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ANALYSIS AND THEORY
OF THE EMOTIONS.

ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS

WITH DISSERTATIONS ON BEAUTY SUBLIMITY AND THE LUDICROUS

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"PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN HAPPINESS AND DUTY."
"A CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES," &c.

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In a work published by the Author a few years ago, entitled "An Enquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness and Human Duty," a detailed account was given of some of the principal desires, chiefly with a view to their influence upon human happiness; but no attempt was made at a general classification and theory of the Emotions, such as is contained in the present volume. Those desires which were treated of at large in the previous work are here but briefly noticed, the reader being referred to the "Enquiry" for a fuller investigation.

The present work may be considered as one of a series which the Author began to publish nearly twelve years ago, commencing with Political Economy, continued through Political and Moral Philosophy, and ending with pure Mental Philosophy, to which this volume belongs.

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ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.

PART I.

ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION.

THE object of the present work is to analyse and classify the EMOTIONS, and by means of this analysis to trace their origin. And in order not to interrupt the general view of the Emotions, such of them as claim a lengthened inquiry will be treated of afterwards in separate Dissertations.

The emotions may be classified in various ways: first as simple and compound, the former class comprising but few, the latter very many emotions. The simple emotions are these, Joy, Grief, Wonder, Desire, Fear, and possibly one or two more, such as Weariness of mind from repetition, and Ennui from vacancy, which however may be classed under the general head of grief. All the other emotions are either modifications or compounds of these elements.

Another classification may be derived from the circumstance whether the emotions do or do not necessarily involve the notion of TIME. Emotions not necessarily involving the notion of time, are the elementary emotions of Joy, Grief, and Wonder, as well as Cheerfulness, Melancholy, Beauty, Sublimity, the Ludicrous emotion, etc.

Emotions necessarily involving the notion of time are of two sorts, as they look to the past, or as they look to the future, and therefore they may be subdivided into the Retrospective and the Prospective. Of the former kind are Regret and Remorse; of the latter, Desire and Fear, and every compound emotion embracing desire as one of its elements.

Though each of these classifications has its advantages, yet is there another which I would propose as preferable to either, for it is equally true to nature, and probably of more practical use. Some emotions are not immediately connected with outward action, while others are. Of the first sort are simple Joy and Grief, Cheerfulness, Melancholy, Beauty, Sublimity, etc. These like every feeling, nay like every thought, *may* lead to outward action, but they may not, and they never immediately precede it; whereas, Desire and Fear, in some form or other, directly urge to action, and when this takes place, they are always the

immediate antecedents. This distinction seems sufficiently well defined, and sufficiently important, for the purposes of classification.

Agreeably to this view, our primary division will be into the PASSIVE and the ACTIVE emotions.

CLASS FIRST.—Passive Emotions.

These the mind *suffers*, but they are not the *agents* in motion.

This class may be divided into two orders, into emotions which have not, and those which have a necessary reference to other individuals, or to our own past conduct. Under the FIRST ORDER we may enumerate the following.

I. II.—Joy and Grief, emotions of an opposite character but of a simple nature, and as such, unsusceptible of analysis and definition.

Under these may be classed, either as species or varieties, the following emotions. Under Joy,

1. *Cheerfulness*, which is permanent but gentle Joy.

2. *Mirth:* a lively joy, the result of ludicrous emotions.

Under Grief,

1. *Melancholy*, which is Grief permanent, but not intense.

2. *Weariness of Mind*, arising from sameness

or repetition; a simple emotion, and allied to Grief.

3. *Ennui*, from vacancy of mind, also a simple feeling, and of the nature of Grief.

III. WONDER, an emotion produced by what is *new*, likewise a simple emotion and not to be analysed.

IV. BEAUTY.*

V. SUBLIMITY.*

VI. THE LUDICROUS EMOTION.*

Ennui is the malady of those who have no sufficient occupation; and a tendency thereto depends upon that peculiar frame of mind in which desires are weak in proportion to the intellectual faculties. Increase desire, or diminish intellect, and in either case you drive away Ennui. And though melancholy be not unfrequently the result of long continued misfortune, yet it is the grief of those especially who have no positive evils, and is often greatest in youth, when everything smiles upon us, and abates with advancing years. The cares and active occupations of mature life effectually expel this dreamy sentimental emotion. Youth, so to say, can better afford to be melancholy, for upon youth consolations shower.

We have little sympathy with Ennui, but more with melancholy, probably because we are aware

* For a particular account of these emotions, see the dissertations contained in this volume.

that the frame of mind indicated, is very different. The man who suffers habitually from Ennui, is likely never to do much good, for in him the active principles are deficient, but the Melancholy wight gives a better promise. The frame of mind which tends to melancholy seems to consist of sensibility more than ordinary, and of eager wishes and aspirations after great things, united with little hopefulness, but with much tenacity. *Desio senza speme* would be a suitable motto. This constitution of mind is however far from unpromising; for delicate sensibility, which implies delicacy of conscience, is highly moral; and eager desire, with constancy, will force its way almost without hope.

Tenacity of thought and feeling supposes frequent recurrence of the same ideas; and sameness has a tendency to lower the tone of spirits. It is thus that tenacity favours melancholy.

Though Ennui and Melancholy differ so widely in themselves, as well as in their causes, yet the remedy for both, as indeed for every ill, but for them especially, is occupation.

CLASS FIRST.—Passive Emotions.

Order Second: Emotions having a necessary reference to others, or to our own past conduct, either towards ourselves or others, and therefore bearing

upon morality and remotely influencing practice.

Though the emotions already considered may have an influence upon practice, yet the influence is neither so near nor so general as in the case of the second order, which in the usual course of things leads on to the active emotions. It may be divided into the IMMEDIATE and the RETROSPECTIVE Emotions, according as they look to the present or to the past.

The Immediate Emotions are,

I. *Sympathy* and *Antipathy.*

Sympathy is an emotion of pleasure arising from the contemplation of some pleasure in another, or of pain on the contemplation of pain.

Antipathy is exactly the reverse of sympathy, and is quite an exception to the general law, for sympathy is the rule of human nature.

II. *Pride* and *Humility.*

Pride, a pleasing emotion, arising from the consciousness of some real or supposed excellence in ourselves, or connected with ourselves, as compared with others.

Humility is a painful emotion, arising from the consciousness of some real or supposed defect in ourselves, or connected with ourselves, as compared with others.

RETROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

I. *Remorse* is a compound state of mind, com-

prising: (1) a judgment of condemnation on our own past conduct; (2) an emotion immediately consequent thereon. The precise nature of this emotion may be a matter of some doubt; it is evident that it cannot be quite the same as that which belongs to Moral Disapprobation when felt towards others, for though in common language we are said almost to hate ourselves, sometimes to be angry with ourselves, by reason of a base action, yet we cannot seriously desire our own injury. The emotion of Remorse, then, is not Hatred, but Grief; grief modified by the reflection that we have done wrong, and accompanied with the resolution of acting better in future. I repent, or think again, I am sorry for my sin, is the language of Remorse, and well describes it. First comes the thought or reflection that we have done wrong, then the sorrow, lastly the resolution consequent on that sorrow.

The grief of Remorse partakes of the nature of Humility, but not to the same extent as the next and kindred emotion, Shame.

II. *Shame* and *Remorse* are the two grand bulwarks of morality, and though allied and often mixed one with another, yet they are by no means identical. The nature of the actions which gives rise to each differs considerably. Remorse never arises but from some action which in the retrospect appears to ourselves morally wrong; whereas shame

is often roused by acts really indifferent as concerns morality, and sometimes, as in the case of false shame, by deeds positively praiseworthy. Even when the conduct which rouses Shame is of an immoral nature or tendency, the shame is often out of all proportion to the degree of guilt. A woman is more ashamed of a slight act of immodesty than of a crime. Chastity is a virtue particularly guarded by Shame; for in women especially, a breach of Chastity gives far more shame than remorse. These and similar considerations prove to us that shame peculiarly depends upon opinion; and as the opinion changes, so will the shame. Adam Smith informs us, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, that the native Americans would be greatly ashamed of living together openly like us, as man and wife; and we know that a Turkish woman is ashamed of showing her face. What would she think of our ladies who uncover themselves down to the breast? In England many men are ashamed of being poor, others are ashamed of their poor relations, or of being seen in unfashionable company, or in unfashionable places; but will any one say that mere poverty or vulgarity is vice? or is it despised where equality prevails? In the English great public schools, where the sons of gentry alone resort, a boy is ashamed of being ill-drest; in the great day-schools in Scotland, frequented by all

classes, a boy is rather ashamed of being well drest. I have known schools where a boy would have been ashamed to be found reading his Bible. Shame, then, is an emotion much more subject to the caprice of opinion than Remorse. Shame originates in the consciousness, not that we have done wrong, but that we have done something that lays us open to Ridicule or Contempt. Now, as Ridicule and Contempt, the former especially, are often awarded where there is no moral delinquency, so Shame is frequently felt where there is little to blame. Shame, then, is variable, because it depends chiefly on the sentiments of others, and upon sentiments of Ridicule and Contempt, which themselves are liable to change.

Since Shame arises from Ridicule or Contempt, it contains, as might be supposed, a strong mixture of Humility; but Humility is not the whole, as is proved by that outward sign which distinguishes Shame from all other emotions, the Blush.

Anger generally reddens, but sometimes, like fear, renders pale the face; Love and Jealousy are said to give a tinge of green or yellow; Pride and Humility are known by the expression of the countenance, and almost by every act; Grief by tears, Wonder by silence; but Shame communicates that beautiful crimson which comes and goes like sunshine in a chequered sky, overspreading in a moment face, neck, arms, and bosom. This sign of

an inward emotion is one of the most charming things in nature, and a peculiar effect must have a peculiar cause, in the emotion of Shame, which, therefore, besides Humility, comprises a feeling which is properly its own, and of the painful sort.

CLASS SECOND.—Active Emotions.

This very important class of emotions may be divided into two orders; for some of them look only to the good of self; some to the good of others, either in whole or in part. The former may be called the solitary or self-regarding, the latter the social active emotions.

Every one of the active emotions contains Desire or Fear in some form or other, as one of its elements; and Desire and Fear simply as such, admit not of analysis or definition. To these alone, and only when intense or permanent, the term *Passion* is properly applied.*

Before entering upon the different kinds of Desire, we must observe that this emotion, in all its species and varieties, is often combined with Belief, and according to the degree of probability, that is of apparent probability, the compound becomes modified in character, and assumes different names, such as Wish, Hope, Expectation, Confidence. In all

* For a more detailed account of the principal desires, see the Author's "Enquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness and Human Duty." Book First, Part II.

these the essential elements are the same, and vary only in degree, for in all, desire is combined with Belief, an emotion with a relation, and in all, the degree of probability modifies the intensity of Desire. Certainty of not succeeding, and certainty of succeeding, in other words Despair and Security, both destroy desire, which depends upon Uncertainty, and therefore, as we approach the opposite limits, the desire will begin to decline; so that the degree of probability most favourable to ardour will be between the two extremes, and at some distance from either.

ORDER FIRST: *Solitary* or *Self-regarding Active Emotions.*

1. *Ambition* in its proper signification is desire of power, though it be often used in a more vague sense for desire of superiority of any kind; in other words of eminence,—

Αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων.

Power is valued on three accounts; *first* for itself, for there is a *peculiar* gratification attached to the exercise of power in any line, quite independent of consequences, and this gratification is original and elementary.

Secondly, power is valued, as many other things are valued, because they argue Superiority, and feed Pride.

Thirdly, power is valued from its consequences, which are apparent to all.

2. *Desire of Wealth :*

Covetousness, Avarice.

Covetousness is an eager desire for getting riches, and, as commonly used, the word expresses Blame for some supposed moral turpitude in the desire.

Avarice is an eager desire for saving riches, and it also expresses that the desire is blameable.

Stinginess, narrowness, parsimony, are lower degrees of avarice, and these words consequently express a lower degree of blame.

Frugality, Economy, are also a desire for saving, but these words convey praise.

Riches are valued first for their uses in spending and consuming, but sometimes also, as it would seem, for their own sake. When riches seem to be valued for themselves, as by the confirmed miser, what are the essential circumstances connected with them for which really they are prized? These circumstances will be found to be two which are very nearly allied, namely, the feeling of power, and that of security, inseparably attached to riches, and the latter is the principal cause. Great desire of power, or ambition, overcomes Avarice, for money must be spent in order really to create power, as Cæsar began by ruining himself in order to acquire popularity; but in the eyes of the timid, security is impaired by every expense which promises no immediate return. Fear, therefore, is the grand promoter

of Avarice, and on that account Avarice is apt to increase with age.

3. *Desire of Reputation, of Fame, or Glory.*

These are all modifications of one and the same emotion, which in its humble form is merely a Desire, but in its higher a powerful passion.

Reputation is valued on many accounts. *First*, it is valued for its own sake; Admiration and Esteem, like Affection, being certainly delightful in themselves without any reference to consequences. So far desire of Reputation is primary or original, like desire of affection or power, and unlike desire of wealth, which has been shown to be derivative.

Secondly, Reputation is valued because it seems to fortify our good opinion of ourselves, and so cherishes Self-Complacency, Self-Admiration, or Pride.

Thirdly, Reputation is valued on account of its consequences; for whether it be for moral worth or for ability, Reputation is useful in every pursuit.

From the above it appears that desire of Reputation comprises a desire for two distinct things, Esteem and Admiration; the one founded on moral worth, the other on talents or some other personal excellence, not necessarily connected with morality, for instance, Grace or Beauty; and as we long for the one more than the other, so the desire will change materially both in its nature and in its consequences.

Reputation, as we have seen, is valued partly because it fortifies our good opinion of ourselves. But this opinion may refer either to moral worth, or to talents and other accomplishments, and, in the latter case especially, Reputation ministers to our Pride, and feeds the universal passion for Superiority. Here then the humble desire begins to swell into the passion, the passion for Fame or Glory, which fills the whole man.

The passion for Fame is chiefly a desire of Admiration, for it may exist with little or no care for Esteem; and herein lies the danger. So long as men shall admire superior talents, or accomplishments, even when abused, for that they do so is certain, so long will a thirst for glory be the charm and terror of mankind.

But other principles unite to heighten this intoxicating passion. We all wish to *extend* as well as to *perpetuate* our being, and fame through the aid of Fancy, conduces to these wished-for ends. An extension of Fame seems to us an extension of self, as common language proves, for we are said to live in the breath of our admirers, and these may be innumerable: and a perpetuity of Fame seems an immortality, for we call illustrious authors, as Bacon and Newton, *immortal*. The passion for Glory is, then, the child of Imagination, and it partakes of that unspeakable charm which surrounds its magical pa

rent.* One very common form of this desire is *Vanity*, a term which always conveys disapprobation.†

4. *Curiosity*, or *Desire of Knowledge* for its own sake, without reference to the use or application thereof. The great spur of Curiosity is Novelty, and on that account it is apt to decline with years, unlike Ambition, Desire of Wealth or of Fame, which rather increase with age. Curiosity is the proper passion of Philosophers, for this alone looks to the end which they propose to themselves, whereas other passions, such as Desire of Fame, though they may rouse the intellect, frequently lead us aside from the path of truth. Though Curiosity is not without its dangers, yet on the whole it is the safest of all the Self-regarding Active Emotions, because it is the most solitary, and the most independent of other men. Hence it is free, in a great degree, from those anxieties which wait upon the rest of the passions. It is generally an agreeable stimulus, seldom a rankling goad.

5. *Desire of Life*, or *of Continued Existence*, here and hereafter. Though without some pleasure

* For a more particular account of this passion see "An Enquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness and Human Duty."—Book First, Part II. Chap. ii. Sec. v.

† For a more particular account of Vanity, which is *the wish for display*, see Note at the end of this Analysis.

we could hardly desire life, yet this feeling seems distinct from desire of pleasure.

As it is with Riches so with Life. Had Riches been of no use to us they would certainly never have been valued; but, after a time, from long association, they come to be prized by some for their own sake. So, though Life without enjoyment could hardly have been an object of desire, yet since there can be no enjoyment without life, therefore, from constant association, life came to be prized for itself. Certainly the desire does not vary directly as enjoyment; since the young, who enjoy most, are frequently most prodigal of their days, while the old, who enjoy least, are often the most eager for life.

This desire, though in general exceedingly permanent, is inferior in intensity to many; for not only may it be overcome for a time by various other passions, as by Love, Ambition, Covetousness, Desire of Glory, Curiosity, but it may be even extinguished and give place to a contrary wish.* Sudden and violent grief, or long-continued pain,

* Bacon even says "It is worthy the observing that there is no passion in the mind of man so weak but it meets and masters the fear of death. Revenge triumphs over death; Love slights it; Honour aspireth to it; Grief flieth to it; Fear pre-occupates it; nay, we read, after Otho the Emperor had slain himself, Pity, which is the tenderest of affections, provoked many to die, out of mere compassion to the sovereign, and as the truest sort of followers.—Bacon's Essays: of Death.

mental or bodily, may give rise to desire of death; but mental distress alone terminates in self-destruction. As an element of religious feeling, Desire of Existence becomes of first-rate importance; but the religious emotions will come under another head.

CLASS SECOND.—ORDER SECOND: *Social Active Emotions.*

This order of Emotions may be subdivided into the Benevolent, and the Malevolent.

BENEVOLENT EMOTIONS.

Most of the emotions comprehended under this head are either different species, or merely varieties of

I. LOVE. Love, in whatsoever form, comprises at least two elements: first, a certain pleasure derived from beholding or reflecting on the beloved object; secondly, a desire of good to that object. These elements are essential, for they are sufficient to constitute Love, and without them there can be no such emotion.

Under this genus may be enumerated as species:

1. *General Benevolence*, or Love to Mankind in general, which is the simplest species of Love, and

I may remark that the custom of self-sacrifice on the death of a Chief, prevailed of old among the followers of princes both in Spain and in Gaul.—See PLUTARCH *in Sartorio*, and CÆSAR *de Bello Gall.* Lib. III.

distinguished from other species by the circumstance of its being *indiscriminate*.

2. *Friendship*, and every private attachment, whether transient or permanent, slight or deep-seated, contains a third element in addition to the two above mentioned, namely, the desire of being loved in return.

3. *Love*, properly so called, Love between the sexes, comprises a fourth element besides these three, namely, the sensual desire, which is so powerful, that the word *desire*, when used by itself, often signifies this alone.

These three species are quite distinct; but the following are only modifications or varieties of the same.

Thus, *Patriotism* is general Benevolence limited to our own countrymen.

Party Spirit, *Esprit de Corps*, the Clannish Spirit, are also General Benevolence still further limited to our own party, sect, clan, or profession.

Family Affection, again, from the nearest and dearest that exists between parent and child, down to a slight regard for distant relations, is a modification of Friendship, taken in its widest sense, for whatever partiality we may entertain towards relatives, we certainly wish that it should be reciprocal. No doubt there are differences between Friendship in its strict sense, and family affection, depending in part upon

this, that Friends, properly so called, are of our own choosing, while Relations come by nature; but these differences are not sufficient to constitute a difference of species; they form therefore only varieties.

Gratitude is Love towards an individual on account of some benefit conferred intentionally. This last consideration somewhat modifies the emotion, for we feel that love is due, and though love in every form desires the good of its object, Gratitude is not satisfied unless that good be our own act. Such however is our natural dislike to anything like constraint in affection, that the very circumstance which ought to command our love, sometimes prevents any real warmth of feeling. This is especially the case where the love ought to be the strongest, namely, where the benefit conferred has been very great; for then, not only is the constraint most felt, but along with it is a sense of inferiority, and the greater the favour, the greater the humiliation. Hence the more Pride prevails in the character, the less is it open to gratitude.

When a return seems to be expected, then the irksomeness of constraint is felt in the highest degree; while the idea thus suggested that the benefit was not gratuitous, serves as an excuse for Ingratitude.

Religious Emotions are of a compound nature,

embracing, *first*, a feeling of Gratitude towards God for all his benefits conferred upon us; and Gratitude is a variety of Love, comprising a delight in contemplating God, and a wish to do all things pleasing in His sight, as well as a desire of favour in His eyes.

Secondly, the Religious Emotion comprehends the desire of continued existence, that longing after immortality which all men feel, but chiefly the intelligent and good. The dolt and the wicked man may be content with this life, but the enlightened and the virtuous never cease to pant for an hereafter.

Love, in some form or other, is the grand solace of human kind; Love, properly so called, is the most violent, the most complex, the most wayward, the most imaginative, the most captivating of the passions, and for a time the most happy; but the Religious Emotions, though occasionally violent, are in general calming, and give a permanent and unspeakable satisfaction.*

Besides the above, there are other emotions and mixed states of mind, of which Love forms a component part; for instance:

Admiration. This is a state of mind which seems to occupy the interval between pure Love and

* This is the *delectation interieure* of the good, the spiritual MALEBRANCHE.

Esteem, comprising as it does some Affection, as well as a favourable Judgment concerning its object. But it is essentially distinguished from either by the presence of Wonder, which is a necessary element of Admiration; and it is owing to this element in particular, that the compound state of mind is on the whole more allied to emotion, than to cool intellectual decision.

Esteem. Here the emotion of Love is reduced to the lowest degree compatible with any partiality, while on the other hand the judgment as to the merits of the object is serious and decided. Esteem is synonymous with Moral Approbation, or, if there be a shade of difference, it is that the latter refers more particularly to the outward expression, the former to the inward sentiment.

Respect. Respect is a mixture of Love with Humility; and Humility tempers Love with something approaching to Fear. Moreover, Respect seems to comprise a certain exercise of the judgment.

In *Veneration*, the Humility is deeper, and consequently the love is more tempered with Fear; while in *Awe*, fear predominates.

II. Pity. Pity and Love are emotions so nearly allied that it is not possible to conceive any person susceptible of the one, and at the same time unsusceptible of the other; meaning by Love no more than

general Benevolence; though Pity frequently gives rise to a warmer affection.

Pity, or Compassion, embraces two elements: first, a feeling of pain at the sufferings of another, secondly, a desire to relieve those sufferings; and though other feelings may follow, those two alone seem to constitute the emotion. The desire, however, which forms a part of Pity, probably admits of a further analysis, for it seems to be compounded of (1) a desire of relief to the sympathetic pain which we ourselves experience, instantly followed by (2), a desire of removing the occasion of that pain, viz. the sufferings of a fellow creature.

Thus it appears that the primary element in Pity is Painful Sympathy, which seems necessary to produce the other, Desire of Relieving, and without the first it does not appear that we should ever have felt the second. Love, on the other hand, seems to begin with pleasing Sympathy, a feeling for the joy of others, followed by the wish to promote that joy; and when our fellow creatures have become associated in our minds with pleasure, the first element of love exists. Sympathy, then, is the foundation of both Pity and Love; and we can hardly conceive the one without the other, (on the proper occasion), for how can we feel for Grief without feeling for Joy? how can we desire to relieve pain without desiring to confer pleasure?

