective good for our country? France would doubtless soon be forced to follow the example of her future autocratic ally, after which we could possibly operate upon Great Britain to reduce, to a reasonable standard, her enormous import duty on the staple. Energy and adroit informal diplomacy would enable us to succeed.

The continued uniformity of the French journals in the observance of silence, in relation to the dismissal of Mr. Poussin, would indicate that they studiously avoid an allusion to the matter. This, however, is not the case. They are occupied with subjects of a graver nature. A difficulty with the United States is not desired by politicians of any shade from rouge to blanc.

The position which the President assumed on account of the official impertinence of the French minister to yourself, will be as memorable in the annals of diplomacy, if it remains unchanged, as it is honorable to our Government. It is a spectacle replete with beauties for courteous well-intentioned States to witness a young self-governing nation, rebuking, in dignified language, a power which before and since the days of Talleyrand has regarded itself as the diplomat par excellence of the universe, for gross international discourtesies committed through her representative and his principal.

Mr. Rives favored me two days since with a visit of half an hour's duration. He was not communicative nor was I inquisitive with respect to his reception. Mr. R. is admirably calculated to make excellent impressions everywhere, and eminently qualified to serve his country with ability abroad. But I can not dismiss my fears that the sphere of his usefulness will be exceedingly contracted in France, in the event of his recognition.

The letter of the President of the Republic to the president of the assembly is virtually a proclamation of war against the majority of the legislature. This majority, headed by Thievo, Molé, and Montalbert, has recently been actuated by but a solitary idea—the restoration of the crown to the Bourbon family. It is understood that some time in August last, the former antagonistic branches of the Bourbons came to an amicable understanding with reference to their pretensions to the throne in the event of its reconstruction. Louis Philippe consented to relinquish his own right to it, together with that of his sons and grandsons in favor of the Count of Chambord at whose death or abdication it was to revert to the Count of Paris. Louis Napoleon at the first intimation, arranged himself against this scheme. To weaken the monarchical coalition in the assembly, occasioned by the definitive arrangement between the Bourbons, he prepared his celebrated Nay letter, in which there was an abandonment of his Roman policy. The adoption by an overwhelming vote of the report of Thieos, in behalf of the Pope, was considered as condemnatory of the principles expressed in that letter, and a great triumph for the Bourbonests. Louis Napoleon now falls back upon the vote of 10th December, as the test of the strength of the Bonapartests and makes a direct issue with the majority, placing himself at the head of a ministry which harmonizes in all his views. He dis-

tinctly enough tells the assembly what its duties are, and that 'they can not be discharged unless it unite itself "in the national thought of which the election of the executive power has been the expression." A conflict between the executive and legislature is, consequently, inevitable and speedy, and the one or the other will have to succumb. I incline to the belief that Louis Napoleon will be triumphant, in which event he will be proclaimed Emperor of France.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Received Dec. 3, 1849.]

No. 17.]

PARIS, *November 8, 1849.*

SIR: Another great national crisis is evidently approaching in France. Nothing short of miracles, I fear, can now save the Republic. The early restoration of the Empire seems to admit of no reasonable doubt. Indeed, before this reaches its destination the incumbent of the Élysée may be seated on an imperial throne. A suitable occasion—such as would be furnished by a vote of the assembly adverse to a ministerial measure—is alone required to insure a consummation of the event. This may not occur immediately but occur it unquestionably will sooner or later.

Paris and the fortresses in its environs contain more than 100,000 troops of the line. These troops, so complete is military rule have the power of giving to France any form of government which they may designate. Louis Napoleon, from recent demonstrations, is their idol. With their affections thus warmly enlisted nothing is more easy than for them to concentrate, at a notice of an hour or two, in the Place Concorde, or elsewhere, proclaim him Emperor, conduct him to the Tuilleries, and dissolve the assembly. No formidable resistance will be made to a procedure of the kind. In fact there is no force anywhere to offer physical opposition. The republican Cavaignac, from his singleness of honest purpose, commands no strength. The Mountain, that which is left of it, is alike destitute of leaders and arms. The revolution, consequently, can not be otherwise than an utterly bloodless one.