Conversely, if we love any one we must pity his misfortunes, and the greater the love the deeper the pity. Indeed, it is well known from experience that a feeling which began in Pity frequently terminates in ardent Love; that the helplessness of women, their delicacy of constitution, nay, their very ailments and sufferings, often rouse the tender passion.

From the above it follows that Sympathy, a feeling for the weal and woe of others, is an *ultimate fact* in Human nature, and the origin of Love and Pity.

CLASS SECOND.—ORDER SECOND.

Family Second: The Malevolent Emotions. As almost all the Benevolent Emotions are species or varieties of LOVE, so nearly all the Malevolent are species or varieties of HATE.

I. Hatred, in whatsoever form, contains at least two elements; first, a certain pain derived from beholding or reflecting on the object hated; secondly, a desire of evil to that object. These elements are essential, for they are sufficient to constitute Hatred, and without them there can be no such emotion. Under the Genus HATE may be enumerated as species,

1. *Anger.* All the species or varieties of Hate agree in this, that they are limited to certain indi-

viduals, or classes of individuals, and that there is always some particular cause for the Hate. There is no such thing as general Hate, as there is general Love or Benevolence; for at the utmost, Hate extends to certain nations, not to the whole family of mankind; and then there is always some particular cause of Hatred. If Misanthropy exist, it is a disease, not a regular phenomenon of human nature. Thus, Anger is a sudden and violent emotion of Hatred towards an individual on account of some injury or affront. Nor is it essential to Anger that the injury or affront be intentional; for though this may make a great difference in the intensity, and still more in the duration of the emotion, yet the storm is raised before there is time for reflection, and cannot be immediately quelled. When pain is acutely felt, we instantly hate the author, even though it should afterwards appear that he was perfectly innocent. But the absence of intention alone is not enough to render any one blameless, for Carelessness and Indifference to others may be highly culpable. But whether he be to blame or not in the eyes of an impartial spectator, the author or occasion of evil to us, becomes the object of Anger, which when confirmed by reflection, terminates in Resentment or Revenge. There is then this difference between Anger and the converse emotion Gratitude, that the former is roused by Injury or Affront simply as

caused by a fellow-creature; while the latter cannot exist unless the Benefit be supposed intentional. Gratitude and Anger however agree in this, that the desire which belongs to each respectively is not satisfied with the good or evil of another howsoever produced, but it requires that the good or evil proceed from the party benefitted or injured, and on account of such benefit or injury; whereas Love or Hate, simply as such, is gratified by good or evil that may befall its object, from whatever source.

2. *Resentment.* Resentment is Anger permanent and confirmed by reflection on the conduct of the offending party.

The observation just made upon Anger as a passion which desires the evil of another, through the agency of the injured individual, applies also to Resentment, and with peculiar force, for Anger does not terminate in Resentment until we become convinced that the injury was intentional, or the result of Negligence as concerns us; and whereas upon better information Anger may altogether cease, Resentment, on the contrary, is confirmed and strengthened by reflection, and is apt to pass into Revenge.

3. *Revenge.* Here the desire of retaliating on the offending party becomes intense, and whatever calamities may befall him, retaliation alone fully gratifies, that is, the fact that we who received,

also return, the injury. Where the opportunity of Revenge is delayed, this may become a very permanent as well as a very violent passion, and the attainment of its object would seem to be attended with an intense pleasure, scarcely, if at all, inferior to any of which our nature is susceptible.

> If I can catch him once upon the hip,
> I will feed fat the ancient grudge I bear him.
> He hates our sacred nation; and he rails,
> E'en there where merchants most do congregate,
> On me, my bargains, and my well-won thrift,
> Which he calls interest. Cursed be my tribe
> If I forgive him! *

The scene in which Tubal announces to Shylock Antonio's losses is highly characteristic of Revenge.

Tubal. Yes, other men have ill luck too: Antonio, as I heard in Genoa,——

Shy. What, what, what? ill luck, ill luck?

Tubal.——hath an argosy cast away coming from Tripolis.

Shy. I thank God, I thank God; is it true? is it true?

Tubal. I spoke with some of the sailors that escaped the wreck.

Shy. I thank thee, good Tubal;—good news, good news, ha! ha!—where? in Genoa?

. . . .

Tubal. There came divers of Antonio's creditors in my company to Venice, that swear he cannot choose but break.

Shy. I am very glad of it; I'll plague him; I'll torture him; I am glad of it.

Here, as in every variety of Hate, the disasters of

* Merchant of Venice, Act. I. Scene 3.

an enemy are a source of gratification; but the grand cause of Shylock's delight in these disasters is the prospect of Retaliation which they hold out.

> I'll plague him; I'll torture him;———
> I will have the heart of him if he forfeit.*

Revenge is in a peculiar degree the passion of savage nations, *first*, because Violence and Injury are there of frequent occurrence, and *secondly*, because there is no Law to take the place of private Resentment. In proportion as the empire of law becomes more established, that of Resentment and Revenge declines.

4. *Indignation.* Resentment and Indignation are both species of Anger, and differ from one another in this respect, that the former depends entirely upon private injury or affront, and may arise even when the offender is not morally to blame; whereas the latter may be roused by an injury to others as well as to ourselves, and always supposes some moral guilt in the provoking party. As the injuries which are the object of Resentment are felt by us directly, so those which are the object of Indignation are in many cases felt by Sympathy, indirectly, and in these cases Indignation rarely becomes excessive. It is then a moral emotion, and when united with a decision or judgment, constitutes

* Merchant of Venice, Act III, Scene 1.

the moral sentiment of Disapprobation. Resentment, on the contrary, being roused by personal injury, is sometimes unjust, more frequently excessive, and at least it never fails to give additional energy to Moral Indignation.

5. *Jealousy.* Jealousy, whatever be its object, comprises two proximate elements, (1) a fear of being deprived by another of something which we consider our right; (2) a feeling of Hate towards the author of the injury. The emotion of Hate has been already analysed. Thus, Fear and Hate are the essential elements of Jealousy, and the former precedes and gives birth to the latter. We hate because we fear to be deprived by another of something which we prize, and which we have been accustomed to consider as of right our own; so that it is the self-regarding Passion which rouses the Malevolent; and the two when united constitute Jealousy.

6. *Envy.* The Passion of Envy comprehends also two elements; (1) Grief at the superiority of another; (2) a feeling of Hate towards the possessor of such superiority.

Thus, a Passive emotion of Pain and an Active emotion of Hate, are the constituent elements of Envy, and the former rouses the latter. The envious man hates because he painfully feels the superiority of another, which is equivalent to his

own inferiority; and he hates without the shadow of pretence that any mortification was intended. It is enough that another, however innocently, has caused him to feel humiliated. Envy, then, is an unjust passion, and the mark of a bad mind; whereas Jealousy may be well-founded and blameless; for no one is blamed for fearing to lose his due, and some ill-will towards those who rob us of our rights seems altogether unavoidable.

Envy, moreover, is a confession of inferiority, for were we not really inferior we should not feel so. But Jealousy denies superiority and asserts equality at least. Envy, then, cannot be a passion of great minds, though Jealousy may. Othello, as Iago allows, was of a "noble nature;" nor does his Jealousy seem at variance with that character; but had he been represented as envious, he would have forfeited all title to our respect.*

Since Love of Superiority is the universal passion, and since every superiority in another lessens our own, we may be sure that Envy is very general; though it be the ugliest feature of human nature, the blane of the mind, a sore which ever runs, for it is ever irritated, and which, if stopped for a time, only breaks out again with greater malignity.

Where the little-minded feel *Envy*, more gene-

* "La plus veritable marque d'être né avec de grandes qualités, c'est d'être né sans envie."—*Rochefoucauld*, Max. 455.

rous natures experience *Emulation.* Envy and Emulation agree so far that in each there is some uneasiness at another's superiority; but whereas in Envy this uneasiness gives rise to Hate, a wish to depreciate, and if possible to pull down our competitor to our own level; in Emulation, on the contrary, it awakens the desire of raising ourselves. In the one case, then, the primary Grief rouses a Malevolent, in the other a Self-regarding passion, and this difference of result will depend upon the talents and moral disposition. Where any one is conscious that he cannot rise, Envy will be apt to grow up; where advancement seems attainable, Emulation will probably ensue.

We may remark this difference between the Malevolent desire which belongs to Anger and Resentment, and the one included under Envy, that the former is a Primary or Original desire, the latter Secondary or derived from another. When we receive an injury, Anger immediately follows, and the Anger vents itself without any notion that the injury can thereby be repaired. If a man be struck, his anger rises, and he instantly returns the blow, though the fracture of an adversary's rib will not mend his own. The Malevolent feeling, in this case, therefore, is original, not dependent on calculation, nor subservient to any other design. But in Envy, the Grief experienced cannot be looked upon as an

injury for which any one is to blame, otherwise Resentment, not Envy, would be felt, and consequently Hatred here is not roused immediately. A painful sense of Inferiority is felt, instantly followed by the desire of relieving this uneasiness; the mind then turns to the innocent cause of the same, wishes to pull it down as the means of raising self, and finally comes to hate it as the obstacle to Self-Complacency. In this case, then, the Malevolent feeling is the consequence of a self-regarding desire. The same holds true of that passion which most nearly resembles Envy, namely, Jealousy, as has been already observed under that head.*

Since Envy and Jealousy both originate in desire of Superiority, or of Equality at least, it follows that this desire, in a greater or less degree, must *tend* to promote Malevolent passions. Envy, indeed, can never want for food, so long as high and low, rich and poor, exist in the world; and only modesty or kindness on the part of the great seem capable of alleviating it; but peculiar circumstances may greatly favour or repress Jealousy. Even Envy has less for its object those who are very much above us, because we are not accustomed to compare our-

* The Angry Passions, including Simple Anger, Resentment, Revenge, Indignation, might be classed together as a sub-genus of Hate; and the Jealous Passions, namely, Jealousy and Envy, as another sub-genus.

selves with them, from which comparison alone a painful sense of Inferiority is felt. But Jealousy exists only between competitors, between those who stand nearly on equal terms, and who, consequently, have similar pretensions. Jealousy fears to be supplanted and outdone, rather than confesses inferiority, and is nourished by doubt, destroyed by certainty. Whatever, then, keeps up doubt, will tend to promote Jealousy. It may be said to spring from Pretension mixed with Diffidence. Therefore, an uncertain position, combined with an eager desire of rising, cannot fail to fan the passion. Now these are the essential elements of a democratical state of Society, which by breaking down every barrier between one class and another, by presenting honours and emoluments as the prize, not indeed of all, but of any, opens up a boundless field to the desires and energies of man. These desires and these energies cannot fail to do great things, as they have in America; but as they meet with a thousand competitors, they will rouse a thousand Jealousies; and though national prosperity will be advanced, and the national grandeur promoted, Tranquillity of Mind will be unknown.

7. *Contempt* is a mixture of Pride with Hatred or Dislike; and is directly opposed to *Respect*, which unites Humility with Love.

II. MALICE. Malice seems to bear the same

relation to Hatred which Pity does to Love. As Pity is composed of two elements, a painful sympathy with the sufferings of another, who may be no friend, and a desire to relieve those sufferings, so Malice is compounded of a pleasurable feeling, arising from the pains of another, who is no enemy, and of a desire to inflict such pains. The one unites a painful Sympathy with desire of relief, the other pleasurable Antipathy with desire of its continuance. This desire also, like that which belongs to Pity, probably admits of a further Analysis, for it seems to be compounded of (1) A desire of the continuance of that pleasure of Antipathy which we experience, and (2) A desire of the continuance of the occasion of that pleasure, viz. the pain of another. And as in Pity the primary element is a pain of Sympathy, so in Malice the original element is a pleasure of Antipathy, which seems necessary to produce the desire which follows.

Be it observed that Malice is quite an exception to the general law of human nature; for where there is no particular reason to the contrary, Sympathy not Antipathy, Good-will, not Ill-will, is the rule. But simple Malice supposes no cause of Hatred, and therefore it may be looked upon as a vile excrescence rather than an ordinary part of the mental system. Malice also has in it nothing personal, that is peculiar to any one

more than another, but applies indifferently to all.

Malice, however, is not Misanthropy; for the primary element in the one is Pleasure, in the other Pain. Besides, the latter, if it exist, is a permanent feeling; the former but an occasional emotion; and whereas Malice supposes no previous injustice, Misanthropy arises from some injury or series of injuries inflicted on an individual, who, by association, comes to hate not only those who injured him, but even the whole human race.

ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS.

Part II.

Theory.

Having now completed our Analysis and Classification of the Emotions, we may proceed to enquire whether it be possible to draw any general conclusions from this long detail of facts. The reader will observe that we strictly follow the Inductive method, by which alone we can hope to arrive at the knowledge of General Principles.

When we pass in review all the Social Emotions, divided into the Benevolent and the Malevolent, the conclusion at once presents itself, that the Primary or Original Element of all these emotions is some feeling of Pleasure or of Pain. In every case this pleasure or pain precedes the movement of desire, and therefore we are justified in concluding that it is the cause of that desire. As all our knowledge

of Cause and Effect amounts to little more than this, that the one invariably precedes and the other invariably follows; wherever we find such a sequence of phenomena, we may conclude that a relation of causation exists between them.

Passive feelings then, pleasurable or painful, must be considered as the cause of all our Benevolent and Malevolent desires; and in general Pleasure is the Source of the Benevolent; Pain of the Malevolent. We call those feelings Passive because they are not immediately connected with outward Action, but inert they by no means are.

Here, however, a remarkable exception presents itself. Though, in general, Pleasure is the source of the Benevolent, Pain of the Malevolent Emotions, as in all the varieties of Love and Hate, yet in the two emotions of Pity and Malice, which we have separated from Love and Hate, the contrary holds good; for in Pity and Malice, Pain and Pleasure create good and ill will respectively. We feel the sufferings of our brother, and desire to relieve them; we are gratified at another's vexation, and wish to plague him. How shall we account for this anomaly? Is the anomaly real or only apparent? How comes it to pass that the pain which we experience in Pity, instead of venting itself against the unhappy author of that pain, urges us to acts of kindness?

Let us observe in the first place, that we do not compassionate all the sufferings of our fellows ; nay, that those sufferings often rouse a contrary feeling. A beggar with sores who forces himself on our notice, or a miserable object clad in rags and eaten up with vermin, rouses our anger or disgust, rather than our pity, though, to outward appearances, he be in the extremity of woe. Again, whenever we have reason to think that the sufferer has brought his calamities on himself, Pity is replaced by Indignation ; and be it remarked, that people have a great tendency to suppose that calamities are the result of ill-conduct, and seem to wish to persuade themselves to this effect. They thus obtain an excuse for not pitying, and not relieving.

Men in general, the proud especially, pity the misfortunes of their relations less than those of strangers, because they feel humiliated by them, and this painful feeling of humility creates dislike rather than compassion.

Some are so sensitive, so shocked by the appearance of misery, that they fly from every sight of woe ; so that with these, dislike or horror, certainly not pity, is the consequence.

Many men have but little tendency to compassion at any time, and instead of pitying, are apt to despise the poor and unfortunate. This is the case particularly with Proud and Self-Confident characters,

who think themselves too secure to be in danger of falling into the like calamities.

Lastly, Pity is but little felt towards beings unlike ourselves; unlike either in species or in the order of society. Persons otherwise of compassionate natures, even sensitive women, are often known to kill and torture the lower kinds of animals; and in those states of society where permanent Inequality reigns, the sufferings of slaves and others are regarded by their masters and superiors with wonderful indifference.

In all the above cases there is no exception to the rule that pain somehow proceeding from another is the cause of Malevolent feelings; for in the first five cases, some modification of Hate, some dislike is roused; in the last no pain is felt.

However, with these exceptions, the sufferings of our fellow creatures do certainly rouse Compassion. But observe, that the feelings thus called up are by no means exclusively painful. The first impression undoubtedly is so, but consequent thereon is a feeling of Self-Complacency, proceeding from the consciousness of our being susceptible of so amiable an emotion as Sympathy. Then comes an emotion of Pride, which arises from comparing the miserable state of another with our own more fortunate condition. These two feelings, being both of an agreeable nature, serve to neutralize, in part, if not entirely, the primary painful emotion, and

prevent any ill-will towards the unhappy occasion of that pain. And ill-will being repressed, another desire naturally springs up, desire of relief to that uneasiness which may remain, instantly followed by the wish to remove the cause, the sufferings of another. But if the Pride which waits upon Pity become excessive, it will stifle Good-will instead of promoting it; and then the painful feeling of Sympathy will create dislike, which when combined with Pride, constitutes Contempt. Pity, then, and Contempt, are often roused under similar circumstances, according to the disposition of mind that may be exposed to the sight of woe.

If the above explanation be correct, it will follow that the instance of Pity is no real anomaly, that it forms no real exception to the rule, that Pain somehow proceeding from another is the cause of Malevolent feelings; for every cause may be overcome by an opposite cause sufficiently powerful; and in this case the opponent Pleasure counteracts the tendency of Pain; but not completely; for on many occasions, and with some dispositions in particular, the tendency of Pain to produce ill-will becomes even here apparent.

Upon the whole, when the sufferings of others give us unmixed pain, especially the pain of Humility, they create simply dislike; when they may be traced with some probability to the fault of

the sufferer, they rouse Indignation; when they present themselves to a very proud character, Contempt; which results are all in agreement with the general principle: but when those sufferings give us a mingled feeling of Pain and Pleasure, particularly a gentle emotion of Self-Complacency, then the Malevolent desire is replaced by the Benevolent; and this, as we have seen, is no real exception to the general law.

The only question which now remains to be answered is, why a large dose of Pride produces Indifference or Contempt, while a smaller quantity of the same is favourable to Compassion. As the feeling is the same in kind, why is the effect so different? When Pride becomes prevalent and habitual, it renders a man indifferent to the calamities of those beneath him, partly on the principle of occupation; for when the mind is habitually filled with Pride, there is no room for the softer emotions; partly on the principle that we fully sympathize with those only whom we consider similar to ourselves, and whose fate may become our own. The proud man looks upon those below him as an inferior race of beings, and has little or no sympathy with joys or woes which he thinks can never be his. But should he at all sympathize with such woes, he could feel no perceptible increase of Pride by comparing his own prosperity with the misfor-

tunes of those whom he considers so far beneath him. Nay, such a comparison would wound rather than gratify his Pride, for comparison appears an approach to equality. Therefore the sufferings of humanity cannot increase the self-satisfaction of the proud man; but on the contrary, so far as felt, they must rather diminish it, for they create a secret consciousness that he is of the same clay. Hence Contempt, rather than Pity, is the consequence.

But the man of humble mind, being not engrossed by Pride, is more open to the tender feelings; and though the woes of others give him pain, yet, on the other hand, they rouse some Self-complacency, because he has never been accustomed to consider himself above humanity. "Homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto" has been his maxim; and therefore he is content to occupy a good place in the scale. On this account, he neither dislikes nor despises, but on the contrary, pities the wretched.

With respect to Malice, which still remains to be explained, we may repeat the observation, that the feeling which lies at the bottom of it, namely, a pleasure of Antipathy, is quite an exception to the general law of human nature; for where there is no particular reason to the contrary, Sympathy is the rule. But supposing such a pleasure to exist, how comes it to pass that it does not, as in

other cases, rouse a Benevolent rather than a Malevolent feeling? To this the simple answer is, because a Benevolent feeling is inconsistent with the continuance of the pleasure. The pleasure of the malicious man is derived from the pain of another; and since he desires to continue that pleasure, he naturally wishes to perpetuate the pain from which it springs. The only thing unaccountable is the original feeling of Antipathy, for this being supposed to exist, the rest follows of course. Sympathy, as well as Antipathy, must be looked upon as ultimate facts in human nature; the one the rule, the other the exception. And this original feeling of Antipathy is not only an exception, but it is so anomalous that it may almost be considered as a disease. When Antipathy is connected with Hatred the case is different; for it is then no longer an original feeling, but the consequence of the previous state of mind in reference to an individual. When one man hates another, he naturally receives pleasure from the pain and pain from the pleasure of the detested object.

But in Malice there is no previous hatred, and therefore here the feeling of Antipathy is original and unaccountable. When we say that it is owing to a peculiar constitution of mind, we give no information; we only state what has been already said, that it is a peculiar fact, of which the cause is unknown.

Hobbes denies that Sympathy is an *ultimate* fact, in other words, that the pains of others, simply and immediately, are a cause of pain to us; for he says that the effect is produced by the consideration that we ourselves are exposed to similar evils. We are witnesses of a calamity, we consider that the like may befall us, and therefore we sympathize with it. Now it must be allowed that the circumstances of similarity and dissimilarity have a great influence in increasing or diminishing the feeling of Sympathy; that the nearer the sufferers come to us in species, station, age, character, even in space and time, the more are we prone to feel for them. We are certainly more afflicted by a small calamity in our own parish than by a great disaster in China or Japan. The fall of a house in our own street affects us more than that of the amphitheatre of Fidena, in the days of Tiberius, which buried in its ruins fifty thousand spectators. Above all, if we have actually experienced any calamity, we feel for it the more readily in others. "Le cœur, cher Chactas, est comme ces sortes d'arbres, qui ne donnent leur baume pour les blessures des autres, que quand le fer les a blessés eux-mêmes.*

True and beautiful words! This similarity,

* The heart, dear Chactas, is like those trees which yield no balm for the wounds of others until the iron has wounded themselves. —*Chateaubriand.*

this nearness to ourselves, seems necessary, *first*, to arrest our attention, and *secondly*, to enlighten our imagination; for we cannot even comprehend the ills of creatures very different from ourselves; and why should we attend much to events over which we can have no control? and without attention, without adequate conception, we of course cannot sympathize. Similarity, then, is a circumstance which greatly promotes Sympathy, supposing a tendency thereto already to exist; but, that a return on Self is essential to Sympathy, is a pure hypothesis; for innumerable cases occur in which we are unconscious of any such consideration. It is more agreeable to experience to admit that the pains as well as the pleasures of others affect us immediately, and that the circumstances of the case greatly modify the degree of Sympathy.

One or two very important questions with respect to our Desires still remain to be discussed. *First*, It has often been asked whether all our Desires, without exception, be at the bottom Self-regarding, in other words, whether they all arise from the prospect of some Good or Evil to Self?