The reaction in continental Europe commenced with the election of Louis Napoleon to the constituent assembly, the retrogradation, the day that the Cossacks war horse crossed the Hungarian frontier. The former has already virtually attained the goal which it was in pursuit of. To what point the latter will extend itself, is a question which the most farsighted statesman is incapable of answering. The bayonet has been made omnipotent. Justice bows to its heartless majesty. Reason submits to its unrighteous decisions. Mercy pleads in vain to its remorseless ferocity.

As sure as truth and light emanate from Divinity, so sure will a day of retribution arrive for the hypocritical monarchists of France and the potentates of those realms, who, inflated by a restoration of

authority, have deliberately caused multitudinous massacres for opinion's sake merely. But that day is apparently remote, and its dawn may not be hailed, perhaps, until many of the more aged friends of rational political freedom shall have passed away from earth.

You may rely with entire certainty upon the preservation of the general peace of Europe. There is not a speck of war, as far as my vision extends, upon the political horizon. The autocrat, seeing his principles in the ascendent, on the Continent, has nothing to fight for. His dispute with the Sultan, which from the first meant nothing, has been adjusted. Austria, Prussia, France, etc., have adopted, in all its rigor, his despotic military system, and could not, if they would engage in hostilities against him or against one another. Great Britain can no longer have a voice in the arrangement of continental questions. Her influence is gone. She must confine her operations, henceforth, to the seas and her colonies.

The aggregate debt of the European States, with the loans proposed and likely to be contracted, is about \$9,000,000,000. The annual interest on this amount may be stated at \$375,000,000, which has to be provided by a population of 235,000,000 inhabitants—more than \$1.50 per head—in addition to the enormous revenue required for ordinary governmental expenses. Repudiation (which would result in anarchy) or continued tranquillity is thus imposed on powers which heretofore have been anxious for an excuse to draw the sword.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

No. 18.]

PARIS, *November 15, 1849.*

SIR: Austria continues to manifest an earnest desire to establish a German commercial union. She now proposes that a congress of delegates, selected by the different States, shall assemble at the earliest convenient period for the purpose. Should this occur, we ought to be prepared to employ all the means at our disposal to secure the admission of our staples at low rates. We should find useful auxiliaries in Hanover, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and the Hanse-Towns.

The treasury of Tuscany appears to be in an exceedingly embarrassed condition. In his extremities to replenish it the Grand Duke proposes to pledge, as collateral security for a loan of \$1,000,000, the proceeds, as they may accrue, from the tobacco régime. I still think, however, that the commercial system of Tuscany will be made to conform to that of Austria as soon as the latter is definitely arranged.

Metternich has removed from Brighton to Brussels. He is within 10 hours of Paris, with which he can communicate twice a day. His departure from Brighton occurred about the time that the daily steam intercourse between that port and Dieppe was suspended. Another revolution in France, and the arch diplomat can return in triumph to Vienna. This revolution, under the counsels of an abler head, he is hastening. His is now located on the direct line from this

metropolis to St. Petersburg. But I was sufficiently explicit, in relation to the potency of his voice at the Élysée, in my No. 12.

The last Liverpool steamer doubtless carried the intelligence across the water of the reception of Mr. Rives by the President of this Republic. I was not advised, however, of what had transpired until after I mailed my last number. In fact, the interview took place only two or three hours before the post with the steamer's letters started. The speech of Mr. Rives, upon the occasion, appeared in *Galvani*, *The Press*, and other journals on the morning of the 9th, unaccompanied, to my great surprise, by any reply from the President. On the 11th the *Monitor* published a statement, which may be considered official, and which certainly has not been contradicted, of the sentiments expressed by the executive to our minister during the audience which he gave to him. This statement will, of course, reach you through other channels, but as I have it before me I transmit it herewith.

I never examined any correspondence more carefully or more dispassionately than that between yourself and the two diplomatic functionaries of France, and I am entirely confirmed in the belief, as I have been all along, that the dismissal of Mr. Poussin by the President was not only imperiously demanded by a due respect for our national honor but that every sentence contained in your notes to himself and Mr. de Tocqueville was eminently just and proper. Viewing the matter in this light, I was amazed at the declaration of the President of France that it was but just to admit that wrongs were committed on both sides, and still more amazed that the accredited representatives of the United States should cordially approve—even in its connection—of such declaration. I conceive the expression of the President of the French to be quite as gratuitous as those employed by Mr. de Tocqueville in his celebrated note to Mr. Rush, and really more objectionable on account of its emanating from a higher authority.