Before answering this question directly, let us repeat that Sympathy with the weal or woe of others is an undoubted fact in human nature; and this Sympathy, even with strangers, with persons in no way connected with us, seems to arise im-

mediately on the view of their happiness or misery. Hobbes indeed, as we have just seen, says "*Grief* for the calamity of another is Pity, and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself." But were this theory true, (for the first part only of the sentence expresses a fact, the second a theory), still the fact is certain that we do sympathize with others, or, in other words, have a fellow-feeling for them, in numberless cases where our own interests are not immediately concerned. The Theory of Hobbes does not deny Sympathy, but only attempts to explain its origin by a distant reference to Self. Besides, we have seen that the theory is not sufficiently supported.

Again, it cannot be denied that we often desire the good of others, and sometimes their evil, and that too in cases where the good or evil of others seems productive of no benefit to ourselves. No doubt, it has been maintained, that in desiring the welfare of others we really look to our own gratification, and that the pleasure anticipated from Sympathy creates the motive to deeds of Charity and Love. Were this theory true, for this also is a theory, it would not disprove the reality of our Benevolent desires; it would only account for their origin, supposing them to exist. In every view of the case, then, the pleasures and pains of

Sympathy, which reach us by reflection, in other words, *because* pleasure or pain has first been felt by others, must be distinguished from the pleasures and pains which affect us directly; and the desires which look immediately to the welfare of our fellow creatures, which becomes our own only by Sympathy, must be separated from the desires which urge us to our own gratification without regard to that of others.

But we may proceed further, and maintain that all our Desires do not *originate* in the prospect of some good or evil to Self. To prove this, we need only consider the phenomena of Anger, Love, and Gratitude. Take the case of Anger. When a man, particularly one of a choleric temper, receives a blow, does he take time to consider what benefit or injury may result to himself from returning it? If he do, we may be sure that Anger is not uppermost in his mind, but Prudence, Fear, or some other principle. He may certainly restrain his anger from prudential considerations, from Fear, from Respect, but that is nothing to the present purpose, for it is by no means contended that Anger cannot be mastered. But supposing it to be indulged in, what does it imply? When a blow or other injury is received, the first impulse is to return it; and if the impulse be not checked, the injury is returned forthwith. To the feeling of injury, to the

perception of an individual as the cause of that injury, there succeeds immediately a violent emotion of Hatred towards that individual, comprising pain at his presence, and desire of evil towards him. Between the perception of the being who has injured us, and the subsequent emotion of Hatred, it does not seem possible to detect any intervening feeling, much less any calculation of consequences, or balancing of opposing advantages. The emotion and its consequences are too sudden to admit of such an hypothesis. This is confirmed by the circumstance, that Anger and its results are often in direct opposition to our interests; as we ourselves acknowledge when we become cool. It is a powerful object with the crafty and ambitious man to keep down his temper, to subdue every appearance of Resentment; for this, he knows, might mar the success of his schemes. To feign Love, or at least Insensibility, where Hate is the natural emotion, belongs to the deceitful man, because Hate is impolitic.

It seems then vain to deny that the Malevolent feeling contained in Anger, looks really to the evil of another, not to the good of self. That desire is roused, as experience proves, not by the prospect of some personal pleasure to come, but by some pain actually felt. There is surely no reason prior to experience, why hurt to one who has injured us,

may not be an ultimate object of desire. Pleasure to self may be a more general object, but *must* it be the only one? And where there is no convincing *a priori* argument, experience should decide.

Now what has been said of Anger, applies equally to Love and Gratitude. In many instances where favours have been received, Love towards our benefactor rises instantly, far too suddenly to admit of any calculation as to the advantages likely to result to ourselves from returning his kindness, and even too quickly to allow of the pleasure of Sympathy being presented to the mind in prospect as an object of desire. As far as our experience tells us, and we can go no further, the Love, the Goodwill, immediately follows the feeling of a benefit, and the perception of a benefactor; nor are we sensible of any intervening sequence of phenomena. That sequence must then be pronounced hypothetical, and the utmost that can be said is, that there is a bare possibility that the mind, quick as lightning, sees the pleasure of sympathy before it, and desires in consequence. But besides the high probability against this, derived from direct experience, we may draw an argument from Analogy; for if it be proved in one case, as in the case of Anger, that we can desire something besides the good of self, namely the evil of others, it will not appear improbable that we are capable of desiring their good as an ultimate

object. As, in the case of Anger, ill-will follows instantly after the injury received, so, in the case of Gratitude, the good will immediately succeeds to the benefit. Thus it is the pain or the pleasure already experienced, not a vague pleasure in prospect, which in these instances rouses the emotion of desire.

The question with which we set out, whether all our desires originate in the prospect of some good or evil to self, is thus determined in the negative.

The origin of the social desires being thus discussed, a *second* question remains, whether all the other desires, which we have called self-regarding, may be reduced to desire of pleasure of some kind, in other words, desire of self-gratification; whether, in short, they be all varieties of one principle, Self-Love: or whether there be desires, such as Ambition, Covetousness, Curiosity, which, though they look to self in some measure, may still be distinguished from Self-Love? *

The truth probably is, that Pleasure, positive or negative, is the *original* object of all our self-regarding desires, but it does not therefore follow that we can never desire anything but Pleasure;

* This last opinion was broached by Bishop Butler in his Sermons at the Rolls, and has since been adopted by Dr. Brown in his Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. III. Lect. lxv, lxvi. What Butler calls *Self Love*, is a calm calculating view of our interests; a principle, according to him, essentially different from the Passions.

for when an object has long been associated with pleasure, that object comes at last to be desired for itself, without any actual thought of the pleasure that may attend it. Thus, Riches are at first sought as the means of enjoyment, afterwards for their own sake; and the same may be said of Life; but in both cases they are sought for ourselves, not for others, and therefore in both cases the desire is Self-regarding. Whether it be Pleasure, or Power, or Riches, or Knowledge, or continued Existence, it is still *our* Pleasure, *our* Power, *our* Riches, *our* Life, which we seek to increase or prolong. What though the immediate object be not always Pleasure? If the object be the good of Self in any form, surely the Principle is the same, and therefore the term should be the same, viz. Self-Love. Though the desire contained in Self-Love may be under the guidance of Reason and Calculation, that does not change the nature of the desire, but only regulates its intensity, or rather the outward signs of intensity, restraining these when necessary to the end in view. Here, Self-Love is a compound state of mind, but the desire which forms part of that compound is of no peculiar sort; it differs not from other desires and passions. When we say that one man is governed by Reason, another by Impulse, we must not suppose that the moving principle is necessarily different, or

that Reason is at all a principle of Action; we can mean only that the desire, whatever it be, is more or less guided by Reflection.

But the assertion with which we set out, that Pleasure of some kind or other, Pleasure positive or negative, is the *original* object of all our Self-regarding desires, deserves more particular proof.

It is allowed by the advocates of an opposite opinion, that Pleasure always accompanies, or at least follows, the desire, when the object is attained; and it is also allowed that such Pleasure may afterwards increase the desire, or rouse a similar one on a future occasion; but it is denied that in the first instance Pleasure was necessarily the object in view, and the source of the desire. They do not dispute that Pleasure is one source of Self-regarding desire, but they deny that it is the only primary one, and affirm that Power, Knowledge, etc. are originally coveted for themselves.

Since Pleasure is admitted to be one immense source of Desire, since the attainment of every Desire is attended with Pleasure, and since this Pleasure certainly re-acts upon the Desire, enough is allowed whereon to build a probability that Pleasure may be the source of all. But in order to decide this point, we must further consult Experience.

It is notorious that men do not desire things eagerly until they feel a *want* of them. But what

is meant by a want, is a passive feeling of Pain, accompanied by the desire of relief to that pain. Thus, when we are hungry or thirsty, we are said to be in want of food; that is, we experience a certain sensation of a painful nature, attended by desire of relief. Hunger, Thirst, etc. are properly called *Appetites*, because the pain is a sensation, or immediately depends upon a change in the state of the body. In all cases, then, of bodily want, there is first a pain, and then a desire to get rid of it, which is a desire of Negative Pleasure; and the greater the pain, the stronger the desire. But, wants are mental as well as bodily; and in the feeling of wants there is an immense difference between men, and desires vary in proportion. Persons of little sensibility, little alive to annoyance or pain of any kind, are apt to be indolent, while sensitive natures are always full of wishes and activity. Those who feel no uneasiness in the absence of comforts and luxuries, as savages, slaves, particularly negro slaves, never desire them eagerly; and persons who feel no shame, no distress at ignorance, never seek knowledge with ardour. The pain of Ennui is a great incentive to exertion, but when the habit is acquired (and acquired it may be) of being idle without uneasiness, there is no hope of amendment, for desire is dead. Whatever renders Home agreeable and comfortable

deadens the longing for gay amusements, such as Plays, Operas, Concerts, Balls, etc. which are frequented by the single, or those less happy at home, who alone feel a want of them. The domestic may relish such amusements, perhaps, quite as much as others, but they must force themselves to go; while the others, urged by Ennui or Discomfort, cannot keep away. Hence the connexion between these three things, Comfort, Domesticity, Morality.

These facts being granted, it seems to follow that Pain actually experienced, not a vague Pleasure in prospect, is the original source of Desire. An uneasiness is felt; the immediate consequence is a desire to get rid of the same, and hence all other desires. But desire of relief from pain is only one form of Desire of Pleasure; and therefore, the result upon the whole is, that Pain, actually felt, is the source, the origin, the first exciting cause of Desire, while Pleasure is its object. The first desire that arises in the mind of an infant is desire of relief to that uneasiness which he feels in the absence of food; but after he has tasted the food, he can desire the same, because it is positively agreeable. What is it that first induces us to use our limbs and move them from place to place? Not the pleasure of Activity which is as yet unknown to us, but the uneasiness resulting from

inaction. Afterwards, indeed, that pleasure is an inducement, but not at first. The same holds good of mental activity, the first spur to which is Ennui. So, what compels us to seek Change or Variety? Not the charms peculiar to variety, which as yet we know not, but the uneasy feelings resulting from Sameness or Repetition. Thus it probably is with all our Desires; and had we not known the pains of Privation, of Insecurity, of Inferiority, and of Ignorance, we should not have eagerly coveted Riches, Power, and Knowledge.

Search and you will find that every Desire has a pain belonging to it; and as no one pretends that Pain is the effect of Desire, what can it be but the cause? And that Pain does really precede, not follow Desire, we conceive to be proved by Experience.

Talking of Curiosity, Brown has said, and his observation applies to many other desires, "Pleasure, indeed, attends the discovery; but it is surely very evident that there must have been Curiosity before the Pleasure, or no pleasure could have been felt. Pain or Disquietude attends the ungratified Curiosity. But in like manner, there must have been a previous desire of Knowledge; or if there was no previous desire of knowing anything, there could be no pain in the continued ignorance."*

* Lectures: Vol. III. Lect. lxvi.

Now, what is this but begging the question? and on what ground can it be said that there "*must* have been curiosity before the pleasure, or no pleasure *could* have been felt? or, "that there *must* have been a previous desire of Knowledge, or if there was no previous desire of knowing anything, there *could* be no pain in the continued ignorance?" Do we see *a priori*, any necessity in the case? Might we not as well reverse the proposition, and say: It is surely very evident that there must have been pleasure in prospect before the curiosity, or no curiosity could be felt; or that there must have been a previous pain in ignorance, or had there been no previous pain in ignorance there could be no desire of knowledge.

Surely one of these propositions is as necessary in our eyes, is as self-evident as the other. But we do not tread on the high *priori* road; but on the humble but safer way of Experience. To Experience, then, we appeal, direct as well as indirect, the latter being called Analogy; and we maintain that not only the innumerable cases in which pleasure is certainly the object of desire, and the allowed inseparable connection between the two, render it probable that pleasure in some form or other, positive or negative, is the original object of all Self-regarding Desire; but also, the direct experience of all our wants, bodily and mental, seems to prove that

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pain is originally ***the indispensable antecedent***, in other words, the actual cause of Desire; while the absence thereof, or negative Pleasure, is its first object.

Pain, therefore, as I have elsewhere said "is the *Primum mobile* of the human race,"* first in the order of Time, as well as in importance.

The existence of evil has ever been, and will ever be, the great stumbling-block of Natural Theology; for our faculties are too limited, as compared with the vastness and variety of the universe, to allow of the hope that we shall ever be able by unassisted reason, fully to "vindicate the ways of God to man."

But, to the religious, every glimpse behind the veil which hides from their eyes the mysteries of the Holy of Holies is invaluable. When, then, we see, that Pain, itself the grand cause of offence, has yet a beneficial tendency, by rousing our faculties, we cannot but embrace with ardour a truth so consoling, so favourable to the idea of Providence; and how small soever may be the portion of the heavenly veil which thus is drawn aside, we shall there for ever gaze, in hopes that hereafter more may be disclosed.

When treating of the Social Desires, we found

* Enquiry into the Principles of Human Happiness and Human Duty, Book I. Part iii, chap. 2.

that those desires are real, and different from the self-regarding; and that they take their origin in Passive Emotions of Pleasure and Pain, roused by another; and now we find that the self-regarding desires originate in feelings of Pain. Therefore, the grand conclusion is, that desire universally springs from the actual feeling of Pleasure or of Pain; that the Self-regarding as well as the Malevolent affections, Malice excepted, take their origin from Pain; the Benevolent from Pleasure alone, except Pity, which springs from a mixture of Pain and Pleasure.

If, then, you wish for the love of others, try to confer Pleasure; and beware of giving Pain, if you would not be an object of Hate.

From the above principles we may also draw this inference: that Pain of every kind, bodily as well as mental, tends to render men Selfish or Malevolent; while Pleasure opens the heart, and disposes it to Love and Charity.*

* Pity, indeed, as depending in part upon Pain, may be more lively in those who have suffered themselves; but much private suffering is unfavourable to this amiable emotion. The remark of Tacitus, in reference to a Military Tribune, *et eo immitior quia toleraverat*, is one of general application.

Note to Page 15.

Vanity is the desire of the admiration of others; so called chiefly when fixed upon small things, or when very prominent and exacting.

Pride is Self-admiration on account of some excellence, real or supposed; so called chiefly when in excess.

Self-Conceit is the *Amour propre* of the French; a compound of Pride and Vanity; not so self-dependent as simple Pride; not so dependent upon others, as simple Vanity. This compound may be considered the ordinary state of man, for few are so distrustful of themselves as to live entirely upon the praises of others; few are so self-satisfied as utterly to neglect them.

Vanity tends to make a man ridiculous: *first,* because it is usually fixed on small things, is demonstrative and exacting.

Secondly, because Vanity is often ill-founded.

Thirdly, because in seeking applause, it argues some self-distrust. This incongruity between the palpable efforts at display and the real want of capability, between the outward bearing and the inward man, is of the very essence of the ludicrous.

Pride, on the other hand, seldom causes *Ridicule,* often *Aversion,* and, not unfrequently, *Respect.*

It causes Aversion, because, by assuming Self-Superiority, it creates in others the pain of Inferiority.

It generates Respect, when it is supposed to arise from the consciousness of solid qualities, such as Independence of Character, Disdain of Servility, Firmness, Constancy, and Hatred of all base actions. For a strong belief in the possession of such qualities is

generally more or less well-founded. The pleasure which accompanies this Pride, and the pain which attends its loss, are strong preservatives of Virtue.

Pride, which cares little for the suffrages of others, tends to render a man unsocial, and regardless of pleasing; while Vanity leads a man into society, and urges him to make himself agreeable, for it is only by giving pleasure to others that he can hope to obtain their applause.

Affectation is the offspring of Vanity and Diffidence. The bantling partakes of the character of its parents; for as the issue of Vanity, it seeks applause; as sprung from Diffidence, it is radically awkward. Affectation is laughed at; for what is more ludicrous than awkward attempts at display? Vanity *tends* to make a man ridiculous, but Affectation always does so. If there be more Vanity in France than in England, yet is there less Affectation; because there is less Diffidence.

The alliance of Pride with Diffidence seems less natural than that of Vanity and Diffidence; but it is by no means uncommon; for a person may be proud of his solid qualities or other advantages, and yet diffident of pleasing. And as the effects of Pride and of Diffidence upon the outward deportment are not unlike, Shyness or Reserve is attributed to the one or the other, according to the good or ill-will of the by-standers, though it may really be owing to an union of the two.

Affectation is a sign of mediocrity. There is hope of a man who is affected under twenty; but after that age not much.

Since Admiration and Love are kindred emotions, it would seem that Vanity, or Desire of being Admired, and the Desire of being Beloved, should also be allied. But as those who differ the least are sometimes the bitterest enemies, and as neighbouring, not distant states, are most apt to be foes, so Vanity and Desire of Affection most frequently come into collision. Between these the victory is often in suspense; and of all the triumphs of Love, the greatest is that over Vanity.

DISSERTATION FIRST.

ON BEAUTY AND SUBLIMITY.

A DISSERTATION ON BEAUTY AND SUBLIMITY.

PART I.—ON BEAUTY.

Chapter I.

Introduction.

In the Analysis and Classification of the Emotions, we assigned to Beauty and Sublimity their proper place; but as these emotions have long been considered as one of the most interesting, as well as one of the most difficult subjects of metaphysical inquiry, they demand a separate Dissertation.

How often has the question been started, What is Beauty? How various have been the accounts of its nature, how different the theories of its origin!

Vain and unprofitable would be the attempt to state and examine these numerous and conflicting systems, for though I should succeed in engaging the reader for a while, yet he must needs be tired in the end, and but ill-disposed to yield an undivided attention to any thing new that might here be set

before him. The writer, too, as well as the reader, becomes fatigued with an endless conflict; and when at last he brings forward his own views, he appears with a bad grace, like an Eastern Monarch who rises to power by the slaughter of all his rivals. But in metaphysical inquiries, and indeed in all inquiries which admit not of demonstration, it ought to be the writer's object to conciliate his readers, rather than arm them against himself by previous habits of controversy. Moreover, nothing tends so much to create general distaste for any subject, and even a contempt for it, as perpetual wrangling; for where there is so much variance, the indolent especially are apt to persuade themselves that nothing is really ascertained. Thus, the never-ending disputes which at one time prevailed among Political Economists, threw discredit on the science of National Wealth, as if it dealt merely in barren subtleties; whereas some of its most important principles were established beyond dispute. For these reasons, I shall proceed at once to the consideration of Beauty, without thinking it necessary to discuss all the systems of my predecessors; but without pretending to undervalue their efforts, or to deny how much I am indebted to some of them.

Chapter II.

On the Nature of Beauty.

In discussing Beauty, or any other emotion, the proper method appears to be to treat first of the Nature of the emotion, next of its Causes, and lastly, if this be thought necessary, of its Effects. We shall begin, then, with the Nature of Beauty.

In ordinary language, the word Beauty is taken in two different senses; for sometimes it means the inward feeling of the mind, sometimes the outward cause of that feeling, whether this be a material object, or something moral or intellectual. This double sense has been one plentiful source of confusion and error in treatises of Beauty; and a similar ambiguity served for a long while to perplex the writings of metaphysicians concerning the Qualities of Objects and the Nature of Sensation. But we must remember that Beauty is not a Sensation, but an Emotion. In a former work, I pointed out the distinction between our sensations and all other mental phenomena, and showed that it consists in this, that the Cause, or, in the language of Brown, The Immediate Invariable Antecedent, of a Sensation, is some change in the state of the body;

whereas the cause of the other mental phenomena, whether Perceptions, Conceptions, or Emotions, is itself some state of mind, and not any bodily affection. When the emotion of Beauty arises from material objects, the immediate antecedent is either a Sensation or a Perception; when it arises from something moral or intellectual, then the immediate antecedent is a Conception; but in all cases, that which immediately precedes is a change in the state of the mind. With Sensation it is otherwise: there the immediate antecedent is some change in the state of the nerves, whether of smell, sight, hearing, taste, or touch. But the Emotion of Beauty has often been confounded with Sensation, and for this reason, that, as in the case of Sensation, so in the case of Beauty, we mix up the Outward Cause with the Inward Effect, and, by a singular mental process, incorporate the beauty, which we feel, with the senseless object before us, just as we incorporate the colours, as seen by us, with inanimate matter. So long as the objects are before us this delusive process goes on, whether we will or not; but it requires, one would think, but a slight exercise of reflection, to be aware that nothing but mind can *feel*, and that the outward material cause must be something totally different from the inward effect, whether Colour or Beauty, of which we are conscious. But obvious as this may appear to us now, it does

not seem always to have been so; for when Locke brought forward the notion that the Secondary qualities of matter, such as colour, sound, taste, etc. are not in the objects themselves, but in our minds, he was thought, as Addison informs us, to have made a great discovery; but the discovery consisted only in separating the material cause from the inward and mental effect; for Locke never thought of denying that there are certain real qualities in objects which give rise to our sensations, still less that there are any material objects at all. It appears then that some reflection is necessary to distinguish between our feelings and the outward objects with which we mentally incorporate them; and as the mass of mankind are not much given to reflection, and as philosophers themselves are liable to popular error, we cannot greatly wonder that two such different things should have sometimes been confounded. And as we so readily incorporate the sensation of Colour as well as the emotion of Beauty with outward material objects, Beauty itself came to be thought a sensation. Besides, the one follows the other so closely that it was the more easy to confound the two.

How necessary it is to remember that Beauty is truly an Emotion, not a Sensation, we may learn from one of the best treatises in our language on this subject, viz. that of Burke. This well known

work is divided into five parts. The first three are pleasing, interesting, and philosophical; but the last two evince a woeful misapprehension of the subject. Having previously endeavoured, and, as I conceive, with very considerable success, to determine some of the sources of Beauty and Sublimity in outward objects, the author, in the fourth part, aims at finding out what he calls the *efficient cause*, by which he means the immediate efficient cause, or some link in the chain interposed between the qualities of outward objects, and the feeling of Beauty in the Mind, which link, according to him, is a change in the state of the Body. Thus he is led to attribute the emotions of Sublimity and Beauty, the one to a *contraction*, the other to a *relaxation* of the muscular fibre! This is nothing less than absurd. The cause, or immediate indispensable antecedent, of these emotions, is not a change in the state of the body, for then they would be Sensations, not Emotions, but a change in the state of the mind, a previous sensation or perception. Therefore, the attempt to discover the cause of Beauty in a change in the state of the body, must be altogether vain and futile.*

Let us then always bear in mind these two

* No less absurd is the attempt, in the Fifth Part, "Of Words," to prove that the effect of Poetry depends not at all upon the ideas it suggests! But I repeat that the first three parts of Burke's Inquiry are not only pleasing but truly philosophical.

things: *first*, that the Beauty which we feel must be distinguished from the outward cause which excites it; *secondly*, that Beauty is an Emotion, not a Sensation.

Beauty, then, is an emotion; a pleasurable emotion; but what else do we know of its nature? Is it simple or compound? Wonder, and other passions, such as Love, may combine with Beauty, and enhance the feeling, but they do not seem essential to its existence. Though

> The lover all as frantic
> Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt;

Yet the Love is one thing, and the Beauty which mingles with it, and is increased by it, is another. We often feel Beauty from objects which we cannot be said to love; and which, being far from new, rouse no emotion of Wonder.