I inclose¹ Kossuth's farewell address to Hungary. You will find that it corroborates the opinions which I advanced respecting Gorgey in my despatch of September 27. It is touchingly beautiful, and can not fail to cause every generous reader of it to heave a sigh and shed a tear for the exiled patriot. Kossuth seems to have hoped on to the last that Turkey, backed by France and Great Britain, would engage in hostilities with Russia and Austria, and that in consequence his country would rise again. For this reason he was unwilling to quit Widdin until a few days since.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

No. 19.]

PARIS, November 22, 1849.

SIR: Many of the European States will be prepared by the 1st of January to engage in the indirect carrying to and from the port of

¹ The inclosure being merely a French translation, the transmission of a copy of it is omitted.

Great Britain on the terms provided for by the act of Parliament of last session. Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Hanover, Oldenburg, and the Hanseatic Republics will, unquestionable, assimilate the British flag with their own in this branch of navigation. Indeed, in several of those States discriminating duties are not levied at present, nor have they been heretofore, upon the vessels or their cargoes of any foreign country. Austria and Russia will also reciprocate with Great Britain, and possibly Belgium. Holland, it is presumable, will not be disposed to change her existing navigation and commercial system, as such a procedure would impair the revenue which she derives from her colonial possessions and result otherwise injurious to her interests. Her India products are conveyed to Amsterdam and Rotterdam exclusively in her own bottoms, where they are brought into market under governmental regulations, and from those places exported to other countries in such vessels as are entitled by treaty stipulations to carry them. Holland claims to be the country of growth of that which is grown in Java, and monopolizing the traffic in the staples of that island, she will hesitate long before she will consent to let coffee be carried from Batavia to New York in a British ship. At this time there are no reliable indications that France seriously contemplates a change of her navigation laws. The President, it is true, has repeatedly spoken and written of commercial "ameliorations," which he designed, but his statements contained nothing of a distinctive nature upon the subject. He will not probably be more specific in his views until a change of the form of government is consummated.

The liberal provisions of the British navigation act are calculated to create an impression adverse to a revision of our own legislation with reference to foreign navigation, and may contribute to the defeat of an object so much required for a more complete development of our prosperity—as pointed out in one or more of my dispatches. I think that Great Britain committed precisely such a mistake as we committed ourselves in permitting illiberal States, which have virtually no ports, and but little legitimate commerce, to trade with her from all ports of the world for the mere privilege of having her vessels and their cargoes placed on an equality with those of their own in inaccessible or unfrequented ports. But this mistake will not operate so injuriously to British interests as the one which we made operates injuriously to American interests. Our products are from the soil and consequently ponderous; those of Great Britain are from the workshop and principally light. The Sound tolls of Denmark and the transit duties of Prussia affect us considerably, while they are scarcely felt by the British. Moreover, 100 pounds of raw cotton pays vastly more toll at Elsiucav than 100 pounds cotton twist.

The second section of the act of Congress approved May 24, 1828, ought, in my opinion, to be so amended as to read as follows:

That upon satisfactory evidence being given to the President of the United States by the Government of any foreign nation that no discriminating duties of tonnage or import, and no sound or river tolls whatever, are imposed or levied in the ports of the said nation upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States, or upon the produce, manufactures, or merchandise, imported in the same from the United States, or from any foreign country, and that no transit duties are levied or collected in such nation upon articles, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States or their fisheries, the President is hereby authorized to issue his proclamation, declaring that the

foreign discriminating duties of tonnage and import within the United States are and shall be suspended and discontinued as far as respects the vessels of the said foreign nation, and the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported into the United States in the same, from the said foreign nation, if they be the build of said foreign nation or of the United States, or from any other foreign country, the said suspension to take effect from the time of such notification being given to the United States, and to continue as long as the reciprocal exemption of vessels, belonging to citizens of the United States, and their cargoes, as aforesaid, shall be continued and no longer; provided always that he, the President, shall be satisfied that no staple product of the United States imported into said nation is considered or employed by the government thereof, as a legitimate article from which to realize revenue.