And if Beauty do not arise from the union of two or more pleasing emotions, assuredly it cannot result from a mixture of painful emotions, or of pleasing with painful, because the feeling of Beauty is free from all pain. Therefore it is a simple emotion, and consequently, cannot be analysed or defined; though it may be described, as an emotion altogether pleasing, which we incorporate with outward objects.

Beauty is altogether pleasing; and herein it is distinguished from Sublimity, which, as we shall find, does not exclude some pain. Sublimity is

connected with Fear, Beauty with Joy or Love. This is one reason why, upon the whole, we prefer the Beautiful to the Sublime; though another reason is, that Beauty is a less violent emotion, and therefore fatigues less. It charms the soul, and leaves behind an impression which may linger long, without creating any violent perturbation, apt to be followed by a corresponding sinking of the spirits. Sublimity is related to Beauty as Pleasure is to Happiness; the one being an intense, but rare and temporary gratification, the other a more permanent delight. The former is the odour of the most precious essences distilled from the choicest herbs; the latter the perfume which salutes the sense from fields and gardens, on a warm and sunny day.

Beauty and Sublimity are distinguished from all other emotions by the *incorporating process* above alluded to, whereby the mind, unintentionally and unconsciously, nay, in defiance of reflection, communicates its own feelings to outward objects, clothing dead matter with the nature and qualities of spirit. While we gaze intently on anything that rouses the feeling of beauty, we cannot help thinking for the time, as many do all their lives, that what we inwardly experience is a part of the object before us, and therefore we call it beautiful; as if the beauty, which we alone feel, resided in

something outward. The experience drawn from every people and every language, proves the universality of this delusion, which is common to the careless and the thoughtful, with this only difference, that the latter, in the absence of the object, and in the hours of reflection, separates the feeling of his mind from insensible matter. It is this incorporating process which distinguishes Beauty and Sublimity from all other emotions, and therefore is really characteristic; for we never incorporate our Love, Hate, Desire, Fear, or Wonder, with their exciting causes, well knowing those to be in our minds alone, not in outward objects.

Another proof, if proof were wanting, of the delusive process, by which we are led to suppose that the Beauty or the Sublimity, which we alone feel, resides in things outward, might be drawn from one circumstance, in particular, belonging to ordinary language, viz: that while all the other emotions have verbs either of action or expressing states of being, connected with them, Beauty and Sublimity alone have none. Thus we have the verbs to Love, to Hate, to Desire, to Fear, to Wonder, to be Proud, to be Humble, to be Grateful, to be Revengeful, to be Cheerful, Melancholy, Languid, etc. but we cannot say to Beautiful, or to be Beautiful, for the last has quite a different meaning, and expresses not that we feel the emo-

tion. This seems as strong a proof as can be given, that the incorporating process here alluded to really takes place, and is peculiar to Beauty and Sublimity. Further, when we use the words to beautify, or to be beautiful, we express our conviction that we add beauty to outward objects, or that it already resides in them.

Beauty is a *Passive* Emotion; the mind *suffers* it, but it does not directly nor necessarily lead to action. Also, it is an *Immediate* Emotion; having no reference to time, past or future. Beauty is wholly occupied with the present, and therefore the idea of time enters not into it at all; for without reference to the past or the future, without the thought of succession, there can be no notion of time. So long as the impression remains, the mind is agreeably filled, and seeks not to dwell on the past, nor on the vague and boundless future. Therefore, the feeling of Beauty is a prodigious solace to the mind, relieving melancholy recollections, as well as eating cares, breaking the routine of thought, and varying the train of ideas by lively and softening images. Beauty is not like our principal desires, Love, Ambition, Covetousness, etc. or like Cheerfullness and Melancholy, a permanent emotion, but it is roused occasionally as the proper objects present themselves, and subsides as soon as they are absent; though it may leave behind a vague agreeable

impression, to continue for some length of time. When one has lately witnessed some scene of unusual beauty, the mind does not at once return to its ordinary state, but retains a gentle but pleasing emotion, like the swell of the sea after the wind is hushed.

Beauty is distinguished from Utility, and in a certain sense is superior to it; for while Utility only tends to enjoyment, Beauty is enjoyment itself. Whatever some writers may say, no two things appear more different than Beauty and Utility; nay, they are often utterly opposed, so that the more we cultivate the one, the less can we have of the other. True it is that a certain beauty does seem to arise from Contrivance, the skilful adaptation of means to an end; and as no one takes the trouble of contriving what appears to be entirely useless, therefore it has been supposed that Utility is a source of Beauty. But this seems disproved by the fact, that the Contrivance alone is of any avail in this respect, the excellence of the end being altogether unimportant; for as much Beauty may arise from an ingenious musical snuff-box, or other toy, as from a well-built ship which wafts us from England to the Indies, and conveys the superabundance of one country to feed the penury of another. But this branch of the subject belongs properly to the following chapter.

We must remember that the emotion of Beauty is not absolutely one and the same. The term comprehends emotions which differ in some degree, though they be sufficiently alike to be classed together under a common name; for our ideas and our emotions are more varied than our language. The most striking varieties are, Material, Intellectual, and Moral Beauty; and even in each of these there may be smaller differences, which have no name. In the following chapter, we shall consider chiefly the sources of material Beauty, which may enable us to judge of the rest.

Beauty is felt by all mankind, though not always from the same objects, still less in the same degree from the same objects. Much, then, must depend upon the individual mind; but are there no General Principles, or Causes, upon which the emotion depends? I shall endeavour to answer this question in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE SOURCES OF BEAUTY.

SECTION FIRST.

Does Beauty depend entirely on Association?

IT must be allowed that an inquiry into the Sources of Beauty, is one of the most difficult within the range of Metaphysics; but it is also one of the most interesting; and if, in what has preceded, I have been successful in throwing light upon the Nature of the Emotion, I trust that the still greater difficulties which beset this part of the Dissertation will not be found insuperable.

In the very threshold of our inquiry into the sources or causes of Beauty, we are met by an opinion supported by great names, and maintained with much ingenuity of argument, and power of eloquence, the opinion that there are no Original Causes of Beauty at all, none deeply fixed in the nature of things; but that the Emotion is derived entirely from Association. If this be true, then it is evident that we may save ourselves the trouble of inquiring into the Original Sources of Beauty, for on this supposition there are none, no Standard of

Beauty or of Taste, and no true philosophy applicable to the subject. Before proceeding any further, therefore, it is necessary to examine this point, and at some length.

At first sight assuredly, the probability is against those who maintain the above opinion. In the previous chapter, we found that the Emotion of Beauty is a simple or elementary feeling of the mind; and if so, it would appear to be original, like all other elementary feelings. All elementary feelings are original, and all original feelings are elementary; how then can Beauty be an exception? And if the feeling be original, it must have its proper original cause. This argument alone appears to be conclusive. That association may rouse a feeling already experienced, we can readily conceive, but that it can create a feeling entirely new, it seems impossible to admit. Assuredly, association has no such power; for association supposes the previous existence of feeling, which from some circumstance is suggested on a future occasion, and which never could be so suggested, had it not been first experienced from the proper cause. It would be quite as absurd to say that Moral Sentiment is derived entirely from association, as to affirm that Beauty is; for association may change, modify, or pervert, provided there be something to be changed, modified, or perverted; but, in all cases, some foun-

dation is supposed on which association rests. To build in association alone, is to build without a base.

The next argument is of a more popular nature than the former, and is not without its weight. All men think and talk of Beauty as if there were something fixed on which it depends; and they would be nearly as much astonished to be told that they were in error in this respect, as to be assured that the material world is nothing but an empty pageant, a phantom of the brain. Nay, we have seen that they carry this notion so far as to believe that Beauty resides entirely in things outward; and though this be a delusion, yet it must be allowed to be more probable, that, in part at least, they are right, than not at all. But according to the theory which we are now considering, Beauty is entirely the creature of the brain, without any definite standard in nature whatever; a feeling of a new and peculiar nature, elaborated by some mysterious process, by some metaphysical alchemy, out of other and different feelings, and yet not compounded of any of them. At the least, then, the burthen of proof lies with those who oppose the universal sense of mankind.

The grand argument which is relied on by those who deny all original Beauty, is the endless diversity of sentiment that prevails on this subject. They refer triumphantly to the various and seemingly

opposite feelings and opinions which have been known to exist, not only in distant ages and in different countries, but in the same country at short intervals of time; especially to the changes of fashion; what was the *mode* and what was generally admired but a few years ago, appearing ludicrous now, as the present fashion will soon appear to others, and even to ourselves. But, though fashion be the most palpable case in point, on account of the sudden change in our own feelings, yet there are other as great and more permanent differences. What different ideas are formed in different nations concerning the beauty of the human shape and countenance? "A fair complexion is a shocking deformity on the coast of Guinea. Thick lips and a flat nose are a beauty. In some nations, long ears that hang down upon the shoulders are the objects of universal admiration. In China, if a lady's foot is so large as to be fit to walk upon, she is regarded as a monster of ugliness."* So writes Adam Smith, with some exaggeration, in giving an account of the system of Father Buffier; though Smith himself disbelieves that Beauty entirely depends upon association.

To this grand argument, it has been answered, and certainly not without reason,† that the very same objections may be urged against the existence

* Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments: Part v. Chap. 1.
† See Brown's Lectures: Vol. III. Lect. lv. lvi.

of Truth, as against fixed principles of Beauty; that the "incurable diversity of human opinions on all subjects short of demonstration" is well known, and is proved, not only by the varying opinion of unreflecting men on all subjects, by the endless difference of religious sects and political parties, but also by the rival systems of those who devote themselves especially to the investigation of Truth. Look at the various Schools of Philosophy, see how one has risen upon the ruins of another, like Empire upon Empire, each to be speedily overthrown; and if you still talk of truth as something distinct from opinion, you have no reason to deny that, notwithstanding all diversities, there is also a Standard of Beauty.

A similar argument may be derived from the sense of Taste. What more striking than the differences which are found among men with respect to the relish of certain dishes! When an Englishman goes abroad for the first time, he generally rails against Continental cookery, and says he can get nothing to eat; while a Frenchman, newly arrived in England, finds our English fare meagre and detestable. Shall we then say that Taste entirely depends on custom, and that originally, all things are alike? Assuredly not; for, judging from the infant palate, it appears that Sweetness is originally agreeable, Bitterness disagreeable;

though a different taste may be afterwards acquired. So, amidst all the vicissitudes of feeling with respect to Beauty, there may be some original difference between Beautiful and Ugly objects, and the analogy of the sense renders this even probable.

These arguments from Analogy certainly have their weight; but the true answer to those who, on account of the diversity of feeling, deny all Original Beauty, seems to me to consist in denying that the differences are so great and general as they suppose. Nothing is more easy than to make out a case, by bringing forward some affirmative instances, which from their nature make an impression on the mind, while the innumerable negative instances are overlooked. I have no doubt that this grand source of fallacy has been the principal cause of misconception in the present case. It is one of the leading *Idols* of the human mind, being common to men of every class, in every age, and in every state of civilisation. Besides, in philosophy, as well as in daily life and conversation, it is the differences alone of opinion, or of feeling, that strike us and rouse opposition; while points of agreement, however numerous, almost escape notice. But if men had no common opinion they could not converse together, for the very arguments they use suppose some common principle, and if they had no common feelings, derived from similar causes, they could

have no pleasure in society, and could not even understand one another; each man would be an enigma to his neighbour. If one man found a dunghill more beautiful than a bed of roses, and so in other cases, what fellowship could there be upon the earth? In fact, without common feelings from similar causes, whether Beauty, Sublimity, or others, there could be no common language, but each one would give vent to his emotions by spontaneous and inarticulate sounds. As it is, how readily is an emotion of Beauty responded to by another, perhaps by a large company, whose attention is drawn to the object! The eyes of all are riveted, and glisten at the same time, a proof that they feel alike. Their admiration may not be equally lively, and one man may like this part better than another, but these differences do not exclude similarity. Innumerable are the instances of Beauty wherein men fundamentally agree. All men admire the starry heavens; the sun rising and setting in majesty, and tinging the clouds with many and brilliant hues; the sweet summer morning and pensive evening; the sea, or other expanse of water, reposing in sunshine; the smooth grassy mead; the forest of noble trees; the mountain top, bathed in floods of red or purple; and the clear and rapid river, hurrying along between precipitous banks, here rocky and bare, there clothed with natural wood, bending

gracefully to the stream. These are but a few, a very few, of the objects which all men deem beautiful, at least all who have ever had sufficient leisure of mind to attend to them. For one grand cause of the diversity which prevails in the feeling of Beauty, is the occupation or the pre-occupation of men. What avails it that the earth, the water, the sky, teem with sources of Beauty, if we be too much engaged to attend to what we see around us? Consider the condition of the great mass of mankind, born to daily toil, and for ever in danger of falling into indigence and want. Consider also the lives of the middle class, intensely occupied in the pursuit of gain; and even the upper ranks, deeply immersed in the cares which accompany fortune, and in political strife. Can we wonder that, among all these pre-occupations, the spectacle which nature presents should often be overlooked, or viewed with an absent eye? But Beauty is not a sensation which we can hardly help feeling in some degree when the proper object presents itself, but it is an emotion which may or may not follow the sensation, according as the mind is sufficiently free from thought. Freedom from anxious care or urgent thought on any subject, is a condition indispensable to the feeling of Beauty, according to the principle, that the mind cannot be occupied with two things at once; and, from want of such freedom, many pass

their lives surrounded by charming objects, without ever feeling their beauty. Moreover, as the capacity of the mind is limited, and as the opportunities of men are various, it cannot but happen that some men will attend more to some objects than to others; and, in proportion as they do attend to them, they are able to discover beauties which are hidden from the common eye. By dwelling on the object long and frequently, whatever source of Beauty it may possess, cannot fail to produce an effect. Thus, while pre-occupation prevents us from seeing Beauty in anything, occupation, special occupation about one thing, enables us to see more in it than other people. In this way, the general dullness of some men on the score of Beauty, as compared with others, may, in part, be accounted for, as well as much of the diversity of feeling which prevails among mankind.

So far as we can judge from our experience of that period of life which has few or no associations, it certainly appears that there is Original Beauty; for even the very young child does not view all things with the same eye, but he shows keen pleasure at the sight of some objects, and indifference at others. Gay and varied colours, as well as musical sounds, generally arrest and please him. Would the nurse sing her lullaby if it did not soothe the babe? And this brings us to the grand and decisive instance in favour of Original Beauty.

Almost every nation has a music of its own, which it prefers to all other kinds. What a prodigious variety prevails upon the face of the earth! What a difference between a simple Scottish air, Swiss ranz-devache, or French romance, and the varied and complicated music of Germany and Italy! Compare a symphony of Beethoven with an air of Neil Gow; the intricate compositions of Thalberg with the last new English ballad. Yet, in spite of the wide difference between these styles of music, they, and every other style, however rude or refined, that exists on the face of the earth, fundamentally agree; and though some may prefer one kind, some another, yet no one, who has an ear, positively dislikes any. The fundamental points of agreement can be stated with mathematical precision, for music is an exact science; and however varied the strains may be, yet certain successions of sound, and those only, are musical, viz. "such as admit of certain mathematical proportions in the times of vibration."* Within these limits there is scope for almost endless variety, but without them there is nothing but discord. This instance is really an *Experimentum Crucis*, for it proves that *all* Beauty at least does not depend upon association; and if there be Original Beauty of one kind, it is probable, from analogy, that there may be also of another.

* See Brown's Lectures, Vol. III, Lect. lv.

I know but of one objection that can be made to this instance. It may be said that the pleasure derived from music is of a two-fold nature, partly a sensation, partly an emotion; that the sensitive pleasure, or at the least the absence of any sensitive pain, of hearing, is an indispensable preliminary to the rise of the emotion of Beauty; that the laws of harmony suffice only to produce the pleasure of sensation, and that of themselves they cannot rouse emotion; for though these laws be essential to beautiful composition, yet not every composition that adheres to them is beautiful. In like manner, certain rules of metre are necessary to verse; but the mere observance of these rules will not insure fine poetry. Such, in substance, is the view of the case taken by Alison, in his very ingenious and elaborate work on the nature and principles of Taste.* That the pleasure derived from music is in part a sensation, I am willing to admit; and the reason why some never feel any pleasure from music, probably is, that they are unsusceptible of this pleasing sensation. The fact of the total want of musical ear in some persons throughout the whole of their lives, is most readily explained by the want of susceptibility to the agreeable sensation; and this, probably, depends upon a physical defect in the organ of hearing, though too minute to be detected by anatomy.

* See Alison on Taste: Essay II, Chap. ii, Sec. 2.

Further, let it be admitted for the sake of argument, that attention to the laws of harmony can insure only the sensitive pleasure, (though this is only supposed, not proved), yet even this supposition is enough for our present purpose. According to this view, certain invariable rules are necessary to the gratification of the sense, and this again is necessary to the emotion; so that, ultimately, the emotion of Beauty rests upon some principles which are fixed, and independent of association. That the observance of the above rules does not always produce beautiful composition, does not prove that they are no part of the cause of Beauty, but only that something else is also necessary. If, as is allowed, they be essential, they must constitute part of the cause.

Closely allied to the notion which we have been considering, and even in some respects identical with it, is the supposition that Beauty depends entirely on Custom. But if Beauty depend at all upon custom, it cannot be *directly*; for, as I have shown in a former work,* the primary effect of custom is to deaden, not quicken, all our sensibilities; and therefore Beauty, no more than any other feeling, can be roused by this cause, which, on the contrary, tends to render all things

* Principles of Human Happiness and Human Duty: Book 1, Part iii, Chap. 4.

indifferent. If, then, Beauty depend at all upon custom, it must be *indirectly*; that is, it must result from remembrance or association, which springs from frequent use, and this case is the same as the one we have already considered.

But the effects of Custom demand a more full explanation. Let us take that case which more than all others seems to prove the power of custom, the case of Fashion, and let us see whether we can account for the facts on the above theory. That the fashions of our ancestors often strike us as ludicrous, as well as any quite new fashion in our own day, but that this feeling is temporary, and frequently gives place even to an opposite, are facts well known to all. How shall we account for these phenomena, if custom be not directly a source of Beauty? If the fashions of our ancestors, or our own, strike us at first as ugly, the probability is that they really are so; for in this case, as in many others, first impressions are right. But, by constant use, the feeling of ugliness is deadened; and as rank and wealth set the fashion, the associations connected therewith are of course pleasing; and therefore we feel inclined to find out any beauty that it really may possess; for though ugliness may predominate in an object, it by no means follows that it has no points of beauty. These, being predisposed to find them, we readily seize upon, and

overlook the opposite qualities. Thus it is that association acts, not by converting Ugliness into Beauty, but by pre-disposing the mind to receive the latter. But the power of custom in destroying Ugliness seems stronger than the power of association over Beauty, for many fashions cease to be thought ugly without being esteemed beautiful.* Very similar is the effect of custom in friendly intercourse. Constant use tends to deaden us much more to the defects than to the excellencies of our friends, because we wish to forget the former and remember the latter; while, in the case of these, the primary influence of custom is counteracted by the pleasures of remembrance, which grow out of long intercourse.

In the case of present fashion, association pre-disposes us to see Beauty, if it can possibly be found in the object; but in other instances it pre-disposes us differently, and produces an effect diametrically opposite. Thus it is difficult to admire what is out of fashion, however beautiful the object may be in itself; and there may be fashions not only in dress and furniture, but even in the fine arts, such as

* Though long use has deadened us much to the ugliness of man's dress in civilized Europe, yet in statues we allow it to be frightful, and admire the Roman toga, which is new to us; and we never see an Asiatic without being struck with the superior beauty of his flowing costume. Different as is the eastern style of architecture from our own, the Mahometan mosque commands the admiration of travellers, and probably not the less by reason of the novelty.

architecture. It would certainly be rash to say that no new order of architecture could be invented worthy of being placed beside the Doric, the Ionic, or the Corinthian; but, were such an one really found out, it would meet with almost unsurmountable opposition, for the associations of centuries have hallowed the others, and a new order would seem a standing insult to our old friends. But, had the Greek orders not been originally beautiful, they never would have been generally adopted, though this general adoption by the most polished people of antiquity gives them an additional charm in our eyes, and even induces us to think there can be no others. Thus we are pre-disposed to find ugliness in any new invention which rivals the old; but when there is no rivality, then we allow beauty, as in the shafts and capitals of Gothic pillars, which are infinitely diversified.

Novelty and Custom are, originally, two opposing powers; but each, by itself, may produce different effects. The primary effect of Novelty is to quicken, of Custom, to deaden our sensibilities, whether to pleasure or pain; but, in either case, these effects may be counteracted by other circumstances, which grow out of each respectively. Thus the deadening effects of Custom are more or less counteracted by Remembrance, and the loss of Novelty is somewhat compensated by Facility, the

result of Repetition; while the pleasing influence of Novelty is impaired by the feeling of Strangeness, of Bewilderment, of Inexperience. Thus, in youth, though all be new, all is not delightful, from want of ease, from shyness, from embarrassment; and though, as we advance in years, the world loses its novelty, yet we acquire facility in all our modes of intercourse. In like manner, though a beautiful object, when first seen, ought to strike us most from Novelty, yet it does not always, for we may not sufficiently comprehend it, as in the case of a complex piece of music, which requires to be heard often before it be appreciated; or the new object may interfere with old associations. Thus, in Beauty, as well as in other things, Strangeness, and rival Association, may weaken or destroy the pleasing influence of Novelty.