The acts of Congress of 1817 and 1814 should be repeated, in the event of an amendment to that of 1818, similar to the foregoing. By such legislation and subsequent judicious diplomacy, I am quite confident that we could within a comparatively short period remove the most restrictive existing fetters upon our commerce in Europe.

It is more clear to my mind than ever that the modification of the British navigation laws will work adversely to British navigation much as British manufactures will be benefited by the act. Should the opinion which I have formed be a correct one, an effort to repeat the law of last session may succeed a year or two hence. In the meantime I trust our Government will contract a reciprocity treaty with Great Britain and for the longest possible term. We should be careful to confine the British, and indeed every other power or State with which we may treat, to the vessels of their own build and the build of the United States in their intercourse with our seaports. This would be calculated to multiply our shipyards and to give profitable employment to mechanical labor.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully, your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Received Dec. 19, 1849.]

No. 20.]

PARIS, *November 29, 1849.*

SIR: The Nicaraguan question, notwithstanding the positive manner in which Lord Palmerston has expressed his opinions, creates no uneasiness in the peace-loving circles of Western Europe. It is confidently believed that it will be adjusted by negotiations, as have been all disputed points between the two countries for the last four and thirty years. I entertain no fears that my Government will insist upon anything that is not just. I am quite satisfied that it will submit to nothing that is manifestly wrong.

The pretensions of Great Britain to the protectorate of the Mosquito Shore were peremptorily asserted in 1845 to the Prussian cabinet. Prince Charles of Prussia, brother of the King, contemplated the planting of a German colony on this shore, under the patronage of the Government; and he despatched a commission in 1843, composed of a farmer, a mechanic, and a physician to examine its suitability for the purpose. This commission, contrary to general expectation, made, upon its return, a rather favorable report; and arrangements, thereupon, were about to be commenced for embarking

the first expedition of emigrants when Lord Westmoreland notified the minister of foreign affairs of Prussia that such a procedure would not be permitted by Great Britain, in consequence of which the project was abandoned.

I presume that the British Government then—as now—took a view of the subject that was not warranted by the treaty which she concluded with Spain in 1786, still in force as concerns Nicaragua. In that treaty Great Britain obligated herself to “evacuate the country of the Mosquitos, and the Continent in general and the adjacent isles, without exception, situated beyond the frontier line of the Belize or British Honduras;” thus formally renouncing every shadow of claim to the protectorate which she desires to exercise. The scheme of Prince Charles found but little favor in Germany from the first except at Berlin, on account of the remoteness of the position selected, and the known unhealthfulness of the climate, and it was abandoned without an investigation of the validity of Great Britain’s right to interfere, as she had done, in the matter.

Lord Palmerston I am disposed to believe must either recede from the stand assumed by him in relation to Nicaragua or retire from the ministry. Perhaps he may be compelled to do both, for a mistaken diplomacy on his part, with the United States, after his numerous blunders in European questions, would be viewed with no indulgence by the reflecting portion of the British. Except as a measure obviously of self-preservation I have long been persuaded that Great Britain will never consent to draw her sword against America. To suppose that she will fight about Nicaragua is to suppose that her treasury is overflowing and that she has more customers for her manufactures, exclusive of ourselves, than she can supply.

Nothing of importance has transpired on the Continent since the date of my last. The London journals, it is true, report that a misunderstanding has arisen between Austria and Prussia of so grave a nature as to seriously endanger the peace of Europe. Such statements are entitled in my opinion to no credit whatever. You may rely upon it that these two powers are acting in entire concert. The one is just as autocratic in its notions as the other. Austria may have protested against the proposed Erfurt convention, as is asserted, but as like as not in doing so she was actuated by motives of tenderness for Prussia, which had been placed a few months ago at the head of this movement and could not withdraw voluntarily from it without giving offense to the States which announced their willingness to follow her lead. The Commissioners of Austria and Prussia charged with the administration of the German central authority until a new Bundesversammlung, similar to the old Diet, shall be definitely established were installed in office at Frankfort a day or two since.

The question of the Duchies I conceive to be almost as good as settled. It is scarcely possible that hostilities will be resumed after the expiration of the armistice. Schleswig must be aware that she can not contend singlehanded against Denmark proper, and the German States will not be disposed to reengage in the conflict. Even if they shall not be restrained from doing so by the Frankfort Commission.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Received January 2, 1850.]