There is one Association which demands our particular attention, because it has often been considered as a principal source of Beauty: this is the Association of Utility. In the previous chapter, however, we took occasion to remark that in this respect it is Contrivance, rather than Utility, which is of consequence; that here the end is as nothing; the degree of ingenuity displayed, everything; for in those cases where Beauty seems really to result from a happy adaptation of means, an object the most frivolous may please as much as the most

important. Indeed, the more we examine the subject, the less will appear the connection between Beauty and Utility. In innumerable cases they are even quite opposed. Who are more at variance than the political economist and the poet, the agriculturist and the lover of nature, the engineer and the man of *virtù*, the patron of the useful and of the fine arts? It is not denied that the two characters may, in a degree, be united in the same individual; but still they are always at war with one another. Indeed, this is a struggle of which most men are conscious occasionally; for few are so exclusively devoted to Beauty, or to Utility, as to pursue the one at all costs. But the great apostle of Utility in our times seems to have been proof against the allurements of Beauty, and even to have considered her as his chief foe; for, not content with discarding all graces of style in his own writings, and depreciating such in others, he would, if possible, have annihilated poetry and the fine arts, as utterly opposed to his favourite principle. He considered the Iliad as one of the most noxious books that ever were written. Time would fail to accumulate instances of the opposition between Beauty and Utility; but a few may be mentioned, and will suffice. Look at that rivulet, meandering gracefully between grassy banks; here slow, there more rapid, with willows weeping over the stream; does not this form an agreeable

picture? But the farmer finds that a winding course is not the best for draining; he therefore makes a straight cut; and the natural brook becomes an ugly ditch. There is a fine lake, surrounded by steep banks, and fringed with natural wood; can anything be more lovely? But what cares the farmer for that? the water is said to cover a precious bed of marl; he therefore drains the lake, and the delight of our eyes is changed into a bed of mire. Waterfalls are charming objects; but how often is their beauty impaired by foot-paths made for the weak and timid! How many old and picturesque buildings have been destroyed to widen streets and roads! How many properties have been cut up by railways, one of the most useful, but at the same time one of the most ugly of modern inventions! No beauty is comparable to that of nature, left in all her original wildness; but how is this compatible with corn fields and pasture fields, hedges, ditches, and roads? A forest is one of the noblest of nature's works, and old trees, untouched by man, are particularly beautiful; but forests often occupy uselessly the ground, and well-grown trees must be felled for timber. What more majestic than distant and lofty mountains! but on nearer approach we find that even these may be injured, by rooting out their natural plants, and enclosing and cultivating their sides. Surely rocky torrents are more captivating

than slow navigable rivers; and if you can make them navigable, you destroy their beauty.

These facts, and innumerable others that might be mentioned, go to prove the inherent opposition between Beauty and Utility. There are, in fact, two different classes of men, distinguished by their attachment to one of these rather than the other, who may be called respectively men of Utility and men of Sentiment, and who never meet and part without mutual contempt: the man of Utility thinking the other an imaginative fool, while the man of Sentiment considers the Utilitarian as an unfeeling calculator, raised by intellect alone above barbarism. This distinction between men is as old as our race, and will probably always exist, and the strife will be maintained between them without the annihilation of either side; for each is partly in the right. If without Utility the world could not go on at all, it would be a dull world without Beauty. This, at least, must be allowed, that those who for the sake of temporary Utility destroy some striking and permanent object of Beauty, really do their best to limit our sources of enjoyment, and deserve to be called barbarians. Thus, we do not hesitate to call those Turks barbarians, who could pull down the temples of Athens, and fill their lime-kilns with the sculptured marbles of Phidias. Surely the Pasha of Egypt, who could destroy the temple of Denderah

to build a cotton manufactory, deserves no better appellation; for the one had already seen some thousand years, and might have lasted as many more, to give pleasure to countless generations, while the other may not survive its founder. But it is not necessary to travel to Turkey and Egypt in order to find such instances of barbarism. Our own country, unhappily, can supply us with cases enough. All who visit the capital of Scotland must be struck with that beautiful hill which borders on the town; not, indeed, remarkable for height, but for grace of form, and especially for the long unbroken ridge of rocks called Salisbury Craigs, which in part surrounds it. Would it then be believed that this unrivalled ridge was for many years converted into a common stone quarry, and not for building, but to mend the roads? and that too in a country where stones abound? Thus, an object that might have lasted unimpaired till the end of time, and given satisfaction to countless millions, has been seriously injured, for the sake of the most temporary of all temporary purposes. And this, I am sorry to say, is not a solitary case of barbarism. About ten miles above the town of Perth there is, or rather was, a celebrated spot on the Tay, where a ridge of rock crossed the stream, there a noble river, and formed a cataract called the Linn of Campsie. This fall is now destroyed; and

what was the mighty object for which it was doomed to ruin? His Grace of Athol had some fine larches, of which he was very proud, for he had first introduced them into this country, and, wishing to build a ship with them, the rock was blown to facilitate their passage to the sea. To his Grace, no doubt, it was an object of interest to have a frigate called the Athol, built of his own wood, but to the nation at large it was utterly insignificant. The Athol might last, at most, thirty or forty years, the Linn of Campsie might have lasted for ever; and therefore, those who destroyed it, for the sake of a straw, robbed of their enjoyment all succeeding ages. What, then, shall we think of the Duke who proposed, and of the proprietor who consented to, such an act of barbarism?

From the above we perceive that though Beauty be commonly said to be a frail and fleeting thing, yet this is true only of certain sorts; while nothing can be more permanent than other kinds.

> Art, Glory, Freedom fail; but Nature still is fair.

Things useful necessarily perish in the using; but things beautiful are lavish of their charms, impart to all, and yet lose nothing.

Finally, we by no means contend that Association has no influence upon Beauty, but we conceive that we are justified in concluding, from the whole of

this discussion, that Association is not a Primary or Original Cause of the same, still less the only Cause, but a Secondary or Subsequent one. Agreeable Association seems to act chiefly by pre-disposing the mind to dwell upon an object, and to see Beauty in it if possible; and most things have some pleasing points which may be detected if we *wish* to detect them, neglecting whatever may be ugly. Beyond this, Association may give an additional charm of another sort, in many cases easily distinguishable from proper Beauty, and in fact often so distinguished, even by those who have no pretensions to analytical acuteness. When from the top of the Alban hills, one looks down upon the storied, but naked and desolate *Campagna*, bounded by the Mediterranean and the Apennines, and covered with ruins of tombs, temples, and aqueducts, with Rome itself in the centre; one is lost in a delicious reverie, which one well knows to be not a mere feeling of Beauty. But when one's eye first takes in the Bay of Naples, with its mountainous shores and rocky islands lit by a southern sun, the mind is too full of Beauty to admit of Associated ideas. When the proper feeling of Beauty is most powerful, it overwhelms and prevents all association, and this acquires power when the former is on the decline. New countries strike us much more than our own, or than places which we have known all our lives, though the

former can have no personal associations, and the latter must have many. Nothing deadens us so much to Beauty of any kind, as to have become familiar with the object before we were capable of appreciating it; though, the earlier the knowledge, the more numerous, and probably the more pleasing, will be the recollections. These facts seem to prove that Beauty is one thing, Associated pleasure another; that the former owes much to Novelty, while the latter grows out of Custom.

Of all the systems of Beauty founded on Association, probably none is so comprehensive and philosophical as that of Alison. According to him, the Beauty of the Material world is entirely to be attributed to the Mental qualities, of which, in his own words, Material qualities are the Signs or Expressions.* But then, these Material Qualities, whether sounds, forms, or colours, which express pleasing mental qualities, and hence rouse Beauty, are allowed to be, for the most part, fixed and permanent; and they suggest qualities of mind, either by natural analogy, or by the inseparable connection of cause and effect, much more than by casual Association. A great deal of ingenuity has been displayed by the above writer, often, I cannot

* These words seem to me very inaccurate, for a Sign or Expression is an Effect from which we infer the Cause, whereas in this case Material qualities are supposed to be Causes which *suggest* Mental qualities.

but think, far-fetched, in order to show that, wherever Beauty is felt from the material world, there is always some pleasing emotion suggested distinct from Beauty, and necessary to rouse the latter; but at all events, it is allowed that certain sounds, forms, and colours, rather than others, are calculated to express emotion, and, hence, to appear beautiful. This system, then, does not suppose Beauty to be a vain and fleeting thing without any fixed principles, but it introduces, as indispensable, a link in the chain of cause and effect, between the perception of an outward object, and the feeling of Beauty. That such a link is indispensable seems to me not proved; but be that as it may, we must still enquire what qualities of matter are beautiful, and what not; whether their Beauty be felt as soon as the object is perceived, or whether another emotion must intervene. On either supposition, there are, in the material world, some permanent sources of Beauty, either immediate or remote.

The perception of an object must precede any pleasing emotion roused by means of it; and, according to Alison's theory, this pleasing emotion must precede Beauty. Therefore, instead of a sequence of two phenomena, we have one of three; we have the Perception, the pleasing Emotion, and then Beauty, instead of the Perception and afterwards Beauty directly. In this view, the qualities

of the object are more remote causes of the effect, Beauty, but still they are causes.

Or, it may be said, although the pleasing emotion must, in the first instance, succeed to the perception, yet, afterwards, the two must coalesce and co-exist in the mind in order to rouse the emotion of Beauty. According to this view, the cause of Beauty is a compound of two elements, a perception, and a pleasing emotion suggested thereby. Now, were this true, still the inquiry would be interesting and useful, what qualities are there which tend to rouse pleasing emotions, and Beauty through them? Such qualities would still be real, though remote, causes of Beauty, nay, the only causes that could be defined with any accuracy, and therefore alone of practical importance in the fine arts. Therefore, Alison's theory, were it true, would not supersede the inquiry pursued in the following section. But it is hoped that by this time the reader is convinced that no theory can be true that looks upon Association as indispensable to Beauty.

Chapter III.

SECTION SECOND.

On the real Sources of Beauty.

If we have now succeeded in proving that Beauty does not depend entirely on Association; that Association is but a secondary cause; and that there must be some Primary or Original sources; the important question remains, what these sources are?

In order to understand the nature of this inquiry, and what is the exact object in view, it is necessary to remark that I do not here propose to discover the ultimate or essential Cause of Beauty, in the language of Bacon, The Form. Whether there be any one circumstance common to all beautiful objects, and on which alone the beauty depends; and, if so, whether that circumstance shall ever be discovered, I do not attempt to decide; but this would be the Form or essential Cause of the emotion, the utmost limit of our philosophy. If there be such a principle, and should it ever be discovered, we cannot hope to reach it at once, however, and an attempt

so to reach it would probably end in some wide generalization, without any real addition to our knowledge. The only sure mode of proceeding is to endeavour first to find out some of the proximate principles, and if we succeed so far, we shall have accomplished something real, we shall have laid a step whereby others may climb to the top of the pyramid. This being understood, we shall now proceed to trace, if possible, some of the Proximate Causes of Beauty.

There seem to be at least four different sources of Beauty in material visible objects.

1. Colour. 2. Form. 3. Outward Texture. 4. Intimate Composition.

Let us begin with Colour.

We must first remark that, besides the Beauty derived from certain Colours, Forms, etc. by themselves, there is also a charm arising from a continuation of the same, or from a mixture of another quite different. Accordingly, we shall find that Uniformity or Regularity, Variety or Contrast, are important principles of Beauty. Moreover, Beauty is heightened by Novelty, deadened by Repetition or Custom, as other emotions are.

I. At the first dawn of perception, and probably long before the infant can distinguish forms and distances, he shows pleasure at the sight of Colours; and those colours please him most which are the most

lively and varied. This, as far as we can judge, is an emotion of Beauty, for at no period of our lives does the mere sensation of Sight appear to be positively agreeable, though a great glare of light may be very much the reverse; and therefore the cessation of that pain may communicate pleasure. It is otherwise with the rest of the senses, for certain Smells, Tastes, Sounds, and even Feelings of Touch, are decidedly agreeable or disagreeable. And if this be an emotion of Beauty, it certainly is the first, for Colours, as we know, are the proper objects of vision, and at first the only objects; the knowledge of forms, magnitude, and distance, being acquired by means of touch, and by it communicated to sight. Lively and varied colours are then originally beautiful; though of course it must be difficult, if not impossible to tell, at so early a period of life, before the use of speech, what peculiar variety is the most agreeable. And lively colours please at all ages, though not in all places and on all occasions, and this for various reasons. *First,* very bright colours, when long exposed to view, become disagreeable to the sense of sight, or glaring, as the expression is, and this sensitive pain overcomes all feeling of Beauty. *Secondly,* when objects are represented by art, in colours more lively than those of nature, we are of course shocked by the badness of the imitation, and this

feeling is so strong as to subdue any pleasing emotion. But children, and uneducated persons, who do not attend to accurate imitation, and who are satisfied with a rude resemblance, find the most gaudy pictures the most beautiful. Who does not admire the bright and variegated rainbow, or the most brilliant colours of the rising and setting sun? but were they to last, as the sight would become fatigued, we should cease to admire them, and long for a milder hue. Neither would such please on canvass, partly for the same reason, for as painting cannot, like nature, change, we have time to tire; partly because their is an incongruity in representing as permanent what we know to be very transitory. The painter often sees colours in nature which he dares not put upon canvass, for, from the brilliancy, they would be thought unnatural; as the colouring of Italian landscape painters sometimes appears unnatural to us who live in a northern climate. But those who have been in the South can admire the picture, because they have witnessed the reality, can doat upon the deep, deep blue, because they have seen water, sky, and mountain, tinged with that matchless colour. It is difficult for such as dwell in the North, to conceive the intensity of delight, the rapture of beauty which fills the soul, when, of a summer evening, one sees the distant mountain bathed in a flood of

purple.* It is colour that makes the wide difference between a northern and a southern landscape, for though our forms may be as fine, they appear comparatively cold, from the want of that magical power which can convert even a barren waste into a scene of enchantment. Look through the kingdoms of nature, the animal, the vegetable, the mineral, and you will find that the brightest colours are the most admired, whenever they are not presented to us in such quantity, or for so long a time, as to fatigue the sight, as in nature they seldom are. Wisely has it been ordained that the world in general should be clad in sober colours; for, had it been otherwise, our sight must have been injured; as we may learn from the effect of snow, which, when long on the ground, weakens the eyes, and may produce even total blindness. But observe the beauty of brilliant colours in the smaller objects around us; in birds, for instance, tropical birds in particular, which are universally admired on account of their brilliant hues; in gold and silver fish; in insects, such as beetles and butterflies of various sorts; in fruits, such as the holly berry, mountain ash berry, arbutus, common strawberry, cherry, peach, nectarine, pomegranate, wild rose berry, nightshade, and countless

* Such a sunset did I once witness from the Poggio Imperiale, near Florence. Were I to live a thousand years I never could forget the impression produced by that wonderful colour. Such sunsets are rare even in Italy.

others, which are beautiful chiefly as highly coloured; for those without colour, of similar form, and even of the same kind, are less thought of. Does any one admire the white strawberry or the white grape as much as the red or the purple? And surely it cannot be maintained that here the charm depends entirely on Association, for fruits of no use to us, as the holly and mountain ash, or even noxious, as the nightshade, are still beautiful. Look again at the flowers; are not these the darling children of Colour? and without her what would they be? Flowers there are many in nature, colourless, or nearly so, as those of the forest trees, which few but botanists remark; but in porportion as colour appears, we stop and admire, and the brighter the hue, the more the admiration. The blossoms of the common horse-chesnut and of the hawthorn are certainly agreeable to the eye, but can they be compared with the red varieties of the same species? or with the blossom of the peach, or of the pomegranate, one of the most exquisite objects in nature? Lastly, cast your eyes on the mineral kingdom, and say whether those stones be not the most admired which are most highly coloured, such as the precious stones, precious, no doubt, by reason of their rarity, but, had they not been originally beautiful, none but mineralogists would have cared for them. Rarity alone cannot give Beauty, though it may

enhance the feeling when already produced by its proper causes. Did we possess a bit of the true cross, no object in nature could be so rare and precious, but beautiful it could not be. Brightness of colour, however, is not the only circumstance of importance; for much depends upon the disposition of colours. Now the due disposition of different colours depends, in great measure, on a proper mixture of Uniformity and Contrast. Herein, in great part, lies the art of dress; and "in France, where this is almost reduced to a science, it is well known what colours go well or ill together; and the general principle seems to be, that those which suit are either very different, or else mere shades of the same. Thus black, or purple, or deep blue, and scarlet make a very pleasing mixture; as well as black and white, blue and yellow, brown and pink, lastly, lilac and green; whereas yellow and green, or blue and green, are decidedly disagreeable. In the former case, the colours are strongly opposed, in the latter, they are too much alike without being the same. But a dark and a light shade of the same colour are never amiss, for here there is uniformity as well as contrast; though the shades should not approach too nearly unless they become identical."*

No more striking instance can be given of the

* Principles of Human Happiness and Human Duty: Book I, Part iii, Chap. 3.

effect of uniform colour than that of an army drawn up in military array; though the effect be increased by some contrast of uniforms, as of the line with the cavalry or artillery. In the dress of each soldier in the French army, though the pantaloon be rather of a dusky red, yet it contrasts pretty well with the dark blue of the coat. Nothing could be more beautiful in its kind than the gold lace of our hussars on their deep blue jackets; but when these were changed to scarlet the effect was much impaired.

Amidst all the Variety of nature there is still a majestic Uniformity, as is seen in the blue sky and the green earth, which are certainly beautiful; though we should tire of perpetual blue or green, and might long for the contrast of a cloud or of a desert. In the works of art, as well as in those of nature, uniformity, as well as contrast, of colour, are of great avail, not only in dress, but also in furniture, and especially in painting. Even in architecture the influence of the same principles may be felt. Though, in general, uniformity of colour is sought for in a building, yet occasionally we may see the happiest effects produced by the opposite principle; as in several buildings in Italy, especially in Florence, where the beauty of the Duomo and Campanile is certainly enhanced by the mixture of black with white marble; and even in our own country, where several old churches and mansions

derive a peculiar charm from the contrast between the dark red brick, approaching to black, and the white stone facing.* If any part of the building happen to be modern, and be composed of new bricks, we instantly see how inferior is the effect. Many village churches in England are built with dark flint, faced with white stone, and the effect is always good. It would be easy to accumulate instances in support of these principles, but as the above may be sufficient, I shall now proceed to the second source of Beauty.

II. Form. Though Colour be so great a source of pleasure, yet Colour is imperfect without the beauty of Form. Now forms are of two kinds: those which are bounded by straight lines, and those which are bounded by curves; and we shall find, as a general rule, that the latter are more beautiful than the former; though the greatest beauty of all arises from an union of the two.

When we cast our eyes upward and look upon the sky, we cannot but admire the majestic vault above our heads; but we admire it more as contrasted with the straight line of the earth. Strange, that what has really no form (for how can we limit the infinite?) should appear spherical, while what is truly spherical, should, to the eye, be

* Take as a specimen the fine old mansion of Charlton, near Woolwich.

straight! This is the most noble and the most constant spectacle in nature; and if we are not always so much struck with it as it deserves, we owe this partly to custom, and partly to pre-occupation. We have here two magnificent instances of uniformity directly opposed to each other; and, though the vault be decidedly more beautiful than the plane, yet the two together are certainly more striking than the former could be alone. From this general view we may descend to more limited instances, and everywhere we shall find that the curve line is more beautiful than the straight. Let us first observe natural objects, and then attend to works of art.

In the animal kingdom we see that *roundness* is a great principle of Beauty. All animals, when in full health and condition, have their bodies and limbs rounded off, instead of being bounded by straight lines and angles; and it is only when they fall into sickness, and in old age, that they become square, long, and angular, and lose all pretensions to beauty. Compare that well-fed horse, so round and sleek, with the gaunt and angular shape of the old and half-starved hackney; or the fair full face of youth with the square visage, the projecting chin and cheek bones of tottering age. What is more becoming in woman than roundness? what more ugly than squareness and angularity? The plump cheek, the round chin, neck, breast,

arms, and waist, are universally admired; and so much is beauty thought to depend on roundness, that ladies, French ladies especially, torture their shapes by padding here and pressing there, till forms are produced rounder even than any in nature. Would painters be so fond of representing infants if they did not find beauty in them? and on what does this depend but on their roundness? What we call *grace* seems to depend very much on movement in curves rather than in straight lines; and at all events, such is the connexion felt between roundness and beauty, that in common language, whether literally or metaphorically, roundness and grace, stiffness and awkwardness, are synonymous.

Again, when we look to the charming productions of the vegetable world, trees and plants of all sorts, we perceive that their trunks or stems, their leaves, seeds, flowers, and fruits are all bounded by curve lines. The beauty of fruits in particular, seems to depend upon this cause as much as upon their colour. What more graceful than pears, quinces, bunches of white grapes, or white currants, white cherries, white strawberries, or even the common acorn, with its round cap? though these have little colour or none.

Lastly, if we turn our attention to unorganized matter, we shall find that the forms of nature are in general waving, and at the same time graceful,

while those of mens' creation, when they depart from this rule, are ugly. The river, when left to itself, seldom takes a direct course, and as it turns or meanders, always charms the eye; while the canal is straight, ugly, and monotonous. Graceful also are the winding shores of a lake, but the formal reservoir is a dismal pool. Nature has no roads, but in proportion as ours are straight or winding, so are they tiresome or pleasant, ugly or attractive. Nothing can be conceived more unsightly than the undeviating causeway of France, lined, if at all, by elm trees lopped into poles; except the railway, that in ugliness surpasses all things. Two or more rails of metal carried in the same direction, as far as the eye can reach, passing here between formal banks, there beneath the surface, with the usual accompaniments of noise and smoke, certainly constitute one of the most dismal objects in the universe. But if at any place there be a curve on the line, the ugliness is somewhat diminished. To be thoroughly aware of the deformity, one must have travelled outside Viewed from such a position paradise itself could have few charms.

And here I must remark an apparent exception to the rule here given. Though we greatly admire a rolling country, the graceful forms of downs and swelling hills, yet in lofty mountains we are more delighted with precipitous sides, needle-like peaks,

and serrated ridges. The needles of Chamouny, the Monte Viso, the shining horns of the Dolden, the serrated cone of the Finster-Aar, and the tremendous pyramid of the Schreckhorn, are some of the most admired of the Alps; as the mountains of Arran are of the Grampians. How can this fact be reconciled with our present theory? Various causes tend to produce this effect. Much must be attributed to Rarity and Contrast, for forms of this sort are rare, and therefore they cause Wonder; and they present a striking Contrast with the ordinary face of nature. Also, from Association they cause fear, for precipices are known to be dangerous. But Fear and Wonder, as we shall find, are allied to Sublimity rather than to Beauty; and thus we are brought to the real answer to the difficulty, which is, that the emotion produced by such objects is not properly Beauty but Sublimity. Even in lofty mountains there are certain curved forms which on the long run, perhaps, please us more than the very percipitous; as the dome of the Jungfrau, and the majestic crown of Monte Rosa.

The most delightful part of every country is that which intervenes between the mountains and the plain, where the sight is not bounded by the narrow horizon, nor the steps confined by the difficulties of the one, nor yet are they condemned to the wearisome monotony of the other; but where the eye can

alternately rest on both; while at hand is an infinite diversity of hill and dale, flat and ravine, through which the river flows, forming rapids, and cataracts. On the north of the Alps this region is extensive, comprehending the whole of the low country of Switzerland; but on the south it is very confined, though exquisitely beautiful. There is a narrow border between the Alps and the plain of Lombardy, which is probably unrivalled in Europe, cut by the Dora, the Ticino, the Adda, the Adige, and innumerable smaller streams, some emerging from extensive lakes, having cast off the pollutions of their origin, and again starting into life, clear, vigorous, and full. There, in a delightful and healthy climate, would the traveller like to dwell, could nature alone make amends for the loss of country and home.