No. 21.]

PARIS, *December 13, 1849.*

SIR: In your letter of instructions to me of June 18 you remark:

Peace and commerce are the noble aims of our happy land. The former by God's blessing we enjoy. Let us omit no exertions to secure the most liberal and beneficial extension of the latter.

May I add, to sentiments so patriotic and enlightened, that peace is the principle, commerce the agent through which the grand destiny of that "happy land" is to be accelerated?

Peace is indispensable to a salutary dissemination of the beauties of the gospel; to enlarged and pure state of morality; to a proper development of our boundless resources; to the attainment, by our national family, of a thorough knowledge in the science of self-government.

Commerce multiplies our domestic enjoyments; brings us in contact with the most distant points of the universe; contributes to influence benighted nations to emulate the precepts of Christianity; carries innumerable blessings to suffering humanity; familiarizes the world with our character as a people and with the superiority of our political and religious institutions.

"Peace and commerce"! Let us inquire in what manner we can best preserve the one and augment the other.

The letter of Sir Charles Napier to Lord Russell, relative to the past and present condition of the British Navy—which I herewith transmit, lest it may not reach you as soon through other channels—abounds with useful instruction for our government. By a perusal of it, it will be seen that the Navy estimates between the years 1821 and 1849 amounted to £156,975,858 (\$784,879,290)—a sum equal to one-fifth of the present enormous debt of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland—from which disbursement but comparatively few practical benefits have been derived. According to the opinion of Sir Charles, nearly the whole of the sailing vessels are so defective, in one way or another, as to be entirely unfit for the service for which they were intended, while it has been ascertained that no less than 30 iron steamers are utterly valueless because of their incapacity to resist a discharge from heavy guns or to carry necessary weights.

From the important discoveries which science is incessantly making in the economy and power of steam, together with the improvements in the mechanical arts, I hazard but little in asserting that a more effective Navy for the purposes of war, which could be employed in peace in moving the products of the industrial classes from the ports of one country to those of another, than that of Great Britain might be constructed within the next five years by our Government for the amount of 12 months' legal United States interest on such a sum as the above mentioned. By an expenditure of \$45,000,000 judiciously between this and the first day of January, 1855, on our Navy, I am confident that we could girdle the earth by steam, which while carrying the "olive branch" to every nation in one hand would carry an unsheathed sword in the other for the intimidation of such as might otherwise be disposed to create obsta-

cles to the proper discharge of the duties attendant upon our benign mission. Forty-five million dollars would build at the lowest computation 90 steamships of the class of the *Mississippi*. It would build 150 of superior capacity for running and carrying of the size of the *Washington*.

The modification of the British navigation laws will facilitate the revolution, on account of the wide field of enterprise which the measure throws open, which steam is destined to occasion in navigation. I believe that before a quarter of a century elapses, a long voyage ship will be quite as rarely seen on the ocean highway as a barge, upward bound, propelled by boatmen, is at this time on the Mississippi River. The foreign canvas navigation, of the different nations of the earth, can not fail to rapidly diminish when fairly subjected to competition with bottoms which move onward, speedily and majestically, regardless of head winds or mountain waves.

The carrying by steam will be conducted by two nations—those which speak the language of Milton and Shakespeare. No other power or state, little Belgium excepted, can engage in it successfully because of a destitution of coal, iron, etc. For a time, Great Britain may divide with us the ocean transportation, but she will not be a prosperous rival long, if we are mindful of our interests and “omit no exertions to secure the most liberal and beneficial extension” of our commerce. Nature has been infinitely more liberal in the bestowal of her valuable favors upon us than she has been upon the once “proud mistress of the seas.” Exclusive of California and Oregon we have 133,000,000 acres of coal field while Great Britain has but 9,000,000 acres.

In order that we may preserve honorable peace we should show to presumptuous powers, without, however, making an ostentatious or unnecessary display of our maritime strength, that we are not unprepared for the protection of our rights and interests. In what manner can this be accomplished so well as by establishing lines of powerful steamers to connect with the most important ports of Europe? Our naval officers and seamen, it is presumable, are desirous of obtaining as practicable a knowledge of steam, in ocean navigation, as possible; for it is perceptible to them that we shall never lay the keel of another sailing man of war as a cruiser. The former perhaps, except those far advanced in years, are solicitous of more constant and active employment, in order that they may increase their usefulness to their country. Even when in service in distant seas they frequently grow weary of port life. Animated, as they are, by a noble ambition to make their manly profession, in peace as in war, redound to the honest fame of the Republic, the Republic should withhold from them no advantages calculated to extend their professional knowledge.