From the works of nature we may turn to those of art. Two of the fine arts are peculiarly conversant with forms, Sculpture and Architecture; the former especially, which depends upon form alone; for although attempts have been made to introduce colour into sculpture, yet these attempts have been unsuccessful. Two reasons may be assigned for this: *first*, that sculpture is an imitative art; and as no colour in stone can imitate the natural, the absence of colour, or white, is better than a false tint; *secondly*, that colour in stone prevents the form

from being so well seen. The ancients did occasionally employ coloured marbles in sculpture, specimens whereof may be seen in the galleries at Rome, but the effect is not good.

As sculpture is an imitative art, it can only reproduce the forms existing in nature; and those which it generally chooses belong to the animal or vegetable kingdom, in the beautiful specimens of which, as we have already seen, the curve prevails over the straight line, the round over the square. And as sculptors naturally select the most graceful specimens, so we find that no long, thin, angular, square figure, is ever represented, but the plump and round. Such are the Venus de Medici, the Apollo, and the dying Gladiator, the graceful bend of whose drooping figure is universally admired; and such are all statues that have any pretensions to beauty.

Since architecture is not an imitative art, for it has no exact original in nature, it will be found the more valuable, as affording new and independent proofs of our present theory. Though the inconvenience of the circle and oval has prevented them from becoming general in building, yet, wherever they exist, we are struck with their graceful form. Of the round temples of antiquity but few remain; but whoever has seen the small fane of Vesta, on the banks of the Tiber, the interior of San Stephano Rotondo, above all the Pantheon,

must have been impressed with the peculiar beauty of the circle. The amphitheatres of antiquity were oval, some of which still remain, at Nismes, Arles, Verona, and Rome, and owe much of their beauty to this very graceful form. Even in our modern towns how fond are we of the circus and crescent! But the grand instances in point are the column, the cupola, and the arch; especially the two former, for some might say that the beauty of the arch was derived from an association with Utility, nay, with Necessity; whereas a square column would appear as substantial as a circular, and would be much more easily constructed; and the cupola is entirely ornamental. The column is the principal beauty of Greek, and even of Gothic architecture; the cupola of Italian. Take away the columns from a Greek temple, and what remains? Little, certainly, to admire, except the elegance of the sculpture. But, as it is, the Greek temple is a perfect object of art; and the sources of its beauty seem to be these: *first*, there is the beauty of the circular columns by themselves; *secondly*, the charm derived from their long succession, and the perfect equality of the space between them, for nothing is more agreeable than variety recurring at regular intervals; *lastly*, there is the striking contrast between the round pillars, and the long, unbroken, straight entablature. There is thus, at once, great

Simplicity or Uniformity, and yet Variety. The effect is less fine where arches are used instead of an Entablature; for though the arch be in itself more graceful than the straight line, yet it forms no contrast with the circular columns beneath; as any one may be convinced who shall attend to Italian buildings, where this combination frequently occurs, as in Santa Agnese, San Pietro in Vincoli, Santa Sabina on the Aventine, San Paulo without the walls, and other fine churches in and about Rome.

To take a similar case, it may be doubted by some whether a flat or a curved bridge be the more pleasing; but most people, I think, prefer the flat, for the straight line above sets off the arch below. Besides, when a bridge rises towards the centre, the arches cannot be of equal size, and therefore the uniformity is impaired. The superiority of contrivance may tend also to increase our admiration for the flat bridge. Waterloo bridge in London, and the Pont d'Iena at Paris, are perfect specimens. But New London bridge is slightly curved, and a finer example of the kind, probably, exists not in the world.

In Gothic Architecture, the arch rises with good effect from the column, partly, perhaps, because the column is in general not circular, but clustered, but principally because the arch is

pointed; for thus greater height is gained, and the point gives sufficient contrast.

The round column supporting the round arch is a mixture of the Greek and Italian styles; for in Italian architecture, properly so called, there are no round columns, or none that are essential; but instead thereof, there is the massy square pillar beneath the semicircular arch; as in St. Peter's, where the columns are mere ornaments, as well as in the great majority of churches throughout Italy.

In the Greek temple, the principal and often the only columns being without the walls, and in the Gothic within, the result is, that the outside of the one, and the inside of the other, are the most remarkable parts of the building. In this respect, modern Italian architecture, whether pure or mixed, agrees with the Gothic; for there also the columns or the pillars are inside, so that some of the first churches in Rome, presenting magnificent colonnades within, are unsightly fabrics without. The old Roman temple was a modification of the Grecian, but very inferior; for whereas in the latter, the columns were continued all round the building, as in the Parthenon, and the temples of Pæstum; in the former, there was only a portico in front, with square pilasters along the side walls. The best specimen now existing of this

sort of building, is the Maison carré, at Nismes.

The characteristics of Greek architecture are the round column, and its straight entablature; of modern Italian, the square pillar, the round arch, and the cupola; of Gothic, the clustered column, the pointed arch, the vaulted and groined roof, and the spire and minaret. The grand modern invention and the glory of Italian architecture, is the cupola, of which the finest specimens are, St. Peter's, at Rome, the Duomo of Florence, and our own St. Paul's.* This seems to have been unknown to the ancients, for the Pantheon cannot be called a cupola. To raise the Pantheon in air was the gigantic idea of Michael Angelo, and this has been effected in St. Peter's, probably the most wonderful achievement of architectural art, in any age or country. Rome may be called the city of cupolas, and when viewed from the Pincian or some other hill in the neighbourhood, presents such a magnificent appearance, that one might almost forget that she is no longer empress of the world.

Though beauty of form result from curved lines as well as from a due mixture of curved with straight, yet much also depends upon the relative magnitude of the lines, whether curved or straight,

* In point of solidity and architectural art, however, St. Paul's cannot be compared with the two others, for it is not a stone cupola.

which define a figure, in a word, on *proportion.* The charm of proportion, again, seems to depend upon one or other of the two principles, Uniformity and Contrast. Thus, a perfect square, whether an entire building, or a room, pleases from uniformity, an oblong from contrast; while a shape between the two has an ill effect. Most of the fine temples of antiquity were oblong, and the length was generally much greater than the breadth, as in the Parthenon, where there are eight columns in front and rear, and seventeen on each side, and in the temple of Neptune, at Pæstum, where the numbers are six and fourteen respectively. The last are still standing without a single interruption. The Exchange at Paris errs by being neither square nor oblong; not so the Madeleine, the finest imitation of a Greek Temple to be found in the world.

The Greek cross, where the arms are equal, is an instance of Beauty from Uniformity, the Latin from Contrast. The most striking effects in architecture seem to result from the latter principle. The Latin cross has been adopted in St. Peter's at Rome, with manifest advantage, so far as the interior is concerned, for thus great length has been given to the nave, which contrasts well with the shortness of the transept; but the exterior has suffered in consequence. For the very length of

the nave, which is all gain within, is a loss without, by obstructing the view of the cupola, by far the noblest part of the building, which cannot be properly seen except at a distance. Viewed from the great square in front, it is half hid.

With respect even to the interior, it has often been questioned whether the effect correspond to the magnitude of the building, All allow that at first there is some disappointment, that the temple, though really immense, does not appear so, and that time is required to be aware of its gigantic size. But, some say, this is a proof of excellence, a proof of fine proportion, for all well-proportioned buildings, or rooms, contain more than they seem; as a well-proportioned man never appears very tall. To such it may be answered, what do you mean by *well* in this case? do you refer to Utility or Convenience, to Beauty or Effect. In the former sense, we can easily understand that a room of the most convenient shape may, on that account, be called well-proportioned, but what we cannot comprehend is, how, with reference to Beauty, a room can be called well-proportioned, which produces less effect than one of equal size, but of different shape. True, it may be said that what strikes at first may not please so much for a continuance; and this will apply to St. Peter's, if it gain upon us day by day. And certainly it does gain upon us; but in spite of this,

when we consider the enormous size of the building, and that, surely, one object of vast dimensions, is to rouse Sublimity rather than Beauty, for a much smaller edifice would suffice for this, we must conclude, as the effect produced does not correspond with the magnitude, that so far the architect has laboured in vain. Had the nave been much narrower, the length remaining the same, or much loftier with the same breadth, the contrast would have been greater, and the first impression more profound. It is in the bold use of contrast that architectural genius is chiefly shown, as in the Gothic cathedral, where the length of the nave contrasted with its narrowness, and the narrowness with the great height, rouse an emotion of Sublimity.

III. Outward Texture of Bodies, or Nature of the Surface.

This division of our inquiry need not detain us so long as the foregoing; for the subject is more simple, and it will be easy to show that *smoothness* and *glossiness* of surface are real sources of Beauty. To be convinced of this we have only to turn our attention to the various objects around us whether natural or artificial; though, as high gloss or polish is but rarely found in nature, most of our instances under this head must be derived from the works of art, or from those of nature modified by man. But wherever remarkable

smoothness or glossiness is found in natural objects, it is sure to be admired. How beautiful are the downy peach, the glossy nectarine, the shining leaves and fruit of the holly! The fruit of the mountain ash has nearly as rich a colour as the holly-berry, but it wants the gloss, and is not so pretty. Surely the lustre of the silver fir is finer than the dead green of the Norway spruce. The fruit of the horse-chesnut has nothing very much to recommend it, either for form or colour, though this be not amiss; it is not eatable, and therefore cannot be prized on that account; but it is highly polished, and certainly pretty. With what eagerness do children collect horse-chesnuts, knowing them not to be eatable, and how much do they admire them! In form and colour the sweet chesnut is not inferior, and association is all in its favour; but it is dull in comparison, and does not much charm the eye; and when horse-chesnuts lose their lustre, they lose their beauty.

One great end of art certainly is to give smoothness and gloss to objects; and as we affirm, Beauty, by means of these. Some objects are, in all their principal points, the work of nature alone, and all we can do is to modify them a little, principally on the surface. Thus we cannot change a horse's form and colour; but we can keep the hair short, close, and fine; and render the coat smooth, glossy,

and beautiful. So, ladies cannot very much alter their shape, but by means of cosmetics and alteratives they may hope to smooth and improve their skin. Grass in its wild state shoots up rough, rank, and course, but in the trim pleasure ground it becomes the velvet lawn. What are our best free-stones, or even our finest marbles, until they be smoothed by the mason's hand? The most precious stones often present no beauty at first, but, when cut and polished by the lapidary, they are admired universally. Wood, as it comes from the tree, has certainly no great Beauty, though in the rough state it may serve every useful purpose; but in the hands of the cabinet maker it is polished and varnished, and rendered highly ornamental. Of late years the introduction of French varnish has increased the beauty of our tables, chairs, and piano-fortes. In France, even the floors and stairs are rubbed with wax, and made as shining and slippery as possible, to the no small danger of one's limbs, but they look pretty.

Other objects, though derived originally, as all things must be, from nature, yet become so changed by art that they may be said to be entirely artificial, as woollen cloths, calico, and other cotton goods, silks, leather, and even articles of hardware. And in all these branches of manufacture, whatever is most smooth and glossy, that we most admire. Thus

we principally admire superfine smooth cloth, shining kid gloves, or *gants glaçés*, as the French call them, shoes highly polished, and of late years even varnished, silks of all kinds, but especially satins and velvets, those most beautiful of tissues. Even to our cotton furniture we can give gloss and beauty by putting it under presses and mangles. So, plate and hardware are rendered more agreeable to the eye, by the labour of the butler and the housemaid, who spends about half her life in giving lustre to grate, fender, and fire-irons.

The following instance may, to some, appear trifling, but in reality it is curious and instructive, as showing the influence of two opposing principles. Which is prettier, a beaver or a silk hat? Association apart, I have no doubt that the silk hat would be preferred, for it is more smooth and glossy; but it is cheap, and the idea of cheapness is fatal.

I might go on accumulating instances in support of our present proposition; but these will suffice to prove that smoothness and glossiness of surface are real sources of Beauty.

IV. Intimate Composition of Bodies.

It will, I think, be generally allowed that *transparent* bodies are beautiful, and transparency depends upon the Intimate Composition. The number of clear and visible bodies is comparatively limited, and perhaps on that account we admire them

more. Instances in point are, first the diamond, then glass, particularly plate-glass and crystal, the most transparent of their kind, rock crystal and quartz in all its varieties, provided they be not opaque, and clear water, whether sparkling in a tumbler, or glistening on the face of the earth, in the tiny well, the feeble streamlet, the rocky torrent, or the ever-changing sea. Even muddy water is often better than none, on account of the variety which it gives to the general landscape, the motion, and the shining appearance which, on a fine day, all water presents at a distance; but without clearness the charm is incomplete. Feeble are our Highland waters, compared with the torrents which descend from the glaciers of Switzerland; but the former are clear, the latter turbid; these make but one rush, those are varied by pool and current; and though the Swiss streams may be more sublime, the Scottish are more beautiful. Few substances are more ornamental than alabaster, which is smooth, shining, and semi-transparent. When colour and transparency go together, the effect is particularly fine, as in the precious stones, coloured quartz, such as is found on the beach at Brighton, Scotch cairngorm, and even coloured glass, which is often used to imitate more costly ornaments. Though the glass in our Gothic cathedrals be but semi-transparent, yet this degree of clearness

adds immensely to the beauty of the painting. The gases are transparent, and also invisible, except when coloured, but those which are coloured, as Chlorine and Iodine, the latter especially, are certainly pretty. The air we breathe cannot be seen, yet a clear atmosphere imparts an inexpressible charm to every landscape. In this country, the clearest waters are generally colourless, but the wonderful blue of the transparent Rhone, and the scarcely inferior tint of the Rhine, the Ticino, and the Adda, after leaving their lakes, produce an emotion never to be forgotten.

Though in the course of the preceding inquiry, numerous instances have been brought forward in support of each principle separately, it may be well, before concluding, to state one or two examples to illustrate them all. We shall select then a remarkable instance from inanimate, and another from animated nature. Of the objects which meet the eye in the unconscious world around us, there is perhaps none more beautiful than a deep sequestered valley, traversed by a clear mountain river, rushing over a rocky bed, and bordered by lofty banks, here densely wooded, there bare and precipitous. This being allowed, let us endeavour to trace the sources of the beauty. *First*, there is the water, *clear*, possibly of a lovely *colour*, animating us by sympathy with its motion,

but *varied* by pool and stream, here presenting one even surface, there broken by points of rock into dazzling foam, seldom pursuing a straight course, but *turning* and *winding* along: then there are the banks, where bare rock *contrasts* with exuberant richness, and which appear more lofty by *contrast* with the narrow ravine; banks *diversified* in form by the constant working of the river, and covered in part with natural wood, in part with yellow furze and flowers of *lively hue:* and lastly there is the sky above which, as partially seen from the gorge, appears at a greater distance, and of a deeper blue.

In animated nature there is one object to which all will yield the palm, a beautiful woman. Look upon that matchless face and figure, that masterpiece of nature's hand, and observe first the perfect *Regularity* of form, the exact correspondence of one side with the other, of eye with eye, and cheek with cheek, and think what would be the effect of the slightest difference between them; consider then the rise of the nose and the *variety* which it gives; the *oval* form of the head and countenance, the *smooth unwrinkled* marble forehead, the *plump downy* cheek, the *finely rounded* chin, the *full clear oval* eye, the *arched* eyebrows, and the striking *contrast* between the dark hair and the white skin, between the white skin and the lively red of the lips. Mark also the *regular* and finely *polished*

teeth, the circular neck, the graceful *curve* of the falling shoulders, the *alabaster* back and breast, the *swelling* bosom, the *round* arms and waist; and you must exclaim, here, indeed, is BEAUTY.

A DISSERTATION ON BEAUTY AND SUBLIMITY.

PART II.—ON SUBLIMITY.

CHAPTER I.

WHEREIN SUBLIMITY DIFFERS FROM BEAUTY.

HAVING dwelt so long on the nature and sources of Beauty, it will be less necessary to enlarge upon Sublimity. So much indeed of what has been said on the nature of the one is applicable to the other, that a brief recapitulation of the points of agreement will suffice, before we come to the differences.

In the *First* place, as in the case of Beauty, so in that of Sublimity, we must carefully distinguish the Sublimity which we feel inwardly, from the outward Cause of the same; for the two are often confounded in ordinary ideas as well as in ordinary language, and this, whether the cause be a material object, or something moral or intellectual.

Secondly, Sublimity, like Beauty, is not a Sensation, but an Emotion, and consequently it is always

preceded immediately, not by any bodily change, but by a change in the state of the mind, by a Sensation, Perception, Conception, or some other Emotion.

Thirdly, like Beauty, Sublimity is distinguished from all other emotions by the incorporating process above described, whereby we embody the feelings of our own mind with inanimate matter, with stocks and stones, which, for the moment, seem to contain the emotion which they only rouse.

Fourthly, Sublimity, as well as Beauty, is a *Passive* Emotion; one which the mind *suffers*; but it does not immediately nor necessarily lead to action.

Fifthly, Sublimity also is an *Immediate* emotion, having no reference to time, past or to come, and therefore not including the notion of time at all, for without reference to the past or the future there can be no idea of succession.

Lastly, Sublimity is a Temporary emotion, as compared with Cheerfulness, or Melancholy, or with our leading desires, Love, Ambition, Covetousness, Curiosity, being roused occasionally, as the proper objects present themselves, and then ceasing altogether. It is even less permanent than Beauty, as we have already observed.

In all these particulars Beauty and Sublimity agree; but wherein do they differ? We before remarked that the emotions which we include under

the general name of Beauty are not absolutely one and the same; and the like may be said of Sublimity. These are generic terms, which comprehend certain species, or at least varieties, sufficiently alike to be classed together under a common term, but differing in some respects. And although in extreme cases Beauty and Sublimity differ widely from one another, yet in others they approach, as happens with many classes of objects, as with the animal and the vegetable world, which, in general, are widely separated, though certain bodies exist which might be included under either. So, though Beauty and Sublimity may pass the one into the other by insensible degrees, from the Sublime to the Grand, from the Grand to the Fine, and so on through gradations more numerous than the terms which we possess to express them; yet in many cases they are quite distinct, and constitute two emotions which we feel to be different, in spite of those points of similarity above enumerated. That the emotions are different is proved by our own consciousness, as well as by the different words which we use; for, vague as ordinary language may be, Beauty and Sublimity are not employed indiscriminately the one for the other. No doubt, both feelings may be roused at the same time by the same objects, as by the deep unclouded blue or starry firmament, or by a wide expanse of unruffled water on a sunny day; but in

spite of the sameness of these objects, the real sources of the two emotions are as different as the emotions themselves, as we shall presently see. These observations are necessary in order to show that the subject of this second part is real, and not the same as the former.

Beauty, as we have seen, is a simple or uncompounded Emotion: how as to Sublimity ?

When we consider the nature of those objects which excite the feeling of Sublimity, we may perceive that they are the same as rouse the Emotion of Wonder. The lofty mountain, the steep precipice, a wide expanse of land or water, the vast firmament over our heads, the Ocean's roar, the sounding cataract, the pealing thunder, are all Wonderful, and all Sublime. But many objects rouse Wonder without exciting Sublimity, as all those curious and rare phenomena which are disclosed by the Microscope, the effects real or pretended of Animal Magnetism, the properties of Electricity, Galvanism, and the Magnet, many Chemical experiments, and even the tricks of jugglers and conjurors. These, and a thousand other Phenomena, give rise to Wonder but not to Sublimity; and therefore, though Sublimity be connected with Wonder, it is not the same. The essential cause of the latter seems to be Rarity, of whatever kind, but this alone suffices not for the former.

Again, when we reflect on the nature of those objects which appear sublime, we shall find that they are such as excite Fear. All those objects or phenomena above enumerated as sublime are accompanied by a degree of Fear; as a deep precipice, a storm at sea, thunder, a great flood, or a great fire, and the avalanche echoing from mountain to mountain. These are among the most sublime and terrible of natural phenomena; and though a wide expanse of sky, of flat desert or sea, be less fearful, it is not exempt from awe, and gives a milder impression of Sublimity. But innumerable causes produce Fear which certainly rouse no Sublimity, as venomous reptiles, such as the tiny but deadly cobra capella, or manilla, or even noxious insects, and ten thousand other objects or phenomena; and consequently, though Fear and Sublimity be connected, they are not identical.

It appears then that Sublimity is somehow connected with Wonder and Fear, and yet differs from both; that whatever rouses Sublimity also rouses Wonder and Fear, but that innumerable causes may produce one or other of these without producing the first. What, then, is the conclusion? Evidently this, that the emotion of Sublimity is a compound of Wonder and Fear, or in other words, the result of the two united.

From this we are not to infer that every mixture

of Fear and Wonder constitutes Sublimity, any more than that every mixture of an acid with an alkali produces a salt; but only mixture in certain proportions. If either Fear or Wonder be in excess, the result will be a loose compound of the two, or rather the mind will pass rapidly from the one to the other, dwelling principally, however, on the stronger emotion, till at last this may exclude the other altogether. Thus, a lofty perpendicular rock, when viewed from a safe position, may appear sublime, for Fear and Wonder can blend harmoniously, but when the precipice is beneath us, Sublimity is destroyed by the predominance of Fear. So, a storm at sea is sublime to the spectator on shore, but not to those on the waters, unless to the very courageous, who can admire the tempest even in the midst of danger. To the fearless, thunder is grand; not so to the timid, who fly to caves and darkness to avoid the threatening bolt. What more sublime than the tumult, the danger, the desolation of war, to one placed at some distance, apart from the extreme terrors or the tumultuous passion of the conflict!

When we consider the phenomena of Sublimity as distinct from Beauty, we shall find that they admit of a ready explanation on the supposition that the emotion is the result of Wonder combined with Fear. *First*, Sublimity, as has been observed, differs

from Beauty in this, that it contains an alloy of pain; and if Fear be an element of the former, the pain which it contains is at once accounted for. *Secondly*, Sublimity is more violent but less durable than the feeling of Beauty, and it bears not repetition so well. Now, both Wonder and Fear are apt to be violent, and both readily subside on a better acquaintance, the former especially, which mainly depends on Ignorance and Novelty. Fear indeed may sometimes increase by increase of Knowledge, but if Wonder subside, Sublimity is doubly destroyed; for it cannot subsist if the two be not in a certain proportion. The predominant element appears to be Wonder, and an excess of Fear soon destroys the result.

Lastly, that, for a continuance, Beauty should please us more than Sublimity, cannot now at all surprise, for, either Fear becomes irksome when Wonder has subsided, or both are soon subdued by custom, and give place to Satiety or Indifference.

Since then the phenomena of Sublimity are readily accounted for on the supposition that Sublimity results from an union of Fear and Wonder, the conclusion above arrived at in favour of that union, drawn from an induction of facts relative to the nature of the objects which rouse the three emotions, is hereby fully confirmed.

It being allowed that both Fear and Wonder are

necessary to Sublimity, it may still be doubted by some, whether a degree of Beauty be not also essential to that emotion. Before we can give a satisfactory answer to this supposition, we must trace the sources of Sublimity, and compare them with those of Beauty, as already ascertained.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE SOURCES OF SUBLIMITY.

HAVING ascertained in the First Part of this Dissertation, that Beauty has real and original Sources in the material world, and that it does not depend entirely on Association, we shall not renew the discussion on the present occasion; but without further preface we proceed to enquire what are the sources of Sublimity. That it depends more on other Emotions than Beauty does, will readily appear.

I. It is evident that the *great*, the *vast*, tends to rouse Sublimity. But greatness is a relative quality, for a size which would be immense for a dog, would be very diminutive for a pony; and therefore, it is greatness of the kind, or relative bulk, that alone appears vast and rouses emotion. Instances of Sublimity derived from greatness occur in a prospect over vast expanse of any kind, whether of sea, sky, or land, of land cultivated or wild, wooded or bare, fertile or barren. These circumstances may greatly influence the beauty of the prospect, but they do not seem materially to affect the Sublimity.

Uniformity of appearance is of most importance in this respect; and a boundless forest, an open savannah, even a vast sandy or stony desert, is more sublime than an enclosed, well-cultivated country, varied by corn, pasture, and wood. The more uniform the surface, the more readily does the eye take it all in at once, and therefore the greatness strikes the more. But Beauty, as we have seen, depends much upon a due mixture of Uniformity with Variety, not on the former alone; and here, therefore, we perceive one difference between the sources of the two. We also see one reason why we sooner get tired of Sublimity than of Beauty, for Variety pleases longer than Uniformity. If there be any truth in what Burke has stated, that Beauty partly depends on Smallness, we shall have another remarkable difference, nay, an opposition between the sources of the two emotions. Certain it is that in our own language as well as in other tongues, the words *pretty* and *little* are frequently found together. A pretty little hand, foot, or even head; a pretty little woman, a pretty little dog, or pony, or cottage, flower, etc. etc. are words in every one's mouth. The word *little* also expresses affection. The Italian language, in particular, is full of diminutives which imply tenderness; and this tenderness may be supposed often to arise from Beauty. At the least, then, there is no contrariety between Smallness and

Beauty, but, if anything, a connection; whereas the former is directly opposed to Sublimity.

II. Though a vast extent of land, of whatever kind, whether forest, moorland, or desert, be imposing and grand, yet the effect is much increased when greatness is united with elevation; and the more abrupt the rise, the greater the Sublimity. The height of the Grampians is surely more striking than the flats of England; and the lofty and precipitous Alps, than the plains of France and Germany. To what shall we attribute this? to what but to the circumstance that great elevation is more *rare* than an extensive flat. This, at least, seems to be one cause of the difference of impression. A certain variety of surface seems to be essential to Beauty, but this does not demand any extraordinary height. But extraordinary height seems necessary to the fulness of Sublimity; and if so, Magnitude and Rarity are sources of this emotion. A height which in Scotland would appear magnificent, might pass unnoticed in the Alps, because in the latter situation it would not be rare, and could not appear great. And the more sudden the rise, the more profound the impression. How noble are those precipitous Needles which tower above the valley of Chamouni! But, did the monarch of mountains himself present but one precipice reaching from top to bottom, what mortal eye could stand the sight! Here, again,

Rarity contributes to the impression; for what is more rare than magnitude of such a sort? Though Rarity enhance Beauty, as it does all our emotions, yet it does not seem properly a source of this, as it is of Sublimity. Rarity cannot render beautiful those barren rocks which surround the Mer de Glace, but nothing can be more grand than this and other scenes where all is barrenness and desolation. Here, then, we see another difference between the sources of Beauty and Sublimity.

III. *Lastly*, Sublimity is raised to the utmost by the presence of some *danger*, not so great as to engross the mind and destroy the influence of the other causes. Thus thunder is highly sublime; and a land storm, as well as one at sea, to those on shore, who by sympathy, and only by sympathy, enter into the fears of those on board of ship. A traveller in America, talking of the grand emotions which he experienced when descending the St. Lawrence in a small boat, mentions the degree of danger as one of the causes thereof; danger sufficient to excite, not to overwhelm the mind.* The same cause conduces to the sublimity of the battle field, of the avalanche, of deep precipices, gloomy caverns, lowering skies, and of wide, open, houseless moors, conveying the idea of desolation and danger. On this account northern climes seem favourable to

* Hamilton's Men and Manners in America.

the Sublime, southern to the Beautiful. The character of Ossian's poetry is gloomy and grand; full of images such as Scotland presents; the black mountain, half hid in mist; the dark lake; the sunless den; the starless night; the bleak, boundless, pathless moor, enlivened only by the cry of the grouse and the scream of the curlew. With all these the idea of danger is associated. Far different is the scenery, and far different the poetry of southern climes, where desolation is nowhere to be seen except near the tops of the highest mountains, where, if all be not rich, at least nearly all is cultivated, where the cheerful sun is seldom hid by day, and where even the nights are bright with moon and stars. The impressions produced by such scenes are, no doubt, far more delightful in general, but they seldom amount to that deep feeling of Sublimity which is roused by the aspect of nature in the more gloomy region of the north. Nothing is more impressive than total solitude and desolation, for they are fearful.

> ——All is hushed and still as death,—'Tis dreadful!
>
> Nay, quickly speak to me, and let me hear
> Thy voice—my own affrights me with its echoes.*

Moreover, a misty atmosphere adds to the apparent height of mountains; and partial con-

* Mourning Bride: Act II, Scene 3.

cealment gives scope to the imagination, which fancies objects half seen to be greater than they really are; whereas a clear atmosphere has just a contrary effect. These causes contribute to the sublimity of Northern scenery.

It may be asked why Silence, Solitude, and Desolation, are fearful? The reason is obvious. Man, when left to himself, is but a weak animal, compared with many beasts of the field or even fowls of the air; his strength depends on association and union. When therefore he finds himself in a situation where, far from descrying any of his fellows, he cannot see even the traces of them, his natural weakness occurs to him, and he trembles.

The result of the above investigation is that the sources of Sublimity are Greatness, Relative Greatness, Rarity, and Danger.

Thus it appears that although the two emotions may frequently be blended in one compound state of mind, yet, that, in reality, the feeling of Sublimity, as known by Consciousness, and traced to its elements by Analysis, differs as widely from Beauty as the sources of the one differ from those of the other. The view from a balloon in air must be one of the most sublime in the world, for it must comprehend Vast Extent united with Rarity in a high degree, and with Danger.

Greatness, then, Rarity, and Danger, are the

sources of Sublimity. But the same are the sources of Wonder and Fear. Therefore our Analysis is confirmed, whereby Sublimity was resolved into these two elements.

It being allowed that Greatness, Rarity, and Danger, are the sources of Sublimity, it may still be asked whether they act directly on the mind, or through the medium of some proximate principle, as by suggesting power, extraordinary power. Were it true that power is the proximate Cause of Sublimity, this would not interfere with the conclusion already arrived at, for, extraordinary power being a complex idea, we should have to enquire on what its efficacy depends, and we should probably find that extraordinary power is sublime, because it is great, rare, and dangerous to those around. There is assuredly something grand in any remarkable display of the powers of nature, and even in the power of a single man, such as Napoleon, who commanded and it was done; and this is a reason why almost all historians, even his political enemies, have been more lenient to him than he deserves. When the mind is captivated by the sublime emotion arising from the conception of wonderful power, it is little disposed to attend to the cold dictates of Reason, or the rigid lessons of Morality. But, though extraordinary power does rouse sublimity, for it contains the three elements above mentioned, yet the conception of power

does not seem necessary to produce that emotion.

It appears to me inconsistent with our experience to say that we cannot look upon any object in nature, such as a lofty mountain, and feel its Sublimity, without calling to mind the Power which brought it into being. This conception may arise and perhaps may increase the feeling, but it does not seem necessary to its existence. Greatness, Rarity, and Danger, are, therefore, the real, ultimate, or elementary sources of Sublimity; and power is sublime only by containing these, not as an elementary cause; and even as a proximate principle it does not seem to be indispensable.

Having discussed the nature and causes of both Beauty and Sublimity, our task may be considered as finished; for it seems scarcely necessary to say a word concerning their effects. But I cannot conclude this Dissertation without dwelling a moment on the proof which these Emotions afford of the goodness of the Author of Nature. The pleasure which these emotions impart, may be considered as an extraordinary gift of God, a gift for its own sake, and which, for aught we can see, might have been withheld without interfering with the other dispensations of his Providence, or arresting the business of the world. Men might have been born to eat, sleep, toil, and die; populous and flourishing nations might have arisen; the

whole earth might have been peopled, though not a soul had ever felt the emotions of Beauty and Sublimity. These, then, have been given to embellish, not to spread, the existence of man; to deck the table of creation; to sweeten the cup of life; and, I may add, to turn our minds to our Creator with feelings of lively gratitude, for this and all his blessings. When the mind is softened by Beauty or elevated by Sublimity, it is drawn for a time from the engrossing cares of life, and is prepared for the kindred but more important feelings of devotion. Wisely, then, have men in most ages of the world exhausted all their resources in beautifying their places of worship, whether Pagan temple, Mahometan mosque, or Christian church; and wisely have they placed them in situations where the charms of Nature were added to those of Art. The temples of ancient Greece were generally placed on spots commanding delightful prospects; like the churches of modern Italy, where Architecture, Sculpture, and Painting unite to adorn the hallowed fane. Even in a barbarous age, our Gothic ancestors raised those stately fabrics, the wonder of their more civilized descendants, who are often content to worship their Creator in a building little better than a barn. Nay, such was the fury of some of our early Reformers, such their hatred to Rome, that they refused to worship in the noble structures of

antiquity, pulled them to the ground, and thought that the purity of their faith was in proportion to the meanness of their church. But in spite of such instances, arising sometimes from a spirit of opposition, sometimes from a spirit of economy, from lukewarmness, poverty, or necessity, whoever considers the nature of man will see that the emotions of Beauty and Sublimity are the genuine allies of Piety; that the attempt to separate them does violence to that nature, and tends to the decay of all religion, or to the growth of a savage fanaticism, or at best to a purely intellectual system of belief, which may occupy the head, but plays not around the heart.

The connection of Beauty and Sublimity with the holiest feelings of the soul must greatly enhance our estimate of their importance. Delightful though they be in themselves, they are not the mere creatures of an hour, for they exert an influence opposed to the malevolent passions, and favourable to Tenderness, to Morality, to Religion; they improve the mind here, and prepare it for happiness hereafter.

DISSERTATION SECOND.

ON THE LUDICROUS EMOTION.

A DISSERTATION

ON THE LUDICROUS EMOTION.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE NATURE OF THE LUDICROUS EMOTION.

THERE is another Emotion, which on many accounts ought to be considered in connection with Beauty and Sublimity, namely, the Ludicrous Emotion; which, along with the two former, constitutes the object of Taste. All the fine arts, and all fine writing and speaking, aim at rousing one or more of these emotions, and though they may rouse others also, yet these are the peculiar objects of the arts of Painting and Sculpture, of Poetry, Oratory, and fine Prose. Without these emotions there may be Truth, there may be Acuteness, there may be Original Thinking, but a charm is wanting which nothing else can supply. We may correct the mis-statements, or combat the arguments and detect the fallacies of any work of history or of reasoning, as we may point out the weak point of any building, or a defect in any piece of machinery; but the proper

object of CRITICISM is to mark what is beautiful, sublime, or ludicrous, and what is not; and to tell *why* this is beautiful, sublime, or ludicrous, and that is not. Such is the business of criticism, which requires a combination of Sensibility with Judgment; for, without the one, Emotions cannot be felt, and without the other, the means adapted to rouse them cannot be discovered. If there be any fixed principle of Beauty, etc. then Criticism is a science, otherwise it is a vain thing, a Will-o'-the-wisp, which lures one in search of nothing. Whatever, therefore, may here be said in favour of the doctrine that Beauty, etc. are not merely conventional, or liable to infinite change, tends to establish the point that there is a standard of Taste as well of Morality, and that Criticism is a science as well as Ethics.

Though the Ludicrous Emotion differ so widely from Beauty and Sublimity, yet in certain particulars it agrees with both.

First, it is, like them, an *Emotion* not a Sensation, and consequently it is always preceded *immediately* by a mental not a bodily change, whether that change be a Sensation, Perception, Conception, or some other Emotion.

Secondly, it is a *Passive* Emotion, an expression which has been already explained.

Thirdly, it is an *Immediate* Emotion, having no reference to Time.

Fourthly, it is a *Temporary* Emotion, as all will allow: and

Fifthly, it is a *Pleasing* Emotion, as will be readily admitted.

In all these particulars, Beauty, Sublimity, and the Ludicrous Emotion, agree.

But, in spite of these resemblances, the Ludicrous Emotion differs widely from both Beauty and Sublimity, as is evident to every man's consciousness, as well as by the outward convulsive movement of laughter, whereby this feeling is distinguished from all others. An *effect* so peculiar must have a peculiar *cause*.

The Sublime often passes into the Ludicrous, according to the proverb "from the Sublime to the Ridiculous there is but one step," and hence we may infer that there is some secret analogy between them. This analogy it seems not very difficult to trace; for Sublimity depends in part upon Wonder or Surprise; and so it would appear does the Ludicrous. If we attend to the matter we shall find that all ludicrous incidents, mistakes, or practical jokes, all sallies of wit, in order to produce their full effect, must be *unexpected*. Sometimes, indeed, we may laugh at an old joke, but if we do, it is by sympathy with the emotion of others to whom it is new. Therefore we may conclude that Wonder or Surprise is essential to the Ludicrous Emotion, as it is to Sublimity; and

this is one reason, at least, why the latter sometimes passes into the former. But Surprise alone has nothing ludicrous, and, when combined with Fear, the result is Sublimity, when united to Love, Admiration; emotions very different in their nature from the present. What then is the emotion which must be combined with Surprise in order to produce the Ludicrous? This seems to be no other than the feeling well known under the name of *Mirth* or *Gaiety*, which is a modification of the common emotion of Delight.

Simple Mirth or Gaiety is not necessarily accompanied with a ludicrous emotion, or with laughter; it prepares the mind for perceiving and feeling the ridiculous, but it may exist alone. The Gay are certainly more prone to ridicule and laughter than the Grave.

> Sport that wrinkled care derides,
> And Laughter holding both her sides,

are the proper attendants of Mirth.

Grave characters are rather fond of the Gay, provided there be no peculiar turn to Ridicule in the latter, for that the grave dread and abhor. With this exception, the contrast of humours does good; the one tempers the other: whereas grave people find each other but dull company; and the gay, when they meet together, are apt to depress more sober spirits.

Mirth is allied to Cheerfulness, but it is a more boisterous and less permanent emotion, depends more upon particular exciting causes, and declines with these; whereas Cheerfulness often continues without any outward cause sufficient to account for it, sometimes amid circumstances which, in the eyes of a spectator, have a very discouraging appearance. To us, nothing can seem more wretched, more depressing, than the life of a native Greenlander, but the Esquimaux are said to bear a cheerful countenance. Mirth, as thus distinguished from Cheerfulness, is the feeling which in union with Surprise seems to constitute the Ludicrous Emotion, and produces Laughter.

Chapter II.

On the Sources of the Ludicrous Emotion.

Having ascertained, in the preceding chapter, that nothing is ludicrous but what is unexpected, and that Wonder or Surprise is one of the elements of the emotion; we have already discovered, in part, the cause or source of the same. But though every thing strange, new, or unexpected, be a cause of Wonder, yet every thing new is not ludicrous. To determine then what strange things are also ludicrous is the question.

Since the Ludicrous Emotion is a mirthful one, it follows that the novelty which rouses it must be of a pleasing nature. Nothing positively disagreeable can be a source of the ludicrous. We may affirm then that the source we seek must be found in a pleasing novelty; but, still, this goes but a little way towards fixing the real cause; for many kinds of novelty are pleasing without being ludicrous. This problem can be solved only by induction; by examining the various objects, incidents, or expressions, which are ludicrous, and endeavouring to find wherein they all agree.

The apparent sources of the Ludicrous Emotion may be divided into two great classes. *First*, objects or incidents that have really existed in nature; or, what amounts nearly to the same thing, accurately described in words, as they either did or might have occurred. *Secondly*, images brought together which may never have been united in nature, and expressed in words. Each of these classes admits of a sub-division, according as the natural incidents or the images are presented to us with or without the intention of raising laughter. Thus, the first class consists of accidental ludicrous incidents, and practical jokes; the second of ludicrous blunders expressed in words, and wit.

I.—1. Among natural incidents where no ludicrous effect is intended, but which nevertheless are ludicrous, we may mention all awkward attempts at bodily dexterity or mental display, where the object of the performer is ambitious, but the result altogether a failure. We laugh at the awkward speaker or writer, as well as at the awkward marksman, who has a great opinion of himself. We laugh at the tragic actor who means to be forcible and pathetic, but who is only noisy, as we do at the vain boaster, whose ball or arrow, instead of hitting the bull's eye, flies far wide of the target; or at the vain puppy who pretends to superior ease and elegance, while art and constraint are visible in every

motion. So, when we see a man very particular about his dress, suddenly bespattered with mud, we can seldom refrain from laughter.

When we meet a poor man in tattered clothes, we may or may not pity him, but certainly we feel no disposition to laughter; but were we to see a man, otherwise remarkably well-dressed, with a sleeve all torn, or the tail of his coat half off, we should certainly be amused. Were I to enter a cottage in Scotland and find the inmates dining on a haggis, I should think nothing of it; but were such a dish presented at a nobleman's table, the company would be convulsed.

Now in all these and similar cases, what is it that is ludicrous? It is evident in the *first* place that there is something quite unexpected, whether an unexpected failure, or something else. *Secondly*, there is a contrast, a very striking contrast, between the pretensions and the result, or between what we witness, and what is usual in such circumstances. It would appear then, that in these cases at least, the essence of the Ludicrous is an unexpected and violent Contrast.

2. As an instance of practical jokes we may mention that boyish trick, introduction to king and queen, where the person introduced is requested to take his seat between the royal couple, on a cloth stretching from one throne to the other; when their

majesties rising up together, and, the cloth being without support, down falls the luckless courtier into a tub of water below. Or we may notice the trick of sewing up a person's sheets before he go to bed, or strewing them with something prickly; putting salt into one's tea instead of sugar; sending one on a fool's errand; sticking a pig tail behind one's back, etc. etc.

Now, in these and innumerable other instances of practical jokes what do we find? *First*, the scheme, whatever it may be, is totally unknown to the sufferer, and his surprise is great when he detects it; and into this surprise we enter by sympathy. *Secondly*, there is a violent contrast between his expectations, or his previous state of mind, and that which follows upon the discovery of the trick; between his previous security and the subsequent catastrophe; between his real situation and his total unconsciousness thereof. In these cases, then, as well as in those enumerated under the foregoing head, it appears that Contrast, violent and unexpected, is the real source of the Ludicrous Emotion.

Under this head must be classed Buffoonery of all sorts: such as we see in pantomimes, or during the carnival in Roman Catholic countries, where there is a violent contrast between the real and the assumed character and dress; or where that dress is made of the most strange and incongruous parts,

where the human face is caricatured in masks, or the human form degraded into the brute. In these instances, also, the sport seems to depend upon novelty, combined with excessive contrast. When masks become familiar they cease to raise any laughter, unless there be one of extraordinary ugliness; and the nearer they approach to a good imitation of the face, the less they amuse.

II.—1. The second of the two classes into which we have divided the apparent sources of the Ludicrous Emotion, comprehends, like the first, two orders: blunders expressed in words, and wit. In both, words are the means by which images or ideas are brought together, which may never have been united in nature; but in blunders they are brought together unintentionally, in wit intentionally. The former rather augur some mental deficiency; while wit, in its best form, requires a lively fancy, and is a very rare and highly valued exercise of the faculties.

As a specimen of blunders in speech, we may take the well-known scene in "Much ado about Nothing," where Dogberry gives his charge to the watch.

Dogb. Are you good men and true?

Verges. Yea, or else it were pity but they should suffer *salvation,* body and soul.

Dogb. Nay, that were a punishment too good for them, if they should have any *allegiance* in them, being chosen for the prince's watch.

Verg. Well, give them their charge, neigbour Dogberry.

Dogb. First, who think you the most *desartless* man to be constable?

1st Watch. Hugh Oatcake, Sir, or George Seacoal; for they can write and read.

Dogb. Come hither neighbour Seacoal; God hath blessed you with a good name; to be a well-favoured man is the gift of *fortune;* but to write and read comes by *nature.*

2nd Watch. Both which, master constable,—

Dogb. You have; I knew it would be your answer. Well, for your favour, Sir, why, give God thanks, and make no boast of it; and for your writing and reading, let that appear *where there is no need* of such vanity. You are thought here to be the most *senseless* and fit man for the constable of the watch; therefore, bear you the lantern; this is your charge; you shall *comprehend* all vagrom men; you are to bid any man stand, in the prince's name.

2nd Watch. How if he will not stand?

Dogb. Why, then take no note of him, but let him go; and presently call the rest of the watch together, and thank *God you are rid of the knave.*

Verg. If he will not stand when he is bidden he is none of the prince's subjects.

Dogb. *True,* and they are to meddle with none but the prince's subjects;——you shall also make no noise in the streets; for, for the watch to babble and talk, is most *tolerable,* and not to be endured.

2nd Watch. We will rather *sleep* than *talk;* we know what belongs to a watch.