It appears to me, from the foregoing and other considerations which I shall express in a subsequent part of this dispatch, that it is obviously the true policy of our Government to commence, at its earliest convenience, the building of a sufficient number of steamships of such construction as would admit of their ready conversion into vessels of war, so as to open a direct semimonthly communication between New York and Liverpool, New York and Havre, New York and Bremen, New York and Lisbon, New York and Genoa, and New York and Trieste. At Havre a steamer would be required, in the

execution of this project, to connect with the ports of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Antwerp. At Bremen one to connect with Cronstadt, Stockholm, Gottenburg, Stettin, Wismar, Copenhagen, and Hamburg. At Lisbon one to connect with Marseilles, Barcelona, Malaga, Gibraltar, and Cadiz. At Genoa one to connect with Palermo, Naples, Civite Vecche, and Leghorn. At Trieste one to connect with Odessa, Constantinople, Zante, Corfu, Caterro, Zara, Fiume, or Porto-re, Venice, and Ancona. This service could be performed with 29 ships, allowing four for each line and five for the branches. The cost of this number of a build sufficiently substantial for effective use in a belligerent engagement would probably not exceed \$10,000,000. I mean for such ships as the better Cunarders, with such improvements as may from time to time be developed before their completion. They should be officered throughout from the Navy and should be manned and run at the expense of the Government. The passenger, freight, and parcel carrying should be let to contractors, bona fide citizens of the United States; not more than one line or one branch to a contractor. Approved sureties and quarterly payments should be exacted. The mails would be conveyed by the Government under the superintendence of its agents. The proceeds from them, with the amount realized from the contractors, would return to the Treasury in all probability a sum of \$3,000,000 in the aggregate for a period of five years annually. Should this result be obtained, the first step would be taken in the direction of making the Navy a self-supporting establishment; and we should, consequently, find it to our interest to increase from time to time the number of our steamers connecting with the ports of the east Atlantic and with the North; Baltic, Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Black Seas, but we would also engage, and eventually on a much larger scale, in a similar service with the far more distant foreign ports of the Pacific.

A large steam navy without commercial employment would be the canker worm to eat out our substance. It would make such requisitions upon the Treasury for its sustenance as to lay the foundation in a few years of a debt like that which bows Great Britain down, crippling her energies and impairing her usefulness. Unless threatened with an immediate war I should question the policy of ever having more steamers in commission at once than a number equal to those which we have at present afloat and upon the stocks.

While existing contracts with individuals for the transportation of mails to foreign countries should not be infringed, no new ones ought to be entered into. As a measure of encouragement to American citizens disposed to build steamships to be employed in trade intercourse abroad our Government, after a deduction of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, should agree to pay the ordinary postage on the mails which they might convey.

If the Government should determine upon adopting the system thus proposed it would become necessary to secure by treaty stipulation, with each of the States embraced, the privilege of carrying from and to our vessels, at their respective stations, in the branch steamers to and from the ports designated, upon the same terms as though the importations and exportations were made direct. This I think could be readily accomplished if negotiations were properly conducted.

"Peace and commerce." Children of public virtue and public wisdom! Properly nourished by us, all thrones will ultimately fall

under their influences and the most benighted barbarians brought within the pale of civilization.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

Mr. Mann to the Secretary of State.

[Extract.]

No. 22.]

PARIS, *January 10, 1850.*

SIR: It is announced that the Chambers of Tuscany are to convene in the beginning of February. The subject of the long-contemplated commercial union of Italy will doubtless engage their early deliberations. The preliminaries of this union had been definitively arranged, as far as concerned Sardinia, Rome, and Tuscany, before the commencement of hostilities between Austria and Sardinia. The compact signed by their respective plenipotentiaries is still regarded as obligatory. Whether or not the intended object will be perfected I am incapable of forming an opinion upon which reliance could be placed. In view, however, of the possibility of such an occurrence and of the modification of the British laws relating to navigation I conceive it to be plainly our interest to contract a treaty of navigation and commerce with Tuscany—containing a stipulation that any one or all the Italian states may accede to it—securing the privilege for term of ten or twelve years of carrying to and from the ports of that grand duchy. We would assuredly be the party most benefited by a navigation treaty of extended reciprocal liberality with the Italian States. It would rarely happen that one of their vessels would arrive at a port of the United States with a cargo from a third country, while we might do a large portion of the carrying between British and other foreign ports and Leghorn, Civita, Vecchia, Naples, etc. In the treaty contracted in 1845 with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies the President, if I am not mistaken, was desirous of bestowing the right on that State to trade indirectly with the United States for permission to enjoy a like right, but the government of Naples refused to entertain the proposition. It is a matter of really more importance for us to obtain this privilege now than it was then. With reference to concessions of customs duties on our staples in Tuscany, etc., I have heretofore repeatedly given you my views, and I should but trespass on your patience and time by advertng again to the subject.

More than ever do I consider it to be to our interest to strengthen our ties of friendship with Greece. If the Czar ever crosses the Bosphorus, as probably meditated by him, he might be inclined, in the plenitude of his power, to circumscribe our intercourse with the ports of the Levant, the Ionian Isles, and the Grecian Archipelago. Lest this may occur I think the policy of establishing a legation at the metropolis of Greece is not a questionable one. Before proceeding to do so, however, it might be well to inquire minutely into the condition of affairs in that Kingdom, and to ascertain whether a desire exists for an augmentation of intercourse with us, and also whether a treaty more favorable than that whose operations are at present in force between the two countries could be negotiated by us.



Switzerland is encompassed by serious difficulties, if not absolutely menaced with national obliteration. It is stated that the Autocrat of the North has issued a decree prohibiting the entrance into his realms of citizens of the Helvetian Republic. This is striking at the genius of our Government through a kindred but feeble State. Under such circumstances I regard it just as imperative upon us to take the initiatory step for opening diplomatic relations with Switzerland as it was for recognizing the independence of Hungary in the event of its establishment.

I see with regret a disposition manifested in certain quarters in the Union to suspend all diplomatic intercourse with Austria. Such a procedure, if consummated, would be productive of no good, while incalculable evils might ensue from it. No one of my countrymen has witnessed the hyena-like ferocity, the demoniacal perfidiousness, of the Austrian authorities toward the Hungarian patriots more distinctly or with more pain than myself. No one of my countrymen can be more indignant at the enormous outrages of Austria against civilization and humanity than myself. In a word, no one of my countrymen has the same or a greater cause for deadly hate of the Austrian rulers than myself. Yet I am not for a measure that would gratify Haynau and cause the votaries of freedom to despond in Austria. The noble minded of every country, irrespective of sex, have pronounced a verdict of condemnation against the cabinet of Vienna, but no Government has undertaken to make the atrocities committed under its direction a *casus belli*. If the United States are prepared to engage in hostilities with Austria for grossly violating, in the instance of the Magyars, all the usages of civilized warfare, let them terminate their relations with her; but until they are thus prepared it seems to me that it would be the most inconsiderate of all inconsiderate acts ever committed by an enlightened deliberative body for Congress to withhold the necessary appropriation for the continuance of our legation at Vienna. If we desire to be instrumental in redeeming our species from political bondage and misrule, we must rely upon the force of our example made apparent by the peaceful dissemination of the benign practical workings of our doctrines. Commerce, our mighty agent for doing good to the world, must be unfettered. Our navigation must thoroughly plough every sea, moor in every haven. Would we be acting in a sense of right to the liberalists of Austria—of crushed Hungary—to shut out our light from them, and thus abandon them to their hard fate, in order to express our contempt for their scourgers? Assuredly not. Our Government, in my opinion, should not only preserve formally its relations with Austria and other merciless continental powers and States, but it should also adopt a system, similar to that proposed in my dispatch No. 21, for the purpose of augmenting its influence through Europe. Our mission on earth, if it be not woefully misdirected by governmental blunders, can not fail to eventuate in the political regeneration of the most despotic States. Let "peace and commerce with all nations, entangling alliances with none," be our "noble aims," and light, with its noiseless blessings, will follow our march as justice follows truth.

I have the honor to be, most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. DUDLEY MANN.

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