In this very ludicrous dialogue we may remark two sorts of blunders, the one sort blunders in words only, the other in idea or sense. The words *salvation*, *allegiance*, *desartless*, *senseless*, *tolerable*, *comprehend*, are very different in meaning from what was intended; the first five altogether opposite to the meaning; and these five have a more ludicrous

effect than the word *comprehend*, which is not so striking a contrast to the sense. But, to most readers, I believe that the word *allegiance* loses much of its ludicrous effect from their not perceiving at once what word it is put for; so that to them it is nonsense, and nothing more. It is clear, also, that the speakers are quite unconscious of the blunders they are making, whether in words or in sense. Here, then, we perceive what are the three particulars essential to a ludicrous verbal blunder. The words, taken, in their usual sense, mean something not only different from what is really intended to be expressed, but altogether opposite; while the speaker is quite unconscious of any such incongruity. He, good easy man, really believes that he has spoken sense, or, if he do not believe it, there is no blunder in him, no laughter in others. Again, in spite of inaccuracy of language, the meaning must still be apparent; for, if not, we may stare and demand an explanation, but we feel no disposition to laugh. We cannot laugh at mere nonsense, or what we do not understand, which to us is mere nonsense; but we laugh when we see the meaning, although the words imply the very reverse. The ludicrous effect, then, seems to depend upon the violent, and of course unexpected, contrast between the speaker's words as usually understood, and what he really means to say; so that the real source of

the emotion is the same in these cases as in those comprehended under the first class. The blunders contained in the words *salvation*, *allegiance*, etc. are purely verbal, and the test of this is, that, like verbal wit or puns, they are untranslatable; whereas the other blunders contained in the above dialogue are real absurdities, which might be turned into any language without injuring the effect. To say that "to be a well-favoured man is the gift of fortune, but to write and read comes by nature," is no blunder upon the words *fortune* and *nature*, which have no resemblance, and could never have been mistaken for each other; but it is a real confusion of ideas. All the ideas are there, as well as all the right words, but they are exactly put in the wrong places. It would be easy to turn this sentence into French, or any language: La bonne mine est *le don de la fortune, mais écrire et lire vient de la nature*; where the ludicrous effect is the same as in English. This test may be applied to the other blunders contained in the above dialogue, to determine whether they be merely verbal or not; as, for instance, to the last: "We will rather sleep than talk; we know what belongs to a watch." The words *sleep* and *talk* have no resemblance, no more than *fortune* and *nature*, and never could be confounded; and, accordingly, the sentence is translatable, the ludicrous effect remaining unimpaired: *Nous aimerions mieux dormir*

que parler; nous savons bien ce qui convient à un garde.

In blunders purely verbal the contrast exists betweeen the speaker's words as usually understood, and what he means to say; but, in mental blunders expressed in words, the contrast lies between what he means and says and what he *ought* to mean and say; and this contrast is violent, and of course unexpected; otherwise the ludicrous effect is not produced.

2. From what has gone before, it would appear that NOVELTY and EXCESSIVE CONTRAST are essential to the ludicrous. Let us inquire whether this conclusion be corroborated by the phenomena of Wit.

It is universally allowed that there is a wide difference between Judgment and Fancy. The peculiar office of the one is to find out differences, the business of the other is to discover resemblances. The object of the former is *Truth*, naked and unadorned; the object of the latter is *Delight*. Most, if not all the error existing in the world, arises from confounding things really different, and reasoning as if they were the same; and it belongs to judgment to draw a line between them, and to assign to each its proper place; and when once things are shown to be different, it is immediately seen that any inference drawn from the one does not necessarily

apply to the other. We believe that like causes are always followed by like effects, it is a necessity of our nature to believe it; but then the causes must be really the same, the principal cause as well as all the circumstances, which are in truth auxiliary causes. Here, then, is the grand source of fallacy: we take for like altogether what is like only in certain particulars; for the same, what is only similar; and draw our conclusions accordingly. To detect differences where they really exist, is, then, the peculiar office of judgment.

The business of Fancy on the contrary lies in detecting Resemblances, and its object is not Truth but Delight. In general, resemblances are much more obvious than differences. To a child all trees are alike, and it is long before he can distinguish one sort from another, and in this respect some are always children. So, the child confounds one man with another, one large animal with another large animal, a horse with an ox, a sheep with a goat, and having got a name for the first, he applies it to the second. To a casual observer all the sheep in a flock are so similar that he cannot tell one from another, but the shepherd can distinguish each. When we first visit a foreign land all the faces seem alike, and it requires some time to discover that they differ as much among themselves as those of our own country. Nothing then is more obvious than

Resemblance of many kinds, but others are more hidden, and to discover these is the office of Fancy. Moreover the perception of Resemblance is always pleasing, and on that account we sooner detect, and dwell longer upon it than on Difference, which of itself has nothing agreeable but rather the contrary, and is interesting only from the results. The detection of differences is often a laborious and painful operation, but resemblance strikes at once and suggests itself rather than is sought.

Though Resemblance be in general agreeable, yet Custom deadens the charm: and in order to feel keenly, the similitude must be new and unexpected. But pleasing Similes are of different kinds, they may be Beautiful, Sublime or Ludicrous; and Fancy varies accordingly, and is poetical, eloquent, or witty.

As there are two kinds of ludicrous Blunders, the verbal and the real, so are there two kinds of Wit, the one depending partly on words, the other on ideas alone; the former consequently untranslatable, the latter capable of being turned into any language without destroying the effect.

To some, nothing appears more contemptible than verbal wit or *puns,* probably on account of the facility; but they have not been despised even by our best authors, particularly by Shakspeare and Swift. Shakspeare abounds in verbal and sometimes

indulges even in literal wit. As a specimen of the latter take the following:

Holofernes. Sir Nathaniel, will you hear an extemporal epitaph on the death of the deer; and to humour the ignorant I have called the deer the princess kill'd, a pricket.

Nathaniel. *Perge*, good master Holofernes, *perge*, so it shall please you to abrogate scurrility.

Hol. I will something affect the letter: for it argues facility.

The praiseful princess pierced and pricked
A pretty pleasing pricket;*
Some say a sore; but not a sore till
Now made sore with shooting.
The dogs did yell; put L to sore, then sorel
Jumps from thicket;
Or pricket, sore, or else sorel; the people
Fall a hooting.
If sore be sore, then L to sore makes fifty sores;
O sore L;
Of one sore I an hundred make, by adding
But one more L.

Nath. A rare talent!

Dull. If a talent be a claw, look how he claws him with a talent.†

We may take another specimen of punning, (in this case upon words), from the same play.

Rosaline. Madam, came nothing more along with that?

Princess. Nothing but this? Yes, as much love in rhyme
As could be cramm'd up in a sheet of paper,
Writ on both side the leaf, margent and all;
That he was fain to seal on Cupid's name.

Ros. That was the way to make his Godhead wax,‡
For he hath been five thousand years a boy.

Katherine. Ay, and a shrewd unhappy gallows too.

* Pricket, sore, sorel, are all names for a deer at particular ages.

† Love's Labour Lost: Act iv, Scene 2. ‡ *Grow.*

Ros. You'll ne'er be friends with him, he kill'd your sister.
Kath. He made her melancholy, sad, and heavy;
And so she died; had she been light, like you,
Of such a merry, nimble, stirring spirit,
She might have been a gradam ere she died;
And so may you; for a light heart lives long.
Ros. What's your dark meaning, mouse, of this light word?
Kath. A light condition in a beauty dark.
Ros. We need more light to find your meaning out.
Kath. You'll mar the light by taking it in snuff,*
Therefore, I'll darkly end the argument.
Ros. Look, what you do, you do it still i' the dark.
Kath. So do not you; for you are a light wench.
Ros. Indeed, I weigh not you; and therefore light.
Kath. You weigh me not; O, that's you care not for me.
Ros. Great reason; for past cure is still past care.†

Now in these and other instances of punning, wherein consists the wit, such as it is, and what is the cause of the Ludicrous Emotion? By means of the words *Sore*, *Sorel*, or sore L etc. two very different, nay totally incongruous ideas are suggested in immediate succession, by reason of Similarity or Identity of Sound in the words expressing these ideas, combined with such a turn of phrase as calls up the two meanings alternately. Thus, at first *sore* is a *deer*, then not a sore in that sense, but a *hurt*. Again *sorel* is a *deer*, then not a deer, but *sore l*, or sorel, and so a *deer* once more and the same as sore, and L added to sore makes sore L, or fifty sores or *hurts*, or sorel a deer again, the same

* Snuff *Anger*. † Act v. Scene 2.

as sore, to which sore or sore L adding but one more L we have sore L L, or a hundred sores or hurts. How sore then must L be which can turn one sore into an hundred. Truly, Shakspeare is supreme in everything, even in quibbling.

We perceive by this example that the object of the punster is to call up two utterly incongruous ideas, by Similarity or Identity of sound in the words or letters that express them, and by such a turn of phrase as shall suggest each in turn. There must then be *First*, Similarity of Sound; and *Secondly*, an extreme contrast in meaning. And the nearer the sound, the more remote the meaning, the better the pun.

Thus, in the above instance, the sounds of the two words, *sore*, a deer, and *sore*, a hurt, of sorel and sore L, are identical, and the opposition of meaning is as great as possible; therefore the wit is good of its sort. But, in what follows, as the words *talent* and *talon* are not quite the same in sound, the pun is not so happy.

From this it follows that a pun may be defined to be a double meaning, suggested by similarity of sound in words, the two meanings being in striking contrast.

We may now bring forward some instances of wit not purely verbal, and therefore of a higher order, and, in the opinion of some, alone worthy of

the name. Wit of this kind displays a very fine and rare exercise of the faculties, and is one of the highest intellectual treats, whether in private society, in books, or on the stage. Of comedy, in particular, it is the very life and soul.

In all Sheridan's plays there are fine strokes of wit; but I shall here mention only one, taken from his comic opera of the Duenna, where Isaac, the Jew, on account of the undecided neutral state of his faith, is compared to the blank leaf between the Old and the New Testament. The same witty author was famous for his sallies in private life. One night, returning from a jovial party, reeling along the streets, he was hailed by the watch: Who goes there? Sheridan replied in a very grave tone of voice—*Wilberforce.* Here the contrast between the real and assumed character and condition of the speaker is inimitably ludicrous.

Let us now take a passage from Shakspeare's play of "Much ado about Nothing."

Beatrice. I wonder that you will still be talking, Signior Benedick; nobody marks you.

Benedick. What, my dear lady Disdain! are you yet living?

Beat. Is it possible disdain should die, while she hath such meet food to feed it, as Signior Benedick? Courtesy itself must convert to disdain, if you come in her presence.

Bene. Then is courtesy a turn-coat:—But it is certain I am lov'd of all ladies, only you excepted; and I would I could find in my heart that I had not a hard heart; for truly I love none.

Beat. A dear happiness to women; they would else have been troubled with a pernicious suitor. I thank God and my cold blood

I am of your humour for that; I had rather hear my dog bark at a crow, than a man swear he loves me.

Bene. God keep your ladyship still in that mind! so some gentleman or other shall 'scape a predestinate scratched face.

Beat. Scratching would not make it worse an 'twere such a face as yours were.

Bene. Well, you are a rare parrot teacher.

Beat. A bird of my tongue is better than a beast of yours.

Bene. I would my horse had the speed of your tongue; and so good a continuer. But keep your way, o' God's name; I have done.

Beat. You always end with a jade's trick, I know you of old.*

In this dialogue all seems to be genuine wit, except the last repartee, where there is a pun on the word *jade.*

Congreve shall furnish us with the next specimen. In the following dialogue, *Trapland* is a scrivener and dun, who has been induced to take a glass with his creditor.

Scandal. Here's a dog now, a traitor in his wine; sirrah, refund the sack. Jeremy, fetch him some warm water, or I'll rip up his stomach, and go the shortest way to his conscience.

Trapland. Mr. Scandal, you are uncivil; I did not value your sack; but you cannot expect it again, when I have drank it.

Scandal. And how do you expect to have your money again when a gentleman has spent it? †

The following contains a very ludicrous blunder, as well as wit.

* Act I, Scene 1. † Love for Love, Act I, Scene 7.

Tattle. I'll make thy fortune; say no more. Thou art a pretty fellow, and canst carry a message to a lady in a pretty soft kind of phrase, and with a good persuading accent.

Jeremy. Sir, I have the seeds of Rhetoric and Oratory in my head. I have been at Cambridge.

Tattle. Ay, 'tis well enough for a servant to be bred at an university; but the education is a little too pedantic for a gentleman. I hope you are secret in your nature, private, close, ha?

Jeremy. O, Sir, for that, Sir, 'tis my chief talent; I'm as secret as the head of *Nilus.*

Tattle. Ay? Who's he, tho'? A Privy Councillor?

Jeremy. O, Ignorance; (*aside*). A cunning Ægyptian, Sir, that with his arms would over-run the country, yet nobody could ever find out his head quarters.

Tattle. Close dog! *

There are many dialogues very lively and sparkling, which no doubt are witty, though the wit be less decided than in the above instances. Such is the following:

Leonato. Well niece, I hope to see you one day fitted with a husband.

Beatrice. Not till God make men of some other metal than earth. Would it not grieve a woman to be over-mastered with a piece of valient dust? To make an account of her life to a clod of wayward marl? No, uncle, I'll none. Adam's sons are my brethren; and, truly, I hold it a sin to match in my kindred.

Leon. Daughter, remember what I told you, if the prince do solicit you in that kind, you know your answer.

Beat. The fault will be in the music, cousin, if you be not woo'd in good time; if the prince be too important,† tell him, there is measure in everything, and so dance out the answer. For, hear me, Hero; wooing, wedding and repenting, is as a Scotch jig, a measure, and a cinque-pace: the first suit is hot and hasty, like a Scotch jig, and full as fantastical; the wedding mannerly-modest, as a

* Love for Love: Act v, Scene 3. † Importunate.

measure, full of state and ancientry; and then comes repentance, and with his bad legs, falls into the cinque-pace faster and faster, till he sinks into his grave.

Leon. Cousin, you apprehend passing shrewdly.

Beat. I have a good eye, uncle; I can see a church by daylight.*

As another specimen of this sort of dialogue, take the following scene from Congreve.

Bellmour. How now George, where hast thou been snarling odious truths, and entertaining company like a physician with discourse of their diseases and infirmities? What fine lady hast thou been putting out of conceit with herself, and persuading that the face she had been making all the morning was none of her own? for I know thou art as unmannerly and as unwelcome to a woman as a looking-glass after the small-pox.

Heartwell. I confess I have not been sneering fulsome lies and nauseous flattery, fawning upon a little tawdry ——, that will fawn upon me again, and entertain any puppy that comes, like a tumbler, with the same tricks over and over; for such, I guess, may have been your late employment.

Bellmour. Would thou hadst come a little sooner; Vainlove would have wrought thy conversion, and been a champion for the cause.

Heartwell. What, has he been here? That's one of Love's April fools; is always upon some errand that's to no purpose; ever embarking in adventures, yet never comes to harbour.

Sharper. That's because he always sets out in foul weather, loves to buffet with the winds, meet the tide, and sail in the teeth of opposition.

Heartwell. What, has he not dropt anchor at Araminta?

Bellmour. Truth on't is she fits his temper best; is a kind of floating island; sometimes seems in reach, then vanishes, and keeps him busied in the search.

Sharper. She had need of a good share of sense to manage so capricious a lover.

* Much ado about Nothing: Act II, Scene 1.

Bellmour. Faith I don't know; he's of a temper the most easy to himself in the world; he takes as much always of an amour as he cares for, and quits it when it grows stale and unpleasant.

Sharper. An argument of very little passion, very good understanding, and very ill-nature.

Heartwell. And proves that Vainlove plays the fool with discretion.*

Let us now examine some of these instances of wit, in order to discover wherein consists their ludicrous effect.

Taking the first in order, we perceive that a certain resemblance, not a mere resemblance in sound, is struck out between two things, otherwise as different as can be imagined, between a man, *Isaac, and a leaf of paper.*

There is an analogy, a far-fetched one, no doubt; but still there is an analogy between the neutral religious state of the one, and the blank leaf which divides the Old and the New Testament; while in other respects the contrast is extreme. And the test that the analogy is real, not verbal, lies in this, that the sentence may be translated into any language without destroying the wit: *Il est comme le feuillet blanc qui separe l'Ancien du Nouveau Testament;* which is as witty as the English. In the next instance, the grave tone of voice with which the word *Wilberforce* was pronounced harmonized well with the serious temper of that benevolent man;

* The Old Bachelor: Act I, Scene 4.

while the contrast between the general character and actual state of him and Sheridan was as great as possible. This is an instance of what is properly called *humour*, where the effect is produced, not so much by the words themselves, as by the tone and manner in which they are pronounced, The comedian Liston was one of the most humourous men that ever lived, and he could throw his audience into fits of laughter by his gestures and the expression of his countenance, without speaking a word.

Much of the wit in the first dialogue, from "Much ado about Nothing," quoted above, consists in that particular variety which is properly called *Repartee;* where the words of the last speaker are taken up by him who follows, and applied in a way totally different from what the former intended. A deduction is drawn from them which he never thought of, and retorted upon him as the natural inference from his own words. There is required for repartee a great quickness of intellect, to discover in a moment some point in the previous speech from which a conclusion may be drawn, utterly at variance with what was expected, and which may tell against the first speaker. The contrast, then, is great, between the obvious meaning of the words of the first speaker, and what is deduced from them by the second; the retort is unexpected, and causes surprise; but there is no formal comparison, as in

other cases of wit. When, however, Beatrice says, " Courtesy itself must convert to disdain, if you come in her presence," and Benedick answers, " Then is courtesy a turn-coat," there is struck out a fanciful analogy between two things very different.

In the very witty answer of Scandal to Trapland, "and how do you expect to have your money again, when a gentleman has spent it?" there is a far-fetched analogy struck out between the case of a man who has taken in liquor, and that of another who has received money, and an inference is drawn from this analogy and retorted upon the first speaker; though in reality the contrast between the cases is as great as possible.

In the second dialogue from Congreve there is wit in the sally of Tattle, " Ay, 'tis well enough for a servant to be bred at an University: but the education is a little too pedantic for a gentleman": and the wit consists in discovering some point from which a conclusion may be drawn diametrically opposite to what it ought to be; though in the person of Tattle it is rather a ludicrous blunder than wit. The Blunder about *Nilus* is irresistibly ludicrous; " Who's he? a Privy Councillor? and the answer of Jeremy " A cunning Ægyptian, Sir, that with his arms would over-run the country, yet nobody could ever find out his head-quarters," is pointed and smart, but not of the highest degree of

wit; *because the simile is too true*, the contrast not sufficient. But the rejoinder of Tattle, who takes the words literally, is inimitable; "close dog!" This observation applies generally to the instances which follow, which we have brought forward as lively and sparkling, rather than highly witty. Thus in the dialogue between Beatrice, Leonato, and Hero, where Beatrice compares wooing, wedding, and repenting, to a Scotch jig, a measure, and a cinque-pace, the comparison is lively, amusing, and no doubt ludicrous, but not *very* ludicrous, because it is too near the truth. The sally, "No, uncle, I'll none: Adam's sons are my brethren; and truly, I hold it a sin to match in my kindred," has more contrast and more wit.

In the dialogue from Congreve's Old Bachelor, where Bellmour says to Heartwell "thou art as unmannerly and as unwelcome to a woman as a looking-glass after the small pox," the simile is sparkling and good, only too good to be eminently witty. The like may be said of the rest of this dialogue, which is clever and lively rather than very ludicrous. The best hits are where Vainlove is called one of Love's April fools; and where Araminta is compared to a floating island, which sometimes seems in reach, then vanishes and keeps the pursuer busy.

From the above instances of wit, and the ex-

amination of them, it appears that the art of the humourist consists in finding some similarity, or point of contact, between ideas widely different, so that the one shall seem naturally to suggest the other. In verbal wit or puns, the similarity is one of sound only between the words; but in real wit, the ideas themselves, how different soever they may be, are brought into contact in some one point. In puns, the nearer the similarity of sound the better, for thus the one word the more readily suggests the other, having a totally different meaning; but in real wit, the analogy being of idea, must not be close, otherwise the ludicrous effect is impaired and destroyed, and instead of a witty, we have an instructive, perhaps a beautiful simile. In wit, then, the only use of the fanciful analogy or simile, is to enable us to perceive the real contrast, which, as in other cases, is the true source of the ludicrous emotion. Though in the beautiful and sublime similes which we meet with in serious prose or poetry, the objects compared may in reality be very different, yet the resemblance must be sufficient to induce us to dwell upon it, and not upon the difference. When this is not the effect of the simile, when we pass over the resemblance and fix our minds upon the contrast, then the ludicrous emotion arises, whether it were intended or not. Sublime similes fail more frequently than those which are

less ambitious, because contrast, to a certain extent, is sublime, but carried a little further, ludicrous. In that famous instance of the *bathos*,

> And thou Dalhousie, thou great God of war!
> Lieutenant Colonel to the Earl of Mar:

the author sets out in the sublime strain, but immediately falls into the ludicrous, from the excessive absurdity of making a God out of a Lieutenant Colonel.

Some similes there are of an ambiguous nature; we hardly know whether to find them beautiful or ludicrous, because the mind vacillates between the resemblance and the difference. Of this nature, I conceive, is that simile of Wordsworth, where he says of some one,

> As lonely he stood as a crow on the sands;

In that kind of Wit, called Repartee, of which an example has been given above, no simile at all is expressed, but the words of the first speaker are taken up by the second, and a new and unexpected inference deduced from them, not altogether without a shadow of reason. Thus, when Benedick says, "But it is certain I am loved of all ladies, only you excepted: and I would I could find in my heart that I had not a hard heart; for truly I love none:" and Beatrice answers "A dear happiness to woman; they would else have been troubled with a pernicious

suitor;" the answer, it is clear, is quite unlooked for, though it follows naturally enough from the speech of Benedick. Here it cannot be said that there is any simile, only a point of contact, some common ground, whereby the repartee is connected with the first speech. This point of contact is found in the words of Benedick "I love none," on which circumstance he was inclined rather to pride himself; but Beatrice deduced from it "A dear happiness to woman, etc."

As then there may be true wit without any proper simile at all, and as, when a resemblance is struck out, it must be far-fetched, otherwise wit is destroyed; it follows that the simile is useful only by bringing into comparison things highly contrasted. Whenever things so contrasted are brought together, no matter in what way, so as to allow the contrast to be *felt*, then a ludicrous effect is produced. The pleasure derived from Resemblance alone is never of a ludicrous nature, but is allied to Beauty, to Sublimity, or to the gratification derived from the Intellect, when, by an analogy, some light is thrown upon a difficult subject. If the comparison be new, its beauty or truth strikes us much more, and gives us more delight; for novelty has a great power; but so long as we dwell on the Resemblance alone, however new and unexpected, surprise never ends in laughter. But where the Resemblance is passed

over as insignificant, and our mind rests upon the Contrast, the ludicrous emotion is felt. In truth there is no contrast without some similarity; for, when things are very different, we never compare them, and never think of the difference. We never compare a house with a tree, a quadruped with a reptile, or even one quadruped with another of a different species. A small poodle does not seem smaller beside a tall horse, but beside a Newfoundland dog it appears very diminutive; though, after all, the Newfoundland be less than a little pony. Thus, wit, by striking out a similarity between objects, forces us to compare them, and then we are struck with the contrast.

The object then of Wit and Humour, as well as of Practical Jokes, is to bring together the most incongruous ideas or events, so as to allow the incongruity to be felt; and the same combination is often produced unintentionally by casual incidents and blunders in speech. The effect of all is to rouse the ludicrous emotion and produce laughter.

We have thus examined the various apparent sources from which the emotion is derived, and amidst all this variety we have found one constant phenomenon, violent and unexpected contrast. Relying on so copious an Induction, We may therefore safely conclude, that NOVELTY and EXCESSIVE CONTRAST are the real sources of the Ludicrous Emotion.

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

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